THE GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED


                                   BY
                            MOSES MAIMONIDES

                TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL ARABIC TEXT
                                   BY
                          M. FRIEDLÄNDER, Ph.D


                   SECOND EDITION, REVISED THROUGHOUT


                                 LONDON
                      GEORGE ROUTLEDGE & SONS LTD
                      New York: E. P. DUTTON & CO
                                  1910








PREFACE


The first Edition of the English Translation of Maimonides’ Dalalāt
al-Hairin being exhausted without having fully supplied the demand, I
prepared a second, revised edition of the Translation. In the new
edition the three volumes of the first edition have been reduced to one
volume by the elimination of the notes; besides Hebrew words and
phrases have been eliminated or transliterated. By these changes the
translator sought to produce a cheap edition in order to bring the work
of Maimonides within the reach of all students of Theology and Jewish
Literature.


M. FRIEDLÄNDER.

Jews’ College, July 1904.








PREFACE TO VOLUME ONE OF THE FIRST EDITION


In compliance with a desire repeatedly expressed by the Committee of
the Hebrew Literature Society, I have undertaken to translate
Maimonides’ Dalalāt al-Ḥairin, better known by the Hebrew title Moreh
Nebuchim, and I offer the first instalment of my labours in the present
volume. This contains—(1) A short Life of Maimonides, in which special
attention is given to his alleged apostasy. (2) An analysis of the
whole of the Moreh Nebuchim. (3) A translation of the First Part of
this work from the Arabic, with explanatory and critical notes.

Parts of the Translation have been contributed by Mr. Joseph Abrahams,
B.A., Ph.D., and Rev. H. Gollancz—the Introduction by the former, and
the first twenty-five chapters by the latter.

In conclusion I beg to tender my thanks to Rev. A. Loewy, Editor of the
Publications of the Hebrew Literature Society, for his careful revision
of my manuscript and proofs, and to Mr. A. Neubauer, M.A., for his
kindness in supplying me with such information as I required.


M. FRIEDLÄNDER.

Jews’ College, June 1881.








CONTENTS


                                                                   PAGE

    Life of Maimonides                                               xv

    Moreh Nebuchim Literature. Analysis of the Guide for the 
      Perplexed                                                   xxvii

    Part I.

    Introduction—
    Dedicatory Letter                                                 1
    The Object of the Guide                                           2
    On Similes                                                        4
    Directions for the Study of this Work                             8
    Introductory Remarks                                              9

    CHAPTER.
    I       The homonymity of Ẓelem                                  13
    II      On Genesis iii. 5                                        14
    III     On tabnit and temunah                                    16
    IV      On raah, hibbit and ḥazah                                17
    V       On Exod. xxiv. 10                                        18
    VI      On ish and ishshah, aḥ and aḥot                          19
    VII     On yalad                                                 19
    VIII    On maḳom                                                 20
    IX      On kisse                                                 21
    X       On ʻalah, yarad                                          22
    XI      On yashab                                                23
    XII     On kam                                                   24
    XIII    On ʻamad                                                 25
    XIV     On adam                                                  25
    XV      On naẓab, yaẓab                                          25
    XVI     On Ẓur                                                   26
    XVII    On Mishnah Ḥagigah ii. 1                                 27
    XVIII   On ḳarab, nagaʻ, niggash                                 27
    XIX     On male                                                  28
    XX      On ram, nissa                                            29
    XXI     On ʻabar                                                 30
    XXII    On ba                                                    32
    XXIII   On Yaẓa, shub                                            32
    XXIV    On halak                                                 33
    XXV     On shaken                                                34
    XXVI    On “The Torah speaketh the language of man”              34
    XXVII   On Targum of Gen. xlvi. 4                                35
    XXVIII  On regel                                                 37
    XXIX    On ʻaẓeb                                                 39
    XXX     On akal                                                  39
    XXXI, XXXII On the Limit of Man’s Intellect                  40, 42
    XXXIII to XXXVI On the Study and the Teaching of 
              Metaphysics                                         43–52
    XXXVII  On panim                                                 52
    XXXVIII On aḥor                                                  53
    XXXIX   On leb                                                   54
    XL      On ruaḥ                                                  55
    XLI     On nefesh                                                56
    XLII    On ḥayyim-mavet                                          56
    XLIII   On kanaf                                                 57
    XLIV    On ʻayin                                                 58
    XLV     On shamaʻ                                                58
    XLVI, XLVII On the Attribution of Senses and Sensations 
              to God                                             59, 63
    XLVIII  The Targum of shamaʻ and raah                            64
    XLIX    Figurative Expressions applied to Angels                 65
    L       On Faith                                                 67
    LI–LX   On Attributes                                         68–89
    LI      On the Necessity of Proving the Inadmissibility of 
              Attributes in reference to God                         68
    LII     Classification of Attributes                             69
    LIII    The Arguments of the Attributists                        72
    LIV     On Exod. xxxiii. 13; xxxiv. 7                            75
    LV      On Attributes implying Corporeality, Emotion, 
              Non-existence and Comparison                           78
    LVI     On Attributes denoting Existence, Life, Power, Wisdom 
              and Will                                               79
    LVII    On the Identity of the Essence of God and His 
              Attributes                                             80
    LVIII   On the Negative Sense of the True Attributes of God      81
    LIX     On the Character of the Knowledge of God Consisting 
              of Negations                                           83
    LX      On the Difference between Positive and Negative 
              Attributes                                             87
    LXI     On the Names of God                                      89
    LXII    On the Divine Names composed of Four, Twelve and 
              Forty-two Letters                                      91
    LXIII   On Ehyeh, Yah and Shaddai                                93
    LXIV    On “The Name of the Lord,” and “The Glory of God”        95
    LXV     On the phrase “God spake”                                96
    LXVI    On Exod. xxxii. 16                                       98
    LXVII   On shabat and naḥ                                        99
    LXVIII  On the Terms: The Intellectus, the Intelligens and 
              the Intelligibile                                     100
    LXIX    On the Primal Cause                                     102
    LXX     On the attribute rokeb baʻarabot                        105
    LXXI    The Origin of the Kalām                                 107
    LXXII   A Parallel between the Universe and Man                 113
    LXXIII  Twelve Propositions of the Kalām                        120
    LXXIV   Proofs of the Kalām for the creatio ex nihilo           133
    LXXV    Proofs of the Kalām for the Unity of God                138
    LXXVI   Proofs of the Kalām for the Incorporeality of God       141


    Part II.

    The Author’s Introduction. The Twenty-Six Propositions 
    employed by the Philosophers to prove the Existence of God      145

    CHAPTER.
    I       Philosophical proofs for the Existence, Incorporeality, 
              and Unity of the First Cause                          149
    II      On the Existence of Intelligences or purely Spiritual 
              Beings                                                154
    III     The Author adopts the Theory of Aristotle as least 
              open to Objections                                    156
    IV      The Spheres and the Causes of their Motion              156
    V       Agreement of the Aristotelian Theory with the Teaching 
              of Scripture                                          159
    VI      What is meant by the Scriptural Term “Angels”           160
    VII     The Homonymity of the term “Angel”                      162
    VIII    On the Music of the Spheres                             163
    IX      On the Number of the Heavenly Spheres                   163
    X       The Influence of the Spheres upon the Earth manifests 
              itself in four different ways                         164
    XI      The Theory of Eccentricity Preferable to that of 
              Epicycles                                             166
    XII     On the Nature of the Divine Influence and that of 
              the Spheres                                           168
    XIII    Three Different Theories about the Beginning of the 
              Universe                                              171
    XIV     Seven Methods by which the Philosophers sought to 
              prove the Eternity of the Universe                    174
    XV      Aristotle does not scientifically demonstrate his 
              Theory                                                176
    XVI     The Author refutes all Objections to Creatio ex 
              nihilo                                                178
    XVII    The Laws of Nature apply to Things Created, but do 
              not regulate the Creative Act which produces them     178
    XVIII   Examinations of the Proofs of Philosophers for the 
              Eternity of the Universe                              181
    XIX     Design in Nature                                        184
    XX      The Opinion of Aristotle as regards Design in Nature    189
    XXI     Explanation of the Aristotelian Theory that the 
              Universe is the necessary Result of the First Cause   190
    XXII    Objections to the Theory of the Eternity of the 
              Universe                                              192
    XXIII   The Theory of Creatio ex nihilo is preferable to 
              that of the Eternity of the Universe                  195
    XXIV    Difficulty of Comprehending the Nature and the Motion 
              of the Spheres according to the Theory of Aristotle   196
    XXV     The Theory of Creation is adopted because of its own 
              Superiority, the Proofs based on Scripture being 
              Inconclusive                                          199
    XXVI    Examination of a passage from Pirḳe di-Rabbi Eliezer 
              in reference to Creation                              200
    XXVII   The Theory of a Future Destruction of the Universe is 
              not part of the Religious Belief taught in the Bible  201
    XXVIII  Scriptural Teaching is in favour of the 
              Indestructibility of the Universe                     202
    XXIX    Explanation of Scriptural Phrases implying the 
              Destruction of Heaven and Earth                       204
    XXX     Philosophical Interpretation of Genesis i.-iv.          212
    XXXI    The Institution of the Sabbath serves (1) to Teach 
              the Theory of Creation, and (2) to promote Man’s 
              Welfare                                               218
    XXXII   Three Theories concerning Prophecy                      219
    XXXIII  The Difference between Moses and the other Israelites 
              as regards the Revelation on Mount Sinai              221
    XXXIV   Explanation of Exodus xxiii. 20                         223
    XXXV    The Difference between Moses and the other Prophets 
              as regards the Miracles wrought by them               223
    XXXVI   On the Mental, Physical and Moral Faculties of the 
              Prophets                                              225
    XXXVII  On the Divine Influence upon Man’s Imaginative and 
              Mental Faculties through the Active Intellect         227
    XXXVIII Courage and Intuition reach the highest degree of 
              Perfection in Prophets                                229
    XXXIX   Moses was the fittest Prophet to Receive and 
              Promulgate the Immutable Law, which succeeding 
              Prophets merely Taught and Expounded                  231
    XL      The Test of True Prophecy                               232
    XLI     What is Meant by “Vision”                               234
    XLII    Prophets Received Direct Communication only in Dreams 
              or Visions                                            236
    XLIII   On the Allegories of the Prophets                       238
    XLIV    On the Different Modes in which Prophets Receive 
              Divine Messages                                       240
    XLV     The Various Classes of Prophets                         241
    XLVI    The Allegorical Acts of Prophets formed Parts of 
              Prophetic Visions                                     245
    XLVII   On the Figurative Style of the Prophetic Writings       247
    XLVIII  Scripture ascribes Phenomena directly produced by 
              Natural Causes to God as the First Cause of all 
              things                                                249


    Part III.

    The Author’s Introduction and Apology for Publishing, contrary 
    to the Teaching of the Mishnah, an Interpretation of Ezek. i.   251

    CHAPTER.
    I       The “Four Faces” are Human Faces with four different 
              peculiarities                                         252
    II      The Ḥayyot and the Ofannim                              252
    III     Further Explanation of the Ḥayyot and the Ofannim 
              derived from Ezek. x.                                 255
    IV      The rendering of Ofan by Gilgal in the Targum of 
              Jonathan                                              256
    V       The Vision of Ezekiel is divided into three stages: 
              (1) Ḥayyot (=the Spheres); (2) Ofannim (=Earthly 
              elements); and (3) the man above the Ḥayyot 
              (=Intelligences)                                      257
    VI      On the Difference between the Vision of Ezekiel and 
              that of Isaiah (vi.)                                  258
    VII     The Different Ways in which the Prophet perceived the 
              Three Parts of the Mercabah (Chariot)                 259
    VIII    Man has the Power to Control his Bodily Wants and 
              Earthly Desires                                       261
    IX      The Material Element in Man Prevents him from 
              Attaining Perfection                                  264
    X       God is not the Creator of Evil                          265
    XI      Man is the Cause of his own Misfortunes                 267
    XII     Three Kinds of Evil: (1) That caused by the Nature 
              of Man; (2) Caused by Man to Man; (3) Caused by 
              Man to himself                                        267
    XIII    The Universe has No other Purpose than its own 
              Existence                                             272
    XIV     It is the Will of the Creator that the Spheres 
              regulate the Affairs of Mankind                       277
    XV      Impossible Things are not ascribed to the Creator, 
              but it is difficult to Prove the Impossibility in 
              each Individual Case                                  279
    XVI     On God’s Omniscience                                    280
    XVII    Five Theories concerning Providence                     282
    XVIII   Every Individual Member of Mankind enjoys the 
              Influence of Divine Providence in proportion to 
              his Intellectual Perfection                           289
    XIX     It is an ancient Error to Assume that God takes no 
              Notice of Man                                         290
    XX      God’s Knowledge is Different from Man’s Knowledge       292
    XXI     The Creator’s knowledge of His Production is Perfect    295
    XXII    Object of the Book of Job, and Explanation of the 
              First Two Chapters                                    296
    XXIII   Job and his Friends Discuss the various Theories 
              concerning Providence                                 299
    XXIV    On Trials and Temptation                                304
    XXV     The Actions of God are Not Purposeless                  307
    XXVI    The Divine Precepts Serve a certain Purpose             310
    XXVII   The Object of the Divine Precepts is to Secure the 
              Well-being of Man’s Soul and Body                     312
    XXVIII  This Object is easily seen in some Precepts, whilst 
              in others it is only known after due Reflection       313
    XXIX    On the Sabeans or Star-worshippers                      315
    XXX     It is one of the Objects of the Law of Moses to 
              Oppose Idolatry                                       320
    XXXI    The Law Promotes the Well-being of Man by teaching 
              Truth, Morality and Social Conduct                    321
    XXXII   Why did God give Laws to Oppose Idolatry instead of 
              Uprooting it directly?                                322
    XXXIII  Another chief Object of the Law is to Train Man in 
              Mastering his Appetites and Desires                   327
    XXXIV   The Law is based on the ordinary condition of man       328
    XXXV    Division of the Precepts into Fourteen Classes          329
    XXXVI   First Class of Precepts, to Know, Love and Fear God     331
    XXXVII  Second Class, Laws concerning Idolatry                  332
    XXXVIII Third Class, Moral Precepts                             338
    XXXIX   Fourth Class, Laws relating to Charity                  339
    XL      Fifth Class, Compensation for Injury and the Duty of 
              Preventing Sin                                        342
    XLI     Sixth Class, Punishment of the Sinner                   344
    XLII    Seventh Class, Equity and Honesty                       350
    XLIII   Eighth Class, Sabbath and Festival                      352
    XLIV    Ninth Class, Prayer, Tefillin, Ẓiẓit and Mezuzah        354
    XLV     Tenth Class, The Temple, its Vessels and its Ministers  355
    XLVI    Eleventh Class, Sacrifices                              359
    XLVII   Twelfth Class, Distinction between Clean and Unclean; 
              and on Purification                                   366
    XLVIII  Thirteenth Class, Dietary Laws                          370
    XLIX    Fourteenth Class, Marriage Laws                         372
    L       On Scriptural Passages with seemingly Purposeless 
              Contents                                              380
    LI      How God is worshipped by a Perfect Man                  384
    LII     On the Fear of God                                      391
    LIII    Explanation of Ḥesed (Love), Mishpat (Judgment), and 
              Ẓedaḳah (Righteousness)                               392
    LIV     On True Wisdom                                          393

    Index of Scriptural Passages                                    399
    Index of Quotations from the Targumim                           409
    Index of Quotations from the Midrashim                          409
    Index of Quotations from the Talmud                             410
    Index of References to Other Works of Maimonides                411
    Index of References to Works of Science and Philosophy          412
    Alphabetical Index                                              412








THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES


“Before the sun of Eli had set the sun of Samuel had risen.” Before the
voice of the prophets had ceased to guide the people, the Interpreters
of the Law, the Doctors of the Talmud, had commenced their labours, and
before the Academies of Sura and of Pumbadita were closed, centres of
Jewish thought and learning were already flourishing in the far West.
The circumstances which led to the transference of the head-quarters of
Jewish learning from the East to the West in the tenth century are thus
narrated in the Sefer ha-kabbalah of Rabbi Abraham ben David:

“After the death of Hezekiah, the head of the Academy and Prince of the
Exile, the academies were closed and no new Geonim were appointed. But
long before that time Heaven had willed that there should be a
discontinuance of the pecuniary gifts which used to be sent from
Palestine, North Africa and Europe. Heaven had also decreed that a ship
sailing from Bari should be captured by Ibn Romahis, commander of the
naval forces of Abd-er-rahman al-nasr. Four distinguished Rabbis were
thus made prisoners—Rabbi Ḥushiel, father of Rabbi Ḥananel, Rabbi
Moses, father of Rabbi Ḥanok, Rabbi Shemarjahu, son of Rabbi Elḥanan,
and a fourth whose name has not been recorded. They were engaged in a
mission to collect subsidies in aid of the Academy in Sura. The captor
sold them as slaves; Rabbi Ḥushiel was carried to Kairuan, R.
Shemarjahu was left in Alexandria, and R. Moses was brought to Cordova.
These slaves were ransomed by their brethren and were soon placed in
important positions. When Rabbi Moses was brought to Cordova, it was
supposed that he was uneducated. In that city there was a synagogue
known at that time by the name of Keneset ha-midrash, and Rabbi Nathan,
renowned for his great piety, was the head of the congregation. The
members of the community used to hold meetings at which the Talmud was
read and discussed. One day when Rabbi Nathan was expounding the Talmud
and was unable to give a satisfactory explanation of the passage under
discussion, Rabbi Moses promptly removed the difficulty and at the same
time answered several questions which were submitted to him. Thereupon
R. Nathan thus addressed the assembly:—‘I am no longer your leader;
that stranger in sackcloth shall henceforth be my teacher, and you
shall appoint him to be your chief.’ The admiral, on hearing of the
high attainments of his prisoner, desired to revoke the sale, but the
king would not permit this retraction, being pleased to learn that his
Jewish subjects were no longer dependent for their religious
instruction on the schools in the East.”

Henceforth the schools in the West asserted their independence, and
even surpassed the parent institutions. The Caliphs, mostly opulent,
gave every encouragement to philosophy and poetry; and, being generally
liberal in sentiment, they entertained kindly feelings towards their
Jewish subjects. These were allowed to compete for the acquisition of
wealth and honour on equal terms with their Mohammedan fellow-citizens.
Philosophy and poetry were consequently cultivated by the Jews with the
same zest as by the Arabs. Ibn Gabirol, Ibn Ḥasdai, Judah ha-levi,
Ḥananel, Alfasi, the Ibn Ezras, and others who flourished in that
period were the ornament of their age, and the pride of the Jews at all
times. The same favourable condition was maintained during the reign of
the Omeyades; but when the Moravides and the Almohades came into power,
the horizon darkened once more, and misfortunes threatened to destroy
the fruit of several centuries. Amidst this gloom there appeared a
brilliant luminary which sent forth rays of light and comfort: this was
Moses Maimonides.

Moses, the son of Maimon, was born at Cordova, on the 14th of Nisan,
4895 (March 30, 1135). Although the date of his birth has been recorded
with the utmost accuracy, no trustworthy notice has been preserved
concerning the early period of his life. But his entire career is a
proof that he did not pass his youth in idleness; his education must
have been in harmony with the hope of his parents, that one day he
would, like his father and forefathers, hold the honourable office of
Dayyan or Rabbi, and distinguish himself in theological learning. It is
probable that the Bible and the Talmud formed the chief subjects of his
study; but he unquestionably made the best use of the opportunities
which Mohammedan Spain, and especially Cordova, afforded him for the
acquisition of general knowledge. It is not mentioned in any of his
writings who were his teachers; his father, as it seems, was his
principal guide and instructor in many branches of knowledge. David
Conforte, in his historical work, Ḳore ha-dorot, states that Maimonides
was the pupil of two eminent men, namely, Rabbi Joseph Ibn Migash and
Ibn Roshd (Averroes); that by the former he was instructed in the
Talmud, and by the latter in philosophy. This statement seems to be
erroneous, as Maimonides was only a child at the time when Rabbi Joseph
died, and already far advanced in years when he became acquainted with
the writings of Ibn Roshd. The origin of this mistake, as regards Rabbi
Joseph, can easily be traced. Maimonides in his Mishneh Tora, employs,
in reference to R. Isaac Alfasi and R. Joseph, the expression “my
teachers” (rabbotai), and this expression, by which he merely describes
his indebtedness to their writings, has been taken in its literal
meaning.

Whoever his teachers may have been, it is evident that he was well
prepared by them for his future mission. At the age of twenty-three he
entered upon his literary career with a treatise on the Jewish
Calendar. It is unknown where this work was composed, whether in Spain
or in Africa. The author merely states that he wrote it at the request
of a friend, whom he, however, leaves unnamed. The subject was
generally considered to be very abstruse, and to involve a thorough
knowledge of mathematics. Maimonides must, therefore, even at this
early period, have been regarded as a profound scholar by those who
knew him. The treatise is of an elementary character.—It was probably
about the same time that he wrote, in Arabic, an explanation of Logical
terms, Millot higgayon, which Moses Ibn Tibbon translated into Hebrew.

The earlier period of his life does not seem to have been marked by any
incident worth noticing. It may, however, be easily conceived that the
later period of his life, which was replete with interesting incidents,
engaged the exclusive attention of his biographers. So much is certain,
that his youth was beset with trouble and anxiety; the peaceful
development of science and philosophy was disturbed by wars raging
between Mohammedans and Christians, and also between the several
Mohammedan sects. The Moravides, who had succeeded the Omeyades, were
opposed to liberality and toleration; but they were surpassed in
cruelty and fanaticism by their successors. Cordova was taken by the
Almohades in the year 1148, when Maimonides was about thirteen years
old. The victories of the Almohades, first under the leadership of the
Mahadi Ibn Tamurt, and then under Abd-al-mumen, were, according to all
testimonies, attended by acts of excessive intolerance. Abd-al-mumen
would not suffer in his dominions any other faith but the one which he
himself confessed. Jews and Christians had the choice between Islam and
emigration or a martyr’s death. The Sefer ha-ḳabbalah contains the
following description of one of the persecutions which then occurred:

“After the death of R. Joseph ha-levi the study of the Torah was
interrupted, although he left a son and a nephew, both of whom had
under his tuition become profound scholars. ‘The righteous man (R.
Joseph) was taken away on account of the approaching evils.’ After the
death of R. Joseph there came for the Jews a time of oppression and
distress. They quitted their homes, ‘Such as were for death, to death,
and such as were for the sword, to the sword; and such as were for the
famine, to the famine, and such as were for the captivity, to the
captivity’; and—it might be added to the words of Jeremiah (xv.
2)—‘such as were for apostasy, to apostasy.’ All this happened through
the sword of Ibn Tamurt, who, in 4902 (1142), determined to blot out
the name of Israel, and actually left no trace of the Jews in any part
of his empire.”

Ibn Verga in his work on Jewish martyrdom, in Shebeṭ Jehudah, gives the
following account of events then happening:—“In the year 4902 the
armies of Ibn Tamurt made their appearance. A proclamation was issued
that any one who refused to adopt Islam would be put to death, and his
property would be confiscated. Thereupon the Jews assembled at the gate
of the royal palace and implored the king for mercy. He answered—‘It is
because I have compassion on you, that I command you to become
Muslemim; for I desire to save you from eternal punishment.’ The Jews
replied—‘Our salvation depends on our observance of the Divine Law; you
are the master of our bodies and of our property, but our souls will be
judged by the King who gave them to us, and to whom they will return;
whatever be our future fate, you, O king, will not be held responsible
for it.’ ‘I do not desire to argue with you,’ said the king; ‘for I
know you will argue according to your own religion. It is my absolute
will that you either adopt my religion or be put to death.’ The Jews
then proposed to emigrate, but the king would not allow his subjects to
serve another king. In vain did the Jews implore the nobles to
intercede in their behalf; the king remained inexorable. Thus many
congregations forsook their religion; but within a month the king came
to a sudden death; the son, believing that his father had met with an
untimely end as a punishment for his cruelty to the Jews, assured the
involuntary converts that it would be indifferent to him what religion
they professed. Hence many Jews returned at once to the religion of
their fathers, while others hesitated for some time, from fear that the
king meant to entrap the apparent converts.”

From such records it appears that during these calamities some of the
Jews fled to foreign countries, some died as martyrs, and many others
submitted for a time to outward conversion. Which course was followed
by the family of Maimon? Did they sacrifice personal comfort and safety
to their religious conviction, or did they, on the contrary, for the
sake of mere worldly considerations dissemble their faith and pretend
that they completely submitted to the dictates of the tyrant? An answer
to this question presents itself in the following note which Maimonides
has appended to his commentary on the Mishnah: “I have now finished
this work in accordance with my promise, and I fervently beseech the
Almighty to save us from error. If there be one who shall discover an
inaccuracy in this Commentary or shall have a better explanation to
offer, let my attention be directed unto it; and let me be exonerated
by the fact that I have worked with far greater application than any
one who writes for the sake of pay and profit, and that I have worked
under the most trying circumstances. For Heaven had ordained that we be
exiled, and we were therefore driven about from place to place; I was
thus compelled to work at the Commentary while travelling by land, or
crossing the sea. It might have sufficed to mention that during that
time I, in addition, was engaged in other studies, but I preferred to
give the above explanation in order to encourage those who wish to
criticise or annotate the Commentary, and at the same time to account
for the slow progress of this work. I, Moses, the son of Maimon,
commenced it when I was twenty-three years old, and finished it in
Egypt, at the age of thirty[-three] years, in the year 1479 Sel.
(1168).”

The Sefer Ḥaredim of R. Eleazar Askari of Safed contains the following
statement of Maimonides:—“On Sabbath evening, the 4th of Iyyar, 4925
(1165), I went on board; on the following Sabbath the waves threatened
to destroy our lives.... On the 3rd of Sivan, I arrived safely at Acco,
and was thus rescued from apostasy.... On Tuesday, the 4th of
Marḥeshvan, 4926, I left Acco, arrived at Jerusalem after a journey
beset with difficulties and with dangers, and prayed on the spot of the
great and holy house on the 4th, 5th, and 6th of Marḥeshvan. On Sunday,
the 9th of that month, I left Jerusalem and visited the cave of
Machpelah, in Hebron.”

From these two statements it may be inferred that in times of
persecution Maimonides and his family did not seek to protect their
lives and property by dissimulation. They submitted to the troubles of
exile in order that they might remain faithful to their religion.
Carmoly, Geiger, Munk, and others are of opinion that the treatise of
Maimonides on involuntary apostasy, as well as the accounts of some
Mohammedan authors, contain strong evidence to show that there was a
time when the family of Maimon publicly professed their belief in
Mohammed. A critical examination of these documents compels us to
reject their evidence as inadmissible.—After a long period of trouble
and anxiety, the family of Maimon arrived at Fostat, in Egypt, and
settled there. David, the brother of Moses Maimonides, carried on a
trade in precious stones, while Moses occupied himself with his studies
and interested himself in the communal affairs of the Jews.

It appears that for some time Moses was supported by his brother, and
when this brother died, he earned a living by practising as a
physician; but he never sought or derived any benefit from his services
to his community, or from his correspondence or from the works he wrote
for the instruction of his brethren; the satisfaction of being of
service to his fellow-creatures was for him a sufficient reward.

The first public act in which Maimonides appears to have taken a
leading part was a decree promulgated by the Rabbinical authorities in
Cairo in the year 1167. The decree begins as follows:—“In times gone
by, when storms and tempests threatened us, we used to wander about
from place to place; but by the mercy of the Almighty we have now been
enabled to find here a resting-place. On our arrival, we noticed to our
great dismay that the learned were disunited; that none of them turned
his attention to the needs of the congregation. We therefore felt it
our duty to undertake the task of guiding the holy flock, of inquiring
into the condition of the community, of “reconciling the hearts of the
fathers to their children,” and of correcting their corrupt ways. The
injuries are great, but we may succeed in effecting a cure, and—in
accordance with the words of the prophet—‘I will seek the lost one, and
that which has been cast out I will bring back, and the broken one I
will cure’ (Micah iv. 6). When we therefore resolved to take the
management of the communal affairs into our hands, we discovered the
existence of a serious evil in the midst of the community,” etc.

It was probably about that time that Maimon died. Letters of condolence
were sent to his son Moses from all sides, both from Mohammedan and
from Christian countries; in some instances the letters were several
months on their way before they reached their destination.

The interest which Maimonides now took in communal affairs did not
prevent him from completing the great and arduous work, the Commentary
on the Mishnah, which he had begun in Spain and continued during his
wanderings in Africa. In this Commentary he proposed to give the
quintessence of the Gemara, to expound the meaning of each dictum in
the Mishnah, and to state which of the several opinions had received
the sanction of the Talmudical authorities. His object in writing this
work was to enable those who are not disposed to study the Gemara, to
understand the Mishnah, and to facilitate the study of the Gemara for
those who are willing to engage in it. The commentator generally
adheres to the explanations given in the Gemara, and it is only in
cases where the halakah, or practical law, is not affected, that he
ventures to dissent. He acknowledges the benefit he derived from such
works of his predecessors as the Halakot of Alfasi, and the writings of
the Geonim, but afterwards he asserted that errors which were
discovered in his works arose from his implicit reliance on those
authorities. His originality is conspicuous in the Introduction and in
the treatment of general principles, which in some instances precedes
the exposition of an entire section or chapter, in others that of a
single rule. The commentator is generally concise, except when occasion
is afforded to treat of ethical and theological principles, or of a
scientific subject, such as weights and measures, or mathematical and
astronomical problems. Although exhortations to virtue and warnings
against vice are found in all parts of his work, they are especially
abundant in the Commentary on Abot, which is prefaced by a separate
psychological treatise, called The Eight Chapters. The dictum “He who
speaketh much commits a sin,” elicited a lesson on the economy of
speech; the explanation of ʻolam ha-ba in the treatise Sanhedrin (xi.
1) led him to discuss the principles of faith, and to lay down the
thirteen articles of the Jewish creed. The Commentary was written in
Arabic, and was subsequently translated into Hebrew and into other
languages. The estimation in which the Commentary was held may be
inferred from the following fact: When the Jews in Italy became
acquainted with its method and spirit, through a Hebrew translation of
one of its parts, they sent to Spain in search of a complete Hebrew
version of the Commentary. R. Simḥah, who had been entrusted with the
mission, found no copy extant, but he succeeded, through the influence
of Rabbi Shelomoh ben Aderet, in causing a Hebrew translation of this
important work to be prepared.—In the Introduction, the author states
that he has written a Commentary on the Babylonian Talmud treatise
Ḥullin and on nearly three entire sections, viz., Moëd, Nashim, and
Nezikin. Of all these Commentaries only the one on Rosh ha-shanah is
known.

In the year 1172 Maimonides wrote the Iggeret Teman, or Petaḥ-tiḳvah
(“Letter to the Jews in Yemen,” or “Opening of hope”) in response to a
letter addressed to him by Rabbi Jacob al-Fayumi on the critical
condition of the Jews in Yemen. Some of these Jews had been forced into
apostasy; others were made to believe that certain passages in the
Bible alluded to the mission of Mohammed; others again had been misled
by an impostor who pretended to be the Messiah. The character and style
of Maimonides’ reply appear to have been adapted to the intellectual
condition of the Jews in Yemen, for whom it was written. These probably
read the Bible with Midrashic commentaries, and preferred the easy and
attractive Agadah to the more earnest study of the Halakah. It is
therefore not surprising that the letter contains remarks and
interpretations which cannot be reconciled with the philosophical and
logical method by which all the other works of Maimonides are
distinguished. After a few complimentary words, in which the author
modestly disputes the justice of the praises lavished upon him, he
attempts to prove that the present sufferings of the Jews, together
with the numerous instances of apostasy, were foretold by the prophets,
especially by Daniel, and must not perplex the faithful. It must be
borne in mind, he continues, that the attempts made in past times to do
away with the Jewish religion, had invariably failed; the same would be
the fate of the present attempts; for “religious persecutions are of
but short duration.” The arguments which profess to demonstrate that in
certain Biblical passages allusion is made to Mohammed, are based on
interpretations which are totally opposed to common sense. He urges
that the Jews, faithfully adhering to their religion, should impress
their children with the greatness of the Revelation on Mount Sinai, and
of the miracles wrought through Moses; they also should remain firm in
the belief that God will send the Messiah to deliver their nation, but
they must abandon futile calculations of the Messianic period, and
beware of impostors. Although there be signs which indicate the
approach of the promised deliverance, and the times seem to be the
period of the last and most cruel persecution mentioned in the visions
of Daniel (xi. and xii.), the person in Yemen who pretends to be the
Messiah is an impostor, and if care be not taken, he is sure to do
mischief. Similar impostors in Cordova, France, and Africa, have
deceived the multitude and brought great troubles upon the Jews.—Yet,
inconsistently with this sound advice the author gives a positive date
of the Messianic time, on the basis of an old tradition; the
inconsistency is so obvious that it is impossible to attribute this
passage to Maimonides himself. It is probably spurious, and has,
perhaps, been added by the translator. With the exception of the rhymed
introduction, the letter was written in Arabic, “in order that all
should be able to read and understand it”; for that purpose the author
desires that copies should be made of it, and circulated among the
Jews. Rabbi Naḥum, of the Maghreb, translated the letter into Hebrew.

The success in the first great undertaking of explaining the Mishnah
encouraged Maimonides to propose to himself another task of a still
more ambitious character. In the Commentary on the Mishnah, it was his
object that those who were unable to read the Gemara should be made
acquainted with the results obtained by the Amoraim in the course of
their discussions on the Mishnah. But the Mishnah, with the Commentary,
was not such a code of laws as might easily be consulted in cases of
emergency; only the initiated would be able to find the section, the
chapter, and the paragraph in which the desired information could be
found. The halakah had, besides, been further developed since the time
when the Talmud was compiled. The changed state of things had suggested
new questions; these were discussed and settled by the Geonim, whose
decisions, being contained in special letters or treatises, were not
generally accessible. Maimonides therefore undertook to compile a
complete code, which would contain, in the language and style of the
Mishnah, and without discussion, the whole of the Written and the Oral
Law, all the precepts recorded in the Talmud, Sifra, Sifre and Tosefta,
and the decisions of the Geonim. According to the plan of the author,
this work was to present a solution of every question touching the
religious, moral, or social duties of the Jews. It was not in any way
his object to discourage the study of the Talmud and the Midrash; he
only sought to diffuse a knowledge of the Law amongst those who,
through incapacity or other circumstances, were precluded from that
study. In order to ensure the completeness of the code, the author drew
up a list of the six hundred and thirteen precepts of the Pentateuch,
divided them into fourteen groups, these again he subdivided, and thus
showed how many positive and negative precepts were contained in each
section of the Mishneh torah. The principles by which he was guided in
this arrangement were laid down in a separate treatise, called Sefer
ha-miẓvot. Works of a similar kind, written by his predecessors, as the
Halakot gedolot of R. Shimon Kahira, and the several Azharot were,
according to Maimonides, full of errors, because their authors had not
adopted any proper method. But an examination of the rules laid down by
Maimonides and of their application leads to the conclusion that his
results were not less arbitrary; as has, in fact, been shown by the
criticisms of Naḥmanides. The Sefer ha-miẓvot was written in Arabic,
and thrice translated into Hebrew, namely, by Rabbi Abraham ben Ḥisdai,
Rabbi Shelomoh ben Joseph ben Job, and Rabbi Moses Ibn Tibbon.
Maimonides himself desired to translate the book into Hebrew, but to
his disappointment he found no time.

This Sefer ha-miẓvot was executed as a preparation for his principal
work, the Mishneh Torah, or Yad ha-ḥazakah, which consists of an
Introduction and fourteen Books. In the Introduction the author first
describes the chain of tradition from Moses to the close of the Talmud,
and then he explains his method in compiling the work. He distinguishes
between the dicta found in the Talmud, Sifre, Sifra, or Tosefta, on the
one hand, and the dicta of the Geonim on the other; the former were
binding on all Jews, the latter only as far as their necessity and
their utility or the authority of their propounders was recognized.
Having once for all stated the sources from which he compiled his work,
he did not deem it necessary to name in each case the authority for his
opinion or the particular passage from which he derived his dictum. Any
addition of references to each paragraph he probably considered useless
to the uninformed and superfluous to the learned. At a later time he
discovered his error, he being himself unable to find again the sources
of some of his decisions. Rabbi Joseph Caro, in his commentary on the
Mishneh Torah, termed Keseph Mishneh, remedied this deficiency. The
Introduction is followed by the enumeration of the six hundred and
thirteen precepts and a description of the plan of the work, its
division into fourteen books, and the division of the latter into
sections, chapters, and paragraphs.

According to the author, the Mishneh Torah is a mere compendium of the
Talmud; but he found sufficient opportunities to display his real
genius, his philosophical mind, and his ethical doctrines. For in
stating what the traditional Law enjoined he had to exercise his own
judgment, and to decide whether a certain dictum was meant to be taken
literally or figuratively; whether it was the final decision of a
majority or the rejected opinion of a minority; whether it was part of
the Oral Law or a precept founded on the scientific views of a
particular author; and whether it was of universal application or was
only intended for a special period or a special locality. The first
Book, Sefer ha-maddaʻ, is the embodiment of his own ethical and
theological theories, although he frequently refers to the Sayings of
our Sages, and employs the phraseology of the Talmud. Similarly, the
section on the Jewish Calendar, Hilkot ha-ʻibur, may be considered as
his original work. In each group of the halakot, its source, a certain
passage of the Pentateuch, is first quoted, with its traditional
interpretation, and then the detailed rules follow in systematic order.
The Mishneh Torah was written by the author in pure Hebrew; when
subsequently a friend asked him to translate it into Arabic, he said he
would prefer to have his Arabic writings translated into Hebrew instead
of the reverse. The style is an imitation of the Mishnah; he did not
choose, the author says, the philosophical style, because that would be
unintelligible to the common reader; nor did he select the prophetic
style, because that would not harmonize with the subject.

Ten years of hard work by day and by night were spent in the
compilation of this code, which had originally been undertaken for “his
own benefit, to save him in his advanced age the trouble and the
necessity of consulting the Talmud on every occasion.” Maimonides knew
very well that his work would meet with the opposition of those whose
ignorance it would expose, also of those who were incapable of
comprehending it, and of those who were inclined to condemn every
deviation from their own preconceived notions. But he had the
satisfaction to learn that it was well received in most of the
congregations of Israel, and that there was a general desire to possess
and study it. This success confirmed him in his hope that at a later
time, when all cause for jealousy would have disappeared, the Mishneh
Torah would be received by all Jews as an authoritative code. This hope
has not been realized. The genius, earnestness, and zeal of Maimonides
are generally recognized; but there is no absolute acceptance of his
dicta. The more he insisted on his infallibility, the more did the
Rabbinical authorities examine his words and point out errors wherever
they believed that they could discover any. It was not always from base
motives, as contended by Maimonides and his followers, that his
opinions were criticised and rejected. The language used by Rabbi
Abraham ben David in his notes (hasagot) on the Mishneh Torah appears
harsh and disrespectful, if read together with the text of the
criticised passage, but it seems tame and mild if compared with
expressions used now and then by Maimonides about men who happened to
hold opinions differing from his own.

Maimonides received many complimentary letters, congratulating him upon
his success; but likewise letters with criticisms and questions
respecting individual halakot. In most cases he had no difficulty in
defending his position. From the replies it must, however, be inferred
that Maimonides made some corrections and additions, which were
subsequently embodied in his work. The letters addressed to him on the
Mishneh Torah and on other subjects were so numerous that he frequently
complained of the time he had to spend in their perusal, and of the
annoyance they caused him; but “he bore all this patiently, as he had
learned in his youth to bear the yoke.” He was not surprised that many
misunderstood his words, for even the simple words of the Pentateuch,
“the Lord is one,” had met with the same fate. Some inferred from the
fact that he treated fully of ʻOlam ha-ba, “the future state of the
soul,” and neglected to expatiate on the resurrection of the dead, that
he altogether rejected that principle of faith. They therefore asked
Rabbi Samuel ha-levi of Bagdad to state his opinion; the Rabbi
accordingly discussed the subject; but, according to Maimonides, he
attempted to solve the problem in a very unsatisfactory manner. The
latter thereupon likewise wrote a treatise “On the Resurrection of the
Dead,” in which he protested his adherence to this article of faith. He
repeated the opinion he had stated in the Commentary on the Mishnah and
in the Mishneh Torah, but “in more words; the same idea being
reiterated in various forms, as the treatise was only intended for
women and for the common multitude.”

These theological studies engrossed his attention to a great extent,
but it did not occupy him exclusively. In a letter addressed to R.
Jonathan, of Lunel, he says: “Although from my birth the Torah was
betrothed to me, and continues to be loved by me as the wife of my
youth, in whose love I find a constant delight, strange women whom I at
first took into my house as her handmaids have become her rivals and
absorb a portion of my time.” He devoted himself especially to the
study of medicine, in which he distinguished himself to such a degree,
according to Alkifti, that “the King of the Franks in Ascalon wanted to
appoint him as his physician.” Maimonides declined the honour.
Alfadhel, the Vizier of Saladin king of Egypt, admired the genius of
Maimonides, and bestowed upon him many distinctions. The name of
Maimonides was entered on the roll of physicians, he received a
pension, and was introduced to the court of Saladin. The method adopted
in his professional practice he describes in a letter to his pupil, Ibn
Aknin, as follows: “You know how difficult this profession is for a
conscientious and exact person who only states what he can support by
argument or authority.” This method is more fully described in a
treatise on hygiene, composed for Alfadhel, son of Saladin, who was
suffering from a severe illness and had applied to Maimonides for
advice. In a letter to Rabbi Samuel Ibn Tibbon he alludes to the amount
of time spent in his medical practice, and says: “I reside in Egypt (or
Fostat); the king resides in Cairo, which lies about two Sabbath-day
journeys from the first-named place. My duties to the king are very
heavy. I am obliged to visit him every day, early in the morning; and
when he or any of his children or the inmates of his harem are
indisposed, I dare not quit Cairo, but must stay during the greater
part of the day in the palace. It also frequently happens that one or
two of the royal officers fall sick, and then I have to attend them. As
a rule, I go to Cairo very early in the day, and even if nothing
unusual happens I do not return before the afternoon, when I am almost
dying with hunger; but I find the antechambers filled with Jews and
Gentiles, with nobles and common people, awaiting my return,” etc.

Notwithstanding these heavy professional duties of court physician,
Maimonides continued his theological studies. After having compiled a
religious guide—Mishneh Torah—based on Revelation and Tradition, he
found it necessary to prove that the principles there set forth were
confirmed by philosophy. This task he accomplished in his Dalalāt
al-ḥaïrin, “The Guide for the Perplexed,” of which an analysis will be
given below. It was composed in Arabic, and written in Hebrew
characters. Subsequently it was translated into Hebrew by Rabbi Samuel
Ibn Tibbon, in the lifetime of Maimonides, who was consulted by the
translator on all difficult passages. The congregation in Lunel,
ignorant of Ibn Tibbon’s undertaking, or desirous to possess the most
correct translation of the Guide, addressed a very flattering letter to
Maimonides, requesting him to translate the work into Hebrew.
Maimonides replied that he could not do so, as he had not sufficient
leisure for even more pressing work, and that a translation was being
prepared by the ablest and fittest man, Rabbi Samuel Ibn Tibbon. A
second translation was made later on by Jehudah Alḥarizi. The Guide
delighted many, but it also met with much adverse criticism on account
of the peculiar views held by Maimonides concerning angels, prophecy,
and miracles, especially on account of his assertion that if the
Aristotelian proof for the Eternity of the Universe had satisfied him,
he would have found no difficulty in reconciling the Biblical account
of the Creation with that doctrine. The controversy on the Guide
continued long after the death of Maimonides to divide the community,
and it is difficult to say how far the author’s hope to effect a
reconciliation between reason and revelation was realized. His
disciple, Joseph Ibn Aknin, to whom the work was dedicated, and who was
expected to derive from it the greatest benefit, appears to have been
disappointed. His inability to reconcile the two antagonistic elements
of faith and science, he describes allegorically in the form of a
letter addressed to Maimonides, in which the following passage occurs:
“Speak, for I desire that you be justified; if you can, answer me. Some
time ago your beloved daughter, the beautiful and charming Kimah,
obtained grace and favour in my sight, and I betrothed her unto me in
faithfulness, and married her in accordance with the Law, in the
presence of two trustworthy witnesses, viz., our master, Abd-allah and
Ibn Roshd. But she soon became faithless to me; she could not have
found fault with me, yet she left me and departed from my tent. She
does no longer let me behold her pleasant countenance or hear her
melodious voice. You have not rebuked or punished her, and perhaps you
are the cause of this misconduct. Now, ‘send the wife back to the man,
for he is’—or might become—‘a prophet; he will pray for you that you
may live,’ and also for her that she may be firm and steadfast. If,
however, you do not send her back, the Lord will punish you. Therefore
seek peace and pursue it; listen to what our Sages said: ‘Blessed be he
who restores to the owner his lost property’; for this blessing applies
in a higher degree to him who restores to a man his virtuous wife, the
crown of her husband.” Maimonides replied in the same strain, and
reproached his “son-in-law” that he falsely accused his wife of
faithlessness after he had neglected her; but he restored him his wife
with the advice to be more cautious in future. In another letter
Maimonides exhorts Ibn Aknin to study his works, adding, “apply
yourself to the study of the Law of Moses; do not neglect it, but, on
the contrary, devote to it the best and the most of your time, and if
you tell me that you do so, I am satisfied that you are on the right
way to eternal bliss.”

Of the letters written after the completion of the “Guide,” the one
addressed to the wise men of Marseilles (1194) is especially
noteworthy. Maimonides was asked to give his opinion on astrology. He
regretted in his reply that they were not yet in the possession of his
Mishneh Torah; they would have found in it the answer to their
question. According to his opinion, man should only believe what he can
grasp with his intellectual faculties, or perceive by his senses, or
what he can accept on trustworthy authority. Beyond this nothing should
be believed. Astrological statements, not being founded on any of these
three sources of knowledge, must be rejected. He had himself studied
astrology, and was convinced that it was no science at all. If some
dicta be found in the Talmud which appear to represent astrology as a
true source of knowledge, these may either be referred to the rejected
opinion of a small minority, or may have an allegorical meaning, but
they are by no means forcible enough to set aside principles based on
logical proof.

The debility of which Maimonides so frequently complained in his
correspondence, gradually increased, and he died, in his seventieth
year, on the 20th Tebeth, 4965 (1204). His death was the cause of great
mourning to all Jews. In Fostat a mourning of three days was kept; in
Jerusalem a fast was appointed; a portion of the tochaḥah (Lev. xxvi.
or Deut. xxix.) was read, and also the history of the capture of the
Ark by the Philistines (1 Sam. iv.). His remains were brought to
Tiberias. The general regard in which Maimonides was held, both by his
contemporaries and by succeeding generations, has been expressed in the
popular saying: “From Moses to Moses there was none like Moses.”








THE MOREH NEBUCHIM LITERATURE


I. The Arabic Text.—The editio princeps, the only edition of the
original text of the Guide (in Arabic, Dĕlil, or Dalalat al-ḥaïrin),
was undertaken and executed by the late S. Munk. Its title is: Le Guide
des Égarés, traité de Théologie et de Philosophie par Moïse ben Maimon,
publié pour la première fois dans l’original Arabe, et accompagné d’une
traduction Française et de notes critiques, littéraires et
explicatives, par S. Munk (Paris, 1850–1866). The plan was published,
1833, in Reflexions sur le culte des anciens Hébreux (La Bible, par S.
Cahen, vol. iv.), with a specimen of two chapters of the Third Part.
The text adopted has been selected from the several MSS. at his
disposal with great care and judgment. Two Leyden MSS. (cod. 18 and
221), various MSS. of the Bibliothèque Nationale (No. 760, very old;
761 and 758, written by R. Saadia Ibn Danan), and some MSS. of the
Bodleian Library were consulted. In the notes which accompany the
French translation, the various readings of the different MSS. are
fully discussed. At the end of the third volume a list is added of
“Variantes des Manuscrits Arabes et des deux Versions Hébraïques.”

The library of the British Museum possesses two copies of the Arabic
text; the one Or. 1423 is complete, beautifully written, with
explanatory notes in the margin and between the lines. The name of the
copyist is not mentioned, nor the date when it has been written. The
volume has in the beginning an incomplete index to the Scriptural
passages referred to in the Guide, and at the end fragments of Psalm
cxli. in Arabic and of astronomical tables.

The second copy of the Dalalat al-ḥaïrin is contained in the MS. Or.
2423, written in large Yemen Rabbinic characters. It is very
fragmentary. The first fragment begins with the last paragraph of the
introduction; there are a few marginal notes in Hebrew.

In the Bodleian Library there are the following copies of the Dalalat
al-ḥaïrin according to the Catal. of Hebr. MSS. by Dr. A. Neubauer:—



No. 1236. The text is preceded by Jehudah al-Charizi’s index of the
contents of the chapters, and by an index of Biblical quotations. In
the margin there are notes, containing omissions, by different hands,
two in Arabic characters. The volume was written 1473.

No. 1237. The Arabic text, with a few marginal notes containing various
readings; the text is preceded by three Hebrew poems, beginning, De’i
holek, Bi-sedeb tebunot; and Binu be-dat Mosheh. Fol. 212 contains a
fragment of the book (III., xxix.).

No. 1238. Text with a few marginal notes.

No. 1239. The end of the work is wanting in this copy. The second part
has forty-nine chapters, as the introduction to Part II. is counted as
chapter i.; Part III. has fifty-six chapters, the introduction being
counted as chapter i., and chapter xxiv. being divided into two
chapters. The index of passages from the Pentateuch follows the
ordinary mode of counting the chapters of the Guide.

No. 1240. Arabic text transcribed in Arabic characters by Saadiah b.
Levi Azankoṭ for Prof. Golius in 1645.

No. 1241. First part of the Dalalat al-ḥaïrin, written by Saadiah b.
Mordecai b. Mosheh in the year 1431.

No. 1242 contains the same Part, but incomplete.

Nos. 1243, 1244, 1245, and 1246 contain Part II. of the Arabic text,
incomplete in Nos. 1245 and 1246.

Nos. 1247, 1248, and 1249 have Part III.; it is incomplete in Nos. 1248
and 1249. No. 1249 was written 1291, and begins with III., viii.

A fragment of the Arabic text, the end of Part III., is contained in
No. 407, 2.

No. 2508 includes a fragment of the original (I. ii.–xxxii.), with a
Hebrew interlineary translation of some words and a few marginal notes.
It is written in Yemen square characters, and is marked as “holy
property of the Synagogue of Alsiani.”

A fragment (I. i.) of a different recension from the printed is
contained in 2422, 16. On the margin the Commentaries of Shem-ṭob and
Ephodi are added in Arabic.

A copy of the Dalalat is also contained in the Berlin Royal Library MS.
Or. Qu., 579 (105 Cat. Steinschneider); it is defective in the
beginning and at the end.

The Cairo Genizah at Cambridge contains two fragments: (a) I. lxiv. and
beginning of lxv.; (b) II. end of xxxii. and xxxiii. According to Dr.
H. Hirschfeld, Jewish Quarterly Review (vol. xv. p. 677), they are in
the handwriting of Maimonides.

The valuable collection of MSS. in the possession of Dr. M. Gaster
includes a fragment of the Dalalat-al-ḥaïrin (Codex 605). II.
xiii.–xv., beginning and end defective.



II. Translations. a. Hebrew.—As soon as European Jews heard of the
existence of this work, they procured its translation into Hebrew. Two
scholars, independently of each other, undertook the task: Samuel Ibn
Tibbon and Jehudah al-Ḥarizi. There is, besides, in the Moreh ha-moreh
of Shemṭob Palquera an original translation of some portions of the
Moreh. In the Sifte yeshenim (No. 112) a rhymed translation of the
Dalalat by Rabbi Mattityahu Kartin is mentioned. Ibn Tibbon’s version
is very accurate; he sacrificed elegance of style to the desire of
conscientiously reproducing the author’s work, and did not even neglect
a particle, however unimportant it may appear. Ibn Tibbon went in his
anxiety to retain peculiarities of the original so far as to imitate
its ambiguities, e.g., meẓiut (I. lviii.) is treated as a masculine
noun, only in order to leave it doubtful whether a pronoun which
follows agrees with meẓiut, “existence,” or with nimẓa, “existing
being,” both occurring in the same sentence (Br. Mus. MS. Harl. 7586,
marg. note by Ibn Tibbon). When he met with passages that offered any
difficulty he consulted Maimonides. Ḥarizi, on the other hand, was less
conscientious about words and particles, but wrote in a superior style.
Vox populi, however, decided in favour of the version of Ibn Tibbon,
the rival of which became almost forgotten. Also Abraham, the son of
Moses Maimonides, in Milḥamoth ha-shem, describes Ḥarizi’s version as
being inaccurate. Most of the modern translations were made from Ibn
Tibbon’s version. There are, therefore, MSS. of this version almost in
every library containing collections of Hebrew books and MSS. It has
the title Moreh-nebuchim. The British Museum has the following eight
copies of Ibn Tibbon’s version:—



Harl. 7586 A. This codex was written in the year 1284, for Rabbi
Shabbatai ben Rabbi Mattityahu. In the year 1340 it came into the
possession of Jacob b. Shelomoh; his son Menaḥem sold it in the year
1378 to R. Mattityahu, son of R. Shabbatai, for fifty gold florins. It
was again sold in the year 1461 by Yeḥiel ben Joab. There is this
peculiarity in the writing, that long words at the end of a line are
divided, and written half on the one line, half on the next; in words
which are vocalized, pataḥ is frequently found for ḳameẓ. There are
numerous various readings in the margin. The text is preceded by a
poem, written by Joseph Ibn Aknin, pupil of Maimonides, in praise of
his master, and beginning Adon yiẓro. This poem is attributed to R.
Yehudah ha-Levi (Luzzatto, in his Divan, Betulat-bat-Yehudah, p. 104).
At the end the copyist adds an epigram, the translation of which is as
follows:—

“The Moreh is finished—Praise to Him who formed and created
everything—written for the instruction and benefit of the few whom the
Lord calleth. Those who oppose the Moreh ought to be put to death; but
those who study and understand it deserve that Divine Glory rest upon
them, and inspire them with a spirit from above.”

Harl. 7586 B. This codex, much damaged in the beginning and at the end,
contains the version of Ibn Tibbon, with marginal notes, consisting of
words omitted in the text, and other corrections. The version is
followed by the poems Ḳarob meod, etc., and De’i holek, etc.

Harl. 5507 contains the Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon, with the
translator’s preface and marginal notes, consisting of various readings
and omissions from the text. The work of Maimonides is followed by Ibn
Tibbon’s Vocabulary (millot-zarot), Mesharet-mosheh, ʻArugot
ha-mezimmah, Millot higgayon, Ruaḥ-ḥen, Alfarabi’s Hatḥalot, a
Hebrew-Italian vocabulary of logical terms, and an explanation of
koṭeb. The passage in Part I., chap. lxxi., which refers to
Christianity, has been erased.

Harl. 5525 was the property of Shimshon Kohen Modon. The MS. begins
with Ḥarizi’s Kavvanat ha-peraḳim; then follows the text, with a few
marginal notes of a later hand, mostly adverse criticisms and
references to ʻArama’s ʻAḳedah and the Biblical commentaries of
Abarbanel. There is also a note in Latin. The text is followed by Ibn
Tibbon’s Vocabulary (Millot-zarot) and Masoret ha-pesuḳim (Index to the
Biblical quotations in the Moreh). In a poem, beginning Moreh asher
mennu derakav gabehu, the Moreh is compared to a musical instrument,
which delights when played by one that understands music, but is
spoiled when touched by an ignorant person.

Add. 27068 (Almanzi coll.). At the end the following remark is added:
I, Samuel Ibn Tibbon, finished the translation of this work in the
month of Tebet 4965 (1205). The text is preceded by the well-known
epigrams, De’i holek and Moreh-nebuchim sa shelomi; the last page
contains the epigram Ḳarob meod. There are some notes in the margin,
mostly referring to various readings.

Add. 14763. This codex, written 1273 at Viterbo, contains the preface
of Ḥarizi to his translation of the Moreh and his index of contents,
Ibn Tibbon’s version with a few marginal notes of different hands,
including some remarks of the translator, and the contents of the
chapters. The codex contains besides the following treatises:
Commentary of Maimonides on Abot; Comm. of Maim. on Mishnah Sanhedrin
x. 1; Letter of Maimonides on the Resurrection of the Dead; Vocabulary
of difficult words by Samuel Ibn Tibbon; Maimonides’ Letter to the wise
men of Marseilles; his Letter to Rabbi Jonathan; Keter-malkut,
Mesharet-mosheh, Ruaḥ-ḥen, Otot ha-shamayim, translated from the Arabic
by Samuel Ibn Tibbon; Hatḥalot ha-nimẓaot, of Alfarabi; Sefer
ha-ḥappuaḥ, Mishle ḥamishim ha-talmidim; on the seven zones of the
earth; a fragment of a chronicle from the exile of Babylon down to the
fourth year of the Emperor Nicepheros of Constantinople, and a poem,
which begins asher yishal, and has the following sense:—“If one asks
the old and experienced for advice, you may expect his success in all
he undertakes; but if one consults the young, remember the fate of
Rehoboam, son of Solomon.”

Add. 14764. In addition to the Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon (from end
of I. xxvii.) with a few marginal notes and index, the codex contains
at the end of Part I. an Index of references made by the author to
explanations given in preceding or succeeding chapters. At the end of
the text the statement is added, that the translation was finished in
the month of Tebet 968 (1208). The Moreh is followed by Ruaḥ-ḥen, and
Ibn Tibbon’s Vocabulary of millot-zarot (incomplete), and is preceded
by four poems in praise of the Moreh, beginning Shim’u nebone leb,
Moreh nebuchim sa shelomi, De’i holek and Nofet maḥkim.

Bibl. Reg. 16 A, xi. This codex, written in Prov. curs. characters in
the year 1308, has in front a fragment of III. i., then follows the
poem of Meshullam, beginning Yehgu mezimmotai (Grätz Leket-shoshannim,
p. 151), and other poems.



The following MS. copies of Ibn Tibbon’s version are included in the
Oxford Bodleian Library; the numbers refer to Dr. Neubauer’s catalogue
of the MSS.:—



1250. An index of the passages from the Bible referred to in the work,
and an index of the contents precede the version. The marginal notes
contain chiefly omissions.

1251. This codex was written in 1675. The marginal notes contain
omissions and explanations.

1252. The marginal notes contain the translator’s remarks on I. lxxiv.
4, and III. xlvii. The version is followed by Ibn Tibbon’s vocabulary,
and his additional remarks on the reasons for the commandments. The MS.
was bought by Samuel ben Moses from a Christian after the pillage of
Padua, where it had belonged to a Synagogue of foreigners (lo’azim); he
gave it to a Synagogue of the same character at Mantua.

1253. The marginal notes include that of the translator on III. xlvii.

1254. 1. Text with marginal notes containing omissions.

1255. The marginal notes include those of the translator on I. xlvi.
and lxxiv. 5.

1256. The marginal notes contain various readings, notes relating to
Ḥarizi’s translation and the Arabic text; on fol. 80 there is a note in
Latin. There are in this codex six epigrams concerning the Moreh.

1257. Text incomplete; with marginal notes.

Fragments of the Version are contained in the following codices: 2047,
3, p. 65; 2283, 8; 2309, 2, and 2336.



Among the MS. copies of the Moreh in the Bibl. Nat. in Paris, there is
one that has been the property of R. Eliah Mizraḥi, and another that
had been in the hands of Azariah de Rossi (No. 685 and No. 691); the
Günzburg Library (Paris) possesses a copy (No. 771), that was written
1452 by Samuel son of Isaac for Rabbi Moses de Leon, and Eliah del
Medigo’s copy of the Moreh is in the possession of Dr. Ginsburg
(London); it contains six poems, beginning Moreh nebuchim sa; Emet
moreh emet; Bi-leshon esh; Mah-baʻaru; Kamu more shav.

The editio princeps of this version has no statement as to where and
when it was printed, and is without pagination. According to Fürst
(Bibliogr.) it is printed before 1480. The copy in the British Museum
has some MS. notes. Subsequent editions contain besides the Hebrew text
the Commentaries of Shem-ṭob and Efodi, and the index of contents by
Ḥarizi (Venice, 1551, fol.); also the Comm. of Crescas and Vocabulary
of Ibn Tibbon (Sabionetta, 1553, fol.; Jessnitz, 1742, fol. etc.); the
Commentaries of Narboni and S. Maimon (Berlin, 1791); the commentaries
of Efodi, Shem-ṭob, Crescas and Abarbanel (Warsaw, 1872, 4to); German
translation and Hebrew Commentary (Biur) Part I. (Krotoschin, 1839,
8vo); German translation and notes, Part II. (Wien, 1864), Part III.
(Frankfort-a.-M., 1838).

The Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon (Part I. to ch. lxxii.) has been
translated into Mishnaic Hebrew by M. Levin (Zolkiew, 1829, 4to).

There is only one MS. known of Ḥarizi’s version, viz., No. 682 of the
Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris. It has been edited by L. Schlosberg,
with notes. London, 1851 (Part I.), 1876 (II.), and 1879 (III.). The
notes on Part I. were supplied by S. Scheyer.

The first Latin translation of the Moreh has been discovered by Dr. J.
Perles among the Latin MSS. of the Munich Library, Catal. Cod.
latinorum bibl. regiae Monacensis, tom. I, pars iii. pag. 208 (Kaish.
36 b), 1700 (7936 b). This version is almost identical with that edited
by Augustinus Justinianus, Paris, 1520, and is based on Ḥarizi’s Hebrew
version of the Moreh. The name of the translator is not mentioned. In
the Commentary of Moses, son of Solomon, of Salerno, on the Moreh, a
Latin translation is quoted, and the quotations agree with this
version. It is called by this commentator ha ʻataḳat ha-noẓrit (“the
Christian translation”), and its author, ha-ma ʻatiḳ ha-noẓer (lit.
“the Christian translator”). Dr. Perles is, however, of opinion that
these terms do not necessarily imply that a Christian has made this
translation, as the word noẓer may have been used here for “Latin.” He
thinks that it is the result of the combined efforts of Jewish and
Christian scholars connected with the court of the German Emperor
Frederic II., especially as in the thirteenth century several Jewish
scholars distinguished themselves by translating Oriental works into
Latin. See Grätz Monatschrift, 1875, Jan.–June, “Die in einer Münchener
Handschrift aufgefundene erste lateinische Uebersetzung,” etc., von Dr.
J. Perles. The title has been variously rendered into Latin: Director
neutrorum, directorium dubitantium, director neutrorum, nutantium or
dubitantium; doctor perplexorum.

Gedaliah ibn Yahyah, in Shalshelet ha-ḳabbalah, mentions a Latin
translation of the Moreh by Jacob Monteno; but nothing is known of it,
unless it be the anonymous translation of the Munich MS., mentioned
above. Augustinus Justinianus edited this version (Paris, 1520), with
slight alterations and a great number of mistakes. Joseph Scaliger’s
opinion of this version is expressed in a letter to Casaubonus, as
follows: Qui latine vertit, Hebraica, non Arabica, convertit, et quidem
sæpe hallucinatur, neque mentem Authoris assequitur. Magna seges
mendorum est in Latino. Præter illa quæ ab inertia Interpretis peccata
sunt accessit et inertia Librariorum aut Typographorum, e.g., prophetiæ
pro philosophiæ; altitudo pro aptitudo; bonitatem pro brevitatem.
(Buxtorf, Doctor Perplexorum, Præf.)

Johannes Buxtorfius, Fil., translated the Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon
into Latin (Basileæ, 1629, 4to). In the Præfatio ad Lectorem, the
translator discusses the life and the works of Maimonides, and dwells
especially on the merits and the fate of the Moreh-nebuchim. The
preface is followed by a Hebrew poem of Rabbi Raphael Joseph of Trèves,
in praise of an edition of the Moreh containing the Commentaries of
Efodi, Shem-tob, and Crescas.

Italian was the first living language into which the Moreh has been
translated. This translation was made by Yedidyah ben Moses (Amadeo de
Moïse di Recanati), and dedicated by him to “divotissimo e divinissimo
Signor mio il Signor Immanuel da Fano” (i.e., the Kabbalist Menaḥem
Azarriah). The translator dictated it to his brother Eliah, who wrote
it in Hebrew characters; it was finished the 8th of February, 1583. The
MS. copy is contained in the Royal Library at Berlin, MS. Or. Qu. 487
(M. Steinschneider Catal., etc.)—The Moreh has been translated into
Italian a second time, and annotated by D. J. Maroni: Guida degli
Smarriti, Firenze, 1870, fol.

The Moreh has been translated into German by R. Fürstenthal (Part I.,
Krotoschin, 1839), M. Stern (Part II., Wien, 1864), and S. Scheyer
(Part III., Frankfort-a.-M., 1838). The translation is based on Ibn
Tibbon’s Hebrew version. The chapters on the Divine Attributes have
been translated into German, and fully discussed, by Dr. Kaufmann in
his Geschichte der Attributenlehre (Gotha, 1877). An excellent French
translation, based on the Arabic original, has been supplied by the
regenerator of the Guide, S. Munk. It was published together with the
Arabic text (Paris, 1850–1866).

The Moreh has also been translated into the Hungarian language by Dr.
Klein. The translation is accompanied by notes (Budapest, 1878–80).

The portion containing the reasons of the Commandments (Part III. ch.
xxvi.–xlix.) has been translated into English by James Townley (London,
1827). The translation is preceded by an account on the life and works
of Maimonides, and dissertations on various subjects; among others,
Talmudical and Rabbinical writings, the Originality of the Institutions
of Moses, and Judicial astrology.

III. Commentaries.—It is but natural that in a philosophical work like
the Moreh, the reader will meet with passages that at first thought
seem unintelligible, and require further explanation, and this want has
been supplied by the numerous commentators that devoted their attention
to the study of the Moreh. Joseph Solomon del Medigo (1591) saw
eighteen Commentaries. The four principal ones he characterizes thus
(in imitation of the Hagadah for Passover): Moses Narboni is rashaʻ,
has no piety, and reveals all the secrets of the Moreh. Shem-ṭob is
ḥakam, “wise,” expounds and criticises; Crescas is tam, “simple,”
explains the book in the style of the Rabbis; Epodi is she-eno yodeʻa
lishol, “does not understand to ask,” he simply explains in short notes
without criticism (Miktab-aḥuz; ed. A. Geiger, Berlin, 1840, p. 18).
The earliest annotations were made by the author himself on those
passages, which the first translator of the Moreh was unable to
comprehend. They are contained in a letter addressed to Samuel Ibn
Tibbon, beginning, lefi siklo yehullal ish (Bodl. Library, No. 2218,
s.; comp. The Guide, etc., I. 21, 343; II. 8, 99). Ibn Tibbon, the
translator, likewise added a few notes, which are found in the margin
of MSS. of the Hebrew version of the Moreh (on I. xlv. lxxiv.; II.
xxiv.; and III. xlvii.—MSS. Bodl. 1252, 1; 1253, 1255, 1257; Brit. Mus.
Add. 14,763 and 27,068).

Both translators wrote explanations of the philosophical terms employed
in the versions. Ḥarizi wrote his vocabulary first, and Ibn Tibbon, in
the introductory remarks, to Perush millot zarot (“Explanation of
difficult words”), describes his rival’s vocabulary as full of
blunders. Ibn Tibbon’s Perush is found almost in every copy of his
version, both MS. and print; so also Ḥarizi’s index of the contents of
the chapters of the Moreh (Kavvanat ha-peraḳim).

The following is an alphabetical list of Commentaries on the Moreh:—



Abarbanel (Don Isaak) wrote a Commentary on I. i.–lv.; II. xxxi.–xlv.,
and a separate book Shamayim-ḥadashim, “New Heavens,” on II. xix., in
which he fully discusses the question concerning Creatio ex nihilo. The
opinion of Maimonides is not always accepted. Thus twenty-seven
objections are raised against his interpretation of the first chapter
of Ezekiel. These objections he wrote at Molin, in the house of R.
Abraham Treves Ẓarfati. The Commentary is followed by a short essay
(maamar) on the plan of the Moreh. The method adopted by Abarbanel in
all his Commentaries, is also employed in this essay. A series of
questions is put forth on the subject, and then the author sets about
to answer them. M. J. Landau edited the Commentary without text, with a
Preface, and with explanatory notes, called Moreh li-ẓeddakah (Prag.
1831; MS. Bodl. 2385). In addition to these the same author wrote
Teshubot “Answers” to several questions asked by Rabbi Shaul ha-Cohen
on topics discussed in the Moreh (Venice, 1754).

Abraham Abulafia wrote “Sodot ha-moreh,” or Sitre-torah, a kabbalistic
Commentary on the Moreh. He gives the expression, ‏גן עדן‎ (Paradise),
for the number (177) of the chapters of the Moreh. MS. Nat. Bibl. 226,
3. Leipsic Libr. 232, 4. MS. Bodl. 2360, 5, contains a portion of Part
III.

Buchner A. Ha-moreh li-ẓedaḳab (Warsaw, 1838). Commentary on “The
Reasons of the Laws,” Moreh III. xxix.–xlix. The Commentary is preceded
by an account of the life of Maimonides.

Comtino, Mordecai b. Eliezer, wrote a short commentary on the Moreh
(Dr. Ginsburg’s collection of MSS. No. 10). Narboni, who “spread light
on dark passages in the Guide,” is frequently quoted. Reference is also
made to his own commentary on Ibn Ezra’s Yesod-mora.

Crescas (Asher b. Abraham), expresses in the Preface to his Commentary
the conviction that he could not always comprehend the right sense of
the words of Maimonides, for “there is no searching to his
understanding.” He nevertheless thinks that his explanations will help
“the young” to study the Moreh with profit. A long poem in praise of
Maimonides and his work precedes the Preface. His notes are short and
clear, and in spite of his great respect of Maimonides, he now and then
criticises and corrects him.

David Yaḥya is named by Joseph Del Medigo (Miktab-aḥuz ed. A. Geiger,
Berlin, 1840; p. 18, and note 76), as having written a Commentary on
the Moreh.

David ben Yehudah Leon Rabbino wrote ʻEn ha-ḳore, MS. Bodl. 1263. He
quotes in his Commentary among others ʻArama’s ʻAkedat yiẓḥaḳ. The
Preface is written by Immanuel ben Raphael Ibn Meir, after the death of
the author.

Efodi is the name of the Commentary written by Isaac ben Moses, who
during the persecution of 1391 had passed as Christian under the name
of Profiat Duran. He returned to Judaism, and wrote against
Christianity the famous satire “Al tehee ka-aboteka” (“Be not like your
Fathers”), which misled Christians to cite it as written in favour of
Christianity. It is addressed to the apostate En Bonet Bon Giorno. The
same author also wrote a grammatical work, Maʻaseh-efod. The name Efod
(‏אפד‎), is explained as composed of the initials Amar Profiat Duran.
His Commentary consists of short notes, explanatory of the text. The
beginning of this Commentary is contained in an Arabic translation in
MS. Bodl. 2422, 16.

Ephraim Al-Naqavah in Shaʻar Kebod ha-shem (MS. Bodl. 939, 2 and 1258,
2), answers some questions addressed to him concerning the Moreh. He
quotes Ḥisdai’s Or adonai.

Fürstenthal, R., translator and commentator of the Maḥzor, added a
Biur, short explanatory notes, to his German translation of Part I. of
the Moreh (Krotoschin, 1839).

Gershon, Moreh-derek, Commentary on Part I. of the Moreh (MS. Bodl.
1265).

Hillel b. Samuel b. Elazar of Verona explained the Introduction to Part
II. (the 25 Propos.). S. H. Halberstam edited this Commentary together
with Tagmule ha-nefesh of the same author, for the Society
Meḳiẓe-nirdamim (Lyck, 1874).

Joseph ben Aba-mari b. Joseph, of Caspi (Argentière), wrote three
Commentaries on the Moreh. The first is contained in a Munich MS. (No.
263); and seems to have been recast by the author, and divided into two
separate Commentaries: ʻAmmude Kesef, and Maskiyot Kesef. The former
was to contain plain and ordinary explanation, whilst profound and
mysterious matter was reserved for the second (Steinschn. Cat.). In
II., chap. xlviii., Caspi finds fault with Maimonides that he does not
place the book of Job among the highest class of inspired writings,
“its author being undoubtedly Moses.” These Commentaries have been
edited by T. Werblumer (Frankfort-a.-M., 1848). R. Kirchheim added a
Hebrew introduction discussing the character of these commentaries, and
describing the manuscripts from which these were copied; a Biography of
the author is added in German.

Joseph Giqatilia wrote notes on the Moreh, printed with “Questions of
Shaul ha-kohen” (Venice, 1574. MS. Bodl. 1911, 3).

Joseph b. Isaac ha-Levi’s Gib’at ha-Moreh is a short Commentary on
portions of the Moreh, with notes by R. Yom-ṭob Heller, the author of
Tosafot Yom-tob (Prag., 1612).

Isaac Satanov wrote a commentary on Parts II. and III. of the Moreh
(see Maimon Solomon p. xxi.).

Isaac ben Shem-ṭob ibn Shem-ṭob wrote a lengthy Commentary on the
Moreh, Part I. (MS. Brit. Mus. Or. 1388). The object of the Commentary
is to show that there is no contradiction between Maimonides and the
Divine Law. He praises Maimonides as a true believer in Creatio ex
nihilo, whilst Ibn Ezra and Gersonides assumed a prima materia (Yoẓer,
ḳadosh). Nachmanides is called ha-ḥasid ha-gadol, but is nevertheless
blamed, together with Narboni and Zeraḥyah ha-Levi, for criticising
Maimonides, instead of trying to explain startling utterances even in
“a forced way” (bederek raḥok); and Narboni, “in spite of his wisdom,
frequently misunderstood the Moreh.” At the end of each chapter a
résumé (derush) of the contents of the chapter is given, and the lesson
to be derived from it. The MS. is incomplete, chaps, xlvi.–xlviii. are
missing.

Kaufmann, D., in his Geschichte der Attributenlehre, translated Part I.
chap, l.–lxiii. into German, and added critical and explanatory notes.

Kalonymos wrote a kind of introduction to the Moreh (Mesharet Mosheh),
in which he especially discusses the theory of Maimonides on
Providence.

Leibnitz made extracts from Buxtorf’s Latin version of the Moreh, and
added his own remarks. Observationes ad R. Mosen Maimoniden (Foucher de
Careil. C.A., La Philosophie Juive, 1861).

Levin, M., wrote Allon-moreh as a kind of introduction to his
retranslation of Tibbon’s Hebrew version into the language of the
Mishnah.

Maimon, Solomon, is the author of Gib’at ha-moreh, a lengthy commentary
on Book I. (Berlin, 1791). The author is fond of expatiating on topics
of modern philosophy. In the introduction he gives a short history of
philosophy. The commentary on Books II. and III. was written by Isaac
Satanov.

Meir ben Jonah ha-mekunneh Ben-shneor wrote a commentary on the Moreh
in Fez 1560 (MS. Bodl. 1262).

Menaḥem Kara expounded the twenty-five propositions enumerated in the
Introduction to Part II. of the Moreh (MS. Bodl. 1649, 13).

Mordecai Yaffe, in his Or Yeḳarot, or Pinnat Yiḳrat, one of his ten
Lebushim, comments upon the theories contained in the Moreh.

Moses, son of Abraham Provençal, explains the passage in Part I. chap,
lxxiii. Prop. 3, in which Maimonides refers to the difference between
commensurable and incommensurable lines (MS. Bodl. 2033, 8).

Moses, son of Jehudah Nagari, made an index of the subjects treated in
the Moreh, indicating in each case the chapters in which allusion is
made to the subject. He did so, “in obedience to the advice of
Maimonides, to consider the chapters in connected order” (Part I. p.
20). It has been printed together with the questions of Shaul ha-kohen
(Venice, 1574).

Moses, son of Solomon of Salerno, is one of the earliest expounders of
the Moreh. He wrote his commentary on Parts I. and II., perhaps
together with a Christian scholar. He quotes the opinion of “the
Christian scholar with whom he worked together.” Thus he names Petrus
de Bernia and Nicolo di Giovenazzo. R. Jacob Anatoli, author of the
Malmed ha-talmidim, is quoted as offering an explanation for the
passage from Pirḳe di-rabbi Eliezer, which Maimonides (II. chap, xxvi.)
considers as strange and inexplicable (Part I., written 1439; MS. of
Bet ha-midrash, London; Parts I.–II., MS. Bodl. 1261, written, 1547;
MS. Petersburg, No. 82; Munich MS. 60 and 370).

Moses ha-ḳatan, son of Jehudah, son of Moses, wrote To’aliyot pirḳe
ha-maamar (“Lessons taught in the chapters of this work”). It is an
index to the Moreh (MS. Bodl. 1267).

Moses Leiden explained the 25 Prop. of the Introduction to Part II.
(MS. Günzburg, Paris).

Moses Narboni wrote a short commentary at Soria, 1362. He freely
criticizes Maimonides, and uses expressions like the following:—“He
went too far, may God pardon him” (II. viii.). Is. Euchel ed. Part I.
(Berlin, 1791); J. Goldenthal, I. to III. (Wien, 1852). The Bodl. Libr.
possesses several MS. copies of this commentary (Nos. 1260, 1264, 2,
and 1266).

Munk, S., added to his French translation of the Moreh numerous
critical and explanatory notes.

S. Sachs (Ha-teḥiyah, Berlin, 1850, p. 8) explains various passages of
the Moreh, with a view of discovering the names of those who are
attacked by Maimonides without being named.

Scheyer, S., added critical and explanatory notes to his German
translation of the Moreh, Part 3, and to the Hebrew version of Ḥarizi,
Part 1. He also wrote Das Psychologische System des Maimonides, an
Introduction to the Moreh (Frankf.-a.-M., 1845).

Shem ṭob Ibn Palquera’s Moreh ha-moreh consists of 3 parts: (1) a
philosophical explanation of the Moreh, (2) a description of the
contents of the chapters of the Moreh, Part I, i.-lvii. (Presburg,
1827); (3) Corrections of Ibn Tibbon’s version. He wrote the book for
himself, that in old age he might have a means of refreshing his
memory. The study of science and philosophy is to be recommended, but
only to those who have had a good training in “the fear of sin.” Ibn
Roshd (Averroes) is frequently quoted, and referred to as he-ḥakam
ha-nizkar (the philosopher mentioned above).

Shem-ṭob ben Joseph ben Shem-ṭob had the commentary of Efodi before
him, which he seems to have quoted frequently verbatim without naming
him. In the preface he dwells on the merits of the Moreh as the just
mediator between religion and philosophy. The commentary of Shem-ṭob is
profuse, and includes almost a paraphrase of the text. He apologises in
conclusion for having written many superfluous notes and added
explanation where no explanation was required; his excuse is that he
did not only intend to write a commentary (biur) but also a work
complete in itself (ḥibbur). He often calls the reader’s attention to
things which are plain and clear.

Shem-ṭob. Ibn Shem-ṭob, in Sefer ha-emunot (Ferrara, 1556), criticises
some of the various theories discussed in the Moreh, and rejects them
as heretic. His objections were examined by Moses Al-ashkar, and
answered in Hasagot ʻal mah she-katab Rabbi Shem-ṭob neged ha-Rambam
(Ferrara, 1556).

Solomon b. Jehudah ha-nasi wrote in Germany Sitre-torah, a kabbalistic
commentary on the Moreh, and dedicated it to his pupil Jacob b. Samuel
(MS. Bet-ha-midrash, London).

Tabrizi. The twenty-five Propositions forming the introduction to Part
2, have been fully explained by Mohammed Abu-becr ben Mohammed
al-tabrizi. His Arabic explanations have been translated by Isaac b.
Nathan of Majorca into Hebrew (Ferrara, 1556). At the end the following
eulogy is added:—The author of these Propositions is the chief whose
sceptre is “wisdom” and whose throne is “understanding,” the Israelite
prince, that has benefited his nation and all those who love God, etc.:
Moses b. Maimon b. Ebed-elohim, the Israelite.... May God lead us to
the truth. Amen!

Tishbi. In MS. Bodl. 2279, 1, there are some marginal notes on Part
III. which are signed Tishbi (Neub. Cat.).

Yaḥya Ibn Suleiman wrote in Arabic a Commentary on the Guide for the
Perplexed. A fragment is contained in the Berlin MS. Or. Qu., 554, 2
(Steinschneider, Cat. No. 92).

Zeraḥyah b. Isaac ha-Levi. Commentary on the Moreh, I., i.–lxxi., and
some other portions of the work. (See Maskir, 1861, p. 125).

MS. Bodl. 2360, 8, contains a letter of Jehudah b. Shelomoh on some
passages of the Moreh, and Zeraḥyah’s reply.



Anonymous Commentaries.—The MS. Brit. Mus. 1423 contains marginal and
interlineary notes in Arabic. No author or date is given, nor is any
other commentary referred to in the notes. The explanations given are
mostly preceded by a question, and introduced by the phrase, “the
answer is,” in the same style as is employed in the Hebrew-Arabic
Midrash, MS. Brit. Mus. Or. 2213. The Midrashic character is prominent
in the notes. Thus the verse “Open, ye gates, that the righteous nation
which keepeth the truth may enter in,” is explained as meaning: Open,
ye gates of wisdom, that human understanding that perceiveth truth may
enter. The notes are numerous, especially in the first part, explaining
almost every word; e.g., on “Rabbi”: Why does Maimonides employ this
title before the name of his pupil? The answer is: either the word is
not to be taken literally (“master”), but as a mere compliment, or it
has been added by later copyists. Of a similar style seem to be the
Arabic notes in the Berlin MS. Or. Oct. 258, 2, 8, 10. (Cat.
Steinschneider, No. 108.)—Anonymous marginal notes are met with almost
in every MS. of the Moreh; e.g., Brit. Mus. Harl. 5525; Add. 14,763,
14,764; Bodl. 1264, 1; 2282, 10; 2423, 3; Munich MS., 239, 6.

The explanation of passages from the Pentateuch contained in the Moreh
have been collected by D. Ottensosser, and given as an appendix
(Moreh-derek) to Derek-selulah (Pent. with Comm. etc., Furth, 1824).

IV. Controversies.—The seemingly new ideas put forth by Maimonides in
the Moreh and in the first section of his Mishneh-torah (Sefer
ha-maddaʻ) soon produced a lively controversy as regards the merits of
Maimonides’ theories. It was most perplexing to pious Talmudists to
learn how Maimonides explained the anthropomorphisms employed in the
Bible, the Midrashim and the Talmud, what he thought about the future
state of our soul, and that he considered the study of philosophy as
the highest degree of Divine worship, surpassing even the study of the
Law and the practice of its precepts. The objections and attacks of
Daniel of Damascus were easily silenced by a ḥerem (excommunication)
pronounced against him by the Rosh ha-golah Rabbi David. Stronger was
the opposition that had its centre in Montpellier. Rabbi Solomon ben
Abraham noticed with regret in his own community the fruit of the
theories of Maimonides in the neglect of the study of the Law and of
the practice of the Divine precepts. It happened to Moses Maimonides
what in modern times happened to Moses Mendelssohn. Many so-called
disciples and followers of the great master misunderstood or
misinterpreted his teaching in support of their dereliction of Jewish
law and Jewish practice, and thus brought disrepute on him in the eyes
of their opponents. Thus it came that Rabbi Solomon and his disciples
turned their wrath against the writings of Maimonides instead of
combating the arguments of the pseudo-Maimonists. The latter even
accused Solomon of having denounced the Moreh and the Sefer ha-maddaʻ
to the Dominicans, who condemned these writings to the flames; when
subsequently copies of the Talmud were burnt, and some of the followers
of the Rabbi of Montpellier were subjected to cruel tortures, the
Maimonists saw in this event a just punishment for offending
Maimonides. (Letters of Hillel of Verona, Ḥemdah Genuzah, ed. H.
Edelmann, p. 18 sqq.).

Meir b. Todros ha-levi Abulafia wrote already during the lifetime of
Maimonides to the wise men in Lunel about the heretic doctrines he
discovered in the works of Maimonides. Ahron b. Meshullam and Shesheth
Benvenisti defended Maimonides. About 1232 a correspondence opened
between the Maimonists and the Anti-Maimonists (Grätz, Gesch. d. J.
vii. note I). The Grammarian David Kimḥi wrote in defence of Maimonides
three letters to Jehudah Alfachar, who answered each of them in the
sense of Rabbi Solomon of Montpellier. Abraham b. Ḥisdai and Samuel b.
Abraham Saportas on the side of the Maimonists, took part in the
controversy. Meshullam b. Kalonymos b. Todros of Narbonne begged
Alfachar to treat Kimḥi with more consideration, whereupon Alfachar
resolved to withdraw from the controversy. Naḥmanides, though more on
the side of Rabbi Solomon, wrote two letters of a conciliatory
character, advising moderation on both sides. Representatives of the
congregations of Saragossa, Huesca, Monzon, Kalatajud, and Lerida
signed declarations against R. Solomon. A ḥerem was proclaimed from
Lunel and Narbonne against the Anti-Maimonists. The son of Maimonides,
Abraham, wrote a pamphlet Milḥamot adonai, in defence of the writings
of his father. The controversy raised about fifty years later by Abba
Mari Don Astruc and R. Solomon ben-Aderet of Barcelona, concerned the
Moreh less directly. The question was of a more general character: Is
the study of philosophy dangerous to the religious belief of young
students? The letters written in this controversy are contained in
Minḥat-ḳenaot by Abba Mari Don Astruc (Presburg, 1838), and Kitab
alrasail of Meir Abulafia ed. J. Brill (Paris, 1871). Yedaya Bedrasi
took part in this controversy, and wrote Ketab hitnaẓlut in defence of
the study of philosophy (Teshubot Rashba, Hanau, 1610, p. 111 b.). The
whole controversy ended in the victory of the Moreh and the other
writings of Maimonides. Stray remarks are found in various works, some
in praise and some in condemnation of Maimonides. A few instances may
suffice. Rabbi Jacob Emden in his Mitpaḥat-sefarim (Lemberg, 1870, p.
56) believes that parts of the Moreh are spurious; he even doubts
whether any portion of it is the work of “Maimonides, the author of the
Mishneh-torah, who was not capable of writing such heretic doctrines.”
S. D. Luzzato regards Maimonides with great reverence, but this does
not prevent him from severely criticising his philosophical theories
(Letters to S. Rappoport, No. 79, 83, 266, Iggeroth Shedal ed. E.
Graber, Przemys’l, 1882), and from expressing his conviction that the
saying “From Moses to Moses none rose like Moses,” was as untrue as
that suggested by Rappoport, “From Abraham to Abraham (Ibn-Ezra) none
rose like Abraham.” Rabbi Hirsch Chayyuth in Darke-Mosheh (Zolkiew,
1840) examines the attacks made upon the writings of Maimonides, and
tries to refute them, and to show that they can be reconciled with the
teaching of the Talmud.

The Bodl. MS. 2240, 3a, contains a document signed by Josselman and
other Rabbis, declaring that they accept the teaching of Maimonides as
correct, with the exception of his theory about angels and sacrifices.

Numerous poems were written, both in admiration and in condemnation of
the Moreh. Most of them precede or follow the Moreh in the printed
editions and in the various MS. copies of the work. A few have been
edited in Dibre-ḥakamim, pp. 75 and 86; in the Literaturblatt d. Or. I.
379, II. 26–27, IV. 748, and Leket-shoshannim by Dr. Grätz. In the
Sammelband of the Mekize Nirdamim (1885) a collection of 69 of these
poems is contained, edited and explained by Prof. Dr. A. Berliner. In
imitation of the Moreh and with a view of displacing Maimonides’ work,
the Karaite Ahron II. b. Eliah wrote a philosophical treatise,
Eẓ-ḥayyim (Ed. F. Delitzsch. Leipzig, 1841).

Of the works that discuss the whole or part of the philosophical system
of the Moreh the following are noteworthy:—



Bacher, W. Die Bibilexegese Moses Maimûni’s, in the Jahresbericht der
Landes Rabbinerschule zu Buda-Pest. 1896.

Eisler, M. Vorlesungen über die jüdischen Philosophen des Mittelalters.
Abtheil. II., Moses Maimonides (Wien, 1870).

Geiger, A. Das Judenthum u. seine Geschichte (Breslau, 1865), Zehnte
Vorlesung: Aben Ezra u. Maimonides.

Grätz, H. Geschichte d. Juden, VI. p. 363 sqq.

Joel, M. Religionsphilosophie des Moses b. Maimon (Breslau, 1859).

Joel, M. Albertus Magnus u. sein Verhältniss zu Maimonides (Breslau,
1863).

Kaufmann, D. Geschichte der Attributenlehre, VII. Gotha, 1874.

Philippsohn, L. Die Philosophie des Maimonides. Predigt und
Schul-Magazin, I. xviii. (Magdeburg, 1834.)

Rosin, D. Die Ethik d. Maimonides (Breslau, 1876).

Rubin, S. Spinoza u. Maimonides, ein Psychologisch-Philosophisches
Antitheton (Wien, 1868).

Scheyer, S. Das psychologische System des Maimonides. Frankfort-a.-M.,
1845.

Weiss, T. H. Beth-Talmud, I. x. p. 289.

David Yellin and Israel Abrahams, Maimonides.








ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED


It is the object of this work “to afford a guide for the perplexed,”
i.e. “to thinkers whose studies have brought them into collision with
religion” (p. 9), “who have studied philosophy and have acquired sound
knowledge, and who, while firm in religious matters, are perplexed and
bewildered on account of the ambiguous and figurative expressions
employed in the holy writings” (p. 5). Joseph, the son of Jehudah Ibn
Aknin, a disciple of Maimonides, is addressed by his teacher as an
example of this kind of students. It was “for him and for those like
him” that the treatise was composed, and to him this work is inscribed
in the dedicatory letter with which the Introduction begins.
Maimonides, having discovered that his disciple was sufficiently
advanced for an exposition of the esoteric ideas in the books of the
Prophets, commenced to give him such expositions “by way of hints.” His
disciple then begged him to give him further explanations, to treat of
metaphysical themes, and to expound the system and the method of the
Kalām, or Mohammedan Theology. [1] In compliance with this request,
Maimonides composed the Guide for the Perplexed. The reader has,
therefore, to expect that the subjects mentioned in the disciple’s
request indicate the design and arrangement of the present work, and
that the Guide consists of the following parts:—1. An exposition of the
esoteric ideas (sodot) in the books of the Prophets. 2. A treatment of
certain metaphysical problems. 3. An examination of the system and
method of the Kalām. This, in fact, is a correct account of the
contents of the book; but in the second part of the Introduction, in
which the theme of this work is defined, the author mentions only the
first-named subject. He observes: “My primary object is to explain
certain terms occurring in the prophetic book. Of these some are
homonymous, some figurative, and some hybrid terms.” “This work has
also a second object. It is designed to explain certain obscure figures
which occur in the Prophets, and are not distinctly characterised as
being figures” (p. 2). Yet from this observation it must not be
inferred that Maimonides abandoned his original purpose; for he
examines the Kalām in the last chapters of the First Part (ch.
lxx.–lxxvi.), and treats of certain metaphysical themes in the
beginning of the Second Part (Introd. and ch. i.–xxv.). But in the
passage quoted above he confines himself to a delineation of the main
object of this treatise, and advisedly leaves unmentioned the other two
subjects, which, however important they may be, are here of subordinate
interest. Nor did he consider it necessary to expatiate on these
subjects; he only wrote for the student, for whom a mere reference to
works on philosophy and science was sufficient. We therefore meet now
and then with such phrases as the following: “This is fully discussed
in works on metaphysics.” By references of this kind the author may
have intended to create a taste for the study of philosophical works.
But our observation only holds good with regard to the Aristotelian
philosophy. The writings of the Mutakallemim are never commended by
him; he states their opinions, and tells his disciple that he would not
find any additional argument, even if he were to read all their
voluminous works (p. 133). Maimonides was a zealous disciple of
Aristotle, although the theory of the Kalām might seem to have been
more congenial to Jewish thought and belief. The Kalām upheld the
theory of God’s Existence, Incorporeality, and Unity, together with the
creatio ex nihilo. Maimonides nevertheless opposed the Kalām, and,
anticipating the question, why preference should be given to the system
of Aristotle, which included the theory of the Eternity of the
Universe, a theory contrary to the fundamental teaching of the
Scriptures, he exposed the weakness of the Kalām and its fallacies.

The exposition of Scriptural texts is divided by the author into two
parts; the first part treats of homonymous, figurative, and hybrid
terms, [2] employed in reference to God; the second part relates to
Biblical figures and allegories. These two parts do not closely follow
each other; they are separated by the examination of the Kalām, and the
discussion of metaphysical problems. It seems that the author adopted
this arrangement for the following reason: first of all, he intended to
establish the fact that the Biblical anthropomorphisms do not imply
corporeality, and that the Divine Being of whom the Bible speaks could
therefore be regarded as identical with the Primal Cause of the
philosophers. Having established this principle, he discusses from a
purely metaphysical point of view the properties of the Primal Cause
and its relation to the universe. A solid foundation is thus
established for the esoteric exposition of Scriptural passages. Before
discussing metaphysical problems, which he treats in accordance with
Aristotelian philosophy, he disposes of the Kalām, and demonstrates
that its arguments are illogical and illusory.

The “Guide for the Perplexed” contains, therefore, an Introduction and
the following four parts:—1. On homonymous, figurative, and hybrid
terms. 2. On the Supreme Being and His relation to the universe,
according to the Kalām. 3. On the Primal Cause and its relation to the
universe, according to the philosophers. 4. Esoteric exposition of some
portions of the Bible (sodot): a, Maʻaseh bereshith, or the history of
the Creation (Genesis, ch. i.–iv.); b, on Prophecy; c, Maʻaseh
mercabhah, or the description of the divine chariot (Ezekiel, ch. i.).

According to this plan, the work ends with the seventh chapter of the
Third Part. The chapters which follow may be considered as an appendix;
they treat of the following theological themes: the Existence of Evil,
Omniscience and Providence, Temptations, Design in Nature, in the Law,
and in the Biblical Narratives, and finally the true Worship of God.

In the Introduction to the “Guide,” Maimonides (1) describes the object
of the work and the method he has followed; (2) treats of similes; (3)
gives “directions for the study of the work”; and (4) discusses the
usual causes of inconsistencies in authors.

1 (pp. 2–3). Inquiring into the root of the evil which the Guide was
intended to remove, viz., the conflict between science and religion,
the author perceived that in most cases it originated in a
misinterpretation of the anthropomorphisms in Holy Writ. The main
difficulty is found in the ambiguity of the words employed by the
prophets when speaking of the Divine Being; the question arises whether
they are applied to the Deity and to other things in one and the same
sense or equivocally; in the latter case the author distinguishes
between homonyms pure and simple, figures, and hybrid terms. In order
to show that the Biblical anthropomorphisms do not imply the
corporeality of the Deity, he seeks in each instance to demonstrate
that the expression under examination is a perfect homonym denoting
things which are totally distinct from each other, and whenever such a
demonstration is impossible, he assumes that the expression is a hybrid
term, that is, being employed in one instance figuratively and in
another homonymously. His explanation of “form” (ẓelem) may serve as an
illustration. According to his opinion, it invariably denotes “form” in
the philosophical acceptation of the term, viz., the complex of the
essential properties of a thing. But to obviate objections he proposes
an alternative view, to take ẓelem as a hybrid term that may be
explained as a class noun denoting only things of the same class, or as
a homonym employed for totally different things, viz., “form” in the
philosophical sense, and “form” in the ordinary meaning of the word.
Maimonides seems to have refrained from explaining anthropomorphisms as
figurative expressions, lest by such interpretation he might implicitly
admit the existence of a certain relation and comparison between the
Creator and His creatures.

Jewish philosophers before Maimonides enunciated and demonstrated the
Unity and the Incorporeality of the Divine Being, and interpreted
Scriptural metaphors on the principle that “the Law speaks in the
language of man”; but our author adopted a new and altogether original
method. The Commentators, when treating of anthropomorphisms, generally
contented themselves with the statement that the term under
consideration must not be taken in its literal sense, or they
paraphrased the passage in expressions which implied a lesser degree of
corporeality. The Talmud, the Midrashim, and the Targumim abound in
paraphrases of this kind. Saadiah in “Emunot ve-deʻot,” Bahya in his
“Ḥobot ha-lebabot,” and Jehudah ha-levi in the “Cusari,” insist on the
necessity and the appropriateness of such interpretations. Saadiah
enumerates ten terms which primarily denote organs of the human body,
and are figuratively applied to God. To establish this point of view he
cites numerous instances in which the terms in question are used in a
figurative sense without being applied to God. Saadiah further shows
that the Divine attributes are either qualifications of such of God’s
actions as are perceived by man, or they imply a negation. The
correctness of this method was held to be so obvious that some authors
found it necessary to apologize to the reader for introducing such
well-known topics. From R. Abraham ben David’s strictures on the Yad
haḥazaḳah it is, however, evident that in the days of Maimonides
persons were not wanting who defended the literal interpretation of
certain anthropomorphisms. Maimonides, therefore, did not content
himself with the vague and general rule, “The Law speaks in the
language of man,” but sought carefully to define the meaning of each
term when applied to God, and to identify it with some transcendental
and metaphysical term. In pursuing this course he is sometimes forced
to venture upon an interpretation which is much too far-fetched to
commend itself even to the supposed philosophical reader. In such
instances he generally adds a simple and plain explanation, and leaves
it to the option of the reader to choose the one which appears to him
preferable. The enumeration of the different meanings of a word is
often, from a philological point of view, incomplete; he introduces
only such significations as serve his object. When treating of an
imperfect homonym, the several significations of which are derived from
one primary signification, he apparently follows a certain system which
he does not employ in the interpretation of perfect homonyms. The
homonymity of the term is not proved; the author confines himself to
the remark, “It is employed homonymously,” even when the various
meanings of a word might easily be traced to a common source.

2 (pag. 4–8). In addition to the explanation of homonyms Maimonides
undertakes to interpret similes and allegories. At first it had been
his intention to write two distinct works—Sefer ha-nebuah, “A Book on
Prophecy,” and Sefer ha-shevaah, “A Book of Reconciliation.” In the
former work he had intended to explain difficult passages of the Bible,
and in the latter to expound such passages in the Midrash and the
Talmud as seemed to be in conflict with common sense. With respect to
the “Book of Reconciliation,” he abandoned his plan, because he
apprehended that neither the learned nor the unlearned would profit by
it: the one would find it superfluous, the other tedious. The subject
of the “Book on Prophecy” is treated in the present work, and also
strange passages that occasionally occur in the Talmud and the Midrash
are explained.

The treatment of the simile must vary according as the simile is
compound or simple. In the first case, each part represents a separate
idea and demands a separate interpretation; in the other case, only one
idea is represented, and it is not necessary to assign to each part a
separate metaphorical meaning. This division the author illustrates by
citing the dream of Jacob (Gen. xxviii. 12 sqq.), and the description
of the adulteress (Prov. vii. 6 sqq.). He gives no rule by which it
might be ascertained to which of the two categories a simile belongs,
and, like other Commentators, he seems to treat as essential those
details of a simile for which he can offer an adequate interpretation.
As a general principle, he warns against the confusion and the errors
which arise when an attempt is made to expound every single detail of a
simile. His own explanations are not intended to be exhaustive; on the
contrary, they are to consist of brief allusions to the idea
represented by the simile, of mere suggestions, which the reader is
expected to develop and to complete. The author thus aspires to follow
in the wake of the Creator, whose works can only be understood after a
long and persevering study. Yet it is possible that he derived his
preference for a reserved and mysterious style from the example of
ancient philosophers, who discussed metaphysical problems in figurative
and enigmatic language. Like Ibn Ezra, who frequently concludes his
exposition of a Biblical passage with the phrase, “Here a profound idea
(sod) is hidden,” Maimonides somewhat mysteriously remarks at the end
of different chapters, “Note this,” “Consider it well.” In such phrases
some Commentators fancied that they found references to metaphysical
theories which the author was not willing fully to discuss. Whether
this was the case or not, in having recourse to that method he was not,
as some have suggested, actuated by fear of being charged with heresy.
He expresses his opinion on the principal theological questions without
reserve, and does not dread the searching inquiries of opponents; for
he boldly announces that their displeasure would not deter him from
teaching the truth and guiding those who are able and willing to follow
him, however few these might be. When, however, we examine the work
itself, we are at a loss to discover to which parts the professed
enigmatic method was applied. His theories concerning the Deity, the
Divine attributes, angels, creatio ex nihilo, prophecy, and other
subjects, are treated as fully as might be expected. It is true that a
cloud of mysterious phrases enshrouds the interpretation of Maʻaseh
bereshit (Gen. i.–iii.) and Maʻaseh mercabah (Ez. i.). But the
significant words occurring in these portions are explained in the
First Part of this work, and a full exposition is found in the Second
and Third Parts. Nevertheless the statement that the exposition was
never intended to be explicit occurs over and over again. The treatment
of the first three chapters of Genesis concludes thus: “These remarks,
together with what we have already observed on the subject, and what we
may have to add, must suffice both for the object and for the reader we
have in view” (II. xxx.). In like manner, he declares, after the
explanation of the first chapter of Ezekiel: “I have given you here as
many suggestions as may be of service to you, if you will give them a
further development.... Do not expect to hear from me anything more on
this subject, for I have, though with some hesitation, gone as far in
my explanation as I possibly could go” (III. vii.).

3 (pag. 8–9). In the next paragraph, headed, “Directions for the Study
of this Work,” he implores the reader not to be hasty with his
criticism, and to bear in mind that every sentence, indeed every word,
had been fully considered before it was written down. Yet it might
easily happen that the reader could not reconcile his own view with
that of the author, and in such a case he is asked to ignore the
disapproved chapter or section altogether. Such disapproval Maimonides
attributes to a mere misconception on the part of the reader, a fate
which awaits every work composed in a mystical style. In adopting this
peculiar style, he intended to reduce to a minimum the violation of the
rule laid down in the Mishnah (Ḥagigah ii. 1), that metaphysics should
not be taught publicly. The violation of this rule he justifies by
citing the following two Mishnaic maxims: “It is time to do something
in honour of the Lord” (Berakot ix. 5), and “Let all thy acts be guided
by pure intentions” (Abot ii. 17). Maimonides increased the
mysteriousness of the treatise, by expressing his wish that the reader
should abstain from expounding the work, lest he might spread in the
name of the author opinions which the latter never held. But it does
not occur to him that the views he enunciates might in themselves be
erroneous. He is positive that his own theory is unexceptionally
correct, that his esoteric interpretations of Scriptural texts are
sound, and that those who differed from him—viz., the Mutakallemim on
the one hand, and the unphilosophical Rabbis on the other—are
indefensibly wrong. In this respect other Jewish philosophers—e.g.
Saadiah and Baḥya—were far less positive; they were conscious of their
own fallibility, and invited the reader to make such corrections as
might appear needful. Owing to this strong self-reliance of Maimonides,
it is not to be expected that opponents would receive a fair and
impartial judgment at his hands.

4 (pag. 9–11). The same self-reliance is noticeable in the next and
concluding paragraph of the Introduction. Here he treats of the
contradictions which are to be found in literary works, and he divides
them with regard to their origin into seven classes. The first four
classes comprise the apparent contradictions, which can be traced back
to the employment of elliptical speech; the other three classes
comprise the real contradictions, and are due to carelessness and
oversight, or they are intended to serve some special purpose. The
Scriptures, the Talmud, and the Midrash abound in instances of apparent
contradictions; later works contain real contradictions, which escaped
the notice of the writers. In the present treatise, however, there
occur only such contradictions as are the result of intention and
design.


PART I.

The homonymous expressions which are discussed in the First Part
include—(1) nouns and verbs used in reference to God, ch. i. to ch.
xlix.; (2) attributes of the Deity, ch. l. to lx.; (3) expressions
commonly regarded as names of God, ch. lxi. to lxx. In the first
section the following groups can be distinguished—(a) expressions which
denote form and figure, ch. i. to ch. vi.; (b) space or relations of
space, ch. viii. to ch. xxv.; (c) parts of the animal body and their
functions, ch. xxviii. to ch. xlix. Each of these groups includes
chapters not connected with the main subject, but which serve as a help
for the better understanding of previous or succeeding interpretations.
Every word selected for discussion bears upon some Scriptural text
which, according to the opinion of the author, has been misinterpreted.
But such phrases as “the mouth of the Lord,” and “the hand of the
Lord,” are not introduced, because their figurative meaning is too
obvious to be misunderstood.

The lengthy digressions which are here and there interposed appear like
outbursts of feeling and passion which the author could not repress.
Yet they are “words fitly spoken in the right place”; for they
gradually unfold the author’s theory, and acquaint the reader with
those general principles on which he founds the interpretations in the
succeeding chapters. Moral reflections are of frequent occurrence, and
demonstrate the intimate connexion between a virtuous life and the
attainment of higher knowledge, in accordance with the maxim current
long before Maimonides, and expressed in the Biblical words, “The fear
of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom” (Ps. cxi. 10). No opportunity
is lost to inculcate this lesson, be it in a passing remark or in an
elaborate essay.

The discussion of the term “ẓelem” (ch. i.) afforded the first occasion
for reflections of this kind. Man, “the image of God,” is defined as a
living and rational being, as though the moral faculties of man were
not an essential element of his existence, and his power to discern
between good and evil were the result of the first sin. According to
Maimonides, the moral faculty would, in fact, not have been required,
if man had remained a purely rational being. It is only through the
senses that “the knowledge of good and evil” has become indispensable.
The narrative of Adam’s fall is, according to Maimonides, an allegory
representing the relation which exists between sensation, moral
faculty, and intellect. In this early part (ch. ii.), however, the
author does not yet mention this theory; on the contrary, every
allusion to it is for the present studiously avoided, its full
exposition being reserved for the Second Part.

The treatment of ḥazah “he beheld” (ch. vi.), is followed by the advice
that the student should not approach metaphysics otherwise than after a
sound and thorough preparation, because a rash attempt to solve
abstruse problems brings nothing but injury upon the inexperienced
investigator. The author points to the “nobles of the children of
Israel” (Exod. xxiv. 11), who, according to his interpretation, fell
into this error, and received their deserved punishment. He gives
additional force to these exhortations by citing a dictum of Aristotle
to the same effect. In a like way he refers to the allegorical use of
certain terms by Plato (ch. xvii.) in support of his interpretation of
“ẓur” (lit., “rock”) as denoting “Primal Cause.”

The theory that nothing but a sound moral and intellectual training
would entitle a student to engage in metaphysical speculations is again
discussed in the digression which precedes the third group of homonyms
(xxxi.–xxxvi.). Man’s intellectual faculties, he argues, have this in
common with his physical forces, that their sphere of action is
limited, and they become inefficient whenever they are overstrained.
This happens when a student approaches metaphysics without due
preparation. Maimonides goes on to argue that the non-success of
metaphysical studies is attributable to the following causes: the
transcendental character of this discipline, the imperfect state of the
student’s knowledge, the persistent efforts which have to be made even
in the preliminary studies, and finally the waste of energy and time
owing to the physical demands of man. For these reasons the majority of
persons are debarred from pursuing the study of metaphysics.
Nevertheless, there are certain metaphysical truths which have to be
communicated to all men, e.g., that God is One, and that He is
incorporeal; for to assume that God is corporeal, or that He has any
properties, or to ascribe to Him any attributes, is a sin bordering on
idolatry.

Another digression occurs as an appendix to the second group of
homonyms (ch. xxvi.–xxvii.). Maimonides found that only a limited
number of terms are applied to God in a figurative sense; and again,
that in the “Targum” of Onkelos some of the figures are paraphrased,
while other figures received a literal rendering. He therefore seeks to
discover the principle which was applied both in the Sacred Text and in
the translation, and he found it in the Talmudical dictum, “The Law
speaketh the language of man.” For this reason all figures are eschewed
which, in their literal sense, would appear to the multitude as
implying debasement or a blemish. Onkelos, who rigorously guards
himself against using any term that might suggest corporification,
gives a literal rendering of figurative terms when there is no cause
for entertaining such an apprehension. Maimonides illustrates this rule
by the mode in which Onkelos renders “yarad” (“he went down,”), when
used in reference to God. It is generally paraphrased, but in one
exceptional instance, occurring in Jacob’s “visions of the night” (Gen.
xlvi. 4), it is translated literally; in this instance the literal
rendering does not lead to corporification; because visions and dreams
were generally regarded as mental operations, devoid of objective
reality. Simple and clear as this explanation may be, we do not
consider that it really explains the method of Onkelos. On the
contrary, the translator paraphrased anthropomorphic terms, even when
he found them in passages relating to dreams or visions; and indeed it
is doubtful whether Maimonides could produce a single instance in
favour of his view. He was equally unsuccessful in his explanation of
“ḥazah” “he saw” (ch. xlviii.). He says that when the object of the
vision was derogatory, it was not brought into direct relation with the
Deity; in such instances the verb is paraphrased, while in other
instances the rendering is literal. Although Maimonides grants that the
force of this observation is weakened by three exceptions, he does not
doubt its correctness.

The next Section (ch. l. to ch. lix.) “On the Divine Attributes” begins
with the explanation that “faith” consists in thought, not in mere
utterance; in conviction, not in mere profession. This explanation
forms the basis for the subsequent discussion. The several arguments
advanced by Maimonides against the employment of attributes are
intended to show that those who assume the real existence of Divine
attributes may possibly utter with their lips the creed of the Unity
and the Incorporeality of God, but they cannot truly believe it. A
demonstration of this fact would be needless, if the Attributists had
not put forth their false theses and defended them with the utmost
tenacity, though with the most absurd arguments.

After this explanation the author proceeds to discuss the impropriety
of assigning attributes to God. The Attributists admit that God is the
Primal Cause, One, incorporeal, free from emotion and privation, and
that He is not comparable to any of His creatures. Maimonides therefore
contends that any attributes which, either directly or indirectly, are
in contradiction to this creed, should not be applied to God. By this
rule he rejects four classes of attributes: viz., those which include a
definition, a partial definition, a quality, or a relation.

The definition of a thing includes its efficient cause; and since God
is the Primal Cause, He cannot be defined, or described by a partial
definition. A quality, whether psychical, physical, emotional, or
quantitative, is always regarded as something distinct from its
substratum; a thing which possesses any quality, consists, therefore,
of that quality and a substratum, and should not be called one. All
relations of time and space imply corporeality; all relations between
two objects are, to a certain degree, a comparison between these two
objects. To employ any of these attributes in reference to God would be
as much as to declare that God is not the Primal Cause, that He is not
One, that He is corporeal, or that He is comparable to His creatures.

There is only one class of attributes to which Maimonides makes no
objection, viz. such as describe actions, and to this class belong all
the Divine attributes which occur in the Scriptures. The “Thirteen
Attributes” (shelosh esreh middot, Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7) serve as an
illustration. They were communicated to Moses when he, as the chief of
the Israelites, wished to know the way in which God governs the
universe, in order that he himself in ruling the nation might follow
it, and thereby promote their real well-being.

On the whole, the opponents of Maimonides admit the correctness of this
theory. Only a small number of attributes are the subject of dispute.
The Scriptures unquestionably ascribe to God Existence, Life, Power,
Wisdom, Unity, Eternity, and Will. The Attributists regard these as
properties distinct from, but co-existing with, the Essence of God.
With great acumen, and with equally great acerbity, Maimonides shows
that their theory is irreconcilable with their belief in the Unity and
the Incorporeality of God. He points out three different ways of
interpreting these attributes:—1. They may be regarded as descriptive
of the works of God, and as declaring that these possess such
properties as, in works of man, would appear to be the result of the
will, the power, and the wisdom of a living being. 2. The terms
“existing,” “one,” “wise,” etc., are applied to God and to His
creatures homonymously; as attributes of God they coincide with His
Essence; as attributes of anything beside God they are distinct from
the essence of the thing. 3. These terms do not describe a positive
quality, but express a negation of its opposite. This third
interpretation appears to have been preferred by the author; he
discusses it more fully than the two others. He observes that the
knowledge of the incomprehensible Being is solely of a negative
character, and he shows by simple and appropriate examples that an
approximate knowledge of a thing can be attained by mere negations,
that such knowledge increases with the number of these negations, and
that an error in positive assertions is more injurious than an error in
negative assertions. In describing the evils which arise from the
application of positive attributes to God, he unsparingly censures the
hymnologists, because he found them profuse in attributing positive
epithets to the Deity. On the basis of his own theory he could easily
have interpreted these epithets in the same way as he explains the
Scriptural attributes of God. His severity may, however, be accounted
for by the fact that the frequent recurrence of positive attributes in
the literary composition of the Jews was the cause that the Mohammedans
charged the Jews with entertaining false notions of the Deity.

The inquiry into the attributes is followed by a treatment of the names
of God. It seems to have been beyond the design of the author to
elucidate the etymology of each name, or to establish methodically its
signification; for he does not support his explanations by any proof.
His sole aim is to show that the Scriptural names of God in their true
meaning strictly harmonize with the philosophical conception of the
Primal Cause. There are two things which have to be distinguished in
the treatment of the Primal Cause: the Primal Cause per se, and its
relation to the Universe. The first is expressed by the tetragrammaton
and its cognates, the second by the several attributes, especially by
rokeb baʻarabot, “He who rideth on the ʻarabot” (Ps. lxviii. 4)

The tetragrammaton exclusively expresses the essence of God, and
therefore it is employed as a nomen proprium. In the mystery of this
name, and others mentioned in the Talmud, as consisting of twelve and
of forty-two letters, Maimonides finds no other secret than the
solution of some metaphysical problems. The subject of these problems
is not actually known, but the author supposes that it referred to the
“absolute existence of the Deity.” He discovers the same idea in ehyeh
(Exod. iii. 14), in accordance with the explanation added in the Sacred
Text: asher ehyeh, “that is, I am.” In the course of this discussion he
exposes the folly or sinfulness of those who pretend to work miracles
by the aid of these and similar names.

With a view of preparing the way for his peculiar interpretation of
rokeb baʻarabot, he explains a variety of Scriptural passages, and
treats of several philosophical terms relative to the Supreme Being.
Such expressions as “the word of God,” “the work of God,” “the work of
His fingers,” “He made,” “He spake,” must be taken in a figurative
sense; they merely represent God as the cause that some work has been
produced, and that some person has acquired a certain knowledge. The
passage, “And He rested on the seventh day” (Exod. xx. 11) is
interpreted as follows: On the seventh Day the forces and laws were
complete, which during the previous six days were in the state of being
established for the preservation of the Universe. They were not to be
increased or modified.

It seems that Maimonides introduced this figurative explanation with a
view of showing that the Scriptural “God” does not differ from the
“Primal Cause” or “Ever-active Intellect” of the philosophers. On the
other hand, the latter do not reject the Unity of God, although they
assume that the Primal Cause comprises the causa efficiens, the agens,
and the causa finalis (or, the cause, the means, and the end); and that
the Ever-active Intellect comprises the intelligens, the intellectus,
and the intellectum (or, the thinking subject, the act of thought, and
the object thought of); because in this case these apparently different
elements are, in fact, identical. The Biblical term corresponding to
“Primal Cause” is rokeb baʻarabot, “riding on ʻarabot.” Maimonides is
at pains to prove that ʻarabot denotes “the highest sphere,” which
causes the motion of all other spheres, and which thus brings about the
natural course of production and destruction. By “the highest sphere”
he does not understand a material sphere, but the immaterial world of
intelligences and angels, “the seat of justice and judgment, stores of
life, peace, and blessings, the seat of the souls of the righteous,”
etc. Rokeb baʻarabot, therefore, means: He presides over the immaterial
beings, He is the source of their powers, by which they move the
spheres and regulate the course of nature. This theory is more fully
developed in the Second Part.

The next section (chap. lxxi.–lxxvi.) treats of the Kalām. According to
the author, the method of the Kalām is copied from the Christian
Fathers, who applied it in the defence of their religious doctrines.
The latter examined in their writings the views of the philosophers,
ostensibly in search of truth, in reality, however, with the object of
supporting their own dogmas. Subsequently Mohammedan theologians found
in these works arguments which seemed to confirm the truth of their own
religion; they blindly adopted these arguments, and made no inquiry
whence these had been derived. Maimonides rejects à priori the theories
of the Mutakallemim, because they explain the phenomena in the universe
in conformity with preconceived notions, instead of following the
scientific method of the philosophers. Among the Jews, especially in
the East and in Africa, there were also some who adopted the method of
the Kalām; in doing so they followed the Muʻtazilah (dissenting
Mohammedans), not because they found it more correct than the Kalām of
the Ashariyah (orthodox Mohammedans), but because at the time when the
Jews became acquainted with the Kalām it was only cultivated by the
Muʻtazilah. The Jews in Spain, however, remained faithful to the
Aristotelian philosophy.

The four principal dogmas upheld by the dominant religions were the
creatio ex nihilo, the Existence of God, His Incorporeality, and His
Unity. By the philosophers the creatio ex nihilo was rejected, but the
Mutakallemim defended it, and founded upon it their proofs for the
other three dogmas. Maimonides adopts the philosophical proofs for the
Existence, Incorporeality, and Unity of God, because they must be
admitted even by those who deny the creatio ex nihilo, the proofs being
independent of this dogma. In order to show that the Mutakallemim are
mistaken in ignoring the organization of the existing order of things,
the author gives a minute description of the analogy between the
Universe, or Kosmos, and man, the mikrokosmos (ch. lxxii.). This
analogy is merely asserted, and the reader is advised either to find
the proof by his own studies, or to accept the fact on the authority of
the learned. The Kalām does not admit the existence of law,
organization, and unity in the universe. Its adherents have,
accordingly, no trustworthy criterion to determine whether a thing is
possible or impossible. Everything that is conceivable by imagination
is by them held as possible. The several parts of the universe are in
no relation to each other; they all consist of equal elements; they are
not composed of substance and properties, but of atoms and accidents:
the law of causality is ignored; man’s actions are not the result of
will and design, but are mere accidents. Maimonides in enumerating and
discussing the twelve fundamental propositions of the Kalām (ch.
lxiii.), which embody these theories, had apparently no intention to
give a complete and impartial account of the Kalām; he solely aimed at
exposing the weakness of a system which he regarded as founded not on a
sound basis of positive facts, but on mere fiction; not on the
evidences of the senses and of reason, but on the illusions of
imagination.

After having shown that the twelve fundamental propositions of the
Kalām are utterly untenable, Maimonides finds no difficulty in
demonstrating the insufficiency of the proofs advanced by the
Mutakallemim in support of the above-named dogmas. Seven arguments are
cited which the Mutakallemim employ in support of the creatio ex
nihilo. [3] The first argument is based on the atomic theory, viz.,
that the universe consists of equal atoms without inherent properties:
all variety and change observed in nature must therefore be attributed
to an external force. Three arguments are supplied by the proposition
that finite things of an infinite number cannot exist (Propos. xi.).
Three other arguments derive their support from the following
proposition (x.): Everything that can be imagined can have an actual
existence. The present order of things is only one out of the many
forms which are possible, and exist through the fiat of a determining
power.

The Unity of God is demonstrated by the Mutakallemim as follows: Two
Gods would have been unable to produce the world; one would have
impeded the work of the other. Maimonides points out that this might
have been avoided by a suitable division of labour. Another argument is
as follows: The two Beings would have one element in common, and would
differ in another; each would thus consist of two elements, and would
not be God. Maimonides might have suggested that the argument moves in
a circle, the unity of God being proved by assuming His unity. The
following argument is altogether unintelligible: Both Gods are moved to
action by will; the will, being without a substratum, could not act
simultaneously in two separate beings. The fallacy of the following
argument is clear: The existence of one God is proved; the existence of
a second God is not proved, it would be possible; and as possibility is
inapplicable to God, there does not exist a second God. The possibility
of ascertaining the existence of God is here confounded with
potentiality of existence. Again, if one God suffices, the second God
is superfluous; if one God is not sufficient, he is not perfect, and
cannot be a deity. Maimonides objects that it would not be an
imperfection in either deity to act exclusively within their respective
provinces. As in the criticism of the first argument, Maimonides seems
here to forget that the existence of separate provinces would require a
superior determining Power, and the two Beings would not properly be
called Gods.

The weakest of all arguments are, according to Maimonides, those by
which the Mutakallemim sought to support the doctrine of God’s
Incorporeality. If God were corporeal, He would consist of atoms, and
would not be one; or He would be comparable to other beings: but a
comparison implies the existence of similar and of dissimilar elements,
and God would thus not be one. A corporeal God would be finite, and an
external power would be required to define those limits.


PART II.

The Second Part includes the following sections:—1. Introduction; 2.
Philosophical Proof of the Existence of One Incorporeal Primal Cause
(ch. i.); 3. On the Spheres and the Intelligences (ii.–xii.); 4. On the
theory of the Eternity of the Universe (xiii.–xxix.); 5. Exposition of
Gen. i.–iv. (xxx., xxxi.); 6. On Prophecy (xxxii.–xlviii.).

The enumeration of twenty-six propositions, by the aid of which the
philosophers prove the Existence, the Unity, and the Incorporeality of
the Primal Cause, forms the introduction to the Second Part of this
work. The propositions treat of the properties of the finite and the
infinite (i.–iii., x.–xii., xvi.), of change and motion (iv.–ix.,
xiii.–xviii.), and of the possible and the absolute or necessary
(xx.–xxv.); they are simply enumerated, but are not demonstrated.
Whatever the value of these Propositions may be, they were inadequate
for their purpose, and the author is compelled to introduce auxiliary
propositions to prove the existence of an infinite, incorporeal, and
uncompounded Primal Cause. (Arguments I. and III.)

The first and the fourth arguments may be termed cosmological proofs.
They are based on the hypothesis that the series of causes for every
change is finite, and terminates in the Primal Cause. There is no
essential difference in the two arguments: in the first are discussed
the causes of the motion of a moving object; the fourth treats of the
causes which bring about the transition of a thing from potentiality to
reality. To prove that neither the spheres nor a force residing in them
constitute the Primal Cause, the philosophers employed two
propositions, of which the one asserts that the revolutions of the
spheres are infinite, and the other denies the possibility that an
infinite force should reside in a finite object. The distinction
between the finite in space and the finite in time appears to have been
ignored; for it is not shown why a force infinite in time could not
reside in a body finite in space. Moreover, those who, like Maimonides,
reject the eternity of the universe, necessarily reject this proof,
while those who hold that the universe is eternal do not admit that the
spheres have ever been only potential, and passed from potentiality to
actuality. The second argument is supported by the following
supplementary proposition: If two elements coexist in a state of
combination, and one of these elements is to be found at the same time
separate, in a free state, it is certain that the second element is
likewise to be found by itself. Now, since things exist which combine
in themselves motive power and mass moved by that power, and since mass
is found by itself, motive power must also be found by itself
independent of mass.

The third argument has a logical character: The universe is either
eternal or temporal, or partly eternal and partly temporal. It cannot
be eternal in all its parts, as many parts undergo destruction; it is
not altogether temporal, because, if so, the universe could not be
reproduced after being destroyed. The continued existence of the
universe leads, therefore, to the conclusion that there is an immortal
force, the Primal Cause, besides the transient world.

These arguments have this in common, that while proving the existence
of a Primal Cause, they at the same time demonstrate the Unity, the
Incorporeality, and the Eternity of that Cause. Special proofs are
nevertheless superadded for each of these postulates, and on the whole
they differ very little from those advanced by the Mohammedan
Theologians.

This philosophical theory of the Primal Cause was adapted by Jewish
scholars to the Biblical theory of the Creator. The universe is a
living, organized being, of which the earth is the centre. Any changes
on this earth are due to the revolutions of the spheres; the lowest or
innermost sphere, viz., the one nearest to the centre, is the sphere of
the moon; the outermost or uppermost is “the all-encompassing sphere.”
Numerous spheres are interposed; but Maimonides divides all the spheres
into four groups, corresponding to the moon, the sun, the planets, and
the fixed stars. This division is claimed by the author as his own
discovery; he believes that it stands in relation to the four causes of
their motions, the four elements of the sublunary world, and the four
classes of beings, viz., the mineral, the vegetable, the animal, and
the rational. The spheres have souls, and are endowed with intellect;
their souls enable them to move freely, and the impulse to the motion
is given by the intellect in conceiving the idea of the Absolute
Intellect. Each sphere has an intellect peculiar to itself; the
intellect attached to the sphere of the moon is called “the active
intellect” (Sekel ha-poʻēl). In support of this theory numerous
passages are cited both from Holy Writ and from post-Biblical Jewish
literature. The angels (elohim, malakim) mentioned in the Bible are
assumed to be identical with the intellects of the spheres; they are
free agents, and their volition invariably tends to that which is good
and noble; they emanate from the Primal Cause, and form a descending
series of beings, ending with the active intellect. The transmission of
power from one element to the other is called “emanation” (shefaʻ).
This transmission is performed without the utterance of a sound; if any
voice is supposed to be heard, it is only an illusion, originating in
the human imagination, which is the source of all evils (ch. xii.).

In accordance with this doctrine, Maimonides explains that the three
men who appeared to Abraham, the angels whom Jacob saw ascend and
descend the ladder, and all other angels seen by man, are nothing but
the intellects of the spheres, four in number, which emanate from the
Primal Cause (ch. x.). In his description of the spheres he, as usual,
follows Aristotle. The spheres do not contain any of the four elements
of the sublunary world, but consist of a quintessence, an entirely
different element. Whilst things on this earth are transient, the
beings which inhabit the spheres above are eternal. According to
Aristotle, these spheres, as well as their intellects, coexist with the
Primal Cause. Maimonides, faithful to the teaching of the Scriptures,
here departs from his master, and holds that the spheres and the
intellects had a beginning, and were brought into existence by the will
of the Creator. He does not attempt to give a positive proof of his
doctrine; all he contends is that the theory of the creatio ex nihilo
is, from a philosophical point of view, not inferior to the doctrine
which asserts the eternity of the universe, and that he can refute all
objections advanced against his theory (ch. xiii.–xxviii.).

He next enumerates and criticises the various theories respecting the
origin of the Universe, viz.: A. God created the Universe out of
nothing. B. God formed the Universe from an eternal substance. C. The
Universe originating in the eternal Primal Cause is co-eternal.—It is
not held necessary by the author to discuss the view of those who do
not assume a Primal Cause, since the existence of such a cause has
already been proved (ch. xiii.).

The objections raised to a creatio ex nihilo by its opponents are
founded partly on the properties of Nature, and partly on those of the
Primal Cause. They infer from the properties of Nature the following
arguments: (1) The first moving force is eternal; for if it had a
beginning, another motion must have produced it, and then it would not
be the First moving force. (2) If the formless matter be not eternal,
it must have been produced out of another substance; it would then have
a certain form by which it might be distinguished from the primary
substance, and then it would not be formless. (3) The circular motion
of the spheres does not involve the necessity of termination; and
anything that is without an end, must be without a beginning. (4)
Anything brought to existence existed previously in potentia; something
must therefore have pre-existed of which potential existence could be
predicated. Some support for the theory of the eternity of the heavens
has been derived from the general belief in the eternity of the
heavens.—The properties of the Primal Cause furnished the following
arguments:—If it were assumed that the Universe was created from
nothing, it would imply that the First Cause had changed from the
condition of a potential Creator to that of an actual Creator, or that
His will had undergone a change, or that He must be imperfect, because
He produced a perishable work, or that He had been inactive during a
certain period. All these contingencies would be contrary to a true
conception of the First Cause (ch. xiv.).

Maimonides is of opinion that the arguments based on the properties of
things in Nature are inadmissible, because the laws by which the
Universe is regulated need not have been in force before the Universe
was in existence. This refutation is styled by our author “a strong
wall built round the Law, able to resist all attacks” (ch. xvii.). In a
similar manner the author proceeds against the objections founded on
the properties of the First Cause. Purely intellectual beings, he says,
are not subject to the same laws as material bodies; that which
necessitates a change in the latter or in the will of man need not
produce a change in immaterial beings. As to the belief that the
heavens are inhabited by angels and deities, it has not its origin in
the real existence of these supernatural beings; it was suggested to
man by meditation on the apparent grandeur of heavenly phenomena (ch.
xviii.).

Maimonides next proceeds to explain how, independently of the authority
of Scripture, he has been led to adopt the belief in the creatio ex
nihilo. Admitting that the great variety of the things in the sublunary
world can be traced to those immutable laws which regulate the
influence of the spheres on the beings below—the variety in the spheres
can only be explained as the result of God’s free will. According to
Aristotle—the principal authority for the eternity of the Universe—it
is impossible that a simple being should, according to the laws of
nature, be the cause of various and compound beings. Another reason for
the rejection of the Eternity of the Universe may be found in the fact
that the astronomer Ptolemy has proved the incorrectness of the view
which Aristotle had of celestial spheres, although the system of that
astronomer is likewise far from being perfect and final (ch. xxiv.). It
is impossible to obtain a correct notion of the properties of the
heavenly spheres; “the heaven, even the heavens, are the Lord’s, but
the earth hath He given to the children of man” (Ps. cxv. 16). The
author, observing that the arguments against the creatio ex nihilo are
untenable, adheres to his theory, which was taught by such prophets as
Abraham and Moses. Although each Scriptural quotation could, by a
figurative interpretation, be made to agree with the opposite theory,
Maimonides declines to ignore the literal sense of a term, unless it be
in opposition to well-established truths, as is the case with
anthropomorphic expressions; for the latter, if taken literally, would
be contrary to the demonstrated truth of God’s incorporeality (ch.
xxv.). He is therefore surprised that the author of Pirke-di Rabbi
Eliezer ventured to assume the eternity of matter, and he thinks it
possible that Rabbi Eliezer carried the license of figurative speech
too far. (Ch. xxvi.).

The theory of the creatio ex nihilo does not involve the belief that
the Universe will at a future time be destroyed; the Bible distinctly
teaches the creation, but not the destruction of the world except in
passages which are undoubtedly conceived in a metaphorical sense. On
the contrary, respecting certain parts of the Universe it is clearly
stated “He established them for ever.” (Ps. cxlviii. 5.) The
destruction of the Universe would be, as the creation has been, a
direct act of the Divine will, and not the result of those immutable
laws which govern the Universe. The Divine will would in that case set
aside those laws, both in the initial and the final stages of the
Universe. Within this interval, however, the laws remain undisturbed
(ch. xxvii.). Apparent exceptions, the miracles, originate in these
laws, although man is unable to perceive the causal relation. The
Biblical account of the creation concludes with the statement that God
rested on the seventh day, that is to say, He declared that the work
was complete; no new act of creation was to take place, and no new law
was to be introduced. It is true that the second and the third chapters
of Genesis appear to describe a new creation, that of Eve, and a new
law, viz., that of man’s mortality, but these chapters are explained as
containing an allegorical representation of man’s psychical and
intellectual faculties, or a supplemental detail of the contents of the
first chapter. Maimonides seems to prefer the allegorical explanation
which, as it seems, he had in view without expressly stating it, in his
treatment of Adam’s sin and punishment. (Part I. ch. ii.) It is
certainly inconsistent on the one hand to admit that at the pleasure of
the Almighty the laws of nature may become inoperative, and that the
whole Universe may become annihilated, and on the other hand to deny,
that during the existence of the Universe, any of the natural laws ever
have been or ever will be suspended. It seems that Maimonides could not
conceive the idea that the work of the All-wise should be, as the
Mutakallemim taught—without plan and system, or that the laws once laid
down should not be sufficient for all emergencies.

The account of the Creation given in the book of Genesis is explained
by the author according to the following two rules: First its language
is allegorical; and, Secondly, the terms employed are homonyms. The
words erez, mayim, ruaḥ, and ḥoshek in the second verse (ch. i.), are
homonyms and denote the four elements: earth, water, air, and fire; in
other instances erez is the terrestrial globe, mayim is water or
vapour, ruaḥ denotes wind, and ḥoshek darkness: According to
Maimonides, a summary of the first chapter may be given thus; God
created the Universe by producing first the reshit the “beginning”
(Gen. i. 1), or hatḥalah, i.e., the intellects which give to the
spheres both existence and motion, and thus become the source of the
existence of the entire Universe. At first this Universe consisted of a
chaos of elements, but its form was successively developed by the
influence of the spheres, and more directly by the action of light and
darkness, the properties of which were fixed on the first day of the
Creation. In the subsequent five days minerals, plants, animals, and
the intellectual beings came into existence. The seventh day, on which
the Universe was for the first time ruled by the same natural laws
which still continue in operation, was distinguished as a day blessed
and sanctified by the Creator, who designed it to proclaim the creatio
ex nihilo (Exod. xx. 11). The Israelites were moreover commanded to
keep this Sabbath in commemoration of their departure from Egypt (Deut.
v. 15), because during the period of the Egyptian bondage, they had not
been permitted to rest on that day. In the history of the first sin of
man, Adam, Eve, and the serpent represent the intellect, the body, and
the imagination. In order to complete the imagery, Samael or Satan,
mentioned in the Midrash in connexion with this account, is added as
representing man’s appetitive faculties. Imagination, the source of
error, is directly aided by the appetitive faculty, and the two are
intimately connected with the body, to which man generally gives
paramount attention, and for the sake of which he indulges in sins; in
the end, however, they subdue the intellect and weaken its power.
Instead of obtaining pure and real knowledge, man forms false
conceptions; in consequence, the body is subject to suffering, whilst
the imagination, instead of being guided by the intellect and attaining
a higher development becomes debased and depraved. In the three sons of
Adam, Kain, Abel, and Seth, Maimonides finds an allusion to the three
elements in man: the vegetable, the animal, and the intellectual.
First, the animal element (Abel) becomes extinct; then the vegetable
elements (Kain) are dissolved; only the third element, the intellect
(Seth), survives, and forms the basis of mankind (ch. xxx., xxxi.).

Maimonides having so far stated his opinion in explicit terms, it is
difficult to understand what he had in view by the avowal that he could
not disclose everything. It is unquestionably no easy matter to adapt
each verse in the first chapters of Genesis to the foregoing allegory;
but such an adaptation is, according to the author’s own view (Part I.,
Introd., p. 19), not only unnecessary, but actually objectionable.

In the next section (xxxii.–xlviii.) Maimonides treats of Prophecy. He
mentions the following three opinions:—1. Any person, irrespective of
his physical or moral qualifications, may be summoned by the Almighty
to the mission of a prophet. 2. Prophecy is the highest degree of
mental development, and can only be attained by training and study. 3.
The gift of prophecy depends on physical, moral, and mental training,
combined with inspiration. The author adopts the last-mentioned
opinion. He defines prophecy as an emanation (shefaʻ), which through
the will of the Almighty descends from the Active Intellect to the
intellect and the imagination of thoroughly qualified persons. The
prophet is thus distinguished both from wise men whose intellect alone
received the necessary impulse from the Active Intellect, and from
diviners or dreamers, whose imagination alone has been influenced by
the Active Intellect. Although it is assumed that the attainment of
this prophetic faculty depends on God’s will, this dependence is
nothing else but the relation which all things bear to the Primal
Cause; for the Active Intellect acts in conformity with the laws
established by the will of God; it gives an impulse to the intellect of
man, and, bringing to light those mental powers which lay dormant, it
merely turns potential faculty into real action. These faculties can be
perfected to such a degree as to enable man to apprehend the highest
truths intuitively, without passing through all the stages of research
required by ordinary persons. The same fact is noticed with respect to
imagination; man sometimes forms faithful images of objects and events
which cannot be traced to the ordinary channel of information, viz.,
impressions made on the senses. Since prophecy is the result of a
natural process, it may appear surprising that, of the numerous men
excelling in wisdom, so few became prophets. Maimonides accounts for
this fact by assuming that the moral faculties of such men had not been
duly trained. None of them had, in the author’s opinion, gone through
the moral discipline indispensable for the vocation of a prophet.
Besides this, everything which obstructs mental improvement, misdirects
the imagination or impairs the physical strength, and precludes man
from attaining to the rank of prophet. Hence no prophecy was vouchsafed
to Jacob during the period of his anxieties on account of his
separation from Joseph. Nor did Moses receive a Divine message during
the years which the Israelites, under Divine punishment, spent in the
desert. On the other hand, music and song awakened the prophetic power
(comp. 2 Kings iii. 15), and “The spirit of prophecy alights only on
him who is wise, strong, and rich” (Babyl. Talm. Shabbat, 92a).
Although the preparation for a prophetic mission, the pursuit of
earnest and persevering study, as also the execution of the Divine
dictates, required physical strength, yet in the moment when the
prophecy was received the functions of the bodily organs were
suspended. The intellect then acquired true knowledge, which presented
itself to the prophet’s imagination in forms peculiar to that faculty.
Pure ideals are almost incomprehensible; man must translate them into
language which he is accustomed to use, and he must adapt them to his
own mode of thinking. In receiving prophecies and communicating them to
others the exercise of the prophet’s imagination was therefore as
essential as that of his intellect, and Maimonides seems to apply to
this imagination the term “angel,” which is so frequently mentioned in
the Bible as the medium of communication between the Supreme Being and
the prophet.

Only Moses held his bodily functions under such control that even
without their temporary suspension he was able to receive prophetic
inspiration; the interposition of the imagination was in his case not
needed: “God spoke to him mouth to mouth” (Num. xii. 8). Moses differed
so completely from other prophets that the term “prophet” could only
have been applied to him and other men by way of homonymy.

The impulses descending from the Active Intellect to man’s intellect
and to his imagination produce various effects, according to his
physical, moral, and intellectual condition. Some men are thus endowed
with extraordinary courage and with an ambition to perform great deeds,
or they feel themselves impelled to appeal mightily to their fellowmen
by means of exalted and pure language. Such men are filled with “the
spirit of the Lord,” or, “with the spirit of holiness.” To this
distinguished class belonged Jephthah, Samson, David, Solomon, and the
authors of the Hagiographa. Though above the standard of ordinary men,
they were not included in the rank of prophets. Maimonides divides the
prophets into two groups, viz., those who receive inspiration in a
dream and those who receive it in a vision. The first group includes
the following five classes:—1. Those who see symbolic figures; 2. Those
who hear a voice addressing them without perceiving the speaker; 3.
Those who see a man and hear him addressing them; 4. Those who see an
angel addressing them; 5. Those who see God and hear His voice. The
other group is divided in a similar manner, but contains only the first
four classes, for Maimonides considered it impossible that a prophet
should see God in a vision. This classification is based on the various
expressions employed in the Scriptures to describe the several
prophecies.

When the Israelites received the Law at Mount Sinai, they distinctly
heard the first two commandments, which include the doctrines of the
Existence and the Unity of God; of the other eight commandments, which
enunciate moral, not metaphysical truths, they heard the mere “sound of
words”; and it was through the mouth of Moses that the Divine
instruction was revealed to them. Maimonides defends this opinion by
quotations from the Talmud and the Midrashim.

The theory that imagination was an essential element in prophecy is
supported by the fact that figurative speech predominates in the
prophetical writings, which abound in figures, hyperbolical expressions
and allegories. The symbolical acts which are described in connexion
with the visions of the prophets, such as the translation of Ezekiel
from Babylon to Jerusalem (Ez. viii. 3), Isaiah’s walking about naked
and barefoot (Isa. xx. 2), Jacob’s wrestling with the angel (Gen.
xxxii. 27 sqq.), and the speaking of Balaam’s ass (Num. xxii. 28), had
no positive reality. The prophets, employing an elliptical style,
frequently omitted to state that a certain event related by them was
part of a vision or a dream. In consequence of such elliptical speech
events are described in the Bible as coming directly from God, although
they simply are the effect of the ordinary laws of nature, and as such
depend on the will of God. Such passages cannot be misunderstood when
it is borne in mind that every event and every natural phenomenon can
for its origin be traced to the Primal Cause. In this sense the
prophets employ such phrases as the following: “And I will command the
clouds that they rain no rain upon it” (Isa. v. 6); “I have also called
my mighty men” (ibid. xi. 3).


PART III.

This part contains the following six sections:—1. Exposition of the
maʻaseh mercabah (Ez. i.), ch. i. vii.; 2. On the nature and the origin
of evil, ch. viii. xii.; 3. On the object of the creation, ch.
xiii.–xv.; 4. On Providence and Omniscience, ch. xvi.–xxv.; 5. On the
object of the Divine precepts (taʻame ha-miẓvot) and the historical
portions of the Bible, ch. xxv.–xl.; 6. A guide to the proper worship
of God.

With great caution Maimonides approaches the explanation of the maʻaseh
mercabah, the chariot which Ezekiel beheld in a vision (Ez. i.). The
mysteries included in the description of the Divine chariot had been
orally transmitted from generation to generation, but in consequence of
the dispersion of the Jews the chain of tradition was broken, and the
knowledge of these mysteries had vanished. Whatever he knew of those
mysteries he owed exclusively to his own intellectual faculties; he
therefore could not reconcile himself to the idea that his knowledge
should die with him. He committed his exposition of the maʻaseh
mercabah and the maʻaseh bereshit to writing, but did not divest it of
its original mysterious character; so that the explanation was fully
intelligible to the initiated—that is to say, to the philosopher—but to
the ordinary reader it was a mere paraphrase of the Biblical
text.—(Introduction.)

The first seven chapters are devoted to the exposition of the Divine
chariot. According to Maimonides three distinct parts are to be
noticed, each of which begins with the phrase, “And I saw.” These parts
correspond to the three parts of the Universe, the sublunary world, the
spheres and the intelligences. First of all the prophet is made to
behold the material world which consists of the earth and the spheres,
and of these the spheres, as the more important, are noticed first. In
the Second Part, in which the nature of the spheres is discussed, the
author dwells with pride on his discovery that they can be divided into
four groups. This discovery he now employs to show that the four
“hayyot” (animals) represent the four divisions of the spheres. He
points out that the terms which the prophet uses in the description of
the hayyot are identical with terms applied to the properties of the
spheres. For the four hayyot or “angels,” or cherubim, (1) have human
form; (2) have human faces; (3) possess characteristics of other
animals; (4) have human hands; (5) their feet are straight and round
(cylindrical); (6) their bodies are closely joined to each other; (7)
only their faces and their wings are separate; (8) their substance is
transparent and refulgent; (9) they move uniformly; (10) each moves in
its own direction; (11) they run; (12) swift as lightning they return
towards their starting point; and (13) they move in consequence of an
extraneous impulse (ruaḥ). In a similar manner the spheres are
described:—(1) they possess the characteristics of man, viz., life and
intellect; (2) they consist like man of body and soul; (3) they are
strong, mighty and swift, like the ox, the lion, and the eagle; (4)
they perform all manner of work as though they had hands; (5) they are
round, and are not divided into parts; (6) no vacuum intervenes between
one sphere and the other; (7) they may be considered as one being, but
in respect to the intellects, which are the causes of their existence
and motion, they appear as four different beings; (8) they are
transparent and refulgent; (9) each sphere moves uniformly, (10) and
according to its special laws; (11) they revolve with great velocity;
(12) each point returns again to its previous position; (13) they are
self-moving, yet the impulse emanates from an external power.

In the second part of the vision the prophet saw the ofannim. These
represent the four elements of the sublunary world. For the ofannim (1)
are connected with the ḥayyot and with the earth; (2) they have four
faces, and are four separate beings, but interpenetrate each other “as
though it were a wheel in the midst of a wheel” (Ez. i. 16); (3) they
are covered with eyes; (4) they are not self-moving; (5) they are set
in motion by the ḥayyot; (6) their motion is not circular but
rectilinear. The same may almost be said of the four elements:—(1) they
are in close contact with the spheres, being encompassed by the sphere
of the moon; earth occupies the centre, water surrounds earth, air has
its position between water and fire; (2) this order is not invariably
maintained; the respective portions change and they become intermixed
and combined with each other; (3) though they are only four elements
they form an infinite number of things; (4) not being animated they do
not move of their own accord; (5) they are set in motion by the action
of the spheres; (6) when a portion is displaced it returns in a
straight line to its original position.

In the third vision Ezekiel saw a human form above the ḥayyot. The
figure was divided in the middle; in the upper portion the prophet only
noticed that it was ḥashmal, (mysterious); from the loins downwards
there was “the vision of the likeness of the Divine Glory,” and “the
likeness of the throne.” The world of Intelligences was represented by
the figure; these can only be perceived in as far as they influence the
spheres, but their relation to the Creator is beyond human
comprehension. The Creator himself is not represented in this vision.

The key to the whole vision Maimonides finds in the introductory words,
“And the heavens were opened,” and in the minute description of the
place and the time of the revelation. When pondering on the grandeur of
the spheres and their influences, which vary according to time and
place, man begins to think of the existence of the Creator. At the
conclusion of this exposition Maimonides declares that he will, in the
subsequent chapters, refrain from giving further explanation of the
maʻaseh mercabah. The foregoing summary, however, shows that the
opinion of the author on this subject is fully stated, and it is indeed
difficult to conceive what additional disclosures he could still have
made.

The task which the author has proposed to himself in the Preface he now
regarded as accomplished. He has discussed the method of the Kalām, the
system of the philosophers, and his own theory concerning the relation
between the Primal Cause and the Universe: he has explained the
Biblical account of the creation, the nature of prophecy, and the
mysteries in Ezekiel’s vision. In the remaining portion of the work the
author attempts to solve certain theological problems, as though he
wished to obviate the following objections, which might be raised to
his theory that there is a design throughout the creation, and that the
entire Universe is subject to the law of causation:—What is the purpose
of the evils which attend human life? For what purpose was the world
created? In how far does Providence interfere with the natural course
of events? Does God know and foresee man’s actions? To what end was the
Divine Law revealed? These problems are treated seriatim.

All evils, Maimonides holds, originate in the material element of man’s
existence. Those who are able to emancipate themselves from the tyranny
of the body, and unconditionally to submit to the dictates of reason,
are protected from many evils. Man should disregard the cravings of the
body, avoid them as topics of conversation, and keep his thoughts far
away from them; convivial and erotic songs debase man’s noblest
gifts—thought and speech. Matter is the partition separating man from
the pure Intellects; it is “the thickness of the cloud” which true
knowledge has to traverse before it reaches man. In reality, evil is
the mere negative of good: “God saw all that He had made, and behold it
was very good” (Gen. i. 31). Evil does not exist at all. When evils are
mentioned in the Scriptures as the work of God, the Scriptural
expressions must not be taken in their literal sense.

There are three kinds of evils:—1. Evils necessitated by those laws of
production and destruction by which the species are perpetuated. 2.
Evils which men inflict on each other; they are comparatively few,
especially among civilized men. 3. Evils which man brings upon himself,
and which comprise the majority of existing evils. The consideration of
these three classes of evils leads to the conclusion that “the Lord is
good to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works” (Ps. cxlv.
9).

The question, What is the object of the creation? must be left
unanswered. The creation is the result of the will of God. Also those
who believe that the Universe is eternal must admit that they are
unable to discover the purpose of the Universe. It would, however, not
be illogical to assume that the spheres have been created for the sake
of man, notwithstanding the great dimensions of the former and the
smallness of the latter. Still it must be conceded that, even if
mankind were the main and central object of creation, there is no
absolute interdependence between them; for it is a matter of course
that, under altered conditions, man could exist without the spheres.
All teleological theories must therefore be confined within the limits
of the Universe as it now exists. They are only admissible in the
relation in which the several parts of the Universe stand to each
other; but the purpose of the Universe as a whole cannot be accounted
for. It is simply an emanation from the will of God.

Regarding the belief in Providence, Maimonides enumerates the following
five opinions:—1. There is no Providence; everything is subject to
chance; 2. Only a part of the Universe is governed by Providence, viz.,
the spheres, the species, and such individual beings as possess the
power of perpetuating their existence (e.g., the stars); the rest—that
is, the sublunary world—is left to mere chance. 3. Everything is
predetermined; according to this theory, revealed Law is inconceivable.
4. Providence assigns its blessings to all creatures, according to
their merits; accordingly, all beings, even the lowest animals, if
innocently injured or killed, receive compensation in a future life. 5.
According to the Jewish belief, all living beings are endowed with
free-will; God is just, and the destiny of man depends on his merits.
Maimonides denies the existence of trials inflicted by Divine love,
i.e. afflictions which befall man, not as punishments of sin, but as
means to procure for him a reward in times to come. Maimonides also
rejects the notion that God ordains special temptation. The Biblical
account, according to which God tempts men, “to know what is in their
hearts,” must not be taken in its literal sense; it merely states that
God made the virtues of certain people known to their fellowmen in
order that their good example should be followed. Of all creatures man
alone enjoys the especial care of Providence; because the acts of
Providence are identical with certain influences (shefaʻ) which the
Active Intellect brings to bear upon the human intellect; their effect
upon man varies according to his physical, moral, and intellectual
condition; irrational beings, however, cannot be affected by these
influences. If we cannot in each individual case see how these
principles are applied, it must be borne in mind that God’s wisdom is
far above that of man. The author seems to have felt that his theory
has its weak points, for he introduces it as follows:—“My theory is not
established by demonstrative proof; it is based on the authority of the
Bible, and it is less subject to refutation than any of the theories
previously mentioned.”

Providence implies Omniscience, and men who deny this, eo ipso, have no
belief in Providence. Some are unable to reconcile the fate of man with
Divine Justice, and are therefore of opinion that God takes no notice
whatever of the events which occur on earth. Others believe that God,
being an absolute Unity, cannot possess a knowledge of a multitude of
things, or of things that do not yet exist, or the number of which is
infinite. These objections, which are based on the nature of man’s
perception, are illogical; for God’s knowledge cannot be compared to
that of man; it is identical with His essence. Even the Attributists,
who assume that God’s knowledge is different from His essence, hold
that it is distinguished from man’s knowledge in the following five
points:—1. It is one, although it embraces a plurality. 2. It includes
even such things as do not yet exist. 3. It includes things which are
infinite in number. 4. It does not change when new objects of
perception present themselves. 5. It does not determine the course of
events.—However difficult this theory may appear to human
comprehension, it is in accordance with the words of Isaiah (lv. 8):
“Your thoughts are not My thoughts, and your ways are not My ways.”
According to Maimonides, the difficulty is to be explained by the fact
that God is the Creator of all things, and His knowledge of the things
is not dependent on their existence; while the knowledge of man is
solely dependent on the objects which come under his cognition.

According to Maimonides, the book of Job illustrates the several views
which have been mentioned above. Satan, that is, the material element
in human existence, is described as the cause of Job’s sufferings. Job
at first believed that man’s happiness depends on riches, health, and
children; being deprived of these sources of happiness, he conceived
the notion that Providence is indifferent to the fate of mortal beings.
After a careful study of natural phenomena, he rejected this opinion.
Eliphaz held that all misfortunes of man serve as punishments of past
sins. Bildad, the second friend of Job, admitted the existence of those
afflictions which Divine love decrees in order that the patient
sufferer may be fitted to receive a bountiful reward. Zofar, the third
friend of Job, declared that the ways of God are beyond human
comprehension; there is but one explanation assignable to all Divine
acts, namely: Such is His Will. Elihu gives a fuller development to
this idea; he says that such evils as befell Job may be remedied once
or twice, but the course of nature is not altogether reversed. It is
true that by prophecy a clearer insight into the ways of God can be
obtained, but there are only few who arrive at that exalted
intellectual degree, whilst the majority of men must content themselves
with acquiring a knowledge of God through the study of nature. Such a
study leads man to the conviction that his understanding cannot fathom
the secrets of nature and the wisdom of Divine Providence.

The concluding section of the Third Part treats of the purpose of the
Divine precepts. In the Pentateuch they are described as the means of
acquiring wisdom, enduring happiness, and also bodily comfort (ch.
xxxi.). Generally a distinction is made between “ḥuḳḳim” (“statutes”)
and mishpaṭim (“judgments”). The object of the latter is, on the whole,
known, but the ḥuḳḳim are considered as tests of man’s obedience; no
reason is given why they have been enacted. Maimonides rejects this
distinction; he states that all precepts are the result of wisdom and
design, that all contribute to the welfare of mankind, although with
regard to the ḥuḳḳim this is less obvious. The author draws another
line of distinction between the general principles and the details of
rules. For the selection and the introduction of the latter there is
but one reason, viz.: “Such is the will of God.”

The laws are intended to promote man’s perfection; they improve both
his mental and his physical condition; the former in so far as they
lead him to the acquisition of true knowledge, the latter through the
training of his moral and social faculties. Each law thus imparts
knowledge, improves the moral condition of man, or conduces to the
well-being of society. Many revealed laws help to enlighten man, and to
correct false opinions. This object is not always clearly announced.
God in His wisdom sometimes withheld from the knowledge of man the
purpose of commandments and actions. There are other precepts which
tend to restrain man’s passions and desires. If the same end is
occasionally attainable by other means, it must be remembered that the
Divine laws are adapted to the ordinary mental and emotional state of
man, and not to exceptional circumstances. In this work, as in the Yad
ha-ḥazaḳah, Maimonides divides the laws of the Pentateuch into fourteen
groups, and in each group he discusses the principal and the special
object of the laws included in it.

In addition to the legislative contents, the Bible includes historical
information; and Maimonides, in briefly reviewing the Biblical
narratives, shows that these are likewise intended to improve man’s
physical, moral, and intellectual condition. “It is not a vain thing
for you” (Deut. xxxii. 47), and when it proves vain to anyone, it is
his own fault.

In the final chapters the author describes the several degrees of human
perfection, from the sinners who have turned from the right path to the
best of men, who in all their thoughts and acts cling to the Most
Perfect Being, who aspire after the greatest possible knowledge of God,
and strive to serve their Maker in the practice of “loving-kindness,
righteousness, and justice.” This degree of human perfection can only
be attained by those who never forget the presence of the Almighty, and
remain firm in their fear and love of God. These servants of the Most
High inherit the choicest of human blessings; they are endowed with
wisdom: they are godlike beings.








INTRODUCTION


[Letter of the Author to his Pupil, R. Joseph Ibn Aknin.]

In the name of God, Lord of the Universe.

To R. Joseph (may God protect him!), son of R. Jehudah (may his repose
be in Paradise!):—


“My dear pupil, ever since you resolved to come to me, from a distant
country, and to study under my direction, I thought highly of your
thirst for knowledge, and your fondness for speculative pursuits, which
found expression in your poems. I refer to the time when I received
your writings in prose and verse from Alexandria. I was then not yet
able to test your powers of apprehension, and I thought that your
desire might possibly exceed your capacity. But when you had gone with
me through a course of astronomy, after having completed the [other]
elementary studies which are indispensable for the understanding of
that science, I was still more gratified by the acuteness and the
quickness of your apprehension. Observing your great fondness for
mathematics, I let you study them more deeply, for I felt sure of your
ultimate success. Afterwards, when I took you through a course of
logic, I found that my great expectations of you were confirmed, and I
considered you fit to receive from me an exposition of the esoteric
ideas contained in the prophetic books, that you might understand them
as they are understood by men of culture. When I commenced by way of
hints, I noticed that you desired additional explanation, urging me to
expound some metaphysical problems; to teach you the system of the
Mutakallemim; to tell you whether their arguments were based on logical
proof; and if not, what their method was. I perceived that you had
acquired some knowledge in those matters from others, and that you were
perplexed and bewildered; yet you sought to find out a solution to your
difficulty. I urged you to desist from this pursuit, and enjoined you
to continue your studies systematically; for my object was that the
truth should present itself in connected order, and that you should not
hit upon it by mere chance. Whilst you studied with me I never refused
to explain difficult verses in the Bible or passages in rabbinical
literature which we happened to meet. When, by the will of God, we
parted, and you went your way, our discussions aroused in me a
resolution which had long been dormant. Your absence has prompted me to
compose this treatise for you and for those who are like you, however
few they may be. I have divided it into chapters, each of which shall
be sent to you as soon as it is completed. Farewell!”








[PREFATORY REMARKS.]


            “Cause me to know the way wherein I should walk, for I lift 
            up my soul unto Thee.”                   (Psalm cxliii. 8.)

            “Unto you, O men, I call, and my voice is to the sons of 
            men.”                                      (Prov. viii. 4.)

            “Bow down thine ear and hear the words of the wise, and 
            apply thine heart unto my knowledge.”     (Prov. xxii. 17.)


My primary object in this work is to explain certain words occurring in
the prophetic books. Of these some are homonyms, and of their several
meanings the ignorant choose the wrong ones; other terms which are
employed in a figurative sense are erroneously taken by such persons in
their primary signification. There are also hybrid terms, denoting
things which are of the same class from one point of view and of a
different class from another. It is not here intended to explain all
these expressions to the unlettered or to mere tyros, a previous
knowledge of Logic and Natural Philosophy being indispensable, or to
those who confine their attention to the study of our holy Law, I mean
the study of the canonical law alone; for the true knowledge of the
Torah is the special aim of this and similar works.

The object of this treatise is to enlighten a religious man who has
been trained to believe in the truth of our holy Law, who
conscientiously fulfils his moral and religious duties, and at the same
time has been successful in his philosophical studies. Human reason has
attracted him to abide within its sphere; and he finds it difficult to
accept as correct the teaching based on the literal interpretation of
the Law, and especially that which he himself or others derived from
those homonymous, metaphorical, or hybrid expressions. Hence he is lost
in perplexity and anxiety. If he be guided solely by reason, and
renounce his previous views which are based on those expressions, he
would consider that he had rejected the fundamental principles of the
Law; and even if he retains the opinions which were derived from those
expressions, and if, instead of following his reason, he abandon its
guidance altogether, it would still appear that his religious
convictions had suffered loss and injury. For he would then be left
with those errors which give rise to fear and anxiety, constant grief
and great perplexity.

This work has also a second object in view. It seeks to explain certain
obscure figures which occur in the Prophets, and are not distinctly
characterized as being figures. Ignorant and superficial readers take
them in a literal, not in a figurative sense. Even well informed
persons are bewildered if they understand these passages in their
literal signification, but they are entirely relieved of their
perplexity when we explain the figure, or merely suggest that the terms
are figurative. For this reason I have called this book Guide for the
Perplexed.

I do not presume to think that this treatise settles every doubt in the
minds of those who understand it, but I maintain that it settles the
greater part of their difficulties. No intelligent man will require and
expect that on introducing any subject I shall completely exhaust it;
or that on commencing the exposition of a figure I shall fully explain
all its parts. Such a course could not be followed by a teacher in a
viva voce exposition, much less by an author in writing a book, without
becoming a target for every foolish conceited person to discharge the
arrows of folly at him. Some general principles bearing upon this point
have been fully discussed in our works on the Talmud, and we have there
called the attention of the reader to many themes of this kind. We also
stated (Mishneh torah, I. ii. 12, and iv. 10) that the expression
Maʻase Bereshit (Account of the Creation) signified “Natural Science,”
and Maʻaseh Mercabah (“Description of the Chariot”) Metaphysics, and we
explained the force of the Rabbinical dictum, “The Maʻaseh Mercabah
must not be fully expounded even in the presence of a single student,
unless he be wise and able to reason for himself, and even then you
should merely acquaint him with the heads of the different sections of
the subject.” (Babyl. Talm. Ḥagigah, fol. 11 b). You must, therefore,
not expect from me more than such heads. And even these have not been
methodically and systematically arranged in this work, but have been,
on the contrary, scattered, and are interspersed with other topics
which we shall have occasion to explain. My object in adopting this
arrangement is that the truths should be at one time apparent, and at
another time concealed. Thus we shall not be in opposition to the
Divine Will (from which it is wrong to deviate) which has withheld from
the multitude the truths required for the knowledge of God, according
to the words, “The secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him” (Ps.
xxv. 14).

Know that also in Natural Science there are topics which are not to be
fully explained. Our Sages laid down the rule, “The Maʻaseh Bereshith
must not be expounded in the presence of two.” If an author were to
explain these principles in writing, it would be equal to expounding
them unto thousands of men. For this reason the prophets treat these
subjects in figures, and our Sages, imitating the method of Scripture,
speak of them in metaphors and allegories; because there is a close
affinity between these subjects and metaphysics, and indeed they form
part of its mysteries. Do not imagine that these most difficult
problems can be thoroughly understood by any one of us. This is not the
case. At times the truth shines so brilliantly that we perceive it as
clear as day. Our nature and habit then draw a veil over our
perception, and we return to a darkness almost as dense as before. We
are like those who, though beholding frequent flashes of lightning,
still find themselves in the thickest darkness of the night. On some
the lightning flashes in rapid succession, and they seem to be in
continuous light, and their night is as clear as the day. This was the
degree of prophetic excellence attained by (Moses) the greatest of
prophets, to whom God said, “But as for thee, stand thou here by Me”
(Deut. v. 31), and of whom it is written “the skin of his face shone,”
etc. (Exod. xxxiv. 29). [Some perceive the prophetic flash at long
intervals; this is the degree of most prophets.] By others only once
during the whole night is a flash of lightning perceived. This is the
case with those of whom we are informed, “They prophesied, and did not
prophesy again” (Num. xi. 25). There are some to whom the flashes of
lightning appear with varying intervals; others are in the condition of
men, whose darkness is illumined not by lightning, but by some kind of
crystal or similar stone, or other substances that possess the property
of shining during the night; and to them even this small amount of
light is not continuous, but now it shines and now it vanishes, as if
it were “the flame of the rotating sword.”

The degrees in the perfection of men vary according to these
distinctions. Concerning those who never beheld the light even for one
day, but walk in continual darkness, it is written, “They know not,
neither will they understand; they walk on in darkness” (Ps. lxxxii.
5). Truth, in spite of all its powerful manifestations, is completely
withheld from them, and the following words of Scripture may be applied
to them, “And now men see not the light which is bright in the skies”
(Job xxxvii. 21). They are the multitude of ordinary men; there is no
need to notice them in this treatise.

You must know that if a person, who has attained a certain degree of
perfection, wishes to impart to others, either orally or in writing,
any portion of the knowledge which he has acquired of these subjects,
he is utterly unable to be as systematic and explicit as he could be in
a science of which the method is well known. The same difficulties
which he encountered when investigating the subject for himself will
attend him when endeavouring to instruct others; viz., at one time the
explanation will appear lucid, at another time, obscure; this property
of the subject appears to remain the same both to the advanced scholar
and to the beginner. For this reason, great theological scholars gave
instruction in all such matters only by means of metaphors and
allegories. They frequently employed them in forms varying more or less
essentially. In most cases they placed the lesson to be illustrated at
the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end of the simile. When they
could find no simile which from beginning to end corresponded to the
idea which was to be illustrated, they divided the subject of the
lesson, although in itself one whole, into different parts, and
expressed each by a separate figure. Still more obscure are those
instances in which one simile is employed to illustrate many subjects,
the beginning of the simile representing one thing, the end another.
Sometimes the whole metaphor may refer to two cognate subjects in the
same branch of knowledge.

If we were to teach in these disciplines, without the use of parables
and figures, we should be compelled to resort to expressions both
profound and transcendental, and by no means more intelligible than
metaphors and similes; as though the wise and learned were drawn into
this course by the Divine Will, in the same way as they are compelled
to follow the laws of nature in matters relating to the body. You are
no doubt aware that the Almighty, desiring to lead us to perfection and
to improve our state of society, has revealed to us laws which are to
regulate our actions. These laws, however, presuppose an advanced state
of intellectual culture. We must first form a conception of the
Existence of the Creator according to our capabilities; that is, we
must have a knowledge of Metaphysics. But this discipline can only be
approached after the study of Physics; for the science of Physics
borders on Metaphysics, and must even precede it in the course of our
studies, as is clear to all who are familiar with these questions.
Therefore the Almighty commenced Holy Writ with the description of the
Creation, that is, with Physical Science; the subject being on the one
hand most weighty and important, and on the other hand our means of
fully comprehending those great problems being limited. He described
those profound truths, which His Divine Wisdom found it necessary to
communicate to us, in allegorical, figurative, and metaphorical
language. Our Sages have said (Yemen Midrash on Gen. i. 1), “It is
impossible to give a full account of the Creation to man. Therefore
Scripture simply tells us, In the beginning God created the heavens and
the earth” (Gen. i. 1). Thus they have suggested that this subject is a
deep mystery, and in the words of Solomon, “Far off and exceedingly
deep, who can find it out?” (Eccles. vii. 24). It has been treated in
metaphors in order that the uneducated may comprehend it according to
the measure of their faculties and the feebleness of their
apprehension, while educated persons may take it in a different sense.
In our commentary on the Mishnah we stated our intention to explain
difficult problems in the Book on Prophecy and in the Book of Harmony.
In the latter we intended to examine all the passages in the Midrash
which, if taken literally, appear to be inconsistent with truth and
common sense, and must therefore be taken figuratively. Many years have
elapsed since I first commenced those works. I had proceeded but a
short way when I became dissatisfied with my original plan. For I
observed that by expounding these passages by means of allegorical and
mystical terms, we do not explain anything, but merely substitute one
thing for another of the same nature, whilst in explaining them fully
our efforts would displease most people; and my sole object in planning
to write those books was to make the contents of Midrashim and the
exoteric lessons of the prophecies intelligible to everybody. We have
further noticed that when an ill-informed Theologian reads these
Midrashim, he will find no difficulty; for possessing no knowledge of
the properties of things, he will not reject statements which involve
impossibilities. When, however, a person who is both religious and well
educated reads them, he cannot escape the following dilemma: either he
takes them literally, and questions the abilities of the author and the
soundness of his mind—doing thereby nothing which is opposed to the
principles of our faith,—or he will acquiesce in assuming that the
passages in question have some secret meaning, and he will continue to
hold the author in high estimation whether he understood the allegory
or not. As regards prophecy in its various degrees and the different
metaphors used in the prophetic books, we shall give in the present
work an explanation, according to a different method. Guided by these
considerations I have refrained from writing those two books as I had
previously intended. In my larger work, the Mishnah Torah, I have
contented myself with briefly stating the principles of our faith and
its fundamental truths, together with such hints as approach a clear
exposition. In this work, however, I address those who have studied
philosophy and have acquired sound knowledge, and who while firm in
religious matters are perplexed and bewildered on account of the
ambiguous and figurative expressions employed in the holy writings.
Some chapters may be found in this work which contain no reference
whatever to homonyms. Such chapters will serve as an introduction to
others; they will contain some reference to the signification of a
homonym which I do not wish to mention in that place, or explain some
figure; point out that a certain expression is a figure; treat of
difficult passages generally misunderstood in consequence of the
homonymy they include, or because the simile they contain is taken in
place of that which it represents, and vice versâ.

Having spoken of similes, I proceed to make the following remark:—The
key to the understanding and to the full comprehension of all that the
Prophets have said is found in the knowledge of the figures, their
general ideas, and the meaning of each word they contain. You know the
verse:—

“I have also spoken in similes by the Prophets” (Hosea xii. 10); and
also the verse, “Put forth a riddle and speak a parable” (Ezek. xvii.
2). And because the Prophets continually employ figures, Ezekiel said,
“Does He not speak parables?” (xxi. 5). Again, Solomon begins his book
of Proverbs with the words, “To understand a proverb and figurative
speech, the words of the wise and their dark sayings” (Prov. i. 6); and
we read in Midrash, (Shir ha-shirim Rabba, i. 1); “To what were the
words of the Law to be compared before the time of Solomon? To a well
the waters of which are at a great depth, and though cool and fresh,
yet no man could drink of them. A clever man joined cord with cord, and
rope with rope, and drew up and drank. So Solomon went from figure to
figure, and from subject to subject, till he obtained the true sense of
the Law.” So far go the words of our Sages. I do not believe that any
intelligent man thinks that “the words of the Law” mentioned here as
requiring the application of figures in order to be understood, can
refer to the rules for building tabernacles, for preparing the lulab,
or for the four kinds of trustees. What is really meant is the
apprehension of profound and difficult subjects, concerning which our
Sages said, “If a man loses in his house a sela, or a pearl, he can
find it by lighting a taper worth only one issar. Thus the parables in
themselves are of no great value, but through them the words of the
holy Law are rendered intelligible.” These likewise are the words of
our Sages; consider well their statement, that the deeper sense of the
words of the holy Law are pearls, and the literal acceptation of a
figure is of no value in itself. They compare the hidden meaning
included in the literal sense of the simile to a pearl lost in a dark
room, which is full of furniture. It is certain that the pearl is in
the room, but the man can neither see it nor know where it lies. It is
just as if the pearl were no longer in his possession, for, as has been
stated, it affords him no benefit whatever until he kindles a light.
The same is the case with the comprehension of that which the simile
represents. The wise king said, “A word fitly spoken is like apples of
gold in vessels of silver” (Prov. xxv. 11). Hear the explanation of
what he said:—The word maskiyoth, the Hebrew equivalent for “vessels,”
denotes “filigree network”—i.e., things in which there are very small
apertures, such as are frequently wrought by silversmiths. They are
called in Hebrew maskiyyoth (lit. “transpicuous,” from the verb sakah,
“he saw,” a root which occurs also in the Targum of Onkelos, Gen. xxvi.
8), because the eye penetrates through them. Thus Solomon meant to say,
“Just as apples of gold in silver filigree with small apertures, so is
a word fitly spoken.”

See how beautifully the conditions of a good simile are described in
this figure! It shows that in every word which has a double sense, a
literal one and a figurative one, the plain meaning must be as valuable
as silver, and the hidden meaning still more precious; so that the
figurative meaning bears the same relation to the literal one as gold
to silver. It is further necessary that the plain sense of the phrase
shall give to those who consider it some notion of that which the
figure represents. Just as a golden apple overlaid with a network of
silver, when seen at a distance, or looked at superficially, is
mistaken for a silver apple, but when a keen-sighted person looks at
the object well, he will find what is within, and see that the apple is
gold. The same is the case with the figures employed by prophets. Taken
literally, such expressions contain wisdom useful for many purposes,
among others, for the amelioration of the condition of society; e.g.,
the Proverbs (of Solomon), and similar sayings in their literal sense.
Their hidden meaning, however, is profound wisdom, conducive to the
recognition of real truth.

Know that the figures employed by prophets are of two kinds: first,
where every word which occurs in the simile represents a certain idea;
and secondly, where the simile, as a whole, represents a general idea,
but has a great many points which have no reference whatever to that
idea; they are simply required to give to the simile its proper form
and order, or better to conceal the idea; the simile is therefore
continued as far as necessary, according to its literal sense. Consider
this well.

An example of the first class of prophetic figures is to be found in
Genesis:—“And, behold, a ladder set up on the earth, and the top of it
reached to heaven; and, behold, the angels of God ascending and
descending on it” (Gen. xxviii. 12). The word “ladder” refers to one
idea; “set up on the earth” to another; “and the top of it reached to
heaven” to a third; “angels of God” to a fourth; “ascending” to a
fifth; “descending” to a sixth; “the Lord stood above it” (ver. 13) to
a seventh. Every word in this figure introduces a fresh element into
the idea represented by the figure.

An example of the second class of prophetic figures is found in
Proverbs (vii. 6–26):—“For at the window of my house I looked through
my casement, and beheld among the simple ones; I discerned among the
youths a young man void of understanding, passing through the street
near her corner: and he went the way to her house, in the twilight, in
the evening, in the black and dark night: and, behold, there met him a
woman with the attire of a harlot, and subtil of heart. (She is loud
and stubborn; her feet abide not in her house: now she is without, now
in the streets, and lieth in wait in every corner.) So she caught him,
and kissed him, and with an impudent face said unto him, I have peace
offerings with me; this day have I paid my vows. Therefore came I forth
to meet thee, diligently to seek thy face, and I have found thee. I
have decked my bed with coverings of tapestry, with striped cloths of
the yarn of Egypt. I have perfumed my bed with myrrh, aloes, and
cinnamon. Come, let us take our fill of love until the morning: let us
solace ourselves with loves. For the goodman is not at home, he is gone
a long journey: he hath taken a bag of money with him, and will come
home at the day appointed. With her much fair speech she caused him to
yield, with the flattering of her lips she forced him. He goeth after
her straightway, as an ox goeth to the slaughter, or as fetters to the
correction of a fool: till a dart strike through his liver; as a bird
hasteth to the snare, and knoweth not that it is for his life. Hearken
unto me now therefore, O ye children, and attend to the words of my
mouth. Let not thine heart decline to her ways, go not astray in her
paths. For she hath cast down many wounded: yea, many strong men have
been slain by her.”

The general principle expounded in all these verses is to abstain from
excessive indulgence in bodily pleasures. The author compares the body,
which is the source of all sensual pleasures, to a married woman who at
the same time is a harlot. And this figure he has taken as the basis of
his entire book. We shall hereafter show the wisdom of Solomon in
comparing sensual pleasures to an adulterous harlot. We shall explain
how aptly he concludes that work with the praises of a faithful wife
who devotes herself to the welfare of her husband and of her household.
All obstacles which prevent man from attaining his highest aim in life,
all the deficiencies in the character of man, all his evil
propensities, are to be traced to the body alone. This will be
explained later on. The predominant idea running throughout the figure
is that man shall not be entirely guided by his animal, or material
nature; for the material substance of man is identical with that of the
brute creation.

An adequate explanation of the figure having been given, and its
meaning having been shown, do not imagine that you will find in its
application a corresponding element for each part of the figure; you
must not ask what is meant by “I have peace offerings with me” (ver.
14); by “I have decked my bed with coverings of tapestry” (ver. 16); or
what is added to the force of the figure by the observation “for the
goodman is not at home” (ver. 19), and so on to the end of the chapter.
For all this is merely to complete the illustration of the metaphor in
its literal meaning. The circumstances described here are such as are
common to adulterers. Such conversations take place between all
adulterous persons. You must well understand what I have said, for it
is a principle of the utmost importance with respect to those things
which I intend to expound. If you observe in one of the chapters that I
explained the meaning of a certain figure, and pointed out to you its
general scope, do not trouble yourself further in order to find an
interpretation of each separate portion, for that would lead you to one
of the two following erroneous courses; either you will miss the sense
included in the metaphor, or you will be induced to explain certain
things which require no explanation, and which are not introduced for
that purpose. Through this unnecessary trouble you may fall into the
great error which besets most modern sects in their foolish writings
and discussions; they all endeavour to find some hidden meaning in
expressions which were never uttered by the author in that sense. Your
object should be to discover in most of the figures the general idea
which the author wishes to express. In some instances it will be
sufficient if you understand from my remarks that a certain expression
contains a figure, although I may offer no further comment. For when
you know that it is not to be taken literally, you will understand at
once to what subject it refers. My statement that it is a figurative
expression will, as it were, remove the screen from between the object
and the observer.




DIRECTIONS FOR THE STUDY OF THIS WORK.

If you desire to grasp all that is contained in this book so that
nothing shall escape your notice, consider the chapters in connected
order. In studying each chapter, do not content yourself with
comprehending its principal subject, but attend to every term mentioned
therein, although it may seem to have no connection with the principal
subject. For what I have written in this work was not the suggestion of
the moment; it is the result of deep study and great application. Care
has been taken that nothing that appeared doubtful should be left
unexplained. Nothing of what is mentioned is out of place, every remark
will be found to illustrate the subject-matter of the respective
chapter. Do not read superficially, lest you do me an injury, and
derive no benefit for yourself. You must study thoroughly and read
continually; for you will then find the solution of those important
problems of religion, which are a source of anxiety to all intelligent
men. I adjure any reader of my book, in the name of the Most High, not
to add any explanation even to a single word; nor to explain to another
any portion of it except such passages as have been fully treated of by
previous theological authorities; he must not teach others anything
that he has learnt from my work alone, and that has not been hitherto
discussed by any of our authorities. The reader must, moreover, beware
of raising objections to any of my statements, because it is very
probable that he may understand my words to mean the exact opposite to
what I intended to say. He will injure me, while I endeavoured to
benefit him. “He will requite me evil for good.” Let the reader make a
careful study of this work; and if his doubt be removed on even one
point, let him praise his Maker and rest contented with the knowledge
he has acquired. But if he derive from it no benefit whatever, he may
consider the book as if it had never been written. Should he notice any
opinions with which he does not agree, let him endeavour to find a
suitable explanation, even if it seem far-fetched, in order that he may
judge me charitably. Such a duty we owe to every one. We owe it
especially to our scholars and theologians, who endeavour to teach us
what is the truth according to the best of their ability. I feel
assured that those of my readers who have not studied philosophy, will
still derive profit from many a chapter. But the thinker whose studies
have brought him into collision with religion, will, as I have already
mentioned, derive much benefit from every chapter. How greatly will he
rejoice! How agreeably will my words strike his ears! Those, however,
whose minds are confused with false notions and perverse methods, who
regard their misleading studies as sciences, and imagine themselves
philosophers, though they have no knowledge that could truly be termed
science, will object to many chapters, and will find in them many
insuperable difficulties, because they do not understand their meaning,
and because I expose therein the absurdity of their perverse notions,
which constitute their riches and peculiar treasure, “stored up for
their ruin.” God knows that I hesitated very much before writing on the
subjects contained in this work, since they are profound mysteries;
they are topics which, since the time of our captivity have not been
treated by any of our scholars as far as we possess their writings; how
then shall I now make a beginning and discuss them? But I rely on two
precedents: first, to similar cases our Sages applied the verse, “It is
time to do something in honour of the Lord: for they have made void thy
law” (Ps. cxix. 126). Secondly, they have said, “Let all thy acts be
guided by pure intentions.” On these two principles I relied while
composing some parts of this work. Lastly, when I have a difficult
subject before me—when I find the road narrow, and can see no other way
of teaching a well established truth except by pleasing one intelligent
man and displeasing ten thousand fools—I prefer to address myself to
the one man, and to take no notice whatever of the condemnation of the
multitude; I prefer to extricate that intelligent man from his
embarrassment and show him the cause of his perplexity, so that he may
attain perfection and be at peace.




INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

[On Method.]

There are seven causes of inconsistencies and contradictions to be met
with in a literary work. The first cause arises from the fact that the
author collects the opinions of various men, each differing from the
other, but neglects to mention the name of the author of any particular
opinion. In such a work contradictions or inconsistencies must occur,
since any two statements may belong to two different authors. Second
cause: The author holds at first one opinion which he subsequently
rejects; in his work, however, both his original and altered views are
retained. Third cause: The passages in question are not all to be taken
literally; some only are to be understood in their literal sense, while
in others figurative language is employed, which includes another
meaning besides the literal one: or, in the apparently inconsistent
passages, figurative language is employed which, if taken literally,
would seem to be contradictories or contraries. Fourth cause: The
premises are not identical in both statements, but for certain reasons
they are not fully stated in these passages; or two propositions with
different subjects which are expressed by the same term without having
the difference in meaning pointed out, occur in two passages. The
contradiction is therefore only apparent, but there is no contradiction
in reality. The fifth cause is traceable to the use of a certain method
adopted in teaching and expounding profound problems. Namely, a
difficult and obscure theorem must sometimes be mentioned and assumed
as known, for the illustration of some elementary and intelligible
subject which must be taught beforehand, the commencement being always
made with the easier thing. The teacher must therefore facilitate, in
any manner which he can devise, the explanation of those theorems,
which have to be assumed as known, and he must content himself with
giving a general though somewhat inaccurate notion on the subject. It
is, for the present, explained according to the capacity of the
students, that they may comprehend it as far as they are required to
understand the subject. Later on, the same subject is thoroughly
treated and fully developed in its right place. Sixth cause: The
contradiction is not apparent, and only becomes evident through a
series of premises. The larger the number of premises necessary to
prove the contradiction between the two conclusions, the greater is the
chance that it will escape detection, and that the author will not
perceive his own inconsistency. Only when from each conclusion, by
means of suitable premises, an inference is made, and from the
enunciation thus inferred, by means of proper arguments, other
conclusions are formed, and after that process has been repeated many
times, then it becomes clear that the original conclusions are
contradictories or contraries. Even able writers are liable to overlook
such inconsistencies. If, however, the contradiction between the
original statements can at once be discovered, and the author, while
writing the second, does not think of the first, he evinces a greater
deficiency, and his words deserve no notice whatever. Seventh cause: It
is sometimes necessary to introduce such metaphysical matter as may
partly be disclosed, but must partly be concealed; while, therefore, on
one occasion the object which the author has in view may demand that
the metaphysical problem be treated as solved in one way, it may be
convenient on another occasion to treat it as solved in the opposite
way. The author must endeavour, by concealing the fact as much as
possible, to prevent the uneducated reader from perceiving the
contradiction.

Inconsistencies occurring in the Mishnah and Boraitot are traceable to
the first cause. You meet frequently in the Gemara with passages like
the following:—“Does not the beginning of the passage contradict the
end? No; the beginning is the dictum of a certain Rabbi; the end that
of another”; or “Rabbi (Jehudah ha-Nasi) approved of the opinion of a
certain rabbi in one case and gave it therefore anonymously, and having
accepted that of another rabbi in the other case he introduced that
view without naming the authority”; or “Who is the author of this
anonymous dictum? Rabbi A.” “Who is the author of that paragraph in the
Mishnah? Rabbi B.” Instances of this kind are innumerable.

Apparent contradictions or differences occurring in the Gemara may be
traced to the first cause and to the second, as e.g., “In this
particular case he agrees with this rabbi”; or “He agrees with him in
one point, but differs from him in another”; or “These two dicta are
the opinions of two Amoraim, who differ as regards the statement made
by a certain rabbi.” These are examples of contradictions traceable to
the first cause. The following are instances which may be traced to the
second cause. “Rabba altered his opinion on that point”; it then
becomes necessary to consider which of the two opinions came second.
Again, “In the first recension of the Talmud by Rabbi Ashi, he made one
assertion, and in the second a different one.”

The inconsistencies and contradictions met with in some passages of the
prophetic books, if taken literally, are all traceable to the third or
fourth cause, and it is exclusively in reference to this subject that I
wrote the present Introduction. You know that the following expression
frequently occurs, “One verse says this, another that,” showing the
contradiction, and explaining that either some premise is wanting or
the subject is altered. Comp. “Solomon, it is not sufficient that thy
words contradict thy father; they are themselves inconsistent, etc.”
Many similar instances occur in the writings of our Sages. The passages
in the prophetical books which our Sages have explained, mostly refer
to religious or moral precepts. Our desire, however, is to discuss such
passages as contain apparent contradictions in regard to the principles
of our faith. I shall explain some of them in various chapters of the
present work; for this subject also belongs to the secrets of the
Torah.

Contradictions traceable to the seventh cause occurring in the
prophetical works require special investigation; and no one should
express his opinion on that matter by reasoning and arguing without
weighing the matter well in his mind.

Inconsistencies in the writings of true philosophers are traceable to
the fifth cause. Contradictions occurring in the writings of most
authors and commentators, such as are not included in the
above-mentioned works, are due to the sixth cause. Many examples of
this class of contradictions are found in the Midrash and the Agada;
hence the saying, “We must not raise questions concerning the
contradictions met with in the Agada.” You may also notice in them
contradictions due to the seventh cause. Any inconsistency discovered
in the present work will be found to arise in consequence of the fifth
cause or the seventh. Notice this, consider its truth, and remember it
well, lest you misunderstand some of the chapters in this book.

Having concluded these introductory remarks I proceed to examine those
expressions, to the true meaning of which, as apparent from the
context, it is necessary to direct your attention. This book will then
be a key admitting to places the gates of which would otherwise be
closed. When the gates are opened and men enter, their souls will enjoy
repose, their eyes will be gratified, and even their bodies, after all
toil and labour, will be refreshed.








PART I

            “Open ye the gates, that the righteous nation which keepeth 
            the truth may enter in.”—(Isa. xxvi. 2.)


CHAPTER I


Some have been of opinion that by the Hebrew ẓelem, the shape and
figure of a thing is to be understood, and this explanation led men to
believe in the corporeality [of the Divine Being]: for they thought
that the words “Let us make man in our ẓelem” (Gen. i. 26), implied
that God had the form of a human being, i.e., that He had figure and
shape, and that, consequently, He was corporeal. They adhered
faithfully to this view, and thought that if they were to relinquish it
they would eo ipso reject the truth of the Bible: and further, if they
did not conceive God as having a body possessed of face and limbs,
similar to their own in appearance, they would have to deny even the
existence of God. The sole difference which they admitted, was that He
excelled in greatness and splendour, and that His substance was not
flesh and blood. Thus far went their conception of the greatness and
glory of God. The incorporeality of the Divine Being, and His unity, in
the true sense of the word—for there is no real unity without
incorporeality—will be fully proved in the course of the present
treatise. (Part II., ch. i.) In this chapter it is our sole intention
to explain the meaning of the words ẓelem and demut. I hold that the
Hebrew equivalent of “form” in the ordinary acceptation of the word,
viz., the figure and shape of a thing, is toär. Thus we find “[And
Joseph was] beautiful in toär (‘form’), and beautiful in appearance”
(Gen. xxxix. 6): “What form (toär) is he of?” (1 Sam. xxviii. 14): “As
the form (toär) of the children of a king” (Judges viii. 18). It is
also applied to form produced by human labour, as “He marketh its form
(toär) with a line,” “and he marketh its form (toär) with the compass”
(Isa. xliv. 13). This term is not at all applicable to God. The term
ẓelem, on the other hand, signifies the specific form, viz., that which
constitutes the essence of a thing, whereby the thing is what it is;
the reality of a thing in so far as it is that particular being. In man
the “form” is that constituent which gives him human perception: and on
account of this intellectual perception the term ẓelem is employed in
the sentences “In the ẓelem of God he created him” (Gen. i. 27). It is
therefore rightly said, “Thou despisest their ẓelem” (Ps. lxiii. 20);
the “contempt” can only concern the soul—the specific form of man, not
the properties and shape of his body. I am also of opinion that the
reason why this term is used for “idols” may be found in the
circumstance that they are worshipped on account of some idea
represented by them, not on account of their figure and shape. For the
same reason the term is used in the expression, “the forms (ẓalme) of
your emerods” (1 Sam. vi. 5), for the chief object was the removal of
the injury caused by the emerods, not a change of their shape. As,
however, it must be admitted that the term ẓelem is employed in these
two cases, viz. “the images of the emerods” and “the idols” on account
of the external shape, the term ẓelem is either a homonym or a hybrid
term, and would denote both the specific form and the outward shape,
and similar properties relating to the dimensions and the shape of
material bodies; and in the phrase “Let us make man in our ẓelem” (Gen.
i. 26), the term signifies “the specific form” of man, viz., his
intellectual perception, and does not refer to his “figure” or “shape.”
Thus we have shown the difference between ẓelem and toär, and explained
the meaning of ẓelem.

Demut is derived from the verb damah, “he is like.” This term likewise
denotes agreement with regard to some abstract relation: comp. “I am
like a pelican of the wilderness” (Ps. cii. 7); the author does not
compare himself to the pelican in point of wings and feathers, but in
point of sadness. “Nor any tree in the garden of God was like unto him
in beauty” (Ezek. xxxi. 8); the comparison refers to the idea of
beauty. “Their poison is like the poison of a serpent” (Ps. lviii. 5);
“He is like unto a lion” (Ps. xvii. 12); the resemblance indicated in
these passages does not refer to the figure and shape, but to some
abstract idea. In the same manner is used “the likeness of the throne”
(Ezek. i. 26); the comparison is made with regard to greatness and
glory, not, as many believe, with regard to its square form, its
breadth, or the length of its legs: this explanation applies also to
the phrase “the likeness of the ḥayyot” (“living creatures,” Ezek. i.
13).

As man’s distinction consists in a property which no other creature on
earth possesses, viz., intellectual perception, in the exercise of
which he does not employ his senses, nor move his hand or his foot,
this perception has been compared—though only apparently, not in
truth—to the Divine perception, which requires no corporeal organ. On
this account, i.e., on account of the Divine intellect with which man
has been endowed, he is said to have been made in the form and likeness
of the Almighty, but far from it be the notion that the Supreme Being
is corporeal, having a material form.






CHAPTER II


Some years ago a learned man asked me a question of great importance;
the problem and the solution which we gave in our reply deserve the
closest attention. Before, however, entering upon this problem and its
solution I must premise that every Hebrew knows that the term Elohim is
a homonym, and denotes God, angels, judges, and the rulers of
countries, and that Onkelos the proselyte explained it in the true and
correct manner by taking Elohim in the sentence, “and ye shall be like
Elohim” (Gen. iii. 5) in the last-mentioned meaning, and rendering the
sentence “and ye shall be like princes.” Having pointed out the
homonymity of the term “Elohim” we return to the question under
consideration. “It would at first sight,” said the objector, “appear
from Scripture that man was originally intended to be perfectly equal
to the rest of the animal creation, which is not endowed with
intellect, reason, or power of distinguishing between good and evil:
but that Adam’s disobedience to the command of God procured him that
great perfection which is the peculiarity of man, viz., the power of
distinguishing between good and evil—the noblest of all the faculties
of our nature, the essential characteristic of the human race. It thus
appears strange that the punishment for rebelliousness should be the
means of elevating man to a pinnacle of perfection to which he had not
attained previously. This is equivalent to saying that a certain man
was rebellious and extremely wicked, wherefore his nature was changed
for the better, and he was made to shine as a star in the heavens.”
Such was the purport and subject of the question, though not in the
exact words of the inquirer. Now mark our reply, which was as
follows:—“You appear to have studied the matter superficially, and
nevertheless you imagine that you can understand a book which has been
the guide of past and present generations, when you for a moment
withdraw from your lusts and appetites, and glance over its contents as
if you were reading a historical work or some poetical composition.
Collect your thoughts and examine the matter carefully, for it is not
to be understood as you at first sight think, but as you will find
after due deliberation; namely, the intellect which was granted to man
as the highest endowment, was bestowed on him before his disobedience.
With reference to this gift the Bible states that “man was created in
the form and likeness of God.” On account of this gift of intellect man
was addressed by God, and received His commandments, as it is said:
“And the Lord God commanded Adam” (Gen. ii. 16)—for no commandments are
given to the brute creation or to those who are devoid of
understanding. Through the intellect man distinguishes between the true
and the false. This faculty Adam possessed perfectly and completely.
The right and the wrong are terms employed in the science of apparent
truths (morals), not in that of necessary truths, as, e.g., it is not
correct to say, in reference to the proposition “the heavens are
spherical,” it is “good” or to declare the assertion that “the earth is
flat” to be “bad”; but we say of the one it is true, of the other it is
false. Similarly our language expresses the idea of true and false by
the terms emet and sheker, of the morally right and the morally wrong,
by tob and ra’. Thus it is the function of the intellect to
discriminate between the true and the false—a distinction which is
applicable to all objects of intellectual perception. When Adam was yet
in a state of innocence, and was guided solely by reflection and
reason—on account of which it is said: “Thou hast made him (man) little
lower than the angels” (Ps. viii. 6)—he was not at all able to follow
or to understand the principles of apparent truths; the most manifest
impropriety, viz., to appear in a state of nudity, was nothing
unbecoming according to his idea: he could not comprehend why it should
be so. After man’s disobedience, however, when he began to give way to
desires which had their source in his imagination and to the
gratification of his bodily appetites, as it is said, “And the wife saw
that the tree was good for food and delightful to the eyes” (Gen. iii.
6), he was punished by the loss of part of that intellectual faculty
which he had previously possessed. He therefore transgressed a command
with which he had been charged on the score of his reason; and having
obtained a knowledge of the apparent truths, he was wholly absorbed in
the study of what is proper and what improper. Then he fully understood
the magnitude of the loss he had sustained, what he had forfeited, and
in what situation he was thereby placed. Hence we read, “And ye shall
be like elohim, knowing good and evil,” and not “knowing” or
“discerning the true and the false”: while in necessary truths we can
only apply the words “true and false,” not “good and evil.” Further
observe the passage, “And the eyes of both were opened, and they knew
they were naked” (Gen. iii. 7): it is not said, “And the eyes of both
were opened, and they saw”; for what the man had seen previously and
what he saw after this circumstance was precisely the same; there had
been no blindness which was now removed, but he received a new faculty
whereby he found things wrong which previously he had not regarded as
wrong. Besides, you must know that the Hebrew word pakaḥ used in this
passage is exclusively employed in the figurative sense of receiving
new sources of knowledge, not in that of regaining the sense of sight.
Comp., “God opened her eyes” (Gen. xxi. 19). “Then shall the eyes of
the blind be opened” (Isaiah xxxviii. 8). “Open ears, he heareth not”
(ibid. xlii. 20), similar in sense to the verse, “Which have eyes to
see, and see not” (Ezek. xii. 2). When, however, Scripture says of
Adam, “He changed his face (panav) and thou sentest him forth” (Job
xiv. 20), it must be understood in the following way: On account of the
change of his original aim he was sent away. For panim, the Hebrew
equivalent of face, is derived from the verb panah, “he turned,” and
signifies also “aim,” because man generally turns his face towards the
thing he desires. In accordance with this interpretation, our text
suggests that Adam, as he altered his intention and directed his
thoughts to the acquisition of what he was forbidden, he was banished
from Paradise: this was his punishment; it was measure for measure. At
first he had the privilege of tasting pleasure and happiness, and of
enjoying repose and security; but as his appetites grew stronger, and
he followed his desires and impulses, (as we have already stated
above), and partook of the food he was forbidden to taste, he was
deprived of everything, was doomed to subsist on the meanest kind of
food, such as he never tasted before, and this even only after exertion
and labour, as it is said, “Thorns and thistles shall grow up for thee”
(Gen. iii. 18), “By the sweat of thy brow,” etc., and in explanation of
this the text continues, “And the Lord God drove him from the Garden of
Eden, to till the ground whence he was taken.” He was now with respect
to food and many other requirements brought to the level of the lower
animals; comp., “Thou shalt eat the grass of the field” (Gen. iii. 18).
Reflecting on his condition, the Psalmist says, “Adam unable to dwell
in dignity, was brought to the level of the dumb beast” (Ps. xlix. 13).

“May the Almighty be praised, whose design and wisdom cannot be
fathomed.”






CHAPTER III


It might be thought that the Hebrew words temunah and tabnit have one
and the same meaning, but this is not the case. Tabnit, derived from
the verb banah (he built), signifies the build and construction of a
thing—that is to say, its figure, whether square, round, triangular, or
of any other shape. Comp. “the pattern (tabnit) of the Tabernacle and
the pattern (tabnit) of all its vessels” (Exod. xxv. 9); “according to
the pattern (tabnit) which thou wast shown upon the mount” (Exod. xxv.
40); “the form of any bird” (Deut. iv. 17); “the form (tabnit) of a
hand” (Ezek. viii. 3); “the pattern (tabnit) of the porch” (1 Chron.
xxviii. 11). In all these quotations it is the shape which is referred
to. Therefore the Hebrew language never employs the word tabnit in
speaking of the qualities of God Almighty.

The term temunah, on the other hand, is used in the Bible in three
different senses. It signifies, first, the outlines of things which are
perceived by our bodily senses, i.e., their shape and form; as, e.g.,
“And ye make an image the form (temunat) of some likeness” (Deut. iv.
16); “for ye saw no likeness” (temunah) (Deut. iv. 15). Secondly, the
forms of our imagination, i.e., the impressions retained in imagination
when the objects have ceased to affect our senses. In this sense it is
used in the passage which begins “In thoughts from the visions of the
night” (Job iv. 13), and which concludes “it remained but I could not
recognize its sight, only an image—temunah—was before my eyes,” i.e.,
an image which presented itself to my sight during sleep. Thirdly, the
true form of an object, which is perceived only by the intellect: and
it is in this third signification that the term is applied to God. The
words “And the similitude of the Lord shall he behold” (Num. xii. 8)
therefore mean “he shall comprehend the true essence of the Lord.”






CHAPTER IV


The three verbs raah, hibbit, and ḥazah, which denote “he perceived
with the eye,” are also used figuratively in the sense of intellectual
perception. As regards the first of these verbs this is well known,
e.g., “And he looked (va-yar) and behold a well in the field” (Gen.
xxix. 2): here it signifies ocular perception; “yea, my heart has seen
(raah) much of wisdom and of knowledge” (Eccles. i. 16); in this
passage it refers to the intellectual perception.

In this figurative sense the verb is to be understood, when applied to
God; e.g., “I saw (raïti) the Lord” (1 Kings xxii. 19); “And the Lord
appeared (va-yera) unto him” (Gen. xviii. 1); “And God saw (va-yar)
that it was good” (Gen. i. 10); “I beseech thee, show me (hareni) thy
glory” (Exod. xxxiii. 18); “And they saw (va-yirü) the God of Israel”
(Exod. xxiv. 10). All these instances refer to intellectual perception,
and by no means to perception with the eye as in its literal meaning:
for, on the one hand, the eye can only perceive a corporeal object, and
in connection with it certain accidents, as colour, shape, etc.; and,
on the other hand, God does not perceive by means of a corporeal organ,
as will be explained.

In the same manner the Hebrew hibbit signifies “he viewed” with the
eye; comp. “Look (tabbit) not behind thee” (Gen. xix. 17); “But his
wife looked (va-tabbet) back from him” (Gen. xix. 26); “And if one look
(ve-nibbat) unto the land” (Isa. v. 30); and figuratively, “to view and
observe” with the intellect, “to contemplate” a thing till it be
understood. In this sense the verb is used in passages like the
following: “He hath not beheld (hibbit) iniquity in Jacob” (Num. xxiii.
21); for “iniquity” cannot be seen with the eye. The words, “And they
looked (ve-hibbitu) after Moses” (Exod. xxxiii. 8)—in addition to the
literal understanding of the phrase—were explained by our Sages in a
figurative sense. According to them, these words mean that the
Israelites examined and criticised the actions and sayings of Moses.
Compare also “Contemplate (habbet), I pray thee, the heaven” (Gen. xv.
5); for this took place in a prophetic vision. This verb, when applied
to God, is employed in this figurative sense; e.g., “to look
(me-habbit) upon God” (Exod. iii. 6); “And the similitude of the Lord
shall he behold” (yabbit) (Num. xii. 8); “And thou canst not look
(habbet) on iniquity” (Hab. i. 13).

The same explanation applies to ḥazah. It denotes to view with the eye,
as: “And let our eye look (ve-taḥaz) upon Zion” (Mic. iv. 11); and also
figuratively, to perceive mentally: “which he saw (ḥazah) concerning
Judah and Jerusalem” (Isa. i. 1); “The word of the Lord came unto
Abraham in a vision” (maḥazeh) (Gen. xv. 1): in this sense ḥazah is
used in the phrase, “Also they saw (va-yeḥezu) God” (Exod. xxiv. 11).
Note this well.






CHAPTER V


When the chief of philosophers [Aristotle] was about to inquire into
some very profound subjects, and to establish his theory by proofs, he
commenced his treatise with an apology, and requested the reader to
attribute the author’s inquiries not to presumption, vanity, egotism,
or arrogance, as though he were interfering with things of which he had
no knowledge, but rather to his zeal and his desire to discover and
establish true doctrines, as far as lay in human power. We take the
same position, and think that a man, when he commences to speculate,
ought not to embark at once on a subject so vast and important; he
should previously adapt himself to the study of the several branches of
science and knowledge, should most thoroughly refine his moral
character and subdue his passions and desires, the offspring of his
imagination; when, in addition, he has obtained a knowledge of the true
fundamental propositions, a comprehension of the several methods of
inference and proof, and the capacity of guarding against fallacies,
then he may approach the investigation of this subject. He must,
however, not decide any question by the first idea that suggests itself
to his mind, or at once direct his thoughts and force them to obtain a
knowledge of the Creator, but he must wait modestly and patiently, and
advance step by step.

In this sense we must understand the words “And Moses hid his face, for
he was afraid to look upon God” (Exod. iii. 6), though retaining also
the literal meaning of the passage, that Moses was afraid to gaze at
the light which appeared to his eye; but it must on no account be
assumed that the Being which is exalted far above every imperfection
can be perceived by the eye. This act of Moses was highly commended by
God, who bestowed on him a well deserved portion of His goodness, as it
is said: “And the similitude of the Lord shall he behold” (Num. xii.
8). This, say our Sages, was the reward for having previously hidden
his face, lest he should gaze at the Eternal. (Talm. B. Berakot Fa.)

But “the nobles of the Children of Israel” were impetuous, and allowed
their thoughts to go unrestrained: what they perceived was but
imperfect. Therefore it is said of them, “And they saw the God of
Israel, and there was under his feet,” etc. (Exod. xxiv. 10); and not
merely, “and they saw the God of Israel”; the purpose of the whole
passage is to criticize their act of seeing and not to describe it.
They are blamed for the nature of their perception, which was to a
certain extent corporeal—a result which necessarily followed, from the
fact that they ventured too far before being perfectly prepared. They
deserved to perish, but at the intercession of Moses this fate was
averted by God for the time. They were afterwards burnt at Taberah,
except Nadab and Abihu, who were burnt in the Tabernacle of the
congregation, according to what is stated by authentic tradition.
(Midr. Rabba ad locum.)

If such was the case with them, how much more is it incumbent on us who
are inferior, and on those who are below us, to persevere in perfecting
our knowledge of the elements, and in rightly understanding the
preliminaries which purify the mind from the defilement of error; then
we may enter the holy and divine camp in order to gaze: as the Bible
says, “And let the priests also, which come near to the Lord, sanctify
themselves, lest the Lord break forth upon them” (Exod. xix. 22).
Solomon, also, has cautioned all who endeavour to attain this high
degree of knowledge in the following figurative terms, “Keep thy foot
when thou goest to the house of God” (Eccles. iv. 17).

I will now return to complete what I commenced to explain. The nobles
of the Children of Israel, besides erring in their perception, were,
through this cause, also misled in their actions; for in consequence of
their confused perception, they gave way to bodily cravings. This is
meant by the words, “Also they saw God and did eat and drink” (Exod.
xxiv. 11). The principal part of that passage, viz., “And there was
under his feet as it were a paved work of a sapphire stone” (Exod.
xxiv. 10), will be further explained in the course of the present
treatise (ch. xxviii.). All we here intend to say is, that wherever in
a similar connection any one of the three verbs mentioned above occurs,
it has reference to intellectual perception, not to the sensation of
sight by the eye; for God is not a being to be perceived by the eye.

It will do no harm, however, if those who are unable to comprehend what
we here endeavour to explain should refer all the words in question to
sensuous perception, to seeing lights created [for the purpose],
angels, or similar beings.






CHAPTER VI


The two Hebrew nouns ish and ishshah were originally employed to
designate the “male and female” of human beings, but were afterwards
applied to the “male and female” of the other species of the animal
creation. For instance, we read, “Of every clean beast thou shalt take
to thee by sevens,” ish ve-ishto (Gen. vii. 2), in the same sense as
ish ve-ishshah, “male and female.” The term zakar u-nekebah was
afterwards applied to anything designed and prepared for union with
another object. Thus we read, “The five curtains shall be coupled
together, one (ishshah) to the other” (aḥotah) (Exod. xxvi. 3).

It will easily be seen that the Hebrew equivalents for “brother and
sister” are likewise treated as homonyms, and used, in a figurative
sense, like ish and ishshah.






CHAPTER VII


It is well known that the verb yalad means “to bear,” “they have born
(ve-yaledu) him children” (Deut. xxi. 15). The word was next used in a
figurative sense with reference to various objects in nature, meaning,
“to create,” e.g. “before the mountains were created” (yulladu) (Ps.
xc. 2); also, “to produce,” in reference to that which the earth causes
to come forth as if by birth, e.g., “He will cause her to bear
(holidah) and bring forth” (Isa. lv. 10). The verb further denotes, “to
bring forth,” said of changes in the process of time, as though they
were things which were born, e.g., “for thou knowest not what a day may
bring forth” (yeled) (Prov. xxvii. 1). Another figurative use of the
word is its application to the formation of thoughts and ideas, or of
opinions resulting from them; comp. “and brought forth (ve-yalad)
falsehood” (Ps. vii. 14); also, “and they please themselves in the
children (yalde) of strangers” (Isa. ii. 6), i.e., “they delight in the
opinions of strangers.” Jonathan the son of Uzziel paraphrases this
passage, “they walk in the customs of other nations.”

A man who has instructed another in any subject, and has improved his
knowledge, may in like manner be regarded as the parent of the person
taught, because he is the author of that knowledge; and thus the pupils
of the prophets are called “sons of the prophets,” as I shall explain
when treating of the homonymity of ben (son). In this figurative sense,
the verb yalad (to bear) is employed when it is said of Adam, “And Adam
lived an hundred and thirty years, and begat (va-yoled) a son in his
own likeness, in his form” (Gen. v. 3). As regards the words, “the form
of Adam, and his likeness,” we have already stated (ch. i.) their
meaning. Those sons of Adam who were born before that time were not
human in the true sense of the word, they had not “the form of man.”
With reference to Seth who had been instructed, enlightened and brought
to human perfection, it could rightly be said, “he (Adam) begat a son
in his likeness, in his form.” It is acknowledged that a man who does
not possess this “form” (the nature of which has just been explained)
is not human, but a mere animal in human shape and form. Yet such a
creature has the power of causing harm and injury: a power which does
not belong to other creatures. For those gifts of intelligence and
judgment with which he has been endowed for the purpose of acquiring
perfection, but which he has failed to apply to their proper aim, are
used by him for wicked and mischievous ends; he begets evil things, as
though he merely resembled man, or simulated his outward appearance.
Such was the condition of those sons of Adam who preceded Seth. In
reference to this subject the Midrash says: “During the 130 years when
Adam was under rebuke he begat spirits,” i.e., demons; when, however,
he was again restored to divine favour “he begat in his likeness, in
his form.” This is the sense of the passage, “Adam lived one hundred
and thirty years, and he begat in his likeness, in his form” (Gen. v.
3).






CHAPTER VIII


Originally the Hebrew term makom (place) applied both to a particular
spot and to space in general; subsequently it received a wider
signification and denoted “position,” or “degree,” as regards the
perfection of man in certain things. We say, e.g., this man occupies a
certain place in such and such a subject. In this sense this term, as
is well known, is frequently used by authors, e.g., “He fills his
ancestors’ place (makom) in point of wisdom and piety”; “the dispute
still remains in its place” (makom), i.e., in statu quo [ante]. In the
verse, “Blessed be the glory of the Lord from His place” (mekomo)
(Ezek. iii. 12), makom has this figurative meaning, and the verse may
be paraphrased “Blessed be the Lord according to the exalted nature of
His existence,” and wherever makom is applied to God, it expresses the
same idea, namely, the distinguished position of His existence, to
which nothing is equal or comparable, as will be shown below (chap.
lvi.).

It should be observed that when we treat in this work of any homonym,
we do not desire you to confine yourself to that which is stated in
that particular chapter; but we open for you a portal and direct your
attention to those significations of the word which are suited to our
purpose, though they may not be complete from a philological point of
view. You should examine the prophetical books and other works composed
by men of science, notice the meaning of every word which occurs in
them, and take homonyms in that sense which is in harmony with the
context. What I say in a particular passage is a key for the
comprehension of all similar passages. For example, we have explained
here makom in the sentence “Blessed be the glory of the Lord from His
place” (mekomo); but you must understand that the word makom has the
same signification in the passage “Behold, a place (makom) is with me”
(Exod. xxxiii. 26), viz., a certain degree of contemplation and
intellectual intuition (not of ocular inspection), in addition to its
literal meaning “a place,” viz., the mountain which was pointed out to
Moses for seclusion and for the attainment of perfection.






CHAPTER IX


The original meaning of the word kisse, “throne,” requires no comment.
Since men of greatness and authority, as, e.g., kings, use the throne
as a seat, and “the throne” thus indicates the rank, dignity, and
position of the person for whom it is made, the Sanctuary has been
styled “the throne,” inasmuch as it likewise indicates the superiority
of Him who manifests Himself, and causes His light and glory to dwell
therein. Comp. “A glorious throne on high from the beginning is the
place of our sanctuary” (Jer. xvii. 12). For the same reason the
heavens are called “throne,” for to the mind of him who observes them
with intelligence they suggest the Omnipotence of the Being which has
called them into existence, regulates their motions, and governs the
sublunary world by their beneficial influence: as we read, “Thus saith
the Lord, The heavens are my throne and the earth my footstool” (Isa.
lxvi. 1); i.e., they testify to my Existence, my Essence, and my
Omnipotence, as the throne testifies to the greatness of him who is
worthy to occupy it.

This is the idea which true believers should entertain; not, however,
that the Omnipotent, Supreme God is supported by any material object;
for God is incorporeal, as we shall prove further on; how, then, can He
be said to occupy any space, or rest on a body? The fact which I wish
to point out is this: every place distinguished by the Almighty, and
chosen to receive His light and splendour, as, for instance, the
Sanctuary or the Heavens, is termed “throne”; and, taken in a wider
sense, as in the passage “For my hand is upon the throne of God” (Exod.
xvii. 16), “the throne” denotes here the Essence and Greatness of God.
These, however (the Essence and Greatness of God) need not be
considered as something separate from the God Himself or as part of the
Creation, so that God would appear to have existed both without the
throne, and with the throne; such a belief would be undoubtedly
heretical. It is distinctly stated, “Thou, O Lord, remainest for ever;
Thy throne from generation to generation” (Lam. v. 19). By “Thy throne”
we must, therefore, understand something inseparable from God. On that
account, both here and in all similar passages, the word “throne”
denotes God’s Greatness and Essence, which are inseparable from His
Being.

Our opinion will be further elucidated in the course of this Treatise.






CHAPTER X


We have already remarked that when we treat in this work of homonyms,
we have not the intention to exhaust the meanings of a word (for this
is not a philological treatise); we shall mention no other
significations but those which bear on our subject. We shall thus
proceed in our treatment of the terms ʻalah and yarad.

These two words, ʻalah, “he went up,” and yarad, “he went down,” are
Hebrew terms used in the sense of ascending and descending. When a body
moves from a higher to a lower place, the verb yarad, “to go down,” is
used; when it moves from a lower to a higher place, ʻalah, “to go up,”
is applied. These two verbs were afterwards employed with regard to
greatness and power. When a man falls from his high position, we say
“he has come down,” and when he rises in station “he has gone up.” Thus
the Almighty says, “The stranger that is within thee shall get up above
thee very high, and thou shalt come down very low” (Deut. xxviii. 43).
Again, “The Lord thy God will set thee on high (ʻelyon) above all
nations of the earth” (Deut. xxviii. 1): “And the Lord magnified
Solomon exceedingly” (lemaʻalah) (1 Chron. xxix. 25). The Sages often
employ these expressions, as: “In holy matters men must ascend
(maʻalin) and not descend (moridin).” The two words are also applied to
intellectual processes, namely, when we reflect on something beneath
ourselves we are said to go down, and when our attention is raised to a
subject above us we are said to rise.

Now, we occupy a lowly position, both in space and rank in comparison
with the heavenly sphere, and the Almighty is Most High not in space,
but with respect to absolute existence, greatness and power. When it
pleased the Almighty to grant to a human being a certain degree of
wisdom or prophetic inspiration, the divine communication thus made to
the prophet and the entrance of the Divine Presence into a certain
place is termed yeridah, “descending,” while the termination of the
prophetic communication or the departure of the divine glory from a
place is called ʻaliyah, “ascending.”

The expressions “to go up” and “to go down,” when used in reference to
God, must be interpreted in this sense. Again, when, in accordance with
the divine will, some misfortune befalls a nation or a region of the
earth, and when the biblical account of that misfortune is preceded by
the statement that the Almighty visited the actions of the people, and
that He punished them accordingly, then the prophetic author employs
the term “to descend”: for man is so low and insignificant that his
actions would not be visited and would not bring punishment on him,
were it not for the divine will: as is clearly stated in the Bible,
with regard to this idea, “What is man that thou shouldst remember him,
and the son of man that thou shouldst visit him” (Ps. viii. 5).

The design of the Deity to punish man is, therefore, introduced by the
verb “to descend”; comp. “Go to, let us go down and there confound
their language” (Gen. xi. 7); “And the Lord came down to see” (Gen. xi.
5); “I will go down now and see” (Gen. xviii. 21). All these instances
convey the idea that man here below is going to be punished.

More numerous, however, are the instances of the first case, viz., in
which these verbs are used in connection with the revelation of the
word and of the glory of God, e.g., “And I will come down and talk with
thee there” (Num. xi. 17); “And the Lord came down upon Mount Sinai”
(Exod. xix. 20); “The Lord will come down in the sight of all the
people” (Exod. xix. 11); “And God went up from him” (Gen. xxxv. 13);
“And God went up from Abraham” (Gen. xvii. 22). When, on the other
hand, it says, “And Moses went up unto God” (Exod. xix. 3), it must be
taken in the third signification of these verbs, in addition to its
literal meaning that Moses also ascended to the top of the mount, upon
which a certain material light (the manifestation of God’s glory) was
visible; but we must not imagine that the Supreme Being occupies a
place to which we can ascend, or from which we can descend. He is far
from what the ignorant imagine.






CHAPTER XI


The primary meaning of the Hebrew yashab is “he was seated,” as “Now
Eli the priest sat (yashab) upon a seat” (1 Sam. i. 9); but, since a
person can best remain motionless and at rest when sitting, the term
was applied to everything that is permanent and unchanging; thus, in
the promise that Jerusalem should remain constantly and permanently in
an exalted condition, it is stated, “She will rise and sit in her
place” (Zech. xiv. 10); further, “He maketh the woman who was childless
to sit as a joyful mother of children” (Ps. cxiii. 9); i.e., He makes
her happy condition to be permanent and enduring.

When applied to God, the verb is to be taken in that latter sense:
“Thou, O Lord, remainest (tesheb) for ever” (Lam. v. 19); “O thou who
sittest (ha-yoshebi) in the heavens” (Ps. cxxiii. 1); “He who sitteth
in the heavens” (ii. 4), i.e., He who is everlasting, constant, and in
no way subject to change; immutable in His Essence, and as He consists
of nought but His Essence, He is mutable in no way whatever; not
mutable in His relation to other things; for there is no relation
whatever existing between Him and any other being, as will be explained
below, and therefore no change as regards such relations can take place
in Him. Hence He is immutable in every respect, as He expressly
declares, “I, the Lord, do not change” (Mal. iii. 6); i.e., in Me there
is not any change whatever. This idea is expressed by the term yashab
when referring to God.

The verb, when employed of God, is frequently complemented by “the
Heavens,” inasmuch as the heavens are without change or mutation, that
is to say, they do not individually change, as the individual beings on
earth, by transition from existence into non-existence.

The verb is also employed in descriptions of God’s relation (the term
“relation” is here used as a homonym) to existing species of evanescent
things; for those species are as constant, well organized, and
unvarying as the individuals of the heavenly hosts. Thus we find, “Who
sitteth over the circle of the earth” (Isa. xl. 22), Who remains
constantly and unremittingly over the sphere of the earth; that is to
say, over the things that come into existence within that sphere.

Again, “The Lord sitteth upon the flood” (Ps. xxix. 10), i.e., despite
the change and variation of earthly objects, no change takes place with
respect to God’s relation (to the earth): His relation to each of the
things which come into existence and perish again is stable and
constant, for it concerns only the existing species and not the
individuals. It should therefore be borne in mind, that whenever the
term “sitting” is applied to God, it is used in this sense.






CHAPTER XII


The term kam (he rose) is a homonym. In one of its significations it is
the opposite of “to sit,” as “He did not rise (kam) nor move for him”
(Esth. v. 9). It further denotes the confirmation and verification of a
thing, e.g.: “The Lord will verify (yakem) His promise” (1 Sam. i. 23);
“The field of Ephron was made sure (va-yakom) as the property of
Abraham” (Gen. xxiii. 17). “The house that is in the walled city shall
be established (ve-kam)” (Lev. xxv. 30); “And the kingdom of Israel
shall be firmly established (ve-kamah) in thy hand” (1 Sam. xxiv. 20).
It is always in this sense that the verb is employed with reference to
the Almighty; as “Now shall I rise (akum), saith the Lord” (Ps. xii.
7), which is the same as saying, “Now shall I verify my word and my
dispensation for good or evil.” “Thou shalt arise (takum) and have
mercy upon Zion” (Ps. cii. 13), which means: Thou wilt establish what
thou hast promised, viz., that thou wouldst pity Zion.

Generally a person who resolves to set about a matter, accompanies his
resolve by rising, hence the verb is employed to express “to resolve”
to do a certain thing; as, “That my son hath stirred up my servant
against me” (1 Sam. xxii. 8). The word is figuratively used to signify
the execution of a divine decree against a people sentenced to
extermination, as “And I will rise against the house of Jeroboam” (Amos
vii. 9); “but he will arise against the house of the evildoers” (Isa.
xxxi. 2). Possibly in Psalm xii. 7 the verb has this latter sense, as
also in Psalm cii. 13, namely: Thou wilt rise up against her enemies.

There are many passages to be interpreted in this manner, but in no way
should it be understood that He rises or sits—far be such a notion! Our
Sages expressed this idea in the formula, “In the world above there is
neither sitting nor standing (ʻamidah)”; for the two verbs ʻamad and
kam are synonyms [and what is said about the former is also applicable
to the latter].






CHAPTER XIII


The term ʻamad (he stood) is a homonym signifying in the first instance
“to stand upright,” as “When he stood (be-ʻomdo) before Pharaoh” (Gen.
xli. 46); “Though Moses and Samuel stood (yaʻamod)” (Jer. xv. 1); “He
stood by them” (Gen. xviii. 8). It further denotes “cessation and
interruption,” as “but they stood still (ʻamedu) and answered no more”
(Job xxxii. 16); “and she ceased (va-taʻamod) to bear” (Gen. xxix. 35).
Next it signifies “to be enduring and lasting,” as, “that they may
continue (yo-ʻamedu) many days” (Jer. xxxii. 14); “Then shalt thou be
able to endure (ʻamod)” (Exod. xviii. 23); “His taste remained (ʻamad)
in him” (Jer. xlviii. 11), i.e., it has continued and remained in
existence without any change; “His righteousness standeth for ever”
(Ps. cxi. 3), i.e., it is permanent and everlasting. The verb applied
to God must be understood in this latter sense, as in Zechariah xiv. 4,
“And his feet shall stand (ve-ʻamedu) in that day upon the Mount of
Olives” (Zech. xiv. 4), “His causes, i.e., the events of which He is
the cause, will remain efficient,” etc. This will be further elucidated
when we speak of the meaning of regel (foot). (Vide infra, chap,
xxviii.) In the same sense is this verb employed in Deuteronomy v. 28,
“But as for thee, stand thou here by me,” and Deuteronomy v. 5, “I
stood between the Lord and you.”






CHAPTER XIV


The homonymous term adam is in the first place the name of the first
man, being, as Scripture indicates, derived from adamah, “earth.” Next,
it means “mankind,” as “My spirit shall not strive with man (adam)”
(Gen. vi. 3). Again “Who knoweth the spirit of the children of man
(adam)” (Eccles. iii. 21); “so that a man (adam) has no pre-eminence
above a beast” (Eccles. iii. 19). Adam signifies also “the multitude,”
“the lower classes” as opposed to those distinguished from the rest, as
“Both low (bene adam) and high (bene ish)” (Ps. xlix. 3).

It is in this third signification that it occurs in the verses, “The
sons of the higher order (Elohim) saw the daughters of the lower order
(adam)” (Gen. vi. 2); and “Forsooth! as the humble man (adam) you shall
die” (Ps. lxxxii. 7).






CHAPTER XV


Although the two roots naẓab and yaẓab are distinct, yet their meaning
is, as you know, identical in all their various forms.

The verb has several meanings: in some instances it signifies “to
stand” or “to place oneself,” as “And his sister stood (va-tetaẓẓab)
afar off” (Exod. ii. 4); “The kings of the earth set themselves”
(yityaẓẓebu) (Ps. ii. 2); “They came out and stood” (niẓẓabim) (Num.
xvi. 27). In other instances it denotes continuance and permanence, as,
“Thy word is established (niẓẓab) in Heaven” (Ps. cxix. 89), i.e., it
remains for ever.

Whenever this term is applied to God it must be understood in the
latter sense, as, “And, behold, the Lord stood (niẓẓab) upon it” (Gen.
xxviii. 13), i.e., appeared as eternal and everlasting “upon it,”
namely, upon the ladder, the upper end of which reached to heaven,
while the lower end touched the earth. This ladder all may climb up who
wish to do so, and they must ultimately attain to a knowledge of Him
who is above the summit of the ladder, because He remains upon it
permanently. It must be well understood that the term “upon it” is
employed by me in harmony with this metaphor. “Angels of God” who were
going up represent the prophets. That the term “angel” was applied to
prophets may clearly be seen in the following passages: “He sent an
angel” (Num. xx. 16); “And an angel of the Lord came up from Gilgal to
Bochim” (Judges ii. 1). How suggestive, too, is the expression
“ascending and descending on it”! The ascent is mentioned before the
descent, inasmuch as the “ascending” and arriving at a certain height
of the ladder precedes the “descending,” i.e., the application of the
knowledge acquired in the ascent for the training and instruction of
mankind. This application is termed “descent,” in accordance with our
explanation of the term yarad (chapter x.).

To return to our subject. The phrase “stood upon it” indicates the
permanence and constancy of God, and does not imply the idea of
physical position. This is also the sense of the phrase “Thou shalt
stand upon the rock” (Exod. xxxiii. 21). It is therefore clear that
niẓẓab and ʻamad are identical in this figurative signification. Comp.
“Behold, I will stand (ʻomed) before thee there upon the rock in Horeb”
(Exod. xvii. 6).






CHAPTER XVI


The word ẓur (rock) is a homonym. First, it denotes “rock,” as “And
thou shalt smite the rock” (ẓur) (Exod. xvii. 6). Then, “hard stone,”
like the flint, e.g., “Knives of stone” (ẓurim) (Josh. v. 2). It is
next employed to signify the quarry from which the stones are hewn;
comp. “Look unto the rock (ẓur) whence ye are hewn” (Isa. li. 1). From
this latter meaning of the term another figurative notion was
subsequently derived, viz., “the root and origin” of all things. It is
on this account that after the words “Look to the rock whence ye are
hewn,” the Prophet continues, “Look unto Abraham your father,” from
which we evidently may infer that the words “Abraham your father” serve
to explain “the rock whence ye are hewn”; and that the Prophet meant to
say, “Walk in his ways, put faith in his instruction, and conduct
yourselves according to the rule of his life! for the properties
contained in the quarry should be found again in those things which are
formed and hewn out of it.”

It is in the latter sense that the Almighty is called “rock,” He being
the origin and the causa efficiens of all things besides Himself. Thus
we read, “He is the Rock, His work is perfect” (Deut. xxxii. 4); “Of
the Rock that begat thee thou art unmindful” (Deut. xxxii. 18); “Their
Rock had sold them” (xxxi. 30); “There is no rock like our God” (1 Sam.
ii. 2): “The Rock of Eternity” (Isa. xxvi. 4). Again, “And thou shalt
stand upon the Rock” (Exod. xxxiii. 21), i.e., Be firm and steadfast in
the conviction that God is the source of all things, for this will lead
you towards the knowledge of the Divine Being. We have shown (chap.
viii.) that the words “Behold, a place is with me” (Exod. xxxiii. 21)
contain the same idea.






CHAPTER XVII


Do not imagine that only Metaphysics should be taught with reserve to
the common people and to the uninitiated; for the same is also the case
with the greater part of Natural Science. In this sense we have
repeatedly made use of the expression of the Sages, “Do not expound the
chapter on the Creation in the presence of two” [vide Introd. page 2].
This principle was not peculiar to our Sages; ancient philosophers and
scholars of other nations were likewise wont to treat of the principia
rerum obscurely, and to use figurative language in discussing such
subjects. Thus Plato and his predecessors called Substance the female,
and Form the male. (You are aware that the principia of all existing
transient things are three, viz., Substance, Form, and Absence of a
particular form; the last-named principle is always inherent in the
substance, for otherwise the substance would be incapable of receiving
a new form; and it is from this point of view that absence [of a
particular form] is included among the principia. As soon, then, as a
substance has received a certain form, the privation of that form,
namely, of that which has just been received, has ceased, and is
replaced by the privation of another form, and so on with all possible
forms, as is explained in treatises on natural philosophy.)—Now, if
those philosophers who have nothing to fear from a lucid explanation of
these metaphysical subjects still were in the habit of discussing them
in figures and metaphors, how much more should we, having the interest
of religion at heart, refrain from elucidating to the mass any subject
that is beyond their comprehension, or that might be taken in a sense
directly opposite to the one intended. This also deserves attention.






CHAPTER XVIII


The three words karab, “to come near,” nagaʻ, “to touch,” and nagash,
“to approach,” sometimes signify “contact” or “nearness in space,”
sometimes the approach of man’s knowledge to an object, as if it
resembled the physical approach of one body to another. As to the use
of karab in the first meaning, viz., to draw near a certain spot, comp.
“As he drew near (karab) the camp” (Exod. xxxii. 19); “And Pharaoh drew
near (hikrib)” (Exod. xiv. 10). Nagaʻ, in the first sense, viz.,
expressing the contact of two bodies, occurs in “And she cast it
(va-taggaʻ) at his feet” (Exod. iv. 25); “He caused it to touch
(va-yaggaʻ) my mouth” (Isa. vi. 7). And nagash in the first sense,
viz., to approach or move towards another person, is found, e.g., in
“And Judah drew near (va-yiggash) unto him” (Gen. xliv. 1).

The second meaning of these three words is “approach by means of
knowledge,” or “contact by comprehension,” not in reference to space.
As to nagaʻ in this second sense, comp. “for her judgment reacheth
(nagaʻ) unto heaven” (Jer. li. 9). An instance of karab being used in
this meaning is contained in the following passage, “And the cause that
is too hard for you, bring (takribun) it unto me” (Deut. i. 17); this
is equivalent to saying, “Ye shall make it known unto me.” The verb
karab (in the Hiphil) is thus employed in the sense of giving
information concerning a thing. The verb nagash is used figuratively in
the phrase, “And Abraham drew near (va-yiggash), and said” (Gen. xviii.
23); this took place in a prophetic vision and in a trance, as will be
explained (Part I. chap, xxi., and Part II. chap, xli.); also in
“Forasmuch as this people draw near (niggash) me with their mouths and
with their lips” (Isa. xxix. 13). Wherever a word denoting approach or
contact is employed in the prophetic writings to describe a certain
relation between the Almighty and any created being, it has to be
understood in this latter sense [viz., to approach mentally]. For, as
will be proved in this treatise (II. chap, iv.), the Supreme is
incorporeal, and consequently He does not approach or draw near a
thing, nor can aught approach or touch Him; for when a being is without
corporeality, it cannot occupy space, and all idea of approach,
contact, distance, conjunction, separation, touch, or proximity is
inapplicable to such a being.

There can be no doubt respecting the verses “The Lord is nigh (karob)
unto all them that call upon him” (Ps. cxlv. 18); “They take delight in
approaching (kirbat) to God” (Isa. lviii. 2); “The nearness (kirbat) of
God is pleasant to me” (Ps. lxxiii. 28); all such phrases intimate a
spiritual approach, i.e., the attainment of some knowledge, not,
however, approach in space. Thus also “who hath God so nigh (kerobim)
unto him” (Deut. iv. 7); “Draw thou near (kerab) and hear” (Deut. v.
27); “And Moses alone shall draw near (ve-niggash) the Lord; but they
shall not come nigh (yiggashu)” (Exod. xxiv. 2).

If, however, you wish to take the words “And Moses shall draw near” to
mean that he shall draw near a certain place in the mountain, whereon
the Divine Light shone, or, in the words of the Bible, “where the glory
of the Lord abode,” you may do so, provided you do not lose sight of
the truth that there is no difference whether a person stand at the
centre of the earth or at the highest point of the ninth sphere, if
this were possible; he is no further away from God in the one case, or
nearer to Him in the other; those only approach Him who obtain a
knowledge of Him; while those who remain ignorant of Him recede from
Him. In this approach towards, or recession from God there are numerous
grades one above the other, and I shall further elucidate, in one of
the subsequent chapters of the Treatise (I. chap, lx., and II. chap,
xxxvi.) what constitutes the difference in our perception of God.

In the passage, “Touch (gaʻ) the mountains, and they shall smoke” (Ps.
cxliv. 5), the verb “touch” is used in a figurative sense, viz., “Let
thy word touch them.” So also the words, “Touch thou him himself” (Job
ii. 5), have the same meaning as “Bring thy infliction upon him.” In a
similar manner must this verb, in whatever form it may be employed, be
interpreted in each place, according to the context; for in some cases
it denotes contact of two material objects, in others knowledge and
comprehension of a thing, as if he who now comprehends anything which
he had not comprehended previously had thereby approached a subject
which had been distant from him. This point is of considerable
importance.






CHAPTER XIX


The term male is a homonym which denotes that one substance enters
another, and fills it, as “And she filled (va-temalle) her pitcher”
(Gen. xxiv. 16); “An omer-full (melo) for each” (Exod. xvi. 32), and
many other instances. Next, it signifies the expiration or completion
of a fixed period of time, as “And when her days to be delivered were
fulfilled (va-yimleü)” (Gen. xxv. 24); “And forty days were completed
(va-yimleü) for him” (Gen. l. 3). It further denotes attainment of the
highest degree of excellency, as “Full (male) with the blessing of the
Lord” (Deut. xxxiii. 23); “Them hath he filled (mille) with wisdom of
heart” (Exod. xxxv. 35); “He was filled (va-yimmale) with wisdom, and
understanding, and cunning” (1 Kings vii. 14). In this sense it is said
“The whole earth is full (melo) of his glory” (Isa. vi. 4), “All the
earth gives evidence of his perfection,” i.e. leads to a knowledge of
it. Thus also “The glory of the Lord filled (male) the tabernacle”
(Exod. xl. 34); and, in fact, every application of the word to God must
be interpreted in this manner; and not that He has a body occupying
space. If, on the other hand, you prefer to think that in this passage
by “the glory of the Lord,” a certain light created for the purpose is
to be understood, that such light is always termed “glory,” and that
such light “filled the tabernacle,” we have no objection.






CHAPTER XX


The word ram (high) is a homonym, denoting elevation in space, and
elevation in dignity, i.e., greatness, honour, and power. It has the
first meaning in “And the ark was lifted up (va-tarom) above the earth”
(Gen. vii. 17); and the latter meaning in “I have exalted (harimoti)
one chosen out of the people” (Ps. lxxxix. 20); “Forasmuch as I have
exalted (harimoti) thee from amongst the dust” (1 Kings xvi. 2);
“Forasmuch as I exalted (harimoti) thee from among the people” (1 Kings
xiv. 7).

Whenever this term is employed in reference to God, it must be taken in
the second sense: “Be thou exalted (rumah), O God, above the heavens”
(Ps. lvii. 12). In the same manner does the root nasa (to lift up)
denote both elevation in space and elevation in rank and dignity. In
the former sense it occurs in “And they lifted up (va-yisseü) their
corn upon their asses” (Gen. xlii. 26); and there are many instances
like this in which this verb has the meaning “to carry,” “to move” from
place to place; for this implies elevation in space. In the second
sense we have “And his kingdom shall be exalted” (ve-tinnase) (Num.
xxiv. 7); “And he bare them, and carried them” (va-yenasseëm) (Isa.
lxiii. 9); “Wherefore do ye exalt yourselves” (titnasseü) (Num. xvi.
3).

Every form of this verb when applied to God has this latter sense—e.g.,
“Lift up thyself (hinnase), thou judge of the earth” (Ps. xciv. 2);
“Thus saith the High (ram) and Exalted (nissa) One” (Isa. lvii.
15)—denoting elevation in rank, quality, and power, and not elevation
in space.

You may be surprised that I employ the expression, “elevation in rank,
quality, and power,” and you may say, “How can you assert that several
distinct expressions denote the same thing?” It will be explained later
on (chap. l. seqq.) that those who possess a true knowledge of God do
not consider that He possesses many attributes, but believe that these
various attributes which describe His Might, Greatness, Power,
Perfection, Goodness, etc., are identical, denoting His Essence, and
not anything extraneous to His Essence. I shall devote special chapters
to the Names and Attributes of God; our intention here is solely to
show that “high and exalted” in the passage quoted denote elevation in
rank, not in space.






CHAPTER XXI


In its primary signification the Hebrew ʻabar, “to pass,” refers to the
motion of a body in space, and is chiefly applied to living creatures
moving at some distance in a straight line, e.g., “And He passed over
(ʻabar) before them” (Gen. xxxiii. 3); “Pass (ʻabor) before the people”
(Exod. xvii. 5). Instances of this kind are numerous. The verb was next
applied to the passage of sound through air, as “And they caused a
sound to pass (va-yaʻabiru) throughout the camp” (Exod. xxxvi. 6);
“That I hear the Lord’s people spreading the report” (maʻabirim) (1
Sam. ii. 24).

Figuratively it denoted the appearance of the Light and the Divine
Presence (Shechinah) which the prophets perceived in their prophetic
visions, as it is said, “And behold a smoking furnace, and a burning
lamp that passed (ʻabar) between those pieces” (Gen. xv. 17). This took
place in a prophetic vision, for the narrative commences, “And a deep
sleep fell upon Abram.” The verb has this latter meaning in Exodus xii.
12, “And I shall pass (ve-ʻabarti) through the land of Egypt” (denoting
“I shall reveal myself,” etc.), and in all similar phrases.

The verb is next employed to express that a person has gone too far,
and transgressed the usual limit, in the performance of some act, as
“And as a man who is drinking wine has passed (ʻabarv) the proper
limit” (Jer. xxiii. 9).

It is also used figuratively to denote: to abandon one aim, and turn to
a different aim and object, e.g., “He shot an arrow, causing it to miss
the aim (lehaʻabiro)” (1 Sam. xx. 36). This is the sense, it appears to
me, of this verb in “And the Lord passed by (va-yaʻabor) before his
face” (Exod. xxxiv. 6). I take “his face” to mean “the face of God”;
our Teachers likewise interpreted “his face” as being identical with
“the face of God.” And, although this is found in the midst of Agadic
interpretations which would be out of place in this our work, yet it is
some support of our view, that the pronoun “his” is employed in this
passage as a substitute for “God’s”—and the whole passage could in my
opinion be explained as follows: Moses sought to attain to a certain
perception which is called “the perception of the Divine face,” a term
occurring in the phrase “My face cannot be seen”; but God vouchsafed to
him a perception of a lower degree, viz., the one called, “the seeing
of the back,” in the words, “And thou shalt see my back” (Exod. xxxiii.
23). We have mentioned this subject in our work Mishneh Torah.
Accordingly, it is stated in the above-mentioned passage that the Lord
withheld from Moses that perception which is termed “the seeing of the
Divine face,” and substituted for it another gift, viz., the knowledge
of the acts attributed to God, which, as I shall explain (chap. liv.)
are considered to be different and separate attributes of the Supreme.
In asserting that God withheld from Moses (the higher knowledge) I mean
to say that this knowledge was unattainable, that by its nature it was
inaccessible to Moses; for man, whilst able to gain perfection by
applying his reasoning faculties to the attainment of what is within
the reach of his intellect, either weakens his reason or loses it
altogether as soon as he ventures to seek a higher degree of
knowledge—as I shall elucidate in one of the chapters of this
work—unless he be granted a special aid from heaven, as is described in
the words, “And I will cover thee with my hand until I pass by” (Exod.
xxxiii. 23).

Onkelos, in translating this verse, adopts the same method which he
applies to the explanation of similar passages, viz., every expression
implying corporeality or corporal properties, when referring to God, he
explains by assuming an ellipsis of a nomen regens before “God,” thus
connecting the expression (of corporeality) with another word which is
supplied, and which governs the genitive “God”; e.g., “And behold the
Lord stood upon it” (Gen. xxviii. 13), he explains, “The glory of the
Lord stood arrayed above it.” Again, “The Lord watch between me and
thee” (Gen. xxxi. 49), he paraphrases, “The word of the Lord shall
watch.” This is his ordinary method in explaining Scripture. He applies
it also to Exod. xxxiv. 6, which he paraphrases, “The Lord caused his
Presence to pass before his face and called.” According to this
rendering the thing which passed was unquestionably some physical
object, the pronoun “his” refers to Moses, and the phrase ʻal panav is
identical with lefanav, “before him.” Comp. “So went the present over
before him” (ʻal panav) (Gen. xxxii, 22). This is likewise an
appropriate and satisfactory explanation; and I can adduce still
further support for the opinion of Onkelos from the words “while my
glory passeth by” (ba-ʻabor) (Exod. xxxiii. 22), which expressly state
that the passing object was something ascribed to God, not God Himself;
and of this Divine glory it is also said, “until I pass by,” and “And
the Lord passed by before him.”

Should it, however, be considered necessary to assume here an ellipsis,
according to the method of Onkelos, who supplies in some instances the
term “the Glory,” in others “the Word,” and in others “the Divine
Presence,” as the context may require in each particular case, we may
also supply here the word “voice,” and explain the passage, “And a
voice from the Lord passed before him and called.” We have already
shown that the verb ʻabar, “he passed,” can be applied to the voice, as
in “And they caused a voice to pass through the camp” (Exod. xxxvi. 6).
According to this explanation, it was the voice which called. No
objection can be raised to applying the verb kara (he called) to kol
(voice), for a similar phrase occurs in the Bible in reference to God’s
commands to Moses, “He heard the voice speaking unto him”; and, in the
same manner as it can be said “the voice spoke,” we may also say “the
voice called”; indeed, we can even support this application of the
verbs “to say,” and “to call,” to “the voice,” by parallel passages, as
“A voice saith ‘Cry,’ and it says ‘What shall I cry?’” (Isa. xl. 6).
According to this view, the meaning of the passage under discussion
would be: “A voice of God passed before him and called, ‘Eternal,
Eternal, All-powerful, All-merciful, and All-gracious!’” (The word
Eternal is repeated; it is in the vocative, for the Eternal is the one
who is called. Comp. Moses, Moses! Abraham, Abraham!) This, again, is a
very appropriate explanation of the text.

You will surely not find it strange that this subject, so profound and
difficult, should bear various interpretations; for it will not impair
the force of the argument with which we are here concerned. Either
explanation may be adopted; you may take that grand scene altogether as
a prophetic vision, and the whole occurrence as a mental operation, and
consider that what Moses sought, what was withheld from him, and what
he attained, were things perceived by the intellect without the use of
the senses (as we have explained above): or you may assume that in
addition there was a certain ocular perception of a material object,
the sight of which would assist intellectual perception. The latter is
the view of Onkelos, unless he assumes that in this instance the ocular
perception was likewise a prophetic vision, as was the case with “a
smoking furnace and a burning lamp that passed between those pieces”
(Gen. xv. 17), mentioned in the history of Abraham. You may also assume
that in addition there was a perception of sound, and that there was a
voice which passed before him, and was undoubtedly something material.
You may choose either of these opinions, for our sole intention and
purpose is to guard you against the belief that the phrase “and the
Lord passed,” is analogous to “pass before the people” (Exod. xvii. 5),
for God, being incorporeal, cannot be said to move, and consequently
the verb “to pass” cannot with propriety be applied to Him in its
primary signification.






CHAPTER XXII


In Hebrew, the verb bo signifies “to come” as applied to a living
being, i.e., its arrival at a certain place, or approach to a certain
person, as “Thy brother came (ba) with subtilty” (Gen. xxvii. 35). It
next denotes (with regard to a living being) “to enter” a certain
place, e.g., “And when Joseph came (va-yabo) into the house” (Gen.
xliii. 26); “When ye come (ta-boü) into the land” (Exod. xii. 25). The
term was also employed metaphorically in the sense of “to come” applied
to a certain event, that is, to something incorporeal, as “When thy
sayings come to pass (yabo)” (Judg. xiii. 17); “Of that which will come
(yaboü) over thee” (Isa. xlvii. 13). Nay, it is even applied to
privatives, e.g., “Yet evil came (va-yabo)” (Job iii. 26); “And
darkness came (va-yabo)” Now, since the word has been applied to
incorporeal things, it has also been used in reference to God—to the
fulfilment of His word, or to the manifestation of His Presence (the
Shechinah). In this figurative sense it is said, “Lo, I come (ba) unto
thee in a thick cloud” (Exod. xix. 9); “For the Lord the God of Israel
cometh (ba) through it” (Ezek. xliv. 2). In these and all similar
passages, the coming of the Shechinah is meant, but the words, “And the
Lord my God shall come (u-ba)” (Zech. xiv. 5) are identical with “His
word will come,” that is to say, the promises which He made through the
Prophets will be fulfilled; therefore Scripture adds “all the holy ones
that are with thee,” that is to say, “The word of the Lord my God will
be performed, which has been spoken by all the holy ones who are with
thee, who address the Israelites.”






CHAPTER XXIII


Yaẓa (“he came out”) is the opposite of ba (“he came in”). The term
yaẓa is applied to the motion of a body from a place in which it had
previously rested, to another place (whether the body be a living being
or not), e.g., “And when they were gone out (yaẓeü) of the city” (Gen.
xliv. 4); “If fire break out (teẓe)” (Exod. xxii. 5). It was then
figuratively employed to denote the appearance of something
incorporeal, as, “The word went out (yaẓa) of the king’s mouth” (Esth.
vii. 8); “When this deed of the queen shall come abroad (yeẓe) unto all
women” (Esth. i. 17), that is to say, “the report will spread.” Again,
“For out of Zion shall go forth (teẓe) the Law” (Isa. ii. 3); further,
“The sun had risen (yaẓa) upon the earth” (Gen. xix. 23), i.e., its
light became visible.

In this figurative sense we must take every expression of coming out
when applied to the Almighty, e.g., “Behold, the Lord cometh out (yoẓe)
of his place” (Isa. xxvi. 21), i.e., “The word of God, which until now
has been in secret, cometh out, and will become manifest,” i.e.,
something will come into being which had not existed before; for
everything new emanating from God is ascribed to His word. Comp. “By
the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by
the breath of his mouth” (Ps. xxxiii. 6). This is a simile taken from
the conduct of kings, who employ the word as the means of carrying
their will into effect. God, however, requires no instrument wherewith
to operate in order to perform anything; the effect is produced solely
by His will alone. He does not employ any kind of speech, as will be
explained further on (chap. lv.).

The verb “to come out” is thus employed to designate the manifestation
of a certain work of God, as we noticed in our interpretation of the
phrase, “Behold, the Lord cometh out of his place.” In a similar manner
the term shub, “to return,” has been figuratively employed to denote
the discontinuance of a certain act according to the will of God, as in
“I will go and return to my place” (Hosea v. 15); that is to say, the
Divine presence (Shechinah) which had been in our midst departed from
us, the consequence of which has been the absence of Divine protection
from amongst us. Thus the Prophet foretelling misfortune says, “And I
will hide my face from them, and they shall be devoured” (Deut. xxxi.
17); for, when man is deprived of Divine protection he is exposed to
all dangers, and becomes the butt of all fortuitous circumstances; his
fortune and misfortune then depend on chance. Alas! how terrible a
threat!—This is the idea contained in the words, “I will go and return
to my place” (Hos. v. 15).






CHAPTER XXIV


The term halak is likewise one of the words which denote movements
performed by living beings, as in “And Jacob went (halak) on his way”
(Gen. xxxii. 1), and in many other instances. The verb “to go” was next
employed in describing movements of objects less solid than the bodies
of living beings, comp. “And the waters were going on (halok)
decreasing” (Gen. viii. 5); “And the fire went along (va-tihalak) upon
the ground” (Exod. ix. 23). Then it was employed to express the
spreading and manifestation of something incorporeal, comp. “The voice
thereof shall go like a serpent” (Jer. xlvi. 22); again, “The voice of
the Lord God walking in the garden” (Gen. iii. 8). It is “the voice”
that is qualified by “walking.”

Whenever the word “to go” is used in reference to God, it must be taken
in this figurative sense, i.e., it applies to incorporeal things, and
signifies either the manifestation of something incorporeal, or the
withdrawal of the Divine protection, an act corresponding in lifeless
beings to the removal of a thing, in living beings to the departure of
a living being, “walking.” The withdrawal of God’s protection is called
in the Bible “the hiding of God’s countenance,” as in Deuteronomy xxxi.
18, “As for me, I will hide my countenance.” On the same ground it has
been designated “going away,” or moving away from a thing, comp. “I
will depart and return to my place” (Hos. v. 15). But in the passage,
“And the anger of the Lord was kindled against them, and he went” (Num.
xii. 9), the two meanings of the verb are combined, viz., the
withdrawal of the Divine protection, expressed by “and he went,” and
the revelation, manifestation, and appearance of something namely, of
the anger which went forth and reached them, in consequence of which
Miriam became “leprous, white as snow.” The expression “to walk” was
further applied to conduct, which concerns only the inner life, and
which requires no bodily motion, as in the following passages, “And
thou shalt walk in his ways” (Deut. xxviii. 9); “Ye shall walk after
the Lord your God” (Deut. xiii. 5); “Come ye, and let us walk in the
light of the Lord.” (Isa. ii. 5).






CHAPTER XXV


The Hebrew shakan, as is well known, signifies “to dwell,” as, “And he
was dwelling (shoken) in the plains of Mamre” (Gen. xiv. 13); “And it
came to pass, when Israel dwelt (bishekon)” (Gen. xxxv. 22). This is
the most common meaning of the word. But “dwelling in a place” consists
in the continued stay in a place, general or special; when a living
being dwells long in a place, we say that it stays in that place,
although it unquestionably moves about in it, comp. “And he was staying
in the plains of Mamre” (Gen. xiv. 13), and, “And it came to pass, when
Israel stayed” (Gen. xxxv. 22).

The term was next applied metaphorically to inanimate objects, i.e., to
everything which has settled and remains fixed on one object, although
the object on which the thing remains is not a place, and the thing
itself is not a living being; for instance, “Let a cloud dwell upon it
[the day]” (Job iii. 5); there is no doubt that the cloud is not a
living being, and that the day is not a corporeal thing, but a division
of time.

In this sense the term is employed in reference to God, that is to say,
to denote the continuance of His Divine Presence (Shechinah) or of His
Providence in some place where the Divine Presence manifested itself
constantly, or in some object which was constantly protected by
Providence. Comp. “And the glory of the Lord abode” (Exod. xxiv. 16);
“And I will dwell among the children of Israel” (Exod. xxix. 45); “And
for the goodwill of him that dwelt in the bush” (Deut. xxxiii. 16).
Whenever the term is applied to the Almighty, it must be taken
consistently with the context in the sense either as referring to the
Presence of His Shechinah (i.e., of His light that was created for the
purpose) in a certain place, or of the continuance of His Providence
protecting a certain object.






CHAPTER XXVI


You, no doubt, know the Talmudical saying, which includes in itself all
the various kinds of interpretation connected with our subject. It runs
thus: “The Torah speaks according to the language of man,” that is to
say, expressions, which can easily be comprehended and understood by
all, are applied to the Creator. Hence the description of God by
attributes implying corporeality, in order to express His existence;
because the multitude of people do not easily conceive existence unless
in connection with a body, and that which is not a body nor connected
with a body has for them no existence. Whatever we regard as a state of
perfection, is likewise attributed to God, as expressing that He is
perfect in every respect, and that no imperfection or deficiency
whatever is found in Him. But there is not attributed to God anything
which the multitude consider a defect or want; thus He is never
represented as eating, drinking, sleeping, being ill, using violence,
and the like. Whatever, on the other hand, is commonly regarded as a
state of perfection is attributed to Him, although it is only a state
of perfection in relation to ourselves; for in relation to God, what we
consider to be a state of perfection, is in truth the highest degree of
imperfection. If, however, men were to think that those human
perfections were absent in God, they would consider Him as imperfect.

You are aware that locomotion is one of the distinguishing
characteristics of living beings, and is indispensable for them in
their progress towards perfection. As they require food and drink to
supply animal waste, so they require locomotion, in order to approach
that which is good for them and in harmony with their nature, and to
escape from what is injurious and contrary to their nature. It makes,
in fact, no difference whether we ascribe to God eating and drinking or
locomotion; but according to human modes of expression, that is to say,
according to common notions, eating and drinking would be an
imperfection in God, while motion would not, in spite of the fact that
the necessity of locomotion is the result of some want. Furthermore, it
has been clearly proved, that everything which moves is corporeal and
divisible; it will be shown below that God is incorporeal and that He
can have no locomotion; nor can rest be ascribed to Him; for rest can
only be applied to that which also moves. All expressions, however,
which imply the various modes of movement in living beings, are
employed with regard to God in the manner we have described and in the
same way as life is ascribed to Him; although motion is an accident
pertaining to living beings, and there is no doubt that, without
corporeality, expressions like the following could not be imagined: “to
descend, to ascend, to walk, to place, to stand, to surround, to sit,
to dwell, to depart, to enter, to pass, etc.”

It would have been superfluous thus to dilate on this subject, were it
not for the mass of the people, who are accustomed to such ideas. It
has been necessary to expatiate on the subject, as we have attempted,
for the benefit of those who are anxious to acquire perfection, to
remove from them such notions as have grown up with them from the days
of youth.






CHAPTER XXVII


Onkelos the Proselyte, who was thoroughly acquainted with the Hebrew
and Chaldaic languages, made it his task to oppose the belief in God’s
corporeality. Accordingly, any expression employed in the Pentateuch in
reference to God, and in any way implying corporeality, he paraphrases
in consonance with the context. All expressions denoting any mode of
motion, are explained by him to mean the appearance or manifestation of
a certain light that had been created [for the occasion], i.e., the
Shekhinah (Divine Presence), or Providence. Thus he paraphrases “the
Lord will come down” (Exod. xix. 11), “The Lord will manifest Himself”;
“And God came down” (xvi. 20), “And God manifested Himself”; and does
not say “And God came down”; “I will go down now and see” (Gen. xviii.
21), he paraphrases, “I will manifest myself now and see.” This is his
rendering [of the verb yarad, “he went down,” when used in reference to
God] throughout his version, with the exception of the following
passage, “I will go down (ered) with thee into Egypt” (Gen. xlvi. 4),
which he renders literally. A remarkable proof of this great man’s
talents, the excellence of his version, and the correctness of his
interpretation! By this version he discloses to us an important
principle as regards prophecy.

This narrative begins: “And God spake unto Israel in the visions of the
night, and said, Jacob, Jacob, etc. And He said, I am God, etc., I will
go down with thee into Egypt” (Gen. xlvi. 2, 3). Seeing that the whole
narrative is introduced as a vision of the night, Onkelos did not
hesitate to translate literally the words addressed to Jacob in the
nocturnal vision, and thus gave a faithful account of the occurrence.
For the passage in question contains a statement of what Jacob was
told, not what actually took place, as is the case in the words, “And
the Lord came down upon Mount Sinai” (Exod. xix. 20). Here we have an
account of what actually occurred in the physical world; the verb yarad
is therefore paraphrased “He manifested Himself,” and entirely detached
from the idea of motion. Accounts of what happened in the imagination
of man, I mean of what he was told, are not altered. A most remarkable
distinction!

Hence you may infer that there is a great difference between a
communication, designated as having been made in a dream, or a vision
of the night, and a vision or a manifestation simply introduced with
phrases like “And the word of the Lord came unto me, saying”; “And the
Lord spake unto me, saying.”

According to my opinion, it is also possible that Onkelos understood
Elohim in the above passage to signify “angel,” and that for this
reason he did not hesitate to translate literally, “I will go down with
thee to Egypt.” Do not think it strange that Onkelos should have
believed the Elohim, who said to Jacob, “I am God, the God of thy
father” (ib. 3), to be an angel, for this sentence can, in the same
form, also have been spoken by an angel. Thus Jacob says, “And the
angel of God spake unto me in a dream, saying, Jacob. And I said, Here
am I,” etc. (Gen. xxxi. 11); and concludes the report of the angel’s
words to him in the following way, “I am the God of Bethel, where thou
anointedst the pillar, and where thou vowedst a vow unto me” (ib. 13),
although there is no doubt that Jacob vowed to God, not to the angel.
It is the usual practice of prophets to relate words addressed to them
by an angel in the name of God, as though God Himself had spoken to
them. Such passages are all to be explained by supplying the nomen
regens, and by considering them as identical with “I am the messenger
of the God of thy father,” “I am the messenger of God who appeared to
thee in Bethel,” and the like. Prophecy with its various degrees, and
the nature of angels, will be fully discussed in the sequel, in
accordance with the object of this treatise (II. chap. xiv.).






CHAPTER XXVIII


The term regel is homonymous, signifying, in the first place, the foot
of a living being; comp. “Foot for foot” (Exod. xxi. 24). Next it
denotes an object which follows another; comp. “And all the people that
follow thee” (lit. that are at thy feet) (ib. xi. 18). Another
signification of the word is “cause”; comp. “And the Lord hath blessed
thee, I being the cause” (leragli) (Gen. xxx. 30), i.e., for my sake;
for that which exists for the sake of another thing has the latter for
its final cause. Examples of the term used in this sense are numerous.
It has that meaning in Genesis xxxiii. 14, “Because (leregel) of the
cattle that goeth before me, and because (leregel) of the children.”

Consequently, the Hebrew text, of which the literal rendering is: “And
his feet shall stand in that day upon the Mount of Olives” (Zech. xiv.
4) can be explained in the following way: “And the things caused by him
(raglav) on that day upon the Mount of Olives, that is to say, the
wonders which will then be seen, and of which God will be the Cause or
the Maker, will remain permanently.” To this explanation does Jonathan
son of Uzziel incline in paraphrasing the passage, “And he will appear
in his might on that day upon the Mount of Olives.” He generally
expresses terms denoting those parts of the body by which contact and
motion are effected, by “his might” [when referring to God], because
all such expressions denote acts done by His Will.

In the passage (Exod. xxiv. 10, lit., “And there was under his feet,
like the action of the whiteness of a sapphire stone”), Onkelos, as you
know, in his version, considers the word (raglav) “his feet” as a
figurative expression and a substitute for “throne”; the words “under
his feet” he therefore paraphrases, “And under the throne of his
glory.” Consider this well, and you will observe with wonder how
Onkelos keeps free from the idea of the corporeality of God, and from
everything that leads thereto, even in the remotest degree. For he does
not say, “and under His throne”; the direct relation of the throne to
God, implied in the literal sense of the phrase “His throne,” would
necessarily suggest the idea that God is supported by a material
object, and thus lead directly to the corporeality of God; he therefore
refers the throne to His glory, i.e., to the Shekhinah, which is a
light created for the purpose.

Similarly he paraphrases the words, “For my hand I lift up to the
throne of God” (Exod. xvii. 16), “An oath has been uttered by God,
whose Shekhinah is upon the throne of his glory.” This principle found
also expression in the popular phrase, “the Throne of the Glory.”

We have already gone too far away from the subject of this chapter, and
touched upon things which will be discussed in other chapters; we will
now return to our present theme. You are acquainted with the version of
Onkelos [of the passage quoted]. He contents himself with excluding
from his version all expressions of corporeality in reference to God,
and does not show us what they (the nobles of the children of Israel,
Exod. xxiv. 10) perceived, or what is meant by that figure. In all
similar instances Onkelos also abstains from entering into such
questions, and only endeavours to exclude every expression implying
corporeality; for the incorporeality of God is a demonstrative truth
and an indispensable element in our faith; he could decidedly state all
that was necessary in that respect. The interpretation of a simile is a
doubtful thing; it may possibly have that meaning, but it may also
refer to something else. It contains besides very profound matter, the
understanding of which is not a fundamental element in our faith, and
the comprehension of which is not easy for the common people. Onkelos,
therefore, did not enter at all into this subject.

We, however, remaining faithful to our task in this treatise, find
ourselves compelled to give our explanation. According to our opinion
“under his feet” (raglav) denotes “under that of which He is the
cause,” “that which exists through Him,” as we have already stated.
They (the nobles of the children of Israel) therefore comprehended the
real nature of the materia prima, which emanated from Him, and of whose
existence He is the only cause. Consider well the phrase, “like the
action of the whiteness of the sapphire stone.” If the colour were the
point of comparison, the words, “as the whiteness of the sapphire
stone” would have sufficed; but the addition of “like the action” was
necessary, because matter, as such, is, as you are well aware, always
receptive and passive, active only by some accident. On the other hand,
form, as such, is always active, and only passive by some accident, as
is explained in works on Physics. This explains the addition of “like
the action” in reference to the materia prima. The expression “the
whiteness of the sapphire” refers to the transparency, not to the white
colour; for “the whiteness” of the sapphire is not a white colour, but
the property of being transparent. Things, however, which are
transparent, have no colour of their own, as is proved in works on
Physics; for if they had a colour they would not permit all the colours
to pass through them nor would they receive colours; it is only when
the transparent object is totally colourless, that it is able to
receive successively all the colours. In this respect it (the whiteness
of the sapphire) is like the materia prima, which as such is entirely
formless, and thus receives all the forms one after the other. What
they (the nobles of the children of Israel) perceived was therefore the
materia prima, whose relation to God is distinctly mentioned, because
it is the source of those of his creatures which are subject to genesis
and destruction, and has been created by him. This subject also will be
treated later on more fully.

Observe that you must have recourse to an explanation of this kind,
even when adopting the rendering of Onkelos, “And under the throne of
His glory”; for in fact the materia prima is also under the heavens,
which are called “throne of God,” as we have remarked above. I should
not have thought of this unusual interpretation, or hit on this
argument were it not for an utterance of R. Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, which
will be discussed in one of the parts of this treatise (II. chap.
xxvi.). The primary object of every intelligent person must be to deny
the corporeality of God, and to believe that all those perceptions
(described in the above passage) were of a spiritual not of a material
character. Note this and consider it well.






CHAPTER XXIX


The term ʻeẓeb is homonymous, denoting, in the first place, pain and
trembling; comp. “In sorrow (be-ʻeẓeb) thou shalt bring forth children”
(Gen. iii. 16). Next it denotes anger; comp. “And his father had not
made him angry (ʻaẓabo) at any time” (1 Kings i. 6); “for he was angry
(neʻeẓab) for the sake of David” (1 Sam. xx. 34). The term signifies
also provocation; comp. “They rebelled, and vexed (ʻiẓẓebu) his holy
spirit” (Isa. lxiii. 10); “and provoked (yaʻaẓibahu) him in the desert”
(Ps. lxxviii. 40); “If there be any way of provocation (ʻoẓeb) in me”
(ib. cxxxix. 24); “Every day they rebel (yeʻaẓẓebu) against my words”
(ib. lvi. 6).

In Genesis vi. 6 the word has either the second or the third
signification. In the first case, the sense of the Hebrew va-yitʻaẓẓeb
el libbo is “God was angry with them on account of the wickedness of
their deeds”; as to the words “to his heart” used here, and also in the
history of Noah (ib. viii. 21) I will here explain what they mean. With
regard to man, we use the expression “he said to himself,” or “he said
in his heart,” in reference to a subject which he did not utter or
communicate to any other person. Similarly the phrase “And God said in
his heart,” is used in reference to an act which God decreed without
mentioning it to any prophet at the time the event took place according
to the will of God. And a figure of this kind is admissible, since “the
Torah speaketh in accordance with the language of man” (supra c.
xxvi.). This is plain and clear. In the Pentateuch no distinct mention
is made of a message sent to the wicked generation of the flood,
cautioning or threatening them with death; therefore, it is said
concerning them, that God was angry with them in His heart; likewise
when He decreed that no flood should happen again, He did not tell a
prophet to communicate it to others, and for that reason the words “in
his heart” are added.

Taking the verb in the third signification, we explain the passage
thus: “And man rebelled against God’s will concerning him”; for leb
(heart) also signifies “will,” as we shall explain when treating of the
homonymity of leb (heart).






CHAPTER XXX


In its primary meaning akal (to eat) is used in the sense of taking
food by animals; this needs no illustration. It was afterwards observed
that eating includes two processes—(1) the loss of the food, i.e., the
destruction of its form, which first takes place; (2) the growth of
animals, the preservation of their strength and their existence, and
the support of all the forces of their body, caused by the food they
take.

The consideration of the first process led to the figurative use of the
verb, in the sense of “consuming,” “destroying”; hence it includes all
modes of depriving a thing of its form; comp. “And the land of your
enemies shall destroy (lit. eat) you” (Lev. xxvi. 38); “A land that
destroyeth (lit. eateth) the inhabitants thereof” (Num. xiii. 32); “Ye
shall be destroyed (lit. eaten) with the sword” (Isa. i. 6); “Shall the
sword destroy (lit. eat)” (2 Sam. ii. 26); “And the fire of the Lord
burnt among them, and destroyed (lit. ate) them that were in the
uttermost parts of the camp” (Num. xi. 1); “(God) is a destroying (lit.
eating) fire” (Deut. iv. 24), that is, He destroys those who rebel
against Him, as the fire destroys everything that comes within its
reach. Instances of this kind are very frequent.

With reference to the second effect of the act of eating, the verb “to
eat” is figuratively used in the sense of “acquiring wisdom,”
“learning”; in short, for all intellectual perceptions. These preserve
the human form (intellect) constantly in the most perfect manner, in
the same way as food preserves the body in its best condition. Comp.
“Come ye, buy and eat” (Isa. lv. 1); “Hearken diligently unto me, and
eat ye that which is good” (ib. 2); “It is not good to eat much honey”
(Prov. xxv. 27); “My son, eat thou honey, because it is good, and the
honeycomb, which is sweet to thy taste; so shall the knowledge of
wisdom be unto thy soul” (ib. xxiv. 13, 14).

This figurative use of the verb “to eat” in the sense of “acquiring
wisdom” is frequently met with in the Talmud, e.g., “Come, eat fat meat
at Raba’s” (Baba Bathra 22a); comp. “All expressions of ‘eating’ and
‘drinking’ found in this book (of Proverbs) refer to wisdom,” or,
according to another reading, “to the Law” (Koh. rabba on Eccl. iii.
13). Wisdom has also been frequently called “water,” e.g., “Ho, every
one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters” (Isa. lv. 1).

The figurative meaning of these expressions has been so general and
common, that it was almost considered as its primitive signification,
and led to the employment “of hunger” and “thirst” in the sense of
“absence of wisdom and intelligence”; comp. “I will send a famine in
the land, not a famine of bread, nor a thirst for water, but of hearing
the words of the Lord”; “My soul thirsteth for God, for the living God”
(Ps. xlii. 3). Instances of this kind occur frequently. The words,
“With joy shall ye draw water out of the wells of salvation” (Isa. xii.
3), are paraphrased by Jonathan son of Uzziel thus: “You will joyfully
receive new instruction from the chosen of the righteous.” Consider how
he explains “water” to indicate “the wisdom which will then spread,”
and “the wells” (maʻayene) as being identical with “the eyes of the
congregation” (Num. xv. 24), in the sense of “the chiefs,” or “the
wise.” By the phrase, “from the chosen of the righteous,” he expresses
his belief that righteousness is true salvation. You now see how he
gives to every word in this verse some signification referring to
wisdom and study. This should be well considered.






CHAPTER XXXI


Know that for the human mind there are certain objects of perception
which are within the scope of its nature and capacity; on the other
hand, there are, amongst things which actually exist, certain objects
which the mind can in no way and by no means grasp: the gates of
perception are closed against it. Further, there are things of which
the mind understands one part, but remains ignorant of the other; and
when man is able to comprehend certain things, it does not follow that
he must be able to comprehend everything. This also applies to the
senses: they are able to perceive things, but not at every distance;
and all other powers of the body are limited in a similar way. A man
can, e.g., carry two kikkar, but he cannot carry ten kikkar. How
individuals of the same species surpass each other in these sensations
and in other bodily faculties is universally known, but there is a
limit to them, and their power cannot extend to every distance or to
every degree.

All this is applicable to the intellectual faculties of man. There is a
considerable difference between one person and another as regards these
faculties, as is well known to philosophers. While one man can discover
a certain thing by himself, another is never able to understand it,
even if taught by means of all possible expressions and metaphors, and
during a long period; his mind can in no way grasp it, his capacity is
insufficient for it. This distinction is not unlimited. A boundary is
undoubtedly set to the human mind which it cannot pass. There are
things (beyond that boundary) which are acknowledged to be inaccessible
to human understanding, and man does not show any desire to comprehend
them, being aware that such knowledge is impossible, and that there are
no means of overcoming the difficulty; e.g., we do not know the number
of stars in heaven, whether the number is even or odd; we do not know
the number of animals, minerals, or plants, and the like. There are
other things, however, which man very much desires to know, and
strenuous efforts to examine and to investigate them have been made by
thinkers of all classes, and at all times. They differ and disagree,
and constantly raise new doubts with regard to them, because their
minds are bent on comprehending such things, that is to say, they are
moved by desire; and every one of them believes that he has discovered
the way leading to a true knowledge of the thing, although human reason
is entirely unable to demonstrate the fact by convincing evidence.—For
a proposition which can be proved by evidence is not subject to
dispute, denial, or rejection; none but the ignorant would contradict
it, and such contradiction is called “denial of a demonstrated proof.”
Thus you find men who deny the spherical form of the earth, or the
circular form of the line in which the stars move, and the like; such
men are not considered in this treatise. This confusion prevails mostly
in metaphysical subjects, less in problems relating to physics, and is
entirely absent from the exact sciences. Alexander Aphrodisius said
that there are three causes which prevent men from discovering the
exact truth: first, arrogance and vainglory; secondly, the subtlety,
depth, and difficulty of any subject which is being examined; thirdly,
ignorance and want of capacity to comprehend what might be
comprehended. These causes are enumerated by Alexander. At the present
time there is a fourth cause not mentioned by him, because it did not
then prevail, namely, habit and training. We naturally like what we
have been accustomed to, and are attracted towards it. This may be
observed amongst villagers; though they rarely enjoy the benefit of a
douche or bath, and have few enjoyments, and pass a life of privation,
they dislike town life and do not desire its pleasures, preferring the
inferior things to which they are accustomed, to the better things to
which they are strangers; it would give them no satisfaction to live in
palaces, to be clothed in silk, and to indulge in baths, ointments, and
perfumes.

The same is the case with those opinions of man to which he has been
accustomed from his youth; he likes them, defends them, and shuns the
opposite views. This is likewise one of the causes which prevent men
from finding truth, and which make them cling to their habitual
opinions. Such is, e.g., the case with the vulgar notions with respect
to the corporeality of God, and many other metaphysical questions, as
we shall explain. It is the result of long familiarity with passages of
the Bible, which they are accustomed to respect and to receive as true,
and the literal sense of which implies the corporeality of God and
other false notions; in truth, however, these words were employed as
figures and metaphors for reasons to be mentioned below. Do not imagine
that what we have said of the insufficiency of our understanding and of
its limited extent is an assertion founded only on the Bible; for
philosophers likewise assert the same, and perfectly understand it,
without having regard to any religion or opinion. It is a fact which is
only doubted by those who ignore things fully proved. This chapter is
intended as an introduction to the next.






CHAPTER XXXII


You must consider, when reading this treatise, that mental perception,
because connected with matter, is subject to conditions similar to
those to which physical perception is subject. That is to say, if your
eye looks around, you can perceive all that is within the range of your
vision; if, however, you overstrain your eye, exerting it too much by
attempting to see an object which is too distant for your eye, or to
examine writings or engravings too small for your sight, and forcing it
to obtain a correct perception of them, you will not only weaken your
sight with regard to that special object, but also for those things
which you otherwise are able to perceive: your eye will have become too
weak to perceive what you were able to see before you exerted yourself
and exceeded the limits of your vision.

The same is the case with the speculative faculties of one who devotes
himself to the study of any science. If a person studies too much and
exhausts his reflective powers, he will be confused, and will not be
able to apprehend even that which had been within the power of his
apprehension. For the powers of the body are all alike in this respect.

The mental perceptions are not exempt from a similar condition. If you
admit the doubt, and do not persuade yourself to believe that there is
a proof for things which cannot be demonstrated, or to try at once to
reject and positively to deny an assertion the opposite of which has
never been proved, or attempt to perceive things which are beyond your
perception, then you have attained the highest degree of human
perfection, then you are like R. Akibha, who “in peace entered [the
study of these theological problems], and came out in peace.” If, on
the other hand, you attempt to exceed the limit of your intellectual
power, or at once to reject things as impossible which have never been
proved to be impossible, or which are in fact possible, though their
possibility be very remote, then you will be like Elisha Aḥer; you will
not only fail to become perfect, but you will become exceedingly
imperfect. Ideas founded on mere imagination will prevail over you, you
will incline toward defects, and toward base and degraded habits, on
account of the confusion which troubles the mind, and of the dimness of
its light, just as weakness of sight causes invalids to see many kinds
of unreal images, especially when they have looked for a long time at
dazzling or at very minute objects.

Respecting this it has been said, “Hast thou found honey? eat so much
as is sufficient for thee, lest thou be filled therewith, and vomit it”
(Prov. xxv. 16). Our Sages also applied this verse to Elisha Aḥer.

How excellent is this simile! In comparing knowledge to food (as we
observed in chap. xxx.), the author of Proverbs mentions the sweetest
food, namely, honey, which has the further property of irritating the
stomach, and of causing sickness. He thus fully describes the nature of
knowledge. Though great, excellent, noble and perfect, it is injurious
if not kept within bounds or not guarded properly; it is like honey
which gives nourishment and is pleasant, when eaten in moderation, but
is totally thrown away when eaten immoderately. Therefore, it is not
said “lest thou be filled and loathe it,” but “lest thou vomit it.” The
same idea is expressed in the words, “It is not good to eat much honey”
(Prov. xxv. 27); and in the words, “Neither make thyself over-wise; why
shouldst thou destroy thyself?” (Eccles. vii. 16); comp. “Keep thy foot
when thou goest to the house of God” (ibid. v. 1). The same subject is
alluded to in the words of David, “Neither do I exercise myself in
great matters, or in things too high for me” (Ps. cxxxi. 2), and in the
sayings of our Sages: “Do not inquire into things which are too
difficult for thee, do not search what is hidden from thee; study what
you are allowed to study, and do not occupy thyself with mysteries.”
They meant to say, Let thy mind only attempt things which are within
human perception; for the study of things which lie beyond man’s
comprehension is extremely injurious, as has been already stated. This
lesson is also contained in the Talmudical passage, which begins, “He
who considers four things,” etc., and concludes, “He who does not
regard the honour of his Creator”; here also is given the advice which
we have already mentioned, viz., that man should not rashly engage in
speculation with false conceptions, and when he is in doubt about
anything, or unable to find a proof for the object of his inquiry, he
must not at once abandon, reject and deny it; he must modestly keep
back, and from regard to the honour of his Creator, hesitate [from
uttering an opinion] and pause. This has already been explained.

It was not the object of the Prophets and our Sages in these utterances
to close the gate of investigation entirely, and to prevent the mind
from comprehending what is within its reach, as is imagined by simple
and idle people, whom it suits better to put forth their ignorance and
incapacity as wisdom and perfection, and to regard the distinction and
wisdom of others as irreligion and imperfection, thus taking darkness
for light and light for darkness. The whole object of the Prophets and
the Sages was to declare that a limit is set to human reason where it
must halt. Do not criticise the words used in this chapter and in
others in reference to the mind, for we only intended to give some idea
of the subject in view, not to describe the essence of the intellect;
for other chapters have been dedicated to this subject.






CHAPTER XXXIII


You must know that it is very injurious to begin with this branch of
philosophy, viz., Metaphysics; or to explain [at first] the sense of
the similes occurring in prophecies, and interpret the metaphors which
are employed in historical accounts and which abound in the writings of
the Prophets. On the contrary, it is necessary to initiate the young
and to instruct the less intelligent according to their comprehension;
those who appear to be talented and to have capacity for the higher
method of study, i.e., that based on proof and on true logical
argument, should be gradually advanced towards perfection, either by
tuition or by self-instruction. He, however, who begins with
Metaphysics, will not only become confused in matters of religion, but
will fall into complete infidelity. I compare such a person to an
infant fed with wheaten bread, meat and wine; it will undoubtedly die,
not because such food is naturally unfit for the human body, but
because of the weakness of the child, who is unable to digest the food,
and cannot derive benefit from it. The same is the case with the true
principles of science. They were presented in enigmas, clad in riddles,
and taught by all wise men in the most mysterious way that could be
devised, not because they contain some secret evil, or are contrary to
the fundamental principles of the Law (as fools think who are only
philosophers in their own eyes), but because of the incapacity of man
to comprehend them at the beginning of his studies: only slight
allusions have been made to them to serve for the guidance of those who
are capable of understanding them. These sciences were, therefore,
called Mysteries (sodoth), and Secrets of the Law (sitre torah), as we
shall explain.

This also is the reason why “the Torah speaks the language of man,” as
we have explained, for it is the object of the Torah to serve as a
guide for the instruction of the young, of women, and of the common
people; and as all of them are incapable to comprehend the true sense
of the words, tradition was considered sufficient to convey all truths
which were to be established; and as regards ideals, only such remarks
were made as would lead towards a knowledge of their existence, though
not to a comprehension of their true essence. When a man attains to
perfection, and arrives at a knowledge of the “Secrets of the Law,”
either through the assistance of a teacher or by self-instruction,
being led by the understanding of one part to the study of the other,
he will belong to those who faithfully believe in the true principles,
either because of conclusive proof, where proof is possible, or by
forcible arguments, where argument is admissible; he will have a true
notion of those things which he previously received in similes and
metaphors, and he will fully understand their sense. We have frequently
mentioned in this treatise the principle of our Sages “not to discuss
the Maʻaseh Mercabah even in the presence of one pupil, except he be
wise and intelligent; and then only the headings of the chapters are to
be given to him.” We must, therefore, begin with teaching these
subjects according to the capacity of the pupil, and on two conditions,
first, that he be wise, i.e., that he should have successfully gone
through the preliminary studies, and secondly that he be intelligent,
talented, clear-headed, and of quick perception, that is, “have a mind
of his own” (mebin middaʻato), as our Sages termed it.

I will now proceed to explain the reasons why we should not instruct
the multitude in pure metaphysics, or begin with describing to them the
true essence of things, or with showing them that a thing must be as it
is, and cannot be otherwise. This will form the subject of the next
chapter; and I proceed to say—






CHAPTER XXXIV


There are five reasons why instruction should not begin with
Metaphysics, but should at first be restricted to pointing out what is
fitted for notice and what may be made manifest to the multitude.

First Reason.—The subject itself is difficult, subtle and profound,
“Far off and exceeding deep, who can find it out?” (Eccles. vii. 24).
The following words of Job may be applied to it: “Whence then cometh
wisdom? and where is the place of understanding?” (Job xxviii. 20).
Instruction should not begin with abstruse and difficult subjects. In
one of the similes contained in the Bible, wisdom is compared to water,
and amongst other interpretations given by our Sages of this simile,
occurs the following: He who can swim may bring up pearls from the
depth of the sea, he who is unable to swim will be drowned, therefore
only such persons as have had proper instruction should expose
themselves to the risk.

Second Reason.—The intelligence of man is at first insufficient; for he
is not endowed with perfection at the beginning, but at first possesses
perfection only in potentiâ, not in fact. Thus it is said, “And man is
born a wild ass” (Job xi. 12). If a man possesses a certain faculty in
potentiâ, it does not follow that it must become in him a reality. He
may possibly remain deficient either on account of some obstacle, or
from want of training in practices which would turn the possibility
into a reality. Thus it is distinctly stated in the Bible, “Not many
are wise” (ib., xxxii. 9); also our Sages say, “I noticed how few were
those who attained to a higher degree of perfection” (B. T. Succah
45a). There are many things which obstruct the path to perfection, and
which keep man away from it. Where can he find sufficient preparation
and leisure to learn all that is necessary in order to develop that
perfection which he has in potentiâ?

Third Reason.—The preparatory studies are of long duration, and man, in
his natural desire to reach the goal, finds them frequently too
wearisome, and does not wish to be troubled by them. Be convinced that,
if man were able to reach the end without preparatory studies, such
studies would not be preparatory but tiresome and utterly superfluous.
Suppose you awaken any person, even the most simple, as if from sleep,
and you say to him, Do you not desire to know what the heavens are,
what is their number and their form; what beings are contained in them;
what the angels are; how the creation of the whole world took place;
what is its purpose, and what is the relation of its various parts to
each other; what is the nature of the soul; how it enters the body;
whether it has an independent existence, and if so, how it can exist
independently of the body; by what means and to what purpose, and
similar problems. He would undoubtedly say “Yes,” and show a natural
desire for the true knowledge of these things; but he will wish to
satisfy that desire and to attain to that knowledge by listening to a
few words from you. Ask him to interrupt his usual pursuits for a week,
till he learn all this, he would not do it, and would be satisfied and
contented with imaginary and misleading notions; he would refuse to
believe that there is anything which requires preparatory studies and
persevering research.

You, however, know how all these subjects are connected together; for
there is nothing else in existence but God and His works, the latter
including all existing things besides Him; we can only obtain a
knowledge of Him through His works; His works give evidence of His
existence, and show what must be assumed concerning Him, that is to
say, what must be attributed to Him either affirmatively or negatively.
It is thus necessary to examine all things according to their essence,
to infer from every species such true and well established propositions
as may assist us in the solution of metaphysical problems. Again, many
propositions based on the nature of numbers and the properties of
geometrical figures, are useful in examining things which must be
negatived in reference to God, and these negations will lead us to
further inferences. You will certainly not doubt the necessity of
studying astronomy and physics, if you are desirous of comprehending
the relation between the world and Providence as it is in reality, and
not according to imagination. There are also many subjects of
speculation, which, though not preparing the way for metaphysics, help
to train the reasoning power, enabling it to understand the nature of a
proof, and to test truth by characteristics essential to it. They
remove the confusion arising in the minds of most thinkers, who
confound accidental with essential properties, and likewise the wrong
opinions resulting therefrom. We may add, that although they do not
form the basis for metaphysical research, they assist in forming a
correct notion of these things, and are certainly useful in many other
things connected with that discipline. Consequently he who wishes to
attain to human perfection, must therefore first study Logic, next the
various branches of Mathematics in their proper order, then Physics,
and lastly Metaphysics. We find that many who have advanced to a
certain point in the study of these disciplines become weary, and stop;
that others, who are endowed with sufficient capacity, are interrupted
in their studies by death, which surprises them while still engaged
with the preliminary course. Now, if no knowledge whatever had been
given to us by means of tradition, and if we had not been brought to
the belief in a thing through the medium of similes, we would have been
bound to form a perfect notion of things with their essential
characteristics, and to believe only what we could prove: a goal which
could only be attained by long preparation. In such a case most people
would die, without having known whether there was a God or not, much
less that certain things must be asserted about Him, and other things
denied as defects. From such a fate not even “one of a city or two of a
family” (Jer. iii. 14) would have escaped.

As regards the privileged few, “the remnant whom the Lord calls” (Joel
iii. 5), they only attain the perfection at which they aim after due
preparatory labour. The necessity of such a preparation and the need of
such a training for the acquisition of real knowledge, has been plainly
stated by King Solomon in the following words: “If the iron be blunt,
and he do not whet the edge, then must he put to more strength; and it
is profitable to prepare for wisdom” (Eccles. x. 10); “Hear counsel,
and receive instruction, that thou mayest be wise in thy latter end”
(Prov. xix. 20).

There is still another urgent reason why the preliminary disciplines
should be studied and understood. During the study many doubts present
themselves, and the difficulties, or the objections raised against
certain assertions, are soon understood, just as the demolition of a
building is easier than its erection; while, on the other hand, it is
impossible to prove an assertion, or to remove any doubts, without
having recourse to several propositions taken from these preliminary
studies. He who approaches metaphysical problems without proper
preparation is like a person who journeys towards a certain place, and
on the road falls into a deep pit, out of which he cannot rise, and he
must perish there; if he had not gone forth, but had remained at home,
it would have been better for him.

Solomon has expatiated in the book of Proverbs on sluggards and their
indolence, by which he figuratively refers to indolence in the search
after wisdom. He thus speaks of a man who desires to know the final
results, but does not exert himself to understand the preliminary
disciplines which lead to them, doing nothing else but desire. “The
desire of the slothful killeth him; for his hands refuse to labour. He
coveteth greedily all the day long; but the righteous giveth, and
spareth not” (Prov. xxi. 25, 26); that is to say, if the desire killeth
the slothful, it is because he neglects to seek the thing which might
satisfy his desire, he does nothing but desire, and hopes to obtain a
thing without using the means to reach it. It would be better for him
were he without that desire. Observe how the end of the simile throws
light on its beginning. It concludes with the words “but the righteous
giveth, and spareth not”; the antithesis of “righteous” and “slothful”
can only be justified on the basis of our interpretation. Solomon thus
indicates that only such a man is righteous who gives to everything its
due portion; that is to say, who gives to the study of a thing the
whole time required for it, and does not devote any part of that time
to another purpose. The passage may therefore be paraphrased thus: “And
the righteous man devotes his ways to wisdom, and does not withhold any
of them.” Comp. “Give not thy strength unto women” (Prov. xxxi. 3).

The majority of scholars, that is to say, the most famous in science,
are afflicted with this failing, viz., that of hurrying at once to the
final results, and of speaking about them, without treating of the
preliminary disciplines. Led by folly or ambition to disregard those
preparatory studies, for the attainment of which they are either
incapable or too idle, some scholars endeavour to prove that these are
injurious or superfluous. On reflection the truth will become obvious.

The Fourth Reason is taken from the physical constitution of man. It
has been proved that moral conduct is a preparation for intellectual
progress, and that only a man whose character is pure, calm and
steadfast, can attain to intellectual perfection; that is, acquire
correct conceptions. Many men are naturally so constituted that all
perfection is impossible; e.g., he whose heart is very warm and is
himself very powerful, is sure to be passionate, though he tries to
counteract that disposition by training; he whose testicles are warm,
humid, and vigorous, and the organs connected therewith are surcharged,
will not easily refrain from sin, even if he makes great efforts to
restrain himself. You also find persons of great levity and rashness,
whose excited manners and wild gestures prove that their constitution
is in disorder, and their temperament so bad that it cannot be cured.
Such persons can never attain to perfection; it is utterly useless to
occupy oneself with them on such a subject [as Metaphysics]. For this
science is, as you know, different from the science of Medicine and of
Geometry, and, from the reason already mentioned, it is not every
person who is capable of approaching it. It is impossible for a man to
study it successfully without moral preparation; he must acquire the
highest degree of uprightness and integrity, “for the froward is an
abomination to the Lord, but His secret is with the righteous” (Prov.
iii. 32). Therefore it was considered inadvisable to teach it to young
men; nay, it is impossible for them to comprehend it, on account of the
heat of their blood and the flame of youth, which confuses their minds;
that heat, which causes all the disorder, must first disappear; they
must have become moderate and settled, humble in their hearts, and
subdued in their temperament; only then will they be able to arrive at
the highest degree of the perception of God, i.e., the study of
Metaphysics, which is called Maʻaseh Mercabah Comp. “The Lord is nigh
unto them that are of a broken heart” (Ps. xxxiv. 18); “I dwell in the
high and lofty place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble
spirit; to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of
the contrite ones” (Isa. lvii. 15).

Therefore the rule, “the headings of the sections may be confided to
him,” is further restricted in the Talmud, in the following way: The
headings of the sections must only be handed down to an Ab-bet-din
(President of the Court), whose heart is full of care, i.e., in whom
wisdom is united with humility, meekness, and a great dread of sin. It
is further stated there: “The secrets of the Law can only be
communicated to a counsellor, scholar, and good orator.” These
qualities can only be acquired if the physical constitution of the
student favour their development. You certainly know that some persons,
though exceedingly able, are very weak in giving counsel, while others
are ready with proper counsel and good advice in social and political
matters. A person so endowed is called “counsellor” and may be unable
to comprehend purely abstract notions, even such as are similar to
common sense. He is unacquainted with them, and has no talent whatever
for them; we apply to him the words: “Wherefore is there a price in the
hand of a fool to get wisdom, seeing he hath no heart to it?” (Prov.
xvii. 16). Others are intelligent and naturally clear-sighted, able to
convey complicated ideas in concise and well chosen language,—such a
person is called “a good orator,” but he has not been engaged in the
pursuit of science, or has not acquired any knowledge of it. Those who
have actually acquired a knowledge of the sciences, are called “wise in
arts” (or “scholars”); the Hebrew term for “wise in arts”—ḥakam
ḥarashim—has been explained in the Talmud as implying, that when such a
man speaks, all become, as it were, speechless.

Now, consider how, in the writings of the Rabbis, the admission of a
person into discourses on metaphysics is made dependent on distinction
in social qualities, and study of philosophy, as well as on the
possession of clear-sightedness, intelligence, eloquence, and ability
to communicate things by slight allusions. If a person satisfies these
requirements, the secrets of the Law are confided to him. In the same
place we also read the following passage:—R. Jochanan said to R.
Elasar, “Come, I will teach you Maʻaseh Mercabah.” The reply was, “I am
not yet old,” or in other words, I have not yet become old, I still
perceive in myself the hot blood and the rashness of youth. You learn
from this that, in addition to the above-named good qualities, a
certain age is also required. How, then, could any person speak on
these metaphysical themes in the presence of ordinary people, of
children, and of women!

Fifth Reason.—Man is disturbed in his intellectual occupation by the
necessity of looking after the material wants of the body, especially
if the necessity of providing for wife and children be superadded; much
more so if he seeks superfluities in addition to his ordinary wants,
for by custom and bad habits these become a powerful motive. Even the
perfect man to whom we have referred, if too busy with these necessary
things, much more so if busy with unnecessary things, and filled with a
great desire for them—must weaken or altogether lose his desire for
study, to which he will apply himself with interruption, lassitude, and
want of attention. He will not attain to that for which he is fitted by
his abilities, or he will acquire imperfect knowledge, a confused mass
of true and false ideas. For these reasons it was proper that the study
of Metaphysics should have been exclusively cultivated by privileged
persons, and not entrusted to the common people. It is not for the
beginner, and he should abstain from it, as the little child has to
abstain from taking solid food and from carrying heavy weights.






CHAPTER XXXV


Do not think that what we have laid down in the preceding chapters on
the importance, obscurity, and difficulty of the subject, and its
unsuitableness for communication to ordinary persons, includes the
doctrine of God’s incorporeality and His exemption from all affections
(πάθη). This is not the case. For in the same way as all people must be
informed, and even children must be trained in the belief that God is
One, and that none besides Him is to be worshipped, so must all be
taught by simple authority that God is incorporeal; that there is no
similarity in any way whatsoever between Him and His creatures; that
His existence is not like the existence of His creatures, His life not
like that of any living being, His wisdom not like the wisdom of the
wisest of men; and that the difference between Him and His creatures is
not merely quantitative, but absolute [as between two individuals of
two different classes]; I mean to say that all must understand that our
wisdom and His, or our power and His do not differ quantitatively or
qualitatively, or in a similar manner; for two things, of which the one
is strong and the other weak, are necessarily similar, belong to the
same class, and can be included in one definition. The same is the case
with all other comparisons; they can only be made between two things
belonging to the same class, as has been shown in works on Natural
Science. Anything predicated of God is totally different from our
attributes; no definition can comprehend both; therefore His existence
and that of any other being totally differ from each other, and the
term existence is applied to both homonymously, as I shall explain.

This suffices for the guidance of children and of ordinary persons who
must believe that there is a Being existing, perfect, incorporeal, not
inherent in a body as a force in it—God, who is above all kinds of
deficiency, above all affections. But the question concerning the
attributes of God, their inadmissibility, and the meaning of those
attributes which are ascribed to Him; concerning the Creation, His
Providence, in providing for everything; concerning His will, His
perception, His knowledge of everything; concerning prophecy and its
various degrees; concerning the meaning of His names which imply the
idea of unity, though they are more than one; all these things are very
difficult problems, the true “Secrets of the Law” the “secrets”
mentioned so frequently in the books of the Prophets, and in the words
of our Teachers, the subjects of which we should only mention the
headings of the chapters, as we have already stated, and only in the
presence of a person satisfying the above-named conditions.

That God is incorporeal, that He cannot be compared with His creatures,
that He is not subject to external influence; these are things which
must be explained to every one according to his capacity, and they must
be taught by way of tradition to children and women, to the stupid and
ignorant, as they are taught that God is One, that He is eternal, and
that He alone is to be worshipped. Without incorporeality there is no
unity, for a corporeal thing is in the first case not simple, but
composed of matter and form which are two separate things by
definition, and secondly, as it has extension it is also divisible.
When persons have received this doctrine, and have been trained in this
belief, and are in consequence at a loss to reconcile it with the
writings of the Prophets, the meaning of the latter must be made clear
and explained to them by pointing out the homonymity and the figurative
application of certain terms discussed in this part of the work. Their
belief in the unity of God and in the words of the Prophets will then
be a true and perfect belief.

Those who are not sufficiently intelligent to comprehend the true
interpretation of these passages in the Bible, or to understand that
the same term admits of two different interpretations, may simply be
told that the scriptural passage is clearly understood by the wise, but
that they should content themselves with knowing that God is
incorporeal, that He is never subject to external influence, as
passivity implies a change, while God is entirely free from all change,
that He cannot be compared to anything besides Himself, that no
definition includes Him together with any other being, that the words
of the Prophets are true, and that difficulties met with may be
explained on this principle. This may suffice for that class of
persons, and it is not proper to leave them in the belief that God is
corporeal, or that He has any of the properties of material objects,
just as there is no need to leave them in the belief that God does not
exist, that there are more Gods than one, or that any other being may
be worshipped.






CHAPTER XXXVI


I shall explain to you, when speaking on the attributes of God, in what
sense we can say that a particular thing pleases Him, or excites His
anger and His wrath, and in reference to certain persons that God was
pleased with them, was angry with them, or was in wrath against them.
This is not the subject of the present chapter; I intend to explain in
it what I am now going to say. You must know, that in examining the Law
and the books of the Prophets, you will not find the expressions
“burning anger,” “provocation,” or “jealousy” applied to God except in
reference to idolatry; and that none but the idolater called “enemy,”
“adversary,” or “hater of the Lord.” Comp. “And ye serve other gods,
... and then the Lord’s wrath will be kindled against you” (Deut. xi.
16, 17); “Lest the anger of the Lord thy God be kindled against thee.”
etc. (ib. vi. 15); “To provoke him to anger through the work of your
hands” (ib. xxxi. 29); “They have moved me to jealousy with that which
is not God; they have provoked me to anger with their vanities” (ib.
xxxii. 21); “For the Lord thy God is a jealous God” (ib. vi. 15); “Why
have they provoked me to anger with their graven images, and with
strange vanities?” (Jer. viii. 19); “Because of the provoking of his
sons and of his daughters” (Deut. xxxii. 19); “For a fire is kindled in
mine anger” (ib. 22); “The Lord will take vengeance on His adversaries,
and he reserveth wrath for his enemies” (Nah. i. 2); “And repayeth them
that hate Him” (Deut. vii. 10); “Until He hath driven out His enemies
from before Him” (Num. xxxii. 21); “Which the Lord thy God hateth”
(Deut. xvi. 22); “For every abomination to the Lord, which He hateth,
have they done unto their gods” (ib. xii. 31). Instances like these are
innumerable; and if you examine all the examples met with in the holy
writings, you will find that they confirm our view.

The Prophets in their writings laid special stress on this, because it
concerns errors in reference to God, i.e., it concerns idolatry. For if
any one believes that, e.g., Zaid is standing, while in fact he is
sitting, he does not deviate from truth so much as one who believes
that fire is under the air, or that water is under the earth, or that
the earth is a plane, or things similar to these. The latter does not
deviate so much from truth as one who believes that the sun consists of
fire, or that the heavens form a hemisphere, and similar things; in the
third instance the deviation from truth is less than the deviation of a
man who believes that angels eat and drink, and the like. The latter
again deviates less from truth than one who believes that something
besides God is to be worshipped; for ignorance and error concerning a
great thing, i.e., a thing which has a high position in the universe,
are of greater importance than those which refer to a thing which
occupies a lower place;—by “error” I mean the belief that a thing is
different from what it really is; by “ignorance,” the want of knowledge
respecting things the knowledge of which can be obtained.

If a person does not know the measure of the cone, or the sphericity of
the sun, it is not so important as not to know whether God exists, or
whether the world exists without a God; and if a man assumes that the
cone is half (of the cylinder), or that the sun is a circle, it is not
so injurious as to believe that God is more than One. You must know
that idolaters when worshipping idols do not believe that there is no
God besides them; and no idolater ever did assume that any image made
of metal, stone, or wood has created the heavens and the earth, and
still governs them. Idolatry is founded on the idea that a particular
form represents the agent between God and His creatures. This is
plainly said in passages like the following: “Who would not fear thee,
O king of nations?” (Jer. x. 7); “And in every place incense is offered
unto my name” (Mal. i. 11); by “my name” allusion is made to the Being
which is called by them [i.e., the idolaters] “the First Cause.” We
have already explained this in our larger work (Mishneh Torah, I. On
Idolatry, chap. i.), and none of our co-religionists can doubt it.

The infidels, however, though believing in the existence of the
Creator, attack the exclusive prerogative of God, namely, the service
and worship which was commanded, in order that the belief of the people
in His existence should be firmly established, in the words, “And you
shall serve the Lord,” etc. (Exod. xxiii. 25). By transferring that
prerogative to other beings, they cause the people, who only notice the
rites, without comprehending their meaning or the true character of the
being which is worshipped, to renounce their belief in the existence of
God. They were therefore punished with death; comp. “Thou shalt save
alive nothing that breatheth” (Deut. xx. 16). The object of this
commandment, as is distinctly stated, is to extirpate that false
opinion, in order that other men should not be corrupted by it any
more; in the words of the Bible “that they teach you not,” etc. (ib.
18). They are called “enemies,” “foes,” “adversaries”; by worshipping
idols they are said to provoke God to jealousy, anger, and wrath. How
great, then, must be the offence of him who has a wrong opinion of God
Himself, and believes Him to be different from what He truly is, i.e.,
assumes that He does not exist, that He consists of two elements, that
He is corporeal, that He is subject to external influence, or ascribes
to Him any defect whatever. Such a person is undoubtedly worse than he
who worships idols in the belief that they, as agents, can do good or
evil.

Therefore bear in mind that by the belief in the corporeality or in
anything connected with corporeality, you would provoke God to jealousy
and wrath, kindle His fire and anger, become His foe, His enemy, and
His adversary in a higher degree than by the worship of idols. If you
think that there is an excuse for those who believe in the corporeality
of God on the ground of their training, their ignorance or their
defective comprehension, you must make the same concession to the
worshippers of idols; their worship is due to ignorance, or to early
training, “they continue in the custom of their fathers.” (T. B.
Hullin, 13a) You will perhaps say that the literal interpretation of
the Bible causes men to fall into that doubt, but you must know that
idolaters were likewise brought to their belief by false imaginations
and ideas. There is no excuse whatever for those who, being unable to
think for themselves, do not accept [the doctrine of the incorporeality
of God] from the true philosophers. I do not consider those men as
infidels who are unable to prove the incorporeality, but I hold those
to be so who do not believe it, especially when they see that Onkelos
and Jonathan avoid [in reference to God] expressions implying
corporeality as much as possible. This is all I intended to say in this
chapter.






CHAPTER XXXVII


The Hebrew term panim (face) is homonymous; most of its various
meanings have a figurative character. It denotes in the first place the
face of a living being; comp. “And all faces are turned into paleness”
(Jer. xxx. 6); “Wherefore are your faces so sad?” (Gen. xl. 7). In this
sense the term occurs frequently.

The next meaning of the word is “anger”; comp. “And her anger (paneha)
was gone” (1 Sam. i. 18). Accordingly, the term is frequently used in
reference to God in the sense of anger and wrath; comp. “The anger
(pene) of the Lord hath divided them” (Lam. iv. 16); “The anger (pene)
of the Lord is against them that do evil” (Ps. xxxiv. 17); “Mine anger
(panai) shall go and I will give thee rest” (Exod. xxxiii. 14); “Then
will I set mine anger” (panai) (Lev. xx. 3); there are many other
instances.

Another meaning of the word is “the presence and existence of a
person”; comp. “He died in the presence (pene) [i.e., in the lifetime]
of all his brethren” (Gen. xxv. 18); “And in the presence (pene) of all
the people I will be glorified” (Lev. x. 3); “He will surely curse thee
in thy very presence” (paneka) (Job i. 11). In the same sense the word
is used in the following passage, “And the Lord spake unto Moses face
to face,” i.e., both being present, without any intervening medium
between them. Comp. “Come, let us look one another in the face” (2
Kings xiv. 8); and also “The Lord talked with you face to face” (Deut.
v. 4); instead of which we read more plainly in another place, “Ye
heard the voice of the words, but saw no similitude; only ye heard a
voice” (ib. iv. 12). The hearing of the voice without seeing any
similitude is termed “face to face.” Similarly do the words, “And the
Lord spake unto Moses face to face” correspond to “There he heard the
voice of one speaking unto him” (Num. vii. 89), in the description of
God’s speaking to Moses. Thus it will be clear to you that the
perception of the Divine voice without the intervention of an angel is
expressed by “face to face.” In the same sense the word panim must be
understood in “And my face (panai) shall not be seen” (Exod. xxxiii.
23); i.e., my true existence, as it is, cannot be comprehended.

The word panim is also used in Hebrew as an adverb of place, in the
sense of “before,” or “between the hands.” In this sense it is
frequently employed in reference to God; so also in the passage, “And
my face (panai) shall not be seen,” according to Onkelos, who renders
it, “And those before me shall not be seen.” He finds here an allusion
to the fact, that there are also higher created beings of such
superiority that their true nature cannot be perceived by man; viz.,
the ideals, separate intellects, which in their relation to God are
described as being constantly before Him, or between His hands, i.e.,
as enjoying uninterruptedly the closest attention of Divine Providence.
He, i.e., Onkelos, considers that the things which are described as
completely perceptible are those beings which, as regards existence,
are inferior to the ideals, viz., substance and form; in reference to
which we are told, “And thou shalt see that which is behind me”
(ibid.), i.e., beings, from which, as it were, I turn away, and which I
leave behind me. This figure is to represent the utter remoteness of
such beings from the Deity. You shall later on (chap. liv.) hear my
explanation of what Moses, our teacher, asked for.

The word is also used as an adverb of time, meaning “before.” Comp. “In
former time (le-phanim) in Israel” (Ruth iv. 7); “Of old (le-phanim)
hast Thou laid the foundation of the earth” (Ps. cii. 25).

Another signification of the word is “attention and regard.” Comp.
“Thou shalt not have regard (pene) to the poor” (Lev. xx. 15); “And a
person receiving attention (panim)” (Isa. iii. 3); “Who does not show
regard (panim),” etc. (Deut. x. 17, etc.). The word panim (face) has a
similar signification in the blessing, “The Lord turn his face to thee”
(i.e., The Lord let his providence accompany thee), “and give thee
peace.”






CHAPTER XXXVIII


The Hebrew term aḥor is a homonym. It is a noun, signifying “back.”
Comp. “Behind (aḥare) the tabernacle” (Exod. xxvi. 12); “The spear came
out behind him (aḥarav)” (2 Sam. ii. 23).

It is next used in reference to time, signifying “after”; “neither
after him (aḥarav) arose there any like him” (2 Kings xxiii. 25);
“After (aḥar) these things” (Gen. xv. 1). In this sense the word occurs
frequently.

The term includes also the idea of following a thing and of conforming
with the moral principles of some other being. Comp. “Ye shall walk
after (aḥare) the Lord, your God” (Deut. xiii. 5); “They shall walk
after (aḥare) the Lord” (Hos. xi. 10), i.e., follow His will, walk in
the way of His actions, and imitate His virtues; “He walked after
(aḥare) the commandment” (ib. v. 11). In this sense the word occurs in
Exodus xxxiii. 20, “And thou shalt see my back” (aḥorai); thou shalt
perceive that which follows me, is similar to me, and is the result of
my will, i.e., all things created by me, as will be explained in the
course of this treatise.






CHAPTER XXXIX


The Hebrew leb (heart) is a homonymous noun, signifying that organ
which is the source of life to all beings possessing a heart. Comp.
“And thrust them through the heart of Absalom” (1 Sam. xviii. 14).

This organ being in the middle of the body, the word has been
figuratively applied to express “the middle part of a thing.” Comp.
“unto the midst (leb) of heaven” (Deut. iv. 11); “the midst (labbath)
of fire” (Exod. iii. 2).

It further denotes “thought.” Comp. “Went not mine heart with thee?” (2
Kings v. 26), i.e., I was with thee in my thought when a certain event
happened. Similarly must be explained, “And that ye seek not after your
own heart” (Num. xv. 39), i.e., after your own thoughts; “Whose heart
(i.e., whose thought), turneth away this day” (Deut. xxix. 18).

The word further signifies “counsel.” Comp. “All the rest of Israel
were of one heart (i.e., had one plan) to make David king” (1 Chron.
xii. 38); “but fools die for want of heart,” i.e., of counsel; “My
heart (i.e., my counsel) shall not turn away from this so long as I
live” (Job xxvii. 6); for this sentence is preceded by the words, “My
righteousness I hold fast, and will not let it go”; and then follows,
“my heart shall never turn away from this.”—As regards the expression
yeḥeraf, I think that it may be compared with the same verb in the form
neḥrefet, “a handmaid betrothed (neḥrefet) to a man” (Lev. xix. 20),
where neḥrefetḥ is similar in meaning to the Arabic munḥarifat,
“turning away,” and signifies “turning from the state of slavery to
that of marriage.”

Leb (heart) denotes also “will”; comp. “And I shall give you pastors
according to my will (libbi)” (Jer. iii. 15), “Is thine heart right as
my heart is?” (2 Kings x. 15), i.e., is thy will right as my will is?
In this sense the word has been figuratively applied to God. Comp.
“That shall do according to that which is in mine heart and in my soul”
(1 Sam. ii. 35), i.e., according to My will; “And mine eyes and mine
heart (i.e., My providence and My will) shall be there perpetually” (1
Kings ix. 3).

The word is also used in the sense of “understanding.” Comp. “For vain
man will be endowed with a heart” (Job xi. 12), i.e., will be wise; “A
wise man’s heart is at his right hand” (Eccles. x. 2), i.e., his
understanding is engaged in perfect thoughts, the highest problems.
Instances of this kind are numerous. It is in this sense, namely, that
of understanding, that the word is used whenever figuratively applied
to God; but exceptionally it is also used in the sense of “will.” It
must, in each passage, be explained in accordance with the context.
Also, in the following and similar passages, it signifies
“understanding”; “Consider it in thine heart” (Deut. iv. 39); “And none
considereth in his heart” (Isa. xliv. 19). Thus, also, “Yet the Lord
hath not given you an heart to perceive,” is identical in its meaning
with “Unto thee it was shown that thou mightest know” (Deut. iv. 35).

As to the passage, “And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine
heart” (Ib. vi. 5), I explain “with all thine heart” to mean “with all
the powers of thine heart,” that is, with all the powers of the body,
for they all have their origin in the heart; and the sense of the
entire passage is: make the knowledge of God the aim of all thy
actions, as we have stated in our Commentary on the Mishnah (Aboth,
Eight Chapters, v.), and in our Mishneh Torah, yesode hatorah, chap.
ii. 2.






CHAPTER XL


Ruaḥ is a homonym, signifying “air,” that is, one of the four elements.
Comp. “And the air of God moved” (Gen. i. 2).

It denotes also, “wind.” Comp. “And the east wind (ruaḥ) brought the
locusts” (Exod. x. 13); “west wind” (ruaḥ) (ib. 19). In this sense the
word occurs frequently.

Next, it signifies “breath.” Comp. “A breath (ruaḥ) that passeth away,
and does not come again” (Ps. lxxviii. 39); “wherein is the breath
(ruaḥ) of life” (Gen. vii. 15).

It signifies also that which remains of man after his death, and is not
subject to destruction. Comp. “And the spirit (ruaḥ) shall return unto
God who gave it” (Eccles. xii. 7).

Another signification of this word is “the divine inspiration of the
prophets whereby they prophesy”—as we shall explain, when speaking on
prophecy, as far as it is opportune to discuss this subject in a
treatise like this.—Comp. “And I will take of the spirit (ruaḥ) which
is upon thee, and will put it upon them” (Num. xi. 17); “And it came to
pass, when the spirit (ruaḥ) rested upon them” (ib. 25); “The spirit
(ruaḥ) of the Lord spake by me” (2 Sam. xxiii. 2). The term is
frequently used in this sense.

The meaning of “intention,” “will,” is likewise contained in the word
ruaḥ. Comp. “A fool uttereth all his spirit” (ruaḥ) (Prov. xxix. 11),
i.e., his intention and will; “And the spirit (ruaḥ) of Egypt shall
fail in the midst thereof, and I will destroy the counsel thereof”
(Isa. xix. 3), i.e., her intentions will be frustrated, and her plans
will be obscured; “Who has comprehended the spirit (ruaḥ) of the Lord,
or who is familiar with his counsel that he may tell us?” (Isa. xl.
13), i.e., Who knows the order fixed by His will, or perceives the
system of His Providence in the existing world, that he may tell us? as
we shall explain in the chapters in which we shall speak on Providence.

Thus the Hebrew ruaḥ, when used in reference to God, has generally the
fifth signification; sometimes, however, as explained above, the last
signification, viz., “will.” The meaning of the word in each individual
case is therefore to be determined by the context.






CHAPTER XLI


The Hebrew nefesh (soul) is a homonymous noun, signifying the vitality
which is common to all living, sentient beings. E.g. “wherein there is
a living soul” (nefesh) (Gen. i. 30). It denotes also blood, as in
“Thou shalt not eat the blood (nefesh) with the meat” (Deut. xii. 23).
Another signification of the term is “reason,” that is, the
distinguishing characteristic of man, as in “As the Lord liveth that
made us this soul” (Jer. xxxviii. 16). It denotes also the part of man
that remains after his death (nefesh, soul); comp. “But the soul
(nefesh) of my lord shall be bound in the bundle of life” (1 Sam. xxv.
29). Lastly, it denotes “will”; comp. “To bind his princes at his will”
(be-nafsho) (Ps. cv. 22); “Thou wilt not deliver me unto the will
(be-nefesh) of my enemies” (Ps. xli. 3); and according to my opinion,
it has this meaning also in the following passages, “If it be your will
(nafshekem) that I should bury my dead” (Gen. xxiii. 8); “Though Moses
and Samuel stood before me, yet my will (nafshi) could not be toward
this people” (Jer. xv. 1), that is, I had no pleasure in them, I did
not wish to preserve them. When nefesh is used in reference to God, it
has the meaning “will,” as we have already explained with reference to
the passage, “That shall do according to that which is in my will
(bi-lebabi) and in mine intention (be-nafshi)” (1 Sam. ii. 35).
Similarly we explain the phrase, “And his will (nafsho) to trouble
Israel ceased” (Judg. x. 16). Jonathan, the son of Uzziel [in the
Targum of the Prophets], did not translate this passage, because he
understood nafshi to have the first signification, and finding,
therefore, in these words sensation ascribed to God, he omitted them
from his translation. If, however, nefesh be here taken in the last
signification, the sentence can well be explained. For in the passage
which precedes, it is stated that Providence abandoned the Israelites,
and left them on the brink of death; then they cried and prayed for
help, but in vain. When, however, they had thoroughly repented, when
their misery had increased, and their enemy had had power over them, He
showed mercy to them, and His will to continue their trouble and misery
ceased. Note it well, for it is remarkable. The preposition ba in this
passage has the force of the preposition min (“from” or “of”); and
baʻamal is identical with meʻamal. Grammarians give many instances of
this use of the preposition ba: “And that which remaineth of (ba) the
flesh and of (ba) the bread” (Lev. viii. 32); “If there remains but few
of (ba) the years” (ib. xxv. 52); “Of (ba) the strangers and of (ba)
those born in the land” (Exod. xii. 19).






CHAPTER XLII


Ḥai (“living”) signifies a sentient organism (lit. “growing” and
“having sensation”), comp. “Every moving thing that liveth” (Gen. ix.
3); it also denotes recovery from a severe illness: “And was recovered
(va-yeḥi) of his sickness” (Isa. xxxviii. 9); “In the camp till they
recovered” (ḥayotam) (Josh. v. 8); “quick, raw (ḥai) flesh” (Lev. xiii.
10).

Mavet signifies “death” and “severe illness,” as in “His heart died
(va-yamot) within him, and he became as a stone” (1 Sam. xxv. 37), that
is, his illness was severe. For this reason it is stated concerning the
son of the woman of Zarephath, “And his sickness was so sore, that
there was no breath left in him” (1 Kings xvii. 17). The simple
expression va-yamoth would have given the idea that he was very ill,
near death, like Nabal when he heard what had taken place.

Some of the Andalusian authors say that his breath was suspended, so
that no breathing could be perceived at all, as sometimes an invalid is
seized with a fainting fit or an attack of asphyxia, and it cannot be
discovered whether he is alive or dead; in this condition the patient
may remain a day or two.

The term ḥai has also been employed in reference to the acquisition of
wisdom. Comp. “So shall they be life (ḥayyim) unto thy soul” (Prov.
iii. 22); “For whoso findeth me findeth life” (ib. viii. 35); “For they
are life (ḥayyim) to those that find them” (ib. iv. 22). Such instances
are numerous. In accordance with this metaphor, true principles are
called life, and corrupt principles death. Thus the Almighty says,
“See, I have set before thee this day life and good and death and evil”
(Deut. xxx. 15), showing that “life” and “good,” “death” and “evil,”
are identical, and then He explains these terms. In the same way I
understand His words, “That ye may live” (ib. v. 33), in accordance
with the traditional interpretation of “That it may be well with thee”
[scil. in the life to come] (ib. xxii. 7). In consequence of the
frequent use of this figure in our language our Sages said, “The
righteous even in death are called living, while the wicked even in
life are called dead.” (Talm. B. Berakhoth, p. 78). Note this well.






CHAPTER XLIII


The Hebrew kanaf is a homonym; most of its meanings are metaphorical.
Its primary signification is “wing of a flying creature,” e.g., “Any
winged (kanaf) fowl that flieth in the air” (Deut. iv. 17).

The term was next applied figuratively to the wings or corners of
garments; comp. “upon the four corners (kanfoth) of thy vesture” (ib.
xxii. 12).

It was also used to denote the ends of the inhabited part of the earth,
and the corners that are most distant from our habitation. Comp. “That
it might take hold of the ends (kanfoth) of the earth” (Job xxxviii.
13); “From the uttermost part (kenaf) of the earth have we heard songs”
(Isa. xxiv. 16).

Ibn Ganaḥ (in his Book of Hebrew Roots) says that kenaf is used in the
sense of “concealing,” in analogy with the Arabic kanaftu alshaian, “I
have hidden something,” and accordingly explains, Isaiah xxx. 20, “And
thy teacher will no longer be hidden or concealed.” It is a good
explanation, and I think that kenaf has the same meaning in Deuteronomy
xxiii. 1, “He shall not take away the cover (kenaf) of his father”;
also in, “Spread, therefore, thy cover (kenafeka) over thine handmaid”
(Ruth iii. 9). In this sense, I think, the word is figuratively applied
to God and to angels (for angels are not corporeal, according to my
opinion, as I shall explain). Ruth ii. 12 must therefore be translated
“Under whose protection (kenafav) thou art come to trust”; and wherever
the word occurs in reference to angels, it means concealment. You have
surely noticed the words of Isaiah (Isa. vi. 2), “With twain he covered
his face, and with twain he covered his feet.” Their meaning is this:
The cause of his (the angel’s) existence is hidden and concealed; this
is meant by the covering of the face. The things of which he (the
angel) is the cause, and which are called “his feet” (as I stated in
speaking of the homonym regel), are likewise concealed; for the actions
of the intelligences are not seen, and their ways are, except after
long study, not understood, on account of two reasons—the one of which
is contained in their own properties, the other in ourselves; that is
to say, because our perception is imperfect and the ideals are
difficult to be fully comprehended. As regards the phrase “and with
twain he flieth,” I shall explain in a special chapter (xlix.) why
flight has been attributed to angels.






CHAPTER XLIV


The Hebrew ʻayin is a homonym, signifying “fountain”; e.g., “By a
fountain (ʻen) of water” (Gen. xvi. 7). It next denotes “eye”; comp.
(ʻayin) “Eye for eye” (Exod. xxi. 24). Another meaning of the word is
“providence,” as it is said concerning Jeremiah, “Take him and direct
thine attention (eneka) to him” (Jer. xxxix. 12). In this figurative
sense it is to be understood when used in reference to God; e.g., “And
my providence and my pleasure shall be there perpetually” (1 Kings ix.
3), as we have already explained (page 140); “The eyes (ʻene), i.e.,
the Providence of the Lord thy God, are always upon it” (Deut. xi. 12);
“They are the eyes (ʻene) of the Lord, which run to and fro through the
whole earth” (Zech. iv. 10), i.e., His providence is extended over
everything that is on earth, as will be explained in the chapters in
which we shall treat of Providence. When, however, the word “eye” is
connected with the verb “to see,” (raah or ḥazah) as in “Open thine
eyes, and see” (1 Kings xix. 16); “His eyes behold” (Ps. xi. 4), the
phrase denotes perception of the mind, not that of the senses; for
every sensation is a passive state, as is well known to you, and God is
active, never passive, as will be explained by me.






CHAPTER XLV


Shamaʻ is used homonymously. It signifies “to hear,” and also “to
obey.” As regards the first signification, comp. “Neither let it be
heard out of thy mouth” (Exod. xxiii. 13); “And the fame thereof was
heard in Pharaoh’s house” (Gen. xlv. 16). Instances of this kind are
numerous.

Equally frequent are the instances of this verb being used in the sense
of “to obey”: “And they hearkened (shameʻü) not unto Moses” (Exod. vi.
9). “If they obey (yishmeʻü) and serve him” (Job xxxvi. 11); “Shall we
then hearken (nishmaʻ) unto you” (Neh. xiii. 27); “Whosoever will not
hearken (yishmaʻ) unto thy words” (Josh. i. 18).

The verb also signifies “to know” (“to understand”), comp. “A nation
whose tongue, i.e., its language, thou shalt not understand” (tishmaʻ)
(Deut. xxviii. 49). The verb shamaʻ, used in reference to God, must be
taken in the sense of perceiving, which is part of the third
signification, whenever, according to the literal interpretation of the
passage, it appears to have the first meaning: comp. “And the Lord
heard it” (Num. xi. 1); “For that He heareth your murmurings” (Exod.
xvi. 7). In all such passages mental perception is meant. When,
however, according to the literal interpretation the verb appears to
have the second signification, it implies that God responded to the
prayer of man and fulfilled his wish, or did not respond and did not
fulfil his wish: “I will surely hear his cry” (Exod. xxii. 23); “I will
hear, for I am gracious” (ib. 27); “Bow down thine ear, and hear” (2
Kings xix. 16); “But the Lord would not hearken to your voice, nor give
ear unto you” (Deut. i. 45); “Yea, when ye make many prayers, I will
not hear” (Isa. i. 15); “For I will not hear thee” (Jer. vii. 16).
There are many instances in which shamaʻ has this sense.

Remarks will now be presented to you on these metaphors and similes,
which will quench your thirst, and explain to you all their meanings
without leaving a doubt.






CHAPTER XLVI


We have already stated, in one of the chapters of this treatise, that
there is a great difference between bringing to view the existence of a
thing and demonstrating its true essence. We can lead others to notice
the existence of an object by pointing to its accidents, actions, or
even most remote relations to other objects: e.g., if you wish to
describe the king of a country to one of his subjects who does not know
him, you can give a description and an account of his existence in many
ways. You will either say to him, the tall man with a fair complexion
and grey hair is the king, thus describing him by his accidents; or you
will say, the king is the person round whom are seen a great multitude
of men on horse and on foot, and soldiers with drawn swords, over whose
head banners are waving, and before whom trumpets are sounded; or it is
the person living in the palace in a particular region of a certain
country; or it is the person who ordered the building of that wall, or
the construction of that bridge; or by some other similar acts and
things relating to him. His existence can be demonstrated in a still
more indirect way, e.g., if you are asked whether this land has a king,
you will undoubtedly answer in the affirmative. “What proof have you?”
“The fact that this banker here, a weak and little person, stands
before this large mass of gold pieces, and that poor man, tall and
strong, who stands before him asking in vain for alms of the weight of
a carob-grain, is rebuked and is compelled to go away by the mere force
of words; for had he not feared the king, he would, without hesitation,
have killed the banker, or pushed him away and taken as much of the
money as he could.” Consequently, this is a proof that this country has
a ruler and his existence is proved by the well-regulated affairs of
the country, on account of which the king is respected and the
punishments decreed by him are feared. In this whole example nothing is
mentioned that indicated his characteristics, and his essential
properties, by virtue of which he is king. The same is the case with
the information concerning the Creator given to the ordinary classes of
men in all prophetical books and in the Law. For it was found necessary
to teach all of them that God exists, and that He is in every respect
the most perfect Being, that is to say, He exists not only in the sense
in which the earth and the heavens exist, but He exists and possesses
life, wisdom, power, activity, and all other properties which our
belief in His existence must include, as will be shown below. That God
exists was therefore shown to ordinary men by means of similes taken
from physical bodies; that He is living, by a simile taken from motion,
because ordinary men consider only the body as fully, truly, and
undoubtedly existing; that which is connected with a body but is itself
not a body, although believed to exist, has a lower degree of existence
on account of its dependence on the body for existence. That, however,
which is neither itself a body, nor a force within a body, is not
existent according to man’s first notions, and is above all excluded
from the range of imagination. In the same manner motion is considered
by the ordinary man as identical with life; what cannot move
voluntarily from place to place has no life, although motion is not
part of the definition of life, but an accident connected with it. The
perception by the senses, especially by hearing and seeing, is best
known to us; we have no idea or notion of any other mode of
communication between the soul of one person and that of another than
by means of speaking, i.e., by the sound produced by lips, tongue, and
the other organs of speech. When, therefore, we are to be informed that
God has a knowledge of things, and that communication is made by Him to
the Prophets who convey it to us, they represent Him to us as seeing
and hearing, i.e., as perceiving and knowing those things which can be
seen and heard. They represent Him to us as speaking, i.e., that
communications from Him reach the Prophets; that is to be understood by
the term “prophecy,” as will be fully explained. God is described as
working, because we do not know any other mode of producing a thing
except by direct touch. He is said to have a soul in the sense that He
is living, because all living beings are generally supposed to have a
soul; although the term soul is, as has been shown, a homonym.

Again, since we perform all these actions only by means of corporeal
organs, we figuratively ascribe to God the organs of locomotion, as
feet, and their soles; organs of hearing, seeing, and smelling, as ear,
eye, and nose; organs and substance of speech, as mouth, tongue, and
sound; organs for the performance of work, as hand, its fingers, its
palm, and the arm. In short, these organs of the body are figuratively
ascribed to God, who is above all imperfection, to express that He
performs certain acts; and these acts are figuratively ascribed to Him
to express that He possesses certain perfections different from those
acts themselves. E.g., we say that He has eyes, ears, hands, a mouth, a
tongue, to express that He sees, hears, acts, and speaks; but seeing
and hearing are attributed to Him to indicate simply that He perceives.
You thus find in Hebrew instances in which the perception of the one
sense is named instead of the other; thus, “See the word of the Lord”
(Jer. ii. 31), in the same meaning as “Hear the word of the Lord,” for
the sense of the phrase is, “Perceive what He says”; similarly the
phrase, “See the smell of my son” (Gen. xxvii. 27) has the same meaning
as “Smell the smell of my son,” for it relates to the perception of the
smell. In the same way are used the words, “And all the people saw the
thunders and the lightnings” (Exod. xx. 15), although the passage also
contains the description of a prophetical vision, as is well known and
understood among our people. Action and speech are likewise
figuratively applied to God, to express that a certain influence has
emanated from Him, as will be explained (chap. lxv. and chap. lxvi.).
The physical organs which are attributed to God in the writings of the
Prophets are either organs of locomotion, indicating life; organs of
sensation, indicating perception; organs of touch, indicating action;
or organs of speech, indicating the divine inspiration of the Prophets,
as will be explained.

The object of all these indications is to establish in our minds the
notion of the existence of a living being, the Maker of everything, who
also possesses a knowledge of the things which He has made. We shall
explain, when we come to speak of the inadmissibility of Divine
attributes, that all these various attributes convey but one notion,
viz., that of the essence of God. The sole object of this chapter is to
explain in what sense physical organs are ascribed to the Most Perfect
Being, namely, that they are mere indications of the actions generally
performed by means of these organs. Such actions being perfections
respecting ourselves, are predicated of God, because we wish to express
that He is most perfect in every respect, as we remarked above in
explaining the Rabbinical phrase, “The language of the Torah is like
the language of man.” Instances of organs of locomotion being applied
to the Creator occur as follows:—“My footstool” (Isa. lxvi. 1); “the
place of the soles of my feet” (Ezek. xliii. 7). For examples of organs
of touch applied to God, comp. “the hand of the Lord” (Exod. ix. 3);
“with the finger of God” (ib. xxxi. 18); “the work of thy fingers” (Ps.
viii. 4), “And thou hast laid thine hand upon me” (ib. cxxxix. 5); “The
arm of the Lord” (Isa. liii. 1); “Thy right hand, O Lord” (Exod. xv.
6). In instances like the following, organs of speech are attributed to
God: “The mouth of the Lord has spoken” (Isa. i. 20); “And He would
open His lips against thee” (Job xi. 5); “The voice of the Lord is
powerful” (Ps. xxix. 4); “And his tongue as a devouring fire” (Isa.
xxx. 27). Organs of sensation are attributed to God in instances like
the following: “His eyes behold, His eyelids try” (Ps. xi. 4); “The
eyes of the Lord which run to and fro” (Zech. iv. 10); “Bow down thine
ear unto me, and hear” (2 Kings xix. 16); “You have kindled a fire in
my nostril” (Jer. xvii. 5). Of the inner parts of the human body only
the heart is figuratively applied to God, because “heart” is a homonym,
and denotes also “intellect”; it is besides the source of animal life.
In phrases like “my bowels are troubled for him” (Jer. xxxi. 20); “The
sounding of thy bowels” (Isa. lxiii. 15), the term “bowels” is used in
the sense of “heart”; for the term “bowels” is used both in a general
and in a specific meaning; it denotes specifically “bowels,” but more
generally it can be used as the name of any inner organ, including
“heart.” The correctness of this argument can be proved by the phrase
“And thy law is within my bowels” (Ps. xl. 9), which is identical with
“And thy law is within my heart.” For that reason the prophet employed
in this verse the phrase “my bowels are troubled” (and “the sounding of
thy bowels”); the verb hamah is in fact used more frequently in
connection with “heart,” than with any other organ; comp. “My heart
maketh a noise (homeh) in me” (Jer. iv. 19). Similarly, the shoulder is
never used as a figure in reference to God, because it is known as a
mere instrument of transport, and also comes into close contact with
the thing which it carries. With far greater reason the organs of
nutrition are never attributed to God; they are at once recognized as
signs of imperfection. In fact all organs, both the external and the
internal, are employed in the various actions of the soul; some, as
e.g., all inner organs, are the means of preserving the individual for
a certain time; others, as the organs of generation, are the means of
preserving the species; others are the means of improving the condition
of man and bringing his actions to perfection, as the hands, the feet,
and the eyes, all of which tend to render motion, action, and
perception more perfect. Animate beings require motion in order to be
able to approach that which is conducive to their welfare, and to move
away from the opposite; they require the senses in order to be able to
discern what is injurious to them and what is beneficial. In addition,
man requires various kinds of handiwork, to prepare his food, clothing,
and dwelling; and he is compelled by his physical constitution to
perform such work, namely, to prepare what is good for him. Some kinds
of work also occur among certain animals, as far as such work is
required by those animals. I do not believe that any man can doubt the
correctness of the assertion that the Creator is not in need of
anything for the continuance of His existence, or for the improvement
of His condition. Therefore, God has no organs, or, what is the same,
He is not corporeal; His actions are accomplished by His Essence, not
by any organ, and as undoubtedly physical forces are connected with the
organs, He does not possess any such forces, that is to say, He has,
besides His Essence, nothing that could be the cause of His action, His
knowledge, or His will, for attributes are nothing but forces under a
different name. It is not my intention to discuss the question in this
chapter. Our Sages laid down a general principle, by which the literal
sense of the physical attributes of God mentioned by the prophets is
rejected; a principle which evidently shows that our Sages were far
from the belief in the corporeality of God, and that they did not think
any person capable of misunderstanding it, or entertaining any doubt
about it. For that reason they employ in the Talmud and the Midrashim
phrases similar to those contained in the prophecies, without any
circumlocution; they knew that there could not be any doubt about their
metaphorical character, or any danger whatever of their being
misunderstood; and that all such expressions would be understood as
figurative [language], employed to communicate to the intellect the
notion of His existence. Now, it was well known that in figurative
language God is compared to a king who commands, cautions, punishes,
and rewards, his subjects, and whose servants and attendants publish
his orders, so that they might be acted upon, and they also execute
whatever he wishes. Thus the Sages adopted that figure, used it
frequently, and introduced such speech, consent, and refusal of a king,
and other usual acts of kings, as became necessary by that figure. In
all these instances they were sure that no doubt or confusion would
arise from it. The general principle alluded to above is contained in
the following saying of our Sages, mentioned in Bereshith Rabba (c.
xxvii.), “Great was the power of the Prophets; they compared the
creature to its Creator; comp. ‘And over the resemblance of the throne
was a resemblance like the appearance of man’” (Ezek. i. 26). They have
thus plainly stated that all those images which the Prophets perceived,
i.e. in prophetic visions, are images created by God. This is perfectly
correct; for every image in our imagination has been created. How
pregnant is the expression, “Great is their boldness!” They indicated
by it, that they themselves found it very remarkable; for whenever they
perceived a word or act difficult to explain, or apparently
objectionable, they used that phrase; e.g., a certain Rabbi has
performed the act (of “ḥaliẓah”) with a slipper, alone and by night.
Another Rabbi, thereupon exclaimed “How great is his boldness to have
followed the opinion of the minority.” The Chaldee phrase rab gubreh in
the original of the latter quotation, and the Hebrew gadol koḥo in that
of the former quotation, have the same meaning, viz., Great is the
power of (or the boldness of). Hence, in the preceding quotation, the
sense is, How remarkable is the language which the Prophets were
obliged to use when they speak of God the Creator in terms signifying
properties of beings created by Him. This deserves attention. Our Sages
have thus stated in distinct and plain terms that they are far from
believing in the corporeality of God; and in the figures and forms seen
in a prophetical vision, though belonging to created beings, the
Prophets, to use the words of our Sages, “compared the creature to its
Creator.” If, however, after these explanations, any one wishes out of
malice to cavil at them, and to find fault with them, though their
method is neither comprehended nor understood by him, the Sages o.b.m.
will sustain no injury by it.






CHAPTER XLVII


We have already stated several times that the prophetic books never
attribute to God anything which ordinary men consider a defect, or
which they cannot in their imagination combine with the idea of the
Almighty, although such terms may not otherwise be different from those
which were employed as metaphors in relation to God. Indeed all things
which are attributed to God are considered in some way to be
perfection, or can at least be imagined [as appertaining to Him].

We must now show why, according to this principle, the senses of
hearing, sight and smell, are attributed to God, but not those of taste
and touch. He is equally elevated above the use of all the five senses;
they are all defective as regards perception, even for those who have
no other source of knowledge; because they are passive, receive
impressions from without, and are subject to interruptions and
sufferings, as much as the other organs of the body. By saying that God
sees, we mean to state that He perceives visible things; “He hears” is
identical with saying “He perceives audible things”; in the same way we
might say, “He tastes and He touches,” in the sense of “He perceives
objects which man perceives by means of taste and touch.” For, as
regards perception, the senses are identical; if we deny the existence
of one sensation in God, we must deny that of all other sensations,
i.e., the perceptions of the five senses; and if we attribute the
existence of one sensation to Him, i.e., the perception appertaining to
one of the senses, we must attribute all the five sensations.
Nevertheless, we find in Holy Writ, “And God saw” (Gen. vi. 5); “And
God heard” (Num. xi. 1); “And God smelt” (Gen. viii. 21); but we do not
meet with the expressions, “And God tasted,” “And God touched.”
According to our opinion the reason of this is to be found in the idea,
which has a firm hold in the minds of all men, that God does not come
into contact with a body in the same manner as one body comes into
contact with another, since He is not even seen by the eye. While these
two senses, namely, taste and touch, only act when in close contact
with the object, by sight, hearing, and smell, even distant objects are
perceived. These, therefore, were considered by the multitude
appropriate expressions [to be figuratively applied to God]. Besides,
the object in figuratively applying the sensations to Him, could only
have been to express that He perceives our actions; but hearing and
sight are sufficient for that, namely, for the perception of what a man
does or says. Thus our Sages, among other admonitions, gave the
following advice and warning: “Know what is above thee, a seeing eye,
and a hearing ear.” (Mishnah Abot, ii. 1.)

You, however, know that, strictly speaking, the condition of all the
sensations is the same, that the same argument which is employed
against the existence of touch and taste in God, may be used against
sight, hearing, and smell; for they all are material perceptions and
impressions which are subject to change. There is only this difference,
that the former, touch and taste, are at once recognized as
deficiencies, while the others are considered as perfections. In a
similar manner the defect of the imagination is easily seen, less
easily that of thinking and reasoning. Imagination (raʻayon) therefore,
was never employed as a figure in speaking of God, while thought and
reason are figuratively ascribed to Him. Comp. “The thoughts which the
Lord thought” (Jer. xlix. 20); “And with his understanding he stretched
out the heavens” (ib. x. 12). The inner senses were thus treated in the
same way as the external; some are figuratively applied to God, some
not. All this is according to the language of man; he ascribes to God
what he considers a perfection, and does not ascribe to Him what he
considers a defect. In truth, however, no real attribute, implying an
addition to His essence, can be applied to Him, as will be proved.






CHAPTER XLVIII


Whenever in the Pentateuch the term “to hear” is applied to God,
Onkelos, the Proselyte, does not translate it literally, but
paraphrases it, merely expressing that a certain speech reached Him,
i.e., He perceived it, or that He accepted it or did not accept, when
it refers to supplication and prayer as its object. The words “God
heard” are therefore paraphrased by him regularly either, “It was heard
before the Lord,” or “He accepted” when employed in reference to
supplication and prayer; [e.g.] “I will surely accept,” lit. “I will
surely hear” (Exod. xxii. 22). This principle is followed by Onkelos in
his translation of the Pentateuch without any exception. But as regards
the verb “to see,” (raah), his renderings vary in a remarkable manner,
and I was unable to discern his principle or method. In some instances
he translates literally, “and God saw”; in others he paraphrases “it
was revealed before the Lord.” The use of the phrase va-ḥaza adonai by
Onkelos is sufficient evidence that the term ḥaza in Chaldee is
homonymous, and that it denotes mental perception as well as the
sensation of sight. This being the case, I am surprised that, in some
instances avoiding the literal rendering, he substituted for it “And it
was revealed before the Lord.” When I, however, examined the various
readings in the version of Onkelos, which I either saw myself or heard
from others during the time of my studies, I found that the term “to
see” when connected with wrong, injury, or violence, was paraphrased,
“It was manifest before the Lord.” There is no doubt that the term ḥaza
in Chaldee denotes complete apprehension and reception of the object in
the state in which it has been perceived. When Onkelos, therefore,
found the verb “to see” connected with the object “wrong,” he did not
render it literally, but paraphrased it, “It was revealed before the
Lord.” Now, I noticed that in all instances of the Pentateuch where
seeing is ascribed to God, he translated it literally, except those
instances which I will mention to you: “For my affliction was revealed
before the Lord” (Gen. xxix. 32); “For all that Laban doeth unto thee
is revealed before me” (ib. xxxi. 12);—although the first person in the
sentence refers to the angel [and not to God], Onkelos does not ascribe
to him that perception which implies complete comprehension of the
object, because the object is “iniquity”—“The oppression of the
children of Israel was known to the Lord” (Exod. ii. 25); “The
oppression of my people was surely known to me” (ib. iii. 7); “The
affliction is known to me” (ib. 9); “Their oppression is known to me”
(ib. iv. 31); “This people is known to me” (ib. xxxii. 9), i.e., their
rebellion is known to me—comp. the Targum of the passage, “And God saw
the children of Israel” (ib. ii. 25), which is equal to “He saw their
affliction and their trouble”—“And it was known to the Lord, and he
abhorred them” (Deut. xxxii. 19); “It was known to him that their power
was gone” (ib. 36); in this instance the object of the perception is
likewise the wrong done to the Israelites, and the increasing power of
the enemy. In all these examples Onkelos is consistent, following the
maxim expressed in the words, “Thou canst not look on iniquity” (Hab.
i. 13); wherefore he renders the verb “to see,” when referring to
oppression or rebellion, It is revealed before him, etc. This
appropriate and satisfactory explanation, the correctness of which I do
not doubt, is weakened by three passages, in which, according to this
view, I expected to find the verb “to see” paraphrased “to be revealed
before him,” but found instead the literal rendering “to see” in the
various copies of the Targum. The following are the three passages:
“And God saw that the wickedness of man was great upon the earth” (Gen.
vi. 6); “And the Lord saw the earth, and behold it was corrupt” (ib.
vi. 12); “and God saw that Leah was hated” (ib. xxx. 31). It appears to
me that in these passages there is a mistake, which has crept into the
copies of the Targum, since we do not possess the Targum in the
original manuscript of Onkelos, for in that case we should have assumed
that he had a satisfactory explanation of it.

In rendering Genesis xxii. 8, “the lamb is known to the Lord,” he
either wished to indicate that the Lord was not expected to seek and to
bring it, or he considered it inappropriate, in Chaldee to connect the
divine perception with one of the lower animals.

However, the various copies of the Targum must be carefully examined
with regard to this point, and if you still find those passages the
same as I quoted them, I cannot explain what he meant.






CHAPTER XLIX


The angels are likewise incorporeal; they are intelligences without
matter, but they are nevertheless created beings, and God created them,
as will be explained below. In Bereshith Rabbah (on Gen. iii. 24) we
read the following remark of our Sages: “The angel is called ‘the flame
of the sword which turned every way’ (Gen. iii. 24), in accordance with
the words, ‘His ministers a flaming fire’ (Ps. civ. 4); the attribute,
‘which turned every way’ is added, because angels are changeable in
form; they appear at one time as males, at another as females; now as
spirits; now as angels.” By this remark they clearly stated that angels
are incorporeal, and have no permanent bodily form independent of the
mind [of him who perceives them], they exist entirely in prophetic
vision, and depend on the action of the imaginative power, as will be
explained when speaking on the true meaning of prophecy. As to the
words “at another time as females,” which imply that the Prophets in
prophetical vision perceived angels also in the form of women, they
refer to the vision of Zechariah (v. 9), “And, behold, there came out
two women, and the wind was in their wings.” You know very well how
difficult it is for men to form a notion of anything immaterial, and
entirely devoid of corporeality, except after considerable training: it
is especially difficult for those who do not distinguish between
objects of the intellect and objects of the imagination, and depend
mostly on the mere imaginative power. They believe that all imagined
things exist or at least have the possibility of existing; but that
which cannot be imagined does not exist, and cannot exist. For persons
of this class—and the majority of thinkers belong to it—cannot arrive
at the true solution of any question, or at the explanation of anything
doubtful. On account of this difficulty the prophetic books contain
expressions which, taken literally, imply that angels are corporeal,
moving about, endowed with human form, receiving commands of God,
obeying His word and performing whatever He wishes, according to His
command. All this only serves to lead to the belief that angels exist,
and are alive and perfect, in the same way as we have explained in
reference to God. If the figurative representation of angels were
limited to this, their true essence would be believed to be the same as
the essence of God, since, in reference to the Creator expressions are
likewise employed, which literally imply that He is corporeal, living,
moving and endowed with human form. In order, therefore, to give to the
mind of men the idea that the existence of angels is lower than the
existence of God, certain forms of lower animals were introduced in the
description of angels. It was thereby shown, that the existence of God
is more perfect than that of angels, as much as man is more perfect
than the lower animals. Nevertheless no organ of the brute creation was
attributed to the angels except wings. Without wings the act of flying
appears as impossible as that of walking without legs; for these two
modes of motion can only be imagined in connection with these organs.
The motion of flying has been chosen as a symbol to represent that
angels possess life, because it is the most perfect and most sublime
movement of the brute creation. Men consider this motion a perfection
to such an extent that they themselves wish to be able to fly, in order
to escape easily what is injurious, and to obtain quickly what is
useful, though it be at a distance. For this reason this motion has
been attributed to the angels.

There is besides another reason. The bird in its flight is sometimes
visible, sometimes withdrawn from our sight; one moment near to us, and
in the next far off; and these are exactly the circumstances which we
must associate with the idea of angels, as will be explained below.
This imaginary perfection, the motion of flight, being the exclusive
property of the brute creation, has never been attributed to God. You
must not be misled by the passage, “And he rode upon a cherub, and he
did fly” (Ps. xviii. 10), for it is the cherub that did fly, and the
simile only serves to denote the rapid arrival of that which is
referred to in that passage. Comp.: “Behold, the Lord rideth upon a
swift cloud, and shall come into Egypt” (Isa. xix. 1); that is, the
punishment alluded to will come down quickly upon Egypt. Nor should
expressions like “the face of an ox,” “the face of a lion,” “the face
of an eagle,” “the sole of the foot of a calf,” found in the prophecies
of Ezekiel (i. 10 and 7) mislead you; for all these are explained in a
different manner, as you will learn later, and besides, the prophet
only describes the animals (ḥayyot). The subject will be explained
(III. i.), though by mere hints, as far as necessary, for directing
your attention to the true interpretation.

The motion of flying, frequently mentioned in the Bible, necessitates,
according to our imagination, the existence of wings; wings are
therefore given to the angels as symbols expressive of their existence,
not of their true essence. You must also bear in mind that whenever a
thing moves very quickly, it is said to fly, as that term implies great
velocity of motion. Comp. “As the eagle flieth” (Deut. xxviii. 49). The
eagle flies and moves with greater velocity than any other bird, and
therefore it is introduced in this simile. Furthermore, the wings are
the organs [lit. causes] of flight; hence the number of the wings of
angels in the prophetic vision corresponds to the number of the causes
which set a thing in motion, but this does not belong to the theme of
this chapter. (Comp. II. iv. and x.)






CHAPTER L


When reading my present treatise, bear in mind that by “faith” we do
not understand merely that which is uttered with the lips, but also
that which is apprehended by the soul, the conviction that the object
[of belief] is exactly as it is apprehended. If, as regards real or
supposed truths, you content yourself with giving utterance to them in
words, without apprehending them or believing in them, especially if
you do not seek real truth, you have a very easy task as, in fact, you
will find many ignorant people professing articles of faith without
connecting any idea with them.

If, however, you have a desire to rise to a higher state, viz., that of
reflection, and truly to hold the conviction that God is One and
possesses true unity, without admitting plurality or divisibility in
any sense whatever, you must understand that God has no essential
attribute in any form or in any sense whatever, and that the rejection
of corporeality implies the rejection of essential attributes. Those
who believe that God is One, and that He has many attributes, declare
the unity with their lips, and assume plurality in their thoughts. This
is like the doctrine of the Christians, who say that He is one and He
is three, and that the three are one. Of the same character is the
doctrine of those who say that God is One, but that He has many
attributes; and that He with His attributes is One, although they deny
corporeality and affirm His most absolute freedom from matter; as if
our object were to seek forms of expression, not subjects of belief.
For belief is only possible after the apprehension of a thing; it
consists in the conviction that the thing apprehended has its existence
beyond the mind [in reality] exactly as it is conceived in the mind. If
in addition to this we are convinced that the thing cannot be different
in any way from what we believe it to be, and that no reasonable
argument can be found for the rejection of the belief or for the
admission of any deviation from it, then the belief is true. Renounce
desires and habits, follow your reason, and study what I am going to
say in the chapters which follow on the rejection of the attributes;
you will then be fully convinced of what we have said; you will be of
those who truly conceive the Unity of God, not of those who utter it
with their lips without thought, like men of whom it has been said,
“Thou art near in their mouth, and far from their reins” (Jer. xii. 2).
It is right that a man should belong to that class of men who have a
conception of truth and understand it, though they do not speak of it.
Thus the pious are advised and addressed, “Commune with your own heart
upon your bed and be still. Selah.” (Ps. iv. 5.)






CHAPTER LI


There are many things whose existence is manifest and obvious; some of
these are innate notions or objects of sensation, others are nearly so;
and in fact they would require no proof if man had been left in his
primitive state. Such are the existence of motion, of man’s free will,
of phases of production and destruction, and of the natural properties
perceived by the senses, e.g., the heat of fire, the coldness of water,
and many other similar things. False notions, however, may be spread
either by a person labouring under error, or by one who has some
particular end in view, and who establishes theories contrary to the
real nature of things, by denying the existence of things perceived by
the senses, or by affirming the existence of what does not exist.
Philosophers are thus required to establish by proof things which are
self-evident, and to disprove the existence of things which only exist
in man’s imagination. Thus Aristotle gives a proof for the existence of
motion, because it had been denied; he disproves the reality of atoms,
because it had been asserted.

To the same class belongs the rejection of essential attributes in
reference to God. For it is a self-evident truth that the attribute is
not inherent in the object to which it is ascribed, but it is
superadded to its essence, and is consequently an accident; if the
attribute denoted the essence [τὸ τὶ ἦν εἶναι] of the object, it would
be either mere tautology, as if, e.g., one would say “man is man,” or
the explanation of a name, as, e.g., “man is a speaking animal”; for
the words “speaking animal” include the true essence of man, and there
is no third element besides life and speech in the definition of man;
when he, therefore, is described by the attributes of life and speech,
these are nothing but an explanation of the name “man,” that is to say,
that the thing which is called man, consists of life and speech. It
will now be clear that the attribute must be one of two things, either
the essence of the object described—in that case it is a mere
explanation of a name, and on that account we might admit the attribute
in reference to God, but we reject it from another cause as will be
shown—or the attribute is something different from the object
described, some extraneous superadded element; in that case the
attribute would be an accident, and he who merely rejects the
appellation “accidents” in reference to the attributes of God, does not
thereby alter their character; for everything superadded to the essence
of an object joins it without forming part of its essential properties,
and that constitutes an accident. Add to this the logical consequence
of admitting many attributes, viz., the existence of many eternal
beings. There cannot be any belief in the unity of God except by
admitting that He is one simple substance, without any composition or
plurality of elements; one from whatever side you view it, and by
whatever test you examine it; not divisible into two parts in any way
and by any cause, nor capable of any form of plurality either
objectively or subjectively, as will be proved in this treatise.

Some thinkers have gone so far as to say that the attributes of God are
neither His essence nor anything extraneous to His essence. This is
like the assertion of some theorists, that the ideals, i.e., the
universalia, are neither existing nor non-existent, and like the views
of others, that the atom does not fill a definite place, but keeps an
atom of space occupied; that man has no freedom of action at all, but
has acquirement. Such things are only said; they exist only in words,
not in thought, much less in reality. But as you know, and as all know
who do not delude themselves, these theories are preserved by a
multitude of words, by misleading similes sustained by declamation and
invective, and by numerous methods borrowed both from dialectics and
sophistry. If after uttering them and supporting them by such words, a
man were to examine for himself his own belief on this subject, he
would see nothing but confusion and stupidity in an endeavour to prove
the existence of things which do not exist, or to find a mean between
two opposites that have no mean. Or is there a mean between existence
and non-existence, or between the identity and non-identity of two
things? But, as we said, to such absurdities men were forced by the
great licence given to the imagination, and by the fact that every
existing material thing is necessarily imagined as a certain substance
possessing several attributes; for nothing has ever been found that
consists of one simple substance without any attribute. Guided by such
imaginations, men thought that God was also composed of many different
elements, viz., of His essence and of the attributes superadded to His
essence. Following up this comparison, some believed that God was
corporeal, and that He possessed attributes; others, abandoning this
theory, denied the corporeality, but retained the attributes. The
adherence to the literal sense of the text of Holy Writ is the source
of all this error, as I shall show in some of the chapters devoted to
this theme.






CHAPTER LII


Every description of an object by an affirmative attribute, which
includes the assertion that an object is of a certain kind, must be
made in one of the following five ways:—

First. The object is described by its definition, as e.g., man is
described as a being that lives and has reason; such a description,
containing the true essence of the object, is, as we have already
shown, nothing else but the explanation of a name. All agree that this
kind of description cannot be given of God; for there are no previous
causes to His existence, by which He could be defined: and on that
account it is a well-known principle, received by all the philosophers,
who are precise in their statements, that no definition can be given of
God.

Secondly. An object is described by part of its definition, as when,
e.g., man is described as a living being or as a rational being. This
kind of description includes the necessary connection [of the two
ideas]; for when we say that every man is rational we mean by it that
every being which has the characteristics of man must also have reason.
All agree that this kind of description is inappropriate in reference
to God; for if we were to speak of a portion of His essence, we should
consider His essence to be a compound. The inappropriateness of this
kind of description in reference to God is the same as that of the
preceding kind.

Thirdly. An object is described by something different from its true
essence, by something that does not complement or establish the essence
of the object. The description, therefore, relates to a quality; but
quality, in its most general sense, is an accident. If God could be
described in this way, He would be the substratum of accidents: a
sufficient reason for rejecting the idea that He possesses quality,
since it diverges from the true conception of His essence. It is
surprising how those who admit the application of attributes to God can
reject, in reference to Him, comparison and qualification. For when
they say “He cannot be qualified,” they can only mean that He possesses
no quality; and yet every positive essential attribute of an object
either constitutes its essence,—and in that case it is identical with
the essence,—or it contains a quality of the object.

There are, as you know, four kinds of quality; I will give you
instances of attributes of each kind, in order to show you that this
class of attributes cannot possibly be applied to God. (a) A man is
described by any of his intellectual or moral qualities, or by any of
the dispositions appertaining to him as an animate being, when, e.g.,
we speak of a person who is a carpenter, or who shrinks from sin, or
who is ill. It makes no difference whether we say, a carpenter, or a
sage, or a physician; by all these we represent certain physical
dispositions; nor does it make any difference whether we say
“sin-fearing” or “merciful.” Every trade, every profession, and every
settled habit of man are certain physical dispositions. All this is
clear to those who have occupied themselves with the study of Logic.
(b) A thing is described by some physical quality it possesses, or by
the absence of the same, e.g., as being soft or hard. It makes no
difference whether we say “soft or hard,” or “strong or weak”; in both
cases we speak of physical conditions. (c) A man is described by his
passive qualities, or by his emotions; we speak, e.g., of a person who
is passionate, irritable, timid, merciful, without implying that these
conditions have become permanent. The description of a thing by its
colour, taste, heat, cold, dryness, and moisture, belongs also to this
class of attributes. (d) A thing is described by any of its qualities
resulting from quantity as such; we speak, e.g., of a thing which is
long, short, curved, straight, etc.

Consider all these and similar attributes, and you will find that they
cannot be employed in reference to God. He is not a magnitude that any
quality resulting from quantity as such could be possessed by Him; He
is not affected by external influences, and therefore does not possess
any quality resulting from emotion. He is not subject to physical
conditions, and therefore does not possess strength or similar
qualities; He is not an animate being, that He should have a certain
disposition of the soul, or acquire certain properties, as meekness,
modesty, etc., or be in a state to which animate beings as such are
subject, as, e.g., in that of health or of illness. Hence it follows
that no attribute coming under the head of quality in its widest sense,
can be predicated of God. Consequently, these three classes of
attributes, describing the essence of a thing, or part of the essence,
or a quality of it, are clearly inadmissible in reference to God, for
they imply composition, which, as we shall prove, is out of question as
regards the Creator. We say, with regard to this latter point, that He
is absolutely One.

Fourthly. A thing is described by its relation to another thing, e.g.,
to time, to space, or to a different individual; thus we say, Zaid, the
father of A, or the partner of B, or who dwells at a certain place, or
who lived at a stated time. This kind of attribute does not necessarily
imply plurality or change in the essence of the object described; for
the same Zaid, to whom reference is made, is the partner of Amru, the
father of Becr, the master of Khalid, the friend of Zaid, dwells in a
certain house, and was born in a certain year. Such relations are not
the essence of a thing, nor are they so intimately connected with it as
qualities. At first thought, it would seem that they may be employed in
reference to God, but after careful and thorough consideration we are
convinced of their inadmissibility. It is quite clear that there is no
relation between God and time or space. For time is an accident
connected with motion, in so far as the latter includes the relation of
anteriority and posteriority, and is expressed by number, as is
explained in books devoted to this subject; and since motion is one of
the conditions to which only material bodies are subject, and God is
immaterial, there can be no relation between Him and time. Similarly
there is no relation between Him and space. But what we have to
investigate and to examine is this: whether some real relation exists
between God and any of the substances created by Him, by which He could
be described? That there is no correlation between Him and any of His
creatures can easily be seen; for the characteristic of two objects
correlative to each other is the equality of their reciprocal relation.
Now, as God has absolute existence, while all other beings have only
possible existence, as we shall show, there consequently cannot be any
correlation [between God and His creatures]. That a certain kind of
relation does exist between them is by some considered possible, but
wrongly. It is impossible to imagine a relation between intellect and
sight, although, as we believe, the same kind of existence is common to
both; how, then, could a relation be imagined between any creature and
God, who has nothing in common with any other being; for even the term
existence is applied to Him and other things, according to our opinion,
only by way of pure homonymity. Consequently there is no relation
whatever between Him and any other being. For whenever we speak of a
relation between two things, these belong to the same kind; but when
two things belong to different kinds though of the same class, there is
no relation between them. We therefore do not say, this red compared
with that green, is more, or less, or equally intense, although both
belong to the same class—colour; when they belong to two different
classes, there does not appear to exist any relation between them, not
even to a man of ordinary intellect, although the two things belong to
the same category; e.g., between a hundred cubits and the heat of
pepper there is no relation, the one being a quality, the other a
quantity; or between wisdom and sweetness, between meekness and
bitterness, although all these come under the head of quality in its
more general signification. How, then, could there be any relation
between God and His creatures, considering the important difference
between them in respect to true existence, the greatest of all
differences. Besides, if any relation existed between them, God would
be subject to the accident of relation; and although that would not be
an accident to the essence of God, it would still be, to some extent, a
kind of accident. You would, therefore, be wrong if you applied
affirmative attributes in their literal sense to God, though they
contained only relations; these, however, are the most appropriate of
all attributes, to be employed, in a less strict sense, in reference to
God, because they do not imply that a plurality of eternal things
exists, or that any change takes place in the essence of God, when
those things change to which God is in relation.

Fifthly. A thing is described by its actions; I do not mean by “its
actions” the inherent capacity for a certain work, as is expressed in
“carpenter,” “painter,” or “smith”—for these belong to the class of
qualities which have been mentioned above—but I mean the action the
latter has performed—we speak, e.g., of Zaid, who made this door, built
that wall, wove that garment. This kind of attributes is separate from
the essences of the thing described, and, therefore, appropriate to be
employed in describing the Creator, especially since we know that these
different actions do not imply that different elements must be
contained in the substance of the agent, by which the different actions
are produced, as will be explained. On the contrary, all the actions of
God emanate from His essence, not from any extraneous thing superadded
to His essence, as we have shown.

What we have explained in the present chapter is this: that God is one
in every respect, containing no plurality or any element superadded to
His essence: and that the many attributes of different significations
applied in Scripture to God, originate in the multitude of His actions,
not in a plurality existing in His essence, and are partly employed
with the object of conveying to us some notion of His perfection, in
accordance with what we consider perfection, as has been explained by
us. The possibility of one simple substance excluding plurality, though
accomplishing different actions, will be illustrated by examples in the
next chapter.






CHAPTER LIII


The circumstance which caused men to believe in the existence of divine
attributes is similar to that which caused others to believe in the
corporeality of God. The latter have not arrived at that belief by
speculation, but by following the literal sense of certain passages in
the Bible. The same is the case with the attributes; when in the books
of the Prophets and of the Law, God is described by attributes, such
passages are taken in their literal sense, and it is then believed that
God possesses attributes; as if He were to be exalted above
corporeality, and not above things connected with corporeality, i.e.,
the accidents, I mean psychical dispositions, all of which are
qualities [and connected with corporeality]. Every attribute which the
followers of this doctrine assume to be essential to the Creator, you
will find to express, although they do not distinctly say so, a quality
similar to those which they are accustomed to notice in the bodies of
all living beings. We apply to all such passages the principle, “The
Torah speaketh in the language of man,” and say that the object of all
these terms is to describe God as the most perfect being, not as
possessing those qualities which are only perfections in relation to
created living beings. Many of the attributes express different acts of
God, but that difference does not necessitate any difference as regards
Him from whom the acts proceed. This fact, viz., that from one agency
different effects may result, although that agency has not free will,
and much more so if it has free will, I will illustrate by an instance
taken from our own sphere. Fire melts certain things and makes others
hard, it boils and burns, it bleaches and blackens. If we described the
fire as bleaching, blackening, burning, boiling, hardening and melting,
we should be correct, and yet he who does not know the nature of fire,
would think that it included six different elements, one by which it
blackens, another by which it bleaches, a third by which it boils, a
fourth by which it consumes, a fifth by which it melts, a sixth by
which it hardens things—actions which are opposed to one another, and
of which each has its peculiar property. He, however, who knows the
nature of fire, will know that by virtue of one quality in action,
namely, by heat, it produces all these effects. If this is the case
with that which is done by nature, how much more is it the case with
regard to beings that act by free will, and still more with regard to
God, who is above all description. If we, therefore, perceive in God
certain relations of various kinds—for wisdom in us is different from
power, and power from will—it does by no means follow that different
elements are really contained in Him, that He contains one element by
which He knows, another by which He wills, and another by which He
exercises power, as is, in fact, the signification of the attributes of
God according to the Attributists. Some of them express it plainly, and
enumerate the attributes as elements added to the essence. Others,
however, are more reserved with regard to this matter, but indicate
their opinion, though they do not express it in distinct and
intelligible words. Thus, e.g., some of them say: “God is omnipotent by
His essence, wise by His essence, living by His essence, and endowed
with a will by His essence.” (I will mention to you, as an instance,
man’s reason, which being one faculty and implying no plurality,
enables him to know many arts and sciences; by the same faculty man is
able to sow, to do carpenter’s work, to weave, to build, to study, to
acquire a knowledge of geometry, and to govern a state. These various
acts resulting from one simple faculty, which involves no plurality,
are very numerous; their number, that is, the number of the actions
originating in man’s reason, is almost infinite. It is therefore
intelligible how in reference to God, those different actions can be
caused by one simple substance, that does not include any plurality or
any additional element. The attributes found in Holy Scripture are
either qualifications of His actions, without any reference to His
essence, or indicate absolute perfection, but do not imply that the
essence of God is a compound of various elements.) For in not admitting
the term “compound,” they do not reject the idea of a compound when
they admit a substance with attributes.

There still remains one difficulty which led them to that error, and
which I am now going to mention. Those who assert the existence of the
attributes do not found their opinion on the variety of God’s actions;
they say it is true that one substance can be the source of various
effects, but His essential attributes cannot be qualifications of His
actions, because it is impossible to imagine that the Creator created
Himself. They vary with regard to the so-called essential attributes—I
mean as regards their number—according to the text of the Scripture
which each of them follows. I will enumerate those on which all agree,
and the knowledge of which they believe that they have derived from
reasoning, not from some words of the Prophets, namely, the following
four:—life, power, wisdom, and will. They believe that these are four
different things, and such perfections as cannot possibly be absent
from the Creator, and that these cannot be qualifications of His
actions. This is their opinion. But you must know that wisdom and life
in reference to God are not different from each other; for in every
being that is conscious of itself, life and wisdom are the same thing,
that is to say, if by wisdom we understand the consciousness of self.
Besides, the subject and the object of that consciousness are
undoubtedly identical [as regards God]; for according to our opinion,
He is not composed of an element that apprehends, and another that does
not apprehend; He is not like man, who is a combination of a conscious
soul and an unconscious body. If, therefore, by “wisdom” we mean the
faculty of self-consciousness, wisdom and life are one and the same
thing. They, however, do not speak of wisdom in this sense, but of His
power to apprehend His creatures. There is also no doubt that power and
will do not exist in God in reference to Himself; for He cannot have
power or will as regards Himself; we cannot imagine such a thing. They
take these attributes as different relations between God and His
creatures, signifying that He has power in creating things, will in
giving to things existence as He desires, and wisdom in knowing what He
created. Consequently, these attributes do not refer to the essence of
God, but express relations between Him and His creatures.

Therefore we, who truly believe in the Unity of God, declare, that as
we do not believe that some element is included in His essence by which
He created the heavens, another by which He created the [four]
elements, a third by which He created the ideals, in the same way we
reject the idea that His essence contains an element by which He has
power, another element by which He has will, and a third by which He
has a knowledge of His creatures. On the contrary, He is a simple
essence, without any additional element whatever; He created the
universe, and knows it, but not by any extraneous force. There is no
difference whether these various attributes refer to His actions or to
relations between Him and His works; in fact, these relations, as we
have also shown, exist only in the thoughts of men. This is what we
must believe concerning the attributes occurring in the books of the
Prophets; some may also be taken as expressive of the perfection of God
by way of comparison with what we consider as perfections in us, as we
shall explain.






CHAPTER LIV


The wisest man, our Teacher Moses, asked two things of God, and
received a reply respecting both. The one thing he asked was, that God
should let him know His true essence; the other, which in fact he asked
first, that God should let him know His attributes. In answer to both
these petitions God promised that He would let him know all His
attributes, and that these were nothing but His actions. He also told
him that His true essence could not be perceived, and pointed out a
method by which he could obtain the utmost knowledge of God possible
for man to acquire. The knowledge obtained by Moses has not been
possessed by any human being before him or after him. His petition to
know the attributes of God is contained in the following words: “Show
me now thy way, that I may know thee, that I may find grace in thy
sight” (Exod. xxxiii. 13). Consider how many excellent ideas found
expression in the words, “Show me thy way, that I may know thee.” We
learn from them that God is known by His attributes, for Moses believed
that he knew Him, when he was shown the way of God. The words “That I
may find grace in thy sight,” imply that he who knows God finds grace
in His eyes. Not only is he acceptable and welcome to God who fasts and
prays, but everyone who knows Him. He who has no knowledge of God is
the object of His wrath and displeasure. The pleasure and the
displeasure of God, the approach to Him and the withdrawal from Him are
proportional to the amount of man’s knowledge or ignorance concerning
the Creator. We have already gone too far away from our subject, let us
now return to it.

Moses prayed to God to grant him knowledge of His attributes, and also
pardon for His people; when the latter had been granted, he continued
to pray for the knowledge of God’s essence in the words, “Show me thy
glory” (ib. 18), and then received, respecting his first request, “Show
me thy way,” the following favourable reply, “I will make all my
goodness to pass before thee” (ib. 19); as regards the second request,
however, he was told, “Thou canst not see my face” (ib. 20). The words
“all my goodness” imply that God promised to show him the whole
creation, concerning which it has been stated, “And God saw everything
that he had made, and, behold, it was very good” (Gen. i. 31); when I
say “to show him the whole creation,” I mean to imply that God promised
to make him comprehend the nature of all things, their relation to each
other, and the way they are governed by God both in reference to the
universe as a whole and to each creature in particular. This knowledge
is referred to when we are told of Moses, “he is firmly established in
all mine house” (Num. xii. 7); that is, “his knowledge of all the
creatures in My universe is correct and firmly established”; for false
opinions are not firmly established. Consequently the knowledge of the
works of God is the knowledge of His attributes, by which He can be
known. The fact that God promised Moses to give him a knowledge of His
works, may be inferred from the circumstance that God taught him such
attributes as refer exclusively to His works, viz., “merciful and
gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness,” etc., (Exod. xxxiv.
6). It is therefore clear that the ways which Moses wished to know, and
which God taught him, are the actions emanating from God. Our Sages
call them middot (qualities), and speak of the thirteen middoth of God
(Talm. B. Rosh ha-shanah, p. 17b); they used the term also in reference
to man; comp. “there are four different middoth (characters) among
those who go to the house of learning”; “There are four different
middoth (characters) among those who give charity” (Mishnah Abot, v.
13, 14). They do not mean to say that God really possesses middot
(qualities), but that He performs actions similar to such of our
actions as originate in certain qualities, i.e., in certain psychical
dispositions; not that God has really such dispositions. Although Moses
was shown “all His goodness,” i.e., all His works, only the thirteen
middot are mentioned, because they include those acts of God which
refer to the creation and the government of mankind, and to know these
acts was the principal object of the prayer of Moses. This is shown by
the conclusion of his prayer, “that I may know thee, that I may find
grace in thy sight, and consider that this nation is thy people” (Exod.
xxxiii. 16), that is to say, the people whom I have to rule by certain
acts in the performance of which I must be guided by Thy own acts in
governing them. We have thus shown that “the ways” used in the Bible,
and “middot” used in the Mishnah, are identical, denoting the acts
emanating from God in reference to the universe.

Whenever any one of His actions is perceived by us, we ascribe to God
that emotion which is the source of the act when performed by
ourselves, and call Him by an epithet which is formed from the verb
expressing that emotion. We see, e.g., how well He provides for the
life of the embryo of living beings; how He endows with certain
faculties both the embryo itself and those who have to rear it after
its birth, in order that it may be protected from death and
destruction, guarded against all harm, and assisted in the performance
of all that is required [for its development]. Similar acts, when
performed by us, are due to a certain emotion and tenderness called
mercy and pity. God is, therefore, said to be merciful; e.g., “Like as
a father is merciful to his children, so the Lord is merciful to them
that fear Him” (Ps. ciii. 13); “And I will spare them, as a man spareth
(yaḥamol) his own son that serveth him” (Mal. iii. 17). Such instances
do not imply that God is influenced by a feeling of mercy, but that
acts similar to those which a father performs for his son, out of pity,
mercy and real affection, emanate from God solely for the benefit of
His pious men, and are by no means the result of any impression or
change—[produced in God].—When we give something to a person who has no
claim upon us, we perform an act of grace; e.g., “Grant them graciously
unto us” (Judges xxi. 22). [The same term is used in reference to God,
e.g.] “which God hath graciously given” (Gen. xxxiii. 5); “Because God
hath dealt graciously with me” (ib. 11). Instances of this kind are
numerous. God creates and guides beings who have no claim upon Him to
be created and guided by Him; He is therefore called gracious
(ḥannun).—His actions towards mankind also include great calamities,
which overtake individuals and bring death to them, or affect whole
families and even entire regions, spread death, destroy generation
after generation, and spare nothing whatsoever. Hence there occur
inundations, earthquakes, destructive storms, expeditions of one nation
against the other for the sake of destroying it with the sword and
blotting out its memory, and many other evils of the same kind.
Whenever such evils are caused by us to any person, they originate in
great anger, violent jealousy, or a desire for revenge. God is
therefore called, because of these acts, “jealous,” “revengeful,”
“wrathful,” and “keeping anger” (Nah. i. 2); that is to say, He
performs acts similar to those which, when performed by us, originate
in certain psychical dispositions, in jealousy, desire for retaliation,
revenge, or anger; they are in accordance with the guilt of those who
are to be punished, and not the result of any emotion; for He is above
all defect! The same is the case with all divine acts; though
resembling those acts which emanate from our passions and psychical
dispositions, they are not due to anything superadded to His
essence.—The governor of a country, if he is a prophet, should conform
to these attributes. Acts [of punishment] must be performed by him
moderately and in accordance with justice, not merely as an outlet of
his passion. He must not let loose his anger, nor allow his passion to
overcome him; for all passions are bad, and they must be guarded
against as far as it lies in man’s power. At times and towards some
persons he must be merciful and gracious, not only from motives of
mercy and compassion, but according to their merits; at other times and
towards other persons he must evince anger, revenge, and wrath in
proportion to their guilt, but not from motives of passion. He must be
able to condemn a person to death by fire without anger, passion, or
loathing against him, and must exclusively be guided by what he
perceives of the guilt of the person, and by a sense of the great
benefit which a large number will derive from such a sentence. You
have, no doubt, noticed in the Torah how the commandment to annihilate
the seven nations, and “to save alive nothing that breatheth” (Deut.
xx. 16) is followed immediately by the words, “That they teach you not
to do after all their abominations, which they have done unto their
gods; so should you sin against the Lord your God” (ib. 18); that is to
say, you shall not think that this commandment implies an act of
cruelty or of retaliation; it is an act demanded by the tendency of man
to remove everything that might turn him away from the right path, and
to clear away all obstacles in the road to perfection, that is, to the
knowledge of God. Nevertheless, acts of mercy, pardon, pity, and grace
should more frequently be performed by the governor of a country than
acts of punishment; seeing that all the thirteen middoth of God are
attributes of mercy with only one exception, namely, “visiting the
iniquity of the fathers upon the children” (Exod. xxxiv. 7); for the
meaning of the preceding attribute (in the original ve-nakkeh lo
yenakkeh) is “and he will not utterly destroy”; (and not “He will by no
means clear the guilty”); comp. “And she will be utterly destroyed
(ve-nikketah), she shall sit upon the ground” (Isa. iii. 26). When it
is said that God is visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the
children, this refers exclusively to the sin of idolatry, and to no
other sin. That this is the case may be inferred from what is said in
the ten commandments, “upon the third and fourth generation of my
enemies” (Exod. xx. 5), none except idolaters being called “enemy”;
comp. also “every abomination to the Lord, which he hateth” (Deut. xii.
31). It was, however, considered sufficient to extend the punishment to
the fourth generation, because the fourth generation is the utmost a
man can see of his posterity; and when, therefore, the idolaters of a
place are destroyed, the old man worshipping idols is killed, his son,
his grandson, and his great-grandson, that is, the fourth generation.
By the mention of this attribute we are, as it were, told that His
commandments, undoubtedly in harmony with His acts, include the death
even of the little children of idolaters because of the sin of their
fathers and grandfathers. This principle we find frequently applied in
the Law, as, e.g., we read concerning the city that has been led astray
to idolatry, “destroy it utterly, and all that is therein” (Deut. xiii.
15). All this has been ordained in order that every vestige of that
which would lead to great injury should be blotted out, as we have
explained.

We have gone too far away from the subject of this chapter, but we have
shown why it has been considered sufficient to mention only these
(thirteen) out of all His acts; namely, because they are required for
the good government of a country; for the chief aim of man should be to
make himself, as far as possible, similar to God: that is to say, to
make his acts similar to the acts of God, or as our Sages expressed it
in explaining the verse, “Ye shall be holy” (Lev. xxi. 2): “He is
gracious, so be you also gracious; He is merciful, so be you also
merciful.”

The principal object of this chapter was to show that all attributes
ascribed to God are attributes of His acts, and do not imply that God
has any qualities.






CHAPTER LV


We have already, on several occasions, shown in this treatise that
everything that implies corporeality or passiveness, is to be negatived
in reference to God, for all passiveness implies change; and the agent
producing that state is undoubtedly different from the object affected
by it; and if God could be affected in any way whatever, another being
beside Him would act on Him and cause change in Him. All kinds of
non-existence must likewise be negatived in reference to Him; no
perfection whatever can therefore be imagined to be at one time absent
from Him, and at another present in Him: for if this were the case, He
would [at a certain time] only be potentially perfect. Potentiality
always implies non-existence, and when anything has to pass from
potentiality into reality, another thing that exists in reality is
required to effect that transition. Hence it follows that all
perfections must really exist in God, and none of them must in any way
be a mere potentiality. Another thing likewise to be denied in
reference to God, is similarity to any existing being. This has been
generally accepted, and is also mentioned in the books of the Prophets;
e.g., “To whom, then, will you liken me?” (Isa. xl. 25); “To whom,
then, will you liken God?” (ib. 18); “There is none like unto Thee”
(Jer. x. 6). Instances of this kind are frequent. In short, it is
necessary to demonstrate by proof that nothing can be predicated of God
that implies any of the following four things: corporeality, emotion or
change, non-existence,—e.g., that something would be potential at one
time and real at another—and similarity with any of His creatures. In
this respect our knowledge of God is aided by the study of Natural
Science. For he who is ignorant of the latter cannot understand the
defect implied in emotions, the difference between potentiality and
reality, the non-existence implied in all potentiality, the inferiority
of a thing that exists in potentiâ to that which moves in order to
cause its transition from potentiality into reality, and the
inferiority of that which moves for this purpose compared with its
condition when the transition has been effected. He who knows these
things, but without their proofs, does not know the details which
logically result from these general propositions; and therefore he
cannot prove that God exists, or that the [four] things mentioned above
are inadmissible in reference to God.

Having premised these remarks, I shall explain in the next chapter the
error of those who believe that God has essential attributes; those who
have some knowledge of Logic and Natural Science will understand it.






CHAPTER LVI


Similarity is based on a certain relation between two things; if
between two things no relation can be found, there can be no similarity
between them, and there is no relation between two things that have no
similarity to each other; e.g., we do not say this heat is similar to
that colour, or this voice is similar to that sweetness. This is
self-evident. Since the existence of a relation between God and man, or
between Him and other beings has been denied, similarity must likewise
be denied. You must know that two things of the same kind—i.e., whose
essential properties are the same, and which are distinguished from
each other by greatness and smallness, strength and weakness, etc.—are
necessarily similar, though different in this one way; e.g., a grain of
mustard and the sphere of the fixed stars are similar as regards the
three dimensions, although the one is exceedingly great, the other
exceedingly small, the property of having [three] dimensions is the
same in both; or the heat of wax melted by the sun and the heat of the
element of fire, are similar as regards heat; although the heat is
exceedingly great in the one case, and exceedingly small in the other,
the existence of that quality (heat) is the same in both. Thus those
who believe in the presence of essential attributes in God, viz.,
Existence, Life, Power, Wisdom, and Will, should know that these
attributes, when applied to God, have not the same meaning as when
applied to us, and that the difference does not only consist in
magnitude, or in the degree of perfection, stability, and durability.
It cannot be said, as they practically believe, that His existence is
only more stable, His life more permanent, His power greater, His
wisdom more perfect, and His will more general than ours, and that the
same definition applies to both. This is in no way admissible, for the
expression “more than” is used in comparing two things as regards a
certain attribute predicated of both of them in exactly the same sense,
and consequently implies similarity [between God and His creatures].
When they ascribe to God essential attributes, these so-called
essential attributes should not have any similarity to the attributes
of other things, and should according to their own opinion not be
included in one of the same definition, just as there is no similarity
between the essence of God and that of other beings. They do not follow
this principle, for they hold that one definition may include them, and
that, nevertheless, there is no similarity between them. Those who are
familiar with the meaning of similarity will certainly understand that
the term existence, when applied to God and to other beings, is
perfectly homonymous. In like manner, the terms Wisdom, Power, Will,
and Life are applied to God and to other beings by way of perfect
homonymity, admitting of no comparison whatever. Nor must you think
that these attributes are employed as hybrid terms; for hybrid terms
are such as are applied to two things which have a similarity to each
other in respect to a certain property which is in both of them an
accident, not an essential, constituent element. The attributes of God,
however, are not considered as accidental by any intelligent person,
while all attributes applied to man are accidents, according to the
Mutakallemim. I am therefore at a loss to see how they can find any
similarity [between the attributes of God and those of man]; how their
definitions can be identical, and their significations the same! This
is a decisive proof that there is, in no way or sense, anything common
to the attributes predicated of God, and those used in reference to
ourselves; they have only the same names, and nothing else is common to
them. Such being the case, it is not proper to believe, on account of
the use of the same attributes, that there is in God something
additional to His essence, in the same way as attributes are joined to
our essence. This is most important for those who understand it. Keep
it in memory, and study it thoroughly, in order to be well prepared for
that which I am going to explain to you.






CHAPTER LVII


On attributes; remarks more recondite than the preceding. It is known
that existence is an accident appertaining to all things, and therefore
an element superadded to their essence. This must evidently be the case
as regards everything the existence of which is due to some cause; its
existence is an element superadded to its essence. But as regards a
being whose existence is not due to any cause—God alone is that being,
for His existence, as we have said, is absolute—existence and essence
are perfectly identical; He is not a substance to which existence is
joined as an accident, as an additional element. His existence is
always absolute, and has never been a new element or an accident in
Him. Consequently God exists without possessing the attribute of
existence. Similarly He lives, without possessing the attribute of
life; knows, without possessing the attribute of knowledge; is
omnipotent without possessing the attribute of omnipotence; is wise,
without possessing the attribute of wisdom; all this reduces itself to
one and the same entity; there is no plurality in Him, as will be
shown. It is further necessary to consider that unity and plurality are
accidents supervening to an object according as it consists of many
elements or of one. This is fully explained in the book called
Metaphysics. In the same way as number is not the substance of the
things numbered, so is unity not the substance of the thing which has
the attribute of unity, for unity and plurality are accidents belonging
to the category of discrete quantity, and supervening to such objects
as are capable of receiving them.

To that being, however, which has truly simple, absolute existence, and
in which composition is inconceivable, the accident of unity is as
inadmissible as the accident of plurality; that is to say, God’s unity
is not an element superadded, but He is One without possessing the
attribute of unity. The investigation of this subject, which is almost
too subtle for our understanding, must not be based on current
expressions employed in describing it, for these are the great source
of error. It would be extremely difficult for us to find, in any
language whatsoever, words adequate to this subject, and we can only
employ inadequate language. In our endeavour to show that God does not
include a plurality, we can only say “He is one,” although “one” and
“many” are both terms which serve to distinguish quantity. We therefore
make the subject clearer, and show to the understanding the way of
truth by saying He is one but does not possess the attribute of unity.

The same is the case when we say God is the First (Kadmon), to express
that He has not been created; the term “First” is decidedly inaccurate,
for it can in its true sense only be applied to a being that is subject
to the relation of time; the latter, however, is an accident to motion
which again is connected with a body. Besides the attribute “first” is
a relative term, being in regard to time the same as the terms “long”
and “short” are in regard to a line. Both expressions, “first” and
“created,” are equally inadmissible in reference to any being to which
the attribute of time is not applicable, just as we do not say
“crooked” or “straight” in reference to taste, “salted” or “insipid” in
reference to the voice. These subjects are not unknown to those who
have accustomed themselves to seek a true understanding of the things,
and to establish their properties in accordance with the abstract
notions which the mind has formed of them, and who are not misled by
the inaccuracy of the words employed. All attributes, such as “the
First,” “the Last,” occurring in the Scriptures in reference to God,
are as metaphorical as the expressions “ear” and “eye.” They simply
signify that God is not subject to any change or innovation whatever;
they do not imply that God can be described by time, or that there is
any comparison between Him and any other being as regards time, and
that He is called on that account “the first” and “the last.” In short,
all similar expressions are borrowed from the language commonly used
among the people. In the same way we use “One” in reference to God, to
express that there is nothing similar to Him, but we do not mean to say
that an attribute of unity is added to His essence.






CHAPTER LVIII


This chapter is even more recondite than the preceding. Know that the
negative attributes of God are the true attributes: they do not include
any incorrect notions or any deficiency whatever in reference to God,
while positive attributes imply polytheism, and are inadequate, as we
have already shown. It is now necessary to explain how negative
expressions can in a certain sense be employed as attributes, and how
they are distinguished from positive attributes. Then I shall show that
we cannot describe the Creator by any means except by negative
attributes. An attribute does not exclusively belong to the one object
to which it is related; while qualifying one thing, it can also be
employed to qualify other things, and is in that case not peculiar to
that one thing. E.g., if you see an object from a distance, and on
enquiring what it is, are told that it is a living being, you have
certainly learnt an attribute of the object seen, and although that
attribute does not exclusively belong to the object perceived, it
expresses that the object is not a plant or a mineral. Again, if a man
is in a certain house, and you know that something is in the house, but
not exactly what, you ask what is in that house, and you are told, not
a plant nor a mineral. You have thereby obtained some special knowledge
of the thing; you have learnt that it is a living being, although you
do not yet know what kind of a living being it is. The negative
attributes have this in common with the positive, that they necessarily
circumscribe the object to some extent, although such circumscription
consists only in the exclusion of what otherwise would not be excluded.
In the following point, however, the negative attributes are
distinguished from the positive. The positive attributes, although not
peculiar to one thing, describe a portion of what we desire to know,
either some part of its essence or some of its accidents; the negative
attributes, on the other hand, do not, as regards the essence of the
thing which we desire to know, in any way tell us what it is, except it
be indirectly, as has been shown in the instance given by us.

After this introduction, I would observe that,—as has already been
shown—God’s existence is absolute, that it includes no composition, as
will be proved, and that we comprehend only the fact that He exists,
not His essence. Consequently it is a false assumption to hold that He
has any positive attribute; for He does not possess existence in
addition to His essence; it therefore cannot be said that the one may
be described as an attribute [of the other]; much less has He [in
addition to His existence] a compound essence, consisting of two
constituent elements to which the attribute could refer; still less has
He accidents, which could be described by an attribute. Hence it is
clear that He has no positive attribute whatever. The negative
attributes, however, are those which are necessary to direct the mind
to the truths which we must believe concerning God; for, on the one
hand, they do not imply any plurality, and, on the other, they convey
to man the highest possible knowledge of God; e.g., it has been
established by proof that some being must exist besides those things
which can be perceived by the senses, or apprehended by the mind; when
we say of this being, that it exists, we mean that its non-existence is
impossible. We then perceive that such a being is not, for instance,
like the four elements, which are inanimate, and we therefore say that
it is living, expressing thereby that it is not dead. We call such a
being incorporeal, because we notice that it is unlike the heavens,
which are living, but material. Seeing that it is also different from
the intellect, which, though incorporeal and living, owes its existence
to some cause, we say it is the first, expressing thereby that its
existence is not due to any cause. We further notice, that the
existence, that is the essence, of this being is not limited to its own
existence; many existences emanate from it, and its influence is not
like that of the fire in producing heat, or that of the sun in sending
forth light, but consists in constantly giving them stability and order
by well-established rule, as we shall show: we say, on that account, it
has power, wisdom, and will, i.e., it is not feeble or ignorant, or
hasty, and does not abandon its creatures; when we say that it is not
feeble, we mean that its existence is capable of producing the
existence of many other things; by saying that it is not ignorant, we
mean “it perceives” or “it lives,”—for everything that perceives is
living—by saying “it is not hasty, and does not abandon its creatures,”
we mean that all these creatures preserve a certain order and
arrangement; they are not left to themselves; they are not produced
aimlessly, but whatever condition they receive from that being is given
with design and intention. We thus learn that there is no other being
like unto God, and we say that He is One, i.e., there are not more Gods
than one.

It has thus been shown that every attribute predicated of God either
denotes the quality of an action, or—when the attribute is intended to
convey some idea of the Divine Being itself, and not of His actions—the
negation of the opposite. Even these negative attributes must not be
formed and applied to God, except in the way in which, as you know,
sometimes an attribute is negatived in reference to a thing, although
that attribute can naturally never be applied to it in the same sense,
as, e.g., we say, “This wall does not see.” Those who read the present
work are aware that, notwithstanding all the efforts of the mind, we
can obtain no knowledge of the essence of the heavens—a revolving
substance which has been measured by us in spans and cubits, and
examined even as regards the proportions of the several spheres to each
other and respecting most of their motions—although we know that they
must consist of matter and form; but the matter not being the same as
sublunary matter, we can only describe the heavens in terms expressing
negative properties, but not in terms denoting positive qualities. Thus
we say that the heavens are not light, not heavy, not passive and
therefore not subject to impressions, and that they do not possess the
sensations of taste and smell; or we use similar negative attributes.
All this we do, because we do not know their substance. What, then, can
be the result of our efforts, when we try to obtain a knowledge of a
Being that is free from substance, that is most simple, whose existence
is absolute, and not due to any cause, to whose perfect essence nothing
can be superadded, and whose perfection consists, as we have shown, in
the absence of all defects. All we understand is the fact that He
exists, that He is a Being to whom none of His creatures is similar,
who has nothing in common with them, who does not include plurality,
who is never too feeble to produce other beings, and whose relation to
the universe is that of a steersman to a boat; and even this is not a
real relation, a real simile, but serves only to convey to us the idea
that God rules the universe; that is, that He gives it duration, and
preserves its necessary arrangement. This subject will be treated more
fully. Praised be He! In the contemplation of His essence, our
comprehension and knowledge prove insufficient; in the examination of
His works, how they necessarily result from His will, our knowledge
proves to be ignorance, and in the endeavour to extol Him in words, all
our efforts in speech are mere weakness and failure!






CHAPTER LIX


The following question might perhaps be asked: Since there is no
possibility of obtaining a knowledge of the true essence of God, and
since it has also been proved that the only thing that man can
apprehend of Him is the fact that He exists, and that all positive
attributes are inadmissible, as has been shown; what is the difference
among those who have obtained a knowledge of God? Must not the
knowledge obtained by our teacher Moses, and by Solomon, be the same as
that obtained by any one of the lowest class of philosophers, since
there can be no addition to this knowledge? But, on the other hand, it
is generally accepted among theologians and also among philosophers,
that there can be a great difference between two persons as regards the
knowledge of God obtained by them. Know that this is really the case,
that those who have obtained a knowledge of God differ greatly from
each other; for in the same way as by each additional attribute an
object is more specified, and is brought nearer to the true
apprehension of the observer, so by each additional negative attribute
you advance toward the knowledge of God, and you are nearer to it than
he who does not negative, in reference to God, those qualities which
you are convinced by proof must be negatived. There may thus be a man
who after having earnestly devoted many years to the pursuit of one
science, and to the true understanding of its principles, till he is
fully convinced of its truths, has obtained as the sole result of this
study the conviction that a certain quality must be negatived in
reference to God, and the capacity of demonstrating that it is
impossible to apply it to Him. Superficial thinkers will have no proof
for this, will doubtfully ask, Is that thing existing in the Creator,
or not? And those who are deprived of sight will positively ascribe it
to God, although it has been clearly shown that He does not possess it.
E.g., while I show that God is incorporeal, another doubts and is not
certain whether He is corporeal or incorporeal; others even positively
declare that He is corporeal, and appear before the Lord with that
belief. Now see how great the difference is between these three men;
the first is undoubtedly nearest to the Almighty; the second is remote,
and the third still more distant from Him. If there be a fourth person
who holds himself convinced by proof that emotions are impossible in
God, while the first who rejects the corporeality, is not convinced of
that impossibility, that fourth person is undoubtedly nearer the
knowledge of God than the first, and so on, so that a person who,
convinced by proof, negatives a number of things in reference to God,
which according to our belief may possibly be in Him or emanate from
Him, is undoubtedly a more perfect man than we are, and would surpass
us still more if we positively believed these things to be properties
of God. It will now be clear to you, that every time you establish by
proof the negation of a thing in reference to God, you become more
perfect, while with every additional positive assertion you follow your
imagination and recede from the true knowledge of God. Only by such
ways must we approach the knowledge of God, and by such researches and
studies as would show us the inapplicability of what is inadmissible as
regards the Creator, not by such methods as would prove the necessity
of ascribing to Him anything extraneous to His essence, or asserting
that He has a certain perfection, when we find it to be a perfection in
relation to us. The perfections are all to some extent acquired
properties, and a property which must be acquired does not exist in
everything capable of making such acquisition.

You must bear in mind, that by affirming anything of God, you are
removed from Him in two respects; first, whatever you affirm, is only a
perfection in relation to us; secondly, He does not possess anything
superadded to this essence; His essence includes all His perfections,
as we have shown. Since it is a well-known fact that even that
knowledge of God which is accessible to man cannot be attained except
by negations, and that negations do not convey a true idea of the being
to which they refer, all people, both of past and present generations,
declared that God cannot be the object of human comprehension, that
none but Himself comprehends what He is, and that our knowledge
consists in knowing that we are unable truly to comprehend Him. All
philosophers say, “He has overpowered us by His grace, and is invisible
to us through the intensity of His light,” like the sun which cannot be
perceived by eyes which are too weak to bear its rays. Much more has
been said on this topic, but it is useless to repeat it here. The idea
is best expressed in the book of Psalms, “Silence is praise to Thee”
(lxv. 2). It is a very expressive remark on this subject; for whatever
we utter with the intention of extolling and of praising Him, contains
something that cannot be applied to God, and includes derogatory
expressions; it is therefore more becoming to be silent, and to be
content with intellectual reflection, as has been recommended by men of
the highest culture, in the words “Commune with your own heart upon
your bed, and be still” (Ps. iv. 4). You must surely know the following
celebrated passage in the Talmud—would that all passages in the Talmud
were like that!—although it is known to you, I quote it literally, as I
wish to point out to you the ideas contained in it: “A certain person,
reading prayers in the presence of Rabbi Ḥaninah, said, ‘God, the
great, the valiant and the tremendous, the powerful, the strong, and
the mighty.’—The rabbi said to him, Have you finished all the praises
of your Master? The three epithets, ‘God, the great, the valiant and
the tremendous,’ we should not have applied to God, had Moses not
mentioned them in the Law, and had not the men of the Great Synagogue
come forward subsequently and established their use in the prayer; and
you say all this! Let this be illustrated by a parable. There was once
an earthly king, possessing millions of gold coin; he was praised for
owning millions of silver coin; was this not really dispraise to him?”
Thus far the opinion of the pious rabbi. Consider, first, how repulsive
and annoying the accumulation of all these positive attributes was to
him; next, how he showed that, if we had only to follow our reason, we
should never have composed these prayers, and we should not have
uttered any of them. It has, however, become necessary to address men
in words that should leave some idea in their minds, and, in accordance
with the saying of our Sages, “The Torah speaks in the language of
men,” the Creator has been described to us in terms of our own
perfections; but we should not on that account have uttered any other
than the three above-mentioned attributes, and we should not have used
them as names of God except when meeting with them in reading the Law.
Subsequently, the men of the Great Synagogue, who were prophets,
introduced these expressions also into the prayer, but we should not on
that account use [in our prayers] any other attributes of God. The
principal lesson to be derived from this passage is that there are two
reasons for our employing those phrases in our prayers: first, they
occur in the Pentateuch; secondly, the Prophets introduced them into
the prayer. Were it not for the first reason, we should never have
uttered them; and were it not for the second reason, we should not have
copied them from the Pentateuch to recite them in our prayers; how then
could we approve of the use of those numerous attributes! You also
learn from this that we ought not to mention and employ in our prayers
all the attributes we find applied to God in the books of the Prophets;
for he does not say, “Were it not that Moses, our Teacher, said them,
we should not have been able to use them”; but he adds another
condition—“and had not the men of the Great Synagogue come forward and
established their use in the prayer,” because only for that reason are
we allowed to use them in our prayers. We cannot approve of what those
foolish persons do who are extravagant in praise, fluent and prolix in
the prayers they compose, and in the hymns they make in the desire to
approach the Creator. They describe God in attributes which would be an
offence if applied to a human being; for those persons have no
knowledge of these great and important principles, which are not
accessible to the ordinary intelligence of man. Treating the Creator as
a familiar object, they describe Him and speak of Him in any
expressions they think proper; they eloquently continue to praise Him
in that manner, and believe that they can thereby influence Him and
produce an effect on Him. If they find some phrase suited to their
object in the words of the Prophets they are still more inclined to
consider that they are free to make use of such texts—which should at
least be explained—to employ them in their literal sense, to derive new
expressions from them, to form from them numerous variations, and to
found whole compositions on them. This license is frequently met with
in the compositions of the singers, preachers, and others who imagine
themselves to be able to compose a poem. Such authors write things
which partly are real heresy, partly contain such folly and absurdity
that they naturally cause those who hear them to laugh, but also to
feel grieved at the thought that such things can be uttered in
reference to God. Were it not that I pitied the authors for their
defects, and did not wish to injure them, I should have cited some
passages to show you their mistakes; besides, the fault of their
compositions is obvious to all intelligent persons. You must consider
it, and think thus: If slander and libel is a great sin, how much
greater is the sin of those who speak with looseness of tongue in
reference to God, and describe Him by attributes which are far below
Him; and I declare that they not only commit an ordinary sin, but
unconsciously at least incur the guilt of profanity and blasphemy. This
applies both to the multitude that listens to such prayers, and to the
foolish man that recites them. Men, however, who understand the fault
of such compositions, and, nevertheless, recite them, may be classed,
according to my opinion, among those to whom the following words are
applied: “And the children of Israel used words that were not right
against the Lord their God” (2 Kings xvii. 9); and “utter error against
the Lord” (Isa. xxxii. 6). If you are of those who regard the honour of
their Creator, do not listen in any way to them, much less utter what
they say, and still less compose such prayers, knowing how great is the
offence of one who hurls aspersions against the Supreme Being. There is
no necessity at all for you to use positive attributes of God with the
view of magnifying Him in your thoughts, or to go beyond the limits
which the men of the Great Synagogue have introduced in the prayers and
in the blessings, for this is sufficient for all purposes, and even
more than sufficient, as Rabbi Ḥaninah said. Other attributes, such as
occur in the books of the Prophets, may be uttered when we meet with
them in reading those books; but we must bear in mind what has already
been explained, that they are either attributes of God’s actions, or
expressions implying the negation of the opposite. This likewise should
not be divulged to the multitude; but a reflection of this kind is
fitted for the few only who believe that the glorification of God does
not consist in uttering that which is not to be uttered, but in
reflecting on that on which man should reflect.

We will now conclude our exposition of the wise words of R. Ḥaninah. He
does not employ any such simile as: “A king who possesses millions of
gold denarii, and is praised as having hundreds”; for this would imply
that God’s perfections, although more perfect than those ascribed to
man are still of the same kind; but this is not the case, as has been
proved. The excellence of the simile consists in the words: “who
possesses golden denarii, and is praised as having silver denarii”;
this implies that these attributes, though perfections as regards
ourselves, are not such as regards God; in reference to Him they would
all be defects, as is distinctly suggested in the remark, “Is this not
an offence to Him?”

I have already told you that all these attributes, whatever perfection
they may denote according to your idea, imply defects in reference to
God, if applied to Him in the same sense as they are used in reference
to ourselves. Solomon has already given us sufficient instruction on
this subject by saying, “For God is in heaven, and thou upon earth;
therefore let thy words be few” (Eccles. v. 2).






CHAPTER LX


I will give you in this chapter some illustrations, in order that you
may better understand the propriety of forming as many negative
attributes as possible, and the impropriety of ascribing to God any
positive attributes. A person may know for certain that a “ship” is in
existence, but he may not know to what object that name is applied,
whether to a substance or to an accident; a second person then learns
that the ship is not an accident; a third, that it is not a mineral; a
fourth, that it is not a plant growing in the earth; a fifth, that it
is not a body whose parts are joined together by nature; a sixth, that
it is not a flat object like boards or doors; a seventh, that it is not
a sphere; an eighth, that it is not pointed; a ninth, that it is not
round-shaped; nor equilateral; a tenth, that it is not solid. It is
clear that this tenth person has almost arrived at the correct notion
of a “ship” by the foregoing negative attributes, as if he had exactly
the same notion as those have who imagine it to be a wooden substance
which is hollow, long, and composed of many pieces of wood, that is to
say, who know it by positive attributes. Of the other persons in our
illustration, each one is more remote from the correct notion of a ship
than the next mentioned, so that the first knows nothing about it but
the name. In the same manner you will come nearer to the knowledge and
comprehension of God by the negative attributes. But you must be
careful, in what you negative, to negative by proof, not by mere words,
for each time you ascertain by proof that a certain thing, believed to
exist in the Creator, must be negatived, you have undoubtedly come one
step nearer to the knowledge of God.

It is in this sense that some men come very near to God, and others
remain exceedingly remote from Him, not in the sense of those who are
deprived of vision, and believe that God occupies a place, which man
can physically approach or from which he can recede. Examine this well,
know it, and be content with it. The way which will bring you nearer to
God has been clearly shown to you; walk in it, if you have the desire.
On the other hand, there is a great danger in applying positive
attributes to God. For it has been shown that every perfection we could
imagine, even if existing in God in accordance with the opinion of
those who assert the existence of attributes, would in reality not be
of the same kind as that imagined by us, but would only be called by
the same name, according to our explanation; it would in fact amount to
a negation. Suppose, e.g., you say He has knowledge, and that
knowledge, which admits of no change and of no plurality, embraces many
changeable things; His knowledge remains unaltered, while new things
are constantly formed, and His knowledge of a thing before it exists,
while it exists, and when it has ceased to exist, is the same without
the least change: you would thereby declare that His knowledge is not
like ours; and similarly that His existence is not like ours. You thus
necessarily arrive at some negation, without obtaining a true
conception of an essential attribute; on the contrary, you are led to
assume that there is a plurality in God, and to believe that He, though
one essence, has several unknown attributes. For if you intend to
affirm them, you cannot compare them with those attributes known by us,
and they are consequently not of the same kind. You are, as it were,
brought by the belief in the reality of the attributes, to say that God
is one subject of which several things are predicated; though the
subject is not like ordinary subjects, and the predicates are not like
ordinary predicates. This belief would ultimately lead us to associate
other things with God, and not to believe that He is One. For of every
subject certain things can undoubtedly be predicated, and although in
reality subject and predicate are combined in one thing, by the actual
definition they consist of two elements, the notion contained in the
subject not being the same as that contained in the predicate. In the
course of this treatise it will be proved to you that God cannot be a
compound, and that He is simple in the strictest sense of the word.

I do not merely declare that he who affirms attributes of God has not
sufficient knowledge concerning the Creator, admits some association
with God, or conceives Him to be different from what He is; but I say
that he unconsciously loses his belief in God. For he whose knowledge
concerning a thing is insufficient, understands one part of it while he
is ignorant of the other, as, e.g., a person who knows that man
possesses life, but does not know that man possesses understanding; but
in reference to God, in whose real existence there is no plurality, it
is impossible that one thing should be known, and another unknown.
Similarly he who associates an object with [the properties of] another
object, conceives a true and correct notion of the one object, and
applies that notion also to the other; while those who admit the
attributes of God, do not consider them as identical with His essence,
but as extraneous elements. Again, he who conceives an incorrect notion
of an object, must necessarily have a correct idea of the object to
some extent; he, however, who says that taste belongs to the category
of quantity has not, according to my opinion, an incorrect notion of
taste, but is entirely ignorant of its nature, for he does not know to
what object the term “taste” is to be applied.—This is a very difficult
subject; consider it well.

According to this explanation you will understand, that those who do
not recognize, in reference to God, the negation of things, which
others negative by clear proof, are deficient in the knowledge of God,
and are remote from comprehending Him. Consequently, the smaller the
number of things is which a person can negative in relation to God, the
less he knows of Him, as has been explained in the beginning of this
chapter; but the man who affirms an attribute of God, knows nothing but
the same; for the object to which, in his imagination, he applies that
name, does not exist; it is a mere fiction and invention, as if he
applied that name to a non-existing being, for there is, in reality, no
such object. E.g., some one has heard of the elephant, and knows that
it is an animal, and wishes to know its form and nature. A person, who
is either misled or misleading, tells him it is an animal with one leg,
three wings, lives in the depth of the sea, has a transparent body; its
face is wide like that of a man, has the same form and shape, speaks
like a man, flies sometimes in the air, and sometimes swims like a
fish. I should not say, that he described the elephant incorrectly, or
that he has an insufficient knowledge of the elephant, but I would say
that the thing thus described is an invention and fiction, and that in
reality there exists nothing like it; it is a non-existing being,
called by the name of a really existing being, and like the griffin,
the centaur, and similar imaginary combinations for which simple and
compound names have been borrowed from real things. The present case is
analogous; namely, God, praised be His name, exists, and His existence
has been proved to be absolute and perfectly simple, as I shall
explain. If such a simple, absolutely existing essence were said to
have attributes, as has been contended, and were combined with
extraneous elements, it would in no way be an existing thing, as has
been proved by us; and when we say that that essence, which is called
“God,” is a substance with many properties by which it can be
described, we apply that name to an object which does not at all exist.
Consider, therefore, what are the consequences of affirming attributes
to God! As to those attributes of God which occur in the Pentateuch, or
in the books of the Prophets, we must assume that they are exclusively
employed, as has been stated by us, to convey to us some notion of the
perfections of the Creator, or to express qualities of actions
emanating from Him.






CHAPTER LXI


It is well known that all the names of God occurring in Scripture are
derived from His actions, except one, namely, the Tetragrammaton, which
consists of the letters yod, hé, vau and hé. This name is applied
exclusively to God, and is on that account called Shem ha-meforash,
“The nomen proprium.” It is the distinct and exclusive designation of
the Divine Being; whilst His other names are common nouns, and are
derived from actions, to which some of our own are similar, as we have
already explained. Even the name Adonay, “Lord,” which has been
substituted for the Tetragrammaton, is derived from the appellative
“lord”; comp. “The man who is the lord (adone) of the land spake
roughly to us” (Gen. xliii. 30). The difference between Adoni, “my
lord,” (with ḥirek under the nun), or Adonay (with kameẓ) is similar to
the difference between Sari, “my prince,” and Saraï, Abraham’s wife
(ib. xvi. 1), the latter form denoting majesty and distinction. An
angel is also addressed as “Adonay”; e.g., “Adonay (My lord), pass not
away, I pray thee” (ib. xviii. 3). I have restricted my explanation to
the term Adonay, the substitute for the Tetragrammaton, because it is
more commonly applied to God than any of the other names which are in
frequent use, like dayyan, “judge,” shadday, “almighty,” ẓaddik,
“righteous,” ḥannun, “gracious,” raḥum “merciful,” and elohim “chief”;
all these terms are unquestionably appellations and derivatives. The
derivation of the name, consisting of yod, hé, vau, and hé, is not
positively known, the word having no additional signification. This
sacred name, which, as you know, was not pronounced except in the
sanctuary by the appointed priests, when they gave the sacerdotal
blessing, and by the high priest on the Day of Atonement, undoubtedly
denotes something which is peculiar to God, and is not found in any
other being. It is possible that in the Hebrew language, of which we
have now but a slight knowledge, the Tetragrammaton, in the way it was
pronounced, conveyed the meaning of “absolute existence.” In short, the
majesty of the name and the great dread of uttering it, are connected
with the fact that it denotes God Himself, without including in its
meaning any names of the things created by Him. Thus our Sages say:
“‘My name’ (Num. vi. 27) means the name which is peculiar to Me.” All
other names of God have reference to qualities, and do not signify a
simple substance, but a substance with attributes, they being
derivatives. On that account it is believed that they imply the
presence of a plurality in God, I mean to say, the presence of
attributes, that is, of some extraneous element superadded to His
essence. Such is the meaning of all derivative names; they imply the
presence of some attribute and its substratum, though this be not
distinctly named. As, however, it has been proved, that God is not a
substratum capable of attributes, we are convinced that those
appellatives when employed as names of God, only indicate the relation
of certain actions to Him, or they convey to us some notion of His
perfection.

Hence R. Ḥaninah would have objected to the expression “the great, the
mighty, and the tremendous,” had it not been for the two reasons
mentioned by him; because such expressions lead men to think that the
attributes are essential, i.e., they are perfections actually present
in God. The frequent use of names of God derived from actions, led to
the belief that He had as many [essential] attributes as there were
actions from which the names were derived. The following promise was
therefore made, implying that mankind will at a certain future time
understand this subject, and be free from the error it involves: “In
that day will the Lord be One, and His name One” (Zech. xiv. 9). The
meaning of this prophecy is this: He being One, will then be called by
one name, which will indicate the essence of God; but it does not mean
that His sole name will be a derivative [viz., “One”]. In the Pirke
Rabbi Eliezer (chap. iii.) occurs the following passage: “Before the
universe was created, there was only the Almighty and His name.”
Observe how clearly the author states that all these appellatives
employed as names of God came into existence after the Creation. This
is true; for they all refer to actions manifested in the Universe. If,
however, you consider His essence as separate and as abstracted from
all actions, you will not describe it by an appellative, but by a
proper noun, which exclusively indicates that essence. Every other name
of God is a derivative, only the Tetragrammaton is a real nomen
proprium, and must not be considered from any other point of view. You
must beware of sharing the error of those who write amulets (kameot).
Whatever you hear from them, or read in their works, especially in
reference to the names which they form by combination, is utterly
senseless; they call these combinations shemot (names) and believe that
their pronunciation demands sanctification and purification, and that
by using them they are enabled to work miracles. Rational persons ought
not to listen to such men, nor in any way believe their assertions. No
other name is called shem ha-meforash except this Tetragrammaton, which
is written, but is not pronounced according to its letters. The words,
“Thus shall ye bless the children of Israel” (Num. vi. 23) are
interpreted in Siphri as follows: “‘Thus,’ in the holy language; again
‘thus,’ with the Shem ha-meforash.” The following remark is also found
there: “In the sanctuary [the name of God is pronounced] as it is
spelt, but elsewhere by its substitutes.” In the Talmud, the following
passage occurs: “‘Thus,’ i.e., with the shem ha-meforash.—You say [that
the priests, when blessing the people, had to pronounce] the shem
ha-meforash; this was perhaps not the case, and they may have used
other names instead.—We infer it from the words: ‘And they shall put My
name’ (Num. vi. 27), i.e., My name, which is peculiar to Me.” It has
thus been shown that the shem ha-meforash (the proper name of God) is
the Tetragrammaton, and that this is the only name which indicates
nothing but His essence, and therefore our Sages in referring to this
sacred term said “‘My name’ means the one which is peculiar to Me
alone.”

In the next chapter I will explain the circumstances which brought men
to a belief in the power of Shemot (names of God); I will point out the
main subject of discussion, and lay open to you its mystery, and then
not any doubt will be left in your mind, unless you prefer to be
misguided.






CHAPTER LXII


We were commanded that, in the sacerdotal blessing, the name of the
Lord should be pronounced as it is written in the form of the
Tetragrammaton, the shem ha-meforash. It was not known to every one how
the name was to be pronounced, what vowels were to be given to each
consonant, and whether some of the letters capable of reduplication
should receive a dagesh. Wise men successively transmitted the
pronunciation of the name; it occurred only once in seven years that
the pronunciation was communicated to a distinguished disciple. I must,
however, add that the statement, “The wise men communicated the
Tetragrammaton to their children and their disciples once in seven
years,” does not only refer to the pronunciation but also to its
meaning, because of which the Tetragrammaton was made a nomen proprium
of God, and which includes certain metaphysical principles.

Our Sages knew in addition a name of God which consisted of twelve
letters, inferior in sanctity to the Tetragrammaton. I believe that
this was not a single noun, but consisted of two or three words, the
sum of their letters being twelve, and that these words were used by
our Sages as a substitute for the Tetragrammaton, whenever they met
with it in the course of their reading the Scriptures, in the same
manner as we at present substitute for it aleph, daleth, etc. [i.e.,
Adonay, “the Lord”]. There is no doubt that this name also, consisting
of twelve letters, was in this sense more distinctive than the name
Adonay: it was never withheld from any of the students; whoever wished
to learn it, had the opportunity given to him without any reserve: not
so the Tetragrammaton; those who knew it did not communicate it except
to a son or a disciple, once in seven years. When, however,
unprincipled men had become acquainted with that name which consists of
twelve letters and in consequence had become corrupt in faith—as is
sometimes the case when persons with imperfect knowledge become aware
that a thing is not such as they had imagined—the Sages concealed also
that name, and only communicated it to the worthiest among the priests,
that they should pronounce it when they blessed the people in the
Temple; for the Tetragrammaton was then no longer uttered in the
sanctuary on account of the corruption of the people. There is a
tradition, that with the death of Simeon the Just, his brother priests
discontinued the pronunciation of the Tetragrammaton in the blessing;
they used, instead, this name of twelve letters. It is further stated,
that at first the name of twelve letters was communicated to every man;
but when the number of impious men increased it was only entrusted to
the worthiest among the priests, whose voice, in pronouncing it, was
drowned amid the singing of their brother priests. Rabbi Tarphon said,
“Once I followed my grandfather to the daïs [where the blessing was
pronounced]; I inclined my ear to listen to a priest [who pronounced
the name], and noticed that his voice was drowned amid the singing of
his brother priests.”

There was also a name of forty-two letters known among them. Every
intelligent person knows that one word of forty-two letters is
impossible. But it was a phrase of several words which had together
forty-two letters. There is no doubt that the words had such a meaning
as to convey a correct notion of the essence of God, in the way we have
stated. This phrase of so many letters is called a name because, like
other proper nouns, they represent one single object, and several words
have been employed in order to explain more clearly the idea which the
name represents; for an idea can more easily be comprehended if
expressed in many words. Mark this and observe now that the instruction
in regard to the names of God extended to the signification of each of
those names, and did not confine itself to the pronunciation of the
single letters which, in themselves, are destitute of an idea. Shem
ha-meforash applied neither to the name of forty-two letters nor to
that of twelve, but only to the Tetragrammaton, the proper name of God,
as we have explained. Those two names must have included some
metaphysical ideas. It can be proved that one of them conveyed profound
knowledge, from the following rule laid down by our Sages: “The name of
forty-two letters is exceedingly holy; it can only be entrusted to him
who is modest, in the midway of life, not easily provoked to anger,
temperate, gentle, and who speaks kindly to his fellow men. He who
understands it, is cautious with it, and keeps it in purity, is loved
above and is liked here below; he is respected by his fellow men; his
learning remaineth with him, and he enjoys both this world and the
world to come.” So far in the Talmud. How grievously has this passage
been misunderstood! Many believe that the forty-two letters are merely
to be pronounced mechanically; that by knowledge of these, without any
further interpretation, they can attain to these exalted ends, although
it is stated that he who desires to obtain a knowledge of that name
must be trained in the virtues named before, and go through all the
great preparations which are mentioned in that passage. On the
contrary, it is evident that all this preparation aims at a knowledge
of Metaphysics, and includes ideas which constitute the “secrets of the
Law,” as we have explained (chap. xxxv.). In works on Metaphysics it
has been shown that such knowledge, i.e., the perception of the active
intellect, can never be forgotten; and this is meant by the phrase “his
learning remaineth with him.”

When bad and foolish men were reading such passages, they considered
them to be a support of their false pretensions and of their assertion
that they could, by means of an arbitrary combination of letters, form
a shem (“a name”) which would act and operate miraculously when written
or spoken in a certain particular way. Such fictions, originally
invented by foolish men, were in the course of time committed to
writing, and came into the hands of good but weak-minded and ignorant
persons who were unable to discriminate between truth and falsehood,
and made a secret of these shemot (names). When after the death of such
persons those writings were discovered among their papers, it was
believed that they contained truths; for, “the simple believeth every
word” (Prov. xiv. 15).

We have already gone too far away from our interesting subject and
recondite inquiry, endeavouring to refute a perverse notion, the
absurdity of which every one must perceive who gives a thought to the
subject. We have, however, been compelled to mention it, in treating of
the divine names, their meanings, and the opinions commonly held
concerning them. We shall now return to our theme. Having shown that
all names of God, with the exception of the Tetragrammaton (Shem
ha-meforash), are appellatives, we must now, in a separate chapter,
speak on the phrase Ehyeh asher Ehyeh, (Exod. iii. 14), because it is
connected with the difficult subject under discussion, namely, the
inadmissibility of divine attributes.






CHAPTER LXIII


Before approaching the subject of this chapter, we will first consider
the words of Moses, “And they shall say unto me, What is His name? what
shall I say unto them?” (Exod. iii. 13). How far was this question,
anticipated by Moses, appropriate, and how far was he justified in
seeking to be prepared with the answer? Moses was correct in declaring,
“But, behold, they will not believe me, for they will say, The Lord
hath not appeared unto thee” (ib. iv. 1); for any man claiming the
authority of a prophet must expect to meet with such an objection so
long as he has not given a proof of his mission. Again, if the
question, as appears at first sight, referred only to the name, as a
mere utterance of the lips, the following dilemma would present itself:
either the Israelites knew the name, or they had never heard it; if the
name was known to them, they would perceive in it no argument in favour
of the mission of Moses, his knowledge and their knowledge of the
divine name being the same. If, on the other hand, they had never heard
it mentioned, and if the knowledge of it was to prove the mission of
Moses, what evidence would they have that this was really the name of
God? Moreover, after God had made known that name to Moses, and had
told him, “Go and gather the elders of Israel, ... and they shall
hearken to thy voice” (ib. xvi. 18), he replied, “Behold, they will not
believe me nor hearken unto my voice,” although God had told him, “And
they will hearken to thy voice”; whereupon God answered, “What is that
in thine hand?” and he said, “A rod” (ib. iv. 2). In order to obviate
this dilemma, you must understand what I am about to tell you. You know
how widespread were in those days the opinions of the Sabeans; all men,
except a few individuals, were idolaters, that is to say, they believed
in spirits, in man’s power to direct the influences of the heavenly
bodies, and in the effect of talismans. Any one who in those days laid
claim to authority, based it either, like Abraham, on the fact that, by
reasoning and by proof he had been convinced of the existence of a
Being who rules the whole Universe, or that some spiritual power was
conferred upon him by a star, by an angel, or by a similar agency; but
no one could establish his claim on prophecy, that is to say, on the
fact that God had spoken to him, or had entrusted a mission to him;
before the days of Moses no such assertion had ever been made. You must
not be misled by the statements that God spoke to the Patriarchs, or
that He had appeared to them. For you do not find any mention of a
prophecy which appealed to others, or which directed them. Abraham,
Isaac, or Jacob, or any other person before them did not tell the
people, “God said unto me, you shall do this thing, or you shall not do
that thing,” or “God has sent me to you.” Far from it! for God spoke to
them on nothing but of what especially concerned them, i.e., He
communicated to them things relating to their perfection, directed them
in what they should do, and foretold them what the condition of their
descendants would be; nothing beyond this. They guided their fellow-men
by means of argument and instruction, as is implied, according to the
interpretation generally received amongst us, in the words “and the
souls that they had gotten in Haran” (Gen. xii. 5). When God appeared
to our Teacher Moses, and commanded him to address the people and to
bring them the message, Moses replied that he might first be asked to
prove the existence of God in the Universe, and that only after doing
so he would be able to announce to them that God had sent him. For all
men, with few exceptions, were ignorant of the existence of God; their
highest thoughts did not extend beyond the heavenly sphere, its forms
or its influences. They could not yet emancipate themselves from
sensation, and had not yet attained to any intellectual perfection.
Then God taught Moses how to teach them, and how to establish amongst
them the belief in the existence of Himself, namely, by saying Ehyeh
asher Ehyeh, a name derived from the verb hayah in the sense of
“existing,” for the verb hayah denotes “to be,” and in Hebrew no
difference is made between the verbs “to be” and “to exist.” The
principal point in this phrase is that the same word which denotes
“existence,” is repeated as an attribute. The word asher, “that,”
corresponds to the Arabic illadi and illati, and is an incomplete noun
that must be completed by another noun; it may be considered as the
subject of the predicate which follows. The first noun which is to be
described is ehyeh; the second, by which the first is described, is
likewise ehyeh, the identical word, as if to show that the object which
is to be described and the attribute by which it is described are in
this case necessarily identical. This is, therefore, the expression of
the idea that God exists, but not in the ordinary sense of the term;
or, in other words, He is “the existing Being which is the existing
Being,” that is to say, the Being whose existence is absolute. The
proof which he was to give consisted in demonstrating that there is a
Being of absolute existence, that has never been and never will be
without existence. This I will clearly prove (II. Introd. Prop. 20 and
chap. i.).

God thus showed Moses the proofs by which His existence would be firmly
established among the wise men of His people. Therefore the explanation
of the name is followed by the words, “Go, gather the elders of
Israel,” and by the assurance that the elders would understand what God
had shown to him, and would accept it, as is stated in the words, “And
they will hearken to thy voice.” Then Moses replied as follows: They
will accept the doctrine that God exists convinced by these
intelligible proofs. But, said Moses, by what means shall I be able to
show that this existing God has sent me? Thereupon God gave him the
sign. We have thus shown that the question, “What is His name?” means
“Who is that Being, which according to thy belief has sent thee?” The
sentence, “What is his name” (instead of, Who is He), has here been
used as a tribute of praise and homage, as though it had been said,
Nobody can be ignorant of Thy essence and of Thy real existence; if,
nevertheless, I ask what is Thy name, I mean, What idea is to be
expressed by the name? (Moses considered it inappropriate to say to God
that any person was ignorant of God’s existence, and therefore
described the Israelites as ignorant of God’s name, not as ignorant of
Him who was called by that name.)—The name Jah likewise implies eternal
existence. Shadday, however, is derived from day, “enough”; comp. “for
the stuff they had was sufficient” (dayyam, Exod. xxxvi. 7); the shin
is equal to asher, “which,” as in she-kebar, “which already” (Eccles.
ii. 16). The name Shadday, therefore, signifies “he who is sufficient”;
that is to say, He does not require any other being for effecting the
existence of what He created, or its conservation: His existence is
sufficient for that. In a similar manner the name ḥasin implies
“strength”; comp. “he was strong (ḥason) as the oaks” (Amos ii. 9). The
same is the case with “rock,” which is a homonym, as we have explained
(chap. xvi.). It is, therefore, clear that all these names of God are
appellatives, or are applied to God by way of homonymy, like ẓur and
others, the only exception being the tetragrammaton, the Shem
ha-meforash (the nomen proprium of God), which is not an appellative;
it does not denote any attribute of God, nor does it imply anything
except His existence. Absolute existence includes the idea of eternity,
i.e., the necessity of existence. Note well the result at which we have
arrived in this chapter.






CHAPTER LXIV


Know that in some instances by the phrase “the name of the Lord,”
nothing but the name alone is to be understood; comp. “Thou shalt not
take the name of the Lord thy God in vain” (Exod. xx. 7); “And he that
blasphemeth the name of the Lord” (Lev. xxiv. 16). This occurs in
numerous other passages. In other instances it means the essence and
reality of God Himself, as in the phrase “They shall say to me, What is
his name?” Sometimes it stands for “the word of God,” so that “the name
of God,” “the word of God,” and “the command of God,” are identical
phrases; comp. “for my name is in him” (Exod. xxiii. 21), that is, My
word or My command is in him; i.e., he is the instrument of My desire
and will. I shall explain this fully in treating of the homonymity of
the term “angel” (II. chap. vi. and xxxiv.).—The same is the case with
“The glory of the Lord.” The phrase sometimes signifies “the material
light,” which God caused to rest on a certain place in order to show
the distinction of that place, e.g., “And the glory of the Lord (kebod
adonay) abode upon Mount Sinai and the cloud covered it” (Exod. xxiv.
16): “And the glory of the Lord filled the tabernacle” (ib. xl. 35).
Sometimes the essence, the reality of God is meant by that expression,
as in the words of Moses, “Show me thy glory” (ib. xxxiii. 18), to
which the reply was given, “For no man shall see me and live” (ib.
xx.). This shows that the glory of the Lord in this instance is the
same as He Himself, and that “Thy glory” has been substituted for
“Thyself,” as a tribute of homage; an explanation which we also gave of
the words, “And they shall say unto me, What is his name?” Sometimes
the term “glory” denotes the glorification of the Lord by man or by any
other being. For the true glorification of the Lord consists in the
comprehension of His greatness, and all who comprehend His greatness
and perfection, glorify Him according to their capacity, with this
difference, that man alone magnifies God in words, expressive of what
he has received in his mind, and what he desires to communicate to
others. Things not endowed with comprehension, as e.g., minerals, may
also be considered as glorifying the Lord, for by their natural
properties they testify to the omnipotence and wisdom of their Creator,
and cause him who examines them to praise God, by means of speech or
without the use of words, if the power of speech be wanting. In Hebrew
this licence has been extended still further, and the use of the verb
“to speak” has been admitted as applicable in such a case; things which
have no comprehension are therefore said to give utterance to praise,
e.g., “All my bones shall say, Lord, who is like unto thee?” (Ps. xxxv.
10). Because a consideration of the properties of the bones leads to
the discovery of that truth, and it is through them that it became
known, they are represented as having uttered the divine praise; and
since this [cause of God’s praise] is itself called “praise,” it has
been said “the fulness of the whole earth is his praise” (Isa. vi. 3),
in the same sense as “the earth is full of his praise” (Hab. iii. 3).
As to kabod being employed in the sense of praise, comp. “Give praise
(kabod) to the Lord your God” (Jer. xiii. 16); also “and in his temple
does every one speak of his praise (kabod)” (Ps. xxix. 9), etc.
Consider well the homonymity of this term, and explain it in each
instance in accordance with the context; you will thus escape great
embarrassment.






CHAPTER LXV


After you have advanced thus far, and truly comprehended that God
exists without having the attribute of existence, and that He is One,
without having the attribute of unity, I do not think that I need
explain to you the inadmissibility of the attribute of speech in
reference to God, especially since our people generally believe that
the Law, i.e., the word ascribed to Him, was created. Speech is
attributed to Him, in so far as the word which Moses heard, was
produced and brought to existence by God in the same manner as He
produced all His other works and creations. As we shall have to speak
more fully on prophecy, we shall here merely show that speech is
attributed to God in the same way as all other actions, which are
similar to our own. When we are told that God addressed the Prophets
and spoke to them, our minds are merely to receive a notion that there
is a Divine knowledge to which the Prophets attain; we are to be
impressed with the idea that the things which the Prophets communicate
to us come from the Lord, and are not altogether the products of their
own conceptions and ideas. This subject, which we have already
mentioned above, will receive further explanation. It is the object of
this chapter to show that the words “speaking” and “saying” are
synonymous terms denoting (a) “Speech”; as, e.g., “Moses shall speak
(yedabber)” (Exod. xix. 19); “And Pharaoh said (va-yomer)” (ib. v. 5);
(b) “Thought” as formed in the mind without being expressed in words;
e.g., “And I thought (ve-amarti) in my heart” (Eccles. ii. 15); “And I
thought (vedibbarti) in my heart” (ib.); “And thy heart will imagine
(yedabber)” (Prov. xxiii. 33); “Concerning Thee my heart thought
(amar)” (Ps. xxvii. 8); “And Esau thought (va-yomer) in his heart”
(Gen. xxvii. 41); examples of this kind are numerous; (c) Will; e.g.,
“And he said (va-yomer) to slay David” (2 Sam. xxi. 16), that is to
say, he wished or he intended to slay him; “Dost thou desire (omer) to
slay me” (Exod. ii. 14); “And the whole congregation intended
(va-yomeru) to stone them” (Num. xiv. 10). Instances of this kind are
likewise numerous.

The two terms, when applied to God, can only have one of the two
last-mentioned significations, viz., he wills and he desires, or he
thinks, and there is no difference whether the divine thought became
known to man by means of an actual voice, or by one of those kinds of
inspiration which I shall explain further on (II. chap, xxxviii.). We
must not suppose that in speaking God employed voice or sound, or that
He has a soul in which the thoughts reside, and that these thoughts are
things superadded to His essence; but we ascribe and attribute to Him
thoughts in the same manner as we ascribe to Him any other attributes.
The use of these words in the sense of will and desire, is based, as I
have explained, on the homonymity of these terms. In addition they are
figures borrowed from our common practices, as has been already pointed
out. For we cannot, at a first glance, see how anything can be produced
by a mere desire; we think that he who wishes to produce a thing, must
perform a certain act, or command some one else to perform it.
Therefore the command is figuratively ascribed to God when that takes
place which He wishes, and we then say that He commanded that a certain
thing should be accomplished. All this has its origin in our comparing
the acts of God to our own acts, and also in the use of the term amar
in the sense of “He desired,” as we have already explained. The words
“And He said,” occurring in the account of the creation, signify “He
wished,” or “He desired.” This has already been stated by other
authors, and is well known. A proof for this, namely that the phrase
“God said,” in the first chapter of Genesis, must be taken in a
figurative sense “He willed,” and not in its literal meaning, is found
in the circumstance that a command can only be given to a being which
exists and is capable of receiving the command. Comp. “By the word of
the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath
of his mouth” (Ps. xxxiii. 6). “His mouth,” and “the breath of his
mouth,” are undoubtedly figurative expressions, and the same is the
case with “His word” and “His speech.” The meaning of the verse is
therefore that they [the heavens and all their host] exist through His
will and desire. All our eminent authorities are cognisant of this;
and, I need not explain that in Hebrew amar and dibber have the same
meaning, as is proved by the passage, “For it has heard all the words
(imre) of the Lord which he spake (dibber) unto us” (Josh. xxiv. 27).






CHAPTER LXVI


“And the tables were the work of God” (Exod. xxxii. 16), that is to
say, they were the product of nature, not of art; for all natural
things are called “the work of the Lord,” e.g., “These see the works of
the Lord” (Ps. cvii. 24); and the description of the several things in
nature, as plants, animals, winds, rain, etc., is followed by the
exclamation, “O Lord, how manifold are thy works!” (Ps. civ. 24). Still
more striking is the relation between God and His creatures, as
expressed in the phrase, “The cedars of Lebanon, which he hath planted”
(ib. 16); the cedars being the product of nature, and not of art, are
described as having been planted by the Lord. Similarly we explain,
“And the writing was the writing of God” (Exod. xxxii. 16); the
relation in which the writing stood to God has already been defined in
the words “written with the finger of God” (ib. xxxi. 18), and the
meaning of this phrase is the same as that of “the work of thy fingers”
(Ps. viii. 4), this being said of the heavens; of the latter it has
been stated distinctly that they were made by a word; comp. “By the
word of the Lord were the heavens made” (ib. xxxiii. 6). Hence you
learn that in the Bible, the creation of a thing is figuratively
expressed by terms denoting “word” and “speech.” The same thing which
according to one passage has been made by the word, is represented in
another passage as made by the “finger of God.” The phrase “written by
the finger of God” is therefore identical with “written by the word of
God”; and if the latter phrase had been used, it would have been equal
to “written by the will and desire of God.” Onkelos adopted in this
place a strange explanation, and rendered the words literally “written
by the finger of the Lord”; he thought that “the finger” was a certain
thing ascribed to God; so that “the finger of the Lord” is to be
interpreted in the same way as “the mountain of God” (Exod. iii. 1),
“the rod of God” (ib. iv. 20), that is, as being an instrument created
by Him, which by His will engraved the writing on the tables. I cannot
see why Onkelos preferred this explanation. It would have been more
reasonable to say “written by the word of the Lord,” in imitation of
the verse “By the word of the Lord the heavens were made.” Or was the
creation of the writing on the tables more difficult than the creation
of the stars in the spheres? As the latter were made by the direct will
of God, not by means of an instrument, the writing may also have been
produced by His direct will, not by means of an instrument. You know
what the Mishnah says, “Ten things were created on Friday in the
twilight of the evening,” and “the writing” is one of the ten things.
This shows how generally it was assumed by our forefathers that the
writing of the tables was produced in the same manner as the rest of
the creation, as we have shown in our Commentary on the Mishnah (Aboth,
v. 6).






CHAPTER LXVII


Since the verb “to say” has been figuratively used to express the will
of the Creator, and the phrase “And he said” has repeatedly been
employed in the account of all the things created in “the six days of
the beginning,” the expression “to rest” has likewise been figuratively
applied to God in reference to the Sabbath-day, on which there was no
creation; it is therefore said, “And he rested (va-yishbot) on the
seventh day” (Gen. ii. 2). For “to leave off speaking” is, in Hebrew,
likewise expressed by the same verb, as, e.g., “So these three men
ceased (va-yishbetu) to answer Job” (Job xxxii. 1); also by nuaḥ, as,
in “They spake to Nabal according to all those words in the name of
David, and ceased (va-yanuḥu)” (1 Sam. xxv. 9). In my opinion,
(va-yanuḥu) means “they ceased to speak,” and waited for the answer;
for no allusion to exertion whatever having previously been mentioned,
the words, “and they rested,” in its primary signification, would have
been entirely out of place in that narrative, even if the young men who
spoke had really used some exertion. The author relates that having
delivered that whole speech, which, as you find, consisted of gentle
expressions, they were silent, that is to say, they did not add any
word or act by which the reply of Nabal could be justified; it being
the object of the entire passage to represent Nabal’s conduct as
extremely reprehensible. In that sense [viz., “to cease,” or “to leave
off”] the verb nuaḥ is used in the phrase “And he left off (va-yanaḥ)
on the seventh day.”

Our Sages, and some of the Commentators, took, however, nuaḥ in its
primary sense “to rest,” but as a transitive form (hiphil), explaining
the phrase thus: “and he gave rest to the world on the seventh day,”
i.e., no further act of creation took place on that day.

It is possible that the word va-yanaḥ is derived either from yanaḥ, a
verb of the class pe-yod, or naḥah, a verb of the class lamed-he, and
has this meaning: “he established” or “he governed” the Universe in
accordance with the properties it possessed on the seventh day; that is
to say, while on each of the six days events took place contrary to the
natural laws now in operation throughout the Universe, on the seventh
day the Universe was merely upheld and left in the condition in which
it continues to exist. Our explanation is not impaired by the fact that
the form of the word deviates from the rules of verbs of these two
classes; for there are frequent exceptions to the rules of
conjugations, and especially of the weak verbs; and any interpretation
which removes such a source of error must not be abandoned because of
certain grammatical rules. We know that we are ignorant of the sacred
language, and that grammatical rules only apply to the majority of
cases.—The same root is also found as a verb ʻayin-vav in the sense “to
place” and “to set,” as e.g., “and it shall be established and she
shall be placed (ve-hunniḥah) there upon her own base” (Zech. v. 11),
and “she suffered neither the birds of the air to settle (la-nuaḥ) on
them” (2 Sam. xxi. 10). According to my opinion, the verb has the same
signification in Hab. iii. 16, “that I might remain firm (anuaḥ) in the
day of trouble.”

The word (va-yinnafash) is a verb derived from nefesh, the homonymity
of which we have already explained (chap. xli.), namely, that it has
the signification of intention or will; (va-yinnafash) accordingly
means: “that which he desired was accomplished, and what he wished had
come into existence.”






CHAPTER LXVIII


You are acquainted with the well-known principle of the philosophers
that God is the intellectus, the ens intelligens, and the ens
intelligibile. These three things are in God one and the same, and do
not in any way constitute a plurality. We have also mentioned it in our
larger work, “Mishneh Torah,” and we have explained there that it is a
fundamental principle of our religion, namely, that He is absolutely
one, that nothing combines with Him; that is to say, there is no
Eternal thing besides Him. On that account we say ḥai adonay, “the Lord
liveth” (Ruth iii. 13), and not ḥe adonay, “the life of the Lord,” for
His life is not a thing distinct from His essence, as we have explained
in treating of the inadmissibility of the attributes. There is no doubt
that he who has not studied any works on mental philosophy, who has not
comprehended the nature of the mind, who has no knowledge of its
essence, and considers it in no other way than he would consider the
nature of whiteness and of blackness, will find this subject extremely
difficult, and to him our principle that the intellectus, the
intelligens, and the intelligibile, are in God one and the same thing,
will appear as unintelligible as if we said that the whiteness, the
whitening substance, and the material which is whitened are one and the
same thing. And, indeed, many ignorant people refute at once our
principle by using such comparisons. Even amongst those who imagine
that they are wise, many find this subject difficult, and are of
opinion that it is impossible for the mind to grasp the truth of this
proposition, although it is a demonstrated truth, as has been shown by
Metaphysicians. I will tell you now what has been proved. Man, before
comprehending a thing, comprehends it in potentia (δυνάμει); when,
however, he comprehends a thing, e.g., the form of a certain tree which
is pointed out to him, when he abstracts its form from its substance,
and reproduces the abstract form, an act performed by the intellect, he
comprehends in reality (ἐνεργείᾳ), and the intellect which he has
acquired in actuality, is the abstract form of the tree in man’s mind.
For in such a case the intellect is not a thing distinct from the thing
comprehended. It is therefore clear to you that the thing comprehended
is the abstract form of the tree, and at the same time it is the
intellect in action; and that the intellect and the abstract form of
the tree are not two different things, for the intellect in action is
nothing but the thing comprehended, and that agent by which the form of
the tree has been turned into an intellectual and abstract object,
namely, that which comprehends, is undoubtedly the intellect in action.
All intellect is identical with its action; the intellect in action is
not a thing different from its action, for the true nature and essence
of the intellect is comprehension, and you must not think that the
intellect in action is a thing existing by itself, separate from
comprehension, and that comprehension is a different thing connected
with it; for the very essence of the intellect is comprehension. In
assuming an intellect in action you assume the comprehension of the
thing comprehended. This is quite clear to all who have made themselves
familiar with the figurative language common to this discipline. You
therefore accept it as proved that the intellect consists in its
action, which is its true nature and essence. Consequently the very
thing by which the form of that tree has been made abstract and
intelligible, viz., the intellect, is at the same time the intelligens,
for the intellect is itself the agens which abstracts the form and
comprehends it, and that is the action, on account of which it is
called the intelligens; but itself and its action are identical; and
that which is called intellect in action consists [in the
above-mentioned instance] of nothing else but of the form of the tree.
It must now be obvious to you that whenever the intellect is found in
action, the intellect and the thing comprehended are one and the same
thing; and also that the function of all intellect, namely, the act of
comprehending, is its essence. The intellect, that which comprehends
and that which is comprehended, are therefore the same, whenever a real
comprehension takes place. But, when we speak of the power of
comprehension, we necessarily distinguish two things: the power itself,
and the thing which can be comprehended; e.g., that hylic intellect of
Zaid is the power of comprehension, and this tree is, in like manner, a
thing which is capable of being comprehended; these, undoubtedly, are
two different things. When, however, the potential is replaced by the
actual, and when the form of the tree has really been comprehended, the
form comprehended is the intellect, and it is by that same intellect,
by the intellect in action, that the tree has been converted into an
abstract idea, and has been comprehended. For everything in which a
real action takes place exists in reality. On the other hand, the power
of comprehension, and the object capable of comprehension are two
things; but that which is only potential cannot be imagined otherwise
than in connexion with an object possessing that capacity, as, e.g.,
man, and thus we have three things: the man who possesses the power,
and is capable of comprehending; that power itself, namely, the power
of comprehension, and the object which presents itself as an object of
comprehension, and is capable of being comprehended; to use the
foregoing example, the man, the hylic intellect, and the abstract form
of the tree, are three different things. They become one and the same
thing when the intellect is in action, and you will never find the
intellect different from the comprehensible object, unless the power of
comprehending and the power of being comprehended be referred to. Now,
it has been proved, that God is an intellect which always is in action,
and that—as has been stated, and as will be proved hereafter—there is
in Him at no time a mere potentiality, that He does not comprehend at
one time, and is without comprehension at another time, but He
comprehends constantly; consequently, He and the things comprehended
are one and the same thing, that is to say, His essence; and the act of
comprehending because of which it is said that He comprehends, is the
intellect itself, which is likewise His essence, God is therefore
always the intellectus, the intelligens, and the intelligibile.

We have thus shown that the identity of the intellect, the intelligens
and the intelligibile, is not only a fact as regards the Creator, but
as regards all intellect, when in action. There is, however, this
difference, that from time to time our intellect passes over from mere
potentiality to reality, and that the pure intellect, i.e., the active
intellect, finds sometimes obstacles, though not in itself, but
accidentally in some external cause. It is not our present intention to
explain this subject, but we will merely show that God alone, and none
besides Him, is an intellect constantly in action, and there is,
neither in Himself nor in anything beside Him, any obstacle whereby His
comprehension would be hindered. Therefore He always includes the
intelligens, the intellectus, and the intelligibile, and His essence is
at the same time the intelligens, the intelligibile, and the
intellectus, as is necessarily the case with all intellect in action.

We have reiterated this idea in the present chapter because it is
exceedingly abstruse, and I do not apprehend that the reader will
confound intellectual comprehension with the representative
faculty—with the reproduction of the material image in our imagination,
since this work is designed only for those who have studied philosophy,
and who know what has already been said on the soul and its faculties.






CHAPTER LXIX


The philosophers, as you know, call God the First Cause (in Hebrew
ʻillah and sibbah): but those who are known by the name of Mutakallemim
are very much opposed to the use of that name, and call Him Agens,
believing that there is a great difference whether we say that God is
the Cause or that He is the Agens. They argue thus: If we say that God
is the Cause, the coexistence of the Cause with that which was produced
by that Cause would necessarily be implied; this again would involve
the belief that the Universe was eternal, and that it was inseparable
from God. When, however, we say that God is the Agens, the co-existence
of the Agens with its product is not implied; for the agens can exist
anterior to its product; we cannot even imagine how an agens can be in
action unless it existed before its own production. This is an argument
advanced by persons who do not distinguish between the potential and
the actual. You, however, should know that in this case there is no
difference whether you employ the term “cause” or “agens”; for if you
take the term “cause” in the sense of a mere potentiality, it precedes
its effect; but if you mean the cause in action, then the effect must
necessarily co-exist with the cause in action. The same is the case
with the agens; take it as an agens in reality, the work must
necessarily co-exist with its agens. For the builder, before he builds
the house, is not in reality a builder, but has the faculty for
building a house—in the same way as the materials for the house before
it is being built are merely in potentiâ—but when the house has been
built, he is the builder in reality, and his product must likewise be
in actual existence. Nothing is therefore gained by choosing the term
“agens” and rejecting the term “cause.” My object here is to show that
these two terms are equal, and in the same manner as we call God an
Agens, although the work does not yet exist, only because there is no
hindrance or obstacle which might prevent Him from doing it whenever He
pleases, we may also call Him the Cause, although the effect may not
yet be in existence.

The reason why the philosophers called God the Cause, and did not call
Him the Agens, is not to be sought in their belief that the universe is
eternal, but in other motives, which I will briefly describe to you. It
has been shown in the science of Physics that everything, except the
Primal Cause, owes its origin to the following four causes:—the
substance, the form, the agens, the final cause. These are sometimes
direct, sometimes indirect causes; but each by itself is called “a
cause.” They also believe—and I do not differ from their opinion—that
God Himself is the agens, the form, and the end; therefore they call
God “the Cause,” in order to express that He unites in Himself these
three causes, viz., that He is the agens, the form, and the final cause
of the universe. In the present chapter I only wish to show you in what
sense it may be said of God that He is the agens, the form, and also
the final cause of the universe. You need not trouble yourself now with
the question whether the universe has been created by God, or whether,
as the philosophers have assumed, it is eternal, co-existing with Him.
You will find [in the pages of this treatise] full and instructive
information on the subject. Here I wish to show that God is the “cause”
of every event that takes place in the world, just as He is the Creator
of the whole universe as it now exists. It has already been explained
in the science of Physics, that a cause must again be sought for each
of the four divisions of causes. When we have found for any existing
thing those four causes which are in immediate connexion with it, we
find for these again causes, and for these again other causes, and so
on until we arrive at the first causes. E.g., a certain production has
its agens, this agens again has its agens, and so on and on until at
last we arrive at a first agens, which is the true agens throughout all
the intervening links. If the letter aleph be moved by bet, bet by
gimel, gimel by dalet, and dalet by hé—and as the series does not
extend to infinity, let us stop at hé—there is no doubt that the hé
moves the letters aleph, bet, gimel, and dalet, and we say correctly
that the aleph is moved by hé. In that sense everything occurring in
the universe, although directly produced by certain nearer causes, is
ascribed to the Creator, as we shall explain. He is the Agens, and He
is therefore the ultimate cause. We shall also find, after careful
examination, that every physical and transient form must be preceded by
another such form, by which the substance has been fitted to receive
the next form; the previous form again has been preceded by another,
and we arrive at length at that form which is necessary for the
existence of all intermediate forms, which are the causes of the
present form. That form to which the forms of all existing things are
traced is God. You must not imagine that when we say that God is the
first form of all forms existing in the Universe, we refer to that
first form which Aristotle, in the Book of Metaphysics, describes as
being without beginning and without end, for he treats of a form which
is a physical, and not a purely intellectual one. When we call God the
ultimate form of the universe, we do not use this term in the sense of
form connected with substance, namely, as the form of that substance,
as though God were the form of a material being. It is not in this
sense that we use it, but in the following: Everything existing and
endowed with a form, is whatever it is through its form, and when that
form is destroyed its whole existence terminates and is obliterated.
The same is the case as regards the relation between God and all
distant causes of existing beings; it is through the existence of God
that all things exist, and it is He who maintains their existence by
that process which is called emanation (in Hebrew shepha’), as will be
explained in one of the chapters of the present work. If God did not
exist, suppose this were possible, the universe would not exist, and
there would be an end to the existence of the distant causes, the final
effects, and the intermediate causes. Consequently God maintains the
same relation to the world as the form has to a thing endowed with a
form; through the form it is what it is, and on it the reality and
essence of the thing depends. In this sense we may say that God is the
ultimate form, that He is the form of all forms; that is to say, the
existence and continuance of all forms in the last instance depend on
Him, the forms are maintained by Him, in the same way as all things
endowed with forms retain their existence through their forms. On that
account God is called, in the sacred language, ḥe ha-ʻolamim, “the life
of the Universe,” as will be explained (chap. lxxii.). The same
argument holds good in reference to all final causes. If you assign to
a thing a certain purpose, you can find for that purpose another
purpose. We mention, e.g., a (wooden) chair; its substance is wood, the
joiner is its agens, the square its form, and its purpose is that one
should sit upon it. You may then ask, For what purpose does one sit
upon it? The answer will be that he who is sitting upon it desires to
be high above the ground. If again you ask, For what purpose does he
desire to be high above the ground, you will receive the answer that he
wishes to appear high in the eyes of those who see him. For what
purpose does he wish to appear higher in the eyes of those who see him?
That the people may respect and fear him. What is the good of his being
feared? His commands will be respected. For what purpose are his
commands to be respected? That people shall refrain from injuring each
other. What is the object of this precaution? To maintain order amongst
the people. In this way one purpose necessitates the pre-existence of
another, except the final purpose, which is the execution of the will
of God, according to one of the opinions which have been propounded, as
will be explained (III. xiii. and xvii.), and the final answer will be,
“It is the will of God.” According to the view of others, which will
likewise be explained, the final purpose is the execution of the decree
of His wisdom, and the final answer will be, “It has been decreed by
His wisdom.” According to either opinion, the series of the successive
purposes terminates, as has been shown, in God’s will or wisdom, which,
in our opinion, are identical with His essence, and are not any thing
separate from Himself or different from His essence. Consequently, God
is the final purpose of everything. Again, it is the aim of everything
to become, according to its faculties, similar to God in perfection;
this is meant by the expression, “His will, which is identical with His
essence,” as will be shown below (ibid.). In this sense God is called
the End of all ends.

I have thus explained to you in what sense God is said to be the Agens,
the Form, and the End. This is the reason why the philosophers not only
call Him “the Maker” but also the “Cause.” Some of the scholars
belonging to the Mutakallemim (Mohammedan theologians), went so far in
their folly and in their vainglory as to say that the non-existence of
the Creator, if that were possible, would not necessarily imply the
non-existence of the things created by Him, i.e., the Universe: for a
production need not necessarily cease to exist when the producer, after
having produced it, has ceased to exist. They would be right, if God
were only the maker of the Universe, and if its permanent existence
were not dependent on Him. The storehouse does not cease to exist at
the death of the builder; for he does not give permanent existence to
the building. God, however, is Himself the form of the Universe, as we
have already shown, and it is He who causes its continuance and
permanency. It is therefore wrong to say that a thing can remain
durable and permanent, after the being that makes it durable and
permanent has ceased to exist, since that thing can possess no more
durability and permanency than it has received from that being. Now you
understand the greatness of the error into which they have fallen
through their assumption that God is only the Agens, and not the End or
the Form.






CHAPTER LXX


The term rakab, “to ride,” is a synonym. In its primary signification
it is applied to man’s riding on an animal, in the usual way; e.g.,
“Now he was riding (rokeb) upon his ass” (Num. xxii. 22). It has then
been figuratively used to denote “dominion over a thing”; because the
rider governs and rules the animal he rides upon; e.g., “He made him
ride (yarkibehu) on the high places of the earth” (Deut. xxxii. 13);
“and I will cause thee to ride (ve-hirkabtika) upon the high places of
the earth” (Isa. lviii. 14), that is, you shall have dominion over the
highest (people) on earth; “I will make Ephraim to ride (arkib)” (Hos.
x. 11), i.e., I shall give him rule and dominion. In this same sense it
is said of God, “who rideth (rokeb) upon the heaven in thy help” (Deut.
xxxiii. 26), that is, who rules the heaven; and “Him that rideth
(la-rokeb) upon the ʻarabot” (Ps. lxviii. 4), i.e., who rules the
ʻarabot, the uppermost, all-encompassing sphere. It has also been
repeatedly stated by our Sages that there are seven rekiʻim
(firmaments, heavens), and that the uppermost of them, the
all-surrounding, is called ʻarabot. Do not object to the number seven
given by them, although there are more rekiʻim, for there are spheres
which contain several circles (gilgallim), and are counted as one; this
is clear to those who have studied that subject, and I shall also
explain it; here I wish merely to point out that our Sages always
assumed that ʻarabot is the uppermost sphere. The ʻarabot is also
referred to in the words, “who rideth upon the heaven in thy help.”
Thus we read in Talm. B. Ḥagigah, p. 12, “The high and exalted dwelleth
on ʻarabot, as it is said, ‘Extol Him that rideth upon ʻarabot’” (Ps.
lxviii. 4). How is it proved that “heaven” and “ʻarabot” are identical?
The one passage has “who rideth on ʻarabot,” the other “who rideth upon
the heaven.” Hence it is clear that in all these passages reference is
made to the same all-surrounding sphere, concerning which you will
hereafter (II. xxiv.) receive more information. Consider well that the
expression “dwelling over it,” is used by them, and not “dwelling in
it.” The latter expression would have implied that God occupies a place
or is a power in the sphere, as was in fact believed by the Sabeans,
who held that God was the soul of the sphere. By saying “dwelling over
it,” they indicated that God was separate from the sphere, and was not
a power in it. Know also that the term “riding upon the heavens,” has
figuratively been applied to God in order to show the following
excellent comparison. The rider is better than the animal upon which he
rides—the comparative is only used for the sake of convenience, for the
rider is not of the same class as the animal upon which he
rides—furthermore, the rider moves the animal and leads it as he likes;
it is as it were his instrument, which he uses according to his will;
he is separate from it, apart from it, not connected with it. In like
manner the uppermost sphere, by the rotation of which everything
moveable is set in motion, is moved by God, who is separate from the
sphere, and is not a power in it. In Bereshit Rabba we read that in
commenting on the Divine words, “The eternal God is a refuge” (lit., a
dwelling, Deut. xxxiii. 27), our Sages said, “He is the dwelling of His
world, the world is not His dwelling.” This explanation is then
followed by the remark, “The horse is secondary to the rider, the rider
is not subservient to the horse; this is meant by ‘Thou wilt ride upon
thy horses’” (Hab. iii. 8). Consider and learn how they described the
relation of God to the sphere, asserting that the latter is His
instrument, by means of which He rules the universe. For whenever you
find our Sages saying that in a certain heaven are certain things, they
do not mean to say that in the heavens there are any extraneous things,
but that from a certain heaven the force emanates which is required for
the production of certain things, and for their continuing in proper
order. The proof for my statement you may find in the following sayings
of our Sages—“The ʻarabot, in which there are justice, charity, right,
treasures of life and peace, treasures of blessing, of the souls of the
righteous, of the souls and the spirits of those to be born, and of the
dew by which God will at some future time revive the dead, etc.” It is
clear that the things enumerated here are not material, and do not
occupy a place—for “dew” is not to be taken in its literal
sense.—Consider also that here the phrase “in which,” meaning “in the
ʻarabot,” is used, and not “over which,” as if to say that all the
things existing in the universe derive their existence from powers
emanating from the ʻarabot, which God made to be the origin and the
place of these powers. They are said to include “the treasures of
life”; a perfectly true and correct assertion! For all existing life
originates in that treasure of life, as will be mentioned below (chap.
lxii., and II. chap. x.). Reflect on the fact that the souls of the
righteous as well as the souls and the spirits of those to be born are
mentioned here! How sublime is this idea to him who understands it! for
the soul that remains after the death of man, is not the soul that
lives in a man when he is born; the latter is a mere faculty, while
that which has a separate existence after death, is a reality; again,
the soul and the spirit of man during his life are two different
things; therefore the souls and the spirits are both named as existing
in man; but separate from the body only one of them exists. We have
already explained the homonymity of ruaḥ (spirit) in this work, and
also at the end of Sefer ha maddaʻ (Mishneh torah Hil. teshubah, viii.
3–4) we treated of the homonymity of these expressions. Consider how
these excellent and true ideas, comprehended only by the greatest
philosophers, are found scattered in the Midrashim. When a student who
disavows truth reads them, he will at first sight deride them, as being
contrary to the real state of things. The cause of this is the
circumstance, that our Sages spoke of these subjects in metaphors; they
are too difficult for the common understanding of the people, as has
been noticed by us several times.

I will now return to the subject which I commenced to explain, in order
to bring it to a conclusion. Our Sages commenced to adduce proofs from
Scripture for their assertion that the things enumerated above are
contained in the ʻarabot. As to justice and right they quote “Justice
and judgment are the habitation of thy throne” (Ps. lxxxix. 18). In the
same way they prove their assertion concerning all things enumerated by
them, by showing that they are described as being related to God, as
being near Him. Note this. In the Pirke Rabbi Eliezer it is said: God
created seven rekiʻim (heavens), and out of all of them He selected the
ʻaraboth for His royal throne; comp. “Exalt him who rideth upon the
ʻarabot” (Ps. lxviii. 4). These are his (Rabbi Eliezer’s) words. Note
them likewise.

You must know that in Hebrew the collective noun denoting animals used
for riding is “mercabah.” Instances of this noun are not rare. “And
Joseph made ready his chariot” (merkabto) (Gen. xlvi. 29); “in the
second chariot” (be-mirkebet) (ib. xli. 43); “Pharaoh’s chariots”
(markebot) (Exod. xv. 4). The following passage especially proves that
the Hebrew merkabah denotes a collection of animals: “And a merkabah
came up and went out of Egypt for six hundred shekels of silver, and a
horse for an hundred and fifty” (1 Kings x. 21). Hence we may learn
that mercabah denotes here four horses. Therefore I think that when it
was stated, according to the literal sense of the words, that four
Ḥayyot (beasts) carry the Throne of Glory, our Sages called this
“mercabah” on account of its similarity with the mercabah consisting of
four single animals. So far has the theme of this chapter carried us,
and we shall be compelled to make many further remarks on this subject.
Here, however, it is our object, and the aim of all we have said, to
show that “who rideth upon heaven” (Deut. xxxiii. 26) means “who sets
the all-surrounding sphere in motion, and turns it by His power and
will.” The same sense is contained in the conclusion of that verse:
“and in his excellency the spheres,” i.e., who in His excellency moves
the spheres (sheḥakim). In reference to the first sphere, the ʻarabot,
the verb “to ride” is used, in reference to the rest, the noun
“excellency,” because through the motion of the uppermost sphere in its
daily circuit, all the spheres move, participating as parts in the
motion of the whole; and this being that great power that sets
everything in motion, it is called “excellency.” Let this subject
constantly remain in your memory when you study what I am going to say;
for it—i.e., the motion of the uppermost sphere—is the greatest proof
for the existence of God, as I shall demonstrate. Note this.






CHAPTER LXXI


Know that many branches of science relating to the correct solution of
these problems, were once cultivated by our forefathers, but were in
the course of time neglected, especially in consequence of the tyranny
which barbarous nations exercised over us. Besides, speculative studies
were not open to all men, as we have already stated (Introd. p. 2, and
I. chap, xxxi.), only the subjects taught in the Scriptures were
accessible to all. Even the traditional Law, as you are well aware, was
not originally committed to writing, in conformity with the rule to
which our nation generally adhered, “Things which I have communicated
to you orally, you must not communicate to others in writing.” With
reference to the Law, this rule was very opportune; for while it
remained in force it averted the evils which happened subsequently,
viz., great diversity of opinion, doubts as to the meaning of written
words, slips of the pen, dissensions among the people, formation of new
sects, and confused notions about practical subjects. The traditional
teaching was in fact, according to the words of the Law, entrusted to
the Great Tribunal, as we have already stated in our works on the
Talmud. (Introd. to Mishneh Torah and Introd. to Commen. on the
Mishnah).

Care having been taken, for the sake of obviating injurious influences,
that the Oral Law should not be recorded in a form accessible to all,
it was but natural that no portion of “the secrets of the Law” (i.e.,
metaphysical problems) would be permitted to be written down or
divulged for the use of all men. These secrets, as has been explained,
were orally communicated by a few able men to others who were equally
distinguished. Hence the principle applied by our teachers, “The
secrets of the Law can only be entrusted to him who is a councillor, a
cunning artificer, etc.” The natural effect of this practice was that
our nation lost the knowledge of those important disciplines. Nothing
but a few remarks and allusions are to be found in the Talmud and the
Midrashim, like a few kernels enveloped in such a quantity of husk,
that the reader is generally occupied with the husk, and forgets that
it encloses a kernel.

In addition you will find that in the few works composed by the Geonim
and the Karaites on the unity of God and on such matter as is connected
with this doctrine, they followed the lead of the Mohammedan
Mutakallemim, and what they wrote is insignificant in comparison with
the kindred works of the Mohammedans. It also happened, that at the
time when the Mohammedans adopted this method of the Kalam, there arose
among them a certain sect, called Muʻtazilah, i.e., Separatists. In
certain things our scholars followed the theory and the method of these
Muʻtazilah. Although another sect, the Asha’ariyah, with their own
peculiar views, was subsequently established amongst the Mohammedans,
you will not find any of these views in the writings of our authors;
not because these authors preferred the opinions of the first-named
sect to those of the latter, but because they chanced first to become
acquainted with the theory of the Muʻtazilah, which they adopted and
treated as demonstrated truth. On the other hand our Andalusian
scholars followed the teachings of the philosophers, from whom they
accepted those opinions which were not opposed to our own religious
principles. You will find that they did not adopt any of the methods of
the Mutakallemim; in many respects they approached the view expressed
in the present treatise, as may be noticed in the few works which were
recently written by authors of that school. You should also know that
whatever the Mohammedans, that is, the Muʻtazilah and the Asha’ariyah,
said on those subjects, consists in nothing but theories founded on
propositions which are taken from the works of those Greek and Syrian
scholars who attempted to oppose the system of the philosophers, and to
refute their arguments. The following was the cause of that opposition:
At the time when the Christian Church brought the Greeks and Syrians
into its fold, and promulgated its well-known dogmas, the opinions of
the philosophers were current amongst those nations; and whilst
philosophy flourished, kings became defenders of the Christian faith.
The learned Greek and Syrian Christians of the age, seeing that their
dogmas were unquestionably exposed to severe attacks from the existing
philosophical systems, laid the foundation for this science of
Dogmatics; they commenced by putting forth such propositions as would
support their doctrines, and be useful for the refutation of opinions
opposed to the fundamental principles of the Christian religion.

When the Mohammedans caused Arabic translations of the writings of the
Philosophers to be made, those criticisms were likewise translated.
When the opinions of John the Grammarian, of Ibn Adi, and of kindred
authors on those subjects were made accessible to them, they adopted
them, and imagined that they had arrived at the solution of important
problems. Moreover, they selected from the opinions of the ancient
philosophers whatever seemed serviceable to their purposes, although
later critics had proved that those theories were false; as, e.g., the
theories of atoms and of a vacuum. They believed that the discussions
of those authors were of a general character, and contained
propositions useful for the defence of positive religion. At a
subsequent period the same theories were more fully developed, and
presented an aspect unknown to those Theologians of the Greeks and
other nations who were the immediate successors of the Philosophers. At
a later time, when the Mohammedans adopted certain peculiar theological
theories they were naturally obliged to defend them; and when their new
theories, again became the subject of controversy among them, each
party laid down such propositions as suited their special doctrine.

Their arguments undoubtedly involved certain principles which concerned
the three communities—Jews, Christians, and Mohammedans, such as the
creatio ex nihilo, which afforded support to the belief in miracles and
to various other doctrines. There are, however, other subjects of
belief which the Christians and Mohammedans have undertaken to defend,
such as the doctrine of the Trinity in the theological works of the
former, and “the Word” in the works of some Mohammedan sects; in order
to prove the dogmas which they thus desired to establish, they were
compelled to resort to certain hypotheses. It is not our object to
criticize things which are peculiar to either creed, or books which
were written exclusively in the interest of the one community or the
other. We merely maintain that the earlier Theologians, both of the
Greek Christians and of the Mohammedans, when they laid down their
propositions, did not investigate the real properties of things; first
of all they considered what must be the properties of the things which
should yield proof for or against a certain creed; and when this was
found they asserted that the thing must be endowed with those
properties; then they employed the same assertion as a proof for the
identical arguments which had led to the assertion, and by which they
either supported or refuted a certain opinion. This course was followed
by able men who originated this method, and adopted it in their
writings. They professed to be free from preconceived opinions, and to
have been led to a stated result by actual research. Therefore when
philosophers of a subsequent date studied the same writings they did
not perceive the true character of the arguments; on the contrary, they
found in the ancient works strong proofs and a valuable support for the
acceptance or the rejection of certain opinions, and thus thought that,
so far as religious principles were concerned, there was no necessity
whatever to prove or refute any of their propositions, and that the
first Mutakallemim had discussed those subjects with the sole object of
defeating certain views of the philosophers, and demonstrating the
insufficiency of their proofs. Persons who hold this opinion, do not
suspect how much they are mistaken; for the first Mutakallemim tried to
prove a proposition when it was expedient to demonstrate its truth; and
to disprove it, when its rejection was desirable, and when it was
contrary to the opinion which they wished to uphold, although the
contradiction might only become obvious after the application of a
hundred successive propositions. In this manner the earlier
Mutakallemim effected a radical cure of the malady! I tell you,
however, as a general rule, that Themistius was right in saying that
the properties of things cannot adapt themselves to our opinions, but
our opinions must be adapted to the existing properties.

Having studied the works of these Mutakallemim, as far as I had an
opportunity, just as I had studied the writings of the philosophers
according to the best of my ability, I found that the method of all
Mutakallemim was the same in its general characteristics, namely, they
assume that the really existing form of things proves nothing at all,
because it is merely one of the various phases of the things, the
opposite of which is equally admissible to our minds. In many instances
these Theologians were guided by their imagination, and thought that
they were following the dictates of the intellect. They set forth the
propositions which I shall describe to you, and demonstrated by their
peculiar mode of arguing that the Universe had a beginning. The theory
of the creatio ex nihilo being thus established, they asserted, as a
logical consequence, that undoubtedly there must be a Maker who created
the Universe. Next they showed that this Maker is One, and from the
Unity of the Creator they deduced His Incorporeality. This method was
adopted by every Mohammedan Mutakallem in the discussion of this
subject, and by those of our co-religionists who imitated them and
walked in their footsteps. Although the Mutakallemim disagree in the
methods of their proofs, and employ different propositions in
demonstrating the act of creation or in rejecting the eternity of the
Universe, they invariably begin with proving the creatio ex nihilo, and
establish on that proof the existence of God. I have examined this
method, and find it most objectionable. It must be rejected, because
all the proofs for the creation have weak points, and cannot be
considered as convincing except by those who do not know the difference
between a proof, a dialectical argument, and a sophism. Those who
understand the force of the different methods will clearly see that all
the proofs for the creation are questionable, because propositions have
been employed which have never been proved. I think that the utmost
that can be effected by believers in the truth of Revelation is to
expose the shortcomings in the proofs of philosophers who hold that the
Universe is eternal, and if forsooth a man has effected this, he has
accomplished a great deed! For it is well known to all clear and
correct thinkers who do not wish to deceive themselves, that this
question, namely, whether the Universe has been created or is eternal,
cannot be answered with mathematical certainty; here human intellect
must pause. We shall have occasion to speak more fully on this subject,
but for the present it may suffice to state that the philosophers have
for the last three thousand years been continually divided on that
subject, as far as we can learn from their works and the record of
their opinions.

Such being the nature of this theory, how can we employ it as an axiom
and establish on it the existence of the Creator? In that case the
existence of God would be uncertain; if the universe had a beginning,
God does exist; if it be eternal, God does not exist; the existence of
God would therefore remain either an open question, or we should have
to declare that the creation had been proved, and compel others by mere
force to accept this doctrine, in order thus to be enabled to declare
that we have proved the existence of God. Such a process is utterly
inadmissible. The true method, which is based on a logical and
indubitable proof, consists, according to my opinion, in demonstrating
the existence of God, His unity, and His incorporeality by such
philosophical arguments as are founded on the theory of the eternity of
the Universe. I do not propose this method as though I believed in the
eternity of the Universe, for I do not follow the philosophers on this
point, but because by the aid of this method these three principles,
viz., the existence of God, His unity and His incorporeality can be
fully proved and verified, irrespectively of the question whether the
universe has had a beginning or not. After firmly establishing these
three principles by an exact proof, we shall treat of the problem of
creation and discuss it as fully as possible. You are at liberty to
content yourself with the declaration of the Mutakallemim, and to
believe that the act of creation has been demonstrated by proof; nor
can there be any harm if you consider it unproven that the universe had
a beginning, and accept this theory as supported by the authority of
the Prophets. Before you learn our opinion on prophecy, which will be
given in the present work, do not ask, how could the belief in prophecy
be justified, if it were assumed that the universe was eternal. We will
not now expatiate on that subject. You should, however, know that some
of the propositions, started and proved by the Radicals, i.e., the
Mutakallemim, in order to prove the act of creation, imply an order of
things contrary to that which really exists, and involve a complete
change in the laws of nature; this fact will be pointed out to you, for
it will be necessary to mention their propositions and their
argumentation. My method, as far as I now can explain it in general
terms, is as follows. The universe is either eternal or has had a
beginning; if it had a beginning, there must necessarily exist a being
which caused the beginning; this is clear to common sense; for a thing
that has had a beginning, cannot be the cause of its own beginning,
another must have caused it. The universe was, therefore, created by
God. If on the other hand the universe were eternal, it could in
various ways be proved that apart from the things which constitute the
universe, there exists a being which is neither body nor a force in a
body, and which is one, eternal, not preceded by any cause, and
immutable. That being is God. You see that the proofs for the
Existence, the Unity and the Incorporeality of God must vary according
to the propositions admitted by us. Only in this way can we succeed in
obtaining a perfect proof, whether we assume the eternity or the
creation of the universe. For this reason you will find in my works on
the Talmud, whenever I have to speak of the fundamental principles of
our religion, or to prove the existence of God, that I employ arguments
which imply the eternity of the universe. I do not believe in that
eternity, but I wish to establish the principle of the existence of God
by an indisputable proof, and should not like to see this most
important principle founded on a basis which every one could shake or
attempt to demolish, and which others might consider as not being
established at all; especially when I see that the proofs of the
philosophers are based on those visible properties of things, which can
only be ignored by persons possessing certain preconceived notions,
while the Mutakallemim establish their arguments on propositions which
are to such an extent contrary to the actual state of things as to
compel these arguers to deny altogether the existence of the laws of
nature. When I shall have to treat of the creation, I shall in a
special chapter prove my opinion to some extent, and shall attain the
same end which every one of the Mutakallemim had in view, yet I shall
not contradict the laws of nature, or reject any such part of the
Aristotelean theory as has been proved to be correct. Even the most
cogent of the proofs offered by the Mutakallemim respecting the act of
creation, has only been obtained by reversing the whole order of things
and by rejecting everything fully demonstrated by the philosophers. I,
however, shall be able to give a similar proof without ignoring the
laws of nature and without being forced to contradict facts which have
been clearly perceived. I find it necessary to mention to you the
general propositions of the Mutakallemim, by which they prove the act
of creation, the Existence of God, His Unity and His Incorporeality. I
intend to explain their method, and also to point out the inferences
which are to be drawn from each proposition. After this, I shall
describe those theories of the philosophers which are closely connected
with our subject, and I shall then explain their method.

Do not ask me to prove in this work the propositions of the
philosophers, which I shall briefly mention to you; they form the
principal part of Physics and Metaphysics. Nor must you expect that I
should repeat the arguments of the Mutakallemim in support of their
propositions, with which they wasted their time, with which the time of
future generations will likewise be wasted, and on which numerous books
have been written. Their propositions, with few exceptions, are
contradicted by the visible properties of things, and beset with
numerous objections. For this reason they were obliged to write many
books and controversial works in defence of their theories, for the
refutation of objections, and for the reconciliation of all apparent
contradictions, although in reality this object cannot be attained by
any sophistical contrivance. As to the propositions of the philosophers
which I shall briefly explain, and which are indispensable for the
demonstration of the three principles—the Existence, the Unity, and the
Incorporeality of God, they will for the greater part be admitted by
you as soon as you shall hear them and understand their meaning; whilst
in the discussion of other parts reference must be made for their
proofs to works on Physics and Metaphysics, and if you direct your
attention to such passages as will be pointed out to you, you will find
everything verified that requires verification.

I have already told you that nothing exists except God and this
universe, and that there is no other evidence for His Existence but
this universe in its entirety and in its several parts. Consequently
the universe must be examined as it is; the propositions must be
derived from those properties of the universe which are clearly
perceived, and hence you must know its visible form and its nature.
Then only will you find in the universe evidence for the existence of a
being not included therein. I have considered it, therefore, necessary
to discuss first in a merely colloquial manner, in the next chapter,
the totality of existing things, and to confine our remarks to such as
have been fully proved and established beyond all doubt. In subsequent
chapters I shall treat of the propositions of the Mutakallemim, and
describe the method by which they explain the four fundamental
principles. In the chapters which will follow, I propose to expound the
propositions of the philosophers and the methods applied by them in
verifying those principles. In the last place, I shall explain to you
the method applied by me in proving those four principles, as I have
stated to you.






CHAPTER LXXII


Know that this Universe, in its entirety, is nothing else but one
individual being; that is to say, the outermost heavenly sphere,
together with all included therein, is as regards individuality beyond
all question a single being like Said and Omar. The variety of its
substances—I mean the substances of that sphere and all its component
parts—is like the variety of the substances of a human being: just as,
e.g., Said is one individual, consisting of various solid substances,
such as flesh, bones, sinews, of various humours, and of various
spiritual elements; in like manner this sphere in its totality is
composed of the celestial orbs, the four elements and their
combinations; there is no vacuum whatever therein, but the whole space
is filled up with matter. Its centre is occupied by the earth, earth is
surrounded by water, air encompasses the water, fire envelopes the air,
and this again is enveloped by the fifth substance (quintessence).
These substances form numerous spheres, one being enclosed within
another so that no intermediate empty space, no vacuum, is left. One
sphere surrounds and closely joins the other. All the spheres revolve
with constant uniformity, without acceleration or retardation; that is
to say, each sphere retains its individual nature as regards its
velocity and the peculiarity of its motion; it does not move at one
time quicker, at another slower. Compared with each other, however,
some of the spheres move with less, others with greater velocity. The
outermost, all-encompassing sphere, revolves with the greatest speed;
it completes its revolution in one day, and causes everything to
participate in its motion, just as every particle of a thing moves when
the entire body is in motion; for existing beings stand in the same
relation to that sphere as a part of a thing stands to the whole. These
spheres have not a common centre; the centres of some of them are
identical with the centre of the Universe, while those of the rest are
different from it. Some of the spheres have a motion independent of
that of the whole Universe, constantly revolving from East to West,
while other spheres move from West to East. The stars contained in
those spheres are part of their respective orbits; they are fixed in
them, and have no motion of their own, but participating in the motion
of the sphere of which they are a part, they appear themselves to move.
The entire substance of this revolving fifth element is unlike the
substance of those bodies which consist of the other four elements, and
are enclosed by the fifth element.

The number of these spheres encompassing the Universe cannot possibly
be less than eighteen; it may even be larger; but this is a matter for
further investigation. It also remains an open question whether there
are spheres which, without moving round the centre of the Universe,
have nevertheless a circular motion. Within that sphere which is
nearest to us, a substance is contained which is different from the
substance of the fifth element; it first received four primary forms,
and then became in these four forms, four kinds of matter: earth,
water, air, fire. Each of the four elements occupies a certain position
of its own assigned to it by nature; it is not found in another place,
so long as no other but its own natural force acts upon it; it is a
dead body; it has no life, no perception, no spontaneous motion, and
remains at rest in its natural place. When moved from its place by some
external force, it returns towards its natural place as soon as that
force ceases to operate. For the elements have the property of moving
back to their place in a straight line, but they have no properties
which would cause them to remain where they are, or to move otherwise
than in a straight line. The rectilinear motions of these four elements
when returning to their original place are of two kinds, either
centrifugal, viz., the motion of the air and the fire; or centripetal,
viz., the motion of the earth, and the water; and when the elements
have reached their original place, they remain at rest.

The spherical bodies, on the other hand, have life, possess a soul by
which they move spontaneously; they have no properties by which they
could at any time come to a state of rest; in their perpetual rotations
they are not subject to any change, except that of position. The
question whether they are endowed with an intellect, enabling them to
comprehend, cannot be solved without deep research. Through the
constant revolution of the fifth element, with all contained therein,
the four elements are forced to move and to change their respective
positions, so that fire and air are driven into the water, and again
these three elements enter the depth of the earth. Thus are the
elements mixed together; and when they return to their respective
places, parts of the earth, in quitting their places, move together
with the water, the air and the fire. In this whole process the
elements act and react upon each other. The elements intermixed, are
then combined, and form at first various kinds of vapours; afterwards
the several kinds of minerals, every species of plants, and many
species of living beings, according to the relative proportion of the
constituent parts. All transient beings have their origin in the
elements, into which again they resolve when their existence comes to
an end. The elements themselves are subject to being transformed from
one into another; for although one substance is common to all,
substance without form is in reality impossible, just as the physical
form of these transient beings cannot exist without substance. The
formation and the dissolution of the elements, together with the things
composed of them, and resolving into them, follow each other in
rotation. The changes of the finite substance, in successively
receiving one form after the other, may therefore be compared to the
revolution of the sphere in space, when each part of the sphere
periodically reappears in the same position.

As the human body consists both of principal organs and of other
members which depend on them and cannot exist without the control of
those organs, so does the universe consist both of principal parts,
viz., the quintessence, which encompasses the four elements and of
other parts which are subordinated and require a leader, viz., the four
elements and the things composed of them.

Again, the principal part in the human body, namely, the heart, is in
constant motion, and is the source of every motion noticed in the body;
it rules over the other members, and communicates to them through its
own pulsations the force required for their functions. The outermost
sphere by its motion rules in a similar way over all other parts of the
universe, and supplies all things with their special properties. Every
motion in the universe has thus its origin in the motion of that
sphere; and the soul of every animated being derives its origin from
the soul of that same sphere.

The forces which according to this explanation are communicated by the
spheres to this sublunary world are four in number, viz., (a) the force
which effects the mixture and the composition of the elements, and
which undoubtedly suffices to form the minerals; (b) the force which
supplies every growing thing with its vegetative functions; (c) the
force which gives to each living being its vitality, and (d) the force
which endows rational beings with intellect. All this is effected
through the action of light and darkness, which are regulated by the
position and the motion of the spheres round the earth.

When for one instant the beating of the heart is interrupted, man dies,
and all his motions and powers come to an end. In a like manner would
the whole universe perish, and everything therein cease to exist if the
spheres were to come to a standstill.

The living being as such is one through the action of its heart,
although some parts of the body are devoid of motion and sensation, as,
e.g., the bones, the cartilage, and similar parts. The same is the case
with the entire universe; although it includes many beings without
motion and without life, it is a single being living through the motion
of the sphere, which may be compared to the heart of an animated being.
You must therefore consider the entire globe as one individual being
which is endowed with life, motion, and a soul. This mode of
considering the universe is, as will be explained, indispensable, that
is to say, it is very useful for demonstrating the unity of God; it
also helps to elucidate the principle that He who is One has created
only one being.

Again, it is impossible that any of the members of a human body should
exist by themselves, not connected with the body, and at the same time
should actually be organic parts of that body, that is to say, that the
liver should exist by itself, the heart by itself, or the flesh by
itself. In like manner, it is impossible that one part of the Universe
should exist independently of the other parts in the existing order of
things as here considered, viz., that the fire should exist without the
co-existence of the earth, or the earth without the heaven, or the
heaven without the earth.

In man there is a certain force which unites the members of the body,
controls them, and gives to each of them what it requires for the
conservation of its condition, and for the repulsion of injury—the
physicians distinctly call it the leading force in the body of the
living being; sometimes they call it “nature.” The Universe likewise
possesses a force which unites the several parts with each other,
protects the species from destruction, maintains the individuals of
each species as long as possible, and endows some individual beings
with permanent existence. Whether this force operates through the
medium of the sphere or otherwise remains an open question.

Again, in the body of each individual there are parts which are
intended for a certain purpose, as the organs of nutrition for the
preservation of the individual, the organs of generation for the
preservation of the species, the hands and eyes for administering to
certain wants, as to food, etc.; there are also parts which, in
themselves, are not intended for any purpose, but are mere accessories
and adjuncts to the constitution of the other parts. The peculiar
constitution of the organs, indispensable for the conservation of their
particular forms and for the performance of their primary functions,
produces, whilst it serves its special purpose, according to the nature
of the substance, other things, such as the hair and the complexion of
the body. Being mere accessories, they are not formed according to a
fixed rule; some are altogether absent in many individuals; and vary
considerably in others. This is not the case with the organs of the
body. You never find that the liver of one person is ten times larger
than that of another person, but you may find a person without a beard,
or without hair on certain parts of his body, or with a beard ten times
longer than that of another man. Instances of this phenomenon, viz.,
great variation as regards hair and colour, are not rare. The same
differences occur in the constitution of the Universe. Some species
exist as an integral part of the whole system; these are constant and
follow a fixed law; though they vary as far as their nature permits,
this variation is insignificant in quantity and quality. Other species
do not serve any purpose; they are the mere result of the general
nature of transient things, as, e.g., the various insects which are
generated in dunghills, the animals generated in rotten fruit, or in
fetid liquids, and worms generated in the intestines, etc. In short,
everything devoid of the power of generation belongs to this class. You
will, therefore, find that these things do not follow a fixed law,
although their entire absence is just as impossible as the absence of
different complexions and of different kinds of hair amongst human
beings.

In man there are substances the individual existence of which is
permanent, and there are other substances which are only constant in
the species not in the individuals, as, e.g., the four humours. The
same is the case in the Universe; there are substances which are
constant in individuals, such as the fifth element, which is constant
in all its formations, and other substances which are constant in the
species, as, e.g., the four elements and all that is composed of them.

The same forces which operate in the birth and the temporal existence
of the human being operate also in his destruction and death. This
truth holds good with regard to this whole transient world. The causes
of production are at the same time the causes of destruction. This may
be illustrated by the following example. If the four forces which are
present in every being sustained by food, viz., attraction, retention,
digestion, and secretion, were, like intelligent forces, able to
confine themselves to what is necessary, and to act at the proper time
and within the proper limits, man would be exempt from those great
sufferings and the numerous diseases [to which he is exposed]. Since,
however, such is not the case, and since the forces perform their
natural functions without thought and intelligence, without any
consciousness of their action, they necessarily cause dangerous
maladies and great pains, although they are the direct cause of the
birth and the temporal existence of the human being. This fact is to be
explained as follows: if the attractive force would absorb nothing but
that which is absolutely beneficial, and nothing but the quantity which
is required, man would be free from many such sufferings and disorders.
But such is not the case; the attractive force absorbs any humour that
comes within the range of its action, although such humour be
ill-adapted in quality or in quantity. It is, therefore, natural that
sometimes a humour is absorbed which is too warm, too cold, too thick,
or too thin, or that too much humour is absorbed, and thus the veins
are choked, obstruction and decay ensue, the quality of the humour is
deteriorated, its quantities altered, diseases are originated, such as
scurvy, leprosy, abscess, or a dangerous illness, such as cancer,
elephantiasis, gangrene, and at last the organ or organs are destroyed.
The same is the case with every one of the four forces, and with all
existing beings. The same force that originates all things, and causes
them to exist for a certain time, namely, the combination of the
elements which are moved and penetrated by the forces of the heavenly
spheres, that same cause becomes throughout the world a source of
calamities, such as devastating rain, showers, snow-storms, hail,
hurricanes, thunder, lightning, malaria, or other terrible catastrophes
by which a place or many places or an entire country may be laid waste,
such as landslips, earthquakes, meteoric showers and floods issuing
forth from the seas and from the interior of the earth.

Bear in mind, however, that in all that we have noticed about the
similarity between the Universe and the human being, nothing would
warrant us to assert that man is a microcosm; for although the
comparison in all its parts applies to the Universe and any living
being in its normal state, we never heard that any ancient author
called the ass or the horse a microcosm. This attribute has been given
to man alone on account of his peculiar faculty of thinking, I mean the
intellect, viz., the hylic intellect which appertains to no other
living being. This may be explained as follows. An animal does not
require for its sustenance any plan, thought or scheme; each animal
moves and acts by its nature, eats as much as it can find of suitable
things, it makes its resting-place wherever it happens to be, cohabits
with any mate it meets while in heat in the periods of its sexual
excitement. In this manner does each individual conserve itself for a
certain time, and perpetuates the existence of its species without
requiring for its maintenance the assistance or support of any of its
fellow creatures; for all the things to which it has to attend it
performs by itself. With man it is different; if an individual had a
solitary existence, and were, like an animal, left without guidance, he
would soon perish, he would not endure even one day, unless it were by
mere chance, unless he happened to find something upon which he might
feed. For the food which man requires for his subsistence demands much
work and preparation, which can only be accomplished by reflection and
by plan; many vessels must be used, and many individuals, each in his
peculiar work, must be employed. It is therefore necessary that one
person should organize the work and direct men in such a manner that
they should properly co-operate, and that they should assist each
other. The protection from heat in summer and from cold in winter, and
shelter from rain, snow, and wind, require in the same manner the
preparation of many things, none of which can properly be done without
design and thought. For this reason man has been endowed with
intellectual faculties, which enable him to think, consider, and act,
and by various labours to prepare and procure for himself food,
dwelling and clothing, and to control every organ of his body, causing
both the principal and the secondary organs to perform their respective
functions. Consequently, if a man, being deprived of his intellectual
faculties, only possessed vitality, he would in a short time be lost.
The intellect is the highest of all faculties of living creatures; it
is very difficult to comprehend, and its true character cannot be
understood as easily as man’s other faculties.

There also exists in the Universe a certain force which controls the
whole, which sets in motion the chief and principal parts, and gives
them the motive power for governing the rest. Without that force, the
existence of this sphere, with its principal and secondary parts, would
be impossible. It is the source of the existence of the Universe in all
its parts. That force is God; blessed be His name! It is on account of
this force that man is called microcosm; for he likewise possesses a
certain principle which governs all the forces of the body, and on
account of this comparison God is called “the life of the Universe”;
comp. “and he swore by the life of the Universe” (Dan. xii. 7).

You must understand that in the parallel which we have drawn between
the whole universe, on the one hand, and the individual man, on the
other, there is a complete harmony in all the points which we mentioned
above; only in the following three points a discrepancy may be noticed.

First, the principal organ of any living being which has a heart,
derives a benefit from the organs under the control of the heart, and
the benefits of the organs thus become the benefits of the heart. This
is not the case in the constitution of the universe. That part which
bestows authority or distributes power, does not receive in return any
benefit from the things under its control; whatever it grants, is
granted in the manner of a generous benefactor, not from any selfish
motive, but from a natural generosity and kindliness; only for the sake
of imitating the ways of the Most High.

Secondly, living creatures endowed with a heart have it within the body
and in the midst thereof; there it is surrounded by organs which it
governs. Thus it derives a benefit from them, for they guard and
protect it, and they do not allow that any injury from without should
approach it. The reverse occurs in the case of the Universe. The
superior part encompasses the inferior parts, it being certain that it
cannot be affected by the action of any other being; and even if it
could be affected, there is nobody without it that could affect it.
While it influences all that is contained within, it is not influenced
by any act or force of any material being. There is, however, some
similarity [between the universe and man] in this point. In the body of
animals, the organs more distant from the principal organ are of less
importance than those nearer to it. Also in the universe, the nearer
the parts are to the centre, the greater is their turbidness, their
solidity, their inertness, their dimness and darkness, because they are
further away from the loftiest element, from the source of light and
brightness, which moves by itself and the substance of which is the
most rarefied and simplest: from the outermost sphere. At the same
ratio at which a body is nearer this sphere, it derives properties from
it, and rises above the spheres below it.

Thirdly. The faculty of thinking is a force inherent in the body, and
is not separated from it, but God is not a force inherent in the body
of the universe, but is separate from all its parts. How God rules the
universe and provides for it is a complete mystery; man is unable to
solve it. For, on the one hand, it can be proved that God is separate
from the universe, and in no contact whatever with it; but, on the
other hand, His rule and providence can be proved to exist in all parts
of the universe, even in the smallest. Praised be He whose perfection
is above our comprehension.

It is true, we might have compared the relation between God and the
universe, to the relation between the absolute acquired intellect and
man; it is not a power inherent in the body, but a power which is
absolutely separate from the body, and is from without brought into
contact with the body. The rational faculty of man may be further
compared to the intelligence of the spheres, which are, as it were,
material bodies. But the intelligence of the spheres, purely spiritual
beings, as well as man’s absolute and acquired intellect, are subjects
of deep study and research; the proof of their existence, though
correct, is abstruse, and includes arguments which present doubts, are
exposed to criticism, and can be easily attacked by objectors. We have,
therefore, preferred to illustrate the relation of God to the universe
by a simile which is clear, and which will not be contradicted in any
of the points which have been laid down by us without any
qualification. The opposition can only emanate either from an ignorant
man, who contradicts truths even if they are perfectly obvious, just as
a person unacquainted with geometry rejects elementary propositions
which have been clearly demonstrated, or from the prejudiced man who
deceives himself. Those, however, who wish to study the subject must
persevere in their studies until they are convinced that all our
observations are true, and until they understand that our account of
this universe unquestionably agrees with the existing order of things.
If a man is willing to accept this theory from one who understands how
to prove things which can be proved, let him accept it, and let him
establish on it his arguments and proofs. If, on the other hand, he
refuses to accept without proof even the foregoing principles, let him
inquire for himself, and ultimately he will find that they are correct.
“Lo this, we have searched it, so it is; hear it, and know thou it for
thy good” (Job v. 27).

After these preliminary remarks, we will treat of the subject which we
promised to introduce and to explain.






CHAPTER LXXIII


There are twelve propositions common to all Mutakallemim, however
different their individual opinions and methods may be; the
Mutakallemim require them in order to establish their views on the four
principles. I shall first enumerate these propositions, and then
discuss each separately, together with the inferences which may be
drawn from it.

Proposition I. All things are composed of atoms.

Proposition II. There is a vacuum.

Proposition III. Time is composed of time-atoms.

Proposition IV. Substance cannot exist without numerous accidents.

Proposition V. Each atom is completely furnished with the accidents
(which I will describe), and cannot exist without them.

Proposition VI. Accidents do not continue in existence during two
time-atoms.

Proposition VII. Both positive and negative properties have a real
existence, and are accidents which owe their existence to some causa
efficiens.

Proposition VIII. All existing things, i.e., all creatures, consist of
substance and of accidents, and the physical form of a thing is
likewise an accident.

Proposition IX. No accident can form the substratum for another
accident.

Proposition X. The test for the possibility of an imagined object does
not consist in its conformity with the existing laws of nature.

Proposition XI. The idea of the infinite is equally inadmissible,
whether the infinite be actual, potential, or accidental, i.e., there
is no difference whether the infinite be formed by a number of
co-existing things, or by a series of things, of which one part comes
into existence when another has ceased to exist, in which case it is
called accidental infinite; in both cases the infinite is rejected by
the Mutakallemim as fallacious.

Proposition XII. The senses mislead, and are in many cases inefficient;
their perceptions, therefore, cannot form the basis of any law, or
yield data for any proof.


First Proposition.

“The Universe, that is, everything contained in it, is composed of very
small parts [atoms] which are indivisible on account of their
smallness; such an atom has no magnitude; but when several atoms
combine, the sum has a magnitude, and thus forms a body.” If,
therefore, two atoms were joined together, each atom would become a
body, and they would thus form two bodies, a theory which in fact has
been proposed by some Mutakallemim. All these atoms are perfectly
alike; they do not differ from each other in any point. The
Mutakallemim further assert, that it is impossible to find a body that
is not composed of such equal atoms which are placed side by side.
According to this view genesis and composition are identical;
destruction is the same as decomposition. They do not use the term
“destruction,” for they hold that “genesis” implies composition and
decomposition, motion and rest. These atoms, they believe, are not, as
was supposed by Epicurus and other Atomists numerically constant; but
are created anew whenever it pleases the Creator; their annihilation is
therefore not impossible. Now I will explain to you their opinion
concerning the vacuum.


Second Proposition.

On the vacuum. The original Mutakallemim also believe that there is a
vacuum, i.e., one space, or several spaces which contain nothing, which
are not occupied by anything whatsoever, and which are devoid of all
substance. This proposition is to them an indispensable sequel to the
first. For, if the Universe were full of such atoms, how could any of
them move? For it is impossible to conceive that one atom should move
into another. And yet the composition, as well as the decomposition of
things, can only be effected by the motion of atoms! Thus the
Mutakallemim are compelled to assume a vacuum, in order that the atoms
may combine, separate, and move in that vacuum which does not contain
any thing or any atom.


Third Proposition.

“Time is composed of time-atoms,” i.e., of many parts, which on account
of their short duration cannot be divided. This proposition also is a
logical consequence of the first. The Mutakallemim undoubtedly saw how
Aristotle proved that time, space, and locomotion are of the same
nature, that is to say, they can be divided into parts which stand in
the same proportion to each other: if one of them is divided, the other
is divided in the same proportion. They, therefore, knew that if time
were continuous and divisible ad infinitum, their assumed atom of space
would of necessity likewise be divisible. Similarly, if it were
supposed that space is continuous, it would necessarily follow, that
the time-element, which they considered to be indivisible, could also
be divided. This has been shown by Aristotle in the treatise called
Acroasis. Hence they concluded that space was not continuous, but was
composed of elements that could not be divided; and that time could
likewise be reduced to time-elements, which were indivisible. An hour
is, e.g., divided into sixty minutes, the minute into sixty seconds,
the second into sixty parts, and so on; at last after ten or more
successive divisions by sixty, time-elements are obtained, which are
not subjected to division, and in fact are indivisible, just as is the
case with space. Time would thus be an object of position and order.

The Mutakallemim did not at all understand the nature of time. This is
a matter of course; for if the greatest philosophers became embarrassed
when they investigated the nature of time, if some of them were
altogether unable to comprehend what time really was, and if even
Galenus declared time to be something divine and incomprehensible, what
can be expected of those who do not regard the nature of things?

Now, mark what conclusions were drawn from these three propositions,
and were accepted by the Mutakallemim as true. They held that
locomotion consisted in the translation of each atom of a body from one
point to the next one; accordingly the velocity of one body in motion
cannot be greater than that of another body. When, nevertheless, two
bodies are observed to move during the same time through different
spaces, the cause of this difference is not attributed by them to the
fact that the body which has moved through a larger distance had a
greater velocity, but to the circumstance that motion which in ordinary
language is called slow, has been interrupted by more moments of rest,
while the motion which ordinarily is called quick has been interrupted
by fewer moments of rest. When it is shown that the motion of an arrow,
which is shot from a powerful bow, is in contradiction to their theory,
they declare that in this case too the motion is interrupted by moments
of rest. They believe that it is the fault of man’s senses if he
believes that the arrow moves continuously, for there are many things
which cannot be perceived by the senses, as they assert in the twelfth
proposition. But we ask them: “Have you observed a complete revolution
of a millstone? Each point in the extreme circumference of the stone
describes a large circle in the very same time in which a point nearer
the centre describes a small circle; the velocity of the outer circle
is therefore greater than that of the inner circle. You cannot say that
the motion of the latter was interrupted by more moments of rest; for
the whole moving body, i.e., the millstone, is one coherent body.” They
reply, “During the circular motion, the parts of the millstone separate
from each other, and the moments of rest interrupting the motion of the
portions nearer the centre are more than those which interrupt the
motion of the outer portions.” We ask again, “How is it that the
millstone, which we perceive as one body, and which cannot be easily
broken, even with a hammer, resolves into its atoms when it moves, and
becomes again one coherent body, returning to its previous state as
soon as it comes to rest, while no one is able to notice the breaking
up [of the stone]?” Again their reply is based on the twelfth
proposition, which is to the effect that the perception of the senses
cannot be trusted, and thus only the evidence of the intellect is
admissible. Do not imagine that you have seen in the foregoing example
the most absurd of the inferences which may be drawn from these three
propositions: the proposition relating to the existence of a vacuum
leads to more preposterous and extravagant conclusions. Nor must you
suppose that the aforegoing theory concerning motion is less irrational
than the proposition resulting from this theory, that the diagonal of a
square is equal to one of its sides, and some of the Mutakallemim go so
far as to declare that the square is not a thing of real existence. In
short, the adoption of the first proposition would be tantamount to the
rejection of all that has been proved in Geometry. The propositions in
Geometry would, in this respect, be divided into two classes: some
would be absolutely rejected; e.g., those which relate to properties of
the incommensurability and the commensurability of lines and planes, to
rational and irrational lines, and all other propositions contained in
the tenth book of Euclid, and in similar works. Other propositions
would appear to be only partially correct; e.g., the solution of the
problem to divide a line into two equal parts, if the line consists of
an odd number of atoms; according to the theory of the Mutakallemim
such a line cannot be bisected. Furthermore, in the well-known book of
problems by the sons of Shakir are contained more than a hundred
problems, all solved and practically demonstrated; but if there really
were a vacuum, not one of these problems could be solved, and many of
the waterworks [described in that book] could not have been
constructed. The refutation of such propositions is a mere waste of
time. I will now proceed to treat of the other propositions mentioned
above.


Fourth Proposition.

“The accidents of things have real existence; they are elements
superadded to the substance itself, and no material thing can be
without them.” Had this proposition been left by the Mutakallemim in
this form it would have been correct, simple, dear, and indisputable.
They have, however, gone further, asserting that a substance which has
not the attribute of life, must necessarily have that of death; for it
must always have one of two contrasting properties. According to their
opinion, colour, taste, motion or rest, combination or separation,
etc., can be predicated of all substances, and, if a substance have the
attribute of life, it must at the same time possess such other kinds of
accidents, as wisdom or folly, freewill or the reverse, power or
weakness, perception or any of its opposites, and, in short, the
substance must have the one or the other of all correlative accidents
appertaining to a living being.


Fifth Proposition.

“The atom is fully provided with all these foregoing accidents, and
cannot exist if any be wanting.” The meaning of the proposition is
this: The Mutakallemim say that each of the atoms created by God must
have accidents, such as colour, smell, motion, or rest, except the
accident of quantity: for according to their opinion an atom has no
magnitude; and they do not designate quantity as an accident, nor do
they apply to it the laws of accidents. In accordance with this
proposition, they do not say, when an accident is noticed in a body,
that it is peculiar to the body as such, but that it exists in each of
the atoms which form the constituent elements of that body. E.g., take
a heap of snow; the whiteness does not exist in that heap as a whole,
but each atom of the snow is white, and therefore the aggregate of
these atoms is likewise white. Similarly they say that when a body
moves each atom of it moves, and thus the whole body is in motion. Life
likewise exists, according to their view, in each atom of a living
body. The same is the case according to their opinion with the senses;
in each atom of the aggregate they notice the faculty of perception.
Life, sensation, intellect and wisdom are considered by them as
accidents, like blackness and whiteness, as will be shown in the
further discussion of their theory.

Concerning the soul, they do not agree. The view most predominant among
them is the following:—The soul is an accident existing in one of the
atoms of which, e.g., man is composed; the aggregate is called a being
endowed with a soul, in so far as it includes that atom. Others are of
opinion that the soul is composed of ethereal atoms, which have a
peculiar faculty by virtue of which they constitute the soul, and that
these atoms are mixed with the atoms of the body. Consequently they
maintain that the soul is an accident.

As to the intellect, I found that all of them agreed in considering it
to be an accident joined to one of the atoms which constitute the whole
of the intelligent being. But there is a confusion among them about
knowledge; they are uncertain whether it is an accident to each of the
atoms which form the knowing aggregate, or whether it belongs only to
one atom. Both views can be disproved by a reductio ad absurdum, when
the following facts are pointed out to them. Generally metals and
stones have a peculiar colour, which is strongly pronounced, but
disappears when they are pulverised. Vitriol, which is intensely green,
becomes white dust when pounded; this shows that that accident exists
only in the aggregate, not in the atoms. This fact is more striking in
the following instance: when parts of a living being are cut off they
cease to live, a proof that the accident [of life] belongs to the
aggregate of the living being, not to each atom. In order to meet this
objection they say that the accident is of no duration, but is
constantly renewed. In discussing the next proposition I shall explain
their view on this subject.


Sixth Proposition.

“The accidents do not exist during two time-atoms.”—The sense of the
proposition is this: They believe that God creates a substance, and
simultaneously its accidents; that the Creator is incapable of creating
a substance devoid of an accident, for that is impossible; that the
essential characteristic of an accident is its incapability of enduring
for two periods, for two time-atoms; that immediately after its
creation it is utterly destroyed, and another accident of the same kind
is created; this again is destroyed and a third accident of the same
kind is created, and so on, so long as God is pleased to preserve [in
that substance] this kind of accident; but He can at His will create in
the same substance an accident of a different kind, and if He were to
discontinue the creation and not produce a new accident, that substance
would at once cease to exist. This is one of the opinions held by the
Mutakallemim; it has been accepted by most of them, and it is the
so-called “theory of the creation of the accidents.” Some of them,
however, and they belong to the sect of the Muʻtazilah, say that there
are accidents which endure for a certain period, and other accidents
which do not endure for two atoms of time; they do not follow a fixed
principle in deciding what class of accidents has and what class has
not a certain duration. The object of this proposition is to oppose the
theory that there exists a natural force from which each body derives
its peculiar properties. They prefer to assume that God himself creates
these properties without the intervention of a natural force or of any
other agency: a theory which implies that no accident can have any
duration. For suppose that certain accidents could endure for a certain
period and then cease to exist, the question would naturally be asked,
What is the cause of that non-existence? They would not be satisfied
with the reply that God by His will brought about this non-existence,
and non-existence does not at all require any agens whatever; for as
soon as the agens leaves off acting, the product of the agens ceases
likewise to exist. This is true to some extent. Having thus chosen to
establish the theory that there does not exist any natural force upon
which the existence or non-existence of a thing depends, they were
compelled to assume that the properties of things were successively
renewed. When God desires to deprive a thing of its existence, He,
according to some of the Mutakallemim, discontinues the creation of its
accidents, and eo ipso the body ceases to exist. Others, however, say
that if it pleased the Almighty to destroy the world, He would create
the accident of destruction, which would be without any substratum. The
destruction of the Universe would be the correlative accident to that
of existence.—In accordance with this [sixth] proposition they say,
that the cloth which according to our belief we dyed red, has not been
dyed by us at all, but God created that colour in the cloth when it
came into contact with the red pigment; we believe that colour to have
penetrated into the cloth, but they assert that this is not the case.
They say that God generally acts in such a way, that, e.g., the black
colour is not created unless the cloth is brought into contact with
indigo; but this blackness, which God creates in the instant when the
cloth touches the black pigment is of no duration, and another creation
of blackness then takes place; they further say that after the
blackness is gone, He does not create a red or green colour, but again
a black colour.

According to this principle, the knowledge which we have of certain
things to-day, is not the same which we had of them yesterday; that
knowledge is gone, and another like it has been created. They
positively believe that this does take place, knowledge being an
accident. In like manner it would follow that the soul, according to
those who believe that it is an accident, is renewed each moment in
every animated being, say a hundred thousand times; for, as you know,
time is composed of time-atoms. In accordance with this principle they
assert that when man is perceived to move a pen, it is not he who has
really moved it; the motion produced in the pen is an accident which
God has created in the pen; the apparent motion of the hand which moves
the pen is likewise an accident which God has created in the moving
hand; but the creative act of God is performed in such a manner that
the motion of the hand and the motion of the pen follow each other
closely; but the hand does not act, and is not the cause of the pen’s
motion; for, as they say, an accident cannot pass from one thing to
another. Some of the Mutakallemim accordingly contend that this white
cloth, which is coloured when put into the vessel filled with indigo,
has not been blackened by the indigo; for blackness being an attribute
of indigo, does not pass from one object to another. There does not
exist any thing to which an action could be ascribed; the real agens is
God, and He has [in the foregoing instance] created the blackness in
the substance of the cloth when it came into contact with the indigo,
for this is the method adopted by Him. In short, most of the
Mutakallemim believe that it must never be said that one thing is the
cause of another; some of them who assumed causality were blamed for
doing so. As regards, however, the acts of man their opinions are
divided. Most of them, especially the sect of the Asha’ariyah, assume
that when the pen is set in motion God has created four accidents, none
of which is the cause of any of the rest, they are only related to each
other as regards the time of their co-existence, and have no other
relation to each other. The first accident is man’s will to move the
pen, the second is man’s power to do so, the third is the bodily motion
itself, i.e., the motion of the hand, and the fourth is the motion of
the pen. They believe that when a man has the will to do a thing and,
as he believes, does it, the will has been created for him, then the
power to conform to the will, and lastly the act itself. The act is not
accomplished by the power created in man; for, in reality, no act can
be ascribed to that power. The Muʻtazilah contend that man acts by
virtue of the power which has been created in him. Some of the
Asha’ariyah assert that the power created in man participates in the
act, and is connected with it, an opinion which has been rejected by
the majority of them. The will and the power created in man, according
to the concurrent belief of the Mutakallemim, together with the act
created in him, according to some of them, are accidents without
duration. In the instance of the pen, God continually creates one
motion after the other so long as the pen is in motion; it only then
ceases to move when God has created in it the accident of rest; and so
long as the pen is at rest, God continually renews in it that accident.
Consequently in every one of these moments, i.e., of the time-atoms,
God creates some accident in every existing individual, e.g., in the
angels, in the spheres and in other things; this creation takes place
continually and without interruption. Such is, according to their
opinion, the right interpretation of the creed that God is the causa
efficiens. But I, together with all rational persons, apply to those
theories the words, “Will you mock at Him, as you mock at man?” for
their words are indeed nothing but mockery.


Seventh Proposition.

“The absence of a property is itself a property that exists in the
body, a something superadded to its substance, an actual accident,
which is constantly renewed; as soon as it is destroyed it is
reproduced.” The reason why they hold this opinion is this: they do not
understand that rest is the absence of motion; death the absence of
life; that blindness is the absence of sight, and that all similar
negative properties are the absence of the positive correlatives. The
relation between motion and rest is, according to their theory, the
same as the relation between heat and cold, namely, as heat and cold
are two accidents found in two objects which have the properties of
heat and cold, so motion is an accident created in the thing which
moves, and rest an accident created in the thing which rests; it does
not remain in existence during two consecutive time-atoms, as we have
stated in treating of the previous proposition. Accordingly, when a
body is at rest, God has created the rest in each atom of that body,
and so long as the body remains at rest God continually renews that
property. The same, they believe, is the case with a man’s wisdom and
ignorance; the latter is considered by them as an actual accident,
which is subject to the constant changes of destruction and creation,
so long as there remains a thing of which such a man is ignorant. Death
and life are likewise accidents, and as the Mutakallemim distinctly
state, life is constantly destroyed and renewed during the whole
existence of a living being; when God decrees its death, He creates in
it the accident of death after the accident of life, which does not
continue during two time-atoms, has ceased to exist. All this they
state clearly.

The logical consequence of this proposition is that the accident of
death created by God instantly ceases to exist, and is replaced by
another death which again is created by God; otherwise death could not
continue. Death is thus continually created in the same manner as life
is renewed every moment. But I should wish to know how long God
continues to create death in a dead body. Does He do so whilst the form
remains, or whilst one of the atoms exists? For in each of the atoms of
the body the accident of death which God creates is produced, and there
are to be found teeth of persons who died thousands of years ago; we
see that those teeth have not been deprived of existence, and therefore
the accident of death has during all these thousands of years been
renewed, and according to the opinion prevailing amongst those
theorists, death was continually replaced by death. Some of the
Muʻtazilah hold that there are cases in which the absence of a physical
property is not a real property, that weariness is the absence of
strength, and ignorance the absence of knowledge; but this cannot be
said in every case of negative properties: it cannot be said that
darkness is the mere absence of light, or that rest is the absence of
motion. Some negative properties are thus considered by them as having
a real existence, while other negative properties are considered as
non-existing, just as suits their belief. Here they proceed in the same
manner as they proceed respecting the duration of accidents, and they
contend that some accidents exist a long time, and other accidents do
not last two time-atoms. Their sole object is to fashion the Universe
according to their peculiar opinions and beliefs.


Eighth Proposition.

“There exists nothing but substance and accident, and the physical form
of things belong to the class of accidents.” It is the object of this
proposition to show that all bodies are composed of similar atoms, as
we have pointed out in explaining the first proposition. The difference
of bodies from each other is caused by the accidents, and by nothing
else. Animality, humanity, sensibility, and speech, are denoted as
accidents like blackness, whiteness, bitterness, and sweetness, and the
difference between two individuals of two classes is the same as the
difference of two individuals of the same class. Also the body of the
heaven, the body of the angels, the body of the Divine Throne—such as
it is assumed to be—the body of anything creeping on the earth, and the
body of any plant, have one and the same substance; they only differ in
the peculiarity of the accidents, and in nothing else; the substance of
all things is made up of equal atoms.


Ninth Proposition.

“None of the accidents form the substratum of another accident; it
cannot be said, This is an accident to a thing which is itself an
accident to a substance. All accidents are directly connected with the
substance.” The Mutakallemim deny the indirect relation of the accident
to the substance, because if such a relation were assumed it would
follow that the second accident could only exist in the substance after
another accident had preceded it, a conclusion to which they would
object even with regard to some special accidents; they prefer to show
that these accidents can exist in every possible substance, although
such substance is not determined by any other accident; for they hold
that all the accidents collectively determine the thing. They advance
also another proof [in support of this proposition], namely: The
substratum which is the bearer of certain attributes must continue to
exist for a certain time; how, then, could the accident;
which—according to their opinion—does not remain in existence for two
moments, become the substratum of something else?


Tenth Proposition.

This proposition concerns the theory of “admissibility,” which is
mentioned by the Mutakallemim, and forms the principal support of their
doctrine. Mark its purport: they observe that everything conceived by
the imagination is admitted by the intellect as possible; e.g., that
the terrestrial globe should become the all-encompassing sphere, or
that this sphere should become the terrestrial globe; reason does not
find here an impossibility; or that the sphere of fire should move
towards the centre, and the sphere of earth towards the circumference.
Human intellect does not perceive any reason why a body should be in a
certain place instead of being in another. In the same manner they say
that reason admits the possibility that an existing being should be
larger or smaller than it really is, or that it should be different in
form and position from what it really is; e.g., a man might have the
height of a mountain, might have several heads, and fly in the air; or
an elephant might be as small as an insect, or an insect as huge as an
elephant. This method of admitting possibilities is applied to the
whole Universe. Whenever they affirm that a thing belongs to this class
of admitted possibilities, they say that it can have this form, and
that it is also possible that it be found differently, and that the one
form is not more possible than the other; but they do not ask whether
the reality confirms their assumption. They say that the thing which
exists with certain constant and permanent forms, dimensions, and
properties, only follows the direction of habit, just as the king
generally rides on horseback through the streets of the city, and is
never found departing from this habit; but reason does not find it
impossible that he should walk on foot through the place; there is no
doubt that he may do so, and this possibility is fully admitted by the
intellect. Similarly, earth moves towards the centre, fire turns away
from the centre; fire causes heat, water causes cold, in accordance
with a certain habit; but it is logically not impossible that a
deviation from this habit should occur, namely, that fire should cause
cold, move downward, and still be fire; that the water should cause
heat, move upward, and still be water. On this foundation their whole
fabric is constructed. They admit, however, the impossibility of two
opposite properties coexisting at the same time in one substance. This
is impossible; reason would not admit this possibility. Again, reason
does not admit the possibility of a substance existing without an
accident, or an accident existing without a substance, a possibility
admitted by some of the Mutakallemim. It is also impossible that a
substance should become an accident, that an accident should become a
substance, or that one substance should penetrate another. They admit
that reason rejects all these things as impossible. It is perfectly
true that no notion whatever can be formed of those things which they
describe as impossible; whilst a notion can be formed of those things
which they consider as possible. The philosophers object to this
method, and say, You call a thing impossible because it cannot be
imagined, or possible because it can be imagined; and thus you consider
as possible that which is found possible by imagination, not by the
intellect, consequently you determine that a thing is necessary,
possible, or impossible in some instances, by the aid of the
imagination—not by the intellect—and in other instances by the ordinary
common sense, as Abu Nasr says in speaking of that which the
Mutakallemim call intellect. It is clear that they describe as possible
that which can be imagined, whether the reality correspond to it or
not, and as impossible that which cannot be imagined. This proposition
can only be established by the nine aforementioned propositions, and no
doubt these were exclusively required for the support of this
proposition. This you will see clearly when I shall show and explain to
you some important parts of this theory, which I shall now introduce in
the form of a discussion supposed to have taken place between a
Mutakallem and a philosopher.

The Mutakallem said to the philosopher: What is the reason that we find
the substance of iron extremely hard and strong, with a dark colour;
the substance of cream, on the other hand, extremely soft and white?
The philosopher replied as follows: All physical bodies have two kinds
of accidents: those which concern their substance, as, e.g., the health
and the illness of a man; and those which concern their form, as, e.g.,
the astonishment and laughter of a man. The substances of compound
bodies differ very much in their ultimate form, according to the
difference of the forms peculiar to each component substance. Hence the
substance of iron has become in its properties the opposite of the
substance of cream, and this difference is attended by the difference
of accidents. You notice, therefore, hardness in the one, and softness
in the other: two accidents, whose difference results from the
difference which exists in the forms of the substances; while the
darkness and the whiteness are accidents whose divergence corresponds
to that of the two substances in their ultimate condition. The
Mutakallem refuted this reply by means of his propositions, as I am now
going to state:—There does not exist a form which, as you believe,
modifies the substance, and thus causes substances to be different from
each other; this difference is exclusively effected by the
accidents—according to the theory of the Kalâm, which we mentioned in
explaining the eighth proposition. He then continued thus: There is no
difference between the substance of iron and that of cream; all things
are composed of the same kind of atoms.—We explained the view of the
Mutakallemim on this point in treating of the first proposition, the
logical consequences of which are, as we have shown, the second and the
third propositions; they further require the twelfth proposition, in
order to establish the theory of atoms. Nor do they admit that any
accidents determine the nature of a substance, or predispose it to
receive certain other accidents; for, according to their opinion, an
accident cannot be the substratum of another accident, as we have shown
in explaining the ninth proposition; nor can it have any duration,
according to the sixth proposition. When the Mutakallemim have
established all that they wish to infer from these propositions, they
arrive at the conclusion that the component atoms of cream and of iron
are alike.—The relation of each atom to each of the accidents is the
same; one atom is not more adapted than another to receive a certain
accident; and as a certain atom is not more fitted to move than to
rest, so one atom is not more apt than another to receive the accident
of life, of reason, of sensation. It is here of no moment whether a
thing contains a larger or smaller quantity of atoms, for, according to
the view of the Mutakallemim, which we explained in treating of the
fifth proposition, every accident [of a thing] exists in each of its
atoms. All these propositions lead to the conclusion that a human being
is not better constituted to become wise than the bat, and establish
the theory of admissibility expressed in this [tenth] proposition.
Every effort was made to demonstrate this proposition, because it is
the best means for proving anything they like, as will be explained.

Note.—Mark, O reader, that if you know the nature of the soul and its
properties, and if you have a correct notion of everything which
concerns the soul, you will observe that most animals possess
imagination. As to the higher class of animals, that is, those which
have a heart, it is obvious that they have imagination. Man’s
distinction does not consist in the possession of imagination, and the
action of imagination is not the same as the action of the intellect,
but the reverse of it. For the intellect analyses and divides the
component parts of things, it forms abstract ideas of them, represents
them in their true form as well as in their causal relations, derives
from one object a great many facts, which—for the intellect—totally
differ from each other, just as two human individuals appear different
to the imagination; it distinguishes that which is the property of the
genus from that which is peculiar to the individual,—and no proof is
correct, unless founded on the former; the intellect further determines
whether certain qualities of a thing are essential or non-essential.
Imagination has none of these functions. It only perceives the
individual, the compound in that aggregate condition in which it
presents itself to the senses; or it combines things which exist
separately, joins some of them together, and represents them all as one
body or as a force of the body. Hence it is that some imagine a man
with a horse’s head, with wings, etc. This is called a fiction, a
phantasm; it is a thing to which nothing in the actual world
corresponds. Nor can imagination in any way obtain a purely immaterial
image of an object, however abstract the form of the image may be.
Imagination yields therefore no test for the reality of a thing.

Hear what profit we derive from the preliminary disciplines, and how
excellent the propositions are which we learn through them. Know that
there are certain things, which would appear impossible, if tested by
man’s imagination, being as inconceivable as the co-existence of two
opposite properties in one object; yet the existence of those same
things, which cannot be represented by imagination, is nevertheless
established by proof, and attested by their reality. E.g., Imagine a
large globe, of any magnitude you like, even as large as the
all-encompassing sphere; further an axis passing through the centre,
and two persons standing on the two extremities of the axis in such a
manner that their feet are in the same straight line with the axis,
which may be either in the plane of the horizon or not; in the first
case both persons would fall, in the second case one, namely the one
who stands on the lower extremity would fall, the other would remain
standing, as far as our imagination can perceive. It has however,
already been proved that the earth has the form of a globe, that it is
inhabited on both extremities of a certain diameter, that both the
inhabitants have their heads towards the heaven, and their legs towards
each other, and yet neither can possibly fall, nor can it be imagined;
for it is incorrect to say that the one extremity is above, the other
below; but the term “above” and “below” apply to both of them as
regards their relative position to each other. Similarly it has been
proved in the second chapter of the book on Conic Sections, that two
lines, which at first are at a certain distance from each other, may
approach each other in the same proportion as they are produced
further, and yet would never meet, even if they were produced to
infinity, although they are observed to be constantly converging. This
is a fact which cannot easily be conceived, and which does not come
within the scope of imagination. Of these two lines the one is
straight, the other curved, as stated in the aforementioned book. It
has consequently been proved that things which cannot be perceived or
imagined, and which would be found impossible if tested solely by
imagination, are nevertheless in real existence. The non-existence of
things which are represented by imagination as possible has likewise
been established by proof, e.g., the corporeality of God, and His
existence as a force residing in a body. Imagination perceives nothing
except bodies, or properties inherent in bodies.

It has thus been clearly shown that in man exists a certain faculty
which is entirely distinct from imagination, and by which the
necessary, the possible, and the impossible can be distinguished from
each other. This inquiry is most useful. It is of the greatest profit
to him who desires to guard himself against the errors of men guided by
imagination! Do not think that the Mutakallemim ignore this altogether;
to some extent they do take it into consideration; they know it, and
call that which can be imagined without having reality—as, e.g., the
corporeality of God—a phantom and a fancy; they state frequently that
such phantoms are not real. It is for this reason that they advance the
first nine propositions and establish on them the proof of the tenth,
according to which all those imaginable things which they wish to admit
as possible are really possible, because of the similarity of all atoms
and the equality of all accidents as regards their accidentality, as we
have explained.

Consider, O reader, and bear in mind that this requires deep research.
For there are certain notions which some believe to be founded on
reason, while others regard them as mere fictions. In such cases it
would be necessary to find something that could show the difference
between conceptions of the intellect and mere imaginary fancies. When
the philosopher, in his way of expressing himself, contends, “Reality
is my evidence; by its guidance I examine whether a thing is necessary,
possible, or impossible,” the religionist replies, “This is exactly the
difference between us; that which actually exists, has, according to my
view, been produced by the will of the Creator, not by necessity; just
as it has been created with that special property, it might have been
created with any other property, unless the impossibility which you
postulate be proved by a logical demonstration.”

About this admissibility (of imaginable things) I shall have to say
more, and I shall return to it in various parts of this treatise; for
it is not a subject which should be rejected in haste and on the spur
of the moment.


Eleventh Proposition.

“The existence of the infinite is in every respect impossible.” The
following is an explanation of this proposition. The impossibility of
the existence of an infinite body has been clearly demonstrated; the
same can be said of an infinite number of bodies, though each of them
be finite, if these beings, infinite in number, exist at the same time;
equally impossible is the existence of an infinite series of causes,
namely, that a certain thing should be the cause of another thing, but
itself the effect of another cause, which again is the result of
another cause, and so on to infinity, or that things in an infinite
series, either bodies or ideals, should be in actual existence, and in
causal relation to each other. This causal relation is the essential
order of nature, in which, as has been fully proved, the infinite is
impossible. As regards the virtual and the accidental existence of the
infinite, it has been established in some cases; it has been proved,
e.g., that a body can virtually be divided ad infinitum, also that time
can be divided ad infinitum; in other cases it is still an open
question, as, e.g., the existence of the infinite in succession, which
is called the accidental infinite, i.e., a series of things in which
one thing comes forth when the other is gone, and this again in its
turn succeeded a thing which had ceased to exist, and so on ad
infinitum. This subject requires deep research.

Those who boast that they have proved the eternity of the Universe say
that time is infinite; an assertion which is not necessarily erroneous;
for only when one atom has ceased to exist, the other follows. Nor is
it absolutely wrong, when they assert, that the accidents of the
substance succeed each other in an infinite series, for these accidents
do not co-exist, but come in succession one after the other, and the
impossibility of the infinite in that case has not been proved. The
Mutakallemim, however, make no difference between the existence of an
infinite body and the divisibility of a body or of time ad infinitum,
between the co-existence of an infinite number of things, as e.g., the
individual human beings who exist at present, and the infinite number
of beings successively existing, as, e.g., Reuben the son of Jacob, and
Jacob the son of Isaac, and Isaac the son of Abraham, and so on to
infinity. This is according to their opinion as inadmissible as the
first case; they believe these four forms of the infinite to be quite
equal. Some of the Mutakallemim endeavour to establish their
proposition concerning the last named form of the infinite, and to
demonstrate its impossibility by a method which I shall explain in this
treatise; others say that this impossibility is a self-evident axiom
and requires no further proof. But if it were undoubtedly wrong to
assume that an infinite number of things can exist in succession,
although that link of the series which exists at present is finite, the
inadmissibility of the eternity of the Universe would be equally
self-evident, and would not require for its proof any other
proposition. This, however, is not the place for investigating the
subject.


Twelfth Proposition.

“The senses are not always to be trusted.” For two reasons the
Mutakallemim find fault with the perception of the senses. First, the
senses are precluded from perceiving many objects, either on account of
the smallness of the objects—this is the case with the atoms, as we
have already stated—or on account of the remoteness of the objects from
the person who desires to perceive them; e.g., we cannot see, hear, or
smell at a distance of many miles; nor do we perceive the motion of the
heavens. Secondly, the senses misapprehend the objects of their
perception: a large object appears small from a distance; a small
object immersed in water appears larger; a crooked thing appears
straight when partly placed in water, and partly out of it; things
appear yellow to a person suffering from jaundice; sweet things are
bitter to him whose tongue has imbibed red gall; and they mention many
other things of this kind. Therefore they say, we cannot trust our
senses so far as to establish any proof on their perceptions. You must
not believe that the Mutakallemim had no purpose in agreeing upon this
proposition, or as most of the later adherents of that school affirm,
that the first Mutakallemim had no ulterior object in endeavouring to
prove the existence of atoms. On the contrary, every proposition here
mentioned is indispensable; if one of these be rejected, the whole
theory falls to the ground. The last-mentioned proposition is of
particular importance; for when our senses perceive things by which any
of the foregoing propositions are confuted, the Mutakallemim say that
no notice should be taken of the perception of the senses so long as
the proposition is supported by the testimony of the intellect, and
established (as they believe) by proof. Thus they say that the
continuous motion is interrupted by moments of rest; that the millstone
in its motion is broken into atoms; that the white colour of a garment
ceases to exist, and another whiteness comes in its stead. All these
theories are contrary to what the eye perceives, and many inferences
are drawn from the assumed existence of a vacuum, all of which are
contradicted by the senses. The Mutakallemim, however, meet these
objections by saying, whenever they can do so, that the perception of
these things is withheld from the senses; in other instances they
maintain that the contradiction has its source in the deceptive
character of the senses. You know that this theory is very ancient, and
was the pride of the sophists, who asserted that they themselves were
its authors; this is stated by Galenus in his treatise on natural
forces; and you know well what he says of those who will not admit the
evidence of the senses.

Having discussed these propositions, I now proceed to explain the
theory of the Mutakallemim concerning the above-mentioned four
problems.






CHAPTER LXXIV


In this chapter will be given an outline of the proofs by which the
Mutakallemim attempt to demonstrate that the universe is not eternal.
You must of course not expect that I shall quote their lengthy
arguments verbatim; I only intend to give an abstract of each proof, to
show in what way it helps to establish the theory of the creatio ex
nihilo or to confute the eternity of the universe, and briefly to
notice the propositions they employed in support of their theory. If
you were to read their well-known and voluminous writings, you would
not discover any arguments with which they support their view left
unnoticed in the present outline, but you might find there greater
copiousness of words combined with more grace and elegance of style;
frequently they employ rhyme, rhythm, and poetical diction, and
sometimes mysterious phrases which perhaps are intended to startle
persons listening to their discourses, and to deter those who might
otherwise criticize them. You would also find many repetitions;
questions propounded and, as they believe, answered, and frequent
attacks on those who differ from their opinions.


The First Argument.

Some of the Mutakallemim thought that by proving the creation of one
thing, they demonstrated the creatio ex nihilo in reference to the
entire universe. E.g., Zaid, who from a small molecule had gradually
been brought to a state of perfection, has undoubtedly not effected
this change and development by his own efforts, but owes it to an
external agency. It is therefore clear that an agent is required for
such organization and successive transmutation. A palm-tree or any
other object might equally be selected to illustrate this idea. The
whole universe, they argue, is analogous to these instances. Thus you
see how they believe that a law discovered in one thing may equally be
applied to everything.


The Second Argument.

This argument is likewise based on the belief that the proof by which
the creation of one thing is demonstrated, holds good for the creatio
ex nihilo in reference to the whole universe. E.g., a certain
individual, called Zaid, who one time was not yet in existence,
subsequently came into existence; and if it be assumed that Amr, his
father, was the cause of his existence, Amr himself must likewise have
passed from non-existence into existence; suppose then that Zaid’s
father unquestionably owed his origin to Khaled, Zaid’s grandfather, it
would be found that Khaled himself did not exist from eternity, and the
series of causes could thus be carried back to infinity. But such an
infinite series of beings is inadmissible according to the theory of
the Mutakallemim, as we have shown in our discussion of the eleventh
proposition. In continuing this species of reasoning, you come to a
first man, who had no parent, viz. Adam. Then you will of course ask,
whence came this first man? If, e.g., the reply be given that he was
made out of earth, you will again inquire, “Whence came that earth?”
“Out of water.” “Whence came the water?” The inquiry would be carried
on, either ad infinitum, which is absurd, or until you meet with a
something that came into existence from absolute non-existence; in this
latter case you would arrive at the real truth; here the series of
inquiries ends. This result of the question proves, according to the
opinion of the Mutakallemim, that the whole universe came into
existence from absolute non-existence.


The Third Argument.

The atoms of things are necessarily either joined together or separate,
and even the same atoms may at one time be united at another disunited.
It is therefore evident that the nature of the atoms does not
necessitate either their combination or their separation; for if they
were separate by virtue of their nature they would never join, and if
they were joined by virtue of their nature, they could never again be
separated. Thus there is no reason why atoms should rather be combined
than separate, or vice versâ, why rather in a state of separation than
of combination. Seeing that some atoms are joined, others separate, and
again others subject to change, they being combined at one time and
separated at another, the fact may therefore be taken as a proof that
the atoms cannot combine or separate without an agent. This argument,
according to the opinion of the Mutakallemim, establishes the theory
that the universe has been created from nothing. You have already been
told, that those who employ this argument rely on the first proposition
of the Mutakallemim with its corollaries.


The Fourth Argument.

The whole Universe is composed of substance and accidents; every
substance must possess one accident or more, and since the accidents
are not eternal, the substance, the substratum of the accidents, cannot
be eternal; for that which is joined to transient things and cannot
exist without them is itself transient. Therefore the whole Universe
has had a beginning. To the objection, that the substance may possibly
be eternal while the accidents, though in themselves transient, succeed
each other in an infinite series, they reply that, in this case, an
infinite number of transient things would be in existence, an
eventuality which, according to their theory, is impossible. This
argument is considered by them the best and safest, and has been
accepted by many of them as a strict proof. Its acceptance implies the
admission of the following three propositions, the object of which is
well understood by philosophers. (1) An infinite series of things, of
which the one succeeds when the other has ceased to exist, is
impossible. (2) All accidents have a beginning.—Our opponent, who
defends the theory of the eternity of the universe, can refute this
proposition by pointing to one particular accident, namely to the
circular motion of the sphere; for it is held by Aristotle that this
circular motion is eternal, and, therefore, the spheres which perform
this motion are, according to his opinion, likewise eternal. It is of
no use to prove that all other accidents have a beginning; for our
opponent does not deny this; he says that accidents may supervene an
object which has existed from eternity, and may follow each other in
rotation. He contents himself with maintaining that this particular
accident, viz., circular motion, the motion of the heavenly sphere, is
eternal, and does not belong to the class of transient accidents. It is
therefore necessary to examine this accident by itself, and to prove
that it is not eternal. (3) The next proposition which the author of
this argument accepts is as follows: Every material object consists of
substance and accidents, that is to say, of atoms and accidents in the
sense in which the Mutakallemim use the term. But if a material object
were held to be a combination of matter and form, as has been proved by
our opponent, it would be necessary to demonstrate that the primal
matter and the primal form are transient, and only then the proof of
the creatio ex nihilo would be complete.


The Fifth Argument.

This argument is based on the theory of Determination, and is made much
of by the Mutakallemim. It is the same as the theory which I explained
in discussing the tenth proposition. Namely, when they treat either of
the Universe in general, or of any of its parts, they assume that it
can have such properties and such dimensions as it actually has; that
it may receive such accidents as in reality are noticed in it, and that
it may exist in such a place and at such a time as in fact is the case;
but it may be larger or smaller, may receive other properties and
accidents, and come to existence at an earlier or a later period, or in
a different place. Consequently, the fact that a thing has been
determined in its composition, size, place, accident and time—a
variation in all these points being possible—is a proof that a being
exists which freely chooses and determines these divers relations; and
the circumstance that the Universe or a part of it requires a being
able to make this selection, proves that the Universe has been created
ex nihilo. For there is no difference which of the following
expressions is used: to determine, to make, to create, to produce, to
originate, or to intend; these verbs have all one and the same meaning.
The Mutakallemim give a great many examples, both of a general and a
special character. They say it is not more natural for earth to be
under water than to be above water; who then determined its actual
position? Or, is it more natural that the sun is round than that it
should be square or triangular; for all qualities have the same
relation to a body capable of possessing them. Who then determined one
particular quality? In a similar way they treat of every individual
being; when, e.g., they notice flowers of different colours, they are
unable to explain the phenomenon, and they take it as a strong proof in
favour of their theory; they say, “Behold, the earth is everywhere
alike, the water is alike; why then is this flower red and that one
yellow?” Some being must have determined the colour of each, and that
being is God. A being must therefore exist which determines everything,
both as regards the Universe generally, and each of its parts
individually. All this is the logical consequence of the tenth
proposition. The theory of determination is moreover adopted by some of
those who assume the eternity of the Universe, as will be explained
below. In conclusion, I consider this to be the best argument; and in
another part I shall more fully acquaint you with the opinion I have
formed concerning the theory of Determination.


The Sixth Argument.

One of the modern Mutakallemim thought that he had found a very good
argument, much better than any advanced hitherto, namely, the argument
based on the triumph of existence over non-existence. He says that,
according to the common belief, the existence of the Universe is merely
possible; for if it were necessary, the Universe would be God—but he
seems to forget that we are at issue with those who, whilst they
believe in the existence of God, admit at the same time the eternity of
the Universe.—The expression “A thing is possible” denotes that the
thing may either be in existence or not in existence, and that there is
not more reason why it should exist than why it should not exist. The
fact that a thing, the existence of which is possible, actually does
exist—although it bears the same relation to the state of existence as
to that of non-existence—proves that there is a Being which gave the
preference to existence over non-existence. This argument is very
forcible; it is a modified form of the foregoing argument which is
based on the theory of determination. He only chose the term
“preference” instead of “determination,” and instead of applying it to
the properties of the existing being he applies it to “the existence of
the being itself.” He either had the intention to mislead, or he
misunderstood the proposition, that the existence of the Universe is
possible. Our opponent who assumes the eternity of the Universe,
employs the term “possible,” and says, “the existence of the Universe
is possible” in a sense different from that in which the Mutakallem
applies it, as will be explained below. Moreover it may be doubted
whether the conclusion, that the Universe owes its origin to a being
which is able to give preference to existence over non-existence, is
correct. For we may apply the terms “preference” and “determination” to
anything capable of receiving either of two properties which are
contrary or opposed to each other; and when we find that the thing
actually possesses one property and not the other, we are convinced
that there exists a determining agent. E.g., you say that a piece of
copper could just as well be formed into a kettle as into a lamp; when
we find that it is a lamp or a kettle, we have no doubt that a deciding
and determining agent had advisedly chosen one of the two possible
forms; for it is clear that the substance of copper existed, and that
before the determination took place it had neither of the two possible
forms which have just been mentioned. When, however, it is the question
whether a certain existing object is eternal, or whether it has passed
from non-existence into existence, this argument is inadmissible; for
it cannot be asked who decided in favour of the existence of a thing,
and rejected its non-existence, except when it has been admitted that
it has passed from non-existence into existence; in the present case
this is just the point under discussion. If we were to take the
existence and the non-existence of a thing as mere objects of
imagination, we should have to apply the tenth proposition which gives
prominence to imagination and fiction, and ignores the things which
exist in reality, or are conceived by the intellect. Our opponent,
however, who believes in the eternity of the Universe, will show that
we can imagine the non-existence of the universe as well as we can
imagine any other impossibility. It is not my intention to refute their
doctrine of the creatio ex nihilo: I only wish to show the
incorrectness of their belief that this argument differs from the one
which precedes; since in fact the two arguments are identical, and are
founded on the well-known principle of determination.


The Seventh Argument.

One of the modern Mutakallemim says that he is able to prove the
creation of the Universe from the theory put forth by the philosophers
concerning the immortality of the soul. He argues thus: If the world
were eternal the number of the dead would necessarily be infinite, and
consequently an infinite number of souls would coexist, but it has long
since been shown that the coexistence of an infinite number of things
is positively impossible. This is indeed a strange argument! One
difficulty is explained by another which is still greater! Here the
saying, well known among the Arameans, may be applied: “Your guarantee
wants himself a guarantee.” He rests his argument on the immortality of
the soul, as though he understood this immortality, in what respect the
soul is immortal, or what the thing is which is immortal! If, however,
he only meant to controvert the opinion of his opponent, who believed
in the eternity of the Universe, and also in the immortality of the
soul, he accomplished his task, provided the opponent admitted the
correctness of the idea which that Mutakallem formed of the
philosopher’s view on the immortality of the soul. Some of the later
philosophers explained this difficulty as follows: the immortal souls
are not substances which occupy a locality or a space, and their
existence in an infinite number is therefore not impossible. You must
bear in mind that those abstract beings which are neither bodies nor
forces dwelling in bodies, and which in fact are ideals—are altogether
incapable of being represented as a plurality unless some ideals be the
cause of the existence of others, and can be distinguished from each
other by the specific difference that some are the efficient cause and
others the effect; but that which remains of Zaid [after his death] is
neither the cause nor the effect of that which is left of Amr, and
therefore the souls of all the departed form only one being as has been
explained by Ibn Bekr Ibn Al-zaig, and others who ventured to speak on
these profound subjects. In short, such intricate disciplines, which
our mind can scarcely comprehend, cannot furnish any principles for the
explanation of other subjects.—It should be noted that whoever
endeavours to prove or to disprove the eternity of the Universe by
these arguments of the Mutakallemim, must necessarily rely on one of
the two following propositions, or on both of them; namely on the tenth
proposition, according to which the actual form of a thing is merely
one of many equally possible forms, and which implies that there must
be a being capable of making the special selection; or on the eleventh
proposition which rejects the existence of an infinite series of things
coming successively into existence. The last-named proposition is
demonstrated in various ways, e.g., they advert to a class of transient
individuals, and to a certain particular date. From the theory which
asserts the eternity of the Universe, it would follow that the
individuals of that class up to that particular date are infinite in
number; a thousand years later the individuals of that class are
likewise infinite in number; the last number must exceed the previous
one by the number of the individuals born in those thousand years, and
consequently one infinite number would be larger than another. The same
argument is applied to the revolutions of the heavenly sphere, and in
like manner it is shown that one infinite number of revolutions would
be larger than another; the same result is obtained when revolutions of
one sphere are compared with those of another moving more slowly; the
revolutions of both spheres [though unequal] would be infinite in
number. Similarly they proceed with all those accidents which are
subject to destruction and production; the individual accidents that
have passed into non-existence are counted and represented as though
they were still in existence, and as though they were things with a
definite beginning; this imaginary number is then either increased or
reduced. Yet all these things have no reality and are mere fictions.
Abunazar Alfarabi in criticizing this proposition, has exposed all its
weak points, as you will clearly perceive, when you study his book on
the changeable beings earnestly and dispassionately. These are the
principal arguments of the Mutakallemim in seeking to establish the
creatio ex nihilo. Having thus proved that the Universe is not eternal,
they necessarily infer that there is an Agens who created it in
accordance with His intention, desire and will. They then proceed to
prove the unity of that Agens as I am going to point out in the next
chapter.






CHAPTER LXXV


In this chapter I shall explain to you how the Mutakallemim prove the
Unity of God. They contend that the Maker and Creator of the Universe,
the existence of whom is testified by all nature, is One. Two
propositions are employed by them in demonstrating the Unity of God,
viz., two deities or more would neutralize each other, and if several
deities existed they would be distinguished from each other by a
specific difference.


First Argument.

The first argument is that of mutual neutralization, and is employed by
the majority of the Mutakallemim. It is to the following effect:—If the
Universe had two Gods, it would necessarily occur that the atom—subject
to a combination with one or two opposite qualities—either remained
without either of them, and that is impossible, or, though being only
one atom, included both qualities at the same time, and that is
likewise impossible. E.g., whilst one of the two deities determined
that one atom or more should be warm, the other deity might determine
that the same should be cold; the consequence of the mutual
neutralization of the two divine beings would thus be that the atoms
would be neither warm nor cold—a contingency which is impossible,
because all bodies must combine with one of two opposites; or they
would be at the same time both warm and cold. Similarly, it might occur
that whilst one of the deities desired that a body be in motion, the
other might desire that it be at rest; the body would then be either
without motion and rest, or would both move and rest at the same time.
Proofs of this kind are founded on the atomic theory contained in the
first proposition of the Mutakallemim, on the proposition which refers
to the creation of the accidents, and on the proposition that negatives
are properties of actual existence and require for their production an
agens. For if it were assumed that the substance of this world which,
according to the philosophers is subject to successive production and
destruction, is different from the substance of the world above, viz.,
from the substance of the spheres—a fact established by proof—and that
as the Dualists assert, there are two divine beings, one of whom rules
this world without influencing the spheres, whilst the other governs
the world above without interfering with this world—such theory would
not involve the mutual neutralization of the two deities. If it were
then objected, that the existence of two deities would necessitate an
imperfection in both of them, in so far as one deity would be unable to
influence the province of the other, the objection would be met by the
reply that this inability need not be considered a defect in either of
them; for that which is not included within the sphere of action of a
being can of course not be performed by that being, and an agens is not
deficient in power, if it is unable to perform what is intrinsically
impossible. Thus we, Monotheists, do not consider it a defect in God,
that He does not combine two opposites in one object, nor do we test
His omnipotence by the accomplishment of any similar impossibility.
When the Mutakallemim noticed the weakness of their argument, for which
they had some apparent support, they had recourse to another argument.


Second Argument.

If there were two Gods, there would necessarily be some element common
to both, whilst some element present in the one would be absent in the
other, and constitute the specific difference between them. This is a
philosophic and sound argument for those who are able to examine it,
and to obtain a clear insight into its premises, which will be further
explained, in our exposition of the view of the philosophers on this
point. But it cannot be accepted by those who admit the existence of
divine attributes. For according to their opinion, the Primal Cause
includes many different elements. They represent its wisdom and its
omnipotence as two different things, and again the omnipotence as
different from the will. Consequently it would not be impossible that
either of the two divine beings possessed several properties, some of
which would be common to both, and some peculiar to only one of them.


Third Argument.

This argument is likewise based on one of the Propositions of the
Kalâm. For some of the Mutakallemim belonging to the old school assume,
that when the Creator wills a thing, the will is not an element
superadded to the essence of God: it is a will without a substratum. In
accordance with the propositions which we have mentioned, and of which,
as you will see, it is difficult to form a true conception, they say
that one will, which is independent of any substratum, cannot be
ascribed to two beings; for, as they assert, one cause cannot be the
source of two laws for two essences. This is, as I told you, the method
of explaining one difficulty by means of another and still greater
difficulty. For as they define the Will, it is inconceivable, and some
have, therefore, considered it to be a mere non-entity; others who
admit its existence, meet with many insuperable difficulties. The
Mutakallemim, nevertheless, establish on its existence one of the
proofs for the unity of God.


Fourth Argument.

The existence of an action is necessarily positive evidence of the
existence of an agens, but does not prove the existence of more than
one agens. There is no difference whether the existence of one God be
assumed or the existence of two, or three, or twenty, or any number.
This is plain and clear. But the argument does not seem to prove the
non-existence of a multitude of deities; it only shows that their
number is unknown; the deity may be one sole being, but may also
include several divine beings. The following supplemental argument has
therefore been advanced: possibility is inapplicable to the existence
of God, which is absolute; the possibility of the existence of more
than one God must therefore be denied. This is the whole essence of the
proof, and its fallacy is self-evident; for although the notion of
possibility cannot be applied to the existence of God, it can be
applied to our knowledge of God: for an alternative in our knowledge of
a thing does not involve an alternative in the actual existence of the
thing, and perhaps there is neither a tripartite deity as the
Christians believe, nor an undivided Unity as we believe. This is clear
to those who have been taught to notice the conclusions implied in
given premises.


Fifth Argument.

One of the modern Mutakallemim thought that he found a proof of the
Unity of God in the idea of requisiteness. Suppose there were two
divine beings; if one of them were able to create the universe, the
second God would be superfluous, and there would be no need for his
existence. If, on the other hand, the entire universe could not be
created or governed except by both of them, each of them would be
imperfect in so far as he would require the co-operation of another
being, and would thus be limited in power. This argument is, in fact,
only a variation of “the mutual neutralization of two deities.” There
is this difficulty in such proofs, that a certain degree of
imperfection is ascribed to a Being which does not accomplish tasks
beyond its sphere. We do not call a person weak because he cannot move
a thousand hundredweights, and we do not say that God is imperfect
because He cannot transform Himself into a body, or cannot create
another being like Himself, or make a square whose diagonal should be
equal to one of its sides. In the same manner we should not consider it
an imperfection in God, if He were not the only Creator, and if it were
absolutely necessary that there should be two Creators; not because the
one God required the assistance of the other, but because the existence
of both of them was equally necessary, and because it was impossible
that it should be otherwise. Further we do not say that the Almighty is
imperfect, because He does not, according to the opinion of the
Mutakallemim, produce a body otherwise than by the creation of atoms,
and by their combination with accidents created in them. That inability
is not called want or imperfection, since another process is
impossible. In like manner the Dualist might say, that it is impossible
for one Being to act alone, and that this circumstance constitutes no
imperfection in either of the Deities, because the absolute existence
of one Deity necessitates the co-existence of the other. Some of the
Mutakallemim, weary of these arguments, declared that the Unity of God
is a doctrine which must be received as a matter of faith, but most of
them rejected this theory, and reviled its authors. I, however, hold,
that those who accept this theory are right-minded, and shrink from
admitting an erroneous opinion; when they do not perceive any cogency
in the arguments, and find that the proofs advanced in favour of the
doctrine are inconclusive, they prefer to assume that it could only be
received as a matter of faith. For the Mutakallemim do not hold that
the Universe has any defined properties on which a true proof could be
founded, or that man’s intellect is endowed with any such faculty as
would enable him to form correct conclusions. It is, however, not
without a motive that they defend this theory; they wish to assume such
a form of the Universe, as could be employed to support a doctrine for
which otherwise no proof could be found, and would lead us to neglect
the investigation of that which in fact can be proved. We can only
appeal to the Almighty and to those intelligent persons who confess
their error when they discover it.






CHAPTER LXXVI


The reasonings and arguments of the Mutakallemim to demonstrate the
Incorporeality of God are very weak, and indeed inferior to their
arguments for the Unity of God. They treat the doctrine of the
Incorporeality of God as if it were the logical sequence of the theory
of His Unity, and they say that the attribute “one” cannot be applied
to a corporeal object. Those who maintain that God is incorporeal
because a corporeal object consists of substance and form—a combination
known to be impossible in the Divine Being, are not in my opinion
Mutakallemim, and such an argument is not founded on the propositions
of the Kalâm; on the contrary, it is a logical proof based on the
theory of substance and form, and on a right conception of their
properties. It has the character of a philosophical argument, and I
shall fully explain it when treating of the arguments of the
philosophers. Here we only propose to discuss the arguments by which
the Mutakallemim desire to prove the Incorporeality of God in
accordance with their propositions and the method of their reasoning.


First Argument.

If God were corporeal, His true essence would necessarily either exist
entirely in every part of the body, that is to say, in each of its
atoms, or would be confined to one of the atoms. In the latter
alternative the other atoms would be superfluous, and the existence of
the corporeal being [with the exception of the one atom] would be of no
purpose. If, on the other hand, each atom fully represented the Divine
Being, the whole body would not be one deity, but a complex of deities,
and this would be contrary to the doctrine adopted by the Kalām that
God is one. An examination of this argument shows that it is based on
the first and fifth propositions. But there is room for the following
objection: “God does not consist of atoms, that is to say, He is not,
as you assert, composed of a number of elements created by Himself, but
is one continuous body, and indivisible except in man’s imagination,
which affords no test; for in man’s imagination the substance of the
heavens may be torn or rent asunder. The philosopher holds that such a
possibility results from assuming a similarity and an analogy between
the visible, i.e., the bodies which exist among us, and the invisible.”


Second Argument.

This argument, they believe, is of great importance. Its main support
is the impossibility of comparison, i.e., the belief that God cannot be
compared to any of His creatures; and that He would be comparable to
other corporeal objects if He were corporeal. They put great stress on
this argument, and say as follows: “If it were asserted that God is
corporeal, but that His substance is not like that of other corporeal
beings, it would be self-contradictory; for all bodies are alike as
regards their substance, and are distinguished from each other by other
things, viz., the accidents.” They also argue that if God were
corporeal it would follow that He has created another being like
Himself. This argument is refuted in two ways. First, the objector does
not admit the impossibility of comparison; he asks how it could be
proved that God cannot be compared to any of His creatures. No doubt
that, in support of their view, that a comparison between the Almighty
and any other being is inadmissible, they would have to cite the words
of the Prophets, and thus accept this doctrine by the authority of
tradition, not by the authority of reason. The argument that God, if
comparable to any of His creatures, would be found to have created
beings like Himself, is refuted by the objector in the following way:
“The created things are not like Him in every respect; for I do not
deny that God has many properties and peculiarities.” For he who admits
the corporeality of God does not deny the existence of properties in
the divine Being. Another and more forcible argument is this: All who
have studied philosophy, and have made themselves thoroughly acquainted
with philosophical theories, assume as demonstrated facts, first that
the term substance, when applied to the spheres above and to, the
corporeal objects here on earth is a perfect homonym, for the substance
of the one is not the substance of the other; and secondly that the
forms of the things on this earth are different from the forms of the
spheres; the terms substance and form when applied both to things below
and to the spheres above are homonyms; although there is no doubt that
the spheres have [like the things below, three] dimensions, they are
corporeal because they consist of substance and form, not because they
have dimensions. If this explanation is admitted with reference to the
spheres, how much more is he who believes that God is corporeal
justified in saying that God is a corporeal being which has dimensions,
but which in its substance, its true nature and properties is very
different from all created bodies, and that the term “substance” is
applied to Him and to His creatures homonymously, in the same manner as
the true believers, who have a correct conception of the divine idea,
apply the term “existence” homonymously to Him and to His creatures.
The Corporealists do not admit that all bodies consist of similar
atoms; they believe that God created all things, and that these differ
from each other both in their substances and in their constituent
properties; and just as the substance of dung differs from the
substance of the sun, so does, according to this theory, the substance
of the spheres and the stars differ from the substance of the created
light, i.e., the Divine Glory (Shechinah), and again the substance of
the Divine Glory, or the pillar of cloud created [for the purpose],
differ from the substance of the Most High; for the substance of the
latter is sublime, perfect, simple, constant and immutable. His
absolute existence remains always the same, and He creates all things
according to His will and desire. How could this argument, though it be
weak, be refuted by these strange methods of the Mutakallemim, which I
pointed out to you?


Third Argument.

If God were corporeal, He would be finite, and so far this argument is
correct; if He were finite, He would have certain dimensions and a
certain form; this is also a correct conclusion. But they continue
thus: Attribute to God any magnitude or form whatever: He might be
either larger or smaller, and might also have a different form. The
fact that He has one special magnitude and one special form presupposes
the existence of a determining agens. I have heard that they attach
great importance to this argument, but in truth it is the weakest of
all the arguments mentioned above. It is founded on the tenth
proposition, the feebleness of which in ignoring the actual properties
of things, we have clearly shown in regard to ordinary beings and must
be much more evident in regard to the Creator. There is no difference
between this argument and their assertion that the fact of the
existence of the Universe having been preferred to its non-existence
proves the existence of an agens that preferred the existence of the
Universe to its non-existence at a time when both were equally
possible. If it were asked why this argument should not be applied to
God—viz., that His mere existence proved the existence of an agens
which determined His existence and rejected His non-existence—they
would undoubtedly answer that this admission would only lead to a
repetition of the same argument until at length a being be found whose
existence is not merely potential but necessary, and which does not
require a causa efficiens. But this same answer can also be applied to
dimensions and to form. It can only be said in reference to all other
forms and magnitudes, the existence of which is possible, that is to
say which came into existence after a state of non-existence, that they
might have been larger or smaller than they actually are, or that they
might have had a form different from that which they actually possess,
and require for this reason some determining agens. But the forms and
dimensions of God (who is above all imperfection and similitude)! did
not come into existence according to the opinion of the Corporealist
after a state of non-existence, and therefore no determining agens was
necessary; His substance with its dimensions and forms has a necessary
existence; no agens was required to decide upon His existence, and to
reject His non-existence, since non-existence is altogether
inadmissible in God. In like manner there was no force required to
determine His magnitude and form, they were absolutely inseparable from
His existence.

If you wish to go in search of truth, to cast aside your passions, your
tradition, and your fondness of things you have been accustomed to
cherish, if you wish to guard yourself against error: then consider the
fate of these speculators and the result of their labours; observe how
they rushed, as it were, from the ashes into the fire. They denied the
nature of the existing things, misrepresented the properties of heaven
and earth, and thought that they were able, by their propositions, to
prove the creation of the world, but in fact they were far from proving
the creatio ex nihilo, and have weakened the arguments for the
existence, the unity, and the incorporeality of God. The proofs of all
these doctrines must be based on the well-known nature of the existing
things, as perceived by the senses and the intellect.

Having thus discussed the arguments of the Mutakallemim, we shall now
proceed to consider the propositions of the philosophers and their
arguments for the existence of God, His Unity and His Incorporeality,
and we shall for the present assume the Eternity of the Universe
without finally accepting it. Next to this we shall develop our own
method, which is the result of deep study, in demonstrating these three
principles, and we shall then examine the theory of the Eternity of the
Universe as assumed by the philosophers.








PART II


INTRODUCTION


Twenty-five of the propositions which are employed in the proof for the
existence of God, or in the arguments demonstrating that God is neither
corporeal nor a force connected with a material being, or that He is
One, have been fully established, and their correctness is beyond
doubt. Aristotle and the Peripatetics who followed him have proved each
of these propositions. There is, however, one proposition which we do
not accept—namely, the proposition which affirms the Eternity of the
Universe, but we will admit it for the present, because by doing so we
shall be enabled dearly to demonstrate our own theory.


Proposition I.

The existence of an infinite magnitude is impossible.


Proposition II.

The co-existence of an infinite number of finite magnitudes is
impossible.


Proposition III.

The existence of an infinite number of causes and effects is
impossible, even if these were not magnitudes; if, e.g., one
Intelligence were the cause of a second, the second the cause of a
third, the third the cause of a fourth, and so on, the series could not
be continued ad infinitum.


Proposition IV.

Four categories are subject to change:—

(a.) Substance.—Changes which affect the substance of a thing are
called genesis and destruction.

(b.) Quantity.—Changes in reference to quantity are increase and
decrease.

(c.) Quality.—Changes in the qualities of things are transformations.

(d.) Place.—Change of place is called motion.

The term “motion” is properly applied to change of place, but is also
used in a general sense of all kinds of changes.


Proposition V.

Motion implies change and transition from potentiality to actuality.


Proposition VI.

The motion of a thing is either essential or accidental; or it is due
to an external force, or to the participation of the thing in the
motion of another thing. This latter kind of motion is similar to the
accidental one. An instance of essential motion may be found in the
translation of a thing from one place to another. The accident of a
thing, as, e.g., its black colour, is said to move when the thing
itself changes its place. The upward motion of a stone, owing to a
force applied to it in that direction, is an instance of a motion due
to an external force. The motion of a nail in a boat may serve to
illustrate motion due to the participation of a thing in the motion of
another thing; for when the boat moves, the nail is said to move
likewise. The same is the case with everything composed of several
parts: when the thing itself moves, every part of it is likewise said
to move.


Proposition VII.

Things which are changeable are, at the same time, divisible. Hence
everything that moves is divisible, and consequently corporeal; but
that which is indivisible cannot move, and cannot therefore be
corporeal.


Proposition VIII.

A thing that moves accidentally must come to rest, because it does not
move of its own accord; hence accidental motion cannot continue for
ever.


Proposition IX.

A corporeal thing that sets another corporeal thing in motion can only
effect this by setting itself in motion at the time it causes the other
thing to move.


Proposition X.

A thing which is said to be contained in a corporeal object must
satisfy either of the two following conditions: it either exists
through that object, as is the case with accidents, or it is the cause
of the existence of that object; such is, e.g., its essential property.
In both cases it is a force existing in a corporeal object.


Proposition XI.

Among the things which exist through a material object, there are some
which participate in the division of that object, and are therefore
accidentally divisible, as, e.g., its colour, and all other qualities
that spread throughout its parts. On the other hand, among the things
which form the essential elements of an object, there are some which
cannot be divided in any way, as, e.g., the soul and the intellect.


Proposition XII.

A force which occupies all parts of a corporeal object is finite, that
object itself being finite.


Proposition XIII.

None of the several kinds of change can be continuous, except motion
from place to place, provided it be circular.


Proposition XIV.

Locomotion is in the natural order of the several kinds of motion the
first and foremost. For genesis and corruption are preceded by
transformation, which, in its turn, is preceded by the approach of the
transforming agent to the object which is to be transformed. Also,
increase and decrease are impossible without previous genesis and
corruption.


Proposition XV.

Time is an accident that is related and joined to motion in such a
manner that the one is never found without the other. Motion is only
possible in time, and the idea of time cannot be conceived otherwise
than in connexion with motion; things which do not move have no
relation to time.


Proposition XVI.

Incorporeal bodies can only be numbered when they are forces situated
in a body; the several forces must then be counted together with
substances or objects in which they exist. Hence purely spiritual
beings, which are neither corporeal nor forces situated in corporeal
objects, cannot be counted, except when considered as causes and
effects.


Proposition XVII.

When an object moves, there must be some agent that moves it, from
without, as, e.g., in the case of a stone set in motion by the hand; or
from within, e.g., when the body of a living being moves. Living beings
include in themselves, at the same time, the moving agent and the thing
moved; when, therefore, a living being dies, and the moving agent, the
soul, has left the body, i.e., the thing moved, the body remains for
some time in the same condition as before, and yet cannot move in the
manner it has moved previously. The moving agent, when included in the
thing moved, is hidden from, and imperceptible to, the senses. This
circumstance gave rise to the belief that the body of an animal moves
without the aid of a moving agent. When we therefore affirm, concerning
a thing in motion, that it is its own moving agent, or, as is generally
said, that it moves of its own accord, we mean to say that the force
which really sets the body in motion exists in that body itself.


Proposition XVIII.

Everything that passes over from a state of potentiality to that of
actuality, is caused to do so by some external agent; because if that
agent existed in the thing itself, and no obstacle prevented the
transition, the thing would never be in a state of potentiality, but
always in that of actuality. If, on the other hand, while the thing
itself contained that agent, some obstacle existed, and at a certain
time that obstacle was removed, the same cause which removed the
obstacle would undoubtedly be described as the cause of the transition
from potentiality to actuality, [and not the force situated within the
body]. Note this.


Proposition XIX.

A thing which owes its existence to certain causes has in itself merely
the possibility of existence; for only if these causes exist, the thing
likewise exists. It does not exist if the causes do not exist at all,
or if they have ceased to exist, or if there has been a change in the
relation which implies the existence of that thing as a necessary
consequence of those causes.


Proposition XX.

A thing which has in itself the necessity of existence cannot have for
its existence any cause whatever.


Proposition XXI.

A thing composed of two elements has necessarily their composition as
the cause of its present existence. Its existence is therefore not
necessitated by its own essence; it depends on the existence of its two
component parts and their combination.


Proposition XXII.

Material objects are always composed of two elements [at least], and
are without exception subject to accidents. The two component elements
of all bodies are substance and form. The accidents attributed to
material objects are quantity, geometrical form, and position.


Proposition XXIII.

Everything that exists potentially, and whose essence includes a
certain state of possibility, may at some time be without actual
existence.


Proposition XXIV.

That which is potentially a certain thing is necessarily material, for
the state of possibility is always connected with matter.


Proposition XXV.

Each compound substance consists of matter and form, and requires an
agent for its existence, viz., a force which sets the substance in
motion, and thereby enables it to receive a certain form. The force
which thus prepares the substance of a certain individual being, is
called the immediate motor.

Here the necessity arises of investigating into the properties of
motion, the moving agent and the thing moved. But this has already been
explained sufficiently; and the opinion of Aristotle may be expressed
in the following proposition: Matter does not move of its own accord—an
important proposition that led to the investigation of the Prime Motor
(the first moving agent).

Of these foregoing twenty-five propositions some may be verified by
means of a little reflection and the application of a few propositions
capable of proof, or of axioms or theorems of almost the same force,
such as have been explained by me. Others require many arguments and
propositions, all of which, however, have been established by
conclusive proofs partly in the Physics and its commentaries, and
partly in the Metaphysics and its commentary. I have already stated
that in this work it is not my intention to copy the books of the
philosophers or to explain difficult problems, but simply to mention
those propositions which are closely connected with our subject, and
which we want for our purpose.

To the above propositions one must be added which enunciates that the
universe is eternal, and which is held by Aristotle to be true, and
even more acceptable than any other theory. For the present we admit
it, as a hypothesis, only for the purpose of demonstrating our theory.
It is the following proposition:—


Proposition XXVI.

Time and motion are eternal, constant, and in actual existence.

In accordance with this proposition, Aristotle is compelled to assume
that there exists actually a body with constant motion, viz., the fifth
element. He therefore says that the heavens are not subject to genesis
or destruction, because motion cannot be generated nor destroyed. He
also holds that every motion must necessarily be preceded by another
motion, either of the same or of a different kind. The belief that the
locomotion of an animal is not preceded by another motion, is not true;
for the animal is caused to move, after it had been in rest, by the
intention to obtain those very things which bring about that
locomotion. A change in its state of health, or some image, or some new
idea can produce a desire to seek that which is conducive to its
welfare and to avoid that which is contrary. Each of these three causes
sets the living being in motion, and each of them is produced by
various kinds of motion. Aristotle likewise asserts that everything
which is created must, before its actual creation, have existed in
potentiâ. By inferences drawn from this assertion he seeks to establish
his proposition, viz., The thing that moves is finite, and its path
finite; but it repeats the motion in its path an infinite number of
times. This can only take place when the motion is circular, as has
been stated in Proposition XIII. Hence follows also the existence of an
infinite number of things which do not co-exist but follow one after
the other.

Aristotle frequently attempts to establish this proposition; but I
believe that he did not consider his proofs to be conclusive. It
appeared to him to be the most probable and acceptable proposition. His
followers, however, and the commentators of his books, contend that it
contains not only a probable but a demonstrative proof, and that it
has, in fact, been fully established. On the other hand, the
Mutakallemim try to prove that the proposition cannot be true, as,
according to their opinion, it is impossible to conceive how an
infinite number of things could even come into existence successively.
They assume this impossibility as an axiom. I, however, think that this
proposition is admissible, but neither demonstrative, as the
commentators of Aristotle assert, nor, on the other hand, impossible,
as the Mutakallemim say. We have no intention to explain here the
proofs given by Aristotle, or to show our doubts concerning them, or to
set forth our opinions on the creation of the universe. I here simply
desire to mention those propositions which we shall require for the
proof of the three principles stated above. Having thus quoted and
admitted these propositions, I will now proceed to explain what may be
inferred from them.






CHAPTER I


According to Proposition XXV., a moving agent must exist which has
moved the substance of all existing transient things and enabled it to
receive Form. The cause of the motion of that agent is found in the
existence of another motor of the same or of a different class, the
term “motion,” in a general sense, being common to four categories
(Prop. IV.). This series of motions is not infinite (Prop. III.); we
find that it can only be continued till the motion of the fifth element
is arrived at, and then it ends. The motion of the fifth element is the
source of every force that moves and prepares any substance on earth
for its combination with a certain form, and is connected with that
force by a chain of intermediate motions. The celestial sphere [or the
fifth element] performs the act of locomotion which is the first of the
several kinds of motion (Prop. XIV.), and all locomotion is found to be
the indirect effect of the motion of this sphere; e.g., a stone is set
in motion by a stick, the stick by a man’s hand, the hand by the
sinews, the sinews by the muscles, the muscles by the nerves, the
nerves by the natural heat of the body, and the heat of the body by its
form. This is undoubtedly the immediate motive cause, but the action of
this immediate cause is due to a certain design, e.g., to bring a stone
into a hole by striking against it with a stick in order to prevent the
draught from coming through the crevice. The motion of the air that
causes the draught is the effect of the motion of the celestial sphere.
Similarly it may be shown that the ultimate cause of all genesis and
destruction can be traced to the motion of the sphere. But the motion
of the sphere must likewise have been effected by an agent (Prop.
XVII.) residing either without the sphere or within it; a third case
being impossible. In the first case, if the motor is without the
sphere, it must either be corporeal or incorporeal; if incorporeal, it
cannot be said that the agent is without the sphere; it can only be
described as separate from it; because an incorporeal object can only
be said metaphorically to reside without a certain corporeal object. In
the second case, if the agent resides within the sphere, it must be
either a force distributed throughout the whole sphere so that each
part of the sphere includes a part of the force, as is the case with
the heat of fire; or it is an indivisible force, e.g., the soul and the
intellect (Props. X. and XI.). The agent which sets the sphere in
motion must consequently be one of the following four things: a
corporeal object without the sphere; an incorporeal object separate
from it; a force spread throughout the whole of the sphere; or an
indivisible force [within the sphere].

The first case, viz., that the moving agent of the sphere is a
corporeal object without the sphere, is impossible, as will be
explained. Since the moving agent is corporeal, it must itself move
while setting another object in motion (Prop. IX.), and as the sixth
element would likewise move when imparting motion to another body, it
would be set in motion by a seventh element, which must also move. An
infinite number of bodies would thus be required before the sphere
could be set in motion. This is contrary to Proposition II.

The third case, viz., that the moving object be a force distributed
throughout the whole body, is likewise impossible. For the sphere is
corporeal, and must therefore be finite (Prop. I.); also the force it
contains must be finite (Prop. XII.), since each part of the sphere
contains part of the force (Prop. XI.): the latter can consequently not
produce an infinite motion, such as we assumed according to Proposition
XXVI., which we admitted for the present.

The fourth case is likewise impossible, viz., that the sphere is set in
motion by an indivisible force residing in the sphere in the same
manner as the soul resides in the body of man. For this force, though
indivisible, could not be the cause of infinite motion by itself alone;
because if that were the case the prime motor would have an accidental
motion (Prop. VI.). But things that move accidentally must come to rest
(Prop. VIII.), and then the thing comes also to rest which is set in
motion. (The following may serve as a further illustration of the
nature of accidental motion. When man is moved by the soul, i.e., by
his form, to go from the basement of the house to the upper storey, his
body moves directly, while the soul, the really efficient cause of that
motion, participates in it accidentally. For through the translation of
the body from the basement to the upper storey, the soul has likewise
changed its place, and when no fresh impulse for the motion of the body
is given by the soul, the body which has been set in motion by such
impulse comes to rest, and the accidental motion of the soul is
discontinued). Consequently the motion of that supposed first motor
must be due to some cause which does not form part of things composed
of two elements, viz., a moving agent and an object moved; if such a
cause is present the motor in that compound sets the other element in
motion; in the absence of such a cause no motion takes place. Living
beings do therefore not move continually, although each of them
possesses an indivisible motive element; because this element is not
constantly in motion, as it would be if it produced motion of its own
accord. On the contrary, the things to which the action is due are
separate from the motor. The action is caused either by desire for that
which is agreeable, or by aversion from that which is disagreeable, or
by some image, or by some ideal when the moving being has the capacity
of conceiving it. When any of these causes are present then the motor
acts; its motion is accidental, and must therefore come to an end
(Prop. VIII.). If the motor of the sphere were of this kind the sphere
could not move ad infinitum. Our opponent, however, holds that the
spheres move continually ad infinitum; if this were the case, and it is
in fact possible (Prop. XIII.), the efficient cause of the motion of
the sphere must, according to the above division, be of the second
kind, viz., something incorporeal and separate from the sphere.

It may thus be considered as proved that the efficient cause of the
motion of the sphere, if that motion be eternal, is neither itself
corporeal nor does it reside in a corporeal object; it must move
neither of its own accord nor accidentally; it must be indivisible and
unchangeable (Prop. VII. and Prop. V.). This Prime Motor of the sphere
is God, praised be His name!

The hypothesis that there exist two Gods is inadmissible, because
absolutely incorporeal beings cannot be counted (Prop. XVI.), except as
cause and effect; the relation of time is not applicable to God (Prop.
XV.), because motion cannot be predicated of Him.

The result of the above argument is consequently this: the sphere
cannot move ad infinitum of its own accord; the Prime Motor is not
corporeal, nor a force residing within a body; it is One, unchangeable,
and in its existence independent of time. Three of our postulates are
thus proved by the principal philosophers.

The philosophers employ besides another argument, based on the
following proposition of Aristotle. If there be a thing composed of two
elements, and the one of them is known to exist also by itself, apart
from that thing, then the other element is likewise found in existence
by itself separate from that compound. For if the nature of the two
elements were such that they could only exist together—as, e.g., matter
and form—then neither of them could in any way exist separate from the
other. The fact that the one component is found also in a separate
existence proves that the two elements are not indissolubly connected,
and that the same must therefore be the case with the other component.
Thus we infer from the existence of honey-vinegar and of honey by
itself, that there exists also vinegar by itself. After having
explained this Proposition Aristotle continues thus: We notice many
objects consisting of a motor and a motum, i.e., objects which set
other things in motion, and whilst doing so are themselves set in
motion by other things; such is clearly the case as regards all the
middle members of a series of things in motion. We also see a thing
that is moved, but does not itself move anything, viz., the last member
of the series; consequently a motor must exist without being at the
same time a motum, and that is the Prime Motor, which, not being
subject to motion, is indivisible, incorporeal, and independent of
time, as has been shown in the preceding argument.

Third Philosophical Argument.—This is taken from the words of
Aristotle, though he gives it in a different form. It runs as follows:
There is no doubt that many things actually exist, as, e.g., things
perceived with the senses. Now there are only three cases conceivable,
viz., either all these things are without beginning and without end, or
all of them have beginning and end, or some are with and some without
beginning and end. The first of these three cases is altogether
inadmissible, since we clearly perceive objects which come into
existence and are subsequently destroyed. The second case is likewise
inadmissible, for if everything had but a temporary existence all
things might be destroyed, and that which is enunciated of a whole
class of things as possible is necessarily actual. All things must
therefore come to an end, and then nothing would ever be in existence,
for there would not exist any being to produce anything. Consequently
nothing whatever would exist [if all things were transient]; but as we
see things existing, and find ourselves in existence we conclude as
follows:—Since there are undoubtedly beings of a temporary existence,
there must also be an eternal being that is not subject to destruction,
and whose existence is real, not merely possible.

It has been further argued that the existence of this being is
necessary, either on account of itself alone or on account of some
external force. In the latter case its existence and non-existence
would be equally possible, because of its own properties, but its
existence would be necessary on account of the external force. That
force would then be the being that possesses absolute existence (Prop.
XIX.). It is therefore certain that there must be a being which has
absolutely independent existence, and is the source of the existence of
all things, whether transient or permanent, if, as Aristotle assumes,
there is in existence such a thing, which is the effect of an eternal
cause, and must therefore itself be eternal. This is a proof the
correctness of which is not doubted, disputed, or rejected, except by
those who have no knowledge of the method of proof. We further say that
the existence of anything that has independent existence is not due to
any cause (Prop. X.), and that such a being does not include any
plurality whatever (Prop. XXI.); consequently it cannot be a body, nor
a force residing in a body (Prop. XXII.). It is now clear that there
must be a being with absolutely independent existence, a being whose
existence cannot be attributed to any external cause, and which does
not include different elements; it cannot therefore be corporeal, or a
force residing in a corporeal object; this being is God.

It can easily be proved that absolutely independent existence cannot be
attributed to two beings. For, if that were the case, absolutely
independent existence would be a property added to the substance of
both; neither of them would be absolutely independent on account of
their essence, but only through a certain property, viz., that of this
independent existence, which is common to both. It can besides be shown
in many ways that independent existence cannot be reconciled with the
principle of dualism by any means. It would make no difference, whether
we imagine two beings of similar or of different properties. The reason
for all this is to be sought in the absolute simplicity and in the
utmost perfection of the essence of this being, which is the only
member of its species, and does not depend on any cause whatever; this
being has therefore nothing in common with other beings.

Fourth Argument.—This is likewise a well-known philosophical argument.
We constantly see things passing from a state of potentiality to that
of actuality, but in every such case there is for that transition of a
thing an agent separate from it (Prop. XVIII.). It is likewise clear
that the agent has also passed from potentiality to actuality. It has
at first been potential, because it could not be actual, owing to some
obstacle contained in itself, or on account of the absence of a certain
relation between itself and the object of its action; it became an
actual agent as soon as that relation was present. Whichever cause be
assumed, an agent is again necessary to remove the obstacle or to
create the relation. The same can be argued respecting this
last-mentioned agent that creates the relation or removes the obstacle.
This series of causes cannot go on ad infinitum; we must at last arrive
at a cause of the transition of an object from the state of
potentiality to that of actuality, which is constant, and admits of no
potentiality whatever. In the essence of this cause nothing exists
potentially, for if its essence included any possibility of existence
it would not exist at all (Prop. XXIII.); it cannot be corporeal, but
it must be spiritual (Prop. XXIV.); and the immaterial being that
includes no possibility whatever, but exists actually by its own
essence, is God. Since He is incorporeal, as has been demonstrated, it
follows that He is One (Prop. XVI.).

Even if we were to admit the Eternity of the Universe, we could by any
of these methods prove the existence of God; that He is One and
incorporeal, and that He does not reside as a force in a corporeal
object.

The following is likewise a correct method to prove the Incorporeality
and the Unity of God: If there were two Gods, they would necessarily
have one element in common by virtue of which they were Gods, and
another element by which they were distinguished from each other and
existed as two Gods; the distinguishing element would either be in both
different from the property common to both—in that case both of them
would consist of different elements, and neither of them would be the
First Cause, or have absolutely independent existence; but their
existence would depend on certain causes (Prop. XIX.)—or the
distinguishing element would only in one of them be different from the
element common to both: then that being could not have absolute
independence.

Another proof of the Unity of God.—It has been demonstrated by proof
that the whole existing world is one organic body, all parts of which
are connected together; also, that the influences of the spheres above
pervade the earthly substance and prepare it for its forms. Hence it is
impossible to assume that one deity be engaged in forming one part, and
another deity in forming another part of that organic body of which all
parts are closely connected together. A duality could only be imagined
in this way, either that at one time the one deity is active, the other
at another time, or that both act simultaneously, nothing being done
except by both together. The first alternative is certainly absurd for
many reasons; if at the time the one deity be active the other could
also be active, there is no reason why the one deity should then act
and the other not; if, on the other hand, it be impossible for the one
deity to act when the other is at work, there must be some other cause
[besides these deities] which [at a certain time] enables the one to
act and disables the other. [Such difference would not be caused by
time], since time is without change, and the object of the action
likewise remains one and the same organic whole. Besides, if two
deities existed in this way, both would be subject to the relations of
time, since their actions would depend on time; they would also in the
moment of acting pass from potentiality to actuality, and require an
agent for such transition; their essence would besides include
possibility [of existence]. It is equally absurd to assume that both
together produce everything in existence, and that neither of them does
anything alone; for when a number of forces must be united for a
certain result, none of these forces acts of its own accord, and none
is by itself the immediate cause of that result, but their union is the
immediate cause. It has, furthermore, been proved that the action of
the absolute cannot be due to an [external] cause. The union is also an
act which presupposes a cause effecting that union, and if that cause
be one, it is undoubtedly God; but if it also consists of a number of
separate forces, a cause is required for the combination of these
forces, as in the first case. Finally, one simple being must be arrived
at, that is the cause of the existence of the Universe, which is one
whole; it would make no difference whether we assumed that the First
Cause had produced the Universe by creatio ex nihilo, or whether the
Universe co-existed with the First Cause. It is thus clear how we can
prove the Unity of God from the fact that this Universe is one whole.

Another argument concerning the Incorporeality of God.—Every corporeal
object is composed of matter and form (Prop. XXII.); every compound of
these two elements requires an agent for effecting their combination.
Besides, it is evident that a body is divisible and has dimensions; a
body is thus undoubtedly subject to accidents. Consequently nothing
corporeal can be a unity, either because everything corporeal is
divisible or because it is a compound; that is to say, it can logically
be analysed into two elements; because a body can only be said to be a
certain body when the distinguishing element is added to the corporeal
substratum, and must therefore include two elements; but it has been
proved that the Absolute admits of no dualism whatever.

Now that we have discussed these proofs, we will expound our own method
in accordance with our promise.






CHAPTER II


The fifth essence, i.e., the heavenly spheres, must either be
transient, and in this case motion would likewise be temporary, or, as
our opponent assumes, it must be eternal. If the spheres are transient,
then God is their Creator; for if anything comes into existence after a
period of non-existence, it is self-evident that an agent exists which
has effected this result. It would be absurd to contend that the thing
itself effected it. If, on the other hand, the heavenly spheres be
eternal, with a regular perpetual motion, the cause of this perpetual
motion, according to the Propositions enumerated in the Introduction,
must be something that is neither a body, nor a force residing in a
body, and that is God, praised be His name! We have thus shown that
whether we believe in the Creatio ex Nihilo, or in the Eternity of the
Universe, we can prove by demonstrative arguments the existence of God,
i.e., an absolute Being, whose existence cannot be attributed to any
cause, or admit in itself any potentiality. The theory that God is One
and Incorporeal has likewise been established by proof without any
reference to the theory of the Creation or the Eternity of the
Universe. This has been explained by us in the third philosophical
argument [in support of the Existence of God], and also in our
subsequent description of the methods of the philosophers in proving
the Incorporeality and the Unity of God.

We deem it now convenient to continue with the theory of the
philosophers, and to give their proofs for the existence of
Intelligences. We will then show that their theory in this regard is in
harmony with the teaching of Scripture concerning the existence of
angels. After the full treatment of this subject we shall return to our
task and discuss the theory of creatio ex nihilo. For the best
arguments in favour of this theory cannot be fully comprehended unless
the theory of the existence of Intelligences be well understood, and
also the method which I adopt in proving their existence. We must,
however, first give the following note, which will introduce you into
the secrets of this whole subject, both of that which we have already
given and of what will yet be given.

Note.—It was not my intention when writing this treatise to expound
natural science or discuss metaphysical systems; it was not my object
to prove truths which have already been demonstrated, or describe the
number and the properties of the spheres: for the books written on
these subjects serve their purpose, and if in some points they are not
satisfactory, I do not think that what I could say would be better than
what has already been explained by others. But my intention was, as has
been stated in the Introduction, to expound Biblical passages which
have been impugned, and to elucidate their hidden and true sense, which
is above the comprehension of the multitude. When you therefore notice
that I prove the existence and number of Intelligences or the number of
the spheres, with the causes of their motion, or discuss the true
relation of matter and form, the meaning of Divine manifestation, or
similar subjects, you must not think that I intend merely to establish
a certain philosophical proposition; for these subjects have been
discussed in many books, and most of them have been demonstrated by
proof. I only desire to mention that which might, when well understood,
serve as a means of removing some of the doubts concerning anything
taught in Scripture; and indeed many difficulties will disappear when
that which I am about to explain is taken into consideration. From the
Introduction to this treatise you may learn that its principal object
is to expound, as far as can be done, the account of the Creation (Gen.
i.-iii.), and of the Divine Chariot (Ezek. i.), and to answer questions
raised in respect to Prophecy and to the knowledge of God. You will
sometimes notice that I am rather explicit on truths already
ascertained; some of them Natural Philosophy has established as facts;
others Metaphysics has either fully demonstrated, or at least shown to
be worthy of belief; others Mathematics have made plain. But you will
invariably find that my exposition includes the key for the
understanding of some allegorical passage of Holy Writ and its esoteric
interpretation, and that I have mentioned, explained, and demonstrated
the subject only because it furthers the knowledge of the “Divine
Chariot,” or “the Creation,” or explains some principle with respect to
Prophecy, or to the belief in any of the truths taught in Scripture.
Now, having made this statement, we return to the subject of which we
began to treat.






CHAPTER III


The theory of Aristotle in respect to the causes of the motion of the
spheres led him to assume the existence of Intelligences. Although this
theory consists of assertions which cannot be proved, yet it is the
least open to doubt, and is more systematic than any other, as has been
stated by Alexander in the book called The Origin of the Universe. It
includes maxims which are identical with those taught in Scripture, and
it is to a still greater extent in harmony with doctrines contained in
well-known genuine Midrashim, as will be explained by me. For this
reason I will cite his views and his proofs, and collect from them what
coincides with the teachings of Scripture, and agrees with the doctrine
held by our Sages.






CHAPTER IV


The enunciation that the heavenly sphere is endowed with a soul will
appear reasonable to all who sufficiently reflect on it; but at first
thought they may find it unintelligible or even objectionable; because
they wrongly assume that when we ascribe a soul to the heavenly spheres
we mean something like the soul of man, or that of an ass, or ox. We
merely intend to say that the locomotion of the sphere undoubtedly
leads us to assume some inherent principle by which it moves; and this
principle is certainly a soul. For it would be absurd to assume that
the principle of the circular motion of the spheres was like that of
the rectilinear motion of a stone downward or of fire upwards, for the
cause of the latter motion is a natural property and not a soul; a
thing set in motion by a natural property moves only as long as it is
away from the proper place of its element, but when it has again
arrived there, it comes to rest; whilst the sphere continues its
circular motion in its own place. It is, however, not because the
sphere has a soul, that it moves in this manner; for animate beings
move either by instinct or by reason. By “instinct” I mean the
intention of an animal to approach something agreeable, or to retreat
from something disagreeable; e.g., to approach the water it seeks
because of thirst, or to retreat from the sun because of its heat. It
makes no difference whether that thing really exists or is merely
imaginary, since the imagination of something agreeable or of something
disagreeable likewise causes the animal to move. The heavenly sphere
does not move for the purpose of withdrawing from what is bad or
approaching what is good. For in the first instance it moves toward the
same point from which it has moved away, and vice versâ it moves away
from the same point towards which it has moved. Secondly, if this were
the object of the motion, we should expect that the sphere would move
towards a certain point, and would then rest; for if it moved for the
purpose of avoiding something, and never obtained that object, the
motion would be in vain. The circular motion of the sphere is
consequently due to the action of some idea which produces this
particular kind of motion; but as ideas are only possible in
intellectual beings, the heavenly sphere is an intellectual being. But
even a being that is endowed with the faculty of forming an idea, and
possesses a soul with the faculty of moving, does not change its place
on each occasion that it forms an idea; for an idea alone does not
produce motion, as has been explained in [Aristotle’s] Metaphysics. We
can easily understand this, when we consider how often we form ideas of
certain things, yet do not move towards them, though we are able to do
so; it is only when a desire arises for the thing imagined, that we
move in order to obtain it. We have thus shown that both the soul, the
principle of motion, and the intellect, the source of the ideas, would
not produce motion without the existence of a desire for the object of
which an idea has been formed. It follows that the heavenly sphere must
have a desire for the ideal which it has comprehended, and that ideal,
for which it has a desire, is God, exalted be His name! When we say
that God moves the spheres, we mean it in the following sense: the
spheres have a desire to become similar to the ideal comprehended by
them. This ideal, however, is simple in the strictest sense of the
word, and not subject to any change or alteration, but constant in
producing everything good, whilst the spheres are corporeal; the latter
can therefore not be like this ideal in any other way, except in the
production of circular motion; for this is the only action of corporeal
beings that can be perpetual; it is the most simple motion of a body;
there is no change in the essence of the sphere, nor in the beneficial
results of its motion.

When Aristotle had arrived at this result, he further investigated the
subject, and found, by proof, that there were many spheres, and that
all moved in circles, but each with its peculiar motion as regards
velocity and direction. He naturally argued that the ideal comprehended
by the one sphere, which completes its circuit in one day, is different
from that of another sphere which completes its circuit in thirty
years; he thus arrived at the conclusion that there were as many ideals
as there were spheres; each sphere has a desire for that ideal which is
the source of its existence, and that desire is the cause of its
individual motion, so that in fact the ideal sets the sphere in motion.
Aristotle does not say, nor does any other authority, that there are
ten or a hundred ideals; he simply states that their number agrees with
that of the spheres. When, therefore, some of his contemporaries held
that the number of spheres was fifty, he said, if that was true, the
number of ideals must likewise be fifty. For the scholars in his time
were few and possessed but imperfect learning; they thought that there
must be a separate sphere for each movement, because they did not know
that what appear to be several distinct movements can be explained as
resulting from the inclination of one sphere as is, e.g., the case with
the change in the longitude of a star, its declination and the places
of its rising and setting noticed in the circle of the horizon. This
point, however, does not concern us at present; let us therefore return
to our subject.

The later philosophers assumed ten Intelligences, because they counted
the spheres containing stars and the all-encompassing sphere, although
some of the spheres included several distinct orbits. There are
altogether nine spheres, viz., the all-encompassing sphere, that of the
fixed stars, and those of the seven planets; nine Intelligences
correspond to the nine spheres; the tenth Intelligence is the Active
Intellect. The existence of the latter is proved by the transition of
our intellect from a state of potentiality to that of actuality, and by
the same transition in the case of the forms of all transient beings.
For whatever passes from potentiality into actuality, requires for that
transition an external agent of the same kind as itself. Thus the
builder does not build the storehouse in his capacity of workman, but
in that of a person that has the form of the storehouse in his mind;
and that form of the building which exists in the mind of the builder
caused the transition of the potential form of the storehouse into
actuality, and impressed it on the material of the building. As that
which gives form to matter must itself be pure form, so the source of
intellect must itself be pure intellect, and this source is the Active
Intellect. The relation of the latter to the elements and their
compounds is the same as that of the Intelligences to their respective
spheres; and our intellect in action, which originates in the Active
Intellect, and enables us to comprehend that intellect, finds a
parallel in the intellect of each of the spheres which originates in
the Intelligence corresponding to that sphere, and enables the sphere
to comprehend that Intelligence, to form an idea of it, and to move in
seeking to become similar to it.

Aristotle further infers, what has already been explained, that God
does not act by means of direct contact. When, e.g., He destroys
anything with fire, the fire is set in motion through the movement of
the spheres, and the spheres by the Intelligences; the latter, which
are identical with “the angels,” and act by direct influence, are
consequently, each in its turn, the cause of the motion of the spheres;
as however, purely spiritual beings do not differ in their essence, and
are by no means discrete quantities, he (Aristotle) came to the
following conclusion: God created the first Intelligence, the motive
agent of the first sphere; the Intelligence which causes the second
sphere to move has its source and origin in the first Intelligence, and
so on; the Intelligence which sets the sphere nearest to the earth in
motion is the source and origin of the Active Intellect, the last in
the series of purely spiritual beings. The series of material bodies
similarly begins with the uppermost sphere, and ends with the elements
and their compounds. The Intelligence which moves the uppermost sphere
cannot be the Absolute Being, for there is an element common to all
Intelligences, namely, the property of being the motive agent of a
sphere, and there is another element by which each of them is
distinguished from the rest; each of the ten Intelligences includes,
therefore, two elements, and consequently another being must be the
First Cause.

This is the theory and opinion of Aristotle on these questions, and his
proofs, where proof is possible, are given in various works of the
Aristotelian school. In short, he believes that the spheres are
animated and intellectual beings, capable of fully comprehending the
principia of their existence; that there exist purely spiritual beings
(Intelligences), which do not reside in corporeal objects, and which
derive existence from God; and that these form the intermediate element
between God and this material world.

In the chapters which follow I will show how far the teaching of
Scripture is in harmony with these views, and how far it differs from
them.






CHAPTER V


Scripture supports the theory that the spheres are animate and
intellectual, i.e., capable of comprehending things; that they are not,
as ignorant persons believe, inanimate masses like fire and earth, but
are, as the philosophers assert, endowed with life, and serve their
Lord, whom they mightily praise and glorify; comp. “The heavens declare
the glory of God,” etc. (Ps. xix. 2). It is a great error to think that
this is a mere figure of speech; for the verbs “to declare” and “to
relate,” when joined together, are, in Hebrew, only used of
intellectual beings. That the Psalmist really means to describe the
heavens’ own doing, in other words, what the spheres actually do, and
not what man thinks of them, may be best inferred from the words,
“There is no speech, nor language, their voice is not heard” (ver. 4).
Here he clearly shows that he describes the heavens themselves as in
reality praising God, and declaring His wonders without words of lip
and tongue. When man praises God in words actually uttered, he only
relates the ideas which he has conceived, but these ideas form the real
praise. The reason why he gives expression to these ideas is to be
found in his desire to communicate them to others, or to make himself
sure that he has truly conceived them. Therefore it is said, “Commune
with your own heart upon your bed, and be still” (Ps. iv. 5). Only
ignorant or obstinate persons would refuse to admit this proof taken
from Scripture.

As to the opinion of our Sages, I do not see any necessity for
expounding or demonstrating it. Consider only the form they gave to the
blessing recited on seeing the new moon, the ideas repeatedly occurring
in the prayers and the remarks in the Midrash on the following and
similar passages:—“And the host of heaven worshippeth thee” (Neh. ix.
6); “When the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God
shouted for joy” (Job xxxviii. 7). In Bereshit Rabba, on the
passage—“And the earth was empty and formless” (Gen. i. 2), our Sages
remark as follows: “The words tohu and bohu mean mourning and crying;
the earth mourned and cried on account of her evil lot, saying, ‘I and
the heavens were created together, and yet the beings above live for
ever, and we are mortal.’” Our Sages, by this remark, indicate their
belief that the spheres are animated beings, and not inanimate matter
like the elements.

The opinion of Aristotle, that the spheres are capable of comprehension
and conception, is in accordance with the words of our prophets and our
theologians or Sages. The philosophers further agree that this world
below is governed by influences emanating from the spheres, and that
the latter comprehend and have knowledge of the things which they
influence. This theory is also met with in Scripture; comp. [the stars
and all the host of heaven] “which the Lord thy God hath divided unto
all nations” (Deut. iv. 19), that is to say, the stars, which God
appointed to be the means of governing His creatures, and not the
objects of man’s worship. It has therefore been stated clearly: “And to
rule over the day and over the night” (Gen. i. 18). The term “ruling”
here refers to the power which the spheres possess of governing the
earth, in addition to the property of giving light and darkness. The
latter property is the direct cause of genesis and destruction; it is
described in the words, “And to divide the light from the darkness”
(ibid.). It is impossible to assume that those who rule a thing are
ignorant of that very thing which they rule, if we take “to rule” in
its proper sense. We will add another chapter on this subject.






CHAPTER VI


As for the existence of angels, there is no necessity to cite any proof
from Scripture, where the fact is frequently mentioned. The term elohim
signifies “judges”; comp. “The cause of both parties shall come before
the ‘judges’” (ha-elohim; Exod. xxii. 8). It has been figuratively
applied to angels, and to the Creator as being Judge over the angels.
When God says, “I am the Lord your God,” the pronoun “your” refers to
all mankind; but in the phrase elohe ha-elohim, He is described as the
God of the angels, and in adone ha-adonim, as the Lord of the spheres
and the stars, which are the masters of the rest of the corporeal
creation. The nouns elohim and adonim in these phrases do not refer to
human judges or masters, because these are in rank inferior to the
heavenly bodies; much less do they refer to mankind in general,
including masters and servants, or to objects of stone and wood
worshipped by some as gods; for it is no honour or greatness to God to
be superior to stone, wood, or a piece of metal. The phrases therefore
admit of no other meaning than this: God is the Judge over the judges;
i.e., over the angels, and the Lord over the spheres.

We have already stated above that the angels are incorporeal. This
agrees with the opinion of Aristotle: there is only this difference in
the names employed—he uses the term “Intelligences,” and we say instead
“angels.” His theory is that the Intelligences are intermediate beings
between the Prime Cause and existing things, and that they effect the
motion of the spheres, on which motion the existence of all things
depends. This is also the view we meet with in all parts of Scripture;
every act of God is described as being performed by angels. But “angel”
means “messenger”; hence every one that is intrusted with a certain
mission is an angel. Even the movements of the brute creation are
sometimes due to the action of an angel, when such movements serve the
purpose of the Creator, who endowed it with the power of performing
that movement; e.g., “God hath sent His angel, and hath shut the lions’
mouths that they have not hurt me” (Dan. vi. 22). Another instance may
be seen in the movements of Balaam’s ass, described as caused by an
angel. The elements are also called angels. Comp. “Who maketh winds His
angels, flaming fire His ministers” (Ps. civ. 4). There is no doubt
that the word “angel” is used of a messenger sent by man; e.g., “And
Jacob sent angels” (Gen. xxxii. 4); of a prophet, e.g., “And an angel
of the Lord came up from Gilgal to Bochim” (Judges ii. 1); “And He sent
an angel, and hath brought us forth out of Egypt” (Num. xx. 16). It is
also used of ideals, perceived by prophets in prophetic visions, and of
man’s animal powers, as will be explained in another place.

When we assert that Scripture teaches that God rules this world through
angels, we mean such angels as are identical with the Intelligences. In
some passages the plural is used of God, e.g., “Let us make man in our
image” (Gen. i. 26); “Go to, let us go down, and there confound their
language” (ibid. xi. 7). Our Sages explain this in the following
manner: God, as it were, does nothing without contemplating the host
above. I wonder at the expression “contemplating,” which is the very
expression used by Plato: God, as it were, “contemplates the world of
ideals, and thus produces the existing beings.” In other passages our
Sages expressed it more decidedly: “God does nothing without consulting
the host above” (the word familia, used in the original, is a Greek
noun, and signifies “host”). On the words, “what they have already
made” (Eccles. ii. 12), the following remark is made in Bereshit Rabba
and in Midrash Koheleth: “It is not said ‘what He has made,’ but ‘what
they have made’; hence we infer that He, as it were, with His court,
have agreed upon the form of each of the limbs of man before placing it
in its position, as it is said, ‘He hath made thee and established
thee’” (Deut. xxxii. 6). In Bereshit Rabba (chap. li.) it is also
stated, that wherever the term “and the Lord” occurred in Scripture,
the Lord with His court is to be understood. These passages do not
convey the idea that God spoke, thought, reflected, or that He
consulted and employed the opinion of other beings, as ignorant persons
have believed. How could the Creator be assisted by those whom He
created! They only show that all parts of the Universe, even the limbs
of animals in their actual form, are produced through angels; for
natural forces and angels are identical. How bad and injurious is the
blindness of ignorance! Say to a person who is believed to belong to
the wise men of Israel that the Almighty sends His angel to enter the
womb of a woman and to form there the fœtus, he will be satisfied with
the account; he will believe it, and even find in it a description of
the greatness of God’s might and wisdom; although he believes that the
angel consists of burning fire, and is as big as a third part of the
Universe, yet he considers it possible as a divine miracle. But tell
him that God gave the seed a formative power which produces and shapes
the limbs, and that this power is called “angel,” or that all forms are
the result of the influence of the Active Intellect, and that the
latter is the angel, the Prince of the world, frequently mentioned by
our Sages, and he will turn away; because he cannot comprehend the true
greatness and power of creating forces that act in a body without being
perceived by our senses. Our Sages have already stated—for him who has
understanding—that all forces that reside in a body are angels, much
more the forces that are active in the Universe. The theory that each
force acts only in one particular way, is expressed in Bereshit Rabba
(chap. l.) as follows: “One angel does not perform two things, and two
angels do not perform one thing”; this is exactly the property of all
forces. We may find a confirmation of the opinion that the natural and
psychical forces of an individual are called angels in a statement of
our Sages which is frequently quoted, and occurs originally in Bereshit
Rabba (chap. lxxviii.): “Every day God creates a legion of angels; they
sing before Him, and disappear.” When, in opposition to this statement,
other statements were quoted to the effect that angels are eternal—and,
in fact, it has repeatedly been shown that they live permanently—the
reply has been given that some angels live permanently, others perish;
and this is really the case; for individual forces are transient,
whilst the genera are permanent and imperishable. Again, we read (in
Bereshit Rabba, chap. lxxxv.), in reference to the relation between
Judah and Tamar: “R. Jochanan said that Judah was about to pass by
[without noticing Tamar], but God caused the angel of lust, i.e., the
libidinous disposition, to present himself to him.” Man’s disposition
is here called an angel. Likewise we frequently meet with the phrase
“the angel set over a certain thing.” In Midrash-Koheleth (on Eccles.
x. 7) the following passage occurs: “When man sleeps, his soul speaks
to the angel, the angel to the cherub.” The intelligent reader will
find here a clear statement that man’s imaginative faculty is also
called “angel,” and that “cherub” is used for man’s intellectual
faculty. How beautiful must this appear to him who understands it; how
absurd to the ignorant!

We have already stated that the forms in which angels appear form part
of the prophetic vision. Some prophets see angels in the form of man,
e.g., “And behold three men stood by him” (Gen. xviii. 2); others
perceive an angel as a fearful and terrible being, e.g., “And his
countenance was as the countenance of an angel of God, very terrible”
(Judges xiii. 6); others see them as fire, e.g., “And the angel of the
Lord appeared to him in a flame of fire” (Exod. iii. 2). In Bereshit
Rabba (chap. 1.) the following remark occurs: “To Abraham, whose
prophetic power was great, the angels appeared in the form of men; to
Lot, whose power was weak, they appeared as angels.” This is an
important principle as regards Prophecy; it will be fully discussed
when we treat of that subject (chap. xxxii. sqq.). Another passage in
Bereshit Rabba (ibid.) runs thus: “Before the angels have accomplished
their task they are called men, when they have accomplished it they are
angels.” Consider how clearly they say that the term “angel” signifies
nothing but a certain action, and that every appearance of an angel is
part of a prophetic vision, depending on the capacity of the person
that perceives it.

There is nothing in the opinion of Aristotle on this subject contrary
to the teaching of Scripture. The whole difference between him and
ourselves is this: he believes all these beings to be eternal,
co-existing with the First Cause as its necessary effect; but we
believe that they have had a beginning, that God created the
Intelligences, and gave the spheres the capacity of seeking to become
like them; that in creating the Intelligences and the spheres, He
endowed them with their governing powers. In this point we differ from
him.

In the course of this treatise we shall give his theory as well as the
theory of Creatio ex nihilo taught in Scripture.






CHAPTER VII


We have already explained that the term “angel” is a homonym, and is
used of the intellectual beings, the spheres, and the elements; for all
these are engaged in performing a divine command. But do not imagine
that the Intelligences and the spheres are like other forces which
reside in bodies and act by the laws of nature without being conscious
of what they do. The spheres and the Intelligences are conscious of
their actions, and select by their own free will the objects of their
influence, although not in the same manner as we exercise free will and
rule over other things, which only concern temporary beings. I have
been led to adopt this theory by certain passages in Scripture; e.g.,
an angel says to Lot: “For I cannot do anything,” etc. (Gen. xix. 21);
and telling him to deliver himself, the angel says: “Behold I have
accepted thee concerning this thing” (ver. 21). Again: “Take heed
before him, and listen to his voice,” etc. (Exod. xxiii. 21). These
passages show that angels are conscious of what they do, and have free
will in the sphere of action intrusted to them, just as we have free
will within our province, and in accordance with the power given to us
with our very existence. The difference is that what we do is the
lowest stage of excellence, and that our influence and actions are
preceded by non-action; whilst the Intelligences and the spheres always
perform that which is good, they contain nothing except what is good
and perfect, as will be shown further on, and they have continually
been active from the beginning.






CHAPTER VIII


It is one of the ancient beliefs, both among the philosophers and other
people, that the motions of the spheres produced mighty and fearful
sounds. They observed how little objects produced by rapid motion a
loud, shrilling, and terrifying noise, and concluded that this must to
a far higher degree be the case with the bodies of the sun, the moon
and the stars, considering their greatness and their velocity. The
Pythagoreans believed that the sounds were pleasant, and, though loud,
had the same proportions to each other as the musical notes. They also
explained why these mighty and tremendous sounds are not heard by us.
This belief is also widespread in our nation. Thus our Sages describe
the greatness of the sound produced by the sun in the daily circuit in
its orbit. The same description could be given of all heavenly bodies.
Aristotle, however, rejects this, and holds that they produce no
sounds. You will find his opinion in the book The Heavens and the World
(De Cœlo). You must not find it strange that Aristotle differs here
from the opinion of our Sages. The theory of the music of the spheres
is connected with the theory of the motion of the stars in a fixed
sphere, and our Sages have, in this astronomical question, abandoned
their own theory in favour of the theory of others. Thus, it is
distinctly stated, “The wise men of other nations have defeated the
wise men of Israel.” It is quite right that our Sages have abandoned
their own theory; for speculative matters every one treats according to
the results of his own study, and every one accepts that which appears
to him established by proof.






CHAPTER IX


We have stated above that in the age of Aristotle the number of spheres
was not accurately known; and that those who at present count nine
spheres consider a sphere containing several rotating circles as one, a
fact well known to all who have a knowledge of astronomy. We need,
therefore, not reject the opinion of those who assume two spheres in
accordance with the words of Scripture: “Behold the heaven and the
heaven of heavens are the Lord’s” (Deut. x. 14). They reckon all the
spheres with stars, i.e., with all the circles in which the stars move,
as one; the all-encompassing sphere in which there are no stars, is
regarded by them as the second; hence they maintain that there are two
spheres.

I will here introduce an explanation which is necessary for the
understanding of our view on the present subject. There is a difference
among ancient astronomers whether the spheres of Mercury and Venus are
above or below the sun, because no proof can be given for the position
of these two spheres. At first it was generally assumed that they were
above the sun—note this well; later on Ptolemy maintained that they
were below the sun; because he believed that in this manner the whole
arrangement of the spheres would be most reasonable; the sun would be
in the middle, having three stars below and three above itself. More
recently some Andalusian scholars concluded, from certain principles
laid down by Ptolemy, that Venus and Mercury were above the sun. Ibn
Aflaḥ of Seville, with whose son I was acquainted, has written a famous
book on the subject; also the excellent philosopher Abu-Bekr
ibn-Alẓaig, one of whose pupils was my fellow-student, has treated of
this subject and offered certain proofs—which we have copied—of the
improbability of Venus and Mercury being above the sun. The proofs
given by Abu-Bekr show only the improbability, not the impossibility.
In short, whether it be so or not, the ancients placed Venus and
Mercury above the sun, and had, therefore, the following five spheres:
that of the moon, which is undoubtedly the nearest to us; that of the
sun, which is, of course, above the former; then that of the five
planets, the sphere of the fixed stars, and the outermost sphere, which
does not contain any star. Consequently there are four spheres
containing figures, i.e., stars, which were called figures by the
ancients in their well-known works—viz., the spheres of the fixed
stars, of the five planets, of the sun, and of the moon; above these
there is one sphere which is empty, without any star. This number is
for me of great importance in respect to an idea which none of the
philosophers clearly stated, though I was led to it by various
utterances of the philosophers and of our Sages. I will now state the
idea and expound it.






CHAPTER X


It is a well-known fact that the philosophers, when they discuss in
their works the order of the Universe, assume that the existing order
of things in this sublunary world of transient beings depends on forces
which emanate from the spheres. We have mentioned this several times.
In like manner our Sages say, “There is no single herb below without
its corresponding star above, that beats upon it and commands it to
grow.” Comp. “Knowest thou the ordinances of heaven? Canst thou set the
dominion thereof in the earth?” (Job xxxviii. 33). The term mazzal,
literally meaning a constellation in the Zodiac, is also used of every
star, as may be inferred from the following passage in the beginning of
Bereshit Rabba (chap. x.): “While one star (mazzal) completes its
circuit in thirty days, another completes it in thirty years.” They
have thus clearly expressed it, that even each individual being in this
world has its corresponding star. Although the influences of the
spheres extend over all beings, there is besides the influence of a
particular star directed to each particular species; a fact noticed
also in reference to the several forces in one organic body; for the
whole Universe is like one organic body, as we have stated above. Thus
the philosophers speak of the peculiar influence of the moon on the
particular element water. That this is the case is proved by the
increase and decrease of the water in the seas and rivers according to
the increase and decrease of the moon; also by the rising and the
falling of the seas according to the advance or return of the moon,
i.e., her ascending and her descending in the several quarters of her
course. This is dear to every one who has directed his attention to
these phenomena. The influence of the sun’s rays upon fire may easily
be noticed in the increase of heat or cold on earth, according as the
sun approaches the earth or recedes or is concealed from it. All this
is so clear that I need not explain it further. Now it occurred to my
mind that the four spheres which contain stars exercise influence upon
all beings on earth that come into existence, and, in fact, are the
cause of their existence; but each of the four spheres is the exclusive
source of the properties of one only of the four elements, and becomes
by its own motion the cause of the motion and changes of that element.
Thus water is set in motion by the moon-sphere, fire by the sun-sphere,
air by the other planets, which move in many and different courses with
retrogressions, progressions, and stations, and therefore produce the
various forms of the air with its frequent changes, contractions, and
expansions; the sphere of the other stars, namely, the fixed stars,
sets earth in motion; and it may be that on this account, viz., on
account of the slow motion of the fixed stars, earth is but slowly set
in motion to change and to combine with other elements. The particular
influence which the fixed stars exercise upon earth is implied in the
saying of our Sages, that the number of the species of plants is the
same as that of the individuals included in the general term “stars.”

The arrangement of the Universe may therefore be assumed to be as
follows: there are four spheres, four elements set in motion by them,
and also four principal properties which earthly beings derive from
them, as has been stated above. Furthermore, there are four causes of
the motion of every sphere, namely, the following four essential
elements in the sphere; its spherical shape, its soul, its intellect,
by which the sphere is capable of forming ideas, and the Intelligence,
which the sphere desires to imitate. Note this well. The explanation of
what I said is this: the sphere could not have been continuously in
motion, had it not this peculiar form; continuity of motion is only
possible when the motion is circular. Rectilinear motion, even if
frequently repeated in the same moment, cannot be continuous; for when
a body moves successively in two opposite directions, it must pass
through a moment of rest, as has been demonstrated in its proper place.
The necessity of a continuous motion constantly repeated in the same
path implies the necessity of a circular form. The spheres must have a
soul; for only animate beings can move freely. There must be some cause
for the motion, and as it does not consist in the fear of that which is
injurious, or the desire of that which is profitable, it must be found
in the notion which the spheres form of a certain being, and in the
desire to approach that being. This formation of a notion demands, in
the first place, that the spheres possess intellect; it demands further
that something exists which corresponds to that notion, and which the
spheres desire to approach. These are the four causes of the motion of
the spheres. The following are the four principal forces directly
derived from the spheres: the nature of minerals, the properties
peculiar to plants, the animal faculties, and the intellect. An
examination of these forces shows that they have two functions, namely,
to produce things and to perpetuate them; that is to say, to preserve
the species perpetually, and the individuals in each species for a
certain time. These are also the functions ascribed to Nature, which is
said to be wise, to govern the Universe, to provide, as it were, by
plan for the production of living beings, and to provide also for their
preservation and perpetuation. Nature creates formative faculties,
which are the cause of the production of living beings, and nutritive
faculties as the source of their temporal existence and preservation.
It may be that by Nature the Divine Will is meant, which is the origin
of these two kinds of faculties through the medium of the spheres.

As to the number four, it is strange, and demands our attention. In
Midrash Tanḥuma the following passage occurs: “How many steps were in
Jacob’s ladder?—Four.” The question refers to the verse, “And behold a
ladder set upon the earth,” etc. (Gen. xxviii. 12). In all the
Midrashim it is stated that there were four hosts of angels; this
statement is frequently repeated. Some read in the above passage: “How
many steps were in the ladder?—Seven.” But all readings and all
Midrashim unanimously express that the angels whom Jacob saw ascending
the ladder, and descending, were only four; two of whom were going up
and two coming down. These four angels, the two that went up and the
two that came down, occupied one step of the ladder, standing in one
line. Hence it has been inferred that the breadth of the ladder in this
vision was four-thirds of the world. For the breadth of an angel in a
prophetic vision is equal to one-third of the world; comp. “And his
body was like tarshish (two-sixths)” (Dan. x. 6); the four angels
therefore occupied four-thirds of the world.—Zechariah, in describing
the allegorical vision of “the four chariots that came out from between
two mountains, which mountains were mountains of brass” (Zech. vi. 1),
adds the explanation, “These are the four spirits of the heavens which
go forth from standing before the Lord of all the earth” (ibid. ver.
5). By these four spirits the causes are meant which produce all
changes in the Universe. The term “brass” (neḥoshet), employed here,
and the phrase “burnished brass” (neḥoshet kalal), used by Ezekiel (i.
7), are to some extent homonymous, and will be discussed further on.

The saying of our Sages, that the angel is as broad as the third part
of the Universe, or, in the words of Bereshit Rabba (chap. x.), that
the angel is the third part of the world, is quite clear; we have
already explained it in our large work on the Holy Law. The whole
creation consists of three parts, (1) the pure intelligences, or
angels; (2) the bodies of the spheres; and (3) the materia prima, or
the bodies which are below the spheres, and are subject to constant
change.

In this manner may those understand the dark sayings of the prophets
who desire to understand them, who awake from the sleep of
forgetfulness, deliver themselves from the sea of ignorance, and raise
themselves upward nearer the higher beings. But those who prefer to
swim in the waters of their ignorance, and to “go down very low,” need
not exert the body or heart; they need only cease to move, and they
will go down by the law of nature. Note and consider well all we have
said.






CHAPTER XI


When a simple mathematician reads and studies these astronomical
discussions, he believes that the form and the number of the spheres
are facts established by proof. But this is not the case; for the
science of astronomy does not aim at demonstrating them, although it
includes subjects that can be proved; e.g., it has been proved that the
path of the sun is inclined against the equator; this cannot be
doubted. But it has not yet been decided whether the sphere of the sun
is excentric or contains a revolving epicycle, and the astronomer does
not take notice of this uncertainty, for his object is simply to find
an hypothesis that would lead to a uniform and circular motion of the
stars without acceleration, retardation, or change, and which is in its
effects in accordance with observation. He will, besides, endeavour to
find such an hypothesis which would require the least complicated
motion and the least number of spheres; he will therefore prefer an
hypothesis which would explain all the phenomena of the stars by means
of three spheres to an hypothesis which would require four spheres.
From this reason we adopt, in reference to the circuit of the sun, the
theory of excentricity, and reject the epicyclic revolution assumed by
Ptolemy. When we therefore perceive that all fixed stars move in the
same way uniformly, without the least difference, we conclude that they
are all in one sphere. It is, however, not impossible that the stars
should have each its own sphere, with a separate centre, and yet move
in the same way. If this theory be accepted, a number of Intelligences
must be assumed, equal to that of the stars, and therefore Scripture
says in reference to them, “Is there any number of his armies?” (Job
xxv. 3); for the Intelligences, the heavenly bodies, and the natural
forces, are called the armies of God. Nevertheless the species of the
stars can be numbered, and therefore we would still be justified in
counting the spheres of the fixed stars collectively as one, just as
the five spheres of the planets, together with the numerous spheres
they contain, are regarded by us as one. Our object in adopting this
number is, as you have noticed, to divide the influences which we can
trace in the Universe according to their general character, without
desiring to fix the number of the Intelligences and the spheres. All we
wish to point out is this: in the first place, that the whole Creation
is divided into three parts, viz. (1) the pure Intelligences; (2) the
bodies of the spheres endowed with permanent forms—(the forms of these
bodies do not pass from one substratum to another, nor do their
substrata undergo any change whatever); and (3) the transient earthly
beings, all of which consist of the same substance. Furthermore, we
desire to show that the ruling power emanates from the Creator, and is
received by the Intelligences according to their order; from the
Intelligences part of the good and the light bestowed upon them is
communicated to the spheres, and the latter, being in possession of the
abundance obtained of the Intelligences, transmit forces and properties
unto the beings of this transient world. We must, however, add that the
part which benefits the part below it in the order described does not
exist for the sole purpose of producing that benefit. For if this were
the case it would lead to the paradox that the higher, better, and
nobler beings existed for the sake of beings lower in rank, whilst in
reality the object should be of greater importance than the means
applied for attaining it. No intelligent person will admit that this is
possible. The nature of the influence which one part of the Creation
exercises upon another must be explained as follows: A thing perfect in
a certain way is either perfect only in itself, without being able to
communicate that perfection to another being, or it is so perfect that
it is capable of imparting perfection to another being. A person may
possess wealth sufficient for his own wants without being able to spare
anything for another, or he may have wealth enough to benefit also
other people, or even to enrich them to such an extent as would enable
them to give part of their property to others. In the same manner the
creative act of the Almighty in giving existence to pure Intelligences
endows the first of them with the power of giving existence to another,
and so on, down to the Active Intellect, the lowest of the purely
spiritual beings. Besides producing other Intelligences, each
Intelligence gives existence to one of the spheres, from the highest
down to the lowest, which is the sphere of the moon. After the latter
follows this transient world, i.e., the materia prima, and all that has
been formed of it. In this manner the elements receive certain
properties from each sphere, and a succession of genesis and
destruction is produced.

We have already mentioned that these theories are not opposed to
anything taught by our Prophets or by our Sages. Our nation is wise and
perfect, as has been declared by the Most High, through Moses, who made
us perfect: “Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding
people” (Deut. iv. 6). But when wicked barbarians have deprived us of
our possessions, put an end to our science and literature, and killed
our wise men, we have become ignorant; this has been foretold by the
prophets, when they pronounced the punishment for our sins: “The wisdom
of their wise men shall perish, and the understanding of their prudent
men shall be hid” (Isa. xxix. 14). We are mixed up with other nations;
we have learnt their opinions, and followed their ways and acts. The
Psalmist, deploring this imitation of the actions of other nations,
says, “They were mingled among the nations, and learned their works”
(Ps. cvi. 35). Isaiah likewise complains that the Israelites adopted
the opinions of their neighbours, and says, “And they please themselves
in the children of strangers” (Isa. ii. 6); or, according to the
Aramaic version of Jonathan, son of Uzziel, “And they walk in the ways
of the nations.” Having been brought up among persons untrained in
philosophy, we are inclined to consider these philosophical opinions as
foreign to our religion, just as uneducated persons find them foreign
to their own notions. But, in fact, it is not so.

Since we have repeatedly spoken of the influence emanating from God and
the Intelligences, we will now proceed to explain what is the true
meaning of this influence, and after that I will discuss the theory of
the Creation.






CHAPTER XII


It is clear that whenever a thing is produced, an efficient cause must
exist for the production of the thing that has not existed previously.
This immediate efficient cause is either corporeal or incorporeal; if
corporeal, it is not the efficient cause on account of its
corporeality, but on account of its being an individual corporeal
object, and therefore by means of its form. I will speak of this
subject later on. The immediate efficient cause of a thing may again be
the effect of some cause, and so on, but not ad infinitum. The series
of causes for a certain product must necessarily conclude with a First
Cause, which is the true cause of that product, and whose existence is
not due to another cause. The question remains, Why has this thing been
produced now and not long before, since the cause has always been in
existence? The answer is, that a certain relation between cause and
product has been absent, if the cause be corporeal; or, that the
substance has not been sufficiently prepared, if the cause be
incorporeal. All this is in accordance with the teachings of natural
science. We ignore for the present the question whether to assume the
Eternity of the Universe, or the Creatio ex nihilo. We do not intend to
discuss the question here.

In Physics it has been shown that a body in acting upon another body
must either directly be in contact with it, or indirectly through the
medium of other bodies. E.g., a body that has been heated has been in
contact with fire, or the air that surrounds the body has been heated
by the fire, and has communicated the heat to the body; the immediate
cause of the heat in this body is the corporeal substance of the heated
air. The magnet attracts iron from a distance through a certain force
communicated to the air round the iron. The magnet does therefore not
act at all distances, just as fire does not act at every distance, but
only as long as the air between the fire and the object is affected by
the fire. When the air is no longer affected by the fire which is under
a piece of wax, the latter does not melt. The same is the case with
magnetism. When an object that has previously not been warm has now
become warm, the cause of its heat must now have been created; either
some fire has been produced, or the distance of the fire from the
object has been changed, and the altered relation between the fire and
the object is the cause now created. In a similar manner we find the
causes of all changes in the Universe to be changes in the combination
of the elements that act upon each other when one body approaches
another or separates from it. There are, however, changes which are not
connected with the combination of the elements, but concern only the
forms of the things; they require likewise an efficient cause; there
must exist a force that produces the various forms. This cause is
incorporeal, for that which produces form must itself be abstract form,
as has been shown in its proper place. I have also indicated the proof
of this theorem in previous chapters. The following may, in addition,
serve to illustrate it: All combinations of the elements are subject to
increase and decrease, and this change takes place gradually. It is
different with forms; they do not change gradually, and are therefore
without motion; they appear and disappear instantaneously, and are
consequently not the result of the combination of corporeal elements.
This combination merely prepares matter for receiving a certain form.
The efficient cause which produces the form is indivisible, because it
is of the same kind as the thing produced. Hence it may be concluded
that the agent that has produced a certain form, or given it to a
certain substance, must itself be an abstract form. The action of this
incorporeal agent cannot depend on a certain relation to the corporeal
product; being incorporeal, it cannot approach a body, or recede from
it; nor can a body approach the incorporeal agent, or recede from it,
because there is no relation of distance between corporeal and
incorporeal beings. The reason why the action has not taken place
before must be sought in the circumstance that the substance has not
been prepared for the action of the abstract form.

It is now clear that the action of bodies upon each other, according to
their forms, prepares the substance for receiving the action of an
incorporeal being, or Form. The existence of actions of purely
incorporeal beings, in every case of change that does not originate in
the mere combination of elements, is now firmly established. These
actions do not depend on impact, or on a certain distance. They are
termed “influence” (or “emanation”), on account of their similarity to
a water-spring. The latter sends forth water in all directions, has no
peculiar side for receiving or spending its contents; it springs forth
on all sides, and continually waters both neighbouring and distant
places. In a similar manner incorporeal beings, in receiving power and
imparting it to others, are not limited to a particular side, distance,
or time. They act continually; and whenever an object is sufficiently
prepared, it receives the effect of that continuous action, called
“influence” (or “emanation”). God being incorporeal, and everything
being the work of Him as the efficient cause, we say that the Universe
has been created by the Divine influence, and that all changes in the
Universe emanate from Him. In the same sense we say that He caused
wisdom to emanate from Him and to come upon the prophets. In all such
cases we merely wish to express that an incorporeal Being, whose action
we call “influence,” has produced a certain effect. The term
“influence” has been considered applicable to the Creator on account of
the similarity between His actions and those of a spring. There is no
better way of describing the action of an incorporeal being than by
this analogy; and no term can be found that would accurately describe
it. For it is as difficult to form an idea of that action as to form an
idea of the incorporeal being itself. As we imagine only bodies or
forces residing in bodies, so we only imagine actions possible when the
agent is near, at a certain distance, and on a particular side. There
are therefore persons who, on learning that God is incorporeal, or that
He does not approach the object of His action, believe that He gives
commands to angels, and that the latter carry them out by approach or
direct contact, as is the case when we produce something. These persons
thus imagine also the angels as bodies. Some of them, further, believe
that God commands an action in words consisting, like ours, of letters
and sound, and that thereby the action is done. All this is the work of
the imagination, which is, in fact, identical with “evil inclination.”
For all our defects in speech or in character are either the direct or
the indirect work of imagination. This is not the subject of the
present chapter, in which we only intended to explain the term
“influence” in so far as it is applied to incorporeal beings, namely,
to God and to the Intelligences or angels. But the term is also applied
to the forces of the spheres in their effects upon the earth; and we
speak of the “influence” of the spheres, although the spheres are
corporeal, and the stars, being corporeal, only act at certain
distances, i.e., at a smaller or a greater distance from the centre, or
at a definite distance from each other, a circumstance which led to
Astrology.

As to our assertion that Scripture applies the notion of “influence” to
God, compare “They have forsaken me, the fountain of living waters”
(Jer. ii. 13), i.e., the Divine influence that gives life or existence,
for the two are undoubtedly identical. Further, “For with Thee is the
fountain of life” (Ps. xxxvi. 10), i.e., the Divine influence that
gives existence. The concluding words of this verse, “in Thy light we
see light,” express exactly what we said, namely, that by the influence
of the intellect which emanates from God we become wise, by it we are
guided and enabled to comprehend the Active Intellect. Note this.






CHAPTER XIII


Among those who believe in the existence of God, there are found three
different theories as regards the question whether the Universe is
eternal or not.

First Theory.—Those who follow the Law of Moses, our Teacher, hold that
the whole Universe, i.e., everything except God, has been brought by
Him into existence out of non-existence. In the beginning God alone
existed, and nothing else; neither angels, nor spheres, nor the things
that are contained within the spheres existed. He then produced from
nothing all existing things such as they are, by His will and desire.
Even time itself is among the things created; for time depends on
motion, i.e., on an accident in things which move, and the things upon
whose motion time depends are themselves created beings, which have
passed from non-existence into existence. We say that God existed
before the creation of the Universe, although the verb existed appears
to imply the notion of time; we also believe that He existed an
infinite space of time before the Universe was created; but in these
cases we do not mean time in its true sense. We only use the term to
signify something analogous or similar to time. For time is undoubtedly
an accident, and, according to our opinion, one of the created
accidents, like blackness and whiteness; it is not a quality, but an
accident connected with motion. This must be clear to all who
understand what Aristotle has said on time and its real existence.

The following remark does not form an essential part of our present
research; it will nevertheless be found useful in the course of this
discussion. Many scholars do not know what time really is, and men like
Galen were so perplexed about it that they asked whether time has a
real existence or not; the reason for this uncertainty is to be found
in the circumstance that time is an accident of an accident. Accidents
which are directly connected with material bodies, e.g., colour and
taste, are easily understood, and correct notions are formed of them.
There are, however, accidents which are connected with other accidents,
e.g., the splendour of colour, or the inclination and the curvature of
a line; of these it is very difficult to form a correct notion,
especially when the accident which forms the substratum for the other
accident is not constant but variable. Both difficulties are present in
the notion of time: it is an accident of motion, which is itself an
accident of a moving object; besides, it is not a fixed property; on
the contrary, its true and essential condition is, not to remain in the
same state for two consecutive moments. This is the source of ignorance
about the nature of time.

We consider time a thing created; it comes into existence in the same
manner as other accidents, and the substances which form the substratum
for the accidents. For this reason, viz., because time belongs to the
things created, it cannot be said that God produced the Universe in the
beginning. Consider this well; for he who does not understand it is
unable to refute forcible objections raised against the theory of
Creatio ex nihilo. If you admit the existence of time before the
Creation, you will be compelled to accept the theory of the Eternity of
the Universe. For time is an accident and requires a substratum. You
will therefore have to assume that something [beside God] existed
before this Universe was created, an assumption which it is our duty to
oppose.

This is the first theory, and it is undoubtedly a fundamental principle
of the Law of our teacher Moses; it is next in importance to the
principle of God’s unity. Do not follow any other theory. Abraham, our
father, was the first that taught it, after he had established it by
philosophical research. He proclaimed, therefore, “the name of the Lord
the God of the Universe” (Gen. xxi. 33); and he had previously
expressed this theory in the words, “The Possessor of heaven and earth”
(ibid. xiv. 22).

Second Theory.—The theory of all philosophers whose opinions and works
are known to us is this: It is impossible to assume that God produced
anything from nothing, or that He reduces anything to nothing; that is
to say, it is impossible that an object consisting of matter and form
should be produced when that matter is absolutely absent, or that it
should be destroyed in such a manner that that matter be absolutely no
longer in existence. To say of God that He can produce a thing from
nothing or reduce a thing to nothing is, according to the opinion of
these philosophers, the same as if we were to say that He could cause
one substance to have at the same time two opposite properties, or
produce another being like Himself, or change Himself into a body, or
produce a square the diagonal of which be equal to its side, or similar
impossibilities. The philosophers thus believe that it is no defect in
the Supreme Being that He does not produce impossibilities, for the
nature of that which is impossible is constant—it does not depend on
the action of an agent, and for this reason it cannot be changed.
Similarly there is, according to them, no defect in the greatness of
God, when He is unable to produce a thing from nothing, because they
consider this as one of the impossibilities. They therefore assume that
a certain substance has co-existed with God from eternity in such a
manner that neither God existed without that substance nor the latter
without God. But they do not hold that the existence of that substance
equals in rank that of God; for God is the cause of that existence, and
the substance is in the same relation to God as the clay is to the
potter, or the iron to the smith; God can do with it what He pleases;
at one time He forms of it heaven and earth, at another time He forms
some other thing. Those who hold this view also assume that the heavens
are transient, that they came into existence, though not from nothing,
and may cease to exist, although they cannot be reduced to nothing.
They are transient in the same manner as the individuals among living
beings which are produced from some existing substance, and are again
reduced to some substance that remains in existence. The process of
genesis and destruction is, in the case of the heavens, the same as in
that of earthly beings.

The followers of this theory are divided into different schools, whose
opinions and principles it is useless to discuss here; but what I have
mentioned is common to all of them. Plato holds the same opinion.
Aristotle says in his Physics, that according to Plato the heavens are
transient. This view is also stated in Plato’s Timæus. His opinion,
however, does not agree with our belief; only superficial and careless
persons wrongly assume that Plato has the same belief as we have. For
whilst we hold that the heavens have been created from absolutely
nothing, Plato believes that they have been formed out of
something.—This is the second theory.

Third Theory.—viz., that of Aristotle, his followers, and commentators.
Aristotle maintains, like the adherents of the second theory, that a
corporeal object cannot be produced without a corporeal substance. He
goes, however, farther, and contends that the heavens are
indestructible. For he holds that the Universe in its totality has
never been different, nor will it ever change: the heavens, which form
the permanent element in the Universe, and are not subject to genesis
and destruction, have always been so; time and motion are eternal,
permanent, and have neither beginning nor end; the sublunary world,
which includes the transient elements, has always been the same,
because the materia prima is itself eternal, and merely combines
successively with different forms; when one form is removed, another is
assumed. This whole arrangement, therefore, both above and here below,
is never disturbed or interrupted, and nothing is produced contrary to
the laws or the ordinary course of Nature. He further says—though not
in the same terms—that he considers it impossible for God to change His
will or conceive a new desire; that God produced this Universe in its
totality by His will, but not from nothing. Aristotle finds it as
impossible to assume that God changes His will or conceives a new
desire, as to believe that He is non-existing, or that His essence is
changeable. Hence it follows that this Universe has always been the
same in the past, and will be the same eternally.

This is a full account of the opinions of those who consider that the
existence of God, the First Cause of the Universe, has been established
by proof. But it would be quite useless to mention the opinions of
those who do not recognize the existence of God, but believe that the
existing state of things is the result of accidental combination and
separation of the elements, and that the Universe has no Ruler or
Governor. Such is the theory of Epicurus and his school, and similar
philosophers, as stated by Alexander [Aphrodisiensis]; it would be
superfluous to repeat their views, since the existence of God has been
demonstrated whilst their theory is built upon a basis proved to be
untenable. It is likewise useless to prove the correctness of the
followers of the second theory in asserting that the heavens are
transient, because they at the same time believe in the Eternity of the
Universe, and so long as this theory is adopted, it makes no difference
to us whether it is believed that the heavens are transient, and that
only their substance is eternal, or the heavens are held to be
indestructible, in accordance with the view of Aristotle. All who
follow the Law of Moses, our Teacher, and Abraham, our Father, and all
who adopt similar theories, assume that nothing is eternal except God,
and that the theory of Creatio ex nihilo includes nothing that is
impossible, whilst some thinkers even regard it as an established
truth.

After having described the different theories, I will now proceed to
show how Aristotle proved his theory, and what induced him to adopt it.






CHAPTER XIV


It is not necessary to repeat in every chapter that I write this
treatise with the full knowledge of what you have studied; that I
therefore need not quote the exact words of the philosophers; it will
suffice to give an abstract of their views. I will, however, point out
the methods which they employ, in the same manner as I have done when I
discussed the theories of the Mutakallemim. No notice will be taken of
the opinion of any philosopher but that of Aristotle; his opinions
alone deserve to be criticized, and if our objections or doubts with
regard to any of these be well founded, this must be the case in a far
higher degree in respect to all other opponents of our fundamental
principles.

I now proceed to describe the methods of the philosophers.

First Method.—According to Aristotle, motion, that is to say, motion
par excellence, is eternal. For if the motion had a beginning, there
must already have been some motion when it came into existence, for
transition from potentiality into actuality, and from non-existence
into existence, always implies motion; then that previous motion, the
cause of the motion which follows, must be eternal, or else the series
would have to be carried back ad infinitum. On the same principle he
maintains that time is eternal, for time is related to and connected
with motion: there is no motion except in time, and time can only be
perceived by motion, as has been demonstrated by proof. By this
argument Aristotle proves the eternity of the Universe.

Second Method.—The First Substance common to the four elements is
eternal. For if it had a beginning it would have come into existence
from another substance; it would further be endowed with a form, as
coming into existence is nothing but receiving Form. But we mean by
“First Substance” a formless substance; it can therefore not have come
into existence from another substance, and must be without beginning
and without end; hence it is concluded that the Universe is eternal.

Third Method.—The substance of the spheres contains no opposite
elements; for circular motion includes no such opposite directions as
are found in rectilinear motion. Whatever is destroyed, owes its
destruction to the opposite elements it contains. The spheres contain
no opposite elements; they are therefore indestructible, and because
they are indestructible they are also without beginning. Aristotle thus
assumes the axiom that everything that has had a beginning is
destructible, and that everything destructible has had a beginning;
that things without beginning are indestructible, and indestructible
things are without beginning. Hence follows the Eternity of the
Universe.

Fourth Method.—The actual production of a thing is preceded in time by
its possibility. The actual change of a thing is likewise preceded in
time by its possibility. From this proposition Aristotle derives the
eternity of the circular motion of the spheres. The Aristotelians in
more recent time employ this proposition in demonstrating the Eternity
of the Universe. They argue thus: When the Universe did not yet exist,
its existence was either possible or necessary, or impossible. If it
was necessary, the Universe could never have been non-existing; if
impossible, the Universe could never have been in existence; if
possible, the question arises, What was the substratum of that
possibility? for there must be in existence something of which that
possibility can be predicated. This is a forcible argument in favour of
the Eternity of the Universe. Some of the later schools of the
Mutakallemim imagined that they could confute this argument by
objecting that the possibility rests with the agent, and not with the
production. But this objection is of no force whatever; for there are
two distinct possibilities, viz., the thing produced has had the
possibility of being produced before this actually took place; and the
agent has had the possibility of producing it before he actually did
so. There are, therefore, undoubtedly two possibilities—that of the
substance to receive a certain form, and that of the agent to perform a
certain act.

These are the principal methods, based on the properties of the
Universe, by which Aristotle proves the Eternity of the Universe. There
are, however, other methods of proving the Eternity of the Universe.
They are based on the notions formed of God, and philosophers after
Aristotle derived them from his philosophy. Some of them employed the
following argument:—

Fifth Method.—If God produced the Universe from nothing, He must have
been a potential agent before He was an actual one, and must have
passed from a state of potentiality into that of actuality—a process
that is merely possible, and requires an agent for effecting it. This
argument is likewise a source of great doubts, and every intelligent
person must examine it in order to refute it and to expose its
character.

Sixth Method.—An agent is active at one time and inactive at another,
according as favourable or unfavourable circumstances arise. The
unfavourable circumstances cause the abandonment of an intended action.
The favourable ones, on the other hand, even produce a desire for an
action for which there has not been a desire previously. As, however,
God is not subject to accidents which could bring about a change in His
will, and is not affected by obstacles and hindrances that might appear
or disappear, it is impossible, they argue, to imagine that God is
active at one time and inactive at another. He is, on the contrary,
always active in the same manner as He is always in actual existence.

Seventh Method.—The actions of God are perfect; they are in no way
defective, nor do they contain anything useless or superfluous. In
similar terms Aristotle frequently praises Him, when he says that
Nature is wise and does nothing in vain, but makes everything as
perfect as possible. The philosophers therefore contend that this
existing Universe is so perfect that it cannot be improved, and must be
permanent; for it is the result of God’s wisdom, which is not only
always present in His essence, but is identical with it.

All arguments in favour of the Eternity of the Universe are based on
the above methods, and can be traced to one or other of them. The
following objection is also raised against Creatio ex nihilo: How could
God ever have been inactive without producing or creating anything in
the infinite past? How could He have passed the long infinite period
which preceded the Creation without producing anything, so as to
commence, as it were, only yesterday, the Creation of the Universe? For
even if you said, e.g., that God created previously as many successive
worlds as the outermost sphere could contain grains of mustard, and
that each of these worlds existed as many years: considering the
infinite existence of God, it would be the same as if He had only
yesterday commenced the Creation. For when we once admit the beginning
of the existence of things after their non-existence, it makes no
difference whether thousands of centuries have passed since the
beginning, or only a short time. Those who defend the Eternity of the
Universe find both assumptions equally improbable.

Eighth Method.—The following method is based on the circumstance that
the theory implies a belief which is so common to all peoples and ages,
and so universal, that it appears to express a real fact and not merely
an hypothesis. Aristotle says that all people have evidently believed
in the permanency and stability of the heavens; and thinking that these
were eternal, they declared them to be the habitation of God and of the
spiritual beings or angels. By thus attributing the heavens to God,
they expressed their belief that the heavens are indestructible.
Several other arguments of the same kind are employed by Aristotle in
treating of this subject in order to support the results of his
philosophical speculation by common sense.






CHAPTER XV


In this chapter I intend to show that Aristotle was well aware that he
had not proved the Eternity of the Universe. He was not mistaken in
this respect. He knew that he could not prove his theory, and that his
arguments and proofs were only apparent and plausible. They are the
least objectionable, according to Alexander; but, according to the same
authority, Aristotle could not have considered them conclusive, after
having himself taught us the rules of logic, and the means by which
arguments can be refuted or confirmed.

The reason why I have introduced this subject is this: Later
philosophers, disciples of Aristotle, assume that he has proved the
Eternity of the Universe, and most of those who believe that they are
philosophers blindly follow him in this point, and accept all his
arguments as conclusive and absolute proofs. They consider it wrong to
differ from Aristotle, or to think that he was ignorant or mistaken in
anything. For this reason, taking their standpoint, I show that
Aristotle himself did not claim to have proved the Eternity of the
Universe. He says in his book Physics (viii., chap. i.) as follows:
“All the Physicists before us believed that motion is eternal, except
Plato, who holds that motion is transient; according to his opinion the
heavens are likewise transient.” Now if Aristotle had conclusive proofs
for his theory, he would not have considered it necessary to support it
by citing the opinions of preceding Physicists, nor would he have found
it necessary to point out the folly and absurdity of his opponents. For
a truth, once established by proof, does neither gain force nor
certainty by the consent of all scholars, nor lose by the general
dissent. We further find that Aristotle, in the book The Heavens and
the World, introduces his theory of the Eternity of the Universe in the
following manner: “Let us inquire into the nature of the heavens, and
see whether they are the product of something or not, destructible or
not.” After this statement of the problem, he proceeds to cite the
views of those who hold that the heavens have had a beginning, and
continues thus: “By doing this, our theory will be most plausible and
acceptable in the opinion of profound thinkers; and it will be the more
so, when, as we propose, the arguments of our opponents are first
heard. For if we were to state our opinion and our arguments without
mentioning those of our opponents, our words would be received less
favourably. He who desires to be just must not show himself hostile to
his opponent; he must have sympathy with him, and readily acknowledge
any truth contained in his words; he must admit the correctness of such
of his opponent’s arguments as he would admit if they were in his own
favour.” This is the contents of the words of Aristotle. Now, I ask
you, men of intelligence, can we have any complaint against him after
this frank statement? Or can any one now imagine that a real proof has
been given for the Eternity of the Universe? Or can Aristotle, or any
one else, believe that a theorem, though fully proved, would not be
acceptable unless the arguments of the opponents were fully refuted? We
must also take into consideration that Aristotle describes this theory
as his opinion, and his proofs as arguments. Is Aristotle ignorant of
the difference between argument and proof? between opinions, which may
be received more or less favourably, and truths capable of
demonstration? or would rhetorical appeal to the impartiality of
opponents have been required for the support of his theory if a real
proof had been given? Certainly not. Aristotle only desires to show
that his theory is better than those of his opponents, who hold that
philosophical speculation leads to the conviction that the heavens are
transient, but have never been entirely without existence; or that the
heavens have had a beginning, but are indestructible; or to defend any
of the other views mentioned by him. In this he is undoubtedly right;
for his opinion is nearer the truth than theirs, so far as a proof can
be taken from the nature of existing things; we differ from him, as
will be explained. Passion, that exercises great influence in most of
the different sects, must have influenced even the philosophers who
wished to affirm that Aristotle demonstrated his theory by proof.
Perhaps they really believe it, and assume that Aristotle himself was
not aware of it, as it was only discovered after his death! My
conviction is, that what Aristotle says on the Eternity of the
Universe, the cause of the variety in the motion of the spheres and the
order of the Intelligences, cannot be proved, and that Aristotle never
intended to prove these things. I agree with him that the ways of
proving this theory have their gates closed before us, there being no
foundation on which to build up the proof. His words on this subject
are well known. He says, “There are things concerning which we are
unable to reason, or which we find too high for us; to say why these
things have a certain property is as difficult as to decide whether the
Universe is eternal or not.” So far Aristotle. The interpretation which
Abu-nasr offers of this parallel is well known. He denies that
Aristotle had any doubt about the Eternity of the Universe, and is very
severe upon Galen, who maintains that this theory is still doubtful,
and that no proof has been offered. According to Abu-nasr, it is clear
and demonstrable by proof that the heavens are eternal, but all that is
enclosed within the heavens is transient. We hold, that by none of the
methods mentioned in this chapter can a theory be established, refuted,
or shaken.

We have mentioned these things only because we know that the majority
of those who consider themselves wise, although they know nothing of
science, accept the theory of the Eternity of the Universe on the
authority of famous scholars. They reject the words of the prophets,
because the latter do not employ any scientific method by which only a
few persons would be instructed who are intellectually well prepared,
but simply communicate the truth as received by Divine inspiration.

In the chapters which follow we will expound the theory of the Creation
in accordance with the teaching of Scripture.






CHAPTER XVI


In this chapter I will first expound my view on this question, and then
support it by argument—not by such arguments as those of the
Mutakallemim, who believe that they have proved the Creatio ex nihilo.
I will not deceive myself, and consider dialectical methods as proofs;
and the fact that a certain proposition has been proved by a
dialectical argument will never induce me to accept that proposition,
but, on the contrary, will weaken my faith in it, and cause me to doubt
it. For when we understand the fallacy of a proof, our faith in the
proposition itself is shaken. It is therefore better that a proposition
which cannot be demonstrated be received as an axiom, or that one of
the two opposite solutions of the problem be accepted on authority. The
methods by which the Mutakallemim proved the Creatio ex nihilo have
already been described by me, and I have exposed their weak points. As
to the proofs of Aristotle and his followers for the Eternity of the
Universe, they are, according to my opinion, not conclusive; they are
open to strong objections, as will be explained. I intend to show that
the theory of the Creation, as taught in Scripture, contains nothing
that is impossible; and that all those philosophical arguments which
seem to disprove our view contain weak points which make them
inconclusive, and render the attacks on our view untenable. Since I am
convinced of the correctness of my method, and consider either of the
two theories—viz., the Eternity of the Universe, and the Creation—as
admissible, I accept the latter on the authority of Prophecy, which can
teach things beyond the reach of philosophical speculation. For the
belief in prophecy is, as will be shown in the course of this treatise,
consistent even with the belief in the Eternity of the Universe. When I
have established the admissibility of our theory, I will, by
philosophical reasoning, show that our theory of the Creation is more
acceptable than that of the Eternity of the Universe; and although our
theory includes points open to criticism, I will show that there are
much stronger reasons for the rejection of the theory of our opponents.

I will now proceed to expound the method by which the proofs given for
the Eternity of the Universe can be refuted.






CHAPTER XVII


Everything produced comes into existence from non-existence; even when
the substance of a thing has been in existence, and has only changed
its form, the thing itself, which has gone through the process of
genesis and development, and has arrived at its final state, has now
different properties from those which it possessed at the commencement
of the transition from potentiality to reality, or before that time.
Take, e.g., the human ovum as contained in the female’s blood when
still included in its vessels; its nature is different from what it was
in the moment of conception, when it is met by the semen of the male
and begins to develop; the properties of the semen in that moment are
different from the properties of the living being after its birth when
fully developed. It is therefore quite impossible to infer from the
nature which a thing possesses after having passed through all stages
of its development, what the condition of the thing has been in the
moment when this process commenced; nor does the condition of a thing
in this moment show what its previous condition has been. If you make
this mistake, and attempt to prove the nature of a thing in potential
existence by its properties when actually existing, you will fall into
great confusion; you will reject evident truths and admit false
opinions. Let us assume, in our above instance, that a man born without
defect had after his birth been nursed by his mother only a few months;
the mother then died, and the father alone brought him up in a lonely
island, till he grew up, became wise, and acquired knowledge. Suppose
this man has never seen a woman or any female being; he asks some
person how man has come into existence, and how he has developed, and
receives the following answer: “Man begins his existence in the womb of
an individual of his own class, namely, in the womb of a female, which
has a certain form. While in the womb he is very small; yet he has
life, moves, receives nourishment, and gradually grows, till he arrives
at a certain stage of development. He then leaves the womb and
continues to grow till he is in the condition in which you see him.”
The orphan will naturally ask: “Did this person, when he lived, moved,
and grew in the womb, eat and drink, and breathe with his mouth and his
nostrils? Did he excrete any substance?” The answer will be, “No.”
Undoubtedly he will then attempt to refute the statements of that
person, and to prove their impossibility, by referring to the
properties of a fully developed person, in the following manner: “When
any one of us is deprived of breath for a short time he dies, and
cannot move any longer: how then can we imagine that any one of us has
been inclosed in a bag in the midst of a body for several months and
remained alive, able to move? If any one of us would swallow a living
bird, the bird would die immediately when it reached the stomach, much
more so when it came to the lower part of the belly; if we should not
take food or drink with our mouth, in a few days we should undoubtedly
be dead: how then can man remain alive for months without taking food?
If any person would take food and would not be able to excrete it,
great pains and death would follow in a short time, and yet I am to
believe that man has lived for months without that function! Suppose by
accident a hole were formed in the belly of a person, it would prove
fatal, and yet we are to believe that the navel of the fœtus has been
open! Why should the fœtus not open the eyes, spread forth the hands
and stretch out the legs, if, as you think, the limbs are all whole and
perfect.” This mode of reasoning would lead to the conclusion that man
cannot come into existence and develop in the manner described.

If philosophers would consider this example well and reflect on it,
they would find that it represents exactly the dispute between
Aristotle and ourselves. We, the followers of Moses, our Teacher, and
of Abraham, our Father, believe that the Universe has been produced and
has developed in a certain manner, and that it has been created in a
certain order. The Aristotelians oppose us, and found their objections
on the properties which the things in the Universe possess when in
actual existence and fully developed. We admit the existence of these
properties, but hold that they are by no means the same as those which
the things possessed in the moment of their production; and we hold
that these properties themselves have come into existence from absolute
non-existence. Their arguments are therefore no objection whatever to
our theory; they have demonstrative force only against those who hold
that the nature of things as at present in existence proves the
Creation. But this is not my opinion.

I will now return to our theme, viz., to the description of the
principal proofs of Aristotle, and show that they prove nothing
whatever against us, since we hold that God brought the entire Universe
into existence from absolute non-existence, and that He caused it to
develop into the present state. Aristotle says that the materia prima
is eternal, and by referring to the properties of transient beings he
attempts to prove this statement, and to show that the materia prima
could not possibly have been produced. He is right; we do not maintain
that the materia prima has been produced in the same manner as man is
produced from the ovum, and that it can be destroyed in the same manner
as man is reduced to dust. But we believe that God created it from
nothing, and that since its creation it has its own properties, viz.,
that all things are produced of it and again reduced to it, when they
cease to exist; that it does not exist without Form; and that it is the
source of all genesis and destruction. Its genesis is not like that of
the things produced from it, nor its destruction like theirs; for it
has been created from nothing, and if it should please the Creator, He
might reduce it to absolutely nothing. The same applies to motion.
Aristotle founds some of his proofs on the fact that motion is not
subject to genesis or destruction. This is correct; if we consider
motion as it exists at present, we cannot imagine that in its totality
it should be subject, like individual motions, to genesis and
destruction. In like manner Aristotle is correct in saying that
circular motion is without beginning, in so far as seeing the rotating
spherical body in actual existence, we cannot conceive the idea that
that rotation has ever been absent. The same argument we employ as
regards the law that a state of potentiality precedes all actual
genesis. This law applies to the Universe as it exists at present, when
everything produced originates in another thing; but nothing perceived
with our senses or comprehended in our mind can prove that a thing
created from nothing must have been previously in a state of
potentiality. Again, as regards the theory that the heavens contain no
opposites [and are therefore indestructible], we admit its correctness;
but we do not maintain that the production of the heavens has taken
place in the same way as that of a horse or ass, and we do not say that
they are like plants and animals, which are destructible on account of
the opposite elements they contain. In short, the properties of things
when fully developed contain no clue as to what have been the
properties of the things before their perfection. We therefore do not
reject as impossible the opinion of those who say that the heavens were
produced before the earth, or the reverse, or that the heavens have
existed without stars, or that certain species of animals have been in
existence, and others not. For the state of the whole Universe when it
came into existence may be compared with that of animals when their
existence begins; the heart evidently precedes the testicles, the veins
are in existence before the bones; although, when the animal is fully
developed, none of the parts is missing which is essential to its
existence. This remark is not superfluous, if the Scriptural account of
the Creation be taken literally; in reality, it cannot be taken
literally, as will be shown when we shall treat of this subject.

The principle laid down in the foregoing must be well understood; it is
a high rampart erected round the Law, and able to resist all missiles
directed against it. Aristotle, or rather his followers, may perhaps
ask us how we know that the Universe has been created; and that other
forces than those it has at present were acting in its Creation, since
we hold that the properties of the Universe, as it exists at present,
prove nothing as regards its creation? We reply, there is no necessity
for this according to our plan; for we do not desire to prove the
Creation, but only its possibility; and this possibility is not refuted
by arguments based on the nature of the present Universe, which we do
not dispute. When we have established the admissibility of our theory,
we shall then show its superiority. In attempting to prove the
inadmissibility of Creatio ex nihilo, the Aristotelians can therefore
not derive any support from the nature of the Universe; they must
resort to the notion our mind has formed of God. Their proofs include
the three methods which I have mentioned above, and which are based on
the notion conceived of God. In the next chapter I will expose the weak
points of these arguments, and show that they really prove nothing.






CHAPTER XVIII


The first method employed by the philosophers is this: they assume that
a transition from potentiality to actuality would take place in the
Deity itself, if He produced a thing only at a certain fixed time. The
refutation of this argument is very easy. The argument applies only to
bodies composed of substance—the element that possesses the possibility
[of change]—and form; for when such a body does not act for some time,
and then acts by virtue of its form, it must undoubtedly have possessed
something in potentia that hath now become actual, and the transition
can only have been effected by some external agent. As far as corporeal
bodies are concerned, this has been fully proved. But that which is
incorporeal and without substance does not include anything merely
possible; everything it contains is always in existence. The above
argument does not apply to it, and it is not impossible that such a
being acts at one time and does not act at another. This does not imply
a change in the incorporeal being itself nor a transition from
potentiality to actuality. The Active Intellect may be taken as an
illustration. According to Aristotle and his school, the Active
Intellect, an incorporeal being, acts at one time and does not act at
another, as has been shown by Abu-nasr in his treatise on the
Intellect. He says there quite correctly as follows: “It is an evident
fact that the Active Intellect does not act continually, but only at
times.” And yet he does not say that the Active Intellect is
changeable, or passes from a state of potentiality to that of
actuality, although it produces at one time something which it has not
produced before. For there is no relation or comparison whatever
between corporeal and incorporeal beings, neither in the moment of
action nor in that of inaction. It is only by homonymity that the term
“action” is used in reference to the forms residing in bodies, and also
in reference to absolutely spiritual beings. The circumstance that a
purely spiritual being does not effect at one time that which it
effects at another, does not necessitate a transition from potentiality
to actuality; such a transition is necessary in the case of forces
connected with bodies. It might, perhaps, be objected that our argument
is, to some extent, a fallacy; since it is not due to anything
contained in the Active Intellect itself, but to the absence of
substances sufficiently prepared for its action, that at times it does
not act; it does act always when substances sufficiently prepared are
present, and, when the action does not continue, it is owing to the
absence of substance sufficiently prepared, and not to any change in
the Intellect. I answer that it is not our intention to state the
reason why God created at one time and not at another; and, in
referring to the Active Intellect as a parallel, we do not mean to
assert that God acts at one time and not at another, in the same manner
as the Active Intellect, an absolutely spiritual being, acts
intermittently. We do not make this assertion, and, if we did, the
conclusion would be fallacious. What we infer, and what we are
justified in inferring, is this: the Active Intellect is neither a
corporeal object nor a force residing in a body; it acts
intermittently, and yet whatever the cause may be why it does not
always act, we do not say that the Active Intellect has passed from a
state of potentiality to that of actuality; or that it implies the
possibility [of change], or that an agent must exist that causes the
transition from potentiality to actuality. We have thus refuted the
strong objection raised by those who believe in the Eternity of the
Universe; since we believe that God is neither a corporeal body nor a
force residing in a body, we need not assume that the Creation, after a
period of inaction, is due to a change in the Creator Himself.

The second method employed in proving the Eternity of the Universe is
based on the theory that all wants, changes, and obstacles are absent
from the Essence of God. Our refutation of this proof, which is both
difficult and profound, is this. Every being that is endowed with free
will and performs certain acts in reference to another being,
necessarily interrupts those acts at one time or another, in
consequence of some obstacles or changes. E.g., a person desires to
have a house, but he does not build one, because he meets with some
obstacles: he has not the material, or he has the material, but it is
not prepared for the purpose on account of the absence of proper
instruments; or he has material and instruments, and yet does not build
a house, because he does not desire to build it; since he feels no want
for a refuge. When changed circumstances, as heat or cold, impel him to
seek a refuge, then he desires to build a house. Thus changed
circumstances change his will, and the will, when it meets with
obstacles, is not carried into effect. This, however, is only the case
when the causes of the actions are external; but when the action has no
other purpose whatever than to fulfil the will, then the will does not
depend on the existence of favourable circumstances. The being endowed
with this will need not act continually even in the absence of all
obstacles, because there does not exist anything for the sake of which
it acts, and which, in the absence of all obstacles, would necessitate
the action: the act simply follows the will. But, some might ask, even
if we admit the correctness of all this, is not change imputed in the
fact that the will of the being exists at one time and not at another?
I reply thus: The true essence of the will of a being is simply the
faculty of conceiving a desire at one time and not conceiving it at
another. In the case of corporeal beings, the will which aims at a
certain external object changes according to obstacles and
circumstances. But the will of an absolutely spiritual being which does
not depend on external causes is unchangeable, and the fact that the
being desires one thing one day and another thing another day, does not
imply a change in the essence of that being, or necessitate the
existence of an external cause [for this change in the desire].
Similarly it has been shown by us that if a being acted at one time and
did not act at another, this would not involve a change in the being
itself. It is now clear that the term “will” is homonymously used of
man’s will and of the will of God, there being no comparison whatever
between God’s will and that of man. The objection is refuted, and our
theory is not shaken by it. This is all we desire to establish.

The third method employed in proving the Eternity of the Universe is
this: whatever the wisdom of God finds necessary to produce is produced
eo ipso; but this wisdom, being His Essence, is eternal, and that which
results from His wisdom must be eternal. This is a very weak argument.
As we do not understand why the wisdom of God produced nine spheres,
neither more nor less, or why He fixed the number and size of the stars
exactly as they are; so we cannot understand why His wisdom at a
certain time caused the Universe to exist, whilst a short time before
it had not been in existence. All things owe their existence to His
eternal and constant wisdom, but we are utterly ignorant of the ways
and methods of that wisdom, since, according to our opinion [that God
has no attributes], His will is identical with His wisdom, and all His
attributes are one and the same thing, namely, His Essence or Wisdom.
More will be said on this question in the section on Providence. Thus
this objection to our theory falls likewise to the ground.

There is no evidence for the theory of the Eternity of the Universe,
neither in the fact cited by Aristotle of the general consent of the
ancient peoples when they describe the heavens as the habitation of the
angels and of God, nor in the apparent concurrence of Scriptural texts
with this belief. These facts merely prove that the heavens lead us to
believe in the existence of the Intelligences, i.e., ideals and angels,
and that these lead us to believe in the existence of God; for He sets
them in motion, and rules them. We will explain and show that there is
no better evidence for the existence of a Creator, as we believe, than
that furnished by the heavens; but also according to the opinion of the
philosophers, as has been mentioned by us, they give evidence that a
being exists that sets them in motion, and that this being is neither a
corporeal body nor a force residing in a body.

Having proved that our theory is admissible, and not impossible, as
those who defend the Eternity of the Universe assert, I will, in the
chapters which follow, show that our theory is preferable from a
philosophical point of view, and expose the absurdities implied in the
theory of Aristotle.






CHAPTER XIX


It has been shown that according to Aristotle, and according to all
that defend his theory, the Universe is inseparable from God; He is the
cause, and the Universe the effect; and this effect is a necessary one;
and as it cannot be explained why or how God exists in this particular
manner, namely, being One and incorporeal, so it cannot be asked
concerning the whole Universe why or how it exists in this particular
way. For it is necessary that the whole, the cause as well as the
effect, exist in this particular manner, it is impossible for them not
to exist, or to be different from what they actually are. This leads to
the conclusion that the nature of everything remains constant, that
nothing changes its nature in any way, and that such a change is
impossible in any existing thing. It would also follow that the
Universe is not the result of design, choice, and desire; for if this
were the case, they would have been non-existing before the design had
been conceived.

We, however, hold that all things in the Universe are the result of
design, and not merely of necessity; He who designed them may change
them when He changes His design. But not every design is subject to
change; for there are things which are impossible, and their nature
cannot be altered, as will be explained. Here, in this chapter, I
merely wish to show by arguments almost as forcible as real proofs,
that the Universe gives evidence of design; but I will not fall into
the error in which the Mutakallemim have so much distinguished
themselves, namely, of ignoring the existing nature of things or
assuming the existence of atoms, or the successive creation of
accidents, or any of their propositions which I have tried to explain,
and which are intended to establish the principle of Divine selection.
You must not, however, think that they understood the principle in the
same sense as we do, although they undoubtedly aimed at the same thing,
and mentioned the same things which we also will mention, when they
treated of Divine Selection. For they do not distinguish between
selection in the case of a plant to make it red and not white, or sweet
and not bitter, and determination in the case of the heavens which gave
them their peculiar geometrical form and did not give them a triangular
or quadrilateral shape. The Mutakallemim established the principle of
determination by means of their propositions, which have been
enumerated above (Part I., chap. lxxiii.). I will establish this
principle only as far as necessary, and only by philosophical
propositions based on the nature of things. But before I begin my
argument, I will state the following facts: Matter is common to things
different from each other; there must be either one external cause
which endows this matter partly with one property, partly with another,
or there must be as many different causes as there are different forms
of the matter common to all things. This is admitted by those who
assume the Eternity of the Universe. After having premised this
proposition, I will proceed with the discussion of our theme from an
Aristotelian point of view, in form of a dialogue.

We.—You have proved that all things in the sublunary world have one
common substance; why then do the species of things vary? why are the
individuals in each species different from each other?

Aristotelian.—Because the composition of the things formed of that
substance varies. For the common substance at first received four
different forms, and each form was endowed with two qualities, and
through these four qualities the substance was turned into the elements
of which all things are formed. The composition of the elements takes
place in the following manner:—First they are mixed in consequence of
the motion of the spheres, and then they combine together; a cause for
variation arises then in the variation of the degree of heat, cold,
moisture, and dryness of the elements which form the constituent parts
of the things. By these different combinations things are variously
predisposed to receive different forms; and these in their turn are
again prepared to receive other forms, and so on. Each generic form
finds a wide sphere in its substance both as regards quality and
quantity; and the individuals of the classes vary accordingly. This is
fully explained in Natural Science. It is quite correct and clear to
every one that readily acknowledges the truth, and does not wish to
deceive himself.

We.—Since the combination of the elements prepares substances and
enables them to receive different forms, what has prepared the first
substance and caused one part of it to receive the form of fire,
another part the form of earth, and the parts between these two the
forms of water and of air, since one substance is common to all?
Through what has the substance of earth become more fit for the form of
earth, and the substance of fire more fit for that of fire?

Ar.—The difference of the elements was caused by their different
position; for the different places prepared the same substance
differently, in the following way: the portion nearest the surrounding
sphere became more rarified and swifter in motion, and thus approaching
the nature of that sphere, it received by this preparation the form of
fire. The farther the substance is away from the surrounding sphere
towards the centre, the denser, the more solid, and the less luminous
it is; it becomes earth; the same is the cause of the formation of
water and air. This is necessarily so; for it would be absurd to deny
that each part of the substance is in a certain place; or to assume
that the surface is identical with the centre, or the centre with the
surface. This difference in place determined the different forms, i.e.,
predisposed the substance to receive different forms.

We.—Is the substance of the surrounding sphere, i.e., the heavens, the
same as that of the elements?

Ar.—No; the substance is different, and the forms are different. The
term “body” is homonymously used of these bodies below and of the
heavens, as has been shown by modern philosophers. All this has been
demonstrated by proof.

But let now the reader of this treatise hear what I have to say.
Aristotle has proved that the difference of forms becomes evident by
the difference of actions. Since, therefore, the motion of the elements
is rectilinear, and that of the spheres circular, we infer that the
substances are different. This inference is supported by Natural
Science. When we further notice that substances with rectilinear motion
differ in their directions, that some move upward, some downward, and
that substances which move in the same direction have different
velocities, we infer that their forms must be different. Thus we learn
that there are four elements. In the same way we come to the conclusion
that the substance of all the spheres is the same, since they all have
circular motion. Their forms, however, are different, since one sphere
moves from east to west, and another from west to east; and their
motions have also different velocities. We can now put the following
question to Aristotle: There is one substance common to all spheres;
each one has its own peculiar form. Who thus determined and predisposed
these spheres to receive different forms? Is there above the spheres
any being capable of determining this except God? I will show the
profundity and the extraordinary acumen which Aristotle displayed when
this question troubled him. He strove very hard to meet this objection
with arguments, which, however, were not borne out by facts. Although
he does not mention this objection, it is clear from his words that he
endeavours to show the nature of the spheres, as he has shown that of
the things in the sublunary world. Everything is, according to him, the
result of a law of Nature, and not the result of the design of a being
that designs as it likes, or the determination of a being that
determines as it pleases. He has not carried out the idea consistently,
and it will never be done. He tries indeed to find the cause why the
sphere moves from east and not from west; why some spheres move with
greater velocity, others with less velocity, and he finds the cause of
these differences in their different positions in reference to the
uppermost sphere. He further attempts to show why there are several
spheres for each of the seven planets, while there is only one sphere
for the large number of fixed stars. For all this he endeavours to
state the reason, so as to show that the whole order is the necessary
result of the laws of Nature. He has not attained his object. For as
regards the things in the sublunary world, his explanations are in
accordance with facts, and the relation between cause and effect is
clearly shown. It can therefore be assumed that everything is the
necessary result of the motions and influences of the spheres. But when
he treats of the properties of the spheres, he does not clearly show
the causal relation, nor does he explain the phenomena in that
systematic way which the hypothesis of natural laws would demand. For
let us consider the spheres: in one case a sphere with greater velocity
is above a sphere with less velocity, in another case we notice the
reverse; in a third case there are two spheres with equal velocities,
one above the other. There are, besides, other phenomena which speak
strongly against the hypothesis that all is regulated by the laws of
Nature, and I will devote a special chapter to the discussion of these
phenomena. In short, there is no doubt that Aristotle knew the weakness
of his arguments in tracing and describing the cause of all these
things, and therefore he prefaces his researches on these things as
follows:—“We will now thoroughly investigate two problems, which it is
our proper duty to investigate and to discuss according to our
capacity, wisdom, and opinion. This our attempt must not be attributed
to presumption and pride, but to our extraordinary zeal in the study of
philosophy; when we attempt the highest and grandest problems, and
endeavour to offer some proper solution, every one that hears it should
rejoice and be pleased.” So far Aristotle. This shows that he
undoubtedly knew the weakness of his theory. How much weaker must it
appear when we bear in mind that the science of Astronomy was not yet
fully developed, and that in the days of Aristotle the motions of the
spheres were not known so well as they are at present. I think that it
was the object of Aristotle in attributing in his Metaphysics one
Intelligence to every sphere, to assume the existence of something
capable of determining the peculiar course of each sphere. Later on I
will show that he has not gained anything thereby; but now I will
explain the words, “according to our capacity, wisdom, and opinion,”
occurring in the passage which we quoted. I have not noticed that any
of the commentators explain them. The term “our opinion” refers to the
principle that everything is the result of natural laws, or to the
theory of the Eternity of the Universe. By “our wisdom” he meant the
knowledge of that which is clear and generally accepted, viz., that the
existence of every one of these things is due to a certain cause, and
not to chance. By “our capacity” he meant the insufficiency of our
intellect to find the causes of all these things. He only intended to
trace the causes for a few of them; and so he did. For he gives an
excellent reason why the sphere of the fixed stars moves slowly, while
the other spheres move with greater velocity, namely, because its
motion is in a different direction [from the uppermost sphere]. He
further says that the more distant a sphere is from the eighth sphere
the greater is its velocity. But this rule does not hold good in all
cases, as I have already explained (p. 174). More forcible still is the
following objection: There are spheres below the eighth that move from
east to west. Of these each upper one, according to this rule, would
have a greater velocity than the lower one; and the velocity of these
spheres would almost equal that of the ninth sphere. But Astronomy had,
in the days of Aristotle, not yet developed to the height it has
reached at present.

According to our theory of the Creation, all this can easily be
explained; for we say that there is a being that determines the
direction and the velocity of the motion of each sphere; but we do not
know the reason why the wisdom of that being gave to each sphere its
peculiar property. If Aristotle had been able to state the cause of the
difference in the motion of the spheres, and show that it corresponded
as he thought to their relative positions, this would have been
excellent, and the variety in their motions would be explained in the
same way as the variety of the elements, by their relative position
between the centre and the surface; but this is not the case, as I said
before.

There is a phenomenon in the spheres which more clearly shows the
existence of voluntary determination; it cannot be explained otherwise
than by assuming that some being designed it: this phenomenon is the
existence of the stars. The fact that the sphere is constantly in
motion, while the stars remain stationary, indicates that the substance
of the stars is different from that of the spheres. Abu-nasr has
already mentioned the fact in his additions to the Physics of
Aristotle. He says: “There is a difference between the stars and the
spheres; for the spheres are transparent, the stars are opaque; and the
cause of this is that there is a difference, however small it may be,
between their substances and forms.” So far Abu-nasr. But I do not say
that there is a small difference, but a very great difference; because
I do not infer it from the transparency of the spheres, but from their
motions. I am convinced that there are three different kinds of
substance, with three different forms, namely:—(1) Bodies which never
move of their own accord; such are the bodies of the stars; (2) bodies
which always move, such are the bodies of the spheres; (3) bodies which
both move and rest, such are the elements. Now, I ask, what has united
these two bodies, which, according to my opinion, differ very much from
each other, though, according to Abu-nasr, only a little? Who has
prepared the bodies for this union? In short, it would be strange that,
without the existence of design, one of two different bodies should be
joined to the other in such a manner that it is fixed to it in a
certain place but does not combine with it. It is still more difficult
to explain the existence of the numerous stars in the eighth sphere;
they are all spherical; some of them are large, some small; here we
notice two stars apparently distant from each other one cubit; there a
group of ten close together; whilst in another place there is a large
space without any star. What determined that the one small part should
have ten stars, and the other portion should be without any star? and
the whole body of the sphere being uniform throughout, why should a
particular star occupy the one place and not another? The answer to
these and similar questions is very difficult, and almost impossible,
if we assume that all emanates from God as the necessary result of
certain permanent laws, as Aristotle holds. But if we assume that all
this is the result of design, there is nothing strange or improbable;
and the only question to be asked is this: What is the cause of this
design? The answer to this question is that all this has been made for
a certain purpose, though we do not know it; there is nothing that is
done in vain, or by chance. It is well known that the veins and nerves
of an individual dog or ass are not the result of chance; their
magnitude is not determined by chance; nor is it by chance, but for a
certain purpose, that one vein is thick, another thin; that one nerve
has many branches, another has none; that one goes down straight,
whilst another is bent; it is well known that all this must be just as
it is. How, then, can any reasonable person imagine that the position,
magnitude, and number of the stars, or the various courses of their
spheres, are purposeless, or the result of chance? There is no doubt
that every one of these things is necessary and in accordance with a
certain design; and it is extremely improbable that these things should
be the necessary result of natural laws, and not that of design.

The best proof for design in the Universe I find in the different
motions of the spheres, and in the fixed position of the stars in the
spheres. For this reason you find all the prophets point to the spheres
and stars when they want to prove that there must exist a Divine Being.
Thus Abraham reflected on the stars, as is well known; Isaiah (xl. 26)
exhorts to learn from them the existence of God, and says, “Lift up
your eyes on high, and behold who hath created these things?” Jeremiah
[calls God] “The Maker of the heavens”; Abraham calls Him “The God of
the heavens” (Gen. xxiv. 7); [Moses], the chief of the Prophets, uses
the phrase explained by us (Part I., chap, lxx.), “He who rideth on the
heavens” (Deut. xxxiii. 26). The proof taken from the heavens is
convincing; for the variety of things in the sublunary world, though
their substance is one and the same, can be explained as the work of
the influences of the spheres, or the result of the variety in the
position of the substance in relation to the spheres, as has been shown
by Aristotle. But who has determined the variety in the spheres and the
stars, if not the Will of God? To say that the Intelligences have
determined it is of no use whatever; for the Intelligences are not
corporeal, and have no local relation to the spheres. Why then should
the one sphere in its desire to approach the Intelligence, move
eastward, and another westward? Is the one Intelligence in the east,
the other in the west? or why does one move with great velocity,
another slowly? This difference is not in accordance with their
distances from each other, as is well known. We must then say that the
nature and essence of each sphere necessitated its motion in a certain
direction, and in a certain manner, as the consequence of its desire to
approach its Intelligence. Aristotle clearly expresses this opinion. We
thus have returned to the part from which we started; and we ask, Since
the substance of all things is the same, what made the nature of one
portion different from another? Why has this sphere a desire which
produces a motion different from that which the desire of another
sphere produces? This must have been done by an agent capable of
determining. We have thus been brought to examine two questions:—(1) Is
it necessary to assume that the variety of the things in the Universe
is the result of Design, and not of fixed laws of Nature, or is it not
necessary? (2) Assuming that all this is the result of Design, does it
follow that it has been created after not having existed, or does
Creatio ex nihilo not follow, and has the Being which has determined
all this done always so? Some of those who believe in the Eternity of
the Universe hold the last opinion. I will now begin the examination of
these two questions, and explain them as much as necessary in the
following chapters.






CHAPTER XX


According to Aristotle, none of the products of Nature are due to
chance. His proof is this: That which is due to chance does not
reappear constantly nor frequently, but all products of Nature reappear
either constantly or at least frequently. The heavens, with all that
they contain, are constant; they never change, as has been explained,
neither as regards their essence nor as regards their place. But in the
sublunary world we find both things which are constant and things which
reappear frequently [though not constantly]. Thus, e.g., the heat of
fire and the downward tendency of a stone are constant properties,
whilst the form and life of the individuals in each species are the
same in most cases. All this is clear. If the parts of the Universe are
not accidental, how can the whole Universe be considered as the result
of chance? Therefore the existence of the Universe is not due to
chance. The following is, in short, the objection which Aristotle
raises against one of the earlier philosophers who assumed that the
Universe is the result of chance, and that it came into existence by
itself, without any cause. Some assume that the heavens and the whole
Universe came into existence spontaneously, as well as the rotation and
motion [of the spheres], which has produced the variety of things and
established their present order. This opinion implies a great
absurdity. They admit that animals and plants do not owe their
existence or production to chance, but to a certain cause, be that
cause Nature, or reason, or the like; e.g., they do not assume that
everything might be formed by chance of a certain seed or semen, but
that of a certain seed only an olive-tree is produced, and of a certain
semen only a human being is developed. And yet they think that the
heavens, and those bodies which appear divine among the rest of bodies,
came into existence spontaneously, without the action of any such cause
as produces plants and animals. Having thus examined this theory,
Aristotle then proceeds to refute it at greater length. It is therefore
clear that Aristotle believes and proves that things in real existence
are not accidental; they cannot be accidental, because they are
essential, i.e., there is a cause which necessitates that they should
be in their actual condition, and on account of that cause they are
just as they in reality are. This has been proved, and it is the
opinion of Aristotle. But I do not think that, according to Aristotle,
the rejection of the spontaneous origin of things implies the admission
of Design and Will. For as it is impossible to reconcile two opposites,
so it is impossible to reconcile the two theories, that of necessary
existence by causality, and that of Creation by the desire and will of
a Creator. For the necessary existence assumed by Aristotle must be
understood in this sense, that for everything that is not the product
of work there must be a certain cause that produces it with its
properties; for this cause there is another cause, and for the second a
third, and so on. The series of causes ends with the Prime Cause, from
which everything derives existence, since it is impossible that the
series should continue ad infinitum. He nevertheless does not mean to
say that the existence of the Universe is the necessary product of the
Creator, i.e., the Prime Cause, in the same manner as the shadow is
caused by a body, or heat by fire, or light by the sun. Only those who
do not comprehend his words attribute such ideas to him. He uses here
the term necessary in the same sense as we use the term when we say
that the existence of the intellectus necessarily implies that of the
intellectum, for the former is the efficient cause of the latter in so
far as intellectum. Even Aristotle holds that the Prime Cause is the
highest and most perfect Intellect; he therefore says that the First
Cause is pleased, satisfied, and delighted with that which necessarily
derives existence from Him, and it is impossible that He should wish it
to be different. But we do not call this “design,” and it has nothing
in common with design. E.g., man is pleased, satisfied, and delighted
that he is endowed with eyes and hands, and it is impossible that he
should desire it to be otherwise, and yet the eyes and hands which a
man has are not the result of his design, and it is not by his own
determination that he has certain properties and is able to perform
certain actions. The notion of design and determination applies only to
things not yet in existence, when there is still the possibility of
their being in accordance with the design or not. I do not know whether
the modern Aristotelians understood his words to imply that the
existence of the Universe presupposes some cause in the sense of design
and determination, or whether, in opposition to him, they assumed
design and determination, in the belief that this does not conflict
with the theory of the Eternity of the Universe.

Having explained this, I will now proceed to examine the opinions of
the modern philosophers.






CHAPTER XXI


Some of the recent philosophers who adhere to the theory of the
Eternity of the Universe hold that God produces the Universe, that He
by His will designs and determines its existence and form; they reject,
however, the theory that this act took place at one certain time, and
assume that this always has been the case, and will always be so. The
circumstance that we cannot imagine an agent otherwise than preceding
the result of its action, they explain by the fact that this is
invariably the case in all that we produce; because for agents of the
same kind as we are, there are some moments in which they are not
active, and are only agents in potentia; they become agents when they
act. But as regards God there are no moments of non-action, or of
potentiality in any respect; He is not before His work, He is always an
actual agent. And as there is a great difference between His essence
and ours, so is also a great difference between the relation of His
work to Him and the relation of our work to us. They apply the same
argument to will and determination; for there is no difference in this
respect whether we say He acts, wills, designs, or determines. They
further assume that change in His action or will is inadmissible. It is
therefore clear that these philosophers abandoned the term “necessary
result,” but retained the theory of it; they perhaps sought to use a
better expression, or to remove an objectionable term. For it is the
same thing, whether we say in accordance with the view of Aristotle
that the Universe is the result of the Prime Cause, and must be eternal
as that Cause is eternal, or in accordance with these philosophers that
the Universe is the result of the act, design, will, selection, and
determination of God, but it has always been so, and will always be so;
in the same manner as the rising of the sun undoubtedly produces the
day, and yet it does not precede it. But when we speak of design we do
not mean it in this sense; we mean to express by it that the Universe
is not the “necessary result” of God’s existence, as the effect is the
necessary result of the efficient cause; in the latter case the effect
cannot be separated from the cause; it cannot change unless the cause
changes entirely, or at least in some respect. If we accept this
explanation we easily see how absurd it is to say that the Universe is
in the same relation to God as the effect is to the efficient cause,
and to assume at the same time that the Universe is the result of the
action and determination of God.

Having fully explained this subject, we come to the question whether
the cause, which must be assumed for the variety of properties noticed
in the heavenly beings, is merely an efficient cause, that must
necessarily produce that variety as its effect, or whether that variety
is due to a determining agent, such as we believe, in accordance with
the theory of Moses our Teacher. Before I discuss this question I will
first explain fully what Aristotle means by “necessary result”; after
that I will show by such philosophical arguments as are free from every
fallacy why I prefer the theory of Creatio ex nihilo. It is clear that
when he says that the first Intelligence is the necessary result of the
existence of God, the second Intelligence the result of the existence
of the first, the third of the second [and so on], and that the spheres
are the necessary result of the existence of the Intelligences, and so
forth, in the well-known order which you learnt from passages dealing
with it, and of which we have given a résumé in this part (ch. iv.)—he
does not mean that the one thing was first in existence, and then the
second came as the necessary result of the first; he denies that any
one of these beings has had a beginning. By “necessary result” he
merely refers to the causal relation; he means to say that the first
Intelligence is the cause of the existence of the second; the second of
the third, and so on to the last of the Intelligences; and the same is
also the case as regards the spheres and the materia prima; none of
these preceded another, or has been in existence without the existence
of that other. We say, e.g., that the necessary result of the primary
qualities are roughness [and] smoothness, hardness [and] softness,
porosity and solidity; and no person doubts that heat, cold, moisture,
and dryness are the causes of smoothness and roughness, of hardness and
softness, porosity and solidity, and similar qualities, and that the
latter are the necessary result of those four primary qualities. And
yet it is impossible that a body should exist with the primary
qualities without the secondary ones; for the relation between the two
sets of qualities is that of causality, not that of agent and its
product. Just in the same way the term “necessary result” is used by
Aristotle in reference to the whole Universe, when he says that one
portion is the result of the other, and continues the series up to the
First Cause as he calls it, or first Intellect, if you prefer this
term. For we all mean the same, only with this difference, that
according to Aristotle everything besides that Being is the necessary
result of the latter, as I have already mentioned; whilst, according to
our opinion, that Being created the whole Universe with design and
will, so that the Universe which had not been in existence before, has
by His will come into existence. I will now begin in the following
chapters my proofs for the superiority of our theory, that of Creatio
ex nihilo.






CHAPTER XXII


Aristotle and all philosophers assume as an axiom that a simple element
can only produce one simple thing, whilst a compound can produce as
many things as it contains simple elements; e.g., fire combines in
itself two properties, heat and dryness; it gives heat by the one
property, and produces dryness by the other: an object composed of
matter and form produces certain things on account of its matter, and
others on account of its form, if [both matter and form] consist of
several elements. In accordance with this axiom, Aristotle holds that
the direct emanation from God must be one simple Intelligence, and
nothing else.

A second axiom assumed by him is this: Things are not produced by other
things at random; there must be some relation between cause and effect.
Thus accidents are not produced by accidents promiscuously; quality
cannot be the origin of quantity, nor quantity that of quality; a form
cannot emanate from matter, nor matter from form.

A third axiom is this: A single agent that acts with design and will,
and not merely by the force of the laws of Nature, can produce
different objects.

A fourth axiom is as follows: An object, whose several elements are
only connected by juxtaposition, is more properly a compound than an
object whose different elements have entirely combined; e.g., bone,
flesh, veins, or nerves, are more simple than the hand or the foot,
that are a combination of bone, flesh, veins, and nerves. This is very
clear, and requires no further explanation.

Having premised these axioms, I ask the following question: Aristotle
holds that the first Intelligence is the cause of the second, the
second of the third, and so on, till the thousandth, if we assume a
series of that number. Now the first Intellect is undoubtedly simple.
How then can the compound form of existing things come from such an
Intellect by fixed laws of Nature, as Aristotle assumes? We admit all
he said concerning the Intelligences, that the further they are away
from the first, the greater is the variety of their compounds, in
consequence of the larger number of the objects comprehensible by the
Intelligences; but even after admitting this, the question remains, By
what law of Nature did the spheres emanate from the Intelligences? What
relation is there between material and immaterial beings? Suppose we
admit that each sphere emanates from an Intelligence of the form
mentioned; that the Intelligence, including, as it were, two elements,
in so far as it comprehends itself and another thing, produces the next
Intelligence by the one element, and a sphere by the other; but the
question would then be, how the one simple element could produce the
sphere, that contains two substances and two forms, namely, the
substance and the form of the sphere, and also the substance and the
form of the star fixed in that sphere. For, according to the laws of
Nature, the compound can only emanate from a compound. There must
therefore be one element, from which the body of the sphere emanates,
and another element, from which the body of the star emanates. This
would be necessary even if the substance of all stars were the same;
but it is possible that the luminous stars have not the same substance
as the non-luminous stars; it is besides well known that each body has
its own matter and its own form. It must now be clear that this
emanation could not have taken place by the force of the laws of
Nature, as Aristotle contends. Nor does the difference of the motions
of the spheres follow the order of their positions; and therefore it
cannot be said that this difference is the result of certain laws of
Nature. We have already mentioned this (ch. xix.).

There is in the properties of the spheres another circumstance that is
opposed to the assumed laws of Nature; namely, if the substance of all
spheres is the same, why does it not occur that the form of one sphere
combines with the substance of another sphere, as is the case with
things on earth, simply because their substance is fit [for such
changes]? If the substance of all spheres is the same, if it is not
assumed that each of them has a peculiar substance, and if, contrary to
all principles, the peculiar motion of each sphere is no evidence for
the special character of its substance, why then should a certain form
constantly remain united with a certain substance? Again, if the stars
have all one substance, by what are they distinguished from each other?
is it by forms? or by accidents? Whichever be the case, the forms or
the accidents would interchange, so that they would successively unite
with every one of the stars, so long as their substance [being the
same] admits the combinations [with every one of the forms or the
accidents]. This shows that the term substance, when used of the
spheres or the stars, does not mean the same as it signifies when used
of the substance of earthly things, but is applied to the two
synonymously. It further shows that every one of the bodies of the
spheres has its own peculiar form of existence different from that of
all other beings. Why then is circular motion common to all spheres,
and why is the fixed position of the stars in their respective spheres
common to all stars? If we, however, assume design and determination of
a Creator, in accordance with His incomprehensible wisdom, all these
difficulties disappear. They must arise when we consider the whole
Universe, not as the result of free will, but as the result of fixed
laws of Nature: a theory which, on the one hand, is not in harmony with
the existing order of things, and does not offer for it a sufficient
reason or argument; and, on the other hand, implies many and great
improbabilities. For, according to this theory, God, whose perfection
in every respect is recognised by all thinking persons, is in such a
relation to the Universe that He cannot change anything; if He wished
to make the wing of a fly longer, or to reduce the number of the legs
of a worm by one, He could not accomplish it. According to Aristotle,
He does not try such a thing, and it is wholly impossible for Him to
desire any change in the existing order of things; if He could, it
would not increase His perfection; it might, on the contrary, from some
point of view, diminish it.

Although I know that many partial critics will ascribe my opinion
concerning the theory of Aristotle to insufficient understanding, or to
intentional opposition, I will not refrain from stating in short the
results of my researches, however poor my capacities may be. I hold
that the theory of Aristotle is undoubtedly correct as far as the
things are concerned which exist between the sphere of the moon and the
centre of the earth. Only an ignorant person rejects it, or a person
with preconceived opinions of his own, which he desires to maintain and
to defend, and which lead him to ignore clear facts. But what Aristotle
says concerning things above the sphere of the moon is, with few
exceptions, mere imagination and opinion; to a still greater extent
this applies to his system of Intelligences, and to some of his
metaphysical views; they include great improbabilities, [promote] ideas
which all nations consider as evidently corrupt, and cause views to
spread which cannot be proved.

It may perhaps be asked why I have enumerated the doubts which can be
raised against the theory of Aristotle; whether by mere doubts a theory
can be overthrown, or its opposite established? This is certainly not
the case. But we treat this philosopher exactly as his followers tell
us to do. For Alexander stated that when a theory cannot be established
by proof, the two most opposite views should be compared as to the
doubts entertained concerning each of them, and that view which admits
of fewer doubts should be accepted. Alexander further says that this
rule applies to all those opinions of Aristotle in Metaphysics for
which he offered no proof. For those that followed Aristotle believed
that his opinions are far less subject to doubt than any other opinion.
We follow the same rule. Being convinced that the question whether the
heavens are eternal or not cannot be decided by proof, neither in the
affirmative nor in the negative, we have enumerated the objections
raised to either view, and shown how the theory of the Eternity of the
Universe is subject to stronger objections, and is more apt to corrupt
the notions concerning God [than the other]. Another argument can be
drawn from the fact that the theory of the Creation was held by our
Father Abraham, and by our Teacher Moses.

Having mentioned the method of testing the two theories by the
objections raised against them, I find it necessary to give some
further explanation of the subject.






CHAPTER XXIII


In comparing the objections raised against one theory with those raised
against the opposite theory, in order to decide in favour of the least
objectionable, we must not consider the number of the objections, but
the degree of improbability and of deviation from real facts [pointed
out by the objections]; for one objection may sometimes have more
weight than a thousand others. But the comparison cannot be trustworthy
unless the two theories be considered with the same interest, and if
you are predisposed in favour of one of them, be it on account of your
training or because of some advantage, you are too blind to see the
truth. For that which can be demonstrated you cannot reject, however
much you may be inclined against it; but in questions like those under
consideration you are apt to dispute [in consequence of your
inclination]. You will, however, be able to decide the question, as far
as necessary, if you free yourself from passions, ignore customs, and
follow only your reason. But many are the conditions which must be
fulfilled. First you must know your mental capacities and your natural
talents; you will find this out when you study all mathematical
sciences, and are well acquainted with Logic. Secondly, you must have a
thorough knowledge of Natural Science, that you may be able to
understand the nature of the objections. Thirdly, you must be morally
good. For if a person is voluptuous or passionate, and, loosening the
reins, allows his anger to pass the just limits, it makes no difference
whether he is so from nature or from habit, he will blunder and stumble
in his way, he will seek the theory which is in accordance with his
inclinations. I mention this lest you be deceived; for a person might
some day, by some objection which he raises, shake your belief in the
theory of the Creation, and then easily mislead you; you would then
adopt the theory [of the Eternity of the Universe] which is contrary to
the fundamental principles of our religion, and leads to “speaking
words that turn away from God.” You must rather have suspicion against
your own reason, and accept the theory taught by two prophets who have
bid the foundation for the existing order in the religious and social
relations of mankind. Only demonstrative proof should be able to make
you abandon the theory of the Creation; but such a proof does not exist
in Nature.

You will not find it strange that I introduce into this discussion
historical matter in support of the theory of the Creation, seeing that
Aristotle, the greatest philosopher, in his principal works, introduces
histories in support of the theory of the Eternity of the Universe. In
this regard we may justly quote the saying: “Should not our perfect Law
be as good as their gossip?” (B. T. Baba batra, 115 b). When he
supports his view by quoting Sabean stories, why should we not support
our view by that which Moses and Abraham said, and that which follows
from their words?

I have before promised to describe in a separate chapter the strong
objections which must occur to him who thinks that human wisdom
comprehends fully the nature of the spheres and their motions; that
these are subject to fixed laws, and capable of being comprehended as
regards order and relation. I will now explain this.






CHAPTER XXIV


You know of Astronomy as much as you have studied with me, and learnt
from the book Almagest; we had not sufficient time to go beyond this.
The theory that [the spheres] move regularly, and that the assumed
courses of the stars are in harmony with observation, depends, as you
are aware, on two hypotheses: we must assume either epicycles, or
excentric spheres, or a combination of both. Now I will show that each
of these two hypotheses is irregular, and totally contrary to the
results of Natural Science. Let us first consider an epicycle, such as
has been assumed in the spheres of the moon and the five planets,
rotating on a sphere, but not round the centre of the sphere that
carries it. This arrangement would necessarily produce a revolving
motion; the epicycle would then revolve, and entirely change its place;
but that anything in the spheres should change its place is exactly
what Aristotle considers impossible. For that reason Abu-bekr
ibn-Alzaig, in an astronomical treatise which he wrote, rejects the
existence of epicycles. Besides this impossibility, he mentions others,
showing that the theory of epicycles implies other absurd notions. I
will here explain them:—(1) It is absurd to assume that the revolution
of a cycle has not the centre of the Universe for its centre; for it is
a fundamental principle in the order of the Universe that there are
only three kinds of motion—from the centre, towards the centre, and
round the centre; but an epicycle does not move away from the centre,
nor towards it, nor round it. (2) Again, according to what Aristotle
explains in Natural Science, there must be something fixed round which
the motion takes place; this is the reason why the earth remains
stationary. But the epicycle would move round a centre which is not
stationary. I have heard that Abu-bekr discovered a system in which no
epicycles occur; but excentric spheres are not excluded by him. I have
not heard it from his pupils; and even if it be correct that he
discovered such a system, he has not gained much by it; for
excentricity is likewise as contrary as possible to the principles laid
down by Aristotle. For it seems to me that an excentric sphere does not
move round the centre of the Universe, but round an imaginary point
distant from the centre, and therefore round a point which is not
fixed. A person ignorant of astronomy might think that the motion of
the excentric spheres may still be considered as taking place round
something fixed, since their centre is apparently within the sphere of
the moon. I would admit this if the centre were situated in the region
of fire or air, although the spheres would not move round a stable
point. But I will show that the amount of excentricity has, in a
certain way, been described in the Almagest; and later scholars have
calculated the exact amount of excentricity in terms of radii of the
earth, and have proved the result. The same measure has been used in
astronomy in describing all distances and magnitudes. It has thus been
shown that the point round which the sun moves lies undoubtedly beyond
the sphere of the moon, and below the superficies of the sphere of
Mercury. The centre for the circuit of Mars, that is, the centre of the
excentric sphere of Mars, is beyond the sphere of Mercury, and below
the sphere of Venus. The centre of Jupiter has the same distance; it
lies between the sphere of Venus and that of Mercury, whilst the centre
of Saturn lies between the spheres of Mars and Jupiter. Now, consider
how improbable all this appears according to the laws of Natural
Science. You will find it out when you consider the known distances and
magnitudes of each sphere and each star, all expressed in terms of the
radii of the earth. There is a uniform measure for all, and the
excentricity of each sphere is not determined by units proportionate to
its own magnitude.

It is still more improbable and more objectionable to assume that there
are two spheres, the one within the other; that these are closely
joined from all sides, and have, nevertheless, different centres. For
in this case the smaller sphere might move whilst the larger be at
rest; but the smaller cannot be at rest when the larger moves, and must
move with the larger when the latter rotates round any other axis than
that which passes through the two centres. Now we have this proposition
which can be proved; and, further, the established theory that there is
no vacuum, and also the assumed excentricity of the spheres; from all
this it follows that in every two spheres the motion of the upper one
should cause the lower sphere to move in the same way, and round the
same centre. But this is not the case; the outer and the inner spheres
do not move in the same way, and not round the same centre or the same
axis; each of them has its peculiar motion. For this reason it has been
assumed that between every two spheres there are substances different
from those of the spheres. It may be very much doubted whether this is
the case; for where should the centres of these intermediate substances
be placed? have these substances likewise their own peculiar motion?
Thabith has explained the above-mentioned theory in one of his
treatises, and proved that we must assume a substance of a spherical
form intermediate between one sphere and the other. All this is part of
that which I have not explained to you when you studied with me, for I
was afraid you might become confused and would not understand even
those things which I wished to show you. But as to the inclination and
the deviation assumed in respect to the latitude of the paths of Venus
and Mercury, I have already clearly shown you vivâ voce that it is
impossible to imagine material beings under such conditions. You have
seen that Ptolemy has already pointed out this difficulty. He says as
follows: “Let no one think that these and similar principles are
improbable. If any one considers what we have here expounded in the
same light as he considers things produced by skill and subtle work, he
will find it improbable; but it is not right to compare human things to
divine things.” This is, as you know, what Ptolemy says, and I have
already pointed out to you the passages by which you can verify all I
said, except what I stated about the position of the centres of the
excentric spheres; for I have not heard that any one has paid attention
to this question. But you will understand it when you know the length
of the diameter of each sphere, and the extent of its excentricity in
terms of radii of the earth, according to the facts which Kabici has
established in his treatise on the distances. When you notice these
distances you will confirm my words.

Consider, therefore, how many difficulties arise if we accept the
theory which Aristotle expounds in Physics. For, according to that
theory, there are no epicycles, and no excentric spheres, but all
spheres rotate round the centre of the earth! How then can the
different courses of the stars be explained? how is it possible to
assume a uniform perfect rotation with the phenomena which we perceive,
except by admitting one of the two hypotheses or both of them? The
difficulty is still more apparent when we find that admitting what
Ptolemy said as regards the epicycle of the moon, and its inclination
towards a point different both from the centre of the Universe and from
its own centre, the calculations according to these hypotheses are
perfectly correct, within one minute; that their correctness is
confirmed by the most accurate calculation of the time, duration, and
extent of the eclipses, which is always based on these hypotheses.
Furthermore, how can we reconcile, without assuming the existence of
epicycles, the apparent retrogression of a star with its other motions?
How can rotation or motion take place round a point which is not fixed?
These are real difficulties.

I have explained to you already vivâ voce, that these difficulties do
not concern the astronomer; for he does not profess to tell us the
existing properties of the spheres, but to suggest, whether correctly
or not, a theory in which the motion of the stars is circular and
uniform, and yet in agreement with our observation. You know that
Abu-bekr al-Zaig, in his treatise on Physics, expresses a doubt whether
Aristotle knew the excentricity of the sun but ignored it, and only
discussed the effect of the inclination, because he saw that the effect
of the excentricity was identical with that of the inclination; or
whether he did not perceive it. The truth is that he did not notice it
or hear of it; the science was not perfect in his age. If he had heard
of it, he would have strongly opposed it; if he had been convinced of
its correctness, he would have been greatly embarrassed as regards all
that he said on the question. What I said before (ch. xxii.) I will
repeat now, namely, that the theory of Aristotle, in explaining the
phenomena in the sublunary world, is in accordance with logical
inference; here we know the causal relation between one phenomenon and
another; we see how far science can investigate them, and the
management of nature is clear and intelligible. But of the things in
the heavens man knows nothing except a few mathematical calculations,
and you see how far these go. I say in the words of the poet, “The
heavens are the Lord’s, but the earth He hath given to the sons of man”
(Ps. cxv. 16); that is to say, God alone has a perfect and true
knowledge of the heavens, their nature, their essence, their form,
their motions, and their causes; but He gave man power to know the
things which are under the heavens; here is man’s world, here is his
home, into which he has been placed, and of which he is himself a
portion. This is in reality the truth. For the facts which we require
in proving the existence of heavenly beings are withheld from us; the
heavens are too far from us, and too exalted in place and rank. Man’s
faculties are too deficient to comprehend even the general proof the
heavens contain for the existence of Him who sets them in motion. It is
in fact ignorance or a kind of madness to weary our minds with finding
out things which are beyond our reach, without having the means of
approaching them. We must content ourselves with that which is within
our reach, and that which cannot be approached by logical inference let
us leave to him who has been endowed with that great and divine
influence, expressed in the words: “Mouth to mouth do I speak with Him”
(Num. xii. 8).

This is all I can say on this question; another person may perhaps be
able to establish by proof what appears doubtful to me. It is on
account of my great love of truth that I have shown my embarrassment in
these matters, and I have not heard, nor do I know that any of these
theories have been established by proof.






CHAPTER XXV


We do not reject the Eternity of the Universe, because certain passages
in Scripture confirm the Creation; for such passages are not more
numerous than those in which God is represented as a corporeal being;
nor is it impossible or difficult to find for them a suitable
interpretation. We might have explained them in the same manner as we
did in respect to the Incorporeality of God. We should perhaps have had
an easier task in showing that the Scriptural passages referred to are
in harmony with the theory of the Eternity of the Universe if we
accepted the latter, than we had in explaining the anthropomorphisms in
the Bible when we rejected the idea that God is corporeal. For two
reasons, however, we have not done so, and have not accepted the
Eternity of the Universe. First, the Incorporeality of God has been
demonstrated by proof; those passages in the Bible, which in their
literal sense contain statements that can be refuted by proof, must and
can be interpreted otherwise. But the Eternity of the Universe has not
been proved; a mere argument in favour of a certain theory is not
sufficient reason for rejecting the literal meaning of a Biblical text,
and explaining it figuratively, when the opposite theory can be
supported by an equally good argument.

Secondly, our belief in the Incorporeality of God is not contrary to
any of the fundamental principles of our religion; it is not contrary
to the words of any prophet. Only ignorant people believe that it is
contrary to the teaching of Scripture; but we have shown that this is
not the case; on the contrary, Scripture teaches the Incorporeality of
God. If we were to accept the Eternity of the Universe as taught by
Aristotle, that everything in the Universe is the result of fixed laws,
that Nature does not change, and that there is nothing supernatural, we
should necessarily be in opposition to the foundation of our religion,
we should disbelieve all miracles and signs, and certainly reject all
hopes and fears derived from Scripture, unless the miracles are also
explained figuratively. The Allegorists amongst the Mohammedans have
done this, and have thereby arrived at absurd conclusions. If, however,
we accepted the Eternity of the Universe in accordance with the second
of the theories which we have expounded above (ch. xxiii.), and
assumed, with Plato, that the heavens are likewise transient, we should
not be in opposition to the fundamental principles of our religion;
this theory would not imply the rejection of miracles, but, on the
contrary, would admit them as possible. The Scriptural text might have
been explained accordingly, and many expressions might have been found
in the Bible and in other writings that would confirm and support this
theory. But there is no necessity for this expedient, so long as the
theory has not been proved. As there is no proof sufficient to convince
us, this theory need not be taken into consideration, nor the other
one; we take the text of the Bible literally, and say that it teaches
us a truth which we cannot prove; and the miracles are evidence for the
correctness of our view.

Accepting the Creation, we find that miracles are possible, that
Revelation is possible, and that every difficulty in this question is
removed. We might be asked, Why has God inspired a certain person and
not another? why has He revealed the Law to one particular nation, and
at one particular time? why has He commanded this, and forbidden that?
why has He shown through a prophet certain particular miracles? what is
the object of these laws? and why has He not made the commandments and
the prohibitions part of our nature, if it was His object that we
should live in accordance with them? We answer to all these questions:
He willed it so; or, His wisdom decided so. Just as He created the
world according to His will, at a certain time, in a certain form, and
as we do not understand why His will or His wisdom decided upon that
peculiar form, and upon that peculiar time, so we do not know why His
will or wisdom determined any of the things mentioned in the preceding
questions. But if we assume that the Universe has the present form as
the result of fixed laws, there is occasion for the above questions;
and these could only be answered in an objectionable way, implying
denial and rejection of the Biblical texts, the correctness of which no
intelligent person doubts. Owing to the absence of all proof, we reject
the theory of the Eternity of the Universe; and it is for this very
reason that the noblest minds spent and will spend their days in
research. For if the Creation had been demonstrated by proof, even if
only according to the Platonic hypothesis, all arguments of the
philosophers against us would be of no avail. If, on the other hand,
Aristotle had a proof for his theory, the whole teaching of Scripture
would be rejected, and we should be forced to other opinions. I have
thus shown that all depends on this question. Note it.






CHAPTER XXVI


In the famous chapters known as the Chapters of Rabbi Eliezer, I find
R. Eliezer the Great saying something more extraordinary than I have
ever seen in the utterances of any believer in the Law of Moses. I mean
the following passage: “Whence were the heavens created? He took part
of the light of His garment, stretched it like a cloth, and thus the
heavens were extending continually, as it is said: He covereth Himself
with light as with a garment, He stretcheth the heavens like a curtain”
(Ps. civ. 2). “Whence was the earth created? He took of the snow under
the throne of glory, and threw it; according to the words: He saith to
the snow, Be thou earth” (Job xxxvii. 6). These are the words given
there; and I, in my surprise, ask, What was the belief of this sage?
did he think that nothing can be produced from nothing, and that a
substance must have existed of which the things were formed? and did he
for this reason ask whence were the heavens and the earth created? What
has he gained by the answer? We might ask him, Whence was the light of
His garment created? or the snow under the throne of His glory? or the
throne of glory itself? If the terms “the light of His garment” and
“the throne of glory” mean something eternal, they must be rejected;
the words would imply an admission of the Eternity of the Universe,
though only in the form taught by Plato. The creation of the throne of
glory is mentioned by our Sages, though in a strange way; for they say
that it has been created before the creation of the Universe.
Scripture, however, does not mention the creation of the throne, except
in the words of David, “The Lord hath established his throne in the
heavens” (Ps. ciii. 19), which words admit of figurative
interpretation; but the eternity of the throne is distinctly described,
“Thou, O Lord, dwellest for ever, thy throne for ever and ever” (Lam.
v. 19). Now, if R. Eliezer had believed that the throne was eternal, so
that the word “throne” expressed an attribute of God, and not something
created, how could anything be produced of a mere attribute? Stranger
still is his expression “of the light of His garment.”

In short, it is a passage that greatly confuses the notions of all
intelligent and religious persons. I am unable to explain it
sufficiently. I quoted it in order that you may not be misled by it.
One important thing R. Eliezer taught us here, that the substance of
the heavens is different from that of the earth; that there are two
different substances: the one is described as belonging to God, being
the light of His garment, on account of its superiority; and the other,
the earthly substance, which is distant from His splendour and light,
as being the snow under the throne of His glory. This led me to explain
the words, “And under his feet as the work of the whiteness of the
sapphire” (Exod. xxiv. 10), as expressing that the nobles of the
children of Israel comprehended in a prophetical vision the nature of
the earthly materia prima. For, according to Onkelos, the pronoun in
the phrase, “His feet” refers to “throne,” as I have shown; this
indicates that the whiteness under the throne signifies the earthly
substance. R. Eliezer has thus repeated the same idea, and told us that
there are two substances—a higher one, and a lower one; and that there
is not one substance common to all things. This is an important
subject, and we must not think light of the opinion which the wisest
men in Israel have held on this point. It concerns an important point
in explaining the existence of the Universe, and one of the mysteries
of the Law. In Bereshit Rabba (chap. xii.) the following passage
occurs: “R. Eliezer says, The things in the heavens have been created
of the heavens, the things on earth of the earth.” Consider how
ingeniously this sage stated that all things on earth have one common
substance; the heavens and the things in them have one substance,
different from the first. He also explains in the Chapters [of R.
Eliezer], in addition to the preceding things, the superiority of the
heavenly substance, and its proximity to God; and, on the other hand,
the inferiority of the earthly substance and its position. Note it.






CHAPTER XXVII


We have already stated that the belief in the Creation is a fundamental
principle of our religion; but we do not consider it a principle of our
faith that the Universe will again be reduced to nothing. It is not
contrary to the tenets of our religion to assume that the Universe will
continue to exist for ever. It might be objected that everything
produced is subject to destruction, as has been shown; consequently the
Universe, having had a beginning, must come to an end. This axiom
cannot be applied according to our views. We do not hold that the
Universe came into existence, like all things in Nature, as the result
of the laws of Nature. For whatever owes its existence to the action of
physical laws is, according to the same laws, subject to destruction:
the same law which caused the existence of a thing after a period of
non-existence, is also the cause that the thing is not permanent; since
the previous non-existence proves that the nature of that thing does
not necessitate its permanent existence. According to our theory,
taught in Scripture, the existence or non-existence of things depends
solely on the will of God and not on fixed laws, and, therefore, it
does not follow that God must destroy the Universe after having created
it from nothing. It depends on His will. He may, according to His
desire, or according to the decree of His wisdom, either destroy it, or
allow it to exist, and it is therefore possible that He will preserve
the Universe for ever, and let it exist permanently as He Himself
exists. It is well known that our Sages never said that the throne of
glory will perish, although they assumed that it has been created. No
prophet or sage ever maintained that the throne of glory will be
destroyed or annihilated; but, on the contrary, the Scriptural passages
speak of its permanent existence. We are of opinion that the souls of
the pious have been created, and at the same time we believe that they
are immortal. Some hold, in accordance with the literal meaning of the
Midrashim, that the bodies of the pious will also enjoy everlasting
happiness. Their notion is like the well-known belief of certain
people, that there are bodily enjoyments in Paradise. In short,
reasoning leads to the conclusion that the destruction of the Universe
is not a certain fact. There remains only the question as to what the
prophets and our Sages say on this point; whether they affirm that the
world will certainly come to an end, or not. Most people amongst us
believe that such statements have been made, and that the world will at
one time be destroyed. I will show you that this is not the case; and
that, on the contrary, many passages in the Bible speak of the
permanent existence of the Universe. Those passages which, in the
literal sense, would indicate the destruction of the Universe, are
undoubtedly to be understood in a figurative sense, as will be shown.
If, however, those who follow the literal sense of the Scriptural texts
reject our view, and assume that the ultimate certain destruction of
the Universe is part of their faith, they are at liberty to do so. But
we must tell them that the belief in the destruction is not necessarily
implied in the belief in the Creation; they believe it because they
trust the writer, who used a figurative expression, which they take
literally. Their faith, however, does not suffer by it.






CHAPTER XXVIII


Many of our coreligionists thought that King Solomon believed in the
Eternity of the Universe. This is very strange. How can we suppose that
any one that adheres to the Law of Moses, our Teacher, should accept
that theory? if we were to assume that Solomon has on this point, God
forbid, deviated from the Law of Moses, the question would be asked,
Why did most of the Prophets and of the Sages accept it of him? Why
have they not opposed him, or blamed him for holding that opinion, as
he has been blamed for having married strange women, and for other
things? The reason why this has been imputed to him is to be found in
the following passage: “They desired to suppress the book Koheleth,
because its words incline towards scepticism.” It is undoubtedly true
that certain passages in this book include, when taken literally,
opinions different from those taught in the Law, and they must
therefore be explained figuratively. But the theory of the Eternity of
the Universe is not among those opinions, the book does not even
contain any passage that implies this theory; much less a passage in
which it is clearly set forth. There are, however, in the book, some
passages which imply the indestructibility of the Universe, a doctrine
that is true; and from the fact that the indestructibility of the
Universe is taught in this book, some persons wrongly inferred that the
author believed in the Eternity of the Universe. The following are the
words that refer to the indestructibility of the Universe: “And the
earth remaineth for ever.” And those who do not agree with me as
regards the above distinction [between the indestructibility and the
Eternity of the Universe], are compelled to explain the term le-ʻolam
(lit., “for ever”), to mean “the time fixed for the existence of the
earth.” Similarly they explain the words of God, “Yet all the days of
the earth” (Gen. viii. 22) to signify the days fixed for its existence.
But I wonder how they would explain the words of David: “He laid the
foundations of the earth, that it should not be moved for ever” (Ps.
civ. 5). If they maintain here also that the term le-ʻolam va-ʻed (lit.
“for ever”) does not imply perpetuity, they must come to the conclusion
that God exists only for a fixed period, since the same term is
employed in describing the perpetuity of God, “The Lord will reign
(le-ʻolam) for ever” (Exod. xv. 18, or Ps. x. 16). We must, however,
bear in mind that ʻolam only signifies perpetuity when it is combined
with ʻad; it makes no difference whether ʻad follows, as in ʻolam
va-ʻed, or whether it precedes, as in ʻad ʻolam. The words of Solomon
which only contain the word le-ʻolam, have therefore less force than
the words of David, who uses the term ʻolam va-ʻed. David has also in
other passages clearly spoken of the incorruptibility of the heavens,
the perpetuity and immutability of their laws, and of all the heavenly
beings. He says, “Praise ye the Lord from the heavens, etc. For He
commanded, and they were created. He hath also stablished them for ever
and ever; he hath made a decree which shall not pass” (Ps. cxlviii.
1–6); that is to say, there will never be a change in the decrees which
God made, or in the sources of the properties of the heavens and the
earth, which the Psalmist has mentioned before. But he distinctly
states that they have been created. For he says, “He hath commanded,
and they were created.” Jeremiah (xxxi. 35) likewise says, “He giveth
the sun for a light by day, and the ordinances of the moon and of the
stars for a light by night,” etc. “If these ordinances depart from
before me, saith the Lord, then the seed of Israel also shall cease
from being a nation before me for ever.” He thus declares, that these
decrees will never be removed, although they had a beginning. We
therefore find this idea, when we search for it, expressed not only by
Solomon but also by others. Solomon himself has stated that these works
of God, the Universe, and all that is contained in it, remain with
their properties for ever, although they have been created. For he
says, “Whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever; nothing can be put
to it, nor anything taken away from it” (Eccles. iii. 14). He declares
in these words that the world has been created by God and remains for
ever. He adds the reason for it by saying, “Nothing can be put to it,
nor anything taken from it;” for this is the reason for the perpetuity,
as if he meant to say that things are changed in order to supply that
which is wanting, or in order to take away what is superfluous. The
works of God being most perfect, admitting no addition or deduction,
must remain the same for ever. It is impossible that anything should
exist that could cause a change in them. In the conclusion of the
verse, Solomon, as it were describes the purpose of exceptions from the
laws of Nature, or an excuse for changes in them, when he says, “And
God doeth it (viz., He performs miracles) that men should fear before
him.” The words which follow, “That which hath been is now; and that
which is to be hath already been, and God seeketh that which is
pursued,” contain the idea that God desires the perpetuity and
continuity of the Universe. The fact that the works of God are perfect,
admitting of no addition or diminution, has already been mentioned by
Moses, the wisest of all men, in the words: “The rock, His work is
perfect” (Deut. xxxii. 14). All His works or creations are most
perfect, containing no defect whatever, nothing superfluous, nor
anything unnecessary. Also whatever God decrees for those created
things, and whatever He effects through them, is perfectly just, and is
the result of His wisdom, as will be explained in some chapters of this
treatise.






CHAPTER XXIX


If we hear a person speaking whose language we do not understand, we
undoubtedly know that he speaks, but do not know what his words mean;
it may even happen that we hear some words which mean one thing in the
tongue of the speaker, and exactly the reverse in our language, and
taking the words in the sense which they have in our language, we
imagine that the speaker employed them in that sense. Suppose, e.g., an
Arab hears of a Hebrew the word abah, he thinks that the Hebrew relates
how a man despised and refused a certain thing, whilst the Hebrew in
reality says that the man was pleased and satisfied with it. The very
same thing happens to the ordinary reader of the Prophets; some of
their words he does not understand at all, like those to whom the
prophet says (Isa. xxix. 11), “the vision of all is become unto you as
the words of a book that is sealed”; in other passages he finds the
opposite or the reverse of what the prophet meant; to this case
reference is made in the words, “Ye have perverted the words of the
living God” (Jer. xxiii. 36). Besides, it must be borne in mind that
every prophet has his own peculiar diction, which is, as it were, his
language, and it is in that language that the prophecy addressed to him
is communicated to those who understand it. After this preliminary
remark you will understand the metaphor frequently employed by Isaiah,
and less frequently by other prophets, when they describe the ruin of a
kingdom or the destruction of a great nation in phrases like the
following:—“The stars have fallen,” “The heavens are overthrown,” “The
sun is darkened,” “The earth is waste, and trembles,” and similar
metaphors. The Arabs likewise say of a person who has met with a
serious accident, “His heavens, together with his earth, have been
covered”; and when they speak of the approach of a nation’s prosperity,
they say, “The light of the sun and moon has increased,” “A new heaven
and a new earth has been created,” or they use similar phrases. So also
the prophets, in referring to the ruin of a person, of a nation, or of
a country, describe it as the result of God’s great anger and wrath,
whilst the prosperity of a nation is the result of God’s pleasure and
satisfaction. In the former case the prophets employ such phrases as
“He came forth,” “came down,” “roared,” “thundered,” or “caused his
voice to be heard”; also “He commanded,” “said,” “did,” “made,” and the
like, as will be shown. Sometimes the prophets use the term “mankind”
instead of “the people of a certain place,” whose destruction they
predict; e.g., Isaiah speaking of the destruction of Israel says, “And
the Lord will remove man far away” (Isa. vi. 12). So also Zephaniah (i.
3, 4), “And I will cut off man from off the earth. I will also stretch
out mine hand upon Judah.” Note this likewise.

Having spoken of the language of the prophets in general, I will now
verify and prove my statement. When Isaiah received the divine mission
to prophesy the destruction of the Babylonian empire, the death of
Sennacherib and that of Nebuchadnezzar, who rose after the overthrow of
Sennacherib, he commences in the following manner to describe their
fall and the end of their dominion, their defeat, and such evils as are
endured by all who are vanquished and compelled to flee before the
victorious sword [of the enemy]: “For the stars of heaven, and the
constellations thereof, shall not give their light: the sun is darkened
in his going forth, and the moon shall not cause her light to shine”
(xiii. 10); again, “Therefore I will shake the heavens, and the earth
shall remove out of her place, in the wrath of the Lord of hosts, and
in the day of his fierce anger” (xiii. 13). I do not think that any
person is so foolish and blind, and so much in favour of the literal
sense of figurative and oratorical phrases, as to assume that at the
fall of the Babylonian kingdom a change took place in the nature of the
stars of heaven, or in the light of the sun and moon, or that the earth
moved away from its centre. For all this is merely the description of a
country that has been defeated; the inhabitants undoubtedly find all
light dark, and all sweet things bitter: the whole earth appears too
narrow for them, and the heavens are changed in their eyes. He speaks
in a similar manner when he describes the poverty and humiliation of
the people of Israel, their captivity and their defeat, the continuous
misfortunes caused by the wicked Sennacherib when he ruled over all the
fortified places of Judah, or the loss of the entire land of Israel
when it came into the possession of Sennacherib. He says (xxiv. 17):
“Fear, and the pit, and the snare, are upon thee, O inhabitant of the
earth. And it shall come to pass, that he who fleeth from the noise of
the fear shall fall into the pit; and he that cometh out of the midst
of the pit shall be taken in the snare: for the windows from on high
are open, and the foundations of the earth do shake. The earth is
utterly broken down, the earth is clean dissolved, the earth is moved
exceedingly. The earth shall reel to and fro like a drunkard.” At the
end of the same prophecy, when Isaiah describes how God will punish
Sennacherib, destroy his mighty empire, and reduce him to disgrace, he
uses the following figure (xxiv. 23): “Then the moon shall be
confounded, and the sun ashamed, when the Lord of hosts shall reign,”
etc. This verse is beautifully explained by Jonathan, the son of
Uzziel; he says that when Sennacherib will meet with his fate because
of Jerusalem, the idolaters will understand that this is the work of
God; they will faint and be confounded. He therefore translates the
verse thus: “Those who worship the moon will be ashamed, and those who
bow down to the sun will be humbled, when the kingdom of God shall
reveal itself,” etc. The prophet then pictures the peace of the
children of Israel after the death of Sennacherib, the fertility and
the cultivation of their land, and the increasing power of their
kingdom through Hezekiah. He employs here the figure of the increase of
the light of the sun and moon. When speaking of the defeated, he says
that for them the light of the sun and moon will be diminished and
darkened; in the same sense their light is said to increase for the
victorious. We can frequently notice the correctness of this figure of
speech. When great troubles befall us, our eyes become dim, and we
cannot see clearly because the spiritus visus is made turbid by the
prevailing vapours, and is weakened and diminished by great anxiety and
straits of the soul; whilst in a state of gladness and comfort of the
soul the spiritus visus becomes clear, and man feels as if the light
had increased. Thus the good tidings that the people shall dwell in
Zion, and in Jerusalem, and shall weep no more, etc., conclude in the
following manner: “Moreover, the light of the moon shall be as the
light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold, as the
light of seven days, in the day that the Lord bindeth up the breaches
of his people, and healeth the stroke of their wound” (Isa. xxx. 19,
26); that is to say, when God will raise them up again after they had
fallen through the wicked Sennacherib. The phrase “as the light of
seven days” signifies, according to the commentators, “very great
light”: for in this same sense the number “seven” is frequently used in
Hebrew. I think that reference is made by this phrase to the seven days
of the dedication of the temple in the reign of Solomon; for there was
never a nation so great, prosperous, and happy in every respect, as
Israel was at that time, and therefore the prophet says, that Israel’s
greatness and happiness will be the same as it was in those seven days.
Speaking of wicked Edom, Israel’s oppressor, Isaiah says: “Their slain
also shall be cast out, and their stink shall come up out of their
carcases, and the mountains shall be melted with their blood. And all
the host of heaven shall be dissolved, and the heavens shall be rolled
together as a scroll: and all their host shall fall down, as a leaf
falleth off from the vine, and as a fig falleth from the fig-tree. For
my sword shall be bathed in heaven; behold, I shall come down upon
Idumea, and upon the people of my curse, to judgment,” etc. (Isa.
xxxiv. 3–5). Will any person who has eyes to see find in these verses
any expression that is obscure, or that might lead him to think that
they contain an account of what will befall the heavens? or anything
but a figurative description of the ruin of the Edomites, the
withdrawal of God’s protection from them, their decline, and the sudden
and rapid fall of their nobles? The prophet means to say that the
individuals, who were like stars as regards their permanent, high, and
undisturbed position, will quickly come down, as a leaf falleth from
the vine, and as a fig falling from the fig-tree. This is self-evident;
and there would be no need to mention it, much less to speak on it at
length, had it not become necessary, owing to the fact that the common
people, and even persons who are considered as distinguished scholars,
quote this passage without regarding its context or its purpose, [in
support of their view of the future destruction of the heavens]. They
believe that Scripture describes here what will, in future, happen to
the heavens, in the same manner as it informs us how the heavens have
come into existence. Again, when Isaiah told the Israelites—what
afterwards became a well-known fact—that Sennacherib, with his allied
nations and kings, would perish, and that the Israelites would be
helped by God alone, he employed figurative language, and said: “See
how the heavens decay and the earth withers away, and all beings on the
earth die, and you are saved”; that is to say, those who have filled
the earth, and have been considered, to use an hyperbole, as permanent
and stable as the heavens, will quickly perish and disappear like
smoke; and their famous power, that has been as stable as the earth,
will be destroyed like a garment. The passage to which I refer begins:
“For the Lord hath comforted Zion; He hath comforted all her waste
places,” etc. “Hearken unto me, my people,” etc. “My righteousness is
near: my salvation is gone forth,” etc. It continues thus: “Lift up
your eyes to the heavens, and look upon the earth beneath; for the
heavens shall vanish like smoke, and the earth shall wax old like a
garment, and they that dwell therein shall die in like manner; for my
salvation shall be for ever, and my righteousness shall not be
abolished” (Isa. li. 3–6). The restoration of the kingdom of Israel,
its stability and permanence, is described as a creation of heaven and
earth. For Isaiah frequently speaks of the land of a king as if it were
the whole Universe, as if heaven and earth belonged to him. He
therefore comforts Israel and says: “I, even I, am he that comforteth
you,” etc. “And I have put my words in thy mouth, and I have covered
thee in the shadow of mine hand, that I may plant the heavens, and lay
the foundations of the earth, and say unto Zion, Thou art my people”
(li. 12–16). In the following verses, Isaiah declares that the dominion
of Israel will continue, whilst that of the renowned and mighty people
will cease: “For the mountains shall depart,” etc. (liv. 10). In order
to express that the kingdom of the Messiah will be permanent, and that
the kingdom of Israel will not be destroyed any more, he says, “Thy sun
shall no more go down,” etc. (lx. 20). In metaphors like these, which
are intelligible to those who understand the context, Isaiah continues
to describe the details of the exile, the restoration, and the removal
of all sorrow, and says figuratively as follows: “I will create new
heavens and a new earth; for the first shall be forgotten, and their
memory shall be blotted out.” He explains this in the course of the
speech, by pointing out that by the phrase, “I will create,” he means
that God will give them perpetual gladness and joy in place of the
previous grief and mourning, which shall no longer be remembered. I
will now describe the sequence of the ideas, and the order of the
verses in which these ideas are contained. The prophet begins as
follows: “I will mention the loving-kindnesses of the Lord,” etc.
(lxiii. 7). He then gives (1) an account of God’s past kindness to us,
concluding with the words, “And he bare them and carried them all the
days of old” (ver. 9). (2) Next follows our rebellion: “But they
rebelled, and vexed his holy spirit,” etc. (ver. 10); (3) the dominion
of our enemies over us: “Our adversaries have trodden down thy
sanctuary; we are like those over whom thou hast never ruled,” etc.
(vers. 18, 19); (4) and the prophet’s prayer on our account: “Be not
wroth very sore,” etc. (lxiv. 9). (5) The prophet then describes how we
deserved these punishments, and how we were called to the truth but did
not respond: “I offered myself to be sought of them that asked not for
me,” etc. (lxv. 1); (6) promises mercy and pardon: “Thus saith the
Lord, As the new wine is found in the cluster,” etc. (ver. 8); (7)
predicts evil for our oppressors: “Behold, my servant shall eat, but ye
shall be hungry,” etc. (ver. 13); (8) and moral improvement of our
nation to such a degree that we shall be a blessing on the earth, and
the previous troubles will be forgotten: “And he shall call his
servants by another name: that he who blesseth himself in the earth,
shall bless himself in the God of truth; and he that sweareth in the
earth, shall swear by the God of truth; because the former troubles are
forgotten, and because they are hid from mine eyes. For, behold, I
create new heavens, and a new earth: and the former shall not be
remembered, nor come into mind. But be ye glad and rejoice for ever in
that which I create: for, behold, I create Jerusalem a rejoicing, and
her people a joy. And I will rejoice in Jerusalem, and joy in my
people,” etc. (lxv. 15–19). The whole subject must now be clear and
evident; for the words, “I create new heavens, and a new earth,” etc.,
are followed by the explanation, “I create Jerusalem a rejoicing, and
her people a joy,” etc. The prophet then adds that the seed and name of
Israel will be as permanent as their faith and as the rejoicing in it,
which God promised to create and to spread over the whole earth: for
faith in God and rejoicing in it are two possessions which, once
obtained, are never lost or changed. This is expressed in the words:
“For as the new heavens and the new earth, which I will make, remain
before me, saith the Lord, so shall your seed and your name remain”
(lxvi. 22). But of other nations, in some instances, the seed remains,
whilst the name has perished; so, e.g., many people are of the seed of
the Persians or Greeks, without being known by that special name; they
bear the names of other nations, of which they form part. According to
my opinion, we have here a prophecy that our religion, which gives us
our special name, will remain permanently.

As these figures are frequent in Isaiah, I explained all of them. But
we meet with them also in the words of other prophets. Jeremiah, in
describing the destruction of Jerusalem in consequence of our sins,
says (iv. 23): “I beheld the earth, and, lo, it was without form, and
void,” etc. Ezekiel (xxxii. 7, 8) foretells the destruction of the
kingdom of Egypt, and the death of Pharaoh, through Nebuchadnezzar, in
the following words: “And when I shall put thee out, I will cover the
heaven, and make the stars thereof dark; I will cover the sun with a
cloud, and the moon shall not give her light. All the bright lights of
heaven will I make dark over thee, and set darkness upon thy land,
saith the Lord.” Joel, the son of Pethuel (ii. 10), describes the
multitude of locusts that came in his days as follows: “The earth shall
quake before them: the heavens shall tremble: the sun and the moon
shall be dark, and the stars shall withdraw their shining.” Amos (viii.
9, 10), speaking of the destruction of Samaria, says: “I will cause the
sun to go down at noon, and I will darken the earth in the clear day;
and I will turn your feasts,” etc. Micah (i. 3, 4), in relating the
fall of Samaria, uses the following well-known rhetorical figures:
“For, behold, the Lord cometh forth out of his place, and will come
down, and tread upon the high places of the earth. And the mountains
shall be molten,” etc. Similarly Haggai (ii. 6, 7), in describing the
destruction of the kingdom of the Medes and Persians: “I will shake the
heavens and the earth, and the sea, and the dry land; and I will shake
all nations,” etc. When [David] (Ps. lx. 4) describes how, during the
expedition of Joab against the Edomites, the nation was low and weak,
and how he prayed to God for His assistance, he says: “Thou hast made
the earth to tremble; thou hast broken it: heal the breaches thereof;
for it shaketh.” In another instance he expresses the idea that we need
not fear when we see other nations die and perish, because we rely on
God’s support, and not on our sword and strength, in accordance with
the words: “A people saved by the Lord, the shield of thy help” (Deut.
xxxiii. 29); he says (Ps. xlvi. 2): “Therefore will we not fear, though
the earth be removed, and though the mountains be shaken in the midst
of the sea.”

The following figurative language is employed in Scripture in referring
to the death of the Egyptians in the Red Sea: “The waters saw thee;
they were afraid: the depths also were troubled, etc. The voice of thy
thunder was in the heaven: the lightnings lightened the world; the
earth trembled and shook” (Ps. lxxvii. 17–19). “Was the Lord displeased
against the rivers?” etc. (Hab. iii. 8). “There went up a smoke out of
his nostrils,” etc. (Ps. xviii. 9). “The earth trembled,” etc. (Judges
v. 4, in the Song of Deborah). There are many other instances; but
those which I have not quoted can be explained in accordance with those
which I have cited.

Let us now consider the words of Joel (iii. 3–5): “And I will show
wonders in the heavens and in the earth, blood and fire, and pillars of
smoke. The sun shall be turned into darkness, and the moon into blood,
before the great and terrible day of the Lord come. And it shall come
to pass, that whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be
delivered, for in Mount Zion and in Jerusalem shall be deliverance,”
etc. I refer them to the defeat of Sennacherib near Jerusalem; but they
may be taken as an account of the defeat of Gog and Magog near
Jerusalem in the days of the Messiah, if this appears preferable,
although nothing is mentioned in this passage but great slaughter,
destruction, fire, and the diminution of the light of the two
luminaries. You may perhaps object: How can the day of the fall of
Sennacherib, according to our explanation, be called “the great and the
terrible day of the Lord?” But you must know that a day of great
salvation or of great distress is called “the great and terrible day of
the Lord.” Thus Joel (ii. 11) says of the day on which the locusts came
over the land, “For the day of the Lord is great and terrible, and who
can abide it?”

Our opinion, in support of which we have quoted these passages, is
clearly established, namely, that no prophet or sage has ever announced
the destruction of the Universe, or a change of its present condition,
or a permanent change of any of its properties. When our Sages say,
“The world remains six thousand years, and one thousand years it will
be waste,” they do not mean a complete cessation of existing things;
the phrase “one thousand years it will be waste” distinctly shows that
time will continue; besides, this is the individual opinion of one
Rabbi, and in accordance with one particular theory. But on the other
hand the words, “There is nothing new under the sun” (Eccles. i. 9), in
the sense that no new creation takes place in any way and under any
circumstances, express the general opinion of our Sages, and include a
principle which every one of the doctors of the Mishnah and the Talmud
recognises and makes use of in his arguments. Even those who understand
the words “new heavens and a new earth” in their literal sense hold
that the heavens, which will in future be formed, have already been
created and are in existence, and that for this reason the present
tense “remain” is used, and not the future “will remain.” They support
their view by citing the text, “There is nothing new under the sun.” Do
not imagine that this is opposed to our opinion. They mean, perhaps, to
say that the natural laws, by which the promised future condition of
Israel will be effected, have been in existence since the days of the
Creation, and in that they are perfectly correct. When I, however, said
that no prophet ever announced “a permanent change of any of its
properties,” I intended to except miracles. For although the rod was
turned into a serpent, the water into blood, the pure and noble hand
into a leprous one, without the existence of any natural cause that
could effect these or similar phenomena, these changes were not
permanent, they have not become a physical property. On the contrary,
the Universe since continues its regular course. This is my opinion;
this should be our belief. Our Sages, however, said very strange things
as regards miracles; they are found in Bereshit Rabba, and in Midrash
Koheleth, namely, that the miracles are to some extent also natural;
for they say, when God created the Universe with its present physical
properties, He made it part of these properties, that they should
produce certain miracles at certain times, and the sign of a prophet
consisted in the fact that God told him to declare when a certain thing
will take place, but the thing itself was effected according to the
fixed laws of Nature. If this is really the meaning of the passage
referred to, it testifies to the greatness of the author, and shows
that he held it to be impossible that there should be a change in the
laws of Nature, or a change in the will of God [as regards the physical
properties of things] after they have once been established. He
therefore assumes, e.g., that God gave the waters the property of
joining together, and of flowing in a downward direction, and of
separating only at the time when the Egyptians were drowned, and only
in a particular place. I have already pointed out to you the source of
this passage, and it only tends to oppose the hypothesis of a new
creation. It is said there: R. Jonathan said, God made an agreement
with the sea that it should divide before the Israelites; thus it is
said, “And the sea returned to its strength when the morning appeared”
(Exod. xiv. 27). R. Jeremiah, son of Elazar, said: Not only with the
sea, but with all that has been created in the six days of the
beginning [was the agreement made]; this is referred to in the words,
“I, even my hands have stretched out the heavens, and all their host
have I commanded” (Isa. xlv. 12); i.e., I have commanded the sea to
divide, the fire not to hurt Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, the lions
not to harm Daniel, and the fish to spit out Jonah. The same is the
case with the rest of the miracles.

We have thus clearly stated and explained our opinion, that we agree
with Aristotle in one half of his theory. For we believe that this
Universe remains perpetually with the same properties with which the
Creator has endowed it, and that none of these will ever be changed
except by way of miracle in some individual instances, although the
Creator has the power to change the whole Universe, to annihilate it,
or to remove any of its properties. The Universe, had, however, a
beginning and commencement, for when nothing was as yet in existence
except God, His wisdom decreed that the Universe be brought into
existence at a certain time, that it should not be annihilated or
changed as regards any of its properties, except in some instances;
some of these are known to us, whilst others belong to the future, and
are therefore unknown to us. This is our opinion and the basis of our
religion. The opinion of Aristotle is that the Universe, being
permanent and indestructible, is also eternal and without beginning. We
have already shown that this theory is based on the hypothesis that the
Universe is the necessary result of causal relation, and that this
hypothesis includes a certain amount of blasphemy. Having come thus far
we will make in the next chapter a few remarks on passages in the first
chapters of Genesis. For the primary object in this treatise has been
to expound as much as possible of the Scriptural account of the
Creation (maʻaseh bereshit), and the description of the heavenly
chariot (maʻaseh mercabah). But let us premise two general
observations.

First, the account given in Scripture of the Creation is not, as is
generally believed, intended to be in all its parts literal. For if
this were the case, wise men would not have kept its explanation
secret, and our Sages would not have employed figurative speech [in
treating of the Creation] in order to hide its true meaning, nor would
they have objected to discuss it in the presence of the common people.
The literal meaning of the words might lead us to conceive corrupt
ideas and to form false opinions about God, or even entirely to abandon
and reject the principles of our Faith. It is therefore right to
abstain and refrain from examining this subject superficially and
unscientifically. We must blame the practice of some ignorant preachers
and expounders of the Bible, who think that wisdom consists in knowing
the explanation of words, and that greater perfection is attained by
employing more words and longer speech. It is, however, right that we
should examine the Scriptural texts by the intellect, after having
acquired a knowledge of demonstrative science, and of the true hidden
meaning of prophecies. But if one has obtained some knowledge in this
matter he must not preach on it, as I stated in my Commentary on the
Mishnah (Ḥagigah, ii. 7), and our Sages said distinctly: From the
beginning of the book to this place—after the account of the sixth day
of the Creation—it is “the glory of God to conceal a thing” (Prov. xxv.
2).

We have thus clearly stated our opinion. It is, however, part of the
Divine plan that every one who has obtained some perfection transmit it
to some other persons, as will be shown in the chapter on Prophecy. It
is, therefore, impossible for a scholar to possess knowledge of these
problems, whether it be through his own researches or through his
master’s teaching, without communicating part of that knowledge to
others; it cannot be done in clear words; it must be done sparingly by
way of hints. We find in the words of some of our Sages numerous hints
and notes of this kind, but mixed up with the words of others and with
other subjects. In treating of these mysteries, as a rule, I quote as
much as contains the principal idea, and leave the rest for those who
are worthy of it.

Secondly, the prophets employ homonymous terms and use words which are
not meant to be understood in their ordinary signification, but are
only used because of some other meaning which they admit, e.g., “a rod
of an almond-tree (shaked),” because of the words which follow, “for I
will hasten (shaked)” (Jer. i. 11, 12), as will be shown in the chapter
on Prophecy. According to the same principle Ezekiel in the account of
the Divine Chariot employs, as we have stated the term ḥashmal (Ezek.
i. 4); also regel egel (v. 7), neḥoshet kalal (v. 7), and similar
terms; Zechariah (vi. 1) likewise adopts this method, and says: “And
the mountains were mountains of neḥoshet (brass),” and the like.

After these two remarks I will proceed to the chapter which I have
promised.






CHAPTER XXX


There is a difference between first and beginning (or principle). The
latter exists in the thing of which it is the beginning, or co-exists
with it; it need not precede it; e.g., the heart is the beginning of
the living being; the element is the beginning of that of which it is
the basis. The term “first” is likewise applied to things of this kind;
but is also employed in cases where precedence in time alone is to be
expressed, and the thing which precedes is not the beginning (or the
cause) of the thing that follows. E.g., we say A. was the first
inhabitant of this house, after him came B; this does not imply that A
is the cause of B inhabiting the house. In Hebrew, teḥillah is used in
the sense of “first”; e.g., when God first (teḥillat) spake to Hosea
(Hos. i. 1), and the “beginning” is expressed by reshith, derived from
rosh, “head,” the principal part of the living being as regards
position. The Universe has not been created out of an element that
preceded it in time, since time itself formed part of the Creation. For
this reason Scripture employs the term “bereshit” (in a principle), in
which the beth is a preposition denoting “in.” The true explanation of
the first verse of Genesis is as follows: “In [creating] a principle
God created the beings above and the things below.” This explanation is
in accordance with the theory of the Creation. We find that some of our
Sages are reported to have held the opinion that time existed before
the Creation. But this report is very doubtful, because the theory that
time cannot be imagined with a beginning, has been taught by Aristotle,
as I showed you, and is objectionable. Those who have made this
assertion have been led to it by a saying of one of our Sages in
reference to the terms “one day,” “a second day.” Taking these terms
literally, the author of that saying asked, What determined “the first
day,” since there was no rotating sphere, and no sun? and continues as
follows: Scripture uses the term “one day”; R. Jehudah, son of R.
Simon, said: “Hence we learn that the divisions of time have existed
previously.” R. Abahu said, “Hence we learn that God built worlds and
again destroyed them.” This latter exposition is still worse than the
former. Consider the difficulty which these two Rabbis found in the
statement that time existed before the creation of the sun. We shall
undoubtedly soon remove this difficulty, unless these two Rabbis
intended to infer from the Scriptural text that the divisions of time
must have existed before the Creation, and thus adopted the theory of
the Eternity of the Universe. But every religious man rejects this. The
above saying is, in my opinion, certainly of the same character as that
of R. Eliezer, “Whence were the heavens created,” etc., (chap. xxvi.).
In short, in these questions, do not take notice of the utterances of
any person. I told you that the foundation of our faith is the belief
that God created the Universe from nothing; that time did not exist
previously, but was created; for it depends on the motion of the
sphere, and the sphere has been created.

You must know that the particle et in the phrase et ha-shamayim ve-et
ha-areẓ (“the heavens and the earth”) signifies “together with”; our
Sages have explained the word in the same sense in many instances.
Accordingly they assume that God created with the heavens everything
that the heavens contain, and with the earth everything the earth
includes. They further say that the simultaneous Creation of the
heavens and the earth is implied in the words, “I call unto them, they
stand up together” (Ps. xlviii.). Consequently, all things were created
together, but were separated from each other successively. Our Sages
illustrated this by the following simile: We sow various seeds at the
same time; some spring forth after one day, some after two, and some
after three days, although all have been sown at the same time.
According to this interpretation, which is undoubtedly correct, the
difficulty is removed, which led R. Jehudah, son of R. Simon, to utter
the above saying, and consisted in the doubt as to the thing by which
the first day, the second, and the third were determined. In Bereshit
Rabba, our Sages, speaking of the light created on the first day
according to the Scriptural account, say as follows: these lights [of
the luminaries mentioned in the Creation of the fourth day] are the
same that were created on the first day, but were only fixed in their
places on the fourth day. The meaning [of the first verse] has thus
been clearly stated.

We must further consider that the term ereẓ is a homonym, and is used
in a general and a particular sense. It has a more general
signification when used of everything within the sphere of the moon,
i.e., of all the four elements; and is used in particular of one of
them, of the lowest, viz., earth. This is evident from the passage:
“And the earth was without form and void, and darkness was on the
surface of the deep. And the wind of God moved upon the face of the
waters.” The term “earth” [mentioned here, and in the first verse]
includes all the four elements, whilst further on it is said, “And God
called the dry land Earth” (Gen. i. 10).

It is also important to notice that the words, “And God called a
certain thing a certain name,” are invariably intended to distinguish
one thing from others which are called by the same common noun. I
explain, therefore, the first verse in Genesis thus: In creating the
principle God created the things above and those below. Ereẓ in this
verse denotes “the things below,” or “the four elements,” and in the
verse, “And God called the dry land Earth” (ereẓ), it signifies the
element earth. This subject is now made clear.

The four elements indicated, according to our explanation, in the term
ereẓ “earth,” in the first verse, are mentioned first after the
heavens; for there are named ereẓ (earth), ruaḥ (air), mayim (water),
and ḥoshek (fire). By ḥoshek the element fire is meant, nothing else;
comp. “And thou heardest his words out of the midst of the fire” (Deut.
iv. 36); and, “When ye heard the voice out of the midst of the ḥoshek”
(darkness) (ibid. v. 2); again, “All ḥoshek (darkness) shall be hid in
his secret places: a fire not blown shall consume him” (Job xx. 26).
The element fire is called ḥoshek because it is not luminous, it is
only transparent; for if it were luminous we should see at night the
whole atmosphere in flames. The order of the four elements, according
to the natural position is here described; namely, first earth, above
it water, air close to water, and fire above air; for by placing air
over water, ḥoshek (fire), which is “upon the face of the deep,” is
undoubtedly above air. It was here necessary to use the term ruaḥ
elohim, because air is described here as in motion (meraḥefet), and the
motion of the air is, as a rule, ascribed to God; comp. “And there went
forth a wind from the Lord” (Num. xi. 31); “Thou didst blow with thy
wind” (Exod. xv. 10); “And the Lord turned a mighty strong west wind”
(ibid. x. 19), and the like. As the first ḥoshek, which denotes the
element fire, is different from the ḥoshek mentioned further on in the
sense of “darkness,” the latter is explained and distinguished from the
former, according to our explanation, in the words, “And darkness he
called Night.” This is now clear.

The phrase, “And he divided between the waters,” etc., does not
describe a division in space, as if the one part were merely above the
other, whilst the nature of both remained the same, but a distinction
as regards their nature or form. One portion of that which was first
called water was made one thing by certain properties it received, and
another portion received a different form, and this latter portion is
that which is commonly called water and of this it is said, “And the
gathering of the waters he called Seas.” Scripture even indicates that
the first mayim (“water”) in the phrase, “On the face of the waters,”
does not refer to the waters which form the seas; and that part of the
element “water,” having received a particular form, and being above the
air, is distinguished from the other part which has received the form
of ordinary water. For the words, “And he divided between the waters
which are beneath the firmament and the waters which are above the
firmament,” are similar in meaning to the phrase, “And God divided
between the light and the darkness,” and refer to a distinction by a
separate form. The firmament itself was formed of water; and in the
words of our Sages (Bereshit Rabba; cap. iv.), “The middle drop
congealed and formed the heavens.”

Here likewise Scripture says, in accordance with what I said above,
“And God called the firmament Heaven” (Gen. i. 8), in order to explain
the homonymity of the term shamayim (heaven), and to show that shamayim
in the first verse is not the firmament which is also called shamayim
(heaven). The difference is more clearly expressed in the words, “In
the open firmament of heaven” (ibid. i. 20); here it is shown that
“firmament” (rakiʻa), and “heaven” (shamayim), are two different
things. In consequence of this homonymity of the term shamayim the term
rakiʻa (firmament) is also used of the true heaven, just as the real
firmament is sometimes called shamayim (heaven); comp. “And God set
them in the rakiʻa (firmament) of the heaven” (ibid. i. 17).

This verse shows clearly that the stars, the sun, and the moon are not,
as people believe, on the surface of the spheres, but they are fixed in
the spheres, and this has been proved satisfactorily, there being no
vacuum in the Universe; for it is said, “in the firmament of the
heaven,” and not “upon the firmament of the heaven.”

It is therefore clear that there has been one common element called
water, which has been afterwards distinguished by three different
forms; one part forms the seas, another the firmament, and a third part
is over the firmament, and all this is separate from the earth. The
Scriptural text follows here a peculiar method in order to indicate
some extraordinary mysteries. It has also been declared by our Sages
that the portion above the firmament is only water by name, not in
reality, for they say (Babyl. Talmud, Ḥagigah 14b) “Four entered the
paradise,” etc. R. Akiba said to them, “When you come to the stores of
pure marble, do not say, Water, water, for it is written, ‘He that
telleth lies shall not tarry in my sight’” (Ps. ci. 7). Consider, if
you belong to the class of thinking men, how clearly and distinctly
this passage explains the subject for those who reflect on it!
Understand that which has been proved by Aristotle in his book On
Meteorology, and note whatever men of science have said on
meteorological matters.

It is necessary to inquire into the reason why the declaration “that it
was good” is not found in the account of the second day of the
Creation. The various Midrashic sayings of our Sages on this point are
well known; the best of them is the explanation that the creation of
the water was not completed on that day. According to my opinion the
reason is likewise clear, and is as follows: When the creation of any
part of the Universe is described that is permanent, regular, and in a
settled order, the phrase “that it is good” is used. But the account of
the firmament, with that which is above it and is called water, is, as
you see, of a very mysterious character. For if taken literally the
firmament would appear at first thought to be merely an imaginary
thing, as there is no other substance but the elements between us and
the lowest of the heavenly spheres, and there is no water above the
air; and if the firmament, with that which is over it, be supposed to
be above the heavens, it would a fortiori seem to be unreal and
uncomprehensible. But if the account be understood in a figurative
sense and according to its true meaning, it is still more mysterious,
since it was considered necessary to make this one of the most hidden
secrets, in order to prevent the multitude from knowing it. This being
the case, how could it be said [of the creation of the second day]
“that it was good”? This phrase would tell us that it is perfectly
clear what share the thing to which it refers takes in the permanent
existence of the Universe. But what good can people find in a thing
whose real nature is hidden, and whose apparent nature is not real?
Why, therefore, should it be said in reference to it, “that it was
good”? I must, however, give the following additional explanation.
Although the result of the second day’s creation forms an important
element among the existing things, the firmament was not its primary
object in the organization of the Universe, and therefore it could not
be said “that it was good”; it was only the means for the uncovering of
the earth. Note this. Our Sages have already explained that the herbs
and trees, which God caused to spring forth from the ground, were
caused by God to grow, after He had sent down rain upon them; and the
passage beginning, “And there went up a mist from the earth” (ii. 6),
refers to that which took place before the creative act, related in the
words, “Let the earth bring forth grass,” etc. (i. ii.). Therefore
Onkelos translates it: “And there had gone up a mist from the earth.”
It is also evident from the text itself, where it is distinctly said,
“And every plant in the field before it was in the earth,” etc. (ii.
5). This question is now explained.

It is well known to every philosopher that the principal causes of
production and destruction, after the influence of the spheres, are
light and darkness, in so far as these are accompanied by heat and
cold. For by the motion of the spheres the elements intermix, and by
light and darkness their constitution changes. The first change
consists in the formation of two kinds of mist; these are the first
causes of meteorological phenomena, such as rain; they also caused the
formation of minerals, of plants, of animals, and at last of man. It is
likewise known that darkness is the natural property of all things on
earth; in them light is accidental, coming from an external cause, and
therefore everything remains in a state of rest in the absence of
light. The Scriptural account of the Creation follows in every respect
exactly the same order, without any deviation.

Note also the saying of our Sages: “When the Universe was created, all
things were created with size, intellect, and beauty fully developed,
i.e., everything was created perfect in magnitude and form, and endowed
with the most suitable properties; the word ẓibyonam (their beauty)
used here has the same meaning as ẓebi, ‘glory’” (Ezek. xx. 6). Note
this likewise, for it includes a principle fully established.

The following point now claims our attention. The account of the six
days of creation contains, in reference to the creation of man, the
statement: “Male and female created he them” (i. 27), and concludes
with the words: “Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all
the host of them” (ii. 1), and yet the portion which follows describes
the creation of Eve from Adam, the tree of life, and the tree of
knowledge, the history of the serpent and the events connected
therewith, and all this as having taken place after Adam had been
placed in the Garden of Eden. All our Sages agree that this took place
on the sixth day, and that nothing new was created after the close of
the six days. None of the things mentioned above is therefore
impossible, because the laws of Nature were then not yet permanently
fixed. There are, however, some utterances of our Sages on this subject
[which apparently imply a different view]. I will gather them from
their different sources and place them before you, and I will refer
also to certain things by mere hints, just as has been done by the
Sages. You must know that their words, which I am about to quote, are
most perfect, most accurate, and clear to those for whom they were
said. I will therefore not add long explanations, lest I make their
statements plain, and I might thus become “a revealer of secrets,” but
I will give them in a certain order, accompanied with a few remarks,
which will suffice for readers like you.

One of these utterances is this: “Adam and Eve were at first created as
one being, having their backs united; they were then separated, and one
half was removed and brought before Adam as Eve.” The term mi-ẓalʻotav
(lit. “of his ribs”) signifies “of his sides.” The meaning of the word
is proved by referring to ẓelʻa, “the side” of the tabernacle (Exod.
xxvi. 20), which Onkelos renders setar (“side”), and so also
mi-ẓalʻotav is rendered by him “mi-sitrohi” (of his sides). Note also
how clearly it has been stated that Adam and Eve were two in some
respects, and yet they remained one, according to the words, “Bone of
my bones, and flesh of my flesh” (Gen. ii. 23). The unity of the two is
proved by the fact that both have the same name, for she is called
ishshah (woman), because she was taken out of ish (man), also by the
words, “And shall cleave unto his wife, and they shall be one flesh”
(ii. 24). How great is the ignorance of those who do not see that all
this necessarily includes some [other] idea [besides the literal
meaning of the words]. This is now clear.

Another noteworthy Midrashic remark of our Sages is the following: “The
serpent had a rider, the rider was as big as a camel, and it was the
rider that enticed Eve; this rider was Samaël.” Samaël is the name
generally applied by our Sages to Satan. Thus they say in several
places that Satan desired to entice Abraham to sin, and to abstain from
binding Isaac, and he desired also to persuade Isaac not to obey his
father. At the same time they also say, in reference to the same
subject, viz., the Akedah (“the binding of Isaac”), that Samaël came to
Abraham and said to him, “What! hast thou, being an old man, lost thy
senses?” etc. This shows that Samaël and Satan are identical. There is
a meaning in this name [Samaël], as there is also in the name naḥash
(“serpent”). In describing how the serpent came to entice Eve, our
Sages say: “Samaël was riding on it, and God was laughing at both the
camel and its rider.” It is especially of importance to notice that the
serpent did not approach or address Adam, but all his attempts were
directed against Eve, and it was through her that the serpent caused
injury and death to Adam. The greatest hatred exists between the
serpent and Eve, and between his seed and her seed; her seed being
undoubtedly also the seed of man. More remarkable still is the way in
which the serpent is joined to Eve, or rather his seed to her seed; the
head of the one touches the heel of the other. Eve defeats the serpent
by crushing its head, whilst the serpent defeats her by wounding her
heel. This is likewise clear.

The following is also a remarkable passage, most absurd in its literal
sense; but as an allegory it contains wonderful wisdom, and fully
agrees with real facts, as will be found by those who understand all
the chapters of this treatise. When the serpent came to Eve he infected
her with poison; the Israelites, who stood at Mount Sinai, removed that
poison; idolaters, who did not stand at Mount Sinai, have not got rid
of it. Note this likewise. Again they said: “The tree of life extends
over an area of five hundred years’ journey, and it is from beneath it
that all the waters of the creation sprang forth”; and they added the
explanation that this measure referred to the thickness of its body,
and not to the extent of its branches, for they continue thus: “Not the
extent of the branches thereof, but the stem thereof [korato, lit.,
‘its beam,’ signifying here ‘its stem’] has a thickness of five hundred
years’ journey.” This is now sufficiently clear. Again: “God has never
shown the tree of knowledge [of good and evil] to man, nor will He ever
show it.” This is correct, for it must be so according to the nature of
the Universe. Another noteworthy saying is this: “And the Lord God took
the man, i.e., raised him, and placed him in the Garden of Eden,” i.e.,
He gave him rest. The words “He took him,” “He gave him,” have no
reference to position in space, but they indicate his position in rank
among transient beings, and the prominent character of his existence.
Remarkable and noteworthy is the great wisdom contained in the names of
Adam, Cain, and Abel, and in the fact that it was Cain who slew Abel in
the field, that both of them perished, although the murderer had some
respite, and that the existence of mankind is due to Seth alone. Comp.
“For God has appointed me another seed” (iv. 25). This has proved true.

It is also necessary to understand and consider the words, “And Adam
gave names” (ii. 20); here it is indicated that languages are
conventional, and that they are not natural, as has been assumed by
some. We must also consider the four different terms employed in
expressing the relations of the heavens to God, bore (Creator), ʻoseh
(Maker), koneh (Possessor), and el (God). Comp. “God created the heaven
and the earth” (i. 1); “In the day that God made the earth and the
heavens” (ii. 4); “Possessor of heaven and earth” (xiv. 19); “God of
the Universe” (xxi. 31); “The God of heaven and the God of the earth”
(xxiv. 3). As to the verbs, konen, “he established,” tafaḥ, “he
spanned,” and natah, “he stretched out,” occurring in the following
passages, “Which thou hast established” (Ps. viii. 4), “My right hand
hath spanned the heavens” (Isa. xviii. 13), “Who stretchest out the
heavens” (Ps. civ. 2), they are included in the term ʻasah (“he made”);
the verb yaẓar, “he formed,” does not occur in reference to the
heavens. According to my opinion the verb yaẓar denotes to make a form,
a shape, or any other accident (for form and shape are likewise
accidents). It is therefore said, yoẓer or, “Who formeth the light”
(Isa. xiv. 7), light being an accident; yoẓer harim, “That formeth the
mountains” (Amos iv. 13), i.e., that gave them their shape. In the same
sense the verb is used in the passage, “And the Lord God formed
(va-yiẓer) all the beasts,” etc. (Gen. ii. 7). But in reference to the
Universe, viz., the heavens and the earth, which comprises the totality
of the Creation, Scripture employs the verb bara, which we explain as
denoting he produced something from nothing; also ʻasah (“he made”), on
account of the general forms or natural properties of the things which
were given to them; kanah, “he possessed,” because God rules over them
like a master over his servants. For this reason He is also called,
“The Lord of the whole earth” (Jos. iii. 11–13); ha-adon, “the Lord”
(Exod. xx., iii. 17). But although none can be a master unless there
exists something that is in his possession, this attribute cannot be
considered to imply the belief in the eternal existence of a materia
prima, since the verbs bara, “he created,” and ʻasah, “he made,” are
also employed in reference to the heavens. The Creator is called the
God of the heavens and the God of the Universe, on account of the
relations between Him and the heavens; He governs, and they are
governed; the word elohim does not signify “master” in the sense of
“owner”; it expresses the relation between His position in the totality
of existing beings, and the position of the heavens or the Universe; He
is God, not they, i.e., not the heavens. Note this.

This, together with those explanations which we have given, and which
we intend to give, in reference to this subject, may suffice,
considering the object of this treatise and the capacity of the reader.






CHAPTER XXXI


It is perhaps clear why the laws concerning Sabbath are so severe, that
their transgression is visited with death by stoning, and that the
greatest of the prophets put a person to death for breaking the
Sabbath. The commandment of the Sabbath is the third from the
commandment concerning the existence and the unity of God. For the
commandment not to worship any other being is merely an explanation of
the first. You know already from what I have said, that no opinions
retain their vitality except those which are confirmed, published, and
by certain actions constantly revived among the people. Therefore we
are told in the Law to honour this day; in order to confirm thereby the
principle of Creation which will spread in the world, when all peoples
keep Sabbath on the same day. For when the question is asked, why this
is done, the answer is given: “For in six days the Lord hath made,”
etc. (Exod. xx. 11). Two different reasons are given for this
commandment, because of two different objects. In the Decalogue in
Exodus, the following reason is given for distinguishing the Sabbath:
“For in six days,” etc. But in Deuteronomy (chap. v. 15) the reason is
given: “And thou shalt remember that thou hast been a slave in the land
of Egypt, etc., therefore the Lord thy God commanded thee,” etc. This
difference can easily be explained. In the former, the cause of the
honour and distinction of the day is given; comp. “Therefore the Lord
hath blessed the day of the Sabbath and sanctified it” (Exod. xx. 10),
and the cause for this is, “For in six days,” etc. But the fact that
God has given us the law of the Sabbath and commanded us to keep it, is
the consequence of our having been slaves; for then our work did not
depend on our will, nor could we choose the time for it; and we could
not rest. Thus God commanded us to abstain from work on the Sabbath,
and to rest, for two purposes; namely, (1) That we might confirm the
true theory, that of the Creation, which at once and clearly leads to
the theory of the existence of God. (2) That we might remember how kind
God has been in freeing us from the burden of the Egyptians.—The
Sabbath is therefore a double blessing: it gives us correct notions,
and also promotes the well-being of our bodies.






CHAPTER XXXII


There are as many different opinions concerning Prophecy as concerning
the Eternity or Non-Eternity of the Universe. For we have shown that
those who assume the existence of God as proved may be divided into
three classes, according to the view they take of the question, whether
the Universe is eternal or not. Similarly there are three different
opinions on Prophecy. I will not notice the view of the Atheist; he
does not believe in the Existence of God, much less in Prophecy; but I
will content myself with discussing the various opinions [on Prophecy]
held by those who believe in God.

1. Among those who believe in Prophecy, and even among our
coreligionists, there are some ignorant people who think as follows:
God selects any person He pleases, inspires him with the spirit of
Prophecy, and entrusts him with a mission. It makes no difference
whether that person be wise or stupid, old or young; provided he be, to
some extent, morally good. For these people have not yet gone so far as
to maintain that God might also inspire a wicked person with His
spirit. They admit that this is impossible, unless God has previously
caused him to improve his ways.

2. The philosophers hold that prophecy is a certain faculty of man in a
state of perfection, which can only be obtained by study. Although the
faculty is common to the whole race, yet it is not fully developed in
each individual, either on account of the individual’s defective
constitution, or on account of some other external cause. This is the
case with every faculty common to a class. It is only brought to a
state of perfection in some individuals, and not in all; but it is
impossible that it should not be perfect in some individual of the
class; and if the perfection is of such a nature that it can only be
produced by an agent, such an agent must exist. Accordingly, it is
impossible that an ignorant person should be a prophet; or that a
person being no prophet in the evening, should, unexpectedly on the
following morning, find himself a prophet, as if prophecy were a thing
that could be found unintentionally. But if a person, perfect in his
intellectual and moral faculties, and also perfect, as far as possible,
in his imaginative faculty, prepares himself in the manner which will
be described, he must become a prophet; for prophecy is a natural
faculty of man. It is impossible that a man who has the capacity for
prophecy should prepare himself for it without attaining it, just as it
is impossible that a person with a healthy constitution should be fed
well, and yet not properly assimilate his food; and the like.

3. The third view is that which is taught in Scripture, and which forms
one of the principles of our religion. It coincides with the opinion of
the philosophers in all points except one. For we believe that, even if
one has the capacity for prophecy, and has duly prepared himself, it
may yet happen that he does not actually prophesy. It is in that case
the will of God [that withholds from him the use of the faculty].
According to my opinion, this fact is as exceptional as any other
miracle, and acts in the same way. For the laws of Nature demand that
every one should be a prophet, who has a proper physical constitution,
and has been duly prepared as regards education and training. If such a
person is not a prophet, he is in the same position as a person who,
like Jeroboam (1 Kings xiii. 4), is deprived of the use of his hand, or
of his eyes, as was the case with the army of Syria, in the history of
Elisha (2 Kings vi. 18). As for the principle which I laid down, that
preparation and perfection of moral and rational faculties are the sine
quâ non, our Sages say exactly the same: “The spirit of prophecy only
rests upon persons who are wise, strong, and rich.” We have explained
these words in our Commentary on the Mishnah, and in our large work. We
stated there that the Sons of the Prophets were constantly engaged in
preparation. That those who have prepared themselves may still be
prevented from being prophets, may be inferred from the history of
Baruch, the son of Nerijah; for he followed Jeremiah, who prepared and
instructed him; and yet he hoped in vain for prophecy; comp., “I am
weary with my sighing, and rest have I not found.” He was then told
through Jeremiah, “Thus saith the Lord, Thus shalt thou say to him,
Thou seekest for thee great things, do not seek” (Jer. xlv. 5). It may
perhaps be assumed that prophecy is here described as a thing “too
great” for Baruch. So also the fact that “her prophets did not find
visions from the Lord” (Lam. ii. 4), may be considered as the result of
the exile of her prophets, as will be explained (chap. xxxvi.). There
are, however, numerous passages in Scripture as well as in the writings
of our Sages, which support the principle that it depends chiefly on
the will of God who is to prophesy, and at what time; and that He only
selects the best and the wisest. We hold that fools and ignorant people
are unfit for this distinction. It is as impossible for any one of
these to prophesy as it is for an ass or a frog; for prophecy is
impossible without study and training; when these have created the
possibility, then it depends on the will of God whether the possibility
is to be turned into reality. We must not be misled by the words of
Jeremiah (i. 5), “Before I formed thee in the womb I knew thee, and
before thou camest forth from the womb I have sanctified thee”; for
this is the case with all prophets; there must be a physical
preparation from the beginning of their existence, as will be
explained. As to the words, “For I am young” (ibid. ver. 6), it is well
known that the pious Joseph, when he was thirty years old, is called by
the Hebrew “young” (naʻar); also Joshua, when he was nearly sixty years
old. For the statement, “and his minister Joshua, the son of Nun, was
young,” occurs in the account of the Golden Calf (Exod. xxxiii. 11).
Moses was then eighty-one years old, he lived one hundred and twenty
years; Joshua, who survived him fourteen years, lived one hundred and
ten years and must consequently have been at least fifty-seven years
old at the time when the Golden Calf was made, and yet he is called
naʻar, “young.” Nor must we be misled by prophecies like the following:
“I will pour out my spirit over all flesh, and your sons and your
daughters shall prophesy”; since it is distinctly stated what is meant
by “prophesy” in this place, viz., “Your old men will dream dreams,
your young men shall see visions.” For we call also prophets all those
who reveal something unknown by surmises, or conjectures, or correct
inferences. Thus “prophets of Baal” and “of Asherah” are mentioned in
Scripture. And God says, “If there arise among you a prophet or a
dreamer of dreams,” etc. (Deut. xiii. 1). As to the revelation on Mount
Sinai, all saw the great fire, and heard the fearful thunderings, that
caused such an extraordinary terror; but only those of them who were
duly qualified were prophetically inspired, each one according to his
capacities. Therefore it is said, “Come up unto the Lord, thou and
Aaron, Nadab and Abihu.” Moses rose to the highest degree of prophecy,
according to the words, “And Moses alone shall come near the Lord.”
Aaron was below him, Nadab and Abihu below Aaron, and the seventy
elders below Nadab and Abihu, and the rest below the latter, each one
according to his degree of perfection. Similarly our Sages wrote: Moses
had his own place and Aaron his own. Since we have touched upon the
revelation on Mount Sinai, we will point out in a separate chapter what
may be inferred as regards the nature of that event, both from the
Scriptural text, in accordance with reasonable interpretation, and from
the words of our Sages.






CHAPTER XXXIII


It is clear to me that what Moses experienced at the revelation on
Mount Sinai was different from that which was experienced by all the
other Israelites, for Moses alone was addressed by God, and for this
reason the second person singular is used in the Ten Commandments;
Moses then went down to the foot of the mount and told his fellow-men
what he had heard. Comp., “I stood between the Lord and you at that
time to tell you the word of the Lord” (Deut. v. 5). Again, “Moses
spake, and God answered him with a loud voice” (Exod. xix. 19). In the
Mechilta our Sages say distinctly that he brought to them every word as
he had heard it. Furthermore, the words, “In order that the people hear
when I speak with thee” (Exod. xix. 9), show that God spoke to Moses,
and the people only heard the mighty sound, not distinct words. It is
to the perception of this mighty sound that Scripture refers in the
passage, “When ye hear the sound” (Deut. v. 20); again it is stated,
“You heard a sound of words” (ibid. iv. 12), and it is not said “You
heard words”; and even where the hearing of the words is mentioned,
only the perception of the sound is meant. It was only Moses that heard
the words, and he reported them to the people. This is apparent from
Scripture, and from the utterances of our Sages in general. There is,
however, an opinion of our Sages frequently expressed in the Midrashim,
and found also in the Talmud, to this effect: The Israelites heard the
first and the second commandments from God, i.e., they learnt the truth
of the principles contained in these two commandments in the same
manner as Moses, and not through Moses. For these two principles, the
existence of God and His Unity, can be arrived at by means of
reasoning, and whatever can be established by proof is known by the
prophet in the same way as by any other person; he has no advantage in
this respect. These two principles were not known through prophecy
alone. Comp., “Thou hast been shown to know that,” etc. (Deut. iv. 34).
But the rest of the commandments are of an ethical and authoritative
character, and do not contain [truths] perceived by the intellect.
Notwithstanding all that has been said by our Sages on this subject, we
infer from Scripture as well as from the words of our Sages, that the
Israelites heard on that occasion a certain sound which Moses
understood to proclaim the first two commandments, and through Moses
all other Israelites learnt them when he in intelligible sounds
repeated them to the people. Our Sages mention this view, and support
it by the verse, “God hath spoken once; twice have I heard this” (Ps.
lxii. 11). They state distinctly, in the beginning of Midrash Ḥazita,
that the Israelites did not hear any other command directly from God;
comp. “A loud voice, and it was not heard again” (Deut. v. 19). It was
after this first sound was heard that the people were seized with the
fear and terror described in Scripture, and that they said, “Behold the
Lord our God has shown us, etc., and now why shall we die, etc. Come
thou near,” etc. Then Moses, the most distinguished of all mankind,
came the second time, received successively the other commandments, and
came down to the foot of the mountain to proclaim them to the people,
whilst the mighty phenomena continued; they saw the fire, they heard
the sounds, which were those of thunder and lightning during a storm,
and the loud sound of the shofar; and all that is said of the many
sounds heard at that time, e.g., in the verse, “and all the people
perceived the sounds,” etc., refers to the sound of the shofar,
thunder, and similar sounds. But the voice of the Lord, that is, the
voice created for that purpose, which was understood to include the
diverse commandments, was only heard once, as is declared in the Law,
and has been clearly stated by our Sages in the places which I have
indicated to you. When the people heard this voice their soul left
them; and in this voice they perceived the first two commandments. It
must, however, be noticed that the people did not understand the voice
in the same degree as Moses did. I will point out to you this important
fact, and show you that it was a matter of tradition with the nation,
and well known by our Sages. For, as a rule, Onkelos renders the word
va-yedabber by u-mallel (“and God spake”); this is also the case with
this word in the beginning of the twentieth chapter of Exodus, but the
words ve-al yedabber immanu elohim, “let not God speak to us” (Exod.
xx. 19), addressed by the people to Moses, is rendered vela yitmallel
immanu min kodam adonai (“Let not aught be spoken to us by the Lord”).
Onkelos makes thus the same distinction which we made. You know that
according to the Talmud Onkelos received all these excellent
interpretations directly from R. Eliezer and R. Joshua, the wisest men
in Israel. Note it, and remember it, for it is impossible for any
person to expound the revelation on Mount Sinai more fully than our
Sages have done, since it is one of the secrets of the Law. It is very
difficult to have a true conception of the events, for there has never
been before, nor will there ever be again, anything like it. Note it.






CHAPTER XXXIV


The meaning of the Scriptural passage, “Behold I will send an angel
before thee,” etc. (Exod. xxiii. 20), is identical with the parallel
passage in Deuteronomy which God is represented to have addressed to
Moses at the revelation on Mount Sinai, namely, “I will raise them up a
prophet from among their brethren,” etc. (Deut. xviii. 18). The words,
“Beware of him, and obey his voice,” etc., said in reference to the
angel, prove [that this passage speaks of a prophet]. For there is no
doubt that the commandment is given to the ordinary people, to whom
angels do not appear with commandments and exhortations, and it is
therefore unnecessary to tell them not to disobey him. The meaning of
the passage quoted above is this: God informs the Israelites that He
will raise up for them a prophet, to whom an angel will appear in order
to speak to him, to command him, and to exhort him; he therefore
cautions them not to rebel against this angel, whose word the prophet
will communicate to them. Therefore it is expressly said in
Deuteronomy, “Unto him ye shall hearken” (Deut. xviii. 15); “And it
shall come to pass that whosoever shall not hearken unto my words which
he shall speak in my name,” etc. (ibid. 19). This is the explanation of
the words, “for my name is in him” (Exod. xxiv. 21). The object of all
this is to say to the Israelites, This great sight witnessed by you,
the revelation on Mount Sinai, will not continue for ever, nor will it
ever be repeated. Fire and cloud will not continually rest over the
tabernacle, as they are resting now on it; but the towns will be
conquered for you, peace will be secured for you in the land, and you
will be informed of what you have to do, by an angel whom I will send
to your prophets; he will thus teach you what to do, and what not to
do. Here a principle is laid down which I have constantly expounded,
viz., that all prophets except Moses receive the prophecy through an
angel. Note it.






CHAPTER XXXV


I have already described the four points in which the prophecy of Moses
our Teacher was distinguished from that of other prophets, in books
accessible to every one, in the Commentary on the Mishnah (Sanhedrin x.
1) and in Mishneh-torah (S. Maddʻa I. vii. 6); I have also adduced
evidence for my explanation, and shown the correctness thereof. I need
not repeat the subject here, nor is it included in the theme of this
work. For I must tell you that whatever I say here of prophecy refers
exclusively to the form of the prophecy of all prophets before and
after Moses. But as to the prophecy of Moses I will not discuss it in
this work with one single word, whether directly or indirectly,
because, in my opinion, the term prophet is applied to Moses and other
men homonymously. A similar distinction, I think, must be made between
the miracles wrought by Moses and those wrought by other prophets, for
his signs are not of the same class as the miracles of other prophets.
That his prophecy was distinguished from that of all his predecessors
is proved by the passage, “And I appeared to Abraham, etc., but by my
name, the Lord, I was not known unto them” (Exod. vi. 3). We thus learn
that his prophetic perception was different from that of the
Patriarchs, and excelled it; a fortiori it must have excelled that of
other prophets before Moses. As to the distinction of Moses’ prophecy
from that of succeeding prophets, it is stated as a fact, “And there
arose not a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew
face to face” (Deut. xxxiv. 10). It is thus clear that his prophetic
perception was above that of later prophets in Israel, who are “a
kingdom of priests and a holy nation,” and “in whose midst is the
Lord”; much more is it above that of prophets among other nations.

The general distinction between the wonders of Moses and those of other
prophets is this: The wonders wrought by prophets, or for them, are
witnessed by a few individuals, e.g., the wonders wrought by Elijah and
Elisha; the king of Israel is therefore surprised, and asked Gehazi to
describe to him the miracles wrought by Elisha: “Tell me, I pray thee,
all the great things that Elisha hath done. And it came to pass as he
was telling, etc. And Gehazi said: ‘My lord, O king, this is the woman,
and this is her son, whom Elisha restored to life’” (2 Kings viii. 4,
5). The same is the case with the signs of every other prophet, except
Moses our Teacher. Scripture, therefore declares that no prophet will
ever, like Moses, do signs publicly in the presence of friend and
enemy, of his followers and his opponents; this is the meaning of the
words: “And there arose not a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses,
etc., in all the signs and the wonders, etc., in the sight of all
Israel.” Two things are here mentioned together; namely, that there
will not arise a prophet that will perceive as Moses perceived, or a
prophet that will do as he did; then it is pointed out that the signs
were made in the presence of Pharaoh, all his servants and all his
land, the opponents of Moses, and also in the presence of all the
Israelites, his followers. Comp. “In the sight of all Israel.” This is
a distinction not possessed by any prophet before Moses; nor, as is
correctly foretold, will it ever be possessed by another prophet. We
must not be misled by the account that the light of the sun stood still
certain hours for Joshua, when “he said in the sight of Israel,” etc.
(Josh. x. 12); for it is not said there “in the sight of all Israel,”
as is said in reference to Moses. So also the miracle of Elijah, at
Mount Carmel, was witnessed only by a few people. When I said above
that the sun stood still certain hours, I explain the words “ka-jom
tamim” to mean “the longest possible day,” because tamim means
“perfect,” and indicates that that day appeared to the people at Gibeon
as their longest day in the summer. Your mind must comprehend the
distinction of the prophecy and the wonders of Moses, and understand
that his greatness in prophetic perception was the same as his power of
producing miracles. If you further assume that we are unable fully to
comprehend the nature of this greatness, you will understand that when
I speak, in the chapters which follow this, on prophecy and the
different classes of prophets, I only refer to the prophets which have
not attained the high degree that Moses attained. This is what I
desired to explain in this chapter.






CHAPTER XXXVI


Prophecy is, in truth and reality, an emanation sent forth by the
Divine Being through the medium of the Active Intellect, in the first
instance to man’s rational faculty, and then to his imaginative
faculty; it is the highest degree and greatest perfection man can
attain; it consists in the most perfect development of the imaginative
faculty. Prophecy is a faculty that cannot in any way be found in a
person, or acquired by man, through a culture of his mental and moral
faculties; for even if these latter were as good and perfect as
possible, they would be of no avail, unless they were combined with the
highest natural excellence of the imaginative faculty. You know that
the full development of any faculty of the body, such as the
imagination, depends on the condition of the organ, by means of which
the faculty acts. This must be the best possible as regards its
temperament and its size, and also as regards the purity of its
substance. Any defect in this respect cannot in any way be supplied or
remedied by training. For when any organ is defective in its
temperament, proper training can in the best case restore a healthy
condition to some extent, but cannot make such an organ perfect. But if
the organ is defective as regards size, position, or as regards the
substance and the matter of which the organ is formed, there is no
remedy. You know all this, and I need not explain it to you at length.

Part of the functions of the imaginative faculty is, as you well know,
to retain impressions by the senses, to combine them, and chiefly to
form images. The principal and highest function is performed when the
senses are at rest and pause in their action, for then it receives, to
some extent, divine inspiration in the measure as it is predisposed for
this influence. This is the nature of those dreams which prove true,
and also of prophecy, the difference being one of quantity, not of
quality. Thus our Sages say, that dream is the sixtieth part of
prophecy; and no such comparison could be made between two things of
different kinds, for we cannot say the perfection of man is so many
times the perfection of a horse. In Bereshit Rabba (sect. xvii.) the
following saying of our Sages occurs, “Dream is the nobelet (the unripe
fruit) of prophecy.” This is an excellent comparison, for the unripe
fruit (nobelet) is really the fruit to some extent, only it has fallen
from the tree before it was fully developed and ripe. In a similar
manner the action of the imaginative faculty during sleep is the same
as at the time when it receives a prophecy, only in the first case it
is not fully developed, and has not yet reached its highest degree. But
why need I quote the words of our Sages, when I can refer to the
following passage of Scripture: “If there be among you a prophet, I,
the Lord, will make myself known unto him in a vision, in a dream will
I speak to him” (Num. xii. 6). Here the Lord tells us what the real
essence of prophecy is, that it is a perfection acquired in a dream or
in a vision (the original mareh is a noun derived from the verb raah);
the imaginative faculty acquires such an efficiency in its action that
it sees the thing as if it came from without, and perceives it as if
through the medium of bodily senses. These two modes of prophecy,
vision and dream, include all its different degrees. It is a well-known
fact that the thing which engages greatly and earnestly man’s attention
whilst he is awake and in the full possession of his senses forms
during his sleep the object of the action of his imaginative faculty.
Imagination is then only influenced by the intellect in so far as it is
predisposed for such influence. It would be quite useless to illustrate
this by a simile, or to explain it fully, as it is clear, and every one
knows it. It is like the action of the senses, the existence of which
no person with common sense would ever deny. After these introductory
remarks you will understand that a person must satisfy the following
conditions before he can become a prophet: The substance of the brain
must from the very beginning be in the most perfect condition as
regards purity of matter, composition of its different parts, size and
position; no part of his body must suffer from ill-health; he must in
addition have studied and acquired wisdom, so that his rational faculty
passes from a state of potentiality to that of actuality; his intellect
must be as developed and perfect as human intellect can be; his
passions pure and equally balanced; all his desires must aim at
obtaining a knowledge of the hidden laws and causes that are in force
in the Universe; his thoughts must be engaged in lofty matters; his
attention directed to the knowledge of God, the consideration of His
works, and of that which he must believe in this respect. There must be
an absence of the lower desires and appetites, of the seeking after
pleasure in eating, drinking, and cohabitation; and, in short, every
pleasure connected with the sense of touch. (Aristotle correctly says
that this sense is a disgrace to us, since we possess it only in virtue
of our being animals; and it does not include any specifically human
element, whilst enjoyments connected with other senses, as smell,
hearing, and sight, though likewise of a material nature, may sometimes
include [intellectual] pleasure, appealing to man as man, according to
Aristotle. This remark, although forming no part of our subject, is not
superfluous, for the thoughts of the most renowned wise men are to a
great extent affected by the pleasures of this sense, and filled with a
desire for them. And yet people are surprised that these scholars do
not prophesy, if prophesying be nothing but a certain degree in the
natural development of man.) It is further necessary to suppress every
thought or desire for unreal power and dominion; that is to say, for
victory, increase of followers, acquisition of honour, and service from
the people without any ulterior object. On the contrary, the multitude
must be considered according to their true worth; some of them are
undoubtedly like domesticated cattle, and others like wild beasts, and
these only engage the mind of the perfect and distinguished man in so
far as he desires to guard himself from injury, in case of contact with
them, and to derive some benefit from them when necessary. A man who
satisfies these conditions, whilst his fully developed imagination is
in action, influenced by the Active Intellect according to his mental
training,—such a person will undoubtedly perceive nothing but things
very extraordinary and divine, and see nothing but God and His angels.
His knowledge will only include that which is real knowledge, and his
thought will only be directed to such general principles as would tend
to improve the social relations between man and man.

We have thus described three kinds of perfection: mental perfection
acquired by training, perfection of the natural constitution of the
imaginative faculty, and moral perfection produced by the suppression
of every thought of bodily pleasures, and of every kind of foolish or
evil ambition. These qualities are, as is well known, possessed by the
wise men in different degrees, and the degrees of prophetic faculty
vary in accordance with this difference. Faculties of the body are, as
you know, at one time weak, wearied, and corrupted, at others in a
healthy state. Imagination is certainly one of the faculties of the
body. You find, therefore, that prophets are deprived of the faculty of
prophesying when they mourn, are angry, or are similarly affected. Our
Sages say, Inspiration does not come upon a prophet when he is sad or
languid. This is the reason why Jacob did not receive any revelation
during the period of his mourning, when his imagination was engaged
with the loss of Joseph. The same was the case with Moses, when he was
in a state of depression through the multitude of his troubles, which
lasted from the murmurings of the Israelites in consequence of the evil
report of the spies, till the death of the warriors of that generation.
He received no message of God, as he used to do, even though he did not
receive prophetic inspiration through the medium of the imaginative
faculty, but directly through the intellect. We have mentioned it
several times that Moses did not, like other prophets, speak in
similes. This will be further explained (chap. xlv.), but it is not the
subject of the present chapter. There were also persons who prophesied
for a certain time and then left off altogether, something occurring
that caused them to discontinue prophesying. The same circumstance,
prevalence of sadness and dulness, was undoubtedly the direct cause of
the interruption of prophecy during the exile; for can there be any
greater misfortune for man than this: to be a slave bought for money in
the service of ignorant and voluptuous masters, and powerless against
them as they unite in themselves the absence of true knowledge and the
force of all animal desires? Such an evil state has been prophesied to
us in the words, “They shall run to and fro to seek the word of God,
but shall not find it” (Amos viii. 12); “Her king and her princes are
among the nations, the law is no more, her prophets also find no vision
from the Lord” (Lam. ii. 9). This is a real fact, and the cause is
evident; the pre-requisites [of prophecy] have been lost. In the
Messianic period—may it soon commence—prophecy will therefore again be
in our midst, as has been promised by God.






CHAPTER XXXVII


It is necessary to consider the nature of the divine influence, which
enables us to think, and gives us the various degrees of intelligence.
For this influence may reach a person only in a small measure, and in
exactly the same proportion would then be his intellectual condition,
whilst it may reach another person in such a measure that, in addition
to his own perfection, he can be the means of perfection for others.
The same relation may be observed throughout the whole Universe. There
are some beings so perfect that they can govern other beings, but there
are also beings that are only perfect in so far as they can govern
themselves and cannot influence other beings. In some cases the
influence of the [Active] Intellect reaches only the logical and not
the imaginative faculty; either on account of the insufficiency of that
influence, or on account of a defect in the constitution of the
imaginative faculty, and the consequent inability of the latter to
receive that influence: this is the condition of wise men or
philosophers. If, however, the imaginative faculty is naturally in the
most perfect condition, this influence may, as has been explained by us
and by other philosophers, reach both his logical and his imaginative
faculties: this is the case with prophets. But it happens sometimes
that the influence only reaches the imaginative faculty on account of
the insufficiency of the logical faculty, arising either from a natural
defect, or from a neglect in training. This is the case with statesmen,
lawgivers, diviners, charmers, and men that have true dreams, or do
wonderful things by strange means and secret arts, though they are not
wise men; all these belong to the third class. It is further necessary
to understand that some persons belonging to the third class perceive
scenes, dreams, and confused images, when awake, in the form of a
prophetic vision. They then believe that they are prophets; they wonder
that they perceive visions, and think that they have acquired wisdom
without training. They fall into grave errors as regards important
philosophical principles, and see a strange mixture of true and
imaginary things. All this is the consequence of the strength of their
imaginative faculty, and the weakness of their logical faculty, which
has not developed, and has not passed from potentiality to actuality.

It is well known that the members of each class differ greatly from
each other. Each of the first two classes is again subdivided, and
contains two sections, namely, those who receive the influence only as
far as is necessary for their own perfection, and those who receive it
in so great a measure that it suffices for their own perfection and
that of others. A member of the first class, the wise men, may have his
mind influenced either only so far, that he is enabled to search, to
understand, to know, and to discern, without attempting to be a teacher
or an author, having neither the desire nor the capacity; but he may
also be influenced to such a degree that he becomes a teacher and an
author. The same is the case with the second class. A person may
receive a prophecy enabling him to perfect himself but not others; but
he may also receive such a prophecy as would compel him to address his
fellow-men, teach them, and benefit them through his perfection. It is
clear that, without this second degree of perfection, no books would
have been written, nor would any prophets have persuaded others to know
the truth. For a scholar does not write a book with the object to teach
himself what he already knows. But the characteristic of the intellect
is this: what the intellect of one receives is transmitted to another,
and so on, till a person is reached that can only himself be perfected
by such an influence, but is unable to communicate it to others, as has
been explained in some chapters of this treatise (chap. xi.). It is
further the nature of this element in man that he who possesses an
additional degree of that influence is compelled to address his
fellow-men, under all circumstances, whether he is listened to or not,
even if he injures himself thereby. Thus we find prophets that did not
leave off speaking to the people until they were slain; it is this
divine influence that moves them, that does not allow them to rest in
any way, though they might bring upon themselves great evils by their
action. E.g., when Jeremiah was despised, like other teachers and
scholars of his age, he could not, though he desired it, withhold his
prophecy, or cease from reminding the people of the truths which they
rejected. Comp. “For the Word of the Lord was unto me a reproach and a
mocking all day, and I said, I will not mention it, nor will I again
speak in His name; but it was in mine heart as a burning fire, enclosed
in my bones, and I was wearied to keep it, and did not prevail” (Jer.
xx. 8, 9). This is also the meaning of the words of another prophet,
“The Lord God hath spoken, who shall not prophesy?” (Amos iii. 8) Note
it.






CHAPTER XXXVIII


Every man possesses a certain amount of courage, otherwise he would not
stir to remove anything that might injure him. This psychical force
seems to me analogous to the physical force of repulsion. Energy varies
like all other forces, being great in one case and small in another.
There are, therefore, people who attack a lion, whilst others run away
at the sight of a mouse. One attacks a whole army and fights, another
is frightened and terrified by the threat of a woman. This courage
requires that there be in a man’s constitution a certain disposition
for it. If man, in accordance with a certain view, employs it more
frequently, it develops and increases, but, on the other hand, if it is
employed, in accordance with the opposite view, more rarely, it will
diminish. From our own youth we remember that there are different
degrees of energy among boys.

The same is the case with the intuitive faculty; all possess it, but in
different degrees. Man’s intuitive power is especially strong in things
which he has well comprehended, and in which his mind is much engaged.
Thus you may yourself guess correctly that a certain person said or did
a certain thing in a certain matter. Some persons are so strong and
sound in their imagination and intuitive faculty that, when they assume
a thing to be in existence, the reality either entirely or partly
confirms their assumption. Although the causes of this assumption are
numerous, and include many preceding, succeeding, and present
circumstances, by means of the intuitive faculty the intellect can pass
over all these causes, and draw inferences from them very quickly,
almost instantaneously. This same faculty enables some persons to
foretell important coming events. The prophets must have had these two
forces, courage and intuition, highly developed, and these were still
more strengthened when they were under the influence of the Active
Intellect. Their courage was so great that, e.g., Moses, with only a
staff in his hand, dared to address a great king in his desire to
deliver a nation from his service. He was not frightened or terrified,
because he had been told, “I will be with thee” (Exod. iii. 12). The
prophets have not all the same degree of courage, but none of them have
been entirely without it. Thus Jeremiah is told: “Be not afraid of
them,” etc. (Jer. i. 8), and Ezekiel is exhorted, “Do not fear them or
their word” (Ezek. ii. 6). In the same manner, you find that all
prophets possessed great courage. Again, through the excellence of
their intuitive faculty, they could quickly foretell the future, but
this excellence, as is well known, likewise admits of different
degrees.

The true prophets undoubtedly conceive ideas that result from premisses
which human reason could not comprehend by itself; thus they tell
things which men could not tell by reason and ordinary imagination
alone; for [the action of the prophets’ mental capacities is influenced
by] the same agent that causes the perfection of the imaginative
faculty, and that enables the prophet thereby to foretell a future
event with such clearness as if it was a thing already perceived with
the senses, and only through them conveyed to his imagination. This
agent perfects the prophet’s mind, and influences it in such a manner
that he conceives ideas which are confirmed by reality, and are so
clear to him as if he deduced them by means of syllogisms.

This should be the belief of all who choose to accept the truth. For
[all things are in a certain relation to each other, and] what is
noticed in one thing may be used as evidence for the existence of
certain properties in another, and the knowledge of one thing leads us
to the knowledge of other things. But [what we said of the
extraordinary powers of our imaginative faculty] applies with special
force to our intellect, which is directly influenced by the Active
Intellect, and caused by it to pass from potentiality to actuality. It
is through the intellect that the influence reaches the imaginative
faculty. How then could the latter be so perfect as to be able to
represent things not previously perceived by the senses, if the same
degree of perfection were withheld from the intellect, and the latter
could not comprehend things otherwise than in the usual manner, namely,
by means of premiss, conclusion, and inference? This is the true
characteristic of prophecy, and of the disciplines to which the
preparation for prophecy must exclusively be devoted. I spoke here of
true prophets in order to exclude the third class, namely, those
persons whose logical faculties are not fully developed, and who do not
possess any wisdom, but are only endowed with imaginative and inventive
powers. It may be that things perceived by these persons are nothing
but ideas which they had before, and of which impressions were left in
their imaginations together with those of other things; but whilst the
impressions of other images are effaced and have disappeared, certain
images alone remain, are seen and considered as new and objective,
coming from without. The process is analogous to the following case: A
person has with him in the house a thousand living individuals; all
except one of them leave the house: when the person finds himself alone
with that individual, he imagines that the latter has entered the house
now, contrary to the fact that he has only not left the house. This is
one of the many phenomena open to gross misinterpretations and
dangerous errors, and many of those who believed that they were wise
perished thereby.

There were, therefore, men who supported their opinion by a dream which
they had, thinking that the vision during sleep was independent of what
they had previously believed or heard when awake. Persons whose mental
capacities are not fully developed, and who have not attained
intellectual perfection, must not take any notice of these [dreams].
Those who reach that perfection may, through the influence of the
divine intellect, obtain knowledge independent of that possessed by
them when awake. They are true prophets, as is distinctly stated in
Scripture, ve-nabi lebab ḥokmah (Ps. xc. 12), “And the true prophet
possesseth a heart of wisdom.” This must likewise be noticed.






CHAPTER XXXIX


We have given the definition of prophecy, stated its true
characteristics, and shown that the prophecy of Moses our Teacher was
distinguished from that of other prophets; we will now explain that
this distinction alone qualified him for the office of proclaiming the
Law, a mission without a parallel in the history from Adam to Moses, or
among the prophets who came after him; it is a principle in our faith
that there will never be revealed another Law. Consequently we hold
that there has never been, nor will there ever be, any other divine Law
but that of Moses our Teacher. According to what is written in
Scripture and handed down by tradition, the fact may be explained in
the following way: There were prophets before Moses, as the patriarchs
Shem, Eber, Noah, Methushelah, and Enoch, but of these none said to any
portion of mankind that God sent him to them and commanded him to
convey to them a certain message or to prohibit or to command a certain
thing. Such a thing is not related in Scripture, or in authentic
tradition. Divine prophecy reached them as we have explained. Men like
Abraham, who received a large measure of prophetic inspiration, called
their fellow-men together and led them by training and instruction to
the truth which they had perceived. Thus Abraham taught, and showed by
philosophical arguments that there is one God, that He has created
everything that exists beside Him, and that neither the constellations
nor anything in the air ought to be worshipped; he trained his
fellow-men in this belief, and won their attention by pleasant words as
well as by acts of kindness. Abraham did not tell the people that God
had sent him to them with the command concerning certain things which
should or should not be done. Even when it was commanded that he, his
sons, and his servants should be circumcised, he fulfilled that
commandment, but he did not address his fellow-men prophetically on
this subject. That Abraham induced his fellow-men to do what is right,
telling them only his own will [and not that of God], may be learnt
from the following passage of Scripture: “For I know him, because he
commands his sons and his house after him, to practise righteousness
and judgment” (Gen. xix. 19). Also Isaac, Jacob, Levi, Kohath, and
Amram influenced their fellow-men in the same way. Our Sages, when
speaking of prophets before Moses, used expressions like the following:
The bet-din (court of justice) of Eber, the bet-din of Methushelah, and
in the college of Methushelah; although all these were prophets, yet
they taught their fellow-men in the manner of preachers, teachers, and
pedagogues, but did not use such phrases as the following: “And God
said to me, Speak to certain people so and so.” This was the state of
prophecy before Moses. But as regards Moses, you know what [God] said
to him, what he said [to the people], and the words addressed to him by
the whole nation: “This day we have seen that God doth talk with man,
and that he liveth” (Deut. v. 21). The history of all our prophets that
lived after Moses is well known to you; they performed, as it were, the
function of warning the people and exhorting them to keep the Law of
Moses, threatening evil to those who would neglect it, and announcing
blessings to those who would submit to its guidance. This we believe
will always be the case. Comp. “It is not in the heavens that one might
say,” etc. (ibid. xxx. 12); “For us and for our children for ever”
(ibid. xxix. 28). It is but natural that it should be so. For if one
individual of a class has reached the highest perfection possible in
that class, every other individual must necessarily be less perfect,
and deviate from the perfect measure either by surplus or deficiency.
Take, e.g., the normal constitution of a being, it is the most proper
composition possible in that class; any constitution that deviates from
that norm contains something too much or too little. The same is the
case with the Law. It is clear that the Law is normal in this sense;
for it contains “Just statutes and judgments” (Deut. iv. 8); but “just”
is here identical with “equibalanced.” The statutes of the Law do not
impose burdens or excesses as are implied in the service of a hermit or
pilgrim, and the like; but, on the other hand, they are not so
deficient as to lead to gluttony or lewdness, or to prevent, as the
religious laws of the heathen nations do, the development of man’s
moral and intellectual faculties. We intend to discuss in this treatise
the reasons of the commandments, and we shall then show, as far as
necessary, the justice and wisdom of the Law, on account of which it is
said: “The Law of God is perfect, refreshing the heart” (Ps. xix. 8).
There are persons who believe that the Law commands much exertion and
great pain, but due consideration will show them their error. Later on
I will show how easy it is for the perfect to obey the Law. Comp. “What
does the Lord thy God ask of thee?” etc. (Deut. x. 12); “Have I been a
wilderness to Israel?” (Jer. ii. 31). But this applies only to the
noble ones; whilst wicked, violent, and pugnacious persons find it most
injurious and hard that there should be any divine authority tending to
subdue their passion. To low-minded, wanton, and passionate persons it
appears most cruel that there should be an obstacle in their way to
satisfy their carnal appetite, or that a punishment should be inflicted
for their doings. Similarly every godless person imagines that it is
too hard to abstain from the evil he has chosen in accordance with his
inclination. We must not consider the Law easy or hard according as it
appears to any wicked, low-minded, and immoral person, but as it
appears to the judgment of the most perfect, who, according to the Law,
are fit to be the example for all mankind. This Law alone is called
divine; other laws, such as the political legislations among the
Greeks, or the follies of the Sabeans, are the works of human leaders,
but not of prophets, as I have explained several times.






CHAPTER XL


It has already been fully explained that man is naturally a social
being, that by virtue of his nature he seeks to form communities; man
is therefore different from other living beings that are not compelled
to combine into communities. He is, as you know, the highest form in
the creation, and he therefore includes the largest number of
constituent elements; this is the reason why the human race contains
such a great variety of individuals, that we cannot discover two
persons exactly alike in any moral quality, or in external appearance.
The cause of this is the variety in man’s temperament, and in accidents
dependent on his form; for with every physical form there are connected
certain special accidents different from those which are connected with
the substance. Such a variety among the individuals of a class does not
exist in any other class of living beings; for the variety in any other
species is limited; only man forms an exception; two persons may be so
different from each other in every respect that they appear to belong
to two different classes. Whilst one person is so cruel that he kills
his youngest child in his anger, another is too delicate and
faint-hearted to kill even a fly or worm. The same is the case with
most of the accidents. This great variety and the necessity of social
life are essential elements in man’s nature. But the well-being of
society demands that there should be a leader able to regulate the
actions of man; he must complete every shortcoming, remove every
excess, and prescribe for the conduct of all, so that the natural
variety should be counterbalanced by the uniformity of legislation, and
the order of society be well established. I therefore maintain that the
Law, though not a product of Nature, is nevertheless not entirely
foreign to Nature. It being the will of God that our race should exist
and be permanently established, He in His wisdom gave it such
properties that men can acquire the capacity of ruling others. Some
persons are therefore inspired with theories of legislation, such as
prophets and lawgivers; others possess the power of enforcing the
dictates of the former, and of compelling people to obey them, and to
act accordingly. Such are kings, who accept the code of lawgivers, and
[rulers] who pretend to be prophets, and accept, either entirely or
partly, the teaching of the prophets. They accept one part while
rejecting another part, either because this course appears to them more
convenient, or out of ambition, because it might lead people to believe
that the rulers themselves had been prophetically inspired with these
laws, and did not copy them from others. For when we like a certain
perfection, find pleasure in it, and wish to possess it, we sometimes
desire to make others believe that we possess that virtue, although we
are fully aware that we do not possess it. Thus people, e.g., adorn
themselves with the poems of others, and publish them as their own
productions. It also occurs in the works of wise men on the various
branches of Science, that an ambitious, lazy person sees an opinion
expressed by another person, appropriates it, and boasts that he
himself originated it. The same [ambition] occurs also with regard to
the faculty of prophecy. There were men who, like Zedekiah, the son of
Chenaanah (1 Kings xxii. 11, 24) boasted that they received a prophecy,
and declared things which have never been prophesied. Others, like
Hananiah, son of Azzur (Jer. xxviii. 1–5), claim the capacity of
prophecy, and proclaim things which, no doubt, have been said by God,
that is to say, that have been the subject of a divine inspiration, but
not to them. They nevertheless say that they are prophets, and adorn
themselves with the prophecies of others. All this can easily be
ascertained and recognized. I will, however, fully explain this to you,
so that no doubt be left to you on this question, and that you may have
a test by which you may distinguish between the guidance of human
legislation, of the divine law, and of teachings stolen from prophets.
As regards those who declare that the laws proclaimed by them are their
own ideas, no further test is required; the confession of the defendant
makes the evidence of the witness superfluous. I only wish to instruct
you about laws which are proclaimed as prophetic. Some of these are
truly prophetic, originating in divine inspiration, some are of
non-prophetic character, and some, though prophetic originally, are the
result of plagiarism. You will find that the sole object of certain
laws, in accordance with the intention of their author, who well
considered their effect, is to establish the good order of the state
and its affairs, to free it from all mischief and wrong; these laws do
not deal with philosophic problems, contain no teaching for the
perfecting of our logical faculties, and are not concerned about the
existence of sound or unsound opinions. Their sole object is to
arrange, under all circumstances, the relations of men to each other,
and to secure their well-being, in accordance with the view of the
author of these laws. These laws are political, and their author
belongs, as has been stated above, to the third class, viz., to those
who only distinguish themselves by the perfection of their imaginative
faculties. You will also find laws which, in all their rules, aim, as
the law just mentioned, at the improvement of the material interests of
the people; but, besides, tend to improve the state of the faith of
man, to create first correct notions of God, and of angels, and to lead
then the people, by instruction and education, to an accurate knowledge
of the Universe: this education comes from God; these laws are divine.
The question which now remains to be settled is this: Is the person who
proclaimed these laws the same perfect man that received them by
prophetic inspiration, or a plagiarist, who has stolen these ideas from
a true prophet? In order to be enabled to answer this question, we must
examine the merits of the person, obtain an accurate account of his
actions, and consider his character. The best test is the rejection,
abstention, and contempt of bodily pleasures; for this is the first
condition of men, and a fortiori of prophets; they must especially
disregard pleasures of the sense of touch, which, according to
Aristotle, is a disgrace to us; and, above all, restrain from the
pollution of sensual intercourse. Thus God exposes thereby false
prophets to public shame, in order that those who really seek the truth
may find it, and not err or go astray; e.g., Zedekiah, son of Maasiah,
and Ahab, son of Kolaiah, boasted that they had received a prophecy.
They persuaded the people to follow them, by proclaiming utterances of
other prophets; but all the time they continued to seek the low
pleasures of sensual intercourse, committing even adultery with the
wives of their companions and followers. God exposed their falsehood as
He has exposed that of other false prophets. The king of Babylon burnt
them, as Jeremiah distinctly states: “And of them shall be taken up a
curse by all the captivity of Judah, which are in Babylon, saying, The
Lord make thee like Zedekiah, and like Ahab, whom the king of Babylon
roasted in the fire. Because they have committed villainy in Israel,
and have committed adultery with their neighbours’ wives, and have
spoken lying words in my name, which I have not commanded them” (Jer.
xxix. 22, 23). Note what is meant by these words.






CHAPTER XLI


I need not explain what a dream is, but I will explain the meaning of
the term mareh, “vision,” which occurs in the passage: “In a vision
(be-mareh) do I make myself known unto him” (Num. xii. 6). The term
signifies that which is also called mareh ha-nebuah, “prophetic
vision,” yad ha-shem, “the hand of God,” and maḥazeh, “a vision.” It is
something terrible and fearful which the prophet feels while awake, as
is distinctly stated by Daniel: “And I saw this great vision, and there
remained no strength in me, for my comeliness was turned in me into
corruption, and I retained no strength” (Dan. x. 8). He afterwards
continues, “Thus was I in deep sleep on my face, and my face toward the
ground” (ibid. ver. 9). But it was in a prophetic vision that the angel
spoke to him and “set him upon his knees.” Under such circumstances the
senses cease to act, and the [Active Intellect] influences the rational
faculties, and through them the imaginative faculties, which become
perfect and active. Sometimes the prophecy begins with a prophetic
vision, the prophet greatly trembles, and is much affected in
consequence of the perfect action of the imaginative faculty, and after
that the prophecy follows. This was the case with Abraham. The
commencement of the prophecy is, “The word of the Lord came to Abraham
in a vision” (Gen. xv. 1); after this, “a deep sleep fell upon
Abraham”; and at last, “he said unto Abraham,” etc. When prophets speak
of the fact that they received a prophecy, they say that they received
it from an angel, or from God; but even in the latter case it was
likewise received through an angel. Our Sages, therefore, explain the
words, “And the Lord said unto her” that He spake through an angel. You
must know that whenever Scripture relates that the Lord or an angel
spoke to a person, this took place in a dream or in a prophetic vision.

There are four different ways in which Scripture relates the fact that
a divine communication was made to the prophet. (1) The prophet relates
that he heard the words of an angel in a dream or vision; (2) He
reports the words of the angel without mentioning that they were
perceived in a dream or vision, assuming that it is well known that
prophecy can only originate in one of the two ways, “In a vision I will
make myself known unto him, in a dream I will speak unto him” (Num.
xii. 6). (3) The prophet does not mention the angel at all; he says
that God spoke to him, but he states that he received the message in a
dream or a vision. (4) He introduces his prophecy by stating that God
spoke to him, or told him to do a certain thing, or speak certain
words, but he does not explain that he received the message in a dream
or vision, because he assumes that it is well known, and has been
established as a principle that no prophecy or revelation originates
otherwise than in a dream or vision, and through an angel. Instances of
the first form are the following:—“And the angel of the Lord said unto
me in a dream, Jacob” (Gen. xxxi. 11); “And an angel said unto Israel
in a vision of night” (ibid. xlvi. 2); “And an angel came to Balaam by
night”; “And an angel said unto Balaam” (Num. xxii. 20–22). Instances
of the second form are these: “And Elohim (an angel), said unto Jacob,
Rise, go up to Bethel” (Gen. xxxv. 1); “And Elohim said unto him, Thy
name is Jacob,” etc. (ibid. xxxv. 10); “And an angel of the Lord called
unto Abraham out of heaven the second time” (ibid. xxii. 15); “And
Elohim said unto Noah” (ibid. vi. 13). The following is an instance of
the third form: “The word of the Lord came unto Abraham in a vision”
(ibid. xv. 1). Instances of the fourth form are: “And the Lord said
unto Abraham” (ibid. xviii. 13); “And the Lord said unto Jacob,
Return,” etc. (ibid. xxxi. 3); “And the Lord said unto Joshua” (Josh.
v. 9); “And the Lord said unto Gideon” (Judges vii. 2). Most of the
prophets speak in a similar manner: “And the Lord said unto me” (Deut.
ii. 2); “And the word of the Lord came unto me” (Ezek. xxx. 1); “And
the word of the Lord came” (2 Sam. xxiv. 11); “And behold, the word of
the Lord came unto him” (1 Kings xix. 9); “And the word of the Lord
came expressly” (Ezek. i. 3); “The beginning of the word of the Lord by
Hosea” (Hos. i. 2); “The hand of the Lord was upon me” (Ezek. xxxvii.
1). There are a great many instances of this class. Every passage in
Scripture introduced by any of these four forms is a prophecy
proclaimed by a prophet; but the phrase, “And Elohim (an angel) came to
a certain person in the dream of night,” does not indicate a prophecy,
and the person mentioned in that phrase is not a prophet; the phrase
only informs us that the attention of the person was called by God to a
certain thing, and at the same time that this happened at night. For
just as God may cause a person to move in order to save or kill another
person, so He may cause, according to His will, certain things to rise
in man’s mind in a dream by night. We have no doubt that the Syrian
Laban was a perfectly wicked man, and an idolater; likewise Abimelech,
though a good man among his people, is told by Abraham concerning his
land [Gerar] and his kingdom, “Surely there is no fear of God in this
place” (Gen. xx. 11). And yet concerning both of them, viz., Laban and
Abimelech, it is said [that an angel appeared to them in a dream].
Comp. “And Elohim (an angel) came to Abimelech in a dream by night”
(ibid. ver. 3); and also, “And Elohim came to the Syrian Laban in the
dream of the night” (ibid. xxxi. 24). Note and consider the distinction
between the phrases, “And Elohim came,” and “Elohim said,” between “in
a dream by night,” and “in a vision by night.” In reference to Jacob it
is said, “And an angel said to Israel in the visions by night” (Gen.
xlvi. 2), but in reference to Laban and Abimelech, “And Elohim came,”
etc. Onkelos makes the distinction clear; he translates, in the last
two instances, ata memar min kodam adonai, “a word came from the Lord,”
and not ve-itgeli, “and the Lord appeared.” The phrase, “And the Lord
said to a certain person,” is employed even when this person was not
really addressed by the Lord, and did not receive any prophecy, but was
informed of a certain thing through a prophet. E.g., “And she went to
inquire of the Lord” (Gen. xxv. 22); that is, according to the
explanation of our Sages, she went to the college of Eber, and the
latter gave her the answer; and this is expressed by the words, “And
the Lord said unto her” (ibid. ver. 23). These words have also been
explained thus, God spoke to her through an angel; and by “angel” Eber
is meant here, for a prophet is sometimes called “angel,” as will be
explained; or the angel that appeared to Eber in this vision is
referred to, or the object of the Midrash explanation is merely to
express that wherever God is introduced as directly speaking to a
person, i.e., to any of the ordinary prophets, He speaks through an
angel, as has been set forth by us (chap. xxxiv.).






CHAPTER XLII


We have already shown that the appearance or speech of an angel
mentioned in Scripture took place in a vision or dream; it makes no
difference whether this is expressly stated or not, as we have
explained above. This is a point of considerable importance. In some
cases the account begins by stating that the prophet saw an angel; in
others, the account apparently introduces a human being, who ultimately
is shown to be an angel; but it makes no difference, for if the fact
that an angel has been heard is only mentioned at the end, you may rest
satisfied that the whole account from the beginning describes a
prophetic vision. In such visions, a prophet either sees God who speaks
to him, as will be explained by us, or he sees an angel who speaks to
him, or he hears some one speaking to him without seeing the speaker,
or he sees a man who speaks to him, and learns afterwards that the
speaker was an angel. In this latter kind of prophecies, the prophet
relates that he saw a man who was doing or saying something, and that
he learnt afterwards that it was an angel.

This important principle was adopted by one of our Sages, one of the
most distinguished among them, R. Ḥiya the Great (Bereshit Rabba,
xlviii.), in the exposition of the Scriptural passage commencing, “And
the Lord appeared unto him in the plain of Mamre” (Gen. xviii.). The
general statement that the Lord appeared to Abraham is followed by the
description in what manner that appearance of the Lord took place;
namely, Abraham saw first three men; he ran and spoke to them. R. Ḥiya,
the author of the explanation, holds that the words of Abraham, “My
Lord, if now I have found grace in thy sight, do not, I pray thee, pass
from thy servant,” were spoken by him in a prophetic vision to one of
the men; for he says that Abraham addressed these words to the chief of
these men. Note this well, for it is one of the great mysteries [of the
Law]. The same, I hold, is the case when it is said in reference to
Jacob, “And a man wrestled with him” (Gen. xxxii. 25); this took place
in a prophetic vision, since it is expressly stated in the end (ver.
31) that it was an angel. The circumstances are here exactly the same
as those in the vision of Abraham, where the general statement, “And
the Lord appeared to him,” etc., is followed by a detailed description.
Similarly the account of the vision of Jacob begins, “And the angels of
God met him” (Gen. xxxii. 2); then follows a detailed description how
it came to pass that they met him; namely, Jacob sent messengers, and
after having prepared and done certain things, “he was left alone,”
etc., “and a man wrestled with him” (ibid. ver. 24). By this term “man”
[one of] the angels of God is meant, mentioned in the phrase, “And
angels of God met him”; the wrestling and speaking was entirely a
prophetic vision. That which happened to Balaam on the way, and the
speaking of the ass, took place in a prophetic vision, since further
on, in the same account, an angel of God is introduced as speaking to
Balaam. I also think that what Joshua perceived, when “he lifted up his
eyes and saw, and behold a man stood before him” (Josh. v. 13) was a
prophetic vision, since it is stated afterwards (ver. 14) that it was
“the prince of the host of the Lord.” But in the passages, “And an
angel of the Lord came up from Gilgal” (Judges ii. 1); “And it came to
pass that the angel of the Lord spake these words to all Israel” (ibid.
ver. 2); the “angel” is, according to the explanation of our Sages,
Phineas. They say, The angel is Phineas, for, when the Divine Glory
rested upon him, he was “like an angel.” We have already shown (chap.
vi.) that the term “angel” is homonymous, and denotes also “prophet,”
as is the case in the following passages:—“And He sent an angel, and He
hath brought us up out of Egypt” (Num. xx. 16); “Then spake Haggai, the
angel of the Lord, in the Lord’s message” (Hagg. i. 13); “But they
mocked the angels of God” (2 Chron. xxxvi. 16).—Comp. also the words of
Daniel, “And the man Gabriel, whom I had seen in the vision at the
beginning, being caused to fly swiftly, touched me about the time of
the evening oblation” (Dan. ix. 11). All this passed in a prophetic
vision. Do not imagine that an angel is seen or his word heard
otherwise than in a prophetic vision or prophetic dream, according to
the principle laid down:—“I make myself known unto him in a vision, and
speak unto him in a dream” (Num. xii. 6). The instances quoted may
serve as an illustration of those passages which I do not mention. From
the rule laid down by us that prophecy requires preparation, and from
our interpretation of the homonym “angel,” you will infer that Hagar,
the Egyptian woman, was not a prophetess; also Manoah and his wife were
no prophets; for the speech they heard, or imagined they heard, was
like the bat-kol (prophetic echo), which is so frequently mentioned by
our Sages, and is something that may be experienced by men not prepared
for prophecy. The homonymity of the word “angel” misleads in this
matter. This is the principal method by which most of the difficult
passages in the Bible can be explained. Consider the words, “And an
angel of the Lord found her by the well of water” (Gen. xvi. 7), which
are similar to the words referring to Joseph—“And a man found him, and
behold, he was erring in the field” (ibid. xxxvii. 15). All the
Midrashim assume that by man in this passage an angel is meant.






CHAPTER XLIII


We have already shown in our work that the prophets sometimes prophesy
in allegories; they use a term allegorically, and in the same prophecy
the meaning of the allegory is given. In our dreams, we sometimes
believe that we are awake, and relate a dream to another person, who
explains the meaning, and all this goes on while we dream. Our Sages
call this “a dream interpreted in a dream.” In other cases we learn the
meaning of the dream after waking from sleep. The same is the case with
prophetic allegories. Some are interpreted in the prophetic vision.
Thus it is related in Zechariah, after the description of the
allegorical vision—“And the angel that talked with me came again and
waked me as a man that is awakened from his sleep. And he said unto me,
‘What dost thou see?’” etc. (Zech. iv. 1–2), and then the allegory is
explained (ver. 6, sqq.).

Another instance we find in Daniel. It is first stated there: “Daniel
had a dream and visions of his head upon his bed” (Dan. vii. 1). The
whole allegory is then given, and Daniel is described as sighing that
he did not know its interpretation. He asks the angel for an
explanation, and he received it in a prophetic vision. He relates as
follows: “I came near unto one of those that stood by, and asked him
the truth of all this. So he told me, and made me know the
interpretation of the things” (ibid. ver. 16). The whole scene is
called ḥazon (vision), although it was stated that Daniel had a dream,
because an angel explained the dream to him in the same manner as is
mentioned in reference to a prophetic dream. I refer to the verse: “A
vision appeared to me Daniel, after that which appeared to me at the
first” (ibid. viii. 1). This is clear, for ḥazon (vision) is derived
from ḥaza, “to see,” and mareh, “vision,” from raah, “to see”; and ḥaza
and raah are synonymous. There is therefore no difference whether we
use mareh, or maḥazeh, or ḥazon, there is no other mode of revelation
but the two mentioned in Scripture: “In a vision I make myself known to
him, in a dream I will speak unto him” (Num. xii. 6). There are,
however, different degrees [of prophetic proficiency], as will be shown
(chap. xlv.).

There are other prophetic allegories whose meaning is not given in a
prophetic vision. The prophet learns it when he awakes from his sleep.
Take, e.g., the staves which Zechariah took in a prophetic vision.

You must further know that the prophets see things shown to them
allegorically, such as the candlesticks, horses, and mountains of
Zechariah (Zech. iv. 2; vi. 1–7), the scroll of Ezekiel (Ezek. ii. 9),
the wall made by a plumb-line (Amos vii. 7), which Amos saw, the
animals of Daniel (Dan. vii. and viii.), the seething pot of Jeremiah
(Jer. i. 13), and similar allegorical objects shown to represent
certain ideas. The prophets, however, are also shown things which do
not illustrate the object of the vision, but indicate it by their name
through its etymology or homonymity. Thus the imaginative faculty forms
the image of a thing, the name of which has two meanings, one of which
denotes something different [from the image]. This is likewise a kind
of allegory. Comp. Makkal shaked, “almond staff,” of Jeremiah (i.
11–12). It was intended to indicate by the second meaning of shaked the
prophecy, “For I will watch” (shoked), etc., which has no relation
whatever to the staff or to almonds. The same is the case with the
kelub ḳayiẓ, “a basket of summer fruit,” seen by Amos, by which the
completion of a certain period was indicated, “the end (ha-ḳeẓ) having
come” (Amos viii. 2). Still more strange is the following manner of
calling the prophet’s attention to a certain object. He is shown a
different object, the name of which has neither etymologically nor
homonymously any relation to the first object, but the names of both
contain the same letters, though in a different order. Take, e.g., the
allegories of Zechariah (chap. xi. 7, sqq.). He takes in a prophetic
vision staves to lead the flock; he calls the one Noʻam (pleasure), the
other ḥobelim. He indicates thereby that the nation was at first in
favour with God, who was their leader and guide. They rejoiced in the
service of God, and found happiness in it, while God was pleased with
them, and loved them, as it is said, “Thou hast avouched the Lord thy
God,” etc., and “the Lord hath avouched thee,” etc. (Deut. xxvi. 17,
18). They were guided and directed by Moses and the prophets that
followed him. But later a change took place. They rejected the love of
God, and God rejected them, appointing destroyers like Jeroboam and
Manasse as their rulers. Accordingly, the word ḥobelim has the same
meaning [viz., destroying] as the root ḥabal has in Meḥabbelim keramim,
“destroying vineyards” (Song of Sol. ii. 15). But the prophet found
also in this name Ḥobelim the indication that the people despised God,
and that God despised them. This is, however, not expressed by the word
ḥabal, but by a transposition of the letters Ḥet, Bet, and Lamed, the
meaning of despising and rejecting is obtained. Comp. “My soul loathed
them, and their soul also abhorred me” [baḥalah] (Zech. xi. 8). The
prophet had therefore to change the order of the letters in ḥabal into
that of Baḥal. In this way we find very strange things and also
mysteries (Sodot) in the words neḥoshet, Kalal, regel, ʻegel, and
ḥashmal of the Mercabah, and in other terms in other passages. After
the above explanation you will see the mysteries in the meaning of
these expressions if you examine them thoroughly.






CHAPTER XLIV


Prophecy is given either in a vision or in a dream, as we have said so
many times, and we will not constantly repeat it. We say now that when
a prophet is inspired with a prophecy he may see an allegory, as we
have shown frequently, or he may in a prophetic vision perceive that
God speaks to him, as is said in Isaiah (vi. 8), “And I heard the voice
of the Lord saying, Whom shall I send, and who will go for us?” or he
hears an angel addressing him, and sees him also. This is very
frequent, e.g., “And the angel of God spake unto me,” etc. (Gen. xxxi.
11); “And the angel that talked with me answered and said unto me, Dost
thou not know what these are” (Zech. iv. 5); “And I heard one holy
speaking” (Dan. viii. 13). Instances of this are innumerable. The
prophet sometimes sees a man that speaks to him. Comp., “And behold
there was a man, whose appearance was like the appearance of brass, and
the man said to me,” etc. (Ezek. xl. 3, 4), although the passage
begins, “The hand of the Lord was upon me” (ibid. ver. 1). In some
cases the prophet sees no figure at all, only hears in the prophetic
vision the words addressed to him; e.g., “And I heard the voice of a
man between the banks of Ulai” (Dan. viii. 16); “There was silence, and
I heard a voice” (in the speech of Eliphaz, Job iv. 16); “And I heard a
voice of one that spake to me” (Ezek. i. 28). The being which Ezekiel
perceived in the prophetic vision was not the same that addressed him;
for at the conclusion of the strange and extraordinary scene which
Ezekiel describes expressly as having been perceived by him, the object
and form of the prophecy is introduced by the words, “And I heard a
voice of a man that spake to me.” After this remark on the different
kinds of prophecy, as suggested by Scripture, I say that the prophet
may perceive that which he hears with the greatest possible intensity,
just as a person may hear thunder in his dream, or perceive a storm or
an earthquake; such dreams are frequent. The prophet may also hear the
prophecy in ordinary common speech, without anything unusual. Take,
e.g., the account of the prophet Samuel. When he was called in a
prophetic vision, he believed that the priest Eli called him; and this
happened three times consecutively. The text then explains the cause of
it, saying that Samuel naturally believed that Eli had called him,
because at that time he did not yet know that God addressed the prophet
in this form, nor had that secret as yet been revealed to him. Comp.,
“And Samuel did not yet know the Lord, and the word of the Lord was not
yet revealed to him,” i.e., he did not yet know, and it had not yet
been revealed to him, that the word of God is communicated in this way.
The words, “He did not yet know the Lord,” may perhaps mean that Samuel
had not yet received any prophecy; for in reference to a prophet’s
receiving divine communication it is said, “I make myself known to him
in a vision, I speak to him in a dream” (Num. xii. 6). The meaning of
the verse accordingly is this, Samuel had not yet received any
prophecy, and therefore did not know that this was the form of
prophecy. Note it.






CHAPTER XLV


After having explained prophecy in accordance with reason and
Scripture, I must now describe the different degrees of prophecy from
these two points of view. Not all the degrees of prophecy which I will
enumerate qualify a person for the office of a prophet. The first and
the second degrees are only steps leading to prophecy, and a person
possessing either of these two degrees does not belong to the class of
prophets whose merits we have been discussing. When such a person is
occasionally called prophet, the term is used in a wider sense, and is
applied to him because he is almost a prophet. You must not be misled
by the fact that according to the books of the Prophets, a certain
prophet, after having been inspired with one kind of prophecy, is
reported to have received prophecy in another form. For it is possible
for a prophet to prophesy at one time in the form of one of the degrees
which I am about to enumerate, and at another time in another form. In
the same manner, as the prophet does not prophesy continuously, but is
inspired at one time and not at another, so he may at one time prophesy
in the form of a higher degree, and at another time in that of a lower
degree; it may happen that the highest degree is reached by a prophet
only once in his lifetime, and afterwards remains inaccessible to him,
or that a prophet remains below the highest degree until he entirely
loses the faculty; for ordinary prophets must cease to prophesy a
shorter or longer period before their death. Comp. “And the word of the
Lord ceased from Jeremiah” (Ezra i. 1); “And these are the last words
of David” (2 Sam. xxiii. 1). From these instances it can be inferred
that the same is the case with all prophets. After this introduction
and explanation, I will begin to enumerate the degrees of prophecy to
which I have referred above.

(1) The first degree of prophecy consists in the divine assistance
which is given to a person, and induces and encourages him to do
something good and grand, e.g., to deliver a congregation of good men
from the hands of evildoers; to save one noble person, or to bring
happiness to a large number of people; he finds in himself the cause
that moves and urges him to this deed. This degree of divine influence
is called “the spirit of the Lord”; and of the person who is under that
influence we say that the spirit of the Lord came upon him, clothed
him, or rested upon him, or the Lord was with him, and the like. All
the judges of Israel possessed this degree, for the following general
statement is made concerning them:—“The Lord raised up judges for them;
and the Lord was with the judge, and he saved them” (Judges ii. 18).
Also all the noble chiefs of Israel belonged to this class. The same is
distinctly stated concerning some of the judges and the kings:—“The
spirit of the Lord came upon Jephthah” (ibid. xi. 29); of Samson it is
said, “The spirit of the Lord came upon him” (ibid. xiv. 19); “And the
spirit of the Lord came upon Saul when he heard those words” (1 Sam.
xi. 6). When Amasa was moved by the holy spirit to assist David, “A
spirit clothed Amasa, who was chief of the captains, and he said, Thine
are we, David,” etc. (1 Chron. xii. 18). This faculty was always
possessed by Moses from the time he had attained the age of manhood; it
moved him to slay the Egyptian, and to prevent evil from the two men
that quarrelled; it was so strong that, after he had fled from Egypt
out of fear, and arrived in Midian, a trembling stranger, he could not
restrain himself from interfering when he saw wrong being done; he
could not bear it. Comp. “And Moses rose and saved them” (Exod. ii.
17). David likewise was filled with this spirit, when he was anointed
with the oil of anointing. Comp. “And the spirit of God came upon David
from that day and upward” (1 Sam. xvi. 13). He thus conquered the lion
and the bear and the Philistine, and accomplished similar tasks, by
this very spirit. This faculty did not cause any of the above-named
persons to speak on a certain subject, for it only aims at encouraging
the person who possesses it to action; it does not encourage him to do
everything, but only to help either a distinguished man or a whole
congregation when oppressed, or to do something that leads to that end.
Just as not all who have a true dream are prophets, so it cannot be
said of every one who is assisted in a certain undertaking, as in the
acquisition of property, or of some other personal advantage, that the
spirit of the Lord came upon him, or that the Lord was with him, or
that he performed his actions by the holy spirit. We only apply such
phrases to those who have accomplished something very good and grand,
or something that leads to that end; e.g., the success of Joseph in the
house of the Egyptian, which was the first cause leading evidently to
great events that occurred subsequently.

(2) The second degree is this: A person feels as if something came upon
him, and as if he had received a new power that encourages him to
speak. He treats of science, or composes hymns, exhorts his fellow-men,
discusses political and theological problems; all this he does while
awake, and in the full possession of his senses. Such a person is said
to speak by the holy spirit. David composed the Psalms, and Solomon the
Book of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Solomon by this spirit;
also Daniel, Job, Chronicles, and the rest of the Hagiographa were
written in this holy spirit; therefore they are called ketubim
(Writings, or Written), i.e., written by men inspired by the holy
spirit. Our Sages mention this expressly concerning the Book of Esther.
In reference to such holy spirit, David says: “The spirit of the Lord
spoke in me, and his word is on my tongue” (2 Sam. xxiii. 2); i.e., the
spirit of the Lord caused him to utter these words. This class includes
the seventy elders of whom it is said, “And it came to pass when the
spirit rested upon them, that they prophesied, and did not cease” (Num.
xi. 25); also Eldad and Medad (ibid. ver. 26); furthermore, every high
priest that inquired [of God] by the Urim and Tummim; on whom, as our
Sages say, the divine glory rested, and who spoke by the holy spirit;
Yahaziel, son of Zechariah, belongs likewise to this class. Comp. “The
spirit of the Lord came upon him in the midst of the assembly, and he
said, Listen, all Judah and inhabitants of Jerusalem, thus saith the
Lord unto you,” etc. (2 Chron. xx. 14, 15); also Zechariah, son of
Jehoiada the priest. Comp. “And he stood above the people and said unto
them, Thus saith God” (ibid. xxiv. 20); furthermore, Azariah, son of
Oded; comp. “And Azariah, son of Oded, when the spirit of the Lord came
upon him, went forth before Asa,” etc. (ibid. xv. 1, 2); and all who
acted under similar circumstances. You must know that Balaam likewise
belonged to this class, when he was good; this is indicated by the
words, “And God put a word in the mouth of Balaam” (Num. xxiii. 5),
i.e., Balaam spoke by divine inspiration; he therefore says of himself,
“Who heareth the words of God,” etc. (ibid. xxiv. 4). We must
especially point out that David, Solomon, and Daniel belonged to this
class, and not to the class of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Nathan the prophet,
Ahijah the Shilonite, and those like them. For David, Solomon, and
Daniel spoke and wrote inspired by the holy spirit, and when David
says, “The God of Israel spoke and said unto me, the rock of Israel” (2
Sam. xxiii. 3), he meant to say that God promised him happiness through
a prophet, through Nathan or another prophet. The phrase must here be
interpreted in the same manner as in the following passages, “And God
said to her” (Gen. xxv. 26); “And God said unto Solomon, Because this
hath been in thy heart, and thou hast not kept my covenant,” etc. (1
Kings xi. 11). The latter passage undoubtedly contains a prophecy of
Ahijah the Shilonite, or another prophet, who foretold Solomon that
evil would befall him. The passage, “God appeared to Solomon at Gibeon
in a dream by night, and God said” (ibid. iii. 5), does not contain a
real prophecy, such as is introduced by the words: “The word of the
Lord came to Abram in a vision, saying” (Gen. xv. 1); or, “And God said
to Israel in the visions of the night” (ibid. xlvi. 2), or such as the
prophecies of Isaiah and Jeremiah contain; in all these cases the
prophets, though receiving the prophecy in a prophetic dream, are told
that it is a prophecy, and that they have received prophetic
inspiration. But in the case of Solomon, the account concludes, “And
Solomon awoke, and behold it was a dream” (1 Kings iii. 15); and in the
account of the second divine appearance, it is said, “And God appeared
to Solomon a second time, as he appeared to him at Gibeon” (ibid. ix.
2); it was evidently a dream. This kind of prophecy is a degree below
that of which Scripture says, “In a dream I will speak to him” (Num.
xii. 6). When prophets are inspired in a dream, they by no means call
this a dream, although the prophecy reached them in a dream, but
declare it decidedly to be a prophecy. Thus Jacob, our father, when
awaking from a prophetic dream, did not say it was a dream, but
declared, “Surely there is the Lord in this place,” etc. (Gen. xxviii.
16); “God the Almighty appeared to me in Luz, in the land of Canaan”
(ibid. xlviii. 3), expressing thereby that it was a prophecy. But in
reference to Solomon we read:—“And Solomon awoke, and behold it was a
dream” (1 Kings iii. 15). Similarly Daniel declares that he had a
dream; although he sees an angel and hears his word, he speaks of the
event as of a dream; even when he had received the information
[concerning the dreams of Nebukadnezzar], he speaks of it in the
following manner—“Then was the secret revealed to Daniel in a night
vision” (Dan. ii. 19). On other occasions it is said, “He wrote down
the dream”; “I saw in the visions by night,” etc.; “And the visions of
my head confused me” (Dan. vii. 1, 2, 15); “I was surprised at the
vision, and none noticed it” (ibid. viii. 27). There is no doubt that
this is one degree below that form of prophecy to which the words, “In
a dream I will speak to him,” are applied. For this reason the nation
desired to place the book of Daniel among the Hagiographa, and not
among the Prophets. I have, therefore, pointed out to you, that the
prophecy revealed to Daniel and Solomon, although they saw an angel in
the dream, was not considered by them as a perfect prophecy, but as a
dream containing correct information. They belonged to the class of men
that spoke, inspired by the ruaḥ ha-kodesh, “the holy spirit.” Also in
the order of the holy writings, no distinction is made between the
books of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Daniel, Psalms, Ruth, and Esther; they
are all written by divine inspiration. The authors of all these books
are called prophets in the more general sense of the term.

(3) The third class is the lowest [class of actual prophets, i.e.] of
those who introduce their speech by the phrase, “And the word of the
Lord came unto me,” or a similar phrase. The prophet sees an allegory
in a dream—under those conditions which we have mentioned when speaking
of real prophecy—and in the prophetic dream itself the allegory is
interpreted. Such are most of the allegories of Zechariah.

(4) The prophet hears in a prophetic dream something clearly and
distinctly, but does not see the speaker. This was the case with Samuel
in the beginning of his prophetic mission, as has been explained (chap.
xliv.).

(5) A person addresses the prophet in a dream, as was the case in some
of the prophecies of Ezekiel. Comp. “And the man spake unto me, Son of
man,” etc. (Ezek. xl. 4).

(6) An angel speaks to him in a dream; this applies to most of the
prophets; e.g., “And an angel of God said to me in a dream of night”
(Gen. xxxi. 11).

(7) In a prophetic dream it appears to the prophet as if God spoke to
him. Thus Isaiah says, “And I saw the Lord, and I heard the voice of
the Lord saying, Whom shall I send, and who will go for us?” (Isa. vi.
1, 8). Micaiah, son of Imla, said likewise, “I saw the Lord” (1 Kings
xxii. 19).

(8) Something presents itself to the prophet in a prophetic vision; he
sees allegorical figures, such as were seen by Abraham in the vision
“between the pieces” (Gen. xv. 9, 10); for it was in a vision by
daytime, as is distinctly stated.

(9) The prophet hears words in a prophetic vision; as, e.g., is said in
reference to Abraham, “And behold, the word came to him, saying, This
shall not be thine heir” (ibid. xv. 4).

(10) The prophet sees a man that speaks to him in a prophetic vision;
e.g., Abraham in the plain of Mamre (ibid. xviii. 1), and Joshua in
Jericho (Josh. v. 13).

(11) He sees an angel that speaks to him in the vision, as was the case
when Abraham was addressed by an angel at the sacrifice of Isaac (Gen.
xxii. 15). This I hold to be—if we except Moses—the highest degree a
prophet can attain according to Scripture, provided he has, as reason
demands, his rational faculties fully developed. But it appears to me
improbable that a prophet should be able to perceive in a prophetic
vision God speaking to him; the action of the imaginative faculty does
not go so far, and therefore we do not notice this in the case of the
ordinary prophets; Scripture says expressly, “In a vision I will make
myself known, in a dream I will speak to him”; the speaking is here
connected with dream, the influence and the action of the intellect is
connected with vision; comp. “In a vision I will make myself known to
him” (etvaddaʻ, hitpael of yadaʻ, “to know”), but it is not said here
that in a vision anything is heard from God. When I, therefore, met
with statements in Scripture that a prophet heard words spoken to him,
and that this took place in a vision, it occurred to me that the case
in which God appears to address the prophet seems to be the only
difference between a vision and a dream, according to the literal sense
of the Scriptural text. But it is possible to explain the passages in
which a prophet is reported to have heard in the course of a vision
words spoken to him, in the following manner: at first he has had a
vision, but subsequently he fell into a deep sleep, and the vision was
changed into a dream. Thus we explained the words, “And a deep sleep
fell upon Abram” (Gen. xv. 12); and our Sages remark thereon, “This was
a deep sleep of prophecy.” According to this explanation, it is only in
a dream that the prophet can hear words addressed to him; it makes no
difference in what manner words are spoken. Scripture supports this
theory, “In a dream I will speak to him.” But in a prophetic vision
only allegories are perceived, or rational truths are obtained, that
lead to some knowledge in science, such as can be arrived at by
reasoning. This is the meaning of the words, “In a vision I will make
myself known unto him.” According to this second explanation, the
degrees of prophecy are reduced to eight, the highest of them being the
prophetic vision, including all kinds of vision, even the case in which
a man appears to address the prophet, as has been mentioned. You will
perhaps ask this question: among the different degrees of prophecy
there is one in which prophets, e.g., Isaiah, Micaiah, appear to hear
God addressing them; how can this be reconciled with the principle that
all prophets are prophetically addressed through an angel, except Moses
our Teacher, in reference to whom Scripture says, “Mouth to mouth I
speak to him” (Num. xii. 8)? I answer, this is really the case, the
medium here being the imaginative faculty that hears in a prophetic
dream God speaking; but Moses heard the voice addressing him “from
above the covering of the ark from between the two cherubim” (Exod.
xxv. 22) without the medium of the imaginative faculty. In Mishne-torah
we have given the characteristics of this kind of prophecy, and
explained the meaning of the phrases, “Mouth to mouth I speak to him”;
“As man speaketh to his neighbour” (Exod. xxxiii. 11), and the like.
Study it there, and I need not repeat what has already been said.






CHAPTER XLVI


One individual may be taken as an illustration of the individuals of
the whole species. From its properties we learn those of each
individual of the species. I mean to say that the form of one account
of a prophecy illustrates all accounts of the same class. After this
remark you will understand that a person may sometimes dream that he
has gone to a certain country, married there, stayed there for some
time, and had a son, whom he gave a certain name, and who was in a
certain condition [though nothing of all this has really taken place];
so also in prophetic allegories certain objects are seen, acts
performed—if the style of the allegory demands it—things are done by
the prophet, the intervals between one act and another determined, and
journeys undertaken from one place to another; but all these things are
only processes of a prophetic vision, and not real things that could be
perceived by the senses of the body. Some of the accounts simply relate
these incidents [without premising that they are part of a vision],
because it is a well-known fact that all these accounts refer to
prophetic visions, and it was not necessary to repeat in each case a
statement to this effect.

Thus the prophet relates: “And the Lord said unto me,” and need not add
the explanation that it was in a dream. The ordinary reader believes
that the acts, journeys, questions, and answers of the prophets really
took place, and were perceived by the senses, and did not merely form
part of a prophetic vision. I will mention here an instance concerning
which no person will entertain the least doubt. I will add a few more
of the same kind, and these will show you how those passages must be
understood which I do not cite. The following passage in Ezekiel (viii.
1, 3) is clear, and admits of no doubt: “I sat in mine house, and the
elders of Judah sat before me, etc., and a spirit lifted me up between
the earth and the heaven, and brought me in the visions of God to
Jerusalem,” etc.; also the passage, “Thus I arose and went into the
plain” (iii. 2, 3), refers to a prophetic vision; just as the words,
“And he brought him forth abroad, and said, Look now toward heaven and
tell the stars, if thou be able to number them” (Gen. xv. 5) describe a
vision. The same is the case with the words of Ezekiel (xxxvii. 1),
“And set me down in the midst of the valley.” In the description of the
vision in which Ezekiel is brought to Jerusalem, we read as follows:
“And when I looked, behold a hole in the wall. Then said he unto me,
Son of man, dig now in the wall; and when I had digged in the wall,
behold a door” (ibid. viii. 7–8), etc. It was thus in a vision that he
was commanded to dig in the wall, to enter and to see what people were
doing there, and it was in the same vision that he digged, entered
through the hole, and saw certain things, as is related. Just as all
this forms part of a vision, the same may be said of the following
passages: “And thou take unto thee a tile,” etc., “and lie thou also on
thy left side,” etc.; “Take thou also wheat and barley,” etc., “and
cause it to pass over thine head and upon thy beard” (chaps, iv. and
v.) It was in a prophetic vision that he saw that he did all these
actions which he was commanded to do. God forbid to assume that God
would make his prophets appear an object of ridicule and sport in the
eyes of the ignorant, and order them to perform foolish acts. We must
also bear in mind that the command given to Ezekiel implied
disobedience to the Law, for he, being a priest, would, in causing the
razor to pass over every corner of the beard and of the head, have been
guilty of transgressing two prohibitions in each case. But it was only
done in a prophetic vision. Again, when it is said, “As my servant
Isaiah went naked and barefoot” (Isa. xx. 3), the prophet did so in a
prophetic vision. Weak-minded persons believe that the prophet relates
here what he was commanded to do, and what he actually did, and that he
describes how he was commanded to dig in a wall on the Temple mount
although he was in Babylon, and relates how he obeyed the command, for
he says, “And I digged in the wall.” But it is distinctly stated that
all this took place in a vision.

It is analogous to the description of the vision of Abraham which
begins, “The word of the Lord came to Abram in a vision, saying” (Gen.
xv. 1); and contains at the same time the passage, “He brought him
forth abroad, and said, Look now to the heaven and count the stars”
(ibid. ver. 6). It is evident that it was in a vision that Abraham saw
himself brought forth from his place looking towards the heavens and
being told to count the stars. This is related [without repeating the
statement that it was in a vision]. The same I say in reference to the
command given to Jeremiah, to conceal the girdle in the Euphrates, and
the statement that he concealed it, examined it after a long time, and
found it rotten and spoiled (Jer. xiii. 4–7). All this was
allegorically shown in a vision; Jeremiah did not go from Palestine to
Babylon, and did not see the Euphrates. The same applies to the account
of the commandment given to Hosea (i.-iii.): “Take unto thee a wife of
whoredom, and children of whoredom,” to the birth of the children and
to the giving of names to them. All this passed in a prophetic vision.
When once stated that these are allegories, there is left no doubt that
the events related had no real existence, except in the minds of those
of whom the prophet says: “And the vision of every one was unto them
like the words of a sealed book” (Isa. xxix. 11). I believe that the
trial of Gideon (Judges vi. 21, 27) with the fleece and other things
was a vision. I do not call it a prophetic vision, as Gideon had not
reached the degree of prophets, much less that height which would
enable him to do wonders. He only rose to the height of the Judges of
Israel, and he has even been counted by our Sages among persons of
little importance, as has been pointed out by us.

The same can be said of the passage in Zechariah (xi. 7), “And I fed
the flock of slaughter,” and all the incidents that are subsequently
described; the graceful asking for wages, the acceptance of the wages,
the wanting of the money, and the casting of the same into the house of
the treasure; all these incidents form part of the vision. He received
the commandment and carried it out in a prophetic vision or dream.

The correctness of this theory cannot be doubted, and only those do not
comprehend it who do not know to distinguish between that which is
possible, and that which is impossible. The instances quoted may serve
as an illustration of other similar Scriptural passages not quoted by
me. They are all of the same kind, and in the same style. Whatever is
said in the account of a vision, that the prophet heard, went forth,
came out, said, was told, stood, sat, went up, went down, journeyed,
asked, or was asked, all is part of the prophetic vision; even when
there is a lengthened account, the details of which are well connected
as regards the time, the persons referred to, and the place. After it
has once been stated that the event described is to be understood
figuratively, it must be assumed for certain that the whole is a
prophetic vision.






CHAPTER XLVII


It is undoubtedly clear and evident that most prophecies are given in
images, for this is the characteristic of the imaginative faculty, the
organ of prophecy. We find it also necessary to say a few words on the
figures, hyperboles, and exaggerations that occur in Scripture. They
would create strange ideas if we were to take them literally without
noticing the exaggeration which they contain, or if we were to
understand them in accordance with the original meaning of the terms,
ignoring the fact that these are used figuratively. Our Sages say
distinctly Scripture uses hyperbolic or exaggerated language; and quote
as an instance, “cities walled and fortified, rising up to heaven”
(Deut. i. 28). As a hyperbole our Sages quote, “For the bird of heaven
carries the voice” (Eccles. x. 20); in the same sense it is said,
“Whose height is like that of cedar trees” (Amos ii. 9). Instances of
this kind are frequent in the language of all prophets; what they say
is frequently hyperbolic or exaggerated, and not precise or exact. What
Scripture says about Og, “Behold, his bedstead was an iron bedstead,
nine cubits its length,” etc. (Deut.), does not belong to this class of
figures, for the bedstead (eres, comp. arsenu, Song of Sol. i. 16) is
never exactly of the same dimensions as the person using it; it is not
like a dress that fits round the body; it is always greater than the
person that sleeps therein; as a rule, it is by a third longer. If,
therefore, the bed of Og was nine cubits in length, he must, according
to this proportion, have been six cubits high, or a little more. The
words, “by the cubit of a man,” mean, by the measure of an ordinary
man, and not by the measure of Og; for men have the limbs in a certain
proportion. Scripture thus tells us that Og was double as long as an
ordinary person, or a little less. This is undoubtedly an exceptional
height among men, but not quite impossible. As regards the Scriptural
statement about the length of man’s life in those days, I say that only
the persons named lived so long, whilst other people enjoyed the
ordinary length of life. The men named were exceptions, either in
consequence of different causes, as e.g., their food or mode of living,
or by way of miracle, which admits of no analogy.

We must further discuss the figurative language employed in Scripture.
In some cases this is clear and evident, and doubted by no person;
e.g., “The mountains and hills shall break forth in song before you,
and all the trees of the wood clap their hands” (Isa. lv. 12); this is
evidently figurative language; also the following passage—“The
fir-trees rejoice at thee,” etc. (ibid. xiv. 8), which is rendered by
Jonathan, son of Uzziel, “The rulers rejoice at thee, who are rich in
possessions.” This figure is similar to that used in the phrase,
“Butter of kine and milk of sheep,” etc. (Deut. xxxii. 14).

And these figures are very frequent in the books of the prophets. Some
are easily recognised by the ordinary reader as figures, others with
some difficulty. Thus nobody doubts that the blessing, “May the Lord
open to thee his good treasure, the heavens,” must be taken
figuratively; for God has no treasure in which He keeps the rain. The
same is the case with the following passage—“He opened the doors of
heaven, he rained upon them manna to eat” (Ps. lxxviii. 23, 24). No
person assumes that there is a door or gate in heaven, but every one
understands that this is a simile and a figurative expression. In the
same way must be understood the following passages—“The heavens were
opened” (Ezek. i. 1); “If not, blot me out from thy book which thou
hast written” (Exod. xxxii. 32); “I will blot him out from the book of
life” (ibid. ver. 33). All these phrases are figurative; and we must
not assume that God has a book in which He writes, or from which He
blots out, as those generally believe that do not find figurative
speech in these passages. They are all of the same kind. You must
explain passages not quoted by me by those which I have quoted in this
chapter. Employ your reason, and you will be able to discern what is
said allegorically, figuratively, or hyperbolically, and what is meant
literally, exactly according to the original meaning of the words. You
will then understand all prophecies, learn and retain rational
principles of faith, pleasing in the eyes of God who is most pleased
with truth, and most displeased with falsehood; your mind and heart
will not be so perplexed as to believe or accept as law what is untrue
or improbable, whilst the Law is perfectly true when properly
understood. Thus Scripture says, “Thy testimonies are righteousness for
ever” (Ps. cxix. 144); and “I the Lord speak righteousness” (Isa. xlv.
19). If you adopt this method, you will not imagine the existence of
things which God has not created, or accept principles which might
partly lead to atheism, or to a corruption of your notions of God so as
to ascribe to Him corporeality, attributes, or emotions, as has been
shown by us, nor will you believe that the words of the prophets are
false; for the cause of this disease is ignorance of what we have
explained. These things belong likewise to the mysteries of the Law;
and although we have treated them in a general manner, they can easily
be understood in all their details in accordance with the above
remarks.






CHAPTER XLVIII


It is clear that everything produced must have an immediate cause which
produced it; that cause again a cause, and so on, till the First Cause,
viz., the will and decree of God is reached. The prophets therefore
omit sometimes the intermediate causes, and ascribe the production of
an individual thing directly to God, saying that God has made it. This
method is well known, and we, as well as others of those who seek the
truth, have explained it; it is the belief of our co-religionists.

After having heard this remark, listen to what I will explain in this
chapter; direct your special attention to it more than you have done to
the other chapters of this part. It is this: As regards the immediate
causes of things produced, it makes no difference whether these causes
consist in substances, physical properties, freewill, or chance—by
freewill I mean that of man—or even in the will of another living
being. The prophets [omit them and] ascribe the production directly to
God and use such phrases as, God has done it, commanded it, or said it;
in all such cases the verbs “to say,” “to speak,” “to command,” “to
call,” and “to send” are employed. What I desired to state in this
chapter is this: According to the hypothesis and theory accepted, it is
God that gave will to dumb animals, freewill to the human being, and
natural properties to everything; and as accidents originate in the
redundancy of some natural force, as has been explained [by Aristotle],
and are mostly the result of the combined action of nature, desire, and
freewill: it can consequently be said of everything which is produced
by any of these causes, that God commanded that it should be made, or
said that it should be so. I will give you instances, and they will
guide you in the interpretation of passages which I do not mention. As
regards phenomena produced regularly by natural causes, such as the
melting of the snow when the atmosphere becomes warm, the roaring of
the sea when a storm rages [I quote the following passages], “He
sendeth his word and melteth them” (Ps. cxlvii. 18); “And he saith, and
a storm-wind riseth, and lifteth up its waves” (ibid. cvii. 25). In
reference to the rain we read: “I will command the clouds that they
shall not rain,” etc. (Isa. v. 6). Events caused by man’s freewill,
such as war, the dominion of one nation over another, the attempt of
one person to hurt another, or to insult him, [are ascribed to God, as]
e.g., in reference to the dominion of Nebuchadnezzar and his host, “I
have commended my holy ones, also I have called my heroes for my anger”
(Isa. xiii. 3); and “I will send him against a hypocrite nation” (ibid.
x. 6); in reference to Shimei, son of Gera, “For God said to him, Curse
David” (2 Sam. xvi. 10); in reference to the deliverance of Joseph, the
righteous, from prison, “He sent an angel and loosed him” (Ps. cv. 20);
in reference to the victory of the Persians over the Chaldees, “I will
send to Babylon scatterers, and they shall scatter it” (Jer. li. 2); in
reference to the providing of food to Eliah, “I have commanded there a
woman, a widow, to maintain thee” (1 Kings xvii. 9); and Joseph, the
righteous, says: “Not ye have sent me hither,” etc. (Gen. xlv. 8). The
case that the will of an animal or its desire for some of its natural
wants is the cause of some event, may be illustrated by the following
instance: “And God spake unto the fish, and it vomited out Jonah” (ii.
11). The act is ascribed to God, because He gave the fish the will, and
not because He made it a prophet or endowed it with a prophetical
spirit. Similarly it is said of the locusts that appeared in the days
of Joel, son of Pethuel, “Mighty is he that accomplishes his word”
(Joel ii. 11); or of the beasts that took possession of the land of
Edom when destroyed in the days of Sennacherib, “He cast lot for them,
and his hand divided it unto them by a line” (Isa. xxxiv. 17). Although
here the verbs “to say,” “to command,” “to send,” are not used, the
meaning is evidently the same, and you must explain all passages that
are analogous to it in a similar manner. Events evidently due to chance
are ascribed to God; e.g., in reference to Rebecca, “Let her be a wife
to the son of thy master, as the Lord spake” (Gen. xxiv. 51); in
reference to David and Jonathan, “Go, for the Lord has sent thee.” (1
Sam. xx. 22); in reference to Joseph, “God sent me before you” (Gen.
xlv. 7). You see clearly that the providing of a cause, in whatever
manner this may take place, by substance, accident, freewill, or will,
is always expressed by one of the five terms, commanding, saying,
speaking, sending, or calling. Note this, and apply it everywhere
according to the context. Many difficulties will thereby be removed,
and passages apparently containing things far from truth will prove to
be true. This is the conclusion of the treatise on Prophecy, its
allegories and language. It is all I intend to say on this subject in
this treatise. We will now commence to treat of other subjects, with
the help of the Most High.








PART III


INTRODUCTION


We have stated several times that it is our primary object in this
treatise to expound, as far as possible, the Biblical account of the
Creation (Maʻaseh bereshit) and the description of the Divine Chariot
(Maʻaseh mercabah) in a manner adapted to the training of those for
whom this work is written.

We have also stated that these subjects belong to the mysteries of the
Law. You are well aware how our Sages blame those who reveal these
mysteries, and praise the merits of those who keep them secret,
although they are perfectly clear to the philosopher. In this sense
they explain the passage, “Her merchandise shall be for them that dwell
before the Lord, to eat sufficiently” (Isa. xxiii. 18), which concludes
in the original with the words ve-li-me-kasseh ʻatik, i.e., that these
blessings are promised to him who hides things which the Eternal has
revealed [to him], viz., the mysteries of the Law (Babyl. Talmud,
Pesaḥim 119a). If you have understanding you will comprehend that which
our Sages pointed out. They have clearly stated that the Divine Chariot
includes matters too deep and too profound for the ordinary intellect.
It has been shown that a person favoured by Providence with reason to
understand these mysteries is forbidden by the Law to teach them except
vivâ voce, and on condition that the pupil possess certain
qualifications, and even then only the heads of the sections may be
communicated. This has been the cause why the knowledge of this mystery
has entirely disappeared from our nation, and nothing has remained of
it. This was unavoidable, for the explanation of these mysteries was
always communicated vivâ voce, it was never committed to writing. Such
being the case, how can I venture to call your attention to such
portions of it as may be known, intelligible, and perfectly clear to
me? But if, on the other hand, I were to abstain from writing on this
subject, according to my knowledge of it, when I die, as I shall
inevitably do, that knowledge would die with me, and I would thus
inflict great injury on you and all those who are perplexed [by these
theological problems], I would then be guilty of withholding the truth
from those to whom it ought to be communicated, and of jealously
depriving the heir of his inheritance. I should in either case be
guilty of gross misconduct.

To give a full explanation of the mystic passages of the Bible is
contrary to the Law and to reason; besides, my knowledge of them is
based on reasoning, not on divine inspiration [and is therefore not
infallible]. I have not received my belief in this respect from any
teacher, but it has been formed by what I learnt from Scripture and the
utterances of our Sages, and by the philosophical principles which I
have adopted. It is therefore possible that my view is wrong, and that
I misunderstood the passages referred to. Correct thought and divine
help have suggested to me the proper method, viz., to explain the words
of the prophet Ezekiel in such a manner that those who will read my
interpretation will believe that I have not added anything to the
contents of the text, but only, as it were, translated from one
language into another, or given a short exposition of plain things.
Those, however, for whom this treatise has been composed, will, on
reflecting on it and thoroughly examining each chapter, obtain a
perfect and clear insight into all that has been clear and intelligible
to me. This is the utmost that can be done in treating this subject so
as to be useful to all without fully explaining it.

After this introductory remark I ask you to study attentively the
chapters which follow on this sublime, important, and grand subject,
which is the pin upon which everything hangs, and the pillar upon which
everything rests.






CHAPTER I


It is well known that there are men whose face is like that of other
animals; thus the face of some person is like that of a lion, that of
another person like that of an ox, and so on; and man’s face is
described according as the form of his face resembles the form of the
face of other animals. By the expressions, “the face of an ox,” “the
face of a lion,” “the face of an eagle” (Ezek, i. 10), the prophet
describes a human face inclining towards the forms of these various
species. This interpretation can be supported by two proofs. First, the
prophet says of the Ḥayyot in general that “their appearance is this,
they have the form of man” (ver. 5), and then in describing each of the
Ḥayyot he attributes to them the face of a man, that of an ox, that of
a lion, and that of an eagle. Secondly, in the second description of
the Chariot, which is intended as a supplement to the first, the
prophet says, Each hath four faces; the one is the face of a cherub,
the second a man’s face, the third a lion’s face, and the fourth that
of an eagle (ibid. x. 14). He thus clearly indicates that the terms
“the face of an ox” and “the face of a cherub” are identical. But
cherub designates “a youth.” By analogy we explain the two other
terms—“the face of a lion” and “the face of an eagle” in the same
manner. “The face of the ox” has been singled out on account of the
etymology of the Hebrew term shor (ox), as has been indicated by me. It
is impossible to assume that this second description refers to the
perception of another prophetic vision, because it concludes thus:
“This is the Ḥayyah which I saw at the river Chebar” (ibid. ver. 15).
What we intended to explain is now clear.






CHAPTER II


The prophet says that he saw four Ḥayyot; each of them had four faces,
four wings, and two hands, but on the whole their form was human. Comp.
“They had the likeness of a man” (Ezek. i. 5). The hands are also
described as human hands, because these have undoubtedly, as is well
known, such a form as enables them to perform all manner of cunning
work. Their feet are straight; that is to say, they are without joints.
This is the meaning of the phrase “a straight foot,” taken literally.
Similarly our Sages say, the words, “And their feet were straight feet”
(ibid. i. 7), show that the beings above do not sit. Note this
likewise. The soles of the feet of the Ḥayyot, the organs of walking,
are described as different from the feet of man, but the hands are like
human hands. The feet are round, for the prophet says, “like the sole
of a round foot.” The four Ḥayyot are closely joined together, there is
no space or vacuum left between them. Comp. “They were joined one to
another” (ibid. i. 9). “But although they were thus joined together,
their faces and their wings were separated above” (ibid. ver. 11).
Consider the expression “above” employed here, although the bodies were
closely joined, their faces and their wings were separated, but only
above. The prophet then states that they are transparent; they are
“like burnished brass” (ibid. ver. 7). He also adds that they are
luminous. Comp. “Their appearance was like burning coals of fire”
(ibid. ver. 13). This is all that has been said as regards the form,
shape, face, figure, wings, hands, and feet of the Ḥayyot. The prophet
then begins to describe the motions of these Ḥayyot, namely, that they
have a uniform motion, without any curvature, deviation, or deflexion:
“They turned not when they went” (ver. 17). Each of the Ḥayyot moves in
the direction of its face. Comp. “They went every one in the direction
of his face” (ver. 9). Now, it is here clearly stated that each Ḥayyah
went in the direction of its face, but since each Ḥayyah has several
faces, I ask, in the direction of which face? In short, the four Ḥayyot
do not move in the same direction; for, if this were the case, a
special motion would not have been ascribed to each of them; it would
not have been said, “They went each one towards the side of his face.”
The motion of these Ḥayyot is further described as a running, so also
their returning is described as a running. Comp. “And the Ḥayyot ran,
and returned as the appearance of a flash of lightning” (ver. 14),
raẓoh being the infinitive of ruẓ, “to run,” and shob the infinitive
instead of shub, “to return.” The ordinary words, haloch and bo, “to
go” and “to come,” are not used, but such words as indicate running to
and fro; and these are further explained by the phrase, “As the
appearance of a flash of lightning” (bazak, used by the prophet, is
identical with barak), for the lightning appears to move very quickly;
it seems to hasten and to run from a certain place, and then to turn
back and to come again to the place from which it had started. This is
repeated several times with the same velocity. Jonathan, the son of
Uzziel, renders the phrase raẓo vashob thus: They move round the world
and return at once, and are as swift as the appearance of lightning.
This quick movement and return the Ḥayyah does not perform of its own
accord, but through something outside of it, viz., the Divine Will; for
“to whichever side it is the Divine Will that the Ḥayyah should move,
thither the Ḥayyah moves,” in that quick manner which is expressed by
“running and returning.” This is implied in the words, “Whithersoever
the spirit was to go they went” (ver. 20); “They turned not when they
went” (ver. 17). By “the spirit” (ruaḥ), the prophet does not mean “the
wind,” but “the intention,” as we have explained when discussing the
homonym ruaḥ (spirit). The meaning of the phrase is, that whithersoever
it is the Divine Will that the Ḥayyah shall go, thither it runs.
Jonathan, the son of Uzziel, gives a similar explanation: Towards the
place whither it is the will to go, they go; they do not turn when they
go. The employment of the future tense of the verbs yihyeh and yeleku
in this passage seems to imply that sometimes it will be the will of
God that the Ḥayyah should move in one direction, in which it will in
fact move, and at other times it will be His will that the Ḥayyah
should move in the opposite direction, in which it will then move. An
explanation is, however, added, which is contrary to this conclusion,
and shows that the future form (yihyeh) of the verb has here the
meaning of the preterite, as is frequently the case in Hebrew. The
direction in which God desires the Ḥayyah to move has already been
determined and fixed, and the Ḥayyah moves in that direction which His
will has determined long ago, without having ever changed. The prophet,
therefore, in explaining, and at the same time concluding [this
description of the Ḥayyot], says, “Whithersoever the spirit was to go
they go, thither was the spirit to go” (ver. 20). Note this wonderful
interpretation. This passage forms likewise part of the account of the
motion of the four Ḥayyot which follows the description of their form.

Next comes the description of another part; for the prophet relates
that he saw a body beneath the Ḥayyot, but closely joining them. This
body, which is connected with the earth, consists likewise of four
bodies, and has also four faces. But no distinct form is ascribed to
it; neither that of man nor that of any other living being. The [four
bodies] are described as great, tremendous, and terrible; no form is
given to them, except that they are covered with eyes. These are the
bodies called Ofannim (lit. wheels). The prophet therefore says: “Now,
as I beheld the Ḥayyot, behold one wheel upon the earth beside the
living creatures, with his four faces” (ver. 15). He thus distinctly
states that the Ofannim form a body, of which the one part touches the
Ḥayyot, and the other part the earth; and that the Ofan has four faces.
But he continues—“The appearance of the Ofannim (wheels) and their work
was like unto the colour of a beryl: and they four had one likeness”
(ver. 16). By speaking of four Ofannim, after having mentioned only one
Ofan, the prophet indicates that the “four faces” and the “four
Ofannim” are identical. These four Ofannim have the same form; comp.,
“And they four had one likeness.” The Ofannim are then described as
partly inter-joined; for “their appearance and their work was as it
were a wheel in the middle of a wheel” (ver. 16). In the description of
the Ḥayyot such a phrase, with the term “in the middle of” (tok) is not
employed. The Ḥayyot are partly joined, according to the words, “they
were joined one to another” (ver. 11); whilst in reference to the
Ofannim it is stated that they are partly intermixed, “as it were a
wheel in the middle of a wheel.” The body of the Ofannim is described
as being covered with eyes; it is possible that a body covered with
real eyes is here meant, or a body with different colours [ʻayin
denoting “eye,” also “colour”], as in the phrase “the colour thereof
[ʻeno] as the colour (keʻen) of bdellium” (Num. xi. 7); or a body
filled with likenesses of things. In this latter sense the term ʻayin
is used by our Sages in phrases like the following:—Like that [keʻen]
which he has stolen, like that [keʻen] which he has robbed; or
different properties and qualities are meant, according to the meaning
of the word ʻayin in the passage, “It may be that the Lord will look
(beʻenai) on my condition” (2 Sam. xvi. 12). So much for the form of
the Ofannim. Their motion is described as being without curvature and
deviation; as being straight, without any change. This is expressed in
the words, “When they went, they went upon their four sides: and they
turned not when they went” (E.; ver. 17). The four Ofannim do not move
of their own accord, as the Ḥayyot, and have no motion whatever of
their own; they are set in motion by other beings, as is emphatically
stated twice. The Ḥayyot are the moving agents of the Ofannim. The
relation between the Ofan and the Ḥayyah may be compared to the
relation between a lifeless body tied to the hand or the leg of a
living animal; whithersoever the latter moves, thither moves also the
piece of wood, or the stone, which is tied to the named limb of the
animal. This is expressed in the following words:—“And when the Ḥayyot
went, the Ofannim went by them; and when the living creatures were
lifted up from the earth, the Ofannim were lifted up” (ver. 19); “and
the Ofannim were lifted up over against them” (ver. 20). And the cause
of this is explained thus:—“The spirit of the Ḥayyah was in the
Ofannim” (ibid.). For the sake of emphasis and further explanation the
prophet adds, “When those went, these went; and when those stood, these
stood; and when those were lifted up from the earth, the Ofannim were
lifted up over against them; for the spirit of the Ḥayyah was in the
Ofannim” (ver. 21). The order of these movements is therefore as
follows:—Whithersoever it is the will of God that the Ḥayyot should
move, thither they move of their own accord. When the Ḥayyot move the
Ofannim necessarily follow them, because they are tied to them, and not
because they move of their own accord in the direction in which the
Ḥayyot move. This order is expressed in the words, “Whithersoever the
spirit was to go, they went, thither was the spirit to go; and the
Ofannim were lifted up over against them; for the spirit of the Ḥayyah
was in the Ofannim” (ver. 20). I have told you that Jonathan, the son
of Uzziel, translates the verse thus, “to the place whither it was the
will that the Ḥayyot should go,” etc.

After having completed the account of the Ḥayyot, with their form and
motion, and of the Ofannim, which are beneath the Ḥayyot, connected
with them and forced to move when the Ḥayyot move, the prophet begins
to describe a third object which he perceived prophetically, and gives
the account of a new thing, viz., of that which is above the Ḥayyot. He
says that the firmament is above the four Ḥayyot, above the firmament
is the likeness of a throne, and over the throne the likeness of the
appearance of man. This is the whole account of what the prophet
perceived at first at the river Chebar.






CHAPTER III


When Ezekiel recalled to memory the form of the Chariot, which he
described in the beginning of the book, the same vision presented
itself to him a second time; in this vision he was borne to Jerusalem.
He explains in describing it things which have not been made clear at
first, e.g., he substitutes the term “cherubim” for Ḥayyot, whereby he
expresses that the Ḥayyot of the first vision are likewise angels like
the cherubim. He says, therefore: “Where the cherubims went, the
Ofannim went by them: and when the cherubims lifted up their wings to
mount up from the earth, the same Ofannim also turned not from beside
them” (x. 16). By these words he shows how closely connected the two
motions are [viz., that of the Ḥayyot and that of the Ofannim]. The
prophet adds, “This is the Ḥayyah that I saw under the God of Israel by
the river of Chebar; and I knew that they were cherubims” (ver. 20). He
thus describes the same forms and the same motions, and states that the
Ḥayyot and the cherubim are identical. A second point is then made
clear in this second description, namely, that the Ofannim are
spherical; for the prophet says, “As for the Ofannim, it was cried unto
them in my hearing, O sphere” (ver. 13). A third point concerning the
Ofannim is illustrated here in the following words: “To the place
whither the head looked they followed it: they turned not as they went”
(ver. 11). The motion of the Ofannim is thus described as involuntary,
and directed “to the place whither the head looketh”; and of this it is
stated that it moves “whither the spirit is to go” (i. 20). A fourth
point is added concerning the Ofannim, namely, “And the Ofannim were
full of eyes round about, even the Ofannim that they four had” (x. 12).
This has not been mentioned before. In this second description there
are further mentioned “their flesh, and their backs, and their hands,
and their wings” (ibid.), whilst in the first account none of these is
mentioned; and it is only stated that they are bodies. Though they are
endowed in the second account with flesh, hands, and wings, no form is
given to them. In the second account each ofan is attributed to a
cherub, “one ofan by one cherub, and another ofan by another cherub.”
The four Ḥayyot are then described as one Ḥayyah on account of their
interjoining: “This is the Ḥayyah that I saw under the God of Israel by
the river of Chebar” (ver. 20). Also the Ofannim, though being four in
number, as has been mentioned, are called “one ofan upon the earth”
(ver. 15), because they interjoin, and “they four have one likeness”
(ver. 16). This is the additional explanation which the second vision
gives of the form of the Ḥayyot and the Ofannim.






CHAPTER IV


It is necessary to call your attention to an idea expressed by
Jonathan, the son of Uzziel. When he saw that the prophet says in
reference to the Ofannim, “It was cried unto them in my hearing, O
gilgal” (“sphere”) (x. 13), he assumed that by Ofannim the heavens are
meant, and rendered ofan by gilgal, “sphere,” and ofannim by gilgelaya,
“spheres.” I have no doubt that he found a confirmation of his opinion
in the words of the prophet that the Ofannim were like unto the colour
of tarshish (ver. 16), a colour ascribed to the heavens, as is well
known. When he, therefore, noticed the passage, “Now as I beheld the
Ḥayyot, behold one Ofan upon the earth” (i. 15), which clearly shows
that the Ofannim were upon the earth, he had a difficulty in explaining
it in accordance with his opinion. Following, however, his
interpretation, he explains the terms ereẓ, employed here as denoting
the inner surface of the heavenly sphere, which may be considered as
ereẓ (“earth” or “below”), in relation to all that is above that
surface. He therefore translates the words ofan eḥad ba-areẓ as
follows: “One ofan was below the height of the heavens.” Consider what
his explanation of the passage must be. I think that he gave this
explanation because he thought that gilgal denotes in its original
meaning “heaven.” My opinion is that gilgal means originally “anything
rolling”; comp. “And I will roll thee (ve-gilgaltika) down from the
rocks” (Jer. li. 25); “and rolled (va-yagel) the stone” (Gen. xxix.
10); the same meaning the word has in the phrase: “Like a rolling thing
(gilgal) before the whirlwind” (Isa. xvii. 13). The poll of the head,
being round, is therefore called gulgolet; and because everything round
rolls easily, every spherical thing is called gilgal; also the heavens
are called gilgallim on account of their spherical form. Thus our Sages
use the phrase, “It is a wheel (gilgal) that moves round the world”;
and a wooden ball, whether small or large, is called gilgal. If so, the
prophet merely intended by the words, “As for the Ofannim, it is cried
to them in my hearing, O sphere” (gilgal), to indicate the shape of the
Ofannim, as nothing has been mentioned before respecting their form and
shape; but he did not mean to say that the Ofannim are the same as the
heavens. The term “like tarshish” is explained in the second account,
in which it is said of the Ofannim: “And the appearance of the ofannim
was like the colour of tarshish.” This latter passage is translated by
Jonathan, the son of Uzziel, “like the colour of a precious stone,”
exactly in the same manner as Onkelos translates the phrase ke-maʻase
libnat ha-sappir, “like the work of the whiteness of sapphire” (Exod.
xxix. 10). Note this. You will not find it strange that I mention the
explanation of Jonathan, son of Uzziel, whilst I gave a different
explanation myself; for you will find many of the wise men and the
commentators differ sometimes from him in the interpretation of words
and in many things respecting the prophets. Why should it be otherwise
in these profound matters? Besides, I do not decide in favour of my
interpretation. It is for you to learn both—the whole of his
explanation, from what I have pointed out to you, and also my own
opinion. God knoweth which of the two explanations is in accordance
with that which the prophet intended to say.






CHAPTER V


It is necessary to notice that the plural marot elohim, “visions of
God,” is here used, and not the singular mareh, “vision,” for there
were several things, of different kinds, that were perceived by the
prophet. The following three things were perceived by him: the Ofannim,
the Ḥayyot, and the man above the Ḥayyot. The description of each of
these visions is introduced by the word va-ereh, “and I beheld.” For
the account of the Ḥayyot, begins, “And I looked (va-ereh), and behold
a whirlwind,” etc. (Ezek. i. 4). The account of the Ofannim begins:
“Now as I beheld (va-ereh) the Ḥayyot, behold one Ofan upon the earth”
(ver. 15). The vision of that which is above the Ḥayyot in order and
rank begins: “And I saw (va-ereh) as the colour of the amber, etc.,
from the appearance of his loins even upward” (ver. 27). The word
va-ereh, “and I beheld,” only occurs these three times in the
description of the Mercabah. The doctors of the Mishnah have already
explained this fact, and my attention was called to it by their
remarks. For they said that only the two first visions, namely, that of
the Ḥayyot and the Ofannim, might be interpreted to others; but of the
third vision, viz., that of the ḥashmal and all that is connected with
it, only the heads of the sections may be taught. Rabbi [Jehudah], the
Holy, is of opinion that all the three visions are called maʻaseh
mercabah, and nothing but the heads of the sections could be
communicated to others. The exact words of the discussion are as
follows:—Where does maʻaseh mercabhah end? Rabbi says, with the last
va-ereh; Rabbi Yiẓḥak says it ends at the word ḥashmal (ver. 27). The
portion from va-ereh to ḥashmal may be fully taught; of that which
follows, only the heads of the sections; according to some it is the
passage from va-ereh to ḥashmal, of which the heads of the sections may
be taught, but that which follows may only be studied by those who
possess the capacity, whilst those that cannot study it by themselves
must leave it.—It is clear from the words of our Sages that different
visions are described, as may also be inferred from the repetition of
the word va-ereh, and that these visions are different from each other
in degree; the last and highest of them is the vision commencing, “And
I saw as the colour of ḥashmal”; that is to say, the divided figure of
the man, described as “the appearance of fire, etc., from the
appearance of his loins even upward, and from the appearance of his
loins even downward,” etc. There is a difference of opinion among our
Sages whether it is permitted to give by way of hints an exposition of
any part of this third vision, or whether it is prohibited even to
teach of it the heads of the sections, so that only the wise can arrive
at understanding it by their own studies. You will also notice a
difference of opinion among our Sages in reference to the two first
visions, viz., that of the Ḥayyot and that of the Ofannim whether these
may be taught explicitly or only by way of hints, dark sayings, and
heads of sections. You must also notice the order of these three
visions. First comes the vision of the Ḥayyot, because they are first
in rank and in the causal relation, as it is said, “For the spirit of
the Ḥayyah was in the Ofannim” and also for other reasons. The vision
of the Ofannim [comes next, and] is followed by one which is higher
than the Ḥayyot, as has been shown. The cause of this arrangement is,
that in study the first two must necessarily precede the third, and in
fact they lead to it.






CHAPTER VI


The sublime and great subject which Ezekiel by prophetic impulse began
to teach us in the description of the Mercabah, is exactly the same
which Isaiah taught us in general outlines, because he did not require
all the detail. Isaiah says, “I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne,
high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple. Above it stood
seraphims,” etc. (Isa. vi. 1 seq.). Our Sages have already stated all
this clearly, and called our attention to it. For they say that the
vision of Ezekiel is the same as that of Isaiah, and illustrate their
view by the following simile:—Two men saw the king riding, the one a
townsman, the other a countryman. The former, seeing that his
neighbours know well how the king rides, simply tells them that he saw
the king; but the villager, wishing to tell his friends things which
they do not know, relates in detail how the king was riding, describes
his followers, and the officers who execute his order and command. This
remark is a most useful hint; it is contained in the following passage
(Ḥagigah, 13 b): “Isaiah saw all that has been seen by Ezekiel; Isaiah
is like a townsman that sees the king, Ezekiel like a countryman that
sees the king.” These words can be explained in the manner which I have
just mentioned, viz., the generation of Isaiah did not require the
detailed description; his account, “I saw the Lord,” etc., sufficed.
The generation of the Babylonian exile wanted to learn all the details.
It is, however, possible that the author of this saying held Isaiah as
more perfect than Ezekiel, so that the vision might have overawed
Ezekiel and appeared fearful to him; but Isaiah was so familiar with it
that he did not consider it necessary to communicate it to others as a
new thing, especially as it was well known to the intelligent.






CHAPTER VII


One of the points that require investigation is the connexion between
the vision of the mercabah and the year, month, and day, and also the
place of the vision. A reason must be found for this connexion, and we
must not think that it is an indifferent element in the vision. We must
consider the words, “the heavens were opened” (Ezek. i. 1); they give
the key to the understanding of the whole. The figure of opening, also
that of opening the gates, occurs frequently in the books of the
prophets; e.g., “Open ye the gates that the righteous nation may enter
in” (Isa. xxvi. 2); “He opened the doors of heaven” (Ps. lxxviii. 23);
“Lift them up, ye everlasting doors” (ibid. xxiv. 9); “Open to me the
gates of righteousness, I will go into them, and I will praise the
Lord” (ibid. cxviii. 19). There are many other instances of this kind.
You must further notice that the whole description refers undoubtedly
to a prophetic vision, as it is said, “And the hand of the Lord was
there upon him” (Ezek. i. 3); and yet there is a very great difference
between the various parts of the description, for in the account of the
Ḥayyot the prophet does not say four Ḥayyot, but “the likeness of the
four Ḥayyot” (ibid. ver. 5); similarly he says, “And the likeness of a
firmament was over the heads of the Ḥayyot” (ver. 22); “as the
appearance of a sapphire stone, the likeness of a throne,” and “the
likeness of the appearance of man above it” (ver. 26). In all these
instances the word “likeness” is used, whilst in the account of the
Ofannim the phrases, “the likeness of Ofannim,” the “likeness of an
Ofan,” are not employed, but they are described in a positive manner as
beings in actual existence, with their real properties. The sentence
“they four had one likeness” must not mislead you, for here the word
“likeness” is not used in the same connexion or in the same sense as
indicated above. In the description of the last vision the prophet
confirms and explains this view. When he commences to describe the
firmament in detail, he says, “the firmament,” without adding the words
“the likeness of,” for he says, “And I looked, and behold, in the
firmament that was above the head of the cherubims there appeared over
them as it were a sapphire stone, as the appearance of the likeness of
a throne” (x. 1). Here the prophet speaks of “the firmament” and not of
“the likeness of the firmament,” as he does when he connects the
firmament with the heads of the likeness of the Ḥayyot (i. 22). But, as
regards the throne, he says, “the likeness of a throne appeared over
them,” in order to indicate that the firmament was first perceived and
then the likeness of the throne was seen over it. Consider this well.

You must further notice that in the description of the first vision the
Ḥayyot have wings and at the same time human hands, whilst in the
second vision, in which the term cherubim is substituted for Ḥayyot, at
first only wings were perceived, and later on human hands were seen.
Comp. “And there appeared in the cherubims the form of a man’s hand
under their wings” (x. 8). Here “form” (tabnit) is used instead of
“likeness” (demut); and the hands are placed under the wings. Note
this.

Consider that in reference to the ofannim, the prophet says,
le-ʻummatam, “over against them,” although he does not ascribe to them
any form.

He further says, “As the appearance of the bow that is in the cloud in
the day of rain, so was the appearance of the brightness round about.
This was the appearance of the likeness of the glory,” etc. (i. 28).
The substance and true essence of the bow described here is well known.
The simile and comparison is in this case very extraordinary, and is
undoubtedly part of the prophecy; and note it well.

It is also noteworthy that the likeness of man above the throne is
divided, the upper part being like the colour of ḥashmal, the lower
part like the appearance of fire. As regards the word ḥashmal, it has
been explained to be a compound of two words ḥash and mal, including
two different notions, viz., ḥash signifying “swiftness,” and mal
denoting “pause.” The two different notions are here joined in one word
in order to indicate figuratively the two different parts,—the upper
part and the lower. We have already given a second explanation, namely,
that ḥashmal includes the two notions of speech and silence; in
accordance with the saying of our Sages, “At times they are silent, at
times they speak,” thus deriving hash of the same root as heḥeshethi,
“I have been silent” (Isa. xlii. 14); the word ḥashmal thus includes
two notions, and indicates “speech without sound.” There is no doubt
that the words, “at times they are silent, at times they speak,” refer
to a created object. Now consider how they clearly stated that the
divided likeness of man over the throne does not represent God, who is
above the whole chariot, but represents a part of the creation. The
prophet likewise says “that is the likeness of the glory of the Lord”;
but “the glory of the Lord” is different from “the Lord” Himself, as
has been shown by us several times. All the figures in this vision
refer to the glory of the Lord, to the chariot, and not to Him who
rides upon the chariot; for God cannot be compared to anything. Note
this. I have thus given you also in this chapter as much of the heads
of the sections as will be useful to you for the comprehension of this
subject, if you fill out [the sections of] these heads. If you consider
all that has been said in this part up to this chapter, the greater
part of this subject or the whole of it will be clear to you, except a
few points and some repetitions the meaning of which is unknown.
Perhaps further study will help to reveal even these things so that
nothing will remain unintelligible.

Do not expect or hope to hear from me after this chapter a word on this
subject, either explicitly or implicitly, for all that could be said on
it has been said, though with great difficulty and struggle. I will now
begin to treat of some of the other subjects which I hope to elucidate
in this treatise.






CHAPTER VIII


Transient bodies are only subject to destruction through their
substance and not through their form, nor can the essence of their form
be destroyed; in this respect they are permanent. The generic forms, as
you know, are all permanent and stable. Form can only be destroyed
accidentally, i.e., on account of its connexion with substance, the
true nature of which consists in the property of never being without a
disposition to receive form. This is the reason why no form remains
permanently in a substance; a constant change takes place, one form is
taken off and another is put on. How wonderfully wise is the simile of
King Solomon, in which he compares matter to a faithless wife; for
matter is never found without form, and is therefore always like such a
wife who is never without a husband, never single; and yet, though
being wedded, constantly seeks another man in the place of her husband;
she entices and attracts him in every possible manner till he obtains
from her what her husband has obtained. The same is the case with
matter. Whatever form it has, it is disposed to receive another form;
it never leaves off moving and casting off the form which it has in
order to receive another. The same takes place when this second form is
received. It is therefore clear that all corruption, destruction, or
defect comes from matter. Take, e.g., man; his deformities and
unnatural shape of limbs; all weakness, interruption, or disorder of
his actions, whether innate or not, originate in the transient
substance, not in the form. All other living beings likewise die or
become ill through the substance of the body and not through its form.
Man’s shortcomings and sins are all due to the substance of the body
and not to its form; while all his merits are exclusively due to his
form. Thus the knowledge of God, the formation of ideas, the mastery of
desire and passion, the distinction between that which is to be chosen
and that which is to be rejected, all these man owes to his form; but
eating, drinking, sexual intercourse, excessive lust, passion, and all
vices, have their origin in the substance of his body. Now it was clear
that this was the case,—it was impossible, according to the wisdom of
God, that substance should exist without form, or any of the forms of
the bodies without substance, and it was necessary that the very noble
form of man, which is the image and likeness of God, as has been shown
by us, should be joined to the substance of dust and darkness, the
source of all defect and loss. For these reasons the Creator gave to
the form of man power, rule, and dominion over the substance;—the form
can subdue the substance, refuse the fulfilment of its desires, and
reduce them, as far as possible, to a just and proper measure. The
station of man varies according to the exercise of this power. Some
persons constantly strive to choose that which is noble, and to seek
perpetuation in accordance with the direction of their nobler
part,—their form; their thoughts are engaged in the formation of ideas,
the acquisition of true knowledge about everything, and the union with
the divine intellect which flows down upon them, and which is the
source of man’s form. Whenever they are led by the wants of the body to
that which is low and avowedly disgraceful, they are grieved at their
position, they feel ashamed and confounded at their situation. They try
with all their might to diminish this disgrace, and to guard against it
in every possible way. They feel like a person whom the king in his
anger ordered to remove refuse from one place to another in order to
put him to shame; that person tries as much as possible to hide himself
during the time of his disgrace; he perhaps removes a small quantity a
short distance in such a manner that his hands and garments remain
clean, and he himself be unnoticed by his fellow-men. Such would be the
conduct of a free man, whilst a slave would find pleasure in such
work;—he would not consider it a great burden, but throw himself into
the refuse, smear his face and his hands, carry the refuse openly,
laughing and singing. This is exactly the difference in the conduct of
different men. Some consider, as we just said, all wants of the body as
shame, disgrace, and defect to which they are compelled to attend; this
is chiefly the case with the sense of touch, which is a disgrace to us
according to Aristotle, and which is the cause of our desire for
eating, drinking, and sensuality. Intelligent persons must, as much as
possible, reduce these wants, guard against them, feel grieved when
satisfying them, abstain from speaking of them, discussing them, and
attending to them in company with others. Man must have control over
all these desires, reduce them as much as possible, and only retain of
them as much as is indispensable. His aim must be the aim of man as
man, viz., the formation of ideas, and nothing else. The best and
sublimest among them is the idea which man forms of God, angels, and
the rest of the creation according to his capacity. Such men are always
with God, and of them it is said, “Ye are princes, and all of you are
children of the Most High” (Ps. lxxxii. 6). This is man’s task and
purpose. Others, however, that are separated from God form the
multitude of fools, and do just the opposite. They neglect all thought
and all reflection on ideas, and consider as their task the cultivation
of the sense of touch,—that sense which is the greatest disgrace; they
only think and reason about eating and love. Thus it is said of the
wicked who are drowned in eating, drinking, and love, “They also have
erred through wine, and through strong drink are out of the way,” etc.
(Isa. xxviii. 7), “for all tables are full of vomit and filthiness, so
that there is no place clean” (ver. 8); again, “And women rule over
them” (ibid. iii. 2),—the opposite of that which man was told in the
beginning of the creation, “And for thy husband shall thy desire be,
and he shall rule over thee” (Gen. iii. 16). The intensity of their
lust is then described thus, “Every one neighed after his neighbour’s
wife,” etc. (Jer. v. 8); “they are all adulterers, an assembly of
treacherous men” (ibid. ix. 2). The whole book of the Proverbs of
Solomon treats of this subject, and exhorts to abstain from lust and
intemperance. These two vices ruin those that hate God and keep far
from Him; to them the following passages may be applied, “They are not
the Lord’s” (ibid. v. 10); “Cast them out of my sight, and let them go
forth” (ibid. xv. 1). As regards the portion beginning, “Who can find a
virtuous woman?” it is clear what is meant by the figurative
expression, “a virtuous woman.” When man possesses a good sound body
that does not overpower him nor disturb the equilibrium in him, he
possesses a divine gift. In short, a good constitution facilitates the
rule of the soul over the body, but it is not impossible to conquer a
bad constitution by training. For this reason King Solomon and others
wrote the moral lessons; also all the commandments and exhortations in
the Pentateuch aim at conquering the desires of the body. Those who
desire to be men in truth, and not brutes, having only the appearance
and shape of men, must constantly endeavour to reduce the wants of the
body, such as eating, love, drinking, anger, and all vices originating
in lust and passion; they must feel ashamed of them and set limits to
them for themselves. As for eating and drinking in so far as it is
indispensable, they will eat and drink only as much as is useful and
necessary as food, and not for the purpose of pleasure. They will also
speak little of these things, and rarely congregate for such purposes.
Thus our Sages, as is well known, kept aloof from a banquet that was
not part of a religious act, and pious men followed the example of R.
Phineḥas, son of Jair, who never dined with other persons, and even
refused to accept an invitation of R. Jehudah, the Holy. Wine may be
treated as food, if taken as such, but to form parties for the purpose
of drinking wine together must be considered more disgraceful than the
unrestrained conduct of persons who in daylight meet in the same house
undressed and naked. For the natural action of the digestive organ is
indispensable to man, he cannot do without it; whilst drunkenness
depends on the free will of an evil man. To appear naked in the
presence of other people is misconduct only according to public
opinion, not according to the dictates of reason, whilst drunkenness,
which ruins the mind and the body of man, reason stamps as a vice. You,
therefore, who desire to act as human beings must keep away from it,
and even from speaking of it. On sexual intercourse, I need not add
anything after I have pointed out in the commentary on Abot (i. 17) how
it is treated by our Law, which is the teaching of pure wisdom—no
excuse whatever should induce us to mention it or to speak of it. Thus
our Sages said, that Elisha the prophet is called holy, because he did
not think of it, and consequently never found himself polluted with
semen. In a similar manner they say that Jacob had the first issue of
semen for the conception of Reuben. All these traditional stories have
the object of teaching the nation humane conduct. There is a well-known
saying of our Sages, “The thoughts about the sin are more dangerous
than the sin itself.” I can offer a good explanation of this saying:
When a person is disobedient, this is due to certain accidents
connected with the corporeal element in his constitution; for man sins
only by his animal nature, whereas thinking is a faculty of man
connected with his form,—a person who thinks sinfully sins therefore by
means of the nobler portion of his self; and he who wrongly causes a
foolish slave to work does not sin as much as he who wrongly causes a
noble and free man to do the work of a slave. For this specifically
human element, with all its properties and powers, should only be
employed in suitable work, in attempts to join higher beings, and not
in attempts to go down and reach the lower creatures. You know how we
condemn lowness of speech, and justly so, for speech is likewise
peculiar to man and a boon which God granted to him that he may be
distinguished from the rest of living creatures. Thus God says, “Who
gave a mouth to man?” (Exod. iv. 11); and the prophet declares, “The
Lord God hath given me a learned tongue” (Isa. l. 4). This gift,
therefore, which God gave us in order to enable us to perfect
ourselves, to learn and to teach, must not be employed in doing that
which is for us most degrading and perfectly disgraceful; we must not
imitate the songs and tales of ignorant and lascivious people. It may
be suitable to them, but is not fit for those who are told, “And ye
shall be unto me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation” (Exod. xix.
6). Those who employ the faculty of thinking and speaking in the
service of that sense which is no honour to us, who think more than
necessary of drink and love, or even sing of these things; they employ
and use the divine gift in acts of rebellion against the Giver, and in
the transgression of His commandments. To them the following words may
be applied: “And I multiplied her silver and gold, which they prepared
for Baal” (Hos. ii. 10). I have also a reason and cause for calling our
language the holy language—do not think it is exaggeration or error on
my part, it is perfectly correct—the Hebrew language has no special
name for the organ of generation in females or in males, nor for the
act of generation itself, nor for semen, nor for secretion. The Hebrew
has no original expressions for these things, and only describes them
in figurative language and by way of hints, as if to indicate thereby
that these things should not be mentioned, and should therefore have no
names; we ought to be silent about them, and when we are compelled to
mention them, we must manage to employ for that purpose some suitable
expressions, although these are generally used in a different sense.
Thus the organ of generation in males is called in Hebrew gid, which is
a figurative term, reminding of the words, “And thy neck is an iron
sinew” (gid) (Isa. xlviii. 4). It is also called shupka, “pouring out”
(Deut. xxiii. 2), on account of its function. The female organ is
called kobah (Num. xxv. 8), from kebah (Deut. xviii. 3), which denotes
“stomach”; reḥem, “womb,” is the inner organ in which the fœtus
develops; ẓoah (Isa. xxviii. 8), “refuse,” is derived from the verb
yaẓa, “he went out”; for “urine” the phrase meme raglayim, “the water
of the feet” (2 Kings. xviii. 17), is used; semen is expressed by
shikbat zeraʻ, “a layer of seed.” For the act of generation there is no
expression whatever in Hebrew; it is described by the following words
only: baʻal, “he was master”; shakab, “he lay”; laḳaḥ, “he took”;
gillah ʻervah, “he uncovered the nakedness.” Be not misled by the word
yishgalennah (Deut. xxviii. 30), to take it as denoting that act; this
is not the case, for shegal denotes a female ready for cohabitation.
Comp. “Upon thy right hand did stand the maiden” (shegal) “in gold of
Ophir” (Ps. xlv. 10). Yishgalennah, according to the Kethib, denotes
therefore “he will take the female for the purpose of cohabitation.”

We have made in the greater part of this chapter a digression from the
theme of this treatise, and introduced some moral and religious matter,
although they do not entirely belong to the subject of this treatise,
but the course of the discussion has led to it.






CHAPTER IX


The corporeal element in man is a large screen and partition that
prevents him from perfectly perceiving abstract ideals; this would be
the case even if the corporeal element were as pure and superior as the
substance of the spheres; how much more must this be the case with our
dark and opaque body. However great the exertion of our mind may be to
comprehend the Divine Being or any of the ideals, we find a screen and
partition between Him and ourselves. Thus the prophets frequently hint
at the existence of a partition between God and us. They say He is
concealed from us in vapours, in darkness, in mist, or in a thick
cloud; or use similar figures to express that on account of our bodies
we are unable to comprehend His essence. This is the meaning of the
words, “Clouds and darkness are round about Him” (Ps. xcvii. 2). The
prophets tell us that the difficulty consists in the grossness of our
substance; they do not imply, as might be gathered from the literal
meaning of their words, that God is corporeal, and is invisible because
He is surrounded by thick clouds, vapours, darkness, or mist. This
figure is also expressed in the passage, “He made darkness His secret
place” (Ps. xviii. 12). The object of God revealing Himself in thick
clouds, darkness, vapours, and mist was to teach this lesson; for every
prophetic vision contains some lesson by means of allegory; that mighty
vision, therefore, though the greatest of all visions, and above all
comparison, viz., His revelation in a thick cloud, did not take place
without any purpose, it was intended to indicate that we cannot
comprehend Him on account of the dark body that surrounds us. It does
not surround God, because He is incorporeal. A tradition is current
among our people that the day of the revelation on Mount Sinai was
misty, cloudy, and a little rainy. Comp. “Lord, when thou wentest forth
from Seir, when thou marchedst out of the field of Edom, the earth
trembled, and the heavens dropped water” (Judges v. 4). The same idea
is expressed by the words “darkness, clouds, and thick darkness” (Deut.
iv. 11). The phrase does not denote that darkness surrounds God, for
with Him there is no darkness, but the great, strong, and permanent
light, which, emanating from Him, illuminates all darkness, as is
expressed by the prophetic simile, “And the earth shined with His
glory” (Ezek. xliii. 2).






CHAPTER X


The Mutakallemim, as I have already told you, apply the term
non-existence only to absolute non-existence, and not to the absence of
properties. A property and the absence of that property are considered
by them as two opposites, they treat, e.g., blindness and sight, death
and life, in the same way as heat and cold. Therefore they say, without
any qualification, non-existence does not require any agent, an agent
is required when something is produced. From a certain point of view
this is correct. Although they hold that non-existence does not require
an agent, they say in accordance with their principle that God causes
blindness and deafness, and gives rest to anything that moves, for they
consider these negative conditions as positive properties. We must now
state our opinion in accordance with the results of philosophical
research. You know that he who removes the obstacle of motion is to
some extent the cause of the motion, e.g., if one removes the pillar
which supports the beam he causes the beam to move, as has been stated
by Aristotle in his Physics (VIII., chap. iv.); in this sense we say of
him who removed a certain property that he produced the absence of that
property, although absence of a property is nothing positive. Just as
we say of him who puts out the light at night that he has produced
darkness, so we say of him who destroyed the sight of any being that he
produced blindness, although darkness and blindness are negative
properties, and require no agent. In accordance with this view we
explain the following passage of Isaiah: “I form the light and create
(bore) darkness: I make peace, and create (bore) evil” (Isa. xlv. 7),
for darkness and evil are non-existing things. Consider that the
prophet does not say, I make (ʻoseh) darkness, I make (ʻoseh) evil,
because darkness and evil are not things in positive existence to which
the verb “to make” would apply; the verb bara “he created” is used,
because in Hebrew this verb is applied to non-existing things, e.g.,
“In the beginning God created” (bara), etc.; here the creation took
place from nothing. Only in this sense can non-existence be said to be
produced by a certain action of an agent. In the same way we must
explain the following passage: “Who hath made man’s mouth? or who
maketh the dumb, or the deaf, or the seeing,” etc. (Exod. iv. 11). The
passage can also be explained as follows: Who has made man able to
speak? or can create him without the capacity of speaking, i.e., create
a substance that is incapable of acquiring this property? for he who
produces a substance that cannot acquire a certain property may be
called the producer of that privation. Thus we say, if any one abstains
from delivering a fellow-man from death, although he is able to do so,
that he killed him. It is now clear that according to all these
different views the action of an agent cannot be directly connected
with a thing that does not exist; only indirectly is non-existence
described as the result of the action of an agent, whilst in a direct
manner an action can only influence a thing really in existence;
accordingly, whoever the agent may be, he can only act upon an existing
thing.

After this explanation you must recall to memory that, as has been
proved, the [so-called] evils are evils only in relation to a certain
thing, and that which is evil in reference to a certain existing thing,
either includes the non-existence of that thing or the non-existence of
some of its good conditions. The proposition has therefore been laid
down in the most general terms, “All evils are negations.” Thus for man
death is evil; death is his non-existence. Illness, poverty, and
ignorance are evils for man; all these are privations of properties. If
you examine all single cases to which this general proposition applies,
you will find that there is not one case in which the proposition is
wrong except in the opinion of those who do not make any distinction
between negative and positive properties, or between two opposites, or
do not know the nature of things,—who, e.g., do not know that health in
general denotes a certain equilibrium, and is a relative term. The
absence of that relation is illness in general, and death is the
absence of life in the case of any animal. The destruction of other
things is likewise nothing but the absence of their form.

After these propositions, it must be admitted as a fact that it cannot
be said of God that He directly creates evil, or He has the direct
intention to produce evil; this is impossible. His works are all
perfectly good. He only produces existence, and all existence is good;
whilst evils are of a negative character, and cannot be acted upon.
Evil can only be attributed to Him in the way we have mentioned. He
creates evil only in so far as He produces the corporeal element such
as it actually is; it is always connected with negatives, and is on
that account the source of all destruction and all evil. Those beings
that do not possess this corporeal element are not subject to
destruction or evil; consequently the true work of God is all good,
since it is existence. The book which enlightened the darkness of the
world says therefore, “And God saw everything that He had made, and,
behold, it was very good” (Gen. i. 31). Even the existence of this
corporeal element, low as it in reality is, because it is the source of
death and all evils, is likewise good for the permanence of the
Universe and the continuation of the order of things, so that one thing
departs and the other succeeds. Rabbi Meir therefore explains the words
“and behold it was very good” (tob me’od); that even death was good in
accordance with what we have observed in this chapter. Remember what I
said in this chapter, consider it, and you will understand all that the
prophets and our Sages remarked about the perfect goodness of all the
direct works of God. In Bereshit Rabba (chap. i.) the same idea is
expressed thus: “No evil comes down from above.”






CHAPTER XI


All the great evils which men cause to each other because of certain
intentions, desires, opinions, or religious principles, are likewise
due to non-existence, because they originate in ignorance, which is
absence of wisdom. A blind man, for example, who has no guide, stumbles
constantly, because he cannot see, and causes injury and harm to
himself and others. In the same manner various classes of men, each man
in proportion to his ignorance, bring great evils upon themselves and
upon other individual members of the species. If men possessed wisdom,
which stands in the same relation to the form of man as the sight to
the eye, they would not cause any injury to themselves or to others;
for the knowledge of truth removes hatred and quarrels, and prevents
mutual injuries. This state of society is promised to us by the prophet
in the words: “And the wolf shall dwell with the lamb,” etc.; “and the
cow and the bear shall feed together,” etc.; and “the sucking child
shall play on the hole of the asp,” etc. (Isa. xi. 6 seq.). The prophet
also points out what will be the cause of this change; for he says that
hatred, quarrel, and fighting will come to an end, because men will
then have a true knowledge of God. “They shall not hurt nor destroy in
all my holy mountain: for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of
the Lord, as the waters cover the sea” (ibid. ver. 9). Note it.






CHAPTER XII


Men frequently think that the evils in the world are more numerous than
the good things; many savings and songs of the nations dwell on this
idea. They say that a good thing is found only exceptionally, whilst
evil things are numerous and lasting. Not only common people make this
mistake, but even many who believe that they are wise. Al-Razi wrote a
well-known book On Metaphysics [or Theology]. Among other mad and
foolish things, it contains also the idea, discovered by him, that
there exists more evil than good. For if the happiness of man and his
pleasure in the times of prosperity be compared with the mishaps that
befall him,—such as grief, acute pain, defects, paralysis of the limbs,
fears, anxieties, and troubles,—it would seem as if the existence of
man is a punishment and a great evil for him. This author commenced to
verify his opinion by counting all the evils one by one; by this means
he opposed those who hold the correct view of the benefits bestowed by
God and His evident kindness, viz., that God is perfect goodness, and
that all that comes from Him is absolutely good. The origin of the
error is to be found in the circumstance that this ignorant man, and
his party among the common people, judge the whole universe by
examining one single person. For an ignorant man believes that the
whole universe only exists for him; as if nothing else required any
consideration. If, therefore, anything happens to him contrary to his
expectation, he at once concludes that the whole universe is evil. If,
however, he would take into consideration the whole universe, form an
idea of it, and comprehend what a small portion he is of the Universe,
he will find the truth. For it is clear that persons who have fallen
into this widespread error as regards the multitude of evils in the
world, do not find the evils among the angels, the spheres and stars,
the elements, and that which is formed of them, viz., minerals and
plants, or in the various species of living beings, but only in some
individual instances of mankind. They wonder that a person, who became
leprous in consequence of bad food, should be afflicted with so great
an illness and suffer such a misfortune; or that he who indulges so
much in sensuality as to weaken his sight, should be struck with
blindness! and the like. What we have, in truth, to consider is
this:—The whole mankind at present in existence, and a fortiori, every
other species of animals, form an infinitesimal portion of the
permanent universe. Comp. “Man is like to vanity” (Ps. cxliv. 4); “How
much less man, that is a worm; and the son of man, which is a worm”
(Job xxv. 6); “How much less in them who dwell in houses of clay”
(ibid. iv. 19); “Behold, the nations are as a drop of the bucket” (Isa.
xl. 15). There are many other passages in the books of the prophets
expressing the same idea. It is of great advantage that man should know
his station, and not erroneously imagine that the whole universe exists
only for him. We hold that the universe exists because the Creator
wills it so; that mankind is low in rank as compared with the uppermost
portion of the universe, viz., with the spheres and the stars; but, as
regards the angels, there cannot be any real comparison between man and
angels, although man is the highest of all beings on earth; i.e., of
all beings formed of the four elements. Man’s existence is nevertheless
a great boon to him, and his distinction and perfection is a divine
gift. The numerous evils to which individual persons are exposed are
due to the defects existing in the persons themselves. We complain and
seek relief from our own faults; we suffer from the evils which we, by
our own free will, inflict on ourselves and ascribe them to God, who is
far from being connected with them! Comp. “Is destruction his [work]?
No. Ye [who call yourselves] wrongly his sons, you who are a perverse
and crooked generation” (Deut. xxxii. 5). This is explained by Solomon,
who says, “The foolishness of man perverteth his way, and his heart
fretteth against the Lord” (Prov. xix. 3).

I explain this theory in the following manner. The evils that befall
man are of three kinds:—

(1) The first kind of evil is that which is caused to man by the
circumstance that he is subject to genesis and destruction, or that he
possesses a body. It is on account of the body that some persons happen
to have great deformities or paralysis of some of the organs. This evil
may be part of the natural constitution of these persons, or may have
developed subsequently in consequence of changes in the elements, e.g.,
through bad air, or thunderstorms, or landslips. We have already shown
that, in accordance with the divine wisdom, genesis can only take place
through destruction, and without the destruction of the individual
members of the species the species themselves would not exist
permanently. Thus the true kindness, and beneficence, and goodness of
God is clear. He who thinks that he can have flesh and bones without
being subject to any external influence, or any of the accidents of
matter, unconsciously wishes to reconcile two opposites, viz., to be at
the same time subject and not subject to change. If man were never
subject to change there could be no generation; there would be one
single being, but no individuals forming a species. Galen, in the third
section of his book, The Use of the Limbs, says correctly that it would
be in vain to expect to see living beings formed of the blood of
menstruous women and the semen virile, who will not die, will never
feel pain, or will move perpetually, or will shine like the sun. This
dictum of Galen is part of the following more general
proposition:—Whatever is formed of any matter receives the most perfect
form possible in that species of matter; in each individual case the
defects are in accordance with the defects of that individual matter.
The best and most perfect being that can be formed of the blood and the
semen is the species of man, for as far as man’s nature is known, he is
living, reasonable, and mortal. It is therefore impossible that man
should be free from this species of evil. You will, nevertheless, find
that the evils of the above kind which befall man are very few and
rare; for you find countries that have not been flooded or burned for
thousands of years; there are thousands of men in perfect health,
deformed individuals are a strange and exceptional occurrence, or say
few in number if you object to the term exceptional,—they are not
one-hundredth, not even one-thousandth part of those that are perfectly
normal.

(2) The second class of evils comprises such evils as people cause to
each other, when, e.g., some of them use their strength against others.
These evils are more numerous than those of the first kind; their
causes are numerous and known; they likewise originate in ourselves,
though the sufferer himself cannot avert them. This kind of evil is
nevertheless not widespread in any country of the whole world. It is of
rare occurrence that a man plans to kill his neighbour or to rob him of
his property by night. Many persons are, however, afflicted with this
kind of evil in great wars; but these are not frequent, if the whole
inhabited part of the earth is taken into consideration.

(3) The third class of evils comprises those which every one causes to
himself by his own action. This is the largest class, and is far more
numerous than the second class. It is especially of these evils that
all men complain,—only few men are found that do not sin against
themselves by this kind of evil. Those that are afflicted with it are
therefore justly blamed in the words of the prophet, “This hath been by
your means” (Mal. i. 9); the same is expressed in the following
passage, “He that doeth it destroyeth his own soul” (Prov. vi. 32). In
reference to this kind of evil, Solomon says, “The foolishness of man
perverteth his way” (ibid. xix. 3). In the following passage he
explains also that this kind of evil is man’s own work, “Lo, this only
have I found, that God hath made man upright, but they have thought out
many inventions” (Eccles. vii. 29), and these inventions bring the
evils upon him. The same subject is referred to in Job (v. 6), “For
affliction cometh not forth of the dust, neither doth trouble spring
out of the ground.” These words are immediately followed by the
explanation that man himself is the author of this class of evils, “But
man is born unto trouble.” This class of evils originates in man’s
vices, such as excessive desire for eating, drinking, and love;
indulgence in these things in undue measure, or in improper manner, or
partaking of bad food. This course brings diseases and afflictions upon
body and soul alike. The sufferings of the body in consequence of these
evils are well known; those of the soul are twofold:—First, such evils
of the soul as are the necessary consequence of changes in the body, in
so far as the soul is a force residing in the body; it has therefore
been said that the properties of the soul depend on the condition of
the body. Secondly, the soul, when accustomed to superfluous things,
acquires a strong habit of desiring things which are neither necessary
for the preservation of the individual nor for that of the species.
This desire is without a limit, whilst things which are necessary are
few in number and restricted within certain limits; but what is
superfluous is without end—e.g., you desire to have your vessels of
silver, but golden vessels are still better: others have even vessels
of sapphire, or perhaps they can be made of emerald or rubies, or any
other substance that could be suggested. Those who are ignorant and
perverse in their thought are constantly in trouble and pain, because
they cannot get as much of superfluous things as a certain other person
possesses. They as a rule expose themselves to great dangers, e.g., by
sea-voyage, or service of kings, and all this for the purpose of
obtaining that which is superfluous and not necessary. When they thus
meet with the consequences of the course which they adopt, they
complain of the decrees and judgments of God; they begin to blame the
time, and wonder at the want of justice in its changes; that it has not
enabled them to acquire great riches, with which they could buy large
quantities of wine for the purpose of making themselves drunk, and
numerous concubines adorned with various kind of ornaments of gold,
embroidery, and jewels, for the purpose of driving themselves to
voluptuousness beyond their capacities, as if the whole Universe
existed exclusively for the purpose of giving pleasure to these low
people. The error of the ignorant goes so far as to say that God’s
power is insufficient, because He has given to this Universe the
properties which they imagine cause these great evils, and which do not
help all evil-disposed persons to obtain the evil which they seek, and
to bring their evil souls to the aim of their desires, though these, as
we have shown, are really without limit. The virtuous and wise,
however, see and comprehend the wisdom of God displayed in the
Universe. Thus David says, “All the paths of the Lord are mercy and
truth unto such as keep His covenant and His testimonies” (Ps. xxv.
10). For those who observe the nature of the Universe and the
commandments of the Law, and know their purpose, see clearly God’s
mercy and truth in everything; they seek, therefore, that which the
Creator intended to be the aim of man, viz., comprehension. Forced by
the claims of the body, they seek also that which is necessary for the
preservation of the body, “bread to eat and garment to clothe,” and
this is very little; but they seek nothing superfluous; with very
slight exertion man can obtain it, so long as he is contented with that
which is indispensable. All the difficulties and troubles we meet in
this respect are due to the desire for superfluous things; when we seek
unnecessary things, we have difficulty even in finding that which is
indispensable. For the more we desire to have that which is
superfluous, the more we meet with difficulties; our strength and
possessions are spent in unnecessary things, and are wanting when
required for that which is necessary. Observe how Nature proves the
correctness of this assertion. The more necessary a thing is for living
beings, the more easily it is found and the cheaper it is; the less
necessary it is, the rarer and dearer it is. E.g., air, water, and food
are indispensable to man: air is most necessary, for if man is without
air a short time he dies; whilst he can be without water a day or two.
Air is also undoubtedly found more easily and cheaper [than water].
Water is more necessary than food; for some people can be four or five
days without food, provided they have water; water also exists in every
country in larger quantities than food, and is also cheaper. The same
proportion can be noticed in the different kinds of food; that which is
more necessary in a certain place exists there in larger quantities and
is cheaper than that which is less necessary. No intelligent person, I
think, considers musk, amber, rubies, and emerald as very necessary for
man except as medicines; and they, as well as other like substances,
can be replaced for this purpose by herbs and minerals. This shows the
kindness of God to His creatures, even to us weak beings. His
righteousness and justice as regards all animals are well known; for in
the transient world there is among the various kinds of animals no
individual being distinguished from the rest of the same species by a
peculiar property or an additional limb. On the contrary, all physical,
psychical, and vital forces and organs that are possessed by one
individual are found also in the other individuals. If any one is
somehow different it is by accident, in consequence of some exception,
and not by a natural property; it is also a rare occurrence. There is
no difference between individuals of a species in the due course of
Nature; the difference originates in the various dispositions of their
substances. This is the necessary consequence of the nature of the
substance of that species; the nature of the species is not more
favourable to one individual than to the other. It is no wrong or
injustice that one has many bags of finest myrrh and garments
embroidered with gold, while another has not those things, which are
not necessary for our maintenance; he who has them has not thereby
obtained control over anything that could be an essential addition to
his nature, but has only obtained something illusory or deceptive. The
other, who does not possess that which is not wanted for his
maintenance, does not miss anything indispensable: “He that gathered
much had nothing over, and he that gathered little had no lack: they
gathered every man according to his eating” (Exod. xvi. 18). This is
the rule at all times and in all places; no notice should be taken of
exceptional cases, as we have explained.

In these two ways you will see the mercy of God toward His creatures,
how He has provided that which is required, in proper proportions, and
treated all individual beings of the same species with perfect
equality. In accordance with this correct reflection the chief of the
wise men says, “All his ways are judgment” (Deut. xxxii. 4); David
likewise says: “All the paths of the Lord are mercy and truth” (Ps.
xxv. 10); he also says expressly, “The Lord is good to all; and his
tender mercies are over all his works” (ibid. cxlv. 9); for it is an
act of great and perfect goodness that He gave us existence; and the
creation of the controlling faculty in animals is a proof of His mercy
towards them, as has been shown by us.






CHAPTER XIII


Intelligent persons are much perplexed when they inquire into the
purpose of the Creation. I will now show how absurd this question is,
according to each one of the different theories [above-mentioned]. An
agent that acts with intention must have a certain ulterior object in
that which he performs. This is evident, and no philosophical proof is
required. It is likewise evident that that which is produced with
intention has passed over from non-existence to existence. It is
further evident, and generally agreed upon, that the being which has
absolute existence, which has never been and will never be without
existence, is not in need of an agent. We have explained this before.
The question, “What is the purpose thereof?” cannot be asked about
anything which is not the product of an agent; therefore we cannot ask
what is the purpose of the existence of God. He has not been created.
According to these propositions it is clear that the purpose is sought
for everything produced intentionally by an intelligent cause; that is
to say, a final cause must exist for everything that owes its existence
to an intelligent being: but for that which is without a beginning, a
final cause need not be sought, as has been stated by us. After this
explanation you will understand that there is no occasion to seek the
final cause of the whole Universe, neither according to our theory of
the Creation, nor according to the theory of Aristotle, who assumes the
Eternity of the Universe. For according to Aristotle, who holds that
the Universe has not had a beginning, an ultimate final cause cannot be
sought even for the various parts of the Universe. Thus it cannot be
asked, according to his opinion, What is the final cause of the
existence of the heavens? Why are they limited by this measure or by
that number? Why is matter of this description? What is the purpose of
the existence of this species of animals or plants? Aristotle considers
all this as the result of a permanent order of things. Natural
Philosophy investigates into the object of everything in Nature, but it
does not treat of the ultimate final cause, of which we speak in this
chapter. It is a recognized fact in Natural Philosophy that everything
in Nature has its object, or its final cause, which is the most
important of the four causes, though it is not easily recognized in
most species. Aristotle repeatedly says that Nature produces nothing in
vain, for every natural action has a certain object. Thus, Aristotle
says that plants exist for animals; and similarly he shows of other
parts of the Universe for what purpose they exist. This is still more
obvious in the case of the organs of animals. The existence of such a
final cause in the various parts of Nature has compelled philosophers
to assume the existence of a primal cause apart from Nature; it is
called by Aristotle the intellectual or divine cause, and this cause
creates one thing for the purpose of another. Those who acknowledge the
truth will accept as the best proof for the Creation the fact that
everything in Nature serves a certain purpose, so that one thing exists
for the benefit of another; this fact is supported by numerous
instances, and shows that there is design in Nature; but the existence
of design in Nature cannot be imagined unless it be assumed that Nature
has been produced.

I will now return to the subject of this chapter, viz., the final
cause. Aristotle has already explained that in Nature the efficient
cause of a thing, its form, and its final cause are identical; that is
to say, they are one thing in relation to the whole species. E.g., the
form of Zeid produces the form of his son Amr; its action consists in
imparting the form of the whole species [of man] to the substance of
Amr, and the final cause is Amr’s possession of human form. The same
argument is applied by Aristotle to every individual member of a class
of natural objects which is brought to existence by another individual
member. The three causes coincide in all such cases. All this refers
only to the immediate purpose of a thing; but the existence of an
ultimate purpose in every species, which is considered as absolutely
necessary by every one who investigates into the nature of things, is
very difficult to discover: and still more difficult is it to find the
purpose of the whole Universe. I infer from the words of Aristotle that
according to his opinion the ultimate purpose of the genera is the
preservation of the course of genesis and destruction; and this course
is absolutely necessary [in the first instance] for the successive
formation of material objects, because individual beings formed of
matter are not permanent; [secondly], for the production of the best
and the most perfect beings that can be formed of matter, because the
ultimate purpose [in these productions] is to arrive at perfection. Now
it is clear that man is the most perfect being formed of matter; he is
the last and most perfect of earthly beings, and in this respect it can
truly be said that all earthly things exist for man, i.e., that the
changes which things undergo serve to produce the most perfect being
that can be produced. Aristotle, who assumes the Eternity of the
Universe, need therefore not ask to what purpose does man exist, for
the immediate purpose of each individual being is, according to his
opinion, the perfection of its specific form. Every individual thing
arrives at its perfection fully and completely when the actions that
produce its form are complete. The ultimate purpose of the species is
the perpetuation of this form by the repeated succession of genesis and
destruction, so that there might always be a being capable of the
greatest possible perfection. It seems therefore clear that, according
to Aristotle, who assumes the Eternity of the Universe, there is no
occasion for the question what is the object of the existence of the
Universe. But of those who accept our theory that the whole Universe
has been created from nothing, some hold that the inquiry after the
purpose of the Creation is necessary, and assume that the Universe was
only created for the sake of man’s existence, that he might serve God.
Everything that is done they believe is done for man’s sake; even the
spheres move only for his benefit, in order that his wants might be
supplied. The literal meaning of some passages in the books of the
prophets greatly support this idea. Comp. “He formed it (viz., the
earth) to be inhabited” (Isa. xlv. 18); “If my covenant of day and
night were not,” etc. (Jer. xxxiii. 25); “And spreadeth them out as a
tent to dwell in” (Isa. xl. 22). If the sphere existed for the sake of
man, how much more must this be the case with all other living beings
and the plants. On examining this opinion as intelligent persons ought
to examine all different opinions, we shall discover the errors it
includes. Those who hold this view, namely, that the existence of man
is the object of the whole creation, may be asked whether God could
have created man without those previous creations, or whether man could
only have come into existence after the creation of all other things.
If they answer in the affirmative, that man could have been created
even if, e.g., the heavens did not exist, they will be asked what is
the object of all these things, since they do not exist for their own
sake but for the sake of something that could exist without them? Even
if the Universe existed for man’s sake and man existed for the purpose
of serving God, as has been mentioned, the question remains, What is
the end of serving God? He does not become more perfect if all His
creatures serve Him and comprehend Him as far as possible; nor would He
lose anything if nothing existed beside Him. It might perhaps be
replied that the service of God is not intended for God’s perfection;
it is intended for our own perfection,—it is good for us, it makes us
perfect. But then the question might be repeated, What is the object of
our being perfect? We must in continuing the inquiry as to the purpose
of the creation at last arrive at the answer, It was the Will of God,
or His Wisdom decreed it; and this is the correct answer. The wise men
in Israel have, therefore, introduced in our prayers (for Neʻilah of
the Day of Atonement) the following passage:—“Thou hast distinguished
man from the beginning, and chosen him to stand before Thee; who can
say unto Thee, What dost Thou? And if he be righteous, what does he
give Thee?” They have thus clearly stated that it was not a final cause
that determined the existence of all things, but only His will. This
being the case, we who believe in the Creation must admit that God
could have created the Universe in a different manner as regards the
causes and effects contained in it, and this would lead to the absurd
conclusion that everything except man existed without any purpose, as
the principal object, man, could have been brought into existence
without the rest of the creation. I consider therefore the following
opinion as most correct according to the teaching of the Bible, and
best in accordance with the results of philosophy; namely, that the
Universe does not exist for man’s sake, but that each being exists for
its own sake, and not because of some other thing. Thus we believe in
the Creation, and yet need not inquire what purpose is served by each
species of the existing things, because we assume that God created all
parts of the Universe by His will; some for their own sake, and some
for the sake of other beings, that include their own purpose in
themselves. In the same manner as it was the will of God that man
should exist, so it was His will that the heavens with their stars
should exist, that there should be angels, and each of these beings is
itself the purpose of its own existence. When anything can only exist
provided some other thing has previously existed, God has caused the
latter to precede it; as, e.g., sensation precedes comprehension. We
meet also with this view in Scripture: “The Lord hath made everything
(la-maʻanehu) for its purpose” (Prov. xvi. 4). It is possible that the
pronoun in la-maanehu refers to the object; but it can also be
considered as agreeing with the subject; in which case the meaning of
the word is, for the sake of Himself, or His will which is identical
with His self [or essence], as has been shown in this treatise. We have
also pointed out that His essence is also called His glory. The words,
“The Lord hath made everything for Himself,” express therefore the same
idea as the following verse, “Everything that is called by my name: I
have created it for my glory, I have formed it; yea, I have made it”
(Isa. xliii. 7); that is to say, everything that is described as My
work has been made by Me for the sake of My will and for no other
purpose. The words, “I have formed it,” “I have made it,” express
exactly what I pointed out to you, that there are things whose
existence is only possible after certain other things have come into
existence. To these reference is made in the text, as if to say, I have
formed the first thing which must have preceded the other things, e.g.,
matter has been formed before the production of material beings; I have
then made out of that previous creation, or after it, what I intended
to produce, and there was nothing but My will. Study the book which
leads all who want to be led to the truth, and is therefore called
Torah (Law or Instruction), from the beginning of the account of the
Creation to its end, and you will comprehend the opinion which we
attempt to expound. For no part of the creation is described as being
in existence for the sake of another part, but each part is declared to
be the product of God’s will, and to satisfy by its existence the
intention [of the Creator]. This is expressed by the phrase, “And God
saw that it was good” (Gen. i. 4, etc.). You know our interpretation of
the saying of our Sages, “Scripture speaks the same language as is
spoken by man.” But we call “good” that which is in accordance with the
object we seek. When therefore Scripture relates in reference to the
whole creation (Gen. i. 31), “And God saw all that He had made, and
behold it was exceedingly good,” it declares thereby that everything
created was well fitted for its object, and would never cease to act,
and never be annihilated. This is especially pointed out by the word
“exceedingly”; for sometimes a thing is temporarily good; it serves its
purpose, and then it fails and ceases to act. But as regards the
Creation it is said that everything was fit for its purpose, and able
continually to act accordingly. You must not be misled by what is
stated of the stars [that God put them in the firmament of the heavens]
to give light upon the earth, and to rule by day and by night. You
might perhaps think that here the purpose of their creation is
described. This is not the case; we are only informed of the nature of
the stars, which God desired to create with such properties that they
should be able to give light and to rule. In a similar manner we must
understand the passage, “And have dominion over the fish of the sea”
(ibid. i. 28). Here it is not meant to say that man was created for
this purpose, but only that this was the nature which God gave man. But
as to the statement in Scripture that God gave the plants to man and
other living beings, it agrees with the opinion of Aristotle and other
philosophers. It is also reasonable to assume that the plants exist
only for the benefit of the animals, since the latter cannot live
without food. It is different with the stars, they do not exist only
for our sake, that we should enjoy their good influence; for the
expressions “to give light” and “to rule” merely describe, as we have
stated above, the benefit which the creatures on earth derive from
them. I have already explained to you the character of that influence
that causes continually the good to descend from one being to another.
To those who receive the good flowing down upon them, it may appear as
if the being existed for them alone that sends forth its goodness and
kindness unto them. Thus some citizen may imagine that it was for the
purpose of protecting his house by night from thieves that the king was
chosen. To some extent this is correct; for when his house is
protected, and he has derived this benefit through the king whom the
country had chosen, it appears as if it were the object of the king to
protect the house of that man. In this manner we must explain every
verse, the literal meaning of which would imply that something superior
was created for the sake of something inferior, viz., that it is part
of the nature of the superior thing [to influence the inferior in a
certain manner]. We remain firm in our belief that the whole Universe
was created in accordance with the will of God, and we do not inquire
for any other cause or object. Just as we do not ask what is the
purpose of God’s existence, so we do not ask what was the object of His
will, which is the cause of the existence of all things with their
present properties, both those that have been created and those that
will be created.

You must not be mistaken and think that the spheres and the angels were
created for our sake. Our position has already been pointed out to us,
“Behold, the nations are as a drop of a bucket” (Isa. xl. 15). Now
compare your own essence with that of the spheres, the stars, and the
Intelligences, and you will comprehend the truth, and understand that
man is superior to everything formed of earthly matter, but not to
other beings; he is found exceedingly inferior when his existence is
compared with that of the spheres, and a fortiori when compared with
that of the Intelligences. Comp. “Behold, he putteth no trust in his
servants: and his messengers he charged with folly: how much less in
them that dwell in houses of clay, whose foundation is in the dust,
which are crushed before the moth?” (Job iv. 18, 19). The expression
“his servants,” occurring in this passage, does not denote human
beings; this may be inferred from the words, “How much less in them
that dwell in houses of clay?” The “servants” referred to in this place
are the angels; whilst by the term “his messengers” the spheres are
undoubtedly meant. Eliphas himself, who uttered the above words,
explains this [in the second speech] when he refers to it in one of his
replies in other words, saying, “Behold, he putteth no trust in his
holy ones; yea, the heavens are not clean in his sight, how much more
abominable and filthy is man, who drinketh iniquity like water” (ibid.
xv. 15, 16). He thus shows that “his servants” and “his holy ones” are
identical, and that they are not human beings; also that “his
messengers,” mentioned in the first passage, are the same as “the
heavens.” The term “folly” is explained by the phrase “they are not
clean in his sight,” i.e., they are material; although their substance
is the purest and the most luminous, compared with the Intelligences it
appears dark, turbid, and impure. The phrase, “Behold, he putteth no
trust in his servants,” is employed in reference to the angels,
indicating that these do not possess perpetual existence, since, as we
believe, they have had a beginning; and even according to those who
assume the Eternity of the Universe, the existence of the angels is at
all events dependent on and therefore inferior to, the absolute
existence of God. The words, “How much more abominable and filthy is
man,” in the one passage, correspond to the phrase “How much less in
those who dwell in houses of clay” in the other passage. Their meaning
is this: How much less in man who is abominable and filthy, in whose
person crookedness or corporeality is mixed up and spread through all
his parts. “Iniquity” (ʻavlah) is identical with “crookedness,” as may
be inferred from the passage, “In the land of uprightness he will act
with iniquity” (Isa. xxvi. 10), and ish, “man,” is here used in the
same sense as adam, “human being”; for “man” in a general sense is
sometimes expressed in Scripture by ish. Comp. “He who smiteth a man
(ish) and he die” (Exod. xxi. 12).

This must be our belief when we have a correct knowledge of our own
self, and comprehend the true nature of everything; we must be content,
and not trouble our mind with seeking a certain final cause for things
that have none, or have no other final cause but their own existence,
which depends on the Will of God, or, if you prefer, on the Divine
Wisdom.






CHAPTER XIV


In order to obtain a correct estimate of ourselves, we must reflect on
the results of the investigations which have been made into the
dimensions and the distances of the spheres and the stars. The
distances are clearly stated in radii of the earth, and are well known,
since the circumference and the radius of the earth are known. It has
been proved that the distance between the centre of the earth and the
outer surface of the sphere of Saturn is a journey of nearly eight
thousand seven hundred solar years. Suppose a day’s journey to be forty
legal miles of two thousand ordinary cubits, and consider the great and
enormous distance! or in the words of Scripture, “Is not God in the
height of heaven? and behold the height of the stars, how high they
are!” (Job xxii. 12); that is to say, learn from the height of the
heavens how far we are from comprehending God, for there is an enormous
distance between ourselves and these corporeal objects, and the latter
are greatly distinguished from us by their position, and hidden from us
as regards their essence and most of their actions. How much more
incomprehensible therefore is their Maker, who is incorporeal! The
great distance which has been proved is, in fact, the least that can be
assumed. The distance between the centre of the earth and the surface
of the sphere of the fixed stars can by no means be less, but it may
possibly be many times as great; for the measure of the thickness of
the body of the spheres has not been proved, and the least possible has
been assumed, as appears from the treatises On the Distances. The same
is the case with the substances which are between every two spheres.
According to logical inference, as has been mentioned by Thabit, the
thickness of these substances cannot be accurately stated, since they
do not contain any star, which might serve as a means of obtaining it.
As to the thickness of the sphere of the fixed stars, it is at least
four years’ journey, as may be inferred from the measure of the stars
contained in the sphere. The body of each of these stars is more than
ninety times as big as the globe of the earth, and it is possible that
the thickness of the sphere is still greater. Of the ninth sphere, that
causes the daily revolution of the whole system of spheres, we do not
know the dimensions; it contains no stars, and therefore we have no
means of finding out its magnitude. Now consider the enormous
dimensions and the large number of these material beings. If the whole
earth is infinitely small in comparison with the sphere of the stars,
what is man compared with all these created beings! How, then, could
any one of us imagine that these things exist for his sake and benefit,
and that they are his tools! This is the result of an examination of
the corporeal beings: how much more so will this be the result of an
examination into the nature of the Intelligences!

The following question may be asked against the opinion of philosophers
on this subject: There is no doubt that from a philosophical point of
view it would be a mistake to assume that the spheres exist for the
purpose of regulating the fate of one individual person or community;
but it is not absurd to think that they serve to regulate the affairs
of mankind, since these mighty individual beings would serve to give
existence to the individual members of the species, the number of
which, according to the philosophers, will never come to an end. We can
best illustrate this by the following simile: An artisan makes iron
tools of a hundred-weight for the purpose of making a small needle of
the weight of a grain. If only one needle had to be produced, we admit
that it would certainly be bad management, though it would not be
entirely a failure; but if with those enormous tools needle after
needle is produced, even many hundred-weights of needles, the
preparation of those tools would be a wise act and excellent
management. In a similar manner the object of the spheres may be the
continuance of successive genesis and destruction; and the succession
of genesis and destruction serves, as has already been said, to give
existence to mankind. This idea is supported by Biblical texts and
sayings [of our Sages]. The philosopher replies thus: If the difference
between the heavenly bodies and the transient individual members of the
species consisted in their different sizes, this opinion could be
maintained; but as the difference consists in their essence, it remains
improbable that the superior beings should be the means of giving
existence to the lower ones. In short, this question supports our
belief in the Creation; and this is the principal object of this
chapter. [It serves] besides [a second purpose]. I frequently hear from
those who know something about astronomy, that our Sages exaggerated
the distances [of the heavenly bodies] when they said that the
thickness of each sphere is five hundred years’ journey; the distance
of the seven spheres from each other five hundred years’ journey, so
that the distance of the outer surface of the seventh sphere from the
centre of the earth is seven thousand years’ journey. Those who hear
such statements consider them [at first thought] as exaggeration, and
believe that the distance is not so great. But you may ascertain from
the data proved in scientific treatises on the distances, that the
centre of the earth is distant from the inner surface of the seventh
sphere, that of Saturn, nearly seven thousand and twenty-four years’
journey. The number eight thousand and seven hundred given by us,
refers to the distance of the centre of the earth from the inner
surface of the eighth sphere. The distance of the spheres from each
other, mentioned by astronomers, is identical with the thickness of the
substance that intervenes between one sphere and the other, and does
not imply that there is a vacuum. You must, however, not expect that
everything our Sages say respecting astronomical matters should agree
with observation, for mathematics were not fully developed in those
days; and their statements were not based on the authority of the
Prophets, but on the knowledge which they either themselves possessed
or derived from contemporary men of science. But I will not on that
account denounce what they say correctly in accordance with real fact,
as untrue or accidentally true. On the contrary, whenever the words of
a person can be interpreted in such a manner that they agree with fully
established facts, it is the duty of every educated and honest man to
do so.






CHAPTER XV


That which is impossible has a permanent and constant property, which
is not the result of some agent, and cannot in any way change, and
consequently we do not ascribe to God the power of doing what is
impossible. No thinking man denies the truth of this maxim; none ignore
it, but such as have no idea of Logic. There is, however, a difference
of opinion among philosophers with reference to the existence of any
particular thing. Some of them consider its existence to be impossible,
and hold that God cannot produce the thing in question, whilst others
think that it is possible, and that God can create it if He pleases to
do so. E.g., all philosophers consider that it is impossible for one
substratum to have at the same moment two opposite properties, or for
the elementary components of a thing, substance and accident, to
interchange, so that the substance becomes accident, and the accident
becomes substance, or for a material substance to be without accident.
Likewise it is impossible that God should produce a being like Himself,
or annihilate, corporify, or change Himself. The power of God is not
assumed to extend to any of these impossibilities. But the existence of
accidents independent of substance is possible according to one class
of philosophers, the Mutazilah, whilst according to others it is
impossible; it must, however, be added that those who admit the
existence of an accident independent of substance, have not arrived at
this conclusion by philosophical research alone; but it was mainly by
the desire to defend certain religious principles, which speculation
had greatly shaken, that they had recourse to this theory. In a similar
manner the creation of corporeal things, otherwise than from a
substance, is possible according to our view, whilst the philosophers
say that it is impossible. Again, whilst philosophers say that it is
impossible to produce a square with a diagonal equal to one of the
sides, or a solid angle that includes four right angles, or similar
things, it is thought possible by some persons who are ignorant of
mathematics, and who only know the words of these propositions, but
have no idea of that which is expressed by them. I wonder whether this
gate of research is open, so that all may freely enter, and whilst one
imagines a thing and considers it possible, another is at liberty to
assert that such a thing is impossible by its very nature; or whether
the gate is closed and guarded by certain rules, so that we are able to
decide with certainty whether a thing is physically impossible. I
should also like to know, in the latter case, whether imagination or
reason has to examine and test objects as to their being possible or
not; likewise how things imagined, and things conceived intellectually,
are to be distinguished from each other. For it occurs that we consider
a thing as physically possible, and then some one objects, or we
ourselves fear that our opinion is only the result of imagination, and
not that of reason. In such a case it would be desirable to ascertain
whether there exists some faculty to distinguish between imagination
and intellect, [and if so,] whether this faculty is different from
both, or whether it is part of the intellect itself to distinguish
between intellectual and imaginary objects. All this requires
investigation, but it does not belong to the theme of this chapter.

We have thus shown that according to each one of the different theories
there are things which are impossible, whose existence cannot be
admitted, and whose creation is excluded from the power of God, and the
assumption that God does not change their nature does not imply
weakness in God, or a limit to His power. Consequently things
impossible remain impossible, and do not depend on the action of an
agent. It is now clear that a difference of opinion exists only as to
the question to which of the two classes a thing belongs; whether to
the class of the impossible, or to that of the possible. Note it.






CHAPTER XVI


The philosophers have uttered very perverse ideas as regards God’s
Omniscience of everything beside Himself; they have stumbled in such a
manner that they cannot rise again, nor can those who adopt their
views. I will further on tell you the doubts that led them to these
perverse utterances on this question; and I will also tell you the
opinion which is taught by our religion, and which differs from the
evil and wrong principles of the philosophers as regards God’s
Omniscience.

The principal reason that first induced the philosophers to adopt their
theory is this: at first thought we notice an absence of system in
human affairs. Some pious men live a miserable and painful life, whilst
some wicked people enjoy a happy and pleasant life. On this account the
philosophers assumed as possible the cases which you will now hear.
They said that only one of two things is possible, either God is
ignorant of the individual or particular things on earth, and does not
perceive them, or He perceives and knows them. These are all the cases
possible. They then continued thus: If He perceives and knows all
individual things, one of the following three cases must take place:
(1) God arranges and manages human affairs well, perfectly and
faultlessly; (2) He is overcome by obstacles, and is too weak and
powerless to manage human affairs; (3) He knows [all things] and can
arrange and manage them, but leaves and abandons them, as too base,
low, and vile, or from jealousy; as we may also notice among ourselves
some who are able to make another person happy, well knowing what he
wants for his happiness, and still in consequence of their evil
disposition, their wickedness and jealousy against him, they do not
help him to his happiness.—This is likewise a complete enumeration of
all possible cases. For those who have a knowledge of a certain thing
necessarily either (1) take care of the thing which they know, and
manage it, or (2) neglect it (as we, e.g., neglect and forget the cats
in our house, or things of less importance); or (3) while taking care
of it, have not sufficient power and strength for its management,
although they have the will to do so. Having enumerated these different
cases, the philosophers emphatically decided that of the three cases
possible [as regards the management of a thing by one who knows that
thing], two are inadmissible in reference to God—viz., want of power,
or absence of will; because they imply either evil disposition or
weakness, neither of which can by any means be attributed to Him.
Consequently there remains only the alternative that God is altogether
ignorant of human affairs, or that He knows them and manages them well.
Since we, however, notice that events do not follow a certain order,
that they cannot be determined by analogy, and are not in accordance
with what is wanted, we conclude that God has no knowledge of them in
any way or for any reason. This is the argument which led the
philosophers to speak such blasphemous words. In the treatise On
Providence, by Alexander Aphrodisiensis, you will find the same as I
have said about the different views of the philosophers, and as I have
stated as to the source of their error.

You must notice with surprise that the evil into which these
philosophers have fallen is greater than that from which they sought to
escape, and that they ignore the very thing which they constantly
pointed out and explained to us. They have fallen into a greater evil
than that from which they sought to escape, because they refuse to say
that God neglects or forgets a thing, and yet they maintain that His
knowledge is imperfect, that He is ignorant of what is going on here on
earth, that He does not perceive it. They also ignore, what they
constantly point out to us, in as much as they judge the whole universe
by that which befalls individual men, although, according to their own
view, frequently stated and explained, the evils of man originate in
himself, or form part of his material nature. We have already discussed
this sufficiently. After having laid this foundation, which is the ruin
of all good principles, and destroys the majesty of all true knowledge,
they sought to remove the opprobrium by declaring that for many reasons
it is impossible that God should have a knowledge of earthly things,
for the individual members of a species can only be perceived by the
senses, and not by reason; but God does not perceive by means of any of
the senses. Again, the individuals are infinite, but knowledge
comprehends and circumscribes the object of its action, and the
infinite cannot be comprehended or circumscribed; furthermore,
knowledge of individual beings, that are subject to change,
necessitates some change in him who possesses it, because this
knowledge itself changes constantly. They have also raised the
following two objections against those who hold, in accordance with the
teaching of Scripture, that God knows things before they come into
existence. First, this theory implies that there can be knowledge of a
thing that does not exist at all; secondly, it leads to the conclusion
that the knowledge of an object in potentia is identical with the
knowledge of that same object in reality. They have indeed come to very
evil conclusions, and some of them assumed that God only knows the
species, not the individual beings, whilst others went as far as to
contend that God knows nothing beside Himself, because they believe
that God cannot have more than one knowledge.

Some of the great philosophers who lived before Aristotle agree with
us, that God knows everything, and that nothing is hidden from Him.
Alexander also refers to them in the above-mentioned treatise; he
differs from them, and says that the principal objection against this
theory is based on the fact that we clearly see evils befalling good
men, and wicked men enjoying happiness.

In short, you see that if these philosophers would find human affairs
managed according to rules laid down by the common people, they would
not venture or presume to speak on this subject. They are only led to
this speculation because they examine the affairs of the good and the
wicked, and consider them as being contrary to all rule, and say in the
words of the foolish in our nation, “The way of the Lord is not right”
(Ezek. xxxiii. 17).

After having shown that knowledge and Providence are connected with
each other, I will now proceed to expound the opinions of thinkers on
Providence, and then I shall attempt to remove their doubts as to God’s
knowledge of individual beings.






CHAPTER XVII


There are four different theories concerning Divine Providence; they
are all ancient, known since the time of the Prophets, when the true
Law was revealed to enlighten these dark regions.

First Theory.—There is no Providence at all for anything in the
Universe; all parts of the Universe, the heavens and what they contain,
owe their origin to accident and chance; there exists no being that
rules and governs them or provides for them. This is the theory of
Epicurus, who assumes also that the Universe consists of atoms, that
these have combined by chance, and have received their various forms by
mere accident. There have been atheists among the Israelites who have
expressed the same view; it is reported of them: “They have denied the
Lord, and said he is not” (Jer. v. 12). Aristotle has proved the
absurdity of the theory, that the whole Universe could have originated
by chance; he has shown that, on the contrary, there is a being that
rules and governs the Universe. We have already touched upon this
subject in the present treatise.

Second Theory.—Whilst one part of the Universe owes its existence to
Providence, and is under the control of a ruler and governor, another
part is abandoned and left to chance. This is the view of Aristotle
about Providence, and I will now explain to you his theory. He holds
that God controls the spheres and what they contain: therefore the
individual beings in the spheres remain permanently in the same form.
Alexander has also expressed it in his writings that Divine Providence
extends down to, and ends with, the sphere of the moon. This view
results from his theory of the Eternity of the Universe; he believes
that Providence is in accordance with the nature of the Universe:
consequently in the case of the spheres with their contents, where each
individual being has a permanent existence, Providence gives permanency
and constancy. From the existence of the spheres other beings derive
existence, which are constant in their species but not in their
individuals: in the same manner it is said that Providence sends forth
[from the spheres to the earth] sufficient influence to secure the
immortality and constancy of the species, without securing at the same
time permanence for the individual beings of the species. But the
individual beings in each species have not been entirely abandoned,
that portion of the materia prima which has been purified and refined,
and has received the faculty of growth, is endowed with properties that
enable it to exist a certain time, to attract what is useful and to
repel what is useless. That portion of the materia prima which has been
subject to a further development, and has received the faculty of
sensation, is endowed with other properties for its protection and
preservation; it has a new faculty of moving freely toward that which
is conducive to, and away from that which is contrary to its
well-being. Each individual being received besides such properties as
are required for the preservation of the species to which it belongs.
The portion of the materia prima which is still more refined, and is
endowed with the intellectual faculty, possesses a special property by
which each individual, according to the degree of his perfection, is
enabled to manage, to calculate, and to discover what is conducive both
to the temporary existence of the individual and to the preservation of
the species. All other movements, however, which are made by the
individual members of each species are due to accident; they are not,
according to Aristotle, the result of rule and management; e.g., when a
storm or gale blows, it causes undoubtedly some leaves of a tree to
drop, breaks off some branches of another tree, tears away a stone from
a heap of stones, raises dust over herbs and spoils them, and stirs up
the sea so that a ship goes down with the whole or part of her
contents. Aristotle sees no difference between the falling of a leaf or
a stone and the death of the good and noble people in the ship; nor
does he distinguish between the destruction of a multitude of ants
caused by an ox depositing on them his excrement and the death of
worshippers killed by the fall of the house when its foundations give
way; nor does he discriminate between the case of a cat killing a mouse
that happens to come in her way, or that of a spider catching a fly,
and that of a hungry lion meeting a prophet and tearing him. In short,
the opinion of Aristotle is this: Everything is the result of
management which is constant, which does not come to an end and does
not change any of its properties, as e.g., the heavenly beings, and
everything which continues according to a certain rule, and deviates
from it only rarely and exceptionally, as is the case in objects of
Nature. All these are the result of management, i.e., in a close
relation to Divine Providence. But that which is not constant, and does
not follow a certain rule, as e.g., incidents in the existence of the
individual beings in each species of plants or animals, whether
rational or irrational, is due to chance and not to management; it is
in no relation to Divine Providence. Aristotle holds that it is even
impossible to ascribe to Providence the management of these things.
This view is closely connected with his theory of the Eternity of the
Universe, and with his opinion that everything different from the
existing order of things in Nature is impossible. It is the belief of
those who turned away from our Law, and said: “God hath forsaken the
earth” (Ezek. ix. 9).

Third Theory.—This theory is the reverse of the second. According to
this theory, there is nothing in the whole Universe, neither a class
nor an individual being, that is due to chance; everything is the
result of will, intention, and rule. It is a matter of course that he
who rules must know [that which is under his control]. The Mohammedan
Ashariyah adhere to this theory, notwithstanding evident absurdities
implied in it; for they admit that Aristotle is correct in assuming one
and the same cause [viz., the wind] for the fall of leaves [from the
tree] and for the death of a man [drowned in the sea]. But they hold at
the same time that the wind did not blow by chance; it is God that
caused it to move; it is not therefore the wind that caused the leaves
to fall; each leaf falls according to the Divine decree; it is God who
caused it to fall at a certain time and in a certain place; it could
not have fallen before or after that time or in another place, as this
has previously been decreed. The Ashariyah were therefore compelled to
assume that motion and rest of living beings are predestined, and that
it is not in the power of man to do a certain thing or to leave it
undone. The theory further implies a denial of possibility in these
things; they can only be either necessary or impossible. The followers
of this theory accepted also the last-mentioned proposition, and say,
that we call certain things possible, as e.g., the facts that Zeid
stands, and that Amr is coming; but they are only possible for us,
whilst in their relation to God they cannot be called possible; they
are either necessary or impossible. It follows also from this theory,
that precepts are perfectly useless, since the people to whom any law
is given are unable to do anything: they can neither do what they are
commanded nor abstain from what they are forbidden. The supporters of
this theory hold that it was the will of God to send prophets, to
command, to forbid, to promise, and to threaten, although we have no
power [over our actions]. A duty would thus be imposed upon us which is
impossible for us to carry out, and it is even possible that we may
suffer punishment when obeying the command and receive reward when
disobeying it. According to this theory, it must also be assumed that
the actions of God have no final cause. All these absurdities are
admitted by the Ashariyah for the purpose of saving this theory. When
we see a person born blind or leprous, who could not have merited a
punishment for previous sins, they say, It is the will of God; when a
pious worshipper is tortured and slain, it is likewise the will of God;
and no injustice can be asserted to Him for that, for according to
their opinion it is proper that God should afflict the innocent and do
good to the sinner. Their views on these matters are well known.

Fourth Theory.—Man has free will; it is therefore intelligible that the
Law contains commands and prohibitions, with announcements of reward
and punishment. All acts of God are due to wisdom; no injustice is
found in Him, and He does not afflict the good. The Mu’tazila profess
this theory, although they do not believe in man’s absolute free will.
They hold also that God takes notice of the falling of the leaf and the
destruction of the ant, and that His Providence extends over all
things. This theory likewise implies contradictions and absurdities.
The absurdities are these: The fact that some persons are born with
defects, although they have not sinned previously, is ascribed to the
wisdom of God, it being better for those persons to be in such a
condition than to be in a normal state, though we do not see why it is
better; and they do not suffer thereby any punishment at all, but, on
the contrary, enjoy God’s goodness. In a similar manner the slaughter
of the pious is explained as being for them the source of an increase
of reward in future life. They go even further in their absurdities. We
ask them why is God only just to man and not to other beings, and how
has the irrational animal sinned, that it is condemned to be
slaughtered? and they reply it is good for the animal, for it will
receive reward for it in the world to come; also the flea and the louse
will there receive compensation for their untimely death: the same
reasoning they apply to the mouse torn by a cat or vulture; the wisdom
of God decreed this for the mouse, in order to reward it after death
for the mishap. I do not consider it proper to blame the followers of
any of the [last named] three theories on Providence, for they have
been driven to accept them by weighty considerations. Aristotle was
guided by that which appears to be the nature of things. The Ashariyah
refused to ascribe to God ignorance about anything, and to say that God
whilst knowing one individual being or one portion of the Universe is
ignorant of another portion; they preferred to admit the
above-mentioned absurdities. The Mu’tazilites refused to assume that
God does what is wrong and unjust; on the other hand, they would not
contradict common sense and say that it was not wrong to inflict pain
on the guiltless, or that the mission of the Prophets and the giving of
the Law had no intelligible reason. They likewise preferred to admit
the above-named absurdities. But they even contradicted themselves,
because they believe on the one hand that God knows everything, and on
the other that man has free will. By a little consideration we discover
the contradiction.

Fifth Theory.—This is our theory, or that of our Law. I will show you
[first] the view expressed on this subject in our prophetical books,
and generally accepted by our Sages. I will then give the opinion of
some later authors among us, and lastly, I will explain my own belief.
The theory of man’s perfectly free will is one of the fundamental
principles of the Law of our Teacher Moses, and of those who follow the
Law. According to this principle man does what is in his power to do,
by his nature, his choice, and his will; and his action is not due to
any faculty created for the purpose. All species of irrational animals
likewise move by their own free will. This is the Will of God; that is
to say, it is due to the eternal divine will that all living beings
should move freely, and that man should have power to act according to
his will or choice within the limits of his capacity. Against this
principle we hear, thank God, no opposition on the part of our nation.
Another fundamental principle taught by the Law of Moses is this: Wrong
cannot be ascribed to God in any way whatever; all evils and
afflictions as well as all kinds of happiness of man, whether they
concern one individual person or a community, are distributed according
to justice; they are the result of strict judgment that admits no wrong
whatever. Even when a person suffers pain in consequence of a thorn
having entered into his hand, although it is at once drawn out, it is a
punishment that has been inflicted on him [for sin], and the least
pleasure he enjoys is a reward [for some good action]; all this is
meted out by strict justice; as is said in Scripture, “all his ways are
judgment” (Deut. xxxii. 4); we are only ignorant of the working of that
judgment.

The different theories are now fully explained to you; everything in
the varying human affairs is due to chance, according to Aristotle, to
the Divine Will alone according to the Ashariyah, to Divine Wisdom
according to the Mu’tazilites, to the merits of man according to our
opinion. It is therefore possible, according to the Ashariyah, that God
inflicts pain on a good and pious man in this world, and keeps him for
ever in fire, which is assumed to rage in the world to come; they
simply say it is the Will of God. The Mu’tazilites would consider this
as injustice, and therefore assume that every being, even an ant, that
is stricken with pain [in this world], has compensation for it, as has
been mentioned above; and it is due to God’s Wisdom that a being is
struck and afflicted in order to receive compensation. We, however,
believe that all these human affairs are managed with justice; far be
it from God to do wrong, to punish any one unless the punishment is
necessary and merited. It is distinctly stated in the Law, that all is
done in accordance with justice; and the words of our Sages generally
express the same idea. They clearly say: “There is no death without
sin, no sufferings without transgression.” (B. T. Shabbath, 55a.)
Again, “The deserts of man are meted out to him in the same measure
which he himself employs.” (Mish. Sotah, i. 7.) These are the words of
the Mishnah. Our Sages declare it wherever opportunity is given, that
the idea of God necessarily implies justice; that He will reward the
most pious for all their pure and upright actions, although no direct
commandment was given them through a prophet; and that He will punish
all the evil deeds of men, although they have not been prohibited by a
prophet, if common sense warns against them, as e.g., injustice and
violence. Thus our Sages say: “God does not deprive any being of the
full reward [of its good deed]” (B. T. Pes. 118a) again, “He who says
that God remits part of a punishment, will be punished severely; He is
long-suffering, but is sure to exact payment.” (B. T. Baba K. 50a.)
Another saying is this: “He who has received a commandment and acts
accordingly is not like him who acts in the same manner without being
commanded to do so” (B. T. Kidd. 31a); and it is distinctly added that
he who does a good thing without being commanded, receives nevertheless
his reward. The same principle is expressed in all sayings of our
Sages. But they contain an additional doctrine which is not found in
the Law; viz., the doctrine of “afflictions of love,” as taught by some
of our Sages. According to this doctrine it is possible that a person
be afflicted without having previously committed any sin, in order that
his future reward may be increased; a view which is held by the
Mu’tazilites, but is not supported by any Scriptural text. Be not
misled by the accounts of trials, such as “God tried Abraham” (Gen.
xxii. 1); “He afflicted thee and made thee hungry,” etc. (Deut. viii.
3); for you will hear more on this subject later on (chap. xxiv.). Our
Law is only concerned with the relations of men; but the idea that
irrational living beings should receive a reward, has never before been
heard of in our nation; the wise men mentioned in the Talmud do not
notice it; only some of the later Geonim were pleased with it when they
heard it from the sect of the Mu’tazilites, and accepted it.

My opinion on this principle of Divine Providence I will now explain to
you. In the principle which I now proceed to expound I do not rely on
demonstrative proof, but on my conception of the spirit of the Divine
Law, and the writings of the Prophets. The principle which I accept is
far less open to objections, and is more reasonable than the opinions
mentioned before. It is this: In the lower or sublunary portion of the
Universe Divine Providence does not extend to the individual members of
species except in the case of mankind. It is only in this species that
the incidents in the existence of the individual beings, their good and
evil fortunes, are the result of justice, in accordance with the words,
“For all His ways are judgment.” But I agree with Aristotle as regards
all other living beings, and à fortiori as regards plants and all the
rest of earthly creatures. For I do not believe that it is through the
interference of Divine Providence that a certain leaf drops [from a
tree], nor do I hold that when a certain spider catches a certain fly,
that this is the direct result of a special decree and will of God in
that moment; it is not by a particular Divine decree that the spittle
of a certain person moved, fell on a certain gnat in a certain place,
and killed it; nor is it by the direct will of God that a certain fish
catches and swallows a certain worm on the surface of the water. In all
these cases the action is, according to my opinion, entirely due to
chance, as taught by Aristotle. Divine Providence is connected with
Divine intellectual influence, and the same beings which are benefited
by the latter so as to become intellectual, and to comprehend things
comprehensible to rational beings, are also under the control of Divine
Providence, which examines all their deeds in order to reward or punish
them. It may be by mere chance that a ship goes down with all her
contents, as in the above-mentioned instance, or the roof of a house
falls upon those within; but it is not due to chance, according to our
view, that in the one instance the men went into the ship, or remained
in the house in the other instance; it is due to the will of God, and
is in accordance with the justice of His judgments, the method of which
our mind is incapable of understanding. I have been induced to accept
this theory by the circumstance that I have not met in any of the
prophetical books with a description of God’s Providence otherwise than
in relation to human beings. The prophets even express their surprise
that God should take notice of man, who is too little and too
unimportant to be worthy of the attention of the Creator; how, then,
should other living creatures be considered as proper objects for
Divine Providence! Comp. “What is man, that thou takest knowledge of
him?” (Ps. cxliv. 3); “What is man, that thou art mindful of him?”
(ibid. viii. 8). It is clearly expressed in many Scriptural passages
that God provides for all men, and controls all their deeds—e.g., “He
fashioneth their hearts alike, he considereth all their works” (ibid.
xxxiii. 15); “For thine eyes are open upon all the ways of the sons of
men, to give every one according to his ways” (Jer. xxxii. 19). Again:
“For his eyes are upon the ways of man, and he seeth all his goings”
(Job xxxii. 21). In the Law there occur instances of the fact that men
are governed by God, and that their actions are examined by him. Comp.
“In the day when I visit I will visit their sin upon them” (Exod.
xxxii. 34); “I will even appoint over you terror” (Lev. xxvi. 16);
“Whosoever hath sinned against me, him will I blot out of my book”
(Exod. xxxii. 33); “The same soul will I destroy” (Lev. xxiii. 30); “I
will even set my face against that soul” (ibid. xx. 6). There are many
instances of this kind. All that is mentioned of the history of
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is a perfect proof that Divine Providence
extends to every man individually. But the condition of the individual
beings of other living creatures is undoubtedly the same as has been
stated by Aristotle. On that account it is allowed, even commanded, to
kill animals; we are permitted to use them according to our pleasure.
The view that other living beings are only governed by Divine
Providence in the way described by Aristotle, is supported by the words
of the Prophet Habakkuk. When he perceived the victories of
Nebuchadnezzar, and saw the multitude of those slain by him, he said,
“O God, it is as if men were abandoned, neglected, and unprotected like
fish and like worms of the earth.” He thus shows that these classes are
abandoned. This is expressed in the following passage: “And makest men
as the fishes of the sea, as the creeping things, that have no ruler
over them. They take up all of them with the angle,” etc. (Hab. i. 14,
15). The prophet then declares that such is not the case; for the
events referred to are not the result of abandonment, forsaking, and
absence of Providence, but are intended as a punishment for the people,
who well deserved all that befell them. He therefore says: “O Lord,
Thou hast ordained them for judgment, and O mighty God, Thou hast
established them for correction” (ibid. ver. 12). Our opinion is not
contradicted by Scriptural passages like the following: “He giveth to
the beast his food” (Ps. cxlvii. 9); “The young lions roar after their
prey, and seek their meat from God” (ibid. civ. 21); “Thou openest
thine hand, and satisfiest the desire of every living thing” (ibid.
cxlv. 16); or by the saying of our Sages: “He sitteth and feedeth all,
from the horns of the unicorns even unto the eggs of insects.” There
are many similar sayings extant in the writings of our Sages, but they
imply nothing that is contrary to my view. All these passages refer to
Providence in relation to species, and not to Providence in relation to
individual animals. The acts of God are as it were enumerated; how He
provides for every species the necessary food and the means of
subsistence. This is clear and plain. Aristotle likewise holds that
this kind of Providence is necessary, and is in actual existence.
Alexander also notices this fact in the name of Aristotle, viz., that
every species has its nourishment prepared for its individual members;
otherwise the species would undoubtedly have perished. It does not
require much consideration to understand this. There is a rule laid
down by our Sages that it is directly prohibited in the Law to cause
pain to an animal, and is based on the words: “Wherefore hast thou
smitten thine ass?” etc. (Num. xxii. 32). But the object of this rule
is to make us perfect; that we should not assume cruel habits; and that
we should not uselessly cause pain to others; that, on the contrary, we
should be prepared to show pity and mercy to all living creatures,
except when necessity demands the contrary: “When thy soul longeth to
eat flesh,” etc. (Deut. xii. 20). We should not kill animals for the
purpose of practising cruelty, or for the purpose of play. It cannot be
objected to this theory, Why should God select mankind as the object of
His special Providence, and not other living beings? For he who asks
this question must also inquire, Why has man alone, of all species of
animals, been endowed with intellect? The answer to this second
question must be, according to the three afore-mentioned theories: It
was the Will of God, it is the decree of His Wisdom, or it is in
accordance with the laws of Nature. The same answers apply to the first
question. Understand thoroughly my theory, that I do not ascribe to God
ignorance of anything or any kind of weakness; I hold that Divine
Providence is related and closely connected with the intellect, because
Providence can only proceed from an intelligent being, from a being
that is itself the most perfect Intellect. Those creatures, therefore,
which receive part of that intellectual influence, will become subject
to the action of Providence in the same proportion as they are acted
upon by the Intellect. This theory is in accordance with reason and
with the teaching of Scripture, whilst the other theories previously
mentioned either exaggerate Divine Providence or detract from it. In
the former case they lead to confusion and entire nonsense, and cause
us to deny reason and to contradict that which is perceived with the
senses. The latter case, viz., the theory that Divine Providence does
not extend to man, and that there is no difference between man and
other animals, implies very bad notions about God; it disturbs all
social order, removes and destroys all the moral and intellectual
virtues of man.






CHAPTER XVIII


Having shown in the preceding chapter that of all living beings mankind
alone is directly under the control of Divine Providence, I will now
add the following remarks: It is an established fact that species have
no existence except in our own minds. Species and other classes are
merely ideas formed in our minds, whilst everything in real existence
is an individual object, or an aggregate of individual objects. This
being granted, it must further be admitted that the result of the
existing Divine influence, that reaches mankind through the human
intellect, is identical with individual intellects really in existence,
with which, e.g., Zeid, Amr, Kaled and Bekr, are endowed. Hence it
follows, in accordance with what I have mentioned in the preceding
chapter, that the greater the share is which a person has obtained of
this Divine influence, on account of both his physical predisposition
and his training, the greater must also be the effect of Divine
Providence upon him, for the action of Divine Providence is
proportional to the endowment of intellect, as has been mentioned
above. The relation of Divine Providence is therefore not the same to
all men; the greater the human perfection a person has attained, the
greater the benefit he derives from Divine Providence. This benefit is
very great in the case of prophets, and varies according to the degree
of their prophetic faculty; as it varies in the case of pious and good
men according to their piety and uprightness. For it is the intensity
of the Divine intellectual influence that has inspired the prophets,
guided the good in their actions, and perfected the wisdom of the
pious. In the same proportion as ignorant and disobedient persons are
deficient in that Divine influence, their condition is inferior, and
their rank equal to that of irrational beings; and they are “like unto
the beasts” (Ps. xlix. 21). For this reason it was not only considered
a light thing to slay them, but it was even directly commanded for the
benefit of mankind. This belief that God provides for every individual
human being in accordance with his merits is one of the fundamental
principles on which the Law is founded.

Consider how the action of Divine Providence is described in reference
to every incident in the lives of the patriarchs, to their occupations,
and even to their passions, and how God promised to direct His
attention to them. Thus God said to Abraham, “I am thy shield” (Gen.
xv. 1); to Isaac, “I will be with thee, and I will bless thee” (ibid.
xxvi. 3); to Jacob, “I am with thee, and will keep thee” (ibid. xxviii.
15); to [Moses] the chief of the Prophets, “Certainly I will be with
thee, and this shall be a token unto thee” (Exod. iii. 12); to Joshua,
“As I was with Moses, so I shall be with thee” (Josh. i. 5). It is
clear that in all these cases the action of Providence has been
proportional to man’s perfection. The following verse describes how
Providence protects good and pious men, and abandons fools; “He will
keep the feet of his saints, and the wicked shall be silent in
darkness; for by strength shall no man prevail” (1 Sam. ii. 9). When we
see that some men escape plagues and mishaps, whilst others perish by
them, we must not attribute this to a difference in the properties of
their bodies, or in their physical constitution, “for by strength shall
no man prevail”; but it must be attributed to their different degrees
of perfection, some approaching God, whilst others moving away from
Him. Those who approach Him are best protected, and “He will keep the
feet of his saints”; but those who keep far away from Him are left
exposed to what may befall them; there is nothing that could protect
them from what might happen; they are like those who walk in darkness,
and are certain to stumble. The protection of the pious by Providence
is also expressed in the following passages:—“He keepeth all his
bones,” etc. (Ps. xxxiv. 21); “The eyes of the Lord are upon the
righteous” (ibid. ver. 16); “He shall call upon me and I shall answer
him” (ibid. xci. 15). There are in Scripture many more passages
expressing the principle that men enjoy Divine protection in proportion
to their perfection and piety. The philosophers have likewise discussed
this subject. Abu-nasr, in the Introduction to his Commentary on
Aristotle’s Nikomachean Ethics, says as follows:—Those who possess the
faculty of raising their souls from virtue to virtue obtain, according
to Plato, Divine protection to a higher degree.

Now consider how by this method of reasoning we have arrived at the
truth taught by the Prophets, that every person has his individual
share of Divine Providence in proportion to his perfection. For
philosophical research leads to this conclusion, if we assume, as has
been mentioned above, that Divine Providence is in each case
proportional to the person’s intellectual development. It is wrong to
say that Divine Providence extends only to the species, and not to
individual beings, as some of the philosophers teach. For only
individual beings have real existence, and individual beings are
endowed with Divine Intellect; Divine Providence acts, therefore, upon
these individual beings.

Study this chapter as it ought to be studied; you will find in it all
the fundamental principles of the Law; you will see that these are in
conformity with philosophical speculation, and all difficulties will be
removed; you will have a clear idea of Divine Providence.

After having described the various philosophical opinions on
Providence, and on the manner how God governs the Universe, I will
briefly state the opinion of our co-religionists on the Omniscience of
God, and what I have to remark on this subject.






CHAPTER XIX


It is undoubtedly an innate idea that God must be perfect in every
respect and cannot be deficient in anything. It is almost an innate
idea that ignorance in anything is a deficiency, and that God can
therefore not be ignorant of anything. But some thinkers assume, as I
said before, haughtily and exultingly, that God knows certain things
and is ignorant of certain other things. They did so because they
imagined that they discovered a certain absence of order in man’s
affairs, most of which are not only the result of physical properties,
but also of those faculties which he possesses as a being endowed with
free will and reason. The Prophets have already stated the proof which
ignorant persons offer for their belief that God does not know our
actions; viz., the fact that wicked people are seen in happiness, ease,
and peace. This fact leads also righteous and pious persons to think
that it is of no use for them to aim at that which is good and to
suffer for it through the opposition of other people. But the Prophets
at the same time relate how their own thoughts were engaged on this
question, and how they were at last convinced that in the instances to
which these arguments refer, only the end and not the beginning ought
to be taken into account. The following is a description of these
reflections (Ps. lxxiii. 11, seq.): “And they say, How does God know?
and is there knowledge in the Most High? Behold, these are the ungodly
who prosper in the world; they increase in riches. Verily I have
cleansed my heart in vain, and washed my hands in innocency.” He then
continues, “When I thought to know this, it was too painful for me,
until I went into the sanctuary of God; then understood I their end.
Surely thou didst set them in slippery places; thou castedst them down
into destruction. How are they brought into desolation, as in a moment!
They are utterly consumed with terrors.” The very same ideas have also
been expressed by the prophet Malachi, for he says thus (Mal. iii.
13–18): “Your words have been stout against me, saith the Lord. As you
have said, It is vain to serve God; and what profit is it that we have
kept his ordinance, and that we have walked mournfully before the Lord
of hosts? And now we call the proud happy; yea, they that work
wickedness are set up; yea, they that tempt God are even delivered.
Then they that feared the Lord spake often one to another, etc. Then
shall ye return and discern between the righteous and the wicked,
between him that serveth God and him that serveth him not.” David
likewise shows how general this view was in his time, and how it led
and caused people to sin and to oppress one another. At first he argues
against this theory, and then he declares that God is omniscient. He
says as follows:—“They slay the widow and the stranger, and murder the
fatherless. Yet they say, The Lord shall not see, neither shall the God
of Jacob regard it. Understand, ye brutish among the people, and ye
fools, when will you be wise? He that planted the ear, shall he not
hear? He that formed the eye, shall he not see? He that chastiseth
nations, shall not he correct? or he that teacheth man knowledge?” I
will now show you the meaning of these arguments, but first I will
point out how the opponents to the words of the Prophets misunderstood
this passage. Many years ago some intelligent co-religionists—they were
physicians—told me that they were surprised at the words of David; for
it would follow from his arguments that the Creator of the mouth must
eat and the Creator of the lungs must cry; the same applies to all
other organs of our body. You who study this treatise of mine, consider
how grossly they misunderstood David’s arguments. Hear now what its
true meaning is: He who produces a vessel must have had in his mind an
idea of the use of that instrument, otherwise he could not have
produced it. If, e.g., the smith had not formed an idea of sewing and
possessed a knowledge of it, the needle would not have had the form so
indispensable for sewing. The same is the case with all instruments.
When some philosopher thought that God, whose perception is purely
intellectual, has no knowledge of individual things, which are
perceivable only by the senses, David takes his argument from the
existence of the senses, and argues thus:—If the sense of sight had
been utterly unknown to God, how could He have produced that organ of
the sense of sight? Do you think that it was by chance that a
transparent humour was formed, and then another humour with certain
similar properties, and besides a membrane which by accident had a hole
covered with a hardened transparent substance? in short, considering
the humour of the eye, in membranes and nerves, with their well-known
functions, and their adaptation to the purpose of sight, can any
intelligent person imagine that all this is due to chance? Certainly
not; we see here necessarily design in nature, as has been shown by all
physicians and philosophers; but as nature is not an intellectual
being, and is not capable of governing [the universe], as has been
accepted by all philosophers, the government [of the universe], which
shows signs of design, originates, according to the philosophers, in an
intellectual cause, but is according to our view the result of the
action of an intellectual being, that endows everything with its
natural properties. If this intellect were incapable of perceiving or
knowing any of the actions of earthly beings, how could He have
created, or, according to the other theory, caused to emanate from
Himself, properties that bring about those actions of which He is
supposed to have no knowledge? David correctly calls those who believe
in this theory brutes and fools. He then proceeds to explain that the
error is due to our defective understanding; that God endowed us with
the intellect which is the means of our comprehension, and which on
account of its insufficiency to form a true idea of God has become the
source of great doubts; that He therefore knows what our defects are,
and how worthless the doubts are which originate in our faulty
reasoning. The Psalmist therefore says: “He who teaches man knowledge,
the Lord, knoweth the thoughts of man that they are vanity” (ibid.
xciv. 10–11).

My object in this chapter was to show how the belief of the ignorant,
that God does not notice the affairs of man because they are uncertain
and unsystematic, is very ancient. Comp. “And the Israelites uttered
things that were not right against the Lord” (2 Kings xvii. 9). In
reference to this passage the Midrash says: “What have they uttered?
This Pillar [i.e., God] does not see, nor hear, nor speak”; i.e., they
imagine that God takes no notice of earthly affairs, that the Prophets
received of God neither affirmative nor negative precepts; they imagine
so, simply because human affairs are not arranged as every person would
think it desirable. Seeing that these are not in accordance with their
wish, they say, “The Lord does not see us” (Ezek. viii. 12). Zephaniah
(i. 12) also describes those ignorant persons “who say in their heart
the Lord will not do good, neither will he do evil.” I will tell you my
own opinion as regards the theory that God knows all things on earth,
but I will before state some propositions which are generally adopted,
and the correctness of which no intelligent person can dispute.






CHAPTER XX


It is generally agreed upon that God cannot at a certain time acquire
knowledge which He did not possess previously; it is further impossible
that His knowledge should include any plurality, even according to
those who admit the Divine attributes. As these things have been fully
proved, we, who assert the teaching of the Law, believe that God’s
knowledge of many things does not imply any plurality; His knowledge
does not change like ours when the objects of His knowledge change.
Similarly we say that the various events are known to Him before they
take place; He constantly knows them, and therefore no fresh knowledge
is acquired by Him. E.g., He knows that a certain person is
non-existent at present, will come to existence at a certain time, will
continue to exist for some time, and will then cease to exist. When
this person, in accordance with God’s foreknowledge concerning him,
comes into existence, God’s knowledge is not increased; it contains
nothing that it did not contain before, but something has taken place
that was known previously exactly as it has taken place. This theory
implies that God’s knowledge extends to things not in existence, and
includes also the infinite. We nevertheless accept it, and contend that
we may attribute to God the knowledge of a thing which does not yet
exist, but the existence of which God foresees and is able to effect.
But that which never exists cannot be an object of His knowledge; just
as our knowledge does not comprise things which we consider as
non-existing. A doubt has been raised, however, whether His knowledge
includes the infinite. Some thinkers assume that knowledge has the
species for its object, and therefore extends at the same time to all
individual members of the species. This view is taken by every man who
adheres to a revealed religion and follows the dictates of reason.
Philosophers, however, have decided that the object of knowledge cannot
be a non-existing thing, and that it cannot comprise that which is
infinite. Since, therefore, God’s knowledge does not admit of any
increase, it is impossible that He should know any transient thing. He
only knows that which is constant and unchangeable. Other philosophers
raised the following objection: God does not know even things that
remain constant; for His knowledge would then include a plurality
according to the number of objects known; the knowledge of every thing
being distinguished by a certain peculiarity of the thing. God
therefore only knows His own essence.

My opinion is this: the cause of the error of all these schools is
their belief that God’s knowledge is like ours; each school points to
something withheld from our knowledge, and either assumes that the same
must be the case in God’s knowledge, or at least finds some difficulty
how to explain it. We must blame the philosophers in this respect more
than any other persons, because they demonstrated that there is no
plurality in God, and that He has no attribute that is not identical
with His essence; His knowledge and His essence are one and the same
thing; they likewise demonstrated, as we have shown, that our intellect
and our knowledge are insufficient to comprehend the true idea of His
essence. How then can they imagine that they comprehend His knowledge,
which is identical with His essence; seeing that our incapacity to
comprehend His essence prevents us from understanding the way how He
knows objects? for His knowledge is not of the same kind as ours, but
totally different from it and admitting of no analogy. And as there is
an Essence of independent existence, which is, as the philosophers call
it, the Cause of the existence of all things, or, as we say, the
Creator of everything that exists beside Him, so we also assume that
this Essence knows everything, that nothing whatever of all that exists
is hidden from it, and that the knowledge attributed to this essence
has nothing in common with our knowledge, just as that essence is in no
way like our essence. The homonymity of the term “knowledge” misled
people; [they forgot that] only the words are the same, but the things
designated by them are different; and therefore they came to the absurd
conclusion that that which is required for our knowledge is also
required for God’s knowledge.

Besides, I find it expressed in various passages of Scripture that the
fact that God knows things while in a state of possibility, when their
existence belongs to the future, does not change the nature of the
possible in any way; that nature remains unchanged; and the knowledge
of the realization of one of several possibilities does not yet effect
that realization. This is likewise one of the fundamental principles of
the Law of Moses, concerning which there is no doubt nor any dispute.
Otherwise it would not have been said, “And thou shalt make a
battlement for thy roof,” etc. (Deut. xxii. 8), or “Lest he die in the
battle, and another man take her” (ibid. xx. 7). The fact that laws
were given to man, both affirmative and negative, supports the
principle, that God’s knowledge of future [and possible] events does
not change their character. The great doubt that presents itself to our
mind is the result of the insufficiency of our intellect. Consider in
how many ways His knowledge is distinguished from ours according to all
the teaching of every revealed religion. First, His knowledge is one,
and yet embraces many different kinds of objects. Secondly, it is
applied to things not in existence. Thirdly, it comprehends the
infinite. Fourthly, it remains unchanged, though it comprises the
knowledge of changeable things; whilst it seems [in reference to
ourselves] that the knowledge of a thing that is to come into existence
is different from the knowledge of the thing when it has come into
existence; because there is the additional knowledge of its transition
from a state of potentiality into that of reality. Fifthly, according
to the teaching of our Law, God’s knowledge of one of two eventualities
does not determine it, however certain that knowledge may be concerning
the future occurrence of the one eventuality.—Now I wonder what our
knowledge has in common with God’s knowledge, according to those who
treat God’s knowledge as an attribute. Is there anything else common to
both besides the mere name? According to our theory that God’s
knowledge is not different from His essence, there is an essential
distinction between His knowledge and ours, like the distinction
between the substance of the heavens and that of the earth. The
Prophets have clearly expressed this. Comp. “For my thoughts are not
your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord. For as
the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your
ways” (Isa. lv. 8–9). In short, as we cannot accurately comprehend His
essence, and yet we know that His existence is most perfect, free from
all admixture of deficiency, change, or passiveness, so we have no
correct notion of His knowledge, because it is nothing but His essence,
and yet we are convinced that He does not at one time obtain knowledge
which He had not before; i.e., He obtains no new knowledge, He does not
increase it, and it is not finite; nothing of all existing things
escapes His knowledge, but their nature is not changed thereby; that
which is possible remains possible. Every argument that seems to
contradict any of these statements is founded on the nature of our
knowledge, that has only the name in common with God’s knowledge. The
same applies to the term intention; it is homonymously employed to
designate our intention towards a certain thing, and the intention of
God. The term “management” (Providence) is likewise homonymously used
of our management of a certain thing, and of God’s management. In fact
management, knowledge, and intention are not the same when ascribed to
us and when ascribed to God. When these three terms are taken in both
cases in the same sense, great difficulties must arise; but when it is
noticed that there is a great difference whether a thing it predicated
of God or of us, the truth will become clear. The difference between
that which is ascribed to God and that which is ascribed to man is
expressed in the words above mentioned, “And your ways are not my
ways.”






CHAPTER XXI


There is a great difference between the knowledge which the producer of
a thing possesses concerning it, and the knowledge which other persons
possess concerning the same thing. Suppose a thing is produced in
accordance with the knowledge of the producer, the producer was then
guided by his knowledge in the act of producing the thing. Other
people, however, who examine this work and acquire a knowledge of the
whole of it, depend for that knowledge on the work itself. E.g., An
artisan makes a box in which weights move with the running of the
water, and thus indicate how many hours have passed of the day and of
the night. The whole quantity of the water that is to run out, the
different ways in which it runs, every thread that is drawn, and every
little ball that descends—all this is fully perceived by him who makes
the clock; and his knowledge is not the result of observing the
movements as they are actually going on; but, on the contrary, the
movements are produced in accordance with his knowledge. But another
person who looks at that instrument will receive fresh knowledge at
every movement he perceives; the longer he looks on, the more knowledge
does he acquire; he will gradually increase his knowledge till he fully
understands the machinery. If an infinite number of movements were
assumed for this instrument, he would never be able to complete his
knowledge. Besides, he cannot know any of the movements before they
take place, since he only knows them from their actual occurrence. The
same is the case with every object, and its relation to our knowledge
and God’s knowledge of it. Whatever we know of the things is derived
from observation; on that account it is impossible for us to know that
which will take place in future, or that which is infinite.

Our knowledge is acquired and increased in proportion to the things
known by us. This is not the case with God. His knowledge of things is
not derived from the things themselves; if this were the case, there
would be change and plurality in His knowledge; on the contrary, the
things are in accordance with His eternal knowledge, which has
established their actual properties, and made part of them purely
spiritual, another part material and constant as regards its individual
members, a third part material and changeable as regards the individual
beings according to eternal and constant laws. Plurality, acquisition,
and change in His knowledge is therefore impossible. He fully knows His
unchangeable essence, and has thus a knowledge of all that results from
any of His acts. If we were to try to understand in what manner this is
done, it would be the same as if we tried to be the same as God, and to
make our knowledge identical with His knowledge. Those who seek the
truth, and admit what is true, must believe that nothing is hidden from
God; that everything is revealed to His knowledge, which is identical
with His essence; that this kind of knowledge cannot be comprehended by
us; for if we knew its method, we would possess that intellect by which
such knowledge could be acquired. Such intellect does not exist except
in God, and is at the same time His essence. Note this well, for I
think that this is an excellent idea, and leads to correct views; no
error will be found in it; no dialectical argument; it does not lead to
any absurd conclusion, nor to ascribing any defect to God. These
sublime and profound themes admit of no proof whatever, neither
according to our opinion who believe in the teaching of Scripture, nor
according to the philosophers who disagree and are much divided on this
question. In all questions that cannot be demonstrated, we must adopt
the method which we have adopted in this question about God’s
Omniscience. Note it.






CHAPTER XXII


The strange and wonderful Book of Job treats of the same subject as we
are discussing; its basis is a fiction, conceived for the purpose of
explaining the different opinions which people hold on Divine
Providence. You know that some of our Sages clearly stated Job has
never existed, and has never been created, and that he is a poetic
fiction. Those who assume that he has existed, and that the book is
historical, are unable to determine when and where Job lived. Some of
our Sages say that he lived in the days of the Patriarchs; others hold
that he was a contemporary of Moses; others place him in the days of
David, and again others believe that he was one of those who returned
from the Babylonian exile. This difference of opinion supports the
assumption that he has never existed in reality. But whether he has
existed or not, that which is related of him is an experience of
frequent occurrence, is a source of perplexity to all thinkers, and has
suggested the above-mentioned opinions on God’s Omniscience and
Providence. This perplexity is caused by the account that a simple and
perfect person, who is upright in his actions, and very anxious to
abstain from sin, is afflicted by successive misfortunes, namely, by
loss of property, by the death of his children, and by bodily disease,
though he has not committed any sin. According to both theories, viz.,
the theory that Job did exist, and the theory that he did not exist,
the introduction to the book is certainly a fiction; I mean the portion
which relates to the words of the adversary, the words of God to the
former, and the handing over of Job to him. This fiction, however, is
in so far different from other fictions that it includes profound ideas
and great mysteries, removes great doubts, and reveals the most
important truths. I will discuss it as fully as possible; and I will
also tell you the words of our Sages that suggested to me the
explanation of this great poem.

First, consider the words: “There was a man in the land Uẓ.” The term
Uẓ has different meanings; it is used as a proper noun. Comp. “Uẓ, his
first-born” (Gen. xxii. 21); it is also imperative of the verb Uẓ, “to
take advice.” Comp. uẓu, “take counsel” (Isa. viii. 10). The name Uẓ
therefore expresses the exhortation to consider well this lesson, study
it, grasp its ideas, and comprehend them, in order to see which is the
right view. “The sons of God then came to present themselves before the
Lord, and the adversary came also among them and in their number”
(chap. i. 6, ii. 1). It is not said: “And the sons of God and the
adversary came to present themselves before the Lord”; this sentence
would have implied that the existence of all that came was of the same
kind and rank. The words used are these: “And the sons of God came to
present themselves before the Lord, and the adversary came also among
them.” Such a phrase is only used in reference to one that comes
without being expected or invited; he only comes among others whose
coming has been sought. The adversary is then described as going to and
fro on the earth, and walking up and down thereon. He is in no relation
to the beings above, and has no place among them. For this reason it is
said, “from going to and fro on the earth, and walking up and down on
it,” for his “going” and “walking” can only take place on the earth.
[Job], the simple and righteous man, is given and handed over to the
adversary; whatever evils and misfortunes befell Job as regards his
property, children, and health, were all caused by this adversary. When
this idea is sufficiently indicated, the author begins to reflect on
it; one opinion Job is represented to hold, whilst other opinions are
defended by his friends. I will further on expound these opinions which
formed the substance of the discussion on the misfortunes of Job,
caused by the adversary alone. Job, as well as his friends, were of
opinion that God Himself was the direct agent of what happened, and
that the adversary was not the intermediate cause. It is remarkable in
this account that wisdom is not ascribed to Job. The text does not say
he was an intelligent, wise, or clever man; but virtues and
uprightness, especially in actions, are ascribed to him. If he were
wise he would not have any doubt about the cause of his suffering, as
will be shown later on. Besides, his misfortunes are enumerated in the
same order as they rank in man’s estimation. There are some who are not
perplexed or discouraged by loss of property, thinking little of it;
but are terrified when they are threatened with the death of their
children and are killed by their anxiety. There are others who bear
without shock or fainting even the loss of their children, but no one
endowed with sensation is able to bear bodily pain. We generally extol
God in words, and praise Him as righteous and benevolent, when we
prosper and are happy, or when the grief we have to bear is moderate.
But [it is otherwise] when such troubles as are described in Job come
over us. Some of us deny God, and believe that there is no rule in the
Universe, even if only their property is lost. Others retain their
faith in the existence of justice and order, even when suffering from
loss of property, whereas loss of children is too much affliction for
them. Others remain firm in their faith, even with the loss of their
children; but there is no one who can patiently bear the pain that
reaches his own person; he then murmurs and complains of injustice
either in his heart or with his tongue.

Now consider that the phrase, “to present themselves before the Lord,”
is used in reference to the sons of God, both the first and the second
times, but in reference to the adversary, who appeared on either
occasion among them and in their number, this phrase is not used the
first time, whilst in his second appearance “the adversary also came
among them to present himself before the Lord.” Consider this, and see
how very extraordinary it is!—These ideas presented themselves like an
inspiration to me.—The phrase, “to present themselves before the Lord,”
implies that they are beings who are forced by God’s command to do what
He desires. This may be inferred from the words of the prophet
Zechariah concerning the four chariots that came forth. He says: “And
the angel answered and said to me, These four winds of the heavens come
forth from presenting themselves before the Lord of the whole earth”
(Zech. vi. 5). It is clear that the relation of the sons of God to the
Universe is not the same as that of the adversary. The relation of the
sons of God is more constant and more permanent. The adversary has also
some relation to the Universe, but it is inferior to that of the sons
of God. It is also remarkable in this account that in the description
of the adversary’s wandering about on the earth, and his performing
certain actions, it is distinctly stated that he has no power over the
soul; whilst power has been given to him over all earthly affairs,
there is a partition between him and the soul; he has not received
power over the soul. This is expressed in the words, “But keep away
from his soul” (Job. ii. 6). I have already shown you the homonymous
use of the term “soul” (nefesh) in Hebrew (Part I., chap. xli.). It
designates that element in man that survives him; it is this portion
over which the adversary has no power.—After these remarks of mine
listen to the following useful instruction given by our Sages, who in
truth deserve the title of “wise men”; it makes clear that which
appears doubtful, and reveals that which has been hidden, and discloses
most of the mysteries of the Law. They said in the Talmud as follows:
R. Simeon, son of Lakish, says: “The adversary (satan), evil
inclination (yeẓer ha-ra’), and the angel of death, are one and the
same being.” Here we find all that has been mentioned by us in such a
clear manner that no intelligent person will be in doubt about it. It
has thus been shown to you that one and the same thing is designated by
these three different terms, and that actions ascribed to these three
are in reality the actions of one and the same agent. Again, the
ancient doctors of the Talmud said: “The adversary goes about and
misleads, then he goes up and accuses, obtains permission, and takes
the soul.” You have already been told that when David at the time of
the plague was shown the angel “with the sword drawn in his hand
stretched out over Jerusalem” (2 Sam. xxiv. 17), it was done for the
purpose of conveying a certain idea to him. The same idea was also
expressed in the vision concerning the sins of the sons of Joshua, the
high priest, by the words, “And the adversary stood on his right hand
to accuse him” (Zech. iii. 1). The vision then reveals that [the
adversary] is far from God, and continues thus: “The Lord will rebuke
thee, O adversary, the Lord who hath chosen Jerusalem will rebuke thee”
(ibid. ver. 2). Balaam saw prophetically the same vision in his
journey, addressing him with the words, “Behold I have come forth to be
a hindrance to thee” (Num. xxii. 32). The Hebrew, satan, is derived
from the same root as séteh, “turn away” (Prov. iv. 15); it implies the
notion of turning and moving away from a thing; he undoubtedly turns us
away from the way of truth, and leads us astray in the way of error.
The same idea is contained in the passage, “And the imagination of the
heart of man is evil from his youth” (Gen. viii. 21). The theory of the
good and the evil inclinations (yeẓer ha-tob, ve-yeẓer ha-ra’) is
frequently referred to in our religion. Our Sages also say, “Serve God
with your good and your evil inclinations.” (B. T. Ber. 57a.) They also
say that the evil inclination we receive at our birth; for “at the door
sin croucheth” (Gen. iv. 7), as is distinctly said in the Law, “And the
imagination of the heart of man is evil from his youth” (ibid. viii.
21). The good inclination, however, comes when the mind is developed.
In explaining the allegory representing the body of man and his
different faculties, our Sages (B. T. Ned. 32b) said: “The evil
inclination is called a great king, whilst the good inclination is a
child, poor, though wise” (Eccles. ix. 14). All these sayings of our
Sages are contained in their writings, and are well known. According to
our Sages the evil inclination, the adversary (satan), and the angel
[of death], are undoubtedly identical; and the adversary being called
“angel,” because he is among the sons of God, and the good inclination
being in reality an angel, it is to the good and the evil inclinations
that they refer in their well-known words, “Every person is accompanied
by two angels, one being on his right side, one on his left.” In the
Babylonian Gemara (Shabbath 119b), they say distinctly of the two
angels that one is good and one bad. See what extraordinary ideas this
passage discloses, and how many false ideas it removes.

I believe that I have fully explained the idea contained in the account
of Job; but I will now show the character of the opinion attributed to
Job, and of the opinions attributed to his friends, and support my
statement by proofs gathered from the words of each of them. We need
not take notice of the remaining passages which are only required for
the context, as has been explained to you in the beginning of this
treatise.






CHAPTER XXIII


Assuming the first part of the history of Job as having actually taken
place, the five, viz., Job and his friends, agreed that the misfortune
of Job was known to God, and that it was God that caused Job’s
suffering. They further agree that God does no wrong, and that no
injustice can be ascribed to Him. You will find these ideas frequently
repeated in the words of Job. When you consider the words of the five
who take part in the discussion, you will easily notice that things
said by one of them are also uttered by the rest. The arguments are
repeated, mixed up, and interrupted by Job’s description of his acute
pain and troubles, which had come upon him in spite of his strict
righteousness, and by an account of his charity, humane disposition,
and good acts. The replies of the friends to Job are likewise
interrupted by exhortations to patience, by words of comfort, and other
speeches tending to make him forget his grief. He is told by them to be
silent; that he ought not to let loose the bridle of his tongue, as if
he were in dispute with another man; that he ought silently to submit
to the judgments of God. Job replies that the intensity of his pains
did not permit him to bear patiently, to collect his thoughts and to
say what he ought to say. The friends, on the other hand, contend that
those who act well receive reward, and those who act wickedly are
punished. When a wicked and rebellious person is seen in prosperity, it
may be assumed for certain that a change will take place; he will die,
or troubles will afflict him and his house. When we find a worshipper
of God in misfortune, we may be certain that God will heal the stroke
of his wound. This idea is frequently repeated in the words of the
three friends, Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zofar, who agree in this opinion.
It is, however, not the object of this chapter to describe in what they
agree, but to define the distinguishing characteristic of each of them,
and to elucidate the opinion of each as regards the question why the
most simple and upright man is afflicted with the greatest and acutest
pain. Job found in this fact a proof that the righteous and the wicked
are equal before God, who holds all mankind in contempt. Job therefore
says (ix. 22, 23): “This is one thing, therefore I said it, He
destroyeth the perfect and the wicked. If the scourge slay suddenly, he
will laugh at the trial of the innocent.” He thus declares that when a
scourge comes suddenly, killing and destroying all it meets, God laughs
at the trial of the innocent. He further confirms this view in the
following passage: “One dieth in his full strength, being wholly at
ease and quiet. His vessels are full of milk, etc. And another dieth in
the bitterness of his soul, and never eateth with pleasure. They shall
lie down alike in the dust, and the worms shall cover them” (ibid. xxi.
23–26). In a similar manner he shows the good condition and prosperity
of wicked people; and is even very explicit on this point. He speaks
thus: “Even when I remember I am afraid, and trembling taketh hold on
my flesh. Wherefore do the wicked live, become old, yea, are mighty in
power? Their seed is established in their sight with them,” etc. (ibid.
6–8). Having thus described their prosperity, he addresses his
opponents, and says to them: “Granted that as you think, the children
of this prosperous atheist will perish after his death, and their
memory will be blotted out, what harm will the fate of his family cause
him after his death? For what pleasure hath he in his house after him,
when the number of his months is cut off in the midst?” (ibid. 21). Job
then explains that there is no hope after death, so that the cause [of
the misfortune of the righteous man] is nothing else but entire neglect
on the part of God. He is therefore surprised that God has not
abandoned the creation of man altogether; and that after having created
him, He does not take any notice of him. He says in his surprise: “Hast
thou not poured me out as milk, and curdled me like cheese?” etc.
(ibid. x. 10, seq.). This is one of the different views held by some
thinkers on Providence. Our Sages (B. T. Baba B. 16a) condemned this
view of Job as mischievous, and expressed their feeling in words like
the following: “dust should have filled the mouth of Job”; “Job wished
to upset the dish”; “Job denied the resurrection of the dead”; “He
commenced to blaspheme.” When, however, God said to Eliphaz and his
colleagues, “You have not spoken of me the thing that is right, as my
servant Job hath” (xlii. 7), our Sages assume as the cause of this
rebuke, the maxim “Man is not punished for that which he utters in his
pain”; and that God ignored the sin of Job [in his utterances], because
of the acuteness of his suffering. But this explanation does not agree
with the object of the whole allegory. The words of God are justified,
as I will show, by the fact that Job abandoned his first very erroneous
opinion, and himself proved that it was an error. It is the opinion
which suggests itself as plausible at first thought, especially in the
minds of those who meet with mishaps, well knowing that they have not
merited them through sins. This is admitted by all, and therefore this
opinion was assigned to Job. But he is represented to hold this view
only so long as he was without wisdom, and knew God only by tradition,
in the same manner as religious people generally know Him. As soon as
he had acquired a true knowledge of God, he confessed that there is
undoubtedly true felicity in the knowledge of God; it is attained by
all who acquire that knowledge, and no earthly trouble can disturb it.
So long as Job’s knowledge of God was based on tradition and
communication, and not on research, he believed that such imaginary
good as is possessed in health, riches, and children, was the utmost
that men can attain; this was the reason why he was in perplexity, and
why he uttered the above-mentioned opinions, and this is also the
meaning of his words: “I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear;
but now mine eye seeth thee. Wherefore I abhor myself, and repent
because of dust and ashes” (xlii. 5, 6); that is to say, he abhorred
all that he had desired before, and that he was sorry that he had been
in dust and ashes; comp. “and he sat down among the ashes” (ii. 8). On
account of this last utterance, which implies true perception, it is
said afterwards in reference to him, “for you have not spoken of me the
thing that is right, as my servant Job hath.”

The opinion set forth by Eliphaz in reference to Job’s suffering is
likewise one of the current views on Providence. He holds that the fate
of Job was in accordance with strict justice. Job was guilty of sins
for which he deserved his fate. Eliphaz therefore says to Job: “Is not
thy wickedness great, and thine iniquities infinite?” (xxii. 5). He
then points out to him that his upright actions and his good ways, on
which he relies, need not be so perfect in the eyes of God that no
punishment should be inflicted on him. “Behold, he putteth no trust in
his servants; and his angels he chargeth with folly: how much less in
them that dwell in houses of clay,” etc. (iv. 17–18). Eliphaz never
abandoned his belief that the fate of man is the result of justice,
that we do not know all our shortcomings for which we are punished, nor
the way how we incur the punishment through them.

Bildad the Shuhite defends in this question the theory of reward and
compensation. He therefore tells Job that if he is innocent and without
sin, his terrible misfortunes will be the source of great reward, will
be followed by the best compensation, and will prove a boon to him as
the cause of great bliss in the future world. This idea is expressed in
the words: “If thou be pure and upright, surely now he will awake for
thee, and make the habitation of thy righteousness prosperous. Though
thy beginning was small, yet thy latter end will greatly increase”
(viii. 6–8). This opinion concerning Providence is widespread, and we
have already explained it.

Zofar the Naamathite holds that the Divine Will is the source of
everything that happens; no further cause can be sought for His
actions, and it cannot be asked why He has done this and why He has not
done that. That which God does can therefore not be explained by the
way of justice or the result of wisdom. His true Essence demands that
He does what He wills; we are unable to fathom the depth of His wisdom,
and it is the law and rule of this wisdom that whatever He does is done
because it is His will and for no other cause. Zofar therefore says to
Job: “But oh that God would speak, and open his lips against thee; and
that he would show thee the secrets of wisdom, for wisdom hath two
portions! Know, therefore, that God exacteth of thee less than thine
iniquity deserveth. Canst thou by searching find out God? canst thou
find out the Almighty unto perfection?” (xi. 6–7).

In this manner consider well how the Book of Job discusses the problem,
which has perplexed many people, and led them to adopt in reference to
Divine Providence some one of the theories which I have explained
above; all possible different theories are mentioned therein. The
problem is described either by way of fiction or in accordance with
real fact, as having manifested itself in a man famous for his
excellency and wisdom. The view ascribed to Job is the theory of
Aristotle. Eliphaz holds the opinion taught in Scripture, Bildad’s
opinion is identical with that of the Muʻtazilah, whilst Zofar defends
the theory of the Asha’riyah. These were the ancient views on
Providence; later on a new theory was set forth, namely, that ascribed
to Elihu. For this reason he is placed above the others, and described
as younger in years but greater in wisdom. He censures Job for his
foolishly exalting himself, expressing surprise at such great troubles
befalling a good man, and dwelling on the praises of his own deeds. He
also tells the three friends that their minds have been weakened by
great age. A profound and wonderful discourse then follows. Reflecting
on his words we may at first thought be surprised to find that he does
not add anything to the words of Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zofar; and that
he only repeats their ideas in other terms and more explicitly. For he
likewise censures and rebukes Job, attributes justice to God, relates
His wonders in nature, and holds that God is not affected by the
service of the worshipper, nor by the disobedience of the rebellious.
All this has already been said by His colleagues. But after due
consideration we see clearly the new idea introduced by Elihu, which is
the principal object of his speech, an idea which has not been uttered
by those who spoke before him. In addition to this he mentions also
other things set forth by the previous speakers, in the same manner as
each of the rest, viz., Job and his three friends, repeat what the
others have said. The purpose of this repetition is to conceal the
opinion peculiar to each speaker, and to make all appear in the eyes of
the ordinary reader to utter one and the same view, although in reality
this is not the case. The new idea, which is peculiar to Elihu and has
not been mentioned by the others, is contained in his metaphor of the
angel’s intercession. It is a frequent occurrence, he says, that a man
becomes ill, approaches the gates of death, and is already given up by
his neighbours. If then an angel, of any kind whatever, intercedes on
his behalf and prays for him, the intercession and prayers are
accepted; the patient rises from his illness, is saved, and returns to
good health. This result is not always obtained; intercession and
deliverance do not always follow each other; it happens only twice, or
three times. Elihu therefore says: “If there be an angel with him, an
interpreter, one among a thousand, to show unto man his uprightness,”
etc. (xxxiii. 29). He then describes man’s condition when convalescent
and the rejoicing at his recovery, and continues thus: “Lo, all these
things worketh God twice, three times with man” (ibid. 29). This idea
occurs only in the words of Elihu. His description of the method of
prophecy in preceding verses is likewise new. He says: “Surely God
speaketh in one way, yea in two ways, yet man perceiveth it not. In a
dream, in a vision of the night, when deep sleep falleth upon man, in
slumberings upon the bed” (ibid. 14, 15). He afterwards supports and
illustrates his theory by a description of many natural phenomena, such
as thunder, lightning, rain, and winds; with these are mixed up
accounts of various incidents of life, e.g., an account of pestilence
contained in the following passage: “In a moment they die, and at
midnight; the people become tumultuous and pass away” (xxxiv. 20).
Great wars are described in the following verse: “He breaketh in pieces
mighty men without number, and setteth others in their stead” (ibid.
24). There are many more passages of this kind. In a similar manner the
Revelation that reached Job (chap. xxxviii., chap. xli.), and explained
to him the error of his whole belief, constantly describes natural
objects, and nothing else; it describes the elements, meteorological
phenomena, and peculiarities of various kinds of living beings. The
sky, the heavens, Orion and Pleiades are only mentioned in reference to
their influence upon our atmosphere, so that Job’s attention is in this
prophecy only called to things below the lunar sphere. Elihu likewise
derives instruction from the nature of various kinds of animals. Thus
he says: “He teacheth us through the beasts of the earth, and maketh us
wise through the fowls of heaven” (xxxv. 11). He dwells longest on the
nature of the Leviathan, which possesses a combination of bodily
peculiarities found separate in different animals, in those that walk,
those that swim, and those that fly. The description of all these
things serves to impress on our minds that we are unable to comprehend
how these transient creatures come into existence, or to imagine how
their natural properties commenced to exist, and that these are not
like the things which we are able to produce. Much less can we compare
the manner in which God rules and manages His creatures with the manner
in which we rule and manage certain beings. We must content ourselves
with this, and believe that nothing is hidden from God, as Elihu says:
“For his eyes are upon the ways of man, and he seeth all his goings.
There is no darkness nor shadow of death, where the workers of iniquity
may hide themselves” (xxxiv. 21, 22). But the term management, when
applied to God, has not the same meaning which it has when applied to
us; and when we say that He rules His creatures we do not mean that He
does the same as we do when we rule over other beings. The term “rule”
has not the same definition in both cases; it signifies two different
notions, which have nothing in common but the name. In the same manner,
as there is a difference between works of nature and productions of
human handicraft, so there is a difference between God’s rule,
providence, and intention in reference to all natural forces, and our
rule, providence, and intention in reference to things which are the
objects of our rule, providence, and intention. This lesson is the
principal object of the whole Book of Job; it lays down this principle
of faith, and recommends us to derive a proof from nature, that we
should not fall into the error of imagining His knowledge to be similar
to ours, or His intention, providence, and rule similar to ours. When
we know this we shall find everything that may befall us easy to bear;
mishap will create no doubts in our hearts concerning God, whether He
knows our affairs or not, whether He provides for us or abandons us. On
the contrary, our fate will increase our love of God; as is said in the
end of this prophecy: “Therefore I abhor myself and repent concerning
the dust and ashes” (xlii. 6); and as our Sages say: “The pious do
everything out of love, and rejoice in their own afflictions.” (B. T.
Shabb. 88b.) If you pay to my words the attention which this treatise
demands, and examine all that is said in the Book of Job, all will be
clear to you, and you will find that I have grasped and taken hold of
the whole subject; nothing has been left unnoticed, except such
portions as are only introduced because of the context and the whole
plan of the allegory. I have explained this method several times in the
course of this treatise.






CHAPTER XXIV


The doctrine of trials is open to great objections; it is in fact more
exposed to objections than any other thing taught in Scripture. It is
mentioned in Scripture six times, as I will show in this chapter.
People have generally the notion that trials consist in afflictions and
mishaps sent by God to man, not as punishments for past sins, but as
giving opportunity for great reward. This principle is not mentioned in
Scripture in plain language, and it is only in one of the six places
referred to that the literal meaning conveys this notion. I will
explain the meaning of that passage later on. The principle taught in
Scripture is exactly the reverse; for it is said: “He is a God of
faithfulness, and there is no iniquity in him” (Deut. xxxii. 4).

The teaching of our Sages, although some of them approve this general
belief [concerning trials], is on the whole against it. For they say,
“There is no death without sin, and no affliction without
transgression.” (See p. 285.) Every intelligent religious person should
have this faith, and should not ascribe any wrong to God, who is far
from it; he must not assume that a person is innocent and perfect and
does not deserve what has befallen him. The trials mentioned in
Scripture in the [six] passages, seem to have been tests and
experiments by which God desired to learn the intensity of the faith
and the devotion of a man or a nation. [If this were the case] it would
be very difficult to comprehend the object of the trials, and yet the
sacrifice of Isaac seems to be a case of this kind, as none witnessed
it, but God and the two concerned [Abraham and Isaac]. Thus God says to
Abraham, “For now I know that thou fearest God,” etc. (Gen. xxii. 12).
In another passage it is said: “For the Lord your God proveth you to
know whether ye love,” etc. (Deut. xiii. 4). Again, “And to prove thee
to know what was in thine heart,” etc. (ibid. viii. 2). I will now
remove all the difficulties.

The sole object of all the trials mentioned in Scripture is to teach
man what he ought to do or believe; so that the event which forms the
actual trial is not the end desired; it is but an example for our
instruction and guidance. Hence the words “to know (la-daʻat) whether
ye love,” etc., do not mean that God desires to know whether they loved
God; for He already knows it; but la-daʻat, “to know,” has here the
same meaning as in the phrase “to know (la-daʻat) that I am the Lord
that sanctifieth you” (Exod. xxxi. 13), i.e., that all nations shall
know that I am the Lord who sanctifieth you. In a similar manner
Scripture says:—If a man should rise, pretend to be a prophet, and show
you his signs by which he desired to convince you that his words are
true, know that God intends thereby to prove to the nations how firmly
you believe in the truth of God’s word, and how well you have
comprehended the true Essence of God; that you cannot be misled by any
tempter to corrupt your faith in God. Your religion will then afford a
guidance to all who seek the truth, and of all religions man will
choose that which is so firmly established that it is not shaken by the
performance of a miracle. For a miracle cannot prove that which is
impossible; it is useful only as a confirmation of that which is
possible, as we have explained in our Mishneh-torah. (Yesode ha-torah
vii. f. viii. 3.)

Having shown that the term “to know” means “that all people may know,”
we apply this interpretation to the following words said in reference
to the manna: “To humble thee, and to prove thee, to know what was in
thine heart, whether thou wouldst keep his commandments, or not” (Deut.
viii. 2). All nations shall know, it shall be published throughout the
world, that those who devote themselves to the service of God are
supported beyond their expectation. In the same sense it was said when
the manna commenced to come down, “that I may prove them whether they
will walk in my law or no” (Exod. xvi. 4); i.e., let every one who
desires try and see whether it is useful and sufficient to devote
himself to the service of God. It is, however, said a third time in
reference to the manna: “Who fed thee in the wilderness with manna,
which thy fathers knew not, that he might humble thee, and that he
might prove thee, to do thee good at thy latter end” (Deut. viii. 16).
This might induce us to think that God sometimes afflicts man for the
purpose of increasing his reward. But in truth this is not the case. We
may rather assume one of the two following explanations; either this
passage expresses the same idea as is expressed in the first and second
passages, viz., to show [to all people] whether faith in God is
sufficient to secure man’s maintenance and his relief from care and
trouble, or not. Or the Hebrew term le-nassoteka means “to accustom
thee”; the word is used in this sense in the following passage: “She
has not accustomed (nisseta) the sole of her foot to set it upon the
ground” (ibid. xxviii. 56). The meaning of the above passage would then
be: “God has first trained you in the hardships of the wilderness, in
order to increase your welfare when you enter the land of Canaan.” It
is indeed a fact that the transition from trouble to ease gives more
pleasure than continual ease. It is also known that the Israelites
would not have been able to conquer the land and fight with its
inhabitants, if they had not previously undergone the trouble and
hardship of the wilderness. Scripture says in reference to this: “For
God said, Lest peradventure the people repent when they see war, and
they return to Egypt. But God led the people about, through the way of
the wilderness of the Red Sea; and the children of Israel went up
harnessed out of the land of Egypt” (Exod. xiii. 17, 18). Ease destroys
bravery, whilst trouble and care for food create strength; and this was
[also for the Israelites] the good that ultimately came out of their
wanderings in the wilderness. The passage, “For God is come to prove
you, and that his fear may be before your faces, that ye sin not”
(ibid. xx. 20), expresses the same idea as is expressed in Deuteronomy
(xiii. 4) in reference to a person who prophesies in the name of idols,
namely in the words: “For the Lord your God proveth you to know whether
ye love the Lord.” We have already explained the meaning of the latter
passage. In the same sense Moses said to the Israelites when they stood
round Mount Sinai: “Do not fear; the object of this great sight which
you perceived is that you should see the truth with your own eyes. When
the Lord your God, in order to show your faithfulness to Him, will
prove you by a false prophet, who will tell you the reverse of what you
have heard, you will remain firm and your steps will not slide. If I
had come as a messenger as you desired, and had told you that which had
been said unto me and which you had not heard, you would perhaps
consider as true what another might tell you in opposition to that
which you heard from me. But it is different now, as you have heard it
in the midst of the great sight.”

The account of Abraham our father binding his son, includes two great
ideas or principles of our faith. First, it shows us the extent and
limit of the fear of God. Abraham is commanded to perform a certain
act, which is not equalled by any surrender of property or by any
sacrifice of life, for it surpasses everything that can be done, and
belongs to the class of actions which are believed to be contrary to
human feelings. He had been without child, and had been longing for a
child; he had great riches, and was expecting that a nation should
spring from his seed. After all hope of a son had already been given
up, a son was born unto him. How great must have been his delight in
the child! how intensely must he have loved him! And yet because he
feared God, and loved to do what God commanded, he thought little of
that beloved child, and set aside all his hopes concerning him, and
consented to kill him after a journey of three days. If the act by
which he showed his readiness to kill his son had taken place
immediately when he received the commandment, it might have been the
result of confusion and not of consideration. But the fact that he
performed it three days after he had received the commandment, proves
the presence of thought, proper consideration, and careful examination
of what is due to the Divine command and what is in accordance with the
love and fear of God. There is no necessity to look for the presence of
any other idea or of anything that might have affected his emotions.
For Abraham did not hasten to kill Isaac out of fear that God might
slay him or make him poor, but solely because it is man’s duty to love
and to fear God, even without hope of reward or fear of punishment. We
have repeatedly explained this. The angel, therefore, says to him, “For
now I know,” etc. (ibid. ver. 12), that is, from this action, for which
you deserve to be truly called a God-fearing man, all people shall
learn how far we must go in the fear of God. This idea is confirmed in
Scripture; it is distinctly stated that one sole thing, fear of God, is
the object of the whole Law with its affirmative and negative precepts,
its promises and its historical examples, for it is said, “If thou wilt
not observe to do all the words of this Law that are written in this
book, that thou mayest fear this glorious and fearful name, the Lord
thy God,” etc. (Deut. xxviii. 58). This is one of the two purposes of
the ʻakedah (sacrifice or binding of Isaac).

The second purpose is to show how the prophets believed in the truth of
that which came to them from God by way of inspiration. We shall not
think that what the prophets heard or saw in allegorical figures may at
times have included incorrect or doubtful elements, since the Divine
communication was made to them, as we have shown, in a dream or a
vision and through the imaginative faculty. Scripture thus tells us
that whatever the Prophet perceives in a prophetic vision, he considers
as true and correct and not open to any doubt; it is in his eyes like
all other things perceived by the senses or by the intellect. This is
proved by the consent of Abraham to slay “his only son whom he loved,”
as he was commanded, although the commandment was received in a dream
or a vision. If the Prophets had any doubt or suspicion as regards the
truth of what they saw in a prophetic dream or perceived in a prophetic
vision, they would not have consented to do what is unnatural, and
Abraham would not have found in his soul strength enough to perform
that act, if he had any doubt [as regards the truth of the
commandment]. It was just the right thing that this lesson derived from
the ʻakedah (“sacrifice”) should be taught through Abraham and a man
like Isaac. For Abraham was the first to teach the Unity of God, to
establish the faith [in Him], to cause it to remain among coming
generations, and to win his fellow-men for his doctrine; as Scripture
says of him: “I know him, that he will command,” etc. (Gen. viii. 19).
In the same manner as he was followed by others in his true and
valuable opinions when they were heard from him, so also the principles
should be accepted that may be learnt from his actions; especially from
the act by which he confirmed the principle of the truth of prophecy,
and showed how far we must go in the fear and the love of God.

This is the way how we have to understand the accounts of trials; we
must not think that God desires to examine us and to try us in order to
know what He did not know before. Far is this from Him; He is far above
that which ignorant and foolish people imagine concerning Him, in the
evil of their thoughts. Note this.






CHAPTER XXV


[Man’s] actions are divided as regards their object into four classes;
they are either purposeless, unimportant, in vain, or good. An action
is in vain if the object which is sought by it is not obtained on
account of some obstacles. Thus people frequently use the phrase “thou
hast worked in vain” in reference to a person who looks out for some
one and cannot find him; or who undertakes the troubles of a journey
for his business without profit. Our endeavours and exertions are in
vain as regards a patient that is not cured. This applies to all
actions which are intended for certain purposes that are not realized.
Purposeless are such actions, which serve no purpose at all. Some
persons, e.g., do something with their hands whilst thinking of
something else. The actions of the insane and confused are of this
kind. Unimportant are such actions by which a trivial object is sought,
an object that is not necessary and is not of great use. This is the
case when a person dances without seeking to benefit his digestion by
that exercise, or performs certain actions for the purpose of causing
laughter. Such actions are certainly mere pastimes. Whether an action
belongs to this class or not depends on the intention of those who
perform it, and on the degree of their perfection. For many things are
necessary or very useful in the opinion of one person and superfluous
in the opinion of another. E.g., bodily exercise, in its different
kinds, is necessary for the proper preservation of health in the
opinion of him who understands the science of medicine; writing is
considered as very useful by scholars. When people take exercise by
playing with the ball, wrestling, stretching out the hands or keeping
back the breathing, or do certain things as preparation for writing,
shape the pen and get the paper ready, such actions are mere pastimes
in the eyes of the ignorant, but the wise do not consider them as
unimportant. Useful are such actions as serve a proper purpose; being
either necessary or useful for the purpose which is to be attained.
This division [of man’s actions] is, as I believe, not open to any
objection. For every action is either intended for a certain purpose or
is not intended; and if intended for a certain purpose, that purpose
may be important or unimportant, is sometimes attained and sometimes
missed. This division is therefore complete.

After having explained this division, I contend that no intelligent
person can assume that any of the actions of God can be in vain,
purposeless, or unimportant. According to our view and the view of all
that follow the Law of Moses, all actions of God are “exceedingly
good.” Thus Scripture says, “And God saw everything that he had made,
and behold, it was very good” (Gen. i. 31). And that which God made for
a certain thing is necessary or [at least] very useful for the
existence of that thing. Thus food is necessary for the existence of
living beings; the possession of eyes is very useful to man during his
life, although food only serves to sustain living beings a certain
time, and the senses are only intended to procure to animals the
advantages of sensation. The philosophers likewise assume that in
Nature there is nothing in vain, so that everything that is not the
product of human industry serves a certain purpose, which may be known
or unknown to us. There are thinkers that assume that God does not
create one thing for the sake of another, that existing things are not
to each other in the relation of cause and effect; that they are all
the direct result of the Will of God, and do not serve any purpose.
According to this opinion we cannot ask why has He made this and not
that; for He does what pleases Him, without following a fixed system.
Those who defend this theory must consider the actions of God as
purposeless, and even as inferior to purposeless actions; for when we
perform purposeless actions, our attention is engaged by other things
and we do not know what we are doing; but God, according to these
theorists, knows what He is doing, and knowingly does it for no purpose
or use whatever. The absurdity of assuming that some of God’s actions
are trivial, is apparent even at first sight, and no notice need be
taken of the nonsensical idea that monkeys were created for our
pastime. Such opinions originate only in man’s ignorance of the nature
of transient beings, and in his overlooking the principle that it was
intended by the Creator to produce in its present form everything whose
existence is possible; a different form was not decreed by the Divine
Wisdom, and the existence [of objects of a different form] is therefore
impossible, because the existence of all things depends on the decree
of God’s wisdom. Those who hold that God’s works serve no purpose
whatever believe that an examination of the totality of existing things
compels them to adopt this theory. They ask what is the purpose of the
whole Universe? they necessarily answer, like all those who believe in
the Creation, that it was created because God willed it so, and for no
other purpose. The same answer they apply to all parts of the Universe,
and do not admit that the hole in the uvea and the transparency of the
cornea are intended for the purpose of allowing the spiritus visus to
pass and to perceive certain objects; they do not assume that these
circumstances are causes for the sight; the hole in the uvea and the
transparent matter over it are not there because of the sight, but
because of the Will of God, although the sense of sight could have been
created in a different form. There are passages in the Bible which at
first sight we might understand to imply this theory. E.g., “The Lord
hath done whatever he pleased” (Ps. cxxxv. 6); “His soul desired it and
he made it” (Job xxiii. 13); “Who will say unto thee, What doest thou?”
(Eccles. viii. 4). The meaning of these and similar verses is this:
whatever God desires to do is necessarily done; there is nothing that
could prevent the realization of His will. The object of His will is
only that which is possible, and of the things possible only such as
His wisdom decrees upon. When God desires to produce the best work, no
obstacle or hindrance intervenes between Him and that work. This is the
opinion held by all religious people, also by the philosophers; it is
also our opinion. For although we believe that God created the Universe
from nothing, most of our wise and learned men believe that the
Creation was not the exclusive result of His will; but His wisdom,
which we are unable to comprehend, made the actual existence of the
Universe necessary. The same unchangeable wisdom found it as necessary
that non-existence should precede the existence of the Universe. Our
Sages frequently express this idea in the explanation of the words, “He
hath made everything beautiful in his time” (Eccles. iii. 11), only in
order to avoid that which is objectionable, viz., the opinion that God
does things without any purpose whatever. This is the belief of most of
our Theologians; and in a similar manner have the Prophets expressed
the idea that all parts of natural products are well arranged, in good
order, connected with each other, and stand to each other in the
relation of cause and effect; nothing of them is purposeless, trivial,
or in vain; they are all the result of great wisdom. Comp. “O Lord, how
manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all: the earth is
full of thy riches” (Ps. civ. 24); “And all his works are done in
truth” (ibid. xxxiii. 4); “The Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth”
(Prov. iii. 19). This idea occurs frequently; there is no necessity to
believe otherwise; philosophic speculation leads to the same result;
viz., that in the whole of Nature there is nothing purposeless,
trivial, or unnecessary, especially in the Nature of the spheres, which
are in the best condition and order, in accordance with their superior
substance.

Know that the difficulties which lead to confusion in the question what
is the purpose of the Universe or of any of its parts, arise from two
causes: first, man has an erroneous idea of himself, and believes that
the whole world exists only for his sake; secondly, he is ignorant both
about the nature of the sublunary world, and about the Creator’s
intention to give existence to all beings whose existence is possible,
because existence is undoubtedly good. The consequences of that error
and of the ignorance about the two things named, are doubts and
confusion, which lead many to imagine that some of God’s works are
trivial, others purposeless, and others in vain. Those who adopt this
absurd idea that God’s actions are utterly purposeless, and refuse to
consider them as the result of His wisdom, are afraid they might
otherwise be compelled to admit the theory of the Eternity of the
Universe, and guard themselves against it by the above theory. I have
already told you the view which is set forth in Scripture on this
question, and which it is proper to accept. It is this: it is not
unreasonable to assume that the works of God, their existence and
preceding non-existence, are the result of His wisdom, but we are
unable to understand many of the ways of His wisdom in His works. On
this principle the whole Law of Moses is based; it begins with this
principle: “And God saw all that He had made, and, behold, it was very
good” (Gen. i. 31); and it ends with this principle: “The Rock, perfect
is His work” (Deut. xxxii. 4). Note it. When you examine this view and
that of the philosophers, taking into consideration all preceding
chapters which are connected with this subject, you will find that
there is no other difference of opinion as regards any portions of the
Universe, except that the philosophers believe in the Eternity of the
Universe and we believe in the Creation. Note this.






CHAPTER XXVI


As Theologians are divided on the question whether the actions of God
are the result of His wisdom, or only of His will without being
intended for any purpose whatever, so they are also divided as regards
the object of the commandments which God gave us. Some of them hold
that the commandments have no object at all; and are only dictated by
the will of God. Others are of opinion that all commandments and
prohibitions are dictated by His wisdom and serve a certain aim;
consequently there is a reason for each one of the precepts; they are
enjoined because they are useful. All of us, the common people as well
as the scholars, believe that there is a reason for every precept,
although there are commandments the reason of which is unknown to us,
and in which the ways of God’s wisdom are incomprehensible. This view
is distinctly expressed in Scripture; comp. “righteous statutes and
judgments” (Deut. iv. 8); “the judgments of the Lord are true, and
righteous altogether” (Ps. xix. 10). There are commandments which are
called ḥuḳḳim, “ordinances,” like the prohibition of wearing garments
of wool and linen (shaʻatnez), boiling meat and milk together, and the
sending of the goat [into the wilderness on the Day of Atonement]. Our
Sages use in reference to them phrases like the following: “These are
things which I have fully ordained for thee; and you dare not criticize
them”; “Your evil inclination is turned against them”; and “non-Jews
find them strange.” But our Sages generally do not think that such
precepts have no cause whatever, and serve no purpose; for this would
lead us to assume that God’s actions are purposeless. On the contrary,
they hold that even these ordinances have a cause, and are certainly
intended for some use, although it is not known to us; owing either to
the deficiency of our knowledge or the weakness of our intellect.
Consequently there is a cause for every commandment; every positive or
negative precept serves a useful object; in some cases the usefulness
is evident, e.g., the prohibition of murder and theft; in others the
usefulness is not so evident, e.g., the prohibition of enjoying the
fruit of a tree in the first three years (Lev. xix. 23), or of a
vineyard in which other seeds have been growing (Deut. xxii. 9). Those
commandments, whose object is generally evident, are called “judgments”
(mishpatim); those whose object is not generally clear are called
“ordinances” (ḥuḳḳim). Thus they say [in reference to the words of
Moses]: Ki lo dabar rek hu mi-kem (lit. “for it is not a vain thing for
you,” Deut. xxxii. 74); “It is not in vain, and if it is in vain, it is
only so through you.” That is to say, the giving of these commandments
is not a vain thing and without any useful object; and if it appears so
to you in any commandment, it is owing to the deficiency in your
comprehension. You certainly know the famous saying that Solomon knew
the reason for all commandments except that of the “red heifer.” Our
Sages also said that God concealed the causes of commandments, lest
people should despise them, as Solomon did in respect to three
commandments, the reason for which is clearly stated. In this sense
they always speak; and Scriptural texts support the idea. I have,
however, found one utterance made by them in Bereshit-rabba (sect.
xliv.), which might at first sight appear to imply that some
commandments have no other reason but the fact that they are commanded,
that no other object is intended by them, and that they do not serve
any useful object. I mean the following passage: What difference does
it make to God whether a beast is killed by cutting the neck in front
or in the back? Surely the commandments are only intended as a means of
trying man; in accordance with the verse, “The word of God is a test”
(lit. tried) (Ps. xviii. 31). Although this passage is very strange,
and has no parallel in the writings of our Sages, I explain it, as you
shall soon hear, in such a manner that I remain in accord with the
meaning of their words and do not depart from the principle which we
agreed upon, that the commandments serve a useful object; “for it is
not a vain thing for you”; “I have not said to the seed of Jacob, seek
me in vain. I the Lord speak righteousness, declare that which is
right” (Isa. xlv. 19). I will now tell you what intelligent persons
ought to believe in this respect; namely, that each commandment has
necessarily a cause, as far as its general character is concerned, and
serves a certain object; but as regards its details we hold that it has
no ulterior object. Thus killing animals for the purpose of obtaining
good food is certainly useful, as we intend to show (below, ch.
xlviii.); that, however, the killing should not be performed by neḥirah
(poleaxing the animal), but by sheḥitah (cutting the neck), and by
dividing the œsophagus and the windpipe in a certain place; these
regulations and the like are nothing but tests for man’s obedience. In
this sense you will understand the example quoted by our Sages [that
there is no difference] between killing the animal by cutting its neck
in front and cutting it in the back. I give this instance only because
it has been mentioned by our Sages; but in reality [there is some
reason for these regulations]. For as it has become necessary to eat
the flesh of animals, it was intended by the above regulations to
ensure an easy death and to effect it by suitable means; whilst
decapitation requires a sword or a similar instrument, the sheḥitah can
be performed with any instrument; and in order to ensure an easy death
our Sages insisted that the knife should be well sharpened.

A more suitable instance can be cited from the detailed commandments
concerning sacrifices. The law that sacrifices should be brought is
evidently of great use, as will be shown by us (infra, chap. xlvi.);
but we cannot say why one offering should be a lamb, whilst another is
a ram; and why a fixed number of them should be brought. Those who
trouble themselves to find a cause for any of these detailed rules, are
in my eyes void of sense; they do not remove any difficulties, but
rather increase them. Those who believe that these detailed rules
originate in a certain cause, are as far from the truth as those who
assume that the whole law is useless. You must know that Divine Wisdom
demanded it—or, if you prefer, say that circumstances made it
necessary—that there should be parts [of His work] which have no
certain object; and as regards the Law, it appears to be impossible
that it should not include some matter of this kind. That it cannot be
avoided may be seen from the following instance. You ask why must a
lamb be sacrificed and not a ram? but the same question would be asked,
why a ram had been commanded instead of a lamb, so long as one
particular kind is required. The same is to be said as to the question
why were seven lambs sacrificed and not eight; the same question might
have been asked if there were eight, ten, or twenty lambs, so long as
some definite number of lambs were sacrificed. It is almost similar to
the nature of a thing which can receive different forms, but actually
receives one of them. We must not ask why it has this form and not
another which is likewise possible, because we should have to ask the
same question if instead of its actual form the thing had any of the
other possible forms. Note this, and understand it. The repeated
assertion of our Sages that there are reasons for all commandments, and
the tradition that Solomon knew them, refer to the general purpose of
the commandments, and not to the object of every detail. This being the
case, I find it convenient to divide the six hundred and thirteen
precepts into classes; each class will include many precepts of the
same kind, or related to each other by their character. I will [first]
explain the reason of each class, and show its undoubted and undisputed
object, and then I shall discuss each commandment in the class, and
expound its reason. Only very few will be left unexplained, the reason
for which I have been unable to trace unto this day. I have also been
able to comprehend in some cases even the object of many of the
conditions and details as far as these can be discovered. You will hear
all this later on. But in order to fully explain these reasons I must
premise several chapters; in these I will discuss principles which form
the basis of my theory. I will now begin these chapters.






CHAPTER XXVII


The general object of the Law is twofold: the well-being of the soul,
and the well-being of the body. The well-being of the soul is promoted
by correct opinions communicated to the people according to their
capacity. Some of these opinions are therefore imparted in a plain
form, others allegorically; because certain opinions are in their plain
form too strong for the capacity of the common people. The well-being
of the body is established by a proper management of the relations in
which we live one to another. This we can attain in two ways: first by
removing all violence from our midst; that is to say, that we do not do
every one as he pleases, desires, and is able to do; but every one of
us does that which contributes towards the common welfare. Secondly, by
teaching every one of us such good morals as must produce a good social
state. Of these two objects, the one, the well-being of the soul, or
the communication of correct opinions, comes undoubtedly first in rank,
but the other, the well-being of the body, the government of the state,
and the establishment of the best possible relations among men, is
anterior in nature and time. The latter object is required first; it is
also treated [in the Law] most carefully and most minutely, because the
well-being of the soul can only be obtained after that of the body has
been secured. For it has already been found that man has a double
perfection: the first perfection is that of the body, and the second
perfection is that of the soul. The first consists in the most healthy
condition of his material relations, and this is only possible when man
has all his wants supplied, as they arise; if he has his food, and
other things needful for his body, e.g., shelter, bath, and the like.
But one man alone cannot procure all this; it is impossible for a
single man to obtain this comfort; it is only possible in society,
since man, as is well known, is by nature social.

The second perfection of man consists in his becoming an actually
intelligent being; i.e., he knows about the things in existence all
that a person perfectly developed is capable of knowing. This second
perfection certainly does not include any action or good conduct, but
only knowledge, which is arrived at by speculation, or established by
research.

It is clear that the second and superior kind of perfection can only be
attained when the first perfection has been acquired; for a person that
is suffering from great hunger, thirst, heat, or cold, cannot grasp an
idea even if communicated by others, much less can he arrive at it by
his own reasoning. But when a person is in possession of the first
perfection, then he may possibly acquire the second perfection, which
is undoubtedly of a superior kind, and is alone the source of eternal
life. The true Law, which as we said is one, and beside which there is
no other Law, viz., the Law of our teacher Moses, has for its purpose
to give us the twofold perfection. It aims first at the establishment
of good mutual relations among men by removing injustice and creating
the noblest feelings. In this way the people in every land are enabled
to stay and continue in one condition, and every one can acquire his
first perfection. Secondly, it seeks to train us in faith, and to
impart correct and true opinions when the intellect is sufficiently
developed. Scripture clearly mentions the twofold perfection, and tells
us that its acquisition is the object of all the divine commandments.
Comp. “And the Lord commanded us to do all these statutes, to fear the
Lord our God, for our good always, that he might preserve us alive as
it is this day” (Deut. vi. 24). Here the second perfection is first
mentioned because it is of greater importance, being, as we have shown,
the ultimate aim of man’s existence. This perfection is expressed in
the phrase, “for our good always.” You know the interpretation of our
Sages, “‘that it may be well with thee’ (ibid. xxii. 7), namely, in the
world that is all good, ‘and that thou mayest prolong thy days’
(ibid.), i.e., in the world that is all eternal.” In the same sense I
explain the words, “for our good always,” to mean that we may come into
the world that is all good and eternal, where we may live permanently;
and the words, “that he might preserve us alive as it is this day,” I
explain as referring to our first and temporal existence, to that of
our body, which cannot be in a perfect and good condition except by the
co-operation of society, as has been shown by us.






CHAPTER XXVIII


It is necessary to bear in mind that Scripture only teaches the chief
points of those true principles which lead to the true perfection of
man, and only demands in general terms faith in them. Thus Scripture
teaches the Existence, the Unity, the Omniscience, the Omnipotence, the
Will, and the Eternity of God. All this is given in the form of final
results, but they cannot be understood fully and accurately except
after the acquisition of many kinds of knowledge. Scripture further
demands belief in certain truths, the belief in which is indispensable
in regulating our social relations; such is the belief that God is
angry with those who disobey Him, for it leads us to the fear and dread
of disobedience [to the will of God]. There are other truths in
reference to the whole of the Universe which form the substance of the
various and many kinds of speculative sciences, and afford the means of
verifying the above-mentioned principles as their final result. But
Scripture does not so distinctly prescribe the belief in them as it
does in the first case; it is implied in the commandment, “to love the
Lord” (Deut. xi. 13). It may be inferred from the words, “And thou
shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul,
and with all thy might” (ibid. vi. 5), what stress is laid on this
commandment to love God. We have already shown in the Mishneh-torah
(Yes. ha-torah ii. 2) that this love is only possible when we
comprehend the real nature of things, and understand the divine wisdom
displayed therein. We have likewise mentioned there what our Sages
remark on this subject.

The result of all these preliminary remarks is this: The reason of a
commandment, whether positive or negative, is clear, and its usefulness
evident, if it directly tends to remove injustice, or to teach good
conduct that furthers the well-being of society, or to impart a truth
which ought to be believed either on its own merit or as being
indispensable for facilitating the removal of injustice or the teaching
of good morals. There is no occasion to ask for the object of such
commandments; for no one can, e.g., be in doubt as to the reason why we
have been commanded to believe that God is one; why we are forbidden to
murder, to steal, and to take vengeance, or to retaliate, or why we are
commanded to love one another. But there are precepts concerning which
people are in doubt, and of divided opinions, some believing that they
are mere commands, and serve no purpose whatever, whilst others believe
that they serve a certain purpose, which, however, is unknown to man.
Such are those precepts which in their literal meaning do not seem to
further any of the three above-named results: to impart some truth, to
teach some moral, or to remove injustice. They do not seem to have any
influence upon the well-being of the soul by imparting any truth, or
upon the well-being of the body by suggesting such ways and rules as
are useful in the government of a state, or in the management of a
household. Such are the prohibitions of wearing garments containing
wool and linen; of sowing divers seeds, or of boiling meat and milk
together; the commandment of covering the blood [of slaughtered beasts
and birds], the ceremony of breaking the neck of a calf [in case of a
person being found slain, and the murderer being unknown]; the law
concerning the first-born of an ass, and the like. I am prepared to
tell you my explanation of all these commandments, and to assign for
them a true reason supported by proof, with the exception of some minor
rules, and of a few commandments, as I have mentioned above. I will
show that all these and similar laws must have some bearing upon one of
the following three things, viz., the regulation of our opinions, or
the improvement of our social relations, which implies two things, the
removal of injustice, and the teaching of good morals. Consider what we
said of the opinions [implied in the laws]; in some cases the law
contains a truth which is itself the only object of that law, as e.g.,
the truth of the Unity, Eternity, and Incorporeality of God; in other
cases, that truth is only the means of securing the removal of
injustice, or the acquisition of good morals; such is the belief that
God is angry with those who oppress their fellow-men, as it is said,
“Mine anger will be kindled, and I will slay,” etc. (Exod. xxii. 23);
or the belief that God hears the crying of the oppressed and vexed, to
deliver them out of the hands of the oppressor and tyrant, as it is
written, “And it shall come to pass, when he will cry unto me, that I
will hear, for I am gracious” (Exod. xxii. 25).






CHAPTER XXIX


It is well known that the Patriarch Abraham was brought up in the
religion and the opinion of the Sabeans, that there is no divine being
except the stars. I will tell you in this chapter their works which are
at present extant in Arabic translations, and also in their ancient
chronicles; and I will show you their opinion and their practice
according to these books. You will then see clearly that they consider
the stars as deities, and the sun as the chief deity. They believe that
all the seven stars are gods, but the two luminaries are greater than
all the rest. They say distinctly that the sun governs the world, both
that which is above and that which is below; these are exactly their
expressions. In these books, and in their chronicles, the history of
Abraham our father is given in the following manner. Abraham was
brought up in Kutha; when he differed from the people and declared that
there is a Maker besides the sun, they raised certain objections, and
mentioned in their arguments the evident and manifest action of the sun
in the Universe. “You are right,” said Abraham; “[the sun acts in the
same manner] as ‘the axe in the hand of him that hews with it.’” Then
some of his arguments against his opponents are mentioned. In short,
the king put him in prison; but he continued many days, while in
prison, to argue against them. At last the king was afraid that Abraham
might corrupt the kingdom, and turn the people away from their
religion; he therefore expelled Abraham into Syria, after having
deprived him of all his property.

This is their account which you find clearly stated in the book called
The Nabatean Agriculture. Nothing is said there of the account given in
our trustworthy books, nor do they mention what he learnt by way of
prophecy; for they refused to believe him, because he attacked their
evil doctrine. I do not doubt that when he attacked the doctrine of all
his fellow-men, he was cursed, despised, and scorned by these people
who adhered to their erroneous opinions. When he submitted to this
treatment for the sake of God, as ought to be done for the sake of His
glory, God said to him, “And I will bless them that bless thee, and
curse them that curse thee” (Gen. xii. 3). The result of the course
which Abraham took, is the fact that most people, as we see at present,
agree in praising him, and being proud of him; so that even those who
are not his descendants call themselves by his name. No one opposes
him, and no one ignores his merits, except some ignoble remnants of the
nations left in the remote corners of the earth, like the savage Turks
in the extreme North, and the Indians in the extreme South. These are
remnants of the Sabeans, who once filled the earth. Those who were able
to think, and were philosophers in those days, could only raise
themselves to the idea that God is the spirit of the spheres; the
spheres with their stars being the body, and God the spirit. Abu-becr
al-Zaig mentions this in his Commentary on the book of Physics.

All the Sabeans thus believed in the eternity of the Universe, the
heavens being in their opinion God. Adam was in their belief a human
being born from male and female, like the rest of mankind; he was only
distinguished from his fellow-men by being a prophet sent by the moon;
he accordingly called men to the worship of the moon, and he wrote
several works on agriculture. The Sabeans further relate that Noah was
an agriculturist, and that he was not pleased with the worship of
idols; they blame him for that, and say that he did not worship any
image. In their writings we meet even with the statement that Noah was
rebuked and imprisoned because he worshipped God, and with many other
accounts about him. The Sabeans contend that Seth differed from his
father Adam, as regards the worship of the moon. They manufactured
ridiculous stories, which prove that their authors were very deficient
in knowledge, that they were by no means philosophers, but on the
contrary were extremely ignorant persons. Adam, they say, left the
torrid zone near India and entered the region of Babylon, bringing with
him wonderful things, such as a golden tree, that was growing, and had
leaves and branches; a stone tree of the same kind, and a fresh leaf of
a tree proof against fire. He related that there was a tree which could
shelter ten thousand men, although it had only the height of a man; two
leaves he brought with him, each of which was sufficient to cover two
men. Of these stories the Sabeans have a wonderful abundance. I am
surprised that persons who think that the Universe is eternal, can yet
believe in these things which nature cannot produce, as is known to
every student of Natural Science. They only mention Adam, and relate
the above stories about him, in order to support their theory of the
Eternity of the Universe; from this theory they then derive the
doctrine that the stars and the spheres are deities. When [Abraham] the
“Pillar of the World” appeared, he became convinced that there is a
spiritual Divine Being, which is not a body, nor a force residing in a
body, but is the author of the spheres and the stars; and he saw the
absurdity of the tales in which he had been brought up. He therefore
began to attack the belief of the Sabeans, to expose the falsehood of
their opinions, and to proclaim publicly in opposition to them, “the
name of the Lord, the God of the Universe” (Gen. xxi. 33), which
proclamation included at the same time the Existence of God, and the
Creation of the Universe by God.

In accordance with the Sabean theories images were erected to the
stars, golden images to the sun, images of silver to the moon, and they
attributed the metals and the climates to the influence of the planets,
saying that a certain planet is the god of a certain zone. They built
temples, placed in them images, and assumed that the stars sent forth
their influence upon these images, which are thereby enabled (to speak)
to understand, to comprehend, to inspire human beings, and to tell them
what is useful to them. They apply the same to trees which fall to the
lot of these stars. When, namely, a certain tree, which is peculiar to
a certain star, is dedicated to the name of this star, and certain
things are done for the tree and to the tree, the spiritual force of
that star which influences that tree, inspires men, and speaks to them
when they are asleep. All this is written in their works, to which I
will call your attention. It applies to the “prophets of Baal,” and the
“prophets of Asherah,” mentioned in Scripture, in whose hearts the
Sabean theories had taken root, who forsook God, and called, “Baal,
hear us” (1 Kings xviii. 26); because these theories were then general,
ignorance had spread, and the madness with which people adhered to this
kind of imaginations had increased in the world. When such opinions
were adopted among the Israelites, they had observers of clouds,
enchanters, witches, charmers, consulters with familiar spirits,
wizards, and necromancers.

We have shown in our large work, Mishneh-torah (Hilkot, ʻAbodah-zarah
i. 3), that Abraham was the first that opposed these theories by
argument and by soft and persuasive speech. He induced these people, by
showing kindness to them, to serve God. Afterwards came the chief of
the prophets and completed the work by the commandment to slay those
unbelievers, to blot out their name, and to uproot them from the land
of the living. Comp. “Ye shall destroy their altars,” etc. (Exod.
xxxiv. 13). He forbade us to follow their ways; he said, “Ye shall not
walk in the manners of the heathen,” etc. (Lev. xx. 23). You know from
the repeated declarations in the Law that the principal purpose of the
whole Law was the removal and utter destruction of idolatry, and all
that is connected therewith, even its name, and everything that might
lead to any such practices, e.g., acting as a consulter with familiar
spirits, or as a wizard, passing children through the fire, divining,
observing the clouds, enchanting, charming, or inquiring of the dead.
The law prohibits us to imitate the heathen in any of these deeds, and
a fortiori to adopt them entirely. It is distinctly said in the Law
that everything which idolaters consider as service to their gods, and
a means of approaching them, is rejected and despised by God; comp.
“for every abomination to the Lord, which he hateth, have they done
unto their gods” (Deut. xii. 31). In the books which I shall name to
you later on, it is stated that on certain occasions they offered to
the sun, their greatest god, seven beetles, and seven mice, and seven
bats. This alone suffices to show how disgusting their practice must be
to human nature. Thus all precepts cautioning against idolatry, or
against that which is connected therewith, leads to it, or is related
to it, are evidently useful. They all tend to save us from the evil
doctrines that deprive us of everything useful for the acquisition of
the twofold perfection of man, by leading to those absurd practices in
which our fathers and ancestors have been brought up. Comp. “And Joshua
said unto all the people, Thus saith the Lord God of Israel, your
fathers dwelt on the other side of the river in old time, even Terah,
the father of Abraham, and the father of Nahor, and they served other
gods” (Josh. xxiv. 2). It is in reference to these [idolatrous ideas]
that the true prophets exclaim, “They walked after [vain] things, which
do not profit.” How great is the usefulness of every precept that
delivers us from this great error, and leads us back to the true faith:
that God, the Creator of all things, rules the Universe; that He must
be served, loved, and feared, and not those imaginary deities.
According to this faith we approach the true God, and obtain His favour
without having recourse to burdensome means; for nothing else is
required but to love and fear Him; this is the aim in serving God, as
will be shown. Comp. “And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God
require of thee but to fear the Lord”? etc. (Deut. x. 12). I shall
complete this subject later on; now let us return to the theme [of this
chapter].

I say that my knowledge of the belief, practice, and worship of the
Sabeans has given me an insight into many of the divine precepts, and
has led me to know their reason. You will confirm it when I shall give
the reason of commandments which are seemingly purposeless. I will
mention to you the works from which you may learn all that I know of
the religion and the opinions of the Sabeans; you will thereby obtain a
true knowledge of my theory as regards the purpose of the divine
precepts.

The great book on this subject is the book On the Nabatean Agriculture,
translated by Ibn Wahshiya. In a succeeding chapter I shall explain why
the Sabeans had their religious doctrines written in a work on
agriculture. The book is full of the absurdities of idolatrous people,
and with those things to which the minds of the multitude easily turn
and adhere [perseveringly]; it speaks of talismans, the means of
directing the influence [of the stars]; witchcraft, spirits, and demons
that dwell in the wilderness. There occur also in this book great
absurdities, which are ridiculous in the eyes of intelligent people.
They were intended as a criticism and an attack on the evident miracles
by which all people learnt that there exists a God who is judge over
all people. Comp. “That thou mayest know how that the earth is the
Lord’s” (Exod. ix. 29), “That I am the Lord in the midst of the earth”
(ibid. viii. 18).

The book describes things as having been mentioned by Adam in his book;
a tree which is found in India, and has the peculiarity that any branch
taken from it and thrown to the ground creeps along and moves like
serpents; it also mentions a tree which in its root resembles a human
being, utters a loud sound, and speaks a word or words; a plant is
mentioned which has this peculiarity, that a leaf of it put on the neck
of a person conceals that person from the sight of men, and enables him
to enter or leave a place without being seen, and if any part of it is
burnt in open air a noise and terrible sounds are heard whilst the
smoke ascends. Numerous fables of this kind are introduced in the
description of the wonders of plants and the properties of agriculture.
This leads the author to argue against the [true] miracles, and to say
that they were the result of artifice.

Among other fables we read there that the plant althea, one of the
Asherot, which they made, as I told you, stood in Nineveh twelve
thousand years. This tree had once a quarrel with the mandragora, which
wanted to take the place of the former. The person who had been
inspired by this tree ceased to receive inspiration; when after some
time the prophetical power had returned to him, he was told by the
althea that the latter had been engaged in a dispute with the
mandragora. He was then commanded to write to the magicians that they
should decide whether the althea or the mandragora was better and more
effective in witchcraft. It is a long story, and you may learn from it,
when you read it, the opinions and the wisdom of the men of that time.
Such were in those days of darkness the wise men of Babel, to whom
reference is made in Scripture, and such were the beliefs in which they
were trained. And were it not that the theory of the Existence of God
is at present generally accepted, our days would now have been darker
than those days, though in other respects. I return now to my subject.

In that book the following story is also related: One of the idolatrous
prophets, named Tammuz, called upon the king to worship the seven
planets and the twelve constellations of the Zodiac; whereupon the king
killed him in a dreadful manner. The night of his death the images from
all parts of the land came together in the temple of Babylon which was
devoted to the image of the Sun, the great golden image. This image,
which was suspended between heaven and earth, came down into the midst
of the temple, and surrounded by all other images commenced to mourn
for Tammuz, and to relate what had befallen him. All other images cried
and mourned the whole night; at dawn they flew away and returned to
their temples in every corner of the earth. Hence the regular custom
arose for the women to weep, lament, mourn, and cry for Tammuz on the
first day of the month of Tammuz.

Consider what opinions people had in these days. The legend of Tammuz
is very old among the Sabeans. This book will disclose to you most of
the perverse ideas and practices of the Sabeans, including their
feasts. But you must be careful and must not be misled to think that we
have real incidents in the life of Adam, or of any other person, or any
real fact in the stories which they relate about Adam, the serpent, the
tree of knowledge of good and evil, and the allusion to the garment of
Adam which he had not been accustomed to wear. A little consideration
will lay open the falsehood of all these accounts; it will show that
they have been invented in imitation of the Pentateuch when it became
known among the nations. The account of the Creation was heard, and it
was taken entirely in its literal sense. They have done this in order
that the ignorant may hear it, and be persuaded to assume the Eternity
of the Universe, and to believe that the Scriptural account contained
facts which happened in the manner as has been assumed by the Sabeans.

It is by no means necessary to point this out to men like you. You have
acquired sufficient knowledge to keep your mind free from the
absurdities of the Kasdim, Chaldeans, and Sabeans, who are bare of
every true science. But I wish to exhort you that you should caution
others, for ordinary people are very much inclined to believe these
fables.

To the same class of books we count the book Istimachis, attributed to
Aristotle, who can by no means have been its author; also the books on
Talismans, such as the book of Tomtom; the book al-Sarb; the book on
the degrees of the sphere and the constellations rising with each
degree; a book on Talismans attributed to Aristotle, a book ascribed to
Hermes, a book of the Sabean Isḥak in defence of the Sabean religion,
and his large work on Sabean customs, details of their religion,
ceremonies, festivals, offerings, prayers and other things relating to
their faith.

All these books which I have mentioned are works on idolatry translated
into Arabic; there is no doubt that they form a very small portion in
comparison to that which has not been translated, and that which is no
longer extant, but has been lost in the course of time. But those works
which are at present extant, include most of the opinions of the
Sabeans and their practices, which are to some degree still in vogue in
the world.

They describe how temples are built and images of metal and stone
placed in them, altars erected and sacrifices and various kinds of food
are offered thereon, festivals celebrated, meetings held in the temples
for prayer and other kinds of service; how they select certain very
distinguished places and call them temples of Intellectual Images (or
Forms); how they make images “on the high mountains” (Deut. xii. 2),
rear asherot, erect pillars, and do many other things which you can
learn from the books mentioned by us. The knowledge of these theories
and practices is of great importance in explaining the reasons of the
precepts. For it is the principal object of the Law and the axis round
which it turns, to blot out these opinions from man’s heart and make
the existence of idolatry impossible. As regards the former Scripture
says: “Lest your heart be persuaded,” etc. (Deut. xi. 16), “whose heart
turneth away to-day,” etc. (ibid. xxix. 17). The actual abolition of
idolatry is expressed in the following passage: “Ye shall destroy their
altars, and burn their groves in fire” (Deut. vii. 5), “and ye shall
destroy their name,” etc. (xii. 3). These two things are frequently
repeated; they form the principal and first object of the whole Law, as
our Sages distinctly told us in their traditional explanation of the
words “all that God commanded you by the hand of Moses” (Num. xv. 23);
for they say, “Hence we learn that those who follow idolatry deny as it
were their adhesion to the whole Law, and those who reject idolatry
follow as it were the whole Law.” (B. T. Kidd, 40a.) Note it.






CHAPTER XXX


On examining these old and foolish doctrines we find that it was most
generally believed by the people that by the worship of stars the earth
will become inhabited, and the ground fertilized. The wise, pious, and
sin-fearing men among them reproved the people and taught them that
agriculture, on which the preservation of mankind depended, would
become perfect and satisfy man’s wishes, when he worshipped the sun and
the stars. If man provoked these beings by his rebelliousness, the
towns would become empty and waste. In the above-named books it is
stated that Mars was angry with [lands, that form now] deserts and
wastes, and in consequence of that anger they were deprived of water
and trees, and have become the habitation of demons. Tillers of the
ground and husbandmen are praised in those books, because they are
engaged with the cultivation of the land in accordance with the will
and desire of the stars. The idolaters also held cattle in esteem on
account of their use in agriculture, and went even so far as to say,
that it is not allowed to slay them, because they combine in themselves
strength and willingness to do the work of man in tilling the ground.
The oxen, notwithstanding their great strength, do this, and submit to
man, because it is the will of God that they should be employed in
agriculture. When these views became generally known, idolatry was
connected with agriculture, because the latter is indispensable for the
maintenance of man, and of most animals. The idolatrous priests then
preached to the people who met in the temples, and taught them that by
certain religious acts, rain would come down, the trees of the field
would yield their fruit, and the land would be fertile and inhabited.
See what is said in the Nabatean Agriculture in the chapter on
vineyards. The following words of the Sabeans are quoted there: “All
ancient wise men advised, and prophets likewise commanded and enjoined
to play before the images on certain instruments during the festivals.
They also said—and what they said is true—that the deities are pleased
with it, and reward those who do it. They promise, indeed, very great
reward for these things; e.g., length of life, protection from illness,
exemption from great bodily deformities, plenty of the produce of the
earth, and of the fruits of the trees.” These are the words of the
Sabeans. When these ideas spread, and were considered as true, God, in
His great mercy for us, intended to remove this error from our minds,
and to protect our bodies from trouble; and therefore desired us to
discontinue the practice of these useless actions. He gave us His Law
through Moses, our teacher, who told us in the name of God, that the
worship of stars and other corporeal beings would effect that rain
would cease, the land be waste, and would not produce anything, and the
fruit of the trees would wither; calamities would befall the people,
their bodies would be deformed, and life would be shortened. These are
the contents of “the words of the covenant which God made” (Deut.
xxviii. 6–9). It is frequently expressed in all parts of Scripture,
that the worship of the stars would be followed by absence of rain,
devastation of the land, bad times, diseases, and shortness of life.
But abandonment of that worship, and the return to the service of God,
would be the cause of the presence of rain, fertility of the ground,
good times, health and length of life. Thus Scripture teaches, in order
that man should abandon idolatry, the reverse of that which idolatrous
priests preached to the people, for, as has been shown by us, the
principal object of the Law is to remove this doctrine, and to destroy
its traces.






CHAPTER XXXI


There are persons who find it difficult to give a reason for any of the
commandments, and consider it right to assume that the commandments and
prohibitions have no rational basis whatever. They are led to adopt
this theory by a certain disease in their soul, the existence of which
they perceive, but which they are unable to discuss or to describe. For
they imagine that these precepts, if they were useful in any respect,
and were commanded because of their usefulness, would seem to originate
in the thought and reason of some intelligent being. But as things
which are not objects of reason and serve no purpose, they would
undoubtedly be attributed to God, because no thought of man could have
produced them. According to the theory of those weak-minded persons,
man is more perfect than his Creator. For what man says or does has a
certain object, whilst the actions of God are different; He commands us
to do what is of no use to us, and forbids us to do what is harmless.
Far be this! On the contrary, the sole object of the Law is to benefit
us. Thus we explained the Scriptural passage, “for our good always,
that He might preserve us alive, as it is this day” (Deut. vi. 24).
Again, “which shall hear all those statutes (ḥuḳḳim), and say, surely
this great nation is a wise and understanding people” (ibid. iv. 6). He
thus says that even every one of these “statutes” convinces all nations
of the wisdom and understanding it includes. But if no reason could be
found for these statutes, if they produced no advantage and removed no
evil, why then should he who believes in them and follows them be wise,
reasonable, and so excellent as to raise the admiration of all nations?
But the truth is undoubtedly as we have said, that every one of the six
hundred and thirteen precepts serves to inculcate some truth, to remove
some erroneous opinion, to establish proper relations in society, to
diminish evil, to train in good manners, or to warn against bad habits.
All this depends on three things: opinions, morals, and social conduct.
We do not count words, because precepts, whether positive or negative,
if they relate to speech, belong to those precepts which regulate our
social conduct, or to those which spread truth, or to those which teach
morals. Thus these three principles suffice for assigning a reason for
every one of the Divine commandments.






CHAPTER XXXII


On considering the Divine acts, or the processes of Nature, we get an
insight into the prudence and wisdom of God as displayed in the
creation of animals, with the gradual development of the movements of
their limbs and the relative positions of the latter, and we perceive
also His wisdom and plan in the successive and gradual development of
the whole condition of each individual. The gradual development of the
animals’ movements and the relative position of the limbs may be
illustrated by the brain. The front part is very soft, the back part is
a little hard, the spinal marrow is still harder, and the farther it
extends the harder it becomes. The nerves are the organs of sensation
and motion. Some nerves are only required for sensation, or for slight
movements, as, e.g., the movement of the eyelids or of the jaws; these
nerves originate in the brain. The nerves which are required for the
movements of the limbs come from the spinal marrow. But nerves, even
those that come directly from the spinal cord, are too soft to set the
joints in motion; therefore God made the following arrangement: the
nerves branch out into fibres which are covered with flesh, and become
muscles; the nerves that come forth at the extremities of the muscles
and have already commenced to harden, and to combine with hard pieces
of ligaments, are the sinews which are joined and attached to the
limbs. By this gradual development the nerves are enabled to set the
limbs in motion. I quote this one instance because it is the most
evident of the wonders described in the book On the use of the limbs;
but the use of the limbs is clearly perceived by all who examine them
with a sharp eye. In a similar manner did God provide for each
individual animal of the class of mammalia. When such an animal is born
it is extremely tender, and cannot be fed with dry food. Therefore
breasts were provided which yield milk, and the young can be fed with
moist food which corresponds to the condition of the limbs of the
animal, until the latter have gradually become dry and hard.

Many precepts in our Law are the result of a similar course adopted by
the same Supreme Being. It is, namely, impossible to go suddenly from
one extreme to the other; it is therefore according to the nature of
man impossible for him suddenly to discontinue everything to which he
has been accustomed. Now God sent Moses to make [the Israelites] a
kingdom of priests and a holy nation (Exod. xix. 6) by means of the
knowledge of God. Comp. “Unto thee it was showed that thou mightest
know that the Lord is God” (Deut. iv. 35); “Know therefore this day,
and consider it in thine heart, that the Lord is God” (ibid. v. 39).
The Israelites were commanded to devote themselves to His service;
comp. “and to serve him with all your heart” (ibid. xi. 13); “and you
shall serve the Lord your God” (Exod. xxiii. 25); “and ye shall serve
him” (Deut. xiii. 5). But the custom which was in those days general
among all men, and the general mode of worship in which the Israelites
were brought up, consisted in sacrificing animals in those temples
which contained certain images, to bow down to those images, and to
burn incense before them; religious and ascetic persons were in those
days the persons that were devoted to the service in the temples
erected to the stars, as has been explained by us. It was in accordance
with the wisdom and plan of God, as displayed in the whole Creation,
that He did not command us to give up and to discontinue all these
manners of service; for to obey such a commandment it would have been
contrary to the nature of man, who generally cleaves to that to which
he is used; it would in those days have made the same impression as a
prophet would make at present if he called us to the service of God and
told us in His name, that we should not pray to Him, not fast, not seek
His help in time of trouble; that we should serve Him in thought, and
not by any action. For this reason God allowed these kinds of service
to continue; He transferred to His service that which had formerly
served as a worship of created beings, and of things imaginary and
unreal, and commanded us to serve Him in the same manner; viz., to
build unto Him a temple; comp. “And they shall make unto me a
sanctuary” (Exod. xxv. 8); to have the altar erected to His name; comp.
“An altar of earth thou shalt make unto me” (ibid. xx. 21); to offer
the sacrifices to Him; comp. “If any man of you bring an offering unto
the Lord” (Lev. i. 2), to bow down to Him and to burn incense before
Him. He has forbidden to do any of these things to any other being;
comp. “He who sacrificeth unto any God, save the Lord only, he shall be
utterly destroyed” (Exod. xxii. 19); “For thou shalt bow down to no
other God” (ibid. xxxiv. 14). He selected priests for the service in
the temple; comp. “And they shall minister unto me in the priest’s
office” (ibid. xxviii. 41). He made it obligatory that certain gifts,
called the gifts of the Levites and the priests, should be assigned to
them for their maintenance while they are engaged in the service of the
temple and its sacrifices. By this Divine plan it was effected that the
traces of idolatry were blotted out, and the truly great principle of
our faith, the Existence and Unity of God, was firmly established; this
result was thus obtained without deterring or confusing the minds of
the people by the abolition of the service to which they were
accustomed and which alone was familiar to them. I know that you will
at first thought reject this idea and find it strange; you will put the
following question to me in your heart: How can we suppose that Divine
commandments, prohibitions, and important acts, which are fully
explained, and for which certain seasons are fixed, should not have
been commanded for their own sake, but only for the sake of some other
thing; as if they were only the means which He employed for His primary
object? What prevented Him from making His primary object a direct
commandment to us, and to give us the capacity of obeying it? Those
precepts which in your opinion are only the means and not the object
would then have been unnecessary. Hear my answer, which will cure your
heart of this disease and will show you the truth of that which I have
pointed out to you. There occurs in the Law a passage which contains
exactly the same idea; it is the following: “God led them not through
the way of the land of the Philistines, although that was near; for God
said, Lest peradventure the people repent when they see war, and they
return to Egypt; but God led the people about, through the way of the
wilderness of the Red Sea,” etc. (Exod. xiii. 17). Here God led the
people about, away from the direct road which He originally intended,
because He feared they might meet on that way with hardships too great
for their ordinary strength; He took them by another road in order to
obtain thereby His original object. In the same manner God refrained
from prescribing what the people by their natural disposition would be
incapable of obeying, and gave the above-mentioned commandments as a
means of securing His chief object, viz., to spread a knowledge of Him
[among the people], and to cause them to reject idolatry. It is
contrary to man’s nature that he should suddenly abandon all the
different kinds of Divine service and the different customs in which he
has been brought up, and which have been so general, that they were
considered as a matter of course; it would be just as if a person
trained to work as a slave with mortar and bricks, or similar things,
should interrupt his work, clean his hands, and at once fight with real
giants. It was the result of God’s wisdom that the Israelites were led
about in the wilderness till they acquired courage. For it is a
well-known fact that travelling in the wilderness, and privation of
bodily enjoyments, such as bathing, produce courage, whilst the reverse
is the source of faint-heartedness; besides, another generation rose
during the wanderings that had not been accustomed to degradation and
slavery. All the travelling in the wilderness was regulated by Divine
commands through Moses; comp. “At the commandment of the Lord they
rested, and at the commandment of the Lord they journeyed; they kept
the charge of the Lord and the commandment of the Lord by the hand of
Moses” (Num. ix. 23). In the same way the portion of the Law under
discussion is the result of divine wisdom, according to which people
are allowed to continue the kind of worship to which they have been
accustomed, in order that they might acquire the true faith, which is
the chief object [of God’s commandments]. You ask, What could have
prevented God from commanding us directly, that which is the chief
object, and from giving us the capacity of obeying it? This would lead
to a second question, What prevented God from leading the Israelites
through the way of the land of the Philistines, and endowing them with
strength for fighting? The leading about by a pillar of cloud by day
and a pillar of fire by night would then not have been necessary. A
third question would then be asked in reference to the good promised as
reward for the keeping of the commandments, and the evil foretold as a
punishment for sins. It is the following question: As it is the chief
object and purpose of God that we should believe in the Law, and act
according to that which is written therein, why has He not given us the
capacity of continually believing in it, and following its guidance,
instead of holding out to us reward for obedience, and punishment for
disobedience, or of actually giving all the predicted reward and
punishment? For [the promises and the threats] are but the means of
leading to this chief object. What prevented Him from giving us, as
part of our nature, the will to do that which He desires us to do, and
to abandon the kind of worship which He rejects? There is one general
answer to these three questions, and to all questions of the same
character; it is this: Although in every one of the signs [related in
Scripture] the natural property of some individual being is changed,
the nature of man is never changed by God by way of miracle. It is in
accordance with this important principle that God said, “O that there
were such an heart in them, that they would fear me,” etc. (Deut. v.
26). It is also for this reason that He distinctly stated the
commandments and the prohibitions, the reward and the punishment. This
principle as regards miracles has been frequently explained by us in
our works; I do not say this because I believe that it is difficult for
God to change the nature of every individual person; on the contrary,
it is possible, and it is in His power, according to the principles
taught in Scripture; but it has never been His will to do it, and it
never will be. If it were part of His will to change [at His desire]
the nature of any person, the mission of prophets and the giving of the
Law would have been altogether superfluous.

I now return to my theme. As the sacrificial service is not the primary
object [of the commandments about sacrifice], whilst supplications,
prayers, and similar kinds of worship are nearer to the primary object,
and indispensable for obtaining it, a great difference was made in the
Law between these two kinds of service. The one kind, which consists in
offering sacrifices, although the sacrifices are offered to the name of
God, has not been made obligatory for us to the same extent as it had
been before. We were not commanded to sacrifice in every place, and in
every time, or to build a temple in every place, or to permit any one
who desires to become priest and to sacrifice. On the contrary, all
this is prohibited unto us. Only one temple has been appointed, “in the
place which the Lord shall choose” (Deut. xii. 26); in no other place
is it allowed to sacrifice; comp. “Take heed to thyself, that thou
offer not thy burnt-offerings in every place that thou seest” (ibid. v.
13); and only the members of a particular family were allowed to
officiate as priests. All these restrictions served to limit this kind
of worship, and keep it within those bounds within which God did not
think it necessary to abolish sacrificial service altogether. But
prayer and supplication can be offered everywhere and by every person.
The same is the case with the commandment of ẓiẓit (Num. xv. 38);
mezuzah (Deut. vi. 9; xi. 20); tefillin (Exod. xiii. 9, 16); and
similar kinds of divine service.

Because of this principle which I explained to you, the Prophets in
their books are frequently found to rebuke their fellow-men for being
over-zealous and exerting themselves too much in bringing sacrifices;
the prophets thus distinctly declared that the object of the sacrifices
is not very essential, and that God does not require them. Samuel
therefore said, “Hath the Lord as great delight in burnt-offerings and
sacrifices as in obeying the voice of the Lord” (1 Sam. xv. 22)? Isaiah
exclaimed, “To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto
me? saith the Lord” (Isa. i. 11); Jeremiah declared: “For I spake not
unto your fathers, nor commanded them in the day that I brought them
out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt-offerings or sacrifices. But
this thing commanded I them, saying, Obey my voice, and I will be your
God, and ye shall be my people” (Jer. vii. 22, 23). This passage has
been found difficult in the opinion of all those whose words I read or
heard; they ask, How can Jeremiah say that God did not command us about
burnt-offering and sacrifice, seeing so many precepts refer to
sacrifice? The sense of the passage agrees with what I explained to
you. Jeremiah says [in the name of God] the primary object of the
precepts is this, Know me, and serve no other being; “I will be your
God, and ye shall be my people” (Lev. xxvi. 12). But the commandment
that sacrifices shall be brought and that the temple shall be visited
has for its object the success of that principle among you; and for its
sake I have transferred these modes of worship to my name; idolatry
shall thereby be utterly destroyed, and Jewish faith firmly
established. You, however, have ignored this object, and taken hold of
that which is only the means of obtaining it; you have doubted my
existence, “ye have denied the Lord, and said he is not” (Jer. v. 12);
ye served idols; “burnt incense unto Baal, and walked after other gods
whom ye know not. And come and stand before me in this house” (ibid.
vii. 9–10); i.e., you do not go beyond attending the temple of the
Lord, and offering sacrifices; but this is not the chief object.—I have
another way of explaining this passage with exactly the same result.
For it is distinctly stated in Scripture, and handed down by tradition,
that the first commandments communicated to us did not include any law
at all about burnt-offering and sacrifice. You must not see any
difficulty in the Passover which was commanded in Egypt; there was a
particular and evident reason for that, as will be explained by me
(chap. xlvi.). Besides it was revealed in the land of Egypt; whilst the
laws to which Jeremiah alludes in the above passage are those which
were revealed after the departure from Egypt. For this reason it is
distinctly added, “in the day that I brought them out from the land of
Egypt.” The first commandment after the departure from Egypt was given
at Marah, in the following words, “If thou wilt diligently hearken to
the voice of the Lord thy God, and wilt do that which is right in His
sight, and wilt give ear to His commandments” (Exod. xv. 26). “There he
made for them a statute and an ordinance, and there he proved them”
(ibid. ver. 25). According to the true traditional explanation, Sabbath
and civil laws were revealed at Marah; “statute” alludes to Sabbath,
and “ordinance” to civil laws, which are the means of removing
injustice. The chief object of the Law, as has been shown by us, is the
teaching of truths; to which the truth of the creatio ex nihilo
belongs. It is known that the object of the law of Sabbath is to
confirm and to establish this principle, as we have shown in this
treatise (Part II. chap. xxxi.). In addition to the teaching of truths
the Law aims at the removal of injustice from mankind. We have thus
proved that the first laws do not refer to burnt-offering and
sacrifice, which are of secondary importance. The same idea which is
contained in the above passage from Jeremiah is also expressed in the
Psalms, where the people are rebuked that they ignore the chief object,
and make no distinction between chief and subsidiary lessons. The
Psalmist says: “Hear, O my people, and I will speak; O Israel, and I
will testify against thee: I am God, even thy God. I will not reprove
thee for thy sacrifices or thy burnt-offerings, they have been
continually before me. I will take no bullock out of thy house, nor
he-goats out of thy folds” (Ps. l. 29).—Wherever this subject is
mentioned, this is its meaning. Consider it well, and reflect on it.






CHAPTER XXXIII


It is also the object of the perfect Law to make man reject, despise,
and reduce his desires as much as is in his power. He should only give
way to them when absolutely necessary. It is well known that it is
intemperance in eating, drinking, and sexual intercourse that people
mostly rave and indulge in; and these very things counteract the
ulterior perfection of man, impede at the same time the development of
his first perfection, and generally disturb the social order of the
country and the economy of the family. For by following entirely the
guidance of lust, in the manner of fools, man loses his intellectual
energy, injures his body, and perishes before his natural time; sighs
and cares multiply; there is an increase of envy, hatred, and warfare
for the purpose of taking what another possesses. The cause of all this
is the circumstance that the ignorant considers physical enjoyment as
an object to be sought for its own sake. God in His wisdom has
therefore given us such commandments as would counteract that object,
and prevent us altogether from directing our attention to it, and has
debarred us from everything that leads only to excessive desire and
lust. This is an important thing included in the objects of our Law.
See how the Law commanded to slay a person from whose conduct it is
evident that he will go too far in seeking the enjoyment of eating and
drinking. I mean “the rebellious and stubborn son”; he is described as
“a glutton and a drunkard” (Deut. xxi. 20). The Law commands to stone
him and to remove him from society lest he grow up in this character,
and kill many, and injure the condition of good men by his great lust.

Politeness is another virtue promoted by the Law. Man shall listen to
the words of his neighbour; he shall not be obstinate, but shall yield
to the wish of his fellow-men, respond to their appeal, act according
to their desire, and do what they like. Thus the Law commands,
“Circumcise therefore the foreskin of your heart, and be no more
stiff-necked” (Deut. x. 16); “Take heed and hearken” (ibid. xxvii. 9).
“If you be willing and obedient” (Isa. i. 19). Those who listen [to the
words of others] and accept as much as is right are represented as
saying, “We will hear and do” (Deut. v. 24), or in a figurative style,
“Draw me, we will run after thee” (Song i. 4).

The Law is also intended to give its followers purity and holiness; by
teaching them to suppress sensuality, to guard against it and to reduce
it to a minimum, as will be explained by us. For when God commanded
[Moses] to sanctify the people for the receiving of the Law, and said,
“Sanctify them to-day and to-morrow” (Exod. xix. 10), Moses [in
obedience to this command] said to the people, “Come not at your wives”
(ibid. ver. 15). Here it is clearly stated that sanctification consists
in absence of sensuality. But abstinence from drinking wine is also
called holiness; in reference to the Nazarite it is therefore said, “He
shall be holy” (Num. vi. 5). According to Siphra the words, “sanctify
yourselves and be ye holy” (Lev. xx. 7), refer to the sanctification
effected by performing the divine commands. As the obedience to such
precepts as have been mentioned above is called by the Law
sanctification and purification, so is defilement applied to the
transgression of these precepts and the performance of disgraceful
acts, as will be shown. Cleanliness in dress and body by washing and
removing sweat and dirt is included among the various objects of the
Law, but only if connected with purity of action, and with a heart free
from low principles and bad habits. It would be extremely bad for man
to content himself with a purity obtained by washing and cleanliness in
dress, and to be at the same time voluptuous and unrestrained in food
and lust. These are described by Isaiah as follows: “They that sanctify
themselves and purify themselves in the gardens, but continue their
sinful life, when they are in the innermost [of their houses], eating
swine’s flesh, and the abomination, and the mouse” (Isa. lxvi. 17):
that is to say, they purify and sanctify themselves outwardly as much
as is exposed to the sight of the people, and when they are alone in
their chambers and the inner parts of their houses, they continue their
rebelliousness and disobedience, and indulge in partaking of forbidden
food, such as [the flesh of] swine, worms, and mice. The prophet
alludes perhaps in the phrase “behind one tree in the midst” to
indulgence in forbidden lust. The sense of the passage is therefore
this: They appear outwardly clean, but their heart is bent upon their
desires and bodily enjoyments, and this is contrary to the spirit of
the Law. For the chief object of the Law is to [teach man to] diminish
his desires, and to cleanse his outer appearance after he has purified
his heart. Those who wash their body and cleanse their garments whilst
they remain dirty by bad actions and principles, are described by
Solomon as “a generation that are pure in their own eyes, and yet are
not washed from their filthiness; a generation, oh how lofty are their
eyes!” etc. (Prov. xxx. 12–13). Consider well the principles which we
mentioned in this chapter as the final causes of the Law; for there are
many precepts, for which you will be unable to give a reason unless you
possess a knowledge of these principles, as will be explained further
on.






CHAPTER XXXIV


It is also important to note that the Law does not take into account
exceptional circumstances; it is not based on conditions which rarely
occur. Whatever the Law teaches, whether it be of an intellectual, a
moral, or a practical character, is founded on that which is the rule
and not on that which is the exception; it ignores the injury that
might be caused to a single person through a certain maxim or a certain
divine precept. For the Law is a divine institution, and [in order to
understand its operation] we must consider how in Nature the various
forces produce benefits which are general, but in some solitary cases
they cause also injury. This is clear from what has been said by
ourselves as well as by others. We must consequently not be surprised
when we find that the object of the Law does not fully appear in every
individual; there must naturally be people who are not perfected by the
instruction of the Law, just as there are beings which do not receive
from the specific forms in Nature all that they require. For all this
comes from one God, is the result of one act; “they are all given from
one shepherd” (Eccles. xii. 11). It is impossible to be otherwise; and
we have already explained (chap. xv.) that that which is impossible
always remains impossible and never changes. From this consideration it
also follows that the laws cannot like medicine vary according to the
different conditions of persons and times; whilst the cure of a person
depends on his particular constitution at the particular time, the
divine guidance contained in the Law must be certain and general,
although it may be effective in some cases and ineffective in others.
If the Law depended on the varying conditions of man, it would be
imperfect in its totality, each precept being left indefinite. For this
reason it would not be right to make the fundamental principles of the
Law dependent on a certain time or a certain place; on the contrary,
the statutes and the judgments must be definite, unconditional, and
general, in accordance with the divine words: “As for the congregation,
one ordinance shall be for you and for the stranger” (Num. xv. 15);
they are intended, as has been stated before, for all persons and for
all times.

After having premised these introductory remarks I will now proceed to
the exposition of that which I intended to explain.






CHAPTER XXXV


In accordance with this intention I find it convenient to divide all
precepts into fourteen classes.

The first class comprises those precepts which form fundamental
principles, such as we have enumerated in Hilkot yesode ha-torah.
Repentance and fasts belong also to this class, as will be shown.

The second class comprises the precepts which are connected with the
prohibition of idolatry, and which have been described by us in Hilkot
aʻbodah-zarah. The laws concerning garments of linen and wool,
concerning the fruit of trees in the first three years after they have
been planted, and concerning divers seeds in a vineyard, are likewise
contained in this class. The object of these precepts is to establish
certain true principles and to perpetuate them among the people.

The third class is formed by commandments which are connected with the
improvement of the moral condition [of mankind]; these are mentioned in
Hilkot deʻot. It is known that by a good moral state those social
relations, which are indispensable for the well-being of mankind, are
brought to perfection.

The fourth class includes precepts relating to charity, loans, gifts,
and the like, e.g., the rules respecting “valuations,” (scil., of
things devoted to sacred purposes, Lev. xxvii. 1–27); “things devoted”
(ibid. ver. 28); laws concerning loans and servants, and all the laws
enumerated in the section Zeraʻim, except the rules of “mixtures” and
“the fruit of trees in the first three years.” The object of these
precepts is clear; their benefit concerns all people by turns; for he
who is rich to-day may one day be poor—either he himself or his
descendants; and he who is now poor, he himself or his son may be rich
to-morrow.

The fifth class contains those precepts which relate to the prevention
of wrong and violence; they are included in our book in the section
Neziḳin. Their beneficial character is evident.

The sixth class is formed of precepts respecting fines, e.g., the laws
on theft and robbery, on false witnesses, and most of the laws
contained in the section Shofetim belong to this class. Their benefit
is apparent; for if sinners and robbers were not punished, injury would
not be prevented at all: and persons scheming evil would not become
rarer. They are wrong who suppose that it would be an act of mercy to
abandon the laws of compensation for injuries; on the contrary, it
would be perfect cruelty and injury to the social state of the country.
It is an act of mercy that God commanded “judges and officers thou
shalt appoint to thee in all thy gates” (Deut. xvi. 18).

The seventh class comprises those laws which regulate the business
transactions of men with each other; e.g., laws about loans, hire,
trust, buying, selling, and the like; the rules about inheritance
belong to this class. We have described these precepts in the sections
Ḳinyan and Mishpatim. The object of these precepts is evident, for
monetary transactions are necessary for the peoples of all countries,
and it is impossible to have these transactions without a proper
standard of equity and without useful regulations.

The eighth class includes those precepts which relate to certain days,
as Sabbaths and holydays; they are enumerated in the section Zemannim.
The Law states clearly the reason and object of each of these precepts;
they are to serve as a means for establishing a certain principle among
us, or securing bodily recreation, or effecting both things at the same
time, as will be shown by me.

The ninth class comprises the general laws concerning religious rites
and ceremonies, e.g., laws concerning prayers, the reading of Shema’,
and the other rules given in the section Ahabah, with the exception of
the law concerning circumcision. The object of these laws is apparent;
they all prescribe actions which firmly establish the love of God in
our minds, as also the right belief concerning Him and His attributes.

The tenth class is formed of precepts which relate to the Sanctuary,
its vessels, and its ministers; they are contained in the section
ʻAbodah. The object of these precepts has already been mentioned by us
(supra, chap. xxxii.).

The eleventh class includes those precepts which relate to Sacrifices.
Most of these laws we have mentioned in the sections ʻAbodah and
Ḳorbanot. We have already shown the general use of the sacrificial
laws, and their necessity in ancient time.

The twelfth class comprises the laws concerning things unclean and
clean. The general object of these laws is, as will be explained by me,
to discourage people from [frequently] entering the Sanctuary; in order
that their minds be impressed with the greatness of the Sanctuary, and
approach it with respect and reverence.

The thirteenth class includes the precepts concerning forbidden food
and the like; we have given them in Hilkot maakalot asurot; the laws
about vows and temperance belong also to this class. The object of all
these laws is to restrain the growth of desire, the indulgence in
seeking that which is pleasant, and the disposition to consider the
appetite for eating and drinking as the end [of man’s existence]. We
have explained this in our Commentary on the Mishnah, in the
Introduction (chap, iv.) to The Sayings of the Fathers.

The fourteenth class comprises the precepts concerning forbidden sexual
intercourse; they are given in the section Nashim and Hilkot
issure-biah. The laws concerning the intermixture of cattle belong to
this class. The object of these precepts is likewise to diminish sexual
intercourse, to restrain as much as possible indulgence in lust, and
[to teach] that this enjoyment is not, as foolish people think, the
final cause of man’s existence. We have explained this in our
Commentary on The Sayings of the Fathers (Introd. chap. viii.). The
laws about circumcision belong to this class.

As is well known, the precepts are also divided into two classes, viz.,
precepts concerning the relation between man and God, and precepts
concerning the relation between man and man. Of the classes into which
we divide the precepts and which we have enumerated, the fifth, sixth,
and seventh, and part of the third, include laws concerning the
relation of man to man. The other classes contain the laws about the
relation of man to God, i.e., positive or negative precepts, which tend
to improve the moral or intellectual condition of mankind, or to
regulate such of each man’s actions which [directly] only concern him
and lead him to perfection. For these are called laws concerning man’s
relation to God, although in reality they lead to results which concern
also his fellow-men; because these results become only apparent after a
long series of intermediate links, and from a general point of view;
whilst directly these laws are not intended to prevent man from
injuring his fellow-man. Note this.

Having described the laws of these classes, I will now again consider
the precepts of each class, and explain the reason and use of those
which are believed to be useless or unreasonable, with the exception of
a few, the object of which I have not yet comprehended.






CHAPTER XXXVI


The reason of all precepts of the first class, viz., of the principles
enumerated by us in the Hilkot yesode ha-torah, is obvious. Consider
them one by one, and you will find that the lesson which every one of
them contains is correct and demonstrable. It is also evident that the
precepts which exhort and command us to learn and to teach are useful;
for without wisdom there cannot be any good act or any true knowledge.
The law which prescribes to honour the teachers of the Law is likewise
useful; for if they were not considered by the people as great and
honourable men, they would not be followed as guides in their
principles and actions. The Law demands also that we be humble and
modest [in their presence]. “Thou shalt rise up before the hoary head”
(Lev. xix. 32). This class includes also the commandment to swear by
the name of God and the prohibition of swearing falsely or in vain. The
reason for all these precepts is evident; they aim at the glorification
of God; they prescribe acts which lead to the belief in God’s
greatness. Likewise the commandment to cry to God in time of trouble,
“to blow an alarm with the trumpets” (Num. x. 9), belongs to this
class. We are told to offer up prayers to God, in order to establish
firmly the true principle that God takes notice of our ways, that He
can make them successful if we worship Him, or disastrous if we disobey
Him, that [success and failure] are not the result of chance or
accident. In this sense we must understand the passage, “If ye walk
with me by chance” (beḳeri. xxvi. 21); i.e., if I bring troubles upon
you for punishment, and you consider them as mere accidents, I will
again send you some of these accidents as you call them, but of a more
serious and troublesome character. This is expressed in the words: “If
ye walk with me by chance: then I will walk with you also in the fury
of chance” (ibid. vers. 27, 28). For the belief of the people that
their troubles are mere accidents causes them to continue in their evil
principles and their wrong actions, and prevents them from abandoning
their evil ways. Comp. “Thou hast stricken them, but they have not
grieved” (Jer. v. 3). For this reason God commanded us to pray to Him,
to entreat Him, and to cry before Him in time of trouble. It is clear
that repentance is likewise included in this class; that is to say, it
is one of those principles which are an indispensable element in the
creed of the followers of the Law. For it is impossible for man to be
entirely free from error and sin; he either does not know the opinion
which he has to choose, or he adopts a principle, not for its own
merits, but in order to gratify his desire or passion. If we were
convinced that we could never make our crooked ways straight, we should
for ever continue in our errors, and perhaps add other sins to them
since we did not see that any remedy was left to us. But the belief in
the effect of repentance causes us to improve, to return to the best of
the ways, and to become more perfect than we were before we sinned. For
this reason many things are prescribed for the promotion of this very
useful principle; e.g., confessions and sacrifices for sins committed
unknowingly, and in some cases even for sins committed intentionally,
and fasts, and that which is common to all cases of repentance from
sin, the resolve to discontinue sinning. For that is the aim of this
principle. Of all these precepts the use is obvious.






CHAPTER XXXVII


The precepts of the second class are those which we have enumerated in
the section “On idolatry.” It is doubtless that they all tend to save
man from the error of idolatry and the evil practices connected with
it; e.g., observing the times, enchantment, witchcraft, incantation,
consulting with familiar spirits, and the like. When you read the books
which I mentioned to you, you will find that witchcraft, which will be
described to you, is part of the customs of the Sabeans, Kasdim,
Chaldeans, and to a higher degree of the Egyptians and Canaanites. They
caused others to believe, or they themselves believed, that by means of
these arts they would perform wonderful things in reference to an
individual person, or to the inhabitants of a whole country, although
no analogy and no reasoning can discover any relation between these
performances of the witches and the promised result. Thus they are
careful to collect certain plants at a particular time, and to take a
definite number of certain objects. There are many things comprised by
witchcraft; they may be divided into three classes: first, witchcraft
connected with objects in Nature, viz., plants, animals, or minerals.
Secondly, witchcraft dependent for its performance on a certain time;
and thirdly, witchcraft dependent on the performance of certain acts of
man, such as dancing, clapping, laughing, jumping with one leg, lying
on the ground with the face upward, burning a thing, fumigating with a
certain material, or speaking intelligible or unintelligible words.

These are the various kinds of witchcraft. In some cases all these
various performances are required. Thus the witches sometimes order:
take a leaf of a certain plant, when the moon is seen in a certain
degree [of the Zodiac] in the east point or in one of the other
cardinal points [of the horizon], also a certain quantity of the horn,
the sweat, the hair and the blood of a certain animal when the sun is,
e.g., in the middle of the sky, or in some other definite place; and a
portion of a certain mineral or minerals, melted at a certain
conjunction of sun and moon, and at a definite position of the stars;
speak then, and say certain words, and fumigate with those leaves or
similar ones to that molten image, and such and such a thing will
happen. In other instances of witchcraft it is assumed that one of the
above performances suffices. In most cases the condition is added that
women must perform these actions. Thus it is stated in reference to the
means of obtaining rain, that ten virgins dressed with diadems and red
garments should dance, push each other, moving backwards and forwards,
and make signs to the sun: the result of this long process was believed
[by the idolaters] to be a downpour of rain.

It is further stated that if four women lay on their back, with their
feet spread and lifted up, said certain words and did certain things
whilst in this disgraceful position, hail would discontinue coming down
in that place. The number of these stupid and mad things is great; in
all of them without exception women are required to be the agent.
Witchcraft is intimately connected with astrology; those that practise
it assign each plant, animal, or mineral to a certain star, and believe
that the above processes of witchcraft are different forms of worship
offered to that star, which is pleased with that act, word, or offering
of incense, and fulfils their wishes.

After this remark, which you will understand when you have read such of
their works as are at present extant, and have been mentioned by me,
hear what I will tell you. It is the object and centre of the whole Law
to abolish idolatry and utterly uproot it, and to overthrow the opinion
that any of the stars could interfere for good or evil in human
matters, because it leads to the worship of stars. It was therefore
necessary to slay all witches as being undoubtedly idolaters, because
every witch is an idolater; they only have their own strange ways of
worship, which are different from the common mode of worship offered to
those deities. But in all performances of witchcraft it is laid down as
a rule that women should be employed in the chief operation; and
therefore the Law says, “Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live” (Exod.
xxii. 17). Another reason is the natural reluctance of people to slay
women. This is also the cause why in the law of idolatry it is said
“man or woman” (Deut. xvii. 2), and again repeated a second time, “the
man or the woman” (ibid. ver. 5)—a phrase which does not occur in the
law about the breaking of Sabbath, or in any other law; for great
sympathy is naturally shown to women. Now the witches believed that
they produced a certain result by their witchcraft; that they were able
through the above-mentioned actions to drive such dangerous animals as
lions, serpents, and the like out of the cities, and to remove various
kinds of damage from the products of the earth. Thus they imagine that
they are able by certain acts to prevent hail from coming down, and by
certain other acts to kill the worms in the vineyards, whereby the
latter are protected from injury; in fact, the killing of the worms in
vineyards, and other superstitions mentioned in the Nabatean
Agriculture, are fully described by the Sabeans. They likewise imagine
that they know certain acts by which they can prevent the dropping of
leaves from the trees and the untimely falling of their fruit. On
account of these ideas, which were general in those days, the Law
declares in “the words of the covenant” as follows: The same idolatry
and superstitious performances which, in your belief, keep certain
misfortunes far from you, will cause those very misfortunes to befall
you. “I will also send wild beasts among you” (Lev. xxvi. 22); “I will
also send the teeth of wild beasts upon them, with the poison of those
that creep in dust” (Deut. xxxii. 24). “The fruit of thy land, and all
thy labours, shall a nation, which thou knowest not, eat up” (ibid.
xxviii. 33). “Thou shalt plant vineyards and dress them, but shalt
neither drink of the wine nor gather the grapes, etc. Thou shalt have
olive trees throughout all thy coasts, but thou shalt not anoint
thyself with the oil” (Deut. xxviii. 39, 40). In short, in spite of the
schemes of idolaters to support and firmly establish their doctrine,
and to make people believe that by idolatry certain misfortunes could
be averted and certain benefits gained, worship of idols will, on the
contrary, as is stated in “the words of the covenant,” prevent the
advantages and bring the troubles. The reader will now understand why,
of all kinds of curses and blessings, those mentioned in “the words of
the covenant” have been selected by the Law, and particularly pointed
out. Note also the greatness of the benefit [of these laws].

In order that we may keep far from all kinds of witchcraft, we are
warned not to adopt any of the practices of the idolaters, even such as
are connected with agriculture, the keeping of cattle, and similar
work. [The Law prohibits] everything that the idolaters, according to
their doctrine, and contrary to reason, consider as being useful and
acting in the manner of certain mysterious forces. Comp. “Neither shall
ye walk in their ordinances” (Lev. xviii. 3). “And ye shall not walk in
the manners of the nation which I cast out before you” (ibid. xx. 23).
Our Sages call such acts “the ways of the Amorite”; they are kinds of
witchcraft, because they are not arrived at by reason, but are similar
to the performances of witchcraft, which is necessarily connected with
the influences of the stars; thus [“the manners of the nations”] lead
people to extol, worship, and praise the stars. Our Sages say
distinctly, “whatever is used as medicine” does not come under the law
of “the ways of the Amorite”; for they hold that only such cures as are
recommended by reason are permitted, and other cures are prohibited.
When, therefore, the dictum was quoted: a tree that casts off its fruit
may be laden with stone or dyed with red colour, the following
objection was raised: The loading of the tree with stones may be
justified on the plea that it serves to weaken the strength of the
tree, but why should it be permitted to dye the tree with red colour?
This question shows that the dyeing of the tree with red colour, and
all similar things which are not explained by analogy from nature, are
prohibited as “ways of the Amorite.” For the same reason our Sages
said, “The uterus of animals which have been selected for the Sanctuary
must be buried; it must not be suspended from a tree, and not buried in
the cross-road, because this is one of ‘the ways of the Amorite.’”
Hence you may learn how to treat similar cases.

It is not inconsistent that a nail of the gallows and the tooth of a
fox have been permitted to be used as cures; for these things have been
considered in those days as facts established by experiment. They
served as cures, in the same manner as the hanging of the peony over a
person subject to epileptic fits, or the application of a dog’s refuse
to the swellings of the throat, and of the vapours of vinegar and
marcasite to the swelling of hard tumours. For the Law permits as
medicine everything that has been verified by experiment, although it
cannot be explained by analogy. The above-named cures are permitted in
the same way as the application of purgatives. Learn, reader, these
noteworthy lessons from this my work, and keep them; “for they are a
diadem of grace for thy head” (Prov. iv.).

We have explained in our large work that it is prohibited to round the
corners of the head, and to mar the corners of the beard, because it
was the custom of idolatrous priests. For the same reason, the wearing
of garments made of linen and wool is prohibited; the heathen priests
adorned themselves with garments containing vegetable and animal
material, whilst they held in their hand a seal made of a mineral. This
you find written in their books. The same is also the reason of the
precept, “The woman shall not wear that which pertaineth unto a man”
(Deut. xxii. 5). You find it in the book Tomtom, that a male person
should wear coloured woman’s dress when he stands before Venus, and a
female, when standing before Mars, should wear a buckler and other
armour. I think that this precept has also another reason; namely, that
the interchange of dress creates lust and leads to immorality.

It is easily understood why it is prohibited to derive any benefit
whatever from an idol. For sometimes a person buys it with the
intention to break it, but keeps it, and it becomes a snare to him.
Even if he broke it, recast it, and sold it to a heathen, he must not
use the money which he received in exchange for the idol; because
people frequently mistake accidental circumstances for essential
causes; thus most people say of a certain person that he has become
rich and wealthy after having dwelt in a certain house, or bought a
certain animal or vessel; and that these things were a blessing to him.
In the same way a person may be successful and make a good profit on
the business in which he employed the money received for the idol; he
might then think that the idol was the cause of his success, and that
the blessing of the money received for it brought him the profit; he
would then believe in the idol; a belief which is just the reverse of
the chief object of the Law, as is clearly seen in every word of it.
For this same reason, we are forbidden to turn to our use the covering
of the idol, its offerings and vessels. We are thus guarded against the
idea [of ascribing our success to idols]. In those days the belief in
the stars was very strong; it was generally assumed that life and
death, good and evil, depended on the stars. The Law employed therefore
strong means, as covenant, witnesses, great oaths, and the
above-mentioned [blessings and] curses, in order to overthrow that
belief. We are thus commanded to abstain from taking any portion of the
idol, and deriving any benefit from it; and God tells us that if money
received for idols be mixed with any person’s property, it will bring
loss and ruin to that property. This warning is contained in the words:
“Neither shalt thou bring an abomination into thine house, lest thou be
a cursed thing like it” (Deut. vii. 26). How much more wrong must it be
to believe that there is a blessing in idols. When you examine all the
precepts that relate to idolatry, you will find that their reason is
obvious, and that they serve to make us abandon this evil belief, and
keep at the greatest possible distance from it.

We must also point out that originators of false, baseless, and useless
principles scheme and plan for the firm establishment of their faith;
and tell their fellow-men that a certain plague will befall those who
will not perform the act by which that faith is supported and confirmed
for ever; this plague may one day accidentally befall a person, who
will then direct his attention to the performance of that act, and
adopt idolatry. It being well known that people are naturally most in
fear and dread of the loss of their property and their children, the
worshippers of fire spread the tale, that if any one did not pass his
son and daughter through the fire, he will lose his children by death.
There is no doubt that on account of this absurd menace every one at
once obeyed, out of pity and sympathy for the child; especially as it
was a trifling and a light thing that was demanded, in passing the
child over the fire. We must further take into account that the care of
young children is intrusted to women, who are generally weak-minded,
and ready to believe everything, as is well known. The Law makes,
therefore, an earnest stand against this practice, and uses in
reference to it stronger terms than in any other kind of idolatry;
namely, “he defileth my sanctuary, and profaneth my holy name” (Lev.
xx. 3). The true prophet then declares in the name of God that the very
act which is performed for the purpose of keeping the child alive, will
bring death upon him who performs it, and destruction upon his seed.
Comp. “And I will set my face against that man and against his family,”
etc. (ibid. xx. 5). Know that traces of this practice have survived
even to the present day, because it was widespread in the world. You
can see how midwives take a young child wrapped in its
swaddling-clothes, and after having placed incense of a disagreeable
smell on the fire, swing the child in the smoke over that fire. This is
certainly a kind of passing children through the fire, and we must not
do it. Reflect on the evil cunning of the author of this doctrine; how
people continued to adhere to this doctrine, and how, in spite of the
opposition of the Law during thousands of years, its name is not
blotted out, and its traces are still in existence.

Idolaters have acted similarly in reference to property. They made it a
law that a certain tree, the asherah, should be worshipped, and that of
its fruit one part should be offered, and the rest consumed in the
temple of the idol; this is stated in the regulations concerning the
asherah. In the same manner, they made it a rule, that the first-fruit
of every fruit-tree should be partly offered as a sacrifice and partly
consumed in the idol’s temple. It was also a widespread belief that if
the first-fruit of any tree was not treated in this manner, the tree
would dry up, its fruit would be cast off, its increase would be
diminished, or some disease would come over it; just as they spread the
belief that every child, that was not passed through the fire, must
die. People in their anxiety for their property obeyed also this
precept unhesitatingly. The Law, in opposition to this doctrine,
commanded us to burn the produce of fruit-trees the first three years;
for some trees bear fruit after one year, whilst some begin to yield
fruit after two, and others after three years. The law is based upon
the nature of trees grown in an ordinary way, namely, in one of the
three well-known methods: planting, propagation, and inoculation
(netiʻah, habrakah, and harcabah). The Law does not take notice of the
case that a kernel or stone is sown; for the ordinances of the Law are
based on the usual condition of things, and as a rule a young tree in
Palestine bears fruit for the first time not later than the third year
after it has been planted. According to the divine promise, the waste
and destruction of this first-fruit of the tree will be followed by
years of plenty of fruit; for it is said, “that it may increase unto
you the fruit thereof” (Lev. xix. 25). The fruit of the fourth year we
are commanded to eat before God, instead of [the heathen custom of]
eating ʻorlah, “the fruit of the preceding years,” in the temples of
the idols, as has been described by us.

It is further mentioned in the Nabatean Agriculture that the ancient
idolaters caused certain things named in that work to rot, waited till
the sun stood in a certain degree [of the ecliptic], and then they
performed many acts of witchcraft. They believed that that substance
should be kept ready by every one, and when a fruit-tree is planted, a
portion of that rotten substance should be scattered round the tree or
under it; the tree would then grow quicker and produce more fruit than
is generally the case. They say that this process is very
extraordinary; it acts like a talisman, and is more efficient than any
kind of witchcraft in accelerating the productiveness of fruit-trees. I
have already shown and explained to you how the Law opposes all kinds
of witchcraft. The Law, therefore, prohibits us to use the fruit
yielded by a tree in the first three years after it has been planted,
so that there should be no opportunity for accelerating, according to
their imagination, the productiveness of any tree. After three years
most fruit-trees in Palestine yield fruit by the ordinary course of
nature, without the application of those magical performances which
were very general in those days. Note this remarkable fact.

Another belief which was very common in those days, and survived the
Sabeans, is this: When a tree is grafted into another in the time of a
certain conjunction of sun and moon, and is fumigated with certain
substances whilst a formula is uttered, that tree will produce a thing
that will be found exceedingly useful. More general than anything
mentioned by the heathen writers was the ceremony of grafting an olive
branch upon a citron tree, as described in the beginning of the
Nabatean Agriculture. I am of opinion that the book of medicines which
Hezekiah put away (B. T. Pes. 56a) was undoubtedly of this kind. They
also said that when one species is grafted upon another, the branch
which is to be grafted must be in the hand of a beautiful damsel,
whilst a male person has disgraceful and unnatural sexual intercourse
with her; during that intercourse the woman grafts the branch into the
tree. There is no doubt that this ceremony was general, and that nobody
refused to perform it, especially as the pleasure of love was added to
the (supposed) future results of the grafting. The Law, therefore,
prohibits us to mix different species together, i.e., to graft one tree
into another, because we must keep away from the opinions of idolaters
and the abominations of their unnatural sexual intercourse. In order to
guard against the grafting of trees, we are forbidden to sow any two
kinds of seed together or near each other. When you study the
traditional explanation of this precept, you will find that the
prohibition of grafting, the principal element in this commandment,
holds good for all countries, and is punishable by forty stripes; but
the sowing of seeds one near the other is only prohibited in Palestine.
In the Nabatean Agriculture it is further distinctly stated that it was
the custom of the people in those days to sow barley and stones of
grapes together, in the belief that the vineyard could only prosper in
this way. Therefore the Law prohibits us to use seed that has grown in
a vineyard, and commands us to burn both the barley and the produce of
the vineyard. For the practices of the heathen, which they considered
as of a magic and talismanic character, even if not containing any
idolatrous element, are prohibited, as we have stated above (p. 334) in
reference to the dictum of our Sages, “We must not hang upon a tree the
fœtus of an animal belonging to the Sanctuary.” The Law prohibits all
heathen customs, called by our Sages “the ways of the Amorite,” because
they are connected with idolatry. On considering the customs of the
heathen in their worship, you will find that in certain kinds of
worship they turn toward stars, in others to the two great luminaries;
frequently they choose the rise of signs in the Zodiac for sowing and
fumigating; and as to the circuits made by those who plant or sow, some
complete five circles, corresponding to the five planets, with the
exclusion of the two luminaries; others go seven times round, according
to the number of the planets, when including sun and moon. They believe
that all these practices are magic charms of great efficiency in
agriculture. Thus those practices lead to the worship of stars; and
therefore all practices of those nations have been prohibited, in the
words, “Ye shall not walk in the manners of the nation which I cast out
before you” (Lev. xx. 23). Those practices which were more general and
common, or were distinctly connected with idolatry, are particularly
pointed out as prohibited; e.g., eating the fruit of a tree during the
first three years, intermixing of species and the mixed species sown in
a vineyard. I am surprised at the dictum of Rabbi Joshiyah, which has
been adopted as legally binding, in reference to the mixed seed in a
vineyard, viz., that the law is only transgressed when wheat, barley,
and the stone of a grape are sown simultaneously. He must undoubtedly
have seen the source of that kind of the ways of the Amorite. It must
now be clear to you, and no room can be left for any doubt, that the
prohibition of wearing garments of wool and linen, of using the fruit
of a tree in the first three years, and of mixing divers species, are
directed against idolatry, and that the prohibition against adopting
heathen manners serves to remove anything which leads to idolatry, as
has been shown by us.






CHAPTER XXXVIII


The precepts of the third class are identical with those which we have
enumerated in Hilkot deʻot. Their use is evident; they are rules
concerning moral conduct by which the social relations of men are
regulated. This is sufficiently clear, and I need not dwell long on it.
Know that some precepts prescribe certain acts which are considered as
arbitrary decrees without any purpose, but are nevertheless the means
of acquiring some moral principle. We shall explain every one of them
in its proper place. But of all those precepts which are mentioned in
Hilkot deʻot, it is distinctly stated that their object is to inculcate
good moral principles.






CHAPTER XXXIX


The precepts in the fourth class include the laws which in our work are
contained in the section Zeraʻim, excepting the laws on the mixture of
species; the rules about things to be “valued” and things “devoted”
(Hilkot ʻerekin va-ḥaramim), and those concerning lender and borrower
(Hilkot malveh ve-loveh) and slaves (Hilkot ʻabadim). When you examine
these precepts you will clearly see the use of every one of them: they
teach us to have sympathy with the poor and infirm, to assist the needy
in various ways; not to hurt the feelings of those who are in want, and
not to vex those who are in a helpless condition [viz., the widow, the
orphan, and the like]. The purpose of the laws concerning the portions
which are to be given to the poor is likewise obvious; the reason of
the laws concerning the heave-offerings and the tithe is distinctly
stated: “for he hath no portion and inheritance with thee” (Deut. xiv.
29). You certainly know that the Levites had no portion, because their
whole tribe was to be exclusively engaged in the service of God and the
study of the Law. They shall not plow or cut the corn, but shall only
minister to God. “They shall teach Jacob thy judgments and Israel thy
law: they shall put incense before thee” (Deut. xxxiii. 10). In the Law
we meet frequently with the phrase, “the Levite, the stranger, and the
orphan and the widow”; for the Levite is reckoned among the poor
because he had no property. The second tithe was commanded to be spent
on food in Jerusalem; in this way the owner was compelled to give part
of it away as charity. As he was not able to use it otherwise than by
way of eating and drinking, he must have easily been induced to give it
gradually away. This rule brought multitudes together in one place, and
strengthened the bond of love and brotherhood among the children of
men. The law concerning the fruit of a tree in its fourth year has some
relation to idolatrous customs, as has been stated by us (chap.
xxxvii.), and is connected with the law concerning the fruit of a tree
in its first three years. But it has in addition the same object as the
law concerning the heave-offering (Deut. xviii. 4), the dough-offering
(ḥallah) (Num. xv. 20), the first-fruit (Exod. xxiii. 19), and the
first of the shearing (Deut. xviii. 4). For the first of everything is
to be devoted to the Lord; and by doing so man accustoms himself to be
liberal, and to limit his appetite for eating and his desire for
property. The same is the reason why the priest took the shoulder, the
two cheeks, and the maw (Deut. xviii. 3); the cheek being the first
part of the body of animals, the right shoulder the first of the
extremities of the body, and the maw the first of all inwards.

The reciting of a certain portion of the Law when the first-fruits are
brought to the temple, tends also to create humility. For he who brings
the first-fruits takes the basket upon his shoulders and proclaims the
kindness and goodness of God. This ceremony teaches man that it is
essential in the service of God to remember the times of trouble and
the history of past distress, in days of comfort. The Law lays stress
on this duty in several places; comp. “And thou shalt remember that
thou hast been a slave,” etc. (Deut. v. 15). For it is to be feared
that those who become great in riches and comfort might, as is
generally the case, fall into the vices of insolence and haughtiness,
and abandon all good principles. Comp. “Lest thou eat and be full,
etc., and thine heart be lifted up and thou forget the Lord” (ibid.
viii. 12–14); “And Jeshurun waxed fat and kicked” (ibid. xxx. 15). On
account of this fear the Law commanded us to read each year a certain
portion before the Lord and His glory, when we offer the first-fruit.
You know how much the Law insists that we shall always remember the
plagues that have befallen the Egyptians; comp. “That thou mayest
remember the day when thou camest forth out of the land of Egypt all
the days of thy life” (ibid. xvi. 3); “That thou mayest tell in the
ears of thy son what things I have wrought in Egypt” (Exod. x. 2). Such
a law was necessary in order to perpetuate the memory of the departure
from Egypt; because such events verify prophecy and the doctrine of
reward and punishment. The benefit of every commandment that serves to
keep certain miracles in remembrance, or to perpetuate true faith, is
therefore obvious.

In reference to the law concerning the first-born of man and cattle it
is distinctly said, “And it came to pass, when Pharaoh would hardly let
us go, that the Lord slew all the first-born in the land of Egypt,
etc., therefore I sacrifice to the Lord,” etc. (Exod. xiii. 15). But it
can easily be explained why only cattle, sheep, and asses are mentioned
in this law; these are kept as domestic animals, and are found in most
places, especially in Palestine, where the Israelites were shepherds,
they, their fathers, and forefathers; comp. “Thy servants are
shepherds, both we and also our fathers” (Gen. xlvii. 3). Horses and
camels, however, are not wanted by shepherds, and are not found in all
places; thus in the booty of Midian (Num. xxxi.) no other animals are
mentioned but oxen, sheep, and asses. But asses alone are indispensable
to all people, especially to those who are engaged in the field or in
the forest. Thus Jacob says, “I have oxen and asses” (Gen. xxxii. 5).
Camels and horses are not possessed by many people, but only by a few,
and are only found in a few places. The law that the first-born of an
ass was to have its neck broken [in case it is not redeemed], will only
ensure the redemption of the ass. It has, therefore, been said that the
act of redeeming the ass is to be preferred to that of breaking its
neck.

As to the precepts enumerated in the laws concerning the year of
release and the jubilee (Hilkot shemittah ve-yobel) some of them imply
sympathy with our fellow-men, and promote the well-being of mankind;
for in reference to these precepts it is stated in the Law, “That the
poor of thy people may eat” (Exod. xxiii. 11); and besides, the land
will also increase its produce and improve when it remains fallow for
some time. Other precepts of this class prescribe kindness to servants
and to the poor, by renouncing all claims to debts [in the year of
release], and relieving the slaves of their bondage [in the seventh
year]. There are some precepts in this class that serve to secure for
the people a permanent source of maintenance and support by providing
that the land should remain the permanent property of its owners, and
that it could not be sold. “And the land shall not be sold for ever”
(Lev. xxv. 23). In this way the property of a person remains intact for
him and his heirs, and he can only enjoy the produce thereof. I have
thus explained the reason of all precepts contained in our work in the
Section Zeraiʻim, with the exception of the laws concerning the
intermixture of different species of beasts the reason of which will be
given (chap. xlix.).

In the same manner we find that all the precepts comprised in “the laws
on valuations,” and on “things devoted” are based on the principle of
charity; some of them prescribe what should be given to the priests;
others tell us what must be devoted to the repairs of the temple. The
practice of all these things accustoms man to act liberally and to
spend money unhesitatingly to the glory of God. For it is in the nature
of man to strive to gain money and to increase it; and his great desire
to add to his wealth and honour is the chief source of misery for man.
Also the precepts contained in “the laws concerning the relation
between lender and borrower” (Hilkot malveh veloveh) will be found, on
being carefully examined, to be nothing but commands to be lenient,
merciful and kind to the needy, not to deprive them of the use of
anything indispensable in the preparation of food. “No man shall take
the nether or the upper millstone to pledge: for he taketh a man’s life
to pledge” (Deut. xxiv. 6).

The precepts contained in “the laws concerning slaves” (Hilkot
ʻabadim), likewise prescribe only acts of pity, mercy and kindness to
the poor. It is an act of mercy to give liberty to a Canaanite servant
for the loss of one of his limbs (Exod. xxi. 26, 27), in order that he
should not suffer from slavery and illness at the same time. The law
applies even to the case that a tooth of a slave has been knocked out,
much more to the mutilation of other limbs. He could only be corrected
with a rod or reed or the like, as we have stated in Mishneh-torah.
Besides, if the master strikes the slave too hard and kills him, he is
punished with death as for ordinary murder. Mercy is also the object of
the law, “Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant that is
escaped from his master” (Deut. xxiii. 15); but it teaches besides a
very useful lesson, namely, that we must always practise this virtue,
help and protect those who seek our help, and not deliver them unto
those from whom they flee; and it is not sufficient to give assistance
to those who are in need of our help; we must look after their
interests, be kind to them, and not hurt their feeling by words. Thus
the Law says: “He shall dwell with thee, even among you, in that place
which he shall choose in one of thy gates, where it liketh him best:
thou shalt not vex him” (ibid. ver. 16). This we owe to the lowest
among men, to the slave; how much more must we do our duty to the
freeborn, when they seek our assistance? But, on the other hand, when
sinners and evildoers seek our help, it must not be granted; no mercy
must be shown to them, and the course of justice must not be interfered
with, even if they claim the protection of that which is noblest and
highest; for “Thou shalt take him from mine altar that he may die”
(Exod. xxi. 14). Here a person comes to seek the help of God, and
claims the protection of that which is devoted to his name; God,
however, does not help him, and commands that he be delivered up to the
prosecutor, from whom he fled. Much less need any one of us help or
pity his fellow-men [under such circumstances]; because mercy on
sinners is cruelty to all creatures. These are undoubtedly the right
ways designated “righteous statutes and judgments” (Deut. iv. 8), and
different from the ways of the fools, who consider a person
praiseworthy when he helps and protects his fellow-men, without
discriminating between the oppressor and the oppressed. This is well
known from their words and songs.

The reason and usefulness of every precept of this class has thus been
clearly demonstrated.






CHAPTER XL


The precepts of the fifth class, enumerated in the Section “On Damages”
(Sepher neziḳin), aim at the removal of wrong and the prevention of
injury. As we are strongly recommended to prevent damage, we are
responsible for every damage caused by our property or through our work
in so far as it is in our power to take care and to guard it from
becoming injurious. We are, therefore, responsible for all damage
caused by our cattle; we must guard them. The same is the case with
fire and pits; they are made by man, and he can be careful that they do
not cause damage. I will point out the equity of the various laws in
this respect. No compensation is enforced for damage caused by the
mouth or the foot of an animal in a public thoroughfare; because this
cannot be guarded against, and the damage caused there is not very
large. Those who place their things in a public place are themselves
guilty of neglect, and expose their property to injury. But
compensation is given for damage caused to the property of a person in
his own field by the tooth or the foot of an animal. It is different in
the case of damage caused by the horn of animals or the like. The
animal can be guarded everywhere [and prevented from causing injury],
whilst those who pass public thoroughfares cannot sufficiently take
care against accidents of this kind. In this case the law is the same
for all places; but there is a difference whether the owner of the
animal has been warned concerning it or not (muʻad or tam). If the
animal has not been in the habit of causing damage, the owner need only
pay half the damage; but damage caused by an animal which has been in
the habit of doing so, and has been known as savage, must be paid in
full. The compensation for a slave is uniformly estimated at half the
value fixed for a free man. For in the law concerning the valuation of
man you find the highest valuation at sixty shekels, whilst the money
to be paid for a slave is fixed at thirty shekels silver. The killing
of an animal that has killed a human being (Exod. xxi. 28, 29) is not a
punishment to the animal, as the dissenters insinuate against us, but
it is a fine imposed on the owner of that animal. For the same reason
the use of its flesh is prohibited. The owner of an animal will,
therefore, take the greatest possible care in guarding it; he will know
that if any person is killed by the animal, whether that person be
grown up or young, free or in bondage, he forfeits at least the animal;
and in case he has already received a warning concerning it, he will
have to pay a ransom in addition to the loss of the animal. This is
also the reason why a beast is killed that has been used by a human
being for an immoral purpose (Lev. xx. 15, 16); its owner will be more
careful as regards his beast, will guard it, and never lose sight of
it, just as he watches his household: for people fear the loss of their
property as much as that of their own life; some even more, but most
people hold both in the same estimation. Comp. “and to take us for
bondmen, and our asses” (Gen. xliii. 18).

This class includes also the duty of killing him who pursues another
person; that is to say, if a person is about to commit a crime we may
prevent it by killing him. Only in two cases is this permitted; viz.,
when a person runs after another in order to murder him, or in order to
commit fornication; because in these two cases the crime, once
committed; cannot be remedied. In the case of other sins, punished with
death by the court of law, such as idolatry and profanation of the
Sabbath, by which the sinner does no harm to another person, and which
concern only his own principles, no person may be killed for the mere
intention, if he has not carried it out.

It is known that desire is denounced because it leads to coveting, and
the latter is prohibited because it leads to robbery, as has been said
by our Sages.

The object of the law of restoring lost property to its owner (Deut.
xxii. 1–3) is obvious. In the first instance, it is in itself a good
feature in man’s character. Secondly, its benefit is mutual; for if a
person does not return the lost property of his fellow-man, nobody will
restore to him what he may lose, just as those who do not honour their
parents cannot expect to be honoured by their children.

A person who killed another person unknowingly must go into exile
(Exod. xxi. 13; Num. xxxv. 11–28); because the anger of “the avenger of
the blood” (Num. xxxv. 19) cools down while the cause of the mischief
is out of sight. The chance of returning from the exile depends on the
death of [the high-priest], the most honoured of men, and the friend of
all Israel. By his death the relative of the slain person becomes
reconciled (ibid. ver. 25); for it is a natural phenomenon that we find
consolation in our misfortune when the same misfortune or a greater one
has befallen another person. Amongst us no death causes more grief than
that of the high-priest.

The beneficial character of the law concerning “the breaking of the
neck of a heifer” (Deut. xxi. 1–8) is evident. For it is the city that
is nearest to the slain person that brings the heifer, and in most
cases the murderer comes from that place. The elders of the place call
upon God as their witness, according to the interpretation of our
Sages, that they have always kept the roads in good condition, have
protected them, and have directed every one that asked his way; that
the person has not been killed because they were careless in these
general provisions, and they do not know who has slain him. As a rule
the investigation, the procession of the elders, the measuring, and the
taking of the heifer, make people talk about it, and by making the
event public, the murderer may be found out, and he who knows of him,
or has heard of him, or has discovered him by any due, will now name
the person that is the murderer, and as soon as a man, or even a woman
or handmaid, rises up and names a certain person as having committed
the murder, the heifer is not killed. It is well known that it is
considered great wickedness and guilt on the part of a person who knows
the murderer, and is silent about him whilst the elders call upon God
as witness that they know nothing about the murderer. Even a woman
will, therefore, communicate whatever knowledge she has of him. When
the murderer is discovered, the benefit of the law is apparent. If the
court of justice cannot sentence him to death, the king may find him
guilty, who has the power to sentence to death on circumstantial
evidence; and if the king does not put him to death, the avenger of
blood may scheme and plan his death, and at last kill him. We have thus
shown the use of the law concerning the breaking of the neck of the
heifer in discovering the murderer. Force is added to the law by the
rule that the place in which the neck of the heifer is broken should
never be cultivated or sown. The owner of the land will therefore use
all means in his power to search and to find the murderer, in order
that the heifer be not killed and his land be not made useless to him.






CHAPTER XLI


The precepts of the sixth class comprise the different ways of
punishing the sinner. Their general usefulness is known and has also
been mentioned by us. I will here describe them one by one and point
out their nature in detail.

The punishment of him who sins against his neighbour consists in the
general rule that there shall be done unto him exactly as he has done:
if he injured any one personally, he must suffer personally; if he
damaged the property of his neighbour, he shall be punished by loss of
property. But the person whose property has been damaged should be
ready to resign his claim totally or partly. Only to the murderer we
must not be lenient because of the greatness of his crime; and no
ransom must be accepted of him. “And the land cannot be cleansed of the
blood that is shed therein but by the blood of him that shed it” (Num.
xxxi. 33). Hence even if the murdered person continued to live after
the attack for an hour or for days, was able to speak and possessed
complete consciousness, and if he himself said, “Pardon my murderer, I
have pardoned and forgiven him,” he must not be obeyed. We must take
life for life, and estimate equally the life of a child and that of a
grown-up person, of a slave and of a freeman, of a wise man and of a
fool. For there is no greater sin than this. And he who mutilated a
limb of his neighbour, must himself lose a limb. “As he hath caused a
blemish in a man, so shall it be done to him again” (Lev. xxiv. 20).
You must not raise an objection from our practice of imposing a fine in
such cases. For we have proposed to ourselves to give here the reason
for the precepts mentioned in the Law, and not for that which is stated
in the Talmud. I have, however, an explanation for the interpretation
given in the Talmud, but it will be communicated vivâ voce. Injuries
that cannot be reproduced exactly in another person, are compensated
for by payment; “only he shall pay for the loss of his time, and shall
cause him to be thoroughly healed” (Exod. xxi. 19). If any one damaged
the property of another, he must lose exactly as much of his own
property: “whom the judges shall condemn he shall pay double unto his
neighbour” (Exod. xxii. 8); namely, he restores that which he has
taken, and adds just as much [to it] of his own property. It is right
that the more frequent transgressions and sins are, and the greater the
probability of their being committed, the more severe must their
punishment be, in order to deter people from committing them; but sins
which are of rare occurrence require a less severe punishment. For this
reason one who stole a sheep had to pay twice as much as for other
goods, i.e., four times the value of the stolen object; but this is
only the case when he has disposed of it by sale or slaughter (Exod.
xxi. 37). As a rule, the sheep remained always in the fields, and could
therefore not be watched so carefully as things kept in town. The thief
of a sheep used therefore to sell it quickly before the theft became
known, or to slaughter it and thereby change its appearance. As such
theft happened frequently, the punishment was severe. The compensation
for a stolen ox is still greater by one-fourth, because the theft is
easily carried out. The sheep keep together when they feed, and can be
watched by the shepherd, so that theft when it is committed can only
take place by night. But oxen when feeding are very widely scattered,
as is also mentioned in the Nabatean Agriculture, and a shepherd cannot
watch them properly; theft of oxen is therefore a more frequent
occurrence.

The law concerning false witnesses (Deut. xix. 19) prescribes that they
shall suffer exactly the same loss which they intended to inflict upon
another. If they intended to bring a sentence of death against a
person, they are killed; if they aimed at the punishment of stripes,
they receive stripes; and if they desire to make a person pay money,
they are sentenced to pay exactly the same sum. The object of all these
laws is to make the punishment equal to the crime; and it is also on
this account that the judgments are “righteous” (Deut. iv. 8). A robber
with violence is not ordered to pay anything as fine (Lev. v. 24); the
additional fifth part [of the value of the robbed goods] is only an
atonement-offering for his perjury. The reason of this rule is to be
found in the rare occurrence of robbery; theft is committed more
frequently than robbery, for theft can be committed everywhere; robbery
is not possible in towns, except with difficulty; besides, the thief
takes things exposed as well as things hidden away; robbery applies
only to things exposed; against robbery we can guard and defend
ourselves; we cannot do so against theft; again, the robber is known,
can be sought, and forced to return that which he has robbed, whilst
the thief is not known. On account of all these circumstances the law
fines the thief and not the robber.

Preliminary Remark.—Whether the punishment is great or small, the pain
inflicted intense or less intense, depends on the following four
conditions.

1. The greatness of the sin. Actions that cause great harm are punished
severely, whilst actions that cause little harm are punished less
severely.

2. The frequency of the crime. A crime that is frequently committed
must be put down by severe punishment; crimes of rare occurrence may be
suppressed by a lenient punishment considering that they are rarely
committed.

3. The amount of temptation. Only fear of a severe punishment remains
us from actions for which there exists a great temptation, either
because we have a great desire for these actions, or are accustomed to
them, or feel unhappy without them.

4. The facility of doing the thing secretly, and unseen and unnoticed.
From such acts we are deterred only by the fear of a great and terrible
punishment.

After this preliminary remark, I say that the precepts of the Law may
be divided into the following four classes with respect to the
punishment for their transgression:—(1) Precepts whose transgression is
followed by sentence of death pronounced by a court of law. (2)
Precepts whose transgression is punished with excision, such
transgression being held to be a very great sin. (3) In some cases the
transgression is punished by stripes administered with a strap (such
transgression not being considered a grievous sin, as it concerns only
a simple prohibition); or by “death by Heaven.” (4) Precepts the
transgression of which is not punished [even] by stripes. Prohibitions
of this kind are all those that involve no act. But there are the
following exceptions: [First], Swearing falsely, because it is gross
neglect of man’s duty, who ought to bear constantly in mind the
greatness of God. [Secondly], Changing an animal devoted to the
sanctuary for another (Lev. xxvii. 10), because this change leads to
contemning sacrifices devoted to the name of God. [Thirdly], Cursing a
person by the name of God (ibid. xix. 14); because many dread the
effect of a curse more than bodily harm. The transgression of other
negative commandments that involve no act causes little harm, and
cannot always be avoided, as it consists in mere words; moreover, man’s
back would be inflicted with stripes all the year round if he were to
be punished with stripes for each transgression of this kind. Besides,
previous warning is impossible in this case. There is also wisdom in
the number of stripes; for although the number of their maximum is
given, there is no fixed number how many are to be applied to each
person; each man receives only as many stripes as he can bear, but not
more than forty (Deut. xxv. 3), even if he be strong enough for a
hundred.

The “death by the court of law” is not inflicted for the transgression
of any of the dietary laws; because in such a case no great harm is
done, and the temptation of man to transgress these laws is not so
great as the temptation to the enjoyment of sexual intercourse. In some
of the dietary laws the punishment is excision. This is the case with
the prohibition of eating blood (Lev. xvii. 26). For in ancient days
people were very eager and anxious to eat blood as a kind of idolatrous
ceremony, as is explained in the book Tomtom, and therefore the
prohibition of eating blood is made very stringent. Excision is also
the punishment for eating fat; because people enjoy it, and because it
was distinguished and sanctified by its use in the offerings. The
eating of leavened bread on Passover (Exod. xii. 15), and breaking the
fast on the Day of Atonement (Lev. xxiii. 29), are likewise punished
with excision: [first] on account of the great discomfort which the
obedience to the law causes in these cases; [secondly] on account of
the principles of faith which the laws of Passover and of the Day of
Atonement inculcate: they confirm fundamental principles of the Law,
viz., the belief in the wonderful departure [of Israel] from Egypt, and
in the effect of repentance, according to the words, “For on this day
will he forgive you” (Lev. xvi. 31). Just as in the case of eating fat,
so is excision also announced as a punishment when a person eats that
which is left [of a sacrifice beyond its limited time], or partakes of
a sacrifice which has been made abominable; or when an unclean person
eats of holy things (ibid. vii. 16–21). The object of this severity is
to increase the estimation of the offering in the eyes of the people,
as has been shown.

Death by the court of law is decreed in important cases: when faith is
undermined, or a great crime is committed, viz., idolatry, incest,
murder, or actions that lead to these crimes. It is further decreed for
breaking the Sabbath (Exod. xxxi. 15); because the keeping of Sabbath
is a confirmation of our belief in the Creation; a false prophet and a
rebellious elder are put to death on account of the mischief which they
cause; he who strikes his father or his mother is killed on account of
his great audacity, and because he undermines the constitution of the
family, which is the foundation of the state. A rebellious and
disobedient son is put to death (Deut. xxi. 18 seq.) on account of what
he might become, because he will likely be a murderer; he who steals a
human being is killed, because he is also prepared to kill him whom he
steals (Exod. xxi. 16). Likewise he who is found breaking into a house
is prepared for murder (ibid. xxii. 1), as our Sages stated. These
three, the rebellious and disobedient son, he who steals and sells a
human being, and he who breaks into a house, become murderers in the
course of time, as is well known. Capital punishment is only decreed
for these serious crimes, and in no other case. Not all forbidden
sexual intercourse is visited with the penalty of death, but only in
those cases in which the criminal act can easily be done, is of
frequent occurrence, is base and disgraceful, and of a tempting
character; otherwise excision is the punishment. Likewise not all kinds
of idolatry are capital crimes, but only the principal acts of
idolatry, such as praying to an idol, prophesying in its name, passing
a child through the fire, consulting with familiar spirits, and acting
as a wizard or witch.

As punishments and judgments are evidently indispensable, it was
necessary to appoint judges throughout the country in every town;
witnesses must be heard; and a king is required whom all fear and
respect, who is able to restrain the people by various means, and who
can strengthen and support the authority of the judges. Although I have
shown the reason of all the laws contained in “the Section of Judges”
(Sefer Shofetim), I find it necessary, in accordance with the object of
this treatise, to explain a few of these laws, e.g., the laws
concerning a rebellious elder.

God knew that the judgments of the Law will always require an extension
in some cases and curtailment in others, according to the variety of
places, events, and circumstances. He therefore cautioned against such
increase and diminution, and commanded, “Thou shalt not add thereto nor
diminish from it” (Deut. xiii. 1); for constant changes would tend to
disturb the whole system of the Law, and would lead people to believe
that the Law is not of Divine origin. But permission is at the same
time given to the wise men, i.e., the great court (Synhedrion) of every
generation to make fences round the judgments of the Law for their
protection, and to introduce bye-laws (fences) in order to ensure the
keeping of the Law. Such fences once erected remain in force for ever.
The Mishnah therefore teaches: “And make a fence round the Law” (Abot
i. 1). In the same manner they have the power temporarily to dispense
with some religious act prescribed in the Law, or to allow that which
is forbidden, if exceptional circumstances and events require it; but
none of the laws can be abrogated permanently, as has been explained by
us in the Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah in treating of
temporary legislation. By this method the Law will remain perpetually
the same, and will yet admit at all times and under all circumstances
such temporary modifications as are indispensable. If every scholar had
the power to make such modifications, the multitude of disputes and
differences of opinion would have produced an injurious effect.
Therefore it was commanded that of the Sages only the great Synhedrion,
and none else, should have this power; and whoever would oppose their
decision should be killed. For if any critic were allowed to dispute
the decision of the Synhedrion, the object of this law would not be
attained; it would be useless.

Transgressions may be divided into four classes, viz.—(1) involuntary
transgressions, (2) sins committed in ignorance, (3) sins done
knowingly, and (4) sins done spitefully. He who sins involuntarily is,
according to the distinct declaration of the Law, exempt from
punishment, and free from all blame; comp. “Unto the damsel thou shalt
do nothing; there is in the damsel no sin worthy of death” (Deut. xxii.
26). If a person sins in ignorance, he is blamable; for if he had been
more considerate and careful, he would not have erred. Although he is
not punished, his sin must be atoned for, and for this reason he brings
a sin-offering. The Law distinguishes in this respect between a private
person and a king, a high-priest or Teacher of Halakah. Hence we
conclude that a person who acts wrongly, or who teaches wrongly, guided
by his own reasoning—except in the case of the great Synhedrion or the
high-priest—is treated as mezid (as one who sins knowingly), and does
not belong to the category of shogegim (of those who sin by error). A
rebellious elder is therefore put to death, although he acted and
taught according to his view. But the great Synhedrion must teach
according to its opinion, and if the opinion is wrong, the sin is
considered as due to error. In reference to such a case the Law says,
“And if the whole congregation of Israel err,” etc. (Lev. iv. 13). It
is on this principle that our Sages say, “The error in learning amounts
to intentional sin” (Abot iv. 13); he who has studied insufficiently,
and teaches and acts according to his defective knowledge, is to be
considered as if he sinned knowingly. For if a person eats of the fat
of the kidneys in the belief that it is the fat of the rump, his error
is not so grave as the error of him who, eating of the fat of the
kidneys, knows that it is that fat, but is ignorant of the fact that it
is prohibited. The latter brings a sin-offering although he is almost
an intentional transgressor. But this is only the case as far as he
acts according to his knowledge; but if he decides a religious question
[wrongly], he is undoubtedly an intentional sinner. The Law admits the
plea of error in a religious decision only in the case of the great
Synhedrion.

He who has sinned knowingly must pay the penalty prescribed in the Law;
he is put to death or receives stripes, or—for transgression of
prohibitions not punishable by stripes—other corporal punishment, or
pays a fine. There are some sins for which the punishment is the same,
whether they have been committed knowingly or unknowingly; because they
are frequent, and are easily done, consisting only in the utterance of
words, and involving no action besides; e.g., false swearing by
witnesses, or by trustees. Intercourse with a betrothed handmaid is
likewise easy and frequent; she is exposed unprotected, being in
reality neither handmaid nor a free person, nor a married woman,
according to the traditional interpretation of this precept.

If a person sins presumptuously, so that in sinning he shows impudence
and seeks publicity, if he does not sin only to satisfy his appetite,
if he does what is prohibited by the Law, not only because of his evil
inclinations, but in order to oppose and resist the Law, he
“reproacheth the Lord” (Num. xv. 30), and must undoubtedly be put to
death. None will act in such a manner but such as have conceived the
idea to act contrary to the Law. According to the traditional
interpretation, therefore, the above passage speaks of an idolater who
opposes the fundamental principles of the Law; for no one worships a
star unless he believes [—contrary to the teachings of Scripture—] that
the star is eternal, as we have frequently stated in our work. I think
that the same punishment [viz., sentence of death] applies to every sin
which involves the rejection of the Law, or opposition to it. Even if
an Israelite eats meat [boiled] in milk, or wears garments of wool and
linen, or rounds the corners of his head, out of spite against the Law,
in order to show clearly that he does not believe in its truth, I apply
to him the words, “he reproacheth the Lord,” and [I am of opinion] that
he must suffer death as an unbeliever, though not for a punishment, but
in the same manner as the inhabitants of a “city misled to idolatry”
are slain for their unbelief, and not by way of punishment for crime;
wherefore their property is destroyed by fire, and is not given to
their heirs, as is the case with the property of other criminals
condemned to death. According to my opinion, all the members of an
Israelitish community which has insolently and presumptuously
transgressed any of the divine precepts, must be put to death. This is
proved by the history of “the sons of Reuben and the sons of Gad”
(Josh. xxii.), against whom the whole congregation of Israel decided to
make war. When warning was given to the supposed offenders, it was
explained to them that they had relinquished their faith, because by
agreeing to transgress one particular law they rejected the truth of
the whole Law. For they were addressed as follows: “What trespass is
this that ye have committed against the God of Israel, to turn away
this day from following the Lord?” (Josh. xxii. 16); and they replied:
“The Lord knoweth, etc., if it be in rebellion, or if in transgression
against the Lord,” etc. (ibid. 22). Take well notice of these
principles in respect to punishments.

The Section on Judges includes also the commandment to blot out the
memory of Amalek (Deut. xxv. 17–19). In the same way as one individual
person is punished, so must also a whole family or a whole nation be
punished, in order that other families shall hear it and be afraid, and
not accustom themselves to practise mischief. For they will say, we may
suffer in the same way as those people have suffered; and if there be
found among them a wicked, mischievous man, who cares neither for the
evil he brings upon himself nor for that which he causes to others, he
will not find in his family any one ready to help him in his evil
designs. As Amalek was the first to attack Israel with the sword (Exod.
xvii. 8–16), it was commanded to blot out his name by means of the
sword; whilst Ammon and Moab, who have not been friendly simply from
meanness, and have caused them injury by cunning, were only punished by
exclusion from intermarriage with the Israelites, and from their
friendship. All these things which God has commanded as a punishment
are not excessive nor inadequate, but, as is distinctly stated,
“according to the fault” (Deut. xxv. 2).

This section contains also the law concerning preparing “a place
without the camp,” and “having a paddle upon the weapon” (Deut. xxiii.
12, 13). As I have told you, it is one of the objects of the Law to
train Israel to cleanliness; that they should keep free from dirt and
filth, and that men should not be degraded to the condition of cattle.
Another object of this law is to confirm by these preparations the
belief of the warriors that God dwells in their midst. The reason of
the law is therefore stated thus: “For the Lord thy God walketh in the
midst of the camp” (ibid. ver. 14). The mention of this reason gave
occasion to add another lesson: “That he see no unclean thing in thee
and turn away from thee” (ibid.). These words warn and caution us
against the usual inclination of soldiers to fornication, when they are
away from their homes a long time. God therefore commanded us to do
certain things which remind us that He is in our midst; we will thereby
be saved from those evil practices; as it is said, “and thy camp shall
be holy, that he see no unclean thing in thee” (ibid.). Even those who
are unclean by pollution were compelled to stop outside the camp till
the evening, and “then he shall come into the camp again.” It will thus
be confirmed in the heart of every one of the Israelites that their
camp must be like a sanctuary of the Lord, and it must not be like the
camps of the heathen, whose sole object is corruption and sin; who only
seek to cause injury to others and to take their property; whilst our
object is to lead mankind to the service of God, and to a good social
order. I have told you already that I only propose to give here such
reasons as are apparent from the text of the Law.

To the same class belongs also the law concerning “the marriage of a
captive woman” (Deut. xxi. 10 seq.). There is a well-known saying of
our Sages: “This law is only a concession to human weakness.” This law
contains, nevertheless, even for the nobler class of people, some moral
lessons to which I will call your attention. For although the soldier
may be overcome by his desire which he is unable to suppress or to
restrain, he must take the object of his lust to a private place, “into
the inner of his house” (Deut. xxi. 12), and he is not permitted to
force her in the camp. Similarly our Sages say, that he may not cohabit
with her a second time before she leaves off her mourning, and is at
ease about her troubles. She must not be prevented from mourning and
crying, and she must be permitted to abstain from bathing, in
accordance with the words, “and she shall weep for her father and for
her mother” (ibid.); for mourners find comfort in crying and in
excitement till the body has not sufficient strength to bear the inner
emotions; in the same manner as happy persons find rest in various
kinds of play. Thus the Lord is merciful to her and gives her
permission to continue her mourning and weeping till she is worn out.
You know certainly that he married her as a heathen, and that during
the thirty days she openly keeps her religion and even continues her
idolatrous practices; no interference with her faith was allowed during
that time; and after all that she could not be sold, nor treated as a
handmaid, if she could not be induced to accept the statutes of the
Law. Thus the Law does not ignore the cohabitation of the Israelite
with the captive woman, although it involved disobedience to God to
some extent, having taken place when she was still a heathen. The Law
prescribes: “Thou shalt not make merchandise of her, because thou hast
humbled her” (ibid. 14). We have thus shown the moral lessons contained
in these laws, and we have explained the reason of every precept of
this section.






CHAPTER XLII


The precepts of the seventh class are the civil laws enumerated in the
Section on Judgments, and part of the Section on Property. The object
of these precepts is obvious. They define the ways of equity in the
various transactions which must take place between man and man. Those
that are engaged in such transactions must mutually promote each
other’s interests; neither of the parties must strive to increase only
his own profit, and that he alone should enjoy the whole benefit of the
transaction. In the first place, no overcharge is permitted; only the
ordinary and known rate of profit may be taken. The law fixes the
limits of profits within which the transaction is valid. Even
imposition in mere words [where no material harm is inflicted] is
forbidden, as is well known. Next comes the law of the four kind of
bailees; the fairness of the law is evident. If one keeps the property
of his neighbour for nothing, without deriving therefrom any benefit
for himself, and is only obliging his neighbour, he is free from all
responsibility, and if any injury is done to the property, the owner
alone must bear the loss. He who borrows a thing keeps it only for his
own advantage, whilst the owner lends it to him to oblige him; he is
therefore responsible for everything; any loss in the property must be
borne by the borrower. If one takes wages for keeping the property or
pays for using it, he as well as the owner profit thereby; the losses
must therefore be divided between them. It is done in this manner; the
bailee pays for any loss caused through want of care, namely, when the
property is stolen or lost; for this happens only when the bailee does
not take sufficient precaution. The owner, on the other hand, bears
such losses as cannot be prevented; namely, if by accident the animal
falls and breaks its limbs, or is carried away by armed men as booty,
or if it dies. The Law further ordains merciful conduct towards hired
workmen because of their poverty. Their wages should be paid without
delay, and they must not be wronged in any of their rights; they must
receive their pay according to their work. Another instance of kindness
to workmen is this: according to the regulations of this law, workmen,
and even animals, must be permitted to partake of the food in the
preparation of which they have been engaged. The laws which relate to
property include laws concerning inheritance. They are based on the
sound principle that man must not “withhold good from those to whom it
is due” (Prov. iii. 27), and when he is about to die, he must not
conceive ill-will against his heirs, by squandering his property, but
leave it to the one who has the greatest claim on it, that is, to him
who is his nearest relation, “unto his kinsman that is next to him of
his family” (Num. xxvii. 11). It is clearly stated that the son has the
first claim, then comes the daughter, then the brother, and then the
father’s brothers, as is well known. The father must leave the right of
the first-born to his eldest son, because his love for this son came
first; he must not be guided by his inclination. He may not make the
son of the beloved first-born before the son of the hated (Deut. xxi.
16). Thus our highly equitable Law preserves and strengthens the virtue
of respecting all kinsmen, and doing well unto them, as the prophet
says: “He that is cruel troubleth his own flesh” (Prov. xi. 17). The
Law correctly says, “Thou shalt open thine hand wide unto thy brother,
unto thy poor” (Deut. xv. 11). Our Sages bestow much praise upon him
who is kind to his relatives, and him who marries the daughter of his
sister. The Law has taught us how far we have to extend this principle
of favouring those who are near to us, and of treating kindly every one
with whom we have some relationship, even if he offended or wronged us;
even if he is very bad, we must have some consideration for him. Thus
the Law says: “Thou shalt not abhor an Edomite, for he is thy brother”
(ibid. xxiii. 7). Again, if we find a person in trouble, whose
assistance we have once enjoyed, or of whom we have received some
benefit, even if that person has subsequently done evil to us, we must
bear in mind his previous [good] conduct. Thus the Law tells us: “Thou
shalt not abhor an Egyptian, because thou wast a stranger in his land”
(ibid.), although the Egyptians have subsequently oppressed us very
much, as is well-known. See how many moral lessons we have derived from
these precepts. The last two precepts do not belong to the seventh
class; but the discussion of the preference due to relatives as regards
inheritance led us to speak of the Egyptians and the Edomites.






CHAPTER XLIII


The precepts of the eighth class are enumerated in “the Section on
Seasons” (Sefer zemannim). With a few exceptions, the reasons for all
of them are stated in the Law. The object of Sabbath is obvious, and
requires no explanation. The rest it affords to man is known;
one-seventh of the life of every man, whether small or great, passes
thus in comfort, and in rest from trouble and exertion. This the
Sabbath effects in addition to the perpetuation and confirmation of the
grand doctrine of the Creation. The object of the Fast of Atonement is
evident. The Fast creates the sense of repentance; it is the same day
on which the chief of all prophets came down [from Mount Sinai] with
the second tables, and announced to the people the divine pardon of
their great sin; the day was therefore appointed for ever as a day
devoted to repentance and true worship of God. For this reason all
material enjoyment, all trouble and care for the body, are interdicted,
no work may be done; the day must be spent in confession; every one
shall confess his sins and abandon them.

Other holy days are appointed for rejoicing and for such pleasant
gathering as people generally need. They also promote the good feeling
that men should have to each other in their social and political
relations. The appointment of the special days for such purposes has
its cause. The reason for the Passover is well known. It is kept seven
days, because the period of seven days is the unit of time intermediate
between a day and a month. It is also known how great is the importance
of this period in Nature, and in many religious duties. For the Law
always follows Nature, and in some respects brings it to perfection;
for Nature is not capable of designing and thinking, whilst the Law is
the result of the wisdom and guidance of God, who is the author of the
intellect of all rational beings. This, however, is not the theme of
the present chapter; let us return to our subject.

The Feast of Weeks is the anniversary of the Revelation on Mount Sinai.
In order to raise the importance of this day, we count the days that
pass since the preceding festival, just as one who expects his most
intimate friend on a certain day counts the days and even the hours.
This is the reason why we count the days that pass since the offering
of the Omer, between the anniversary of our departure from Egypt and
the anniversary of the Lawgiving. The latter was the aim and object of
the exodus from Egypt, and thus God said, “I brought you unto myself”
(Exod. xix. 4). As that great revelation took place only on one day, so
we keep its anniversary only one day; but if the eating of unleavened
bread on Passover were only commanded for one day, we should not have
noticed it, and its object would not have been manifest. For it
frequently happens that we take the same kind of food for two or three
days. But by our continuing for a whole period [of seven days] to eat
unleavened bread, its object becomes clear and evident.

New-Year is likewise kept for one day; for it is a day of repentance on
which we are stirred up from our forgetfulness. For this reason the
shofar is blown on this day, as we have shown in Mishneh-torah. The day
is, as it were, a preparation for and an introduction to the day of the
Fast, as is obvious from the national tradition about the days between
New-Year and the Day of Atonement.

The Feast of Tabernacles, which is a feast of rejoicing and gladness,
is kept seven days, in order that the idea of the festival may be more
noticeable. The reason why it is kept in the autumn is stated in the
Law, “When thou hast gathered in thy labours out of the field” (Exod.
xxiii. 16); that is to say, when you rest and are free from pressing
labours. Aristotle, in the ninth book of his Ethics, mentions this as a
general custom among the nations. He says: “In ancient times the
sacrifices and assemblies of the people took place after the
ingathering of the corn and the fruit, as if the sacrifices were
offered on account of the harvest.” Another reason is this—in this
season it is possible to dwell in tabernacles, as there is neither
great heat nor troublesome rain.

The two festivals, Passover and the Feast of Tabernacles, imply also
the teaching of certain truths and certain moral lessons. Passover
teaches us to remember the miracles which God wrought in Egypt, and to
perpetuate their memory; the Feast of Tabernacles reminds us of the
miracles wrought in the wilderness. The moral lessons derived from
these feasts is this: man ought to remember his evil days in his days
of prosperity. He will thereby be induced to thank God repeatedly, to
lead a modest and humble life. We eat, therefore, unleavened bread and
bitter herbs on Passover in memory of what has happened unto us, and
leave [on Succoth] our houses in order to dwell in tabernacles, as
inhabitants of deserts do that are in want of comfort. We shall thereby
remember that this has once been our condition; [comp.] “I made the
children of Israel to dwell in booths” (Lev. xxiii. 43); although we
dwell now in elegant houses, in the best and most fertile land, by the
kindness of God, and because of His promises to our forefathers,
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who were perfect in their opinions and in
their conduct. This idea is likewise an important element in our
religion; that whatever good we have received and ever will receive of
God, is owing to the merits of the Patriarchs, who “kept the way of the
Lord to do justice and judgment” (Gen. xviii. 19). We join to the Feast
of Tabernacles the Feast of the Eighth Day, in order to complete our
rejoicings, which cannot be perfect in booths, but in comfortable and
well-built houses. As regards the four species [the branches of the
palm tree, the citron, the myrtle, and the willows of the brook] our
Sages gave a reason for their use by way of Agadic interpretation, the
method of which is well known to those who are acquainted with the
style of our Sages. They use the text of the Bible only as a kind of
poetical language [for their own ideas], and do not intend thereby to
give an interpretation of the text. As to the value of these Midrashic
interpretations, we meet with two different opinions. For some think
that the Midrash contains the real explanation of the text, whilst
others, finding that it cannot be reconciled with the words quoted,
reject and ridicule it. The former struggle and fight to prove and to
confirm such interpretations according to their opinion, and to keep
them as the real meaning of the text; they consider them in the same
light as traditional laws. Neither of the two classes understood it,
that our Sages employ biblical texts merely as poetical expressions,
the meaning of which is dear to every reasonable reader. This style was
general in ancient days; all adopted it in the same way as poets [adopt
a certain style]. Our Sages say, in reference to the words, “and a
paddle (yated) thou shalt have upon thy weapon” [azeneka, Deut. xxiii.
14]: Do not read azeneka, “thy weapon,” but ozneka, “thy ear.” You are
thus told, that if you hear a person uttering something disgraceful,
put your fingers into your ears. Now, I wonder whether those ignorant
persons [who take the Midrashic interpretations literally] believe that
the author of this saying gave it as the true interpretation of the
text quoted, and as the meaning of this precept; that in truth yated,
“the paddle,” is used for “the finger,” and azeneka denotes “thy ear.”
I cannot think that any person whose intellect is sound can admit this.
The author employed the text as a beautiful poetical phrase, in
teaching an excellent moral lesson, namely this: It is as bad to listen
to bad language as it is to use it. This lesson is poetically connected
with the above text. In the same sense you must understand the phrase,
“Do not read so, but so,” wherever it occurs in the Midrash. I have
departed from my subject, but it was for the purpose of making a remark
useful to every intellectual member of the Rabbanites. I now return to
our theme. I believe that the four species are a symbolical expression
of our rejoicing that the Israelites changed the wilderness, “no place
of seed, or of figs, or of vines, or of pomegranates, or of water to
drink” (Num. xx. 5), with a country full of fruit-trees and rivers. In
order to remember this we take the fruit which is the most pleasant of
the fruit of the land, branches which smell best, most beautiful
leaves, and also the best of herbs, i.e., the willows of the brook.
These four kinds have also those three purposes: First, they were
plentiful in those days in Palestine, so that every one could easily
get them. Secondly, they have a good appearance, they are green; some
of them, viz., the citron and the myrtle, are also excellent as regards
their smell, the branches of the palm-tree and the willow having
neither good nor bad smell. Thirdly, they keep fresh and green for
seven days, which is not the case with peaches, pomegranates,
asparagus, nuts, and the like.






CHAPTER XLIV


The precepts of the ninth class are those enumerated in the Section on
Love. Their reason is obvious. The actions prescribed by them serve to
remind us continually of God, and of our duty to fear and to love Him,
to keep all His commandments, and to believe concerning God that which
every religious person must believe. This class includes the laws of
Prayer, Reading of Shema, Grace, and duties connected with these,
Blessing of the priests, Tefillin, Mezuzah, Ẓiẓit, acquiring a scroll
of the Law, and reading in it at certain times. The performance of all
these precepts inculcates into our heart useful lessons. All this is
clear, and a further explanation is superfluous, as being a mere
repetition and nothing else.






CHAPTER XLV


The precepts of the tenth class are those enumerated in the laws on the
Temple (Hilkot bet ha-beḥirah), the laws on the vessels of the temple
and on the ministers in the temple [Hilkot kele ha-miḳdash veha-ʻobedim
bo]. The use of these precepts we have stated in general terms. It is
known that idolaters selected the highest possible places on high
mountains where to build their temples and to place their images.
Therefore Abraham, our father, chose Mount Moriah, being the highest
mount in that country, and proclaimed there the Unity of God. He
selected the west of the mount as the place toward which he turned
during his prayers, because [he thought that] the most holy place was
in the West; this is the meaning of the saying of our Sages, “The
Shekinah (the Glory of God) is in the West” (B. T. Baba B 25a); and it
is distinctly stated in the Talmud Yoma that our father Abraham chose
the west side, the place where the Most Holy was built. I believe that
he did so because it was then a general rite to worship the sun as a
deity. Undoubtedly all people turned then to the East [worshipping the
Sun]. Abraham turned therefore on Mount Moriah to the West, that is,
the site of the Sanctuary, and turned his back toward the sun; and the
Israelites, when they abandoned their God and returned to the early bad
principles, stood “with their backs toward the Temple of the Lord and
their faces toward the East, and they worshipped the sun toward the
East” (Ezek. viii. 16). Note this strange fact. I do not doubt that the
spot which Abraham chose in his prophetical spirit, was known to Moses
our Teacher, and to others; for Abraham commanded his children that on
this place a house of worship should be built. Thus the Targum says
distinctly, “And Abraham worshipped and prayed there in that place, and
said before God, ‘Here shall coming generations worship the Lord’”
(Gen. xxii. 14). For three practical reasons the name of the place is
not distinctly stated in the Law, but indicated in the phrase “To the
place which the Lord will choose” (Deut. xii. 11, etc.). First, if the
nations had learnt that this place was to be the centre of the highest
religious truths, they would occupy it, or fight about it most
perseveringly. Secondly, those who were then in possession of it might
destroy and ruin the place with all their might. Thirdly, and chiefly,
every one of the twelve tribes would desire to have this place in its
borders and under its control; this would lead to divisions and
discord, such as were caused by the desire for the priesthood.
Therefore it was commanded that the Temple should not be built before
the election of a king who would order its erection, and thus remove
the cause of discord. We have explained this in the Section on Judges
(ch. xli.).

It is known that the heathen in those days built temples to stars, and
set up in those temples the image which they agreed upon to worship;
because it was in some relation to a certain star or to a portion of
one of the spheres. We were, therefore, commanded to build a temple to
the name of God, and to place therein the ark with two tables of stone,
on which there were written the commandments “I am the Lord,” etc., and
“Thou shalt have no other God before me,” etc. Naturally the
fundamental belief in prophecy precedes the belief in the Law, for
without the belief in prophecy there can be no belief in the Law. But a
prophet only receives divine inspiration through the agency of an
angel. Comp. “The angel of the Lord called” (Gen. xxii. 15); “The angel
of the Lord said unto her” (ibid. xvi. 11); and other innumerable
instances. Even Moses our Teacher received his first prophecy through
an angel. “And an angel of the Lord appeared to him in the flame of
fire” (Exod. iii.). It is therefore clear that the belief in the
existence of angels precedes the belief in prophecy, and the latter
precedes the belief in the Law. The Sabeans, in their ignorance of the
existence of God, believed that the spheres with their stars were
beings without beginning and without end, that the images and certain
trees, the Asherot, derived certain powers from the spheres, that they
inspired the prophets, spoke to them in visions, and told them what was
good and what bad. I have explained their theory when speaking of the
prophets of the Ashera. But when the wise men discovered and proved
that there was a Being, neither itself corporeal nor residing as a
force in a corporeal body, viz., the true, one God, and that there
existed besides other purely incorporeal beings which God endowed with
His goodness and His light, namely, the angels, and that these beings
are not included in the sphere and its stars, it became evident that it
was these angels and not the images or Asherot that charged the
prophets. From the preceding remarks it is clear that the belief in the
existence of angels is connected with the belief in the Existence of
God; and the belief in God and angels leads to the belief in Prophecy
and in the truth of the Law. In order to firmly establish this creed,
God commanded [the Israelites] to make over the ark the form of two
angels. The belief in the existence of angels is thus inculcated into
the minds of the people, and this belief is in importance next to the
belief in God’s Existence; it leads us to believe in Prophecy and in
the Law, and opposes idolatry. If there had only been one figure of a
cherub, the people would have been misled and would have mistaken it
for God’s image which was to be worshipped, in the fashion of the
heathen; or they might have assumed that the angel [represented by the
figure] was also a deity, and would thus have adopted a Dualism. By
making two cherubim and distinctly declaring “the Lord is our God, the
Lord is One,” Moses clearly proclaimed the theory of the existence of a
number of angels; he left no room for the error of considering those
figures as deities, since [he declared that] God is one, and that He is
the Creator of the angels, who are more than one.

A candlestick was then put in front of the curtain, as a sign of honour
and distinction for the Temple. For a chamber in which a continual
light burns, hidden behind a curtain, makes a great impression on man,
and the Law lays great stress on our holding the Sanctuary in great
estimation and regard, and that at the sight of it we should be filled
with humility, mercy, and soft-heartedness. This is expressed in the
words, “And ye shall reverence my sanctuary” (Lev. xix. 30), and in
order to give these words more weight, they are closely joined to the
command to keep the Sabbath.

The use of the altar for incense and the altar for burnt-offering and
their vessels is obvious; but I do not know the object of the table
with the bread upon it continually, and up to this day I have not been
able to assign any reason to this commandment.

The commandment that the stones of the altar shall not be hewn and that
no iron tool shall be lifted up upon them (Deut. xxvii. 5), has been
explained by our Sages as follows: It is not right that the tool that
shortens man’s life should be lifted up upon that which gives length of
life. As an Agadic explanation this is good; but the real reason is
this: the heathen used to build their altars with hewn stones; we ought
not to imitate them. For this reason we have to make an altar of earth:
“Thou shalt make unto me an altar of earth” (Exod. xx. 24); if it
should be impossible to dispense altogether with stones, they must not
be hewn, but employed in their natural state. Thus the Law also
prohibits from worshipping over painted stones (Lev. xxvi. 1), or from
planting any tree near the altar of the Lord (Deut. xvi. 21). The
object of all these commandments is the same, namely, that we shall not
employ in the worship of God anything which the heathen employed in the
worship of their idols. In general terms this is repeated in the
following passage: “Take heed, that thou inquire not after their gods,
saying, How did these nations serve their gods? even so will I do
likewise” (Deut. xii. 30); the Israelites shall not do this, because—as
is expressly added—“every abomination unto the Lord, which he hateth,
have they done unto their gods.”

The mode of worshipping Peor, then very general among the heathen,
consisted in uncovering the nakedness. The priests were therefore
commanded to make breeches for themselves to cover their nakedness
during the service, and, besides, no steps were to lead up to the
altar, “that thy nakedness be not discovered thereon” (Exod. xx. 23).

The Sanctuary was constantly guarded and surrounded [by Levites] as a
mark of respect and honour; and at the same time the layman, the
unclean, and mourners, were prevented from entering the Sanctuary, as
will be explained. Among other things that tend to display the
greatness and the glory of the Temple and to inspire us with awe, is
the rule that none shall approach it in a state of drunkenness or
uncleanness, or in a disorderly state, i.e., the hair undressed and the
garments rent; and that every one who officiated as priest should first
wash his hands and his feet.

In order to raise the estimation of the Temple, those who ministered
therein received great honour; and the priests and Levites were
therefore distinguished from the rest. It was commanded that the
priests should be clothed properly with beautiful and good garments,
“holy garments for glory and for beauty” (Exod. xxviii. 2). A priest
that had a blemish was not allowed to officiate; and not only those
that had a blemish were excluded from the service, but also—according
to the Talmudic interpretation of this precept—those that had an
abnormal appearance; for the multitude does not estimate man by his
true form but by the perfection of his bodily limbs and the beauty of
his garments, and the Temple was to be held in great reverence by all.

The Levites did not sacrifice; they were not considered as being agents
in the atonement of sins, for it was only the priest who was commanded
“to make atonement for him” (Lev. iv. 26) and “to make atonement for
her” (Lev. xii. 8). The duty of the Levites was the performance of
vocal music; and a Levite became therefore disabled for service when he
lost his voice. The object of the singing is to produce certain
emotions; this object can only be attained by pleasing sounds and
melodies accompanied by music, as was always the case in the Temple.

Again, the priests, even when fit for service, and actually officiating
in the Temple, were not allowed to sit down, or enter it whenever they
liked; the Most Holy was only entered by the high-priest four times on
the Day of Atonement, and on no other occasion. The object of all these
rules was to raise the estimation of the Sanctuary in the eyes of the
people.

Since many beasts were daily slaughtered in the holy place, the flesh
cut in pieces and the entrails and the legs burnt and washed, the smell
of the place would undoubtedly have been like the smell of
slaughter-houses, if nothing had been done to counteract it. They were
therefore commanded to burn incense there twice every day, in the
morning and in the evening (Exod. xxx. 7, 8), in order to give the
place and the garments of those who officiated there a pleasant odour.
There is a well-known saying of our Sages, “In Jericho they could smell
the incense” [burnt in the Temple]. This provision likewise tended to
support the dignity of the Temple. If there had not been a good smell,
let alone if there had been a stench, it would have produced in the
minds of the people the reverse of respect; for our heart generally
feels elevated in the presence of good odour, and is attracted by it,
but it abhors and avoids bad smell.

The anointing oil (Exod. xxx. 22–33) served a double purpose: to give
the anointed object a good odour, and to produce the impression that it
was something great, holy, and distinguished, and better than other
objects of the same species; it made no difference whether that object
was a human being, a garment, or a vessel. All this aimed at producing
due respect towards the Sanctuary, and indirectly fear of God. When a
person enters the Temple, certain emotions are produced in him; and
obstinate hearts are softened and humbled. These plans and indirect
means were devised by the Law, to soften and humble man’s heart at
entering the holy place, in order that he might entrust himself to the
sure guidance of God’s commandments. This is distinctly said in the
Law: “And thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God, in the place which he
shall choose to place his name there, the tithe of thy corn, of thy
wine, and of thine oil, and the firstlings of thy herds and of thy
flocks; that thou mayest learn to fear the Lord thy God always” (Deut.
xiv. 23). The object of all these ceremonies is now clear. The reason
why we are not allowed to prepare [for common use] the anointing oil
and the incense (ibid. ver. 32, 38) is obvious; for when the odour [of
the oil and incense] is perceived only in the Sanctuary, the desired
effect is great; besides [if it were allowed for every one to prepare
the anointing oil], people might anoint themselves therewith and
imagine themselves distinguished; much disorder and dissension would
then follow.

It is clear that when the ark was carried on the shoulder, and was not
put on a waggon, it was done out of respect towards it, and also to
prevent its being damaged in its form and shape; even the staves were
not moved out of the rings, for this reason. In order that the form of
the ephod and the breastplate should not be spoiled, they were never
separated. The garments were also entirely woven and not cut, in order
not to spoil the work of the weaving.

Those that ministered in the Temple were strictly prohibited to
interfere with each other’s work; for if in public duties and offices,
each one would not have assigned to him his particular task, general
carelessness and neglect would soon be noticed.

It is evident that the object of giving different degrees of sanctity
to the different places, to the Temple mount, the place between the two
walls, to the Hall of women, to the Hall, and so on up to the Most
Holy, was to raise the respect and reverence of the Temple in the heart
of every one that approached it.

We have thus described the reason of all precepts of this class.






CHAPTER XLVI


The precepts of the eleventh class are enumerated in the Section on
Divine Service (Sefer ʻabodah) and the Section on Sacrifices (Sefer
ha-ḳorbanot). We have described their use in general terms (chap.
xxxii.). I will now proceed to give the reason of each precept
separately.

Scripture tells us, according to the Version of Onkelos, that the
Egyptians worshipped Aries, and therefore abstained from killing sheep,
and held shepherds in contempt. Comp. “Behold we shall sacrifice the
abomination of the Egyptians,” etc. (Exod. viii. 26); “For every
shepherd is an abomination to the Egyptians” (Gen. xlvi. 34). Some
sects among the Sabeans worshipped demons, and imagined that these
assumed the form of goats, and called them therefore “goats” [seʻirim].
This worship was widespread. Comp. “And they shall no more offer their
sacrifices unto demons, after whom they have gone a whoring” (Lev.
xvii. 7). For this reason those sects abstained from eating goats’
flesh. Most idolaters objected to killing cattle, holding this species
of animals in great estimation. Therefore the people of Hodu [Indians]
up to this day do not slaughter cattle even in those countries where
other animals are slaughtered. In order to eradicate these false
principles, the Law commands us to offer sacrifices only of these three
kinds: “Ye shall bring your offering of the cattle [viz.], of the herd
and of the flock” (Lev. i. 2). Thus the very act which is considered by
the heathen as the greatest crime, is the means of approaching God, and
obtaining His pardon for our sins. In this manner, evil principles, the
diseases of the human soul, are cured by other principles which are
diametrically opposite.

This is also the reason why we were commanded to kill a lamb on
Passover, and to sprinkle the blood thereof outside on the gates. We
had to free ourselves of evil doctrines and to proclaim the opposite,
viz., that the very act which was then considered as being the cause of
death would be the cause of deliverance from death. Comp. “And the Lord
will pass over the door, and will not suffer the destroyer to come unto
your houses to smite you” (Exod. xii. 23). Thus they were rewarded for
performing openly a service every part of which was objected to by the
idolaters.

To the above reason for the exclusive selection of the three kinds of
animals for sacrifices, we may add the following, namely, that these
species are animals which can be got very easily, contrary to the
practice of idolaters that sacrifice lions, bears, and wild beasts, as
is stated in the book Tomtom. As, however, many could not afford to
offer a beast, the Law commanded that birds also should be sacrificed,
but only of those species which are found abundantly in Palestine, are
suitable, and can easily be obtained, namely, turtle-doves and pigeons.
Those who are too poor to offer a bird, may bring bread of any of the
kinds then in use: baked in the oven, baked in a pan, or in a
frying-pan. If the baking of the bread is too much trouble for a
person, he may bring flour. All this concerns only those who desire to
sacrifice; for we are distinctly told that the omission of the
sacrificial service on our part will not be reckoned to us a sin: “If
thou shalt forbear to vow, it shall be no sin in thee” (Deut. xxiii.
22). The idolaters did not offer any other bread but leavened, and
chose sweet things for their sacrifices, which they seasoned with
honey, as is fully described in the books which I named before; but
salt is not mentioned in any of their sacrifices. Our Law therefore
forbade us to offer leaven or honey, and commanded us to have salt in
every sacrifice: “With all thine offerings thou shalt offer salt” (Lev.
ii. 13). It is further ordained that the offerings must all be perfect
and in the best condition, in order that no one should slight the
offering or treat with contempt that which is offered to God’s name:
“Offer it now unto thy governor; will he be pleased with thee?” (Mal.
i. 8). This is the reason why no animal could be brought that was not
yet seven days old (Lev. xxii. 26); it is imperfect and contemptible,
like an untimely birth. Because of their degraded character it was
prohibited to bring “the hire of a harlot and the price of a dog”
(Deut. xxiii. 18) into the Sanctuary. In order to bring the offering in
the best condition, we choose the old of the turtle-doves and the young
of the pigeons, the old pigeons being less agreeable. The oblation must
likewise be mingled with oil, and must be of fine flour (Lev. ii. 1),
for in this condition it is good and pleasant. Frankincense is
prescribed (ibid.) because its fumes are good in places filled with the
odour of burnt flesh. The burnt-offering was flayed (Lev. i. 16), and
its inwards and legs, although they were entirely burnt, had to be
previously washed (ibid. ver. 9), in order that due respect should be
shown to the sacrifice, and it should not appear despicable and
contemptible. This object is constantly kept in view, and is often
taught, “Ye say, The table of the Lord is polluted; and the fruit
thereof, even his meat, is contemptible” (Mal. i. 12). For the same
reason no body uncircumcised, or unclean (Lev. xxii. 4), was allowed to
partake of any offering; nor could any offering be eaten that had
become unclean (Lev. vii. 19), or was left till after a certain time
(ibid. vii. 15–17), or concerning which an illegal intention had been
conceived; and it had also to be consumed in a particular place. Of the
burnt-offering, which is entirely devoted to God, nothing at all was
eaten. Those sacrifices which are brought for a sin, viz., sin-offering
and guilt-offering, must be eaten within the court of the Sanctuary
(ʻazarah), and only on the day of their slaughtering and the night
following, whilst peace-offerings, which are next in sanctity, being
sacrifices of the second degree, may be eaten in the whole of
Jerusalem, on the day they have been offered and on the following day,
but not later. After that time the sacrifices would become spoiled, and
be unfit for food.

In order that we may respect the sacrifices and all that is devoted to
the name of God, we are told that whosoever takes part of a holy thing
for common use has committed a trespass, must bring a sin-offering, and
restore what he has taken with an addition of the fifth part of its
value, although he may have committed the trespass in ignorance. For
the same reason animals reserved for holy purposes must not be employed
in work; nor is the shearing of such animals permitted (Deut. xv. 19).
The law concerning the change of a sacrifice must be considered as a
preventive; for if it were permitted to substitute a good animal for a
bad one, people would substitute a bad animal for a good one, and say
that it was better than the original; it was therefore the rule that,
if any such change had taken place, both the “original sacrifice and
the exchange thereof should be holy” (Lev. xxvii. 9). When a person
redeems a thing devoted by him to the Sanctuary, he must likewise add
one-fifth (Lev. xxvii. 13, 15); the reason for this is plain. Man is
usually selfish, and is naturally inclined to keep and save his
property. He would therefore not take the necessary trouble in the
interest of the Sanctuary; he would not expose his property
sufficiently to the sight of the valuer, and its true value would not
be fixed. Therefore the owner had to add one-fifth, whilst a stranger
paid only the exact value. These rules were laid down in order that
people should not despise that with which the name of God is connected,
and which serves as a means of approaching God. The oblation of the
priest was entirely burnt (Lev. vi. 16), because the priest offered up
his oblation by himself, and if he were to offer it, and at the same
time to eat it, it would appear as if he had not performed any service.
For nothing was offered upon the altar of the ordinary oblations of any
person except the frankincense and a handful of the flour or cake; and
if, in addition to the fact that the offering was small, he who offered
it were himself to eat it, nothing of a sacrificial service would be
noticed. It is therefore entirely burnt (Lev. vi. 16).

The reason of the particular laws concerning the Passover lamb is
clear. It was eaten roasted by fire (Exod. xii. 8–9) in one house, and
without breaking the bones thereof (ibid. ver. 46). In the same way as
the Israelites were commanded to eat unleavened bread, because they
could prepare it hastily, so they were commanded, for the sake of
haste, to roast the lamb, because there was not sufficient time to boil
it, or to prepare other food; even the delay caused by breaking the
bones and to extract their marrow was prohibited; the one principle is
laid down for all these rules, “Ye shall eat it in haste” (Exod. xii.
11). But when haste is necessary the bones cannot be broken, nor parts
of it sent from house to house; for the company could not wait with
their meal till he returned. Such things would lead to laxity and
delay, whilst the object of these rules was to make a show of the hurry
and haste, in order that none should be too late to leave Egypt with
the main body of the people, and be thus exposed to the attacks and the
evil [designs of the enemy]. These temporary commandments were then
made permanent, in order that we may remember what was done in those
days. “And thou shalt keep this ordinance in his season from year to
year” (Exod. xiii. 10). Each Passover lamb was only eaten by those who
had previously agreed to consume it together, in order that people
should be anxious to procure it, and should not rely on friends,
relations, or on chance, without themselves taking any trouble about it
before Passover. The reason of the prohibition that the uncircumcised
should not eat of it (Exod. xii. 48) is explained by our Sages as
follows:—The Israelites neglected circumcision during their long stay
in Egypt, in order to make themselves appear like the Egyptians. When
God gave them the commandment of the Passover, and ordered that no one
should kill the Passover lamb unless he, his sons, and all the male
persons in his household were circumcised, that only “then he could
come near and keep it” (ibid. xii. 48), all performed this commandment,
and the number of the circumcised being large the blood of the Passover
and that of the circumcision flowed together. The Prophet Ezekiel (xvi.
6), referring to this event, says, “When I saw thee sprinkled with
thine own blood I said unto thee, Live because of thy [two kinds of]
blood,” i.e., because of the blood of the Passover and that of the
circumcision.

Although blood was very unclean in the eyes of the Sabeans, they
nevertheless partook of it, because they thought it was the food of the
spirits; by eating it man has something in common with the spirits,
which join him and tell him future events, according to the notion
which people generally have of spirits. There were, however, people who
objected to eating blood, as a thing naturally disliked by man; they
killed a beast, received the blood in a vessel or in a pot, and ate of
the flesh of that beast, whilst sitting round the blood. They imagined
that in this manner the spirits would come to partake of the blood
which was their food, whilst the idolaters were eating the flesh; that
love, brotherhood, and friendship with the spirits were established,
because they dined with the latter at one place and at the same time;
that the spirits would appear to them in dreams, inform them of coming
events, and be favourable to them. Such ideas people liked and accepted
in those days; they were general, and their correctness was not doubted
by any one of the common people. The Law, which is perfect in the eyes
of those who know it, and seeks to cure mankind of these lasting
diseases, forbade the eating of blood, and emphasized the prohibition
exactly in the same terms as it emphasizes idolatry: “I will set my
face against that soul that eateth blood” (Lev. xvii. 10). The same
language is employed in reference to him “who giveth of his seed unto
Molech”; “then I will set my face against that man” (ibid. xx. 5).
There is, besides idolatry and eating blood, no other sin in reference
to which these words are used. For the eating of blood leads to a kind
of idolatry, to the worship of spirits. Our Law declared the blood as
pure, and made it the means of purifying other objects by its touch.
“And thou shalt take of the blood ... and sprinkle it upon Aaron, and
upon his garments, and upon his sons, and upon the garments of his sons
with him. And he shall be hallowed, and his garments, and his sons,”
etc. (Exod. xxix. 21). Furthermore, the blood was sprinkled upon the
altar, and in the whole service it was insisted upon pouring it out,
and not upon collecting it. Comp. “And he shall pour out all the blood
at the bottom of the altar” (Lev. iv. 18); “And the blood of thy
sacrifices shall be poured out upon the altar of the Lord thy God”
(Deut. xii. 27). Also the blood of those beasts that were killed for
common use, and not for sacrifices, must be poured out, “Thou shalt
pour it upon the earth as water” (ibid. ver. 24). We are not allowed to
gather and have a meal round the blood, “You shall not eat round the
blood” (Lev. xix. 26). As the Israelites were inclined to continue
their rebellious conduct, to follow the doctrines in which they had
been brought up, and which were then general, and to assemble round the
blood in order to eat there and to meet the spirits, God forbade the
Israelites to eat ordinary meat during their stay in the wilderness;
they could only partake of the meat of peace-offerings. The reason of
this precept is distinctly stated, viz., that the blood shall be poured
out upon the altar, and the people do not assemble round about. Comp.
“To the end that the children of Israel may bring their sacrifices,
which they offer in the open field, even that they may bring them unto
the Lord.... And the priest shall sprinkle the blood upon the altar,
... and they shall no more offer their sacrifices unto the spirits”
(Lev. xvii. 5–7). Now there remained to provide for the slaughtering of
the beasts of the field and birds, because those beasts were never
sacrificed, and birds did never serve as peace-offerings (Lev. iii.).
The commandment was therefore given that whenever a beast or a bird
that may be eaten is killed, the blood thereof must be covered with
earth (Lev. xvii. 13), in order that the people should not assemble
round the blood for the purpose of eating there. The object was thus
fully gained to break the connexion between these fools and their
spirits. This belief flourished about the time of our Teacher Moses.
People were attracted and misled by it. We find it in the Song of Moses
(Deut. xxxii.): “They sacrificed unto spirits, not to God” (ibid. 17).
According to the explanation of our Sages, the words lo eloha imply the
following idea: They have not only not left off worshipping things in
existence; they even worship imaginary things. This is expressed in
Sifri as follows: “It is not enough for them to worship the sun, the
moon, the stars; they even worship their babuah.” The word babuah
signifies “shadow.” Let us now return to our subject. The prohibition
of slaughtering cattle for common use applied only to the wilderness,
because as regards the “spirits” it was then the general belief that
they dwelt in deserts, that there they spoke and were visible, whilst
in towns and in cultivated land they did not appear. In accordance with
this belief those inhabitants of a town who wanted to perform any of
those stupid practices, left the town and went to woods and waste
places. The use of cattle for common food was therefore allowed when
the Israelites entered Palestine. Besides, there were great hopes that
the disease would become weakened, and the followers of the doctrines
would decrease. Furthermore, it was almost impossible that every one
who wanted to eat meat should come to Jerusalem. For these reasons the
above restriction was limited to the stay of the Israelites in the
wilderness.

The greater the sin which a person had committed, the lower was the
species from which the sin-offering was brought. The offering for
worshipping idols in ignorance was only a she-goat, whilst for other
sins an ordinary person brought either a ewe-lamb or a she-goat (Lev.
iv. 27–35), the females bring, as a rule, in every species, inferior to
the males. There is no greater sin than idolatry, and also no inferior
species than a she-goat. The offering of a king for sins committed
ignorantly was a he-goat (ibid. vers. 22–26), as a mark of distinction.
The high priest and the Synhedrion, who only gave a wrong decision in
ignorance, but have not actually committed a sin, brought a bull for
their sin-offering (ibid. ver. 3–21), or a he-goat, when the decision
referred to idolatry (Num. xv. 22–26). The sins for which
guilt-offerings were brought were not as bad as transgressions that
required a sin-offering. The guilt-offering was therefore a ram, or a
lamb, so that the species as well as the sex were superior in this
latter case, for the guilt-offering was a male sheep. For the same
reason we see the burnt-offering, which was entirely burnt upon the
altar, was selected from the superior sex; for only male animals were
admitted as burnt-offerings. It is in accordance with the same
principle that luxury and incense were absent from the oblations of a
sinner (Lev. v. 11), and of a sotah, i.e., a woman suspected of
adultery (Num. v. 15). In these cases the oil and the frankincense were
not added; this luxury was absent, because the persons that brought the
oblation were not good and proper in their deeds, and they are, as it
were, to be reminded by their offerings that they ought to repent; as
if they were told, “Your offering is without any ornamental addition on
account of the wickedness of your deeds.” As the sotah acted more
disgracefully than any person who sins in ignorance, her offering
consisted of the lowest kind, viz., of barley flour (ibid.). Thus the
reasons of all these particular laws are well connected, and show that
the precepts are wonderful in their significance.

Our Sages say that the offering for the eighth day of dedication was “a
calf, a young bullock, for a sin-offering” (Lev. xi. 2), in order to
atone for the sin of the Israelites in making a golden calf. The
sin-offering, which was brought on the Day of Atonement (ibid. xvi. 3),
was likewise explained as being an atonement for that sin. From this
argument of our Sages I deduce that he-goats were always brought as
sin-offerings, by individual persons and also by the whole
congregation, viz., on the Festivals, New-moon, Day of Atonement, and
for idolatry, because most of the transgressions and sins of the
Israelites were sacrifices to spirits (seʻirim, lit., goats), as is
clearly stated, “They shall no more offer their sacrifices unto
spirits” (Lev. xvii. 7). Our Sages, however, explained the fact that
goats were always the sin-offerings of the congregation, as an allusion
to the sin of the whole congregation of Israel; for in the account of
the selling of the pious Joseph we read, “And they killed a kid of the
goats” (Gen. xxxvii. 31). Do not consider this as a weak argument; for
it is the object of all these ceremonies to impress on the mind of
every sinner and transgressor the necessity of continually remembering
and mentioning his sins. Thus the Psalmist says, “And my sin is ever
before me” (Ps. li. 3). The above-mentioned sin-offerings further show
us that when we commit a sin, we, our children, and the children of our
children, require atonement for that sin by some kind of service
analogous to the sin committed. If a person has sinned in respect to
property he must liberally spend his property in the service of God; if
he indulged in sinful bodily enjoyments he must weary his body and
trouble it by a service of privation and fasting, and rising early
before daybreak. If he went astray in respect to his moral conduct he
must oppose his failings by keeping to the opposite extreme, as we have
pointed out in Mishneh-torah Hilkot Deʻot (chap. ii.) et passim. If his
intellectual faculties have been concerned in the sin, if he has
believed something false on account of the insufficiency of his
intellect, and his neglect of research and proper study, he must remedy
his fault by turning his thoughts entirely away from worldly affairs,
and directing them exclusively to intellectual exercise, and by
carefully reflecting on that which ought to form the subject of his
belief. Comp. “And my heart hath been secretly enticed, but my hand
touched my mouth” (Job xxxi. 27). These words express figuratively the
lesson that we should pause and stop at that which appears doubtful, as
has been pointed out by us in the beginning of this treatise. The same
we notice in the case of Aaron. He had his share in the sin of the
golden calf, and therefore a bullock and a calf were brought by him and
his successors as an offering. Similarly, the sin connected with a kid
of goats was atoned for by a kid of goats. When this theory has been
well established in the minds of the people, they must certainly be led
by it to consider disobedience to God as a disgraceful thing. Every one
will then be careful that he should not sin, and require a protracted
and burdensome atonement; he will be afraid he might not be able to
complete it, and will therefore altogether abstain from sinning, and
avoid it. This object [of the laws under discussion] is very clear, and
note it likewise.

I will here call your attention to a very remarkable thing, although it
does not seem at first thought to belong to our subject. It is only the
goat brought on New-moon as a sin-offering that the law calls “a
sin-offering unto the Lord” (Num. xxviii. 15). The sin-offerings
brought on the three festivals (ibid. vers. 22, 30; xxix. 5, 11, etc.)
are not called so, nor are any other sin-offerings. The reason thereof
is, according to my opinion, undoubtedly this: The additional offerings
brought by the congregation at certain periods were all
burnt-offerings; only “one kid of goats to make an atonement” was
offered on every one of these exceptional days. The latter was eaten
[by the priests], whilst the burnt-offerings were entirely consumed by
fire, and are called “an offering made by fire unto the Lord.” The
phrases “a sin-offering unto the Lord” and “a peace-offering unto the
Lord” do not occur in the law, because these were eaten by man; but
even those sin-offerings that were entirely burnt (Lev. iv. 12, 21)
cannot be called “an offering made by fire unto the Lord,” as will be
explained in the course of this chapter. It is therefore impossible
that the goats which are eaten [by the priests], and are not entirely
burnt, should be called “sin-offerings unto the Lord.” But as it was
found that the kid offered on New-moon might be mistaken as an offering
brought to the moon, in the manner of the Egyptians, who sacrificed to
the moon on the days of New-moon, it was distinctly stated that this
goat is offered in obedience to God’s command, and not in honour of the
moon. This fear did not apply to the sin-offerings on the Festivals,
nor to any other sin-offering, because they were not offered on the
days of New-moon, or on any other day marked out by Nature, but on such
days as were selected by the Divine Will. Not so the days of New-moon;
they are not fixed by the Law [but by Nature]. On the New-moon the
idolaters sacrificed to the moon, in the same manner as they sacrificed
to the sun when it rose and set in certain particular degrees. This is
described in the works [mentioned above]. On this account the
extraordinary phrase “A sin-offering unto the Lord” is exceptionally
introduced in reference to the goat brought on New-moon, in order to
remove the idolatrous ideas that were still lingering in the sorely
diseased hearts. Note this exception likewise. A sin-offering which is
brought in the hope to atone for one or more great sins, as, e.g., the
sin-offering [of the Synhedrion or the high-priest] for a sin committed
in ignorance, and the like, are not burnt upon the altar, but without
the camp; upon the altar only the burnt-offering, and the like, are
burnt, wherefore it was called the altar of the burnt-offering. The
burning of the holocaust, and of every “memorial,” is called “a sweet
savour unto the Lord”; and so it undoubtedly is, since it serves to
remove idolatrous doctrines from our hearts, as we have shown. But the
burning of these sin-offerings is a symbol that the sin [for which the
offering it brought] is utterly removed and destroyed, like the body
that is being burnt; of the sinful seed no trace shall remain, as no
trace is left of the sin-offering, which is entirely destroyed by fire;
the smoke thereof is not “a sweet savour unto the Lord,” but, on the
contrary, a smoke despised and abhorred. For this reason the burning
took place without the camp. Similarly we notice that the oblations of
a sotah is called “an offering of memorial, bringing iniquity to
remembrance” (Num. v. 15); it is not a pleasing thing [to the Lord].
The goat [of the Day of Atonement] that was sent [into the wilderness]
(Lev. xvi. 20, seq.) served as an atonement for all serious
transgressions more than any other sin-offering of the congregation. As
it thus seemed to carry off all sins, it was not accepted as an
ordinary sacrifice to be slaughtered, burnt, or even brought near the
Sanctuary; it was removed as far as possible, and sent forth into a
waste, uncultivated, uninhabited land. There is no doubt that sins
cannot be carried like a burden, and taken off the shoulder of one
being to be laid on that of another being. But these ceremonies are of
a symbolic character, and serve to impress men with a certain idea, and
to induce them to repent; as if to say, we have freed ourselves of our
previous deeds, have cast them behind our backs, and removed them from
us as far as possible.

As regards the offering of wine (Num. xv. 5, seq.), I am at a loss to
find a reason why God commanded it, since idolaters brought wine as an
offering. But though I am unable to give a reason, another person
suggested the following one: Meat is the best nourishment for the
appetitive faculty, the source of which is the liver; wine supports
best the vital faculty, whose centre is the heart; music is most
agreeable to the psychic faculty, the source of which is in the brain.
Each one of our faculties approaches God with that which it likes best.
Thus the sacrifice consists of meat, wine, and music.

The use of keeping festivals is plain. Man derives benefit from such
assemblies: the emotions produced renew the attachment to religion;
they lead to friendly and social intercourse among the people. This is
especially the object of the commandment to gather the people together
on the Feast of Tabernacles, as is plainly stated: “that they may hear,
and that they may learn and fear the Lord” (Deut. xxxi. 12). The same
is the object of the rule that the money for the second tithe must be
spent by all in one place (ibid. xiv. 22–26), as we have explained
(chap. xxxix. p. 184). The fruit of trees in their fourth year, and the
tithe of the cattle, had to be brought to Jerusalem. There would
therefore be in Jerusalem the meat of the tithes, the wine of the fruit
of the fourth year, and the money of the second tithe. Plenty of food
would always be found there. Nothing of the above things could be sold;
nothing could be set aside for another year; the Law orders that they
should be brought “year by year” (Deut. xiv. 22); the owner was thus
compelled to spend part of them in charity. As regards the Festivals it
is especially enjoined: “And thou shalt rejoice in thy feast, thou, and
thy son, and thy daughter, and thy man-servant, and thy maid-servant,
and the Levite, the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow” (ibid.
xvi. 14). We have thus explained the reason of every law belonging to
this class, and even many details of the laws.






CHAPTER XLVII


The precepts of the twelfth class are those which we have enumerated in
the section on “Purity” (Sefer tohorah). Although we have mentioned
their use in general, we will here offer an additional explanation, and
[first] fully discuss the object of the whole class, and then show the
reason of each single commandment, as far as we have been able to
discover it. I maintain that the Law which was revealed to Moses, our
Teacher, and which is called by his name, aims at facilitating the
service and lessening the burden, and if a person complains that
certain precepts cause him pain and great trouble, he cannot have
thought of the habits and doctrines that were general in those days.
Let him consider the difference between a man burning his own son in
serving his god, and our burning a pigeon to the service of our God.
Scripture relates, “for even their sons and their daughters they burn
in the fire to their gods” (Deut. xii. 31). This was the way in which
the heathen worshipped their gods, and instead of such a sacrifice we
have the burning of a pigeon or a handful of flour in our worship. In
accordance with this fact, the Israelites, when disobedient, were
rebuked by God as follows: “O My people, what have I done unto thee?
and wherein have I wearied thee? Testify against me” (Mic. vi. 3).
Again, “Have I been a wilderness unto Israel? a land of darkness?
Wherefore say my people, We are miserable; we will come no more unto
thee” (Jer. ii. 31); that is to say, Through which of the commandments
has the Law become burdensome to the Israelites, that they renounce it?
In the same manner God asks the people, “What iniquity have your
fathers found in me, that they are gone far from me?” etc. (ibid. ii.
5). All these passages express one and the same idea.

This is the great principle which you must never lose sight of. After
having stated this principle, I repeat that the object of the Sanctuary
was to create in the hearts of those who enter it certain feelings of
awe and reverence, in accordance with the command, “You shall reverence
my sanctuary” (Lev. xix. 30). But when we continually see an object,
however sublime it may be, our regard for that object will be lessened,
and the impression we have received of it will be weakened. Our Sages,
considering this fact, said that we should not enter the Temple
whenever we liked, and pointed to the words: “Make thy foot rare in the
house of thy friend” (Prov. xxv. 17). For this reason the unclean were
not allowed to enter the Sanctuary, although there are so many kinds of
uncleanliness, that [at a time] only a few people are clean. For even
if a person does not touch a beast that died of its own accord (Lev.
xi. 27), he can scarcely avoid touching one of the eight kinds of
creeping animals (ibid. 29, seq.), the dead bodies of which we find at
all times in houses, in food and drink, and upon which we frequently
tread wherever we walk; and, if he avoids touching these, he may touch
a woman in her separation (ibid. xv. 18), or a male or female that have
a running issue (ibid. ver. 1, seq. and 25, seq.), or a leper (ibid.
xiii. 46), or their bed (ibid. xv. 5). Escaping these, he may become
unclean by cohabitation with his wife, or by pollution (ibid. 15), and
even when he has cleansed himself from any of these kinds of
uncleanliness, he cannot enter the Sanctuary till after sunset; but not
being enabled to enter the Sanctuary at night time, although he is
clean after sunset, as may be inferred from Middot and Tamid, he is
again, during the night, subject to becoming unclean either by
cohabiting with his wife or by some other source of uncleanliness, and
may rise in the morning in the same condition as the day before. All
this serves to keep people away from the Sanctuary and to prevent them
from entering it whenever they liked. Our Sages, as is well known,
said, “Even a clean person may not enter the Sanctuary for the purpose
of performing divine service, unless he takes previously a bath.” By
such acts the reverence [for the Sanctuary] will continue, the right
impression will be produced which leads man, as is intended, to
humility.

The easier the diffusion of uncleanliness is, the more difficult and
the more retarded is its purification. Most easily is uncleanliness
communicated by the dead body to those who are under the same roof,
especially to relatives. The purification can only be completed by
means of the ashes of the red heifer, however scarce it may be, and
only in seven days (Num. xix. 11). The uncleanness caused by a woman
having running issue or during her separation is more frequent than
that caused by contact with unclean objects; seven days are therefore
required for their purification (Lev. xv. 19, 28), whilst those that
touch them are only unclean one day (ibid. vii. 18). Males or females
that are unclean through running issue, and a woman after childbirth,
must in addition bring a sacrifice, because their uncleanness occurs
less frequently than that of women in their separation. All these cases
of uncleanliness, viz., running issue of males or females,
menstruations, leprosy, dead bodies of human beings, carcases of beasts
and creeping things, and issue of semen, are sources of dirt and filth.
We have thus shown that the above precepts are very useful in many
respects. First, they keep us at a distance from dirty and filthy
objects; secondly, they guard the Sanctuary; thirdly, they pay regard
to an established custom (for the Sabeans submitted to very troublesome
restrictions when unclean, as you will soon hear); fourthly, they
lightened that burden for us; for we are not impeded through these laws
in our ordinary occupations by the distinction the Law makes between
that which is unclean and that which is clean. For this distinction
applies only in reference to the Sanctuary and the holy objects
connected with it; it does not apply to other cases. “She shall touch
no hallowed thing, nor come into the Sanctuary” (Lev. xii. 4). Other
persons [that do not intend to enter the Sanctuary or touch any holy
thing], are not guilty of any sin if they remain unclean as long as
they like, and eat, according to their pleasure, ordinary food that has
been in contact with unclean things. But the practice of the Sabeans,
even at present general in the East, among the few still left of the
Magi, was to keep a menstruous woman in a house by herself, to burn
that upon which she treads, and to consider as unclean every one that
speaks with her; even if a wind passed over her and a clean person, the
latter was unclean in the eyes of the Sabeans. See the difference
between this practice and our rule, that “whatever services a wife
generally does to her husband, she may do to him in her separation”;
only cohabitation is prohibited during the days of her uncleanness.
Another custom among the Sabeans, which is still widespread, is this:
whatever is separated from the body, as hair, nail, or blood, is
unclean; every barber is therefore unclean in their estimation, because
he touches blood and hair; whenever a person passes a razor over his
skin he must take a bath in running water. Such burdensome practices
were numerous among the Sabeans, whilst we apply the laws that
distinguish between the unclean and the clean only with regard to
hallowed things and to the Sanctuary. The divine words, “And ye shall
sanctify yourselves, and ye shall be holy” (Lev. xi. 44), do not refer
to these laws at all. According to Sifra, they refer to sanctity by
obedience to God’s commandments. The same interpretation is given in
Sifra of the words, “Ye shall be holy,” i.e. obedient to His
commandments (xix. 2). Hence the transgression of commandments is also
called uncleanliness or defilement. This term is especially used of the
chief and principal crimes, which are idolatry, adultery, and murder.
In reference to idolatry it is said, “He hath given of his seed unto
Molech to defile my sanctuary, and to profane my holy name” (ibid. xx.
3). In reference to adultery we read, “Defile not ye yourselves in any
of these things” (ibid. xviii. 24), and “Defile not the land” (Num.
xxxv. 34) in reference to murder. It it therefore clear that the term
“defilement” [or uncleanliness] is used homonymously of three things:
1. Of man’s violation and transgression of that which he is commanded
as regards his actions and his opinions. 2. Of dirt and filth; comp.
“Her filthiness in her skirts” (Lam. i. 9). 3. Of the above-named
imaginary defilement such as touching and carrying certain objects, or
being with them under the same roof. In reference to the third kind,
our Sages said, The words of the Law are not subject to becoming
unclean (B. T. Ber. 22a). In the same manner the term “holiness” is
used homonymously of three things corresponding to the three kinds of
uncleanness. As uncleanness caused by a dead body could only be removed
after seven days, by means of the ashes of the red heifer, and the
priests had constantly occasion to enter the Sanctuary, the Law
exceptionally forbids them to defile themselves by a dead body (Lev.
xxi. 1), except in cases where defilement is necessary, and the
contrary would be unnatural. For it would be unnatural to abstain from
approaching the dead body of a parent, child, or brother. As it was
very necessary that the high-priest should always be in the Sanctuary,
in accordance with the Divine command, “And it shall always be on his
forehead” (Exod. xxviii. 38), he was not permitted to defile himself by
any dead body whatever, even of the above-named relatives (Lev. xxi.
10–12). Women were not engaged in sacrificial service; the above law
consequently does not apply to women; it is addressed to “the sons of
Aaron,” and not to “the daughters of Aaron.” It was, however,
impossible to assume that none of the Israelites made a mistake, by
entering the Sanctuary, or eating hallowed things in a state of
uncleanliness. It was even possible that there were persons who did
this knowingly, since there are wicked people who commit knowingly even
the greatest crimes; for this reason certain sacrifices were commanded
as an atonement for the defilement of the Sanctuary and its hallowed
things. They were of different kinds; some of them atoned for
defilement caused ignorantly, others for defilement caused knowingly.
For this purpose were brought the goats on the Festivals and the
New-moon days (Num. xxviii. 15, 22, etc.), and the goat sent away on
the Day of Atonement (Lev. xvi. 16), as is explained in its place
(Mishnah Shebnot, i. 4). These sacrifices serve to prevent those who
defiled the Sanctuary of the Lord knowingly from thinking that they had
not done a great wrong; they should know that they obtained atonement
by the sacrifice of the goat, as the Law says, “That they die not in
their uncleanness” (Lev. xv. 31); “That Aaron may bear the iniquity of
the holy things” (Exod. xxviii. 38). This idea is frequently repeated.

The uncleanness through leprosy we have already explained. Our Sages
have also clearly stated the meaning thereof. All agree that leprosy is
a punishment for slander. The disease begins in the walls of the houses
(Lev. xiv. 33, seq.). If the sinner repents, the object is attained; if
he remains in his disobedience, the disease affects his bed and house
furniture; if he still continues to sin, the leprosy attacks his own
garments, and then his body. This is a miracle received in our nation
by tradition, in the same manner as the effect of the trial of a
faithless wife (Num. v. 11, seq.). The good effect of this belief is
evident. Leprosy is besides a contagious disease, and people almost
naturally abhor it, and keep away from it. The purification was
effected by cedar-wood, hyssop, scarlet thread, and two birds (Lev.
xiv. 4); their reason is stated in various Midrashic sayings, but the
explanation does not agree with our theory. I do not know at present
the reason of any of these things; nor why cedar-wood, hyssop, and
scarlet were used in the sacrifice of the red heifer (Num. xix. 6); nor
why a bundle of hyssop was commanded for the sprinkling of the blood of
the Passover-lamb (Exod. xii. 22). I cannot find any principle upon
which to found an explanation why these particular things have been
chosen.

The red heifer is called a sin-offering, because it effects the
purification of persons that have become unclean through the dead body
of a human being, and enables them to enter the Sanctuary [and to eat
of hallowed things]. The idea taught by this law is this: Those who
have defiled themselves would never be allowed to enter the Sanctuary,
or to partake of holy things, were it not for the sacrifice of the red
heifer, by which this sin is removed; in the same manner as the plate
[which the high-priest wears on his forehead] atones for uncleanness,
and as a similar object is attained by the goats that are burnt. For
this reason those were unclean who were engaged in the sacrifice of the
heifer or the goats which were burnt, and even their garments were
unclean. The same was the law in the case of the goat that was sent
away [on the Day of Atonement]; for it was believed that it made
unclean those who touched it, because it carried off so many sins.

We have now mentioned the reasons for those commandments of this class,
for which we were able to give a satisfactory reason according to our
view.






CHAPTER XLVIII


The precepts of the thirteenth class are those which we have enumerated
in the “Laws concerning forbidden food” (Hilkot maakalot asurot), “Laws
concerning killing animals for food” (Hilkot sheḥitah), and “Laws
concerning vows and Nazaritism” (Hilkot nedarim u-nezirot). We have
fully and very explicitly discussed the object of this class in this
treatise, and in our Commentary on the Sayings of the Fathers. We will
here add a few remarks in reviewing the single commandments which are
mentioned there.

I maintain that the food which is forbidden by the Law is unwholesome.
There is nothing among the forbidden kinds of food whose injurious
character is doubted, except pork (Lev. xi. 7), and fat (ibid. vii.
23). But also in these cases the doubt is not justified. For pork
contains more moisture than necessary [for human food], and too much of
superfluous matter. The principal reason why the Law forbids swine’s
flesh is to be found in the circumstance that its habits and its food
are very dirty and loathsome. It has already been pointed out how
emphatically the Law enjoins the removal of the sight of loathsome
objects, even in the field and in the camp; how much more objectionable
is such a sight in towns. But if it were allowed to eat swine’s flesh,
the streets and houses would be more dirty than any cesspool, as may be
seen at present in the country of the Franks. A saying of our Sages
declares: “The mouth of a swine is as dirty as dung itself” (B. T. Ber.
25a)

The fat of the intestines makes us full, interrupts our digestion, and
produces cold and thick blood; it is more fit for fuel [than for human
food].

Blood (Lev. xvii. 12), and nebelah, i.e., the flesh of an animal that
died of itself (Deut. xiv. 21), are indigestible, and injurious as
food; Trefah, an animal in a diseased state (Exod. xxii. 30), is on the
way of becoming a nebelah.

The characteristics given in the Law (Lev. xi., and Deut. xiv.) of the
permitted animals, viz., chewing the cud and divided hoofs for cattle,
and fins and scales for fish, are in themselves neither the cause of
the permission when they are present, nor of the prohibition when they
are absent; but merely signs by which the recommended species of
animals can be discerned from those that are forbidden.

The reason why the sinew that shrank is prohibited is stated in the Law
(Gen. xxxii. 33).

It is prohibited to cut off a limb of a living animal and eat it,
because such act would produce cruelty, and develop it; besides, the
heathen kings used to do it; it was also a kind of idolatrous worship
to cut off a certain limb of a living animal and to eat it.

Meat boiled in milk is undoubtedly gross food, and makes overfull; but
I think that most probably it is also prohibited because it is somehow
connected with idolatry, forming perhaps part of the service, or being
used on some festival of the heathen. I find a support for this view in
the circumstance that the Law mentions the prohibition twice after the
commandment given concerning the festivals “Three times in the year all
thy males shall appear before the Lord God” (Exod. xxiii. 17, and
xxxiv. 23), as if to say, “When you come before me on your festivals,
do not seethe your food in the manner as the heathen used to do.” This
I consider as the best reason for the prohibition; but as far as I have
seen the books on Sabean rites, nothing is mentioned of this custom.

The commandment concerning the killing of animals is necessary, because
the natural food of man consists of vegetables and of the flesh of
animals; the best meat is that of animals permitted to be used as food.
No doctor has any doubts about this. Since, therefore, the desire of
procuring good food necessitates the slaying of animals, the Law
enjoins that the death of the animal should be the easiest. It is not
allowed to torment the animal by cutting the throat in a clumsy manner,
by poleaxing, or by cutting off a limb whilst the animal is alive.

It is also prohibited to kill an animal with its young on the same day
(Lev. xxii. 28), in order that people should be restrained and
prevented from killing the two together in such a manner that the young
is slain in the sight of the mother; for the pain of the animals under
such circumstances it very great. There is no difference in this case
between the pain of man and the pain of other living beings, since the
love and tenderness of the mother for her young ones is not produced by
reasoning, but by imagination, and this faculty exists not only in man
but in most living beings. This law applies only to ox and lamb,
because of the domestic animals used as food these alone are permitted
to us, and in these cases the mother recognises her young.

The same reason applies to the law which enjoins that we should let the
mother fly away when we take the young. The eggs over which the bird
sits, and the young that are in need of their mother, are generally
unfit for food, and when the mother is sent away she does not see the
taking of her young ones, and does not feel any pain. In most cases,
however, this commandment will cause man to leave the whole nest
untouched, because [the young or the eggs], which he is allowed to
take, are, as a rule, unfit for food. If the Law provides that such
grief should not be caused to cattle or birds, how much more careful
must we be that we should not cause grief to our fellow-men. When in
the Talmud (Ber. p. 33b) those are blamed who use in their prayer the
phrase, “Thy mercy extendeth to young birds,” it is the expression of
the one of the two opinions mentioned by us, namely, that the precepts
of the Law have no other reason but the Divine will. We follow the
other opinion.

The reason why we cover the blood when we kill animals, and why we do
it only when we kill clean beasts and clean birds, has already been
explained by us (supra, chap. xlvi., p. 362).

In addition to the things prohibited by the Law, we are also commanded
to observe the prohibitions enjoined by our own vows (Num. xxx.). If we
say, This bread or this meat is forbidden for us, we are not allowed to
partake of that food. The object of that precept is to train us in
temperance, that we should be able to control our appetites for eating
and drinking. Our Sages say accordingly, “Vows are a fence for
abstinence.” As women are easily provoked to anger, owing to their
greater excitability and the weakness of their mind, their oaths, if
entirely under their own control, would cause great grief, quarrel, and
disorder in the family; one kind of food would be allowed for the
husband, and forbidden for the wife; another kind forbidden for the
daughter, and allowed for the mother. Therefore the Law gives the
father of the family control over the vows of those dependent on him. A
woman that is independent, and not under the authority of a chief of
the family, is, as regards vows, subject to the same laws as men; I
mean a woman that has no husband, or that has no father, or that is of
age, i.e., twelve years and six months.

The object of Nazaritism (Num. vi.) is obvious. It keeps away from wine
that has ruined people in ancient and modern times. “Many strong men
have been slain by it” (Prov. xxvii. 26). “But they also have erred
through wine, ... the priest and the prophet” (Isa. xxviii. 7). In the
law about the Nazarite we notice even the prohibition, “he shall eat
nothing that is made of the vine tree” (Num. vi. 4), as an additional
precaution, implying the lesson that man must take of wine, only as
much as is absolutely necessary. For he who abstains from drinking it
is called “holy”; his sanctity is made equal to that of the
high-priest, in not being allowed to defile himself even to his father,
to his mother, and the like. This honour is given him because he
abstains from wine.






CHAPTER XLIX


The precepts of the fourteenth class are those which we enumerated in
the Section on Women, the Laws concerning forbidden sexual intercourse,
and cross-breeding of cattle (Sefer nashim, Hilkot issure biah ve-kalee
behemah). The law concerning circumcision belongs also to this class.
The general purpose of these precepts has already been described by us.
We will now proceed to explain them singly.

It is well known that man requires friends all his lifetime. Aristotle
explains this in the ninth book of his Nikomachean Ethics. When man is
in good health and prosperous, he enjoys the company of his friends; in
time of trouble he is in need of them; in old age, when his body is
weak, he is assisted by them. This love is more frequent and more
intense between parents and children, and among [other] relations.
Perfect love, brotherhood, and mutual assistance is only found among
those near to each other by relationship. The members of a family
united by common descent from the same grandfather, or even from some
more distant ancestor, have towards each other a certain feeling of
love, help each other, and sympathize with each other. To effect this
is one of the chief purposes of the Law. Professional harlots were
therefore not tolerated in Israel (Deut. xxiii. 18), because their
existence would disturb the above relationship between man and man.
Their children are strangers to everybody; no one knows to what family
they belong; nor does any person recognize them as relatives. And this
is the greatest misfortune that can befall any child or father. Another
important object in prohibiting prostitution is to restrain excessive
and continual lust; for lust increases with the variety of its objects.
The sight of that to which a person has been accustomed for a long time
does not produce such an ardent desire for its enjoyment as is produced
by objects new in form and character. Another effect of this
prohibition is the removal of a cause for strife; for if the
prohibition did not exist, several persons might by chance come to one
woman, and would naturally quarrel with each other; they would in many
cases kill one another, or they would kill the woman. This is known to
have occurred in days of old, “And they assembled themselves by troops
in a harlot’s house” (Jer. v. 7). In order to prevent these great
evils, and to effect the great boon that all men should know their
relationship to each other, prostitutes (Deut. xxiii. 17) were not
tolerated, and sexual intercourse was only permitted when man has
chosen a certain female, and married her openly; for if it sufficed
merely to choose her, many a person would bring a prostitute into his
house at a certain time agreed upon between them, and say that she was
his wife. Therefore it is commanded to perform the act of engagement by
which he declares that he has chosen her to take her for his wife, and
then to go through the public ceremony of marriage. Comp. “And Boaz
took ten men,” etc. (Ruth iv. 2). It may happen that husband and wife
do not agree, live without love and peace, and do not enjoy the benefit
of a home; in that case he is permitted to send her away. If he had
been allowed to divorce her by a mere word, or by turning her out of
his house, the wife would wait for some negligence [on the part of the
husband], and then come out and say that she was divorced; or having
committed adultery, she and the adulterer would contend that she had
then been divorced. Therefore the law is that divorce can only take
place by means of a document which can serve as evidence, “He shall
write her a bill of divorcement” (Deut. xxiv. 1). There are frequently
occasions for suspicion of adultery and doubts concerning the conduct
of the wife. Laws concerning a wife suspected of adultery (sotah) are
therefore prescribed (Num. v.); the effect of which is that the wife,
out of fear of the “bitter waters,” is most careful to prevent any
ill-feeling on the part of her husband against her. Even of those that
felt quite innocent and safe most were rather willing to lose all their
property than to submit to the prescribed treatment; even death was
preferred to the public disgrace of uncovering the head, undoing the
hair, rending the garments and exposing the heart, and being led round
through the Sanctuary in the presence of all, of women and men, and
also in the presence of the members of the Synhedrion. The fear of this
trial keeps away great diseases that ruin the home comfort.

As every maiden expects to be married, her seducer therefore is only
ordered to marry her; for he is undoubtedly the fittest husband for
her. He will better heal her wound and redeem her character than any
other husband. If, however, he is rejected by her or her father, he
must give the dowry (Exod. xxii. 15). If he uses violence he has to
submit to the additional punishment, “he may not put her away all his
days” (Deut. xxii. 29).

The reason of the law concerning marrying the deceased brother’s wife
is stated in the Bible (Deut. xxv. 5). It was a custom in force before
the Law was given, and the Law perpetuated it. The ceremony of ḥaliẓah
(ibid. 6, seq.), “taking off the shoe,” has been introduced, because in
those days it was considered disgraceful to go through that ceremony,
and in order to avoid the disgrace, a person might perhaps be induced
to marry his deceased brother’s wife. This is evident from the words of
the Law: “So shall it be done unto that man that will not build up his
brother’s house. And his name shall be called in Israel, The house of
him that hath his shoe loosed” (Deut. xxv. 9). In the action of Judah
we may perhaps notice an example of a noble conduct, and uprightness in
judgment. He said: “Let her take it to her, lest we be shamed; behold,
I sent this kid, and thou hast not found her” (Gen. xxxviii. 23). For
before the Lawgiving, the intercourse with a harlot was as lawful as
cohabitation of husband and wife since the Lawgiving; it was perfectly
permitted, nobody considered it wrong. The hire which was in those days
paid to the harlot in accordance with a previous agreement, corresponds
to the ketubah which in our days the husband pays to his wife when he
divorces her. It is a just claim on the part of the wife, and the
husband is bound to pay it. The words of Judah, “Let her take it to
her, lest we be shamed,” etc., show that conversation about sexual
intercourse, even of that which is permitted, brings shame upon us; it
is proper to be silent about it, to keep it secret, even if the silence
would lead to loss of money. In this sense Judah said: It is better for
us to lose property, and to let her keep what she has, than to make our
affair public by inquiring after her, and bring still more shame upon
us. This is the lesson, as regards conduct, to be derived from this
incident. As to the uprightness to be learned therefrom, it is
contained in the words of Judah when he wanted to show that he had not
robbed her, that he has not in the least departed from his agreement
with her. For he said, “Behold, I sent this kid, and thou hast not
found her.” The kid was probably very good, therefore he points to it,
saying, “this kid.” This is the uprightness which he had inherited from
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob: that man must not depart from his given
word, nor deviate from what he agreed upon; but he must give to others
all that is due to them. It makes no difference whether he holds a
portion of his neighbour’s property as a loan or a trust, or whether he
is in any other way his neighbour’s debtor, owing him wages or the
like.

The sum which the husband settles upon his wife (ketubah) is to be
treated in the same way as the wages of a hired servant. There is no
difference whether a master withholds the wages of a hired servant, or
deprives his wife of that which is due to her; whether a master wrongs
a hired servant, and brings charges against him with the intention to
send him away without payment, or a husband treats his wife in a manner
that would enable him to send her away without the payment of the
promised sum.

The equity of the statutes and judgments of the Law in this regard may
be noticed in the treatment of a person accused of spreading an evil
report about his wife (Deut. xxii. 13, seq.). There is no doubt that
the man that did this is bad, does not love his wife, and is not
pleased with her. If he desired to divorce her in a regular manner,
there is nothing to prevent him, but he would be bound to give her what
is due unto her; but instead of this, “he gives occasion of speech
against her” (ibid. xxii. 14), in order to get rid of his wife without
paying anything; he slanders her, and utters falsehood in order to keep
in his possession the fifty shekels of silver, the dowry fixed in the
Law for maidens, which he is obliged to pay unto her. He is therefore
sentenced to pay one hundred shekels of silver, in accordance with the
principle, “Whom the judges shall condemn, he shall pay double unto his
neighbour” (Exod. xxii. 9). The Law is also analogous to that about
false witnesses, which we have explained above (chap. xli. p. 195). For
he intended to cheat her of her fifty shekels of silver, he must
therefore [add fifty, and] pay her a hundred shekels. This is his
punishment for withholding from her her due, and endeavouring to keep
it. But in so far as he degraded her, and spread the rumour that she
was guilty of misconduct, he was also degraded, and received stripes,
as is implied in the words, “and they shall chastise him” (Deut. xxii.
18). But he sinned besides in clinging to lust, and seeking only that
which gave pleasure to him; he was therefore punished by being
compelled to keep his wife always, “he may not put her away all his
days” (ibid. 19); for he has been brought to all this only because he
may have found her ugly. Thus are these bad habits cured when they are
treated according to the divine Law; the ways of equity are never lost
sight of; they are obvious and discernible in every precept of the Law
by those who consider it well. See how, according to the Law, the
slanderer of his wife, who only intended to withhold from her what he
is bound to give her, is treated in the same manner as a thief who has
stolen the property of his neighbour; and the false witness (Deut. xix.
16, seq.) who schemes to injure, although the injury was in reality not
inflicted, is punished like those who have actually caused injury and
wrong, viz., like the thief and the slanderer. The three kinds of
sinners are tried and judged by one and the same law. See how wonderful
are the divine laws, and admire His wonderful deeds. Scripture says:
“The Rock, His work is perfect; for all His ways are judgment” (Deut.
xxxii. 4), i.e., as His works are most perfect, so are His laws most
equitable; but our mind is too limited to comprehend the perfection of
all His works, or the equity of all His laws; and as we are able to
comprehend some of His wonderful works in the organs of living beings
and the motions of the spheres, so we understand also the equity of
some of His laws; that which is unknown to us of both of them is far
more than that which is known to us. I will now return to the theme of
the present chapter.

The law about forbidden sexual intercourse seeks in all its parts to
inculcate the lesson that we ought to limit sexual intercourse
altogether, hold it in contempt, and only desire it very rarely. The
prohibition of pederasty (Lev. xviii. 22) and carnal intercourse with
beasts (ibid. 23) is very clear. If in the natural way the act is too
base to be performed except when needed, how much more base is it if
performed in an unnatural manner, and only for the sake of pleasure.

The female relatives whom a man may not marry are alike in this
respect—that as a rule they are constantly together with him in his
house; they would easily listen to him, and do what he desires; they
are near at hand, and he would have no difficulty in procuring them. No
judge could blame him if found in their company. If to these relatives
the same law applied as to all other unmarried women, if we were
allowed to marry any of them, and were only precluded from sexual
intercourse with them without marriage, most people would constantly
have become guilty of misconduct with them. But as they are entirely
forbidden to us, and sexual intercourse with them is most emphatically
denounced unto us as a capital crime, or a sin punishable with
extinction (karet), and as there is no means of ever legalizing such
intercourse, there is reason to expect that people will not seek it,
and will not think of it. That the persons included in that prohibition
are, as we have stated, at hand and easily accessible, is evident. For
as a rule, the mother of the wife, the grandmother, the daughter, the
granddaughter, and the sister-in-law, are mostly with her; the husband
meets them always when he goes out, when he comes in, and when he is at
his work. The wife stays also frequently in the house of her husband’s
brother, father, or son. It is also well known that we are often in the
company of our sisters, our aunts, and the wife of our uncle, and are
frequently brought up together with them. These are all the relatives
which we must not marry. This is one of the reasons why intermarriage
with a near relative is forbidden. But according to my opinion the
prohibition serves another object, namely, to inculcate chastity into
our hearts. Licence between the root and the branch, between a man and
his mother, or his daughter, is outrageous. The intercourse between
root and branch is forbidden, and it makes no difference whether the
male element is the root or the branch, or both root and branch combine
in the intercourse with a third person, so that the same individual
cohabits with the root and with the branch. On this account it is
prohibited to marry a woman and her mother, the wife of the father or
of the son; for in all these cases there is the intercourse between one
and the same person on the one side and root and branch on the other.

The law concerning brothers is like the law concerning root and branch.
The sister is forbidden, and so is also the sister of the wife and the
wife of the brother; because in the latter cases two persons who are
considered like root and branch, cohabit with the same person. But in
these prohibitions brothers and sisters are partly considered as root
and branch and partly as one body; the sister of the mother is
therefore like the mother, and the sister of the father like the
father, and both are prohibited; and since the daughter of the parent’s
brother or sister is not included in the number of prohibited
relatives, so may we also marry the daughter of the brother or the
sister. The apparent anomaly, that the brother of the father may marry
a woman that has been the wife of his brother’s son, whilst the nephew
must not marry a woman that has been the wife of his father’s brother,
can be explained according to the above-mentioned first reason. For the
nephew is frequently in the house of his uncle, and his conduct towards
the wife of his uncle is the same as that towards his brother’s wife.
The uncle, however, is not so frequent in the house of his nephew, and
he is consequently less intimate with the wife of his nephew; whilst in
the case of father and son, the familiarity of the father with his
daughter-in-law is the same at that of the son with the wife of his
father, and therefore the law and punishment is the same for both
[father and son]. The reason why it is prohibited to cohabit with a
menstruous woman (Lev. xviii. 19) or with another man’s wife (ibid.
20), is obvious, and requires no further explanation.

It is well known that we must not indulge in any sensual enjoyment
whatever with the persons included in the above prohibitions; we must
not even look at them if we intend to derive pleasure therefrom. We
have explained this in “the laws about forbidden sexual intercourse”
(Hilkot issure bïah, xxi. 1–2), and shown that according to the Law we
must not even engage our thoughts with the act of cohabitation (ibid.
19) or irritate the organ of generation; and when we find ourselves
unintentionally in a state of irritation, we must turn our mind to
other thoughts, and reflect on some other thing till we are relieved.
Our Sages (B.T. Kidd 30b), in their moral lessons, which give
perfection to the virtuous, say as follows: “My son, if that monster
meets you, drag it to the house of study. It will melt if it is of
iron; it will break in pieces if it is of stone: as is said in
Scripture, ‘Is not my word like a fire? saith the Lord, and like a
hammer that breaketh the rock in pieces?’” (Jer. xxiii. 29). The author
of this saying thus exhorts his son to go to the house of study when he
finds his organ of generation in an irritated state. By reading,
disputing, asking, and listening to questions, the irritation will
certainly cease. See how properly the term monster is employed, for
that irritation is indeed like a monster. Not only religion teaches
this lesson, the philosophers teach the same. I have already quoted
verbatim the words of Aristotle. He says: “The sense of touch which is
a disgrace to us, leads us to indulge in eating and sensuality,” etc.
He calls people degraded who seek carnal pleasures and devote
themselves to gastronomy; he denounces in extenso their low and
objectionable conduct, and ridicules them. This passage occurs in his
Ethics and in his Rhetoric.

In accordance with this excellent principle, which we ought strictly to
follow, our Sages teach us that we ought not to look at beasts or birds
in the moment of their copulation. According to my opinion, this is the
reason why the cross-breeding of cattle is prohibited (Lev. xix. 19).
It is a fact that animals of different species do not copulate
together, unless by force. It is well known that the low class of
breeders of mules are regularly engaged in this work. Our Law objected
to it that any Israelite should degrade himself by doing these things,
which require so much vulgarity and indecency, and doing that which
religion forbids us even to mention, how much more to witness or to
practise, except when necessary. Cross-breeding, however, is not
necessary. I think that the prohibition to bring together two species
in any kind of work, as included in the words, “Thou shalt not plow
with an ox and an ass together” (Deut. xxii. 10), is only a preventive
against the intercourse of two species. For if it were allowed to join
such together in any work, we might sometimes also cause their
intercourse. That this is the reason of the commandment is proved by
the fact that it applies to other animals besides ox and ass; it is
prohibited to plow not only with ox and ass together, but with any two
kinds. But Scripture mentions as an instance that which is of regular
occurrence.

As regards circumcision, I think that one of its objects is to limit
sexual intercourse, and to weaken the organ of generation as far as
possible, and thus cause man to be moderate. Some people believe that
circumcision is to remove a defect in man’s formation; but every one
can easily reply: How can products of nature be deficient so as to
require external completion, especially as the use of the fore-skin to
that organ is evident. This commandment has not been enjoined as a
complement to a deficient physical creation, but as a means for
perfecting man’s moral shortcomings. The bodily injury caused to that
organ is exactly that which is desired; it does not interrupt any vital
function, nor does it destroy the power of generation. Circumcision
simply counteracts excessive lust; for there is no doubt that
circumcision weakens the power of sexual excitement, and sometimes
lessens the natural enjoyment; the organ necessarily becomes weak when
it loses blood and is deprived of its covering from the beginning. Our
Sages (Beresh. Rabba, c. 80) say distinctly: It is hard for a woman,
with whom an uncircumcised had sexual intercourse, to separate from
him. This is, as I believe, the best reason for the commandment
concerning circumcision. And who was the first to perform this
commandment? Abraham, our father! of whom it is well known how he
feared sin; it is described by our Sages in reference to the words,
“Behold, now I know that thou art a fair woman to look upon” (Gen. xii.
11).

There is, however, another important object in this commandment. It
gives to all members of the same faith, i.e., to all believers in the
Unity of God, a common bodily sign, so that it is impossible for any
one that is a stranger, to say that he belongs to them. For sometimes
people say so for the purpose of obtaining some advantage, or in order
to make some attack upon the Jews. No one, however, should circumcise
himself or his son for any other reason but pure faith; for
circumcision is not like an incision on the leg, or a burning in the
arm, but a very difficult operation. It is also a fact that there is
much mutual love and assistance among people that are united by the
same sign when they consider it as [the symbol of] a covenant.
Circumcision is likewise the [symbol of the] covenant which Abraham
made in connexion with the belief in God’s Unity. So also every one
that is circumcised enters the covenant of Abraham to believe in the
unity of God, in accordance with the words of the Law, “To be a God
unto thee, and to thy seed after thee” (Gen. xvii. 7). This purpose of
the circumcision is as important as the first, and perhaps more
important.

This law can only be kept and perpetuated in its perfection, if
circumcision is performed when the child is very young, and this for
three good reasons. First, if the operation were postponed till the boy
had grown up, he would perhaps not submit to it. Secondly, the young
child has not much pain, because the skin is tender, and the
imagination weak; for grown-up persons are in dread and fear of things
which they imagine as coming, some time before these actually occur.
Thirdly, when a child is very young, the parents do not think much of
him; because the image of the child, that leads the parents to love
him, has not yet taken a firm root in their minds. That image becomes
stronger by the continual sight; it grows with the development of the
child, and later on the image begins again to decrease and to vanish.
The parents’ love for a new-born child is not so great as it is when
the child is one year old; and when one year old, it is less loved by
them than when six years old. The feeling and love of the father for
the child would have led him to neglect the law if he were allowed to
wait two or three years, whilst shortly after birth the image is very
weak in the mind of the parent, especially of the father who is
responsible for the execution of this commandment. The circumcision
must take place on the eighth day (Lev. xii. 3), because all living
beings are after birth, within the first seven days, very weak and
exceedingly tender, as if they were still in the womb of their mother;
not until the eighth day can they be counted among those that enjoy the
light of the world. That this is also the case with beasts may be
inferred from the words of Scripture: “Seven days shall it be under the
dam” (Lev. xxii. 27), as if it had no vitality before the end of that
period. In the same manner man is circumcised after the completion of
seven days. The period has been fixed, and has not been left to
everybody’s judgment.

The precepts of this class include also the lesson that we must not
injure in any way the organs of generation in living beings (ibid.
xxii. 24). The lesson is based on the principle of “righteous statutes
and judgment” (Deut. iv. 8); we must keep in everything the golden
mean; we must not be excessive in love, but must not suppress it
entirely; for the Law commands, “Be fruitful, and multiply” (Gen. i.
22). The organ is weakened by circumcision, but not destroyed by the
operation. The natural faculty is left in full force, but is guarded
against excess. It it prohibited for an Israelite “that is wounded in
the stones, or hath his privy member cut off” (Deut. xxiii. 2), to
marry an Israelitish woman; because the sexual intercourse is of no use
and of no purpose; and that marriage would be a source of ruin to her,
and to him who would claim her. This is very clear.

In order to create a horror of illicit marriages, a bastard was not
allowed to marry an Israelitish woman (ibid. xxiii. 3); the adulterer
and the adulteress were thus taught that by their act they bring upon
their seed irreparable injury. In every language and in every nation
the issue of licentious conduct has a bad name; the Law therefore
raises the name of the Israelites by keeping them free from the
admixture of bastards. The priests, who have a higher sanctity, are not
allowed to marry a harlot, or a woman that is divorced from her
husband, or that is profane (Lev. xii. 7); the high-priest, the noblest
of the priests, must not marry even a widow, or a woman that has had
sexual intercourse of any kind (ibid. xii. 14). Of all these laws the
reason is obvious. If bastards were prohibited to marry any member of
the congregation of the Lord, how much more rigidly had slaves and
handmaids to be excluded. The reason of the prohibition of
intermarriage with other nations is stated in the Law: “And thou take
of their daughters unto thy sons, and their daughters go a whoring
after their gods, and make thy sons go a whoring after their gods”
(Exod. xxxiv. 16).

Most of the “statutes” (ḥukkim), the reason of which is unknown to us,
serve as a fence against idolatry. That I cannot explain some details
of the above laws or show their use is owing to the fact that what we
hear from others is not so clear as that which we see with our own
eyes. Thus my knowledge of the Sabean doctrines, which I derived from
books, is not as complete as the knowledge of those who have witnessed
the public practice of those idolatrous customs, especially as they
have been out of practice and entirely extinct since two thousand
years. If we knew all the particulars of the Sabean worship, and were
informed of all the details of those doctrines, we would clearly see
the reason and wisdom of every detail in the sacrificial service, in
the laws concerning things that are unclean, and in other laws, the
object of which I am unable to state. I have no doubt that all these
laws served to blot out wrong principles from man’s heart, and to
exterminate the practices which are useless, and merely a waste of time
in vain and purposeless things. Those principles have turned the mind
of the people away from intellectual research and useful actions. Our
prophets therefore describe the ways of the idolaters as follows:
“(They go) after vain things which cannot profit nor deliver; for they
are vain” (1 Sam. xii. 21); “Surely our fathers have inherited lies,
vanity and things wherein there is no profit” (Jer. xvi. 19). Consider
how great the evil consequences of idolatry are, and say whether we
ought with all our power to oppose it or not! Most of the precepts
serve, as has been stated by us, as a mere fence against those
doctrines [of idolatry], and relieve man from the great and heavy
burdens, from the pains and inflictions which formed part of the
worship of idols. Every positive or negative precept, the reason of
which is unknown to thee, take as a remedy against some of those
diseases with which we are unacquainted at present, thank God. This
should be the belief of educated men who know the true meaning of the
following divine dictum: “I said not unto the seed of Jacob, Seek me in
vain” (Isa. xlv. 19).

I have now mentioned all the commandments of these fourteen classes one
by one, and pointed out the reason of each of them, with the exception
of a few for which I was unable to give the reason, and of some details
of less importance; but implicitly we have given the reason even of
these, and every intelligent reader will easily find it.

The reasons of the Precepts are now complete.






CHAPTER L


There are in the Law portions which include deep wisdom, but have been
misunderstood by many persons; they require, therefore, an explanation.
I mean the narratives contained in the Law which many consider as being
of no use whatever; e.g., the list of the various families descended
from Noah, with their names and their territories (Gen. x.); the sons
of Seir the Horite (ibid. xxxvi. 20–30); the kings that reigned in Edom
(ibid. 31, seq.); and the like. There is a saying of our Sages (B.T.
Sanh. 99b) that the wicked king Manasse frequently held disgraceful
meetings for the sole purpose of criticising such passages of the Law.
“He held meetings and made blasphemous observations on Scripture,
saying, Had Moses nothing else to write than, And the sister of Lotan
was Timna” (Gen. xxxvi. 22)? With reference to such passages, I will
first give a general principle, and then discuss them seriatim, as I
have done in the exposition of the reasons of the precepts.

Every narrative in the Law serves a certain purpose in connexion with
religious teaching. It either helps to establish a principle of faith,
or to regulate our actions, and to prevent wrong and injustice among
men; and I will show this in each case.

It is one of the fundamental principles of the Law that the Universe
has been created ex nihilo, and that of the human race, one individual
being, Adam, was created. As the time which elapsed from Adam to Moses
was not more than about two thousand five hundred years, people would
have doubted the truth of that statement if no other information had
been added, seeing that the human race was spread over all parts of the
earth in different families and with different languages, very unlike
the one to the other. In order to remove this doubt the Law gives the
genealogy of the nations (Gen. v. and x.), and the manner how they
branched off from a common root. It names those of them who were well
known, and tells who their fathers were, how long and where they lived.
It describes also the cause that led to the dispersion of men over all
parts of the earth, and to the formation of their different languages,
after they had lived for a long time in one place, and spoken one
language (ibid. xi.), as would be natural for descendants of one
person. The accounts of the flood (ibid. vi.-viii.) and of the
destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah (ibid. xix.), serve as an
illustration of the doctrine that “Verily there is a reward for the
righteous; verily He is a God that judgeth in the earth” (Ps. lviii.
12).

The narration of the war among the nine kings (ibid. xiv.) shows how,
by means of a miracle, Abraham, with a few undisciplined men, defeated
four mighty kings. It illustrates at the same time how Abraham
sympathized with his relative, who had been brought up in the same
faith, and how he exposed himself to the dangers of warfare in order to
save him. We further learn from this narrative how contented and
satisfied Abraham was, thinking little of property, and very much of
good deeds; he said, “I will not take from a thread even to a
shoe-latchet” (Gen. xiv. 23).

The list of the families of Seir and their genealogy is given in the
Law (ibid. xxxvi. 20–30), because of one particular commandment. For
God distinctly commanded the Israelites concerning Amalek to blot out
his name (Deut. xxv. 17–19). Amalek was the son of Eliphas and Timna,
the sister of Lotan (ibid. xxxvi. 12). The other sons of Esau were not
included in this commandment. But Esau was by marriage connected with
the Seirites, as is distinctly stated in Scripture; and Seirites were
therefore his children; he reigned over them; his seed was mixed with
the seed of Seir, and ultimately all the countries and families of Seir
were called after the sons of Esau who were the predominant family, and
they assumed more particularly the name Amalekites, because these were
the strongest in that family. If the genealogy of these families of
Seir had not been described in full they would all have been killed,
contrary to the plain words of the commandment. For this reason the
Seirite families are fully described, as if to say, the people that
live in Seir and in the kingdom of Amalek are not all Amalekites; they
are the descendants of some other man, and are called Amalekites
because the mother of Amalek was of their tribe. The justice of God
thus prevented the destruction of an [innocent] people that lived in
the midst of another people [doomed to extirpation]; for the decree was
only pronounced against the seed of Amalek. The reason of this decree
has already been stated by us (p. 205).

The kings that have reigned in the land of Edom are enumerated (Gen
xxxvi. 31, seq.) on account of the law, “Thou mayst not set a stranger
over thee, which is not thy brother” (Deut. xvii. 15). For of these
kings none was an Edomite; wherefore each king is described by his
native land; one king from this place, another king from that place.
Now I think that it was then well known how these kings that reigned in
Edom conducted themselves, what they did, and how they humiliated and
oppressed the sons of Esau. Thus God reminded the Israelites of the
fate of the Edomites, as if saying unto them, Look unto your brothers,
the sons of Esau, whose kings were so and so, and whose deeds are well
known. [Learn therefrom] that no nation ever chose a foreigner as king
without inflicting thereby some great or small injury upon the country.
In short, what I remarked in reference to our ignorance of the Sabean
worship, applies also to the history of those days. If the religious
rules of the Sabeans and the events of those days were known to us, we
should be able to see plainly the reason for most of the things
mentioned in the Pentateuch.

It is also necessary to note the following observations. The view we
take of things described by others is different from the view we take
of things seen by us as eye-witnesses. For that which we see contains
many details which are essential, and must be fully described. The
reader of the description believes that it contains superfluous matter,
or useless repetition, but if he had witnessed the event of which he
reads, he would see the necessity of every part of the description.
When we therefore notice narratives in the Torah, which are in no
connexion with any of the commandments, we are inclined to think that
they are entirely superfluous, or too lengthy, or contain repetitions;
but this is only because we do not see the particular incidents which
make those narratives noteworthy. Of this kind is the enumeration of
the stations [of the Israelites in the wilderness] (Num. xxxiii.). At
first sight it appears to be entirely useless; but in order to obviate
such a notion Scripture says, “And Moses wrote their goings out
according to their journeys by the commandment of the Lord” (ibid. ver.
2). It was indeed most necessary that these should be written. For
miracles are only convincing to those who witnessed them; whilst coming
generations, who know them only from the account given by others, may
consider them as untrue. But miracles cannot continue and last for all
generations; it is even inconceivable [that they should be permanent].
Now the greatest of the miracles described in the Law is the stay of
the Israelites in the wilderness for forty years, with a daily supply
of manna. This wilderness, as described in Scripture, consisted of
places “wherein were fiery serpents and scorpions, and drought, where
there was no water” (Deut. viii. 15); places very remote from
cultivated land, and naturally not adapted for the habitation of man,
“It is no place of seed, or of figs, or of vines, or of pomegranates,
neither is there any water to drink” (Num. xx. 5); “A land that no man
passed through, and where no man dwelt” (Jer. ii. 6). [In reference to
the stay of the Israelites in the wilderness], Scripture relates, “Ye
have not eaten bread, neither have ye drunk wine or strong drink”
(Deut. xix. 5). All these miracles were wonderful, public, and
witnessed by the people. But God knew that in future people might doubt
the correctness of the account of these miracles, in the same manner as
they doubt the accuracy of other narratives; they might think that the
Israelites stayed in the wilderness in a place not far from inhabited
land, where it was possible for man to live [in the ordinary way]; that
it was like those deserts in which Arabs live at present; or that they
dwelt in such places in which they could plow, sow, and reap, or live
on some vegetable that was growing there; or that manna came always
down in those places as an ordinary natural product; or that there were
wells of water in those places. In order to remove all these doubts and
to firmly establish the accuracy of the account of these miracles,
Scripture enumerates all the stations, so that coming generations may
see them, and learn the greatness of the miracle which enabled human
beings to live in those places forty years.

For this very reason Joshua cursed him who would ever build up Jericho
(Josh. vi. 26); the effect of the miracle was to remain for ever, so
that any one who would see the wall sunk in the ground would understand
that it was not in the condition of a building pulled down by human
hands, but sunk through a miracle. In a similar manner the words, “At
the commandment of the Lord the children of Israel journeyed, and at
the commandment of the Lord they pitched” (Num. ix. 18), would suffice
as a simple statement of facts; and the reader might at first sight
consider as unnecessary additions all the details which follow, viz.,
“And when the cloud tarried long.... And so it was when the cloud was a
few days.... Or whether it were two days,” etc. (ibid. ix. 19–22). But
I will show you the reason why all these details are added. For they
serve to confirm the account, and to contradict the opinion of the
nations, both of ancient and modern times, that the Israelites lost
their way, and did not know where to go; that “they were entangled in
the land” (Exod. xiv. 3); wherefore the Arabs unto this day call that
desert Al-tih, “the desert of going astray,” imagining that the
Israelites erred about, and did not know the way. Scripture, therefore,
clearly states and emphatically declares that it was by God’s command
that the journeyings were irregular, that the Israelites returned to
the same places several times, and that the duration of the stay was
different in each station; whilst the stay in one place continued for
eighteen years, in another place it lasted one day, and in another one
night. There was no going astray, but the journey was regulated by “the
rising of the pillar of cloud” (Num. ix. 17). Therefore all these
details are given. Scripture clearly states that the way was near,
known, and in good condition; I mean the way from Horeb, whither they
came intentionally, according to the command of God, “Ye shall serve
God upon this mountain” (Exod. ii. 12), to Kadesh-barnea, the beginning
of inhabited land, as Scripture says, “Behold, we are now in Kadesh, a
city in the uttermost of thy border” (Num. xx. 16). That way was a
journey of eleven days; comp. “Eleven days’ journey from Horeb, by the
way of mount Seir, unto Kadesh-barnea” (Deut. i. 3). In such a journey
it is impossible to err about for forty years; but Scripture states the
cause of the delay.

In like manner there is a good reason for every passage the object of
which we cannot see. We must always apply the words of our Sages: “It
is not a vain thing for you” (Deut. xxxii. 47), and if it seems vain,
it seems your fault.






CHAPTER LI


The present chapter does not contain any additional matter that has not
been treated in the [previous] chapters of this treatise. It is a kind
of conclusion, and at the same time it will explain in what manner
those worship God who have obtained a true knowledge concerning God; it
will direct them how to come to that worship, which is the highest aim
man can attain, and show how God protects them in this world till they
are removed to eternal life.

I will begin the subject of this chapter with a simile. A king is in
his palace, and all his subjects are partly in the country, and partly
abroad. Of the former, some have their backs turned towards the king’s
palace, and their faces in another direction; and some are desirous and
zealous to go to the palace, seeking “to inquire in his temple,” and to
minister before him, but have not yet seen even the face of the wall of
the house. Of those that desire to go to the palace, some reach it, and
go round about in search of the entrance gate; others have passed
through the gate, and walk about in the ante-chamber; and others have
succeeded in entering into the inner part of the palace, and being in
the same room with the king in the royal palace. But even the latter do
not immediately on entering the palace see the king, or speak to him;
for, after having entered the inner part of the palace, another effort
is required before they can stand before the king—at a distance, or
close by—hear his words, or speak to him. I will now explain the simile
which I have made. The people who are abroad are all those that have no
religion, neither one based on speculation nor one received by
tradition. Such are the extreme Turks that wander about in the north,
the Kushites who live in the south, and those in our country who are
like these. I consider these as irrational beings, and not as human
beings; they are below mankind, but above monkeys, since they have the
form and shape of man, and a mental faculty above that of the monkey.

Those who are in the country, but have their backs turned towards the
king’s palace, are those who possess religion, belief, and thought, but
happen to hold false doctrines, which they either adopted in
consequence of great mistakes made in their own speculations, or
received from others who misled them. Because of these doctrines they
recede more and more from the royal palace the more they seem to
proceed. These are worse than the first class, and under certain
circumstances it may become necessary to slay them, and to extirpate
their doctrines, in order that others should not be misled.

Those who desire to arrive at the palace, and to enter it, but have
never yet seen it, are the mass of religious people; the multitude that
observe the divine commandments, but are ignorant. Those who arrive at
the palace, but go round about it, are those who devote themselves
exclusively to the study of the practical law; they believe
traditionally in true principles of faith, and learn the practical
worship of God, but are not trained in philosophical treatment of the
principles of the Law, and do not endeavour to establish the truth of
their faith by proof. Those who undertake to investigate the principles
of religion, have come into the ante-chamber; and there is no doubt
that these can also be divided into different grades. But those who
have succeeded in finding a proof for everything that can be proved,
who have a true knowledge of God, so far as a true knowledge can be
attained, and are near the truth, wherever an approach to the truth is
possible, they have reached the goal, and are in the palace in which
the king lives.

My son, so long as you are engaged in studying the Mathematical
Sciences and Logic, you belong to those who go round about the palace
in search of the gate. Thus our Sages figuratively use the phrase:
“Ben-zoma is still outside.” When you understand Physics, you have
entered the hall; and when, after completing the study of Natural
Philosophy, you master Metaphysics, you have entered the innermost
court, and are with the king in the same palace. You have attained the
degree of the wise men, who include men of different grades of
perfection. There are some who direct all their mind toward the
attainment of perfection in Metaphysics, devote themselves entirely to
God, exclude from their thought every other thing, and employ all their
intellectual faculties in the study of the Universe, in order to derive
therefrom a proof for the existence of God, and to learn in every
possible way how God rules all things; they form the class of those who
have entered the palace, namely, the class of prophets. One of these
has attained so much knowledge, and has concentrated his thoughts to
such an extent in the idea of God, that it could be said of him, “And
he was with the Lord forty days,” etc. (Exod. xxxiv. 28); during that
holy communion he could ask Him, answer Him, speak to Him, and be
addressed by Him, enjoying beatitude in that which he had obtained to
such a degree that “he did neither eat bread nor drink water” (ibid.);
his intellectual energy was so predominant that all coarser functions
of the body, especially those connected with the sense of touch, were
in abeyance. Some prophets are only able to see, and of these some
approach near and see, whilst others see from a distance: comp. “The
Lord hath appeared from far unto me” (Jer. xxxi. 3). We have already
spoken of the various degrees of prophets; we will therefore return to
the subject of this chapter, and exhort those who have attained a
knowledge of God, to concentrate all their thoughts in God. This is the
worship peculiar to those who have acquired a knowledge of the highest
truths; and the more they reflect on Him, and think of Him, the more
are they engaged in His worship. Those, however, who think of God, and
frequently mention His name, without any correct notion of Him, but
merely following some imagination, or some theory received from another
person, are, in my opinion, like those who remain outside the palace
and distant from it. They do not mention the name of God in truth, nor
do they reflect on it. That which they imagine and mention does not
correspond to any being in existence; it is a thing invented by their
imagination, as has been shown by us in our discussion on the Divine
Attributes (Part I. chap. 1.). The true worship of God is only possible
when correct notions of Him have previously been conceived. When you
have arrived by way of intellectual research at a knowledge of God and
His works, then commence to devote yourselves to Him, try to approach
Him and strengthen the intellect, which is the link that joins you to
Him. Thus Scripture says, “Unto thee it was showed, that thou mightest
know that the Lord He is God” (Deut. iv. 35); “Know therefore this day,
and consider it in thine heart, that the Lord He is God” (ibid. 36);
“Know ye that the Lord is God” (Ps. c. 3). Thus the Law distinctly
states that the highest kind of worship to which we refer in this
chapter, is only possible after the acquisition of the knowledge of
God. For it is said, “To love the Lord your God, and to serve Him with
all your heart and with all your soul” (Deut. xi. 13), and, as we have
shown several times, man’s love of God is identical with His knowledge
of Him. The Divine service enjoined in these words must, accordingly,
be preceded by the love of God. Our Sages have pointed out to us that
it is a service in the heart, which explanation I understand to mean
this: man concentrates all his thoughts on the First Intellect, and is
absorbed in these thoughts as much as possible. David therefore
commands his son Solomon these two things, and exhorts him earnestly to
do them: to acquire a true knowledge of God, and to be earnest in His
service after that knowledge has been acquired. For he says, “And thou,
Solomon my son, know thou the God of thy father, and serve him with a
perfect heart ... if thou seek him, he will be found of thee; but if
thou forsake him, he will cast thee off for ever” (1 Chron. xxviii. 9).
The exhortation refers to the intellectual conceptions, not to the
imaginations; for the latter are not called “knowledge,” but “that
which cometh into your mind” (Ezek. xx. 32). It has thus been shown
that it must be man’s aim, after having acquired the knowledge of God,
to deliver himself up to Him, and to have his heart constantly filled
with longing after Him. He accomplishes this generally by seclusion and
retirement. Every pious man should therefore seek retirement and
seclusion, and should only in case of necessity associate with others.

Note.—I have shown you that the intellect which emanates from God unto
us is the link that joins us to God. You have it in your power to
strengthen that bond, if you choose to do so, or to weaken it gradually
till it breaks, if you prefer this. It will only become strong when you
employ it in the love of God, and seek that love; it will be weakened
when you direct your thoughts to other things. You must know that even
if you were the wisest man in respect to the true knowledge of God, you
break the bond between you and God whenever you turn entirely your
thoughts to the necessary food or any necessary business; you are then
not with God, and He is not with you; for that relation between you and
Him is actually interrupted in those moments. The pious were therefore
particular to restrict the time in which they could not meditate upon
the name of God, and cautioned others about it, saying, “Let not your
minds be vacant from reflections upon God.” In the same sense did David
say, “I have set the Lord always before me; because he is at my right
hand, I shall not be moved” (Ps. xvi. 8); i.e., I do not turn my
thoughts away from God; He is like my right hand, which I do not forget
even for a moment on account of the ease of its motions, and therefore
I shall not be moved, I shall not fall.

We must bear in mind that all such religious acts as reading the Law,
praying, and the performance of other precepts, serve exclusively as
the means of causing us to occupy and fill our mind with the precepts
of God, and free it from worldly business; for we are thus, as it were,
in communication with God, and undisturbed by any other thing. If we,
however, pray with the motion of our lips, and our face toward the
wall, but at the same time think of our business; if we read the Law
with our tongue, whilst our heart is occupied with the building of our
house, and we do not think of what we are reading; if we perform the
commandments only with our limbs, we are like those who are engaged in
digging in the ground, or hewing wood in the forest, without reflecting
on the nature of those acts, or by whom they are commanded, or what is
their object. We must not imagine that [in this way] we attain the
highest perfection; on the contrary, we are then like those in
reference to whom Scripture says, “Thou art near in their mouth, and
far from their reins” (Jer. xii. 2).

I will now commence to show you the way how to educate and train
yourselves in order to attain that great perfection.

The first thing you must do is this: Turn your thoughts away from
everything while you read Shemaʻ or during the Tefillah, and do not
content yourself with being devout when you read the first verse of
Shema, or the first paragraph of the prayer. When you have successfully
practised this for many years, try in reading the Law or listening to
it, to have all your heart and all your thought occupied with
understanding what you read or hear. After some time when you have
mastered this, accustom yourself to have your mind free from all other
thoughts when you read any portion of the other books of the prophets,
or when you say any blessing; and to have your attention directed
exclusively to the perception and the understanding of what you utter.
When you have succeeded in properly performing these acts of divine
service, and you have your thought, during their performance, entirely
abstracted from worldly affairs, take then care that your thought be
not disturbed by thinking of your wants or of superfluous things. In
short, think of worldly matters when you eat, drink, bathe, talk with
your wife and little children, or when you converse with other people.
These times, which are frequent and long, I think, must suffice to you
for reflecting on everything that is necessary as regards business,
household, and health. But when you are engaged in the performance of
religious duties, have your mind exclusively directed to what you are
doing.

When you are alone by yourself, when you are awake on your couch, be
careful to meditate in such precious moments on nothing but the
intellectual worship of God, viz., to approach Him and to minister
before Him in the true manner which I have described to you—not in
hollow emotions. This I consider as the highest perfection wise men can
attain by the above training.

When we have acquired a true knowledge of God, and rejoice in that
knowledge in such a manner, that whilst speaking with others, or
attending to our bodily wants, our mind is all that time with God; when
we are with our heart constantly near God, even whilst our body is in
the society of men; when we are in that state which the Song on the
relation between God and man poetically describes in the following
words: “I sleep, but my heart waketh; it is the voice of my beloved
knocketh” (Song v. 2):—then we have attained not only the height of
ordinary prophets, but of Moses, our Teacher, of whom Scripture
relates: “And Moses alone shall come near before the Lord” (ibid.
xxxiv. 28); “But as for thee, stand thou here by me” (Deut. v. 28). The
meaning of these verses has been explained by us.

The Patriarchs likewise attained this degree of perfection; they
approached God in such a manner that with them the name of God became
known in the world. Thus we read in Scripture: “The God of Abraham, the
God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.... This is My name for ever” (Exod.
iii. 15). Their mind was so identified with the knowledge of God, that
He made a lasting covenant with each of them: “Then will I remember my
covenant with Jacob,” etc. (Lev. xxvi. 42). For it is known from
statements made in Scripture that these four, viz., the Patriarchs and
Moses, had their minds exclusively filled with the name of God, that
is, with His knowledge and love; and that in the same measure was
Divine Providence attached to them and their descendants. When we
therefore find them also, engaged in ruling others, in increasing their
property, and endeavouring to obtain possession of wealth and honour,
we see in this fact a proof that when they were occupied in these
things, only their bodily limbs were at work, whilst their heart and
mind never moved away from the name of God. I think these four reached
that high degree of perfection in their relation to God, and enjoyed
the continual presence of Divine Providence, even in their endeavours
to increase their property, feeding the flock, toiling in the field, or
managing the house, only because in all these things their end and aim
was to approach God as much as possible. It was the chief aim of their
whole life to create a people that should know and worship God. Comp.
“For I know him, that he will command his children and his household
after him” (Gen. xviii. 19). The object of all their labours was to
publish the Unity of God in the world, and to induce people to love
Him; and it was on this account that they succeeded in reaching that
high degree; for even those [worldly] affairs were for them a perfect
worship of God. But a person like myself must not imagine that he is
able to lead men up to this degree of perfection. It is only the next
degree to it that can be attained by means of the above-mentioned
training. And let us pray to God and beseech Him that He clear and
remove from our way everything that forms an obstruction and a
partition between us and Him, although most of these obstacles are our
own creation, as has several times been shown in this treatise. Comp.
“Your iniquities have separated between you and your God” (Isa. lix.
2).

An excellent idea presents itself here to me, which may serve to remove
many doubts, and may help to solve many difficult problems in
metaphysics. We have already stated in the chapters which treat of
Divine Providence, that Providence watches over every rational being
according to the amount of intellect which that being possesses. Those
who are perfect in their perception of God, whose mind is never
separated from Him, enjoy always the influence of Providence. But those
who, perfect in their knowledge of God, turn their mind sometimes away
from God, enjoy the presence of Divine Providence only when they
meditate on God; when their thoughts are engaged in other matters,
divine Providence departs from them. The absence of Providence in this
case is not like its absence in the case of those who do not reflect on
God at all; it is in this case less intense, because when a person
perfect in his knowledge [of God] is busy with worldly matters, he has
not knowledge in actuality, but only knowledge in potentiality [though
ready to become actual]. This person is then like a trained scribe when
he is not writing. Those who have no knowledge of God are like those
who are in constant darkness and have never seen light. We have
explained in this sense the words: “The wicked shall be silent in
darkness” (1 Sam. ii. 9) whilst those who possess the knowledge of God,
and have their thoughts entirely directed to that knowledge, are, as it
were, always in bright sunshine; and those who have the knowledge, but
are at times engaged in other themes, have then as it were a cloudy
day: the sun does not shine for them on account of the cloud that
intervenes between them and God.

Hence it appears to me that it is only in times of such neglect that
some of the ordinary evils befall a prophet or a perfect and pious man;
and the intensity of the evil is proportional to the duration of those
moments, or to the character of the things that thus occupy their mind.
Such being the case, the great difficulty is removed that led
philosophers to assert that Providence does not extend to every
individual, and that man is like any other living being in this
respect, viz., the argument based on the fact that good and pious men
are afflicted with great evils. We have thus explained this difficult
question even in accordance with the philosophers’ own principles.
Divine Providence is constantly watching over those who have obtained
that blessing which is prepared for those who endeavour to obtain it.
If man frees his thoughts from worldly matters, obtains a knowledge of
God in the right way, and rejoices in that knowledge, it is impossible
that any kind of evil should befall him while he is with God, and God
with him. When he does not meditate on God, when he is separated from
God, then God is also separated from him; then he is exposed to any
evil that might befall him; for it is only that intellectual link with
God that secures the presence of Providence and protection from evil
accidents. Hence it may occur that the perfect man is at times not
happy, whilst no evil befalls those who are imperfect; in these cases
what happens to them is due to chance. This principle I find also
expressed in the Law. Comp. “And I will hide my face from them, and
they shall be devoured, and many evils and troubles shall befall them;
so that they will say in that day, Are not these evils come upon us,
because our God is not among us?” (Deut. xxxi. 17). It is clear that we
ourselves are the cause of this hiding of the face, and that the screen
that separates us from God is of our own creation. This is the meaning
of the words: “And I will surely hide my face in that day, for all the
evils which they shall have wrought” (ibid. ver. 18). There is
undoubtedly no difference in this regard between one single person and
a whole community. It is now clearly established that the cause of our
being exposed to chance, and abandoned to destruction like cattle, is
to be found in our separation from God. Those who have their God
dwelling in their hearts, are not touched by any evil whatever. For God
says: “Fear thou not, for I am with thee; be not dismayed, for I am thy
God” (Isa. xli. 10). “When thou passest through the waters, I will be
with thee; and through the rivers, they shall not overflow thee” (ibid.
xliii. 2). For if we prepare ourselves, and attain the influence of the
Divine Intellect, Providence is joined to us, and we are guarded
against all evils. Comp. “The Lord is on my side; I will not fear; what
can man do unto me?” (Ps. cxviii. 6). “Acquaint now thyself with him,
and be at peace” (Job xxii. 21); i.e., turn unto Him, and you will be
safe from all evil.

Consider the Psalm on mishaps, and see how the author describes that
great Providence, the protection and defence from all mishaps that
concern the body, both from those that are common to all people, and
those that concern only one certain individual; from those that are due
to the laws of Nature, and those that are caused by our fellow-men. The
Psalmist says: “Surely he will deliver thee from the snare of the
fowler, and from the noisome pestilence. He shall cover thee with his
feathers, and under his wings shalt thou trust: His truth shall be thy
shield and buckler. Thou shalt not be afraid for the terror by night;
nor for the arrow that flieth by day” (Ps. xci. 3–5). The author then
relates how God protects us from the troubles caused by men, saying, If
you happen to meet on your way with an army fighting with drawn swords,
killing thousands at your left hand and myriads at your right hand, you
will not suffer any harm; you will behold and see how God judges and
punishes the wicked that are being slain, whilst you remain unhurt. “A
thousand shall fall at thy side, and ten thousand at thy right hand;
but it shall not come nigh thee. Only with thine eyes shalt thou behold
and see the reward of the wicked” (ibid. vers. 7, 8). The author then
continues his description of the divine defence and shelter, and shows
the cause of this great protection, saying that such a man is well
guarded “Because he hath set his love upon me, therefore will I deliver
him: I will set him on high, because he hath known my name” (ibid. ver.
14). We have shown in previous chapters that by the “knowledge of God’s
name,” the knowledge of God is meant. The above passage may therefore
be paraphrased as follows: “This man is well guarded, because he hath
known me, and then (bi chashak) loved me.” You know the difference
between the two Hebrew terms that signify “to love,” ahab and ḥashak.
When a man’s love is so intense that his thought is exclusively engaged
with the object of his love, it is expressed in Hebrew by the term
ḥashak.

The philosophers have already explained how the bodily forces of man in
his youth prevent the development of moral principles. In a greater
measure this is the case as regards the purity of thought which man
attains through the perfection of those ideas that lead him to an
intense love of God. Man can by no means attain this so long as his
bodily humours are hot. The more the forces of his body are weakened,
and the fire of passion quenched, in the same measure does man’s
intellect increase in strength and light; his knowledge becomes purer,
and he is happy with his knowledge. When this perfect man is stricken
in age and is near death, his knowledge mightily increases, his joy in
that knowledge grows greater, and his love for the object of his
knowledge more intense, and it is in this great delight that the soul
separates from the body. To this state our Sages referred, when in
reference to the death of Moses, Aaron, and Miriam, they said that
death was in these three cases nothing but a kiss. They say thus: We
learn from the words, “And Moses the servant of the Lord died there in
the land of Moab by the mouth of the Lord” (Deut. xxxiv. 5), that his
death was a kiss. The same expression is used of Aaron: “And Aaron the
priest went up into Mount Hor ... by the mouth of the Lord, and died
there” (Num. xxxiii. 38). Our Sages said that the same was the case
with Miriam; but the phrase “by the mouth of the Lord” is not employed,
because it was not considered appropriate to use these words in the
description of her death as she was a female. The meaning of this
saying is that these three died in the midst of the pleasure derived
from the knowledge of God and their great love for Him. When our Sages
figuratively call the knowledge of God united with intense love for Him
a kiss, they follow the well-known poetical diction “Let him kiss me
with the kisses of his mouth” (Song i. 2). This kind of death, which in
truth is deliverance from death, has been ascribed by our Sages to none
but to Moses, Aaron, and Miriam. The other prophets and pious men are
beneath that degree; but their knowledge of God is strengthened when
death approaches. Of them Scripture says, “Thy righteousness shall go
before thee; the glory of the Lord shall be thy rereward” (Isa. lviii.
8). The intellect of these men remains then constantly in the same
condition, since the obstacle is removed that at times has intervened
between the intellect and the object of its action; it continues for
ever in that great delight, which is not like bodily pleasure. We have
explained this in our work, and others have explained it before us.

Try to understand this chapter, endeavour with all your might to spend
more and more time in communion with God, or in the attempt to approach
Him; and to reduce the hours which you spend in other occupations, and
during which you are not striving to come nearer unto Him. This
instruction suffices for the object of this treatise.






CHAPTER LII


We do not sit, move, and occupy ourselves when we are alone and at home
in the same manner as we do in the presence of a great king; we speak
and open our mouth as we please when we are with the people of our own
household and with our relatives, but not so when we are in a royal
assembly. If we therefore desire to attain human perfection, and to be
truly men of God, we must awake from our sleep, and bear in mind that
the great king that is over us, and is always joined to us, is greater
than any earthly king, greater than David and Solomon. The king that
cleaves to us and embraces us is the Intellect that influences us, and
forms the link between us and God. We perceive God by means of that
light that He sends down unto us, wherefore the Psalmist says, “In Thy
light shall we see light” (Ps. xxxvi. 9): so God looks down upon us
through that same light, and is always with us beholding and watching
us on account of this light. “Can any hide himself in secret places
that I shall not see him?” (Jer. xxiii. 24). Note this particularly.

When the perfect bear this in mind, they will be filled with fear of
God, humility, and piety, with true, not apparent, reverence and
respect of God, in such a manner that their conduct, even when alone
with their wives or in the bath, will be as modest as they are in
public intercourse with other people. Thus it is related of our
renowned Sages that even in their sexual intercourse with their wives
they behaved with great modesty. They also said, “Who is modest? He
whose conduct in the dark night is the same as in the day.” You know
also how much they warned us not to walk proudly, since “the fulness of
the whole earth is His glory” (Isa. vi. 3). They thought that by these
rules the above-mentioned idea will be firmly established in the hearts
of men, viz., that we are always before God, and it is in the presence
of His glory that we go to and fro. The great men among our Sages would
not uncover their heads because they believed that God’s glory was
round them and over them; for the same reason they spoke little. In our
Commentary on the Sayings of the Fathers (chap. i. 17) we have fully
explained how we have to restrict our speech. Comp. “For God is in
heaven and thou upon earth, therefore let thy words be few” (Eccles. v.
1).

What I have here pointed out to you is the object of all our religious
acts. For by [carrying out] all the details of the prescribed
practices, and repeating them continually, some few pious men may
attain human perfection. They will be filled with respect and reverence
towards God; and bearing in mind who is with them, they will perform
their duty. God declares in plain words that it is the object of all
religious acts to produce in man fear of God and obedience to His
word—the state of mind which we have demonstrated in this chapter for
those who desire to know the truth, as being our duty to seek. Comp.
“If thou wilt not observe to do all the words of this law that are
written in this book, that thou mayest fear this glorious and fearful
name, the Lord thy God” (Deut. xxviii. 58). Consider how clearly it is
stated here that the only object and aim of “all the words of this law”
is to [make man] fear “the glorious and fearful name.” That this end is
attained by certain acts we learn likewise from the phrase employed in
this verse: “If thou wilt not observe to do ... that thou mayest fear.”
For this phrase clearly shows that fear of God is inculcated [into our
hearts] when we act in accordance with the positive and the negative
precepts. But the truths which the Law teaches us—the knowledge of
God’s Existence and Unity—create in us love of God, as we have shown
repeatedly. You know how frequently the Law exhorts us to love God.
Comp. “And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and
with all thy soul, and with all thy might” (Deut. vi. 5). The two
objects, love and fear of God, are acquired by two different means. The
love is the result of the truths taught in the Law, including the true
knowledge of the Existence of God; whilst fear of God is produced by
the practices prescribed in the Law. Note this explanation.






CHAPTER LIII


This chapter treats of the meaning of three terms which we find
necessary to explain, viz., ḥesed (“loving-kindness”), mishpat
(“judgment”), and ẓedakah (“righteousness”).

In our Commentary on the Sayings of the Fathers (chap. v. 7) we have
explained the expression ḥesed as denoting an excess [in some moral
quality]. It is especially used of extraordinary kindness.
Loving-kindness is practised in two ways: first, we show kindness to
those who have no claim whatever upon us; secondly, we are kind to
those to whom it is due, in a greater measure than is due to them. In
the inspired writings the term ḥesed occurs mostly in the sense of
showing kindness to those who have no claim to it whatever. For this
reason the term ḥesed is employed to express the good bestowed upon us
by God: “I will mention the loving-kindness of the Lord” (Isa. lxiii.
7). On this account, the very act of the creation is an act of God’s
loving-kindness. “I have said, The Universe is built up in
loving-kindness” (Ps. lxxxix. 3); i.e., the building up of the Universe
is an act of loving-kindness. Also, in the enumeration of God’s
attributes, Scripture says: “And abundant in loving-kindness” (Exod.
xxxiv. 6).

The term ẓedakah is derived from ẓedek, “righteousness”; it denotes the
act of giving every one his due, and of showing kindness to every being
according as it deserves. In Scripture, however, the expression ẓedakah
is not used in the first sense, and does not apply to the payment of
what we owe to others. When we therefore give the hired labourer his
wages, or pay a debt, we do not perform an act of ẓedakah. But we do
perform an act of ẓedakah when we fulfil those duties towards our
fellow-men which our moral conscience imposes upon us; e.g., when we
heal the wound of the sufferer. Thus Scripture says, in reference to
the returning of the pledge [to the poor debtor]: “And it shall be
ẓedakah (righteousness) unto thee” (Deut. xxiv. 11). When we walk in
the way of virtue we act righteously towards our intellectual faculty,
and pay what is due unto it; and because every virtue is thus ẓedakah,
Scripture applies the term to the virtue of faith in God. Comp. “And he
believed in the Lord, and he accounted it to him as righteousness”
(Gen. xv. 6); “And it shall be our righteousness” (Deut. vi. 25).

The noun mishpat, “judgment,” denotes the act of deciding upon a
certain action in accordance with justice which may demand either mercy
or punishment.

We have thus shown that ḥesed denotes pure charity; ẓedakah kindness,
prompted by a certain moral conscience in man, and being a means of
attaining perfection for his soul, whilst mishpat may in some cases
find expression in revenge, in other cases in mercy.

In discussing the impropriety of admitting attributes of God (Part I.,
chap. liii., seq.), we stated that the divine attributes which occur in
Scripture are attributes of His actions; thus He is called ḥasid,
“kind,” because He created the Universe; ẓaddik, “righteous,” on
account of His mercy with the weak, in providing for every living being
according to its powers; and shofet, “judge,” on account of the
relative good and the great relative evils that are decreed by God’s
justice as directed by His wisdom. These three names occur in the
Pentateuch: “Shall not the Judge (shofet) of all the earth,” etc. (Gen.
xviii. 25); “Righteous (ẓaddik) and upright is he” (Deut. xxxii. 4);
“Abundant in loving-kindness” (ḥesed, Exod. xxxiv. 6).

We intended in explaining these three terms to prepare the reader for
the next chapter.






CHAPTER LIV


The term ḥokmah (“wisdom”) in Hebrew is used of four different things:
(1) It denotes the knowledge of those truths which lead to the
knowledge of God. Comp. “But where shall wisdom be found?” (Job xxviii.
12); “If thou seekest her like silver” (Prov. ii. 4). The word occurs
frequently in this sense. (2) The expression ḥokmah denotes also
knowledge of any workmanship. Comp. “And every wise-hearted among you
shall come and make all that the Lord hath commanded” (Exod. xxxv. 10);
“And all the women that were wise-hearted did spin” (ibid. ver. 25).
(3) It is also used of the acquisition of moral principles. Comp. “And
teach his senators wisdom” (Ps. cv. 22); “With the ancient is wisdom”
(Job xii. 12): for it is chiefly the disposition for acquiring moral
principles that is developed by old age alone. (4) It implies, lastly,
the notion of cunning and subtlety; comp. “Come on, let us deal wisely
with them” (Exod. i. 10). In the same sense the term is used in the
following passages: “And fetched thence a wise woman” (2 Sam. xiv. 2);
“They are wise to do evil” (Jer. iv. 22). It is possible that the
Hebrew ḥokmah (“wisdom”) expresses the idea of cunning and planning,
which may serve in one case as a means of acquiring intellectual
perfection, or good moral principles; but may in another case produce
skill in workmanship, or even be employed in establishing bad opinions
and principles. The attribute ḥakam (“wise”) is therefore given to a
person that possesses great intellectual faculties, or good moral
principles, or skill in art; but also to persons cunning in evil deeds
and principles.

According to this explanation, a person that has a true knowledge of
the whole Law is called wise in a double sense; he is wise because the
Law instructs him in the highest truths, and secondly, because it
teaches him good morals. But as the truths contained in the Law are
taught by way of tradition, not by a philosophical method, the
knowledge of the Law, and the acquisition of true wisdom, are treated
in the books of the Prophets and in the words of our Sages as two
different things; real wisdom demonstrates by proof those truths which
Scripture teaches us by way of tradition. It is to this kind of wisdom,
which proves the truth of the Law, that Scripture refers when it extols
wisdom, and speaks of the high value of this perfection, and of the
consequent paucity of men capable of acquiring it, in sayings like
these: “Not many are wise” (Job xxxii. 9); “But where shall wisdom be
found” (ibid. xxviii. 12)? In the writings of our Sages we notice
likewise many passages in which distinction is made between knowledge
of the Law and wisdom. They say of Moses, our Teacher, that he was
Father in the knowledge of the Law, in wisdom and in prophecy. When
Scripture says of Solomon, “And he was wiser than all men” (1 Kings v.
11), our Sages add, “but not greater than Moses”; and the phrase, “than
all men,” is explained to mean, “than all men of his generation”; for
this reason [only] “Heman, Chalcol, and Darda, the sons of Mahol,” the
renowned wise men of that time, are named. Our Sages further say, that
man has first to render account concerning his knowledge of the Law,
then concerning the acquisition of wisdom, and at last concerning the
lessons derived by logical conclusions from the Law, i.e., the lessons
concerning his actions. This is also the right order: we must first
learn the truths by tradition, after this we must be taught how to
prove them, and then investigate the actions that help to improve man’s
ways. The idea that man will have to render account concerning these
three things in the order described, is expressed by our Sages in the
following passage: “When man comes to the trial, he is first asked,
‘Hast thou fixed certain seasons for the study of the Law? Hast thou
been engaged in the acquisition of wisdom? Hast thou derived from one
thing another thing?’” This proves that our Sages distinguished between
the knowledge of the Law on the one hand, and wisdom on the other, as
the means of proving the lessons taught in the Law by correct
reasoning.

Hear now what I have to say after having given the above explanation.
The ancient and the modern philosophers have shown that man can acquire
four kinds of perfection. The first kind, the lowest, in the
acquisition of which people spend their days, is perfection as regards
property; the possession of money, garments, furniture, servants, land,
and the like; the possession of the title of a great king belongs to
this class. There is no close connexion between this possession and its
possessor; it is a perfectly imaginary relation when on account of the
great advantage a person derives from these possessions, he says, This
is my house, this is my servant, this is my money, and these are my
hosts and armies. For when he examines himself he will find that all
these things are external, and their qualities are entirely independent
of the possessor. When, therefore, that relation ceases, he that has
been a great king may one morning find that there is no difference
between him and the lowest person, and yet no change has taken place in
the things which were ascribed to him. The philosophers have shown that
he whose sole aim in all his exertions and endeavours is the possession
of this kind of perfection, only seeks perfectly imaginary and
transient things; and even if these remain his property all his
lifetime, they do not give him any perfection.

The second kind is more closely related to man’s body than the first.
It includes the perfection of the shape, constitution, and form of
man’s body; the utmost evenness of temperaments, and the proper order
and strength of his limbs. This kind of perfection must likewise be
excluded from forming our chief aim; because it is a perfection of the
body, and man does not possess it as man, but as a living being; he has
this property besides in common with the lowest animal; and even if a
person possesses the greatest possible strength, he could not be as
strong as a mule, much less can he be as strong as a lion or an
elephant; he, therefore, can at the utmost have strength that might
enable him to carry a heavy burden, or break a thick substance, or do
similar things, in which there is no great profit for the body. The
soul derives no profit whatever from this kind of perfection.

The third kind of perfection is more closely connected with man himself
than the second perfection. It includes moral perfection, the highest
degree of excellency in man’s character. Most of the precepts aim at
producing this perfection; but even this kind is only a preparation for
another perfection, and is not sought for its own sake. For all moral
principles concern the relation of man to his neighbour; the perfection
of man’s moral principles is, as it were, given to man for the benefit
of mankind. Imagine a person being alone, and having no connexion
whatever with any other person, all his good moral principles are at
rest, they are not required, and give man no perfection whatever. These
principles are only necessary and useful when man comes in contact with
others.

The fourth kind of perfection is the true perfection of man; the
possession of the highest intellectual faculties; the possession of
such notions which lead to true metaphysical opinions as regards God.
With this perfection man has obtained his final object; it gives him
true human perfection; it remains to him alone; it gives him
immortality, and on its account he is called man. Examine the first
three lands of perfection, you will find that, if you possess them,
they are not your property, but the property of others; according to
the ordinary view, however, they belong to you and to others. But the
last kind of perfection is exclusively yours; no one else owns any part
of it, “They shall be only thine own, and not strangers’ with thee”
(Prov. v. 17). Your aim must therefore be to attain this [fourth]
perfection that is exclusively yours, and you ought not to continue to
work and weary yourself for that which belongs to others, whilst
neglecting your soul till it has lost entirely its original purity
through the dominion of the bodily powers over it. The same idea is
expressed in the beginning of those poems, which allegorically
represent the state of our soul. “My mother’s children were angry with
me; they made me the keeper of the vineyards; but mine own vineyard
have I not kept” (Song i. 6). Also the following passage refers to the
same subject, “Lest thou give thine honour unto others, and thy years
unto the cruel” (Prov. v. 9).

The prophets have likewise explained unto us these things, and have
expressed the same opinion on them as the philosophers. They say
distinctly that perfection in property, in health, or in character, is
not a perfection worthy to be sought as a cause of pride and glory for
us; that the knowledge of God, i.e., true wisdom, is the only
perfection which we should seek, and in which we should glorify
ourselves. Jeremiah, referring to these four kinds of perfection, says:
“Thus saith the Lord, Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, neither
let the mighty man glory in his might, let not the rich man glory in
his riches; but let him that glorieth glory in this, that he
understandeth and knoweth me” (Jer. ix. 22, 23). See how the prophet
arranged them according to their estimation in the eyes of the
multitude. The rich man occupies the first rank; next is the mighty
man; and then the wise man; that is, the man of good moral principles:
for in the eyes of the multitude, who are addressed in these words, he
is likewise a great man. This is the reason why the three classes are
enumerated in this order.

Our Sages have likewise derived from this passage the above-mentioned
lessons, and stated the same theory that has been explained in this
chapter, viz., that the simple term ḥokmah, as a rule, denotes the
highest aim of man, the knowledge of God; that those properties which
man acquires, makes his peculiar treasure, and considers as his
perfection, in reality do not include any perfection; and that the
religious acts prescribed in the Law, viz., the various kinds of
worship and the moral principles which benefit all people in their
social intercourse with each other, do not constitute the ultimate aim
of man, nor can they be compared to it, for they are but preparations
leading to it. Hear the opinion of our Sages on this subject in their
own words. The passage occurs in Bereshit Rabba, and runs thus, “In one
place Scripture says, ‘And all things that are desirable (ḥafaẓim) are
not to be compared to her’ (Prov. viii. 11); and in another place, ‘And
all things that thou desirest (ḥafaẓeḥa) are not to be compared unto
her’” (ibid. iii. 15). By “things that are desirable” the performance
of Divine precepts and good deeds is to be understood, whilst “things
that thou desirest” refer to precious stones and pearls. Both—things
that are desirable, and things that thou desirest—cannot be compared to
wisdom, but “in this let him that glorieth glory, that he understandeth
and knoweth me.” Consider how concise this saying is, and how perfect
its author; how nothing is here omitted of all that we have put forth
after lengthy explanations and preliminary remarks.

Having stated the sublime ideas contained in that Scriptural passage,
and quoted the explanation of our Sages, we will now complete what the
remainder of that passage teaches us. The prophet does not content
himself with explaining that the knowledge of God is the highest kind
of perfection; for if this only had been his intention, he would have
said, “But in this let him who glorieth glory, that he understandeth
and knoweth me,” and would have stopped there; or he would have said,
“that he understandeth and knoweth me that I am One,” or, “that I have
not any likeness,” or, “that there is none like me,” or a similar
phrase. He says, however, that man can only glory in the knowledge of
God and in the knowledge of His ways and attributes, which are His
actions, as we have shown (Part I. liv.) in expounding the passage,
“Show me now thy ways” (Exod. xxxviii. 13). We are thus told in this
passage that the Divine acts which ought to be known, and ought to
serve as a guide for our actions, are, ḥesed, “loving-kindness,”
mishpat, “judgment,” and ẓedakah, “righteousness.” Another very
important lesson is taught by the additional phrase, “in the earth.” It
implies a fundamental principle of the Law; it rejects the theory of
those who boldly assert that God’s providence does not extend below the
sphere of the moon, and that the earth with its contents is abandoned,
that “the Lord hath forsaken the earth” (Ez. viii. 12). It teaches, as
has been taught by the greatest of all wise men in the words, “The
earth is the Lord’s” (Exod. ix. 29), that His providence extends to the
earth in accordance with its nature, in the same manner as it controls
the heavens in accordance with their nature. This is expressed in the
words, “That I am the Lord which exercise loving-kindness, judgment,
and righteousness in the earth.” The prophet thus, in conclusion, says,
“For in these things I delight, saith the Lord,” i.e., My object [in
saying this] is that you shall practise loving-kindness, judgment, and
righteousness in the earth. In a similar manner we have shown (Part I.
liv.) that the object of the enumeration of God’s thirteen attributes
is the lesson that we should acquire similar attributes and act
accordingly. The object of the above passage is therefore to declare,
that the perfection, in which man can truly glory, is attained by him
when he has acquired—as far as this is possible for man—the knowledge
of God, the knowledge of His Providence, and of the manner in which it
influences His creatures in their production and continued existence.
Having acquired this knowledge he will then be determined always to
seek loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness, and thus to imitate
the ways of God. We have explained this many times in this treatise.

This is all that I thought proper to discuss in this treatise, and
which I considered useful for men like you. I hope that, by the help of
God, you will, after due reflection, comprehend all the things which I
have treated here. May He grant us and all Israel with us to attain
what He promised us, “Then the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and
the ears of the deaf shall be unstopped” (Isa. xxxv. 5); “The people
that walked in darkness have seen a great light; they that dwell in the
shadow of death upon them hath the light shined” (ibid. ix. 1).

God is near to all who call Him, if they call Him in truth, and turn to
Him. He is found by every one who seeks Him, if he always goes toward
Him, and never goes astray. Amen.








NOTES


[1] See infra, page 4, note 1.

[2] See infra, page 5, note 4.

[3] Saadiah proves the existence of the Creator in the following
way:—1. The Universe is limited, and therefore cannot possess an
unlimited force. 2. All things are compounds; the composition must be
owing to some external cause. 3. Changes observed in all beings are
effected by some external cause. 4. If time were infinite, it would be
impossible to conceive the progress of time from the present moment to
the future, or from the past to the present moment. (Emunot vedeʻot,
ch. i.).—Baḥya founds his arguments on three propositions:—1. A thing
cannot be its own maker. 2. The series of successive causes is finite.
3. Compounds owe their existence to an external force. His arguments
are:—1. The Universe, even the elements, are compounds consisting of
substance and form. 2. In the Universe plan and unity is discernible.
(Ḥobot ha-lebabot, ch. i.)