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THE

THEISTIC CONCEPTION OF

THE WORLD.


_AN ESSAY

IN OPPOSITION TO CERTAIN TENDENCIES

OF MODERN THOUGHT._


BY B. F. COCKER, D.D., LL.D.,

PROFESSOR OF MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN;

AUTHOR OF "CHRISTIANITY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY."


"Science discloses the method of the world, but not its cause; Religion,

its cause, but not its method."--MARTINEAU.


NEW YORK:

HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,

FRANKLIN SQUARE.


Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1875, by

HARPER & BROTHERS,

In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.




PREFACE.


The present volume was announced in the preface to "Christianity and
Greek Philosophy" as nearly ready for publication under the title of
"Christianity and Modern Thought."

Several considerations have induced the author to delay its appearance,
the most influential of which has been the desire to await the
culmination among a class of self-styled "advanced thinkers" of what
they have been pleased to call "the tendency of modern thought." No
extraordinary sagacity was needed to foresee the issue, or to predict
that it must soon be reached. The transition has been rapid from
negative criticism of the Christian religion to direct assault upon the
very foundation of all religion--the personality and providence of God.
Distrust of a supernatural revelation, and denial of all authority to
the teaching of the sacred Scriptures, has been succeeded by doubt of
the existence of God in the proper import of that sacred name. The
Theistic postulate is degraded to the rank of a mere hypothesis, which
is pronounced inadequate to explain the universe. A "law-governed
Cosmos, full of life and reason," eternal and infinite, must now take
the place of a personal God, the Creator and Ruler of the universe. This
is the "New Faith" which is to supersede the Old.

The question, "Are we still Christians?" has received a final answer in
the words of Strauss: "If we would speak as honest, upright men, we must
acknowledge we are no longer Christians."[1] And in giving this answer
he is confident he speaks in the name of a large and rapidly increasing
number of men who once believed in the truth of Christianity--"The We I
mean no longer counts only by thousands."[2] The further question, "Have
we still a Religion?" (understanding by religion "the recognition and
veneration of God, and the belief in a future life") is also answered in
the negative. Religion "is a delusion, to abolish which ought to be the
endeavor of every man whose eyes are open to the truth."[3] The only
question which now remains for the speculative intellect is, "What is
our conception of the Universe?"--the conception which henceforth must
take the place of a personal God. The answer of Strauss is explicit, and
in his estimation final: "The conception of the Cosmos, instead of that
of a personal God as the finality to which we are led by perception and
thought, or as the ultimate fact beyond which we can not proceed, ...
assumes the more definite shape of matter infinitely agitated, which, by
differentiation and integration, develops itself to ever higher forms
and functions, and describes an everlasting circle by evolution,
dissolution, and then fresh evolution."[4]

This may be called pantheism or atheism, materialism or idealism, just
as we please; Strauss has no solicitude about mere names. "If this be
considered pure, unmitigated materialism, I will not dispute it. In
fact, I have always tacitly regarded the contrast so loudly proclaimed
between materialism and idealism (or by whatever term one may designate
the view opposed to the former) as a mere quarrel about words. They have
a common foe in the dualism which pervaded the conception of the world
throughout the Christian era, dividing man into body and soul, his
existence into time and eternity, and opposing an eternal Creator to a
created and perishable universe."[5]

The end is reached at last--no soul, no God, no providence, no
immortality! We have waited for a culmination, and now we are called
upon to look, "not into the golden Orient, but vaguely all around into a
dim, copper firmament pregnant with earthquake and tornado." Or, rather,
we are called to look into an abyss, and, "shouting question after
question into the Sibyl-cave of Destiny, receive no answer" save "the
Everlasting No." It only remains for us to listen to Strauss's _De
Profundis_ and retire. "The loss of the belief in providence belongs,
indeed, to the most sensible deprivations which are connected with a
renunciation of Christianity. In the enormous machine of the universe,
amid the incessant whirl and hiss of its jagged iron wheels, amid the
deafening crash of its ponderous stamps and hammers, in the midst of
this whole terrific commotion, man--a helpless and defenseless
creature--finds himself placed, not secure for a moment that on some
imprudent motion a wheel may not seize and rend him, or a hammer crush
him to powder. This sense of abandonment is at first something awful.
But, then, what avails it to have recourse to an illusion? Our wish is
impotent to refashion the world; the understanding clearly shows that it
indeed is such a machine. But it is not merely this. We do not only find
the revolution of pitiless wheels in our world-machine, but also the
shedding of soothing oil. Our God [the world-machine] does not, indeed,
take us into his arms from the outside, but he unseals the well-spring
of consolation within our own bosoms.... He who can not help himself in
this matter is beyond help, is not yet ripe for our stand-point."[6]

There is a weighty and solemn lesson in this illustration of the
"tendency of modern thought"--a lesson which even Strauss intended to
teach the age, viz., that there is no discernible _via media_ between
"the Old Faith and the New"--between the belief in a personal God and
the impersonal All. The "New Faith" must at last be the faith of all who
reject _providence_, that providence which is pre-eminently revealed in
history, instituting a kingdom of God upon earth by a supernatural
guidance and grace.

The issue, now so sharply and clearly defined, between _a God and no
God_, has determined a change in the plan of our work, and justifies, we
trust, the attempt we have made to restate and defend "The Theistic
Conception of the World."

Those who have done me the honor to read "Christianity and Greek
Philosophy" will detect in the present volume a radical change of views
concerning the concepts Time and Space. This change of position is the
result of patient reconsideration of this branch of the discussion, and
we allude to it here simply to guard against the charge of unconscious
inconsistency. The views presented in this volume must stand or fall on
their own merits.

The author has to acknowledge many obligations to his friend, Dr.
Bernard Moses, for material aid rendered in getting this work through
the press.


UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, _July, 1875_.




CONTENTS.

                                                         Page

 CHAPTER I.

 THE PROBLEM STATED                                        13

 CHAPTER II.

 GOD THE CREATOR                                           27

 CHAPTER III.

 THE CREATION                                              56

 CHAPTER IV.

 CREATION.--THE GENESIS OR BEGINNING                       97

 CHAPTER V.

 CREATION: ITS HISTORY                                    127

 CHAPTER VI.

 CONSERVATION.--THE RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD          172

 CHAPTER VII.

 CONSERVATION.--THE RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD          202

 CHAPTER VIII.

 PROVIDENCE OF GOD IN HUMAN HISTORY.--THE RELATION OF
 GOD TO HUMANITY                                          244

 CHAPTER IX.

 SPECIAL PROVIDENCE AND PRAYER                            292

 CHAPTER X.

 MORAL GOVERNMENT.--ITS GROUNDS, THE CORRELATION BETWEEN
 GOD AND MAN                                              344

 CHAPTER XI.

 MORAL GOVERNMENT.--ITS NATURE, CONDITION, METHOD, AND
 END                                                      366


"To such readers as have reflected on man's life; who understand that
for man's well-being Faith is properly the one thing needful; how with
it martyrs, otherwise weak, can cheerfully endure the shame and the
cross; and without it worldlings puke up their sick existence by suicide
in the midst of luxury: to such it will be clear that for a pure moral
nature, the loss of religious belief is the loss of every thing.

"All wounds, the crush of long-continued destitution, the stab of false
friendship and of false love, all wounds in thy so genial heart, would
have healed again had not its life-warmth been withdrawn.

"Well mayest thou exclaim, 'Is there no God, then; but at best an
absentee God, sitting idle, ever since the first Sabbath, at the outside
of his universe and seeing it go?' 'Has the word Duty no meaning; is
what we call Duty no Divine messenger and guide, but a false earthly
phantasm made up of desire and fear?' 'Is the heroic inspiration we name
Virtue but some passion; some bubble of the blood, bubbling in the
direction others profit by?' I know not; only this I know, If what thou
namest Happiness be our true aim, then are we all astray. 'Behold, thou
art fatherless, outcast, and the universe is--the Devil's.'"--CARLYLE.


THE THEISTIC

CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD.




CHAPTER I.

THE PROBLEM STATED.


As Archimedes demanded only one fixed point in order to move the world,
so Descartes desired to find one certain and indubitable principle upon
which he could plant his feet and lift himself out of the universal
doubt which environed him. He found it in the proposition--I exist. This
for me is the most direct, immediate, and certain of all intuitions. I
can not doubt, I can not deny my own existence. Whatever else I doubt, I
can not doubt that I, the doubter, exist. This I that thinks, that is
conscious, is the fundamental _reality_.[7]

I see around me a plurality of personal existences who are
self-conscious and self-manifesting beings--beings who think and feel,
and display their activities in time and space, as I do; and I can no
more doubt their existence than I can doubt my own. This combination of
the content of external perception with that of internal perception
gives the immediate consciousness of external _reality_.[8]

Besides these personal existences analogous to my own, there are other
objects which exist in relation to my corporeal organism--relations of
position, distance, and direction, which are purely objective. These
existences offer resistance to my muscular effort to displace them in
space, and defy all my mental effort to reduce them to the category of
subjective phenomena. These objects have specific properties or exist in
certain conditions which, in their mutual relation with my sensitive
organism, produce in me certain vital affections, as heat, light, color,
and sound. These affections presuppose a force or energy outside of my
consciousness, and distinct from myself. Thus I am constrained to
believe that the earth on which I tread, the heavens that shine upon me,
the forms and movements which surround me, are not vain shadows, unreal
phantoms of my own creation, but real entities. The totality of
existence called the universe is for me a _reality_.

The phenomena of the universe are in ceaseless flow and change. Bodies
are aggregated and dissolved. Plants are evolved from germs, they live
and grow, then decay and perish. Animals and men are born and developed
to maturity, then they sicken and die. The earth itself is in constant
change. The storms of heaven, the erosion of the atmosphere, the gnawing
of the tidal wave, the mountain torrent, the flowing river, the
earthquake and the volcano, are perpetually changing the aspect of the
globe. There is perpetual _genesis_, ceaseless _becoming_, incessant
_change_.

Beneath all these changes there is an enduring "something." There are
abiding constants as well as fleeting changes; enduring realities as
well as unstable phenomena. The same forms and relations, the same
forces and laws, the same analogous functions, and the same archetypal
ideas, remain amid all individual changes. There is an enduring
_substance_ which is the subject of all these changes. There is a
permanent force, or _power_, which is the cause of all change. There are
constant numerical proportions, determinate geometrical forms, specific
ideal archetypes, and special ends, which give the law of all change.
The universe is not a mere aggregation of phenomena, a mere concourse of
things in time and space with accidental resemblances: it is a _unity_,
a cosmos, a harmonious whole, both in its contemporaneous and successive
history.

So much is and always has been known, with more or less clearness and
distinctness by all men, and known by a spontaneous and immediate
intuition. This intuition, like every intuition, even the commonest
intuition of sense, has had a gradual development both in the
consciousness of the individual, and in the consciousness of the race.
It has always been immanent in human thought even when not articulately
expressed in human language. To the native common-sense of our race, the
world is a reality, not a dream; to the universal reason of mankind the
universe is a harmony, not a chaos. Men have instinctively apprehended
some ideal relations, some causal connection, some adaptation and
purpose in nature, and they have always had some intuition, however dim
and shadowy, of an _all-pervading unity_, and an _ultimate causative
principle_.

But when the universe has become the object of _reflective_ thought,
when man has attempted a colligation of the individual facts, and an
ideal construction and rational interpretation of the phenomena, when he
has sought to grasp the manifoldness and diversity of nature in a higher
unity of thought, and, above all, when he has attempted to pass beyond
phenomena and their relations, and form a conception of _the absolute
reality and ultimate cause_--then it is that difficulties have arisen
and questions have presented themselves which have perplexed the
discursive reason, and taxed the genius of the ablest thinkers of every
age.


1. First of all, there have arisen the fundamental questions: Has the
universe always existed, or had the Cosmos, with its changes and
constants, its forces and laws, its forms and relations, a _Beginning_?
Is its present condition but one link in an endless chain, one phasis in
a series of changes, which had no beginning and shall have no end? Is
the universe limited both in space and duration, or is it unlimited,
unbeginning, and endless?


2. If the universe had a beginning, what is the ἀρχῆ--the originant,
causative Principle in which or from which it had its beginning? How are
we to conceive aright that First Principle of all existence and of all
knowledge? is it material or spiritual, intelligent or unintelligent?


3. What conception are we to form of the nature and mode of that
beginning? Was it a pure supernatural Origination--an absolute creation?
or was it simply a Formation out of a first matter or first force--an
artistic, architectonic, demiurgic creation? Was that beginning
determined by necessity or by choice? Was it an unconscious emanation
from, or a necessary development of, the First Principle; or was it a
conscious forth-putting of power for the realization of a foreseen,
premeditated, predetermined plan--a _mental_ Order.


4. A supernatural Origination being assumed, then, from that first
initial act of absolute creation, has the process of formation been
gradual, continuous, and uniform--a progressive _Evolution_ from the
homogeneous to the heterogeneous, from lower to higher forms, according
to a changeless law of uniformity and continuity? or have there been
marked, distinct, and successive stages of formation--creative epochs
which may be called "new beginnings?" Is the historic unity of creation
a unity of Thought, an ideal consecution? or is it simply a physical
unity grounded in a material nexus--a genetic connection resulting from
the necessary action of physical causes?


5. What is the relation of the Creator to the existing creation? Is the
Deity, in any sense, immanent in, or does he dwell altogether apart
from, and out of all connection with, the universe? Has any finite thing
or being an independent existence? Have the forces of nature any reality
apart from the Divine efficiency? Did the Creator, in the beginning,
give self-being to the substance of the universe, and endow it with
properties and forces, so that it can exist and act apart from, and
independently of, the First Cause? or is God still in nature upholding
all substance, the power of all force, the life of all life, shaping all
forms, and organizing all systems? Is God not only the Creator but the
_Conservator_ of all things?


6. Is there any Ethical meaning, any moral significance in the universe?
Is the physical order of the universe subordinated to a moral order in
which freedom exists? Are there any indications that the existence of
moral personality is the end toward which all the successive changes of
nature have tended, and the progressive types of life have been a
preparation and a prophecy? Was the earth designed to be a theatre for
the development of moral character, the education and discipline of
moral beings? Does the course of history reveal "a power that works for
righteousness," and aims at the highest perfection of rational and free
beings? In a word, is there a _Providential_ Government of the world?


7. Does man stand in a more immediate relation to God than the things of
nature? Is each individual the charge of a providence, the subject of a
moral government, and the heir to a future retribution? Has man a
spiritual and immortal nature? Has he the power so to determine his own
action and character that he can justly be held accountable, and treated
as the proper subject of reward and punishment? In the final issue of
things, will every human being meet his righteous deserts, and be
rewarded or punished according to his works? In short, is man under
_Moral Government_?


These are the great, the vital questions of to-day. In one form or
another they have engaged the attention and stimulated the earnest
thought of the ablest and best of minds in past ages; and, whether from
the inherent demand of reason, or the promptings of instinctive
curiosity, they have a deeper hold on the mind of this, than of any
preceding age.


We approach the discussion of these questions with a profound conviction
of their magnitude and difficulty, and an oppressive foreboding that our
essay will be pronounced ambitious and vain. Their vastness seems to
defy our admeasurement, and their complexity and difficulty may defeat
our feeble efforts at solution. "The mer-de-glace of the Infinite is
covered with myriads of philosophic insects which have been carried up
there and lost." May we hope for any better fate? Do the problems permit
any solution at all?

Of one thing, at any rate, we are sure: these questions are native to
the human mind. They arise spontaneously in presence of the facts of the
universe. However much of human effort to solve these problems has ended
in failure and defeat, the human mind has never lost confidence in the
possibility of their ultimate solution, and humanity has never abandoned
them in despair.[9] A few impatient souls have plunged into Pyrrhonism
and taken refuge in universal skepticism; while others have sought to
organize nescience into a science. But patient, earnest souls have never
cast away their faith in the integrity of universal reason, and have
never ceased to believe that its ideas and laws are, in truth, the ideas
and laws of the universe. These problems are the great problems of all
philosophy, and all religion; and unless philosophy be a dream, and
religion an illusion, they are capable of such a solution as shall
satisfy the reason of man.[10] This conviction, which is common to the
mass of thoughtful men, will justify every attempt of philosophy to
attain to an ultimate unity of thought. The ultimate harmony of
physical, philosophical, and religious truth is the faith of all noble
minds.

The signs of the times are propitious. To-day the conflict between
reason and faith, science and religion, presents many hopeful
indications of an approaching conciliation. Candid men in both fields
are earnestly working, and patiently watching, and hourly catching
clearer glimpses of the everlasting harmony which pervades the universe
of being and of thought. Every, even the smallest, contribution made
with an honest purpose to give confidence and collimation to this
movement, will be welcome to all earnest minds. This may be our apology
for attempting a task that belongs to stronger intellects than ours.

It is obvious, at first thought, that the questions before us admit of
no loose and desultory treatment. Abysses are not to be concealed by
laurel screens, or chasms bridged by flowers of rhetoric. If we are to
reach any satisfactory conclusions, our procedure must be rigidly
systematic and logically exact. We must have a fixed point of departure,
and, if possible, a faultless method of advance. The fundamental
question must be determined. The central problem must be ascertained,
and we must deal with all correlative questions in their logical
connection with the one fundamental inquiry.

First of all, then, can we place that central problem clearly before
our mental vision? Amid the diverse questions which spontaneously arise
in presence of the diversified phenomena of nature, and the wonderful
evolutions of humanity, can we fix upon the _one_ question in which all
others are involved--the grand underlying problem which comprehends them
all?

A little reflection will make it apparent that the problem of all
problems is this--

_How shall we conceive aright the_ FIRST PRINCIPLE _and_ ORIGIN _of all
things, itself unoriginated and unbeginning, the source of all
beginnings? Or again, what is that_ FIRST PRINCIPLE _which, being
assumed, shall be found a sufficient explanation of the motion and
change, the order and adaptation, the life and feeling, the
consciousness and reason, we call, collectively, the universe_?

This is clearly the fundamental question on which all the others are
grounded, and in the solution of which they have their solution.

The universe presents itself to sense and sense-perception as a
perpetual genesis, "a vast aggregation and history of phenomena
conditioned in time and space which, by its diversity and mutability, is
disqualified from being regarded as independent and self-existent." To
our experiential knowledge, to our physical science in its highest
generalizations, the universe is a product, an _effect_. And it is an
effect for which the reason demands an explanation and a cause. It is a
manifoldness and diversity which the logical understanding is
ceaselessly endeavoring to reduce to a unity. Indeed, every movement of
thought, from the first rude attempt at classification on the simple
basis of resemblance, upward to the recognition of more profound ideal
relations and uniform laws, until its culmination in the highest
integration of reason, is but the effort of the mind to grasp the
individual facts of nature in a unity of thought, and interpret the
universe according to principles and ideas which the reason supplies.

The moment reflective thought is directed to the phenomenal world, the
questions spontaneously arise--Out of what does the phenomenal come? By
what agency or efficiency does it arise? Why does it present itself in
this order rather than another? Or, more specifically--What is the
abiding _reality_ which sustains the array of phenomena? What is the
invisible _power_ which effects all the changes we see around us? What
is that unseen _presence_ which determines the forms, relations, and
adaptations which every where present themselves to the reason of man?
In a word, _What is that ultimate principle--the last or remotest in the
order of analytic thought, the first in the order of being and of
reason--which sustains and moves and organizes and governs all_--that
fundamental, abiding PRIMUS which is everlastingly present behind the
scenery and changes of the world--_that which always was, and now is,
and ever shall be_ FIRST? Or if we permit ourselves to regard the
present order of things as a necessary out-birth from the past, still we
are compelled by a laborious effort of regressive thought to climb
upward through a series of changes to an absolutely FIRST of the series
conditioning all the other members, but itself unconditioned. Few will
now claim that this is the natural and adequate cosmical conception;
but, even under this mode of conception, we can not but feel that a
development without a beginning of the process, a series without a first
term, is impossible. "The absolute infinity of a series is a
contradiction _in adjecto_. As every number, although immeasurably and
inconceivably great, is impossible unless unity is given as its basis,
so every series, being itself a number, is impossible unless a first
term is given as its commencement." Therefore the question still
returns--What is that First Principle of all things?

In obedience to this demand of reason, or impelled by an innate
"wonder"--"the feeling of the philosopher"--men have in all ages
attempted an ideal construction and rational interpretation of the
universe.[11] The Mythologies, Cosmogonies, Philosophies, Religions of
the ancient world were the simple products of this innate tendency.
Beyond the circle of thought illuminated by Divine revelation, the first
movement of reflection was unmethodical and incomplete. Pursuing the
inquiries objectively, that is, in the realm of outward nature, and not
subjectively in the realm of reason, the human mind was perpetually
entangled with dualistic conceptions. There were contrarieties,
polarities, antagonisms, which the logical understanding could not
cancel. Hence we have, as an early, perhaps the earliest, form of
construction, an Oriental Dualism--as in the Adonis and Moloch of the
Phœnicians, the Isis and Osiris of the Egyptians, the Ormuzd and
Ahriman of the Persians, the Chaos and Love of Orpheus, the Plenum and
Vacuum (Matter and Space) of Democritus, and even some lingering taint
in the God and Necessity of Plato's "Timæus."

But all this was unsatisfactory to human reason, which is a _unity_, and
which makes its imperious demand that _absolute unity_ shall stand at
the fountain-head of being. It has never been able to rest in an
Ultimate which was not an Absolute--that is, a _unity_ which by its very
idea and conception is the negation of all plurality and mutability; a
_unity_ which is unconditioned, and yet which conditions all; an
"eternal constancy," the voluntary cause of all genesis and all
change.[12] It is a law of reason, under which alone it can maintain its
integrity, that the _First Cause must be_ ONE, _and not many_. An
absolute cause must be one in order to be absolute; two absolutes is a
contradiction. With more or less clearness, men in all ages have
apprehended that "the _First Principle must be one or nothing_."

This is tacitly conceded in all modern systems of thought. Büchner, the
materialist; Spencer, the dynamist; Hegel, the idealist; Cousin and
Coleridge, the spiritualists, know no divergence here. Atheism,
Pantheism, and Theism alike commence with unity at the fountain-head of
being--a unity which is incomposite, absolutely continuous, every where
present and eternal. Every system of philosophy is essentially an effort
to show how the universe that now is has been originated by, or evolved
out of, or has emanated from, a First Principle, an absolute Unity. To
determine whether this absolute First Principle can be known, and, if
known, how conceived and expressed aright, is the ultimate problem of
all philosophy and all religion.

All the answers which have been given, and, indeed, all which can be
conceived, are contained in the following four propositions:

1. _In the beginning was_ MATTER--matter as the original substance or
substratum, with its inherent, essential, and necessary attribute of
force; this alone is eternal and infinite. "No force without matter--no
matter without force." "Matter and its immanent force is immortal and
indestructible." "The world is unlimited and infinite."[13] Matter, with
its primary forces of attraction and repulsion, cohesion and affinity,
is fully adequate to the explanation of all the phenomena of the
universe, physical, vital, and mental.

2. _In the beginning was_ FORCE--force homogeneous but unstable, and
necessarily tending to differentiation and heterogeneity; splitting into
opposites, standing off into polarities, ramifying into attractions and
repulsions, light, heat, magnetism, and electricity; and mounting up
through the stages of physical, vital, and neural to the mental life
itself, with all its varied and endless phenomena, as revealed in the
languages, laws, institutions, arts, sciences, and religions of the
world. Force is "the ultimate of all ultimates," the "Absolute Reality,"
the "Unconditioned Cause."[14]

3. _In the beginning was_ THOUGHT--thought as an eternal process of
self-manifestation and self-actualization, which in its necessary
evolution reveals itself as force, and expresses itself in the varied
types of existence and laws of phenomena, natural and spiritual. "_The
Absolute Idea_," as a perpetual process, an eternal thinking, is the
supreme principle of all reality. "The idea of the Absolute Spirit
comprehends the entire wealth of the natural and the spiritual world; it
is the only substance and truth of this wealth, and nothing is true and
real except so far as it forms an element of its being."[15]

4. _In the beginning was_ WILL--an unconditioned Will as the indivisible
unity and perpetual differentiation of _Reason_ and _Power_ and _Love_.
This Unconditioned Will is the causative principle of all Reality, all
Efficiency, and all Perfection--a causative principle containing,
predetermining, and producing all the manifold forms and relations,
forces and laws of the universe in reference to a final purpose. This
_Absolute First Cause_ is a living personal Being, "from whom, in whom,
and to whom are all things."[16]

The first and second of these propositions coalesce with the creed of
_Atheism_, the third with the creed of _Pantheism_, the fourth is the
creed of _Theism_, and, as we hope to prove in subsequent chapters, the
only rational and adequate explanation of the facts of the universe.




CHAPTER II.

GOD THE CREATOR.

"In the beginning GOD created the heaven and the earth."--Gen. i. 1.

"GOD that made the world and all things therein.... He is Lord of heaven
and earth."--Acts xvii. 24.

"The Eternal Will is the creator of the world as He is the creator of
the finite person."--FICHTE.


_God is the first principle, the unconditioned cause of all existence._
This is the answer of Christian doctrine to the great problem presented
for solution in the preceding chapter. Whether this fundamental
presupposition shall be finally accepted as the only adequate solution
of the problem of existence will depend in a large degree upon our
apprehension of the Christian idea of God. We shall, therefore, open the
discussion by asking the question--What is the content of our conception
of God?

Dogmatic theology might rest satisfied with the simple affirmation,
"_God is_ GOD,"[17] as against all the captious demands of science, were
it not necessary to render an account to itself of what, at first sight,
might be pronounced a "sublime tautology." For, while it is hereby
confessed that God in his essential being is incomprehensible and
ineffable, so that to the Christian as well as to the philosopher he is
"the great Unknown," still it is not hereby admitted that it is
absolutely impossible to know God. To affirm that God is absolutely "the
Unknowable" is simply to assert his unreality. Mr. Martineau has finely
observed that this term is self-contradictory; for we affirm by the use
of it that we know so much that He can not be known. Nay, it assumes the
existence of God, and in the same breath separates us from Him forever.
But if it be admitted that God _is_, it can not be absolutely impossible
to know _what_ He is. The knowledge of existence and the form of
existence mutually condition each other. There must be something in the
understanding answering to the term in the language of mankind, and
there must be something in the realm of being which is the ground of the
idea in the reason of Man. The heathen have a presentiment, a dim
intuition of the "unknown God," and the inspired teacher may so "declare
Him" in human language that his hearers may receive a definite notion,
and attain to a practical knowledge of God.

The _idea_ of God is a common phenomenon of the universal intelligence
of our race, and must have been present to the thought of man even
before he uttered the _name_ of God.[18] The moment man becomes
conscious of himself, and knows himself as distinct from the world, that
same moment he becomes conscious of a _Higher Self_--a living Power upon
which both himself and the world depend. For this Higher Self all
nations have found a name. All languages have a term cognate with the
Saxon "God," which expresses that spontaneous consciousness of a
supernatural power which is common to all minds--that intuition of a
supramundane existence which is the ground and reason of all other
existence. Even Polytheism has a name for the abstract of all the gods,
which sets forth the ideas of being, power, causality, and personality.
And in Christian lands the term God, without any periphrasis, at once
represents the idea of a Being distinct from self and the world, who is
the Maker of the world and the Father of humanity. For all practical
ends it is enough to say God is _God_. It is only when reflective
thought seeks to express some more specific and determinate conception
of the Supreme Being that we find ourselves under the necessity of
adding other expletives to this term God.

It is therefore desirable that we should set down, in a provisional
form, the general conception of God as it exists in the mind of the
Theist and the Christian. I can not do this better than by selecting
from the writings of three men of diverse schools of thought--one a
Physicist, another a Metaphysician, the third a Theologian; and all in a
greater or less degree influenced by the teaching of the Christian
Scriptures.

My first selection will be from the "Meditations" of Descartes, who is
regarded as "the father of modern philosophy." "By the name of God,"
says he, "I mean an infinite, eternal, immutable, independent,
omniscient, omnipresent substance, by which I and all other things which
are have been created and produced."[19]

My second selection is from the "Principia" of Sir Isaac Newton, a work
which, by the general consent of the scientific world, is the greatest
contribution ever made to science. Sir Isaac Newton was a Physicist
rather than a Metaphysician; he will therefore represent to us the
conception of God entertained by the scientific Theist. At the close of
this his great work he writes: "The true God is a living, intelligent,
powerful Being, and, from His other perfections, it follows that He is
Supreme, or most perfect. He is eternal and infinite, omnipotent and
omniscient; that is, His duration reaches from eternity to eternity, His
presence from infinity to infinity. He governs all things, and knows all
things that are or can be done. He is not eternity and infinity, but
eternal and infinite. He is not duration or space, but He endures and is
present. He endures forever, and He is every where present; and by
existing always and every where, He constitutes [or causes] duration and
space. Since every particle of space is _always_, and every indivisible
moment of duration is _every where_, certainly the Maker and Lord of all
things can not be _never_ and _nowhere_.... God is the same God, always
and every where. He is omnipresent, not _virtually_ [potentially] only,
but also substantially; for virtue can not subsist without substance. In
Him all things are contained and moved, yet neither affects the other.
God suffers nothing from the motion of bodies; bodies find no resistance
from the omnipresence of God. It is allowed by all that the Supreme God
exists necessarily; and by the same necessity exists _always_ and _every
where_.... We know Him only by His most wise and excellent contrivances
of things and final causes; we admire Him for His perfections; but we
reverence and adore Him on account of His dominion. A God without
dominion, providence, and final causes is nothing else but Fate and
Nature. Blind mechanical necessity, which is certainly the same always
and every where, could produce no variety of things. All that diversity
of natural things which we find suited to different times and places
could arise from nothing but the _ideas_ and _will_ of a Being
necessarily existing."

My last selection is from the "Grammar of Assent," by John Henry Newman,
formerly a Protestant, now a Catholic divine. Prior to his change of
theological position he published a remarkable work "On the Development
of Christian Doctrine in Aid of a Grammar of Assent," the design of
which is to exhibit the influence of philosophic thought upon the
evolution of Christian doctrine, and to bring it into harmony with the
theories of Cosmical, Physiological, and Historical development, which
seem for the present to be in the ascendant. For this reason I choose to
employ his words, as setting forth the conception of God which is
generally entertained by thoughtful men. At page ninety-seven of his
last work, "The Grammar of Assent," I read:

"There is one God, such and such in Nature and Attributes. I say 'such
and such,' for, unless I explain what I mean by _one God_, I use words
which may mean any thing or nothing. I may mean a mere _anima mundi_; or
an initial principle which once was in action and now is not; or
collective humanity. I speak then of the one God of the Theist and of
the Christian: a God who is numerically One, who is Personal; the
Author, Sustainer, and Finisher of all things, the Life of Law and
Order, the moral Governor. One who is Supreme and Sole; like Himself,
unlike all things besides Himself, which all are but his creatures;
distinct from, independent of, them all. One who is self-existing,
absolutely infinite, who has ever been and ever will be, to whom nothing
is past or future; who is all perfection, and the fullness and archetype
of every possible excellence, the Truth itself, Wisdom, Love, Justice,
Holiness; One who is All-powerful, All-knowing, Omnipresent,
Incomprehensible. These are some of the distinctive prerogatives which
I ascribe unconditionally and unreservedly to the great Being whom I
call God."

These statements of the Theistic conception will be regarded by most men
as adequate and satisfactory. They will be accepted by the scientific
Theist and approved by the dogmatic Theologian. They present the idea of
God within the sphere of Christian thought; that is, reflective thought
informed and illuminated by the revelations of God which are given in
the Christian Scriptures. At the same time it must be confessed that
they are defective in scientific form, philosophical development, and
logical articulation. They do not present the conception of God in
harmony with any _principles of Rational Integration_. They show no
attempt to combine the various elements of this conception in the unity
of an _Absolute Principle_, an _Ultimate and Fundamental Idea_.

The aim of all true philosophy is to attain to the insight of First
Principles, yea, to the insight of the Absolute First Principle from
which whatever now _is_ must be derived, and in which whatever _is_ must
have its intelligible ground and sufficient reason. There exists in man,
as the essential characteristic of his humanity, a power or faculty of
intelligence, best named the _Reason_, which awakens in him the desire
and furnishes to him the law that enables him to fulfill the inherent
desire of combining all his manifold knowledges in the unity of such
_Absolute First Principle_; and the one fundamental law of this faculty
is the _Law of Sufficient Reason_, which has been thus enounced by
Leibnitz: "Whatever exists, or begins to be, must have a sufficient
reason for its existence, and why it is as it is, and not otherwise;"
or, to give the principle a fuller, and at the same time a legitimate
expansion--For all genesis, or beginning, there must be an adequate
_Cause_; beneath all appearance, all changeful and fleeting phenomena,
there must be a permanent _Being_ or _Reality_; beyond all the diverse
and manifold, there must be an ultimate _Identity_, an incomposite
indivisible _Unity_; and in all order and special adaptation, there must
be a unifying _Thought_, a definite _Purpose_ and _End_.

The Reason of man can find satisfaction and harmony only in the
recognition of an Absolute First Principle which shall comprehend and
unite all these universal and necessary ideas which are the correlates
of the facts of experience; that is, an Absolute First Principle which
shall be the Ultimate Reality, the Ultimate Cause, the Ultimate Unity,
and the Ultimate Reason of all existence. In other words, the Reason is
not and can not be satisfied without "the clear insight of a _Causative
Principle_ containing, predetermining, and producing all the actual
results we see around us, with their orderly relations in reference to a
final purpose, reason, or end; and which causative principle exists not
only as the originative and constructive, but also as the conservative
energy of all things;" a Being who "is before all things, and by whom
all things consist," "from whom, in whom, and to whom are all things."

And now what is this Absolute First Principle, causative of all
existence, which the spontaneous reason has always intuitively
apprehended, and which the reflective reason has always found to be the
adequate, and only adequate explanation of the universe? I answer in a
word, it is AN UNCONDITIONED WILL OR SELF-DIRECTIVE POWER, SEEING ITS
OWN WAY, AND HAVING THE REASON AND LAW OF ITS ACTION IN ITSELF ALONE.
This always and every where has been intuitively apprehended, with more
or less clearness, as standing at the fountain-head of all existence.

This, then, we shall postulate as the fundamental axiom of all rational
integration, viz., AN UNCONDITIONED WILL, _the principle of all Reality,
all Efficiency, and all Perfection_.

1. An unconditioned Will which realizes itself in IPSËITY--self-potency
and self-affirmation; expresses itself in that august name of God "I
AM;" and constitutes ABSOLUTE REALITY.

2. An unconditioned Will which manifests itself in
ALTERITY--pluri-efficiency; utters itself in the "I WILL" of the
creative fiat; and constitutes INFINITE EFFICIENCY.

3. An unconditioned Will which returns to itself in TOTALITY--a complete
Ideal to be realized in Creation; which expresses its satisfaction in
pronouncing all things "very good," and constitutes PERFECT PERSONALITY.

The changeless correlation and inherent harmony of these ideas of the
reason (Reality, Efficiency, and Personality) may be rendered more
obvious by the following formula, after the method of Coleridge's "polar
logic."[20]


                               _PROTHESIS_

                          UNCONDITIONED WILL
                                /  |  \
             /-----------------/   |   \------------------\
 _THESIS_   /                 _MESOTHESIS_                 \_ANTITHESIS_
           /                       |                        \
      IPSËITY-----Efficient     CAUSALITY     Efficient----ALTERITY
           \                       |                        /
            \                    Final                     /
             \-----------------\   |   /------------------/
                                \  |  /
                               TOTALITY

                               _SYNTHESIS_

PROTHESIS expresses the absolute identity or eternal co-inherence of
Reason, Love, and Power (the Divine Essence). THESIS expresses Power in
the form of Love (the Divine Self-sufficiency and Self-potency).
ANTITHESIS expresses Reason in the form of Power (the Divine
Efficiency). SYNTHESIS expresses the diversity in unity of Reason, Love,
and Power (the Divine Perfection). And MESOTHESIS expresses the
essential correlations which integrate the whole (the Triunity of the
manifested God). Thus Absolute Reality, Infinite Efficiency, and Perfect
Personality are all, as a triplicity, contained in the fundamental unity
of an unconditioned Will, which has Love as its motive, Power as its
agent, and Reason as its light and law.

And now let us retire within our own consciousness, and see if this
fundamental axiom of rational integration--Will as the principle of all
Reality, Efficiency, and Perfection--is not reflected in our reason, and
evolved in our inner experience. Do we not find that the central point
of our consciousness--that which makes each man what he is in
contradistinction from every other man--that which expresses the _real
essence of the soul_ apart from its formal processes and regulative
laws--is the WILL? Without Will man would fall back from the elevation
which he now assumes to the level of impersonal nature: in a word, he
would be a _thing_, and not a _power_. Power, spontaneity, causality,
will--these, or similar forms, express, as nearly as can be, the
essential nature or principle of the human soul.[21] Furthermore, it is
obvious that mere Power or Energy does not suffice for the notion of
Will--there must also be Reason and Affection.[22] Indeed, "Will is
contemplated universally as the inseparable union and perpetual
differentiation of Intelligence and originative Power, and as such the
sole ground of the intelligibility of all causation."[23]

A volitional act, a moral and responsible act, must be one which is
performed under the influence of motives, and for which, when called to
account, we can assign valid reasons. All true volition supposes a
purpose or end to be realized, an inward appetency or motive which makes
the end desirable, and the selection and adaptation of means to
accomplish that end. Power divorced from reason is simply _blind force_,
and can not be dignified with the name of Will. The mind of man is
sometimes in a predominant state of _knowing_, sometimes in a
predominant state of _feeling_, and sometimes in a predominant state of
_determination_. To call these separate faculties, however, is
altogether beside the mark. No act of intelligence can be performed
without some determination of the Ego, no act of determination without
some cognition, and no act of the one or the other without some amount
of feeling being mingled in the process. Thus, while each mental state
may have its distinctive characteristics, there is unity at the
root--_the identical Ego, spirit_, WILL.[24]

Sensibility is the condition, Reason is the light, Will is the centre of
human consciousness. Consciousness is a threefold phenomenon in which
feeling, knowing, and self-determination are reciprocal elements, and in
their connection and simultaneousness, and at the same time their
differentiation, they compose the entire intellectual life.[25] The
finite spirit or will unfolds itself, first, subjectively, in the
spontaneous affirmation of self-being or self-potency (IPSËITY);
secondly, objectively, in the exertion of power to produce motion,
change, phenomena (EFFICIENCY); thirdly, synthetically, in the unity of
motive and intention, purpose and act, means and end (PERSONALITY).

Thus does "Will present the middle point, which embraces _thought_ on
the one hand and _force_ on the other; and which yet, so far from
appearing to us to be a _compound_ arising out of them as an effect, is
more easily conceived as the originative prefix (prothesis) of all
mental phenomena.... It carries with it, in its very idea, the
co-presence of thought as the necessary element within whose sphere it
has to manifest itself; its phenomena can not exist alone; it acts on
preconceptions, which stand related to it, not however as its source,
but as its conditions, and are its co-ordinates in the effect, rather
than its generating antecedents."[26]

Psychological analysis leads us inevitably to this conclusion, that all
things are issued by Will, whether in the sphere of the finite or the
infinite, and therefore we postulate an UNCONDITIONED WILL, A PERFECT
MIND, at the source of all becoming. Thus, as Martineau truly remarks,
_between the_ FORCE _of the physical atheist and the_ THOUGHT _of the
metaphysical pantheist_, _we fix upon_ WILL _as the true balancing-point
of a moral theism_.

The intelligent reader scarce needs to be reminded that this is the
conclusion reached by reflective thought in that best and fullest
exhibition of it which is found in Greek philosophy. The great problem
of Greek philosophy, as of all philosophy, was, "What is the ἀρχῆ, the
First Principle--the ground and cause and reason of all existence?" The
final answer of that age is found in Plato, for Platonism was the
culmination, the ripened fruit of the ages of earnest thought which
preceded Plato. He gathered up, co-ordinated, and grasped into unity the
results bequeathed by the mental efforts of his predecessors. The
Platonic answer to this great question of philosophy is clear and
unequivocal. A perfect MIND is the primal source of all being--a Mind in
which Intellect, Efficiency, and Goodness are one and identical. "Mind
is the most worthy ἀρχῆ." "God is the most excellent of causes."[27]
"Mind is king of heaven and earth."[28] "Motion and life and soul and
mind are present with absolute being. We can not imagine being to be
devoid of life and mind, remaining in awful unmeaningness and
everlasting fixture."[29]

"Whatever begins to be, must necessarily be produced by some cause; for
nothing can have its generation without a cause." "The Maker and Father
of the universe ... had no beginning of his being." He formed the
universe according to the eternal model or archetype which his own
reason supplied, and for motives which his own essential goodness
proposed. "Let us now tell for what cause the Maker of this creation and
this universe made it as it is. He was _good_; and he who is good
grudges no advantage to any creature. Being thus free from envy, He
willed that the universe should be good like Himself; and this, the
special ground of the creation and the world, which we receive from the
wisest philosophers, we must accept."[30]

It would be easy to show that the recognition of intelligent Will, as
standing at the fountain-head of all the force which is manifested in
the universe, is common to the first Physicists of this age.

Grove concludes his admirable essay on "The Correlation of the Physical
Forces" with these words: "In all phenomena the more closely they are
investigated the more are we convinced that, humanly speaking, neither
matter nor force can be created or annihilated, and that an essential
cause is unattainable [by science]--_Causation is the_ WILL, _Creation
is the act_, _of God_."[31] Sir John Herschel has not hesitated to
express his conviction that "it is but reasonable to regard the Force of
Gravitation as the direct or indirect result of a consciousness or a
WILL existing somewhere."[32] Dr. Carpenter, with his usual sagacity in
penetrating to the essential point, remarks that the WILL "is that form
of Force which must be taken as the type of all the rest;" "Force must
be regarded as the direct expression of WILL."[33] "If," says Wallace,
"we have traced one force, however minute, to an origin in our own WILL,
while we have no knowledge of any other primary cause of force, it does
not seem an improbable conclusion that _all force may be_ WILL-FORCE,
and thus the whole universe is not only dependent on, but actually is
the will of higher intelligences or of one Supreme Intelligence."[34] In
short, the present attitude of science in relation to this great problem
is, I think, fairly represented by the Duke of Argyll: "Science, in the
modern doctrine of the Conservation of Energy and the Convertibility of
Forces, is already getting hold of the idea that all kinds of Force are
but forms and manifestations of some one Central Force issuing from
some one Fountain-head of Power." "This one Force, into which all others
return again, is itself but a mode of action of the Divine WILL."[35]
Even Spencer concedes that "the Force by which we ourselves produce
changes, and which serves to symbolize the cause of changes in general,
is the final disclosure of all analysis ... all other modes of
consciousness are derived from our consciousness of exerting Force."[36]
"The order of nature is doubtless very imperfect, but its production is
far more compatible with the hypothesis of an intelligent will than with
that of blind mechanism."[37] Physical science is surely coming into
harmony with metaphysical thought. It looks upon nature with the eye of
reason as well as the eye of sense. And it reduces the phenomena to
unity, not simply by comparative abstraction, which classifies under
resemblance, co-existence, and succession, but by that rational
integration which operates under the necessary laws of substance,
causality, intentionality, and absolute unity. It regards the forces of
nature as the product or manifestation of a higher force--a force which
is not merely dynamical in its nature--a force which can compass not
merely concurrent and antagonistic motions in space, but which is able
so to adjust these concurrences and antagonisms as to construct agencies
which shall realize designs--a force, therefore, which is thoughtful and
percipient: in one word, intelligent--a force, in fine, which is not a
mere mechanical dynamism in space and time, but a true Power existing in
its type and fullness: in one word--God.[38]

Thus does all reflective thought, whether directed to the phenomena of
the human mind or the phenomena of nature, confirm the _à priori_
intuition of an unconditioned Will unfolding itself in Thought and
Power, and completing itself in a harmonious Totality, as the First
Principle and Originative Cause of all existences and of all relations,
of all individual beings, and of that harmonious whole men call the
Cosmos.

And now we pass to the important question--How are we to bring all our
acquired conceptions of God into harmony with this fundamental idea?
Assuming that we have certain conceptions of God which are derived from
verbal instruction, and ultimately from Divine revelation, can we bring
these into unity under this First Principle? Or, in other words, can we
logically evolve the attributes and perfections of God out of this
fundamental Idea, and find the result in harmony with the Christian
doctrine?

As the object of thought, even of Christian thought, God must
necessarily be conceived by us under the fundamental categories of
_Being_, _Attribute_, and _Relation_. All objects of thought must come
under these categories, and out of or beyond these categories we can not
think at all. Furthermore, we can not think of God as the unconditioned
Being conditioning Himself, without conceiving Him as _Reality_,
_Efficiency_, and _Personality_. These constitute the conception of the
Divine essence whereby it is what it is. When we think of the Attributes
of such a Being, we must necessarily conceive them as _Absolute_,
_Infinite_, and _Perfect_.[39] And when we think of the Relations of
God to finite existences and finite consciousness, we are constrained to
regard Him as the _Ground_ and _Cause_ and _Reason_ of all dependent
being.

In the unity and completeness of this categorical scheme of thought, we
can not fail to recognize the following logical order:

 BEING (Essentia)               REALITY  }  EFFICIENCY }  PERSONALITY }
 ATTRIBUTE (Related Essence)    ABSOLUTE }  INFINITE   }  PERFECT     }
 RELATION (Free Determination)  GROUND      CAUSE         REASON OR END

In the Absolute Reality we have the ultimate ground; in the Infinite
Efficiency we have the adequate cause; and in the Perfect Personality we
have the sufficient reason or final cause of all existence.

1. BEING or ESSENCE, as _Reality_, _Efficiency_, and _Personality_. The
intuition of Being is the most fundamental and the most abstract of all
ideas. After every property and relation has been eliminated, there
still remains the affirmation that something _is_. Non-existence, except
as the negation of being, is inconceivable. But, at the same time, pure
being is the most indeterminate of all ideas. Simple being, without
attributes, and out of all relation to other ideas, is a notion without
contents, and consequently indescribable and unknowable. For us,
therefore, pure abstract being is equal to non-being, and the paradox of
Hegel has some truth: Pure Being = Nothing.
Distinction--differentiation, determination--is the condition of all
reality. Real being must be determined, only pure nothing can be
undetermined. The least determined being is the least real; the most
determined is the most real, the most perfect being. Exactly in
proportion as the nature of beings is differentiated and complicated do
they rise in the scale of being. The vegetable has more determinations
than inanimate matter; the percipient animal has more determinations
than the vital plant; rational man has more determinations than the
percipient animal, he is the most complicated, the most determined, and
therefore the most perfect being in creation. An absolutely perfect
being must be the most determined of all beings; he must contain within
himself a fullness of determinations.

The pantheist Spinoza tells us that determination is negation--that is,
limitation. "_Omnis determinatio negatio est._" Nothing can be falser or
more arbitrary than this principle. Its fallacy consists in the
confusion of two things essentially different, namely, the _limits of a
being_, and _its determinate characteristics_. A pure Ego, by
determining itself to thought, affection, or action, is not thereby
limited. The limitation or the illimitation depends simply upon the
character of the thought, affection, or act as perfect or imperfect. "I
am an intelligent being, and my intelligence is limited; these are two
facts equally certain. The possession of intelligence is the
constitutive characteristic of my being which distinguishes me from the
brute. The limitation imposed upon my intellect, which can only see a
small number of truths at a time, is my limit, and this is what
distinguishes me from the Absolute Being, from Perfect Intelligence
which sees all truths at a glance. That which constitutes my
imperfection is not certainly my being intelligent; therein, on the
contrary, lies the strength, the richness, and the dignity of my being.
What constitutes my weakness and my nothingness is that this
intelligence is inclosed in a narrow circle. Thus, inasmuch as I am
intelligent, I participate in being and perfection; inasmuch as I am
only intelligent within certain limits, I am imperfect."[40]
Determination differs from limitation as much as being differs from
nothing.

The Causative Principle of all reality must itself be _real_, that is,
it must be a self-manifesting and self-conscious power, for there can be
no reality without consciousness. Being which is not known to itself,
and can not manifest itself, is as though it were not. Intuition, _sui
conscia_, is the essence of reality. Here being and knowing are
identical. It must also contain within itself a fullness of
determinations, must be rich in ideas, must be the archetype of all
possible existences. All forms and relations, all ideas and laws, all
individual and special adaptations, all harmonious systems, must be
present to the Absolute Reality. "Uncreated must be Mental Being. This
seems an invincible necessity of all thought. Whatever else, or whatever
more it is, it must be Mental Being" = REASON.

The Causative Principle of all efficiency must itself be _power_,
pluri-efficiency, it must be self-determined and self-moved, and
perfectly adequate to the production of being, motion, change, life, and
intelligence objective to itself; in a word, it must be adequate to the
realization of all the ideals which reason supplies; it must be
unlimited Infinite Efficiency = SPIRIT.

The Causative Principle of all personality must itself be
_personal_--that is, it must have a self-conceived, self-determined
purpose; must freely choose and wisely adapt the means to realize that
purpose; above all, it must have a worthy motive, a best and highest
reason for both purpose and act; and must make all conform to and result
in a moral order in harmony with the blessedness and worthy the
approbation of the All-perfect One. Intuition and choice, affection and
conscience--these are the grand momenta of personality.

The necessary demand of reason is that the first and originative cause
of all finite personality shall be Himself a person. Consciousness can
not arise out of unconsciousness, reason can not be generated from
unreason, personality can not have its birth from impersonality, no more
than something can be born of nothing. There must be intelligence
answering to our intelligence, freedom answering to our freedom, feeling
responding to our feeling, and moral sentiment unisonant with our moral
sentiment: in short, personality correlated with our personality, in the
cause and author of finite responsible being. That perfection which is
mirrored in our finite personality exists in all its fullness in the
unconditionally perfect Being, the Perfect Personality whose name is
LOVE.[41]


God, then, is the Absolute, Infinite, and Perfect Being in whom, by
whom, and for whom the finite has existence and consciousness. He is
_the unconditioned, conditionating Will_. The Divine Essence can not be
apprehended or expressed in a higher universal. This is the first dim
intuition of spontaneous reason, and the final goal of all reflective
thought. The Divine Being is He who is before all, and who originates,
destines, and conditions all. The Biblical idea of the unconditioned
Being is in perfect harmony with the philosophical idea. In the language
of Scripture, "the Will of God" stands for the remotest, inmost essence
of the Godhead--a will which is the absolute identity, the eternal
co-inherence of reason, power, and love. The Divine Will as efficient
cause is never dissociated from the Divine Will as the formal cause and
the final cause. That will is at once cause and law and reason of all
things. God "effectuates all things according to the _counsel_ (τὴν
βουλὴν = deliberation, purpose, design) of his own Will" (Eph. i.
11). And not only according to the counsel, but "according to the _good
pleasure_ (τὴν εὐδοκίαν = the benevolent affection) of his
own will" (ver. 5); a "good pleasure which He hath PURPOSED (προέθετο)
in Himself" (ver. 9). He "created all things, and for his
own _pleasure_ (θέλημα = will) they are and were created."
Here "Will" is clearly more than power, more than efficiency: it is
thought or purpose; it is reason or end; in a word, it is the identity
and co-inherence of reason, power, and love. The unconditioned Will as
revealed to us in Scripture is an _intelligent_ Will--a will that
thinks, deliberates, counsels, designs; and it is also a _benevolent_
Will--a will that loves and delights in and desires the good of being.
And in thinking and desiring it effectuates, for thinking and operating,
desiring and doing, are one with God. "He speaks and it is done, He
commands and it stands fast." Creation is a speech of God, a language in
which He reveals his thoughts, his purposes, his benevolent designs, his
will--that is, Himself. Every revelation of God is the development in us

of the consciousness of the REAL BEING (τὸ ὄντως ὄν). All the proofs of
the being of God--the etiological, the cosmological, the teleological,
and the moral--are centred in the _ontological_: this is first and last.
And just as our consciousness of the indivisible identical EGO as the
unity and co-inherence of reason, feeling, and power is the exact
arresting-point of psychological science, beyond which thought can not
pass, so our intuition of the unconditioned BEING as the absolute
identity of Reason, Power, and Love is the exact arresting point of
Theological science, beyond which nothing can be known. Spirit, Light,
Love--these designate essence or being. "GOD IS SPIRIT" (πνεῦμα =
Spirit, not a Spirit--John iv. 24), the self-moving, efficient,
animating principle, the unity and life-motion of the creative divine
activity; ἡ ζωὴ αἰώνιος--vita absoluta--underived, eternal Life (John v.
26; xi. 25; 1 John v. 20). GOD IS LIGHT (1 John i. 5), the
self-manifesting, intuitional, revealing principle = ὁ λόγος; the
Eternal Reason, in which Spirit becomes objective to itself, and God is
revealed to Himself (John i. 1; 1 Tim. vi. 16). GOD IS LOVE (1 John iv.
8, 16), the self-complete, self-sufficient, self-satisfying principle =
τὸ τέλος, the Perfect One (Matth. v. 48). This Divine Love finds its
fullest satisfaction in the κόσμος νοητός, the intelligible world as
revealed and rendered objective to Himself in "the WORD." Reason,
Spirit, Love are the simplest elements in the conception of the
unconditioned Being: Reason as Reality, Spirit as Efficiency, and Love
as Perfection.

The unconditioned Being is revealed, may we not say "incarnated,"[42] in
the κόσμος αἴσθησις--the sensible world: 1, by the incarnation
of the Spirit in the moving and animating forces of nature; 2, by the
incarnation of the Reason in the typical forms and permanent laws or
relations of the universe, by which reality becomes known to finite
minds; 3, by the incarnation of Love in the final causes, the benevolent
purposes, which are realized in the completed Cosmos and the life of
Humanity.[43]

2. ATTRIBUTE OR RELATED ESSENCE. The knowledge of the Divine Essence is
the root of the knowledge of the Divine Attributes, for in every
conception of an attribute the Divine Essence is, in some mode or other,
supposed. We may therefore define an attribute as a conception of the
unconditioned Being under some relation to our consciousness. That
conception may be either positive or negative, and the relation may
consequently be one of causation or abstraction.

When we conceive of the Divine Essence as _reality_, our conception is
in some measure determined by our consciousness of reality. The
intuition of reality is immanent to our own consciousness. We know self
as a reality, an indivisible, identical Ego--a unity, but yet a
conditioned and dependent reality, which must have its ground and cause
in an independent and unconditioned reality. Thus the pure intuition of
reality is a preluding for the affirmation of absolute reality. We can
not, however, affirm such reality on purely subjective grounds. To the
eye of reason, which is the organ of necessary and absolute truth, the
Divine Essence abstracts itself from the limits of space and time, and
absolves itself from all the determinations of objective being. It is a
reality which is not conditioned by _kind_, a reality which is
independent of, absolved from, undetermined by any other antecedent or
contemporaneous being--absolute reality.

Furthermore, when we conceive the Divine Essence as _power_ or
efficiency, our conception is in some measure determined by our
consciousness of power. We know ourselves as a power, a cause of our own
volitions, and a power which can control and modify external nature, but
yet a limited and finite cause. To the eye of reason the Divine
efficiency transcends all limitation and mensuration. It is a power
which is not conditioned by _quantity_. It is limitless power,
spaceless, all-mighty presence, self-directive power, carrying its own
light and seeing its own way--infinite efficiency.

And, finally, when we conceive of the Divine Essence as _personality_,
again our conception is in some measure determined by our consciousness
of personality. We are conscious of desiring and purposing, of
determining and doing, of approving and delighting in our artistic and
ethical creations, and in these we stand out from the plane of nature as
persons and not things. But we are also conscious of limitation and
imperfection. We fall short even of our own ideals; we feel we have
unsatisfied longings and daily wants. The Divine Essence reveals itself
to reason as exempt from all limitation by _degree_. "Pure personality
is no more limited than absolute being, but it is deeper by all the
contents of perfect consciousness." It is a personality which has no
defect and no want: unconditioned, unlimited perfection--perfect
personality.

Our conception of the Attributes of God may thus be formed through some
relation to our consciousness, but by a process of immediate
abstraction--the negation of all limitation by kind, by quantity, or by
degree.

1. As related to our intuition of real being; by abstraction from all
other being and personality--the _Immanent_ attributes of God.

2. As causally related to finite, dependent existence; by elimination of
all necessary limitation--the _Relative or Transitive_ attributes of
God.

3. As ethically related to finite personality; by elimination of all
imperfection--the _Moral_ attributes of God.


1. _The_ IMMANENT _attributes_. The absolute reality (REASON) must
necessarily be conceived as First, Supreme, and Sole; must be underived,
and therefore eternal; must be absolved from all necessary relation to
other being, and therefore independent; must be above all law of change,
and therefore immutable; must have incomposite unity, and therefore
indivisible; and must be the only one, for two absolutes would limit
each other, and are thus inconceivable. Finally, absolute reality must
be the fullness and archetype of all being in which every form and every
relation, every totality and every harmony, conceivable or possible,
must be ideally and eternally present.

ETERNITY (1 Tim. i. 17; vi. 15, 16; Rev. i. 4, 8; Heb. i. 8).

IMMUTABILITY (James i. 17; Psalm cii. 26, 27; Heb. i. 12).

UNITY (Isaiah xliv. 6; Eph. iv. 6; 1 Tim. ii. 5; John xvii. 3).

IDEALITY (Psalm cxxxix. 16; Rom. xi. 36; Acts xv. 18).

These are the immanent attributes of God.


2. _The_ TRANSITIVE OR RELATIVE _attributes_. The Infinite Efficiency
(SPIRIT) must necessarily be conceived as all-mighty, all-present, and
all-knowing. The Infinite Spirit fills, penetrates, moves, and vitalizes
the universe. He is in all, and through all, and transcends all. He can
not be bounded in space or limited in power, therefore He is spaceless
and infinite. "He is every where present, not virtually but
substantially, for virtue can not subsist without substance." And as the
All-mighty is present every where, present to all things, so all things
exist "in Him," and are present to Him in an immediate and intuitive
vision--He knows all things.

OMNIPOTENCE (Psalm cxv. 3; Jer. xxxii. 27; Rom. xi. 36; 1 Cor. viii. 6).

UBIQUITY (Psalm cxxxix. 7-13; Jer. xxiii. 23, 24; 1 Cor. xv. 28; Matth.
x. 29).

OMNISCIENCE (Psalm cxxxix. 1-6; Acts i. 24; Heb. iv. 13; Matth. vi. 8).

These are the relative or transitive attributes of God.


3. _The_ MORAL _attributes_. Perfect Personality (LOVE) must by the very
conception be wise and holy, righteous and blessed, for these are the
attributes of personality, and may all be ultimately grounded in love.
The reason of all existence and all personality is found, not in
infinite causality, but in the free love of the perfect personality.
This is the final cause of all existence. And if perfect Love be the
final cause of all existence, it must know the end, and ordain the law
and means. The highest end of the world is the perfect fellowship of man
with God; the physical must therefore be subordinated to the moral order
of the universe. The Perfect Personality must freely will to impart his
fellowship to those who are obedient to his moral law; and it must be
removed from fellowship with and deny itself to evil, which is
antagonistic to the ends of Love. Or, in other words, it must establish
a fixed and changeless relation between righteousness and blessedness in
the creature. It must approve the good and condemn the evil. And in
making the righteous "partakers of his joy," He must be "well pleased."
The absolute blessedness of God is found in the fullness and harmony of
the Divine life. He has in Himself the eternal and absolutely worthy
object of his love. But there is a Divine satisfaction, "a good pleasure
of God," which is found in the communication of Himself to the creature.
"He rejoiceth in the habitable parts of the earth, and his delights are
with the sons of men." "He taketh pleasure in them that fear Him, in
those that hope in his mercy."

WISDOM (Job xii. 13; Rom. xi. 33, 34; Eph. iii. 9, 10).

GOODNESS (Psalm xxxiii. 5; xxxiv. 8; cvii. 1, 8).

HOLINESS (Deut. xxxii. 4; Psalm v. 5; James i. 13, 17).

BLESSEDNESS (1 Tim. i. 11; vi. 15).

These are the moral attributes of God.[44] They are also called by
pre-eminence the Perfections of God, because they are free
determinations of the Divine nature, an everlasting "BECOMING," rather
than an eternal "BEING." The immanent attributes of God are a necessary
inbeing; the moral attributes of God are a voluntary outgoing, an
eternally free, alternative forth-putting of choice for the right and
the good.[45]

The doctrine concerning God above presented, in which we fain would
hope that philosophy and Christian thought are brought into harmony, may
now be summarily presented in the following schema:

 _Fundamental Idea of Reason._    _Thought-Conceptions_
                                _Founded on Relations._

             (Essence)         {ETERNITY }
     {as ABSOLUTE REALITY....  {IMMUTABILITY }   Immanent
                               {UNITY }          Attributes.
                               {IDEALITY }

 UNCONDITIONED                   {OMNIPOTENCE }    Transitive
 WILL  {as INFINITE EFFICIENCY.. {UBIQUITY }       or Causal
                                 {OMNISCIENCE }    Attributes.

                                 {WISDOM }   Moral Attributes
       {as PERFECT PERSONALITY   {GOODNESS } (Relational).
                                 {HOLINESS }
                                 {BLESSEDNESS }

The references to the Sacred Scriptures already given will show the
harmony between the conceptions of reason and the verbal revelations of
God. Reason and Scripture unite in proclaiming that God is "the great
and holy _One_ that inhabiteth eternity," who "only hath immortality,"
"with whom is no variableness," and who "filleth all in all;" to whom
"all his works are known from eternity," in whose book "all our members
were written when as yet there was none of them," and whose "purposes,"
ideas, and plans are "eternal." These are mainly the immanent attributes
of God, conceptions which flow from the very idea of the Absolute and
Infinite Being. They are evolved from Real Being by the negation of all
limit, all parts, all change; the canceling of time and space and
matter, the recognition of God as pure Reason, pure Spirit, pure Love.

The Scriptures, however, deal more immediately with the causal,
transitive, and relational aspects of the Divine attributes--that is,
with the conception of God in his voluntary relations to finite being
and finite personality. They speak of God in his historically known
existence, as a Being who _voluntarily_ conditions his Omnipotence and
Sovereignty under concessions of self-reality, self-life, and freedom to
finite beings, without Himself being conditioned by any thing--a
_self-limitation_ which in nowise detracts from the absoluteness and
infinity of God--an _unconditioned conditionating Will_.[46]

The relation which God sustains to his works is not a _necessary_
relation--it is a _voluntary_ and self-imposed relation. Free Love is
the highest determining principle for the efficiency of Divine
Omnipotence. Power thus directed and conditioned by wisdom and love does
not, can not detract from the perfection of God. The substitution of
_choice_ for necessity is, in fact, no real limitation; on the contrary,
it ascribes to God the most _absolute perfection_.

The causal attributes of God, or those conceptions of God which are
especially grounded upon his relation to the world and humanity, are
properly divided into those which are Cosmical and those which are
Ethical. The first, of course, embrace his relation to the world, the
second his relation to personal, responsible beings. The content of the
cosmological conception is Omnipotence, Ubiquity, Omniscience. The
content of the ethical conception is Wisdom, Goodness, Holiness, and
Blessedness. God as the Creator and Sustainer of the world, God as the
Father, Teacher, and Ruler of humanity, are the two grand manifestations
of the one infinite and perfect Being, and "_Elohim_" and "_Jehovah_"
are his expressive and distinctive names, the first denoting the
cosmical activity of God, the latter his government and kingdom among
men.

These two grand aspects of the Divine manifestation are marked in the
Elohistic and Jehovistic portions of the first revelation given to the
Semitic race. They are still more distinctly recognized in Paul's
discourse before the assembled Athenian philosophers, where Christian
theology was for the first time presented to the Greek mind--God the
Creator and Conservator of the world (Acts xvii. 24, 25); God the
Father, Teacher, Ruler, and Judge of humanity (Acts xvii. 26-31).




CHAPTER III.

THE CREATION.


God is the Absolute, Infinite, and Perfect Being, in whom, through whom,
and for whom are all things. This is the Christian conception of God;
and it is the only conception which furnishes an adequate and
satisfactory explanation of all the facts of the universe. Here we have
a First Principle, an Originative Cause which is sufficient to account
for all existence.

But what conception are we to form of the nature and mode of this
Origination? Was it a pure, supernatural Origination, an absolute
Creation? or was it simply a formation out of a first substance existing
coeval with and independent of God? Was that act of creation determined
by necessity? was it an unconscious emanation from, or a necessary
development of that First Principle? Or was it a conscious, free
exertion of power for the realization of a foreseen and predetermined
plan--a mental Order? What is the Biblical conception of Creation? This
is the question we must now endeavor to answer.

Until very recently it has been the practice of theologians to attempt
the determination of the Biblical notion of Creation on purely
philological grounds. It is now generally conceded that this method is
inadequate and inconclusive. The Greeks probably never conceived the
idea of an absolute creation (commonly, though we judge incorrectly,
styled creation _ex nihilo_), and consequently the Greek language has no
terms expressive of a primal origination, an absolute beginning of the
world. Ποιεῖν, the term employed in the LXX. (Gen. i. 1), and
also by St. Paul (Acts xvii. 24), means to endow with a certain quality
(ποῖος = _qualis_)--to construct, make, form, build, and
evidently conveys the notion of _formation_ rather than _origination_,
the production of qualitative phenomena rather than real entity; κτίζειν
is also ordinarily used in the sense of forming, fashioning,
building, and seems to imply pre-existing materials.

There is also a wide difference of opinion among Oriental scholars with
respect to the precise import of the verbs בָּרָא (bara), עָשָׂה (aysah), and
יִצֶר (yetsar), as employed in the Hebrew Scriptures. Some distinguished
critics, as Parkhurst, Clarke, Lange, and Delitzsch, assert that בָּרָא
means to originate _de novo_, to create in an absolute sense; and that
עָשָׂה and יִצֶר strictly mean to fashion out of pre-existent materials.[47]
But Pusey, Kitto, Tayler Lewis, and some of the Rabbinical commentators
(Aben Ezra especially), affirm that בָּרָא, both by its etymology and its
connections, indicates _formation_ as much as origination, and is, in
fact, indifferent and neutral either as to a supposed creation _ex
nihilo_, or a creation, that is, a formation from pre-existing
materials. Furthermore, it is affirmed that the three Hebrew verbs are
used indiscriminately in the Mosaic record. It is said in Gen. i. 27
that God created בָּרָא man, and that statement is amplified and explained
at ch. ii. 7: "And the Lord God formed עָשָׂה man _out of the dust of the
earth_."[48] An appeal to the merely verbal expressions of Scripture
does not, therefore, promise any satisfactory and conclusive results.

By what method, then, are we to determine the Biblical notion of
Creation? Clearly, not by a critical study of the several words which
are employed to express the creative act--not by confining our attention
to the visible embodiment of the Divine word, and neglecting the
informing thought. We must ground our conception of creation upon the
fundamental ideas and principles of Divine revelation, and determine it
in harmony with the Christian idea of God, and the Christian doctrine of
the relation of the world to God.

These fundamental principles we have already presented. They may be
succinctly restated in the following propositions:

(1.) God is the one only self-existent, independent, unconditioned
Being, "who alone hath immortality," "the incorruptible or immutable
God" (ἀφθάρτος Θεός), "with whom is no variableness or shadow of
change."[49] (2.) God is the sole causality of the heavens and the
earth, in the most absolute sense. Whatever is, and is not God, is the
creature of God. "By Him were all things created which are in heaven and
which are upon earth, things visible and things invisible"--the objects
of sense-perception and of rational intuition. The origin, development,
and end, the principle, law, and reason of all existence, are in God and
from God--πάντα ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, εἰς τὸν Θεόν.[50] (3.) The all
of the finite is in ceaseless and complete dependence on the Divine
causality--"He upholdeth all things," and "by Him all things consist."

Our interpretation of the formal language of Scripture, especially of
the verbs which are employed to denote the act of creation, must
therefore be informed and determined by these fundamental principles. If
God is the unconditioned Cause of all existence, then the Creation must
be the absolutely _free_ and self-determined act of God. As such, it can
not have been conditioned by any immanent necessity in the Divine nature
itself, nor by any necessary existence out of and extraneous to the
Divine nature. By this conception of God, and of his relation to the
world, we are debarred from supposing the coeval existence of any thing
besides God (_e. g._, ἄπειρον, τὸ μὴ ὄν of Plato, the ὕλη of Aristotle,
the "matter" of the modern Physicist) as the condition and medium of the
Divine agency and manifestation. While, therefore, it is acknowledged
that in Gen. i. 21, 27, בָּרָא (bara) denotes the _formation_ of organic
bodies out of pre-existent materials, we can not be restricted to this
meaning of the term when dealing with verse 1, "In the beginning God
created the heaven and the earth." We are compelled to believe that
"bara" here means _origination_--origination _de novo_; first, because
the primal act of creation must have been a supernatural, miraculous
production of something which had not previously existed under any
form--an unconditioned creation antecedent to nature; and, secondly,
because we are informed that after this primal act of creation, "the
earth was still _without form_ and void." No possible ingenuity of
criticism can construe that opening sentence of revelation to mean, "In
the beginning God gave _form_ to pre-existing matter." That first
beginning is the _principium principiorum_, the beginning of all
beginnings, and must be distinguished from the six new beginnings of the
six days' work.[51] We must regard this sublime utterance, standing at
the head of all God's communications, as affirming this foundation-idea
of revelation--that God is the sole causality of the heavens and the
earth in an absolute sense, the efficient cause of time, and all
temporal relations; the all-mighty cause of space, and all spatial
relations; the originator of the primordial substance, and all its
qualities--in a word, the unconditioned Creator of all finite being,
quality, and relation--"בְּרֵאשִית--ἐν ἀρχῆ--_in principio_--first of all
(in the order of conception rather than the order of time) God
originated, laid the foundations of, the heavens and the earth."[52]

And now that the Creation here affirmed was an absolute origination, a
bringing into being of the primordial elements out of which the heavens
and the earth were subsequently "formed," is the doctrine of the best
Hebrew lexicographers. It is held by many of the best authorities that
the particle אֵת (ayth) means "the very substance of," "the very or
real essence." Fürst, in his recently published Hebrew and Chaldee
Lexicon, gives "being, essence, substance," as the meaning of "ayth."
Gesenius, in his Hebrew Grammar, says "'ayth' means being, substance"
(p. 216). And furthermore, he says "'_ayth_' is a substantive derived
from a pronominal stem, and signifies essence, substance, being." "The
particle '_ayth_,'" says Aben Ezra, "signifies the substance of a
thing." Kimchi, in his famous "Book of Hebrew Roots," gives a similar
definition. In the Syriac version, "_yoth_" takes the place of "_ayth_,"
and is very appropriately rendered in Walton's Polyglot, "_esse cœli
et esse terræ_"--the being or substance of the heavens and the earth. It
is not, therefore, a fanciful and altogether unauthorized reading of
this opening sentence of Divine revelation which the Christian idea of
God, and of his relation to the world, seems to demand--"_In the
beginning God originated, brought into being, the primordial elements of
the heavens and the earth._"


For manageable clearness, in dealing with the Mosaic primeval history,
we shall find ourselves under the necessity of accepting the distinction
made by theologians between _creatio prima, immediata_, and _creatio
mediata, formativa_.

1. _An absolute Creation_, a pure supernatural origination--the
Beginning of all beginnings.

2. _An artistic, architectonic Creation_, a supernatural formation out
of a first substance--the production of new things or beings by
aggregation, organization, and development according to pre-established
laws and archetypal ideas.

The first notion of Creation is grounded on the Omnipotence of God, the
second on the Infinite Wisdom of God, and both are united in and
ultimately grounded on the unconditioned Will.


And now let us confine our attention to the first conception of
Creation--_creatio prima, immediata_, or ABSOLUTE CREATION.

The fundamental Theistic conception which lies at the very root of the
Biblical doctrine of Creation, and clearly distinguishes it from all
Materialistic, Pantheistic, and Dualistic notions of the origin of the
world, is that God is the _Absolute Personality_--the eternally
self-conscious, self-complete, self-sufficient Being, all the
determinations of whose _nature_ and _action_ are grounded in his
absolute Will. The Divine essence, in its inmost, deepest ground, is not
determined being, but _unlimited power of self-determination_. The
primitive, root idea of the Godhead is an _ever-living, unconditioned
Will_--an unconditioned Will as the indivisible unity and perpetual
differentiation of _reason_ and _power_, a will which realizes itself in
self-affirmation (IPSËITY); manifests itself in self-determination and
choice (ALTERITY); and completes itself in the actualization of a final
purpose (PERFECTION).[53] The _nature_ of God, as distinct from his
_essence_, is absolutely his own act.[54] God, as the manifested God, is
what He is by his own determination and choice. God is just, because He
wills to be just; God is holy, because He wills to be holy; God is good,
because He wills to be good, and not from any constraining, immanent
necessity, otherwise He could not be the object of praise, adoration,
and love. If God is not good by virtue of his own determination and
choice, then there is nothing praiseworthy and adorable in his nature,
and all the thanksgiving of sacred psalmody is meaningless; worship is
groundless, religion has no significance, and love to God is impossible.
A necessitated goodness can no more command our moral esteem than the
uniform revolution of the planetary orbs, and where there is no moral
esteem, there can be no love, no worship, and no praise.[55]

If, then, God is a personal Being, the Absolute Personality, another
being can not proceed from Him except in virtue of his own free
determination. _Creation must therefore be a_ VOLUNTARY _act_.

And for the full comprehension of this fundamental principle, we must
remember that volition is something more than a simple efflux of power,
something more than a mere developing tendency--an evolution or process
without motive and without design. A voluntary act is a designed, an
_intentional_ act, the act of a being who can previously contemplate the
act in thought, who can have a reason or motive for the doing of the
act, and who can determine and condition the deed. This conception of
creation as a voluntary act is unmistakably presented in the
oft-repeated language of the Mosaic record, "God said, _Let there
be--and there was!_" "The speaking of God most certainly indicates the
thinking of God, and it thence follows that all the works of creation
are _thoughts_ of God (idealism). But it indicates also a will making
itself externally known, an active operation of God; and thence it
follows that all the works of creation are _deeds_ of God (realism).
Thinking and operating, however, are one in the Divine speaking, the
primal source of language--his personality making Himself known
(personalism).... Through creating, speaking, making, forming, the world
is ever and again denoted as the _free deed_ of God."[56] Furthermore,
creation is a voluntary act in the most absolute sense--that is, it is
an act of God to which He was not determined by any _inherent_ necessity
or want of his own nature, and an act which was not conditioned, in a
necessary manner, by any thing out of, distinct from, and extraneous to
the Divine nature.

1. _Creation was an act of God to which He was not determined by any
inherent necessity or want of his own nature._

If God is the eternally self-conscious, self-complete, and
self-sufficient Being, He is under no necessity to create other beings
in order to realize perfect self-consciousness, or to secure his own
perfect blessedness. He does not need "otherness"--that which is not
Himself--in order to become manifest to Himself; neither does He "crave
beings not Himself"[57] in order to his complete felicity. The
antithesis of self and non-self--the _ego_ and the _non-ego_--may be a
necessary condition of finite personality, but it can not be a necessary
condition of Absolute Personality. God is eternally revealed to Himself
in an unconditioned manner as self-conscious Love, self-conscious
Reason, self-conscious Energy--the Father, the Word, the Spirit; and He
is from all eternity "the ever-blessed God," who has in the Divine
Triunity the eternal and absolutely worthy object of his Love,
independent of every relation to the world and humanity--"Thou lovedst
Me _before_ the foundation of the world" (John xvii. 24), "before the
world was" (ver. 5).[58]

If, then, creation be the act of an Absolute Personality, the act of a
Being who freely and unconditionally determines his own nature and
conditionates all existence, then _the Will of God is the sole causality
of the world_, and in his Will alone we have the unlimited, infinite
ground-principle of all reality. Absolute Personality tolerates no other
transition from the idea of God to the idea of the world than that of a
Will which freely conditions itself by Love. This Free Love is the
highest determining principle for the Divine efficiency. Therefore, in
order to derive the essential existence of the world from God, the
Scriptures postulate nothing beside or beyond an ever-living,
intelligent Will which has its reason or motive, but not its
necessitating cause, in Love--"_the benevolence_ (εὐδοκία) _of
his Will_" (Eph. i. 5). The Creation is nothing else than the free
self-communication of God, who is Himself eternally self-complete and
self-sufficient, but who from love alone wills that other beings shall
have existence and, in fellowship with Him, eternal life.[59]

It is only by holding fast to these principles in all their integrity
that we can escape the seductions of Pantheism, that perpetual
temptation of metaphysical minds. The fundamental idea of Pantheism is
"an indeterminate principle which is _necessarily_ determined to become
successively every thing. Absolute necessity is the beginning, middle,
and end."[60] We can escape its iron grasp only by distinctly
recognizing and firmly holding the Absolute Personality of God--that is,
by affirming a perfect self-consciousness which is not conditioned by an
antithetical not-self; a perfect self-determination which is not
conditioned by an antecedent _natura naturans_; and a perfect
self-sufficiency which knows no want. The first affirmation rejects the
dialectical necessity of Hegel, the second excludes the mathematical
necessity of Spinoza, the third cancels the metaphysical necessity of
Cousin.[61]

2. _Creation as the free act of God was not conditioned by any thing out
of and foreign to the Divine nature._

A moment's reflection will suffice to convince us that a _limitation
posited from without_ would be as fatal to the idea of God as a supposed
inherent necessity determining the Divine causality from within. The
idea of God as the Being who is absolutely self-grounded,
self-sufficient, and self-determined, equally excludes both. If God is
the sole causality of the heavens and the earth in an absolute
sense--the efficient cause of time and all temporal succession--the
all-mighty cause of space, and of all spatial relations--the sole
originator of the primordial substance, and of all its qualities, then
the creative act can not have been conditioned by _Time_ or _Space_ or
_Matter_.

In his otherwise admirable essay on "Nature and God," Mr. Martineau
asserts that we can have no conception of even the possibility of a
creation except on the assumption of the coeval existence of something
objective to God as the condition and medium of the Divine agency and
manifestation. He therefore affirms the coeval and co-eternal existence
of _Space_ and _Matter_, _Time_ and _Number_, "with Him, and yet
independent of Him."[62] The idea of God's "_supplying Himself_ with
objectivity" is, in his judgment, "discredited by modern science." The
creative act must therefore have been conditioned by something other
than God, and independent of God.

Now it must be obvious to every thoughtful mind that this assumption
tends to the invalidation of every proof of the existence of God. If it
can be shown that any one thing exists aside from and independent of
God--that any thing exists which was not created by God--then may we
claim equal independence for every other thing, and He who claims to be
the Creator of _all_ things is discredited. As Herbert Spencer urges,
with great force, "If we admit that there can be something uncaused,
there is no reason to assume a cause for any thing."[63] With what
reason can we say that some things do exist that never were created, but
others can not so exist? If substances are eternal, why not attributes?
If matter is self-existent, why not force? If space is independent, why
not form? And if we concede the eternity of matter and force, why not
admit the eternity of law--that is, uniformity of relations? And if so
much is granted, why not also grant that a consequent order of the
universe is also eternal? If we admit that any thing besides God is
self-existent, that any thing exists independent of God as "the
_condition_ of the Divine agency and manifestation," then God is not the
unconditioned Absolute Being. "A limitation posited from without
directly destroys the idea of God, for it contradicts the idea of the
Absolute."[64]

Mr. Martineau admits that the assumption of "the coeval existence of
matter as the condition and medium of the Divine agency" "rests on quite
other grounds than those which support our belief respecting space."[65]
We can conceive the non-existence of matter, but we can not conceive the
non-existence of space. The idea of space is absolutely necessary,
therefore "no one asks a cause for the space of the universe."[66] In
making this assertion, however, Mr. Martineau betrays some want of
acquaintance with the history of the philosophy of space and time. Many
able and thoroughly philosophic minds have "asked a cause," and have
assigned a cause for "the space of the universe." Sir Isaac Newton held
that "God endures always and is present every where, and by existing
always and every where _constitutes_ duration and space."[67] This
doctrine, thus generally stated, is held by Saisset to be
incontestible.[68] McCosh also believes that time and space are not
independent of God: "I am not necessarily obliged to believe that the
infinity of space and time is independent of the infinity of God.... Who
will venture to affirm that space and time, being dependent on God, may
not stand in some relation to God which is altogether indefinable and
utterly incomprehensible by us."[69] Finally, Schleiermacher and Nitzsch
do not hesitate to teach that "God is the all-mighty cause of space" and
"the efficient cause of time."[70]

The question whether the idea of space is conditionally or
unconditionally necessary can only be determined by the solution of the
deeper question whether space is a real entity or a relation. If space
is a real entity, it must have properties or attributes, but what
philosopher of any reputation has ever attempted to set down the
properties or attributes of space? They who assert that space is an
uncreated, independent, and indestructible entity, ought to be able to
define it and tell _what_ it is. Dr. Porter tells us that space can not
be defined, "We can not form a concept of this _entity_ by means of
generalized attributes or relations."[71] Can that be for us an entity
of which we can form no concept, and which we can not determine in
thought by any attribute or relation? The writer of the article on "The
Philosophy of Time and Space," in the _North American Review_,[72] is an
earnest defender of the objective reality of space as an independent and
indestructible entity, and he has defined and analyzed the concept.
"Space is _absolute vacuity_" (p. 91). "The idea of space is a triple
synthesis ... of three _negative_ notions--receptivity, unity, and
infinity; the first is the negation of matter, the second is the
negation of divisibility, the third is the negation of limitation" (p.
95). Do these words convey any knowledge? Absolute vacuity is void,
empty, inane. Absolute vacuity is pure nothing, and of course there is
nothing to be divided and nothing to be limited. Absolute vacuity is a
negation, and unity and infinity are negations of a negation--that is,
they are predicates of nothing. "Negative notions" must be predicates of
_something_, otherwise they are a mere negation or absence of thought,
and convey absolutely no knowledge. We may, if we please, assert with
Hegel, that "Nothing is the same as Being," and then amuse ourselves
with making affirmations concerning vacuity, nihility, and unreality to
the disgrace of philosophy; but the common-sense of mankind will
repudiate our absurdities. We can not think about nothing; all thought
must be positive. Thought must have an object, and that object must be
either an entity, or the attribute of an entity, or a relation between
entities.

If pure space is regarded as "_absolute vacuity_"--pure nothing--then we
may readily dispose of the argument on which Prof. Stewart relies with
so much confidence. "Divine omnipotence can not annihilate space,"[73]
therefore it must be an independent reality. We have simply to
answer--the notion of annihilating nihility is an absurdity and a
contradiction. There is nothing to be annihilated, and Omnipotence even
must be inadequate to the annihilation of nothing.

If, with Leibnitz, Lord Monboddo, Calderwood, and many modern
physicists,[74] we reject the notion of "absolute vacuity"--infinite
space--and regard space as a _relation_--the relation of position,
distance, direction--then, like all the quantitive relations of
mathematics, it may be regarded as conditionally necessary--that is,
bodies being given, they must necessarily have place, distance, and
direction.[75] Space as a necessary relation is a reality, but a reality
which is conditioned and conditional, and "God is the all-mighty cause
of space." If all bodies were annihilated, there would be no position,
no distance, no direction, and consequently space would be annihilated.
There would remain nothing but the timeless, spaceless, Infinite One,
who is the efficient cause of all existence, all qualities, and all
relations. This, again, would be a sufficient answer to the sophism of
Dr. Clark, quoted and indorsed by Stewart--"God can not annihilate the
space in this room!" Annihilate the room, and the relative space in the
room is no more--that is, the distance between the inclosing walls. Of
"pure space" apart from the relations of bodies we have no conception,
can have no conception; for to annihilate all bodies, in thought, we
must annihilate our own body, and to a disembodied spirit there can be
no _here_ and no _there_. Place is a relation belonging to extension,
and extension is a property of matter only.[76]

There has been so much confusion of thought generated by the mere
word-jugglery of philosophers in the use of the terms _time_ and
_space_, _duration_ and _extension_, _eternity_ and _immensity_, that a
revision of the whole terminology in the interest of true science is
demanded. It is perilous to launch out upon this ocean of equivocal
phraseology, called the philosophy of time and space, before taking our
bearings, amid notions so closely related, yet so dissimilar, and
endeavoring to fix some definite meaning to these terms, which, like
points of the compass, shall enable us to find our position.

1. _Let us commence our effort with_ SPACE, EXTENSION, _and_ IMMENSITY.
Some philosophers--Cousin,[77] Hamilton,[78] Spencer,[79] McCosh,[80]
for example--confound _space_ and _extension_, and all of them confound
both with absolute _immensity_.[81]

Now if space is identical with extension, it must be cognized by the
senses and the sensuous imagination. This is unhesitatingly affirmed by
Hamilton: "We _see_ extension," and "by the name extension we designate
our empirical knowledge of space."[82] So also McCosh: "Of space in the
concrete we have an immediate knowledge by the senses, certainly by some
of them, such as the touch and sight."[83] Space in this connection can
not therefore be regarded as an _à priori_ cognition. It is equally
obvious that if space is identical with extension, it must have color
and form. This also is admitted by Hamilton: "I can easily annihilate
all corporeal existence [in imagination]. I can imagine _empty_ space.
But there are two attributes of which I can not divest it--that is,
shape and color."[84] Now if space has "shape," that is, figure, it must
have dimensions, and accordingly we find almost all philosophers
speaking of the three dimensions of space--length, breadth, and depth.
That which has length, breadth, and depth must be divisible, must have
parts and proportions, must have susceptibilities of exact measurement,
and therefore must be _finite_. This again is the doctrine of Hamilton:
"Space is finite, and a finite, that is, a bounded space constitutes a
figure"--a sphere.[85] The fundamental doctrine of Hamilton is that
"space, like time, is only the intuition or the concept of a certain
correlation of existence--of existence, therefore, _pro tanto_, _as
conditioned_. _It is thus itself only a form of the conditioned._"[86]
But if space be only a correlation of conditioned, and therefore finite
existence, how can he speak of it "being conceived as infinite,"[87]
and, above all, how can he speak of "the absolute totality" and "the
infinite immensity of space."

McCosh, also, though evidently with some hesitation, teaches that "we
can conceive _proportion_ in space, and if we take any of these
proportional sections, and divide it into two, thought will compel us to
say that the two make up the whole. In this sense the _parts_ make up
the whole--that is, the subsections make up the section. If the question
be extended beyond this, and it be asked, Is infinite space made up of
parts? I answer, that as we can have no adequate notion of infinite
space, so we can not be expected to answer all the questions which may
be put regarding it. _It is certain that neither infinite space nor
finite space is made up of separate parts._ We can speak intelligibly
of _proportions_ in finite space, and determine their relations to each
other and the whole. I tremble to speak of the proportions of infinite
space, lest I be using language which has or can have no proper meaning,
and the signification attached to which by me or others might be
altogether inapplicable to such a subject. Still there are propositions
which we might intelligibly use. It is self-evident that _any proportion
of space must be less than infinite space_. And if infinite space can be
conceived as having _proportions_, and we could conceive all these
proportions, then these proportions would be equal to the _whole_!"[88]
Well may the author say that he is "in a region dark and pathless;" for
the language here employed "can have no proper meaning" in regard to
infinite space. Well may he "tremble to speak of _the proportions of
infinite space_," for what can proportion (_pro_, for _portio_, a part)
mean except a numerical relation of parts? Proportions--numerical
relations--are measurable quantities, therefore finite quantities, and
no addition of finite quantities, can make the infinite. What confusion
and contradiction is here wrought by this word-jugglery with "the whole
and parts" of space!

Cousin, also, falls into the same inaccuracy and confusion. He tells us
that "human reason can conceive of a space determined and limited,"[89]
therefore divisible, measurable, and _finite_; and yet at the same time
he teaches that "space is illimitable, absolutely continuous, an
indivisible unity."[90]

And now let us note the contradictions which flow from this confounding
of space with extension, and both with immensity. Space is cognized _à
posteriori_, space is cognized _à priori_. Space has parts and
proportions, space has no parts or proportions. Space is divisible,
space is indivisible--an absolute unity. Space is finite, space is
infinite. Space is susceptible of exact measurement, space is
immeasurable--that is, absolute immensity.

Space and extension are not identical. Extension is simply an attribute
of body--the continuity of matter. Space is place, distance, direction,
relations of bodies. _Space is a certain correlation of finite
existences._ Immensity is the attribute of the unconditioned Being, the
absolute Spirit--that is, God. He is incorporeal, boundless, spaceless,
infinite.


2. The same confusion pervades the writings of philosophers in regard to
TIME, DURATION, _and_ ETERNITY.

Succession is confounded with duration,[91] duration with time,[92] and
time with eternity.[93]

If succession and duration are identical, then, there is no permanent
substance underlying the fugitive phenomena of the outer world, and no
personal existence which remains the same through all the changes of our
mental states. The human mind is simply "a series of feelings," a
succession of mental states without any enduring ground principle
constituting our personal identity, and we are thus landed in the
constructive Idealism of John Stuart Mill.[94] On the other hand, if
there be a permanent substance or essence underlying all mental
phenomena, whose continuance in existence is measured by phenomenal
change, time succession, then duration can not be identical with time,
any more than permanence can be the same as change. With finite duration
there is necessarily given change; the past is like the future--always a
minus in relation to the present.

Furthermore, if time is synonymous with eternity, then eternity is
divisible, measurable, it has limits and parts. Time, say the
philosophers, has one dimension, while space has three. "We," says
McCosh, "represent time as a line,"[95] it must therefore be divisible,
and, if divisible, it is legitimate to speak, with Hamilton, of "time
and its parts." "Time has succession, or priority and posteriority."[96]
And yet this same writer in the same work tells us, "Time has no
limits," and "Time can not be divided into separable parts."[97] If time
and eternity are identical, eternity has a past, a present, and a
future--"eternity _ab ante_ and eternity _a post_."[98] The eternity
past is bounded by the present, it _ends_ now; the eternity to come
_begins_ now. We may with propriety ask, How can that which has
succession, which is capable of exact measurement, which has a beginning
and an end, be infinite? That which had a beginning can not be
unbeginning, that which will come to an end can not be endless. Is not
the "eternity of _time_" a contradiction in terms? Is not "absolute
time" an absurdity?

Mark, then, the contradictions which flow from the confounding of
succession and duration, time and eternity. Time has limits, time has no
limits. Time is divisible, time is indivisible. Time is finite, time is
infinite. Time is relative, time is absolute. Time is moving, "it
flows;" time is immovable, "it does not flow."[99]

Duration and succession, eternity and time, are not identical. Duration
is the continuance in existence of finite creatures, a continuance which
is measured by the equable motion of planetary orbs, and imperfectly by
phenomenal changes in our mental states. Succession is simply an order
of phenomena, the recurrence, at regular or irregular intervals, of like
changes, or the series of different states in the same existence. _Time
is a certain correlation of successive existences._ Eternity is an
attribute of the absolute Being--the _timelessness_ of God. He is not
subject to the law of change, and therefore not to the law of time,
therefore his absolute being can not be measured by successive epochs.

Let us now endeavor to dismiss from our thought all this perplexing
necromancy of words, and humbly pray, with Themistocles, for "some sweet
voluptuous art of forgetting." Let us fix our mental gaze upon the
_objects_ of thought which are denoted by the terms _time_ and _space_,
and ask what are they? Are they existences or attributes, are they ideal
or real, are they entities or relations? Have we any clear and definite
notions of which these are the unequivocal signs? The solution of these
questions is the essential condition of a true philosophy of time and
space.

First of all, is it not self-evident that, if time and space are for us
the objects of thought, they must be conceived under the categories of
_Being_ or _Quality_ or _Relation_? If they can not be thought as real
existences, or as attributes of existing things, or as relations among
existing things, they can not be thought at all--they are non-entities,
and we can not think about nothing. "Thought can only be realized by
thinking _something_ ... this something must be thought as existing ...
and we can only think a thing as existing, by thinking it as existing in
this or that determinate manner of existence; and whenever we cease to
think of something as existing--something existing in a determinate
manner of existence--we cease to think at all."[100]

McCosh asserts that time and space are "neither substances, modes, nor
relations."[101] What, then, are they? He answers, "They seem to be
entitled to be put in a class by themselves, and resemble substances,
modes, relations only in that they are _existences, entities,
realities_."[102] But if they are entitled to be put in a class by
themselves, what is the name of that class, and by what characteristic
marks shall we distinguish it? If they are realities, they must have
being, or inhere in something that has being, or be relations of
something in being. If they are existences, they must be the objects of
_sense perception_, or _rational intuition_, or _immediate judgment_,
otherwise they can not be cognized at all, for "the mind can not create
objects of its own cognition."

We ask again, What _are_ space and time? McCosh and Dr. Porter both
answer: 1. They are not substances. This no one will dispute. They are
not material substances having sensible qualities which can be the
objects of sense perception. Space and time are not perceived by the
senses.[103] Neither are they spiritual substances. We do not know them
as having power and performing acts. 2. They both reply, They are not
attributes or qualities of matter or spirit. This, also, no one will
dispute, if the word "time" is not used as a synonym for "eternity," and
the word "space" is not used as a synonym for "immensity," because
"eternity" and "immensity" are attributes of the absolute Spirit. 3.
They both assert, They are not relations. This is disputed by many: by
Leibnitz, by Hamilton, by Saisset, by Calderwood, and by others.
Leibnitz says, "Space is the order of things co-existing. Time is the
order of things successive."[104] Hamilton says, "Space, like time, is
only the intuition or the conception of a certain correlation of
existence."[105] Calderwood defines time "as a certain correlation of
existence," and "space as the recognized relation of extended
objects."[106] And Saisset regards time and space as standing in the
same category with mathematical relations.[107] These are, to say the
least, distinguished names in philosophy. The opinions of men who have
for years pondered these profound problems are at any rate entitled to
proper consideration, and if in opposition to their views it is affirmed
that time and space as understanding-concepts are _not_ relations, some
reasons should be assigned. All the proof offered by Dr. McCosh is that
"we know no two or more things which by their relation could yield space
and time" (p. 211). We answer, promptly, _duration_ and _change_ do
yield the relation of time. "The consciousness of succession in our
mental states is in reality our consciousness of time."[108] The
co-existence of two or more extended objects must yield the relation of
space, for "empty space is nothing more than the relative distance of
extended objects from each other, measured on a standard similar to that
which applies to the bodies themselves. In this way it is equally
accurate to say that there is a certain specified _distance_ between the
bodies, and that there is _nothing_ between them, because space is
nothing but their relation to each other."[109] Annihilate all finite
existences, and what remains? Nothing but the immensity of God. Let one
atom of matter be created, and we have extension. Let a second atom be
created, and there is now a relation of distance, position,
direction--that is, there is _space_.

The only remark made by Dr. Porter which has a direct bearing on this
important discussion is that "Space and time are neither relations nor
correlations, but _correlates_ to beings and events" ("The Human
Intellect," p. 568). It may seem an act of presumption in one who has
spent much less time on these studies than Dr. Porter to offer a
criticism on this final deliverance. But when he tells us that space and
time are neither relations nor correlations, after having through four
pages "On the relations of space and time concepts to motion" labored to
sustain the doctrine of Trendelenberg that "the categories of space and
time are derived from the universal and all-pervading motion which is
common to both" (p. 526), we confess we are amazed. Let it be granted
that the spatial and temporal relations can be, in their last analysis,
resolved into motion, still the question remains, How can we conceive of
motion except as the result of force?--that is, of power actually
exerted somewhere. In the last analysis, therefore, the relations of
space, time, and motion are resolved into "_the relation of
causality_." The conclusion seems inevitable that time and space are
_correlations of finite existences_. Annihilate all finite existences
and finite duration, and there is neither space nor time--that is, there
is "pure nothing." Or, more properly, there is the Omnipotence, the
Immensity, the Eternity of God, whose causation may give existence to
finite beings with all their necessary as well as contingent relations.
"Whoever maintains a beginning of the world must also adopt _a beginning
of time_, for only worldly being, which according to its notion has not
its ground in itself, but is an originated being, can at all have time
for the form of its existence."[110]

And now, in summing up, let us see if we can clearly disengage three
classes of distinct notions:

1. The notion of concrete and finite EXTENSION as the essential quality
of matter; and the notion of finite DURATION as a quality of changeful
dependent existence.

2. The notion of SPACE as the relation of co-existing material
things--that is, the relation of position, distance, direction,
hereness, thereness; and the notion of time as the relation of
successive existence--that is, the relation of priority and
posteriority, of past, present, and future.

3. The notion of IMMENSITY and ETERNITY--that is, an absolute continuity
and illimitability of being, the absence of all limit, all quantity, all
beginning and end, the attributes of the unconditioned Being. Let us
endeavor sharply to define these notions, which unhappily are too often
confounded.

1. The external senses in their different degrees, especially sight and
touch, give us the knowledge of objects that are _extended_ and figured.
The body I grasp with the hand or survey with the eye has limits,
outlines, angles, surfaces--that is, it has more or less EXTENSION. The
inner sense gives us the knowledge of the changes and successions of our
mental life. But, amid all these changes, I am conscious there is a
something which _endures_. What is that permanent something which I
apprehend under all the varying mental states? It is that principle of
personal identity which I call _I_--_myself_. To feel and know that I am
the same person under all modifications of my mental activity is to
_endure_. Through the aid of memory, which enables me to recall past
mental states, and the immediate consciousness of personal existence,
through all these changes I obtain the notion of DURATION. The notions
of Extension and Duration are clear to my mind.

2. Besides the notion of extended bodies, I have also the notion of
position, distance, direction among extended bodies. They exist in
various relations to each other; they are here or there, above or below,
near at hand or indefinitely remote. It may be the distance between two
particles of dust in the sunbeam, or the walls of the room, or between
the earth and the sun, or between the sun and the outermost planet of
our system, or between the earth and the remotest star which twinkles at
the outposts of the universe. Position, distance, direction are all
_relations_. And to all these relations I prefer, with Sir John
Herschel, to give the generic name SPACE.[111] Then I have no confusion
of thought, and no difficulty or contradiction in using the language of
Cousin, Hamilton, and McCosh, when they speak of "determinate and
limited space," "particular spaces," "parts of space," and "proportions
of space."

Along with the notion of duration (and succession of different states in
the same existence), I am conscious that this duration is capable of
admeasurement by common standards, and ideally divided into periods of
longer or shorter duration. This duration may be measured by successive
states of consciousness, or facts of domestic history, or, better still,
by the succession of day and night, or the relative position of the sun
in the heavens, the revolutions of the moon around the earth, or of the
earth around the sun. These are really world-measurements of duration.
Since, then, duration can be measured from any point and in any
proportions, it is clear that measurement is a purely relative thing--a
relation. Of any such thing as "pure time" or "absolute time" we have no
knowledge. TIME _is the measure of finite duration_--the correlation of
things successive. And if I confine myself to this usage, I am under no
necessity of using the paradoxical language of many philosophers, "time
is eternity!"

3. We come, lastly, to the notions or ideas of IMMENSITY and ETERNITY,
and we ask, Are these necessary ideas of the reason, or can they be
confounded with the relations of co-existence and succession on the one
hand, or with the attributes of finite extension and duration on the
other?

This is not a mere question of systems of philosophy or theology--it is
a question of facts. Are the ideas of Absolute Infinity and Eternity
necessary intuitions of the reason? The world of sense-perception, the
world of science, is phenomenal and contingent. All that is offered to
our observation is _limited_ and _temporal_. The universe surrendered to
our science is one of quantities and quantitative relations. It is
conditioned by number and form. Its extensions, spaces, and motions are
capable of admeasurement. Its worlds and systems are subject to
numeration. The phenomena of the universe are all subject to change,
they have beginning, succession, and end. But beyond the notions of the
limited and the temporal, we find in consciousness the ideas of the
_illimitable_ and the _eternal_; the latter always appearing to reason
as the necessary correlates of the former. The finite necessarily
supposes the infinite; the temporal necessarily supposes the eternal.
The two classes of notions are essentially different, and defy all
attempts to generalize them under higher concepts. The infinite is not
the totality of finite existences; eternity is not the prolongation of
finite durations. Immensity and eternity are absolutely and
unconditionally necessary ideas. I can easily conceive the non-existence
of any finite thing. I can, without any contradiction, suppose the whole
world to be destroyed. All which has a derived and a dependent existence
may cease to be. But we can not conceive the source of all existence
annihilated. There is one notion which it is impossible for me to
annihilate in thought, and that is the notion of absolute
being--underived, unconditioned, changeless, eternal being. Despite the
destruction of all determinate extension and all finite duration, there
remains a Supreme Reality, unlimited, unbeginning, and endless, as an
absolute necessity of thought.

Here, then, are two absolute ideas found in the depths of
consciousness--the ideas of IMMENSITY and ETERNITY; ideas as real, as
natural, and as necessary as the notions of extension and duration.
Immensity and Eternity are attributes of God. Extension and Duration are
attributes of finite, dependent existence. Space and time are relations
between co-existing things and successive events.

If by this somewhat abstruse and, perhaps, too lengthy discussion we
have succeeded in proving that Time and Space are simply relations
between co-existent things and successive events, which, apart from
things and events, have no reality, and are "nothing but the bare
possibility of body and change," then we have disentangled the Christian
doctrine of absolute creation from the embarrassment occasioned by
supposing "the coeval and co-eternal existence of Time and Space as the
_necessary_ conditions of the Divine activity." If Time and Space are
relations between things and events, then God, as the almighty cause of
things and relations, is the efficient cause of space and time, and the
creative act was not conditioned by them.

The affirmation of the necessary existence of Space, Time, and Number as
co-eternal with and independent of God,[112] prepared the way for and
rendered plausible the further affirmation of "the coeval existence of
matter as the condition and medium of the Divine agency and
manifestation."[113] For if Space, Time, and Number are eternal, _why
may not Matter be eternal_? But why stop with the assertion of the
eternity of Space, Time, Number, and Matter? "If we admit that there may
be something uncaused, there is no reason to assume a cause of
anything." If we admit the eternity of Matter, how can we deny the
eternity of Force? We can not conceive of the existence of substance
without some properties or qualities, and of all the properties of
matter, gravitation or weight seems to approach nearest to an essential,
necessary quality. And if we concede the eternity of matter and
gravitating force, why not admit the eternity of law--that is,
"uniformity of properties and relations;" uniformity in the results
arising from the motions and changes of matter? And when so much is
granted, why not grant that a consequent _Order_ of the universe must
also be eternal? why not grant that the universe is an infinite
succession of orderly phenomena without a beginning and end? After the
first concession that matter is uncreated and eternal, how can any one
refute the doctrine of Hume that the universe never had a beginning, and
that under some one or another possible phase--amid the infinite
possibility of phases--it is both eternal and infinite? How, after this
admission, can we deny that the universe is "a series of events existing
eternally in a state of order without a cause other than the eternally
inherent laws of matter?"

It would be easy to show that all those writers on "Natural Theology"
who have made the least concession in regard to this fundamental
question have involved themselves in entanglements and difficulties from
which they could not logically extricate themselves.

Dr. Chalmers contends that the mere existence of matter with its
properties and laws would not involve the affirmation of an Absolute
First Cause. The proof, he says, lies solely in the disposition,
collocation, and arrangement of these properties and laws in their
relation to each other, so as to secure harmonious and beneficial
results. So far as the argument for the existence of God is concerned,
he provisionally concedes that _matter, with all its laws, may be
eternal_.[114] True, he says that he grants the eternity of matter
simply for the purposes of his argument. But what right has he to grant
it for the purposes of his argument, and then to deny it in obedience to
the decisive affirmation of a "well-accredited revelation?" If Divine
revelation teaches the non-eternity of matter, this is for the Christian
a truth--a fundamental truth; and whoever surrenders or compromises a
fundamental position must finally fail in his management of the Theistic
argument. The intuitions of reason and the doctrines of revelation are
but separate rays from the one eternal fountain of light; and if we
ignore or compromise the fundamental truths of revelation, reason will
refuse to place her _imprimatur_ upon and give her indorsement to our
lame and halting proofs. This is strikingly illustrated by Chalmers's
failure to "construct an argument for a God" that satisfies the reason,
after he has affirmed "the eternity of matter for the purpose of
bringing out his conclusion" (p. 79). But Dr. Chalmers can not stop with
the simple concession that matter is eternal. Only grant its necessary
existence, and "it is impossible to imagine that along with existence it
should not have _properties_ ... and _laws_" (p. 75). Now, if the
admission that a finite, composite, divisible substance may be
self-existent, and have eternal properties and laws, is not logically
inconsistent, how can he show that these properties and laws in their
eternal action and reaction are not adequate to the production of a
series of phenomena which to our understanding may appear harmonious?
Can eternal laws produce any thing but order? The existing order of
things is the only possible order that could arise from the _necessary_
operation of eternal laws, and there can be no choice, design, or
purpose in the universe. Collocation, arrangement, adaptation, are only
subjective anthropomorphic conceptions we impose upon nature. If matter
and its laws are eternal, how will Chalmers extricate himself from this
dilemma? By this admission he places a weapon in the hands of the
anti-Theist, by which the latter may cut the teleological argument to
pieces.

My esteemed friend, Dr. Mahan, in his zeal to overthrow the ontological
proof of the being of God, and to vindicate for the etiological proof
the sole claim to validity, has been betrayed into a similar
inconsistency. That there is any _à priori_ proof of the being of God is
in his estimation a "wild chimera." "_Formation_ from pre-existing
materials" constitutes "the exclusive basis" of Natural Theology.[115]
Matter, then, _may_ be eternal, and an infinite series of events
existing in a state of order is conceivable and possible. At page 85 of
his "Natural Theology" he writes: "Mr. Hume has undeniably announced the
truth _as it is_ upon this subject, to wit, that the idea of a nature
eternally existing in a state of order without a cause other than the
eternally inhering laws of nature, is no more self-contradictory than
the idea of an eternally existing and infinite mind who originated this
order--a mind existing without a cause." After several pages disfigured
by a labored effort to prove the possibility and logical consistency of
an "infinite series of events existing in an orderly succession," he
sums up with the imperious assertion that "the argument against the
possibility of an infinite series of events stands revealed as a
_logical absurdity_" (p. 88).

It is our deliberate conclusion, however, that the "logical absurdity"
lies in the position of Dr. Mahan. "The idea of order in the Finite
without a cause is no more self-contradictory than the idea of order in
the Infinite without a cause." Mark the two points which stand out
clearly in this strange assertion. First, the Finite here is
nature--that is, matter and its laws. Secondly, the Infinite is the
Supreme Mind. Dr. Mahan asserts that this _finite_ may be conceived as
_eternally_ existing--that is, as existing through _infinite_ time; in
other words, _the finite may be infinite_. For a thing or being, or for
a series of things or beings, to be at once "finite" and "infinite" Dr.
Mahan says "is not self-contradictory." This is on a par with the logic
of Hegel--"Contradictory opposites are identical." Again, we ask, Is
there no difference between "finite matter" and "Infinite Mind?" Is not
matter composite, extended, divisible, and limited? Is not Infinite Mind
unextended, incomposite, indivisible, and illimitable? The mere
existence of matter does not necessarily involve the idea of _Order_.
There are nebulæ existing in the universe "utterly devoid of all
symmetry of form, ... irregular and capricious in their shapes and
convolutions to a most extraordinary degree."[116] Wherever order is
presented, we instinctively and infallibly ascribe it to mind. Mind for
all of us, and forever, is the analogon and exponent of Order in every
sphere, irrespective of all knowledge on our part as to when or how it
had a beginning.

Furthermore, on the main issue we affirm briefly--if matter is extended,
it is measurable; if it is measurable, it must have definite limits; if
it has definite limits, it can not be infinite. Now that which is
finite, limited, quantitive, conditioned, can not be self-existent, can
not be infinite. Infinitude is illimitation by kind, quantity, or
degree--illimitation by temporal, spatial, or numerical relations. An
"infinite series" is therefore a contradiction _in adjecto_. "As every
number, although immeasurably and inconceivably great, is impossible
without _unity_ as its basis, so every series, being itself a number, is
impossible unless a _first term_ is given as its commencement.... Even
if it should be allowed that the series has no _first term_, but has
originated _ab æterno_, it must always at each instant have a _last
term_; the series as a whole can not be infinite."[117] If one thing
more can be added to the number of existing things in the universe, then
it is not infinite in number or in extent. In short, a series implies a
succession of terms, or members, or links; if there is a last term,
there must be a first term; if there is a last link, there must be a
first. Through an Unconditioned First Cause, originating and
conditioning all the members thereof, is a series conceivable or
possible. To apply to number or quantity the designation of infinitude
is surely _the_ "absurdity" in presence of which all others pale. We
grant that the term "infinite series" is employed by mathematicians in a
loose manner, to denote that which exceeds our powers of mensuration or
conception, but which nevertheless has bounds or limits--the
_indefinite_, but not the infinite;[118] such loose use of terms in
philosophy, however, is inadmissible. The final reply of Dr. Mahan,
"that the series under consideration is one which by hypothesis has no
first," is the extreme of absurdity. It is as though a man should talk
of a "round square" or a "bilinear figure," and when remonstrated with
as to the contradictory character of these phrases, should reply, "Yes,
but the 'square' under consideration is one which by hypothesis is
'round,' and the 'figure' is one which by hypothesis is formed by 'two
lines!'" Men may make all kinds of strange hypotheses, but the strangest
of all is that of an infinite-finite.

These incautious writers of "Natural Theology" all assert, as a
fundamental doctrine, that God is the Absolute and Unconditioned Cause.
We might ask, Whence do they derive this fundamental truth that God is
"absolute and unconditioned," if not by an _à priori_ rational
intuition? We let that pass, however, to press the more pertinent
question--How can God be "the absolute cause," if matter is coeval with
and independent of Him? And how can He be the "unconditioned cause," if
space, time, number, and matter necessarily exist as the _conditions_ of
the Divine agency and manifestation? If matter, with its essential
properties and laws, exist independent of the Deity, do not these impose
conditions upon the action of the Deity, and determine it to certain
necessary modes? If so, God can not be the unconditioned Cause. Instead
of one supreme, sole First Principle, there are at least two
principles, God and Necessity, and may be more. No system of Natural
Theology can maintain its integrity and consistency except by holding
fast to the fundamental postulate--God is the Absolute and Unconditioned
Cause of all things, of matter and form, quality and relation, purpose
and law.

And now, in conclusion, we may properly ask, Whence arises the necessity
for assuming the coeval and co-eternal existence of matter besides and
independent of God? Why should the theologian feel himself under the
necessity of prejudicing the Biblical conception of Creation by any such
concession? The only reasons we have seen assigned are, first, that
"creation out of nothing is discredited by the discoveries of modern
science;"[119] secondly, that "an absolute origination is inconceivable
and self-destructive."[120] In attempting an estimate of the weight of
these reasons, we would first suggest that the question of _absolute_
creation has been prejudiced by the persistent employment of the old
formula of "creation out of nothing," as though "nothing" contained the
cause of existence, and the universe was developed out of nothing. The
Christian Fathers, who first employed the phrase κτίσις ἐκ τοῦ μὴ
ὄντος, never indulged in such representations. The idea they sought
to express was that the production of "_otherness_," the awarding of
existence to something besides Himself, was an absolutely free act of
God which was not conditioned by any thing external to Himself--in a
word, that God is the positive original ground of all existence.

But who shall decide that this doctrine has been discredited by the
progress of science? What special discovery of modern science has so
revealed to us the ultimate constitution of matter, that we can affirm
its absolute reality and its eternal existence? Nay, are the most
advanced physicists and physiologists agreed as to whether, apart from
our subjective, ideal conceptions, matter has any reality? If we are not
utterly mistaken, the entire tendency of science is to reduce matter
from the rank of entities to the rank of phenomena. "The old
speculations of Philosophy, which cut the ground from Materialism by
showing how little we know of matter, are now being daily reinforced by
the subtle analysis of the physiologist, the chemist, and the
electrician. Under that analysis matter dissolves and disappears,
_surviving only as the phenomena of Force_."[121] We offer no opinion as
to the validity of this new doctrine, but are sure it is the doctrine of
modern science as represented by Faraday, Owen, McVicar, Bayma, Exley,
Wallace, Poisson, Poyntong, Laycock, and, we think, Huxley. If modern
science has resolved all our external sensations, even the feeling of
resistance, into "phenomena of Force," then, according to the doctrine
of Mr. Martineau, it had a beginning--"_phenomena demand causation_....
Supreme Entity needs no cause." "The universe resolves itself into a
perpetual genesis," and "the Theist is perfectly justified in treating
it as disqualified for self-existence."[122]

Sir William Hamilton contends that "an absolute commencement" is
inconceivable. All the conception we can possibly form of Creation is
"merely as the evolution of new forms of existence by the fiat of the
Deity." "Let us suppose the very crisis of creation. Can we realize it
to ourselves in thought, that the moment after the universe came into
manifested being there was a larger complement of existence in the
universe and its Author together than there was the moment before in
the Deity himself alone? This we can not imagine."[123]

There are, we presume, very few Hamiltonians who are prepared to indorse
this bold statement of their master. Mansel, the editor and annotator of
his "Lectures," has very distinctly and emphatically expressed his
dissent. "Whether it be true or not that we can not conceive the
quantity of existence to be increased or diminished, there is at any
rate no such inability as regards the _quantity of matter_. It may be
true as a fact that no material atom has been added to the world since
the Creation; but the assertion, however true, is certainly not
necessary. The power which created once must be conceived as able to
create again, whether that ability is actually exercised or not. The
same conclusion is still more evident when we proceed from the
consideration of matter to that of mind. Of matter, we maintain that the
creation of new portions is _perfectly conceivable_--as a result, at
least, if not as a process; of mind, we believe that such creation
actually takes place. Every man who comes into the world comes into it
as a distinct individual, having a personality and consciousness of his
own, and that personality is a distinct accession to the number of
persons previously existing.... Every new person that comes into the
world is a _new existence_."[124] Hence we are not justified in
asserting that all actual existences are only different modes of one
identical reality. We can not merely conceive, but we _know_, as a
primary fact of consciousness, that the _sum_ of existence, of personal
conscious being, which is the most fundamental reality, may be increased
in the universe.[125]

We readily confess that the act of creation--that is, _causing wholly
new existence_--is utterly incomprehensible to us; so are thousands of
other things. I am told by the physicist that eight hundred billions of
ether-impulses impinge on the retina of the eye in a second of time to
produce the sensation of deep violet;[126] and I believe it, but at the
same time it is to me incomprehensible. My reason affirms that the First
Cause must be infinite; and I believe it, but I can not comprehend
Infinity. No logician of the present day teaches that comprehensibility
is a test of truth. Is our finite capacity of conceiving or of doing a
standard for Omnipotence? The only question here involved is, Can
Infinite Power produce that mode of being we call matter? Does such an
exercise of Infinite Power involve a contradiction? I conscientiously
submit this question to my own reason, and I confess I am unable to see
any contradiction. To my experiential knowledge matter presents "the
essential characteristics at once of a _manufactured article_ and a
_subordinate agent_."[127] "This," says the distinguished Prof. Maxwell,
"precludes the idea of its being eternal and self-existent.... It must
have been _created_."[128] The notion of its origination by a Power
which is unconditioned and every way unlimited, satisfies my reason, and
affords the best solution of the problem of its existence. That it is
self-existent, independent, eternal--"a second other God"--is directly
contradictory. The original, primitive fountain of existence is _Mind_.
This must stand at the fountain-head. God is the sole and absolute Cause
of all things--of time, and all temporal relations; of space, and all
spatial relations; of the primordial element, and all its properties.
_The creative act was not conditioned by Time or Space or Matter._[129]





CHAPTER IV.

CREATION.--THE GENESIS OR BEGINNING.

"The laws of nature can not account for their own origin."--J. S. MILL.


Creation was the absolutely free act of God, unconditioned by any
pre-existing thing. Matter with its properties and forms, its temporal,
spatial, and numerical relations; Spirit with its life and feeling, its
ideas and laws--these had all their origin in the creative Word of God.
Whatever is, and is not God, is the creature of God. This is the
Biblical conception of Creation.

Origination and formation are so immediately and inseparably united in
the Biblical notion of Creation that the revelation of the one is the
revelation of the other, and we can not deny the former without
logically involving ourselves in the denial of the latter. He who gave
to matter its forms must have given it its essential properties, upon
which many of its forms depend; and He who gave to matter its essential
properties must have given it _origination_, for how can we conceive of
substance devoid of all attributes? Whether, therefore, the account in
Genesis "be found to have in view, mainly or solely, a universal or a
partial creation; whether the _principium_ there mentioned be the
particular beginning of the special work there described, or the
_principium principiorum_,--the beginning of all beginnings--the Bible
is in either case a protest against the dogma of the eternity of the
world, or of the eternity of matter."[130]

This notion of Creation as a pure supernatural origination is the only
one which reason can accept as adequate, satisfactory, and complete.
Formation without origination is a conception of creation which is
logically incomplete. It fails to meet the demand of reason for an
Absolute First Principle adequate to the production and explanation of
all existence. There are outlying elements of the problem which it can
not grasp in the unity of a Fundamental Idea. Matter with its
properties, Number, Time, and Space, with their relations, are still
lying outside of its field, and setting themselves up as self-existent
and independent realities, which by their apparent or conceded
independence must necessarily impose _conditions_ upon the Divine
activity, and perpetually embarrass the human mind in its effort to
think of God as the free and unconditioned Cause. Reason demands that
absolute unity shall stand at the fountain-head of being, and every
system of philosophy which allows of more than one self-existent and
independent and underived reality bewilders and staggers the
understanding, and vitiates all its processes of thought. After this
concession every argument for the being of God seems to us a _petitio
principii_.

Reason and Revelation, then, are agreed in the affirmation that the
Universe, both as to its matter and form, had its origin in the creative
Word and Will of God. How far this affirmation is sustained by the _à
posteriori_ inductions of physical science is a question of the deepest
interest, and to this we now invite attention.

This question naturally divides itself into two subordinate inquiries,
one relating to the _form_, the other to the _matter_ of the universe,
which may be thus presented:

1. Had the existing _Order_ of the universe a beginning? Had the forms,
relations, laws, and harmonies of the universe a beginning?

2. Had that which is the ground of all forms, the subject of all changes
and relations, a beginning? Had the _Matter_ of the universe a
beginning?

In regard to the first question, we remark in general: _The common
conviction of our race in all ages has been that the existing order of
the universe had a beginning, and will have an end._

It has been affirmed by some mental philosophers that mankind has an
intuitive and natural belief in the uniformity of nature, and the
consequent stability and permanence of the universe. Reid, the father of
the Scottish school of philosophy, says, "God has implanted in the human
mind an original principle by which he believes in and expects the
continuance of the course of nature." It is a matter of surprise that so
acute a thinker should have fallen into so flagrant an error. He has
evidently confounded our natural belief in causation with our acquired
experiences of uniformity. That "like causes will always produce like
effects" is a native intuition; but that "the same causes will always
continue in operation, and always operate with the same intensity," is a
mere presumption. Our faith in the uniformity and permanent stability of
nature is an induction from experience, and not a natural and necessary
intuition of the mind.[131]

Far from entertaining a belief in the permanence and stability of the
present order of nature, the great mass of mankind in earlier times
regarded the system of things as liable to constant interference on the
part of supernatural powers. In all ages of the world the existing order
of nature has been regarded as temporal, and the flow of terrestrial and
even of cosmical events has been conceived as liable to be broken up by
universal revolutions. The historical evidence of this universal belief
in "geological catastrophes" has been fully brought forward by Dr.
Winchell in his "Sketches of Creation."[132] Traditions of a primal
chaos and of periodic cataclysms are found among the Greeks, Egyptians,
Phœnicians, Chaldæans, Hebrews, Persians, Arabians, Hindoos, South
Sea Islanders, and the Aztecs. And among those nations in which the
physical sciences have been cultivated the same conceptions are still
entertained. As science has extended our acquaintance with natural
phenomena in all parts of the earth, and beyond the earth into the
celestial spaces, men have gradually attained a belief in the uniformity
of nature. But the doctrine of periodical catastrophes has not been
abandoned by scientific men. When men now speak of the uniformity of
nature, they use that term in a very large sense, and even loose sense,
as including catastrophes and convulsions of an intense and extensive
kind;[133] and, as we shall presently see, the most advanced and exact
modern science teaches us to contemplate a grand final catastrophe in
which all life will be extinguished on the earth, and the globe itself
shall be "ensepulchred in an extinguished sun." The attempt, therefore,
to represent the belief in the uniformity of nature as a universal and
necessary truth is vain. We have no _à priori_ ground for believing in
the permanence of the universe.

The common conviction of our race that the universe had a beginning,
that it has been the subject of great catastrophal changes, and that it
will finally come to an end, is not to be regarded as an insignificant
fact. As Herbert Spencer justly remarks, "We must presume that beliefs
that have long existed and have been widely diffused ... beliefs that
are perennial and universal ... have some foundation, and some amount of
verity."[134] Universal beliefs must rest on some common ground. That
common ground can not be experience. A belief which was as clearly and
confidently held four thousand years ago as it is held to-day can not
have been gradually attained by successive generalizations. It is
grounded on the fundamental antithesis between Becoming and Being,
phenomena and reality, the changeful and the permanent, the finite and
the infinite, the temporal and the eternal, which has been a necessary
form of thought to all minds in all ages. The human mind has never been
able to conceive these contradictory opposites as predicable of the same
subject. The universe as presented to sense is a perpetual genesis, a
ceaseless change; therefore it can not be permanent. It is a time-march
of phenomena; therefore it can not be eternal. It is limited by quantity
and quantitative relations; therefore it can not be infinite. Thus
reason has always conceived the universe as having a _beginning_, and
has confidently predicted that it will come to an _end_. All systems of
philosophy, and, indeed, many systems of religion, have been attempts to
explain "the beginning or origin of things"--that is, they have been "_à
priori_ theories of the universe."[135] Even Atheism itself comes under
this definition: it is an attempt to explain the origin of the universe
and of man on the _à priori_ assumption of the self-existence of Matter,
Space, and Motion. Thus all systems of thought, ancient and modern, have
had their birth in the innate conviction that there is something to be
explained, and that human reason is adequate to the task of furnishing
an explanation. They all assume that the universe had a beginning, and
their one, central problem is, "How are we to conceive aright the origin
of things?"

In what does this differ from the problem of modern science? It is true
that Comte would limit positive science to "the study of phenomena in
their orders of co-existence, resemblance, and succession," an idea
which the word "positive" by no means conveys. And Tyndall asserts that
"the man of science, if he confine himself within his own limits, will
give no answer to the question" as to the origin of things. At the same
time he admits that "he can clearly show that the present state of
things _may_ be derivative."[136] The great masters of science, however,
refuse to acknowledge any such arbitrary limitations. "The essence of
science," says Sir William Thomson, "consists in inferring antecedent
conditions, and anticipating future evolutions from phenomena which have
actually come under observation."[137] If this be the _essence_ of
science, then we presume that it is competent to throw some light on the
primitive condition of the universe, and give some prevision of its
future destiny. Did not Comte himself teach that the solar system was
once all nebula, and that it will yet collapse into an exhausted and
extinguished sun?[138] Is it true, then, that physical science by its
inductive inference of "antecedent conditions," does really furnish a
solid confirmation of the _à priori_ and native conviction of our race
that the universe had a beginning? Then most assuredly even physical
science is carrying us forward toward the ultimate unity of all truth--a
unity which can be realized perfectly only by the constant mutual
determination of _à priori_ and empirical knowledge, a synthesis and
equipoise of physical and metaphysical truths.

This is the most obvious tendency of modern science in its relation to
the question under consideration. Nothing is more remarkable in the
present aspect of physical research than what has been aptly called "the
transcendental character of its results." As George Henry Lewes
observes, "the fundamental ideas of modern science are as transcendental
as any of the axioms of ancient philosophy."[139] Palætiological science
in general has advanced by sure and steady steps, through careful
observation and experiment, inductive inference, and the application of
exact mathematical calculus to the recognition of the truth long ago
announced by Paul: "The things which are seen are _temporal_, the things
which are not seen are _eternal_." Dynamical Geology, Astronomical
Palætiology, Cosmogony, Molecular Physics, Abstract Dynamics, have all
landed in the same inevitable conclusion that "the existing order of
things had a beginning." Sir William Thomson's doctrine of the
"Dissipation of Energy" leads us, by sure steps of deductive reasoning,
to the necessary future of the universe--necessary, that is, if physical
laws remain unchanged--"so it enables us distinctly to say that the
present order of things has not been evolved through infinite past time
by the agency of laws now at work, but must have had a _distinctive
beginning_, a state beyond which we are totally unable to penetrate--a
state which must have been produced by _other than the now acting
causes_."[140]

The science of Geology reduces all terrestrial phenomena to the great
law of finite duration. If there be one scientific induction which may
be fairly pronounced legitimate and irrefragable, it is this one--that
the existing terrestrial economy had a beginning. "All organic
existence, recent or extinct, vegetable or animal, had a beginning;
there was a time when they were not. The geologist can indicate that
time, if not by years, at least by periods, and show what were its
relations to the periods that went before and that came after." He can
carry us back to the time when man did not exist upon the earth, when no
mammals existed; to the time when no birds, no reptiles, no fishes
existed--when even Huxley's protoplasm had no being; "when all creation,
from its centre to its circumference, was a creation of dead inorganic
matter,"[141] and when there was not one spore or monad or atom of life
throughout its dark domain. The form of the earth itself clearly reveals
its history, and points us to that beginning. Its bulging equator and
flattened poles, its pavement of congealed lava, which in some cases we
name granite; nay, the oldest water-worn pavement composed of the
detritus of the igneous rocks--all attest the emergence of our planet
from a molten condition, and a temperature[142] in which no life could
exist; so that even Tyndall admits "there are the strongest grounds for
believing that during a certain period of its history the earth was not,
nor was it fit to be, the theatre of life."[143]

The earth was once a molten mass heated to incandescence--a
self-luminous globe. On this point there is scarcely any difference of
opinion among scientific men. Furthermore, a large majority of modern
scientists regard themselves as justified in the affirmation of a still
anterior nebulous condition. If the nebular hypothesis is accepted, then
we are required to contemplate a period when the earth did not exist,
and when even the matter which now enters into its constitution was an
undistinguished part of the nebula from which the whole solar system was
evolved.

Many exact observations and mathematical computations as to the secular
cooling of the earth give results which are in strict accordance with
this theory of its primitive igneous condition. The observed facts
clearly indicate that the earth is becoming, on the whole, cooler from
age to age, and that the natural current of events is carrying it
inevitably to a state of total refrigeration.[144] The fossil remains
now found within the arctic circle indicate that at a period, not
extremely remote, tropical vegetation flourished, and forms of animal
life subsisted there which are now confined to the torrid zone. Mammoths
lived in the now uninhabited polar regions, and tree-ferns and the
tropical shell-fish found there a home.[145] The surface of the earth
was then warmed by internal heat which since that period has waned; that
heat has been gradually dissipated in the surrounding space, as a
red-hot ball suspended even in the warm air of a room must, according to
the well-known laws of radiation and absorption, necessarily part with
its heat.

Many experiments carefully conducted in our time show that the
temperature of the earth increases with the depth to which we
penetrate: "In boring for the artesian well at Grenelle, which is 546
metres deep, it was observed that the temperature augmented at the rate
of 1° Centigrade for every 30 metres. The same result was obtained by
observations in the artesian well at Mondorf, in Luxemburg; this well is
671 metres in depth, and its waters 34° warm." As the result of many
investigations in mines and borings, Sir William Thomson concludes that
the average inference may be thus stated--there is on the whole about 1°
Fahr. of elevation of temperature per 50 British feet of descent.[146]
If this increase is uniform--and we have no reason to suppose the
contrary--then at the depth of 50 miles there exists, says Helmholtz, a
heat sufficient to fuse all our minerals.

The fact that the temperature of the earth increases with the depth
necessarily involves a continual loss of heat from its interior by
conduction outward into and through the upper crust, according to a
well-known law of equilibrium of temperatures. "Hence, since the upper
crust does not become hotter from year to year, there must be a secular
loss of heat from the earth."[147] Thus it appears that from the surface
of the earth and the ocean, from thermal springs, and from three hundred
active volcanoes, the internal heat of the globe is incessantly radiated
into space and is practically lost.

Now this average loss of heat may be at least approximately measured,
and data are thereby furnished for determining the probable _age_ of the
earth, or, perhaps more correctly, its phase of life. If a man were to
find a hot ball of iron suspended in a room, and if he were carefully
to observe the distribution of heat in the ball, he would be able easily
to determine whether the ball were becoming hotter or cooler. If he
found that the inside were hotter than the outside, he would conclude
that the ball was cooling, and had therefore been hotter than when he
found it. So far common-sense would be his guide; but with the aid of
mathematics, and some knowledge of the physical properties of iron and
air, he could go much further, and be able to calculate how hot the ball
must have been at any given moment, if it had not been interfered with.
Thus he would be able to say, the ball must have been hung up less than,
say, five hours ago, for at that time the heat of the metal would have
been such that it would have been in a state of fusion, and hence not
capable of hanging as a solid mass. Precisely analogous reasoning holds
with regard to the earth: it is such a ball; it is hotter inside than
outside. The distribution of the heat near its surface is approximately
known--1° Fahr. of elevation in temperature for 50 British feet of
descent.[148] The properties of the matter of which it is composed are
approximately known. The temperature at which granite rocks are fusible
has been found to be about 7000° Fahr. This must therefore have been the
temperature of the earth in its primitive igneous condition. From these
data, Sir William Thomson has, by rigid mathematical calculations,
reached the conclusion that the consolidation of the earth's crust
commenced 98,000,000 years ago.[149] The rates of increase of
temperature _inward_ in a great amount of average rock at various
periods after the commencement of cooling, from the primitive heat of
7000° Fahr., are estimated by Sir William Thomson as follows:

"At    10,000 y'rs after commencement of cooling should have 2° per ft.
 At     40,000  "            "              "           "        1°    "
 At    160,000  "            "              "           "      1/2°    "
 At  4,000,000  "            "              "           "     1/10°    "
 At 100,000,000 "            "              "           "     1/50°    "

It is therefore probable that for the last 96,000,000 years the rate of
increase of temperature under ground has gradually diminished from 1/10
to about 1/50 of a degree Fahrenheit per foot, and that the thickness of
the crust through which any stated degree of cooling has been
experienced has gradually increased during that period from 1/5 of its
present thickness to what it now really is."[150]

We freely admit our inability to sit in judgment on the validity of Sir
William Thomson's conclusions. There are eminent geologists who
entertain the opinion that the secular cooling of the earth has
proceeded with much greater rapidity. It is, however, sufficient for our
purpose that the most distinguished physicists of the day are agreed in
teaching that _the existing terrestrial economy had a beginning_.

There are other terrestrial changes which engage the attention of the
geologist, and which force upon him the conclusion that the existing
terrestrial order had a beginning and must have an end. The surface of
the earth has at intervals undergone great changes in the disposition of
its land and water. That which is now dry land was once the ocean-bed,
and the ocean waves now roll and murmur over what was once dry land.
Sudden, or comparatively sudden, catastrophes have extinguished the
then existing creations, and the earth has been repeopled by new orders
of life. Changes are now in progress which are gradually reducing the
populous regions of the earth to the condition of the Sahara of Africa
and the Desert of Arabia. Upper and Lower Mesopotamia, the seat of the
ancient monarchies of Chaldæa, Assyria, and Babylonia, now present "vast
tracts of arid plain--yellow, parched, and sapless--which have now
become a bare and uninhabited desert." That ancient continent drained by
the Colorado, once as fertile as the Valley of the Mississippi, is now
the Great American Desert. "Every freshet burdens the streams with a
load of sediment; and the Mississippi bears daily to the Gulf material
sufficient for a cotton plantation. From the slopes of the Alleghanies
and the Rocky Mountains, from the broad acres over which the Mississippi
and the Ohio reach their silver fingers to filch from the land, the
sediments are stolen and carried away to the sea. The Western States are
slowly traveling toward the Gulf. The hills are melting, and even the
mountain cliffs are lowering under the ceaseless conflict with storm and
frost. The summits of the Alleghanies have come down 3000 feet from
their original altitudes. Give time enough, and the inequalities of the
land will disappear. The ocean will be filled, and again assert a
triumph over the continents which in the beginning were wrested from his
dominion." Thus by the storms of heaven, the erosion of the atmosphere,
the blasting power of frost, the gnawing of the tidal wave, the
mountains are being leveled, and the rocks and soils carried onward by
the rivers to fill up the basin of the sea. The headlong rush of the
avalanche, the murmuring of the brook, the roaring of the sea, the voice
of the storm--all proclaim, "The things which are seen are
temporal!"--"The existing order of things had a beginning and must come
to an end!"[151]

Astronomical Palætiology reduces all celestial phenomena to the same
great law of finite duration. It teaches that planets, stars, systems,
have their birth, their process of formation, their maturity, and their
slow, protracted decay. The ephemeron perishes in an hour, man endures
his three-score years and ten; continents and islands have their ages
and æons; the stars of heaven are not exempt from this universal law of
change and decay. According to the Nebular Hypothesis, the formation of
this our system of sun, planets, and satellites was a process of the
same kind as that which is still going forward in the heavens. One after
another, nebulæ condense into separate masses, which begin to revolve
about each other in obedience to dynamical laws, and form systems of
which our system is a matured example. The present aspect of this
planetary system is, however, but a passing phase in the history of its
fleeting life. Our planet was once a self-luminous orb; it has now
become opaque, and shines only with a borrowed light. The moon is
probably in a state of total refrigeration; its lunar air and lunar seas
have been changed by intensity of cold into the solid form.[152] The sun
itself is radiating heat into space in quantities incomparably greater
than it receives, and, as Helmholtz affirms, "the inexorable laws of
mechanics show that its store of heat must be finally exhausted."[153]
The planets in their motions encounter resistance from the interstellar
ether; they must, therefore, necessarily move in shorter and shorter
orbits, and at last fall into the sun. Thus the Nebular Hypothesis,
combined with the doctrine of a resisting medium, teaches us that the
solar system is wending its way, through successive changes, from a past
of vaporous unity to a future of consolidated reunion. "It was once all
nebula; it will, if left to physical agencies alone, collapse into an
extinguished and exhausted sun."

The astronomer who has been accustomed to regard every question relating
to his favorite science as almost exclusively a problem in mathematics,
will pronounce the above "a crude and adventurous" attempt on the part
of the physicist to solve a problem which belongs to "the calculus of
variations." Is the universe a Conservative or a Dissipative system?
Under its present laws will it run on forever, or will these very laws
in the end lead to its subversion? Will the mechanism of the heavens
finally run down as surely as the weights of a clock run down to their
lowest position, or are we authorized on scientific grounds to assert
the permanent stability of the solar system? This question has been
earnestly discussed by the most distinguished astronomers since the days
of Newton. Until recently, the general conclusion--reached mainly on
mathematical grounds--seems to have been that the universe is a
thoroughly conservative system, and that the celestial machinery by a
species of perpetual motion will run on forever. But must not all
applied mathematical reasoning obtain its data from the exact
observation of material facts? The mathematician must also be a good
natural philosopher; he must lay his account with all the facts of the
universe, otherwise his symbols have no contents, and his reasoning,
however faultless in its processes, will be fallacious in its results.
The discoveries of the present century respecting the correlation of the
various forms of energy, the nature of the solar light and heat, the
motions of comets, and especially the new doctrine of the "Dissipation
of Energy," have introduced new elements into the great problem, which
seem to indicate that gravitation is by no means the only force by which
the motions of the heavenly bodies are influenced, and that causes are
now in operation which are slowly but surely undermining the system. We
now find, therefore, such high authorities as Whewell, Sir John
Herschel, Sir William Thomson, Balfour Stewart, Prof. Maxwell, Dr. J. R.
Mayer, Helmholtz, Tyndall, Littrow, Comte, Adolph Fick, asserting that
the solar system is not a self-winding clock which may run forever, but
that it is a dissipative system which must ultimately lose all motion,
unless some power capable of controlling the laws of material nature
interfere to preserve it. We have no more valid reason for concluding
that the Deity intended the system should be eternal than that He
intended the earthly life of man should be eternal.[154] A few general
statements may assist the reader in appreciating the merits of the
discussion.

It has been observed since the dawn of science that changes are taking
place in the motions of the heavenly bodies. The eccentricity of the
earth's orbit has been gradually diminishing from the earliest
observations to the present time. The moon, also, has been moving faster
and faster from the time of the first recorded eclipses, and is now in
advance by about four times her own breadth of what her place would have
been had she not been affected by these accelerations.[155] In a few
thousand years she will be half a month ahead of the place she would be
in if her month were to remain constant. The moon is, therefore,
approaching closer and closer to the earth; and if these changes go on
uninterruptedly, without any reaction or adjustment, sooner or later the
final catastrophe must come, and the moon be precipitated on the body of
the earth.

Toward the close of the last century, Laplace, in his great work, the
"Méchanique Céleste," attempted by certain mathematical computations to
show that, nevertheless, the solar system is stable and permanent. The
planets, by their mutual attractions, produce perpetual perturbations in
one another's movements. Laplace believed he could prove that these were
periodic; they reach a maximum value and then diminish, oscillating
between very narrow extremes. He therefore taught that the machine would
go on by a kind of perpetual motion, without any winding up or
adjustment from without; and, consequently, the eternal continuance of
the solar system is insured.

All the investigations of Laplace, and the computations of Lagrange,
proceeded on two assumptions: first, that the planets are moving _in
vacuo_; and, secondly, that they are solid throughout their entire mass.
The latter assumption is certainly in conflict with well-determined
geological facts; and there is no _à priori_ ground for assuming that
the planetary spaces are void and empty. On the contrary, the general
analogies of nature would lead us to the very opposite conclusion, and
all attempts at producing a perfect vacuum have hitherto failed.
Furthermore, the great body of modern physicists, and nearly all modern
astronomers, hold that the celestial spaces are filled with a "material
ether," which must by its very nature offer some resistance to planetary
motion.

"Scientific men," says Mayer, "do not doubt the existence of such an
ether." The presence of such "material ether--dense, elastic, and
capable of motion--subject to and determined by mechanical laws,"[156]
is demanded for the explanation of radiant heat, light, and actinism. No
other theory ever proposed has so beautifully and completely accounted
for all the facts. Its reality must be admitted, until the positions
established by Huyghens, Young, Fresnel, Foucault, and Fiziau are shown
to be untenable. All the prominent experimental physicists of the
present day agree in teaching that light and heat are transmitted by
vibrations or wave-like motions in a material medium universally
diffused through space, and permeating all material bodies. Light and
heat are the ceaseless thrill which the distant orbs collectively create
in the ether, and which constitute what has been called the _temperature
of space_. If the existence of such material medium as the assumed ether
be denied, we can not account in any conceivable or rational manner for
the transmission of light and heat from the sun. And now, if the space
between the celestial bodies contain no other matter than that necessary
for the transmission of light, "that alone," says Littrow, "is
sufficient, in the course of time, to alter the motion of the planets,
and the arrangements of the solar system itself; the fall of all the
planets and comets into the sun, and the destruction of the present
state of the solar system, must be the final result of this
action."[157]

But it is further claimed by Helmholtz, Mayer, and Sir William Thomson
that the phenomena presented by Encke's comet furnish "direct proof" of
the existence of such resisting medium. The observations on this comet
made during the past thirty or forty years show that the periods of its
revolution are continually diminishing at the rate of 0.11° per
revolution of nearly 3-1/3 years. In other words, the comet's mean
distance from the sun is diminishing by slow and regular degrees. The
solution which Encke himself proposed, and which Herschel informs us "is
generally received,"[158] is that resistance is experienced from the
medium in which the comet moves; such resistance diminishing its actual
velocity and also its centrifugal force, thus giving the sun greater
power to draw it nearer. It will, therefore, fall into the sun. A
similar fate, says Helmholtz, threatens all the planets. "The analogies
of nature, and the ascertained facts of physical science, forbid us to
doubt that _every star_, and, indeed, _every body of every kind_ moving
in any part of space, has its relative motion impeded by the air, gas,
vapor, medium, or whatever we call the substance occupying space
immediately around them, just as the motion of a rifle-bullet is impeded
by the resistance of the air."[159]

There are also indirect resistances, the effects of tidal friction, on
all bodies which, like the earth, have portions of their free surfaces
covered by liquids, which, so long as these bodies move relatively to
neighboring bodies, must keep drawing off energy from their relative
motions. "Thus, if we consider the action of the moon on the earth, with
its oceans, lakes, and rivers, we perceive that it must tend to equalize
the period of the earth's rotation on its axis, and of the revolution of
the two bodies about their centre of inertia; because, so long as these
periods differ, the tidal action of the earth's surface must keep
subtracting energy from their motions."[160] As the tidal wave sweeps
over the oceans and rushes into the numerous bays and estuaries, the
motions which it produces in the waters necessarily involve an
expenditure of power or _vis viva_ in overcoming the resistance from
friction. The energy of motion thus expended must be drawn from the set
of machinery which produces the motions--that is, from the motion of
revolution of the moon, and the motion of rotation of the earth. It can
not be returned to the machinery, because all that is not spent in
triturating the sand and other materials composing the ocean-bed, is
transformed into heat and radiated into space.

It is true that in the present state of science we have not exact data
for estimating the relative importance of tidal friction, and of the
resistance of the interstellar medium; but, whatever it may be, there
can be, says Thomson, "but one ultimate result for such a system as that
of sun and planets if continuing long enough under existing laws....
That result is _the falling together into one mass, which, although
rotating for a time, must in the end come to rest relatively to the
surrounding medium_."[161]

Another evidence that the solar system is temporal, and that the present
cosmical order must come to an end, is found in the fact that the sun is
radiating heat into space in quantities incomparably greater than it
receives. If it were not so, we should receive, on the average, as much
heat from every other quarter of the heavens as from the sun, and no
vicissitudes of temperature would ever occur on the earth. Now, from
what we know of the nature of heat, it is impossible that the supply
contained in the sun should be inexhaustible. There is no apparent
reason why the sun should form an exception to the fate of all fires,
its only difference being one of size and time. It is larger and hotter
than ordinary lamps, but is nevertheless a lamp in which invisible
molecular energy is consumed, and consumed, too, at a rate which baffles
all conception. From every square foot of its surface the sun gives out
energy equal in amount to seven thousand horse-power. The total amount
of heat sent off from the sun in _one minute_ is "five thousand millions
of millions of units": a unit of heat being the quantity of heat
required to raise one kilogramme--or about one quart--of water one
Centigrade degree.[162] This enormous consumption of energy must finally
exhaust the original stock. Were the sun a solid block of coal, and were
it allowed a sufficient quantity of oxygen to enable it to burn at the
rate necessary to produce the observed emission of heat, it would be
utterly consumed in five thousand years. Or if we suppose, with Thomson,
that the initial form of the energy of the universe is the potential
energy of gravitation in matter diffused through space, and if this
potential energy (energy of position) is transformed into heat
(molecular kinetic energy) by condensation or contraction of the sun,
and this energy of molecular motion (heat) is again transformed into
radiant energy and diffused through infinite space, it is obvious that
this condensation can not be continued forever, and Thomson has shown in
his article on the "Age of the Sun's Heat" that its power of radiation
must come to an end. Various theories have been suggested for
replenishing the solar heat, one of the most plausible of which is the
falling of meteoric and cometary bodies into the sun. Prof. Thomson, who
was one of the first to adopt this view, has now abandoned it, or at
least has denied its adequacy to account for the maintenance of solar
heat. Even were the hypothesis accepted as valid, the supply of fuel is
still finite. Time will drain the entire space inclosed by the orbit of
the planet Neptune of all the meteors and comets. Even the planets must
at length be ensepulchred in the sun. "As surely," writes Sir William
Thomson, "as the weights of the clock run down to the lowest position,
from which they can never rise again unless fresh energy is communicated
to them from some source not yet exhausted, so surely must every planet
creep in, age after age, toward the sun." Not one can escape its fiery
end. And, finally, the heat of the sun itself--that is, its molecular
energy--must be transformed into radiant energy, and diffused and lost
as a working force in infinite space. "Thus do the inexorable laws of
mechanics indicate that the sun's store of heat, which can only suffer
loss and not gain, must _be finally exhausted_."[163]

There are thus special geological and astronomical facts which have long
been regarded as indicative of the principle that the existing order of
the material universe is _temporal_--it had a beginning, and must have
an end. But the modern Theory of Energy,[164] with its three great laws
of Conservation, Transformation, and Dissipation, must be regarded as a
comprehensive, complete, and final settlement of the question. It has
been shown, first, that no system of machinery can _create_ force any
more than it can create matter; and that the amount of energy in the
universe, or in any limited system which does not receive energy from
without, or part with it to external matter, is a constant or invariable
quantity. This is the _Law of the Conservation of Energy_. It has been
proved, secondly, as an experimental fact that, in general, one form of
energy may, by suitable processes, be transformed wholly or in part to
an equivalent amount of another form; and the sole and only function of
all possible machines is the conversion or _transformation_ of energy.
This is the _Law of the Transformation of Energy_. This law of
Transformation is, however, subject to the limitations which are imposed
by the _Law of the Dissipation of Energy_, the discovery of which is
mainly due to Sir William Thomson. He has shown that every machine does
its work against friction. "A material system can never be brought
through any returning cycle of motions without spending more work
against the mutual forces of its parts than it gained from these parts,
because no relative motions can take place without meeting with
frictional or other forms of resistance." No known process of
transformation is exactly reversible. Whenever an attempt is made to
transform and retransform energy by an imperfect process, part of the
energy is converted into heat, and the heat is _dissipated_, so as to
become useless because incapable of further transformation. It therefore
follows that, as energy is constantly in a state of transformation,
there is a constant degradation of energy to that final unavailable form
of uniformly diffused heat; and this will go on as long as
transformations occur, until the whole energy of the universe has taken
this form.[165] The reader will find an extended discussion of this
great question in Thomson and Tait's "Natural Philosophy," vol. i. pp.
188-304, in which it is shown that the present material system is not a
_dynamically conservative_ but a _dissipative_ system, and therefore
that in such a system "perpetual motion" is an impossibility.

Indeed, the Law of the Dissipation of Energy is an intelligent and
well-supported denial of the chimera of perpetual motion. There is a
loose idea that perpetual motion is impossible to us, because we can not
avoid friction with its consequent loss of energy, but that nature works
without friction, or that, in general, friction entails no loss, and so
here perpetual motion is possible; but nature no more works without
friction than we do, and friction entails a loss of available power. The
supply of invisible molecular energy in the sun is no more infinite than
the quantity of matter in the sun is infinite. The sun is daily lifting
huge masses of water from the sea to the skies, yearly lifting endless
vegetation from the earth, setting breezes and hurricanes in motion,
dragging the huge tidal wave round and round the earth; performing, in
short, the great bulk of the endless labor of this world and other
worlds, so that the energy of the sun is continually being given away
without any corresponding restoration. The loss of force in the shape of
radiant light and heat can never be weaned back to any other mode of
available energy. Carnot, Clausius, Thomson, and Rankine have all from
different points of view been led to the same conclusion. We can make no
use whatever of the energy represented by equally diffused heat. If one
body is hotter than another, as the boiler of a steam-engine is hotter
than the condenser, then we can make use of the difference of
temperature to convert some of the heat into work; but if two substances
are equally hot, even though their particles contain an enormous amount
of molecular energy, they will not yield us a single unit of work.
Energy is thus of different qualities, mechanical energy being the
_best_, and universal heat the _worst_; in fact, this latter description
of energy may be compared to the waste heap of the universe, in which
the _effete_ forms of energy are suffered to accumulate without any
further conversion.[166] If, then, when mechanical force passes into
heat, _some_ of the heat can never be brought back to be mechanical
force, and if the change from mechanical force to heat be ever going on,
all the force in the universe must at last take the form of radiant
heat. But if that be so, then at last all differences of temperature
must disappear, and every thing end in a universal death.

"We are come," says Adolph Fick, "to this alternative: either in our
highest, most general, most fundamental abstractions, some great point
has been overlooked, or the universe will have an END, and must have had
a BEGINNING; it could not have existed from Eternity, but must at some
date, not infinitely distant, have arisen from something not forming a
part of the natural chain of causes--that is, IT MUST HAVE BEEN
CREATED."[167]


So far, then, the deductions of science are found to be in striking
harmony with the teaching of revelation--the existing order of the
universe had a beginning; the forms, relations, laws, harmonies of the
Cosmos had a commencement in time. We may now proceed to the
consideration of the second question: Had that which is the _ground_ of
all form, the _subject_ of all changes and relations, a beginning? Had
the _matter_ of the universe a beginning?

That we may fairly present the answer which modern science offers to
this question, we must premise, in general, that it confesses its
inability, in the present stage of physical knowledge, to determine what
is the ultimate or internal constitution of matter. Many scientists of
to-day are of the opinion expressed by Grove[168] that "probably man
will never know the ultimate structure of matter." Others, as, for
example, Thomson, Bayma, McVicar, and Challis, entertain the opinion
that physical science is competent to discover all the minutiæ of
molecular actions, and when this has been achieved, the question as to
the ultimate constitution of matter can be finally determined. There is
one guiding principle, recognized alike by the physicist and the
metaphysician, namely, that substances, ultimate entities, are known,
and can only be known in and through their respective phenomena. An
exact enumeration and careful colligation of all the phenomena are
therefore indispensable prerequisites to the solution of the problem.

Meantime nothing is more remarkable, even in the present state of
physical science, than the fact that, under the subtile analysis of
modern physics, much that we have been accustomed to regard as phenomena
of matter dissolves and disappears, surviving only as phenomena of
_Force_. The phenomena of heat, light, color, sound, electricity, and
magnetism are now "modes of motion"--manifestations of one and the same
omnipresent energy, which is transferred from one portion of matter to
another, and modified or transformed simply by the mechanical
arrangements and collocations of matter. The opinion is rapidly gaining
ground that even chemical action is a mode of motion, and Professor
Norton does not hesitate in affirming that "_all the phenomena of
material nature result from the action of force upon matter_."[169] All
that we mean by a Material Force "is a force which acts _upon_ matter,
and produces in matter its own appropriate effects."[170] It is not an
attribute of matter, not a quality inherent in matter, but a mode or
state superimposed upon matter.

There is a large, influential, and daily increasing class of scientists,
among whom may be named Faraday, Prof. Owen, Dr. Laycock, Wallace, Dr.
Winslow, Prof. Huxley, who do not regard matter as an ultimate entity,
and who believe that all the phenomena of matter (so called), even
extension, resistance, and ultimate incompressibility, may be resolved
into phenomena of force. In other words, matter is only _phenomenal_,
and, like all phenomena, demands a _cause_.[171] These men are perplexed
with no difficulties as to the _origin_ of matter. As a phenomenon it
must be a product of Creative Efficiency, and therefore had a beginning.

It is obviously unnecessary that we should here discuss the merits of
this hypothesis which resolves matter into force. We shall encounter it
at a subsequent stage of our inquiry, and may then attempt to gauge its
merits. It is enough for our present purpose that Heat, Light, Color,
Sound, Electricity, Magnetism, are recognized as forms of molecular
Energy--phenomena of Force; that these forms of invisible molecular
energy, together with all the energy of visible motions and positions,
are regarded as flowing from one great central force, or fountain-head
of power; and that there is a remarkable unanimity among the first
scientific men of our age in acknowledging this power as the Creative
Efficiency of God. These forces uniformly work in obedience to Law; and
Law, whether viewed in the orderly movement of a planet or an atom, in
the symmetrical arrangement of a crystal of the definite proportions of
chemical combination, in the organization of a worm or of an elephant,
is intellect, is _reason_. This is the ultimate principle upon which
every condition of matter and form depends.

This conception of force will materially aid us in the conception of
matter. It is simply "the recipient of impulses or energy"[172]--the
mere passive condition for the exercise of power. "It does not generate
the phenomena which it manifests. It is only the substratum--it does
absolutely nothing but give to the phenomena their conditions of
manifestation."[173] Every molecule of matter, every aggregation of
molecules, every organism must be regarded as a machine upon which the
forces of nature play, and by which they are transformed and rendered
available for the performance of work. Thus matter, by its very
conception, must have been _created_, and fitted for the fulfillment of
a predetermined function. Before the mechanism of the universe was set
in motion, there was a preparation and collocation of its materials, and
an adjustment of its minutest parts. As Sir John Herschel justly
remarks, "Chemical analysis most certainly points to an origin, and
effectually destroys the idea of an external self-existent matter, by
giving to each of its atoms the essential character, at once, of a
_manufactured article_ and a _subordinate agent_."[174] The numerical
relations between chemical elements are the expression of creative
ideas. The maxim of the Pythagorean philosophers is daily receiving new
illustration from science, "The world is a living arithmetic in its
development, a realized geometry in its repose." There can be no
arithmetic without an Arithmetician, no geometry without a Geometrician.
Thus in the very elements out of which the universe is built, the blocks
of nature's temple, we see the indications not only of a fashioning but
of an _originating_ intelligence--a Creating God. Design as truly
appears in the primitive nature of matter as in its secondary
formations. The primitive purpose is stamped on the primitive article.

"Every molecule throughout the universe bears impressed on it the stamp
of a metric system as distinctly as does the metre of the Archives at
Paris, or the double royal cubit of the Temple of Karnac.

"No theory of evolution can be formed to account for the similarity of
molecules, for evolution necessarily implies continuous change, and the
molecule is incapable of growth or decay, of generation or destruction.

"None of the processes of Nature, since the time when Nature began, have
produced the slightest difference in the properties of any molecule. We
are therefore unable to ascribe either the existence of the molecules or
the identity of their properties to the operation of any of the causes
which we call _natural_.

"On the other hand, the exact quality of each molecule to all others of
the same kind gives it the essential character of a manufactured
article, and _precludes the idea of its being eternal and
self-existent_."[175]




CHAPTER V.

CREATION: ITS HISTORY.


The universe had a beginning. It is not eternal either in its matter or
form; it is neither self-originated nor self-sustained. The all of the
finite, with its relations and laws, its adaptations and harmonies, had
its origin solely and absolutely in the unconditioned will of God. This
is the Christian doctrine concerning the world.

In the preceding chapters we have endeavored to show that this doctrine
is in perfect agreement with the teachings of sound philosophy, and we
have found that it is daily receiving fresh confirmation from the
discoveries of modern science.

If the universe originated solely in the free determination of God, then
we are assured there must be a sufficient and ultimate reason for its
existence. This logically follows from the true conception of _Will_,
for will is not unconscious force, neither is it groundless
arbitrariness, but conscious, rational choice.

In the merely formal and indifferent sense of the word, an arbitrary
action is one in which the agent yields to the blind impulse of caprice,
and can assign no reason for his doing. An action is truly free only
when the agent knows _what_ he wills, and _why_ he wills it. The
self-conscious will is the only real will. Will is intrinsically
something more than power, something more, even, than the power of
spontaneous self-determination. Will involves precognition,
deliberation, and alternative choice: it is the living synthesis of
reason and power. "The mere moment of self-determination does not
suffice for the notion of will, for this, in a certain sense, we must
ascribe to unintelligent creatures, to the organic life of nature by
virtue of its development from its own principle. Self-determination
only thereby becomes will by its being a _conscious_ determination--that
is, the conscious subject is able to present to its own mind that which
it brings to reality by its self-determination."[176] All real volition
supposes a purpose or end to be realized, an inward motive or reason
which renders the end desirable, and the choice and adaptation of means
to accomplish that end. Consequently, if the universe is the product of
the Divine Will, it must, both in its origination and its history, be
the realization of an ultimate or final purpose, must have a perfect
unity of plan; and the highest law of the universe must be a
_teleological_ idea to which all nature-forces and all causal
connections are subordinated. This ultimate purpose forms, as it were, a
complete network of higher teleological connections above the web of
mere aiteological connections which pervades the universe.

This great principle that a teleological idea is the highest law of the
universe has been recognized by all philosophers of the spiritualistic
school from the time of Plato to the present day. Even Mr. Mill admits
that "Teleology, or the Doctrine of Ends, may be termed, not improperly,
a principle of the practical reason;"[177] and he advises those who
would prove the existence of God "to stick to the argument from
_design_." No saying of Bacon has been more often quoted or more grossly
misunderstood and misapplied than his remark on final causes: "The
search after final causes is barren, for like virgins consecrated to
God they produce nothing." If, however, we refer to his writings
("Advancement of Learning," bk. ii. p. 142), we find him adding, "_not
because these final causes are not true and worthy to be inquired, being
kept within their own province_." A fair consideration of the context
clearly shows that the remark was intended to apply to Physics, and not
at all to Metaphysics. All that he intends to say is that in purely
physical inquiries the search after final causes can have no practical
application; and the error he would guard against is the assumption that
what appears to man a final cause must be the ultimate final cause to
the Infinite One.

The belief that a principle of adaptation to special ends pervades all
existence, and that it must be assumed as the ground of the scientific
explanation of the facts and phenomena of the universe, is avowed by the
first scientists of the age. "We can not be content," says Dr. Laycock,
"with simply determining the mere relations of things or events--an
existence, a co-existence, a succession, or a resemblance--and not
inquire into the _ends_ thereof. Such a doctrine applied to physiology
would, in fact, arrest all scientific research into the phenomena of
life; for the investigation of the so-called functions of organs is
nothing more than a _teleological_ investigation."[178] "_A law of
design is the higher generalization of the great uniformities of
nature._"[179] In his inaugural address at the meeting of the British
Association of Science at Edinburgh, Sir William Thomson said: "I feel
profoundly convinced that the argument from design has been greatly lost
sight of in recent speculations.... Overwhelmingly strong proofs of
Intelligence and Benevolent Design lie all around us; and if ever
perplexities, whether of a metaphysical or scientific character, turn us
away for a time, they will come back upon us with irresistible force,
showing us through nature the influence of a _Free Will_, and teaching
us that all living beings depend upon one ever-acting _Creator_ and
_Ruler_."[180]

Every enlargement of our knowledge of organic nature is an addition to
the already numberless instances of recognized special adaptation which
crowd us on every hand; and all scientific discovery is but an
illustration and a verification of the _à priori_ intuition of the
reason that a principle of design is co-extensive with and the highest
law of the universe. Not merely of each individual existence, but of the
grand totality of existence, are we constrained to believe that it
exists for a purpose. Above all special ends there is a great ultimate
design of creation--a last or final end to which all intermediate ends
are means; and though physical science can not fully compass that final
purpose, yet in the light of its present knowledge of special ends it
has abundant reason for assuming that there _must_ be a final purpose,
and that that final purpose is at once beneficent and wise.[181]

But while the final purpose of creation may not be discoverable by human
science, we know that it has been revealed in the Christian Scriptures.

The most fundamental doctrine of Christianity is that _God is Love_ (1
John iv. 8, 16), and that Love is the highest determining principle of
the Divine efficiency. Creation, Providence, and Redemption are grounded
in Love as the final cause (Gen. i. 31; Isa. lxiii. 9; John iii. 16).

The gravitating point of the Christian doctrine of "God the Creator" is
not Omnipotence, nor yet Wisdom, but always Love. Omnipotence, in
itself considered, possesses no moving or determining principle. God
does not create the world to reveal his infinite power. Infinite Wisdom
devises the best means and methods for the Divine efficiency, but it
does not supply the ultimate reason why the world exists. The Love of
God is the moving principle of his wisdom and power in that it appoints
the _end_ to which omnipotence is related as the efficient, and wisdom
as the formal cause. Whatever displays of power or of wisdom may be made
in the created universe, they are all subordinated and made subservient
to the purpose of Love. The highest law of the universe is Love. "The
conservation of Love is the loftiest conservation of Force."

The world, then, was created to be a revelation of God, and especially
to be a revelation of the perfections of the Divine nature which are
grounded in and deducible from Love; and it exists as the
self-manifestation and self-communication of God to personal creatures
who can know Him and love Him in return. "That which can determine God,
absolutely sufficient in Himself, in the production of beings distinct
from Himself, is _Love alone_; consequently the creation is nothing else
than the free self-communication of God Himself, who could be
exclusively in Himself, but wills that others may have being and, in
fellowship with Him, eternal life."[182] The world-creating,
world-preserving Love of God has this for its ultimate purpose, _that
there shall be beings who, in the completeness and perfection of
personal existence, shall know and love and resemble God, and have
fellowship in his blessedness and joy_ (Matt. v. 8; 1 Cor. xiii. 12; 2
Peter i. 4; 1 John iii. 2).

The realization of a perfected humanity in fellowship with God is, then,
the final end of creation. We find some intimations of this grand
purpose in the sublime record of creation which is given by Moses. We
there learn that every thing was created with a view to man--to "man in
the image of God." The inorganic world exists for the vegetable kingdom,
the vegetable exists for the animal kingdom, and all exists for man (ch.
i. 26-30). All its successive changes were a preparation for the
appearance of man.[183] The more comprehensive revelation of the New
Testament teaches that man exists for the realization of that perfected
humanity of which Christ is the model, and which is attained in and
through Christianity. The idea of man is the teleological principle of
the world, the idea of Christ is the teleological principle of humanity.
All things were created _by_ Christ and for Christ. "The good pleasure
(εὐδοκία = the benevolent purpose) of the Divine Will" is, in the
fullness of time, to gather together in one all things both which are in
heaven and which are on earth, even in Christ, that in the final
consummation _God may be all in all_ (Eph. i. 9, 10; 1 Cor. xv. 28).

This purpose of Divine Love is an "_eternal purpose_," ordained before
the foundation of the world, and progressively unfolded in the creation,
government, and redemption of the world. Thus the world, as an actual,
temporal world, reposes on an eternal ideal world which has always been
present to the Divine cognition. The visible creation is but the
realization of the Divine ideal in such modes and under such conditions
as shall constitute it a manifestation of God to finite
intelligences--the external expression of the mind and character of God,
the language of the Deity.


Assuming this as a fundamental principle of Christian theology that
Creation is the self-manifestation of God, and that the final cause of
this manifestation is the communication of the Divine blessedness to
intelligent, personal being, we may logically infer the following
intermediate principles as _Laws of this Manifestation_.

1. _This manifestation must be_ GRADUAL, _not instantaneous. In other
words, it must be unfolded in successive steps or phases, so as to be
adapted to the nature and capabilities of the being to whom it is made.
The determinations of nature, like those of consciousness, must conform
to the law of progressive development._

Divine omnipotence was, no doubt, adequate to the production of new
beings without any pre-existing materials or any prearranged conditions;
but creation is not mainly or primarily a revelation of omnipotence. The
Deity might have brought the phenomena of the universe into instant
being without any succession and independent of all means, but a
universe thus instantaneously produced and simultaneously presented
would reveal no purpose to, and could not be understood by, a finite
mind. Finite consciousness can be developed only under conditions of
plurality, difference, and succession, and therefore the objects of
cognition must be successively presented. We may be sensible of the
external reality by immediate intuition, but we can _understand_ only
through experience; and experience supposes a gradual process--a
succession not simply in our mental states, but a succession of external
phenomena. This experience of succession constitutes our consciousness
of _time_. Therefore, in order that the Divine manifestation may be
understood, it must have a _history_.[184]

2. _This manifestation must be_ CUMULATIVE--_that is, it must afford an
increase of knowledge through successive additions; it must be an
advancing revelation of new principles and laws in an ascending line of
creative acts._

An evolution which is absolutely continuous, and in which the present is
the necessary outcome of the past, and that by degrees infinitely small,
may be a manifestation of unconscious force, but can not be a
manifestation of living Will. If nature be a manifestation of God--the
unfolding of an eternal purpose of Love--this manifestation must ever be
open to receive _new_ additions, the intercalation of new principles,
and the superinduction of new laws working for a nobler end. All
limitations from the scientific stand-point are illogical and absurd.
This law would determine our conception of the universe as an
aggregation of combined evolutions from several intermediate principles
or beginnings, rather than an evolution from a single first matter or
first force. _The creation of the new_, whether as primordial element,
or primary force, or principle of life, or rational soul, is the
fundamental idea of the _supernatural_--that is, the production of
something which is not a necessary out-birth from pre-existing
conditions and laws.[185] Therefore what is commonly, though perhaps
incorrectly, styled "miraculous interposition," must itself be a law of
the Divine manifestation, and the law of uniformity must be subordinated
to the more general law of progressive development, which subordinates
the inorganic to the organic, the physical to the moral world.

3. _This manifestation must be_ CONSECUTIVE. _Not only must it be a
succession of steps or phases, but the entire series must be so related
and concatenated as to present an Order of Thought--an ascending
development toward a foreseen and predetermined end._

If it were not so, every thing would be _isolated_ and _disconnected_,
and consequently unintelligible. There would be a succession of
phenomena, but no manifestation of thought; a series of dissolving views
presented to the sense, but no revelation to the understanding. Isolated
phenomenal changes might be continued through untold ages, but the past
would have no connection with the present, and would be unknown and lost
to all the future. A revelation of the Infinite Mind to finite
intelligences, made through the manifold and diversified phenomena of
nature, must be a connected and related whole, so that from phenomena
actually observed we may infer antecedent conditions, and anticipate
future evolutions; otherwise it could not be understood. To be
intelligible, a process of development must be the product of thought,
and it must reveal thought--that is, it must be _consecutive_.[186]

4. _This manifestation must be_ HARMONIOUS. _Notwithstanding its
multiplicity of parts and manifold stages, it must be a unity--a
Cosmos._

Beings the most varied in endowment, things the most diversified in form
and function, events the most remote from each other in time and space,
must all be related and connected in virtue of the ultimate and
all-embracing purpose for which the universe exists. An external purpose
revealed under time-relations must be an _all-harmonious evolution_ and
an _orderly totality_--a Cosmos.

Let us now turn to the record of creation as given in the Sacred
Scriptures--the Mosaic Cosmogony--and see how that account conforms to
the laws which on logical grounds we have deduced as the Laws of the
Divine Manifestation.

The fundamental prerequisite for a right interpretation of the sacred
narrative is a clear apprehension, first, of its general purpose, and,
secondly, of its special literary characteristics. On these two points,
therefore, we offer the following preliminary considerations:

1. _The design of the sacred narrative is to teach Theology and not
Science._ A cursory reading of the narrative will convince any one that
its purpose is not to enlarge men's views of nature, but to teach them
something concerning nature's God. It says nothing about the forces of
nature, the laws of nature, the classifications of natural history, or
the size, positions, distances, and motions of the heavenly bodies. From
first to last, every phenomenon and every law is linked immediately to
some act or command of God. It is God who creates, God who commands, God
who names, God who approves, and God who blesses. Strike out the
allusions to God, and the narrative is meaningless. Clearly, it was
never intended to teach science. It has obviously one purpose, to reveal
and keep before the minds of men the grand truth _that Jehovah is the
sole Creator and Lord of the heavens and the earth_; and it leaves the
scientific comprehension of nature to the natural powers with which God
has endowed man for that end.

All this is what we might legitimately expect. The narrative was
designed primarily and mainly for the instruction of the masses of men
who knew nothing or scarcely any thing of science; and if designed for
their instruction, it must be couched in language which they could
comprehend. A revelation made in the language of science would have been
unintelligible to the race for nearly six thousand years of its history,
and, practically, would have been no revelation at all. Scientific
language, moreover, is subject to modification and change as science
advances; but the narrative of Genesis was intended for all time, and
therefore needed to be couched in language not liable to change. "The
only language which possesses these two requisites of general
intelligibility and non-liability to change is the _language of
appearances_. The facts set forth must be described as they would have
seemed to the eye of man; that is, in a word, phenomenally, or the
cosmogony would fail of its purpose. All scrutiny or objection in the
matter of unscientific, or scientifically inaccurate language, then,
must be put aside as irrelevant."[187]

While earnestly maintaining that the inspired history of creation was
given for the instruction of unscientific persons, and is therefore
theological and not scientific, we also believe that all truth is one,
and that all revelation, whether in Scripture or in nature, must be
ultimately harmonious. Science in its last generalization must be
Theology. Theology in its proper development must be Science. They are
twin children of heaven, vestal virgins which can not be wedded to
error. We are, therefore, justified in the expectation that the
revelation in Scripture, when rightly interpreted, will contain nothing
that is inconsistent with the scientific interpretation of nature. While
we hold that there are no untimely anticipations of scientific discovery
in Genesis, yet we expect that when the scientific discoveries are made,
the congruity and dignity of the moral and religious lesson shall not be
defeated and marred. Nay, more, we maintain that the Mosaic cosmogony
presents the great principles which really lie at the basis of a truly
scientific interpretation of nature. It teaches that God is before all
things and the Creator of all things--that He alone is unbeginning, and
that all things had a beginning in his creative word and will. It
presents the universe as one harmonious whole, the product of one
designing Mind, the project of his thought, the transcript of his
plan--a plan evolved through successive stages toward a foreseen
terminus or goal. And, finally, it teaches that man is the end toward
which creation was tending, that he is the last and crowning work of
God, and that he is the child and charge, not of a blind, impersonal
force, but of a living, loving God.

2. _The sacred narrative is poetic, symbolical, and unchronological._ It
is a noteworthy fact that the early literature of the most ancient
nations was poetic--the natural, spontaneous product of that earliest
stage of mental development in which the conceptions of God and of
nature were determined by subjective feeling and native sentiment, and
not by reflective thought. The "Vedas" of the Hindus, the "Iliad" of the
Greeks, the "Eddas" of the ancient Germans, were each the product of an
age in which "prose was unknown, as well as the distinction between
prose and poetry." The earliest Hebrew compositions are of the same
character; and it is reasonable to assume that a primitive revelation to
the progenitors of our race would be accommodated to this earliest phase
in the development of mind.

The Book of Genesis opens with a _Psalm_--"the inspired Psalm of
Creation"[188]--"a grand symbolical Hymn of Creation." "The rhythmical
character of the passage, its stately style, its parallelisms, its
refrains, its unity within itself, all combine to show that it is a
_poem_."[189] Here is the same organic unity which marks the 104th
Psalm, or the Lord's Prayer, or the parable of the laborers in the
vineyard. Or, if we go out of the Bible for illustration, it combines
with lyric breadth of treatment and stateliness of movement all the
compactness of a "solemn sonnet freighted with a single thought from
beginning to end." Analysis of its interior structure exhibits a most
artificial synthesis, founded upon well-known sacred numbers. It has,
first, an _Exordium_, the proemial part. Then it is articulated into six
_Strophes_. Finally there is the _Epode_, or peroration. The six
strophes separate naturally into two groups, in which there is a balance
and correlation of parts celebrating the first three and the last three
concordant steps in the creative movement--the _Strophe_ and the
_Antistrophe_.

The exordium states briefly the subject of the poem: "In the beginning
God created the heavens and the earth."

The first three strophes unfold the creative development of the
receptacles:

 1. A. The luminiferous ether.                      } "The heavens
 2. B. Waters and the firmament between the waters. } and the earth."
 3. C. Dry land above the waters, with plants.      }

The second three strophes (or, more correctly, antistrophes) unfold the
creative development of the occupants:

 4. A. The light-bearers: sun, moon, and stars. } "And all the hosts
 5. B. Water-animals and birds.                 } of them" (Gen. ii. 1).
 6. C. Land-animals and man.                    }

The epode, or peroration, fills up the sacred number 7--the symbol
always of permanence and repose. "Thus the heavens and the earth (the
receptacles) were finished, and all the host of them (the occupants);
and on the seventh day God put period to the work which he created by
fashioning," etc.[190]


_THE SYMBOLICAL HYMN OF CREATION._

    EXORDIUM.

    In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.

    FIRST STROPHE.

    And the earth was formless and empty;
    And darkness was upon the face of the abyss.
    And the Spirit of God brooded upon the face of the vapors.[191]
    And God said, Let there be light:
    And there was light.

    REFRAIN--_And God saw the light that it was good._

    And God called the light Day:
    And the darkness He called Night.
            And there was evening and there was morning: one day.

    SECOND STROPHE.

    And God said, Let there be an expanse in the midst of the waters,
    And let it be a division of waters from vapors.
    And God made the expanse,
    And divided the waters which were below the expanse from the waters
     which were above the expanse:[192]
    And it was so.
    And God called the expanse Heavens.
            And there was evening and there was morning: a second day.

    THIRD STROPHE.

    And God said, Let the waters under the heavens be gathered
     into one place,
    And let the dry ground appear:
    And it was so.

    And God called the dry ground Land;
    And the gathering of the waters He called Seas.

    REFRAIN--_And God saw that it was good._

    And God said, Let the land shoot forth shoots:
    Herbs yielding seed, fruit-trees yielding seed-inclosing fruit
     after their kind upon the land;
    And it was so.
    And the land brought forth shoots;
    Herbs yielding seed after their kind, and trees yielding
     seed-inclosing fruit after their kind.

    REFRAIN--_And God saw that it was good._

            And there was evening and there was morning: a third day.

    FOURTH STROPHE.

    And God said, Let there be luminaries in the expanse of the heavens
     to divide the day from the night;
    And let them be for signs and for seasons, and for days and years;
    And let them be for light-bearers in the expanse of the heavens,
     to give light upon the earth:
    And it was so.
    And God made the two great luminaries;
    The greater luminary to rule the day;
    The lesser luminary to rule the night.
    He made the stars lights also;
    And God appointed them in the expanse of the heavens
     to give light upon the earth,
    And to rule over the day and night,
    And to divide the light from the darkness.

    REFRAIN--_And God saw that it was good._

            And there was evening and there was morning: a fourth day.

    FIFTH STROPHE.

    And God said, Let the waters swarm forth swarming things,
     living souls;[193]
    And let birds fly upon the land upon the face
     of the expanse of the heavens.
    And God created great leviathans,
    And all living souls that creep, which the waters swarmed forth
     after their kind;
    And all birds of wing after their kind.

    REFRAIN--_And God saw that it was good._

    And God blessed them, saying:
    Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the waters of the sea;
    And let the birds multiply in the land.
            And there was evening and there was morning: a fifth day.

    SIXTH STROPHE.

    And God said, Let the land bring forth living souls after their
     kind:
    Cattle, and creeping things, and land-animals after their kind:
    And it was so.
    And God made land-animals after their kind,
    And cattle after their kind,
    And all creeping things after their kind.

    REFRAIN--_And God saw that it was good._

    And God said, Let us make MAN in our image, after our likeness;
    And let him have dominion over the fish of the sea,
    And over the birds of the heavens,
    And over the cattle,
    And over the land,
    And over all the creeping things that creep upon the land.
    And God created MAN in his own image;
    In the image of God created He him:
    Male and female created He them.
    And God blessed them; and God said unto them,
    Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the Earth, and subdue it;
    And have dominion over the fishes of the sea,
    And over the birds of the heavens,
    And over all the animals that creep upon the land.
    And God said, Behold, I have given you all herbs seeding seed
     which are upon the face of all the land,
    And every tree which has seed-inclosed fruit:
    They shall be unto you for food.
    And to all land-animals,
    And to all the birds of the heavens,
    And to all creeping things upon the land wherein is a living soul,
    I have given every green herb for food:
    And it was so.

    REFRAIN--_And God saw every thing that He had made,
               and behold it was very good._

            And there was evening and there was morning: the sixth day.

    EPODE.

    Thus the heavens and the earth were finished,
    And all the hosts of them.
    And on the seventh day God put period to the work which He had made;
    And He rested on the seventh day from all his work which He had
     made.
    And God blessed the seventh day, and hallowed it:
    Because that in it He rested from all his works
     which God by making created.

Who can read this sublime composition without feeling that it is "a
solemn sonnet freighted with a single thought from beginning to end?" In
our English Bible, broken up into verses, and split across into two
chapters, it is like an image reflected in a shattered mirror; all its
real beauty is concealed. But he who can look upon it with a clear eye,
and grasp its real unity, must recognize it as a Sacred Hymn composed
probably by Adam, and chanted in the tents of the patriarchs at their
morning and evening devotions for more than two thousand years, to
commemorate the fact and keep alive the faith that _the world is the
work of the triune God_.

Besides being poetic, the sacred narrative is pre-eminently
_symbolical_--must be symbolical, because the Divine reality could never
be intuitively known. The facts transcend all the possibilities of human
experience. Whatever knowledge the writer had in regard to the creative
process must have been obtained in a preternatural way--that is, it must
have been revealed by Divine Omniscience. But such a revelation could
not have been communicated in mere vocables. Words are themselves but
signs--mere arbitrary signs of images and ideas--and can convey no
meaning unless the image or the idea be already before the mind. The
only natural hypothesis is that the knowledge was conveyed in a symbolic
representation--a vision of the past in a succession of scenic
representations with accompanying verbal announcements, like the visions
of the future in the prophecies of Ezekiel and the apocalypse of John.
The original formless nebula--the primeval darkness--the brooding Spirit
producing motion--the consequent luminosity--the separation of the
aeriform fluid into atmosphere and water--the emergence of the solid
land--the shooting forth of grass and plants--the appearance of the
heavenly luminaries--the swarming of the waters with living things, and
the appearance of birds of wing in the expanse of heaven--the bringing
forth of land-animals--and, finally, the creation of man--all pass
before his mind in a succession of pictorial representations of the
actual progress of creation. "The sights seen, the voices heard, the
emotions aroused, are just those adapted to bring out the very words the
_seer_ actually uses, and in both cases the very best words that could
have been used for such a purpose. The description being given from the
barely optical rather than from any reflective scientific stand-point
more or less advanced, is on this very account the more vivid as well as
the more universal. It is a language read and understood by all." The
words of the inspired writer are descriptive of the "vision pictures,"
and these were symbolic representations of the Divine realities.

The language of the sacred record must therefore be regarded as
_anthropopathic_--the Divine idea being symbolized under the figure of
human acts and affections; and from the analogy between the human and
the Divine we may conceive not what God is in Himself, nor yet the
manner of the Divine action, but the relation of God to the world. We
must, however, guard against substituting the human symbol for the
Divine reality, and making the human analogy a measure for the infinite
Being. "The Sacred Hymn is no more a _literal_ detail of the actual
process of creation than the description of the New Jerusalem in
Revelation is a _literal_ picture of the heavenly state."[194] God is
forever above all finite relations. Finite acts and relations may be
employed as representative symbols of the Divine, but they can never be
adequate representations. Divine creating and moving, commanding and
naming, seeing and approving, working and resting, must not be narrowed
down to the standard of our finite personality, and conceived under
human limitations. The conception of the Deity as standing outside of
matter, and moving and fashioning it after the manner of a human
artificer, as commanding and naming in human language, as being
conditioned in his action by the time-measures which He himself
appointed, as expending energy and then resting after the manner of a
human laborer, is the rudest anthropomorphism. God is eternal; neither
his being nor his action are conditioned by finite measures of time. God
is absolute immensity, essential omnipresence. He is "in all and through
all" as truly as He is "above and before all." He is a Living Power
immanent in all matter, as well as transcending all matter, moving it,
organizing it, vitalizing it continually--a Living Power working from
_within_, rather than a mechanical force acting from _without_.

If the primitive composition standing at the commencement of Genesis be
"the Symbolical Hymn of Creation," we are not permitted to regard it as
_chronological_--that is, we are not justified in expecting that it
shall conform to time-measures which had no existence prior to the
creative act, but which were consequent upon and determined by the
creative act. This is obvious both from the nature of things and the
character of the composition.

The 106th Psalm is an epic poem--that is, it is a narrative in poetic
measure, a history in metrical form. Who will be so unreasonable as to
demand that this Psalm shall furnish any chronological data, or conform
to any time-measures whatever? Psalms are composed to be sung and excite
emotion, not to be merely read and criticised. The poet groups his
materials for the best moral effect, and arranges his numbers to secure
rhythm and harmony. It is simply absurd to demand that there shall be
any chronology--nay, it spoils the grand effect to think of chronology
in reading the "Symbolical Hymn of Creation." In fact, we are forbidden
to think of time at all by the first word of the exordium, which states
the subject of the poem. The Hebrew _bereshith_, the Greek ἐν ἀρχῆ = in
Beginning (not in _the_ Beginning, for the article is not used), has _no
relation to succession in time_. It denotes _pretemporality_, and is
rendered by Meyer, Keil, and others--"before time or in eternity." It is
the same thought which is presented in John i. 1: "In the beginning was
the Word;" and Tholuck and Dean Alford both read the text, "_Before the
world was, or before time was_." Indeed, the whole poem represents an
ideal conception, and not a time-march of phenomena. So assured are we
on this point that we confidently affirm that no one who endeavors to
think of the creation in its relation to God can ever fall into the
anthropomorphic error of saying that "God's ways are like unto our
ways," "God's speaking is like unto our speaking," "God's working and
resting are like unto our working and resting," and "God's days are like
unto our days of twenty-four hours." As Dr. Whedon remarks, "Our
traditional unscientific scientific constructions of this chapter are
Japhetic interpretations of a Semitic text."

The men who persist in regarding "the day of God" as a natural day of
twenty-four hours are involved in numberless inconsistencies when they
attempt to carry their rigid preconception throughout the whole Bible.
Human or finite measures of time, when applied to any thing God does,
can only be accommodated representations to meet our feeble
comprehension, and we are constantly guarded, in the Bible itself,
against a literal and anthropomorphic conception. "Hast thou eyes of
flesh, or seest thou as man seeth? Are thy days as man's days?" (Job x.
4, 5.) To say that God's days of working are like our days is just as
absurd and as degrading a conception as to say that God's eyes are "eyes
of flesh," like ours. Our time-measures can not condition the Divine
action. "One day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand
years as one day" (2 Peter iii. 8); which means that time is as nothing
with God, that time does not condition the Divine life or the Divine
action, but that it is the Divine action which makes and conditions all
time. _The beginning of the world is the beginning of time_, and time is
the duration of the world measured into equal parts by the equable
motion of bodies in space.[195] The attempt to measure the creating work
of God by days of twenty-four hours is just as absurd as the attempt to
measure immensity by a three-foot rule, or to estimate omnipotence by
horse-power.

Let any one test the twenty-four-hour measure on such texts as the
following: "Your father Abraham desired to see my _day_." "The _day_ of
the Son of Man." "I must work the works of him that sent me while it is
_day_." "If thou hadst known in this thy _day_." "He shall rise again in
the resurrection at the last _day_." "The _day_ of salvation." "The
_day_ of judgment." "The terrible _day_ of the Lord." It would be a
wholesome and profitable exercise to take up the Concordance and refer
to all the texts in which the word "day" stands in any relation to the
determinations or doings of God, and it will be found that it is always
an indefinite period of longer or shorter duration, and may be
twenty-four hundred years, or twenty-four thousand years, just as well
as twenty-four hours.

The Hebrew יום (yom), first occurring in Gen. i. 5, is the name of
an indefinite period, a cycle of time radically grounded on the
primitive conception of division or separation. Light is the first
_separation_. It is "divided from the darkness." "And God called the
light _day_, and the darkness He called _night_." This is God's own
naming, and we must take it as our guide in the interpretation of the
subsequent "days." Obviously, it is not the duration, but the
phenomenon, the appearing itself which is for the first time called day.
Then the term is used for a period, or the whole first cycle of events,
with its two great antithetical parts--"And there was an evening, and
there was a morning, _one day_." We look into the sacred narrative to
see what corresponds to this naming. What was the night? Certainly the
_darkness_ on the face of the waters. What was the day? Certainly the
_light_ consequent on the brooding of the Spirit and the commanding
word. How long was the day? How long was the night or the darkness? The
account tells us nothing about it. There is something on the face of it
which seems to forbid such questions. Where are we to get twelve hours
for this first night? Where is the point of commencement when darkness
began to be on the face of the deep? All is vast, sublime, immeasurable.
The time is as formless as the material. It has, indeed, a chronology of
some kind, but on a scale vastly different from that afterward appointed
(ver. 14) to regulate the history of a completed and habitable world.
Whoever thinks seriously on the impossibility of accommodating this
first day to the measure of twenty-four hours needs no other argument.
The first day is, in this respect, the model of all the rest.[196]

It is equally impossible to reduce the "seventh day" to a chronological
standard of twenty-four hours. "And God rested on the seventh day from
all his works which He had made." Are we to presume that God "rested" as
we rest, because He was weary, and that He needed to rest just
twenty-four hours? Is not God "resting" still in the sense in which the
word "rest" is here used, viz., _to cease doing_ a particular work? Is
not all time since the Creation God's grand Sabbath, in which he is not
doing works of Origination, but works of Love and Mercy to our race?

It is obvious that the first and the seventh days can not be days of
twenty-four hours; and, furthermore, a clear apprehension of the nature
of the first day must open to us the true conception of all the rest.
The days are _new appearances, new manifestations, new developments_ in
the Creative Week--the great _day_ of God (Gen. ii. 4). According to the
analogy of the first day, the evening is the time of a peculiar or
partially chaotic condition, like the glacial epoch which closed the
Cenozoic and opened the Phrenozoic day. The morning is a _new evolution
of a new order of things_, which carries the world-formation to a higher
stage. With each creative morning there comes a higher, fairer, richer
state of the earth, until it reaches the Sabbath of the world, the day
on which God rested or ceased from his world-creating work, that He
might educate and recreate and redeem and glorify the human race.

In these antithetical movements of each creative day we are not
necessitated to assume a sudden catastrophe, or any return to the chaos
of the first day, any more than we now conceive of night as a sudden
return to darkness, or of day as the sudden return of light. There is a
steady progression, an orderly movement in the history of each creative
day, just as there is in the history of a single solar day. The light
does not break suddenly upon the world--the sun rises gradually upon the
earth. And so the creative day was a slow development, a gradual
evolution out of a prior order of things, by the direct efficiency of
God.

It has been insinuated that this is an interpretation which has been
forced upon us by the progress of modern science. Theology, it is said,
has been perpetually driven from her positions by science, and is now
compelled to take refuge in subterfuge and equivocation. The insinuation
is as false as it is foul. This mode of interpretation was propounded
ages before the science of Geology was known, and was taught by Jewish
doctors and Christian fathers for fifteen hundred years. St. Augustine,
the father of Systematic Theology, who was born A.D. 354, asks the
question, "What mean these days--these strange sunless days? Does the
enumeration of days and nights avail for a distinction between the
nature that is not yet formed, and those which are made, so that they
shall be called morning _propter speciem_ [_i. e._, in reference to
appearing, receiving form or species], and evening _propter privationem_
[_i. e._, in reference to non-appearance, formlessness, and want of
sensible quality]?" ("De Genesi ad Literam," lib. ii. ch. 14.) Hence he
does not hesitate to call them _naturæ_, natures, births or growths;
also _moræ_, delays, or solemn pauses in the Divine work. They are _dies
ineffabiles_; their true nature can not be told. Hence they are called
days as the best symbol by which the idea could be expressed. They are
God-divided days and nights in distinction from sun-divided. Common
solar days are mere _vicissitudines cœli_, mere changes in the
positions of the heavenly bodies, and not _spatia morarum_, or
evolutions in nature belonging to a higher chronology, and marking their
epochs by a law of inward change instead of incidental outward
measurement. As to how long or how short they were he gives no opinion,
but contents himself with maintaining that _day is not a name of
duration_, the evenings and the mornings are to be regarded not so much
as measuring the passing of time (_temporis præteritionem_) as marking
the boundaries of a periodic work or evolution. This is not the
metaphorical, but the real and proper sense of the word _day_, in fact
the original sense, inasmuch as it contains the idea of rounded
periodicity or self-completed time, without any of the mere accidents
that belong to the outwardly measured solar or planetary epochs, be they
longer or shorter.[197]

These are not the mere fancies of St. Augustine. This was the doctrine
of the ablest Christian fathers--of Irenæus, Origen, Basil, and Gregory
of Nazianzen. Nay more, it was the doctrine of many of the doctors of
the old Jewish Church. In more recent times we find Calmet, Burnet,
Stillingfleet, Henry More, Lord Bacon, Poole, and others, presenting
similar views; and this long before Geology existed as a science, and
irrespective of any supposed collision with physical induction. Their
opinions and interpretations were therefore no shift for the avoidance
of difficulties, but conclusions reached independently on sound
principles of Biblical exegesis.

Disregarding the chronology of Archbishop Usher printed in the margin of
our Bible, and the division into chapters and verses made by Hugh de St.
Cher--both modern inventions which are no part of the sacred
record--and purging our minds of those prepossessions which are
incident to an uncritical faith, we can now contemplate the Symbolical
Hymn of Creation in its simple and original form, as a record of the
_self-manifestation of God_, given in such order and under such
conditions that it shall be apprehensible and interpretable by the
finite mind.

1. _Creation was a gradual process._ God did not create a perfect
universe at once, but built it up slowly, step by step. A consistent
interpretation of the record forbids us to regard "the Creative Week" as
a literal week composed of days of twenty-four hours each. Creation is
the work of God, and surely the Divine action can not have been
conditioned by time-measures which did not exist before, but were
consequent upon the act of God. The great cyclical changes in nature
produced by the creative Word are the only measures of time. Therefore
the "days" of the Creative Week are _new appearances, new
manifestations, new developments_ in the creative purpose of God.

The first morning is the appearance of _luminosity_ in the aeriform
fluid, or nebulous vapor, whatever science may finally determine that to
have been. The Hebrew מַיִם (mayim), from the root ים, which denotes
_tumultuous_, _tremulous_, or _undulatory_ movement, is used of the
waters of the ocean, of the waters above the firmament, of vapor and
clouds, because of their susceptibility of tremulous, undulatory motion.
The first distinct creative formation was _heat_, or invisible molecular
motion, resulting from "the Spirit of God brooding upon the face of the
abyss;" and this heat reveals itself in the phenomena of _light_.[198]
How closely the ideas of light and heat were united in the Hebrew mind
is shown by the same word being used for both, with merely a slight
difference in pronunciation, אוֹר (ōr) and אוּר (ūr).

The second morning is the appearance of an _expanse_ in the midst of the
vapors, dividing the vapors which were below the expanse from the vapors
which were above the expanse. The Hebrew רֳקִיֹעַ (rakai), from רֳקַע (to
stretch, to spread out), means properly an extension, an expanse. This
is the translation adopted by Benisch, Kalisch, Delitzsch, Keil, and
Lange. After heat and light, the next creative formation is an
_atmosphere_, with its auroral light and a cloudy canopy.

The third morning is the appearance of _land_ and _seas_, and the
sprouting forth of _vegetation_, at first in its lowest forms--perhaps
as marine plants. The Hebrew אֶרֶץ (eretz) has two significations,
"earth" and "land." Whenever it is used in a restricted sense, and
especially wherever it is contrasted with "water," the most appropriate
rendering is "land." The third creative formation is _gross, ponderable
matter_, whether aggregated by molecular attraction, or compounded by
elective affinity, or selected and organized by vital force.

The fourth morning is the appearance of _luminaries_ or _light-bearers_
in the expanse of heaven, which are now "set," or, more correctly,
"appointed to give light upon the earth," and to be time-measures in
the future world-history. The Hebrew word employed in ver. 14
(מְארֹת), which is unfortunately rendered "lights" in the Authorized
Version, is a different word from the "light" (אוֹר) of vers. 3-5.
מְארֹת (meoroth) strictly means "light-bearers," or bodies giving
light. This distinction is carefully observed in the LXX., DeWette,
Benisch, Kalisch, Tuch, Knobel, Delitzsch, and Keil.[199] The fourth
creative formation was the establishment of such cosmical conditions or
relations as should enable the heavenly bodies to fulfill their
light-giving function to the earth. What those conditions were we may
not be able to say. The dense clouds and ceaseless showers of the "Age
of Rain," which had shut out the light of the heavenly bodies for a
geological age, had now passed away, the atmosphere becomes fitted for
the transmission of light, and the sun, moon, and stars are visible from
the earth. The conditions for a rapid development of vegetable life now
exist, and this is regarded as pre-eminently "the Age of Plant-growth."

The fifth morning is the appearance of _animal life_--life moving in the
waters and soaring in the air, marine animals, aquatic reptiles, and
birds.

The sixth morning is the appearance of a higher order of animal life,
_mammals_, chiefly designed for the use of a still higher being--for
_Man_, whose appearance is the noontide splendor of the sixth day.

The seventh morning is the commencement of the _Sabbath of God_, which
is devoted to the moral and religious instruction of humanity--the New
Creation of the moral world.

The following scheme, furnished by Dr. Winchell, presents at one view
the order of the Mosaic record, and at the same time sets forth the
harmony between the _Mosaic_ and _Geologic_ records:[200]

+----+------------------------------------------------------------------+
|    |  Genesis,   | Brief announcement of chief events in the history: |
|    |   ch. i.    |                                                    |
|----+-------------+----------------------------------------------------|
|    |             |   I. God the Creator of the Substance and Form     |
|    | Vers. 1, 2. |       of the Universe.                             |
|    |  EXORDIUM.  |  II. Terrestrial Chaos.                            |
|    |             | III. Darkness on the face of the Deep.             |
|    |             |  IV. Vivification of the Waters.                   |
|----+-------------+----------------+----------------+------------------|
|DAYS|             |    GEOLOGY     | GEOLOGICAL AGES|                  |
|----+-------------+----------------+----------------+--------------+---|
|I.  |  Vers. 3-5. |  Igneous Vapor |     Age of     |}             |   |
|    | Creation of |   condensing.  |      FIRE.     |}             |   |
|    |   LIGHT.    |                |                |}             |   |
|----+-------------+----------------+----------------|}             |   |
|    |  Vers. 6-8. |  Gathering of  |                |} ABIOTIC.    |   |
|    | Creation of |    Clouds.     |     Age of     |}             |   |
|II. |  FIRMAMENT  |Descent of Rain.|      RAIN.     |}             |   |
|    | or EXPANSE. |    Earliest    |                |}             | A |
|    |             |   Sediments.   |                |}             | Z |
|----+-------------+----------------+----------------+--------------| O |
|    | Vers. 9-13. |    Uplift      |                |}             | I |
|    | Creation of | of Continents. |     Age of     |}             | C |
|III.| DRY LAND and|  Appearance    |    LAND and    |}             | . |
|    |  of PLANTS. |   of Marine    |  PLANT-MAKING. |}             |   |
|    |             |  Vegetation.   |                |}             |   |
|----+-------------+----------------+----------------|} PROTOPHYTIC.|   |
|    | Vers. 14-18.|   Dispersion   |                |}             |   |
|    | Creation (or|   of Clouds.   |                |}             |   |
|    | appointment)|   Appearance   |     Age of     |}             |   |
|    |      of     |     of Sun,    |                |}             |   |
|IV. | LUMINARIES: |    Moon, and   |  PLANT-GROWTH. |}             |   |
|    |  sun, moon, |      Stars.    |                |}             |   |
|    |  and stars. |                |                |}             |   |
|----+-------------+----------------+----------------+--------------+---|
|    |             | Appearance of  |     Age of     |                  |
|    | Vers. 20-23.| Marine Animals |    MOLLUSKS,   |   PALÆOZOIC.     |
|V.  | Creation of |  (mollusks,    |    FISHES,     |                  |
|    |   AQUATIC   | fishes, etc.), |................|..................|
|    | ANIMALS and |  and Aquatic   |    REPTILES,   |                  |
|    |   BIRDS.    | Reptiles and   |    BIRDS.      |   MESOZOIC.      |
|    |             |    Birds.      |                |                  |
|----+-------------+----------------+----------------+------------------|
|    | Vers. 24-31.| Appearance of  |     Age of     |                  |
|VI. | Creation of |  Mammals and   |    MAMMALS.    |   CÆNOZOIC.      |
|    | LAND-ANIMALS|     MAN.       |                |                  |
|    |   and MAN.  |                |                |                  |
|----+-------------+----------------+----------------+------------------|
|    |Gen. ii. 2,3.|  Reign of Man. |     Age of     |                  |
|VII.|   Sabbath   | The Sabbath of |      MAN.      |  PHRENOZOIC.     |
|    |   of GOD.   |   Creation.    |                |                  |
+----+-------------+----------------+----------------+------------------+


2. Creation was _cumulative_--that is, it was a succession of beginnings
or creative epochs, in which new entities or new forces were inserted
into the already existing sphere of nature, carrying it forward toward a
nobler end.

This, we think, is the natural impression which the reading of Gen. i.
makes on the unbiased mind. Each creative word appears as the dynamical
basis of a real _principium_--a beginning of something intrinsically
new, and which can not be conceived as the physical result of any
pre-existing condition of things.[201] A new entity or a new force was,
as it were, inserted in the order of nature; a new impulse was given to
matter, or a new direction to existing forces, and from that initial
point a new series of developments, which go on in accordance with
law--a new succession of births and growths--flows on as a part of the
grand totality of effects we call "nature." This is, obviously, the
Biblical conception. Here creation does not present itself as a
necessary evolution from a first matter or a first force in unbroken
continuity, and without any supernatural interposition. Here are clearly
defined creative epochs, new beginnings, which have their origin in the
creative will and word of God. What these beginnings were is a question
of the deepest interest.

A careful study of Gen. i. and ii. has led us to the conclusion that
there is something fundamental and radical in the distinction between
the creative words with _bara_ (בָרָא) and those with _yetsar_ (יָצַר) and
_aysah_ (עָשָׂה). It is, in reality, the distinction between Origination
_de novo_ and Formation out of pre-existing materials. There are three
instances in which _bara_ occurs in Gen. i. We are fully convinced that
in each case it denotes the origination of a new entity--a real addition
to the sum of existence.

FIRST ORIGINATION (Gen. i. 1): "_In the beginning God created_
[אה = _the substance or essence of_] _the heavens and the
earth._" This is the reading of Parkhurst's Hebrew Grammar (1813), which
has since that time been approved by able lexicographers and
commentators. Some of these authorities have been already presented to
the reader.[202] But even aside from philological considerations, the
context forbids us to regard _bara_ here as denoting "formation," for
the product of that creative act was "_formless_ and
_matter-less_;"[203] that is, it was homogeneous, non-differentiated,
structureless, and destitute of all sensible quality--an abyss of
darkness and death, exhibiting that sole condition of matter, "perhaps
its only true indication, namely, _inertia_."[204] The first created
element was the single omnipresent fluid _Ether_, out of which all gross
matter was built by the action of force. As we advance in this
discussion we shall find that this is an opinion which is entertained by
the first physicists of the age, as, for example, Thomson, Tait,
Maxwell, Challis, in England, and Norton and Hinrich in America.

SECOND ORIGINATION (Gen. i. 21): "_And God created the great monsters,
and every living soul_ [נֶפֶשׁ הַיָּה = _soul of life_] _that moveth._"

The first created animals are here most carefully denoted as "living
souls," evidently to distinguish the life now first manifested in nature
from the molecular, "bioplasmic" life which organizes the vegetable
cell, and builds up the tissues of the animal body. The life here
indicated has an _individuality_ which separates it from the universal
life of nature. There is now an immaterial entity--a soul, which is an
individualized and indivisible centre of force, a soul which has
sensation, feeling, perception, and memory, none of which are properties
of matter or products of organization. The animal soul is not material,
neither is it a function or phenomenon of organized matter; it is a
creation, and therefore _bara_ is here significantly employed to denote
the origination of something new; a new power or principle is here
inserted into the sphere of existing nature.

The second created entity is animal life--_Soul_--somatic life as
distinct and distinguishable from vegetable, molecular, bioplasmic life.

THIRD ORIGINATION (Gen. i. 27): "_And God created man in his own image,
in the image of God created He him._"

The entire paragraph (vers. 26-29) is obviously the record of a
supernatural origination. There is a significance even in the change of
the _creative_ word. In regard to prior and inferior existences the
language is, "Let the earth bring forth!" "Let the waters bring forth!"
as though there were some parturient power in nature, or as though
nature co-operated with and furnished the conditions and means of the
Divine efficiency. But when man is to be created the language is, "Let
us make man;" thus placing the origin of man outside the chain of
physical causation, and ascribing it to the immediate agency of God.
Besides, the creation here spoken of is the production of a _spiritual_,
not a material entity. "God created man in _his own image_." This
creation can not be a formation out of a pre-existent matter, for no
form of matter can possibly bear any resemblance to God (Acts xvii. 29).
"God is _spirit_" and man can be like God only in so far as he is
endowed with a spiritual nature. Spirit alone can bear the image of God.
Whatever may be the teaching of Genesis as to the origin of the human
body, be it a formation or a development, there is no uncertainty in its
language as to the origin of the human spirit. It is an inbreathing from
God. It proceeded directly from Him. By no mere figure of speech, but by
a Divine reality God is "the Father of spirits," and man is the
offspring and the image of God. This likeness of God lifts man out of
the sphere of mere nature--it sets him apart in the essential
characteristics and endowments of his being as _above_ nature, and in
some sense _divine_.

The third created entity is _Spirit_; spirit with its reason, its
liberty, its conscience, its susceptibility of Divine inspiration, its
capacity for endless progression in knowledge and love.

Here, then, are three entities, _matter_, _life_, and _mind_ (= body,
soul, and spirit), which had their beginning in an act of absolute
creation, and are therefore to be regarded as primordial things.[205]
Their existence is the necessary condition of all subsequent formative
and developing production, inasmuch as all formation supposes a
something to be formed, and all evolution a something involved. These
primordial entities are the substratum, or ground, of all the mediate
architectonic creation which is effected by the moving and informing
presence and agency of the Spirit of God.

This leads us to the consideration of those creative words which are
_formative_, and which always presuppose the existence of real entities
as the condition of their efficiency; as, for example, "Let there be
light;" "Let there be an expanse in the midst of the waters;" "Let the
dry land appear;" "Let there be luminaries in the expanse of heaven."
All the dividings, the gatherings, the organizings, the ordainings, and
collocations suppose the prior existence of matter.

We have seen that the first act of absolute creation--the beginning of
all beginnings--was the origination of that mysterious entity which is
the recipient of impulse, or energy, and the physical substratum of all
sensible phenomena. From this initial point, the first _formative_ act
was "the moving or brooding of the Spirit of God upon the face of the
abyss." All the qualities which matter presents to the senses, all
physical phenomena, are the result of this action of the Deity upon
matter--that is, _they are all manifestations of force_.[206] "By
various motions of the nature of eddies (vortices) the qualities of
cohesion, elasticity, hardness, weight, mass, or other universal
properties of matter, are given to small portions of the fluid [ether]
which constitute the _chemical atoms_, and these by modifications in
their combination, form, and movement produce all the accidental
phenomena of _gross matter_; and the primary fluid by other motions
transmits light, radiant heat, magnetism, and gravitation."[207]

The first distinct creative formation was _molecular_ and _radiant
energy_. "And God said, Let there be light." By this "light" we are not
to understand light in its technical sense as distinguished from heat,
but rather as including heat, such light, in fact, as we meet with in
nature in the light of the sun, the same Hebrew word (אוֹר) being
used for both.

The second distinct creative formation was that wonderful mechanical
combination of chemical elements we call the _atmosphere_. "And God
said, Let there be an expanse in the midst of the vapors, and let it be
a division of vapors from vapors." The Creator has endowed the oxygen
and nitrogen of the atmosphere with the power of retaining the aeriform
condition under all circumstances, while the aqueous vapor is liable to
very great fluctuation. Were there no air surrounding the globe, the
quantity of vapor would adjust itself almost instantaneously to any
variation of temperature, and the maximum amount possible would always
be present at any given place; there could then be no clouds and no
genial showers of diffusive rain. "An elevation of temperature would be
attended by rapid evaporation, and the amount of water required to fill
the space would suddenly flash into vapor; while, on the other hand, a
corresponding depression of temperature would be accompanied by an
equally sudden precipitation of the aqueous vapor, not in genial
showers, but terrific torrents.... The drops, falling without
resistance, would be as destructive in their effects as volleys of
leaden shot."[208] The presence of a dense medium, such as the
atmosphere, retards these sudden changes, and determines the formation
of clouds. Thus "the expanse" is admirably adapted to the creative
purposes of "_dividing_ the waters from the waters."

The third creative formation was the _chemical compounds_ and their
molar aggregation in land and seas. "And God said, Let the waters below
the expanse be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry ground
appear." The chemical reactions, crystallizations, precipitations, and
sedimentary accumulations involved in the creative formation are
admirably sketched in Ch. VI. of Dr. Winchell's "Sketches of Creation."
The transmutation of the primary fluid into gross matter was something
more than a natural evolution--it was a "_creative_ action,"[209] and
the exact numerical proportions in which the chemical elements combine
must be the result of a distinct creative impulse.

The fourth creative formation was _bioplasm_, or that vitalized germinal
matter which is instrumental in building up the tissues and organs of
plants (and animals). "And God said, Let the land sprout forth sprouts;
herbs seeding seed, fruit-trees producing fruit after their kind wherein
is their seed." The vital force which is concerned in the formation of
bioplasm (vitalized matter) must be regarded as distinct, on the one
hand, from the physical forces which are efficient in the combinations
and aggregations of non-living matter,[210] and, on the other hand, from
that sentient, percipient, self-moving principle which constitutes the
animal soul. "The 'life' of a man or an animal is very different from
what is termed the 'life' of a white blood, or a mucus, or a pus
corpuscle; inasmuch as many hundreds of white blood corpuscles, or
elemental units of the tissues, might die in man without affecting the
'life' of the man; moreover the man himself might perish, and some of
the corpuscles remain alive.... By the _life_ of a man (or an animal)
something very different is meant from what we understand by the life of
each elemental unit of the organism, _and the difference is not merely
of degree but of kind_."[211] Bioplasm, or cell-life, is generic;
soul-life is specific, individual, and indivisible. The former we regard
as the direct effect of the Divine life, immanent in nature; the latter
is an individualized centre of force, "a delegation of Divine power
under limits of necessity." The physical forces are the action of God
_upon_ matter, the vital force is the immanence of God _in_ matter. The
first is mechanical, the second is vito-dynamical.

The fifth creative formation was the adjustment of the cosmical
relations of the heavenly bodies, and the establishment of such
atmospheric conditions as rendered the sun and moon the _luminaries_, or
light-bearers, to the earth. "And God said, Let there be luminaries in
the expanse of heaven to divide the day and night." What these
adjustments and collocations were, we are not able to say. The ultimate
cause of the sun's luminosity is yet an unsolved problem. No explanation
thus far offered has been accepted as adequate by the majority of
scientific men. The statement of Genesis, which ascribes "the
appointment of the sun and moon to be light-bearers to the earth" to a
distinct creative formation of some kind, is not, therefore, invalidated
by science.

The sixth creative formation was the _material organisms_ of the varied
species of "living souls" which people the _waters_; the seventh, of
those which people the _air_; the eighth, of those which people the
_land_. The final creative formation was the body of man, into which God
breathed the breath of _lives_, and in consequence of which he became
not merely a living soul, but a spiritual personality, a _spirit-being_.

The question whether the material organisms in which the varied species
of "living souls" are embodied were each the product of a special
creation, or whether later and higher organisms were derived from prior
and lower organisms by "filiation," so that "new species are new
births," is of little consequence to the interpretation of Genesis. The
essential element of species is a _spiritual_ entity. Specific existence
is a positive existence, an immaterial existence,[212] "a soul of life."
"It is not," says Dr. Winchell, "a primordial organic form: _it is the
life embodied within that form_--the principle which rules its
existence, moulds its features, determines its instincts, and conserves
its specific and individual identity. It is the principle embodied in
the ovum--often a mere microscopic organism--which unfailingly holds
fast to the specific type, and through all embryonic and immature
existence guides the progress of development in one direction, toward
one end. Here is more than matter: here is a power which controls
matter, controls chemistry--manifests its superiority to body, and
asserts its dignity as spirit." The establishment of a genetic
connection from the lowest to the highest material organism would not
decide the question as to "the origin of species." The origin of species
lies back of all material organisms. The species is a "spiritual germ,"
which acts upon and fashions the material elements, and through them
expresses its own characteristics. That therefore which constitutes man
a distinct species is not to be sought in anatomical peculiarities, but
in spiritual attributes. It is the image of God and the inspiration of
God which lifts man out of mere animal nature and makes him a _peculiar
species_--"one genus, and that genus the only one of the order."[213]
Nor would this title be affected by any theory about the mode of the
creation of his body. There would be nothing more derogatory to
Omnipotence, or even to human nature, in the conjecture that man did not
become "a living personal spirit" until he had passed through various
stages of animal life, than in the doctrine that he was fashioned
immediately out of the dust of the earth. There is as much dignity, or,
if the reader please, as much humility of origin in the one case as in
the other. The former is an extraordinary birth, consequent on some
mysterious action of the Deity on the course of nature; the latter is a
miraculous formation. The Hebrew text is as favorable to the one
hypothesis as to the other. The preposition "of," or "out of," is not
authorized by the original. Dr. Whedon reads the whole passage as
follows: "And God developed [וַיִּיצֶר] the man--dust of the earth--and
breathed into his nostrils the breath of lives, and the man became to a
living person."[214] If the body of the second Adam, the Divine Man, was
a birth (a miraculous birth), we do not see that any one need be shocked
at the suggestion that the body of the first Adam was also an
extraordinary or supernatural birth. Science may have free scope to
settle the problem on purely inductive grounds.

The following scheme will exhibit our conception of the cumulative
character of the creative development:

 ORIGINATIONS.|(בָּרָא)                |FORMATIONS (עָשָׂה = יִצֶר).
              |                     |
 Primal       |"The Spirit of God   |
 Element.     |MOVED _upon_ the face|
              |  of the abyss."     |
              |                     |
              |MECHANICAL}..........|ENERGY.
              |FORCE,    }          |
              |     .               |
              |       .             |{ Vortex  }
              |         .           |{ Motion, } CHEMICAL ATOMS.
              |           .         |{
              |             .       |{Molecular} SENSIBLE AND
              |               .     |{ Energy, } LATENT HEAT.
  ETHER.......|.....................|{ Radiant }
              |                     |{ Energy, } RADIANT HEAT AND LIGHT.
              |                     |{
              |                     |{ Molar   {AIR,
              |                     |{ Energy, {WATER,
              |                     |          {LAND and SEAS.
              |                     |
              |VITAL FORCE..........|Vitality.....BIOPLASM = PLANTS.
              |                     |\_________  __________/
              |                     |          \/
              |                     |           .     {MOLLUSKS,
              |                     |             .   {FISHES,
 LIVING}......|.....................|................ {REPTILES,
 SOUL, }      |                     |                 {BIRDS,
              |                     |                 {MAMMALS,
              |                     |                  \__  __/
              |                     |                     \/
              |                     |                      |..}
 RATIONAL}....|.....................|.........................}MAN.
 SPIRIT, }    |  INSPIRATION.       |

3. _Creation was consecutive._ The creative epochs follow each other in
a manifest Order of Thought. The reasons for this order are obvious on
the face of the sacred narrative, so that we are constrained to regard
the creative process as the realization of a purpose, the development
of a foreseen and predetermined plan.

This is clearly manifest from the aptly styled "pauses of contemplation"
which occur in the progress of the sacred narrative. At each stage of
the creative work the Deity is represented as surveying that already
finished, and pronouncing it "_good_" (טוֹב = καλόν, fair and good). This
may seem strange when viewed apart from the completed plan. What good,
one might ask, is the light when there is no eye to see? What good the
expanse of heaven, the land and seas, with none to inhabit them? What
good the plants with none to use them? But the Intelligence that foresaw
the end toward which the creative process was tending could recognize
the fitness and the beauty of each new element of creation as
contributing to that completed whole, which, when realized, is
pronounced "_very good_." Thus each stage of the advancing work of
creation is pronounced "good" in view of its subordination to the
ultimate purpose, which is the highest "good." Each is a step upward and
onward, and is "good" as a preparation and a means for a better that is
yet to come. Thus the reading of the sacred Hymn of Creation leaves the
decided impression that a chain of subordination and interdependence
runs through the entire organic and inorganic creation, binding the
whole together in an ideal unity. All the laws and results of the past
are brought forward, and become a prelude and a preparation for the
future developments. The earlier stages of the creation furnish the
conditions for the later stages, and are in some sense a prophecy of
what is to come. The successive stages of creation are thus results, in
part, of a "nature"--a constitution and order of things already
established, and in part of a new impulse carrying nature forward toward
the predestinated goal.

The more extended our acquaintance with the actual economy of nature,
the more does the subordination and interdependence of the creative
epochs become manifest, and the more are we convinced that "the law of
consecution" which reveals itself in the sacred narrative is a real law
of the universe.

The existence of radiant energy (heat and light), is the fundamental
precondition of all the subsequent creative formations. It is more
universal than gravitation, and absolutely co-extensive with the
universe,[215] the connecting bond between all worlds. It determines the
temperature of space, of the atmosphere, and of the earth, and, in fact,
most of the phenomena of meteorology. It is essential to the life and
growth of the plant, and ultimately of the animal; without it, indeed,
no life could exist upon the earth. Next in importance is the
atmosphere, which has peculiar relations to light and heat. It softens
the intensity of light, and diffuses it in every direction; it absorbs
and retains heat, and, infolding the earth as with a mantle, keeps it
warm. It conditions the formation of clouds, and determines the fall of
genial showers. It is the medium in which combustion and change, and all
the phenomena of life, take place. Its oxygen has been the chief
world-builder, and its nitrogen has been aptly styled the _zoögen_ or
generator of life. The gathering of the waters into lakes and seas, the
phenomena of aqueous circulation, the formation of soils through its
agency--these were all preconditions of vegetable life. "Reasoning
deductively, it is equally presumable that vegetable life preceded
animal life in order of appearance.... Vegetation is capable of drawing
its sustenance from the mineral world, while animals rely exclusively
upon organic food. The vegetable stands between the animal and the
mineral, performing a sort of commissary function in behalf of the
animal. The animal--even the carnivorous animal--implies the vegetable.
All things considered, we are led to believe that plant life had a
history upon our earth a full epoch before the existence of
animals."[216] Finally, all geological preparations and ideas converge
in man. "The beneficent provisions of the earth's crust not only
prophesy man, but they reach their finality in man. It was only for
human uses that the coal was treasured in the recesses of the earth; for
human uses alone the mountains have lifted up their burdens of iron; for
human uses only the grandest movements of geological history elaborated
and distributed the soils. It is only for man that the forests yield
their abundant supplies of timber and fuel. For man the edible and
medicinal vegetables were provided. For man the natures of the domestic
animals were moulded, and their domestic attachments are directed to no
other being."[217] Thus through the long ages of geological time the
earth was preparing for the dwelling-place of man, and in the earliest
forms of animal life his coming was prefigured and foretold.

4. _The completed creation is a Divine harmony._ This is the abiding
impression which the sublime Psalm of Creation leaves upon our minds as
we close the book. It has taught us this final lesson, that the universe
is the manifestation of _one grand creative thought_, as comprehensive
in the diversity of its parts as it is complete in the unity of its
plan. We learn, not merely that God made all the parts of the universe,
but that He made each part for a specific purpose, and that all the
separate and successive parts are chords in nature's music, parts of
creation's anthem of perpetual praise. The Symbolical Hymn of Creation,
with its striking parallelisms, its balance and correlation of parts,
its harmonic numbers (3 and 7 and 10, the symbols of perfection), its
pauses and refrains, its rhythm and unity symbolizes the universal
prevalence of _Law_ in nature; reveals a changeless _Order_ in respect
to space and time, to number and form; suggests harmonious _relations_
between terrestrial conditions and cosmical adjustments, between organic
and inorganic existence, and accords with the wonderful rhythm which
pervades the Cosmos.

The glorious mansion is first built, then furnished. A triad of days is
devoted to its architecture, a triad to its occupants. The former
describes a series of _dividings_ and _combinings_, the latter portrays
a series of _formations_ and _vivifications_. "The last day of each era
includes one work typical of the era, and another related to it in
essential points, but also prophetic of the future. Vegetation, while,
for physical reasons, a part of the creation of the third day, was also
prophetic of the future Organic era, in which the progress of life was
the grand characteristic. The record thus accords with the fundamental
principle in history that the characteristic of an age has its
beginnings within the age preceding. So, again, man, while like other
mammals in structure, even to the homologies of every bone and muscle,
was endowed with a spiritual nature which looked forward to another era,
that of spiritual existence. The seventh "day," the day of rest from the
work of creation, is man's period of preparation for that new existence,
and it is to promote this special end that, in strict parallelism, the
Sabbath follows man's six days of work."[218]

The following scheme will exhibit the completeness of the parallelism:

      INORGANIC ERA.                ORGANIC ERA.

   I. Day.....LUMINOSITY.     IV. Day....LUMINARIES

  II. Day....{WATER,           V. Day...{MARINE ANIMALS, REPTILES,
             {ATMOSPHERE.               {BIRDS.

 III. Day.....DRY LAND        VI. Day....MAMMALS

              VEGETATION.                MAN.

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTE.

_The Principle of Teleology not affected by the Theory of
Evolution._--"It is necessary to remark that there is a wider teleology
which is not touched by the doctrine of evolution, but is actually based
upon the fundamental proposition of evolution.... The teleological and
the mechanical views of nature are not necessarily mutually exclusive;
on the contrary, the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the more
firmly does he assume a primordial molecular arrangement, of which all
the phenomena of the universe are the consequences; and the more
completely thereby is he at the mercy of the teleologist, who can always
defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was not
_intended_ to evolve the phenomena of the universe."--Prof. Huxley, in
_The Academy_ for October, 1869, No. 1, p. 13.




CHAPTER VI.

CONSERVATION.--THE RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD.

"The relations which unite the creature and the Creator compose a
problem obscure and delicate, the two extreme solutions of which are
equally false and perilous: on the one hand, a God so passes into the
world that He seems to be absorbed in it; on the other hand, a God so
separated from the world, that the world has the appearance of going on
without Him; on both sides there is equal excess, equal danger, equal
error."--COUSIN.


In the preceding chapters we have endeavored to present the Christian
doctrine concerning God, and concerning the world as the work of God.
God is a _person_--the unconditioned Personality, all of whose
determinations are from Himself. And creation is the voluntary act of
God, who freely chooses to award existence to other beings distinct from
Himself. If our scientific conceptions are in harmony with this
doctrine, we are safe from the temptations of materialism on the one
hand, and proof against the seductions of pantheism on the other.
Henceforth we must regard the unconditioned Being as essentially
distinct from the material universe. Matter with its phenomena is
limited in extent and duration, God is infinite and eternal. Extension
is not an attribute of the Divine substance. Succession is not a mode of
God's eternity. The Divine life infinitely transcends the dynamical life
of the universe.

Still there is some connection, some relation between God and the world.
Of this we have the fullest assurance, however incapable we may be of
comprehending the mode. The material universe is the product of the
Divine efficiency, and therefore the first and most fundamental relation
of God to the world is that of _causality_. The universe exists solely
through the will of God. It had a beginning, and the beginning of the
world was the beginning of time. Prior to that beginning there was no
succession, no limitation, no finite existence; only the eternal and
infinite One. The creative efficiency was put forth, and matter, as the
statical condition necessary to the manifestation of physical phenomena,
began to be. The Spirit of God moved upon the formless abyss, and
phenomenal change commenced its history. With motion and consequent
succession there arose the relations of time. With the differentiation
and collocation of matter there arose the relations of space. And the
wealth and fullness of inorganic and organic nature sprang up under the
directive, formative, and vitalizing energy of the Spirit of God.

But is there no further relation of God to the world, beyond that which
is involved in the primary and solitary fact of creative causality? Did
the connection of God with his works terminate in an event which belongs
to the inapproachable past? Did the Creator, in the beginning, give
self-being to the substance of the universe, and endow it with active
forces, so that it can exist and act apart from and independent of God?
Have the laws of nature a real efficiency, so that the further agency of
God is dispensed with, and the universe can pursue a fixed and
inevitable path of self-development without his control and oversight?
Or is God still immanent in nature, upholding all substance, the power
of all force, the life of all life, shaping all forms, and organizing
all systems? In a word, has the Divine efficiency remained, since the
first creative act, in sublime repose, or does "the Father work
hitherto," sustaining, moving, vitalizing, and perfecting the
universe--the _Conservator_, as well as the Creator, of all things? This
is the living question of our times, whether viewed from the scientific
or the theological stand-point. The mental posture we assume in relation
to this question must determine our systems of philosophy and religion.

The language of Scripture on this point is direct and explicit, and
unless our interpretation thereof needs to be modified in order to place
it in harmony with the general spirit and tenor of Christian teaching,
or with the unquestionable facts of nature, which are also a revelation
of God, there can be no difficulty in determining the Christian doctrine
of God's relation to the world. It teaches us, not only that all things
were made by God, but that all things are _sustained_ by God. God is
still the first and immediate cause of all existence. "He giveth to all
life, and breath, and all things" (Acts xvii. 25). The created universe
is in complete and ceaseless dependence on the Divine causality; it
consists by the same will and the same word by which it was first
originated. He who made all things, continues to "uphold all things by
the word of his power" (Heb. i. 3). "He is before all things, and by Him
all things consist" (Col. i. 17). The universe is not self-existent, nor
self-evolved, neither has it any inherent power of self-perpetuation.
Notwithstanding the individuality and self-life conceded to the
creature, it has no independent existence apart from God, "for of Him,
and through Him, and for Him are all things, to whom be glory forever."
(Rom. xi. 36.)

The recognition of a real presence of God in nature, and of the
immediate agency of God in the production of all natural phenomena, has
been a characteristic of the religious consciousness in all ages. This
consciousness of the presence of God embracing and sustaining all
worldly being is, in fact, an essential content of all vital piety. "It
is only a mechanical deism, a barren rationalistic theology, or a piety
meagre in the last degree, which has interposed a chasm between God and
his creatures." The religious spirit is remarkably developed in the
Psalms of David, and here all the operations of nature are spoken of as
the operations of Deity. The thunder is "the voice of God." The
lightnings are "his arrows." The earthquakes and volcanoes are produced
directly by Him. "He looketh on the earth, and it trembleth; He toucheth
the hills, and they smoke." "He giveth snow like wool, He scattereth the
hoar-frost like ashes, He casteth forth his ice like morsels; who can
stand before his cold? He causeth his winds to blow, and the waters
flow." "He covereth the heavens with clouds, He prepareth rain for the
earth." "He watereth the hills from his chambers, the earth is satisfied
with the fruit of his work." "He causeth grass to grow for the cattle,
and herb for the service of man." "He giveth to the beast his food, and
to the young ravens which cry." "All creatures wait upon Him, and He
giveth them their meat in due season. He openeth his hand, they are
filled with good. He hideth his face, and they are troubled. He taketh
away their breath, they die and return to the dust. _He sendeth forth
his Spirit, and they are created_; and He reneweth the face of the
earth." To the eye of the inspired writer, the agency of God is
concerned in every process and every product of nature. "There are
diversities of operations, but _it is the same God who worketh all in
all_." His will and his power are the only real forces in nature.

The interpretation which the Church has given of this teaching of the
Sacred Scriptures has been remarkably uniform through the ages. She has
always taught that the continuance of the world, no less than its
origination, has its ground in the Divine causality; and every theory of
the relation of God to the world which has sacrificed the doctrine of
the all-embracing, all-sustaining presence of God in the universe, as an
immediate and real efficiency, has always been rejected as Pelagian,
Rationalistic, or Deistic. The conception of the Divine conservation of
the world as the simple, uniform, and universal agency of God sustaining
all created substances and powers in every moment of their existence and
activity, is the catholic doctrine of Christendom. In attempting the
difficult, perhaps impossible task of conceiving the _mode_ of this
Divine conservation, different theories have been developed. But
whatever the conception formed, whether that of the Divine
_co-operation_ (_concursus Dei generalis_), as taught by St. Augustine
and the Schoolmen; or that of a Divine intermediate _impulse_ (_impulsus
non cogens_), as taught by Luther; or that of the Divine _sustentation_
(_sustentatio Dei_), as held by the Arminians; or even that of the
_superintendence_ and _control_ of the Deity, as adopted by some modern
religious scientists,[219] they all repose on the ultimate truth that
whatever is created can have no necessary or independent existence; the
same power which called it into being must continue to uphold it in
being; and were God to withdraw his conserving efficiency the creature
would be immediately annihilated.[220]

St. Augustine, "the father of systematic theology," conceived the Divine
conservation of the world as a _continual creation_ (_creatio
continua_). He taught that the life and activity of the creatures,
collectively and individually, are ceaselessly and absolutely dependent
on and conditioned by the almighty and omnipresent agency of God. "Were
He to withdraw from the world his creative power, it would straightway
lapse into nothingness."[221] Thomas Aquinas, "the Angelical Doctor,"
who is regarded as having brought Scholastic theology to its highest
development, held the same views on this subject as Augustine. He taught
that "preservation is an ever-renewed creation."[222] All creaturely
causes derive their efficiency directly and continually from the First
Cause.[223]

Theological writers of more recent times have assented to these views
with notable uniformity. Dr. Samuel Clarke, the intimate friend of
Newton, whose "Lectures on the Being and Attributes of God," and on the
"Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion," secured for him a European
renown as a Christian philosopher, states the doctrine of the immediate
agency of the Deity with remarkable explicitness. "All things that are
done in the world are done either immediately by God Himself, or by
created intelligent beings. Matter being evidently not capable of any
laws or powers whatsoever, any more than it is capable of intelligence,
except only this one negative power, that every part of it will of
itself always and necessarily continue in that state, whether of rest or
motion, wherein it at present is. So that all those things which we
commonly say are the effects of the natural powers of matter and laws of
motion, of gravitation, attraction, or the like, are indeed (if we will
speak strictly and properly) _the effect of God's acting upon matter
continually and every moment_, either immediately by Himself, or
mediately by some created intelligent beings.... Consequently there is
no such thing as what we commonly call the _course of nature_, or the
_power of nature_. The course of nature, truly and properly speaking, is
nothing else but the will of God, producing certain effects in a
continued, regular, constant, and uniform manner."[224]

Dr. Clarke may properly be regarded as the representative of the
metaphysico-theological thought of the seventeenth century. No apology
is needed at this hour for presenting John Wesley as the best
representative of the evangelical movement of the eighteenth century
which adhered firmly to the _ipsissima verba_ of the sacred writers. He
expresses the evangelical conception with admirable clearness and force:
"God is also the supporter of all the things which He has made. He
beareth, upholdeth, sustaineth all created things by the word of his
power; by the same powerful word which brought them out of nothing. As
this was absolutely necessary for the beginning of their existence, it
is equally so for the continuance of it; were his almighty influence
withdrawn, they could not subsist a moment longer.... He preserves them
in their several relations, connections, and dependencies, so as to
compose one system of beings, to form one entire universe, according to
the counsel of his will.... He is the true author of all the motion in
the universe. All matter of whatever kind is absolutely and totally
_inert_. It does not, can not in any case move itself.... Neither the
sun, moon, nor stars move themselves. _They are moved every moment by
the Almighty hand that made them._"[225] These views are earnestly
maintained by Nitzsch and Müller, Chalmers and Harris, Young and Whedon,
Channing and Martineau.

The religious life of the present age, in all its purest and most
vigorous manifestations, still clings with passionate ardor to the
belief that God is every where present, and that the ceaseless, uniform,
and direct agency of God is still upholding, moving, vivifying, and
controlling all things. The harp of David is restrung and swept with a
firmer hand. It rings with nobler conceptions, and swells into diviner
harmonies. God is recognized as "_above_ all, _through_ all, and _in_
all." "In Him we live and move, and have our being." The Christian
still believes, with a fuller and richer assurance, that God's
presence--

    "Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze.
    Glows in the stars, and blossoms in the trees."

He still hears the voice of God in the thunder at midnight, and in the
rustling of the forest leaves at noonday. He sees the beauty of God in
"the silent faces of the clouds," and in the virgin blush of the
solitary flower. He sees the life of God in the activities of organic
nature, and marks his power and presence in the falling rain and
noiseless dew, the flowing river and the restless ocean. The seasons, as
they come round to him in their grateful vicissitudes, bring to him
fresh tokens of the goodness of God, and inspire him with perennial joy.

    "These as they change, Almighty Father, these
    Are but the varied God. The rolling year
    Is full of Thee....
    But wandering oft, with brute, unconscious gaze,
    Man marks not Thee, marks not the mighty hand
    That, ever busy, wheels the silent spheres;
    Works in the secret deep; shoots, steaming, thence
    The fair profusion that o'erspreads the spring;
    Flings from the sun direct the flaming day;
    Feeds every creature, hurls the tempest forth;
    And, as on earth this grateful change revolves,
    With transport touches all the springs of life."[226]

A discussion of the Christian doctrine of the relation of God to the
world can scarcely be regarded as adequate and complete which keeps not
constantly in view the theories of certain "advanced thinkers" that
conflict with the views here presented. We do not now refer to the
extreme opinions of the Atheists, who deny the existence of God,
proclaim the eternity of matter, and regard force as an inherent and
essential attribute of matter, by which all the phenomena of nature and
humanity are necessarily evolved; nor of the Pantheists, on the other
hand, who deny the personality of God, and represent the Deity as an
eternal _natura naturans_, which by a spontaneous and unconscious
development is forever emerging as the _natura naturata_. For these
thinkers there can be no conceivable Providence. "Science has shown us
that we are under the dominion of general laws, and that there is no
special Providence. Nature acts with fearful uniformity; stern as fate,
absolute as a tyrant, merciless as death; too vast to praise; too
inexplicable to worship; too inexorable to propitiate; it has no ear for
prayer, no heart for sympathy, no arm to save."[227]

At present we are to deal with the theories of a class of scientists who
believe in the existence of God--of a personal God, and who profess the
greatest reverence for the Sacred Scriptures, but whose God is clearly
not the God the Bible reveals. This general class of thinkers may be
subdivided into subordinate schools, as they verge toward one or the
other of the extremes above indicated.

1. One school is represented by such writers as Prof. Tyndall, Dr. H.
Bence Jones, and Dr. Bastian. Their fundamental principle is "the
absolute inseparability of matter and force;" consequently they do not
recognize the Divine Will as the sole and immediate cause of the motion
and life of the universe. Molecular attractions and repulsions are the
primal forces communicated to matter at the Creation, and from "the
self-activity of these primary forces" result all the forms of energy in
nature, whether organic or inorganic. "Our idea of the grandeur, the
unity, and the power of the first cause," writes Dr. H. Bence Jones,
"will surely not be lessened if we can show that one law of the union of
matter and force and of the conservation of energy obtains throughout
the organic as well as the inorganic creation."[228] Here we have a
close approximation, if not intentionally, yet logically, to the
Atheistic extreme. The transition seems easy, if not inevitable, to the
recognition of force as an inherent and necessary attribute of matter
which _may_ be eternal. Then what need of a God, or what place for one,
if the forces and laws of matter are adequate to the explanation of all
phenomena? As Martineau aptly suggests, "These properties and powers
once installed in the cosmic executive are too apt, like mayors of the
palace, to set up for themselves," and eject the real Lord and God.

2. Another school is represented by such men as Professors Owen, Huxley,
and Baden Powell, who deny the ultimate distinction between matter and
force, and regard both as phenomenal manifestations of some "unknown
substratum"--a supramaterial PHYSIS (φύσις) which is identical with the
Divine substance, the _natura naturans_ of Spinoza. To these minds the
universe discloses nothing but immutable law, absolute continuity, and
necessary development. "The grand principle of the _self-evolving powers
of nature_"[229] and "the grand inductive conclusion of universal and
_eternal_ order,"[230] are the bases of all rational theology. Here we
encounter a phase of thought which verges toward the extreme of
Pantheism. The Deity himself is conditioned in his action by the eternal
and immutable laws of nature, and can not be conceived as a living Will
exercising control over and subordinating these laws to higher moral
ideas and ends. This doctrine, Prof. Powell admits, "summarily overrides
the Mosaic creation, renders miracles irrational, excludes a special
providence, and, we may add, dismisses prayer as a useless absurdity."

3. A third and intermediate school assumes the existence of a plastic
nature (_vis formativa_) intermediate between the Creator and his work,
by which the phenomena of nature are produced. This hypothesis was
propounded by Cudworth, and has lately been reproduced by Dr. Laycock
and Mr. Murphy under the name of "unconscious organizing intelligence,"
to explain those facts of organic nature which come under the relation
of means and ends, or structure and function. This hypothesis must
deflect toward one or other of the extremes indicated, when it attempts
to decide in what subject this "unconscious intelligence" inheres. If it
be said that it inheres in matter, the tendency must be toward Atheism:
that it inheres in spirit, then the tendency is toward Pantheism.

Common to all these hypotheses is the denial of the direct, immediate,
and voluntary agency of God in nature as _the only real and efficient
force_. They are all attempts to account for the conservation of the
world by "the conservation and transformation of energy," that is, by
secondary causes, which in reality are only conditions and not real
causes. They interpose a chasm between God and the world. The universe
is a self-supporting, self-evolving machine, and God is an isolated,
incommunicable abstraction.

It is to be deplored that certain Christian writers have deemed it
necessary, on what they consider moral grounds, to give countenance to
theories which in one form or another ascribe a real efficiency to
natural laws, and dispense with the immediate and ceaseless agency of
God in the conservation of the world. They imagine that some such
hypothesis is needed to vindicate the Divine honor and righteousness. In
their imagination, it derogates from the Divine majesty to be
ceaselessly concerned and busied with the minute and insignificant
operations of nature, or even cognizant of them. His eternal serenity
would be disturbed, and his unsullied purity compromised by any
connection therewith, and He would become responsible for the disorders
and abnormities, the evils and sufferings, which appear in the world. He
must, therefore, be released from a constant and direct connection with
the universe. He must leave nature to the necessary predestinated course
of self-evolution, or, if He interpose at all, it must be in some
exceptional, extraordinary, and supernatural way; so that, if there be a
providential administration, every act and incident thereof must be a
_miracle_.

We respect the motives, but we can not approve the procedure or commend
the logic of these theologians. The moral difficulties they would by
these hypotheses evade still remain in all their force. "Any hypothesis
which essays to relieve these difficulties from pressing against
Providence only transfers and leaves them to press with equal force
against an original creation."[231] The Supreme Intelligence which
originally endowed matter with its properties, and ordained the laws of
force, must have foreseen all possible combinations, interactions, and
consequences, and, if it be proper to speak of responsibilities in this
connection, must be as responsible for these consequences as though they
were the direct effect of immediate volition. An agent is accountable
not only for his acts, but for all the foreseen consequences of his
acts. The solution of these difficulties must be sought in another
field.

Meantime it may be observed that these theologians affect a concern for
the Divine honor which even revelation itself does not confess. It
teaches that all the operations of nature are the operations of God, and
no apologies are offered for consequences which, to short-sighted men,
may appear to conflict with righteousness or love. Does the earthquake
tear the mountain asunder, and spread devastation and death throughout
the surrounding country? it is the Lord who roareth from Zion, and
uttereth his voice from Jerusalem; He causeth the habitation of the
shepherds to mourn, and the top of Carmel to wither.[232] The people bow
their heads with reverence, and in their chastening sorrows see the hand
of God. But these philosophic theologians must correct the language of
Scripture, and tone it down in harmony with the capricious demands of
modern scientists. The language of the ancient Prophet of God is simply
the expression of a childlike and subjective conception of nature which
modern science has emptied of all its significance. The earthquake was
the product of "secondary causes"--of inherent nature-forces which now
exist and act independent of the agency and control of God. To maintain
the consistency of their hypothesis, they will even affirm that the
catastrophe was unforeseen, and did not come within the purview of the
creative plan. The exuberance of the Oriental imagination has thrown a
haze of unreality over all the descriptions of natural phenomena, and
therefore the language of the inspired Psalmist must be amended. When he
tells us that God "covereth the heavens with clouds, and prepareth rain
for the earth," we must paraphrase after the following fashion: "In the
beginning God gave to water those properties, and determined those
cosmical conditions which, when coincident, result in the formation of
clouds and the descent of rain!" This, we are told, is the
interpretation which modern science demands. Conservation is simply "the
indestructibility of matter and the persistence of force," and
Providence is "the uniformity of natural law." We must no longer believe
that God is a present, immanent, and diffusive Power and Life in nature.
To find the connection between God and nature we must remount by a
process of regressive thought to the first, and, indeed, the last act of
creation--the primal origination of matter and motion. So that if now
piety would stand face to face with its supreme object, it is compelled
to fling itself back into the abyss of duration, before the mountains
were brought forth, or ever the earth and the world were formed.

Practically, this conception gives us a universe without a God; for the
world, once created, and stocked with the necessary forces and
adjustments and laws, will henceforth govern itself. It will run its
predestinated course in obedience to an original impulse, and realize a
perpetual motion without further oversight or care or control. The world
is a huge soulless machine, and theology is reduced to Mechanical Deism!
But surely no one pretends that this theory satisfies the demands of
Scripture language, and fills up the complement of its idea.
Practically, it renders the Word of God of no effect.

This theory is equally inadequate to satisfy the cravings of the human
heart. "The heart demands a present God--a God who is never far from any
one of us; it demands the immediate presence and constant care of a
heavenly Father; it demands, when it looks upon nature, to feel that God
is there, not in his laws only, but in conscious and perpetual action;
not in the sense of a Wisdom and Goodness, embodied in arrangements
contrived and perfected long ago, as the mind of an artificer may be
said to be present in the work of his hands, but in the sense of a Love
co-present to every aspect of nature, and a Will inworking in every
event that takes place."[233] "Reacting against the usurpation of
secondary causation, wearied of its distance from the Fountain-head, it
flings itself back with pathetic repentance into the arms of the Primary
Infinitude."

The relation of God to the world, however, is a problem which can not be
solved by an appeal to sentiment. The religious consciousness may be the
counter-proof, but it can not be the starting-point of a philosophy
which aims at the explanation of things--that is, of their origin and
continuance--by principles and ideas of the reason. For what is meant by
_understanding_, but translation into ideas, and comprehending under
necessary principles? Any theory which essays such explanation of things
must therefore commend itself to the logical understanding, and be
capable of logical construction.

Now the various hypotheses which seek to dispense with the immediate
agency of God, and to explain the conservation of the world by
"secondary" or natural agencies, when critically examined do not satisfy
the understanding. However convenient for the evasion of difficulties,
however plausible for their simplicity and manageable clearness, on a
closer inspection they are found to be inadequate.

1. _There is the hypothesis of natural law._ The world is governed by
general laws which are fixed and immutable. These laws were impressed
upon matter at the beginning, and in obedience to them the universe has
gradually evolved itself in rigid continuity and necessary order. No
room, therefore, is left for special direction or providential control,
and if the term "providence" is at all permissible, it is only as a
synonym for natural law.

It is affirmed by the advocates of this hypothesis that "the grand
principle of the uniformity and constancy of natural causes is _a
primary law of belief_ so strongly entertained by the truly inductive
inquirer that he can not conceive the _possibility_ of its
failure."[234] As science extends her domain and pushes her discoveries
into new regions, cases that once seemed anomalous are found to be
conformable to this general rule, and therefore we are justified in
assuming the absolute uniformity and inviolability of natural law
through all the realms of time and space. Thus we reach "the grand
inductive conclusion of the universal and _eternal_ order of nature."
But an _overruling_ providence must step beyond _ordinary rule_: it must
control, interrupt, modify, or in some manner give a new direction to
the action of nature, and thus become _super_natural--that is,
miraculous. So that were we even to concede the phenomenal reality of
the miracles recorded in the New Testament, and to accept them as
"objects of faith, but not as the evidences of faith," still modern
science would forbid us to believe that any supernatural interposition
can _now_ take place. Not a single instance of counteraction or control
of natural law can now be authenticated, and therefore we must regard
special providence as incredible and impossible.

The first error, and indeed the fundamental error, of this hypothesis is
the assumption that the absolute uniformity and permanence of nature is
"_a primary law of belief_," and therefore the natural philosopher
"must set out with clear ideas of the _possible_ and the _impossible_."

Now we grant that had we such _à priori_ conviction of the permanence
and immutability of nature, then it would be impossible to prove that
the order of nature had a beginning, or that there could be any
interference with the agencies or laws of nature by a supernatural
power. "No evidence adduced in favor of a creation or of Divine
interposition could ever be so strong as to overcome the necessary
belief in direct opposition to it."[235] But the truth is, we have no
such intuitive conviction. Our belief has none of the characteristics of
an _à priori_ intuition: it is neither self-evident nor universal nor
necessary. John Stuart Mill has successfully shown that this belief is
the result of experience, that it is entertained only by the cultivated
and educated few, and that even among such it has been of slow growth.
Therefore he properly concludes that "the uniformity in the succession
of events ... must be received, _not as the law of the universe, but of
that portion only which is within the range of our means of
observation_, with a reasonable degree of extension to adjacent
cases."[236]

Belief in the uniformity of nature is an induction from _experience_,
and not a primary intuition. And by the word experience, in this
connection, we must understand not the experience of one man only, or of
one generation, but the accumulated experience of mankind in all ages as
registered in books or transmitted by tradition. But how limited, at
best, is human experience--how circumscribed both in time and space!
Compared with the vastness and duration of the universe, it is narrowed
down to a mere point. All experience, be it that of the individual or
of mankind, is only finite. To infer a universal law from a limited
number of instances is to violate to the uttermost the fundamental canon
of logic that "no conclusion must contain more than was contained in the
premises from which it is drawn."[237] Inductive science can only give
us the contingent and the relative, it can never attain to the necessary
and the absolute. By abstraction, comparison, and generalization it may
furnish us with _general_ notions, but it can not give us _universal_
principles. "Experience can not conduct us to universal and necessary
truths--not to universal, because she has not tried all cases; not to
necessary, because necessity is not a matter to which experience can
testify."[238] The intuitive reason, we doubt not, is furnished with
necessary and universal principles which may illuminate the pathway of
experience, and give meaning and law to the facts of sensation, so that
man may become "the Interpreter of Nature;" but certainly the absolute
uniformity of nature is not one of these ideas.

Notwithstanding the boasted mathematical precision of the inductive
method, and the rigid exactness of its results, scientific men are not
wholly exempt from the common infirmity of hasty generalization. They
are perpetually liable to the temptation to draw immense conclusions
from premises that are too narrow and inadequate. The history of science
is a record of the correction of hasty generalizations by future
discoveries, and leads to the final conviction that there are no laws of
nature which can lay claim to absolute universality. Since the time of
Newton, the law of gravitation has been regarded by many as strictly
universal. But now we are told by Herschel that "our evidence of the
existence of gravitation fails us beyond the region of the double stars,
or leaves us at best only a _presumption_ amounting to moral conviction
in its favor." Furthermore, in regard to the luminiferous ether, he
tells us that "we are freed from the necessity of any mental reference
to the actual weight or specific gravity of the material, which in this
case is the more necessary, as, though we suppose the ethereal molecules
to possess inertia, _we can not suppose them affected by the force of
gravitation_." "Beyond all doubt, the widest and most interesting
prospect of future discovery ... is that distinction between
_gravitating_ and _levitating_ matter, that positive and unrefutable
demonstration of the existence of a repulsive force ... enormously more
powerful than the attractive force of gravity."[239]

Until recently the presence of free oxygen as the necessary condition of
life has been regarded as a universal biological law. "But the latest
researches of Pasteur have shown that, so far from oxygen being
essential to the life of the simplest living beings, there are certain
forms of infusoria which not only pass their lives without oxygen, but
are killed by its presence."[240]

Other illustrations might be adduced, but these are sufficient for our
purpose. The truth is, there is not a phenomenon known to man that can
properly be said to be the result of the action of _one_ invariable and
universal force, not even the falling of a stone to the earth; for some
force must have previously been exerted to raise the stone from the
earth, which force is represented by energy of position, or "potential
energy."[241] And this potential energy is the exact numerical
equivalent of the energy of motion which it acquires in falling--_i.
e._, the mass multiplied by the square of the velocity. Every event,
every change in nature, is due to "some _variable_ combinations of
invariable forces."[242] Material causes are always complex. Every law
of nature is liable to counteraction and modification by other laws, and
the most fundamental fact of the universe is that material forces are
adjusted, combined, and modified in endless modes in order to the
fulfillment of purposes and ends. The phenomena of life present a vast
series of such adjustments and modifications. The mechanical and
chemical forces are controlled and subordinated by the vital force, so
that life has been defined as "a _resistance_ to the physical forces of
matter"[243]--a resistance which Liebig regards as in a certain degree
invincible. Living matter is the seat of energy, and so long as it is
living, can overcome the primary law of the _inertia_ of matter, and
moves spontaneously.[244] Living matter overcomes the attraction of
gravitation, and resists, suspends, and modifies the action of chemical
affinity.[245] It is in direct opposition to chemical affinity that
organized beings exist.

Thus the various forms of energy are mutually conditioned. The
mechanical, chemical, and electrical energies are counteracted by the
vital force. And all the forces and energies of nature are controlled
and subordinated by a higher force which orders means to ends, and
adapts structure to function, viz., an _Intelligent Will_. The
conviction finally becomes irresistible that nature is a system of
things designed to be subject to Mind, and that a law of design is the
highest law of the universe.

It must now be obvious that we can reach no definite conclusion in
regard to the question under discussion--the uniformity of
nature--unless we have a clear and precise conception of the meaning of
the term "nature." The word is employed, even by men of science, in a
very loose and ambiguous sense. At one time it is used to denote the
totality of sensible phenomena; at another, the conditions or causes of
phenomena; again, the relations of phenomena; and often, all these
collectively. We must endeavor to extricate ourselves from this
confusion.

According to its derivation, nature (_natura_--_nascitur_) means that
which is born or produced--_the becoming_; that which has a beginning
and an end; that which has not the cause of its existence in itself, and
the cause of which must be sought in something antecedent to and beyond
itself--that is, nature is _the phenomenal_. This the word itself
expresses in the strongest manner. That which begins to be, as the
necessary consequence of antecedent conditions, is _natural_. The
co-existence, resemblance, and succession of phenomena constitute the
_order of nature_; and the uniformity of these relations among phenomena
are the _laws of nature_. So much is clear from the stand-point of mere
empirical science. Now if law is "the uniformity of relations among
phenomena,"[246] then it is equally clear that the phrase "uniformity of
natural law" is meaningless, for, by the definition, the uniformity
itself is the law, and the expression is simply equivalent to "the
uniformity of the uniformity," which is absurd. Furthermore, if "nature"
is the phenomenal--the becoming--then the word can not be properly
employed to denote the causes of that becoming, unless by causes we
understand antecedent conditions, which, as we shall presently see, are
not real causes. Nature, or the sum-total of phenomena, is an
_effect_--an effect which demands a cause. There can be no phenomena
without change, no change without motion, no motion without force, no
force without Spirit, for Spirit-force is the only force of which we
have any knowledge or consciousness. A rational Will, and not a blind
necessity, must stand at the fountain-head of being, and uniformity in
nature must be the result of _reason_ and _choice_.

But suppose we are permitted to employ the term "nature" to denote the
essential properties of matter, and the various forms of energy,[247]
potential and kinetic; and suppose we admit that matter is
indestructible, and that the amount of energy in the world is unchanged,
the sum of the actual and potential energies being a constant quantity;
still we are not entitled from these premises to infer the absolute
uniformity in the succession of events--that is, the uniformity of the
phenomenal. We have already seen that no phenomenon known to man is the
result of a single property of matter or a single form of energy. "All
issues in nature are the effects produced upon matter by the resultant
of component forces." The phenomena of nature are the result of
adjustments, combinations, and distributions of matter and of force in
endless variety and complexity. Hence we have in nature the variable,
the contingent, the particular, as well as the invariable, the uniform,
and the general. This is admitted by Comte: "That which engenders this
_irregular variability_ of the effect is the great number of different
agents determining at the same time the same phenomena; and from which
it results, in the most complicated phenomena, _that there are no two
cases precisely alike_. We have no occasion, in order to find such
complexity, to go to the phenomena of living beings. It presents itself
in bodies without life, for example, in studying meteorological
phenomena.... _Their multiplicity renders the effects as irregularly
variable as if every cause had not been subject to any precise
condition._"[248]

Thus we are led by various lines of thought to the same conclusion. It
is certain that we can only learn what the uniformities (the laws) of
nature are by _experience_, and in order to determine whether all the
successions of events have been and now are universally uniform, we must
have a _universal_ experience. If there have been deviations from
general laws under peculiar conditions--if one form of energy has been
counteracted and modified by another form of energy, or even by an
intelligent Will, so as to give a _particular_ result--experience (=
observation and testimony) must be just as adequate to attest the
reality of that particular deviation as it is to attest the prevalence
of general laws.[249] We have no intuitive and necessary conviction of
the uniformity of nature, and therefore we can not affirm in an _à
priori_ manner what is _possible_ or _impossible_. Those scientists who
adopt the maxim of Faraday, that in the investigation of new and
peculiar phenomena "we must set out with clear ideas of the possible
and the impossible," are doomed to move in a vicious circle. They can
not be sure that a fact of experience is a real fact until they have
ascertained the laws of nature in the case, and they can not ascertain
what the laws of nature are until they have ascertained the facts. They
must not profess to have learned any thing until they have ascertained
that it is possible, and they can not decide that it is possible until
they have learned every thing, because the single item of knowledge they
are deficient in may be the very principle which warrants a belief in
the possibility of the fact. The maxim is obviously absurd. In its
theological bearings it is repudiated even by Professor Tyndall, the
pupil and successor of Faraday at the Royal Institution. "You never hear
the really philosophical defenders of the doctrine of uniformity
speaking of _impossibilities_ in nature. They never say ... that it is
impossible for the Builder of the universe to alter his work. Their
business is not with the possible, but with the actual."[250]

The hypothesis under discussion is further vitiated by the assumption
that laws are _causes_ adequate in themselves to the production of all
phenomena. So that now Creation by Law (Nomogeny) is the watchword of
this school of thinkers. The men who have defined law as "the uniformity
of relations among phenomena"--as "an observed order of facts"--now
speak of laws as having in themselves a real efficiency; as producing,
regulating, and governing powers. Under this high-sounding
phrase--"Creation by Law"--there is not only the artful concealment of a
difficulty, but there is also the interpolation of a positive error. The
_uniformities_ of natural phenomena are the _causes_ of phenomena, or,
in other words, the order of nature is its own cause, which is not only
erroneous but self-contradictory.

Here, again, we encounter the perplexity consequent on the use of
ambiguous phraseology. The term "Law" is employed in an equivocal sense,
as denoting, indifferently, property and relation, condition and cause,
antecedent and consequence. In such an atmosphere of verbal haze it is
impossible to see clearly or think correctly. We must feel our way
toward a purer light, and find a less wavering stand-point.

The primary and generic conception of law is "_the authoritative
expression of Will_." This is the most natural, the most obvious, and
the most legitimate conception. The true notion of Will is the synthesis
of Reason and Power. Power exerted in the forms of reason is
self-consciousness. Reason manifested in the forms of power is
self-determination. Self-consciousness and self-determination are the
two elements of personality. More explicitly, we may therefore define
law as "_the idea of the Reason enforced by Power_." The subjects of
legislation are:

1. _The actions of Free Beings._ To ascertain the laws in this case is
to answer the question, What _ought_ to be done?

2. _The processes of Thought._ To ascertain the laws in this case is to
answer the questions, Why do we judge or affirm this or that? and, What
are the grounds and criteria of certitude?

3. _The facts or events of Nature._ To ascertain the laws in this case
is to answer the questions, _What_ are the facts in their observed
order? _How_ or from what causes do they arise? _Why_ or for what end do
they exist?

It is under the last division that we encounter the secondary and
symbolical senses in which the term law has come to be used by
scientific men, which have well-nigh supplanted the primary and only
legitimate signification.

That which lies nearest to sense--the phenomena of nature--first engages
the awakening intellect. If the attention is confined solely to the
phenomena of nature, the simple question propounded is, _What_ is the
observed order of the facts? At this stage science can be no more than a
classification of phenomena according to their relations of
co-existence, resemblance, and succession, and law must be defined as
"_the uniformity of relations among phenomena_."[251] Here the term is
taken _objectively_, and the facts are simply conceived as perceived by
the senses.

But the human mind can never rest in the bare knowledge of phenomena.
The reason intuitively recognizes the uniformities of nature as the
suggestive signs of properties or powers which are not perceptible to
sense, and the question arises, _How_--that is, from what adjustment of
antecedent conditions and physical agencies--does the order of nature
arise? And now the term law comes to indicate more than an observed
order of facts; it denotes an order resulting from the coincidence of
some permanent properties, qualities, or forces which are conceived as
lying back of the phenomena, and pushing them into the objective field.
Accordingly, laws are now defined as "_the necessary relations which
spring from the [inner] nature of things_."[252] Here the phrase is
taken _subjectively_, as the expression of a mental conception, and not
of a sense perception. "It has relation to us as _understanding_, rather
than to the materials of which the universe consists as obeying certain
rules."[253]

Finally, the human mind approaches the question--_Why_ have these
physical agencies been so collocated or adjusted? What relation does
this adjustment bear to _purpose_, _intention_, or _end_? Law is now
_the reason or end for which an orderly arrangement exists_. Here the
phrase is taken ideally or _rationally_ as a revelation of the intuitive
reason, in the light of which the phenomena of nature find their only
satisfactory interpretation.

By this route we are led back to the primary and universal conception of
law as "_the idea of the Reason enforced by Power_." All government,
human or Divine, is the enforcement of ideas by authority, and "Natural
Law" is the actualization of the Divine idea by the Divine efficiency.
As Bunsen remarks, "Law is the supreme rule of the universe, and this
law is Intellect, is _Reason_, whether viewed in the formation of a
planetary system or the organization of a worm."

Laws and ideas are thus correlated. Viewed in respect to the reason as
conceiving, originating, and projecting, we speak of the _idea_. Viewed
in respect to the sphere of determinate movement and action in which
ideas are realized and actualized, we speak of _law_. Hence Plato often
calls ideas laws; and Lord Bacon, the British Plato, describes the laws
of the material world as ideas: "_Quod in naturâ naturatâ lex, in naturâ
naturante idea dicitur_."

It is obvious, then, that laws are not attributes of matter, but of
intelligence. It is equally obvious that laws are not efficient causes,
and can not execute themselves. They are the ideas and purposes of
reason, and the rules or methods according to which the ideas are
actualized. Law, therefore, presupposes a _Lawgiver_ and an _Executive_.
Law without a lawgiver is the merest abstraction, and law without an
agent to realize and execute it is, in fact, not a law, but an idea. To
maintain that the universe is governed by laws, without ascending to the
superior reason and source of these laws--to talk of laws, and yet not
to recognize that every law implies a legislator, and an executor to put
it in force--is to hypostatize laws, to make beings of them, and to
substitute mythical and fabulous divinities in the place of the one
living and true God, the source of all power and all law.

Few men of recent times can claim a larger acquaintance with the history
and the philosophy of the Inductive Sciences than the late Professor
Whewell, and he may be fairly regarded as expressing the doctrine of the
best scientists. "A law supposes an _agent_ and a _power_: for it is a
mode according to which the power acts. Without the presence of such an
agent, of such a power, conscious of the relations on which the law
depends, producing the effects which the law prescribes, the law can
have no efficiency, no existence. Hence we infer that the intelligence
by which the law is ordained, the power by which it is put in action,
must be present in all places where the effects of the law occur; that
thus the knowledge and agency of the Divine Being pervade every portion
of the universe, producing all action and passion, all permanence and
change. _The laws of nature are the laws which He in his wisdom
prescribes to his own acts_; his universal presence is the necessary
condition of any course of events, his universal agency the only origin
of any efficient force."[254]

We grant that the term law may, by metonymy, be employed to designate
"the uniformity of relations among phenomena," but then it must not be
forgotten that here the effect is put for the cause, the consequence of
law for the law itself. It may be that this is the only conception of
law which is legitimate within the sphere of strictly physical science,
and to limit the scientists solely to the knowledge of phenomena and
their relations would simply be to take them at their word. The inquiry
concerning Causes and First Principles must then, by common consent, be
surrendered to pure metaphysics and theology. But if, after this truce,
the scientist still persists in speaking of laws as efficient causes,
and claiming for them "an eternal and necessary uniformity," thus
virtually denying the liberty and personality of God, and the
possibility of Creation and Providence, the Christian Theist must be
permitted in the name of polemic fairness and logical consistency to
protest.




CHAPTER VII.

CONSERVATION.--THE RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD.

(_Continued._)


Of the various hypotheses which seek to dispense with the immediate
agency of God, and to explain the conservation of the world by
"secondary" or natural agencies, the second is that of _active Force
communicated to matter at its creation_. This force being transformable,
and at the same time indestructible, is regarded as adequate to the
conservation of the universe.

This hypothesis must not be confounded with the Dynamical theory of
matter propounded by Leibnitz, and more fully elaborated by Boscovich,
which regards matter as a mere phenomenon or function of force; on the
contrary, it conceives of matter as a distinct entity moving under the
action of a primary impulse communicated by "the Creator's fiat at the
beginning." This hypothesis in its fundamental conception and its
further elaboration is purely mechanical. It represents the universe as
a machine first set in motion by the Deity, and conserved by the actions
and reactions of its several parts. All subsequent motions, changes, and
configurations are the prolonged results of the original impulse,
without any further direct action or control on the part of the Creator.

A more precise and accurate statement would require that the term
"Energy" should be substituted for "Force." In the language of modern
physics, _Force_ is "that which _originates_ or tends to originate
motion or change," and "is _wholly expended_ in the action it
produces."[255] All energy has its origin in force, but force can not
pass into energy except under conditions in which it is at liberty to
act. For instance, the _force_ of gravity produces the _energy_ of
motion of a falling body, but gravity can not produce motion unless
there is space through which the body can fall. _Energy_, therefore, is
defined as "the power of doing work."[256] The work done is the
resistance overcome, and in overcoming resistance the energy is
transformed, but not annihilated. In every case in which energy is lost
by resistance, heat is generated; and we learn from Joule's
investigations that the quantity of heat generated is a perfectly
definite equivalent for the energy lost. It is therefore claimed that
the total quantity of energy in the universe is constant, and that the
material system is dynamically conservative. The universe is a
self-acting and self-sustained machine, and perpetual motion is a
necessary consequence.

A little reflection, however, ought to convince any one that this
conception of the universe--as a machine which is kept in perpetual
motion by the reciprocal action of its parts--is a false analogy. And
its fallacy is apparent from this, that the moving force of every
machine is not inherent in the machine, but some natural primary force
distinct from the machine, such as gravity, or the primary atomic forces
of attraction and repulsion; and consequently the very idea of mechanism
_assumes_ the existence of those primary forces of which it is the
professed object of a mechanical theory of the universe to give an
explanation. A machine "can no more create energy than it can create
matter;" its sole function is "to transform energy into a kind most
convenient for us."[257] "We may with the greatest ease convert
mechanical work into heat, but we can not by any means convert all the
energy of heat back again into mechanical work. In the steam-engine we
do what can be done in this way, but it is a very small portion of the
whole energy of the heat that is convertible into work, for a large
portion is dissipated, and will continue to be dissipated however
perfect our engine may become. Let the greatest care be taken in the
construction and working of a steam-engine, yet we shall not succeed in
converting one fourth of the whole energy of the heat of the coals into
mechanical work."[258] It is impossible to construct a machine that can
do work without parting with energy; and when the energy is all parted
with, any machine whatever must necessarily cease to do any more work
unless a fresh supply of energy be brought in from without. It is
impossible to make a water-mill work without a constantly renewed supply
of water, or to make a steam-engine work without a constantly renewed
supply of fuel. "Every one who understands mechanics knows that any such
inexhaustible supply of energy is impossible by means of merely
mechanical arrangements; but it is equally true, though not perhaps
equally so evident, that it is impossible by means of any arrangement of
thermal, electric, or chemical forces."[259]

But we are told that modern science has proved that the law of the
Conservation of Energy is an absolute law of the universe, and that
though man can not construct a machine which will realize the dream of
perpetual motion, the material universe is in reality such a machine.
It becomes us to speak with some degree of diffidence in regard to a
question which lies outside of our special department of study.
Nevertheless we must confess that we have a growing suspicion of all
so-called "absolute laws" in the domain of physical nature. And we are
confirmed in this mistrust by the fact that physicists themselves are
not agreed in regarding this law of conservation of energy as
universally true. "That the amount of energy in the world is
unchangeable, the sum of the actual or kinetic and potential energies
being a constant quantity, has been by some writers overstrained. It may
be taken as a postulate, and is probably true, but it is a proposition
equally incapable of proof and of disproof."[260] "This principle," says
Sir J. Herschel, "so far as it rests upon any scientific basis as a
legitimate conclusion from dynamical laws, is no other than the
well-known dynamical theorem of the conservation of _vis viva_ (or of
'energy,' as some prefer to call it), _supplemented to save the truth of
its verbal enunciation_ by the introduction of what is called 'potential
energy,' a phrase which I can not help regarding as unfortunate,
inasmuch as it goes to substitute a truism for the announcement of a
dynamical fact. No such conservation, in the sense of an identity of
total amount of _vis viva_ at all times and in all circumstances, in
fact, exists. So far as a system is maintained by the mutual actions and
reactions of its constituent elements _at a distance_ (_i. e._, by
force), _vis viva_ may temporarily disappear, and be subsequently
reproduced between certain limits. Collision, indeed, between its
ultimate particles or atoms, regarded as absolutely rigid, and therefore
inelastic (_for that which can not change its figure can have no
resilience_), can not take place without producing a permanent
destruction of it, which there exists no means of repairing.... If,
indeed, we could be assured _à priori_ that the system [of the universe]
is one of simple or compound periodicity, in which a certain lapse of
time will restore every molecule to identically the same relative
situation with respect to all the rest, we should then be sure that in
the nature of things there would take place, so to speak, a winding up
from a lower to a higher state of potential energy, to be subsequently
exchanged for newly created _vis viva_. But, as we can have no such _à
priori_ assurance, can only assume such restoration to be possible, and
can see no means of effecting it, if possible, otherwise than by
foresight and prearrangement; the one equally with the other is an
unknown function, variable within unknown limits, and susceptible of
fluctuation to an unknown extent; nor can we have any, the smallest,
right to assert that what is expended in one form _is_ necessarily laid
up for further use in the other. It would be very difficult, I
apprehend, to show whether, in the winding up of a clock or the building
of a pyramid, taking into consideration all the various modes in which
_vis viva_ disappears and reappears in the expenditure of muscular
power, the evolution of animal heat, the consumption of the materials of
our tissues, the propagation of vibratory motions, and a thousand other
modes of transfer, the total _vis viva_ of this our planet is increased
or diminished. That it should remain absolutely unchanged during the
process is in the last degree inconceivable. The amount of _vis viva_
latent in the form of heat or molecular motion in the sun and planets in
our immediate system may bear, and probably does bear, a by no means
inappreciable ratio to that more distinctly patent in the form of bodily
motion in the periodic circulation of the planets round the sun, and
the sun and planets round their axes. The latter amount fluctuates to
and fro according to laws easily calculable, _but the former we have no
means whatever of computing, and to what extent, or within what limits,
it may be variable, we are altogether ignorant_."[261]

The two dynamical laws of Conservation of Energy and Transformation of
Energy can not therefore be regarded as universal and absolute laws;
they are particular and derivative laws subject to limitations which are
supplied by the third dynamical law--the Dissipation of Energy. The law
of the conservation of energy simply asserts "that the whole amount of
energy in the universe, or in any limited system which does not receive
energy from without, or part with it to external matter, is invariable;"
in other words, that every material system subject to no other forces
than actions and reactions between its parts is a dynamically
conservative system. But Sir William Thomson has shown that "in nature
this hypothetical condition is apparently violated in all circumstances
of motion. A material system can never be brought through any returning
cycle of motion without spending more work against the mutual forces of
its parts than is gained from these forces, because no relative motion
can take place without meeting with frictional or other forms of
resistance."[262] "There can be but one ultimate result for such a
system as that of the sun and planets, if continuing long enough under
existing laws, and not disturbed by meeting with other moving masses in
space. That result is the falling together of all into one mass, which,
although rotating for a time, _must in the end come to rest relatively
to the surrounding medium_."[263]

The law of the transformation of energy is "the enunciation of the
empirical fact that in general any one form of energy may by suitable
processes be transformed, wholly or in part, to an equivalent amount in
any other given form." This law, however, is subject to limitations
which are supplied by the dissipation of energy. "No known natural
process is exactly reversible, and whenever an attempt is made to
transform and retransform energy by an imperfect process, part of the
energy is necessarily transformed into heat and _dissipated_, so as to
be incapable of further useful transformation. It therefore follows
that, as energy is constantly in a state of transformation, there is a
constant _degradation_ of energy to the final unavailable form of
uniformly diffused heat, and that will go on until the whole energy of
the universe has taken this final form."[264] No mechanical work can be
done by heat in a state of equilibrium; as a dynamical agent it is
_dead_. "Thus the inexorable laws of mechanics indicate that the store
of force in our planetary system, which can only suffer loss and not
gain, must be finally exhausted."[265]

So far, then, as the conservation of energy has any scientific meaning,
it is inadequate to account for the origin or explain the continuance of
the existing order of nature. It is true we may conceive that every atom
of matter was endowed at the Creation with a certain store of potential
energy--"the potential energy of gravitation"[266]--which it has ever
since given out; but as every motion which has resulted from its action
has been attended with the expenditure of a certain amount of the
original endowment, it must have been continually undergoing a
diminution. There is, says Professor Norton, no escaping this conclusion
but by taking the ground that _the primary atomic forces_ (as
gravitation, and the atomic repulsion and attraction by which atoms are
aggregated into bodies of sensible magnitude) are correlated with the
_living forces_ (or various forms of energy) which are involved in the
motions that have resulted from the previous operation of the primary
atomic forces. "But," he says, "_no evidence has been obtained of any
such correlation_." The primary force of attraction (if it be regarded
as a primary force) may be the cause of motion in bodies which are
separated in space, and part of that energy of motion may be transformed
into the energy of heat or light or electricity, but the primary force
of attraction is not transformed. Energy is convertible into other forms
of energy, but heat, light, and electricity are not transformable into
primary force. The correlation of force and energy is therefore a
scientific heresy.[267]

Modern physicists are agreed that visible motion, heat, electricity,
magnetism, and radiance (radiant light and heat) are forms of actual
_energy_ which are correlated and capable of mutual conversion. Any one
form may, by suitable processes, be transformed, wholly or in part, to
an equivalent amount of any other form of energy. So much is generally
accepted by scientific men.

But in regard to the primary _force_ or forces in which these forms of
energy have their origin, there is not the same agreement among
physicists. Some regard gravitation, cohesion, and chemical affinity as
the three primary forces of nature; while others suggest that the last
two are related with and probably derived from the first.

There is also a respectable school of physicists who teach that atomic
attractions and repulsions are the universal cosmic forces which
originate all molecular and mechanical motions. Then, again, each of
these forms of force have their special advocates. On the one side it is
affirmed, as an important generalization, that all primary force is
_attractive_; "there is no such thing in nature as a primary repulsive
force."[268] Universal attraction is the one world-forming and
world-conserving energy. On the other side it is contended that
gravitation is not a primary, but a secondary and derivative force, and
that the grand primal force is a universal force of _repulsion_.[269]

It is beyond our province to discuss the merits of these conflicting
theories. Our position is that no purely physical hypothesis is adequate
to account for the conservation of the universe, and therefore it is of
little consequence to our argument which of the above theories may find
most favor with scientific men. The tendency of modern scientific
thought is toward the conception of "one primordial form of matter, and
but one primary form of force," as the simplest basis upon which a
physical theory of inanimate nature can be erected. The ultimate nature
of this one primary force is a question for pure metaphysics. From the
stand-point of physical science it can only be thought "as a _pull_ or a
_push_ in a straight line."[270] Universal attraction or universal
repulsion must be the ultimate dynamical conception for the pure
physicist.

1. Let us consider the first hypothesis. It is claimed that gravitation,
or universal attraction, is the great conserving and sustaining
principle of the universe. A stone falls to the earth, a round body
rolls along a plane inclined toward the horizon; a liquid mass, as a
brook or a large river, flows on the sloping surface which forms its
bed. All these phenomena are the varied manifestation of a universal
_tendency_ in all bodies to fall one toward the other. In virtue of this
tendency the great orbs which hang suspended in space gravitate toward
one another; the moon and the earth fall toward each other, and they
both gravitate toward the sun. All the planets of our solar system
continually act one on the other, and on the immense sphere which shines
at their common focus. By its enormous mass, the sun keeps all of them
in their orbits. If we ask why one body _falls_ toward another which is
more than ninety millions of miles off, in preference to moving in any
other direction, the answer given is that, "Every particle of matter in
the universe _attracts_ every other particle with a force whose
direction is that of the line joining the two, and whose magnitude is
directly as the product of their masses, and inversely as the square of
their distance from each other." This force of attraction is the
universal bond which holds the universe together, and sustains its
physical life.

To the superficial thinker, the language of the Newtonian philosophy
appears to sanction the materialistic notion that gravitation and
attraction are active powers essential to and inherent in matter. Such,
however, was by no means the doctrine of Newton, and he was careful to
guard his readers against any such misapprehension of his meaning. "The
words attraction, repulsion, or tendencies of whatever kind toward a
centre, I use indifferently and without distinction for each other,
considering these forces not physically but metaphysically. Wherefore
let not the reader suppose that by words of this kind I any where mean
a species or mode of action, or cause, or physical reason; or that I
really and in a physical sense assign forces to centres (which are only
mathematical points), even though I may say that centres _attract_, or
that _forces belong to centres_."[271]

The history of scientific opinion on the point before us furnishes a
striking illustration of the manner in which language reacts on the
ideas which it is intended to express, and thus men fall into the habit
of talking nonsense without knowing it. The conception of atoms having
the property of exerting various forces across a void space seemed to
follow as a matter of course from the discovery of the law of
gravitation, and from the language in which it is expressed. After
Newton a school arose which taught that atoms have the property of
_exerting force at a distance_, and that this property must be inherent
in the atoms, just as Lucretius taught that hardness and elasticity were
original indefeasible properties of the primordial elements, the "semina
rerum," or seeds of things. But Newton did not teach this; he stated a
fact, but did not devise an hypothesis; he attempted no explanation of
the law of gravitation.

"The law of gravitation considered as a _result_ is beautifully simple;
in a few words it expresses a fact from which most numerous and complex
results may be deduced by mere reasoning--results found invariably to
agree with the records of observation; but this same law of gravitation
looked upon as an axiom or first principle is so astonishingly far
removed from all ordinary experience as to be almost incredible. What!
every particle in the whole universe is actively attracting _every other
particle_ [that is, every particle in the universe with the same force,
without any expenditure of force], through void, without the aid of any
communication by means of matter, or otherwise--each particle, unchecked
by distance, unimpeded by obstacles, throws this miraculous influence to
infinite distance without the employment of any means![272] No particle
interferes with its neighbor, but all these wonderful influences are
co-existent in every point in space! The result is apparent at each
particle, but the condition of intermediate space is exactly the same as
though no such influence were being transmitted across it! Earth
attracts Sirius across space, and yet the space between is as if neither
Earth nor Sirius existed! Can these things be? We think not; and Newton
himself did not affirm this."[273] On the contrary, he earnestly rejects
any such hypothesis. "It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter
should, without the mediation of something else _which is not material_,
operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact, as it must
do if gravitation, in the sense of Epicurus, be essential to and
inherent in matter.... That gravitation should be innate, inherent, and
essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a
distance, through a vacuum, without the mediation of any thing else, by
and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to
another, is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in
philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into
it. _Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to
certain laws._"[274]

The ancient axiom that "Matter can not act where it is not any more
than when it is not," was universally believed till Newton's time, and
Newton himself regarded it as a self-evident truth. Some of his
disciples asserted that gravitation must be considered as an essential
property of matter, and they were under the necessity of assuming that
atoms can exert a force upon one another across a void. This to Leibnitz
was either miraculous or absurd; and in modern times the doctrine is
rejected by the first physicists--by Faraday, Helmholtz, Thomson, Tait,
and Maxwell.[275] Sir William Thomson, the Newton of modern physics,
says emphatically, "I have no faith whatever in attractions and
repulsions _acting at a distance_ between centres of force according to
various laws."[276] And Clerk Maxwell, in his lecture on "Action at a
Distance,"[277] explains how Faraday, by his discovery of magnetic
rotation of polarized light, and by his showing how lines of force arise
in media, "rudely shook the theory of attraction and repulsion at a
distance across a void."

If, now, "direct action at a distance" is rejected by scientific men as
inconceivable and absurd, how can it be that the sun _pulls_ the earth
toward it, and holds the planets in their orbits? The verbal statement
of the law of gravitation is no answer to this question. It expresses a
fact, but it does not assign a cause. Gravitation is a phenomenon which
demands an explanation, and some of the first scientists of the day are
engaged in devising a theory which shall afford a rational answer to the
question, What is the _cause_ of gravity?[278]

The first and most fundamental presupposition for any physical
hypothesis which seeks to explain the action of gravitation is that some
_medium_ of communication exists. This is suggested by every physical
analogy. Sound is communicated through a medium. The influence which is
exerted at a distance by heat, light, electricity, and magnetism is
effected through media. The most plausible suggestion yet made is that
"a single omnipresent fluid, _ether_, fills the universe," which by
various forms or modes of motion transmits light, radiant heat,
magnetism, and electricity.[279] May not gravitation, it is asked, be
transmitted by the _same_ fluid? may it not consist of or result from
actual recurring impulses propagated in ethereal waves?

The hypothesis that gravitation is transmitted through the same medium
as light, or indeed through any medium, is encumbered with serious if
not insuperable difficulties. All transmission of whatever kind--of a
letter by the post, a gunshot, a sound, a wave of light, an
electro-magnetic disturbance--_occupies time_. It has a
velocity--sometimes a very great one, as in the case of light; still it
is a measurable velocity. But, according to Herschel, the pull which the
sun exerts on the earth is delivered _instantaneously_. Were it not so
there would be "a continually progressive increase of the major axis of
the earth's orbit, and therefore of the length of the year."[280] Surely
it must be obvious to every one that the _instantaneous_ transmission of
the sun's attractive force to the planet Neptune, three thousand
millions of miles distant, through a physical medium like the ether,
would be as great a miracle as action at a distance through a perfect
void. But the advocates of this hypothesis have not thereby escaped the
difficulties of action at a distance. The majority of physicists regard
the luminiferous ether as consisting of "discrete
particles"--"elementary molecules of inconceivable minuteness and
tenuity." These ultimate particles or atoms of highly attenuated matter
must have some magnitude, some extension, however inconceivably minute.
If extended, they must have some form, and must occupy separate
positions in space. If they are capable of motions--undulatory,
rotatory, or spiral motions--they can not be in mutual contact.
Conceive, then, two such atoms, and draw around each an imaginary
circle. Let these circles touch at the middle point between the two, and
ask yourself the question, What exists there? On the hypothesis under
consideration you are bound to answer pure, empty space--that is, pure
nothing. "But if there is no matter between the atoms, then all their
actions, one upon the other, must be exerted across a void--that is,
through a medium of nothingness;" in other words, through no medium at
all. Now the size of the interval makes no difference in the argument.
"Whether that interval be the 92 billionth of an inch, or the 92
millions of miles or thereabouts between the earth and the sun, it is
still action at a distance, and no escape."[281]

The physicist who regards the ether as consisting of discrete particles
not in bodily or actual contact, and at the same time finds himself
logically compelled to reject this "mystical action at a distance," has
no alternative but to accept the doctrine of Newton that the action of
one particle of matter upon another is mediated by an agent which is not
_material_. "If it be true that the conception of _force_ as the
originator of motion in matter without bodily contact ... is essential
to the right interpretation of phenomena; and if it be equally true, on
the other hand, that its exertion makes itself manifest to our personal
consciousness by that peculiar sensation of _effort_ which is not
without its analogue in purely intellectual acts of the mind, it [_i.
e._, force] comes not unnaturally to be regarded as affording a point of
contact, a connecting link between these two great departments of
being--between mind and matter--the one as the _originator_, the other
as the _recipient_ of force."[282]

There are distinguished physicists--as Helmholtz, Thomson, Challis, and
Maxwell--who seek to escape the difficulties of action at a distance by
the assumption that the ether is absolutely continuous (and therefore
does not consist of atoms)--a perfectly homogeneous, incompressible,
frictionless fluid which fills the universe. This fundamental
presupposition as the basis of a physical theory of the universe
necessitates the further assumption that "_motion is the very essence of
what has been hitherto called matter_."[283] All quantitative and
qualitative phenomena, all statical and dynamical phenomena, are due
solely to varied modes of motion in the primordial fluid. "By various
motions of the nature of eddies [ring-vortices], the qualities of
matter--cohesion, elasticity, hardness, weight, mass, or other universal
properties of matter--are given to small _portions_ of the fluid which
constitute the _chemical atom_, and these, by modifications in their
combinations, form, and motion, produce the accidental phenomena of
_gross matter_.... On this view, gross matter would be merely an
assemblage of _parts_ of the medium moving in a peculiar way, groups of
ring-vortices having inertia.... The primary fluid by other motions
transmits light, radiant heat, magnetism, and _gravitation_."[284]

It may be regarded as an act of presumption in an obscure critic to
offer an opinion of the theories of these great masters in science. We
venture, however, to suggest that most men will find a difficulty in
conceiving how space absolutely full of matter can be made to contain
more, or how a truly continuous substance can be capable of
condensation. The most tenuous ether, if it be absolutely continuous,
occupies the whole of the space in which it lies--that is, there is no
point of the space which is not occupied by a point of matter.[285] But
the hardest iron can do no more than this, and, therefore, on this
hypothesis it seems impossible to account for its greater density. It is
suggested that if molecules are mere assemblages of parts of the ether
moving in a peculiar way, then greater density may be due to a
modification in the motion of molecules, and not merely to the greater
frequency of the eddying molecules in a given space. But how can a truly
continuous substance have _parts_, and how can relative motion occur in
an absolute plenum? The very notion of particles is quite inconsistent
with the continuity of matter; and in a universe absolutely full no
motion whatever would be possible. We are told that Sir William Thomson
and Professor Tait find no difficulty in all these, to our minds,
contradictory conceptions, and therefore we must conclude that our
intellect is not properly "focussed so as to give definition without
prenumbral haze."

Granting, then, the absolute continuity of all matter, and the
possibility of motion in an absolute plenum, the question which concerns
us most in this essay is, How is motion generated and sustained? One of
the greatest lights of this new school tells us that "all we can affirm
of matter is that it is the _recipient_ of impulse and of energy."[286]
They no longer regard the atom "as a mystic point endowed with inertia
and the attribute of _attracting_ and _repelling_ other such centres
with forces depending on the intervening distances."[287] They have "no
faith whatever in _attractions_ and _repulsions_ acting at a distance
between centres of force."[288] Force, then, is not regarded by these
leading physicists as an inherent attribute of matter. The primary
fluid, originally inert and motionless, must have been set in motion by
some force, by some agency external to and distinct from itself. An
"original impetus" _from without_, according to Maxwell,[289] or a
"pressure" of the universal ether "from somewhere _outside_ the world of
stars," according to Challis,[290] must be the source of all motion and
all forms of energy in the universe.

It is a fundamental principle of dynamics that "force is wholly expended
in the action it produces,"[291] therefore, if all the forms of energy
in the universe are the result of pressure, that pressure must be
_continuous_; if they are the result of impulses, these impulses must be
_incessantly renewed_, and must recur with immeasurable rapidity. On
either supposition, "the universe is not even temporarily automatic,
but must be fed from moment to moment by an agency external to itself,"
and "the preservation of the universe is effected only by the unceasing
expenditure of enormous quantities of work;"[292] that is, it is
ceaselessly sustained by Divine Omnipotence--"He upholdeth all things by
the word of his power."

So much with respect to the first form of this hypothesis which regards
atomic _attraction_ as the sole world-forming and world-conserving
force. We turn now to that form of the hypothesis which considers atomic
_repulsion_ as the grand primal force in which all the other physical
forces, even gravitation itself, have their origin.

This view is presented by Professor W. A. Norton, in his articles "On
Cosmical and Molecular Physics" in the _American Journal of Science and
Arts_. His theory rests essentially upon the following principles:

1. The doctrine of _inertia_ applied to all matter.

2. The existence of a single primary force of _repulsion_ exerted by
every atom upon every other atom.

3. The existence of but one primary form of _elementary matter_, viz.,
the universal or luminiferous ether; the atoms, so called, of ordinary
matter, and of the electric ether being but different masses of
condensed luminiferous ether.

4. The doctrine of the _interception of force_ by matter. This is a
necessary consequence of the fact that a certain portion of the
propagated force is instantly expended in imparting motion to the
molecules or atoms which it encounters, and is therefore abstracted from
this force.

5. The primary force of repulsion is made up of _impulses recurring with
an immeasurable rapidity_. This is no new hypothesis. In all treatises
on Mechanics, gravity and all incessant forces are conceived to consist
of an indefinitely great number of impulses taking effect in a finite
interval of time.[293] "The ever-recurring pulses of the primary
cosmical force, emanating from all the atoms of the one primary form of
matter, are directly _consumed_ in communicating opposite movements, or
virtual movements, to every atom in the universe. It is, as I conceive,
because in the existing condition of things the distribution of matter
is unequal in different directions round a point, and therefore the
partial interception of the impulses of the cosmical force along the
different lines of direction is unequal, that an effective gravitating
force exists.[294] The entire amount of the cosmical force consumed in
any interval of time is the amount intercepted by all the atoms of
matter, and is independent of the motions that result from the
inequalities just noticed. Gravitation, and molecular and chemical
attractions, which originate in the gravitation of electric ether toward
atoms of ordinary matter, are then _derivative_ forces incidental to the
direct actions exerted by the cosmical force upon the atoms."[295]

In a communication from Professor Norton to the author, he furnishes the
following further exposition of his theory: "If, as I conceive, the
primary atomic force is of the nature of a perpetual emanation from each
atom, and is expended in the act of producing motion, we must thence
infer that the atom is an entity through which a stream of force is
_perpetually flowing from the Infinite Source of all power and all
existence_. That the primary force is a force of repulsion, and that the
immediate source of all the forces that are known to take effect upon
ordinary matter is the action of recurring repulsive impulses upon the
atoms of the universal ether, and their subsequent propagation and
partial interception by the atoms which they encounter, I infer from the
fact that this conception furnishes a rational explanation of all the
known forces and phenomena of inanimate nature."

It will thus be seen that the theory of Professor Norton gives no
countenance to the materialistic tendencies of the physical science of
the age. He is decidedly of the opinion that "force is _not_ an inherent
and essential attribute of matter," and he "devoutly acknowledges that
in following the chain of cause and effect into the precincts of that
most deeply hidden of all mysteries, the origin of force, _we have come
into the presence of the Infinite Spirit who puts forth unceasingly,
from every point in the realms of space, his creative and sustaining
power upon the subtile matter that fills all space, and is the essential
substance of all worlds_."[296]

3. The third hypothesis is that of a _plastic nature_, intermediate
between God and the material universe, by which all the phenomena of
visible nature are produced.

This hypothesis was first presented (at least in modern times) by Ralph
Cudworth, in his "True Intellectual System of the Universe."[297] In
opposition to Democritus, who explained all phenomena by means of matter
and motion; and also in opposition to Strato, who taught that matter is
the only substance, but at the same time a living and active force,
Cudworth maintains that there is a _plastic nature_--a vital and
spiritual, but unconscious energy, distinct from and created by the
Deity, which "doth drudgingly execute that part of his providence which
consisteth in the regular and orderly motion of matter,"[298] and in the
organization and development of plants and animals, "according to laws
prescribed for it by a perfect intellect, and impressed upon it."[299]
This _plastic nature_ is an "inferior kind of life or soul," destitute
of all consciousness,[300] which, though it "acts for the sake of ends,"
does "not know the reason of what it does," and therefore operates
"fatally and sympathetically."[301]

The arguments urged by Cudworth in support of this hypothesis are mainly
of a negative character. On the one hand he endeavors to show that force
and vitality are not essential attributes of matter, and on the other
hand that the motion and life of the universe can not be properly
regarded as the direct action of the Deity upon matter. It is with this
latter part of the argument that we are here immediately concerned. He
urges (1) that if every thing in nature were done immediately by God, it
would render Divine Providence "oporose, solicitous, and distractious;"
and, furthermore, it would be unbecoming the Divine Majesty, and
"indecorous," for God "immediately to do all the meanest and triflingest
things Himself drudgingly." He maintains (2) that if God do all things
immediately, then he does them "_miraculously_"--that is, "forcibly and
violently." And (3) that the immediate agency of God is inconsistent
with that slow and gradual development of things we see in nature, which
would seem to be a "trifling formality" if the agent were omnipotent,
and especially inconsistent with "those errors and bunglings which are
committed when the matter is inept and contumacious." "Wherefore it may
be concluded that there is a plastic nature under God which, as an
inferior agent, doth drudgingly execute that part of his providence
which consists in the regular and orderly motion of matter, yet so that
there is also a higher providence, which, _presiding_ over it, doth
often supply the defects of it, and sometimes _overrule_ it; forasmuch
as the plastic nature can not act electively nor with discretion." So
that, after all, as Plato says, God "is the beginning and end and middle
of all things," and therefore their being is "_as much to be ascribed to
his causality as if Himself had done all things immediately_ without the
concurrent instrumentality of any subordinate natural cause."[302]

There is nothing original in this hypothesis of a plastic nature except
perhaps the name. It is the old _anima mundi_ of the Platonic physics, a
vital soul of the world, distinct from but created by the Supreme God.
It has reappeared under various names in the history of natural science,
especially in that department which is now comprehended under the
general name of Biology. The "_motus tonico-vitalis_" of Stahl, the
"animating principle" of Harvey, the "_materia vitæ_" of John Hunter,
the "organic force" of Müller, and the "organic agent" of Dr. Prout, are
all but separate names "for an imaginary principle, or entity,
possessing powers and properties which (however men may try to impress
themselves with a contrary notion) would entitle it to rank as an
intelligent agent. It is true that, according to most of the advocates
of this doctrine, this power is supposed to be superintended and
controlled by the Deity himself, and by this supposition they have
screened themselves against the accusation of attributing to a creature
the powers of the Creator."[303]

Cudworth's hypothesis of a plastic nature has been recently reproduced,
without the slightest recognition of its paternity, by Joseph John
Murphy, under the name of "_unconscious intelligence_"--"a power
transcending the ordinary properties of matter and adapting means to
purposes, presiding over all vital actions, whether formative, motor, or
mental, directing each action to its specific end."[304] Mr. Murphy is
very solicitous that we should not understand him to teach that "the
formative intelligence" which in nature adapts structure to function is
Divine. "I believe," he says, "that the Creator has not separately
organized every structure, but has endowed vitalized matter with
intelligence, under the guidance of which it organizes itself."[305]
This "unconscious intelligence," which builds the tissues and fashions
the organs of plants and animals, becomes conscious of itself in the
deliberate thought of man.[306]

It is worthy of note that this hypothesis commends itself to the mind of
Murphy by considerations akin to those which are urged by Cudworth; and
especially because it is supposed to relieve certain moral difficulties
connected with the belief of a Divine purpose in creation--as, for
example, the existence of parasitic worms which inflict pain and disease
on beings endowed with sensation and consciousness, and the presence of
"immoral instincts" in higher forms of animal life.[307]

We readily grant that the relation of God to the existing order and
economy of the world is mysterious; and we believe that no conceivable
hypothesis can deprive it of this mysteriousness. There are numerous
difficulties which arise from the imperfection of our knowledge and the
limited range of our powers. We see through an obscure medium, and we
know only in part. There are also difficulties peculiar to individual
minds--intellectual, ethical, emotional difficulties--which are the
products of a peculiar culture, or the offspring of certain theoretical
prepossessions. Some of these difficulties may be relieved by the
hypothesis of "unconscious intelligence," but on a further examination
it will be found that this hypothesis is embarrassed with still greater
difficulties and open to more serious objections both intellectual and
moral.

First, there is the difficulty of forming any conception of
"_unconscious_ intelligence." This has been felt by the ablest minds.
"The hypothesis," says Wallace, "has the double disadvantage of being
both unintelligible and incapable of any kind of proof."[308] Mivart
observes that the phrase will "to many minds appear to be little less
than a contradiction in terms; the very first condition of an
intelligence being that, if it know any thing, it should at least know
its own existence."[309] Mr. Murphy tells us that this unconscious
intelligence "adapts means to ends," "it presides over all vital
actions, directing each action to its specific end."[310] But an
intelligence adapting means to ends without any knowledge
(consciousness) of either the ends to be secured or the means to be
employed to secure the end surpasses all comprehension and all belief.
We can readily believe, with Hamilton, that the human mind "exerts
energies and is the subject of modifications" of which it is not
immediately conscious, the combined results of which are manifested in
the complex fact of consciousness. But to call that _intelligence_
which never had a perception, a thought, an emotion; which has no
knowledge of self or of any thing else; in short, which is not and never
was conscious, is to reduce philosophic terminology to chaos, and
tantalize thought by meaningless words. An intelligent agent is one who
_understands_, who distinguishes between subject and object, who knows
things in their relations, who can unite the terms of a relation in
thought, and judge of their congruity or incongruity, all of which are
conscious operations. Intelligence is consciousness (conscientia =
relational knowledge); unconscious intelligence is unconscious
consciousness, unintelligent intelligence, which is a contradiction and
an absurdity.

Secondly, in endeavoring to find the mental stand-point of Mr. Murphy,
in order that we may fairly estimate his hypothesis, we encounter the
still more serious difficulty of conceiving how unconscious intelligence
can exist apart from some _subject_ or substratum in which it inheres.

We are aware that "the tendency of modern thought" is to hypostatize
force and intelligence, and conceive them as entities. We have
conscientiously made the attempt again and again to realize this
conception, but we must confess we can only conceive of force and
intelligence as properties or attributes of some subject. It is beyond
our ability, and we imagine it is beyond the ability of Mr. Murphy, to
conceive of force without something that exerts force, of intelligence
without a being who is intelligent. Indeed, Mr. Murphy concedes that
"where there are properties there must be a _substance_,"[311] and by
substance, he says, he understands "_underlying reality_."[312]
Unconscious intelligence, if there be such a thing, must be an
attribute or quality inherent in some underlying substance. But Mr.
Murphy asserts "there is no scientific basis for the old belief in a
distinct _mental substance_"[313]--that is, if we understand him aright,
so far as finite mind is concerned. On the other hand, he distinctly
affirms that this unconscious intelligence is not Divine intelligence.
The power and intelligence which work in the world of matter and mind
"are not the Divine power and intelligence."[314] Unconscious
intelligence, then, must be an "endowment of vitalized matter;"[315] and
"life has its origin in no secondary cause, but in the direct action of
creative power."[316] Now the question arises, What is matter? On this
point we must be careful not to misunderstand or misrepresent Mr.
Murphy. "Matter, whether viewed from a metaphysical or from an inductive
point of view, is known only as a function of force, and can be
described only in terms of force. In other words, _the universe is
nothing but a manifestation of force_." And now we ask, Of what force?
"Force," says Mr. Murphy, "is known to us by immediate consciousness as
a function of our own mind and will; that is to say, the mind, acting in
will, is conscious of itself as a force--and we are able to conceive of
force in no other way; the only conception of force which we are able to
frame is that of voluntary force, or the exertion of will. _Either the
force manifested in the universe is the force of a Creative Will, or we
are able to form no conception of it whatever._"[317] Can there be any
possibility of misunderstanding this language? Matter itself is not an
entity, not a _substance_; it is a phenomenon, not a reality. Matter is
"a function of force." Force is a "fact of mind, and therefore
spiritual." Consequently "matter can only be conceived as
_spiritual_."[318] And now let us recall the statement of Mr. Murphy
that there is no finite, created, underlying reality for the phenomena
of mind and will--"_no distinct mental substance_." If we hold to this
doctrine, then we must say with Mr. Murphy again that "the powers of
matter and mind alike are the result and expression of a Living
Will--and if a Living Will, then also an Intelligent Will."[319] The
final and only conclusion is that God, "the Self-existent Being," is the
one only underlying reality or _substance_ in the universe; all the
force in the universe is "the force of the Creative Will," and all the
intelligence in the universe a modification of the Divine Thought.

This, however, is Pantheism, even according to that very defective
definition of Pantheism given by Mr. Murphy: "Pantheism is the
identification of the Divine power and intelligence with the powers and
intelligences that work in the world of matter and mind."[320] Still,
Mr. Murphy declares, "I am not a Pantheist;" and we are bound to accept
his disclaimer--"the power and intelligence which work in nature are not
identical with the Divine power and intelligence." Be it so; then there
is power, and there is intelligence in nature, which are not attributes
of any reality, and which do not inhere in any substance; and we come
round to the original difficulty of conceiving of an attribute apart
from a subject.

The reader can not have failed to see that Mr. Murphy has been leading
us round a vicious circle. "Force is a function of matter, and matter is
a function of force."[321] "Matter is only explicable as a function of
force, force only explicable as a function of conscious mind,"[322] and
mind is "one of the functions of matter."[323] "It is perfectly
certain," says Mr. Murphy, "that inductive psychology gives no hint of
any mental _substance_ as distinguished from the material substance of
the brain."[324] But the material substance of the brain after all is
not material; "matter can only be conceived as _spiritual_"[325]--that
is, as _force_. There is no underlying reality which men call "matter,"
and there is no underlying reality which men call "spirit." Matter is
spirit, spirit is matter; but in reality neither the one nor the other
has any substantial reality. If all finite existences are but modes of
the Infinite Being, we have a consistent Pantheism at any rate. But if
all finite existences are simply phenomena without any underlying
reality, then "perception is a dream, and my existence the dream of that
dream."

Thirdly, the hypothesis of an "_unconscious intelligence_," distinct
from the Supreme Intelligence, which does "the drudgery of Providence,"
and to which the defects and disorders and "immoralities" of nature are
ascribed, is neither adequate nor satisfactory.

The conceit of Cudworth that it is unbecoming the Divine Majesty to be
immediately concerned in every thing that takes place in nature is
scarcely worthy of consideration: "If it were not congruous in respect
of the state and majesty of Xerxes, the king of Persia, that he should
condescend to do all the meanest offices himself, much less can this be
thought decorous in respect of God."[326]

Human conceptions of what is great or small, dignified or indecorous,
are merely relative conceptions which vary with our knowledge, culture,
and taste; but--

    "There is no great and no small
    To the soul that maketh all."--_Emerson_.

For the Creator of all things an atom is an ample field in which to
display the resources of his omnipotence. The more the microscope and
spectroscope reveal of the "infinitely little," the more do we see of
the greatness and glory of God. So of men's conceptions of what is
dignified or indecorous; it may be that, in a land and an age where
labor is held in contempt, it becomes the state of an Eastern monarch
that he should live in voluptuous ease, but the followers of Him who
said, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work," have learned to believe
in the dignity of labor, and to regard all true work as divine. An
imperfect human ruler can not do every thing, therefore he must employ
agents and ministers; the Omnipotent Ruler of the universe can do all
things, and needs no subordinate ministry. A finite mind can not know
every thing, and often staggers beneath the burden of its limited
acquisitions; the Infinite Mind _must_ know all things, and can not be
perplexed amid the boundless profusion of its own creations. It is only
a childish impotence or a barbaric vanity which sees the need of
supplementary agencies to add to the splendor and efficiency of the
Divine government of the world. "Are not two sparrows sold for a
farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your
Father." "The very hairs of your head are all numbered." Such views
exalt rather than diminish our reverence for the majesty of God. But
there is neither congruity nor dignity in the hypothesis that God has
associated with Himself an agent which is "_unconscious_," whose action
He must direct,[327] and whose "shortcomings and defects" He must
supply.[328] Dr. Mosheim, the annotator of Cudworth's "Intellectual
System," pertinently remarks: "That master has enough to do who must
continually take care that the servants he employs, unskillful and
devoid of reason, do not err; who must preside over the actions of his
agents, and continually remedy the defects and mischiefs they
occasion.... That master is the happier man who possesses the power of
conducting his own affairs, who can do all things himself, and needs no
servants whatever." But if subordinate agents are needed, or if it
please the Supreme Being to employ them, the presumption is certainly in
favor of rational conscious agents, rather than blind unconscious forces
which can neither conceive a purpose nor adapt means to secure it. If we
must have formative agents, we prefer the "junior divinities" of Plato
or the "higher intelligences" of Mr. Wallace.[329]

But even admitting there are "defects, deformities, and superfluities"
in nature, we are at a loss to conceive how the hypothesis of an
"unconscious intelligence," working necessarily, removes the blame (if
there be any blame) from the Author of nature. Does not every theist
believe that the Creator of matter "saw and knew every purpose which
every particle and atom of matter should subserve in all suns and
systems, and through all coming æons of time?" Must not that Intelligent
Will, which is the fountain-head of all the force that sweeps like a
tide of life through the universe, have known every form of energy which
could result therefrom, and foreseen all the possible effects which
would arise from the composition of any and all systems of forces? Did
not He who created this supposed "organizing force," who ordained all
its laws, and who directs and controls all its actions, know with
mathematical precision every consequence which could possibly arise from
its prearranged and necessitated adaptations? If God is the creator of
this unconscious, necessitated "plastic nature," if He always observes
what it does, if He directs and overrules it, if He supplies some of its
defects and corrects most of its mistakes, must not He be regarded as
the real cause of all things which, in popular language, are said to be
done by nature? If we believe with Mr. Murphy that

    "Nature is but the name for an effect
    Whose cause is God,"

we shall find no relief from the difficulties and mysteries of Divine
providence by interposing between the first creative volition and the
last phenomenal result a series of secondary causes which are themselves
only effects of the primal creative act. It were better far to leave the
mystery untouched, and take refuge in faith; better to confess the
difficulties are insoluble, and

    "Still trust that God is love indeed,
        And love Creation's final law;
        Though nature, red in tooth and claw
      With ravin, shrieks against our creed."

We are brought finally to the question whether, in reality, there is any
thing defective or any thing superfluous in the normal products of
organic nature? or, in other words, whether the Author of nature has
made any thing inadequate to its purpose, or which fulfills no purpose
whatever? We venture to suggest that inductive science is not in
possession either of the facts or the principles which are necessary to
a correct judgment. To be competent to deal with this question, science
should not only know all the purposes which may be fulfilled by a single
organism, but also the ultimate purpose which is subserved by the
wondrous play of all the means and relative ends which constitute the
entire cosmos. Far be it from us to depreciate the achievements or dare
to set limits to the possibilities of inductive science. But, assuredly,
the most enthusiastic scientist will admit that, compared with the
vastness and complexity of natural phenomena, human knowledge is
exceedingly limited and very imperfect. As to the final purpose of
creation--the ultimate end of the Creator in the existence of the
universe--modern science does not even claim to have an opinion.[330]
With no knowledge of the ultimate purpose of creation, with a limited
acquaintance with the general plan of the universe, with an imperfect
knowledge of the reasons and ends of individual existences, it seems
little less than impertinence for science to sit in judgment on the
works of God, and unceremoniously condemn this as defective and that as
unnecessary. As Baden Powell observes, "How can we undertake to affirm,
amid all the possibilities of things of which we confessedly know so
little, that a thousand ends and purposes may not be answered, because
we can trace none, or even imagine none, which seem to our short-sighted
faculties to be answered."[331] In view of the fact that hitherto the
belief in "purpose" or "final cause" has been the guiding light of
science, and the further fact that science is every day making new
discoveries as to the utility of existences and organs of which before
we were ignorant, scientific men might learn a profitable lesson, and
manifest less "audacity."[332] Meantime we shall be content with the
assurances of Scripture that "the works of God are _perfect_," and that
"He hath made nothing _in vain_."


We may now gather up the several threads of thought which run through
this essay, and state our final conclusions:

1. Matter is the merely passive or statical condition for the action of
force.[333] The most fundamental condition or characteristic of matter,
"perhaps its only true indication, is _inertia_."[334] "All that we can
affirm of it is that it is the _recipient_ of impulse and of
Energy."[335] All the attempts which have been made to reduce matter to
a function or phenomenon of force have ended in failure. Motion
necessarily implies a _something_ which is moved by the action of force.
Even that most wonderful and subtile of all "modes of
motion"--light--necessarily implies an entity which is moved. "The
magnetic rotation of the plane of polarized light, discovered by
Faraday, implies an _actual_ rotatory motion of something." "The seeing
intellect," says Mr. Tyndall, "when properly focused, must realize this
conception at last." Matter must consist of ultimate continuous atoms or
molecules possessing inertia and capable of being moved in space. By
virtue of its extension and inertia it can intercept force, transform
force into energy, and transmit energy. The various forms of energy
(heat, light, electricity, magnetism, etc.) are transformations of force
resulting directly or indirectly from the interception of force by inert
matter, and "all the phenomena of material nature result from the action
of force _upon_ matter."[336] "Matter," says M. Claude Bernard, "does
not generate the phenomena which it manifests. It is only the
substratum, and does absolutely nothing but give to phenomena the
conditions of its manifestation."[337]

2. Force is that which originates or tends to originate motion, or
changes or tends to change the state of a body with regard to motion. It
is not and can not be a property of matter. The doctrine that force is
an attribute of matter is disproved by the fact of inertia. Inert matter
can have no spontaneous power--it can not change its own state of motion
or rest. Neither is motion capable _per se_ of producing motion. It is a
fundamental axiom of natural philosophy that motion can not be generated
by motion itself, any more than by the negation of motion. Inertness and
exertion, passivity and activity, are contradictory attributes, and can
not be affirmed of the same subject. To say that matter is inert, and at
the same time that it can exert force, is to violate the law of
non-contradiction to the uttermost.

Force is an attribute of mind or spirit, and of mind or spirit alone.
Spirit-force is the only force in the universe. It is a doctrine as old
as the hills that mind is the first cause of motion. Νοῦς μὲν ἀρχὴν
κινησέως.[338] It is a doctrine toward which all modern science tends
with remarkable unanimity that all motion is the product of mind; and,
though continued and transformed and transmitted through various means,
it never commences except in a volition either of the Supreme Mind or of
a created mind. "The deep-seated instincts of humanity and the
profoundest researches of philosophy alike point to _Mind as the one and
only source of power_."[339] "The conception of force as the originator
of motion in matter, without bodily contact or the intervention of any
intermedium, is essential to the right interpretation of physical
phenomena;... its exertion makes itself manifest to our personal
consciousness by the peculiar sensation of _effort_;... and it [force]
affords a point of contact, a connecting link between the two great
departments of being--between mind and matter--the one as its
_originator_, the other as its _recipient_."[340]

3. All the forms of energy manifested in the universe are only
transformations of the one omnipresent force issuing from the one
fountain-head of power--_the Divine Will_. The final disclosure of
modern science is the convertibility and homogeneity of all forms of
physical energy--"a dynamical self-identification masked by
transmigration." Of this wonderful transformation of energy many
striking illustrations may be given; we select the following from the
"Lecture Notes" of Dr. A. F. Mayer (p. 64): "The heat developed by the
'falling force' of a weight striking the terminals of a compound thermal
battery (formed by pieces of iron and German-silver wire twisted
together at alternate ends) caused a current of electricity through the
wire which, being conducted through a helix, magnetized a needle (which
then attracted iron particles), caused light to appear in a portion of
the circuit formed of Wollaston's fine wire, decomposed iodide of
potassium, and finally moved the needles of a galvanometer."[341] Here
we have visible kinetic energy transformed into sensible heat, then
absorbed heat converted into electricity, then electricity transformed
into magnetism, also into light, and still further into the energy of
chemical separation, while some portion of it returns to the form of
visible energy of motion. Of course, some of the energy is dissipated in
the form of radiance (radiant light and heat), but no energy is either
created or destroyed. All the various forms of energy are thus reducible
to _unity_; they are one force transformed by mechanical arrangements.
"Electricity and magnetism, heat and light, muscular energy and chemical
action, motion and mechanical work, are only different forms of one and
the same power.... Moreover, chemical union of the elements of matter,
the attraction of gravitation in all the bodies of the universe, are but
varied forms of this universal motive force."[342] If it be asked, What
is that one form of force which is to be taken as the type of all the
rest? the explicit answer of the first scientists of the age is, "Force
must be regarded as the direct expression of that mental state which we
call _Will_. All force is of one type, and that type is mind."[343] This
is conceded even by Herbert Spencer: "The force by which we ourselves
produce changes, and which serves to symbolize the cause of changes in
general, is the final disclosure of analysis."[344] The whole
conception is summed up in one comprehensive statement by Professor
Norton, of Yale College: "I regard the primary force of repulsion as
incessantly outstreaming in every direction from every ethereal atom
(which is incessantly renewed), and as it spreads outward ever tending
toward evanescence on each radiating line by the mere result of its own
expansion--_a perpetual stream of force flowing from the Infinite Source
of all power_, vanishing ultimately by diffusion in the infinite expanse
of the universe. It breaks incessantly against the atoms of bodies, and
so furnishes the secondary streams of force that maintain the
constitution and determine the phenomena of the material universe."[345]
Force, then, is the act of the immanent Deity, who puts forth
unceasingly from every point in the realm of space his creative and
sustaining power.

4. All the phenomena of molecular life (bioplasmic phenomena) are the
result of the immediate presence and direct agency of God.[346]

This is the doctrine which must finally be accepted, whether vitality be
regarded as a mode of energy--a transformation of chemico-physical
forces--or as a distinct and special force. Dr. Carpenter has long held
that the physical and vital forces are mutually convertible, but he
regards both as the result of the direct action of the Deity. "Believing
that all force which does not emanate from the will of created sentient
beings _directly and immediately proceeds from the will of the
Omnipotent and Omnipresent Creator_; and looking on the (what we are
accustomed to call) physical forces as so many _modi operandi_ of one
and the same agency, the creative and sustaining will of the Deity, I do
not feel the validity of the objections urged against the idea of the
absolute metamorphosis or conversion of forces."[347] Inasmuch, however,
as the advocates of this theory have failed to establish either a
_quantitative_ or a _qualitative_ relation between the vital and
physical forces, but, on the contrary, the most exact and careful
biological researches show them to be inconvertible and antagonistic, we
are constrained still to hold the doctrine maintained by Dr. Beale.

The ancient doctrine that "Life is the cause, and not the consequence of
organization,"[348] still maintains its ground against all assaults.
Harvey's famous maxim, _Omne vivum ex ovo_--as amended by Charles Robin,
_Omne vivum ex vivo_--stands yet unrefuted; and, as Sir William Thomson
remarked in his inaugural address before the British Association of
Science, "This seems to me as sure a teaching of science as the law of
gravitation. I confess to being deeply impressed by the evidence put
before us by Professor Huxley, and I am ready to adopt it as an article
of scientific faith--true through all space and all time--that _life
proceeds from life, and nothing but life_."[349] Life has its origin in
no secondary cause, but in the immediate presence and direct action of
the Deity. God is the author and giver of Life--the constant sustainer
of all vitality; "in Him we live and move and are."

The final conclusion to be drawn from these propositions is that God is
not simply the _transitive_ but the _immanent_ cause of the universe.
He is in nature, not merely as a _regulative_ principle impressing laws
upon matter, but as a _constitutive_ principle, the ever-present source
and ever-operating cause of all its phenomena. If by the term nature we
understand the totality of necessary and uniform phenomena, God is the
immediate cause of all uniform and necessary phenomena. If by nature we
understand the varied forms of energy which underlie the phenomena, and
are manifested in the phenomena, these forms of energy are but various
modes in which the omnipresent power of God reveals itself. God is
immanent in matter, and his ceaseless energy produces all the phenomena
of nature. Nature is more than matter: it is matter swayed by Divine
power, and organized and animated by the Divine life.

But the question may be here raised, Is not this identification of the
dynamical life of the universe with God, Pantheism? We answer in the
language of James Martineau: "It certainly would be so if we also turned
the proposition round and identified God with no more than the life of
the universe, and treated the two terms as for all purposes
interchangeable. If in affirming the Divine _immanency_ in nature we
deny the Divine _transcendency_ beyond nature, and pay our worship to
the aggregate of all its powers, the law of its laws, the unity of its
organism,... then undoubtedly we do pass from part to whole, and rest in
a dream of future science instead of emerging into immediate
religion."[350] The theory which represents the Deity as the transitive
cause of the universe--a Δημιουργός mechanically fashioning the
materials supplied to his hands, and then leaving it to the working of
its own inherent forces--is rank Deism. The hypothesis which regards
the Deity as _no more_ than the dynamical life of the universe--an
informing and organizing soul associated with matter--is naked
Hylozoism. The theory that reduces all existence, material and mental,
to phenomenal manifestations of one eternal self-existent substance
which evolves itself according to an inward law of necessity, and which
is elusively called God, is Pantheism. But the doctrine which embraces
the two conceptions of _transcendence_ and _immanence_, and while it
teaches the immanence of God in matter, proclaims the infinite
distinctness in essence between matter and God, and the infinite
omnipresence of a personal God above and beyond the limitations of
matter, is Christian Theism.[351]

And now, in conclusion, may we not say that this dictum of faith that
the universe exists only in virtue of the continued Will of its Creator,
is coming more and more to be recognized as a scientific fact. The will
of God is the one primal force which streams forth in ever-recurring
impulses with an immeasurable rapidity at every point in space--an
incessant pulse-beat of the Infinite Life.[352] The disposition and
collocations of matter are simply the conditions necessary to the
manifestation of this primal force. The chemical atom, "already quite a
complex little world,"[353] is a mechanism for the interception,
transformation, and transmission of force. All the varied forms of
energy are but secondary and derivative streams of force--forms of
energy which are conceivable only as effects, and which by mere
accommodation we may be permitted to call "causes," yet with this
specific reservation that "they are not vicegerents outside of the
Divine Will, but are held within the Divine Will." "The word '_cause_'
may be used in a secondary and concrete sense as meaning antecedent
forces, yet in an abstract sense it is totally inapplicable; we can not
predicate of any physical agent that it is abstractedly the cause of
another; and if, for the sake of convenience, the language of secondary
causation be permissible, it should only be with reference to the
special phenomena referred to, as it can never be generalized." "The
common error, if I am right in supposing it to be such, consists in the
abstraction of cause, and in supposing in each case a general secondary
cause--a something which is not the First Cause, but which, if we
examine it carefully, _must have all the attributes of a first cause,
and an existence independent of and dominant over matter_." "CAUSATION
IS THE WILL OF GOD."[354] The Divine conservation of the world is the
_simple, universal, uniform efficiency of God_.





CHAPTER VIII.

THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD IN HUMAN HISTORY.

     "He hath made of one blood all the nations of mankind to dwell upon
     the face of the whole earth, and ordained to each the appointed
     seasons of their existence and the bounds of their habitation, that
     they should seek God."--ST. PAUL.

     "Divine providence, which conducts all things marvelously, rules
     the series of human generations from Adam to the end of the world
     _like one man_, who, from his infancy to his old age, furnishes
     forth his career in time in passing through all its ages."--ST.
     AUGUSTINE.

     "The right education of the human race, so far as concerns the
     people of God, like that of a single man, advances through certain
     divisions of time, as that of the individual through the
     consecutive ages of human life."--ST. AUGUSTINE.

     "Les nations sont régies par les mêmes lois que les
     individus."--LAURENT.


From the central and fundamental truth that God is the Creator and
Conservator of the universe, Christian theology advances to the still
more practical truth that He determines and presides over the
development of the human race, leading it toward a foreseen and
predestinated goal.

This is the natural and logical order of thought. If nature and man were
created and are still conserved by an intelligent power, there must be
some reason or end for which they exist; for intelligent power can only
be conceived as a power which works toward ends. The existence of the
world and of man being given, the question concerning the purpose or end
for which they exist becomes unavoidable and necessary; and though
physical science may proclaim "its inability to disclose the final
purpose of creation," and speak contemptuously of all such inquiries, it
does not by any means follow that Christian doctrine can furnish no
satisfactory answer to this inevitable question. As the reference of the
dependent universe to the efficient ground of its existence gives the
concepts of _Creation_ and _Conservation_ with which the idea of power
is pre-eminently associated, so the reference of the same to the
ultimate reason of its existence gives the concepts of _Providence_ and
_Moral Government_ with which the idea of all-wise love is immediately
correlated.

The Christian doctrine of Providence in human history is succinctly
stated in the words of St. Paul: "God hath made of one blood all the
nations of mankind to dwell upon the face of the whole earth, and
ordained to each the appointed times of their existence and the bounds
of their habitation, that they should seek after, and indeed feel after,
and find the Lord." He has endowed man with intelligence and freedom by
which he may achieve the conquest of nature, and be able to maintain his
existence and ascendency in every part of the habitable globe. A new and
subtile force appears in the arena of nature, which is superior to
nature, which can control and regulate its action, and subordinate the
forces of nature to the higher purposes and needs of spiritual and moral
being. By travel and observation, by reasoning and invention, by
interchange of ideas and products, man may continually enlarge the
sphere of his knowledge, and multiply the means of improvement and
happiness.[355] God has also "determined beforehand the _time_ of each
nation's existence, and the geographical _boundaries_ of their
habitation." Divine providence has decreed and presided over the
dispersions and migrations of the human race, and in the plan of history
fixed the time when and the people by which each continent and island
shall be inhabited. And the ultimate purpose of this providential
arrangement and supervision is that men "may seek God, and feel after
and really find Him," who for all dependent rational existence is the
chief good.

This, then, is the explicit teaching of Christian theology: The
appearance of rational existence on the earth constitutes a distinct
creative epoch; the final cause of all rational existence is to know
God, consciously to feel after and find Him; and the whole of God's
action upon humanity has been an inspiration, guidance, and education
toward this end. _The progress of the human race, the course of human
history, is therefore a revelation of the Providence of God._

"The consideration of nature," says Niebuhr, "shows an inherent
intelligence, which may be also considered as coherent in nature; so
does history, on a hundred occasions, show an intelligence distinct from
nature which conducts and determines those things which may seem to us
accidental; and it is not true that history weakens our belief in Divine
providence. History is, of all kinds of knowledge, the one which tends
most decidedly to that belief."[356] "History," observes Richter, "has,
like nature, the highest value (if studied philosophically) in so far as
we by means of it, as by means of nature, can divine and read the
Infinite Spirit who, with nature and history as with letters, legibly
writes to us. He who finds a God in the physical world will also find
one in the moral world--which is history. Nature forces on our hearts a
Creator; history, a Providence." To the student of history it becomes
apparent that the hand of God has been guiding humanity toward the
fulfillment of its destiny. God has presided over the development of
human society and government. Throughout the ages He has been the
Educator of the race--leading, instructing, chastening, and blessing the
nations. "Man holds relations to God not merely at the moment of
creation; he does not cease to be in connection with his Creator through
the endless duration of his existence. The incessant action of God on
man is grace; the incessant action of God on humanity is providential
government."[357] "History is the manifestation of God's supervision of
humanity, and the judgments of history are the judgments of God."[358]

If we have here the true conception of history, if it is a manifestation
of Divine supervision, direction, and discipline, then the question is
at once legitimate and practical, What is the end of this discipline?
what is the foreseen and predestinated goal toward which, through
conflict and pain and travail, Divine providence is leading the human
race?

It must be conceded on all hands that the adequate and final answer can
only be given by that Divine prescience which "sees the end from the
beginning." The study of the past and of the present moral and religious
phenomena of the world may afford to the philosophic mind some prevision
of the future, but it is obvious that revelation alone can supply the
principles which must constitute the light of history--the light in
which even its darkest chapters may be interpreted, and its true
philosophy evolved.

The general answer which speculative thought has furnished to this
question is that the goal of history is _the highest perfection of
humanity_. Aristotle clearly recognizes that there must be an end or
final cause of human existence and action--a τέλειον τέλος (_summum
bonum_), or chief end.[359] He therefore addresses himself to the
inquiry, What is the chief good, or highest end of man? The conclusion
which he reaches is, that it is the absolute satisfaction of his whole
nature--that which men have agreed to call _happiness_. This happiness,
however, is not mere sensual pleasure. The brute shares this in common
with man, therefore it can not constitute the happiness of man. Human
happiness must express the _completeness_ of rational existence, or, as
he expresses it, "a perfect practical activity in a perfect life."[360]
This "complete and perfect life" is the complete satisfaction of our
rational nature. It is the realization of the Divine in man, and
constitutes the absolute and all-sufficient good.[361] A good action is
thus "an end in itself," inasmuch as it tends to secure the _perfection_
of our nature.

The human mind can not, however, rest in the general and vague idea of
perfection; we are therefore pressed with the further question, In what
does the highest perfection of humanity consist? by what standard are we
to judge of this perfection? what is the _ideal_ toward which the
progress of humanity may be presumed to tend, and which we hope it will
ultimately attain? The following considerations may furnish the answer:

1. That ideal must be the same for the race as for the individual, the
same for the nation as for the man. For, on the one hand, society exists
for the sake of the individual, and it is only in society that
individual existences can be preserved, developed, and perfected; on the
other hand, national character is but the expression of the collective
or average character of the individual citizens.

In seeking for the ideal of individual perfection, we must take account
of all the capacities, powers, and relations of man. We must have in
view, not simply his physical and intellectual, but also his moral and
religious nature. We must think of the relation in which he stands to
his fellow-beings and to his God, as well as the relation in which he
stands to himself--that is, to the liberty and intelligence which are in
him, and which he must develop. Now no man can be said to be complete,
to be _perfect_, no man can be said to have reached his τέλος, or end,
until he has developed in his thought and realized in his life the idea
of the useful, the true, the just, the good, the pure, the Divine.
Loyalty to God and the truth, justice and charity toward men,
self-control and purity of mind, intellectual discipline and cultivated
taste--these are the characteristics of the perfect man. Judged from the
Christian stand-point, he is the perfect man who has attained to that
ideal of moral and spiritual excellence which was exhibited in the human
life of Christ, that grand embodiment of all that is "pure and true and
just and lovely and of good report." The realization of this ideal in
the collective life of humanity must be the goal of history.

2. Further light is shed upon this problem by the consideration of the
Christian idea of God. The gravitating point of Christian theology is
found in the Divine declaration, "_God is Love_" (1 John iv. 8, 16).
This is the most fundamental revelation of the Divine nature, so that
nothing can pertain to his perfections or his works which is not
ultimately resolvable into love. "If ever the idea of Divine justice
shall obtain consistency [in our systems of theology], it must be in
general through the relation of infinite holy love to the spontaneous
and self-determining capacity of the personal being, or the relation of
Divine perfection to the existence of the economy in the universe."[362]
The fact that God creates worlds and gives birth to personal existences
is not grounded in his omnipotence, but in his love. Divine love is the
determinative principle of Divine efficiency--the final cause or
ultimate reason of all existence. Creation must therefore be conceived
as the free self-communication of God, who is Himself eternally
self-complete and self-sufficient, but who, from love alone, wills that
other intelligences shall have existence who can "know God," and in
fellowship with Him attain that fullness and fruition of being which is
called "Eternal Life."[363] If, then, the Divine mind has always had
this end in view--the perfection and blessedness of personal being in
fellowship with Himself--it must be regarded by us as the consummation
toward which his providence is leading humanity.

3. The explicit declarations of Scripture are in perfect accord with
these inferences drawn from the nature of man and the idea of God. We
learn from the words of St. Paul that the aim of Divine providence is to
lead the race to the practical recognition of the personal dignity of
man as "the offspring of God;" to the practical recognition of the
universal brotherhood of man, as "of one blood," with equal rights to
place, provision, and free self-development in "every part of the
earth;" finally, to the practical recognition of our relation to God as
his dependent creatures, in fellowship with whom we have eternal
life.[364] God's great end in the whole course and discipline of
providence is to unite all men in bonds of mutual affection and aid, and
to unite the race to Himself in bonds of loyalty and love. Then
"whatsoever things are true and pure and honest and lovely and of good
report" will be revered and practiced among the nations of the earth.

These views of Divine providence can scarcely be said to have had any
place or any recognition in the ancient schools of philosophy. The
Stoics taught that an invincible necessity rules in the realm of history
as well as in the field of nature, to which God and man are equally
subject. "God is the reason of the world (τοῦ παντὸς τοῦ λόγου); the
laws of the world are as necessary as the laws of eternal reason. This
necessity is at once _fate_ (εἱμαρμένη), and the _providence_ (πρόνοια)
which governs all things."[365] The Epicureans reduced all existence to
the plane of mere physical nature, and represented humanity as a
development from the lower forms of life by the agency of blind,
unconscious force. If they recognized the existence of any god or gods,
they removed them far away from all intercourse with humanity, and all
supervision of or concern in human affairs. "They admitted their
existence in words," says Cicero, "but denied it in act." These two
forms of error are combined by the modern deniers of providence. Human
society, languages, laws, institutions, arts, sciences, are all the
products of matter and force. The succession of events, the progress of
civilization, and the religious phenomena of the world, have not been
determined by an intelligent Will, or presided over by a conscious
Personality. In the last analysis, matter is resolved into a function of
force, and a process of necessary evolution, which has no design and no
final purpose, is substituted for Divine providence. The ultimate
destination of the world and humanity is unknown, or, if conjecture is
permissible, is chaos and death.

In opposition to these cold and cheerless speculations Christianity
affirms the doctrine of Divine providence in human history.[366]

By Providence we understand intelligent _forethought_ and timely
_provision_ for all contingencies. The term supposes a precognized
_plan_, a constant supervision of its development, and the control and
subordination of all finite powers and agencies in order to its
completion. From nature, strictly considered as the empire of mechanical
necessity, nothing can proceed but that which is posited in it by the
immediate act of God; and consequently, considered apart from man, there
can be no contingency, and, properly speaking, no providence in this
sphere. The existence of mere nature, however, can not be regarded as an
end in itself. The whole interest and significance of nature is found in
the conception that it exists as a means for a higher end. As matter is
simply the condition for the manifestation of force, as the physical
forces are subordinated to the vital force, and the vital is
subordinated to the mental, so is it a legitimate assumption, which we
shall justify in the sequel, that all these are subordinated to the
_moral_ and _spiritual_. It is only in the sphere of spiritual
being--that is, of self-conscious and self-determined being--and in the
_relation of nature to spiritual being_, that contingency can arise and
providence find place.

The uniform teaching of Scripture is that human history is the special
field of Divine providence. In fact, the historic portions of the Bible
are nothing else than a record of the control and direction and
subordination of human agencies, and of external physical conditions in
their relation to personal beings, by the hand of God. This primitive
revelation throws light upon the cradle of human civilization. It points
to a period when man, at his departure from the hand of God, received
those intellectual, moral, and spiritual endowments which raise him in
the scale of being immeasurably above the animal creation, and fit him
for a progress, a development to which no conceivable limits can be
assigned.[367] The Bible is the history of Divine providence from that
signal commencement to the planting of the Christian Church, where we
can clearly see all the lines along which the race advanced, converging
upon "the Kingdom of God." It is a history of Divine interposition in
human affairs, and of supernatural guidance toward a higher development
and a nobler destiny. Indeed, to the eye of the observant and
conscientious student of all history, whether secular or ecclesiastical,
there are undeniable evidences of the presence of Intelligence,
disposing and collocating the conditions of human progress, and
directing humanity toward a nobler civilization.

Considering the earth in its relation to man, we must recognize the
providence of God in the physical universe. The earth was unquestionably
made for man. It was created, and has been especially adapted to be the
theatre of human history. This is the doctrine of Scripture (Gen. i.
28-31; Psa. cxv. 16)--I believe it is also the doctrine of science. The
geological changes through which the earth has passed indicate "a
process of preparation" for the inhabitation of man. This process of
preparation is fully recognized by Agassiz. "There has been," he says,
"a manifest progress in the succession of beings on the surface of the
globe. This progress consists in an increasing similarity to the living
fauna, and, among the vertebrates especially, in the increasing
resemblance to man. But this connection is not the consequence of a
direct lineage between the faunas of different ages. The fishes of the
Palæozoic are in no respect the ancestors of the reptiles of the
Secondary age, nor does man descend from the mammals of the Tertiary
age. The link by which they are connected is of an immaterial nature,
and their connection is to be sought in the thought of the Creator
Himself, whose _aim_ in forming the earth, in allowing it to pass
through the successive changes which Geology has pointed out, and in
creating successively all the different types of animals which have
passed away, was to introduce man upon the surface of the globe. Man is
the end toward which all the animal creation has tended."[368] The
language of Prof. Owen is equally explicit: "The recognition of an ideal
exemplar in the vertebrated animals proves that the knowledge of such a
being as man existed before man appeared; for the Divine Mind which
planned the archetype also foresaw all its modifications. The archetype
idea was manifested in the flesh long prior to the existence of those
animal species that actually exemplify it."[369] "Of the nature of the
creative acts by which the successive races of animals were called into
being, we are ignorant. But this we know, that as the evidence of unity
of plan testifies to the oneness of the Creator, so the modifications of
the plan for different modes of existence illustrate the benevolence of
the Designer. Those structures, moreover, which are at present
incomprehensible as adaptations to a special end, are made
comprehensible on a higher principle, and a _final purpose_ is gained in
relation to human intelligence."[370] That these views are still held by
Prof. Owen is evident from his remarks in the fortieth chapter of his
"Anatomy of the Vertebrates:" "Of all the quadrupedal servants of man,
none have proved of more value to him, in peace or war, than the horse;
none have co-operated with the advanced races more influentially in
man's destined mastery over the earth and its lower denizens.... I
believe the horse to have been predestinated and prepared for man. It
may be a weakness; but, if so, it is a glorious one, to discern, however
dimly, across our finite prison-wall, evidence of 'the Divinity that
shapes our ends,' abuse the means as we may."[371]

Long before the appearance of man upon the earth, the providence of God
laid up in its strata those vast treasures of granite, sandstone, lime,
marble, coal, salt, petroleum, and the various metals, the product of a
long succession of ages and revolutions, thus making an inexhaustible
provision for the necessities of man, and furnishing ample resources for
the development of his genius and skill.[372] In the vegetable life
which appeared on the globe immediately prior to and contemporaneous
with the advent of man, we can recognize a providential arrangement made
for man. In the flora of the Palæozoic and Secondary periods we can not
fail to observe the absence of all those plants which are adapted for
human food. Even in the Tertiary epoch, which immediately precedes the
Adamic or human period, so far as Geology reveals, there were few or no
plants yielding the appropriate supplies for the sustentation of man.
There are few indications of any of those vegetables from which man may
derive food and valuable fibre, and, in a word, of species which support
and clothe by far the larger portion of the human race. "Scarcely any
grasses appear in the list of extinct vegetation, and there is reason
to believe that the principal cereals which are characteristic of the
human period--as barley, wheat, oats, rye, millet, Indian corn, and
rice"--had no existence.[373] When the fullness of time was come, and
all things were ready for the reception of man, then God called him into
being, and invested him with dominion over nature.

Physical geography also indicates, not only a state of preparation for
man, but also a special adaptation of the fixed forms of the earth's
surface for securing the perfect development of man according to the
Divine ideal. And as the land which man inhabits, the food he eats, the
air he breathes, the mountains and rivers and seas which are his
neighbors, the skies that overshadow him, the diversities of climate to
which he is subject, and indeed all physical conditions, exert a
powerful influence upon his tastes, pursuits, habits, and character--we
may presume that not only are all these conditions predetermined by God,
but continually under his control and supervision.

The distribution of terrestrial areas--the continents, islands, and
seas; the disposition of the climate, soil, and vegetation, apparently
accidental, have played an important part in the moral history of our
race. There is a close relation between nature and history, between the
earth and man. The soul of man is distinct from, but not totally
independent of the body and of external physical conditions. To deny
this would be to reject all the lessons of experience. The relation of
man to nature is not, however, a relation of cause and effect, but, as
Cousin remarks, "Man and nature are two great effects which, coming from
the _same_ cause, bear the same characteristics, so that the earth and
he who inhabits it, man and nature, are in perfect harmony."[374] "A
living God," says Ritter, "is at the head of the physical and moral
world."[375] The earth was created for man, not simply to be a
dwelling-place, but a _school-house_[376]--made to be a theatre for the
education, the development, and the perfection of the human race. And as
the moral and intellectual culture of the child is materially affected
by the physical conditions with which he is surrounded, and as these are
consequently the subject of care and forethought on the part of the
intelligent and prudent parent and teacher, so the external physical
conditions of a nation exert a powerful influence on its intellectual
and moral development, and therefore must be presumed to be the subject
of forethought and providence on the part of God, "the Father of the
families of all the earth." God has superintended the peopling of the
earth, the dispersions and migrations of nations, guiding the footsteps
of the "covenant, educating, and missionary nations" to those countries
best adapted to their highest development. In a word, He has ordained
the progress of empire and the course of civilization.

Thus nature and history are the two great factors of Divine providence;
in their relations and harmonies we have a revelation of the purposes
and plans of God.[377]

That geographical conditions do exert a powerful influence on the
character of nations can not be denied. "The bodily constitution of a
people, their temperament, modes of life, habitations, customs,
languages, and even religious opinions have been formed or modified
under the influence of that magic circle of nature which surrounds them,
and which so powerfully affects what is individual in national
character." So that, could we fully grasp all the characteristics of a
country--its position, configuration, climate, scenery, and natural
products--we could, with tolerable accuracy, determine what are the
characteristics of the people who inhabit it. We have discussed this
topic at some length in "Christianity and Greek Philosophy," and shall
here simply recall such of the general facts and principles as may be
needed for a clear understanding of the present discussion.

1. _The habits and characteristics of the dwellers in the Temperate Zone
differ widely from those of the dwellers in the Torrid Zone._ This is an
obvious fact; and the causes of this difference are equally obvious to
the observant mind. In the tropical regions the powers of vegetable and
animal life are stimulated to the highest degree, and here nature
displays her fullest energy, her greatest variety, and her richest
splendors. Excessive heat enfeebles and enervates man. It induces
lassitude, dreaminess, effeminacy, and tempts to quietude and indolence.
Where nature pours her fullness into the lap of ease, forethought and
providence are little needed. Here is none of that struggle for
existence which awakens sagacity and develops industry. Nothing calls
man to that effort for the conquest of nature by which the intellect is
aroused and the reasoning faculties are developed. Consequently the mere
life of the body, the powers of the physical nature of man, overmaster
the faculties of the mind. The instincts predominate over the reason.
Simple spontaneity of thought is manifested, but little or no analytic
reflection. Feeling, imagination, sentiment, predominate over intellect,
reason, and science. In a temperate climate all is reversed. The
alternations of heat and cold render man more vigorous, and impart more
physical tone. Where there is less profusion and lavishment of nature's
gifts, there is more room and motive for industry. The change of
seasons, and an annual period of dormancy, demand forethought and
prudence. The preservation of life demands, not merely physical toil,
but some degree of contrivance, and, indeed, the vigorous exertion of
the intellectual powers. And here, though nature is not prodigal of her
gifts, she grants to industry and skill something more than the bare
necessities of life. She allows man to lay up a store for the future,
and furnishes some leisure for the culture of the mind. The active
powers of man, his reason and judgment, rule his instincts, and control,
more or less, his appetites and emotions. Here man becomes a careful
observer of events; he treasures up the results of experience, compares
one fact with another, notes their relations, and makes new experiments
to test his conclusions. Thus science has its birth in the Temperate
Zone.[378]

2. _There is a marked difference between the mental habits and modes of
thought of the peoples who dwell in the interior of an immense continent
and those who dwell on the margin of the sea._ Vast continents, unbroken
by lakes and inland seas, and extended plains where broad deserts and
high mountain ranges separate the populations, are the seats of
immobility. The inhabitants are isolated from the rest of the world, and
excluded from a stimulating and profitable intercourse with the nations
of the earth. They have comparatively no navigation, their commerce is
limited to the bare necessities of life, and there are no inducements to
movement, to travel, and to enterprise. Society is therefore stationary,
as in China; the habits, manners, and usages of social and civil life
remain as they were two thousand years ago. Infolded and imprisoned
within the overwhelming vastness and illimitable sway of nature, man is
almost unconscious of his freedom and personality. He surrenders himself
to the disposal of a mysterious "fate," and yields readily to the
absolute control of rulers who are regarded as of supernatural origin
and endowed with superhuman powers. The forms of government remain
unchanged from age to age, and the state is the reign of fixed and
inexorable laws--"The laws of the Medes and Persians are unalterable."
The rights of the person are scarcely recognized, and the individual is
lost in the mass.

Extended border-lands on the margin of great rivers and inland seas are,
on the contrary, the theatre of movement, activity, and life. Here man
is set free from the bondage imposed by the overpowering magnitude and
vastness of continental and oceanic forms. Here industry is not
stationary, but progressive; and commerce thrives because the rivers and
inland seas furnish the means of easy transit, and the opportunity for a
free interchange of commodities. Along with the exchange of commodities
there will be an exchange of ideas, because ideas flow along the
channels of commerce. Here also the arts will be cultivated, first for
purposes of gain, and subsequently for the gratification of taste. And,
where there is freedom of movement, where there is creative industry,
where nature is subjugated by man, the idea of personal liberty will be
developed, and the rights of the individual will be regarded. These
ideas of personal liberty and rights will become incorporated with the
laws and institutions of society, and the government will tend toward a
democracy. Finally, this freedom of movement and action will engender
freedom of thought. Reflection will commence, the speculative and
critical spirit will arise, and philosophy will be born.[379]

3. _There is also an acknowledged difference between the mental
character of the inhabitants of a bright and sunny climate who breathe
an elastic atmosphere, and are surrounded by the most inspiring scenery,
and that of the people who dwell under a gray and sombre sky, and daily
look upon the more stern and rugged aspects of nature._ The dwellers in
the former climate are ardent, vivacious, and mercurial; the inhabitants
of the latter are slow, deliberate, persistent, and conservative. One
nation will be speculative, enamored of plausible hypotheses, and prone
to hasty and brilliant generalization; the other will be practical,
intolerant of hypotheses, and clamorous for facts and logical inferences
from facts. In the former climate the fine arts will be enthusiastically
cultivated, and elegance and taste, and all that is graceful in
sentiment and action, will find a congenial home; in the latter, the
exact sciences and the useful arts will be cultivated with persistence
and zeal. Under the former conditions, a religion of poetry, of
sentiment, of artistic display and imposing ceremonial, will sway the
popular mind; under the latter, a religion of personal duty and purity,
of social righteousness, of active beneficence, and of universal
charity, will command respect.

These principles constitute what may be designated the _statics_ of
history--the more or less stable and permanent _conditions_ under which
the living forces of humanity are developed.

The _dynamics_ of history are the fundamental powers and rational ideas
of human nature. There are certain primary ideas of the reason which are
revealed in the universal consciousness of our race under the
conditions of experience--the exterior conditions of physical nature and
sensational life. Such are the ideas of substance and cause, of unity
and infinity, which govern all the processes of discursive thought, and
lead us to the recognition of the uncreated and unconditioned Being;
such the ideas of right, of duty, of accountability, and of retribution
which regulate all the conceptions we form of our relations to other
moral beings, and constitute _morality_; such the ideas of order,
proportion, and harmony which preside in the realm of art, and
constitute the beau-ideal of _æsthetics_; such the ideas of God, the
soul, and immortality which rule in the domain of _religion_, and
constitute man a religious being. In addition to these, there are the
powers of observation, of abstraction, of generalization, of inference,
the capacity of symbolic conception and expression, the faculty of
creative imagination, the powers of invention, of foresight, and of
scientific prevision. These are the living forces of humanity,
fundamentally the same under all circumstances, but modified in their
intensity and development by geographical, climatal, and scenic
conditions. The providential adjustment and harmonious relation of the
exterior conditions with the inherent powers of humanity is the problem
of history.

Before attempting to trace the hand of Divine providence in the original
location and subsequent migrations of the historic races, let us briefly
reproduce the sentences which express the _conditions_ most favorable to
the development and perfection of humanity. 1. While the tropical
climate of Southern Asia, of Africa, and of South America is unfavorable
to the highest intellectual and moral development, the temperate climate
of Western Asia, of Europe, and of North America is peculiarly adapted
to minister to the advancement and perfection of the human race. 2. The
massive, unbroken continents of the South, shut in by immense oceans and
impassable mountain ranges, are the seats of immobility and the home of
despotic power; but the deeply indented and elaborately articulated
continents of the North, with their inland seas and large navigable
rivers, are the theatre of activity, of progress, and of liberty. 3. The
sunny skies and glowing landscapes and inspiring scenery of the south of
Europe are most congenial to poetry and music, and painting and
sculpture, and all that is graceful in expression and action; the deeper
tone and sterner features of the northern portion of Europe, "whose
skies are sombre, and whose mountains are rugged and gray," determine it
to be the home of practical industry and useful arts, of benevolent
enterprises and philanthropic deeds. Bearing in mind these principles,
we turn to history in the belief that we shall find that Divine
providence has at successive periods placed the historic races in such
geographical relations and amid such physical conditions as have been
most favorable to their intellectual and moral development.

1. The first historic fact to which we would now direct attention is
_that the human race really commenced its history in the midst of the
continents of the Temperate Zone_. Western Asia was unquestionably the
cradle of the human race, the grand centre whence the different families
or races commenced their migrations.

Whatever views may be entertained of the doctrine supposed to be taught
in Gen. i.-iv. that the whole human race originally descended from a
single pair, or whatever method of interpretation in regard to that
ancient document may finally prevail--even should we adopt the theory of
Dr. McCausland[380] that the Biblical account is concerned only with
the origin of a covenant and redemptive race (the Adamite or Edenic
race), which was to be the instructor and benefactor of the pre-Adamite
races--there can be no question that the sacred historian traces the
source of the great historic nations to the family of Noah (Gen. ix.
19). Whatever difficulties there may be in determining the site of
Eden--and they are confessedly great, if not insurmountable--there is no
difficulty in locating the second geographical centre from whence the
great historic races departed to overspread the earth. Ararat is, no
doubt, in its Biblical import, the Armenian highlands, the lofty plateau
which overlooks the plains of the Araxes on the north and Mesopotamia on
the south. This "Armenian plateau stands equidistant from the Euxine and
the Caspian seas on the north, and between the Persian Gulf and the
Mediterranean Sea on the south. With the first it is connected by the
Acampsis, with the second by the Araxes, with the third by the Tigris
and the Euphrates, the latter of which serves as an outlet toward the
countries on the Mediterranean coast. These seas were the highways of
primitive colonization, and the plains watered by these rivers were the
seats of the most powerful nations of antiquity--the Assyrians, the
Babylonians, the Medes, and the Colchians. Viewed with reference to the
dispersion of the nations, Armenia is the true ὀμφαλος--the
middle part--of the earth; and it is a significant fact that at the
present day Ararat is the great boundary-stone between the empires of
Russia, Turkey, and Persia."[381]

The Scripture account, which certainly authorizes us to fix upon the
highlands of Armenia as the new centre whence the descendants of Noah
went forth to people the earth, is confirmed by the most ancient
traditions and the most reliable historic records. Josephus tells us
there was in Armenia a city which was called Ἀποβατήριον--the
Place of Descent[382]--"for the ark being saved in that place, its
remains are shown by the inhabitants to this day."[383] He further adds
that "all the writers of the barbarian histories make mention of the
flood, and of this ark, among whom is Berosus, the Chaldæan,[384] who,
when he goes on to describe the circumstances of the flood, remarks, 'it
is said there is still some part of this ship in Armenia, at the
mountain of the Cordyæans;' Hieronymus, the Egyptian, who wrote the
Phœnician antiquities, and Manases, and indeed a great many others,
also make mention of the same. Nay, Nicholas of Damascus, in his
ninety-sixth book, hath a particular relation about them, where he
speaks thus: 'There is a great mountain in Armenia, over Minyas, called
Baris, upon which, it is reported,... that one who was carried in an ark
came on shore upon the top of it, and that the remains of the timber
were a great while preserved.'"[385]

This concurrent testimony of sacred and profane history, which
designates Western Asia as the cradle of the historic nations, has
received additional confirmation from the researches of modern
ethnologists and philologists. In the tenth chapter of Genesis, the
sacred historian sketches the nations of the earth at his time of
writing, indicates their ethnic affinities, and marks to some extent
their geographical positions. The professor of ancient history in the
University of Oxford, George Rawlinson, remarks that "the _Toldoth Beni
Noah_ (the Generations of Noah) has excited the admiration of modern
ethnologists, who continually find in it the anticipations of their
greatest discoveries."[386] Sir Henry Rawlinson assures us that "the
Toldoth Beni Noah is undoubtedly the _most authentic_ record we possess
of the affiliations of the human race which sprang from the triple stock
of the Noachidæ."[387] The same distinguished Oriental scholar in an
essay "On the Ethnic Affinities of the Nations of Western Asia,"
further remarks: "In Western Asia, the cradle of the human race, the
several ethnic branches of the human family were more closely
intermingled and more evenly balanced than in any other portion of the
ancient world. Semitic, Indo-European, and Tâtar or Turanian races not
only divided among them this portion of the earth's surface, but lay
interspersed and confused upon it in a most remarkable entanglement. It
is symptomatic of this curious intermixture that the Persian monarchs,
when they wished to communicate to their Asiatic subjects in such a way
that it should be generally intelligible, had to put it out not only in
three different languages, but in three languages belonging to the
_three principal divisions of human speech_. Hence the trilingual
inscriptions of Behistun, Persepolis, etc., which consist of an
Indo-European, a Tâtar, and a Semitic column."[388]

Thus do all the varied lines of evidence proceeding from history,
ethnology, and philology converge upon Western Asia as the cradle of the
human race--the centre from which the families of mankind departed to
people the earth; and we are constrained to regard the early populations
of that region as furnishing the _typical_ standard or average sample of
our species.

Proceeding from a purely zoological stand-point, we should be led to an
opposite conclusion. Looking to the general phenomena of the
geographical distribution of animals, and the natural rather than the
artificial conditions of human existence, and arguing solely on
naturalistic grounds, we should be constrained to place the centre of
our race in the tropics; and of the intertropical regions those which
are the habitat of the anthropoid (or anthropomorphic) ape, as Western
Africa and the southern extremity of Asia. In the protoplasts of his
species the mere zoologist sees but so many naked bipeds, with the
capabilities, indeed, of working out for their future behoof the
essentials of clothing, the use of fire, and the like, but in the first
instance unfit for any climate except the mildest, and incapable of
sustenance on any soil except the most luxuriant. He consequently fixes
upon the tropics as the cradle of our race; and those who assume the
lineal descent of the human species from the quadrumana fix upon those
intertropical points which are the habitats of the anthropomorphic apes.

The law which governs the distribution and development of vegetable and
animal life would also lead us to fix upon the tropical regions as the
geographical centre of our race. That law may be thus stated: _The
degree of perfection of the types of life, and the diversity and number
of species, are proportional to the intensity of heat._ In this
progress, as Humboldt has remarked, we find organic life and vigor
gradually augmenting with the increase of temperature. And the number of
species increases as we approach the equator, and decreases as we retire
from it.[389]

In the Frigid Zone life seems almost extinguished during the greater
part of the year by the rigors of an almost perpetual winter. The
vegetation of the polar regions is stunted, dull, and monotonous in
color, and inadequate to sustain animal life. The plains are covered
with mosses and lichens, and here and there a few herbs and shrubs
(saxifrages, gentians, papaver, etc.), but no stately forest trees. In
short, the general characteristic of these cold regions is the
preponderance of cryptogamous plants. In the Temperate Zone we have a
marked superiority in vegetable life. Here we have grassy pastures,
cerealia, and dicotyledonous trees--the oak, ash, beech, maple,
chestnut, walnut, the apple, pear, plum, etc. The number of genera and
species is greatly increased, and the superior types acquire a fuller
development. The preponderance of phanerogamous plants, the richer
coloring, and the appearance of evergreen trees, are the signs of an
immense progress. But the soft tints, the medium forms, and the wintry
sleep extending through half the year, clearly indicate that the
perfection of physical nature is not attained.[390] It is in the heat of
the Torrid Zone where nature puts forth all her energy, and displays her
greatest resources. "The cryptogamous plants attain, in arborescent
forms, the proportions of our forest trees. The grasses which we know in
our climates only under the humble forms they put on in our fields,
rise, in the elegant and majestic bamboo, to the height of sixty or
seventy feet. A single tree is a garden, wherein a hundred different
plants intertwine their branches, and display their brilliant flowers on
a ground of verdure, where their varied hues and forms of leaves are
richly blended." And here the perfection of vegetable life is attained
in the graceful palms which stand at the head and crown the vegetable
kingdom. This is the region of a perpetual summer, where nature makes
ample provision for the support of animal life, and the date, the
cocoa-nut, the banana, the plantain, the sugar-cane, the pine-apple,
supply all the wants of uncivilized man.

The same gradation is marked in the animal kingdom. The most
characteristic feature of the arctic fauna is its dull uniformity. The
species are few in number, their forms are regular, and their tints are
dusky as the northern heavens. The most conspicuous animals are the
reindeer, the white bear, and the various seals; but the most important
are the whales, which rank lowest of all the mammals. The preponderance
of marine animals clearly indicates an inferior development. The faunas
of the temperate regions are much more varied than in the Arctic Zone.
Instead of consisting mainly of aquatic tribes, we have a considerable
number of terrestrial animals of graceful form, animated appearance, and
varied coloring, though less brilliant than those found in tropical
regions. It is in the tropics that animal life attains its highest
development. The boundless variety of species, the richness of the
colors, the diversity of forms, the size and strength of the great
pachyderms that people the forests and rivers, the fleetness and vigor
of the ferocious denizens of the jungle and the plain, all attest that
this is the privileged zone. And here only are found the quadrumanæ,
which stand at the head of the animal kingdom.

Such, then, is clearly the law of the physical world. "Nature goes on
adding perfection to perfection from the polar regions to the Temperate
Zone, and from the Temperate Zone to the region of the greatest heat."
Animal life increases in strength and development; the types are
improved; intelligence enlarges; the form approaches nearer the human
figure; the ourang-outang occasionally stands erect; and the presence of
the mastoid and styloid processes, the development of the heel-bone, and
the form of the pelvis, together with the shape of the ears and a higher
frontal development, give the gorilla a startling resemblance to man.
Following, then, the ascending series (especially if man be regarded as
the lineal descendant of the anthropomorphic apes), we might reasonably
suppose that here would be found the proper home and habitat of man,
and that the tropical man would be the highest type of humanity, and,
physically speaking, the most beautiful of the species.

But this, as every one knows, is not the case. While all the types of
plants and of animals go on increasing in perfection from the polar to
the equatorial regions in proportion to the increase of temperature,
"man presents to our view his purest, his most perfect type at the very
centre of the temperate continents, at the centre of Asia-Europe, in the
region of Iran, of Armenia, and of the Caucasus;, and, departing from
this geographical centre in the three grand directions of the lands, the
types gradually lose the beauty of their forms in proportion to their
distance, even to the extreme points of the southern continents, where
we find the most deformed and [physically] degenerated races, and the
lowest in the scale of humanity."[391]

The distribution of the human race over the face of the earth has thus
been governed by a different law from that which has governed the
distribution of plants and animals.

In the latter case, the degree of perfection of the types is exactly
proportional to the intensity of heat and other material conditions
favorable to the development of physical life. _This is the law of a
physical order._

In the former case, in man, the degree of perfection of the types is in
proportion to the degree of intellectual and moral improvement, and to
the physical conditions favorable to intellectual and moral development.
_This is the law of a moral order._

This difference between the two laws has its ground and reason in the
essential difference between the nature and destination of these
different orders of being. The plant and the animal are not destined to
become a different thing from what they already are. The end of their
existence is already attained. The development of each individual is
bound to an immutable necessity of nature. Therefore vegetable life and
organization are ceaselessly uniform; there are always the same cellular
structures and the same morphological forms. Unreasoning and instinctive
life never leaves its sphere. The beaver builds its dam, lives, and
dies, just as it did six thousand years ago. The bee builds the same
hexagonal cell she built before the flood. There is an all-pervading
order in the physical world, But with man it is quite otherwise. Man,
created in the image of God, is a free moral being. He is not solely
under the dominion of mere nature-conditions, and he is therefore a
progressive being. The physical man is not the true man; the body is not
an end, but a means. There is another man--the intellectual, the moral,
the spiritual man--which grows up with the body, and to which the
physical man is a servant and minister. The unfolding, the development,
the perfection of this spiritual nature is the grand end of man. This
development can only take place under freedom; this nature be unfolded
only by education; the maturity and the perfection of man secured only
by the exercise and discipline of his spiritual powers.[392]

Who does not see a plan, a purpose, a Providence in this fact that the
cradle of the human race was placed in the midst of the continents of
the north and not at the centre of the tropical regions? The balmy but
enervating atmosphere of the equatorial regions would have lulled man
to sleep, and he would have made no progress. With an abundant supply
for his natural wants, there would have been no motive to industry, to
enterprise, and to the development of his intellectual powers. Unable to
endure the rigors of a colder climate, and to live on a less luxuriant
soil, he could not have been induced to migrate to less favorable
regions, and, crowded on a narrow area, the race must have been finally
exterminated. But planted in the Temperate Zone, in the midst of the
continents of the North, so well adapted by their forms, their highly
articulated peninsulas, and their climate to stimulate the active powers
of man, to promote enterprise, to favor commerce, and hasten individual
development and social organization, he was surrounded by conditions
most favorable to the fulfillment of his destiny.


It is also worthy of being noted that Western Asia was not only the
geographical centre of the human race, but also the grand centre of
religious light--the cradle of man's spiritual nature. It was here in
the midst of the six great nations of antiquity--the Babylonians, the
Assyrians, Medes, Persians, Phœnicians, and Egyptians--that for ages
"the living oracles" proclaimed the "Truth of God," and patriarchs and
prophets and seers were received into intercourse with the higher world.
And it was in Palestine, the centre of the three continents of the Old
World, and near five great seas--the highways of the world's travel and
commerce--that Jesus of Nazareth taught "the glad tidings of great joy"
for the nations, and sent forth his apostles "into all the world to
preach that Gospel to every creature."


2. Another important fact which history enables us very distinctly to
recognize is _that those epochs of civilization which represent the
highest degree of culture attained by man at different periods in his
history have not succeeded one another in the same place, but have
passed from one country to another_.

It is an undoubted historic fact, as we have already seen, that Asia was
the cradle of the human race. Western Asia is the theatre of the
earliest civilization of which we have any historic records. Then a
newer and higher form appears on the peninsula of Greece. The centre of
civilization again changes place, and Rome embraces and improves upon
that of the ancient world. Then passing the Alps, still further to the
west, it spreads over France and Germany and the British Isles, and
assumes a nobler form; and finally it crosses the Atlantic Ocean, and
develops its highest type in the New World. This order may be called the
geographical march of civilization.

In the principle we enounced at the opening of this chapter, that the
earth is the school-house of man--its highest function being to aid in
his intellectual and moral training, and furnish the conditions in which
he may fulfill his noble destiny--we can recognize at once the reason
and the law of this remarkable progression. And as no single continent
furnishes all the conditions necessary to the complete development of
man, and each of the three northern continents, by virtue of its
structure and climate and physical conditions, has a special function to
fulfill in the education of mankind, so God, in his providence, has led
the human family from east to west, over the continents of the Temperate
Zone, in order to secure the education, the moral advancement, and the
final perfection of our race.

The education of the race has, no doubt, proceeded very much in the same
manner as the education of the individual. The general law observable in
the development of one human mind may be traced in the development of
humanity as a whole. That which takes place on the limited field of
individual consciousness may also be found upon the larger field of
universal consciousness, which is the theatre of history; and as one
epoch succeeds another in the progress of the individual, so must it be
in the progress of nations. What, then, are the clear and obvious stages
in the development of the human mind? Do we not clearly recognize the
following order?

1. _The period of submission to absolute authority._ This is the first
condition of infancy. The child is controlled absolutely by the will of
the parent. It is almost passive amid surrounding conditions, and
parental authority is its only law of movement and action.

2. _The discipline of the conscience._ This is the era of childhood. The
ideas of the right and the good are developed in the mind. An internal
law of duty begins to reveal itself. The child begins to discriminate
between what he ought and ought not to do. And in the education of the
child the object of a wise and virtuous parent is to strengthen this
tendency by urging him to act upon these ideas.

3. _The development of personal liberty_--that is, of independent
thought and self-originated action. This is the period of youth. The
youth passes from the control of his parents and teachers, and begins to
think and act for himself.

4. _The training and discipline of the will under social law_--that is,
the voluntary obedience to laws imposed by society, submission to
regulations imposed for the public good. This is the period of manhood.
The young man passes into society, he becomes a member of the body
politic, and freely acts, not simply as an individual, but as a member
of a corporation and of a state.

5. _The development of active philanthropy._ The man advances beyond the
claims of social law, and acts from the promptings of love and good-will
toward all men. Passing through all the varied stages in the progressive
development of human character, and retaining the results of each, he
becomes the perfect man.

And now it will be promptly recognized that this has been the order of
progress in humanity as a whole--that is, the progress of history and of
civilization. The first corresponds with _Oriental_, the second with
_Hebrew_, the third with _Greek_, the fourth with _Roman_, and the last
with _Christian_ civilization.

It will also be observed that each epoch in the development of the
individual has demanded new conditions, and has taken place in a new
sphere. The first stage in the development of individual character is
infoldment in the arms of the parent. He is still held, as it were,
within the circle of maternal life. He is bewildered by the vastness and
variety of external nature, and he sinks back into his mother's arms.
The second sphere is in the bosom of the family and amid the scenes of
domestic life, where he recognizes relations and becomes conscious of
duties. The third is in the school and the outer world, where thought
awakens, and, enjoying more freedom of movement, he becomes more
conscious of his personal liberty. The fourth is in society, the state,
the arena of political life, where his movements must be regulated by
law; and the pursuit of his own pleasure or aggrandizement must not
interfere with the rights of his fellow-man. The fifth and last is in
the church, the home of religious life, where he is called to ascend
from the region of mere law to that of holy love. So also each epoch in
the development of humanity has had its separate sphere and its new
conditions, first in Asia proper, next in Palestine, on the borders of
the Mediterranean Sea, then on the peninsula of Greece, then in Italy,
and lastly in Continental Europe, England, and America.

1. Asia, as we have seen, was the cradle of the race. Here, in the
infancy of humanity, Oriental Civilization dawns. Amid the extended
plains and lofty mountains of Asia, those stupendous and massive forms
of Oriental nature, man felt himself absolutely dependent. To the river
he looked as the fertilizer of the soil; to the animal which roamed in
the desert, and the almost spontaneous vegetation of the earth, for his
food; to the sun, as the fountain of light and heat, the giver of life
and death.[393] He was environed and overpowered by nature. Almost
unconscious of his own freedom, he lay in her bosom, as the child
reposes in the arms of its mother. Underlying all the massive forms of
Oriental nature he recognized an invisible Power and Presence, and he
worshiped nature as an impersonation of God. Every thing inspired him
with the sense of the Infinite, the consciousness of dependence on an
absolute Will. The patriarchal government, imposed by nature, restrained
his personal liberty. His property and life were at the disposal of his
chief--an absolute autocrat, who exercised over him an unlimited power.
Oriental civilization unquestionably represents the _infancy_ of man.

2. In Hebrew civilization we have, as an especial feature, the
discipline of the conscience. The child-man comes more directly under
the power of moral culture. The government and discipline to which he is
now subjected aim to develop in his mind the idea of the just, the
right, the pure. He is receiving instruction in what he ought and ought
not to do. His conceptions of the moral character of God are to be
enlarged, the idea especially of the holiness of God is to be developed
in his mind through the medium of material symbols and religious rites.
The call of Abraham sets forth at once the central lesson of faith in an
unseen personal God. The history of the patriarchs brings into clearer
light the sovereignty of God as opposed to the mere dominion of nature
and fate. A nation grows up in presence of Egyptian culture, and after
the purpose of God in the discipline of Egypt is accomplished, they are
led into the wilderness, and God now reveals Himself as a Lawgiver and
Judge, and a ritual is given which teaches at once the holiness of God
and the exceeding sinfulness of sin.[394]

For the achievement of this object a new sphere is demanded--the
seclusion and isolation of family life. Accordingly Abraham was called
to leave Chaldæa, the scene of Oriental civilization, and led into
Canaan, that he might become the father of a great nation, and the
source of a new and better civilization. The mountainous region of
Palestine was admirably fitted to be the theatre of this new
civilization. No other land on the globe was so peculiarly fitted to
fulfill this office. The northern half of Syria was not so favorable a
locality; for traversed as it was by the great highway from Asia Minor
to Assyria, it was subject to the influence of foreign travel from the
earliest times. But Palestine lay surrounded by populous countries, and
yet isolated from them. In the midst of the six great nations of
antiquity--the Babylonians, the Assyrians, the Medes, Persians,
Phœnicians, and Egyptians--it was separated from them all.[395] Thus
secluded and isolated from the rest of mankind, the Hebrews dwelt alone
as one great _family_. The first form of government was a
patriarchy--the father of the family and of the tribe being the ruler.
The second was a theocracy, in which God, the Father of the families of
all the earth, becomes the immediate ruler. The third was a
monarchy--the government of a man appointed and sustained in his
authority by God. And the history of this nation is little else than one
of instruction, discipline, and chastisement--a tutelage in which the
people were under law and not under grace. The Hebrew civilization
represents the _childhood_ of humanity.

And the lessons here taught were not lost to the race. They were carried
to Assyria and Babylonia during the period of the two captivities; and
in the colonies which were founded in Asia Minor, Rome, and Alexandria
the influence exerted by Judaism was considerably greater than that
which was exerted upon it. The union of Judaism and Platonism is fully
represented in Philo the Alexandrian Jew.

3. In Grecian civilization we have the development of personal freedom
of thought and action. The Divine discipline of the Jews, as we have
seen, was essentially a moral discipline--a discipline of the
conscience. This, however, was not a complete discipline of our whole
nature. The reason demands culture as well as the conscience. The
process and the issue in the two cases were widely different, but they
were in some sense complementary; and the one succeeds the other in the
order of time. The Divine kingdom of the Jews was just overthrown when
free speculation arose in the Ionian colonies of Asia; and the teaching
of the last prophet nearly synchronizes with the death of Socrates.[396]

This new civilization could not be achieved on the continent of Asia,
and therefore a new theatre is prepared. "Europe may be called a
continuation of Central Asia. It surpasses its Oriental neighbor in the
advantage of having no internal mountain barrier to divide its north and
south. Thus Europe has been able to develop itself more independently
and freely in consequence of the number of its peninsular forms.... The
three characteristic features in the formation of Europe that are the
physical grounds of the development of its nations are its large extent
of seaboard, its peninsular forms, and the number of its islands."[397]
On the peninsula of Greece, on the shores of the Ægean and Ionian seas,
there was freedom of movement, facility of intercourse with the
surrounding nations, and inducements to maritime enterprise. These
conditions were undoubtedly favorable to a higher development. "The
inland sea, the magnificent river," says Cousin, "is the natural symbol
of _movement_." These represent the activity of nature, and they become
natural centres of progress. The sea is the highway of commerce, and
commerce is the grand channel of ideas, the medium through which the
knowledge acquired by one people can flow readily into other lands.
Amid such conditions the mind awakes to activity, and the _period of
youth_ commences. Awakening thought is first directed to the outer
world, and attempts an explanation of its phenomena. Greek philosophy
thus becomes, at its first appearance, a philosophy of nature, and the
Ionian school was a school of physicists. Here the great names which
appear at the dawn of mental activity are Thales, Anaximander,
Anaximenes, Heraclites, and Diogenes. From the study of nature the human
race advances to the study of man. The new school is a school of moral
and mental philosophy, or, more correctly, of psychology and ethics,
adorned by such immortal names as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. In
Greece, philosophy, poetry, eloquence, the fine arts, were extensively
cultivated. As this was an age of great activity of thought, so it was
also an age of great political freedom. The government was in many
respects a government of the people, a democracy. "Every thing, in fact,
in Greece bears evidence of the preponderance of human personality, and
the energy of individual character."[398] Grecian civilization
represents the _youth_ of humanity.

The results of this culture were carried to other lands by the conquests
of Alexander, and subsequently by the conquering Romans. The poets, the
architects, the sculptors, the historians, the philosophers of Greece,
are still the guides and models of the men of thought and taste in all
cultivated nations. The Greek is still, in a peculiar sense, the teacher
of the world.

4. In Roman civilization we have the discipline of the will under social
and civil law, the more perfect organization of society and of
government, the development of the science of jurisprudence.

This social and political organization was a new work, a higher
civilization, and it demanded a new and, in fact, a larger sphere. The
centre of the civilized world now changes place, and, moving westward,
establishes itself in the peninsula of Italy. By successive conquests
its circumference enlarges, and finally it embraces at once the South
and the East and the West. The place which Rome occupied, in the very
middle of the basin of the Mediterranean Sea, seemed to foreshadow that
she was destined to become the metropolis of all the civilized nations
who dwelt upon its shores. Rome extended its conquests to Spain, Gaul,
Britain, Illyria, Greece, Asia Minor, Egypt, Africa, and the islands of
the Mediterranean--over, in fact, six hundred thousand square leagues of
the most fertile country; and all but realized the dream of the world's
great conquerors--a universal empire. It was defended by a regular army
of five hundred thousand men, ranged in the order of the famous legions,
which constituted the most effective military organization known. The
government of an empire of such vast proportions and diversity of
populations demanded the greatest political skill. To establish durable
ties between these diverse peoples, and to combine in the same social
network all the civilized nations of the world, demanded the highest
legislative talent, and gave birth to the science of jurisprudence,
which, next to that of theology, is the most important and useful to
man. The inability of the Greek to achieve this great work is clearly
evinced by the terrible Peloponnesian War and the lamentable history of
the empire of Alexander and his successors. Greece represents
individuality; Rome, association, unity, and, in some degree, the
equality of all races of men.

This was unquestionably a marvelous development: "In public law, the
extension, step by step, through many a civil commotion, of the full
rights of citizenship from the narrow circle of a few score of favored
families to the entire sphere of the free subjects of the empire; in
private law, the equal communication among various classes of the rights
of property and dominion over the national soil; the abolition of
territorial privileges; the readjustment, by gradual and peaceful
manipulation, of the cadastral map of the empire; the relaxation, by
slow and experimental process, of the patriarchal authority of the head
of the family; of the father over the son, whom at first he might
punish, sell, or slay; of the husband over the wife, whom at first he
received from her parents as the spoil of his own spear, and ruled as
the chattel he had plundered;[399] of the master over the slave,
absolute at first, final and irresponsible to law, custom, or
conscience; the gradual replacement of the strictly national and tribal
ideas on these subjects by views of right, justice, and virtue to
mankind in general; the slow but constant growth of principles of
natural and universal law, and their application, searchingly and
thoroughly, to every subject of jurisprudence, and to all the dealings
of man with man."[400]

This vast Roman Empire combined all the elements of civilization
characteristic of former periods. The philosopher, the lawyer, and the
statesman were united in the person of her great men, as Cicero and
Cato, and sometimes also the warrior, as in the case of the first of the
Cæsars. The days of the Roman Republic present the most brilliant social
and political epoch in the history of the ancient world. The life of a
Roman citizen was emphatically a public life. The love of country was
carried to the highest pitch, and was paramount to every other
consideration. The laws and jurisprudence of Ancient Rome have furnished
models for the whole civilized world. "The world-wide elastic system of
jurisprudence by which the great Roman Empire, with all its boundless
variety of races, creeds, and manners, was for ages harmoniously and
equitably governed; which was accepted and ratified as an eternal
possession by the same empire when it became Christian; and has been
proved to satisfy the principles of law and justice announced by a
religion which alone proclaimed the unity and equality of man;...
finally, a jurisprudence which has been incorporated into the particular
legal systems of, I suppose, every modern nation in Christendom," marks
a high degree of civilization, and justifies us in regarding Roman
civilization as representing the _manhood_ of our race.

5. And now comes, last of all, the Christian civilization, or the age of
philanthropy. When the Roman Empire had attained its zenith, and all
civilized nations were brought under one government; and the world was
at peace; and the philosophy of Greece and the jurisprudence of Rome had
prepared the way for a higher and a nobler civilization, then, "in the
fullness of time"--the ripeness and maturity of the ages or
dispensations--"God sent his Son, made under the law, to redeem them
that are under the law, that we might receive the _adoption of sons_."
He came to exhibit completely the truth which had been partially
revealed to Plato, that "_God is Love_"--that "Love is creation's final
law"--and that the completeness and perfection of humanity is
"_resemblance to God_."[401] He came to announce and enforce the
brotherhood of mankind, and the equality of all classes and races in
the sight of God. He proclaimed the equal worth of all human souls in
the estimation of the heavenly Father; and to prove that all men are
alike the objects of Divine care and solicitude, He laid down his life
as "a propitiation for the sins of the whole world." For the reception
of this gospel of universal brotherhood and equal rights the Grecian and
Roman civilizations had prepared the way. And now He gives to the race
the "new commandment," which is the fundamental law of the Kingdom of
God, and is finally to become the universal law for all nations, that
"_Men should love one another, as He loved all men, and laid down his
life for them._" The whole spirit and tendency of this crowning form of
civilization can not be misapprehended. Its sympathies are all with the
poor, the suffering, and the oppressed; it can not fail to overthrow
castes and aristocracies, to destroy tyranny, oppression, and slavery,
and at last to unite all men in bonds of love to each other and to God.

And now to what people shall be committed the office of diffusing and
perpetuating this noblest and highest civilization? Not to the Jewish
nation, for it was exclusive and selfish; not to the Greek, for it had
become effete; not to the Roman, for it had become corrupt.
Christianity, it is true, was born on Jewish soil, but it was soon
transferred to a more favorable clime. The Church was early planted in
Rome, but achieved its grandest conquests among another people. The
fierce Germanic tribes of the North conquer the Roman Empire, and are
conquered by its Christianity. Already the Germans had the conception of
an illimitable Deity, toward whom they looked with solemn and
reverential awe.[402] Having penetrated into the midst of the Roman
Empire, they came fully into the presence and under the influence of
Christianity. Their conversion was speedy and comparatively complete.
The constant intercourse now maintained between Rome and Central and
Northern Europe in a short time carried this new civilization across the
Alps; the circle rapidly widens, and embraces all Europe in a common
faith.

All the rich treasures of the past are appropriated by Christianity--the
moral culture of the Hebrew, the poetry and philosophy of Greece, the
jurisprudence of Ancient Rome. All these--in so far as they are pure and
good--are absorbed by Christianity, and ennobled and baptized by the
Christian spirit. In Christian Europe poetry, philosophy, science
flourished as they had never flourished in any preceding age, and they
lay their richest tribute at the feet of Christ, the Divine King of the
world. Nature, also, herself becomes more and more subject to man, and
to the religion of the God-man. Science multiplies the means of
diffusing knowledge and the facilities of intercourse among the nations
of the earth. The discovery of the art of printing opens the Book of
Life to the millions of our race. Space has been annihilated by
railroads; by the help of steam continents are united; the electric
telegraph is binding the nations in one. And now the genius of
Christianity begins more signally to reveal itself as a power acting on
the social life of man. The forms and conditions of his earthly lot are
being wonderfully transformed and improved. Science is emancipating
labor, and constantly overcoming the sources of human suffering.
Hygienic science is preserving life and extending the term of human
existence. Mankind is rising above the sphere of mere law, into the
sphere of noble love. Philanthropic institutions are being daily
multiplied, humanitarian and Christian enterprises most vigorously
prosecuted, and a noble benevolence is rapidly supplanting the ignoble
selfishness of former ages. Chalmers, Howard, Wilberforce, Hitchcock,
Amos Lawrence, Elizabeth Fry, Florence Nightingale, Mrs. Gladstone, are
representative men and women of the new age.

Christian civilization is no longer the property of any one nation
alone. Now it embraces in its purposes and plans the evangelization of
all the nations of the earth. The world is now its field. The
accumulated waves of light and power from Hebrew and Grecian and Roman
civilizations, to which Christianity has added a new life and force, are
destined to roll back a tide of blessing upon the remnants of those
ancient nations, and sweep northward and southward--

    "Till like a sea of glory,
    It spreads from pole to pole."

The crowning achievement of a Christian civilization will be the
political regeneration of the nations--the establishment of all human
governments on the principles of human equality, natural rights, and the
brotherhood of man. The glory of this achievement, in all its fullness,
is not, however, the work of Europe. She inherits too positively the
martial spirit of Ancient Rome. Ancient customs and prescriptions,
hereditary castes, aristocracies, and kings, and an ecclesiastical
polity moulded by these, stand in the way of a Christianity of equality,
of freedom, and of universal brotherhood. Europe has her roots too
deeply infixed in the past to adapt herself, fully and readily, to the
enlarged principles of a thoroughly Christian civilization. A new
country is therefore needed, a _New World_, where Christianity can
remodel human society, and reconstruct human governments upon her own
principles, and the human race can enter upon the last stage in its
progress toward the now visible portals of its final goal. "The East,"
says Ritter, "represents _hope_, the West, _fulfillment_." That new
continent was discovered just at the proper hour. Had North America been
discovered earlier, it would have been peopled by Catholic nations, and
the noble civilization which Christianity was designed to achieve would
have been cramped and fettered by the hand of an ecclesiastical
hierarchy. The New World reposed quietly in the bosom of a yet
untraversed ocean awaiting the advent of the Protestant Reformation.
Luther drew the Bible from its concealment in the library of the
University of Erfurt at the same time (1502) that Columbus discovered
the American continent.[403]

The first settlers in New England were eminently Protestant. They were
men who loved the Word of God, and they sought to organize society in
this new country upon its holy principles. This new colonization had its
birth amid the agonizing throes of martyrdom. The "Pilgrim Fathers" had
been persecuted and driven from home for Christ's sake. They sought the
desert that they might have freedom to worship God according to the
dictates of their own consciences; and they braved the dangers of the
almost untraveled deep, and the perils of an inhospitable shore in
mid-winter, to lay the foundations of a new empire which should be the
home of liberty, and the sanctuary of piety for themselves and their
children. The Puritan love of freedom and reverence for religion has
left its impress on the mind and character of the American people, upon
their modes of thought, and upon the institutions of their country. The
ideas of universal liberty and equal justice are interwoven in her
Constitution, and, in general, the spirit of her legislation has been in
accordance therewith. A relic of barbarism landed at Jamestown, in
Virginia, which after a fierce struggle of years was finally conquered,
and the rank offense was expiated by tears and blood. God has destroyed
slavery in America by "the breath of his mouth," and its death-knell has
sounded all over the globe. The cause of freedom is stronger in Europe
as the reflex of her triumphs here.

Finally, a remarkable characteristic of the civilization of the New
World is the emancipation of man from the dominion of nature. By an
amazing fertility of mechanical contrivance man is here rapidly
"subduing the earth." Released from merely local and hereditary ties, he
spreads freely over the vast territory, and rapidly multiplies the means
of easy locomotion. The soil is being extensively cultivated; the
climate, even, modified; the physiognomy of nature changed by the
intelligence of man; and a regenerated earth is to be, at last, the
consequence of a regenerated race. Physical nature sympathizes with the
intellectual and moral condition of man. Science is anticipating the
time "when the earth will only produce cultivated plants and domestic
animals; when man's selection shall have supplanted 'natural selection;'
and when the ocean alone will be the only domain in which that power can
be exerted which for countless cycles of ages ruled supreme over the
earth."[404] "The whole creation has groaned and travailed together in
pain until now,... waiting for the manifestation of the sons of God."

"Verily there is a God" that not only judges in the earth, but guides
and instructs the nations, and who in the development of the earth and
of history "worketh all things according to his eternal counsel and
purpose," that for the rational creation "God may be all in all."




CHAPTER IX.

SPECIAL PROVIDENCE AND PRAYER.

     "England's thinkers are again beginning to see, what they had only
     temporarily forgotten, that the difficulties of metaphysics lie at
     the root of all science."--J. S. MILL.


The most sharply defined issue between Science and Religion--in fact,
the only real issue at the present time--is in regard to the doctrine of
Special Providence and the efficacy of Prayer.

These are not in reality two distinct questions: they are but opposite
phases of one and the same question. The doctrine of special providence
is the _theoretic_ aspect, and the doctrine of the efficacy of prayer is
the _practical_ aspect of the Christian doctrine of the relation of God
to nature and man. We can not, therefore, discuss the practical question
apart from the theoretic; neither can we reach any decisive conclusions
in regard to either unless we start with clear and well-defined
conceptions of the fundamental relations between God and nature, and
between God and man.

We shall assume the existence of God as the common postulate of all
religion and of all philosophy. If this be denied, then all discussion
of the present question is useless, because we have no common
starting-point. But it will not be denied, we think, that the vast
majority of scientific men are agreed that the idea of God is the
necessary presupposition of all those branches of science which concern
themselves with "genetic problems"--that is, with problems of origin;
and which, strictly speaking, are not problems of science, but of
philosophy. These scientists may not all choose to employ the term
"God," but they will all recognize, with Mr. Spencer, the existence of
"an unconditioned Cause" as "the ultimate of all ultimates," and they
will admit with him that the First Cause must be infinite, absolute, and
perfect, "including within itself all power and transcending all
law."[405] Mr. Spencer calls this idea of a First Cause "a datum of
consciousness;" and he asserts that this "inexpugnable consciousness, in
which religion and philosophy are at one with common-sense, is likewise
that on which all exact science is founded."[406]

Taking this fundamental presupposition as generally conceded--namely,
the existence of a Power which is unoriginated and independent; a Power
which is conscious of itself and determines itself; a Power which
transcends all law and is the source of all law--the question at issue
may be thus stated--_Have our prayers any influence with this Power?_
Can they in any way affect the Divine feeling and action toward us? Do
they have any indirect influence upon that succession of events in
nature and history which is effectuated and determined by that Supreme
Power? This is the real question at issue between science and religion.

Nothing need be said to deepen our sense of the importance of this
issue. We all regard it as one of the vital questions of the hour, the
most vital question for religious men, yea, the most vital question for
scientific men, inasmuch as there are moments of sadness and sorrow, of
doubt and mystery, when man feels that his only refuge is in prayer,
and, science or no science, he must pray. But if there is no living God
to sympathize with us in our sorrow and help us in our deepest need, or,
which amounts to the same thing, if God is so completely environed by
laws which He has Himself enacted, and so imprisoned in his own works
that He can do nothing to aid us, then prayer is an illusion, and
instead of being in any way beneficial to us, it inflicts a deep and
irreparable injury upon our intellectual and moral life. If there is
nothing in the universe but mechanical force and necessary law; if there
is no freedom and no moral purpose, then prayer for help and succor and
guidance is a conscious or unconscious deception practiced by the soul
upon itself, and the sooner we are undeceived the better; for of all
deception the most pernicious and depraving is that which a man
practices upon himself. We could not even accept the cold apology for
prayer which was made by David Hume, that it may have a wholesome reflex
influence upon the mind of the worshiper, and be a good way of preaching
to ourselves.[407] There can be nothing useful or helpful in the belief
and practice of a lie. No accession of moral force or moral purity can
come from doing any thing in which we do not believe. If there is any
moral value and any real helpfulness in prayer, it must be based upon a
_rational_ belief that the Divine mind is accessible to the supplication
of his creature, and that the Divine will is moved thereby. "He that
cometh to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them
that diligently seek Him."

Humbly professing this belief without any reservation, and regarding it
as a perfectly rational belief, we proceed to defend it against certain
so-called scientific objections, and to consider certain difficulties
which present themselves to the minds of scientific men.

We have said that there is a _real_ issue between science and religion
as to the efficacy of prayer. The statement is not strictly correct, and
we amend it by saying that the issue is not between science and
religion, but between certain men who study and teach science and
certain men who study and teach religion. For, as Mr. Murphy observes,
"The antagonism between science and religion themselves is purely
imaginary. The antagonism between the men who study and teach science
and the men who study and teach religion is unfortunately sometimes
real, though it is the fashion [just now] to exaggerate it; but so far
as it is real it is an accident of the present time, which will
disappear, and indeed is already visibly disappearing."[408]

No man is in a position to affirm that there is an antagonism between
science and religion until he has first clearly determined the sphere
and function of each, and can say distinctly _what science is and what
religion is_. He may have utterly misconceived the nature of religion,
or he may have misapprehended the function of science, and therefore the
supposed antagonism may be purely imaginary. For example, Herbert
Spencer says, "Every religion may be defined as an _à priori_ theory of
the universe."[409] If this definition were correct, we could easily
conceive how religion and modern science might come into collision,
because the tendency of science at the present time is to occupy itself
with "questions of origin"--that is, with "theories of the origin of
things," instead of being, as Spencer defines it, "a systematic
collection of facts, ascertained with precision, and so classified and
generalized as to reveal the uniform relations of co-existence and
succession among phenomena, and thus give _prevision_." This is the
legitimate sphere of all that science which can lay any claim to be
regarded as "exact science." When it transcends this limit it ceases to
be science and becomes philosophy--a philosophy which will be more or
less valid and legitimate as it recognizes the authority and submits to
the guidance of _à priori_ ideas of the reason.

But is Mr. Spencer's definition of religion correct? We think not.
Indeed, it would be difficult to give a definition of religion wider
from the mark. He might with just as much propriety have said that
religion is an _à priori_ theory of the origin of language, of
government, of trade, or of music. Either Mr. Spencer must have made
this definition for an unworthy purpose, or he must be in utter darkness
as to the nature of religion. One needs only to cast a hasty glance over
the history of ancient religions, or to consider with an unprejudiced
mind any of the contemporaneous forms of religion, to be convinced that
religion is, and always has been, a mode of life determined by the sense
of dependence upon a Supreme Power.[410] Religion has always been a
matter of practical interest and personal concernment, and has no more
to do with "theories of the universe" than with theories of light, or
theories of electricity, or theories of political economy.

The separate spheres of religion and science have been admirably defined
by James Martineau in a few words--"Science discloses the _Method_ of
the world but not its cause; religion [or theology] discloses the
_Cause_ of the world but not its method. There is no conflict between
them except when either forgets its ignorance of what the other alone
can know."[411] This is well said, and directly to the point. Religion,
or more properly theology (for theology is the objective correlate and
piety the subjective correlate of religion), teaches _what God is_, what
are his attributes, what are the moral and spiritual relations which
subsist between God and man, and what are the duties which arise out of
these relations. Science teaches _what nature is_, and what are the
relations and laws of natural phenomena. Science is the co-ordination of
phenomena. Here no conflict can arise. The truths which are taught by
each rest on their own appropriate evidence, and they are capable of
verification by direct or indirect reduction to experience--the facts of
science to external experience, and the facts of religion to internal
experience. These experiences can not, in the nature of the case, be
contradictory, because religion deals with one class of facts and
science with another. Such being the case, the scientist may be as
certain of the reality of religion as of the reality of science--that
is, he may be directly and immediately conscious of the same feeling of
reverence, the same sense of dependence, the same feeling of obligation,
and the same loyalty of soul toward the unseen "Power which makes for
righteousness,"[412] which is experienced by the unscientific believer.
This is frankly avowed by Dr. Tyndall. He says, "The facts of religious
feeling are to me as certain as the facts of physics;" and he refers
with evident emotion to a period in his earlier years when he "prized
the conscious strength and pleasure derived from moral and religious
feeling." "Give me," he says, "their health, and there is no spiritual
experience of those earlier years, no resolve of duty or work of mercy,
no act of self-denial, no solemnity of thought, no joy in the life and
aspect of nature which would not still be mine."[413] We doubt not that
there are thousands of scientific men who to-day might bear the same
testimony.

Here the question will suggest itself, How, then, comes it to pass that
there exists any antagonism between the teachers of science and the
teachers of religion? We answer, the antagonism has arisen on that
debatable ground which lies between the two, where speculative thought,
whether from the stand-point of religion or the stand-point of science,
seeks to form definite conceptions of the relation between God and
nature, to bring our outer and inner experiences into a higher unity of
reason, and to construct "_à priori_ theories of the origin of things."

We do not presume to say that these metaphysical speculations are either
futile or improper. But what we do insist upon, and beg the reader
distinctly to note, is that these speculations are neither _scientific_
nor _religious_, and that neither true science nor true religion is
responsible for them. They are not religious, even though indulged in by
theologians; because religion is solely concerned with the personal
consciousness of our relation to God, and the discharge of our personal
duty to God, and not in the remotest sense with any theory as to the
method of causation in the world around us. It is equally certain that
these speculations are not scientific, even though indulged in by
scientists; because science deals only with phenomena, and the laws of
phenomena; and it is a fundamental canon of all scientific induction
that no problem is to be mooted unless it can be presented in terms of
experience, and no principles are to be admitted which can not be
verified by experiment. But the modern speculations respecting the
_origin_ of motion, of life, and of mind can not be presented in terms
of sensible experience, and can not be verified by actual experiment. So
far as sensible experience goes, every case of physical motion is a
transformation of energy, and every new physiological unit or
aggregation of units is derived from pre-existent bioplasm. And so Dr.
Tyndall, in the speculations in which he indulges, in the now celebrated
"Inaugural Address" delivered at Belfast, particularly in regard to the
origin of life, admits that he "_oversteps the boundary of the
experimental evidence_;" therefore, by his own admission, these
speculations are _unscientific_.[414] These discussions are inevitable,
and even valuable. We would protest as earnestly as Dr. Tyndall against
the attempt of any man to set limits to human thought, but we would
equally protest against the attempt to pass off the results of
speculative thinking in any direction as "exact science." True science
is itself dishonored and discredited by all such attempts.

We have said that it is solely within the field of speculative thought
that all controversy has arisen concerning the doctrine of special
providence and the efficacy of prayer. This will be apparent from the
consideration of the fact that from the dawn of speculative thought to
the present hour two radically opposite theories of the origin of things
have prevailed--one _mechanical_, the other _vital_.

The vital theory regards nature as the product and the continued work of
an ever-living and ever-creating Spirit, who is the immediate fountain
of all force, and the immanent life of all that lives. It looks upon the
universe "as the manifestation and the abode of a Free Mind like our
own," who realizes his thoughts in its collocations and adjustments,
embodies his ideals in its typical forms, and by his free volition
subordinates nature to the higher purposes of intellectual and moral
life--the formation of noble human characters. In a world so constituted
prayer is a real power, and human character is a free development
through the power of prayer which influences that ever-present Will that
sustains our life.

The mechanical theory regards the world as a huge machine supplied with
motor power in the primal act of creation, and then left to make its own
history according to rigid laws of mechanics and "the multiplication
table." There is no "Power which makes for righteousness," and no
purpose of love mingling in the necessary order of things. Evolution is
the only law of creation; there is nothing spontaneous, nothing free.
All the processes of nature, all the forms of life, all the facts of
consciousness, all the sympathies, sacrifices, joys, and sorrows of
social life, and all the noble or ignoble deeds of history, are only
mechanical functions which can be weighed or measured, and catalogued
in tables of statistics. Inflexible necessity, inexorable law, absolute
uniformity, unbroken continuity tell the story of the universe. In such
a world there is no place for prayer, or at most it is but the cry of
anguish wrung from the lips of those who are being mangled and crushed
by the ponderous mechanism, which floats away into the infinite spaces,
and never finds a living ear or touches a compassionate heart. Then, as
Dr. Hedge puts the melancholy case, "We must rough it as best we can
with driving-wheel and fly-wheel, and trust that the power may not fail
and the gearing foul in our short day."

This is the position of some, but by no means of the majority of the
scientists of our time. We venture the assertion that it is no part of
the doctrine of modern science, neither does it follow as a logical
consequence from any of the accepted principles of modern science, nor
does it reflect the real feeling of the best exponents of modern
science.

Dr. Tyndall stands as one of the most popular exponents of scientific
knowledge, and may be regarded as a fair representative of the feelings
of many scientific men. And in his estimation "the problem of problems
of our day is to find a legitimate satisfaction for the religious
emotions." He admits that these religious emotions are inexpugnable
facts of human nature, as certain and as incontestable as the facts of
physics. Now what is meant by a _legitimate_ satisfaction of the
religious emotions? Does it not mean that human reverence must have a
_real_ and a worthy Object? that for human duty there must be an
imperative ground of obligation? that for true loyalty of soul to truth
and right there must be an eternal reason? and that the instinctive
trust of the soul in everlasting righteousness and everlasting love
must have a rational vindication? Where shall we look for this object?
"May we look upward and onward, or have we nothing to do but yield to
the pressure from behind and below?" What conception are we to form of
that mysterious Power or Principle which stands in necessary correlation
with the religious nature of man? Dr. Tyndall permits us "to fashion
this conception as we will"--with that "he has nothing to do;" only he
demands that in doing so we observe two conditions: 1. "Be careful that
your conception is not an unworthy one;" "invest it with your highest
and holiest thoughts." 2. Allow "no intrusion of purely creative power
into any series of phenomena," no arbitrary interference with the order
of nature "for special purposes." The first condition would be violated
by our conceiving that Power as purely _mechanical_, for then the
sublimest interests of our moral and spiritual life would be surrendered
to the action of the same force as that which draws a stone to the
earth. The conception of unconscious and unmoral force is not our
highest and holiest thought--it can not inspire reverence and loyalty
and love. The second condition would be violated by our regarding that
Power as _arbitrary_--that is, as following no law; for that would be
opposed to all the inductions of modern science, and would invalidate
all conclusions based on the assumed permanence of natural laws. The
problem, then, is to steer between the Scylla and Charybdis of mechanism
and arbitrariness, and find the open sea where freedom may move in
harmony with law, and where, in the grand hierarchy of laws the physical
order of the world may be co-ordinated with, perhaps subordinated to,
the higher reign of righteousness and love.

The solution of this problem can only be reached through the discussion
of the following questions: 1. What are "the facts of religious feeling"
involved in this problem, and what are the necessary correlatives of
these facts? 2. What are the facts concerning the order of nature
involved in the problem, and what are the logical inferences from these
facts? 3. How can the conception of the _Force_ which is manifested in
the phenomena of nature be brought into harmony with the idea of _God_
as revealed in the religious consciousness?

1. First, then, what are the facts of religious feeling which "as
experiences of consciousness are perfectly beyond the assaults of
logic," and what are the necessary correlatives of these facts?

We present first of all the incontestable fact that _prayer is natural
to_ man. Like our instinctive belief in the being of God, the
accountability of man, and the immortality of the soul, we have also an
instinctive prompting to pray, and an instinctive belief in the efficacy
of prayer. This is an essentially human characteristic; it is common to
all men. Man has been defined in many ways, as "a rational animal," "a
social animal," "a tool-using animal," "a language-speaking animal;"
with more justice may he be called "a _praying_ animal," for prayer is a
universal characteristic and fundamental differentia of man. Never has
the traveler yet found a people which did not pray. Tribes of men have
been found without houses, without raiment, without letters, without
science, but never without prayer any more than without speech. This was
remarked by Plutarch eighteen centuries ago,[415] and the researches and
explorations of modern travelers and ethnologists have added
confirmation to its truth. The flow of prayer from human lips is just as
natural as the flow of speech. Is man in danger or in sorrow, his most
natural and spontaneous refuge is in prayer. The suffering, bewildered,
terror-stricken soul that knows not where to fly, flies to God. There
are few men, probably no men, who in moments of extreme peril or intense
anguish can resist the impulse to pray. Nature is stronger than all our
logic; and, science or no science, the cry for help will rise from the
lips of even skeptical men.[416]

We ask that these facts may be fully considered and fairly estimated.
The instinctive tendency to pray is a universal fact of human nature, as
valid and as significant as any fact in physics. It presents as rightful
a claim to be taken account of in our theories of the ultimate
constitution of the universe as the First Law of Motion or the
Conservation of Energy. If we disregard it, our _Systema Mundi_ will be
one-sided and partial, and, instead of being a philosophy, will be only
a caricature.

We do not claim that the presence in man of this instinctive tendency
to pray proves the efficacy of prayer--that is, proves the existence of
a living God and Father who hears and answers prayer. But it does
establish a strong presumption in favor of the doctrine; for how comes
it to pass that the sentiment is so perennial and so universal? Either
it was originally implanted in the soul of man by the Creator, or there
exists something in the constitution of nature--the "relation between
the organism and its environment"--which determines this feeling in man,
and in either case it must be regarded as normal, and as essential to
humanity. If nature teaches us to pray, and, as it were, compels us to
pray, then we are justified in the assumption that there is nothing in
the ultimate constitution of nature which can contradict her own
ordinances and render prayer an absurdity.

The next fact to which we desire to direct attention is that _prayer is
an essential element of life_--we do not mean physical life, but that
which gives significance and value and completeness to human
existence--namely, ethical and spiritual life. That religion is deeply
seated in the nature of man, and, in fact, ineradicable, is conceded by
Dr. Tyndall. "No atheistical reasoning," he says, "can dislodge religion
from the heart of man. Logic can not deprive us of life, and religion is
life to the religious. As an experience of consciousness, it is
perfectly beyond the assaults of logic."[417] This general admission
that man has a religious nature, a religious consciousness, is
important. The bearing of this upon our argument will be obvious when we
have considered more particularly the nature and content of this
"religious consciousness." In what does it consist? Into what elements
is it resolvable by psychological analysis? We answer, religious
consciousness is a consciousness conditioned by the idea of God, and
involves a sense of dependence; a feeling of reverence; a sense of
obligation; a sentiment of loyalty; a conscious community of nature; and
a longing for a deeper fellowship with the _Divine_.

Every thing around us and every thing within us makes us conscious of
limitation and dependence. We know that our own existence is not
self-originated or self-sustained. We have the sense of an immanent
all-pervading Life which sustains and conditions our life. We have the
sentiment of an overshadowing Power and Presence which compasses us
behind and before, and lays its hand upon us, and we are constrained to
bow in reverence and awe before that Power which controls our destiny.
With the sense of dependence is associated the feeling of obligation to
conform our conduct to the will of this Supreme Being, and to
subordinate the ruling purpose of our life to the Divine purpose of
creation so far as that purpose can be known. There is also more or less
loyalty of soul to what is just and true, a natural and constitutional
sympathy of reason with the law of God--"it delights in that law," and
"consents that it is good." Finally, there is the consciousness of some
community of nature between God and man, and some living susceptibility
to the influences and inspirations of the higher world which authorizes
the belief that there may be a communion of thought, a relation of
conscience, and an approach of affection between the Divine and human
that shall purify and elevate our nature, and lift us up into a
resemblance to God.

The bearing of all that we have just said on the necessity of prayer
will have already suggested itself to the reader. The feeling of
dependence, the sense of feebleness will prompt man to pray. Man is not
sufficient for himself. He is not fit to be his own all in all. He has
not resources within himself to supply his own spiritual wants. He needs
some external succor, some support to the will, some inspiration from
without. And he can become a strong man and a noble man only by aspiring
and striving after something beyond and above himself--

    "Unless above himself he can
    Erect himself, how mean a thing is man!"

When his affections and cares and thoughts all centre upon himself, his
soul shrivels down to a dreary selfishness, and becomes a dry
microscopic point, or else a mass of putrid sensuality. Man needs a
lofty object above himself, after which he may aspire and upon which he
may lay hold and lift himself into a nobler form of life. That lofty
object is the ideal of a _perfect, noble human character_. "The
formation of noble human character," says Mr. Murphy, "is the highest
work that man or, so far as we know, that God can be engaged in."[418]
The thoughtful mind recognizes that there is a purpose to be fulfilled
in life which is nobler than mere enjoyment. Who has dared to say that
our highest duty is to be happy? But every one must feel that it is our
highest duty to form a nobler character and let the happiness take care
of itself.

And now is it not a fact of experience that the more a man strives after
a pure and noble life, the more does he become conscious of the need of
superhuman strength and grace? He finds that he has to wage an
uncompromising, sometimes even agonizing warfare against hereditary
"taints of blood," against morbid instincts and low passions, against
inherent selfishness and meanness, against tyrant habits engendered in
the recklessness of youth, against the temptations of designing men and
abandoned women, and the false sentiment, despotic opinion, and
arbitrary customs of modern fashionable society. In the presence of
these giants of evil with their fetters of iron he stands appalled, and
against himself, against his temptations and sins, even against society
itself, he feels he must _call upon God for help_. Through Divine
strength he may conquer; without it--never. There are those who hope to
conquer evil through a certain inherent force of nature, or a certain
self-caused and self-attained culture. We do not dare to say that they
will utterly fail, or that what they achieve is utterly valueless. But
we do say that the character they develop is not the highest style of
excellence. There is in it a boldness bordering on audacity, a
self-sufficiency akin to haughtiness, and an arbitrariness which is
repulsive. The very basis of a noble character, the very essence of that
prophetic power which has exerted the mightiest influence on the
destinies of man, is humility. The loftiest and finest minds have been
eminently trustful--men of heroic confidence who derived their
inspiration and confessed their dependence on the light and strength
which come from above. These are the men who really shape the history of
the world,[419] these are the men who command the esteem and win the
reverence even of unbelievers. We can not illustrate this point better
than by quoting the words of Dr. Tyndall in regard to Michael Faraday.
Faraday, it is well known, was one of the greatest of modern
scientists--it ought also to be as widely known that he was a devout
Christian. Tyndall dined with Faraday, and on that occasion Faraday
"said grace."

Tyndall writes: "I am almost ashamed to call his prayer a 'saying' of
grace. In the language of Scripture, it might be described as the
petition of a son into whose heart God had sent the Spirit of his Son,
and who, with absolute trust, asked a blessing from his father. We dined
on roast beef, Yorkshire pudding, and potatoes; drank sherry, talked of
research and its requirements, and of his habit of keeping himself free
from the distractions of society. He was bright and joyful--boylike, in
fact--though he is now sixty-two. His work excites my admiration, but
contact with him warms my heart. Here surely is a _strong_ man. I love
strength, but let me not forget the example of its union with _modesty_,
_tenderness_, and _sweetness_ in the character of Faraday."[420]

This, then, is the point we desire to emphasize. It is a fact of
experience that prayer can give calmness, purity, and strength of soul.
It can lighten perplexity and sorrow. It can empower us to resist
temptation, and enable us to overcome sin. It can give "modesty,
tenderness, and sweetness" to character. In a word, it can aid us
materially in the formation of a noble human character.

Noble character can only be formed under two conditions. First, it can
only be formed under the condition of _freedom_. The unfree is the
unmoral.[421] There can be no dignity and no moral worth in action which
results from mere mechanical force. Personality alone has
responsibility, dignity, and worth. If, then, moral personality has true
freedom and self-determination, we are free to pray, and God is free to
answer prayer. We may believe that the physical world is held in iron
bands of necessary causation, but we can not believe that the moral
world is so bound. The human will is free, and the Divine will is free.
"The First Cause," says Mr. Spencer, "includes within itself all
power"--therefore alternative power--"and transcends all law"--therefore
it can not be necessitated. We can not doubt that Mr. Tyndall would
freely accord this position. He might hesitate, he would unquestionably
refuse to unite in "prayer for rain," for example, because he holds that
the fall of rain is governed by changeless physical laws, and "no act of
humiliation, individual or national, could call one shower from heaven;"
this would be a miracle, and "the age of miracles is past."[422] But we
do not see how he could refuse to unite in the prayers of the National
Church for the forgiveness of sins, for strength to overcome sin, for
fortitude to endure, and for consolation under the afflictions and
sorrows incident to human life.

The second condition necessary to the development of noble character is
that man shall be capable of receiving inspiration from the great source
of all life, especially of all spiritual life. The universal belief of
our race that there is a community of nature between God and man,
expressed alike in the words of Aratus, the Asiatic poet, Cleanthes, the
Stoic philosopher, and Paul, the Christian teacher--"_We are the
offspring of God_"--justifies the further expectation and hope that
there may be a real communion between the human and the Divine. Of
course this is fundamentally "a question between Theism and Atheism,
between a God and no God," between a conscious Being and an unconscious
Force. If there is a personal God, then He may communicate with our
souls which dwell, as it were, within the ocean of his immensity, and
are surrounded and interpenetrated by his living presence. Then there
may be a real sympathy, a loving fellowship, and a sanctifying
communion. Even should science forbid the Author of nature to interpose
in the slightest degree in the procession of phenomena or modify in the
least the action of the so-called natural forces, surely it will not be
so "audacious"[423] as to forbid that He shall come near to human souls,
and interpose in the moral order of the world to deliver man from sin
and purify and elevate human society. Here at any rate science is out of
its place. It is guilty of that very presumption with which it is
evermore charging the theology of the Middle Ages, viz., the attempt to
monopolize the whole field of human knowledge and experience. If the
good man does feel that God is with him and in him, if he knows by
experience that prayer is an act of Divine communion--that it opens to
him an unfailing fountain of refreshment, solace, and strength; if he is
conscious that it does lift him up to a larger and more blessed life,
then even science, which boasts its rigid adherence to the inductive
method, and its unswerving loyalty to fact and experience, must obey the
Divine injunction--"Be still, and know that I am God." "I dwell with him
that is of a contrite and humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the
humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite."

2. We come now to the consideration of the second question, What are the
facts concerning the order of nature which have been placed beyond
controversy by the inductions of science, and what are the logical
inferences from these facts?

The facts concerning the order of nature which it is claimed are placed
beyond controversy may be stated in the following words: Now of all the
results of science, none is more universal and more emphatic than this:
that there is no arbitrariness in the series of events which constitute
our experience; but that a perfect order or uniformity prevails through
them all, an order which our intellect can apprehend under the form of
cause and effect, or _permanent_ force and _necessary_ phenomena, or,
better, a constant persistency of amount both of matter and force in the
universe.[424] This statement of the scientist is accepted by many
theologians (of the Calvinistic school), who say with Rev. William
Knight, "The doctrine of the persistence of physical force and the
invariability of natural law, is a physical truth of which the
theological phase or corollary is the uniformity of Divine operation and
the inviolableness of Divine love. 'The permanence of the order of
nature' is the scientific equivalent of the Divine constancy--'the same
yesterday, to-day, and forever.'"[425] How far and in what sense we
accept this doctrine will be seen as we advance in the discussion.

At the beginning of this chapter we remarked that if the Christian
doctrine of the efficacy of prayer is disputed, whether on _theoretical_
or _experiential_ grounds, an adequate and complete defense can only be
made by falling back upon the fundamental conception of God, and the
relation of God to nature and humanity presented in the preceding
chapters of this volume. Is there a God in the proper and commonly
accepted sense of the term--a conscious, free, personal First Cause, the
Creator of the world and man? Is He the immanent Conservator of the
universe--is his omnipotence the _force_, his reason the _law_, and his
omnipresence the _life_ of all nature? These are the questions which
must be settled before we can successfully deal with the problem of the
efficacy of prayer. If we are not agreed on these points, the debate
must be adjourned until we have settled the first principles which
underlie the discussion. This will be obvious to all who are acquainted
with the history of the controversy. If it can be proved that there is
no conscious, free, personal God, the creator and conservator of the
universe, the question is settled; then prayer can be of no avail, and
must "be abandoned to the domain of recognized superstitions." But if it
be admitted that there is a God, in the proper import of that term, then
the question may be debated whether the Christian doctrine of the
efficacy of prayer is consistent with the scientific conception of
material nature as "the living garment of God."[426]

Dr. Tyndall is the fairest and ablest representative of that class of
scientific men who to-day are denying the efficacy of prayer--that is,
of such prayer the answer to which would seem to involve the
interference of personal volition in the economy of nature; and he
believes in the existence of a God. He has again and again repelled with
feeling the imputation of atheism which the English theologians have
inconsiderately and unfairly cast upon him. He is a frank, outspoken
man, and he admits that in "his hours of weakness and doubt" he has
temptations to material atheism. "But," he says, "I have noticed that it
is not in hours of clearness and vigor that this doctrine commends
itself to my mind, and that in presence of stronger and healthier
thoughts it ever disappears as offering no solution of the mystery in
which we dwell and of which we form a part."[427] He also expresses his
conviction that "the Power which works for righteousness is
_intelligent_ as well as ethical."[428] And furthermore he asserts that
"it is no departure from scientific method to place behind natural
phenomena _a universal Father_ who, in answer to the prayers of his
children, alters the currents of those phenomena. Thus far theology and
science go hand in hand."[429] Let it, then, be distinctly remembered
that we are arguing with men who believe in the existence of God.

In an article which appeared in the _Fortnightly Review_ for August,
1872, entitled "Statistical Inquiries into the Efficacy of Prayer," by
Francis Galton, a species of guerrilla warfare is opened on this
doctrine from the stand-point of experience.

Mr. Galton assumes that "the efficacy of prayer is a perfectly
appropriate and legitimate subject of scientific inquiry." It must be
assumed to be subject to unvarying laws, and, like all physical
problems, may be brought to the test of rigid mathematics. By the
marshaling of very incomplete and partial statistics, drawn chiefly from
Chalmers's "Biographical Dictionary," he endeavors to show that praying
men, especially clergymen, are no healthier, recover from sickness no
better, and do not live any longer than the men who do not pray.
Insurance companies make no distinction between the prayerful and the
prayerless; they regard them as equal risks. Furthermore, praying men do
not make any better statesmen, any more successful men of business, or
any better physicians and lawyers than prayerless men. On the contrary,
"it is a common week-day opinion of the world that praying men are not
practical." Finally, the children of praying parents are no better
endowed intellectually, and do not turn out any better morally than the
rest of mankind. His gentle impeachment is that they are somewhat below
the common average. By this "scientific method," as he is pleased to
call it, the writer flatters himself that he has routed the army of
believers in the efficacy of prayer, and that the practice of prayer
will soon become "obsolete;" "just as the Water of Jealousy and the Urim
and Thummmin of the Mosaic law did in the times of the later Jewish
kings."

But Mr. Galton's fusillade did not produce the effect he expected. True,
it made some noise, and for a brief season commanded attention; but it
was soon discovered to be a mere discharge of rhetorical blank-cartridge
which hit nothing. His parade of argument was found to be utterly
inconsequential. The dullest mind could perceive that the attempt to
solve moral problems by statistical averages was a practical folly,
because it began by unceremoniously assuming the very point it ought to
prove, namely, that _the determinations of will, whether Divine or
human, are governed by necessary laws_ as surely as the revolution of
planets and the vibration of molecules. It is precisely because personal
acts are _not_ reducible to any fixed laws, or capable of representation
by any numerical calculations, that statistical averages acquire any
value as substitutes. "No one dreams of applying statistical averages to
calculate the period of the earth's rotation, by showing that four and
twenty hours is the exact medium of time, comparing one month's or one
year's revolutions with another's. It is only where the individual
movements are irregular that it is necessary to aim at a proximate
regularity by calculating in masses."[430] The comparison of large
averages may approach equality and furnish a basis of probability as to
the future, but the contingency of each individual case remains still a
contingency.

In no department of human inquiry is there so much temptation and so
much opportunity for plausible sophistry as in the now somewhat popular
application of statistics to ethological problems. By a skillful
manipulation of figures, Mr. Buckle[431] flatters himself that he has
made it apparent that "individual felons only carry into effect the
necessary consequences of preceding circumstances;" that marriages are
regulated by the price of wheat; and that the number of suicides is
determined by the rise and fall of the barometer; in a word, that the
whole of man's social and moral life is part and parcel of nature, and
subject to the same necessary mechanical laws.

The logic of statistics, or rather the sophistry of statistics by which
Mr. Galton proves the uselessness of prayer, would, if skillfully
managed, be equally efficacious in proving that sobriety and integrity,
honor and honesty, are unprofitable and useless virtues--at least so far
as this life is concerned; and we might say of each of them what
Shakespeare's "Murderer" says of conscience: "It fills one full of
obstacles.... It beggars any man that keeps it. It is turned out of all
towns and cities for a dangerous thing; and every man that means to live
well endeavors to trust himself, and live without it." Dishonest men are
as healthy, recover as well from sickness, and live as long as honest
men. Wicked men prosper in the world, they succeed in business and
increase in riches better, it may be, than good and godly men.
Dishonorable and unprincipled politicians climb into place and power
with more facility than men of honor and integrity. Distinguished
lawyers and skillful physicians have not been strictly temperate; and
statistical tables may be easily produced which show that the
longest-lived men have been such as did not go to bed sober for the last
fifty years of their lives. Therefore sobriety, honesty, integrity,
veracity are not profitable virtues, and, weighed in the same scales and
by the same standards as are used by Mr. Galton to test the weight and
worth of prayer, they are practically valueless and do not pay.

Simultaneous with Mr. Galton's article, there appeared a communication
in the _Contemporary Review_ entitled "The Prayer for the Sick: Hints
toward a serious attempt to estimate its value," with the indorsement of
Dr. Tyndall. The proposal contained in this communication came to be
generally known in newspaper slang as "Tyndall's Prayer-gauge," though
Tyndall was not its author. The proposition was that "One single ward or
hospital under the care of first-rate physicians or surgeons, containing
a number of patients afflicted with those diseases which have been best
studied, and of which the mortality rates are best known, should be,
during a period of not less than three to five years, made the subject
of special prayer by the whole body of the faithful, and that at the end
of that period the mortality rates should be compared with the past
rates, and also with those of other leading hospitals similarly well
managed during the same periods." This experiment, the writer thinks,
offers "to the faithful an occasion of demonstrating to the faithless an
imperishable record of the power of prayer."

There was a tone of moderation and candor in this proposition which for
a moment beguiled the popular mind, and there were Christian ministers
so injudicious as to admit that the proposal should be entertained and
the experiment tried. But its superficial fairness was delusive, and
its plausibility concealed a snare. The writer must have been
sufficiently conversant with the Christian doctrine concerning prayer to
know that the acceptance of his challenge would be a theological
blunder; for there are no unconditional assurances in the Word of God
that prayers for health and long life shall always be answered. We
presume also that he must have been sufficiently acquainted with medical
science to perceive that the acceptance of his challenge would be a
scientific blunder, for there are elements in the problem which can not
be scientifically appreciated, measured, and recorded. Such, for
example, are the temperament, idiosyncrasy, hereditary diathesis,
previous habits of life, and mental characteristics of the patients;
such the variety in skill, care, sympathy, and almost inspiration among
physicians and nurses; such also the differences of climatal, sanitary,
and hospital conditions; all these elements, whose varied degrees of
potency are incapable of being estimated, enter into the problem and
affect the results. The multiplicity and complexity of these elements
render the effects as irregularly variable as if each cause had not been
subject to any previous conditions.[432] The problem is not even capable
of being scientifically presented in terms of experience, and until that
is done it can not be subjected to experiment. Suppose the experiment to
be tried in the manner proposed by the writer, and the mortality rates
to be in favor of the hospital for which prayer had been offered, it
would still be open for the scientific skeptic to affirm that the causes
of the difference are to be found in those elements whose varying values
had not been enumerated in the statement of the problem, and not in any
Divine interposition in answer to prayer.[433] He might claim that the
patients were not all of the same age or temperament, the physicians
were not all of equal skill, the nurses were not all alike attentive,
the climatal and sanitary conditions were not equal, and the question
would be left in precisely the same condition as before.

Whatever may be the award of a thoughtless derision, we do not hesitate
in saying that the proposition is an improper one, and can not be
entertained. Especially because there is one party concerned in this
matter for whom no human being is authorized to make any engagements,
and that is "the Hearer and Answerer of Prayer." There is only one class
of blessings for which He has given us any warrant to pray
unconditionally, and these are _spiritual_ blessings. For strength to
resist temptation, to endure affliction, and perform well our appointed
work in life; for grace to purify our nature, elevate our aims, conquer
our selfishness and pride, and help us to form a noble character, God
has authorized and commanded us to pray. But for the blessings of this
life, for deliverance from danger and suffering, for restoration from
sickness and for long life, we are taught to pray in submission to that
highest wisdom which knows what is best for us, and to append to every
supplication, however ardent our desire and intense our solicitude,
"Nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt." This submission is the
loftiest attitude of prayer.

At the same time we shrink not from the distinct avowal of the Christian
doctrine that it is reasonable and proper to offer prayer for recovery
from sickness, and that such prayer, offered in submission to the Divine
will, may be answered. We are not ashamed of the good old faith--"the
Aberglaube," or superstition, as some are pleased to call it--that "_the
prayer of faith shall save the sick_." The calmness and serenity of mind
which the prayer of faith supplies is favorable to recovery. In fact, as
"the systematic excitation of a definite expectation and hope," it has a
legitimate place in psycho-therapeutics, as Feuchtersleben has shown,
and even as Dr. Tuke concedes in his work on the "Influence of the Mind
on the Body."[434] This "definite expectation and hope" is not a mere
illusion. We have the assurance of Scripture that there is a Divine
blessing which "giveth wisdom to the wise and knowledge to men of
understanding," and which may descend upon the head and the heart of the
most skillful physician in answer to prayer. Furthermore, it is
generally admitted by medical men that "as in health certain mental
states may induce disease, so in disease certain mental states may
restore health."[435] Now these "mental states" may be the subject of
Divine influence. Science has not dared to shut out the Spirit of God
from the realm of mind, and therefore restoration to health may be
given, in this manner at least, in answer to prayer. But no man would
propose to make the prevalence of such prayer the subject of statistical
averages. Prayer for the sick can not always result in their recovery,
for then they would never die. Our lives are in the hands of God, and we
shall live until our work is done, or until we have clearly shown that
we will not do our work, and our life is a failure and a defeat.

Finally, in the name of our holy religion, we repel with scorn the
attempt of certain scientists to test the value of prayer, and with it
also the value of a life of self-denial, purity, and piety, by merely
temporal, secular, and visible results which may be weighed and measured
and set down in statistical tables. Christianity teaches that the
present life is a probationary scene. It is a state of trial and
discipline with a view to the formation of moral character. Therefore
our principles and our virtues must be put to the test. Temptation tries
our fortitude; affliction ascertains our submission; suffering purifies
our souls; doubt and mystery give energy to our faith. Amid the good and
the evil of the present our character has to be developed and perfected.
There is much to be encountered, much to be endured. But as Richard
Winter Hamilton has said, "This discipline is salutary. The furnace heat
purities the gold by its rigorous assay. The vine prunes until it bleeds
that it may bear its richer clusters. A theatre is raised for lofty
struggle and celestial dint." The end of all is to make us pure and
noble and heroic souls.

The scientists of this age, who are so enamored of inert matter and
insensate force, may have no eye to see, no heart to sympathize with,
and no competent faculty by which to estimate the value of this blessed
vintage; but there are souls to whom honor is dearer than life, and
wisdom more precious than rubies, and purity more desirable than fine
gold, who will continue to pray--"Cleanse the thoughts of our hearts by
the inspiration of thy Holy Spirit, that we may perfectly love Thee and
worthily magnify thy holy name."

So much for the argument against the efficacy of prayer from the
experiential stand-point. We are compelled to pronounce it a failure.
There seems good reason to believe that Dr. Tyndall regards it as a
failure, for we do not find that he any where denies the efficacy of
prayer for spiritual blessings. But, like a second Ajax Telemon, he
makes haste to interpose his ample shield for the defense of his
unfortunate friends; he is careful, however, to change the entire mode
of warfare, and he opens the attack on the efficacy of prayer from the
_theoretical_ stand-point.

Dr. Tyndall begins by observing that "the idea of direct personal
volition mixing itself in the economy of nature is retreating more and
more" in presence of advancing science, and among educated and
scientific communities there is a growing conviction that "nature is
absolutely uniform," and that her laws are changeless and permanent. He
takes the ground that all prayer for Divine interposition "to produce
changes in external nature," such, for example, as "prayer for rain or
for fair weather," is irrational, because the answer to such prayer
would be "a violation of the order of nature," "a manifest contradiction
to natural laws," and in fact "a _miracle_." "The dispersion of the
slightest mist by the special volition of the Eternal would be as great
a miracle ... as the stoppage of an eclipse or the rolling of the St.
Lawrence up the Falls of Niagara. No act of humiliation, individual or
national, could call one shower from heaven or deflect toward us a
single beam of the sun."[436]

We have characterized this attack of Dr. Tyndall's as an attack on the
efficacy of prayer from the _theoretical_ stand-point: 1. Because he
does not claim that the belief in the changeless uniformity of nature is
a _self-evident_ truth--a direct intuition, either of sense or of
reason, which needs no proof. 2. Because he does not assert that the
absolute uniformity of nature has been _inductively_ proved, or is even
capable of verification by experience, since all experience, whether of
the individual or the race, is necessarily limited, and can not,
therefore, give a universal truth. All that he can say of it is that it
is "an _assumption_"--an assumption which all carefully conducted
experiments have justified, and upon which all successful scientific
research has been based. The majestic fabric of modern science has been
reared upon this foundation.

But mark, it is still "_an assumption_,"[437] and the central question
around which the battle must be fought is, _What ground have we for the
assumption that the order of nature is so absolutely persistent and
changeless that it never has been and never can be interfered with by an
act of intelligent volition?_

Dr. Tyndall has attempted an answer to this question. We shall endeavor,
first, clearly to comprehend his answer, and, secondly, to estimate its
logical validity.

1. He tells us that the belief in a changeless order of nature "is a
kind of inspiration." "The passage from facts to principles (that is,
the passage from our limited experience of uniformity to the affirmation
of universal and permanent order) is called induction, which in its
highest form is inspiration."[438] This, however, is poetry, and not
science. This inductive inference embraces vastly more in the conclusion
than is contained in the premises; the antecedent is limited, the
consequent is unlimited; and the only warrant that Dr. Tyndall has for
the violation of the most fundamental logical canon is "inspiration."
But, whatever Dr. Tyndall may understand by this ambiguous phrase, it is
certain that his own mind is not satisfied, and so he tries again.

2. He tells us that this belief rests upon the long-continued
observations, registered experiences, and experimental verifications of
a succession of scientific men, as Galileo, Torricelli, Pascal, Kepler,
and Newton. But here again the experiences are limited, and do not
justify a universal conclusion; and Dr. Tyndall himself is not
satisfied. He says, "The scientific mind can find no repose in the mere
registration of sequences in nature. The further question obtrudes
itself with resistless might, _Whence come the sequences?_ What is it
that binds the consequent with the antecedent in nature?" What is it, we
ask with redoubled earnestness and emphasis, which authorizes our
drawing a universal conclusion from particular premises? "The truly
scientific intellect never can attain rest until it reaches the FORCES
by which the observed succession is produced.... Not until the relation
between the forces and the phenomena has been established is the _law of
the reason_ rendered concentric with the _law of nature_, and not until
this is effected does the mind of the scientific philosopher rest in
peace."[439] Here we have "the law of the reason" substituted for "the
highest form of inspiration," and we are curious to learn what this "law
of the reason" is. Is it the principle, or law of causality--namely,
that "all phenomena present themselves to us as the expression of
_power_, and refer us to a causal ground?" But this law of the reason
says nothing about uniformity. The same power may produce a diversity of
effects. "Infinitely numerous and various universes might have been
fashioned by the various distribution of the original nebulous matter,
although the particles of matter should obey the one law of
gravity."[440]

3. And, finally, Dr. Tyndall tells us that "The expectation of likeness
[_i. e._, uniformity] in the procession of phenomena is not that on
which the scientific mind founds its belief in the order of nature. If
the force is _permanent_, the phenomena are _necessary_ whether they
resemble or do not resemble any thing that has gone before. Hence in
judging of the order of nature our inquiry eventually relates to the
permanence of force,"[441] or, as he elsewhere styles it, "the
conservation of energy," which means "that no power can make its
appearance in nature without an equivalent expenditure of some other
power; that natural agents are so related as to be mutually convertible,
but that no new agency is created."[442] Whether this is or is not a
correct statement of the principle of the conservation of energy we
shall see by and by. And now, after having hunted the game through many
tortuous passages to its final burrow, what have we found? That the
ultimate principle which justifies the belief or "assumption" that the
laws of nature are so rigidly inflexible and the order of nature is so
absolutely uniform that "personal volition can not mingle in or
interfere with the economy of nature" _is the principle of the
conservation of energy_.

The answer of Dr. Tyndall is now fully and clearly before our mental
view, and we are prepared for the consideration of its logical validity.
This answer may be conveniently divided into two propositions. First,
personal volition, human or Divine, can not intermingle or in any way
interfere with the economy of nature because her laws are inflexible and
her order is uniform. Second, the ultimate principle which justifies the
assumption that the laws of nature are absolutely inflexible and the
order of nature is absolutely uniform is the principle of the
conservation of energy. We shall consider this latter proposition first.

There are in this proposition three ambiguous terms, which have hitherto
been the source of serious misapprehension; and unless we can attain to
clearer and more definite conceptions, which shall be mutually accepted,
the controversy will be interminable. These are the terms "nature,"
"laws of nature," and "uniformity of the order of nature." We have made
the attempt in a previous chapter[443] to give precision and
definiteness to the concepts which these terms should connote. Referring
the reader to the chapter indicated, we shall here simply restate our
results.

1. _Nature_ is the aggregate or totality of all material or physical
phenomena.[444] "Nature (_nascor_, to be born) means that which is
produced or born."[445]

2. _A Law of Nature_ is the statement of a certain uniformity observed
in the relations among phenomena.[446] The laws of nature are "simply
expressions of phenomenal uniformities, having no _coercive_ power
whatever."[447]

3. _The Uniformity of the Order of Nature_ may mean either "uniformity
of co-existence" or "uniformity of succession." "Uniformity of
co-existence" means that the same substances must always have the same
essential properties[448] and the same permanent relations to other
substances, as, for example, every molecule of hydrogen must have the
same properties, the same definite mass, the same periodic vibrations,
and the same chemical affinities. If these were to be altered in the
least, it would no longer be a molecule of hydrogen.[449] This is
uniformity in the ultimate _constitution_ of nature. "Uniformity of
succession" means that the same or similar consequents will always be
found to follow similar antecedents, or "the same causes will always be
followed by the same effects,[450] as, for example, the combination of
carbon and oxygen will always be followed by the evolution of heat, and
heat will always melt ice." This is uniformity in the _course_ of nature
or the procession of phenomena. Belief in the constancy of the course of
nature or the uniformity of causation is the general expectation that
"the future will resemble the past."[451]

With a clearer apprehension of the terms, we may now discuss the first
proposition with more precision, and hope to reach a logical conclusion.
We approach the discussion by remarking--

1. The constancy of the _course_ of nature or the uniformity of
causation is not a self-evident and necessary truth. In so far as it is
a scientific truth it is purely an induction from experience, an
experience which is necessarily limited, and therefore does not warrant
a universal conclusion. There is no rational _à priori_ ground for the
assumption that the same or similar causes (even if we understand by
physical causes all antecedent conditions) shall necessarily produce the
same effects. In other words, there is no authority for the assertion
that the course of nature or the procession of phenomena must be
absolutely uniform. Science has succeeded in establishing a strong
probability, but it is beyond her power to demonstrate an absolute
certainty. This is generally conceded, alike by physicists and
metaphysicians. J. S. Mill says, "The uniformity in the course of events
... must be received, not as a law of the universe, but of that portion
of it which is within the range of our means of observation, with a
reasonable degree of extension to adjacent cases."[452] "The uniformity
of causation," says Murphy, "is not a truth of the reason, it is known
by experience only; and the truth of a conclusion from experience can
never be free from all possibility of limitation or exception."[453] And
Professor Jevons asserts, "The conclusions of scientific inference
appear to be always of a hypothetical and purely provisional nature.
Given certain experience, the theory of probability yields us the true
interpretation of that experience, and is the surest guide open to us.
But the best calculated results which it can give us are never absolute
probabilities: they are purely relative to the extent of our
information. It seems to be impossible for us to judge how far our
experience gives us adequate information of the universe as a whole, and
of all the forces and phenomena which can have place therein."[454]

2. It is an immediate fact of consciousness that the will is a cause
which is adequate to the production of a diversity of effects. Whatever
may be true of the world of matter, it is certain that within the sphere
of our conscious personality the relation of cause and effect is not a
relation of invariable and necessary sequence. Further, it is certain
that a self-determining agent exists. "Every event in the universe of
matter is determined by the events which precede it, but physical
reasonings make it certain that the chain of causes and effects can not
have been of absolutely endless length through past time. There must
have been a first link of the chain; there must have been a first act of
causation; and this act must have been determined, not by any previous
act of causation when as yet there was none, but by the free
self-determining power of the agent. The first act of causation we call
Creation; the freely self-determining agent we call God."[455]

3. Physical science itself does not teach that the course of nature is
absolutely uniform; on the contrary, all the conclusions of science lead
to the conviction "that the universe is ever changing, and that,
notwithstanding secular recurrences which would _primâ facie_ seem to
replace matter in its original position, nothing in fact ever returns or
can return to a state of existence _identical_ with a previous
state."[456] Every theory of the origin of things is compelled to assume
that an innate tendency to _variability_ is a fundamental fact of
nature. This is made apparent by the reasoning in Spencer's chapters on
"The Instability of the Homogeneous" and "The Multiplication of
Effects."[457] The advocates of Natural Selection are very emphatic in
the assertion of this "Law of Variation," as the cardinal fact upon
which turns their doctrine of the origin of species, and the whole
system on which organic life has been developed from the lowest to the
highest forms.[458] "There is," says Comte, "an irregular variability of
effect engendered by the great number of different agents determining at
the same time the same phenomena [meteorological, social, and vital],
from which it results in the most complicated phenomena that _there are
not two cases precisely alike_." "The multiplicity [of the agents]
renders the effects as irregularly variable as if every cause had not
been subjected to any previous conditions."[459] Dr. Tyndall himself is
in fact compelled to surrender the doctrine of uniformity in the
succession of phenomena. He says "if the force be permanent, the
phenomena are necessary whether they _resemble_ or do not resemble any
thing that has gone before."[460] But if the phenomena do not resemble
any thing that has gone before, how can there be "uniformity" in the
succession of phenomena?

4. The uniformity of the _constitution_ of material nature, or the
principle that the same substances must always have the same essential
properties, is undoubtedly a self-evident and necessary truth, an _à
priori_, rational intuition. It is simply a statement in concrete form
of the principle or law of identity (A = A, or A is not equal to non-A).
As we have already observed, a substance which ceases to have the same
essential properties ceases to be the same substance; for substances are
only known to us through their properties. But this "uniformity of
co-existence" is distinct from "uniformity of succession," and we can
not infer the latter from the former. Admitting that the same substance
must always have the same properties, we can not affirm that the same
substances will always be collocated in the same manner, or distributed
in space with the same uniformity. In fact, "we can discover nothing
regular in the distribution of matter through space; we can reduce it to
no uniformity, to no law."[461] Matter is never replaced in its original
position; "nothing repeats itself, because nothing can be placed in the
same conditions; the past is irrevocable."[462]

Even should we say with Sir William Thomson that "motion constitutes the
very essence of what is commonly called matter," still we know with
infallible certainty that there must be a _something_ that moves, and
that this something which moves must have ultimately a definite _mass_
(inertia) and a measurable _velocity_, and that the _energy of motion_
to which the power of doing work is due is proportionate to the mass
multiplied into the square of the velocity. Matter, then, is something
more than motion.[463] We know further that there are different "modes
of motion"--transitive, rotatory, vibratory, pulsatory, gyratory--and
that these are undergoing perpetual transformation or conversion one
into the other. And, finally, we know that the quantities of visible
molar energy, and of invisible molecular energy (as heat, light,
electricity, magnetism), are not uniform; on the contrary, the quantity
of mechanical energy is being continually dissipated--that is,
transformed into radiant heat, "which may be compared to the wasteheap
of the universe,"[464] and uniformly diffused heat will not yield a
single unit of work.

The principle of the conservation of energy is therefore subject to
limitations which are supplied by the principle of the dissipation of
energy. It simply asserts that, so far as our observation extends, the
whole amount of potential and kinetic energy in the universe is
invariable, but it can not determine whether the amount of vital force,
or of psychic force, is invariable; and it is certainly incompetent to
fix a limitation to the exercise of Creative Power. "It is nothing more
than an intelligent and well-supported denial of the chimera of
perpetual motion, and that a machine can no more create work than it can
create matter."[465] In the words of Grove, we can not conceive of the
production of any new force in the universe "_without the interposition
of Creative Power_."[466]

Dr. Tyndall, in his solicitude to exclude all Divine interposition in
the economy of nature, has stated the law of the conservation of energy
in a form quite different from that of his scientific brethren. He says,
"The principle of conservation is, _no creation_ but infinite
conversion;"[467] and he seems desirous to convey the impression that
any interposition of God to answer prayer would be a creation of
physical force, and as much a miracle as the rolling of the waters of
the St. Lawrence up the Falls of Niagara. Dr. Tyndall does not here
display his usual fairness and candor. Surely he would not assert that
the qualitative and quantitative combination of the different natural
agents--such as light, heat, electricity, elasticity of vapors, and
aerial currents--which determine the fall of a shower of rain, would be
a _creation_ of energy; or that the disposition of the meteorological,
physical, chemical, vital, and psychical conditions which result in the
cure of the sick, would be as much a miracle as "the stoppage of an
eclipse;" for these natural agents are more or less under the control of
man. But suppose it were granted that all interposition of God in the
economy of nature must be regarded as _miraculous_, would he deny the
possibility of miracles even if they should involve a creation of
energy? Because we can not by any of our mechanical arrangements create
energy, does it therefore follow that God can not create energy? Dr.
Tyndall will not say this. "If you ask who is to limit the outgoings of
Almighty power, my answer is--not I."[468]

It will be seen presently that Dr. Tyndall admits that the interference
of personal volition in the economy of nature is not forbidden by the
law of the conservation of energy. The point we now insist upon is that
he has not succeeded in showing that this principle is an absolute and
universal law of nature. We have already seen that it is limited and
conditioned by the law of the dissipation of energy, and that in reality
"it is merely a kind of _movable equilibrium_ between supply and
destruction."[469] By no experimental evidence has it been shown that it
holds true in the realm of vital dynamics and psycho-dynamics. There are
able scientific men who question its absolute certainty even in the
realm of physics. Professor Brooke says that "the amount of energy in
the world is unchanged, the sum of the actual or kinetic and potential
energies being a constant quantity has been by some writers
overstrained. It may be taken as a postulate, and is probably true; but
it is a proposition equally incapable of proof and of disproof."[470]
To the same effect are the words of Sir John Herschel,[471] and still
more recently of Professor Jevons.[472]

"Nature," says Dr. Cohn, of Breslau, "is an equation with very many
unknown quantities. It is the work of natural science to determine the
value of these quantities. Some believe it never will be possible to
solve the equation, since in it factors occur which can not be
determined." Until this is done, it is simply presumptuous for Dr.
Tyndall to pretend to know all the antecedents which determine the
complex phenomena of nature, and dogmatically to affirm that "no new
agency is created," and no "interference of Divine agency" can be
permitted. "Our knowledge of things is finite, while our ignorance is
infinite; and we must consequently regard all known lines of causation
as being liable to be cut through by unknown ones." For aught we know to
the contrary one of the unknown factors in the equation may be "personal
volition," may be the ceaseless energy of the Divine Will sustaining and
carrying nature forward through successive stages toward a predestinated
goal. The foremost physicists do not deny that there may possibly be
forms of energy which are neither potential nor kinetic.[473] We venture
to assert with Prof. Challis that will, or personal energy, is neither
the one nor the other, but the source of both. Mind is the originator,
and matter is the recipient of force.[474]

We sum up what has been said in the preceding paragraphs on the
uniformity of nature in the following words: We admit that the
uniformity of the _constitution_ of nature is a self-evident and
necessary truth. We admit also that, so far as our experience extends,
the uniformity of the _course_ of nature must be admitted as a
scientific truth, for to deny this would be to deny the possibility of
all science, inasmuch as all science is _prevision_. But at the same
time we maintain that the conclusions of scientific inference must
always be of a hypothetical and purely provisional character, because it
is impossible for us to judge with absolute certainty how far our
experience gives us adequate information of the universe as a whole, and
of all the forces and phenomena which can have place therein.[475] The
conservation of energy, for example, is a very probable hypothesis which
accords satisfactorily with the experiments of scientific men during a
few years past, but it would be a gross misconception of the nature of
scientific inference to suppose that it is certain in the same sense
that a proposition in geometry is certain, or that any fact of immediate
consciousness is certain.[476]

Admitting the principle of the uniformity of nature as a hypothetical
inference from a limited experience, we advance to the main position of
Dr. Tyndall, namely, _that personal volition can not mingle in or
interfere with the procession of phenomena in nature_.

Dr. Tyndall admits the reality of "personal volition." We have not
discovered in his writings any indications of the tendency manifested
by some of his scientific associates to reduce volition to a form of
physical energy. He grants "the power of free-will in man,"[477] but he
seems unwilling to admit that free-will can exert any controlling,
modifying, or determining influence on the procession of phenomena.
"Assuming the efficacy of prayer to produce changes in external nature,
it necessarily follows that natural laws are more or less at the mercy
of man's volition, and no conclusion founded on the assumed permanence
of those laws would be worthy of confidence."[478] But are not natural
laws more or less subject to man's volition? Does he not act _upon_ the
chain of cause and effect in nature, and _alter_ the procession of
phenomena on earth? Certainly he can and does control and direct the
forces of nature. He can so collocate and adjust the properties and
forces of matter as to accomplish the purposes of his intelligence, and
bring about _new_ results which would not otherwise have been produced.
That man has materially modified the physical geography of the globe can
not be denied. He has altered the climatal condition of whole tracts of
country, and changed the physiognomy of the globe. The rain-fall has
been changed by the felling of timber or the planting of trees.[479] He
has extended or circumscribed the geographical boundaries of plants and
animals. He has learned to control the mechanical, chemical, and
electric forces. When he lifts a stone from the earth and suspends it in
the air, or locks it in the arch that spans the river, the law of
gravitation is subordinated to the higher law of intelligent purpose. By
the collocation and adjustment of mechanical forces he overcomes the
resistance of winds and tides, and guides his vessel across the
trackless deep. He seizes the lightning in the clouds and guides it
harmless to the earth, and sends the electric current along the
telegraphic wire to chronicle his deeds and report his thoughts at the
ends of the earth. He loosens the most intricate combinations of
elementary substances, and recomposes them in new forms of the highest
value in medicine and the fine arts. He solidifies carbonic acid;
freezes water at the tropics, and even in red-hot crucibles in the
Temperate Zone. He also modifies and changes the development of
vegetable life, obliterating thorns and spines, altering the color and
size of flowers, and the flavor and nutritive character of fruits. And,
finally, he has wrought marvelous changes in the form, size, habits, and
instincts of the animal creation.[480] Thus in numberless ways does man
control, modify, and subordinate nature to accomplish the purposes of
his intelligence; but we can not see with Dr. Tyndall how this renders
scientific "conclusions founded on the assumed permanence of natural law
unworthy of confidence."

There is a vacillation in Dr. Tyndall's treatment of this aspect of the
subject which renders it difficult to fix his exact position. Does he
intend to assert that "personal volition" can not in the slightest
degree change the succession of phenomena? Will he say that man does
not, and that God can not control and modify and subordinate natural
forces so as to bring about _new_ and _special_ results? Unless he is
prepared to assert this in the most unequivocal manner, the whole
superstructure of his argument falls to the ground. If it is granted
that human volition can change the procession of phenomena, and "alter
within certain limits the current of events," then _à fortiori_ we may
conclude that Divine volition may also interfere in the economy of
nature to answer prayer. At one time Dr. Tyndall insinuates that "our
notion" (that is, the Christian's conception) "of the Power which rules
the universe" is a "mere fanciful or ignorant enlargement of human
power,... a _mythologic imagination_ which pictures a being able and
willing to do any and every conceivable thing."[481] At another time he
admits that "the theory that the system of nature is under the control
of a Being who changes phenomena in compliance with the prayers of men
is, in my opinion, a perfectly legitimate one.... It is a matter of
experience that an earthly father, who is at the same time both wise and
tender, listens to the requests of his children, and if they do not ask
amiss, takes pleasure in granting their requests. We know also that this
compliance extends to the alteration, within certain limits, of the
current of events on earth. With this suggestion offered by our
experience, it is no departure from scientific method to place behind
natural phenomena a universal Father, who in answer to the prayers of
his children alters the currents of phenomena. Thus far theology and
science go hand in hand. The conception of an ether, for example,
trembling with the waves of light, is suggested by the ordinary
phenomena of wave-motion in water and in air; and in like manner the
conception of personal volition in nature is suggested by the ordinary
action of man upon earth. I therefore urge no _impossibilities_, though
you constantly charge me with doing so. I do not even urge
inconsistency, but, on the contrary, frankly admit that you have as good
a right to place your conception at the root of phenomena as I have to
place mine."[482]

If this concession is made in good faith, and really means any thing at
all, it covers the whole ground. It is neither unscientific nor
irrational to place behind natural phenomena a universal Father who
alters the current of phenomena in answer to prayer. But this is not the
conception which Dr. Tyndall places behind the phenomena of nature. His
conception is that of a _permanent force_, which is "under the
circumstances _necessary_," producing "an unerring order which in our
experience knows no exception." This brings us to the third and last
question.

3. How can the scientific conception of the _force_ which is manifested
in the phenomena of nature be brought into harmony with the idea of
_God_ as revealed in the religious consciousness?

We are now in the very heart of what we have characterized as the
debatable ground which lies between science and religion, where
questions are mooted concerning the relation between God and nature.

On the one side we have the facts of external sensible experience--the
_statical_ phenomena of nature as mass, extension, position, and
distance--conditions essential to the action or manifestation of force;
then the _dynamical_ phenomena of nature as rotatory, vibratory,
pulsatory, gyratory, and transitive motion, which to our reason, not to
our senses, are manifestations of force. Science observes the uniformity
of relations among these phenomena--uniformities of resemblance,
co-existence, and succession, and calls these uniformities _laws of
nature_. This is all that science can do, all that men of exact science
claim to be able to do.

On the other side we have the facts of internal experience--the
consciousness of effort, the sense of power and freedom, the idea of
right and wrong, the feeling of dependence, of duty, and of obligation,
the consciousness of moral responsibility and of moral desert, and the
anticipation of a future retribution. These to our reason are the
revelation of a righteous Lawgiver and Ruler who is over us; by whom we
are obliged, and to whom we must account. This is the theoretic basis
and necessary presupposition of all religion.

And now speculative philosophy steps in and endeavors to reduce these
concepts of science and religion to an ultimate unity. It endeavors to
construe in thought the nature of that relation between the force
manifested in nature and the moral Ruler revealed in conscience.
Therefore it asks the questions, What is force? What is life? What is
mind?

If we say that force is as inherent and essential to matter as extension
and inertia are, and that life and mind are but modes of force, we are
on the high-road to mechanical Deism, if not _material Atheism_. If we
say that matter is itself only a function of force, and that force is
the ultimate of all ultimates, then the distinction between finite
existence and the infinite Being is a merely verbal distinction, and we
must yield to the seductions of _Pantheism_, which under this aspect of
it is but another name for Atheism. But if we say that Spirit is the
originator and matter the recipient of force, or "the recipient of
impulse and energy," and that the immanent God is the life of all
nature, we are pure _Theists_. We have now a "workable theory" by which
we can satisfactorily interpret the universe.

This, however, is not the conception of Dr. Tyndall. The power which he
sees in nature is a force which is inherent and essential to matter, and
"in that matter he sees the promise and the potency of all _terrestrial_
life," but not of all life, for "religion is life." The Power which is
revealed as the object of the "religious emotions" is a Power which
works for "righteousness," and is "intelligent" as well as "ethical."
This Power he seems to regard as distinct from the force which produces
the necessary phenomena of nature. But whence does he obtain this
conception of force? He writes as though he had seen force, or cognized
force, by some one of the senses. We claim that force is "a subtile
mental conception, and not a sensuous perception or phenomenon;"[483] it
is a metaphysical idea, "a postulate of reason applied to nature." We
venture the assertion that the physicist has not the remotest conception
of force except as a datum of consciousness. The senses give us only
phenomena. All we perceive is motion, change, succession. "All we know
or see is the effect; we do not see force."[484] So say all physicists
as well as all metaphysicians. "Experiences of force are not derived
from any thing else,... and the force by which we ourselves produce
changes, and which serves to symbolize the cause of changes in general,
is the final disclosure of all analysis."[485] Whenever, therefore, Dr.
Tyndall attempts to account for motion and change in external nature by
assuming the existence of invisible, imponderable forces, he is
interpreting nature in terms of consciousness--we mean that
consciousness of personal causation which we have when we put forth
_effort_ with an _intention_ thereby to accomplish an end. Force is
known to us by immediate consciousness as a function of our own
mind--that is, mind acting in will is conscious of itself as a force. We
are able to conceive of force in no other way. "Force dissociated from
personality and will must be forever incomprehensible by us, because it
would be something contradictory to our consciousness."[486] If we may
not regard will-force as "the type of all the force in nature," then the
physicist knows nothing about it, does not know there is any force, and
the only consistent course is to unite with Comte in eradicating the
word from the vocabulary of science.

In the only case in which we are admitted into any immediate personal
knowledge of the origin of force, we find it connected with volition,
with will, with motion, with intellect, and with all the attributes of
mind in which personality consists.[487] We must, therefore, conclude
that all force is mind-force, is spirit-force, and that the forces which
animate nature are spiritual. Either the force manifested in the
universe is the force of a self-existent and self-determining
Intelligent Will, or we can form no conception of it whatever.

When we have once arrived at the conception of force as an expression of
will, which we derive from our experience of its production, "the
universal and constantly sustaining agency of the Deity is recognized in
every phenomenon of the universe."[488] "The laws of nature are the laws
which God in his wisdom prescribes to his own acts. His universal
presence is the necessary condition of any course of events. His
universal agency the only origin of all efficient force."[489] The
persistence of force is the permanence of the Divine agency, and the
deepest ground of our faith in the uniformity and changelessness of
natural laws is the immutability of God.

We come, then, at last, to this, that the Power which is manifested in
nature is the God who is revealed in consciousness, and that He is at
once a God of power, of righteousness, and of love. In prayer, the
intelligent believer does not invoke a different Power from that which
is manifested in all the forms of physical energy which were manifested
in nature; he does but invoke the _same_ Power and the _only_ Power
which is the source of all causation and produces all the processions of
phenomena.

The perpetual immanence and ceaseless action of God in nature is the
source of all _force_ and all _law_. There is no force and no law
besides and apart from this. All our conceptions of necessity and
uniformity, of special providence and miracle, are merely relative
conceptions which result from our imperfect vision. These are all
swallowed up and lost in the Divine Immensity. God is Power. God is Law.
God is Love. Love is the motive, Law is the method, and Power is the
hand manifested in all the changes of the universe. "The devout feel
that wherever God's hand is, _there_ is miracle; and it is simply an
undevoutness which imagines that only where miracle is can there be the
hand of God."

Let us say with Goethe, "Nature is the living garment of God," which at
once reveals and conceals his mysterious splendors. In our days of
darkness and sorrow and danger there are vouchsafed to us clearer
gleamings of the Creative Spirit through the veil of nature in answer to
prayer. These we may call "special providences," and even "miracles,"
if we please, but let us not fall into the error of supposing that we
have seen more of God than in the budding of the leaf or the blooming of
the flower in the time of spring. "There are diversities of operations,
but it is the _same_ God which worketh all in all."[490]




CHAPTER X.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.

I. ITS GROUND.--THE CORRELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MAN.

    "That they may seek the Lord, and truly feel after Him and find
    Him, though He is not far from any one of us, for in Him we live
    and move and are; as certain of your own poets have said, '_For we
    are his offspring_.'"--ST. PAUL.

    "Jove's presence fills all space, upholds this ball;
    All need his aid, his power sustains us all--
    For we his offspring are."--ARATUS.

    "Thou art able to enforce obedience from all frail mortals,
    Because we are all thine offspring."--CLEANTHES.


From the fundamental truth that God is the Creator and Conservator of
the universe, and that his providence presides over and directs the
historic development of humanity, Christian doctrine advances, in a
natural and logical order, to the recognition of the more direct and
personal relations between God and each individual human soul. "He is
not far from _any one_ of us, for in Him we live and move and are." God
is intimately near to the human soul. God is the immanent ground of
men's spiritual being. God is the Father of the human spirit. Therefore
God is manifested _in_ man--in the constitution of his moral nature, and
in the susceptibilities, the aspirations, the longings, the hopes and
fears of his spiritual being; and God manifests Himself _to_ man by an
inward illumination--"the true _light_ which lighteth every man that
cometh into the world." Contemplate these relations on the Divine side,
and you have the foundation of all moral government; study them on the
human side, and you have the foundation of all religion, for religion is
a mode of thought, of feeling, and of action determined by the
consciousness of our relations to God.

All Christian teaching proceeds upon the assumption that there exist in
all men the elements of a _religious consciousness_. The recognition of
some relation to an unseen moral Personality is a universal fact of
human nature. The feeling of dependence, the sense of obligation, the
sentiment of reverence, the tendency to worship, the apprehension of a
future reward or punishment--these are the common characteristics of
man. The untutored savage, the half-civilized pagan, the ancient
philosopher, the modern scientist, all alike betray the consciousness of
some mysterious bond which holds them fast to the unseen Power which
controls the destinies of men. With this sentiment of the Divine there
is associated in all human minds an instinctive yearning after the
Invisible, a conscious susceptibility of our spiritual nature to the
influences of the higher world, and a reaching out of the human spirit
toward the Infinite, which prompt man to seek for a fuller knowledge and
a deeper communion. Christianity assures us that this religious
consciousness may, by a loving reception of the truth and a loyal
allegiance to duty, be raised into a living _koinonia_--a living
fellowship with and a conscious participation of the Divine life. Man
may know God, not simply by verbal instruction, not merely through the
symbolism of nature, or the providential unfoldings of human history, or
even the moral attributes of his own spiritual being, but by an exalted
and immediate consciousness. "The pure in heart shall _see_ God" by an
inward vision of wondrous power and glory, in which they shall know
God, and be as fully assured of his personal love and guidance as of the
love and guidance of any human friend.

Now there is a natural order in which the knowledge of God is clearly
differentiated and fully developed in the human mind; and this order is
distinctly recognized and noted in the words of St. Paul--"That they may
_seek_ God, and truly _feel_ God, and actually _find_ God."

1. There is an earnest _inquiry_ (ζητεῖν)--a search after God. This is
the effort of reflective thought to attain a more exact and definite
conception of that Power and Intelligence which the spontaneous
consciousness of man immediately and instinctively affirms as the ground
and cause and law of the created universe.

2. There is a real _feeling_ (ψηλαφᾶν) of God--an awakening
consciousness of some near relation to God, excited by the voice of
conscience and the spiritual affinities and yearnings of the soul. There
is, as it were, a "_touching_" of the living God[491]--the sense of a
living bond which holds man to God, not merely by a consciousness of
dependence and obligation, but a spiritual nexus, a real filiation,
which enables man to articulate the wondrous words, "_We are the
offspring of God_."

3. There is an actual _finding_ (εὑρίσκειν) of God--that higher
religious consciousness in which the pure and earnest soul attains a
personal knowledge, and enters into a beatifying communion with "the
Father of the human spirit." This direct "manifestation of God" in its
highest form is the peculiar glory of that new and divine life of the
soul communicated through Christian faith, for which all antecedent
knowledges and experiences, whether of the individual mind or of
collective humanity, are a preparation and a discipline.

This inspired statement of the order in which the conception of God as a
determinate mode of thought is evolved in the human mind is exactly
verified by the history of reflective thought as presented in Greek
philosophy. Reflective thought began with Thales in Asia Minor and
Pythagoras in Lower Italy. The Ionian and Italian schools commenced most
naturally with the objective phenomena of nature, and sought for the
ἀρχή--the first principle and cause of all that appears. Their
question was not, _Is_ there a first principle and cause? but _What_ is
the first principle and cause? The orderly phenomena of the universe
presented themselves to their minds as the expression of _power_ and
_thought_ as certainly as they do to ours; and their endeavor was to
construe this intuition in logical form and give it articulate
expression. It is true their method was at first defective, and the
results attained were consequently often erroneous. Still their mental
effort must have been unconsciously governed by those fixed laws of
cognition which constrain all minds to regard all phenomena as the
expression of power, and all orderly arrangement as the utterance of
thought. If in the realm of objective things they fixed upon a single
element as that out of which all things else were evolved, that first
seed of things was either a living, potential energy, or it was
associated with and animated by a living soul.[492] Or if guided by
analogy, they conceived the universe as a living organism,

    "Whose body nature is, and God the soul."

The informing principle was still an _intelligent_ Power. So that at the
end of this period of inquiry we find that Anaxagoras distinctly
articulates the word which his countrymen had half unconsciously
recognized, "the ἀρχή, or first principle, is mind, intellect,
νοῦς."

From this point we date a new era in philosophy. The Socratic school
turned from the contemplation of external nature, and commenced the
study of mind. Man finds his rational nature in changeless correlation
to a moral law. There are within his spiritual nature the ideas of
justice, of truth, of purity, and of goodness. These ideas of the human
reason reflect the character of its Author and Source, and we can not
refrain from ascribing these attributes in their most perfect form to
the Maker of the human soul. God is now regarded as the Moral Ruler of
the world. Man becomes conscious of obligation to a personal Lawgiver,
and of accountability to a personal Judge. He feels that he has
spiritual susceptibilities and longings for a Divine inspiration. He
believes that man "may become conscious of the wisdom and the love of
the Deity," and that there are "Divine secrets which may not be
penetrated by man, but which are imparted to those who consult, who
adore, and who obey God."[493] Yielding to these spiritual affinities of
the soul, he seeks God in prayer.[494] He desires to come near to God,
to feel his presence and inspiration, and to become "assimilated to
God," by "becoming holy, just, and wise."[495]

Whether any of the ancient philosophers attained to that high religions
consciousness in which God is actually "found," so that He becomes the
object of a real love and confidence, and a refuge amid the storms and
adversities of life, is a question we may not be competent to answer.

To attempt an answer may be deemed presumptuous. If the Divine
declaration that "_every one_ that asketh receiveth, and he that seeketh
findeth, and to him that knocketh it shall be opened," is of universal
application, then it may, at least, be hoped that the prayer of Socrates
was answered, and the desire of Plato was fulfilled, and the aspiration
of Epictetus was satisfied in some degree. Socrates certainly expressed
the belief that "he was moved by a certain Divine and spiritual
impulse."[496] Plato held that the highest form of philosophy is the
love of the Supreme Good--that is, God; and that "a man who is just and
pious and entirely good is loved of God."[497] And Epictetus taught that
"if we always remember that in all we do God stands by as a witness, we
shall not err in our prayers and actions, and _we shall have God
dwelling with us_." Do not these utterances remind us vividly of the
Saviour's promise--"If _a man_ love me, he will keep my words, and my
Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with
him?" Can we doubt that these words express the Divine feeling and the
Divine procedure toward the heathen world? Was not God their Father as
well as ours? Was not Christ their Saviour as well as our Saviour? May
we not hope that the redeeming Word enlightened their minds, and the
sanctifying Spirit touched their hearts?

It will be obvious to the thoughtful reader that this order, in which
the definite knowledge of God is attained, is the reverse of that in
which the idea of God is manifested in the spontaneous consciousness of
the individual and the race. The former is analytical, the latter is
synthetical. The _idea_ of God as the ground and cause and reason of all
existence is immediately given in spontaneous thought.

The _conception_ of God as pure Spirit, as the eternal Reason, the
righteous Will, the supreme Good, the omnipresent Ruler of the universe,
and the Father of humanity, is gradually developed in reflective
thought. The first is a metaphysical _datum_, standing at the
commencement of all inquiry, the second is a logical _quœsitum_ which
is reached at the end of a process of rational inquiry. Spontaneous
consciousness begins with an indeterminate feeling, a mysterious
presentiment of the Divine; it proceeds through simple intuition, and
ends with affirmative thought. Reflective consciousness begins by
questioning our primitive beliefs, and asking for their logical grounds;
it proceeds by analytic and inductive reasoning, and may result in the
union of logical convictions, with determinate affections--an
intelligent reverence and an appreciating love. Spontaneous thought is
involuntary, and must necessarily result in faith. Reflective thought is
voluntary, and may result in error, doubt, and skepticism. Therefore the
method by which we attain to a clear and determinate knowledge of
God--by which we really _feel_, and actually _find_ God--may be
defeated, interrupted, and marred by sin. Unholy passion and a perverted
will may materially vitiate the process by which the human reason
reaches a logical conviction of the being of a God. The ungodly man may
desire that the First Cause shall have no moral attributes. The sinner
may imagine that the Deity is "altogether such an one as himself." The
fool may say in his heart, "There is no God." While the idea of God
presents itself naturally and necessarily in spontaneous thought, there
may be an "unwillingness to retain God in the knowledge." And even where
God is known, He may not be honored and gratefully recognized; and, as a
consequence, the "understanding may be darkened." Swallowed up of
uncleanness and lust, the abandoned man may "barter the truth of God for
lies," and eventually "worship and serve the creature _more_ than the
Creator." Still man can not utterly relegate himself from all sense of
obligation, and all feeling of dependence upon God. He can not sever the
link which binds him to his Maker. He can not wholly extinguish in his
heart the sense of the Divine, nor eradicate from his reason the ideas
which, in their spontaneous, unimpeded development, reveal to him the
personal Lawgiver and Judge. Where there is any rectitude of purpose,
any sincere love for truth, there will be, in a proportionate measure,
the true knowledge of God. And the pure mind may assuredly rise to that
higher religious consciousness in which doubt and uncertainty are
swallowed up in an inward vision of his glory.

Here, then, we have the rational foundation for moral government, and
the ultimate ground of all religion. The possibility of knowing God, the
obligation to reverence and obey God, the power to do the will of God,
the susceptibility of the human heart for Divine inspiration and Divine
communing, are all grounded upon the _correlations between God and man_.
"God is not far from any one of us, for in Him we live and move and are;
as certain of your own poets have said, '_For we are his offspring_."'

1. _The relation between God and man is a relation of contiguity._ God
is perpetually near to man. "He is not far from any one of us." The
sacred Scriptures not only teach the ubiquity of God, but they emphasize
the immediateness of the Divine presence in relation to man. "Whither
shall I go from thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence?
If I ascend up into heaven, Thou art there; if I make my bed in hell,
behold, Thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in
the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall thy hand lead me, and
thy right hand shall hold me. Thou hast beset me behind and before, and
laid thine hand upon me." No man can escape from God. We may retire to
the remotest parts of the earth, and take up our abode in the most
solitary isle; we may press our way into the deepest recesses of the
primeval forest, to spots where the foot of man has never trod, and on
which the light of heaven has never shone, and where solitude has held
its undisturbed reign ever since the morning of creation, and the
conviction that "God is in this place" will relieve the loneliness, and
hold us fast within the grasp of his government and laws. Let human
thought take to itself the wings of imagination and pierce the heavens,
let it travel on through the immensity of space until it has reached the
confines of the universe, let it alight on one of the outermost stars
which seem to stand as sentinels at the very outposts of creation, and
looking out upon the depths of space, there shall be heard the voice of
God toning on throughout the fathomless abyss, "Can any hide himself in
secret places that I shall not see?" "Do not I fill heaven and earth?
saith the Lord." God is not far from any one of us. He is the "_Ever
Near_." Nearer to us than the air we breathe, nearer than the light
which reveals surrounding objects, nearer than our body, the living
vesture of the soul, is God. In the words of the Persian oracle, "God is
nearer to thee than thou art unto thyself." As the Infinite Mind is
present to all rational beings, so are they all present to Him. God is
omniscient. The thoughts, feelings, and actions of all men are
immediately and directly known by Him. "O Lord, thou hast searched me
and known me. Thou knowest my downsitting and mine uprising, Thou
understandest my thought afar off. Thou compassest my path and my lying
down, and art acquainted with all my ways. For there is not a word in my
tongue, but lo, O Lord, Thou knowest it altogether." The first condition
of a moral government is found in the nearness, the contiguity of God to
every human soul, and the immediate and infallible knowledge which He
consequently must possess of every human thought and act.

2. _The relation between God and man is a relation of immanency._ "In
Him we live and move and are" (ἐσμέν, = have conscious being).
Our life, our power, our consciousness are _from_ God, _through_ God,
and _in_ God. This relation is manifestly something more immediate than
the relation of contiguity. It is the present, instant, ceaseless
relation of Divine _efficiency_. This is involved in the very idea of
the creature. If man is the creature of God, he has not only his
beginning, but his continuance of existence by a real and immediate
causality. God alone possesses true life--"life in Himself"--He alone is
really self-existent, our life and our being are continually derived
from Him. If we were without God, and entirely isolated from Him, we
could not live or move or even exist. God is every where, not virtually
but actually. He pervades and interpenetrates all existences without
displacing them in space or disturbing their operations. His infinite
essence underlies all the principles and powers of all created
existences; they all move within the range of his presence, and act
within the sphere of his energy. And God is not only present immediately
to man, but his mighty will sustains man in existence every moment,
vitalizing his organism, endowing him with power, illuminating his
reason, and inspiring him with knowledge. God is immanent in man, and
man is immanent in God. "To us there is but one God, the Father, of whom
are all things, and we _in_ Him."[498]--"One God and Father of all, who
is above all, and _through_ all, and _in_ you all."[499]--"The same God
who worketh _all_ in _all_."[500] Our life is from God and in God. Our
power to energize is from God and constantly sustained by God. We
consciously know in and through God, who so illuminates our reason that
we can interpret the symbolism of nature. "God teacheth man knowledge."
"He giveth wisdom to the wise and prudence to men of understanding."
"There is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth
him understanding." The reason of man is a beam of the eternal reason.
"The spirit of a man is the candle of the Lord." All good desires, all
noble impulses, all power to resist temptation and perform heroic acts
of endurance and suffering, are from God. "Every good and every perfect
gift cometh down from above, from the Father of Lights."[501]

The constant, ceaseless dependence of all rational existence on God for
vitality, for power, and for consciousness must be maintained, if we
would be faithful to the plain language of Scripture. We are aware that
fears of a pantheistic perversion has led some men, without reason, to
refine upon the language of Scripture. By the expression "_in_ Him"
(ἐν αυτῷ), we are, they say, to understand "_with_ Him." But
ἐν αυτῷ does not mean "_with_ Him" or "_through_ Him." The most
natural grammatical construction is "_in_ Him," and this suits best the
logical connection. The Uncreated is the only self-existent being. All
other existences are derived and dependent, and therefore can not be
self-existent. The Supreme can not communicate the attribute of
self-existence any more than the attribute of infinity. A finite
existence can not be at once dependent and independent. Of mind, as well
as of matter, it is equally true that the sole ground of its continuing
to be, as well as its beginning to be, is in the Almighty will and power
directly and ceaselessly put forth. The direct agency of God sustaining
conscious life is a universal, constant, profound _reality_.[502]

It may be objected that in maintaining these views we are in danger of
sacrificing the personality of man. It may be asked, How can we sustain
the antithesis between the I and Thou of a commandment or of a prayer?
How can we reconcile human self-determination with absolute dependence
upon God? How can we conceive the possibility of sin--the possibility of
a creature dependent every moment on God for power, acting in opposition
to the mind and will of God?

These are questions of profound significance; they are also questions of
extreme difficulty. Our reason staggers under their weight. We tremble
in the presence of the mystery of evil. It is obvious that these
questions involve the deeper question as to the causal connection of God
with his creation, which all men confess is an insoluble and
impenetrable mystery. The feeling of dependence on the one hand, as well
as the sense of personal power and freedom on the other, are primitive
facts of consciousness. That we live and move and have our being in God,
and that we have a real determinate selfhood, a finite personality, a
responsible spirit-life, are both affirmed in Scripture. That a holy God
made the world, and still actually upholds it; and that sin, as
lawlessness (ἀνομία), as a real antagonism to the will and nature of
God, exists in his world, can not be denied by Christian men. These are
equally truths. To our conception, they may appear antithetical, if not
contradictory. But truth is often of a dual character; like the magnet,
it may have opposite poles. And many of the differences which agitate
the world are often to be traced to the exclusiveness with which
different parties affirm one half of the duality in forgetfulness of the
other half. We must accept both aspects of the truth, even though we can
not at present effect their real conciliation in thought, and wait for
further light.

A profound faith in the unity of all truth will inspire the hope that
reason may yet attain to ultimate principles in which shall be found the
harmony of facts and subordinate principles that to-day seem
irreconcilable. Underlying the above apparently antithetical truths we
can even now dimly discern still more fundamental principles which
prophesy a solution. If Divine Love will that there shall be other
existences who shall resemble God, and be capable of fellowship with Him
in knowledge and in love--in other words, shall be _perfect_ so far as
is consistent with the notion of dependent existence--these beings must
have a real selfhood, a conscious personality, a conditioned freedom.
For impersonal being, even though it may by its absolute dependence
reveal the eternal power, and in some degree reflect the thought of God,
can not in any sense be the _image_ of God, who is absolute Personality.
Above all, that which can not know itself, can not know God, and can not
love God. That which can not freely determine itself, can not obey God
or resemble God. The highest form of spirit-life "is the conscious
return, by a free identification, of every delegated power into harmony
with its source." Real being and real life in God must therefore
involve, not only a consciousness of dependence and obligation, but also
self-consciousness and self-determination. Resemblance to God and
fellowship with God are possible only through these fundamental elements
of personality. Moral union requires dynamical separation. And because
God wills this highest unity, He creates the highest individuality, and
gives being to a will under concessions of freedom.

We conceive of the Divine conservation of the world and man as "the
simple, universal, uniform efficiency of God which sustains the created
powers in every moment of their activity, and thereby keeps them bound
to Himself. As such it makes itself the basis of all individual
efficiencies in the life and movement of the world, _without indeed
itself, as such, giving to the efficiency of creaturely powers any
particular direction_." The conserving activity of God moves in
prearranged lines, and according to laws and measures determined by the
infinite wisdom of God, and conserves, therefore, all individual
existence only within the boundaries which are fixed by these
arrangements, and through the relations of the powers of the world. Thus
as the world-conserving activity of God leaves all creatures just as it
finds them, and equally embraces irrational as well as rational beings,
"the evil as well as the good" (Matt. v. 45), it can in nowise remove
the answerableness of man for his sins, or in any way taking part in the
same. The world-conserving efficiency of God sustains man every moment
in being, and conditions the activity of his moral powers even when they
are exerted in an evil choice, just as it sustains the universe
according to a predetermined plan and in harmony with fixed laws; but it
does not thereby give to the activity of the moral creature any
determinate direction whatever, either good or evil. The general power
to will and do is received immediately and constantly from God, but it
is a delegation of power under concessions of freedom and conditions of
accountability. The specific determinations of that power are from man
himself. He may give an evil direction to his derived and dependent
activities, and thus commit sin. The responsibility for that evil
determination rests upon himself alone, even though he is every moment
pervaded and sustained by the conserving efficiency of God. Alternative
power is a talent loaned out by God to man. But it is a talent which
still belongs to God, for the proper or improper use of which man is
accountable.

It has been urged by the captious critic, who would fain cast upon God
all responsibility for the presence of evil in the world, that "if God
does not actually determine the evil, He delegates to man the power to
actualize evil; let Him only refuse his conserving efficiency to the
will of man, and thus prevent the evil!" The reckless objector knoweth
not what he saith. In order to render evil impossible, it is demanded
that God shall rob man of his personality, and degrade him to the level
of impersonal nature; for the possibility of evil is inseparable from
the notion of free, self-determined existence. "The momentary
withdrawment of the conserving activity of God from the moral creature
were the immediate annihilation of its existence."[503] Liberty is not
only a good, but it is the necessary condition of all goodness. It is
the sphere of all great virtues, noble deeds, and heroic acts. There can
be no virtue, no praiseworthiness, no godlikeness, no real felicity,
where there is no freedom. Shall we reproach God for having made us free
personalities? Shall we complain because God has honored us by
committing to us a sacred trust, and placed our happiness and well-being
largely under our own control? Who would surrender his conscious power
and freedom, and sacrifice the infinite possibilities of good which lie
before him, to escape the possibility of failure and suffering and
defeat? Will any rational man exchange his position for that of the ant
or the beaver? "What," exclaims Rousseau, "to render man incapable of
evil, would we have him lowered to mere brute instinct? No! God of my
soul, I will not reproach Thee for having made me in thine image, so
that I might be good and free and happy like Thyself."

The ceaseless dependence of man on the conserving efficiency of God
imposes upon him the obligation to determine himself, and to regulate
his action in conformity with the will of God. Here, then, we have found
a still deeper ground for moral government.

3. _The relation of God to man is a relation of paternity; the relation
of man to God is a relation of childship._ "We are his offspring;" and
as the offspring of God we must have a kindred nature, and, in some
sense, "resemble God."

God is "the Father of the human spirit" by no mere figure of speech, but
by a Divine reality; and man, in virtue of that rational and spiritual
nature inbreathed and, as it were, begotten within him by the "Eternal
Word of God," is "the likeness and image of God." It is one of the
changeless laws of all derived and dependent existence that the
offspring shall resemble the parent. And just as every seed must produce
its own kind, just as every offspring must be of the same species as its
parent, so must man bear the image of God.[504] This image of God can
have no reference to the body of man, nor to any qualities or attributes
which belong to matter. Spirit is the only thing which does bear or is
capable of bearing any resemblance to God. The all-pervading personality
of God is mirrored in the finite personality of man. The four grand
elements of personality are _intelligence_, _will_, _affection_, and
_conscience_, and these in man reflect the character of God. Elevated to
absolute perfection, they become the august attributes of Omniscience,
Omnipotence, All-lovingness, and All-holiness. "One God," says Cousin,
"is doubtless the author of the world, and as his workmanship it must
reflect, in some measure, his perfections. But He is especially the
Father of humanity. His intelligence and his personality are therefore
of the same kind with our intelligence and our personality, to which we
add infinity by a necessary law of thought." So that our knowledge, our
freedom, our charity, our justice, give us the idea of Divine wisdom,
Divine freedom, Divine justice, and Divine charity.[505] These
conclusions of philosophy are in striking harmony with the positive
statements of Scripture. Here we are taught that the image of God in man
consists in _power_, _knowledge_, _righteousness_, and _benevolence_
(ὁσιότης)[506]--ὅσιος, from חֶסִיד = kind, merciful, benevolent.

Inasmuch, then, as man is the "offspring of God," he may know _that_ God
is, and he may, in some measure at least, know _what_ God is, and what
are the duties which he owes to God. Selfhood or personality in man is
the primordial germ of the idea of God. The self-consciousness, the
intelligence, the free activity, the potential righteousness and charity
of man must have their origin in a cause which is itself a full and
adequate explanation. We accept the ancient philosophic maxim "_ex
nihilo nihil_," and apply it rigorously to the case in hand. "That which
is can not have arisen out of that which is not." "Out of nothing
nothing can arise." Consciousness can not arise out of unconsciousness.
Reason can not arise out of unreason. Self-activity can not arise out of
absolute passivity and eternal rest. Justice, righteousness, charity,
can not be generated from brute matter, or born in the abyss of
nothingness. The Creator of man, of the reason that is in man, of the
moral liberty of man, of the ideas of justice and benevolence which
dwell in the conscience of man, must Himself be intelligent, free, just,
and good. Such is the logic of Scripture and of common-sense. "He that
planted the ear, shall He not hear? He that formed the eye, shall He not
see? He that chastiseth the heathen, shall not He correct? He that
teacheth man knowledge, shall not He know?" He that made man a sentient,
percipient, self-conscious personality, shall not He be percipient and
self-conscious? He that hath given man reason, is He not the Eternal
Reason? He that hath planted in the hearts of men the principles of
justice, must not He be a righteous Being? He that inspires man with
compassion, must not his nature be Love? "If the First Cause be
destitute of these qualities, then for us, at least, He is as though He
were not." He is a thousand times inferior to us--inferior even in his
infinity and his eternity to one hour of our finite existence, if during
that fugitive hour we can _know_ and _think_ and _love_. A finite moral
personality, even though it be the most perfect form of _dependent_
existence, points, with an infallible logic, to a being beyond and above
itself, and suggests an Infinite Personality who is absolute
perfection--that is, a Being of perfect knowledge, perfect freedom,
perfect righteousness, and perfect love.

This community of nature between man and God is not only the ground and
condition of our knowing God, but it is also the living, everlasting
bond which holds man to God, even in his sins. It involves much more
than obligation--obligation to an omnipotent Master, and submission to
an omnipresent Lord. Such sense of obligation may be developed within
the sphere of instinctive and unreasoning life. But the kinship of souls
to God brings man within the sphere of _moral_ life, with its eternal
and immutable laws. It endows man with the power and imposes upon him
the duty to reverence, adore, and love the heavenly Father. Wonderful
and awful, this idea of the paternity of God and the childship of human
souls! This paternity of God is suggestive at once of the highest form
of authority and the most sacred form of duty that can be conceived by
the human mind. "The power of a sovereign, however extensive it may be,
is, after all, only conventional; it admits of being circumscribed or
suspended.... All earthly forms of authority, which belong to the
political, civil, or social relation of men, are accidental and
official, created by men for their own purposes, and may be modified or
abolished by the power that created them. But the authority of a father
over his child is founded in nature and established by God. This is not
a voluntary arrangement among men themselves, which they are at liberty
to continue or to terminate as they please; but, on the contrary, it is
a Divine constitution. Such authority as a father possesses over his
child--so natural, so real, so Divine--no human being besides can
possess over another. This, accordingly, is the selected type of the
supreme rights of God, and of the essential sovereignty which belongs to
the Father of minds. No other explains, as this does, the _foundation_
and _nature_ of Divine authority. There are, indeed, other terms which
indicate the mere fact of sovereignty in God, and do so more pointedly
and directly than this. For example: He is compared to a _king_--a name
which belongs to the highest secular office and the highest secular
authority on earth. 'The Lord is king forever.' His creatures are his
subjects; He gives them wise and righteous laws, and they must answer to
Him for obedience and disobedience. The comparison is obviously just up
to a certain limit; but it is obvious that in many essential respects it
entirely fails. The king and his people are connected together only by
one bond--that of authority and corresponding subjection." The relation
is purely a contingent relation, and may be maintained by arbitrary
power. But the relation between God and his rational creatures is a
natural and a necessary relation. All that is denoted by the word
_king_--authority, power, law--is really contained in the word _father_;
but there is much more conveyed in the word _father_ than can be
possibly expressed by the word _king_. God is a king, but He is a
Father-king; his subjects are his own children, and his government of
them--in its origin, its spirit, its laws, and even its penalties--is
strictly paternal. God's kingship is a _figure_, his fatherhood is the
profoundest _reality_.[507]

This correlation between the spirit of man and the spirit of God is the
living indissoluble bond which has ever held, and shall forever hold
the hearts of men to the living God. Humanity has not been enchained to
the throne of God by servile fear, and held in subjection to his
government by the dread of future punishment. Fear never made men
virtuous, never can insure virtue. Man has been held to God by spiritual
affinities and a conscious kinship. Men have always felt that the Ruler
of the world is merciful and just, and that his claim upon their
allegiance and loyal obedience is reasonable and right. Therefore they
have in all ages hoped in his mercy, and confided in the righteousness
of his administration. This has been the consolation of the wise and
good in seasons of danger and adversity. To this Being innocence and
weakness under oppression and wrong have made their proud appeal, like
that of Prometheus to the elements, to the witnessing world, to coming
ages, to the just ear of Heaven. When, therefore, Paul at Athens
announced that "God is not far from any one of us, for in Him we live
and move and are," he touched a chord which vibrated in every heart. For
in every age men have had a presentiment of some nearer relation to God
than the rest of creation--a relation not of dependence only, but of
kinship and sonship. In moments of deep feeling the poets, who are the
best interpreters of nature, have given oracular utterance to the native
feeling of the human heart:

    "We are all thine offspring,
    The image and the echo of thy eternal voice."--CLEANTHES.

    "All need his aid, his power sustains us all--
    For we his offspring are."--ARATUS.

Finally, as the spiritual nature of man is derived from and correlated
to God, he may become inwardly conscious of the Divine favor, or may be
sensible of the Divine displeasure. These are the sanctions of the moral
law--the reward and the penalty awarded to men. The smile of God is
heaven, the frown of God is hell. Here we have found the deepest ground
of a Divine government--the paternity of God.




CHAPTER XI.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.

II. ITS NATURE, CONDITIONS, METHOD, AND END.

     "The times of this ignorance God overlooked, but now commandeth all
     men every where to repent; because He hath appointed a day in the
     which He will judge the world in righteousness."--ST. PAUL.


The relations existing between God and man, especially the correlations
of paternity and filiation, constitute the ultimate foundations of Moral
Government. This is the conclusion of the preceding discussion. If God
is intimately near to man--if He is immanent in man, and man is immanent
in God--if God is "the Father of the human spirit," and man "the
offspring of God," then man must bear some resemblance to God--he must
have a spiritual and immortal nature, must be a free personality, must
be capable of knowing and loving God, and therefore must be under solemn
responsibility to God, and within the sphere of the eternal and
immutable laws of moral life; in a word, he must be the subject of
_moral_ government.

We proceed now to consider, more especially, the _nature_, the
_conditions_, the _methods_, and the _ends_ of moral government.

I. _The nature of moral government._--Government, in general, is
control--control with a view to the maintenance of order. This may be
effected by direct coaction or forceful compulsion; or by the reaction
of natural consequences; or by the pervasive influence of moral
motives. The first is constraint, the second is restraint, the third is
authoritative direction. We must, therefore, distinguish between
physical, natural, and moral government.

The _physical_ government of God is the absolute control which He
exercises over the material creation. He is the Fountain-head of all the
forces, and the Author of all the laws according to which passive,
unconscious matter is resistlessly impelled; and because his power and
wisdom are infinite, and his purposes are immutable, therefore material
nature is uniform, and there is an all-pervading order in the physical
world.

The _natural_ government of God is that constitution of nature, and of
man in so far as he is a part of nature, by which the sensations of
pleasure and pain result directly and necessarily from the actions of
man; and inasmuch as he is able by an induction from experience to
foresee these consequences, and to determine his own conduct in view of
them, they are not improperly called rewards and punishments. Thus it is
found by experience that disease and suffering result from acts of
intemperance and licentiousness, and men are restrained from the
commission of these acts by the fear of their foreseen results. This is
control by the reaction of natural consequences in that intermediate
sphere which we may designate the physico-moral order of the world.

The _moral_ government of God is that kind of control which a wise and
virtuous parent exercises over his family, or a just and equitable
magistrate over his subjects.[508] It is a government by laws or rules
addressed to the reason, by moral motives which appeal to the
conscience, and by moral sanctions which appeal to the emotions. It is
a constitution in which God has declared his will to man, and taught
him, prior to the experience of retributive consequences, what is right
and what is wrong; a constitution under which man is endowed with the
capacity of perceiving the inherent righteousness of the Divine law, of
feeling the imperative claims of duty, and of apprehending a future
retribution, and also a real causative power of self-determination and
choice. Finally, it is an economy in which ample scope is afforded for
the development of responsible character. It is a probation in which
there are tests and temptations, in which forbearance is exercised and
consequences are delayed, in which remedial agencies are plied and
opportunities are afforded for repentance and reformation, and in the
final consummation of which virtuous character shall receive its meet
reward, and sinful character its merited punishment. This is the ideal
order of moral life.

This twofold distinction between the _physical_ and the _spiritual_, and
between the _natural_ and the _moral_, runs through the entire domain of
existence and action, of being and becoming.

The terms _physical_ and _spiritual_ are employed as collective terms to
connote the essential, changeless, and permanent attributes of certain
entities or realities which are regarded as ultimate, viz., matter and
spirit. The attributes of matter are extension, divisibility, absolute
incompressibility, and inertia; the attributes of spirit are
sensitivity, reason, power, spontaneity, and memory. The term physical
is further employed to denote certain "affections of matter"--that is,
mechanical effects which are the result of the action of force upon
matter. It is true we often speak of "physical forces," as though force
were an essential attribute of matter. But this is one of the many
ambiguities of language. All that we mean by physical force is a force
which acts upon matter, and produces in the motions and collocations of
matter its appropriate effects.[509] Spirit-force is the only force in
the universe; all that our physical science deals with is "forms of
energy which have their origin in force." "Mind," says Dr. Carpenter,
"is the one and only source of power."[510]

The terms _natural_ and _moral_ are employed to denote opposite modes of
action and classes of effects. In the one case the mode of action is
fixed and uniform, and the effect is necessary; in the other case the
mode of action is free and volitional, and the effect is contingent and
variable. The first is the order of nature where force reigns, the
second is the order of moral life where freedom prevails. "Whatever is
comprised in the chain and mechanism of cause and effect, of course
necessitated, and having its necessity in some other thing antecedent or
concurrent, this is said to be _natural_, and the aggregate and system
of all such things is nature."[511] While, on the contrary, that which
lies within the agent's power, and to which he determines himself by an
act of free choice; and especially that which the agent knows he _ought_
to do, and in choosing which he is conscious of power to put forth, in
the same unchanged circumstances, a different volition instead, is
called _moral_.

Thus does morality commence with "the sacred distinction" between
_thing_ and _person_. "On this distinction all legislation, human and
Divine, proceeds." That which fundamentally distinguishes a person from
a mere thing of nature is _free causality_--that is, "the power or
immunity to put forth in the same circumstances either of several
volitions." A thing is unconscious, involuntary, and powerless, and
consequently limited to one sole possible eventuation. A thing has no
responsibility for its movements, which it has not willed, and of the
nature and consequences of which it is ignorant. A person alone is
responsible, because he is intelligent and free; that is, he can foresee
the consequences of his action, and freely determines himself to its
performance. A thing has no dignity; dignity attaches only to
personality. Personality is inalienable, sacred, and inviolable; it can
not be abrogated, surrendered, or transferred, and it demands to be
respected. In a word, it has both duties and rights, while things have
neither.[512]

Thus do we find that all dignity, all sacredness, all responsibility,
all morality belong to and are predicable only of the personal being,
because intelligence and freedom are the essential moments of
personality.

Furthermore, the sphere of the _moral_ is to be determined by another
important limitation. Not all the actions of men are personal and
responsible acts. Sensation is not a voluntary operation. When the
external object is brought into proper relation with the animated
organism, perception necessarily occurs. The intuitive apperceptions of
the reason are impersonal; when a change transpires, the reason
necessarily affirms the existence of a cause. Reflex nervous action is
involuntary. Many muscular movements are spontaneous, but not
volitional. A responsible action is an _intentional_ action--that is, an
act performed to realize an end which lies within the agent's
contemplation. Spontaneity or self-determination only thereby becomes
_will_. A moral act is consequently a premeditated, intentional,
voluntary act, and the merit or demerit of an agent is as his actual
intention.

The last and most important limitation of the moral sphere is to those
voluntary actions which have relation to personality, human and Divine.
"The peculiar distinction of moral actions, moral character, moral
principles, moral habits, as contrasted with the intellectual and other
parts of man's nature, lies in this, that they always imply a relation
between two persons."[513] Morality is the relation of person to person.

We sum up what has been said in the preceding paragraphs in these words:
The moral government of God is a _legislation_ which has respect to
personality, especially the relations of person to person; and it is an
_administration_ under which the subjects have power to resist and
violate its requirements, but which is provided with ample means to
vindicate its authority, and maintain the moral order of the universe.

II. _The subjective conditions of moral government._--It will be
apparent from what has been already said that the following conditions
are essential to moral government:

(1.) The subject of moral government must be _intelligent_. He must be
able to understand the Divine requirements, to perceive their inherent
rightness, and to feel the sense of obligation to comply therewith. He
must also be susceptible of certain pleasurable or painful _emotions_
which follow as the direct consequences of his actions, and secure an
adequate retribution. In a word, he must have a moral consciousness, or,
briefly, a _conscience_.

(2.) The subject of moral government must be a _free power_. He must be
the efficient cause of his own action, and he must be conscious of this
power of self-determination--that is, he must be conscious of power to
put forth, in the same unchanged circumstances, either of several
volitions. In short, he must have a _free will_.

These, then, are the essential conditions of moral agency--the
possession of a _conscience_, and the _power to obey or disobey_ the
requirements of moral law. Both these conditions of accountability exist
in man. By virtue of his constitution as a spiritual being made in the
image of God, he is capable of perceiving what is inherently right,
just, and good. His reason intuitively apprehends the good, and affirms
the imperative obligation to choose the good. His judgment pronounces
upon the relation of human conduct to the law of right, affirming man
has or has not done right. And his emotive nature yields him complacence
and joy as the reward of well-doing, or inflicts pain and remorse as the
punishment of wrong-doing. In the words of Chalmers, "he is endowed with
a conscience which performs within his bosom all the offices of a
lawgiver and a judge."

The possession of this faculty necessarily supposes the existence of
power in the agent to comply or not to comply with its behests. A moral
law is designed only for the government of a free being, and nothing is
moral or immoral which is not voluntary. If there is no
self-determination, there is no proper personality to which the law of
reason can attach. Remorse, on the one hand, satisfaction on the other,
are emotions which are inconceivable and impossible in a being who is
not consciously free.

_The nature and authority of conscience_ is a question which is
earnestly discussed. Among philosophers and theologians there are
diverse and conflicting opinions. It has been variously characterized as
a _witness_ of our past actions; as a _judgment_ passed upon our
actions; or as a _feeling_ arising in view of our actions. By one,
conscience is regarded as an _appetite_--a craving for the right, but
not a faculty intuitively perceiving the right. Another defines it "as a
_capacity_ and a _tendency_ to inquire into duty, but not as supplying a
law of duty."[514] While a third regards it as a state of the
_sensibility_--"a simple feeling, emotion, or vivid sentiment which
arises immediately in the mind in presence of certain actions, and to
which we give the name of moral approbation."[515]

These definitions of conscience may all be regarded as containing some
truth. They are all defective, however, in this one respect--_they fail
to recognize an internal law which constitutes a subjective standard of
right_, and an intuitive perception of moral distinctions and qualities
in human action.

As an essay toward a clearer apprehension of the nature of conscience,
we present the following propositions:

1. _Conscience is not a distinct faculty of the mind._ Conscience
(_conscientia_ = joint or double knowledge) is the knowledge of self in
relation to a known law of right and wrong. Conscience and consciousness
may therefore be regarded as, in some respects, identical. The terms in
their etymology and their general import are synonymous. There is,
however, a technical distinction to be made. Consciousness expresses
self-knowledge in general. Conscience expresses self-knowledge relative
to responsibility. Consciousness is the recognition by the thinking
subject of its own states and affections. Conscience is the knowledge of
an act or an affection as having some moral quality--as being right or
wrong.

2. _Conscience is, like consciousness, a complex phenomenon_, the
result of the simultaneous action of the primary powers of the mind. The
simplest fact of consciousness is a synthesis of sensation and reason in
a primitive psychological judgment. Sensation alone is not knowledge,
and it becomes consciousness only as it is illuminated and informed by
the reason. And so a mere state of the sensibility--a mere feeling of
approbation or disapprobation--does not constitute conscience until it
is informed by the reason. Conscience is the unity of feeling and reason
in a judgment which has respect to voluntary action.

3. _Conscience is the common field in which is revealed the result of
the operation of all our faculties in their especial relation to moral
law._ As consciousness is the common field in which the results of the
operation of all our faculties come to light, so conscience is that
department of the same field in which is revealed the action of the mind
in relation to the unchangeable principles of order and right which
dwell in the bosom of the Infinite. Conscience is pre-eminently the
Godward side of our mental being, which reflects the moral character of
God, and brings us into relationship with Him. It is that which carries
us _per saltum_ to the immediate recognition of a God, the Lawgiver and
the Judge who is over man, and which holds him in mysterious but
indissoluble bonds of obligation. Conscience is therefore,

(1.) The _reason_ intuitively apprehending universal moral ideas and
laws. It furnishes _the idea of the good_. It affirms that the good is
universally _obligatory_. It asserts that the good has _desert_,
worthiness, and dignity. And it demands for the good an appropriate
recognition and a just reward.

(2.) The _understanding_ apprehending the relations in which we stand to
God, to our fellow-beings, and to self as a moral personality endowed
with reason and freedom.

(3.) The _judgment_ comparing the acts of a voluntary agent existing in
certain relations with the immutable ideas and laws of the reason, and
affirming this is _right_ and worthy of praise and reward, or that is
_wrong_ and deserving of blame and punishment.

(4.) A particular state of the _sensibility_--the painful or pleasurable
emotions which spontaneously arise in presence of right or wrong in our
own actions or in the actions of our fellow-men.

Thus conscience is, as it were, the focal point at which are united and
blended the varied acts and states of the soul in its immediate relation
to the moral law. It is the synthesis of moral ideas, cognitions, and
feelings in a moral judgment.

The co-operation of these powers and susceptibilities of the soul in
their relation to the _good_ has a parallel and an illustration in their
operation in relation to the _beautiful_.

The ideas of order, proportion, harmony, fitness, and unity in variety
are unquestionably fundamental and necessary ideas of the _reason_. In
the Divine reason these ideas have always existed as the laws in
accordance with which He fashioned the material universe. And inasmuch
as the human reason is configured to the Divine, these ideas must also
exist in the human mind. Like statuary in the inner palaces of the soul,
they are the models by which we recognize and the standards according to
which we judge the forms of beauty in the external world. The
correspondence between these external forms and the inner ideals of the
reason is recognized by the _judgment_. And the delight we experience in
presence of the beautiful in nature and art is a particular direction
of the _sensibility_.

This is not, however, the chronological order in which the idea of the
beautiful is developed in the mind. The sense of beauty first reveals
itself in the spontaneous consciousness in presence of the order and
harmony and fitness which pervade the universe. We experience delight
without being able to specialize the precise causes of our pleasure. But
the reflective consciousness, which is pre-eminently analytic, brings
out into clear light the fundamental ideas of order, harmony, fitness,
and unity, which had a prior existence in the reason, and have now
recognized themselves as mirrored in the universe. The repeated
observation of the forms of beauty around us, and the comparison of
these with the standard ideas of the reason, will result in the
beau-ideal of a pure and correct taste--true αἰσθητικόν.

So in relation to the idea of the _good_. It does not stand forth to the
eye of consciousness, in the first instance, as an abstract conception.
The _moral sense_--the affection of the sensibility in presence of
voluntary and responsible action--is first revealed in the spontaneous
consciousness. When we behold an act of justice, of kindness, of
beneficence, we experience the fullest satisfaction. We admire and
esteem the actor. We feel that his conduct is praiseworthy, and that he
is deserving of honor and reward. These sentiments spring up
spontaneously and involuntarily in our bosoms long before we have
defined their reason and law. The reflective consciousness subsequently
elicits the rational ideas which underlie these emotions--the ideas of
the useful, the just, the beneficent, the noble, and the perfect, all
which are finally embraced in the idea of the _good_. And the repeated
comparison of the conduct of voluntary agents existing under certain
relations, with the fundamental ideas of the reason, these standards of
right erected in the soul, will result in an ideal of moral
excellence--a true ἐθικόν.

If this doctrine of conscience be the product of a true psychological
method, it will enable us to account for the apparent want of uniformity
in its suffrages in individual cases, and the varied phenomena presented
in different men.

Conscience, like consciousness, has its gradual development. Though
natural and necessary to every human soul whose powers are normally
developed, it is not exercised at the beginning of its existence, but
only after certain conditions of growth and stages of growth have been
attained. This development may be arrested or it may be perverted. The
absence of proper conditions, the lack of suitable discipline and
culture in any one of the faculties whose operation enters into the
concrete phenomena, will modify the general result. An excess of
_sensibility_ will give a morbid conscience; the lack of sensibility, a
slumbering conscience. A defective apprehension of the relations in
which we stand to God and to our fellow-men will prevent our seeing our
specific duties. Inattention to the character of our own motives, or
ignorance of the real intentions of other men, may mislead the
_judgment_ in discriminating between the quality of actions. There are
also natural differences in the soundness and accuracy of the judgments
of individual men. We meet those who with a limited acquaintance with
particular facts and abstract notions are nevertheless endowed with
sound practical judgment; while others, with a larger knowledge of facts
and general principles, are strangely defective in judgment. Finally,
unless men accustom themselves to reflection, to analysis, the ideas of
the just, the right, the good, do not come clearly into the light of
consciousness. Hence the different manifestations of conscience in
individual men.

We claim, however, that the moral ideas of the reason are in all men
_identical_; that they exist and operate, even though unconsciously, in
all minds, determining their moral judgments; and that _when the same
relations of personality are clearly before the mind the moral judgments
of men are uniform_.

In spite of all the topical moralities to which factitious circumstances
may have given birth, there is unquestionably _a universal and immutable
morality_. In every nation under heaven, veracity, justice, and
beneficence are separated by a clear, unmistakable line from falsehood,
injustice, and cruelty; nor can all the casuistry and sophistry in the
universe transpose or confound them. Custom, prescription, conventions
of human opinion, factitious circumstances, can never blur over and
obliterate these lines which separate right and wrong. Beneath all these
apparent differences, the conscience will make her voice heard in the
depth of the soul, in the common sentiments of mankind, and in the
statutes of universal jurisprudence. The great ideas of justice and
right were prominent and well defined among the nations of antiquity.
"Nemesis and Themis were not only their abstractions and deities--they
were embodied in their systems of jurisprudence. Law secured property
and sanctified life. Law guarded every relation and ordered every act.
Law was the theme of their philosophy and the burden of their song. We
are not unacquainted with the jealousies and disputes of their schools
of philosophy. They placed the good of man and the reason of morality in
the most incongruous things, but _they never differed concerning the
conduct which was right_. Epicurus and Zeno knew no divergence
here."[516] Indeed, they asserted the immutability of moral law for all
times and places--

    "The unwritten laws of God that know not change;
    They are not of to-day nor yesterday,
    But live for ever."[517]

"There is," says Cicero, "one true and original law, conformable to
nature and reason, diffused over all, invariable, eternal, which calls
to the fulfillment of duty and to abstinence from injustice, and which
calls with that irresistible voice which is felt in all its authority
wherever it is heard. This law can not be curtailed or abolished, nor
affected in its sanctions by any law of man. A whole senate, a whole
people, can not dispense with its paramount obligation. It requires no
commentator to render it distinctly intelligible, nor is it different at
Rome, at Athens, now and in ages before and after, but in all ages and
all nations it is and has been and will be one and everlasting--one as
that God, its author and promulgator, who is the common Sovereign of all
mankind, is Himself one. Man is truly man as he yields himself to this
Divine influence. He can not resist it but by flying, as it were, from
his own bosom, and laying aside the general feelings of humanity, by
which very act he must already have inflicted on himself the severest of
punishments, even though he were to avoid what is usually accounted
punishment."[518]

Among the most savage tribes, as among the most refined and polished
nations, are also to be found the same common principles of morality.
Theft, murder, adultery are offenses condemned and punished by every
nation under heaven. The high qualities of virtue are the things which
win esteem and command respect in every country, however rude. Were
proof demanded, we might bring it at once from the darkest corners of
the earth. The savage Fijian regards theft, adultery, abduction,
incendiarism, and treason as serious crimes.[519] And Dr. Livingstone
tells us that, "On questioning intelligent men among the Backwains as to
their former knowledge of good and evil, of God, and of a future state,
they have scouted the idea of any of them ever having been without a
tolerably clear conception on all these subjects. Respecting their sense
of right and wrong, they profess that nothing we indicate as sin ever
appeared to them as otherwise, except the statement that it was wrong to
have more wives than one."[520]

We conclude that the universal consciousness of our race, as revealed in
human history, languages, legislations, and sentiments, bears testimony
to the fact that the ideas of right, duty, accountability, and moral
desert are native to the human mind; and consequently the existence of
the first condition of moral government--namely, the possession by its
subject of a _conscience_--is an unquestionable fact.

The _second_ condition of moral government is the existence, in the
subject, _of free self-determining power_: the agent must be the real
cause and the sole cause of his own actions; he must have freedom both
_to_ and _from_ the act.

Under a reign of necessity there can be no moral government and no just
retribution. It is, at best, a mere physical or natural government; for
moral government must be of beings who are free and self-determined, and
not of mere machines. To blame a necessitated thing is irrational, to
punish it is a cruelty and an injustice. The necessitarian himself is
unable to conceal his conscious embarrassment in presence of these
difficulties, and to save his theory he becomes reckless in assertions.
He affirms that "the whole system of morality--its duties and
responsibilities; the whole scheme of moral government, with its rewards
and punishments--remains, on his theory, as entire and stable as
ever."[521] This affirmation runs athwart all the dictates of
common-sense, and collides with the universal conviction of humanity. He
is the only consistent necessitarian who rejects the Christian doctrine
of sin, denies all accountability and retribution, and reduces the
government of God to mere physical impulsion and the management of a
universal mechanism. The necessitarian dogma can not be made to quadrate
with our primitive convictions; it is out of harmony with all our
instinctive beliefs. The innate idea of right, the native sense of duty
and accountability, the consciousness of sin, our faith in the justice
of God, our religious hopes and fears, all impel us onward to find a
rational and valid basis for human responsibility and moral government
in the freedom of the will.

That man does possess an alternative power of self-determination and
choice is evident:

1. _From the direct testimony of consciousness._ We _know_ that any
doing of ours might have been reserved--we _feel_, by that same direct
consciousness which certifies our existence and our reason, that we have
the fullest power of choice. No subtlety, no abstraction of argument,
can convince us that we are otherwise than free. "Men are not conscious
of compulsion of any kind, not conscious of certain mental states,
called choices, which are either wholly or partially independent of
their free agency; but they are perfectly and distinctly conscious of
entire liberty, and of complete inward power to choose."[522]

That we have a direct consciousness of freedom is the doctrine of most
of the writers on moral science. Cousin is emphatic in the assertion of
this doctrine: "I am conscious of this sovereign power of the will. I
feel in myself, before its determination, the force that can determine
itself in such a manner or in such another. At the same time that I will
this or that I am equally conscious of the power to will the opposite; I
am conscious of being master of my resolution, of the ability to arrest
it, continue it, repress it."[523] The distinguished Professor of Moral
Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, Dr. Calderwood, teaches the
same doctrine: "It is in our consciousness of self-control for the
determination of activity that we obtain our only knowledge of
causation. Every one knows himself as the cause of his own actions. In
the external world we continue ignorant of causes, and are able only to
trace uniform sequence, as Hume and Comte have insisted. But in
consciousness we distinguish between sequence and causality. We are
conscious of our own causal energy by knowing the origin of our activity
in self-determination."[524]

The direct consciousness of freedom is denied by Sir William Hamilton.
This denial is a necessary consequence of his doctrine of relativity. If
we are not conscious of self as a reality, but only of certain modes or
affections, then, of course, we can not be conscious of self as a free
power. But as Mansel has forcibly replied: "Does it not rather appear a
flat contradiction to maintain that I am not immediately conscious of
myself, but only of my sensations or volitions? Who, then, is the _I_
that is conscious; and how can _I_ be conscious of such states as
_mine_? In this case it would surely be more accurate to say, not that I
am conscious of my sensations, but that the sensation is conscious of
itself; but, thus worded, the glaring absurdity of the theory would
carry with it its own refutation.... Self-personality is revealed to us
with all the clearness of an original intuition."[525] With an
inconsistency which shows the fallacy of Sir William Hamilton's whole
theory of relativity, he admits that, "As clearly as I am conscious of
existing, so clearly am I conscious at every moment of my existence that
the conscious Ego is not itself a mere modification, nor a series of
modifications of any other subject, but that it is itself something
different from all its own modifications, and a _self-subsistent
entity_."[526]

If, then, we admit, as we must admit, the existence of an immediate
consciousness, not merely of the phenomena of mind, but of the personal
self as actively and passively related to them, we must also admit the
direct testimony of conscience to the fact of liberty. "I am conscious
not merely of the phenomenon of volition, _but of myself as producing
it, and as producing it by choice, with a power to choose the opposite
alternative_."

The necessitarians are all compelled to concede that the universal
conviction of our race is, and always has been, that man is free. They
have, however, asserted that this dictate of common-sense is not to be
accepted as philosophically true. Lord Kames admits the natural
conviction of freedom from necessity, though he declares it to be an
illusion:

    "Man fondly dreams that he is free to act;
    Naught is he but the powerless, worthless plaything
    Of the blind force that in his will itself
    Works out for him a dread necessity."

And Hommel, certainly one of the ablest and most decided of fatalists,
says, "I must believe that I have a feeling of liberty, at the very
moment I am writing against liberty, upon grounds which I regard as
incontestable. Zeno was a fatalist only in theory; he did not act in
conformity with his convictions."[527]

The possession of alternative power is a fact of consciousness as clear
and indubitable as the fact of personal existence. It is admitted by the
necessitarians that all men have "a natural conviction of freedom;" they
believe themselves to be free beings, and they act upon this belief in
all the relations of life. If this fact of consciousness is an illusion,
then our existence is also an illusion, for that same intuition which
certifies to me that I exist certifies also that I am free. If the
testimony of consciousness is invalidated, there is no criterion for
truth. If one of its deliverances is found to be false, how can we
vindicate the veracity of any? "Our faculties are bestowed upon us as
the instruments of deception; the root of our nature is a lie, and
universal skepticism is the only goal."

2. _The idea of moral obligation necessarily presupposes the freedom of
the will._ This is a principle so obvious that it needs no elucidation.
If man have duties, he must possess the power of fulfilling them. He
ought to be free if he ought to obey law, or human nature is in
contradiction with itself. The direct certainty of obligation implies
the corresponding certainty of freedom. Hence Kant's well-known canon,
"_I ought, therefore I can._" Though denying the direct consciousness of
freedom, Kant maintained with earnestness that the fact of liberty is
guaranteed by the existence of the moral law, whose categorical
imperative _thou shalt_ necessarily implies a corresponding _thou
canst_. To the same effect are the words of Sir William Hamilton: "The
fact that we are free is given to us in the consciousness of an
uncompromising law of duty.... Our consciousness of the moral law, which
without a moral liberty in man would be a mendacious imperative, gives a
decided preponderance to the doctrine of freedom over the doctrine of
fate."[528] Physical causation and moral obligation can not coexist side
by side. In proportion as we extend the domain of necessity we must
diminish that of duty.

3. _The sense of responsibility presupposes the freedom of the will._
This sense of responsibility is native to the human mind. Every man
feels himself to be accountable for his own conduct, not only at the bar
of his own conscience, but before the moral judgment-seat of his
fellow-men. Every where he recognizes the right of his fellow-men to
inquire into his character, to sit in judgment upon his conduct, and to
esteem and treat him accordingly. We necessarily impute blame when an
unjust action is performed by another; we feel conscious of guilt and
unworthiness when a wrong is done by ourselves. These are facts of
universal consciousness. But these sentiments are irrational and absurd
if man is a mere machine impelled by natural causes, and has no
self-determining power.[529] Whatever disasters may overtake us in the
course of nature, however we may suffer by the wild tornado or the
blighting mildew, how much soever of our property may be swallowed up by
the ocean tempest or the devouring flame, we impute no blame; and we
experience here emotions essentially different from those which we
experience when a wrong is intentionally inflicted upon us by our
fellow-men. "Suppose yourself to have been the victim of some act of
injustice and villainy by which you were reduced to penury, and your
family to want and indigence. By what philosophy can you eradicate the
sense of wrong or cease to impute blame to the man whose perfidy has
despoiled your life? You may forgive him, and follow him with your
prayers to the last hour of your life, but you will still pray for him
as a guilty man whose crime has been the burden of your life." Now what
is this radical and fundamental difference between the events of the
material universe and the actions of men? and what is the rational basis
for the different feelings we experience and the diverse judgments we
pass in regard to them?

There is only one answer to this question. The ultimate
ground-difference is found in the fact that one class of events is
_necessary_--there is no adequate power in the thing to be or do
otherwise; the other class of actions is _free_--they need not have been
performed, the actor had full power for a contrary choice. In the world
of nature _force_ reigns; in the world of moral life _liberty_ prevails.
The fundamental principle of difference is the _freedom of the will_.

This second condition of moral government--namely, the possession of
_free alternative power_ on the part of the subject to comply, or refuse
to comply, with the requirements of moral law--is thus established,
first, by the direct testimony of consciousness, from which there can be
no appeal, and, secondly, by necessary inference from collateral facts
of consciousness, which can not be invalidated by counter-proofs.

Unhappily, the restlessness of speculative minds, the necessities of
false theories in philosophy, or the unwarrantable assumptions of
dogmatic theologians, have led to the disregard of the affirmations of
universal consciousness. Men have asked, How can freedom be possible in
a dependent creature? How can it be consistent with our belief in the
principle of universal causation? How can it be harmonized with the fact
that man always acts under the influence of motives? How can it be
reconciled with the omnipotence and absolute prescience of God?

We shall now address ourselves to the consideration of the arguments
against the doctrine of the freedom of the will which are suggested by
these queries.


1. The first is the _Metaphysical or Causational Argument_. The rational
intuition that "every event must have a cause" is a universal and
necessary truth. It must therefore be rigorously applied to all mental
as well as to all physical phenomena. Every volition must have a cause,
and if caused it can not be _free_. This is the grand argument upon
which the necessitarian mainly relies, and it is urged with eloquence
and force by Edwards, Chalmers, and McCosh.

Now that "every event must have a cause" is an _à priori_ truth, which
is as readily accorded by the freedomist as it is vehemently insisted
upon by the necessitarian. No philosophic writers have more ably and
clearly enounced this law of causality than the freedomists Reid,
Stewart, and Cousin. They rely upon it as one of the main pillars of the
Theistic argument. And they apply it, in all its integrity, to mental as
well as to physical phenomena. They hesitate not to say that "_every
volition must have a cause_." That cause is the efficient creative power
which resides in a free, spiritual personality. And that power is not,
like a material or physical cause, shut up to one sole mode of
effectuation: it is an _alternative_ power, a pluri-efficient cause.
Where, then, is the discrepancy between the universal principle of
causality and the doctrine of alternative causation? Is the infinite
First Cause confined to one solely possible mode of effectuation? If so,
how will you account for the endlessly varied effects which appear in
the physical universe? God is the Eternal _One_; whence the plurality
and diversity of his creative acts if He be not an equipotent cause? And
yet, of all the events which have transpired in the universe, whether
natural or supernatural, we affirm "every event must have had a
cause."[530] The endless diversity of effects which originate in the
alternative causation of God is in perfect harmony with this universal
law of causality.

But on a closer examination it will be found that when the necessitarian
attempts to invalidate our consciousness of alternative power by the
application of the causational argument he adroitly shifts his ground.
He assumes another proposition, which is neither equivalent to the above
axiom, nor in itself axiomatic and self-evident, nor justifiably
assumed without proof. McCosh says "the doctrine of necessity is founded
on the intellectual intuitions of man's mind, which lead us, in mental
as in material phenomena, to anticipate the _same_ effects to follow the
_same_ causes"[531]--that is, every cause is inalternative or unipotent;
one effect, and only one can follow.

Now that a given phenomenon must have a cause is one assertion; that the
_same_ cause will again and forever produce the _same_ effect is
another. The first is an axiom, the second is an induction. That "every
event must have a cause" is a rational intuition. That "like causes will
produce always like effects" is a generalization from our limited
experience, and on a further analysis will be found to apply only to our
cognitions of the _material_ universe. It is grounded simply on what we
know empirically of the uniformity of nature. Now we have no _à priori_
intuitive conviction of the uniformity of nature. As the result of
maturer thought, McCosh admits this in his work on the "Intuitions of
the Mind:" "It is vain to speak of the belief in the uniformity of
nature as a self-evident, a necessary, or a universal truth" (page 276).
It is perfectly conceivable that the world might have been so
constituted that there should have been no regularity in the succession
of events. The causes of all the events in nature might have been
_supernatural_, and consisted in the immediate free volitions of the
Deity, or subordinate angelic agencies.[532] They might have been all
"miraculous," and yet the true law of causality would not have been
violated, or in any way invalidated. And so when man, in the exercise of
his free alternative power, produces a new succession of events in
physical nature, or moves disorder and ἀνομία into the moral sphere,
this is no way inconsistent with the axiom that "every event has a
cause."

"In our very definition of freedom of will we assume in the volitional
sphere the inapplicability of the maxim that 'like causes ever and
always produce like effects.' We assume that _either_ one of several
effects is legitimate from the _same_ cause. And while we admit that in
non-volitional causation the law that 'every event must have a cause'
means that every event must have its own peculiar cause, adequate for
itself alone, in volitional causation an event may have a cause adequate
either for it or for other event; and whichever event exists, the
_demands of the laws of causation are completely satisfied_."[533]

Driven from this boasted stronghold, the necessitarian resorts to his
favorite dialectic strategy. He demands the explanation of equipotent
causation, how one cause can be adequate to several effects. He asks,
_What causes the will to put forth one particular volition rather than
another?_

Now when we have shown that, as a fact of consciousness and experience,
a personal, _spiritual_ cause is adequate to several results, we are
entitled in reason and justice to protest against any attempt to push
the inquiry a step farther. We have attained an ultimate fact, and we
have no right to cast doubt upon its authority by raising perplexing
questions as to the _how_ or _why_ of that which _is_. This is precisely
the method by which the atheist Holyoake would invalidate the argument
for the existence of the infinite First Cause. He subjects the Deity to
this universal law of causality, and asks, What caused the Creator to
create? "The atheist holds that the universe is an endless series of
causes and effects _ad infinitum_, and therefore the idea of a _first_
cause is an absurdity and a contradiction." The "infinite series" of
Edwards and of Holyoake are constructed on the same principle. They both
ask _a_ cause for _the_ cause.

When, therefore, it is asked, What causes the will to effect one
volition rather than another? our answer is, _Nothing whatever!_

"Of its own effect, WILL, in its proper conditions, is not a partial,
but a full and adequate cause. Put your finger upon any effect
(volition) and ask, What caused this result exclusively of the others?
and the reply is, The will, or the agent in willing. Ask then what
caused the will in its conditions to cause the volition, and the reply
is, NOTHING. Nay, you are a bad philosopher in asking; for for its own
effect will or the willing agent is a complete cause: as complete a
cause as any cause whatever; _and every complete cause produces its
effect_ UNCAUSEDLY. The volition, like every other effect, is completely
accounted for when a complete cause is assigned. To ask what caused the
complete cause to produce the effect is to ask the cause of
causation."[534]

But such an "alternative" power, the necessitarian affirms, is
incomprehensible and inexplicable. To which we need only reply in the
language of Hamilton, "The scheme of freedom is not more
incomprehensible than the scheme of necessity."[535] "_Omnia exeunt in
mysterium_"--there is nothing the absolute ground of which is not a
mystery. In saying so much, however, we by no means grant the
affirmation of Hamilton that "we are unable to conceive an absolute
commencement [of being or motion]; we can not therefore conceive a free
volition."[536] This is not admitted by Mansel, the disciple and
annotator of Hamilton, as flowing even from his mental "law of the
conditioned." "It may be true, as a fact, that no material atom has been
added to the world since the first creation; but the assertion, however
true, is certainly not _necessary_. The Power which created once must be
conceived as able to create again, whether that ability is actually
exercised or not. The same conclusion is still more evident when we
proceed from the consideration of matter to that of mind. Of matter we
maintain that the creation of new portions is perfectly conceivable as a
result, if not as a process. Every man who comes into the world comes
into it as a distinct individual, having a personality and consciousness
of his own; and that personality is a distinct accession to the number
of persons previously existing.... I believe that every new person that
comes into the world is, as a person, a new existence."[537] So a
volition is a _new_ existence, an absolute origination, "a beginning of
motion" which has its source in the primordial power of the human spirit
as spirit. The _fact_ is undeniable, the _mode_ is inexplicable. But the
inconceivability of the mode in which the will creates a volition no
more renders the fact doubtful than the impossibility of conceiving how
a new and distinct self-conscious personality comes into existence
invalidates the fact that "I exist, and know myself as a distinctly
existing being."


2. _The Psychological Argument._--This may be briefly stated in the
following terms:

It is a fact of observation and experience that _motives_ do stand to
the will in the relation of _causes_ which necessitate volition. They
have an exact mathematical commensurability, and their prevalence is in
the precise ratio of their antecedent intrinsic _strength_. If motives
are wanting, there can be no choice; but when the same motives are
presented to the same mind, it obeys them with such remarkable
_uniformity_ that human actions may be reduced to statistical tables as
reliable and as accurate as tables of mortality.

We might here at once, and with justice, enter our caveat against the
attempt to invalidate a primitive datum of consciousness by alleged
deductions from the exterior phenomena of human life and history. A
primitive datum of consciousness is unquestionable and infallible. A
process of induction is liable to the interpolations of error. The
latter is therefore a lesser authority than the former, and a merely
derivative assurance can not be argued against an ultimate fact. We must
regard it as a philosophic canon that an experience cognition can not
conflict with an intuitive belief. The exterior phenomena of life and
history, properly interpreted, must harmonize with the interior facts
and laws of the human mind, for what is _history_ but the development,
under the conditions and relations of time, of the primitive powers,
ideas, and laws of humanity? If, then, consciousness attests the
presence in man's spiritual nature of a power, in the same
circumstances, to choose either of several ways, we may confidently
expect that the phenomena of the moral world will not belie that
testimony. Now it is a palpable fact that an unbroken law of continuity
and uniformity pervades the material universe. It is locked up in an
unchangeable status. There is no deviation and no progression. All
things remain as they were since the beginning. The fundamental fact
lying at the basis of this undeviating uniformity of nature is that
material causes are unipotent, and shut up to one solely possible mode
of effectuation.[538] And it is equally palpable that the phenomena of
the moral world, the sphere of human life and history, reveal
contingency, diversity, alteriety, and progression. Humanity has not
revolved in cycles, neither has it run in the inflexible grooves of an
anterior causation, nor remained in the dead-lock of an unchangeable
status. History is not an inflexible frame-work in which all events have
been shaped by necessity; it is a development of the inherent powers and
capabilities of humanity, and it teaches us that new trains of causes
have been originated, and new conditions have been superinduced by man.
The ground-fact which underlies all the diversity, contingency, and
progress which appear in the moral world is that volitional causes are
equipotent and efficient for any one of the several results.[539] In
moral development the progressive principle is just the freedom of the
will. The facts of the inner and outer world are therefore in harmony.

The theory of the necessitarian assumes that the will is a mere
passivity, a simple conductor of the impulse which motive power exerts,
a mere transition-point where ideal force is transformed into physical
force, and desires, inclinations, moral convictions, divine influences
become necessary acts. Motives thus prevail by their antecedent
intrinsic power just as physical forces prevail in mechanical and vital
dynamics. And, proceeding upon this assumption, he labors to construct a
science of Ethology in which he would anticipate human action by
statistics, and show how individual character _must_ be in accordance
with physical and mental causation. Whereas consciousness asserts that
the will "is not a bleak mechanical thing." It is a free alternative
power. It is a full, complete, adequate cause. It is _spirit_, not
matter.

Now it is freely granted that the mind acts in view of motives, acts in
accordance with motives, acts in a certain qualified sense under the
influence of motives; _but the freedomist emphatically denies that the
will is necessitated to action by motives_. Motives may be reason _for_
action, conditions under which will acts, but they are not causes _of_
action. They may solicit, invite, urge to action, but they can not
constrain, compel, and force action.[540]

Motives have no fixed correlation to the will. They address themselves
to the feelings, the judgment, the conscience, and not directly and
immediately to the will. They may awaken desire, fear, inclination,
preference, a sense of obligation; but these are all states of the
intellect and sensibility, and may coexist in the same mind with a state
of indetermination and non-differentiation in the will. That which is
desirable may appeal to the feelings, that which is eligible to the
judgment, that which is obligatory to the conscience, and these may
excite the mind in different degrees of intensity; but none of them have
power to move the will. We may be able intellectually to perceive that
some motives are intrinsically "higher" than others, that some have a
prevolition power to excite all minds more intensely than others; but
they do not prevail and secure action in any ratio with their supposed
_à priori_ strength. They can only become real motives for the will by
its voluntary placing its interest in them and making them objects of
its choice.[541] All the actual strength which a motive has is derived
from the action of the will. On this subject we offer the following
propositions:

(1.) _The so-called strength of a motive is the degree of probability
that the will will act in accordance with or on account of it._ "And it
is most important to remark that the _result_ is not always, nor in most
cases, necessarily as the _highest probability_. The will may choose for
the higher or for the lower. And as the will may choose for a lower
rather than a higher probability, so the will may choose on account of
what is called antecedently a _weaker_ over a _stronger_ motive. And
hereby is once for all established the difference between mechanical
force and motive influence--that whereas in the former, by necessity,
the greater effect results from the greater force, in the latter the
less is possible from the greater, the greater from the less."[542] That
result is not as the highest probability Dr. Whedon has shown most
conclusively from the doctrine of Contingencies or Probabilities. And on
this he grounds his doctrine of _contingent motive probability_. "This
contingent character of motive influence is correspondent with the
alternative character of that which is its sole possible object--will.
An alternative will and a contingent motive influence are correlatives.
They mutually explain and sustain each other. To admit either is to
admit both. And so a unipotent will and a necessary motive influence are
correlatives. He who is compelled to admit one is compelled to admit the
other. It will be a mere controversy about a word to say that an
influence which does not produce effect is no influence. That may
legitimately be called an influence, it is important to add, which is
conceived as _possessing an intrinsic probability for result, though the
higher probability be a contingency_ for which there exists power of
_failure_. If so, then the doctrine of contingent motive influence is
established, and the doctrine of volitional necessity is at an end. The
relation between physical force and effect is _necessity_. The relation
between motive and volition is _contingency_."[543]

(2.) _The so-called strength of a motive is the comparative prevalence
which the will assigns to it by its own action._ It is impossible to
erect any standard by which the intrinsic "strength" of motives can be
determined previous to volition. "A cold intellection is not
intrinsically commensurable with a deep emotion, nor a sentiment of
taste with a feeling of obligation, nor a physical appetite with a sense
of honor." Now by what standard can the comparative force of these
influences be determined? There is no more commensurability between them
than between "the brightness of day and the force of magnetic
attractions." Or if we could possibly determine, by some rational _à
priori_ method, that a feeling of obligation is intrinsically stronger
than a physical appetite, or that the love of life is stronger _per se_
than a sense of duty, we can not affirm that the one or the other shall
therefore uniformly and necessarily prevail. These influences derive all
their prevalency, and consequently their comparative strength of motive,
_from the will alone_. The will places its interest in the one or the
other. It decides the mental position. "It settles the question of
preferences between alternatives, dismisses the counter-motive from
view, and closes the debate."[544]

The "strength" of a motive, in its relation to the will, can only be
known by the test of _prevalency_. This is unwittingly conceded by the
necessitarian. He says "the strongest motive prevails because that is
the strongest which the will chooses." This really concedes the
position assumed by Dr. Whedon, that "the strength of a motive is the
comparative prevalence which the will, in its own action, assigns to it,
or the nearness to which the will comes to acting on account of it." Men
do not always choose that which is most _desirable_, nor that which is
most _eligible_, nor that which appears most _obligatory_. But from
whatever motive men may choose to act, however base and unworthy, the
necessitarian affirms it was intrinsically the strongest motive
_because_ it was chosen; which simply amounts to this--the strongest
motive is always chosen because the motive chosen is always the
strongest motive.

The attempts of the necessitarian to fix upon some standard by which to
estimate the antecedent strength of motives have all signally failed.
The most plausible is that of Edwards. He asserts that the volition is
always as the greatest _apparent_ good. But by what standard is that
good estimated, by which faculty is it recognized and pronounced _good_?
by the reason, the conscience, the judgment, or the appetites? Can that
be pronounced _good_ which is chosen in obedience to passion and lust?
Does the man who inflicts a premeditated injury upon his neighbor choose
the greatest apparent good? Does the murderer believe that in taking
away the life of his fellow-man "the volition is as the greatest
apparent good?" Certainly not. "Never," says Bushnell, "was there a case
of wrong, a sinful choice, in which the agent believed he was choosing
for the strongest, weightiest, or most valuable motives." The great mass
of sinful men are conscious of choosing sinful indulgence against their
"highest good."

(3.) _Motives are the conditions, but not the causes of volition._ "Of
volition the cause, the sole cause, is will. Motives are collateral
conditions ... for the volition to be; with which there is adequate
power for the volition not to be.... The motive is only the _occasion_,
and all its acts of excitement amount to no more than this, that they
stand as _probable conditions_ opening the way toward which the will
thereby acquires opportunity to act with full adequate power of not
acting."[545] The relation between motive and volition is not a
necessary but a contingent relation. The will is the controlling
conscious self in the exercise of direct causative power in producing
volition.

Some modern writers of the necessitarian school, McCosh for example,
admit the existence of "self-activity" in the will. But what can be the
meaning of "self-activity" if the will have not the power of either
resisting or yielding to motives presented, and in the same unchanged
circumstances of choosing a different alternative? To be moved
absolutely by motives is not _self_-movement. A power to move in only
one given direction is a mere nature-force; it can not be self-activity.
The distinguished writer above named also admits that "_causation in the
will is entirely different from causation in other actions_."[546] If he
mean that motives act upon the will in a manner "entirely different"
from that by which physical causes secure action or change in the
material world, what right has he to call it _causation_ at all? And if
he mean that volitional causation is "alternative," and not, like
physical causation, "unipotent," then the controversy is at an end.

(4.) _We have no such experience of "uniformities of volition" as shall
enable us to generalize a universal law of volitional causation._ The
facts of uniformity which present themselves in the continuous life of
some men who were absorbed in one great life-purpose, as also in the
conduct of aggregate masses of men, are not denied. We affirm that the
correct definition of a free will supposes that it may choose in a
generally uniform manner. Much of the uniformity in the life of an
individual may be accounted for by corporeal nature--disposition,
standard purpose, and habit. "Upon a basis of corporeal, psychological,
and mental nature are overlaid a primary stratum of dispositions
blending the natural and the volitional, and a secondary formation of
generic purposes wholly volitional, and formed by repetition into a
tertiary of habits; and thus we have, in his mingled constitution of
necessitation and freedom, an agent prepared for daily free responsible
action."[547]

Now it may be readily granted that character forms a basis of reliable
_probability_ as to how in given circumstances a man will act. We may be
able to judge, with some degree of accuracy, how a man will work in his
freedom; but we can never calculate with absolute certainty, because we
have numberless examples of men acting strangely "out of character," and
disappointing our most confident expectations.

"There is often the action, great or small, which reverses the record of
a life or a protracted course of action. He who well watches his
neighbor, however blind he may be to his own practical
self-contradictions, is sure to find, even in the life most uniform in
its great outline, plenty of minor inconsistencies. Or as Müller, in his
'Doctrine of Sin,' well says, that both our observation and our
subject's temptation may occur just at the moment of one of his great
volitional turning-points. From the apostasy of the first angels and the
fall of man, through the whole course of human history, we have
innumerable instances of revolutionary volitions, not only _out of the
previous character_, but shaping a _new_ character. The one disastrous
sin of Moses, the one great complicated crime of David, the apostasy of
Solomon, the wisest of men, are all proofs how, not only in contrasted
traits, but in revolutionary acts, a man may be

    'The wisest, brightest, meanest of mankind.'"[548]

Statistics are cited by Buckle, in his "History of Civilization in
England," showing that crimes, suicides, marriages, etc., occur with
remarkable uniformity, as the result of general conditions of human
society; and he thence infers that all the actions of men are governed
by a uniform law of causation. This uniformity may, however, be as
easily accounted for on the doctrine of freedom as on the doctrine of
necessity. In the calculations of contingencies, while results of
compared large aggregates in the same conditions may approach equality,
the _contingency of each individual case remains still a contingency_.
The actuary of an insurance company can assert with accuracy the average
duration of human life in different countries; but were he to attempt to
predict the duration of any one individual life he had insured, he would
certainly fail. The insured may falsify his predictions by a voluntary
act of suicide. So though large aggregations of free volitions,
surrounded by the same motives, may approach equality, the _freedom of
the individual will remains_.[549]

And as Mansel very justly remarks, "it is precisely because individual
actions are not reducible to any fixed law, or capable of representation
by any numerical calculation, that the statistical averages acquire
their value as substitutes. No one dreams of applying statistical
averages to calculate the period of the earth's rotation by showing that
four-and-twenty hours is the exact medium of time, comparing one month's
or one year's revolution with another's. It is only when individual
movements are irregular that it is necessary to aim at a proximate
regularity by calculating in mass."[550]


3. _The Theological Argument._--The main points of the theological
argument may be thus presented: Freedom in a created being is
incompatible with the absolute sovereignty and prescience of God. To
suppose a being capable of acting either of several ways is to suppose a
being out of the control of God. And a free agent can not possess power
to do otherwise than God foreknows he will do.

In regard to the first of these supposed incompatibilities, we need only
remark that if the Deity, in order to the existence of an equitable
moral government, and the consequent possibility of free responsible
action by the creature, shall please to subject his omnipotence to
conditional limitations, the necessitarian has no business to
object.[551] We need feel no solicitude about the Divine sovereignty.
God will take care of his own honor and defend his own high and holy
prerogatives. Such self-limiting laws prescribed by Divine wisdom and
love do not place man beyond Divine control. The necessitarian will not
deny that such self-limitation is essential to the very existence of the
kingdom of nature. God has established an order in nature, a uniformity
of antecedence and sequence, with which Omnipotence shall not interfere.
"Such a Divine law of non-usance of power is still more necessary in the
kingdom of living agents, and most of all in the realm of responsible
agents; it being observable that the more close the Divine
self-restraint, and the larger the amount of powers in the agent left
untouched, the more the creative system rises in dignity, and the higher
God appears as a sovereign. Even in the system of living _necessitated_
agents, as necessitarians must admit, God forbids Himself to disturb the
agent's uniform and perpetual acting according to strongest motive."

The second of these incompatibilities is really predicated upon our
ignorance, and not upon our knowledge. We can not understand _how_ the
Divine Intelligence foreknows all future events. To enable us to
understand the exact manner in which an Infinite Intelligence
contemplates succession in time, it would be necessary that we should be
infinite also. The _fact_ that God foreknows all future events is all
that is revealed to us; the _manner_ of it He has left in darkness, and
we can throw no light upon it by our verbal speculations.

Of one thing we may rest assured, that as perception precedes volition
in the finite intelligence, so knowledge must precede determination in
the Divine Mind. God can not will or act in absolute darkness. Divine
predestination must be conditioned on Divine foreknowledge.[552] His
foreknowledge does not depend upon his will, or on the adjustment of
motives to make us will thus and thus; but He foreknows every thing
first conditionally, in the world of possibility, before He creates, or
determines any thing to be, in the world of fact. Otherwise, all his
purposes would be grounded in ignorance, not in wisdom, and his
knowledge would consist in following after his will, to learn what it
had blindly determined.[553]

Another important principle clearly and vigorously maintained by Dr.
Whedon is "that the freeness of an act is not affected by the
consideration of its being foreknown." First, because the Divine
knowledge must always correspond to the reality. A free action must be
known as _free_. "If there be in the free agent, ascertainable by
psychology, or required by intuition, or supposably seen by the Divine
eye, the power of putting forth the volition with full power of
alteriety, then God knows that power."[554] Secondly, the occurrence of
an event or act may be _certain_ to Divine foreknowledge, and yet
perfectly _contingent_ in itself. Foreknowledge renders nothing
_necessary_; _it is the consequence, not the cause of events_.

If there be a necessity at all in the case, "the necessity lies not upon
the free act, but upon the foreknowledge. The foreknowledge must see to
its own accuracy. Pure knowledge, temporal or eternal, must conform
itself to the fact, not the fact to the knowledge."[555] The real
difficulty is, not how an act can be a free act and yet be foreknown
(for the act of knowledge can not change the object of knowledge), but
how God can possibly know with certainty a future contingency which may
or may not happen.

It is a clear and immediate revelation of consciousness that man has a
free power of self-determination. No revelation can contradict this
revelation. This fact of consciousness can not be invalidated by any
conceptions of the logical understanding in regard to the omnipotence or
prescience of God, for these by their very nature transcend all human
comprehension.

III. _The method of moral government._--We have seen that government, in
general, is control exercised with a view to the maintenance of order.
In the material world, order is secured by the direct compulsion of
omnipotent force. The things of nature are inertly passive under the
hand of God. They can offer no resistance to the Divine control, and
consequently, in the sphere of nature, there can be no real disorder.
But in the realm of self-determining powers there is the possibility of
collision, because there is the power to resist the will of God. And, as
a matter of fact, we know there is opposition, lawlessness, and sin. In
that sphere, where above all others the demand of the reason is for
order, there is the presence of _disorder_--that is, there is
disconformity to law and consequent suffering.

And now the question arises, By what _method_ is order to be maintained
in the sphere of freedom? How are beings that have the power to
determine for themselves what they will choose and do, to be brought to
act in harmony with the eternal laws of righteousness and love?

There are inconsiderate souls who dream that this may be achieved by
force. God, say they, is omnipotent; if He will the non-extension of
evil, He is able to destroy it; if He desire the maintenance of moral
order, He can compel it. Such reckless declaimers know not what they
say.

Had it so pleased God, He could have made beings in human form without
any sense of moral right and wrong, and without any power to commit sin;
but they would not have been _rational_ beings, would not have been
_free_ beings, would not have been _moral_ beings; neither could they,
in any high and proper sense, be _happy_ beings, because they could
experience no sense of rectitude, no approval of conscience, no delight
in moral excellence, no blessedness in duty and sacrifice. God, indeed,
has made many such creatures that can not sin. The bee, the ant, the
swine, the ape--these can not sin; but they are mere things, not free
powers; they have no sense of dignity and moral worth, no approving
conscience, no joy of sacrifice, and no immortal hopes. Lived there ever
a sane man who would change his lot with one of these, even though in
being a man he has the fearful power to sin, and in sinning, the fearful
susceptibility to suffer--yea, to suffer eternally? Is there any thing
on earth whose value does not fade away when compared with the priceless
value of being capable of duty, of virtue, of devotion, and of
sacrifice? In the eyes of God, the humblest of moral beings is worth
more than all the firmament of stars, and all the teeming myriads of
brutal forms of sense that dwell upon the earth. Because God preferred
to rule over free powers, and not mere things--free powers that could be
governed by truth and reason and love; because He loves moral character,
and cares for it more than all the things "that can be piled in the
infinitude of space, even though they were diamonds," therefore He
bestowed on man this high capacity of character--the capacity to know,
to choose, to love, to enjoy, and in a conscious communion with God to
be blessed forever.

But when God thus determines to create a rational and free being--to
make "man in his own image"--He determines to make a being who in acting
freely may act in opposition to the mind of God, and in violation of his
holy law. In creating a free self-determined being who shall be the
cause of his own action, God puts his own omnipotence under conditional
limitations, and renders it morally impossible for Him, by mere force,
to constrain the will of man. The notion of a free will, which is an
efficient cause, being governed by force, is a contradiction.
Omnipotence may, if it please, annihilate man, but it can not control
man in the sphere of his freedom. "Powers governed by the absolute force
or fiat of omnipotence would in that fact be uncreate and cease."[556]

The moral government of God must deal with man _as man_, must treat him
as intelligent and free, and must govern him solely by moral influences.
He must be controlled by the voice of reason and the sense of duty, by
persuasion and sympathy, by hope and fear; in short, by motives
addressed to the judgment, the conscience, and the heart. A
self-determined being can be brought into harmony with the Divine order
only by "the schooling of his consent." He can be perfected--that is,
fully established in harmony with the character and will of God--by the
discipline of the will. He must, therefore, be placed in such
circumstances as invite consent, and at the same time permit resistance.
He is to be trained, furnished, and perfected, and to this end he must
be carried through just such experiences, changes, and trials as will
best help the formation of a noble human character, and will best
prepare man for the plenitude and blessedness of that life for which the
present is a course of education and discipline.[557]

Furthermore, God's moral government of the world must deal with the
_actual man_--that is, with man as he exists in society with certain
hereditary taints that are not his fault, and under certain unfavorable
conditions in which he has been placed without his consent. With
reverence, we affirm that God Himself is under moral obligation to treat
man equitably, to take account of the weakness which he inherits, the
perverted education that has been given him, and the depraved
associations that surround him, and graduate his responsibility on the
scale of his available light. Finally, the moral government of God must
deal with _the man that will be_--with that fixed character which may be
formed by man in the exercise of his free power of self-determination,
amid the circumstances of his earthly probation. This character must
contain within itself the elements of a blessed or a wretched
futurition, and thus a retribution be secured by fixed nature, and
inflicted by an inflexible necessity.

That the moral government of God is a probationary economy, in which
ample scope is afforded for the development of character, and in which
we are in the act of being _proved_, is evident,

(1.) From the fact _that all our future interests are dependent upon our
present conduct_. God has endowed us with some degree of foresight, and
has thus made us provident beings. We have a native tendency to take
account of and forecast the future. By the aid of reason we can, in some
measure, foresee the tendencies of our actions; we can lay our plans for
the future, and anticipate events which are yet remote. We can also
bring to our aid the lessons of experience, and from this also we can
learn that our present action will have a powerful influence upon our
future condition. We know that the circumstances which surround us
to-day have been in a large degree created or moulded by ourselves, and
that many of our misadventures and our miseries may be easily traced
back to particular acts of imprudence and folly on our own part as the
cause. So that there is no truth we more certainly know than this, that
our future happiness of the next moment, and of every succeeding stage
of our living, is dependent upon our present conduct.

(2.) This is further evident from the fact _that the present scene is
filled with moral tests and temptations_. There is in the present life
an admixture of _good_ and _evil_. On the one hand there are numerous
solicitations to evil; on the other there are motives and inducements to
virtue, the plain intention of which is to prove us. In the words of
Bishop Butler, "We have here free scope and opportunity for that good or
evil conduct which God will reward or punish hereafter." This is
necessary to moral government, because moral government can not exist
without freedom of choice, and consequently the existence of those
circumstances in which that freedom can be exercised. That we have
freedom of choice we know; and our every-day experience of the
temptations to wrong-doing, and of the difficulties in the way of a
uniform adherence to virtue, teaches us that we are in a state of trial,
where our principles are being continually put to the test.

(3.) That our present life is a probation for a future life is evident
from the fact _that in the present life punishment is deferred,
consequences are delayed, to give play to the exercise of moral
motives_.

By "moral motives" we mean regard for what is right and just, _because
it is right and just_, respect for the voice of conscience, and
reverence for the will and requirements of God. If the consequences of
our moral conduct were to follow immediately on the heels of the act, if
reward or punishment were instantly to ensue, then moral motives could
have no exercise. If there were no delay--no interval between sin and
its punishment, moral government would cease, and a merely natural
government would remain, such as prevails over irrational creatures. Man
would then be influenced purely by motives of personal interest or
safety or enjoyment, and his obedience would not be the result of moral
motives, consequently neither virtuous nor vicious. God has, therefore,
put the consequences of much of our conduct into the future, that we may
have room for free deliberate choice, while just so much of consequence
is permitted to appear as will clearly indicate that we are under moral
government, and awaken the anticipation that _all_ our conduct will be
brought into judgment.

(4.) That our present life is a probation for a future life is more
fully proved by the fact _that as a moral economy the present life is
incomplete_. The present is a sphere too contracted for the equitable
administration of rewards and punishments, because some of the _last_
actions of men's lives, some of their _best_ actions or some of their
_basest_ actions, would come under neither. The blood of the martyrs who
died for the faith, or of the patriot who bled for his country, would
cry alike in vain for vengeance or reward. The man who first took away
his brother's life, and then his own, has evaded justice, and escaped
punishment. The hand of violence has robbed the virtuous man of his
present reward; and the suicide, by breaking in upon the sanctuary of
his own life, has defied and defeated the government of God, if there be
no future life.

In the present life retribution fails in uniformity. It is a proposition
which the reason of every man must approve--that the government of God
must be perfectly equitable, and that under it every man must receive
his just due. But men do not receive their requital in this life,
consequently we are bound to affirm that in the present life the Divine
administration is _incomplete_. We can not conceal from ourselves the
fact that events occur in the present life which we can not conceive as
benevolently or righteously consummated. These events lift the tyrant to
power, and trample down the patriot and the freeman. The orphan eats the
bitter bread of misery, while the man who has robbed him of the paternal
inheritance revels in luxury. The ungodly prosper in the world, "their
eyes stand out with fatness, they have more than heart could wish,"
while the righteous suffer affliction, and are in need. And if there is
no future life in which God will balance accounts with the universe, and
render to every man according to his works, then moral government is
incomplete, injustice has triumphed, wrong has prevailed. An imperfect
retribution and an unequal providence demand a future life for their
vindication--a future life both for the good and the bad, so that God
may reckon with all of them--and teach most convincingly that the
present life is a probation. The experiences, changes, conflicts, trials
of a probationary economy, are all intended to prove men, to test their
principles and make manifest their real character.

The government of God is a _moral discipline_ by which men are trained
in the practice and confirmed in the habits of virtue, and thus brought,
by the "schooling of their own consent," into harmony with the Divine
order.

It is a question which may be properly entertained, whether a free
self-determined being can be made perfect in moral character in any
other manner than by the discipline of the will. There certainly can be
no created moral desert. Responsible character must be the product of
free choice. A man can no more become virtuous without the discipline of
the will than he can become intelligent without the discipline of the
understanding. For wherein consists the virtue of a self-determined
being? Is it not in his free choice of what is right and good, his
resistance to temptation, his voluntary submission to the Divine will?
Is it not in his integrity, his patience, his fortitude, and his
resignation? But how can these virtues exist, how can they be exercised,
and how brought to maturity, except in the midst of difficulties and
hinderances? Where can patience and resignation and fortitude and
sympathy have a place, if there are no sufferings to be endured? How can
firmness and diligence and courage be developed, if there are no
difficulties and hinderances to the practice of virtue?

Therefore, in order that men may be trained and educated and perfected,
they are placed amid such scenes, experiences, and trials as shall draw
out the moral powers of the soul, shall strengthen and confirm the will
in goodness, and establish them in the law of their being, so that their
moral future is secure. "Life, thus ordered, is a magnificent scheme to
bring out the value of law, and teach the necessity of right as the only
conserving principle of order and happiness; teaching the more
powerfully, if so it must, by disorder and sorrow." Suffering is a
chastisement which is wholesome: it teaches the blessedness of purity
and the sinfulness of sin; and it may develop into "a godly sorrow"
which shall heal and purify the soul.

The moral government of God is an equitable administration, in which
responsibility is graduated on the scale of available light and
opportunity. "This is the condemnation that _light_ is come into the
world." Light is the symbol of knowledge, because it _reveals_ the right
and clearly manifests what duty is. Light is consequently the exact
measure of responsibility. Our knowledge of what we ought to do, or
ought not to do, determines the degree of our accountability. An
absolute and involuntary ignorance would be the most perfect plea of
innocence. The imputation of sin in such a case would be made void, but
thereby the completeness of human nature be destroyed. That which would
relegate man from the sphere of responsibility would also banish him
from the sphere of rationality.

St. Paul distinctly recognizes an alleviation of responsibility and
guilt in the "ignorance" of heathen life, and speaks of a Divine
"overlooking of the times of that ignorance"--a non-imputation of sins
committed in ignorance. But he does not by any means account the sinning
heathen as free from _all_ guilt. He shows that they were not in utter
ignorance, and that much of their ignorance was voluntary. He refers to
the original consciousness of God, and to the fact that this
consciousness is kept alive by the revelation of God in nature; and he
shows that the disorder of their religious and moral life resulted from
the voluntary suppression of this consciousness--"When they knew God,
they glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in
their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened." He also
appeals to the no less definite power of conscience in the heart of the
heathen, "which shows the works required by the law to be written on
their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness to this law, and
their thoughts approving or condemning each other," and their civil laws
"adjudging their crimes as worthy of death." So far as their ignorance
was involuntary it was an alleviation of guilt, though not an excuse for
all sin. Whatever light they had, be it little or much, it was the
standard and measure of their accountability.

The Founder of Christianity distinctly recognized this principle of
moral government. "If I had not come and spoken unto them, _they had not
had sin_, but now they have no cloak for their sin"--clearly teaching
that ignorance would be a negation of guilt, and knowledge an
aggravation of guilt. Not that we are to suppose that the Jews, without
the light which Christ supplied, were absolutely guiltless; their
ignorance was a mitigation of their guilt. Christ lays it down as a
universal principle that knowledge of the Divine law or ignorance of the
Divine law by the person who violates it is the ground of a distinction
in the different degrees of culpability. "That servant which _knew_ his
lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his
will, shall be beaten with _many_ stripes. But he that _knew not_, and
did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with _few_
stripes."[558] This is the uniform rule of the Divine government among
all nations.

Increase of light and knowledge necessarily enhances human
responsibility. "To whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much
required." More is expected of the man than of the child. More is
demanded at the hands of the man who has been blessed with the
advantages of a Christian civilization than from the untutored savage.
The man who has been favored with a liberal education is held to a more
rigid account than the man who has been cradled in ignorance and
schooled in vice. And when the kingdom of God comes nigh to men, human
responsibility must be enlarged in commensuration with its blessings.
There is a holier, richer trust, and consequently a deeper obligation.
There is a greater light and a greater condemnation.

"Woe unto thee, Chorazin! woe unto thee, Bethsaida! for if the mighty
works which were done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would
have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. But I say unto you, It
shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon at the day of judgment than
for you. And thou, Capernaum, which art exalted unto heaven, shalt be
brought down to hell: for if the mighty works which have been done in
thee had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day. But
I say unto you, That it shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom in
the day of judgment than for thee."[559]

This aspect of the Divine government, which Dr. Whedon has felicitously
styled "the equation of probational advantages," relieves our sadness in
view of the moral condition of the world. "The Judge of all the earth
will do right" in the case of every human soul that has passed through
this probationary scene. His omniscient eye can take in at one view all
the influences and circumstances, favorable or unfavorable, which have
surrounded each individual, and fix the precise amount of
responsibility. He will "overlook" the "defect of doubt and taints of
blood," the faults of education and sins of ignorance, and He will make
a due allowance for the power of temptation, the trammels of evil
associations, and an enfeebled and perverted nature. "He is full of
compassion, and his tender mercies are over all his works." "He knows
our frame, and He remembers that we are dust." We may safely conjecture
that a negro hamlet in Central Africa, however inferior in its temporal
moral aspects, may, in its prospect for an eternal destiny, be superior
to many an American village. And in the dregs of our large cities there
are numbers who are excluded as effectually from the knowledge of the
truth as the heathen, and are scarcely developed to the level of
responsibility. These may be the least in the kingdom of heaven, but by
the law of moral equation they can not be excluded.[560] In every nation
under heaven, he that has feared God and wrought righteousness,
according to his knowledge and ability, will be "_accepted of God_."

The moral government of God secures an infallible and equitable
retribution by binding _character_ and _consequence_ in indissoluble
bonds, and evolving a reward or a punishment out of that permanent moral
state of the soul which has been induced by the free self-determination
of man.

"Character," says Novalis, "is a completely fashioned will (_vollkommen
gebildeter Wille_). It is that ultimate stress and determination of the
soul which results from the coherence and complexure of habits, and
habit is the result of repeated acts of voluntary choice. From the
persistence of habit a fixed disposition and cast of the inner man is
evolved which constitutes his _moral individuality_."

Even in this formative process we can discern the workings of the law of
retribution. One good deed handsels a second, and renders its
performance more easy and pleasurable. The man who obeys his conscience
feels that he can respect himself. He has a consciousness of growing
power; a sense of dignity and moral worth. The moral law is for him "a
law of liberty." On the other hand, one sinful deed involves a second,
and drags it after it. One lie demands another to maintain its
consistency. One act of injustice emboldens to the next. Self-respect is
broken down by license, and the path is prepared and cleared for further
iniquity. Thus, by the repetition of sinful deeds, restraints are
overborne, depraved habits are engendered, vice acquires a mastery over
the man, and he becomes a slave. There is a deep humiliation in this
sense of degradation and unworthiness. The sinner despises himself
because of his weakness, and blushes in secret places at the remembrance
of his own debasement.

The principal happiness or misery of man consists in the settled state
of his own heart, and not in the outward conditions of his daily life.
All human plaudits are as naught compared with the approval of one's own
conscience; and no penal inflictions can compare with the anguish of
remorse. The inward peace of the righteous soul, the disquietude and
misery of the sinful soul, are the blossom and the fruitage of the seed
which has been sown, and the stem and branches which have been nurtured
by the voluntary choices and acts of man. "He that soweth to his flesh
shall of the flesh reap corruption; but he that soweth to the spirit
shall of the spirit reap life everlasting." The connection between sin
and punishment is no arbitrary or accidental connection. It is just as
much a relation between cause and effect as the relation between sowing
and reaping in the physical world. "To cause the mind to punish itself,
to work a retribution out of ourselves, to secure it by fixed nature, to
inflict it by inflexible necessity, to convert the capacity of sin into
the instrument of suffering, is the prerogative of Divine rule."[561]

IV. _The end of moral government._--We have said that the end of
government, in general, is the maintenance of order. The end of moral
government is the maintenance of _moral order_ in the realm of free
self-determined powers. The moral order must consist in conformity to
the idea of the _absolute good_. The personality of God (the essential
momenta of which are reason and freedom, holiness and love) is _per se_,
in its totality, the absolute good. Infinite Personality is but another
name for Absolute Perfection.

The highest good for a created dependent personality is "to resemble
God" in all those attributes or perfections which constitute
personality. It is to be fully established in harmony with God's moral
character, unified with Him in will, glorified with Him in holiness, and
perfected with Him in the blessedness of love. The highest perfection of
personal being is moral order, and therefore human personality,
conceived in its purity and perfection, is the end of the Divine
government.[562]

This we have called "the ideal order of moral life," because it is not
yet realized in the world. We must believe, however, that the final
triumph of goodness is a part of the great world-plan. We must not only
believe, but know, that the great design of creation, the reason for
which the world exists at all, is that in it goodness may come to its
final realization. And this conviction is grounded on the fact that the
moral life of humanity has its source in the same Being who called the
world into existence, and who is conducting this present dispensation to
a glorious consummation, in which He shall "reconcile all things unto
Himself,... whether they be things in earth or things in heaven," and
"gather together in one all things in Christ," that "God may be all in
all."

Christianity bases all the obligations and sanctions of morality on the
great truths that God is near to man, that He sustains him every moment
in life, that He is the Father of the human spirit, and that He governs
man in order to perfect his nature and bring him into an everlasting
fellowship with Himself. Christianity knows nothing of "a science of
morals" which is not based upon the correlations between man and God,
nor of a morality which forgets God and disregards the most sacred and
fundamental of all duties, namely, the duties we owe to God. A morality
based solely upon the relations in which we stand to our fellow-men is
at best but secular and utilitarian. A morality which is grounded upon
the relation of volition to the state of the sensibility, and regards
"happiness as our being's end and aim," is egoistic and selfish. A
morality which rests upon our relation to God, the absolute good, and
which looks backward rather than forward for its motive, is unselfish
and Christian.




INDEX.


 A.

 Absolute creation, 62.

 Absolute, Infinite, and Perfect, relation of these terms, 41, 42.

 Action at a distance denied by Newton, 214;
   by Leibnitz, Faraday, Helmholtz, Thomson, Tait, Maxwell, 214.

 Agassiz on species, 164;
   on the preparation of the earth for man, 254.

 Attraction of gravitation not a primary force, 210-220;
   not an essential attribute of matter, 211-213.

 Attribute or related essence, 48-52.

 Augustine, St., on the days of creation, 150, 151;
   his conception of Divine conservation, 176, 177.


 B.

 Beale, Dr., on distinction between cell-life and soul-life, 163;
   on life, 192, 240.

 Being or essence, as reality, efficiency, and personality, 42-48.

 Bioplasm, or cell-life, 162, 163.

 Brooke, Prof., on conservation of energy, 205.

 Büchner, Dr., asserts the eternity of matter and force, 24.


 C.

 Calderwood, Prof., on consciousness of freedom, 382.

 Carpenter, Dr., on will as the type of all force, 39, 237;
   on distinction between molecular and somatic life, 163, 236;
   on the forces of nature as modes of the Divine action, 240.

 Catastrophes, common belief in, 100;
   sustained by science, 101, 102.

 Categories, universal, 41.

 Causative principle, the, must be real, efficient, and personal, 44.

 Chalmers's, Dr., incautious concession as to the eternity of matter,
  86.

 Character, the formation of perfect, noble--the highest end, 306,
   can only be attained under conditions of freedom, 308,
   and through the inspiration of a higher life, 309, 310.

 Christian civilization the age of philanthropy, 285-290.

 Cicero on a universal and immutable moral law, 379.

 Civilization, each epoch of, has had a different theatre, 275;
   stages of development in, 277-290.

 Clarke, Dr. Samuel, on immediate agency of God in conservation, 178.

 Cohn, Dr., on nature, 333.

 Coleridge on nature, 325;
   on the natural, 369.

 Comte on irregular variability in nature, 195, 329.

 Conditions of moral government, 371, 372.

 Conscience, its nature and authority, 372-377;
   its gradual development, 377.

 Consciousness, religions, 304, 305, 345;
   natural order of its development, 346-349.

 Conservation, Biblical doctrine of, 174, 175;
   conceptions of the mode of conservation, 176.

 Conservation by secondary causes or agencies, 181, 182;
   (1) hypothesis of natural law, 187-201;
   (2) hypothesis of active force inherent in matter, 202-222;
   (3) hypothesis of plastic nature, 222-235.

 Conservation of energy not an absolute law, 205, 206;
   limited by the law of dissipation of energy, 207;
   not fairly stated by Dr. Tyndall in his discussion on prayer, 331,
    332;
   no evidence that it holds in the realm of vital dynamics
    and psycho-dynamics, 332;
   is not absolute in the realm of physics, 332.

 Continuity of the ether, 217.

 Correlation between God and man, 344.

 Creation, Biblical account of, not designed to teach science, 136-138;
   poetic, symbolical, and unchronological, 138-151.

 Creation by law, 196.

 Creation _ex nihilo_, how understood by the Christian Fathers, 92;
   not discredited by the progress of science, 93.

 Creation, its history, 126-171;
   a gradual process, 152-155;
   cumulative, 156-166;
   consecutive, 166-171;
   harmonious, 169, 170;
   final purpose of creation, 130-133.

 Creation, the conception of, 56;
   the Biblical conception of, can not be determined
    on philological grounds, 56-58;
   how to be determined, 58-61;
   distinction between absolute and architectonic, 61;
   an origination _de novo_, 60, 61;
   a voluntary act of God, 63-68;
   not determined by any inherent necessity, 64;
   not conditioned _ab extra_, 66.

 Cudworth on a plastic nature, 222-225.


 D.

 Days of the creative week, 145-151.

 Defects in nature, supposed, not removed by hypothesis
  of unconscious intelligence, 232, 233;
   this supposition based upon our ignorance of nature
    as a whole, 233-235.

 Descartes, his conception of God, 29.

 Dissipation of mechanical energy, 120, 121, 207-209.

 Dualism, Oriental, 23.

 Duration not identical with time, 77;
   nor with eternity, 77;
   a quality of dependent existence, 81;
   a fact of consciousness, 82.


 E.

 Earth, secular cooling of the, 105-108;
   indications of surface transformations of the, 108, 109.

 Earth, the, a school-house for man, 258.

 End of moral government, 417-419.

 Energy, conservation, transformation, and dissipation of, 118, 119;
   defined, 194;
   distinction between force and energy, 203;
   laws of conservation and transformation limited by
    the law of dissipation, 207-209;
   cases of transformation, 237;
   all the forms of energy are transformations of one
    Omnipresent force, 237.

 Eternity an attribute of God, 77, 83, 84.

 Ether, hypothesis of the, 113;
   a resisting medium, 114, 115;
   absolute continuity of the, 217, 218.

 Experience can not attain to a universal truth, 190.

 Extension a quality of matter, 81;
   not a predicate of space, 79;
   a percept of sense, 81.


 F.

 Faraday on the possible and the impossible, 195;
   on action at a distance, 214.

 Final purpose of creation revealed in Scriptures, 130-133;
   not discoverable by science, 234, 245.

 Force defined, 203, 236;
   the ultimate of all ultimates, according to Spencer, 25;
   theory that matter is a phenomenon of force, 123;
   the power of God, 123;
   distinct from energy, 203;
   not inherent in matter, 219, 236;
   tendency of modern scientists to hypostatize, 227;
   spirit-force the only force, 236, 237, 341;
   a metaphysical idea, 340;
   the expression of will, 341.

 Forces, primary, of nature, 209;
   a perpetual stream of power from the Infinite Spirit, 221, 222.

 Foreknowledge of God and human freedom, 402-405.

 Formation implies origination, 97.

 Free self-determining power of the will, 380, 387;
   arguments against--(1) Metaphysical or causational, 387, 392;
   (2) Psychological, 392-402;
   (3) Theological, 402-405;
   conceded by Dr. Tyndall, 335.

 Freedom of God, absolute, 63.


 G.

 Galton on the efficacy of prayer, 313.

 Geographical conditions, their influence on the character
  of nations, 258-264.

 Geology points back to a beginning, 104-110.

 Geological changes indicate a preparation for man, 254-257.

 God, omnipotence of, and human freedom, 355-359.

 God the author and giver of life, 240.

 God, the existence of, the fundamental postulate of all
  philosophy and all religion, 291, 292.

 God, the fatherhood of, 359-365.

 God the first principle and unconditioned cause of all existence, 27;
   the content of our conception of, 27;
   the idea of, a phenomenon of the universal intelligence
    of our race, 28;
   idea and concept of, 350;
   harmony of the Biblical and philosophic conception of, 46, 47;
   distinction between the nature and essence of, 62, 63;
   not necessarily but freely just and good, 63;
   immanence of, in nature, 174, 175, 240, 241.

 Government of God, distinction between physical, natural,
  and moral, 367, 368.

 Gravitation--attraction not a universal and necessary attribute
  of matter, 191, 211-213;
   must have a cause, 214;
   transmitted by the ether, 215;
   instantaneous, 215;
   cause of, not material, 216;
   a derivative force, 221.

 Grecian civilization the youth of humanity, 280-282.

 Grove on causation, 39;
   on force, 340.


 H.

 Hamilton, Sir William, confounds space and extension, 72;
   also space and immensity, 73;
   confuses the concepts time, duration, and eternity, 76;
   on the inconceivability of an absolute commencement, 93.

 Harmony between the philosophic conception of force and the
  religious conception of God, 338-343.

 Hebrew civilization the childhood of humanity, 278-280.

 Hedge, Dr., on the immanence of God in nature, 186.

 Hegel on Thought as the supreme reality, 25.

 Helmholtz denies direct action at a distance, 214.

 Herschel, Sir John, his conception of matter, 95, 125, 237;
   on force, 39, 341;
   on universal gravitation, 191;
   on law, 198;
   on conservation of energy, 205, 206.

 History a revelation of Divine providence, 246;
   the goal of, is the perfection of humanity, 248;
   the especial field of Divine providence, 253.

 Human race commenced its history in the Temperate Zone, 264-268;
   distribution of the, not governed by the same law as the distribution
    of plants and animals, 272;
   distribution of, indicates a Providential guidance, 273.

 Human freedom and Divine omnipotence, 355-359;
   and Divine prescience, 402-405.

 Humanity, perfection of, in what does it consist? 248, 249.


 I.

 Immanence of God in nature, 174, 175, 240, 241;
   the doctrine of, not pantheistic, 241, 242.

 Immanent attributes of God, 50;
   an eternal and necessary in being, 52.

 Immensity an attribute of God, 75, 81, 83, 84.

 Inertia of matter, 220, 235.

 Infinite series a contradiction _in adjecto_, 90.

 Interception of force by matter, 220.


 L.

 Laplace on the stability of the solar system, 113.

 Laurent on Providence, 247.

 Law, creation by, 196;
   meaning of the term, 197-200.

 Laycock, Dr., on the law of design, 129;
   on life, 192;
   on science, 195.

 Life, distinction between molecular and individual, 163;
   molecular, the result of the immediate presence and agency of God,
    239;
   the cause, not the consequence of organization, 240.

 Love the highest, determining principle of the Divine
  efficiency, 130, 131.


 M.

 Mahan, Dr. A., his fatal concession to Hume, 88;
   on an infinite series, 88;
   rejects the _à priori_ argument for the being of God, 88-91.

 Mansel on the conceivability of a commencement of existence, 94.

 Martineau asserts the coeval and coeternal existence of something
  objective to God, 67;
   if true, would invalidate every proof of the existence of God, 67,
    68;
   on the separate spheres of religion and science, 296.

 Matter a created entity, 95, 125.

 Matter, eternity of, affirmed by Martineau, 67;
   a fatal admission, which imperils the Theistic argument, 85-92.

 Matter, theory that, is a phenomenon or a function
  of force, 123, 124, 228, 236;
   a real entity, 235.

 Maxwell, Prof., on the nature of matter, 124;
   regards matter as a created entity, 125, 126;
   rejects the doctrine of action at a distance, 214;
   on the origin of motion, 219.

 McCosh concedes that space and time are not independent of God, 68;
   on proportions of infinite space, 74;
   on causation in the will, 399.

 Mechanical theory of the origin of things, 299, 300.

 Method of the Divine government, 405-407;
   a probationary economy, 408-411;
   a moral discipline, 411, 412;
   an equitable administration, in which responsibility is graduated
    on the scale of available light and opportunity, 412-416;
   secures an infallible and equitable retribution
 by connecting character and consequence, 416, 417.

 Mill, J. S., on Teleology, 128;
   on uniformity of nature, 189.

 Mind, stages of development of, in the individual, 276, 277.

 Mind the primal source of all being, 38;
   the first cause of motion, 236;
   the one and only source of power, 237.

 Mivart on unconscious intelligence, 226.

 Montesquieu, his definition of law, 198.

 Moral attributes or perfections of God, 51;
   an everlasting voluntary becoming, 52, 63.

 Moral government, its grounds, 351-365;
   its nature, 366-371;
   its subjective conditions, 371, 404;
   its end, 417-419.

 Moral ideas of the reason identical in all men, 378-380.

 Motion, origin of, 219.

 Motives, moral, do not act causally on the will, 393-396;
   the so-called _strength_ of motives discussed, 397-402.

 Müller on Divine love as the highest determining principle
  of the Divine efficiency, 131.

 Murphy, J. J., on unconscious intelligence, 225;
   on matter and force, 227-229;
   his doctrine involves Pantheism, 229, 230.


 N.

 Natural and moral distinguished, 369-371.

 Nature, meaning of the term, 193, 325;
   course of, 326;
   constitution of, 326, 329;
   controlled and modified by man, 335, 336;
   therefore also controlled by God, 337.

 Nebular hypothesis implies a beginning, 110, 111.

 Necessitarians, theory of, 394, 395.

 Newman, John Henry, his conception of God, 31.

 Newton, Sir Isaac, his conception of God, 29;
   teaches that God constitutes space and duration, 68;
   denies action at a distance, 214;
   denies that gravity is inherent in and essential to matter, 211, 213.

 Niebuhr on Divine providence, 246.

 Nitzsch teaches that God is the cause of space and time, 69.

 Norton, Prof., on Atomic Forces, 209;
   his doctrine that atomic repulsion is the primary force, 220;
   teaches that the Infinite Spirit is the primal source
    of all force, 221, 222.


 O.

 Omnipotence of God and human freedom, 355-359.

 Order of nature, facts concerning the, which are
  supposed to conflict with the efficacy of prayer, 310.

 Order of the universe had a beginning, 98.

 Oriental civilization the infancy of humanity, 275.

 Origin of things, mechanical theory of the, 299, 300;
   vito-dynamical theory of, 299.

 Origination and formation, 97.

 Owen, Prof. R., on the preparation of the earth for man, 255, 256.


 P.

 Pantheism, the doctrine of unconscious intelligence ends in, 229, 230.

 Perfect personality of God, 51.

 Permanence of substance, force, and law, 15.

 Permanence of the universe, no _à priori_ ground for
  belief in the, 100, 188, 189.

 Phenomena of the universe in ceaseless change, 14.

 Physical and spiritual distinguished, 368.

 Physical geography indicates a preparation of the earth for man, 257.

 Plastic nature, theory of a, 183, 222-235.

 Plato taught that a perfect mind is the primal source
  of all existence, 38.

 Porter, Dr., regards space as an entity, 69.

 Prayer--have our prayers any influence with the Supreme Power? 292;
   importance of this question, 292, 293;
   natural to man, 302-304;
   an essential element of life, 304-310;
   necessary to the formation of noble character, 306-308;
   attacks on the efficacy of, from the stand-point
    of experience, 313-321;
   from the theoretic stand-point, 321-338.

 Prayer-gauge, the, not presented in terms of experience, and therefore
  not capable of experimental application, 317, 318.

 Problem, the central, specifically stated, 21, 22.

 Procter on Divine supervision and control, 176.

 Providence, statement of the Christian doctrine of, 245, 246;
   the course of human history a revelation of, 246, 247;
   defined, 252;
   in the physical universe, 254;
   nature and history the two great factors of Divine providence, 258.


 R.

 Reality of the external world, 14.

 Relation between God and man--(1) contiguity, 351-353;
   (2) immanency, 353-359;
   (3) paternity and filiation, 359-365.

 Religion, the sphere of, 294-297;
   inadequate definition of, by Spencer, 298;
   true conception of, 295.

 Religious consciousness, the content of, 304, 305;
   order of development of, 346-349.

 Religious feeling, the facts of, as incontestible as the
  facts of Physics, 296;
   statement of the facts of, 302-310.

 Repulsion the primary force, 220.

 Richter on the providence of God in history, 247.

 Roman civilization the manhood of the race, 282-285.


 S.

 Schleiermacher on the cause of space and time, 69.

 Science and Religion, the apparent antagonism between them, 297, 298.

 Science, modern, its metaphysical tendency, 103;
   the sphere of science, 294-297.

 Self, the fundamental reality of, 13.

 Solar heat, dissipation of, 116, 117;
   must be finally exhausted, 118.

 Space--what is space? 69-78;
   is absolute vacuity, 69, 70;
   is an entity, 69;
   is a relation, 71-75;
   confusion of thought in regard to, 71;
   confounded with extension, 72
     --by Hamilton, 72, 73
     --by McCosh, 73
     --by Cousin, 74;
   confounded with immensity, 74;
   the relation of coexistence among extended bodies, 82.

 Special providence and the efficacy of prayer, the present
  issue between science and religion, 291.

 Species, the essential element of, a spiritual entity, 164.

 Spencer asserts that force is the ultimate of all ultimates, 25;
   his definition of law, 198;
   admits that will-force symbolizes the cause of all change, 40, 341.

 Spinoza, his assertion that all determination is negation, 43.

 Spirit-force the only force in the universe, 236.

 Stewart, Dugald, on the impossibility of annihilating space, 70;
   answer thereto, 71.

 Sufficient reason, the law of, 31.

 Symbolical Hymn of Creation, 140-142.


 T.

 Tait, Prof., rejects direct action at a distance, 214.

 Teleological idea the highest law of the universe, 128-130;
   not invalidated by the doctrine of evolution, 171.

 Temperate Zone, the human race commenced its history in the, 264-268;
   purely zoological data would lend us to fix that starting-point in
    the Torrid Zone, 268-272;
   a providence here revealed, 273, 274.

 Temporal character of the universe, 98;
   the order of the universe had a beginning, 98;
   this has been the common belief of all ages, 99;
   all philosophers have recognized a beginning, 101;
   modern science sustains this belief, 102, 103;
   Geology points back to a beginning, 104-110;
   astronomical paletiology confirms the law of finite duration,
    110-118;
   Physics especially sustains the belief, 118-121.

 Thomas Aquinas, his notion of conservation, 177.

 Thomson, Sir William, on secular cooling of the earth, 107, 108;
   on dissipation of energy, 119, 120;
   on the argument from design, 129;
   rejects direct action at a distance, 214;
   on life, 240.

 Tidal friction dissipates mechanical energy, 115.

 Time or Succession, what is it? 78;
   confounded by most philosophers with duration, 75,
     and with eternity, 75;
   consequences of this confusion, 76;
   answer of McCosh, 78;
   of Dr. Porter, 80;
   time the measure of finite duration, 83.

 Transformation of energy, 208;
   illustrations of, 237.

 Transitive or relative attributes of God, 50.

 Tyndall on impossibilities in nature, 196;
   on the certainty of the facts of religious experience, 296;
   admits that the great problem of the age is to find a legitimate
    satisfaction for the religious emotions, 300;
   prescribes the conditions under which it must be solved, 301;
   admits that religion can not be dislodged from the heart of man, 304;
   believes in the existence of God, 312;
   his attack on the efficacy of prayer from the stand-point
    of science, 321-338;
   does not deny that God may create energy, 332;
   admits the interference of personal volition in nature, 332-334;
   grants that the conception of a universal Father who controls the
    phenomena of nature is not unscientific, 337;
   distinguishes between the force which animates nature and the God
    who answers prayer, 338-340.


 U.

 Unconditioned Will the principle of all reality, efficiency,
  and perfection, 34, 41-48.

 Unconscious intelligence, doctrine of, 225;
   impossibility of forming any conception of, 226, 227;
   no difficulties relieved by this hypothesis, 232-235.

 Uniformity of Nature, meaning of the term, 193-196, 325-330.

 Uniformity of the course of nature not an intuitive
  belief, 99, 188-190, 321, 326;
   an assumption, 322;
   what ground is there for this assumption? 322-324.

 Unity, demand of the reason for, 23.

 Unity of the Cosmos, 15.

 Universal beliefs, authority of, 100, 101.

 Universal Father controlling nature a scientific conception, 336, 337.

 Universe an effect, 21;
   had a commencement in time, and will therefore have an end, 98-121;
   not a conservative but a dissipative system, 118-121;
   dependent on the Divine conservation every moment, 174-177.


 V.

 Vito-dynamical theory of the origin of things, 299.

 Volition, reality of personal, 334.


 W.

 Wallace on unconscious intelligence, 226;
   regards all force as will-force, 39.

 Wesley on Divine conservation of the world, 179.

 Whedon, Dr., on causation in the will, 390-391;
   on the so-called strength of motives, 396, 397, 399, 400;
   on Divine foreknowledge, 404;
   on equation of probational advantages, 415.

 Whewell, Prof., on law and cause, 200;
   on the origin of force, 341.

 Will the fountain-head of all force, 38;
   so recognised by scientists, 39, 40;
   this doctrine the balancing-point of a moral theism, 37.

 Will, the freedom of the, 380-387;
   direct testimony of consciousness, 381-384;
   presupposed by the idea of moral obligation, 384, 385;
   and by the sense of obligation, 385, 386.

 Will the real essence of the soul, 35, 36;
   is more than mere power of energy, 35;
   the synthesis of reason and power, 197.

 Will, the unconditioned, 34;
   the absolute first principle, 25;
   the Divine will the source of all the forms of force in the
   universe, 237.

 Winchell, Dr., on surface transformations of the earth, 109;
   on molar aggregation, 162;
   on species, 164;
   on the harmony between the Mosaic and geological records, 155.

THE END.




FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: "The Old Faith and the New," vol. i. p. 107.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. vol. i. p. 3.]

[Footnote 3: Ibid. vol. i. p. 158.]

[Footnote 4: "The Old Faith and the New," vol. ii. p. 35.]

[Footnote 5: Ibid. vol. ii. p. 19.]

[Footnote 6: "The Old Faith and the New," vol. ii. p. 213.]

[Footnote 7: Ueberweg's "History of Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 41.]

[Footnote 8: Ueberweg's "Logic," p. 91.]

[Footnote 9: This is mournfully conceded by Geo. Henry Lewes (an avowed
Comtean): "No army of argument, no accumulation of contempt, no
historical exhibition of the fruitlessness of its effort, has sufficed
to extirpate the tendency toward metaphysical speculation. Although its
doctrines have become a scoff (except among the valiant few), its method
still survives, still prompts to renewed research, and still misleads
some men of science. In vain History points to the failure of twenty
centuries; the metaphysician admits the fact, but appeals to History in
proof of the persistent passion which no failure can dismay; and hence
draws confidence in ultimate success. A cause which is vigorous after
centuries of defeat is a cause baffled but not hopeless, beaten but not
subdued. The ranks of its army may be thinned, its banners torn and
mud-stained; but the indomitable energy breaks out anew, and the fight
is continued."--"Problems of Life and Mind," p. 7.]

[Footnote 10: "Every religion may be defined as an _à priori_ theory of
the universe. The surrounding facts being given, some form of agency is
alleged which, in the opinion of these alleging it, accounts for these
facts.... Nay, even that which is commonly regarded as the negation of
all religion--even positive Atheism, comes within the definition; for
it, too, in asserting the self-existence of Space, Matter, and Motion,
which it regards as adequate causes of every appearance, propounds an _à
priori_ theory from which it holds the facts to be deducible."--Spencer,
"First Principles," p. 43.]

[Footnote 11: "Philosophy begins in wonder: he was not a bad genealogist
who said that Isis, the messenger of Heaven, is the child of Thaumas
(Wonder); for Wonder is the feeling of a philosopher."--Plato,
"Theætetus," § 155.]

[Footnote 12: Plato, "Timæus," § 9.]

[Footnote 13: Büchner, "Matter and Force," pp. 1-27.]

[Footnote 14: Spencer, "First Principles," pp. 235, 236.]

[Footnote 15: Hegel, "Philosophy of Religion," vol. i. p. 201.]

[Footnote 16: "Spiritual Philosophy of Coleridge," by Green, vol. i. pp.
1, 2.]

[Footnote 17: Isaiah xliii. 13; Exod. iii. 14: "I am that I am."]

[Footnote 18: "We can see the sun, we can greet it in the morning and
mourn for it in the evening, without necessarily naming it, that is to
say, comprehending it under some general notion. It is the same with the
perception of the Divine. It may have been perceived, men may have
welcomed it or yearned after it, long before they knew how to name
it."--Max Müller, "Science of Language," 2d Series, p. 454.]

[Footnote 19: "Meditations," vol. i. p. 313.]

[Footnote 20: "Works," vol. i. p. 218; vol. v. p. 18; Hamilton's
"Philosophy," p. 176; Murphy's "Scientific Basis of Faith," p. 130.]

[Footnote 21: Morell, "Philosophy of Religion," p. 3.]

[Footnote 22: Müller, "Christian Doctrine of Sin," vol. i. p. 28.]

[Footnote 23: Green, "Spiritual Philosophy," vol. i. p. 2.]

[Footnote 24: Morell, "Psychology," p. 61.]

[Footnote 25: Cousin, "Elements of Psychology," p. 452.]

[Footnote 26: Martineau's "Essays," p. 188, 2d Series.]

[Footnote 27: "Timæus," ch. ix.]

[Footnote 28: "Philebus," § 50.]

[Footnote 29: "Sophist," § 72.]

[Footnote 30: "Timæus," ch. ix. x.]

[Footnote 31: "Correlation and Conservation of Forces," p. 199.]

[Footnote 32: "Outlines of Astronomy," pp. 233-4; also "Familiar
Lectures on Scientific Subjects," pp. 462, 475.]

[Footnote 33: "Human Physiology," p. 542; also art. "On Mutual Relation
of Vital and Physical Forces," _Philosophical Transactions_, p. 730.]

[Footnote 34: "Natural Selection," p. 368. See Mivart, "Genesis of
Species," p. 298; Laycock, "Mind and Brain," vol. i. pp. 225, 304;
Murphy, "Scientific Basis of Faith," p. 51.]

[Footnote 35: "Reign of Law," pp. 123, 129; Cooke, "Religion and
Chemistry," p. 340.]

[Footnote 36: "First Principles," p. 235. See also Challis, "Principles
of Mathematics and Physics," p. 681.]

[Footnote 37: Comte, "L'Ensemble du Positivisme," p. 46.]

[Footnote 38: M'Vicar, "Sketch of Philosophy," p. 8.]

[Footnote 39: These terms are frequently and somewhat loosely employed
as synonymous; but in reality each has its own peculiar shade of
meaning. Here we employ the term _Absolute_ to denote the underived,
independent, incomposite, and immutable. _Infinite_ is employed to
denote the absence of all limitation--that which can not be bounded,
measured, quantified. _Perfect_ is employed to denote that which is
complete, finished, self-sufficient--that which has no defect and no
want. _The unconditioned_ is a genus, of which the Infinite, Absolute,
and Perfect are species--not conditioned by quantity, kind, or degree.
For the Infinite there are no limits; for the Absolute no parts, no
equals, and no change; for the Perfect no wants. See Calderwood,
"Philosophy of the Infinite," p. 179; _North American Review_, Oct.
1864, pp. 407, 417.]

[Footnote 40: Saisset, "Modern Pantheism," vol. ii. p. 70.]

[Footnote 41: "The idea of God is the unity of three factors--the
logical (intelligence), the ethical (love), and the physical
(might)."--Dr. Martensen, "Die Christliche Ethik," § 19.]

[Footnote 42: Dr. Whedon, _Meth. Qu. Review_, Jan. 9, 1871, p. 164.]

[Footnote 43: As related to the purpose of Redemption. God the Father is
the moving or actuating cause of Redemption, God the Son is the
revealing and actualizing cause, and God the Spirit is the active and
efficient cause. Father = Love; Logos = Revealer; Spirit = Life.]

[Footnote 44: The Justice, Truth, and Faithfulness of God are not
properly regarded as attributes of the Divine nature, but as modes of
Divine conduct or action, determined by the Holiness and Goodness of
God. So Grace, Mercy, Compassion are but modifications of Divine Love
viewed in relation to sinful, guilty, and suffering creatures, and their
consideration belongs not to the doctrine of Creation, but of
Redemption.]

[Footnote 45: Whedon, "On the Freedom of the Will," p. 316.]

[Footnote 46: For an exhaustive discussion of this subject, see Müller,
"Christian Doctrine of Sin," vol. ii. pp. 199-215.]

[Footnote 47: We make no pretensions to critical acquaintance with the
Hebrew, but will hazard this suggestion, עָשָׂה (aysah) is the most
general term; its fundamental meaning is _to do, to perform, to work_,
and may embrace both origination and formation. בָּרָא (bara) and יִצֶר
(yetsar) are more specific, the former denoting the origination of a
new essence or substance, the latter formation or fashioning out of
pre-existing materials. Thus we read in Gen. ii. 7: "And the Lord God
formed [יִצֶר] man [_i. e._, the body of man] out of the dust of the
earth." Here we have pre-existing matter. But in Gen. i. 27 we read,
"And God created [בָּרָא] man [_i. e._, the soul of man] in his own
image." Here we have no pre-existing material, for matter can not bear
the image of God. (See Acts xvii. 29.) _Bara_ must therefore here mean
origination. Even in Gen. i. 21, where _bara_ is employed in regard to
the production of _living creatures_, we have the origination of
something new: for _vitality_, _sensitivity_, _perception_ are not
properties of matter, neither can they be educed from any organization
of matter.]

[Footnote 48: We can not help regarding this mode of reasoning as
superficial and misleading. Gen. i. 27, "So God created [בָּרָא]
man in _his own image_," refers to the spiritual nature of man which
alone can bear the "image of God," and must mean _origination_. Gen. ii.
7, "And the Lord God formed [עָשָׂה] man out of the dust of the
earth," refers solely to the body of man. This distinction can scarcely
be accidental.]

[Footnote 49: James i. 17.]

[Footnote 50: Rom. xi. 36.]

[Footnote 51: Lange's "Commentary," Introduction.]

[Footnote 52: We can not overlook the connection between Gen. i. 1 and
John i. 1, and close our eyes to the light which the later announcement
throws upon the former. It is most probable that by ἐν ἀρχῇ John means
ἐν αἰῶνι, in eternity--that is, before all time-succession began. Ἀρχή
here can have no relation to time. And why may we not accept the
Platonic notion of "a creation in eternity," which itself constituted a
beginning of time? Prior to finite succession and change, there can be
no time.]

[Footnote 53: "God being limited neither _in_ nor _by_ any other
existence, is infinite in a positive sense, inasmuch as _his will alone_
imposes all limitation."--Ulrici, "Gott und die Natur," 1862, p. 535.]

[Footnote 54: _Natura_--that which is produced or born, that which is
always _becoming_. _Essentia_--the fundamental, permanent _being_. See
note 1 (Next footnote.)]

[Footnote 55: "We Arminians hold that God is freely good from eternity
to eternity, just as man is good freely and alternatively for one hour.
Infinite knowledge does not insure infinite goodness. Infinite knowledge
(which is a very different thing from infinite _wisdom_) is not an
anterior cause of infinite goodness; but both Infinite Wisdom and
Infinite Holiness _consist in_ and result from God's volitions
eternally, and absolutely, perfectly coinciding with, not the Wrong, but
the Right. God's infinite knowledge = omniscience, is an eternal, fixed,
necessary _be_-ing; God's wisdom and holiness are an eternal volitional
BECOMING; an eternally free, alternative _putting forth_ of choices for
the Right. God's omniscience is self-existent; God's wisdom and holiness
are self-made, or eternally and continuously _being made_. God is
necessarily omnipotent and all-knowing through eternity, but God is
_truly_ wise and holy through all eternity, but no more _necessarily_
than a man through a single hour. God is holy therefore, not
automatically, but freely; not merely with infinite excellence, but with
infinite meritoriousness."--Whedon, "Freedom of the Will," p. 316.]

[Footnote 56: Lange, "Commentary" on Gen. i., p. 180.]

[Footnote 57: Poynting, quoted by Martineau in "Nature and God," p.
153.]

[Footnote 58: See also Heb. i.]

[Footnote 59: See Müller's "Christian Doctrine of Sin," vol. ii. p.
146.]

[Footnote 60: Saisset, "Modern Pantheism," vol. ii. p. 119.]

[Footnote 61: "History of Modern Philosophy," vol. i. p. 94.]

[Footnote 62: "Essays," 1st Series, pp. 158, 161.]

[Footnote 63: "First Principles," p. 37.]

[Footnote 64: Müller, "Christian Doctrine of Sin," vol. ii. p. 215.]

[Footnote 65: "Essays," 1st Series, p. 161.]

[Footnote 66: "Essays," 1st Series, p. 203.]

[Footnote 67: "Deus durat semper et adest ubique, et existendo semper et
ubique durationem et spatium, æternitatem et infinitatem
_constituit_."--_Principia_, _Schol. Gen._]

[Footnote 68: "Modern Pantheism," vol. i. p. 180.]

[Footnote 69: "Intuitions," p. 213.]

[Footnote 70: "System of Christian Doctrine," by Nitzsch, pp. 156-7.]

[Footnote 71: "The Human Intellect," p. 565.]

[Footnote 72: July, 1864.]

[Footnote 73: Stewart's Dissertation in "Encyclopædia Britannica," vol.
i. p. 142.]

[Footnote 74: Even physical science rejects the notion of "pure space,"
and it may be reasonably doubted whether "absolute vacuity" has any
place in the universe of God. As a question of science, the existence of
the "vacuum" is doubtful. "It may be safely asserted that hitherto all
attempts at producing a perfect vacuum have failed."--Grove,
"Correlation of Physical Forces," p. 134. The general tendency of
science is toward a denial of its existence (p. 137). As a question of
metaphysics, the human reason can only find satisfaction in believing in
a spiritual Being, a living Will which "inhabiteth eternity and
immensity," and "filleth all in all" with living and life-giving
fullness, so that "in Him we live and move and have being."--McCosh,
"Intuitions of the Mind," p. 225.]

[Footnote 75: "By empty space I mean _distance_, I mean _direction_:
that steeple is a mile off, and not _here_ where I sit, and it lies
southeast and not north."--Herschel, "Familiar Lectures on Scientific
Subjects," p. 455.]

[Footnote 76: Taylor, "Physical Theory of Another Life," p. 26.]

[Footnote 77: "The idea of space--the idea of extension--is the logical
condition of the admission of the idea of the body."--"History of
Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 217.]

[Footnote 78: "Extension is only another name for space."--"Lectures on
Metaphysics," vol. ii. p. 113.]

[Footnote 79: "Space and extension are convertible terms."--"First
Principles," p. 48.]

[Footnote 80: See "Intuitions," p. 223, where the terms are employed as
synonymous.]

[Footnote 81: "L'immensité ou l'unité de l'espace."--Cousin, "Histoire
de la Philosophie du xviii^me Siècle," p. 121. "Infinity of
extension."--McCosh, "Intuitions," p. 223. "Infinite immensity of
space."--Hamilton, "Discussions," p. 36.]

[Footnote 82: "Lectures," vol. ii. pp. 114, 167.]

[Footnote 83: "Intuitions," p. 202.]

[Footnote 84: "Lectures," vol. ii. p. 169.]

[Footnote 85: "Lectures," vol. ii. p. 170]

[Footnote 86: "Discussions," etc., p. 36.]

[Footnote 87: "Philosophy," p. 357.]

[Footnote 88: "Intuitions," p. 208.]

[Footnote 89: "History of Philosophy," vol. i. p. 77.]

[Footnote 90: "History of Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 224.]

[Footnote 91: "When the succession of ideas ceases, our perception of
duration ceases with it."--Locke, "Essays" (bk. ii. ch. xiv. § 4).]

[Footnote 92: Time and duration are confounded by McCosh ("Intuitions,"
p. 223), by Mahan ("Intellectual Philosophy," p. 22), and by Cousin
("History of Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 229).]

[Footnote 93: "Absolute time is eternity" (Cousin, "History of
Philosophy," vol. i. p. 77). "L'éternité ou l'unité de temps" ("Histoire
de la Philosophie du xviii^{me} Siècle," p. 121). "Eternity is the
synonym of pure time" (_North American Review_, April, 1864, p. 115).]

[Footnote 94: "Mind is nothing but the series of our feelings as they
actually occur, with the addition of infinite possibilities of feeling"
("Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy," vol. i. p. 253).]

[Footnote 95: "Intuitions," p. 206.]

[Footnote 96: "Intuitions," p. 206.]

[Footnote 97: "Intuitions," p. 252.]

[Footnote 98: Hamilton's "Lectures," vol. ii. p. 527.]

[Footnote 99: McCosh, "Intuitions," p. 205; Saisset, "Mod. Pantheism,"
vol. i. p. 193.]

[Footnote 100: Hamilton's "Logic," p. 55.]

[Footnote 101: "Intuitions," p. 211. See also Porter's "Human
Intellect," p. 567.]

[Footnote 102: "Intuitions," p. 211.]

[Footnote 103: Strange as it may sound, Dr. McCosh says, at p. 202, that
"we have an immediate knowledge of space in the concrete by the senses,"
and here he asserts that "space is not a substance," and therefore can
not be perceived.]

[Footnote 104: "Opuscula," p. 752.]

[Footnote 105: "Discussions," p. 36.]

[Footnote 106: "Philosophy of the Infinite," pp. 319, 331.]

[Footnote 107: "Modern Pantheism," vol. i. p. 192.]

[Footnote 108: "Philosophy of the Infinite," p. 300.]

[Footnote 109: "Philosophy of the Infinite," p. 331.]

[Footnote 110: Müller, "Christian Doctrine of Sin," vol. i. p. 243.]

[Footnote 111: "Familiar Lectures," p. 455.]

[Footnote 112: Martineau's "Essays," 1st Series, p. 158.]

[Footnote 113: Martineau's "Essays," 1st Series, p. 161.]

[Footnote 114: "Institutes of Theology," vol. i. pp. 76, 79.]

[Footnote 115: "Natural Theology," p. 23.

The practice so common among writers of Natural Theology of fixing upon
one line of proof of the being of God as the only valid method, and then
disparaging and endeavoring to show the invalidity of all others, is
highly reprehensible. The strongest arguments employed by the Atheists
have been culled from the writings of these eccentric theologians. In
the celebrated public discussion between Mr. Holyoake, the leader of the
Secularists in England, and Mr. Brindley, "On the existence of God," the
most telling arguments of Mr. Holyoake were drawn from the standard
works on Natural Theology. How much more rational and commendable is the
course of the philosopher: "There are different proofs of the existence
of God. The consoling result of my studies is that these different
proofs are more or less strict in form, but they have all a depth of
truth which needs only to be disengaged and put in a clear light in
order to give incontestable authority. Every thing leads to God. There
is no bad way of arriving at Him, but we go to Him by different
paths."--Cousin, "History of Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 418.

The argument for the being of a God in its completeness is at once
Ontological and Cosmological, Etiological and Teleological. It is in the
concurrence and synthesis of these separate but harmonious lines of
proof that we have an unanswerable demonstration. For ourselves, we are
convinced, with Neitzsch, that the Ontological proof is first and last;
they who seek to invalidate this cut the ground from under all the
rest.]

[Footnote 116: Herschel's "Outlines of Astronomy," p. 511.]

[Footnote 117: _North American Review_, October, 1864, p. 428.]

[Footnote 118: "By finite we generally mean that which is within reach,
or may be brought within reach of our senses.... The powers, therefore,
of our senses and mind place the limit to the finite, but those
magnitudes which severally transcend these limits, by reason of their
being too great or too small, we call _infinite_ and
_infinitesimal_."--Price, "Infinitesimal Calculus," vol. i. pp. 12, 13.]

[Footnote 119: Martineau, "Essays," 1st Series, p. 161.]

[Footnote 120: Hamilton, "Metaphysics," vol. ii. p. 539.]

[Footnote 121: Argyll, "Reign of Law," p. 117.]

[Footnote 122: "Essays," 1st Series, p. 206.]

[Footnote 123: "Lectures," vol. ii. p. 406.]

[Footnote 124: "Prolegomena," p. 267-269.]

[Footnote 125: See Locke's "Human Understanding," bk. iv. ch. x., where
a similar line of argument is pursued.]

[Footnote 126: Schellen, "Spectrum Analysis," p. 45.]

[Footnote 127: Sir John Herschel, "Natural Philosophy," § 28.]

[Footnote 128: "On Molecules," Lecture at the British Association at
Bradford, in _Nature_, vol. viii. p. 441.]

[Footnote 129: "God is not merely spirit, but He has upon Himself a
realistic _nature_. God did not create the world out of an absolute
nothing. The something out of which God created it are his eternal
_potentialities_--not merely logical (merely conceived by God), but at
the same time also _physical_ (essentially in God existing)
potentialities. In these δυνάμεις God possesses both the something out
of which He makes the world, and also the forces, instruments, and means
by which He produces it. In this sense it is literally true: _All things
are of God_ (Rom. xi. 33). This admission of a supramaterial physis in
God--this spiritual realism--furnishes not only an escape from the
errors of a lifeless materialism and of an abstract spiritualism, but is
the synthesis of the partial truth that is in both."--_Bibliotheca
Sacra_, January, 1873, p. 191.]

[Footnote 130: Lange's Commentary, "Preliminary Essay," p. 126.]

[Footnote 131: See Whewell's "History of Scientific Ideas," vol. ii. p.
287.]

[Footnote 132: Ch. XXXIV.]

[Footnote 133: Whewell's "History of Inductive Sciences," vol. ii. p.
593.]

[Footnote 134: Spencer, "First Principles," p. 4.]

[Footnote 135: Spencer, "First Principles," p. 43.]

[Footnote 136: "Fragments of Science," p. 12.]

[Footnote 137: Inaugural Address before the British Association of
Science, in _Nature_, vol. iv. p. 269.]

[Footnote 138: "Positive Philosophy," vol. i. p. 206.]

[Footnote 139: "Philosophy of Aristotle," p. 66.]

[Footnote 140: Prof. P. G. Tait, M.A., opening Address at the Edinburgh
Meeting of the British Association of Science, in _Nature_, vol. iv. p.
271. See also Prof. Maxwell's Address at the Liverpool Meeting, in
_Nature_, vol. ii. p. 422.]

[Footnote 141: Miller's "Testimony of the Rocks," p. 221.]

[Footnote 142: Sir William Thomson supposes that temperature to have
been at least 7000° Fahr. See Thomson and Tait's "Natural Philosophy,"
vol. i. p. 716.]

[Footnote 143: "Fragments of Science," p. 158.]

[Footnote 144: Thomson and Tait, "Natural Philosophy," vol. i. p. 714.
Winchell, "Sketches of Creation," p. 407.]

[Footnote 145: Mayer, "Celestial Dynamics: Correlation and Conservation
of Forces," p. 315. The palæobotanist Heer has described many species of
tropical plants from Greenland, Alaska, and Spitzbergen.]

[Footnote 146: Thomson and Tait, "Natural Philosophy," vol. i. p. 714.
Observations on over forty artesian wells in Central Alabama show an
average increase of temperature of 1° for every 47 feet of descent.--Dr.
Winchell, in "Proceedings of American Association," part ii. p. 102.]

[Footnote 147: Thomson and Tait, "Natural Philosophy," vol. i. p. 714.]

[Footnote 148: Pouillet estimates that the heat which reaches the
surface of the earth from its interior at 200 cubic miles per diem. A
cubic mile is the quantity of heat necessary to raise a cubic mile of
water 1° Centigrade in temperature.]

[Footnote 149: Thomson and Tait, "Natural Philosophy," vol. i. p. 716.]

[Footnote 150: Thomson and Tait, "Natural Philosophy," vol. i. p. 721.]

[Footnote 151: See Winchell's "Sketches of Creation," chap. xxxvi.]

[Footnote 152: Proctor, "Other Worlds than Ours," p. 193. "More likely
these have been totally absorbed by the lunar rocks."--Dr. Winchell.]

[Footnote 153: "Correlation and Conservation of forces," p. 245.]

[Footnote 154: _North American Review_, Oct., 1861, pp. 372-3.]

[Footnote 155: Mitchell's "Planetary and Stellar Worlds," p. 143.]

[Footnote 156: Tyndall, "Fragments of Science," p. 135.]

[Footnote 157: Quoted by Mayer, "Celestial Dynamics: Correlation and
Conservation of Forces," p. 271.]

[Footnote 158: "Outlines of Astronomy," p. 308.]

[Footnote 159: Thomson and Tait, "Natural Philosophy," vol. i. p. 191.]

[Footnote 160: Thomson and Tait, "Natural Philosophy," vol. i. p. 191.
Balfour Stewart, "Treatise on Heat," p. 372.]

[Footnote 161: Thomson and Tait, "Natural Philosophy," vol. i. p. 194;
also Helmholtz, in "Correlation and Conservation of Forces," p. 242.]

[Footnote 162: Winchell, "Sketches of Creation," p. 422. If the whole
solar radiation were employed in dissolving a layer of ice inclosing the
sun, it would dissolve a stratum ten miles and a half thick in one day.]

[Footnote 163: Helmholtz, "Correlation and Conservation of Forces," p.
245.]

[Footnote 164: _Energy_ is now defined as "_the power of doing work_,"
that is, the power, in _virtue of its position_ (as a head of water, a
raised mass, a coiled spring) or in _virtue of its motion_ (as a falling
mass, a current of wind, a projectile), to do work. The first is called
_Potential_, the second _Kinetic_ Energy. Besides these instances of
_Visible_ Energy, there is also _Invisible_ Molecular Energy, divided
into, (_a_) the Energy of electricity in motion; (_b_) the Energy of
radiant heat and light; (_c_) the kinetic Energy of absorbed heat; (_d_)
molecular potential Energy; (_e_) potential Energy caused by electrical
separation; (_f_) potential Energy caused by chemical separation. Of
these different _kinds_ of Energy, the most available for work is
Mechanical Energy, or Energy of visible motions and positions; the least
available is universal heat, or radiant Energy.]

[Footnote 165: See article "Energy," in _North British Review_, May,
1864, and Balfour Stewart's "Treatise on Heat," p. 370.]

[Footnote 166: Stewart's "Elements of Physics," p. 357.]

[Footnote 167: "Die Naturkräfte in ihrer Wechselbeziehung," p. 89.]

[Footnote 168: "Correlation of Physical Forces," p. 187.]

[Footnote 169: _American Journal of Science_, July, 1864.]

[Footnote 170: Argyll, "Reign of Law," p. 121.]

[Footnote 171: Sir Isaac Newton entertained a similar opinion. "We may
be able," he said, "to form some rude conception of the _creation of
matter_, if we suppose that God by his power had prevented the entrance
of any thing into a certain portion of pure space which is of its nature
penetrable,... from henceforward this portion of space will be endowed
with _impenetrability_, one of the essential qualities of matter; and as
pure space is absolutely uniform, we have only to suppose that God
communicated the same impenetrability to another portion of space, and
we should obtain in a certain sort the notion of _mobility_, another
quality which is essential to matter."--M. Coste, Note in the 4th
Edition of his "French Translation of Locke's Essay." (M. Coste reports
the above from Newton's lips.)]

[Footnote 172: Prof. Maxwell, in _Nature_, vol. ii. p. 219.]

[Footnote 173: M. Claude Bernard, _Revue des Deux Mondes_, 1867.]

[Footnote 174: "Dissertation on the Study of Natural Philosophy," § 28.]

[Footnote 175: Prof. Clerk Maxwell, F.R.S., "Lecture delivered before
the British Association at Bradford," in _Nature_, vol. viii. p. 441.]

[Footnote 176: Müller, "Christian Doctrine of Sin," vol. i. p. 28.]

[Footnote 177: "Logic," vol. ii. p. 527, 4th edition.]

[Footnote 178: "Mind and Brain," vol. i. pp. 107-8.]

[Footnote 179: "Mind and Brain," vol. i. p. 261.]

[Footnote 180: _Nature_, vol. iv. p. 270.]

[Footnote 181: See Murphy, "Habit and Intelligence," vol. i. p. 121.]

[Footnote 182: Müller, "Christian Doctrine of Sin," vol. ii. p. 146.]

[Footnote 183: That man is the final end of the material creation is a
principle recognized by scientific men. "The aim of the Creator in
forming the earth, in allowing it to undergo the successive changes
which geology has pointed out, and in creating successively all the
different types of animals, was to introduce man upon the earth. Man is
the end toward which all the animal creation has tended from the
appearance of the Palæozoic fishes."--Agassiz and Gould, "Principles of
Zoology," p. 238. See Dr. Winchell's "Sketches of Creation," pp. 373,
374; Owen's "Anatomy of the Vertebrates," vol. iii. pp. 796, 808.]

[Footnote 184: Argyll, "Reign of Law," p. 213.]

[Footnote 185: See Müller's "Christian Doctrine of Sin," vol. i. p.
237.]

[Footnote 186: Argyll, "Reign of Law," p. 219.]

[Footnote 187: G. Warrington, "The Week of Creation," p. 27.]

[Footnote 188: Rorison, "Creative Week," in Replies to "Essays and
Reviews."]

[Footnote 189: Dr. Whedon, in _Methodist Quarterly Review_, July, 1862,
p. 528.]

[Footnote 190: See "Creative Week," by Rorison, in Replies to "Essays
and Reviews."]

[Footnote 191: "The waters of verse 2 is quite another thing than the
water proper of the third creative day: it is the fluid (or gaseous)
form of the earth itself in its first condition."--Lange.]

[Footnote 192: "We must beware of thinking of a mass of elementary
water.... Here is meant the gaseous fluid as it forms a unity with the
air."--Lange, p. 168.]

[Footnote 193: נֶפֶשׁ הַיָּה = soul of life.--Lange.]

[Footnote 194: Whedon.]

[Footnote 195: Hence αἰών, time, or the all of time, is used
to express the all of the finite, the universe. See Heb. i. 2, xi. 3,
where αἰῶνες is equivalent to universe.]

[Footnote 196: See Special Introduction by Prof. T. Lewis, in Lange's
"Commentary."]

[Footnote 197: Lange's "Commentary" on Genesis, Introduction, p. 131.]

[Footnote 198: "In a conversation held some years ago by the author (Sir
J. Herschel) with his lamented friend, Dr. Hawtrey, Head-Master and late
Provost of Eton College, on the subject of Etymology, I happened to
remark that the syllable _Ur_ or _Or_ must have some very remote origin,
having found its way into many languages, conveying the idea of
something absolute, solemn, definite, fundamental, or of unknown
antiquity, as in the German _Ur-alt_ (primeval), _Ur-satz_ (a
fundamental proposition), _Ur-theil_ (a solemn judgment)--in the Latin
_Oriri_ (to arise), _Origo_ (the origin), _Aurora_ (the dawn)--in the
Greek Ὄρος (a boundary, the extreme limit of our vision, whence
our horizon), Ὄρκος (an oath or solemn obligation, etc.). 'You
are right,' was his reply, 'it is the oldest word of all words: the
first word ever recorded to have been pronounced. It is the Hebrew for
_Light_'" (אוֹר, AOR).--"Familiar Lectures on Scientific
Subjects," p. 219.]

[Footnote 199: See "Week of Creation," by Geo. Warrington, p. 13.]

[Footnote 200: The critical reader will discover a slight difference of
opinion between Dr. Winchell and myself in regard to how much of chapter
i. is to be regarded as the "Exordium" of the Hymn of Creation. Dr.
Winchell includes verses 1 and 2; I incline, however, to the opinion
that it is embraced in verse 1. The reasons which weigh with me are the
following: 1. The chaos or the darkness of verse 2 is clearly recognized
as "the _evening_" of the first day, "And God called the light Day, and
the darkness He called Night; and there was evening and morning: one
day." I do not see how on a fair interpretation of the sacred poem we
can escape the conclusion that the _first_ day embraces "the evening and
morning"--that is, the primal darkness of verse 2, and the creation of
dawning light. This conception furthermore harmonizes with the Hebrew
usage, which always regarded the preceding night as part of the one
natural day. The Hebrew Sabbath commenced at six o'clock on Friday
evening. Thus we read in Leviticus xxiii. 32, "From even to even shall
ye celebrate your Sabbath." Hence also the evening--morning = day
(νυχθή-μερον)--of Daniel viii. 14. 2. The division I have made is the
one which has been followed by the best Hebrew scholars, whose opinion
is entitled to the highest deference in this connection. The independent
character of the opening sentence of Genesis was affirmed by such
judicious and learned men as Calvin, Bishop Patrick, and Dr. D.
Jennings. The early fathers of the Church, as St. Gregory of Nazianzen,
St. Justin Martyr, Origen, St. Augustine, and others, held that there
was a considerable interval between the creation related in the first
verse, and that of which an account is given in the third and following
verses. See "The Pre-Adamite Earth," by Dr. Harris, p. 281.]

[Footnote 201: Breman Lectures, M. Fuchs "On Miracles," p. 105.]

[Footnote 202: See _ante_, p. 61.]

[Footnote 203: Lange, _in loco_.]

[Footnote 204: Faraday.]

[Footnote 205: "Three direct acts of the Deity may be recognized, viz.,
the creation of matter, of life, and of mind."--Prof. Hinrich, _American
Journal of Science and Arts_, vol. xxxix. p. 57.]

[Footnote 206: See M. Claude Bernard, _Revue des Deux Mondes_, December
15, 1867; Prof. Norton, _American Journal of Science_, July, 1864;
Cooke, "Religion and Chemistry," p. 330.]

[Footnote 207: _North British Review_, March, 1868, p. 127. This is the
doctrine of the first physicists of the age, of Sir William Thomson (see
_Nature_, vol. i. p. 551; vol. ii. p. 421; and especially vol. iv. pp.
265-6), of Prof. Maxwell (see _Nature_, vol. ii. p. 421), of Prof. Tait
(see _Nature_, vol. iv. p. 271), also of Clausius and Rankine. See also
Prof. Hinrich, "On Planetology," in _American Journal of Science_, vol.
xxxix. p. 283; and Prof. Norton, "On Molecular and Cosmical Physics,"
_American Journal of Science_, vol. xlix. pp. 24, 33.]

[Footnote 208: Cooke's "Religion and Chemistry," p. 129.]

[Footnote 209: _North British Review_, March, 1868, p. 127; also Prof.
Tait, in _Nature_, vol. iv. p. 271.]

[Footnote 210: See Beale, "Protoplasm," pp. 69-71, 88, 108; Carpenter,
"Human Physiology," pp. 46, 865-6.]

[Footnote 211: Beale, "Protoplasm," pp. 67-8.]

[Footnote 212: See Agassiz's "Methods of Study in Natural History," p.
287; also Grindon, "Life, its Nature," etc., pp. 189-190.]

[Footnote 213: Cuvier, "Animal Kingdom," p. 32.]

[Footnote 214: _Methodist Quarterly Review_, January, 1867, p. 143.]

[Footnote 215: Herschel, "Familiar Lectures on Science," p. 218;
"Outlines of Astronomy," § 599; _North British Review_, 1868, p. 127.]

[Footnote 216: Dr. Winchell, "Sketches of Creation," pp. 66, 67.]

[Footnote 217: Dr. Winchell, "Sketches of Creation," p. 374.]

[Footnote 218: Dana, "Geology," pp. 745, 746.]

[Footnote 219: The theory of "Divine superintendence and control" falls
very little, if any thing, short of the ever-present and pervading
energy which we advocate. At least, the arguments which would establish
such a relation of the Deity to the material universe as amounts to
"superintendence and control," would go far to establish the doctrine of
a real presence and agency of God pervading and upholding all nature.
Superintendence and control imply some agency, some efficiency, and some
_intervention_ of righteousness or mercy to secure other ends than those
secured by the established course of nature, for whoever _overrules_
steps on a field beyond his ordinary _rule_. The physical laws are,
therefore, simply God's uniform mode of governing the world. This is the
conclusion which is reached by Proctor ("Other Worlds than Ours"). In
his chapter on "Supervision and Control" (ch. xiii.), he says: "Thus we
are led to the conclusion that all things happen according to set
physical laws; and without, by any means, adopting the view that the
Almighty exercises no special control over his universe, we see strong
reason to believe that the laws which He has assigned to it are
sufficient for the control of all things. Indeed, as far as all things
take place in accordance with laws which the Almighty must assuredly
have Himself ordained, we may say that _every event which has happened
or will happen throughout infinite time is the direct work and indicates
the direct purpose and will of Almighty God_" (pp. 329, 332); and
further, "_He who made the laws may annul or suspend them at his
pleasure_" (p. 333).]

[Footnote 220: St. Augustine's "De Civitate Dei," xii. 25, 26; Neander's
"Church History," vol. ii. p. 605; Nitzsch, "System of Christian
Doctrine," p. 193; Müller's "Christian Doctrine of Sin," vol. i. p. 248;
Harris's " Pre-Adamite Earth," p. 103; Young's "Creator and Creation,"
pp. 57, 58; Chalmers's "Astronomical Discourses," Dis. iii. pp. 91, 98.]

[Footnote 221: "De Civitate Dei," xii. 25; xiii. 26.]

[Footnote 222: Contra Gentiles, ii. 38.]

[Footnote 223: "Summa Universalis," pt. i. q. 105, art. 5.]

[Footnote 224: "Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion," Prop. xiv.
Dugald Stewart, after quoting the above, adds, "My opinion on this
subject coincides with that of Dr. Clarke" ("Philosophy of the Active
and Moral Powers of Man," vol. ii. p. 29).]

[Footnote 225: "Sermons," vol. ii. pp. 178, 179.]

[Footnote 226: Thomson's "Seasons."]

[Footnote 227: Holyoake, "Discussion with Townley," p. 68.]

[Footnote 228: Croonian Lecture, "On Matter and Force," p. 94. Is it not
significant that Dr. Jones must write his "First Cause" without the
initial capitals?]

[Footnote 229: Powell, "Essays and Reviews," p. 139.]

[Footnote 230: Powell, "Christianity and Judaism," p. 11.]

[Footnote 231: Dr. Harris, "Pre-Adamite Earth," p. 104.]

[Footnote 232: Amos i. 2.]

[Footnote 233: Hedge, "Reason and Religion," p. 74.]

[Footnote 234: "Essays and Reviews," p. 102.]

[Footnote 235: McCosh, "Intuitions," p. 276.]

[Footnote 236: "Logic," vol. ii. pp. 117, 118.]

[Footnote 237: Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 102.]

[Footnote 238: Whewell, "Novum Organon Renovatum," p. 7.]

[Footnote 239: "Familiar Lectures on Science," pp. 218, 284, 140.]

[Footnote 240: "Physiological Anatomy," by Todd, Bowman, and Beale, p.
19; Nicholson's "Biology," p. 14.]

[Footnote 241: Jevons, "Principles of Science," vol. ii. pp. 433, 434.]

[Footnote 242: Argyll, "Reign of Law," p. 100.]

[Footnote 243: Laycock, "Mind and Brain," vol. i. p. 225.]

[Footnote 244: Beale, "Protoplasm," pp. 39, 42, 109.]

[Footnote 245: Beale, "Protoplasm," pp. 104, 117; Laycock, "Mind and
Brain," vol. i. pp. 222, 224; Liebig, "Organic Chemistry," p. 69.]

[Footnote 246: Spencer, "First Principles," p. 128.]

[Footnote 247: By _Energy_ we understand "the power of doing work," or
overcoming resistance, which in nature is something perfectly
intelligible and measurable, equivalent in all cases to the product of
the mass into the square of the velocity. By _Force_ we understand "that
which originates motion." All the forms of Energy have therefore their
origin in Force, and Force has its origin in the Will of the Deity.]

[Footnote 248: Quoted from "Positive Philosophy," by Dr. McCosh, "Divine
Government," p. 167.]

[Footnote 249: Science has been defined as the "knowledge of these
_deviations_ from the great laws of nature formularized in contingent or
derivative laws."--Laycock, "Mind and Brain," vol. i. p. 221.]

[Footnote 250: "Fragments of Science," p. 162.]

[Footnote 251: Spencer, "First Principles," p. 128.]

[Footnote 252: Montesquieu, "Spirit of Laws," bk. i. ch. i.]

[Footnote 253: Herschel, "Natural Philosophy," § 27.]

[Footnote 254: "Astronomy and Physics," p. 224.]

[Footnote 255: Thomson and Tait, "Natural Philosophy," vol. i. p. 164;
Mayer, "Correlation and Conservation of Forces," p. 335.]

[Footnote 256: Stewart's "Physics," p. 103.]

[Footnote 257: Stewart's "Physics," pp. 114, 353.]

[Footnote 258: Stewart's "Physics," p. 356.]

[Footnote 259: Murphy, "Habit and Intelligence," vol. i. p. 22.]

[Footnote 260: Professor Charles Brooke, in _Nature_, vol. vi. p. 125.]

[Footnote 261: "Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects," pp. 469-472.]

[Footnote 262: "Natural Philosophy," vol. i. pp. 190, 191.]

[Footnote 263: Ibid. p. 194.]

[Footnote 264: _North British Review_, vol. xl. pp. 182, 183.]

[Footnote 265: Helmholtz, "Correlation and Conservation of Forces," p.
245.]

[Footnote 266: This is the hypothesis of Helmholtz, Mayer, and Thomson.]

[Footnote 267: Tyndall, "Fragments of Science," p. 31; Murphy, "Habit
and Intelligence," vol. i. p. 23.]

[Footnote 268: Murphy, "Habit and Intelligence," vol. i. p. 43.]

[Footnote 269: Professor Norton, "On Molecular Physics;" _American
Journal of Science and Arts_, vol. iii, 3d Series, pp. 329-331.]

[Footnote 270: Tyndall, "Fragments of Science," p. 76.]

[Footnote 271: "Principia," Def. viii. p. 8.]

[Footnote 272: "Does every grain of salt and pepper in a million
salt-cellars and pepper-casters individually and separately pull and
actually move the sun and fixed stars?"--De Morgan.]

[Footnote 273: _North British Review_, vol. xlviii. March, 1868, p.
125.]

[Footnote 274: Third Letter to Bentley.]

[Footnote 275: _Nature_, vol. iii. p. 51; vol. ii. p. 422.]

[Footnote 276: _Nature_, vol. i. p. 551.]

[Footnote 277: Delivered at the Royal Institution, and reported in
_Nature_, vol. vii. Nos. 174, 175.]

[Footnote 278: _North British Review_, vol. xlviii. March, 1868;
"Correlation and Conservation of Forces," p. 368; _Amer. Jour. of
Science and Arts_, vol. xlix. p. 24.]

[Footnote 279: _North British Review_, vol. xlviii. p. 127; _Nature_,
vol. vii. p. 343.]

[Footnote 280: "Familiar Lectures on Science," p. 90.]

[Footnote 281: Picton, "Mystery of Matter," p. 49.]

[Footnote 282: Herschel, "Familiar Lectures on Science," p. 467.]

[Footnote 283: Sir William Thomson, "Papers on Electrostatics and
Magnetism," p. 419.]

[Footnote 284: _North British Review_, vol. xlviii. p. 127.]

[Footnote 285: We do not by any means assert that two substances can not
occupy the same point in space at the same moment in time. We accept the
Hegelian maxim that "two substances may occupy the same point in space
at the same time _provided their qualities are essentially different_."
If the qualities of the ether are essentially different from gross
matter, then to call ether "matter" is to confound and mislead the mind.
May not ether be a "tertium quid" between matter and mind?]

[Footnote 286: Prof. Clerk Maxwell, in _Nature_, vol. ii. p. 421.]

[Footnote 287: Sir William Thomson, in _Nature_, vol. iv. p. 266.]

[Footnote 288: Sir W. Thomson, in _Nature_, vol. i. p. 551.]

[Footnote 289: _Nature_, vol. ii. p. 421.]

[Footnote 290: _Philosophical Magazine_, 1868.]

[Footnote 291: Thomson and Tait, "Natural Philosophy," vol. i. p. 164.]

[Footnote 292: _Nature_, vol. viii. p. 280; also Challis, "Principles of
Mathematics and Physics," pp. 685-687.]

[Footnote 293: _American Journal of Science and Arts_, vol. xlix. pp.
32, 33.]

[Footnote 294: How gravitation may result from the interception of the
Cosmic Force of Repulsion is explained by Prof. Norton at pp. 26-28, and
still more fully in vol. iii. 3d Series, May, 1872, pp. 332, 336.]

[Footnote 295: _American Journal of Science and Arts_, vol. xlix. p.
34.]

[Footnote 296: _American Journal of Science and Arts_, vol. xlix. p.
33.]

[Footnote 297: See vol. i. pp. 217-284.]

[Footnote 298: "Intellectual System of the Universe," vol. i. p. 224.]

[Footnote 299: Ibid. p. 271.]

[Footnote 300: Ibid. p. 244.]

[Footnote 301: Ibid. p. 271.]

[Footnote 302: "Intellectual System of the Universe," vol. i. pp.
223-4.]

[Footnote 303: Todd, Bowman, and Beale, "Physiological Anatomy and
Physiology of Man," p. 25.]

[Footnote 304: "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii. p. 5.]

[Footnote 305: Ibid. p. 8.]

[Footnote 306: Ibid. p. 5.]

[Footnote 307: Ibid. pp. 6, 7.]

[Footnote 308: "On Natural Selection," p. 360.]

[Footnote 309: "Genesis of Species," p. 294.]

[Footnote 310: "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii. p. 5.]

[Footnote 311: "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii. p. 160.]

[Footnote 312: "Scientific Basis of Faith," p. 43.]

[Footnote 313: "Scientific Basis of Faith," p. 14.]

[Footnote 314: "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii. pp. 4, 7.]

[Footnote 315: Ibid. p. 8.]

[Footnote 316: Ibid. vol. i. p. 89.]

[Footnote 317: "Scientific Basis of Faith," pp. 351, 352.]

[Footnote 318: "Scientific Basis of Faith," pp. 46, 47.]

[Footnote 319: Ibid. pp. 51, 52.]

[Footnote 320: "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii. p. 7. "Pantheism
asserts the absolute UNITY and permanence of SUBSTANCE with its two
attributes of _matter_ and _force_(= extension and thought), and their
innumerable modifications which go to form all the phenomena of the
universe."--Dr. Cohn. Under this definition, Mr. Murphy must be ranked a
Pantheist. He knows but of ONE SUBSTANCE underlying all phenomena.]

[Footnote 321: "Scientific Basis of Faith," p. 29.]

[Footnote 322: Ibid. p. 14.]

[Footnote 323: Ibid. p. 36.]

[Footnote 324: Ibid. p. 35.]

[Footnote 325: Ibid. p. 47.]

[Footnote 326: "Intellectual System of the Universe," vol. i. p. 223.]

[Footnote 327: "Scientific Basis of Faith," p. 52.]

[Footnote 328: "Intellectual System," vol. i. p. 224.]

[Footnote 329: "On Natural Selection," p. 372.]

[Footnote 330: Tyndall, "Fragments of Science," p. 104.]

[Footnote 331: "Unity of Worlds," p. 230.]

[Footnote 332: Tyndall.]

[Footnote 333: By the statical properties of matter we understand
extension, limit, position, impenetrability, and _inertia_. We have no
idea that there is a _vis inertiæ_ in matter. Vis inertiæ is a
_forceless force_, which is an absurdity. Inertness in matter is not a
force, but the opposite of a force--a passivity which requires a force
in order to change.]

[Footnote 334: Faraday, "Correlation and Conservation of Forces," p.
368.]

[Footnote 335: Clerk Maxwell, in _Nature_, vol. ii. p. 421; Herschel,
"Familiar Lectures on Science," p. 467.]

[Footnote 336: Professor Norton, in the _American Journal of Science and
Arts_, July, 1864, p. 64; Herschel, "Familiar Lectures on Science," p.
467; Dr. Carpenter, "Human Physiology," p. 542.]

[Footnote 337: _Revue des Deux Mondes_, 1867.]

[Footnote 338: Anaxagoras.]

[Footnote 339: Dr. Carpenter, in _Nature_, vol. vi. p. 312.]

[Footnote 340: Herschel, "Familiar Lectures on Science," p. 467.]

[Footnote 341: For other illustrations, see Cooke's "Religion of
Chemistry," pp. 326-8; Grove, "Correlation and Conservation of Forces,"
pp. 116, 117.]

[Footnote 342: Dr. Cohn, of the University of Breslau, in _Nature_, vol.
vii. p. 137.]

[Footnote 343: Carpenter, "Human Physiology," p. 542; Herschel,
"Outlines of Astronomy," pp. 233, 234; Wallace, "On Natural Selection,"
p. 368; Murphy, "Scientific Basis of Faith," p. 51; Laycock, "Mind and
Brain," vol. i. pp. 225, 258-9, 304.]

[Footnote 344: "First Principles," p. 235.]

[Footnote 345: Letter to the author.]

[Footnote 346: The distinction made by Dr. Carpenter between _molecular_
(bioplasmic) and _somatic_ (individual) life is important: molecular
life is a cosmic force, somatic life is an individualized force; the
former is the direct action of Deity, the second is the indwelling of a
created but yet dependent spiritual entity in a vitalized organism.]

[Footnote 347: "On the Mutual Relation of the Vital and Physical
Forces," _Philosophical Transactions_, 1850, p. 730. See also Laycock,
"Mind and Brain," vol. i. p. 304; Wallace, in _Nature_, vol. vi. p.
285.]

[Footnote 348: Huxley, "Introduction to the Classification of Animals."]

[Footnote 349: _Nature_, vol. iv. p. 269.]

[Footnote 350: "God in Nature," in _Old and New_, 1872, p. 163.]

[Footnote 351: _Methodist Quarterly Review_, July, 1871, p. 499.]

[Footnote 352: "All atomic forces are incessant forces that are made up
of impulses which are renewed every instant."--Professor Norton, in the
_American Journal of Science and Arts_, vol. iii. 3d Series, p. 331.]

[Footnote 353: Sir W. Thomson, in _Nature_, vol. iv. p. 266.]

[Footnote 354: Grove, "Correlation and Conservation of Forces," pp. 15,
18, 199. See also the words of Dr. Mayer in the same volume, p. 341.]

[Footnote 355: Mr. Wallace, the author of the theory of natural
selection, denies its applicability to man. Man is "a being apart," a
"being superior to nature." "He has not only escaped 'natural selection'
himself, but he is actually able to take away some of that power from
nature which, before his appearance, she universally exercised" ("On
Natural Selection," pp. 325, 326). See also Lubbock's "Prehistoric
Times," last chapter.]

[Footnote 356: "Lectures on the History of Rome," vol. ii. p. 59.]

[Footnote 357: Laurent, "Études sur l'Histoire de l'Humanité," vol. v.
p. 14.]

[Footnote 358: Cousin, "History of Philosophy," vol. i. p. 160.]

[Footnote 359: "Nichomachean Ethics," bk. i. ch. ii.]

[Footnote 360: Ibid. bk. i. ch. x.]

[Footnote 361: Ibid. bk. x. ch. viii.]

[Footnote 362: Nitzsch, "System of Christian Doctrine," p. 172.]

[Footnote 363: Müller, "Christian Doctrine of Sin," vol. ii. p. 146.]

[Footnote 364: Acts xvii. 25-28.]

[Footnote 365: Laurent, "Études sur l'Histoire de l'Humanité," vol. v.
p. 12. Not all the Stoics seem to have understood this "necessity" in so
rigorous a sense. Cleanthes would exempt the evil actions of men from
necessity: "Nothing takes place without Thee, O Deity, except that which
bad men do through their own want of reason; but even that which is evil
is overruled by Thee for good, and is made to harmonize with the plan of
the world."--_Hymn to Zeus._]

[Footnote 366: Laurent, "Études sur l'Histoire de l'Humanité," vol. v.
p. 12.]

[Footnote 367: The statement of the text will remain unaffected by any
theory as to the derivation of the material organism of the primitive
man. If the hypothesis be true that "man is the descendant of some
pre-existent generic type, the which, if it were now living, we would
probably call an ape," this can only be affirmed of the body of man, and
the statement is still correct that "God formed man of the dust of the
earth." The body of the ape and the body of man are formed of the same
materials. But, as Prof. Cope, a thorough-going Evolutionist, remarks,
this material nature can not bear or be "the image of God," for "God is
a spirit," and "a spirit hath not flesh and bones" (Luke xxiv. 39). The
image of God must inhere in that spiritual nature which was inbreathed
by God, and consists in reason, conscience, and moral liberty. (See
Cope, "On the Hypothesis of Evolution," pp. 33, 34.) This theory as to
the descent of man's material organism from some pre-existent generic
type does not by any means involve the conclusion of Sir J. Lubbock that
"the primitive condition of mankind was one of _utter barbarism_." We
may grant that the primitive condition of man was one of childhood
ignorance and inexperience, a state in which his intellectual and moral
nature was undeveloped; but this is not "Savagism." Barbarism is the
lapse and deterioration of man. Even if it could be shown that primeval
man was destitute of the industrious arts, "it would not afford the
slightest presumption that he was also ignorant of duty or ignorant of
God" ("Primeval Man," by the Duke of Argyll, p. 132). "Whenever we can
trace back a religion to its first beginnings, we find it free from many
blemishes that affect it in its later stages" (Max Müller, "Chips from a
German Workshop," vol. i., preface). The most ancient form of religion
was the Monotheistic (Grimm, "Deutsche Mythologie," p. xliv. 3d ed.).
See also "Les Origines Indo-Européennes," vol. ii. p. 720, by M. Adolphe
Pictet.]

[Footnote 368: Agassiz and Gould's "Zoology," p. 238.]

[Footnote 369: "On Limbs," p. 88.]

[Footnote 370: "On the Skeleton and Teeth," p. 228.]

[Footnote 371: "Anatomy of the Vertebrates," vol. iii. p. 796.]

[Footnote 372: "The Harmonies of Nature," by Dr. C. Hartwig, pp. 46,
47.]

[Footnote 373: "Typical Forms and Special Ends," R. McCosh and Dr.
Dickie, p. 352.]

[Footnote 374: "History of Philosophy," vol. i. p. 169.]

[Footnote 375: "Geographical Studies," p. 34.]

[Footnote 376: Ritter, "Geographical Studies," p. 314; Guyot, "Earth and
Man," p. 34.]

[Footnote 377: Ritter, "Geographical Studies," p. 34; Guyot, "Earth and
Man," p. 35.]

[Footnote 378: See Guyot, "Earth and Man", pp. 268-270.]

[Footnote 379: Cousin, "History of Philosophy," vol. i. pp. 169-170.]

[Footnote 380: "Adam and the Adamites."]

[Footnote 381: Article "Ararat," in Smith's Dictionary.]

[Footnote 382: It is called in Ptolemy _Naxuana_, and by Moses
Chorenensis, the Armenian historian, _Idsheuan_, but at the place itself
_Nachidsheuan_, which signifies "the first place of descent." See
Whiston's note on p. 87, vol. i. of Josephus.]

[Footnote 383: "Antiquities," bk. i. chap. iii. § 5.]

[Footnote 384: Ibid. bk. i. chap. iii. § 6. Scaliger was the first to
draw the attention of scholars to the writings of Berosus. In his work
"De Emendatione Temporum" he has collected his fragments, and vindicated
their authenticity. Berosus is always quoted with respect by English
divines, and Niebuhr has sustained his claims to be regarded as a
reliable authority. In more than one place he speaks of Armenia as the
resting-place of the ark. See Rawlinson's "Historical Evidences," p. 63,
and note liii.]

[Footnote 385: "Antiquities," bk. i. chap, iii. § 6.]

[Footnote 386: "For instance, in the very second verse, the great
discovery of Schlegel, which the word Indo-European embodies--the
affinity of the principal nations of Europe with the Arian or
Indo-Persic stock--is sufficiently indicated by the conjunction of the
Madai or Medes (whose native name is Mada) with Gomer of the Cymry, and
Javan of the Ionians. Again, one of the most recent and unexpected
results of modern linguistic inquiry is the proof which it has furnished
of an ethnic connection between the Ethiopians or Cushites, who adjoined
on Egypt, and the primitive inhabitants of Babylonia; a connection which
was positively denied by an eminent ethnologist only a few years ago,
but which has now been sufficiently established from the cuneiform
monuments. In the tenth chapter of Genesis (vers. 8-10) we find this
truth thus briefly stated: 'And Cush begat Nimrod,' the 'beginning of
whose kingdom was Babel' (ver. 11). So we have had it recently made
evident from the same monuments that 'out of that land went forth
Asshur, and builded Nineveh'--or that the Semitic Assyrians proceeded
from Babylonia and founded Nineveh long after the Cushite foundation of
Babylon. Again, the Hamitic descent of the early inhabitants of Canaan,
which had often been called in question, has recently come to be looked
upon as almost certain, apart from the evidence of Scripture; and the
double mention of Sheba, both among the sons of Ham, and also among
those of Shem (vers. 7 and 28), has been illustrated by the discovery
that there are two races of Arabs--one (the Joktanian) Semitic, the
other (the Himyaric) Cushite or Ethiopic."--Rawlinson's "Historical
Evidences," pp. 71, 72.]

[Footnote 387: _Asiatic Society's Journal_, vol. xv.]

[Footnote 388: Rawlinson's "Herodotus," vol. i. p. 523.]

[Footnote 389: "Cosmos," vol. i. p. 348.]

[Footnote 390: Article "Botany," _Encyclopædia Britannica_, vol. v.;
also "Geographical Botany;" and Guyot, "Earth and Man," p. 251.]

[Footnote 391: Guyot, "Earth and Man," p. 255.]

[Footnote 392: Guyot, "Earth and Man," pp. 264, 265; Wallace, "On
Natural Selection," pp. 324-6; Martineau, "Essays," 1st Series, p. 126.]

[Footnote 393: Guyot, "Earth and Man," p. 304.]

[Footnote 394: See Article "Philosophy," in Smith's "Dictionary of the
Bible." See also Shairp, "Culture and Religion," pp. 40-46.]

[Footnote 395: "Palestine was from the beginning an isolated land, as
Israel was an isolated people, and therefore for thousands of years both
have been unintelligible to the world at large. No great highway led
through Palestine from people to people; all passed _by_ it, and not
_over_ it; all its coast was without favorable harbors. No one of the
pagan states of antiquity could come into close geographical,
mercantile, political, and religious relations with a people existing
under the sway of Jehovah."--Ritter, "Geographical Studies," p. 43.]

[Footnote 396: Article "Philosophy," in Smith's "Dictionary of the
Bible."]

[Footnote 397: Ritter, "Geographical Studies," pp. 342, 343.]

[Footnote 398: Guyot, "Earth and Man," p. 307.]

[Footnote 399: "The conjugal tie was held sacred, and polygamy
prohibited."--De Pressensé, "Religions before Christ," p. 160.]

[Footnote 400: Merivale, "Conversion of the Roman Empire," p. 92.]

[Footnote 401: "God," said Plato, "is supremely good" ("Republic," book
ii. ch. 18); and "virtue is likeness or assimilation to God"
("Theætetus," § 384).]

[Footnote 402: Milman, "Latin Christianity," vol. i. p. 357.]

[Footnote 403: Guyot, "Earth and Man," p. 322.]

[Footnote 404: Wallace, "On Natural Selection," p. 326.]

[Footnote 405: "First Principles," p. 38.]

[Footnote 406: Ibid. p. 496.]

[Footnote 407: Buchanan, "Modern Atheism," p. 285.]

[Footnote 408: "Scientific Basis of Faith," p. 6.]

[Footnote 409: "First Principles," p. 43.]

[Footnote 410: Without referring to the writings of theologians, we may
take any definition of religion which incidentally occurs in general
literature. For example, Froude defines religion as "the attitude of
reverence in which noble-minded men instinctively place themselves
toward the Unknown Power which made man and his dwelling-place. It is
the natural accompaniment of their lives, the sanctification of their
actions and their acquirements. It is what gives to man in the midst of
the rest of Creation his special elevation and dignity" ("History of
England," vol. xii. p. 560).]

[Footnote 411: "Essays," 1st Series, p. 178.]

[Footnote 412: Preface to the seventh edition of the Address before the
British Association of Science at Belfast.]

[Footnote 413: Preface to the seventh edition of the Address before the
British Association of Science at Belfast.]

[Footnote 414: Dr. Tyndall subsequently defends his course by saying,
"The kingdom of science cometh not by observation and experiment alone,
but is completed by fixing the roots of observation and experiment in _a
region inaccessible to both_, and in dealing with which we are forced to
fall back upon the picturing power of the
mind"--"_Einbildungskraft_"--the force of imagination (Preface to
seventh edition). Are we then to believe that the imagination is the
source of scientific principles, that it has any "power of intuition, or
can in any way create its own objects?" Why does he not fall back on his
"_Anschauungsgabe_," or faculty of rational intuition, and admit that he
is in the region of the metaphysical? See "Fragments of Science," p.
130.]

[Footnote 415: "Πρὸς Κολώτην," xxxi.]

[Footnote 416: This is admitted even by those who regard prayer for
physical change, as, for example, the averting of disease or the fall of
rain, to be "irrational and unconsciously irreverent." "I repeat that no
theory of the universe, no philosophy of human nature, and no conclusion
of science can ever lay an arrest upon the instincts of the universal
heart in the presence of calamity, and with the prospect of its
increase. Let men philosophize as they will, and let science march where
it will (conquering realm after realm, and reducing all under the rigor
of law), the human spirit will always 'cry unto God' in times of crisis,
and will find immeasurable solace in 'committing its causes' unto Him;
for the instinct to pray for relief in times of anxiety or of peril is
one which can never be exorcised from the heart of man. But it does not
follow that it will always (or that it ought ever) to imagine that by so
doing it can deflect the order of nature or induce God to alter his
prearrangements. The relief obtained is in the act of _submission_ and
of filial trust, not in the notion of being able to persuade an
infinitely powerful and sympathetic Listener" ("Prayer: 'The Two
Spheres:' They _are_ Two," by the Rev. William Knight, _Contemporary
Review_, December, 1873, p. 35). Of course we have no reason to expect
that Dr. Tyndall should yield his judgment to the authority of
Scripture, but we may legitimately expect the Rev. William Knight, of
the Free Church of Scotland, to defer in some measure to James v.
13-18.]

[Footnote 417: Preface to the seventh edition of Dr. Tyndall's
"Address."]

[Footnote 418: "Scientific Basis of Faith," p. 39.]

[Footnote 419: "When ten men are so in earnest on one side that they
will sooner be killed than give way, and twenty are earnest enough on
the other to cast their votes for it but will not risk their skins, the
ten will give the law to the twenty in virtue of the robuster faith, and
of the strength that goes along with it."--Froude, "History of England,"
vol. xii. p. 562.]

[Footnote 420: "Fragments of Science," p. 350.]

[Footnote 421: "Only in the domain of Freedom can there exist the
moral."--Martensen, "Christian Ethics," p. 1.]

[Footnote 422: "Fragments of Science," p. 39.]

[Footnote 423: "Questions such as these derive their present interest in
great part from their _audacity_."--Tyndall.]

[Footnote 424: See "Fragments of Science," pp. 38 and 64-65.]

[Footnote 425: _Contemporary Review_, December, 1873, p. 30.]

[Footnote 426: Tyndall, "Fragments of Science," p. 160.]

[Footnote 427: Preface to the Address before the British Association of
Science at Belfast.]

[Footnote 428: Preface to the seventh edition.]

[Footnote 429: _Contemporary Review._]

[Footnote 430: Mansel, "Prolegomena Logica," p. 280.]

[Footnote 431: "History of Civilization."]

[Footnote 432: Comte, "Positive Philosophy," vol. i. p. 45.]

[Footnote 433: "No record of _coincidences_ can prove a causal
connection, or even suggest it--unless the instances are exceptionally
numerous, and unless other causes leading to the result are excluded by
the rigid methods of verification."--"Prayer: 'The Two Spheres:' They
_are_ Two,"_Contemporary Review_, Dec., 1873, p. 39.]

[Footnote 434: See pp. 386-7.]

[Footnote 435: Dr. Tuke, "Influence of the Mind on the Body in Health
and Disease," p. 351.]

[Footnote 436: "Fragments of Science," pp. 36-39.]

[Footnote 437: "Fragments of Science," p. 40: "The _assumed_ permanence
of natural laws."]

[Footnote 438: Ibid., p. 60.]

[Footnote 439: "Fragments of Science," p. 64.]

[Footnote 440: Jevons, "Principles of Science," vol. ii. p. 434.]

[Footnote 441: "Fragments of Science," p. 64.]

[Footnote 442: Ibid. p. 38.]

[Footnote 443: "On the Relation of God to the World," pp. 187-201.]

[Footnote 444: See Coleridge, "Works," vol. i. pp. 152, 263; Hamilton,
"Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 40.]

[Footnote 445: Fleming, "Vocabulary of Philosophy," _in loco_.]

[Footnote 446: See Jevons, "Principles of Science," vol. ii. p. 440;
Spencer, "First Principles," p. 128.]

[Footnote 447: Carpenter, "Mental Physiology," p. 692; see Lewes,
"Problems of Life and Mind," vol. i. p. 336.]

[Footnote 448: Essential properties "are those which admit neither of
intension nor remission of degrees."--Newton, _Regula Tertia
Philosophandi_, "Principia," lib. iii]

[Footnote 449: Maxwell, "Theory of Heat," p. 310; and also in _Nature_,
vol. ii. p. 421.]

[Footnote 450: By "causes" is here meant nothing more than all the
antecedent conditions. The statement makes no real distinction between
"causes" and "conditions." "We can not predicate of any physical agency
that it is abstractedly the cause of another." "_Causation is the will
of God._"--Grove, "Correlation and Conservation of Forces," pp. 15,
199.]

[Footnote 451: See Murphy, "Habit and Intelligence," vol. ii. p. 157;
"Scientific Basis of Faith," pp. 75, 76; J. S. Mill, "Logic," vol. ii.
ch. xxii. § 1.]

[Footnote 452: "Logic," bk. iii. ch. xvi. See also McCosh, "Intuitions,"
pp. 275-7.]

[Footnote 453: "Scientific Basis of Faith," p. 79.]

[Footnote 454: "Principles of Science," vol. ii. p. 465.]

[Footnote 455: Murphy, "Scientific Basis of Faith," pp. 80 and 49-51;
Jevons, "Principles of Science," vol. ii. p. 438.]

[Footnote 456: Grove, "Correlation and Conservation of Forces," p. 193.]

[Footnote 457: "First Principles," chs. xiii. and xiv.]

[Footnote 458: Wallace, "On Natural Selection," p. 266.]

[Footnote 459: "Positive Philosophy," vol. i. p. 153-156.]

[Footnote 460: "Fragments of Science," p. 64.]

[Footnote 461: Jevons, "Principles of Science," vol. ii. p. 434.]

[Footnote 462: Grove, "Correlation and Conservation of Forces," p. 24.]

[Footnote 463: "There is one wonderful condition of matter, perhaps its
only true indication, namely, inertia."--Faraday, "Correlation and
Conservation of Forces," p. 368; Maxwell, "Theory of Heat," p. 86.]

[Footnote 464: Stewart, "Physics," p. 357.]

[Footnote 465: Ibid. p. 355.]

[Footnote 466: "Correlation and Conservation of Forces," p. 195.]

[Footnote 467: "Fragments of Science," p. 39.]

[Footnote 468: "Fragments of Science," p. 420.]

[Footnote 469: _Nature_, vol. viii. p. 280.]

[Footnote 470: _Nature_, vol. vi. p. 125.]

[Footnote 471: "Familiar Lectures on Science," p. 469.]

[Footnote 472: "Principles of Science," vol. ii. p. 83.]

[Footnote 473: Maxwell, "Theory of Heat," p. 92.]

[Footnote 474: Challis's "Mathematical Principles of Physics," p. 107;
Herschel, "Familiar Lectures on Science," p. 467.]

[Footnote 475: "It is pretty much the same to the greater number even of
the instructed hearers whether a man of science say 'I know' or 'I
suppose;' they only ask after the result and the authority by which it
is supported, not the grounds of the _doubts_. It is thus not to be
wondered at if earnest investigators _do not willingly shock the
confidence of their readers in what the former may think true and
demonstrable by the enumeration of ideas of the correctness of which
they do not feel themselves quite secure_."--Helmholtz, "On John
Tyndall," in _Nature_, vol. x. p. 301.]

[Footnote 476: Jevons, "Principles of Science," vol. ii, p. 466.]

[Footnote 477: "Fragments of Science," p. 40.]

[Footnote 478: Ibid. p. 40.]

[Footnote 479: Marsh, "Man and Nature," chs. i. and iii.; Lyell,
"Principles of Geology," pp. 713-717.]

[Footnote 480: Wallace, "On Natural Selection," pp. 324-326; Lyell,
"Principles of Geology," pp. 681-688, 579-590.]

[Footnote 481: "Fragments of Science," p. 421.]

[Footnote 482: _Contemporary Review_, July, 1872.]

[Footnote 483: Grove, "Correlation and Conservation of Forces," p. 20.]

[Footnote 484: Ibid.]

[Footnote 485: Spencer, "First Principles," pp. 235, 252.]

[Footnote 486: Challis, "Mathematical Principles of Physics," p. 681.]

[Footnote 487: Herschel, "Familiar Lectures on Science," p. 461.]

[Footnote 488: Carpenter, "Mental Physiology," p. 703.]

[Footnote 489: Whewell, "Astronomy and Physics," p. 224.]

[Footnote 490: 1 Cor. xii. 6.]

[Footnote 491: "ἄραγε ψηλαφήσειαν αὐτόν" = truly feel or
touch Him.]

[Footnote 492: See Ritter, "History of Philosophy," vol. i. p. 200.]

[Footnote 493: "Memorabilia," bk. i. ch. iv.]

[Footnote 494: "Timæus," ch. viii.; also "Second Alcibiades," which is a
discourse on prayer.]

[Footnote 495: "Laws," bk. v. ch. i.; bk. x. ch. xii.; "Theæstetes," §
83.]

[Footnote 496: "Apology," § 19.]

[Footnote 497: "Philebus," § 84.]

[Footnote 498: 1 Cor. viii. 6.]

[Footnote 499: Eph. iv. 6.]

[Footnote 500: 1 Cor. xii. 6.]

[Footnote 501: "Without God there is no great man. It is He who inspires
us with great ideas and exalted designs. When you see a man superior to
his passions, happy in adversity, calm amid surrounding storms, can you
forbear to confess that these qualities are too exalted to have their
origin in the little individual whom they ornament? A god inhabits every
virtuous man, and without God there is no virtue."--Seneca, "Epistles,"
41, 73.]

[Footnote 502: See "Creator and the Creation," by Dr. Young, pp. 57,
58.]

[Footnote 503: See Müller, "Christian Doctrine of Sin," vol. i. pp. 248,
249.]

[Footnote 504: Some theologians affirm that this "image of God" was
utterly and totally lost in the fall. Such an unqualified statement does
not, however, seem warranted by Scripture. After the fall, the sanctity
of human life is still grounded upon the fact that man is "made in the
_image_ of God" (Gen. ix. 6), and Paul affirms of man, as man, that he
is "the _image_ and glory of God" (1 Cor. xi. 7).]

[Footnote 505: "History of Philosophy," vol. i. p. 115.]

[Footnote 506: See Psa. viii. 6; 1 Cor. xi. 7; Col. iii. 10; Eph. iv.
24.]

[Footnote 507: See Dr. Young's "Christ of History," pp. 136-138.]

[Footnote 508: Butler's "Analogy," pt. i. ch. iii.]

[Footnote 509: "Reign of Law," by the Duke of Argyll, p. 121.]

[Footnote 510: _Nature_, vol. vi. p. 312.]

[Footnote 511: Coleridge's Works, vol. i. p. 152.]

[Footnote 512: Cousin, "True, Beautiful, and Good," pp. 287-289.]

[Footnote 513: Sewell's "Christian Morals," p. 339.]

[Footnote 514: R. W. Hamilton.]

[Footnote 515: Dr. Thomas Brown.]

[Footnote 516: R. W. Hamilton.]

[Footnote 517: Sophocles, "Antigone," v. 450-460.]

[Footnote 518: Quoted by Dr. Brown from "Lucani Pharsalia," bk. ix.]

[Footnote 519: "Fiji and the Fijians," by Williams and Calvert, p. 22.]

[Footnote 520: "Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa," p.
153.]

[Footnote 521: Chalmers's "Institutes of Theology," vol. ii. p. 294.]

[Footnote 522: "The Creator and the Creation," by John Young. LL.D., pp.
101-2. See also "Man Primeval," by Dr. Harris, p. 109; Hamilton's
"Revealed Doctrine of Rewards and Punishments," p. 67.]

[Footnote 523: "True, Beautiful, and Good," p. 286.]

[Footnote 524: "Hand-book of Moral Philosophy," p. 184. See also
Cairns's "Treatise on Moral Freedom," p. 222; and Hazard on "Causation
and Freedom in Willing," p. 7; Dr. Alexander, "Outlines of Moral
Science," p. 125: Sir John Herschel's "Familiar Lectures on Science," p.
461; Carpenter's "Human Physiology," p. 543; Wallace, "On Natural
Selection," p. 367; Beale's "Protoplasm," p. 121.]

[Footnote 525: "Prolegomena Logica," p. 122.]

[Footnote 526: "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 373; also Porter's
"Human Intellect," p. 95.]

[Footnote 527: Quoted by Hamilton in "Notes on Reid," p. 616.]

[Footnote 528: "Discussions," p. 587.]

[Footnote 529: "The feeling of responsibility is unmeaning unless it
presupposes the reality of freedom."--Murphy, "Scientific Basis of
Faith," p. 85.]

[Footnote 530: "The miraculous interpositions recorded in the Scriptures
are not inconsistent with this fundamental axiom, for they are effects
of the will of God as the _cause_."--McCosh, "Divine Government," p.
113.]

[Footnote 531: "Divine Government," p. 541.]

[Footnote 532: See McCosh's "Divine Government," p. 113, and Mill's
"Logic," p. 114, vol. ii., English edition.]

[Footnote 533: Whedon, "Freedom of the Will," p. 87.]

[Footnote 534: Whedon, "Freedom of the Will," p. 92. "Every intelligent
effort is an exercise of _originating creative power_ which makes the
future different from what it would have been but for the exercise of
this power."--Hazard, "On Causation," p. 87.]

[Footnote 535: "Philosophy," p. 511.]

[Footnote 536: "Philosophy," p. 508.]

[Footnote 537: "Prolegomena Logica," App., note C.]

[Footnote 538: Whedon, "Freedom of the Will," p. 32.]

[Footnote 539: Ibid., p. 56.]

[Footnote 540: See Calderwood's "Hand-book of Moral Philosophy," pp.
196, 197.]

[Footnote 541: Müller's "Christian Doctrine of Sin," vol. ii. p. 56.]

[Footnote 542: Whedon, "Freedom of the Will," p. 130.]

[Footnote 543: Whedon, "Freedom of the Will," p. 135.]

[Footnote 544: Ibid., p. 193.]

[Footnote 545: Whedon, "Freedom of the Will," p. 158.]

[Footnote 546: "Intuition," etc., p. 472.]

[Footnote 547: Whedon, "Freedom of the Will," p. 171.]

[Footnote 548: Whedon, "Freedom of the Will," p. 173.]

[Footnote 549: "So long as there are fluctuations at all, even though
they be of infinitesimal magnitude as compared with the total,
statistical regularity does not exclude all room for freedom."--Murphy,
"Scientific Basis of Faith," p. 84.]

[Footnote 550: "Prolegomena Logica," p. 280.]

[Footnote 551: On self-limitation of the Divine will, see Müller,
"Christian Doctrine of Sin," vol. ii. pp. 208-212.]

[Footnote 552: This is unquestionably the doctrine of Scripture, "Whom
He _foreknew_, them also He did predestinate."]

[Footnote 553: Bushnell, "Nature and the Supernatural," p. 50.]

[Footnote 554: Whedon, "Freedom of the Will," p. 273; Müller, "Christian
Doctrine of Sin," vol. ii. pp. 236-247.]

[Footnote 555: Whedon, "Freedom of the Will," p. 283.]

[Footnote 556: Bushnell, "Nature and the Supernatural," p. 83.]

[Footnote 557: Ibid., p. 99.]

[Footnote 558: Luke xii. 47, 48.]

[Footnote 559: Matt. xi. 21-24.]

[Footnote 560: Whedon, "Freedom of the Will," pp. 355-357.]

[Footnote 561: Hamilton, "Revealed Doctrine of Rewards and Punishments,"
p. 88.]

[Footnote 562: "The formation of noble human characters is the highest
work that man, or, so far as we know, that God can be engaged
in."--Murphy, "Scientific Basis of Faith," p. 39.]


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