.. -*- encoding: utf-8 -*-

.. meta::
   :PG.Id: 46192
   :PG.Title: The Pan-German Programme
   :PG.Released: 2014-07-04
   :PG.Rights: Public Domain
   :PG.Producer: Al Haines
   :DC.Creator: Various
   :MARCREL.trl: Edwyn Bevan
   :DC.Title: The Pan-German Programme
              The Petition of the Six Associations and the Manifesto of the Intellectuals
   :DC.Language: en
   :DC.Created: 1918
   :coverpage: images/img-cover.jpg

========================
THE PAN-GERMAN PROGRAMME
========================

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      THE
      PAN-GERMAN
      PROGRAMME

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      THE
      PETITION OF THE SIX ASSOCIATIONS
      AND THE
      MANIFESTO OF THE INTELLECTUALS

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      *Translated from the German*

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      With an Introduction by

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      EDWYN BEVAN

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      LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.
      RUSKIN HOUSE 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C. 1
      1918 

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   THE
   PAN-GERMAN PROGRAMME.

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   INTRODUCTORY.

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The two documents presented in this pamphlet
are the fullest statement of the programme of
the Pan-German party in Germany.  They were both
drawn up in the earlier months of 1915.  After the
series of rapid German successes in the West, with
which the war opened, had seemed to come to a
check, and month after month went by without the
expected advance on Paris being resumed, it was
felt to be necessary that the German people should
get some more precise idea of what it was fighting
for, what it had to obtain before it could consider that
the war had attained its end.

In March, 1915, the rumour got about that the
German Government was contemplating a peace of
compromise, and Pan-German circles took alarm.
Pan-Germanism was not strong in the working class
and many of the Radical Intellectuals disapproved
of it.  But it was very strong among the country
landowners, *i.e.* the class called *Junkers*, and the rich
manufacturers, especially the great ironmasters of
the Rhenish-Westphalian country, who wanted to
get hold of the French iron-districts of Briey and
Longwy.  These interests were organised in a
number of powerful Associations.

If there was danger of the Government under
Bethmann Hollweg's direction weakening, it appeared
necessary that pressure should be brought to bear
upon it in time.  Five Associations in March drew
up a Memorandum to be presented privately to the
Chancellor.  They were afterwards joined by a sixth,
and the Memorandum in its final form was laid before
the Chancellor on May 20, 1915.  This is the first of
the two documents here translated.

The second is the so-called "Manifesto of the
Intellectuals."  It was read on June 20, 1915, to a
great gathering of professors, diplomats, and high
Government officials in the Artists' Hall (*Künstlerhaus*)
in Berlin.  It was not published, but circulated
as a "strictly confidential manuscript," and was
submitted to the Chancellor on July 8.  When 1341
signatures had been appended to it the Government
stepped in and forbade further canvassing.  It is
therefore claimed that the 1341 do not represent the
amount of the support which the manifesto would
have got in the country had it been allowed free course.

The Intellectuals' Manifesto has a more extensive
programme than that of the Six Associations.  It
includes, not only the demands of the Associations,
but the scheme commonly designated by the term
*Mittel-Europa*, with its appendix, the control of
the Turkish Empire by Germany, implying a great
belt of German power across the world from the
North Sea to the Persian Gulf—about which the Six
Associations said nothing.  Again, whereas the
Six Associations say only in general terms that they
demand the possession of "a colonial empire adequate
to satisfy Germany's manifold economic interests,"
the Intellectuals state more specifically that this
means an empire in Central Africa, and more—endorsing,
therefore, the scheme labelled *Mittel-Afrika*.

These two documents will always be two of the
most important documents of the Great War for
students of history.  Although they were not published
in Germany till long after they had begun to circulate
privately, their contents became rapidly known and
they became main objects of attack for Radical and
Socialist circles.  Much has happened since they
were drawn up.  It has become clear to a much
larger number of people in Germany that such
schemes are unrealisable.

In July, 1917, the majority of the Reichstag
passed a resolution in favour of a peace on the basis
of the *status quo ante*.  But we should guard against
the error of supposing that, because the largest body
of opinion in the country last summer was against
annexations, all danger from German ambitions has
passed away.  We must take into account two things:

(1) The Pan-German opinion, even if that of a
minority, is that of a very strong and desperately
energetic minority.  It has recently taken body
in the *Vaterlandspartei*, which may be rendered
"National Party."  It carries on a vigorous
propaganda backed by vast funds, and has on its side
many men of influence upon the Government.  It
shows what the majority of the Germans would
desire, if weakness on our side gave them any hope
of getting it.  And hopes seem to have risen again
since the collapse of Russia and the repulse of Italy.
The Reichstag majority which passed the "peace
resolution" last July seems no longer solid.  It is
highly improbable that the majority of the Reichstag
would now demand a peace "without annexations."

(2) Even those who oppose the Pan-Germans and
stand for a "peace without annexations" cherish the
design of laying a foundation for German power
within the sphere of Germany and its allies, upon
which *later on* a more ambitious structure of power
could be reared.  The trouble with "these gentlemen
of the *Vaterlandspartei*," one Socialist writer
explained, was not that they asked for too much but
that they asked for it all at once.  If Germany could
strengthen its grip upon Central Europe, Bulgaria,
and the restored Turkish Empire, one of the great
schemes contained in the Intellectuals' Manifesto
could be realised *without annexations*.  It may be
that when the German Government ultimately state
their minimum requirements they will seem modest,
compared with the Pan-German programme.  Even
so they will require careful scrutiny lest there should
be more in them of the Pan-German spirit than
appears on the outside, more than is compatible with
the safety of the world.

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EDWYN BEVAN,
   *January*, 1918.





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.. _`THE PETITION OF THE SIX ASSOCIATIONS`:

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   \I.

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   THE PETITION OF THE SIX ASSOCIATIONS.

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The following is the full text of the Petitions addressed
to the German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg,
and to the Governments of the various Federated States
of the German Empire, on March 10 and May 20, 1915,
by the League of Agriculturists (*Bund der Landwirte*),
the German Peasants' League (*Deutscher Bauernbund*),
the Christian German Peasants' Unions (*die christlichen
deutschen Bauernvereine*), the Central Association of
German Manufacturers (*Centralverband deutscher
Industrieller*), the Manufacturers' League (*Bund der
Industriellen*) and the League of Middle-Class Citizens in
the German Empire (*Reichsdeutscher Mittelstandsverband*):—

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Together with the whole German people, those occupied
in business pursuits, whether in agriculture or manufacture,
in handicrafts or trade, are determined to endure to the
end, notwithstanding every sacrifice, in this struggle for
life and death which has been forced upon Germany, in
order that Germany may emerge stronger in its external
relations, assured of a lasting peace, and thus also assured
of further national, economic, and cultural development
at home.

Since the whole German people recognises these aims
as its own, and has given tangible proof of its willingness
to make sacrifices for their achievement, the rumours
recently circulating in town and country were bound to be
most disquieting.  These rumours (confirmed, apparently,
by certain announcements in the Press) were to the effect
that preliminary steps were being taken to prepare the way
for peace negotiations, and, in particular, for a separate peace
with England, based on certain English wishes and demands.

Hence universal satisfaction has been caused by the
declaration of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, that
no competent judge would dream of sacrificing Germany's
favourable military position in order to conclude a premature
peace with any one of her enemies.

Even if the military situation were more unfavourable, or
more doubtful, this ought to make no difference to our
determination—unless, indeed, we are to lose sight of the
aims in home and foreign policy which His Majesty the
Emperor has himself proclaimed.  These aims can only be
attained by achieving a peace which will bring us better
security for our frontiers in East and West, an extension of
the foundations of our sea power, and the possibility of
an unchecked and strong development of our economic
resources; in short, those extensions of power, alike in
politics, in the army, in the navy, and in our economic
life, which will guarantee to us a stronger position in
the world.

Any peace which does not bring us these results
will make a speedy renewal of the struggle inevitable
under circumstances essentially less favourable to Germany.
Therefore no premature peace!  For from a premature
peace we could not hope for a sufficient prize of victory.

But also no half-hearted peace, no peace which does not
include complete political exploitation of those ultimate
military successes which we expect to obtain!

For it must be realised that, not only the security of our
future international position, but also our power to utilise
the present self-sacrificing spirit of the German people for
the settlement of those questions of domestic policy, which
will arise on the return of peace, both equally presuppose
the complete exploitation of our military position so as to
increase Germany's power abroad.  Assuredly our people
would understand any concessions which were wrung from
them by a military situation so desperate as to oppose
insuperable obstacles to any resistance, however determined
and however self-sacrificing; but they would not tolerate
any weak concessions at the conclusion of peace which
were not justified and necessitated by the military situation.
Concessions of this kind would be fraught with the most
fatal consequences for the domestic peace of our Fatherland,
since they might lead to the same result as a premature
withdrawal from the conflict, and our soldiers would
discover, on returning home, that the only reward for their
splendid endurance was a crushing burden of taxation.
Hundreds of thousands have given their lives: the prize of
victory must correspond to the sacrifice.

*The following Memorandum was drawn up on March* 10
*of this year* and addressed to your Excellency by the
League of Agriculturists, the German Peasants' League,
the Central Association of German Manufacturers, the
Manufacturers' League, and the League of Middle-Class
Citizens in the German Empire.  The Memorandum, to
which the Christian German Peasants' Unions, who are also
signatories to the present Petition, have given their adhesion,
explains in detail the requirements which—the necessary
military successes being assumed—must in the opinion of
the undersigned Associations be fulfilled, in order to secure
for Germany that political, military, and economic position
which would enable her to look forward with confidence to
all possibilities of the future.

The Memorandum was as follows:

   
   The undersigned Corporations have carefully
   considered what measures are required to give practical
   effect to the formula, which has so often been heard
   during the last few months, viz., that this war must be
   followed by an honourable peace, corresponding to the
   sacrifices which have been made and containing in
   itself a guarantee for its continuance.
   
   In answering this question, it must never be
   forgotten that our enemies continue to announce that
   Germany is to be annihilated and struck out of the rank
   of the Great Powers.  Against such aims treaties will
   afford us no protection; for treaties, when the fitting
   moment comes, would once more be trodden under
   foot.  We can only look for safety in a serious
   economic and military weakening of our enemies,
   sufficient to ensure peace for as long a time as can
   be foreseen.
   
   We must demand a colonial Empire adequate to
   satisfy Germany's manifold economic interests, we
   must safeguard our future policy in matters of customs
   and commerce, and we must secure a war indemnity to
   be paid in a form suitable to our requirements: but
   our chief end in the struggle which has been forced
   upon us is, in our opinion, to strengthen and
   improve the foundations on which Germany's position
   in Europe rests, in the following directions:
   
   In order to provide the necessary security for our
   influence at sea and in order to secure our future
   military and economic position as against England,
   *Belgium*, owing to the close connexion of Belgian
   territory (which is economically of such importance)
   with our main manufacturing districts, must be
   subjected to German Imperial legislation, both in
   military and tariff matters, and also in regard
   to currency, banking, and postal arrangements.
   Railways and canals must be incorporated in our
   transport system.  In general, the government and
   administration of the country must be so managed
   that *the inhabitants obtain no influence on the political
   fortunes of the German Empire*; there must be
   separation of the Walloon and of the predominantly
   Flemish territory, and *all economic and industrial
   undertakings and real estate, which are so vital for
   the government of the country, must be transferred into
   German hands*.
   
   We must consider the question of *French* territory
   from the same point of view, *i.e.* so far as it
   affects our position towards England.  Hence we
   must regard it as a matter of vital importance,
   in the interests of our future influence at sea,
   that *we should hold the French coastal districts from
   the Belgian frontier approximately as far as the Somme*.
   and thus secure access to the Atlantic Ocean.
   *The Hinterland, which must be acquired with them*,
   must be so delimited as to secure to us the complete
   economic and strategic exploitation of those Channel-ports
   which we gain.  Any further acquisitions of
   French territory, apart from the necessary annexation
   of the iron-ore district of Briey, must be determined
   solely by military and strategic considerations.  After
   the experiences of this war, it may be regarded as
   self-evident that we cannot in the future leave our frontiers
   at the mercy of hostile invasion by allowing our
   opponents to retain those fortified positions which
   threaten us, in particular Verdun and Belfort and the
   Western slopes of the Vosges which lie between them.
   *The acquisition of the line of the Meuse and the
   French Channel-coast would carry with it the possession,
   not only of the iron-ore district of Briey mentioned
   above, but also of the coal-country in the department of
   the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais*.  These annexations
   also—as is self-evident, after our experiences in
   Alsace-Lorraine—must be so arranged that the population of
   the annexed districts shall be precluded from exercising
   political influence on the fortunes of the German
   Empire; and all the economic resources of these
   districts, including both large and medium-sized
   estates, must be transferred to German hands on such
   terms that France shall compensate and take over their
   owners.
   
   *As to the East*, the determining consideration must
   be that the great addition to our manufacturing
   resources, which we anticipate in the West, must be
   counterbalanced by an equivalent annexation of
   agricultural territory in the East.  The present economic
   structure of Germany has shown itself so fortunate
   in this war, that it is hardly too much to say
   that every German is convinced of the necessity for
   maintaining it for as long a time as we can foresee.
   
   The necessity of strengthening the sound agricultural
   basis of our economic system, of making possible a
   German agricultural colonisation on a large scale, of
   restoring the German peasants who are living abroad—especially
   those settled in Russia and at present deprived
   of their rights—to the territory of the Empire, so that
   they may take part in the economic life of Germany,
   and, lastly, the necessity of greatly increasing the
   numbers of our population capable of bearing arms,
   implies *a considerable extension of the Imperial and
   Prussian frontiers in the East by annexation of at least
   parts of the Baltic Provinces and of those territories
   which lie to the south of them, whilst at the same time
   we must keep in mind, the object of making our Eastern
   German frontier capable of military defence*.
   
   The restoration of East Prussia requires a better
   safeguarding of its frontiers by placing in front of them other
   districts, nor must West Prussia, Posen and Silesia
   remain frontier marches exposed to danger as they now
   are.
   
   With regard to the granting of political rights to the
   inhabitants of the new districts and the safeguarding
   of German economic influence, what has already been
   said about France applies here too.  The war indemnity
   to be paid by Russia will have to consist to a large
   extent in the cession of land.
   
   Of course these demands depend on the hypothesis
   that military results will enable them to be carried out.
   But in view of what we have already achieved, we
   confidently rely on our army and its leaders to gain a
   victory which will guarantee the attainment of these
   ends.  We must pursue these ends, not from a
   policy of conquest, but because it is only by attaining
   them that we can secure that lasting peace which all
   classes of the German people expect in return for their
   sacrifices.  Moreover, in our opinion, a voluntary
   surrender of hostile territories, in which so much German
   blood has been spilt and so many of our best and
   noblest have found a grave, would do violence to the
   sentiments of our people and to their conception of an
   honourable peace.
   
   In the future as in the past, the want of harbours
   directly on the Channel would strangle our activity
   beyond the seas.  An independent Belgium would continue
   to be a *tête de pont* to England, a point from which to
   attack us.  If the natural line of fortifications of France
   were left in the hands of the French, there would be a
   permanent menace to our frontiers; and Russia, if she
   emerged from the war without loss of territory, would
   underestimate our ability and power to prevent her
   doing injury to our interests, while, on the other hand,
   the failure to win new agricultural territories on our
   Eastern frontier would diminish the possibility of
   strengthening the defensive power of Germany against
   Russia by a sufficient increase of the German
   population.
   
   We have the honour to draw Your Excellency's
   attention to the views expressed above, which
   are not confined to the undersigned Corporations,
   but are widely held—possibly with occasional
   variations in detail—in many German circles which
   have not as yet publicly expressed them, and at the
   same time to inform you that we have simultaneously
   communicated this petition to the Ministries of the
   various Federated States.


As a supplement to this Memorandum, we must here
lay special stress on the fact that the political, military and
economic objects, which the German people must strive
after in the interests of the security of their future, are
inseparably connected with one another.  It is clear, to
start with, that the attainment of our great political objects
depends on the offensive power and the successes of our
army.  But precisely our experiences in this war prove,
beyond any doubt, that our military successes, particularly
in a long war, and their further exploitation depend to
a large extent upon the economic strength and ability of our
people.  If German agriculture had not been in a position
to secure the food of the people despite all the efforts of
our enemies, and if German manufacturers, German
inventive genius and German technical skill had not been
able to render us independent of foreign countries in the most
different spheres, then, notwithstanding the brilliant successes
of our victorious troops, we should have had to give way
eventually in the struggle which has been forced upon us, if
indeed we should not have been defeated already.

Hence it follows that even those demands, which seem at
first sight to possess a purely economic significance, must be
viewed in the light of the urgent necessity for the greatest
possible increase of our national strength, and also from a
military standpoint.

This applies with special force to the demands, which are
set forth in the Memorandum, both (a) for the acquisition of
territory suitable for agricultural settlement and (b) for the
appropriation of the iron-ore district of the Meurthe and
Moselle, of the French coaling districts in the Departments
of the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais, and also of the Belgian
coalfields.

The acquisition of sufficient territory suitable for
agricultural settlement is indispensable—(a) in order to broaden
the agricultural basis of our national resources, and thus to
maintain that happy balance in our whole economic life
which has been recognised as so necessary in the present
war; (b) in order to strengthen our military power by
safeguarding the sources of our national strength, which
depend upon a vigorous agricultural policy, and more
especially by assuring the increase of our population.

In the same way, acquisitions, such as that of the iron ore
and coal districts mentioned above, are demanded by our
military necessities, and not by any means only in the
interests of our manufacturing development.  This is
clear from the following facts and figures:—

The monthly production of pig-iron in Germany has
risen once more, since August 1914, to nearly 1,000,000
tons; that is, it has nearly doubled.  The monthly output
of steel has risen to more than 1,000,000 tons.

There is, however, no excess of pig-iron or steel; on the
contrary, there is a deficiency in Germany, and an even
greater deficiency in neutral countries.

The output of shells calls for both iron and steel, in
quantities of which only a few persons originally had any
conception.  For cast-iron shells alone—the inferior
substitute for drawn and cast steel shells—at least 4000 tons
of pig-iron have been used daily during the last few months.
The exact figures are not for the moment before us; but
this much is certain, that, unless the output of iron and steel
had been doubled since the month of August, a continuation
of the war would have been impossible.

As a raw material for the production of these quantities of
pig-iron and steel, minette is being employed more and
more, for this ore alone can be obtained in this country in
greatly increasing quantities.

The output of the other iron-ore districts of Germany is
very limited, and the overseas imports, even of the Swedish
ores, are so difficult to procure that in many places, in
addition to Luxemburg and Lorraine, minette at the present
time covers 60 to 80 per cent. of the output of steel and
pig-iron.  It the output of minette were interrupted, the war
would be as good as lost.

But how do matters stand as regards the supply of
minette in this or in a future war?

If the fortress of Longwy, with the numerous surrounding
French blast-furnaces, were given back, then in another war,
with a few long-range guns, the following works in Germany
and Luxemburg could be ruined in a few hours:

.. vspace:: 2

::

     Rodingen .......     7  }
     Differdingen ...    10  }
     Esch ........... 16-17  } kilometres from Longwy.
     Oettingen ......    21  }
     Rümelingen .....    21  }
     Düdelingen .....    25  }

.. vspace:: 2

By this destruction alone it may be estimated that 20 per
cent. of the German output of pig-iron and steel would
be lost.

But a glance at the map shows us further that, *e.g.*,
Jarny (the "Phoenix" minette pits) lies at a distance of
13 to 15 kilometres from Verdun, and that the western
mining concessions near Landres and Conflans are not more
than 26 kilometres at most from Verdun.  To-day we are
bombarding Dunkirk from a distance of 38 kilometres.
Does anyone believe that the French, in the next war, would
neglect to place long-range guns in Longwy and Verdun,
and allow us to continue the extraction of ore and the
production of pig-iron?

Incidentally it may be remarked that the extensive
production of steel from minette offers at the same time the
one and only possibility of providing German agriculture
with the necessary phosphoric acid for the manufacture of
the now excluded phosphates.

*Hence the security of the German Empire in a future war
imperatively demands the possession of the whole minette-bearing
district of Luxemburg and Lorraine, together with
the fortifications of Longwy and Verdun, without which this
district cannot be held*.

The possession of larger supplies of coal—and, in particular,
of coal rich in bitumen, which is found in great quantities in
the basin of Northern France—is at least as decisive for the
result of this war as the possession of iron-ore.

Belgium and North France together produce over forty
million tons.

Even to-day, as the British prohibition of coal exports
(enacted on the 15th of May) shows us, coal is one of the
decisive means of political influence.  The neutral
manufacturing States must do the bidding of that belligerent who
can guarantee a supply of coal.  We cannot do this at
present in a sufficient degree, and are to-day already
compelled to fall back upon the Belgian coal supply, in order
not to let our neutral neighbours become entirely dependent
upon England.

It is quite probable that the systematic increase of the
Belgian coal output, even during the present war, will prove
a weighty factor in determining various neighbour States
to remain neutral.

That coal, which produces coke and gas, at the same
time supplies the bases of our most important explosives, is
presumably well known, as also is the importance of coal in
the production of ammonia.

In benzol, moreover, it offers the only substitute for
petrol, of which we are short; and, finally, it supplies
coal-tar, which yields (*a*) the oil fuel so indispensable for the
Navy, (*b*) anthracite oil, the most serviceable substitute as
yet obtainable at home for lubricating oil, and (*c*)
naphthaline, the probable base of synthetic petroleum.

It may in this connection be remarked that we should
probably be unable to develop our destroyer and submarine
warfare to the requisite intensity without an abundance of
liquid fuel.  The course of the war has so clearly proved
the superiority of oil fuel over ordinary coal-firing in
torpedo-boats, that we should be guilty of unpardonable
folly if we failed to base our future conduct on this
experience.

If our hostile neighbours secure the possession of the
oil wells, Germany must take care to secure for herself the
necessary supplies of gas-producing and bituminous coal,
and must in time of peace develop these until they
constitute inexhaustible sources of oil, benzol, toluol,
ammonia, and naphthaline; and that, not merely in order
to increase our prosperity in time of peace, but as an
indispensable part of our equipment for war.

To recapitulate: The realisation of the war-aims, which
are proposed above with a view to our permanent economic
security, will also guarantee our military strength, and
consequently our political independence and power: moreover,
we shall thus secure an extended field for our economic
activity, which will afford and guarantee increased
opportunities for work, and thus benefit our working classes as a
whole.

.. vspace:: 2

"The Six Associations," states Grumbach, in his
*Annexationist Germany*, "did not confine themselves to
presenting their Petitions to the Government, but printed
them and circulated them in the form of a confidential
pamphlet amongst their members, who are domiciled in all
parts of Germany.  The anti-annexationist league, *Neues
Vaterland* (New Fatherland), which got to know of it,
kindly circulated the Petitions amongst its own members in
the form of a confidential report, thus bringing them to
the notice of a fresh public.  Nevertheless, the great
majority of the German people has, to this day, no accurate
knowledge of the annexationist desires set forth in the
Petitions, since the German newspapers were forbidden to
reproduce them.  In foreign countries the complete text
of the Petitions was first published in the Parisian Socialist
newspaper, Humanité, for August 11, 1915, after the Socialist
*Berner Tagwacht* had published an abridged version on
June 22, 1915."





.. vspace:: 4

.. _`THE MANIFESTO OF THE INTELLECTUALS.`:

.. class:: center large bold

   \I\I.


.. class:: center large bold

   THE MANIFESTO OF THE INTELLECTUALS.

.. vspace:: 2

The following is the full text of the Petition agreed on
by a number of German professors, diplomatists, and
superior Government officials, at a meeting held on
June 20, 1915, in the *Künstlerhaus*, Berlin, for the
purpose of its being presented to the German Imperial
Chancellor:—

.. vspace:: 2

The German people and their Emperor have preserved
peace for forty-four years, preserved it until its further
maintenance was incompatible with national honour
and security.  Despite her increase in strength and
population, Germany never thought of transgressing
the narrow bounds of her possessions on the European
Continent with a view to conquest.  Upon the world's
markets alone was she forced to make an entry, so as to
ensure her economic existence by peacefully competing
with other nations.

To our enemies, however, even these narrow limits and
a share of the world's trade necessary to our existence
seemed too much, and they formed plans which aimed at
the very annihilation of the German Empire.  Then we
Germans rose as one man, from the highest to the
meanest, realising that we must defend not only our
physical existence but also our inner, spiritual, and moral
life—in short, defend German and European civilisation
(*Kultur*) against barbarian hordes from the east, and
lust for vengeance and domination from the west.  With
God's help, hand in hand with our trusty allies, we have
been able to maintain ourselves victoriously against half a
world of enemies.

Now however, although another foe has arisen, in Italy,
it is no longer sufficient for us merely to defend ourselves.
Our foes have forced the sword into our hands and have
compelled us to make enormous sacrifices of blood and
treasure.  Henceforth our aim is to protect ourselves with
all our might against a repetition of such an attack from
every side—against a whole succession of wars which we
might have to wage against enemies who had again become
strong.  Moreover, we are determined to extend our territory
and to establish ourselves so firmly and so securely upon it
that our independent existence shall be guaranteed for
generations to come.

As to these main objects, the nation is unanimous in its
determination.  The plain truth, which is supported by
evidence from all sides, is this:—In all classes of the people
there is only one single fear, which is most prevalent and
deep-seated in the most simple-minded sections, viz. the fear
that illusory ideas of reconciliation, or even perhaps a
nervous impatience, might lead to the conclusion of a
premature and consequently patched-up peace which could
never be lasting; and that, as happened a hundred years
ago, the pen of the diplomats might ruin what the sword
has victoriously won, and this perhaps in the most fateful
hour of German history, when popular feeling has attained
an intensity and unanimity, which were never known in the
past and will not so easily recur in the future.

Let there be no mistake.  We do not wish to dominate
the world, but to have a standing in it fully corresponding
to our great position as a civilised Power and to our
economic and military strength.  It may be that, owing
to the numerical superiority of our enemies, we cannot
obtain at a single stroke all that is required in order thus
to ensure our national position; but the military results
of this war, obtained by such great sacrifices, must be
utilised to the very utmost possible extent.  This, we repeat,
is the firm determination of the German people.

To give clear expression to this resolute popular determination,
so that it may be at the service of the Government and
may afford it strong support in its difficult task of enforcing
Germany's necessary claims against a few faint-hearted
individuals at home as well as against stubborn enemies
abroad, is the duty and right of those whose education and
position raise them to the level of intellectual leaders and
protagonists of public opinion.  We appeal to them to fulfil
this duty.

Being well aware that a distinction must be drawn between
the objects of the war and the final conditions of peace, that
everything of necessity depends on the final success of our
arms, and that it cannot be our business to discuss
Austria-Hungary's and Turkey's military objects, we have drawn up
the following brief statement of what, according to our
conviction, constitutes for Germany the guarantee of a lasting
peace and the goal to which the blood-stained roads of
this war must lead:

1.  FRANCE.—After being threatened by France for
centuries, and after hearing the cry of *revanche* from 1815
till 1870, and from 1871 till 1915, we wish to have done
with the French menace once for all.  All classes of
our people are imbued with this desire.  There must
be no misplaced attempts at reconciliation, which have
always been opposed by France with the utmost fanaticism;
and as regards this we would utter a most urgent warning to
Germans not to deceive themselves.  Even after the terrible
lesson of this unsuccessful war of vengeance, France will
still thirst for *revanche*, in so far as her strength permits.
For the sake of our own existence we must ruthlessly weaken
her both politically and economically, and must improve
our military and strategic position with regard to her.
For this purpose, in our opinion, it is necessary to effect a
thorough rectification of our whole Western frontier from
Belfort to the coast.  Part of the North French
Channel-coast we must acquire, if possible, in order to be
strategically safer as regards England and to secure better
access to the ocean.

Special measures must be taken, in order that the German
Empire may not suffer any internal injury owing to this enlargement
of its frontiers and addition to its territory.  In order
not to have conditions such as those in Alsace-Lorraine, the
most important business undertakings and estates must be
transferred from anti-German ownership to German hands,
France taking over and compensating the former owners.
Such portion of the population as is taken over by us must
be allowed absolutely no influence in the Empire.

Furthermore, we must have no mercy upon France, however
terrible the financial losses her own folly and British
self-seeking have already brought upon her.  We must
impose upon her a heavy war indemnity (of which more
hereafter), and indeed upon France before our other enemies.

We must also not forget that she has disproportionately
large colonial possessions, and that, should circumstances
arise, England could indemnify herself out of these, if we
do not help ourselves to them.

2.  BELGIUM.—On Belgium, in the acquisition of which
so much of the best German blood has been shed, we must
keep a firm hold, political, military, and economic, despite
any arguments which may be urged to the contrary.  On no
point is public opinion so unanimous.  The German people
consider it an absolutely unquestionable matter of honour
to keep a firm hold of Belgium.

From the political and military standpoints it is obvious
that, were this not done, Belgium would be neither more nor
less than a basis from which England could attack and most
dangerously menace Germany—in short, a shield behind
which our foes would again assemble against us.  Economically
Belgium means a prodigious increase of power to us.

Belgium may also bring us a considerable addition to our
population, if in course of time the Flemish element, which
is so closely allied to us, becomes emancipated from the
artificial grip of French culture and remembers its Teutonic
affinities.

As to the problems which we shall have to solve, once
we possess Belgium, we would here confine ourselves to
emphasising the following principles:—(1) The inhabitants
must be precluded from exercising any political influence
whatever in the Empire; and (2) the most important business
undertakings and estates (as in the districts to be ceded by
France) must be transferred from anti-German ownership to
German hands.

3.  RUSSIA.—On our Eastern frontier the population of the
Russian Empire is increasing on an enormous scale—about
2-½ to 3 millions yearly.  Within a generation a population
of 250 millions will be attained.  Against this overwhelming
pressure of numbers on our eastern flank, undoubtedly the
greatest danger to the German and European future,
Germany can hold her ground only—(*a*) if a strong boundary-wall
be erected both against the advancing tide of Russification,
which encroaches imperceptibly in times of peace, and
also against the menace of an aggressive war; and (*b*) if we
adopt all possible measures to maintain the past healthy
increase of our population.  But the realisation of both
these conditions demands land, which Russia must cede
to us.  It must be agricultural land for colonisation—land
which will yield us healthy peasants, the rejuvenating source
of all national and political energy; land which can take
up part of the increase of our population, and offer to
the returning German emigrants, who wish to turn their
backs on hostile foreign countries, a new home in their own
country; land which will increase Germany's economic
independence of foreign countries, by developing her own
possibilities of food-production, which will constitute the
necessary counterpoise to the advancing industrialisation of
our people and the increase of town-dwellers, thus
conserving that equilibrium of our economic resources, whose
inestimable value has been proved during the war, and
saving us from the dangerous one-sidedness of the English
economic system; land which will arrest the decline of
the birth-rate, check emigration, and alleviate the dearth of
dwelling-houses; land whose re-settlement and Germanisation
will provide new possibilities of livelihood for the
professional classes also.  Such land for our physical,
moral, and intellectual health is to be found above all
in the East.

The measure in which our Eastern frontier is to be
advanced will depend on the military situation, and in
particular also it should be determined by strategic considerations.
As far as the rectification of the eastern frontier of
Posen and Silesia and the southern frontier of East Prussia
is concerned, a frontier zone, accessible to German colonisation
and as far as possible free of private ownership, must be
created.  This German frontier zone will protect the Prussian
Poles against the direct and excessive influence of Russian
Poland, which will perhaps attain its independence.  Moreover,
in this connection, we have no hesitation whatever in
drawing special attention to that ancient territory in the
Russian Baltic Provinces, which has been cultivated by Germans
for the last 700 years.  It is sparsely populated, its soil is
fruitful, and it therefore promises to have a great future as a
field for colonisation, whilst its Lithuanian, Lettish, and
Esthonian population is derived from a stock alien to the
Russians, which may prove a reliable source of that supply
of journeyman-labour which we so urgently need.

We based our demand for land for colonisation from
Russia on two grounds—the need for erecting a "boundary-wall"
and the need for maintaining the increase of our
population.  But, in the third place, land is the form in
which Russia's war-indemnity ought to be paid to us.  To
obtain an indemnity from Russia in cash or in securities
will probably be just as impossible after this war as it
proved after the Russo-Japanese war.  On the other
hand, Russia can easily pay an indemnity in kind.  Russia
is excessively rich in territory, and we demand that the
territory which Russia is to surrender to us in lieu of a
war-indemnity shall be delivered to us for the most part free of
private ownership.  This is by no means an outrageous
demand, if we bear in mind Russian administrative methods.
The Russian population is not so firmly rooted in the soil as
that of Western and Central Europe.  Again and again,
right up to the early days of the present war, Russia has
transplanted parts of her population on an enormous scale
and settled them in far distant provinces.  The possibilities
of the scheme here proposed must not be judged in
accordance with the modest standards of German civilisation
(*Kultur*).  If the acquisition of political control over
territory is to bring with it that increase of power which we
so urgently need for our future, we must also obtain
economic control and have in the main free disposition
over it.  To conclude peace with Russia without ensuring
the diminution of Russian preponderance, and without
acquiring those territorial acquisitions which Germany
needs, would be to lose a great opportunity for promoting
Germany's political, economic, and social regeneration, and
to impose upon future generations the burden of the final
settlement with Russia—in other words, Germany and
European civilisation would be confronted with the certainty
of a renewal of their life-and-death struggle.

4.  ENGLAND, THE EAST, COLONIES, AND OVERSEA TRADE.—The
war between us and Russia has been waged with
extraordinary violence, and has led to a glorious success
for our arms; and we must never forget the menace to our
future presented by the enormous Russian mass encamped
on our Eastern frontier, if we should fail to disintegrate it.
Nevertheless, we must never for one moment lose sight of
the fact that this war is, in its ultimate origin, England's
war upon the foreign trade, the naval power, and the
world-prestige of Germany.

Since this is the motive of England's hostility and war
against us, our war-aims against England are clear.  We
must wrest a free field for our foreign trade, we must
enforce the recognition of our naval power and our
world-prestige in spite of England.

We admit that England has taught us one lesson by her
blockade, which has compelled Germany to reorganise
herself for the duration of this war as a self-contained
industrial state; for we have learned that, before and
above all, we must win and secure a wider territorial basis
in Europe (as is explained in detail above), in order that we
may stand before the world in the utmost possible political,
military and economic independence.  And we must also
create on the Continent the widest possible sphere of
economic interest, directly contiguous with our country's
frontiers (*i.e.* avoiding sea-routes), so as to free ourselves
as far as possible from dependence upon the good pleasure
of England and of the other world-empires, whose
self-sufficiency and exclusiveness are constantly increasing.  In
this respect our political friendship with Austria-Hungary
and Turkey, which is bound to throw open the Balkans and
Western Asia to us, is of the first importance.  It is
therefore necessary that Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Turkey,
and Western Asia, down to the Persian Gulf, should be
permanently secured against the covetousness of Russia
and England.  Commercial relations with our political
friends must be furthered by all available means.

But, in the second place, it must be our aim to re-enter the
world's oversea markets, in spite of England, and even
though we have already safeguarded our foundations on the
Continent.  Undoubtedly it will be necessary to change the
direction of a considerable part of our oversea trade; but
we shall also have to conquer anew our old trade and
shipping connections.  Herein we shall in future stand upon
our own feet, and shall, *e.g.*, eliminate the hitherto customary
mediation of English bankers and brokers, English arbitrage
and exchange business, and the preponderance of English
marine insurance companies.  England has wantonly
destroyed in us the trust and confidence which all such
transactions require, and must pay the penalty by losing the
profits which she has hitherto derived from them at the
expense of German trade.  In Africa our aim must be to
rebuild our Colonial Empire, making it more self-contained
and stronger than before.  Central Africa alone would, it is
true, give us a great extent of territory, but the value of the
colonial products which it contains does not correspond to
its size.  We must therefore look to other quarters of the
globe also, if we are to secure adequate acquisitions.  From
this point of view the importance of a permanent connection
with the world of Islam and the vital necessity of a
safe ocean highway are once more plainly evident.  Those,
therefore, who insist upon colonies at the sacrifice of our
security against England's naval tyranny over the Channel—those
who insist upon colonies in return for, and subject to,
our surrender of Belgium—not only fail to realise that the
acquisition of an extended European basis for our Fatherland
is far more important than all colonial possessions;
they are also guilty of the grave political blunder of
aspiring to colonial possessions without securing their
maritime communications, *i.e.* colonial possessions which
will once more be dependent on England's arbitrary will.

We must have the freedom of the seas.  For this—which
is to benefit all peoples alike—we are wrestling with England.
And if we are to enforce it, the first requisite is to establish
ourselves firmly upon the Channel, facing England.  As we
have already explained above, *we must retain a firm hold
upon Belgium, and we must, if possible, conquer part of the
Channel-coast of Northern France in addition*.  Further, we
must break the chain of England's naval bases, which
encircles the globe, or weaken it by a corresponding
acquisition of German bases.  But Egypt, which connects
English possessions in Africa with those in Asia and
converts the Indian Ocean into an English sea with Australia
for its distant opposite shore; Egypt, which forms the
connecting link between the mother country and all her
Eastern colonies:—Egypt is, as Bismarck said, the neck of
the British Empire, the vice in which England holds East
and West in subjection.  *There* a blow may be dealt at
England's vital nerve.  If it is successful, the international
trade route of the Suez Canal must be freed from the
domination of a single Power, and the ancient rights of
Turkey be protected as far as possible.

But England's power is also essentially based upon the
overwhelming influence which she exercises on the
Governments and the Press of the whole world.  In order to
remedy this state of affairs and to secure counter-influence
for Germany, it is vitally necessary to destroy England's
monopoly of the cable-service and press-agencies.  Our
best ally in our fight against England's influence over the
world's public opinion is freedom—freedom which we shall
bring to all nations by fighting for our own liberation from
the yoke imposed by England upon the world.  We must
not strive to dominate and exploit the world, like the
English: our aim should be to safeguard our own special
needs, and then to act as pathmakers and leaders of Europe,
respecting and securing the free self-development of the
peoples.

5.  INDEMNITY FOR THE WAR.—Finally, as regards
indemnity for the war, we naturally desire such an
indemnity as will, so far as possible, cover the public cost
of the war, make restoration possible in East Prussia and
Alsace, guarantee the establishment of a pension fund for
cripples, widows, and orphans, indemnify private individuals
for losses inflicted on them contrary to international law,
and provide for the renewal and further development of
our armaments.

But we are aware that these matters depend not only
upon the extent of our military successes but also upon the
financial capacity of our enemies.  If we found ourselves
in a position to impose a war-indemnity upon England—England,
which has always been so niggardly in sacrificing
the lives of its own citizens—no sum in money could be
great enough.  England has set the whole world against us,
and chiefly by her money.  The purse is the sensitive spot
in this nation of shopkeepers.  If we have the power, we
must strike at her purse above all else and without any
consideration whatever.  In all probability, however, we
shall have to look to France (primarily, if not exclusively)
for our financial indemnification.  And we ought not, from
a mistaken idea of generosity, to hesitate to impose upon
France the heaviest indemnity.  Let France turn to her
ally across the Channel for the alleviation of this enforced
burden.  If England refuses to fulfil her financial obligations
towards her ally, we shall have secured an incidental political
advantage with which we may be well contented.

But we are primarily concerned to insist that, important
as it is to adopt retrospective measures for the mitigation of
the injuries we have already suffered, it is still more vitally
important to secure such terms of peace as will throw open
to our people new paths for a vigorous future development;
and in proportion as a financial indemnity is unobtainable,
increased political and moral justification attaches to all
the demands set forth above for the acquisition of territory,
for an additional supply of productive labour for our
manufactures, and for colonies.  If we win in this titanic
struggle, we must not emerge from it with losses.  Otherwise,
despite all our victories, posterity will view us as the
conquered party.

We refrain from expressing any decided opinion on the
weighty question of the mode of payment, but we would
draw attention to the following point.  It would be greatly
to our interest, if a considerable part of the indemnity were
paid in the form of foreign securities of such a kind that
their possession would strengthen our economic position in
the countries of our political friends, whilst freeing the
latter from the preponderant influence of England and
France.

6.  A POLICY OF CIVILISATION (KULTURPOLITIK) CAN
ONLY BE BASED ON A POLICY OF POWER.—If the signatories
of this Petition—particularly the men of science, the
artists, and ecclesiastics—are reproached, on the ground
that the demands which they put forward are solely
to promote Germany's political and economic power,
and perhaps also to satisfy some of her social requirements,
whilst the purely spiritual tasks of Germany's future have
been forgotten, our answer is as follows:—

Care for the development of the German Mind and
Genius (*die Sorge um den deutschen Geist*) cannot be made
a war-aim or a condition of peace.

If, nevertheless, we are to say a few words on this subject,
our position is briefly this.  The German Mind is, in our
opinion, beyond all doubt our one supremely valuable
asset.  It is the one priceless possession amongst all
our possessions.  It alone justifies our people's existence
and their impulse to maintain and assert themselves in the
world; and to it they owe their superiority over all other
peoples.  But, in the first place, we must emphatically insist
that, if Germany is to be free to pursue her spiritual
vocation, she must first of all secure her political and
economic independence.  And, secondly, to those who
advocate the so-called Policy of Civilisation
(*Kulturpolitik*) alone, to those whose watchword is "The
German Mind without the Policy of Power," we reply:
"We have no use for a 'German Mind' which is in
danger of becoming, as it were, an uprooted national
spirit, in danger of being itself disintegrated and the
cause of disintegration in others.  We have no use
for a Mind which, having no healthy national body
of its own, is driven to seek vainly in every country
for a home and to become 'all things to all men'—a
Mind which is forced to be untrue to its own character
and a spurious imitation of the character of the nation
that is its host.  If the demands which we have formulated
are satisfied, we shall create the necessary healthy body
for the German Mind.  The expansion of the national
body which we have demanded will do the German
Mind no injury, provided the precautions upon which
we have also insisted are observed.  On the contrary,
subject to those precautions, such an expansion will
strengthen the German Mind by providing it with wider
opportunities."

We are well aware that the aims which we have proposed
are great, and that their attainment is impossible without a
spirit of resolute self-sacrifice and the most energetic skill
in negotiation.  But we appeal to a sentence of Bismarck's:
"It is palpably true in Politics, if it is true anywhere, that
'faith removes mountains,' that Courage and Victory are not
cause and effect, but identical with one another."

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"Amongst the signatories to the above Petition,"
states Grumbach, in his *Annexationist Germany*,
"were Dr. E. Kirdorf, engineer and general director
of the Gelsenkirchener Mining Company, Ltd.;
Herm. Schumacher, Professor of Political Economy; von
Reichenau, Imperial Ambassador (retired); von
Schwerin, President of the Government Board
(*Regierungs-Präsident*) at Frankfort (retired);
Reinh. Seeberg, Professor of Theology, Berlin;
Dietr. Schafer, Professor of History, Berlin.  In a
controversy with Professor Delbrück in the *Tägliche
Rundschau*, Professor Seeberg announced that the
document contains 1,341 signatures in all, including
those of 352 professors of universities and colleges;
158 schoolmasters and clergymen; 145 superior
administrative officials, mayors, and town-councillors;
148 judges, magistrates, and lawyers; 40 members of
the *Reichstag* and the *Landtag*; 18 retired admirals
and generals; 182 manufacturers, business men, and
bankers; 52 agriculturists; 252 artists, authors, and
publishers."

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   *Printed in Great Britain by* THE FIELD & QUEEN (HORACE COX) LTD.
   *Bream's Buildings, London, E.C.* 4.

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