Produced by Al Haines.





                                  THE
                               PAN-GERMAN
                               PROGRAMME

                                  THE
                    PETITION OF THE SIX ASSOCIATIONS
                                AND THE
                     MANIFESTO OF THE INTELLECTUALS


                      _Translated from the German_


                        With an Introduction by

                              EDWYN BEVAN



                   LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.
                 RUSKIN HOUSE 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C. 1
                                  1918




                      *THE PAN-GERMAN PROGRAMME.*



                            *INTRODUCTORY.*


The two documents presented in this pamphlet are the fullest statement
of the programme of the Pan-German party in Germany.  They were both
drawn up in the earlier months of 1915.  After the series of rapid
German successes in the West, with which the war opened, had seemed to
come to a check, and month after month went by without the expected
advance on Paris being resumed, it was felt to be necessary that the
German people should get some more precise idea of what it was fighting
for, what it had to obtain before it could consider that the war had
attained its end.

In March, 1915, the rumour got about that the German Government was
contemplating a peace of compromise, and Pan-German circles took alarm.
Pan-Germanism was not strong in the working class and many of the
Radical Intellectuals disapproved of it.  But it was very strong among
the country landowners, _i.e._ the class called _Junkers_, and the rich
manufacturers, especially the great ironmasters of the
Rhenish-Westphalian country, who wanted to get hold of the French
iron-districts of Briey and Longwy.  These interests were organised in a
number of powerful Associations.

If there was danger of the Government under Bethmann Hollweg’s direction
weakening, it appeared necessary that pressure should be brought to bear
upon it in time.  Five Associations in March drew up a Memorandum to be
presented privately to the Chancellor.  They were afterwards joined by a
sixth, and the Memorandum in its final form was laid before the
Chancellor on May 20, 1915.  This is the first of the two documents here
translated.

The second is the so-called "Manifesto of the Intellectuals."  It was
read on June 20, 1915, to a great gathering of professors, diplomats,
and high Government officials in the Artists’ Hall (_Künstlerhaus_) in
Berlin.  It was not published, but circulated as a "strictly
confidential manuscript," and was submitted to the Chancellor on July 8.
When 1341 signatures had been appended to it the Government stepped in
and forbade further canvassing.  It is therefore claimed that the 1341
do not represent the amount of the support which the manifesto would
have got in the country had it been allowed free course.

The Intellectuals’ Manifesto has a more extensive programme than that of
the Six Associations.  It includes, not only the demands of the
Associations, but the scheme commonly designated by the term
_Mittel-Europa_, with its appendix, the control of the Turkish Empire by
Germany, implying a great belt of German power across the world from the
North Sea to the Persian Gulf—about which the Six Associations said
nothing.  Again, whereas the Six Associations say only in general terms
that they demand the possession of "a colonial empire adequate to
satisfy Germany’s manifold economic interests," the Intellectuals state
more specifically that this means an empire in Central Africa, and
more—endorsing, therefore, the scheme labelled _Mittel-Afrika_.

These two documents will always be two of the most important documents
of the Great War for students of history.  Although they were not
published in Germany till long after they had begun to circulate
privately, their contents became rapidly known and they became main
objects of attack for Radical and Socialist circles.  Much has happened
since they were drawn up.  It has become clear to a much larger number
of people in Germany that such schemes are unrealisable.

In July, 1917, the majority of the Reichstag passed a resolution in
favour of a peace on the basis of the _status quo ante_.  But we should
guard against the error of supposing that, because the largest body of
opinion in the country last summer was against annexations, all danger
from German ambitions has passed away.  We must take into account two
things:

(1) The Pan-German opinion, even if that of a minority, is that of a
very strong and desperately energetic minority.  It has recently taken
body in the _Vaterlandspartei_, which may be rendered "National Party."
It carries on a vigorous propaganda backed by vast funds, and has on its
side many men of influence upon the Government.  It shows what the
majority of the Germans would desire, if weakness on our side gave them
any hope of getting it.  And hopes seem to have risen again since the
collapse of Russia and the repulse of Italy. The Reichstag majority
which passed the "peace resolution" last July seems no longer solid.  It
is highly improbable that the majority of the Reichstag would now demand
a peace "without annexations."

(2) Even those who oppose the Pan-Germans and stand for a "peace without
annexations" cherish the design of laying a foundation for German power
within the sphere of Germany and its allies, upon which _later on_ a
more ambitious structure of power could be reared.  The trouble with
"these gentlemen of the _Vaterlandspartei_," one Socialist writer
explained, was not that they asked for too much but that they asked for
it all at once.  If Germany could strengthen its grip upon Central
Europe, Bulgaria, and the restored Turkish Empire, one of the great
schemes contained in the Intellectuals’ Manifesto could be realised
_without annexations_.  It may be that when the German Government
ultimately state their minimum requirements they will seem modest,
compared with the Pan-German programme.  Even so they will require
careful scrutiny lest there should be more in them of the Pan-German
spirit than appears on the outside, more than is compatible with the
safety of the world.


EDWYN BEVAN,
       _January_, 1918.




                                  *I.*

                *THE PETITION OF THE SIX ASSOCIATIONS.*


The following is the full text of the Petitions addressed to the German
Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, and to the Governments of the
various Federated States of the German Empire, on March 10 and May 20,
1915, by the League of Agriculturists (_Bund der Landwirte_), the German
Peasants’ League (_Deutscher Bauernbund_), the Christian German
Peasants’ Unions (_die christlichen deutschen Bauernvereine_), the
Central Association of German Manufacturers (_Centralverband deutscher
Industrieller_), the Manufacturers’ League (_Bund der Industriellen_)
and the League of Middle-Class Citizens in the German Empire
(_Reichsdeutscher Mittelstandsverband_):—


Together with the whole German people, those occupied in business
pursuits, whether in agriculture or manufacture, in handicrafts or
trade, are determined to endure to the end, notwithstanding every
sacrifice, in this struggle for life and death which has been forced
upon Germany, in order that Germany may emerge stronger in its external
relations, assured of a lasting peace, and thus also assured of further
national, economic, and cultural development at home.

Since the whole German people recognises these aims as its own, and has
given tangible proof of its willingness to make sacrifices for their
achievement, the rumours recently circulating in town and country were
bound to be most disquieting.  These rumours (confirmed, apparently, by
certain announcements in the Press) were to the effect that preliminary
steps were being taken to prepare the way for peace negotiations, and,
in particular, for a separate peace with England, based on certain
English wishes and demands.

Hence universal satisfaction has been caused by the declaration of the
_Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, that no competent judge would dream
of sacrificing Germany’s favourable military position in order to
conclude a premature peace with any one of her enemies.

Even if the military situation were more unfavourable, or more doubtful,
this ought to make no difference to our determination—unless, indeed, we
are to lose sight of the aims in home and foreign policy which His
Majesty the Emperor has himself proclaimed.  These aims can only be
attained by achieving a peace which will bring us better security for
our frontiers in East and West, an extension of the foundations of our
sea power, and the possibility of an unchecked and strong development of
our economic resources; in short, those extensions of power, alike in
politics, in the army, in the navy, and in our economic life, which will
guarantee to us a stronger position in the world.

Any peace which does not bring us these results will make a speedy
renewal of the struggle inevitable under circumstances essentially less
favourable to Germany. Therefore no premature peace!  For from a
premature peace we could not hope for a sufficient prize of victory.

But also no half-hearted peace, no peace which does not include complete
political exploitation of those ultimate military successes which we
expect to obtain!

For it must be realised that, not only the security of our future
international position, but also our power to utilise the present
self-sacrificing spirit of the German people for the settlement of those
questions of domestic policy, which will arise on the return of peace,
both equally presuppose the complete exploitation of our military
position so as to increase Germany’s power abroad.  Assuredly our people
would understand any concessions which were wrung from them by a
military situation so desperate as to oppose insuperable obstacles to
any resistance, however determined and however self-sacrificing; but
they would not tolerate any weak concessions at the conclusion of peace
which were not justified and necessitated by the military situation.
Concessions of this kind would be fraught with the most fatal
consequences for the domestic peace of our Fatherland, since they might
lead to the same result as a premature withdrawal from the conflict, and
our soldiers would discover, on returning home, that the only reward for
their splendid endurance was a crushing burden of taxation. Hundreds of
thousands have given their lives: the prize of victory must correspond
to the sacrifice.

_The following Memorandum was drawn up on March_ 10 _of this year_ and
addressed to your Excellency by the League of Agriculturists, the German
Peasants’ League, the Central Association of German Manufacturers, the
Manufacturers’ League, and the League of Middle-Class Citizens in the
German Empire.  The Memorandum, to which the Christian German Peasants’
Unions, who are also signatories to the present Petition, have given
their adhesion, explains in detail the requirements which—the necessary
military successes being assumed—must in the opinion of the undersigned
Associations be fulfilled, in order to secure for Germany that
political, military, and economic position which would enable her to
look forward with confidence to all possibilities of the future.

The Memorandum was as follows:

    The undersigned Corporations have carefully considered what
    measures are required to give practical effect to the formula,
    which has so often been heard during the last few months, viz.,
    that this war must be followed by an honourable peace,
    corresponding to the sacrifices which have been made and
    containing in itself a guarantee for its continuance.

    In answering this question, it must never be forgotten that our
    enemies continue to announce that Germany is to be annihilated
    and struck out of the rank of the Great Powers.  Against such
    aims treaties will afford us no protection; for treaties, when
    the fitting moment comes, would once more be trodden under foot.
    We can only look for safety in a serious economic and military
    weakening of our enemies, sufficient to ensure peace for as long
    a time as can be foreseen.

    We must demand a colonial Empire adequate to satisfy Germany’s
    manifold economic interests, we must safeguard our future policy
    in matters of customs and commerce, and we must secure a war
    indemnity to be paid in a form suitable to our requirements: but
    our chief end in the struggle which has been forced upon us is,
    in our opinion, to strengthen and improve the foundations on
    which Germany’s position in Europe rests, in the following
    directions:

    In order to provide the necessary security for our influence at
    sea and in order to secure our future military and economic
    position as against England, _Belgium_, owing to the close
    connexion of Belgian territory (which is economically of such
    importance) with our main manufacturing districts, must be
    subjected to German Imperial legislation, both in military and
    tariff matters, and also in regard to currency, banking, and
    postal arrangements. Railways and canals must be incorporated in
    our transport system.  In general, the government and
    administration of the country must be so managed that _the
    inhabitants obtain no influence on the political fortunes of the
    German Empire_; there must be separation of the Walloon and of
    the predominantly Flemish territory, and _all economic and
    industrial undertakings and real estate, which are so vital for
    the government of the country, must be transferred into German
    hands_.

    We must consider the question of _French_ territory from the
    same point of view, _i.e._ so far as it affects our position
    towards England.  Hence we must regard it as a matter of vital
    importance, in the interests of our future influence at sea,
    that _we should hold the French coastal districts from the
    Belgian frontier approximately as far as the Somme_. and thus
    secure access to the Atlantic Ocean. _The Hinterland, which must
    be acquired with them_, must be so delimited as to secure to us
    the complete economic and strategic exploitation of those
    Channel-ports which we gain.  Any further acquisitions of French
    territory, apart from the necessary annexation of the iron-ore
    district of Briey, must be determined solely by military and
    strategic considerations.  After the experiences of this war, it
    may be regarded as self-evident that we cannot in the future
    leave our frontiers at the mercy of hostile invasion by allowing
    our opponents to retain those fortified positions which threaten
    us, in particular Verdun and Belfort and the Western slopes of
    the Vosges which lie between them. _The acquisition of the line
    of the Meuse and the French Channel-coast would carry with it
    the possession, not only of the iron-ore district of Briey
    mentioned above, but also of the coal-country in the department
    of the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais_.  These annexations also—as
    is self-evident, after our experiences in Alsace-Lorraine—must
    be so arranged that the population of the annexed districts
    shall be precluded from exercising political influence on the
    fortunes of the German Empire; and all the economic resources of
    these districts, including both large and medium-sized estates,
    must be transferred to German hands on such terms that France
    shall compensate and take over their owners.

    _As to the East_, the determining consideration must be that the
    great addition to our manufacturing resources, which we
    anticipate in the West, must be counterbalanced by an equivalent
    annexation of agricultural territory in the East.  The present
    economic structure of Germany has shown itself so fortunate in
    this war, that it is hardly too much to say that every German is
    convinced of the necessity for maintaining it for as long a time
    as we can foresee.

    The necessity of strengthening the sound agricultural basis of
    our economic system, of making possible a German agricultural
    colonisation on a large scale, of restoring the German peasants
    who are living abroad—especially those settled in Russia and at
    present deprived of their rights—to the territory of the Empire,
    so that they may take part in the economic life of Germany, and,
    lastly, the necessity of greatly increasing the numbers of our
    population capable of bearing arms, implies _a considerable
    extension of the Imperial and Prussian frontiers in the East by
    annexation of at least parts of the Baltic Provinces and of
    those territories which lie to the south of them, whilst at the
    same time we must keep in mind, the object of making our Eastern
    German frontier capable of military defence_.

    The restoration of East Prussia requires a better safeguarding
    of its frontiers by placing in front of them other districts,
    nor must West Prussia, Posen and Silesia remain frontier marches
    exposed to danger as they now are.

    With regard to the granting of political rights to the
    inhabitants of the new districts and the safeguarding of German
    economic influence, what has already been said about France
    applies here too.  The war indemnity to be paid by Russia will
    have to consist to a large extent in the cession of land.

    Of course these demands depend on the hypothesis that military
    results will enable them to be carried out. But in view of what
    we have already achieved, we confidently rely on our army and
    its leaders to gain a victory which will guarantee the
    attainment of these ends.  We must pursue these ends, not from a
    policy of conquest, but because it is only by attaining them
    that we can secure that lasting peace which all classes of the
    German people expect in return for their sacrifices.  Moreover,
    in our opinion, a voluntary surrender of hostile territories, in
    which so much German blood has been spilt and so many of our
    best and noblest have found a grave, would do violence to the
    sentiments of our people and to their conception of an
    honourable peace.

    In the future as in the past, the want of harbours directly on
    the Channel would strangle our activity beyond the seas.  An
    independent Belgium would continue to be a _tête de pont_ to
    England, a point from which to attack us.  If the natural line
    of fortifications of France were left in the hands of the
    French, there would be a permanent menace to our frontiers; and
    Russia, if she emerged from the war without loss of territory,
    would underestimate our ability and power to prevent her doing
    injury to our interests, while, on the other hand, the failure
    to win new agricultural territories on our Eastern frontier
    would diminish the possibility of strengthening the defensive
    power of Germany against Russia by a sufficient increase of the
    German population.

    We have the honour to draw Your Excellency’s attention to the
    views expressed above, which are not confined to the undersigned
    Corporations, but are widely held—possibly with occasional
    variations in detail—in many German circles which have not as
    yet publicly expressed them, and at the same time to inform you
    that we have simultaneously communicated this petition to the
    Ministries of the various Federated States.

As a supplement to this Memorandum, we must here lay special stress on
the fact that the political, military and economic objects, which the
German people must strive after in the interests of the security of
their future, are inseparably connected with one another.  It is clear,
to start with, that the attainment of our great political objects
depends on the offensive power and the successes of our army.  But
precisely our experiences in this war prove, beyond any doubt, that our
military successes, particularly in a long war, and their further
exploitation depend to a large extent upon the economic strength and
ability of our people.  If German agriculture had not been in a position
to secure the food of the people despite all the efforts of our enemies,
and if German manufacturers, German inventive genius and German
technical skill had not been able to render us independent of foreign
countries in the most different spheres, then, notwithstanding the
brilliant successes of our victorious troops, we should have had to give
way eventually in the struggle which has been forced upon us, if indeed
we should not have been defeated already.

Hence it follows that even those demands, which seem at first sight to
possess a purely economic significance, must be viewed in the light of
the urgent necessity for the greatest possible increase of our national
strength, and also from a military standpoint.

This applies with special force to the demands, which are set forth in
the Memorandum, both (a) for the acquisition of territory suitable for
agricultural settlement and (b) for the appropriation of the iron-ore
district of the Meurthe and Moselle, of the French coaling districts in
the Departments of the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais, and also of the
Belgian coalfields.

The acquisition of sufficient territory suitable for agricultural
settlement is indispensable—(a) in order to broaden the agricultural
basis of our national resources, and thus to maintain that happy balance
in our whole economic life which has been recognised as so necessary in
the present war; (b) in order to strengthen our military power by
safeguarding the sources of our national strength, which depend upon a
vigorous agricultural policy, and more especially by assuring the
increase of our population.

In the same way, acquisitions, such as that of the iron ore and coal
districts mentioned above, are demanded by our military necessities, and
not by any means only in the interests of our manufacturing development.
This is clear from the following facts and figures:—

The monthly production of pig-iron in Germany has risen once more, since
August 1914, to nearly 1,000,000 tons; that is, it has nearly doubled.
The monthly output of steel has risen to more than 1,000,000 tons.

There is, however, no excess of pig-iron or steel; on the contrary,
there is a deficiency in Germany, and an even greater deficiency in
neutral countries.

The output of shells calls for both iron and steel, in quantities of
which only a few persons originally had any conception.  For cast-iron
shells alone—the inferior substitute for drawn and cast steel shells—at
least 4000 tons of pig-iron have been used daily during the last few
months. The exact figures are not for the moment before us; but this
much is certain, that, unless the output of iron and steel had been
doubled since the month of August, a continuation of the war would have
been impossible.

As a raw material for the production of these quantities of pig-iron and
steel, minette is being employed more and more, for this ore alone can
be obtained in this country in greatly increasing quantities.

The output of the other iron-ore districts of Germany is very limited,
and the overseas imports, even of the Swedish ores, are so difficult to
procure that in many places, in addition to Luxemburg and Lorraine,
minette at the present time covers 60 to 80 per cent. of the output of
steel and pig-iron.  It the output of minette were interrupted, the war
would be as good as lost.

But how do matters stand as regards the supply of minette in this or in
a future war?

If the fortress of Longwy, with the numerous surrounding French
blast-furnaces, were given back, then in another war, with a few
long-range guns, the following works in Germany and Luxemburg could be
ruined in a few hours:


    Rodingen .......     7  }
    Differdingen ...    10  }
    Esch ........... 16−17  } kilometres from Longwy.
    Oettingen ......    21  }
    Rümelingen .....    21  }
    Düdelingen .....    25  }


By this destruction alone it may be estimated that 20 per cent. of the
German output of pig-iron and steel would be lost.

But a glance at the map shows us further that, _e.g._, Jarny (the
"Phoenix" minette pits) lies at a distance of 13 to 15 kilometres from
Verdun, and that the western mining concessions near Landres and
Conflans are not more than 26 kilometres at most from Verdun.  To-day we
are bombarding Dunkirk from a distance of 38 kilometres. Does anyone
believe that the French, in the next war, would neglect to place
long-range guns in Longwy and Verdun, and allow us to continue the
extraction of ore and the production of pig-iron?

Incidentally it may be remarked that the extensive production of steel
from minette offers at the same time the one and only possibility of
providing German agriculture with the necessary phosphoric acid for the
manufacture of the now excluded phosphates.

_Hence the security of the German Empire in a future war imperatively
demands the possession of the whole minette-bearing district of
Luxemburg and Lorraine, together with the fortifications of Longwy and
Verdun, without which this district cannot be held_.

The possession of larger supplies of coal—and, in particular, of coal
rich in bitumen, which is found in great quantities in the basin of
Northern France—is at least as decisive for the result of this war as
the possession of iron-ore.

Belgium and North France together produce over forty million tons.

Even to-day, as the British prohibition of coal exports (enacted on the
15th of May) shows us, coal is one of the decisive means of political
influence.  The neutral manufacturing States must do the bidding of that
belligerent who can guarantee a supply of coal.  We cannot do this at
present in a sufficient degree, and are to-day already compelled to fall
back upon the Belgian coal supply, in order not to let our neutral
neighbours become entirely dependent upon England.

It is quite probable that the systematic increase of the Belgian coal
output, even during the present war, will prove a weighty factor in
determining various neighbour States to remain neutral.

That coal, which produces coke and gas, at the same time supplies the
bases of our most important explosives, is presumably well known, as
also is the importance of coal in the production of ammonia.

In benzol, moreover, it offers the only substitute for petrol, of which
we are short; and, finally, it supplies coal-tar, which yields (_a_) the
oil fuel so indispensable for the Navy, (_b_) anthracite oil, the most
serviceable substitute as yet obtainable at home for lubricating oil,
and (_c_) naphthaline, the probable base of synthetic petroleum.

It may in this connection be remarked that we should probably be unable
to develop our destroyer and submarine warfare to the requisite
intensity without an abundance of liquid fuel.  The course of the war
has so clearly proved the superiority of oil fuel over ordinary
coal-firing in torpedo-boats, that we should be guilty of unpardonable
folly if we failed to base our future conduct on this experience.

If our hostile neighbours secure the possession of the oil wells,
Germany must take care to secure for herself the necessary supplies of
gas-producing and bituminous coal, and must in time of peace develop
these until they constitute inexhaustible sources of oil, benzol,
toluol, ammonia, and naphthaline; and that, not merely in order to
increase our prosperity in time of peace, but as an indispensable part
of our equipment for war.

To recapitulate: The realisation of the war-aims, which are proposed
above with a view to our permanent economic security, will also
guarantee our military strength, and consequently our political
independence and power: moreover, we shall thus secure an extended field
for our economic activity, which will afford and guarantee increased
opportunities for work, and thus benefit our working classes as a whole.


"The Six Associations," states Grumbach, in his _Annexationist Germany_,
"did not confine themselves to presenting their Petitions to the
Government, but printed them and circulated them in the form of a
confidential pamphlet amongst their members, who are domiciled in all
parts of Germany.  The anti-annexationist league, _Neues Vaterland_ (New
Fatherland), which got to know of it, kindly circulated the Petitions
amongst its own members in the form of a confidential report, thus
bringing them to the notice of a fresh public.  Nevertheless, the great
majority of the German people has, to this day, no accurate knowledge of
the annexationist desires set forth in the Petitions, since the German
newspapers were forbidden to reproduce them.  In foreign countries the
complete text of the Petitions was first published in the Parisian
Socialist newspaper, Humanité, for August 11, 1915, after the Socialist
_Berner Tagwacht_ had published an abridged version on June 22, 1915."




                                 *II.*

                 *THE MANIFESTO OF THE INTELLECTUALS.*


The following is the full text of the Petition agreed on by a number of
German professors, diplomatists, and superior Government officials, at a
meeting held on June 20, 1915, in the _Künstlerhaus_, Berlin, for the
purpose of its being presented to the German Imperial Chancellor:—


The German people and their Emperor have preserved peace for forty-four
years, preserved it until its further maintenance was incompatible with
national honour and security.  Despite her increase in strength and
population, Germany never thought of transgressing the narrow bounds of
her possessions on the European Continent with a view to conquest.  Upon
the world’s markets alone was she forced to make an entry, so as to
ensure her economic existence by peacefully competing with other
nations.

To our enemies, however, even these narrow limits and a share of the
world’s trade necessary to our existence seemed too much, and they
formed plans which aimed at the very annihilation of the German Empire.
Then we Germans rose as one man, from the highest to the meanest,
realising that we must defend not only our physical existence but also
our inner, spiritual, and moral life—in short, defend German and
European civilisation (_Kultur_) against barbarian hordes from the east,
and lust for vengeance and domination from the west.  With God’s help,
hand in hand with our trusty allies, we have been able to maintain
ourselves victoriously against half a world of enemies.

Now however, although another foe has arisen, in Italy, it is no longer
sufficient for us merely to defend ourselves. Our foes have forced the
sword into our hands and have compelled us to make enormous sacrifices
of blood and treasure.  Henceforth our aim is to protect ourselves with
all our might against a repetition of such an attack from every
side—against a whole succession of wars which we might have to wage
against enemies who had again become strong.  Moreover, we are
determined to extend our territory and to establish ourselves so firmly
and so securely upon it that our independent existence shall be
guaranteed for generations to come.

As to these main objects, the nation is unanimous in its determination.
The plain truth, which is supported by evidence from all sides, is
this:—In all classes of the people there is only one single fear, which
is most prevalent and deep-seated in the most simple-minded sections,
viz. the fear that illusory ideas of reconciliation, or even perhaps a
nervous impatience, might lead to the conclusion of a premature and
consequently patched-up peace which could never be lasting; and that, as
happened a hundred years ago, the pen of the diplomats might ruin what
the sword has victoriously won, and this perhaps in the most fateful
hour of German history, when popular feeling has attained an intensity
and unanimity, which were never known in the past and will not so easily
recur in the future.

Let there be no mistake.  We do not wish to dominate the world, but to
have a standing in it fully corresponding to our great position as a
civilised Power and to our economic and military strength.  It may be
that, owing to the numerical superiority of our enemies, we cannot
obtain at a single stroke all that is required in order thus to ensure
our national position; but the military results of this war, obtained by
such great sacrifices, must be utilised to the very utmost possible
extent.  This, we repeat, is the firm determination of the German
people.

To give clear expression to this resolute popular determination, so that
it may be at the service of the Government and may afford it strong
support in its difficult task of enforcing Germany’s necessary claims
against a few faint-hearted individuals at home as well as against
stubborn enemies abroad, is the duty and right of those whose education
and position raise them to the level of intellectual leaders and
protagonists of public opinion.  We appeal to them to fulfil this duty.

Being well aware that a distinction must be drawn between the objects of
the war and the final conditions of peace, that everything of necessity
depends on the final success of our arms, and that it cannot be our
business to discuss Austria-Hungary’s and Turkey’s military objects, we
have drawn up the following brief statement of what, according to our
conviction, constitutes for Germany the guarantee of a lasting peace and
the goal to which the blood-stained roads of this war must lead:

1.  FRANCE.—After being threatened by France for centuries, and after
hearing the cry of _revanche_ from 1815 till 1870, and from 1871 till
1915, we wish to have done with the French menace once for all.  All
classes of our people are imbued with this desire.  There must be no
misplaced attempts at reconciliation, which have always been opposed by
France with the utmost fanaticism; and as regards this we would utter a
most urgent warning to Germans not to deceive themselves.  Even after
the terrible lesson of this unsuccessful war of vengeance, France will
still thirst for _revanche_, in so far as her strength permits. For the
sake of our own existence we must ruthlessly weaken her both politically
and economically, and must improve our military and strategic position
with regard to her. For this purpose, in our opinion, it is necessary to
effect a thorough rectification of our whole Western frontier from
Belfort to the coast.  Part of the North French Channel-coast we must
acquire, if possible, in order to be strategically safer as regards
England and to secure better access to the ocean.

Special measures must be taken, in order that the German Empire may not
suffer any internal injury owing to this enlargement of its frontiers
and addition to its territory.  In order not to have conditions such as
those in Alsace-Lorraine, the most important business undertakings and
estates must be transferred from anti-German ownership to German hands,
France taking over and compensating the former owners. Such portion of
the population as is taken over by us must be allowed absolutely no
influence in the Empire.

Furthermore, we must have no mercy upon France, however terrible the
financial losses her own folly and British self-seeking have already
brought upon her.  We must impose upon her a heavy war indemnity (of
which more hereafter), and indeed upon France before our other enemies.

We must also not forget that she has disproportionately large colonial
possessions, and that, should circumstances arise, England could
indemnify herself out of these, if we do not help ourselves to them.

2.  BELGIUM.—On Belgium, in the acquisition of which so much of the best
German blood has been shed, we must keep a firm hold, political,
military, and economic, despite any arguments which may be urged to the
contrary.  On no point is public opinion so unanimous.  The German
people consider it an absolutely unquestionable matter of honour to keep
a firm hold of Belgium.

From the political and military standpoints it is obvious that, were
this not done, Belgium would be neither more nor less than a basis from
which England could attack and most dangerously menace Germany—in short,
a shield behind which our foes would again assemble against us.
Economically Belgium means a prodigious increase of power to us.

Belgium may also bring us a considerable addition to our population, if
in course of time the Flemish element, which is so closely allied to us,
becomes emancipated from the artificial grip of French culture and
remembers its Teutonic affinities.

As to the problems which we shall have to solve, once we possess
Belgium, we would here confine ourselves to emphasising the following
principles:—(1) The inhabitants must be precluded from exercising any
political influence whatever in the Empire; and (2) the most important
business undertakings and estates (as in the districts to be ceded by
France) must be transferred from anti-German ownership to German hands.

3.  RUSSIA.—On our Eastern frontier the population of the Russian Empire
is increasing on an enormous scale—about 2-½ to 3 millions yearly.
Within a generation a population of 250 millions will be attained.
Against this overwhelming pressure of numbers on our eastern flank,
undoubtedly the greatest danger to the German and European future,
Germany can hold her ground only—(_a_) if a strong boundary-wall be
erected both against the advancing tide of Russification, which
encroaches imperceptibly in times of peace, and also against the menace
of an aggressive war; and (_b_) if we adopt all possible measures to
maintain the past healthy increase of our population.  But the
realisation of both these conditions demands land, which Russia must
cede to us.  It must be agricultural land for colonisation—land which
will yield us healthy peasants, the rejuvenating source of all national
and political energy; land which can take up part of the increase of our
population, and offer to the returning German emigrants, who wish to
turn their backs on hostile foreign countries, a new home in their own
country; land which will increase Germany’s economic independence of
foreign countries, by developing her own possibilities of
food-production, which will constitute the necessary counterpoise to the
advancing industrialisation of our people and the increase of
town-dwellers, thus conserving that equilibrium of our economic
resources, whose inestimable value has been proved during the war, and
saving us from the dangerous one-sidedness of the English economic
system; land which will arrest the decline of the birth-rate, check
emigration, and alleviate the dearth of dwelling-houses; land whose
re-settlement and Germanisation will provide new possibilities of
livelihood for the professional classes also.  Such land for our
physical, moral, and intellectual health is to be found above all in the
East.

The measure in which our Eastern frontier is to be advanced will depend
on the military situation, and in particular also it should be
determined by strategic considerations. As far as the rectification of
the eastern frontier of Posen and Silesia and the southern frontier of
East Prussia is concerned, a frontier zone, accessible to German
colonisation and as far as possible free of private ownership, must be
created.  This German frontier zone will protect the Prussian Poles
against the direct and excessive influence of Russian Poland, which will
perhaps attain its independence.  Moreover, in this connection, we have
no hesitation whatever in drawing special attention to that ancient
territory in the Russian Baltic Provinces, which has been cultivated by
Germans for the last 700 years.  It is sparsely populated, its soil is
fruitful, and it therefore promises to have a great future as a field
for colonisation, whilst its Lithuanian, Lettish, and Esthonian
population is derived from a stock alien to the Russians, which may
prove a reliable source of that supply of journeyman-labour which we so
urgently need.

We based our demand for land for colonisation from Russia on two
grounds—the need for erecting a "boundary-wall" and the need for
maintaining the increase of our population.  But, in the third place,
land is the form in which Russia’s war-indemnity ought to be paid to us.
To obtain an indemnity from Russia in cash or in securities will
probably be just as impossible after this war as it proved after the
Russo-Japanese war.  On the other hand, Russia can easily pay an
indemnity in kind.  Russia is excessively rich in territory, and we
demand that the territory which Russia is to surrender to us in lieu of
a war-indemnity shall be delivered to us for the most part free of
private ownership.  This is by no means an outrageous demand, if we bear
in mind Russian administrative methods. The Russian population is not so
firmly rooted in the soil as that of Western and Central Europe.  Again
and again, right up to the early days of the present war, Russia has
transplanted parts of her population on an enormous scale and settled
them in far distant provinces.  The possibilities of the scheme here
proposed must not be judged in accordance with the modest standards of
German civilisation (_Kultur_).  If the acquisition of political control
over territory is to bring with it that increase of power which we so
urgently need for our future, we must also obtain economic control and
have in the main free disposition over it.  To conclude peace with
Russia without ensuring the diminution of Russian preponderance, and
without acquiring those territorial acquisitions which Germany needs,
would be to lose a great opportunity for promoting Germany’s political,
economic, and social regeneration, and to impose upon future generations
the burden of the final settlement with Russia—in other words, Germany
and European civilisation would be confronted with the certainty of a
renewal of their life-and-death struggle.

4.  ENGLAND, THE EAST, COLONIES, AND OVERSEA TRADE.—The war between us
and Russia has been waged with extraordinary violence, and has led to a
glorious success for our arms; and we must never forget the menace to
our future presented by the enormous Russian mass encamped on our
Eastern frontier, if we should fail to disintegrate it. Nevertheless, we
must never for one moment lose sight of the fact that this war is, in
its ultimate origin, England’s war upon the foreign trade, the naval
power, and the world-prestige of Germany.

Since this is the motive of England’s hostility and war against us, our
war-aims against England are clear.  We must wrest a free field for our
foreign trade, we must enforce the recognition of our naval power and
our world-prestige in spite of England.

We admit that England has taught us one lesson by her blockade, which
has compelled Germany to reorganise herself for the duration of this war
as a self-contained industrial state; for we have learned that, before
and above all, we must win and secure a wider territorial basis in
Europe (as is explained in detail above), in order that we may stand
before the world in the utmost possible political, military and economic
independence.  And we must also create on the Continent the widest
possible sphere of economic interest, directly contiguous with our
country’s frontiers (_i.e._ avoiding sea-routes), so as to free
ourselves as far as possible from dependence upon the good pleasure of
England and of the other world-empires, whose self-sufficiency and
exclusiveness are constantly increasing.  In this respect our political
friendship with Austria-Hungary and Turkey, which is bound to throw open
the Balkans and Western Asia to us, is of the first importance.  It is
therefore necessary that Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Turkey, and
Western Asia, down to the Persian Gulf, should be permanently secured
against the covetousness of Russia and England.  Commercial relations
with our political friends must be furthered by all available means.

But, in the second place, it must be our aim to re-enter the world’s
oversea markets, in spite of England, and even though we have already
safeguarded our foundations on the Continent.  Undoubtedly it will be
necessary to change the direction of a considerable part of our oversea
trade; but we shall also have to conquer anew our old trade and shipping
connections.  Herein we shall in future stand upon our own feet, and
shall, _e.g._, eliminate the hitherto customary mediation of English
bankers and brokers, English arbitrage and exchange business, and the
preponderance of English marine insurance companies.  England has
wantonly destroyed in us the trust and confidence which all such
transactions require, and must pay the penalty by losing the profits
which she has hitherto derived from them at the expense of German trade.
In Africa our aim must be to rebuild our Colonial Empire, making it more
self-contained and stronger than before.  Central Africa alone would, it
is true, give us a great extent of territory, but the value of the
colonial products which it contains does not correspond to its size.  We
must therefore look to other quarters of the globe also, if we are to
secure adequate acquisitions.  From this point of view the importance of
a permanent connection with the world of Islam and the vital necessity
of a safe ocean highway are once more plainly evident.  Those,
therefore, who insist upon colonies at the sacrifice of our security
against England’s naval tyranny over the Channel—those who insist upon
colonies in return for, and subject to, our surrender of Belgium—not
only fail to realise that the acquisition of an extended European basis
for our Fatherland is far more important than all colonial possessions;
they are also guilty of the grave political blunder of aspiring to
colonial possessions without securing their maritime communications,
_i.e._ colonial possessions which will once more be dependent on
England’s arbitrary will.

We must have the freedom of the seas.  For this—which is to benefit all
peoples alike—we are wrestling with England. And if we are to enforce
it, the first requisite is to establish ourselves firmly upon the
Channel, facing England.  As we have already explained above, _we must
retain a firm hold upon Belgium, and we must, if possible, conquer part
of the Channel-coast of Northern France in addition_.  Further, we must
break the chain of England’s naval bases, which encircles the globe, or
weaken it by a corresponding acquisition of German bases.  But Egypt,
which connects English possessions in Africa with those in Asia and
converts the Indian Ocean into an English sea with Australia for its
distant opposite shore; Egypt, which forms the connecting link between
the mother country and all her Eastern colonies:—Egypt is, as Bismarck
said, the neck of the British Empire, the vice in which England holds
East and West in subjection.  _There_ a blow may be dealt at England’s
vital nerve.  If it is successful, the international trade route of the
Suez Canal must be freed from the domination of a single Power, and the
ancient rights of Turkey be protected as far as possible.

But England’s power is also essentially based upon the overwhelming
influence which she exercises on the Governments and the Press of the
whole world.  In order to remedy this state of affairs and to secure
counter-influence for Germany, it is vitally necessary to destroy
England’s monopoly of the cable-service and press-agencies.  Our best
ally in our fight against England’s influence over the world’s public
opinion is freedom—freedom which we shall bring to all nations by
fighting for our own liberation from the yoke imposed by England upon
the world.  We must not strive to dominate and exploit the world, like
the English: our aim should be to safeguard our own special needs, and
then to act as pathmakers and leaders of Europe, respecting and securing
the free self-development of the peoples.

5.  INDEMNITY FOR THE WAR.—Finally, as regards indemnity for the war, we
naturally desire such an indemnity as will, so far as possible, cover
the public cost of the war, make restoration possible in East Prussia
and Alsace, guarantee the establishment of a pension fund for cripples,
widows, and orphans, indemnify private individuals for losses inflicted
on them contrary to international law, and provide for the renewal and
further development of our armaments.

But we are aware that these matters depend not only upon the extent of
our military successes but also upon the financial capacity of our
enemies.  If we found ourselves in a position to impose a war-indemnity
upon England—England, which has always been so niggardly in sacrificing
the lives of its own citizens—no sum in money could be great enough.
England has set the whole world against us, and chiefly by her money.
The purse is the sensitive spot in this nation of shopkeepers.  If we
have the power, we must strike at her purse above all else and without
any consideration whatever.  In all probability, however, we shall have
to look to France (primarily, if not exclusively) for our financial
indemnification.  And we ought not, from a mistaken idea of generosity,
to hesitate to impose upon France the heaviest indemnity.  Let France
turn to her ally across the Channel for the alleviation of this enforced
burden.  If England refuses to fulfil her financial obligations towards
her ally, we shall have secured an incidental political advantage with
which we may be well contented.

But we are primarily concerned to insist that, important as it is to
adopt retrospective measures for the mitigation of the injuries we have
already suffered, it is still more vitally important to secure such
terms of peace as will throw open to our people new paths for a vigorous
future development; and in proportion as a financial indemnity is
unobtainable, increased political and moral justification attaches to
all the demands set forth above for the acquisition of territory, for an
additional supply of productive labour for our manufactures, and for
colonies.  If we win in this titanic struggle, we must not emerge from
it with losses.  Otherwise, despite all our victories, posterity will
view us as the conquered party.

We refrain from expressing any decided opinion on the weighty question
of the mode of payment, but we would draw attention to the following
point.  It would be greatly to our interest, if a considerable part of
the indemnity were paid in the form of foreign securities of such a kind
that their possession would strengthen our economic position in the
countries of our political friends, whilst freeing the latter from the
preponderant influence of England and France.

6.  A POLICY OF CIVILISATION (KULTURPOLITIK) CAN ONLY BE BASED ON A
POLICY OF POWER.—If the signatories of this Petition—particularly the
men of science, the artists, and ecclesiastics—are reproached, on the
ground that the demands which they put forward are solely to promote
Germany’s political and economic power, and perhaps also to satisfy some
of her social requirements, whilst the purely spiritual tasks of
Germany’s future have been forgotten, our answer is as follows:—

Care for the development of the German Mind and Genius (_die Sorge um
den deutschen Geist_) cannot be made a war-aim or a condition of peace.

If, nevertheless, we are to say a few words on this subject, our
position is briefly this.  The German Mind is, in our opinion, beyond
all doubt our one supremely valuable asset.  It is the one priceless
possession amongst all our possessions.  It alone justifies our people’s
existence and their impulse to maintain and assert themselves in the
world; and to it they owe their superiority over all other peoples.
But, in the first place, we must emphatically insist that, if Germany is
to be free to pursue her spiritual vocation, she must first of all
secure her political and economic independence.  And, secondly, to those
who advocate the so-called Policy of Civilisation (_Kulturpolitik_)
alone, to those whose watchword is "The German Mind without the Policy
of Power," we reply: "We have no use for a ’German Mind’ which is in
danger of becoming, as it were, an uprooted national spirit, in danger
of being itself disintegrated and the cause of disintegration in others.
We have no use for a Mind which, having no healthy national body of its
own, is driven to seek vainly in every country for a home and to become
’all things to all men’—a Mind which is forced to be untrue to its own
character and a spurious imitation of the character of the nation that
is its host.  If the demands which we have formulated are satisfied, we
shall create the necessary healthy body for the German Mind.  The
expansion of the national body which we have demanded will do the German
Mind no injury, provided the precautions upon which we have also
insisted are observed.  On the contrary, subject to those precautions,
such an expansion will strengthen the German Mind by providing it with
wider opportunities."

We are well aware that the aims which we have proposed are great, and
that their attainment is impossible without a spirit of resolute
self-sacrifice and the most energetic skill in negotiation.  But we
appeal to a sentence of Bismarck’s: "It is palpably true in Politics, if
it is true anywhere, that ’faith removes mountains,’ that Courage and
Victory are not cause and effect, but identical with one another."


"Amongst the signatories to the above Petition," states Grumbach, in his
_Annexationist Germany_, "were Dr. E. Kirdorf, engineer and general
director of the Gelsenkirchener Mining Company, Ltd.; Herm. Schumacher,
Professor of Political Economy; von Reichenau, Imperial Ambassador
(retired); von Schwerin, President of the Government Board
(_Regierungs-Präsident_) at Frankfort (retired); Reinh. Seeberg,
Professor of Theology, Berlin; Dietr. Schafer, Professor of History,
Berlin.  In a controversy with Professor Delbrück in the _Tägliche
Rundschau_, Professor Seeberg announced that the document contains 1,341
signatures in all, including those of 352 professors of universities and
colleges; 158 schoolmasters and clergymen; 145 superior administrative
officials, mayors, and town-councillors; 148 judges, magistrates, and
lawyers; 40 members of the _Reichstag_ and the _Landtag_; 18 retired
admirals and generals; 182 manufacturers, business men, and bankers; 52
agriculturists; 252 artists, authors, and publishers."




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