Produced by Melissa McDaniel and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was
produced from images generously made available by The
Internet Archive)







Transcriber's Note:

  Inconsistent hyphenation, capitalization, diacritics and spelling
  in the original document have been preserved. Obvious typographical
  errors have been corrected.

  Index inconsistencies with the text have been regularized with the
  text.

  Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.




THE ENGLISHMAN IN CHINA




CHAP. XXIII.: Tsze-kung asked, saying, "Is there one word which may
serve as a rule of practice for all one's life?" The Master said, "Is not
RECIPROCITY such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not do
to others."




  [Illustration: Signature
   J. Thomson, photo.
   Walker & Cockerell, ph. sc.]




     THE ENGLISHMAN IN CHINA
     DURING THE VICTORIAN ERA

     AS ILLUSTRATED IN
     THE CAREER OF
     SIR RUTHERFORD ALCOCK, K.C.B., D.C.L.
     MANY YEARS CONSUL AND MINISTER IN
     CHINA AND JAPAN

     BY
     ALEXANDER MICHIE

     AUTHOR OF
     'THE SIBERIAN OVERLAND ROUTE,' 'MISSIONARIES
     IN CHINA,' ETC.

     VOL. II.

     WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
     EDINBURGH AND LONDON
     MDCCCC




CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME.


         CHAP.                                                    PAGE

         XIX. JAPAN--

               I. THE TREATIES AND THEIR NEGOTIATORS                 1

              II. THE OPERATION OF THE TREATIES                     12

             III. ASSASSINATION PERIOD, 1860-61                     34

              IV. NEGOTIATIONS AND RENEWED ASSASSINATIONS,
                  1862-64                                           44

               V. THE TYCOON'S DILEMMA                              60

              VI. THE CRISIS                                        75

             VII. THE BIRTH OF NEW JAPAN                            92

            VIII. THE DIPLOMATIC BODY--TSUSHIMA                    104

              IX. TRADE AND TRADERS                                115

          XX. SIR RUTHERFORD ALCOCK IN PEKING, 1865-1869--

               I. THE BRITISH LEGATION                             130

              II. FOREIGN LIFE IN PEKING                           138

             III. THE FOREIGN CUSTOMS UNDER THE PEKING CONVENTION  156

              IV. EMIGRATION                                       168

               V. KOREA                                            175

         XXI. THE REVISION OF THE TREATY--

               I. PREPARATION                                      180

              II. THE BURLINGAME MISSION                           192

             III. CHINESE OUTRAGES--YANGCHOW AND FORMOSA           198

              IV. REVISION NEGOTIATIONS AND CONCLUSION             210

        XXII. MISSIONARY PROBLEM--TIENTSIN MASSACRE OF 1870        223

       XXIII. THE EXPANSION OF INTERCOURSE--

               I. RUSSIA AND FRANCE ADVANCING                      250

              II. JAPAN AGGRESSIVE                                 255

             III. KOREA OPENED                                     256

              IV. THE FIRST IMPERIAL AUDIENCE--SUCCESSION OF
                  KWANGHSU                                         260

        XXIV. THE MURDER OF MR MARGARY, 1875--CHEFOO CONVENTION,
              1876--RATIFICATION, 1885--

               I. THE MURDER OF MR MARGARY, 1875                   265

              II. CHEFOO CONVENTION, 1876                          275

             III. THE RATIFICATION, 1885                           282

         XXV. A CHAIN OF INCIDENTS--

               I. DISPUTE WITH RUSSIA RE KULDJA                    290

              II. KOREAN IMBROGLIO, 1882-85                        293

             III. THE PORT HAMILTON EPISODE, 1885-87               303

              IV. TIBET                                            305

               V. THE CRUISE OF THE SEVENTH PRINCE, 1886           312

              VI. THE EMPEROR ASSUMES THE GOVERNMENT, 1889         318

             VII. THE VISIT OF THE CZAREVITCH, 1891                321

        XXVI. THE TONGKING QUARREL                                 324

       XXVII. THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE OF CHRISTIANS                336

      XXVIII. BRITISH SERVICES: DIPLOMATIC, CONSULAR, AND
              JUDICIAL                                             353

        XXIX. CHINA AND HER RULERS                                 368

         XXX. CHINA'S AWAKENING                                    388

        XXXI. THE COLLAPSE                                         403

       XXXII. THE RESETTLEMENT OF THE FAR EAST                     417

      XXXIII. THE OUTCOME--

               I. THE SITUATION IN PEKING                          435

              II. THE CHRONIC CAUSE                                440

             III. IMMEDIATE PROVOCATION                            447

              IV. THE DYNASTIC FACTOR                              455

               V. THE CHINESE OUTBREAK                             461

              VI. THE CRUX                                         464

       XXXIV. SIR RUTHERFORD ALCOCK'S LATER YEARS                  476

       INDEX                                                       490




ILLUSTRATIONS TO THE SECOND VOLUME.


                                                                  PAGE

     SIR RUTHERFORD ALCOCK                              _Frontispiece_

     LORD ELGIN                                                      6

     PRINCE KUNG                                                   134

     WÊNSIANG                                                      136

     MANCHU (TARTAR) WOMEN                                         138

     MANCHU WOMEN                                                  140

     CHINESE WOMEN                                                 142

     CHINESE STREET SCENE DURING RAINY SEASON                      144

     LI HUNG-CHANG AT THE AGE OF FIFTY                             184

     RUINS OF FRENCH CATHEDRAL AT TIENTSIN, BURNED
     JUNE 20, 1870                                                 240

     PEI-T'ANG CATHEDRAL IN PEKING, PURCHASED BY CHINESE
     GOVERNMENT                                                    340

     MINISTERS OF THE YAMÊN OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: H.E. SHÊN
     KUEI-FÊN; H.E. TUNG HSÜN; H.E. MAO CHANG-TSI                  416


MAPS.

     BAY OF YEDO                                                     4

     MAP OF EASTERN ASIA                                      _At end_




In the contents under Chapter XIX. the date of Commodore Perry's
expedition is by a misprint given as 1883-84 instead of 1853-54.




THE ENGLISHMAN IN CHINA.




CHAPTER XIX.

JAPAN.


I. THE TREATIES AND THEIR NEGOTIATORS.

    Commodore Perry's expedition, 1853-54--Townsend Harris--Count
    Poutiatine--Lord Elgin--The treaties of 1858--The solidarity of
    Western Powers--The practical attitude of the Japanese--Their
    yielding to circumstances--The condition of the country--The
    character of the people--Nagasaki--The Dutch--Their two hundred
    years' imprisonment.

A mystery hung over the island empire, which had been sealed against
foreign intercourse for two hundred years, and its mere seclusion, apart
from the weird romance that gilded such fragments of its history as were
known, invested the efforts to reopen the country with a romantic charm.
It was in Japan that Lord Elgin achieved the real diplomatic success of
his life, in the briefest possible time, at the least possible cost, and
with the most far-reaching consequences; for undoubtedly he hastened the
entry of the Land of the Rising Sun into the family of nations.

The poetical side of the mission was done ample justice to by Laurence
Oliphant in his 'Narrative,' by Captain Sherard Osborn in the pages of
'Blackwood,' and elsewhere. The prosaic side and the practical issues of
this rediscovery of an old world were not so clearly apprehended by them
or by any other contemporary writer. The Powers of Europe and America had
long been watching for opportunities to effect an opening in the barrier,
but all tentatives proved in vain until force was resorted to. This was
first done by the United States, whence a naval squadron under Commodore
Perry appeared off the coast in 1853, repeating the visit, on a still more
imposing scale, in 1854. The apparition deeply impressed the minds of
the Japanese Government and people, who, Lafcadio Hearn tells us, speak
to this day of the "black ships," birds of omen foreshadowing events for
which it behoved them to prepare themselves. Black, indeed, they were,
grim of aspect, huge in bulk, and looming larger than they really were,
with their high sides, great paddle-boxes, and "smoke-stacks." The ships
were armed with a few guns of such calibre and power as had not till
then been placed on any floating battery. Jonathan is never second-best
in naval artillery. Commodore Perry with his three black ships, the
steamers Powhattan, Susquehanna, and Mississippi, and his squadron of
sailing-vessels, opened the door of Japan--not very wide, it is true, yet
so that it could never again be closed. The rudimentary treaty he made was
little more than a covenant to supply wood and water to needy ships and
to be merciful to their crews. A similar treaty was made by the English
Admiral Stirling in 1854, and it included the "most-favoured-nation"
clause, only excepting from its application the privileges enjoyed by
China and Holland.

To carry the work forward to a more practical stage a man of affairs was
required, and he was found in the person of Townsend Harris, who was
accredited to Japan under the title of Consul-General for the United
States. Mr Harris had been nearly two years in the country when Lord
Elgin, with his modest escort, arrived and made his acquaintance. With
infinite patience Mr Harris had been prosecuting his negotiations,
against wind and current, it would seem, until a propitious gale wafted
his venture into port. The black ships had gone, but another fleet more
numerous was assembled on the neighbouring coast, whence their fame had
reached the secluded empire. Riding on the shoulders of the Anglo-French
exploits in China, and not obscurely hinting at the prospect of the allies
shortly visiting Japan, Mr Harris induced his Japanese friends to "hurry
up" with his treaty, that it might not only serve as a model of moderation
for the other Powers when they also should come to negotiate, but provide
in advance friendly mediation between them and Japan. Lord Elgin justified
the forewarnings of Mr Harris by appearing in the Bay of Yedo within a
few weeks after the signature of the American treaty.

How much both Mr Harris's treaty and the one which Lord Elgin was about
to sign owed to the previous Russian negotiations cannot be estimated.
Admiral Count Poutiatine concluded a treaty in 1855, and improved it in
1857, on the basis of Sir James Stirling's opening the ports of Nagasaki,
Hakodate, and Shimoda for ship's supplies, with sundry minor privileges.
When Lord Elgin reached the Bay of Yedo in August 1858 he found Count
Poutiatine already there with a frigate and a gunboat.

  [Illustration: BAY OF YEDO.
   _Walker & Cockerell sc._]

This convergence of the great Powers of the world upon a single object,
that of breaking down the seclusion of Japan, was clearly recognised, and
its proximate effect weighed, by the Japanese statesmen of the day. Too
wise to oppose an uncompromising resistance to the pressure, they employed
their skill more profitably in deflecting its course. In accordance with
this policy, Lord Elgin's demand, backed as it was by the prestige of
his recent achievements in China, was promptly conceded, and within the
short space of fourteen days from his arrival in the bay a treaty was
concluded of the same tenor as the American, of which Lord Elgin had
obtained a copy from Mr Harris, who also lent him the invaluable services
of his Dutch interpreter, Mr Heusken. By the two treaties three of the
chief ports of the empire were opened to foreign trade within one year,
and two more at later dates. In some respects the English was an advance
on the American treaty. By the latter the import tariff had been reduced
from the old Dutch rate of 35 per cent to a general rate of 5 per cent _ad
valorem_. The British treaty specifically provided that cotton and woollen
manufactured goods should be included in the class of merchandise paying
5 per cent. The immunities of extra-territoriality were unreservedly
conceded, and were only rescinded by the revised treaties, the first of
which was made with Great Britain in 1894, coming into force in July 1899.

One general remark applies to all treaties made between foreign powers and
China or Japan, that the interests of each separate Power were safeguarded
by the virtual solidarity which existed among them, through the operation
of that convenient diplomatic save-all, the "most-favoured-nation" clause.
This comprehensive provision inserted in the treaties secured for all the
Powers the advantages gained by any one of their number. Faith in this
ultimate protection may have led occasionally to slipshod negotiations.
There might even be a temptation in some cases to seek special credit
for moderation, with the foreknowledge that the exactions of any of the
Powers would inure to the benefit of all. Lord Elgin wrote the simple
truth when he said that, "as regards all these important commercial
privileges, I have to fight the battles of the Western trading nations
single-handed." This feature had been particularly noticeable in the
negotiations in China, where it was so well understood that the English
treaty would be the common standard that it mattered little that the
signature of some of the others was hurried forward so as to take priority
of the British in point of date. The treaty which Lord Elgin negotiated
with Japan was destined to occupy the same ruling position as the treaty
with China, and therefore it devolved upon him to make provision for all
manner of contingencies which no experience could enable him to foresee.
Considering that these treaties were drawn up with so little knowledge of
the circumstances of the country and of the future exigencies of trade,
the fact that they have stood the test of forty years' experience redounds
greatly to the credit of the negotiants.

   [Illustration: LORD ELGIN.]

Lord Elgin had to learn what a Daimio was from Count Poutiatine, who
probably had but just acquired the knowledge himself. It is strange at the
present day to read the solemn preamble, "Her Majesty the Queen of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and his Majesty the Tycoon
of Japan." "It was not till some time later that it was discovered that
there was a still higher power than the Shôgun," said Earl Russell in
1865. The imperfect knowledge, however, attests the general soundness of
the principles adopted.

It must be admitted that on the Japanese side, also, nothing seemed
wanting to render the treaty a workable instrument. The Japanese
negotiators were animated by a more practical spirit than any Chinese
diplomatist with whom foreigners had had dealings. There was no idea in
their minds of blind obstruction; they were bent, if not upon efficient
working, at least on the minimising of friction and risk. And though it
is probable, indeed quite certain, that no treaty whatever could have
been made without substantial force in the background, intelligently
apprehended by the Japanese Government, yet, that being conceded, it
was clearly their object to make the best of the position in which they
actually found themselves. Under no other circumstances could treaties so
complete in detail and so effective for their purpose have been concluded.

To judge of the acts of the pioneers of foreign intercourse, or to form a
just opinion of the conditions under which the treaties came into force,
it would be necessary for the critic to regard the whole surroundings
as a painter does his subject, not representing what he knows or may
afterwards discover to be there, but considering only what actually meets
his eye. This, of course, is next to impossible in the case of Japan,
where the transformation resulting from the contact with foreigners was
so rapid and so kaleidoscopic, and while foreign knowledge of things
Japanese has increased at so marvellous a rate, that only a series of
mutoscopic photographs could have preserved the sequence. Opinions were
at first, and for some time after, unduly affected by the preconception
of a certain analogy between China and Japan founded on geographical
propinquity, and in a measure on language: this bias influenced the first
influx of foreigners in 1859, who were largely drawn from the commercial
ports of China. Yet those who had been habituated to the manners and
customs of the Chinese were at once struck, not by the similarities,
but by the violent contrasts, which the two peoples presented. These
visitants had left behind them filth and squalor; they met cleanliness
and tidiness of an extreme type. They left behind vagueness of thought,
slovenliness of action; and they encountered pedantic precision. They
left behind indifference and stolidity, with ignorance cherished as a
proud possession; and they encountered a keen and intelligent appetite
for knowledge. These features met the stranger before even his ship had
cast anchor, or he had set foot on shore. He soon perceived, also, that
existence was carried on under an elaborate prescription which left but
a narrow margin to spontaneous action, and such a minute supervision
that a sparrow could hardly cross the road without being noted by the
official guardians of the peace; that every function, whether of official
or private life, was under the undisputed control of the same vigilant
organisation.[1] On entering the narrow waters approaching the harbour
of Nagasaki, he would pass under forts where through a telescope he could
see guns and gunners' quarters all spick and span. If there happened to be
another vessel approaching from seaward, he would know it by the booming
of two guns from the outermost fort, the signal being taken up and passed
on by those inland, and so all the way to Yedo. This, he learned, was
the mode of announcing to the capital the appearance of any foreign craft
off the coast. On entering the inner harbour he would see boats full of
men who looked like women, pushing off to his ship; and then a posse of
officers, each armed with two sharp swords, would come on board. They,
by means of a very imperfect interpreter, would at once ply the master
with questions on every conceivable subject, as if he were competing in
an examination in universal knowledge. The tedious catechism, with its
admixture of seeming frivolity, would have been exasperating but for the
imperturbable suavity of the catechists. Every answer was promptly, yet
deliberately, committed to writing. Such was, and is, the custom of the
race.

Nagasaki being still, in the first half of 1859, the gate of Japan,
and the only sample of the country known to foreigners, the bright
welcome with which it greeted the new arrivals was of happy augury. It
was there, also, that the first observations of the ways of Japanese
commerce were made, for Nagasaki had carried on trade with China and
with Holland for two hundred years,--a trade which was conducted on the
one side by officials of the Government, who fixed the prices of the
commodities exchanged, and which was all but strangled by monopoly. The
restricted annual "turn-over" must have required a high percentage of
profit to support the Dutch factory, and the privilege of trading on so
petty a scale seemed to be dearly bought by the perpetual imprisonment
of the agents. The unfortunate Dutchmen were confined, with their whole
establishment of warehouses, residences, &c., within an area of less than
three acres of reclaimed foreshore called Deshima, thus described by Sir
Rutherford Alcock in 'The Capital of the Tycoon':--

    A low fan-shaped strip of land, dammed out from the waters of
    the bay, the handle being towards the shore and truncated. One
    large wide street, with two-storeyed houses on each side, built in
    European style, gives an air of great tidiness; but they look with
    large hollow eyes into each other's interiors in a dismal sort of
    way, as if they had been so engaged for six generations at least,
    and were quite weary of the view.... But the view from the Dutch
    commissioner's residence, with its quaint Japanese garden and
    its fine sweep down the bay, is very charming.... There flitted
    before me a vision of the solitary chiefs of the factory in long
    succession taking up their present station in long rotation and
    looking forward upon the fair bay with which their sight alone
    may be gladdened. How often must the occupants of this lone post
    have strained their eyes looking in vain for the solitary ship
    bringing tidings from Europe and home!

The imprisonment of the Dutch was aggravated by many degrading conditions
imposed by the Japanese Government. Their position bore some analogy to
that of the English and other foreigners in Canton previous to 1839. In
both cases the Europeans endured indignities at the hands of Asiatics for
the sake of profit, but beyond that point it is the differences rather
than the resemblances which are significant. The humiliation of the Dutch
in the island of Deshima was indeed unmitigated so far as it went, but
it was neither capricious nor spiteful. Once the yoke was peacefully
adjusted, what remained of life to the Dutchman was made as agreeable
to him as to a cockatoo in a cage. His jailors had no particular animus
against him; they had a purpose of their own to serve in keeping open,
through the foreigners, a channel of communication with the West, and
they had as valid reasons of State for tethering him as one may have
for tying up his ox or his ass. These purposes once served, however, the
Japanese did not revel in harshness or cruelty.[2] With the Chinese it was
otherwise. They also had a political object in restricting the barbarians,
only they were never satisfied with its attainment, but continued heaping
up insults on their victims to the utmost limits of their submissiveness.

The petty trade which the new-comers were able to do at Nagasaki was,
in the beginning, managed through the existing agency of the Dutch, from
whom, however, there was nothing useful to be learned, much indeed to be
unlearned; and in a few months it was the Dutch themselves who had to go
to school to the interlopers. As commerce had been kept entirely in the
hands of the Government officials, there had been no opportunity for the
rise of any mercantile class among the natives: that was to be a product
of the new era.


II. THE OPERATION OF THE TREATIES.

    Japanese preparations for trade at Yokohama--Mr Alcock's arrival
    as consul-general--Assumes the rank of Minister--The situation
    as he found it--The establishment of diplomatic intercourse
    at the capital--The location of the foreign settlement--The
    currency--The low value of gold--Its rapid exportation--Friction
    caused by conditions of exchange--Efforts of Mr Alcock to set
    matters right--Report by Secretary of H.B.M. Treasury--Japanese
    double standard, gold and copper--Japanese courage in meeting
    difficulties--The Daimios' coinage--Beginnings of trade--Amenities
    of residence--The charm of the people--The two Japans, official
    and non-official--Complete despotism and complete submission.

The treaties of 1858 took their proper effect at the two ports of Hakodate
and Kanagawa; but the former being remote from any centre of population,
and its trading resources so obviously limited, it attracted little
attention in commercial circles. It was in the more southerly port that
the new foreign interests became concentrated; and it was so near the
capital--only seventeen miles distant--that the political and commercial
currents soon acted and reacted on each other with direct, and sometimes
violent, effect. To Kanagawa, therefore, the merchants of all nations
gathered in anticipation of the official opening of the port on the 1st
of July 1859.

We say "Kanagawa," to follow the official nomenclature, but in reality
the adventurers who came there to seek their fortunes did not land at
that place, but three miles away from it, at an obscure village called
Yokohama. There the Japanese Government had decided should be the
future settlement for foreigners, and they had made costly preparations,
according to their lights, for the accommodation of the strangers. Roads
were marked out, a certain number of wooden bungalows had been run up,
a few shops had been opened in the quarter which was designed for native
occupation, a custom-house was built, with warehouses attached, and stone
landing-places had been constructed for boats and lighters. The area thus
marked out for the native and foreign business quarter was a narrow strip
along the sea-shore, having in its flank and rear an immense lagoon, or,
as it was called, "the swamp," intersected by boat channels, where punting
after wildfowl provided amusement for idle foreigners. Being an inlet
of the bay, the swamp made a peninsula of Yokohama, which had just been
connected with the _tokaido_, the great trunk road between the capital
of the Tycoon and that of the Mikado, by a new causeway and several good
bridges, admitting of boat traffic between the swamp and the sea.

In the middle of the swamp, in rear of Yokohama, was a reclaimed portion
whereon was erected an extensive range of buildings connected by a
causeway with the dry land of the settlement. From its balconies there
waved pendants of cotton cloth bearing the legend, "This place is designed
for the amusement of foreigners," a class of amusement of which there has
never been any lack in Japan.

Such were some of the outward and visible preparations made by the
Japanese Government, on its own initiative, for the reception of the
foreigners under the new treaties,--preparations which surprised and
somewhat disconcerted the representatives of the Western Governments when
they arrived on the eve of the opening of the port.

Mr Alcock, who had recently returned to his post as consul at Canton,
was chosen as the first representative of Great Britain in Japan, with
the rank of consul-general. As this rank placed the representative of the
leading Power in an inferior position to his colleagues, and consequently
derogated from the influence he could exercise on the Japanese, Mr Alcock
took it upon himself to assume the title of Plenipotentiary, placing his
resignation in the hands of his Government in case they should disavow
his action. At the same time he recommended that the future British
representative should bear the title of Minister Resident. So far from
disavowing his action, the Government appointed him Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary, a higher rank than that suggested by him,
and he was authorised to at once assume the title, although so unusual
a proceeding as the transfer of a consular official to the diplomatic
service involved considerable delay while the needful formalities were
being arranged. The appointment, however, was coupled with the conditions
that the step should not be made a precedent, and that it should confer
no claim to future diplomatic employment in the countries of the West.

Mr Alcock was conveyed from China in one of her Majesty's ships,
arriving at the port of Nagasaki in June 1859. There he found a fleet
of foreign merchantmen already in the harbour, and some fifteen British
subjects resident on shore, under the ægis of the old Dutch conventions
supplemented by more recent enactments. Mr Alcock remained some days,
and having made arrangements for the carrying on of trade under the new
treaties, left a consul in charge of British interests and proceeded to
Yedo, where he arrived on June 26.

It is a date to be remembered as that of the practical initiation of
diplomatic intercourse with the ruling Power in Japan. The difference
between a mission to negotiate treaties and one to carry them into effect
is thus set forth by Sir Rutherford Alcock in the preface to his valuable
work, 'The Capital of the Tycoon,' in terms the simple truth of which must
commend itself to every candid reader:--

    The Ambassadors Extraordinary had only to extort certain
    privileges on paper; it was the business of the resident Ministers
    to make of these paper-concessions realities--practical, everyday
    realities. As this was the very thing the rulers of the country
    had determined to prevent, it cannot be matter of wonder that
    there was not, and never could be, any real accord, whatever
    the outward professions of good faith and amity. Hence also it
    naturally followed that, although the original negotiators were
    received with smiles, and their path was strewn with flowers,
    their successors had only the poisoned chalice held to their lips,
    thorns in their path, and the scowl of the two-sworded braves and
    Samurai to welcome them whenever they ventured to leave their
    gates--while the assassin haunted their steps, and broke their
    rest in the still hours of the night with fell intent to massacre.

To say the situation was novel is to say little. The forces at work in the
Japanese state economy were either unknown to, or, what was perhaps even
worse, misunderstood by, foreign Powers. The lurid history of previous
intercourse, followed by rigid exclusion for two centuries, would have
sufficed to establish one factor in the problem, the iron resolution of
the Japanese rulers. With such men neutrality or indifference was out
of the question, while there was nothing as yet to indicate what was
henceforth to be the ruling motive of Japanese policy. Both parties were
embarking on an unknown voyage, and the avoidance of shipwreck depended
in a very large measure on the character of those who had to discover for
themselves the winds and currents, the rocks and shoals, through which
they had to steer. The leadership among the foreign Powers was tacitly
assigned to Great Britain, and it was a born leader who was commissioned
to represent her. Mr Alcock had had fifteen years' experience of Asiatic
relations, during which time he had proved himself the possessor of those
qualities which were now in special request. These were indomitable
energy, earnestness of purpose much beyond the common run of official
service, fearlessness of responsibility, and alertness to grasp the
nettle danger in order to avert greater evils, and a spirit which would
neither shirk nor postpone an unpleasant duty nor tolerate lukewarmness
nor dilatoriness in others. He was fifty years old--matured in character
and experience, while yet in the prime of his intellectual vigour.

Mr Alcock arrived in Yedo Bay in time to arrange for the opening of trade
at the appointed date, July 1.

    Nagasaki to Yedo! Two centuries lie between these points, so
    near on the map, but so far and completely separated by the
    determined policy of the Japanese rulers. A policy of isolation so
    effectually carried out that no foreigner, though he might under
    the Dutch flag gain access to Nagasaki, could force or find his
    way to the capital.

Steaming up the Bay of Yedo, and leaving Kanagawa unvisited, Mr Alcock
anchored as close to the capital as the depth of water would allow, and
at once informed the Foreign Minister that he had come to stay. This was
done advisedly, as he has explained, to obviate all discussion as to
his place of residence, for he knew that efforts had been made--_more
Sinico_--through Lord Elgin to induce her Majesty's Government to
postpone the residence in Yedo for a couple of years, and to keep their
representative at a distance. His first object was to obtain a suitable
residence for himself and the Legation staff, in which assistance was
cheerfully rendered by the Government officials, as soon as they saw he
was resolved to remain in the capital. Diplomatic intercourse became thus
an established fact.

The opening of the trading-port did not prove quite so simple, for the
consul-general found he had been forestalled in the choice of a site
for the merchants' residence, which the Government had, as we have seen,
prepared at great expense some three miles away from Kanagawa, the port
named in the treaty. Interpreting this hurried action of the Japanese
as covering the ulterior design of segregating the foreigners from the
natives by thrusting them to a distance from the trunk road which led
through Kanagawa, of keeping them in a kind of imprisonment like the Dutch
at Deshima, and of retaining the power to stop their supplies, whether of
the materials of trade or of sustenance, Mr Alcock warmly contested the
action of the Government. In the end he extorted from them the concession
of a commercial site at Kanagawa itself, which, however, was never taken
up. Events proved too strong for the consul-general, for the merchants
of all nations as they arrived settled in Yokohama, where there was deep
water for shipping and every convenience for business. And it soon began
also to be felt that there was an element of safety in this foreign
settlement being removed from the great imperial road along which armed
processions were continually passing to and from the capital. Within a
year the controversy had died a natural death, and Yokohama speaks for
itself.

The second obstacle to the free course of trade was a more deep-rooted
one, being nothing less than that chronic bugbear of commerce and finance,
the currency. There was no circulating medium in Japan in the least
degree adequate for the service of international commerce. The trade in
miniature that had been carried on in Nagasaki had been a simple exchange
of commodities without the intervention of the precious metals. Mr Consul
Winchester says that neither in the Dutch nor in the Chinese factories
was a Japanese coin ever seen. But the commerce inaugurated in 1859
could brook no such limitations, while the extent of its requirements
was of course absolutely unknown to the negotiators of the treaties.
In this state of doubt and ignorance on both sides it seemed that the
best temporary provision that the circumstances admitted of was for the
Tycoon's Government to undertake, after twelve months, to make all foreign
money current in Japan at its natural value, and that until the expiration
of that period Japanese coin should be supplied in exchange for foreign,
weight for weight. Yet it was a monstrous stipulation to insert in any
international treaty, and could never, in fact, be enforced.

The amazing laxity in this respect with which the treaties of 1858 were
drawn opened the door to unfathomed abuses in the matter of currency.
The coin which was in the minds of the American and English negotiators
was what was then current on the coast of China, the dollar, or more
specifically the Mexican dollar. Yet, as was afterwards pointed out by
Mr G. Arbuthnot, Secretary to her Majesty's Treasury, no provision was
made in the treaties expressly for exchanging that, but only British and
American money. In his opinion the Tycoon's Government might have refused
altogether to receive the Mexican dollar, which was the only coin tendered
to them, and thus the currency clause in the treaty would have been a dead
letter from the first. But since they did not know the weakness of the
ground which the foreigners had chosen, they had to fight out the question
under all the disadvantages of a false position.

By the treaty provisions, then, as interpreted by both sides, the foreign
merchants who chose to import specie were to be supplied in exchange with
current coin of the realm whereby they could purchase the produce of the
country without awaiting the slow and uncertain realisation of imported
merchandise. But the Japanese, apart from any question of good faith,
had vastly under-estimated the demand which this agreement was to make on
their mintage resources. They could only supply tens where thousands were
required, and in consequence of their scarcity native silver coins were
soon run up to a high premium. These coins were needed not alone for the
purchase of produce, but for the more lucrative investment in the gold
coinage of the country; for an extraordinary anomaly presented itself to
the foreign traders in the relative value of silver and gold in Japan. The
ratio between the two metals throughout the commercial world was at that
time about fifteen to one, but in Japan, owing partly to the fact that
the silver _ichibu_ was a token coin, and yet interchangeable, weight for
weight, with foreign silver coins, the ratio in the market was reduced to
five to one. Nothing could better show how completely the country had been
isolated than this simple phenomenon. Since the seclusion of Japan no such
opportunity of profit without risk had ever tempted merchant adventurers
outside the dreams of romance.[3] It could not be the intention of the
treaty-makers to deprive Japan of her gold, yet the exportation of it
was not only not prohibited, it was expressly sanctioned by treaty, the
export of copper coins alone being forbidden; and once the conduit was
opened no power could arrest the flow from the higher to the lower level.
The currency question presented many intricacies and anomalies against
which the foreign representatives struggled in the dark, but the ratio of
gold to silver was the ruling factor which underlay the whole problem,
and until every _koban_ was exported, or the relative value of gold and
silver had been assimilated to that of the outer world, there could be no
settlement of the currency question in Japan.

In the mean time the friction caused by the unsatisfied demands of the
traders was considerable; it became in time ludicrous. There was a daily
exchange held at the custom-house, and various arbitrary systems of
distribution were adopted by the officials there. The discovery that a
kind of manhood suffrage was recognised, and that an employee received
as much as his employer, led to applications being made in the names of
servants and even of fictitious persons, to each of whom an allotment
was granted. Again, the discovery that allotments were also made _pro
rata_ according to the amount applied for led to the applications being
sent in for ever larger and larger sums until billions and quintillions
were reached. By such devices, no doubt, some of the applicants may have
gained a momentary advantage over their neighbours, but at no time did
the merchants receive a sufficiency of Japanese coin to carry on the most
restricted business. At one time, about a year after the opening, it was
estimated that there was in the hands of foreign merchants one million
and a half of dollars which were not exchangeable, and were a "drug in
the market."

Their wants were, however, partially supplied in another manner. For among
the anomalies of the place and period one must be mentioned which had a
quite peculiar bearing on the supply of currency for commercial purposes.
The precious coin, which was doled out homœopathically to merchants, was
supplied to foreign officials in liberal measure. Every minister, consul,
and assistant; every admiral, captain, and lieutenant; every paymaster,
for himself and for the service of his ship, received his quota of
Japanese money on a scale graduated according to rank. The amount put in
circulation by these means was given by Mr Winchester as $2,000,000 per
annum. The recipients, whether directly or through agents, were able to
sell their surpluses to the merchants, of course at a handsome profit, and
no doubt abuses grew out of what was in its original intention a simple
measure of justice to salaried officers. The practice was condemned by
Mr Arbuthnot, and was discontinued by order of the Foreign Office in
1864, on the initiative of the Prussian Government, whose agent in Japan
had voluntarily renounced the privilege. But, oddly enough, the official
exchange was resumed by request of the Japanese Government, and continued
for several years longer, until, in fact, foreign and native coin had
found their common level.

Trade certainly suffered much in the beginning from the incongruous state
of the currency, which was greatly more complicated than we have attempted
to outline. Even after the year of probation foreign coins were neither
received by traders at their value nor exchangeable in accordance with
the treaties. Whether the Government was at the bottom of the obstruction
or was overruled by circumstances beyond its control was uncertain, but
the British consul-general made masterful exertions to set the matter
right. Currency reform, however, has baffled so many generations of expert
economists that, even assuming the goodwill of the native Government,
an alien official new to the country must have found it difficult to
accomplish much, with the time and means at his disposal. Earl Russell
in 1862 "declined to pronounce on so large and intricate a question," and
would not even discuss it with the Japanese envoys.

Japanese currency formed the subject of four elaborate reports by the
Secretary to her Majesty's Treasury, extending over twelve months, from
December 1862 to December 1863, drawn up after personal conference
with Sir Rutherford Alcock and on information derived from various
other sources, especially from a series of very able papers by Consul
Winchester. In each of these reports Mr Arbuthnot remarks on the paucity
of data, and in each he qualifies the deductions of the preceding one. Had
the series been still further extended, it is even doubtful if finality
of judgment would have been reached; for in his third report he says, "The
whole question, both as regards the condition of the currency and the real
intentions of the Japanese Government, is involved in so much obscurity
that no sound judgment can yet be formed on the subject" (May 1863).

It would be a mere weariness to the reader to attempt to elucidate a
problem which an expert student found perplexing, but a few salient
points brought out in Mr Arbuthnot's review may repay citation, as
illustrative of the general state of relations beyond the immediate
question of the currency. "We found," he says, "the Japanese with a
carefully devised system of coinage, presenting indeed anomalies, when
regarded from a European point of view, but apparently well adapted to
their domestic wants; and their coins were found on assay in London to be
well manufactured." The Chinese had no such system, and the evolution of
a metallic currency entitled to such high praise, in a country from which
the rest of the world had been long shut off, is one of the most striking
evidences of the high originating faculty of the Japanese.

As to the stipulation in the treaties that foreign coin should be current
in Japan on a par with native, weight for weight (not a word said about
purity), it was not only preposterous and absolutely unworkable, but
it was imposed by the ignorance of the foreign negotiators against the
superior knowledge of the Japanese; for it is remarkable that in the
negotiations carried on by the Americans in 1854 the Japanese took up the
impregnable ground that "American coin was only bullion to them." Force
alone--or the fear of it--drove them from that position in 1858, and in
yielding to the unreasoning pressure of the subsequent negotiators the
Japanese probably consoled themselves with their resources of secret
evasion to save them from the worst consequences of the obligation--a
characteristic of the whole treaty-making campaign.

It appeared to Mr Arbuthnot that the Japanese had a double
standard--itself "a contradiction in terms"--gold and copper; silver
occupying the position of a token currency between the two, at a highly
artificial value, strictly governed by law. The fact was exemplified in
many ways. Art objects in silver contained more metal than the coin paid
for them, the work of the artificer thrown into the bargain. Gold and
copper, on the other hand, bore about the same relationship to each other
as prevailed in other countries. It was silver alone that was maintained
at a conventional level three times above its value in the outer world.
And the philosophy of this is explained by Mr Winchester, who tells us
that, whereas the supply of gold and copper was in many hands, the sources
of the supply of silver were in the exclusive control of the Tycoon's
Government, which derived great advantage from maintaining the silver
coinage at a high fictitious level.

The efforts of the Japanese to readjust the currency to meet the demands
of the treaty were naturally first directed to silver, which was recoined
and revalued, but confusion was worse confounded by all these attempts.
Eventually the gold _koban_, worth intrinsically 18s. 4d. sterling, or 4
_bus_ of the intrinsic value of 1s. 4d., was reduced to a sterling value
of 5s. 6d., but was still rated at 4 _bus_, while the copper coinage was
disestablished and iron substituted of no intrinsic value. "I am aware of
no other example," says Mr Arbuthnot, "of so sudden and violent a rending
of the monetary regulations of a country; certainly of none which has been
produced by the interference of foreigners."

The effect of these inquiries by the Treasury was to discourage further
interference by foreign Governments, to trust much to that great solvent
of anomalies, the silent operation of commerce; while the only complete
remedy was recognised as the establishment of a mint under European
regulations.

The problem was still further complicated by the separate coinage of
the Daimios. Their _nibukin_, as a general rule, passed only at first in
their own provinces, but gradually they filtered down to the open ports,
and at one time considerable embarrassment arose from the mixture of the
coinage thus caused. In 1871-72 the Imperial Government, then just come to
supreme power, took the matter up with the thoroughness they showed in all
their doings. They gave secret notice to the foreign Ministers of their
intention to call in all princes' _nibukin_, and thereupon issued an order
that during one week these coins should be brought into the custom-houses
at the treaty ports, where they would be fastened up in sealed packets
of $100 value, and notified that coins so stamped within the week would
be accepted by the Government as legal tender, but that thereafter their
use would be prohibited. Now, as the Daimios' money stood at about 90 per
cent discount at the time, the fact that some of the foreign officials who
had access to this confidential information were also merchants created
immediate speculation, with the result that within a fortnight these
silver-gilt _nibukin_ rose from 90 per cent discount to 2 or 3 per cent
premium, the officially sealed packets being a most convenient form for
the payment of duties.

The alacrity with which the Government applied heroic remedies to a
disastrous predicament was typical of the energy of the Japanese, which
has been displayed since in wider fields. They do not sit down and bemoan
their troubles, but at once arm themselves against them.

When to the inherent difficulties common to currency problems
generally were superadded the complexities of the monetary system of a
non-commercial and long-secluded country, surprise should be felt that the
regulation of the circulating medium in Japan was accomplished so soon,
rather than that it took so many years to arrive at the solution. The
Tycoon's Government did not live long enough to settle the currency, but
left the problem as a legacy to the Restoration. A good many years elapsed
before the Mikado's Government succeeded in evolving order out of chaos.

In the mean time, in spite of many drawbacks, trade was making headway
in other directions besides the exportation of gold, and quaint indeed
were the beginnings of it. The staple products happened to be the same
in Japan as in China, tea and silk, and they soon began to be regularly
brought down to Yokohama for sale. But business was at first on such
a lilliputian scale, and was introduced in so dainty a manner, that to
merchants accustomed to the large transactions of China the whole affair
wore something of the air of comic opera, or as if children were playing
at being merchants. This impression was strengthened by the aspect of
the fragile wooden structures with their sliding doors and windows, but
without sitting accommodation, wherein business was transacted, which to
those habituated to the massive, if inelegant, buildings of Hongkong and
Shanghai irresistibly suggested the idea of a doll's house. The Chinese
methods also were inverted. Instead of sending samples of substantial
quantities, such as a thousand chests of tea or fifty bales of silk, and
the owner or his broker coming to chaffer in the silk-room or the tea-room
of the foreign merchant, the latter had to go the round of the Japanese
shops to find out what they had got. Early every morning the leading
merchants might be seen booted to the thighs--for the rain was frequent
and the roads unmade--trudging up and down the Japanese bazaar to see
what novelties had come to hand. The more zealous would sometimes make a
second round in the afternoon, in case there might be some late as well
as early worms to be picked up. The bodily fatigue and consumption of time
involved in this process would have rendered a large business impossible.
There were as yet no Japanese merchants properly so called, and their
endless parley resembled more the tenacious higgling of peasants than
the negotiations of men of business. Moreover, the native dealers seemed
scarcely conscious of any law which should hold them to a bargain in the
event of a more acceptable offer turning up.

Conclusions unfavourable to Japanese commercial morality have been
drawn from some of those early--and later--experiences; but commercial
like other kinds of specialised morality has necessarily something of a
professional character. The _akindo_, or merchant, was a sort of pariah
in Japan, his social status being inferior to those of the peasant and
the handicraftsman. His sense of honour was not, therefore, sustained by
tradition or stimulated by _esprit de corps_. There being no mercantile
body in Japan, there was no mercantile code, at least none applicable
to international trade, and those unwritten laws without which large
commerce is impossible had not yet been called into being. Contrasts
between the two neighbouring nations have just been mentioned very much
to the advantage of the Japanese; but in matters of commerce, it must be
conceded, the advantage lay entirely with the Chinese, a nation of traders
from their birth.

In the sale of lacquer ware and objects of art the Japanese were much
more at home than in dealing in raw products of foreign manufactures,
and the treasures which were in the early days exposed in the shops of
Yokohama would make a modern dealer sigh for opportunities which are
no more. Speaking roundly, it would have been safe to buy the stock
indiscriminately at the sellers' own prices, when fortune would have
awaited the investor as surely as if he had bought up the gold coinage
at the ratio of 5 to 1. The same remark would apply to such of the raw
produce of Japan as had been in large demand in China; and conversely
the rule applied also to selected articles of foreign manufacture,
which the Japanese were satisfied to buy at a price mid-way between
the high level of the Dutch monopoly and the low level of what would
remunerate the free importer. Therefore the sudden inroad of open trade
on a market artificially confined resulted in profitable trading while
a new equilibrium was being found; but such prosperity was in its nature
evanescent.

Irrespective of the material aims which attracted foreign residents to
Japan, the life itself presented several novel and interesting features.
Nothing could have been pleasanter than the social relations which
sprang up between the foreign communities and the unofficial natives.
The strangers were received everywhere with open arms, and the residence
among a smiling people (excluding altogether the meretricious allurements
of the country, which have also not been without their influence) and
amid enchanting scenery was found to add a new pleasure to existence.
Here again we must resort for illustration to a comparison with China,
where strangers at the best were sullenly tolerated, where one might live
a lifetime without entering a house, or seeing a respectable woman, or
making a friend save on a business footing. The Japanese of Yokohama and
Kanagawa, as well as in the surrounding villages and temples, never failed
in courtesy and hospitality to passers-by, and were eager for conversation
with foreigners. A useful smattering of the language was soon acquired
under the stimulus of a quick-witted and sympathetic people alert to jump
at the meaning and patient to help the novice to find his words. The women
of the household were always charming, and if their domestic conversation
sometimes startled the stranger by its freedom, there was neither malice
nor any such impropriety as leaves an evil odour in its trail. Friendships
were formed, not deep perhaps, but genuine as far as they went, and
certainly not the less sincere on the Japanese than on the foreign side.

The intelligence also of the common people enhanced both the pleasure and
the value of friendly intercourse with them: apt as they were to receive,
they were no less ready to impart, information. Their appreciation of
their country--its beauties, history, traditions, and folk-lore--was
conscious and unrestrained, indeed it amounted to a passion. This afforded
endless subject for talk. Everything save the politics of the day might
be freely discussed, and though the first-arrived foreigners came poorly
prepared to assimilate so much that was novel, they could not help
carrying away a good deal from their frequent confabulations. The native
guide-books formed a reservoir of suggestive topics: surprisingly minute
they were, noting every gem of scenery or point of interest, with the
legends of history, romance, or mythology attaching to them. So accurate
were these itineraries that with their contents well studied foreigners
might make excursions inland lasting several days without the aid of guide
or the necessity of inquiring the way.

It need not, of course, be said that the mutual intelligence of Japanese
and foreigners did not penetrate below the surface of every-day phenomena.
Of their festivals, their pilgrimages, their votive offerings to temples
and shrines, their ancestral worship, and their whole relation to the
Unseen--call it religion, superstition, or idolatry--the strangers had
no comprehension. Although its outward symbols were passing constantly
under their eyes, esoteric Japan was to them a sealed book, as the mental
processes of the Oriental always are to the Occidental, whose imagination
is cramped by the syllogism, and whose faith languishes for demonstration.
There was, however, ample outside the region of mysticism, outside the
concerns of trade, and equally apart from political questions, to nourish
the best relations between Japanese and foreigners.

The impressions of the British Minister on his journeys of relaxation
are by no means the least interesting portion of his important work,
'The Capital of the Tycoon.' Having shaken off the official incubus, and
breathing the free air of the country, the intercourse with the common
people in which he was able to indulge was fruitful of reflections of
a brighter hue than any that were prompted by his strenuous life in the
capital. He observes:--

    They are really a kindly people when not perverted by their rulers
    and prompted to hostility.... I had begun to forget I was in
    Japan, so much goodwill was shown.... There may be a good deal
    of tyranny and oppression, but the people show no marks of it....
    The feudal lord is everything and the lower and labouring classes
    nothing. Yet what do we see? Peace, plenty, apparent content, and
    a country more perfectly and carefully cultivated and kept, with
    more ornamental timber everywhere, than can be matched even in
    England.... The material prosperity of a population estimated at
    thirty millions, which has made a garden of Eden of this volcanic
    soil, and had grown in numbers and in wealth by unaided native
    industry.

Such were the observations made during a few days' rest at the mineral
springs of Atami, and they coincided exactly with the opinions formed
by those whose daily intercourse lay with these same common people, in
which term, of course, were included such town populations as foreigners
had acquaintance with. A contemporary writer, Nagasaki, 1859, remarked:
"The Government of Japan is the most absolute despotism in the world,
and perfectly successful.... For the present it is consistent with great
prosperity and contentment on the part of the people, but it seems to me
it is only their exclusive policy that has kept it so."

The great, industrious, prosperous masses of Japan, enjoying the gifts of
the gods with thankful hearts, and drinking the cup of life as presented
to them without any acidulating scruples, seemed to be happiest of all in
this, that they were not burdened with the dignity of wearing swords. The
storms that convulsed the upper regions passed over their humble heads
without interrupting the cast of a fishing-net or hindering by a day
the gathering of their harvest. How different the life of the nobles and
their following! their humanity dominated by an elaborate and intolerable
ceremonial, settling their quarrels at the sword's point, and ever on the
alert for bloody intrigue.[4]

For there were two Japans, that of the people and that of the ruling
class, separated by an impassable gulf. "The very existence of the
plebeian seems unrecognised by the patrician in his lordly progress,"
wrote Sir Rutherford Alcock. "And for that very reason there may be more
real liberty among the mass of the people than we imagine."

The members of the official class were distinguished by carrying in
their girdle two heavy swords with a razor's edge, one long, one short.
The functionaries of the custom-house, with whom alone the foreign lay
community had contact, also wore swords as part of their official uniform,
which they placed with delicate ceremony on a rack in front of them
as they sat on their mats at the receipt of custom,--for there were no
chairs, and the habitual posture was squatting on the hams and heels. To
the aristocratic caste the Japanese people were as absolutely submissive
as if every two-sworded man wielded the power of life and death, which,
so far as the common people were concerned, was not far from the simple
truth.[5] The only great concourses of armed men which the foreign
residents were in the way of seeing were the Daimio processions, which,
hundreds, sometimes thousands strong, were constantly travelling along
the highroad; and in the long town of Kanagawa they could observe the
people prostrated by the sides of the road with heads abased while the
great man with his scowling retainers passed. Residents in Yedo--that is,
the _personnel_ of the foreign Legations--had less agreeable experience
of these feudal swordsmen, who, living in idleness during their prince's
sojourn in the capital, were quick in quarrel, especially in their cups,
and far from agreeable to meet in the streets.


III. ASSASSINATION PERIOD, 1860-61.

    Storms begin--Russians murdered at Kanagawa--Two Dutchmen
    in Yokohama--Prince regent assassinated--Servant of French
    Minister attacked--Mr Heusken, secretary to American Legation,
    murdered--Ministers withdraw to Yokohama--And return to
    Yedo--First murderous attack on British Legation, 1861--Mr
    Oliphant wounded--Attempt on a Japanese Minister--The causes
    of these outrages--Partly anti-foreign feeling--Foreign
    treaties imposed by force on Tycoon never received sanction of
    emperor--Hence universal hostility to foreigners--Internecine
    jealousy--Mr Alcock makes ascent of Fujiyama--Against the wish of
    Japanese Ministers--Makes a second overland journey from Nagasaki
    to Yedo--Sullen attitude of Daimios.

The ports had not been many months opened when storms began to disturb the
political sky, and the idyllic charm of the new life became tempered by
assassination. The why and the wherefore of these outrages was imperfectly
understood at the time, though it has since been copiously expounded.
The uncertainty as to the moving cause or causes rendered precautions
difficult, and the only safe resource was a watchful eye and the nimble
revolver.

Much bad feeling had been displayed towards the foreign diplomatic staff
in Yedo, and assaults had been frequent, but nothing of a tragic nature
had occurred until the arrival of a Russian squadron of ten ships, with
Count Mouravieff-Amurski on board. He landed in August 1859 with an escort
of 300 men in Yedo, where he was safe; but an officer and two men at
Kanagawa, buying provisions, were cut to pieces by armed Japanese. This
was what Sir Rutherford Alcock designated as "first blood." The next was
the assassination of a native linguist employed in the British Legation.
Early in 1860 two Dutch shipmasters, one over sixty years of age, were
hacked to pieces in Yokohama. Next the prince regent himself was, within
the precincts of the castle, set upon by an armed band of retainers of the
Prince of Mito and killed, his head being carried off to assure the said
prince of the accomplishment of an act of long-meditated revenge.

Before the end of the year 1860 the Italian servant of the French Minister
had to defend himself at the entrance of the Legation from the murderous
attack of a couple of two-sworded men; and the year 1861 was ushered in
by the assassination of Mr Heusken, secretary to the American Legation,
on his way from the Prussian Minister, whom he had been assisting in the
negotiation of his treaty. This crime filled the cup for the time being.
The Government proved itself unable or unwilling to protect the diplomatic
body from their bloodthirsty assailants, and three out of the four foreign
representatives--the Dutch minister not being at the time resident in
Yedo--made a protest to the Tycoon's Government, struck their flags, and
withdrew to Yokohama. The American Minister alone remained in Yedo. Soon
the Prussian and Dutch returned thither, leaving only the British and
French representatives in Yokohama, where they remained until specially
invited back to the capital under conditions which they had demanded of
the Government.

The following summer witnessed the most desperate attempt of all to
exterminate the inmates of at least one of the Legations. Mr Alcock had
just returned from a long, venturesome, dangerous, but most fruitful
journey overland from south to north--from Nagasaki to Yedo--which
included a sea passage through the Inland Sea, when an assault was made
on the Legation at midnight on 4th July 1861. The Tycoon's guard of 150
men are charitably credited with having been asleep, for they opposed no
obstacle to the entrance of a band of men who cut an opening through a
substantial bamboo stockade at the outer gate, and on their way thence
to the apartments of the Legation staff, a distance of some three hundred
yards, killed, at intervals, four men, some of whom defended themselves,
and a barking dog. The scene is fully and graphically described in 'The
Capital of the Tycoon.' The central object of the attack seems to have
been the Minister himself, who however escaped unhurt, while two members
of the Legation were wounded,--Laurence Oliphant, who had recently come
out as secretary of Legation, having a very severe sword-cut in the arm
and another in the neck. Being more than common tall, Mr Oliphant's head
was saved by the intervention of a low beam, in which a deep sword-cut
was found. If that brilliant writer had seen Yedo rose-tinted in 1858,
he had now at least a chance of judging it in a greyer light. The guard
did not put in an appearance until after the assailants had been beaten
off from, or at least baffled in, their attempt on that portion of the
temple buildings which was occupied by the Minister, and a fierce struggle
ensued in the precincts, in which two of the assailants were killed and
one badly wounded, while twelve of the guard were wounded and one of the
Tycoon's bodyguard killed. The details of Japanese sword-play are not
pleasant matters to dwell upon, but a few words from Mr Alcock's notes
of the tragedy will suffice to give an idea of the manner in which these
massacres were carried out. "I have seen many a battlefield," he says,
"but of sabre wounds I never saw any so horrible. One man had his skull
shorn clean through from the back and half the head sliced off to the
spine, while his limbs only hung together by shreds." "There is probably
not in all the annals of our diplomacy an example of such a bloodthirsty
and deliberate plot to massacre a whole Legation."

This is a sufficiently full list of the outrages of what may be called
the Yedo period, to distinguish it from a subsequent chapter of history
which was opened in connection with the new port in the Inland Sea, but
which is beyond the range of the present work.

The only conclusions to be drawn from these occurrences, and those yet to
be related, were--(1) that either the Tycoon's Government itself or some
powerful faction was in deadly opposition to the admission of foreigners
into the country, and (2) that the Tycoon's Government was either unable
or unwilling to protect the persons of foreigners either within the
capital or out of it; (3) that certain great Daimios were concerned
in these murderous outrages. The Prince of Mito's men assassinated the
regent, and were most probably the assailants of the British Legation,
while the Prince of Satsuma's retainers killed Richardson. Another great
Daimio, whose forts commanded the western gate of the Inland Sea, put
himself a year later in a state of war with all the foreign nations.

The motives of these powerful feudatories were not free from ambiguity,
for they might be animated by a _bonâ fide_ desire to expel the
foreigners, or they might be plotting to embroil the Government with the
Western Powers. It was evident that the authority of the Tycoon over the
great Daimios was far from absolute, and that at any rate he dared not
enforce it in defence of the hated foreigners.[6] Thus the Legations were
left to the mercy of a ferocity which has known no parallel. The midnight
attempt on the British Legation on July 4, 1861, typified the whole
situation. The inmates were ignorant whence the several attacks on them
came, the imperial and Daimio's guard were asserted to have slept through
the crucial stage of the assault, and the provoking cause of the attempt
to exterminate the English was unknown. In such a maze of occult forces
it was almost as difficult to adopt precautions as against earthquakes.

What lay at the root of all these troubles, according to the deliberate
opinion of Mr Alcock, was that the foreign treaties had been forced on the
Government against its will and in violation of the fundamental laws of
the empire. He says the treaties were not sanctioned by the Mikado, and
that therefore the opposition of the Daimios was on strictly legitimate
lines. Also that the law of the seventeenth century which made it a
capital offence for a foreigner to land in Japan had not been repealed.
The Tycoon's Ministers had been scared into signing even Commodore Perry's
almost platonic treaty; for though that officer had strict orders to
use no force, he did not impart this information to the Japanese, and
they could not otherwise interpret the naval demonstration than as an
intimation that the ship's guns would support the commodore's demands. The
case of Mr Harris's treaty of 1858 was even clearer. It had been drawn up,
but the signature postponed _sine die_ until the great nobles should have
been gained over, and Mr Harris retired to his retreat at Shimoda to wait
events. The news of the forcing of the Peiho forts by the Anglo-French
squadron and the imposing of a treaty on the Emperor of China was conveyed
express to Mr Harris by the steam frigate Mississippi. Another vessel,
the Powhattan, arrived fortuitously at the same time, in which Mr Harris
proceeded to Kanagawa, where commissioners were sent down at once to meet
him, and in three days the treaty was signed. Of course the Allies who
had forced the door of China, having no quarrel whatever with Japan, had
no more thought of coercing that country than the United States had in
1853 and 1854; but it was perhaps scarcely conceivable to the oriental
mind that any nation should deny itself the exercise of a power it
consciously possessed. Naturally, therefore, the Japanese were predisposed
to believe in the aggressive purposes of the invaders of China. No less
natural was it that subsequent evidence of the self-imposed limitation of
their pressure on China should lead the Tycoon's advisers to deplore the
panic-haste with which they had been hustled into making treaties against
the will of the great council of the Empire. In the interval between the
signing and the execution of the treaties the Government had time for
reflection on all that: the malcontent majority of Daimios had also time
to consider what resistance they could offer to innovations which they
detested.

The reactionary policy that had set in was also clearly shown in the
obstacles thrown in the way of the negotiation of the Prussian treaty.
Count Eulenberg had been six months at work, and as his treaty was but a
copy of those already signed there was no reason in the thing itself for
the obstruction. But Prussia was not then a nation from which there was
much to be feared at such a distance, and therefore the true disposition
of the Japanese Government had free play.

The Tycoonate itself was a perpetual cause of jealousy among the three
great families, one of which was Mito, who had themselves pretensions
to the honour; and the combination of their private grievances with a
quasi-patriotic and probably sincere hatred of foreign intruders raised
a storm against the Tycoon with which his advisers found it hard to cope.
The Government being committed to the protection of foreigners, massacres
of the latter offered a ready means of gratifying the double passion of
hatred of them and of the Tycoon.

But although the foreign representatives and the Tycoon were thus to an
unknown extent the objects of a common enmity, it was yet impossible for
them to make common cause, for they were not in harmony. The Government
would willingly have got rid of the treaties or reduced them to a dead
letter. The foreign Ministers, on the other hand, had no choice but to
insist on the fulfilment of the engagements into which the Government had
entered. Not for them to count the cost, the difficulties, or the danger:
relaxation of their demands would have aggravated all three. So there was
nothing for it but the "rigour of the game."

The British Minister held decided views on the importance of keeping alive
all rights and privileges by exercising them. China would have taught
him, if the knowledge did not come by nature, the value of the modern
principle of "effective occupation" as the only valid sanction of an
abstract title. The treaties of 1858 conferred upon the representatives
of Foreign Powers the right of travelling throughout Japan. The Tycoon's
Government desired to restrict or nullify the privilege, no doubt for
reasons quite sufficient from their point of view. Mr Alcock on his part
saw good reasons for opposing this tendency from the outset. Consequently,
as a first experiment, he organised a journey by the _tokaido_ to the
"matchless" mountain, Fujiyama, distant about eighty miles from the
capital. Every effort was made by the Government officials to dissuade
him from the undertaking; dangers natural and supernatural were conjured
up, a more convenient season was recommended. At length their pleas
for the abandonment or delay of the expedition having been exhausted
without any effect on the resolution of the Minister, the officials
became helpful in the preparations and most careful to provide for the
success of the journey. The party--eight Europeans in all with a large
native contingent--set out on September 4, 1860, rather late in the year
for the ascent, which was, nevertheless, successfully accomplished, and
for the first time the foot of the stranger trod the sacred summit, the
object of constant religious pilgrimages. The whole journey, including a
detour to the hot springs of Atami, occupied one month: it was fruitful
in first-hand information, and replete with agreeable experiences.

A more important journey was undertaken eight months later, on the
occasion of a return voyage from China and Hongkong, whither the Minister
had gone on certain legal business. Being at Nagasaki, Mr Alcock arranged
to travel in the company of Mr de Wit, the head of the Dutch mission,
across the island of Kiusiu, then by junk up the Inland Sea to Hiogo,
thence by the highroad to Yedo. The proposal met with the same kind of
opposition from the Japanese authorities as the going to Fujiyama the
previous year had done: the dangers of the journey were depicted in strong
colours, and the unsettled state of the country was alleged as a cogent
reason why a foreigner should not trust himself on the highroad. When
these arguments proved unavailing, and the journey was finally resolved
upon, the authorities endeavoured to minimise both its pleasure and its
usefulness by an attempt to extort from the two Ministers an undertaking
in writing never to go in advance of the escort or to leave the highroad.
The plea for the latter restriction was that the road alone was under
imperial control, the land on either side belonging to the Daimios. The
feudatories on their part took effective measures to enforce the condition
by supplying guards through their respective domains, who blocked up every
byway, and in the towns and villages where the party rested screened off
the side streets even from view by means of large curtains stretched on
high poles, emblazoned with the Prince's arms. When the party landed
at Hiogo to resume the journey by the _tokaido_, they were met by a
"Governor" of Foreign Affairs, sent expressly from Yedo to warn the
foreign Ministers once more of the dangers of the road, and to persuade
them to complete their journey by sea. This had become such a stereotyped
formula that the two diplomats paid no attention to the warning, though
they had some reason afterwards to think that on this single occasion
the cry of wolf was genuine; for the assassins who attacked the English
Legation on the night of the return of the party to Yedo were said to have
tracked the foreigners the whole way from Hiogo.

These two interesting and--the second one especially--arduous journeys,
each of one month's duration, settled the question of the right of the
foreign representatives to travel through the length and breadth of Japan.
They also afforded much insight into the state of the country and the
real feeling of the general population. But they were only interludes
in the drama of sensational diplomacy, which had now to be resumed with
redoubled energy. The Legations had been two years located in Yedo, and no
progress whatever had been made towards establishing a state of security
for foreign life. Matters were, indeed, going from bad to worse. One point
had been gained after the murder of the American secretary in January--the
Government had formally assumed the responsibility for the protection of
the foreigners. Moreover, strong guards of the Tycoon's men were posted
in the different Legations; but, as we have seen, they added nothing to
the sense of security. The demonstration of the inadequacy of all these
precautions left the conditions of foreign life in the capital in worse
plight than ever. The attack on the British Legation therefore called for
a fresh review of the position.


IV. NEGOTIATIONS AND RENEWED ASSASSINATIONS, 1862-64.

    British and French guards brought to Yedo--Marks a new
    era--Decided position of British Government--Concessions asked
    by Japanese, refused by Mr Alcock, granted by Earl Russell to
    Japanese envoys--Retrogression--Position of foreign Ministers
    assimilating to that of the Dutch at Deshima--Mr Alcock's
    departure for Europe, 1862--Bad effects of Lord Russell's
    concessions to Japanese--Encouraged them to make fresh
    demands--The building of a British Legation in Yedo--_Chargé
    d'affaires_ resides mostly in Yokohama--Colonel Neale's
    account of the system of guarding the Legation--Midnight
    attack on the guards--British sentries murdered--Suspicious
    behaviour of Government--British guard increased--Admiral
    Hope's opinion--Attack on an English riding party and murder
    of Mr Richardson on highroad--Admiral Hope's proposal to "nip
    assassination in the bud."

The question now, therefore, entered on a new phase. Since reliance on
the Government afforded no sense of security, the foreigners must abandon
the position or find some more effective protection, not to supersede,
but to supplement, that which was afforded by the Government. There was
fortunately a British despatch vessel, the Ringdove, at the moment at
Yokohama, to the commander of which Mr Alcock appealed for a guard of
marines and bluejackets. These arrived the next day, twenty-five all
told, with Captain Craigie himself at their head, and they were happily
accompanied by a detachment of fifteen men from the French transport
Dordogne, brought up by the French Minister, Mons. de Bellecourt,
always a staunch supporter of his British colleague. That gentleman,
on hearing the tragic news at Yokohama, where he had been staying,
returned promptly to his post with this most welcome reinforcement for
the defence of the Legations. This simple proceeding marked the beginning
of a new era in the foreign relations with Japan--the era in which the
Powers represented there took the law into their own hands, with highly
important consequences to Japan and to the world. The British naval guard
was reinforced within a few months by a mounted escort of twelve men
drawn from the force then in China. This step was strongly objected to
by the Tycoon's Ministers, but the answer was complete: the Government's
acknowledged incompetence had forced this measure of self-defence on the
Legations. The position taken up by Mr Alcock was confirmed in the most
explicit manner by Earl Russell a year later, who thus addressed the
Japanese envoys in London:--

    Her Majesty's Government will not agree to any proposal which
    may be made by the Ministers of the Tycoon having for its object
    to preclude the representatives of the Queen in Japan from
    maintaining a cavalry escort for the protection of her Majesty's
    servants in that country. The Tycoon cannot ensure the safety of
    the British officers within the precincts of the capital and its
    immediate neighbourhood; and even if the Tycoon were to engage to
    do so, it is notorious that he would not have the power to fulfil
    his engagement.

This plain speaking defined the status of "old" Japan, and gave the clue
to the remarkable train of events which followed.

Much anxiety and many sinister rumours, but no serious outrages,
disturbed the peace of the Legations and the general foreign community
during the remainder of the year 1861. Mr Oliphant was sent home in
consequence of his wounds, and the occasion was taken advantage of to
have certain private conferences with the Japanese Foreign Ministers, at
which that gentleman assisted, when the "past, present, and future" were
confidentially discussed. Mr Oliphant, thus thoroughly "posted," was able
personally to explain the state of affairs to her Majesty's Ministers,
which greatly assisted them in forming their decisions. He was also the
bearer of an autograph letter from the Tycoon to her Majesty the Queen.

The Japanese Government had long been pressing the foreign representatives
for the relaxation of some of the articles in the treaties, which were
not to come into operation until a subsequent date. These provided for
the opening of Yedo for general residence on 1st January 1862, and for
the opening of the trading ports of Hiogo, Osaka, and Ní-í-gata on 1st
January 1863. The Tycoon's Government was most anxious to postpone all
these privileges to an indefinite period, nominally seven years, and as
the foreign Ministers in Yedo had no such authority--Mr Alcock had been
instructed to grant "no concessions without equivalents"--the Government
prepared to despatch special envoys to the five Courts of Europe with
which they had treaties. A similar mission to the United States the
previous year had been so well received as to encourage the second effort.
The principle involved in the Japanese plea was precisely the same as that
which had kept Canton closed for so many years, notwithstanding the treaty
provision opening it; but there was this difference of fact between the
two cases, that whereas the danger apprehended and alleged by the Japanese
was probably real, that which had been put forward by the Chinese was
false, and manufactured by the authorities themselves.

The Japanese were now in full retrogression, and every point they might
gain was certain to become a new fulcrum for forcing more and more
concessions from the foreign Powers. This was proved in many kinds of
ways. For example, the restrictions placed on the foreign envoys, by
which they were kept as prisoners in their Legations, and were attended
in their walks abroad by officious guards who prevented them from seeing
more than could be helped, and forbade intercourse with the people, were
almost tantamount to those formerly imposed on the Dutch in Deshima.
Mr Oliphant frankly speaks of his "jailors." Then repression, and yet
more repression--as much repression, in fact, as the foreigners could
be brought to endure--was the unvarying rule. Even when they were
themselves seeking favours, and had therefore every inducement to show
their liberal side to the foreign Minister, the rule of repression was
rigorously maintained. Mr Alcock relates how this determination prevented
him from presenting the Queen's reply to the Tycoon's letter. First,
the audience was delayed on frivolous grounds; then the ceremonial was
varied. Among other things it was proposed to place the envoy at double
the distance from the Tycoon which had been observed on a previous
occasion. Being anxious to take his leave, to present his _locum tenens_,
and to deliver the Queen's autograph, Mr Alcock waived these innovations
under protest--"being reluctant at the last moment to stand upon a point
of mere etiquette"; but "having found my desire was strong not to raise
difficulties on any minor points, it had been resolved [by the Japanese]
to profit by the circumstance to gain some further advantages derogatory
to the position of the British Minister," and so after everything had been
arranged according to their own wishes the Court officials returned the
following day to say they had made a mistake, and that, in fact, sundry
further restrictions must be observed. This was too much, and the Minister
quitted the capital without his audience, March 1862.

The same tactics were observed by the envoys in Europe. When the mission
reached London and had laid their case before the same Foreign Secretary
who had instructed the Minister in Japan to "make no concessions without
equivalents," he at once conceded the whole of the Japanese demands
unconditionally, for the nominal conditions were merely that the rest of
the treaty should stand. A detailed memorandum of the agreement was drawn
up and formally signed by Earl Russell and the three Japanese envoys on
June 6, 1862. Having succeeded beyond all expectation in their demands,
the Japanese envoys evidently concluded that the Foreign Office was of
plastic substance, and within two days they had formulated a list of nine
further concessions which they desired to discuss. This, however, was
too much for Lord Russell's patience, and as the envoys had "completed
their business and taken their leave," he declined to enter on any fresh
questions.

The effect of Lord Russell's concessions could not be otherwise than
detrimental, the only open question being whether his insistence on
opening the ports on the agreed dates would have been a greater or a
lesser evil. Mr Alcock points out the family likeness between the Japanese
pleas for suspension of treaty rights and those with which we had so long
been familiar in China. "The time," he says, allowed to the authorities
of Canton to "soothe the people and prepare the way" was deliberately
used by them to "create the very difficulties which they alleged already
to exist, and make it each year more and more impossible to admit the
foreigners,"--a comment on the Japanese proposal which leaves little doubt
as to his opinion of that transaction. Yet there were cogent reasons for
the course actually adopted, if the premisses be granted that the ports
could only be opened by force, and that England would have been left
alone to employ the necessary force. The most that can be said, then,
for the concessions to the Japanese is that they represented the choice
of evils. No one was benefited by them. They did not help the Tycoon or
avert the catastrophe to his dynasty. They did not lessen the friction,
or the danger to foreign life and interests, or interrupt the long
series of assassinations of foreigners in Japan; nor did they obviate the
necessity of using force in that country, to avoid which was the principal
inducement to her Majesty's Government to violate its own principle. The
analogy with China was, in fact, complete; the old lesson was once more
driven home, that there is no safety in doing wrong. As Sir Rutherford
Alcock puts it, "To retrograde safely and with dignity is often more
difficult for nations and their governments than to advance."

During the year 1861 an important improvement was inaugurated in
respect to the housing of the foreign Legations. Hitherto they had been
accommodated in temples neither suited to Western modes of living nor, as
had been proved, adapted for defence. Independent sites were now allotted
on a commanding ridge within the city, where the respective Ministers
might have buildings erected on their own plans. These were promptly put
in hand, and soon after Mr Alcock was able to bring his first arduous
campaign--a term applicable in its double sense--to a close. Having
brought the various business of the Legation into a state convenient for
transfer to new hands, he left Yedo in March 1862, a few days before the
arrival of the future _chargé d'affaires_, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward St
John Neale. The Minister was accompanied to England by Moriyama, the chief
interpreter to the Japanese Foreign Office, who was charged with special
instructions to the three envoys then in England.

From the time that Colonel Neale took charge of the British Legation
events chased each other rapidly. While the new buildings were in progress
the _chargé d'affaires_ divided his time between Yedo and Yokohama, and
while in the capital continued to reside in the temple called To-zen-ji,
where the Legation had been located from the beginning. The inner
buildings were guarded by the mounted escort and by the naval contingent,
which had been renewed as one British warship took the place of another
during the year. In the outer enclosure there was a guard of 500 Japanese,
the retainers of a certain Daimio who was intrusted by the Tycoon with
the protection of the Legation.

In order to understand what follows, it is necessary to give Colonel
Neale's account of the arrangements which were in force for the protection
of the British Legation:--

    I found on my arrival that the usual precautions had been taken by
    the authorities, and which consisted in placing numerous guards,
    entirely surrounding this residence, in detached wooden huts: the
    number of these guards, according to the Japanese return which I
    obtained, amounted to no less than 535 men, partly of the Tycoon's
    bodyguard, but chiefly composed of the retainers of a Daimio named
    Matsudaira Temba no Kami, who had been chosen and charged by the
    Government with the protection of this Legation.

    Small parties of these men came down at short intervals during
    the night to the very doors of this residence, and remained for a
    short time with our own sentries, leaving behind them one man at
    each post to aid in challenging persons approaching and demanding
    the parole, which was in the Japanese language, and issued at
    sunset each evening.

    These dispositions were uninterruptedly observed up to the evening
    of the 26th June. At midnight on that day the several British
    sentinels were at their post, and challenging with vigilance the
    Japanese guards, who, in parties of two or three, descended from
    the heights overhanging this building at the back for the purpose
    of relieving their men.

What took place at midnight on the 26th June may also be best described
in Colonel Neale's own language:--

    At half an hour after midnight the British sentry posted at the
    door adjoining my bedroom challenged some approaching object in my
    hearing, and received in answer the right parole; but the sentry
    sharply challenged again in an anxious and eager manner, as if
    some circumstance excited his suspicion, after which he walked
    three or four steps towards the object approaching. I rose in
    bed to hear the result, and in an instant the deadened sound of
    a rapid succession of heavy blows and cuts reached my ears, given
    in less than two minutes, and at every one of which followed a cry
    of anguish from the unfortunate sentry. Silence succeeded for the
    moment, and was followed by the beating of drums from the heights
    and the gathering of Japanese guards with their red lanterns....
    The assassin having left the sentry at my door, went on towards
    the corner of the residence occupied by the guard, a distance
    of twenty paces, where he met Corporal Crimp, R.M., coming alone
    on his rounds to visit the sentry at my door. A conflict appears
    instantly to have taken place between them: a revolver-shot was
    heard about the moment the guard was turning out, but nothing
    further.

The corporal was found dead with sixteen sword and lance wounds: the
sentry had nine sword-wounds--"every cut had severed the member it was
aimed at"; but he survived long enough to tell of the instant desertion
of the Japanese sentry who was posted with him.

This attack was marked by several distinguishing features:--

1. The assassins belonged to the Legation guard, or were their comrades;
the only weapon found on the ground was a lance of the precise pattern of
those of the Daimio's guard, which was twelve feet long, and, according to
Colonel Neale, no man carrying such a weapon could have passed the strong
barricade or crawled through the brushwood: presumably, therefore, the
lance was supplied from the armoury within the Legation. According to the
Japanese Ministers, there was but a single assassin. In their anxiety to
maintain their contention that the wounds were all inflicted by the same
man, the Ministers explained to Colonel Neale a little of the science of
Japanese sword-play. "They have attained the climax of dexterity. The
sword is always carried at the side, and adepts in the use of it wound
the moment it is drawn." The fatal stroke, upwards, is given in the act of
drawing. Hence, placing the hand on the hilt is equivalent to presenting
a cocked revolver, and if the assailant is not disabled in the act it
is too late for defence. One only, being wounded by a pistol-bullet and
having committed suicide, was found, and though they could not help
admitting that the man was a retainer of the Daimio who supplied the
guard, the Ministers yet drew a vain distinction between him and the men
actually on duty. It could not, however, be denied that he, or they, were
allowed free ingress and egress through hundreds of men carefully posted
as described by Colonel Neale, and already alert and sounding the alarm,
or that the huts of the Japanese were within 150 feet of the spot where
two Englishmen were murdered, and while the assassin (or assassins) was
inflicting sixteen wounds on one victim and nine on the other.

2. The intended attack was publicly known beforehand: for several days
the Japanese servants had refused to remain in the Legation overnight,
absenting themselves against orders. The Government also were aware of
the plot, and of the day when it was to be put in execution, which was
on the recurrence of a festival, and, according to the Japanese calendar,
the anniversary of the attack in 1861. The actual day having passed, one
of the Governors of Foreign Affairs was deputed by the Council to call
and congratulate Colonel Neale on his escape. Colonel Neale remarked that
he had no reason for anxiety. The Governor smiled and took leave. But
the "ides of March ... had not gone," In the darkness of that very night
the attack was made. Colonel Neale, recounting the circumstances to the
Council of Foreign Affairs, asked why the Governor had not warned him of
what was impending, instead of congratulating him on his supposed escape;
but "the Gorogiu, to my great surprise, replied that I was quite right in
my observations, and they regretted they had not thought of warning me."

3. The Japanese Ministers treated the whole matter with apparent
indifference, months having elapsed before any information was
communicated to the British Minister respecting either the cause of the
attack or the execution of justice on the instigators, and then it was
only such information as had been common property for two months. All that
the Japanese Ministers had to say by way of explanation to the foreign
envoys was that the attack proceeded from the unsettled state of public
feeling and from the Japanese nation clinging to the old _régime_; but
that they, the Ministers, hoped gradually to modify this national feeling
so that the foreigners might live in the country without apprehension,
&c. But in the meantime? Well, they "had given strict orders to increase
the protection." Tragicomedy could not well go further. Evidently matters
must soon reach a climax.

As the first outward and visible consequence of the assassination of
the two marines, an infantry guard of twenty-five men from the 67th
Regiment was sent over from China in addition to the naval guard and the
cavalry escort; and thus another step was taken towards the _dénoûment_
of the plot. Then the word "retribution" was revived in the diplomatic
correspondence, after having been launched by the Foreign Office in
1861 but arrested _in transitu_, so that it did not reach the Japanese
authorities. It was Admiral Hope, a man who never shrank from speaking
his mind or backing his opinion, who put the case in a pointed form
to the British Admiralty. "Deeply as I should lament the adoption of
hostile measures against the Japanese," he wrote on August 28, "after
the best consideration I have been able to give to the subject I
cannot avoid the conclusion that it is absolutely necessary to nip this
assassination-system in the bud; and that not to take effectual measures
for doing so now will be merely to postpone the evil day to a future, but
not far distant, occasion."

If further impetus had been wanting to develop this idea, the Japanese
lost no time in supplying it; for the next assassination which has left a
dark blood-stain on the annals of the time was perpetrated on the highroad
between Yedo and Kanagawa on September 14, 1862.

The victims were a party of three gentlemen and one lady from Yokohama who
had crossed the bay in a boat to Kanagawa, where their horses awaited them
on the _tokaido_. This broad road not being macadamised made an agreeable
riding-course, and it was beautified with lines of old trees, one section
in particular near where the tragedy occurred being known as "The Avenue."
The party proceeded from Kanagawa towards Yedo, not intending to go
farther than Kawasaki, which was the limit of authorised excursions in
that direction. On the way they met the _cortège_ of a Daimio, the first
indication of which was several _norimono_ (the heavy palanquin in which
the nobles of Japan travel) with armed attendants, forming an irregular
train with considerable intervals between. When passing these _norimono_
the foreigners walked their horses. In the intervals where the road was
clear they cantered, and this mode of alternate progression continued
for three or four miles. Then a regular procession was met, preceded
by about a hundred men marching in single file on either side of the
road. The foreign party thereupon proceeded at a foot's pace, keeping
close to the left side, until they reached "the main body, which was
then occupying the whole breadth of the road." The English party halted
on approaching the main body, according to one of the survivors; but
according to another, they were stopped "when they had got about twelve
men deep in the procession," by "a man of large stature[7] issuing from
the main body," who, swinging his sword with both hands, cut at the two
leading foreigners, Mr Richardson and Mrs Borrodaile, as their horses
were being turned round, and then rushed on the other two. Whereupon the
advance-guard, who had been described as marching in single file, closed
in upon the retreating riders. They were all able by the speed of their
horses to get clear of their assailants; but Mr Richardson was so terribly
hacked that after going some distance he fell from his horse, dying, or,
as his companions thought, dead. He lived, however, until the Daimio's
procession reached the spot, when several of his retainers proceeded to
butcher and mutilate the dying man in the most shocking manner. It speaks
well for all three gentlemen that Mrs Borrodaile escaped substantially
unhurt, though a sword-stroke aimed at her head cut away her hat as she
stooped to avoid the blow. She saw Mr Richardson fall, and her two wounded
companions, unable to render help, urged her to ride on. She miraculously
arrived at Yokohama, bespattered with blood and in a state of very natural
agitation. Mr Clarke and Mr Marshall, exhausted by their wounds, managed
to reach Kanagawa, where they were properly cared for at the American
consulate.

This tragedy made a more vivid impression on the world at large than
previous ones had done, for several reasons. The cumulative effect of so
many cold-blooded massacres was beginning to tell, and the Japanese cup
was nearly full. There was a lady in the case who galloped seven miles
for dear life, her horse falling twice under her. The chief victim was a
fine specimen of a young Englishman, and very popular. The crime touched
the general foreign community in Japan in a special manner, since the
party belonged to, or were the guests of, Yokohama, where there were also
newspapers and press correspondents to make literature of the event.

Some friction was created between the foreign community and the British
representative by the ghastly circumstances of this murder. The community,
seeing their own comrades slaughtered without mercy, were incensed,
and called for vengeance, which they deemed to be within reach, for the
Daimio's retinue were sleeping at Hodogaya, a station but a few miles
off. There was force enough afloat and on shore to effect the capture of
the murderers red-handed, and the residents called for this to be done.
Reasons of policy and expediency influenced Colonel Neale in a contrary
sense, in which he was fully supported by the Foreign Office when the
reports reached England.

The Richardson murder, like that at the British Legation, had its
special characteristics, though of a different order. The outrage was
unpremeditated; the Government was not implicated: it was a fortuitous
collision between the spirit and traditions of two opposed civilisations.
The deed might be construed as the natural punishment of a breach of good
manners--for Japanese etiquette, of which the party seemed to have been
ignorant, required them to dismount--or, as the spontaneous expression
of feudal Japan's deep hatred of the foreigner, concentrated in the
act of a single moment. There was no need on this occasion to hazard
guesses as to the responsible author of the crime, or to keep up a long
train of make-believe negotiations. The _cortège_ belonged to the Prince
of Satsuma, and was escorting his father, Shimadso Saburo, who went
afterwards to the Mikado and said he had been grossly insulted by the
foreigners on the road, and had ordered them to be cut down.[8]

The problem was thus reduced to its simplest expression. The circumstances
supplied precisely what was wanting to give shape and point to Admiral
Hope's proposal to "nip this assassination-system in the bud"; and a month
after the event he followed up his previous despatch to the Admiralty by
a detailed scheme of reprisals, with the amount and precise distribution
of the force required to give effect to it. And he concludes his despatch
appropriately with the remark, that "should it be found necessary to use
measures of coercion especially against Satsuma, ... the position and
confirmation of his principality render him peculiarly open to attack."

There were now two reclamations on the Japanese Government--redress for
the murder of the two marines at the Legation in June, and for the killing
and wounding of the Richardson party in September. The British _chargé
d'affaires_ pressed both demands, without committing himself to specific
threats until the mind of her Majesty's Government should be known. Lord
Russell's instructions were sent on 24th December 1862, and would reach
Japan some time in February. They were peremptory as to the use of force
in case of need, whether against the Government or the Prince of Satsuma.


V. THE TYCOON'S DILEMMA.

    Strife of parties in Japan--Impotence of Tycoon--His prospective
    overthrow--Orders issued by Mikado to drive foreigners out of
    Japan--Prevarications of Tycoon--Plots and counterplots--French
    and English troops in Yokohama--Compensation paid for the
    Richardson murder, but assassin not yet brought to justice--Demand
    made on Prince of Satsuma--Bombardment of his castle by
    Admiral Kuper--Happy results--Offensive attitude of Prince of
    Nagato--Firing on foreign ships of war--Sir R. Alcock's return
    from furlough--Publication of his book 'The Capital of the
    Tycoon'--His exposition of the political status of parties in
    Japan--Dubious attitude of Tycoon--And Mikado--Utmost limit of
    concession to Japanese pleas of weakness reached.

During the interval that elapsed between the tragedy of September 1862
and the expiation of the crime, revelations of a startling character were
made respecting the strife which was raging among the various parties
in the State--the Tycoon, the Mikado, the great Daimios, and the lesser
Daimios, who followed the Tycoon and the Mikado respectively. These
revelations, however, though they lit up as by lurid lightning-flashes
some corners of the landscape, left the whole in a fog more treacherous
than total darkness. The foreign officials who were called upon to act in
the midst of it confessed themselves unable to unravel the mystery that
surrounded them, nor is it any part of our task to make such an attempt.
It was the chaos which preceded order, a period when the elemental forces
were in the melting-pot, a phase of foreshortened evolution such as had
never till then been dreamed of. However trying such an ordeal was to
the foreign agents who had to go through it, the stress upon them was
as nothing compared to that which lay upon the principalities and powers
of the country itself during the agony of their national birth-throes--a
circumstance which has to be borne in mind when judging of the behaviour
of the Japanese Government in that trying time; for truly the defence of
their proceedings stood much in need of extenuating circumstances.

We have seen that the British Government had already confessed its
belief that the Tycoon's Government was incompetent to maintain order
where foreigners were concerned. Yet until that Government itself should
plead incompetence, foreign States could only hold it wholly accountable
for all that was done affecting their interests. But the Tycoon's
Government fought tooth and nail against such admission, resorting
to every subterfuge to maintain their status, while yet evading the
responsibilities of the position. The success of this ambiguous policy
required that the foreign representatives should be kept in ignorance
of the relations which subsisted between the different parties in the
Japanese State. Hence secrecy and misdirection governed their diplomatic
intercourse. The treaties themselves having been tainted from their
origin with deception, every stage of their execution was marked by
dissimulation, which came gradually to light as the pressure from within
and from without caused now one corner, now another, of the curtain to be
raised.

The Tycoon was between the upper and the nether millstone,--foreigners
pressing him for fulfilment of his obligations, while a power greater
than his own was demanding the complete repudiation, or at least the
substantial curtailment, of all these obligations. The straits he was
put to to keep up his two faces were pitiable and desperate, for he had
to make the Mikado and the Daimios believe he was as much opposed to the
foreigners as they were, while to foreigners he was professing loyalty
and throwing the blame of the reaction on the hostile Daimios. Instigated
by them, the Mikado had fully asserted his authority, and the Tycoon was
no longer able to pose as the sovereign ruler of Japan. The allocation of
a site for the foreign Legations on Gotenyama, a popular pleasure-ground
in Yedo, was attacked, and the Tycoon ordered to rescind the grant, which
he endeavoured to do by proposing the substitution of another site. This
being refused by the British _chargé d'affaires_, the Japanese sentry on
the buildings under construction was assassinated, and soon after the
whole building was blown up and burned.[9] So ambiguous had become the
attitude of the Tycoon, that Colonel Neale was in doubt whether this
conflagration pleased or displeased the Yedo Government. (Six months
later the buildings occupied by the United States Legation were likewise
destroyed by fire.) The hostile Daimios, in the name of the Mikado, were,
in fact, putting strong pressure on the Tycoon, while those Daimios who
had favoured the treaties had been punished by confiscation of their
revenues. The Tycoon's position was fast becoming untenable, and in the
last extremity his advisers decided to take the foreign representatives
for the first time into their confidence.

In January 1863 a Governor of Foreign Affairs informed Colonel Neale
that the Mikado was angry because he had not been consulted about the
treaties, either before or after the signing of them; and that his
Majesty had ordered the Tycoon repeatedly to drive foreigners out of
the country. "But," replied the British _chargé d'affaires_, "that is
wholly inconsistent with what the Gorogiu previously told Sir Rutherford
Alcock." "Quite so," rejoined the Governor; "only what the Ministers told
Sir Rutherford Alcock was false." "But if one member of the Gorogiu can
thus give the other the lie, what security have we that some successor
of yours will not equally disavow what you say? so that at one time
we have the Mikado reported as friendly and at another as hostile to
foreign treaties and trade, and we shall never know which to believe."
This not very promising beginning of "confidences" was quickly followed
by singular confessions and proposals--part of the system of "frauds,
stratagems, and deceptions practised by the Tycoon's Government," as
Colonel Neale characterises them. The Tycoon's Government was ordered to
communicate officially to the foreign representatives the mandate of the
Mikado to drive out foreigners and close the ports. In obedience to this
order a Governor of Foreign Affairs, in announcing the fact to the French
Minister, softened its effect by explaining that this was carrying out the
Mikado's orders "officially"; but "ce n'est là qu'un stratagème nécessaire
pour tromper le peuple japonnais." In developing his plan of campaign the
Governor laid bare to the French Minister the intention of the Tycoon to
deceive the Mikado by pretending to share his views about foreigners; he
was in like manner to deceive the Daimios. Ogasawara, the Minister who was
responsible for carrying out the edict against foreigners, being "un homme
très capable," would find a means of avoiding the execution; he would
himself go to Kioto and make the Mikado listen to reason; if he refused,
then he would pick a quarrel and employ force against the sovereign. In
that case would the foreign Powers assist the Tycoon? All this, however,
must be kept from Hitotsubashi, the First Minister of the Tycoon, "whose
views were as yet uncertain whether to carry out the expulsive orders from
Kioto or not. Ogasawara had formed the plan to declare himself the enemy
of foreigners in order to deceive the high officers even of the Tycoon who
might not be favourable to his scheme; but everything was to be done to
"save Japan." Finally, Ogasawara was to come the day following himself to
interview the foreign Ministers at Yokohama, but not a word of all this
would he utter "for fear of indiscretions." He would only speak briefly
to the point of the notification of the Mikado's order of expulsion. And
if the foreign Ministers would be good enough to frame their reply to that
message in such severe terms as would make an impression on the agitators
in Kioto and Yedo, it would assist the patriotic schemes of this bustling
statesman. So everybody in Japan from the highest to the lowest was to
be bamboozled--even one's own colleagues in the Tycoon's service--and the
only people with whom faith was to be kept were the detested foreigners,
as represented by the Ministers of England and France! Well might Colonel
Neale recoil in disgust from such a brewage of "fraud, stratagem, and
deception." The Tycoon's officers had in all this one definite object
in view, which was to induce the foreign squadrons then menacing Yedo to
transfer themselves to Osaka and Hiogo and menace some one in that part of
the empire. And, curiously enough, the presence of the French troops which
had recently arrived in Yokohama was not only tolerated by the Tycoon,
but they were to serve him as a lever whereby the astute Ogasawara was
to work on the feelings of the Mikado, by representing to his sovereign
the indignation of the foreign Governments and the difficulty of giving
effect to an order for general expulsion, which would include a body of
well-armed troops.

For while such comedies were being enacted at Yokohama the Tycoon himself
was at Kioto under the friendly surveillance of the Mikado and his
faithful Daimios, and it was a reasonable enough calculation that the
vicinity of foreign fleets might tend to moderate the counsels of these
recalcitrants, to ease the tension between the contending factions, and
lighten the burden of the Tycoon.

Meantime the pressure of the British demands for redress of the two
grievances was met by evasions and delays until the ultimatum stage was
reached in June 1863. The pecuniary indemnity charged on the Tycoon,
amounting to £110,000, was then paid under circumstances so peculiar as
to be worth recounting as affording further insight into the agitations
of the period. After exhaustive negotiations, leading to an ultimatum,
an agreement was made whereby the Government was to pay the amount
demanded by seven instalments, commencing 18th June 1863. On the 17th
June Ogasawara, third member of the Gorogiu, wrote a curt note to say
the money could not be paid owing to an "unforeseen circumstance," and
postponing payment till 22nd June. On the 19th the same Minister wrote
to Colonel Neale that he intended to have left Yedo for Yokohama for an
interview, but was prevented by sudden illness. This was followed by an
intimation from the Government that no payment whatever would be made.
Diplomatic relations were thereupon broken off by the British _chargé
d'affaires_, and the conduct of affairs was placed in the hands of the
admiral. This brought about the interview with the French Minister above
alluded to, when the Japanese emissaries promised to pay at once the whole
amount due under the agreement with Colonel Neale, and the specie was
actually conveyed in four cartloads to the British Legation on 24th June.
The only explanation given of this strange shuffle was that the numerous
enemies of the Tycoon and of foreigners were on the watch, and threatened
terrible consequences if any money should be paid to the foreigners. That
difficulty, however, had been surmounted by the resourceful Japanese
Machiavel issuing strict orders that the payment should be kept a dead
secret from all except the Governors of Foreign Affairs themselves,--the
four cartloads of silver, drawn each by a dozen or two of men, grunting
laboriously at the task, from the Japanese custom-house to the British
Legation, remaining for this purpose conveniently invisible to a cloud of
hostile witnesses.

The demands made on the Tycoon in respect of the attack on the British
Legation and on the Richardson party being thus satisfied, it only
remained to carry out the second portion of Earl Russell's instructions
and exact equal satisfaction from the Prince of Satsuma, over whom the
Yedo Government had shown itself to have no control whatever. Much delay
had occurred, due to a variety of circumstances--mainly to the aggressive
acts of another great Daimio, Choshiu, who possessed the western key
of the Inland Sea. This might have necessitated a concentration of the
British squadron in that spot--which actually came to pass a year later.
Finally, however, Rear-Admiral Sir Augustus Kuper proceeded in August to
the Bay of Kagoshima, the stronghold of the Satsuma principality, Colonel
Neale accompanying him to present the demand on the prince with which he
had been intrusted by the British Government.

The sole reply vouchsafed by the Daimio was a recommendation to Colonel
Neale to return to Yedo and treat with the Tycoon, as Satsuma had no
relations with Great Britain. It was now the admiral's turn to act, and
his first step in the way of reprisal was the seizing of three steamers,
then lying in the bay, which were soon burned to relieve the squadron
of their charge. Thereupon the Daimio's forts opened fire, and a hot
engagement ensued in the midst of a terrific gale, which the prince's
people afterwards said was reckoned on as a condition favourable for
his attack on the foreign ships. There was considerable loss of life
on both sides; much damage was done to the Daimio's defences, arsenal,
and magazines. But the inhabitants of the town escaped injury from the
conflagration, they having previously been removed to places of safety.
The squadron returned to the Bay of Yedo.

Within a short time the Prince of Satsuma sued for terms, paid the
indemnity demanded, £25,000, promised to punish the murderer of
Richardson, when caught, and became a good friend to the English, to the
extent at least of desiring to cultivate relations with them.

Thus happily ended the first hostile encounter between Japan and any
Western Power, the first demonstration of the superiority of foreign arms,
and, as some think, the baptism of fire which was the inaugurating rite
by which Japan entered into the comity and the competition of the Western
nations, and into that path of material progress which has since led to
such astonishing results.

The attitude of the Yedo Government in this affair may be said to
have been one of placid observation. They had nothing to regret in the
chastisement inflicted on a prince who set their authority at defiance.

In the interval of time between the settlement of the indemnities for the
two outrages and the departure of the fleet for Kagoshima the Tycoon's
Ministers had drawn closer and closer to the foreign representatives, and
English steamers were chartered for conveyance of the Tycoon's troops
to Osaka with the knowledge and approval of the British authorities.
The defence of Yokohama was by the Government voluntarily confided to
the English and French admirals, and sanguine hopes were held out to
the foreign representatives that if the Tycoon should succeed in his
endeavours at Kioto, foreign relations would assume a totally different
aspect on his return to his capital.

On the other hand, while the negotiations with the Yedo Government had
been dragging their slow length along, another of the great princes
had taken arms against the foreign Powers indiscriminately. The Daimio
Choshiu had made a strong stand against foreign intercourse, and in a
well-reasoned and moderately worded letter addressed to the Tycoon in
May 1862 he urged union between that high officer and the Mikado in order
that the country might be placed in a condition to resist foreigners. The
territory of the Prince of Nagato, as he was also designated, commanded
the narrow strait of Shimonoséki, which connects the Suwonada, or Inland
Sea, with the outer waters. This had become the regular route of steamers
between the Bay of Yedo and the south of Japan, as at this day.

Moved by an impulse which was not cleared up at the time, if ever it has
been since, Choshiu began in July 1863 to fire from his forts and from
armed vessels in the straits on passing steamers. French, American, and
Dutch war-vessels were successively bombarded as they entered the passage.
The fire was returned, and damage inflicted on the Daimio's batteries;
but such was the power of their guns and their precision of aim that
many were killed and wounded on the foreign ships, some of which were
obliged to retire without getting through the strait. The prince remained
obdurate and continued his hostile proceedings, a steamer belonging to
the Tycoon and another belonging to Satsuma, said to be the friend and
ally of Choshiu, coming in for the customary salutation as they passed.
He embargoed or destroyed trading junks attempting to pass the straits,
and thus established an effective blockade of the great commercial artery
of Japan.

It was droll to find Satsuma, soon after the affair of Kagoshima,
appealing to the Mikado against these outrages of Nagato, and opposing
the reactionary policy of his quondam ally. Satsuma had had his lesson;
Nagato had yet to receive his.

       *       *       *       *       *

Sir Rutherford Alcock returned to his post after two years' furlough. His
distinguished services had been recognised by the Queen's Government,
who conferred on him the honour of Knight Commander of the Bath. In
the same year, 1862, he completed his valuable work, 'The Capital of
the Tycoon,' which for the first time brought the real Japan of that
day to the knowledge of the reading world. This, the most important
single literary work left by the busy pen of Sir Rutherford Alcock,
is a storehouse of information on the history, civilisation, politics,
religion, art, and industry of Japan, carefully sifted and presented in
the most attractive form. It contains, moreover, a vivid narrative of
the reopening of international intercourse with that country, and of the
stirring incidents which marked the earlier years of its progress. It is
also a philosophical study at first hand of the most remarkable political
evolution that history records. Considering the official activity and high
tension under which the materials were gathered, the writing of such a
book, of a Japanese Grammar, and other literary and artistic studies, is
a proof of the intellectual detachment which is usually associated with
the higher order of mind. This work of a single pioneer observer has well
borne the scrutiny of the innumerable host of students, grave and gay, who
have followed in the same path. After forty years its authority remains
intact. A short extract will at once show the character of the book and
afford a convenient summary of the then Government of Japan:--

    That the Mikado is the hereditary sovereign of the empire, the
    descendant of a long and uninterrupted line of sovereigns of the
    same dynasty, and the only sovereign _de jure_ recognised by all
    Japanese from the Tycoon to the lowest beggar--a true sovereign
    in all the legal attributes of sovereignty; and that the Tycoon
    receives investiture from him as his lieutenant or generalissimo,
    _and as such only_, the head of the executive, is known to most
    readers of the present day. True, the Mikados have been shorn
    of much of their power since Yoritomo, in 1143, profiting by
    civil commotions among the princes of the land, and armed with
    power as generalissimo to humble these turbulent chiefs, only
    suppressed the troubles to arrogate to himself the greater part
    of the sovereign power under the title given by a grateful master
    of Ziogun. Another Pepin d'Héristal and mayor of the palace, he
    did not care to dethrone the descendant of an illustrious line of
    emperors, and was content with holding the reins, and transmitting
    the same privilege to his descendants. And so the power continued
    divided in great degree, the shadow from the substance, until
    later, towards the close of the sixteenth century, a peasant's son
    and favourite attendant of the actual generalissimo, but known
    in Japanese history by the name he afterwards assumed of Taiko
    Sama, raised himself, apparently by great abilities as well as
    daring, to the seat of power on his master's death, and stripped
    the reigning Mikado of the last remains of secular power.

    Since that time the successive emperors, or Mikados, are brought
    into the world, and live and die within the precincts of their
    Court at Miaco (Kioto), the boundaries of which they never pass
    during their whole life. Is it possible to conceive a less
    desirable destiny? But the Zioguns, or Tycoons, as they are
    styled in European treaties, have long been undergoing a somewhat
    analogous process, under which all substantial power has been
    transferred from them to the principal Daimios, or Princes,
    who form a Great Council of State, and whose nominee the Tycoon
    himself has become, as well, I believe, as all his chief Ministers
    or councillors. They exercise, if they do not claim, the right
    of removing both Tycoon and Ministers, and a voice potential in
    all affairs of State. For legislative changes even the almost
    forgotten Mikado must indeed give his consent, never of course
    refused when any unanimity prevails....

    The Mikado of the day is the exact type of the last descendant
    of Clovis, sitting "sad and solitary, effeminate and degenerate,"
    doomed only to wield "a barren sceptre" and sigh away a burdensome
    and useless existence of mock pageantry; never permitted to pass
    the gates of his prison-palace....

    This double machinery of a titular sovereign who only reigns,
    and a lieutenant of the empire who only governs and does not
    reign, from generation to generation, is certainly something
    very curious; and by long continuance it seems to have led to a
    duplicate system such as never existed in any other part of the
    world, carried out to almost every detail of existence. Every
    office is doubled; every man is alternately a watcher and watched.
    Not only the whole administrative machinery is in duplicate,
    but the most elaborate system of check and countercheck, on the
    most approved Machiavellian principle, is here developed with a
    minuteness and perfection as regards details difficult at first
    to realise. As upon all this is grafted a system of more than
    oriental mendacity, we feel launched into a world of shadows and
    make-believes hard to grapple with in the practical business of
    life. Of their mendacity and cynical views respecting it I had
    many illustrations. One of the official gentry upon a particular
    occasion having been found by a foreign Minister in deliberate
    contradiction with himself, was asked, somewhat abruptly perhaps,
    how he could reconcile it to his conscience to utter such palpable
    untruths. With perfect calmness and self-possession he replied, "I
    told you last month that such and such a thing had been done, and
    now I tell you the thing has not been done at all. I am an officer
    whose business it is to carry out the instructions I receive and
    to say what I am told to say. What have I to do with its truth or
    falsehood?"...

    To return to the Tycoon and the governors of the early middle
    ages, with its suzerain and feudatories, its fiefs and a
    phantom king, with hereditary mayors of the palace and chiefs
    with 10,000 retainers, each one holding himself as good as the
    Tycoon, who must live in constant dread of open revolt or secret
    assassination, what a pleasant state of existence for all parties
    it reveals! Each of these territorial magnates or great Daimios
    is practically independent of the Tycoon when within his own
    territory, with power of life and death over all his subjects
    and dependants; ... even an imperial passport will not secure an
    intruder's life....

    Power has passed in no small degree from the Tycoon's hands, as
    it formerly did from the Mikado's, and now remains chiefly in an
    executive Council of State, consisting of five Ministers, and
    these again held in no small check, if not in subservience, by
    the Daimios and feudal chiefs of the higher order, amounting to
    some 360. Although these do not actually form a Chamber of Lords
    nor assemble in a body at stated periods, nothing legislative, it
    is said, can be done without their assent obtained.... They hold
    themselves too high to demean themselves by taking part in the
    administration, or holding office, under the Tycoon. But neither
    the Tycoon nor the Ministers, separately or collectively, can
    venture upon a change in their laws and customs without their
    sanction and a further confirmation by the phantom sovereign of
    Miaco....

    In the mean time, between the Mikado who nominally wields the
    sceptre--the Tycoon, a youth who no less nominally governs the
    kingdom, and is but fourth in rank in the Japan red-book, for
    three of the Mikado's officers take precedence--and the Daimios
    great and small, ... the administrative machinery of the realm
    seems to be kept in order.

Another incident of the year was Sir Rutherford Alcock's second marriage
to a friend of the earlier Shanghai days, the widow of the Rev. T. Lowder,
first consular chaplain of that settlement. They had been both widowed
about the same time. They were about the same age too, and the union,
based on a deep-rooted and matured affection, proved an exceptionally
happy one during thirty-five years, till death divided them. Lady Alcock
accompanied her husband on his return to Japan, where they arrived in
March 1864.

During the two years of the Minister's absence affairs in Japan had, as we
have seen, been advancing rapidly--whether towards a reasonable solution
or to a catastrophe was as yet doubtful. The agitation against the foreign
treaties had been gathering force and consistency; the Tycoon's position
was becoming more and more precarious, his existence being pledged to
the annulment of the hated treaties. Encouraged by the success which
had attended his mission to Europe in 1862, he despatched another in
the beginning of 1864, to represent to the European Governments that the
public feeling in Japan was growing worse every day, that the Tycoon would
not be able to protect foreigners in Yokohama, and that, in short, the
port must be closed and foreign trade confined to Hakodate and Nagasaki.
The mission, already on its way, was met by Sir Rutherford Alcock in
Shanghai, where he had an opportunity of personal conference with the
envoys. The situation was thus summarised by the Minister in a despatch
to the Foreign Office, 31st March 1864:--

    It is just two years since I left Japan in order to be present in
    London when the first mission sent by the Tycoon to the treaty
    Powers in Europe should arrive. Returning to my post a month
    ago, I met a second mission on its way to the same Courts. These
    two embassies seem to me to form very significant events in the
    history of Japan and its relations with foreign States.... I
    consider the signing of the protocol of June 1862 (afterwards
    adopted with unimportant modifications by all the other Powers),
    freely granting without abatement all that the Tycoon asked, was
    the culminating act and fitting end of the conciliatory policy
    so consistently adhered to from the beginning. It was impossible
    to concede more without abandoning the treaties altogether.
    Thenceforth it only remained to gather the promised fruit of
    greater security to life, and freer intercourse within narrowed
    limits, which, for the moment at least, appeared unattainable in
    the wider range of five ports and two cities.... The avowed object
    of the second mission is to declare that all the hopes held out
    by the Tycoon of the probable results of the first concessions
    have been illusory.... The only fruit has been indiscriminate
    aggression, increased insecurity, calling for measures of coercion
    on the part of all the treaty Powers; finally, a decree for the
    expulsion of foreigners, with a mission from the Tycoon to declare
    his utter inability to maintain the treaties, and to suggest a
    surrender of all the rights and privileges they were framed to
    secure in perpetuity.

The mission was not successful in its main purpose, and soon returned to
Japan to report progress.


VI. THE CRISIS.

    Foreign rights must be sustained by force or definitively
    abandoned--Organises a retaliatory demonstration against
    Nagato--Forts at Shimonoséki attacked by international squadron,
    after delays--Satisfactory results--Nagato claims authority of
    Mikado for his attacks on foreign ships--His defeat gave courage
    to Tycoon--Anti-foreign measures promptly withdrawn--The treaties
    of 1858 ratified by Mikado--Sir R. Alcock's recall--Lord Russell's
    _amende_.

The Tycoon's Government had actually succeeded by patient persistence in
evil-doing in making Yedo "too hot to hold" the foreign representatives,
who had in consequence gradually accustomed themselves to residence in the
freer air of Yokohama. "Incendiarism and assassination had done their work
and effected the end for which they were employed," writes Sir Rutherford
Alcock, who goes on to remark that "the recovery of this lapsed right"
(of residence in the capital) "will have now to follow, not precede, other
measures." So far had the foreign nations retreated before the forces of
reaction, forces which necessarily acquired cohesion and momentum with
each retrograde step of the opposing Powers. The country, meaning thereby
the official hierarchy, was now at least, if not before, practically
unanimous. Mikado, Daimios, the Tycoon himself, however they may have been
embittered by their mutual jealousies, were now united, and passionately
united, in the determination to expel the foreigners, so far as it might
be possible,--on which latter point, however, there was room for great
differences of opinion. The Prince of Nagato might be a rebel against
the Tycoon's or the Mikado's authority, both of whom had disavowed his
proceedings, but his determination to block the passage of the Inland Sea
and suppress all trade but his own was an important part of the national
policy of expulsion. It appeared that the only friend of foreigners at
that time was the Prince of Satsuma, who had become a changed man since
his stronghold was bombarded, and he began to see that the restoration of
imperial rule and deposition of the Tycoon might be accomplished by the
assistance of foreigners. That event was undoubtedly accelerated by the
policy of the first two British ministers in Japan.

The new position was reviewed under a sense of deep personal
responsibility by Sir Rutherford Alcock in several despatches during
the spring of 1864, and, as we have seen, the conclusion he arrived at
was that the utmost limit of concession to Japanese exigencies had been
reached: everything had been given up to them that could be given up
without abandoning the treaties entirely and leaving the country. There
was not even room left for negotiation. "No attempt at a compromise of
such conflicting pretensions could possibly succeed." "Compromise or
concession is plainly impossible in the nature of things." Moreover, Earl
Russell had enjoined on both the _chargé d'affaires_ and the Minister to
stand firmly for their rights. His latest instruction to Sir Rutherford
Alcock on his departure from England was, "You will in any case require
from the Tycoon and the Daimios the execution of the treaty." In the face
of a determination to annul the treaties this necessitated some vigorous
action.

The most obvious and most straightforward course indicated was to deal
a decisive blow against the Prince of Nagato, who for nearly twelve
months had set the whole of the Western Powers at defiance. He was more
accessible from the salt water than even Satsuma; he was repudiated,
hypocritically or not, by his sovereign; and a punitive expedition to
Shimonoséki would not involve detriment to trade or inflict injury on
innocent people. Such an operation had, moreover, much to recommend it
from the point of view of general Japanese policy; for "in attacking
in his stronghold the most violent and rash of his class, it may be
possible," said the British Minister, "by one blow to paralyse the whole
body of Daimios.... The command of the Inland Sea and the whole internal
trade of that portion of Japan which must of necessity be in our hands
during any operations would do more, probably, to bring the Court of the
Mikado and of Yedo to a sense of the danger and folly of entering upon
hostilities with the treaty Powers than any course of diplomacy.... The
alternative is a probable catastrophe, and a war of a protracted kind at
no distant period."

About this time the appeals which for two years had been made in vain to
the British military authorities in China for a sufficient force to give
security at Yokohama were listened to, and a regiment of infantry, the
20th, and of marines, were detached from Hongkong and a force of Beloochis
from Shanghai. One of the anomalies of an unprecedented situation was that
the Government, which was concerting measures to expel all foreigners,
was nevertheless constrained to provide accommodation for these troops,
"which were not to make war, but to prevent acts which would lead to war."
For all that, the presence of foreign troops on the sacred soil was far
from palatable, even though the Tycoon might secretly acquiesce in the
reasoning by which the British Minister had commended a measure which was
in any case an unavoidable necessity.

The arrival of these troops had a marked effect on the tactics of the
Tycoon. For ten months his Government, which had been powerless and
passive regarding the warlike proceeding of Choshiu, now became alarmed
lest the foreigners were about to take the law into their own hands with
that recalcitrant Prince. The Tycoon's Ministers began to affect much
concern for his punishment and repression. They would at once move against
him, and until the result of their efforts was known they urged that the
British garrison should remain absolutely passive in Yokohama.

For effective action against the Daimio Choshiu it was necessary that an
agreement should be come to among the treaty Powers, three of whom had
been in actual collision with his batteries and armed ships. Individually
Great Britain had not received this direct provocation, and was only
interested in the general question of the obstruction to commerce and in
the maintenance of the political status of the Powers. How the concert
was brought about would be an interesting inquiry, but we may safely
conclude that the achievement owed much to two causes, one positive and
one negative. The former was the strong will, clear sight, and absolute
fearlessness of responsibility of the British Minister; the latter was
the non-existence of any ocean telegraph. For, as we have so frequently
seen nearer home, the direct efforts of the Great Powers to arrive at
any agreement for common action are always protracted, often abortive,
and seldom successful. The decision in this case had to be taken by the
agents on the spot, personally intimate with each other, acting on general
principles and on a free interpretation of the instructions from their
Governments. And so it came to pass that within three months after Sir
Rutherford Alcock's arrival in Japan the Ministers of France, the United
States, the Netherlands, and Great Britain had signed a protocol in which
they agreed to make a fresh representation in the nature of an ultimatum
to the Tycoon's Government, calling upon it to adopt means to put an end
to the hostilities of the Prince of Nagato, and informing it that on no
account would their Governments allow the port of Yokohama to be closed.
This agreement of May 1864 was the natural sequel to a declaration of 25th
July 1863, by which the same four Powers had intimated to the Tycoon the
necessity of reopening the Inland Sea, but which had remained without any
acknowledgment by the Government. The new _note identique_ addressed to
the Gorogiu was equally left unacknowledged by that body.

Nothing therefore remained but to take the respective naval commanders
into counsel. The Ministers had no authority over them, but it was quickly
found that the concert of admirals and captains was as perfect as that
of the diplomatic body. The ships of the four Powers--Great Britain,
France, United States, and Netherlands--were placed under the command of
Vice-Admiral Sir Augustus Kuper, and a plan of action was settled upon.

The advance to Shimonoséki was still, however, delayed by two
circumstances. The first was the return from Europe of two Japanese
students, out of five who had been sent there the previous year by that
very Prince of Choshiu against whom coercive measures were about to be
undertaken. These young men, hearing while abroad of the proceedings
of their chief, and convinced, from what they had seen in Europe, of
the overwhelming resources of the Powers, that Choshiu was bringing
disaster on himself in forcing battle on such antagonists, resolved to
hurry back to Japan with the express object of warning their prince of
his danger. The arrival of the two youths in Yedo was thought by the
foreign Ministers to offer some chance of coming to terms with Choshiu
without the arbitrament of arms, and accordingly facilities were afforded
by Vice-Admiral Kuper for landing the two travellers at the nearest
convenient point to their prince's territory. They were intrusted with
overtures of peace in the form of a long memorandum from the British
Minister, reviewing the whole situation, and explaining the attitude of
the Powers and the hopelessness of the armed resistance of any Daimio. The
messengers brought back to the rendezvous, where a light-draught vessel
waited for them, an oral reply from the prince explaining his attitude
and asking for three months' delay to enable Choshiu to confer with the
Mikado and Tycoon, by whose orders he had done what he had done, and
without whose consent he dare not change his policy. It is interesting
to recall the fact that the names of the two youthful emissaries were Ito
and Inouyé, who have since played so distinguished and honourable a part
in the development of their country.

The second cause of suspension of action against Choshiu was the news
of a convention concluded in Paris between the Japanese envoys and the
French Foreign Minister, dated June 20, 1864, in which this very object of
the reopening of the Straits of Shimonoséki was provided for. Were this
convention to be ratified by the Tycoon the immediate cause of dispute
would be removed. The matter, however, was disposed of with more than its
accustomed promptitude by the Japanese Government, who curtly refused to
ratify the French convention. The Tycoon's Ministers declared themselves
unable to carry out the agreement, and to ratify it would merely be to
add another to their too onerous obligations. Admiral Kuper was finally
given a free hand on August 25, and before the middle of September the
forts and ships of the recalcitrant prince were completely destroyed by
the Allied squadrons, not without considerable resistance and some loss
to the assailants. The action was conducted with admirable harmony among
the officers engaged, and the reciprocity of compliments between the
respective commanders-in-chief, especially between the French and English
admirals, is edifying reading in these later days.

The negotiations which followed on board the British flagship ended in
the most satisfactory manner. Choshiu submitted with a good grace, while
apologetically throwing the blame of his hostile proceedings on the two
higher authorities, the Mikado and the Tycoon.

All the Daimios had been notified of the decision of the Mikado and
the Tycoon to break off relations with foreigners from 20th June 1863.
Three days after this notice its purport was confirmed, and a positive
order given to "make military preparations with diligence that the ugly
barbarians may be swept out." This was promptly followed by a third yet
more explicit. "Bearing this in mind" (the date of expulsion, 20th June
1863), "you must omit nothing which is required to complete the maritime
defences of your province, and you must be ready to sweep them off should
they attack you unawares." A liberal interpretation of these imperial
decrees might be held to cover the aggressive proceedings of the most
powerful Daimio in the empire, whose province happened to command its most
important strategic position, and who watched the continual passing of
foreign ships under the guns of his forts. The time when Choshiu commenced
his attacks on passing ships coincided so exactly with the date assigned
by the Mikado for the general rupture with foreigners, that it is hardly
possible to dissociate his act from the scheme of his suzerain. When
subsequently called before the council, Choshiu boldly defied both Tycoon
and Mikado, declaring that he alone had obeyed the imperial mandate, and
deserved gratitude for executing single-handed the law of the empire for
the extermination of foreigners. The rupture was decreed for June 20.
The American steamer Pembroke was fired on on the 25th, being, no doubt,
the first foreign vessel to pass the straits after the 20th. Whatever
ulterior designs this great feudatory may have entertained, therefore, he
was not altogether without provocation in making a raid on the Mikado's
capital, which he did in the month of August following, and for which he
was condemned by his suzerain to a term of seclusion within his palace,
the usual form of punishment of an offending feudatory, which implies much
more than would appear from this mild definition.

On the capture of the forts at Shimonoséki the Government at once stepped
in and assumed all the obligations, pecuniary and other, which the issue
of the collision imposed on the Prince of Nagato. The town of Shimonoséki
had been spared, but held to ransom. A convention was signed whereby the
Tycoon agreed to pay an indemnity of three million dollars, which was
eventually paid in full, the last instalment of it after the fall of the
Shôgunate.

Taking heart of grace from his defeat by foreigners, the Tycoon, if
not the Mikado also, began to coerce Choshiu on his own account. Not
being able to reach him conveniently in his principality, the Tycoon's
Government set to work to destroy his vast establishment at Yedo. The fire
brigade was employed in this work, and such was the extent of it that
several thousand men were said to be engaged for three days in burning
down the buildings and fittings. Moreover, when categorically questioned
by the foreign Minister whether, now that Satsuma and Choshiu had been
brought under control, "the Tycoon would find it possible to give full
effect to the treaties, and to deal with any recalcitrant or rebellious
Daimios," the confidential Minister of the Tycoon replied without
hesitation, "Yes, certainly."

The defeat of the two most warlike of the Daimios illuminated the
situation and cleared the way for more intelligent action all round.
To the Japanese Government it was once for all demonstrated that it was
not by force of arms that the "ugly barbarians" were to be driven from
the country. The foreign fleets were for the time being invincible, and
the Powers had also shown themselves ready not only to act, but to act
together. There was, besides, a strong garrison of foreign troops in
Yokohama--a British force of 1200 men of all arms, with a marked tendency
to increase. The Mikado and the Tycoon wisely acquiesced in the situation,
so far as foreigners were concerned, not necessarily abandoning their
policy, but at any rate deferring its execution.

Their immediate attention was directed to the internal commotions of the
country, which could not now be long in coming to an explosion. A new
planet had intersected their system and upset its balance. There could
be no rest, therefore, until a new equilibrium was found. Foreign forces
chastising the great feudatories, with the tacit acquiescence and for the
benefit of the suzerain, could only be a step either towards dissolution
and subjugation, or towards renaissance and national unity. Feudalism had
had its day and served its turn; it was wholly incompatible with the new
relations which had been imposed on the country by the foreign Powers. But
where is the State, ancient or modern, that could entirely remodel itself,
as it were, on the field of battle and in front of the enemy? That must
remain the proud speciality of Japan.

The effect of the action at Shimonoséki on the position of foreigners
was at once made apparent in various ways. The Tycoon's Government had
laid a secret embargo on raw silk sent to market at Yokohama as part and
parcel of the general imperial design of closing that port, or, in the
alternative, of a gigantic scheme of Government monopoly of the whole
foreign trade, such being the only form of commerce for which the Japanese
officials had any real sympathy. The stoppage had lasted three months.
After Choshiu's defeat the restrictions were at once officially withdrawn,
though considerable efforts were still required to give full effect to the
withdrawal. Once more, also, "the Tycoon resolved to abandon the policy
of equivocation and duplicity," and to inform the Mikado frankly of the
impossibility of closing the port or of refusing to maintain the treaties.

The moment seemed opportune for raising the question of the ratification
of the treaties by the Mikado, in respect to which Sir Rutherford Alcock
made certain plain statements in a letter addressed to the Tycoon in
person. "There exists," he said, "a want of accord on the subject of
foreign relations between the Mikado and Tycoon.... The Mikado, by
requiring the abrogation of treaties, has reduced the Tycoon to the
alternative of either disobeying his legitimate sovereign or bringing
on his country all the calamities of war.... The only solution of the
difficulty that promises either peace or security is the ratification
of the treaties by the Mikado." The four foreign representatives
simultaneously pressed the same consideration on the Government, eliciting
from the Japanese Ministers the admission, "We perfectly agree with you,
it should now take place."

It now became the business of the British Minister to show to his
Government that the proceedings at Shimonoséki fulfilled in every point
the instructions he had received from the Foreign Office. This he did in
a despatch dated September 28, 1864, and so convincingly that Earl Russell
wrote in reply--

    Your despatch of the 28th of September is a successful vindication
    of the policy you have pursued.... My despatches of the 26th of
    July were written with a view to discourage the interruption of a
    progressive trade by acts of hostility, and to forbid recourse to
    force while the treaty was generally observed. Those despatches,
    you will understand, remain in full force.

    But the documents you have sent me, which arrived by the last
    mail, show that the silk trade was almost wholly interrupted by
    the Tycoon, who seemed to be preparing to abet or to abandon the
    project of driving out foreigners according to the boldness or
    the timidity of our demeanour.

    In this position there could be no better course than to punish
    and disarm the Daimio Prince Nagato.

    That course had these three separate advantages:--

    1. It gave the best promise of concurrence of the four Powers,
    as France, Holland, and the United States had all been sufferers
    from the Prince of Choshiu's violations of treaty, while we were
    most exposed to risk and loss by any Japanese attack on Yokohama.

    2. It involved proceeding only against a rebellious vassal, and
    not against the Mikado or the Tycoon.

    3. If the operation should prove successful, the four Powers were
    under no obligation to undertake further hostilities unless fresh
    provocation should be received.

    Her Majesty's Government have received with great satisfaction
    the account of the naval operations of the four squadrons, and
    their result, contained in your despatch of September 28. Those
    operations were conducted in the most gallant manner; the loss was
    not considerable; the four Powers acted in harmony together; no
    defenceless city suffered during the hostilities; and the terms
    granted to the offending Daimio were moderate towards him, and
    sufficient for us.

    I have only to add, that I am commanded to express to you her
    Majesty's full approbation of your conduct.

So far so good. But the slow mail service of those days, and the entire
absence of the telegraph, admitted of wonderful interpolations in
correspondence with such far-off countries as Japan. Events marched
quicker than the course of post could follow them, and despatches were
sometimes written which the writer would have given a good deal to recall.
Such was the case here. We have said that soon after Sir Rutherford
Alcock's return to Japan he addressed some weighty despatches to the
Foreign Office on the situation, undoubtedly leading up to the ultimate
employment of force in vindication of the foreign treaties. This was in
full accord with the spirit of Earl Russell's instructions dated December
17, 1863. These were--

  1. To require from the Tycoon and the Daimios the execution of the
    engagements of the treaty.

  2. To consult the admiral and any military officer who may be sent
    to Japan as to the means of strengthening and holding our position
    in Yokohama.

  3. To endeavour to procure from Hongkong the services of a regiment
    of infantry.

  4. The admiral to be authorised to land marines and destroy the
    batteries which have been erected for the evident purpose of
    interrupting the passage of our merchandise, &c.; but he must take
    care that no unarmed and peaceable town should be bombarded.

But when the Foreign Secretary received the Minister's despatches of
May, following the terms of these instructions to their only logical
conclusion, he became alarmed at the prospect of active measures, and
by despatch of August 8 he recalled the Minister under the pretext of
the need of a personal consultation on the state of affairs. This was
followed up by some temporising despatches, saying the Inland Sea was of
no consequence; that the Tycoon was professing an intention to do all
that was necessary; and that the Tycoon and Mikado, seeing the British
forces strong though passive, would gradually drop all hostile policy.
How were these vacillating utterances to be reconciled with the position
so decidedly taken up eight months before?

A disturbing influence had intervened, causing Lord Russell to see Japan
at an oblique angle. Certain other brave words of the Foreign Secretary
in that year, 1864, in connection with the Danish Duchies, had also had
their current turned awry and lost the name of action. Japan was but
an echo. Of course, after the definite energetic policy of the Queen's
representative in Japan had proved a brilliant success, had involved no
complications, had, in fact, been the means of temporarily uniting four of
the treaty Powers, Lord Russell was ready enough to make the _amende_ to
Sir Rutherford Alcock, though to have cancelled his order of recall would
have been too frank an admission of error to expect from any statesman.
In this manner was the career of Sir Rutherford Alcock in Japan brought
to an abrupt, but highly honourable, conclusion. He received his letter
of recall while in the act of completing the final convention with the
Tycoon respecting the affair of the Prince of Choshiu. The announcement
was heard in Japan almost with consternation. The Tycoon's Ministers were
particularly grieved about it, and they sent a strongly-worded letter
to Earl Russell to be laid before the Queen, dwelling on the important
services the envoy had rendered to their country, and begging that he
might be sent back to them as soon as the urgent affairs that required
his presence in England had been settled. The mercantile communities of
the treaty ports were no less warm in their commendation of the services
rendered to them and to general commerce by the decided measures adopted
by the Minister, and in their regret at his departure. "The principal
triumph of your success," they said in a farewell address, "lies in
the fact that you have accomplished all this not only without causing a
collision between her Majesty's Government and that of the Tycoon, but
by actually strengthening the Government from which you obtained the
concessions, as well as by acting in such a way as to secure the cordial
co-operation of the foreign Ministers resident at this port."

Admiral Kuper took so serious a view of the loss of a representative
of such unrivalled experience and virility, that he took it on himself
to address to the Minister privately a weighty appeal, on public and
patriotic grounds, to postpone his departure until at least he had time to
refer again to the Foreign Office, which on subsequent information must
certainly take a different view of the action of their Minister. That
the admiral correctly appreciated the attitude of the Foreign Office is
sufficiently shown by Lord Russell's despatches already quoted, and by
that dated January 31, 1865, which concludes, "I shall wish you to return
at once to Yokohama, to perform in Japan such additional meritorious
services as may be expected from your tried ability and long experience."
But Sir Rutherford Alcock did not consider that the episode would have
left him the prestige necessary for further useful service in Japan, and
he declined to return to that country.

Sir Rutherford remained at his post long enough to secure the fulfilment
of the primary objects of the Allied expedition against Choshiu: the
reopening of trade, which had been practically closed both at Yokohama and
Nagasaki, and a number of most important improvements in the conditions
of foreign residence in Yokohama. These comprised a parade-ground and
racecourse, hospitals, slaughter-houses, filling in of swamp, a clear
and convenient site for consular buildings, a good carriage-road seven
miles in circuit, away from the town, and various other extensions of the
comforts of foreign residents.

The ratification of the treaties, too, by the Mikado was virtually
arranged. The very day before Sir Rutherford Alcock embarked for England
he was enabled to report to his Government that the law interdicting
intercourse and putting all foreigners under the ban of outlawry had
been modified, and its hostile provisions repealed. This was considered
tantamount to the Mikado's acknowledgment of the Tycoon's treaties, and
thus the vice of illegality which had attached to them from their origin
was at last removed. A year later the Mikado distinctly and in so many
words approved of the treaties. This, therefore, may fairly be considered
Sir Rutherford Alcock's last service to his country in Japan. It was
not, however, till 1868, after the attack on Sir H. Parkes while on his
way to the palace of the Mikado, that an edict was published, over the
imperial sign manual, decreeing that the lives of foreigners in Japan were
thenceforth to be deemed as sacred as the lives of the subjects of the
empire.

But it would not have been Japan without an assassination to mark the
close of the Minister's eventful career. Two officers of the British
garrison, Major Baldwin and Lieutenant Bird, on an excursion on horseback
to the romantic district of Kamakura, and near the celebrated bronze
statue of Buddha, were stealthily attacked in broad day by a couple of
two-sworded men, and mercilessly cut down. One of them lived late into
the night, spoke, and drank tea, when the assassins, or accomplices
in the crime, paid another visit to the dying man and, as in the case
of Richardson, despatched him with ghastly ferocity. The Tycoon might
truthfully say, "An enemy hath done this"; but the position of the
Government had been so much strengthened by the collapse of Choshiu that
the Tycoon's officers were no longer afraid of pursuing the criminals
and bringing them to justice, especially as they happened to be _ronin_,
or masterless men. "Twelve similar onslaughts," wrote Sir Rutherford,
"have been made on foreigners, and in no one instance has justice had its
due." For "even in the only case where men were executed, the Government
did not venture in exposing their heads to declare their crime, or admit
that it was for an attack upon foreigners." The present case was to
prove an exception to the hitherto unbroken rule. Within a month certain
accomplices in the crime were brought to punishment in Yokohama, and there
one of the principals, who was executed in presence of British officers,
died boasting of his crime and claiming the highest patriotic sanction
for it.

Sir Rutherford and Lady Alcock took their departure from Yokohama on
December 24, 1864.


VII. THE BIRTH OF NEW JAPAN.

    Four years of civil strife--Cessation of efforts to eject
    foreigners--The adoption of foreign appliances--Educational
    missions--Unanimity of Japanese in cultivating foreign
    intercourse--The merits of those who promoted the movement--Sir R.
    Alcock's services in the cause of Japanese progress--His services
    to Japanese art.

"Is this the commencement of a civil war?" wrote the British Minister
during his first year of residence in Japan. When he left the civil war
was well advanced. Feverish energy was being displayed by every party
in the State. There was a race for foreign ships and armaments among
the Daimios; the Tycoon was involved in a struggle for existence; the
legitimate sovereign was asserting his authority, and the feudatories were
rallying to his support. Neither the immediate nor the remote issues were
clear, but the sword was out of the scabbard, and would not be sheathed
again until a new order of things should be established.

The civil strife, which ended within four years in the abolition of
feudalism and the assumption by the Mikado by divine right of all
administrative functions, may be called revolution, restoration, or merely
evolution, according to the point of view from which we regard it. The
hand of the foreigner had loosened the stone from the mountain-side, but
it rolled down by its own laws. The introduction of foreigners into the
country brought down vengeance on the Tycoon as the responsible agent.
To abase him and transfer the sceptre to another house was perhaps as
far as the views of the hostile princes in the first instance extended.
The consummation of the movement in the unification of the State, though
its natural fruit, grew and ripened with a rapidity which bewildered
the lookers-on. From the moment when the goal was descried a profound
unanimity of sentiment urged the leaders towards it, the territorial
magnates being themselves the first to propose the abolition of the
privileges, titles, and responsibilities of their order, which stood
in the way of nationality in the larger sense. But wide and manifold as
were the issues raised in the course of the brief but fierce struggle, it
concerns us chiefly to remember that the avowed impulse which gave the
first impetus to the whole was the passionate purpose of expelling the
foreigner. This was the rallying cry that brought the entire nation into
line. The presence of the foreigner on the soil sacred to the gods was
an insult and a deep humiliation. The manifestoes of the Daimios, their
invective against the Tycoon, the distress of the Mikado and his constant
imploring appeals for help to purge the land of its defilement, testify
to the sincerity and universality of the feeling. In that sentiment there
was no difference between Tycoon and Mikado, the Daimios attached to the
one and those attached to the other: they were only divided as to the time
and the means, the risks and the consequences.

From the first the foreigners had evidence of the tenacious character
of the Japanese: their persistency in face of difficulties and
discouragements, and, above all, their readiness, not only to risk, but
deliberately to sacrifice, their lives in the pursuit of an object. Such
a spirit would render any people formidable,--most formidable when united
in a common purpose; and their genius for combination is one of their
most typical characteristics. What these qualities have already led to
the world has partly seen; what they will hereafter lead to is perhaps as
much hidden from our generation as the phenomena of the present were from
the preceding one. But from the earliest days of the new intercourse it
was hardly possible to misconstrue the seriousness of the Japanese people,
though their refinement of taste, especially in art, their pleasant
vices, and their addiction to light and frivolous recreation, often masked
their more solid qualities. One word may possibly reconcile the seeming
contradiction. They are an intensely vital people, living every part of
their lives earnestly, which, however, is no synonym for solemnly. The
gravest and the gayest have their appointed place in the social system,
whose parts appear to be co-ordinated as if the whole were a direct
inspiration of nature itself, elastic, accommodating, ever renewing
itself, and yet so highly organised that there is no unemployed surplus,
no waste material, nothing that does not find an effective place in the
great cosmic product. That many practical men have misjudged the Japanese
is beyond doubt. Indeed it is the so-called practical men who are the
most apt to misjudge human phenomena, seeing that their system leaves out
of account all they do not understand, which is usually a good deal. It
was long thought that the Japanese were mere copyists and imitators, and
disparaging epithets have been applied to them under that misapprehension.
But, rightly considered, their very imitation was the clearest proof of
their depth. They had been overcome by the foreigner, therefore they
would help themselves to his weapons--all his weapons, educational,
scientific, ethical, and not merely the machinery of war. This was not
imitation, but adaptation and assimilation. It was no more imitation than
what is seen every day among Americans, for instance, who so successfully
"exploit" the ideas of Europe, and improve on them. It gradually dawned
upon the intelligent few who watched the process from the beginning that
the adaptation of European customs and costume was nothing but a strict
application of the laws of evolution. The Japanese began spontaneously
to appropriate ideas from the dress of Europeans; modifications, scarce
perceptible, were adopted at first by servants. Certain malefactors
advertised for by the Yedo police as early as 1862 were described as
wearing "riding trousers and coats of tight foreign fashion." Each article
of attire was adopted on its merits, for convenience and for no other
reason, one of the first items being buttons. Strange combinations were
sometimes seen, such as a billycock hat, or policeman's cast-off coat with
a few buttons left on, surmounting a pair of bare legs shod with wooden
clogs. Such bizarre combinations were not uncommon during the time of
transition. The growing habits of travel necessitated a revolution in the
coiffure. The ancient custom of shaving part of the head and training the
truncated queue required a staff of skilled barbers to accompany every
travelling party. The expense and inconvenience were intolerable, and so
the old head-dressing had to go the way of obsolete things.

The Japanese deliberately resolved to learn every secret thing that any
foreign nation possessed. To do this they had to be conciliatory, so as
to gain access to schools, laboratories, arsenals, factories of every
kind. Japanese swarmed in the workshops of Europe and America; they took
military, naval, mercantile, and industrial service wherever they could
get it.[10] In such pursuits an outlandish costume would have been a
severe handicap, not merely marking them as strangers, but hampering them
for the mechanical work they might be engaged in. To be the comrades of
the foreign workmen they must dress like them, and minimise all personal
peculiarities. It is often said by those who regret the change that
the native dress was so becoming, and that the Japanese looked ever so
much nicer in their own than in foreign garb--which may be true, though
irrelevant. To look nice was not what they were aiming at. They had to
join the family of nations, to become men of the world, to comply with
all civilised observances, and as much as in them lay to avoid attracting
notice to their nationality. Such a programme necessitated adoption of
the common costume of the Western nations, and if we do not accuse German,
French, English, and Americans of being imitators, who for similar reasons
adopt a uniform society habit, why should the Japanese be imitators when
doing the very same thing? Let the world not deceive itself,--there is
something more serious than copying in the development of the Japanese
nationality. Borrowers they have undoubtedly been, and that on a grand
scale. Religion, philosophy, language, literature, art, and artistic
manufacture they took bodily from China, apparently through Korea. But who
shall say they have not improved upon their teachers? That is a kind of
borrowing which may yet carry Japan very far. We should not forget that
even a Shakespeare may be an incorrigible borrower.

From the first appearance of Commodore Perry's "black ships" in 1853
one idea took complete possession of the Japanese ruling classes, and
inspired all their manifestoes. How far the common people were in sympathy
with their rulers there was no evidence available to show. The idea was
that their nation was weak, and in its seclusion had been outstripped by
the nations of the West, and that they must make every exertion to arm
themselves in order to be able to cope with and to expel the barbarians.
All their temporising with the enemy had this end in view, and they
followed it up with such zeal, intelligence, and national harmony, as to
excite both wonder and admiration. In the building up of their nation, and
giving it a status among the military and industrial Powers, the Japanese
freely and extensively employed foreigners in all capacities, dispensing
with their services when done with as naturally as a builder dispenses
with his temporary scaffolding. They used foreigners from the outset,
but have never allowed foreigners to use them. They have thus remained
the masters in their own house, and therein has lain their strength,
present and prospective. Teaching they have recompensed with coin; and
though confidences have been received with courtesy, their own plans and
purposes have been veiled from the most honoured of their tutors. Their
attitude has remained what it was in the days of the Dutch monopoly,
when instruction in Western lore, including naval and military science,
was freely imparted to them, while the uses to which it was applied were
studiously hidden from the teachers. Though the Dutch, for example, taught
the Japanese mathematics and triangulation so successfully that the pupils
were able to make accurate surveys and construct maps of the country and
charts of its sea-coasts, yet the Dutch were never permitted to see the
finished result.

In looking back on the work of those foreign Governments and their
agents who by their interference shook this new nation into life, it is
obvious that they did not, any of them, know what they were doing. There
was a divinity shaping their ends which they, with their conventional
concessions to the modern spirit, had no idea of. If we are to pass
judgment at all on those men, it must not be by the ulterior consequences
which they did not and could not foresee, but on the merits of the
problem which immediately presented itself to them. The demand for free
intercourse with Japan being shared by all the nations of Christendom
was bound to be satisfied one day: it was but a question of a favourable
opportunity. Commodore Perry and the United States Government made their
opportunity. Townsend Harris had his opportunity made for him, and with
great adroitness, and not too much scruple, he took advantage of it to
force the half-open door. Lord Elgin, in his turn, did a smart thing in
sandwiching in a full treaty with Japan between his earlier and later
negotiations with China. Each in his degree contributed to the general
result without any apparent sense of responsibility for unsettling an
ancient polity of which they were ignorant, and to which they were blind.
Lord Elgin was indeed visited by the qualms of conscience which were as
natural to him as they were honourable, but the particular consequences
of which he had a passing dread were not those which followed. In any
case, his act was momentary: its results remained to be dealt with by
those who came after. The heat and burden of the day fell upon those who
had to "stub the Thurnaby waste" which the cavaliers had gaily cantered
round,--to reduce theories and compliments to everyday practice. Here was
not only a labour but a responsibility, not of the attenuated abstract
order, but one which was apt to knock violently at their door every
morning and every night. For whatever might be the remote effects, the
immediate issues were always urgent, and what a conscientious man had to
do was to shape a daily course among unknown rocks and whirlpools such
as would eventually lead to a successful ocean voyage. It is surely a
test of good pilotage in such emergencies that no step need be retraced;
that to whatever extent temporary exigencies may hasten or retard, they
should never deflect the general movement from its true direction; that
the years achievement should be homogeneous with the day's doings. It is
a test which would eliminate the time-server from political life, but it
was in all important particulars well responded to in the short career of
Sir Rutherford Alcock in Japan.

It would be idle to conjecture the probable course of events had a
different spirit prevailed among the first diplomatic representatives
in Japan. Had they been a weak and yielding body, or had they been
connected with the bureaux of their respective Governments by electric
wire; still more, had each step taken by them formed a bone of contention
between opposing factions in their legislatures, all alike ignorant of
the situation, the proceedings of the Ministers would not only have been
deprived of all initiative, but would have been liable to paralysis at
every critical moment. Under such conditions foreign policy in Japan
would have been like driftwood in a whirlpool; the forces of reaction must
have gained courage; the position of foreigners would have been rendered
untenable; and what might have happened in the country itself it would,
as we have said, be quite idle to imagine. In those days no Power would
have interfered to maintain order or to defend treaties had England held
aloof. There is no need to carry hypothesis further than this in order
to appreciate the good fortune not only of Great Britain herself, but of
Japan and the world, in having as pioneer representative a man so alert,
so capable, so clear, and with such unshakable nerve as Sir Rutherford
Alcock; for it is the man on the spot in distant countries who shapes
the policy of his Government, if it is to have a policy at all, and this
historic service the first Minister sent to Japan did effectually render
to his country. Amid difficulties unprecedented, emergencies incessant,
and an elemental strife ever raging, the terms of which were inscrutable,
two immutable principles guided the Minister to a clear issue. The first
was duty, at all costs and hazards; the second, the integrity of the
treaties. Whatever might be argued about the policy or the ethics of
making them, once made, retreat from their engagements was impossible
and compromise futile. Matters had to be pushed to an issue. The whole
term of Sir Rutherford Alcock's service in Japan was filled up with
a warfare against the temptation to temporise in the hope that things
would be better,--a temptation to which, as we have seen, her Majesty's
Government for a time succumbed. In perplexing situations the best solvent
is simplicity, and the Minister found his safety in directness of aim and
inflexibility of purpose. Standing on that rock, the mystifications with
which he was surrounded lost their power to disturb him. "Fortunately,"
he wrote to Earl Russell, "whether the Tycoon was playing a comedy or
not, the course plainly indicated is the same, the assertion of a fixed
determination not to be driven out, and to maintain the rights secured
under treaties, by force, if all other means fail."

To the man who perceived and successfully carried out this simple rule of
action his countrymen owe no common debt.

As it is proverbially the busiest people who have the most leisure, the
British Minister found time in the midst of his harassing labours to
employ his æsthetic gifts for the benefit of the public. It fell to his
lot, as the reader may remember, while consul in Shanghai, to contribute
samples of the art, industry, and natural products of China to the
Great Exhibition of 1851, neither the native Government nor the foreign
mercantile community being sufficiently interested to assist in the
work. A similar service was asked of him in Japan for the Exhibition of
1862, and it was performed under similar conditions, neither the native
Government nor the foreign residents taking any part in it. The task
had a special fascination for Sir Rutherford, for Japanese art was a new
and rich field for the student as for the dilettante. The Japanese had
originally borrowed their whole art, with their literature and religion,
from China, but they had improved or at least transformed it so much as
to make it their own, though it is contended that in ceramics they had
never succeeded in overtaking the Chinese. For five hundred years they
had worked on the Chinese idea; but at last in the eleventh century A.D.
native schools sprang up, and thenceforth Japanese artists followed their
own inspiration, which was that of nature, producing, in the fulness of
time, the exquisite results with which the world is now so familiar.
The introduction of this Japanese work to the connoisseurs of Europe
through the London Exhibition of 1862 was effected through the personal
exertions of Sir Rutherford Alcock, who added immensely to the obligations
under which he laid his countrymen by the publication in 1878 of a short
but comprehensive work on 'Art and Art Industries of Japan.' Like the
collecting of objects for the Exhibition, the writing of this book was
evidently a labour of love. It reviews with a sympathy which almost
rises to enthusiasm not only the finished product, but the stages of the
evolution of Japanese art, having its origin in a loving fellowship with
nature and in a special affinity with what may be called its humorous
side. The genius of Japan has taken a different form from that of the
West, where "the great works of the sculptor and the painter are seen by
but few," whereas the art work of Japan, "which is always in sight, tends
to cultivate the taste of the million by bringing constantly before their
eyes objects of taste, not less effective because they are unconsciously
felt and enjoyed." It is art pressed into the service of the life of the
people "which can give a priceless value to the commonest and least costly
material by the mere impress of genius and taste, ... which is the most
precious, tested by any true estimate of value and utility." The volume
is well worth perusal by those who are interested in art, not only for
its philosophical yet simple analysis of the subject generally, but for
the instructive way in which universal principles are adapted to the
popularised art of Japan. To read this book, one would imagine the writer
had devoted the whole of the three years and a half he spent in Japan to
the cultivation of the industrial fine arts.

The Japanese language, too, attracted the interest of the busy Minister,
who during his stay in Yedo brought out a grammar and phrase-book in
Japanese and English. They have, as a matter of course, been superseded by
the more recondite studies of later students; but as a first step towards
familiarising the language to visitors and strangers these introductory
works cannot be denied their meed of merit.


VIII. THE DIPLOMATIC BODY--TSUSHIMA.

    Four Western Powers represented in Tokio--Russia only in
    Hakodate by consul--And naval officers--Cordial Anglo-French
    relations--Temptations to intrigue--Secret communications to
    Japanese--Representatives of the Powers arousing suspicions
    of each other's designs--Letters cited--The Tsushima
    incident--Admiral Sir James Hope obtains its evacuation by
    Russians.

During the first few years there were four representatives of the
Western Powers resident in or near the Tycoon's capital: they were the
Ministers of Great Britain, the United States, France, and Holland.
Russia had accredited no Minister, but intrusted her interests to the
very capable hands of M. Goskavitch, consul at Hakodate, the treaty port
in the northern island of the Japanese group. What was no doubt deemed
of at least equal importance, she maintained a powerful squadron on the
western coast of Japan, whose actual strength was magnified to the view
by their incessant activity, which had the character of a continuous
demonstration on the coast both of China and Japan; and the principle of
direct action by naval officers without the medium of diplomacy, at the
ports of Nagasaki and Hakodate, was so different from that of any other
Power, that the Daimios declared to the Tycoon that any of the foreigners
could be safely insulted except the Russians. Their manœuvres in force
round Hongkong, meaningless to the ordinary professional or political
eye, played probably a corroborative part in the impressions they were
making on the rulers of the neighbouring countries. Prussia had not yet
come effectually on the scene when the decisive operations against the two
great Daimios, which really determined the future course of events, were
undertaken.

The relations of the resident foreign Ministers among themselves
were marked by substantial harmony, in some instances rising to great
cordiality. The foreign diplomatic body thus presented a united front to
the forces, open or covert, that were opposed to them. Such differences of
opinion as arose in the course of business either were not of a nature, or
were not allowed, to interfere with the pursuit of the national interests
of each, which were inextricably bound up in the common interests of all.
United, the influence of the Powers was practically irresistible; divided,
they would have fallen an easy prey to the devices of what, for want of
another term, must be spoken of as the common enemy, Japan. It is not
pleasant to think of Japan in this way, since she was on her defence in
a position forced upon her; yet overruling circumstances had, in fact,
placed the parties in temporary antagonism--the world against Japan.

The key to the success of European diplomacy of the earlier period was
without doubt the Anglo-French alliance, which had culminated in the
coercion of imperial China, and was spending its ebbing strength in
suppressing the great Taiping insurrection against that empire. Being
possessed of mobile forces within call, the two Powers were always in a
position to act when circumstances called for action, and they had become
accustomed to co-operation. Hence the potency of their united counsels.

The Minister of France as well as the admiral on the station had the
instructions of the Imperial Government to support England in her Far
Eastern policy,--"for," said the calculating Emperor Napoleon III.,
"though our interests in that part of the world are trivial, we may find
our account in the friendship of England in quarters where our interests
are vital." That the Ministers of the two countries, therefore, should be
on terms of official intimacy and mutual confidence was only natural, and
it was a tower of strength to them both. But we gather from the despatches
that personal respect and attachment went hand in hand with the official
_liaison_; and whether it was Sir Rutherford Alcock or Colonel Neale on
the one side, or M. Duchesne de Bellecourt or Leon Roche on the other,
their expressions towards their colleagues were always of the warmest.
So completely confidential were their relations, that when something was
insinuated by third parties which, if credited, would have necessitated
explanations between the two, it was simply dismissed as unworthy of
consideration. There were not wanting those who would have regarded with
equanimity a little more coldness between the Allied colleagues.

For, notwithstanding their good fraternal relations, it cannot be said
that the foreign officials in Japan were uniformly successful in resisting
the besetting sin of diplomacy, the common temptation to intrigue. In
certain cases it was resorted to as the natural means of advancing the
solid interests of a particular country; in other cases, where no national
interest could be served by it, it would appear that intrigue was its own
allurement, followed for the mere pleasure of the game. The political
situation in Japan was sufficiently complicated to afford occasion for
both these motives of action. The unstable Government of the country,
oppressed by conflicting obligations and consciously struggling for
existence, offered an ideal theatre for volunteer experimentation by those
on whom no ulterior responsibility rested.

Be that as it may, however, secret communications did pass between certain
foreign officials and the Japanese Government of a kind which betrayed the
design of undermining the interests of other Powers and frustrating their
policy, presumably for the benefit of those whose zeal in the cause of
international honour impelled them to adopt the _rôle_ of international
informers. It need hardly be said that Great Britain was a principal
object of these occult practices; neither need it be denied that she
suffered from their effects in the estimation of the Japanese Government,
which was naturally credulous of any disparagement of the Powers it
dreaded so much. In the incandescent condition of the intercourse of those
earlier years, had any of the foreign agents spoken well of his neighbours
he would have obtained no hearing for his praise; but given vilification
for its motive, the representation would find its way straight to the
Japanese heart, since nothing could be too vile to be believed of the
intentions of any of the foreign nations. The spy system was congenial
to the Japanese, woven into their whole administration; while as regards
foreigners, they had had ample experience centuries before of the lengths
Christian nations would go in traducing each other for the sake of gaining
a little favour of the rulers of Japan. It was entirely in keeping with
their medieval experiences that these dastardly barbarians should now
be ready to stab each other in the back. Whatever reception, therefore,
on other grounds, might be accorded to gratuitous information conveyed
through prejudiced channels, no surprise was occasioned by it, and as
little doubt of its truth, so long as its burden was evil. This much has
to be borne in mind as a tribute to the intelligence of the writers of
letters such as the following, addressed to the Gorogiu, or Bureau of
Foreign Affairs, and conveyed to them with ostentatious secrecy. In 1860
one Government agent wrote--

    Last year towards the middle of the second month the English
    created great difficulties in China in consequence of the war
    they waged by sea and land. They had violated the treaties in
    a shameful manner, and as this excited the indignation of the
    Chinese they attacked the English on the river, and captured three
    men-of-war. Feeling herself humbled by this defeat, England swore
    revenge. She uttered the most unjust menaces against China, and
    at the very moment the Chinese commenced their conferences upon
    this subject four or five months ago the English suddenly ordered
    forty-seven men-of-war from London. These vessels are at present
    at Chusan, and await the signal for action. Within two or three
    months the men-of-war will leave for the north. The merchant
    vessel Dayspring brought us all this news on the 12th instant.

    On speaking about this important news to Mr ----, the British
    Consul residing here, he gave me the following information in a
    strictly private manner.

    "At last," said Mr ----, "the war with China is decided upon.
    We have for a long time been searching for a good harbour where
    we shall be able to put the sick and wounded. We have chosen
    Tsushima, where we intend to send the sick and wounded, and as
    soon as the war has commenced we have resolved to take possession
    of that island."

    Mr ---- communicated this to me as a great secret, and I now give
    you this information in a strictly private manner.

    You will perceive that this is a question of the utmost
    importance, and you must take it into serious consideration
    without delay, and with the utmost attention.

    Four years ago the English, who had for a long time coveted
    an excellent little island called Perim, took possession of
    it, informing the Turkish Government that they only wished to
    place their invalids on that island, and this false pretext was
    matter for serious discussion. The Turks were perfectly aware of
    the deceitful conduct of the English. They did not ignore that
    fourteen or fifteen years before, while fighting with the Chinese,
    the English had stolen Hongkong under the same pretences.... But
    while they were deliberating the English sent their invalids to
    Perim, and immediately built forts and stole this island in the
    most disgraceful manner.

    As the English are wonderful impostors, it is your duty not only
    to take care of Tsushima, but also of the smallest island in your
    empire: this must be done with the utmost watchfulness.

    I inform you of this danger in the most private and secret manner.

And a year or two later, when the intercourse between the British Minister
and the Tycoon was charged with contentious, almost with explosive,
matter, missives were passed in from philanthropic onlookers of a tenor
which excited no surprise, but a good deal of genuine exultation, in the
minds of the Japanese Ministers. It was well known some time before that
it had been sought to prevent a settlement of outstanding difficulties
between the two countries by the assurance volunteered to the Tycoon's
Government that Great Britain was quite unable to make war on Japan,
and the following letter is only one of a series of such international
amenities which shunned the light of day:--

    Japan was opened by us, ... and after we had settled down here
    the other Powers made their appearance. The intentions of ...
    in opening this country to foreign intercourse was to increase
    the welfare and prosperity of its inhabitants. While we were
    doing our utmost for this nation some English men-of-war suddenly
    appeared here to demand indemnities for a murder which, although
    unjustifiable, was not a _casus belli_. As long as the ambitious,
    warlike, and quarrelsome Englishmen are here, the object we have
    in view cannot be obtained. They must, therefore, be driven out
    of this country. You cannot consent to their demands. Do not
    fear the English; there are other nations in Japan, and if you
    require assistance you may rest assured we shall give you moral
    and material support.

But in vain was the snare set by these fowlers in the sight of the bird.
The notion of setting a thief to catch a thief was not uncongenial to
Japanese habits of thought, but a generous offer of armed assistance
against a foreign Power savoured too much of the wooden horse even for
such inexperienced internationalists as the New Japan. Having expressed
their appreciation--had it been the Chinese Government it would have taken
the form of praise for their loyal obedience--the Government intimated
that they would exhaust their own resources before putting these friendly
foreign Powers to the trouble of intervening on their behalf. The Japanese
have always been wary about accepting help unasked for. The United States
frigate Niagara, which brought back the envoys in 1860, brought also a
staff of artillery officers whose services were tendered to the Tycoon,
but declined. And it was said the American officers were rather astonished
by the proofs afforded them in Yedo of the efficiency of armament and
proficiency of the gunners which Japan was already able to show.

One of the vigilant observers of political portents about that time became
convinced that the French had designs upon Tsushima, a belief which was
no doubt in some way also communicated to the Japanese Government; but
by that time--1863--it was too late for any Power to flirt with that
"excellent little island," for since the first warning given the Japanese
in 1860, above cited, the island had been made the subject of definitive
arrangements. The incident itself, though of brief duration and leaving
no visible trail behind it, nevertheless deserves to be remembered as a
landmark of history.

When Count Mouravieff was in Yedo in 1859, he took the trouble to warn
the Tycoon's Government that the English harboured aggressive designs
against the island of Tsushima, which is a long double or "twin" island,
possessing wonderful harbours, and situated midway between the main
island of Japan and the southern coast of Korea. On March 13, 1861, the
Russians landed from the corvette Possadnik in Tsushima, and saying their
ship wanted repairs, began to build houses on shore. Captain Birileff had
forced the Prince of Tsushima to receive him at his capital, which created
an intense feeling of indignation, especially in the ranks of the nobles,
who each saw himself exposed to similar intrusions. The Daimio repeatedly
requested the Russians to leave, but was always told the ship required
further repairs. In consequence of reports from his own officers and the
Japanese Government, Vice-Admiral Sir James Hope looked in at Tsushima
himself in the month of August, and observing what was going on there,
he addressed a letter to Captain Birileff, of which the substance was as
follows: The prolonged stay of his Imperial Majesty's corvette Possadnik,
the erection of buildings, &c., having created alarm in Yedo, the admiral
had the intention to communicate on the subject as early as possible
with Commodore Likatchoff. Would Captain Birileff meantime facilitate
this correspondence by replying to the questions--(1) Should the Japanese
Government appeal to the treaty, which conveys no right either to create
establishments ashore, to survey the Japanese coast without Government
sanction, or even to enter a non-treaty port except in case of necessity,
would Captain Birileff's orders admit of his leaving Tsushima immediately
on the request of the Japanese authorities? (2) Was it Captain Birileff's
intention to leave Tsushima in October as previously stated to Commander
Ward, leaving the buildings to whomsoever wanted them?... (3) Had the
captain orders to create a permanent establishment there?

The reply of Captain Birileff was to the effect that the officers of his
Imperial Majesty were accountable only to their own chiefs; ... that he
was quite astonished to hear of the alarms in Yedo, seeing that only two
months before the Prince of Bungo had been sent to Tsushima expressly
from Yedo to grant permission to the corvette to remain there; that the
same prince gave him the opportunity of visiting the Prince of Tsushima,
who was instructed to supply workmen and all that might be necessary
for the construction of the buildings in question; that if the Japanese
Government were annoyed by the surveying operations, they should address
their complaint to the Russian diplomatic agent; that he had no orders
for the occupation of the island, and the nature of the buildings which
the admiral had done him the honour to visit would not show any such
intention; and finally, that when he spoke of leaving in October it had
referred only to himself personally. So far Captain Birileff.

It was no "Prince of Bungo," but a Governor of Foreign Affairs named
Bungo, who had been despatched in haste from the capital to endeavour by
any means to induce the Russians to leave Tsushima, and was, for his want
of success, disgraced.

Sir James Hope forthwith proceeded in search of Commodore Likatchoff to
Olga Bay, whence he addressed to him a letter dated September 5, pointing
out the irregularity of the proceedings at Tsushima, the bad effect they
were having on the relations of foreigners generally in Yedo, and that he
could not recognise any establishment on Japanese territory not sanctioned
by treaty--which resolutions he would make known to the authorities
concerned.

To this the Russian commodore courteously replied from Hakodate, September
23, excusing himself from entering on any international questions, and
pointing out that in their hydrographical labours the Russians were only
following the excellent example set them by the British surveying officers
whom they met on their respective missions, and that no complaint had ever
been made by the Japanese Government. As for the "absurd rumours" alluded
to, the Possadnik had already received orders for another destination,
before receipt of the admiral's letters, and nothing consequently need be
said to calm the doubts and alarms, "si même elles auraient véritablement
raison d'exister."

Admiral Hope acknowledged this letter, "with much satisfaction," from
Chefoo, October 22, and remarked that, so far as the surveying operations
of the ships in his squadron were concerned, they were carried out with
the full consent of the Japanese Government, at whose special request
Japanese officers and interpreters were accommodated on board during
the whole of the cruise. He added that it was not so much the surveying
operations of the Possadnik as the preparation for a permanent settlement
on shore that disquieted the Japanese Government; and, moreover, that
the Japanese Ministers had distinctly stated that the matter had been
the subject of remonstrance to the commodore, through M. Goskavitch,
the consul at Hakodate, and to Captain Birileff by an officer specially
deputed for the purpose (Bungo).

The question extended itself to St Petersburg, where Prince Gortchakoff
had remarked to Lord Napier, then British ambassador, on the tone of
Admiral Hope's letter to Commodore Likatchoff, which, he said, but for
the conciliatory disposition of the latter, might have led to serious
misunderstanding. Lord Napier, in reply, observed that "Admiral Hope was
a man of a frank, downright, energetic character, who used the language
natural to him without any intention of giving offence."

As the Russians had abandoned the island, Prince Gortchakoff called
on Lord Napier to declare that the English would never take possession
of Tsushima, whereupon the ambassador reminded his Excellency that the
English had "offered to sign a treaty binding ourselves and the other
Powers having engagements with Japan to make no acquisitions in those
seas." "I think," concludes the ambassador in his letter to the Foreign
Office, "that Admiral Hope will do well to assure himself that the
buildings have really been evacuated." This precaution had already been
taken, and the admiral reported on November 10 that the Russians had
evacuated on September 29.

There the incident ended, but not its historical significance.


IX. TRADE AND TRADERS.

    Commerce increases in spite of adverse political
    situations--And of efforts of Japanese government to repress
    it--The _personnel_ of the mercantile community--British
    predominance--Relations of merchants to Ministers--Interests
    and duties not always identical--Sumptuary laws--Discharges of
    firearms forbidden--Seizure of Mr Moss--Wounding of a Japanese
    policeman--Trial and sentence of Mr Moss--His liberation in
    Hongkong--Sues the Minister and obtains damages--Legal supremacy
    at Hongkong--Defects of the consular jurisdiction--The recreation
    of shooting.

These fierce struggles, the sudden arousing to intensity of dormant
passions, the dislocation of the whole structure of Japanese polity,
represented to the foreign nations merely the risks and sacrifices
incidental to the expansion of their commerce. In order to compel the
Government to permit the people to exchange the products of their soil for
the merchandise of the strangers within their gates, the labour, anxiety,
and expense which we have only faintly indicated were voluntarily incurred
by the Western treaty Powers, and by them in turn forced on the reluctant
rulers of Japan. An _a priori_ judgment of the probable effect of the
sanguinary conditions into which official intercourse had been thrown
would probably have concluded that peaceful commerce could not under such
circumstances exist. The restrictions resulting from an ill-regulated
currency, and from the direct interference of the Government, might have
been deemed sufficient of themselves to check the development of trade.
When to these inimical influences were superadded the further facts that
the foreign traders went in peril of their lives, that the communities
of Nagasaki and Yokohama were at different times in such danger that
provisional arrangements were made for conveying them, bag and baggage, on
board ship, a condition of things less favourable to international traffic
could scarcely be conceived. Yet these difficulties, and a score of others
which could be enumerated, served only to bring into clear recognition
the inherent vitality of commerce, which, like running water, finds its
way through or round almost any obstacle. There were, on the other hand,
circumstances favourable to trade. In Japan, as has been already hinted,
the traders of the country had neither part nor lot in the strife that
raged above and around them, and for the most part they could pursue their
peaceful avocations without fear or hindrance. So the quality of commerce
was not strained; but, shedding its benefits on buyer and seller alike,
it grew from small beginnings till it attained to a volume of world-wide
importance, accumulating momentum as it progressed.

The total amount of foreign trade was a little over one million sterling
per annum for the first three years of the open ports. In the fourth year,
1863, the development of Japanese produce, especially the more precious
commodities, silk and the eggs of the silkworm, began to tell on the gross
values, and the exports for that year amounted to two and a half millions
sterling, the imports of foreign goods being £811,000. The year 1864,
notwithstanding its crowded events of anti-commercial character, witnessed
a notable advance in the value of foreign trade, which in that year
doubled itself. The same thing occurred again in 1865, when the figures
reached a total of eight millions sterling, being double the returns for
1864.

Thus the foreign trade of Japan had fairly established itself as "a going
concern," advancing in war and peace, but with great fluctuations and many
vicissitudes to those engaged in it. From the purely commercial standpoint
the result justified the anticipations of the Powers who opened Japan to
the world. The event proved that when the materials of trade exist there
trade is sure to follow on the removal of obstructions. And the materials
of trade are not wanting wherever there is a population that wears clothes
and builds houses.[11]

It is obvious to remark that had it been in the power of the Japanese
Government to place an effective interdict on foreign commerce at its
sources within their own jurisdiction, and beyond the reach of treaty
obligations, it would have been the surest means of causing the withdrawal
of foreigners from the country. That the Government had the will to do so
was shown by their repeated partial attempts at preventing produce from
reaching the open ports, and even inducing a temporary exodus therefrom
of the native population. Why their measures of repression were not more
thorough may be conjectured to have been connected with the circumstance
that the advantages of the foreign trade soon began to be felt in quarters
with which it was not convenient for the Tycoon to inter-meddle.

As in China, so in Japan, the relations of the merchants to their
official representatives exercised a certain influence on events. The
trade was carried on at first by a very small number of people. In 1861
there were not 200 foreign residents in all the ports of Japan, the
British nationality predominating in Yokohama, the Dutch at Nagasaki.
The British residents in the former port seem to have numbered about
fifty. It was a small body to carry the burden of inaugurating commercial
intercourse with an empire of thirty millions of people. Nor was it
individually a community of any particular weight, being mostly composed
of young men, not themselves principals, but, in the beginning at least,
a considerable number of them occupying the position of delegates of
mercantile houses in China. It was their representative character which
lent importance to the foreign merchants in Japan. They represented,
first of all, the establishments of which they were subordinates or
offshoots; they represented their respective nations; and they, in
a larger sense, represented the commercial creed of Christendom. The
present sketch would be wanting in symmetry if no account were taken
of the relationship of these handfuls of traders to their own national
authorities, both being engaged in the struggle for the development and
security of commerce under the trying conditions of the time and country.
But of course any such inquiry practically limits itself to those of
British nationality, for two reasons: British trade and British diplomacy
were pre-eminently representative of all others by the preponderance of
the interests involved; in addition to which, the strong individuality
and matured experience of the first British envoy were such that his
colleagues tacitly assigned to him the leading _rôle_, so that his was the
personality which exerted the dominant influence in shaping events from
the opening of the ports.

The tendency to divergence of view between the merchants and their
official representatives has already been remarked upon in connection with
affairs in China: it was most pronounced in times of difficulty such as
were chronic for more than twenty years in Canton, where it was so acute
at one time that English Chambers of Commerce made formal complaint to the
Foreign Office that its representative in China--Sir John Davis--refused
to see the merchants in Canton, who desired to present their views to him
in time of danger. The antagonism was natural: it is generically the same
that one hears constantly in this country in the form of complaints and
criticisms of Government, Government servants, and generally of all in
authority--with, however, this difference, that in the many-sided life of
a large society there are buffers between the critics and the criticised.
They do not meet face to face unless it be in such circumstances as on
the floor of "the House" with "a substantial piece of furniture" between;
whereas in nascent communities composed of a few scores of individuals,
where there is no tempering medium, where the parties are never out
of each other's sight, differences are apt to become accentuated like
village scandals. Nothing escapes censure; the smallest indiscretions
have a magnifying lens constantly applied to them, and a sinister colour
is given to innocent trifles. Interests are not diversified, shaded
off, or balanced as in adult nations, but are narrow, concentrated, and
highly sensitive. Between Minister and merchants there was of course a
general identity of interest. They had a common test to apply to all
their proceedings and aspirations, the furtherance of commerce. The
official would, perhaps, add the qualifying adjective "legitimate," in the
interpretation of which differences of opinion might arise; and he would
naturally give a wider scope to the commercial idea than those actually
engaged in trade could or ought to do.

The Minister represents the interests of Great Britain as a whole; the
merchants represent trade generally, but each of them his own interests
particularly, and these various interests cannot always coincide. An
Englishman would naturally give a preference to the manufactures of his
own country, but as a merchant he has to study the requirements of the
country in which he trades, and if he cannot supply them at all, or so
well, by articles manufactured in his own country, he is obliged to seek
them elsewhere. Officials are apt to look askance on this as not fostering
the trade of Great Britain; and while recognising the necessity, the fact
does not warm their sympathy for the merchants of their own country. There
are times also when, from the international point of view, the general
interests of the country may override the special interests of the small
British community in Japan. If policy requires intimate relations between
the Governments, the tendency must inevitably be for the British Minister
to minimise the just causes of complaint of his countrymen in order to
avoid irritation. But the sufferers can hardly be expected to appreciate
sacrifices so forced on them; and so from one cause and another there will
never be wanting grounds of dissatisfaction, and possibly estrangement.

But the ultimate object being definitely agreed upon between the two
parties, there would still remain room for variance in the means,
questions of tactics, of the nearer or the further view, of the present
generation and the next, and so on _ad infinitum_. Where there was a
third party influencing and opposing legitimate commerce by direct or
indirect means, as the Government of China or Japan, whose machinations
called for strong measures of resistance, the occasions of impatience and
dissatisfaction would be frequent, and friction between the representative
and his constituents would naturally result. But perhaps the most
antagonistic of all to harmony was the fact already pointed out, that in
extra-territorialised countries like China and Japan the representatives
of the treaty Powers were necessarily intrusted with exceptional authority
over the persons of their nationals--for they had to assume the functions
denied to the native Governments, of giving the law to the settlers and
punishing evil-doers. What an invidious and onerous position this entailed
on British officials will presently be shown. Yet it was a temporary
necessity, for which nobody was blamable.

In treating of the period of the consulship in Shanghai, a certain
distance or aloofness between Consul Alcock and the community of his
nationals was remarked upon, due to difference of age, taste, culture, or
temperament. This characteristic was rather accentuated than otherwise
by the local circumstances of Japan. The Minister was ten years older,
while the community was about as much younger than in Shanghai, so
that the disparity of age was increased. The mere conditions of life
also placed a material gulf between the diplomatic representatives in
Yedo and the lay residents of Yokohama. The capital city being closed
to all but the diplomatic body, visitors not only required a pass from
one of the Ministers, but, in the absence of available accommodation,
strangers had to rely on the hospitality of the foreign Legations. The
curiosity to see Yedo, which in the early days so attracted tourists
and travellers, threw a heavy and most unfair burden of entertainment on
the Ministers, the principal victim of these birds of passage being of
course the representative of Great Britain. So long, therefore, as the
Legations remained in Yedo the barrier was effectual against personal
intercourse between the Ministers and the permanent residents in Yokohama,
even had mutual affinity been stronger than it was. Like most things,
this local separation between the communities and their representative
had its advantages and disadvantages. While on the one hand it was not
conducive to intimacy, on the other the risk of personal friction was
eliminated by it. Nor was direct intercourse at all necessary in the
conduct of business, seeing the regular official medium of communication
was the local consuls, who had nothing of the Olympian about them, and
were felt by the residents to be men of like passions with themselves,
with easy manners, the spirit of good fellowship, and imbued with the
characteristic sporting proclivities of Englishmen at home and abroad,
always an effective bond of sympathy.

The relations of Sir Rutherford Alcock with the mercantile community
had not been very happily inaugurated, for he clearly felt officially
aggrieved by their settling in Yokohama, instead of waiting till
accommodation could be found for them in Kanagawa; so much so, indeed,
that he seemed almost to deplore the absence of means of coercing them
into obedience to his will.

While the sore as to the location of the settlement was still somewhat
raw, the Minister found yet another grievance against the merchants
in the fabulous demands for Japanese coins which a few of them had put
forward, by way of burlesquing the system of distribution by the native
authorities. The severity with which this schoolboyish escapade was
pilloried, and the community of Yokohama held up to the opprobrium of
the world, was felt by them as going beyond what the merits of the case
warranted, and the incident did not tend to mollify acerbities on either
side.

A year later evidence of a certain widening of the breach became more
conspicuous in the course of a rather exceptional lawsuit, in which a
merchant was heavily mulcted for an offence of which the general opinion
was that he was not guilty. A certain Mr Moss was arrested, cruelly
maltreated, and hidden from his official protector, the consul, by a posse
of Japanese police, for having shot game in the vicinity of Kanagawa.
When faced by these armed men, Mr Moss cocked his gun and threatened
any one who should approach to lay hands on him. The party was numerous
enough to surround and wrest the gun from him, which somehow went off,
wounding one of the men badly in the arm. The Minister ordered the consul
to prosecute Mr Moss for murder, in the Queen's name, the consul himself
being judge, sitting with two assessors. The accused was sentenced to pay
a fine of 1000 dollars (£225) and to be deported from Japan. The assessors
dissented, on the ground that the Japanese evidence was falsified to
order, and that the prisoner was in their opinion innocent of the charge
on which he was tried. In consequence of this dissent the judgment had
to be referred to the Minister, who added to the consul's sentence three
months' imprisonment in Hongkong, whither the culprit was conveyed in a
British ship of war. After a week's incarceration in the Hongkong jail the
warrant for imprisonment was found defective, and Mr Moss was released.
He was then advised to bring an action against Sir Rutherford Alcock in
the Supreme Court at Hongkong, which occupied twelve months, and ended
in a jury awarding damages against the Minister for false imprisonment,
that being the only part of the sentence which could be brought within
the jurisdiction of the Hongkong court. As regards the original sentence
of fine and deportation, the Foreign Office, by advice of their law
officers, had long before quashed the conviction and ordered the fine to
be remitted.

A parallel case had occurred in Canton in 1846. Sir John Davis instructed
the consul there to levy a fine on a British subject for an alleged
offence. Whether just or not, it was illegal, and on appeal to the Supreme
Court in Hongkong, of which colony Sir John Davis himself was governor,
the judgment of the consul was reversed, and the fine of 200 dollars
refunded. Even Sir Frederick Bruce, with all his circumspection, did
not escape falling into the same error with regard to the division of
legal authority between himself and the Supreme Court. "From a careful
perusal of ... her Majesty's Order in Council," he writes, "the chief
superintendent of trade [himself] in cases arising under this section is
the Supreme Court in China: it is for him to prescribe to the consul the
course he is to pursue, and the Supreme Court at Hongkong cannot interfere
in such matters." Her Majesty's Government, however, replied: "You fall
into an error by confounding two distinct questions.... You are mistaken
in treating the question which you have referred to them for decision as
depending upon the 4th and following articles of the Order in Council,"
and so on. So that had it fallen to his lot to give a decision involving
a penalty, he would have been sued not before himself, but before the
Supreme Court at Hongkong, and would have sustained the same reverse as
Sir Rutherford Alcock had done.

These bald facts of the case supplied a striking illustration of the vices
of the consular court system, which was in vogue in China for twenty years
until the establishment of the Supreme Court for China and Japan in 1865.
Consuls were called upon to exercise judicial functions, and Ministers
those of Courts of Appeal, without the slightest preparatory training,
and as often as not without natural aptitude. In criminal cases they were
at once prosecutors and judges, it might even be executioners as well.
The state of conflict in which they lived with the native authorities, of
whom they were accustomed to demand in vain the punishment of malefactors,
placed British officers under continual temptation to prove how promptly
they could bring to justice their own nationals accused of offences
against the natives. This idea of giving object-lessons to Chinese and
Japanese pervades the consular and diplomatic records. English officials
seem to have been oppressed with the reflection of what the natives would
think of the failure of justice in any particular case, and they were
ever apprehensive of political dangers or embarrassments as contingent on
misunderstood lenity to "white men"--natural and proper feelings on the
part of mere political agents, but quite foreign to the administration
of justice according to the rules and maxims of civilised nations. It
seems not unlikely that the obvious lessons of the Moss case itself as
to the incompatibility of judicial and administrative functions, and the
unfair responsibility which their combination threw upon the consular
and diplomatic officers, hastened the realisation of the scheme of an
independent judiciary which was so strongly advocated by Sir Rutherford
Alcock in 'The Capital of the Tycoon.'

These various incidents, and sundry vexatious restrictions imposed on them
from time to time for their own security, no doubt disposed the residents
to look askance at many acts of the Minister, the reasons for which failed
to impress them. But though the surface of the relations between the
Minister and the merchants was thus perturbed, and regrettable, in the
common interest, as the lukewarmness of personal sympathy may have been,
the residents never failed in their respect for the high and sterling
qualities of the Minister, and the courageous manner in which he fought
for his country's interests. It only needed an emergency to give definite
expression to this feeling, and no testimony could be stronger, more
genuine, or less conventional than the farewell addresses in which the
merchants of Yokohama and Nagasaki summed up the brilliant record of a
man of whom they never ceased to feel proud. Instead of detracting from
the value of such spontaneous testimony, the minor differences only lent
emphasis to it, and set the seal of deep conviction on what in an ordinary
case might have passed as the language of mere compliment.

As shooting has been alluded to as an occasion of trouble, a word or two
on the subject of this amusement may have an interest for certain readers.
To the Japanese the pursuit of game seemed to be as strange a form of
sport as the other vagaries of the foreigner. Firearms were not in use
with them, cold steel being the regulation weapon of offence. There was a
tradition that the discharge of firearms within twenty-five miles of the
Tycoon's palace was prohibited by law,--what law or how promulgated was
never clearly made out, though the motive was intelligible enough. For
whatever reason, such game as there was in the country had evidently not
been disturbed; the pheasants were not wilder than the English stall-fed
variety. Small shooting-parties were in the habit of going out for a day,
or half a day, from Yokohama and Kanagawa with dogs and native beaters
among the coppices where the birds lay. The country itself was so charming
to walk or ride over, the peasant-folk were so polite and merry, that
heavy bags were not needed to attract sportsmen. Still, a good shot with
industry and a shrewd acquaintance with the habits of the game could
often get several brace of the splendid green pheasant of the country
(_Phasianus versicolor_) in an afternoon; while at rarer intervals the
finger would tremble on the trigger as one of those magnificent birds
called locally the "copper" pheasant (Soemerring's), with tail feathers
as long as a peacock's, would rise from the furrows and sail grandly
into the impenetrable thicket. Objections had been taken by the Japanese
officials to this form of amusement, because it was not the policy of the
rulers to familiarise the people with the sight of firearms, still less
to facilitate their acquiring them. In accordance with representations
from the authorities, the British consul had requested his nationals in
1859 to desist for a time until some arrangement was come to. This they
did, but in the following season resumed the sport, in which there were
no keener participants than the British consular officers. A contemporary
writer in September 1860 thus refers to the return of the shooting season:
"There being nothing to do, we are all looking forward anxiously to the
1st October, on which day the first onslaught on the feathered race takes
place. The weather is now hot, but we are all in very good health....
We live in a beautiful country, among a civil, amicable, kind-hearted,
and intelligent people. We can roam over the country without let or
hindrance." It is curious to note by the way how tenacious the Englishman
is of the punctilio of his game laws, carrying his observance of them into
countries where he and his laws are alike strangers, and where in many
cases the principles are not applicable to the local conditions.

A new element in the sport appeared with the advent of cold weather, in
the form of flocks of wildfowl, chiefly geese, which spread themselves
over the low-lying grounds, mostly at some miles distant from the
settlements. They were "geese," indeed, quite unsophisticated, having no
fear of man before their eyes--inherited instinct apparently at fault.
"Their tameness was shocking" at first, but they wonderfully soon learned
to be wary with a foreigner and a gun. The morning's bag of one early
riser, riding six miles and back to a nine o'clock breakfast, late in
November, dwindled rapidly from 12 to 6, 4, 2. The birds were shot within
200 yards of the _tokaido_, and in full view of many curious spectators,
armed and unarmed. Men were hired on the spot to carry the game along the
six miles of highroad and through the long street of Kanagawa, the whole
proceeding, in short, enjoying the utmost possible publicity.

The unfortunate Mr Moss, however, a few days later, toiled a whole day
and bagged one, with the consequences we have seen. Whether it was law
or not, the evidence supplied by the birds themselves of prescriptive
immunity from gunpowder attack was overwhelming. Hitherto the heavy winged
wildfowl had felt safe so long as they kept out of sword-range of the
human biped, but the new experience of a detonating missile fatal at fifty
yards broke up in a week the habits of generations, and forced them to
promptly readjust themselves to their environment.

FOOTNOTES:

 [1] "We are never for a moment unwatched; ... if my servant
    runs after a butterfly, a two-sworded official runs after
    him."--Laurence Oliphant, Letter from Yedo, July 1861.

 [2] "As a general rule, our guardians exercise their functions with
    civility; when they are impertinent, one has to submit as one
    would to one's jailor.... With entire humility, one is in no
    danger whatever."--Oliphant, 2nd July 1861.

 [3] The effect of the commercial isolation of Japan on the value
    of general commodities was no less striking. The first foreign
    traders might have bought with eyes shut nearly every article that
    was offered to them, so great was the disparity of prices between
    Japan and her nearest markets. Mr Hunter gives an interesting
    example. "I had in go-downs," he says, "8000 piculs of sapan-wood
    imported from Manila unsaleable at one dollar and a quarter per
    picul, which was about its cost. Immediately that the opening
    of the port of Simoda to foreign trade was announced officially,
    an English vessel was chartered to carry it there. Brief--it was
    sold for 35 dollars per picul, and the proceeds were invested in
    Japanese vegetable wax at a cost of 6½ dollars, and sold for $17
    the picul (133⅓ lb. English)," so that in the short voyage from
    China to Japan and back the capital multiplied seventy times!

 [4] A story is told of two Samurai meeting on a bridge which was too
    narrow to allow of their passing each other. Neither being willing
    to give way, they were about to settle the difficulty at the
    point of the sword, when a peasant, strolling along the dry bed of
    the stream, offered to extricate them without loss of dignity on
    either side. Amused at his impertinence, and curious to see how
    he would effect his purpose, they consented to humour him; and
    when each, following his instructions, was seated in one of the
    baskets at either end of the pole he was carrying, he swung it
    round on to the opposite shoulder, asked pardon, bowed, and went
    on his way, leaving them each facing in the direction in which he
    would proceed.

 [5] Ieyasu says the Samurai are the masters of the four classes.
    Agriculturists, artisans, and merchants may not behave in a rude
    manner towards Samurai. The term for a rude man is, "other than
    expected fellow"; and a Samurai is not to be interfered with in
    cutting down a fellow who has behaved to him in a manner other
    than is expected. The Samurai are grouped into direct retainers,
    secondary retainers and nobles, and retainers of high and low
    grade; but the same line of conduct is equally allowable to them
    all towards an "other than expected fellow."

 [6] "All my old friends have disappeared," writes Laurence Oliphant
    on his return to Yedo as secretary of Legation. "One who was an
    especial favourite of mine when I was here last, ripped himself
    up a short time ago; and two of the other commissioners are
    disgraced, and it is supposed have followed his example. This was
    all on account of their friendship for foreigners. Every one, down
    to the lowest interpreter, who has had anything to do with the
    introduction of foreigners, has disappeared or been disgraced."

 [7] This man, Murioka by name, became afterwards well known to
    foreigners, and was always ready to talk freely about the whole
    transaction. When asked why he struck at a lady he would reply,
    "How should I know, never having seen a foreign woman, least of
    all on horseback?"

 [8] It was a common thing for a Daimio to rid himself of the irksome
    obligations of his position by abdicating in favour of his son.
    On better acquaintance Shimadso Saburo proved a most genial old
    gentleman. Three years later he entertained Sir Harry and Lady
    Parkes at his capital most hospitably.

 [9] Count Inouyé, the foremost statesman of the new Japan, is said
    to have confessed that he set fire to the British Legation with
    his own hand with the express object of embarrassing the Tycoon's
    Government.

 [10] The following souvenir of Count Mutsu, Foreign Minister of
    Japan, who died in 1897, told by Mr J. F. Lowder and quoted in
    'Things Japanese' by Mr Basil Hall Chamberlain, affords a graphic
    illustration of this point. "In the very early Sixties, when
    he was in his nineteenth or twentieth year, he was in Nagasaki
    desirous of acquiring a knowledge of English. A lady of my
    acquaintance taking an interest in him used to devote an hour or
    two every morning to teaching him to read and write, but it was
    not long before he came to me despairing of his slow progress, and
    asking whether I could not give him a berth on board ship where
    nothing but English was spoken. Believing him to be physically too
    weak to stand such an ordeal, I endeavoured to dissuade him, but
    without success; and so with some misgivings I shipped him as a
    cabin-boy, which was the only position I could obtain for him, on
    board a small British schooner that used in those days to voyage
    between Nagasaki and Shanghai. How long he remained on board I
    cannot say, but my recollection is that it was a very considerable
    time."

 [11] The foreign trade of Japan now (1900) approximates 40 millions
    sterling, exports and imports being very nearly balanced.




CHAPTER XX.

SIR RUTHERFORD ALCOCK IN PEKING, 1865-1869.


I. THE BRITISH LEGATION.

    Contrast between Peking and Yedo--Finds old comrade Wade--The
    Manchu statesmen, Kung and Wênsiang--Material progress pressed
    upon them--Their failure to appreciate foreign advice.

Sir Rutherford Alcock had spent only a few months in England when he was
appointed to succeed Sir Frederick Bruce as Minister to China, he himself
being succeeded in Japan by Sir Harry Parkes. Sir Rutherford reached
his post in Peking at the close of 1865. The change of scene from Japan
back to China was even more striking than that from China to Japan had
been in 1859. The excitement of shooting the rapids was succeeded by the
weariness of meandering among mud-shoals--the same medium to work in,
only under different conditions. Fundamentally the international problem
was identical in Japan and China--the conflict between aggression and
resistance. Rational dread of, and natural repulsion to, foreigners,
inspired alike the policies of both countries. Where they differed was
in the manner of meeting the invasion. Japan braced herself nervously
to the effort, and, distinguishing between what was feasible and what
was not, organised a counter-invasion unsuspected by foreign nations,
whom she subdued by their own strength. China, on the other hand,
opposed a fatalistic and unreasoning resistance, making no intelligent
counter-stroke and showing no true anticipation of the issues of the
struggle. The energy of ambitious youth on the one side; on the other mere
inertia, irresponsive to the stimulus of pride, shame, patriotism, or even
material interest. Bearing this contrast in mind, we may partly understand
the prosaic _rôle_ which foreign representatives were doomed in China to
play from the time the capital was forced open by Anglo-French arms in
1860.

The position of the new British Minister was different from that which he
had occupied in Japan, where, being first in the field, he had to make
precedents, whereas in China he had to follow the course which had been
marked out during the previous four years. In judging of the wisdom of
that course, it is fair to apply the same retrospective criterion that we
proposed in the case of Japan--namely, to consider the situation so far as
it was known and could be realised at the time. Notwithstanding all that
had gone before, China in general, and Peking in particular, remained as
great mysteries to foreigners as Japan itself. The pioneer diplomatists
had to create their diplomacy out of their own consciousness, working upon
an idea which they imported, and not on the objective facts, which were
mere chaos to them.

Sir Rutherford Alcock had the happiness to find the Peking Legation
in charge of his old vice-consul, Thomas Wade, from whom he had been
officially separated for ten years. Mr Wade was Chinese secretary and
secretary of Legation, offices which were some years later separated, to
the infinite detriment of both. For the secretary of Legation, drawn from
the ranks of the diplomatic service, had neither knowledge of nor interest
in Chinese affairs, nor aught to do but wait idly for the contingency
which might make him _chargé d'affaires_, reckoning every month spent
in the country as a penance entitling him to swift promotion to a more
congenial sphere. And the Chinese secretaryship, by itself, offered no
attraction to an ambitious man. But in 1865 the combination of offices was
most important, especially in the hands of a man of so much distinction
as Mr Wade. As the custodian of the Bruce tradition, if indeed he had not
a large share in its evolution, he bridged the gulf between the outgoing
and the incoming Minister, much as the Permanent Under-Secretary does at
the Foreign Office.

As Mr (afterwards Sir Thomas) Wade, in the capacity of secretary, _chargé
d'affaires_, and Minister Plenipotentiary, represented Great Britain at
the Chinese Court for the best part of a quarter of a century, a term
equal to that of the other six Ministers put together, a brief reference
to his personality seems necessary to a just comprehension of the course
of affairs during his long residence in Peking.

Mr Wade began life as a soldier. He had been in the "Black Watch," but,
being the only officer who could not speak Gaelic, found it congenial to
exchange into the 98th Regiment, with which he served in China during the
first war. He was adjutant of the regiment, which was commanded by Colonel
Campbell, afterwards Lord Clyde. When peace was made in 1842, he resigned
his commission and betook himself to the study of Chinese and of Chinese
subjects. After qualifying as interpreter he became Chinese secretary to
the Superintendency of Trade, which until 1858 was domiciled in Hongkong.
Transferred to the consular service, he was for some years interpreter and
vice-consul at Shanghai, where it fell to his lot to command the local
volunteers in the attack on the Chinese Imperial camps in 1854. He was
the first executive head of the Maritime Customs, established in the same
year, his services being lent by his chief to start the new institution.
Attached to Lord Elgin in his two missions to China, he was appointed
secretary of Legation and Chinese secretary under Sir Frederick Bruce when
the Legation was installed in Peking.

Wheresoever Mr Wade's lot was cast he was beloved for his Irish geniality,
open-mindedness, and sincerity. He was the soul of honour, and was
possessed by the spirit of chivalry much beyond the common measure. His
best friends would never wish to forget his endearing infirmities of
temper, associated as they were with the generous _amende_ which never
failed to follow an over-hasty word. A well-read man, with a memory like
Macaulay's, a brilliant _raconteur_ and inimitable mimic, he was the
delight of every society. The services which he was enabled, by many
years of arduous labour, to render to succeeding generations of students
of Chinese are incalculable, and if his work begins now to be superseded
by that of others, this is but the common fate of pioneers in every
department of research.

Sir Thomas Wade's character may thus be fitly and fairly summed up in
the hackneyed epithet, "a scholar and a gentleman,"--but not therefore
a statesman. His mind was cast in another and a finer mould than befits
the political arena; and, unnatural as the inference may seem, it is
open to question whether his extensive knowledge of China was the best
qualification for dealing at first hand with current affairs, even in
that country. Profound researches into Chinese literature and philosophy
tend to overshadow and induce a distaste for the jarring questions of
the day. Seen through the luminous haze of its classic history, China
presents to the contemplative mind an object of reverence unlike any
other existing State, for the thread of its continuity since the time
before Abraham is unbroken. Grander than hewn stone or graven bronze, the
monuments of China are written books, and a living race, the heirs of all
her ages, to be conversed with and interrogated. The burden of such vast
homogeneous antiquity may well oppress the mere man of politics: he needs
a certain alloy of Philistinism and a limitation of view to enable him to
concentrate his attention on the exigencies of the passing hour.

  [Illustration: PRINCE KUNG.]

Relations which might be called intimate had been established between
the two Manchu statesmen, Prince Kung and Wênsiang, and the foreign
representatives. When these high personages were forced to assume
responsibility for international relations, they were not only unversed
in foreign affairs but untrained to any kind of business. The work of the
six Boards was carried on by expert secretaries, and the presidency of
one of them would have been no qualification for the new duty thrust upon
the emperor's Ministers of transacting business with foreign officials
standing on an equality with themselves. Their older colleague, Hangki,
had gained a little foreign knowledge by observation and hearsay while
filling the lucrative office of _hoppo_ at Canton; but the two younger men
mistrusted him, perhaps with reason, possibly from the suspicion naturally
aroused by his possession of superior knowledge. Prince Kung and Wênsiang
recognised that they had everything to learn, and they were apt and eager
scholars. Considering all the circumstances, it is indeed marvellous how
they adjusted themselves by innate tact to the novel position, and how
quickly they assimilated new knowledge. Many illuminating discussions were
carried on between them and the foreign representatives, who on their part
were no less desirous of imparting than the Chinese were of acquiring
information respecting the outer world. In these interesting symposia
Mr Wade naturally played the prominent part. On the enchanted ground of
Chinese history and literature, also, the interlocutors made endless
excursions together; and Chinese philosophy being directed to conduct
rather than speculation, it was possible to deduce from the teaching of
the sages authority for the adoption of almost any useful measure. Between
the modern innovator, therefore, though in foreign garb, and the ancient
moralists there was no such intellectual disagreement as sympathetic
explanations could not resolve.

It might have been justifiable to conclude that the Chinese were being
influenced for good by the well-meant counsels so copiously addressed to
them, were it not that the tutorial being so entirely incompatible with
the diplomatic function, no useful result could be expected from their
strained combination. It was as if one were to teach a novice the moves
in a game which the two were at the same time playing for serious stakes.

These interminable interviews and voluminous memoranda were wholly
unproductive, owing, no doubt, to the fact that the ideas of the parties
ran on parallel lines destined never to come to any point of fertile
contact. The burden of the cry of the Western people was "progress," a
word without equivalent in the language, and expressing an idea which
had no place in the conception of the Chinese. Incessant repetition
with varying illustrations were to the Chinese as flowers of rhetoric
wasted on a deaf man, and that simply because the basis of the Chinese
political thought lay at the opposite pole from that of the European.
On one occasion a distinguished American promoter was expatiating to the
governor of Formosa on the advantages of railway communication, his most
telling example being his own experience in being rushed along after an
early breakfast from his house in Albany to New York, where he spent the
day transacting important business and got wheeled back again to Albany
for dinner. The governor stopped him, and asked what in the name of
sanity possessed him to lead such a wearing life, as the last thing he
(the governor) would dream of doing would be to live a hundred miles from
his work. Though the earliest public advocate of railroads in China, the
governor regarded their utility from a far different point of view.

  [Illustration: WÊNSIANG.
   _From a photo by J. Thomson, Grosvenor Street, W._]

So eager were the foreigners for progress, which in their mind included
the regeneration of the Chinese empire and the development of its full
capacity for self-defence, that they were wont to rejoice over the
slightest indications of a beginning being made. Thus the mission of a man
of no standing as a secretary of the Tsungli-Yamên, who was sent to Europe
in 1866 to take observations, was hailed as the beginning of the new era,
and commended so warmly by the foreign Ministers to their Governments
that the emissary was received like the Queen of Sheba by King Solomon,
and shown--at least in Great Britain--everything that was admirable from
the Western point of view. He was as far, however, from appreciating the
triumph of science as was Cetewayo, the Zulu, whose admiration of England
focussed itself on the elephant "Jumbo" at the Zoological Gardens, or the
Scotswoman who, after being shown over the British Museum, had carried
away from it one impression, and that of the "graund mat" at the door.
The Chinese Government's appreciation of Western progress was by no means
increased by the mission of Pin, which rather indeed produced a contrary
effect. China soon began to put forth fresh claims to go her own way, her
own way being directly opposed to the kind of progress which was being
pressed upon her.

The Chinese in following the doctrines of the sages felt they were under
the guidance of Heaven, so that innovations appeared to them tainted with
impiety. So deeply did the worship of the past pervade their field of
thought, that when high officials ventured to introduce something new,
they usually endeavoured to disarm opposition by gilding their proposals
with well-selected texts from the classics.


II. FOREIGN LIFE IN PEKING.

    Social influence of the Alcock family--Sir Rutherford's relations
    with his staff--No social relations with natives--Manchu
    courtesy to English ladies--Community of foreigners sociable yet
    non-cohesive--Description of city--Foreign residency--Objects
    of interest--The streets--Mules--Camels--Mongol market--Fur
    sales--Absence of regulations--Street anecdotes--Summer
    residences.

By the end of 1865 the foreign life in Peking, official, social, and
private, had already settled into the grooves prescribed by local
conditions, within which it has, more or less, run ever since.

  [Illustration: MANCHU (TARTAR) WOMEN.]

Nevertheless, the advent of Sir Rutherford and Lady Alcock, with their
daughter, now Lady Pelly, introduced an element into the social atmosphere
of Peking which has afforded the happiest reminiscences to those who came
under its influence. We have seen that Sir Rutherford Alcock, by force of
character, conviction, and sense of duty, naturally assumed the lead among
his peers wherever he happened to be placed. A German resident in Peking
at the time we are speaking of says, "I remember very well that fine
English gentleman, who was conscious of representing the greatest country
of the world, and did it well." The official personality of the British
Minister could not be more truly depicted than in these simple words; but
this natural pre-eminence extended far beyond the official sphere, and
made itself felt for the general good in the common relations of life.
His dealings with subordinates were marked by thoroughgoing loyalty; his
rule was to give his confidence without reserve to those who merited
it, to support and defend them in the discharge of their duty. He was
accessible, always ready to listen to the opinions even of his juniors,
and though exacting as regards work, he never spared himself, but set an
example of industry to those who served under him. He possessed that rare
faculty of appreciation which enables a man to command services which no
money could buy. The survivors of his staff to this day speak of him in
affectionate terms as the best of chiefs. In business he was strictly,
perhaps even rigidly, formal, and his manner was intolerant of laxity in
others. When the official crust was put off like a suit of armour, the
genial depths of his nature were reached, but the number of those who
enjoyed this experience seems never to have been large. Select, but few,
were the friends of his bosom.

The foreign residents in Peking did not number many, and, with the
exception of the Legations, were rather widely scattered over a city of
vast distances. The original community consisted of about sixty persons,
distributed over the four Legations, the customs' staff, and missionary
establishments. It was a community of young men "about twenty-four years
of age," eminently social, no member being a stranger to the rest, and all
living in friendly intercourse. The Legations may almost be said to have
sat with open doors, so easy were their interchanges of informal visits.
During the time of Sir Rutherford and Lady Alcock their hospitalities
rendered the British Legation the chief centre of social interest, while
the unaffected kindness which inspired these courtesies endeared its
inmates to all their fellow-residents. That, indeed, was the golden age of
the British Legation, and, it may be added, of the general social life of
the Chinese capital, a period when life-long friendships were formed. The
time had not yet come for international rivalries to mar the cordiality
of personal intercourse. Indeed in the convivialities of Peking national
distinctions were absolutely lost, and so to a great extent were the
distinctions of rank. On the racecourse, which was early instituted, as
in the billiard-room, picnic excursions, and the like, all were free and
all were equal.

  [Illustration: MANCHU WOMEN.]

When we speak of the "social" life of Peking, it must be understood as
referring exclusively to that of the foreign residents among themselves,
for between them and the natives there was no such intimacy. But in those
early days the high Chinese officials seemed to have been more genial than
those of a later epoch. In the winter of 1860-61, for example, Hangki,
formerly _hoppo_ of Canton, was in the habit of receiving Mr Adkins
familiarly at his private residence,--a practice which was afterwards
gradually discontinued. The arrival of the two ladies at the British
Legation was the signal for a display of courtesy by the Manchu Ministers,
who from time to time sent them seasonable presents of plants, flowers,
and other things, thus establishing agreeable personal relations with the
Minister. That the advent of ladies to the Legations should have evoked
the natural politeness of the high officials need not be a matter for
wonder if it be remembered that the Chinese contempt for women is not
shared by the Manchus. It is well known that their women are free from
most of the trammels which contract the lives of their Chinese sisters.
Their unbound feet symbolise liberty of locomotion generally, and they
show themselves unveiled and unabashed in public thoroughfares. They have
the coquetries common to the sex, among which may be reckoned a passion
for floral decoration of the head, and the universal practice of painting
the face and lips. This is done in a thoroughgoing manner, and as if the
paint were "laid on with a trowel," leaving a sharply defined margin on
cheek and neck between the pink and white and the sallow ground on which
the colour is overlaid, giving it the appearance of a mask which might
be easily removed. Even young children are subjected to the cosmetic
treatment; and the very aged do not discard the artificial flowers in the
remnant of their hair. As the fairest Chinese have no such natural colour
as is thus imitated, it is rather difficult to divine whence they derived
the notion of an ideal human skin.

It is not to be wondered at that the first European girls who appeared in
Peking should have excited some curiosity. One young lady, probably the
first arrival, whose fresh and fair complexion suggested the acme of the
cosmetic art, excited intense interest among the Mongol and Manchu ladies.
On one occasion she was met in the street by a great princess, who was
so struck by her appearance that she stopped her _cortège_, alighted from
her cart, and stood before the English girl and gently rubbed her cheeks
to find out, as she naively said, how the colour was put on!

The foreign residents at Peking, happy as their circumstances were,
lacked some of the principal elements of a community properly so called.
They had, in fact, little in common besides their æsthetic culture and
their Christian civilisation, the literature, philosophy, and the social
tenets of the West. They had no head, no centre, no neutral meeting-ground
even except the racecourse and the open fields, and were thus always
either hosts or guests to each other. The assumed identity of their high
political interests gave an appearance of solidarity to the diplomatic
section; but the fusion of the other elements in the society was far
from complete, and, in short, outside of the region of recreation and
conviviality the residents could not be said to be animated by any
unifying purpose, nor to have any communal existence. Individual isolation
prevented the aggregate from attaining collective force.

  [Illustration: CHINESE WOMEN.]

These sterilising conditions were aggravated by another feature of
the situation which had an important bearing on social life. Peking
was one of the most inaccessible capitals in the world. The great
tourist-stream passed it by. It stirred no human emotion unless it
were languid aversion or inarticulate curiosity. The dilettante element
which has ventilated Japan so well and kept her in constant touch with
cosmopolitan life-currents has been absent in Northern China. Peking with
its particular concerns has been thus permitted to lie secluded from the
world, neither generating fruitful ideas nor inviting or profiting by
their importation from without; nor, in short, making itself intelligible
or interesting to mankind other than as an archaic curiosity. China, with
its immense wealth and resources, weighed less in the consideration of the
nations than the petty kingdom of Greece or the deadly swamps of Africa.
Considerations of that kind help to explain the bewilderment with which
the action of these neglected forces has been received during the past few
years, and the disarray of the organs of European opinion when suddenly
called on to deal with the phenomenon of Peking as a daily "headline."

       *       *       *       *       *

Of the city itself it may be noted that it is magnificently laid out
within high and massive walls, the gates and corners surmounted by
bastions and imposing towers pierced with three tiers of gun-ports. The
main streets are straight and extravagantly wide. Spaciousness is the
dominant expression of the whole--the back-yard is a feature of the
meanest one-storeyed hovels. It has not occurred to the Pekingese to
economise earth-space by vertical architecture ground-ward or sky-ward.
Viewed from an elevation, the city has the appearance of a vast park:
the tree-foliage seen in perspective seems to cover the whole area, only
picked out by yellow and green roofs of imperial and other conspicuous
buildings. The palace, a city in itself of 10,000 inhabitants, occupies
an immense _enclave_ symmetrically placed in the centre of the whole.

From such a coign of vantage as the high wall affords, Peking presents
at once an impressive and a pleasing spectacle. It gives the distance
necessary to lend enchantment to the view. The soothing hum of a great
population; the sweetness of an atmosphere untainted, if it be summer,
or spiced by the aromatic herbs which grow promiscuously between the
interstices of the bricks, if it be autumn,--enfolds the scene in that
kind of soft drapery which memory throws over common things long past. One
lingers, loth to renew a closer acquaintance with the crowd below, which
no longer hums but utters wild discordant cries,--with the horrors of the
streets, which are of the earth, earthy. The area contained between the
rectilinear arteries of the city is dismally laid out on the plan of the
rabbit-warren. These wide streets are alternately deep mire and deep dust
at the best, but at the worst, receptacles of indescribable abominations.
The witty and wise Bishop Favier, when describing these to a friend in
France, was asked, How could a population living in such insanitary
conditions resist a visitation of cholera. "Cholera!" exclaimed the
Father; "it could never enter. It would be asphyxiated at the gate!"[12]

The dust is acrid to nose and eyes, from the dessicated refuse of
generations, for the streets are watered by long scoops from standing
pools of sewage which overflow in the summer rains and obliterate the
roadway, so that animals harnessed between shafts not unfrequently meet
with a cruel death by drowning in these fœtid thoroughfares.

  [Illustration: CHINESE STREET SCENE DURING RAINY SEASON.]

Such hints as these will be sufficient to suggest to the least imaginative
that peculiar unattractiveness of the Peking streets which has been
a determining factor in the habits of the foreign residents. Life
would be intolerable to Western folks if it were not removed from the
sights, noises, and odours of the streets; and fortunately the ruling
local principle of spaciousness lends itself to the solution without
running counter to any native practice or prejudice. The Legations, the
customs, and the missionaries are in their various degrees established
in "compounds" large enough to accommodate the members of their staffs
in separate buildings with ample elbow-room, as in an Indian cantonment,
interspaced with trees and sometimes gardens, the whole surrounded by a
high wall and capable of defence. These seductive oases in a wilderness of
garbage, in a city of great distances, naturally conduce to stay-at-home
habits and to segregation, which it requires some energy to overcome.

Nor is Peking life wanting in more mundane compensations. The city itself
contains many "objects of interest," which in the earlier years of foreign
intercourse were open to the curious. The well-known "Lama temple,"
reputed to contain 2000 inmates, which has for many years been dangerous
to enter, was in those days a much-frequented resort, where the stranger
was welcome to go over the establishment and listen to the Buddhist
litanies: a certain bass voice, or perhaps a succession of bass voices, in
the choir, indeed, attained celebrity among foreigners. In the refectory
of that monastery one was obliged, out of respect, to eat, or feign to
eat, the unmitigated fat of the sheep's tail, fished from out the broth,
not with a hook, as was the custom in the Jewish Church, but by the deft
fingers of the chief lama. Now, on the contrary, the foreigner who enters
the gate is hustled, robbed, and stoned. This great change in the attitude
of the lamas has never been satisfactorily explained, but it is presumed
that the manners and customs of some of the visitors to the temple may
have had something to do with it. There have been visitors who, with the
keen acquisitiveness of the world-tourist, have slipped small "josses"
into their pockets out of what, perhaps, appeared to them the superfluous
number of molten images ranged round the shelves of the great Buddha's
sanctuary.

The Temple of Heaven, too, that grand altar to the Living God, standing
in an immense park enclosed by a lofty wall, was then, and for many
years remained, open to all comers. This was perhaps due less to any
intentional liberality of the authorities than to the negligence of the
gatekeepers and the Board of Works. For a long time access was gained
over a broken part of the outer wall left unrepaired. At one period
English residents played cricket within the vast enclosure; at another
Billingsgate and brickbats were the ordinary salutations which greeted
the would-be visitor--the change being probably due to the slow awakening
of the officials. So with many other places within and without the city,
for in some cases where direct request was made for extension of the
accommodation, the effect of drawing official attention to the subject
was to restrict the privileges which had actually been enjoyed.

Notwithstanding the occasional rudeness of which Dr Rennie has given us so
faithful a picture, the most unartistic of men could hardly fail to take
pleasure in the daily traffic of the streets, provided only his nerves,
visual and olfactory, were not too delicate. The true lord of the roads
is apt from his commonplaceness to be overlooked by those who owe him
most--that universal conveyancer, the sagacious, tireless mule. He does
not belong to the "five great families"--the fox, weasel, hedgehog, snake,
and rat--which the Chinese hold in mystic awe because they have learned
the secret of immortality; but if utility to man were a criterion of
merit, they would surely fall down and worship this indispensable hybrid.
Hot or cold, wet or dry, the mule never fails to respond to the severest
call upon his strength and courage.

With the approach of winter an antediluvian rival is introduced upon
the scene, in the shape of the well-known two-humped camel, which is
then shaggy, dignified, and in really grand form. Intolerant of heat,
but impervious to cold, the camels, after passing the summer on the
grass-lands of the Mongolian plateau, are brought down in droves to
the great fair held on a large open space outside the Northern Wall.
The coming of the camels with their bronzed and heavily booted riders
is like a whiff of the free air of the desert. The Pekingese use this
patient but surly beast of burden chiefly for carrying coal from the
mines in the Western Hills to the city; but immense numbers are employed
in transporting tea from the navigable limit of the Peiho to Siberia and
Russia, not entering Peking city at all.

A roomy encampment between the British and Russian Legations is allotted
to the Mongols, and serves as a market-place where the products of the
desert are exchanged for the utensils and gewgaws of civilisation. The
staple of the Mongol trade is frozen meat--mutton, venison, furred and
feathered game; and without refrigerator or other appliance the carcasses
remain fresh in their skins till the end of the three winter months.
These simple-minded herdsmen, chaffering with shrewd Chinese hucksters,
or sitting, where they seem to have been born, between the high humps of
their slow-moving beasts, form picturesque groups in the imperial city,
the more interesting that their appearance is pathetically suggestive
of an order which is passing away. The Grand Khan, dispensing favours to
his loyal tributaries, has come ominously near to being a mere tradition.
These very sheepskin-coated camel-drivers are the only buffer remaining
between the receding empire and the advancing tide of foreign encroachment
from the north.

Other evidences of that imperial grandeur which lent some justification to
the title "Middle Kingdom" were still occasionally to be met with. Though
Siam, and even Burma, had fallen indefinitely into arrears, dust-begrimed
embassies from Korea or Nepaul, with their trains of pack-mules bearing
tribute and merchandise (duty free for the benefit of the officials),
might still be seen defiling through the massive gates of the city,
preserving to our day a living picture of the Asiatic mission of the
antique type. For what were they but interesting survivals, shadows of
departed greatness?

Peking is not a commercial city, but essentially an imperial camp. Trade
proper is confined to an outer or Chinese city, which is but a walled-in
suburb sparsely built over. Through traffic, for obvious fiscal reasons,
shuns the capital; but there is sufficient local commerce, of which
gold and silver smelting forms a not unimportant part, to support many
bankers and merchants who are domiciled in the outer city. It has been
remarked that Chinese trade may be seen at its best in the settlement of
Maimaichên, which faces Kiachta on the Russo-Chinese frontier, or in the
Straits Settlements or Rangoon, where nothing hinders the merchants from
accumulating and displaying their wealth. Even Peking, however, affords
some glimpses of the far-reaching enterprise of the Chinese traders.

What a suggestive display, for instance, is the fur-market, also of
necessity a "winter exhibition"! Acres and acres of ground are covered
with skins of every conceivable species of quadruped, spread out from dawn
till near noon. Here are daily laid out for sale under the blue sky (and
what a light to make purchases in!) the commonest and the most precious
furs from Manchuria, the Amur, and even Kamtschatka, the total value of
which must be enormous. Let us learn from the history of the Hudson's
Bay Company what organisation of energy, what confidence, what variety of
enterprise and skill, are required to bring these costly commodities from
such vast distances to this great sale-room, and we shall not make light
of the vitality of the Chinese.

       *       *       *       *       *

The amenities of the street traffic, though not of special importance,
call for mention as illustrating certain phases of foreign contact
with the Chinese. If we may take Japan for comparison, in nothing is
the contrast between the two systems more apparent than in municipal
administration. The antithesis may be expressed in one word,--in Japan,
excessive regulation; in China, absence of regulation. Whether there be
any rule of the road in China is of little interest, seeing that, like
other rules, it might be disregarded and there would be no one to enforce
it. The traffic adjusts itself with little friction. China employs no
police,--things arrange themselves by their own interaction, as the
pebbles do on the sea-shore; and for most of the purposes of life the
people are their own law-makers and their own executive. The Chinese
system of government is to govern as little as possible--to let the
country rule itself. So when a strange element demanded accommodation
in the busy streets and congested gateways of Peking, without rules
or supervision, it had to find its level among the rest by friction
and concussion. It would have been an interesting process to watch in
its initial stages. Amid a good deal of clamour and language of a racy
description applied to man and beast and their respective ancestors, there
is rarely a serious road quarrel among the Chinese. One excellent custom
of polite society tends to restrict the area of disputes on the highway,
leaving collisions to be fought out by grooms, carters, chair-bearers, or
boatmen, as the case may be, while the masters maintain an imperturbable
reserve.

Mr Colborne Baber, who had a way of his own of solving the minor problems
of Chinese intercourse, was once in a cart, sitting well back and
unobserved, in a narrow street that admitted neither of turning nor of
passing another vehicle, when a cart was met about half way. The drivers
began to vociferate, each calling on the other to give way. The opposition
carter claimed the precedence on the ground that his vehicle carried
women, and it looked as if he would gain his point when Baber himself,
becoming impatient, thrust out his head and called out that in his cart
there was a foreign devil, and without further discussion the rival jehu
backed out.

Those who ride do not recognise each other on the road, even though they
be friends; for if they did so, etiquette would require both to stop and
dismount and go through formal salutations on foot. Foreigners, ignoring
this rule, and their servants not unwilling to profit by the prestige
of their masters in accosting bystanders from the saddle, are sometimes
grievously misdirected when not lectured on their bad manners. The
natives on their part are seldom averse from presuming on the foreigner's
ignorance of what is due to him. Between the one and the other, or as a
result of the mere chapter of accidents, collisions were inevitable in
the streets. How were they to be dealt with in the absence of constituted
authority? If aggression towards a foreigner on the part of a great man's
servants were submitted to, there would be no end to it, they being 500 to
1. On the other hand, insolence promptly resented and vigorously punished
never failed to elicit the approval not only of the spectators, but even
of the great man himself, who perhaps had secret grievances of his own
against his lackeys, which he was not sorry to see partially paid off
by proxy. In all cases the sympathy of the Chinese goes with the side
that successfully asserts itself. Of this hundreds of examples could be
given--perhaps not one on the converse side.

A writer in the 'Whitehall Review' some years ago, among interesting
reminiscences of the 'Sixties, relates some incidents to show the
primitive means by which equilibrium was established between natives and
foreigners in the Peking streets. _Place aux dames._ The experience of the
first foreign female who had been seen is thus amusingly told. Mr Bruce's
housekeeper, an old family retainer who had followed the fortunes of her
master all over the world,

    saw no particular reasons for not acting in Peking as she had
    done in Cairo or Constantinople, and the first morning after her
    arrival sallied forth, basket on arm, to do her marketing for the
    day. When I add that she knew not a word of Chinese, that none of
    the natives spoke English, that she was about five feet high and
    ten feet round the crinoline, and was the first female European
    ever seen by the Pekingese, her enterprise will be judged to have
    been braver than she knew. However, nothing daunted, she entered
    a butcher's shop, closely pressed upon by an inquisitive and
    delighted crowd. Before she could even look at a joint or chop
    she was hemmed in, and one waggish native, bolder than the rest,
    gave her a substantial dig in the crinoline, shouting in Chinese,
    "Let's see if she's solid." But the laugh was not for long on his
    side. Seizing a chopper from the block, Mrs A. made a mighty blow
    at his head, which he happily evaded. In less than a second the
    shop was clear, the terrified natives tumbling over each other
    in their haste to get away. A European who came upon the scene
    at the moment beheld the startling sight of some 500 Chinese
    rushing up the principal street pursued by an infuriated old woman
    armed with a chopper. With some difficulty she was persuaded to
    abandon the chase and resume her basket, which she had dropped
    in her excitement. But it is on record that for a good two years
    thereafter Mrs A. was allowed to shop in peace, and became a
    "Black Douglas" to troublesome Chinese children in the vicinity
    of the Legation.

In later years she talked in what she called "broken China."

Another "adjustment to environment" is thus described:--

    A curious little industry sprang up in the environs of the city,
    consequent on the horsey proclivities of the Europeans. This was
    getting run over, which was generally accomplished by rushing in
    front of the horses and throwing the hands up. One of two things
    always happened. Either the horse shied and the rider came off, to
    the huge delight of the Chinese mob, or the gesticulating party
    was knocked down. In this latter event, cautioned as we all were
    to give no offence, if possible, to the natives, a dollar was
    generally handed as salve to the artful victim, whose screams and
    yells that he had been killed never failed to draw a large and
    sympathising crowd of friends, who regarded the "foreign devil"
    with most unfriendly looks. In one village at last it became
    intolerable, and we decided if any further attempt was made we
    would run down the culprits intentionally. As usual, on our next
    visit three or four young _gamins_ essayed the usual dodge. Being
    fully prepared for it, nobody was unseated, and we turned our
    horses back at full gallop, three or four Chinese being hurled
    into the hedge by our horses. We did not stop to offer dollars,
    but were never afterwards stopped.

Following the same train of reflection, he gives examples of the drastic
manner in which the Russians asserted their prerogatives on the road,
which we do not quote, as they were probably exceptional cases.

The never-failing courtesy of the Manchus rises superior to such
unpleasant encounters. An example of this was related to the writer by a
member of the British Legation. In riding through a narrow place, narrowed
probably by the cesspool occupying more than its fair share of the street,
he met the _cortège_ of a grandee at a spot where it seemed impossible
to pass, and it looked as if the solitary horseman must turn back. As
he thought of doing so he observed the occupant of the sedan call a halt
and direct his bearers to make room for the stranger. Observing closely
the features of him who showed so much consideration for a foreigner, the
Englishman was pleased, some time afterwards, to recognise in him Prince
Ch'ing, who succeeded Prince Kung as President of the Tsungli-Yamên in
1884.

The lives of the foreign residents were by no means confined within the
four walls of the city. The environs without fences or trespass notices
make charming excursion-grounds for riding-parties. For longer expeditions
there are the never-failing attractions of the Ming Tombs, the Great
Wall, the passes into Mongolia, and various other distant points. The
city is beautifully situated in the centre of a mountain crescent, whose
nearest point is thirteen miles distant. The first object of quest when
the Legations had been established was a sanatorium or summer retreat--for
the thermometer reaches 100 Fahr. in June--and the Western Hills were
explored. Some of the most beautiful spots there are occupied by Buddhist
temples or monasteries, whose builders have shown as nice a taste in
the selection of their sites as their brethren the monks of the West
have always done. These religious houses, laid out with a view to the
accommodation of pilgrims and strangers, are regularly used by Chinese
grandees as health-resorts or shelters from political storms. The Russian
mission, while it was alone in Peking, had set the example twenty years
before of resorting to the hill temples in the dog-days. Arrangements
with the priests for the occupation of certain portions of one of the
temples were soon made by Mr Parkes, who was on a visit to the capital,
and ever since 1861 official Peking, with one notable exception, has on
the approach of summer migrated bodily from the oppressive atmosphere of
the great city to the exhilarating air of the Western Hills. The social
life of the city was reproduced at the temples, but in a less conventional
form, every one residing there being considered on a holiday. The country
round offered many temptations to excursions, and amateurs of geology,
botany, and natural history were never at a loss for something to interest
them in their rambles among the hills. Residence so far from town brought
the foreigners into friendly contact also with their rustic neighbours,
whose innate good qualities, moderation, contentment, and kindliness were
displayed in a very favourable light.

But the sojourn at the hills also brought the foreigner into occasional
contact with Chinese of high rank, who welcomed such opportunities of
showing civility to the strangers. At other times disagreeable collisions
with the retainers of a great personage were experienced. So popular were
the temples of the Western Hills as a summer resort that they were always
full, and consequently disputes about accommodation were liable to occur,
especially when some grasping priest would let the same premises to two
different occupants, leaving them, or rather their servants, to fight for
the possession.


III. THE FOREIGN CUSTOMS UNDER THE PEKING CONVENTION.

    Centralised in Peking--Encouraged by British Ministers--Assumed
    imperial form after the treaties of 1858--Extension to all the
    ports--Original international basis becomes purely Chinese--Shows
    capacity for larger functions than collection of duties--Becomes
    a diplomatic auxiliary--British Government leans upon it--The
    Chinese faithfully served by it--Interpreter of the intentions
    of the foreign Governments--Inspector-General gains influence
    over British Minister--Pleases Board of Trade--And maintains
    confidential relations with British Government--While remaining
    faithful to China--Services rendered by the Customs to all
    commercial nations.

It was a source of unmixed satisfaction to Sir Rutherford Alcock, on
assuming office in Peking, to find the maritime customs, the bantling of
Shanghai, firmly established in the capital and gathering strength and
influence. As its functions pertained exclusively to trade, Sir Frederick
Bruce had been originally of opinion that the inspector-general should be
located in the commercial centre, Shanghai, and he took exception to the
institution being domiciled in Peking, where trade was expressly excluded
by treaty. Sir Frederick, however, soon saw reason to modify his views.
When it began to appear to him that the customs might prove a convenient
auxiliary to the diplomacy of the treaty Powers, he cultivated the
institution and encouraged it to occult activity in the political sphere.
Sir Frederick Bruce's interests in the fortunes of the customs, however,
could never be so ardent as that of its parent, Sir Rutherford Alcock,
and its monthly nurse, Mr Wade. The presence of these two in the British
Legation afforded a fresh guarantee of the prosperity of the customs,
which they were both well satisfied to see in the competent hands of Mr
Hart. For as the institution was a creation without precedent, the form
of its development must be largely influenced by the personal qualities
of its head. Whatever character it might have assumed under its original
inspector-general, Lay, it could hardly have been the same service that
has grown and spread under the directing hand of Sir Robert Hart. It
is impossible to dissociate the Chinese customs as it stands from the
vigorous self-sustained intellect that has moulded and still controls it,
for it is assuredly not such a going concern as can be made over to any
new head without the risk of changes more or less organic.

The story of the first decade of the maritime customs was told clearly,
briefly, and modestly in a monograph which Mr Hart prepared for Mr Bruce
in 1864, published as a Blue Book of thirteen pages (No. 1, 1865). Up
to the date of the Tientsin treaty of 1858 the operations of the foreign
collectorate were confined to the single port of Shanghai, the inspectors
holding the appointment from the governor-general at Nanking, who was
Imperial Commissioner for Foreign Trade. The new treaty gave the foreign
Powers an interest in the Chinese customs which they did not possess
before, because the war indemnities were to be paid by instalments out
of the collections of duty, so that during the time when these payments
were being made the maintenance of the machinery for collecting the duties
was a matter of international concern. The new treaty also provided for a
uniform system of duty collection for all the trading-ports; and then the
institution assumed an imperial and dropped its provincial character, the
inspector-general receiving his commission from the Central Government.

Considering that the mission of the foreign customs was to subvert
time-honoured native systems, it was received with surprising graciousness
at most of the trading centres. The first port to which the new system was
extended was Canton, the leader in welcoming its advent there being the
_hoppo_, the one functionary in the empire whose privileges seemed to be
most directly threatened by the new-comer. By one of those anomalies which
are so common and yet so inexplicable in Chinese affairs, arrangements for
opening the office in Canton were carried on without interruption during
the hostilities of 1859. Patience, tact, and resolution were nevertheless
required to overcome the innumerable difficulties of detail incidental to
substituting rigorous inspection and remorseless collection for the chaos
of unaccountability which had previously reigned unchallenged. A very few
years, however, served to reduce all obstruction, and to bring trader and
official, foreigner and Chinese, into working harmony.

For the first time in history a true account was rendered to the Imperial
Government, accompanied by a substantial revenue on which it could depend.
Naturally the agency, though foreign, which yielded such tangible fruit,
commended itself to the statesmen of the capital, who frankly recognised,
as did the provincial authorities themselves, that the result obtained
was wholly beyond the competence of any native organisation. Though,
therefore, the customs service was essentially of a provisional, stop-gap
character, it had on that very account a surer guarantee of permanence
than could have been derived from any paper covenant by which the Chinese
Government could have been bound, for that would have provoked disputation
and evasion. The spasmodic attempt to formalise the service on a basis
of international obligation which was made in 1898 was perhaps the first
thing that really imperilled its constitution. In its origin, indeed,
the foreign customs had been international, the three treaty Powers being
each represented on the inspectorate; but with the expansion in 1858 this
character was abandoned, and the customs became a purely Chinese concern
operated by foreign employees, the staff being selected from among all
nations indiscriminately, according to personal merit.

Almost from the time of the transference of the inspectorate to the
capital the customs showed capacities of wider range than are comprised
within the routine of a custom-house. Profoundly impressed as were the
imperial statesmen with the value of the new revenue-producer, they soon
began to perceive that the institution might be put to other and greater
uses. Plurality of function in itself was no stumbling-block to them,
for it is the system on which Chinese administration is carried on. In
the very first year they had intrusted the inspector-general and his
deputy with the organisation of a navy, with the evident approval of the
British Minister. That functionary, indeed, seemed as little disposed as
the Chinese themselves to see incongruity in the various forms of customs
activity, especially when he regarded its extra official services as
rendered to himself; and he really stood much in need of services of that
kind.

Her Majesty's first representative in Peking, helpless and despairing,
was, in fact, fain to throw himself on the support of the first
inspector-general, Mr Lay, and then of his successor, Mr Hart, as
having knowledge and influence with the Chinese Government which was
not possessed by the British Legation. It did not apparently occur to Mr
Bruce that such knowledge was strictly limited, and that the influence
could be of very little use to him, and might be too dearly purchased.
Having no other resource, however, he was perhaps not unwilling to
shut his eyes to the false position in which he was placing himself in
leaning upon the paid servants of the Chinese Government to assist him in
carrying out a policy which was totally repugnant to that Government. The
fidelity of both Mr Lay and Mr Hart to the master whom they served being
beyond question, the diplomatic prestige conferred on them by the British
Minister, as well as the knowledge and influence derived from the other
side, must, in all matters of controversy, be thrown into the Chinese
scale.

As this interesting truth dawned upon the minds of the Tsungli-Yamên, they
saw in their English employee a providential instrument for drawing the
sting from the threatening language which was sometimes applied to them
by the foreign representatives. Of these, the only one who had as yet any
serious matter to discuss with the Chinese was the representative of Great
Britain. It was assumed on the British side that nothing proposed by that
Power was contrary to the interests of China: so far, indeed, did this
theory inspire their action, that the welfare of the Chinese seemed at
times to overshadow that of their own empire in the minds of the British
representatives. No doubt there was an ideal point of view from which
the interests of China and her Western neighbours might seem ultimately
to blend, but Chinese statesmen were in nowise able to take in such a
large perspective. They continued to regard the foreign invasion, with
all its pretences of goodwill, as an unmitigated calamity to be opposed
wherever possible. No man can pronounce a certain judgment as to whether,
with their imperfect knowledge, they were more right or more wrong in
following their obstructive instincts. Reforms, progress, and the opening
up of the country to foreigners, were being persistently pressed upon
them; they fully expected these concessions to be demanded of them when
the time came--and it was already drawing near--when the treaties should
be revised. Admitting, moreover, that some one, or more, of the Powers
might have been considerate enough to forego, or indefinitely postpone,
advantages for themselves rather than imperil the wellbeing of the Chinese
State, there were already six instead of the original three treaty Powers
to be reckoned with; nor was there any limit to the further increase of
their numbers. Supposing, then, that, relying on the benignant intentions
of the English, they should, in the revision of their treaty, admit such
innovations as inland steam navigation, inland residence, railways,
and so forth, would not these successes stimulate the other Powers,
when their turn for revision came,--France in 1870, Germany in 1871,
and others later,--to advance still farther the outposts of the foreign
invasion, each, in a spirit of generous emulation, striving to surpass the
achievements of his predecessor; and all with the complacent consciousness
that they were doing good to China? These endless contingencies were more
than Chinese statesmen could cope with, and the apprehension of them had
no other effect than to consolidate their resistance in small as well
as in great things. They were learning to mistrust the efficacy of their
ancient imperial policy of dividing and ruling, and with good reason had
lost confidence in their capacity to distinguish in embryo between what
was trivial and what was laden with deep consequences.

Resistance, therefore, tempered by the fear of force, seemed their only
refuge. Some of the dangers ahead, of which they had glimpses, might have
been obviated by a bolder policy; but being unable to formulate such
a policy for themselves, and unwilling to accept it cut and dried from
others, there was nothing left them but indiscriminate resistance. Under
such conditions no harmony was possible between the Chinese and Western
Governments; and not knowing how far they might with safety evade the
pressure put upon them, the Chinese had recourse to the Inspector-General
of Customs, as Louis XI. had recourse to his astrologer whenever he felt
himself in a difficult crisis.

The Tsungli-Yamên, accustomed to act on hand-to-mouth views of policy,
would do anything to relieve the pressure of the moment, but nothing to
prevent a recurrence of it. Indisposed to follow up the sequences of cause
and effect, they would in emergencies become impatient of ratiocination
and attempt to reach the foregone conclusion by a shorter cut. Common
gossip in China thus fairly summarised their attitude in certain crises
of this kind. If discussion with the British Legation ran high, the Yamên
would send for the inspector-general and ask simply, "Does this mean
war?" The answer being "No," the question ceased to trouble the Yamên,
and the foreign Minister would be allowed to rage at his pleasure. Their
Excellencies would even help him out with the opprobrious terms he was
searching for, and then listen placidly to the remainder of the tirade.
Great Britain having not only the preponderating interest, but being still
the leading Power in the Far East, it was obviously a great advantage for
the Chinese that it should be that Power which came particularly under
the influence of the inspector-general. To tie the hands of the British
Government for a whole generation was, indeed, an achievement worthy of a
master of policy; but it was by no means the only service which might be
rendered to China even by an Inspector-General of Customs.

The same agency was destined in later days to unravel many tangled skeins
in China's international relations. It brought Gordon to her rescue in
1880; by sheer innate ability in the use of the most unpromising means, it
brought about peace with France in 1885; and, though with less success, it
procured the attempted intervention of Great Britain with Japan in 1894.

How far these great potentialities were foreseen in the earlier years
of the Customs service is doubtful. Even in their parental complacency
Sir Rutherford Alcock and Mr Wade may well have failed to realise, as an
uninterested outsider might have done, the nature of the power that was
being nursed in their infant Hercules. Certain it is that they reckoned
it as a factor on their own side. It is clear that Sir Rutherford Alcock,
so far from regarding the inspector-general as an opponent, commended him
to the Foreign Office as a valuable auxiliary. Mr Wade clung to the same
belief for a good many years longer.

The first to perceive the tendency of the new relationship which events
were bringing about was, no doubt, the inspector-general himself.
China, he saw, could be best served by a virtual control of the British
Legation. The nascent power was, however, too precious to be trusted to
personal accidents, and the inspector-general wisely availed himself
of circumstances as they arose to widen his basis of influence by
establishing such relations with the Home Government as might save
him from being wholly dependent on the life or the caprice of the
representative for the time being at Peking. Such to an ordinary man
might have appeared a hopeless ambition, considering the circumstance
of distance and other adverse conditions. Yet by gradual steps this too
was accomplished. A well-directed stroke or a happy accident established
the inspector-general in high favour with the Board of Trade when under
the presidency of Mr John Bright. He had summed up the results of the
treaty revision[13] negotiations in 1868 in a congratulatory letter to
the British Minister which has been many times published. As a masterly
exposition of the State of China in its relation to foreign Powers it was
warmly indorsed by Sir Rutherford Alcock, and is well worth perusal even
at this day. The Board of Trade was much impressed by a presentment of
the Chinese case so much in sympathy with the views often expressed by Mr
Cobden and Mr Bright, and which are traditional in the Board of Trade.
Their policy was noninterference in the affairs of China, based largely
on their disparagement of the value of British interests in that country.
In commenting on this closely reasoned State Paper, the Board of Trade
specially selected for illustration of its merit the following passage:
"Of course, force will wrest anything from China: but wherever there is
action there is reaction; and as sure as natural laws continue to act,
so sure it is that appeals to force in one age will give to the men of
a later day a heritage of vengeance,--the Europeans of some future day
may wish that their forefathers had not sown the seeds of hatred in the
bayonet-ploughed soil of Cathay."

Nor was this the only result of the happy success of the new customs
diplomacy, for, as the connecting link between commerce and politics, the
Board of Trade was a potent agency in determining the political action of
the Government, more especially when there was a strong man at the head
of it and a weak one at the Foreign Office.

The rising power in China did not seek fresh conquests, but was adroit in
seizing on such as came in its way, and circumstances having brought it
in direct touch with the Foreign Office, that department was drawn into
close relation with the Chinese customs.

The result of all this, briefly stated, was the partial effacement of
the Legation and the gradual promotion of Sir Robert Hart to the first
place in the confidence of the British Government. As the Foreign Office
had, since the suppression of the Taiping rebellion and the death of
Lord Palmerston, been most reluctant either to busy itself or to inform
itself respecting affairs in China, and was, moreover, anxious to minimise
the cost of the Legation in Peking, it was rather predisposed to accept
volunteer assistance in the management of British interests in China. The
Legation was then, as now, without any intelligence department, the cost
of which was saved under the vague belief that all needful information
might be obtained from the customs. Thus relegated to a secondary place,
the Legation was more and more neglected by Her Majesty's Government,
until at last representatives were selected at random and sent out
without instructions, in blind reliance on the good offices of the
Inspector-General of Customs.

Before this final stage had been reached, however, such an opportunity
occurred, through the death of Sir Harry Parkes, of legitimising
the irregular connection, as a death sometimes provides in certain
relations of domestic life, and Sir Robert Hart was himself appointed
British Minister. This step was recognised as so far appropriate to the
circumstances that it conjoined responsibility with power, which had
been too long divorced from each other. But just as the new Minister
was about to assume his duties a hitch occurred with the Tsungli-Yamên,
whose views as to the succession to the post of head of the customs not
coinciding with Sir Robert Hart's, he thereupon resigned the office of
British Minister and resumed his Chinese service. The incident made no
difference in the confidence which Sir Robert Hart inspired in the Foreign
Office, which had, in fact, drifted into a position of dependence on the
inspector-general. This close relationship continued until the Japanese
war in 1894, when the British Government, the victim of many illusions,
found itself in a condition of bewilderment, like King Lear on the heath,
quite unfurnished with the means of coping with the superior intelligence
of the other European Powers.

Throughout all these years the attitude of the inspector-general towards
his Chinese employers was absolutely above suspicion. He served them
loyally throughout, and if the British Government imagined he was using
his highly paid position under the Chinese Government in any way to
promote other than Chinese interests, that was a gratuitous assumption on
their part for which they alone were responsible, and for which, as for
all false strategy, the inevitable penalty must be paid.

Among the important international services rendered by the foreign
customs, the effective lighting of the coast deserves the first place.
Next to that may be reckoned the compilation of accurate statistics of
foreign trade with China, more complete perhaps than exists in any other
country. The reports of the commissioners of customs at the various
ports are also replete with varied and useful information concerning the
commerce, industry, and agriculture, with other conditions of the life
of the Chinese. Special subjects assigned to individual men are treated
as exhaustively as if investigated by a Royal Commission. These valuable
papers constitute a modern Chinese Repository to which there is but one
drawback--its inaccessibility.


IV. EMIGRATION.

    Extensive emigration of Chinese labourers in consequence of
    gold discoveries--Great abuses--Attempt to diminish same by
    international action--Tripartite treaty concluded in Peking--Not
    ratified by France and England--Who send out amended treaty,
    but negotiations never resumed by Chinese--Opposition of British
    colonies and the United States to Chinese emigration.

The first public question with which Sir Rutherford Alcock was called upon
to deal was that of the emigration or exportation of Chinese coolies.
Among the consequences of the gold discoveries of the middle of the
century was a demand for human labour, which China of all countries was
best able to supply. Voluntary emigration to California and Australia
(the "Old" and the "New Gold Mountain") was considerable; but it did not
meet the requirements of those enterprises in tropical and subtropical
countries which, if not originated, were at least stirred into activity
by the impulse radiating from the gold mines. The contractor was called
into requisition, and Chinese were carried off in shiploads to Cuba,
Peru, Chili, "where they were sold into virtual slavery" under agreements
over which there was no legal supervision. Terrible abuses characterised
the traffic; mutiny and massacre on the high seas were among the natural
consequences. "Another coolie tragedy" was as common a newspaper heading
in the 'Fifties as "another missionary outrage" in the subsequent decades
of the nineteenth century.

Hongkong being the most convenient shipping port, it was natural
that thence should emanate the first efforts to suppress the abuses
of the traffic. The "Chinese Passengers Act" passed by the Colonial
Legislature in 1855 was a well-considered step in that direction, and
the establishment of responsible emigration agencies was another. Such
efforts, however, could only be partially successful; for while they
cleared the colony from participation in a nefarious trade, they made
no impression on the trade itself. Indeed, by throwing it into the least
reputable channels, the fate of the victims may even have been rendered
less endurable by the restrictive measures conceived for their benefit.
The Portuguese settlement of Macao remained open, and there the coolie
traffic flourished exceedingly, to the pecuniary advantage of that colony
and of the maternal Government, which levies an annual tribute from its
Far Eastern offspring. The trade was also carried on in a more or less
clandestine and irregular manner at Canton, Swatow, and other Chinese
ports, under non-British flags.

For years the colonial press was filled with the horrors of the traffic.
Such paragraphs as the following were continually appearing in the
Hongkong newspapers:--

    At Macao the coolie trade is still rampant, with all its
    abominations. The inquiries instituted, or said to have been
    instituted, by Governor Amaral, have ended in smoke. Day after day
    some additional iniquity comes to light in connection with this
    horrible traffic. Coolies kidnapped, imprisoned in barracoons,
    flogged to make them consent to sign the iniquitous contract that
    binds them to a life of slavery, marched with a strong guard to
    testify at the Government offices to their signature as given
    voluntarily and freely, half-starved, exposed to blindness and
    disease on board ship in transit to the place of their exile,
    tossed overboard, or left on some barren isle to die, if loss of
    sight or sickness renders them useless to their masters. Such
    are the grand features of the Macao coolie trade, supported by
    the governor in his official acts, and the semi-official paper he
    edits. Such are the horrors of a slave-trade worse than that of
    the poor African negro, which all nations ought to unite to put
    an end to.

Foreigners could of course have had no success whatever in such
man-hunting schemes without the interested co-operation of the natives.
How this was obtained may be gathered from such reports as that of Mr W.
M. Cooper, acting consul at Swatow, one of the principal entrepots.

    Nowhere [he says] is population more dense than in the plains
    of the Han. There is a constant tendency, where the struggle
    for existence is so keen, and no drain exists as that caused by
    recruiting for an army, towards the formation of a scum of bad
    characters, whom their idleness or ill-deeds drive to prey on the
    more industrious. These, frequently discarded by their families,
    are seen by the official and the village elder on their way to
    the coolie-house with a sense of relief and satisfaction; and
    not seldom is the coolie-broker aided in his object of obtaining
    men by persons of this class, and frequently by the relations of
    the men themselves. Thus the trade is allowed to take root with
    the concurrence of the heads of the people, who not only rid
    themselves by means of it of a nuisance and a burden, but make
    money by the transaction; and a connection is formed which the
    broker, in his thirst for dollars, becoming gradually hardened and
    more ruthless, is not slow to avail himself of in carrying out,
    with greater boldness, evil designs on his victim.

But if the atrocities incident to the capture and embarkation cried aloud
for a remedy, the brutalities of the middle passage were no less heinous;
and though the light could not easily penetrate the scenes enacted in the
distant mines and plantations which were the ultimate destination of the
coolies, enough was known to show that their lot in Spanish-American and
other countries and colonies was far from enviable.

To efface this blot on civilisation was the first object which engaged
the attention of Sir Rutherford Alcock in Peking. The Chinese Government
itself had remained for many years callous to the cruelties perpetrated
on its subjects; but this was in keeping with its tolerant habit, its
blindness to things disagreeable, and its constitutional aversion to
overt action of any kind. The Peking authorities seem, however, to have
been at last aroused by the interest in the question evinced by foreign
Governments, and in 1866 the Chinese Ministers were induced to join
the foreign Powers in devising means to ameliorate the condition of the
emigrants. The suggestions of Prince Kung were practical and well directed
towards a solution of the problem.

The problem, however, was by no means simple; for to be effective,
regulations must be of universal obligation, and receive the sanction of
all the interested Powers. There was no desire in any quarter to arrest
the stream of honest and free emigration; on the contrary, it was welcomed
as an outlet for destitute Chinese. To impose restrictions on Hongkong
while the neighbouring colony was lawless and free; to place obstacles
in the way of emigration to Demerara and Trinidad, where the coolies
were happy and contented, thereby driving them in greater numbers to
territories where they were enslaved,--was obviously no gain to humanity.
The question, however, was as urgent as it was difficult.

Yet there were circumstances in the situation favourable to a satisfactory
issue. Chief among these was the fact that France and England were
still working loyally together in matters of cosmopolitan concern. Sir
Rutherford Alcock found his French colleagues in Peking as amenable as he
had found those in Yedo. The consequence was that, as the result of the
winter's labours, a tripartite convention for the regulation of coolie
emigration was signed in March 1866 by the British and French Ministers
and Prince Kung. The convention was approved by the Ministers of Russia,
the United States, and Prussia, though they were not parties to it.
But the French Government took exception to certain of its provisions,
and deferred ratification until these should be modified. The British
Colonial Office and Emigration Board fell in with the views of the French
Government. The settlement of the question was thereupon shifted from
Peking to Paris and London, when voluminous correspondence ensued between
the two Foreign Offices, extending through the years 1866, 1867, and
into 1868. The co-operation between the two Governments was hearty and
complete; and the amount of patient labour devoted to the task, especially
by the French Foreign Office, which had not the auxiliary machinery at its
disposal which existed in the Government departments in England, was in
the highest degree creditable to both. It may suffice to say that after
eighteen months of earnest work a "Projet de Règlement International
d'Emigration" was completed in twenty-three articles with subsidiary
forms, and was despatched to Peking at the end of 1867, the discussions
having resulted in the retention of almost the entire text of the original
convention--a fact which reflected no small credit on the Ministers in
Peking who had drawn it up.

But when the time came for resuming negotiations in the Chinese capital,
the Government there had relapsed into its habitual apathy respecting
the welfare of its people. Possibly, also, the zeal of the resident
Ministers of France and England may have cooled during the interval
which had elapsed since their previous efforts. Their attention was
becoming engrossed with other subjects. Effective co-operation between
the three parties was evidently no longer feasible. The attempt to
regulate emigration by a comprehensive international agreement was tacitly
abandoned, and the evils of the coolie trade were left to be dealt with
sporadically.

Free emigration from Hongkong--that is to say, of emigrants who paid
their own passage--proceeded all the while on an extensive scale. But
the laws of the colony did not permit contract emigration except to
British colonies, and under elaborate supervision both at embarkation and
after arrival at the field of labour. Although coolie ships could not be
despatched from Hongkong, a certain amount of indirect participation in
the traffic was maintained for some years by residents in the colony who
supplied fittings for the coolie ships preparatory to their proceeding
to the port of embarkation. Colonial legislation, however, gradually put
an end to this, and successive ordinances so narrowed the field of the
contractors' operations that the trade, both direct and indirect, was
practically extinguished so far as Hongkong was concerned. A declaration
by the Chief Justice in 1873 summed up the various prohibitory laws by
enacting that the coolie trade would be treated as a slave trade, aiding
or abetting which would be felony. In the year following, the Portuguese
Government, yielding to the friendly pressure that had been for a long
time put upon them, passed a law prohibiting the coolie trade at Macao.

While the emigrants were so anxiously protected at the outset of their
voyage, the immigration of Chinese into the United States and the
Australian colonies was exciting interest of a different kind in those
countries. Legislation was continuously directed against the influx
of Chinese, and not legislation only, but barbarous ill-treatment and
outrages on a par with those perpetrated against foreigners in China. Mr
Secretary Seward on his round-the-world tour in 1871 expressed himself
highly favourable to Chinese labour in the United States, and his views
afforded great encouragement to emigration to California for some years
after. The treaty concluded at Washington in 1868 by Mr Burlingame
accorded full privileges to Chinese in the United States. But a sharp
reaction occurred in the views of American statesmen, and in 1880 the
Chinese Government, by treaty made in Peking, consented to a modification
of the Washington treaty of 1868, which would allow the United States to
limit or suspend, though not absolutely to prohibit, Chinese immigration.
This step towards prohibition was completed in another convention signed
at Washington in 1894. Why the Chinese Government should have gratuitously
consented to attach a stigma to their country and people is one of those
inexplicable matters which abound in the history of China's foreign
relations.


V. KOREA.

    Comes into the sphere of international relations in 1866--Illegal
    propagandism followed by persecutions--France adopts the
    cause of the missions--Calls upon China as suzerain to punish
    Koreans--Which failing, French Minister proclaims annexation
    of Korea--Naval expedition repulsed--American naval expedition
    repulsed in 1871.

It was in the year 1866 that foreign aggression first complicated the
relations between China and her tributaries. The kingdom of Korea had with
more consistency and more success than either China or Japan secluded
itself absolutely from foreign intrusion. Nevertheless, the ubiquitous
Jesuit had found his way there, under desperate subterfuges; for if
the foreigner in general was proscribed, the foreign religionist was
anathema to the rulers of Korea. The laws of the country were draconic
in their severity against all priests or pretenders to supernatural
authority; but the zeal of the Catholic propaganda defied the laws,
though not always with impunity. "Persecutions," in fact, occasionally
broke out, and "massacres" was a not inappropriate description of the
repressive measures adopted by the Government in vindication of what it
considered the law of the State. The French Government, or at least its
representative in Peking, resolved to espouse the cause of the persecuted
missionaries in 1866, and to make reprisals on the King of Korea. But
that country being a vassal state, the demand was first made formally on
the suzerain, that he should cause the Korean persecutors to be punished
and the missionaries avenged. This was not only prejudging the particular
case, but was yet another instance of foreigners forcing a formula on
China, and making her answerable to a tribunal of whose jurisdiction
she had no cognisance. The relations of China to the surrounding States
which acknowledged her suzerainty were vague and various, imperfectly
understood by Western States, as was sufficiently proved in the Burma
Convention concluded between Great Britain and China in 1886. But the
French _chargé d'affaires_ recognised no debatable ground such as even
in the international comity of the West differentiates one dependent
State from another, and one suzerain Power from another. In the British
system alone the diversity in the relations of the members to the head
is sufficient to exclude the application of any general rule. While the
touchstone of war would no doubt reduce all to one level, yet in the
matter of administrative responsibility what single rule could embrace,
for example, India, Malta, the self-governing colonies, the Transvaal, and
the African Protectorates? M. de Bellonet, however, was not embarrassed
by any dubitations about the clean-cut rule to be enforced on China and
Korea. He simply demanded that the suzerain should punish the vassal,
failing which, he would take the affair into his own hands. Logical, no
doubt, and not unreasonable, assuming the quarrel to be just. But the
French _chargé_ went a step further in adjudging the actual dissolution
of the family compact and sequestration of the inferior kingdom. On
Prince Kung's declining responsibility for the Korean persecutions, M.
de Bellonet, without further ado, annexed Korea to the empire of France,
dethroned the king, and posted placards about the streets of Peking
promulgating the fact. To Prince Kung he addressed a weighty despatch, in
which he said, "The same day on which the King of Korea laid his hands on
my unhappy countrymen was the last of his reign. He himself declared its
end, which I, in my turn, solemnly declare to-day."[14]

This was carrying the question beyond the scope of international law.

Taking an analogy from common life, a father may neglect to correct a
mischievous son, and thus leave his neighbours free to take the law into
their own hands, but their right to chastise or prosecute does not include
that of annulling the parental relationship, and of making a bondman
of the offender. Force, of course, may effect such a rupture in the
connection between nations, but in this case the force had not yet been
applied. Admiral Roze proceeded with a squadron to the mouth of the Han,
the waterway to the Korean capital, bombarded forts, and left his name to
an island which faces the port of Chemulpo. The incident was then at an
end.

But not the effects of it. It was to Chinese and Koreans a flash of the
Röntgen rays that revealed the innermost hearts of the foreigners with
a vividness not to be forgotten; it was the whole missionary question,
from the Eastern point of view, in a nutshell. To violate the laws and
teach the natives to do so, and then appeal to foreign Governments to
back them in this insidious form of rebellion--that was the function of
the missionaries. The foreign Government thereupon lays claim to the
territory, and so the conspiracy is crowned. In the face of such an
unveiling of motives the chance of the Chinese statesmen being led by
the friendly counsel poured constantly into their ears by the foreign
Ministers in Peking must have been small indeed.

About the same time a small American vessel called the General Sherman,
with a cargo of notions and some passengers, including one English
missionary, made her way through the archipelago which fringes the coast
into the inner waters of Korea. She was never again heard of, and the
fate of crew and passengers was for long a matter of report and surmise.
At last, in 1868, a United States ship of war, the Shenandoah, was
sent to the Korean coast to get information about the General Sherman.
Nothing whatever was learned. Then Mr George F. Seward, consul-general in
Shanghai, advocated a mission to Korea with a sufficient force to ensure
respect. His persevering recommendations prevailed with the Government at
Washington, and a squadron was equipped in 1871 to proceed to Korea and
attempt to open the country, the admiral being furnished with copies of
the Japan treaties of 1854 and 1858 as models. The Americans at once came
into collision with the Korean troops, bombarded their forts, and defeated
with considerable loss a military force marshalled to resist them. But
no negotiations were possible. The Korean Government remained impervious
to remonstrance and uncompromising in its refusal of intercourse. The
following characteristic letter, addressed by the Korean authorities to
Admiral Rogers, tersely expresses their attitude of resolute isolation:--

    In the year 1868 a man of your nation, whose name was Febiger,
    came here and communicated and went away; why cannot you do the
    same? In 1866 a people called the French came here, and we refer
    you to them for what happened. This people has lived 4000 years
    in the enjoyment of its own civilisation, and we want no other.
    We trouble no other nation--why do you trouble us? Our country
    is in the extreme east, and yours in the extreme west; for what
    purpose do you come so many thousand miles across the sea? Is it
    to inquire about the ship destroyed [the General Sherman]? Her men
    committed piracy and murder, and they were punished with death.
    Do you want our land? That cannot be. Do you want intercourse with
    us? That cannot be either.

The American ships withdrew, as the French had done, leaving the peninsula
once more to its fate.

Previously to this a piratical expedition was attempted by a German in
a North-German steamer, instigated and piloted by a French priest. Its
purpose was to desecrate the tombs of the kings, with a view to carrying
off the golden treasures with which they were believed to be buried.

The three fiascos left no outward trace in the current of affairs in
China, and diplomatic intercourse proceeded in the capital as if the
Korean peninsula did not exist. Let it not be supposed, however, that
the statesmen of Peking failed to take these exhibitions to heart,
although they maintained the strictest reserve on the subject. Christian
proselytism and foreign domination were once more discovered in active
alliance, justifying all the suspicions of the Asiatic nations.

FOOTNOTES:

 [12] There is more truth than may appear in the bishop's paradox.
    Peking is singularly free from epidemics, except occasionally
    of smallpox. When Shanghai suffered so severely from cholera in
    1862, there were two British regiments quartered there--one, the
    67th, within the native city, amid filth and stagnant water; the
    other, the 31st, in the foreign settlement, in quarters carefully
    selected by the surgeon, Dr Rennie. The 31st lost a third of its
    strength; the 67th suffered very little. Writing in August 1860
    from Peitang, a town 500 yards square in the midst of a great
    swamp, into which 17,000 men were huddled, Sir Hope Grant says:
    "Notwithstanding the pestilential nature of the place, our troops,
    wonderful to say, never enjoyed better health."

 [13] See _infra_, "Revision of the Treaty," pp. 210-222.

 [14] _Vide_ 'U.S. Diplomatic Corresp.,' vol. ii. for 1867, p. 424.




CHAPTER XXI.

THE REVISION OF THE TREATY.


I. PREPARATION.

    Struggle for the observance of the treaty--Hope in the prospective
    revision--Information gathered by British Minister--Chinese
    apprehensive of force being used--Imperial Government consult
    provincial officials--Interesting memorials in reply--Especially
    from Li Hung-chang--His liberal views respecting foreigners--And
    wise advice to the throne.

The conflict between foreign aggressions and Chinese resistance had
proceeded without intermission on either side for seven years. In the
struggle the Chinese had gained many successes, but the fruits of them had
not been secured beyond the risk of reprisal. Both sides were ill at ease.
The foreigners on their part had been buoyed up under their grievances
by the hope of a readjustment of international relations, which had been
provided for in the treaties of Tientsin and Peking.

The decennial period was at hand when revision of the treaty of Tientsin
might be claimed. To that important juncture all eyes looked forward. The
foreigners hoped for freer intercourse; the Chinese wished to restrict
what already existed. Great preparations were made for the revision
campaign. On the part of the foreigners opinions were invited from all the
trading-ports as to the points where modification could be advantageously
claimed, and memorials from the Chambers of Commerce both in China and in
Great Britain, from individuals, professional men, and from missionaries,
poured in upon the British Minister during the years 1867 and 1868,
extending even into 1869.

Sir R. Alcock had even taken every possible pains to acquaint himself
with the local circumstances of the various treaty ports by personal
inspection and personal communication--a practice which public opinion
urged in vain upon his successors, who had much greater need of such
local observations. Following up this tour of his own, he delegated to
a subordinate the task of studying the conditions under which trade was
carried on in the interior, in the districts most likely to be affected by
any probable changes in the treaty. Under this roving commission Consul
Swinhoe made an extensive tour through the canal district of the Yangtze
delta, and finished up with an expedition to Szechuan in 1869, on which
he was accompanied by delegates of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce.

The importance attached by foreigners to the occasion naturally stirred
the Chinese Government also to make special exertions to meet the coming
contest. From the measures to which they resorted it is evident that they
were apprehensive lest force should be applied by the foreigners to gain
their ends; for the idea of free negotiation and of voluntary agreement
had not yet been assimilated by the Chinese. To them the foreigner
represented force and nothing else. They had never really comprehended
the reasons for the withdrawal of the Allies when in possession of Peking,
and though the immediate danger of war was removed, the shadow of it never
ceased to haunt the dreams of Chinese statesmen.

Mistrusting their own resources, the Central Government appealed to the
provinces for confidential advice; and as these communications throw light
on the inner--though not the innermost--thoughts of the Chinese, which it
is difficult otherwise to gauge, some of them are worth perusing in the
actual words of the writers.

The secret circular addressed by the Tsungli-Yamên to the high officials
throughout the empire in 1867 opened abruptly with the proposition, "The
barbarian question is one of old standing"; it then proceeded to review
the difficulties and the dangers of "our present conjuncture," arising
mainly from the improvement of communications and armaments combined
with the earth-hunger of the various European nations. The foreigner at
one time stood in awe of the Central Power, but that was before railways
and steamships had been invented; and while the numbers who came to
China were as yet insignificant, and were conveniently restricted to one
spot, where they could be managed, now they occupy so many positions as
to form a strategic cordon round the empire. Moreover, they are united
in interest, and cannot suddenly be either isolated or weakened. How,
then, can we confront them with our isolation and weakness? It is to
be feared that we have no one who, taking a comprehensive view of the
whole situation, can create disunion among our enemies through their own
rivalries and insatiable avarice. Yet it is just here that the germ of
an effective policy should be sought. If, however, circumstances render
such a scheme at present impracticable, its execution may be deferred. We
must be patient under suffering, diligently strengthening ourselves, and
abide in hope. We bear in mind the calamities of 1860, and how to save
the State the emperor was entreated to conclude a treaty. It was evident
that the treaty, hastily concluded, would remain a fruitful source of
future difficulty; nevertheless, good faith required that it should be
fulfilled, and even the very fulfilment of it be turned into a means of
limitation and restraint. The time for revision being now at hand, you are
requested to give your suggestions as to the means of avoiding a rupture
with foreigners, and in case of a rupture, what will ensure safety. The
principal points likely to be brought forward at the revision conferences
are here submitted for your consideration. To simply declare the whole
impracticable is easy; the difficulty will be to devise a plan for safely
avoiding concession. Deal with the matter, therefore, in a practical way,
and not by an empty thesis; and let your memorial reach us not later than
December. The points are--(1) The audience question. (2) The question
of an embassy to foreign countries, which had been repeatedly urged by
the various foreign Ministers in Peking. The arguments in favour of such
a measure are, that "to know your adversary as he knows you" is a maxim
of practical wisdom, and that it would be of great advantage to have the
means of appealing from an unreasonable foreign Minister in Peking to his
own Government. (3) Telegraphs and railways. (4) Residence of merchants in
the interior. (5) Salt trade and coal-mining. (6) Extension of missions.

Such was the substance of the Tsungli-Yamên's circular to the
governors-general and governors of provinces. The memorials in reply
were distinguished by some plain speaking. Amid a good deal that was
vaporous and fantastic, such as would characterise any general council,
there were propositions of sound statecraft, maxims which it would have
been good for the Central Government to lay to heart, and side-lights
on their traditional conceptions of national policy well deserving to be
studied by the Powers which have relations with the Chinese. One clause
in the memorial of Tsêng Kwo-fan, for example, went to the root of the
administrative difficulties which caused then, and still cause, the major
portion of the angry friction between Chinese and foreign officials.
He reminded the emperor, in fact, that he had a court of appeal in the
provinces; so that though he might, under pressure, be forced to concede
points to the foreign nations in Peking, yet it was the memorialist
himself and his peers in the provinces who would have the last word to
say. The elliptic and allusive style usually assumed in Chinese documents
may allow this hint to be interpreted either as a veiled defiance of, or
as an assurance of support to, the throne--perhaps both subtly compounded.
But the practical inference remains, that, as experience has often proved,
the provinces revise the decisions of the capital, and the execution rests
with them.

  [Illustration: LI HUNG-CHANG AT THE AGE OF FIFTY.
   _From a photo by J. Thomson, Grosvenor Street, W._ ]

The memorial, however, which is most interesting to foreigners, because
the plainest to their comprehension, is that of Li Hung-chang, at that
period Governor-General of the Hu-kwang; and as it affords a key to that
statesman's subsequent career and the unique position he has occupied
in regard to the foreign relations of the empire, it seems well worthy
of reproduction. Omitting the preamble, and certain classic references
without which a Chinese State Paper would be no more complete than a
speech in Parliament or a leader in the 'Times' fifty years ago would
have been without a Latin quotation, the substance of the memorial runs
as follows:--

    The humble opinion of the writer is, that in conducting business
    with foreigners the point of the greatest importance is to avoid
    exciting their contempt; that contempt once excited, they will
    thwart us at every turn, and even in affairs that are really
    practicable they will contrive a thousand schemes and devices to
    throw obstacles in the way of their practicability. But if they
    feel respect for China, all matters can be mutually arranged;
    and even difficult questions can be settled by compromise or
    agreement.

    Foreigners, however, are not the only persons who are influenced
    by this feeling: it animates alike the minds of the whole human
    race.

    It is often said that foreigners are crafty and malign and full
    of unexpected ruses: but is it not the fact that Chinese are the
    same; or rather that the outrageous craft and malignity of the
    Chinese exceeds even that of foreigners? The truth is, that at
    present foreigners are powerful and the Chinese feeble. And whence
    arises the power of the former? It certainly is not innate in
    them, but depends upon the fact that "the requisites of Government
    are sufficiency of food, sufficiency of military equipment, and
    the confidence of the people in their ruler" (Confucian Analects).
    And how is the weakness of China to be accounted for? This also is
    not innate, but is a result of the truth of the above axiom not
    being sufficiently recognised. The present condition of foreign
    countries resembles that of China before the union, or is perhaps
    even still more formidable.

    In the course of time foreigners came to China, opened numerous
    marts, and conveyed their merchandise everywhere. They traded
    at as many as five ports, and all with no other object but that
    of making the wealth of China contribute to their own. A little
    consideration shows that those who ventured to come to this
    country must have placed their reliance upon something to have
    rendered them so fearless; and there is not the slightest reason
    why that which they confided in should not also become a source
    of confidence to China.

    Many persons have offered their views upon the several questions
    now under consideration, and it is useless to take the trouble
    to recapitulate them. But all such appliances as telegraphs,
    railways, locomotives, and steamships--the things on which
    foreigners rely--can without exception be learned by the Chinese.
    It is often alleged that these inventions are attended with
    harm: how is it, then, that in foreign countries every district
    has its trains and steamers, every locality its telegraphs and
    railways? Natives of China, too, have travelled abroad and can
    bear testimony that these things, so far from being harmful, are
    advantageous.

    Imperial audience is distinctly stipulated for in the treaty of
    1860, and it is next to impossible to withdraw it; especially as
    his sainted Majesty Kanghsi admitted Japanese to his presence,
    and there will be no difficulty in ascertaining the ceremony then
    employed. And again, during the negotiations with the Russians
    on the boundary and trade questions, which took place about the
    same period, they were treated as an equal Power. It is but right,
    indeed, to consider such Powers as upon a footing of equality with
    ourselves.

    The idea of the writer is to wait until the majority of the
    emperor, and then to receive all the representatives in a
    side-hall as was done by his sacred Majesty Kanghsi. It will,
    however, first be necessary to arrange distinctly whether such
    interviews are to take place once or twice a-year. Otherwise an
    impropriety will be caused by their constantly demanding audiences
    every few days on frivolous questions.

    Such a course presents no difficulties from our point of view, and
    from theirs it is a _sine quâ non_. Moreover, they would see how
    the imperial magnanimity extends to every region. Their request
    may with great propriety be granted.

    As to the appointment of an envoy, in the fourth year of Tungchih,
    Pin Ch'un and others were sent on a visit to the several foreign
    countries, and the Tsungli-Yamên has lately written to state
    that Chih kang and others have now proceeded thither. Thus the
    mission has been continuous, and it would be well to adhere to
    this system.

    The question of separate missions at the Courts of the several
    Powers, however, still remains for deliberation. In discussing
    these questions persons are apprehensive, either that the
    emperor's commission will be disgraced, or that there will be an
    extravagant expenditure of the imperial funds. But such persons
    are not acquainted with the whole bearing of the subject.

    Memorialist is of opinion that this question is eminently
    susceptible of a satisfactory solution. After selecting reliable
    and trustworthy men to reside at foreign Courts, it will be
    necessary to appoint subordinates and interpreters, who can be
    exchanged every three or every five years. Interpreters, indeed,
    should be selected from each country to which an envoy proceeds--a
    system which would give us the double advantage of facilitating
    public business, and of affording us an opportunity to display
    our amicable desires. Far from being detrimental, the project is
    attended with great advantages.

    The matter of missionary extension is beset with greater
    difficulties than the rest, especially as it is not a State
    question with foreign Governments.[15] At the present moment
    innumerable churches are being erected in every province,
    district, and department for the explanation of their canon and
    the preaching of their faith; and the common people are one-half
    of them deceived, and the other half led to join them for evil
    purposes. Instructions should be issued to the superintendents
    of northern and southern trade, as well as to the generals,
    viceroys, governors, customs superintendents, and taotais, to
    become intimate with the foreign officials with whom they are
    in communication. Then, when anything is to be arranged, there
    would be no harm in telling them distinctly that when the common
    people misbehave the local functionaries must adjudicate; and
    that when it happens that the people refuse to become proselytes,
    the officials can on no account insist upon their doing so
    against their will--for such a course would but raise riots and
    disturbances, to the detriment of international amity. At the
    approaching revision of the treaty all possible arguments must be
    used with regard to this point, and on no account must any further
    clause be added.

    With reference to the remaining points--viz., coal mines,
    importation of salt, erection of inland warehouses, inland
    steam navigation, and the like--these, although comparatively
    unimportant matters, nevertheless entail serious consequences. If
    their introduction is harmless, there is no necessity to waste
    words and ink in the raising of disputes and complications; but
    if, on the other hand, there are among them concessions which
    we are unwilling to make, it will be very proper to "explain the
    circumstances to them and argue the rights of the case," and they
    will hardly wish to press embarrassments upon us.

    Should they, however, take advantage of their strength to
    impose upon our weakness by dividing our territory and sharing
    among them the fat of the land, in such a pressing crisis the
    greatest firmness would be necessary. But there need be no great
    apprehension of such a contingency, for the simple reason that,
    with the exception of Russia, foreign countries are all too
    distant from China, and the acquisition of its territory would be
    nothing but an embarrassment to them.

    The fact is, that the prosperity of foreign countries is
    inseparably connected with the welfare of the Chinese people; and
    instead of draining that people to the last drop, would they not
    rather prefer to use, without exhausting--to take, and still leave
    a residue?

    The present occasion of treaty revision with the English is a
    most important juncture. The English treaty once disposed of,
    there will be no difficulty with the other Powers. The danger
    to be apprehended is that during the revision of next year they
    will employ coercion to extort concession. This, however, may be
    known previously; and should it be the case, it will of course
    be necessary to select experienced troops and able officers to
    confront them. Should nothing of the sort occur, negotiations
    should be entered upon.

    In short, supposing we are to cherish a feeling of revenge and
    devise schemes to subvert foreign Powers, it will be necessary to
    wait until--with large armies and abundant supplies, with no rebel
    or Mohammedan outbreaks in the provinces, and no difficulties in
    the capital--we can cope with them without hesitation. We shall be
    a match then for all adversaries; but otherwise we cannot engage
    in a rash and random conflict. Even when it is supposed that we
    are ready for the struggle, it will still be necessary to exercise
    extreme and continual caution, and to wait until our spirit is
    high, and our aspect, therefore, formidable. Then should there
    be no war, the question would be disposed of; but in the event of
    our taking the field, it would not be unvictoriously.

    Memorialist, however, has had several years' experience in
    conducting business with foreigners, and is thoroughly familiar
    with their character. He has found that, no matter what they are
    engaged in, they act honourably without deceit or falsehood. But
    although it is possible to acquire a general knowledge of their
    mode of action in the conduct of their own affairs, yet there is
    no means of becoming thoroughly acquainted with the details and
    motives of their conduct. Their bearing, however, in military
    matters affords clear evidence of their straightforwardness.
    There is the instance of the Englishman Gordon, late
    commander-in-chief at Soochow, who, having organised 3000 troops
    of the Ever-Victorious Army, took the field against the rebels.
    Subsequently, at the capture of Soochow, the memorialist himself
    observed that officer personally leading in advance of his
    troops with a courage and _sang-froid_ worthy of all praise. He
    subsequently became the recipient of the imperial commendation
    and reward.

    The writer has also, in conjunction with Tsêng Kwo-fan, acting
    viceroy of the two Kiang, been associated with foreigners in
    organising foreign-drilled infantry and cavalry, and in making
    arrangements for the building of steam-vessels. He is thoroughly
    convinced that they are actuated by upright and amicable
    principles, and entertain no feelings of animosity towards China.
    With the knowledge of these facts before us, it is possible to
    draw our conclusions upon other matters.

    It is from these considerations, therefore, that the writer
    suggests the policy to be pursued in intercourse with foreigners.
    There seems to be no necessity to dispose of the several
    questions hastily and on the instant, nor do the resident foreign
    Ministers at Peking apparently intend to insist upon an immediate
    settlement.

    It would be well if H.I.M. on attaining his majority were himself
    to adopt the policy suggested, and in that case no difficult
    questions would arise.

    6th year, 11th month, 6th day.

As perhaps the best essay yet extant in translating the Chinese imperial
tradition into the language of the modern world, this paper of Li
Hung-chang's is full of instruction for foreign diplomatists. Read in
the light of the subsequent thirty years, we see that it sets forth
the principles which have inspired the whole public life of the most
prominent man in China. His recognition of the honourable character of
foreigners, as he knew them, represented a notable advance on the like
testimony of Commissioner Lin in 1841, inasmuch as Lin deduced from it
the ease by which their good faith could be abused, while Li made it
a ground of confidence in co-operation with them. His recommendation
to his contemporaries, to cultivate intimacy with foreign officials in
order to obviate misunderstandings in the execution of the treaties, was
only preaching that which he has consistently practised throughout his
official life. He was the first high official who braved public opinion by
sitting with open doors. This conciliatory temper and open mind has made
Li Hung-chang the lubricator in many jarring conflicts; and it kept him,
contrary to constitutional usage, for twenty-five years at the diplomatic
outpost of the capital.

His delicate handling of the suggestion of the Central Government,
to resist by hostile means the proposals of foreigners, is also
characteristic of the man who had seen war and hated it. While bowing to
the imperial will, he proposed postponement of its execution. In a similar
case many years afterwards a memorial of Li's was quoted as an incitement
to war with Japan, whereas it was an extinguisher, in diplomatic form,
put upon the bellicose proposal of another.

Not the least interesting part of Li's memorial is the ground on which
he advocates reform--the proved superiority of foreign nations. His
argument takes the identical form, and is expressed in the very words,
used by the Daimios of Japan; and the circumstances of the two countries
in their foreign relations were in the main so similar, that it cannot
but be instructive to observe how they comported themselves respectively
under the stress of the foreign irruption. Both had been overawed by
foreign forces, and both sought revenge by using the strength of their
opponents for their own regeneration. The difficulty, as we see it, in
the carrying out of the scheme of regeneration was of the same nature in
both countries--the want of unity and centralisation. Japan was divided
up into feudal principalities; China into provinces and prefectures as
independent as self-governing British colonies. The councils of the
Daimios bore a rough analogy to the consultations with the governors
and governors-general of China. The enemy was the same, and the means of
overcoming him are as clearly laid down in Li Hung-chang's memorial as in
the most perfervid of the Japanese manifestoes. How, then, did it come
about that the same leaven should have fermented with such miraculous
rapidity in the one country, while in the other it has been buried in a
torpid mass? Obviously this is a matter which will repay the consideration
of those who concern themselves with the state and prospects of China.


II. THE BURLINGAME MISSION.

    Mysterious inception--American Minister becomes Chinese envoy
    to Western countries--Objects of mission concealed--Its first
    adventure--Mr Burlingame concludes treaty at Washington--Persuades
    British Government to adopt new policy in China.

Three processes--separate, though not independent--were going on
simultaneously during the year 1868: the revision of the British treaty
in Peking; an epidemic of anti-foreign demonstrations in the provinces;
and the progress of the Burlingame mission in Europe. One of them cannot
be understood without the other; but taking the revision of the treaty
as the object towards which the other two converged, it will be simpler
to reserve the special consideration of the treaty question until we have
given a short outline of the accessory episodes.

Of the eight questions submitted to the provincials, one was disposed of,
and that in a surprisingly precipitate manner, a month before even the
memorials of the various authorities were sent in. An embassy to Europe
and America was appointed, equipped, and despatched in the month of
November 1867, and with a foreigner at its head. A proceeding so contrary
to Chinese tradition naturally excited curiosity as to its origin,--a
curiosity which has been tantalised but not to this day satisfied, though
the mission itself soon became ancient history. It is certain none of the
representatives of foreign Powers then in the capital were consulted,
or in any way taken into confidence with regard to the scheme--except,
of course, the one who transferred himself from the service of his own
country to that of China. "No one," wrote Sir Rutherford Alcock, "knew
that the Chinese were on the eve of a revolution which would materially
change the aspect of affairs." This by way of explaining an important
memorandum he had just written on the state of China, which would have
been of a different tenor had any hint of what was intended been given to
him.

As the embassy was the first that China had sent to a foreign country,
and as it was commissioned under some urgent demand which evidently
would brook no delay, its composition, character, and objects are all
interesting to the student of Chinese politics. There were three envoys,
two Chinese and one foreign. The latter was the Hon. Anson Burlingame,
Minister of the United States to China, who of course was the spokesman of
the mission. A better selection for the purpose could not have been made,
had even a larger choice of men been open to the Chinese. Mr Burlingame
had been an active politician in his time, and was a practised orator. If
we add the epithet "sophisticated rhetorician," which was ten years later
applied to a still more eminent personage, that is little more than to say
he was a special pleader. And he was engaged on special pleader's duty.
Whatever the genesis of the mission, therefore, it was a master stroke of
the Chinese Government, eclipsing all their other contrivances to resist
the expected demands of foreigners at the revision of the treaties. It was
the first open attempt by the Chinese to apply the homœopathic principle
to their international affairs in using the foreigner as an antidote to
the foreigner.

The Burlingame mission left Peking with the ostensible approval of
the foreign representatives. The support of the British Minister was
given in the most practical way by the permission granted to the acting
Chinese secretary, Mr J. McLeavy Brown, to accept the secretaryship of
the mission--a favour the more marked in that Mr Brown happened to be
the _locum tenens_ of Mr Wade, who had just gone on leave, so that his
departure left the British Legation destitute at a season of the year when
it was impossible to call up substitutes from the ports, and at a time
when the greatest burden of work was in prospect. And yet the true object
of the mission was concealed from Sir Rutherford Alcock. "I do not know
what Mr Burlingame's instructions may ultimately be," he wrote in January
1868, adding, "but it is very obvious what is the work which devolves upon
him." Sir Rutherford's judgment of its purpose seems to have been based on
his own inferences from the facts of the situation and his unquestioning
faith in Mr Burlingame's loyalty to his professed principles.

He had known Mr Burlingame for two years as the _doyen_ of the diplomatic
body, the most fervid champion of that "co-operative policy" whereby the
treaty Powers agreed to act as a united body in pursuit of identical
objects. He could not suppose that his late colleague had turned his
back on those common objects without notice. Although, therefore, the
suddenness and secrecy of the move might have suggested misgivings as
to the mission being intended to promote the views of the diplomatic
body in Peking, yet it is beyond question that Sir Rutherford Alcock
heartily favoured the embassy. His confidence in it is further attested
by a very long and elaborate memorandum which he addressed to Prince
Kung, indicating the uses to which the embassy should be put in bringing
about an understanding with the Powers, whereby Chinese interests would
be safeguarded while the treaty rights of foreigners should be amply
fulfilled. "I see in the mission a hope of improvement and a material
change in the whole aspect of affairs.... Proves there are Ministers with
power and influence in the councils of the emperor who believe the time
has come for breaking with the past.... After a long night of weariness
and futile efforts, daylight begins to appear.... I hail the appointment
of a representative to the Western Powers as the beginning of a new era."
Such was the Minister's valediction in his report to the Foreign Office.
But he had been mightily deceived. The night had indeed been long, but
it was not the true dawn which was welcomed with this joyful acclamation.
How quickly the gloom settled down again on that scene of fruitless toil
will presently be seen.

The mission was introduced to the notice of the world by a humorous
prelude, which may be quoted for the sake of the light it incidentally
throws on the chronic state of China. On their way from Peking to
Tientsin, seventy or eighty miles, the envoys halted at a large
market-town, where a report met them of a phenomenon not very uncommon
in those parts, especially in winter--a band of marauders who had been
annoying the neighbourhood. The mission took refuge in an inn, resolved
to stand a siege until aid should come. In this strait Mr Burlingame
seems never to have thought of applying either to the local authorities
of the town or to the Government he was serving, but despatched urgent
messages to Peking, where there were escorts kept at the Russian and
British Legations, and to Tientsin, where was the British gunboat Dove.
His appeals were answered with alacrity from both sides. From Peking came
a relief party of British and Russian soldiers in charge of members of
the two Legations; from Tientsin a party of mounted bluejackets under
Lieutenant Dunlop. They met at the half-way house where the mission lay,
but nothing could be seen or heard of the besiegers. Mr Burlingame's
party reached their port of embarkation without further adventure. Indeed
the only serious matter that arose out of the imbroglio was a difference
of opinion between one Vodkansky of the Cossack guard and Mulvaney, a
sturdy Hibernian of the British escort, which the latter proposed to
settle by the means in vogue among heroes before the days of Agamemnon.
Tragic consequences were, however, averted by the soothing diplomacy
of the representative of her Majesty's Legation, Mr Conolly, and the
two Burlingame relief expeditions returned to their respective stations
nothing the worse for a couple of days' outing in the bracing November
air.

Mr Burlingame made his _début_ in the United States, first by eloquent
speeches in San Francisco, and next by what assumed the form of
serious negotiations at Washington. An orator cannot reasonably be held
accountable for every detail of his orations, but Mr Burlingame's mission
may be most favourably summarised by a few carefully chosen words of his
own:--

    1st. It was the object of the mission to disabuse the foreign
    Powers of an impression they were supposed to entertain, that the
    Chinese Government had entered upon a retrograde policy.

    2nd. To deprecate a precipitate and unfriendly attempt on their
    part to enter upon a policy which might make all progress
    impossible from its menacing tone and "violent shock to the
    feelings, and even prejudices, of the people."

Translated into practice, these propositions meant that China wished
to be let alone; and that, we may safely assume, represented the whole
extent of Mr Burlingame's instructions. This claim was embodied in a
convention which he made at Washington, comprising certain "additional
articles" to the American treaty of 1858, the purport of which was that
the United States undertook to apply no pressure to China, which, it may
be presumed, that Power had never the intention of doing. The convention
was for several reasons not welcomed at Peking, but it served the only
purpose which perhaps it was ever expected to serve, that of giving the
keynote to the representations which the envoy was afterwards to make to
the various Powers in Europe.

The next Government to which Mr Burlingame addressed himself was that
of Great Britain, over which he obtained a more important success than
over that of the United States. In fact, he persuaded Lord Clarendon
to discard all the information that ever reached the Foreign Office
from its own responsible agents in China--men who were bound by every
consideration of loyalty and public duty to report only what was true,
and to accept instead thereof the protestations of an agent hired to
make out a case; for it is superfluous to add that Mr Burlingame was
far indeed from representing the true state of facts. He succeeded in so
altering the course of the British Government that their agent in China
was discredited, stultified, and rendered powerless to effect the objects
for which he had been labouring. This was the first step of the Foreign
Office in the new departure which had many evil results--that, namely, of
taking their cue not from agents in their own pay, but from others over
whom they could exercise no control, and who had alien interests to serve.

From the Chinese point of view the Burlingame mission was a decided
success.


III. CHINESE OUTRAGES--YANGCHOW AND FORMOSA.

    Missions attacked at Yangchow--Redress refused by Chinese
    and enforced by consul--With naval assistance--Satisfactory
    issue--Continuous outrages in Formosa--Government affords no
    relief--Disturbances quelled by British forces--Lawlessness near
    Swatow--Communications with interior controlled by bandits--Order
    restored by Consul Alabaster with naval force--Peace and
    good feeling between Chinese and foreigners resulting from
    these various measures--Which were approved by Imperial
    Government--Disapproved by British Government in consequence of Mr
    Burlingame's representations--Consuls punished--Lord Clarendon,
    prompted by Mr Burlingame, sends fresh instructions to Minister
    and consuls.

The year 1868 was marked by serious anti-foreign outbreaks in widely
distant provinces of the empire. At Yangchow, a wealthy city on the Grand
Canal, twelve miles from the left bank of the Yangtze river, a favourite
resort for retired officials, rich salt merchants, and gentry, the Inland
missionaries under the orders of Mr Hudson Taylor established themselves.
In no locality in China could they have been less welcome, for there they
met their natural enemies in the greatest force. Before long an attack
on them was organised at the instigation of the literati and gentry, and
with the connivance of the local authorities. "The onslaught was sudden
and severe, the mob set fire to the premises, the ladies and children of
the mission had to be thrown out of the windows to save their lives."
There was no mistake, therefore, as to the murderous intentions of the
assailants. The nearest British consul was at Shanghai, the consulate at
Chinkiang, twelve miles from the scene of the outrage, being in charge
of an assistant, Mr Clement Allen. That young officer hastened instantly
to the assistance of the missionaries, and made his protest against the
culpable negligence, to say no more, of the Chinese officials, who on
their part made a great to-do of hushing the matter up and repairing the
injured house. Consul Medhurst promptly followed up the representations
made by Mr Allen by personal appeal to the viceroy at Nanking, fifty miles
distant. The mind of that high official had already been prejudiced by
ingeniously falsified reports of the transaction supplied to him by the
prefect of Yangchow, and in consequence he refused Mr Medhurst's request
to depute an official to accompany him to that city for the purpose of
investigating the facts. Thereupon Mr Medhurst, availing himself of the
arrival of H.M.'s ship Rinaldo at Chinkiang, obtained from her commander
a sufficient escort to accompany him to Yangchow; and then only did the
viceroy, Tsêng Kwo-fan, appoint an officer, though of totally inadequate
rank, to co-operate with the consul. The Chinese officer did not, however,
keep his appointment, and Mr Medhurst proceeded without him, and placed
in the hands of the prefect at Yangchow a written demand for redress, one
of the items being the seizure and punishment of the gentry, whose names
were submitted. The prefect at once declared his inability to deal with
men of such influence, all being of higher rank than himself. As nothing,
therefore, could be settled at Yangchow, the prefect agreed to accompany
Mr Medhurst to Nanking to lay the whole matter before the viceroy.
A deputy from the viceroy, however, met Mr Medhurst at Chinkiang and
endeavoured to dissuade him from proceeding to Nanking, offering instead
to accompany him back to Yangchow, according to the original programme. Mr
Medhurst, in his turn, persuaded the deputy to return with him to Nanking
on H.M.'s ship Rinaldo, which was to start from Chinkiang the following
morning. But the deputy Chang did not keep that appointment, any more
than he had kept his previous one. The prefect of Yangchow also found
means of evading his promise to accompany the consul into the presence
of the viceroy. After much pressure on the one side and evasion on the
other, the viceroy offered to settle the matter by a charitable gratuity
to the missionaries in lieu of damages, and showed his anxiety to get
the affair patched up quickly by sending an official of rank to follow
Mr Medhurst on board H.M.'s ship Rinaldo, where he spent two hours in
attempting to persuade the consul to accept the terms offered. Matters
were, in fact, in a fair way of settlement when, "just at this juncture,"
the commander of the Rinaldo fell sick and determined to proceed with
his ship to Shanghai, the consul being thus left in a humiliating and
helpless position, as Sir Rutherford Alcock describes it. The Chinese
officials at once changed their tone, withdrew from negotiations, and
nothing more could be done with them. The action of the naval officer
in abandoning the consul was freely criticised at the time, and being in
consequence asked by the Admiralty for an explanation, he stated, among
other things, "that it never entered his head that the presence simply
of a small man-of-war could have the effect of influencing the viceroy."
He also stated that he had "been given to understand that the viceroy had
expressed his willingness to comply with Mr Medhurst's requests, and would
send a letter to that effect that night or the next morning." The gallant
officer did not appear to perceive that the withdrawal of his ship before
the viceroy's promise had been fulfilled completely changed the situation.

Nothing was left for the consul, then, but to lay the whole case before
H.M.'s Minister, and in doing so he made these observations: "I can call
to mind, out of my experience of British relations with China, scarcely
one instance in which the outrage complained of has been more unprovoked
on the part of the sufferers, and in which the evidence of neglect and
culpability on the part of the local authorities has been more marked
and incontrovertible. Few cases can have occurred, moreover, in which the
power to grant prompt and reasonable redress was more within the reach of
the supreme provincial authority."

The Minister, in his turn, had no resource but to call upon the admiral
on the station "to repair the mischief by sending such naval force
to the mouth of the Grand Canal as shall enable him, if necessary, to
apply effective pressure both on the local authorities and populace at
Yangchow and on the viceroy at Nanking," to whom the consul was once
more instructed to address himself. Of course the Minister had before
this applied in the usual form to the Tsungli-Yamên, and with the usual
result. They deprecated hasty conclusions until they themselves had
full information from the local authorities; but they admitted without
hesitation that, assuming the facts, full redress must be granted.

The Minister's representations to the Central Government were renewed
with greater emphasis on receipt of the news of the collapse of the
consul's negotiations. Prince Kung then expressed his readiness to
make the compensations demanded; but as regarded the punishment of the
instigators of the outrage, he contented himself with tacitly indorsing
the plea of the viceroy, "that the gentry indicated were men of high
rank, and incapable of wilful disregard of treaty provisions, for which
reason they need not be called to account." In reply the Minister stated
that immunity to such offenders, more especially if highly placed, is
wholly incompatible with the treaty rights of foreigners. A new inquiry,
however, was instituted at Yangchow, and the Viceroy Tsêng, who had just
been gazetted to another post, was warned not to leave Nanking until the
affair was concluded. After an interval of two months, Consul Medhurst,
escorted by a naval force despatched to his aid by Admiral Keppel, sent
his cards once more to the Nanking viceroy. The old tactics were repeated,
and negotiations threatened to be indefinitely protracted, but eventually
promises were given for the full redress demanded. Promises, however, had
been given before, and it was deemed not unreasonable in the circumstances
to demand a material guarantee. There happened to be lying at anchor
opposite the city a small steamer recently built for the viceroy, which
he was induced to place under the orders of Captain Heneage, R.N.,
pending the execution of the arrangements. The end of the discussion
was a complete and satisfactory settlement of the whole affair, which
included the deprivation of the prefect and the magistrate of Yangchow.
The after-effects have been no less satisfactory. For the last thirty
years Yangchow has been the most peaceable missionary field in the whole
empire. We have set forth this incident in some detail, because it was
typical, isolated, and free from all obscurities.

While these events were passing on the Yangtze, similar troubles, which
had been threatening for some time, came to a head in the island of
Formosa. Outbreaks of mob-violence against the property and person of
both missionaries and merchants took place in different parts of the
island. At Banca, in the Tamsui district, two English merchants, Messrs
Kerr and Bird, were murderously assaulted by a ferocious armed mob, and
Mr Holt, the acting vice-consul at Tamsui, reported in October 1868 that
"remonstrance, expostulation, despatches, letters, messages, and visits
having alike failed in securing common justice" from the mandarin, he
might be "driven at any moment to strike his consular flag and close
communication with the authorities. Our lives are threatened by people
who have proved that the will to murder us is not wanting," and with whom
the authorities either could not or would not interfere. Mr Holt held
his ground until assistance reached him, and he made no secret of his
intention to back his diplomacy by a show of force whenever he got the
chance. "Short of destruction of life and property," he wrote, "I intend
using any means in my power to enforce that justice that the people who
are supposed to administer it deny me. On the arrival of the gunboat I
will at once inform your Excellency of the measures concerted between the
commander and myself." Vice-Admiral Keppel reported to the Admiralty in
December that "the opportune arrival of H.M. gunboat Janus and the United
States Aroostook was followed by a full compliance with the demands of
her Majesty's consul."

Matters did not run quite so smoothly at the other end of the island,
where missionaries as well as merchants were the object of attack. The
campaign was carried on with vigour for some six months. Redress was
not only unobtainable from the Chinese authorities, but even personal
access to them was rendered impossible by the obstruction of the mob.
Mr George Jamieson was obliged to forego a visit to the magistrate
at Taiwan in April on the latter confessing that he could not protect
him from violence. Mr Gibson, five months later, found his road to the
mandarin ambuscaded by three parties of sixty or seventy men each, armed
with jingalls, swords, and spears. Outrage succeeded outrage during the
whole period. The state of affairs was of course a subject of serious
remonstrance with the Central Government, of whom the Minister first
demanded, as in the Yangchow case, a joint inquiry into the facts. For
this purpose the consul, Mr Swinhoe, who had been absent on other duty,
was ordered to his proper post. At the same time Vice-Admiral Keppel was
requested to send an adequate naval force to support the consul's position
and prevent further outbreaks.

The Yamên went through the form of ordering to the spot a commissioner,
who, however, left it again immediately, thus turning the orders of the
Yamên into ridicule. This proceeding naturally encouraged the hostility
of the local officials and of the mob who executed their behests. The
situation became most threatening.

The squadron detached by Admiral Keppel for active operations at Takow
and its neighbourhood consisted of three corvettes and five gunboats, to
be reinforced if necessary by the flagship Rodney, carrying eighty-two
guns. Before this imposing force arrived, however, the task they were
intended to achieve had been already accomplished. "Driven to despair,
and believing life and property to be in great danger, Mr Gibson, without
waiting for instructions, called upon Lieutenant Gurdon of the gunboat
Algerine to take possession of the Chinese fort, which resulted in a loss
of life and a destruction of Government stores."

Mr Gibson's action was somewhat euphemistically described as "without
waiting for instructions," seeing that he had positive instructions
to maintain his ground until a naval force should arrive. Both the
operation itself and certain details of its execution were adverted
upon so severely, first by Sir Rutherford Alcock and then by the British
Government, that, notwithstanding Commodore Jones's commendation of "the
most brilliant exploit I have heard of in these seas," Lieutenant Gurdon
fell under the displeasure of the Lords of the Admiralty, as the acting
consul did under that of the Foreign Office. The object of the joint
adventure, however, was attained, and the spirit of outrage among the
Chinese completely subdued. This happened in December.

There remained, however, yet another centre of turbulence which greatly
impeded the operation of the treaty, at the port of Swatow. The villages
which lie between that seaport and the district city of Chow-chow-fu,
some 12 miles up the river Han, had banded themselves together to oppose
foreign intercourse with the latter city. Not only were the business and
property of foreign merchants interfered with, but a British man-of-war
gig in the river was fired upon, and when the men landed to identify the
offender they were overpowered by the whole population of the nearest
village. This hostile attitude, resembling very much that of the Canton
villages twenty years before, steadily increased until the native
officials themselves were not safe in passing to and from the district
city. Strong representations were made to the high authorities of the
province at Canton. The viceroy had promised to send a military force to
quell the riotous villages, but before he had proved the sincerity of his
intention the Gordian knot was cut by British initiative in January 1869.
The late Sir Challoner Alabaster, a man of uncommon resolution, was at
that time acting consul at Swatow; and he, having secured the co-operation
of Commodore Jones, led a force of marines and bluejackets against the
offending villages. A stout resistance was offered at first, but when
several of the villages had been taken and destroyed the whole eighteen
made their submission. Thereafter the district enjoyed perfect peace
and security. In the following March Sir Rutherford Alcock was able to
telegraph to Lord Clarendon that "the accounts from all the ports showed
that peace and order had been restored; that at Yangchow and Formosa
entire security and an improved position had been obtained; that there
was no more cause for anxiety at any point; that the best understanding
existed with the foreign body at Peking; and that the relations with China
had never been more satisfactory."

The bearing of these occurrences on the revision of the treaty may not at
first sight be quite clear, but it is interesting to note in what manner
they were connected with that operation in the mind of Sir Rutherford
Alcock. He calculated that the necessity of using force to vindicate
foreign treaty rights, of which both he and his predecessor had constantly
warned them, would bring home to the Peking authorities the alternative
which they would always have to face in case of failure to carry out the
treaties. How very differently these outrages and the enforced redress
affected the situation in Peking will now be seen.

The action taken at Yangchow and in Formosa having been fully explained
to the Tsungli-Yamên, Wênsiang and the other Ministers expressed their
entire concurrence. But what satisfied the Government of China produced
quite another impression on that of Great Britain. Lord Stanley, as
Foreign Secretary, had written on November 20, 1868: "Mr Medhurst appears
to have acted with great prudence and firmness, and you will convey to
him my approval of his proceedings.... I have to instruct you [Sir R.
Alcock] to press the case in question upon the Chinese Government." Two
months later Mr Medhurst was reprimanded by Lord Clarendon for his action,
and the "full satisfaction for the outrage" was attributed exclusively
to the "readiness with which the Central Government took measures that
proved effectual." The change of Government which had in the interval
taken place in England (December 9, 1868) was hardly sufficient to account
for so diametrical a change of view in a matter of imperial concern.
Another agency had effected the conversion of the British Government.
Mr Burlingame had arrived fresh from fervid denunciations in the United
States of the "tyrannic policy" and the "throat policy" of Great Britain
as applied to China, and adroitly seizing on the repression of the
Yangchow and Formosa outrages as flagrant examples, he succeeded in
incensing Lord Clarendon against the various British officials concerned
in these troubles, whom his lordship visited with punishment which
scarcely stopped short of vindictiveness. Mr Medhurst, indeed, a man of
long and distinguished service, had only a black mark set against his
name; but Mr Gibson was publicly censured and degraded, and ordered to
make an apology to the Chinese officials whose lawless aggressions he
had lawlessly repelled. With some inconsistency, Lord Clarendon, about
the same time, approved the conduct of Acting-Consul Holt at Tamsui, who
succeeded in adjusting most serious misunderstandings with the Chinese
through no other means than the visible force of the small gunboat Janus,
for whose arrival he waited before preferring his demands.

That the sudden change in the policy of the British Government was the
work of Mr Burlingame was frankly avowed by Lord Clarendon himself, who
based the fresh instructions to the Minister in China on the arrangements
he had concluded with the Chinese representative. In his letter of
condemnation, January 14, 1869, he, moreover, intimated that he could not
wait before pronouncing judgment for Sir Rutherford Alcock's complete
report on the Yangchow affair, because his "communication with Mr
Burlingame ... rendered it necessary that he should not defer making his
observations." That a British Secretary of State could have so demeaned
his office would not have been believed save on his own confession. He
of course carried the Admiralty with him, and the same influence which
inspired the new instructions issued to the Minister and consuls inspired
those issued to the commanding officers on the China station.

Taken textually, the negotiations between Mr Burlingame and Lord Clarendon
were of a platonic character. H.M.'s Government undertook to apply
no pressure to China. It would have been a simple matter to refrain
from applying pressure, and a tacit resolution to that effect with
corresponding instruction to the Minister in Peking would have secured the
object. To make it a subject of direct pledge to the Chinese Government
seemed one of those gratuitous acts which all diplomatic experience
condemns as fraught with future embarrassments. To save appearances,
however, a nominal equivalent was taken. "Mr Burlingame was requested to
bear in mind, and to make known to the Chinese Government, that we should
henceforward have a right to expect on its part the faithful fulfilment
of treaty engagements, the prompt redress of grievances referred to the
Central Government, and friendly treatment of British subjects by the
Chinese authorities"--as if all that had not been already stipulated for
under the solemn sanction of the existing treaty.


IV. REVISION NEGOTIATIONS AND CONCLUSION.

    Lukewarmness of British Government--Sir R. Alcock's misgivings
    as to success--Mixed commission in Peking to consider
    details--Mr Hart's predominance--Treaty becomes a custom-house
    concern--Increase of duties being the Chinese aim--Sir
    Rutherford Alcock attributes failure to Mr Burlingame's
    misrepresentations--Merchants oppose the treaty--Ratification
    refused by British Government--Inferences from this
    fiasco--Chinese influenced by force alone.

Let us now revert to the cause and origin of the Burlingame mission--the
revision of the treaty of Tientsin. The instruction for revision was
given by Lord Stanley on August 16, 1867, in such general terms as the
following:--

    Her Majesty's Government neither wish, nor have they the
    right, to impose sacrifices on China, even though they may be
    convinced that the inconvenience of such sacrifices will be only
    temporary, whereas the benefit which will result from them will be
    lasting.... We must reconcile ourselves to waiting for the gradual
    development of that [better] system, and content ourselves with
    reserving for revision at a future period any new arrangement we
    may come to in 1868.... You will of course act openly with the
    representatives of other Powers, inviting and availing yourself
    of their co-operation.

A note of misgiving as to the policy of asking for the revision runs
through the whole correspondence. After the preliminary labours of sifting
the voluminous memorials from merchants and others, Sir Rutherford Alcock
sums up their demands thus: "All their wants turn upon three or four
cardinal defects, not of the treaties so much as in their execution." And
he adds the significant reflection: "The question arises, if nothing is to
be gained by demanding a revision, ... whether much would not be lost, and
an opportunity thrown away, which might, by reserving the right, be turned
to better account when the emperor's majority is declared. I believe the
true policy of foreign Powers would be to wait; ... to this conclusion
... all the representatives of foreign Powers now in Peking are led." "The
Chinese," he also says, "would go much faster and better if left alone."

The question naturally suggested by these remarks--why a task involving
enormous labour, of which only negative results were to be expected, was
entered upon at all at such an inopportune moment--remains unanswered.

It would be insufferably tedious, and of no practical utility, to track
the windings of a maze leading nowhere, for the revised treaty was never
ratified. But the labours of two whole years could not but leave landmarks
to guide succeeding travellers over the same ground. It could not be but
that with so much beating of the bushes the game would be started, if not
brought to bag. It was a reconnaissance in force which, for the first
time, compelled the respective parties to the struggle to reveal their
true character and intentions. Such a discovery was perhaps not too dearly
bought by the time and trouble expended on it.

The first definite step in the process of revision was the nomination of
a mixed commission of British and Chinese "to devise means of securing a
more prompt redress of commercial grievances." The members were Mr Fraser,
second secretary to the British Legation; Mr Hart, Inspector-General of
Customs; and two secretaries of the Tsungli-Yamên--a heavy preponderance
on the Chinese side of the question. To the same commission was added
another British member, Mr Adkins. And here it is not impertinent to
observe that the absence of both the Chinese secretary, Mr Wade, and the
acting Chinese secretary, Mr Brown, left the Legation in a condition too
crippled to engage on work which would have taxed its full strength. The
members of the commission held many sittings, reporting proceedings from
time to time to their respective principals, the Tsungli-Yamên and the
British Minister.

It needs no great effort of imagination to divine, in a body thus
composed, whose would be the dominant voice. Mr Hart conducted the
proceedings throughout. The discussion had not gone far when it was found
hopeless to revise the provisions of the treaty in any sense compatible
with progress or freer intercourse; and the dangerous questions which had
caused the Government so much anxiety, and which had inspired both the
Burlingame mission and the various secret memorials, being thus happily
ruled outside the controversy, the Chinese Ministers seem to have given
themselves no further concern about the revision. This distant attitude
of theirs was severely commented on by a contemporary writer in 'Fraser's
Magazine,' who said:--

    After ten years of conciliatory blandishments on our part, the
    high Chinese authorities had so far disobeyed the spirit of the
    treaty that, although they had not actually prevented our Minister
    from corresponding and visiting with them, yet they had had the
    audacity to render all such intercourse absolutely nugatory,
    and had constrained him, after a long and successful diplomatic
    career, to descend to the extremely humiliating position of
    treating with them indirectly through the medium of Mr R. Hart.

As, however, the proceedings became focussed on a tariff revision destined
to add to the duty receipts, a "collector of revenue wanting money," as Mr
Hart described himself, was the most fitting negotiator, and the Chinese
ministers were well pleased to leave him free to make his own bargain, so
long as it yielded that result.

To give colour to the Chinese demand for higher duties a bold formula was
resorted to, and supported by equally bold reasoning. The expedient was
a rearrangement of the method of collection of inland dues on foreign
merchandise, which was then, as it continues to be, the great bone of
contention between foreign traders and the Chinese authorities. The
treaties conferred on merchants the right of compounding for all inland
taxation of their merchandise by a single payment at the port of entry;
but the practices of the Chinese officials had rendered the privilege a
nullity. In the new negotiations Mr Hart, on the part of the Chinese,
took the high ground of maintaining, with subtle dialectic, that the
protection which foreigners claimed was not in fact given by the treaties.
So strongly did the Chinese entrench themselves in this contention, that
heavy artillery was required to dislodge them. "Could any negotiators
be so dull or incompetent," wrote Sir R. Alcock in reply, "as to sign a
treaty of commerce with an Eastern potentate, extorted at the point of
the bayonet, and leave this unlimited power in his hands to turn against
us the next moment, or whenever he pleased, and nullify all that had been
stipulated, destroying the trade for which alone war had been made?"
Defeated in argument, the Chinese next begged that what they could not
claim as a right might yet be accorded to them as a favour, thus copying
the tactics of the Japanese in an analogous case.

As this proved to be the crux of the whole transaction, the rock on which
the convention eventually split, it is useful to consider how the subject
was treated in the negotiations. The treaties of Nanking, 1842, and of
Tientsin, 1858, provided for the transit of British goods throughout
the empire on payment of a fixed charge. But in securing exemption from
arbitrary imposts in the interior, the treaty of Nanking signally failed;
that of Tientsin had proved equally ineffective, and why? From inherent
difficulties in the nature of things--obstacles absolutely insuperable
so long as the country remained under the same organic conditions. Such
were the propositions with which the British Minister entered upon the
discussion of the subject; and as no proposal was made for changing the
organic conditions of the empire, the prospect of obtaining a satisfactory
fulfilment of those treaty provisions did not seem very encouraging.

But then a suggestion, apparently emanating from Consul Robertson at
Canton, was made for simplifying the problem by doing away with the option
which had been reserved in the treaties for foreign merchants, either
to pay the commutation at the port of landing, or to allow their goods
to run the gantlet of the Chinese customs stations. Instead of this, it
was suggested that a single compulsory payment, amounting to half the
import tariff, might be levied on the landing of the goods, which should
thereafter be freed from all other imposts throughout the empire. It
was not unnatural that a "collector of revenue" should appropriate this
conception, and introduce it into the revised treaty; but then the doubt
immediately arose on the other side, whether the promised exemption would
be any more of a reality than it had been under the existing _régime_. If
the difficulties in the way of fulfilling the stipulation in the treaty
of Tientsin and Nanking were really insuperable, would they now disappear
merely because the Chinese Government received an increased import duty?
In considering Mr Hart's proposal, "the question would be," according to
Sir Rutherford Alcock, "Could we obtain a sufficient guarantee that such
additional import due would effectually exempt British goods from all
other dues, local, provincial, and what not?" And again, "Security for
exemption from all but the fixed 2½ per cent was the one question on which
depended the value of any revision."

A necessary condition of any successful treaty was the assent of
all the other Powers to its provisions, seeing that under their
most-favoured-nation clauses any one of them by holding aloof could
render the treaty inoperative. The various foreign representatives were
therefore kept informed of the progress of negotiations. In this way their
opinions were obtained from time to time as to the merits of the various
proposals. On the subject of the compulsory payment of transit dues the
opinions which the British Minister received from his colleagues were
all unfavourable. They considered that some "additional guarantee would
be necessary against failure, and as against security for additional
losses which would be entailed upon the merchants." To give effect to
the new proposals an edict was to be published acquainting all provincial
officials with what had been agreed upon. But still the diplomatic body
maintained "that nothing is really certain but the addition of 2½ per
cent to the import duties. This will be rigorously exacted and paid;
but whether the equivalent exemption from all other taxation will be
obtained must be held doubtful, ... seeing that in the past the same
provincial authorities have shown the most persistent disregard of
treaty stipulations and proclamations." "Under such circumstances," Sir
Rutherford adds, "it would seem reasonable that, during the first year
at least, all amounts collected under the new arrangements ... should be
carried to a separate account ... to meet claims for compensation." In the
end, however, he saw reason to waive this proviso, to disregard the views
of his colleagues, and to assent to the new impost, without any guarantee.
Attempts to obtain concessions from the Chinese in the way of freer
intercourse proved, as we have said, hopeless from the first. The renewal
of the Chinese demand to establish a customs station in Hongkong--that
"immense smuggling depot"--was refused on the British side; while the
British request for recognition of Hongkong as a port of call for goods
in transit to Canton was in like manner refused on the Chinese side,
because it "would give the place a respectable name" as well as make it
the "great emporium of the south." Hongkong, it is fair to remember, was,
not unnaturally, odious in the eyes of the Chinese. The more prosperous
the colony became, the more they hated it; and the more patriotic among
them--as, for instance, the Minister Wênsiang--detested it the most.

The ruling factor in eliminating all measures of progress from the
negotiations and reducing the whole to a customs question was Mr
Burlingame.

    After the arrival of the mission to Washington [wrote Sir
    Rutherford on February 27, 1869] the hopes which the signature
    of the additional articles was calculated to excite undoubtedly
    exercise a very prejudicial effect on my efforts.... With Mr
    Burlingame's enthusiastic reception, and the prompt signature
    of the convention by which the United States Government pledged
    itself to leave China free to adopt or reject all such innovations
    and internal improvements, and even to use its influence with
    other Powers for the same end, they gained precisely the assurance
    they wanted.... From that moment further progress or successful
    negotiation became impossible.

He added in a subsequent despatch to Lord Clarendon:--

    One result stands out more clearly than any other, and it is this:
    what we have gained by the last year's preliminary negotiations is
    not likely to be withdrawn. But if it was difficult to negotiate
    for large concessions before the assurance authoritatively given
    by your lordship to Mr Burlingame, ... it is now out of the
    question to hope for more than has already been conceded....
    Strong in the assurances of two of the treaty Powers, ... it is
    quite certain that no further progress can be made at present. It
    simply remains for her Majesty's Government to determine whether
    they will carry out the revision on the basis proposed and already
    assented to by the Chinese Government, or defer the revision
    altogether to some later period.

The provisional report of the negotiations having been submitted by the
Foreign Office to the other treaty Powers for their opinion, most of
them contented themselves with amicable generalities, the only definite
criticism elicited being that of the North German Confederation. Going
straight to the core of the matter, in May 1869, Count Bernstorff wrote
as follows, basing his remarks upon the opinion of the German merchants:--

    Although the advantages which are to be expected for trade in
    general from the abolition of the "lekin taxes" would not be
    too dearly bought by this extension of the transit duty to all
    commodities, yet, on the other hand, the treaty Powers certainly
    have the right of demanding the abolition of the taxes levied
    contrary to treaty, even without giving anything in return,
    and they might probably obtain this result by common action.
    And then, moreover, it appears, from existing circumstances
    in China, exceedingly questionable whether this tax, even if
    abolished by imperial edict in consequence of a treaty, would not,
    nevertheless, still be levied by the mandarins, although perhaps
    in another shape, since now indeed they have their assignments
    thereon.

Doubts on the part of the Foreign Office led to further correspondence
backwards and forwards, closing with the following ambiguous despatch,
dated 29th September, which was transmitted by telegram, a very slow
process in those days:--

    If you should not have concluded an arrangement before this
    reaches you, her Majesty's Government think it would be better
    to protract negotiations rather than accept now a limited
    arrangement, which would be binding for so long a period as ten
    years, and which would not comprise a satisfactory arrangement
    respecting transit duties, and which might compromise the right
    of her Majesty's Government to take part in the negotiations of
    other Powers for a revision of their treaties.

    Should you, however, have completed any arrangement, you may be
    assured that the best view will be taken of it here.

The supplementary convention was, in fact, signed in October, and Sir
Rutherford Alcock took his leave immediately after, visiting the Yangtze,
Shanghai, Hongkong, and India on his way to Europe. At these places
he explained in general terms the bearing of the treaty, the Indian
Government being specially concerned in the increase of the Chinese import
duty on opium, to which the trade generally were absolutely indifferent.

The supplementary convention was exhaustively reviewed by the Shanghai
General Chamber of Commerce in a memorial addressed to Lord Clarendon
(December 31, 1869). To the practical view of the merchants the treaty
consisted of three clauses: one making compulsory what had previously been
optional--the payment of half the import duty in commutation of inland
dues on foreign merchandise; one doubling the export duty on raw silk;
and the third more than doubling the import duty on opium. Of these, the
first alone was deemed important. The consideration offered by the Chinese
Government for the compulsory payment--that they would frank imported
goods through nine of the eighteen provinces of China--was not regarded as
an equivalent; for the treaty of Tientsin contained the same undertaking
without the geographical limitation, but it had not been fulfilled. The
ground alleged for this non-observance of the existing treaty had been
the existence of insurmountable obstacles in connection with provincial
and imperial finance. These obstacles, the merchants observed, were
"now assumed to have been suddenly overcome," an assumption which they
considered illusory. The question of transit dues was not new to them:
it had been threshed out on all sides during weary years; it was the
recurrent topic of the day with them, as it was destined to continue to
be for a generation longer; and the merchants could not therefore believe
that the difficulties against which they had been hopelessly struggling
were suddenly removed by magic. They were not shown how the revolution was
to be effected. In short, "the conclusion," they said, "was irresistible,
that to a very great extent the commutation of transit dues, which is
made compulsory by the new treaty, will simply become an additional tax
on trade without any return whatever; and that the provincial authorities
will as heretofore tax goods in transit very much as they please, the
treaty stipulation to the contrary notwithstanding,"--a conclusion
supported by arguments which could not be refuted.

Sir Thomas Wade some years later expressed the same views as the merchants
had done. "I doubted," he said, "the good faith of officials when breach
of faith could only be established by the evidence of those subject to
their authority and entirely in their power.... I have since found reason
to believe that the control of taxation in the provinces is a matter of
no small trouble to the Central Government as at present constituted,
if indeed it be possible at all." Nevertheless, he adds, "I have found
occasion to regret that the convention has not been allowed at least a
term of probation." A term of probation was the alternative suggested by
the merchants also, but it seems never to have received any consideration
from the Foreign Office.

The representation which the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce based upon
their review of the treaty was adopted by influential commercial bodies in
England, who in a "monstrous deputation," as Mr Hammond called it, urged
on the Secretary for Foreign Affairs the non-ratification of the treaty.
The British Government gave way, not, as they candidly admitted, convinced
by the reasoning, but overawed by the electoral pressure of the merchants;
and the supplementary convention was allowed to fall through.

Thus ended the first attempt to negotiate a treaty with China as a
perfectly free agent. The conclusion to be drawn not only from the
negative result, but from the whole process of the negotiations--from the
memorials from the provinces, and still more from the Privy Council, the
six boards, and the censorates--is, as stated by Sir Rutherford Alcock in
May 1869, "that the old spirit of arrogance of the days of Lin and Yeh is
still in full vigour, and the assumption of superiority over the barbarian
absolutely unmeasured. That the anti-foreign element amongst the official
and educated classes has suffered no diminution whatever; that if some
two or three leading men take a clearer view of the political situation,
they are evidently without power to take action upon it; and so the vessel
of State is allowed to drift whichever way the tide of prejudice and
ignorance may set. There are still some documents," he added, "wanting to
complete the series, especially the answer of Li Hung-chang and a second
memorial of Tsêng Kwo-fan [p. 184 _seq._], which it would be desirable to
obtain as showing the policy advocated by two of the most prominent men
in the empire at this moment."

One sentence of Sir Rutherford Alcock sums up the case China _v._ the
West: "Pressure, indeed, there must always be here if anything is to be
achieved for the advancement of foreign interests and commerce. In one
way or other, however we may disguise it, our position in China has been
created by force--naked, physical force; and any intelligent policy to
improve or maintain that position must still look to force in some form,
latent or expressed, for the results." Whether the Western nations,
singly or collectively, are justified in using their force for such a
purpose is a question which is not affected by this plain statement of the
case. That the policy of the Western Powers has been largely influenced
by sentimental consideration towards China is true; but their action
has never been consistent with their professions, and their oscillation
between coercion and submission has led to disastrous consequences.

  [Illustration]

FOOTNOTE:

 [15] He now knows better.




CHAPTER XXII.

MISSIONARY PROBLEM--TIENTSIN MASSACRE OF 1870.

    Importance of missionary question long foreseen by Consul
    Alcock--Introduction of missionaries under two French
    treaties--Toleration of Christians under treaties of 1858--Forced
    upon China--Ardour of missionary spirit uncontrollable--Negligence
    of treaty-makers in providing no regulations for admission of
    the propaganda--Contrasted with the care bestowed on trade
    regulations--Religious toleration of the Chinese--Christian
    intolerance--Surreptitious article in French Convention of
    1860--Giving large privileges to missionaries in the interior--Its
    abuse complained of by Chinese--Enforced restitution of old
    property--Bitter injustice--Disintegrating action of the
    propaganda--Abuses of extra-territoriality--Interference in
    local affairs--Detaching natives from their allegiance--Causes of
    strife--Chinese Government culpable in permitting abuses--Disputes
    about land and houses--Chinese official laxity compensated
    for by unofficial illegitimate methods--Attacks on missions
    fomented thereby--No remedy possible without the unanimous
    consent of the Powers--Each having different objects--Fruits
    of widespread hostility to missions appeared in 1868--Riot and
    outrage--Culminated in Tientsin massacre of 1870--Details of the
    occurrence--Treated cavalierly by Imperial Government--Culpability
    of officials--Pressure by foreign Ministers induces Chinese
    to execute sixteen criminals--Apologetic mission of Chunghou
    to France--Suspicions of his complicity unfounded--Causes of
    the hostility to foreigners--Government fear of reprisals
    by France--They begin to take the missionary question
    seriously--Issue an important circular--Badly received by the
    Powers.


No subject more seriously engaged the attention of Sir Rutherford Alcock
during his whole term of service than that of the Christian propaganda.
While it was yet in embryo, and long before the untoward consequences now
so familiar had declared themselves, the evil to come formed the theme of
many anxious despatches. For, with the exception of Mr T. T. Meadows, he
was the only one of the early consuls who attempted to read the horoscope
of China with a conscious participation in the responsibility for its
welfare. Their warnings were, of course, wasted on the desert air, for
statesmen whose hands are on the lever of events are like the signalmen on
a busy railway, recking nothing of the origin or destination of the train,
careful only that it pass their own "point" in safety. The thin end of the
entering wedge destined to split China into fragments, unless anticipated
(as in fact it has been) in its disruptive work by some ruder allied
agency, was clearly discerned by Consul Alcock while at Shanghai. Under
cover of the first French treaties in 1844 and 1846 missionaries effected
a legal lodgment on the coast of China, from which they cast longing
eyes on the vast interior of the country. Rivalry between the Christian
sects brought fresh pressure to bear on the plenipotentiaries, and the
"toleration clause" was introduced into all the treaties negotiated at
Tientsin in 1858, and in the German treaty of 1861.

Russia led the way, followed by the United States, Great Britain, and
France. The "clause" was substantially the same in all, the toleration
of Christianity being based on its moral character exclusively--"Hommes
de bien qui ne cherchent pas d'avantages matériels" (Russian); "Teaching
men to do good, and to do to others as they would have others do to
them" (American); "Inculcates the practice of virtue, and teaches man
to do as he would be done by" (English); "Ayant pour objet essentiel de
porter les hommes à la vertu" (French).[16] Yet this apparent unanimity
concealed essential differences in aim and motive. Russia, France, and the
United States, to leave England out of the account, each meant something
specifically distinct from the other by the practically identical clause.

What the Chinese would have said, had they been free to discuss the
demand made upon them, we can hardly conjecture; but in the position in
which they actually found themselves they would have subscribed to any
form of words submitted to them, their sole anxiety then being to get
rid of the barbarians on any terms. Had the preamble run, "Whereas the
Christian religion as practised for 1800 years has not brought peace but a
sword upon the earth, has set the father against the son, nation against
nation, instigated crimes without number, sided with the oppressor and
the unrighteous judge, and is daily prostituted for political ends,"
the Chinese would have signed the toleration clause just the same. The
phraseology was nothing to them, whence it follows that the responsibility
for the consequences rests on the Powers who imposed the form as well
as the substance of the obligations. These Powers placed themselves in
a self-contradictory position both towards China and the Church, for
the only ground on which they claimed protection for missionaries in the
framing of the treaty is the one which they cannot so much as consider in
the fulfilment of it. The ethical and religious side of the propaganda
is to the executive official a negligible quantity, while he can take
cognisance only of that aspect of Christianity which was studiously kept
out of sight in the treaty--its political character, the temper of the
missionaries and of the people among whom they work, and all that makes
for good or bad relations between them.

Amid mixed and perverted motives there is doubtless in all sections of
the propaganda a residuum of pure zeal in a holy cause. The medieval
solicitude for "saving the heathen" survives, and men and women, fired
with the conviction that they are engaged in such a godlike enterprise,
constitute an ever-living force with which statesmen have to lay their
account. It can neither be reasoned with nor turned aside, and is the more
intractable in that the logical effect of its inspiration is to place
it above civil law, but under a divine law of its own interpreting, the
interpretation varying indefinitely with the divisions of the force, each
division, and sometimes each individual, selecting such portions of the
code and bending them to such meaning as may support the objects and the
methods of the sect. To introduce such a complex ferment into the Chinese
body politic was a psychological experiment on a colossal scale, and also
irrevocable. It was, therefore, an experiment which demanded the kind of
precaution used in handling dangerous chemicals.

Yet absolutely no thought was bestowed on the subject; the explosive was
imported with less ceremony than is bestowed on a bale of long cloth, and
left to spread according to its own laws in the living tissue into which
it was injected. So far at least as the English treaty was concerned,
we have it on the authority of the actual negotiator that the Christian
clause was an after-thought "shoved in" at the last moment. The same
authority adds, "The treaty was left to carry out itself"--in other
respects besides that of the missionary question. Sir Rutherford Alcock
speaks of "the futility of grafting on to a treaty of commerce, forced
upon the Chinese under circumstances which left them no power to refuse, a
proselytising agency for the conversion of the nation to Christianity....
Whatever aims at these ends under the stipulation of a treaty of commerce
and amity introduces a cause of distrust and an element of disturbance.
This we have done, and are now reaping the fruit." But a rose-cutting
would not be grafted with the insouciance with which this spiritual
element was incongruously inserted in a commercial treaty. Commenting
directly upon the toleration clause itself, Sir Rutherford wrote: "It is
only necessary to read carefully the words of the article to be aware that
in the whole range of the treaty, from the 1st to the 56th article, there
is nothing stipulated for so difficult to secure as the fulfilment in its
integrity of this one clause."

The foreign Powers generally seemed to court the very "disturbance"
apprehended by "leaving the treaty to carry out itself," washing their
hands of their own careless work. We have seen what pains were taken to
allow the treaty to operate smoothly in its main purpose by elaborating
a scheme of trade regulations far more complete than the treaty itself.
But as foreign trade had been carried on by the Chinese for centuries,
and the merchants of the respective countries were thoroughly at home
with each other, commerce was the least likely source of friction. Of
the new dynamic element introduced into the treaties, it seems never to
have occurred to the negotiators that any regulation was necessary at
all. Missionaries were permitted to enter and settle in the interior,
where everything was strange, for practical purposes beyond the orbit
of their countries' laws, while protected against the jurisdiction of
the Government under which they were to live. Men who could withstand
the temptation offered by such a state of things are not born every day.
Without rule of conduct save their individual judgment, with no previous
understanding with the Chinese provincial officials as to relative
rights and duties, they were left to find such accommodation to their
surroundings as their several idiosyncrasies and the untried conditions
of Chinese social life might determine. The missionary in the interior
had thus all the qualities of a "foreign body" setting up irritation in
the organism,--a state of things, however, which his absolute faith in
the sanctity of his mission perhaps prevented him from comprehending.

One trait in the national character was highly favourable to the
reception of a foreign religion. The Chinese were of all nations the
most tolerant of opinion. They had already accepted and assimilated two
foreign religions--Buddhism and Mohammedanism; indeed they had also, two
hundred years before, accepted and retained Christianity until it was
expelled in convulsions provoked by the foreign missionaries themselves.
Its second advent need not have caused convulsions had it come as the
others had done, with clean hands, as a religion and nothing else. The
tolerance of the Chinese has been referred to materialism and contemptuous
apathy, which is by no means an exhaustive account of the matter.
They were not, any more than Hindus, naked savages without language
or literature: if anything, they were over-civilised. Proud they were,
indeed, and conceited, and in its religious aspect they affected to regard
Christianity as but a wave breaking on a rock. Their rock was a unique
philosophy, scarcely to be called a system, which stands for religion,
differing from other philosophic systems in eschewing speculation and
attending to the ethics of common life,--the only philosophy that may be
said ever to have transfused itself into the blood of a people.

The culture of the Chinese, however, was merely an obstacle to the
realisation of the Catholic ideal of saving the heathen, as the grandest
natural scenery was regarded merely as a hindrance to medieval travel.
"Unhappy infidels, who spend their lives in smoke and their eternity in
flames," was Father le Jeune's epigrammatic summary of the whole case in
Quebec. So deep-rooted is the tradition of the reprobation of the heathen,
that it generally requires many years' experience before a foreign
missionary is led by contact with facts to see that Chinese ethics form
the natural basis for the Christian superstructure. Some missionaries,
indeed, go so far as to use the writings of Confucius as a text-book.
Before reaching this ripe stage, however, the foreign missionary has it
in his power to do more mischief than he can perhaps ever undo.

There was one treaty stipulation which has not been left to chance for its
fulfilment--the additional article inserted in the French Convention of
Peking in 1860. An astute missionary, acting as interpreter to Baron Gros,
managed to interpolate in the Chinese text a clause of his own which had
no place in the French--the ruling version--and was quite unknown to the
French Envoy.[17] By that clause full permission was accorded to French
missionaries to purchase land and erect buildings thereon throughout
the empire; and further, all churches, schools, cemeteries, lands, and
buildings which had been owned by persecuted Christians (Chinese) in
previous centuries were to be paid for, and the money handed to the
French representative in Peking for transmission to the Christians in
the localities concerned. This astounding demand, in our eyes at once so
truculent and so impracticable, seems to have been to the Chinese neither
more nor less oppressive than the rest of the treaty, and they signed
without demur, under the usual mental reservation. But it was in germ an
official recognition of a French protectorate over Chinese Christians,
and of corporate communities of Christians held qualified to be served
heirs to those who had been persecuted in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries--a germ which might be cultivated with greater or less success,
according to the skill of those who had the care of it. Some effort
of imagination is required in order to realise what is implied in this
surreptitious article.

    We must suppose [wrote Sir Rutherford Alcock] a French army
    entering London and there dictating the conditions of peace, and
    among others one that all Church property confiscated by Henry
    VIII. should forthwith be restored to the Roman Catholic Church by
    the present holders, however acquired, and without compensation,
    and that the French Government could be appealed to in order to
    enforce the rigorous execution of the stipulation.

How the stipulation was enforced is thus described by Prince Kung in his
circular of 1871, more fully noticed below:--

    During the last few years the restitution of chapels in every
    province has been insisted upon without any regard for the feeling
    of the masses, the missionaries obstinately persisting in their
    claims. They have also pointed out fine handsome houses (belonging
    to, or occupied by, the gentry or others) as buildings once used
    as churches, and these they have compelled the people to give up.
    But what is worst, and what wounds the dignity of the people,
    is that they often claim as their property _yamêns_, places of
    assembly, temples held in high respect by the literates and the
    inhabitants of the neighbourhood. Buildings which were once used
    as chapels have been in some cases sold years ago by Christians;
    and, having been sold and resold by one of the people to another,
    have passed through the hands of several proprietors. There is
    also a large number of buildings which have been newly repaired
    at very considerable expense, of which the missionaries have
    insisted on the restitution, refusing at the same time to pay
    anything for them. On the other hand, there are some houses which
    have become dilapidated, and the missionaries put in a claim for
    the necessary repair. Their conduct excites the indignation of
    the people whenever they come in contact with each other, and it
    becomes impossible for them to live quietly together.[18]

Bitter consequences have resulted from the enforced operation of the
interpolated clause, for the French Government, as is shown above, took
full advantage of the pious fraud. Neither did the Chinese themselves,
on discovering the truth, openly resent this example of how the foreign
religion "porte les hommes à la vertu." The fraud was more than condoned
by missionaries of all nations and sects, whose legal title to residence
in the interior of China, distant from all authority, rests solely on the
interpolated French clause, the benefit of which accrues to them under
the most-favoured-nation privilege. British Protestant missionaries, not
altogether satisfied with this tainted title, in a long letter to their
Minister, Sir Rutherford Alcock, claimed the right of inland residence
on another ground. They adduced the public declaration of Mr Burlingame,
that "China invites Protestant missionaries to plant the shining Cross on
every hill and in every valley"; to which the answer was simple, that the
Chinese Government disavowed the promises of the envoy, and repudiated the
implied obligation. The British Government disapproved of the claim under
the French treaty, though in rather ambiguous terms, because it rested
"on no sound foundation, but on an interpolation of words in the Chinese
version alone in the French treaty with China." Since then, however, the
pretensions of the French missionaries have been vindicated less by the
interpolated clause itself than by the vigorous exercise of all the rights
conferred by it, and very much more. The clause thus lent material force
to the spiritual ferment, accelerating by many degrees its disintegrating
action. It may be alleged, in palliation of the light-heartedness with
which the whole subject was treated by the negotiators of the treaties,
that they could not have foreseen such a development of their innocent
toleration clause; but the circumstance only emphasises the urgent need
there was for a clear definition of what was really meant by it.

But if toleration be the note of Chinese polity--concerning not
religion alone, but almost every matter affecting government--it may
be asked, What is it in the propagation of Christianity that excites
the hostility of people and rulers? It is that the missionaries present
themselves to Chinese view as the instruments of powerful nations bent
on the ruin of the empire. They enter the country with a talisman of
extra-territoriality; their persons are sacred; the law of the land cannot
lay hands on them. That is the first stage. The second is, that they seek
to extra-territorialise their converts also, whose battles they fight
in the provincial courts and in the rustic communes, and so make it of
material advantage to the people to bear the banner of the Cross. Many
missionaries are really zealous in the work of alienating the Chinese from
their natural allegiance, and of encouraging them to seek the protection
of foreign Powers as against the native authorities. Thus a revolution
of the most vital nature is in progress, and is being pushed on with all
the energy which Christian, combined with ecclesiastical and political,
zeal can throw into the work. Village is set against village, clan against
clan, family against family, and a man's foes in China are too often they
of his own household.[19]

No doubt the Chinese Government are to blame for having allowed such a
state of things to grow up; but it is part and parcel of their drifting
attitude towards everything. It is not that their apprehensions are not
aroused, but that they lack initiative to avert the danger which they
fear. While in theory they do not admit the claim of any foreign Power
to protect Chinese subjects, yet in practice the thing goes on, and
is acquiesced in. So formidable, indeed, have the foreign missionaries
become, that most of the provincial authorities are afraid as well as
jealous of them; and peace-loving viceroys give the simple injunction
to their prefects and magistrates that on no account must they permit
dispute with foreigners or native Christians. This means that the Chinese
Christian must be upheld, right or wrong, and the Christian would be very
un-Chinese if he did not take advantage of such a privilege to trounce
his heathen neighbours.

The right given in the French treaty of acquiring land and building houses
in the interior is one of the most constant causes of local quarrel. Real
estate in China, being held not on personal but on family tenure, can
only be rightfully alienated by the common consent. A dissentient member
holding out, or reviving his claim for purposes of extortion after assent
has been given and transfer made, may become a convenient instrument
in the hands of agitators against the foreigners; and where there is no
such dissentient it is not unusual for the local authorities to create
one by forcible means. A case in point may be mentioned in illustration.
A building was made over to the Baptist Missionary Society by a Chinese
family, every precaution being taken to obtain the unanimous consent of
its various branches. When the deed had been signed by the head of the
family and other responsible members, the local magistrate examined the
chief of the clan, denounced him, and punished him severely by bastinado.
Two of the signatories, thus intimidated, disowned their own act, thereby
invalidating the deed by non-unanimity.

Nearly all the attacks on missionaries proceed in one form or another
from that fecund nursery of feuds, the land question. Whatever the merits
of the dispute, the foreigner is _prima facie_ in the wrong; for he is
an alien, an intruder, and he erects buildings which are outlandish,
offensive to taste, and of sinister influence; and whosoever, albeit
the most disreputable member of a family of three or four generations,
proclaims a grievance by which he has lost his birthright, is sure of
a sympathetic following. Thus without taking into account individual
indiscretions, or infirmities of temper, open attacks on time-honoured
customs, and so forth, there is a perennial root of bitterness in
missionary enterprise in the interior of China, which throws out shoots
culminating in murder and fiendish ferocity; and all this without even
a distant approach to the kernel of Christianity which lies behind the
outworks.

For what the Chinese authorities have failed to do by the legitimate means
at their command, their underlings and the circle of gentry that surrounds
each provincial centre attempt to do by illegitimate and criminal methods.
Hatred of missions and converts shows itself by violent outbreaks in
which innocent and guilty suffer a common fate; mobs are excited by false
suggestions, scholars write inflammatory placards filled with the foulest
calumnies, and the higher officials "let it work"--secretly applauding,
but ready, if called to account, to exculpate themselves and blame the
poor ignorant people.

The charges which form the staple of these attacks turn largely upon the
murder of children in order to make use of eyes, members, blood, &c.,
in certain Christian rites; and they are so extravagant and absurd that
foreigners are apt to doubt that even the most ignorant among the people
really believe in the crimes which are alleged against Christians. The
best authorities, however,--as, for example, the late Sir Thomas Wade,--do
not question the sincerity of the popular belief; and indeed if we compare
these charges with those made against the Jews by influential sections of
Christians in Europe, we shall be surprised at their practical identity.

For this deplorable state of things no one has been able to suggest a
remedy. What has been done cannot be undone. To mend it even would require
such united action among the Great Powers as it is hardly possible in
the present state of the world to conceive. France, indeed, on the morrow
of the Tientsin massacre, did appeal to the co-operative principle as a
protection to all foreign interests in China. The French ambassador in
London addressed the Foreign Office in these terms:--

    Bien que les victimes de ces attentats soient presque
    exclusivement des Français, on ne saurait contester que des
    faits pareils révèlent l'existence de dangers qui menacent
    indistinctement tous les étrangers résidant en Chine. C'est en
    considérant leurs intérèts comme solidaires dans ces contrées de
    l'extrême Orient que les Puissances européennes peuvent arriver à
    assurer à leurs nationaux les garanties et les sécurités stipulées
    dans les traités.

In the subsequent action of France in China, however, there has been no
trace of regard for any such principle of solidarity. Indeed, were the
Powers ever so amicably disposed towards each other on other questions,
they could not agree in this, the objects of their policy being absolutely
irreconcilable.

"We cannot doubt," wrote Sir Rutherford Alcock, "that the missionary
question is the main cause of disturbance in our relations with China,
and of danger to the Chinese Government itself no less than to all
foreigners resident in the country, missionaries and laymen alike." He
recommended in 1868 that "the treaty Powers should, if possible, come
to some understanding on the religious and missionary question as the
necessary preliminary to any united action for the common benefit, the
acquisition of increased facilities for trade, &c." And he says, "As
regards Chinese converts, any attempt to extend a protectorate over them
would of necessity either fail or be subversive of the whole government of
China." But in the same paper he states that "France, with no trade in the
East, is ambitious of a protectorate over Roman Catholic missions"; and
that "with regard to converts protection has been partially extended to
them under the ægis of the French Government, and that persistent efforts
were being made to make that protection effectual." These efforts have
been still more persistent during the generation that has since passed.
With France the protectorate over native Christians is the great objective
of her Chinese diplomacy--not the ultimate end, indeed, but the lever
by which that end may be attained. To suggest to France, therefore, the
abandonment of this policy would be about as hopeless as asking her to
give up her colonies as the preliminary to an international conference.
And while France protects the proselytising machinery of the Roman
Catholic Church and its consequent usurpation of the Chinese authority, it
would seem of little avail to place other missionaries under restriction.

       *       *       *       *       *

The fruits of this war of the social elements began to be harvested in
1868, as Sir Rutherford Alcock observed; but that was only the beginning
of a long series of conflicts which have marked the progress of missionary
work in China up to the present day. Riot, outrage, and massacre are its
regular landmarks. The outbreaks have so much in common that it would
serve no useful purpose to trace them in detail, or attempt to apportion
praise or blame to this or that individual or sect. The one which has
left the reddest mark on history, and, being enacted in the presence of a
foreign mercantile community, brought the several factors in the question
into a clearer light than can ever be thrown upon outrages in remote parts
of the interior, is the Tientsin massacre of 21st June 1870. This occurred
six months after Sir Rutherford Alcock left China, while Mr Wade was
_chargé d'affaires_ for Great Britain, and Count Rochechouart for France,
in Peking.

The massacre of sixteen French Sisters of Charity, including an Irish
girl, Alice Sullivan, a French consul, and several French subjects,
also--unwittingly, according to the imperial edict treating of the
occurrence--a Russian merchant and his wife, was the work of an organised
band, led by the city fire brigade, under the direction of the civic
authorities. The crime had been planned for some time: it was preceded
by the murder of an isolated English missionary, Mr Williamson, near
Tientsin, and by an attempted anti-foreign rising in Nanking, which
was promptly suppressed by the viceroy, Ma, who was soon after himself
assassinated. (He was a Mohammedan.) The impending outrage in Tientsin
was foreseen, and warning given, several days before. An Englishman was
attacked on the 19th for no reason. The official highest in rank on the
spot--not, however, a territorial authority--was Chunghou, a Manchu,
holding the office of Imperial Commissioner for Trade, and very friendly
to foreigners. Admiral Keppel says of him that he was the most finished
Chinese gentleman he had ever met, with the exception of the viceroy of
Canton (probably meaning Kiying). The governor of the province was Tsêng
Kwo-fan, whose capital was Paoting-fu, some 100 miles in the interior;
and his subordinates, the prefect and magistrate, were the authorities at
Tientsin immediately responsible for the massacre. Chunghou had warned the
Peking Government several weeks before of the progress of the agitation
against the French mission.

The Imperial Government immediately on the occurrence issued an edict
describing the massacre as "a quarrel between the people and the
missionaries resulting in a fight," but were promptly driven from that
position and pressed, not only by the French, but by all the foreign
representatives, to investigate and do justice in the case, Count
Rochechouart demanding the capital punishment of the three mandarins
who had instigated the massacre. On this the Chinese Government
remarked in a secret edict, "Rochechouart, with boundless arrogance,
demands the execution of the Fu and Hsien, a demand ten thousand times
to be rejected." Under pressure, however, the Government ordered the
governor-general, Tsêng, to proceed to the spot and investigate. After
a protracted journey he reached Tientsin and commenced to take evidence,
not of the crime committed, but of the suspicions which had been excited
against the Sisters of Mercy, whom, after ransacking their cemeteries
for mutilated children, he eventually acquitted. He then suspended the
magistrates _pro formâ_, and spoke of sending for troops to catch the
rioters! On receiving the viceroy's report another imperial decree was
issued repeating the original falsehoods, and causing much disappointment
to the foreign Ministers. Renewed pressure from them, not without hints
of stronger measures, resulted in the offer of fifteen of the mob to be
executed, which, being unanimously rejected, the Chinese Government,
apparently thinking it was the number that was inadequate, threw in
five more, making twenty in all. Sixteen were actually beheaded, the
remaining four being saved by the timely arrival of the Russian Minister,
who protested against the execution of the men accused of murdering the
Russians, because he did not believe in their guilt. Compensation was paid
by the Chinese officials to the families of the executed men, which, with
the honours done to their dead bodies, showed that they were sacrificed
not for crime, but for reasons of State. Of course pecuniary compensation
was made on account of the victims of the massacre, the Chinese Government
being never hard to deal with where money is concerned. The prefect and
the magistrate who had busied themselves after the tragedy in torturing
Christians, in order to extort from them confessions which would justify
the massacre, were nominally banished, though it was perfectly understood
that this was a pure matter of form.

  [Illustration: RUINS OF FRENCH CATHEDRAL AT TIENTSIN, BURNED JUNE 20,
   1870.]

As part of the reparation for the massacre the Imperial Commissioner for
Northern Trade, Chunghou, was despatched in the early part of 1871 on
a mission to France to express the regret of the Chinese Government for
what had occurred. This official, the first man of rank who was ever sent
out of China, received but an indifferent reception from the President of
the French Republic. Being the highest authority in Tientsin at the time
of the massacre, and having known of the preparations for an outbreak
of some kind, Chunghou was severely blamed by Europeans on the coast of
China, who alleged that the massacre could have been prevented had he put
forth his authority. Meetings were even held on the subject in Shanghai,
and remonstrances were sent to Europe against Chunghou's being received
anywhere as an ambassador until he should exonerate himself from all share
in the Tientsin atrocity. These representations, no doubt, had something
to do with the attitude of the French Provisional Government, which, on
other grounds also, was probably little disposed in that year to occupy
itself with the affairs either of the Church or of China.

There is reason to believe, however, that Chunghou's conduct during the
affair of Tientsin was not inconsistent with innocence; for although he
was a man in authority, it was only as superintendent of trade, having
no control whatever over the hierarchy of territorial officials, who
were under the orders of the viceroy, Tsêng Kwo-fan. Beyond his personal
attendants it is not probable that Chunghou could move a corporal's guard
in Tientsin, and his position was such that the local authorities and
their myrmidons looked with the keenest jealousy on any departure of the
superintendent of trade from the strict line of his own functions. He
dared not, in fact, move a finger against officers who owed allegiance
to the viceroy, and in apprising the Peking Government of the rumours
which were current, Chunghou probably considered that he had gone as
far as public duty warranted. These somewhat anomalous relations between
two high dignitaries of the empire were put an end to when Li Hung-chang
succeeded Tsêng Kwo-fan as viceroy of Chihli; for he was appointed also
the successor of Chunghou as superintendent of trade, and resided for the
most part of his time in the commercial port, Tientsin. The two offices
continue to be combined in one person.

Most of the typical features of a missionary outrage were in this case
exemplified--ferocious placards and brochures, circulation of calumnies
against the missionaries, guilt of the local authorities, their immunity
from punishment, and the official publication of travestied versions of
the occurrence. There was also, we may add, a lurking disposition on the
part of foreign Governments to give credit to the Chinese charges against
the missionaries. Finding themselves unable by pressure on the Chinese
to obtain satisfaction for past or security against future outrages, they
were seldom indisposed to cover their impotence by throwing the blame on
their own people.

There was, consequently, readiness in certain foreign official quarters
to dwell on undefined "indiscretions." It was too easily assumed in the
beginning that the practice of the Sisters of Charity of purchasing
destitute children reasonably excited the suspicions of the people.
As a matter of fact, however, as was admitted afterwards, this alleged
practice of the Sisters was entirely imaginary. It was also assumed that
the massacre was a spontaneous act of the populace, who believed the
stories of kidnapping. But in view of the fact that these agitations arose
simultaneously in distant parts of the empire, this theory of sporadic
action could not be sustained: besides, as Tsêng Kwo-fan himself shrewdly
enough pointed out, no child had been missed from any family at Tientsin,
and the idea of a disciplined fire brigade and a great city mob being
suddenly roused to fury by the abstract idea that somewhere children had
been kidnapped by somebody is too altruistic for ordinary belief. The mob
needed an instigator, and the instigator was well known.

In the diplomatic correspondence which ensued, admitted on all hands to
be most unsatisfactory, the British _chargé d'affaires_ had occasion to
complain to Prince Kung that in the communications that passed foreign
Ministers and their Governments were spoken of as vassals, which, coming
two years after Mr Wade's warm support of the Burlingame mission, was
instructive as regards the progress in liberal ideas which had been
claimed for the Chinese.

Another consequence of this affair may be noted. The instructions to
British naval officers in China, which had been dictated by Mr Burlingame
in 1869, were virtually reversed after the Tientsin massacre.

It was the general belief at the time that, literally by the fortune
of war, the Chinese Government narrowly escaped a signal retribution
for its continued guerilla warfare against foreigners as represented by
the missionary vanguard. Information travelled slowly then. The nearest
telegraph stations to Peking were Kiachta on the Russian frontier and
Colombo, and there was only periodical communication with either, so that
it happened that the official news of the massacre reached the British
Foreign Office on July 25th. If we recall what was transpiring in the
capitals of Europe during that month of July 1870, we may permit ourselves
the speculation that events might have taken quite another turn had the
news from China reached the Tuileries a month earlier than it did. The
Chinese Government themselves were strongly imbued with this idea. In
an interesting interview which Consul Adkins had with Li Hung-chang in
October, after he had succeeded to the viceroyalty of Chihli, in which the
incident was discussed, the viceroy could not conceal his anxiety. The
pith of a Chinese interview usually lies, like that of a lady's letter,
in the postscript, and as Mr Adkins was taking leave the governor-general
asked him, "Do you think France will make war next year?" (It is worth
noting that in his report of the interview Mr Adkins expressed himself
"reassured by the governor-general's tone and manner." "I take for
granted," he wrote, "that he will not tolerate any outrage on foreigners
within his jurisdiction;" and this forecast of Mr Adkins has, we believe,
been completely borne out by the event.)

But although the Chinese had escaped a great peril, they were somewhat
shaken in their sense of security for the future. The attacks on
missionaries had no doubt gone further than was altogether safe, since
the indignation of the foreign Powers had been roused almost to the pitch
of war. The provincial authorities having had their own way so long,
threatened to be too strong for the Central Government, and were likely
to embroil them with foreign nations; while in their turn the "literati
and gentry," unemployed officials and the leaders of disorder in the great
provincial cities, were also becoming too demonstrative for the provincial
rulers. It was clear to the authorities that they were face to face with
a dangerous situation, and, contrary to their traditional practice, they
began to devise measures in order to meet it. The missionary, they now
saw, was with them for good, the hope of expelling him by intimidation
must be relegated to fanatics of the non-practical school, and it would be
imbecile to shut their eyes any longer to facts. No doubt they had allowed
things to go too far in the admission of foreigners into the interior,
trusting to the resourcefulness of the provinces in insidious means of
repression, but to retrace their steps was now impossible. They could no
longer hope to expel the missionary, but they would contrive some means to
mitigate the dangers of his presence. They would, in short, endeavour to
supply, in concert with the treaty Powers, that culpable omission in the
treaties by henceforth regulating the missions and defining their rights
and obligations.

The result of these cogitations was an elaborate scheme for the control
of missions which was published in the summer of 1871, and was addressed
to the French Government, and by them communicated to the others. That the
Chinese Ministers of themselves took so unprecedented an initiative it is
not necessary to believe. The circular was attributed to that greatest of
all Chinese statesmen, Wênsiang, but the unseen hand that has done so much
to assist China out of her international difficulties may easily be traced
in this notable State Paper. In the preamble the case is stated much as
we have endeavoured to set it forth: "Trade has in no degree occasioned
differences between China and the Powers. The same cannot be said of the
missions, which engender ever-increasing abuses. Although in the first
instance it may have been declared that the primary object of the missions
was to exhort men to virtue, Catholicism, in causing vexation to the
people, has produced a contrary effect in China." The circular submitted
eight rules for the government of missionary relations with the people and
officials in the provinces. The rules referred to (1) the management of
orphanages, which it was proposed either to close altogether or to place
under severe restrictions; (2) the mixed attendance of women and men at
public worship, which, being contrary to Chinese propriety, scandalised
the people; (3) the legal status of missionaries in the interior, and the
evil consequences of the _imperia in imperio_ which had resulted through
the missionaries' separating themselves, and even their native converts,
from the jurisdiction of the local authorities; (4) the restriction of
proceedings in the case of riots to the persons actively participating
in the same; (5) the clear definition of passports, so that missionaries
should not be able to move about at will, leaving no trace; (6) the need
of strict examination into the character and antecedents of converts;
(7) the etiquette to be observed by missionaries in intercourse with
officials, the missionaries not to arrogate official style; and (8) the
reclamation of alleged sites of ancient churches to be stopped, great
injustice having been done to Chinese through their being obliged to
surrender properties which they had honestly bought and paid for.

Many things have happened since 1871, and each transaction with foreigners
has involved greater and greater encroachment on the Chinese prerogatives.
Thus the objection taken in 1871 to the missionaries' arrogating official
style has now been so completely waived that the Chinese Government
itself bestows official rank on missionaries, and has sanctioned a rule
of etiquette for their intercourse with the high Chinese authorities.
Thus "bishops are authorised to demand to see viceroys and governors of
provinces; vicars-general and archdeacons are authorised to demand to see
provincial treasurers, judges, and taotais; other priests are authorised
to demand to see prefects of the first and second class, independent
prefects, sub-prefects, and other functionaries. The various orders
of ecclesiastics are to visit and write to the corresponding orders of
Chinese officials on terms of equality, and these officials will naturally
respond, according to their rank, with the same courtesies."[20]

This famous circular of 1871 unfortunately perished at its birth: it was
roughly attacked in the foreign press, and met with a very cold reception
by the Foreign Offices. The English and American Governments seemed
satisfied with the reflection that the strictures on missionary practices
applied specially to Catholics, and pleased to be able on that account to
dismiss it from consideration. From that day to this the evils complained
of have gone on increasing and accumulating year by year, outrages and
massacres following each other without interruption, and the exacerbation
of feeling between foreign missionaries and the Chinese population going
on with accelerated speed. The political results to China have assumed
in these later years the very concrete form of territorial spoliation,
and the Chinese have had abundant experience of the religion which makes
nations strong and the people virtuous. That is not to say, however,
that there is not good seed already germinating under the snow, which may
hereafter bear the peaceable fruits of righteousness. Meanwhile the naked
unregulated forces are in open conflict, and he would be a bold prophet
who should forecast the issue.

  [Illustration]

FOOTNOTES:

 [16] Germany in her treaty made no profession, but simply stipulated
    for toleration.

 [17] M. Eugene Simon, one of the most distinguished of the French
    consuls in China, in his book, 'La Cité Chinoise,' awards the
    credit of this performance to M. Delamarre, "un prêtre des
    Missions étrangères," who acted as Baron Gros' interpreter.
    "Je tiens," says M. Simon, "le fait de plusieurs sources, et
    entre autres de M. Delamarre, qui se glorifait beaucoup de sa
    supercherie."

 [18] Compare "Jesuits' Estates Act" in Canada, 1890, for which Mr
    Mercier was decorated by the Pope.

 [19] It will be understood that a concise view of the general
    mission question is all that is here aimed at, no distinction
    being drawn between branches of the propaganda. Important as
    are their differences viewed from the foreign standpoint, they
    are practically ignored by the Chinese, as we see from the
    impartiality with which they visit resentment on all. Our concern
    is with the impression produced by the propaganda as a whole,
    gathered as far as possible from Chinese evidence and not from
    the hypothetical arguments of foreign disputants. In other words,
    it is the political bearing of the movement which alone we are
    endeavouring to illustrate.

 [20] This measure was intended by the Chinese Government to
    facilitate the local settlement of disputes where the facts
    were known, and so obviate incessant appeals to the Central
    Government. It has not fulfilled its purpose, partly because an
    important section of the propaganda declined to avail itself of
    the concession offered to them. Indeed the form of the concession
    implies a hierarchy which only Catholic missions possess.




CHAPTER XXIII.

THE EXPANSION OF INTERCOURSE.


I. RUSSIA AND FRANCE ADVANCING.

    Influx of treaty Powers--Diversion of Chinese foreign policy into
    new channels--Aggrandisement of Russia--And France--At the expense
    of China--Affecting whole policy of China for thirty years--The
    rise of German influence--And Japanese.

Up to this stage the foreign relations of China have been traced from
what is practically a single point of view--the English--without sensible
distortion of their true proportions. But the events of 1857-60, and
the treaties by which they were crowned, introduced new factors and a
wider ramification of international connections. The arms of England
and France opened the door to an influx of Powers eager to reap where
they had not sown; and though the full effect was not realised till many
years later, the shifting of foreign intercourse from an essentially
Anglo-Chinese to a Sino-cosmopolitan basis became a potential reality
on the day that Peking surrendered to the Allies. Foreseeing such a
result, the negotiators of the treaties of 1858 advisedly refrained from
pressing the Chinese Government more than was essential to the freedom
of commerce, on the ground that other Powers less restrained than the
authors of the treaties by a sense of moral responsibility might take
undue advantage of concessions extorted from the vanquished. This
prevision has been borne out by events, for the original "three treaty
Powers" soon became thirteen, and the old solicitude for the conservation
of China was gradually discovered to be confined to the small minority
who had a substantial commercial stake in the country. With the increase
in their number there naturally also appeared diversity of interest,
scarce perceptible in the beginning, but ever widening with the progress
of events until at length a stage of violent antagonism in the policy of
the Powers was reached. The division among their enemies, which Chinese
statesmen have deplored their inability to compass, has thus been brought
about without their aid; but so far from realising the Chinese dream of
ruling the barbarians, the division has only exposed the empire to the
ravages of rival spoilers.

It is impossible to do more than glance at the several channels into
which the foreign relations of China have branched off since 1860. Yet
they intersect each other at so many points as to form a network which
can only be intelligently considered as a whole. The quasi-biographical
form of the present work may be appropriately dropped, so far as China
is concerned, with the beginning of 1870, when the more immediate subject
of it disappears from the stage of action to reappear as a perspicacious
critic surveying the scene from a distant but commanding standpoint.

Two developments of far-reaching importance found their proximate
starting-point, though not their origin, in the crisis which laid China
prostrate in 1858 and 1860. These were the extension of the Russian empire
to the Pacific Ocean, and the creation of that Asiatic empire which had
been the dream of France for two centuries. China being by these vast
territorial aggressions placed between the upper and the nether millstone,
the anticipated advance of the two Powers has exerted an influence on her
destiny scarcely less potent than the Japanese war itself, with which it
so effectively co-operated. The soldier-statesmen of Russia foreseeing,
what the war of 1854-55 was soon to demonstrate, that the sea route
to their Pacific possessions was at the mercy of the maritime Powers,
resolved to make a dash for a line of communication by land, and in
pursuance of this adventurous conception forced their way down the Amur
in spite of the feeble remonstrance of the Chinese wardens of the marches.
What was thus taken by the strong hand in 1854 was formally ceded in 1858,
when, first, the Amur province, with the free navigation of the river,
and, next, an undefined condominium in the Usuri province, were granted
by treaty to Russia. This was but a step towards the absolute cession, two
years later, of that territory, including the whole Manchurian sea-coast,
600 miles in length. These extensive cessions, giving Russia the command
of North-Eastern Asia, were extorted from China while _in extremis_ as a
direct result of the Anglo-French victories.

So with the French establishment in the south-eastern section of the
Continent. The expedition sent to the Far East in conjunction with that
of Great Britain was, on completion of its work in China, withdrawn to
Cochin-China, and, in an alliance of brief duration with Spain, invaded
that dependency of the empire of Annam--a vassal of China--and captured
Saigon. The Spanish partnership being thereupon dissolved, the French
empire of "Indo-China" was inaugurated with a free hand. Zeal for religion
was the motive of the invasion: "The emperor wished to put a stop to
the constantly recurring persecutions of Christians in Cochin-China, and
to secure them the efficacious protection of France." The record of the
phenomenal progress of the new French empire since the treaty of Saigon
in 1862 has been related by many eloquent pens. M. F. Garnier, the heroic
explorer; M. de Carné, his colleague; M. Lanier, M. Deschamps, M. de
Lanessan, and a host of enthusiastic French writers, have depicted in
glowing terms not only the process, but the motives and aspirations, of
the French "empire-builders."[21]

The pressure, latent and active, of these two powerful neighbours has
given its tone to the policy of China during thirty years, and in such a
way that her relations with the commercial nations who did not menace her
integrity have been relegated to a secondary place.

The new German influence in the Far East, which had its modest beginnings
in the treaties so reluctantly concluded by the Japanese and Chinese in
1861, has grown in importance _pari passu_ with the rapid development of
the German empire itself, ably seconded, it must always be allowed, by the
personal qualities of the Ministers who have been successively chosen to
represent the Fatherland at Peking and Tokio. The first resident Minister
to China was Baron Rehfues, who opened the Legation in Peking in 1866,
under the treaty of 1861.

Another nation destined to play a leading _rôle_ among the Powers in the
Western Pacific was during the same period rising like the sun in the
eastern sky. Nor was it very long before the nascent Power of Japan began
to make its weight felt in the conflicts and concerts of the Far Eastern
world.

It is obvious that under these various influences operating from without,
and the reflex action set up within the State itself, the character
of China as a political and diplomatic entity could not any longer
be what it had been in the years before the war. What had been simple
became complex; no international issue could be raised in an isolated
form; nor could China make any move, whether voluntary or involuntary,
without facing the critical observation of many interested parties.
This multiple responsibility to Powers by no means at one in their aims,
and each assuming over her a status of superiority, could have no other
effect than to reduce to nullity any efforts China might make either to
improve herself or please the Powers. It was impossible to please them
all. Decades before the Japanese war, more than one of them had offered
her armed assistance in thwarting the designs of a third,--which things
Chinese statesmen pondered in silence.


II. JAPAN AGGRESSIVE.

    Extraordinary progress of Japan--Nation becomes restless--Invades
    Formosa--Bought off by China.

The civil war in Japan had been fought with characteristic energy during
three years, when a revolution, the like of which was never before seen,
established the new empire on the double foundations of hereditary
monarchy and popular suffrage. The effect of the revolution was to
concentrate the whole strength of the State under the government of the
Mikado, and thus enable it to give free play to the widest ambitions. With
incredible rapidity the nation made itself efficient for every enterprise
of peace or war. The best that the Western world had to teach was eagerly
appropriated by a people just aroused from a long sleep, and anxious to
make up lost time. They went so fast, indeed, that onlookers shook their
heads, and their best friends would have applied the brake had it been
possible. But the nation was self-reliant, and in its first adolescence
it began to be aggressive.

Within six years of the revolution of 1868 an expedition was sent to
invade the Chinese island of Formosa. Through the good offices of Sir
Thomas Wade, British Minister in Peking, war between the two empires was
averted, and the Japanese forces withdrawn. They were virtually bought
off, a proceeding characterised by Sir H. Parkes as pusillanimous on
the part of the empire of China. The transaction really sealed the fate
of China, in advertising to the world that here was a rich empire which
was ready to pay, but not ready to fight. The euphemisms under which
the ransom was disguised deceived no one unless it were the Chinese
themselves. The vast cessions to Russia, incredible as they appeared, had
at least the palliation of a dire emergency, and verbal equivalents in
the shape of promises of deliverance therefrom. The submission to Japan,
on the other hand, was made in a time of comparative ease.

The incident had yet a further significance. The pretext of the Japanese
invasion was injuries done to shipwrecked Liuchiuans, a people whom China
till then and for some years later considered her own vassals, and who
had for centuries paid her regular tribute. Such an episode was therefore
a sure mark of imperial decadence;--a definite step, moreover, in the
downward process, to be followed not long after by the Japanese boldly
asserting a claim to the Liuchiu Islands, against which China could only
interpose an inarticulate protest. The meaning of these indications was
not likely to be lost either on the Japanese, who were more immediately
concerned, or on other less interested onlookers. And what has the
subsequent history of China been but a development of the symptoms?


III. KOREA OPENED.

    Japan concludes commercial treaty with Korea--Establishes working
    relations--Exciting jealousy in China--The suzerain--China replies
    by opening Korea to the whole world.

The expanding life of Japan was soon to overflow in another direction.
The kingdom of Korea lay within twelve hours' steaming from the Japanese
coast: it had a historic and a mythical interest for Japan; it had been
the source of her culture as well as the scene of her conquests and
ultimate defeat. With the exception of piratical raids on the coast towns
of China, Korea was the only foreign field into which Japanese arms had
been carried, and the prowess of their peninsular heroes was cherished
as a sacred treasure by a people singularly tenacious of their heroic
legends. After an interval of three centuries the new Japan directed its
ambition to the scene of its medieval exploits; and the "hermit kingdom"
was at last dragged from its seclusion and forced to play an unwilling
part in the international game. The modern spirit had tempered the
military passion, commerce and industry supplied the ballast to adventure,
and instead of landing an army of 200,000 men, as they had done in 1592,
the Japanese, in 1876, re-established themselves in the peninsula through
the peaceable agency of a treaty of amity and commerce--a weapon newly
borrowed from the armoury of Europe. This movement of the Japanese was by
no means intended to "open" Korea--except to themselves. On the contrary,
it appears that that very astute people ingratiated themselves with
the king's Government by aiding, or professing to aid, them to keep the
country closed to all other nations.

But, like every other attempt to isolate an international question, the
exclusive effort of the Japanese not only failed, but resulted in opening
Korea instead of closing it. They could not lock themselves in: the key
was on the outside of the door. Although they disguised their feelings,
the Chinese authorities had been gravely disturbed by the attacks of the
French and the Americans on Korea in 1867 and 1871. The audacious advance
of the Japanese aroused them to the extent of considering the merits of a
counter-move; for Korea was the secular battle-ground between China and
Japan, the historic stepping-stone between the two countries. And Korea
was a vassal to China, if ever one State did occupy such a relation to
another. By old tradition, by effective conquest, by solemn engagement,
by regular tributary missions, by the prerogative of investiture, by
the obeisance of the sovereign before the Chinese envoys sent on great
occasions, by every kind of acknowledgment which the servant could render
to the master, was the suzerainty of China established.

China's relations to her tributaries was perhaps the best feature in
her imperial character. There was protection, nominal or real, but never
a shadow of domination. The ceremonial once settled, the most complete
independence was accorded to the vassal State, the imperial object being
never oppression or exploitation, but the girdling of the empire with a
cordon of contented States looking with filial eyes towards the Dragon
throne. Of these filial States Korea was the most important, on account
of its geographical position as commanding one of the main approaches
to the Middle Kingdom, or, as the king himself once expressed it in a
memorial to the emperor, as "the lips protecting the teeth." For China the
Korean peninsula has been a strategical stronghold, but its importance was
increased a hundredfold when the statesmen of Peking came to realise what
they had done in giving away the whole Manchurian sea-coast, leaving them
no outlet to the Sea of Japan excepting through Korea, which, moreover,
was studded all round with excellent harbours, useful to friends and
tempting to enemies.

The wise policy which the emperors had observed towards their tributaries
had borne valuable fruit in Korea. For two hundred years the Peking
Government had dealt so benignly with king and people as to have inspired
feelings of genuine affection combined with deep reverence for the "big
country." Whether collectively or individually, officially or privately,
the Chinese were warmly welcomed everywhere without ever abusing the
courtesy of their hosts--in marked contrast, it must be observed, to
the Japanese, whose record in Korea has been one of unbroken brutality,
producing a general feeling of aversion.

If anything, therefore, could excite the jealousy of Chinese statesmen, it
would be to see this filial dependency being tampered with by strangers,
more especially by their hereditary foes, the Japanese. Better all the
world in Korea with Japan excluded, than Japan in with the rest of the
world kept out. Slow of apprehension, and still slower of action, her
unpractical conservatism in high places reducible only by sap and mine,
China brooded over the Korean problem for some years before any result
of the incubation appeared. The conclusion eventually arrived at was to
neutralise the Japanese action by opening Korea to the whole world under
treaty. The realisation of this scheme was as usual placed in the hands of
Li Hung-chang, who on the one hand recommended the Korean king to conclude
commercial treaties with foreign Powers, and on the other encouraged the
latter to open negotiations. Hence the general opening of the country in
1882, with its train of tragic consequences.

The terms of the foreign treaties with Korea had not been thoroughly
thought out, and the very ambiguity was perpetuated which it was the
interest of China to clear away. The treaties purported to be made with an
independent State, whereas Korea was a vassal, and the inconsistency was
attempted to be remedied by a separate letter from the king to the Powers
with whom he had concluded treaties, declaring, notwithstanding, that the
Chinese emperor was his suzerain.


IV. THE FIRST IMPERIAL AUDIENCE--SUCCESSION OF KWANGHSU.

    End of the minority of Emperor Tungchih--Audience of the foreign
    Ministers in 1873--Under derogatory conditions--Death of the
    young emperor--Empress regent's _coup d'état_ in selecting
    successor--Her own nephew--Eighteen years' minority of Emperor
    Kwanghsu.

An event looked forward to for twelve long years with patient expectation,
and with hope, lively at the beginning but fading away towards the end
of the period, that it would prove the sovereign remedy for the defects
of Chinese intercourse with the world, was the assumption of power by
the young emperor, who attained his majority in 1873. The diplomatic
body busied themselves greatly in preparations for their first audiences
with the sovereign to whom they were accredited. The Chinese on their
part were no less anxiously engaged in devising means of lightening
the blow to their prestige in consenting to receive foreigners at all,
while dispensing with the prescribed prostrations. Obliged to yield the
main point, the Court officials minimised its significance by imposing
sundry derogatory conditions as to the building in which the audience
was to be granted, and by the terms in which it was referred to in the
imperial decree, which represented the foreign Ministers as "imploring an
audience," and by other like devices.

The first to be admitted to the presence was the representative of Japan,
who held the rank of ambassador. Next came the resident Ministers of
Russia, the United States, Great Britain, France, and Holland, in a body;
and lastly, the French Minister separately, in order to convey the reply
of his Government to the mission of Chunghou respecting the Tientsin
massacre of 1870. The several letters of credence were placed on a table.
The emperor "seemed to be speaking" to Prince Kung, though no sound was
heard. The prince in his turn addressed a few words to the five Ministers,
in Chinese, purporting to be what the emperor had spoken in Manchu, and
the audience was at an end, the whole ceremony lasting about five minutes.

By long anticipation a superstitious halo had formed round the abstract
question of audience: it grew into a kind of fetish. Mr Lay shrewdly
observed that the object of the "resident Minister" clause in the
treaties had been misunderstood by foreigners in being regarded by them
as an end instead of only a means. Mr Wade, who was British Minister at
the time, made no such mistake; for though he consistently laid stress
on ceremonial, it was, as he has frequently explained, because with
the Chinese form was more than substance, and included it. A proper
regulation of official etiquette was in his estimation the principal key
to the remedy of material wrongs. From this point of view a five minutes'
audience of the Son of Heaven, even in dumb show and once a-year, was a
step of real importance. "The empire," wrote Mr Wade, "has for the first
time in its history broken with the tradition of isolated supremacy--not,
it may be, with a good grace, but still past recall; and while I would
anxiously deprecate a too sanguine estimate of its results, I am as little
disposed to undervalue the change that has been effected."

But whatever hopes of a practical kind were raised by this ceremonial
innovation were doomed to speedy extinction, for the emperor did not
survive to grant a second reception. He died within the year, and was
succeeded by another infant, involving a second minority much longer than
the preceding one. Eighteen years, in fact, elapsed between the first
imperial audience and the second.

The Emperor Tungchih, though but eighteen years of age, left a legend
behind him. The gossip of the capital assigned to him considerable
independence of character, and a certain audacity in breaking bounds
without the discreet chaperonage enjoyed by the Prince Siddhârtha in his
explorations beyond the palace precincts of King Suddhôdana. He was,
if common report belied him not, a true son of his mother in certain
respects, though of her masterful statecraft, and the qualities which
become a great monarch, he was too young to have given proofs. Leaving
no heir, the deficiency was promptly supplied by the resourcefulness of
the empress-mother. As the widow of the Emperor Hsienfêng and co-regent,
she adopted a posthumous heir to that monarch to replace his own son.
Her choice fell on the infant son of Prince Ch'un, the youngest brother
of Hsienfêng. The mother of the adopted child was the empress-regent's
own sister, and by thus enthroning her nephew the regent assured herself
another long lease of power. The proceeding was irregular, there being two
older brothers of Prince Ch'un alive and having sons. The nearest heir
was the infant grandson of Prince Tun, the fifth son of Tao-kuang, but
though Prince Tun himself had thirty years before been given in adoption
to an uncle, the claim of his descendants to the imperial inheritance
being thereby weakened, he seems never to have renounced his rights. At
the time of the decease of Tungchih there was so much apprehension of
disturbances in Peking, both on account of the succession and the form of
the regency, that the 'Times' (February 4, 1875) wrote, "A battle on this
question would seem almost inevitable, and notwithstanding the proverbial
slowness of the East in most things, in crises like the present aspirants
to Eastern thrones are wont to display both energy and readiness when the
moment arrives for a _coup d'état_."

The next in seniority of the sons of Tao-kuang was Prince Kung, whose
title was uncompromised by alienation, and he had a son eligible. Whatever
may have been the reasons for setting aside the claims of the two elder
brothers to occupy the Dragon throne, they were considered to have been
wrongfully set aside, and of this more will doubtless be heard in the
fulness of time. Since, for reasons well understood, no natural heir
to the present monarch can succeed him, there must be fresh recourse
to adoption when or before the necessity arises, and what influences,
native or alien, may then be concentrated on the imperial succession is
a speculation on which it would be profitless to enter.

The empress-regent's _coup d'état_ of January 1875, when on a bitterly
cold night her infant nephew was taken out of his warm bed, conveyed
into the palace, and proclaimed emperor the following morning, answered
the scheming lady's expectations, for she has ruled the Chinese empire
from that day to this. By the same stroke she was enabled to disembarrass
herself of her original confederate, Prince Kung, to whose ambition she
dealt a crushing blow in ousting his family from the succession. The two
had come to hate each other with more than common virulence; and now that
Prince Ch'un had been set on an unassailable pedestal as father of the
reigning sovereign, the regent placed her trust and confidence in him, and
shared with him the sweets of empire. Inasmuch, however, as the regent
was a woman, and her imperial brother-in-law neither a man of affairs
nor in a position to assume any outward share in the Government, it was
necessary to bring in a practical statesman to stand between them and the
outer world. This position of confidence was occupied for twenty years by
the grand secretary, Li Hung-chang.

FOOTNOTE:

 [21] For an unvarnished narrative of both the French and the Russian
    advances the reader cannot do better than consult Mr Gundry's
    'China and her Neighbours,' Chapman & Hall, 1893.




CHAPTER XXIV.

THE MURDER OF MR MARGARY, 1875--CHEFOO CONVENTION, 1876--RATIFICATION,
1885.


I. THE MURDER OF MR MARGARY, 1875.

    Efforts to reach China from Burma--Expedition under Colonel
    Browne--Mr Margary appointed interpreter--Meets party at
    Bhamo--Precedes them into China, and is assassinated at
    Manwyne--Discussion thereon with the Chinese Government--Tsên
    Yü-ying, Governor of Yunnan--British Minister charges him with the
    murder--Demands his arraignment--Sends commission from Peking to
    Yunnan to take evidence--Unsuccessful.

Ever since the conquest of British Burma, and more especially since the
treaty concluded with the King of Burma in 1862, political and commercial
speculation had been busied with the mountainous country which divides
it from the empire of China. The fact that next to nothing was known
of that wild region, combined with the prospect of reopening the old
caravan route which had been some time closed by disturbances among the
frontier tribes and by Chinese insurgents, constituted a great stimulus to
exploration. To this end projects were from time to time considered by the
Indian Government--sometimes at the instance of enthusiastic officials,
sometimes urged by the superior authority of the British Government under
pressure from mercantile bodies in England. South-western China, however,
was as jealously guarded from intrusion as the sea-coast had been, and no
progress was made in penetrating its mystery.

After the failure of an exploring expedition under Colonel Edward B.
Sladen in 1868, the Indian Government, in furtherance of the wishes of the
Government at home, sanctioned yet another attempt six years later, though
with decided misgivings as to any successful issue. Arrangements were
made during 1874, and the expedition, under Colonel Horace Browne, was
despatched from Burma _viâ_ Bhamo in the beginning of 1875. The British
Minister in China had been asked for his co-operation, and in particular
he was requested to furnish Colonel Browne with a competent interpreter.
It was arranged that this official, armed with a Chinese passport issued
by the Government at Peking, should make his own way through China from
the coast and join Colonel Browne at Bhamo.

The choice of her Majesty's Minister fell upon one of the most promising
officers in the consular service, Mr Augustus Raymond Margary, who
proceeded from Shanghai by way of the Yangtze to the province of Yunnan,
and in five months accomplished his perilous pioneering journey with
perfect success, arriving on the 17th of January at the rendezvous, where
he was received with the warmest feelings by Colonel Browne and his party,
and with surprise and admiration by the Burmese.

On being joined by Mr Margary, the mission prepared to start from Bhamo
towards China. Everything seemed auspicious for the expedition. On
arriving at the Burmese frontier, however, the party were met by sinister
rumours of armed opposition to their passage through the Kakhyen hills.
Margary, having just come safely through these districts, volunteered
to proceed alone to ascertain the truth of the reports which they had
heard. How he was treacherously assassinated at Manwyne, the first city
within the Chinese border, and how Colonel Browne's mission was assailed
and driven back by armed bands, has been told by Dr John Anderson in 'A
Narrative of the two Expeditions to Western China' of 1868 and 1875, and
by Sir Rutherford Alcock, the sympathetic editor of Mr Margary's 'Letters
and Journals,' as well as in numerous Government publications.

It became then a question of the gravest import to fix the guilt of
this treachery, and to consider what means could be adopted for avenging
the death of a young Englishman within Chinese territory, and bearing a
passport from the Government of Peking. "Whether it be Burmese, Kakhyens,
Shan tribes, or Chinese that are in question, it is impossible we can
accept a defeat of this nature, brought on, too, by our own spontaneous
acts," was the conclusion of Sir Rutherford Alcock. Governments which
resorted to the assassination of individuals under their own safe conduct
must be deterred, by persuasion or by force, from the use of such tactics.
The demand for redress which was made direct to the Tsungli-Yamên was
followed by a wrangling and evasive discussion as to the conditions on
which the passport had been granted. These, it must be admitted, had
not been so definitely stated as they might have been. Passports, as Mr
Wade, then Minister in Peking, explained, were granted in two forms--for
"business," meaning trade, or for "pleasure," rendered in Chinese "tour
or travel." It was in the latter form that the passport for Colonel
Browne was applied for, and the Chinese made a plausible defence of their
position on this narrow ground, asserting that the subsequent declaration
that the mission was intended to open a trade route through Chinese
provinces, where they alleged no trading rights for foreigners existed,
could not be covered by a passport granted for pleasure.

The voluminous discussion on international rights which followed, although
academical in form and irrelevant to the question at issue, betrayed the
animus of the Chinese Government in regard to commercial concessions in
the interior; but it is possible that the true motive for the repulse
of Colonel Browne's expedition, of which Mr Margary's murder was but an
incident, lay deeper. Europeans are accustomed to make light of oriental
suspicions, and the idea that Colonel Browne's party was the vanguard of
a hostile force to be treacherously introduced into Chinese territory
under passport may seem too fantastic to have been entertained in good
faith. Yet if we consider on what trivial grounds even the civilised
Powers of Europe will at times suspect each other of the most grandiose
designs, and how often the suspicion is justified, we need not dismiss
as incredible the fact that, in a frontier province which had recently
been the scene of a formidable rebellion, an armed escort accompanying a
foreign tourist party should have caused sincere misgivings in the minds
of the authorities. Nor do the facts of the case exclude the possibility
of such suspicions being suggested from without, even if they did not
arise spontaneously within. Apart from these special considerations, the
chances of success would probably have been greater if the mission had
started from the Chinese side, where the right of travel and exploration
had already been established.

The verbal polemic over the conditions of the passport did not, however,
touch the matter in hand, which was the murder of a British official for
whom the Chinese Government, both imperial and provincial, were expressly
responsible. It is not necessary at this day to pronounce judgment on
the identity of the actual criminal. The murder was the result of a
conspiracy in which Chinese and Burmese were both implicated. They were
alike interested in preventing the passage of the mission, and the strong
opposition of the Burma Government was not unknown to Mr Margary, for he
had noted it in his Journal.

The King of Burma, the father of the well-known Theebaw, was a learned
pandit and a devout Buddhist, as severe in regard to heretics as the
crowned heads of Europe were in the days of the Inquisition. The Court of
Ava, in its claims to obeisance from foreigners, was almost as exacting as
the Son of Heaven himself, and the priests lorded it over the community
with the arrogance of a pampered caste. Thus foreign intercourse was
heavily hampered, and a good understanding rendered almost impossible.
Fears for their prerogatives must have inspired the royal and priestly
coterie with aversion to that restless element which was always trying to
"open up" other people's country and to explore trade routes. Hence the
motive for obstructing the passage of a foreign expedition between Burma
and China was as strong on the Burmese as on the Chinese side.

Tsên Yü-ying, the Chinese governor, held an exceptionally strong position
in his province, and the officials stood very much in awe of him. Though
not a pure Chinese, having been born in the mountains of Kwangsi, of
aboriginal parentage on one side, his personal prestige was very great.
A fighting man from his youth, he had acquired an immense reputation in
suppressing the Mohammedan rebellion in Yunnan. This he did in oriental
style, extirpating the rebels so far as he could, root and branch. To save
the trouble of burying many thousands of old people and children, he had
them drowned in the Tali Lake. The military commander who was told off for
this pleasing duty palliated the massacre, when in after years narrating
these occurrences, by saying there were not really 10,000 but only 3000
thrown into the lake. This official had remonstrated with the governor
against the sentence, saying that such severity was not in accordance with
Tao li (principle); but Tsên replied, "You have nothing to do with Tao
li; you must conform to the Leu li" (Penal Code).

Tsên Yü-ying was therefore something greater than an ordinary provincial
governor, and wielded something more than the authority belonging to
his office. Not only was he responsible, as all governors are, for what
was done within his government, but it is difficult to conceive of any
important incident occurring there without his personal sanction. But
which was the leader in the plot, whether the acting-governor Tsên Yü-ying
or the King of Burma, is comparatively unimportant; suffice it that her
Majesty's Minister fixed, on grounds which satisfied himself, though of
course on inferential evidence only, the instigation of the crime on the
governor-general Tsên Yü-ying; and whether the direct guilt were brought
home to him or not, there could be no question about his responsibility
under the Chinese principle of administration. "From the governor-general
downwards they are each and all individually and collectively held
responsible for all that may happen in the limits of their jurisdiction."
Accordingly, after much preliminary discussion, Mr Wade demanded that
that high official should be censured for neglect of duty, and, on later
information, that he should be brought for trial to Peking. To this
demand the Peking Government refused to listen, and after feigning for
many months to have no knowledge of what had taken place, they produced a
report from the governor-general himself inculpating certain subordinates,
of whom he seemed willing to make a nominal sacrifice. This report was so
openly mendacious that Sir Thomas Wade threatened to haul down his flag
if it were published.

Unluckily for the successful prosecution of the demand for the arraignment
of the viceroy, the British Minister became entangled in a cat's-cradle of
negotiations for the revision of the treaty of Tientsin, with which the
Yunnan outrage got so mixed up that the different questions never could
be, or at any rate never were, separated again. Throwing the net is the
tactical device in which the Chinese excel. The demand for reparation
for the murder was alternately put forward, modified, and withdrawn
according as the general propositions were shuffled about, and thus the
effect of a concentrated attack on the essential point was lost. The
minister on his own showing found himself in a succession of dilemmas,
while the Chinese defensive position was clear throughout: it was to
refuse everything, evade when direct refusal was dangerous, and in short
to baffle all attempts of the British Minister to get to close quarters
with the question. Sir Thomas Wade was several times brought by these
elusive tactics to the point of threatening withdrawal of the Legation,
which in itself the Chinese would have welcomed as a householder might
the "positively last visit" of a tax-collector, but for the ulterior
consequences to be apprehended.

After many months of fruitless labour Sir Thomas Wade resolved to send
a commission of his own to Yunnan to collect evidence as to Margary's
murder. His right to do so was at first contested by the Chinese; but
after considering the matter, and getting the best advice at their
command, they assented, and named High Commissioners to meet the British
officials. The Hon. T. G. Grosvenor, secretary of Legation, was detached
for this duty, assisted by two of the most competent men in the consular
service--Mr Colborn Baber and Mr Arthur Davenport. On the Chinese side
were appointed the viceroy of the Hu Kwang, Li Han-chang, elder brother
of Li Hung-chang, another official to whom Sir Thomas Wade objected
strongly, but in vain, and Tsên Yü-ying himself, the inculpated party.
The promises made to the British Minister before he would allow the
mission to set out were broken as soon as it was fairly on its way, and
Sir Thomas Wade had serious thoughts of recalling it, foreseeing that
it was destined merely to waste time. What possible hope, indeed, could
there be of isolated foreigners collecting evidence in a distant city
against the high provincial officials? No evidence was taken. The British
Commissioner was simply presented with the original report, to which was
added the so-called "confession" of thirteen savages "kidnapped to do
duty as prisoners at the bar." These savages could not speak Chinese, nor
was their language understood by any one in the viceregal court; it was
evident that they had never been near the scene of the crime, nor did they
look in the least like men who were pleading guilty to a capital charge.

The motive of the Chinese in yielding to the appointment of the British
commission, after refusing their assent to it, only occurred to Sir Thomas
Wade when they recommended that Mr Grosvenor should remain in Yunnan
until the case was closed. No coercive measures, they calculated, would
be taken against them while these hostages remained in their hands. From
first to last the only question that occupied the mind of the Chinese
Government was whether force would be applied or not. And if they read--as
of course they did--the English newspapers of the day they would see that
the contingency of war was dwelt upon throughout the year 1875 as the
sole alternative to the condign punishment of the Governor-General of
Yunnan-Kweichow. This was, indeed, from time to time directly threatened
by Sir Thomas Wade, and he had applied for the Flying Squadron to come on
from India to support his demands. When at last, after eighteen months'
struggle, he abandoned the negotiations, and "abruptly left Peking" for
Shanghai in order to be in direct telegraphic communication with the
Home Government, he wrote, "I had, in the last fortnight, again and again
threatened either to remove the Legation or to recommend to her Majesty's
Government the extremest measure of coercion unless I had secured a very
moderate form of reparation."

When Prince Kung realised the fact that the British Minister had actually
left the capital he became suddenly serious, and sent after him to
say there had been a misunderstanding, which would have been cleared
away if he had only waited. At the same time the prince had recourse
to his foreign adviser, the Inspector-General of Customs, who stood
to the Government somewhat in the relation of a "medicine-man." The
inspector-general had taken an active part, both direct and indirect, in
the comedy of the preceding eighteen months--whether as an ally or an
opponent of the British Minister seems not to have been quite clear to
the comprehension of the latter.

An imperial decree was immediately despatched to the Grand Secretary,
Li Hung-chang, instructing him to detain the British Minister on his
way through Tientsin, in order to confer with him on the Margary case.
This proposal Sir Thomas Wade declined on several grounds: among others,
that at a previous stage of the negotiations the promises made by Li
Hung-chang had been repudiated by the Peking Government. This effort to
stop him at Tientsin having failed, Mr Hart was despatched in hot haste
after Sir Thomas Wade to Shanghai, ostensibly to discuss the "commercial
question," but really to induce the British Minister to re-enter the
arena of negotiation,[22] in which the Chinese felt themselves safe. Sir
Thomas, therefore, consented to meet a special commissioner, but without
committing himself as to the scope of the intended conference. The High
Commissioner was Li Hung-chang, and the place of meeting Chefoo, the
locality being selected by Sir Thomas Wade himself. There was concluded
the famous Chefoo Convention.


II. CHEFOO CONVENTION, 1876.

    Negotiations with Li Hung-chang at Chefoo--Mr Hart
    assisting--Sir Thomas Wade hurried into making an unsatisfactory
    settlement--Chefoo convention analysed--Net result an increase
    in the customs dues--Criticised by the merchants.

It was in the month of September, the summer not yet over, during which
season the sea air and fine beach of Chefoo made it at that time the
best health resort for the China coast. Visitors from Peking occasionally
varied their summer residence at the Western Hills by spending a few weeks
at Chefoo, and in 1876 there were several members of the diplomatic body
taking their holiday at the watering-place, the meeting of the British
and Chinese plenipotentiaries constituting for them an added attraction.

Sir Thomas Wade had originally no intention of concluding a formal
convention, nor had he authority for closing the Yunnan question without
further reference to his Government; but circumstances proved too
strong for him to keep to his resolution. He, in fact, found himself in
such a position of difficulty as is perhaps best described by the word
"cornered"--the advantage of the game having passed entirely to the
other side. The Chinese commissioner was powerfully reinforced by the
inspector-general, supported by the local commissioner of customs for
Chefoo; and the neutrality of those of the diplomatic body who were on
the spot was believed to be benevolent to the Chinese. The "co-operative
policy" of Mr Burlingame's day had for the time being at least lapsed,
and particularist views among the Powers or their representatives began
to prevail. The British Minister, deeming the matter in dispute with
the Chinese a purely British concern, did not hold it incumbent on him
to hamper his negotiations by daily consultations with his colleagues,
who on their part resented his reticence, claiming it as a right that,
considering how their national interests might be affected by the result,
they should be kept informed of the progress of the negotiations.
Sir Thomas Wade admits that, among other considerations, it was the
impatience of these colleagues of his to see the discussion definitely
terminated which induced him to close the case without waiting for further
instructions from his Government.

It must be borne in mind that the problem before the Chinese High
Commissioner had never varied: it was the extremely simple one, how to
screen the ex-governor Tsên Yü-ying, whether guilty or innocent, without
encountering a British armed force. The fate of the negotiations depended
entirely on the probable movement of the Flying Squadron, which was lying
at Talien-wan, a hundred miles off. No greater service could have been
rendered to the Chinese Government than to assure the High Commissioner
that he had nothing to fear from the British ships. The foreign Ministers
who were present had their Intelligence Departments in full activity, and
they had a shrewd notion of the limitations of the Flying Squadron, which
they were free to communicate to the Chinese plenipotentiary. They were
aware that the time--September 1876--was not opportune for the British
Government to embark on distant enterprises of indefinite possibilities.
From one source or another the assurance was given to the Chinese
negotiator, and once convinced, on whatever evidence, that the British
guns would fire nothing but salutes, Li Hung-chang felt himself master of
the situation. It then became his turn to force a settlement, and he at
once assumed a peremptory tone with the British Minister, notifying him
that he would leave Chefoo on a certain day, convention or no convention.
Sir Thomas Wade had, or thought he had, no choice but to capitulate to
superior force. Pressed by his diplomatic colleagues, as has been said, as
well as by the expressed desire of his own Government to get the tedious
matter settled, he had to accept the best agreement he could get, and the
Chefoo convention was the result.

The fear of coercion being eliminated, the negotiation became reduced
to a custom-house affair like the treaty revision of 1869, the Chinese
seizing the occasion to renew their former efforts to obtain an increase
of revenue from foreign trade. Instead of adding to the import duty on
foreign merchandise as in 1869, they now proposed to extend the area
of internal taxation, and in particular they prepared the way for an
indefinite increase in the opium revenue. This was the substantial part
of the convention. New ports were opened in harmony with the scheme.

A clause referring to residence at Chungking in Szechuan provided that
British merchants would not be allowed to reside there so long as no
steamers had access to the port. When, under this contingent clause, it
was attempted to make the conditional permission effective by sending
steamers to the port, the Chinese Government offered opposition, and the
right was abandoned by Great Britain.

As for the Yunnan affair, the settlement of it gravitated to the form
which had been universally condemned. "Do not let the nation lay itself
open to the contempt of an Asiatic people by accepting money for life
treacherously taken by official order," wrote Sir R. Alcock in July
1875. But "the series of bad precedents" was once more followed, and
"blood-money was accepted for the life of a British subject."

It was thought important to publish far and wide the terms of settlement,
and a proclamation with Sir T. Wade's _imprimatur_ was posted throughout
the country. It was remarked, however, that this proclamation embodied the
very falsities against the publication of which the British Minister had
previously protested under threat of breaking off diplomatic relations.
The guilt of notoriously innocent parties was assumed in it, but their
pardon granted on the fictitious ground that the evidence against them
would not suffice to convict by the processes of British law.

A separate article provided for a mission of exploration by way of
Szechuan and Tibet in the following year.

A subject on which Sir Thomas Wade had long set his heart was an
improvement in the terms of intercourse between foreign and Chinese
officials, with a view of putting an end to the habitual assumption
of superiority of the Chinese. This was treated in a few empty words
providing that the Tsungli-Yamên should invite foreign representatives to
consider with them a code of etiquette, a clause imposing no obligation
whatever on either party.

Another question which had greatly occupied the minds of both the
British Government and its successive representatives ever since 1833
was the establishment of a code of laws to regulate the civil and
criminal relations between foreigners and Chinese at the treaty ports
and elsewhere. This had formed a feature in the supplementary convention
of 1869, the undertaking in which did not, however, extend beyond the
general terms that "it is further agreed that England and China shall in
consultation draw up a commercial code."

Strongly approving, however, of the abstract idea that China should adopt
a written code of commercial law as a first step towards a general legal
reform, Sir T. Wade nevertheless uttered a useful caution to those ardent
reformers who see in a good code of laws a panacea for either national
or international grievances. "No nation," he says, "worked harder at its
legislation than China; but in the way of justice there are at least
two serious impediments--an ignorance which renders due appreciation
of the value of evidence, especially in criminal cases, impossible; and
a dishonesty that would be fatal to the administration of any laws, no
matter how enlightened." He illustrates this by relating an instance of
the obstinate nature of the _chose jugée_ in China.

    In a case [he says] the termination of which is just announced
    at Peking, we have a woman wrongly convicted, on a confession
    extorted from her by torture, of the murder of a husband who
    died a natural death, the injustice being so patent that the
    fellow-provincials of the accused appealed to Peking. Orders
    being issued for a rehearing of the case, the former decision
    was affirmed in the province, and this a second and again a third
    time. The proceedings were then removed to Peking; and it is in
    the end established that magistrates of districts, prefects of
    departments, the governor of the province, and the high officer
    charged with the public instruction of the province, who had been
    specially commissioned to rehear the case, have all more or less
    combined to conceal the delinquency of the first authority who
    heard it; with whose guilt the rest, his seniors, had associated
    themselves either through carelessness or from a corrupt motive.
    These proceedings lasted over two years.

One point, however, was definitively gained in connection with
jurisprudence, the recognition of the British Supreme Court as a means of
discharging treaty obligations.

The convention as a whole was subjected to the same kind of criticism
as that of 1869 had been. The Chambers of Commerce pointed out that it
sanctioned Chinese exactions which had been up to that time consistently
resisted as violations of the treaty of Tientsin. Imposts, condemned by
the Chinese themselves,[23] which were to be abolished altogether by
the terms of the Alcock convention, were by the Chefoo agreement not
only recognised as lawful, but the area of their levy, within which
the taxes were to be freed from all restrictions whether as to their
amount or incidence, greatly extended. It would appear, therefore, said
the merchants, "better to revert to the clear and simple provisions of
the treaty of Tientsin, and insist on their being carried out without
evasion." So far, they say, from simplifying the question of the taxation
of foreign goods, the obliquely worded clauses in the Chefoo convention
tend to quite the opposite result. "New elements of obscurity have
been introduced, and if twenty years have been spent wrangling over the
comparatively simple wording of the Tientsin treaty, it is to be feared
that no person now living will see the end of the controversies which will
rage over the indefinite arrangement set forth in the Chefoo convention."

Opium was also for the first time introduced into a treaty, for the
purpose of increasing the Chinese revenue from it and of making the
maritime customs, supported by the British Government, the agent for its
collection. The Chinese had always been at liberty to levy what internal
taxation they pleased on opium; but, said the Chamber of Commerce, for
the "English Government to make itself even indirectly answerable for the
collection from Chinese of an impost of indefinite amount, varying at each
port according to the caprice or the necessities of local authorities who
are not even specified, would surely be to introduce a most inconvenient
precedent." The convention was left for nine years unratified by the
British Government. It could not be ratified because, among other reasons,
five of the treaty Powers took the same objection as the British and other
merchants had taken to the curtailment of the area of exemption from
inland taxation--in other words, to the legal sanction extended by the
agreement to unlimited exactions of the Chinese tax-collectors which had
up till then been resisted as illegal.

During the eight years following the signature of the Chefoo convention
incessant discussion and agitation on the subject of the duties on opium
and general merchandise kept the British Legation in Peking, and in a
lesser degree the Foreign Office at home, in full activity. The question
was turned over in all its aspects, threshed out on this side and on
that, and numerous schemes were proposed for readjusting the imposts. The
British Minister displayed the utmost ingenuity in evolving variations
on the central theme, in which ethical, political, and sentimental
considerations played their part, but without advancing the solution of
the problem. The problem was altogether too simple for such recondite
treatment. The Chinese throughout all the tortuous disquisitions pressed
towards the one object of a substantial increase in their revenue, by
whatever means it might be arrived at; and eventually they attained their
object, as those generally do who concentrate their attention on a single
point.


III. THE RATIFICATION, 1885.

    Ratification postponed--Tedious discussion during nine
    years--Chinese claiming large increase in opium duty--Ultimately
    granted--By agreement signed in 1885--Hongkong and Macao made
    stations for collecting opium duties.

The convention simmered for nine years before its final ratification.
The two Governments skirmished in the air all that time, misconceiving
each other's aims and avoiding close quarters. The policy of Great
Britain with regard to opium had been fatally deflected by unpractical
considerations. The article had been placed by the trade regulations
appended to the treaty in the exceptional position of being excluded
from the privilege accorded to all other merchandise of exemption from
inland taxation by payment of a fixed charge. The Chinese authorities
were therefore at liberty to tax the article in transit to any extent
they pleased. For reasons connected with their own administration, this
unlimited power of taxation in transit was not deemed sufficient to
produce the desired amount of revenue, and they were intent on supplying
the deficiency by an enhanced import tariff. The difference between
the two forms of taxation was that the inland duty was collected in a
Chinese sieve, while the import duty was levied with the formalities of
a banker's counter. Naturally, therefore, the Chinese Government missed
no opportunity of pressing for an increase on the tariff fixed by treaty.
It was the main object sought by them in the unratified convention of
1869. Failing then, they renewed their efforts in the Chefoo convention of
1876, seeking the same end by an inverted process, like taking a sea-fort
from the land side. Instead of reviving the discredited proposal, they
effected a turning movement by extending the area of the inland dues
until it included the port of landing. Why, having full licence over the
whole empire, a few acres added to their tax-collecting province should
have been deemed of such vital importance is not perhaps at first sight
self-evident. The reason was that under the proposed system the machinery
of the Imperial maritime customs could be employed in collection, with
the protection of the foreign consuls.

The concession was set forth in cryptic form in the convention, but the
Chinese knew very well what interpretation they intended to give to the
clause. That intention remained unaltered, though tactics varied. By the
light of the vague and pointless correspondence carried on for seven years
with the British Government they saw their way to advancing considerably
beyond the position gained by the convention. They consequently raised
their demands in proportion as they found the British Government yielding,
until eventually they reached a vantage-ground where they could safely
unmask and make direct for their object, an increase in the import tariff
pure and simple. Eighty taels were added to the thirty allowed by the old
treaty, and the opium duty was thus really trebled at a stroke.

The negotiations which led up to the convention are chiefly interesting
as showing how easily the Foreign Office was chased from cover to cover
by the Chinese Minister. Having once got the enemy "on the run," the
Marquis Tsêng did not relax his pursuit until, notwithstanding one or two
rear-guard actions, he capitulated without conditions.

After seven years of active deliberation the definitive diplomatic
conference was opened by Lord Granville in January 1883. As a preliminary,
the basis of the negotiations was rigidly defined by Mr (now Lord) Currie,
in accordance with the Chefoo convention, thus: the regulation of the
_likin_ taxation, and specification of the barriers at which collections
were to be made.

But, as we have hinted, the Chinese aspirations had in the mean time
far transcended the scope of any provision of any treaty. No longer
content with regulating _likin_, their first step in the conference
was to induce Lord Granville to abandon the preliminary stipulation
he had so carefully laid down. The Chinese Minister proposed a general
commutation rate, uniform at all the ports, supporting the claim by sundry
specious arguments. The _likin_ barriers had been a chronic grievance
of the merchants. The marquis held out a prospect of their abolition as
a consequence of the single-payment commutation of inland dues on which
he was intent. It is a feature of Chinese bargains of every description
that something definite should be conceded on the one side, and something
indefinite promised on the other,--the "bird in the hand" invariably for
the Chinese. There was nothing surprising, therefore, in the time-honoured
formula being employed in these diplomatic interchanges.

In moving from his base, Lord Granville, of course, ceded everything; but
he made a final stand at the amount, declaring that "he could not agree
that the _likin_ payment should be fixed at more than 70 taels"; moreover,
that he "would require full information as to the guarantees which would
be given that opium would not be subject to any further payment while in
transit." One such guarantee was already provided for in the convention,
which stipulates "that the nationality of the person possessing or
carrying the merchandise would be immaterial." This was deemed of great
importance to trade, because since it was not always possible for a
foreign owner, or even a deputy of his own race, to accompany a parcel of
goods into the interior, the permission for Chinese to accompany them was
essential to the working of the transit business. The contention of the
merchant had always been, that the exemption from dues was a privilege
attaching to the goods, and not to the temporary owner or transport agent.
On the other hand, as the goods could not speak, the option of sending
either a native or a foreigner at the merchant's own choice was considered
a useful check on illicit exactions.

The confident manner in which the marquis brushed away both of Lord
Granville's ultimata showed how well he had profited by his experience of
Foreign Office diplomacy. To Lord Granville's maximum of 70 taels (the sum
actually agreed upon with the Chinese Government) the marquis said he was
sorry, but his instructions did not permit of his accepting less than 80
taels per pecul. It is not customary to ask for proofs of good faith from
ambassadors acting "on instructions," and Lord Granville simply yielded
the point, while entering a mild protest against being forced by a Chinese
_non possumus_.

And the right of the foreigner to accompany his goods, on which so much
stress had been laid, was disposed of with exquisite assurance by the
Chinese Minister, who was confident that such a mere detail "would not
be allowed to stand in the way of a settlement," notwithstanding that it
involved a reversal of the Chefoo convention.

And as to the guarantees for fulfilment, the Marquis Tsêng was sure that
"the strongest guarantee would consist in the moral obligation" on the
part of the Chinese Government to carry out arrangements of their own
proposing. Thus, by sheer persistence, the Chinese gained every point,
securing not only a threefold duty on opium, but the assistance of her
Majesty's Government in its collection, for that was the meaning of
transferring the levy from the interior to the seaport. The agreement,
concluded by Lord Granville in June, was signed by Lord Salisbury in July
1885, under the title of an "Additional Article to the Chefoo Convention."

It is right to add, on the authority of recent observers, that the
convention has worked smoothly, no complaints being heard of inland
exactions in contravention of its terms. It thus appears that the moral
guarantee on which the Marquis Tsêng spoke so confidently was after all
of some validity. But as the only source from which complaints could come
would be those foreign agents who were by the terms of the convention
expressly excluded from conveying or accompanying opium into the country,
the negative evidence is not absolutely conclusive.

It would have been most interesting to gain from so enlightened a
Minister as Tsêng some insight into the causes of the continual friction
and recrimination which attend the operation of the commercial articles
in the Chinese treaties, but his despatches have reference only to the
question of the moment. "The Imperial Government," he says, "have often
been held responsible for the friction caused in working arrangements but
ill-adapted to the state of the country, and which a better knowledge of
its internal conditions would have shown to those who framed them are
incapable of execution." "The present scheme," he intimates, "being in
harmony with existing institutions," may be expected to work smoothly.
Existing institutions, therefore, are opposed to local taxation and in
favour of single commutations. When, however, a different thesis has
to be sustained, we are assured by other authorities that "existing
institutions" claim arbitrary, variable, and unlimited taxation of goods
in transit for the benefit of the provincial exchequers, and that it is
the attempt to commute these by a payment at the port which is the true
cause of the friction and disputation.

The natural corollary followed the ratification of the Chefoo convention.
The desire of the Chinese Government, cherished for nearly thirty years,
to establish a customs station in Hongkong was virtually consummated
in the following year. The trade of the colony had been vexed by a
perpetual blockade by so-called revenue cruisers which harried every
native vessel entering or leaving the harbour. The hope of getting the
investment relaxed may have induced the acquiescence of the colony in
any alternative. The Chinese sought to grip the opium supply by the neck,
which could only be done by their obtaining control over the harbour of
Hongkong. This was conceded, and a customs station was established on the
Chinese side of the anchorage, while an office was opened in the city of
Victoria.

There was a second "neck" to the opium supply--Macao. The arrangement
made with Hongkong without a corresponding agreement with Macao would
have merely driven the trade from the one to the other. Overtures were
therefore made to the Portuguese, who, unlike the English, were offered a
valuable consideration for admitting the control of the Chinese customs
into their waters. They then obtained for the first time a treaty of
independent sovereignty for the colony.

The effect of all these negotiations and arrangements, whether intended or
not, was to stimulate the cultivation of Chinese opium to a high degree,
and this, according to the impartial testimony of an ex-German Minister,
is, apart from the increase to the Chinese revenue, the net result of the
anti-opium agitation.

  [Illustration]

FOOTNOTES:

 [22] "Experience shows us that in the eyes of the Chinese negotiation
    is a sign of weakness."--Sir F. BRUCE.

 [23] "_Likin_ is in its nature an oppressive institution only
    continued in force owing to the necessity of providing resources
    to meet the army expenditure in the north-west."--'Peking
    Gazette,' January 18, 1875.




CHAPTER XXV.

A CHAIN OF INCIDENTS.


I. DISPUTE WITH RUSSIA _RE_ KULDJA.

    Insurrection in Kashgaria--Russia occupies Kuldja--Engaging to
    evacuate when country settled--Tso Tsung-tang's march--Death
    of Yakub-beg--China reoccupies Kashgaria--Calls upon Russia
    to retire from Kuldja--Relations become strained--Chunghou
    concludes treaty with Russia--Violently repudiated by empress--War
    threatened--Gordon summoned--Dispute arranged by Marquis Tsêng.

The dilatoriness of China in making a stand against Japanese pretensions
in Korea may be partly explained by her serious preoccupations elsewhere.
She had been immersed in a sea of troubles. She seemed to be enveloped in
rebellion. In the south-west the province of Yunnan had been severed from
the imperial rule, and in its recovery the land was almost depopulated.
In the north-west there were also Mohammedan risings, and in far-distant
Kashgaria, separated from China by a thousand miles of desert and
militarily untenable by her, the adventurer known as Yakub-beg set up
an independent government, which he maintained for some years. Anarchy
on her frontier afforded to Russia the pretext of occupying Chinese
territory to maintain order; but she was scrupulous in assuring the Peking
Government that this step was provisional, and that she was ready to
restore Kuldja as soon as the Chinese were again in a position to resume
the government of the town and territory. The time came sooner than was
expected. The famous march of Tso Tsung-tang, who halted to grow grain
for the support of his army, and the disaffection in his camp leading to
the demise of Yakub, enabled China to reoccupy the revolted districts.
Russia, on being asked to redeem her pledge as to Kuldja, made conditions
which were not acceptable, and a diplomatic campaign was entered upon.
A high Manchu official, Chunghou, the same who had been sent to France
in 1871, was despatched to Prussia, where he concluded the treaty of
Livadia, which was so repugnant to the empress-regent and her advisers
that not only was it repudiated at Peking, but the envoy was delivered
to the Board of Punishments. Relations became strained between Russia
and China, and on both sides there were hints of a resort to force. In
view of this eventuality the Chinese Government were recommended to apply
for the services of their old champion, Gordon, who, unknown to them,
had taken service with Lord Ripon, the then new Viceroy of India, and,
equally unknown to them, had precipitately resigned that service. The
Chinese had a large body of troops in Manchuria; the long line of Russian
communication was very weak along that frontier; the governor of Eastern
Siberia, declaring himself unable to resist a Chinese attack, had urged
the Government at St Petersburg to come to terms at once with China, and
wait for a suitable opportunity to recover what they might be obliged
to cede. The Chinese Government hoped that if Gordon would come to their
assistance, and take command of their Manchurian levies, his name would
be a host in itself, and his appearance on the scene would at any rate
convince the Russian Government that China was in earnest. With this view
an invitation was sent to General Gordon in a telegram from Sir Robert
Hart, which found him in Bombay. The invitation was unconditional; it
indicated no purpose and named no price. Gordon took it entirely on trust,
closed at once, and proceeded to China. Having been given no clue as to
what service was expected from him, Gordon, nevertheless, not only came
to a conclusion of his own on the subject, but supplied his views to the
newspapers before leaving India, and at every port of call on the route.
He declared he was going to China to induce her to make peace, for she
was unable to do otherwise. In this he was of an opposite opinion from
the Russian governor-general. But whatever the merit of his opinion, the
object of the Chinese in sending for him was of course frustrated by his
published declarations. These being communicated to the Government at
Peking, they saw that so far from stiffening them in their negotiations
with Russia, Gordon's presence would seriously embarrass them, and they
accordingly endeavoured to prevent his coming. Through Sir Robert Hart
they sent a message to meet Gordon at Chefoo, requesting him to proceed no
farther. Disregarding this request, he continued his journey to Tientsin,
where he had interviews with his old friend the Viceroy Li; and he also
made his way to Peking, where by the aid of an indifferent Cantonese
interpreter he made representations to the Tsungli-Yamên, some of which
the interpreter dared not reproduce in Chinese. Gordon left without seeing
either Sir Robert Hart, on whose authority alone he had come to China,
or the British Minister, Sir Thomas Wade. The advice he left with the
Chinese Ministers was to renounce the endeavour to organise an army on
Western models, and not to waste money on modern weapons, but to trust
rather to numbers and the Fabian strategy which was natural to them. This
being promptly published in foreign journals, was regarded as highly
paradoxical, if not cynical; but it was recalled to mind fifteen years
later, when China was being defeated in the pitched battles against which
Gordon had warned them.

The Kuldja dispute was eventually disposed of by the Chinese Minister,
Marquis Tsêng, who negotiated a treaty at St Petersburg, by which the
territory was nominally receded to China, while its strategical positions
were retained in the occupation of Russia, thus rendering the whole region
untenable by Chinese troops.


II. KOREAN IMBROGLIO, 1882-1885.

    Outbreak in 1882--Conspiracy of the king's father--Attack on
    Japanese legation--Chinese troops control the capital--Foreign
    innovations--Brought bad elements to the surface--Conspiracy
    in 1884--Assassinations--Treachery of king's confidant--Kim
    Ok Kun's escape to Japan--The avenger--His elaborate
    preparations--Assassination of Kim--Joy in the Korean
    Court--Honours to the assassin--Japan dissatisfied--Count Ito's
    mission--Japan secures equal rights with China in Korea.

The Russian question settled, China had leisure to attend to Korean
affairs, of which the importance was becoming more and more clear to her
statesmen. The scare on the north-west was in another form transferred
to the north-east, where there was the double risk of complications
arising from both Russian and Japanese encroachment on Korea. The opening
of the country to foreign intercourse, intended as a protection against
such dangers, was soon discovered to be inadequate. A procession of
events, dating from the signing of the treaties and culminating in 1885,
transformed the kingdom from a vassal to a quasi-independent State.

The first link in the chain, so far as visible effects were concerned,
was an _émeute_ which took place in Söul in 1882. The father of the
king had occupied a position as regent curiously resembling that of the
Empress-Dowager of China, and being ambitious to regain the authority
which he had laid down on the king's coming of age, raised a conspiracy
to depose him. In connection with the plot a mob was let loose on the
Japanese legation, where a desperate struggle ensued, in which, and
in the running fight which they made towards the seaport, a number of
Japanese were killed. The survivors were conveyed to Nagasaki in a British
ship-of-war. What provocation the Japanese had given for this savage
onslaught is not a matter on which we need enter. The point is that it
afforded justification for sharp reprisals. Perceiving this, and being in
a position of unaccustomed preparedness, the Chinese Government--that is
to say, Li Hung-chang--adopted prompt measures for anticipating action
on the part of the Japanese. They despatched an envoy with a body of
troops and a naval squadron to the seaport of the capital where they at
once put down the conspiracy, re-established the king's authority, and by
a clever but wonderfully common oriental ruse captured the Usurper, and
carried him off to China as a State prisoner. The Chinese troops remained
in the vicinity of the capital, and a Resident on the Indian pattern was
installed at the Korean Court.

Before long a foreign element began to be introduced into the Korean
administration. Among other things a branch of the Chinese customs service
was established, and, as in China, many duties besides that of raising a
revenue soon claimed the attention of the foreign commissioner. No more
effective first step in the regeneration of such a country could have
been undertaken than an honest administration of its maritime revenue. It
was a measure both good in itself and prolific of beneficial results in
many directions. Other reforms, however, were projected which required
a certain preparation of the soil and a careful consideration of social
forces and conditions. The introduction of foreign ideas of any kind into
a country which, so far as politics were concerned, might be considered
virgin soil, was, to say the least, a hazardous experiment. Undigested
schemes for the Europeanisation or the Japonisation of a Government which
had up till then banished foreign intercourse entirely from its shores
was likely to have an effect analogous to that of suddenly administering
strong meat to the victim of protracted privation. Korean affairs were
even less understood by foreigners than Western affairs were by the
Koreans, so that the yeast thrown into the Korean dough produced risings
for which Western foreigners at least, whatever may be said of the
Japanese, were quite unprepared. Factions sprang up like fungoid growths
in an excavation, sordid ambitions were set in motion, and the royal Court
became a hotbed of intrigue towards which the most flagitious elements in
the capital were naturally drawn.

The agitation which was fed from these various sources broke out into
open violence in 1884, when two of the king's Ministers were assassinated
by a band of conspirators. It would be futile to attempt to unravel the
plot; its visible consequences only need be considered as further links in
the chain of events, and also as affording some curious evidence of the
manner in which the new alien civilisation was beginning to adapt itself
to that which was ingrained in the Korean character. The professed object
of the plot was understood to be the severance of the Chinese tie through
the instrumentality of the Japanese, and the king himself was believed
to be privy to this scheme. It is probable that the high political and
patriotic ideal was but the rallying flag under which diverse schemers
might pursue their several ambitions. The Koreans are credited with a
special dose of the subtlety which belongs to Asiatic races, and whatever
the real intentions of the king may have been, the conspirators were false
to him. A concise contemporary account of the fray given in a message to
the 'Times' states that--

    The rising against the King of Korea is the outcome of reactionary
    intrigues similar to the movement in 1882, when the present
    king's father was captured and taken as a State prisoner to
    China. Defective accounts only have been received of the recent
    events. On the night of December 4, during an entertainment,
    there was an alarm of fire near the palace; Min chong ik, the
    queen's nephew, who was recently travelling in Europe, rushed
    out, met some assassins, and was stabbed, with many others. The
    conspirators then attacked the king, who applied to the Japanese
    Minister for the protection of his guard. Before morning six of
    the Ministers were killed. On the 6th the Koreans again attacked
    the palace, the Chinese troops being present. A fight ensued, and
    the Japanese guard lost three men killed and five wounded. Being
    overpowered, the Japanese abandoned the palace, retiring to the
    Japanese Legation, the king being carried off by the Chinese. The
    tumult increased, and thirty Japanese residents were massacred
    by the Chinese. On the 7th the Korean mob attacked the Japanese
    Legation, which was destroyed, and the Minister with his guard
    forced his way out amid showers of missiles. They stormed the
    gates and retreated to the seaport of Chemulpo. On the following
    day the king sent friendly messages to the Japanese Minister.

    At a recent date the Chinese garrison consisted nominally of 3000
    men, but the force has been much depleted. The Japanese numbered
    120, and these were about to be withdrawn when the outbreak
    occurred. The situation is critical, each side accusing the other
    of aggression; but it is expected that the affair will be settled
    amicably, neither Power desiring a quarrel for the benefit of
    interested spectators. The Japanese may insist on steps being
    taken to secure their Minister for the future from such outrages.
    Each Power has appointed an officer to investigate the facts
    before deciding on a definite course. Further complications are,
    however, certain to arise from the anomalous position of Korea.
    After the Kuldja scare China perceived the supreme strategic
    importance of the peninsula, and that a great Power occupying it
    would control Chinese external policy. The Government promoted
    the foreign treaties in 1882 with the objects of interesting the
    commercial Powers in the integrity of Korea, and of obtaining a
    recognition of its vassalage. Later treaties, beginning with that
    negotiated by Sir Harry Parkes last year, assumed the independence
    of Korea. The exercise of Chinese sovereignty is exposing Korea
    to the double peril of her own troubles and of China's possible
    wavering at a critical moment. The Chinese and Korean interests
    are, in the absence of commerce, purely political, Korea's
    importance consisting in its commanding position.

And the Japanese shortly after tabulated the casualties as follows:--

    Seven officials killed by progressives, 7 progressives killed
    by Korean troops, 38 Korean soldiers killed by Japanese troops,
    95 rioters killed by Japanese, 67 progressives imprisoned, 11
    beheaded, with shocking barbarities at execution.

The immediate purpose of the leaders of the plot appears to have been to
destroy the influence of the powerful family to which the queen belonged,
and had they contented themselves with the murder of any number of that
family, it was not considered likely that either king or people would have
greatly deplored the crime. But the chief assassin, Kim Ok Kun, struck at
the two Ministers who were the king's right hand, and who had, moreover,
endeared themselves to the nation by the exceptional purity of their
public life and their beneficence in times of scarcity. Execrated alike
by the sovereign and his people, Kim Ok Kun sought an asylum in Japan,
where he was entertained for a number of years while engaged in hatching
further plots against the peace of his native land.

Naturally his presence in Japan caused umbrage to China. The King of Korea
lived in terror of his machinations, for Kim had a considerable following,
by whose aid he hoped to make a descent on Korea and effect a revolution
in the government. The guilt of Kim Ok Kun's betrayal of his sovereign was
the more heinous from his having been confidential adviser to the Crown
during all the negotiations with foreigners, between whom and the king
he was the constant referee. He carried into exile the innermost royal
secrets. The king's resentment against Kim was naturally embittered by
his impotence to avenge the treachery to which he had been a victim.

For the preservation of peace and of friendly relations an agreement
was entered into between the three Governments to the effect that Kim
should not be permitted to leave Japan for any other country excepting
China or the United States. On these conditions the refugee became an
embarrassment to the Government of Japan, which felt bound to protect him
against counterplots while preventing him from carrying out his seditious
designs. Nevertheless Nemesis was on the track of the assassin, and the
way in which the quarry was hunted down by the avenger of blood affords
a greater insight into the nature of the tragedy than do any of the
contemporary comments. It also serves to illustrate certain points in the
Korean character which are decidedly not without interest to students of
current history.

A member of an important Korean family named Hong had been implicated
in Kim's conspiracy, and by Korean law his whole family were held guilty
of the treason. The king fully exonerated the head of the family, being
convinced that no blame attached to him personally. Nevertheless, the old
man was so dejected by the disgrace brought on his name, that he forthwith
poisoned himself with his whole house. A young man distantly connected
with the family of Hong, and bearing their surname, took upon himself the
duty of avenging these deaths, and set to work in a systematic manner to
compass the murder of Kim. The private vengeance of Hong-tjyong-on fitted
in well with his patriotic duty, and his scheme was favoured by the Korean
king. About three years after Kim's flight, Hong made his way to Japan,
bearing secret letters from the king outlawing Kim and his followers and
authorising their capture or assassination. Hong's plan was to ingratiate
himself with Kim as a supporter of his schemes, but his recent arrival
direct from Korea without any credentials from the revolutionary party in
that country rendered Kim suspicious of the would-be recruit. Unable to
gain the access which he required to the person of his victim, Hong saw
that he would have to adopt more elaborate means to effect his purpose. He
went therefore to Europe, where he must have spent five or six years at
least in acquiring a European education, European manners, and a perfect
knowledge of European ways. He was courteous, refined, and intelligent,
a great favourite in society (especially in religious circles), and made
in particular many warm friends in France. Having thoroughly shaken off
Korea, he thought he might now present himself in Japan in a character
that would disarm all suspicion. Accordingly he made his way thither, and
succeeded in attaching himself to Kim, talked progress and revolution, and
thereby insinuated himself into the confidence of the arch-conspirator,
becoming gradually master of his secret plots and schemes. The
arrangements of the Japanese Government for the protection of Kim's person
seem to have been so efficient that, in order to accomplish his purpose,
Hong perceived that it was necessary to induce Kim to leave Japan. This
seemed the most difficult part of his enterprise, and a far-fetched scheme
had to be contrived in order to furnish Kim with a plausible reason for
proceeding to China. Between the plots which Kim may have had in his mind
and those which Hong for his own purposes suggested to him, it is not
possible, neither is it necessary, to distinguish. Hong's own account of
the matter was, that Kim had been concerting some movement on Korea from
a Russian base, but was prevented from proceeding to Vladivostock by the
vigilance of the Japanese Government. The agreement between the three
Powers would not, however, be violated by his proceeding to Shanghai,
where he would find the means of continuing his voyage to Vladivostock,
for neither of the travellers apprehended any difficulty in eluding the
surveillance of the Chinese officials and taking passage in a trading
steamer to the Russian port.

Kim eventually fell in with this proposal, and left Japan with a Japanese
servant, accompanied by Hong. They arrived in Shanghai on the 27th of
March 1894, repaired to a Japanese hotel, and reported themselves at the
Japanese consulate. The following day Hong, having first put on Korean
upper garments, murdered Kim, and fled, but was captured at Wusung by the
foreign municipal police of Shanghai, and by them detained in custody
until claimed by the Chinese authorities under instructions from Li
Hung-chang. The news of the assassination was received by the Chinese
Government with a sense of relief and "sombre acquiescence," but at the
Korean Court with almost a frenzy of delight. The king gave a banquet in
honour of the event, to which he invited all the foreign Ministers. The
Chinese Government ordered a man-of-war to convey the murderer and the
remains of the victim to Korea. The former was covered with honours, while
the remains of Kim were treated with savage indecency and his family put
to death.

Thus did the assassin of 1884 expiate his crime exactly ten years later.

The issue of the plot of 1884 was not agreeable to the Japanese, who were
particularly affronted by the fact that the Chinese were in a position to
snatch the king out of their hands and to afford him military protection
against all comers. But Japan was in no humour to relinquish her own
policy in Korea, which was quite incompatible with the suzerain status
of China, and with the very concrete form in which it had just been
manifested. One of the leading statesmen of Japan, Count Inouye, was sent
to Korea to investigate the whole affair, and inquire into the relative
position of China and Japan in the peninsula. The result of his inquiries
was a determination to follow up by orthodox diplomacy the disintegrating
effects which the risings in 1882 and 1884 had no doubt been intended
to subserve. China being in the throes of a war with France, the moment
was particularly favourable for preferring demands upon her. An embassy
was therefore despatched to Peking, under Count Ito, in March 1885. He
counted much on the friendly offices of the British Minister, Sir Harry
Parkes, in smoothing the way to amicable negotiations with China, but
unhappily the Japanese ambassador arrived at Peking almost on the day of
Sir Harry's death. After vain attempts to deal with the Tsungli-Yamên the
Japanese mission withdrew to Tientsin, where negotiations were entered
into by Li Hung-chang, extending over several weeks. Count Ito's mission
was successful in concluding a treaty by which China and Japan were put
on a footing of equality in the peninsula so far as regards military
protection. The troops of both countries were to be withdrawn, and neither
party was to send a force in future without giving written notice to the
other. This arrangement was a surrender in substance of China's suzerainty
over Korea, though she retained the ceremonial form in full vigour for
nine years after.


III. THE PORT HAMILTON EPISODE, 1885-1887.

    Sudden occupation of Korean harbour by Great Britain--Questioned
    by China, Japan, and Korea--Position condemned by naval
    authority--Abandoned on guarantee from China against occupation
    by other Powers.

"In view of potentialities" the British Government on April 14, 1885,
sent instructions to Vice-Admiral Dowell to occupy Port Hamilton, an
island harbour on the coast of Korea. This high-handed proceeding was
justified on the plea of necessity--the necessity, as explained by Lord
Granville, of anticipating the "probable occupation of the island by
another Power." Naturally the measure disturbed neighbouring States,
as well as the Government of Korea itself. China and Japan asked for
explanations, and an agreement with the former, as suzerain of Korea, was
about to be signed for the temporary use of the harbour by Great Britain,
when the Russian Minister at Peking interposed with an intimation that
if China consented to the occupation of Port Hamilton by Great Britain,
Russia would compensate herself by the seizure of some other point of the
Korean littoral. The protest of the Korean Government thus became merged
in negotiations with China, but was never withdrawn.

While these _pour-parlers_ were going on, the position of Port Hamilton
was unequivocally condemned as a naval station by a succession of three
admirals commanding the China Squadron; and as the immediate occasion
of the occupation of the harbour had happily passed, there remained
no ostensible reason for prolonging it. Before abandoning the island,
however, the British Government hoped that some arrangement might be
come to for an international guarantee of the integrity of Korea, which
being already a bone of contention between certain Powers, and unable
to defend its own independence, constituted a constant menace to the
peace of the Far East. The proposal met with no favour from the Chinese
Government, for the reason probably that it would have involved an organic
change in its own relations with Korea. The next proposal came from the
Korean Government itself, which suggested a _modus vivendi_ by opening
as treaty ports both Port Hamilton and Port Lazareff, which latter was
the point Russia would have seized if she had seized anything. This
idea was approved of by the British Government, but nothing came of it.
Eventually the evacuation was agreed to on the assurance from China that
neither Port Hamilton nor any other portion of Korean territory would in
future be occupied by any other Power. This pledge China was enabled to
give on the strength of an equivalent guarantee which she had received
from Russia, that Power being then the only one considered as likely to
cherish aggressive designs on the Korean peninsula. These engagements were
exchanged in November 1886, eighteen months after the occupation, and the
British flag was finally hauled down on the island on February 27, 1887.

The net visible result of the incident was to confirm China in her
suzerainty, since the negotiations were made with her and not with Korea,
and to obtain a specific pledge from Russia that she would keep her hands
off Korea "under any circumstances." It was argued seven years afterwards
that Russia had broken her pledge by her interferences in Korean affairs,
but in 1895 a new state of circumstances had been brought about. China in
that year ceased to be the suzerain of Korea, and obligations which were
valid under the old _régime_ necessarily lapsed. A new page of history was
turned, and Korea attained the status of a nominally independent kingdom.


IV. TIBET.

    Lhassa visited by Babu Sarat Chandra Das--Proposed commercial
    expedition--Originated by Secretary of State--Envoy sent to
    Peking to obtain passport--Opposition organised by Chinese and
    Tibetans--Mission withdrawn.

The year 1885 witnessed the first act in the ill-advised policy--as to its
method, not its object--of the Indian Government of opening commercial
relations with Tibet. A learned Bengali pandit, versed in Tibetan, had
made two successful visits to Lhassa, where he gained the friendship
of the lamas, who invited him to come again. A fair prospect of opening
commercial relations by gradually disarming prejudices and apprehension
was thus presented. Having duly reported his experiences to the Government
of India, the babu waited their pleasure as to further developments at
Darjeeling, where he occupied the post of Government schoolmaster. An
English civilian, making the acquaintance of the babu in that hot-weather
retreat, conceived the idea of an official mission to Lhassa, in which
the services of the babu might be utilised as guide and interpreter. The
Indian Government was averse from the enterprise on economical if on no
other grounds, but direct pressure being brought to bear on the India
Office in London, the ambitious young statesman who then presided over its
counsels is said to have espoused the proposal and overruled the reluctant
Government of India.

Of the organisation and procedure of the mission nothing very
complimentary can be said. Instead of following the line of least
resistance, of driving in the thin end of the wedge, in accordance with
the commonplace maxims consecrated by all human experience, the reverse
process was followed in every single particular. Sarat Chandra Das had
shown the way, and the entry he had effected could have been gradually
widened by himself and others of his own class until the obstacles to free
commercial intercourse had been overcome. The experience of a hundred
years had shown to the world the invincible prejudices of the Tibetan
rulers against foreign visitors. The babu had in his own person conquered
these prejudices by his mastery of Buddhistic lore, as well as by his
gentleness and consummate tact; but the mission, which had its origin
in the information he supplied, discarded his methods and proceeded on
military lines. Its _personnel_ included politicals and scientists, but
no commercial agent, and as Mr Gundry has well said, "The Under Secretary
of State, while stating that the object of the mission was to confer with
the Chinese commissioners and the Lhassa Government as to the resumption
of commercial relations between India and Tibet," added in Parliament
that, "looking to the delicate nature of the mission, it had not been
thought advisable to appoint a special commercial representative." An
armed force of some 300 men sent on a "delicate mission" which, though
essentially commercial, yet had nothing commercial in its composition!
Could anything be conceived more certain to arouse the sleeping suspicions
of the Tibetans? It was but repeating on a larger scale the deplorable
fiasco of Colonel Browne's attempted march from Burma to China in 1875.

The first act in this little drama was performed in Peking when the envoy,
Macaulay, arrived with his staff for the ostensible purpose of applying
for a passport for Tibet. For such a purpose there was no need to have
sent a special messenger to Peking at all, as a passport could have been
much more easily obtained by the British Minister there and transmitted
by post in the ordinary course of business. The passport could not, of
course, be refused in plain terms by the Chinese Government, but the
personal demand for it gave them the opportunity of cross-examining the
intended envoy as to the objects of his proposed mission. It may well
be believed, from the self-contradictory explanation of the mission
tendered to the British Parliament, that the envoy in Peking failed to
allay the suspicions of the Chinese Government. On the contrary, his
presence intensified them exceedingly. The sole effect of the preliminary
expedition to Peking was, in fact, to forewarn the Chinese Government,
so that they, in concert with the rulers of Tibet, should be prepared to
interpose obstacles to the advance of the mission, but in such a way as
not openly to compromise the good faith of the Chinese Government. The
journey of the envoy to Peking, therefore, sealed the fate of his own
mission, and at the same time closed Tibet against more judicious advances
in the future.

The most interesting episode in connection with this abortive effort
was the appearance of the Babu Sarat Chandra Das himself in the Chinese
capital. By sheer force of intellect he succeeded in a few days in
obtaining the confidence of the inner circle of the lamas there. Having
been brought in contact with a certain Manchu official, the pandit
showed very unobtrusively a familiarity with the more recondite tenets of
Buddhism which captivated the Manchu, whose heart was set on improving
his knowledge of the sacred mysteries.[24] The babu could speak no
Chinese, but it was not difficult among the thousands of lamas in Peking
to find a competent Tibetan interpreter. The fame of the pandit spread
rapidly among the ranks of the priesthood, whose chiefs competed for the
honour of sitting at the feet of the Indian Gamaliel. In expounding the
doctrines, while enjoying the hospitality, of different groups of lamas,
the popularity of the pandit grew from day to day, until he was at length
constrained to take up his quarters at the great Yellow Temple, outside
the north wall of Peking, and live with the brethren. They invested him
with the yellow robe and the other ecclesiastical insignia, and treated
him altogether as one of the initiated. It required all his acumen to
prevent his status as a Buddhist lama from clashing with his position as
a subordinate of the Indian envoy, on whom he was in attendance. He had
to pay frequent visits to the British Legation, where it would have been
impossible for him to appear in his religious vestments without exciting
inconvenient gossip, and perhaps incurring the disapproval of his superior
officer. The custom of travelling in Peking in closed carts enabled the
babu to play the double part of Jekyll and Hyde with perfect success.
He would leave the Temple as a lama, drive to a friend's rooms in the
city, where his Indian costume was kept ready, in which he proceeded in
another cab and in another character to the British Legation, returning
to reassume his yellow robes and then repair to the Temple.

During the time when the envoy designate remained in Peking a very high
personage arrived from Tibet, and it was on his conferences with the
Chinese Court that the success of the intended mission depended. It would
be presumptuous on the part of any foreigner to attempt to divine what
passed between the delegate from the Grand Lama and the Chinese Ministers;
but were it possible for any one to penetrate into those secret counsels,
the babu was the man to do it. There is no doubt that he did. In fact,
he had positive information that the Indian mission to Tibet would be
stopped at the instance of the Chinese Government, and that the issue
of the passport was an empty form. Such information would naturally be
unwelcome to the envoy, and the sequel seems to show that the warning
was disregarded. The expedition was organised, fully equipped, ready
for a march into Tibet. Had it proceeded it is highly improbable that
the babu would have accompanied it as interpreter, for he could not have
exonerated himself from the imputation of bad faith towards his Tibetan
hosts in acting as guide to an armed force into a country where he had
been received and reinvited as a private guest.

What would have been the consequence of the mission proceeding into Tibet
it is, of course, impossible to say, but the circumstances of its recall
were not conducive to satisfactory relations between China and Great
Britain. Mistrusting the effectiveness of the Tibetan opposition to the
Indian mission--for the force could very likely have made good its passage
to Lhassa--the Chinese Government resorted to diplomatic means of stopping
its advance. Its never-failing emergency man, the Inspector-General of
Customs, was called upon, and he intervened with the British Government
with such good effect that they sent orders to India to stop the Tibetan
mission. Thus the Indian Government was a second time overruled: first,
in being made to organise the mission against its will; and secondly, in
being forced to recall it when its recall involved immeasurable loss of
influence in future dealings with China. An attempt was made to cover the
retreat in a cloud of verbiage by a convention signed at Peking in 1886,
which, however, only made the case worse, in that it was a retrograde
step, virtually cancelling the right of visiting Tibet, which had been
conferred by the Chefoo convention of ten years before. The same treaty
which embodied this renunciation, perhaps the weakest to which any British
representative ever set his name, also fostered the illusions which have
been so detrimental to the welfare of China, by promising a continuance of
the tribute missions from Burma after that country had become an integral
part of the Indian Empire.

The fruits of this diplomatic surrender were not long in showing
themselves, for it was soon followed by an invasion of British Sikkim
from the Tibetan side. This aggression of the lamas was of necessity
resisted by the Indian Government, and an unexpected opportunity was
thus offered to them of settling the whole Tibetan question by the rapid
march of a small force to Lhassa. There is good reason to believe that
this solution of the difficulty was the one which commended itself to the
practical statesmen and soldiers of India; but their action was paralysed
by the orders of the Home Government, which continued to be ruled by
influences which were neither military nor political nor practical.
Discussions between the Indian Government and the Chinese _amban_ or
Resident at Lhassa, professing to speak for the Tibetan Lama Government,
were protracted year after year, and seemed interminable. At last even
the Chinese themselves grew weary of the comedy, and experienced in Tibet
something of the difficulty which occasionally beset them in China--that
is to say, they were unable to exorcise the demon they had invoked. They
had stirred up the Tibetans to the point of obstructing the Macaulay
mission, but seemed really to lose control of the force after it had been
set in motion. After some years of futile talk the statesmen of China
would perhaps have hailed with satisfaction the advance of a British force
to Lhassa to cut the Gordian knot; but they dared not, of course, give
such a hint as was conveyed to Captain Fournier, "Avancez donc,"[25] and
the Indian Government, not having the wit to divine it, had to submit to
a long-drawn-out and permanent humiliation, that was in no wise mended
by the Calcutta convention of 1890, which, professing only to settle the
existing frontiers, did not even settle them.


V. THE CRUISE OF THE SEVENTH PRINCE, 1886.

    Character and position of Prince Ch'un--Had been misunderstood by
    foreigners while he was in seclusion--An amiable and progressive
    man--His visit to Port Arthur in 1886--Intercourse with many
    foreigners.

The spring of 1884 witnessed a ministerial crisis of the first order
in Peking. For twenty-four years Prince Kung, uncle to the deceased
emperor Tungchih, had held a position equivalent to Chancellor of the
empire. To the outside world he was only known as Minister for Foreign
Affairs and head of the Tsungli-Yamên. During the greater part of the
time he had been at feud with the empress-regent, from whom his power
was derived, but, being indispensable to her, he was tolerated for want
of a competent successor. The troubles in Tongking caused an agitation
in the capital, and the empress seized the opportunity to dismiss Prince
Kung with most of his colleagues of the Yamên and introduce a fresh set.
The eminent position of the prince, however, was one difficult to fill;
but the substitution was effected by a kind of _coup d'état_ by which the
empress brought the younger brother of Prince Kung out of his retirement
and made him virtually, as far as it was possible, her coadjutor in the
Government. But the peculiar status of Prince Ch'un, as father to the
reigning emperor, rendered him immune from responsibility, since in China
the son could not place the father under discipline. For this reason the
prince could not in his own name exercise any of the great functions of
the State. He was therefore obliged to keep in the background, while the
executive service was performed by his nominees. Thus in foreign affairs
he was efficiently represented by the Grand Secretary Li Hung-chang, and
by Prince Ch'ing, a junior member of the imperial family, who was made
president of the Tsungli-Yamên, and holds the office to the present day.

Whatever the true motives may have been for recasting the
Tsungli-Yamên--and it would be hazardous for any foreigner to dogmatise
about such matters--a great improvement was remarked in the efficiency of
that body. Prince Ch'ing, though new to public affairs, acquitted himself
like a gentleman, and gained the goodwill of all the foreign Legations by
his laborious efforts to learn his work and to bring justice and reason
as well as courtesy into the transaction of business. The circumstances
of the time were also favourable to improvement; for being at war with
one great Power, China was naturally most anxious to conciliate the
others. While this amenable temper lasted, business was despatched by
the Tsungli-Yamên with a celerity never before known, and good use was
made of the opportunity to clear off legacies of arrears that had been
accumulating in the foreign legations.

The Seventh Prince, so long as he was in seclusion, had stood in the
opinion of foreigners for everything that was fanatical, obstructive,
and irreconcilable, the head of the war party, and so forth. Even Sir
Rutherford Alcock, in an article on Chinese Statesmen in 1871, adopted
this popular estimate, calling him "violently hostile, joining with Wo in
all efforts to make the anti-foreign faction predominate."

The announcement of Prince Ch'un, therefore, as the successor of Prince
Kung not unnaturally aroused apprehension of a reactionary policy.
His first public act, however, in so far as it was his, dispelled the
misconception under which foreigners had been labouring for many years:
it was to conclude a peace with France in the face of a rabid opposition.
This misconception of Prince Ch'un's character and policy is only an
example of how vain it is for foreigners to attempt to sound the currents
of Chinese politics, more especially where palace factions are concerned.

The advent of the Seventh Prince having removed all friction between the
empress-regent and the Government, it was a signal for tentative reforms
and what foreigners call progress. Li Hung-chang had to a considerable
extent imbued the Court with his own ideas. He assured them there was no
danger in adopting foreign methods and foreign manners,--on the contrary,
that to do so was the only means of safety to the empire. Within a few
months of his taking the reins, the Prince established a precedent which
amounted to a small revolution in its way. He began to transact business
through his agents with foreigners in the capital itself, which had been
up to that time strictly preserved from all contamination of foreign
trade. The two "stores" which existed were not traders by right, but
were under the special protection of certain foreign Ministers, who had
represented to the Government the necessity of such agencies for the
supply of necessaries for the use of their Legations. This was followed
in course of time by the introduction of novelties in the palace, such
as electric light, toy railways and steam launches in the imperial
pleasure-grounds. The telegraph wire itself was introduced into the city
during the summer of 1884, it having been previously jealously kept at
a distance of thirteen miles, from superstitious fears concerning the
sinister influence which the electric wire might exert over the fortunes
of the capital. However real such fears may be in the minds of the
Chinese, and however convenient they may be as a defence against proposals
from without, they invariably yield to the pressure of necessity. While
the terminus of the telegraph line was at Tungchow, the inconvenience of
having to send mounted messengers thirteen miles to despatch and receive
messages was for some time felt almost entirely by the foreign Legations;
but when the war crisis with France arose, and the Chinese Government
itself was sending urgent messages requiring immediate answers to the
southern provinces and to Europe, the absurdity of losing more time
between the Tsungli-Yamên and the telegraph station than was occupied
by the transmission of the message and its reply from Europe became so
striking, that the order was given to bring the telegraph into the city.
No more was heard of geomantic difficulties.

The most important object, however, which Li Hung-chang sought to gain
through the activity of the Seventh Prince, was so to interest his
Highness in the scheme of national defence, which had been growing under
the viceroy's initiative, that this department of the work of Government
should be transformed from a provincial to an imperial concern. With this
end in view an expedition on salt water was arranged for the Prince; and
insignificant as the feat must appear in Western eyes, yet for a Manchu
prince, who had never seen the sea, to be allowed to trust himself on the
treacherous element at all, or on such a strange monster as a steamer,
must be accepted as a decided proof that the old order was changing,
giving place to the new. The prince was undoubtedly nervous, not knowing
what should befall him on his expedition.

The first ordeal through which he had to pass was that of personal
contact with foreigners, of whom he had perhaps never seen one in
Peking. His introduction was carefully organised by Li Hung-chang, and
it was at Tientsin that the prince first met with foreign officials,
who waited upon him at separate audiences. The foreigners were as much
charmed with his Highness as he expressed himself to have been with them,
so that he embarked on his cruise free from anxiety. His attendants,
however,--on whom and on Li Hung-chang all the responsibility of course
rested,--continued to feel anxious during their passage across the Gulf.
This feeling became for a moment acute when, on landing at Port Arthur,
they were met by a British admiral and staff with a guard of honour. It
is an actual fact that the sight of strange armed men waiting for the
prince, working on oriental traditions, did suggest a trap, for the idea
of capture by treachery is never wholly absent from the Chinese mind. The
Government had taken the wise precaution of attaching to the prince an
experienced and capable foreigner in whom he reposed perfect confidence,
and Mr Detring explained foreign customs and forms of courtesy to the
prince and his suite in a way which completely reassured them. Among all
the dignitaries in the prince's suite, however, there was not one capable
of taking in the entirely novel ideas which were presented to them. One
man only, of quite subordinate rank--whether a Manchu or a Chinese by
birth is unknown to the writer--a confidential agent of the Seventh Prince
in business matters, seized the entire programme of foreign etiquette the
moment it was explained to him, and through him the whole ceremony passed
smoothly and agreeably to all parties. The name of this official was Chang
Yi, who has since been taking a leading part in mining, railway, and other
progressive enterprises in China.

On his return to Peking Prince Ch'un in a memorial to the Throne reported
fully the incidents of his cruise to the gulf ports. Not long after a
naval board was established in Peking, with the prince at its head. As a
step in the direction of centralising the naval authority, which included
also the direction of the land defences, the establishment of a Board
of Admiralty in the capital was certainly a progressive one; but as its
members possessed neither knowledge nor experience of naval or military
affairs its authority was much attenuated, almost every question having
to be referred back to Li Hung-chang in Tientsin. Any chance that might
have existed of Prince Ch'un himself inspiring the new Board and bringing
it up to a state of efficiency was lost through his Highness falling into
ill-health, from which he never recovered, but after a lingering illness
died in 1890.


VI. THE EMPEROR ASSUMES THE GOVERNMENT, 1889.

    The Emperor Kwanghsu comes of age in 1889--Audience of foreign
    Ministers arranged--Derogatory conditions--Second audience refused
    by Ministers--Accepted by Austrian and British envoys.

In 1889 his Majesty Kwanghsu attained his majority and married. But his
coming of age was a somewhat gradual process, with intervals between
each step, as if the empress-regent, who alone determined the time and
the seasons, were either mistrustful of the capacity of her nephew
or reluctant to lay down the reins of authority. The emperor, kept
in leading-strings, was allowed to assume some of the functions of an
autocrat, but not all. This slow unfolding of the imperial blossom had
this result among others, that it procured a welcome respite from the
bitter ordeal of granting an audience to the representatives of foreign
States. It was well understood that the foreigners had for sixteen years
been looking forward to the emperor's assumption of power as to the
consummation of their diplomatic function, and that as soon as a decent
interval had been allowed to the young monarch after his majority, the
subject would become pressing.

It had been discussed in whispers for nearly two years, when, to the
astonishment of everybody, including even the members of the Tsungli-Yamên
themselves, an imperial decree was issued in December 1890 in kindly
terms ordering preparations to be made to receive the foreign Ministers
after the Chinese New Year--that is, in the February following. Since
nobody owned to having been in the secret, the act was set down to the
emperor's gracious initiative, and was hailed with enthusiasm as the
opening of a new era. The Great Wall had at last fallen; the pretensions
to superiority for which the Chinese had made such great sacrifices were
suddenly abandoned, and henceforth equality with foreign nations was to
be the basis of their diplomatic intercourse.

The hope was shortlived, for as soon as the details of the imperial
reception came to be arranged with the Tsungli-Yamên all the old
difficulties appeared in an aggravated form. The foreign ministers, having
pondered the question for eighteen years, had unanimously resolved that
they would not accept an audience in the building used for the reception
of tributary princes, where the ceremony of 1873 had taken place, but only
in the imperial palace, or not at all. The whole value of the audience was
the acknowledgment it signified of international equality. The idea that
it would facilitate business must have been long before abandoned. The
form, therefore, was everything, and the Chinese Ministers were resolved
that the "tributary" form should be adhered to. They became urgent in
their appeals to the reasonableness of the foreign Ministers. They had
gone to expense in renovating the hall, Tz-kwang-ko; they had no other
place available; the imperial decree must be obeyed, and this admitted of
no postponement.

Yielding to these arguments, the foreign Ministers agreed to a compromise.
They would, for this time only, repair to the Tz-kwang-ko, but never
again. The ceremony took place therefore on 5th March 1891. There were
two receptions--first an audience to the various foreign Ministers
separately, next a general reception of the whole of them. The diplomatic
body soon felt the consequences of their retrograde step, for when they
came to discuss details of the audience of the following year, the Chinese
interposed a simple _non possumus_ to every demand which implied the
acknowledgment of equality. A reception within the palace without the
_kotow_ could not even be discussed. No accommodation between the opposing
views being possible, there was no audience in 1892. The diplomatic
body were solidly united in maintaining the dignity of their respective
countries, and by ceasing to solicit, they left the onus of discovering
a solution of the question on the Chinese themselves. The audience was of
no practical value to the foreigners, while the withholding of it placed
the Chinese so much in the wrong that they might safely have been left to
their own devices.

Before, however, the pressure to extricate themselves and their sovereign
from an untenable position had become too severe, a diversion in their
favour was created by the flying visit of an Austrian envoy, who seemed
ready to present his credentials on any terms whatever, so that the
formalities were quickly got over, and he enabled to conclude his mission.
The Chinese availed themselves of this unexpected opportunity, and the
emperor granted an audience to M. Biegeleben in another hall or pavilion
outside the palace, which thenceforth became known locally as the Palais
Biegeleben.

At the end of 1892, not long after the Biegeleben incident, a new British
Minister arrived in Peking. Not apparently considering himself bound
by the compact to which his predecessor was a party, he, without the
knowledge of his diplomatic colleagues, accepted an audience on the same
derogatory terms as the Austrian envoy had done, and the reactionary
policy of the Chinese thus enjoyed a complete, if temporary, triumph. This
proceeding of the British Minister was deeply resented by the diplomatic
body, most of all by the Russian Minister, Count Cassini, himself a
new arrival, and the circumstance did not tend to smooth the subsequent
intercourse between the parties.


VII. THE VISIT OF THE CZAREVITCH, 1891.

    Worthy reception in Peking impossible--Attempted substitution
    of provincial reception--Czarevitch visits only the Russian
    communities in China.

Closely connected in point of time, and possibly by a more vital link,
with the imperial audience was the voyage of the Czarevitch to India,
China, and Japan in 1890-91. There was no precedent in China for the
reception of the member of any foreign royal family. In the days before
the first audience the Duke of Edinburgh, while in command of the Galatea,
visited Peking, but strictly _incognito_, no visits being exchanged with
any Chinese. But times had changed considerably in the twenty years that
had since elapsed, and with an emperor of full age on the throne things
that were winked at during his minority could no longer be so lightly
treated. The Chinese Government were, in fact, perfectly conscious of the
responsibility which lay upon them to show courtesy to so distinguished a
visitor as the heir to the throne of Russia, and they took timely measures
for his reception.

The position of the audience question convinced the Ministers that it
would be impossible to receive him worthily in Peking, since to do so
would be to admit equality with foreign States. The first care of the
Chinese, therefore, was to induce his Imperial Highness to stay away
from the capital. The Russian Government were told that Li Hung-chang,
representing the Chinese Emperor, would meet the Czarevitch at Chefoo,
and that his reception by other Governors of provinces would be deemed
equivalent to one by the emperor in person. The Russian Government
fell into the trap, and the programme of provincial receptions would
have been carried out but for the eccentricity of Chang Chih-tung,
the governor-general of the Hu provinces on the Yangtze. He, with the
other provincials, had received the instructions about the reception of
the Czarevitch, but he alone treated the order with contempt, not even
deigning to answer it or to explain his reason. The order did not emanate
from Peking, and he would not accept a mandate from an equal. Evidently
the emperor had no hand in drawing up the programme, and this Chang had
the best means of knowing, for he had a brother in the Inner Council. This
action of a high authority throws full light on the difference between an
imperial and a provincial transaction, as the Chinese themselves regard
it.

In keeping with this independent attitude of Chang was the rudeness with
which he received the officer deputed by the Russian admiral to arrange
details of the reception at Wuchang. In this way the intended imposture
was exposed. But if the Russian Government had been too easily led into a
false position, it must be admitted they extricated themselves cleverly,
by simply demanding a yellow chair for the Czarevitch, a colour reserved
exclusively for the emperor. As this could not be conceded the official
ceremonies fell through, and the Czarevitch contented himself with
visiting the Russian communities at the Chinese ports. He then proceeded
to Japan, where a brilliant reception awaited him; and from Japan to
Vladivostock, where he turned the first sod of the Trans-Siberian Railway,
19th May 1891.

  [Illustration]

FOOTNOTES:

 [24] See _infra_, p. 343.

 [25] See _infra_, p. 330.




CHAPTER XXVI.

THE TONGKING QUARREL.

    Rapid advance of French towards China proper--The Black
    Flags--Discussions between France and China--Attempted
    negotiations--Conquest of Tongking decided upon--Chinese
    feared attack on Canton--City defenceless--Negotiation with
    France recommended--Captain Fournier concludes convention
    with Li Hung-chang in Tientsin--Strong opposition in the
    capital--Collision between forces in Tongking--French make war
    on China--Peace concluded through customs agency, April 1885--The
    Li-Fournier convention ratified.


The progress of the French in the annexation of Cochin China, Annam, and
Tongking was phenomenally rapid. These aggressions on her tributary States
were far from agreeable to China, but no effective means of resistance was
proposed. The Chinese policy, wrote Sir R. Alcock,[26] "has been one of
drift, and letting things slide into irretrievable confusion and disaster
for want of courage and decisive action at the right time. Between the
Dupuis and Garnier expeditions, in which a handful of men were seizing
towns, storming citadels, and terrorising the Annamite mandarins and
king into virtual submission to any terms dictated to them, and Captain
Rivière's very similar proceedings in 1883, there was abundant time and
opportunity for China either to fight or to negotiate with effect, but
she did neither."

When, however, the advance of the French brought them within measurable
distance of the southern provinces of China proper, a more serious view of
the invasion was forced upon the Government. A body of irregular troops,
called the Black Flags, for some time stood in the way of the French, who
designated them "pirates." The status of these Black Flags was, indeed,
somewhat ambiguous, as they had been virtually outlawed by the Chinese.
But when it was seen that they were harassing the French, the provincial
authorities recognised that they were fighting the battle of China and of
her tributary. The Annamese Government had, in the first instance, invited
the assistance of the Black Flags, and the Chinese Government officially
encouraged them, while hoping to evade direct responsibility for doing so.
The French had made the useless mistake of wounding China in a tender spot
by destroying the seal granted to the Annamese sovereign by the emperor,
and it was probably this insult rather than the territorial seizures which
induced China to reinforce the Black Flags by a body of imperial troops,
and to lay down distinctly the line which she would consider herself bound
to defend.

The annexation of Annam became the subject of protracted discussions
between France and China. The diplomacy of the Marquis Tsêng in Paris,
and of Li Hung-chang in China--a convention had actually been concluded
between the latter and the French Minister, Bourrée--failed to arrest the
progress of France, and the question between the two countries reached
a burning point after the capture by the French of Sontay and Bacninh in
the spring of 1884.

The Chinese envoy had declared to M. Ferry that a French advance on these
places would be regarded by his Government as a _casus belli_. Seeing,
however, that no action was taken by China after their actual capture,
the French took fresh courage, and their programme of conquest became so
much expanded that what had been the dream of a few became the definitive
policy of the Republic. "The conquest of Tongking had been decided upon
in principle," wrote Admiral Jaurèguiberry to Captain Rivière at the
time when M. de Freycinet was declaring that there should be no policy
of aggression. The taking of the two citadels sealed the policy of the
admiral and falsified that of the Foreign Minister. From that point may be
dated the important position which France has since assumed in claiming to
direct, in conjunction with Russia, the destinies of the Chinese Empire.

On the fall of the two cities the Chinese officials of the southern
provinces were filled with consternation. They feared that the successes
of the French would encourage them, if not to invade China, at least to
force a settlement with her on their own terms. They had before them the
brochure of Captain Rivière, commander of the French forces in Tongking,
in which he advocated a quarrel with China as a preliminary to the seizure
of the three southern provinces, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan. An
obvious step towards the execution of such a design would be an attack on
the provincial capital, Canton, an event which was not only anticipated
by the authorities, but was thought feasible, and even probable, by
disinterested onlookers. How little prepared were the Chinese to resist
such an attack will be best understood by the measures they took to avert
it.

An officer of the Chinese customs service, Mr G. Detring, returning from
furlough, brought with him the details of the Marquis Tsêng's abortive
negotiations in Paris. He arrived in China immediately after the capture
of the two strongholds of Sontay and Bacninh. In proceeding from Hongkong
to take up his official post at Canton he accepted a passage in the French
_aviso_ Volta, which conveyed Rear-Admiral Lespès to the latter city. She
was commanded by Commandant Fournier, with whom Mr Detring had been some
years before on terms of intimacy in the north of China. The principal
topic discussed on the passage was naturally Tongking, and, judging from
subsequent developments, it is reasonable to suppose that the seeds of the
settlement eventually concluded between China and France were sown during
that short but interesting voyage. When Mr Detring reported himself to the
provincial authorities they evinced the greatest anxiety as to what they
conceived to be the threatening attitude of the French against Canton.
Asked if their river defences were in a position to resist attack, they
frankly avowed that they were not; but yet, being personally responsible
for the defence, they dared not confess the true state of affairs to the
Imperial Government. The viceroy of Canton and the governor of Yunnan
were already under censure, and the military commanders in Tongking
were even threatened with decapitation "pour encourager les autres." The
Canton authorities were thus, in fact, in the dilemma in which Chinese
provincial officials have so frequently found themselves in dealing with
foreign exigencies--responsible yet helpless. Since they were avowedly
incapable of resistance, the viceroy and governor were advised at once
to open negotiations with the French, and, as a first step, to report the
actual position frankly to the Central Government,--in other words, to Li
Hung-chang, who in this, as in all other crises, had to bear the burden
of every initiative. Having had experience of the capacity of Mr Detring,
first in the negotiating of the Chefoo convention, and subsequently during
several years of official intercourse at Tientsin, Li Hung-chang moved
the Central Government to summon the Canton commissioner of customs to
Tientsin for consultation.

The way being thus partially opened to negotiation, Rear-Admiral Lespès
held himself in readiness to proceed to Tientsin in response to any
invitation that might be conveyed to him. Captain Fournier was sent on
in advance to the rendezvous at Chefoo, where he was to remain until
the real views of the Chinese Government respecting a settlement of the
Tongking dispute had been ascertained. The French having set their hearts
on extorting a large indemnity, it was emphatically declared to them that
China would never pay one farthing. Any negotiation, therefore, would be
futile unless this question was first eliminated. Having paved the way
with Li Hung-chang, Mr Detring next proceeded to Chefoo to invite Captain
Fournier to Tientsin. From previous good relations he was _persona grata_
with Li, and on that account was thought a not unfit agent with whom to
discuss preliminaries in anticipation of the arrival of his admiral. But
that there should be no mistake about the indemnity, Captain Fournier
was once more told that unless it were dropped it would be useless his
proceeding to Tientsin. His doing so, therefore, was a tacit withdrawal
of that important item in the French demands. Both parties being equally
desirous of a settlement, all official technical difficulties were
promptly overcome, and Captain Fournier, from a mere herald of the French
admiral, was by telegraphic instructions from Paris at once promoted to
the rank of plenipotentiary for France, and this notwithstanding that
there was an accredited representative of the Republic eighty miles off
in Peking. The two negotiators, in short, fell into each other's arms,
and the convention of May 11, 1884, was the result.

The peace so suddenly and irregularly patched up was not, however,
destined to endure. Li Hung-chang, knowing better than any of his
peers the risks of a war with France, had stretched his authority to
the uttermost in concluding a treaty which practically ceded Annam and
Tongking to that Power. For though in this as in all his other acts he
carried with him the approval of the empress-dowager, he knew that he
had to brave the ferocious opposition of the ignorant fanatics of the
capital, which he himself described as the "howling of dogs." The moment
the announcement was made, indeed, the furies were let loose upon him,
and he had practically no support but that of the empress-dowager; for
the Tsungli-Yamên, so far as they were not opposed to the treaty, were
invertebrate. It is necessary to bear in mind this critical position
of Li Hung-chang in order to understand the series of blunders,
misunderstandings, recriminations, and actual war which ensued.

After the ratification of the treaty, arrangements had to be made for the
withdrawal of the Chinese forces from the territory which had been ceded
to France. Captain Fournier, in an interview with Li Hung-chang, presented
a memorandum fixing the dates on which the troops were to evacuate the
several positions specified. A long discussion appears to have taken
place, in which it is not difficult, from the circumstances above referred
to, to divine what the viceroy's attitude must have been. He wished
to avoid the invidious responsibility of asking the Central Government
to order the withdrawal of the troops from Langson, as to do so would
obviously add fuel to the fire of those powerful functionaries who were
clamouring for the repudiation of the treaty, and for the negotiator's
head. In vain endeavouring to obtain from Fournier an indefinite delay in
carrying out the stipulation for the retirement of the Chinese troops, Li
perhaps trusted that the French commanders in Tongking would themselves
cut the knot by marching forward with an adequate force and brushing away
the Chinese troops opposing them. The accomplished fact would then have
settled everything.

It has been said that the clever interpreter, instead of translating all
the viceroy's arguments and explaining his difficulties, summed the whole
up to Captain Fournier in two words, "Avancez donc"--advice which would no
doubt have been sufficient if only the French military commander, Colonel
Dugenne, had marched with a reasonable force, or even if he had carried
with him a competent interpreter, through whom he might have communicated
with the Chinese commander. The latter officer, however, when called upon
to evacuate the post, pleaded that he had received no instructions to
that effect, and asked for time to communicate with Peking. The letter
to the French commander containing these reasonable pleas for delay was
either wrongly translated or left untranslated for months. In the meantime
Colonel Dugenne advanced with a small party, and was forced to retreat
with loss, for which he was not unjustly recalled by his own authorities;
and thereupon ensued the Franco-Chinese war.

This was not, however, the only _contretemps_ in connection with this
lamentable outbreak. The Chinese commander had actually telegraphed
to Li Hung-chang for instructions; but, still unwilling to face the
responsibility, the latter left the reply to his council, among whom
there happened to be for the moment his evil genius, Chang Pei-lun, a
fire-eating member of the Tsungli-Yamên, who was on his way to take up
the post of governor of Fukien province and Imperial Commissioner of the
Foochow arsenal.

Laudable efforts were made to repair the mischief, and in the conferences
which followed in Paris peace was more than once all but assured; but
owing to a series of accidents and misunderstandings, in which the
authorities at Peking, the French representative there, the French
commanders on the Chinese coast, and the telegraph were all implicated,
the die was cast in August 1884, and the war was continued till the
following April.

For reasons of their own the French Government were averse to calling the
hostilities "war," preferring reprisals and "intelligent destruction." By
whatever name it may be called, the French did not distinguish themselves
greatly in the conduct of the operations. Their only feat of arms was
the destruction, at their anchorage in the river Min, of the Chinese
ships belonging to the Foochow squadron, and of the arsenal, which, as
Li Hung-chang bitterly reflected, had been erected by "French genius."
Admiral Courbet found his destructive work easy, having entered the river
and taken up a position in the rear of the batteries during time of peace.
The subsequent operations in Formosa were without result; and the French
Government refused permission to Admiral Courbet to attack Port Arthur,
on the non-military ground of wishing to save the prestige of "notre ami
Li Hung-chang." So far as the naval operations were concerned, even when
most successful in intelligent destruction, they were quite ineffective
towards ending the war until the method which has never failed to bring
the Chinese Government to terms was resorted to--the stoppage of the
grain-supply to the capital. This was accomplished by a patrol of the
coast for the purpose of intercepting vessels carrying rice to Tientsin.
The work performed during the winter and spring of 1885 by the French
cruisers, in keeping the sea without any base and performing their patrol
duties in all weathers, excited the admiration of seamen. It should be
mentioned that they were precluded from acting offensively against the
Yangtze by tacit understanding with Great Britain and other Powers.

If the breach of the peace between France and China was a historical
curiosity, the eventual settlement of the dispute resembled a dramatic
extravaganza. The final incident of the war in Tongking was the defeat
of the French, followed by a panic, caused apparently by General Négrier
being wounded. The force then made a disorderly retreat before imaginary
pursuers. In the meantime the empress-dowager had given positive orders
that peace should be made on any terms. Both parties had thus come round
to the _status quo ante bellum_--that is to say, they were both equally
urgent to obtain peace, as they had been in May 1884. The agent in
bringing this about was Sir Robert Hart; and it was effected, as great
things usually are, by the adroit use of very simple means. During the
blockade of Formosa a small Chinese lighthouse tender was captured by the
French admiral and detained. As she was essentially non-combatant, and was
serving the interests of humanity in supplying the numerous lighthouses
on the coast of China for the benefit of the commerce of all nations, Sir
Robert Hart instructed his very capable London agent, Mr Duncan Campbell,
to go to Paris and represent the case to the French Ministers, with a
view to obtaining the release of so useful and harmless a vessel. In
this manner the door was opened to the larger negotiation. Mr Campbell
executed his delicate mission with so much tact, that in the amicable
conversations which ensued between him and certain French officials the
idea of putting an end to a war of which both parties were tired, and
which, moreover, seemed objectless, was ventilated; and in a few days
authority was telegraphed from Peking to Mr Campbell to sign a protocol.

This was done before the news of the French reverse at Langson reached
Paris. After such a military success M. Jules Ferry could not imagine
that the Chinese Government would adhere to the terms of the protocol,
and therefore he kept the whole negotiation secret from the Chambers. In
the meanwhile the mishap to the French troops, being greatly exaggerated,
excited such intense feeling in France that M. Ferry, _le Tonkinois_,
was obliged to resign, with the treaty which might have saved him in his
pocket. As for the empress-dowager, she recked nothing of the success of
her brave troops on the outskirts of the empire, but thought only of the
enormous expense of the war, which had been unpleasantly brought home to
her, and of matters affecting her own convenience. She therefore had no
thought of going back on the treaty, but was even more urgent than before
to have it promptly signed and ratified. The honours of the peace thus
fell in a few days to M. Ferry's successor.

And what was the outcome of a year's fighting which cost China 100,000,000
taels and France some proportionate amount? A simple reaffirmation of the
Li-Fournier convention of May 1884! The convention itself was short and
simple--one clause only exciting much interest during the negotiations,
and that provoked a hot discussion, not on the substance, but on the
verbal form. It was a stipulation by which the two contracting parties
consciously meant different things, and each fought hard for a phrase
sufficiently subtle to allow each to interpret it in his own way when the
time came for the fulfilment of the treaty provisions. The French were
most desirous of binding the Chinese to employ French industries in all
their new undertakings. China was equally resolute in avoiding any such
obligation. In the end each was satisfied that he could read the treaty
clause in his own favour. But the final victory in the struggle would go
to the side that was most persistent in forcing its meaning into practice.
The French Ministry had announced to the Chambers a great victory for
French manufacturing industries, which were represented as having by it
obtained a monopoly in China. The text of the treaty, even in the French
version, did not, indeed, bear this out; but the French had the _primâ
facie_ argument on their side, that the introduction of a clause in a
treaty referring to the Chinese patronage of French industries, however
worded, must have meant something more than merely to register the common
fact that China was at liberty to deal with whom she pleased. In the
end a compromise was effected by China's giving to a French syndicate
the contract for excavating the basin and dock at Port Arthur and
certain orders for material, among which was a famous military balloon,
wonderfully symbolic of the whole proceeding.

  [Illustration]

FOOTNOTE:

 [26] 'Contemporary Review,' December 1884.




CHAPTER XXVII.

THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE OF CHRISTIANS.

    Alliance with Church the corner-stone of French
    conquest--Persistence of French ambitions in the Far
    East--Protectorate of native Christians--Its abuse by the
    propaganda--Forcible erection of cathedrals in Peking--Imperial
    family aggrieved thereby--Negotiations for removal of church
    from palace grounds--Mr Dunn's mission to Rome--Vatican to send
    a nuncio--French Government vetos--French minister vetos transfer
    of cathedral--Unless transaction placed in his hands.


The claim of France to protect Christians against the native authorities
in the Far East constitutes the basis and the origin of her present
political position in those countries. The propagation of the faith was,
indeed, a recognised element in the adventures of other countries besides
France; but she has, since the eclipse of Portugal and Spain, enjoyed
the distinction of a working alliance with the Church in furthering the
foreign domination of both. "Church and State, linked in alliance close
and potential, played faithfully into each other's hands," says Parkman
('Jesuits in North America'). In the reign of Louis XIV. the kingdom
of Siam was the object of their joint attention. A missionary bishop
persuaded the most Christian king that to establish the Church in Siam
and convert king and country to the Catholic faith would open an effectual
door for the extension of French commerce. A century later another bishop
persuaded another Louis to interfere in the affairs of Annam, and only
the events of 1789 cut short an expedition that was being prepared of
politico-ecclesiastical propagandism. Napoleon III. took up the cause,
and actually effected the conquest of Cochin China; and Gambetta was
so enthusiastic on the subject that, while persecuting the Catholics in
France, he was ready to expend the forces of the Republic in protecting
them in distant countries.

There is here, therefore, irrespective of persons or forms of government,
an unbroken tradition, which furnishes a key to the successive operations
of France in the Far East. Thus when she resolved to join England in
hostilities against China in 1857 a pretext was ready to hand in the
murder of a Catholic priest in the interior of the country, his presence
there being a defiance of the laws of the empire. There has been flux
and reflux in French policy, but no change in its direction; and though
prudence has from time to time set limits to its full expression,
the claim to a special representation of Chinese Christians has been
consistently pursued as a cardinal object of the French military, naval,
and diplomatic forces in the Far East.

The treaties of 1858 for the first time authorised travelling into the
interior, and placed French subjects, whether missionary or not, who
availed themselves of the permission, under the protection of their own
country. But ever since the convention of Peking in 1860 it has been
sought by indirect and unobtrusive means to assume the protectorate over
native Christians as well. The interpolated clause in the Chinese, which
was no part of the authentic French version of the convention, lent a
certain colour to the pretension by seeming to recognise communities
of Chinese Christians as legal units and fit subjects of international
agreement between China and France. Nevertheless, "French interference
between the Chinese authorities and the subjects of the empire of China
has never had any treaty warrant or justification by the law of nations,"
wrote Sir Rutherford Alcock in the 'Nineteenth Century,' November 1886;
and he added, "China has the remedy in her own hands, to a certain extent,
by refusing to admit the pretension." The Chinese Government had long
been alive to the danger, as its elaborate appeal to the reason of the
Powers in 1871 amply testified, but its eyes were opened still wider by
the lesson of the Tongking war. A disposition was thereafter evinced to
withstand the claim of the French, and the action of Germany afforded
sufficient support to the Chinese position, had the Government only
had the courage and perspicacity to lean upon it. For in the Catholic
propaganda were missionaries of German origin, who were not permitted to
divest themselves of their nationality, but were made to apply for their
passports into the interior not to the French, but the German, Legation in
Peking. Had Italy and Spain been equally independent, the question of the
French, or any other protectorate, could scarcely have been entertained
without introducing the element of separate foreign nationalism into
the constitution of the Christian communities in China, which would not,
perhaps, have been agreeable to the views of the Catholic propagandists,
for they naturally aspired to maintain their independence as a compact
ecclesiastical organisation.

The dread of the French protectorate was much accentuated by the enforced
restitution of ancient buildings, the most conspicuous examples of which
occurred in the city of Peking itself, and even within the area of the
imperial palace. The sites of three ancient churches being claimed by the
French Minister, the emperor's Government was compelled to violate its
sense of justice by evicting the existing owners. The original building of
one of the three was found practically intact, though hidden by the houses
built round and against its walls. These of course had to be cleared away,
regardless of the rights of their occupants. The interior fittings and
decorations of the church had disappeared, but, strange to say, much of
the wood carving and other ornaments were gradually recovered from the
old-curiosity shops, where the parts not destroyed had, by the instinct
of the Wardour Street craft, been preserved, begrimed with the dust of a
hundred years and hopelessly unsaleable. By patiently collecting these
disjointed fragments and piecing them together like a Chinese puzzle,
the Fathers were able gradually to restore the church to something like
its original state, so that it became itself an interesting relic of the
golden age of the Jesuits in Peking.

The other two churches had been demolished, and the sites converted to
secular uses, requiring some ingenuity to identify. When these sites
were, under the new dispensation, cleared of superincumbent buildings,
churches were erected as much exceeding the original as the glory of
the Jewish temple, rebuilt after the Captivity, excelled that of the
former house. The restrictions imposed by the Government on the style of
the buildings, the last vestige of power which they dared assert, bore
lightly on the astute constructors of the new churches. In deference
to a common Chinese objection, perhaps partly superstitious, to lofty
structures overlooking them, a limit was set to the height of the new
buildings. But remonstrances after completion were easily disposed of by
the pious Fathers inviting the objectors to go and measure the towers! The
Chinese seem to have the same constitutional dislike of a demonstration
that they have to a straight line or a right angle, and a challenge
like this never failed to put them to silence. As to their neglect to
exercise their right of supervision during construction, the shortest
way to characterise it is merely to say it was Chinese. The same kind of
negligence also allowed roofs of cathedrals, not in the capital alone, but
in distant provinces, to be covered with yellow tiles, a colour reserved
exclusively for imperial use. It is true the process was disguised, for
the benefit of those who chose to be blind, by the tiles being whitewashed
before being sent aloft, leaving to the slow action of the weather the
gradual revelation of the imperial colour, which might then, indeed, be
represented as the act of Heaven. Nothing is too transparent to deceive
those who are willing to be deceived.

  [Illustration: PEI-T'ANG CATHEDRAL IN PEKING, PURCHASED BY CHINESE
   GOVERNMENT.]

The cathedral around which the greatest interest centred, however, was the
one which was erected within the palace grounds. The site had been granted
by the great Emperor Kanghsi, the most imperial of the Manchu line, to the
learned fathers who cured his fever by administering Jesuits' bark, then
a new discovery, and whom he reckoned on attaching to his house by the
favours bestowed on them. The new building was presumably erected on or
near the site of the old, against the most urgent protests of the Court.
Every inducement was offered to the French--larger and better sites,
perhaps other compensations as well--if they would forego their demand
for the resumption of the ground; but the French Government being set
upon marking its ascendancy by a permanent sign, compelled the erection
of the Pei-t'ang Cathedral on the spot indicated. The Lazarists, who had
succeeded to the Jesuits in North China, had a kindly bishop at their
head, who conceded much in the structure of the new building to soothe
the feelings of the imperial family. Nevertheless, stunted as they were,
from the point of view of architectural symmetry, the double towers of the
cathedral were visible from the palace, and the two belfries commanded
a view over a large part of the precincts. The building was therefore
an eyesore to the inmates for twenty years, on the common ground on
which it would have been offensive even to a provincial population, but
still more as a staring monument of the deepest humiliation the dynasty
had endured.[27] The empress-dowager bore the grievance, but not with
resignation, for soon after the affairs of the empire assumed a settled
aspect she urged her Ministers to find a way to get rid of the obnoxious
building.

Monseigneur Delaplace had, in his former diocese of Chêkiang, rendered
good service to the Government in opposing the rebels, for which he was
granted high Chinese rank. Being dissatisfied with the action of France
after the Tientsin massacre of 1870, he extricated his mission from the
control of the French Legation in Peking, and from that date till his
death in 1882 conducted its affairs in direct communication with the
Tsungli-Yamên. Fully recognising how hateful his cathedral was to the
Chinese, he co-operated with Prince Kung and Wênsiang in their efforts
to remove it, and in 1874 he actually concluded an agreement with them
to that effect. But the contract was vetoed by the French Government. The
sore was thus reopened and continued to fester until 1881, when there was
so much excitement in the capital that the Church and mission were thought
to be in great danger. During the Tongking troubles the question of the
cathedral was allowed to rest, but no sooner was peace assured than the
Court again became restless, and with renewed urgency sought a remedy for
its grievance.

The negotiations, which proved successful, were entered upon in an
irregular manner, such as has characterised so many of the Chinese
official acts. An Englishman in Peking, who had had business dealings with
the Government, was asked one day by the confidential factotum of Prince
Ch'un whether he could render assistance in the matter of the Pei-t'ang.
The case was explained at length, and the foreigner, not being then aware
of the negotiations of 1874, suggested, as the most obvious course, trying
to make an arrangement with the Lazarist mission. The Manchu shook his
head, to signify the futility of that proceeding. The enterprise thus
seemed desperate, unless the Imperial Government should exercise its
sovereign right of expropriation,--much too drastic a measure for any
Chinese Government to attempt.

One hope only seemed to remain, a direct appeal to the Vatican. This led
to a long conversation on the Papacy, and the Manchu official,[28] being a
pious and even a learned Buddhist, became intensely interested in hearing
much that was new to him respecting the position and prerogatives of the
European Dalai Lama. Nor did the "great Western Saint," whose vicegerent
the Pope claims to be, fail to evoke the deep reverence of both the Manchu
and the Chinese who were present, so that one might be almost justified
in appropriating words uttered on a different occasion,--they were "not
very far from the kingdom" ruled by "the Western Saint."

But the interesting question was, How was the Vatican to be approached? By
a qualified secret agent intrusted with the full confidence of the Chinese
Court. The mission would be by no means easy, for should its object become
known, it would be thwarted in advance from mere jealousy, if from no
other motive, by Lazarist and perhaps other Catholic missions, so that
access to the Supreme Pontiff would be blocked at the outset. The mission
would also be certain to arouse the strenuous hostility of the French
Government. After discussing the problem from all sides for three hours,
the Manchu cut it short by the abrupt question, "Will you go?" "No," said
the foreigner; "such an undertaking requires quite other qualities than
any I possess. But," he added, after considering the matter, "I think I
know the man who might carry it through." "Where is he? in Peking? Bring
him here," were rapped out like musketry-fire, showing how urgent was
the subject. The agent recommended to him was Mr J. G. Dunn, a man of
genius and of varied accomplishments, a Catholic, and having an extensive
personal acquaintance with the propaganda. He was at once invited to
Peking, when another long conference ensued, and Mr Dunn was requested to
draw up a memorandum on the whole scheme for the information of Prince
Ch'un. After waiting some time for a response Mr Dunn left the capital,
decidedly disappointed, for he was eager for a service so congenial to
his character and feelings. Indeed had the mission been created for the
man, or the man for the mission, the harmony between means and ends could
hardly have been closer.

Several months elapsed before the question emerged again from official
obscurity, and the manner of it is worth relating if only for the
side-light it throws on Chinese methods. Li Hung-chang paid a visit to the
capital in 1885, and soon after his return to Tientsin he requested his
secretaries to find out where Mr Dunn was and to invite him by telegraph
to come to see the viceroy. Not knowing why he was sent for, any more
than Gordon did when summoned from India five years before, Mr Dunn came,
and Li at once entered on the Pei-t'ang question, showing him his own
memorandum on the subject. The affair having been placed by Prince Ch'un
in the hands of Li Hung-chang to be carried through, Mr Dunn was promptly
commissioned, and in concert with the viceroy's secretary, the very
capable officer who now represents China at Washington, the emissary's
instructions and credentials were drawn up. There were two separate
instructions, and no little confusion was caused thereby.

On leaving China for Rome, Mr Dunn stipulated that a competent
intermediary should be appointed to interpret his correspondence to Li
Hung-chang, a duty which was intrusted to the commissioner of customs in
Tientsin. The utility of this provision was soon made manifest, for when
telegrams began to arrive from Rome, their purport was unintelligible,
as they seemed irrelevant to the expropriation of the cathedral, which
was Mr Dunn's special mission. Irritated by this apparent aberration,
the viceroy's idea was to recall the emissary. But when it was suggested
that the copies of his credentials should be first carefully examined
the position became clearer. One part of his instructions was then found
to be directed towards the question of the Christian protectorate, and
Mr Dunn was, in fact, diplomatising with the Pope with a view to his
appointing a nuncio or apostolic delegate to China to represent all the
Catholic missions. The Chinese had not fully mastered this idea, and even
Li Hung-chang, who has a wonderful memory, had forgotten the existence
of the second section of his instructions, which no doubt Mr Dunn had
drawn up himself. The Tsungli-Yamên, languid and bemused, hesitated to
express any opinion, and assumed their habitual passive attitude. One
person alone really grasped the importance of having the Church in China
represented by the delegate of a Power "which has no armies or fleets
wherewith to threaten or attack." The empress-dowager, when the nomination
of Mgr. Agliardi was announced, and his coming depended on formal imperial
invitation, sent the urgent message to the Yamên, "Get that man here; lose
no time."

Mr Dunn's negotiations with the Vatican of course soon leaked out; notices
appeared in the press; Mr Punch had his little joke that though there
was evidently a good deal _doing_, the question was, Who was _Dunn_? The
French Government took the matter up energetically through their Minister
in Rome, and their diplomatic efforts having failed, they presented
an ultimatum to the Pope which compelled him to cancel the appointment
of his nuncio. France threatening to terminate the concordat, withdraw
the subvention to the Church in France, and sequestrate its ministers,
the Holy Father had no option but to submit. With tears in his eyes he
deplored his impotence to respond to the invitation of China under such
a truculent menace to "his children in France."

While these things were going on in Rome the transference of the Pei-t'ang
Cathedral, which had been settled in principle through Mr Dunn, was then
taken up by the Lazarist Mission, and the popular Père Favier was deputed
by the Bishop of Peking to proceed to Rome and to Paris to obtain from
the Vatican and the General of the Lazarist Order the specific authority
to negotiate the transfer. Having brought back the necessary powers,
a convention was shortly concluded between Bishop Tagliabue and Li
Hung-chang. The Church made an excellent bargain, as it generally does:
a new site of about thrice the area was granted close to the old on the
opposite side of the broad roadway, and a bountiful compensation in money
was made for the trouble and cost of removal. But after the agreement was
signed the French Government interposed its veto so far as to insist on
being the intermediary through whose hands the transaction should pass.
France also, it was said, had previously essayed to _marchander_ with
China for her consent, but withdrew when it became clear that further
obstruction might entail untoward consequences. To mark its satisfaction
at the final solution of this question, the Chinese Government eulogised
all those who had helped to bring it about, and bestowed high rank on
Bishop Tagliabue and the Abbé Favier (now bishop).

This transaction supplied a crucial test of French policy and pretensions
in China, the first concrete expression of both that had been obtained
since the forcible restitution of Church property immediately after the
capture of Peking. The coercion, indeed, was applied on this occasion
to the Roman Pontiff and the Catholic Church rather than to the Chinese
Government; but the latter were not so dull as not to see to what
ulterior objects the French scheme might be extended, given convenient
circumstances. They were, in fact, really alarmed, and the question was
discussed with some warmth in the Chinese as well as in the European
press. "The end is not yet," wrote Sir Rutherford Alcock; "China may
be less open to intimidation than heretofore, and assert her undoubted
right to refuse the recognition of an assumed protectorate over Roman
missions, irrespective of the nationality of their members." The French
press espoused the cause of the protectorate warmly, treating it as a most
valuable national asset. The Chinese press took up the question in reply.
Their view of the position was comprehensively summed up in a native
newspaper in October 1886 in the following terms:--

    It has been said by them of old time that when a man is found
    acting injuriously to his own family but benevolently to strangers
    his behaviour is unnatural, and there is something hidden under
    the cloak of outward kindness.

    We have from time to time printed translations from various
    foreign newspapers on the subject of the relations between the
    Chinese Government and the Pope. Some days ago we reproduced an
    article on the same subject from the 'Temps,' a French newspaper
    of the highest authority. These articles all indicate that the
    French Government is greatly troubled at the prospect of losing
    what is called the right to protect Christians in China. This is
    a question which has not hitherto been much considered by Chinese
    statesmen. Those of them who have been in Europe, or who have
    studied political affairs there, know something of the importance
    of the issues which are covered up in that apparently harmless
    word "protection"; but it is hardly to be expected that the
    Ministers and statesmen who have scarcely travelled beyond the
    walls of Peking can realise the full significance of the phrase.
    Nothing is better calculated to quicken the apprehension of the
    Government on this point than the extraordinary excitement of the
    French Government, which insists on protecting the Christians
    in China whether they desire this protection or not. For now
    that the French have so plainly shown their secret designs, it
    would be impossible for China to acquiesce, by word or deed, in
    the pretensions which France sets up. It is rather suspicious
    that the French Government, the greatest enemy of Christianity,
    which is constantly oppressing the priests and confiscating their
    property in France, should be so intensely desirous of protecting
    Christians in China, where this protection is not required. A
    leading French statesman, Gambetta, who died a few years ago,
    left as a legacy to his followers the doctrine that the Church
    should be suppressed in France but supported in all foreign
    countries. Gambetta was a man who had no reverence for Heaven, and
    no religion, and seems to have regarded Christianity as a disease
    which he wished his own country to be rid of, but was not sorry
    to see it spreading elsewhere. It is necessary to keep these ideas
    in mind in order to understand the action of the French Government
    to-day.

    It would be out of place here to discuss what Christianity
    is. Like Buddhism, it had a very pure origin, and the living
    principles of both are mercy, benevolence, and peace. But both
    religions have in course of ages been overlaid with doctrines and
    practices which have obscured the simplicity of their origin,
    and even changed their character. But the greatest misfortune
    to Christianity is that it has been made use of by princes
    as a pretext for wars of aggression. In fact, nearly all the
    wars of Europe for the last thousand years have been in some
    way connected with religion. This is sometimes made a reproach
    against Christianity, which professes to be founded on peace and
    self-sacrifice, but the reproach is scarcely just. Rather it is
    the peaceful character of Christianity which has induced ambitious
    statesmen to make use of it to work out their own designs, just as
    in private life unscrupulous men are sometimes enabled to carry
    out questionable plans by using the names of men of blameless
    character. We are only now concerned with the political aspect of
    Christianity, not its merits as a religion. The modern history of
    Turkey affords the best illustration of the danger of allowing
    foreign Powers to interfere in matters of religion. During the
    last hundred years Russia has several times made war on Turkey,
    always on the pretext of protecting Christians, and it is this
    which is fast breaking up the Turkish empire. It is interesting
    to observe that Russia and France follow the same policy in this
    matter. When the French Legation withdrew from Peking on the 2nd
    day of the 7th moon of the 10th year of Kwanghsu (22nd August
    1884), the affairs of the Christians were transferred to the
    Russian Legation. The Ministers of the Tsungli-Yamên remember
    very well how eagerly the Russian Minister assumed the office
    of protector of Christians, going to even greater lengths in the
    way of protection than the French themselves had done. The reason
    for this is plain. Russia, although she has none now, expects to
    have by-and-by many Christians in Mongolia and Manchuria who may
    be extremely useful to her in her aggressive designs on China.
    Therefore the Russian officials, always looking very far ahead,
    were most anxious to establish a right of interference for the
    protection of Christians. And they could do this without reproach
    when they were acting not for themselves but for France during
    war-time; well knowing that, whatever position she succeeded in
    establishing for France, Russia could claim for herself when the
    proper time came. But the more anxious Russia and France are to
    assert the right of interfering with Chinese Christians, the more
    resolute China should be in resisting all such interference. The
    only safety for China is to treat Christians, whether Chinese
    or foreign, exactly as all other people are treated--to make no
    distinctions. Foreign missionaries have the right to travel and
    reside in the interior; they can exercise this right without
    getting passports from the French Minister. The Catholic missions
    are composed of men of all nations, but they all have Ministers in
    Peking to whom they can apply for passports. Let the Germans get
    their passports from the German Legation, the Spaniards from the
    Spanish, Italians, Belgians, and Hollanders from their respective
    Legations, but no European State has any right to arrogate to
    itself the position of protector of missionaries in general.

    It is satisfactory to learn that the head of the Catholic Church
    is of this opinion, and although grateful to France for what
    she has done in the past, is now desirous of being free from
    French protection in the future. To carry out these views, the
    Pope is about to send to China a very high official to reside
    in Peking and perform the functions of a Minister. As the Pope
    has no troops and no territory, but is merely a kind of Dalai
    Lama, there is no danger to China from opening direct relations
    with him. The affairs of the missionaries can then be dealt with
    in an open and straightforward manner, as no fear of political
    traps will lurk behind. The Christians when they know they are no
    longer protected by a military State will understand that their
    security will depend on their own wisdom in avoiding offence.
    And the officials and people, on the other hand, will gradually
    learn that the Christians are only anxious to lead virtuous
    lives, without any political ambition, and they will respect
    them. The Imperial Government will then also be able to extend
    its favour to all Christians and missionaries without the fear
    of nursing traitors in its bosom. The missionaries have among
    them men of great learning and much skill in sciences, which the
    Emperor Kanghsi--who must always stand as the model for Chinese
    rulers--knew very well how to utilise. The present generation
    possesses men no less capable of rendering good services to China,
    and there would be no reason for not using them if the suspicion
    of their being agents of the French Government were once cleared
    away.

Notwithstanding so much clear thinking, however, the action of the
Chinese continued, as before, nebulous. They seemed never able to seize
the bull by the horns, but drifted on, allowing themselves constantly to
be put in the wrong, hoping perhaps to accomplish by illegitimate means
what was within their legal competence. Afraid or unwilling to control
the provincial authorities, they allowed outrages to be perpetrated for
which they refused redress until coercion was applied, thus affording to
foreign Powers a not in all cases unwelcome pretext for extending their
protection even to Chinese Christians. Within a month of the consummation
of the transfer of the Pei-t'ang Cathedral, and after the Marquis Tsêng,
fresh from Europe, had taken his seat at the Board, the Tsungli-Yamên had
fallen into its chronic apathy with regard to Christians. A missionary
named Bodinier arrived in Peking from distant Kweichow for the purpose
of soliciting the intervention or intercession of the French Legation
in favour of the persecuted Christians in that province. While he
was on his journey the Catholics of Chungking in Szechuan were being
similarly maltreated. Certain disturbances in that great commercial mart
culminated in the attack on the house of a wealthy Christian family, which
resisted the assailants, several of whom were killed in the affray. The
magistrates, who had been supine during the time when the mischief was
brewing, thereupon arrested the head of the Lo family and condemned him
to death,--an exercise of authority which was held to be arbitrary, and
invidiously directed against Christians. Here was an occasion when the
Central Government should have taken prompt action, and so deprived the
French Government of any pretext for interference. It was a moment when
that Government was less apt than usual to put forth its power in the
Christian cause. M. Constans was Minister in China, and he was personally
not at all disposed to assume the protection of Chinese Christians.
Nevertheless, the case being urgent, and the Tsungli-Yamên either cowardly
or indifferent, M. Constans broke through the rule he had laid down for
himself so far as to telegraph to Paris for instructions. The reply was
prompt, doubtless inspired by the propaganda at home, to the effect that
he should take up the case of Mr Lo. Thus the Chinese threw away a golden
opportunity of showing to the world that the Chinese Christians did not
stand in need of any foreign aid. An impartial investigation might have
shown, indeed, that the Christians were the aggressors, and the local
Chinese officials might have been vindicated from the charges made against
them. But the Government's inaction constantly puts it in the wrong even
when it may be substantially in the right. The same fatal course has been
regularly pursued even to our day, with results patent to all.

FOOTNOTES:

 [27] The effect of these imposing edifices, which dwarf into
    insignificance the most pretentious native buildings, is well
    exemplified in the approach to Canton, where the French cathedral
    church, erected on the site of the Viceroy Yeh's _yamên_, is the
    only object visible, and where the idea of a permanent memorial
    of defeat is well realised. It is not a conciliatory policy;
    irresistible force is required to maintain it.

 [28] See _supra_, p. 308.




CHAPTER XXVIII.

BRITISH SERVICES: DIPLOMATIC, CONSULAR, AND JUDICIAL.

    Necessity for administrative and judicial control over
    British subjects--Consular courts--Supreme court for China and
    Japan--_Personnel_ of the consular service--Functions of the
    diplomatic representatives--Absence of distinction explained by
    apathy of Home Government--Need of reform.


The frequent references throughout this work to the part played by British
agents in the development of intercourse with China seem to call for a
short account of the character and status of the official machinery which
served for so many years as the principal working joint between the two
opposed systems of civilisation.

The relations between Great Britain and China were necessarily at first
experimental. The consuls appointed to the five ports were selected with
no special training, and the chief superintendent, to whom they looked
for guidance, was scarcely better furnished than themselves. Yet, as has
been shown, the remoteness of the consuls from their chief, and of both
from the Government they served, threw them much upon their own resources.
How the demand for independent initiative was responded to by some of the
individuals concerned has been incidentally noticed in previous chapters.

From the time when it assumed direct relations with China, the need of an
effective control over British subjects resorting to that country weighed
heavily on the British Government; for in exempting them from native
jurisdiction the Government took on itself the responsibility for the good
behaviour of its people. The exercise of this control was necessarily
tentative, proceeding step by step as occasions arose. The unceasing
solicitude of the Government for the orderly conduct of its subjects in
China is testified by a long series of Orders in Council conferring on
the consuls and their superintendent an almost despotic authority over the
persons of the British residents. The operation of this arbitrary system
was more satisfactory than could have been expected, thanks to the high
character of the parties concerned and the common-sense which governed
their mutual relations. In their double capacity, however, of protectors
of Chinese and foreigners against the inroads of British subjects, and of
the latter against the inroads of the Chinese, the consuls soon discovered
that the one part of their duty was easy and the other difficult; and
it is no matter for wonder, therefore, if, following the line of least
resistance, some of them should have leaned to the side of repression
rather than to that of the encouragement of their countrymen. This was
noticeable even in judicial proceedings, where the consul was supreme
over his own nationals, but had no authority over their opponents. Some
check on the consequences of consular idiosyncrasies and defective legal
knowledge was maintained by a supreme court in Hongkong, independent
alike of the superintendent of trade and of the governor of the colony,
to which court appeals lay from consular decisions. This prerogative
of the colonial court was not unnaturally irksome to the diplomatic and
consular servants of the Foreign Office, and was doubtless one cause of
the coolness, not to say antipathy, with which the colony has generally
been regarded by them.

The treaties of 1858 and 1860 were followed by a great development
in all three services--diplomatic, consular, and judicial. Some years
previously the China consular service began to be treated as a career for
which special preparation was required, the entry being by competitive
examination, through which a certain number of students were annually sent
out to China, there to complete their education and then take their part
in executive work. When additional ports were opened, therefore, making
about twenty in all, in 1861, there was the full complement of qualified
men ready to occupy the new consular posts, each of them competent to be
his own interpreter. Diplomatic functions were at the same time withdrawn
from Hongkong, where they had been merely nominal for eighteen years,
and became centred in the Chinese capital. A few years later the judicial
authority, so far as it related to the communities at the Chinese ports,
was also withdrawn from Hongkong, and was conferred upon the Supreme Court
for China and Japan, having its headquarters in Shanghai, established by
the Queen's Order in Council of 1864. The new court was inaugurated by
Sir Edmund Hornby, who brought to the work practical experience gained in
the Levant, the assistant judge being Mr C. W. Goodwin, Barrister of the
Inner Temple. This establishment has furnished a solvent for many of the
difficulties connected with British residence in the Far East. Adapted
with judgment to local circumstances, the court has proved of immense
assistance to the consuls, who, subordinated judicially to the chief
judge, could now obtain from him proper guidance in their difficulties,
a facility of which they availed themselves freely.

Although a great advance on what preceded it, the Supreme Court could
not of course escape from all the drawbacks which affected the consular
courts. As between British subjects, it enjoyed the full powers of law
courts in the mother country; but as between British subjects on the one
hand, and the natives of the country, or non-British residents, on the
other, the authority of the British court could only be exercised over the
former. This one-sided action has been to some extent compensated in later
times by the judicial qualifications of consuls representing other Western
nationalities, who administer their own laws with the same impartiality
as the British courts do theirs. But as regards the Chinese no such
compensation operates, for although the treaties make provision for the
judicial action of the Chinese authorities, their conceptions of equity
and forms of procedure being wholly alien to those of the Western nations,
their decisions seldom satisfy the foreign litigant. An attempt to supply
a connecting-link between two radically different juridical ideals was
made in the setting up of mixed courts for the purpose of dealing with
petty cases between natives and foreigners within the settlements of
Shanghai. These courts have been occasionally presided over by honest and
competent judges, assisted by able foreign assessors; but as the native
magistrates, being men of low rank, could always be overruled by the local
executive, they lacked the power to make their decisions effective.

As it was impossible to set up a separate judicial establishment at
each treaty port where there was but a handful of residents, the consuls
had to continue to perform magisterial duty with all the inconveniences
attending their double function. Efforts were made by the Home Government
to minimise these disadvantages by infusing a modicum of legal knowledge
into the service, for which purpose they offered inducements to consular
officials who should qualify as barristers. Notwithstanding all this,
however, the simple fact that a consul is bound in his administrative
capacity to take a part in matters which may afterwards come before him as
a judge perpetuates an element of incongruity demanding an uncommon degree
of tact on the part of the official. Some of the worst consequences to be
apprehended from this state of things are partially obviated by the judge
or assistant judge of the Supreme Court going on circuit, when important
cases in the consular districts require it; but that expedient is only
possible at rare intervals.

The wisdom with which the Supreme Court has been directed is attested
by the absence of incident in its history, and by the universal tacit
approval of its proceedings. Its success, indeed, soon came to be accepted
so much as a matter of course that the true source of it was forgotten.
It was, however, recalled vividly to the public memory by a certain
retrograde movement. After a quarter of a century of satisfactory working
her Majesty's Government took a step which was equivalent to pulling out
the corner-stone of the edifice--the absolute independence of the bench.
In order to effect an economy in salaries, it was ordained that the two
incompatible offices--the judicial and political--should be merged into
one, making the chief judge consul-general, and the assistant judge consul
for Shanghai. By this move the judges became subordinate to the Legation
in Peking, and the Supreme Court itself was subjected to all the evils of
the dual function under which the consuls had been labouring. Thanks to
the exceptional qualities of the holders of the double office, no glaring
scandal arose out of the unnatural combination; but the protests of the
community, and of the incumbent of the two offices himself, were strong
enough to induce the Foreign Office, after a few years' trial, to retrace
their false step and restore the judge to his independence.

       *       *       *       *       *

The twenty consular establishments in China on which the Select Committee
of the House of Commons reported in 1872 were manned by forty "effectives
on duty," besides a considerable contingent on furlough. The ten posts
subsequently created employ on an average twenty more. Two complete
generations of officials have passed through the consular mill in fifty
years, which may be moderately reckoned at two hundred men, all of them
selected by a competitive examination only one degree less stringent
than that for the Indian Civil Service, and nearly all of them men
of varied accomplishments. They have been placed in every part of the
wide empire of China, and during their career have been shifted about
so that every one has had chances of interesting himself in localities
strongly contrasted with each other, both as regards official labour
and personal recreation and study. From a body of highly educated men
so situated, it was naturally to be expected that much enlightenment
would be obtained concerning China and its people, and considerable
progress made in the promotion of amiable intercourse between them and
foreigners. These expectations have not been disappointed. In the period
immediately following the peace of 1860 remarkable activity was shown
by British consular officers. The names of Meadows, Markham, Alabaster,
Oxenham, recall many exploits of exploration in the interior during
very troublous times. Swinhoe, Baber, Hosie, Bourne, Spence, Davenport,
Parker, have continued the work and greatly extended its area. Others
have distinguished themselves in the held of literary research, and
some have found their appropriate reward in honourable appointments in
English universities. On the whole, there has been lack of neither energy
nor capacity in the British consular service; and yet it is a matter of
common remark, even by its members themselves, that in their primary duty
of promoting and defending the interests of British commerce they have
been unsuccessful. Treaty rights, they admit, have not been safeguarded
at the Chinese ports, and this in spite of every apparent incentive to
exertion in their defence. A distinction, however, must be drawn between
an apparent incentive which is general and remote, such as the patriotic
desire for the advancement of their country's interests, and those
influences which are nearer and more personal. The attitude of the China
consuls can only be fairly estimated in its relation to that of their
chief, and his again in relation to that of the Home Government. "Like
master, like man," is an adage which fits the case, and it is to Peking
and to London we must look for the key to the character of the consular
rank and file.

       *       *       *       *       *

The British Ministers at Peking have been selected without any fixed
rule. The first of the series was taken from the diplomatic circle. The
succeeding three, whose term of office covered a period of twenty years,
were chosen from among the veterans of the consular service. The next
two were taken from the junior ranks of diplomacy, and the seventh was a
military officer from Africa. The appointment of Sir Robert Hart in 1885,
which was cancelled by his wish, afforded further illustration of the
extreme catholicity of the Government's elective faculty.

The witnesses examined before the Select Committee of the House of
Commons in 1872 were unanimous in insisting on the necessity for long and
special training for the office of consul in China, and this principle
has been strictly followed by the Government. But for the higher post of
superintendent of all the consuls the Government has, at least since 1885,
acted on the theory that no such qualification is necessary. But the task
of a Minister to China is by no means an easy one. It may be left undone,
or it may be done so badly that it were better not to be done at all, but
to discharge the duties of the office in a creditable manner requires not
only high training but large capacity. The Minister has to conduct his
own diplomatic duties in the capital, in which not the Chinese alone but
all or nearly all his foreign colleagues are openly or secretly thwarting
him. He has at the same time to direct the proceedings of twenty or thirty
officers placed at great distances, whom he has never seen, and every one
of whom is superior to himself in the knowledge of the conditions to be
dealt with. For such a duty it is obvious that an officer sent from Europe
must be incompetent, the circumstances of the service in China differing
essentially from those prevailing elsewhere. The new incumbent, unless
he were a born genius, could never get beyond the elementary lessons of
experience before, overtaken by promotion, he shakes the Chinese dust off
his feet for ever. Much might of course be learned by personal observation
at the consular ports and conference with local officials and people in
the provinces, but it is somewhat singular that this obvious source of
intelligence has been taken advantage of almost exclusively by those of
the British Ministers who stood the least in need of it. Indeed the only
one of them who made it a rule to visit the treaty ports at intervals
was Sir Rutherford Alcock, whose long experience convinced him of the
necessity of constantly refreshing and extending his knowledge of local
circumstances and people.

A service dispersed over such a large area as the Chinese empire, carried
on by despatches between parties who were strangers to each other, and
one of whom at least had no personal knowledge of the subjects treated,
must have been characterised by an absence of reality, and must have
tended more and more towards a perfunctory routine. For this, however,
the system of appointing Ministers who were strangers to the country
was not wholly responsible. Long before the Ministers were so selected
the secretaries began to be sent from European schools, and thus the
consular service, disheartened by inadequate pay and a constant menace
of further diminution, saw the few prizes of their profession withdrawn
from their reach. To serve his time quietly, therefore, to earn his
pension and retire without a stain on his character, became more or less
the consular ideal. Ambition was starved among those who had to bear
the burden and heat of a thirty years' residence in China, when they saw
good posts thrown away upon men imported for two or three years, who were
almost useless, and who themselves deplored their enforced idleness. The
disadvantages attending these exotic importations have been often insisted
upon. An old member of the consul staff comments upon it in the following
practical manner:--

    In every country administered by the British Crown, or at
    every Court at which there is a British representative, the
    administrator or envoy has from the moment of his entering
    on the duties of his office the assistance of an experienced
    staff, well versed in the local history and traditions, or finds
    himself in the midst of a society the language and usages of
    which are familiar to him. In China, where we have been fighting
    and negotiating for over fifty years, we are not so fortunate.
    A Minister proceeds there, and on his arrival finds himself in
    a new and to him unknown country, the staff which he may bring
    with him being like himself utterly unacquainted with the East
    and its peoples. The Minister is obliged either to grope his way
    unassisted, or to rely on the aids and advice of experienced (but
    not always disinterested) outsiders. Under these circumstances his
    only wise course is to put himself entirely in the hands of the
    permanent local staff, which, for this purpose, means the Chinese
    Secretary. That officer, the real motive force of the Legation,
    occupies a position of greater importance than that of the nominal
    head of the mission, but, with an irony which is not uncommon in
    Government administration, he is the least appreciated member of
    the staff. His salary is that of the junior ranks in the consular
    service, and yet it is to him that the seniors in that service
    look for instructions which he is incompetent to give them: the
    result may be imagined. Why should these things be? The Indian
    Government has in its service many men of brilliant attainments,
    and of knowledge gained in long years of service in the East,
    who might be called upon to fill the post of Minister which would
    be suitable and congenial to them. And there is an abundance of
    choice of junior Legation officers in the well-trained consular
    service. Would it not be very advantageous if the working hands in
    the Legation were chosen from the most competent Chinese scholars
    in the consular service?

Considering their initial qualifications, their social standing, and their
great opportunities, it must be admitted that the men of distinction
who have emerged from the consular service during the last fifty years
seems disproportionately small. It is perhaps invidious to mention
names in this connection, but in response to inquiries addressed to
veterans in the service, four men only are placed in the first rank as
the best representatives of the consular training school. These are Sir
Harry Parkes, Mr T. T. Meadows, Mr H. N. Lay, and Mr W. F. Mayers. Sir
Robert Hart, it should be mentioned, left the service so early, and Sir
Rutherford Alcock joined it so late, in life, that their distinguished
careers can scarcely be claimed as the product of the consular nursery.

       *       *       *       *       *

It is impossible to look back over the forty years which have elapsed
since the new relations were established in China without being struck
by a certain change which passed over the character of the diplomatic
and consular services between the first decade of that period and the
second. The anxious years of the rebellion evoked much active energy on
the part of British officials. The serious opposition to the operation
of the treaties was met by very vigorous action on the part of the
consuls at the ports and of the Minister at the capital. The years 1868
and 1869 may be considered to have marked the culminating-point of the
British official effort to enforce observance of the treaties in letter
and spirit, and to protect all commercial interests. The change which
came over the diplomatic and consular services at the end of the first
decade of diplomatic relations may be likened to the rising followed by
the receding of a tide. Up till the years we have specified, whatever the
difficulties which beset their office, the consuls showed earnestness in
the defence of the interests confided to them, and acted on the conviction
that their exertions were pleasing to those who were set in authority
over them. Their sense of duty was sustained by the hope of distinction.
After 1869 the discovery was made that the situation had been undergoing
a change of which the service had been unaware. What was formerly deemed
a merit had become a demerit in consular officers, and on this discovery
zeal naturally fell to a discount. It was but a reflex of the change that
had crept over the spirit of the British Foreign Office, a change which
also had escaped notice until circumstances forced it into publicity.
This seems to have originated with the removal from the scene of Lord
Palmerston, the statesman who for forty years had stood in a general way
for what was manly and straightforward in the British national character.
Though he left a tried and trusted colleague, Lord Clarendon, in charge of
the Foreign Office, and a sturdy permanent Under-Secretary, perhaps the
last custodian of the Palmerstonian tradition, and who remained at his
post for five years longer, yet it was made evident by results that the
spirit which had animated that great department of State had vanished.
The Foreign Office became nerveless and invertebrate, sentimental
and unstable. Those who had to do with it in the time of Palmerston,
Layard, and Hammond know that since their time the officials bearing
the same titles have been of quite another calibre, have been swayed
by different influences, and above all have exhibited no such knowledge
of the affairs with which they had to deal as their predecessors of the
Palmerstonian era. Many explanations may be given for the new departure
without disparagement of the capacities of the individuals concerned.
Such explanations interest those who may desire to promote reform in the
constitution and the inspiration of the Foreign Office. It suffices us
merely to note the fact by way of accounting for some of the shortcomings
which have been laid to the charge of our representation in China. We
have seen how easily one Foreign Secretary yielded to the meretricious
solicitations of the envoy Burlingame, and how another allowed himself
to be cajoled by the Marquis Tsêng. After these, and sundry other such,
exhibitions it was impossible for any Minister serving the country in
the Far East to place the old reliance on the support of his Government.
With John Bright, the implacable opponent of Palmerston and his works,
installed at the Board of Trade, whose word was law on such matters
as Chinese commercial treaties, and apparently more anxious to undo
the work of Palmerston than to promote a trade which both he and his
department unaffectedly despised, it was not likely that the commercial
communities trading with China should cherish any hope of redress of
grievances from a Government whose face seemed set against them. Apathy,
therefore, became the principle, to keep the peace at all sacrifices the
avowed policy of British diplomacy in China. The apparent exception to
this rule in the attempted reclamations in connection with the Margary
murder in 1875 afforded in its abortive ending a new corroboration of
the rule. The diplomatic and consular establishments went on grinding out
routine despatches and publishing statistical reports, but with the tacit
understanding that whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil. Under
such conditions it was of little consequence how the Peking representation
might be filled, since it has not for thirty years risen above the level
of comedy, the term applied to it by those who have grown old in its
service.

       *       *       *       *       *

Such was the situation of affairs when the greatest crisis in the history
of China, or of foreign relations with that country, was sprung upon
the world in 1894. A Legation equal only to clerical routine suddenly
called upon to play a part in a commotion which unhinged the policy of
the world was totally inadequate to the strain, and as a consequence of
the impotence of the Foreign Office and its agent in China, the interests
of Great Britain and, what was only second in importance, the interests
of the Chinese empire were allowed to go by default. The Chinese were,
and perhaps even still remain, unconscious of the reasons of the collapse
of their empire. Perhaps something of the same kind might be said of
the British Foreign Office in regard to the interests of Great Britain
in China. Certainly there is as yet little sign of a determination to
reform the mechanism of the country's representation, and this, perhaps,
because the preliminary step thereto would be the reform of the Foreign
Office itself. And so the Legation goes on under the nominal headship
of a Minister who must be guided entirely by his Chinese Secretary, an
official of inferior rank and position to the body of consuls whom he has
to control, and for whose authority they can never have genuine respect.

The recent upheaval has offered many new opportunities of distinction for
the consuls, especially in the interior of China. That these openings
have infused new life into the consular ranks has been shown in many
ways during the last few years; and if natural selection be allowed to
operate freely and the best men be not discouraged in their efforts for
their country's benefit by undue interferences from Peking, where there is
neither knowledge nor capacity to guide them, it is still possible that
the consular service may play a valuable part in the reconstruction of
the foreign relations of China.




CHAPTER XXIX.

CHINA AND HER RULERS.

    Longevity of the State--Government by prestige--Necessity
    of adaptation to European ideas--The Empress-dowager--Prince
    Kung--Wênsiang--Hu Lin-yi--Tsêng Kwo-fan--Tso Tsung-tang--Chang
    Chih-tung--Li Hung-chang--His long and consistent career--Efforts
    at reorganising national forces.


The long continuance of a State more populous than any other on record is
a phenomenon which to thoughtful minds can hardly fail to evoke a feeling
akin to reverence. De Quincey declared if he met a Chinaman he would
make obeisance to him, saying, "There goes a man 2000 years old." Be the
causes of this national longevity what they may, the fact should make us
pause to consider on what foundation does this great vital national system
rest? The most realistic word-painter of China represents the country as
a collection of villages, each being a unit of self-government,[29] and
in describing "village life" in minute detail, seems to depict the great
empire, of which each village is a pattern in miniature. Dynasties may
come and dynasties may go, but the Chinese families, their industries
and their customs, go on for ever. It is remarkable with what ease the
people adapt themselves to changes in their ruling powers, regardless
of race or origin; indeed it is a noteworthy fact that the rulers have
for many centuries been more often foreign than native.[30] Foreign,
however, not quite in the sense in which the word is so easily translated
"barbarian" by the Chinese, and applied by them to the hated Aryans of
the West. The rulers of China have been of cognate races, more or less
imbued with the same generic ideas as the Chinese themselves, and with
tastes akin to theirs. How this succession of dynasties, each established
by violence, has coexisted with the continuity of the grand national
idea of the emperor being the Son of Heaven can only be explained by the
very practical character of the race, who accept the usurper as divinely
appointed from the moment he has proved himself successful. What holds,
and has held together from ancient times, this great aggregate of mankind
in common usages and ideas is naturally a mystery to Occidentals, the
cohesive principle not being perceptible to them. China occupies the
unique position of a State resting on moral force,[31] a conception almost
as alien to the Western mind as material progress is to the Eastern, hence
the proposition is apt to be received with amused contempt. Yet a State
administered without police, and ruled without an army, is a something
which cannot be explained away. Government by prestige is, other things
being equal, surely the most economical as well as the most humane of all
species of government; but an obvious consequence is that in emergencies
the Government is beholden to volunteers, and is often driven to enlist
the services of banditti and other forces proscribed by the law. Imperial
prestige, which embraces the relations of the surrounding tributaries,
is but an expansion of the authority of the head of the family and of
the elders of the village, which rests on moral sanction only. The first
collision, however, with the material forces of Christendom proved that
in the system of the modern world the Chinese principle of government
was an anachronism, and that moral must succumb to physical force. Yet
in the midst of the world's triumph in the pricking of the great Chinese
bubble, it had been well to reflect what the kind of bubble was that was
being pricked. China with her self-contained, self-secreted knowledge,
could not be expected to foresee how the impact of the West was likely to
affect her ancient polity. She had nothing wherewith to compare herself,
and no criterion of good or evil except her own isolated experience; nor
did she know aught of human development except what was, so to speak,
forcibly injected into her, but never assimilated. What, then, could she
do to be saved but to take herself entirely to pieces like a house that
has to be rebuilt on a new plan, and so fit herself for the companionship
and competition of the worldly Powers, from whose pressure she could by
no means escape? She had to put away the wisdom of ages, the traditions
of a civilisation unbroken for thousands of years, and convert herself
into a mechanical, scientific, and military Power. Something more radical
than reform is involved in such a root-and-branch change: it was not
improvement but transformation that was demanded.

That some such essential changes are necessary to the preservation of
the Chinese empire is probably recognised by all who interest themselves
in the subject--including a large ever-increasing number of the Chinese
themselves; but the gravity of the revolution may well cause misgivings
both as to its possibility and its incalculable effects. Who among the
Chinese rulers is sufficient for such things?

It is not always possible to locate the nervous centre of any Government
in the West, whether its form be autocratic or representative. With
regard to that of China we may safely say it is never possible--at
least for any foreigner. The attempts which have been from time to time
made to assign acts of Government to the will or influence of certain
individuals have in general proved in the sequel to have been far from
hitting the mark. The monarch under whose authority the whole machine
moves is not necessarily the directing will: indeed he is very often
little better than a puppet. "The eunuchs, concubines, and play-actors,
who constituted the Court of the late Emperor Hsien-fêng, the father of
the present young emperor, had more influence probably in bringing on
the war that led the Allies to Peking than any of the high officers or
Ministers," wrote Sir Rutherford Alcock in 1871. Another writer put it in
a more paradoxical form: "There is in China something more powerful than
the Emperor, and that is the Viceroy; more powerful than the Viceroy,
and that is the Taotai; more powerful than the Taotai, and that is the
Weiyuen," meaning that the power of obstruction, extending through every
grade of officialdom, is most widely diffused at the base. Official
responsibility and moral responsibility do not therefore coincide--men
in highest positions being unable to do the things they would, while the
things they would not they are often obliged to do. The Government is
consequently carried on by continual compromise beyond the limits to which
we are accustomed in Western Governments, because it is not confronted
with outspoken opposition with which it can reason, but with a network
of secret machinations which can only be met by correlative tactics. But
though Government in China may seem by this state of things to be reduced
to an almost passive condition, yet the individuality of statesmen is
not altogether destroyed. In some respects, indeed, the circumstances
we have noted rather favour the influence of men of mark; for where the
complicated machine is held in a state of equilibrium by innumerable
neutralising checks, it would appear that any determined will could set
it in motion in a given direction. The character of Chinese statesmen,
therefore, is not a factor to be ignored in considering either the present
or the future of China, although the very partial knowledge of them which
is accessible to Europeans must constantly lead to erroneous conclusions.

       *       *       *       *       *

Of the statesmen who have appeared since the opening of Peking in 1860,
it would probably be fair to consider the two emperors as negligible
quantities. The potent personage in the empire during that period is
no doubt the Empress-dowager, who has, in so far as any one can be
said to have done so, ruled China for forty years. Apart from ethical
considerations, which have less to do with matters of government than
could be wished, the empress's characteristics are clearness of purpose,
strength of will, a ready accommodation of means to ends, and frank
acceptance of the inevitable. There are no signs of the bigot or the
doctrinaire about her. Mundane in her objects, she is practical in seeking
them; and if to hold an entirely anomalous position of authority opposed
to legitimacy and the traditions of the dynasty and the empire be evidence
of success, then the empress-dowager must be admitted to be a successful
woman. In the position she has occupied, and still occupies, she would
appear to be the principal force in the State. Whatever may be her power
of initiative, which is so attenuated in the high State functionaries,
her power of veto probably stands pre-eminent.

The anomalous relations which have subsisted between the empress-dowager
and her imperial nephew are too intricate for us to attempt to unravel
them. But the facts resulting from them, which are patent to the world,
point to conditions which are not without danger to the empire. Indeed
the Emperor himself constituted such a danger from the moment when as
an infant he was placed on the Dragon Throne by usurped authority. His
personal imperfections added materially to that danger, and his final
efforts to free himself from the leading-strings of his patroness have
indefinitely enhanced the evil by destroying the personal prestige
of the sovereign. For what can be thought of a Son of Heaven who has
his prerogatives doled out to him and again withdrawn by the will of
another, and where is the force to meet the crisis in the State which
may yet result from the illegitimacy of the emperors succession? The
worship accorded throughout the empire to the Son of Heaven may indeed be
transferred unimpaired to a new possessor of that dignity. But a reigning
emperor shorn of his governing faculty must, one would think, put the
allegiance of the people to a severe strain. How far such considerations
may go in weakening the ties of loyalty in the provinces and in letting
loose the spectre of rebellion cannot be known, but it may be guessed and
feared.

       *       *       *       *       *

Leaving out the Camarilla of the Court, of whom nothing certain can
be predicated, the executive statesmen who have to outward appearance
directed the public affairs of the Chinese empire for forty years may
almost be counted on the fingers of one hand. Prince Kung, the highest in
station and nearest to the throne, was rather a moderating than an active
force in the State, and his attention was very much divided between public
affairs and those of more personal concern. His colleague, Wênsiang, was a
more energetic character. By common consent he was the most conscientious
as well as the most liberal-minded statesman that China has produced
during the sixty years of foreign intercourse. Mr Adkins, who knew him
intimately in the early days, says: "He was courteous in manner and a
lively conversationalist. He once told me over the teacups that, if he
could have his will, every brick and stone of Hongkong city should be torn
down and thrown into the sea." This was not the kind of language he held
at a later period; for, in a private interview with Sir Rutherford Alcock
in 1869, while admitting the hostility of his class and that he himself
had originally shared all their prejudices, he declared that his long and
intimate relations with the foreign Legations had opened his eyes to the
favourable side of the foreign character and progressive policy. Perhaps
the best account of this Manchu statesman is that given by Sir Rutherford
Alcock himself in an article in 'Fraser's Magazine,' 1871:--

    Wênsiang is by far the most distinguished, both from his superior
    knowledge and his intellectual grasp of the position occupied
    by China in its relations with foreign States.... As a member of
    the Grand Secretariat, and vested with other high functions, his
    influence is very great, both personal and official--subject,
    nevertheless, to such attenuation as the active hostility of a
    very powerful party of anti-foreign functionaries within and
    without the palace can effect. This party, if party that can
    properly be called which is composed of nearly the whole of
    the educated classes of the empire--officials, literati, and
    gentry--are unceasing in their opposition to all progressive
    measures, whether emanating from the Foreign Board or elsewhere.
    But Wênsiang is held in especial hatred as the known advocate of a
    policy of progressive improvement with foreign aid and appliances.
    The failure of the Lay-Osborn fleet very nearly effected his ruin,
    and that of his patron the prince [Kung] also, and has ever since
    told against his influence. The cost and humiliation of that most
    disastrous experiment were all visited on his head, and it has no
    doubt tended not solely to impair his power, but also to render
    him more timid and less disposed to make any further venture in
    the same direction. He has the reputation among his own people of
    being honest, and foreigners know him to be patriotic and earnest
    in what he believes to be for the good of his country, while
    far in advance of all his contemporaries in enlightened views
    as to how in the actual situation of affairs that end may best
    be served. Upon occasions he can be both bitter and sarcastic,
    and speaks out his mind plainly enough against the pretensions
    of foreigners to shape everything to their own ends in China. He
    nevertheless gets little credit from the opposite faction for
    patriotism or a disinterested love of his country, and of late
    there has been remarked, with failing health, an expression of
    weariness, as if he were losing heart and hope, and began to feel
    unequal to any further struggle. With the ever-increasing demands
    for better execution of treaties--in things often materially and
    legally impossible in the present state of affairs, for larger
    facilities and increased privileges on the foreign side, and
    the gathering of hostile elements in front and all round him
    proceeding from the Chinese national party, who would refuse
    everything, and, if left to themselves, precipitate the country
    into another war with the Western Powers, he may well feel weary.

Wênsiang, in short, suffered the fate of those who are too liberal and
too far advanced for their surroundings, and became a martyr to his own
disappointment. Old before his time, and overwhelmed with difficulties
which he was unable to surmount, his mind became depressed, and his death
in 1876 cost China the ablest, the best, and most devoted of her public
men. No doubt there have been good and well-meaning men since his time,
both in the Tsungli-Yamên, the Great Council, and in the provincial
governments; but none of them has shown any quality of leadership, and
all have for the most part been content with the maxim, "Sufficient for
the day is the evil thereof."

The comparatively early death of Hu Lin-yi, a Hunanese, Governor of the
province of Hupei, who, in conjunction with Kuanwen, the Governor-General
of the Hu provinces, originated the scheme for repressing the Taiping
rebellion, prevented him from receiving the credit of that notable
achievement. The institutions of the country paralysed its defence, for
a provincial army was an object of dread to the Manchu rulers, while they
possessed no imperial organisation to cope with the calamity. No attempt,
therefore, could be made to organise a force to resist the rebellion,
and so the devastation was allowed to spread from province to province
without check. Hu Lin-yi set himself to overcome this difficulty, and
thought out a scheme by which the rebellion might be overcome. Before
taking any action, however, it was necessary that he should bring the
Peking Government to his views, which he accomplished by first converting
the Governor-General, who was a Manchu. The two thereupon joined in a
memorial to the throne, praying that they might be permitted to raise in
the Central Provinces a mobile military force to repel the invasion of
the insurgents.

The nucleus of this force already existed in the province of Hunan, where
volunteer levies under the leadership of Tsêng Kwo-fan, the father of the
late Marquis Tsêng, Minister to Great Britain, had done good service in
several small engagements with the rebels. The execution of the general
scheme of defence against the rebels fell naturally, therefore, to the
lot of Tsêng, who during his subsequent governor-generalship of the Lower
Yangtze had the honour of putting an end to the ravages of the Taipings.
No man was held in higher esteem among the counsellors of the Chinese
empire than this sagacious statesman. At once moderate and resolute, he
perceived the need of accommodation to the exigencies of the new time, and
though he would have resisted the ingress of foreigners to the uttermost,
he had the wisdom to see that this was no longer possible, and the advice
tendered to his sovereign, while tempered to the susceptibilities of the
Court, was distinctly in favour of respecting the treaties and avoiding
conflict with foreign nations.

A contemporary of Tsêng Kwo-fan, and his equal in rank and authority,
was Tso Tsung-tang, best known as the Conqueror of Kashgar, where he was
credited with military exploits which history will scarcely ratify. He
was a thoroughgoing man, blunt in manner, but straightforward, and loyal
to his engagements. He was somewhat rash and uncompromising, seeking the
end sometimes without considering the means, and his opinion on matters of
State would have carried no weight but for his reputation for exemption
from the prevailing vice of his class--financial corruption. This
character obtained him toleration for many originalities. On one occasion
he camped outside the walls of Peking for several days because he refused
to pay the customary exactions of the officials in charge of the gates,
so that his audience of the emperor seemed likely to be indefinitely
postponed. But high officials in China of austere views have usually a
man of business in attendance who oils the wheels while saving the face
of their master. Tso's money matters were in the hands of a very politic
gentleman of this class, and so the Grand Secretary's entry into the city
was duly arranged. Tso had a lofty idea of the dignity of his country,
and of the necessity for its defending itself against all enemies.
To this end he threw his energies into the development of the arsenal
and shipbuilding-yard at the Pagoda anchorage in the Foochow river. He
was generally considered an opponent of his younger contemporary, Li
Hung-chang, the one being held to stand for the old conservatism of China,
and the other for its liberalisation. They were for many years the two
chief provincials, the one being Imperial Commissioner for the southern
and the other for the northern ports of China. It was customary for the
emperor to refer important questions connected with foreign affairs to
these two advisers, whose opinions must very often have neutralised each
other. In the end Tso recognised the necessity for a change of policy for
the preservation of the empire, but being himself too old to change he
recommended his rival, Li Hung-chang, to the Throne as the fitting man to
introduce needed innovations. If the records are to be implicitly trusted
Tso would appear to have undergone a sort of death-bed repentance, for
in his political testament, a document which is regarded with a kind of
sacred authority in China, he recommended to the throne the improvements
he had steadfastly opposed, including even the introduction of railways
into the country.

Although out of the chronological order, we may mention here another
eminent official, distinguished by many of the characteristics of
Tso Tsung-tang, who has been Governor of the province of Shansi,
Governor-General of the Canton provinces, and is now Governor-General of
the central provinces. Wherever he has been, Chang Chih-tung has proved
himself bold and original. His open mind has led him to take up schemes
warmly without counting the cost, and under his inspiration immense sums
have been spent in both his viceroyalties for which but little return
was obtained, and of which indeed it was scarcely possible to render a
clear account. His reputation for purity, however, has saved him from
the consequences of his recklessness, both in the eyes of the people and
of the Government, and enabled him to hold office long enough to show
some results of his expensive enterprises. The great ironworks which he
set up in Hanyang, with very little consideration as to how they were to
become effective, have at last produced iron of a quality sufficient to
make inferior rails, thus giving an earnest of the ultimate realisation
of his dream of rendering China independent of foreign countries. Chang's
literary power is of a very high order, his style is terse and incisive,
and this is a weapon which renders him formidable in a country which
cultivates literature as a religion. To say that Chang Chih-tung is
the opponent of foreigners is merely to credit him with the ordinary
patriotism of his countrymen. But though he often treats strangers with
the studied discourtesy which characterised the older generation of
Chinese officials, he has never allowed his prejudices to stand in the
way of free intercourse with any foreigner whom he thought he could make
subservient to some purpose of his own. As a statesman Chang Chih-tung has
failed through intensity and want of comprehensiveness. In fact he is not
a statesman, but a sciolist, and a trenchant essayist, unaccustomed to
accommodate his ideas to the circumstances of actual life. He, too, has
been a bitter opponent of Li Hung-chang, which, however, did not hinder
him from composing a most fulsome panegyric on that statesman on the
occasion of his seventieth birthday, in which he was credited with all
the attributes of all the heroes of Chinese mythology. The many fantastic
schemes which Chang has originated would in any Western country have
relegated their author to the custody of the Commissioners of Lunacy.
One of these was to prevent foreign ships entering the Gulf of Pecheli
by sinking tiers of junks between Shantung and Talien-wan; another was
to catch the Japanese soldiers in a gigantic locust-trap, consisting of a
deep trench to be dug at their supposed landing-place near Shanhai-kwan,
and the fact of this proposal being seriously adopted and some miles
of the trench actually dug by the Chinese soldiers reveals more of the
military impotence of China than the most voluminous dissertations.

Without carrying the exhaustive process further, it is safe to say that
whatever concrete statesmanship there has been in China during the past
generation has been embodied in the person of Li Hung-chang. He alone has
a continuous record, has followed a definite line, and kept his ideals,
like a captive balloon, strictly attached to the earth on which he had
to work. He also was a literate of distinction, having taken the highest
degree, that of the Hanlin College. But though his literary tastes have
not been left wholly uncultivated, they have never intruded themselves
into his conduct of affairs, so that an estimate of his position cannot
be based upon his writings, but only on his actions. He indulged in no
speculations, propounded no theories, but was eminently a man of fact.
Contrary to all Chinese tradition he laid himself out for personal
intercourse with foreigners, from whom he was never weary of learning, and
in doing so he braved the odium of his peers, and incurred the charge of
treason as a truckler to barbarians. Living in the eyes of the world, both
of his own and foreign countries, for a period of nearly forty years, he
has been the one familiar figure in modern China. His accessibility has
afforded to travellers and visitors endless opportunities of delineation,
so that if ever a Chinese of rank was known throughout the world it must
be Li Hung-chang.

The interest attaching to this statesman consists in his having in his
own person, and without a party, stood between the Old World and the
New, having devoted his life to working out in practice a _modus vivendi_
between them. His methods have been wholly empirical and opportunist, and
hence no synthesis of his plan of operations is available, except such as
we may compose out of the facts themselves. A few cardinal principles,
nevertheless, stand out clearly in the life-work of this statesman. One
is that of reorganising the defensive forces of the empire in accordance
with the lessons learned from foreign raids; a second has been so to
observe the treaties made with foreigners as to afford them no ground
for complaint; and a third, when causes of difference arose, whether
by inadvertence or by design, to agree with the adversary quickly. The
following out of the first two might very well have entailed upon Li the
reproach of favouring foreigners; the following out of the third may with
greater justice have earned for him the character of a peace-at-any-price
man. So consistently did he follow the line of action dictated by these
principles, that no attacks on foreigners or on Christian missions have
ever been tolerated within his jurisdiction. During the twenty-four years
of his governor-generalship of Chihli, whose population is one of the most
turbulent in the empire, there was not a single missionary outrage, his
instructions to his district officials being peremptory, that, right or
wrong, they must have no questions with foreigners. Had the other viceroys
been similarly minded and equally resolute, no attacks on missionaries
would have been recorded throughout the Chinese Empire. Though Li
Hung-chang was as much anti-foreign at heart as every true Chinaman
must be, he endeavoured, crudely following the example of the Japanese,
to employ foreign men and appliances in order the more effectually to
resist them. His pacific tendencies were no proof of pusillanimity, but
rather of a deep consciousness, derived from personal experience, of the
incapacity of China to resist foreign attack. Li Hung-chang's external
policy, therefore, may be defined as the strengthening of the country to
meet invasion, and the avoidance, while such preparations were being made,
of every cause of collision with foreigners. These cardinal points had to
be kept in view, like guiding stars, amid the exigencies of daily affairs,
which alone were sufficient to fill up the measure of one man's capacity.
The administration of two populous provinces, the superintendency of the
maritime trade of half the empire, and incessant consultations concerning
imperial affairs generally, constituted a burden which no one man could
bear. While to these were added the whole details of national defence,
naval and military reorganisation, the construction of a navy on foreign
lines, the whole of which was undertaken by Li Hung-chang, working not
only without a party but practically without a staff, and at the mercy of
technical advisers who owed him no allegiance. The briefest recapitulation
of the duties so undertaken would be enough to stagger the credulity of
the most active administrator of the West; the recital would suffice,
without any proof from experience, to show that these labours of Hercules
could never, in fact, be performed. But the difference between performance
and non-performance marks the chasm which divides the Chinese from the
Western world, and distinguishes the order of ideas and practice which
make for the preservation, from those which tend to the disintegration,
of the Chinese empire itself. The task from which the mass of Chinese
statesmen have recoiled, and which has only been attempted in a persistent
manner by Li Hung-chang himself, was probably beyond the power of any man
and of any party.

       *       *       *       *       *

But here the inquiry suggests itself, why a strong-headed and
practical-minded man should have devoted a lifetime to impossible
achievements, and why in a nation of great intellects the task should
have been virtually relegated to one man? The Chinese are not fools;
their mental capacity is second to that of no other race. Their culture is
excessive, though narrow; and if we find them exhibiting in great national
affairs no more intelligence than that shown by children in building
castles of sand, it is natural to conclude that there is some fundamental
misconception either on their part or on ours of the problem before them.
But if we consider the Chinese as belonging to the world of moral force,
then their misconception of all that belongs to the world of physical
force is not only explicable, but it is inevitable; for between the two
there is no common ground on which even a compromise might be effected,
and the one must eternally misunderstand the other.

The burden of the memorials of the Chinese high functionaries on this
subject have been that the Middle Kingdom being overcome by the brute
force of the rebellious barbarians, the obvious way to restore the
lapsed authority of the empire was to acquire the instruments of foreign
strength. This they diligently set themselves to do, but apparently
without the slightest comprehension of the secret of the strength of the
foreigners. The Chinese being what they were, could no more win the secret
of the Western power by buying its weapons than a musical tyro could hope
to rival the greatest artistes by possessing himself of a Stradivarius.
Guns, ships, explosives of the latest type, are worse than dummies without
the organised human force that gives them life. The element which would
have infused vitality into the new organisation was the one thing beyond
their imagination, and so far as they did comprehend it, it inspired them
with aversion and awe, for it meant in their eyes delivering the keys of
power into the hands of strangers. What was needed to regenerate the army,
to create a navy, to reform the finances, was the liberal importation
of men. This necessity was no doubt partially perceived by Li Hung-chang
and his like, but never entirely even by him; for he remained throughout
the one-eyed man among the blind, groping after something which he could
only guess at. Teachers from Europe and America were employed in the
country, and natives were sent to foreign countries to be instructed;
but the spirit of the new instruction was never allowed to vitalise the
organisation, and consequently all the knowledge that was acquired by both
methods remained barren and unfruitful. Thus Li Hung-chang's efforts fell
short of their object, and China continued to be the land of moral force
for the iron-shod physical forces to trample on.

From the earliest period of his career Li Hung-chang stood out far in
advance of his fellows, and in all the troubles which have beset the
empire during his time, it is he who has been thrust into the breach and
made to bear the brunt of its misfortunes. Being the only man who did
anything, he was naturally made responsible for all, and critics, both
foreign and native, have had an easy task in laying bare his failures,
which his contemporaries have escaped by confining themselves to official
routine and playing for their own safety. Though the burden of the State
has fallen upon the shoulders of Li Hung-chang more than upon any other
individual, he has never flinched from the responsibility. The occurrences
of 1894 and subsequently threw him into greater prominence than ever
before. Forced to carry on the war with Japan, during which the defences
of the empire for which he was responsible completely broke down, he
was next also forced to make peace with that Power on very humiliating
conditions. Seldom was a more pathetic scene witnessed than the virtual
controller of the Chinese empire lying at the feet of a victorious enemy
in a foreign country, with the bullet of an assassin in his cheek. More
tragic still was his return to the capital with the treaty of Shimonoseki.
An intense feeling against Li had been roused throughout the country. The
provincial officials with singular unanimity denounced his treachery as
they considered it, for the treaty was in their eyes no less disgraceful
than the conduct of the war, for both of which Li alone was deemed
responsible. The sentiment of the provinces was echoed in Peking, where
his enemies in high places had almost secured the capital punishment of
the negotiator, and failing that, his assassination, from which fate he
was only saved by the veto of Prince Kung and the subsequent protection
of the empress-dowager. He was also in an important sense under the
protection of Russia, that Power having undertaken to hold him harmless
from the consequences of his surrender to the Japanese. In order to take
him out of the way of the conspiracies in Peking, Russia requested that
an Imperial prince might be sent to the coronation ceremony in 1896.
That being impossible by the laws of the empire, which Russia very well
knew, a substitute of the highest rank had to be found, and thus Li
Hung-chang was designated, by the approval of the empress-dowager and by
the consent--reluctant it is believed--of the Emperor, for the mission
of congratulation to the Czar. After the festivities at Moscow, Li made
the tour of Europe and the United States, meeting everywhere with a
distinguished reception.

FOOTNOTES:

 [29] Village Life in China. By Arthur Smith, D.D.

 [30] An ingenious friend, who was kind enough to read this passage
    in MS., sent me the following suggestive note: "King Solomon was a
    thorough Chinaman, crafty, gaining the throne although the fourth
    and youngest son of his mother; killing off the kingdom-maker,
    Joab, and murdering the lawful heir, Adonijah. His fondness for
    pomp and joss pidjin, witness the Queen of Sheba and the Temple;
    love of trade, his ventures with King Hiram to Ophir. His apathy
    in military affairs, leading to the breaking up of the empire.
    His love of sententious maxims, Proverbs. His truly Chinese and
    non-Hebrew syncretism, worshipping Ashtoreth, Moloch, and Chemosh,
    as well as Jehovah. Now David, judging by the weak characters of
    his children, was, like many famous men in history, the reverse of
    prepotent. Solomon was a son of erewhile widow Bathsheba. Uriah
    being a Hittite, she was presumably one also. So Solomon would
    be practically a Hittite--i.e., Mongolian or Tartar; a striking
    example of the newly-named but long-observed phenomenon called
    telegony or 'throwing back.' Solomon 'threw back' to the first
    sire, Uriah."

 [31] "The boasted influence that the Government of China possesses
    over its subjects is almost entirely _moral_, and they really do
    not possess the power to cope with a popular tumult, which is the
    object of their greatest dread."--H. Parkes, at Foochow, May 1,
    1846, _æt._ seventeen.




CHAPTER XXX.

CHINA'S AWAKENING.

    Prestige gained, 1880-90--Yields to Japan in Korea while
    reasserting full suzerainty--The lessons of adversity--Schemes for
    naval and military reforms--Purchase and manufacture--Provincial
    system antagonistic to reform--Li Hung-Chang's efforts--Faithful
    service of foreign experts--Drill-instructors--Creation of a
    navy--Coast fortification--Superior efficiency of navy compared
    with army--Corruption and nepotism--Awakening of China apparent,
    not real.


The service of the navy in the conveyance of troops and of a special
envoy to Korea in 1882 was the first which that luckless force was able
to render to China. The service was repeated on two other occasions:
when a High Commissioner was sent on a mission of imperial condolence
in 1890, and again when an assassin was rescued from the revenge of
counter-assassins and conveyed safely from China to Korea in 1894. The
little kingdom thus played a considerable part in the awakening scenes of
the suzerain empire.

On a retrospective view, indeed, it would appear that during the period
in question China passed the culminating-point in her efforts to regain
national prestige. She had just asserted herself in an unexpected manner
in her dealings with Russia, playing a very different part in regard to
her distant and worthless possessions in the north-west from what she
had done twenty years before in regard to the integral part of her proper
territories in the north-east, which she had surrendered with scarcely a
protest. The world began to respect China as a power. Her decisive action
in Korea showed that she was no longer disposed to permit her neighbours
to trifle with the question of her suzerainty in that kingdom, and for
ten years she was pre-eminent there in fact as well as of right. Yet
with a significant qualification. For, being challenged by Japan while at
war with France in 1885, she was unable to vindicate her sole supremacy
in Korea, and was constrained to admit her rival into partnership. Thus
was the first irrevocable step taken towards the future realisation
of the Japanese designs on the peninsula. A _condominium_ must ever be
destructive to the policy of the less energetic member, and the treaty
concluded between Li Hung-chang and Count Ito in 1885 was the fatal
prelude to the events of ten years later. As the treaties granting to
Russia a coequal right of navigating the Amur and a joint ownership of
the Usuri province constituted the virtual surrender of Chinese rights,
so any treaty with Japan, no matter on what conditions, respecting Korea,
was a virtual abdication of the Chinese suzerainty. The right in common
to send troops into Korea on notice given could have no other effect than
to deliver up the kingdom to the Power which was the most alert in taking
advantage of the agreement. In giving up half her rights China retreated
from an inexpugnable position, and left herself no footing for defending
the remaining half, when its turn came to be assailed.

But with the irony which is the very pathos of human and national decline,
the outward pretence to authority became more demonstrative as the
substance of the claim slipped away. Not for two hundred and fifty years
had China asserted her prerogative with such uncompromising arrogance
as when she sent an imperial mission of condolence to the royal Court in
1890, years after the keystone of her Korean arch had been pulled away. It
was also about this period that the Chinese Minister to England lent his
name to a manifesto warning the world of the coming resurrection of China.
"The sleep and the awakening" strictly followed the law above alluded to,
that hollowness, not solidity, makes the loudest sound.

But so many interests are now inextricably interwoven with the destinies
of China that her effort at reform and its failure compel us to give
attention to the opening of a new chapter in the world's history. The
humiliating foreign invasions, the three rebellions that shook the
empire, and the numerous minor risings, had all left their impression.
The lessons taught by these adversities had been taken to heart, and
the rulers of the empire were called upon to devise a remedy. The first
and most obvious desideratum was, of course, naval and military reform,
or rather regeneration, whereby they might be strengthened to speak
with their enemies in the gates. On this subject Chinese statesmen were
absolutely at one with their officious foreign advisers: it was a subject
which inspired many of the early homilies of the British Minister, if no
others. There was, however, this essential difference in the conception of
the means of carrying out the reform, that the foreign advisers of China
were completely prepossessed by the notion that an imperial executive,
if it did not exist, must be promptly created, while nothing was further
from the imagination of the Chinese. They were entirely prepossessed
by their tradition and the state of things actually existing, which
they did not dream of changing. That was the provincial system on which
the administration of the empire rested. The fiasco of the Lay-Osborn
flotilla, which was the first crude attempt to mix the oil and vinegar
of the two conflicting systems, revealed the fundamental, irreconcilable
divergence between the two sets of ideas, which rendered all advice
from the one side to the other futile, and co-operation impossible. That
palpable failure of the Central Government was calculated to discourage
fresh innovations from the same quarter, and the incident was constantly
referred to by diplomatists as having blighted the promising career of
Wênsiang as a reformer, he being the minister personally responsible for
the scheme.

The Chinese, nevertheless, proceeded according to their own lights to set
their house in order in so far as its defensive services were concerned.
The successful employment of foreign arms and foreign auxiliaries in the
suppression of the Taiping rebellion showed them the way. It was a natural
but a fatal error, which the Chinese have not to this day abjured, to
attach too much importance to the arms, and too little to the man using
them. They accordingly commenced in a rather wild and wayward manner to
buy weapons and munitions, and then to set up in their own country the
means of manufacturing the simpler kinds. The chief promoter, if not the
originator, of these novelties was Li Hung-chang, who continued to be the
presiding genius of military and naval reform, no matter in what province
his official duties happened to lie. The personal authority wielded by
the Grand Secretary in provinces beyond his own government was really
a step towards centralisation of the executive, and with time and an
adequate succession of followers in the same path there is no telling what
changes in the Government system might not have been evolved from such a
nucleus. But the one-man power was unequal to any great result; it also
weakened with age, opposition, and discouragement. The actual reforms
inaugurated remained strictly provincial, and even local. There was no
evidence of initiative or supervision from the Central Government. The
nearest approach to it was the establishment of an arsenal at Tientsin by
Chunghou, the first superintendent of trade for the northern ports, and a
member of the imperial clan. It would almost appear as if the Government
had no concern with the more distant parts of the country, and the strange
anomaly presented itself to the onlookers of large sums being expended on
the most modern artillery and in the manufacture of thousands of arms of
precision while the Peking field force was equipped with bows and arrows.

There came a time at last when the necessity of some kind of
centralisation was forced on the Government. It was after Prince Kung had
been sent into retirement in 1884, when his younger brother, the father of
the emperor, had decided to "come out" and take a part in the executive
government, and especially after Prince Ch'un had made a short cruise in
salt water in 1886, that a Naval Board was established in Peking itself
with the prince at its head. The institution was of course laughed at,
as the beginnings of things usually are, and its inefficiency was indeed
glaring enough. It would have taken a generation in slow-moving China for
such a board to have learned the rudiments of its duties.

What we are at the moment concerned with is the naval and military reform
of the twenty-five years preceding the advent of Prince Ch'un to power. In
the purchase of war material no single system was followed. The provincial
rulers at Canton, Foochow, Nanking, and Tientsin no doubt had to sanction
what was done within their respective provinces--a check which might be
perfunctory or conscientious--but practically the management was in the
hands of subordinate officials without knowledge or training or visible
responsibility. As in war each Chinese regiment fights for its own hand,
or runs away as the case may be, so in the supply of arms each local
official did pretty much what seemed right in his own eyes. Hence the
heterogeneous composition of _matériel_, one small body of troops carrying
in a campaign thirteen different patterns of rifle, with ammunition still
more curiously diversified.

Concerning the arsenals established under the auspices of the various
governors-general from Canton even to Kirin in Manchuria, and under
the technical management of foreigners, the most remarkable point to
be noted--and it applies generally to the employment of foreigners in
China--is the faithful service the Chinese have been able to command in
circumstances where it was hardly to be expected. An ignorant employer and
an expert employee is a combination apt to engender the worst abuses, and
the way the Chinese selected their foreign executive--a marine engineer
here, a surgeon of a marching regiment there, a naval lieutenant somewhere
else--was not the way, one would have thought, to obtain either honesty
or efficiency. Yet the foreigners selected either possessed or acquired
adequate qualifications, and one and all rendered devoted service to
their employers. The position of these foreigners, however, never was or
could be one of authority: whatever they did was under the orders of their
Chinese superior, who was often too ignorant to weigh the reasons for what
was done. In course of time the natives themselves became more instructed,
but whether their half-knowledge was a help or a hindrance to the work of
their foreign experts is problematical. Of the quality or quantity of the
_matériel_ turned out in the various Chinese arsenals it were useless to
speak. It produced an illusory sense of security, and for a time imposed
equally on native and foreigner.

Nor was training entirely neglected. Drill-masters were engaged. Schools
were established in connection with the arsenals, where naval instruction
especially was carried to a high standard. Students sent to Europe
proved themselves most apt to assimilate the instruction given to them.
Of those who distinguished themselves at Greenwich may be mentioned the
present Minister to the Court of St James's. Cadets were also received
into the British navy, and some very expert officers were turned out by
these means. A large number of youths were at one time selected to be
educated in the United States, remaining there long enough to learn to
read and write English, and to become enamoured of Western life. This
educational experiment was interesting in many ways. The youths who were
sent to America under the care and at the instigation of the Cantonese,
Yung Wing, who had himself been educated in the United States, were
domiciled for the most part with private families there; and they so
imbibed the influence of their surroundings that a high sense of honour
was developed in them. The writer can speak from personal experience of
the fidelity and efficiency of some of these students. Captain Clayson,
who had several serving under him in the "Peiyang Squadron," has said that
although on their return to China the authorities had distributed them in
services other than those for which they had been trained, yet because
of the school discipline they had been subjected to, and the sense of
honour developed by their contact with Western people, he found them far
more useful and trustworthy than the men who had been trained in Chinese
naval schools. This experience seems to suggest that there are good moral
qualities of the Chinese waiting, like the mineral ores in their country,
for an awakening influence. In all these progressive efforts Li Hung-chang
retained the lead, and his own province was well in advance in educational
enterprises. Besides a military school with German, and a naval school
with English, instructors, he set up within a mile of his Yamên a fairly
furnished medical school with a hospital attached. His special corps of
foreign-drilled troops was the best equipped and best disciplined force
in the empire.

While all this progress was being made in the direction of military
efficiency, the naval requirements of the country were not neglected. The
failure of the undigested Lay-Osborn scheme showed the Chinese that the
naval problem must be attacked in a different fashion. It was a false
start, and they must begin again. Accordingly, profiting by what they
had heard and seen of the efficient service rendered in their narrow
waters by foreign gunboats, the Chinese Government contracted with the
Armstrong firm for a small flotilla carrying one heavy gun with a wide
range of fire. These craft were little more than floating gun-carriages;
but notwithstanding broad beam and flat bottoms, they were moderately
sea-worthy. They were known as the Alphabeticals, from being named after
the Greek letters. This modest flotilla was the nucleus of the Chinese
navy.

Attempts at naval construction were made at Shanghai, Foochow, and Canton;
but beyond providing work and training for native artificers, and acting
occasionally as transports on a small scale, despatch-carriers, and
official yachts, the vessels turned out from native yards rendered no
service to the country. The Chinese navy as a potential military arm only
took shape when Li Hung-chang was able to carry the Government with him so
far as to purchase effective war-ships in Europe, to institute a system of
training under competent foreign officers, and to establish naval harbours
with docks and workshops. Two iron-clad battleships, a respectable
squadron of cruisers, and some smaller craft, manned by trained crews and
officered by men who had received a regular naval education and perfectly
understood their duties, constituted the fighting navy of China. The two
English officers who supervised the training, Captain Tracy at Foochow
and Captain Lang in the Gulf of Pechili, were thoroughly satisfied with
the capacity of both officers and men, and what was distinguished as the
Peiyang or Northern Squadron was brought up by the latter officer to such
a state of efficiency that he reckoned that a further two years' drill
would enable the Chinese to take its place, on a small scale, among the
best equipped fleets in the world.

And while the navy was developing so satisfactorily, coast fortifications
also made great progress. The mouths of rivers were all defended by
the best modern guns; three naval ports in the Gulf of Pechili--Port
Arthur, Weihai-wei, and Talien-wan--were fortified at great expense,
and everything externally evinced a determination on the part of China
to place herself in a position of independence, delivered from the fear
of foreign attack, except of course by land, and even that had been
partially provided for, as we have seen, by the military establishments
in Manchuria.

Between the naval and the military preparations, however, there was an
immense disparity. The force for which Li Hung-chang was personally
responsible was carefully drilled, armed, fed, and paid, and, given
competent leading, would no doubt have rendered a good account of
itself; but the army as a whole was never brought to a state approaching
efficiency. The navy, on the other hand, possessed the best ships and the
best armament that money could buy, with the most modern appliances for
war, and its _personnel_ was subjected to the most careful discipline.
The fortress guns were also of the newest and best pattern, and nothing
was spared, apparently, to fit them for the purpose for which they were
intended. It was generally conceded that the fortresses so armed were safe
from attack by sea.

The explanation of the great difference between the organisation of
the sea and the land forces seems to be that the former, being a new
creation, was beyond the range of criticism and was unhampered by any
traditions, while the reform of the army was merely patching a worn-out
garment. The immemorial conditions of military service were unchanged.
No army was formed, but a series of local levies raised without cohesion
or central control. The foreign instructors were kept strictly to their
class-work, were subordinated to the people whom they had to instruct,
and possessed no kind of authority. They were allowed to drill the men,
while the officers for the most part held themselves above the drudgery
of the parade-ground. The few who had acquired a smattering of military
education in Europe were as helpless as the foreign drill-masters to move
their wholly ignorant superiors. Hence abuses of the most grotesque kind
did not creep but rushed into every camp and every school, reducing the
scientific teaching to a hollow farce.

The familiar factors of peculation and nepotism had an important influence
on these naval and military developments in China. Such things are no
monopoly of the Chinese. If corruption could ruin a State, it would not
be necessary to look so far afield as China for national disasters. But
the form which the vice takes in China has a determining effect on the
administration quite irrespective of the waste of resources and diminution
of efficiency which are common to corruption in all its forms. Thus if we
have to reconcile the lavish purchases of material with the attenuation of
_personnel_, we need only reflect that the former bring large emoluments
with little labour to the official employed, while the training of men
involves much work and little profit. Further, if we want an explanation
of the infinite diversity of the arms which are furnished to the troops,
we may find it in the excessive competition among officials for a share of
the traffic, and the interest which the higher authorities have in passing
without inspection what is purveyed by their subordinates.

Nepotism in China is part and parcel of the family system, which is the
palladium of the nation. Every military corps raised is essentially
territorial; and if ever it is moved from one province to another,
it looks to a territorial chief, and no stranger can command it. Li
Hung-chang's disciplined troops, if not all of his own clan, were at
least the natives of his province and spoke his dialect. His subordinate
officials were blood relations and family adherents. It needs no argument
to show how such a survival of feudalism militates against national
organisation. Pure feudalism, indeed, would be less detrimental; for under
it territorial exclusiveness would at least be balanced by territorial
responsibility, but under the short-service system of China a governor
or governor-general may during his three years' term throw everything
into confusion and half ruin the finances of a province with which he is
precluded from having any territorial tie, and then proceed to another and
repeat the performance. The navy, though, as we have said, exempt from the
incubus of tradition, was nevertheless unable to withstand the pressure of
immemorial heredity. As the first and principal naval school happened to
be at Foochow, it was natural that new battleships and cruisers should be
officered and manned in the first instance by natives of Fukien province.
The admiral, however, hailed from another province--that of Li Hung-chang.
Though brave and capable, Admiral Ting was uneducated, and found it
hard to hold his own among the captains and lieutenants who had been to
Greenwich and could speak and write English, and some of them French.
Neither the Chinese admiral nor the English co-admiral--who was led to
believe he possessed authority, but was deceived--were able to repress
the intrigues which ran riot among the Foochow officers,--intrigues having
for their object the complete control of the fleet, the power of keeping
out and admitting whom they chose without reference to qualifications,
and the general determination to subordinate the naval service to
their personal and family advantage. The presence of Captain Lang was a
hindrance to their schemes, and they intrigued him out. But as the fleet
belonged to the north, they were unable to exclude northern seamen from
the country round Weihai-wei, who proved when the day of trial came the
most intelligent and the staunchest force that China possessed.

The Peiyang Squadron was the nearest approach to an imperial navy that
China ever possessed, and yet it was so far provincial that it could not
be sent into the central or southern waters without creating jealousy
on the part of the local authorities, just as if it had been a foreign
force. In 1891, when anti-foreign riots in various places on the Yangtze
threatened to endanger the peace of the empire, the Imperial Government
allowed foreign ships of war to proceed up the river for the purpose
of preventing outbreaks rather than offend the susceptibilities of the
provincial authorities by employing their own naval forces on that duty.
During that critical period the Peiyang Squadron was cruising in Japanese
waters while the Great River was being patrolled by foreign gunboats.

These various evidences of martial energy procured for China the credit
of a real awakening, and ensured her the respect due to a serious Power.
Yet the unsoundness of the foundation on which her new prestige rested was
no secret to any one who took the trouble to consider the facts, for all
the weaknesses we have mentioned, with many more, were notorious to every
foreign resident in China; nor was there a naval officer of any nation
who did not regard the fighting value of the Chinese fleet as nothing.
Ships were good, officers and men in themselves were passable, but without
organisation, while the whole force was governed by other than militant
principles. The attempted military reorganisation could, in fact, have no
vitality except as a branch of a general reform of the administration,
the keystone of which was fiscal. Of this, however, the Chinese rulers
seemed to take no heed, contenting themselves with snatching at what
was superficial and conspicuous to the eye. The Chinese florists in the
spring-time supply to hawkers shrubs covered with blossom which is so
cleverly attached by fine wire to the twigs as almost to deceive the
elect. This is practically what the Chinese Government bad been doing with
their national defences, so that on the first trial they collapsed like a
sapless flower. These experiences have an important bearing on the large
problem of Chinese reform and reorganisation, and indeed on the continued
existence of the empire.

  [Illustration]




CHAPTER XXXI.

THE COLLAPSE.

    China clings to universal sovereignty--Demonstration of same
    towards Korea--Irritating to Japanese--Their aspirations in
    Korea--Insurrection in southern districts--Chinese troops sent
    there--Japanese simultaneously occupy Korean capital--War between
    China and Japan--China defeated--Causes and consequences--General
    sympathy with Japan.


We have seen that up to the end of 1892 the Chinese Government clung
to the figment of universal sovereignty. Perhaps it was the figment
that clung to them, they not knowing how to drop it. When they had,
under stress, seemed to concede the principle of equality, it was not
done heartily, but to serve a momentary purpose. Like a belligerent
who continues a guerilla warfare after concluding peace, they fought
inch by inch for the rags of the old prerogative after having by
treaty surrendered it. It had been long predicted that their refusal
or inability to bring their theories into agreement with patent facts,
and to come into line with the Powers of the world, must lead to tragic
consequences. Foreign nations laughed at the Chinese pretension as an
innocent archaic survival. But those individuals to whose lot it fell,
in their own persons, to suffer the continued humiliation which was a
consequence of the survival, did not find the comedy of the situation
quite so congenial. The high-spirited nation living in the closest
neighbourhood to China, using its language and literature, was naturally
more galled by the Chinese assumption than those distant peoples who
only suffered in the persons of their diplomatic agents. Though it would
be more than the evidence warrants to say that the pretension of the
Chinese Government was directly provocative of the events of 1894, yet it
is certain that it had a full share in filling the cup. Nowhere had the
Chinese conception of supremacy been exemplified in a more uncompromising
form than in her relations with Korea. Her position as suzerain was a
reality. She had in times past defended her tributary at great cost, had
marked the relationship by permanent monuments, and had maintained the
rites necessary to keep her title alive. As late as 1890 the tributary
formalities were repeated conspicuously before the world. In that year the
"Grand" Queen-Dowager Chao of Korea died. According to custom the king
despatched a messenger to Peking to report the death to his suzerain.
The envoy presented his papers kneeling before the vice-president of the
Board of Rites. He was the bearer of a petition from the king descanting
on the miseries of his country, and expressing regret that, owing to the
straitened circumstances of his Court, he might be unable to carry out
all the ceremonies required for the entertainment of the usual mission
of condolence from the emperor; therefore, as "an infant trusting to the
tender mercies of his parents," the king begged that not a mission, but a
message only, might be returned to him by the hands of his own envoy. The
imperial decree in reply to this petition, while admitting the facts of
the situation as set forth by the king, nevertheless announced that the
customary usage must be maintained, only an important concession would
be made to the poverty of Korea in the route which would be followed by
the new mission. Previous envoys had made the whole journey between the
two capitals by land, and after entering Korean territory they had to
pass many stations in their slow march to the capital, involving much
expense to the country through which they travelled. All this would be
saved on the present occasion by the two commissioners travelling by sea,
and landing at Chemulpo, a few miles only from the capital. The king had
to submit to the modified burden, if such he really considered it. The
ceremonies observed were elaborate and impressive. Frequent prostrations
by Korean officials before the emperor's tablet, and before the Imperial
Commissioners, introduced the proceedings; afterwards the king was taken
charge of by the Chinese master of ceremonies, led through a complicated
ritual, and told to bend, kneel, _kotow_, and stand erect at so many
different stages that the mere reading of the official account of them
is bewildering. The reporter's conclusion gives the gist of the whole
ceremonial from the Chinese point of view: "The emperor's consideration
for his vassal State as evinced by his thoughtfulness in matters
pertaining to the mission is fathomless. How admirable and satisfactory!
And how glorious!"

All this was unexceptionably correct, and in its fantastic way expressed
an actuality not to be contested. Yet to the Japanese, with their
antagonistic policy, we can well understand that this renewed assertion
of the Chinese suzerainty, after the convention of 1885, must have
been highly irritating. Scarcely less so was the superior position
habitually assigned to the Chinese Resident over all the other foreign
representatives at the Korean Court. He alone at all times had the ear
of the king; he was the only one privileged to enter the palace in his
sedan chair, the others having to leave theirs at the gate and walk. While
abstaining from interference in small things, the Chinese Resident did,
in fact, direct the national policy of Korea so far as such a thing could
be said to exist.

As the affairs of Korea formed the occasion, if not the cause, of the
Japanese War in 1894, it might seem desirable to refer once more to
the troubles and misgovernment of that country. To explain them would
be quite impossible, for to say that there are wheels within wheels,
intrigue within intrigue, the whole revolving round a pivot of sordid
corruption, is perhaps the only general account that can be given of the
state of the Government and of its official hierarchy. But the conflict
between China and Japan held on its way through the labyrinth of local
intrigue, and eventually produced a result which, strange to say, seems
never to have been anticipated by any one outside the Government circles
of Japan. The energetic Chinese Resident at the Korean Court may perhaps
have been needlessly ostentatious in asserting the legitimate paramountcy
of China, but the aggression of the Japanese in various parts of the
country, and the extravagant claims they founded upon these aggressions,
really called for a champion of Korean independence, a function which Yuan
Shih-kai[32] filled with considerable ability. The subordination of Korea
to China was nowhere visible except in Court relations. The subjugation
of the peninsula by the Japanese, on the other hand, was rapidly bringing
the population itself into bondage to alien merchants, adventurers, and
usurers, actively supported by their own Government. If they had had
the patience to wait a few years, the Japanese must have won Korea by
energetic infiltration alone.

But these things did not move fast enough for the settled ambition
of Japan, which she with diligence, unanimity, and wonderful secrecy
determined to develop by force of arms. It would be idle to seek for
the causes of the war elsewhere than in this forward national policy
of Japan. Alert as she had been to seize every chance that offered of
detaching Korea from her allegiance to China, her preparations were not
sufficiently complete to justify her unmasking her whole policy until
1894, when the grand opportunity for which she had been waiting, if she
did not actively assist in bringing it about, presented itself. What
proved to be an ill-advised interference of China in the internal affairs
of Korea furnished the occasion. An insurrection had broken out in the
southern part of the peninsula, and the king had no forces to put it
down. Various versions had been circulated of the extent and character of
the insurrection; but when it had continued for some time, and nothing
was done to check it, the advisers of the Chinese Government became
apprehensive of interference by some foreign Power for the restoration of
order. Strangely enough, Japan was the very last quarter from which this
danger was anticipated. The Chinese at length summoned resolution to send
a force to the king's assistance to put down the insurrection, but whether
the king in his heart desired this armed interference it is impossible
for us to say.

Li Hung-chang was personally opposed to any such expedition, and when
goaded to action from Peking, where the bellicose spirit had been
generated, he pointed out that no request had been received from the
king. This omission was also remarked upon by the practical Admiral Ting,
and both may have hoped that the absence of so important a link in the
chain would enable them to avoid the overt action which they had the
best grounds for deprecating. Such a hope, if it existed, was of brief
duration; for the King of Korea was induced, by influences brought to
bear on him, "to place himself in order" and implore his suzerain for
assistance, which the suzerain could no longer withhold. Then was Li
Hung-chang pressed by that body whose characteristic was the negation
of initiative, the Tsungli-Yamên, and like a sluggish horse which once
takes the bit in its teeth, the Yamên became as impatient for action as
in all its previous history it had been resolute in evasion. When but a
few days had elapsed since the issue of the order, and the troops were
not yet embarked, the Ministers, quite ignorant of what was involved in
sending a military force across the sea, began to jeer Li Hung-chang on
his delay, hinting that he was perhaps growing stale with age. The troops
were, nevertheless, despatched all too soon. On their landing at Yashan
in Southern Korea, the insurrection immediately collapsed: such was the
prestige of the imperial authority.

In order to comply with the letter of the Li-Ito convention China
notified Japan officially of the despatch of these troops, some 2000
in all, and of the purpose for which they were sent. But Japan had no
need to wait for any such formal intimation. She had her Intelligence
Department, remarkably alert. Japanese--not perhaps always known as
such--were employed in the Chinese official bureaus, even in the most
confidential departments, while Japanese in disguise swarmed in all the
military centres. The Chinese telegraph service has no secrets from any
one who thinks it worth his while to possess them. Consequently every
detail of the preparation, every point in the discussion, and every step
in embarkation, was punctually telegraphed by the Japanese consul to the
Foreign Office in Tokio. Hence it was that Japanese troops arrived in
Korea simultaneously with the Chinese, only they numbered 10,000 against
2000, and instead of being assigned to the region of the insurrection,
in accordance with the provisions of the Li-Ito convention, they marched
straight to the capital and took possession of the king. The insurrection
having collapsed, the Chinese troops were under orders of withdrawal,
and would have returned home in the same transports that conveyed them to
Korea but for the unaccountable, and of course illegitimate, presence of
Japanese troops at the capital. Notwithstanding the provocation to retain
the Chinese troops in Korea as a counterbalance to those, five times more
numerous, which had been sent by Japan, the Chinese authorities were
advised by their best friends to recall their troops, even though the
Japanese should thereby be apparently left in possession of the field.
The Chinese would in that case have maintained an unassailably correct
position, and Japan would have had to dispense with her pretexts for war.
Evacuation by the Chinese had been actually decided upon, and the steamer
Kowshing was chartered for the purpose of bringing back the troops. Before
the measure was carried out, however, other counsels prevailed, and that
very ship was employed in conveying more troops to reinforce the first
expedition, and in the midst of pretended negotiations for an arrangement
between the two Powers, the Japanese sank the Kowshing on the high sea
with all on board.

It is usual, as a matter of form, if nothing else, to assign some specific
cause for a war; but though many able writers have essayed to explain
the Japanese action in 1894, they have all of them left the question in
greater obscurity than they found it. Nor did the formal declaration of
war by the Mikado throw any light on the subject. A Japanese statesman
being asked what the war was about, replied bluntly, "It is to defeat
China," and the most elaborate exposition of motives or policy does
not carry us perceptibly further than this concise and straightforward
statement. The Chinese Government itself held precisely the same view as
to the object of the war, though its perceptions were so obscured that
it was quite unaware of its incapacity for defence. Neither did it during
the actual progress of hostilities realise the cause of its defeat. Indeed
there is no evidence to show that China has even to this day discovered
the secret of her impotence.

The course and immediate consequence of the war itself have been set forth
in many books, and are so well known as to render it superfluous to enter
into any detail here. A few general points only need be mentioned as a
key to what followed.

1. Russia took unusual pains to dissuade Japan from engaging in the war,
pointing out in clear terms that her interests would not allow her to be
an indifferent spectator of any changes on the continent of Asia.

2. Great Britain next endeavoured to patch up the supposed quarrel--which
could never be defined in words--between China and Japan, and on the
day on which her agent in Tokio expressed himself confident that the
differences, so far as he understood them, would be arranged without
recourse to war, the British chartered transport Kowshing was sunk with
1200 men on board.

3. The solution of the question which would have reconciled the views
of the four Powers more immediately concerned was the neutralisation of
Korea. Great Britain, Russia, and Japan were of one mind on this subject,
and China would have hailed such an escape from her chronic embarrassment
respecting Korea. Why, then, was no attempt made to bring about such a
solution? Want of co-ordination, it would appear; diplomatic paralysis.
Though the views of each Power separately ascertained were identical,
none of them would speak first, and there was no fifth party to assume the
initiative in bringing them to a common understanding. The blame of this
must be equally distributed, though in point of fact there were degrees
of responsibility which it would be useless now to recall. It is only one
example the more of the great gap which often yawns between professional
diplomacy and practical politics.

The issue of the war was a foregone conclusion, both by sea and land.
China had no army, and the more numerous her levies the more helpless
they were before a disciplined enemy. The navy failed precisely where
it was expected to fail. It was an incomplete machine, neglected and
in disorder, deficient in many essential things. Worst of all, there
was no heart in it. Captain Lang, R.N., and other British officers had
been expelled from the service through a conspiracy of the captains in
1890, and thenceforth its deterioration became rapid. The efficiency of
the navy for its main purpose was the last thing considered by the cabal.
They relied absolutely on the diplomatic resources of Li Hung-chang to
save them from any possible trial of strength, and refused to face an
alternative even by way of argument. Bravery was by no means lacking in
the ranks, nor professional education among the officers. There were some
who had Nelson's maxims at the tip of their tongue, and there were some
who added to a thorough naval training the spirit of devotion which makes
heroes. But these qualities were isolated and incoherent; there was no
tradition to render them fruitful, no martial spirit, no disgrace for
the coward, no honour for the valiant. The fleet was a body, defective
enough at that, but without a soul. The minds of the captains being set
on quite other objects than the efficiency of their service, when the
crisis threatened they were intent only on evading collisions. The valour
of the admiral, the fine sense of duty of individual officers, and the
fighting qualities of a considerable body of the seamen, were swamped
in the prevailing pusillanimity of the service; the choice spirits were
discouraged by the fatuous neglect at headquarters to supply the ordinary
necessaries of warfare. It was the writer's fortune to make a passage in a
Chinese protected cruiser in September 1894, a few days before the great
naval action off the Yalu, and it was most pathetic to hear the defects
pointed out by the captain and first lieutenant--defects in ammunition
for the guns mounted, absence of gun crews, so that in action men would
have to be taken from one gun to another and put to work for which they
had no training, everywhere the ship spoiled for want of the ha'porth of
tar. That particular vessel was not disgraced in the Yalu fight, but was
brought into Port Arthur by the superhuman exertions of her officers,
her iron deck beams twisted by the fire and her plates red hot. A second
conversation with the captain and first lieutenant after the action
was but a painful commentary on that of the week before. The one was
prediction, the other fulfilment. Perhaps the state of the navy could not
be more forcibly illustrated than by the fact that the fleet was led into
action at the Yalu by a German military officer.

China was indeed defeated, amid the applause of Europe and the whole
world, and the primeval law of violence received a new consecration. This
is the one outcome of the war which seems likely to leave a permanent
impress on the surface of our civilisation, for the spontaneous outburst
from the four corners of the earth cannot be referred to any venal or
wire-pulling agency. There had been foreign wars in China before, wars
entered upon after long discussion and accumulating causes of quarrel.
Their merits divided the opinion of the world--they divided even the
nations that waged them; and the opposition was on one occasion strong
enough to overturn a British Government that had actually entered into
hostilities against China. But in 1894 there was not a dissentient
voice. The cause of the war was not known and not inquired into, the
universal enthusiasm was simply for the victor, as such, without regard
to anything but his military prowess. That was what the world fell down
and worshipped. Not any righteous cause, or racial sympathy, or community
of interest, inspired their acclamations; for none of these things were
considered or understood by the masses who chorussed the triumph of the
conqueror of China. English pens and tongues beyond all others urged
the victorious Power to make crushing conditions of peace, and in the
clamour traditional landmarks were forgotten. The policy of saving China,
the great English milch cow, from destruction, which had been patiently
followed by Great Britain for forty years, was thus suddenly submerged in
a wave of warlike enthusiasm.

Press-made feeling was both stronger and had more influence on the action
of Government in England than in any other country. The war had upset
the balance of power in Asia, but the press took no heed of that, and
urged with conspicuous success that the Japanese should on no account
be hindered in their seizure of the spoils. Other countries, keeping a
cooler outlook on eventualities, were unable to regard the occupation of
Liao-tung by Japanese forces with the equanimity with which it was viewed
in England, though they made no objection to the enormous indemnities
forced from China, which might indeed be philosophically regarded by
them as a tax levied specially on British trade. Being threatened in her
weakest frontier by this ambitious military Power, Russia had intimated
before war began, in no ambiguous terms, that she could not tolerate
such a neighbour, and on the conclusion of peace she took steps to give
effect to that resolution. Russia had throughout the war been extremely
nervous about the possible action of Great Britain, and would have gone
considerable lengths to come to an understanding with her; but towards
the end, when the pretensions of the Japanese began to assume extravagant
dimensions, their moral effect on the Great Powers enabled her to dispense
with English favour by drawing France and Germany to her support. The
gravity of the Japanese demands was the factor that drew the three Powers
together, and Li Hung-chang, when he went as envoy to Japan in March
1895, assented to the indemnity and the surrender of territory on the
assurance given him that the more excessive the conditions of peace he
might be forced to sign, the more certain were they to be revised by
the intervention of the Powers. The three Powers proved strong enough
to induce Japan to give up Liao-tung for an increased indemnity, and
the future of the Far East thus was arranged in conferences from which
Great Britain had excluded herself. There were several reasons for
the abstention of the British Government from taking a share in this
settlement. One was the complete failure of their Intelligence Department
before, during, and after the war. But the fervour of the nation in
deprecating interference with the Japanese was a sufficient, and no doubt
a welcome, warrant for the inaction of the Government. An experienced
observer of English public life remarked afterwards that he had never
known a situation in which the press, metropolitan and provincial, had
displayed such entire unanimity and lavished such unmixed praise on the
Government for its isolation. And yet it was a unanimity of nescience,
of simple abdication, the surrender of a position in the Far East which
had been built up for two generations on the permanent interests of the
country, and which, sacrificed at the critical moment, is gone beyond
recall. The "new diplomacy," uninstructed popular impulse, never had
a freer field; for the Government which it dominated was scarcely more
enlightened, and decidedly more apathetic, than the nation itself.

  [Illustration]

  [Illustration: MINISTERS OF THE YAMÊN OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
   H.E. Shên Kuei-fên.
   H.E. Tung Hsün.
   H.E. Mao Chang-tsi.
   _From a photo by J. Thomson, Grosvenor Street, W._]

FOOTNOTE:

 [32] The same who is now governor of Shantung.




CHAPTER XXXII.

THE RESETTLEMENT OF THE FAR EAST.

    An unsettlement--Interference of Russia, Germany, and
    France--China reduced to dependence--Disintegration
    proceeds--France forces China to violate her treaties with
    England--Russian approval--The loans pressed upon China--Russia
    vetoes English loan, substituting a French one, Russia
    standing security--Germany seizes Kiaochow--Russia seizes
    Port-Arthur--England's remonstrance unheeded--A diplomatic
    correspondence explained--British public aroused to importance of
    the Far Eastern question--Call upon Government to take protective
    action.


It would perhaps be in stricter accordance with facts to describe
what ensued on the Chinese collapse as a process of unsettlement than
resettlement, since no man now living is likely to see the end of the
dislocation effected by the transactions of 1895. The crude ingredients of
national policy, stripped of the international decencies with which they
were wont to be invested, were then thrown into the caldron; elementary
forces, naked and undisguised, confronted each other; and the scramble
which moderate men had hoped to see indefinitely postponed was entered
into with the zest of a Cornish wrecking raid. The officious interference
of quasi-friendly Powers to save the derelict empire from mutilation
proved, according to unvarying experience, a remedy which was worse than
the disease. Russia, Germany, and France proceeded to treat China as a
No Man's Land; disintegration was the order of the day. The example was,
of course, contagious. Other Powers, with no more substantial ground of
claim than was afforded by the defencelessness of China, began whetting
their knives to carve the moribund carcass.

A momentous transformation had been effected in a few months. China now
occupied the paradoxical position of a protected State without protection;
of a sovereign State shorn of the power of fulfilling her obligations.
To this impossible situation the Government itself had been an efficient
contributor. During the progress of the war China had, of her own motion,
thrown herself on the mercy of the world. Before all the Powers, great
and small, with whom she had intercourse, she humbled herself in the dust,
imploring them collectively, separately, or anyhow, to save her from her
relentless foe. She, the titular mistress of the world, grovelled thus at
the feet of Powers to whom she would not, even then, in plain words, have
conceded equality. And when assistance eventually came it was imposed on
her by external force. She could make no conditions.

The revolution which the revised treaty of Shimonoseki effected in the
international status of China was naturally first realised by those
who had brought it about. China ceased to be a free agent; she became a
vassal, and not to one Power only. And the intervening Powers lost no time
in demonstrating the fact, France taking the lead. Within two months of
the revision of the treaty of Shimonoseki the French Minister in Peking
compelled China to sign a treaty granting to France large territorial
concessions on which she had long had her eye, with commercial privileges
never before granted to any Power. But the stipulations of the French
convention were in open conflict with those of an existing treaty with
this country, inasmuch as they gave to France a portion of the Shan
States, which had been expressly reserved as a neutral zone in the treaty
between China and Great Britain. The British Minister, pointing this out
before the French treaty was concluded, protested against its signature.
The Ministers of the Yamên admitted the justice of his contention, nor
can it be said the protest was unheeded. With the Yamên it was a question
solely of the balance of power, and feeling that the French force was the
heaviest in the scale, they yielded to that and signed the treaty with
France in direct violation of that which they had previously signed with
Great Britain. As if to leave no ambiguity as to the true significance
of the change of status which had come over China, the Russian Minister
on the day following made a formal visit to the Tsungli-Yamên, with more
than the customary display, to congratulate the Chinese Ministers on what
they had done, and to assure them of the approval of his Government.

This novel application of the law of force threw out of gear the whole
system of Chinese national engagements, and was quite incompatible with
normal diplomatic relations. Formerly the struggle had lain between China
and all the Powers, her obligations to whom were observed in proportion
to the amount of coercion applied by, or to be apprehended from, each.
From this resulted a chronic demand for the fulfilment of agreements, and
constant reclamations for non-fulfilment. But now the native reluctance
to observe treaties was potentially reinforced by the action of foreign
Powers in not only condoning, but explicitly insisting upon, China's
violating her engagements.

It may be that this species of _force majeure_ was not wholly unwelcome to
the Chinese. It certainly widened the field for their favourite tactics
of playing off one foreign Power against another. A better answer than
heretofore was now available to all demands and remonstrances. "We should
for our part be most happy to do as you desire, but--what would Russia
say, what would France say?" Thus diplomacy in China at once degenerated
into a "tug of war" contest, China herself being merely the rope which
was pulled. She was virtually ruled out of the active management of her
own affairs and became the _corpus vile_ for rival aggressors.

Aggression sometimes assumed strange forms. One of the first which the
treaty of peace with Japan developed was a remarkable competition in
lending money to the Chinese. The indemnities to be paid to Japan were
heavy, and it was obvious that China must borrow. But before she had time
to take any step in that direction money was being thrust upon her. First
in the ranks were English loan-mongers, who had had some experience in
the business. Their negotiations were slow and halting; and when they
had at last concluded a contract it was only to be told that Russia
objected to the transaction, and required that China should borrow from
French capitalists, who were willing to lend on the guarantee of Russia.
The Chinese Government were absolutely passive, not willingly, but of
necessity; they had not asked for the guarantee which Russia volunteered,
and were quite willing to accept the loan of £16,000,000 sterling on
the English terms. But Russia simply insisted on their taking the French
money, under an ominous threat, while she herself stood security for the
solvency of China, thereby assuming the position of first mortgagee on the
revenues of that empire. That accomplished, Russia stipulated that China
should contract no further loan for a period of six months.

The precedent set by Russia and France of ignoring the Government of China
as an efficient factor in negotiations respecting her territory or her
obligations was followed to the letter by Germany when in November 1897
she took possession of the most important naval harbour on the Chinese
coast, with an adequate hinterland, carrying elastic rights extending over
an immense area of country. Admiral von Diedrichs reduced the question
of the acquisition to its very simplest expression. "Common-sense," he
submitted to the Chinese commandant, "must tell you on which side the
superior force lies, and therefore you would be wise to make way for me
without resistance." With the prize in her hands, Germany next demanded
a formal title to what she had seized, and instead of giving the German
Minister his passports the Chinese Government granted the request.

In this unceremonious manner was the new status of China embodied in
monumental facts. She was the common victim, having no power to bind or
loose save in accordance with the dictates of her masters. The Chinese
Government seemed to have abdicated sovereign functions.

After France and Germany it was Russia's turn to give tangible evidence of
the real ascendancy she had gained over the Chinese Imperial Government.
Hers was the only true mastery. The others might wrest provinces and
extort concessions from a prostrate Government, but Russia alone reached
the cerebral centre and controlled--so far as outward effect went--the
volition of the organism. Negotiations, partly revealed in 1895, showed
conclusively the scope and direction of her Chinese policy. It was
profound and practical, continuing on the lines that had proved so
successful in the past. The basis of it was an ostensible friendship for
China, out of which grew a protective alliance, and the peculiar kind of
partnership which had constituted the intermediate stage in the previous
great territorial acquisitions of Russia. The joint right of the two
Powers--to the exclusion of all others--to navigate the Amur and the
Songari, and the joint possession of the Usuri territory--"details to be
hereafter settled"--was now to be applied to the coast and harbours of
Liao-tung, of which Russia was to have the use, afterwards defined in a
treaty as the "usufruct." The gentlest methods were to be used, and so far
as mere phrases were concerned, a matter on which the Chinese always were
punctilious, the utmost consideration for their feelings was to be shown.
Russia had two immediate objects in view, both of cardinal importance
to her. The first was to obtain a terminus for the Great Siberian
Railway more southerly than Vladivostock, which could only be obtained
in Korean or Chinese territory. The second--the necessary corollary of
the first--was to bring the territory through which the railway should
run within the Russian administration. The sanction of China to a branch
of the Siberian Railway being carried through Manchuria to a terminus
on the Liao-tung littoral was formally given in conferences between
Li Hung-chang and the Czar on the occasion of the coronation at Moscow
in 1896. The details were afterwards developed in a way of which it is
probable the Chinese Government had little foresight; but it would have
made no difference, for to Russia nothing could be denied.

Out of these comprehensive projects of Russia--projects which belonged
to the very highest order of imperial statecraft--arose a strange unequal
duel between Russian and British diplomacy, which has also left its mark
on history. Her Majesty's Government and their agents abroad having been
found wanting in the matter of information during the upheaval of the Far
East, it appeared to be their _rôle_ to ignore and deny the facts upon
which other Powers were acting. In particular the whole Russian scheme
of utilising Chinese territory and controlling the Chinese Government was
discredited with considerable vehemence. The consequence of this attitude
of scepticism was that whatever Great Britain might resolve to do must be
done in the dark. Assured by their agents in the Far East that the bay
of Kiaochow was worthless, the British Government satisfied themselves
that Germany had made a poor bargain in taking it. Dismissing as a
phantasy the whole string of facts concerning Russia's plans, the British
Government exposed themselves to collision with those plans, and received
in consequence a series of diplomatic humiliations, entailing upon the
country permanent disadvantages of a most substantial kind. Towards the
end of 1898, soon after the German seizure of Kiaochow, a harbour which
had also proved a convenient winter rendezvous for the Russian fleet, the
announcement came from China that the latter had received permission from
the Chinese Government to winter at Port Arthur on the opposite coast
of Liao-tung. Thereupon a discussion was raised between London and St
Petersburg concerning the prospective designs of Russia. This discussion
was stamped from its origin with futility by previous communications with
the Russian Government, the purport of which was inferred from a speech by
Mr Balfour in February 1896. On that occasion he declared that the British
Government would not only not oppose, but would hail with satisfaction,
the acquisition by Russia of an ice-free port in the Pacific. As her
Majesty's Government held Russia to the pledge she gave in 1886 to
respect the integrity of the Korean coast, it followed that the ice-free
harbour contemplated by Mr Balfour could only be in Chinese territory,
which, as affecting the dominating power of Russia in the Far East, was
greatly in advance of what the occupation of a Korean harbour would have
been. Korea had been safe-guarded from encroachment because it was the
stepping-stone to China, but the Russian lodgment on the inner waters of
China itself deprived Korea of most of its strategical value. Hence Russia
kept silence when Mr Curzon stated in Parliament that the pledge held
good which preserved the integrity of Korea, a pledge which had lost its
significance. This acquiescence in Russia's taking an ice-free port on the
Chinese coast was in direct contradiction to other no less authoritative
statements of the British Government. As, for instance, the resolution
passed by the House of Commons, and accepted by the Government, pledging
them to maintain the integrity of China, followed by the statement by
the Under Secretary of State that the Liao-tung coast with its harbours
constituted an integral part of the Chinese dominions. It is obvious that
this confusion arose either from lack of information or lack of interest
in the subject, coupled in either case with absent-mindedness on the part
of the British Government. But these inconsistencies of the members of
the British Government made no difference to the steady prosecution of
the Russian plans, which were now developed with great rapidity. These
pretensions were signalised by two memorable incidents, following each
other so closely as to be practically simultaneous, in January 1898.
The first was a new loan to the Chinese under negotiation by British
financiers, to assist which her Majesty's Government was strongly urged
by the China merchants to give its guarantee to the lenders as Russia
had done in the case of the previous loan. On being asked by the Foreign
Office what securities it would be proper to demand from the Chinese
Government as the equivalent of such British guarantee, the British
Minister at Peking replied that one of the conditions should be the
opening of Talien-wan as a treaty port by the Chinese Government. Whether
he had considered in what way this concession was to benefit the position
of Great Britain was not disclosed. The proposal was promptly vetoed by
the Russian Government, whose ambassador in London urged strongly that
"if we insisted on making Talien-wan an open port we should be encroaching
on the Russian sphere of influence, and denying her in future that right
to the use of Port Arthur to which the progress of events had given her a
claim,"--adding, that without having any designs on the territory, "it was
generally admitted that Russia might claim a commercial _débouché_ upon
the open sea, and that in order to enjoy that advantage fully she ought
to be at liberty to make such arrangements with China as she could obtain
with respect to the commercial _régime_ which was to prevail there."

The second incident was that two British war-vessels which were anchored
in Port Arthur--where, of course, they had the same right to be as
any other foreign man-of-war--"made a bad impression" on the Russian
Government, and formed the subject of complaint to the British Secretary
of State. While denying the right of Russia to comment on the movements
of British ships in Chinese waters, Lord Salisbury nevertheless allowed
the vessels in question to depart, a movement which was reported with much
colour of truth in Peking and St Petersburg as having been made by the
order of Russia.

Thus within one month the exposition of the Russian designs was expanded
from the first assurance of Count Muravieff that the wintering of the
ships was merely for the temporary convenience of the fleet, to the
assertion of vague territorial rights over the coast and harbours of
Liao-tung. And Lord Salisbury observed with plaintive naïveté in the month
of March, that whereas his Government "had always looked with favour upon
the idea of Russia obtaining an ice-free port on the Pacific, Russia had
now given a most unfortunate extension to this policy." It appears that
the eyes of the British Government were not opened to the gravity of the
situation until Russia, alleging that an ice-free port on the Chinese
coast (no longer the Pacific) was a vital necessity to her, thereupon
took possession of Port Arthur and Talien-wan. The British Government
at the eleventh hour opposed the proceeding, for the reason that "the
influence of Russia over the Government of Peking will be so increased to
the detriment of that of her Majesty's Government, if the Russians are to
have a lease of Port Arthur and Talien-wan, that it seems desirable for
us to make some counter-move." Thus the British Government were brought
to see, when too late, what those interested in Far Eastern affairs had
been endeavouring to tell them years before; and there seems to be no
doubt that the final discovery of the truth was due to the efforts of one
or two persistent writers in the press during January and February 1898,
but chiefly to the action of a small independent section of the British
House of Commons led by Mr Yerburgh. On such trifling accidents do great
events sometimes hang, that it seems probable that had Mr Yerburgh's
movement taken effect three months earlier British ships would not have
been withdrawn from Port Arthur, neither would China have been ousted from
the possession of her only two naval harbours north of the Yangtze--at
least not just then. It would serve no good purpose to follow the various
explanations given by Ministers of the British Crown of their diplomatic
encounters with Russia. They will have little interest for the historian.
But a clear account of these transactions given in a letter to the
'Times,' May 19, 1898, may very well serve as a guide to future inquirers
into these matters:--

                        _The Legend of Talien-wan._

    Before the recent diplomatic struggle in the Far East is allowed
    to pass away from the public mind, may I be permitted to say a
    few words on one of its aspects which seems to have received very
    little attention?

    The bad faith of the Russian Government has been strongly, and
    not unreasonably, condemned; but no attempt has been made to
    explain it, except on the popular hypothesis that a double dose of
    original sin is normal in the Muscovite. It does not seem to have
    occurred to any writer on the subject that the Russians themselves
    may have a grievance, that they may have acted under a sense of
    injury, or that, in their view, the good faith of the British
    Government is not above reproach. I believe they are mistaken;
    but it is none the less true that the chain of facts on which they
    rely will well bear the interpretation they place upon it.

    The great blot on the recently published "Correspondence
    respecting the affairs of China" (No. 1, 1898) is that it takes
    no account of its immediate _Vorgeschichte_. It relates to a
    diplomatic struggle of which we last heard officially as far
    back as 1887, when the Blue-book on Port Hamilton was published.
    Since then many important things have happened, notably the
    Chino-Japanese war and the intervention of Russia, France, and
    Germany in the settlement of Shimonoseki. To ignore these events
    is really to delude the public; for the chapter of Far Eastern
    politics which begins with the German descent on Kiaochow is
    little short of meaningless if the story of Shimonoseki is
    passed over. Indeed the legend of Talien-wan itself belongs to
    a policy which may easily be traced back half a century. It is,
    however, not necessary for my purpose that I should go behind the
    Shimonoseki intervention. What was the object of that transaction?
    No one who has given any attention to Far Eastern affairs has
    ever been under the slightest illusion on this point. The great
    problem of Russian statesmanship since the foundation of the
    empire has been to reach the open sea, first in the Baltic, then
    in the Euxine and the Mediterranean, and, after the Crimean war,
    in the Pacific. Since Muravieff and Nevelskoy opened the Amur
    Russia has neglected no opportunity of pushing southward in order
    to get beyond the line of winter ice, and every embarrassment
    of China has been skilfully used by her to bring her nearer her
    goal. We in England have consistently resisted this policy, and
    in 1886 we thought to have finally defeated it when, by seizing
    Port Hamilton, we extracted a pledge from Russia that she would
    not occupy Korean territory "under any circumstances whatever."
    To all outward seeming Russian expansion in the Far East was thus
    stopped in the ice-bound harbour of Vladivostock. This, however,
    was not the view of Russia herself. She was still confident that
    an opportunity would be afforded her of realising her ambition,
    for there were other harbours on the Pacific besides those of
    Korea, and if the road to them was longer and more difficult,
    Russian patience was equal to the task of covering it. In these
    circumstances Japan, victorious in her war with China, claimed
    and obtained the cession of the Liao-tung peninsula, and thus
    threatened to shut the door for ever against Russian access to the
    Pacific. The intervention of the Powers which Russia thereupon
    organised was ostensibly directed to the protection of the
    integrity and independence of China, but no intelligent politician
    doubted at the time, or has doubted since, that its real aim was
    to keep the Pacific door open for Russia.

    Shortly after this event Lord Salisbury came into office. The
    problem which then most urgently demanded his attention was that
    of Armenia. Largely by its attitude in the Far East the Rosebery
    Cabinet had left our relations with Russia in a distinctly
    strained condition, and the one obvious remedy of the Armenian
    horrors--the coercion of the Sultan--was blocked by Russia. Lord
    Salisbury directed himself to the conciliation of Russia, wisely
    recognising that nothing could be done in the Near East without
    Russian goodwill and assistance. What were the means he employed?
    I cannot say what private negotiations may have taken place
    between the two Governments, but we seem to have a sufficiently
    significant illustration of the direction in which the Premier
    was disposed to make concessions to Russia in a speech delivered
    by Mr Balfour at Bristol on February 3, 1896. In that speech a
    British Minister announced for the first time that this country
    would not oppose Russian expansion to the Pacific. "I, for my
    part, frankly state," he said, "that, so far from regarding with
    fear and jealousy a commercial outlet for Russia in the Pacific
    Ocean which would not be ice-bound half the year, I should welcome
    such a result as a distinct advance in this far-distant region."
    This statement made a profound impression all over the world, as
    well it might, seeing that it implied the abandonment of a policy
    which had been consistently and vigilantly adhered to by Great
    Britain from the time of Lord Clarendon to that of Lord Rosebery.

    A few days after Mr Balfour's Bristol speech--on February 20--it
    fell to Mr Curzon to explain in a negative way the scope of his
    leader's pronouncement. An impression had got abroad that the new
    policy implied the surrender of the pledge given by Russia in 1886
    with regard to the occupation of Korean territory, and the Under
    Secretary was asked in the House of Commons for his views on the
    subject. Mr Curzon replied that "her Majesty's Government consider
    that the pledge given by the Russian Government is still binding."
    Was this a disavowal of the new Russophile policy. Obviously not:
    for later in the year, at the Guildhall banquet, Lord Salisbury
    made to Russia the friendliest overtures he has ever made in
    public speech. At the same time he especially accentuated the
    novelty of his attitude by asserting that "it is a superstition
    of an antiquated diplomacy that there is any necessary antagonism
    between Russia and Great Britain."

    The position, then, of the Government was apparently this: they
    had abandoned the traditional hostility of this country to Russian
    expansion towards the ice-free Pacific on condition that it did
    not trench on Korean territory. It followed, then, that they
    were not disposed to offer any hindrance to the acquisition by
    Russia of a port on Chinese territory, westward of the Korean
    frontier--that is, somewhere between the mouth of the Yalu and
    Port Arthur. This must be clear to anybody who cares to glance at
    a map. The upshot of the speeches of Mr Balfour and Lord Salisbury
    and of the statement of Mr Curzon was, in short, to invite Russia,
    whenever she might feel so disposed, to plant the Russian flag
    on the southern coast of Manchuria. This, at any rate, was the
    view taken in Russia, and, for my part, I can see no escape from
    it. It is not a little significant of the satisfaction caused in
    Russia by this interpretation of the policy of Great Britain that,
    on November 25, a fortnight after Lord Salisbury's speech, the
    Tsar at last consented in principle to the British proposals for
    coercing the Sultan of Turkey on the Armenian question.

    Now we come to the events of last November, when Germany suddenly
    swooped down on Kiaochow. This step is known to have been very
    distasteful to the Russian Government. It was the first appearance
    of a European Power in the northern waters of China, in a region
    which Russia had persuaded herself was reserved for her own
    domination. Long before the murder of the unfortunate German
    missionaries in Shantung it was well known in St Petersburg that
    Germany had her eyes on Kiaochow, and the Russian Minister at
    Peking had more than once warned Li Hung-chang and urged him to
    fortify the bay. The disappointment of Russia became intensified
    when it was observed that the step taken by Germany, was not
    resented in this country, and fears of an Anglo-German alliance
    in the Far East began to possess the Russian mind. Then suddenly
    there came the Talien-wan incident, and Russia found herself once
    more confronted by the danger which had threatened her in the
    treaty of Shimonoseki.

    The real significance of the Talien-wan incident has never yet
    been fully set forth. Had Talien-wan been made a treaty port, and
    thus given more or less of an international status, Russia would
    have been practically shut out for ever from the ice-free ocean.
    The only stretch of coast on which she could obtain this outlet
    was, as I have already shown, the southern coast of Manchuria
    from the Korean frontier on the Yalu to Port Arthur. Now, if we
    examine this coast-line carefully we shall find that there is only
    one spot capable of being transformed into a commercial port, and
    that is Talien-wan. The China Sea Directory (vol. iii.), published
    by the Hydrographic Department of the Admiralty, gives us the
    fullest particulars on this subject. It traces the coast-line in
    microscopic detail and shows us that it has only five possible
    harbours. The first, westward from the Yalu, is Taku-shan, the
    approach to which is frozen during the winter months. The second
    is Pi-tse-wo,--here the water is too shallow even for large junks.
    The third is Yen-tao Bay, the anchorage of which is bad, and in
    places dangerous. The fourth is Talien-wan, and the fifth Port
    Arthur. Talien-wan has all the advantages which are absent from
    the other ports. It is ice-free, spacious, well sheltered, with
    excellent anchorage and considerable commercial possibilities. Is
    it surprising that Russia should have felt aggrieved when it was
    proposed to make Talien-wan a treaty port?

    As a matter of fact, I believe Russia regarded this proposal
    as an attempt to evade the assurance given by Mr Balfour in his
    Bristol speech. She looked upon it as the design of a powerful
    Anglo-German combination to exclude her for ever from the China
    seas. It was to her mind a conspiracy of the most dangerous
    kind, and she bent all her efforts to defeat it. When she had
    defeated it she lost no time in securing her position. She took
    Port Arthur as well as Talien-wan, for the simple reason that her
    interpretation of the situation convinced her that a commercial
    port overlooked by a great citadel in foreign hands would be a
    vantage to her foes rather than a prize to herself. Can she be
    altogether blamed for taking this view?

    The mistake the Russian Government made was in attaching a
    serious meaning to the casual blunders of our Government, and in
    imagining that these blunders marked a connected purpose, if not
    a consistent policy. They were not to know that the Russophile
    passage in Mr Balfour's Bristol speech was a mere oratorical tag;
    that our friendly attitude towards Germany at Kiaochow was only
    a sort of amiable tolerance of an act the scope and consequence
    of which we had not measured; and that our proposal to open
    Talien-wan was made at the suggestion of our Minister at Peking,
    who, of course, knew what he was about, while it was acquiesced in
    at home by Ministers who simply did not know what they were doing.
    That Sir Claude Macdonald designed the Talien-wan move as a check
    to Russia I have no doubt; that Lord Salisbury never dreamed of
    this aspect of it I am equally convinced.

    However that may be, one thing, I think, is clear. The sense of
    injury and the complaints of bad faith are not all on one side. In
    diplomacy, as in most of the affairs in this world, it is a wise
    rule not to believe your opponent to be as stupid as he looks.
    Russia at any rate paid us this compliment during the recent
    negotiations. The result, no doubt, is that she has overreached
    us. But whose fault is it?

The Russian flag once hoisted over Port Arthur and Talien-wan (by what
nominal authority makes no difference whatever to the fact) placed the new
relation of China to the rest of the world beyond all discussion. China
did not willingly surrender her territory: she looked in vain for help,
but found none. She weighed in the balance the words and acts of one great
Power against the words and acts of another, and had no choice but to
place herself under authority of the strongest, finally and irrevocably.
That fact must be taken as the master-key to her subsequent policy in all
its phases.

These several events succeeding each other in close order awoke the
British public from their optimistic dream, and forced them to reflect
that there was after all something more in these Far Eastern readjustments
than had occurred to them when cheering on gallant little Japan to
the spoliation of China. The result obtained was certainly not that
which was contemplated either by the nation or the Government when
Great Britain settled down into her isolation. When the truth of the
situation had revealed itself to the public there was naturally a loud
call for something to be done to safeguard the commercial interests of
the country, if not to recover lost prestige; but the Government were as
far from having definite aims in China as they had ever been, and while
goading them to action, the public was scarcely in a position to advise
what that action should be. Neither had the Government, in spite of
all that had taken place, fully realised to what extent China had added
impotence to reluctance, for they continued to deal with China very much
as if the events of 1895 to 1898 had never happened. They were reluctant
to recognise the fact that Russia, in possession of the Liao-tung or
Kwan-tung peninsula and of the railway line connecting it with Siberia,
held a noose round the neck of the Peking Government, which she could
tighten or relax, conceal or parade, as circumstances required, and
that until some other Power or Powers were prepared to speak with equal
authority Russia must be paramount, not by virtue of any convention, but
as the outcome of accomplished facts.

Two measures adopted by Great Britain to rectify the preponderance of
Russia were the seizure, under a form of negotiation, of the harbour of
Weihai-wei and the forcing of money upon the Chinese by way of loan. The
value of these strokes of policy has not yet become apparent.

  [Illustration]




CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE OUTCOME.


I. THE SITUATION IN PEKING.

    A magnified repetition of experiences in Canton--Chinese
    unchanged--International usages inapplicable.

Since the foregoing chapters were put into the printer's hands the Far
Eastern Question has reached a crisis in which its ruling factors have
been suddenly exposed in their nakedness. But the searchlight now thrown
upon them casts a blacker shadow on the unilluminated portions of the
field. The events of 1900, while revealing the landmarks of past foreign
relations with China, have deepened the obscurity of all that concerns
the future of the Chinese State itself, as well as of the position of the
foreign Powers in relation to it and to one another. International comity
is seen to have made no progress in sixty years; on the contrary, the
gulf that divides China from the world yawns wider than ever, of which a
striking example is afforded by the telegrams lately exchanged between
the Chinese and the German Emperors. They speak in tongues unknown to
one another and are mutually unintelligible, so that they have no common
ground but that of brute force. Intercourse imposed on them against their
will and conscience has resulted, naturally enough, in exhibiting the
Chinese as the enemies of the human family.

The capture of the Taku forts and the occupation of Peking by foreign
troops were but a repetition of similar incidents forty years before; and
it is instructive to observe how closely the lines of the old precedents
have been followed. Prisoners taken treacherously, or envoys held as
hostages; the threat to kill them if foreign troops menaced the capital;
the devices to arrest the advance of the Allied forces; the proposal to
negotiate only when the Chinese case became desperate; the ineradicable
belief in the credulity of foreigners; and the flight of the Court when
all other expedients failed,--were but another rehearsal, with variations,
of previous performances at Canton, Nanking, and Peking. The parallel is
completed by the efforts of foreign Powers to coax the emperor back to his
capital. Nothing has been changed, only the scale has been magnified, and
the civilised world, instead of one or two Powers, has become directly
interested in the catastrophe. Official intercourse with China has
thus continued on the lines on which it began. The first British envoy
was treated as a malefactor, imprisoned, his letters were intercepted,
his communications cut off, his servants withdrawn; he was guarded and
threatened by armed men posted at his door, and reduced to dangerous
subterfuges in order to get a message conveyed to his countrymen outside.
Canton in 1834 was simply Peking in 1900, in embryo. A naval force was
required to relieve Lord Napier from his perilous situation then,[33] as a
combined naval and military force has been required to relieve the foreign
Ministers in Peking now. The cycle has been completed. Every link in the
chain connecting the opening with the closing incidents of diplomatic
intercourse has been, on one side at least, homogeneous. Whatever and
whoever may have altered, the Chinese certainly have not. Commissioner
Lin, Viceroy Yeh, Prince Tuan, the empress-dowager, and all wielding
authority, whether in name or not, have been true to the Chinese ideal.
They have all alike been blind to the consequences of their acts, which
have throughout been characterised by the strategy of fools--momentary
success followed by overwhelming reverses, resulting at each succeeding
encounter in a further invasion of the frontiers of their political
independence.

The crisis has been sufficiently prolonged to enable the world to perceive
what the Chinese mean by the term negotiation. To them it signifies what
it has always done, a palaver to gain time, to hoodwink an opponent,
to escape from a threatened danger, to purchase immunity by promises; a
device to manage, or, as they themselves express it, "to soothe and bridle
barbarians." As little now as at any former period can they conceive the
idea of a fair bargain between equals. They but temporise as with a savage
or a dangerous beast. "Get rid of the barbarians" is their unvarying
_mot d'ordre_, and it matters but little to them what instruments are
employed in carrying it out. The office is one from which every statesman
instinctively shrinks, since if he fails in taming the barbarians his
case is referred to the Board of Punishments, and if he succeeds he incurs
the contempt of all classes for the concessions by which he has purchased
peace. It is hardly possible for him in any case to escape degradation.
Be it therefore Lin, Kishen, Kiying, Yeh, Kweiliang, Wênsiang, Chunghou,
Li Hung-chang, or any one else, Chinese negotiators, whatever their
apparent success in averting a danger, are morally certain to come to a
bad end; and for the reason which caused the failure of Lord Napier in
1834, the impossibility of reconciling two principles which are wholly
incompatible. As negotiation under such conditions can only be nugatory,
a lengthened experience has made it clear that neither the negotiator
nor the negotiation avails anything, but solely the manner in which the
Chinese are held to their engagements, even when imposed on them by force,
and the strictness with which the common duties of civilised nations are
exacted from them, with or without written agreements.

One feature in the recent Peking episode distinguishes it from previous
experiences. A Government communicating with foreign Powers through its
own envoys, doling out through them garbled information, while isolating
the envoys of those same Powers within its capital, and planning, and
if not doing its best to effect, their extermination, at least openly
approving the attempt, is surely unexampled in human history. The
proposal of such a Government, on the failure of its plans to "negotiate
for peace," would be the most sardonic of practical jokes if we could
disconnect it from the evidence implied in the proposal of the estimate
of foreign nations which is ingrained in the Chinese moral constitution.
Obviously, however, such a Government has placed itself beyond the pale
of international relations, and it is hardly possible to conceive any
restoration of the old or evolution of a new _régime_ which can place
China in the rank of civilised Powers.

We are, in fact, thrust back on the conclusion arrived at by Lord Napier
in 1834: "That Government is not in a position to be dealt with or treated
by civilised nations according to the same rules as are acknowledged and
practised among themselves." Yet, instead of being treated with less, the
Chinese Government has received greater consideration than is accorded by
one Western State to another. Prerogatives implying superiority have been
conceded to it by consent of all the foreign Powers--a false principle
which has now produced its natural result.

The usages of Western Courts, therefore, being wholly inapplicable in
China, no matter what Government may rule there, international relations
of the European type must be, as they have hitherto been, an illusory
ideal, and some new form of intercourse, corresponding more closely to
the realities of the case, must take the place of that which has proved so
totally unworkable. Should foreign nations, by reason of differences among
themselves or the magnitude of the problem, hesitate to act up to this
view of the situation, the continuance of a status which is essentially
false to the facts must lead to some still more tragic catastrophe than
any that has yet taken place.


II. THE CHRONIC CAUSE.

    Hostility of Government and people--Fostered by immunity--Cause of
    animosity as set forth by Chinese--Incitements to outrage--Chinese
    press calumnies--Compared with European--Effect on the Chinese of
    international vituperation.

It must be admitted that the attitude of the Chinese has been quite
consistent: from first to last they have resisted the foreign impact
_per fas et nefas_, using such weapons as they could command, while
avoiding, according to their lights, the risk of reprisals. Their lights
have indeed deceived them, their resistance has failed, and their methods
stand condemned. But it is beside the question to inveigh against their
barbarity, for "what is bred in the bone comes out in the flesh," and in
human relations there are permanent facts which have to be accepted, like
the skin of the Ethiopian and the spots of the leopard. Since foreigners
have, for their own purposes, broken into a hornet's nest, it is idle for
them to prescribe the manner of retaliation unless they are prepared to go
through with their aggression and to enforce obedience to their own canon.

The constant feature in all Chinese attacks on foreigners has been the
immunity from punishment of the real instigators. Massacres of foreigners
have been condoned, for the blood-money exacted for them was no punishment
to criminals who did not contribute to the payment. All attempts on the
part of foreign agents to make guilty officials responsible for their
outrages have been frustrated by the Government, who have invariably held
the persons of officials exempt from punishment at the instance of, or
for injuries done to, foreigners. In Chinese eyes injury to foreigners
is meritorious in the abstract, and to be rewarded rather than punished.
Foreign Powers have in practice acquiesced in this fatal principle, for
though on rare occasions they have successfully insisted on the removal
of some obnoxious official, the Government have taken care to nullify
the penalty by promoting him to a better post. The various attempts that
have been made by foreign representatives to collect evidence to support
a legal charge against the instigators of outrages have been baffled by
the inflexible determination of the Government to shield the official as
well as the non-official leaders of riots. The foreign method of seeking
redress, being thus foredoomed to failure, is obviously not suited to the
circumstances.

But while foreigners were pursuing their object by a hopeless path, the
Chinese administration itself provided the simpler and more efficacious
remedy of holding the chief authority of every province responsible for
misgovernment, as well as for crimes and misdemeanours committed within
his district. In the words of Sir Rutherford Alcock, "Each province
constitutes a separate state in its administration; to compensate
for this the emperor can appoint and remove every official, from the
Governor-General downwards, at his pleasure. And they are each and all
individually and collectively held responsible for all that may happen
in the limits of their jurisdiction." By the custom of the country,
therefore, the guilt of the highest official is assumed whenever any
disturbance of the peace takes place or crime is committed within his
government. He may transfer it, if he can, and ferret out evidence in
his own exculpation; but errors of judgment, pleas of good intentions,
and palliatives of that kind are not admitted, and not offered. Why
foreigners have never appealed to this fundamental principle of Chinese
administration, and have preferred relying on their own crude procedure
and strange methods of collecting evidence while practically acquiescing
in the immunity of Chinese officials, has never been satisfactorily
explained. For it is only in matters concerning foreigners that the
persons of Chinese officials are held sacred. The Government have
no scruples with regard even to the highest in rank when they make
themselves obnoxious to the powers that be. Degradation, deprivation,
chains, imprisonment, and the headsman's broadsword, are ever ready to
vindicate the majesty of the law when the Court awards the penalty. But
foreigners are treated as outside the law, which is the gravamen of the
Chinese offence against them. The constitution of the country afforded
them a clear ground for demanding that the traditional principle of
responsibility should be put in force for their protection. It was, in
fact, applied spontaneously by Li Hung-chang in the province of which
he was viceroy, with the result that Chihli was exempt from outrages
on foreigners for nearly a quarter of a century. Why was the system
not extended to all the provinces of the empire? Had not the foreign
representatives the natural right of demanding the benefit of Chinese
institutions, or did they consider their exotic substitute as preferable?

A wrong road can never lead to a right destination; sins of omission
and commission have alike to be atoned for, and the cost accumulates
at compound interest. The result of sparing prefects and governors the
consequences of the evil deeds permitted within their jurisdiction is that
the Western Powers are now confronted with the more serious dilemma of
sparing the throne itself and tolerating the continuance of anti-foreign
outrages, or of doing stern justice towards the guilty even though the
heavens should fall. A retrospective glance over the history of sixty
years might help towards a solution even of this momentous problem. Have
the sacrifices of principle that have hitherto been made in order to save
the empire, or the dynasty, been efficacious to these ends? The answer of
history is No; on the contrary, they have accelerated the ruin of both.

The provoking cause of recent outbreaks against foreigners in all
parts of the Chinese empire may be gathered from the proceedings of
the conspirators, from their placards and lampoons, and from their
secret correspondence. The keynote of all these is general detestation
of foreigners, special enmity to Christianity and its accessories, and
aversion to the symbols of material progress. Hatred of foreigners now
shows itself as a passion which binds the provinces together as nothing
else has ever been known to do. Their expulsion is a cause which is
held to justify the vilest deeds done in its name. Nor is the present
state of things a growth of yesterday. The ferment has been working for
forty years--to go no further back--with many sporadic outbreaks to
mark its progress. It was not nipped in the bud, as it might perhaps
have been. Exhibitions of ill-feeling had been habitually disregarded
by foreigners, who in their readiness to blame each other for provoking
them, were accustomed to repel obvious explanations, and to go far afield
for theories which would exonerate themselves at the expense of their
neighbours. If stones were thrown or abusive epithets shouted, "It was
only the children." Only the children! As if more conclusive testimony to
any prevailing sentiment were possible.[34] In Peking itself the foreign
Ministers set the example of palliating these abuses, and the only wonder
is that the fire has smouldered so long without bursting into flame.
During thirty years--to speak only of the recent period--missionaries
in the interior have encountered the growing hostility of the people,
which they have ascribed, perhaps too exclusively, to the machinations of
"literati and gentry," forgetting that the torch would be applied in vain
to a substance that was not inflammable.

Not that the machinations of the official and literary classes of the
country are by any means to be held of little account, for they have
been the most potent factor in fomenting and directing the passions
of the people. What corresponds in China to a newspaper press has been
constantly employed in vilifying the character and execrating the designs
of foreigners, and holding them up continually to the contempt and hatred
of the Chinese people. There was no effective means of contradicting the
calumnies which were daily poured forth from every centre of population.
Attempts have, indeed, been made by special counterblasts in the form
of missionary publications in the chief citadel of hostility, and in a
less polemic form in the periodicals in the Chinese language conducted by
foreigners, yet these have had little more effect on the popular beliefs
than a leading article in the 'Times' has upon the flood of anti-English
literature that is poured out every day from Continental journals. From
an observation of the calumnies which are so unquestioningly accepted
by European populations we may partly judge of the effect of a constant
stream of the same class of vituperative literature among the still more
ignorant people of China. The features of both are the same. In Europe, as
in China, there is no crime that the lowest savages have ever committed
which is not attributed, with impassioned eloquence and with the finest
literary skill, to those who are held up to the popular animosity. In
Europe, as in China, the ruling powers encourage the virulence of the
press. In countries where the Government exercises direct control, and in
others where the connection is less official, extravagances are permitted
which can serve no other purpose than that of making the objects of
the invective so odious that a quarrel with them is rendered popular in
advance. European Governments thus play with fire, as the Chinese have
done, but in the case of the latter the incendiary policy has worked out
its logical result.

Nor should it be forgotten that since, in these days, the Chinese have
the fullest access to European literature, the calumnies of one nation
by another are calculated to confirm their conviction of the turpitude of
all. Neither is their armoury confined to the international amenities of
the Western press. The charges habitually, and as a matter of course, made
against their own countrymen by British writers and speakers would justify
a stranger people, already predisposed thereto, in forming the worst
opinion of English character. During the saturnalia of a general election,
when the fountains of the great deep are broken up, no baseness, no
falsity, no treachery, is too gross to be attributed, not to the rabble,
but to the chosen leaders of the people. Such things being circulated
throughout the world, preserved in indelible ink, can the enemies of the
British nation, or at least the prejudiced Chinese, be greatly blamed for
accepting the character of our people on such unimpeachable evidence?
Should we not judge them on analogous testimony? From whatever sources
they gather their ideas, however,--whether from the study of foreign
newspapers, from their own observation of the ways of foreign men and
women, or from the gross libels published by their literati,--there is no
reason to doubt that the unfavourable opinion which the Chinese entertain
of foreigners is held by them in good faith.


III. IMMEDIATE PROVOCATION.

    Shock of the Japanese war--European spoliation of
    China--Anarchy apprehended therefrom--Reminiscence of Taiping
    rebellion--Proposals for moderating foreign inroads--Lawlessness
    of foreign Powers--Chinese yield to force but nurse
    resentment--The missionary irritant.

What has caused the chronic anti-foreign movement to swell suddenly to
imperial dimensions, and to explode simultaneously in the capital and in
distant provinces, is a larger question than we can attempt to answer.
As contributory causes, however, there are certain facts lying on the
surface of foreign relations which are too suggestive to be passed over.
The Japanese war of 1894-95, and the train of events following it, noted
in a previous chapter, struck at the vital centre of the Chinese empire.
Foreigners of all nations applied force to China, not to defend person
or property, but to divide up the empire in disregard of the Government
and the people, both assumed to be moribund. The partition of China was
discussed in the Western press as a matter in which the Government and
natives of the country had no concern. Open doors, spheres of influence,
concessions, protectorates--the various modes in which the Chinese oyster
was to be cooked and served--were treated solely as questions of rivalry
and preponderance between the Western Powers. The people were not indeed
ignored, for the aggressors reckoned on them as their most valuable
asset, the raw material of prospective armies, the source of labour supply
for excavations and earthworks, and of the payable traffic for railways
and other exotic enterprises. But there is more in human nature than a
capacity to dig or obey a drill-sergeant, and it is precisely the elements
which were disregarded by political, financial, and industrial adventurers
which have risen up in judgment against them. The grandiose pronouncements
of the foreign press during the last two or three years were by no means
lost on the Chinese Government. These writings showed that the ambitions
of foreign countries had no limits, while the gratification of them was
absolutely incompatible with the retention of any semblance of independent
authority by the rulers of the country.

Reasoning after the fact, and from effect to cause, is apt to be
fallacious, but when the circuit is completed by the joining of prediction
with realisation, some confidence may be felt in the soundness of
the conclusion. Those who have observed the condition of China with
a sympathetic eye have been for years labouring under the deepest
apprehension for the peace of the country. The Japanese war accentuated
this feeling, and the subsequent ruthless proceedings of the Western
Powers deepened the apprehension. As the forces of aggression could in
nowise be restrained, anxious, but inadequate and altogether ineffectual,
attempts were made to avert their worst effects. Warnings were not
wanting that "dangers which might have slept for generations to come
had been suddenly brought within the range of practical politics, and
that unless measures of precaution were taken in time, what happened in
1894-95 would sooner or later happen again, ... that the Chinese Empire
would be brought to the verge of disruption; for all the forces, external
and internal, which make for anarchy would be let loose, and the empire
would be powerless alike to resist dismemberment by the aggressive Powers
or the subversion of authority by internal upheaval." The paper from
which we quote, doubtless one of many such drawn up in 1896, goes on to
say: "However desirous some, or even all, of the Great Powers might be
of saving China from dissolution, they would be paralysed by their own
jealousies, and they would perhaps be more concerned to avert a general
war among themselves than to prevent calamity in China. A crisis might
thus arise more direful in its consequences than the chronic crisis in
the Ottoman Empire, and a reign of havoc would follow in which millions
would perish where the loss of thousands now excites the indignation of
the civilised world.[35] No circumstances would be wanting to intensify
the horror, for it would not be even civil war, but promiscuous rapine
as aimless and as uncontrollable as a forest fire. A generation has
scarcely passed since China was desolated by the scourge of the Taiping
rebellion, which is thought to have destroyed a population equal to that
of a first-class European State; and a new outbreak of the like kind
would be more hopeless, inasmuch as the factors which were eventually
brought into play to extinguish the conflagration in 1862-64 would now
be wanting, or would be rendered inoperative by the complex circumstances
above indicated."

The spectre was anarchy, the provocatives aggression and dismemberment;
and the permanent interests of international commerce were appealed to
to avert the calamities foreshadowed. "Dismemberment, from the point
of view of the general interests of trade, would be little better than
anarchy." Severe pressure was being put on the Chinese Government--even
in 1896, when these and similar forebodings were uttered--to permit
free communication by steam and rail, and the development of the mineral
resources of their country. It was from such sources that the immediate
danger to the integrity of the territory and the peace of the State was
apprehended, while, on the other hand, the need for the innovations was
freely granted. "The Chinese having neither men nor appliances capable
of undertaking either the construction or management of railways, must
be wholly dependent on foreigners for their inauguration. This state of
things, fully recognised on all sides, has led speculators and promoters
of all nations to besiege the Chinese authorities with offers of the
means of construction and with demands for concessions. But considering
the relative positions of China and the Western nations, it cannot
but be admitted that the Chinese have done well to refuse to listen
to such proposals. Rival concessionaires working under the ægis of
extra-territoriality in the interior would be the axe at the root of the
tree of China's integrity."

The problem of preserving the independence and integrity of China,
while permitting the opening of the interior of the country to foreign
enterprise, was felt to be one of the gravest importance, not to be
settled by the clamour either of rival concession-hunters or the intrigue
of rival States. "Inland residence," wrote Sir Rutherford Alcock, in 1868,
"will bring weakness to the nation and death to the Government, and must
eventuate in greater anarchy than has yet been seen.... Right of residence
in the interior is hardly compatible with an extra-territorial clause."

The essential condition of safety for the country was evidently,
therefore, to bar the acquisition of territorial rights by any foreign
Government or company. With this view it was urged that at least the
ownership and control of railways and mines should be retained in the
hands of the Government itself, under a competent organisation in which
foreign skill and experience should be effectively represented. As
the then existing railway line of 200 miles was of such a character, a
development of the same system was recommended for the larger schemes
which were thought to be impending. The foreign Powers were urged
to assist China in putting her house in order and in adapting her
administration to the exigencies of the time.

Such were among the proposals made in 1896, and not disapproved by
the Powers to which they were addressed. But common action thereon by
foreigners was hindered by mutual rivalry and distrust, while the Chinese
Government on its part showed neither inclination nor capacity--any more
than it had ever done--to meet its difficulties by comprehensive measures.
It preferred the ancient system of resisting, in detail and in secret, the
advances of foreigners,--a policy of traps and snares and entanglements.
Possibly the paralysis of despair had already reached the nerve centres
of Chinese statesmanship, or the desperate scheme of a general expulsion
of foreigners had begun to fascinate the leading spirits. Certain it is
no practical _rapprochement_ was effected, or even seriously attempted,
between the contending forces.

Meantime, however, the invaders would brook no delay,--they had no
time for temporising tactics. The "ugly rush" began--syndicate rivalled
syndicate, and Government Government, in dividing up the _corpus vile_.
Within twelve months of the period just referred to Germany led the way
in the dismemberment of China by cutting off a slice of Shantung; Russia
promptly followed in Liaotung; then Great Britain took Weihai-wei as a
set-off, and assumed an interest in the central zone keener than that
of the Chinese Government itself. Other Powers followed with imperious
demands for portions of Chinese territory, on no ground whatever
except that China was weak. Every law save the law of the strongest
was suspended. Justice and mercy were thrown to the winds. And yet the
orgies of spoliation were followed by no change in the outward forms of
diplomatic relations with the Chinese Government. Foreign representatives
continued to negotiate as if the power of that Government remained intact,
though to assume, for one purpose, that there was neither sentient
organism nor sovereign authority in China, and for another, that the
Government retained its full competence,[36] was obviously to bring chaos
into their intercourse. As a consequence, diplomatic correspondence
with China since 1898--the British share of which, so far as has been
published, extends to a thousand pages--is but a harvest of Dead Sea
Fruit.

But Chinese relations being a compound of courtesy and force on the
part of foreign Powers, it is not difficult to divine which of the two
must be the dominant factor. Though they bowed their heads in morose
silence before their conquerors, Chinese statesmen retained sufficient
vitality to discriminate between platonic diplomacy and the "mailed
fist," yielding in all things to menace, in nothing to argument. To
seize territory, under this _régime_, presented less difficulty than to
obtain redress for trivial injuries. Aggressive Powers were respected
according to the measure of their aggression, while those who concerned
themselves with the preservation of the empire met with no recognition
whatever. British schemes were thwarted at every point, while other
Powers ran riot throughout the territory. For this reason the Chinese
Government collectively, and individual mandarins, have been stigmatised
as anti-British, as if to be so were a blot upon their escutcheons. No
doubt they are; but to assume on that account that the Chinese rulers
are pro-Russian, pro-French, or pro-German is more than the premisses
seem to warrant. History and tradition are alike opposed to such an
idea. That peculiar kind of patriot, the friend of every country but
his own, is not much in evidence in China. The vainest and most jealous
nation on earth was not likely in a moment to suppress its self-love,
invert its whole character, and welcome an army of foreign adventurers,
no matter of what nationality, who came in the guise not of servants but
masters. And, setting sentiment aside, the Chinese were not blind to the
material consequences of the foreign schemes which were pressed on them,
but were as keenly alive to the danger of intrusting railway and mining
enterprises to foreigners as they had always shown themselves to be
when their military and naval armaments were concerned. The memorials of
provincial authorities clearly prove this. If, therefore, they admitted
the disruptive agency into their country, it was from no love of the
interlopers, but solely by way of submission to superior force, and under
the same mental reservation with which they had subscribed to all their
previous treaty engagements.

The chronic missionary irritant mentioned in previous chapters had been
steadily spreading, and the hostility evoked by it as steadily increasing.
Christianity being the only character in which foreigners had presented
themselves to the view of the masses, the extirpation of it stood in the
forefront of the anti-foreign programme. The disasters which the governing
classes had always apprehended from the extension of foreign missions had
suddenly assumed the form of a concrete reality. All that its opponents
had for generations foretold became fact: their administration was being
undermined, their traditions set at nought, their very territory wrenched
from them in the name of the foreign religion. Propagandism was finally
unmasked by the German Emperor in the uncompromising manner characteristic
of that potentate. The Name that is above every name was openly made
subservient to the lust of conquest. China saw at last that she was really
doomed through the instrumentality of the religion which she had engaged
herself to tolerate.


IV. THE DYNASTIC FACTOR.

    Irregularity of the succession--Defensive position of the
    empress-dowager--Cantonese reformers influence emperor--Regent's
    alarm, vengeance and reaction--The new heir-apparent.

Ever since the _coup d'état_ in January 1875, whereby the empress-regent
by her own fiat placed her infant nephew on the throne of her deceased
son, to the exclusion of more legitimate heirs, the dynastic question
has been regarded by Chinese patriots as a certain source of future
trouble.[37] The imperial dignity was not the only matter involved in the
succession, but a vast amount of property also, and so many members of
the imperial clan were interested in the result that it was deemed certain
that the partisans of legitimacy would lie in wait for an opportunity of
enforcing the claims of the rightful heir. As it is customary to attribute
the acts of statesmen to personal motives, it has never been doubted that
the interest of the empress-regent in setting the reigning emperor on the
throne was sufficiently explained by her own lust of power. We know what
is done, but do not always know what is prevented, and in the case of
the families of both the elder brothers who were passed over, there may
have been practical as well as judicial reasons to justify even a _coup
d'état_ which supplanted them. From what has recently been revealed of
the character of Prince Tuan, for example, the exclusion of his progeny
may possibly have been a providential deliverance.

Be these things as they may, however, and be her ulterior motives what
they may, the solicitude of the empress-regent has been constantly
directed to protecting the weak point in her dynastic defences. The
childlessness of the present emperor, as well as the misfortunes of
the empire since he assumed the reins of power in 1889, of course added
indefinitely to her anxiety, while at the same time serving to keep alive
the pretensions of the elder branches.

Speaking, as we have done throughout, only of what is apparent, the
succession question was brought to the point of incandescence by certain
events in 1898. Great and justifiable discontent had arisen in the
provinces with the manner in which the affairs of the empire had been
conducted, resulting in humiliation and calamity. The idea of doing
something to stem the tide of misgovernment by enforcing the lessons
of recent misfortune was freely discussed. But the Chinese have not
discovered any method of remedying grievances except insurrections
in one form or another, on a small or on a large scale. A movement of
this character has been on foot in the Canton province ever since the
Japanese war. These revolutionary conspiracies have indeed been so well
organised, and so powerfully supported, that once, if not oftener, the
provincial city of Canton has narrowly escaped capture. The agitation has
been directed nominally against the Manchu Government. Whether directly
associated with the insurrectionary propaganda or not, another body
afterwards challenged public notice under the name of Reformers. As in the
case of the insurrectionary movement, many Government officials secretly
gave their adhesion to the cause, and inspired the leaders with confidence
in the ultimate success of their schemes.

Reform had been preached continuously to China from every foreign pulpit
for forty years. "Reform or perish" was the regular formula--words so
easily written that no resident, tourist, publicist, foreign official,
or any one with a pen or a tongue, refrained from reiterating them
continually. Individually every Chinese official with whom foreigners came
in contact joined in the cry. But though the general demand was unanimous,
there was diversity in the details, and in such a case the details were
everything. A dozen writers, each insisting on the necessity of thorough
reform, would postulate separately some indispensable preliminary to any
reform whatsoever. These indispensable preliminaries, added together,
would have left nothing for the substantive portion of the programme; by
them Chinese administration would have been renovated from top to bottom.
Such was the difficulty which friends and critics experienced in knowing
where to begin in their efforts to reduce the general to the particular.

In 1898, however, a bold attempt was made to launch a comprehensive scheme
of reform by imperial fiat. A Cantonese named Kang Yu-wei, backed by a
body of opinion,--of the extent and value of which different estimates may
be formed, "financed," of course, as popular leaders must be,--obtained
the ear of the emperor, and induced him to promulgate a budget of edicts
of startling novelty. Being deemed revolutionary, they excited alarm
in the Imperial Court. What were the specific grounds of alarm may be
easily surmised. Foreigners who refer it exclusively to the question of
reform may possibly take as partial a view of this as they have done of
other Court movements. What is known is, that the empress-regent, always
ready to strike when her interest or her schemes have been threatened,
pounced on the unfortunate emperor, and by force of will and the parental
authority which counts for so much in China, and in virtue of the Great
Seal which she had reserved when handing over her trust, made him revoke
his revolutionary edicts, hunted out his dangerous counsellors and
punished them as traitors. The embers of reform were thus for the time
ruthlessly stamped out. Of the ethics of these proceedings it is needless
to speak: not ethics but strength decided the issue; nature's primeval law
was not suspended in favour of the adventurous spirits who flew at such
high game. A reaction against all reform naturally set in, and the old
struggle was renewed: between conservation and revolution, viewed from
the Chinese Court side; between purity and corruption, viewed from that
of the Reformers.

But the quarrel cannot be restricted to so simple an issue as either of
these. The question between the Reformers and the Court was complicated by
sundry important considerations. In the first place, the capture of the
Emperor by Kang Yu-wei was directly inspired by the teaching of foreign
missionaries. In the second place, the movement originated in the same
southern provinces whence the Taiping rebellion itself had sprung, and
where conspiracies against the Government had been active since 1895.
And thirdly, the reform agitation was ostentatiously patronised by the
foreign, or at least by the English, press, while the leaders of the
insurgents found a safe asylum, if not an effective base of operations,
in Hongkong and in foreign countries. Taking these circumstances
together, therefore, whatever may be thought of the intrinsic merits
of the double agitation, it could scarcely be expected that the Powers
which saw themselves so seriously menaced should draw any such fine
distinction between the ostensible objects of the reformers and of the
revolutionaries, as to regard the one with complacency while suppressing
the other. The most abject of governments and the most timid of animals
will resist to the death an attack which threatens their existence. There
would be nothing unnatural, therefore, in the resentment of the Imperial
Government against its disaffected people being, by the process which
is so familiar to us in family quarrels, temporarily diverted from the
domestic to the foreign enemy, against whom the combined hostility of all
parties in the Chinese State might, for the time being, be concentrated.

Without, however, attempting to assign their relative values to all or
any of these factors in the question, it seems evident that the events of
1898 revealed the elements of a drama in which the contending factions in
the Court were forced to show their colours. The course of the conflict
during the year and a half following the autumn of 1898 has probably
been obscured rather than elucidated by the contradictory reports and
fluctuating comments which have been so freely disseminated with but
slight regard to the authenticity of their origin. But the nomination of
a grandson of Prince Tun as heir-apparent, which was decreed in January
1900, looks like a belated, if not compulsory, recognition of the prior
claims of that Princes family, and a confession that the Emperor Kwanghsu
has kept the rightful heir twenty-five years out of his inheritance;
for the grandson now selected possesses no right which the grandson set
aside in 1875 did not possess. The relations of Prince Tuan, the father
of the emperor designate, with the empress-regent are as obscure as
the intricacies of palace politics usually are to contemporary foreign
observers. Fortunately, however (in one sense), the cross-currents and
undercurrents of the Court, the question who are confederates and who
rivals, who betrayers and who betrayed, in the imperial camp, are matters
which have to a great extent been deprived of their significance. Under
normal conditions the dynastic imbroglio might have had a perturbing
influence on the policy of foreign Powers, but the explosion of last
summer has relegated all such domestic questions to a secondary place.
When the correspondent of the 'Times' could report that there was "no
Government" in Peking, the _personnel_ of that Government lost its
practical interest. The old order, with its sins and sorrows, has indeed
passed away, but to find a substitute for it is a problem that will tax
the wisdom as well as the forbearance of the world. The anarchy which
has been so long dreaded is actually upon us, and the prospective horrors
of it are assuredly not lessened by the outbreak being signalised in the
capital rather than in the provinces.


V. THE CHINESE OUTBREAK.

    Chinese methods of expelling foreigners--Secret societies--The
    Boxers.

Considering as a whole, therefore, the succession of crushing blows which
during the past six years have been dealt against the integrity of China
by open enemies and dissimulating friends, we may conceive, at least
partially, the hatred of foreigners which exists in the country. In this
case we are not driven to assume any wide difference between the Chinese
and races more nearly allied to ourselves, nor need we seek to account
for their demonstrations by defects in their moral or religious training.
Had even the whole population of China been miraculously converted to
Christianity, as suggested by Sir Robert Hart ('Fortnightly Review,'
November 1900), it is not permissible to assume that they would have
continued turning the other cheek to so many smiters. If we suppose the
case of any Western nation subjected to the experiences through which
the Chinese have had to pass at the hands of foreign dictators, the mode
in which it would act may afford us some measure by which to gauge the
excesses of the Chinese.

The origin and organisation of the recent outbreak will no doubt be a
topic of discussion for some time to come, and it is not within our
province to anticipate the final verdict on it. But, as in certain
contagious diseases which become constitutional, the angry symptoms first
show themselves at the point of infection, it is interesting to note
that the German sphere in Shantung enjoys the distinction of being the
cradle of the principal agency producing the cataclysm. The prominence
suddenly attained by the Boxer movement is probably fortuitous, due to
its casual connection with high personages. Secret societies are nothing
new, nor societies of divers sorts which have scarcely the pretence of
secrecy. As weeds spring up where cultivation is neglected, these social
growths may be considered in the light of spontaneous efforts to occupy
ground left vacant by the constituted Government,--a sort of excrescence
of autonomy rising and falling according as the administration is less or
more efficient. The members of these societies may be ascetics who follow
strict rules of living, defenders of popular rights, or mere "bullies"
who may be hired. They bear virtuous titles, but it is safe to assume that
the ostensible object of the associations is in practice invariably lost
in schemes of a different complexion. Sometimes in collision, at other
times in collusion, with the established Government, these societies are
a mobile factor, a sort of shifting ballast, always to be reckoned with
in the Chinese economy.

As the Boxers are an athletic corps, drilled and exercised, it was
natural to inquire, when their imposing force stood revealed, how
such a formidable movement could have been organised among the Chinese
people without the fact becoming known to the foreign residents in the
country. One answer is, that those who saw what was going on and warned
their countrymen were decried as alarmists, and then held their peace.
The wisest were but little wiser than their neighbours, for as weather
prophets easily forecast the character of the following season, while
they are at fault as regards that of the next twenty-four hours, so those
who are able to predict with confidence the remote future in China are
often the most blind to the nearer future which is reckoned by days or
months. But incredulity was excusable in the present case, for the extent
and apparent suddenness of the movement were really unprecedented. Such a
force has not been mobilised and kept in the field in a militant condition
without immense effort and liberal supplies, for though pillage might
go far, it would not go all the way in supporting so large a body for
any length of time. The junction of the Boxers with imperial troops, the
relations of the commanders to members of the imperial family, and the
influence of the movement on the question of the dynastic succession, are
all matters on which light will be welcome; for as no military invasion
of the territory has ever called forth such a general enthusiasm of
resistance, interesting, indeed, will be the discovery of the real genesis
of a rising at once spontaneous and aggressive.

The most practical observation, however, that foreign nations have been
forced to make during the crisis is that, whatever might have been the
separate designs of those who presided over the general movement, the
rallying flag of the combination was the extermination of foreigners.
That was the pretext which, for the time being at least, reconciled
all antagonisms and satisfied all consciences. It seemed as if the
long-accumulated hatred of the Chinese had gathered to a head, and its
whole force had been concentrated in one supreme effort to sweep the
aliens throughout the empire into the sea. That elaborate preparation had
been made to carry this into effect seems to be placed beyond doubt, the
rulers of China evidently conceiving that the effort would be successful.

The excuse put forward in palliation of an anti-crusade headed by the
highest personages in the empire bears an interesting family resemblance
to the apology usually made for rebels. Being beguiled by false prophets,
they believed they would succeed;[38] and success would have justified the
venture. The facts are such as no subsequent negotiations, no treaties,
no modifications of government, no reform, no professions of any kind,
can ever explain away.


VI. THE CRUX.

    Concert of foreign Powers unstable--Divergent aims--Aggressive
    and non-aggressive Powers--Unpromising outlook--The progress of
    Russia the only permanent element.

If conflicting forces in China have been united in an effort to expel
the foreigners, so the non-Chinese world has been forced into temporary
agreement in order to extinguish a conflagration which endangered all
interests. But the Powers assembled to execute judgment and restore order
in China present a picturesque diversity of ulterior aims. Their unity
can hardly, therefore, be expected to survive the emergency which gave it
birth. After the storm has passed--if it does pass--the permanent policy
of the several Powers may be expected to resume its normal sway. Of the
character of these different policies we are not left in doubt, for in the
history of the past six years it has been revealed in overt acts bearing
a higher authority than the most solemn official manifestoes.

The principal Powers concerned may be ranged in three groups--the
aggressive, the non-aggressive, and the absorbent. Under the first
must be ranked Japan, France, and Germany. Facts which cannot lie have
proved that these three Powers have long cherished designs upon the
territory of China. No doubt they flatter themselves with the belief
that their rule over such portions of Chinese soil as may come under
their control would be a blessing to mankind, an opinion which it would
serve no good purpose to controvert. And they reckon that, in addition
to the higher civilisation which they propose to confer on the Chinese
people and Government, they will secure material advantages for their
own populations. The ruling characteristic, however, of this policy is
that it is factitious, adventurous, and ideal, in search of interests
to defend rather than framed for the defence of interests existing. It
is essentially, therefore, an aggressive policy, though, in a sense,
also progressive. Dividing the world into communities to be conquered
and nations who are fitted to conquer them, it represents the primeval
moving power in ethnic evolution. But it is a policy quite unsuited for
co-operation, and the attempt to yoke together Governments, certain of
whom are moved empirically by facts as they exist and as they arise,
and others by the desire of creating facts, ends--as all concerts
of antagonistic interests must end--most likely in explosion. A safe
calculation may be made as to the action of a non-aggressive Power,
under given circumstances, as the action of a man of business may be
approximately inferred from obvious considerations of pecuniary advantage.
But in the case of States with ideal policies, like France and Germany,
no such forecast can be made. This radical divergence between the aims of
the Powers who are called upon to decree the fate of China must render a
sincere agreement between them, under any circumstances, impossible; and
if the policy of one of them should happen to be directed by a political
genius ambitious of distinction, the course of the whole would be subject
to aberrations incalculable. It is true that the Governments which have
marked out for themselves these extensive plans of aggression may begin
to perceive that their proceedings in China have been somewhat in advance
of any justification, also that they have been reckoning without their
host, and that to found and maintain empires in further Asia may put a
strain upon their resources out of proportion to the material gains to
be derived from the enterprise. Perceiving that their "vaulting ambition
may o'erleap itself" and land them on the off-side of the horse, they may
show themselves willing, for the moment, to attenuate the significance
of their previous energy. The discovery that the conquest of China
involves something more than a military promenade may induce them to
make professions which, however sincere for the time being, accord but
indifferently with established facts. In the procession of history,
however, it is the facts and not the words which ultimately prevail.

And this is the only canon by which it is safe to interpret the
apocalyptic exchange of notes just announced between Great Britain and
Germany, whose significance, like that of the conversation of a Chinese,
lies in the things which are not said. Considered as a convention, it
must be classed with those elastic bargains of which several examples
occur in the preceding narrative, in which one party has a definite
aim and the other not, and which is therefore destined to be employed
exclusively to the advantage of the former. _Vigilantibus non dormientibus
servit lex._ Without knowing what secret inducements led to such a
declaration of policy between Great Britain and Germany it is impossible
to assign a value to it. Its most authoritative expositors in the German
press rejoice in the fact that it pins Great Britain down to the only
policy which she has ever pursued, or ever will,--a policy in which her
public utterances have throughout coincided with her overt acts,--that,
namely, of opening Chinese and all other markets not for herself but
for the whole world on equal terms. An agreement, however, which does
not arrest French encroachments in the south, Russian appropriations in
the north, nor German exclusive exploitations in Shantung or elsewhere,
contributes little to that maintenance of the integrity of China which is
its professed object. Neither the world at large nor China herself will
benefit greatly by a verbal restriction on the one Power to whom the "open
door" and the integrity of China are articles of political religion and
of undeviating practice. And the clause which solemnly reserves to the
two parties the right of consulting together in certain contingencies
gives to the transaction a very platonic character. But a covenant whose
meaning is veiled is always a hazardous operation, even in private life,
where the power of definite interpretation lies with the more aggressive
of the two parties.

       *       *       *       *       *

The non-aggressive Powers may be defined as those whose citizens have
established in the country a substantial position, which their Governments
have been slow to protect. The principal representatives of this group
are Great Britain and the United States, whose interests in China have
many times been defined as commercial, and not territorial. They have
acted consistently on the conviction that there is no country in the
world where conquest for the sake of commerce was less justifiable than
in China, which possesses a large population inured to labour, accustomed
to the luxuries of a civilised society, and with unsurpassed aptitude
for business. No special credit is due to the two Anglo-Saxon nations for
their recognition of these circumstances, except in so far as it indicates
an intelligent appreciation of their own interests. They desire, as an
ordinary trader or manufacturer would, that a good customer may be kept
on his legs, and that a promising inheritance shall not be alienated
from the next generation of their merchants. Their policy, however, being
essentially passive and conservative, suffers from the defects of these
qualities, and is liable to be overborne by the more energetic action of
the Powers which we have ventured to place in the aggressive class.

       *       *       *       *       *

There remains the third group, which consists of one member, and that is
Russia. Although Russia is in effect more aggressive than all the others
put together, her annexations have been conducted under a different
formula from those of Germany, France, or Japan. It is not merely that she
has avoided hostilities, and effected her purpose by patient and adroit
diplomacy, but that her acquisitions of Chinese territory have not been
of the "wild-cat" order, but genuine integral additions to her existing
possessions. The expansion of Russia, whether a matter to be deplored
or applauded, is at any rate a natural growth, unduly forced at times,
but steady and progressive. It is the shadow of this secular advance of
Russia that covers the whole Far Eastern situation, and has in fact done
so for nearly fifty years. The character of her progress could not be
better described, even with the lights we now possess, than it was by Sir
Rutherford Alcock as far back as 1855. With rare clearness of vision and
firmness of touch he thus foretold the position which Russia was destined
to occupy in the Far East:--

    China has long been impotent. Russia has within the last few
    years, by force of diplomacy, appropriated half the province
    of Manchuria, the ancient patrimony of the reigning dynasty,
    and with it the command of the river Amur. If this other great
    Leviathan ... has not yet swallowed the whole empire, it can only
    be that, great as are its capacities, there are limits imposed by
    nature to the powers of deglutition and digestion in the largest
    boa-constrictor or predatory animal yet discovered. In the mean
    time the danger is more immediate and menacing to Europe than
    to China, perhaps; for Russia has at Sakhalin, the mouth of the
    Amur, and the adjoining coasts of the Western continent, laid the
    foundation for a position as menacing to European commerce as any
    now existing at the opposite extremity in the Baltic. Stretching
    with giant arms across the whole breadth of Northern Asia and
    Europe from fastnesses at each end, Asiatic hordes, directed by
    Western genius and science, are held in leash, ready to let slip
    over the fair and fertile south of both continents. The wealthiest
    regions of both Europe and Asia are at once threatened by this
    modern colossus.... China, India, and the kingdoms of Southern
    Europe form but the three different stages of invading progress.
    Long before the whole of such a gigantic scheme of rule and
    conquest can have its accomplishment in China--the most helpless
    as well as the richest of all the victims--Russia will be enabled
    to reap the first-fruits and take instalments of the larger and
    more distant spoil, by controlling the trade of Northern China
    and the rich European trade so recently developed in its seas.

Russia alone has a policy independent at once of accidents, autocrats,
shifting governing bodies, and of all personalities, weak or strong.
With the accumulated force of past achievements, an unbroken tradition,
and great military forces massed on a frontier which is no frontier,
Russia among the other Powers now masquerading in the Far East is as the
iron vessel floating among the earthenware pots. Russian publicists, in
order to strengthen the dominant position to which they aspire, have been
proclaiming with increasing insistency that they are the only nation who
can deal with the Chinese Question because they are themselves an Asiatic
people. They justify this pretension by their primitive Asiatic military
ethics, and it is an instructive spectacle to see their forces massacring
Chinese populations wholesale while their diplomatists are ostentatiously
shielding those in high places from the just consequences of their
crimes. The German Emperor has said many clever and some foolish things,
but perhaps he never did a wiser one than in making over his schemes of
vengeance to his august ally, for the work is more becoming to an Asiatic
than a Teutonic people.

       *       *       *       *       *

From an areopagus composed of these incongruous elements great
achievements are expected, but the comparison between the end and the
means inspires little confidence as to the result. The task itself is
gigantic enough to appal the boldest political experimenter that ever
lived, while its complexity involves insoluble contradictions. China,
the very Government itself, has been guilty of outrages against foreign
nations such as no nation can forgive another. The foreign Powers have
been openly and persistently defied--their people massacred throughout
the empire. Yet the nations so hated and flouted assume that they
have a mission to fulfil in setting up a stable Government in China, a
Government to be created for their own convenience, with which they may
in future negotiate,--a puppet Government, therefore, yet one which is to
maintain peace and good order throughout a vast empire by the prestige
of its authority over a loyal and devoted people. As buttresses to the
stability of the new _régime_, "the loyal southern viceroys," as they
are termed--loyal to whom, or to what?--deriving authority, it is to be
presumed, from the Government which is to be patronised by foreigners, are
expected to meet the convenience of the dictators and prevent anarchy in
the provinces. In short, the subjective Chinaman, as we have ventured to
call the fabulous animal so often evolved from Western consciousness, is
once more to be brought on the scene, and do everything that is expected
of him.

A puppet Government is an intelligible thing, but of a puppet pulled by
a dozen strings no clear conception can be formed. Such, however, has
been the anomalous history of foreign relations with China, that the
identical state of things now threatening has not been absent from the
minds of observers for a whole generation. The missionary question alone
was thought likely to result in a deadlock between China and the Powers.
More than thirty years ago Sir Rutherford Alcock was impressed with the
destructive effect of "each treaty Power dictating to the Government and
coercing its officers in their jurisdiction wherever Christians were
concerned." This, he thought, "would tend to paralyse and bring into
contempt the executive, leading to a process of disintegration fatal to
the existence of the Empire." What was then thought applicable to the
missionary field now affects the whole range of international intercourse
and of Chinese government. We are, in fact, confronted by two anarchies
of most serious portent--anarchy in the administration of China, and
anarchy among the foreign Powers who are so active in that country. From
the beginning of the intervention to protect the Legations anarchy among
the Allies has been the predominant feature: it was that which frustrated
effective action in June, and led to such severe loss and suffering.
Anarchy alone can account for the lawless proceedings at Tientsin,
Peking, and on the Chinese coast, which on any other hypothesis would be a
disgrace to civilisation. Anarchy has characterised all the utterances of
the Western Powers. Beginning at the wrong end with great swelling words
full of sound and fury, the Powers who assumed to lead have gradually
toned down their threats as they obtained more light on the situation
and on their own incapacity to deal with it. The latest expression of
this incapacity is the Anglo-German Agreement, already referred to, which
perpetuates the fallacy of excluding the Chinese factor from the China
question. Yet out of, even by means of, this confusion it is expected that
order may be established in China! _Similia similibus!_

       *       *       *       *       *

In this desperate imbroglio the ultimate advantage will no doubt fall
to those members of the unnatural coalition who have the clearest views
and the firmest resolution in giving effect to them. The dubious and
vacillating Powers frittering away their political forces, espousing every
contradiction in succession, and turning in weariness from the disgusting
scenes in which they will have reluctantly participated, will in all
probability leave the path open for their neighbours who have steadier
aims and fewer scruples.

Russia has been in real, though not nominal or legal, possession of
Manchuria since 1896. She has absorbed in times past many stony deserts
and barren solitudes, but in Manchuria she has for the first time
acquired a rich territory with an all-important sea-base and a virile
population, whereby her dominant position in Eastern Asia has been
rendered inexpugnable. China lies at her feet. Obviously, therefore,
her interests in that empire are not only distinct from, but opposed to,
those of every other Power: for while they may desire (1) to support an
efficient government and keep the empire of China on its legs, and (2) to
cut off slices of the territory for their own use,--two contradictory and
mutually destructive policies,--Russia has no need to be anxious, either
as to the efficiency of any Chinese Government or as to her own ulterior
interests in the territory. The looser the substance to be absorbed the
more painless will be the process of absorption. Once established in
strength in Manchuria, disorder on her frontier may afford the perhaps not
unwelcome opportunity of restoring order on her own terms,--of, in fact,
continuing the process by which Siberia with Central and North-Eastern
Asia have, in the course of two hundred years, been gradually incorporated
into the Russian Empire. "It may well be doubted," wrote Sir Rutherford
Alcock in 1868, "if this vast empire (of China) is not too large to be
any longer governed from Peking. It is impossible to conceive a more
disadvantageous site for the capital." Disadvantageous, perhaps, to
China, whose centre of gravity lies a thousand miles to the south; but
not disadvantageous to a Power whose strength is consolidated five hundred
miles to the north.[39]

And the veto which Russia has exercised over the acts of the Chinese
Government since 1895, whereby she has been able, at her pleasure, to
frustrate the enterprises of other Powers, is not likely to fall into
abeyance when that Government has been prostrated by its own folly. For
the weaker the Chinese Government becomes the greater will be its need of
correction and guidance. But we have only to imagine half-a-dozen Powers,
each aspiring, and some of them fully resolved, to exercise their special
veto over the proposals of the others, to realise the tragic complexity
of the international problems which now present themselves for solution.
A government holding together three hundred millions of people ripened
for rebellion, potentially at war with the rest of the world, and yet
governing under multiple tutelage--such is the prospect before us. Of
all the legacies which the nineteenth bequeaths to the twentieth century,
there is none more portentous than that of the sick giant of the Far East.

  [Illustration]

FOOTNOTES:

 [33] See vol. i. p. 38.

 [34] Mr Freeman-Mitford, in 'The Attaché at Peking,' recently
    published, tells the following good story illustrative of this
    (p. 168). M. de Mas, the Spanish Minister, happening to be at
    the house of Hêng-Chi, and knowing that he had a little son of
    whom he was inordinately proud, thought it would be a very pretty
    compliment if he asked to see the little boy, who was accordingly
    produced, sucking his thumb after the manner of his years. Him his
    father ordered to pay his respects to M. de Mas--that is to say,
    shake his united fists at him in token of salutation; instead of
    which the child, after long silence and much urging, taking his
    thumb deliberately out of his mouth roared out "Kwei-tzŭ" (devils)
    at the top of his voice and fled.

 [35] Referring to the massacre of Armenian Christians, with regard
    to which Germany took up a very different attitude from that now
    assumed towards China--a circumstance, by the way, which serves
    to reduce the "Christian" factor in the present intervention to
    its proper value.

 [36] Or, as M. Paul Boell expresses it, "Traitant la Chine tantôt
    comme un pouvoir tout à fait formidable, tantôt comme une
    puissance nègre de septième ordre."

 [37] Kwanghsu, being first cousin to the deceased Emperor Tungchih,
    could not, according to Chinese usage, be his heir. In adopting
    him, therefore, as posthumous heir to the previous Emperor
    Hsienfêng, his uncle, the Regent left her own son, the Emperor
    Tungchih, without an heir, promising to supply the want from
    the future offspring of Kwanghsu, or by some other adoption; but
    against this procedure strong protests were made. The arrangement,
    however, conferred upon the Dowager-Empress, as the widow of
    Hsienfêng, the authority of a mother over his heir, a circumstance
    which to a large extent accounts for the filial deference the
    reigning emperor has always paid to his adoptive mother.

 [38] Thirty years ago the great Nanking viceroy, Tsêng Kwo-fan,
    assured the Government in a memorial to the throne that if the
    question of treaty revision could not be satisfactorily arranged
    with foreigners, he had forces enough under his orders to drive
    them all into the sea.

 [39] The question of removing the capital to a more convenient site
    has been discussed academically--by foreigners--for many years,
    their view being that Nanking would be the most suitable. No doubt
    a central point open to the sea would be more convenient for the
    maritime Powers, but that is evidently not an advantage which
    commends itself to the Chinese themselves. During the Japanese war
    their strategists urged the removal of the Court from Peking to
    Signan fu in Shensi, simply on the ground of the inaccessibility
    of the latter site. The transport was prepared and the Emperor
    was ready, but the Empress-Dowager vetoed the project.




CHAPTER XXXIV.

SIR RUTHERFORD ALCOCK'S LATER YEARS.

    Retirement--Literary work--Social and charitable
    occupations--Geographical Society--Borneo--Failing health--Active
    to the end.


After twenty-seven years' service in the Far East Sir Rutherford Alcock
spent the remaining twenty-seven years of his life in his own country,
not in the placid enjoyment of a well-earned leisure or in mere literary
recreation, but in labours incessant for the good of his countrymen.
Though the scene had changed, the methodical habits of his business life
remained unaltered, and were directed in their full activity to the duties
that presented themselves in England.

During his whole active life Sir Rutherford had cherished the hope of
occupying his years of leisure with work for the sick and needy. His
visit to England, 1856-58, perhaps gave the definite direction to this
aspiration, and led him to see that hospitals, schools, prisons, and
similar institutions would afford the best available medium through
which he could reach the object of his desires. No sooner, therefore,
was he released from official service than the ex-army surgeon returned
to his first love. The associations of his youth were bound up with the
two hospitals in Westminster where he had studied. There, accordingly,
after the lapse of forty years, his active connection with the medical
schools was resumed. Residing in the immediate vicinity, Sir Rutherford
was able to devote a large share of his time to the affairs of Westminster
Hospital, giving back with interest what he had received from his nursing
mother. He was a regular visitor there: before long he joined the Board,
and became a prominent figure at its meetings. Being appointed one of the
vice-presidents, an office he held till his death, he was, through his
constant attendance, the working chairman of the board. There was much
good work waiting to be done in the control and direction of the routine
service of the establishment, and still more in the way of improvements
required to adapt the machine to the needs of the time. Hospitals in
general were by no means in a satisfactory condition thirty years ago,
and the Westminster was certainly no better than its neighbours. The
sanitary state of the establishment was antiquated and unfavourable to
the patients. But the structural changes necessary to improve this and to
extend the accommodation, and the heavy expenditure involved, demanded
first-rate financial and organising capacity, as well as unremitting
labour,--desiderata which Sir Rutherford was eminently qualified to
supply. The nursing was at such a low level as amounted almost to a
scandal. Drastic remedies, in short, and in many directions, were called
for. But reform from within is proverbially an unpromising undertaking,
the _personnel_ being identified with conservative traditions. That kind
of parsimony which is in effect the worst extravagance, inasmuch as it
yields no adequate return, was a serious obstacle to improvement. It was
not their fault, but that of the system of which they were but creatures,
that nurses and other attendants were so perfunctory and so inefficient.
It was the system, therefore, that had to be reformed, and into that work
Sir Rutherford Alcock threw himself _con amore_. In his labours for the
improvement of the hospital he was supported throughout by the cordial
co-operation of the late Lady Augusta Stanley. We are indebted to his
colleague, Mr George Cowell, F.R.C.S., for a short reference to the work
initiated and carried through by Sir Rutherford Alcock, and for a warm
tribute to the zeal and ability which he brought into the service:--

    Most of the many valuable reports on such subjects as the nursing,
    admission of out-patients, structural alterations, and improved
    sanitation were written by him, and endorsed by the committees
    over which he so ably presided. The writer of this notice
    remembers the early controversies with reference to the nursing,
    and the growing complaints which failed to receive attention until
    Sir Rutherford came on the scene. Hospital committees in those
    days were not so liberal as they are now, and all increase in
    the wages of the nurses was absolutely refused for many years.
    The result of this parsimony was that as the general rate of
    wages increased, the best nurses were enticed away by better pay
    elsewhere, and Westminster had gradually come to be nursed by a
    lower and lower class, and indeed thirty years ago it was not an
    unheard-of thing to convict a nurse for consuming brandy ordered
    for the patient. The medical staff were obliged to make a stand
    against this crying evil, and at last, with the assistance of Sir
    Rutherford, and in spite of the determined opposition of the then
    senior physician, a change was made, and the cost of the nursing
    was doubled at a bound.

Sir Rutherford was chairman of the Westminster Ophthalmic Hospital for
sixteen years, and of the Hospital for Women in Soho Square, to both
of which institutions he rendered great services. He was member of the
Council of the House of Charity for assisting those who have seen better
days, and chairman of the Nursing Home founded by Lady Augusta Stanley,
in which he took a keen interest. He was also a Poor Law Guardian and
a leader in sundry charitable and other parochial work, his experiences
of which he likened to the steps of a dancing-master--"two forward and
one backward, with no very sensible advance in any one direction." One
important step forward he did, however, succeed in making, and that was
in obtaining trained nurses for sick inmates of workhouses. His efforts,
while connected with St George's Union, were specially devoted to the
treatment of the sick: he also took a great interest in the emigration of
pauper children to Canada.

As a member of the committee of the Charity Organisation Society he
laboured for many years in a variety of ways to bring about unity of
action between that body and the Board of Guardians. In connection with
the Westminster District Board of Works, Board of Parochial Trustees,
Western Dispensary, and Westminster Nursing Committee, he rendered
innumerable services to the populous districts controlled by these
organisations. Having been elected to the Board of Works in 1875, Sir
Rutherford was at once placed upon the Sanitary Committee, to which the
Board delegated the administration of the Public Health Acts then in
force. The vestry clerk of St Margaret's and St John's records that the
Sanitary Committee of the District Board of Works was Sir Rutherford's
favourite field of work--an impression which was no doubt also formed by
the executive officers of the other spheres of his multifarious activity.
The members of the Board were at that time greatly occupied in combating
the evils resulting from the overcrowded and insanitary condition of
their district, and Sir Rutherford was largely instrumental in urging
upon the Home Office the necessity of legislation to compel medical
practitioners and heads of families to give notice of cases of infectious
diseases--efforts which eventually resulted in the Act of Parliament of
1889.

In 1881 he was appointed a member of the Royal Commission to investigate
the London smallpox and fever hospitals, to the formation of which he
had contributed powerfully by his reports and articles and labours in the
Medical Conference. In 1882 he presided over the Health Department of the
Social Science Congress.

In all the social and philanthropic objects to which he devoted himself he
was an original worker, never a follower of routine or one to say ditto
to another man's opinions. Whatever he undertook he did thoroughly, and
with a single eye to the main purpose. His various activities brought him
into contact with all sorts and conditions of men, but chiefly with those
on the pathetic side of social life--the unfortunate, the debilitated,
the improvident, the suffering. He shirked none of his obligations to the
meanest of these, and would suffer the greatest personal inconvenience
rather than fail in fulfilment of the smallest promise, or in gratifying
the slightest request. This punctilious observance of the minor duties
was remarked as a prominent feature in his character. An intimate friend
writes, "How I wish I could convey even a faint idea of his kindly and
sympathetic friendship, which left the feeling that he was on a plane
above one in his lofty sense of love and duty." Pure philanthropy,
genuine economy, and sound finance being his guiding principles in all
social undertakings, and whatever he undertook being pushed through to
a successful issue, he by degrees acquired a reputation for efficiency
and tenacity. It was not surprising that his energetic character should
have gained him the credit of aggressiveness, or, as Mr Co well puts
it, "bellicose individuality," which, however, served him in good stead
in every post he occupied. We have already seen throughout his official
career how he was stimulated by controversy: he was at his best as a
fighting man.

The high qualities which Sir Rutherford devoted to his labours of love
received flattering recognition from the Queen, who applied to him to draw
up the regulations and rules of the institution by which deserving nurses
were to be benefited in commemoration of her Majesty's Jubilee. This
honour he accepted from her Majesty on the condition that he should have
for colleagues in the work Sir James Paget and the Duke of Westminster, a
request which was graciously granted. The balance of the Women's Jubilee
offering of 1887 was £70,000, of which fund the three were appointed
trustees. They decided that it should be applied to the foundation of
an institution to promote the education and maintenance of nurses for
the sick poor in their own homes. When the scheme had been matured a
royal charter of incorporation was granted, wherein the governing body
was styled "The Queen Victoria Jubilee Institute for Nurses," the three
trustees being appointed to act permanently in that capacity, and also as
members of the Council of the Institute. "Sir Rutherford," says the Rev.
Arthur Peile, Master of St Katharine's, "continued to the last to take
an unfailing interest in the work, and in many valuable ways aided the
committee and council by his advice. From his wide grasp of the subject
in its various bearings he was able to make important suggestions."
The Diamond Jubilee and the incidents connected with the celebration
interested Sir Rutherford greatly during the last year of his life, and
the medal he received on the occasion was valued by him more highly than
any other distinction, because he knew that the bestowal of it was the
spontaneous act of the Queen herself, for whom he had a deep personal
affection.

To the larger public Sir Rutherford Alcock was perhaps best known by his
work in connection with the Royal Geographical Society, on the committee
of which he served for twenty years. Elected President in 1876, it
fell to him to receive Sir George Nares on his return from his Arctic
expedition in that year, and Mr H. M. Stanley on his return from the
Congo in 1877. His various presidential addresses to the Society itself,
and to the geographical section of the British Association, are replete
with well-digested summaries of the progress of geographical exploration
throughout the world. His comprehensive treatment of the subject assisted
very much, if not to make geography a science, at least to lift it out
of the region of mere technical knowledge, and to assign to the study of
it the social and political significance now universally attached to the
description of the earth's surface. Personally he did much to stimulate
enterprise of that kind in various regions. As Chairman of the African
Exploration Fund, he took an active share in the labours which resulted in
the despatch of Mr Keith Johnston and Mr Joseph Thomson to East Africa,
and, by bringing the country into notice, had such important results in
the direction of the opening up of that part of the continent. Speaking
of him a few days after his death, the President, Sir Clements Markham,
said: "Judicious, patient, and courteous, he was esteemed by us all,
and his able advice helped us out of many a difficulty. The period of
his presidency will always be remembered for the energy with which he
advocated African exploration, the result of his efforts being represented
by the memorable expeditions of Joseph Thomson."

We have already had occasion to remark on the personal interest which Sir
Rutherford had taken during the earlier years of his service in China and
Japan in the London Exhibitions of 1851 and 1862.[40] Indeed the Japanese
"show" in the latter was virtually organised by him. His well-known
sympathy with, and interest in, all industrial and artistic collections
led to his being chosen as British Commissioner to the Paris Exhibition
of 1878.

About the same time a question of imperial concern claimed Sir
Rutherford's active intervention: that was colonisation in the Eastern
Archipelago. Borneo, the largest island in the world after Australia,
has from time to time excited considerable interest in Great Britain.
The romantic career of the Rajah of Sarawak, Sir James Brooke, on the
west coast, had much to do with bringing that part of the world into
public notice. Adopting as his country the domain made over to him by the
native chiefs, Rajah Brooke laboured among his people like a missionary
of civilisation, trampled out the savage customs of the natives, and
after many trials gained the confidence of the people by his justice and
firmness, and eventually brought the country into a state of prosperity
and good order. In this he was loyally seconded by Captain Keppel, now
Admiral of the Fleet, whose 'Expedition to Borneo of H.M.S. Dido' is a
graphic story of their joint adventures among pirates and head-hunters.
Coal having been found in Labuan, adjoining the Rajah's territory, that
island was acquired by Great Britain in 1847, under treaty from the Sultan
of Brunei, who engaged not to make any cession of his territory without
her Majesty's consent, and established as a Crown colony.

The Netherlands and Spain claimed between them, upon a vague tenure,
enormous tracts of the coast of Borneo and the adjoining archipelago,
effectually blocking all progress in these regions. There still remained,
however, an important section of the northern part of that immense island
unappropriated by the white man. Portions of this tract had been leased
to an American citizen, who transferred it to an American company; but
being unable to furnish the capital either to pay the stipulated rent
or to develop so enormous a property, in 1877 the holders were glad
to part with all their rights to an English association consisting of
Baron von Overbeck and Mr (now Sir) Alfred Dent, who undertook to pay
the agreed tribute to the Sultans of Borneo and Sooloo. Possessing this
immense estate, with the sovereign rights inherent in the proprietor, the
English association made arrangements to develop the property. Agents
were sent out to occupy certain points on the coast, and a provisional
government, suited to the requirements of the place, was set up. But the
administration putting too heavy a strain upon a private individual, Mr
Dent set to work to find assistance in his undertaking.

At this juncture, 1879, Sir Rutherford Alcock, impressed by the important
strategical position of the island of Borneo, lying close to the track of
vessels traversing the China Sea, its possession of several good harbours,
and prospective coal supply, joined Mr Dent in his efforts to place the
British occupation of the Bornean harbours on a secure basis. As a first
step it was necessary to organise a company with sufficient capital to
take over the government and utilise the resources of the territory. This
may well have seemed at the time not only an arduous but an impossible
undertaking; for nothing short of a royal charter could supply the
necessary guarantee to attract capitalists, and to assure them that their
property investment would eventually be productive. The era had long gone
past when royal charters were granted to merchant adventurers. Such an
institution, therefore, seemed an anachronism, opposed to the spirit of
the age. Nor was the political colour of the British Government at the
time encouraging to imperial schemes of any description. In spite of these
difficulties the knowledge of affairs and insistency of Sir Rutherford
Alcock and the other promoters enabled them eventually to succeed in
pushing their enterprise with the Government to the point of obtaining a
charter of incorporation in November 1881. On the faith of this charter a
company was formed, of which the capital now stands at £2,000,000, under
the title of the "British North Borneo Company." Sir Rutherford Alcock
became the chairman, which post he continued to fill during the ten
years which may be considered the probationary stage of the company. To
him it owed much of its success in overcoming the numerous difficulties
incidental to starting so novel a venture; and among his other labours in
its behalf he drew up a full and elaborate handbook of North Borneo. It
was not a trading, but a governing and a land-owning company, its revenues
consisting of royalties paid by private adventurers for the privileges
of mining, agriculture, and so forth, licences and the necessary taxes
on commerce. But the interests of a dividend-earning and a governing
company were so nearly incompatible that no little ingenuity as well as
patient effort were required to bring about reconciliation between the
two elements.

The affairs of the company have been conducted with great perseverance,
the exploitation of the territory by means of planting, mining, and
industries of various kinds having been handed over to subsidiary
companies created for the purpose, while the parent body maintains its
position as overlord, administering the whole territory.

But amidst his numerous preoccupations in England Sir Rutherford never
loosened his grasp on the events which were transpiring in the distant
field to which his official life had been devoted. As the only competent
and persistent critic of these events, he did as much as one man could to
turn the eyes of his countrymen towards their most important interests
in Further Asia. Nearly every passing event was noticed briefly by
him in the columns of the daily press, while the permanent features of
the Far Eastern problem, which are only now beginning to dawn upon the
consciousness of the nation, were copiously dealt with in the monthly
magazines and in the more stately pages of the 'Edinburgh Review.' Sir
Rutherford's contributions to periodical literature, forming a tolerably
complete repertory of the questions arising out of the intercourse of
Europe with Eastern Asia, would fill many volumes. As late as 1896 the
subject was still uppermost in his mind. "In China," he then wrote,
"there is a far larger Eastern question than what is occupying us at
Constantinople. An open port for Russia, a railroad across Russia, with
the French scheming for our commerce in the Indo-Chinese peninsula,--the
whole situation is full of danger to all our interests in China." And
during the last year of his life the thought of all that had been lost
to the country through sheer neglect seemed to weigh heavily on his
mind. That his constant premonitions of coming changes passed practically
unheeded by the public to whom they were addressed is unfortunately true;
and it is trite to say that it would have been well for this country
if the warnings of such serious writers as this had been taken to heart
before instead of after the deluge. But that would have been a historical
anomaly, for mankind has learned little since the days of Noah.

Under the valid plea of advancing age and failing health Sir Rutherford
during his last years relinquished one after another the offices which
he had filled with so much earnestness and good faith. Deafness alone
obliged him to retire from the active chairmanship of the Westminster
Hospital, though his attendances at the weekly meetings of the Board
were unremitting to the very end. As late as July 1897 he took a leading
part in measures he deemed urgent for the wellbeing of the institution.
During the Jubilee celebrations he was able to receive a formal visit
from a party of twelve Dyak police from British North Borneo, under the
command of Mr Wardrop. The Committee of the Jubilee Nurses continued to
meet at his house, and he did work for the institution during the summer.
While at Wimbledon with his family in August, he was seized by an illness
from which he rallied sufficiently to be brought home to his house at
Westminster, where he came under the medical care of his old friend and
physician, Dr Lionel Beale. Among the few friends who were admitted to see
him during the last month of his life were the Dean of Westminster, Lord
Lister, Mr Edmund Bagshawe of Bath, and one or two others. His strength
was then gradually failing, though he retained his intellect unimpaired
till within a few days of the end, on November 2, 1897. He was buried in
Merstham churchyard. His widow, nearly his own age, survived him sixteen
months, dying in March 1899. How much the maintenance of the husband's
long life of active usefulness owed to the support and encouragement of
a judicious and devoted wife must remain behind the veil. She had her
reward.

  [Illustration: MAP OF EASTERN ASIA
   TO ILLUSTRATE
   THE ENGLISHMAN IN CHINA IN THE VICTORIAN ERA
   BY ALEXANDER MICHIE]

It may be interesting in conclusion to add a few words of Sir Rutherford
Alcock's estimate of himself, which occur in a letter to the friend who
had pressed him on the subject of biography, written within a year of his
death. "In worldly things," he said, "I have been exceptionally favoured
by opportunities, many of them unanticipated, and rather fortuitous than
by any efforts or merits. My early life was marked by a great rashness,
and a readiness to accept responsibilities which savoured much of
presumption and confidence from conceit in my powers to deal with whatever
fell in my way--very different from my retrospect in old age and the
sobered estimate my judgment is now disposed to form of all I undertook
and accomplished, and the risks I accepted, through my fifty years of
active life."

If, however, age be the season appropriate for judgment, youth is the time
for laying up the materials for it; and he who takes no risks achieves
nothing worthy of being judged. We estimate the man by his record rather
than by his own review of it, falling back on the criterion, valid in all
circumstances, "By their fruits ye shall know them."

FOOTNOTE:

 [40] In 1863 the University of Oxford conferred upon him the degree
    of D.C.L.




INDEX.


  Adkins, Mr, reports foreign atrocities, i. 302, 303;
    in charge of Peking legations, i. 355;
    intimate with Hangki, ii. 140;
    on mixed commission regarding redress of commercial grievances,
      ii. 212;
    interview with Li, ii. 244, 245.

  Alabaster, Sir Challoner, ii. 206, 359.

  Alcock, John Rutherford--
    _Chronological sequence of career_--
      Birth and early years, i. 1, 2;
      medical education, i. 2-4; visit to Paris, i. 2;
      medical work, i.8; campaign in Portugal, i. 14-20;
      campaign in Spain, i. 21, 22;
      publications on surgery, i. 23, 24;
      appointed Inspector of Anatomy, i. 25;
      marriage, i. 26;
      paralysis of hands, i. 27;
      appointed consul at Foochow, i. 29, 116;
      residence at Amoy, i. 116, 117;
      at Foochow, i. 117-122;
      Consular Reports (1845-46), i. 123;
      appointed to Shanghai, i. 126;
      Tsingpu affair, i. 129-133;
      Taiping occupation of Shanghai, i. 138, 141;
      custom-house plans, i. 148, 151-154;
      promoted to Canton consulate, i. 156;
      death of his wife, i. 158;
      literary work, i. 159;
      first furlough, i. 159;
      Memorandum requested by Foreign Office, i. 332;
      appointed Consul-General in Japan and granted title of
        Plenipotentiary, ii. 14;
      arrival in Yedo, ii. 15-17;
      journey up the Inland Sea, ii. 36, 42;
      expedition to Fujiyama, ii. 41, 42;
      leaves Yedo on furlough (1862), ii. 50;
      made K.C.B., ii. 70;
      completes 'The Capital of the Tycoon,' ii. 70;
      made D.C.L. of Oxford University (1863), ii. 484 _note_;
      returns to Yedo, ii. 70;
      second marriage, ii. 73;
      recalled by Earl Russell, ii. 87, 88;
      leaves Japan, ii. 91;
      publishes 'Art and Art Industries of Japan,' ii. 102;
      publishes Japanese Grammar, ii. 103;
      appointed minister to China, ii. 130;
      efforts against coolie trade, ii. 168, 171, 172;
      favours Burlingame mission, ii. 194, 195;
      departure for Europe, ii. 218;
      criticisms of Far Eastern events, ii. 476, 477;
      work for Westminster Hospital, ii. 478-480;
      various public and charitable works, ii. 480, 481, 483;
      receives Jubilee medal from the Queen, ii. 483;
      work regarding colonisation in Borneo, ii. 485-488;
      illness and death, ii. 488, 489.
    _Personal characteristics_--
      Aggressiveness, ii. 482.
      Alertness, ii. 16, 100.
      Appearance, i. 117.
      Appreciative faculty, ii. 139.
      Art, love of, i. 2, 4, ii. 101.
      Common-sense, i. 27.
      Courage and nerve, i. 15-17, 27, ii. 100, 126.
      Courtesy, ii. 484.
      Duty, devotion to, i. 15, 18, 157, ii. 16, 101, 138, 482.
      Energy, i. 26, 116, ii. 16, 482, 484.
      Enthusiasm, i. 27.
      Formality, ii. 139.
      Geniality to intimates, ii. 139.
      Grasp of fundamentals and breadth of view, i. 116, 122, 143, 162,
        166, 204.
      Hospitality, ii. 139.
      Industry, ii. 139.
      Judgment and farsightedness, i. 18, 163, ii. 484.
      Kindness and sympathy, ii. 482.
      Loyalty, ii. 138.
      Lucidity of style, i. 26, 166.
      Practical philosophy, i. 161.
      Reserve, i. 158, ii. 121.
      Resolution, ii. 101.
      Responsibility, fearlessness of, i. 20, 166, 437, ii. 16, 489.
      Thoroughness and earnestness of purpose, i. 18, 27, ii. 16, 181,
        361, 481.

  Alcock, Lady, marriage of, ii. 73;
    death of, ii. 489.

  Alcock, Mrs (_née_ Bacon), marriage of, i. 26;
    arrival in Foochow, i. 120;
    death of, i. 158.

  America, Americans (_see also_ Powers)--
    British support advantageous to, i. 437.
    Burlingame mission to, ii. 192, 193, 196, 197.
    Chinese trade with, i. 168, 177;
      Chinese traders in, i. 270;
      "dummy" Chinaman evolved by, i. 338, 339;
      action against Chinese emigration, ii. 174;
      Chinese youths educated in, ii. 394, 395.
    Custom-house co-operation omitted in treaty of, i. 146;
      customs not levied by, at Shanghai in Taiping rebellion, i. 149.
    Disputes of French and British with (1849), i. 435.
    Foochow developed by, i. 121, 122, 241.
    Japan, naval demonstration off, ii. 2;
      Mr Harris's treaty, ii. 3, 5, 39, 99;
      Minister remains in Yedo during assassination period, ii. 36;
      Japanese mission to, ii. 47;
      artillery officers declined by Japanese, ii. 110.
    Korean expedition from, ii. 178, 179.
    Li's visit to, ii. 387.
    Missionaries from, in Yangtze expedition, i. 370.
    Non-aggressive policy of, ii. 468.
    Opium included in Tientsin treaty at instance of, i. 342.
    Shipping industry in, i. 224, 228-230.
    Silk industry of, i. 191.
    Taiping rebellion, joint action with British at Shanghai during,
      i. 138.
    Tientsin Conference attended by (1854), i. 311;
      at Tientsin later with Lord Elgin, i. 331.
    Toleration clause in treaty of, ii. 224.

  Amoy--
    Alcock's residence at, i. 116, 117.
    Opening of, i. 115.
    'Times' pronouncement against, i. 114.

  Amur, the, Russian acquisitions on, ii. 252, 422.

  Anatomy Act, Alcock appointed Inspector under, i. 25, 26.

  Anderson, Dr John, cited, ii. 267.

  Annam, French conquest of, ii. 253, 324, 325.

  A'Pak, exploit of, against lorchas, i. 304, 305.

  Arbuthnot, G., on Japanese currency, ii. 19, 22, 23.

  Arrow, crew of, seized by Chinese, i. 309;
    Lord Elgin's view of incident, i. 323, 324.

  Atami, Springs of, Alcock's visit to, ii. 32, 42.

  'Attaché at Peking, The,' cited, ii. 444 _note_.

  Australia, attitude of, towards Chinese emigrants, ii. 174.

  Austria, envoy from, received in audience at Peking, ii. 320, 321.


  Baber, Colborne, ii. 150, 272, 359.

  Bacon, Miss. _See_ Alcock, Mrs.

  Baldwin, Major, assassination of, ii. 91.

  Balfour, the Right Hon. A. J., speech of, regarding Russian ports,
    ii. 425, 430, 432.

  Balfour, Captain George, i. 124, 128.

  Bernard, W. D., cited, i. 63.

  Biegeleben, M., ii. 320, 321.

  Bird, Lieutenant, assassination of, ii. 91.

  Birileff, Count, at Tsushima, ii. 111-114.

  Blakiston, Captain, cited, i. 370.

  Bonham, Sir George, succeeds Sir J. Davis at Hongkong, i. 131;
    rebuffed by Seu, i. 165;
    applies to Alcock for information, i. 166;
    asked to defend Nanking against Taipings, i. 312;
    Alcock's despatch to (1852), i. 428-432.

  Borneo, Alcock's interest in British development of, ii. 485-488.

  Bowring, Sir John, demands right of entry into Canton, i. 160;
    Russian despatches brought to, i. 233;
    plenipotentiary at Hongkong, i. 309;
    dealings with Yeh, i. 310, 313, 314;
    visit to Tientsin, i. 311;
    protects factories at Canton, i. 312;
    influenced towards strong measures, i. 315;
    policy of, i. 319, 323 _note_;
    superseded, i. 319, 320.

  Boxers, ii. 462, 463.

  Bright, the Right Hon. John, confidence of, in Sir R. Hart,
      ii. 164-166;
    attitude of, towards China trade, ii. 365, 366.

  Brodie, Sir Benjamin, i. 25.

  Brown, J. McLeavy, ii. 194.

  Brown, Major-General, i. 385, 386, 392.

  Browne, Colonel Horace, ii. 266, 267.

  Bruce, the Hon. Frederick--Tientsin treaty brought home by, i. 335;
    repulsed at Taku forts, i. 348;
    British minister at Peking, i. 355;
    prohibits Englishmen from visiting Peking, i. 363;
    adopts determined attitude, i. 367;
    refuses to defend Ningpo, i. 377;
    Gordon's interview with, i. 383;
    supports Burgevine's cause, i. 384, 385;
    implicated in the Lay-Osborn flotilla failure, i. 389, 390;
    applauds Gordon's resentment against Li, i. 392;
    policy and diplomacy, i. 401-404, 407;
    correspondence with Prince Kung, i. 404-406, 409;
    confuses legal authority of himself and Supreme Court, ii. 124,
      125;
    succeeded by Alcock, ii. 130;
    anecdote of his housekeeper, ii. 152;
    relations with Inspector-General of Customs in Peking, ii. 156,
      159, 160.

  Burgevine, General, i. 382, 384-387.

  Burlingame, the Hon. Anson, mission of, as Chinese envoy, ii. 192-198;
    Alcock's approval of the mission, ii. 194, 195;
    Alcock's subsequent view, ii. 217;
    British Government influenced by mission, ii. 208, 209;
    negotiates American treaty giving full privileges to Chinese
      immigrants, ii. 174;
    asserts Chinese welcome to missionaries, ii. 232.

  Burma--
    Browne, Colonel H., expedition under, ii. 266, 267.
    King of, ii. 269.


  Campbell, Duncan, ii. 333.

  Canton--
    Alcock promoted to consulate of, i. 156.
    Arrogant hostility and excesses of population, i. 72, 92, 95-99,
      107, 274, 415, 419.
    Arrow incident, i. 309, 323, 324.
    Blockade of river (1839), i. 61, 63.
    Commerce carried on during hostilities, i. 68, 69, ii. 158.
    Conditions of life in, in early days, i. 33, 34, 46.
    D'Aguilar's destruction of river defences, i. 102, 103.
    Davies, Sir John, policy of, i. 94, 99-104, 106-108.
    Entry, right of, refused, i. 98, 107, 114, 160, 165, 310, 333, 338.
    Factories attacked (1846), i. 99;
      burned (1856), i. 317.
    Foochow sensitive to disturbances in, i. 119, 314.
    French attack feared, ii. 326-328.
    Merchants in, imprisoned, i. 53, 55;
      views of, disparaged, i. 254;
      characteristics of, i. 255;
      influence of, i. 315;
      friction between Sir J. Davis and, ii. 119.
    "Merchants' War," i. 316 _seq._
    Naval construction attempted at, ii. 396.
    Occupation of, by Allied troops, i. 328, 342-345;
      Kowloon concession obtained during occupation, i. 286;
      evacuated by Allies, i. 396.
    Portuguese relief of, in sixteenth century, i. 259;
      Portuguese crews slaughtered by Cantonese, i. 304, 305.
    Revolutionary conspiracies in neighbourhood of, ii. 456.
    Shameen site acquired, i. 330.
    Smuggling insignificant at, i. 144, 145.
    Taipings at, i. 312.
    War of 1839-42--blockade of river, i. 63;
      destruction of Bogue forts and junks, i. 66;
      forts restored, i. 67;
      recaptured, i. 68;
      fire-raft attempts, i. 71;
      British attack stopped by Elliot, i. 71;
      ransom taken for the city, i. 72, 91;
      departure of British troops, i. 72;
      evil effects of ransoming, i. 108.
    War of 1857 ("The Merchants' War"), i. 316 _seq._
    Weddell's bombardment of (1655), i. 292.

  'Capital of the Tycoon, The,' passages quoted from, ii. 10, 15,
      31, 32, 71-73;
    independent judiciary advocated in, ii. 126.

  Ceylon, growth of tea trade with, i. 184, 185.

  Challenger, i. 235-238.

  Chamberlain, Basil Hall, quoted, ii. 96 _note_.

  Chang Chih-tung, rudeness of, regarding the Czarevitch, ii. 322, 323;
    characteristics and policy of, ii. 380, 381.

  Chang Yi, ii. 317.

  Chantrey, Sir F. L., Alcock's studies under, i. 2.

  Chefoo--
    Convention of. _See under_ Treaties.
    Czarevitch to be received at, ii. 322.
    Early exploration of, i. 221, 222.

  Chêkiang, Taiping campaign in, i. 380, 394.

  Chesney, Colonel, i. 99, 100.

  China (_for particular persons, towns, &c., see their titles_)--
    Admiralty board, ii. 317, 318, 392, 393.
    Army--
      Abuses in, ii. 398.
      Arms, diversity of, ii. 391, 393, 399.
      Discipline lax, i. 137.
      Honour, military, non-existent in, i. 140.
      Li's efforts for, ii. 188, 190, 391, 397.
    Black Flags, ii. 325.
    Boxers, ii. 462, 463.
    _Chose jugée_, instance of, ii. 280.
    Commerce. _See that title._
    Commercial community in Britain keenly alive to affairs in, i. 87.
    Consuls. _See below under_ Foreigners.
    Coolie trade, i. 295, ii. 168-174.
    Corruption and laxity inherent in government of, i. 155, 192.
    Court--
      Audience, right of, approved by Li, ii. 186;
        granted by Emperor Tungchih (1873), ii. 260, 261;
        by Kwanghsu (1891), ii. 318-320.
      Chinese, not Manchu, influence predominant at, i. 84.
      Dynastic arrangements of the Empress-Dowager, ii. 264, 313,
        455 _and note_, 456.
      Flight of, i. 354, ii. 436;
        proposed removal during Japanese War, ii. 474 _note_.
    Custom-house. _See below under_ Taxation.
    Decentralisation the principle of government, i. 388, 402, 407, 408.
    Drift, policy of, ii. 324.
    Emigration, ii. 168, 169, 171-174.
    "Ever Victorious Army," campaign of, i. 382-387;
      disbandment of, i. 393.
    Exhibition of 1851, represented at, i. 200-202, ii. 101, 102.
    Foreigners--
      Aims of, i. 368.
      Assistance from, distrusted, i. 387;
        made use of, ii. 385, 386;
        faithfully rendered, ii. 393, 394.
      Co  nciliatory and subservient attitude of British, i. 35-41, 56,
        118, 253, 415;
        of Portuguese, i. 287.
      Confidence between native merchants and, i. 48.
      Consistent attitude of, desirable, i. 340, ii. 222.
      Consular Courts, drawbacks of, ii. 125, 126, 354, 356, 357.
      Consular officials, peculiar responsibilities of, i. 30, 79, 85,
          92 _note_, 128, 130, ii. 353, 354, 360;
        numbers and qualifications of, ii. 358, 359.
      Degradation and indignities imposed upon, i. 33, 35-40, 55-58,
        60, 118, 163, 411, 415.
      Force, policy of, the condition of security for, i. 39, 40, 61,
        80, 90, 106, 119, 426, 437-439, ii. 221, 222.
      Hatred and contempt for, i. 313, 419, ii. 29, 440, 441, 443-446,
        461, 463, 464.
      Ignorance of Chinese prevalent among, i. 338, 339, 361, 362, 398.
      Immunity for wrongs against, i. 436, 440, 441.
      Inland residence, Alcock's view of, ii. 450, 451.
      Legation, British. _See_ Great Britain--Peking.
      Legations, diplomatic difficulties of, i. 398-401;
        relieved by military force, ii. 437.
      Life-and-death jurisdiction over, claimed by government, i. 57.
      Negotiation with, Chinese view of, ii. 274 _note_, 437.
      Pioneers, general character of, i. 31-33.
      Policy adopted towards--"rule by misrule," i. 35, 403;
        perfidy and denial of human rights, i. 36, 78-80, 84, 85, 90, 342;
        resistance and ejection, 38, 111, 311, 331, 366, 367, ii. 437;
        degradation in the eyes of the people, i. 163, 411;
        "refractory subjects" treatment, i. 313.
      Proclamations and placards against, i. 56, 58, 65, 70, 96, 314,
        317, 342, 360, 435, ii. 236, 242.
      Supreme Court for China and Japan, ii. 355-358.
    Fortifications, ii. 397.
    Futai, position of, i. 381.
    Helplessness and paradoxical position of, ii. 418, 421, 422, 433,
      452.
    Hong merchants, i. 40 _note_.
    Hoppo, position of, i. 44, 45.
    Illegality of administration in, i. 43.
    International ethics of, i. 86.
    Japanese War (1894), Li's responsibilities regarding, ii. 386, 387;
      no reasonable cause for, ii. 410;
      deprecated by Russia, ii. 411;
      sinking of the Kowshing, ii. 410, 411;
      bombardment of Têngchow, i. 220;
      China's defeat, ii. 411-413;
      universal applause, ii. 413, 414;
      indemnity exacted, ii. 415;
      indemnity supplied by Russian loan, ii. 421;
      results of the war, ii. 447;
      proposed removal of Chinese Court during, ii. 474 _note_.
    Junks--
      Build and appearance of, i. 246, 247.
      Chinese authorities' control of, i. 113, 275, 308.
      Coasting trade conducted by, in China and Japan, i. 246.
      Convoy system, i. 302-304.
      Grain fleet blockaded at Shanghai (1845), i. 131-133;
        blockaded by French in Tongking quarrel, ii. 332.
      "Shantung junks," i. 220.
      Value of trade by, at Foochow, i. 209.
    Korea, relations with. _See_ Korea.
    Lorchas, tonnage of, i. 247;
      atrocities connected with, i. 304, 305;
      colonial registers granted to, i. 305, 309.
    Maritime Customs. _See below under_ Taxation--Custom-house.
    Missionaries. _See that title._
    Moral force the sanction of rule, ii. 370 _and note_, 385.
    Navy--
      Beginnings of, ii. 396.
      Board of Admiralty, ii. 317, 318, 392, 393.
      British instruction in, ii. 395.
      Li's efforts for, ii. 391, 396.
      Nepotism in, ii. 398-400.
      Organisation lacking in, ii. 401, 412, 413.
      Peiyang Squadron, ii. 395, 400.
      Tradition, unhampered by, ii. 398.
    Nepotism in, ii. 398-400.
    Opium trade. _See that title._
    Passports, two forms of, ii. 267.
    Piracy. _See that title._
    Populace, excesses of, connived at by Government, i. 95, 97, 98,
        364;
      coerced by Government, i. 108, 109;
      feared by Government, i. 109, 424;
      direct diplomatic negotiations with, i. 109-111.
    "Progress," no word for, ii. 136.
    Provincial officials, smuggling undertaken by, i. 44, 45;
      power of, ii. 184, 372;
      responsibility of, ii. 441, 442.
    Punishments, difficulties of ensuring, i. 426, 427;
      not inflicted for wrongs against foreigners, i. 436, 440, 441.
    Real estate, importance of, i. 176, 177, 434;
      missionary problem complicated by question of, ii. 234, 235.
    Rhubarb exported from, i. 168.
    Salt trade, i. 210, 439-442, ii. 188.
    Smuggling. _See that title._
    Supreme Court, award given against Alcock by, ii. 124;
      independence of, ii. 354;
      removal of, to Shanghai, ii. 355;
      subordinated to British legation, ii. 358.
    Taiping Rebellion--
      Burgevine's defection to rebels, i. 386.
      Canton, at, Yeh asks British aid against, i. 312.
      Chêkiang campaign against, i. 380, 394.
      Commerce continued during, i. 148.
      Devastation caused by, i. 375, 377, 378, 350, 381, 394, ii. 449.
      End of, i. 394.
      Foreign desperadoes attacked by, i. 303.
      Imperial measures against, i. 381;
        view of, i. 395, 396.
      Magnitude of, i. 135.
      Maritime Customs the important outcome of, i. 142.
      Nanking, capture of, i. 136.
      Ningpo, capture of, i. 376, 377.
      Russian attitude towards, i. 394, 395.
      Shanghai captured, i. 136;
        besieged by Imperial troops, i. 137;
        collision between foreigners and troops, i. 137, 138;
        French bombardment of city, i. 139;
        rebel refugees in, i. 141, 142;
        departure of rebels from, i. 156.
      Yangtze, rebel strongholds and operations on the, i. 369, 371-375.
    Taotai, status of, i. 129.
    Taxation--
      Custom-house--
        Chefoo Convention provisions of, ii. 277, 278, 280, 281, 286, 287.
        Hongkong, station at, desired by Chinese, i. 276;
          refused, ii. 216;
          established, i. 276, ii. 288.
        Korea, established in, ii. 295.
        Macao, established at, ii. 288.
        Maritime Customs Inspector, position and work of, in Peking,
          ii. 156-160, 162-167.
        Revision of treaty made an affair of, ii. 213, 216, 217.
        Shanghai, at, unsatisfactory conditions of, i. 145-147, 435,
          436;
          customs collected by consuls, i. 148;
          promissory notes cancelled by British Government, i. 148, 155;
          American exemption, i. 149;
          re-establishment of custom-house, i. 151;
          period of free trade, i. 152;
          Alcock's scheme of mixed control, i. 152-154.
      Inland, proposed commutation of, ii. 214-216, 218;
        commutation provided by treaty (1869), ii. 219, 220;
        area of, increased by Chefoo Convention, ii. 277, 278, 280, 281.
      Likin taxes, German minister's view of, ii. 218;
        nature of, ii. 280 _note_;
        grievance of, ii. 285.
      Native trade, on, i. 210.
    Tributaries, position towards, ii. 258.
    Tsungli-Yamên--
      Audience difficulties raised by, ii. 319, 320.
      Ch'ing, Prince, a member of, ii. 154, 313.
      Circular addressed to Provincial Governors by, ii. 182, 183.
      Creation of, i. 360.
      Etiquette, codification of, suggested for, ii. 279.
      Formosa riots, action regarding, ii. 205.
      Function of, i. 399.
      Gordon's representations to, ii. 292.
      Helplessness of, ii. 419.
      Ito's attempt to negotiate with, ii. 302.
      Korean expedition urged by, ii. 408.
      Kung, Prince, a member of, i. 360;
        dismissed by Empress, ii. 312.
      Margary murder, action regarding, ii. 267.
      Maritime Customs Inspector, attitude towards, ii. 160.
      Mixed commission regarding redress of commercial grievances,
        represented on, ii. 211.
      Yangchow affair, action in, ii. 202.
    War with Great Britain (1839-1842). _See under_ Canton;
      with Great Britain (1857), i. 316 _seq._;
      with Great Britain and France (1860), i. 349-354;
      with Japan (1894). _See above_ Japanese War;
    Women, position of, ii. 140, 141.

  Chinese--
    Appearances valued by, i. 192.
    Commercial aptitude and honesty of, i. 33, 34, 263-270, ii. 28.
    Industry of, i. 284.
    Japanese contrasted with, ii. 8, 27-29, 130, 131, 259.
    Kindliness of, i. 289, ii. 155.
    Manchus contrasted with, i. 80, 81, 83, 84.
    Toleration of, ii. 228, 233.
    War customs of, i. 352.

  Ch'ing, Prince, anecdote of, ii. 153, 154;
    efficiency of, as president of Tsungli-Yamên, ii. 313.

  Chinnery, George, i. 298.

  Choshiu. _See_ Nagato, Prince of.

  Christianity (_see also_ Missionaries), toleration clause for,
    in Tientsin treaty, i. 332;
    Chinese view of, ii. 349.

  Ch'un, Prince, son of, adopted as Emperor by Empress-mother, ii. 262;
    made Empress's coadjutor, ii. 264, 313;
    voyage of, ii. 316, 317;
    illness and death of, ii. 318;
    memorial regarding Vatican mission submitted to, ii. 344.

  Chunghou, Tientsin massacre foreseen by, ii. 239;
    mission to France, ii. 241;
    to Russia, ii. 291;
    establishes arsenal at Tientsin, ii. 392.

  Chungking, residence in, opposed, ii. 278;
    persecutions of Christians in, ii. 351.

  Chusan, capture and occupation of, i. 64;
    reoccupied, i. 75;
    retained till 1846, i. 91;
    restored, i. 99;
    contrasted with Hongkong, i. 273.

  Clarendon, Lord, Mr Burlingame's success with, ii. 197, 198, 208, 209;
    reprimands Mr Medhurst, ii. 207, 208;
    trusted by Lord Palmerston, ii. 365.

  Cochin China, French conquests in, ii. 253, 324.

  Commerce--
    China, in--
      Alcock's despatch on trade between Europe, India, and China,
          i. 204-206;
        his investigations prior to revision of treaty, ii. 181.
      Aptitude of Chinese for, i. 33, 34, 263-270, ii. 28.
      Arbitrary interference of Chinese Government with, i. 35.
      Balance of trade against China, i. 42, 171.
      British treaty the model for others, ii. 6.
      Chefoo Convention, internal taxation area increased by, ii. 277,
        278, 280, 281.
      Chinese language essential to commercial agents, i. 253.
      Code of law, establishment of, suggested, ii. 279.
      Co-hong system, i. 40 _note_, 266.
      Compradoric system, i. 266, 267.
      Confidence between Chinese and foreigners, i. 48.
      Drawbacks to, i. 169, 170.
      Imports and exports, nature of, i. 168;
        present value of, i. 171 _note_;
        shipments from United Kingdom in various years, i. 203.
      Intercourse of British and Americans with China caused by, i. 167.
      Losses in early days, i. 172-175.
      Merchants in Britain, Chinese affairs closely followed by
          (1839-40), i. 87-89;
        merchants in China, aims and work of, i. 248-253;
        complaints of, i. 253, 254, ii. 119;
        influence of, i. 254, 315;
        characteristics of, i. 255-263;
        representations of, to Lord Elgin, i. 322.
      "Merchants' War," i. 316 _seq._
      Mixed Commission regarding redress of grievances, ii. 211, 212.
      Native trade, i. 207-210.
      Peking, in, ii. 148, 149.
      Pioneer expeditions (1859), i. 220.
      Ports overcrowded with goods, i. 224;
        number open in 1861, i. 402.
      Precarious position of, i. 35, 412, 413, 419.
      Real estate a valuable asset, i. 176, 177.
      Shipments from United Kingdom in various years, values of, i. 203.
      Simplicity of, i. 168.
      Transit of goods, ii. 214-216, 218-220.
      Value of, in 1839, i. 87.
      War no bar to, i. 68, 69, 148, ii. 158.
    Gold discoveries a stimulus to, i. 227.
    Japan, in--
      Development of, ii. 116-118.
      Merchants, preference of, for Yokohama to Kanagawa, ii. 17, 18, 123;
        regret of, at Alcock's recall, ii. 89;
        interests of, at variance with diplomatic, ii. 119-124, 126.
      Methods of, ii. 27, 28.
      Profits of, in early days, ii. 20 _note_, 29.
      Value of, annually, ii. 117 _note_.
    Opium, Silk, Tea. _See those titles._
    Straits, with, suggested by Alcock, i. 208.

  Comprador, position of, i. 266, 267.

  Confucianism, i. 229.

  Consular Court system, drawbacks of, ii. 125, 126, 354, 356, 357.

  Cooke, Wingrove, quoted, i. 252, 253, 300, 303-305, 339;
    cited, i. 317, 322, 323 _and note_, 325.

  Coolie trade, i. 295, ii. 168-174.

  Cooper, W. M., on coolie trade, ii. 170.

  Cowell, George, appreciation of Alcock, ii. 479, 480.

  Curzon, the Hon. George, speech regarding Russian pledge concerning
    Korea, ii. 424, 430.

  Czarevitch, visit of, to China and Japan, ii. 321-323.


  Daimios. _See under_ Japan.

  Davis, Sir John, Manchus and Chinese contrasted by, i. 80, 81;
    policy of, in Canton, i. 94, 99-104, 106-108;
    diplomatic negotiations with the populace, i. 109-111;
    succeeds Sir H. Pottinger, i. 116;
    policy regarding Foochow, i. 119;
    Canton merchants' complaints against, ii. 119;
    decision of, reversed by Supreme Court, ii. 124.

  De Mas, M., anecdote of, ii. 444 _note_.

  De Quincey cited, i. 133 _note_.

  Delamarre, M., ii. 230 _note_.

  Delaplace, Mgr., ii. 341, 342, 394.

  Detring, G., accompanies Prince Ch'un on his voyage, ii. 317;
    relations with Capt. Fournier, ii. 327;
    summoned to Tientsin, ii. 328;
    assists Li regarding Mr Dunn's mission, ii. 345.

  Dunn, J. G., ii. 344-346.

  Dupont, M., Alcock's studies under, i. 5.

  Dutch--
    Japanese instructed by, ii. 98.
    Macao, commercial establishment at, i. 291.
    Nagasaki, ii. 10, 11.
    Portuguese commercial rivalry with, i. 291.
    Promptness of, as paymasters, i. 11.


  East India Company--
    Commercial methods of, i. 175.
    Employees pampered by, i. 211-214, 260.
    Macao, commercial establishment at, i. 291.
    Officials of, employed in Chinese consular posts, i. 38, 80.
    Opium trade of, i. 198, 199.
    Shipping of, i. 211-215.
    Subservience of, towards Chinese, i. 37, 38, 88, 253.
    Tea trade developed by, i. 182, 183.

  Eitel, Dr, cited, i. 63, 199 _note_, 273, 301.

  Elgin, Earl of, cruise in the Furious, i. 223;
    contrasts Hongkong and Chusan, i. 273;
    on Tientsin conference (1854), i. 311;
    conduct of Hongkong affairs, i. 320-329;
    aversion to his Chinese mission, i. 320, 323-327;
    services in Indian Mutiny, i. 321;
    concludes Tientsin treaty, i. 331, 334;
    hurried departure from Tientsin, i. 333, 335, 336;
    visit to Japan, i. 335, 336;
    diplomatic success there, i. 347, ii. 1, 5, 6, 99;
    defends his China policy in House of Lords, i. 337;
    predisposed to illusions regarding Chinese, i. 339;
    misgivings as to Chinese good faith, i. 340, 347;
    return to Shanghai, i. 343, 347;
    negotiates with Treaty Commissioners at Shanghai, i. 343, 344;
    estimate of, i. 346-348;
    voyage up the Yangtze (1558), i. 347, 370;
    second mission to China, i. 349;
    negotiations with Prince Kung, i. 329, 352, 353;
    succeeded by his brother, i. 355.

  Elliot, Captain Charles, subservience of, to Chinese, i. 40, 41, 54;
    offers to suppress opium trade, i. 48, 49;
    surrenders opium cargoes, i. 53, 54;
    imprisoned in Canton, i. 53, 55;
    appointed joint-plenipotentiary with Rear-Admiral Elliot, i. 64;
    left in sole charge, i. 65-71;
    recalled, i. 74;
    confidence of, in Chinese, i. 66, 69, 70;
    contradictory nature of his commission, i. 92 _note_;
    strictures on opium trade, i. 199.

  Elliot, Rear-Admiral the Hon. George, i. 63-65.

  Empress--Dowager of China, Prince Ch'un the coadjutor of, ii. 264, 313;
    _coup d'état_ executed by, ii. 264, 313, 455;
    enmity with Prince Kung, ii. 264, 312;
    attitude towards Li, ii. 264, 329, 387;
    view of Tongking affair, ii. 329, 334;
    characteristics of, ii. 373;
    power of, ii. 455 _and note_;
    reformers punished by, ii. 458.

  Eulenberg, Count, i. 366, ii. 40.

  Evans, General de Lacy, appreciation of Alcock, i. 14;
    Alcock under, in Spanish Legion, i. 21.

  "Ever--Victorious Army," campaign of, i. 382-387;
    disbandment of, i. 393.

  Exhibition of 1851, Alcock's collection of exhibits for, i. 200-202,
      ii. 101, 102;
    influence of, on foreign trade, i. 227.

  Exhibition of 1862, Alcock's collection of samples for, ii. 102, 484.

  Exhibition, Paris, Alcock British Commissioner to, ii. 485.


  Favier, Bishop, ii. 144, 346, 347.

  Foochow--
    Alcock's appointment as consul at, i. 116;
      his commercial researches at, i. 200.
    American enterprise a stimulus to tea trade at, i. 121, 122, 241.
    Canton disturbances reflected in, i. 119, 314.
    Naval construction attempted at, ii. 396;
      naval school at, ii. 400.
    Opening of (1844), i. 115;
      further development of, i. 240.
    Situation and importance of, i. 117, 119, 120.
    'Times' pronouncement against, i. 114.
    Trade at, nature of, i. 118, 121, 122, 241;
    sea-borne trade at, i. 209.

  Formosa--
    French blockade of, ii. 333.
    Japanese invasion of, ii. 255.
    Missionary riots in, ii. 203-205, 207.

  Fortune, Robert, i. 182, 183.

  Fournier, Captain, ii. 327-330.

  France, French (_see also_ Powers)--
    Aggressive policy of, ii. 465, 466.
    British cordially supported by, in China, i. 377, 379;
      in Japan, ii. 45, 81, 105;
      regarding Chinese emigration, ii. 172.
    Cochin China, conquest of, ii. 253, 324.
    Concession of land obtained by (1849), i. 138, 139, 435;
      extorted by (1895), ii. 419.
    Coolie trade, efforts against, ii. 172.
    Customs Inspector proposed by Alcock from consular service of, i. 153.
    Elgin followed to Tientsin by, i. 331.
    Loan to China, ii. 421.
    Missionary enterprise of, ii. 175-177, 224, 225, 229-232, 234, 237,
        238, 253;
      protectorate of Christians the aim of, ii. 336-342, 346-352.
    Peking campaign (1860), i. 349-354.
    Russia supported by, after Japanese War, ii. 415;
      their approval of French acquisitions, ii. 419.
    Shanghai settlement and "concession" of, i. 138, 139, 435.
    Silk industry of, i. 191.
    Taipings' support by British resented by, i. 141.
    Tientsin Conference attended by (1854), i. 311.
    Tongking quarrel, ii. 325-334.
    Yangtze expedition of MM. Simon and Dupuis, i. 371.

  Freeman-Mitford, Mr, anecdote cited from, ii. 444 _note_.

  Fujiyama, Alcock's expedition to, ii. 41, 42.

  Futai, position of, i. 381.


  Germany, Germans (_see also_ Powers)--
    Aggressive policy of, ii. 465, 466.
    Alcock, appreciation of, by Peking resident, ii. 138.
    Anglo-German agreement, ii. 467, 468, 473.
    Armenian massacres, attitude towards, ii. 449 _note_.
    Chinese attitude towards, i. 366.
    Influence of, increasing, ii. 253, 254.
    Japanese attitude towards, ii. 40.
    Kiaochow. _See that title._
    Korean expedition of, ii. 179.
    Military instruction of Chinese undertaken by, ii. 395.
    Missionaries kept to their nationality, ii. 338.
    Peking, legation established in, ii. 254.
    Propagandism unmasked by, ii. 454.
    Russia supported by, after Japanese War, ii. 415.
    Shantung sphere of, disturbances in, ii. 462.
    Silk industry of, i. 191.
    Toleration clause in treaty of, ii. 225 _note_.
    Transit duty extension, Count Bernstorff on, ii. 218.

  Gibson, Mr, ii. 204-206, 208.

  Giquel, Prosper, i. 394.

  Gordon, Captain C. G., commands the "Ever-Victorious Army," i. 383-387;
    quarrels with Li, i. 392, 393;
    honoured by Chinese Government, i. 395;
    attempts at intercourse with Chinese, i. 399;
    appreciated by Li, ii. 189;
    summoned by Chinese Government, ii. 291, 292.

  Gorogiu, function of the, ii. 108.

  Grant, Sir Hope, i. 348, 349, 352.

  Granville, Lord, negotiates ratification of Chefoo Convention,
    ii. 284-287.

  Great Britain (_see also_ Powers)--
    Anglo-German agreement, ii. 467, 468, 473.
    Borneo, colonisation in, ii. 485-487.
    Good faith of, recognised by Chinese, i. 83, ii. 190.
    Inconsistent policy of, in China, i. 432, 433.
    Japanese War, attitude towards, ii. 413-416, 433.
    Loan offered to China, ii. 420;
      forced on her, ii. 434.
    Narrowness of view among politicians in, i. 319.
    Naval instruction of Chinese undertaken by, ii. 395.
    Non-aggressive policy of, ii. 468.
    Peking, Legation in--
      Chinese Secretaryship, ii. 132, 362, 363, 367.
      Deterioration in personnel of, ii. 360-362, 364, 366, 367.
      Establishment of, i. 355.
      Intelligence department defective, ii. 415, 423.
      Subordination of, to Inspector-General of Customs, ii. 165, 166.
      Supreme Court for a time subordinate to, ii. 358.
    Russian acquisitions, attitude towards, ii. 423-433.
    Weihai-wei seized by, ii. 434.
    Yedo, Legation in, assaulted, ii. 36-38;
      indemnity demanded, ii. 65, 66;
      burnt, ii. 62 and _note_.

  Greenwell, Dora, appreciation of 'Life's Problems' expressed by, i. 159.

  Gros, Baron, i. 321, 349, ii. 230.

  Gurdon, Lieutenant, ii. 205.

  Guthrie, G. J., Alcock's medical studies under, i. 2;
    recommends Alcock to Mr O'Meara, i. 9.


  Hakodate, opening of, for ships' supplies, ii. 4;
    neglected by merchants, ii. 12;
    Russian representative at, ii. 104.

  Hankow--
    Abandonment of, by inhabitants in Taiping scare, i. 374.
    Consular officer established at, i. 373.
    Development of, i. 224, 225.
    Elgin's voyage to (1858), i. 347.
    Hope's visit to (1861), i. 223.

  Harris, Townsend, ii. 3, 5, 39, 99.

  Hart, Sir Robert, temporarily Inspector-General of Chinese Maritime
      Customs, i. 387;
    implicated in the Lay-Osborn flotilla failure, i. 388-390;
    an authority on Gordon's reconciliation with Li, i. 193;
    position and work of, as Inspector-General of Customs in Peking,
      ii. 157, 160, 162-167;
    appointed British Minister in China, but resigns post, ii. 166;
    on Mixed Commission regarding redress of commercial grievances,
      ii. 211-215;
    action in the Margary murder case, ii. 274;
    influence on the Chefoo Convention, ii. 276;
    invites Gordon to help Chinese, ii. 292;
    obtains recall of Tibetan mission, ii. 310;
    obtains peace with France, ii. 333;
    'Fortnightly Review' paper cited, ii. 461.

  Hodges, Colonel, takes Alcock on to his staff, i. 9, 10;
    appreciation of Alcock, i. 14.

  Holt, Mr, ii. 203, 204, 208.

  Hong merchants, i. 40 _note_.

  Hongkong--
    Administration of, i. 277, 278.
    Advantages of site, i. 273, 274, 277, 284.
    Alcock's visit to (1869), ii. 219.
    Bank of, i. 284, 285.
    British contempt for, i. 115;
      Government's attitude towards, i. 276.
    Buildings in, i. 282, 283.
    Cession of, and occupation by British, i. 67.
    Chinese traders and mechanics in, i. 73;
      shipowners in, i. 247, 308;
      escaped criminals numerous, i. 275;
      improvement of general character, i. 277-282, 284.
    Chusan contrasted with, i. 273.
    Coolie trade, efforts against, ii. 168, 169.
    Cost of voyage to, in early days, i. 258.
    Customs station at, desired by Chinese, i. 276;
      refused, ii. 216;
      established, i. 276, ii. 288.
    Development of, i. 73, 274-286.
    Dislike of, by diplomatic and consular officials, i. 273, 276,
        320, ii. 355;
      by Chinese Government, i. 275, ii. 216.
    Early record of (1816), i. 272.
    Elgin's aversion to, i. 273, 320.
    Emigration from, ii. 173.
    Industries of, i. 283, 284.
    International character of, i. 285.
    Junk trade under Chinese control, i. 113, 275, 308.
    Kiying House, i. 316.
    Macao contrasted with, i. 287, 294.
    Piracy headquarters at, i. 302, 305.
    Pottinger, Sir H., first governor of, i. 112.
    Reformers safe in, ii. 459.
    Schools in, i. 281, 282.
    Supreme Court in, ii. 354, 355.
    Tonnage entered and cleared at, in 1898, i. 277 _note_.
    Yokohama guard despatched from, ii. 77.

  Hong-tjyong-on, ii. 299-302.

  Hope, Admiral Sir James, Yangtze formally opened by, i. 223;
    commands British naval contingent in Peking campaign, i. 349;
    repulsed at Taku forts (1859), i. 350;
    visits Peking, i. 365;
    relations with Taipings, i. 370-373, 375-379;
    opinion on Taiping Rebellion, i. 375;
    vigorous policy of, i. 376;
    friendship with Admiral Protêt, i. 379;
    comradeship with Ward, i. 382;
    advises strong measures in Japan, ii. 55;
    scheme for offensive measures in Japan, ii. 59;
    correspondence with Capt. Birileff regarding Tsushima, ii. 111-114.

  Hoppo, position of, i. 44, 45.

  Hsienfêng, Emperor, death of, i. 397.

  Hu Lin-yi, ii. 377.

  Huang, Governor-General, i. 342, 343.

  Hunter, W. C., quoted, i. 34, 46-48, ii. 20 _note_;
    cited, i. 82.

  Hwang-chu-ke, massacre of Englishmen at, i. 104, 108.


  Ignatieff, General, assists Sir H. Grant, i. 353, 354;
    negotiates cession of Vladivostock, i. 357, 358;
    attitude towards British Legation and Chinese, i. 359.

  Ilipu, Commissioner, i. 76, 77, 81.

  India--
    Alcock's visit to (1869), ii. 219.
    Calcutta Convention, ii. 312.
    Chinese imports from, i. 168.
    East India Company. _See that title._
    Elgin's opportune arrival in, i. 321.
    Gordon summoned from, ii. 292.
    Opium trade. _See that title._
    Tea trade, i. 182-186.
    Tibetan expedition, ii. 305-310.

  Inouyé, Count, British Legation building burnt by, ii. 62 _note_;
    return from Europe and mission to Choshiu, ii. 80, 81;
    mission to Korea, ii. 302.

  Ito, Count, return from Europe and mission to Choshiu, ii. 80, 81;
    mission to Peking, ii. 302.


  Japan (_for particular persons, towns, see their titles_)--
    Aggressive policy of, ii. 254-256, 465, 466.
    Art of, ii. 102, 103.
    Assassination period in, ii. 35-38.
    Chinese War. _See under_ China.
    Consuls in, peculiar responsibilities of, ii. 121.
    Currency of, ii. 18-27.
    Customs of, ii. 33.
    Czarevitch's visit to, ii. 323.
    Daimios--
      Coinage of, ii. 25, 26.
      Hostility of, to foreigners, ii. 38-41, 43.
      Legation guards provided by, ii. 51, 53.
      Processions of, ii. 34, 56.
      Tycoon's relation to, ii. 38, 60-65, 67, 68, 76, 93.
    Elgin's visit to, i. 335, 336;
      his diplomatic success, i. 347, ii. 1, 5, 6, 99.
    Exhibition of 1862, represented at, ii. 102, 484.
    Foreigners, supervision of, ii. 8;
      early pleasant relations with, ii. 9, 29-31;
      hatred of, ii. 38-41, 43, 58, 77, 93;
      retrograde policy towards, ii. 47-49;
      use made of, ii. 95-98, 130, 131, 191, 255;
      help of, declined when unasked, ii. 110.
    Formosa invaded by, ii. 255.
    Gorogiu, function of the, ii. 108.
    Hong's vendetta pursued in, ii. 300, 301.
    Inland Sea, Alcock's expedition up, ii. 36, 42;
      Prince of Nagato's blockade of, ii. 69, 76, 77.
    Korea, treaty with, ii. 256, 257;
      Korean outbreak against, ii. 294, 297, 298;
      equality with China in, ii. 302, 303, 389;
      aggression in, ii. 406, 407, 409.
    Liao-tung claimed by, ii. 429.
    Liuchiu Islands claimed by, ii. 256.
    Opening of, to foreign intercourse (1858), i. 225.
    Portuguese expelled from, i. 291.
    Prosperity of, ii. 32.
    "Rudeness," term for, ii. 34 _note_.
    Russian admiral in, i. 395.
    Samurai, anecdote of, ii. 33 _note_ 1.
    Silk industry of, i. 188, 191 _note_.
    Sport in, ii. 127-129.

  Japanese--
    Chinese contrasted with, ii. 8, 27, 29, 130, 131, 259.
    Combination, power of, ii. 94.
    Imitation, faculty of, ii. 94-97.
    Practical comprehension of circumstances, ii. 7.
    Seriousness of, ii. 94.
    Tenacity and resolution of, ii. 16, 93.

  Junks. _See under_ China.


  Kanagawa--
    American treaty signed at, ii. 39.
    Massacre of Russians at, ii. 35.
    Moss, Mr, arrested for shooting game near, ii. 123, 128.
    Opening of (1859), ii. 12.
    Riding party from, attacked, ii. 55-57.
    Yokohama preferred to, by foreign merchants, ii. 17, 18, 123.

  Kang Yu-wei, reform programme of, ii. 457, 458.

  Kashgaria, rebellion in, ii. 290, 291.

  Kennedy, Vice-Admiral Sir W. R., cited, i. 317, 318.

  Keppel, Admiral, diary entry regarding opium clipper, i. 217;
    appreciation of Dent's hospitality, i. 294, 316;
    operations against war-junks, i. 317, 318;
    aids Consul Medhurst in Yangchow affair, ii. 202;
    report on Formosa missionary affair, ii. 204;
    details force to aid Mr Gibson, ii. 205;
    appreciation of Chunghou, ii. 239.

  Kiaochow, German seizure of, ii. 421;
    British opinion, ii. 423;
    Russian attitude, ii. 431.

  Kim Ok Kun, ii. 298-302.

  Kishen, appointment of, to negotiate with British, i. 65;
    conciliatory manner of, i. 67;
    good faith and courtesy of, i. 81, 82.

  Kiying, Commissioner, appointed to treat with Sir H. Pottinger,
      i. 76, 77;
    courtesy of, i. 82;
    pleasant nature of intercourse with, i. 94, 95;
    impotence of, before Cantonese, i. 97;
    high-handed manner of, after restoration of Chusan, i. 99;
    agreement concluded with (1847), i. 103, 107;
    effects postponement of foreign entry into Canton, i. 107;
    popular memorial to Sir J. Davis inspired by, i. 110;
    affability of, to governor of Hongkong, i. 112, 113;
    supplementary treaty with, i. 113;
    no redress from, against a Chih-hsien, i. 426.

  Korea--
    American expeditions to, ii. 178, 179.
    China, tribute embassies to, ii. 148;
      reverence for, ii. 259;
      embassy of condolence from, ii. 404, 405;
      privileges of, ii. 406.
    Foreign ferment in, ii. 295.
    French annexation of, ii. 176, 177.
    Hong honoured by Court, ii. 301, 302.
    Japanese, treaty with, ii. 256, 257;
      brutality of, ii. 259;
      equality of, with China, ii. 302, 303, 389;
      aggression of, ii. 406, 407, 409.
    Jesuit propagandism in, ii. 175.
    Opening of, by China, ii. 259.
    Port Hamilton incident, ii. 303, 305.
    Russian pledge regarding, ii. 424, 425.
    Söul, _émeute_ in, ii. 294, 296-298.

  Kowloon, concession of, acquired by Parkes, i. 286, 330.

  Kuldja, Russian claims regarding, ii. 290-293.

  Kung, Prince, Lord Elgin's negotiations with, i. 329, 352, 353;
    signs Peking treaty, i. 354;
    deceived by Ignatieff, i. 358;
    member of Tsungli-Yamên, i. 360;
    Gordon's interviews with, i. 383;
    implicated in the Lay-Osborn flotilla failure, i. 389, 390;
    executes _coup d'état_, i. 397, 398;
    correspondence with British Minister, i. 403-406, 409;
    high-handed tone of, i. 410;
    intimate relations with British Legation, ii. 134, 135;
    efforts against coolie trade, ii. 171, 172;
    declines responsibility for Korean persecutions, ii. 176;
    action in Yangchow affair, ii. 202;
    circular regarding missionaries, ii. 231;
    Sir T. Wade's remonstrance to, on Chinese official tone, ii. 244;
    present at audience of foreign Ministers, ii. 261;
    imperial claims of, ii. 263;
    enmity between Empress and, ii. 264, 312;
    action regarding Margary case, ii. 274;
    dismissed by Empress, ii. 312;
    efforts regarding Pei-t'ang Cathedral, ii. 342;
    moderating influence of, ii. 374;
    vetoes proposed assassination of Li, ii. 387.

  Kuper, Rear-Admiral Sir Augustus, attack on Satsuma, ii. 67;
    operations against Prince of Nagato, ii. 80, 81;
    appeals to Foreign Office regarding Alcock's recall, ii. 89.

  Kwanghsu, Emperor, selected by Empress, ii. 263;
    comes of age, ii. 318;
    childlessness of, ii. 456;
    reform programme adopted by, ii. 458.

  Kweiliang, i. 334, 360.


  Lane-Poole, Stanley, cited, i. 117, 316.

  Lang, Captain, ii. 396, 400, 412.

  Lay, H. N., residence of, at Foochow, i. 118 _note_;
    Inspector-General of Customs, i. 155;
    negotiates Tientsin treaty, i. 331;
    Osborn flotilla fiasco, i. 387-391;
    summary of Chinese affairs (1858-63), i. 409, 410;
    fidelity to Chinese Government, ii. 160;
    observation on residence of Ministers, ii. 261;
    representative of consular training school, ii. 363.

  Lay-Osborn flotilla, i. 387-391;
    Wênsiang and Prince Kung discredited by failure of scheme,
      ii. 375, 391.

  Lekin, likin. _See under_ China--Taxation.

  Lhassa, Bengali's friendly visits to, ii. 305;
    Indian expedition attempted, ii. 306-310;
    protracted negotiations at, ii. 311, 312.

  Li Han-Chang, ii. 272.

  Li Hung-Chang, foreigners enlisted by, i. 381, 382;
    dismisses Burgevine, i. 385, 387;
    rejects the Lay-Osborn flotilla, i. 391;
    Gordon's quarrel with, i. 392, 393;
    memorial of, regarding revision of treaty, ii. 184-190;
    influence of, in foreign affairs, ii. 190, 264, 313, 314;
    succeeds Tsêng Kwo-fan and Chunghou, ii. 242;
    interview with Consul Adkins, ii. 244, 245;
    negotiates opening of Korea, ii. 259;
    ascendancy of, in imperial counsels, ii. 264, 329;
    appointed to treat with Sir T. Wade on Margary murder, ii. 274, 275;
    negotiates Chefoo Convention, ii. 275-277;
    Gordon's interviews with, ii. 292;
    action in Korean _émeute_, ii. 294;
    Count Ito's negotiations with, ii. 302;
    arranges voyage of Prince Ch'un, ii. 316;
    deputed to meet the Czarevitch at Chefoo, ii. 322;
    Annam negotiations, ii. 325;
    summons Mr Detring to Tientsin, ii. 328;
    concludes Fournier Convention, ii. 329;
    arranges Vatican mission, ii. 345;
    opposed by Tso Tsung-tang, ii. 379;
    characteristics and policy of, ii. 381-386;
    promotes naval and military reform, ii. 382, 391, 396, 397;
    no anti-foreign outbreaks in province of, ii. 383, 442;
    responsibilities of, regarding Japanese War, ii. 386, 387;
    progressive efforts of, ii. 395;
    opposed to Korean expedition, ii. 408;
    agrees to Manchurian branch of Siberian railway, ii. 423.

  Liao-tung--
    Japanese occupation of, ii. 414;
      cession of, for indemnity, ii. 415.
    Russian acquisition of, ii. 422, 423.

  'Life's Problems,' appreciation of, i. 159.

  Likatchoff, Commodore, ii. 112, 114.

  Lin, Commissioner, measures of, against opium trade, i. 51-54;
    demands life-and-death jurisdiction, i. 57;
    reply of, to Macaese, i. 58;
    superseded, i. 65;
    custom-house administration of, i. 435.

  Lindsay, W. S., cited, i. 237;
    quoted, i. 242.

  Liuchiu Islands, ii. 256.

  Livadia, treaty of, ii. 291.

  Lorchas. _See under_ China.

  Lowder, Mrs, Alcock's marriage with, ii. 73.


  Macao (_see also_ Portuguese)--
    British refugees expelled from, i. 58, 272, 293;
      plenipotentiaries repair to, i. 65.
    Celebrities of, i. 297, 298.
    Clerks from, i. 259.
    Coolie trade at, ii. 169, 174.
    Custom-house established at, ii. 288.
    Elliot's retirement to, i. 41.
    Hongkong contrasted with, i. 287, 294.
    Peacefulness and salubrity of, i. 287, 288, 292-294.
    Piracy tolerated at, i. 295, 296.
    Population of, i. 294, 295.
    Portuguese occupation of, i. 289-291.

  Macaulay, T. B., ii. 307.

  MacCunn, James, cited, i. 243 _note_.

  Macdonald, Sir Claude, ii. 432.

  MacDonnell, Sir Richard, i. 277, 305, 306.

  Manchuria--
    Chinese troops in, ii. 291.
    Russian acquisition of coast, ii. 252, 469, 473.
    Siberian railway to pass through, ii. 423.

  Manchus--
    Chinese contrasted with, i. 80, 81;
      complementary to, i. 83, 84.
    Courtesy of, i. 82, 368, ii. 140, 153.
    Moderation and humanity of, i. 81.
    Women, position of, ii. 140, 141.

  Margary, Augustus Raymond, ii. 266, 267.

  Markham, Sir Clements, appreciation of Alcock, ii. 484.

  Mas, M. de, anecdote of, ii. 444 _note_.

  Mayers, W. F., ii. 363.

  Meadows, Taylor, Alcock compared with, i. 161, ii. 224;
    distinguished services of, ii. 359;
    representative of consular training school, ii. 363.

  Medhurst, Mr, foreign atrocities reported by, i. 302;
    map made by, i. 432;
    action in Yangchow affair, ii. 199-201;
    reprimanded by Lord Clarendon, ii. 207, 208.

  Mikado of Japan, sanction of, necessary to treaties, ii. 39, 63, 85;
    sanction obtained, ii. 90;
    Tycoon's relation to, ii. 60-65, 71-73, 76, 85, 92, 93;
    expulsion of foreigners ordered by, ii. 63;
    administrative functions assumed by, ii. 92, 255.

  Missionaries--
    Alcock's views on, ii. 223, 224, 227, 230, 231, 237.
    American, on Yangtze expedition, i. 370.
    Charges against, ii. 236.
    Chinese view of, ii. 177-179.
    Control of, Chinese scheme for, ii. 246-248.
    Disunion among the Powers caused by, ii. 237.
    French enterprise regarding, ii. 175-177, 224, 225, 229-232, 234,
        237, 238, 253;
      their aim a protectorate of Christians, ii. 336-342, 346-352.
    Hongkong, in, i. 281.
    "Indiscretions" of, emphasised by their Governments, ii. 243.
    Irritation and disruption caused by, ii. 203-205, 207, 224, 226-233,
      238, 246, 248, 249, 454.
    Kang Yu-wei inspired by, ii. 458.
    Korea, in, ii. 175, 177-179.
    Li's advice regarding, ii. 187;
      his policy towards, ii. 383, 442.
    Publications of, ii. 445.
    Russian Peking establishment, i. 356, ii. 154.
    Tientsin massacre, ii. 238, 239;
      French ambassador's note on, ii. 237;
      results of, ii. 240-244.
    Tsingpu attack, i. 129.

  Mito, Prince of, ii. 35, 38, 40, 41.

  Mongol market in Peking, ii. 147, 148.

  Montauban, General (Count Palikao), i. 349, 351-353.

  Morrison, Robert, i. 297, 298.

  Moss, Mr, ii. 123, 124, 128.

  Mouravieff-Amurski, Count, at Yedo, ii. 35;
    warns Japanese against British designs, ii. 111;
    gives assurances regarding Russian fleet, ii. 426.

  Mutsu, Count, anecdote of, ii. 96 _note_.


  Nagasaki--
    Alcock's arrival at, ii. 14.
    Coins not used in trade at, ii. 18.
    Dutch trade at, ii. 10, 11.
    Legation from Korea conveyed to, ii. 294.
    Opened for ships' supplies, ii. 4.
    Welcome to foreigners at, ii. 9.

  Nagato, Prince of, hostile action of, ii. 67, 69, 76, 77;
    operations against, ii. 77-81;
    Japanese students sent to Europe by, ii. 80;
    justifies his anti-foreign action, ii. 82;
    results of his defeat, ii. 86.

  Namoa, typical sale of opium at, i. 47, 48.

  Nanking--
    Capital, proposed as, ii. 474 _note_.
    Important position of, i. 134.
    Lay-Osborn flotilla, connection with, i. 391.
    Robertson's mission to, i. 133, 428.
    Taipings at, British aid asked against, i. 312;
      Admiral Hope's dealings with, i. 371, 372.
    Treaty. _See under_ Treaties.

  Napier, Lord, experiences of, in China, i. 38-40;
    views on Chinese government, ii. 439.

  Neale, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward St John, in charge of British Legation
      at Yedo, ii. 50;
    attack on British Legation described by, ii. 51, 52;
    congratulated by Japanese on his escape, ii. 54;
    action after Richardson murder, ii. 58;
    negotiations with Japanese, ii. 62-67.

  Newchwang, i. 219, 222.

  Ningpo--
    A'Pak's exploit at, i. 304, 305.
    Characteristics of, i. 116.
    Occupation of, by British, i. 76.
    Opening of, i. 115.
    Piratical stronghold near, i. 306.
    Taipings, captured by, i. 376, 377;
      captured from, i. 380;
      base of British and French during Chêkiang campaign, i. 394.
    'Times' pronouncement against, i. 114.


  Oliphant, Laurence, cited, i. 223, 336, 337, 347, ii. 2;
    quoted, i. 341, ii. 9 _note_, 11 _note_;
    wounded by Japanese, ii. 36, 37;
    invalided home, ii. 46.

  Opium trade--
    Alcock's attitude towards, i. 194-198, 417-419.
    Cash payments the rule in, i. 43, 171, 192.
    Chefoo Convention, introduced into, ii. 281, 283;
      stimulated by, ii. 289.
    Clippers, i. 193, 215-217.
    Contraband before 1858, i. 44-48, 192;
      legalisation of, urged by Alcock, i. 418;
      effected, i. 199;
      recognised by Tientsin treaty, i. 332, 341.
    Elliot's offer to suppress, i. 48, 49;
      his attitude towards, i. 199.
    Foochow, at, i. 121.
    Hostility of Chinese attitude towards, i. 417-419.
    Importance of, i. 193, 194, 196, 197, 417, 418.
    Lin's measures against, i. 51-54.
    Postal communication dependent on, i. 193, 216, 217.
    Smuggling connected with, i. 44-48.
    Surrender of opium at Canton, i. 53, 54 _and note_.
    Transit dues, proposed increase of, ii. 219;
      duty trebled, ii. 284, 286.
    Value of, i. 192.

  Osborn, Captain Sherard, Yangtze explored by, i. 223, 347;
    in command of flotilla refused by Chinese, i. 388;
    cited, ii. 2.


  Paget, Sir James, appreciation of Alcock, i. 23, 24.

  Palikao, Count, i. 349, 351-353.

  Palmerston, Lord, successful Chinese policy of, i. 88, 100, 101, 104,
      131;
    the China dissolution, i. 319;
    change in foreign policy after death of, ii. 364, 365.

  Paris, Alcock's first visit to, i. 2-7;
    Campbell's mission to, ii. 333.

  Parkes, Sir Harry, interpreter to Alcock, i. 117;
    appreciation of Alcock, i. 120, 121;
    accompanies Alcock to Shanghai, i. 126;
    despatched with Robertson to Nanking, i. 133;
    compiles returns of sea-borne trade at Foochow, i. 209;
    obtains Kowloon concession, i. 286, 330;
    action regarding the Arrow incident, i. 309;
    remonstrates with Yeh, i. 314;
    Lord Elgin's appreciation of, i. 326 _note_;
    commissioner at Canton, i. 328, 330;
    successful administration there, i. 397;
    deplores Lord Elgin's hurried departure from Tientsin, i. 335;
    reward offered for head of, i. 342;
    seized and imprisoned by Chinese, i. 352;
    released, i. 354;
    visits Peking, i. 365;
    attached by Lord Elgin to Admiral Hope, i. 370;
    describes abandonment of Hankow, i. 374;
    attack on, in Japan, ii. 90;
    succeeds Alcock in Japan, ii. 130;
    views on Chinese action regarding Formosa and Japan, ii. 255;
    negotiates treaty regarding Korea, ii. 297;
    death of, ii. 302;
    representative of consular training school, ii. 363.

  Pechili Gulf, cruise in, i. 220-223;
    defences suggested for, ii. 381;
    fortifications of ports in, ii. 397.

  Peiho river, demonstration off mouth of (1840), i. 64;
    defences of (1860), 350.
    _See also_ Taku forts.

  Peking--
    Blockade of, a means of coercing Government, i. 416, 428-431.
    British Legation. _See under_ Great Britain.
    Campaign of 1860, i. 349-354.
    _Chose jugée_, case of, ii. 280.
    Convention signed at (1886), ii. 310.
    Disadvantages of, as site for capital, ii. 474 _and note_.
    Distant view of, ii. 143.
    Elgin's error in omitting to visit, i. 334-337 _and note_.
    Fur market, ii. 149.
    German Legation established in, ii. 254.
    Health of, ii. 144 _note_.
    Hostility of natives in, i. 364.
    Inaccessibility of, ii. 142.
    Innovations after 1884, ii. 315.
    Insanitary condition of, ii. 144, 145.
    Lama temple, ii. 145, 146.
    Legations, diplomatic difficulties of, i. 398-401;
      relieved by military force (1900), ii. 437.
    Macaulay's mission to, ii. 307, 308.
    Maritime Customs Inspector established in, ii. 156.
    Mules and camels, ii. 147.
    Pei-t'ang Cathedral, erection of, ii. 341;
      transfer of, ii. 346, 347.
    Prohibitions against English visitors, i. 363.
    Residence of British representative at, suggested in merchants'
        memorial (1839), i. 89;
      residence included in Tientsin treaty, i. 332, 336;
      right of residence suspended, i. 337, 346.
    Russian mission in, i. 356, ii. 154.
    Sarat Chandra Das, visit of, ii. 308-310.
    Social Life in, ii. 138-142.
    Street traffic in, ii. 149-153.
    Summer retreat from, ii. 154, 155.
    Temple of Heaven, ii. 146.
    Treaty signed at (1860), i. 354.

  Pin Ch'un, ii. 137, 186.

  Piracy--
    Alcock's views on, i. 208.
    British action against, i. 299, 301, 305-307.
    Chinese attitude towards, i. 299-301.
    Foreigners engaged in, in China, i. 302;
      foreigners subjected to, i. 306, 307.
    Hongkong headquarters of, i. 302, 305.
    Portuguese leniency to, i. 295, 296;
      their earlier assistance against, i. 289, 290.
    Prevalence of, i. 194, 209, 218.
    Steam traffic a blow to, i. 307.
    Taiping Rebellion complicated by, i. 275.

  Popoff, M., i. 357, 395.

  Port Arthur--
    British evacuation of, ii. 426.
    Ch'un, Prince, meets British Admiral at, ii. 317.
    Fortifications of, ii. 397.
    French abstain from attacking, ii. 332;
      French syndicate entrusted with construction works at, ii. 335.
    Russian acquisition of, ii. 424-427.

  Portugal, Alcock's work as army surgeon in, i. 14-18;
    on Anglo-Portuguese Commission regarding claims of British
      auxiliaries, i. 25.

  Portuguese (_see also_ Macao)--
    Chinese cupidity conciliated by, i. 287.
    Convoy trade carried on by, i. 304, 305.
    Ming dynasty supported by, i. 291.
    Obligations to Great Britain disregarded by, i. 58 and _note_.

  Pottinger, Sir Henry, i. 74, 112-114.

  Powers, Western--
    Anarchy among, ii. 472, 473.
    Audience granted to, by Emperor Tungchih, ii. 261;
      by Kwanghsu, ii. 318-320.
    British covertly attacked by, to Japanese government, ii. 107-110.
    Chefoo Convention, feeling regarding, ii. 276, 277, 281.
    Classification of, ii. 465.
    Danger to be apprehended from, i. 163, 420.
    "Dummy" Chinaman evolved by, i. 338, 339, ii. 472.
    Korea, inaction regarding, ii. 411.
    Missionary problem, unity not possible regarding, ii. 237.
    Rivalry of, i. 262, ii. 447, 451, 475.
    Spoliation of China by, ii. 417, 418, 447, 452.
    Taiping Rebellion, attitude towards, i. 394.

  "Progress," no Chinese equivalent for, ii. 136.

  Protêt, Admiral, i. 377, 379.


  Queen Victoria Jubilee Institute for Nurses, Alcock's work for,
    ii. 482, 483.


  Real estate, value of, in the Far East, i. 176, 177, 434.

  Rennie, Dr, quoted, i. 362-366, ii. 146.

  Rhubarb, Chinese export of, i. 168.

  Richardson, Mr, murder of, ii. 38, 56, 57;
    redress for, ii. 65, 66.

  Robertson, Vice-Consul, i. 133, 428, ii. 210.

  Royal Geographical Society, Alcock's work for, ii. 483, 484.

  Roze, Admiral, ii. 177.

  "Rudeness," Japanese term for, ii. 34 _note_.

  Russell, Earl, approves Alcock's measures, ii. 45, 86;
    negotiates with Japanese envoys, ii. 49;
    advocates firm policy in Japan, ii. 59, 76;
    recalls Alcock, ii. 87, 88;
    desires Alcock's return to Japan, ii. 89.

  Russia, Russians (_see also_ Powers)--
    Absorbent policy of, ii. 469, 470, 473, 474.
    Akbar despatches incident, i. 233.
    Amur, acquisitions on the, ii. 252, 429.
    Ascendancy of, in China, ii. 422, 434, 473, 475.
    British friction with, ii. 321.
    Czarevitch visits China, ii. 321-323.
    Elgin followed to Tientsin by, i. 331.
    French in concert with, ii. 415;
      their acquisitions approved by, ii. 419.
    Japan--squadron at Yedo, ii. 35;
      represented by M. Goskavitch, ii. 104;
      Tsushima affair, ii. 111-114.
    Japanese War deprecated by, ii. 411;
      Japanese claims modified by, ii. 415.
    Kuldja incident, ii. 290-293.
    Li protected by, ii. 387, 415.
    Liao-tung acquired by, ii. 422, 423.
    Livadia, treaty of, ii. 291.
    Loan to China guaranteed by, ii. 421.
    Manchurian coast acquired by, ii. 252, 469.
    Military ethics of, ii. 470, 471.
    Peking, establishment in, i. 356, ii. 154.
    Port Hamilton incident, ii. 303-305.
    Protectorate of Christians assumed by, ii. 349, 350.
    Respect accorded to, by Chinese, i. 357;
      by Japanese, i. 357, ii. 104.
    Siberian railway, beginning of, ii. 323;
      Manchurian branch of, ii. 423.
    Taiping Rebellion, attitude towards, i. 394, 395.
    Talien-wan seized by, ii. 427;
      'Times' extract on the proceeding, ii. 428-432.
    Tea supply of, i. 186.
    Tientsin massacre, ii. 239, 241.
    Toleration clause in treaty of, ii. 224.
    Vladivostock, acquisition of, i. 358;
      Czarevitch's visit to, ii. 323.


  Salisbury, Lord, additional article to the Chefoo Convention signed by,
      ii. 287;
    speech regarding Russian ports, ii. 426, 430;
    Russia conciliated by, ii. 429.

  Samqua, i. 151, 434, 435.

  Samurai, status of, ii. 33 _note_ 2.

  Sarat Chandra Das, ii. 306, 308-310.

  Satsuma, Prince of, riding party attacked by retinue of, ii. 58;
    attack on, ii. 67, 68;
    appeals to Mikado against Prince of Nagato, ii. 69;
    friendly to foreigners, ii. 76.

  Seventh Prince. _See_ Ch'un, Prince.

  Seward, George F., ii. 174, 178.

  Seymour, Sir Michael, naval commander-in-chief at Hongkong, i. 309;
    relations with Sir J. Bowring, i. 315;
    operations in the "Merchants' War," i. 317.

  Shanghai--
    Alcock appointed to, i. 126;
      testimonial to him from foreign residents in, i. 157, 158;
      his visit to (1869), ii. 218.
    Apathy of residents regarding Exhibition samples, i. 200, 201.
    Capture of, in first China War, i. 75.
    Chamber of Commerce at, reviews Supplementary Convention, ii. 219.
    Chunghou, condemned at meetings in, ii. 241.
    Custom-house. _See under_ China--Taxation.
    Development of, i. 124-126.
    French concession in, i. 139.
    Inland trade from, i. 210.
    Kim assassinated in, ii. 301.
    Lindsay's mission to (1832), i. 115.
    Naval construction attempted at, ii. 396.
    Neighbourhood of, i. 126, 127.
    Opening of (1843), i. 115.
    Self-reliance of community in, i. 140.
    Silk trade facilitated by opening of, i. 188.
    Smuggling centre at, i. 144.
    Supreme Court for China and Japan established at, ii. 355-358.
    Taipings, danger from, i. 377-379.
    Thirty mile radius established round, i. 128, 372, 376, 383, 384.
    Tientsin treaty negotiations conducted at, i. 343, 347.
    Tonnage famine at, i. 232, 233.
    Tsingpu affair, i. 129-133.
    Yokohama guard of Beloochis sent from, ii. 78.

  Shantung--
    German seizure of port in, ii. 421;
      British opinion on seizure, ii. 423;
      Russian attitude, ii. 431.
    Scenery of, i. 221.
    Unrest most violent in, ii. 462.

  Shaw, Sir Charles, sketch of career of, i. 12-14;
    appreciation of Alcock, i. 14-17, 21, 22.

  Shimadso Saburo, ii. 58, 59 _and note_.

  Shimoda, opening of, ii. 4.

  Shimonoséki, Straits of, blockaded by Prince of Nagato, ii. 69, 76, 77;
    forts at, captured by Allies, ii. 83.

  Shimonoseki treaty, ii. 387, 418.

  Shipping--
    Convoy system in China, i. 302-304.
    Disguise of boats for Chinese coasting trade, i. 246, 247.
    East India Company's, i. 211-215.
    Gold discoveries' effect on, i. 227-231.
    Hanseatic and Scandinavian, i. 218, 219.
    Junks. _See under_ China.
    Lorchas. _See under_ China.
    Merchant owners, i. 217, 218, 224.
    Navigation Law repealed, i. 230.
    Opium clippers, i. 193, 215-217.
    Piracy. _See that title._
    Revival of British, i. 231, 237, 239.
    Silk cargoes, i. 235, 236.
    Steam brought into general use, i. 243-245;
    effect on piracy, i. 307.
    Tea clippers, i. 239-243.

  Shore, the Hon. Henry N., cited, i. 213 _note_.

  Silk, Chinese trade in, importance of, i. 168, 187-191 _and note_, 203;
    shipping of, i. 235, 236;
    Japanese trade in, ii. 116.

  Smith, Arthur, cited, ii. 368.

  Smuggling--
    Alcock's efforts against, i. 143, 145;
      extract from his report on, i. 145-147.
    Elliot's offer to suppress, i. 48, 49.
    England, in, i. 213.
    Prevalence of, i. 44, 45, 143, 195, 301.
    Salt merchants vigilant against, i. 442.
    Trade disastrously affected by, i. 147.

  Solomon, King, Chinese characteristics of, ii. 369 _note_.

  Spain, Alcock's work as army surgeon in, i. 21, 22;
    on Commission regarding payment of Foreign Legion, i. 24, 25;
    rheumatic fever contracted at San Sebastian, i. 27.

  Stanley, Lady Augusta, Alcock's work with, ii. 479, 480.

  Staveley, Brigadier-General, i. 365, 379, 383, 385.

  Stirling, Sir James, Japanese treaty of, ii. 4.

  Swatow, ii. 206.

  Swinhoe, Consul, ii. 181, 204, 359.


  Taiping Rebellion. _See under_ China.

  Taku forts, British repulse at, i. 222, 223, 348;
    strengthened by Chinese, i. 350;
    captured by Allies, i. 351;
    occupied by Allies, i. 355;
    captured (1900), ii. 436.

  Talien-wan--
    British suggestion regarding, ii. 425.
    Fortifications of, ii. 397.
    Russian seizure of, ii. 427.
    'Times' letter on, ii. 428-432.

  Tao-kuang, Emperor, i. 50, 51.

  Taotai, status of, i. 129.

  Tartars, i. 81.

  Taxation. _See under_ China.

  Tea trade--
    Clippers, i. 239-243.
    Consumption of tea, quality and quantity of, i. 180, 181.
    Duties heavy, i. 178-181, 186.
    Foochow famous for, i. 121, 122, 240, 241.
    Hankow a new centre for, i. 225.
    Importance of, in early Chinese trade, i. 168;
      decline of, i. 184-186.

  Thomson, J., quoted, i. 269.

  Tibet, Bengali's friendly visits to, ii. 305;
    Indian expedition attempted, ii. 306-310;
    attack on British Sikkim, ii. 311.

  Tientsin--
    Arsenal established at, by Chunghou, ii. 392.
    Ch'un, Prince, introduced to foreigners at, ii. 316.
    Conference at (1840), i. 65;
      (1854), i. 311.
    Elgin's treaty. _See_ Treaties--Tientsin;
      his hurried departure from, i. 333, 335, 336.
    Gordon's interviews with Li at, ii. 292.
    Gutzlaff's expedition to, i. 115.
    Massacre at. _See under_ Missionaries.
    Peking campaign, base of Allied troops during, i. 351;
      garrison left in, i. 355.
    Treaty of. _See under_ Treaties.

  Ting, Admiral, ii. 400, 408.

  Tông-chow, i. 219, 220.

  Tongking, French conquest of, ii. 326.

  Trade. _See_ Commerce.

  Treaties--
    Alcock's stand for integrity of, ii. 101.
    Anglo-German Agreement, ii. 467, 468, 473.
    Calcutta Convention, ii. 312.
    Chefoo Convention, negotiation and provisions of, ii. 275-280, 310,
        311;
      criticism of, ii. 280, 251;
      ratification of, ii. 284, 287.
    Disregard of, chronic, ii. 214, 359.
    Fournier Convention, ii. 329.
    Japan--Commodore Perry's, ii. 2;
      Townsend Harris's, ii. 3, 5, 39, 99;
      Sir J. Stirling's, ii. 4;
      Lord Elgin's, ii. 5, 6, 99.
    Li-Ito Convention, ii. 302, 303, 389, 408, 409.
    Livadia, ii. 291.
    "Most-favoured-nation" clause, ii. 3, 5, 6, 215, 232.
    Nanking, signing of, i. 75, 76;
      Chinese hostility to, i. 78, 79, 91, 93, 97;
      supplement to, i. 112-114;
      English opposition to, i. 114;
      working of, summed up by Alcock, i. 162, 411-428;
      evaded by Chinese, i. 333, ii. 214;
      restrictions of boundary imposed by, i. 415.
    Peking (1860), i. 354;
      (1886), ii. 310.
    St Petersburg, ii. 293.
    Shimonoseki, ii. 387, 418.
    Tientsin, ports opened by, i. 219;
      signing of, i. 331, 334;
      provisions of, i. 332, 341;
      residence at Peking a stipulation of, i. 332-335;
      Chinese view of, i. 334-336, 341, 342, 346, 348;
      suspension of residence clause, i. 337, 346;
      ratified at Peking, i. 354;
      regarded as model for other Powers, ii. 6;
      revision preparations, ii. 180-183;
      revision discussed, ii. 211-218;
      supplementary convention signed, ii. 218;
      reviewed, ii. 219, 220;
      not ratified, ii. 220, 221.
    Toleration clauses, ii. 224, 225.
    Yeh's contempt for, i. 333.

  Tsên-Yü-ying, ii. 270-273.

  Tsêng, the Marquis, negotiates ratification of Chefoo Convention,
      i. 284-287;
    negotiates treaty at St Petersburg, ii. 293;
    Annam negotiations, ii. 325;
    member of Tsungli-Yamên, ii. 351.

  Tsêng Kwo-Chuan, i. 381, 391.

  Tsêng Kwo-fan, operations in Taiping Rebellion, i. 381, 391, 393;
    memorial regarding revision of treaty, ii. 184;
    intercourse with foreigners, ii. 189;
    action in Yangchow affair, ii. 199-203;
    action regarding Tientsin massacre, ii. 240, 243;
    volunteer levies under, ii. 377;
    characteristics of, ii. 378;
    expulsion of foreigners suggested by, ii. 464 _note_.

  Tsushima, designs on, attributed to British, ii. 108, 109, 111;
    to French, ii. 110;
    Russian occupation of, ii. 111-114.

  Tsingpu affair, i. 129-135, 415, 423, 424.

  Tso Tsung-tang, ii. 291, 278, 279.

  Tsungli-Yamên. _See under_ China.

  Tuan, Prince, characteristic action of (1900), ii. 437;
    progeny of, not in the succession, ii. 456;
    relations of, with Empress Regent obscure, ii. 460.

  Tun, Prince, imperial claims of son of, ii. 263;
    grandson of, nominated heir-apparent, ii. 460.

  Tungchih, Emperor, i. 397, ii. 260-262.

  Tycoon of Japan, Lord Elgin's treaty with, ii. 6, 7;
    guards of, at foreign legations, ii. 36, 38, 44, 51-53;
    Daimios' relation to, ii. 38-41, 60-65, 67, 68, 76, 93;
    autograph letter to the Queen, ii. 46;
    the Queen's reply, ii. 48;
    envoys sent by, to Great Britain, ii. 48, 49;
    second mission, ii. 74, 75;
    Mikado's relation to, ii. 71-73, 85, 92;
    regret at Alcock's recall, ii. 88.


  United States. _See_ America.


  Vatican, appeal to, ii. 343.

  'Village Life in China' cited, ii. 368.

  Vladivostock, Russian acquisition of, i. 358;
    Czarevitch at, ii. 323.


  Wade, Sir Thomas, action in Taiping Rebellion, i. 138, ii. 133;
    Inspector of Customs at Shanghai, i. 154;
    at Peking with Alcock (1865), ii. 131;
    career and characteristics of, ii. 132-134;
    views of, on Maritime Customs Inspectorship, ii. 163, 164;
    on supplementary convention to Tientsin treaty, ii. 220;
    _chargé d'affaires_ at Peking, ii. 239, 244;
    views of, on audience of foreign Ministers, ii. 261, 262;
    negotiations regarding Margary case, ii. 270-275, 278;
    negotiates Chefoo Convention, ii. 275-279;
    views of, on Chinese legislation, ii. 279.

  Ward, Mr, i. 382.

  Weihai-wei--
    British seizure of, ii. 434.
    Chinese forlorn hope at, i. 222, 301.
    Early exploration of, i. 222.
    Fortifications of, ii. 397.

  Wênsiang, member of Tsungli-Yamên, i. 360;
    discredited by Lay-Osborn flotilla fiasco, i. 389, ii. 375, 391;
    intimate relations with British Legation, ii. 134, 135;
    concurs in strong measures against rioters, ii. 207;
    dislike of Hongkong, ii. 216;
    circular regarding control of missions attributed to, ii. 246;
    efforts regarding Pei-t'ang Cathedral, ii. 342;
    high qualities of, ii. 374-376.

  Westminster Hospital, Alcock's work for, ii. 478-480.

  Winchester, Consul, on Japanese currency, ii. 18, 23.

  Wolseley, Lieutenant-Colonel, i. 371, 373.

  Wu, i. 151, 434, 435.

  Wusung--
    Challenger on the bar at, i. 236.
    Hong captured at, ii. 301.
    Opium trade at, i. 193.
    Thirty mile radius, included in, i. 372, 376.


  Yakub-beg, ii. 290, 291.

  Yangchow riot, ii. 198-203, 207.

  Yangtze river--
    Advance of 200 miles up (1842), i. 74;
      Lord Elgin's voyage to Hankow (1858), i. 347, 370.
    Blockade of, suggested, i. 430.
    Opening of, i. 223, 369, 373.

  Yedo--
    Alcock's arrival at, ii. 15-17.
    British Legation. _See under_ Great Britain.
    Choshiu's establishment at, destroyed, ii. 83.
    Hostility to foreigners, ii. 35.
    Legations, withdrawal of, to Yokohama, ii. 36;
      foreign guards at, ii. 45;
      improved residence for, ii. 50.
    Social conditions in, ii. 122.

  Yeh, Viceroy, evades demands for right of entry into Canton, i. 160;
    hostile to native shipowners, i. 309;
    asks British aid against Taipings, i. 312;
    attitude towards foreigners, i. 312-314;
    offers reward for English heads, i. 317;
    contemptuous of treaties, i. 333;
    superseded, i. 342;
    capture and death of, i. 328.

  Yerburgh, Mr, ii. 427.

  Yokohama--
    Foreigners' residence prepared by Japanese at, ii. 13;
      improved, ii. 90.
    Garrison of British troops in, ii. 77, 78, 84.
    Legations' withdrawal to, during assassination period, ii. 36.
    Merchants' preference for, to Kanagawa, i. 18, 122, 123.
    Tycoon's inability to maintain order in, ii. 74.

  Yuan Shih-kai, ii. 406.

  Yunnan--
    Burmese expedition and murder of Mr Margary, ii. 266, 267;
      negotiations regarding, ii. 267-276;
      settlement of affair, ii. 278.
    Rebellion in, ii. 290.


THE END.


PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS.