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Transcriber's Note

For this version of the text, italics are denoted with _underscore_
characters, and bold text with =equal= signs. The ligature for 'oe' is
separated into its two letters, e.g., 'manoeuvre'.

Please consult the notes at the end of this text for a detailed
discussion of the various footnotes, endnotes, and navigation through
this text, as well as any other textual issues.

Right-side page headers contained descriptions of the current topics
covered by the two open pages. These were retained and are placed on
separate lines prior to the paragraph where the topic is introduced, and
enclosed in brackets, as [Sidenotes]. The choice of that position is
not always obvious and should be regarded as approximate. Should the
topic persist over multiple pages, any redundant headers have been
removed.

Illustrations, all but one of them maps, are denoted with square
brackets as [Illustration: <caption>] at approximately the point
where they were printed. The captions are usually printed on the maps
themselves. Where there is no obvious title to the map, the caption
has been provided from the table of illustrations.




                          THE WAR WITH MEXICO




               +----------------------------------------+
               |          BY THE SAME AUTHOR            |
               |                                        |
               |                 The                    |
               |         Annexation of Texas            |
               |                                        |
               |     _Octavo ix + 496 pages_            |
               |                                        |
               |    _By mail, postpaid, $3.00_          |
               |                                        |
               |        ------------------------        |
               | This is the only work attempting to    |
               | deal thoroughly with an affair that    |
               | was intrinsically far more important   |
               | than had previously been supposed,     |
               | and was also of no little significance |
               | on account of its relation to the war  |
               | with Mexico.                           |
               |        ------------------------        |
               |                                        |
               |          THE MACMILLAN COMPANY         |
               |             _PUBLISHERS_               |
               +----------------------------------------+




                                  THE

                            WAR WITH MEXICO

                                   BY

                            JUSTIN H. SMITH

                  FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY
                          AT DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
               AUTHOR OF "THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS," "OUR
                  STRUGGLE FOR THE FOURTEENTH COLONY,"
                          "ARNOLD'S MARCH FROM
                         CAMBRIDGE TO QUEBEC,"
                                  ETC.


                                VOLUME I

                                New York

                         THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
                                  1919

                       _All rights reserved_

                           COPYRIGHT, 1919,
                     BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.

             Set up and printed. Published December, 1919.

                             Norwood Press
                 J. S. Cushing Co.--Berwick & Smith Co.
                         Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.




                                   TO

                        HENRY CABOT LODGE, LL.D.

                      SENATOR OF THE UNITED STATES
                               HISTORIAN
           PRESIDENT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY
               WHO GAVE THE AUTHOR INVALUABLE ASSISTANCE
                 IN THE COLLECTION OF MATERIAL RELATING
                         TO THE WAR WITH MEXICO
                               THIS WORK
                     IS VERY RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED




                                PREFACE


As every one understands, our conflict with Mexico has been almost
entirely eclipsed by the greater wars following it. But in the field
of thought mere size does not count for much; and while the number of
troops and the lists of casualties give the present subject little
comparative importance, it has ample grounds for claiming attention. As
a territorial stake New Mexico, Arizona and California were of immense
value. National honor was involved, and not a few of the Mexicans
thought their national existence imperilled. Some of the diplomatic
questions were of the utmost difficulty and interest. The clash of North
and South, American and Mexican, produced extraordinary lights and
shades, and in both countries the politics that lay behind the military
operations made a dramatic and continual by-play. The military conduct
of the governments--especially our own--and the behavior of our troops
on foreign soil afforded instruction worthy to be pondered. While vast
concentrations of forces and complicated tactical operations on a great
scale were out of the question, the handling of even small armies at a
long distance from home and in a region that was not only foreign but
strange, created problems of a peculiar interest and afforded lessons of
a peculiar value, such as no earlier or later war of ours has provided;
and the examples of courage, honor and heroism exhibited in a conflict
not only against man but against nature merited correct appreciation and
lasting remembrance.[P.1][A]

  [A] The notes to which this and the other "superior figures" invite
      attention will be found immediately after the text of the volume.
      In the notes only brief titles of books are given, but these may be
      supplemented by reference to the list of printed sources given in
      the appendix of the second volume. Citations (in the notes)
      preceded by a number in black type refer to the list of MS. sources
      standing at the end of the notes.

The warrant for offering another work on the subject rests primarily
on the extent and results of the author's investigations. His
intention was to obtain substantially all the valuable information
regarding it that is in existence, and no effort was spared to reach
his end. The appendix of volume II gives a detailed account of the
sources. By special authorization from the Presidents of the United
States and Mexico it was possible to examine every pertinent document
belonging to the two governments. The search extended to the archives
of Great Britain, France, Spain, Cuba, Colombia and Peru, those of
the American and Mexican states, and those of Mexican cities. The
principal libraries here, in Mexico and in Europe, the collections of
our historical societies, and papers belonging to many individuals in
this country and elsewhere were sifted. It may safely be estimated that
the author examined personally more than 100,000 manuscripts bearing
upon the subject, more than 1200 books and pamphlets, and also more
than 200 periodicals, the most important of which were studied, issue
by issue, for the entire period.[B] Almost exclusively the book is
based upon first-hand sources, printed matter having been found of
little use except for the original material it contains or for data
regarding biography, geography, customs, industries and other ancillary
subjects.[P.2]

  [B] These figures cover also the author's "Annexation of Texas," which
      is virtually an introduction to the present work.

The author also talked or corresponded with as many of the veterans as
he could reach, and he spent more than a year, all told, in Mexico,
where he not only studied the chief battlefields but endeavored, through
conversations with Mexicans of all grades and by the aid of foreigners
long resident in the country, to become well acquainted with the
character and psychology of the people. As the war was fought almost
exclusively among them, and its inception, course and results depended
in large part upon these factors, the author attaches not a little
importance to his opportunities for such personal investigations and to
his Mexican data in general.[P.2]

Probably more than nine tenths of the material used in the preparation
of this work is in fact new. No previous writer on the subject had been
through the diplomatic and military archives of either belligerent
nation, for example. Virtually a still larger percentage is new, for
the published documents needed to be compared with the originals. In
the printed American reports relating to the battles of September 8 and
13, 1847, for instance, over fifty departures from the manuscripts,
that seemed worth noting, were found. Nor did the additional documents
prove by any means to supply mere details. A great number of unprinted
statements from subordinate officers, who were nearer to the facts than
their superiors could be, were discovered. The major official reports
needed both to be supplemented and to be corrected. Such reports were in
most instances colored more or less, and in some radically distorted,
for personal reasons or from a justifiable desire to produce an effect
on the subordinates concerned, the army in general, the writer's
government, the enemy, and the public at home and abroad; while, as
General Scott stated in orders, unintentional omissions and mistakes
were "common." Taylor's account of the battle of May 9, 1846, for
example, failed completely to explain his victory. It has been only by
obtaining and comparing a large number of statements that approximate
verity has been reached. The same has been true of the diplomatic and
political aspects of the subject. The reports of the British, French and
Spanish ministers residing at Mexico, to cite one illustration, proved
indispensable. In reality, therefore, aside from its broader outlines
the field presented ample opportunities for study; and while no doubt
so extended an investigation included many facts of slight value, La
Rochefoucauld was right when he said, "To know things perfectly, one
should know them in detail."[P.3]

As a particular consequence of this full inquiry, an episode that has
been regarded both in the United States and abroad as discreditable to
us, appears now to wear quite a different complexion. Such a result, it
may be presumed, will gratify patriotic Americans, but the author must
candidly admit that he began with no purpose or even thought of reaching
it. His view of the war at the outset of his special inquiries coincided
substantially with that prevailing in New England, and the subject was
taken up simply because he felt convinced that it had not been studied
thoroughly. This conviction, indeed, has seemed to be gaining ground
rapidly for some time, and hence it is believed that new opinions,
resting upon facts, will be acceptable now in place of opinions resting
largely upon traditional prejudices and misinformation.

Some might suggest that only a military man could properly write this
work. But, in the first place, the author did not wish to prepare a
technical military account of the war. His aim was to offer a correct
and complete view of it suitable for all interested in American history,
and it will be found that politics, diplomacy and other phases of the
subject required as full investigation as did its military aspects.

Secondly, the author took pains to qualify himself for his task. The
real difficulty of the commanding general consists in applying the
principles of war under complicated, obscure and changeful conditions,
and in overcoming "friction" of many sorts. The intellectual side of the
art is readily enough understood. "In war everything is very simple,"
wrote Clausewitz, the fountainhead of the modern system. "The theory of
the great speculative combinations of war is simple enough in itself,"
said Jomini; "it only requires intelligence and attentive reflection."
"Strategy is the application of common sense to the conduct of war,"
declared Von Moltke. Arnold in his Lectures on Modern History said: "An
unprofessional person may, without blame, speak or write on military
subjects, and may judge of them sufficiently;" and the eminent military
authority, G. F. R. Henderson, endorsed this view. "The theory of war
is simple," wrote another expert, "and there is no reason why any man
who chooses to take the trouble to read and reflect carefully on one or
two of the acknowledged best books thereon, should not attain to a fair
knowledge thereof." As may be seen from the list of printed sources,
the present author--beginning with the volumes recommended by a board
of officers to the graduates of the United States Military Academy--did
much more than is here proposed.

Finally, during the entire time occupied in writing this work he
fortunately enjoyed the advantage of corresponding and occasionally
conferring with Brigadier General Oliver L. Spaulding, Jr., of the
United States Field Artillery, formerly instructor at the Army Service
Schools, Fort Leavenworth, and more recently Assistant Commandant of the
School of Fire, Fort Sill, who had distinguished himself not only in the
service but as a writer on professional subjects. General Spaulding has
kindly discussed with the author such military questions as have arisen,
and has read critically all the battle chapters. No responsibility
should, however, be attached to him, if a mistake is detected.[P.4]

A word must be added with reference to the notes. These have been placed
at the ends of the volumes because the author believes the best plan
will be to read the text of each chapter before looking at the notes
that bear upon it, and also in part because he did not wish any one
to feel that he was parading his discussions and citations. The notes
contain supplementary material designed to make the work a critical
as well as a narrative history, and contain also specific references
to the sources on which the text is based. These references involved
a most annoying problem. When one's citations are limited in number
and proceed in single file, as it were, they can be handled easily.
But in the present instance as many as 1800 documents were used for a
chapter, not a few of which were cited more than once; and each sentence
of the text--to speak broadly--resulted from comparing a number of
sources. Under these conditions the usual method would have produced a
repellent mass of references, perhaps greater in extent than the text
itself, which would have been very expensive to print and from their
multiplicity would have been extremely inconvenient. Where that method
appeared feasible it was adopted, but as a rule the references have
been grouped by paragraphs or topics. In many cases, however, pains
have been taken to indicate in the text itself the basis of important
statements, and further hints will be found in the notes. The reader can
thus always ascertain in general the basis of the text, and will find
specific references wherever the author has thought it likely they would
be desired. The special student will wish to look up all the citations
bearing on any topic that interests him. No doubt the plan is somewhat
unsatisfactory, but after studying the subject for a dozen years the
author feels sure that any other would have been more so.[P.5]

To thank all who kindly assisted the author to obtain material is
practically impossible; but a number of names appear in the list of
MS. sources, and others must be mentioned here. Without the cordial
support of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Porfirio Diaz, Secretary of
State Elihu Root, Minister of Relations Ignacio Mariscal, and Senator
Henry Cabot Lodge this history could not have been written; and the
author acknowledges with no less pleasure his special obligations to
Whitelaw Reid, American Ambassador to Great Britain, Joseph E. Willard,
Ambassador to Spain; Henri Vignaux, First Secretary of our embassy at
Paris; J. J. Limantour, Minister of Hacienda, Mexico; Major General
J. Franklin Bell, Chief of Staff; Major General F. C. Ainsworth, Adj.
Gen.; Admiral Alfred T. Mahan; Admiral French E. Chadwick; Brigadier
General J. E. Kuhn, Head of the War College, Washington; Dr. J. Franklin
Jameson, Director of the Department of Historical Research, Carnegie
Institution; Dr. Gaillard Hunt, Chief of the Division of MSS., Library
of Congress; Dr. St. George L. Sioussat, Brown University; Dr. Eugene
C. Barker, University of Texas; Dr. Herbert E. Bolton, Professor
Frederick J. Teggart and Dr. H. I. Priestley of the University of
California; Dr. R. W. Kelsey of Haverford College; Dr. J. W. Jordan,
Pennsylvania Historical Society; Dr. Worthington C. Ford, Editor for the
Massachusetts Historical Society; Dr. Solon J. Buck of the Minnesota
Historical Society; R. D. W. Connor, Secretary of the Historical
Commission of North Carolina; Dr. R. P. Brooks of the University of
Georgia; Dr. Dunbar Rowland, Director of the Archives and Historical
Department of Mississippi; T. M. Owen, Director of the Historical
Department of Alabama; Dr. George M. Philips, State Normal School, West
Chester, Pa.; Waldo G. Leland, Secretary of the American Historical
Association; W. B. Douglas and Miss Stella M. Drumm, Librarian, of the
Missouri Historical Society; Dr. Clarence E. Alvord of the University of
Illinois and Mrs. Alvord (formerly Miss Idress Head, Librarian of the
Missouri Historical Society); Ignacio Molina, Head of the Cartography
Section, Department of Fomento, Mexico; Charles W. Stewart, Librarian
of the Navy Department; James W. Cheney, long the Librarian of the War
Department; Major Gustave R. Lukesh, Director, and Henry E. Haferkorn,
Librarian of the United States Engineer School, Washington Barracks; D.
C. Brown, Librarian of the Indiana State Library; Victor H. Paltsits,
Department of MSS., New York Public Library; W. L. Ostrander of the
library at West Point; Lieutenant James R. Jacobs, 28th United States
Infantry; Dr. Katherine J. Gallagher; Dr. Martha L. Edwards. To the
widow of Admiral Charles S. Sperry and their son, Professor Charles
S. Sperry, the author is particularly indebted for an opportunity to
examine important papers left by William L. Marcy. Valuable suggestions
were most kindly given by Dr. William A. Dunning of Columbia University
and Dr. Davis R. Dewey of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who
read portions of the text, by Francis W. Halsey, Esq., of New York, who
read nearly all of it, and by Dr. Edward Channing of Harvard University,
who was so good as to look over more or less closely all of the proofs.
To the helpers not mentioned by name the author begs leave to offer
thanks no less sincere.

Finally, the author desires to mention the enterprise and public spirit
shown by the publishers in bringing out so expensive a work at this time
of uncertainty.

                      THE CENTURY CLUB, NEW YORK,
                            September, 1919.




                          CONTENTS OF VOLUME I


                                                                PAGE

  MAPS AND PLANS IN VOLUME I                                    xvii

  CONSPECTUS OF EVENTS                                           xix

  PRONUNCIATION OF SPANISH                                       xxi

  CHAPTER

      I. MEXICO AND THE MEXICANS                                   1

     II. THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF MEXICO                        29

    III. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
         MEXICO, 1825-1843                                        58

     IV. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
         MEXICO, 1843-1846                                        82

      V. THE MEXICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR                  102

     VI. THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR                 117

    VII. THE PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONFLICT                       138

   VIII. PALO ALTO AND RESACA DE GUERRERO                        156

     IX. THE UNITED STATES MEETS THE CRISIS                      181

      X. THE CHOSEN LEADERS ADVANCE                              204

     XI. TAYLOR SETS OUT FOR SALTILLO                            225

    XII. MONTEREY                                                239

   XIII. SALTILLO, PARRAS, AND TAMPICO                           262

    XIV. SANTA FE                                                284

     XV. CHIHUAHUA                                               298

    XVI. THE CALIFORNIA QUESTION                                 315

   XVII. THE CONQUEST OF CALIFORNIA                              331

  XVIII. THE GENESIS OF TWO CAMPAIGNS                            347

    XIX. SANTA ANNA PREPARES TO STRIKE                           370

     XX. BUENA VISTA                                             384

  NOTES ON VOLUME I                                              402

  APPENDIX (MANUSCRIPT SOURCES)                                  565




                       MAPS AND PLANS IN VOLUME ONE

As equally good sources disagree sometimes, a few inconsistencies are
unavoidable. Numerous errors have been corrected. An asterisk indicates
an unpublished original. Statements, cited in the notes, have also been
used.


                                                                PAGE

  1.  Mexico in 1919. Based upon standard maps                  xxii

  2.  Profile of the Route between Vera Cruz and Mexico            2

      Drawn by Lieut. Hardcastle (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong.,
      1 sess.).

  3.  Matamoros and Fort Brown                                   159

      Sketch map based on a *map drawn by Luis Berlandier,
      Arista's chief engineer (War Dept., Mexico); Meade,
      Letters, i, 73; McCall, Letters, 444; New Orleans
      _Picayune_, June 28, 1846; *sketch by Mansfield,
      Taylor's chief engineer (War Dept., Washington); and
      an anonymous plan (Mass. Hist. Society).

  4.  Fort Brown to Brazos Island                                162

      Sketch map based principally upon the map in Apuntes para
      la Historia de la Guerra entre México y los Estados-Unidos
      and a map by Eaton of Third Infantry (Ho. Ex. Doc. 209;
      29 Cong., 1 sess.).

  5.  Battle of Palo Alto                                        164

      Sketch map drawn by a U. S. army officer. Based on Eaton's
      plan (Ho. Ex. Doc., 209; 29 Cong., 1 sess.); a *sketch by
      Berlandier (War Dept., Mexico); Apuntes; México á través
      de los Siglos, iv, 562; _El Republicano_ (Berlandier);
      a map in Campaña contra los Norte-Americanos; a map by
      Lieut. Dobbins in Life of General Taylor; and _Journal of
      Milit. Service Institution_, xli, 96.

  6.  Battle of Resaca de la Palma (_i.e._ Resaca de Guerrero)   170

      Sketch map based on Apuntes; New Orleans _Picayune_,
      June 25, 1846, from official drawings; a plan by Dobbins
      in Life of General Taylor; a map in Campaña contra, _etc._;
      a plan by Berlandier in _El Republicano_; a plan by
      Eaton (Ho. Ex. Doc. 209; 29 Cong., 1 sess.); French, Two Wars,
      52; and _Journal of Milit. Service Instit._, xli, 100.

  7.  From Matamoros to Monterey                                 210

      Based on an official Mexican map prepared by the Fomento
      Dept. and on Gen. Arista's map.

  8.  Battles of Monterey: General Map                           232

      Based on *three plans drawn by Lieut. Gardner from surveys
      of Lieut. Scarritt (War Dept., Washington); _Picayune_
      Extra, Nov. 19, 1846 (Lieut. Benjamin); a *drawing by
      Adjutant Heiman (Tennessee Hist. Society); a map in
      Apuntes; and a plan by Balbontín (Invasión Americana).

  9.  Battles of Monterey. Central Operations                    240

      Based on the same sources as No. 8 _supra_.

  10. General Wool's March                                       271

      Based on reconnaissances of Capt. Hughes, Lieut. Sitgreaves,
      and Lieut. Franklin (Sen. Ex. Doc. 32; 31 Cong., 1 sess.).

  11. Tampico and Its Environs                                   276

      Based on a sketch by Lee and Gilmer (War Dept.,
      Washington); and a Fomento Dept. Map (_see_ No. 7
       _supra_).

  12. General Kearny's March to Santa Fe                         287

      From a sketch drawn by A. Wislizenus (Sen. Misc. Doc.
      26; 30 Cong., 1 sess.).

  13. El Paso to Rosales, Mexico                                 305

      From a U. S. War College map, Washington.

  14. Battle of Sacramento                                       307

      Based on a map in Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess.; and
      a plan in México á través de los Siglos, iv, 644.

  15. California in 1846                                         316

      Based on a map in Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess.

  16. Northern California                                        317

      From a sketch by Lieut. Derby (Sen. Ex. Doc. 18; 31 Cong.,
      1 sess.) and recent maps.

  17. Fight at San Pascual                                       341

      From a plan in Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess.

  18. Fight near Los Angeles                                     344

      From a plan in Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess.

  19. General Patterson's March                                  360

      From a map in Ho. Ex. Doc. 13; 31 Cong., 2 sess.

  20. From Mexico City to Agua Nueva                             381

      From a Fomento Dept. map.

  21. From Monterey to La Encarnación                            382

      Based on a map in Rápida Ojeada sobre la Campaña, _etc._;
      and a *sketch by Lee and Gilmer (War Dept., Washington).

  22. Battle of Buena Vista                                      387

      Based on a map drawn by Capt. Linnard from the surveys of
      Capt. Linnard and Lieuts. Pope and Franklin (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1;
      30 Cong., 1 sess.); *two plans by the same officers (War
      Dept., Washington); a *map based on a sketch by Dr.
      Vanderlinden, chief Mexican surgeon (War Dept., Mexico);
      a map by Balbontín (Invasión Americana); a *map drawn by
      Stanislaus Lasselle (Indiana State Library); a plan by Lieut.
      Green (Scribner, Campaign in Mexico); *Croquis para la
      intelligencia de la Batalla de la Angostura (War Dept.,
      Washington).




                        CONSPECTUS OF EVENTS


                                   1845

  March.   The United States determines to annex Texas; W. S. Parrott
           sent to conciliate Mexico.

  July.    Texas consents; Taylor proceeds to Corpus Christi.

  Oct.  17. Larkin appointed a confidential agent in California.

  Nov.  10. Slidell ordered to Mexico.

  Dec.  20. Slidell rejected by Herrera.

                                   1846

  Jan.  13. Taylor ordered to the Rio Grande.

  Mar.   8. Taylor marches from Corpus Christi.

        21. Slidell finally rejected by Paredes.

        28. Taylor reaches the Rio Grande.

  Apr.  25. Thornton attacked.

  May    8. Battle of Palo Alto.

         9. Battle of Resaca de la Palma.

        13. The war bill becomes a law.

  June   5. Kearny's march to Santa Fe begins.

  July   7. Monterey, California, occupied.

        14. Camargo occupied.

  Aug.   4. Paredes overthrown.

         7. First attack on Alvarado.

        13. Los Angeles, California, occupied.

        16. Santa Anna lands at Vera Cruz.

        18. Kearny takes Santa Fe.

        19. Taylor advances from Camargo.

  Sept. 14. Santa Anna enters Mexico City.

     20-24. Operations at Monterey, Mex.

     22-23. Insurrection in California precipitated.

        23. Wool's advance from San Antonio begins.

        25. Kearny leaves Santa Fe for California.

  Oct.   8. Santa Anna arrives at San Luis Potosí.

  Oct.  15. Second attack on Alvarado.

        24. San Juan Bautista captured by Perry.

        28. Tampico evacuated by Parrodi.

        29. Wool occupies Monclova.

  Nov.  15. Tampico captured by Conner.

        16. Saltillo occupied by Taylor.

        18. Scott appointed to command the Vera Cruz expedition.

  Dec.   5. Wool occupies Parras.

         6. Kearny's fight at San Pascual.

        25. Doniphan's skirmish at El Brazito.

        27. Scott reaches Brazos Id.

        29. Victoria occupied.

                                  1847

  Jan.   3. Scott orders troops from Taylor.

         8. Fight at the San Gabriel, Calif.

         9. Fight near Los Angeles, Calif.

        11. Mexican law regarding Church property.

        28. Santa Anna's march against Taylor begins.

  Feb.   5. Taylor places himself at Agua Nueva.

        19. Scott reaches Tampico.

     22-23. Battle of Buena Vista.

        27. Insurrection at Mexico begins.

        28. Battle of Sacramento.

  Mar.   9. Scott lands near Vera Cruz.

        29. Vera Cruz occupied.

        30. Operations in Lower California opened.

  Apr.   8. Scott's advance from Vera Cruz begins.

        18. Battle of Cerro Gordo; Tuxpán captured by Perry.

        19. Jalapa occupied.

  May   15. Worth enters Puebla.

  June   6. Trist opens negotiations through the British legation.

        16. San Juan Bautista again taken.

  Aug.   7. The advance from Puebla begins.

        20. Battles of Contreras and Churubusco.

  Aug. 24-Sept. 7. Armistice.

  Sept. 8. Battle of Molino del Rey.

       13. Battle of Chapultepec; the "siege" of Puebla begins.

       14. Mexico City occupied.

       22. Peña y Peña assumes the Presidency.

  Oct.  9. Fight at Huamantla.

       20. Trist reopens negotiations.

  Nov. 11. Mazatlán occupied by Shubrick.


                                  1848

  Feb.   2. Treaty of peace signed.

  Mar. 4-5. Armistice ratified.

        10. Treaty accepted by U. S. Senate.

  May 19, 24. Treaty accepted by Mexican Congress.

        30. Ratifications of the treaty exchanged.

  June  12. Mexico City evacuated.

  July   4. Treaty proclaimed by President Polk.


                      THE PRONUNCIATION OF SPANISH

The niceties of the matter would be out of place here, but a few general
rules may prove helpful.

_A_ as in English "ah"; _e_, at the end of a syllable, like _a_ in
"fame," otherwise like _e_ in "let"; _i_ like _i_ in "machine"; _o_, at
the end of a syllable, like _o_ in "go," otherwise somewhat like _o_ in
"lot"; _u_ like _u_ in "rude" (but, unless marked with two dots, silent
between _g_ or _q_ and _e_ or _i_); _y_ like _ee_ in "feet."

_C_ like _k_ (but, before _e_ and _i,_ like [C]_th_ in "thin"); _ch_ as
in "child"; _g_ as in "go" (but, before _e_ and _i_, like a harsh _h_);
_h_ silent; _j_ like a harsh _h_; _ll_ like [D]_lli_ in "million"; _ñ_
like _ni_ in "onion"; _qu_ like _k_; _r_ is sounded with a vibration
(trill) of the tip of the tongue (_rr_ a longer and more forcible sound
of the same kind); _s_ as in "sun"; _x_ like _x_ in "box" (but, in
"México" and a few other names, like Spanish _j_); _z_ like [C]_th_ in
"thin."

Words bearing no mark of accentuation are stressed on the last syllable
if they end in any consonant except _n_ or _s_, but on the syllable next
to the last if they end in _n_, _s_ or a vowel.

  [C] In Mexico, however, usually like _s_ in "sun."

  [D] In Mexico usually like _y_.


  [Illustration: MEXICO IN 1919]




                          THE WAR WITH MEXICO




                                   I

                        MEXICO AND THE MEXICANS

                               1800-1845


Mexico, an immense cornucopia, hangs upon the Tropic of Cancer and opens
toward the north pole. The distance across its mouth is about the same
as that between Boston and Omaha, and the line of its western coast
would probably reach from New York to Salt Lake City. Nearly twenty
states like Ohio could be laid down within its limits, and in 1845 it
included also New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, California and portions
of Colorado and Wyoming.[1.1]

On its eastern side the ground rises almost imperceptibly from the Gulf
of Mexico for a distance varying from ten to one hundred miles, and
ascends then into hills that soon become lofty ranges, while on the
western coast series of cordilleras tower close to the ocean. Between
the two mountain systems lies a plateau varying in height from 4000 to
8000 feet, so level--we are told--that one could drive, except where
deep gullies make trouble, from the capital of Montezuma to Santa Fe,
New Mexico. The country is thus divided into three climatic zones, in
one or another of which, it has been said, every plant may be found that
grows between the pole and the equator.[1.1][E]

  [E] It will be seen that occasionally the same "superior figure" is
      attached to several paragraphs, and that sometimes these reference
      numbers are not in consecutive order. The reasons will be
      discovered when the reader consults the notes, which follow the
      text of each volume.

Except near the United States the coast lands are tropical or
semi-tropical; and the products of the soil, which in many quarters is
extraordinarily deep and rich, are those which naturally result from
extreme humidity and heat. Next comes an intermediate zone varying in
general height from about 2000 to about 4000 feet, where the rainfall,
though less abundant than on the coast, is ample, and the climate far
more salubrious than below. Here, in view of superb mountains and even
of perpetual snows, one finds a sort of eternal spring and a certain
blending of the tropical and the temperate zones. Wheat and sugar
sometimes grow on the same plantation, and both of them luxuriantly;
while strawberries and coffee are not far apart.[1.1]

  [Illustration: PROFILE OF THE ROUTE BETWEEN MEXICO AND VERA CRUZ]

The central plateau lacks moisture and at present lacks trees. The
greater part of it is indeed a semi-desert, though a garden wherever
water can be supplied. During the wet season--June to October--it is
covered with wild growths, but the rains merely dig huge gullies or
_barrancas_, and almost as soon as they are over, most of the vegetation
begins to wither away. The climate of the plateau is quite equable,
never hot and never cold. Wheat, Indian corn and maguey--the plant from
which _pulque_, the drink of the common people, is made--are the most
important products; and at the north great herds of cattle roam. In the
mountains, finally, numberless mines yield large quantities of silver,
some gold, and a considerable amount of copper and lead.[1.1]

The principal cities on the eastern coast are Vera Cruz, the chief
seaport, and Tampico, not far south of the Rio Grande River. In the
temperate zone between Vera Cruz and Mexico lie Jalapa and Orizaba,
and behind Tampico lies Monterey. On the central plateau one finds the
capital reposing at an elevation of about eight thousand feet and, about
seventy miles toward the southeast, Puebla; while on the other side of
the capital are the smaller towns of Querétaro and San Luis Potosí
toward the north, and Zacatecas and Chihuahua toward the northwest.
In the middle zone of the Pacific slope rises the large city of
Guadalajara, capital of Jalisco state; and along the coast below may be
found a number of seaports, the most important of which are Guaymas, far
to the north, Mazatlán opposite the point of Lower California, San Blas
a little farther down, and Acapulco in the south.[1.1]

[THE PEOPLE]

Exactly how large the population of Mexico was in 1845 one cannot
be sure, and it included quite a number of racial mixtures; but for
the present inquiry we may suppose it consisted of 1,000,000 whites,
4,000,000 Indians, and 2,000,000 of mixed white and Indian blood.[1.2]
The Spaniards from Europe, called Gachupines in Mexico, were of two
principal classes during her colonial days. Many had been favorites of
the Spanish court, or the protégés of such favorites, and had exiled
themselves to occupy for a longer or shorter time high and lucrative
posts; but by far the greater number were men who had left home in
their youth--poor, but robust, energetic and shrewd--to work their way
up. With little difficulty such immigrants found places in mercantile
establishments or on the large estates. Merciless in pursuit of gain yet
kind to their families, faithful to every agreement, and honest when
they could afford to be, they were intrinsically the strongest element
of the population, and almost always they became wealthy.[1.3]

Their sons, poorly educated, lacking the spur of poverty, and finding
themselves in a situation where idleness and self-indulgence were their
logical habits, commonly took "_Siempre alegre_" (Ever light-hearted)
for their motto, and spent their energy in debauchery and gambling.
To this result their own fathers, while disgusted with it, usually
contributed. Spanish pride revolted at the ladder of subordination by
which these very men had climbed. They felt ambitious to make gentlemen
of their sons, and some easy position in the army, church or civil
service--or, in default of it, idleness--was the career towards which
they pointed; and naturally the heirs to their wealth, whose ignoble
propensities had prevented them from acquiring efficiency or sense of
responsibility, made haste, on getting hold of the paternal wealth,
to squander it. If the pure whites, with some exceptions of course,
fell into this condition, nothing better could fairly be expected of
those who were partly Indian; and before the revolution it was almost
universally felt in Spain and among the influential class of colonials
themselves, that nothing of much value could be expected of Creoles, as
the whites born in Mexico and the half-breeds were generally called.
The achievement of independence naturally tended to increase their
self-respect, broaden their views and stimulate their ambition; but the
less than twenty-five years that elapsed between 1821 and 1846, when
the war between Mexico and the United States began, were not enough to
transform principles, reverse traditions and uproot habits.[1.3]

The pure-blooded Indians--of whom there were many tribes, little
affiliated if at all--had changed for the worse considerably since
the arrival of the whites. In their struggles against conquest and
oppression the most intelligent, spirited and energetic had succumbed,
and the rest, deprived of strength, happiness, consolation and even
hope, and aware that they existed merely to fill the purses or sate
the passions of their masters, had rapidly degenerated. Their natural
apathy, reticence and intensity were at the same time deepened. While
apparently stupid and indifferent, they were capable of volcanic
outbursts. Though fanatically Christian in appearance, they seem to
have practiced often a vague nature worship under the names and forms
of Catholicism. Indeed they were themselves almost a part of the soil,
bound in soul to the spot where they were born; and, although their
women could put on silk slippers to honor a church festival and every
hut could boast a crucifix or a holy image, they lived and often slept
beside their domestic animals with a brutish disregard for dirt.[1.3]

Legally they had the rights of freemen and were even the wards of the
government, and a very few acquired education and property; but as
a rule they had to live by themselves in little villages under the
headship of lazy, ignorant caciques and the more effective domination
of the priests. As the state levied a small tax upon them and the
Church several heavy ones, their scanty earnings melted fast, and if
any surplus accumulated they made a fiesta in honor of their patron
saint, and spent it in masses, fireworks, drink, gluttony and gambling.
When sickness or accident came they had to borrow of the landowner
to whose estate they were attached; and then, as they could not leave
his employ until the debt had been discharged, they not only became
serfs, but in many cases bequeathed their miserable condition to
their children. Silent and sad, apparently frail but capable of great
exertion, trotting barefooted to and from their huts with their coarse
black hair flowing loosely or gathered in two straight braids, watching
everything with eyes that seemed fixed on the ground, loving flowers
much but a dagger more, fond of melody but preferring songs that were
melancholy and wild, always tricky, obstinate, indolent, peevish and
careless yet affectionate and hospitable, often extracting a dry humor
from life as their donkeys got nourishment from the thistles, they went
their wretched ways as patient and inscrutable as the sepoy or the
cat--infants with devils inside.[1.3]

[THE CLASSES]

At the head of the social world stood a titled aristocracy maintained by
the custom of primogeniture. But as the nobles were few in number, and
for a long time had possessed no feudal authority, their influence at
the period we are studying depended mainly upon their wealth. Next these
came aristocrats of other kinds. Some claimed the honor of tracing their
pedigree to the conquerors, and with it enjoyed great possessions; and
others had the riches without the descent. The two most approved sources
of wealth were the ownership of immense estates and the ownership of
productive mines. On a lower level stood certain of the rich merchants,
and lower still, if they were lucky enough to gain social recognition,
a few of those who acquired property by dealing in the malodorous
government contracts. To these must be added in general the high
dignitaries of the church, the foreign ministers, the principal generals
and statesmen and the most notable doctors and lawyers. Such was the
upper class.[1.4]

A sort of middle class included the lesser professional men, prelates,
military officers and civil officials, journalists, a few teachers,
business men of importance and some fairly well-to-do citizens without
occupations. Of small farms and small mines there were practically
none, and the inferior clergy signified little. The smaller importing
and wholesale merchants came to be almost entirely British, French
and German soon after independence was achieved, and the retailers
were mostly too low in the scale to rank anywhere. The case of those
engaged in the industries was even more peculiar. Working at a trade
seemed menial to the Spaniard, especially since the idea of labor was
associated with the despised Indians, and most of the half-breeds and
Indians lacked the necessary intelligence. Skilled workers at the
trades were therefore few, and these few mostly high-priced foreigners.
Articles of luxury could be had but not comforts; pastries and ices
but not good bread; saddles covered with gold and embroidery, but not
serviceable wagons; and the highly important factor of intelligent,
self-respecting handicraftsmen was thus well-nigh missing.[1.4]

The laboring class consisted almost entirely of half-breeds and
Indians. In public affairs they were not considered, and their own
degraded state made them despise their tasks. Finally, the dregs of the
population, especially in the large cities, formed a vicious, brutal and
semi-savage populace. At the capital there were said to be nearly 20,000
of the _léperos_, as they were called, working a little now and then,
but mainly occupied in watching the religious processions, begging,
thieving, drinking and gambling. In all, Humboldt estimated at 200,000
or 300,000 the number of these creatures, whose law was lawlessness and
whose heaven would have been a hell.[1.4]

[THE CHURCH]

The only church legally tolerated was that of Rome; and this, as the
unchallenged authority in the school and the pulpit, the keeper of
confessional secrets and family skeletons, and the sole dispenser
of organized charity, long wielded a tremendous power. The clerical
_fuero_, which exempted all ecclesiastics from the jurisdiction of the
civil courts, reinforced it, and the wealth and financial connections
of the Church did the same. In certain respects, however, the strength
of the organization began to diminish early in the nineteenth century;
and in particular the Inquisition was abolished in Mexico, as it was
in Spain. Soon after the colony became independent, a disposition to
bar ecclesiastics from legislative bodies, to philosophize on religious
matters and to view Protestants with some toleration manifested itself.
Ten years more, and the urgent need of public schools led to certain
steps, as we shall see, toward secular education. Political commotions,
the exactions of powerful civil authorities under the name of loans,
and various other circumstances cut into the wealth of the Church; and
the practical impossibility of selling the numberless estates upon which
it had mortgages or finding good reinvestments in the case of sales,
compelled it, as the country became less and less prosperous, to put up
with delays and losses of interest.[1.5]

Moreover the Church was to no slight extent a house divided against
itself. Under Spanish rule and substantially down to 1848, all the high
dignities fell to Gachupines, who naturally faced toward Spain, whereas
the parish priests were mainly Creoles with Mexican sympathies; and
while the bishops and other managers had the incomes of princes, nearly
all of the monks and ordinary priests lived in poverty. There was,
therefore, but little in common between the two ranks except the bare
fact of being churchmen, which was largely cancelled on the one side by
contempt and on the other side by envy; and the common priests, having
generally sided against Spain during the revolution and always been
closely in touch with the people, exercised, in spite of their pecuniary
exactions, an influence that largely balanced the authority of their
heads. Finally, the ignorance of most ecclesiastics and the immorality
of nearly all greatly diminished their moral force. A large number,
even among the higher clergy, were unable to read the mass; and the
monks, who in the early days of the colony had rendered good service as
missionaries, were now recruited--wrote an American minister--from "the
very dregs of the people," and constituted a public scandal.[1.5]

Still, the Church wielded immense power as late as 1845, and this was
reinforced by the type of religion that it offered. High and low alike,
the Mexicans, with some exceptions, lived in the senses, differing
mainly in the refinement of the gratifications they sought; and the
priests offered them a sensuous worship. Sometimes, almost crazed by
superstitious fears, men would put out the lights in some church,
strip themselves naked, and ply the scourge till every blow fell with
a splash. It was pleasanter, however, and usually edifying enough, to
kneel at the mass, gaze upon the extraordinary display of gold and
silver, gorgeous vestments, costly images and elaborately carved and
gilded woodwork, follow the smoke of the incense rolling upward from
golden censers, listen to sonorous incantations called prayers, and
confess to some fat priest well qualified to sympathize with every
earthy desire. A man who played this game according to the rule was
good and safe. A brigand counting the chances of a fray could touch his
scapularies with pious confidence, and the intending murderer solicit a
benediction on his knife. Enlightened Catholics as well as enlightened
non-Catholics deplored the state of religion in Mexico.[1.5]

Next after the Church came the "army," which meant a social order, a
body of professional military men--that is to say, officers--exempted
by their fuero from the jurisdiction of the civil law and almost
exclusively devoted to the traditions, principles and interests of their
particular group. As the Church held the invisible power, the army held
the visible; and whenever the bells ceased to ring, the roll of the drum
could be heard. Every President and almost every other high official
down to the close of our Mexican war was a soldier, and sympathized
with his class; and as almost every family of any importance included
members of the organization, its peculiar interests had a strong social
backing. By force of numbers, too, this body was influential, for at
one time, when the army contained scarcely 20,000 soldiers, it had
24,000 officers; and so powerful became the group that in 1845, when
the real net revenue of the government did not exceed $12,000,000, its
appropriation was more than $21,000,000.[1.5]

Under Spanish rule, although the army enjoyed great privileges, it
had been kept in strict subordination, and usefully employed on the
frontiers; but independence changed the situation. Apparently the
revolution was effected by the military men, and they not merely claimed
but commonly received the full credit. Not only did a large number of
unfit persons, who pretended to have commanded men during the struggle,
win commissions, but wholesale promotions were made in order to gain
the favor of the officers; and in these ways the organization was both
demoralized and strengthened. Over and over again military men learned
to forswear their allegiance, and at one time the government actually
set before the army, as a standard of merit, success in inducing
soldiers of the opposite party to change sides.[1.5]

[THE ARMY]

In the course of political commotions, to be reviewed in the next
chapter, the armed forces were more and more stationed at the cities,
where they lost discipline and became the agents of political schemers;
and naturally, when the government admitted their right to take part as
organized bodies in political affairs, the barracks came to supersede
the legislative halls, bullets took the place of arguments, and the
military men, becoming the arbiters on disputed points, regarded
themselves as supreme. Moreover, every administration felt it must have
the support of this organization, and, not being able to dominate it,
had to be dominated by it. Political trickery could therefore bring the
officer far greater rewards than professional merit, and success in a
revolt not only wiped away all stains of insubordination, cowardice and
embezzlement, but ensured promotion. A second lieutenant who figured
in six affairs of that sort became almost necessarily a general, and
frequently civilians who rendered base but valuable services on such
occasions were given high army rank. No doubt some risk was involved,
but it was really the nation as a whole that paid the penalties; and
anyhow one could be bold for a day far more easily than be courageous,
patient, studious, honest and loyal for a lifetime. All true military
standards were thus turned bottom-side up, and some of the worst
crimes a soldier can perpetrate became in Mexico the brightest of
distinctions.[1.5]

Of course the discovery that rank and pay did not depend upon deserving
them set every corrupt officer at work to get advanced, while it drove
from the service, or at least discouraged, the few men of talents and
honor; and as all subordination ceased, a general not only preferred
officers willing to further his dishonorable interests, but actually
dreaded to have strong and able men serve in his command. In 1823 the
Mexican minister of war reported to Congress, "Almost the whole army
must be replaced, for it has contracted vices that will not be removed
radically in any other way," and four years later a militia system
was theoretically established with a view to that end; but the old
organization continued to flourish, and in April, 1846, the British
minister said, "The Officers ... are, as a Corps, the worst perhaps to
be found in any part of the world. They are totally ignorant of their
duty, ... and their personal courage, I fear, is of a very negative
character."[1.5]

In 1838, a German visitor stated there were a hundred and sixty generals
for an army of thirty thousand, and this was perhaps a fair estimate
of the usual proportion; but out of all these, every one of whom could
issue a glowing proclamation, probably not a single "Excellency"
could properly handle a small division, while few out of thousands
of colonels could lead a regiment on the field, and some were not
qualified to command a patrol. A battle was almost always a mob fight
ending in a cavalry charge; and Waddy Thompson, an American minister to
Mexico, said he did not believe a manoeuvre in the face of the enemy
was ever attempted. Naturally the general administration of military
affairs became a chaos; and, worst of all, a self-respecting general
thought it almost a disgrace to obey an order--even an order from the
President.[1.5]

The privates and non-commissioned officers, on the other hand, mainly
Indians with a sprinkling of half-breeds, were not bad material. The
Indians in particular could be described as naturally among the best
soldiers in the world, for they were almost incredibly frugal, docile
and enduring, able to make astonishing marches, and quite ready--from
animal courage, racial apathy or indifference about their miserable
lives--to die on the field. But usually they were seized by force,
herded up in barracks as prisoners, liberally cudgelled but scantily
fed, and after a time driven off to the capital, chained, in a double
file, with distracted women beside them wailing to every saint. When
drilled enough to march fairly well through the street in column,
clothed in a serge uniform or a coarse linen suit, and equipped with
an old English musket and some bad powder, they were called soldiers,
and were exhorted to earn immortal glory; but naturally they got
away if they could, and frequently on a long expedition half a corps
deserted.[1.5]

Such men were by no means "thinking bayonets," and as a rule they
shot very badly, often firing with their guns at the hip in order to
avoid the heavy recoil. Not only did they lack the inspiration of good
officers, but in pressing times it was customary to empty the prisons,
and place their inmates in the ranks to inculcate vice. The government
furnished their wages, upon which as a rule they had to live from day
to day, even more irregularly than it paid the officers, and the latter
frequently embezzled the money; so that it became a common practice to
sell one's arms and accoutrements, if possible, for what they would
bring. Finally, the duty always enjoined upon the troops was "blind
obedience," not the use of what little intelligence they possessed;
and their bravery, like that of such officers as had any, was mainly
of the impulsive, passionate and therefore transient sort, whereas
Anglo-Saxon courage is cool, calculating, resolute and comparatively
inexhaustible.[1.5]

The special pride of all military men was the cavalry; but the horses
were small, and the riders badly trained and led. "The regular Mexican
cavalry is worth nothing," wrote the British minister early in 1846; and
as the mounts were quite commonly hired merely for the parades, just as
the rolls of the whole army were stuffed with fictitious names on which
the officers drew pay, it was never certain how much of the nominal
force could be set in motion. As for the artillery, Waddy Thompson
remarked that in a battle of 1841 between the foremost generals of the
country, not one ball in a thousand reached the enemy. On the other hand
there were excellent military bands, and one of them dispensed lively
selections every afternoon in front of the palace at Mexico.[1.5]

[THE CIVIL OFFICIALS]

Third in the official order of precedence and in the actual control of
affairs came the government officials, and these, like the army and
the clergy, formed a special group with a similar fuero, a similar
self-interest and a similar disregard for the general good. Once
appointed to an office one had a vested right therein, and could not
legally be removed without a prosecution. To eliminate a person in
that manner was extremely difficult; and when the government, in a few
notorious instances, tried ejectment, the newspapers of the opposition
hastened to raise an outcry against it for attacking property rights,
and the culprits were soon reinstated.[1.5]

Offering such permanence of tenure, a "genteel" status, idleness even
beyond the verge of ennui, a perfect exemption from the burden of
initiative, and occasional opportunities for illegitimate profits,
government offices appealed strongly to the Mexicans, and a greed for
them--dignified with the name of aspirantism when it aimed at the
higher positions--was a recognized malady of the nation. To get places,
all the tricks and schemes employed in the army and, if possible, still
more degrading intrigues were put in play; and offices had to be created
by the wholesale to satisfy an appetite that grew by what it fed upon.
The clerks became so numerous that work room--or rather desk room--could
not be provided for all of them. Only a favored portion had actual
employment and received full pay--if they received any--while the rest
were laid off on barely enough to support life. Some were competent
and willing to be faithful; but when they saw ignorance, laziness,
disloyalty and fraud given the precedence, they naturally asked, Why do
right? Idleness is the mother of vice; and so there was a very large
body of depraved and discontented fellows, wriggling incessantly for
preferment, fawning, backbiting, grabbing at any scheme that would
advance their interests, intensely jealous of one another, but ready to
make common cause against any purification of the civil service.[1.5]

How justice was administered in Mexico one is now able to surmise. The
laws, not codified for centuries, were a chaos. Owing to numberless
intricacies and inconsistencies, the simplest case could be made almost
eternal, especially as all proceedings were slow and tedious. A litigant
prepared to spend money seldom needed to lose a suit. Some cases lasted
three generations. The methods of administering justice, reported the
British representative in 1835, "afford every facility" for "artifices
and manoeuvres."[1.6]

Another difficulty was that the courts lacked prestige. During the
revolution the magistrates, practically all of them Gachupines,
committed so many acts of injustice in behalf of the government, that
people forgot the proper connection between crime and retribution.
Punishment seemed like a disease that any one might get. In 1833 the
minister of this department complained that for five years Congress
had almost ignored the administration of justice; and in 1845, the
head of the same department said that for a long time the government
had systematically reduced the dignity and influence of the judges and
magistrates. Their pay was not only diminished but often withheld; and
the official journal once remarked, that the authorities had more
important business in hand than paying legal functionaries.[1.6]

This was obviously wrong, but in a sense the judges merited such
treatment, for they seem to have lacked even the most necessary
qualifications. To make the situation still worse, the executive
authorities had a way of stepping in and perverting justice arbitrarily.
Even the Mexicans were accustomed to say, "A bad compromise is better
than a good case at law"; but it was naturally aliens who suffered
most. "The great and positive evil which His Majesty's subjects, in
common with other Foreigners, have to complain of in this country is the
corrupt and perverse administration of justice," reported the minister
of England in 1834.[1.6]

Criminal law was executed no better than civil. The police of the city
are a complete nullity, stated the American representative in 1845. A
fault, a vice and a crime were treated alike; and the prisons, always
crowded with wrongdoers of every class, became schools in depravity,
from which nearly all, however bad, escaped in the end to prey upon
society. Well-known robbers not only went about in safety, but were
treated with kindly attentions even by their late victims, for all
understood that if denounced and punished, they would sooner or later go
free, and have their revenge.[1.6]

[EDUCATION]

Adverting formally before Congress in 1841 to the "notoriously
defective" administration of justice, the Mexican President said, "the
root of the evil lies in the deplorable corruption which pervades
all classes of society and in the absence of any corrective arising
from public opinion." In large measure this condition of things was
chargeable to the low state of religion, but in part it could be
attributed to the want of education. Spain had required people to think
as little as possible, keep still and obey orders; and for such a rôle
enlightenment seemed unnecessary and even dangerous. To read and write a
little and keep accounts fairly well was about enough secular knowledge
for anybody, and the catechism of Father Ripalda, which enjoined the
duty of blind obedience to the King and the Pope, completed the circle
of useful erudition. In the small towns, as there were few elementary
schools, even these attainments could not easily be gained; and as for
the Indians they were merely taught--with a whip at the church door, if
necessary--to fear God, the priest and the magistrate. Religion gave no
help; and the ceremonies of worship benumbed the intellect as much as
they fascinated the senses.[1.6]

When independence arrived, however, there sprang up not a little
enthusiasm for the education of the people, and the states moved quite
generally in that direction. But there were scarcely any good teachers,
few schoolhouses and only the most inadequate books and appliances;
money could not be found; and the prelates, now chiefly absorbed in
their political avocations, not only failed to promote the cause, but
stood in the way of every step toward secular schools. A few of the
leaders--notably Santa Anna--professed great zeal, but this was all for
effect, and they took for very different uses whatever funds could be
extorted from the nation. In 1843 a general scheme of public instruction
was decreed, but no means were provided to carry it into effect. The
budget for 1846 assigned $29,613 to this field, of which $8000 was
intended for elementary schools, while for the army and navy it required
nearly twenty-two millions. In short, though of course a limited number
of boys and a few girls acquired the rudiments--and occasionally
more--in one way or another, no system of popular education existed.[1.6]

Higher instruction was in some respects more flourishing. Before the
revolution the School of Mines, occupying a noble and costly edifice,
gave distinction to the country; the university was respectable; an
Academy of Fine Arts did good work; and botany received much attention.
But at the university mediaeval Latin, scholastic and polemic theology,
Aristotle and arid comments on his writings were the staples, and even
these innocent subjects had to be investigated under the awful eye of
the Inquisition. Speculation on matters of no practical significance
formed the substance of the work, and the young men learned that worst
of lessons--to discourse volubly and plausibly on matters of which they
knew nothing. This course of discipline, emphasizing the natural bent
of the Creoles, turned out a set of conceited rhetoricians, ignorant
of history and the real world, but eager to distinguish themselves by
some brilliant experiment. When the yoke of Spain had been cast off,
all these institutions declined greatly, and the university became so
unimportant that in 1843 it was virtually destroyed; but the view that
speculation was better than inquiry, theory better than knowledge,
and talk better than anything--a view that suited Mexican lightness,
indolence and vanity so well, and had so long been taught by precept and
example--still throve despite a few objectors. Of foreign countries, in
particular, very little was commonly known. While elementary education,
then, was nothing, higher education was perhaps worse than nothing.[1.6]

Nor could the printed page do much to supply the lack. Only a few had
the taste for reading books or opportunities to gratify the taste, if
they possessed it. Great numbers of catchy pamphlets on the topics
of the day flew about the streets; newspapers had a great vogue; and
there were poor echoes of European speeches, articles and books; but
most of the printed material was shockingly partisan, irresponsible
and misleading. "Unfortunately for us," observed the minister of the
interior in 1838, "the abuse of the liberty of the press among us is so
great, general and constant, that it has only served our citizens as the
light of the meteor to one travelling in a dark night, misguiding him
and precipitating him into an abyss of evils."[1.6]

[THE INDUSTRIES]

Only some 300,000 out of 3,000,000 white and mixed people were actual
producers--three times as many being clericals, military men, civil
officials, lawyers, doctors and idlers, and the rest old men, women
and children. The most brilliant of their industries was mining, the
annual output of which was about $18,000,000 in 1790, fell during the
revolution to $5,000,000, and by 1845 rose again--despite the unwise
policy of the government--to about the earlier level. During the period
of depression most of the old proprietors and many of their properties
were ruined; but English companies took up the work, and although
for some time their liberal expenditures went largely to waste, they
gradually learned the business, and their example encouraged some
Germans to enter the field. How greatly the nation profited from the
mines was not entirely clear. About as much silver went abroad each
year as they produced, paying interest on loans that should not have
been made, and buying goods for which substitutes could usually have
been manufactured at home. But the government laid valuable taxes
on the extraction and export of the precious metals, and there was
also a profit in the compulsory minting of them--though, as all the
inventiveness of the nation expended itself in politics, the processes
at the mints were about as tedious and costly in 1845 as while Cortez
ruled the country.[1.7]

Little more can be said for the cultivation of the soil. When Mexico
separated from Spain, the vine and the olive, flax and certain other
plants formerly prohibited were acquired, and coffee soon became
important; but on the other hand agriculture had met with disaster
after disaster in the course of the revolution. "Up to the present,"
said a ministerial report in December, 1843, "agriculture among us has
not departed from the routine established at the time of the conquest."
A cart-wheel consisted still of boards nailed together crosswise, cut
into a circular shape and bored at the centre; a pointed stick, shod
sometimes with iron, was still the plough; a short pole with a spike
driven through one end served as the hoe; the corn, instead of going
to a mill, was ground on a smooth stone with a hand roller; and no
adequate means existed of transporting such products as were raised
to such markets as could be found. Most of the "roads" made so much
trouble even for donkeys and pack-mules that it was seriously proposed
to introduce camels; and the most important road of all, the National
Highway from the capital to Jalapa and Vera Cruz, was allowed to become
almost impassable in spots. Besides poor methods, bad roads, brigands,
revolutions and a great number of holidays, there were customhouses
everywhere and a system of almost numberless formalities, the accidental
neglect of which might involve, if nothing worse, the confiscation of
one's goods. In short, how could agriculture prosper, said a memorial on
the subject, when he that sowed was not permitted to gather, and he that
gathered could reach no market?[1.7]

[COMMERCE]

However, more could be produced than used. The prime requisite was
population. So much appeared to be clear; and for that reason, as well
as to obtain the profits of the industries and prevent money from
going abroad, great efforts were made by independent Mexico to develop
manufacturing, which had been prohibited--though not with entire
success--by Spain. The year 1830 was a time of golden hopes in this
regard. At the instance of Lucas Alamán a grand industrial scheme went
into effect, and a bank was founded to promote it by lending public
money to intending manufacturers. Cotton fields were to whiten the
plains; merino sheep and Kashmir goats to cover the hillsides; mulberry
trees to support colonies of silk-worms; imported bees to produce the
tons of wax needed for candles; and ubiquitous factories to work up the
raw materials. A few men honestly tried to establish plants, but the
industry chiefly promoted by the law and the bank was that of prying
funds from the national treasury; and when this income failed, as it
did in a few years, many half-built mills came to a stop, and much
half-installed machinery began to rust. Alamán himself, partner in a
cotton factory, became bankrupt in 1841, and the bubble soon burst.[1.7]

The manufacturers formed, however, a strong political clique, and in
their interest a system not only of protection, but of absolutely
prohibiting the importation of numerous articles, was adopted by law.
This had the effect of making the people pay dearly for many of their
purchases. The farmers, who wished raw materials kept out, had influence
too, and were always blocking the scheme of the manufacturers to let raw
materials in; and, as the cost of producing and transporting made native
goods dear, smuggled merchandise undersold Mexican articles even after
paying for the necessary bribery and other expenses. In a word, although
certain coarse and bulky things continued to be made in the country, the
endeavor to build up an industrial population, support agriculture, and
thus doubly strengthen the nation was very superficially planned and
very unsuccessfully carried out. Nearly all the better manufactures, a
large part of the food, most of the clothing, and substantially all the
luxuries came from abroad.[1.7]

The business of importing continued to be mainly in Spanish hands for
some years after Mexico became independent, but for reasons that will
appear in the next chapter the Spaniard had to retire about 1830. The
British then obtained the lion's share; and as they were Protestants
they could not, even when they so desired, identify themselves with the
nation, and take a responsible share in public affairs. Commerce was
not, in fact, a source of strength. A few raw products were exported,
but essentially commerce consisted, as was natural, in merely receiving
goods from foreigners and letting the foreigners have money in return.
Moreover the volume of commerce dwindled notably, like that of all other
business. As for retail trade, when the Spaniards had to retire, it fell
mainly into Mexican hands; but it was conducted in a small way, the
profits were narrow, and the failures were many.[1.7]

[LIFE IN THE COUNTRY]

Even more significant for us, however, than such details were the life
and character of the people, and it may be helpful to call back the year
1845 and visit Mexico for a couple of days. First we will stroll along
a country road in a fairly typical region. The general aspect is one of
semi-wildness, but soon the tops of well-bleached ruins amid the soft
green indicate decrepitude instead, suggesting as the national character
decay preceding maturity. A long mule team approaches in a waving line,
and on a finely equipped horse at the head of it we observe a swarthy
man in green broadcloth trousers open on the outside from the knee down,
with bright silver buttons in a double row from hip to ankle, and loose
linen drawers visible where the trousers open. A closely fitting jacket,
adorned with many such buttons and much braid, is turned back at the
chin enough to reveal an embroidered shirt; and the costume reaches a
climax in a huge sombrero with a wide, rounding brim and high sugar-loaf
crown, adorned with tassels and a wide band of silver braid. This
gentleman, the _arriero_, is the railroad king of Mexico, for he and
others of his class transport the freight and express. Trust him with
anything you please, and it will surely be delivered; but should he be
unlucky at cards and out of work, he might rob you the next day.[1.8]

A group of Indians meet us, little more human in appearance than the
donkeys they drive; and we observe how easily they carry loads on their
backs, and how quickly and lightly they march. Yonder we see their
huts--pigpens, Americans would suppose; and a little apart from these
we notice a stone or adobe house. Certainly there is nothing grand
about this dwelling, for it contains only a single room, and that half
full of implements, horse furniture, charcoal, provisions and what
not; but it affords a home for six or eight persons of the two sexes.
Presently the master, though not the owner, of the establishment rides
up, prodding his active but light and stubby horse with blunt steel
spurs almost as large as the palm of one's hand, to make a dash for our
benefit. Swinging his wife from the saddle-bow the _ranchero_ alights,
and we find him to be a short, wiry, muscular person, with a bronzed
and rather saturnine countenance but friendly and respectful manners.
He wears tough leggings, leather trousers, a small rectangular shawl
(_serape_) that falls over his back and breast, allowing his head to
protrude through a hole in the middle, and a wide sombrero, while at
the saddle-bow hang the inevitable lasso and a bag of corn and jerked
beef, one meal a day from which is all he requires. Apparently he does
not feel quite at home on the ground, and that is natural, for he
spends about half of his waking hours in the saddle. Herdsman, farmer
or brigand, according to circumstances, he is also cavalryman at need;
and a corps of such fellows, if properly trained and led, would make the
best light horse in the world, perhaps. His chief interests in life,
however, are gambling and cock-fighting, and he is quite capable of
losing all his worldly goods, his wife and even his pony at the national
game of monte, and then of lighting a cigarette and sauntering off
without a sign of regret.[1.8]

Now we approach what may be called a village, but one extremely
different from a village in the United States. The great things are a
handsome grove and in the midst of it one old church of gray stone, full
of saints and relics and ancient plate, with a ragged, stupid Indian
crouching on the floor. Near by are two or three ranchero cottages with
a group of Indian huts in the distance, and yonder stands a large,
rambling edifice of stone with a mighty door and heavily barred windows.
From the ends of the building run high walls inclosing several acres,
and within the protected space may be seen a number of substantial
dwellings and what appear to be storehouses and stables, while far
away over hill and plain spreads the _hacienda_, an estate as large
as a county. Finally, on a gentle slope not far distant we observe a
monastery with a rich garden behind it, and a fat, contented prior
riding sleepily up to its arched gateway through a dozen or two of
kneeling aborigines.[1.8]

Toward evening we reach the state capital, and as we cross a bridge
on the outskirts, we see a crowd of people bathing. Both sexes are
splashing and swimming, all as happy as ducks and all entirely nude.
Even the presence of strangers does not embarrass the young women,
some of whom are decidedly good-looking; and they even try to draw our
attention by extra displays of skill. Looking for an inn we discover
two lines of low, rickety buildings alternating with heaps of rubbish,
fodder and harness. After some efforts a waiter is found and we obtain a
room, with a mule already slumbering in one corner of it and all sorts
of household litter thrown about. A wretched cot with a rope bottom, a
dirty table and an abundance of saints portrayed in Mexican dress help
to make the place homelike. The waiter is amiable, and ejects the mule
with a great show of indignation; but when we ask for water and a towel
his good nature fails. "Oh, what a man," he cries, flinging up his
hands; "What a lunatic, Ave María Purísima; Ha! Ha! Ha! He wants water,
he wants a towel; what the devil--! Good-by." The dining-room is a hot,
steamy cell, fitted up with charcoal furnaces; and for viands we are
offered plenty of hard beef, _chile_ (pepper) and _tortillas_ (flapjacks
of a sort), besides a number of dishes that only a native could either
describe or eat. Chile and tortillas appear, however, to be the
essentials; and the latter, partly rolled up, serve also as spoons.[1.8]

After dinner we look about the town. All is monotonous and sombre. The
houses, mostly of one story, form a continuous wall along the street--or
along the sidewalk, if there be one--and their projecting, heavily
barred windows, in front of which the young fellows have to do their
courting, suggest prisons more than homes. Now we come to the massive,
crumbling, gloomy church, and wonder where the priest keeps the family
which everybody knows he has. Here is the government house, and we stop
to picture the wily politicians, who--with noble exceptions--obtain the
offices of local grandeur, and the little horde of clerks, many of them
rendered prematurely decrepit by their vices, that fawn but cannot be
made to work at the nod of authority. In vain we look for a book-store,
though somewhere that name doubtless appears on a sign; but we do find
the office of the comandante general, an officer who represents the
central power, has charge of the military, and often is mining and
counter-mining in a sharp struggle with the governor. How intolerably
dull it must be to live here! Business of a large sort there is none.
The little newspapers are scarcely more than echoes from partisan
sheets at Mexico. Religion is a subject that one must let alone, and
education a subject that it is useless to discuss. Of science, history,
art, nothing is known. The small men in power brook no criticism except
from enemies. Affairs in other states, even a famine or a flood,
excite little interest. Not much is left except petty intriguing and
the gratification of coarse appetites. A revolution is about the only
possible escape from this more deadly ennui.[1.8]

[LIFE AT MEXICO]

Our second day shall be given to the metropolis. The suburbs of Mexico
are mostly ragged and unclean, but some broad avenues lined with fine
trees run through them, and entering the city by one of these we make
our way to the great central plaza. On the eastern side of this extends
the palace, a very long two-storied building of little distinction, and
on the northern side towers the huge cathedral, quite in the grand,
heavy, Spanish style, seamed with earthquake scars and pockmarked by
revolutionary bullets. It is a Sunday morning and still rather early,
but the plaza is alive. The usual nightly crop of dead and wounded is
being carried to the morgue or the hospital. Sick men, cripples and
stalwart beggars are beginning to pose for alms. Prisoners in chains
are pretending to put the streets in order; but their guards, with that
mixture of good nature and indolence that characterizes the Mexican
unless his passions are excited, let them do about as they please, and
they take their cue for street-cleaning from the Book of Revelation:
They that be filthy, let them be filthy still.[1.8]

Indians in various tribal costumes, mostly picturesque and all dirty,
patter through the square with loads of provisions or babies. As
no stoves or fireplaces exist, the charcoal man's loud "Carbosiú!"
(_Carbón, señor!_) resounds through the streets. So does the plaintive
cry of the water-carrier, bending under his great earthen jar, for the
houses are all supplied from a few public fountains, the termini of
aqueducts. "Orchata, lemon, pineapple, tamarind!" calls out a shrill
voice; "What will you take, my darling? This way for refreshment:"
and we see a good-looking girl in a short skirt expanded wide with
hoops, her arms bare and her bodice cut low enough for a ball, selling
"temperance" drinks. Here is a dingy cell stuffed with chin-basins,
razors, dental implements, boxes of pomade, a guitar, a fighting-cock
tethered in a corner, and sundry pictures of saints, parrots and
battles; and there a cigar shop with a slender, black-eyed girl behind
the counter, bold enough and handsome enough, even without the red rose
in her hair, to tempt St. Anthony. Observe the _evangelista_, or public
letter-writer, with two quills and an inkstand ready on his little desk
under a canopy of straw matting; and observe, too, that lépero with his
back against a donkey's pannier, robbing the pannier while he pretends
to be buying a knife.[1.8]

Priests in long shovel hats; lousy soldiers in ragged, ill-fitting
uniforms; gaudy officers chatting and smoking; jugglers with snakes and
balls; cynical dandies retailing love affairs; half-naked léperos in the
corners sleeping off their pulque; lottery venders with long strings
of tickets; sellers of flowers, toys, candy, glass, wax-work, mock
jewellery, cheap cutlery, and a thousand other things; closed carriages
taking ladies to church; more beggars and still more--these and many
other sights keep us too busy for reflection; but we cannot help
noticing that seven out of ten persons are social drones or parasites,
and that vice of one sort or another dims the face and weakens the step
of almost every one. Suddenly a light bell tinkles, and the crowd is
instantly grave and still. "God is coming," they whisper, or in other
words the viatic is going to a sick man. A coach drawn by two mules
and followed by a dozen slovenly friars holding lighted candles and
chanting, comes slowly down a street. All uncover and kneel, and we must
do likewise or very likely get a pummelling.[1.8]

This reminds us of duty; and, electing the cathedral in preference to
sixty other churches, we enter. Before us is a great throng, chiefly
women and léperos, of most devout worshippers. The finest ladies in
the city are here, dressed all in black, with no ornaments except
a silk mantilla, edged with lace, and a high tortoise-shell comb;
and they kneel humbly beside the drudge or the beggar. The church
itself--designed in the Spanish style, which places the choir in the
middle of the nave and a balustraded walk between that and the great
altar--with a cloud of incense filling the air and many hundreds
of candles gleaming murkily from the shrines, is most mysterious
and impressive. The gorgeousness of the sacred ornaments amazes us.
Literally tons of silver are in sight; gold, precious stones and gems
abound; and magnificent vestments try to hide the vulgar priests. But
the splendor is oppressive, and the stench of the léperos intolerable;
let us return to the light of day.[1.8]

All the streets are laid out at right angles, and most of the houses
that line them are in two stories, of which the lower one is reserved
for horses, carriages, servants, cows and storage; and the walls, built
of rough stone, are very thick. The outside is usually frescoed in
white, orange, blue, red or pale green, and often adorned with pious
verses or biblical texts. Entering the big double gateway, we find
ourselves in a courtyard, upon which doors and grated windows open; and
we observe that a covered balcony of wrought iron or possibly bronze,
reached by a central stairway and giving access to the rooms of the
second story, is built round it. In many courtyards there are flowers
and a fountain, and sometimes there are trees. Occasionally we find
what looks like a grandee's residence, for Mexico was called in the
Spanish time a city of palaces, and some of these residences, built of
superior stone, equipped with gilded balconies and stairs, adorned with
artistic sculptures, and perhaps decorated with Dutch tiles in blue and
white, have survived in a fair condition the ruin of fortunes and the
disappearance of titles; but at their best they were always imperfect,
reminding one of the golden image with clay feet, and now most of them
are dilapidated.[1.8]

Here is a gambling place, well filled; but it is only the usual monte,
and if we care to watch a game, there will be something like a thousand
more opportunities. Already, people are making for the bull-fight; but
the upper classes mostly ignore that sport, and we may well follow
their example. On the other hand let us drop in at the cock-pit. "Hail,
immaculate Mary, the cocks are coming!" the herald is proclaiming. On
the benches one may see the most delicate and fashionable young ladies
of the city as well as the sharpest gamblers, and everything is quiet
and orderly. But a glance is enough; and now as the "quality" will soon
have dined, we will stroll on past the stately trees of the Alameda to
the New Promenade, and be ready for them.[1.8]

Here, every afternoon at about five o'clock, and especially on Sunday,
may be seen the Mexican élite. About a thousand carriages are in line
to-day, many of them heavy, grand affairs from Europe, but some very
antiquated and shabby, for the lady, however poor, must have a carriage
of some sort. Here one sees the fair sex at their best. Clad in the
most sumptuous and brilliant costumes they can possibly obtain and
well covered with diamonds--for everybody above the rank of a lépero
has diamonds--they sit up straight and handsome, and many of them
look almost regal. More horses than mules are to be seen, and many of
them have been imported. Guided by postilions instead of drivers, the
carriages roll sedately along with an exchange of mutual salutes but
not a word of conversation, and after a turn or two draw up and stop
side by side, so that the ladies may review some four or five thousand
cavaliers, who now ride past.[1.8]

Each gallant, without appearing to notice the carriage of his choice,
pays court to an adored occupant of it by a special show of grace and
horsemanship as he goes by. Small fortunes in silver and gold are
lavished on the equipment of the steed, and the cavalier is resplendent
in his tightly fitting trousers, short jacket, huge sombrero, gilded
spurs, silver buttons, silk braid and gold lace. For us the impression
is impaired considerably by his manner of riding, for he leans forward,
puts barely his toes into the stirrup, and carries his heels far back;
but he can ride very showily after all, curvetting and prancing, and the
Mexicans are fully satisfied that no other horsemen in the world are
their equals.[1.8]

The promenade over, all go to the play--not that anybody of fashion
cares for it, but because that is the style, and few have any other way
to pass the time. Let us have a look ourselves at the principal theatre,
which travellers have pronounced--after one at Naples--the finest
edifice of the kind. It accommodates more than eight thousand persons,
and the rent of the best boxes is about $3000 a year. But almost every
man and many of the women appear to be smoking; one can hardly see
the actors; the noise of conversation is distracting; and as we are
not adepts in the play of glances and fans which keep so many ladies
in the boxes and so many gallants in the pit fully occupied, we shall
find it pleasanter at the British legation ball. _Allons!_ Why, what a
clangor the church bells are making! To be sure that opens the gates of
purgatory for a while and gives the inmates a respite, but it certainly
bears rather hard on the living.[1.8]

While by nature the most sociable of people, the Mexicans are the least
so in practice, wrote an American minister at that capital. This is
partly because many of social rank now lack the means to entertain, and
partly because society is cut up by intrigues, jealousies and bitter
memories; but at a foreign legation one has no expenses, and all meet on
neutral ground. As we enter, everything seems fine and even brilliant.
Diamonds are in profusion again, and the lustre of the great pearls
matches them. But in Mexico it is never wise to look closely, for gross
imperfections are sure to be discovered; and here, as we soon observe,
the gowns are not really in style, and the musicians are only unshaven,
half-blind, tatterdemalion scrapers.[1.8]

However, the people are what we care for, and they are certainly most
interesting. Again we see the dignified ladies; they move now, and with
a decided though rather ponderous grace. Conversation is not their
forte, for they seldom read and never think; but all have beautiful
eyes, teeth and hair; all have small hands and feet; and all are
amiable, sincerely kind and by no means wanting in tact. The older
ones appear stout and rather phlegmatic, it is true, but those of an
earlier age are often fascinating. Look for instance at the girl under
the chandelier, plainly all sentiment and senses, not really tall but
slender enough to appear so, with a profile of carved ivory, pale cheeks
just warmed with crimson, large, dark, languorous eyes, and a voluptuous
figure disguised with no stays; and all this poised seemingly on the toe
of a dainty satin slipper. What matters it if she and the rest of the
ladies passed their day in gazing idly out of windows, smoking, nibbling
sweetmeats and chattering trifles, and did not put on their stockings or
do up their hair until dinner-time?[1.8]

But for us the men are more important. That short individual in
spectacles, who looks erudite and speaks in a low tone with a
gravity and reserve that emphasize his remarks, is Alamán, the most
distinguished of the conservatives. The thin-featured, sharp-nosed
person, so elegant and cynical, is Tornel, posing now in his favorite
attitude as the patron of learning. Smooth-faced Bocanegra, an honorable
if not very able statesman, is talking yonder to the British minister
with the easy courtliness of a genuine hidalgo. Handsome and brave
Almonte--"a good boy," as Santa Anna calls him--is laying siege to the
belle under the chandelier; and Peña y Peña, seemingly rather dry and
uninspired, is debating somewhat laboriously with a brother judge.[1.8]

Let us join a group. How strong, genial, easy, ready and gay, yet
dignified and reposeful, they all are! Few indeed of our own countrymen
could be so charming. Some one approaches, and they grasp him warmly by
the hand, throwing the left arm at the same time round his shoulder and
softly patting his back. "Friend," "Comrade," are frequent salutations.
We are presented to the group, and find ourselves at once among devoted
intimates. "My house is yours," exclaims one with a look that carries
conviction. "Remember, I exist only to serve you," says another. "Only
command me and all that are mine," exclaims a third.[1.8]

Mexico, however, reported a British minister, "judged merely by outward
Appearances, is a perfectly different thing from Mexico seen in the
Interior." One might be presented with a dozen houses and all their
contents, yet go to bed on the sidewalk hungry. These friends and
comrades are daily intriguing and conspiring against one another. Talk
with an eloquent declaimer, and you will find his beautiful ideas vague
and impracticable. Discuss them with him, and you will either excite
wrath by demolishing his opinions or earn contempt--since he suspects
in his heart that he is an ignoramus--by letting him vanquish you.
Notice how lightly they speak of religion. That is considered good
form. The Church is to be regarded as an institution for the women.
But at bottom almost every one is mortally afraid of the hereafter,
as a child is afraid of the dark, and when seriously ill is ready to
grovel before a priest. The apparent robustness of these men, largely
due to their indolence, is too often undermined by Cyprian accidents,
which are confessed without hesitation. Hardly one of the husbands is
loyal to his vows, while the other sex care only to elude numberless
watchful eyes, and observe a strict regard for appearances; and in
the lower walks a mother will quite readily sell her daughter's good
name. However, courtesy is delightful whatever lies behind it, and if
a person will try to eat a picture of grapes, he should blame himself
for his disappointment. Temperament, environment and education make
sangfroid and intellectual mastery impossible here; and in a world
where passionate men and women grow up in traditions of idleness and
self-indulgence they can hardly be expected, especially with the
bad example of their priests before them, to be distinguished for
self-restraint.[1.8]

Meanwhile, are the common people at home knitting? Let us walk back to
the cathedral. The full moon is out. Almost above us rise the powerful
towers against the clear firmament, and on our left is the palace,
filling one whole side of the square with its numberless balconies
and windows, while in front spreads the great plaza, glittering with
innumerable lights against the shadowy arcades that fill the opposite
side. The sky is a soft, pale blue; and the stars, fading near the
brilliant moon, appear like dust raised by her chariot wheels. Under the
trees on our right a huge serpent, the scales of which are human beings,
turns, winds, bends, parts and rejoins in a circular promenade.[1.8]

Some occupy themselves with prosaic thoughts,--business, politics
or social events--and a few talk of science and poetry. Yonder goes
a millionaire, a real king of gold, at sight of whom all hats come
off, while all eyes court his glance; but another, who passes with
a triumphant step and bold gestures, appears to the crowd a greater
man, for he is the king of the sword, the king of the bull-ring, the
_matador_. But most, perhaps, are talking and thinking of love and of
pleasure. Furtive but meaning glances are often exchanged; occasionally
hand presses hand under the folds of the cloak; at times a few
mysterious words pass quickly; now and then one sees a pretty woman
on the arm of her bold lover, showing herself proudly to the world,
while the husband follows on behind as best he can; and here and there
a scowling, discarded friend looks out from behind a post with a knife
clutched behind him.

Would you like to see a little more? Then visit the Barrio Santa Anna,
and watch men with bloodshot eyes and women in red petticoats and loose,
open chemisettes dancing a wild fandango, or plunge into a lépero's
dive and watch the pariahs gambling sedately with a bloody knife on the
table before them, while down in one corner a crouching woman moans and
mutters over a prostrate figure. But how lightly all is done, even the
tragedies, compared with northern depth and seriousness. In a sense we
feel we are observing children.[1.8]

Of course in so brief a space the subject of this chapter could not be
thoroughly treated, but our inquiry seems to make certain facts plain.
Little in the material, mental and moral spheres was really sound in
the Mexico of 1845. Her population was insufficient, and was badly
welded together, so far as it had been welded at all; and while the
lower orders of the people lay deep in ignorance, laziness and vice, the
upper class, if we ignore exceptions, were soft, superficial, indolent
and lax, urbane, plausible and eloquent, apathetic but passionate,
amiable and kind though cruel when excited, generous but untrustworthy,
wasteful but athirst for gain, suspicious and subtle but not sagacious,
personally inclined to be pompous and nationally afflicted with a
provincial vanity, greatly enamoured of the formalities of life,
greatly wanting in the cool, steady resolution for which occasional
obstinacy is a poor substitute, and still more wanting in that simple,
straightforward, sober and solid common sense which is the true
foundation of personal and national strength. In particular, the Mexican
was intensely personal. This made him and his politics very interesting
yet was really unfortunate, for in such men principles and institutions
could have but feeble roots. Finally, as one result of this awareness
of self, every man of any strength had the instincts of a dictator.
Authority he instinctively resented; but on the other hand, when some
one appeared to be dominant, a consciousness of this inner recalcitrancy
and a fear of its being detected, combining with a hope of favors,
produced adulation and apparent slavishness.

Evidently, then, Mexico was not intrinsically a strong country.
Evidently her people had few qualifications for self-government.
Evidently, too, they were unlikely to handle in the best manner a grave
and complicated question requiring all possible sanity of judgment and
perfect self-control; and, in particular, misunderstandings between them
and a nation like the United States were not only sure to arise but sure
to prove troublesome.




                                   II

                   THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF MEXICO

                               1800-1845


It was of course the political side of Mexican civilization that had the
most direct bearing on our relations with that country, and this can
best be explained by approaching it historically. At the same time we
shall be aided in studying, not only some of the principal figures in
the war and their mutual attitudes, but some of its most important and
mysterious events.

The colonial régime of Spain was intended and carefully planned to
ensure the safety, prosperity and contentment of her distant subjects,
but for certain reasons it worked badly. Like all nations of that
period, she believed that her colonies existed for the good of the
mother-country, and aimed first of all to control and exploit them. She
had to depend upon very human agents that were practically beyond her
reach. While theoretically all Mexicans, except the aborigines, enjoyed
an equality before the law, the government felt that emigrants from the
Peninsula were especially worthy of confidence; and at the same time
not a few of these men had friends industriously scheming for them at
court. The consequences were, first, the establishment of a powerful
Gachupine oligarchy, largely dependent on the royal will, the lowest
member of which, even if penniless, felt superior to every Creole,
and, secondly, the enthronement of privilege, often gained by ignoble
means, in government, army, church and business. The Creoles--overawed
by the almost divine prestige of the king, trembling before his power,
and convinced that only his troops could protect them against the
Indians--submitted; but they hated their insolent oppressors, and the
Indians hated both groups. On the principle of "Divide and conquer"
the government fomented these dissensions; and, supported by the
intolerance of the Church, it did its utmost to bar out foreigners and
foreign ideas in order to ensure an unreasoning subordination.[1.1]

What Mexico owed to Spain, therefore, aside from the remembrance and
fruits of an efficiency that she could not hope to equal, was a settled
tradition of arbitrary rule based on force, of authority selfishly
and often corruptly used, of the government as possessing the sole
initiative, of social disunion resulting from privilege and monopoly,
of personal successes frequently due to intrigue or purchased favor, of
political indifference except among the controlling or aspiring cliques,
of apathy concerning all high interests, of ignorance, inertness,
fanaticism, hard oppression, blind obedience, passionate feuds and gross
pleasures.[2.1]

[THE REVOLUTION AGAINST SPAIN]

Little by little new ideas reached a few of the more intelligent,
however. The American Declaration of Independence became known, and also
the fact that Spain, by supporting England's rebellious colonies, had
coöperated with heretics long pictured as infidels and fiends. Echoes
from Diderot's encyclopædia and reports of the French revolution crept
in; and the natural desire both to share on equal terms in the offices
and in business, and to escape from the extra cost of living due to the
monopolies, quickened thought. When war with England led to the raising
of Mexican troops, a new sense of power began to be felt; when the
Spanish monarchy crumbled before Napoleon in 1808, the illusion of the
king's divinity and invincibility faded; when the royal family exhorted
the Mexicans to accept the heir of the French revolution as their
master, loyalty quivered to its base; and when the people of Spain took
up arms to defend their betrayed nationality, the principle of popular
sovereignty loomed up as greater than royal prerogatives. Finally the
mass of the people, though too apathetic to realize the full meaning of
these facts, were roused by a thunder-clap at home.[2.2]

Struggling with the crisis precipitated by events in the Peninsula,
the viceroy--partly to gain support for himself, it is probable, and
partly to gain support for the monarchy--showed a disposition to give
the Creoles a voice in the government, upon which the leaders of the
oligarchy were so amazingly foolish as to depose him by force, and usurp
his authority. This conduct proved that much of their boasted loyalty
and supposed ability had been shams, that what they really meant was to
enjoy the wealth and power, that the cause of the Creoles was not one
of subjects against their king, but one of subjects against subjects,
and that only force could settle the issue. Dreams of independence
immediately crystallized into schemes of insurrection.[2.2]

Foremost among the conspirators was Hidalgo, commonly described by the
Mexicans as a Washington, but in reality a kindly, public-spirited,
mockingly irreligious and frankly immoral priest. His plans were
discovered; and so on the sixteenth of September, 1810, in the
desperate hope of saving himself and his associates, he called upon
the Indians, rabid with fanaticism and hatred of their oppressors, to
rise against the Spanish, who, he declared, had now allied themselves
with infidel Frenchmen against their holy religion. What followed was
like the bursting of reservoirs filled with blood and fire. Scarcely
a trace of statesmanship was exhibited by the leaders; most of their
disciples acted like fiends let loose; and their enemies did little
better. Soon many common priests, many Creole military men, and not a
few other persons who felt sore under the heel of wealth and power and
were ambitious to rise, embraced the cause, and so many of the rest
sympathized with Hidalgo's demand for independence, that probably by
good management he could have succeeded; but against a campaign like
his the substantial elements of society found it necessary to combine,
and when the heads of the insurrection were betrayed, captured and shot
in 1811, little of it remained except horrible memories and lessons in
conspiracy, treachery, hate, folly, wholesale destruction and wholesale
murder.[2.2]

In a new form, however, the cause of independence lived on. Instead of
wild hordes crying, "Death to the Gachupines!" there were now for the
most part stealthy but merciless bands of guerillas, and the government
soldiers followed close behind them in daring and ruthlessness. On the
coast near Vera Cruz an officer named Antonio López de Santa Anna won a
captaincy about this time by hunting down insurgents, and on the plateau
a handsome, dashing man with brown hair and reddish side-whiskers named
Agustín de Itúrbide, who had negotiated with Hidalgo about accepting
the lieutenant generalship of the revolutionary army, distinguished
himself on the royal side for greed and bloodthirstiness. In 1814 he
wrote to the viceroy one Good Friday, "In honor of the day, I have just
ordered three hundred excommunicated wretches to be shot," and the women
among his prisoners fared no better than the men. On the other side
Nicolás Bravo, whose father had been taken and executed, won a noble
distinction by releasing about three hundred captives despite orders
to kill them; Guadalupe Victoria, as he named himself, earned renown
by living in caves like a wild beast rather than give up; and Vicente
Guerrero, operating at the south in unexplored mountains, exhibited
great resourcefulness, remarkable knowledge of men and extraordinary
courage. The principal hero of this period, however, was Morelos, an
Indian priest, who showed himself a consummate partisan leader.[2.2]

So successful were these and the many other chiefs in terrorism,
robbery, slaughter and sack, and so deep a sentiment in favor of
independence now existed, that with a little sagacity in counsel and a
little concert in action the cause might have triumphed; but ambitions,
jealousies, insubordination, disloyalty and political incompetence
ruined everything, and by the end of 1819, although Guerrero still made
head a little, the second phase also of the revolution was substantially
at an end, leaving behind it hot embers of turmoil, fighting, treachery
and massacre, and countless examples of making pillage a livelihood,
selfishly disregarding the common cause, and grossly blundering in
political management. Thought and feeling in Mexico had, however, been
so educated by reflection, experience, discussion and foreign comments
during the past nine or ten years, that a longer acceptance of the
old régime could not be expected. Absolutism, though triumphant, was
doomed.[2.2]

[ITÚRBIDE]

The fatal blow came from its champions. In 1820 a revolution in Spain
revived the liberal constitution that had been adopted eight years
before and then had been abolished by Ferdinand VII; and Apodaca,
now viceroy of Mexico, felt compelled to proclaim the new law. The
troops and the people began to dread another civil war; and the
oligarchy, especially the Church dignitaries, concluding at once that
only separation from the mother-country could save their privileges,
looked about for an instrument. One was easily found. Itúrbide's greed
had finally driven him from his post, his fortune had been wasted in
self-indulgence, and he was now desperate. Long since, his active mind
had seen that if the Creole troops could be seduced, they--supported
by the revolutionary sentiment of the people--could overmatch about
half their number of Spanish regiments; and he agreed readily to become
the champion of autocracy in order to betray it. Cleverly deceiving
the government, he obtained a command through the aid of his backers,
and, in order to clear the field, attacked Guerrero. To dispose of that
wary foe proved, however, no easy task; so he negotiated privately
with a public enemy, described himself as "destitute of ambition and
self-interest," and finally inveigled the insurgent leader into joining
the conspiracy. Victoria followed that example. Santa Anna, though
recently made a lieutenant colonel by the viceroy, came over with his
men. Other leaders did the same; and on February 24, 1821, Itúrbide felt
strong enough to announce a programme, the famous Plan of Iguala.[2.2]

This declared for independence, a limited monarchy under a Bourbon
king, the Roman Catholic church as the sole form of religion, the
old _fueros_, the right of office-holders to retain their posts, the
fraternal union and political equality of Gachupines, Creoles and
Indians, and the appointment of a committee (_junta_) to govern Mexico
provisionally. No scheme could have seemed more inviting, and none could
have been more delusive, for it ignored insurmountable difficulties
and promised incompatible advantages. In all probability Itúrbide knew
this; but prelates, troops, officials and people took the shining bait;
O'Donojú, the new Spanish general, deciding it would be useless to
fight, made a treaty with the revolutionary chief; and on September 27,
1821, Itúrbide carried the tricolor through the gate of the capital,
stopped his gallant black charger at the convent of San Francisco,
and received the golden keys of the city. Obedience, the sole basis
of Mexican society, had been swept away; treachery and perjury had
triumphed; and yet the unthinking multitude hurrahed.[2.2]

The generalísimo, violating the principle of popular sovereignty, now
appointed the junta himself, excluding all the old revolutionists; that
body in turn elected him and four associates to exercise the executive
power as regents; and a Constituent Congress was prematurely summoned
to draw up an organic law. The situation soon proved to be extremely
difficult. Resentments needed to be healed, jealousies appeased,
commerce and the industries put in motion, and the whole edifice of
society and politics rebuilt on new foundations out of incongruous
elements. Peculiarly urgent was the demand for money--the more so as
some of the taxes were abolished in order to sweeten the revolution,
while the expenses grew. On entering Mexico Itúrbide had proclaimed,
"You see me in the most opulent of capitals;" and every one expected the
new government--an independent, Mexican, popular government--to bear
an open purse. In October, 1821, some fourteen thousand claims were
presented to it.[2.3]

Itúrbide, whatever his aims and whatever his faults, was the sole
Mexican of recognized preëminence, the sole possible rallying point;
and patriotism called upon all to support his prestige and patiently
correct his errors until society could take shape. Nothing of the sort
occurred, however. The army idolized him; the civil officials counted
on him; the prelates feared him less than they did his enemies; and
the masses, ignorant of what went on below the surface, revered him as
the Father of Independence; but the cheated absolutists, disappointed
borbonistas, cajoled insurgents, distanced comrades, eclipsed leaders
and unsuccessful claimants, the patriots, indignant that a cruel
royalist should be the heir of the revolution, the republicans, few
in number but increasingly influential, the friends of those he had
massacred or plundered, and behind all the Scottish Rite Freemasons, who
were liberals yet partisans of Spain--all these hated and dogged him.
Honors and emoluments were heaped upon him to excite envy and odium; his
weaknesses were baited; his strength was provoked; his administrative
blundering was stimulated instead of corrected. When financial
necessities compelled him to decree a forced loan, paper money and other
arbitrary measures, many began to denounce him as a tyrant. Plausibly
enough he was accused of disloyalty to his pledges and of aiming to be
king. Finally his enemies, making the most of certain indiscretions that
he committed, undertook to remove him from the command of the army.
Whatever had been his purpose, he now found it necessary to strike; and
a mutiny of the troops--endorsed later by the Congress under military
and mob pressure--declared him emperor.[2.3]

Expenses then increased still more. Jealousies and enmities were
embittered. Public sentiment veered sharply. Time, strength and
funds were swallowed up in pomps that created no more illusion than
a college student in a toga. Encompassed with flatterers, foes and
traitors, financially and politically incompetent himself and guided by
incompetent advisers, well enough aware that after deceiving everybody
he could expect no one to be true, Itúrbide lost his head, sometimes
wavered and sometimes tyrannized. Finally he thought it necessary to
deprive Santa Anna of an authority that had no doubt been abused; and
this interesting young man, who had recently proclaimed that he welcomed
Itúrbide's elevation with a positively uncontrollable exuberance of
joy, "pronounced" for a republic, knowing scarcely anything about that
system, but knowing a great deal about the Emperor's unpopularity. This
precipitated a revolution; and the movement, soon taken up by Victoria,
Guerrero and Bravo, spread rapidly. Itúrbide's most intimate and trusted
general was despatched against the insurgents, but betrayed him. The
army went over. The people, who revered the Liberator but not the
Emperor, concurred. With bad faith and gratuitous outrages his enemies
crowded savagely upon him. Early in 1823 he abdicated; and in May,
forsaken by every one of the many he had benefited, the discredited hero
sailed for Europe, leaving behind him examples and suggestions of the
most demoralizing kind.[2.3]

The junta, meanwhile, had disgusted the nation with its frivolities,
political and fiscal incompetence and usurpation of powers, and there
was a feeling of relief when it dissolved in February, 1822, the next
day after Congress met. Congress, however, did no better and fared even
worse, for it earned much contempt by sanctioning under pressure the
elevation of Itúrbide; and then Itúrbide made Congress, and made all
popular government, quite ridiculous in the eyes of the people and the
army by forcibly sending the members home. When at his wit's end, he
recalled it as if inviting the _coup de grace_, and soon it not only
earned more contempt by pronouncing his elevation illegal and punishing
every mark of condolence for the fallen chief, but undertook to outrank
omnipotence by pretending that no empire had existed. Soon, too, all the
selfish ambitions that had combined against Itúrbide in this body showed
themselves so clearly as to add further discredit; and worse yet the
Congress, though chosen merely to frame a constitution under the Plan of
Iguala, held on after the refusal of Spain to coöperate had put an end
to that scheme.[2.3]

The republicans, who were gaining ground because evidently no other
Mexican could stand where Itúrbide had fallen, and the Iturbidistas, who
desired to create anarchy in order to force the recall of their hero,
clamored for new elections. Five provinces demanded them formally; and
at length, despised by every one, Congress, the firstfruit of popular
government, fell to the ground. Almost every institution that should
have enjoyed respect was now discredited--even the Church, for it had
crowned the emperor and shed its benedictions liberally on Congress. The
army, however, stood, for it had shown its power both to elevate and to
overthrow.[2.3]

The next Congress, which met November 7, 1823, had a more democratic
basis; but the members were personally inferior, intrigue and
self-seeking again prevailed, and the young orators--convinced
that winning applause from the galleries was the true object of
speaking--launched forth on all occasions with that fatal fluency
which their intoxicating idiom encouraged. After centuries of enforced
silence, men to whom liberty could only mean license were called upon
to decide the gravest questions of statesmanship. Naturally they were
eager to build before laying foundations; and naturally, too, where
nine tenths of the people could not read, it seemed like genuine
statesmanship to flourish the novel vocabulary of independence.[2.3]

Frivolous, fickle, now torpid and now running amuck, Congress found
itself compelled eventually to frame a constitution. Under Spanish rule
the provinces, each governed by an intendant, had known little and
cared less about one another; and now, stimulated by the centrifugal
tendency of the Iberian character and the dread of a tyrant, inflamed
by transcendental doctrines of liberty, disgusted with the proceedings
of the national authorities, and captivated by the thought of offices
for all, they began to claim sovereignty; and something had to be
done at once. A republic, though alien to all the habits and feelings
of the nation, seemed evidently necessary, because no possible monarch
existed, and because no other system could make it the interest of a
sufficient number of persons to maintain the government; but this did
not end the difficulties. The centralized type of republic was ardently
desired by the oligarchy as likely to prove controllable, and by all
the monarchists as a sloping path toward their goal; but the friends of
Itúrbide and the enemies of privilege--strongest at a distance from the
capital--fought against it, and at length, as the federal system, about
which only the vaguest notions were entertained, promised more offices
and seemed more likely to hold the country together, it was decided
upon.[2.3]

To meet the crisis one individual, taking the constitution of the
United States as a basis,[2.4] drafted the required instrument in
three days; and so an untrained and uneducated nation found itself
provided with a complicated mixture of democracy and privilege, liberty
and intolerance, progress and reaction, which paralyzed itself by
combining such antagonistic elements, omitted the safeguard of a supreme
court like ours, and showed its own inadequacy by providing that in
emergencies the President might be given "extraordinary powers," or in
other words become a dictator. In short, the government was organized
as a permanent revolution. There was much enthusiasm, however, over
this triumph of nationality, and on New Year's day, 1825, the first
constitutional Congress assembled. The treasury was now full of borrowed
English gold; and--as every one hoped the new system might be developed
in the direction he preferred--all agreed that an era of peace, joy and
prosperity had at length arrived.[2.3]

[VICTORIA'S ADMINISTRATION]

Victoria was elected President. His frank, ruddy, bronzed face, peering
out of gray whiskers and curly gray hair, looked happy and encouraging,
but soon the mass of the nation felt once more cheated; for although
Bravo had been the candidate of the oligarchy, Victoria--yielding to the
pressure of that element--gave it a preponderance in the administration.
A multitude of people were exasperated to find the old privileged
classes again in control, and the execution of Itúrbide under an illegal
law--for he had returned to Mexico--infuriated his partisans. Worse
yet, the oligarchy denied the practicability of the federal system for
so unwieldy a country, where the states felt so independent, where so
many men aspired to hold office and where so few were qualified, and
plotted to set up the centralized regime, with monarchy--preferably
under a Spanish prince--as the ultimate aim of many; and Victoria, a
polite, weak, indolent, easily-flattered man of small abilities, little
education and immense vanity, who idolized his country but felt she
would always need him as chief-priest, fell in with this plan, because
without a change of the constitution he could not be President a second
time.[2.5]

Disgusted and alarmed, the Federalists, who included the Iturbidistas,
began therefore to scheme gropingly for a new revolution, a new war of
independence; but at length, realizing that under the constitution a
majority could rule, they established Masonic lodges of the York Rite,
and with great skill, activity and perseverance organized their forces.
Before long their power showed itself at the voting-urns, and the
President, recognizing the logic of events and perceiving he could never
supplant Bravo in the favor of the aristocracy, changed the complexion
of the government. This in turn angered the faction displaced, and most
unwisely--being physically much the weaker side--it massed its power
in December, 1827, and revolted under a certain Montaño. Bravo, though
Vice-President, placed himself at the head of the insurgents; but the
government forces under Guerrero, attacking him during a truce, quickly
ended the revolt.[2.5]

Peace, however, did not return. The newspapers unearthed or invented so
many unsavory tales about the leading citizens that, besides proving
those men unworthy of confidence, they excited lasting resentments. The
Federalists--particularly the Iturbidistas--harshly avenged their past
sufferings, for the Mexican idea of justice meant a chance to persecute
the oppressor; and every thinking mind saw with dismay that whereas
previous insurrections had occurred in a natural revolutionary period,
the government legally established by the nation had now been defied by
a great party led by the Vice-President himself. This was the letting
out of waters, and to palliate it as chargeable to circumstances would
be to excuse all political crimes.[2.5]

Meanwhile another storm had been gathering. The Spanish element, which
not only was superior but felt so, had given much offence; and, quite
aside from grudges, many thought it unsafe to have so large a number of
Gachupines in the country--many of them active and able, not a few of
them soldiers, and some occupying high civil and military positions--at
a time when Spain was preparing to reassert her authority over Mexico.
Others argued that should the Spaniards go, their places in business
and the public service would be available for Mexicans. Still others
considered this a good way to enfeeble the oligarchy, so as to curtail
its privileges. Many demagogues perceived that here lay a splendid
opportunity to acquire a following; and the Spaniards, for their
part, long accustomed to despise and lord it over the Mexicans, often
exasperated the public by offensive and imprudent conduct. The natural
consequences followed. Many insurrections, benevolently treated by the
government, demanded the expulsion of the Gachupines; some of the states
passed laws in that sense; and finally, in 1827 and 1828, Congress
did the same. A very large number of Gachupines actually departed and
carried away their money. This drew out the strongest fibres of public
life, the army, finance, trade and the industries; while the injustice
and impolicy of these decrees and the bloody vengeance taken upon a few
silly Spanish conspirators embittered feeling in Mexico, and greatly
injured Mexican credit in Europe, where few except the Spanish merchants
enjoyed any financial standing.[2.5]

By the time Victoria's administration drew near its end, Mexico
had marked out her downward route. The parties faced each other as
implacable foes. Each perpetrated as much electoral fraud and violence
as it could; each kept up a savage press; and each worked in the dark
through secret societies. Owing to extravagance, peculation, bad
management, the backwardness of the states in paying their quotas, and
the failure of an English banking house, the treasury was empty in spite
of lavish borrowing. "Liberty" had become a by-word, for Victoria had
wielded the extraordinary powers for a year and a half, punishments had
gone beyond the laws, and the government had been given authority, not
only to expel foreigners at will, but even to banish citizens from their
states. Corruption was general and profound, commerce feeble, credit
extinct, justice perverted, reported the French agent; and, as his
British colleague added, the "Name of Patriotism" was used as a "Cloak
to cover the greatest Excesses."[2.5]

And now came something worse. Well aware they could not elect one of
their own number President against the popular candidate, Guerrero, the
Centralists looked about for an acceptable Federalist. Gómez Pedraza,
Victoria's minister of war, though narrow, harsh and passionate, was a
strict and honest man, a laborious official and a thoughtful, effective
orator. He had fought on the Spanish side in the revolution, and
naturally favored a conservative, aristocratic régime. He, therefore,
was secretly adopted in place of Bravo, now in exile. All those who
detested unseemly party strife preferred him, and as the moderate wing
of the Federalists also took that side, quite unaware that Centralism
lurked in the shadow, Guerrero's noisy and overconfident supporters
found themselves beaten. This result and the open exultation, threats
and hostilities of their old enemies, who still controlled the senate
and the supreme court, enraged them, for they perceived they had been
duped once more, and they hotly charged--no doubt with some reason--that
money and Pedraza's power as head of the war department had frustrated
the will of the people; while it disgusted Victoria to be superseded by
a man he had looked down upon as merely a useful clerk.[2.6]

[SANTA ANNA]

Another individual also took offence. After setting the ball in motion
against Itúrbide, Santa Anna had been eclipsed by larger figures, and
to shine again he took up arms as Protector of the People; but this
enterprise collapsed at once, and he issued a very humble proclamation,
closing with the words, "Permit me, permit me to dig myself an obscure
grave that my ashes and my memory may disappear." A fairly comfortable
grave was, however, dug for him by removing His Penitence to Yucatan
as military commandant, and he proceeded at once to gild its interior
by permitting illicit commerce with Cuba. Returning after a while to
the proper field of ambition, he was more than suspected of complicity
in two insurrections; but in each case he read the omens in season to
extricate himself, and virtuously offered his sword to the government.
Now, however, he took a bold stand. Not only were he and the successful
candidate personal enemies, but he felt that little would be left of
himself after four years of Pedraza's rule; and he knew that Guerrero,
in addition to being favored by the army, really had a majority of the
people on his side. Accordingly he unfurled his flag in September, 1828,
for Guerrero, popular rights and a total expulsion of the Gachupines. In
this contest he showed amazing quickness, audacity and resourcefulness,
keeping up his motley troops principally by brigandage; but very soon
his cause appeared to be doomed.[2.6]

At this point Lorenzo de Zavala, one of those human meteors that rarely
illuminate Anglo-Saxon skies, came forward. His political relations were
extremely intense; and now, believing the Centralists intended to place
him before a firing-squad, he organized at Mexico, in the hope of saving
himself and Santa Anna, the woeful insurrection of the Acordada, which
fixed the example of party revolution. Victoria had an understanding
with him, though after betraying the government and letting the handful
of rioters get a safe start, he lost his nerve and betrayed them also;
and in the end, at the cost of some bloodshed and extensive robberies,
the insurrection triumphed; "the vile and unnatural Pedraza"--as his
foes called him--fled to the United States, and Congress, after having
declared Pedraza elected, pronounced Guerrero President on the express
ground that revolts had occurred in his favor. In reality this was a
revolution of numbers and popular ideas against privilege and oligarchy,
and before long the country accepted the situation.[2.6]

[A NEW REVOLUTION]

Santa Anna was now a popular hero, the saviour of the nation; and he
proceeded to confirm his title. In 1829 came the long expected blow from
Spain, and having calmly assumed the military authority at Vera Cruz,
he advanced to meet it. Near Tampico the invading army, stricken with
fever, desired to lay down its arms; but Santa Anna, eager for laurels,
attacked it. Spanish valor accepted the challenge; the Mexicans were
repulsed; and their ambitious leader left the field before the battle
ended. The invaders were then permitted to surrender, and soon a new cry
was echoing through the streets of Mexico, "Viva Santa Anna, the Victor
of Tampico!" Clothing himself with modesty and grace he now posed as a
sort of benevolent divinity. Rather tall, thin, apparently feeble but
capable of great exertions on occasion, with a head that bulged at the
top, a swarthy complexion, brilliant and restless eyes, a very clear-cut
voice and a voluble tongue, he moved about his estate at Manga de Clavo
and the near-by city of Vera Cruz in an easy, affable way, accumulating
popularity. "Can read somewhat," reported our consul in that city; but
his thoughts were above literature. "Were I made God," it was said that
he once remarked, "I should wish to be something more."[2.6]

Meantime, April 1, 1829, Guerrero assumed the Presidency. In his green
jacket edged with fur, red waistcoat bound with a blue sash, brown
mantle and heavy sabre, with his thick hair bristling toward all
points of the compass, he was a picturesque figure, and as candidate
had answered very well. For the role of chief magistrate, however, the
British minister justly described him as "totally unfit." Being mostly
of Indian and partly--it was stated--of negro blood, he instinctively
distrusted the whites, while the latter utterly despised the class to
which he belonged. Though his intuitive judgment was quick and within
the range of his experience remarkably correct, he knew nothing whatever
of letters and politics, necessarily depended upon the self-seeking
flatterers of his party, and veered about like the wind. In military
emergencies he could burst his bonds like a Samson, but the things he
really cared for were a wench, a bottle, a game of monte and a nap
under some spreading tree. Without ideas, knowledge, experience or
high character, he faced a terrible inheritance: the laws ignored, the
authorities despised, the administration disorganized, the treasury
worse than empty, the country in distress and turmoil.[2.6]

Professions of loyalty to the "sacred" constitution and the laws could
not blot out the fact that his authority was based upon a riot; and
others would not feel satisfied merely because he was content. The
extraordinary powers of the Executive, granted in view of the Spanish
invasion, were used oppressively. A multitude of persons clamored for
money and he could give them none; a multitude clamored for reforms, and
he scarcely knew what they were talking about. As far as possible the
rest of the Gachupines were driven out, but this merely added to the
confusion. President and nation simply drifted, and the rocks were near.
Before long the general government was practically ignored except at the
capital, and the heads of the secret societies wielded the real power.
Guerrero even allowed the oligarchy, his deadliest foe, to alienate him
from the common people, the source of his strength. He became almost
as isolated as Mahomet's coffin; and then--as soon as ambition could
disguise itself with a programme--he fell.[2.6]

Mainly owing to the good-will of Guerrero, the Vice-President was
General Anastasio Bustamante, a heavy, dull, rather kindly and fairly
honest aristocrat, though nominally a moderate Federalist. When
appointed by Guerrero to command the army of reserve at Jalapa, the
principal military force in the country, he exclaimed on taking leave
of the President, "Never will I unsheathe my sword against General
Guerrero," but within a year (December, 1829) he did it; and, though a
beneficiary of the Acordada riot, he revolted against the government
in the name of the constitution. As a matter of fact his rebellion was
merely another effort of the privileged classes, a revised edition of
Montaño's, and the army received its pay from the money chests of the
oligarchs. Little opposition was encountered, for Guerrero had let
Delilah shear him, the Acordada episode and much other misconduct had
completely discredited the radical Federalists, and the Federalists in
general--who had raised Bustamante from a political prison to the second
place in the nation--could not believe, after his fresh protestations of
loyalty to the constitution, that he would betray them. The President,
finding nobody to lean upon, fled to his old haunts in the south,
was treacherously captured and was shot; and meanwhile, on the first
of January, 1830, Bustamante took up the reins. Greed, corruption,
imprudence, evil passions and lawlessness had ruined the cause of
democracy, and Victoria's experiment of letting aristocrats administer a
professedly popular system had to be tried again.[2.6]

Bustamante opened Congress with a bit of the fashionable hypocrisy,
asserting that a "sacred Constitution" had placed him in power; but he
showed that what interested him was "the wishes of the army," and the
army reciprocated this affection. Alamán, who had been Victoria's chief
adviser at first, now became the real head of the government. More
than any other man in Mexico he could claim to be called a statesman,
for he knew some history, had observed politics in Europe, and in a
superficial yet impressive way could reason; but he was a statesman of
the Metternich school, wily and insincere, wholly unable to sympathize
with democracy, and profoundly in love with force. Whatever did not suit
the government he demolished without regard to law; whoever opposed it
was crushed. In administration the government did well, but--attempting
to represent democracy and privilege, progress and reaction, the past
and the future, a self-governing state and an all-controlling church at
one and the same time--it undertook to perform an impossible task by
impossible means. Consequently it satisfied neither of the parties and
offended both. King Stork proved worse than King Log.[2.7]

Santa Anna, incensed because Guerrero would not appoint him minister
of war, had at first coquetted with Bustamante's movement; but soon,
overshadowed at Jalapa by the Vice-President and by Bravo, whom
Guerrero had pardoned, he retired to his estate. On the outbreak of
the revolution he took up arms for Guerrero; but when his chief gave
up, he followed that example, and patiently awaited, crouching, the
time to spring. Now he saw the tide of passion rising, and saw also
the best citizens agreeing that Mier y Terán,[F] an able and honorable
man, should be the next chief magistrate. Accordingly, to prevent an
election if nothing more, he "pronounced" in the name of Federalism
at the beginning of 1832, and called for a change of Cabinet, though
four years earlier he had battled for the principle that nobody should
interfere with a President's choice of ministers; and then he required
that Bustamante should give up his place to Pedraza as the rightful head
of the state, though Santa Anna himself had been the cause of Pedraza's
exclusion on the ground of illegal election. Supported by the Vera Cruz
customhouse and defended by the pestilence of the coast, he occupied a
most advantageous position; and consistency did not signify.[2.7]

  [F] A Mexican sometimes chose to bear the family name of his mother
      as well as that of his father. The former was connected to the
      latter with the word "and" (_y_). Paredes y Arrillaga, Peña y
      Peña, Mora y Villamil are instances. In referring to such
      persons, however, it was customary to use only the first of the
      names. Thus one finds much more often "Paredes" than "Paredes y
      Arrillaga."

Near the close of the year the two chiefs, brought together by Pedraza,
adjusted the affairs of the nation--that is to say, the offices--as
private business, and the troops on both sides were liberally rewarded.
Congress protested, but was utterly powerless. Bustamante soon found it
wise to give up the Presidency; and as the elections were not general
enough, at the proper time, to create a Congress, constitutional
government vanished. However, though Pedraza had resigned and even
left the country, which no President could legally do, Santa Anna and
Bustamante now hoisted him into power to complete the term interrupted
by Guerrero, while the "best citizens" fell out over offices and
personal issues, and so dissipated the brightest prospect seen as yet in
Mexican public life.[2.7]

[SANTA ANNA PRESIDENT]

Under these circumstances, of course, the dominant general, Santa Anna,
was elected President. For Vice-President the choice fell upon Valentín
Gómez Farías, leader of the radical Federalists. In many ways Farías
deserved warm admiration. He was active, indefatigable, fearless,
thoroughly honest, and willing--perhaps a little more than willing--to
serve the public in the humblest or the highest office. He loved
Mexico ardently, and he believed in the supremacy of law and the civil
authority. Unfortunately, however, his education was inadequate for the
work he undertook to do; and he lacked prudence, patience and common
sense. In short, he may be characterized as a fanatical democrat and
political idealist.[2.7]

Santa Anna now had the army at his back, but he desired to have also
the privileged classes there, and they had been exasperated by his
overthrowing Bustamante. He therefore decided to let them see they
needed him; and, retiring early in 1833 to his estate--which in fact he
enjoyed much more than bearing the burdens of administration--he left
the Vice-President in power. Farías then undertook to transform Mexico,
by merely saying "Open Sesame!" to the Federalist majority in Congress,
into a modern, liberal, orderly and prosperous nation; and reform
projects made their appearance at once. The privileges of the army
were boldly attacked and still more those of the Church, which aimed
to be _in_ the social order enough to dominate it, yet enough outside
to escape from all obligations. Farías proposed, therefore, without
having a well-digested plan, to reassert the supreme authority formerly
exercised by the king, abolish the clerical fuero and the compulsory
tithes, provide for popular, lay education, and bring into productive
circulation the immense wealth controlled by the Church; and Congress,
fully aware that reforms were necessary, dazzled by the boldness and
novelty of his programme, and misled by the Mexican faith in theories
and formulæ, supported him.[2.7]

Naturally such projects and their foreseen consequences roused the
clericals and all in that camp to fury, and the proprietors of great
estates also grew alarmed. The President felt his time had come, and
in May, therefore, he resumed his functions. The progress of reform
promptly halted, and soon it was announced that Santa Anna, ingeniously
made a prisoner by his own troops, had been proclaimed dictator.
Undoubtedly he expected the mutiny that now broke out at the capital
to overthrow the government; but Farías, again in power during the
President's absence, quelled the revolt, and Santa Anna found it
necessary to "escape" and resume his office.[2.7]

[A CHANGE OF RÉGIME]

Pretending still with consummate address to favor both parties--though
really a Centralist now--he made both of them court and fear him, and
proved his power by breaking down and then restoring the army. Of
course, however, these manoeuvres excited suspicion. The privileged
classes, though anxious for his support, hesitated to pledge him theirs,
and so he returned on a six months' leave of absence to his figurative
plow, leaving Tornel, whom an American minister described as "a very bad
man," to scheme in his interest. The now embittered and excited forces
of reform were thus unleashed, and before long the Church and the rich
proprietors offered the Cincinnatus of Manga de Clavo absolute power on
condition that he should protect them. In April, 1834, therefore, two
months before his leave was to expire, he took possession of the supreme
power again, and was hailed by the clergy as a new Messiah. Supported
soon by the revolutionary "plan" of Cuernavaca, he made himself in
effect a dictator. The cause of reform was harshly checked and turned
back. Congress found the door of its hall barred; and Farías, covered
with abuse, was driven from the country.[2.7]

Secretly encouraging reactionary insurrections and instigating demands
for a centralized régime, though still professing publicly the other
creed, Santa Anna ordered the people to surrender their weapons, and
crushed with a ruthless hand the state of Zacatecas, which dared to
oppose his will. "Worthy son of the father of lies," "unrivalled
chameleon," "shameless hypocrite," "atheist and blasphemer," shrieked
his opponents. "With the tranquility of a tiger, which, sated with the
flesh of its prey, reposes on what it does not wish to devour, Santa
Anna reports his victory," cried _El Crepúsculo_. But resentment counted
for nothing; Mexico was prostrate. Late in 1835, therefore, a packed
Congress of self-seeking politicians decided upon centralization, and
it was understood that Santa Anna would be chosen President for ten
years, with a longer term and a higher title in prospect. But now the
scene was tragically shifted. In March, 1836, the Texans declared their
independence. The Napoleon of the West fell into their hands at San
Jacinto, where they defeated his army; and, as an inkling got abroad
of the unpatriotic agreements made with his captors while in fear of
revenge for his cruelties, he thought it wise to announce, on returning
to Mexico in 1837, a definitive retirement from public life.[2.7]

According to the organic law, any proposed constitutional change had to
remain under consideration for two years; but the Congress of 1835, not
minding a trifle like this, drew up as fast as possible what it named
the Seven Laws--called by others the Seven Plagues. By December, 1836,
despite the resistance and threats of the Federalists, the new régime
was fully organized, and Bustamante soon held the reins again. The
Church and the wealthy were now satisfied. The army also felt pleased,
for the Federalists denounced its privileges, the cost of the many state
offices created by them reduced the amount of money it could get, and
an aristocratic government seemed likely to need it constantly and pay
it with some regularity; and so the prospect was, especially with Santa
Anna eliminated, that the new regime would be stable.[2.7]

But among the aristocrats it had become unfashionable by this time to
meddle with politics. The groups that made up the dominant party,
though united against the democrats, had little else in common. Each
group desired to enjoy privileges and shun burdens; each aimed to
exploit the nation; and there was not enough to satisfy all. The
expulsion of the Spaniards had weakened the numbers, ability, energy
and wealth of the party; and now, as after every revolution, it proved
so impossible to fulfill the promises made to win support, that soon
disappointed friends were allying themselves with open enemies.[2.8]

A new difficulty, too, arose, for under a centralized system the
government had to assume financial responsibilities previously borne
by the states. A strong treasury was therefore essential; yet the
rich, and in particular the clergy, would not pay enough to carry on
the government they had established. Consequently funds had to be
borrowed, Church property being the only available security; and the
clergy, instead of meeting the terms of the money-lenders, busily hid or
exported their wealth. Every dollar that could be raised had to be given
the army as the price of its allegiance, and for six months not one
civil employé, from the President down, received a salary. In October,
1837, the ministry resigned in a body, and would not return to their
desks, for nobody cared to support so heavy a load when there was no
chance to steal or even to get paid.[2.8]

Early in November the British representative, although the legation
had all along sympathized with the aristocratic party, reported
that Centralism had completely failed; and it was notorious that
Bustamante himself desired a restoration of Federalism as the only
possible expedient. Seeing their enemies divided, the liberals took
heart, and petitions for a change of system were soon pouring in
from the departments, which had now taken the places of the states.
Dissatisfaction spread. Pronunciamientos began, and only the popularity
of Bustamante, who had mellowed with age and foreign travel during his
period of eclipse, maintained the government. Yet Federalism could not
act, for at this juncture the French minister was pressing claims,
and the two wings of the party--the moderates led by Pedraza and the
radicals led by Farías--disagreed passionately on this foreign issue.
A complete state of anarchy prevails, reported our consul at Mexico in
December, 1838.[2.8]

[FALL OF BUSTAMANTE]

Santa Anna all this time was quietly at work, though he had called
heaven to witness that he would be loyal to the existing regime; and,
as often happened, chance came to his aid. A French fleet captured the
fortress of Ulúa, off Vera Cruz, at this time, and a party of marines
landed at the town, destroyed some war material, and then marched
back to reëmbark. Santa Anna commanded there, and, being wounded in
attacking these troops, had to undergo amputation at the knee. This was
his opportunity, and he at once issued a most eloquent address. Already
he had outdone opera bouffe, and now he outdid himself. "Probably this
will be the last victory I shall give my country," he said; "I die happy
that Divine Providence has permitted me to devote to her every drop
of my blood.... May all my fellow-citizens, forgetting my political
errors, concede to me the one title that I would leave my children,
that of a Good Mexican." There had been no victory, for the French
drove him out of Vera Cruz before he could dictate the address, and he
did not dream of dying; but the Mexicans are tender-hearted, and the
episode--particularly in contrast with the inaction of the government,
which could not afford an efficient regular army and dared not arm the
people--gave him a fresh hold on the nation, even though all capable of
thinking felt by this time profoundly skeptical about him.[2.8]

Accordingly he became the power behind the tottering throne in December,
1838, and when Bustamante took the field early the next year to put
down an insurgent named Mejía, the Centralist leaders had Santa Anna
made temporary President as a bulwark against Federalism. The quality
of his penitence quickly showed itself. His power was audaciously used
to cripple Bustamante, suppress liberty, gain partisans and benefit
himself and his friends. In a word, he achieved the most lawless and
shameless administration yet witnessed, and though universally feared,
was now execrated by almost all except his personal followers. In July,
1839, the President resumed his functions, but matters only went on from
worse to worst--corruption rampant in the administration, public spirit
dead. In July, 1840, rioters actually made him their prisoner for a
time. False advisers, particularly Tornel, drew him farther and farther
into Santa Anna's net. Corpulent and aging rapidly, he fell into a sort
of mental stupor; and in August, 1841, the British minister reported
that the government, if left to itself, would soon expire of inanition.
As for the nation, it was not merely in anarchy but in chaos. Even the
conservatives admitted that the Seven Laws would not do.[2.8]

This very month rang the bell for the next scene. General Mariano
Paredes, another important figure in the history of our war with Mexico,
was a brave but rather besotted officer, more honest but less clever
than his leading contemporaries. On a mere pretext, though he owed much
to Bustamante, he revolted; more or less in collusion with him Santa
Anna pronounced as mediator; and General Valencia, correctly described
by an American consul as "destitute of every principle of honor or
honesty," treacherously getting hold of what was called the citadel
at Mexico, rebelled on his own account: check from two knights and a
castle, as Señora Calderón wittily described the situation. Weary,
disgusted, indifferent, cynical, men heard unmoved the "Quién vive?" and
"Centinela alerte!" of the insurgents at the capital, and between two
puffs of their cigarettes gossiped about the revolution as if it had
occurred in Europe. It was only a game of chess, and the public were
spectators. They understood now that nearly all the pompous phrases of
the politicians had meant, as Lara's _Revista Política_ of 1840 put it,
"Move, and let me have your place."[2.8]

In this confusion Santa Anna, whom the conservatives had now decided
to support instead of the inefficient Bustamante, came rapidly to the
front. His triumph was soon foreseen, and the nation acquiesced. Most
people knew he was a villain, but felt that at any rate he possessed
energy. Probably he could keep order, they said, and perhaps, if
entirely trusted, would act well. If not, one big rascal could not be
so bad as many little ones; and at the very least any change must be an
improvement. In reality this bold, cunning, hungry, sharp adventurer,
who knew what he wanted and got it, dazzled the average Mexicans. They
saw in him a fulfilment of themselves, and in letting him rule they had
the feeling of success without the trouble.[2.8]

For a while Bustamante, whose government practically faded out in
September, 1841, resisted with dignity though with no chance of
survival; but at length, in a fit of desperation, he cut the ground
of legality from under his own feet by pronouncing for Federalism, and
on October 7, Santa Anna, driving rapidly through Mexico behind four
white horses belonging to a stockbroker, with a retinue of splendid
coaches and an immense escort of cavalry, took up his quarters at the
palace in Tacubaya, a few miles beyond. Yet not a single viva greeted
his magnificent entry or his address to Congress. Memory paralyzed
admiration. In despair, not love, Mexico consented to be his.[2.8]

[SANTA ANNA VIRTUALLY DICTATOR]

By the new arrangement, called the Bases of Tacubaya, a new Congress was
to draw a new constitution. Meantime some one, the choice of a junta
appointed by the successful chief, was to have the powers "necessary for
the organization of all branches of the public service," and naturally
Santa Anna himself received the votes of his junta. This arrangement
was regarded by the nation as a mere parenthesis, but the General
held a different idea. On October 10, the gloomy old cathedral was as
bright as gold, silver, gems and hundreds of candles could make it.
Troops entered the sacred precincts, and formed to the music of drums
and cornets. The archbishop proceeded to the main entrance in cope and
mitre, holding in his hands a crucifix equally beautiful and precious,
and there he waited for about three quarters of an hour, when a military
officer, who had not even deigned to put on full dress, marched in and
seated himself on a splendid throne. A large suite of generals followed,
but none of them ventured to sit, though the _Te Deum_ lasted an hour;
and finally the man on the throne rose and took this oath: I swear to
God--to do as I please; for such was the meaning of the Bases. Hardened
by seeing his superior astuteness, audacity and energy balked so many
times by circumstances and a lack of confidence in his honor, Santa Anna
proposed, now that he once more had the power, to grip it with a hand of
steel.[2.9]

As dictator he indulged himself by running through the entire diapason
from childishness to omnipotence, announcing impossibilities and
attempting absurdities. The freedom of the press and the freedom of
speech were violated. The tariff was juggled with for selfish pecuniary
reasons. He ordered the university to give one of his friends a degree
and a chair--that is to say, learning and a profession. He closed a
bank without allowing it the time to liquidate. He put up a cheap
building of rubble work that was merely an eyesore--though Tornel
compared it to the Simplon road of Napoleon--and the city government
had to fall down and worship it. His amputated foot was dug up and
reinterred with extraordinary pomp. On the top of a monument was erected
a gilded statue of him pointing toward Texas, though some said it was
pointing at the mint. The Church, now governed by the soft Archbishop
Posada, drowsy with satisfaction and carelessly fattening on sweetmeats
presented to him by adoring nuns, was forced to make "loans"; and
payments on public debts, for which revenues had been solemnly pledged,
were suspended.[2.9]

Nothing, one might almost say, was too great or too small for Santa
Anna, if it looked auriferous. No coach wheel could turn without first
paying a tax. Anybody with a promising scheme to get national funds
could find a partner at the palace. Brokers and contractors took the
places of politicians; wealthy merchants, able to loan great sums at
great percentages, took the places of statesmen. Corruption was rampant
everywhere, of course. "An arbitrary system, indeed, must always be a
corrupt one," as Burke said; "there never was a man who thought he had
no law but his own will, who did not soon find that he had no end but
his own profit." These words describe Santa Anna's course. And when his
chest was full enough and his army big enough, putting a substitute in
his place and shaking off the cares of state, he went down to enjoy his
gambling and cockfighting and plan his next political move at Manga
de Clavo, secure from observation and protected by troops. Hints of a
formal dictatorship began to be heard.[2.9]

To keep up appearances, however, he summoned the proposed Congress. A
majority of the members were Federalists, but he promptly informed it
that Federalism would not do, and when they insisted on their notion,
Tornel, the minister of war, who was glad to be his lackey and wear
the livery of the house, barred Congress out of its hall. Presently,
without a sign of protest from any one, it was dissolved by decree;
and then eighty persons, chosen by the administration, drew up a new
constitution called the Organic Bases. Valencia was president of this
junta; and both he and Paredes began to plot against the dictator.
Santa Anna forced them to swallow their ambitions for the time being,
however, and by dint of military interference--though his enemies were
bestirring themselves and he was now increasingly unpopular--he became
President in January, 1844, under the new constitution. This appeared
like a concession to legality, but no doubt it was intended as a recoil
for another spring. His dream of empire still went on, it was fully
believed.[2.9]

Although the minister of justice described this period as "an epoch of
glory" and an "era of absolute felicity," the new Congress manifested
a disposition to antagonize the President; but an almost supernatural
dread of him paralyzed even his enemies, and he readily bowled them
over. Then he was given a special sum of four millions for war with
Texas; and after that sum was promptly absorbed, he demanded not only
ten millions more but "extraordinary powers" to lay taxes. This meant
that he wanted to have every man's property at his disposal, and it
was generally believed that with a foreign war as excuse he would soon
try to make himself autocrat. Congress resisted, and before long was
suspended.[2.9]

[DOWNFALL OF SANTA ANNA]

But now the people took fire. They had trusted Santa Anna completely,
and their confidence had been as completely abused. It was felt that
he had shown a deliberate intention to ignore the public interest and
feed upon the nation--disregarding all personal rights, threatening
all fortunes and contradicting all principles. Paredes, who had never
forgiven Santa Anna for running him off the track in 1841, pronounced.
In November, 1844, war began. The President attempted both to cajole
and to terrorize his enemies, and moved against the insurgents with a
powerful army; but on December 6 the troops at the capital revolted, and
the nation concurred. In the departments he was particularly hated, for
he had impoverished them with taxes and spent the money elsewhere; but
Mexico itself blazed. "Death to the lame man!" shouted the populace,
dragging his foot round the streets. Dazed and overwhelmed, Santa Anna,
after moving about irresolutely with his dwindling army, left it with
a small escort early in January, 1845, and then took to his heels with
only four servants. Before long some peasants captured him, and later in
the year he was banished.[2.9]

At first sight this collapse amazes us. It seems impossible that
Santa Anna, whose particular talent lay in discovering the direction
of political currents, should have lost so suddenly his tremendous
power. But the explanation is readily found. Without a doubt he was
the foremost Mexican of his time. Seen at the head of a ragged,
undisciplined mob called a regiment, inspiring them with eye, gesture
and words, and leading them on with almost electrical energy; seen at
a banquet, where he could show himself--despite the six colonels erect
and stiff behind his chair--merely a prince of good fellows, dignified
but cordial, courtly but unrestrained, brilliant yet apparently simple;
seen at the council board, seizing upon a shrewd idea expressed by one
of his associates and developing, illustrating and applying it in a way
that made its real author marvel at his chief's wisdom; seen in one of
his outbursts of Jacksonian rage, as when he threatened at a diplomatic
reception to run the boundary line between Mexico and the United
States at the cannon's mouth; seen at the opera house, in a crimson
and gold box with a retinue of crimson and gold officers, dressed in
the plainest of costumes himself, and wearing on his countenance an
interesting expression of gentle melancholy and resignation, as if he
were sacrificing himself for the nation and shrank from the gaze of an
adoring public--seen in these and other phases he appeared remarkable,
and even, as combining them, extraordinary.[2.9]

But in reality he was a charlatan. Though head of an army, he knew
nothing of military science; though head of a nation, he knew nothing
of statesmanship. By right of superiority and by right of conquest
Mexico seemed to be his; and, with what Burke described as "the generous
rapacity of the princely eagle," he proposed to take the chief share of
wealth, power, honor and pleasure, leaving to others the remnants of
these as a compensation for doing the work. It was a cardinal principle
with him that the masses could be ignored; and in 1844, having reduced
the Church to subservience and formed a combination with the military
and the financial men, based on a community of interest in exploiting
the national revenues, he deemed himself invulnerable, the more so
because the coterie of base flatterers that he loved to have about
him reflected this conviction. Of a true national uprising he had no
conception; and when this came, finding himself in the presence of a
power that amazed and overawed him, seeing his axioms disproved and his
pillars going down, he lost heart, and plunged from the zenith to the
nadir of his essentially emotional nature.[2.9]

[HERRERA BECOMES PRESIDENT]

Santa Anna's legal successor was General J. J. Herrera, president of
the council of state, a fair, pacific, reasonable and honest man; and
the new ministry commanded respect. For a time the halcyon days of
1825 returned. This was the first great popular movement since Mexico
had become independent. All had united in it, and therefore all were
in harmony; every one had assisted, and therefore every one felt an
agreeable expectation of reward. Factions laid down their arms. For
a few weeks all remembered they were Mexicans. But the situation was
extremely difficult. Santa Anna's constitution, which commanded no
respect because neither authorized by the people nor endorsed by good
results, was still in force. All who believed in his system, including
twenty thousand half-pay--or rather no-pay--officers, dissipated, hungry
and reckless, began at once to plot for his return or for some one of
the same kind to succeed him. Herrera's aim to introduce reforms, both
civil and military, gave great offence. Paredes, representing the Church
and the aristocracy, stood at the head of the main army, and soon showed
a disposition to hold aloof. Indeed every prominent man had a busily
scheming clique.[2.10]

The correct course for the new President would have been to declare
for the constitution of 1824, and throw himself upon the Federalists;
but, fearing that such a step would excite a revolution, he adopted
the timid and hopeless policy of trying to balance one party against
another. Owing to fear of the army, though he knew he could not rely
upon it, he dared not organize militia; and before long a body of troops
were allowed to revolt with impunity. Soon, therefore, the government
had no prestige and no substantial backing. Every sort of a complaint
was made against it. The financial troubles became acute. Confusion and
uncertainty reigned, and the President was physically incapable of a
hard day's work.[2.10]

In March a conspiracy that indicated an ominous combination of
Federalists and Santannistas came to light. In May, under strenuous
pressure from England and France, the government shrinkingly agreed
to recognize Texas if she would bind herself not to join the United
States; and this wise though tardy move brought an avalanche of abuse
upon it. In June the Federalists rose, but the affair was badly managed
and failed. Tornel, the arch-plotter, a general who never had a command,
was sent to the northern army; and other turbulent men were imprisoned.
But still the government merely drifted--blind, irresolute, vacillating,
moribund; and the general public looked on with complete indifference.
Going to sleep red and waking up green--for revolutions usually began at
night--was no longer a novelty.[2.10]

In August the ministers resigned; "the chief offices of state were
begging in the streets," wrote the correspondent of the London _Times;_
and the men who finally took them, while personally well enough, had
little strength and less prestige. By September the government stood
in hourly fear of a revolution; but so little booty could be seen,
that although the plots thickened, they were lazily developed, and
amounted to nothing. Paredes, the Santannistas and the Federalists
became constantly more threatening, however, and the administration
more and more afraid to take any step whatever, good or bad. Nobody
could guess what it would do to-day from what it did yesterday. The
anarchy of weakness constituted the government. A triumvirate of
Paredes, Tornel and Valencia was much talked of. Many prayed for some
respectable despot, many for a foreign prince; and some of the more
thoughtful suggested cautiously an American protectorate. "Sterile,
deplorably sterile" has been the movement against Santa Anna, exclaimed
the friendly _Siglo XIX_ in October, describing it as "a moment of
happy illusion." By this time the administration was powerless even at
the capital; and on November 30 _El Amigo del Pueblo_, an opposition
sheet, announced, "There is no government in Mexico." This, however, was
premature. Before the dénouement of this tragi-farce the United States
was to enter upon the scene; and as this new phase of the drama requires
to be prepared for, we must here leave Herrera, for a brief space, in
the midst of his difficulties.[2.10]

[DEPLORABLE STATE OF MEXICO]

Sterile indeed and most deplorable was the whole series of events that
we have now followed. One is glad to pass on; but let it be noted first
that while circumstances promoted, they did not produce it. The Mexicans
knew better, far better, than they acted. In 1824 the Constituent
Congress pointed out distinctly in a solemn address to the nation, that
without virtue liberal institutions would fail, revolution would follow
revolution, anarchy would ensue; and as time went on editors and orators
frequently traced the causes of Mexico's downfall in vivid and truthful
sentences. The trouble was that a great majority of those who might
have advanced her welfare preferred ease to effort, guile to wisdom,
self-indulgence to self-control, private advantage to the public weal,
partisan victory to national success; and naturally, in such a state
of things, the few honorable, public-spirited citizens could seldom
command a sufficient following to accomplish anything. Our leading
public men, said a contemporary, having been for one reason or another
contemptible, have learned to despise and distrust one another, and the
public, sick to death of their manoeuvres, have learned to despise and
distrust them all; yet such persons--demagogues and soldiers--were still
permitted to lead. Paper constitutions and paper laws, naturally of
little validity in the eyes of such a wilful, passionate race, had been
rendered by experience contemptible.

For the consequences, if there be such a principle as national
responsibility, the people as a body were responsible; and so they
were for the results of this deplorable schooling as it affected the
relations between their country and ours. The inheritance from Spain had
been unfortunate, but there had been time enough to recover from it; and
instead of improving, the Mexicans had even degenerated.[2.11]




                                  III

           THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO

                               1825-1843


In turning from the domestic to the foreign affairs of Mexico we must
beware of carrying prejudice with us. Our minds must be open to all
the facts, and see them exactly as they were. But it is right and even
necessary, for our guidance in interpreting these facts, to presume that
aliens, traditionally disliked by the Mexicans,[3.1] were treated
no more kindly, fairly and honestly than fellow-citizens; and the
evidence is conclusive that even the highest authorities were generally
unbusinesslike, often unjust or tricky, and on too many occasions
positively dishonorable in their dealings with foreigners.[3.2]

Our first minister to Mexico, received there on June 1, 1825, was Joel
R. Poinsett. Apparently a better man for the office could not have been
chosen or even created; and the warm interest of the United States in
the cause of Spanish-American independence, our prompt recognition of
Mexico, and the fact that her political institutions had been modeled
upon ours, were additional auguries for the success of his mission.
But duty required him to stand for a Protestant power in a country
intensely Roman Catholic, to represent democracy where the dominant
element consisted of aristocrats hoping more or less generally for a
Bourbon king, to support Monroe's doctrine of America for the Americans
against the strength of Europe and the European affiliations of Mexico,
to vindicate the equal position of the United States where Great Britain
had established a virtual protectorate, to insist upon full commercial
privileges when the Spanish-American states favored mutual concessions,
and to antagonize other influences possessing no little strength.[3.3]

[FRICTION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES]

His only feasible course was to affiliate with men of the popular,
democratic, Federalist party. Largely through his advice they abandoned
their plan of rebelling, placed their confidence in organization and the
ballot, and so gained the ascendency. They soon fell into excesses of
their own, however, which they were glad to charge against a Protestant
and foreigner; all the other elements antagonized by him joined in the
accusations; envy of the recognized prosperity of the United States
assisted; and in the end he came to be almost universally denounced
by the Mexicans as the diabolical agent of a jealous, hypocritical,
designing government.[3.3]

Of course, the Poinsett affair planted a root of bitterness in the
United States. Our national authorities could but protest against the
attacks upon our minister that were made by state legislatures in
contempt of all diplomatic usage, against the neglect of the Mexican
Executive to shield him, and against the general attitude of distrust
and ill-will exhibited by that country. Indeed, our government fully
believed that baseless popular clamor had been permitted to exert "a
sinister influence" against the Americans in its councils, and pointedly
informed Guerrero that unless "a marked change" in the temper of his
administration should "speedily" occur, a collision might result; and
of course the people of the United States could not fail to notice the
abusive and even ferocious treatment accorded to our representative,
against whom no charges were made by the Mexican government, and to
resent still more keenly the insults that were lavished upon the
character and purposes of the American nation. The fact that Poinsett
continued to be an important factor in our public life, even becoming
a member of the Cabinet at a later day, tended to emphasize these
feelings, both official and popular.[3.4]

Besides all this, official work of his added to the irritation in both
countries. As one of his principal duties, he was instructed to make
a treaty reaffirming the boundary agreed upon with Spain in 1819, or,
if he could, buy a portion at least of Texas. The proposal that our
neighbor should sell us territory has been called by partisan writers
in the United States, insulting, but as we have made purchases from
Spain, France, Russia and Mexico herself, this accusation is evidently
unwarranted. On the other hand the suggestion was reasonable. We for
our part desired the land, aside from its intrinsic value, as a needed
protection to New Orleans and the Mississippi; and Mexico not only
appeared to misprize it, but could have strengthened herself somewhat by
letting it go. Later it became a fashion with her public men to declaim
about its preciousness and beauty; but as late as 1836, according to
Santa Anna himself, many officials did not know where Texas was or what
nation claimed it. Mexico had ten times the area she could people, and
what she needed in that quarter was the means of shielding her northern
settlements from the Indians. Moreover, under contracts already made,
Texas was filling up with men who, as President Victoria saw in 1825,
were not at all likely to assimilate with the Mexicans; and since it was
recognized that a mistake had been made in admitting such colonists,
it might well have seemed the part of wisdom to cut off the infected
section before it should set an example of dissatisfaction, and perhaps
cause trouble also with the United States.[3.5]

Poinsett, accordingly, taking the matter up in July, 1825, stated
frankly that the treaty of 1819 was recognized by his country as
binding, but expressed a desire to lay it aside, and fix upon a more
satisfactory line. This pleased Victoria and Alamán, for they imagined
they could push the boundary eastward almost to the Mississippi, but
in spite of Poinsett's urgency and his dropping the plan to extend our
territory, a long delay followed. At last, however, on January 12,
1828, a treaty of limits reaffirming the agreement with Spain was duly
signed. In the course of April it reached Washington and was ratified.
On the last day of the month our secretary of state notified the Mexican
representative that he was ready to exchange ratifications, and reminded
him that under the terms of the instrument this would have to be done
by May 12; but Obregón was not prepared to act, and for that reason the
treaty failed.[3.6]

Yet the Mexicans not only held that the United States caused the
miscarriage in order to prosecute designs upon Texas, but charged
officially as well as on the street, with neither evidence nor
plausibility in favor of the accusation, that our minister stole the
paper--entrusted to him on May 10 for transmission--which would have
authorized Obregón to exchange the ratifications. So we had in 1830 this
extraordinary picture: on the one hand, the United States earnestly
desiring the prosperity and friendship of Mexico, and pursuing a just
and sympathetic policy towards her; and, on the other, Mexico accusing
us of hostile intentions and the basest arts. From that day on,
everything we did was viewed with a jaundiced eye.[3.6]

The treaty of limits was, however, revived by fresh negotiations, and
in April, 1832, went into effect. By its terms a joint commission to
run the line had to be appointed within a year from this date, and
presently Mexico received notice, both at her own capital and at ours,
that an American commissioner had been named; but she paid no attention
to the matter, and the year expired. Our minister was then directed
to negotiate a new agreement, labored for more than twelve months,
and finally, by addressing strong language personally to the acting
President, carried the point. Yet the United States was officially
denounced for endeavoring--and by wretched artifices--to delay the
fixing of the boundary.[3.7]

Meanwhile a treaty of amity and commerce, proposed by Poinsett at
about the same time as the treaty of limits, had been pursuing a
checkered career, though a similar agreement between Mexico and England
went rapidly through. At one stage of the proceedings the Mexican
plenipotentiaries kept our minister entirely in the dark about an
important concession made to Great Britain, falsely assuring him that
equally favorable terms were offered to this country. Indeed, Victoria
showed a strong disposition to block the business altogether. July 10,
1826, however, the negotiators reached an agreement, but it did not
prove satisfactory to the American Senate. A second treaty signed in
February, 1828, did not please the Congress of Mexico, and was properly
rejected. At a later date negotiations were again resumed; but in 1831
that body held the matter in abeyance for more than nine months. At
last, one day before the session was to close, our minister gave notice
that unless the treaty were concluded, he would leave the country. The
government at Washington also exerted some pressure by insisting that
the two matters should fare alike, and postponing the re-ratification of
the treaty of limits; and consequently both treaties became law at the
same time, April 5, 1832. Yet for nearly a year the commercial treaty
was not promulgated by Mexico; and hence, though her citizens residing
in the United States could have the benefit of it, Americans in Mexico
could not, for the local authorities with whom it was necessary to deal
declared they had no knowledge of such an agreement.[3.8]

Toward the close of 1829 Guerrero, as a desperate throw for popularity,
asked for the recall of Poinsett, merely saying that public opinion
demanded it; and then for about six years the United States had as its
representative a friend of Jackson's named Anthony Butler, whose only
qualifications for the post were an acquaintance with Texas and a strong
desire to see the United States obtain it. In brief, he was a national
disgrace. Besides having been through bankruptcy more than once, if we
may believe the Mexican minister at Washington, and having a financial
interest in the acquisition of this Mexican territory, he was personally
a bully and swashbuckler, ignorant at first of the Spanish language
and even the forms of diplomacy, shamefully careless about legation
affairs, wholly unprincipled as to methods, and, by the testimony of two
American consuls, openly scandalous in his conduct. One virtue, to be
sure, according to his own account he possessed: he never drank spirits;
but one learns of this with regret, for an overdose of alcohol would
sometimes be a welcome excuse for him.[3.9]

His particular business was to obtain as much of Texas as possible, an
enterprise that lay close to Jackson's heart; and he began by visiting
the province--about whose loyalty and relations with the United States
much concern was already felt at Mexico--when on the way to his post.
This promise of indiscretion in office was admirably fulfilled.
Maintaining a hold on our President by positive assurances of success,
he loafed, schemed, made overtures, threatened, was ignored, rebuffed,
snubbed and cajoled, fancied he could outplay or buy the astute and
hostile Alamán, tried to do "underworking" with Pedraza, plotted bribery
with one Hernández, the confessor of Santa Anna's sister, grossly
violated his conciliatory instructions by engaging in a truculent
personal affair with Tornel, and was finally, after ceasing to represent
us, ordered out of the country. In short he succeeded only in proving
that we had for minister a cantankerous, incompetent rascal, in making
it appear that our government was eager to obtain Mexican territory,
and in suggesting--though explicitly and repeatedly ordered to eschew
all equivocal methods--that we felt no scruples as to means. On the
ground of Butler's connection with disaffected Texas, Mexico politely
asked for his recall near the close of 1835, and in December Powhatan
Ellis, born a Virginian but now a federal judge in Mississippi, was
appointed chargé d'affaires.[3.10]

[THE TEXAN REVOLUTION]

A few months later Texas broke away from the mother-country, and her
former lords felt sure that from beginning to end, in the colonization,
rebellion and successful defence of that region, the hand of the
American government could plainly enough be seen. Their state of feeling
seemed to Butler "a perfect tempest of passion," and Ellis believed
that the Cabinet of Mexico discussed seriously the question of an open
rupture with the United States. The Mexican view, however, although
supported by a section of the American public, was radically incorrect.
Essentially the migration of our citizens across the Sabine formed a
part of the great movement that peopled the Mississippi valley. The
causes of the Texan rebellion were provided by Mexico herself. That
step actually crossed the wish and aims of our administration, which
desired to buy the province--not see it become an independent country.
From the very first, our national authorities proclaimed and endeavored
to enforce neutrality; and they gave the Texans no assistance in their
struggle for independence. The British minister at Mexico expressed the
opinion to Santa Anna that our government had done all that could be
expected, and all that lay in its power; and Santa Anna did not venture
to deny this. Individual Americans and sometimes Americans in groups
did, it is true, contribute materially to aid the cause of Texas; but
in most cases their action was entirely lawful, while in the others it
could not be prevented. Moreover, these few trespasses against the law
of neutrality were in substance only just retribution for the tyranny,
misgovernment and atrocities of Mexico. In reality, therefore, our
skirts were as clear as reasonably could have been expected.[3.11]

One phase of the case, however, which excited special indignation
at Mexico, requires notice. Two streams from the north send their
waters into Sabine Lake, and it was held by some that either of these
could be regarded as the Sabine River and, therefore, as marking the
boundary. In October, 1833, Butler urged that we insist upon the western
stream, commonly called the Neches, and occupy in force the valuable
intermediate region, which included Nacogdoches; and for a time Jackson
felt inclined to do so. Near the close of 1835 Mexico was officially
warned against encroaching upon our territory while fighting the
Texans, and suspected that Secretary of State Forsyth took this action
with a view to the Nacogdoches district. She therefore became alarmed,
and early in 1836 a special minister hastily set out for Washington
to investigate the matter. This minister was Manuel E. de Gorostiza,
a witty, agreeable man of the world, Mexican by birth, Spanish by
education, the author of some clever dramas, but not professionally a
topographer, a lawyer or even a diplomat.[3.12]

[BOUNDARY DIFFICULTIES]

Then a delicate matter became suddenly menacing. On both sides of the
Sabine there were Indians, who loved war, whisky and plunder as much
as they hated work and the whites. A paper boundary, particularly one
in dispute, meant nothing to them. Once roused, they were practically
sure, as Gorostiza admitted, to rob and murder wherever they could;
and not only the fighting in Texas but at least one Mexican emissary
enkindled their passions. United States Indians crossed the line and
perpetrated outrages. Homes were abandoned. People fled panic-stricken
from the vicinity of Nacogdoches; citizens of the town implored American
protection against our own Indians; and evidence of an incipient
conflagration was placed in the hands of General E. P. Gaines, who
commanded our troops on the border.[3.12] Now the treaty of amity
required each country to prevent its Indians from ravaging the other;
but, as Mexico did not wish us at this time to keep our savages
from harassing the Texans, and did not request us to act for her in
fulfilling her pledge, which she could not fulfil herself, possibly
the treaty, though often cited by the United States, had technically
no direct bearing. But the American government argued rightly that
substance was more important than form; that the intent of the treaty
was to require both countries to prevent "by all the means in their
power" an Indian war on the frontier; that it was the paramount duty
of the Executive to protect our people, who, as Gorostiza virtually
admitted, were liable to be endangered by the threatened conflagration;
that as it was known to be physically impossible for Mexico to comply
with the treaty, she could not complain of us for doing what she had
agreed ought to be done, and had undertaken to do; that, should it be
necessary to cross what had been commonly assumed to be the boundary
in order to perform our duty--particularly in order to prevent our own
Indians from perpetrating outrages on the other side--common sense and
the spirit of the treaty warranted our doing it; and that, on account
of the distance to the Sabine, it was necessary to give the general
commanding there a certain credence and a certain discretion. Our
government could have reasoned also, and very likely it did, that the
strong desire of the Texans, _de facto_ successors to the Mexicans in
that region, that we should fulfil the obligation which the treaty
created, was an additional ground for so doing.[3.12]

Accordingly Gaines, while ordered with strong emphasis to maintain a
rigid neutrality, was authorized to advance as far as Nacogdoches--an
excellent point from which to defend the American frontier and prevent
our Indians from operating beyond it--should such a step seem positively
necessary; and then, as measures of precaution, Forsyth not only
explained our views and intentions personally to Gorostiza, but made
in writing what that minister himself described as a "frank and noble"
statement, saying that the occupation of the intermediate region, should
it occur, would be temporary and for the sole purpose indicated, and
would have no significance in regard to the boundary question.[3.12]

Apparently satisfied by the directness and candor of this policy,
Gorostiza at first admitted the right of the United States to enter
Texas in order to punish actual or prevent intended outrages, and
thus conceded that the frontier could be crossed without offence. But
apparently, when he had taken leave of the secretary of state, his
distrust returned, and his Mexican subtlety imagined all sorts of ugly
possibilities. It disturbed him that Forsyth did not formally commit
himself, in advance of a survey, against the Neches claim. It alarmed
him to find that the state department could not give him early and exact
information as to Gaines's movements in a remote, unsettled region.
He felt angry that Lewis Cass, who was secretary of war but of course
had no control over our foreign relations, looked upon Nacogdoches
as American territory. Various other things also appeared to him
suspicious, when really his lack of judgment was the chief or only
reason. Most important of all, no doubt, he thought of public opinion
in Mexico, which was entirely unacquainted with American directness
as exemplified by Forsyth, intensely suspicious of us, and intensely
hostile.[3.12]

[DIPLOMATIC CLASHES]

He retracted, therefore, as much as possible of his concurrence, opened
a war of notes upon our state department, and near the end of the year
1836, on learning from the secretary that in spite of his objections
American troops had gone to Nacogdoches, demanded his passports, and
left our shores in wrath. His conduct in so doing was officially
endorsed by his government, and anti-American feeling in that country
became deeper and hotter than before. Nothing could be seen there except
that "sacred" soil claimed and long occupied by Mexico, though now out
of her control, had been profaned by Gaines's troops, and thus, as all
Mexicans argued, the way opened for limitless aggressions. To make the
case even worse, it was erroneously believed that Houston's victory at
San Jacinto had really been gained by troops then in the service of the
United States, and it was said that we were preparing to attack Mexico
very soon by sea and by land.[3.12]

Our recognition of Texas, which occurred early in 1837, was entirely in
line with our previous action in similar cases, was less prompt than our
recognition of Mexico herself had been, and seemed not only warranted
but required by the circumstances. That republic had a government in
operation which appeared to be competent, and was thought likely to
endure. Santa Anna, the President of Mexico, admitted that she could not
hope to gain control of the revolted province, even should its troops
be vanquished in the field, and expressed a desire that we should open
the way to a settlement of the controversy by granting recognition.
After 1836, as the Mexican minister of war stated eight years later,
there was no serious talk of attempting to subdue Texas. At the date of
recognition, since war between us and Mexico seemed almost inevitable,
there appeared to be no great need of considering her susceptibilities;
and it was feared that England entertained certain designs, unfavorable
to us, regarding Texas, which could be defeated or at least hindered by
taking this action. As Mexico was totally unable to protect American
vessels in the port of Galveston, we had to establish relations with the
power that could do so, or else conduct an important part of our trade
under hazardous conditions; and no commercial nation willingly accepts
the second alternative in such a case. Finally, the leading powers of
Europe endorsed our course by doing the same thing before any material
change in the situation occurred.[3.13]

Mexico, however, would see none of these facts. Our earliest moves
toward recognition were looked upon by her, said the British minister,
"as the consummation of a design long since entertained" to rob her
of that valuable territory, and excited, as he remarked, a "bitter
animosity" that no explanation could even mitigate; and our formal
action became one more standing ground of complaint and wrath against
the government and people of the United States.[3.13]

In 1842 Mexican feeling was intensified. At this time Santa Anna
thought it advisable to rekindle the Texan war, now virtually dormant
for six years. Very likely he did not wish to let the case go by
default; naturally his recollections of Texan hospitality moved him to
reciprocate; and in all probability he believed that any prospect of
fighting Texas or the United States in the name of national honor would
help to make his autocratic military rule more acceptable. Accordingly,
several annoying though ineffective raids beyond the Rio Grande
occurred, and a serious invasion was threatened. Upon this, many Texan
sympathizers in the Unites States and many who thought they saw England
supporting the Mexican operations, held meetings, contributed funds, and
even migrated to Texas with guns on their shoulders, all of which they
could legally do.[3.14]

In pursuance of Santa Anna's policy--probably also to gratify the strong
and universal sentiment of his fellow-citizens, aid the anti-Texas and
anti-administration party in the United States, neutralize perhaps the
good understanding between the United States and England resulting
from the settlement of our northeastern boundary, and possibly gain
the sympathy not only of Great Britain, but of her friend Louis
Philippe--Bocanegra, the minister of relations, now declared war
upon us in the field of diplomacy. May 12, 1842, he addressed Daniel
Webster, then secretary of state, directly, protesting against the
aid given Texas by our citizens, and asking whether the United States
could injure Mexico any more, if openly at war against her. "Certainly
not," he said, in reply to his own question. Then he issued a circular
to the diplomatic corps at Mexico, in which he charged our government
with tolerating aggressions made upon Mexican territory by "subaltern
and local authorities," and announced that while his country did not
wish to fight the United States, she would certainly do all that was
"imperatively required for her honor and dignity." Still not satisfied,
he wrote again to Webster, though an answer to the first letter was
not yet due, accusing the American Cabinet itself of "conduct openly
at variance with the most sacred principles of the law of nations and
the solemn compacts of amity existing between the two countries," and
threatening that a continuance of this policy would be regarded as "a
positive act of hostility."[3.14]

In reply to Bocanegra's first despatch, Webster said that the American
government utterly denied and repelled the charges made against it, and
then with characteristic power he discussed and refuted them. We shall
still maintain neutrality, he concluded, "but the continuance of amity
with Mexico cannot be purchased at any higher rate." To Bocanegra's
second letter his reply was no less positive but a great deal briefer.
The President, he wrote, considers the language and tone of that
communication "highly offensive," and orders "that no other answer be
given to it than the declaration that the conduct of the Government of
the United States, in regard to the war between Mexico and Texas, having
been always hitherto governed by a strict and impartial regard to its
neutral obligations, will not be changed or altered in any respect or in
any degree."[3.14]

This compelled Mexico, as the British minister observed, to accept the
rebuke invited by her imprudent language or begin hostilities. The
former course was chosen; and Bocanegra humbly replied that, relying
upon Webster's "frank declaration" of neutrality, he would not dwell
further upon the subject. Even before Webster was heard from, our
minister described the state of feeling at Mexico as "most bitter";
and such a correspondence, disagreeable enough to Mexican pride, tended
naturally to bring the two countries nearer to the tented field.
Richtofen, the Prussian envoy at Mexico, said that Bocanegra's note led
to a distinctly hostile state of things. At one time the President of
the United States did not see how war could be avoided; and the Mexican
press did about all it could to create a fighting temper.[3.14]

An opera bouffe sequel followed. Commodore T. A. C. Jones, lying at
Callao with our Pacific squadron, received some of Bocanegra's effusions
from the American consul at Mazatlán, who added that war seemed "highly
probable." Jones could not believe that a responsible minister would
write so fiercely unless prepared for a conflict, and he felt sure the
United States would not flinch. Anxious to provide a port of refuge for
American vessels, alarmed lest England should now obtain California
under some arrangement with Mexico, as she was thought ready to do, and
satisfied that hostilities would actually break out before he could
reach that coast, he sailed promptly and arrived at Monterey on October
19. Being a rather self-sufficient and hasty person, he investigated
the matter there in but a superficial manner, and the next day politely
occupied the town. He now found that war had not begun; and upon this,
after hauling down his flag and saluting that of Mexico, he sailed
away, while General Micheltorena, the governor, thundered grandiloquent
language at him from a safe distance. Naturally the authorities at
Mexico flared up at this episode; but they soon found that no charge
could be made against our government, and, realizing presently with our
minister's aid that the longest finger pointed toward Bocanegra and the
loudest laugh was at Micheltorena, they willingly allowed the matter to
fade away. It therefore sharpened Mexican hostility far less than might
have been expected, yet no doubt considerably.[3.15]

Meanwhile fresh trouble arose. The continuance of nominal war between
Mexico and Texas and the constant danger of raids interfered seriously
with our commercial interests. Near the end of June, 1842, therefore,
the American secretary of state, hoping to influence the government of
Mexico, observed to our minister that the war was "not only useless,
but hopeless, without attainable object, injurious to both parties
and likely to be, in its continuance, annoying and vexatious to other
commercial nations"; and this line of policy was followed up in January,
1843. Indeed, Webster gave notice that a formal protest would very
likely be made, unless the state of war should be ended or respectable
forces take the field.[3.14]

Naturally these remonstrances, however proper, gave much offence;
and the translation of John Quincy Adams's brilliant speech at
Braintree, Massachusetts, which made an eloquent but mistaken attack
upon the American administration, gave the newspapers of Mexico a
fresh opportunity and fresh reason to ventilate their suspicions of
us. A merciless warfare upon Texas was now announced; and Santa Anna
decreed in June, 1843, that all foreigners taken in arms on Texan soil
should be executed. In reply to this, our secretary of state declared
that American citizens could not be prevented from serving abroad,
as Frenchmen and Germans had served in our own revolutionary armies;
and that, if captured in Texas, they must be treated as prisoners of
war. "On this point," he insisted, "there can be no concession or
compromise."[3.14]

[AMERICAN GRIEVANCES]

Here our point of view must be shifted. So far we have mainly been
concerned with complaints on the part of Mexico, and it will be admitted
that in those affairs the United States did not materially injure her
in any unlawful way, and exhibited no malicious intentions. We must now
take up certain American grievances; and first in order may be mentioned
the summary execution of twenty-two of our citizens in 1835. Under the
revolutionist Mejía they had left the United States for Texas, but they
were conducted to Tampico and there were captured. The minister of
relations asserted that they were duly tried, and simply experienced the
rigor of the law; but our minister ascertained that no trial took place.
In spite of international law and treaty stipulations the government
ordered them shot, and shot they were--officially murdered. At the edge
of the grave eighteen of them signed a denial, their "dying words," that
any intention to invade Mexico had existed in their minds.[3.16]

Next may come the systematic endeavor of Mexico, even after signing the
treaty of amity and commerce, to hinder our people from crossing the
boundary, and in particular to keep them out of Texas. Article III of
the treaty said: "The citizens of the two countries shall have liberty
to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any part of said
territories, respectively." All Mexicans were offered the full benefit
of this agreement in the United States; but a Mexican law, revived by
decree on April 4, 1837, with evident reference to our people, read
thus: "Foreigners are prohibited from settling in those States and
territories of the Confederacy which border on the territories of their
own nations." This was done on the ground that political mischief was
liable to result from their presence. Now some allowance is to be made
for this view. But in reality all international relations involve
danger, and the country that fears it should use precautions. American
sailors make trouble in French ports, but France does not refuse them
admission--she appoints policemen. The danger from Americans in Texas
was doubtless greater, but so were the advantages to be derived from
their coming. Had Mexico governed that region well, their presence
would have benefited her immensely; and to make a treaty sanctioning
foreign intercourse, and then endeavor to keep the main avenue of that
intercourse barred, in order to avoid the legitimate results of her own
misgovernment, was an international system decidedly more novel than
friendly, more ingenious than straightforward.[3.17]

In April, 1840, under a verbal order from the governor of upper
California, a considerable number of peaceable Americans and other
foreigners, residing at scattered points, were suddenly arrested in a
brutal and even bloody manner on the pretext of a conspiracy, and their
property was confiscated. Even the possession of legal passports did
not protect them. After suffering inhuman treatment, they were sent in
irons to Mexico. There only the charity of strangers preserved their
lives; and at length, after marching under blows and with bleeding feet
as far as Tepic, they were thrust into prisons. No doubt they were rough
in character and behavior, and the presence of such bold, vigorous
foreigners in a weakly governed region obviously involved some dangers;
but they had rights. No evidence justifying the treatment they received
was brought forward, and the government at Mexico, even while ordering
them expelled from the country without compensation, admitted the
illegality of their arrest. Finally, as the British minister demanded,
they were permitted to go home; but Mexico failed to bear the expense of
their journey, as she had promised to do, and paid but a slight, if any,
indemnity. Such conduct when she had millions for the army, the civil
wars and the pockets of officials, was inexcusable. Justly enough this
affair excited the deep indignation of our government and people.[3.18]

In June, 1841, a Texan expedition set out for Santa Fe, hoping to
bring about the incorporation of New Mexico in the new republic, but
not planning under any circumstances to make war; and a considerable
number of Americans--among them Kendall, editor of the New Orleans
_Picayune_--joined the caravan with commercial or other peaceable
aims. After a while the entire body were made prisoners by the Mexican
governor. Kendall's passport, when duly exhibited under a flag of truce,
was taken from him; and, although the utmost penalty incurred under
Mexican law by the non-combatant Americans was expulsion, they were
driven with instances of extreme brutality to Mexico, and compelled
to work in chains on public roads. For one reason or another a few of
our citizens gained their freedom from time to time; but it was not
until well on in 1842--and then as an act of condescension instead of
justice--that Santa Anna released the main body of them. Of course this
country felt highly incensed again; and the Executive, while disclaiming
all desire to screen Americans from any deserved punishment, ordered our
minister to protest against the treatment of the prisoners, declaring
that Mexico would be required to observe the rules prescribed by modern
public law. On the other side of the Rio Grande still more passion was
aroused, but in the opposite sense.[3.19]

Beginning in a humble way, a caravan trade between St. Louis, Santa
Fe and Chihuahua grew to large proportions, and eventually interested
even the New York and Philadelphia merchants; but this commerce, though
sanctioned by treaty, was looked upon by Mexico with disfavor from
the very first. Excessive taxes were imposed at the frontier and at
Chihuahua; and finally, in August, 1843, Santa Anna arbitrarily locked
the door. Possibly there was a baseless notion that political designs
upon New Mexico were entertained in the United States; competition with
native traders may have been feared; and it was charged that smuggling
occurred. But competition and smuggling are unavoidable features of
international commerce; and if they afforded an adequate reason for
disregarding a formal agreement, international trade arrangements would
not be worth making. Our citizens and government objected therefore
vigorously and with justice to Santa Anna's course.[3.20]

One week after this decree went forth, another prohibited the
importation of certain specified articles at any point, and ordered the
forfeiture of such merchandise, already in the hands of dealers, if not
sold within the ensuing twelve months. The list of articles, printed
solidly in small type, filled nearly an octavo page, and apparently was
intended to include almost everything embraced in our trade with Mexico.
Peculiarly harsh seemed the forfeiture provision. Not only was it _ex
post facto_, but our traders by paying the duty had become entitled to
the privilege of selling their goods; and the American secretary of
state could do no less than protest against the law, as "a manifest
violation of the liberty of trade secured by the treaty." Yet something
still more serious followed it, for aliens were soon prohibited from
doing retail business at all. An attempt was made to defend this order
on the ground that Americans residing in the country were subject to its
laws, usages and statutes; but our government replied that a treaty must
be regarded as the supreme law, and that if one solemn agreement with
Mexico could thus be made a nullity, all the other privileges accorded
us could one by one be abrogated.[3.21]

These commercial grievances, however, were trifles compared with
another of the same halcyon period. In July, 1843, Tornel, the
minister of war, instructed the governors of California and three
other northern departments to expel all citizens of the United States
residing therein, and permit no more of them to enter. Extraordinary
precautions were taken to keep this measure secret, and Waddy Thompson,
our representative at Mexico, first learned of it on December 23. Four
times he inquired in vain whether such an order had been issued; but
when he demanded his passports, Bocanegra attempted to justify Tornel's
instructions, arguing that every government is authorized to protect
itself against seditious aliens. This was an evasion, for the order had
reference to all Americans, however law-abiding. The outcome was that
now, after the order had been in force almost six months and after it
had been executed in at least one department, directions were given
to make it include all foreigners, and apply only to the seditious.
Thompson, strongly disposed to please the Mexicans, accepted this as
satisfactory; but his country did not, for the governors had authority
still to decide what Americans were dangerous, and expel these without
a trial. Besides, even the modified order required them to prevent our
citizens from entering their jurisdictions, and thus plainly violated
the treaty.[3.22]

All of the grievances thus far mentioned bore directly upon the general
government of Mexico, but there were also many others, primarily
chargeable to minor authorities, in which our national rights were
seriously attacked;[3.23] and next we reach the question of "American
claims"--that is to say, private injuries for which damages were asked.
At once the idea occurs to us that perhaps our citizens brought their
troubles upon themselves by peculiarly obnoxious conduct. This does not
appear likely to have been the rule, however, for the British, although
the Mexicans felt anxious to have their goodwill and assistance,
complained loudly and long, and their government protested in the most
emphatic and sweeping style. Indeed, said Ashburnham, the chargé of
England: "There is scarcely one foreign power with whom they have had
any relation, which has not had more or less cause to complain of the
iniquity and persecution to which its subjects here have been exposed;"
and France, though her claims were much smaller than ours, took up arms
on this account. Bearing in mind, then, how peculiarly inimical were the
people and authorities of Mexico toward us, one can readily imagine what
sort of treatment citizens of ours had to endure.[3.24]

[THE AMERICAN CLAIMS]

In the next place one desires to be sure whether our actual claims were
real or, as some American and Mexican writers have asserted, were simply
"trumped-up." That a few of the less important ones had no basis is
apparently true, but it must be remembered that our government was bound
to consider any case resting on _prima facie_ support, and ask for
an investigation. It could not, like the Mexican authorities, examine
the records necessary for the detection of all mistakes and frauds.
Moreover, the existence of unfounded claims, if such there were, does
not matter to us, for the real question is merely whether substantial
sums were justly demanded. On that point one immediately reflects, not
only that our national authorities were scarcely capable of conspiring
with skippers and traders to pick the pocket of Mexico, but that, had
they been silly enough to present a list of imaginary claims, her
quick-witted if not profound officials would have delighted to analyze
and expose the frauds. Coming then to the question, one can answer it
positively in the affirmative. Both national and international tribunals
decided that we had well-founded and substantial claims.[3.25]

It has been urged, however, that our demands required very difficult
and extensive investigations, which in the midst of her embarrassments
Mexico could not reasonably be expected to enter upon; but many, if not
most, of the claims were in fact simple.[3.26] It has been insisted
that as aggrieved Mexicans in the United States appealed to our courts,
the proper policy for aggrieved Americans was to appeal to the courts
of Mexico;[3.27] but the assumed analogy did not exist. The Mexican
tribunals, in addition to being notoriously bad from every point of
view, were sometimes deliberately used to perpetrate iniquities, and
could not always enforce their fair decisions.[3.28]

American writers have also argued that it was contemptible for a strong
and rich nation like ours to demand money from a poor neighbor; but
the extent of our national resources had no bearing on the rights of
individual citizens, crippled or impoverished by Mexican injustice.
This, however, is by no means all that should be said. The wisdom
and the equity of the civilized world are embodied in its laws, and
those laws agree that one's debts are to be paid. Spendthrifts are not
exempted from the effects of this rule, and the poverty of the Mexican
treasury was due not only to carelessness but also to crime. Moreover,
if an amiable, "_siempre-alegre_" young man borrows without repaying,
wastes his substance in riotous living, and perpetrates outrages on the
passers-by, it is the duty of some creditor to bring him before the
courts, and convince him in a practical manner that, as a member of
civilized society, he is accountable for his acts. The same principle
holds of international relations. "All political communities are
responsible to other political communities for their conduct," wrote
Canning to the Spanish government; Webster enunciated the same rule;
and it was not only the right but the duty of the United States--as a
fellow nation, a sister republic and a next neighbor--to bring Mexico
to her senses by teaching her what membership in the family of nations
involved. Had this been done at the beginning of her wild career,
she might have put her house in order before bad practices became
habitual.[3.29]

Again, we shall presently find good reasons to believe, that had
Mexico fairly examined our claims and frankly stated her financial
difficulties, a lenient arrangement regarding what were after all
moderate sums for a nation to pay could readily have been made. Further
still, if Mexico was too poor to discharge her debts promptly, it
was incumbent upon her, besides recognizing them, to show a certain
appreciation of the indulgence accorded her; but instead of so doing she
continued to harass American citizens, and showed, as we shall find,
a distinct lack of good-will and even of straightforwardness in her
dealings with us.

Finally, it has been repeated over and over again by American and
Mexican writers that our claims were urged aggressively. But the history
of the matter does not read in that way. Our demands for redress began
early in Poinsett's day. In October, 1829, Butler was directed to lay
them before the Mexican government, but at the same time to avoid
"anything like menace or defiance." Morning after morning his table was
covered with fresh American remonstrances against official conduct,
he reported, and for years his efforts met only with rebuffs; yet
his instructions were still to maintain amicable relations, and our
government set him the example.[3.30]

[OUR CLAIMS CONSIDERATELY URGED]

In June, 1836, Ellis reported that "daily" acts of "injustice and
oppression" continued to be perpetrated, while every application for
redress was treated with "cold neglect"; yet the next month he was
merely instructed to "make a fresh appeal" to the "sense of honor and
justice" of the Mexican government, asking that our grievances "should
be promptly and properly examined" and "suitable" redress be afforded.
In order, however, to check what the British minister called "their
usual system of evasion," a satisfactory reply of some kind within
three weeks was to be required, and should it not be made without
"unnecessary" delay, Ellis, after giving a fortnight's notice, was to
withdraw. In October Monasterio, after delaying for weeks to answer
Ellis, admitted that his predecessors had neglected this business, and
promised he would give his first attention to our claims, many of which,
as we know, were very simple, very old and very familiar to the foreign
office; but his reply, the following month, was mere evasion. Why, asked
Ellis, have not the claims presented during the past ten years been
either accepted or rejected? But the mystery was not explained, and at
the end of December, 1836--after waiting, not three weeks, but three
months--he withdrew. Meanwhile Gorostiza distributed among the diplomats
at Washington a pamphlet in which he accused our government of grossly
dishonorable conduct in regard to Texas; and the unqualified approval
of his superiors turned this impropriety into a grave international
issue.[3.31]

President Jackson had originally felt most sympathetic toward Mexico;
and although Butler and Ellis agreed that indulgence was a mistaken
policy, and her official journal described all Americans as villains
and all our claims as the pretexts of smugglers, yet in a Message of
December, 1836, Jackson recommended courtesy and great forbearance. The
evasions practised upon Ellis, however, and still more the approval of
Gorostiza's insulting pamphlet, sharpened his feelings, and early in
February, 1837, he laid the subject of our claims anew before Congress,
as it was his right and his duty to do, proposed to make the next demand
for settlement from the deck of a warship, and asked for authority to
undertake reprisals in case that step also should prove ineffectual. In
the official view of Mexico, Gaines's advance and Gorostiza's withdrawal
from Washington amounted to a formal rupture, even though Castillo, her
ordinary representative, lingered in the United States until March; and
in our own official opinion the endorsement of Gorostiza's conduct, the
refusal to examine our claims, and the return of Ellis could signify
hardly less. Under such circumstances Jackson's February Message was
perfectly normal and proper.[3.32]

Congress took substantially the same view as the Executive; but
there was some fear of Mexican privateers, a good deal of pity for a
sister republic supposed to be the victim of circumstances, a little
unwillingness to increase Jackson's power, a pronounced wish to comply
exactly with the treaty of amity, which required formal notice in
advance of hostilities, and considerable hope that Santa Anna, who had
now been restored alive to his country through the magnanimity of the
Texans and the Americans, would reciprocate by endeavoring to adjust
our claims. Another consideration, however, was probably still more
potent. The administration party felt that should war be declared, the
opposition would say its real object was the acquisition of Texas; and
so Jackson's well-known desire to obtain that region prevented in large
measure, instead of causing, an outbreak of hostilities. It was decided,
therefore, to make the final demand for redress in a peaceful manner,
and to show full respect for what the House of Representatives described
as our "ancient, though now estranged, friend."[3.33]

In March, 1837, Van Buren became President, and found it necessary to
take some action. The documents bearing on our claims were critically
examined; fifty-seven cases, apparently free from doubt, were made out
and proved; and in July, Robert Greenhow, interpreter of the state
department, presented them at Mexico with a final demand for redress,
adding that we had no desire to cause embarrassment by pressing for
payment. On one point, however, he insisted: Gorostiza's conduct must
be disavowed. The minister of relations admitted in reply that certain
of the cases did not require long examination, which was indeed true;
but he said the President, while "most anxious" not to cause delay,
wished that "each" of them should be examined "in its turn" and that
"nothing should be left undone" which could promote "the most speedy and
equitable" settlement.[3.34]

In November Martínez, a new minister to the United States, whom we
received kindly even though Gorostiza's action had not been disavowed,
presented the answer of his government. Instead of the document
officially transmitted by Greenhow, an obsolete, incomplete and
necessarily inaccurate list of our claims, obtained nobody knows how,
had been used; only four of our fifty-seven living cases had even been
considered; and not one of these had been disposed of. Accordingly,
when our Congress assembled in December, 1837, the Executive laid the
whole subject before it anew, analyzed Mexico's evasive reply--so
different from what had been solemnly promised--announced that fresh
outrages of a serious and exasperating sort had been committed, and
plainly intimated that no hope of a peaceful settlement could be
entertained. Evidently the patience of the United States had nearly
come to an end; but before Congress was ready to act, Martínez proposed
a scheme of arbitration, which--though formally decided upon by
Mexico in May, 1837--it had apparently been her deliberate purpose
to hold in reserve until all other dilatory tactics should have been
exhausted.[3.35]

[ARBITRATION AGREED UPON]

Naturally our government hesitated to adopt a plan which, as the British
representative at Mexico wrote when he heard of it, was precisely the
one to "gratify the favourite object" of our debtors--"the gaining of
time and postponement of the day of reckoning"; but in April, 1838,
quite unlike France and much to the surprise of Mexico, we accepted
arbitration, and it then appeared that Martínez had no powers to act
in the matter. For months, indeed, although our consul at Mexico was
assuring that government of our fair and friendly disposition, he did
not receive them.[3.36]

In September, 1838, however, a convention was signed. Martínez stated
that it would not have to be ratified by the Congress of his country,
but her President ruled otherwise, and then with an extremely poor
excuse did not submit it. So the time limit arrived; and, to the intense
disgust of our people and administration, the agreement lapsed. The poor
excuse was accepted by our government, however, and in April, 1839,
after two years had thus been frittered away, another convention was
made, providing that each country should name two commissioners, and the
king of Prussia select a fifth person to be an umpire; and as Mexico
disavowed Gorostiza's conduct in circulating the offensive pamphlet, our
patience appeared to be rewarded.[3.37]

In the opinion of Pakenham, British minister at Mexico, the arbitration
arrangement was "a very fortunate circumstance" for the debtor nation,
and one that she ought to observe scrupulously; but the minister of
relations, without even a poor excuse, failed to consider seriously the
appointment of commissioners until a few days before the treaty required
them to be in Washington, and consequently the agreement expired.
Mexico, however, could not well take advantage of this fact; the United
States waived it; and on August 25, 1840, nearly two and a half years
after we had accepted arbitration, the joint commission was organized.
The representatives of Mexico were Señores Castillo and León, one of
whom, being unfamiliar with business, fell under the control of his
colleague, while the other was described by Pakenham as conspicuously
dishonest. In eighteen months from that date, according to the treaty,
the labors of this body were to end. To kill time was, therefore, to
kill claims--or at any rate bury them.[3.38]

When the subject of the commission was discussed in 1838, Forsyth
took the ground that it would be a judicial body, guided solely by
the evidence before it; and this principle was apparently accepted
as fundamental. Webster, now the secretary of state, pointed out
that it was essentially and necessarily such a tribunal. The Mexican
commissioners, however, had been ordered to act, not freely according to
the evidence, but according to the instructions of their government; and
moreover they promptly refused to let the claimants present themselves
either in person, by attorney or in writing. Some four months were
spent in discussing objections raised by them, and finally, in order to
get something done, the American representatives found it necessary to
give way. Yet the sailing was not smooth even then. Castillo and León
resorted not only to dilatory tactics and unfair methods, but even to
express falsehood; and their government violated in a signal manner one
of the most fundamental stipulations of the treaty. In short, if we may
believe the apparently fair statement of the American commissioners,
the Mexicans caused delays that prevented the adjustment of claims
amounting to more than five millions, and pursued a course in general
that excited great indignation throughout this country. Meanwhile, as
our philo-Mexican minister, Thompson, reported, "The rights of American
Citizens of every grade and character" were still subjected to "constant
outrage."[3.39]

[MEXICAN EVASIONS]

In spite of everything, however, some two millions--in 1841 a
substantial amount--were awarded, and at once Mexico set at work to
devise a scheme for evading the obligation. Urgent advice from the
British minister discouraged this plan, however; and finally a new
convention was made in January, 1843, expressly for the convenience of
our debtor, by which the amount with interest was to be paid within five
years, counted from the following April, in equal quarterly instalments
of cash. "Such indulgent terms," was Pakenham's description of the
arrangement. Both governments ratified it; and so after these many years
of patience and effort on the one side, evasion and sometimes dishonesty
on the other, compensation for a portion of our grievances began to be
received. But--after all, Mexico paid only three instalments. At that
point she broke her word, and stopped.[3.40]

For her course in this matter there seem to be only two conceivable
excuses; her embarrassed condition and her irritation over the Texas
affair. With reference to these it must be said that her condition was
itself inexcusable, and at the utmost did not incapacitate her for doing
all that we demanded; while her irritation was essentially unfounded,
and, even had it been reasonable, would not have justified her making
promises and agreements only to break them, or resorting in other ways
to dishonorable methods.[3.41]




                                   IV

                THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
                               AND MEXICO

                               1843-1846


In 1843 our decisive difficulty with Mexico began to take shape. The
annexation of Texas to the United States was on legal, moral and
political grounds entirely legitimate. That republic had defied the
arms of the mother-country for nine years. It was recognized as an
independent nation by the leading commercial powers of the world; and
no well-informed person, even in Mexico, dreamed that it would return
to its former connection. To be sure, her pretensions were asserted in
1845 as loudly as ever; but she made them ridiculous by declaring that
never, under any circumstances, would the independence of her rebellious
daughter be conceded. Besides, Mexico had practically acquiesced in the
recognition of Texas by our own and other governments; and, in view of
this fact, as good a lawyer and statesman as Daniel Webster, though
opposed to incorporating that country in the Union, held that our doing
it gave Mexico no ground of complaint.[4.1]

[TEXAS ANNEXED JUSTLY]

Annexation was therefore permissible, and grave national interests of
the United States appeared to demand the step. All northern Mexico,
including California, seemed liable to secede, for the people of that
whole region felt profoundly dissatisfied with the administration of
their national affairs, and realized the urgent need of a strong and
orderly government; there was reason to believe that Sam Houston, the
President of Texas, thought of organizing under European auspices a
southwestern empire, absorbing Oregon, and thus offsetting the United
States; as A. J. Donelson, our minister in Texas at that period, wrote
in 1848, "He was not mistaken. This he could have done"; and in that
event we should have had a bold, ambitious rival in the rear. The
anti-slavery agitation in the United States led many of our southern
citizens to long for separation and a union with slaveholding Texas. The
possibilities of Texan cotton production, stimulated by the English,
who were eager to be independent of the American fields, were keenly
dreaded. The logic of the situation seemed likely to render Texas not
only a commercial and industrial competitor and a rancorous political
enemy, but a source of dangerous complications with Mexico, England and
France. Finally, the British, who possessed a powerful influence in
her councils and in those of Mexico, were deliberately endeavoring to
shape matters in such a way as to do very serious harm, it was believed,
to the interests of the United States. Under such conditions no one
could reasonably complain because we undertook, employing as means
only argument and persuasion, to acquire that important and valuable
territory, and ward off these apparently imminent dangers. Albert
Gallatin, who opposed our taking the step, wrote later that it was "both
expedient and natural, indeed ultimately unavoidable."[4.1]

No doubt it was quite natural that Mexico should take offence. To see
a handful of poor farmers, nearly all of them foreigners by birth,
rebel against their national government, appropriate a large portion
of the nation's territory, rout its army, capture its President,
establish a working political system, and gain recognition abroad, had
been fearfully trying. To believe, not only on the authority of every
Mexican leader but on that of many Europeans and some eminent Americans,
that all this loss and chagrin were largely, if not wholly, due to the
machinations of a neighbor, allied to Mexico by a treaty of amity and
constantly professing friendship, was harder yet. And now to find those
Texans, recently so eager to escape from all outside control, preparing
as if by a preconcerted understanding to join that seemingly perfidious
and aggressive nation, carrying their invaluable territories with them,
and bringing its frontier to the very bank of the Rio Grande--this was
certainly enough to make any citizen, ignorant of the natural steps by
which it had really come about and quite unable to understand American
ways, boil with rage. But the United States had labored to explain the
affair to Mexico, and was not responsible for her blindness.

For a number of reasons Mexico had anticipated the final outcome of the
Texan difficulties, and on August 23, 1843, Bocanegra, her secretary
of relations, addressed our minister on the subject. The conduct of
the United States regarding that province, he wrote, has "appeared to
afford grounds for doubting the sincerity and frankness" of the American
authorities, and therefore, while hoping that the republic founded by
Washington may be saved "from stain and dishonor," we announce hereby,
"that the Mexican Government will consider equivalent to a declaration
of war against the Mexican Republic the passage of an act [by the
American Congress] for the incorporation of Texas with the territory
of the United States; the certainty of the fact being sufficient for
the immediate proclamation of war." Such a note was of course decidedly
offensive to the honor of this nation. Even Thompson felt compelled to
be indignant.[4.2]

The following November Almonte, who then represented Mexico at
Washington, informed our secretary of state that should Congress and
the Executive decide upon annexation, he should consider his mission at
an end. "My country," he stated, "is resolved to declare war as soon
as it receives information of such an act." In reply, Upshur asserted
rather sharply the right of the United States to regard Texas as an
independent nation; but early in 1844 he talked the matter over with
Almonte in a very frank and amicable way, and the Mexican minister
concurred substantially in the annexation policy of our government. The
next spring, however, he formally repeated the protests of August and
November, 1843.[4.3]

[THE UNITED STATES CONCILIATORY]

Probably to gain time and if possible lead us on to acknowledge in some
way the claim of Mexico, Almonte encouraged Calhoun, who had succeeded
Upshur as the secretary of state, to believe that his government,
looking upon Texas as lost, would accept a pecuniary consideration
in order to minimize the misfortune; and about the middle of April,
1844, a "bearer of despatches" named Thompson left Washington with
certain instructions from the secretary of state to B. E. Green, our
chargé at Mexico. These directed him to inform the Mexican government
that, while intending no disrespect and feeling an "anxious desire"
to maintain friendly relations, the United States had been compelled
by a regard for our own security to negotiate a treaty for the
annexation of Texas without reaching a previous understanding with it,
but had borne its attitude in mind, and was now ready to adjust all
difficulties--particularly that of the boundary, which had purposely
been left an open question--"on the most liberal and satisfactory
terms."[4.4]

Thompson landed at Vera Cruz on May 14, and proceeded at once to call on
President Santa Anna, then at one of his estates near the coast. He next
went on to the capital, and in company with Green had a conference with
the acting President, who was, of course, entirely under Santa Anna's
control. No good results followed, however, and Calhoun's overture for
an amicable adjustment of the Texan difficulty, which Green presented
officially in a note, was rejected by the Cabinet. The United States,
Bocanegra pretended in his reply, though it had injured and outraged
Mexico by taking steps toward annexation, had now recognized her claim
to the territory; and he not only refused to make any concession, but
formally repeated the declaration of August 23. He then placed the Texas
affair before the diplomatic corps at Mexico; an unsuccessful attempt
was made to obtain from Bankhead, the British minister, some hint of
aid against the United States; Almonte received orders to persist in
his protests; the newspapers, taking their cue from a journal under the
President's direct control, broke out into what Bankhead characterized
as "the most violent strain of invective against the proposed
annexation"; and Santa Anna himself, assuming the reins of government,
called for 30,000 men and a large sum of money.[4.5]

It is thus clear that while our government positively and rightfully
denied the claims of Mexico to any legal ownership of Texas, it
showed--even to the extent of imprudence--a kindly regard for her
feelings and a willingness to make her, under cover of adjusting the
boundary, a substantial present; and it is equally clear that our
overture, instead of being received in a friendly or even a candid
manner, was twisted and misrepresented, and was used by Santa Anna not
only to advance his personal interests, but even to feed the prevalent
hostility against the United States and increase the danger of war.
Of course Mexico had a perfect right to repulse our advances, but her
method of procedure in the case was unjustifiable.

Meanwhile, from a variety of causes, among which the merits of the
question had but a small place, the treaty of annexation failed in our
Senate, and the Texans, who had given offence to England, France and
especially Mexico by accepting the overture of our Executive, found
themselves not only slighted by the United States but ferociously
menaced by Santa Anna, and seemed likely, in their resentment and
peril, to swing quite beyond our reach--presumably under the shield of
England. To counteract this tendency somewhat and in a measure safeguard
Texas against the dangers we had brought upon her, Calhoun sent a bold
and even audacious despatch to the American representative at Mexico.
The United States, he said, is responsible for the annexation treaty,
and upon us, not upon Texas, the wrath of Mexico should be visited;
moreover the matter of acquiring that territory, which it has long
been our policy to do, is pending still, and for that reason, as well
as on the score of humanity, we could not allow the question to be
decided by fierce Mexican threats of brutal hostilities; Texas is to be
treated as an independent power; but should annexation be consummated,
the United States will be ready to settle most liberally all resulting
difficulties.[4.6]

In October, 1844, our minister gave the substance of this despatch to
the Mexican government; and soon the talented, energetic and audacious
Rejón, the successor of Bocanegra, sent him in reply a long but not
wearisome review of the Texas affair, that was absolutely a masterpiece
in its class. Truths, managed so as to give a wrong impression, clever
half-truths and flat falsehoods were skilfully combined, and at last the
United States appeared to stand in the dock as a confessed perjurer and
thief awaiting sentence. As for Calhoun's intervening now between Mexico
and a handful of rebels, protested Rejón, that could not be tolerated,
unless every nation that so chose might fill neighboring territory with
its people, incite them to revolt, aid them to resist, and finally offer
them annexation. Our minister, Shannon, who had been a useful Democratic
stump-speaker in Ohio, blustered, blundered, threatened and undertook to
argue, but only drew from Rejón a still more insulting letter, and still
more embittered the feeling in both countries.[4.7]

At the beginning of March, 1845, our President signed the joint
resolution of Congress which provided for the annexation of Texas.
Almonte, the Mexican minister, at once protested, giving notice that his
country would maintain the claim to her ancient province "at all times,
by every means ... in her power"; and although James Buchanan, who now
became secretary of state under Polk, replied in a conciliatory manner,
Almonte broke off diplomatic relations and left our shores. At Mexico
the news produced a tremendous commotion, heightened by the report from
California that a revolution, decided by the American settlers, had
occurred in that department. War at once and war to the knife! cried the
press in concert; while the administration, in a note moderated by the
British and French ministers yet sufficiently positive, severed official
relations with Shannon, and insisted upon this policy even after
receiving a conciliatory reply from him. By the action of Mexico there
was, therefore, a complete rupture between the two countries.[4.8]

[MEXICO PREPARES FOR WAR]

When it was learned, about the middle of July, that our terms of
annexation had been accepted by Texas, passion burst forth again. The
leash of Mexican eloquence and fury broke. "August Houses! President of
the Republic!" cried _El Amigo del Pueblo_, "The hour of danger for the
country has sounded and she has a right to look to you for salvation.
Union and war!" Not merely Texas but all Mexico, the people were
told, had been marked as its prey by American greed. In order to save
itself before the public the administration, though at heart averse to
hostilities, proposed to Congress a declaration of war. Money was asked
from the Chambers, and full quotas of troops were summoned from the
departments; and by the end of the month, as the agent of our government
duly reported, the course of things pointed strongly toward hostilities.
The archives of Vera Cruz were carried to the interior; new guns were
mounted in the fortress there; steps were taken to raise a loan of
fifteen millions; munitions and provisions were said to be going as
rapidly as possible to Matamoros; and much was heard about the movements
of troops. At the end of July the ministers of Mexico at London and
Paris were notified that an appeal to arms would be made. August 8 the
Mexican consulate at New Orleans closed; and a few days later our consul
at Havana reported that his Mexican colleague had received an official
notification of the existence of war.[4.9]

To be sure, no public declaration to that effect appeared, but
there were good reasons for considering this fact unimportant. With
Spanish-American subtlety the Mexicans discovered that the threat of
August 23, 1843, repeated later, had rendered such an announcement
unnecessary, and that it would be shrewder to hold that by annexing
Texas we had declared war upon them, since they would then be free to
attack or defer attacking us, as might seem expedient. Besides, it
was argued, Texas was merely a rebellious province, and hence Mexico
could make war there at will, without giving us an excuse for opening
hostilities against her seaboard, and without enabling us to seize
territory by the right of belligerency. Consequently, as large forces
had been ordered to the north, a move across the Rio Grande at any
hour seemed more than possible; and the official journal urged, that
it should be effected at the earliest practicable moment, in order to
prevent the United States from occupying the territory, and making ready
there for hostilities.[4.10]

[OUR EFFORTS TO RESTORE INTERCOURSE]

The American government, on the other hand, undertook to restore
friendly relations. The official assurances of good-will given Almonte
were supplemented by private representations conveyed to him through
a mutual friend by a member of our Cabinet; and Polk took also a step
of much greater importance. Before the end of March W. S. Parrott was
appointed a confidential agent of our state department, and ordered
to reach Mexico, which had long been his place of residence, by the
quickest route. Try to convince the Mexican government, ran his
instructions, that it is truly for the interest of that country, "to
restore friendly relations between the two republics." If it is found
willing, you may reveal your official character, and say that the
United States will send a "Minister" on learning that he will be kindly
received. The annexation of Texas cannot be undone; but "you are at
liberty to state your confident belief that in regard to all unsettled
questions, we are prepared to meet Mexico in a most liberal and friendly
spirit."[4.11]

Thus commissioned, Parrott sought his post without delay, renewed
his acquaintance with members of the Mexican Congress, invited them
frequently to lunch or dinner, and talked, no doubt in the spirit of
his instructions, with all such influential persons as he could reach.
In particular, as he reported, he was "very precise in stating, that
the Government of the United States could never recognize in Mexico the
right to claim an indemnity for the annexation of Texas to the American
Union; but that, in a treaty of _limits_, for the sake of peace and
good neighborhood, the United States would, no doubt, be disposed, as
had been officially stated, to meet Mexico, in a negotiation, upon the
most friendly and _liberal_ terms." No explanation could have been
clearer.[4.12]

There were good reasons for anticipating a favorable result from this
overture. President Herrera, connected by marriage with a leading
American merchant at the capital, was an honest, reasonable and
patriotic citizen; and, knowing that hostilities with the United States
would at best involve many costly sacrifices, and would very likely
throw California into our hands, he desired to escape by some method
from his public action in favor of war. It was altogether possible, too,
that a reverse on the field might upset his administration and injure
his friends; and, since the movement that had placed him in power had
cost money, his backers, in order to be repaid, felt anxious to curtail
instead of increasing the military expenses. Moreover there was trouble
with both England and France at this time; the more intelligent part of
the nation, cooling a little, were beginning to perceive the advantages
of a peaceful settlement with us; a chance could be seen that in the end
such a policy, reducing the cost of government, would become popular;
and finally it was realized that unless money to pay the troops were
obtained from the United States, their fickle allegiance probably could
not be retained. Accordingly on August 29, 1845, Parrott reported that
in his opinion an envoy from this country would be heartily welcomed;
almost at the same time Black, our consul at Mexico, and Dimond, our
consul at Vera Cruz, expressed the same view; and private advices tended
to confirm these opinions.[4.13]

Our own reasons for wishing to have diplomatic intercourse restored
were almost equal in strength to Herrera's. Aside from the political
and commercial interests that had always led us to seek the friendship
of Mexico, we desired to collect the unpaid instalments of our awards,
prosecute our claims, guard our citizens residing in that country,
adjust the Texan difficulty, counteract prejudicial movements on the
part of European states, and cultivate the good-will of the Central and
South American peoples, who were sure to be influenced by the sentiments
of their kindred next us. In particular, only two or three months later
Guizot's idea of establishing a balance of power in this hemisphere
was exciting alarm in Congress; and there is reason to believe that
our Executive, already aware of it, desired the support of Mexico in
opposing a design so un-American. Besides, Polk felt sure that European
governments had an eye upon California, and a minister was needed at
the Mexican capital to prevent, if possible, any bargaining on the
subject.[4.14]

Even more important, there were signs that a monarchy headed by
a European prince might be set up in Mexico, involving dangerous
interference in our commercial and political relations with that
country, sure to increase the gravity of a military contest, should one
arise, and seriously attacking the "Monroe Doctrine." As early as 1838
our consul at Mexico reported that Alamán and the conservatives were
laboring to establish a monarchy. In 1840 Estrada, one of the ablest and
best of their statesmen, was denounced for openly advocating the change.
Paredes, now at the head of the army, had favored it for years, and in
1841 had initiated a movement in that direction. In January, 1845, two
agents of the Spanish government were said to be laboring in Mexico
for the same cause, and the _Memorial Histórico_ announced that Spain,
France and England had formed an alliance to set up a new government
there. At about the same time the _Picayune_ stated that official
documents relating to the monarchical scheme had been received at New
Orleans; and early in March our diplomatic representative at London
sounded a strong note of warning.[4.15]

To reinforce all these considerations, England and France felt deeply
offended at our absorption of Texas; Polk, who believed "that no
compromise [in the Oregon affair] to which Great Britain would accede,
could pass the Senate," now regarded a peaceful adjustment of that
controversy as impossible; and Mexico, though as a rule profoundly
influenced by the policy of England, might any day take offence at
some British move, and wish to approach the United States. For these
reasons it was of great importance to have a diplomatic agent near her
government ready to take advantage of any promising turn; and, finally,
one can easily imagine that in Polk's opinion the reception of a United
States minister would of itself, aside from what he might do, render it
more difficult for Mexico to maintain her unfriendly attitude.[4.16]

[SLIDELL DESPATCHED AS MINISTER]

Accordingly the letters of Parrott, Black and Dimond were promptly
taken up by the American Cabinet, and after a thorough discussion
of the subject it was unanimously agreed, although the rupture had
been caused by Mexico, to reopen diplomatic relations with her; to
keep this intention profoundly secret, lest European ministers at
Washington should thwart our aims; to despatch as minister John
Slidell of Louisiana, an agreeable man, able lawyer and excellent
Spanish scholar--just the sort of person most likely to gain the ear
of Mexico--and to pay as much as forty millions, if necessary, for
a satisfactory boundary. The next day, however, Polk learned that
Mexico had been taking warlike steps as late as August 21. It was
therefore concluded, in order to make sure that our envoy would not
be rejected, to wait a little for news, and meantime instruct Black
to ascertain "officially" whether a "Minister" would be received. No
further action on the part of the Mexican government appeared necessary
to restore friendly intercourse, for previously, after the withdrawal
of a legation, the broken thread had been mended by sending a new
representative. Nothing less than such action would have answered
our purpose, for only a diplomatic agent of the usual kind, residing
near that government, could have handled the existing problems. In
consequence exactly this, without qualification or ambiguity, was
proposed.[4.17]

Just at this point a new factor appeared. The British, holding a great
amount of Mexican bonds, enjoying a very profitable trade in that
quarter, and not at all anxious to see us extend our territory by
conquest, did not wish Mexico to challenge the United States; and early
in October Bankhead expressed a desire to confer with Peña y Peña,
her secretary of relations, concerning the situation. This offer was
cordially accepted; and, at an interview between these gentlemen and
the President, Herrera said that the "subjects" which an American envoy
might bring up would be discussed "with every disposition to terminate
them amicably." Moreover, after frequent conversations and a second
formal interview, Peña thanked Bankhead most gratefully in writing for
offering to use his influence with Pakenham, now the British minister
at Washington, "for the purpose of amicably arranging the differences
[_las diferencias_]" existing between the United States and Mexico, and
intimated plainly that Herrera would listen to any "proposals" coming
from the American government.[4.18]

[SLIDELL'S MISSION UNDERSTOOD BY MEXICO]

To suppose that such men, discussing a matter of so much gravity, would
not in the course of numerous conversations take up its most obvious and
most important aspects would be absurd. These must have been considered,
and Bankhead reported that not only the annexation of Texas but "the
other points of difference, such as Limits and Indemnity," were to come
up, and in particular he understood that whatever sum the United States
might agree to pay would be "much reduced by claims arising out of the
Convention [of 1839] ... and by others since created." Such was Polk's
view. The questions of boundary compensation and claims compensation,
he said, "naturally and inseparably blended"; and the former existed
only as a consequence of annexation. To suppose after the United States
and Mexico had so long and beautifully illustrated the scene on Keats's
Greek vase--we forever pursuing and she forever eluding us--that we
should hand over to her a large sum without first ascertaining and
subtracting the just value of our claims, would have been ridiculous.
Moreover our claims counted prominently among the "differences" existing
between the two governments, and without a definite adjustment of them a
complete settlement and restoration of harmony, such as this plan aimed
expressly to accomplish, was impossible.[4.19]

At this point, however, Bankhead's agency ended, for another superseded
it. On October 13, after having gone over the matter informally with
Peña, Consul Black at the minister's request wrote a confidential letter
to him, in which he quoted the following language from his instructions:
Ascertain from the Mexican government whether it will receive "an envoy
from the United States, intrusted with full power to adjust all the
questions in dispute between the two governments"; if so, he will be
"immediately" despatched. The secretary of relations now, if he had
not already done so, laid this matter before the President, and on the
fifteenth he replied thus: My government is "disposed to receive the
representative [_comisionado_] of the United States who may come to
this capital with full powers from his government to settle the present
dispute [_contienda_] in a peaceful, reasonable and honorable manner";
but, in order to eliminate every sign of coercion, the American fleet
must retire from Vera Cruz. This proposal was sanctioned by the Mexican
Congress in a secret session.[4.20]

Now the American proposition contemplated "all the questions in
dispute," while Peña said in reply, "the present dispute." But this
was apparently an immaterial variation in phraseology, such as is
customary with men of independent minds. In the first place, it is an
axiom that a whole includes all of its parts, and the American claims
were, as we have just observed, an essential feature of the dispute
between the two countries. In the second place we know that Bankhead
so understood the matter. In the third place this mere difference in
phraseology certainly did not indicate with any clearness a rejection
of the American proposal and the substitution of an essentially
different one, and, if so intended, it involved an ambiguity for which
Mexico was bound to pay the penalty. Fourthly, Black's note was the
sequel to a confidential interview with Peña held expressly for a free
comparison of ideas. Now the consul must have understood the unvarying
refusal of the United States to recognize any Mexican claim to Texas,
and therefore he could see that no envoy would be appointed by us
to treat directly and exclusively regarding the annexation of that
republic. His instructions, moreover, were perfectly distinct; and his
understanding of these matters would have been corrected, had correction
been required, by Parrott, with whom he was ordered to confer. If,
then, it had appeared in his preliminary conversation with Peña that
Mexico insisted upon rejecting the American overture and substituting
an essentially different and essentially unacceptable proposition, he
would have stopped at that point, and reported in substance that Polk's
offer was declined. There would have been no occasion to address the
note of October 13 to Peña. In other words the American offer was
understood, and it was fairly and squarely met. Herrera's government
desired earnestly, as Peña showed Bankhead, to bring about such a
complete settlement as Polk had in mind, and to that end it accepted our
overture.[4.21]

But there is another point worthy of notice. The word _comisionado_
used by Peña--the past participle, employed here as a noun, of the verb
"to commission"--has usually been translated "commissioner," and hence
it has often been urged by American writers, that he did not agree to
receive a minister. But by good fortune we have a definition of that
word from a Mexican secretary of relations. "A _comisionado_," wrote
Bocanegra, "is a person charged by any community, or private citizen
to conduct any business," and this definition obviously included
ministers. On comparing the documents we find _minister_, _envoy_,
_plenipotentiary_ and _comisionado_ used as equivalents; and Peña called
Slidell a _comisionado_ after learning that he came as a resident
minister. Besides, the title signified nothing substantial, for the
parties agreed that our agent should have full powers to discuss the
whole business in hand, and so it follows again that, for the purpose of
settling all the points of difference existing between the two nations,
Mexico agreed to receive an American minister. November 6 Polk heard
as much through Commodore Conner, then off Vera Cruz; and three days
later Parrott arrived with Peña's autograph note, which was similarly
understood at the White House.[4.22]

For good reasons the President felt that no time could be wasted. It was
a critical juncture. The controversy with England over the possession
of Oregon had reached an acute stage, and our minister at London
expressed the opinion that she was trying to make use of Mexico in
connection with it. Our relations with Mexico had dragged long enough.
If it is intended to do anything, a New York merchant had written some
time since to the secretary of the navy, "no time should be lost in
sending a person to Mexico, as you can scarcely conceive the feverish
excitement in our mercantile community," due to the dread of privateers.
Herrera's pacific administration was tottering; and our consul at Vera
Cruz warned the state department to act promptly, since it might go
down at any time. Paredes, the monarchist, was known to be plotting a
revolution; and the London _Times_, then a journal of great importance,
had pronounced emphatically for a Spanish throne in Mexico as a bulwark
against the United States, and had said that it believed no European
power would object. We had promised through Black that a minister would
be despatched "immediately," if he would be received; and Peña not
only had made no objection to this, but had shown impatience for his
arrival. In anticipation of satisfactory news from our consul, Slidell
had been ordered to Pensacola, and instructions for him drafted. By ten
o'clock in the evening of November 10 these were ready; Polk signed
his commission; and Lieutenant Lanier of the navy set out at once for
Pensacola with the documents.[4.23]

[SLIDELL'S INSTRUCTIONS]

"To counteract the influence of foreign Powers, exerted against the
United States in Mexico, and to restore those ancient relations of peace
and good will which formerly existed between the Governments and the
citizens of the sister Republics, will be the principal objects of your
mission," read Slidell's instructions; take up the subject of our claims
"in a prudent and friendly spirit," and arrange through an adjustment of
the Texas boundary to cast upon the United States the burden of paying
them; "exert all your energies" to prevent the cession of California to
England or France if it be contemplated, and, if you can do so without
endangering the restoration of amicable relations with Mexico and the
adjustment of the Texas boundary, endeavor to purchase at least the
northern part of California, including San Francisco Bay, but at all
events conciliate the good-will of the Mexicans, even should their
vanity and resentment prove trying. Fully in sympathy with Buchanan's
instructions, the minister proceeded to Vera Cruz as quickly as possible
on a vessel of war, landed there by November 30, and, noting that his
way had already been paved by the retirement of our fleet, set out at
once for the capital.[4.24]

Unfortunately, though as prompt as possible, Polk had not been prompt
enough. Herrera's administration, as we have learned, had now sunk
to the lowest point in courage, efficiency, prestige and sense of
responsibility. Every morning it looked for a revolution, and every
night for a mutiny. Its one idea was to hold on until the assembling of
Congress on the first of January, in the hope that something favorable
might then occur; and it found this last resource threatened by its
reasonable and pacific policy in regard to the United States. Earlier in
the year it had been denounced for agreeing to recognize Texas on the
condition of her abandoning all thoughts of joining the American Union,
and now it was menaced for listening to Black and Buchanan. A call for
war in the name of honor, territory and independence appeared to be a
serviceable oriflamme for its political enemies. Fierce, unsparing cries
of treason, ignominy and national ruin therefore assailed Herrera; and
under these onslaughts the weak, timid, irresolute administration lost
heart.[4.25]

On December 3 Peña saw Black at the palace and exclaimed, We hear an
envoy has arrived from the United States; who can he be, and what has
he come for? The consul replied that he supposed he must be the envoy
that Mexico had agreed to receive. This ought not to be, answered Peña
hastily; no envoy was expected before January; we are not prepared to
receive him; the government desires he should not come to the capital or
even disembark; "you know the opposition are calling us traitors, for
entering into this arrangement with you;" his coming now might produce a
fatal revolution. This interview showed that before anything was known
regarding Slidell's quality, credentials or instructions, and purely on
account of domestic politics, the government was anxious to break its
agreement. So Peña admitted later, for he privately sent word to Slidell
that under the circumstances it feared to compromise itself, and would
have acted otherwise had it been free. So the matter was understood
by Bankhead; and so it has been understood by fair-minded Mexican
historians. It only remained to contrive a method of evasion.[4.26]

The method adopted was to ask the council of state--a quite unnecessary
proceeding--whether it would be proper to receive Slidell. In so doing
Peña expressed a decided opinion in the negative, advancing, besides
arguments of no moment, the more serious objection that receiving a
resident minister would imply the existence of friendly relations
between the two countries, and would thus condone the annexation of
Texas. Even this argument, however, possessed no real value, for,
as Peña recognized, Slidell was explicitly commissioned to "restore"
friendly relations, which indicated that such relations could not
exist until after he should be received and after he should act; and,
besides, Mexico could have received him with a declaration of reserve,
safeguarding all her claims. Moreover this was evidently a point, if of
any importance, which the secretary should have considered before making
the agreement.[4.27]

To avoid this last difficulty, he alleged in his desperation that
Black had proposed, and he accepted, the plan of sending merely an
envoy _ad hoc_, a special envoy commissioned to settle with Mexico for
the annexation of Texas. His assertion, however, is disproved by the
circumstances and correspondence leading to Slidell's appointment; and
a simple argument reinforces the facts. For the United States to offer
amends for annexation would have been to deny its repeated protestations
that annexation was perfectly proper; would have been to brand upon
its own forehead the heinous charges drawn in vitriol by Rejón. Peña
could see that no country possessing the eyesight of a mole and the
courage of a mouse would so degrade itself. He knew, October 11, that
on such a demand the negotiations would end before beginning; would end
at once in his study with Black's bidding him a respectful good-night;
and since Herrera desired the negotiations, he could not make such a
proposition.[4.28]

[SLIDELL REJECTED]

Moreover the council of state, which was a permanent body of notables,
brushed aside this contention of Peña's, and fell back "on the very
nature of the affair and on the state of our relations (_en la
natureleza misma del negocio y en el estado de nuestras relaciones_)."
Assuming plainly that the United States desired to avoid war and restore
friendly diplomatic and commercial intercourse, it declared that we had
set a trap [_lazo_] for Mexico, and undertaken to introduce a regular
minister under false pretences, as it were, in order to compel her to
be amicable against her will. In furtherance of this design the promise
of the Mexican administration cannot be urged, it protested, for the
intention must have been merely to let the Texas affair be settled, as
a preliminary to the restoration of cordial relations, and it would be
an "unexampled humiliation" were Mexico to receive a regular American
minister before being satisfied for the outrage and injury inflicted
upon her. In other words, Mexico had promised to receive Slidell, but
it did not comport with her interest and her dignity to fulfil the
agreement. This decision ensured his rejection. December 20 he was
officially notified of it, and in reply he wrote what seemed to him a
spiritless note, explaining to Buchanan that under his instructions
he did not wish to make war inevitable by closing the door finally to
negotiations. This done, he withdrew as soon as an escort could be
obtained to the city of Jalapa, situated not far from the coast on the
Vera Cruz road, to await instructions.[4.29]

Daniel Webster, a lawyer of no mean abilities, formerly our secretary
of state, and at the time when he spoke a resolute opponent of Polk,
said, after mature consideration of the matter, that Mexico was "highly
unjustifiable" in thus refusing to hear our minister; and the demand
upon this nation to repudiate its protestations of honesty, and become
the football of Mexican party politics, did seem a bit unreasonable. As
for Polk, it was hard indeed to be charged with ruining by his awkward
statesmanship the pacific administration of Herrera, when in fact the
inherent weakness of that administration ruined his own hopes, and to be
denounced in the United States for trying to force war upon Mexico, when
the Mexicans denounced him for trying to force peace upon them.[4.30]

But Herrera's amiable inefficiency was near its doom. The aristocratic
elements--Church, army and monarchists--drew together, and this action
forced the Santannistas and the Federalists to overlook their own
differences. Paredes, natural leader of the former combination, hated
and feared the latter, for Santa Anna had worsted him in more than one
clash, and the Federalists aimed not only to reform the Church and
support republican institutions, but also to destroy the military order
by establishing an effective militia system. Professing allegiance to
the administration and extorting from its hopes and fears of him all
the money that could be obtained, he disobeyed the orders to divide his
army or march to the Texas frontier; and about the middle of December,
seeing that the Federalists were likely to control the new Congress,
he revolted. The relations of Mexico to the United States afforded a
battle-cry helpful to the army and hurtful to Herrera's administration;
and hence the President was accused of "seeking to avoid a necessary
and glorious war" and of stooping to negotiate "the ignominious loss of
national integrity" with an American envoy.[4.31]

[HERRERA OVERTHROWN BY PAREDES]

Herrera fulminated against the traitorous general who was attacking his
own country. Both houses of Congress fulminated. The city of Mexico
and every department fulminated. But all this was merely eloquence.
The officer despatched to require the immediate surrender of Paredes
accepted a seat in his carriage. Most of the commanders appointed to
defend the capital took their stations under pledges to the enemy.
December 29, when Paredes arrived within about a dozen miles of Mexico,
the garrison of the citadel, instigated by their chief officer, General
Valencia, rose; nearly all the rest of the forces at the capital soon
followed that example; and Herrera, giving up the Presidency without
firing a gun, left the palace with the entire body of his loyal officers
and officials, his mild face and his respectable side-whiskers--in one
hired cab.[4.31]

The only danger of the revolutionary cause had been from treachery.
Tornel and many of the officers were at work for Santa Anna, and
Valencia, whom nobody would trust, was at work for himself. Paredes,
resembling the one-eyed man among the blind, had a certain reputation
for honesty; and these plotters, misled by his reiterated declarations
that he would accept no office in the new government, thought him simple
enough to be used and then thrown over. Valencia in particular, who was
president of the council of state and therefore legally the successor of
Herrera, felt already triumphant, put on regal style, and helped himself
liberally to the public funds. But he and Tornel had enabled Paredes to
make himself independent of them, and now found themselves dealing with
a master instead of a dupe. The troops at Mexico sided with the majority
of the army, and Paredes notified Valencia that he would shoot every
one opposing him--"archbishop, general, magistrate, or anybody else."
Then with military pomp, accompanied by officials whose signatures
adorned the placards denouncing him, he took possession of Mexico, while
the public, long since weary of the incidental music of revolutionary
professions, looked on in silence.[4.31]

The classical farce of an electoral junta appointed by the victorious
general was now enacted, and Paredes became temporary President.
Apparently, however, he intended to use this ill-gotten power with
integrity and force. He drew no salary except that of a general,
avoided all display, and surrounded himself with men of the better
class; and when a broker, who had fattened on corrupt dealings with the
government, offered him a loan, he replied with blazing eyes, "I do
not wish money, but I wish to prosecute the robbers of the Treasury."
With equal firmness he took his promised attitude of hostility toward
the United States. On the fourth of January he swore publicly to defend
the integrity of the national territory; and this had reference to
Texas--every foot of Texas to the Sabine--for such was the unqualified
claim of Mexico.[4.31]

With a government based upon a pledge of war against us and swearing to
carry out that pledge, it seemed as if the United States could have no
amicable dealings; but our authorities were now accustomed to forbear,
and all the reasons for desiring a restoration of diplomatic intercourse
were still in force. Indeed, one of them had become pressingly urgent,
for the European monarchical scheme appeared now to be unmistakable.
Remain in Mexico, Buchanan therefore instructed Slidell, so as to take
advantage of any opening for negotiations; if you deem it wise to do so,
let Paredes know that his financial straits can be relieved by arranging
matters with us; present another formal request for a hearing, and make
"every honorable effort" in your power to avoid a rupture.[4.32]

[SLIDELL MAKES ANOTHER EFFORT]

Accordingly, on the first day of March, 1846, our minister addressed
a letter to Castillo, the new minister of relations, summarizing the
negotiations with Peña, placing clearly in view the alternatives
of diplomacy or war as they had now been defined, and asking to be
received. Again the council of state was consulted, and again this
oracle pronounced for rejection. Castillo then tried to frame a reply to
Slidell; but his note, drafted in opposition to his own ideas, proved
so weak and halting that he laid it before the Spanish minister. In
the view of this diplomat the best solution of the imbroglio seemed to
be European arbitration, and therefore he probably thought it well to
show the United States that we could reach no understanding with Mexico
ourselves. It was also desirable to rally the nation round Paredes by
assuming a bold, aggressive tone. And a fiery, offensive note, suited to
these conditions, rejected the second American overture.[4.33]

Here stands an American minister, answered Slidell, "clothed with full
power to settle all the questions in dispute between the two nations."
Begone, said Mexico once more.[4.34]




                                   V

                 THE MEXICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR


In tracing the mutual relations of the United States and Mexico, we have
often had occasion to note how each nation felt about the other and
about a possible conflict; but it is very desirable now to understand as
completely as possible what those feelings were at about the beginning
of 1846, and this will require the consideration of many additional
facts.

Already there were influential and wealthy Mexicans, particularly in
the north, who wished or half-wished that the United States would
subjugate their country, so that order and prosperity might come; and
others reflected that at least our assistance might be desired, should
Paredes undertake to set up a European monarchy. But these were selfish
calculations. They seldom implied good-will. Friends we have none at
the capital, Slidell reported; and our consul at the northern city of
Tampico, even though but a faint loyalty to the central government
prevailed in that section, wrote in September, 1845: "The most stubborn
and malignant feeling seems to exist in the mind of every Mexican
against the United States."[5.1]

[WHY MEXICO DISLIKED THE UNITED STATES]

The principal cause of this feeling--the supposed misconduct of our
government in the settlement, revolution and successful resistance of
Texas, and in the recognition and annexation of that republic--has
already been explained; but other strong reasons coöperated. All
understood that intense dissatisfaction existed in the northern
departments. Now that our frontier had been advanced so far south,
further peaceful aggression seemed easy; and it was believed that we
intended to pursue the Texas method progressively, until all of Mexico
should little by little become ours. "This first invasion is the threat
of many more," said the official journal. It was alleged that we,
fearing the competition of that country in the markets of the world,
did all we could to hinder its agricultural, industrial and commercial
development, and excited the revolutions that paralyzed it; and it
was even believed that we incited the Indians to ravage the northern
frontiers, and so create discontent against the central government. The
privileged classes dreaded the influence of our democratic ideas. The
clergy were afraid that Protestantism, or at least free thought, might
cross the border, and that so far as Mexican territory should fall under
our sway, secular education, the confiscation of their property, and the
other anti-clerical plans of the Federalists, who appeared to draw their
inspiration and their arguments largely from this country, might be put
into force. The numerous misunderstandings and clashes with the United
States that we have noted had produced an enduring resentment, and in
particular our claims and our efforts to have them settled were commonly
deemed artificial and unjust.[5.1]

Behind all these facts lay the general anti-foreign prejudice; and this,
we should now observe, was in our case more than a prejudice. Even in
the eyes of the intelligent _El Siglo XIX_, an American was "a being
detestable to the nation on account of the little accord between [him
and] the religion, the language, and the gentle, affable, frank, and
generous character of the Mexican." Our directness of thought, speech
and action, and the brusqueness of manner that naturally accompanied it
appeared inconsiderate and haughty; and no doubt, in dealing with people
who seemed to us deceitful, unreliable and unfriendly, our citizens
often emphasized these characteristics. In habits and customs there was
indeed a profound unlikeness, and below this lay a still more profound
racial antagonism. Finally the politicians of all parties, fearing to
be outdone in the display of patriotism, encouraged the anti-American
feeling. The sharp and rancorous Tornel used every opportunity to speak
against us; and Santa Anna, whose prestige was immense--it must not be
forgotten--as late as 1844, both fearing the influence of our freedom
and wishing his fellow-citizens to consider him essential, represented
the United States as a Minotaur eager to devour them. Few were
enlightened enough to correct the misconceptions regarding us; no one
had the power, courage or wish to do so; and in the end, very naturally,
these dominated the public mind--or, to be more precise, created and
kept alive a general impression. Americans "scarcely have the look of
men," it was gravely asserted.[5.1]

In regard to an immediate conflict in arms with us, Mexico by no means
felt like the dove threatened by a hawk, as people in this country have
generally supposed. To be sure, the national existence was often said to
be in danger, but such talk was largely for effect. Castillo asserted
that Slidell had been sent in order to obtain a pretext for war; but
this was in all probability a bid for Mexican and European support,
since he knew that we already had grounds enough, and the council of
state evidently believed we did not seek a conflict. Paredes whispered
to the British minister at a banquet, "I hope your government does not
mean to let us be eaten up;" but this was a plea for English assistance.
As we have just said, not American arms but American settlers were the
chief danger, in the opinion of Mexico. The very men who clamored that
the national existence was threatened by the United States were the ones
who called most loudly for war. A circular to the local authorities
issued by the central government in December, 1845, invited attention
to the prevailing opinion that armed resistance could prevent further
usurpations like that of Texas; and another such paper, issued in
November of the following year, dwelt strongly upon this point. From
military force also there was danger, to be sure. Our superiority in
numbers and resources was admitted. But there were many offsets to that
superiority, and the Mexicans closely studied and shrewdly counted upon
them.[5.2]

[THE UNITED STATES DEEMED FEEBLE]

Let us review those offsets. In the first place, while the government
of the United States deemed its course honorable and considerate, in
the eyes of many, if not all, Mexicans we had been abject as well as
knavish, stealing her territory and then trying to buy off her anger,
submitting to be gulled, flouted and lashed, and each time going back
for more of the same treatment; and it seemed hardly possible that we
should suddenly adopt a bold, positive, unflinching course. It was even
believed that we dreaded to enter the lists. Almonte, for example, in
reporting that his protest against annexation had caused a heavy fall
on the stock exchange, observed, "The fears of a war with Mexico are
great;" and it was notorious that his departure from the United States
created almost a panic in our money market.[5.3]

Besides, it was assumed that party feeling would go to about the same
lengths here as in Mexico, and that our differences over the slavery
question and the tariff would probably make it impossible for us to
conduct a war vigorously--perhaps, impossible to wage it at all. "The
northern states, I again repeat to you, will not aid those of the south
in case of war with Mexico," wrote Almonte while minister at Washington
in June, 1844. European journals like _Le Constitutionnel_ of Paris
confirmed this opinion;[5.4] and the London _Times_ remarked, It would
be a war, not of the United States, but of a party that has only a bare
majority, and "odious" to a "large and enlightened minority in the best
States." Moreover, argued the official journal of Mexico, the injustice
of the war would of itself excite American opposition.[5.5]

From a military as well as a political point of view this country
seemed feeble. Our regular army was understood to be numerically
insignificant and fully occupied with frontier and garrison duties;
our artillery appeared weak in quality as well as in numbers; and our
cavalry was deemed little more than a cipher. As for volunteers, our
citizen-soldiers were represented in Mexico not merely as unwarlike,
but as "totally unfit to operate beyond their frontiers." Indeed, as
competent a judge as Captain Elliot, British minister in Texas--who
knew the United States well, and in the spring of 1845 was in close
touch with Mexican leaders at their capital--said that the greater their
number, the greater would be the difficulty of invading Mexico. "They
could not resist artillery and cavalry in a Country suited to those
arms," he believed; "they are not amenable to discipline, they plunder
the peasantry, they are without steadiness under reverses, they cannot
march on foot." Nor did there exist in this country, added Elliot,
either aptitude or adequate means for a regular military invasion.[5.6]

"America as an aggressive power is one of the weakest in the world
... fit for nothing but to fight Indians," declared _Britannia_, an
important English weekly; and apparently the war of 1812, to which the
Mexicans referred with peculiar satisfaction, had proved even more than
this. The military operations in a war between Mexico and the United
States would be "contemptible and indecisive," said the London _Times_.
As for our navy, it was undoubtedly small; the Mexican consul at New
Orleans reported that it lacked the discipline commonly attributed to
it; and, however efficient it might really be, Mexico had no commerce to
attack.[5.7]

The Mexicans, on the other hand, were deemed by many observers decidedly
formidable. "There are no better troops in the world, nor better drilled
and armed, than the Mexicans," asserted Calderón de la Barca, the
Spanish minister at Washington; and some of the generals were thought,
even by foreigners, equal to the most renowned in Europe. The Americans
would be at a vast disadvantage, was Captain Elliot's opinion, "in
rapidity of movement" and ability to endure "continued fatigue on the
hardest food." The soldiers of the tri-color "are superior to those of
the United States," declared the Mexico correspondent of the London
_Times_ flatly in 1845.[5.8]

[MEXICAN CALCULATIONS OF THE CHANCES]

If the military power of Mexico was rated in this way by outside
observers of such competence, one can imagine how it was rated at
home. The Mexicans regarded themselves as martial by instinct, and
viewed their troops, inured to war by an almost unceasing course of
revolutions, as remarkably good. Santa Anna once boasted that, if
necessary, he would plant his flag upon the capitol at Washington; and
the results of the wars with Spain and France had tended powerfully to
encourage the self-confidence of his fellow-citizens. "We have numerous
and veteran forces burning with a desire to gain immortal renown," said
the _Boletín Oficial_ of San Luis Potosí. "Not to speak of our approved
infantry," it was argued, "our artillery is excellent, and our cavalry
so superior in men and horses that it would be an injustice not to
recognize the fact;" besides which "our army can be rapidly augmented."
Indeed an officer of reputation told Waddy Thompson that the cavalry
could break infantry squares with the lasso. In November, 1845, the
Mexican minister of war solemnly predicted that his countrymen would
gain the victory, even if one third less numerous than their American
adversaries. To clinch this matter, the feeling of superior power,
which it was known that we entertained, was regarded as an ignorant
over-confidence that would ensure our defeat. In short, "We have
more than enough strength to make war," cried the editors of _La Voz
del Pueblo_; "Let us make it, then, and victory will perch upon our
banners."[5.9]

The clash, it seemed probable, would come first in Texas, far from our
centres of strength. On that field Tornel, the keenest public man in
the country, insisted that Mexico could triumph over any force we could
bring to bear, and Almonte offered some reasons for entertaining such
an opinion. The Texan troops, he said, would exhaust their supplies
before the campaign would really begin; and consequently, since there
would be no way to subsist a large American force in that extensive,
poor and sparsely settled region, the greater the number coming, the
greater would be their sufferings. Even the cultivated districts, wrote
Elliot, could support only a trifling addition, if any, to the resident
population. Moreover, even should an American army be able to exist
there, a few light troops placed along the frontier would keep it busy
on the defensive, said Pakenham; while it was urged by Mexicans that,
should our line break, their invading host would soon find itself among
the opulent cities of the southern states, where perhaps it could not
only exact money, but free two million slaves, obtain their grateful
and enthusiastic assistance, enroll the Indians of the southwest, who
detested the United States, and draw aid as well as encouragement from
the abolitionists of the north. Almonte himself assured his government
that the blacks, the savages and the anti-slavery extremists could be
reckoned on.[5.10]

Possibly, of course, their line instead of ours might be the one to give
way; but in that case the Americans, instead of meeting with conditions
like these, would be confronted by immense distances, great deserts,
furious rains, long droughts, and barren, easily defended mountains.
"If the war should be protracted and carried beyond the Rio Grande,"
said Captain Elliot, "I believe that it would require very little skill
and scarcely any exposure of the defending force to draw the invading
columns well forward beyond all means of support from their own bases
and depots into situations of almost inextricable difficulty;" and a
correspondent of Calhoun, referring to such natural obstacles, wrote,
"nothing is more certain than your statement that [the] war will have
to become defensive [on our part]."[5.11]

Moreover it was argued, said the Mexican minister of relations in 1849,
that the invaders would be unable to obtain resources of any description
from the country about them, would be masters of nothing but the
ground actually occupied, and would find the difficulty of maintaining
themselves, at such a distance from their base, "invincible." On the
other hand should invasion by sea be attempted, the Americans would
have to struggle with tempestuous waters, a coast guarded by reefs and
currents, lowlands protected by "a terrible and faithful ally"--as
Cuevas described the yellow fever, more than one tremendous wall of
mountains, and bad roads that could easily be closed; and they would
find no vital point of attack within practicable reach. The United
States cannot hope to conquer Mexico, was the conclusion of the London
_Morning Herald_, commonly regarded as a ministerial organ; while the
Paris _Globe_, reputed to be Guizot's personal voice, went farther,
and predicted that undertaking to do it would be "ruinous, fatal" to
us.[5.12]

Should we, however, care to make the attempt, Mexico--it was pointed
out--would not only fight on the defensive, and enjoy all the advantages
of knowing the ground, moving on inside lines, and using fortifications,
but would also be able to strike. Nothing would be paid on our claims,
either principal or interest. There was considerable American property
in the country; and while the means of her citizens were being spent in
righteous self-defence, that property could hardly expect exemption.
Above all, one "terrible weapon," as the Mexican consul at New Orleans
termed it, could be wielded night and day, near and far, without expense
and without risk. This was the issuance of commissions to privateers,
for the "nefarious" conduct of the United States in using this weapon,
said the London _Times_, authorized Mexico to do the same. The pursuit
of slavers had been so close of late that many fine Baltimore clippers,
able to outsail anything but a steamer and to go where a steamer could
not, were lying idle in Cuban ports, ready to scour the Gulf and the
Atlantic.[5.13]

No less vulnerable seemed the United States in the Pacific Ocean,
where--according to the New York _Herald_--American property worth
fifteen or twenty millions was afloat. Should letters of marque be
"actively and prudently distributed on the coasts of the Pacific," wrote
consul Arrangóiz to his government, "the Americans would receive a fatal
blow in the captures [of whalers and merchantmen] that would immediately
be made in the seas of Asia, where the naval forces of the United States
are insignificant and could not promptly be increased"; and he reported
in July, 1845, that owing to the prospect of hostilities the insurance
companies at New Orleans were refusing to take war risks. Tornel and
the other Mexican leaders counted heavily on the value of this weapon.
Our own journals were full of the subject, and could find no remedy.
American commerce was defenceless against such an attack, the London
_Times_ cheerfully admitted.[5.14]

Under these conditions it was most natural to believe that Mexico
could make the war "obstinate and tedious," as the London _Standard_
said, and therefore extremely expensive for the United States. She
could "with trifling inconvenience to Herself," Pakenham told Calhoun,
"impose upon this Country the necessity of employing as large a Naval
and Military force as if the War was with a far more powerful enemy."
Obviously a great number of warships would be needed to blockade seven
hundred leagues of coast and patrol two oceans, and the cost of soldiers
could be figured thus, it was thought: During the war of independence
in Mexico eighty thousand royal troops and sixty thousand insurgents
were supported by that country; its population and resources had since
increased; the United States would therefore have to send probably
two hundred and fifty thousand men; and the American soldier was very
expensive.[5.15]

The people of this nation were looked upon as worshippers of the
dollar, and it was believed that war taxes would not be endured here
long. Consequently, since the United States had no credit--said
European journals--the conflict would soon have to end. "The invasion
and conquest of a vast region by a state which is without an army and
without credit is a novelty in the history of nations," remarked the
London _Times_ in 1845. The war losses were expected to reinforce the
effect of war taxes. "War with the United States would not last long,"
wrote Arrangóiz, "because the [American] commerce finding itself
attacked on all seas would beg for peace." When the Mexican corsairs
have captured a few American ships and the Americans have thrown a
few bombs into Vera Cruz, matters will be arranged, predicted _Le
Constitutionnel_ of Paris.[5.16]

[MEXICO RECKONS ON BENEFITS]

Evidently, then, Mexico was not likely to suffer disastrously, and
certain benefits of great value could be anticipated. The act of
crossing swords with us would fulfil a patriotic duty and vindicate the
national honor. Glory and the satisfaction of injuring a perfidious
and grasping enemy would more than compensate for the cost. A conflict
would prevent this greedy neighbor, as the London _Times_ argued,
from imagining that Mexico dared not resist spoliation. The American
settlers, whom every effort had been made for many years to keep out
of the country, would be driven away, and the danger of American ideas
averted. Even if the frontier could not be forced back to the Sabine, a
long period of hostilities would render it impossible to practice near
the border our arts of political seduction, and merely a short contest
would tend to re-Mexicanize thoroughly the northern departments. Indeed
the whole country would be re-Mexicanized, for the first effect of the
war would be to cure disunion and baptize the nation anew in the fires
of patriotism. The necessity of meeting a foreign foe would vitalize
the courage of the army, which had grown somewhat lax in battling with
fellow-citizens, restore discipline, and perfect the officers in their
difficult but noble profession. A blockade, many believed with Almonte
and Santa Anna, preventing the exportation of silver and the squandering
of good money on foreign luxuries, would be "the best possible
thing" for the country. Stimulated by exemption from ruinous foreign
competition, the industries would at length flourish, and the boundless
natural resources of the country become fountains of wealth.[5.17]

War is no doubt a great evil, argued the editors of _La Voz del Pueblo_,
"but we recall what Polybius said, to wit: 'If many empires have been
destroyed by war, by war also have many risen from nothing.'" Prussia
owes her greatness to the Seven Years War, pointed out _El Siglo XIX_.
The conquest of the Moors cost Spain a struggle of centuries, but
what Spaniard would undo it? asked others. "Nations determine their
history only in the most dangerous crises," urged an anonymous but able
pamphlet; "and such a crisis, in which posterity will admire us, has
arrived."[5.17]

So the matter presented itself to many when studied as an exclusively
Mexican affair. But could it be regarded as exclusively Mexican?
In Central and South America there were countries that naturally
entertained a racial prejudice against the "Anglo-Saxon." They were
fully capable of discovering the claim to monopoly suggested by the name
United States of "America," by our considering none except ourselves
"Americans," and by our "Monroe Doctrine"; and moreover our press
clamored for the entire continent. Mexico had her eye upon them, and she
counted on drawing support from that quarter.[5.18]

As early as 1836 Cuevas, then minister at Paris, after pointing out to
his government how strongly the country was protected by nature against
the United States, remarked: "Add to this the interest of the republics
of the South to defend Mexico against an always threatening enemy,
which with its ever monstrous greed seems a volcano ready to burst upon
them." The next year a Mexican agent at Lima reported that the alleged
unlawful interference of this country in Texas was the subject of
general conversation and of just alarm in the Spanish-American states.
In 1842 Dorsey, bearer of despatches from our legation at Mexico, stated
at Savannah that Santa Anna had sent envoys to all the South American
republics with this message: "Unless you enable us to resist such
aggression as will be perpetrated by the United States, she will proceed
to embrace in her mighty grasp the whole of the southern continent;"
and Dorsey added that Colombia had already promised financial aid and
two thousand men. At the close of that year, as a letter from Caracas
mentioned, steps were said to have been taken toward forming a league to
support Mexico against American encroachments. In 1843 Almonte made up a
pamphlet of extracts from John Quincy Adams's brilliant though unfounded
speech at Braintree, in which he accused our government of greed and
unrighteousness in the Texas business; and this telling document was
distributed in the principal cities of South America. During the
following years the menace of our ambition to all of the Spanish race
in this hemisphere continued to be discussed in the Mexican press.
"Republics of South America," cried _La Aurora de la Libertad_, for
example, "your existence also is in danger; prepare for the combat;"
and it was easy to believe that official appeals for assistance, in the
event of actual invasion, would not fall upon deaf ears.[5.18]

[EUROPEAN AID EXPECTED]

And there were still better grounds, it was reckoned, for expecting aid
from abroad. In the first place, holding more or less honestly that we
had trampled on the law of nations, the Mexicans persuaded themselves
that every civilized country would feel an interest in their cause. The
justice of our case against the United States, declared the official
_Diario_, will be recognized at once by all governments to which "public
faith and honor are not an empty name." This view was encouraged in
Europe. The cause of Mexico, said the Liverpool _Mail_, is that of all
just and honest governments. The Mexicans have good ground to complain,
proclaimed the sympathetic _Journal des Débats_, for "they have been
tricked and robbed."[5.19]

Covered with so noble a sentiment as devotion to the cause of justice,
more practical considerations could be expected to exert their full
influence. In Mexico as well as in the United States, the monarchies of
Europe were believed to view with jealousy the success of our republican
institutions. Our policy of "America for the Americans," which the
British minister, Ward, had turned against Poinsett at Mexico, was
contrary to the interest of every commercial nation beyond the Atlantic.
The United States, exclaimed _Le Correspondant_ of Paris, assumes to
exclude Europe from the affairs of that continent--as if Europe had not
had rights and possessions there before the United States began to be!
as if the United States did not owe its existence to Europe! as if the
ocean could change the law of nations; and leading journals in London
expressed similar indignation.[5.20]

As the whole world understood, great Britain had not yet forgiven us for
becoming independent, and viewed with great repugnance our extensions
of territory, our commercial development and our control over raw
cotton; and it was obvious that she would be glad to stop our growth.
Sooner or later, warned the British press, the course of this monster
will have to be checked. Guizot, the premier of France, regarded the
United States as a "young Colossus," and earnestly desired to apply in
this hemisphere the principle of the balance of power. Polk was by no
means popular at the Tuilleries, and the _Journal des Débats_, commonly
regarded as the mouthpiece of the government, courteously described his
Message of December, 1845, as bellicose, passionate, full of vain and
ludicrous bravado, arrogant, detestably hypocritical, brutally selfish
and brutally dishonest.[5.21]

The plan to annex Texas had greatly disturbed these two governments,
and they had not only exerted to the utmost against it their diplomatic
strength, both separately and in concert, but, as Mexico knew, had
been disposed to take up arms in that cause. Aided by circumstances,
the courage and skill of the United States had completely foiled them,
but they could not be supposed to view the result with satisfaction;
and there was good reason to believe that they contemplated a possible
further extension of this country, not only with alarm, but with a
strong desire to prevent it. Said the London _Morning Herald_ in March,
1845: Mexico will turn to good account the support of her powerful
protectors and their intense repugnance to the annexation of Texas; and
the London _Times_ predicted that our greed in the Texas affair would be
punished.[5.22]

Gifted at vaticination, the _Times_ predicted also that our next aim
would be the mines of Mexico, and asked the nations of Europe how
they would like to find their monetary circulation "dependent on the
caprice of the President of the United States." In September, 1845,
it printed the assertion of its Mexican correspondent, that England
must interfere or be prepared to see not only those mines but also
California in American hands. There is a general feeling, announced the
London _Standard_, that only the interposition of England and France
can check the United States. The United States will absorb Mexico
unless foreign powers avert this, preached the London _Journal of
Commerce_. "The conquest of Mexico would create perils for the political
balance of the world," said the _Journal des Débats_; and hence "the
immense aggrandizements" contemplated by the United States "could not
take place without giving umbrage to several nations." Europe would
certainly forbid a conquest of Mexico, threatened _Le Constitutionnel_.
The Mexicans were fully capable of seeing all this for themselves.
The _Monitor Constitutional_, for example, gave currency to the idea
that certain powers would prevent the invasion of their country.
Indeed they could see even more. "Enlightened nations of Europe,"
exclaimed _La Aurora de la Libertad_, "a people consumed with ambition
and covetousness is already taking up arms to conquer the American
continent, lay down the law to your interests and possessions, and some
day disturb your peace at home."[5.23]

Another source of possible trouble for the United States abroad was
the idea that any territory obtained from Mexico would be given up to
slavery. This point came out strongly in the _Journal des Débats_, for
example. Considerably more serious was the danger that in coping with
Mexican privateers we should offend other nations. In this way, so the
British minister warned our secretary of state, the Americans were
likely to become involved in "complications of the gravest character";
and it was believed by the Mexicans that a blockade of their coast, in
addition to being extremely difficult, was almost or quite certain to
have that effect.[5.24]

To these points they added characteristically that fear of their power,
as well as antipathy to us, might lead foreign nations to espouse their
side; and all the supporters of the monarchical plans now entertained
by the government and the upper classes, felt that if carried out
these would pave the way for European assistance. In fact the British
minister himself believed that such a change of regime would guarantee
Mexico against the United States, and it is reasonable to suppose that
in talking with her public men he disclosed this conviction. Being a
jealous nation, thoroughly given up to politics, and not industrial or
commercial, Mexico could not fail to exaggerate the probable effect of
all these influences upon England and France, and to underestimate the
factors that were tending to keep them at peace with us.[5.25]

[WAR DESIRED BY MEXICO]

The strongest basis of hope for effective aid from abroad was, however,
none of these considerations, but our dispute with England over
Oregon. In January, 1846, Bankhead and Slidell agreed that Mexico's
policy toward the United States would depend mainly or wholly upon the
outcome of that issue, and to the Mexican eye the outcome was already
clear. Each country had rejected the proposition of the other, and
Polk's Message of December 2, 1845, committed him afresh to an extreme
position. The course of England tended to confirm the natural inference.
Her perfectly excusable intention was to hold the Mexicans ready to
coöperate with her, should war become her programme, while restraining
them from engaging us alone. Bankhead replied with an encouraging
vagueness to Mexican hints that British assistance was desired, and Lord
Aberdeen talked with the Mexican agent at London of a possible alliance
against us. Indeed that agent reported that he believed Aberdeen would
like to see Mexico fight the United States and win.[5.26]

For superficial, touch-and-go people here was enough to build upon, and
the long entertained hopes of British aid struck root anew. January
14, 1846, our minister Slidell stated that the idea of an approaching
conflict over the Oregon question was assiduously nursed, and seventeen
days later the correspondent of the London _Times_ reported, that it
had become a general conviction. Aberdeen's possible alliance seemed
therefore like a certainty, and he himself admitted to our minister at
London that Mexico had counted upon a war over Oregon. With France, as
we know, Mexico did not stand on the best of terms at this juncture; but
in addition to the other reasons for looking to her, Guizot and Louis
Philippe were strongly pro-English, and in fact, so Bankhead reported,
Paredes hoped for assistance from that country also.[5.27]

From high to low, as we have learned, the Mexicans were inveterate
gamblers, passionately fond of calculating probabilities and accepting
chances, and a situation like this appealed most fascinatingly to their
instincts and their habits. But in the eyes of many--indeed most, it is
likely--the outlook seemed more than promising. Vain and superficial,
they did not realize their weaknesses. "We could not be in a better
state for war," the _Diario_ announced in March, 1845. If any one
thought of the empty treasury, he assured himself that patriotism and
the boundless natural wealth of the country would afford resources.
Enthusiasm would supply everything, it was believed. Equally unable were
the Mexicans to perceive the frailty of their hopes for European aid.
With few exceptions they saw through a veil, darkly. Even Almonte, a
military man and better acquainted with the United States than any other
prominent citizen, assured his government that in such a conflict the
triumph of Mexico would be "certain."[5.28]

Here and there one doubted. Some drew back. But the nation as a
whole--if Mexico really was a nation--felt convinced that pride and
passion could safely be indulged. We shall dictate our own terms,
thought many. At any rate, argued others, our honor will be vindicated
by a brilliant stroke beyond the Rio Grande; European intervention will
then occur; the United States will have to pay a round sum for Texas;
and we shall obtain a fixed boundary, guaranteed by the leading powers
of Europe, that will serve as an everlasting dike against American
aggression. The press clamored for war; the government was deeply
committed to that policy; and the great majority of those who counted
for anything, panting feverishly, though with occasional shivers, to
fight the United States, were passionately determined that no amicable
and fair adjustment of the pending difficulties should be made.[5.28]

"For us [Mexicans]," Roa Bárcena admitted, "the war was a fact after
Shannon's declarations of October, 1844, and the fact was confirmed
by the admission of Texas to the North-American Union." "Since the
usurpation of Texas no arrangement, no friendly settlement has
been possible," said _La Reforma_. Besides, a faith in eventual
triumph, strong enough to survive a series of disasters, burned in
the heart of the nation. The Mexican correspondent of the Prussian
minister at Washington--regarded by our secretary of war as entirely
trustworthy--reported that the people were bent upon war. But for the
procrastination and vanity of Mexico, no conflict would have occurred,
said J. F. Ramírez, who stood high among the best public men of that
country. "The idea of peace was not popular," states one Mexican
historian; the nation was responsible for the war, confess others.
_Mexico desired it_, admitted Santa Anna in 1847 and the minister of
relations in 1849, both speaking officially.[5.28]




                                   VI

                THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR

                                  1845


In the United States a strong feeling against the dominant elements in
Mexico had been created by events that did not directly concern us.
The atrocious massacres perpetrated at Goliad and the Alamo during the
Texan struggle for independence made an indelible impression on the
public mind. Said Buchanan on the floor of the American Senate: "I
shall never forget the deep, the heart-rending sensations of sorrow and
of indignation" which pervaded this body when we first heard of Santa
Anna's "inhuman butcheries." The decimating of Texan prisoners for
trying to escape from their guards, as they had a perfect right to do,
and the cruelties, or at least excessive hardships, which they were made
to suffer in confinement, deepened the feeling. The official threats
of ruthless war and even extermination against the Texans, and the
belief that Indians were incited to fall upon their women and children,
sharpened it still more. In 1844 one Sentmanat went from New Orleans to
Tabasco on a revolutionary mission but was unsuccessful; and his party
surrendered to the Mexican leader, General Ampudia, on the promise of
good treatment. Most of the men, however, were shot; the rest of them
disappeared in prison; Sentmanat was summarily executed; and his head,
fried in oil to make it last longer, became the chief decoration of the
public square at San Juan Bautista.[6.1]

Such acts--naturally though incorrectly supposed to represent the
character of the Mexican, and linked with the apparent cowardice of
Santa Anna and his army in the Texan war of independence--caused the
nation in whose name they were perpetrated to be looked upon by not a
few Americans as a nest of poisonous reptiles, fit only to be stamped
upon. Referring to one of the Texan outrages, the Indiana _State
Sentinel_ exclaimed: "Should that blustering, cowardly nation ever
have the temerity to declare war against the United States, think you
not that the remembrance of such scenes will make every soldier feel
himself 'thrice armed'?" When people of our own became the victims,
when they were robbed and deported without cause on the shores of
the Pacific, when they were shot without trial at Tampico, when they
were threatened with the death of pirates for joining the Texans, and
especially when the newspapers told how Americans among the Santa Fe
prisoners were insulted, abused and forced to work in chains on the road
to Santa Anna's palace, so that he might feast his cruel, cowardly eyes
upon their sufferings, fury burned like a flame in many a heart. Time
appeased the fire, but in 1846 the embers were still red.[6.1]

[AMERICAN FEELING ABOUT MEXICAN OUTRAGES]

With less poignant but no less real indignation the American public
noted in a general way the entire long series of our grievances: our
flag insulted, our minister traduced and threatened, our consuls
maltreated, our government officially maligned, agreements broken,
treaties ignored or violated, citizens persecuted and imprisoned,
property confiscated, trade hampered and ruined, complaints more or
less politely mocked, positive demands adroitly evaded, valid claims
fraudulently defeated; and heard that such offences were not merely
committed now and then, but repeated over and over again with apparent
deliberation and malice. The highest Mexican authorities were found
encouraging prejudice and ill-will against our citizens, exerting
themselves to make foreign nations distrust and hate us, misrepresenting
our efforts to conciliate them, and describing our honest wish to be on
friendly terms as hypocrisy and craft. Our people saw the legitimate
results of Mexican misgovernment charged against this country;
proceedings of our authorities, fully warranted by the facts, protested
against; threats of war freely made to influence our national conduct;
and measures looking toward hostilities openly advocated and adopted in
the most offensive manner. Just how fully the details were noted by the
public, and how long the incidents were remembered, it would obviously
be impossible to say; but in all probability they sank into the general
consciousness, and produced a certain state of mind.

In February, 1847, the Virginia House of Delegates declared that the war
had been "most unrighteously provoked ... by a long series of acts of
injustice and outrage towards the United States," and this is only one
of almost countless equivalent expressions, which no doubt were fairly
sincere.[6.2]

On the other hand certain factors tended to neutralize our indignation.
There was a disposition, traceable to natural good-heartedness,
political expediency and commercial interests, to maintain friendly
relations with our neighbor. Much of what seemed like misconduct was
attributed to circumstances. We had a rather conceited notion that
Mexicans could not be expected to know very much or do very well. More
or less faintly the idea glimmered, that perhaps it was easy for them
to misunderstand the Texas affair, and natural for them to be angry
about it. Many felt inclined on general principles to suspect that our
aggrieved citizens were not entirely exempt from blame. Money was used
by the agents of Mexico to influence our press. Domestic politics warped
public opinion in her favor sometimes; and finally the anti-slavery
people went great lengths in championing her government and accusing
their own, for every suggestion of war upon Mexico was suspected of
aiming at the acquisition of territory and the reinforcement of a hated
institution.[6.3]

The northeastern states, on account of the strong anti-slavery sentiment
existing there, were not a little disposed to heed these influences, but
elsewhere they signified much less, and were quite unable to offset the
prevalent feeling that Mexico had insulted, outraged and cheated us, and
the growing conviction that, in dealing with her, forbearance had proved
to be a mistake. As early as 1830 Count Lillers wrote from New Orleans:
It would be "impossible" to speak of Mexico with "more bitterness and
desire of vengeance than is done by certain persons whose words must not
be neglected," and by 1837 many agreed with Jackson that satisfaction
ought to be required; yet nothing positive was done, and the impatience
grew. The lenity of our authorities began to be denounced, and the New
Orleans _Picayune_ in particular attacked what it called "the known
imbecility which has for years marked our government at home as regards
its external relations with Mexico."[6.4]

The proceedings of her claims commissioners had a signally bad effect.
"The conduct of the Mexican government towards the American claimants
under the treaty between the two countries," declared the _Picayune_,
"has been the most infamously perfidious ever practised by one
country and submitted to by another." "Many earnest remonstrances and
complaints," wrote Webster, our secretary of state, officially to the
Mexican commissioners, have been made to me against your proceedings and
those of your government in this affair; and though he refrained from
expressing any opinion as to the justice of them, such a declaration
was evidence of an indignation both deep and general. At the same time
fresh grievances accumulated; and the Mexicans, instead of showing
any appreciation of what our people regarded as kindness toward them,
appeared even less willing to grant effectual redress than ten or
fifteen years before. "Forbearance and lenity toward such creatures,"
protested the _Jeffersonian Republican_ of New Orleans in August, 1845,
"are all lost and worse than lost," for they are thought signs of
weakness, and lead to greater atrocities.[6.5]

The decision of Herrera's administration to reject Slidell, our minister
of peace, was generally regarded--except by the partisan opponents of
our government--as a crowning proof of the vanity of forbearance and
a loud call for action. This nation, said the St. Louis _Republican_,
"owes it to herself and her character, and the just appreciation of her
ministers and her standing in all foreign countries not to suffer so
open an insult to her representative to pass unnoticed." "The indignity
to our Minister requires atonement," was the crisper utterance of the
_Picayune_, which was widely recognized as the best informed authority
on Mexican affairs among our newspapers. The revolution of Paredes
appeared to be a further evidence of hostility. The government of
Mexico, observed the _Delta_ of New Orleans, has been overthrown with no
pretext except the necessity of active war against the United States;
so let war be waged. Finally, the definitive rejection of our peace
overture, announced in Castillo's defiant and offensive note, supplied a
conclusive argument in the opinion of many against further hesitation.
"We have borne and forborne long enough, and a resolute stand should be
taken at once," was the comment of the _Missouri Reporter_. "The United
States," declared the New Orleans _Commercial Bulletin_, "have borne
more insult, abuse, insolence and injury, from Mexico, than one nation
ever before endured from another ... they are now left no alternative
but to extort by arms the respect and justice which Mexico refuses to
any treatment less harsh."[6.6]

[BELIEF THAT EUROPE WAS BEHIND MEXICO]

Another consideration that intensified public sentiment was the
suspicion, which in many cases deepened into something more, that
she was to be used against us by the monarchies of Europe, and in
particular by Great Britain. In 1842, when she made forays into Texas
and threatened a serious invasion, it became a very prevalent opinion
in the United States, reported the Mexican consul at New Orleans, that
England stood behind these movements; and later that country was justly
believed to be working in Texas to defeat and injure us. Her influence
at Mexico was understood to be powerful; and the Americans, not aware
what elements of strength Mexico felt able to count upon, thought she
certainly would not defy us unless assured of foreign support. "Our
people are prone to the opinion, whether well or ill-founded," said the
_Commonwealth_ of Lexington, Kentucky, in February, 1846, "that that
ambitious and mischievous government [of Great Britain] is at the bottom
of Mexican hostility towards us." This was provocation enough. "To fight
the Britishers, all the States are one," complained the London _Times_,
and on this point it was doubtless much closer to the fact than in most
of its deliverances on American affairs.[6.7]

England was not supposed to be alone, however. Our people understood
that France had coöperated with her against the annexation of Texas,
and not a few suspected her of pursuing the same course to bring about
the rejection of Slidell and the anti-American revolution of Paredes.
In February, 1846, the _Courrier des Etats Unis_ of New York, which
could be regarded as of considerable importance, made this rather
startling announcement: "The latest intelligence from Mexico leaves no
doubt that the new Government of that country is resolved to reject all
peaceful overtures from the United States and solicit the intervention
of European powers to obtain from the Union indemnification for the loss
of Texas and a boundary line under the protecting guaranty of France and
Great Britain. We know personally that this was an idea entertained by
General Almonte when he left New York, on his return to Mexico, where
he now occupies an influential place in the government." The statement
that Almonte expressed such a view early in 1845 must have become known
somewhat widely, for apparently it signified much; and the scheme could
not fail to give offence to as many of our people as heard of it. Even
more disagreeable were the plans for a European monarchy now looming
up so boldly south of the Rio Grande, for they defied the "Monroe
Doctrine," and threatened to bring some great power--perhaps more than
one--directly into the lists against us. During February, 1846, the New
Orleans papers, especially the _Picayune_, invited the attention of the
country vigorously to this phase of the situation.[6.8]

All things considered, it seemed imperative to stop drifting, and to
settle our affairs with Mexico before the monarchs of Europe could
mature plans to injure us; and evidently, from that point of view, no
further delay could be afforded. At this time, therefore, the people
of the southwest, the region most deeply interested in the situation
and consequently best entitled to speak, demanded very seriously and
very positively a definitive adjustment of our relations with Mexico.
As matters were, the thought of armies and privateers appearing on
the horizon as the first announcement of war hardly allowed nervous
people to sleep. Actual fighting, it was often argued, would be less
injurious than passive hostility with its threats and possibilities.
The desirability of Mexican friendship on the score of commercial and
political interests was not forgotten, but many believed that good
relations could not be had without first giving her a lesson. Finally,
urged the _Picayune_ with reference to the monarchical designs of
Paredes, it was now the most critical time since the Spanish colonies
had revolted; the future of republicanism and the independence of
America were at stake; and as matters stood, European powers had the
battlefield, Mexico, wholly to themselves.[6.9]

These broad views were strongly supported by more limited and often by
less justifiable ones. The trade interests of the entire Mississippi
valley required not only to be freed from danger, but also to have the
plan of non-intercourse, which Mexico had practically put into force,
given up. A Mexican army would march into Texas, it was remarked, "as
avowed abolitionists," and slaveholders may naturally have preferred
to meet this peril in the enemy's territory. Political considerations
of a personal sort, and one especially, doubtless had an influence.
Calhoun, the dominant figure of the South, contemplating a possible
withdrawal from the Union, desired the people of that section to husband
their strength. "We need our young men for other troubles," he said
with reference to their fighting Mexico. Besides, he naturally could
not welcome a great disturbance that would interfere necessarily with
his plans, and lead to political results of an unpredictable sort. Now
there were men, particularly in Mississippi, by no means unwilling to
embarrass and possibly unhorse that overshadowing leader by forcing him
to antagonize a popular movement; and a war with Mexico seemed obviously
well-suited for such a purpose.[6.10]

[AMERICAN DESIRE FOR TERRITORY]

A wish to extend the Union was undoubtedly a factor.[6.11] As the
_American Review_ said, Burr had planted in the lower Mississippi
valley the seeds of ambition for southern conquest, and the soil proved
very fit for their germination and growth.[6.12] As early as 1830 the
British consul at New Orleans believed the people would support an
attack upon the territory of Mexico. In 1835 a French visitor of some
prominence concluded that every American held two ideas firmly: that
our prosperity resulted from our republican institutions, and that
Providence intended the new world for the Anglo-Saxon. In 1843 Captain
Elliot, mistaking an instinct for a determination, felt satisfied that
the United States had resolved to push south. By 1845 the appetite for
more territory was pronounced. "There appears to be no limit to the
insatiable lust of territorial acquisition which pervades the minds
of many of our citizens," lamented the New Orleans _Tropic_. When the
annexation of Texas appeared to be certain, the New York _Morning News_
exclaimed, "Who's the next customer, California or Canada?" To this
question the _Tribune_ replied, that its neighbor had tasted blood and
growled for more. No, we don't growl, retorted the _News_; more "will
come soon enough--come of its own accord," for our destiny is to possess
the whole continent. Believers in this convenient theory felt bound to
go forward, and should Mexico oppose the decree of Heaven, so much the
worse for her.[6.13]

Behind our voracity and largely responsible for it were a restlessness
and a dissatisfaction resulting from energies that found no adequate
outlet. In all parts of the country this was the case. As a people "we
are restless, fidgety, discontented, anxious for excitement," confessed
the New York _Herald_. In Illinois times were hard. Every attempt at
commercial or industrial enterprise had failed; farmers could not sell
their crops at paying rates; with boundless force in heart and brain
the young man could find nothing worth while to do. The state of mind
in other parts of that section appears to have been similar. Indiana
gave up all attempts to pay interest on her debt as early as 1840. All
over the western border, said the _American Review_, "are great numbers
of bold and restless spirits, men gathered out of all the orderly and
civilized portions of society as its most turbulent members, and ready
for any enterprise that can minister to their reckless manner of life
and love of danger and of change;" and the West was already powerful in
our national affairs. "Our people," wrote Calhoun, "are like a young
man of 18, full of health and vigour, and disposed for adventure of any
description."[6.14]

[THE POPULAR EYE FIXED ON MEXICO]

Such an intoxication of animal vitality demanded a fight, of course.
"The multitude cry aloud for war," admitted the New York _Herald_ in
August, 1845. "Nine-tenths of our people, ceteris paribus, would rather
have a little fighting than not," was the opinion of its neighbor, the
_Morning News_. "LET US GO TO WAR," began a leader in the New
York _Journal of Commerce_; "The world has become stale and insipid,
the ships ought to be all captured, and the cities battered down, and
the world burned up, so that we can start again. There would be fun
in that. Some interest,--something to talk about." If such was the
feeling in a high latitude, it must have burned hot at the south; and
the young men of the Mississippi valley had special reasons for their
ardor. The region of western Tennessee had been settled by revolutionary
soldiers, and they had left a rich inheritance of military traditions.
Jackson towered above all other figures at the southwest, and his chief
distinction was that of the sword. Everybody talked still of the war of
1812 and his brilliant exploit at New Orleans. Indeed, when the mind
wearied of the continual hunting, there was little else to fasten its
eye upon. Military glory became the young man's dream. All aspired to
be soldiers, and to win renown by fighting for their country. This was
their inborn and incessantly cultivated ambition; and it need not be
added that all the young ladies felt that only a military hero, or at
least the makings of such a hero, deserved their attention.[6.15]

Reasons enough why this feeling concentrated upon Mexico have already
been given, but certain others are in order here. That "is indeed the
garden spot of the Americas and presents allurements more tempting than
did the sunny plains and vineyards of Italy, when the northern hordes
swept down and drifted like a snowstorm over the south of Europe"--such
was the picture of "that magnificent region" held up by the _Commercial
Bulletin_ of New Orleans before thousands of young sparks bored nearly
to death by the commonplace. Besides, greatly exaggerated notions of
Mexico's wealth got abroad. Young fellows overstocked with energy were
not willing to hoe corn at five shillings a day, or dig potatoes for
every tenth bushel when the mountains of a near and hostile country were
understood to be packed with silver, and her churches to be radiant
with diamonds and gold. Stronger than all else, perhaps, the vague but
romantic idea of "revelling in the halls of the Montezumas" exercised
a perfect fascination. A letter from New York published in August,
1845, declared that fully twenty thousand volunteers could be raised in
that city alone "without fee or reward, who would jump at the chance
of marching to Mexico" simply to enjoy this diversion. In short, said
the New York _Morning News_, all the "young and ardent spirits that
throng the cities and are spread over the face of the Union want but a
direction to their restless energies, and their attention is already
fixed on Mexico."[6.16]

What made this outlook peculiarly inviting was the belief that only one
bold, swift dash would be needed--no dull, plodding, grimy campaigning
year after year. Six sevenths of the people in Mexico were said to
be Indians, half-breeds and negroes--"mere slaves," and the rest of
them degenerate Spaniards; and the keepers of that paradise, the
guardians of those treasures, were represented as "a feeble and degraded
soldiery, who would be scattered like chaff by the first volley from
the Anglo-Saxon rifle, the first charge of the Anglo-Saxon bayonet."
"An adventure full of fun and frolic and holding forth the rewards of
opulence and glory," was therefore the _Commercial Bulletin's_ golden
picture of a war with Mexico, and such became the common idea.[6.17]

In the summer of 1845 this magnificent dream of sport, glory and
opulence appeared to be on the point of realization, and the war spirit
flamed high. Even journals that had stood firmly against annexing Texas
took fire. "What more inspiring strain can strike the ears of freemen,"
demanded the Richmond _Enquirer_, "than the trumpet note which summons
our people to the punishment of tyrants?... We utterly mistake the
spirit of republicanism in America, if there be not one voice for a full
and thorough chastisement of Mexican arrogance and folly." The prospect
of "coercing" out of Mexico her "spirit of depredation, perfidy and
aggression" and thus inaugurating the sweet and commercially profitable
reign of peace excited hot zeal. West of the Alleghanies the feeling was
peculiarly strong. At Nashville the _Union_ promised that "any number"
of volunteers the government might call for would be forthcoming. At St.
Louis, in the opinion of the _Reveille_, only a prospect of service in
the field was needed to induce "the most active volunteering" among the
"enthusiastic population." "Go where you will," recorded the _Picayune_,
"'tis war and nothing but war;" and Buchanan wrote, "You can have no
adequate conception of the military ardor which exists" in the west and
southwest; "It will be easy to bring 100,000 volunteers into the field
from those States."[6.18]

When Mexico seemed to be slow about striking, the New York _Morning
News_ declared that "a feeling of disappointment" began to be shown
by the public, though still, it added, "At every spring of the whelp,
at every mail from the Gulf, the national pulse moves quicker." When
the prospect of immediate hostilities appeared to be over, the Mobile
_Herald and Tribune_ announced, "After all the visions of glory and
honor which have been dancing through the popular brain for the last
six months" nothing has been done. But in reality something had been
done. Such a state of passion could not simply go out of existence,
especially since the causes of it still remained. The people had become
yet more thoroughly inoculated with the idea of fighting Mexico, and
the country had not advanced far into the new year 1846 before all were
again talking about it, said a Mississippi journal. "Sunday editors" in
particular, it added, "shriek out 'War! War! War!'" Will Polk be able to
withstand the clamor? asked the Memphis _Enquirer_; "We fear not." The
final rejection of Slidell naturally intensified the martial feeling.
"The almost unanimous voice of the American people," wrote even Governor
Hammond of South Carolina, insisted upon war. So much for the attitude
of the public.[6.19]

[THE CHARGE THAT POLK WISHED FOR WAR]

Turning now to the attitude of the government, we are told at once that
Polk deliberately intended to attack Mexico, and are offered various
reasons for so believing. One accuser says that he was ambitious for
personal glory; another, that he desired to perpetuate the power of
his party; a third, that he felt anxious to cover up the humiliating
result of the Oregon negotiation; still another, that he wished to be
reëlected; and more than one allege that he was determined to obtain
California. For this last view there is just evidence enough to create
a suspicion. For example, Bancroft remarked more than forty years after
the event that Polk said the acquisition of that province would be one
of his aims, and this remark has been cited as if it proved the charge.
But there was not the slightest impropriety in his desiring an immensely
valuable territory that Webster had endeavored a few years before to
acquire, and in 1845 Bancroft himself represented the President's
feeling toward Mexico as "most conciliatory." Indeed, after the conflict
had begun, Bancroft wrote privately to Samuel Hooper, "We were driven
reluctantly to war."[6.20]

Again, certain facts are cited and aligned: Polk wanted California, a
war occurred, and he promptly took advantage of the war to occupy the
desired territory. But the existence of several points in line does not
prove the existence of a path connecting them, and there is weighty
evidence against the suspicion which these facts naturally excite.
While directing Slidell to obtain the cession of northern California,
if he could, Buchanan intimated, as we have seen, that he should
not press this matter, if so doing would prevent the restoration of
amicable relations with Mexico. In other words, instead of desiring to
precipitate a war for the sake of obtaining California, Polk was ready
to let California go--or at least wait--for the sake of maintaining
peace. Besides, as we shall find when we come to the operations on the
western coast, Polk had a policy for the acquisition of that region, and
this policy did not contemplate war. With nothing solid to stand upon,
then, and much to stand against, this theory must be given up.[6.20]

The other explanations of Polk's alleged intention to fight Mexico are
evidently mere conjectures, and prove nothing. The idea that contracts
and offices could strengthen the administration and build up the party
is mainly, or perhaps entirely, fallacious. There were not enough to
satisfy more than a small percentage of the hungry patriots, and the
rest were likely to take offence. Moreover, if given to Democrats, these
favors could make no converts; while if given to Whigs, the Democrats
were sure to complain, and few of the recipients could change their
party for such a reason. Many of Polk's chief troubles, as his diary
shows, came from dissatisfied applicants for commissions, and any
person well versed in public affairs could have foreseen that it would
be so.[6.21] And yet, after all, the charge that he purposely brought
on the war has been so commonly believed, or at least so frequently
repeated, that it can fairly demand a more extended examination.[6.22]

[POLK'S PERSONALITY]

First of all, then, we must form an estimate of Polk. For this purpose
his diary is extremely useful. No doubt, like other documents of the
sort, it colors some things and omits others; but so extremely busy a
man could not have practised systematic misrepresentation in his daily
record without hopelessly enmeshing and entangling himself and incurring
the risk of detection at many points, while--occupying, as he did, a
position where his every word and act were noted by others--he would
have exposed himself often to documentary refutation. Besides, the
marks of good faith are without number. The diary should therefore be
accepted, and has been accepted, as essentially truthful; and the man
it shows us--revealed also by a large amount of other evidence--is a
cold, narrow, methodical, dogged, plodding, obstinate partisan, deeply
convinced of his importance and responsibility, very wanting in humor,
very wanting in ideality, very wanting in soulfulness, inclined to be
sly, and quite incapable of seeing great things in a great way. All know
the type. It is the leading citizen and schemer of the small town, who
marches up the centre aisle on public occasions with creaking shoes
and a wooden smile, and takes his seat with a backward, all-embracing
glance.[6.23]

Such a person--lean, stiff, angular, with sharp gray eyes in a sad face,
and long, grizzled hair brushed straight back behind his ears--makes
no appeal to our sympathies, and for that reason is almost sure to be
judged unfairly. For example, Polk has been called the "Mendacious"; but
that is unjust. Many things are done in good society which, if thrown
upon a screen before two thousand people, would be recognized instantly
as mean; and the same is true in the world of affairs. As a lawyer and
politician of Nashville, Polk no doubt resorted to devices of this kind,
and he was not the man to realize the difference between a provincial
town and a nation, and adapt himself to his new position. Compelled to
act, he acted as he could; used the tactics with which he was familiar.
In this manner he deceived men or permitted men to deceive themselves,
and those accustomed to broader and larger and nobler methods thought
he lied. In reality he was not Polk the Mendacious, but simply Polk the
Mediocre.[6.23]

Yet he was mediocre only as compared with great standards. He could by
no means be called insignificant. George Bancroft, secretary of the
navy, has testified that he surpassed every member of his Cabinet in
ability--not as high a distinction, perhaps, as might have been wished,
but still high. His will-power was ample, and his output of mental
energy large. In seriousness, industry and fidelity he left nothing to
be desired. Though strongly inclined to be positive, he would listen
patiently to others, discuss weighty matters at length, and if convinced
would yield. He reflected long, and yet when the time for decision came,
he did not shrink from taking a stand. He intended to do his duty as he,
Polk, was able to see it, and spent himself liberally in that cause. He
certainly was religious, and no doubt--though blind to the beauty of
uprightness and unresponsive to the delicacy of honor--he fully believed
that he was conscientious.[6.23]

To regard such a man, uninspired and uninspiring, as capable of playing
the brilliant villain's rôle in a grand international tragedy, of
dreaming the conqueror's dream and sacrificing his fellow-citizens
on the altar of gory but gorgeous ambition, of smelling the battle
from afar like the war-horse and crying, "Ha, ha!"--this is out of
the question. It was not in him. Neither intellect, conscience nor
imagination permitted it. The Cabinet, which he selected with care,
hampered by no preëlection agreements, was much like him; and as Benton
said, it is "impossible to conceive of an administration less warlike,
or more intriguing." "Mr. Polk never dreamed of any other war than a war
upon the Whigs," admitted Robert Toombs, then a Whig member of Congress,
in February, 1846.[6.23]

A number of circumstances almost committed him to a peaceable course
toward Mexico. During the discussions of the annexation project one of
the strongest objections had been that it would involve the country
in war, and its advocates had strenuously denied this allegation. The
President belonged to that group, and Webster said: "That Mr. Polk
and his Cabinet will desire to keep the peace, there is no doubt. The
responsibility of having provoked war by their scheme of annexation is
what they would greatly dread." Though many plain citizens desired a
fight, an influential body of merchants, financiers and conservatives
did not; and in the view of a still greater number a vital discrepancy
between the predictions of the annexationists and their later conduct
would surely have been damaging. The Oregon question threatened to prove
serious; and it is hardly credible that Polk, even if quite willing to
meet an attack from Mexico, would have desired to attack her before
settling this controversy with England. The secretaries of state, war
and the navy did not hail from fire-eating communities. The head of
the army, General Scott, was a Whig and a recognized candidate for the
Presidency; and the chiefs of the Democratic party had fully sense
enough to understand that a war might enable him to succeed Polk. In
fact the President's diary exhibits painful writhings due to such a
possibility. Finally war, no matter how successful, would mean taxes,
and even those who demanded a fight might not be willing to pay for it.
Certainly Polk was not self-sacrificing enough to desire the odium of
laying war taxes for the sake of bringing Scott into the White House.
Besides, it looked as if war expenses could not fail to strengthen
the tariff system, and that was obnoxious to a great number of the
Democrats.[6.24]

[POLK'S COURSE PACIFIC]

Polk's professions were every way most pacific. The assurances conveyed
to Almonte after he made his protest have already been mentioned. In
August, 1845, Polk wrote confidentially to a Senator, "We will not
be the aggressors upon Mexico." A month later Buchanan declared in a
"Private and Personal" letter to our minister at London: "The President
does not intend to proceed beyond a just and righteous self-defence, and
he is ready to present the olive branch to Mexico the moment he knows it
will be accepted." It is hardly supposable that our secretary of state
intended to deceive our most important representative abroad, or that he
was deceived himself by Polk in so vital a matter.[6.25]

The confidential orders of the government were emphatically unwarlike
in tone. To Conner, commanding in the Gulf, the secretary of the navy
wrote in March, 1845, "The disposition of the President is to maintain
the most friendly relations with the Mexican Republic," and in substance
this declaration was repeated in the following July and August. "Take
special care," the department said to Stockton, who had a few vessels
on the Texas coast, "to avoid every act that can admit of being
construed as inconsistent with our friendly relations" with Mexico.
Commodore Sloat, in the Pacific, was told in "Secret and Confidential"
instructions dated June 24, 1845, "The President hopes, most earnestly,
that the peace of the two countries may not be disturbed ... do
everything consistent with the national honor" to avoid a rupture; and
these instructions to Sloat were most noteworthy, for the commander on
the Pacific station was liable to be out of touch with the government
for a year at a time, and he needed to be sure as to its general
policy.[6.26]

For the guidance of our chargé in Texas, where many feared a Mexican
invasion and called for American troops, a clear statement of our
intentions was equally necessary, and Buchanan wrote to Donelson at
about the same time, "The Government will studiously refrain from all
acts of hostility towards that republic [Mexico], unless these should
become absolutely necessary in self-defence." Quite in line with all
this was the order cancelling Frémont's second exploring trip to the far
west, because he had equipped his party in a military style--an order
that was decidedly over-strict, since precautions against the Indians
could not be neglected. In his Message to the Senate, March 24, 1846,
the President declared it his "settled purpose" to maintain peace with
Mexico, and it is believed that no expression of his indicating a desire
to provoke a conflict can be found.[6.26]

The measures of the administration corresponded with its professions.
In the first place this was true negatively. It would not be easy to
deny that Mexico's refusal to pay the instalments of our awards could
have been handled by our government in a way to enrage this nation,
already so eager for the fray, and probably her severance of diplomatic
relations might have been used to precipitate an issue; but no advantage
was taken of either opportunity. Another instance is even more signal.
One can hardly doubt that Polk might have brought on a war in the
summer of 1845, had he so desired. Not only had Mexico grossly insulted
us, refused to pay those awards, and severed relations with us both
at her capital and at our own, but she had solemnly announced that
our annexing Texas would be regarded as equivalent to a declaration
of war, notified her agents privately and the world at large publicly
that she was going to fight, and begun preparations for immediate
hostilities. Had Polk summoned Congress and laid all the facts before
it, a declaration of war, or at least an ultimatum that Mexico would
in all probability have rejected, must certainly, or almost certainly,
have been the response; and if one may judge from the state of mind
existing in the United States at the time, our people would in the main
have supported such a course. "The current of public opinion," said the
St. Louis _Republican_, "seems now strongly inclined in favor of a war
with Mexico." "All the better portions of the press of the country,"
was the summary of the New Orleans _Picayune_, "are urgent for the
adoption of the most energetic measures" against that country. Almost
every Democratic journal and a vast majority of the Whig journals,
declared the Washington _Globe_, were for crushing Mexico at once. "The
people will approve" of vigorous action, admitted even the Charleston
_Courier_.[6.27]

[POLK DID NOT DESIRE THE WAR]

But Polk did not adopt a course of that sort. He took no such steps
to settle matters with England as a President of ordinary common
sense would have taken, if anxious to fight Mexico; and no serious
measures were adopted to increase our nominal army or our insufficient
fleet. In September, he requested the members of the Cabinet to make
their estimates for the coming year on "the most economical scale,"
and in fact only twenty-six hundred additional men were asked for the
army--none for the navy. A note from the secretary of the navy to
Captain Perry--"We are jogging on quietly this winter, not anticipating
war"--well represents our military and naval programme; and a letter to
Conner explains it: "We all hope Mexico will agree to a peace." Knowing,
as Polk must have known, the deep and widespread fear of Mexican
privateers, he would have been prevented by a merely selfish regard for
the good opinion of the public from planning war without making some
dispositions to protect, or at least warn, our millions of floating
property. And apparently even the ardor of our young men for combat did
not seriously move him.[6.28]

In the second place, Polk's action pointed the same way as his
non-action. No one could think of any rational method to conciliate
Mexico that he did not put into operation. The chief object of Parrott's
mission, which was private and therefore could not have been intended
for effect upon the world, was understood by Parrott himself to be,
"preventing a declaration of war, by Mexico, against the United
States." In appointing Slidell, as even the _American Review_ admitted,
the President was evidently sincere. At the end of March, 1846, Polk
received advices from Slidell which made it seem quite possible that he
would finally be given a hearing, and immediately he set on foot a plan
to furnish Paredes with funds, enable him to keep the army faithful,
and thus encourage him to settle matters amicably. Indeed, all that is
known of this mission from beginning to end, including Slidell's private
letters to Buchanan and numerous details that it would be wearisome
to hear specified, show that Polk strongly desired--as the Mexicans
accused him of desiring--a restoration of friendly intercourse; and when
the purpose had evidently failed, Slidell gave final evidence of that
disposition by writing: "I am greatly mortified at the total failure
of a mission commenced under auspices apparently the most flattering,
but that mortification is much mitigated by the consciousness, that no
fault of omission or commission, can justly be attributed either to the
Government or to the Legation."[6.29]

In short, then, we find that Polk had the gravest reasons for desiring
friendly intercourse with Mexico, and probably felt none for plotting
war; that a variety of personal and political circumstances naturally
inclined him toward peace; that his declarations, both public and
private, pointed consistently in that direction as long as any hope of
an amicable settlement remained; and that what he did in repeated and
most significant ways, as well as what he refrained from doing, had the
same meaning. We must therefore give up the idea that he desired, and
from the first intended, to have a war with Mexico.

[A CRISIS]

All prospects of negotiation came to an end, however, and the
administration found itself confronted by a crisis. The dignity of the
United States had certainly been outraged in a defiant and contemptuous
manner. By the acts of Mexico, diplomatic relations had been completely
severed, and she would not renew them on any terms which the United
States could think of accepting. Commercial intercourse was practically
at an end, and the interests of our citizens were so gravely prejudiced,
that from this point of view even a London paper, the _Examiner_,
admitted reluctantly that the situation was becoming "intolerable to
the United States." Our claims and our awards were still facts. "The
honor of this government is pledged to our own people for the diligent
and proper prosecution of these claims," our secretary of state had
said in 1843, and it was perfectly true. To let them go unpaid, in
addition to being internationally immoral, would have wronged our
aggrieved citizens; and to pay them from our own revenues, besides being
immoral, pusillanimous and ridiculous, would have been unfair to all
of our tax-payers. We had observed no more willingness, although the
Mexican government had nearly always been sufficiently strong, to do us
justice before annexation became an issue than afterwards; and in fact
Ashburnham, a British representative at Mexico, did not exaggerate when
he wrote, "They _will_ not pay but on compulsion." There was therefore
no way to collect our due except by force.[6.30]

If our long forbearance appeared to American editors a mistake, much
more reason had the administration to entertain that opinion, for
our ministers and consuls in Mexico had repeatedly urged it, and
Slidell had summed up his experience there in the following words,
amply justified by the sequel: "We shall never be able to treat with
her on fair terms until she has been taught to respect us ... here
all amicable advances are considered as indicative either of weakness
or treachery." "Be assured," he added privately to Buchanan, "that
nothing is to be done with these people, until they shall have been
chastised." The solemn declarations of a succession of trusted agents
that our forbearance was a tactical error were facts that our government
was bound to consider; and by way of confirmation it had not only our
complete failure to get on with Mexico, but the success of a power which
seemed to have pursued a very different course, for in October, 1845,
our consul at Vera Cruz had given the state department a specimen of
England's tone. Mexico, said she to the minister of relations, must
fulfil to the letter every contract with a British subject.[6.31]

Furthermore our government felt seriously concerned about the European
monarchical schemes. Early in January, 1846, the London _Times_ printed
a letter from its correspondent at Mexico in which the opinion was
expressed that a foreign prince, if "seconded by any leading European
power," could gain a Mexican throne. A week later the same journal,
recommending a Spanish king as the only possible cure for the ills
of Mexico, had remarked that the United States could not oppose the
"united policy of the European Powers"; and at about the same time
the _Picayune_ had announced, that it was proposed to give Cuba to
England for her coöperation in the monarchical plan. Our government
had, and could have, no intention of submitting to such European
manoeuvres. Any attempt of England and France to place a king on the
throne of Mexico, wrote Buchanan, "would be resisted by all the power
of the United States;" and the best way to oppose it was to effect a
definitive settlement of our difficulties with Mexico at once--first,
because this of itself would very likely make the development of the
rather complicated scheme appear, in view of the "Monroe Doctrine,"
impracticable, and, secondly, because no European power could, with any
show of decency, interfere in the domestic affairs of that country,
while she was actually at war.[6.32]

Chivalry does not govern international relations even at the present
day, and in 1845 sentiment was perhaps less tender on the subject than
it now is. Vattel, the recognized authority on the law of nations,
wrote thus: "Every nation ... has, therefore, a right ... to preserve
herself from all injuries.... When the evil is done, the same right to
security authorizes the offended party to endeavour to obtain a complete
reparation, and to employ force for that purpose, if necessary."[6.33]

Moreover, the United States could appeal, not only to strict law,
but still more forcibly to broad equity. To sum up the case in one
sentence, Mexico, our next neighbor, on no grounds that could be
recognized by the United States, repudiated her treaties with us, ended
official relations, aimed to prevent commercial intercourse, planned to
deprive us of all influence on certain issues vitally connected with
our declared foreign policy, seemed likely to sell California to some
European rival of ours, made it impossible for us to urge long-standing
claims or watch over citizens dwelling within her borders, refused to
pay even her admitted debts to us, claimed the privilege of applying to
our government publicly the most opprobrious epithets in the vocabulary
of nations, designed to keep our people in a constant state of
uncertainty and alarm, intended to cause us the expense of maintaining
for defensive purposes a large army and a large navy, planned to destroy
our commerce by commissioning privateers, claimed the right to harry
Texas, a part of the Union, at will, threatened and prepared for war,
and proposed to assume such an attitude that, whenever encouraged by
foreign support or any other circumstances, she could open fire upon
us without even giving notice. She had informed the world that it was
her privilege to keep on harrying Texas from generation to generation;
and on a broader scale, but in a manner precisely analogous, it was now
proposed to hang upon the flank of the United States. Foreign mediation
could not be invoked, for all the American states were naturally
supposed to be prejudiced, and it was contrary to our interest and
avowed policy to allow European intervention in the affairs of this
continent; and no end of what had become truly an intolerable state of
affairs could be seen, for Mexico declared she would never give up her
pretensions until she had recovered Texas, which it was now beyond her
power to do.[6.34]

[THE CASE URGENT]

It rested with our government, therefore, as the agent of national
defence and the representative of national dignity and interests, to
apply a remedy. Of course, too, all the pressure of warlike sentiment
among our people, especially in the President's party, and even the
pressure of motives distinctly selfish, had to be recognized more or
less, for such is the nature of popular government. Very likely Polk's
abandoning a part of our Oregon claim rendered it the more necessary
to avoid flinching in the Mexican affair; and accordingly on April 21,
1846, after long consideration of the matter, he informed the Cabinet
that our relations with Mexico "could not be permitted to remain" as
they were, and that he thought he should recommend to Congress the
adoption of energetic measures for the redress of our grievances,
which meant also of course a full settlement of our differences with
that power. In truth no other course would have been patriotic or even
rational.[6.35]




                                  VII

                   THE PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONFLICT

                        April, 1845-April, 1846


Strangely enough, although our diplomatic troubles with Mexico would
almost certainly have led to hostilities, the war actually came about in
a totally different way.[7.1]

During the spring and early summer of 1845, in view of Mexican threats
and of reports from trustworthy sources that an invasion of Texas might
be expected,[7.2] it was decided by our government that when her
people should have accepted our annexation proposal, as they were almost
sure to do, it would become the duty of the United States to defend
her;[7.3] and this decision made the question where her southern
boundary lay a practical matter. It was a thorny subject. In 1834
Mexico herself did not feel sure about the line; and according to the
chief technical officer in our state department, sole commissioner to
negotiate the treaty of peace with Mexico, if an official demarcation
had existed, the war between Texas and the mother-country had rubbed
it out. The former now claimed the territory as far as the Rio Grande,
but she did not establish her title by occupying completely and
effectively the region south of the Nueces. Only by an agreement with
Mexico, indeed, could limits have been fixed. So far as it concerned the
republic of Texas, this was in effect the situation.[7.4]

For the United States, however, this was not the whole story. Down
to 1819 our government had insisted that Louisiana extended to the
Rio Grande. In other language, since the southern part of Louisiana
was called Texas, the official view was that Texas bordered on that
stream. Such, then, was in effect the contention of Jefferson,
Madison, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Pinckney, Livingston and Clay,
who represented three administrations in upholding the claim. By the
treaty of 1819 we did not withdraw from our position, but merely
arranged to "cede" whatever possessions we had west of the Sabine for
certain valuable considerations. From 1819 to 1845, Texas, considered
under its geographical and historical aspects as a district of old
Louisiana, appeared to border on the Rio Grande not less truly than
before, for no other line became established. Hence it seemed evident
from this point of view, that by annexing Texas we revived our old
claim, our old official view, and the testimony of all those eminent
statesmen. Our government so held. November 10, 1845, in explaining to
Slidell the extent of Texas, Buchanan went back to Jefferson, Madison,
Monroe, Pinckney and the discussion of the Louisiana boundary. Polk,
as the head of our government, could not well repudiate, simply on his
own authority, the solemn declarations of Presidents and other high
officials, in which through a term of years the nation had acquiesced.
The fact that for a considerable time the Texans, asserting the Rio
Grande line, had maintained themselves against Mexico perhaps had
some confirmatory value; and Polk was further bound, not only by his
apparently sincere belief in our old claim, but by the pledge he had
given to Texas and the pledge our official representative had given her,
expressly to promote the cause of annexation, that he would maintain the
claim as President. These were grips of steel.[7.5]

[THE UNITED STATES ARMY]

To meet the responsibility thus incurred, we had eight regiments of
infantry, four of "artillery" and two of dragoons, including about
7200 men. The "artillery" regiments, which were theoretically expected
to serve in fortifications with heavy guns, were armed, equipped and
drilled as infantry; but one company of each had a field battery,
and under the instruction of excellent officers had reached a high
state of skill in using it. The infantry and cavalry, drilled on the
French system, were in a good condition generally, though division
among coast and frontier stations, besides impairing discipline and
efficiency, had prevented manoeuvring in large bodies; and the infantry
soldiers in particular, inured on the border to hard service, felt now
a reasonable confidence in themselves and their immediate superiors.
The forty-five capable engineer officers understood their duties fairly
well, except that a lack of men to execute operations had left them,
as the head of the corps admitted, too much like theoretical mariners.
A few well-trained topographical engineers, a small medical staff, and
a quartermaster's department rounded out this miniature army. Nearly
all the infantry carried flint-lock muskets, and numerous defects and
deficiencies existed; but probably the forces were better equipped
for service than has generally been supposed. In view of possible
difficulties with Mexico, a disproportionate share of the troops were
placed at or near Fort Jesup on the western border of Louisiana; and in
June, 1845, these included the Third Infantry, eight companies of the
Fourth Infantry, and seven companies of the Second Dragoons.[7.6]

[GENERAL ZACHARY TAYLOR]

Their commander was Brevet Brigadier General Zachary Taylor. This child
of destiny, born in 1784, had grown up and gained some rudiments of an
education amidst the Indian troubles of the Kentucky border. At the age
of twenty-three he had been commissioned first lieutenant in the Seventh
Infantry, and after showing remarkable coolness and intrepidity in two
small affairs during our second war with England and the Black Hawk War,
he had won a stubborn fight in 1837 against the Seminoles at the head of
some 1100 soldiers. Three years later he was assigned to a supervising
command in the southwest, and this included Fort Jesup.[7.7]

Personally Taylor possessed a strong character, a very strong character,
neither exhausted by self-indulgence nor weakened by refinement and
study. He was every inch a man, with a great heart, a mighty will, a
profound belief in himself, and a profound belief in human nature.
The makings of a hero lay in him, and to a large extent the making
had been done. He was gifted, too, with solid common sense, not a
little shrewdness and ambition, a thorough knowledge of men--the sort
of men that he knew at all--a military eye, and a cool, resourceful
intelligence that was always at work in its own rather ponderous
fashion. The sharp gray eyes and the contraction of his brows that made
the upper part of his face look severe were tempered by the benignity
of the lower part; and the occasional glimmer of a twinkle betokened
humor.[7.7]

On the other hand, everything about him suggested the backwoodsman. His
thick-set and rather corpulent body, mounted on remarkably short legs,
typified barbaric strength. In speech he was rough and ungrammatical, in
dress unkempt and even dirty, and in every external of his profession
unmilitary. He never had seen a real battle nor even a real army.
Ignorance and lack of mental discipline made him proud of his natural
powers and self-mastered attainments, and he saw very distinctly the
weaknesses of school-taught and book-taught men. West Pointers, trim in
person and in mind but inferior to him in strength, practical sense and
familiarity with men and things, he felt strongly inclined to belittle;
and this feeling went so far that he despised, or at any rate frequently
seemed to despise, knowledge itself. He could not, however, fail to
recognize on occasions the professional superiority of his trained
officers, and no doubt found himself unable now and then to defend
his opinions. In such cases, being by temperament extremely firm, he
naturally took refuge in obstinacy; and sometimes he appears to have
been positively mulish, holding to his own view after he must have seen
its incorrectness.[7.7]

From various logical results of these limitations Taylor was happily
saved by Major General Winfield Scott, the head of the army, who
purposely gave him Captain W. W. S. Bliss as adjutant general. Bliss was
described by a good authority as the peer of any man alive in learning,
statesmanship and military capacity; and he felt willing to give the
General--later his father-in-law--the unstinted benefit of all his
talents and attainments. With him at his elbow Taylor could be sure of
trustworthy information, honest and competent advice, a friendly hand
to supplement or subtract, and a skilful pen to report, explain and,
if necessary, discreetly color the facts. Captain Williams, an able
officer, wrote in 1848 that he could not imagine one man's being more
indebted to another than Taylor was to his assistant. In other words,
"Taylor" in the history of the Mexican War is the name of a double star,
one partner in which was the dominating personality of the General, and
the other a fine, trained intelligence known as Bliss.[7.8]

Taylor, then, having been warned by a despatch of May 28, 1845, to hold
the troops in readiness, was confidentially ordered on the fifteenth
of June to place them at some port where they could readily embark for
the Texas frontier, and, after learning that our annexation overture
had been accepted, to occupy "on or near the Rio Grande del Norte"
such a position, favorable to the health of the men, as would be "best
adapted to repel invasion." Accordingly he concentrated his infantry at
New Orleans, where official notice that annexation had been accepted by
Texas reached him. Further orders from William L. Marcy, the secretary
of war, enjoined upon him to "avoid any Acts of aggression," and in
particular to refrain from disturbing any Mexican posts on the left
bank of the river "unless an actual state of war should exist"; and
under these instructions the forces left New Orleans toward the end of
July for Aransas Bay, Texas. His troops--counting the dragoons, who set
out by land for San Antonio, about 120 miles from the coast, a little
later--numbered some 1500.[7.9]

Taylor himself with a part of the command reached his destination on the
twenty-fifth; landed his men, with such rapidity as meagre facilities
and heavy surf would permit, on St. Joseph's Island; and then, with row
boats and small sailing-craft, conveyed them some twenty-five miles
farther to Corpus Christi, a hamlet on the south side of the Nueces
River at its mouth. News that Mexico was on the point of beginning
hostilities caused great alarm presently; but no enemy came, and by the
end of August the General felt secure. The rest of the troops from Fort
Jesup were then on the ground. Seven companies of the Seventh Infantry,
collected laboriously from a number of points, had arrived. Two
volunteer artillery companies from New Orleans had come to the rescue;
and a party of Texan rangers were near him. The Mexicans, on the other
hand, showed no signs of concentrating.[7.10]

[CONDITIONS AT CORPUS CHRISTI]

Naturally the public inquired whether the occupation of Corpus Christi,
and especially the words "on or near" the Rio Grande, could be
justified. But, as the London _Times_--a witness by no means prejudiced
in our favor--observed, "When the United States Government, with the
full sanction of the American people, consummated the annexation of
Texas, ... they should, according to all the usages of civilized
Governments, have proceeded to take military means for the protection of
their new frontier." The performance of this duty involved giving the
commander a somewhat liberal discretion, for southern Texas was a region
of which the Washington authorities knew very little, and what steps it
would be proper for the General to take, should the Mexicans launch a
raid at San Antonio, was known there even less. It would have required
about a month to send information and receive orders based upon it.
Authority to occupy such a post as might seem necessary, in view of the
ground, the vicinity and the news, had to be given. Taylor understood
that Corpus Christi, which belonged to Texas by the same right of
effective occupation as Nacogdoches or Galveston, satisfied the terms of
the order; the government accepted that interpretation; and the country
acquiesced.[7.11]

Gradually his forces assumed rather formidable proportions. Some of
the troops had to come from Detroit, and some from Florida; but it
was feared in all quarters that a heavy Mexican body might cross the
Rio Grande any day, and the reinforcements made quick time. October
13 the army included General W. J. Worth's command, called the first
brigade, which comprised the Eighth Infantry and twelve companies of the
so-called artillery consolidated as a battalion; the second brigade,
consisting of the Fifth and the Seventh Infantry under Lieutenant
Colonel J. S. McIntosh; the third brigade under Colonel William
Whistler, which included the Third and the Fourth Infantry; the Second
Dragoons, commanded by Colonel D. E. Twiggs; some United States and New
Orleans field artillery, and the Texas rangers. In all, officers and
men, there were about 3900.[7.12]

Taylor, accustomed to frontier conditions, described his troops as
healthy, remarkably well-behaved and very comfortable. But in reality
the tents could scarcely keep out a heavy dew; for weeks together every
article in many of them was thoroughly soaked; and much of the time
water stood three or four feet deep in some. The weather oscillated
sharply between sultry heat and piercing northers, so that one lay down
gasping for breath and woke up freezing. As hardly enough wood could be
obtained for the cooks, camp-fires were usually out of the question; and
only brackish drinking water could be had. At one time nearly twenty
per cent of the men were on the sick list, and half of the others more
or less ill. Taylor knew so little of military evolutions that he could
not get his men properly into line, and few of his chief officers
excelled him very much. Despite orders from the President, military
exercises were given up after a time; a sullen torpor and silence
reigned in the camp, and many deserted. Meanwhile a horde of gamblers
and liquor-sellers opened booths near by; and the soldiers, driven
to desperation, paid what little money they had to be drugged into
insensibility or crazed into brawls and orgies. Some, if not many, of
the officers gave up acting like gentlemen, and one at least even forgot
how to be honest.[7.13]

Then a dispute regarding precedence brought the camp to the verge of
battle. Twiggs had the honor of seniority as colonel; but Worth, as a
brevet brigadier general, insisted that should Taylor cease to hold the
command, it would fall to him. The question was referred to Washington;
and Scott, directed by Marcy to settle it, gave a ruling in favor of
brevet rank. This decision did not, however, end the controversy. More
than a hundred officers joined in an appeal to Congress, while Worth
declared he would maintain his rights "to any extreme." Taylor, instead
of using his personal and official strength to enforce a _modus vivendi_
until the issue could be properly decided, or at least refraining from
all accentuation of it, ordered a general review, and in spite of the
ruling announced by his superior officer, assigned Twiggs to command
on that occasion; and then, finding that serious trouble would ensue,
proved himself, by countermanding the review, unable to maintain even
his own authority. After all this, discipline could hardly be said
to exist. Moreover, a general want of confidence in the commander
prevailed. "Whether an idea, strategic or of any other description, has
had the rudeness to invade the mind or imagination of our chief is a
matter of doubt," said Worth; "We are literally a huge body without a
head." If Taylor succeeds, it will be by accident, concluded Lieutenant
Colonel Hitchcock, now commanding the Third Infantry, who had studied
and taught at West Point.[7.14]

[THE QUESTION OF RIGHT]

Toward the end of August Marcy wrote: "Should Mexico assemble a large
body of troops on the Rio Grande and cross it with a considerable
force, such a movement must be regarded as an invasion of the United
States and the commencement of hostilities." This declaration called
forth protests, but was quite fair. By stationing troops peaceably in
the "intermediate region" between the Nueces and the Rio Grande we
only placed ourselves on an equality with Mexico; and, as we ordered
Taylor to leave her posts undisturbed, we showed a friendly recognition
of the principle of pacific joint-occupation during negotiations. Our
forces, to be sure, outnumbered hers, but her attitude made it unsafe to
despatch a smaller representation. Unlike us, Mexico had no occasion to
send an army into that region for defensive purposes. The United States
had shown every sign of desiring peace and none of desiring war, and at
this time was endeavoring to bring about a friendly settlement. Such an
army could not have prevented us from entering the intermediate region,
for at Corpus Christi Taylor was already there; and it could not have
saved the Mexican posts and citizens, for they were not menaced. Mexico,
on the other hand, had threatened us and made open preparations to
strike; it was now understood at Washington that no declaration of war
should be expected to precede a blow; her generals had proclaimed that
hostilities were on the point of beginning; and it was only common sense
to assume that, should a Mexican army cross the Rio Grande, it would
come to execute the announced intention of those who sent it.[7.15]

During the evening of January 12, 1846, despatches from Slidell and
Black arrived at Washington, and made the rejection of our pacific
overture look almost certain. This unexpected turn of affairs gave
new seriousness and fresh urgency to the Mexican issue; and the next
day Taylor was ordered to encamp on the Rio Grande at whatever point
he should consider most advantageous. He was cautioned, however,
against regarding Mexico as an enemy, unless war should be declared
or hostilities be undertaken by her, and against provoking a conflict
by insistence upon the joint navigation of the river, which our claim
implied.[7.16]

February 3 the General received these instructions, and replied that he
should lose no time. Three days later the army was formally ordered to
"be prepared for a field movement at short notice." But, although Taylor
had been on the ground for six months, he was "utterly ignorant"--said
Hitchcock--of the way to Matamoros, and had now to investigate the
matter. By February 24 he possessed the necessary data, and ordered the
troops to be in readiness to set out "at forty-eight hours notice";
yet it was not until the eighth of March that his cavalry, led by
the impetuous Twiggs and accompanied by Ringgold's handsome battery,
actually moved off. The infantry brigades followed at intervals of a
day with Duncan's and Bragg's field artillery; and transports prepared
to remove the convalescents, extra baggage and Major Munroe's artillery
company to Point Isabel, near the mouth of the Rio Grande.[7.17]

[THE ADVANCE TO THE RIO GRANDE]

Soon after receiving the instructions to advance, Taylor had given
notice of his orders to influential citizens of Matamoros then at Corpus
Christi, explaining that his march would be entirely pacific, and that
he expected the pending questions to be settled by negotiation; and
similar assurances were conveyed to the Mexican customhouse office at
"Brazos Santiago," near Point Isabel. March 8 a more formal announcement
appeared in General Orders No. 30. Taylor here expressed the hope
that his movement would be "beneficial to all concerned," insisted
upon a scrupulous regard for the civil and religious rights of the
people, and commanded that everything required for the use of the army
should be paid for "at the highest market price." These orders, which
merely anticipated instructions then on their way from Washington,
were translated into Spanish, and placed in circulation along the
border.[7.18]

To the troops the march proved a refreshing and beneficial change. The
weather was now fine, the road almost free from mud, and the breeze
balmy. Frequently the blue lupine, the gay verbena, the saucy marigold
and countless other bright flowers carpeted the ground. The cactus and
the cochineal excited and gratified curiosity. Ducks and geese often
flew up from the line of advance. Many rabbits and many deer scampered
across the plain; and occasionally wolves, catamounts and panthers
were frightened from cover. Wild horses would gaze for an instant at
their cousins in bondage, and then gallop off, tossing their manes
disdainfully; and once a herd of them, spaced as if to allow room
for cannon, were taken for Mexican cavalry. Innumerable centipedes,
tarantulas and rattlesnakes furnished a good deal of interest, if
not of charm. The boundless prairie had somewhat the fascination of
the sea; and occasionally, when a mirage conjured up a range of
blue mountains--clothed with forests and reflected in lakes--that
melted presently into the air, one had a sense of moving on enchanted
ground.[7.19]

To be sure, the march was not entirely agreeable. For about 196 miles
it stretched on and on, and most of the way it lay through deep, sandy
plains, here glistening with salt, and there varied with briny marshes
or sticky black dirt. In some places Mexicans had burned the herbage;
and the light ashes, raised by the tramp of many feet, settled on the
soldiers' faces till they could scarcely recognize one another. Tortured
with thirst, they would occasionally break ranks pell-mell at the sight
of water; but as a rule they found it brackish. All suffered alike; and
we have a picture of Taylor himself breakfasting at the door of his
tent with a mess-chest for table, his rugged countenance flaming with
sunburn, his long lips cracked and raw, and his long nose white with
peeling skin. But the experience, even at its worst, proved a wholesome
tonic after the degeneration of Corpus Christi.[7.19]

March 20 the army came to the Arroyo Colorado, a salt lagoon about a
hundred yards wide and three or four feet deep. Here General Mejía,
the commander at Matamoros, who knew all about our troops and their
movements, had intended to win a sheaf of laurels; but orders from
his government, not quite ready for action, arrived in time to curb
this ambition. He concluded then to try the effect of a ruse, and his
officer convinced the Americans, with solemn warnings, bugle-calls here
and there, and a clever showing of heads among the bushes and trees on
the southern side of the lagoon, that a hard fight would result from
attempting to cross it. But without the least hesitation Taylor prepared
for battle. Ringgold's pieces were made ready. Worth dashed into the
stream at the head of an advance party; and on gaining, unopposed,
the opposite bank, he saw--dust in the atmosphere, and far away a
dozen small black specks rapidly growing smaller. But morally it was a
victory; and the troops, though cheated, felt encouraged.[7.20]

March 23, after making fifteen miles across a clear, dry prairie, the
army came to a road that led to Matamoros, about eighteen miles away
on the right, and to Point Isabel, distant nine or ten on the other
side; and Taylor, ordering Worth and the infantry to camp and watch
for the enemy at a suitable place in the former direction, proceeded
to the coast with his cavalry. There he found the transports in sight
and the wind favorable. Defences were planned at once; and on the 27th,
leaving an engineer, supported by a guard under Munroe, to superintend
the construction of them, the General returned to the army, then some
ten miles from Matamoros. The next morning all advanced, and soon came
to rough defiles. On each side bristled what a soldier described as an
irregular, impenetrable mass of "scraggly, scrubby, crooked, infernally
illegitimate and sin-begotten bushy trees loaded with millions of
thornpins"--that is to say, _chaparral_. Passing this and a few cabins
in the midst of corn, cotton and pomegranates, the troops found
themselves at the end of their march, Río Bravo, the "Bold river of the
North," brown with mud, rolled swift and boiling at their feet; and in
plain view about half a mile distant--black with crowded house-tops, gay
with flags, and noisy with bugles and barking dogs--lay Matamoros. A
rude pole was soon raised; to the music of our national airs the colors
went up; and a small masked battery of field guns was planted near
them.[7.21]

A singular political game then took place between Taylor and Mejía.
The former did everything possible to convince the Mexican general
that his movement was entirely pacific, and offered to "enter into any
arrangements to secure the peace and harmony of the frontier" during
negotiations between the two governments; but the latter insisted
over and over again that a state of war had been created by the
American advance. In spite of this Taylor reminded his officers of the
"essentially pacific" and "conciliatory" intentions of the army; yet at
the same time he reported the Mexican attitude as distinctly hostile,
asked for reinforcements, mounted four 18-pounders to command the city,
and about April 7 began what came to be known as Fort Brown, a large,
bastioned "field-work" opposite the lower end of the city.[7.22]

[THE MEXICAN ATTITUDE]

On April 11 General Ampudia, the assassin of Sentmanat, arrived at
Matamoros to assume the chief command, accompanied by cavalry and
followed, as the Americans understood, by two or three thousand more
troops. The next day he signalized his advent by ordering Taylor to
decamp at once for the other side of the Nueces--a proposal to which
a courteous negative was returned--and by compelling all the Americans
in the city, "under open threats of violence," to leave town within
twenty-four hours. Taylor retaliated by requesting our naval commander
off the Rio Grande to stop the use of that stream. As the Mexican
attitude made it impossible for us to have the joint navigation implied
by our claim, this appeared reasonable; but essentially the measure was
defensive, since without supplies coming by water a large force could
not remain long at Matamoros. When Ampudia complained, the General
pointed out that sealing up the river was only the "natural result of
the state of war so much insisted on by the Mexican authorities as
actually existing," and offered to reopen it if Ampudia would join
him in maintaining an armistice during the negotiations of the two
governments; but this led to no result.[7.23]

Ampudia's orders and intention had been to attack the Americans as
soon as possible, but his glorious prospects darkened immediately.
Though given the place of Major General Arista, long at the head of
military affairs in this quarter, because he supported the revolution
of Paredes while Arista not only frowned upon it, but seemed to aim
at making northeastern Mexico independent, Ampudia was detested and
thought incompetent--an opinion he did not share--by not a few in the
northern army, whereas Arista stood high in his caste, and, as a person
of wealth and position, had strong friends well able to make trouble
for the central government. Consequently an order dated April 4 made
Arista commander-in-chief with Ampudia as lieutenant. The latter was
immediately forbidden to shine on the field of glory, and, finding his
officers would not support him in disobedience, he submitted.[7.24]

Arista, however, bearing instructions dated April 4 to attack the
Americans, reached the scene on the 24th, and ordered his cavalry
general, Torrejón, to cross above Matamoros with about 1600 men. Hearing
a rumor of this movement, Taylor sent Captain Thornton and about sixty
dragoons late that afternoon to reconnoitre; and the next morning, some
twenty-eight miles from camp, finding himself completely shut in by
overwhelming forces, the Captain tried to break through, lost several
men killed and wounded, and then with all the rest surrendered. This
was war. "Hostilities have begun," announced Arista on the day of his
arrival. "Hostilities may now be considered as commenced," reported
Taylor on the 26th; and--besides advising Polk to organize twelve-months
volunteers--he at once called upon Texas and Louisiana for about 5000
men.[7.25]

[REASONS FOR POLK'S COURSE]

It was a tragic and most regrettable dénouement; yet, on a close review
of all the data now accessible, one does not find it easy to censure
Polk. If he had wished and meditated war from the first, why did he work
for an amicable settlement through Parrott, Black and Slidell? For the
sake of appearances, many said. But in the first place we have found
that Polk was honest in those negotiations; and, in the second, had
war been his aim and appearances his care, he would not have permitted
the order of January 13 to be issued that day. On January 12 it looked
at Washington as if the question of receiving Slidell would soon be
decided. The President could afford to wait a little, and he would have
done this, for it was clear that an unnecessary military step, taken
while he was extending the olive branch, would needlessly make him
appear either treacherous or ridiculous. Moreover if he sought a war, he
knew on January 12 that matters were shaping themselves to his taste;
that Mexico was almost sure to close the door of negotiation soon;
and consequently that he would soon be able to demand of Congress the
forcible redress of our grievances.[7.26]

Here lay a _casus belli_ amply endorsed by international law, the
practice of civilized powers, and the general opinion of the world. It
was a ground, too, that Polk himself, as we have seen, felt entirely
satisfied to stand upon, and one that our people, feeling as they did,
would almost certainly have accepted. Having, then, apparently within
his reach a pretext for war that almost everybody thought good, he would
not have exerted himself to obtain one that almost everybody thought
bad; and in fact--evidently expecting no event of decisive importance
to occur near the Rio Grande--he went on day after day with his plan
to lay our grievances before Congress, until news of the attack on
Thornton burst upon Washington like a rocket. On the hypothesis that
he had wished and meditated war from the first and merely stuck at
appearances, his conduct was therefore irrational; and, besides, we have
seen adequate reasons for believing that he desired peace.[7.26]

Discarding that hypothesis, however, leaves us the important question,
How did the idea of sending Taylor forward present itself to Polk?
First, then, from his point of view it seemed entirely permissible.
A proprietor is not debarred from going where a squatter has built a
cabin; and in the light of our official claim and arguments Mexican
occupation above the Rio Grande was merely by sufferance. The so-called
"provocative act" of pointing guns at Matamoros could not be charged
against the government, for Marcy had suggested other points also for
Taylor's camp, leaving the choice to him. It was a defensive measure
adopted by the General for military reasons in conjunction with pacific
assurances and proposals; and we learn from Arista and others that it
had a sedative effect on the property owners of that flimsily built city
and on the army authorities.[7.27]

No encroachment upon the powers of Congress appeared to be involved.
Had Polk's aim been, as Calhoun alleged, to establish a boundary, he
could not have tolerated Mexican posts, for the troops of foreign
states cannot be permitted to sojourn within our officially defined
limits. Besides, Polk had sent Slidell to treat on this very question,
and Slidell had not given up the task. Though it rested with Congress
to declare war, a President could legally, in the exercise of his
discretion, take steps liable to bring about hostilities. Moreover
Congress appeared to have authorized Taylor's movement. Corpus Christi,
claimed by Tamaulipas, had been made an American port of delivery. A
collection district had been established in the intermediate region. The
declaration of Polk's Message, December, 1845, that our jurisdiction
had been extended to the Rio Grande, and Marcy's appended report, which
announced that Taylor's instructions were to regard that stream as our
boundary, had raised no storm. For six months, admitted the chief Whig
organ, our doings in this field not only had appeared to be endorsed
by the people, but had gone on openly without calling forth "a single
question from any public authority." Officially notified of the military
occupation of Corpus Christi, Congress, instead of protesting, had
voted supplies for the troops. Finally, Congress had instructed the
Executive, in the resolutions for annexing Texas, to reach an agreement
with Mexico regarding the boundary; it was his duty to persevere in the
attempt until convinced he could not succeed; and Taylor's advance, as
will presently be seen, appeared to him a proper step in the discharge
of this obligation.[7.28]

Familiar precedents and principles were believed to sanction the
movement of our troops. In 1794 Washington had ordered Wayne to conduct
hostilities in disputed territory, and had threatened to destroy a
British fort there. In accordance with a resolution of Congress, Madison
had seized the "Florida parishes" claimed by Spain. Just before Taylor
was ordered to move, Hilliard informed the House of Representatives that
England had magistrates in the southern part of Oregon; and John Quincy
Adams proposed to take military possession of that disputed territory
before concluding negotiations. If such a method could be employed in
dealing with countries willing to treat, very naturally--in the case
of one that had pronounced for war--pacific occupation, leaving the
competing jurisdiction undisturbed, seemed fully justifiable.[7.29]

Taylor's advance appeared also to be highly expedient. For one thing,
our claim upon the intermediate region would have been weakened, had
we refrained from sharing with Mexico in the occupation of it. For
another, it seemed wise to place ourselves in a strategic position that
would be of great value, should Mexico's threat of war be carried into
effect. And for a third it was believed that a bold military attitude,
indicating that at last the United States had made up its mind, would
count with Mexico as a strong argument for negotiation. Such was the
opinion of Parrott, Slidell, Worth, Taylor, Scott, Archer, now chairman
of the Senate committee on foreign relations, Brantz Mayer, formerly
secretary of legation at Mexico, Polk himself, the administration
circle in general, and well-informed persons outside it. January 17
Conner was ordered to assemble all his vessels and exhibit them off
Vera Cruz--evidently in pursuance of this design. The government organ
stated, and opposition writers conceded, that such a purpose was in
view.[7.30]

But essentially, as already has been suggested, Taylor's advance
rested on the necessity of military defence; and indeed there is reason
to consider Scott the prime factor in the business, for the order of
January 13 was based upon, and in part verbally reproduced, a "projet"
submitted by him, whereas Polk's diary for January 12 and 13 does not
even allude to the subject. Now not only were defensive measures called
for on general principles, as we have just been informed by the London
_Times_, but the Texans actually and urgently needed a sheltering arm.
During the latter part of 1845 the chief Mexican engineers drew detailed
plans for crossing, not only the Rio Grande, but the Sabine. Merely
the refusal of Paredes, growing out of his revolutionary designs, to
reinforce the troops on the frontier with 2400 men prevented an attack
at this time. Almonte, who had particularly recommended incursions into
Texas, held the post of war minister in January, 1846. The Mexican
troops were extremely mobile. Ampudia's main force, at the end of a long
march, did 180 miles in four days. Screened by rancheros and living on
a little corn and jerked beef carried in their pouches, a body of light
cavalry could have reached San Antonio by way of Laredo, ruined the
town, and been well on their way toward home before their movement would
have been suspected at Corpus Christi. The government received warnings
of this danger from Dimond and from Parrott in 1845; Marcy and Polk
feared it; and the probable rejection of Slidell--which meant a triumph
of the war party--seemed likely to accentuate the peril. In fact Mejía
ordered irregulars into Texas on February 16 and March 17, though, as
their commander aspired to execute a revolution with American aid, he
did us no harm.[7.31]

Nor were only such formal incursions to be guarded against. The war
of 1836 in Texas had shown what outrages Mexicans were capable of
committing, and similar affairs had now begun to occur. In one instance
a party of fifteen, including women, after having been induced to
surrender, were all butchered except a single person, who survived
though seriously wounded. In April, 1846, the Mexicans opposite
Matamoros confessed that bloodthirsty guerillas were abroad. Ampudia,
whose murderous record had been his chief distinction, commanded there.
May 13 the British consul in that city reported that licensed bands of
assassins, "caressed, rewarded, and encouraged" by the authorities,
were committing atrocities near the Rio Grande; and, had the way been
open, such gangs might have robbed and murdered in the settlements of
Texas.[7.32]

The position selected by Taylor was admirably suited to this emergency.
Scott, though a Whig, wrote out a long explanation, showing that on
the Rio Grande the army had a more healthful camp than before, better
drinking water, more abundant fuel, better grazing and a better port.
Information could be obtained more quickly; the border watched more
closely; an invading force pursued more promptly; and its line of
retreat cut more certainly. Besides, the river amounted to a great
breastwork, for this part of it could be crossed with safety at only
certain points, and a body of men, even though comparatively small,
could not cross anywhere on its lower course without peril. It was
not, however, simply that the Rio Grande position seemed far the best.
The nature of the region made it essential. Taylor had to be in that
vicinity or else near Corpus Christi, and for purposes of defence the
latter point could not be deemed satisfactory. Now the necessity of
defence was entirely due to the threatening conduct of Mexico. Therefore
she could not reasonably complain of our precautions; and if she could
not complain, then no one could do so in her name.[7.33]

But the challenge was triumphantly thrown out: Can it be denied that
our taking a position on the river did in fact cause the war? In view
of the data it can and should be denied. First, joint occupation of the
disputed region might have gone on peaceably, as occupation of that
character has continued elsewhere, but for a distinctly aggressive step
on the part of Mexico; and, secondly, for her the Rio Grande had no
particular significance. She claimed all of Texas, and intended to drive
us from it, if she could. Furthermore, the crass vanity and ambition of
Mexican generals and the exigencies of domestic politics would probably
have led to an attack upon us, had Taylor remained at Corpus Christi,
or even pitched his camp at San Antonio. In spite of express orders,
Mejía actually attempted an offensive in the intermediate region. When
the Mexican government gave formal notice to England and France in the
summer of 1845 that war had become inevitable, our army lay far from the
Rio Grande. Taylor's advance to the Bold River no more produced the war
than Pitcairn's march to Lexington produced the American revolution. It
was an effect and an occasion, but not a cause.[7.34]

[MEXICO THE AGGRESSOR]

Finally, as a matter of fact, the hostilities were deliberately
precipitated by the will and act of Mexico. The circumstances proved
this and testimony illuminates them. In October, 1847, a pamphlet
written by Mariano Otero, editor of _El Siglo XIX_ and Senator from the
state of Jalisco, appeared. His object was by no means to defend the
United States, but he said: "The American forces did not advance to
the Rio Grande until after the war became inevitable, and then only as
an army of observation.... The military rebellion of San Luis [Potosí]
gave rise to a government [that of Paredes] pledged to resist all
accommodation [with the United States] ... which government ... began
hostilities." Arista declared in December, 1847, "I had the pleasure of
being the first to begin the war." In short, Polk told only the truth
when he said the conflict was forced upon us. Mexico wanted it; Mexico
threatened it; Mexico issued orders to wage it; and on April 18 her
President, no doubt in view of his political difficulties, insisted upon
those orders. "It is indispensable," he wrote urgently to Arista, "that
hostilities begin, yourself taking the initiative."[7.35]

"If in a litigious affair," declared Vattel, "our adversary refuses
the means of bringing the right to proof, or artfully eludes it; if he
does not, with good faith, apply to pacific measures for terminating
the difference, and above all, if he is the first who begins acts of
hostility, he renders just [even] the cause which was before doubtful."
Every condition of this judgment fitted the course of Mexico.[7.36]




                                  VIII

                     PALO ALTO, RESACA DE LA PALMA

                               May, 1846


[THE MEXICAN ARMY]

The Mexico of 1845 had an elaborate military organization. In addition
to the comandantes general--regularly one in each department or
state--there were six generals at the head of the six military Divisions
in which the political divisions of the country had been grouped.
The college at Chapultepec provided a full course of instruction for
officers; and though it seemed hardly worth while to spend three
years there in order to become a second lieutenant, when one could
leap at once into a captaincy or something better by acting as the
tool of a revolting general, there were never less than one hundred
students.[8.1]

At the head of the army stood a sort of general staff called the
plana mayor; but the duties of this inefficient body fell mostly to
the engineers, some of whom possessed excellent qualifications, while
others--admitted to the corps for political or personal reasons--did
not. The artillery, which included nominally four brigades with fourteen
batteries, suffered from this all-pervading evil and also from defects
of its own. Many of the guns had come down from olden times, though
a large number of the field pieces equalled any the United States
possessed; not a few were honeycombed; and the carriages were mostly
of the old Gribeauval pattern. To convey ammunition, carts had to be
obtained when needed. For the transportation of ordnance, mules or oxen
were usually hired by contract; and, as the drivers had no acquaintance
with artillery drill and tactics, battery evolutions were out of the
question, and guns could be moved but slowly, if at all, during an
engagement.[8.1]

The so-called Permanent infantry consisted substantially of three Light
(_Ligero_) and twelve Line regiments, and there were also twenty-five
Active (_Activo_) corps, large or small, which, though originally
designed as a sort of reserve to be called out in emergencies, were now
constantly under arms. Owing to the great extent of the country the
regiments were broken into sections, which assumed to be independent;
and for this reason drill, discipline and _esprit de corps_ suffered
greatly. Training and equipment left much to be desired. When four
simple manoeuvres were understood, soldiers were pronounced perfect. For
arms almost all the infantry had flint-lock muskets, many of which had
been discarded by the British army. Firing from the hip to avoid the
recoil marred their aim; and, partly in consequence of using too much
powder, they generally fired high. Of horse there were ten Permanent
and five Activo regiments besides numerous minor units. The cavalry
included also nearly fifty Presidial companies, originally designed to
guard the frontier against Indian raids; but these had almost vanished
except in name, and the remnants were extremely inefficient. The mounted
men carried in general a sword and a sort of blunderbuss called the
_escopeta_, but many used lances instead of swords. About 3000 Coast
Guards are also to be mentioned, but as a rule they were expected merely
to defend the ports where they lived and the immediate vicinity. In all
there may have been 32,000 men under arms in 1845.[8.1]

The medical corps suffered at all times from the low quality of its
personnel and from its defective equipment; and the accommodations
for surgeons in a campaign were so poor that many found pretexts for
remaining behind when their corps took the field. The commissaries
had peculiar difficulties to meet. A Mexican army drew supplies from
places near it and not from government dépôts; and when money failed,
as it often did, payments had to be made with drafts on the treasury,
which possessed an uncertain value. Hence people often would not part
with supplies, the troops went hungry, and the natural tendency toward
inefficiency and desertion was accentuated. In order to release the
army from service in the interior, when hostilities became imminent in
1845, it was decided to organize volunteer corps; but almost every one,
however anxious to see the United States chastised, preferred to let
somebody else do the work.[8.1]

Mexico, then, did not exactly rise _en masse_ to sweep Taylor
away,[8.2] yet the forces gathered at Matamoros could be termed
respectable. Arista seems to have had about 175 artillerymen, 3500
infantry, 1100 cavalry, 425 irregular horse under General Antonio
Canales and some 500 Matamoros volunteers--in all, say, 5700 men
including officers and ineffectives. His first brigade consisted of
infantry led by García, a fine man and officer; the second, also
infantry, had Vega, a brave and patriotic soldier, for commander; and
the third brigade, cavalry, was under Torrejón, who possessed one
excellent quality--the instinct of self-preservation. Canales could be
described succinctly as a border ruffian and conspirator; and Ampudia,
second in general command, was about the same thing plus a cosmopolitan
varnish.[8.3]

[MEXICAN PREPARATIONS AT MATAMOROS]

After news of Taylor's intention to advance reached Matamoros, the
Mexicans worked most zealously in constructing fortifications there,
and by the end of April had a series of earthworks. Just above the city
was erected Fort Paredes, laid out in regular style for 800 men, which
guarded the ferry of Las Anacuitas. Two redoubts, crossing their fires,
were planted opposite Fort Brown at a distance of seven or eight hundred
yards; and two or three minor forts commanded approaches. Gabions or
wicker-work strengthened the embrasures, and fascines and sand-bags were
freely used. No guns heavier than 12-pounders defended the works, and
no platforms were laid; but in general the ordnance was of brass, well
cared for though somewhat honeycombed.[8.4]

For a number of reasons the garrison felt confident. Through deserters
and spies they knew as much as they were capable of understanding about
the American army. To Mejía our general seemed "more contemptible than
the lowest of Mexican tailors," and to Ampudia "an absolute nullity."
The martial Worth, who did impress them, left the front at the beginning
of April because Polk decided against him on the question of brevet
rank. Hitchcock had been compelled to go north on sick leave. For some
good reason every infantry colonel and many others in high positions
were absent. One regiment had not a field officer, and in another only a
single company could boast a captain. Personally the officers in general
were believed to lack harmony and zeal, and the men to be discontented,
hopeless, unwilling to fight, and enfeebled by their hardships and
misbehavior at Corpus Christi. According to Mexican reports our
cavalry could neither shoot nor control their hard-bitted horses,
and our infantry, chiefly composed--except the officers--of needy
foreigners, came short in discipline, training and every other soldierly
qualification save appetite. "Those adventurers cannot withstand the
bayonet charge of our foot," said Mejía, "nor a cavalry charge with the
lance."[8.5]

  [Illustration: MATAMOROS AND FORT BROWN SKETCH MAP

A Fort Brown B 44-pounders C Traverse D American Infantry E American
Dragoons F American Cannon G Artillery Battalion H Mexican Mortars I
Mexican Batteries J Mexican Infantry K Mexican Cavalry ]

No very alarming degree of intelligence had appeared to direct the
American operations. Our troops were on a point exposed to a convergent
fire; Fort Brown enfiladed none of the hostile batteries, though it
might have been planned to do this; near the cavalry camp stood thick
groves offering shelter to assailants; behind our main position was a
lagoon forming--with a bend of the river--almost a circle; and the
enemy, once in possession of the single road, which ran for seven or
eight miles through rough country, would have had the army in a bottle.
All the ammunition and provisions were brought by wagon from the coast,
exposed to attack at every step. The imperfectly fortified base at Point
Isabel, stored with indispensable supplies, had a garrison of only two
companies aside from two or three hundred sutlers, clerks, teamsters
and the like; and vessels could approach the landing only by a narrow
passage between two islands, which could have been closed by a few
6-pounders. Yet we should have encouraged Mexico beyond calculation,
and might have been injured greatly in Europe, had we now given up Fort
Brown.[8.6]

A number of small disasters overtook the Americans. Colonel Cross,
chief of the quartermaster's department, went out and never came
back. April 22 Lieutenant Porter and ten men, operating against the
banditti, allowed their arms to get wet, and were scattered with loss
by a party of Mexicans. Twenty of the Texas rangers commanded by
Captain Walker permitted themselves to be surprised, and half of them
were either killed or driven beyond recall. Taylor attributed these
mishaps to a lack of experience, but the enemy regarded them as proofs
of inferiority; and when Thornton's party succumbed, the enthusiasm
burst all bounds. "Honor and glory a thousand and one times" to the
"brave men" of the army, cried a Tampico leaflet, and a triumph in the
anticipated battle appeared certain.[8.7]

[MEXICAN CONFIDENCE]

From another source also the Mexicans drew encouragement. While Taylor's
officers were nearly all West Pointers and perhaps quite all native
Americans, many of the privates were in fact of European birth and a
large percentage Roman Catholics. To these Mejía, Ampudia and Arista
issued moving appeals based upon religious prejudice and alleged
foreign condemnation of our course toward Mexico, gilded with generous
promises of rewards for deserting, supported by the luring voices of
gayly dressed sirens who lined the opposite bank of the river all day,
and reinforced by two captured American dragoons, who were given back,
and reported that deserters received handsome treatment. A considerable
number of men, largely veteran offenders from the British army, stole
across; most of the Seventh Infantry were believed ready to change
sides; and the Mexicans boasted exultingly that "Old Taylor" himself
would soon be over.[8.8]

Arista, who had spent several years in the United States, did not feel
very sanguine. Ampudia's predictions of glory he regarded as "castles in
the air," or as perhaps intended to raise expectations that Ampudia's
successor would be unable to satisfy. But the officers and the troops
felt impatient for combat. So loudly and so long had the charges of
haughtiness, perfidy, aggressiveness and greed been reiterated against
us, that all believed them true. The Americans were in their eyes
accursed heretics, eager to trample under foot their holy religion:
and they were also barbarians, capable of everything rough and cruel.
In the event of their success the family hearth was to be polluted,
the glorious, dearly-bought independence of the nation crushed, and
the adored accents of the mother-tongue stifled. To the Indian rank
and file the word "patriotism," indeed, meant little; but they loved
their villages, and could imagine even worse tyrants than Mexicans.
The name "foreigner" had a terrible sound in their ears, and fanatical
devotion to the Roman church set their passionate natures aflame. At
the first sight of the "detestable" Stars and Stripes fluttering in
the breeze, they had loudly demanded battle, and later the confident
hope of triumph gave a still keener edge to their enthusiasm. Taylor
evidently despised the enemy, believing there was no fight in them;
but those tawny fellows, though miserably clothed and apparently
spiritless, were trained to "blind obedience," could fight like devils
while their strength and fury lasted, and had now reached a good state
of discipline. Even Captain Hardee of Thornton's command, a prisoner
at large in Matamoros, believed the Mexicans would gain the coming
battle.[8.9]

One of Taylor's most obvious needs in taking post on the Rio Grande was
a light corps available for scouting, and in ordering him to advance,
Marcy had expressly authorized him to call upon the Texans--by whom legs
were valued chiefly as the means of sticking to a horse--for assistance;
but nothing was done about the matter. On April 11 a friend in Matamoros
warned him that an attempt might be made to cut his line to Point
Isabel, but he did not seem to feel concerned. His troops were merely
drawn beyond the effective range of Ampudia's artillery; the work of
fortifying was quickened; on the 23d he described the fort complacently
as "in a condition of defence"; and a week later he contented himself
with having the road inspected for seven miles. Point Isabel, he said as
early as April 12, could withstand attack.[8.10]

  [Illustration: Fort Brown to Brazos Island]

Arista, for his part, decided quite naturally, while on his way
to Matamoros, that he would plant himself on the American line of
communication, and prevent our army from receiving ammunition,
provisions and reinforcements. Accordingly the 1600 men under Torrejón,
after disposing of Thornton's command, passed Fort Brown, held the road
for some days without the knowledge of Taylor, and then by a grave
blunder were drawn away, and concentrated on the Rio Grande opposite
Longoreño, eight or ten miles below the city, to protect the crossing
of the other troops, who proceeded to that point by several routes in
order to deceive the Americans. The last day of the month Ampudia with
his brigade and four guns went over; and on May 1 Arista--leaving Mejía
with about 1400 men to hold Matamoros--followed with his other brigade
and eight pieces. Unfortunately for him three scows of little capacity
were the only boats available; and as these had been taken to Longoreño
in carts by a circuitous route nearly fifteen miles in length, so as to
avoid exciting our suspicions, they were not in good order. One or two,
in fact, seem to have been almost useless, and hence many precious hours
were lost; but at any rate the army succeeded in crossing a swift river
without injury almost under the eyes of the Americans.[8.11]

[TAYLOR ALARMED]

By about one o'clock in the afternoon on the first of May Taylor heard
that Mexicans were below him, and awoke. He saw now that Fort Brown
required munitions and food, and that Point Isabel could not, even yet,
resist a serious attack. Tents came down in haste; the wagon train was
made ready; and at about half-past three--leaving behind the Seventh
Infantry commanded by Major Brown, with Captain Lowd's four 18-pounders,
Lieutenant Bragg's field battery and the sick, under orders to hold
out as long as possible--Taylor marched for the coast. No time was
lost in getting there. The troops bivouacked that night on the damp,
chilly plain without fires, and early the next morning set out again.
The shallow, greenish-brown lagoons rimmed with broad, flat, oozing
banks of mud, the marshes full of tawny grass, and the low ridges
mottled with patches of herbage and bald surfaces of gleaming dry dirt,
seemed interminable; but as hours passed the now sultry air began to
be streaked with salt odors, and by noon the panting troops caught the
sparkle of blue waves. Fortunately they could not hear the shouts of joy
in Matamoros over what was called their precipitate flight.[8.12]

As it was necessary to strengthen the defences, all the troops now
exchanged their muskets for picks and shovels. May 6 the engineer in
charge was authorized to continue the work by employing a hundred
laborers; and at about three o'clock the next day, escorting more than
200 loaded wagons, the little army, preceded by a body of dragoons,
moved out on the return march. As the small garrison of Fort Brown had
provisions for at least three weeks, and the Mexicans could not be
expected to attack it seriously with Taylor approaching their rear,
whereas they were practically sure to be met on the road, Taylor's best
officers entreated him to gain freedom of action by leaving the train
behind, which at most would have delayed it only a day or so; but he
would not. No fears disturbed his mind. Reinforced with perhaps 200
men just landed at the Point, the army now with him numbered 2228,
all told. Recent exercise and drill had left it in a splendid physical
condition. Recollecting how long popular orators had been mocking at the
"regulars," it longed to do something. The attacks upon Cross, Walker,
Porter and Thornton had exasperated its temper; nothing could have
pleased the great majority of the soldiers better than a fight; and the
General felt very much the same way.[8.13]

When it had made about seven miles the army bivouacked, and early the
next day it resumed the march. Soon after noon, when some ten or twelve
miles more had been covered, a low, dark line could be seen across the
plain in front, some two or three miles away. It was the Mexican army.
As the pond or water-hole of Palo Alto lay near, the tired and thirsty
troops were permitted to halt, rest a little, drink and fill their
canteens; and then Taylor had them posted in order of battle. At the
extreme right the Fifth Infantry led by Lieutenant Colonel McIntosh was
placed, and on its left in succession came Major Ringgold's battery,
the Third Infantry (Captain Morris), two 18-pounders on siege carriages
under Lieutenant Churchill, and the Fourth Infantry (Major Allen). The
Third and Fourth made up a brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
Garland; and all the troops just mentioned, together with Twiggs's
dragoons, some 250 strong, in two squadrons led by Captains Kerr and
May, formed the right wing. The other wing, known as the first brigade
and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Belknap, consisted of the Artillery
Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Childs, Captain Duncan's battery, and
the Eighth Infantry, posted in this order from right to left. The wagons
were then assembled near the pond at the side of some woods, and Kerr
was detached with his squadron to guard them.[8.14]

  [Illustration: BATTLE OF PALO ALTO
                 May 8, 1846

                  American Forces Black
                  Mexican Forces Red
                  Regmental numeral III
                  Artillery battalion A
                  Kerr's squadron K
                  May's squadron M
                  Ringold's battery R
                  Duncan's battery D
                  Churchill's battery C
                  Tampico Corps T
                  Zapadores (Sappers) Z
                  Presidiales P Light Cavalry L

                  Infantry-First position
                           Intermediate position
                           Final position
                  Cavalry-First position
                          Intermediate position
                          Final position
                  Artillery-First position
                            Intermediate position
                            Final position
                  Wagon Train-First position

                  (The positions of the troops can be indicated only
                  approximately.)

[BATTLE OF PALO ALTO]

During these days Arista had waited for Taylor's return; but, in order
to hasten that and perhaps accomplish direct results, he had ordered
the guns of Matamoros to begin cannonading Fort Brown on the morning of
May 3, and two days later, believing the garrison were near starvation,
sent Ampudia to invest it. For the sake of water and to cover all of
the roads that might be taken by the American army, he placed himself
at Los Tanques del Ramireño; and about noon on the eighth, learning
of Taylor's approach, he set out for Palo Alto, some five miles
away. Shortly before gaining that point he saw through his glass blue
American dragoons in the far distance, and, as quickly as he could,
put his troops in position. At the extreme right were placed about 150
horse under Noriega, and then came a 4-pounder, a corps of Sappers, the
Second Light Infantry, the Tampico Veteran Company and Coast Guards,
five 4-pounders, the First, the Sixth and the Tenth Infantry, and
finally, beyond an interval of about 400 yards and somewhat in advance,
Torrejón and the rest of the cavalry--their front extended, their right
strengthened with two small guns, and their left reaching beyond the
Point Isabel road to a piece of chaparral on a slight elevation beside a
swamp. In the rear of the line were some thickets; just behind the right
wing an eminence eighteen or twenty feet high rose above chaparral;
protected by this lay a watering-place; and in front there were some
boggy pools and wide fields of stiff grass almost shoulder-high.[8.14]

As soon as formed, the Americans advanced in silence--the 18-pounders,
drawn by oxen, following the road--while Lieutenant Blake reconnoitred
the Mexican line within musket range to look for artillery. At about
two o'clock Ampudia came in sight with the Fourth Infantry, commanded
by Colonel Uraga, a company of Sappers, two 8-pounders, and about
400 irregular horse under Canales. Upon this Arista and his staff, a
blaze of gold lace, passed rapidly down the line. It seemed strange
to find in his position a tall, raw-boned man with red hair and sandy
whiskers; but he showed the martial bearing of his nation, and harangued
the troops with genuine Mexican eloquence. They were found ready for
battle. Answering him with loud vivas they made ready their arms. The
silken banners fluttered; the bands played; and at about half-past
two or three o'clock, by the General's order, his artillery opened.
The hostile armies were then approximately half a mile apart; and the
Mexicans--drawn out, except the cavalry, only two deep on a front
about a mile in length without reserves--seemed to number 6000, though
probably not more than two thirds as many.[8.14]

Apparently Taylor's plan had been to force a passage by charging, for
his aim was to reach Fort Brown, and his infantry had been instructed,
the day before, to rely mainly on the bayonet; but he now halted. All
his infantry except the Eighth regiment deployed into line. At strange
words of command--"Haw, Brindle!" "Whoa, Brandy!"--ten yoke of oxen
wheeled each ammunition wagon into its place; and the cannon advanced.
At this juncture Ampudia's column approached the field. Canales led his
men a considerable distance forward into the scattered chaparral on the
Mexican left, probably with a view to cutting off Taylor's retreat, and
thus put himself entirely out of the battlefield; but the rest of the
command proceeded toward their appointed place between Torrejón and the
infantry, and as this movement appeared to mean a charge, the American
fire was turned in that direction. Without faltering, however, they
moved up to the line and deployed, but their route was marked with the
fallen.[8.14]

Now ensued about an hour of cannonading, supported by our troops with
shouts that often drowned the roar of the guns, and endured by the
Mexicans with unfailing constancy. Arista's pieces, though bravely and
skilfully served, were mostly too light. The balls generally fell short,
and as they ricocheted, our men stepped aside. But the American practice
met every hope. Sometimes a single shot appeared to mow down a whole
platoon of mounted men; and here, there, everywhere gaps opened in the
infantry. With vivas the gaps instantly closed, but they would not stay
closed.[8.14]

Arista, a bold and experienced officer, expecting Taylor to act on such
a plan as Taylor seems actually to have formed, intended to charge both
flanks of the advancing Americans with cavalry supported by infantry;
but the American artillery surprised him almost as much as if Taylor
had used shooting stars. Probably the right course for him would have
been to attack anyhow, for his men were still eager to fight, a cannon
could be discharged only about once a minute, and our batteries would
not have done much more harm at 70 than at 700 yards. But apparently it
seemed impracticable to wallow slowly for such a distance through the
grass, the sharp edges of which would have cut the legs of his poorly
dressed soldiers badly, under so withering a fire. Something had to be
done, however, for the troops grew impatient. He therefore directed his
right wing to prepare for a charge, and ordered Torrejón and his two
small guns to attack the American right, rear and wagons. Reluctantly
Torrejón obeyed. Passing to the left, his "red lancers"--probably a
thousand strong and "portentous" with trumpets, banners and lance
points--advanced through the scattered chaparral and across a slough,
becoming somewhat broken on the way, and found themselves at another
small morass. Evidently the nature of the ground on which he was likely
to operate had not interested Torrejón.[8.14]

Taylor, sitting unconcernedly with one leg over the pommel of his
saddle, writing, was notified of this movement and simply replied, "Keep
a bright lookout for them." But some one--probably Twiggs, who commanded
the right wing--had the Fifth Infantry march rapidly more than a quarter
of a mile to the right and rear, and throw itself into a square.
Torrejón awkwardly approached this body in column instead of line with
some of the worthless Presidials in the lead, fired ineffectively, was
answered with a disconcerting though not very injurious volley, and
recoiled some 300 yards. He then sent word to Arista that a morass
rendered his movement impracticable; but on receiving instructions to
persevere, he made a circuit, advanced upon the second front of the
square, and once more exchanged a volley. Now, however, he found our
Third Infantry moving to defend the wagons, and saw two of Ringgold's
cannon hurrying to the scene at a gallop, while his own pieces had
not come up. As rapidly as possible, therefore, and quite willingly,
he retreated, but not without a salute from our two cannon, which he
was unable to return. This unsuccessful manoeuvre exhausted Arista's
ingenuity, and he only waited now for darkness, hoping to get away and
find a better position.[8.14]

During these operations a wad from Duncan's battery had fired the grass.
The wind from the Gulf, nearly parallel to the American front, drove a
wall of roaring, crackling flame and a cloud of thick smoke across the
plain; and, as the armies could see each other only now and then and
in spots, firing had to be suspended for nearly an hour. Meanwhile,
believing the Mexican left had given way, Taylor shifted his position
behind the screen with a view to advancing. Churchill pushed on by the
road nearly to where Torrejón had been; the Fourth Infantry moved up to
support him; the Fifth went ahead on the extreme right; the rest of the
army made corresponding changes; and as a whole the line diverged now
thirty or forty degrees from its original direction, while the wagons
came nearly up to it.[8.14]

But the Mexican left had not yielded, and so Taylor found when he sent
a squadron of dragoons to open the way. To avoid being enfiladed,
Arista swung his line forward in excellent order, using the Fourth
Infantry as a pivot, and again it stood firm under an artillery fire
more destructive than at first. Indeed our Fourth Infantry began to
suffer a galling cannonade, and Torrejón again assumed the offensive.
Canister from the 18-pounders checked him, however, and after sharp
musketry exchanges between the Mexican line and our Artillery Battalion,
which had advanced and formed a square, serious infantry operations
in this quarter came to an end. As for the artillery, Arista had now
used up his 650 cannon balls; but the Americans kept at work until
nightfall.[8.14]

On our left, however, important events occurred. From the first Captain
Duncan's battery, which made two fire-units because handled in sections,
played a brilliant and effective rôle, supported by the Eighth Infantry
and either Kerr's or May's dragoons, and advancing or retiring as the
course of the battle dictated. When Arista's change of front threw his
right forward nearly 700 yards and seemed to threaten a flank attack,
these pieces became more active and more daring than ever, and under
their blasting discharges, aided more or less at this time by the
18-pounders, the Mexicans fell rapidly. Again they grew impatient--not
principally because they were suffering so terribly, but because they
were inactive, and because hints that Arista had sold them began to
arrive from Ampudia's quarter; and finally the extreme right wing
broke.[8.14]

After a time some of the officers and Arista, who exposed himself
bravely throughout the battle, induced these troops to go back, and as
they were still in much confusion, the remnants of Noriega's corps,
reinforced with 200 men from Torrejón, were ordered to support them.
The cavalry, however, badly demoralized themselves, dashed blindly at
a trot against the infantry; the resulting disorder extended even to
the Tampico men; and these desperate corps, ordered to charge as the
only possible way to prevent them from bolting, moved forward aimlessly
in succession. Duncan, when he saw this large force advance, withdrew
a little, still firing; but soon under cover of the smoke he came up
again, and gained an enfilading position. Suddenly with a sharp crack
his guns opened, and against the fading horizon his shells and shrapnel
could be seen bursting, with almost the regularity of signal rockets,
over those dark masses. Driven like sheep by this fire, the Mexican
right wing turned toward the left and hurried across the entire field,
presenting their flank and to some extent their rear to the Americans at
a distance of 200 paces or even less, while, in a somewhat more orderly
manner, the First Infantry, which stood next in line, followed them.
Now was the time to decide the battle; but, though Taylor had come to
this part of the field, nothing could be done, for it was feared that
should a charge be made, the enemy's cavalry might reach the wagons, and
cripple our army by destroying the provisions. Indeed, the Americans
appear to have drawn back a little toward the train; and the disordered
Mexicans, having reached the extreme left and finally the rear of their
line, were re-formed.[8.14]

It was now about seven o'clock. The Americans had lost five killed and
forty-three wounded, and the Mexicans probably seven times as many. The
afterglow of sunset lighted up the dun clouds of smoke. Darkness was
close at hand. Necessarily, therefore, the struggle ended; and while
the Mexicans retired through the chaparral to the low eminence behind
the original position of their right wing, and there camped in order
of battle, the Americans bivouacked where they stood, or in the fitful
glare of the still burning grass gave attention to such of both armies
as could be discovered lying on the field. At last the prairie fire
burned out; the smoke of battle drifted away; the full moon appeared;
and the tired troops, watched over by pacing guards, slept between the
stacks of arms like images.[8.14]

Important moral results had been gained by the Americans, but they
were not aware of the fact, and expected the battle to be resumed. At
about seven o'clock the next morning, however, as the light mist slowly
dissolved, their astonished eyes beheld the Mexican line gliding off
into the road; and presently, like the tail of a huge serpent, its rear
wound away into the chaparral, and vanished. Taylor gazed and reflected,
moved a short distance, waited to ascertain through a party of dragoons
that it was a genuine retreat, consulted with some of his principal
officers, and then decided on pursuit; but the forenoon had to be
spent in erecting breastworks and planting four heavy cannon to defend
the train, which he now saw should be left behind; and he merely sent
forward a composite force of 220 men, under Captain McCall of the Fourth
Infantry, to harass the Mexican rear.[8.15]

  [Illustration: BATTLE OF RESACA DE LA PALMA]

[ARISTA IN A NEW POSITION]

Arista turned this delay to good account. The chaparral and woods that
his troops had been seen to enter extended with some interruptions to
the Rio Grande, a distance of approximately seven miles; and two hours
before noon, after marching about halfway through it, he stopped at the
Resaca de Guerrero. The Resaca was an ancient channel of the river,
but it now consisted merely of a shallow, muddy ravine somewhat in
the shape of a bow, several hundred feet wide and three or four feet
deep at the banks, lying substantially east and west across the route,
with its concave side toward Palo Alto. At the bottom of it, both to
the right and to the left of the road, lay narrow ponds, and the space
between the water and the banks was rather closely filled with bushes
and small trees. Facing round here, Arista planted three or four guns
at the right, or east, of the road from Palo Alto where it approached
the Resaca, two at least--hidden with branches of trees--on the southern
bank of the Resaca, and other pieces at suitable points toward his left.
The infantry were placed in two wings divided by the road, with much the
greater weight on the right hand, some of the troops taking position
just in the rear of the ravine, some behind its northern bank, and
some in the chaparral still farther forward. The headquarters tent was
pitched in a small clear space or _placeta_ about 500 paces back on the
left of the road, and Torrejón's cavalry halted in the same road still
farther away; while Canales with two guns, placing himself on the left a
considerable distance back from the Resaca, guarded a cross-road leading
to Arista's rear.[8.16]

The Mexican position, besides covering every line to Fort Brown, offered
a number of other advantages. It did not call for much use of artillery,
and therefore neutralized Arista's deficiency in cannon ammunition. The
woods made it impossible for the Americans to employ that dreaded arm
effectively. The bank of the Resaca formed a natural breastwork, and
it seemed likely that the troops, protected in this manner, would be
confident and firm. But evidently a bold and enterprising enemy could
take advantage of the woods to conceal his movements; and evidently,
too, Arista's main batteries could fire only in the direction of the
road, since there were Mexicans in advance of the Resaca both to right
and to left. Another handicap lay in the impossibility of surveying the
field and manoeuvring troops--particularly the cavalry; the soldiers,
unable to see far, lacked that sense of union and support which Mexicans
peculiarly needed; and the want of reserves, though to a certain extent
a part of the Fourth Infantry stationed on the right behind the Resaca
could act as such, was an additional source of weakness.[8.16]

A still more serious feature of Arista's situation was the condition
of his troops. Many, and probably most of them, had not eaten for more
than twenty-four hours. The sufferings they had witnessed and the
neglect of their fallen comrades had worked upon their feelings. The
dreadful effectiveness of the American artillery had been profoundly
discouraging; many of their officers had proved unworthy of confidence;
and above all, accustomed to the duplicity of Mexican leaders and
unable to understand their general's inactivity the day before, many
concluded that Arista, who was accused of seeking American support for
his alleged revolutionary scheme, had betrayed them. This idea, if we
may trust common sense and Mexican intimations, was suggested or at
least encouraged by Ampudia himself; and the coöperation of all these
depressing influences had spread a general conviction through the army
by the forenoon of May 9 that a great disaster would befall it that
day. A few, it was said, broke their weapons in despair; and utter
dejection could be read in the faces of every corps. Some reinforcements
were drawn from the city, but they did not materially improve the
situation.[8.16]

[BATTLE OF RESACA DE LA PALMA]

Taylor, then, advancing at about two o'clock, after detaching most
of the Artillery Battalion and perhaps Kerr's dragoons to guard the
train, moved forward to the edge of the woods, and halted at what was
called the Resaca de la Palma to await information. The advance corps
under McCall, which consisted principally of the light companies of
the first brigade under Captain C. F. Smith, was now feeling its way
toward the enemy. At a little after two o'clock, turning a bend in the
road, it found cannon in front. Instantly they fired. About half a
dozen Americans fell, and the rest quickly withdrew. At three o'clock
McCall's report arrived at headquarters. Taylor pushed on immediately,
and in about an hour came up with the advance party. Ringgold's battery,
now commanded by Lieutenant Ridgely, was sent forward on the road, and
McCall's command, thrown into the chaparral on both sides, began a slow
and painful advance through the bushes. Almost immediately it found
itself in contact with the enemy.[8.16]

Under such circumstances McCall could give the battery no support, of
course, and the only reasonable expectation was that Ridgely's men and
horses would be shot from the woods, and his guns be taken. That,
however, made no difference to him. His orders were to advance, and
advance he would. Once a body of lancers charged his guns, but by a
combination of courage, skill and good luck he routed it. Some of the
Mexican artillery seems to have moved up the road a little way after
McCall retired; but Ridgely, pushing on even into the very smoke of the
enemy's cannon, drove them in spite of stubborn resistance beyond the
edge of the Resaca, and then sent back for troops to help him capture
them. When the battle became more general he continued to fire upon
the Mexican batteries; and, as far as he could without endangering
Americans, he also swept the woods with canister, frightening the
enemy with a terrible noise in the tree-tops that reminded them of the
slaughter at Palo Alto.[8.16]

To right and to left the battle soon raged. All the Americans on the
ground, numbering about 1700, were put in. No general guidance could
be exercised. "Chance was the lord of all save the good right arms" of
the troops, wrote an officer. In such woods and thickets lines could
not be formed. Even companies found it impossible to remain intact. A
field officer was no more than a captain, and a captain no more than a
subaltern. All got into the work promptly, and all did their best when
there. As fast as they could, singly or in little squads, they pushed
on, cheering and shouting. Often it required one's utmost exertions to
squeeze through or hack through the dense and thorny chaparral under
pelting showers of bullets. Now there was shooting, and now the cold
steel struck fire. "My orders was to make free use of the bayonet,"
said the General afterwards, and the orders were borne in mind. Here
Lieutenant Meade, the future victor of Gettysburg, had a chance to win
his spurs; and he was but one of many heroes, though perhaps the most
conspicuous in his quarter.[8.16]

Nor did the Americans have it all their own way. Those Mexicans who
fought at all this day, fought like tigers. On the right near the
road the Second Light Infantry, which had been placed there in ambush
just before the real battle opened, stood firm; but most of its field
officers were struck down, and it had to give way. A company of Uraga's
regiment did nobly close by, and every man of it, we are told, was
either killed or wounded.[8.16]

Farther toward Arista's left, however, our men pushed forward rather
easily, though it seemed evident from the firing that Mexicans were in
front. Gaining ground in this direction some Americans probably came
upon a path which led round the western end of the pond, and gave access
to the Mexican flank. Just before the battle began Ampudia learned of
the path, and stationed a company of the Sappers and a company of the
Fourth Infantry in this quarter; and later he sent another detachment
from the Fourth with a gun. Besides these meagre forces probably no
corps guarded the left except a few Tampico troops. These also fought
well; but the splendid silk banner of the Veterans, the bravest corps
in the army, was captured, and only at heavy cost could they fight
their way back. Meantime the rest of Uraga's regiment came over from
beyond the road, but it could not stop the Americans; and brave Captain
Barbour, followed by a small party, soon approached the placeta. The
effect was electrical. Nobody knew how many troops were following him.
Canales took flight. The sense of defeat, already imparted by hurrying
soldiers of the Second Light, spread across the road from the broken
left, and at about half-past five o'clock Arista's right wing, the
strength of the army, crumbled like a sand fort struck by a wave. Except
perhaps one, all the corps dissolved; and in a moment, as it seemed,
nothing was left but a mob of fugitives.[8.16]

During all this, Taylor, exposing himself as much as any one, had been
fighting at the centre. The proper course to adopt there was to charge
the Mexican guns on the road with infantry, but for some reason he sent
May's dragoons against them. In a way the effort succeeded. Slashing as
they galloped, the horsemen quickly ran over the batteries--more than
a quarter of a mile beyond them, in fact; and then, coming back in a
scattered condition, had a chance to slash again, for the batteries had
been reoccupied. But the thickets on both sides were full of Mexican
infantry. Against their muskets the dragoons were mere targets--broad
ones, too; and before long the squadron, much the worse for its charge,
recrossed the Resaca. Taylor was disgusted. Turning to Belknap and the
Eighth Infantry he exclaimed, "Take those guns, and by ---- keep them!"
A part of the Fifth joined Belknap; and these men, rushing in furiously
all together, yelling like fiends, after a brief though sharp struggle
with the artillerymen--for the supporting infantry had now abandoned
their position--captured the pieces. But the battle had already been
won.[8.16]

Before McCall had shown himself Arista, dazed perhaps by his reverse
at Palo Alto, valuing too highly his new position, and probably
overestimating the injury inflicted on Taylor the day before, had made
up his mind that no immediate attack was to be expected, and after
placing the army had withdrawn to his tent, and busied himself in
writing. Even when firing began, he said it was only a skirmish; and
after our troops reached his left flank, he merely ordered Ampudia and
the rest of the Fourth Infantry to go and settle things in that quarter.
When Americans appeared at the _placeta_, however, he awoke. Pouring
curses on the cowards of his army, he hurried to the cavalry, and
taking the place of Torrejón, who had refused to charge, dashed up the
road. His men lanced a few lingering American dragoons and helped a few
comrades to escape, but the battle could not be saved. On one side of
the road at least, Americans already held the chaparral, and like May he
could not stand against protected infantry.[8.16]

At the head of the cavalry he retreated, therefore, and turning to
the left crossed the Rio Grande by one of the lower passages. Other
fugitives got over at various points; and a great number, passing Fort
Brown, which was about three miles from the battlefield, crowded to the
Anacuitas ferry. Here they found a couple of scows; and some troops,
that had been engaged all this time in annoying Fort Brown, stood on
guard. But the fleeing soldiers were panic-stricken, the boats moved
slowly, and the Americans were looked for at every moment. Men fought
for places. Clothing and arms were thrown away. Many tried to swim or
fell accidentally into the water, and an unknown number perished in the
swift current.[8.16]

          "Rio Bravo! Rio Bravo!
          Saw men ever such a sight
          Since the field of Roncesvalles
          Sealed the fate of many a knight?"

But the Americans did not come. Taylor had scarcely any fresh troops
except those guarding the wagons nearly or quite five miles in the
rear. May's dragoons had been used up. Apparently no effort had been
made to communicate with Fort Brown, and have its defenders--now tired
but not exhausted--sally forth to help reap the fruits of the expected
victory. Taylor only claimed to have captured "a number" of this utterly
broken army facing a difficult river. Even badly wounded men got safely
across, it would seem; and very soon, in spite of everything, nearly
four fifths--that is to say, about 4000 besides those under Canales--of
the troops commanded by Arista on the first of the month appear to
have been in safety on the south shore. He lost on May 9, according to
his official report, 160 killed, 228 wounded and 159 missing, but the
accuracy of the figures may be doubted. Fourteen officers, eight guns
and a large amount of property were captured by the Americans, while
their casualties were only 33 killed and 89 wounded.[8.16]

During the whole week so dramatically concluded, Fort Brown had been
under attack.[8.17] On May 3 it replied vigorously, though with
trifling results, to the guns of Matamoros; but as Taylor, with more
than a month of good weather and about 300 wagons at his disposal, had
neglected to bring up a stock of ammunition, it fired only occasionally
after that in order to notify both friend and foe that its courage
still held good. On the 4th Canales occupied the road, and on the next
day Ampudia arrived with four guns and nearly a thousand men. Arista,
however, believing his cannon were not heavy enough to breach the wall
and confident that hunger would soon reduce the garrison, forbade
assault. The besiegers made themselves extremely disagreeable; but by
this time the Americans had bomb-proofs and "gopher holes," and, aside
from the death of Major Brown, met with no serious losses. Taylor's
profound silence, after as well as before the battle of Palo Alto,
caused intense anxiety; but when the cannon began to "bark" again on
the 9th, and especially when a throng of panic-stricken fugitives could
be seen rushing past, haggard faces put on smiles. Finally a solitary
messenger approached at a gallop with his reins on the horse's neck,
waving cap and sword, and shouting "Victory!" and the long strain ended
in exultation.[8.18]

[SITUATION OF THE MEXICANS]

The Mexican army was now hanging like a plum, overripe, shaken by
the wind and ready to fall. To the British consul it seemed utterly
demoralized, and beyond the possibility of reorganization. Yet there
it was permitted to rest and recuperate undisturbed. The official
explanation said that although a pontoon train had been proposed a long
time before, the dim prospect of hostilities had not seemed to warrant
that expense; but like numerous other official statements put out in the
course of the war, this explanation hid more than it told.[8.19]

A bridge might have been in readiness; but, though several officers
had been laboring for more than a month to focus Taylor's mind upon
the subject, "the old gentleman," wrote Meade, "would never listen or
give it a moment's attention," Flat-boats and scows, towed by the light
steamers belonging to the army, might have been sent from Point Isabel
into the river, and the troops, reinforcements and light batteries,
crossing at the much-used ferry of Burrita, less than twenty miles from
Matamoras, and by land appearing at the town, say, in early morning,
could probably have taken army, cannon and ammunition substantially
complete. Instead of doing anything of this description, Taylor now sent
down to Point Isabel for mortars and for plank to make into boats, and
went there himself. A slight illness delayed him further; and in eight
days nothing was accomplished in the direction suggested beyond placing
at Burrita a battalion of the First Infantry and some 200 volunteers
just landed at Point Isabel.[8.19]

Still, though let alone, Arista occupied no enviable position. He
was commonly charged with incompetence, treason or both. Many of the
officers had forsaken their troops in the hour of danger, and were now
viewed with distrust and contempt. The men felt exhausted and profoundly
disheartened. Even the dogs kept still. Provisions, ammunition and funds
were scant. Fierce complaints and recriminations became rife. Panic
brooded over all. Taylor's inaction seemed an encouraging sign, however,
and on the 17th a request for a suspension of hostilities, accompanied
with hints of a peaceful settlement, was made by Arista. This petition
Taylor rejected. But, not aware that a general's first duty in war is to
eliminate the fighting strength of the enemy, he said that Arista might
retire with his army, the sick and the wounded, if he would give up all
public property. In fact, as if anxious to fight these men again after
letting them get nicely rested, he threatened to bring Matamoros down
about their ears, unless they would move to a safer place.[8.20]

Arista had been ordered to hold the city as long as possible, but a
council of officers pronounced it indefensible; and, besides feeling no
violent wish to sacrifice himself, he doubtless realized that nobody was
ready to stand by him. He therefore ordered now an immediate retreat,
and a wild scramble ensued. The transportation facilities were entirely
inadequate. Some of the guns and ammunition had to be thrown into the
river. The troops of Canales were dismissed. A large number of men
deserted; and the rest, leaving four or five hundred sick and wounded in
the town, hurried away. Fatigues and miseries almost unspeakable were
their lot, and also for some time a terrible fear of pursuit. Heat,
cold, thirst, famine, tempest, sickness, desertion, a route lined with
dead animals, sleep in the mud as profound as the sleep of the grave,
troopers carrying their horse furniture, deaths from exhaustion or
broken hearts, and even suicides--these made up the record. Finally,
almost at the end of the month 2638 men, according to an officer,
crawled painfully into Linares, and a week later Arista received orders
to place Mejía in command.[8.21]

Taylor, all this while, had been proceeding in his deliberate way.
Boats were made and put on the river two or three miles above the town,
and early on the eighteenth troops began to cross; but when the first
of them were over, a report that Arista had retreated was confirmed,
and the greater part of the army, retracing their steps, used the
regular Anacuitas ferry. As they approached Fort Paredes the city
officials--dressed all in white, bearing white flags and riding white
horses--came forth to surrender Matamoros. No terms of capitulation were
granted, but the General said he would protect persons and property, and
allow the civil laws to continue in force; and already he had promised
to respect the religion of the people. To their surprise the Americans
appeared to find themselves among friends, for the lately implacable
but seldom tactless Mexicans came up smiling, cried "_Amigo, amigo!_"
and with sunny enthusiasm offered their hands; and although a feeble
pursuit of Arista produced only insignificant results, the victors felt
well content. Their superiority as fighting men had been demonstrated.
Their artillery had evidently surpassed the Mexican artillery in both
mechanical and personal qualities. The officers had exhibited the finest
courage, _esprit de corps_ and skill. An army supposed to outnumber ours
three to one had been scattered, and a prestige of the utmost value at
home, in Mexico and in Europe, had been gained.[8.22]

[EFFECTS OF THE BATTLES]

Regarding Taylor, thoughtful officers did not feel enthusiastic,
however. The General had shown himself slow, unskilful, wanting in
penetration and foresight, and poorly grounded professionally. Nine
tenths of the regular officers felt that no talents had been displayed
by him, even in the battles. He had shown, said Meade, "perfect
inability to make any use of the information" given him. In the opinion
of another excellent officer he seemed "_utterly, absurdly_ incompetent
to wield a large army." He had failed to realize the difficulties of his
position; had undervalued the enemy; and, as Bliss admitted, had had
"no conception" of the Mexican preparations. This last fact dimmed his
credit, even for courage, in the minds of discerning critics. But, after
all, his resolution had been superb and inspiring. He had succeeded;
and among us Americans "Nothing succeeds like success." The reports
written for him read admirably. Terse remarks of his, often tinged with
soldierly humor, delighted the general taste at home, and mere questions
of tactics or strategy signified in comparison rather less than zero.
Besides, he was so democratic--no military stiffness, no West Point
"aristocracy" about him. A tidal wave of popularity rose in his favor,
and soon Thurlow Weed of New York, the Warwick of the Whig party, came
out for him as Presidential candidate. A commission as brevet major
general and other official honors did not fail to arrive.[8.23]

At Mexico the news of these events produced utter amazement and
consternation. The public, reported the British minister, had been
assured "in the most inflated Tone that Victory would follow the
steps of the Mexican Army and that annihilation and dishonour would
be the portion of their enemies." Even General Vega, a man of sense,
had predicted a victory that would end the war. Now, alas, the cards
had fallen badly. "Profound and bitter sorrow," as it privately
admitted, was the feeling of the government. Down like a plummet went
expectations, confidence and courage; down went the plausible hope of
Paredes that all the nation, glowing with pride and enthusiasm over a
victory, would rally about him; and down also, reported Bankhead, went
his monarchical scheme, which four out of five on the Congressional
committee appointed to draft a new constitution had favored.[8.24]




                                   IX

                   THE UNITED STATES MEETS THE CRISIS

                             May-July, 1846


Polk believed in pursuing "a bold and firm course" toward Mexico. In
this policy--as her character and methods, the comparative success of
England in dealing with her, and the many humiliating failures of the
United States indicated--he was right.[9.1] More and more positive,
during his examination of the case before and after the end of April,
1846, became his intention to place the subject before Congress in a
strong Message; and when he found that Slidell, who called at the White
House on Friday, May 8, held the same opinion, he decided to send that
Message "very soon." The next day he and the Cabinet discussed the
question at length once more. George Bancroft, secretary of the navy,
was not ready to advise the employment of force, unless Mexico should
commit a hostile act; but when, at about six o'clock, Taylor's report
of the Thornton affair presented itself, this difficulty vanished. In
the evening, at the President's request, the Cabinet reassembled, and
after another full discussion all agreed that a war Message should
be delivered to Congress on Monday. Sunday Polk worked on the paper
both before and after going to church, and conferred with leading
Congressmen. The military committee of the House, meeting in haste,
agreed unanimously to recommend 50,000 men and ten million dollars for
the prosecution of hostilities; and the Senators and Representatives
gathering in excited and quickly changing groups, anxiously discussed
and planned.[9.4]

About noon on Monday the expected Message arrived at the capitol, and
was read to thronged and agitated Houses. Our forbearance has been
misconstrued, said the President. "After reiterated menaces, Mexico has
passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory and
shed American blood upon the American soil.[9.2] She has proclaimed
that hostilities have commenced, and that the two nations are now at war
... war exists, and, notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists
by the act of Mexico herself." "The most energetic and prompt measures
and the immediate appearance in arms of a large and overpowering
force are recommended to Congress as the most certain and efficient
means of bringing the existing collision with Mexico to a speedy and
successful termination." Volunteers to serve not less than six or twelve
months, with liberal financial provision for the war, were therefore
suggested; but at the same time a desire for an "amicable" as well
as early settlement of the pending difficulties was expressed, and a
pledge was given to negotiate whenever Mexico would either make or hear
proposals.[9.4]

Objections greeted the Message at once. Calhoun in particular strongly
opposed the President's fundamental idea. Hostilities have occurred,
he said; but as Congress has not acted, there is no war "according
to the sense of our Constitution." Archer, a leading Whig Senator,
concurred in this view, adding that perhaps the Mexican proceedings
had been justifiable, and that first of all a careful investigation of
the facts was requisite. Clayton, another Whig, went farther, and said
that by having Taylor advance to the Rio Grande Polk had made himself
the aggressor. There is no evidence, it was urged, that Mexico has
declared war or sanctioned hostilities. Recognition of a state of war
would extinguish all treaties with that country, jeopardize the persons
and property of our citizens on sea and land, wipe out our claims upon
Mexico, expose the nation to untold evils, and perhaps give offence in
Europe, objected others; hence let us merely authorize the President
to repel invasion. On Benton's motion the Senate divided the subject
of the Message, referring the matter of invasion to the committee on
military affairs and the broad question of waging war to that on foreign
relations.[9.3] Excellent possibilities of delay seemed to lurk in this
decision. Calhoun favored it.[9.4]

[THE ACTION OF CONGRESS]

But the House was prompt and positive. Conveniently reposing on the
table there was a bill, presumably growing out of the Oregon issue,
which proposed that Polk should be authorized to accept volunteers
and repel invasion; and this was now modified to fit the President's
recommendations. It was also given a preamble, which stated that "by
the act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists between that
Government and the United States." This phraseology displeased most of
the Whigs; but they were powerless to change it. In the committee of
the whole about an hour and a half were allowed for a partial reading
of the Message and the accompanying documents, and thirty minutes for
debate. Amidst a great uproar the bill was then reported, ordered
without discussion to its third reading, and under the spur of the
"previous question" passed. One hundred and seventy-four supported it
and fourteen--five from Massachusetts, five from Ohio, and one each from
Maine, Rhode Island, New York and Pennsylvania--voted in the negative.
The next morning this bill was reported in the Senate.[9.4]

Calhoun pleaded now for at least a pause of twenty-four hours, and
this appeared not unreasonable, since the documents that supported the
Message had not yet come from the printer; but the party caucus had
resolved upon a course of action, and Benton and Allen, chairmen of the
committees on military affairs and foreign relations, announcing that
consideration had already been given to both aspects of the war measure,
favored immediate action. Cass made an effective speech in the same
sense; and, although a test showed that eighteen Senators objected to
the preamble, the bill, somewhat amended, was passed finally by a strong
majority--forty against only two. Calhoun, Berrien of Georgia and Evans
of Maine did not vote. Crittenden and Upham answered to their names,
"Aye, except the preamble." Webster and a few others were absent. In the
evening the House accepted the amendments, and the next day at about
one o'clock Polk received and signed the bill. Later some of the Whig
Congressmen pretended that all they had voted for was to save Taylor's
army; but the 50,000 soldiers and ten millions of money were not asked
for a mere rescue party, and it was pointed out in the discussion that
the General's fate would be decided long before the bill would give him
troops. By an overwhelming majority in both houses, then, voting in
full accord with the President and his Cabinet, war on a large scale
was provided for. "The gates of Janus are open," wrote Alexander H.
Stephens.[9.4]

[THE MOTIVES OF CONGRESS]

At every stage of these proceedings flowed a tide of real national
feeling, but there were also devious currents that need to be mentioned.
Probably few, if any, of the chief actors expected very serious trouble
with Mexico. Polk for his part assured Benton that if Congress would
recognize the war and provide large forces, he believed the affair
could speedily be terminated; and he promised to use no more funds and
men than should prove "absolutely necessary to bring the present state
of hostilities to an end." Many Congressmen, who talked with members
of the Cabinet, were told that without firing another gun the United
States would have a satisfactory treaty within four months.[9.5] The
Washington correspondent of the New York _Tribune_, an anti-slavery Whig
journal, reported that on learning of the action taken by the House
Polk said, "I shall now give you peace--I have the power." "The war was
declared as the means of peace"--as a part of the President's policy of
intimidating Mexico into making a settlement, wrote the correspondent of
the New York _Journal of Commerce_. So thought the New York _Herald_.
Merely passing the war bill will be enough, it said; and, especially
since Polk's Message exhibited the same combination of sword and olive
branch as his employing Slidell and Taylor jointly, so to speak, one
cannot well reject this view, which is supported also by evidence
previously offered.[9.10]

The Democrats, being the administration party, naturally stood by the
President,[9.6] and a wish to make the attitude of the United States
impressive and effective was an additional reason for their urgency and
haste. But probably these were not the only inducements. The party was
falling into dissensions. The Van Buren group felt indignant that New
York should occupy a secondary place in the Cabinet, and be represented
there by the Old Hunker, Marcy, while the rest of the Democrats
complained that Van Buren's faction, the Barnburners, were dictating
everything. A short, inexpensive and successful war--especially one
without gunpowder--seemed likely to please the country, provide offices,
consolidate the party, and compel the Whigs to lose prestige by
endorsing the policy of their opponents, or else to sacrifice popularity
by antagonizing it. Moreover it looked as if a discussion of Polk's
course in sending Taylor to the Rio Grande, however correct that course
had been, might prove at such a juncture dampening and vexatious; and
for all of these reasons it seemed expedient that a war bill, with
exactly the preamble already quoted, should be rushed through Congress
at the quickest pace.[9.10]

The Whigs were no less perspicacious, and they especially hated to lose
the partisan advantage of charging that Polk had been the aggressor.
Mexico has not declared war, they insisted; and with more or less
honesty they complained that a regard for sacred truth forbade them to
endorse the preamble. But their position was exceedingly delicate. Not
only had Mexico long threatened hostilities, prepared openly for them,
and severed her diplomatic relations with us at both capitals, but
she had in effect made a declaration of war. Her only official voice
at this time was that of Paredes; and his agent, Arista, an officer
of the highest rank, had given Taylor formal notice of hostilities.
Arista had been sent but recently to command against the Americans,
and nobody could reasonably suppose that he had proceeded at once to
transgress or ignore deliberately the wishes of his master in so grave
an affair.[9.10]

Taylor on the other hand had shown the most pacific disposition both in
word and in deed. Nothing serious could be alleged against us except
the peaceable joint-occupation of territory long claimed by the United
States; and in short, unless Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Pinckney and
John Quincy Adams were to be disavowed, it seemed legitimate for Polk
and for Congress to hold now that Arista's attack upon Thornton had been
the first hostile act.[9.7] The preamble, therefore, could not well be
rejected; and nearly all of the Whigs, having before their eyes the doom
of those who opposed the war of 1812, choked down some honest though
mistaken compunctions and in most cases a probably more troublesome lump
of partisan regret, and voted for the bill.[9.10]

As already has been suggested, however, there was in Congress a third
party--John C. Calhoun, and for later as well as for present reasons
it is desirable to understand his opinions. To him it seemed highly
advisable to forestall European interference, and quite possible to
avoid a conflict with Mexico, by adjusting the Oregon question before
coming decisively to an issue in the Mexican difficulty, and therefore
he thought the United States ought by all means to limit itself now
to repelling invasion. Personal reasons also led him to deplore the
prospect of a conflict in arms. The culmination of his fiery life, the
fulfilment of his brilliant dream, had seemed in April to be drawing
near. By his convenient method of bending facts and principles to his
purpose, as the sparrow makes a nest for herself, he had found it
possible to coöperate with the West in spending great sums on internal
improvements, and expected in this way to make the Northeast a helpless
minority; but he could easily see that war might empty the treasury and
bring about new political alignments. For the same reason it looked as
if his project of a low tariff also would vanish; and, as we have seen,
contemplating the possibility of secession, he did not wish[9.8] the
youth of the southern states to expend their blood in Mexico.[9.10]

Before the news of Thornton's encounter arrived he argued with Polk
against sending to Congress the proposed Message on our relations with
Mexico. During the excitement on that eventful Sunday he not only
planned with his partisans in Senate and House to oppose war, but worked
for the same purpose with leading Whigs, urging--for example--that
Mexico should be given more time to consider the risk of a conflict, as
if she had not already been speculating upon it for several years. Then
in the Senate he gravely proclaimed the truism that border hostilities
do not necessarily constitute war, and turned it into a sophism by
applying it in the present case. To compare Arista's attack upon
Thornton to an unmeaning border squabble was truly, in view of the long
series of preliminaries, ridiculous; and equally ridiculous was the
endeavor to support this fallacy with another: that since Congress had
not declared war, a state of war with Mexico could not lawfully exist at
this time.[9.9] "Is not Calhoun deranged?" exclaimed our minister at
Paris on hearing of this.[9.10]

To be sure, Congress is the only branch of our central government that
can legally declare war; but, for instance, other nations are not
hampered by our Constitution, and might attack us in such a manner as
to prevent Congress--for a time, at least--from acting. None the less
we should fight, and it would be nonsense to describe our resistance
as unconstitutional. As a matter of fact Congress did not declare war
against Mexico, and on Calhoun's theory we had no lawful war with that
country. On that theory, not only our military men, Congress and the
President, but our Supreme Court, which fully recognized the war, acted
unconstitutionally. Indeed, he himself illustrated the untenability of
his idea. In order to avoid the weakness of advocating purely defensive
operations a Whig leader, Senator Crittenden, said that by repelling
invasion he meant pursuing the enemy until we could be sure that no
repetition of the outrage would occur. This programme would have
involved substantially all that we did against Mexico. It would have
meant a war without a declaration; yet Calhoun endorsed it. In short,
even one so acute and so deeply interested as he could not find a real
argument against the war bill, and his "friends" abandoned him on this
issue. By an overwhelming majority Congress rejected his interpretation
of the organic law. War existed. No American who recognized our claim to
the intermediate region, formally made by national authorities and never
withdrawn, and especially none who recognized the claim of Texas, could
logically deny that it existed by the act of Mexico; and in the light
of its antecedents, including Arista's declaration of war and attack
upon Thornton, the war bill committed the nation properly as well as
completely.[9.10]

[THE CAUSE OF THE WAR]

We were, then, under arms; but, after all, why? What was the cause of
the war? It was not--as will plainly appear in another chapter, it is
believed--an unholy determination to obtain California at the cost, if
necessary, of fifty thousand lives. It cannot have been a difficulty as
to the boundary of Texas, for two nations do not fight over an issue
that exists for only one of them--and that one not the aggressor; and
for Mexico the question between the Nueces and the Rio Grande had
no international significance except when it could be used, as an
_argumentum ad hominem_, to embarrass Americans.[9.14]

Nor was it a scheme to extend the field of negro servitude. Even a
cormorant requires time for digestion, and in 1845 the acquisition of
Texas appeared so powerful a bulwark for the peculiar institution, that
no strong and widespread craving for additional areas can be supposed to
have existed at the beginning of 1846. Besides, as pro-slavery Taylor,
Calhoun and Polk, anti-slavery Webster and time-serving Buchanan
agreed, free labor was practically sure to dominate California; and
hence, in view of the slight probability that much cultivable territory
could be obtained in the south against the stubborn opposition of the
free states, the war seemed more likely to diminish than to increase
the relative strength of slavery. Moreover, the soil south and west
of the Rio Grande was unsuitable for cotton, sugar, rice or tobacco.
Rich proprietors already owned the land, and had no thought of parting
with it. The system of peonage was extremely economical, and it held
the ground so firmly that negro slavery, though tried, had been unable
to make headway against it. The free laborers of northeastern Mexico
would have been, admitted the _North American_, particularly hostile to
our southerners and their methods; and the colored population, it was
pointed out, could have escaped gradually from its bonds by amalgamating
with the natives. Now the leaders of the "slavocracy" doubtless inquired
into the conditions; and, as most of our ministers and probably most of
our consuls in Mexico were from their section, they could easily obtain
information. Waddy Thompson and A. J. Donelson, for example, believed
and said, that slavery would not thrive in northern Mexico.[9.14]

Polk's diary and papers reveal no evidence that he seriously considered
the interest of the peculiar institution in connection with our Mexican
problem. The debates of Congress are equally barren. Soon after the
war opened, as we shall discover, northeastern Mexico seemed ready
to join the United States or accept our protection, and there is no
sign that the slavocracy attempted to improve the opportunity. The
politicians most eager to acquire Mexican territory were Dickinson
of New York, Hannegan of Indiana and Walker, an anti-slavery man. A
northern correspondent of Calhoun wrote that many in New York insisted
on extending that way "to augment the strength of the non-slaveholding
states," while a Mobile correspondent said, "I would let the war
continue forever before I would take 697,000 [square miles] of
territory, which must be free territory." A meeting in Ohio declared
for taking all of that country, and this does not seem to have been
paralleled in the South. South Carolina was preëminently the champion
of slavery, yet Governor Aiken publicly opposed making acquisitions in
that quarter. Calhoun, the leader of the southern ultras there and
elsewhere, did the same. So did Waddy Thompson, Botts, Toombs, Lumpkin,
Campbell and many other southerners. W. R. King said that while the
South would insist--as a point of pride and right--upon sharing the
benefit of any territory gained from Mexico, it was a gross libel to
represent her as desiring to increase in that way the strength of
slavery.[9.14]

King deplored the war. One of the South Carolina Senators wrote
that it was detested nowhere more than in his state. In Georgia,
too, the conflict was bitterly opposed. The people did not desire
the war, said Toombs. Half of the slaveholders oppose it, admitted
Ritchie, a Virginian, editor of the administration organ. Besides
all other objections, it was pointed out that the southern policy of
conservatism and her stand for a strict construction of the Constitution
would be endangered by absorbing a large area mainly populated by
extremely inferior aliens. To combat all this evidence, we find hardly
anything[9.11] except the characteristic hints, imaginings and
assertions of certain abolitionists.[9.14]

On the other hand, the evidence that the annexation of Texas was
essentially the cause[9.12] of the war is impressive both in quantity
and in quality.[9.13] Benton, Clay, Robert C. Winthrop, Stephen A.
Douglas, Andrew Johnson and many other public men agreed on this point.
As Van Buren and substantially all the Whig organs had predicted
that immediate annexation would entail war with Mexico, they must
be counted in the same class. Charles Sumner drew up a resolution
declaring that such was the primary cause, and it passed the legislature
of Massachusetts, where the subject was rather closely studied, by
overwhelming majorities. The House committee on foreign affairs took
that ground in its report of February 24, 1847. All agree upon this,
was Winthrop's declaration. Paredes expressed the same view in the most
formal manner. The Mexican minister of war under the government that
overthrew Paredes publicly endorsed it; and at least two well-qualified
foreign observers, Duflot de Mofras and the biographer of Lord Aberdeen,
took the same view. Indeed, the proposition seems demonstrated by the
plain course of events.[9.14]

The mere annexation of Texas cannot, however, be regarded as the sole
cause of the war. But for the loudly expressed wrath of the Americans,
due mainly to Mexican barbarities in Texas and outrages upon the persons
and property of American citizens, Mexico would have been far less
irritable, and the annexation difficulty, which came so near to being
patched up, might have been adjusted; while, as Polk maintained, if
the policy of the United States regarding our claims had been firm,
consistent and strong from the first, Mexico would not have dared to
risk so much in dealing with us later.[9.14]

The general cause of hostilities was, therefore, the series of
unpleasant incidents occurring in the mutual relations of the two
countries from the scandalous treatment of Poinsett down to the
scandalous treatment of Slidell, from the first mutterings of discontent
in Texas down to the setting of her one fair star in the broad sea of
the American Union; and in this long series the annexation of Texas was
the chief event.[9.14]

But one can speak much more definitely. For a term of years, mainly
in consequence of the use made of these affairs by self-seeking
politicians, the people of Mexico had fed on the ideas of despising,
fearing, hating and fighting the United States; Paredes had gained
supreme authority on this basis; public sentiment demanded that he
should pursue the route marked out by his professions; to beat the small
and apparently demoralized American army, led by a backwoods general,
seemed quite feasible; it appeared likely that a victory would confirm
the dictator's power, while a failure to strike would ensure his doom;
and hence an attack upon our army was ordered. This was the precise
cause of the war.[9.14]

[THE WAR MEASURES]

Let us now return to Congress. The war bill of May 13 gave the President
authority to use the army, the navy, the militia and not more than
50,000 volunteers--to serve twelve months after reaching the rendezvous
"or to the end of the war, unless sooner discharged"--to expend not more
than $10,000,000, to complete the vessels of war already authorized,
and to purchase additional vessels. By other Acts he was authorized
(May 13) to increase by enlistment the number of privates in the
regular army from sixty-four to not over one hundred per company, thus
bringing the rank and file up to 15,540; a company of sappers, miners
and pontoniers and a regiment of mounted riflemen, originally intended
to protect emigrants and traders on the Oregon route, were created
(May 15 and 19); and numerous details concerning organization were
either prescribed or entrusted to the Executive (June 18 and 26).[9.15]
Under the last head authority was given to appoint all the necessary
general officers.[9.16] Meantime (May 13) the President issued a war
proclamation, modelled upon that of 1812, in which he announced that an
appeal had been made to "the last resort of injured nations"; and the
state department (May 14) sent a confidential circular to our agents
abroad, explaining that we had taken up arms reluctantly, and "solely
for the purpose of conquering an honorable and permanent peace."[9.17]

"The war sense of the United States," it has been remarked, "seems to
be in inverse ratio to its war spirit;" and in general the military
measures of the government exhibited more zeal than discretion. In
particular they put into action the very system that had proved
disastrous a generation before. For this Taylor was primarily
responsible, for after having seen the war of 1812 and that of Florida
languish and crawl, he strongly urged that volunteers be called out for
one year of service. Polk's Message deepened the mischief by expressing
confidence in raw troops, although in 1838 the secretary of war had
assured him that the difference in expense between volunteers and
regulars was "at least as four to one," besides the waste resulting
from their total ignorance of administration, the cost of marching
to and from distant points for short periods of service, and the
disproportionate growth of the pension list.[9.18] The President was
indeed authorized to increase the number of privates in a regular
company, but the roll of officers remained as before; and enlistment
was not stimulated, as it might have been, by adding something to the
pay.[9.19]

Having a choice between a definite and an indefinite period, the
volunteers were sure, as Marcy foresaw, to elect the former,
although--as the sequel appeared to show--a sufficient number
would almost certainly have engaged for the war, had that been the
only proposal. The Mexicans were commonly regarded as cowardly and
inefficient. Very few Americans expected them to hold out as long
as they did; and intending volunteers would naturally have counted,
therefore, upon returning soon. There were also the enthusiastic
feelings natural at the opening of a war, and a deep interest resulting
from the supposed peril of Taylor's army. Yet the government chose to
accept gratuitously the risk, which in due time became a certainty, of
embarrassing itself, disappointing the country and encouraging the enemy
by offering a brief term of service.[9.19]

Instead of retaining control of the organization and officering of the
regiments, it entrusted this work to the states, and as a rule the men
chose their own officers;[9.20] but in these features of the system, as
in our governmental methods generally, there was some advantage as well
as much loss. Webster, for example, held that volunteers ought to have
the right of electing for leaders men whom they knew and could trust;
and if they preferred, to sicken and bleed under captains as ignorant as
themselves, whom they knew and could trust, rather than fare otherwise
under trained officers whom they would have had to obey without fully
understanding them, they were perhaps entitled to the privilege, and no
doubt they learned something from exercising it. Anyhow, said Webster,
the other method would have been degrading; and American citizens must
not be degraded. As for generals, the law of June 18 compelled the
Executive to take them from the militia, although they would be under
no obligation to serve more than three months, and might withdraw in
the midst of a campaign. There was no provision for filling vacancies
resulting from death or discharge; and finally the appropriations were
so poorly arranged that the quartermaster's office had to juggle with
funds as even Polk himself could not lawfully have done.[9.19]

Such as it was, however, the system went promptly into effect. Beginning
on May 15, the secretary of war sent requisitions for volunteers to the
governors of the states, deeming this method of application advantageous
as well as due to their official position, since they were supposed
to know the troops of their jurisdictions and the best places from
which to draw them. In general the plan was to summon about 25,000
from the northeastern states, to be enrolled and await orders, and to
call out nearly as many from the other states for immediate service.
The former were all to be infantry; the latter, horse and foot in the
ratio of about one to three. It was expected that existing militia
organizations--regiments or parts of regiments--would offer their
services, and that new men would fill the ranks as they felt moved
to come forward. Not only privates but officers were to approach the
national service by that portal, and then be mustered into the army at
the appointed state rendezvous by a United States officer detailed for
the purpose.[9.21] In four days the calls were nearly all on their
way.[9.24]

The purpose of distributing requisitions over the whole country was to
interest every state, Polk explained; and to stimulate the executive
officials he urged upon the secretary of war the most prompt and
energetic action and personal attention to each detail, insisting for
his own part upon being kept "constantly advised of every important
step that was taken."[9.22] This charge Marcy accepted with all
seriousness.[9.23] Whether bowing his massive head ponderously over a
big desk, sifting callers with keen glances through shaggy brows, or
giving instructions to subordinates in a voice roughened with snuff, he
devoted his faculties to his task with a rare power of concentration.
But he preferred the quiet of his home; and there, comfortably wrapped
in his dressing gown with a box of the brown powder and an old red
handkerchief on the table, he did his best work.[9.24]

Polk believed, or tried to believe, that "multitudes" were eager to
volunteer, but others feared it would not be easy to raise troops
after so long a peace. Strong influences were at work, however. Though
evidently the fireside was not in danger, patriotism urged men to take
the field, for did not the nation call?

          "Arm! arm! your country bids you arm!
          Fling out your banners free--
          Let drum and trumpet sound alarm,
          O'er mountain, plain and sea;"

thus wrote Park Benjamin the day Polk signed the war bill. A longing to
escape from the dulness of bare existence, ambition to see the world
and test one's powers, a passion for adventure and frolic in a far
clime believed to be all glitter, beauty and romance, the prospect of
revelling in the Halls of Montezuma, a feeling that one who was not
"in it" would have to spend the rest of his days explaining why, the
expectation of honors and popularity that would make success easy in any
pursuit, quarrels with sweethearts or hopes of becoming irresistible
to the "girls," were among the motives. For the high officers it was a
"political tour," said one of them; and with everybody the barbarities
perpetrated by the Mexicans in Texas counted for much. The hardships of
campaigning were unknown. While every one understood that some would
fall, it was practically impossible for an ardent young fellow, well
and strong, to imagine his particular person stretched lifeless on
the ground; or, if such an end was ever contemplated, it appeared as
something quick, unfelt amidst the excitement, and sweetened by the
greatness of one's cause.[9.24]

Behind all of this lay certain facts too deep for the soldiers
themselves to perceive, but not too deep for them to feel. One
instinctively shunned that "misery of cowardice," which--as Pericles
told the Athenians--is more dreadful to men of spirit than death in
battle. As the ages have demonstrated, man is naturally a fighting
animal, and therefore he finds in war the keenest sense of his vital
selfhood. It is our chief glory to will and to do; and in mortal
combat this glory is more intense, if not more real, than in peaceful
occupations. Besides, if a man comes to his end in being supremely
himself, he triumphs over death, and indeed he wins another victory,
too, for life--so rich in menaces--can threaten him no longer. The
validity of nearly all these motives was more or less transitory. When,
for example, a man had proved that he could face a cannon, it seemed
unnecessary to keep on facing it. But while they lasted, they were
strong.[9.24]

In almost every section, therefore, except New England, where the
annexation of Texas could not yet be forgiven, the war spirit rose high,
astonishing even the most sanguine. At New York the walls were covered
with placards headed, "Mexico or Death," or "Ho, for the halls of the
Montezumas!" and the streets echoed to the song:

          "Come all ye gallant volunteers
            Who fear not life to lose,
          The martial drum invites ye come
            And join the Hickory Blues:
          The gallant Hickory Blues,
          The daring Hickory Blues--
          To Mexico they proudly go,
          The gallant Hickory Blues."

[TROOPS COME FORWARD]

At Philadelphia 20,000 citizens of all parties gathered "to sustain the
country." In the central states banks advanced money without security,
farmers' wives issued free rations, ladies made clothing and flags by
the wholesale, roads turned black with men. Ohio looked with disfavor
on the annexation of Texas and the war with Mexico, regarding them as
measures favorable to slavery; yet in less than two weeks after the
requisition for volunteers arrived, three thousand of her sons were
marching to the rendezvous. At Indianapolis Lew Wallace hung out a flag
and a four-sided transparency inscribed, "For Mexico; fall in"; and
in three days his company was full. "Illinois must rally now and win
a character," James Shields wrote to Koerner; and fourteen regiments
volunteered instead of the four that could be taken.[9.24]

In Kentucky, said reports, the quota of the state was complete by May
26, and the governor had to stop the volunteering by proclamation.
Tennessee was called upon for about 3000 men, and nearly 30,000 came
forward. None would retire, and the selection was made by lot or ballot.
At Memphis troops organized before the call arrived. "May glory and
honor await them!" cried the _Daily Eagle_. St. Louis began to drill on
May 12, and in a few days the excitement was so deep and universal that
the courts adjourned. North Carolina offered more than three times her
quota.[9.24]

In the Gulf states many feared that not enough citizens would remain at
home to police the negroes. "Governor, do--if possible--get them into
the service," was the tune in Alabama. Mississippi complained bitterly
that so few of her sons had a chance. At New Orleans the roar of
business was almost drowned by a still more clamorous roar:

          "The drums, the drums, the busy, busy drums,
           The drums, the drums, the rattling, battling drums,
           The drums, the drums, the merry, merry drums!"

As rapidly as possible Brigadier General Wool and other officers
mustered the regiments into service; and, leaving the rendezvous and the
crowds of praying, cheering people amidst the saddest good-bys and the
warmest good wishes, the volunteers bravely set out for the war.[9.24]

Before very long new views of military life began to dawn upon the
soldiers. At the old battlefield below New Orleans, where many of the
troops camped, mud and water covered what was below their boot-tops
while mosquitos covered what was above. Going down the river they
brightened at the sight of sycamores and live-oaks, draped with Spanish
moss, and of the ducks, jays, mocking-birds and Virginia nightingales,
that seemed to find life so merry. But soon the lighthouse of the
Southwest Pass was gleaming astern, the muddy water became blue, and
these landsmen were on the deep. Sharks, diving porpoises, squadrons of
nautili and shoals of little flying-fish gave them some pleasure; but
the motion, especially to men packed like sardines in the dirty holds
of schooners and small brigs or lying spoon-fashion--if there was even
room to do that--on deck, seemed horrible. On the slow voyage the water,
which was often impure, fermented sometimes, and ten cents was the price
of a wholesome drink.[9.25]

And then the Gulf storms! The wind howled; the sea opened its jaws;
the heavens were now like ink, and now one burst of flame; thunders
rolled; ropes hissed and shrieked; spars cracked, snapped and were swept
away; the vessel tossed from beam-end to beam-end; the maddened horses
almost kicked the planking from the ribs, and the men cursed, prayed
or stolidly awaited their fate. But sooner or later nearly all of them
perceived on the horizon a line of sandy beach spotted with tents.
It was Brazos Island off Point Isabel, and they anchored about four
miles from it in the open sea. Meanwhile Brevet Major General Gaines,
commanding the military department of the West, had begun on May 3 at
his own instance to requisition troops for the relief of Taylor, and a
considerable number of these men also set out for the Point.[9.25]

[THE CHOICE OF A COMMANDER]

The question of a commander now had to be decided. Polk felt little
confidence in Taylor. The General's separating his army so far from
his base and exposing both to imminent peril seemed inexcusable; and
furthermore General Scott, not only the head of the army but the famous
hero of Lundy's Lane, was the natural chief of the large forces now
called out. Certain facts, however, injured Scott's chances. He was now
almost exactly sixty years old, and many thought him, as did Senator
Fairfield, "too much of an old granny." In 1839 he had been given 57
votes at the Whig Presidential convention, and of late the brilliancy
of his political anticipations had made him look "ten feet high," said
Corwin. His want of reverence for the President's decision respecting
brevet rank had led Polk and Benton to think of banishing him to a post
on the northern frontier. General Gaines and his many friends had long
hated him; and Mrs. Gaines insisted that no one was "much," whose lips
could be covered with a button. Finally, he was called vain, and so he
appeared to be.[9.30]

But the ostentation that won him the nickname "Old Fuss and Feathers,"
in addition to being much exaggerated by report, was doubtless
attributable in large measure to military policy and respect for his
rank. No one ever saw it interfere with serious affairs, and one who
could remark on the weak point of his own personal appearance, the point
ridiculed by Mrs. Gaines, was not so extremely vain after all. The
right word for Scott was egotism. Now egotism--in others--is doubtless
a shocking trait; yet merely to seem aware of what everybody knows,
does not, as many think it does, convert merits into demerits. General
Scott had a magnificent presence--fully six feet and four inches of
height and a corresponding weight--the brightest fame as an intrepid
soldier, the honor of a long and eminent career, the first place in our
army, a high social position, superior talents and attainments, unusual
knowledge of the world, charming personal graces, and a character of
rare quality--powerful, gentle and true. That he did not dissemble nor
cloak his value was a fault; but those who felt entitled to censure him,
merely because they had no such merits to be aware of, were somewhat in
error.[9.30]

Besides, almost every great artist is egotistical, and Scott was a great
artist. In more ways than one this was true. He could instruct the baker
in the mysteries of making bread, and superintend ably the roasting
of a ham; damn his delighted black body-servant for hiding everything
and then hiding himself; rave at an admiring guest for cutting lettuce
instead of rolling it round his fork, or lament in tragic tones at whist
that he had to play against three; and the next moment he would be
analyzing a campaign of Turenne, monologuing inimitably about the great
men he had met in Europe, or criticizing and comparing the best authors
of French prose. His foibles--particularly a sensitiveness of temper, an
ambition for the Presidency and a fondness for relieving heavy thought
with light words, as Marcy did with light snuff--were numerous; the
openness of his large and generous nature, superior to the prudence of
smaller minds, prevented his concealing them; certain peculiarities of
language and manner, from a delicacy about commas to a fondness for
literary effects, were easily ridiculed; and in non-military affairs
his indiscretion was now and then glaring; but he must be described
emphatically as a soldier, a gentleman, a "character," a great general
and a great man.[9.30]

Distrusting Taylor, and profoundly alarmed about the situation on the
frontier,[9.26] Polk sent for Scott on May 13, and conferred upon him
verbally the chief command in Mexico; yet, while admitting that he saw
proofs of experience in the General's remarks, he pronounced him too
"scientific and visionary," as the master of a difficult business must
always appear to the tyro.[9.27] Probably he knew that a man could not
become a soldier overnight, as he could become a militia colonel or a
"statesman," or--in Santa Anna's opinion--a professor of jurisprudence;
but he believed that, should fighting really need to be done, even an
improvised army would make "a brisk and a short war of it," as the
administration paper neatly said, and, if necessary, dictate a peace "in
the Halls of the Montezumas." Under circumstances like these prevision
and science appeared rather superfluous. The only things needful were to
march now and triumph to-morrow.[9.30]

Scott, however, felt that waging war might involve military operations.
He undertook to prove by elaborate calculations that the greater part
of the volunteers could not at the best arrive on the Rio Grande before
the first week in August; and, since that would be the rainy season,
when the hoofs of mules and horses would be unfit for hard use, and
various other difficulties would arise, he recommended that most of the
new troops, after remaining under instruction at salubrious points in
the United States during the summer, should be placed upon that river by
September 25, so as to make, with the volunteers and regulars already
there, 25,000 or possibly 30,000 healthy, properly equipped and more or
less trained soldiers, ready to invade Mexico in a decisive manner. In
the execution of this plan he did not intend to shirk or dally.[9.28]
May 15 he gave the chiefs of the general staff directions about throwing
supplies of all kinds upon the various rendezvous in advance of the
volunteers, prompted the quartermaster general to obtain wagons, and
even called attention to the necessity of seasonably obtaining light
boats for the navigation of the Rio Grande.[9.30]

His feeling was, however, particularly after news of what he called
Taylor's "great and brilliant victories" arrived, that it would not seem
proper--especially to military men--for him to supersede that officer
except with heavy reinforcements; and no doubt he saw it would scarcely
enhance a prestige that was dear to him personally and invaluable to him
as the commander-in-chief, to lie idle in hot mud for several months. He
therefore proposed to leave Washington about May 30, give his personal
attention to the troops and supplies _en route_ and at the rendezvous,
and reach the scene of action a little before them.[9.30]

Such procrastination disgusted Polk, and such "schemes" annoyed
Marcy, both of whom doubtless had an eye on political considerations.
Democratic members of Congress protested that Scott was slow, and
also that, if successful in Mexico, he would be the ruin of their
party. In short, it seemed necessary to get rid of him.[9.29] May
19, therefore, without saying a word to Scott, the secretary of war
had a provision attached to the bill which finally became the law of
June 18, enabling the Executive to appoint an officer new to the army
as commander-in-chief of the volunteers, and at the end of the war
eliminate Scott entirely. This led to sharp language between Marcy and
Scott.[9.30]

Marcy, the politician, intimated that the militia, who had gone to
Taylor's assistance and were to serve only three months, must have a
chance to do something, and Scott, the soldier, declined to take the
field if liable to be fired on from the rear. In one of his notes the
General remarked that he had taken for lunch merely "a hasty plate of
soup"--a fact that really proved his extreme devotion to the business in
hand; and in another he specified a number of the reasons why a summer
campaign was not feasible. At this juncture, too, a private note of his,
to the effect that no eastern man, Whig or West Pointer was likely to
be given a commission, turned up at the White House. Polk regarded the
note as disrespectful, and also thought the expression "fire upon my
rear" was a reflection on the Executive. Scott protested that his words
referred to Marcy and the members of Congress, and apparently did all he
could, without sacrificing his professional convictions, to satisfy the
President; but his efforts were in vain.[9.30]

The army on the Rio Grande was now out of danger; Taylor seemed not
so extremely incompetent after all; and Scott was still a scientific,
visionary schemer and a promising candidate for the chair of state, whom
it was more politic to disgrace than to honor. Polk decided therefore
that he was meddlesome, insubordinate, hostile, foolish, vindictive
and untrustworthy, a procrastinating obstructionist, and above all
a "violent partisan"; and on May 25 he received orders to stay at
Washington and hasten the preparations. His correspondence with Marcy
was published. The big dogs and little--Blanche, Tray and all--began
to bark. He was called a farrier general for speaking of hoofs, and
"Marshal Tureen" for admitting that he took soup. His off-hand remarks
were termed flippant, his close calculations fussy, and his deliberate
plans dilatory. His allusion to the "rear," fully justified by what had
occurred and what was to follow, seemed even to some friendly critics
disrespectful and uncalled for. Political intrigue, not war, was said to
occupy his mind. The General has "committed suicide with a goose-quill,"
announced the Boston _Courier_; Marcy himself confided to a friend that
Scott had lost a position he would never be able to regain; and Taylor,
assigned to duty with his new brevet rank,[9.31] was continued in the
chief command.[9.30]

[THE OREGON ISSUE SETTLED]

All this while the administration felt extremely anxious, on both
domestic and international grounds, regarding the Oregon issue. The
West, which Representative Graham called "the ruling star" in Congress,
clamored for "fifty-four forty or fight." Cass admitted that he found
it necessary to sacrifice to its demand his preference for a boundary
at the forty-ninth degree, and Polk's yielding to the same pressure
is readily understood.[9.32] It was believed that England's interest
in peace would forbid her fighting the United States for a small area
of unrecognized value, and the Democratic leaders probably had no
expectation of getting into a war. The British Cabinet, however, had
its public to deal with, and felt that it could not live a day should
it appear submissive to American "bullying." Hence on February 4, 1846,
when the United States finally rejected arbitration, the two nations
were almost at the grips.[9.33]

Yet each contained powerful elements favorable to accommodation. The
strong tone of the American government impressed England, and Polk
realized that while compromising on the lower line would anger the
Northwest, an opposite course might throw upon him the responsibility
of disrupting his party, ruining his administration, and plunging the
country into an abyss. The American Congress, like the people, took
a more and more serious view of the situation; and the roar of the
"fifty-four forty" men subsided into a growl. On a hint from the United
States Great Britain presented in May a compromise practically similar
to that which her minister at Washington had rejected the previous year.
The Senate, whose advice Polk asked in order to escape from his radical
declarations, recommended the acceptance of it on June 12, and the
crisis ended.[9.33]

During the same anxious period a less public negotiation also was on
foot. There were signs of a revolution in Mexico, and it behooved Polk
to consider who might come to the front. Farías and Almonte had many
partisans, and both were hostile to the United States; but Santa Anna,
now living in exile near Havana and spending his time on gamecocks,
monte and a huge mail from Mexico, seemed quite likely to regain the
power; and it was believed that his intelligence, ambition and knowledge
of his country's weakness, combining in favor of peace, were more than
enough to offset any stirrings of patriotic enthusiasm in his breast.
Reports from trustworthy sources--particularly from Slidell, Consul
Dimond at Vera Cruz, and Consul Black at Mexico--tended to support this
belief;[9.34] and it was understood also that past actions and present
circumstances bound Santa Anna to oppose all European and monarchical
designs upon Mexico. Not having begun the conflict with the United
States, he could pronounce peace a necessity, it was thought, and throw
upon Paredes all the odium of the abortive war. Moreover A. J. Atocha,
a naturalized American citizen, who had been a confidant and tool of
Santa Anna, had assured Polk in February that the General, should he
regain power, would be ready to treat.[9.35] From the despatches of
the Spanish minister at Mexico we know that it was impossible, as Polk
asserted, to prevent a man possessing large resources from landing on
the Mexican coast; and it seemed evident that Santa Anna's presence in
the country, should he fail to regain power and make a treaty, would in
all probability lead to a distracting civil war. On the day Polk signed
the war bill, an order[9.36] to let him pass through our blockading
squadron off Vera Cruz was, therefore, issued to Commodore Conner.[9.38]

[NEGOTIATIONS WITH SANTA ANNA]

And this was not all. Though deeply distrustful of Atocha, Polk seems
to have derived from a conversation with him the idea of despatching a
secret emissary to Santa Anna, and on the evening of July 5 Commander
Mackenzie of the United States navy arrived at Havana.[9.37] Two days
later he passed three hours with the ex-dictator, informing him of the
order to let him pass, and giving him the substance of a conversation
with Polk, in which the President had expressed these interesting
sentiments: first, a hope of seeing the General once more in authority;
secondly a desire for peace--on the basis of a boundary _via_ the
Rio Grande and thence west, ample payment in cash for the territory
thus transferred, and permanent friendly relations with Mexico; and,
thirdly, a willingness to stop military operations and send a minister,
should Santa Anna, on regaining his former position, be willing to
negotiate.[9.38]

In reply the General drew up a note, which was copied by Mackenzie
and then destroyed. In this he professed liberal intentions regarding
commerce and politics, anti-monarchical and anti-European principles,
and a disposition--in case the United States would promote his
"patriotic desires"--to respond with a treaty of the desired sort.
Taylor, he said, must promote the scheme by marching to Saltillo,
forcing Paredes to fight, defeating him, and then advancing perhaps
to San Luis Potosí, so as to constrain the Mexicans of all parties
to recall the Hero of Tampico; and he offered valuable hints about
attacking Tampico and Vera Cruz, which seemed to attest his sincerity.
Mackenzie then took his leave, and, impressed by Santa Anna's military
suggestions, transcended his instructions by visiting Taylor on the way
home--thus rendering himself and his mission unduly conspicuous.[9.38]

In these ways, combining diplomacy and force as he loved to do, Polk
imagined that our Mexican crisis had been fully met.




                                   X

                          THE LEADERS ADVANCE

                          May-September, 1846


On taking possession of Matamoros Taylor pitched his tent in the shade
of a small tree about half a mile from town, and there he remained.
Dressed in attakapas pantaloons and a linen roundabout he sat enthroned
on a box cushioned with an Arkansas blanket, and for dinner-table had a
couple of rough blue chests. The slight pursuit of Arista and the search
for concealed ordnance, arms and munitions did not require his personal
attention. June 6 Lieutenant Colonel Wilson with his four companies of
the First Infantry, Price's company of rangers and two of Bragg's guns
under Lieutenant Thomas, the future "Rock of Chickamauga," marched for
Reynosa, about sixty miles distant by the road, which had asked for
the protection of American troops,[10.1] and on the fifteenth Captain
McCulloch and his company were sent off on a scouting expedition; but
the General had ample time for reflection, and his thoughts were not
entirely agreeable.[10.2]

Despite newspaper glorification, the low opinion of his abilities that
was entertained by the officers must have impinged somewhat upon his
consciousness. Captain Larnard, in fact, believed that he not only
realized his inadequacy, but longed to retire; and certainly Taylor's
private letters exhibited the profoundest mental discomfort. Scott
should come, he insisted over and over again; the campaign would be a
failure, and the officer conducting it would be ruined. He distrusted
the intentions of the administration, and he condemned its policy. As
early as May 9 he feared too many volunteers--whom he disliked--were
coming; by May 20 he knew what Gaines had done; and Scott's letter of
May 18 informed him that about 20,000 such troops were "to march upon
Mexico."[10.2]

[THE TROOPS ON THE RIO GRANDE]

Under this head all his fears were realized. First, three-months
men (militia) sent for by himself in April, then six-months men
called out by Gaines, and then twelve-months men raised under the
war bill poured in. By June 3 his army had risen to nearly 8000.
Three weeks later the First Tennessee Infantry--advance guard of
the Congressional troops--appeared, and it found on the scene six
regiments from Louisiana, one from St. Louis, one from Kentucky, seven
companies from Alabama and twelve or fifteen from Texas. All of these
had come in response to the calls of Taylor or Gaines; and some had
been on the ground more than a month. In all about 8000 of these two
classes arrived, and in accordance with Taylor's desire nearly all of
them--except a very few, who agreed to serve twelve months--were sent
home about the first of August.[10.3] Before they took their leave,
at least 20,000 American soldiers were on the Rio Grande, besides an
inevitable number of American civilians more or less directly connected
with the army or not connected at all; and by far the greater part of
their subsistence had to come, of course, from the United States.[10.4]

The men were stationed in a series of camps. The best of all these was
probably at Point Isabel, where the dry, undulating ground and fresh
breezes made for health and comfort. Fort Polk, as the station was
now called, included about fifty acres. The shallowness of the harbor
impaired the convenience of the Point somewhat, however; and the primary
camp lay three or four miles away at the north end of Brazos Island,
which consisted of low hills on the side toward the mainland, a swamp in
the centre, a wreck-strewn beach on the outer side, and in general three
blades of grass to fifty square feet of sand, as Lieutenant George B.
McClellan wrote home. Here, too, the air was excellent; but the brackish
water caused many complaints, and the sand blew into everything--hair,
nose, eyes and food. Marching the entire length of the island the
soldiers found themselves, at its southern end, about eighty yards from
the mainland, waded across the bayou or strait known as Boca Chica, and
after going about seven miles farther came to another camp and group of
storehouses, ten miles or so from their point of departure, called Mouth
of the Rio Grande, where the river steamers tied up or anchored.[10.5]
Here, as at Camp Brazos, the ground was "working A live with magotes and
land crabs," as a soldier put it; but the same breezes usually tempered
the heat. Eight miles from the Gulf by land--twenty-five or thirty by
water--one came to Burrita, a cluster of huts on a ridge close to the
stream, and this high ground was made the site of a roomy camp. On the
opposite side of the river and separated from it by a mile of swamp lay
Camp Belknap, a spot fit only for the snakes, tarantulas, centipedes,
fleas, scorpions and ants that infested it. Above this point lay several
more camps,[10.6] and still others enveloped Matamoros.[10.7]

Except Belknap all of these places were fairly salubrious for men of
reasonable prudence, and several of them distinctly healthful; yet
considerable sickness prevailed. At Brazos Island a sort of dysentery
made trouble, and by some the water of the Rio Grande itself was thought
injurious. Until May 13 no funds available for tents had been within
the reach of Quartermaster General Jesup; and after this difficulty
was removed, feeling that he could not wait for duck, he used, common
muslin, which let the rain through; and many of the troops, even
regulars, had no protection against the weather except a screen of brush
or a blanket thrown over a bush. Measles invaded the camps, and lying
on the damp ground made the disease fatal in many instances. What was
worse, the heedlessness and homesickness of the volunteers caused much
sickness even at Point Isabel. The regulars, however, were comparatively
healthy and contented.[10.7]

The heat, softened by constant breezes, was thought by many less
oppressive than in Tennessee and Kentucky, though sometimes men fainted
at the drills. Bathing proved a valuable resource; and on the seashore
there were oysters, crabs and a large variety of beautiful fish to catch
and eat. Stately processions of herons and scarlet-winged flamingos
and the chatter of jackdaws and many other birds amused the soldiers;
and some of those addicted to sport discussed the project of crossing
the mosquitos with gamecocks, we are told. The roar of the sea and
the mirages along the river, innumerable flowers, the solemn _burros_
(donkeys) almost buried by their loads, the Mexicans vending eatables at
exorbitant prices, the long lines of tents where such a luxury as tents
existed, target shooting, and now and then the muffled drum helped
occupy one's attention. On July 5 occurred a Sunday and a sermon--the
last of the campaign. At sunset a tremulous orange haze in the west
was due, followed by the twinkling lights of the camp, that were so
agreeable to view from a distance, and then by the howling of wolves,
the tenor chorus of the swamps, and the agonized baritone fugues of
the donkeys. It was now time for singing, story-telling and, above
all, gambling--perhaps Old Sledge on a blanket, perhaps Chuckle-luck,
perhaps monte, perhaps faro; and now and then came a fandango (dance)
on the hard ground with such American and Mexican women as there were.
The camp life was "a rough furnace and a hot fire," wrote Sergeant
Miller; but the novelty of it soon wore off, and the volunteers grew
discontented.[10.7]

[THE MORALE OF THE ARMY]

They had come for glory and a good time, and were having neither. They
wanted to do something, and to do it at once or go home. One at least of
them believed that assignment to garrison duty would have led to general
desertion. Wherever they were, they panted to be somewhere else. Having
come to gamble, with their lives for a stake, they clamored to have the
game begin. If there was no enemy to fight, they were ready to fight
friends; and in one of the many brawls and riots Colonel Baker was shot
in the neck. Four or five months of training under expert officers and
strict discipline were necessary to prepare regulars for the field;[10.8]
and naturally these volunteers, almost wholly alien to the habits,
feelings and efficiency of the real soldier, often felt at liberty to
thwart and even defy their commander, and were unable to coöperate with
him intelligently when really disposed to do so. In spite of positive
orders they wasted ammunition recklessly, and Lieutenant Meade thought a
day passed in his tent no less perilous than a stiff battle.[10.11]

The officers were very similar. One brigadier general came with a light
buggy, in which he proposed to make the campaign. Another had enlisted
as a private, and, not being deemed worthy to command the company, had
been elected a lieutenant; but the executive fiat provided him with
qualifications. "In the name of God," wrote a soldier to Senator Allen,
don't let Hamer be a brigadier general; he is talented, but doesn't
dare undertake to drill a squad; yet the commission was issued.[10.9]
Pillow, another of the same rank, ambitious to figure but not acquainted
with his proper work, did what was not proper. Some of the volunteer
generals on horseback reminded Lieutenant Jamieson of the line,

     "Woe to the mullein-stalk that came in our way."

Persons of a mature age, who had bulked large at home, would not stoop
to plod through the rudiments of a new profession. Even good officers
were in fear of the letters written by their men and the revenge that
might be taken later, should real discipline be enforced; while those
less conscientious threatened to resign if kept in the background, stood
in the way of superiors belonging to the opposite political party, in
order to prevent them from making a reputation, or even took part with
the men in the hope of getting into Congress by and by.[10.11]

In short, the volunteers were all one costly mass of ignorance,
confusion and insubordination, said Meade; while the regular officers
felt discouraged, not merely by discovering that civilians were
preferred to educated soldiers for high appointments, but by finding
themselves in the shadow and even under the command of men who had
been discharged from West Point for incapacity or from the army for
gross misconduct.[10.10] At the height of this, General Taylor, who was
disqualified by lack of experience and mental discipline for organizing
an efficient staff, and therefore needed to use his own eyes and his
own voice, held aloof. "I very seldom leave my tent," he wrote on July
25, adding helplessly, "How it will all end time alone must tell."
Besides, every mail brought letters about the Presidency to distract his
attention.[10.11]

Probably he saw he had blundered. On April 26 he knew that war had
begun, and called upon Louisiana and Texas for soldiers with a view
to the invasion of Mexico, which he must have believed, under the
circumstances, that his government wished. By the rules of the service
it was then his duty, as he well knew, to make requisitions for
everything the campaign would require,[10.12] and a zealous commander,
gathering--as Taylor had been instructed to do--all the information he
could find regarding the local conditions, might reasonably have sent on
to Washington with it an able officer to assist the department. With a
scorn, however, for science and vision that should have delighted Polk,
Taylor did neither; but, assuming that the Mexicans would not fight--if
at all--north of the mountains beyond Monterey, he determined to advance
with about 6000 men. Unfortunately he neglected to have his engineers
inspect the three steamboats on which his plan depended, and these
proved to be worm-eaten and practically useless.[10.13]

[TROOPS ADVANCE]

About the middle of June, boats for the Rio Grande began to be
despatched from New Orleans, but--in addition to mishaps at the coast
resulting from gales and the freaks of the shifting bars--a serious
embarrassment soon occurred above. A direct advance against Monterey by
land was deemed impracticable, because the route lacked water. Taylor
had therefore planned to have his troops march to Camargo, the head of
navigation toward that city, and send their supplies to that point by
the river; but during the first eleven days of July rain fell heavily
and flooded the country. The freshet, however, ensured a sufficient
depth in the Rio Grande, and on July 6 the Seventh Infantry set out
for Camargo. The distance, called about 120 miles by land, was more
than twice as long by water; and the river wandered about so much that
according to humorous natives a bird could never get across--always
alighting on some projection of the bank from which it had risen. It
proved a hard task for the light and feeble steamboats, with only
green wood for the boilers, to stem the fierce current; the pilots
were unacquainted with the difficulties of such navigation;[10.14] and
in making one of the sharp turns a boat was frequently caught by the
current, and swept downstream or against the bank--breaking the rudder
perhaps.[10.16]

But in one way or another the steamers puffed ahead past great
cornfields, and occasionally there was a small village, where the people
stared in wonder at the strange craft, and the girls laughed and shouted
to see the soldiers throw kisses to them. After some 200 miles of this
came Reynosa on a high limestone point, dominated by a heavy, stunted
church tower like an ancient castle; and, farther along, the mouth of
the Alcantro was passed. The country became still better now, with
fertile valleys running back to the tablelands; and not only corn but
potatoes, wheat, beans, and cotton could be seen. Forty miles of such a
landscape, and the steamboats entered the San Juan; and after struggling
on for three or four more they stopped early on July 14 at Camargo,
where Captain Miles, who commanded the regiment, sent at once for the
alcalde, an official who acted as mayor, judge and _pater familias_ in
a Mexican town, and formally took possession. The rest of the regular
infantry pursued the same route as fast as possible, and on July 30 most
of the volunteers were ordered to do so.[10.16]

  [Illustration: FROM MATAMORE TO MONTEREY]

August 4 Taylor himself embarked, and the next day artillery and
infantry began to advance by the southern shore of the river. The road
was in places deep with mud or covered with water; thick chaparral cut
off the friendly breeze; the intense heat felled many a soldier, and
thirst tormented all who retained their senses; but after a time the
plan of moving by night lessened the suffering, and at last the painful
march was achieved. The cavalry and wagons also proceeded in due course
to the general rendezvous;[10.15] and meanwhile Mier, a hill town only a
short distance from the Rio Grande, was occupied without resistance on
July 31.[10.16]

[DREADFUL CAMARGO]

Camargo, a place of perhaps 5000 inhabitants, was said to be some 400
miles from the Gulf by water. It stood well up on the right bank of the
river, here about one hundred yards in width; but the recent freshet,
rising to an unprecedented height, had nearly destroyed it, replacing
houses and gardens with about a foot of mud. This was dug away, and the
banks were cleared of vegetation; "acres and acres" of tents rose; and
by the end of August some 15,000 men were encamped along the San Juan
for a distance of three miles or so up and down and several hundred
yards back, while a quantity of stores that dumfounded the Mexicans and
satisfied Taylor, was gradually piled up. Worth, who had returned to
his brigade at the end of May, commanded the place and insisted on firm
discipline. No American trader was tolerated; and all persons caught
smuggling liquor into camp suffered "a punishment cruel to use on tender
skins."[10.17]

This was well, but it did not redeem the situation. Natives regarded
Camargo as the sickliest point in the region, and the freshets had made
it worse. Every breath of air raised a stifling cloud of dust from the
dried and pulverized mud. Barren hills of limestone cut off the breeze
to a great extent and concentrated the fierce heat, frequently sending
the mercury in "this hottest of all hot places," as a soldier called the
town, to 112 degrees. Scorpions, tarantulas, mosquitos and centipedes
abounded. There was a plague of small frogs. "Last night the ants tried
to carry me off in my sleep," wrote a soldier. The only drinking water
came from the San Juan, and it made trouble. The ignorance of the
volunteers about caring for their health was fairly matched by that of
their officers and medical men. Days of sweltering under a cruel sun,
with nothing to do and apparently nothing to hope for, were followed by
cool nights and heavy dews, the heart-rending groans of the sick, and
the yelping of numberless prairie wolves. In almost all the volunteer
regiments at least one third of the men were ill, wrote Meade, and in
many of them, one half. The three volleys at the graves became well-nigh
a continuous roll; and the "dead march" was played so often that, as an
officer said, the very birds knew it. The First Tennessee, originally
1040 prime young fellows, was reduced by deaths and discharges to less
than 500. "Oh, what a _horror_ I have for Camargo," exclaimed one of the
generals; "it is a Yawning Grave Yard"; a thousand soldiers torn and
mangled on the battlefield would be nothing to its suffering and dying
regiments.[10.17]

And all this appears to have been unnecessary. As we have seen, Taylor
had no intention of using more than about 6000 men in the near future;
and there were salubrious places not only near the Gulf but near
Camargo. No local maladies prevailed in the Rio Grande valley, said
Meade. "There are no causes for disease," wrote Captain Henry. The
climate of that region, said an Illinois officer, equalled in salubrity
the climate of "any Western state." Reynosa was described by the General
Sedgwick of Civil War days as perfectly healthy. Mier, selected the
following year, with a particular view to salubrity, as the site of a
camp for instruction, lay near by on the road to Monterey; and Cerralvo,
farther along on the same route, was a kind of Eden. The best comment
on what the General did is what the General himself said. His first
duty, he told Senator Crittenden, was to place the troops in a healthful
situation.[10.17]

[MEXICAN PREPARATIONS]

During all this while, Mexico, too, had been preparing for the war, and
preparing characteristically. Paredes began with good intentions, a
serious and fairly honorable Cabinet, and sound ideas of economy. Though
he did not seem to be very strong either physically or intellectually,
his many scars and the bull-like expression of his face inspired respect
and caution. He lived quietly and honestly, and the correspondent of
the London _Times_ thought Mexico had a better prospect of being well
governed than at any previous period since 1821. It was the dictator's
hope that such a policy and a bold campaign against the Americans would
rally the country to his banner.[10.20]

About April 1, as we already know, he gave orders to attack Taylor. In
May he severed all consular relations with the United States.[10.18] June
6 the new Congress met; and Paredes, in opening the session, announced
that the time had come to declare war, and summoned all Mexicans to
the support of the country. Six days later he was elected President
as a matter of course, and the action of the American government
regarding war with Mexico was made known by the official _Diario_. On
the sixteenth Tornel--the enemy of the United States and worse enemy
of his own country, who had now wormed himself into the war department
in place of Almonte--proposed to Congress a declaration of war; and on
July 6 Paredes proclaimed, as Congress had voted five days before, that
Mexico would repel the aggression and invasion of the Americans. It was
further stated that besides completing the Permanent and Active corps,
the government would create additional forces to serve during the war.
A million dollars were supplied by the clergy to pay for a campaign.
Paredes obtained permission to command the army in person, and his
intention to do so was publicly announced.[10.20]

But as usual the war plans ended mostly in talk. Except at the far
distant north, denunciation of the United States moderated somewhat, and
even at Mexico bragging lost a part of its flavor;[10.19] yet, though
really discouraged, people would, not recognize the war as anything
very serious. After news of Arista's defeat arrived at the capital,
the shiver of astonishment and disgust lasted for a time; but the glib
fellows in the cafés were soon remarking, "Well, that's over; that won't
happen again." Explanations abounded. After all, Arista was only making
a reconnaissance in force, it was pointed out. "Such is the fortune of
war; a defeat to-day and glory to-morrow," remarked one of the generals.
The hour chosen by Providence to give the world a lesson by terribly
punishing the aggressive Americans has not yet arrived, explained the
governor of San Luis Potosí. Reverses have occurred, but they can easily
be repaired and will be, the minister of war assured Congress airily;
and moreover the enemy had suffered most severely, it was believed.
Even the evacuation of Matamoros was eclipsed by domestic politics.
The triangular difficulties between Scott, Gaines and the American
government were cited as illustrating the state of discipline in our
army. The wreck-strewn coast near the mouth of the Rio Grande and the
billows laden with boxes and barrels afforded no little encouragement;
and editorials from the London _Times_, proving in detail the
hopelessness and risk of an American attack upon Mexico, were translated
and printed by the official journal.[10.20]

So the nation took heart. Its case did not look desperate after all.
Heroics appeared unnecessary. The military men have seized the country,
thoughtful citizens reflected; let them defend it. The people did not
fly to arms. The departments opened their strong boxes by only a chink
or not at all. "A dreadful and cruel lethargy has buried the Republic,"
exclaimed _El Indicador_. How the Mexicans could be roused, nobody
knew. To proclaim a _levée en masse_ and place a weapon in every hand
seemed politically dangerous. Paredes, observing that his plan to go
north received the cordial endorsement of his enemies, and fully warned
that his departure would be the signal for an uprising, dared not set
out; and as for the idea of British aid, upon which great expectations
had been erected, the minister of England gave lectures instead of
promises.[10.20]

[PAREDES IN DIFFICULTIES]

Indeed, Paredes found himself struggling, not merely to achieve, but
even to survive. Knowing well that his political existence depended
upon paying the army, he devoted all the revenues to it from the first,
and made every exertion to solve the all-important problem of money. In
March he tried to borrow heavily on the security of Church property, but
failed. In May the payment of all treasury obligations was suspended,
and a cut in pensions and salaries made; but the principal results were
to anger multitudes already offended by his economies, destroy credit,
paralyze business, and call forth an emphatic protest from the British
legation. On the principle, perhaps, of setting a thief to catch a
thief, the cynical Iturbe, one of the corrupt jobbers in government
contracts, was appointed minister of the treasury; and extraordinary
powers to raise funds were conferred upon the President by Congress.
But this very law shielded private and Church property, and there was
no help in laying taxes that could not be collected. Besides, the army
was now but a fragile staff. The defeats of the north had smitten its
confidence and prestige; being badly paid it was unreliable; and it
really preferred Santa Anna, the natural chief of its unprincipled
and rapacious officers.[10.22] Paredes counted upon the monarchical
party. Beyond a doubt he aimed to place it in power.[10.21] Alamán, an
avowed advocate of that policy, was not only his principal adviser
but the chief editor of a monarchist newspaper, _El Tiempo_, set up
at this time and protected by the government; and the _convocatoria_
summoning the new Congress, prepared by Alamán, pointed in the same
direction. But his party had no "substantial plan," as the British
minister well said, and the idea commanded no popular support. To the
army it meant a permanent throne in the place of a Presidential chair
to which every successful general might aspire, and imported troops
instead of Mexicans behind the foreign prince; while the departments,
under the pretence that local interests were neglected but mainly
to facilitate access to the public treasury, turned away from even
the idea of a centralized republic toward a revival of Federalism.
The convocatoria, which denied Congressional representation to six
sevenths of the people, was generally and furiously denounced as an open
rupture with the nation; and Archbishop Posada, the strongest support
of the monarchists, fell sick and passed away. Paredes found it wise,
therefore--in fact, unavoidable--to declare for the Republic. But his
action seemed a confession of weakness, dishonesty and inconsistency;
and this impression was deepened by a futile decree against the freedom
of the press and a vain endeavor to gain the support of Pedraza, who led
the conservative wing of the Federalists.[10.22]

Numerous other difficulties embarrassed the President. Like all the
successful revolutionary leaders, he found it impossible to keep the
promises he had made. It was complained that he did not protect northern
Mexico against the Indians. His adjustment of the foreign debt raised
a loud clamor. Many charged that his bringing the principal military
forces to the capital had laid the frontier open to the Americans, and
he was accused of using them still as his personal bodyguard. The Army
of Reserve is too much reserved, cried the _Monitor Republicano_; and
over and over again the opposition press demanded that he should take
the field, which nobody believed he intended to do.[10.22]

By June the spirit of revolt, which had shown itself early in February,
seemed formidable. Almonte, who had left the Cabinet ostensibly because
opposed to monarchical designs, was believed to be at work for himself,
and Santa Anna was known to be plotting. The President's ability fell
conspicuously short of his needs, and he clouded with drink such talents
as he possessed. His weak and vacillating course fortified every enemy,
and estranged almost every sensible friend; and it came to be felt,
even by those hostile to the monarchical idea, that a more energetic
ruler must be found. In short, six months after taking the reins Paredes
had no real strength whatever. The door stood actually ajar for a new
revolution.[10.22]

Preparations for such a change had then been going on for a long
while. In the London _Times_ of February 10, 1846, its correspondent
at Mexico had said that Santa Anna's coming into power again "would be
regarded by all classes as the greatest affliction that could befall
the nation," and other good observers entertained similar opinions. The
Federalists in particular disliked him. But on February 20 a protest
of his against monarchical schemes appeared in print at Mexico, and
newspapers were soon advocating his return.[10.23] Farías, leader of the
radical Federalists, was easily won over by a patriotic letter full of
penitence and unselfish zeal, and with Rejón as intermediary an alliance
of his faction and the Santannistas, based upon the idea of uniting army
and people, was at length, with much difficulty, brought about. Almonte
joined the combination; by the first of April it planned to "pronounce"
at Vera Cruz; and although disagreement regarding the terms of the plan
and a dispute whether Santa Anna or Almonte should be named the leader
prevented this action, Juan Alvarez, who had been a turbulent partisan
fighter in the Acapulco region ever since 1821, and was cognizant of
this conspiracy, inaugurated a revolution, April 15, in favor of a
provisional triumvirate: Santa Anna, Herrera and Rincón.[10.26]

Santa Anna insisted upon his own views, and Almonte, whom Paredes
appointed minister to France in order to get rid of him and then
obligingly detained at Havana by withholding funds for the journey,
yielded. In May Paredes put Farías and fifteen other suspected men into
prison, and this enabled them to plot at their leisure. On the twentieth
of that month all the scheming came to a head at Guadalajara, where the
people cried, "_Viva la República!_ Death to the foreign prince!" The
officers despatched against them proved unsuccessful.[10.24] The country
was soon like a tossing sea; and insurrections, attempted or planned,
showed themselves at various places.[10.26]

[PAREDES OVERTHROWN]

The government now proceeded to commit suicide. Paredes announced that
he was going to make his long deferred campaign against the Americans.
About 4000 troops marched for the north--really destined, it was
believed, for Guadalajara--and near the end of July Vice President
Bravo reluctantly accepted the reins of government. It was hoped to
rally the conservatives to his support, and to that end he proclaimed
on August 3 the revival of the constitution (_Organic Bases_) that had
been in force during the Presidency of Herrera, while urgent appeals
for union and harmony were put forth by the new ministers. It was hoped
also to conclude the war. Paredes had wished to do this in May, and
a member of the Cabinet had indirectly proposed to Consul Black that
a minister should be sent by the United States; but the government
finally concluded that the matter was "too delicate." The new Executive,
however, had not committed himself in favor of war as the President had,
and it was understood that his administration fully intended to end the
conflict.[10.26]

Bravo's course alarmed the conspirators, for many of the Federalists,
besides distrusting Santa Anna, believed the Organic Bases could be
made over into a satisfactory constitution. Nobody felt sure, however,
that such was the real intention of Paredes; the new Cabinet did not
please the radicals; the revolution had gone so far it could not
easily be stopped; and when word came on the third of August that the
garrison of Vera Cruz had pronounced for Santa Anna, General Salas, the
comandante general at Mexico, who was believed to be a firm supporter
of the government, declared at the "citadel" the following night--with
the concurrence of Farías--for Santa Anna and federation, citing
particularly as excuses the monarchical designs of the administration
and its failure to prosecute the war. Paredes, who had remained secretly
in town, hastily set off now to bring back his troops; but the second in
command of his escort betrayed him, and, overtaken by a cavalry regiment
despatched by Salas, the man who had boasted that at any rate his fall
would be no comedy, was brought back to town by the ear, so to speak,
like a truant schoolboy.[10.26]

Bravo, having few men and no artillery, could not resist, and his
retirement on the sixth of August left Salas in supreme _de facto_
command,[10.25] pledged only to carry on the war against the United
States and assemble Congress, but really destined, as his organ
modestly assured an indifferent public, to open "a new epoch, an epoch
of liberty, of movement and of life, an epoch of deeds and realities
and not of fraudulent and vain promises." "Federation, Santa Anna and
Texas," was his motto. An abundance of reassuring laws, and especially
the annulment of all edicts repressing the liberty of the newspapers, a
restoration of curtailed pensions and salaries, and the proclamation of
a political amnesty relieved anxious minds; and the spring of patriotism
was touched by summoning all Mexicans to unite against the invader.
Salas, however, counted only as a herald; it was time for the hero to
appear.[10.26]

[SANTA ANNA'S RETURN TO MEXICO]

Early in the forenoon on the sixteenth of August, a salvo of artillery
from the fortress of Ulúa at Vera Cruz announced the advent of something
unusual. At about nine o'clock a "crack" regiment, the Eleventh
Infantry, marched down to the customhouse, and after manoeuvring for
some hours was formed by dint of cuffing into two lines, which faced
each other and extended to the "Palace"; and finally, at a quarter
before one, a well-groomed and somewhat portly man in the full uniform
of a Mexican major general came up from the wharf between the lines.
He stood about five feet and ten inches in height, looked forty years
old though really fifty-one, seemed capable of great endurance, and
bore himself with an air of blended suavity and command. "The Flower of
Mexico," a very young and very pretty little blonde, his wife, preceded
him on the arm of an officer, and a retinue followed in his wake.[10.28]

The guns of Ulúa boomed again; such of the soldiers as chose, fired
their muskets or saluted; but not a viva was heard. The young and
pretty woman pouted at the cool reception. The glittering dark-gray
eyes of her husband clouded; his dignified and courtly manner seemed a
little disturbed; and his tawny face, whereon a studied graciousness
and self-control could not hide from a close observer the marks of
duplicity, treachery, avarice and sensuality, seemed to grow black. But
he went on to the palace; and presently, as he sat there surrounded by
officers in more or less brilliant uniforms, a tinman, speaking in the
name of the people, lectured him roundly on his past misdeeds. Such was
the home-coming of "The Illustrious General, Benemérito de la Patria,
the Most Excellent Señor, Don Antonio López de Santa Anna," "Champion of
Independence, Hero of Tampico, Immortal Commander," as he was officially
styled;[10.27] and such was "the most pronounced enthusiasm" with which,
according to Almonte, the people received him.[10.28]

Santa Anna put forth at once an allocution to the troops, which
exhibited in proper style the ecstatic joy that he experienced on
finding himself among such devoted patriots; and a manifesto, composed
by Rejón, laid his programme before the public. The latter address
rambled somewhat, and even J. F. Ramírez said he could not gather its
meaning; but it declared plainly against monarchy and ecclesiastical
domination. "Habits of passive obedience no longer exist," the paper
said; "and if there remains a sentiment of religion, time has undermined
the power of the directors of consciences." Peace, democracy and "the
concert of the army and the people" were said to be the General's
political principles, and he declared himself "the slave of public
opinion." As for the past, his mistakes as a ruler had been due to
circumstances and errors of judgment; and in regard to the future,
"Mexicans," he exclaimed, "there was a day, and my heart expands with
the recollection, when, leading forward the popular masses and the
army to demand the rights of the nation, I was hailed by you with
the enviable title, Soldier of the People. Allow me again to take
it, nevermore to be given up, and to devote myself, until death, to
the defence of the liberty and independence of the republic." At the
same time, as a pledge of sincerity, he advised restoring the federal
constitution of 1824, and giving the new Congress full control over the
executive.[10.28]

Having thus placed himself before the country, Santa Anna proceeded to
his pretty house at Manga de Clavo, about sixteen miles from Vera Cruz,
and thence to his more pretentious country-seat, El Encero, a little way
below Jalapa. By this time--so it was reported to excuse the suspension
of his journey and perhaps to remind the public of his part in the war
with France--the stump of his leg had become painful; but in reality he
paused to consider the situation. In that he did well. His position was
extremely critical.[10.28]

Santa Anna did not merely enjoy an occasional game of chance; he was a
gambler through and through. He did not merely stoop now and then to see
two game birds prove their mettle; he was essentially a "sporting man."
Not without reason did the London _Atlas_ refer to him as "that very
sorry hero but most determined cock-fighter." Possessing the strong, he
possessed also the weak points of this type. He was not only uneducated,
but incapable of study. He could improvise variations on a given theme
with astonishing volubility, throwing back--wonderfully elaborated--an
idea suggested to him; but he was not a thinker. He could shuffle and
deal current political notions most shrewdly, but his only principle,
either political or moral, was that having accidentally proclaimed the
republic of Mexico, he owned it. He understood the shallow and selfish
manoeuvres in the midst of which he lived, but had no deep insight,
and found it much easier to do things than to perceive what needed to
be done. His power to dupe others grew mainly, perhaps, from being a
dupe himself. He was in statesmanship only by force of circumstances;
and he always hated a business like that, for it perplexed and wearied
his passionate, untrained character. In a critical Mexican situation
his narrow but intense perspicacity, his unreflecting but unequalled
quickness, his reckless but ingenious adaptation of means to ends,
and his magnetic skill in "reaching" and combining men governed by
self-interest gave him for the time being an immense advantage, and,
when viewed under the dazzling arc lights of prestige and power, seemed
truly brilliant; but his ability was essentially thin, short-sighted
and weak. Indeed Consul Campbell, who saw him at Havana without his
trappings, declared that in any American village of a thousand persons
he would be thought intellectually feeble. Intellectually undeveloped he
certainly was.[10.29]

[SANTA ANNA'S POLICY]

In the present instance he had supposed in the Mexican style that a
phrase was a philosophy, that a catchword was a magical formula, that
an eloquent peroration would be as mighty after he had been found out
as it had been before, that a profession of repentance would erase long
years of deliberate bad conduct;[10.30] and from the hour of setting foot
upon Mexican soil his mistake had been growing every hour more evident.
Only the army felt confidence in him, and that not altogether, for he
now called himself a Federalist, and the Federalists aimed to substitute
for the army a citizen soldiery called the National Guard.[10.31] After
the experience of many sad years, "people" and "army" could no more
unite than oil and water. Owing to suspicions that resembled those of
the army, the moderates also held aloof; and although the country in
general, aware of his preëminent energy and resourcefulness and reduced
to the unhappy necessity of fighting fire with fire, consented to his
resumption of power, it did not, even when somewhat reassured by his
connection with Farías, trust him.[10.32] How can he speak truth who has
no truth in his heart? men asked; and he himself could feel what the
answer was.[10.41]

As to Farías and his party of extreme democrats, who were good enough in
Santa Anna's opinion for servants but not for masters, they evidently
intended to control him, which could not be tolerated long; and as to
relations with the United States, the people seemed far more bent upon
war than a mere gamester could have supposed. Moreover, to declare
now for peace[10.33] looked very much like playing into the hands of
ex-President Herrera, the champion and martyr of that cause, round
whom an opposition party of citizens, military men and journalists was
gathering at the capital; and to do this appeared even to endanger
Santa Anna's personal safety, for as yet he was only a returning exile,
expelled but yesterday from the country like a felon, and ordered never
to come back. The civil authorities of the nation in general seemed
to be unfriendly; and the second city, Puebla, which lay across his
road to Mexico and had the power to wreck his cause, was found to be
ill-disposed. Not only famous and rich, but hardened by extraordinary
reverses--especially that of December, 1844--he was no longer the
hopeful, daring adventurer. His wish now, as he told an American at this
time, was to play a safe game. At Havana, so Campbell said, he had not
fathomed the crisis, but he now realized that he was treading the crust
of a volcano. His plans collapsed; and when the government,[10.34] which
had become alarmed by accounts of his hesitation, deputed Baranda to act
as his escort or custodian, he refused to move.[10.41]

He did, however, send Rejón and Almonte forward to help guide Salas,
who did not relish the tutelage of Farías; and on August 22 with proper
solemnities and a lavish ringing of bells the federal constitution of
1824 came forth from its tomb.[10.35] The people then felt a little
more confidence in the future, though Santa Anna, if at all able to
forecast that future, would probably have felt less. About a week
later, at his instance, Rejón was appointed minister of foreign
affairs, Almonte minister of war, Farías minister of the treasury, and
Pacheco minister of justice;[10.36] and a broad scheme of war measures
went into effect.[10.37] A levy of 30,000 troops was assigned to the
states in quotas; Guardians of the Peace were decreed, so that all the
regulars might be able to take the field; every Mexican between the
ages of sixteen and fifty was ordered to be ready for service; and
steps were taken to buy up the weapons belonging to citizens as well
as promote the importation of arms. The apprehensions of the military
class had recently been assuaged by declarations that the army stood
in no danger of abolition; and they now tolerated not only an order to
enroll National Guards, but an offer of pardon to all deserting from the
regular corps within three months.[10.41]

While these events were taking place, the sort of ability that Santa
Anna possessed and the sort of advice that he could obtain enabled him
to decide firmly upon a policy for the immediate future. He knew that no
way could be seen to meet the present embarrassments of the government;
he knew that the hot-headed radicals, if given a chance, would soon
discredit themselves; he knew that whoever should control the army would
be safe and strong; and he knew that one victory over the Americans
would make him omnipotent. He determined, therefore, to accept no public
share in the government, pose as the single-minded patriot-soldier, and
ask only the privilege of fighting at the head of the troops. At one
time he refused even to enter the capital, but he was notified by the
administration that such marked aloofness from the government would be
regarded as an open breach.[10.41]

September 14, therefore, after several delays on his part, the bell of
the cathedral and a salvo of artillery announced at half-past one that
the professional saviour of Mexico, who never saved her, had entered
the city. Everything possible was done by the authorities to give an
appearance of concord and enthusiasm.[10.38] Watched as he knew he was
by ostensible friends, Santa Anna played out his distasteful rôle, and
so did the rest of the actors. Emblems abounded. Eloquence overflowed.
The cathedral chanted _Te deums_. "Immense multitudes" (hardly perceived
by ordinary observers) cheered incessantly--in the official journal.
Not only public but private edifices were lavishly decorated--by order.
A hired band perambulated the streets. The General listened patiently
to a lecture from another man of the people, and replied with edifying
humility; and he asked that a well-known statue of himself should be
replaced with the national arms. But it was noticed that he and Farías,
facing each other in the carriage of honor under a huge picture of the
Constitution, looked more like victims than victors; and he would not be
present at the grand banquet.[10.41]

Having complied with the ultimatum of the government, Santa Anna was
now, September 17, appointed commander-in-chief of "The Liberating
Army." "Every day that passes without fighting at the north is a century
of disgrace for Mexico," he then exclaimed; and although he remained in
Tacubaya, a suburb of the capital, and was said to be ill, he exerted
himself to forward troops, hoping to concentrate 25,000 rapidly at San
Luis Potosí. Tidings from the seat of war foreshadowed a battle at
Monterey, and increased his anxiety. He exhorted the war department
unsparingly.[10.41]

But the government was exceedingly poor. According to the _Diario_ only
1839 pesos (dollars) lay in its treasury on September 6. Voluntary
offerings for the war took mostly the form of eloquence.[10.39] The
million raised by Paredes had nearly vanished in his preparations and
the Citadel revolution. Pressure was applied to the clergy, and the
_Diario_ asked, Is it not worth while for the merchant to give 100,000
pesos in order to save 900,000? But both of these classes held back
stubbornly, and managed the affair so as to escape. One brigade formed
on three successive days to march, but had to wait for funds. At length,
however, with extreme difficulty about 90,000 pesos were borrowed;
and on September 28, after piously seeking the Divine Blessing at
Guadalupe,[10.40] Santa Anna with some 2500 men set out. About 3000 were
already on their way, and he expected to find a large force at San Luis
Potosí.[10.41]

As he rolled along in his coach for about 380 miles, drawn by relays
of fleet mules, the General probably congratulated himself upon his
policy. He was on living terms with the radicals, had been accepted by
the Church, had soothed the army, and through Pedraza--recently his
enemy and still the enemy of Farías--had reached an understanding with
the Moderados. Unquestionably he stood much better with the public than
a month before; and he probably did not perceive that his recent course
had ensured for himself and the nation a series of most unpalatable
surprises.[10.41]

Through it all, however, the capital managed easily to be gay, and six
"arrogant bulls" were artistically sacrificed in the Plaza de Toros on
one of these anxious days.[10.42]




                                   XI

                      TAYLOR SETS OUT FOR SALTILLO

                          June-September, 1846


Arista had scarcely reached Linares when he began, though he knew
his military standing had been destroyed, to rebuild the army. Mejía
followed in his predecessor's footsteps, adopted a policy that was both
conciliatory and stern to check desertion and bring offenders back to
the colors, kept guards out on the roads leading to the Rio Grande, and
exerted himself to improve the morale of his troops. Though Linares
was a central point within easy reach of all the principal towns of
northeastern Mexico, he justly regarded Monterey, a city of twelve or
fifteen thousand inhabitants and capital of Nuevo León, as the vital
spot, and about the ninth of July transferred his army to that place.
Desertion had now ceased, he reported; morale had been restored; and the
troops were described as eager to avenge the disasters of May 8 and 9,
which in their opinion "they had suffered but not caused."[11.1]

This view of the situation, however, must be described as rather
imaginative and extremely incomplete. It was hard to find money and
hard to find mounts. As late as August 19 Mejía admitted that neither
Mexicans nor foreigners would advance him funds, and even after paying
for horses he could not obtain them. Two of the governors in this
quarter would give him no aid, and still less were the people inclined
to rise for the national defence. Both troops and artillery came far
short of the requirements. Though Arista had called for reinforcements
on April 24, not a man from the south had arrived by August 20.
Including the scattered and almost worthless Presidials, the total
number of soldiers in the region--outside of Tampico--was less than
3000, and about one third of these could not easily be concentrated at
headquarters. Ill-fed, ill-clothed, soured by misfortune, smarting
under the general contempt, some desiring Mejía and some Ampudia for
commander, still more wishing Arista back, and all wrangling bitterly,
even if less bitterly than at first, over the conduct of their generals
and officers, the army had for chief a little, pockmarked man in blue
glasses, who looked like a sot, and thus far in the campaign had been
distinguished only for bad health and a pompous vocabulary.[11.2]

Mejía's plan was to conduct a guerilla warfare, save the army from
further disgrace in the field, and make a stand at Monterey. General
Canales and the irregulars were, therefore, his first line; but the
"Chaparral Fox," who entertained revolutionary designs for which he
desired American support, had managed so as to do us no harm in the
battles of May 8 and 9, and proposed to continue that policy. Mejía
suspected his intentions, yet could not prove him a traitor, and sent
him funds and horses grudgingly; whereupon Canales, protesting that his
loyal aims were paralyzed by Mejía's personal ill-will and stinginess,
made the cause of Mexico odious by robbing and outraging the people
under cover of her flag. At length, early in August, Mejía concluded to
give him about a thousand men, and ordered him to annoy the Americans in
every possible way; but the General reported that his horses were too
weak to trot three miles, and that he saw little prospect of injuring or
even delaying the enemy. In the northeast, therefore, to all intents and
purposes no aggressive Mexican army existed. The business of the nation
at this time was changing masters.[11.3]

[TAYLOR'S PROCEEDINGS]

Taylor intended to invade Mexico, and having been favored by Providence
and the government with enough men and supplies, his next need was
information regarding the enemy, the roads and the towns. Plenty of
this he could easily have obtained, one must believe. A strong feeling
against the government and even in favor of joining hands with the
Americans now prevailed in this quarter; and a large number of the
inhabitants on the border, long engaged in smuggling operations, had
the training, as well as the natural gifts of disloyalty, daring and
secretiveness, needed by the spy. A well-informed Mexican of this region
stated that some of his fellow-citizens were quite ready to serve the
Americans faithfully. Taylor could have made it for their interest to
do so, and in addition the circumstances gave him countless hostages
for their fidelity. Scott advised him to employ a large force of secret
agents in a systematic way. But this was not done, and his information
continued to be meagre.[11.4]

Another subject of prime importance was, of course, the means of
transportation. Taylor had, as we have seen, a large outfit of
wagons, but not enough of them for the expedition in view. A train
of pack-mules was the natural supplement. Those animals were almost
universally employed in Mexico; the country abounded in them; and it
was the General's obvious duty to use the facilities within his reach.
At Washington the practice of the region was understood, and it could
only be inferred that good wagon roads did not exist. Besides, Taylor
intimated that he expected to follow the usual system, and indeed he
was not aware until August that army wagons could be used where he
intended to go. There is no reason to doubt that by the first of that
month fully 3000 pack-mules could have been at his command. Under such
circumstances, to suppose the war department would expend a million
dollars or so in the manufacture of wagons, without having a requisition
from the army or even definite information as to Taylor's plans, went
beyond reason. But the matter was overlooked at the front; and finally,
gathering barely 1700 of those animals Taylor complained loudly, though
he himself recognized that the fate of the administration depended
upon the success of the war, that departmental neglect had inexcusably
delayed and crippled his advance.[11.5]

Still, the General decided to move, for he knew the public demanded
action; and he wished--as he said--to sustain the government. Indeed,
he now declared it necessary to go forward immediately, "be the
consequences what they may." "I must attempt something," he wrote
privately. The government, however, had not requested him to support
the administration or to incur such a risk; and Taylor--who stood
conspicuous now in the Whig party, and suspected that "Polk, Marcy and
Co." were aiming to discredit and ruin him--can scarcely have felt a
passionate desire to sustain them. In short, as may be inferred from his
correspondence, he understood that he himself was the person chiefly
blamed by the country for inactivity; and, assuming that no serious
resistance would be encountered, he determined--primarily, it would
appear, for his own sake--to occupy Monterey and Saltillo. For the head
of an invading army, both the motive and the assumption were somewhat
improper.[11.6]

He understood, however, that resistance might possibly be offered, and
for that his plan seems to have been ready. As early as the middle of
June there were at his disposal ten 18-pound siege guns, two 10-inch
mortars and four 24-pound howitzers; and we know that at least the
mortars and half a dozen of the 18-pounders were then at Fort Brown.
Before July some of the howitzers were certainly at Point Isabel. It
was entirely feasible to carry heavy ordnance to Monterey, for Santa
Anna did a much harder job of the same kind; and Engineer Sanders had
warned Taylor that field pieces would not be effective against the stone
houses of Mexican towns. But, probably quite unaware how much the moral
effect produced by his guns on May 8 had contributed to his victory the
following day, he seems to have retained his low opinion of artillery.
Even while Taylor was protesting against the number of volunteers
thrown upon him, Ridgely complained bitterly that he could not get
enough men for his battery. The cold steel--simple, direct, positive,
unflinching--was a weapon such as Taylor could understand. One required
no book learning to use that. And no doubt he already intended, as we
know he intended later, to overcome resistance at Monterey, should any
be offered, "pretty much with the bayonet."[11.7]

[ADVANCE OF THE AMERICANS]

Careful attention was paid to the choice of a route. That through
Cadereita offered the better grazing; but the General wisely determined
to march by way of Mier and Cerralvo, a distance believed to be 140
miles but in reality only about 125. This route was a little shorter
and better provided with water. The roads were much more satisfactory.
The problem of crossing the San Juan without boats or graded approaches
did not present itself. The groves and ravines where an enemy could
make trouble were few, and but one stream had to be forded. On August
19, therefore, Brevet Brigadier General Worth, commanding the Second
Division of regulars, crossed the river with his first brigade over a
bridge of steamboats, and moved off to establish a dépôt at Cerralvo,
about sixty miles away. All the pack-mules, which were to return under
escort and make a second trip, accompanied the troops. Brigadier General
Persifor F. Smith and the second brigade, Brigadier General Twiggs with
the First Division of regulars and about 180 wagons, and Major General
W. O. Butler with a "Field Division" of volunteers followed. September 5
headquarters moved, and in a day or two the last of the men belonging to
the expedition set out.[11.8]

The advance to Cerralvo did not prove entirely agreeable. At first there
was trouble because the mules could not be loaded until after daybreak,
and it was hard for the troops to march during the hot hours; but after
a little experience the troops moved off at about three o'clock in the
morning, and the train proceeded later under escort. The road proved
to be full of sharp stones most of the way; and everything--even the
frogs and the grass--had thorns, reported the soldiers. Although, as
Worth said, there was no dangerous lack of water, the men suffered not
a little during a part of the time. Some almost raved from thirst, and
brushing the yellow scum aside, would drink eagerly from any pool. The
heat baked them, and in spite of wet cotton in their caps a considerable
number were overcome. Mier, the only town of any importance on the
route, proved to be the roughest and gloomiest sort of a place. Gloomy,
too, was the long line of wooden crosses beside the road, for every
one marked a grave, and not a few signified a murder. After a while,
however, came the inspiring sight of distant mountains--the fantastic,
pale-blue summits of the Sierra Madre, which rose higher and stood out
more boldly day by day; and the occasional inhabitants appeared, as
Worth reported, "cordial in the highest degree."[11.9]

Particularly sunny were the Mexican smiles at beautiful Cerralvo, where
the advance arrived at noon, August 25; and there were still more
substantial reasons for satisfaction. The town, a place of some 1800
people, was built of stone, and hence formed a strong military position.
It had enough springs of excellent water to supply New York City,
declared Taylor. Standing, all in white, on a ridge at the foot of a
spur from the Sierra Madre, surrounded with groves, pastures and fields,
it gave promise of abundance and kept the promise. Sheep, cattle
and goats, watermelons, pecans, half a dozen delicious fruits, ample
grazing, and large stores of corn were to be had, and plenty of oak,
walnut, ebony, cypress and willow for the cooks' fires. By the morning
of September 15, with the exception of the Texas contingent, which had
marched by way of China and Cadereita, all the troops concentrated
here.[11.10]

[MEXICAN PLANS]

Mexico, anticipating Taylor's advance, had now taken steps to meet it.
In July Paredes had sent three brigades of regulars from the capital to
operate against the revolutionists of Guadalajara, and on August 6 these
were ordered to Monterey. Ampudia, who was to supersede Mejía, received
instructions to make haste; and the commander of the third brigade, on
leaving San Luis Potosí, went so far as to destroy all baggage that
could hinder the march. News of the revolution, which overtook these
forces tardily, delayed the advance, for of course many of the officers
felt they must "pronounce"; and almost the whole of one brigade,
abandoning their general, went back to Mexico. The number deserting was
quite serious, for besides the usual reasons for leaving a distasteful
service, the troops were alarmed by the prospect of real fighting, and
the sombre monotony of the deserts that had to be crossed disheartened
them.[11.11]

But on August 29 the first brigade, about 1400 infantry with three
8-pounders, arrived at Monterey. The second came on September 6, and
the third only a few days later. The garrison was now strong. Mejía
had concentrated some 4000 regulars and auxiliaries, and according to
the detailed official report there were in all, on September 10, 7303
officers and men. The arrival of the new forces greatly encouraged the
soldiers of Palo Alto and the Resaca--who had felt little desire to meet
the Americans again--and hence checked their deserting. As the cavalry
had now been re-mounted, it seemed likely to be efficient; and when
the Señorita Dosamantes, equipped as a captain, volunteered to fight
the invader, and was exhibited on horseback to the entire army, its
enthusiasm rose high.[11.11]

From the forced march of Ampudia and his troops one might infer that the
government had positively decided to make a stand at Monterey, but such
was by no means the fact. Before leaving Vera Cruz and again later Santa
Anna warned both Salas and the minister of war emphatically against
this idea, and on August 20 Ampudia was therefore notified that unless
Mejía's troops and the fortifications were certainly of sufficient
strength to check the enemy, he should "on no account risk an action."
Three days later the department informed him that the general-in-chief
was "convinced" that Monterey could not be defended, and that his
forces were "not strong enough to resist the Americans"; and in view of
this opinion he was directed to halt at Saltillo, and order Mejía by
special express to demolish his fortifications, and remove his army and
military effects to that city "without loss of time"--the purpose of the
government being "to gather an army capable of winning a victory without
risking the honor and great interests of the nation."[11.12]

The new commander at the north, however, was doubtless thinking for
himself. In view of Santa Anna's purpose to organize a grand army
under his personal orders, this was Ampudia's last opportunity to
shine independently, and he did not wish to lose it. On learning the
strength of Mejía's and Taylor's armies and the condition of the
fortifications, he believed he could not only repulse the Americans but
drive them beyond the Rio Grande. Mejía took the ground that it would
be dishonorable to give up Monterey and the pass between that city and
Saltillo without a fight, and that it might be very hard to recover the
road through the mountains after giving the Americans an opportunity
to fortify it. His officers, who met by Ampudia's order in a council
of war, appear to have shared this opinion; and the comandante general
of Nuevo León, "as a Mexican and an officer in the national army,"
protested "before God and men" against the instructions to retreat,
leaving twenty guns that could not be taken away, and permitting the
enemy to triumph "without hearing a shot from the Mexican arms." So the
die was cast; and on learning of Ampudia's decision, together with his
reasons, the war department endorsed it.[11.13]

[MONTEREY MADE READY FOR DEFENCE]

On reaching the ground, Ampudia proceeded to inspect Mejía's works. The
importance of erecting fortifications at Monterey had been clearly seen.
May 27 the minister of war gave orders accordingly, and Mejía promptly
sent an engineer there to reconnoitre and draw a plan. Since, however,
he could not afford to hire or even feed laborers, only soldiers carried
on the work, and little was accomplished before the end of July; but
people were then required to labor without pay, and the progress became
more rapid. Ampudia now brought men from the neighboring towns also;
and Monterey, excited by the news of Taylor's advance, became a hive of
industry.[11.14]

  [Illustration: BATTLE OF MONTEREY GENERAL PLAN]

The opportunities for defence were excellent. Lying encompassed--except
on the north and east--with steep, high spurs of the Sierra Madre, where
the Saltillo road and the small but swift Santa Catarina River debouched
from Rinconada Pass, the city formed a sort of rectangle somewhat more
than a mile in length from east to west and about nine squares wide
at the broadest. Only a short distance from the western end rose high
and steep foothills, and some of these were now crowned with redoubts.
Along the southern side the river and its high, rough bank were almost
a sufficient protection; but they were supplemented with fortified
buildings and yard walls, barricades at the ends of the streets, and for
about half the way a solid parapet.[11.15]

The eastern part of the town was given special attention, for here
entered the principal roads from the north. In the city proper nearly
all the streets ran straight either at right angles or parallel, and
in each of the central ones now rose a double line of overlapping
barricades or breastworks of masonry, provided with embrasures and
with ditches. Outside these a series of redoubts was constructed; and
wherever the enemy seemed likely to come, the houses--almost always
one story high--were loopholed and provided with ammunition. As they
had been constructed very solidly of rubble-work, were protected with
strong doors and iron-barred windows, and had flat roofs (_azoteas_)
defended with sand-bags in addition to their stone parapets, they were
veritable fortresses. At the heart of the town stood the cathedral with
its elaborately carved façade, a chime in one spire and in the other a
clock. This became the general magazine. In front of it was the main
plaza, bounded on the western side by the prison; and beyond the prison
lay the market square.[11.15]

The north side of the town had even stronger protection. Within
12-pounder range of almost every part of the city stood a solid pile of
masonry, twenty-five or thirty feet high, blackened by time. This was
an unfinished cathedral; and, taking it as a donjon, Mejía's engineers
threw round its columns and buttresses a quadrangular bastioned
earthwork, intended for about thirty guns. The high parapet, eleven and
a half feet thick, was faced on both sides with a soft gray tufa, in
which cannon balls were expected to embed themselves. The ditch, though
not wide enough and not completely excavated, was twelve feet deep. A
garrison of four hundred with eight guns occupied the position; and
although the two small magazines were not adequately protected against
falling projectiles, and still other faults could be pointed out by
an expert, this fort, commonly known as the citadel, was a powerful
work, and, standing on a slight elevation, it could sweep the roads and
the plain east and north of the town. A sort of telegraph enabled its
commander, Colonel Uraga, to communicate with headquarters.[11.16]

Plenty of ammunition and an adequate store of provisions were
accumulated. General Requena labored indefatigably in repairing
discarded cannon, and about forty guns were found available. American
deserters, who either had been or had become skilful gunners, were on
hand to point some of them. There was one capital, underlying defect in
the whole plan of defence. To hold all the works firmly required a much
larger garrison than Ampudia had. More or less clearly the mistake was
understood; but the active coöperation of the cavalry and the reserves
was expected to offset it.[11.17]

Santa Anna's policy was not merely to give up indefensible towns, and
he ordered Ampudia to drive away all cattle that the Americans might
otherwise obtain, destroy provisions and make the water supply useless
whenever a place had to be abandoned, besides urging the inhabitants
to leave their homes on Taylor's approach, so as to show the Americans
and the world that Mexico could never be subdued; and Ampudia not only
endeavored to execute these instructions, but adopted measures of his
own to supplement the efforts of his troops. The people were ordered to
intercept messengers and convoys, capture small parties, and in every
possible way imitate the royalists of Spain, who had made the soldiers
of Napoleon so much trouble. Martial law went into effect, and thus
in addition to other advantages the authority of the indifferent or
disloyal governor was obliterated.[11.18]

Disloyalty and indifference among the people were combated at the
same time, as Ampudia informed the government, by a twofold policy of
"moderation" and "decisive energy," in which the second ingredient
appeared the more conspicuous. All the citizens of the region received
a summons to come and help defend the nation. Notice was publicly given
that any person voluntarily affording the enemy direct or indirect aid
would be shot; everybody was required to denounce offences of this kind;
and all authorities were ordered to inflict the penalty. A circular in
English inviting Americans to desert met our troops, and the inhabitants
were directed to succor and protect all such repentant foes. Taylor
had but a few regulars, Ampudia proclaimed, and the rest of his army
was "a mob of adventurers without valor or discipline." Moreover the
sacred cause of independence itself appealed for support, and could not
be ignored. "Soldiers," he cried, "Victory or death must be our only
motto." Thanks to this vigorous policy and the increased numbers of the
army at Monterey, by the middle of September the temper of the people
towards the Americans noticeably changed.[11.19]

[AMPUDIA UNDER A CLOUD]

In other respects, however, the General did not feel so well pleased.
In person large and strong, with a soldierly mustache and goatee and a
martial bearing, he figured well on horseback; but he was really small
and mean, and his measure had been taken. His obtaining the command
of the army--first at Matamoros and again recently--through political
intrigue was fairly well understood. Many attributed the disaster
of May 9 to his machinations against Arista. A dominant regard for
personal safety was known to be one of his characteristics. His chief
distinction, said the British minister at Mexico, arose from acts of
violence done in abuse of power, and he now acted out his disposition.
However the general public might be deceived, such a man could not
impress the officers by talking about a sacred cause and "victory or
death"; and old personal animosities against him supplemented the want
of confidence based on public grounds. One of the officers wrote bluntly
to him that the disgust and discouragement produced by the news of his
appointment could be seen plainly on the faces of nearly all. Complaints
against him were forwarded to the government. The press voiced this
hostile sentiment, and fresh enmities were rapidly engendered.[11.20]

Nor did military affairs prosper very well. The funds were scanty, and
that state of things could not fail to cause dissatisfaction. Ampudia's
appointing Ramírez, who understood tactics but not engineering, to
supervise the construction of works met with disapproval. Numerous
changes of policy had a similar reception. At first he adopted Mejía's
plan of attempting nothing serious in the field, and then he decided to
meet the enemy at Marín, some twenty miles from the city. A council was
held; and finally, as most of the officers opposed this project, it was
given up. Then another council decided to abandon certain incomplete
fortifications between the citadel and the western defences; and at
the instance of Ramírez a very important fort, the Tenería redoubt at
the eastern end of the town, was demolished. Such vacillation and such
waste, both moral and material, undermined the courage and confidence of
the garrison and stimulated its dissensions.[11.21]

At Cadereita, August 31, there were a thousand regular cavalry, and
they were ordered to attack five hundred Texan horse then at China; but
they accomplished nothing. The Americans march carelessly and in small
bodies, observers reported; they loosen their arms and stoop down to
drink at the first water; they sleep as if at home; they carry little
ammunition; and their muleteers are hoping the train will be attacked.
With such opportunities the six hundred troopers now under Canales were
expected to do something; but that astute leader merely gave reasons why
they could not. "Nothing, absolutely nothing will either the regular
cavalry or the auxiliaries do against the enemy," exclaimed Ampudia
bitterly; and on September 18 the whole mounted force of about three
thousand meekly retreated to the town, leaving the roads practically
open.[11.21]

[TAYLOR PRESSES FORWARD]

Early on September 12 all the pioneers of Taylor's army advanced from
Cerralvo to prepare the road for his artillery and wagons. Ahead of
them went a strange-looking company. Mounted on quick, tough horses
and marching at will, the men were dressed as they pleased; but they
agreed substantially on leggings, trousers belted round the waist,
coarse red or blue shirts, and either a buckskin cap or a soft felt hat.
Each carried a heavy rifle, a pouch of bullets, a large powderhorn and
a bowie knife, and some had Colt revolvers. At every saddle-bow hung
a braided lariat for a tether; and a bag of parched and pounded corn,
together with whatever else the rider thought he needed, was bound to
the saddle with thongs. This company was Captain McCulloch's rangers--a
part of the First Texas regiment--Taylor's finest body of scouts; and
they, assisted by a squadron of dragoons, covered the pioneers. On
the following three days the First, Second and Field Divisions moved
successively, carrying forty rounds of ammunition and rations for eight
days, besides what went as freight; and only the sick, with a guard of
two Mississippi companies, remained at Cerralvo.[11.22]

The spell of Mexico, that was to charm away so often the pains of a hard
existence, now fell upon the soldiers. The country became more fertile.
One broad plain shone with Spanish dahlias, and curious trees and plants
could be seen on all sides. Every few miles a stream of cool, sparkling
water leaped across the road. In the morning a curtain of gray, thinning
little by little, went slowly up at last, and revealed a world of hills,
edged with burnished gold, where one or two, catching the sun aslant on
a bare, crystalline side, would flash out amidst the lingering shadows
in all the colors of a diamond; while, farther on, lilac mountain rose
above lilac mountain and purple range looked over purple range until the
crowning peaks touched the firmament. In one town after another grapes,
figs and pomegranates delighted the eye, and, as an officer quoted to
himself,

     "The air was heavy with the sighs of orange groves."

And finally, as night came on, the jagged blue sierras, growing almost
black, were silhouetted perhaps against a pale yellowish-green streaked
with crimson. A spice of danger added zest, for about a thousand Mexican
cavalry hovered constantly in the front, and once near Ramos McCulloch's
rangers got near enough to exchange shots with a party of them. But
Torrejón's men employed themselves principally in driving the Mexicans
from their homes under Santa Anna's and Ampudia's instructions; and
on September 17, after passing through Papagallos, the Americans now
marching with Taylor concentrated near Marín.[11.23]

Very early the next morning a bugle broke the silence of the camp; other
bugles answered it; the drums awoke; the fifes joined in; the army
sprang to its feet. As soon as possible the advance guard moved off. The
First Division followed at eight o'clock, and the others at intervals of
an hour. After sleeping that night at San Francisco the army, completed
by the arrival of the Texas Division, set out again at about sunrise
on the nineteenth. Since reaching Marín Taylor had rather come to the
conclusion that he would scarcely reach Saltillo on time--that first
he would have something to do at Monterey; and this opinion was now
confirmed. At about nine o'clock, accompanied by his staff and an escort
of Texas mounted men, he came to the edge of the plain, and passed on
down the gentle slope of the San Juan valley.[11.21]

In front lay a stretch of broken ground. Beyond it cattle were feeding
peacefully in green fields, and corn was ripening under a hot sun.
Farther away still lay Monterey, the holy city of the frontier, as if
in a niche of the vast sierra, its white houses partly hidden with
green and the spires of its cathedral soaring above; and now and then
the music of a bell, a bugle or a drum came faintly across the plain.
A little at the right could be seen the long, low line of the citadel
wall, surmounted by the dark bulk of the "donjon" and its flag of red,
white and green. But suddenly the tranquillity of the scene was broken.
A white puff rose from the fort, and a 12-pound ball tore up the dirt in
front of the General. Another dropped near him, and a body of Mexican
cavalry advanced. Hays's regiment of horse was ordered to charge; but
seeing the enemy retire as if to lure the Americans under the guns of
the fortress, Taylor recalled him.[11.24]

Meanwhile the rest of our troops, excited by the rolling echoes from
the mountains, pressed on. Some threw away their packs of cards, but
mostly the men joked, laughed, cheered each report from the citadel
guns, and shouted that they were going to a grand fandango at Monterey.
"No one discussed depots of supplies, base of communications, lines
of retreat, or strategic positions," we are told by General S. G.
French, then a lieutenant of artillery; "but every one knew that the
brave old soldier would fight the enemy, wherever he found them, to
the end." The victories at Palo Alto and the Resaca had filled the
men with confidence; and in this happy mood the army encamped about
three miles from the city at Walnut Grove (_Bosque de San Domingo_),
an extensive and beautiful group of pecans and live-oaks, watered by
large, pure springs, where pleasure parties of well-to-do Mexicans were
accustomed to enjoy themselves. The army now consisted, all told, of
some 3080 regulars and 3150 volunteers. About 1350 of the troops were
mounted men; and for artillery there were four field batteries, and
a pair of 24-pound howitzers, but no real siege ordnance except one
10-inch mortar. In the front lay a city of stone, protected with strong
and rather skilfully planned works, and guarded by an army larger than
Taylor's.[11.25]




                                  XII

                                MONTEREY

                            September, 1846


[FIRST OPERATIONS AT MONTEREY]

At once American reconnoitring parties accompanied by engineers hurried
out (September 19), and both ends of the city were examined. Despite
the fire of the citadel, particular attention was paid to the western
fortifications, for the idea of turning them had already presented
itself. By ten o'clock that night Brevet Major Mansfield, the chief
engineer, returned to camp with five prisoners to be questioned and with
satisfactory evidence that the Saltillo road could be gained in spite of
the forts; and then a council decided to make the attempt.[12.1]

  [Illustration: BATTLE OF MONTEREY DETAILED PLAN]

Evidently, however, this meant a severe struggle. Going three quarters
of a mile west from the main plaza of Monterey by the Saltillo route,
passing a cemetery, and keeping on about a mile and a quarter farther,
one found on a low eminence at the right a dilapidated but massive
stone building known as the Bishop's Palace, close below which stood
now a half-moon battery facing and commanding the town. Beyond this
redoubt, called La Libertad, the eminence became an ascending ridge,
and some three hundred yards from the Palace the ridge ended sharply
as the summit of an extremely steep height known by the Americans as
Independence Hill (_Loma de Independencia_), where a small sand-bag
redoubt had been constructed. Immediately west of this hill, what
was known as the Topo road left the Saltillo highway and struck off
toward one's right, and near the farther edge of this road a spur of
the mountain began to ascend. On the other side of the highway flowed
the Santa Catarina, passing by the city and joining the San Juan
some distance below. Farther to the left and parallel to the river
rose a high, bristling hill named Federation Ridge. At the western
end--the summit--of this ridge, which extended some distance beyond
La Libertad, stood a redoubt occupied by some eighty men; and about
six hundred yards to the east, in a depression of the ridge, was a
substantial masonry fort called El Soldado, armed with two 9-pounders,
which were dragged, before the fighting began, to the redoubt on the
summit.[12.2]

Meantime the Mexicans also were observing. It was generally believed
that Taylor had thirty guns, which meant a hard fight; but the soldiers
were excited and ready for battle. "The enthusiasm is great, the
determination greater, the desire to sacrifice ourselves for the sacred
rights of the nation unbounded," wrote the comandante general of Nuevo
León. But Ampudia--"the Culinary Knight," as Worth called him, who had
fried Sentmanat's head--already trembled. We have food for barely twenty
days, he reported to the government; the troops at San Luis Potosí
are few in number and little inclined to advance; through spies the
enemy are aware of these facts; they will gain the pass between here
and Saltillo, and from that position "it will be almost impossible to
dislodge them."[12.3]

Sunday morning all was bustle in the American camp, and at length,
a little before two o'clock, Hays and about 400 mounted Texans rode
away. A long sky-blue line of infantry followed them, and then another
line of men in dark-blue jackets and trousers with a red stripe down
the leg--Lieutenant Colonel Childs's Artillery Battalion. Blanchard's
Company of Louisiana volunteers, dressed in every sort of clothes and
carrying every sort of weapon, and Duncan's and Mackall's batteries with
their gleaming pieces and clattering caissons completed the detachment,
which included some 2000 men, all told. The rest of the army watched
their departure with keen interest, for their design looked well-nigh
desperate, and yet the fate of the campaign was believed to depend upon
it.[12.4]

Especially they watched the commander. In the usual undress uniform but
on a splendid horse, which he managed with consummate address, rode
Worth. He was a man of average height but noticeably strong, with a
trim figure and a strikingly martial air. Conversing easily with his
staff he seemed the elegant gentleman; but his face was stern, and
his restless dark eyes flashed. In war he found his element; and at
present behind his natural ardor burned a new flame. His withdrawing
from the army in April had injured both his prestige and his relative
position, and his motto now was, "A grade or a grave." His orders were
to turn Independence Hill, occupy the Saltillo highway, and so far as
practicable carry the works in that quarter; and no doubt he intended to
do more rather than less.[12.4]

Soon taking leave of the road, this command plunged into cornfields
and chaparral. Progress was difficult and slow. For the benefit of the
artillery, ditches had to be bridged or filled and brush fences opened.
The enemy promptly observed and understood the movement, and a body of
cavalry embarrassed it somewhat. Once they nearly surrounded the General
and his staff, who were some distance in advance; but after a time,
fearing his artillery, they withdrew to the citadel. Ampudia himself
rode to Independence Hill, watched the blue line a while, ordered one
hundred infantry to the summit, and had a 12-pounder and a howitzer
planted there.[12.5]

By six o'clock Worth made nearly or quite seven miles. He was now on
the Topo road; and, halting just beyond the range of the battery on
Independence Hill, he pushed a reconnoitring party toward the Saltillo
highway. Infantry and cavalry had now been posted, however, in that
vicinity. The party was fired upon; and, owing to this, to nightfall
and to the torrents of rain, its purpose was not accomplished until the
lateness of the hour prevented further operations. With great difficulty
the Americans were placed in a fairly defensible position; and without
fires, food, blankets or shelter, they lived through the stormy night as
best they could. By this time the rest of the Mexican cavalry had been
withdrawn from its position between the Bishop's Palace and the citadel,
and a part of it retired into the town.[12.6]

[AT THE WESTERN GATES]

Monday, a day of fate, broke heavy, dark and ominous. Dense clouds
covered the sky, and for a time a thick mist cut off the outlook. By
about six o'clock Worth moved, however, and, saluted occasionally
with harmless grape from Independence Hill, advanced by the Topo
road. Anticipating trouble, he arranged the column so as to be ready
for prompt action. The Texans led; Captain C. F. Smith and the light
companies of the Artillery Battalion, deployed as skirmishers, came
next; Lieutenant Colonel Duncan's battery was third; and the rest of the
command followed. Two or three hundred yards or so from the Saltillo
highway, at a turn round the mountain, some two hundred lancers could
be seen approaching. It was a gallant sight. The horses, though small,
showed plenty of spirit; many of the saddles were silver-mounted; the
cavaliers wore brilliant uniforms, and green and red pennons fluttered
gayly from their poised lances. At the head of the advance rode
Lieutenant Colonel Nájera, a tall, fine-looking trooper with a fierce
black mustache. Smith's corps and a part of the Texas riflemen were
thrown behind a strong fence; Duncan halted and unlimbered; and then,
like a whirlwind, Nájera struck McCulloch.[12.7]

The shock was terrible; and like a lion and a tiger grappling the two
bodies writhed and fought. The weight of the American horses proved
a great advantage, but numbers were on the other side. Nájera, after
running a Texan through with his lance, fell; but a gallant successor
took his place, and the soldiers proved worthy of him. Many lances were
shivered, and others, useless at close quarters, were dropped; but sword
and escopeta served instead. On our part Smith's infantry fired well,
and the Mexicans could not break through the fence.[12.7]

After recoiling a little they formed to charge again. Other troops of
Worth's came up, took post beside the road, and began work. A minute or
two more and Duncan, on higher ground, was firing over the Americans. By
this time Nájera's squadron was nearly accounted for; but behind it were
the rest of Romero's cavalry brigade and a party of infantry. However,
Mackall's battery was now coöperating with Duncan's and both did
splendidly. The Mexican foot withdrew instead of advancing. A part of
the cavalry soon retreated toward Saltillo and a part into the town; and
the brief but important struggle ended. Probably more than one hundred
Mexicans had been killed or wounded, while our own casualties appear to
have numbered about a dozen, and the way to the Saltillo highway lay
open. By a quarter past eight Worth's command was on this road; and
he reflected with exultation that the Mexican line of communication,
supply, reinforcement and retreat had been cut. Nor was that all or even
the best of it, he believed. "The town is ours," he scrawled in pencil
to the commander-in-chief. The battery on Independence Hill now became
active, however; and as Federation redoubt, of which the Americans had
not heard, began to drop round shot among our troops, they had to be
withdrawn about half a mile in the direction of Saltillo.[12.7]

Worth's courage and spirit were inflexible, but he was a little wanting
in steadiness. His impetuous, restless mind would leap to a decision
without fully grasping all the facts, and then it was necessary to
reconsider and re-decide. In the face of the present unexpected
situation he changed his plan several times, and fatigued the troops
perhaps with some unnecessary movements; but by noon he concluded to
storm Federation Ridge first, and Captain C. F. Smith was assigned to
this task with four Artillery and five dismounted Texan companies--about
three hundred or three hundred and fifty effectives. Riding up to the
command Worth exclaimed in his bold, magnetic way, which went straight
to the soldier's heart, "Men, you are to take that hill--and I know you
will do it." "We will," they answered, and the detachment, followed by
the most anxious hopes of all the other corps, moved off. It seemed like
charging the clouds, but it had to be done.[12.8]

The intention was to gain the rear of the fort, and hence a circuitous
route leading to the southern flank of the ridge was chosen. After
hurrying through cornfields and sugarcane to the river and then upstream
a considerable distance to find a crossing place, the men slid down the
rough bank of the Santa Catarina, and plunged in. The swift stream,
waist-deep, was hard to resist, especially as one could not help
slipping on the loose round stones, and the water hissed and boiled
with grape and bullets; but by good luck no casualty occurred, and the
men clambered up the opposite bank. Pushing on then, after pausing
for breath under the cover of thickets, they came at length to a low
eminence, and concealed themselves behind a hedge while the captain
reconnoitred. The main hill, which appeared to be nearly four hundred
feet high, was rough, steep and covered with chaparral. The garrison
seemed to be strong and resolute. The two guns made heavy odds. For
quite a while Smith studied the hard problem, doubting whether it was
practicable to assault the position, but finally he ordered the men
forward; and soon lines of dark blue Mexican skirmishers, descending
from the redoubt, stationed themselves at favorable points to meet
him.[12.8]

[AMERICAN SUCCESSES]

Meanwhile, noting this delay and certain preparations of the enemy,
Worth despatched the Seventh Infantry under Captain Miles to support
Smith; and then, worried at the sight of reinforcements on their way to
the redoubt, he sent the Fifth Infantry (Major Scott) and Blanchard's
Company in the same direction, with General Smith to take charge of all
these forces. Miles had not only the voice of a trumpet but the eyes of
a hawk, and striking at once upon a direct line of march, he promptly
reached the main ridge; and soon General Smith found him supporting the
wary but steady charge already launched. Discovering now El Soldado and
believing he would not be needed at the redoubt, General Smith moved
to his right along the southern side of the ridge with all the troops
except Captain Smith's. Like a fiery serpent, these now forced their way
up in a winding but ever advancing line. The hill blazed and smoked. The
sharp crack of the rifles punctuated the duller reports of the muskets.
Soon the Mexican skirmishers were driven back; the 9-pounders could
not be depressed enough to be effective; the Texans and "red-legged
infantry" conquered the slope; and finally, struggling breathlessly to
the redoubt, they found the garrison already in flight, carrying off one
of their guns.[12.8]

Some of the victors then joined the rest of General Smith's command,
which could be seen winding through a gorge toward the other fort. Those
who did not, quickly remounted the second piece, which the Mexicans
had upset in trying to drag it away, and at the first shot, luckily
knocking the El Soldado gun out of position, sent the garrison flying.
At the double-quick the attacking column reached that position an
instant later, and brave Captain Gillespie, followed by other brave men,
despising the grape from Independence Hill that shrieked above their
heads, clambered over the parapet. The Mexican piece, quickly righted,
saluted the fugitives and then offered its compliments to the Palace
works. The other captured piece was then brought down to El Soldado;
and Miles's command, moving still farther east along the ridge with one
of the guns, took a third fortification; and thus by about the middle
of the afternoon, at a trifling cost, we had three forts, intended to
protect the rear and flank of Monterey, fighting for us.[12.8]

But a still harder task now confronted the Americans. Shortly before
nightfall three companies of the Artillery Battalion, three of the
Eighth Infantry and some two hundred Texas riflemen--in all about
five hundred--accompanied by Captain Sanders, Lieutenant Meade and a
Mexican guide and commanded by Childs, were sent forward to the skirt of
Independence Hill. The peak before them was almost or quite as high as
the summit of Federation Ridge; and in addition to the redoubt, guns and
garrison on the top, a stronger position, more guns and a larger force
were just below at the Palace. The Mexican generals regarded the point
as unassailable.[12.9]

The night was tempestuous. The men were tired out. Few had eaten for
thirty-six hours--none since breakfast. The rain fell in torrents,
and they had not even blankets. Small rivers flowed down the slope.
Sometimes heavy stones, loosened by the water, rolled upon them. The
darkness was absolute. Most of them sat up, holding their firearms,
covering the locks, and dozing when they could. At three o'clock the
sleepers were roughly shaken, and a hoarse whisper, "Fall in," passed
along. The storm was still raging. There was a chill in the wet air.
Muscles were stiff. Teeth actually rattled. Strict orders to make
no noise under any circumstances were circulated. Then came another
whisper, "Forward!" and in two columns--one under Childs and the other
under Captain Vinton--the almost vertical climb began.[12.9]

Feet were placed cautiously but firmly. Despite the thorns, bushes had
to be seized for support. Sometimes the men crawled. Above all, the
gun-locks were to be kept dry. Now and then a stone, pried out by the
rain, would go clattering down; and with beating hearts, expecting to
be challenged, the men would pause. If discovered, they could have been
annihilated with rocks. But the storm drowned all the noise except its
own, and kept the Mexicans under cover. Slowly but steadily the ragged
line mounted. The night began to look grayish. The outline of the summit
could be made out.[12.9]

Suddenly burst forth a blaze and a roar. It came from a picket-guard
about a hundred yards down, that had been sheltering themselves among
some rocks. The hasty fire was ineffective, except that some of the
Americans were burned. Not a musket answered it--only a yell and a
rush. Finally, sixty feet or so from the top it was time to fire, and
the musket and rifle spoke. Real fighting began now, give and take; and
the Mexicans had the advantage of position. But there were only about
fifty or sixty of them. The line closed in. There was a fierce grapple;
the Mexicans broke, and as the rising sun glimmered faintly through the
clouds, the Stars and Stripes were unfurled. Then the victors cheered
and cheered. Cheers came up from their comrades in the valley. Taylor's
men, who had watched the double line of fire and smoke go higher and
higher till it crowned the top and ceased, cheered and threw their caps
into the air; and the echoing mountain seemed to cheer back.[12.9]

But the work was not yet done. Indeed the Americans only had the bull
by the horns. Too exhausted to pursue effectively at once, they had to
let the Mexicans escape. Seeing how the fight would end, some of the
garrison had removed the guns of the redoubt--accidentally throwing one
of them down the hill; but the saved piece and two 6-pounders now opened
fire on our men, and a counter-attack from the Palace garrison was to
be expected. That garrison probably numbered two hundred and fifty and
perhaps more. Some fifty dismounted dragoons reinforced it now; and
probably not less than two hundred and fifty horse occupied the slope
below.[12.9]

But Worth had no intention of losing his prize. Three companies of
the Seventh Infantry were already moving down Federation Ridge, and
they took post near enough the Palace to menace any troops going from
that point against the summit, cheering loudly to attract attention.
The Fifth and Blanchard's Company reinforced Childs; and about noon
"with infinite difficulty," as Worth said, a 12-pound howitzer, taken
apart, was dragged up with straps. As the Palace had no roof and the
windows were poorly barricaded, the interior could be searched with
shrapnel. The Mexicans reciprocated, and desultory fighting continued
all the morning. In the afternoon Mexican reinforcements were seen in
the distance, and a prompt, decisive stroke appeared to be necessary.
One body of Americans therefore went about halfway to the Palace, and
concealed themselves among some rocks and bushes in a small ravine,
while another were placed out of sight on the slope. Then the howitzer
opened, and a force of skirmishers advanced in full view.[12.9]

Ampudia's policy was a strict defensive, and Lieutenant Colonel
Berra, who commanded at this position, had been forbidden to take the
aggressive. But the howitzer had made itself extremely disagreeable;
his artillery had become disabled; his only chance lay in charging; and
this appeared to be the time. Foot and horse, the Mexicans therefore
sallied out, and gallantly they moved up the ridge, closing their ranks
when the howitzer opened them. Then the signal was given, and the men in
ambush, springing up like a flight of blackbirds, fired. The enemy broke
and ran; many of them did not stop till they reached the city; and the
massive gate of the Palace was closed. The howitzer soon broke the gate,
however, and the Americans poured in. For a time the struggle was fierce
yet indecisive; but suddenly the cry was heard, "Throw yourselves flat!"
and instantly over the prostrate Americans the howitzer belched a double
charge of canister. This was enough; and soon the Mexicans, harassed
with grape by Duncan and Mackall, who arrived now at a gallop, by the
fire of a piece captured at La Libertad and by that of El Soldado, were
fleeing into the city, spreading consternation on every hand. It was now
about four o'clock.[12.9]

[AT THE EASTERN GATES]

Leaving Worth and his gallant men thus in full possession of the western
gate of Monterey, we will now trace Taylor's operations at the opposite
end of the town. Sunday afternoon, observing the Mexican reinforcements
hastening to the summit of Independence Hill and fearing Worth might
be overpowered, he displayed most of his troops before the city until
dark as a menace. During the night his 10-inch mortar and two 24-pound
howitzers were planted about seven eighths of a mile from the citadel,
near the forward edge of a depression which screened them from the
enemy, and at seven o'clock the next morning these pieces fired for
twenty minutes, doubtless encouraging rather than alarming the enemy by
their ineffective work.[12.10]

At the same time, to divert attention from Worth, as a note from that
officer had suggested, all the available infantry were drawn out before
the citadel as if to assault it. The First Division (regulars) stood
at the left of this line; Quitman's brigade--the Tennesseeans under
Campbell and the Mississippi riflemen under Davis--came next it, and
Hamer with the Ohio regiment occupied the extreme right. Meanwhile the
work of reconnoitring continued. Believing that he would meet with no
serious resistance at Monterey, Taylor had apparently felt little or no
anxiety to ascertain how the town had been fortified; but now he may
have realized that such information was desirable.[12.10]

In a general sense we are already aware what defences had been prepared
in this quarter--particularly the barricaded streets and the stone
houses turned into forts; but the situation must now be investigated
more closely. West of the grand plaza and toward the northern edge of
the city there was a large spring. The outlet of this flowed toward the
east, widened into a pond, then contracted into a stream, passed under
Purísima bridge--a heavy structure of stone by which the Marín road
entered the city proper--veered a little toward the right, and finally
left the town at its northeastern corner. On the inner side of this
watercourse below Purísima bridge there were two simple redans capable
of holding fifty or seventy men each; and some distance farther down,
on the top of a rather steep slope, stood a strong earthwork named El
Rincón del Diablo (The Devil's Corner), commonly known by the Americans
as El Diablo, which had two or three guns, and could accommodate a
garrison of one hundred and fifty or two hundred.[12.10]

On the outer side of the watercourse an irregular but strong
fortification (_tête de pont_), armed with a 12-pounder, defended
Purísima bridge. East and northeast of this lay a confused suburban
district occupied in part with streets, lanes, houses and huts, and in
part with orchards, gardens and yards enclosed with high stone walls.
Near the edge of it all, some four hundred yards in front of El Diablo,
was the most advanced Mexican position. This, occupied by about two
hundred men, consisted of a stone tannery building, often spoken of by
the Americans as a distillery, the flat roof of which, protected with
sand-bags in addition to the parapet, was held by a competent garrison,
and of an earthwork in front of it called the Tenería (Tannery)
redoubt, which, after having been erected and demolished, was rebuilt
with desperate exertions during Sunday night.[12.10]

This fortification consisted of two short parallel sides prolonged
and drawn together in front so as to meet at a sharp angle; and the
north side was similarly prolonged and drawn in toward the rear so as
to protect partially the opening or throat. The approaches were not
cleared; the ditch was neither sufficiently deep nor sufficiently wide;
steps used in the process of construction made it easy to scale the face
(scarp); the parapet was completed with sand-bags made with ordinary
cotton cloth; and the guns, mounted in barbette without platforms, were
hard to manage on fresh dirt soaked with rain; but the redoubt, armed
with a 4-pounder and an 8-pounder--its northern side protected by the
guns of the citadel, its southern face by the tannery building, and its
throat by El Diablo--was a serious obstacle for infantry.[12.10]

Why Taylor did not plant his mortar in front of it Sunday night--for
it was plainly visible and there was a transverse ridge within short
grape-shot range--drive the garrison out with half a dozen well-aimed
bombshells Monday morning, and repeat the operation the following night
and morning with El Diablo, is rather hard to understand. But it must
be remembered that he had probably never seen, and had certainly never
attacked, a scientific earthwork; these "mud-forts," as the soldiers
termed them, did not look impressive; and his plan to capture Monterey
"pretty much with the bayonet" had been determined upon. He was
nothing if not stubborn; and he doubtless believed that his officers
and men, given a chance at the Mexicans, would certainly whip them
somehow.[12.10]

Accordingly, as Twiggs, commander of the First Division, was too ill
for battle, Taylor gave Lieutenant Colonel Garland this verbal order,
written down by one of Garland's aides: "Colonel lead the head of your
column off to the left, keeping well out of reach of the enemy's Shot,
and if you think (_or_ you find) you can take any of them little Forts
down there with the bay'net you better do it--but consult with Major
Mansfield, you'll find him down there." Garland then advanced with
the First and Third regiments and the Washington-Baltimore Battalion,
about 800 men, and made his way forward a considerable distance over
broken and obstructed ground. He soon came in sight of Mansfield, and
before long that officer galloped back to meet him. Garland no doubt
communicated Taylor's orders at this time; and Mansfield, supported by
some skirmishers, then went forward again.[12.10]

The responsibility now resting upon the engineer was extremely heavy.
A map prepared by Meade from data brought by a spy probably showed
the Mexican works fairly well, but of course did not fully reveal the
intricacies of the situation. Taylor had seen this map, and must have
known everything thus far discovered by the reconnoitring officers, and
he evidently saw nothing to forbid an infantry attack. Under the fire of
the citadel and other fortifications, a close and detailed examination
of the ground, screened not only by the maze already alluded to but by
hedges, bush fences, trees and cornfields lying just outside the suburb,
was impossible; and to send the troops back without an overwhelming
reason in the face of the two armies, and look "Old Rough and Ready" in
the eye, was unthinkable. Taylor's order was therefore to all intents
and purposes an order, not merely for a demonstration, but for an
assault.[12.10]

[MONTEREY ASSAULTED]

So Garland, after marching for some time over and through all manner of
obstructions, as Mansfield directed, kept on for a considerable distance
under the fire of the citadel and redoubts, and at length saw that
officer running ahead on foot at the northeastern angle of the town, and
waving the troops on with his spy-glass. To obey this order involved
turning to the right and then to the left--movements that disconcerted
and scattered the raw Washington-Baltimore corps--and finally charging
at a venture into the maze already described, but it was done; the
Mexicans reinforcing the redoubt meanwhile with 150 men and an
8-pounder. Owing to the trend of the streets the Americans, now greatly
reduced in numbers, took a course that led them to the right instead of
the left, and failed to discover the throat of the redoubt, Mansfield's
objective. Caught in the maze and falling rapidly under an artillery and
musketry fire that seemed to come from everywhere, they found themselves
totally helpless. Bragg's battery was thrown in, but it could accomplish
nothing; and on Mansfield's recommendation Garland fell back.[12.10]

Shortly before this, judging from the heavy fire that a serious
engagement was on, Taylor had ordered Butler to advance with his Field
Division. By a sad blunder three companies of the Fourth Infantry, which
had been covering the mortar and howitzers, were sent ahead of this
corps against the redoubt, and "almost in a moment"--as the official
report admitted--a third of the men fell. The rest, including Lieutenant
Ulysses S. Grant, then retired; and Quitman's brigade, which now formed
the left of the line, was ordered to support the regulars--in other
words, renew the attack.[12.10]

With ample courage and enthusiasm the men advanced nearly a mile under
the fire of the citadel--which, as Taylor privately admitted, "done
considerable execution"--and before long under the worse fire of the
redoubt in front; but they staggered in the smashing blast of lead and
iron, their formation became very irregular, and after a time, though
not within effective musket or rifle range, they began to fire at will.
Colonel Davis, then some distance in advance on his iron-gray, Pompey,
grew impatient at the waste of time, ammunition and life, and as the
redoubt stopped firing just then, he cried, "Now is the time. Great
God, if I had fifty men with knives I could take that fort." Then he
waved his sword, and called on his men to charge. Colonel Campbell,
equally ignoring his brigade commander, did the same; and both regiments
hurried on as groups and individuals, each man trying to outstrip the
rest.[12.10]

Fortunately the time was ripe. Worn down by several hours of excitement
and exertion--for noonday was now approaching--the Mexicans felt a
reaction. The stubborn perseverance of the Americans daunted them.
Captain Backus and about 100 men of the First Infantry, not receiving
the order to withdraw, had climbed to the parapeted roof of a building
about 130 yards from the redoubt and now persistently annoyed them. They
looked for the reserves; but perhaps Garland's operations prevented
sending them, and certainly none came. Ammunition began to fail. The
muskets were hot and foul. The cloth of the sand-bags took fire, and
made the parapet extremely uncomfortable. Carrasco, the commander, who
had run away at the Resaca, now openly took flight again; and a part
of the garrison, formed to charge upon the Americans, were seen, or
at least were supposed, to be retreating. A panic seized the troops,
and almost in an instant the guns were abandoned and the redoubt stood
nearly empty. A few minutes more, and tall, powerful McClung of the
Mississippi Rifles leaped upon the parapet and waved his sword. By the
same way or bursting through the sallyport, equally brave men of both
regiments came close after him. Thirty or thirty-five prisoners were
seized. An American flag went up; and after a brief conflict the tannery
also--practically abandoned by the enemy--was taken.[12.10]

During Quitman's advance the First Ohio approached the city farther to
the right. It was well officered, for besides its colonel, Brigadier
General Hamer, the Hooker of Chancellorsville, the Johnston of Shiloh,
Major General Butler and Major General Taylor accompanied it; but it
failed to accomplish anything. A second attempt was equally unfortunate,
but when Taylor--evidently despairing of success--had ordered it out
of town, word came of Quitman's achievement. The regiment was then
sent into the fight again. Garland's remnant, still in the outskirts
of the city, came up; Quitman's troops were ordered to coöperate; and
a determined effort was made to gain the rear of El Diablo. Both grand
and pitiful that effort was. As an exhibition of pluck it could hardly
have been surpassed. Taylor, fighting on foot, matched Richard Coeur
de Lion storming Front de Boeuf's castle; and his intrepidity was so
flawless and unforced that courage appeared to all round him the easy
and only way. To die under such a leader seemed the acme of living. It
was not war, but it was grand fighting.[12.10]

          "We were not many, we who stood
          Before the iron sleet that day;
          Yet many a gallant spirit would
          Give half his years if but he could
          Have been with us at Monterey.

          And on, still on our column kept
          Through walls of flame its withering way;
          Where fell the dead, the living stept,
          Still charging on the guns which swept
          The slippery streets of Monterey."

But the enemy, seldom visible, appeared to be everywhere. A large part
of the groping Americans got in front of Purísima bridge, and went down
fast under a rain of bullets from the _tête de pont_, while Captain
Gutiérrez, who had now masked his gun on the opposite bank, poured grape
and canister upon them at short range. Ridgely came up and fired several
times at the bridgehead, but without effect. Among our troops, as one
of the surgeons wrote, "All was confusion." Smoke hid the outlook; and
the Mexican shots, breaking the limestone, mortar and adobe, raised a
blinding dust. The assailants did not know where to turn or what to do.
Taylor, Butler, Hamer, Quitman and other officers shouted orders that
few could hear amidst the uproar, and perhaps fewer could reconcile.
It was proposed to cut through from house to house, but the necessary
implements had not been brought. Ridgely's and Bragg's batteries and
the captured Mexican guns fired on El Diablo, and finally the 24-pound
howitzers were brought in; but nothing could be accomplished in that
way. Many of the best and the bravest fell; and eventually, at about
five o'clock, the Americans retreated from all of Monterey except the
Tenería redoubt and a few adjacent buildings.[12.10]

[A COSTLY AMERICAN TRIUMPH]

So the fight ended. It had been one long scene of gallantry, confusion,
mistakes and waste. Lieutenant D. H. Hill, afterwards General Hill of
the Confederate army, wrote in his journal on learning the details: "It
seems that every sort of folly was committed." To pitch handfuls of
infantry into an unknown maze of obstacles, fortifications and cannon as
if they had been fighting Indians in a Florida swamp, and to send field
batteries into narrow streets--in the suburb crooked, too--against heavy
stone works and roofs filled with protected marksmen was extraordinary.
And, it was credibly reported, Taylor did more. He ordered Ridgely out
into the open to try conclusions with El Diablo. Ridgely was absolutely
fearless. To satisfy the General he went out himself and reconnoitred,
but he would not lead his battery to destruction. The Tennessee regiment
was needlessly taken back and forth six times within range of the
citadel.[12.10]

Now--to get shelter, food, ammunition--the troops had to march
separately or in groups all the way to camp, exposed for a long distance
not only to the citadel guns but also to the lancers, who nearly caused
a disaster and might have done so, had all, instead of but a part of
them, obeyed the order to charge. A howitzer, aided by the captured
guns, still exchanged compliments now and then with El Diablo, but
the battle of the day was over. A redoubt had been won, and Worth's
operations against the Federation Ridge redoubts had been assisted; but
these advantages might have been gained far more cheaply.[12.10]

The Tenería position was garrisoned for the night by Garland's exhausted
command, the Kentucky regiment (Louisville Legion), which had been on
guard at the mortar, and Ridgely's battery. This was not an agreeable
task. The rain fell in torrents, and the interior of the fort was so
thoroughly searched by the guns of El Diablo, that a part of the men had
to lie on their backs in the mud. Some defences were thrown up, however;
Tuesday morning Quitman's brigade relieved the garrison; and Taylor's
men, cheered now by the sight of their comrades taking Independence
Hill, were given a necessary rest. Both sides used their artillery to
some extent, and in spite of the Mexican fire our position was further
strengthened; but on this day nothing was done at the eastern end to
assist Worth.[12.10]

During Tuesday night the enemy seemed to be in motion. They should
have made an attack; and the Americans--without blankets, overcoats
or food, soaked with rain, and chilled by a north wind--passed the
hours reconnoitring or standing in water behind their breastwork. Far,
however, from Ampudia's mind was the thought of a vigorous offensive.
Dismayed by the cutting of his communications and by the stubborn valor
of the Americans, and weakened by the cowardice of certain officers, he
ordered all the outworks abandoned, and concentrated his forces in and
near the grand plaza. Such a change could not be made at night without
much confusion. Many of the troops, too, were indignant; some refused to
leave their posts; all felt disheartened, and a few broke out in riotous
disorder. The work of fortifying the inner line went on, but the loss of
morale far more than offset this advantage.[12.10]

At daybreak Wednesday, suspecting that the Mexicans had left or were
leaving El Diablo, Quitman advanced, and found that both men and guns
had been withdrawn; but other works not far distant were still held too
strongly to be captured. Attempts were made to gain ground in various
directions; and finally, an hour or two before noon, with assistance
from the Second Texas regiment, dismounted, and the Third and the
Fourth Infantry, extensive and well-supported operations began to be
undertaken. In particular, a systematic plan of breaking through the
continuous line of houses and firing from the roofs was adopted. At
each cross-street vigorous fighting had to be done, for the Mexicans,
though inferior as marksmen, resisted obstinately at every favorable
point; and the musketry and artillery behind their barricades swept
the approaches fiercely. Five out of the twelve commissioned officers
of the Third Infantry were killed, says General Grant. Two sections of
field artillery came up, but the gunners were shot down rapidly in spite
of all precautions; and at length, finding the pieces too light for
effective service, Taylor ordered them to retire. A gun at the Tenería
redoubt was tried, but after a time the advance of the Americans made it
dangerous to fire toward the plaza.[12.10]

The infantry pushed on, however, and by three o'clock were only one
square from the grand plaza. Here ammunition began to fail, and
Lieutenant Grant, hanging over the side of his horse by an arm and a
foot, dashed across the streets too swiftly to be fired at, and went in
search of it. With a view to preparing for a general assault, however,
or for some other reason Taylor ordered the troops, now working safely
inside the houses, to withdraw--under fire, of course. Reluctantly,
though many of them had not eaten for thirty-six hours, they marched
back to the redoubts and thence after dark to Walnut Grove; and the Ohio
and Kentucky regiments went on duty at the captured redoubts.[12.10]

Strangely enough, Taylor seems to have made no effort, after the
storming of the Bishop's Palace, to arrange with General Worth for
concerted action or to give him fresh orders, although he could easily
have done so, and knew that all the work assigned to that division had
been completed. Wednesday morning, therefore, after the long, deep
slumber of exhaustion, Worth's men found themselves mostly in idleness,
and a large part of them, concentrated near the Palace, gazed upon the
city at their leisure as the dissolving mists revealed it. Not far away
in the suburb were General Arista's gardens, full of orange, lemon,
pomegranate and fig trees, bananas, grapes and flowers, watered by
canals that sparkled in the sun. Once in a while a blue-frocked monk,
girded with a white cord and tassel, could be seen; and flashes from
the streams that ran through almost every street were caught here and
there. Beyond lay the white or lightly tinted houses with leafy squares
here and there, dominated by the cathedral spires. At due intervals the
clock bell peacefully tolled the hour or the quarter. On the left the
dark citadel belched occasionally a cloud of white smoke. On the right
the Santa Catarina hurried along between the city and the picturesque
villas on its opposite bank. Farther away, but still near, the twisted
strata and the vast, splintered buttresses, battlements and pinnacles
of the Sierra Madre, thinly draped with soft clouds, towered aloft;
and overhead great birds that seemed to be eagles travelled like dark
planets round their orbits in the blue.[12.10]

But though they gazed with deep interest, these haggard fellows with
bloodshot eyes were not in a mood to enjoy the scene. No orders came
from Taylor. Hardly a shot had been heard this morning from the lower
town. Mexicans boasted of gaining a victory on that side, and "Your turn
will come next," our men were told. Heavy reinforcements from Saltillo,
it was rumored, would soon arrive by the pass. Worth, nervous and
anxious, climbed to the Palace tower with his glass, and searched every
quarter for news. Meantime the cannon were planted at more commanding
points. A howitzer opened on the town. Preparations to make an assault
were continued; and, as Mexicans from the south were now said to be
approaching, a detachment went about three miles up the Saltillo highway
to a strong position. An hour or two before noon, however, the roar of
battle began to come from the lower town; and Worth, judging that it
meant a serious attack, ordered a column forward by each of the two main
streets.[12.10]

[WORTH ADVANCES AGAIN]

With a cheer that sounded like a roar the troops hurried down the slope,
and burst into the suburb. For some time the work was easy, for in fear
of the Libertad guns all the western section had been evacuated; and
raising a fierce cry that afterwards came to be known as the "rebel
yell," which began with a growl and rose to a falsetto scream, the
Americans dashed on at a run. Beyond the cemetery, however, Mexican
troops opened fire, and until some of Duncan's and Mackall's guns came
up, fought like demons. Barricaded streets and garrisoned roofs were
next encountered, and again the Americans dived into the houses. Making
a small hole in the wall that divided two dwellings they would drop
through it a six-inch shell with a three-seconds fuse lighted, and
throw themselves flat. Results followed promptly. The aperture was then
enlarged; and crawling through, they repeated the operation, while the
best marksmen fought from the roof.[12.10]

Taylor's withdrawal from the city, however, supplied the Mexicans with
reinforcements. The enemy fairly seemed to swarm, and their courage
seemed to rise. "Cannons and small arms flashed, crashed and roared like
one mighty storm of wind, rain, hail, thunder and lightning," wrote a
soldier; while the thud of planks against heavy doors and the blows of
pickaxes on walls of stone swelled the uproar. Once the advance was
halted. But Colonel Hays, a shy man with a broad forehead, a Roman nose,
brilliant, restless hazel eyes, and the courage of twenty lions packed
in his delicate frame, had been a prisoner in the Monterey post-office
once, and had sworn a great oath to sleep this night in the post-office
or in hell, and nothing could stop him. By dark the Americans were
only a square from the market-place, and the Colonel had the postal
accommodations at his command.[12.10]

Ampudia's case was by no means desperate even now. His losses had been
small--twenty-nine officers and 338 men killed and wounded, according
to his report. There were provisions, ammunition and artillery enough;
the strong buildings round the plaza and market-place, defended with
resolution by a large garrison, could not easily have been taken; and
the division of the Americans into widely separated commands invited a
sortie.[12.10]

The situation was, however, by no means agreeable. After nightfall the
Americans planted two howitzers and a 6-pounder on the top of a high
building close to the western side of the plaza. Taylor's mortar had
been carried to Worth during the day, and after sunset it began to fire
now and then on the cathedral, where tons of gunpowder were stored. The
citadel undertook to reply, but the mortar, planted behind the stone
wall of the cemetery, was not likely to be struck, and a single one of
its bombs might conceivably have blown the Mexican army to pieces. In
fact so might a shot from Taylor's 24-pound howitzers, which delivered
two shells effectively after dark. On the southern side of the river,
opposite the town, the Fifth Infantry had planted one of the El Soldado
guns at the third work on Federation ridge, where it could at least have
proved annoying. The horses of the cavalry were in the way. The garrison
of the citadel could not promptly coöperate with the troops in town, for
it had sealed up the exit. Ampudia's defensive policy discouraged the
soldiers, for even though some of them flanked the retiring Americans
on Wednesday afternoon, they were not permitted to reoccupy the houses
abandoned by Taylor, and still less to attack the redoubts. Despondency
was general; some of the leading officers urged surrender; and Ampudia,
it was reported, keeping the choicest corps near his person, shut
himself up in the cathedral until a shell dropped near it, and then fled
to a private house.[12.10]

[NEGOTIATIONS]

Naturally, then, early on Thursday morning one of his aides carried
to the American general a proposition to give up the city, and retire
with the troops and military material. Taylor replied with a demand for
unconditional surrender, and insisted upon having an answer by noon.
Instead of complying Ampudia sent a request for a personal interview.
The result was a joint commission. Vexatious negotiations followed. The
tedious and wily methods of Mexican diplomacy were thoroughly tried; but
at length an ultimatum from Taylor's representatives ended the affair,
and the terms of capitulation were signed. These provided that the
citadel should be given up immediately, that within a week the Mexican
troops with their arms, accoutrements and six field pieces should
retire--without giving their parole not to fight again--beyond the line
of Rinconada Pass, Linares and San Fernando de Presas, that before this
evacuation of Monterey the town should be occupied by the Americans
for hospital and storage purposes only, and that for eight weeks--"or
until the orders or instructions of the respective governments can be
received"--the Americans would not cross the specified line.[12.11]

As Polk asserted and the General himself admitted, Taylor violated
his orders in granting such terms, and his excuses for doing so
were signally unconvincing, while some of them involved perhaps the
virtual assumption on his part of a political authority superior to
the President's. But substantial reasons for the terms did exist.
"Considering our situation," explained the General privately, they were
not over-liberal; and that was true. Being very short of ammunition
and provisions, he could only negotiate, assault or retreat. According
to his spokesmen in the Senate, his effectives numbered only some 5000
and probably they did not reach those figures. About one third of them
had no bayonets. The First Division of regulars had been crippled; the
Second was tired out; and the volunteers had been so far demoralized,
that in Meade's opinion they could no longer be depended upon. Worth,
chief American representative on the joint commission, had not "the
slightest confidence" left in Taylor's leadership, and wrote privately
that "many others" shared his opinion, while a still greater number felt
doubtful.[12.12]

With such troops, feeble artillery and scant ammunition, to attack an
enemy of proved fighting quality, now at bay in stone houses, fully
supplied with guns and munitions, and comparatively fresh, was not an
inviting proposition. In short, as Crittenden and Clayton stated in
defence of Taylor on the floor of the Senate, it was not feasible to
storm the city; and to retreat with sick and wounded over such a route,
pursued by mobile infantry and sleepless mounted men, and harried by
an exultant population, would have meant ruin. It was a wise course
to escape from this dilemma as he did, and the truth could not be
told.[12.12]

[MONTEREY OCCUPIED]

September 25 the citadel was evacuated, and the next day with drums
beating and banners flying the first brigade of Mexicans left the
city--all noting with curious interest the difference between their trim
uniforms and freshly pipe-clayed belts and the unkempt appearance of
the victors, who, as an American said, were as dirty as they could be
without becoming real estate. The second brigade followed on the next
day, and the rest of the troops on the twenty-eighth. Monterey, with
a quantity of indifferent gunpowder and a number of cannon, many of
them bad, was ours, and soon the people of the United States, whom a
costly but valorous battle impressed far more than orderly, scientific
operations could have done, were again acclaiming Taylor. By distance,
by his courage, by his picturesque individuality, and by his very
position as commander of the one American army fighting the Mexicans,
he was idealized. His excellent reports--the work of Bliss--confirmed
every favorable impression; and the writers of the day, fully aware that
he was already a popular hero and anxious to suit the prevailing taste,
colored the facts until these could hardly be recognized. Men on the
ground, in contact with the crude realities, felt otherwise. Taylor's
want of prevision and of generalship was in fact bitterly censured
there. Worth "is the high comb cock of the army," wrote one officer.
He has won all the laurels, though Taylor will have the glory at home,
remarked a surgeon.[12.13]

As for the conduct of the troops in general, however, there could be
only one opinion. "Three glorious days," was General Scott's description
of the struggle. War is--war. Dreadful things were done, splendid
men were cut down. Yet if there be glory in fidelity and courage, in
meeting extraordinary hardships, and in triumphing over extraordinary
difficulties, then Scott's description was correct.[12.13]




                                  XIII

                       SALTILLO, PARRAS, TAMPICO

                         August-December, 1846


For men supposed to have won a splendid victory, Taylor and his army
seem to have been rather low in their spirits after the capture of
Monterey. Taylor admitted that his forces had been "greatly reduced."
Learning that a part of the Second Infantry had arrived on the Rio
Grande, he described this trifling reinforcement as "most welcome." The
Texas troops wished to go home and were discharged. To replace them
he counted on the Tennessee and Kentucky horse; but these regiments,
having been ordered to San Antonio, were long in reaching the front.
October 15 he estimated his aggregate effective strength as less than
12,000.[13.1] Chills and fever, a depressing malady, was extremely
prevalent; and a strong tendency to desert appeared to indicate a
generally unsatisfactory state of things.[13.2] Not only priests but
Mexican officers remaining at Monterey to convalesce or to care for
the sick, stimulated this tendency; and about the middle of November
all such officers, not indispensably needed by the sick and wounded,
received peremptory orders to go south. A little later, it was reported,
the alcalde was imprisoned for the same offence. Moreover bands of
Mexicans, not dismayed by the American triumphs, hung upon Taylor's
lines to rob and kill.[13.6]

[TAYLOR AND THE GOVERNMENT]

The General had other troubles also. There was a plan at Washington,
promoted by reports of his inefficiency and by letters from certain
ambitious officers left in the rear, to put in his place one of the new
brigadier generals. Scott, however, protected his interests, and by
having him assigned to duty with his brevet rank, threw a great obstacle
before the schemers. They encountered other difficulties as well, and
finally Polk sent him word confidentially that he need have no fear of
displacement. This, however, did not prevent a serious clash between
him and the administration over another matter. Perceiving that Mexico
could not defend effectively the remote and disaffected provinces
of the north against even our volunteer forces, realizing that the
possession of territory would be an advantage in making a treaty, and
wishing particularly to impress the Mexican Congress, which was to meet
on December 6, Polk felt extremely anxious to extend our occupation as
much as possible at once, and with all this in view it was proposed to
Taylor on September 22 that, should he see fit, he should have General
Patterson,[13.3] who was now the commanding officer at Camargo, occupy
the chief points in Tamaulipas.[13.6]

As Taylor had bitterly complained of receiving hordes of volunteers for
whom there was nothing to do, it was naturally presumed at Washington
that such an expedition could be organized without interference with his
plans; and, supposing also that Patterson was at Matamoros, far from
Monterey, Marcy instructed that general to begin his preparations while
awaiting definitive orders from Taylor on the subject. Such a movement,
however, not being permissible under the terms of the armistice, a
plan in which the government felt deeply interested came to nothing;
and Taylor, perhaps to divert attention from this aspect of the case,
not only vetoed the expedition, but protested violently against the
course of the government in addressing one of his officers.[13.4]
Polk was naturally and properly incensed, but he believed Taylor was
now in the field for the Whig Presidential nomination, and wanted to
force a quarrel upon the administration; and hence Marcy replied mildly
to the General that the right of the commander-in-chief to offer mere
"suggestions" could hardly be denied.[13.6]

On another point also there was a clash. Polk and his Cabinet condemned
at once and unanimously the Monterey armistice; but, shrewdly or
charitably suspecting that undisclosed reasons for it might have
existed, they decided to end it in such a manner as to express neither
approval nor censure. Marcy therefore directed on October 13 that it
should be terminated, explaining that it stood in the way of prosecuting
the war vigorously and forcing Mexico to seek peace. As by its terms the
agreement was subject to the approval of the respective governments, no
difficulty stood in the way of cancelling it; and on November 5 Taylor
notified Santa Anna, that since the Washington authorities disapproved
of the armistice, he should consider himself at liberty to resume
offensive operations on the fifteenth, since by that date he reckoned
that his despatch would reach San Luis Potosí.[13.6]

In reply the wily Mexican attempted to convey an insinuation of bad
faith on the part of the American government. This Taylor properly
noticed in his rejoinder, expressing at the same time a hope that
Mexico would accept the offer of the United States to negotiate, and
that permanent friendly relations between the two republics might
ensue. Santa Anna had now a better opening; and he protested that his
country would do all she could to justify her title to sovereignty and
independence, and would never listen to any proposal of peace, until the
American army should evacuate her soil, and the American vessels lay
aside their hostile attitude.[13.5] The correspondence was published
of course in the _Diario_, and obviously tended to unite the nation, as
well as to enhance the prestige of its leader.[13.6]

[MOVEMENT AGAINST SALTILLO]

The termination of the armistice enabled Taylor to occupy Saltillo,
upon which his eye had long been fixed. For several reasons he deemed
the town, a place of some 18,000 souls, important. It was the capital
of the state of Coahuila, a support for Monterey and the chief pass
through the Sierra Madre, a station on the high road to the south,
and the dominating point in a region full of corn, wheat, cattle and
other supplies. At this time the city was entirely without protection.
Mejía had been ordered in May to fortify it, but had not been able to
do so; and Santa Anna's first thought, on learning that Monterey had
capitulated, was to bring Ampudia back to San Luis Potosí with his
demoralized soldiers.[13.10]

Accordingly General Worth received orders on November 8 to march for
that place four days later with Lieutenant Colonel Duncan's battery,
the Artillery Battalion (eight companies), the Fifth and the Eighth
Infantry, and Blanchard's Company--in all about 1000 men;[13.7] and
Taylor with two squadrons of the Second Dragoons under Lieutenant
Colonel May determined to accompany him. The morning of the twelfth
brought a despatch from Marcy dated October 22, expressing the wish of
the government that, in view of Santa Anna's threatening posture and
the increasing unfriendliness of the people, no attempt should be made
to hold territory beyond Monterey, or at most beyond the mountains;
but the decision was confided to the General, and he set out the next
day.[13.10]

Advancing, then, by the left bank of the swift Santa Catarina River, at
this time of the year but an insignificant stream, the column ascended
gradually, passed the village of that name, and after marching nearly 28
miles came to a small bridge and a group of handsome live-oaks. Next the
road descended a little, and, enclosed much of the way by lines of trees
and maguey,[13.8] pursued the same general direction until it reached
the hacienda of Rinconada, a mile or so farther on. Up to this point the
majestic ranges of the Sierra Madre, nearly destitute of vegetation,
though here and there brightened by a white thread of water, had stood
about six miles apart; but now they closed in, and the road, turning
sharply to the left, plunged into a grand and sombre gorge known as the
Pass of Rinconada. For three miles or more it ascended steeply between
gray and frowning walls of stone decorated only with a few hardy and
prickly growths, and sometimes partly hidden by the clouds; but finally
the summit was gained, and before long the farm of Los Muertos (The
Dead) came in sight with its bare, vertical cliffs and its huge cairn of
cobble-stones--probably a memorial to some party of travellers murdered
by robbers--which gave a grim significance to the name.[13.10]

Here the Americans gazed with special interest at Mexican works
intended to check their advance. Not willing to give up this natural
fastness Ampudia, in spite of the orders to withdraw, had undertaken to
fortify it; but soon, discovering that more extensive defences than he
possessed the means to erect and equip would be needful, to prevent the
position from being turned, he had prudently concluded to dismantle his
fortifications and retreat. The gorge now expanded, and gave place to a
long, wide, open valley extending to Saltillo. Here gardens, fields and
crops were seen once more, but how different! Instead of the orange and
lemon groves, the bananas and figs of Monterey, with the languid smokes
of sugar-houses rising in the distance, the soldiers beheld fields of
wheat and oats, and orchards of cherries and apples. In short, a march
of 65 or 70 miles had transported them to New England.[13.10]

Gathered with great difficulty on November 15, the legislature of
Coahuila had elected and inaugurated J. M. de Aguirre as governor, and
on approaching Saltillo the following day Taylor received from him a
formal protest against the American advance.[13.9] The General kept
on, however, without replying, and leaving Worth's command in the city
square, pitched his tent on the farther side of the town. There was
little to make the place agreeable. Saltillo lay on the southeastern
side of a slightly concave plain, with mountains close behind it that
looked, in the afternoon of a sunny day, like immense drifts of dusty
snow. The city itself, consisting mostly of low adobe houses--protected
with grated windows--clinging to steep, narrow streets, wore the aspect
of dilapidation and age that was characteristic of provincial Mexico;
and the common people, apparently less intelligent then the populace of
Monterey, probably more dominated by the priests, and certainly more
secluded from contact with Americans, looked sullen and hostile.[13.10]

Some of better standing attempted to charge exorbitant prices; but the
General promptly seized whatever supplies he could lay hands upon,
ascertained the owners, and proposed to pay what had been the current
rates or nothing. He treated the chief magistrate well, however,
assuring him that his desire was to see peace restored as soon as
possible, and good order preserved meanwhile at Saltillo; and after
ordering certain reconnaissances made in the surrounding region, he
set out for Monterey about the twenty-first. His gruff, unpolished
ways did not entirely please the Mexicans, and they were glad to find
themselves now under the courtly Worth, to whom they ascribed "better
feelings."[13.10]

[THE CHIHUAHUA EXPEDITION]

Meanwhile two other American commands, one on each side of Taylor, were
conducting aggressive operations. If the occupation of Tamaulipas was
likely to influence Mexico and facilitate the negotiation of a treaty,
so was that of Chihuahua; and the western as well as the eastern of
these provinces was believed to be disaffected toward the general
government on account of the overthrow of the federal constitution. As
early, therefore, as the middle of May, Polk proposed to the Cabinet
an expedition against Chihuahua, and the suggestion was immediately
accepted. Naturally such a diversion of strength from an effective
line of attack to a remote section, where the people were hardly strong
enough to cope with the savages, occasioned both at the time and later
much criticism; and not only on this, but on other grounds as well, the
President's action in the matter could be criticized fairly.[13.11]

Indeed, in almost every case that required a thorough comprehension
of the Mexican problem, he blundered. Yet this was not his fault.
He did his best; and one is tempted to lay the charge against a
system of government which confers on politicians, ignorant or poorly
informed regarding vital matters, the honors and responsibilities of
statesmanship. So broad a censure is, however, unjust, as one scarcely
needs to say. At all events we do not place in power, as others have
done, mere _fainéants_ or persons qualified only for social functions
and palace intrigues. Very few Americans reach a high public station
unless they have ability of some kind, a more or less healthful ambition
to achieve, and much force of character; and thus we stand about as
well perhaps as the Chinese, who used to reason that a man who could
surpass a multitude of rivals in memorizing--and thus absorbing more or
less fully--the best thought and language of his race, would be able to
perform the commonplace duties of a magistrate. In reality our troubles
arise from the infirmities of human nature and the defectiveness of all
human institutions, no doubt, and this reflection may help us feel the
proper resignation as we view the blunders of the Mexican war; yet one
cannot quite forget the opinion of Meade: "Well may we be grateful that
we are at war with Mexico! Were it any other power, our gross follies
would have been punished severely."[13.11]

About the middle of June Brigadier General Wool, then at Louisville,
received instructions to take command at San Antonio, Texas--for which
point certain troops were already under orders--report to Taylor,
and prepare for an expedition against Chihuahua. He proceeded to New
Orleans, accordingly, and from there he wrote on the twenty-eighth of
July that within twenty days, he hoped, the whole of his force would be
at the rendezvous. In this he was disappointed. La Vaca, Texas, about
160 miles from San Antonio, was the chief base on the coast,[13.12]
and wet weather made the so-called roads almost impassable. To get 1112
heavy loads of supplies through bottomless mud, churned by about 500
wagons going and returning, was an almost inconceivable task. Though
excessive rains had been falling, the troops, marching under an August
sun, were tormented by thirst; an occasional bunch of delicious grapes
or slice of prime venison could hardly solace them for the abundance of
rattlesnakes, tarantulas, scorpions and centipedes; and sleep was broken
by the screaming of panthers and howling of wolves--positively unearthly
when near, one of the soldiers wrote, and resembling, when distant, the
wail of some terrible monster gasping for life. In spite of hardships
and labors, however, men and wagons finally reached San Antonio, and on
August 14 Wool himself arrived at that point.[13.26]

Here the troops had time to rest, and they found much of interest. The
old Mexican town--where one could still see now and then a fig tree
spreading itself in the _patio_ (courtyard) of a crumbling house, or
gaze at the heavy, earth-brown or moss-covered walls of the Alamo,
pitted by Santa Anna's cannon balls--looked in their eyes like some
ancient oriental city "just dug up," as one of them said; and the
cactus, the live-oaks, the mocking-birds, the pellucid river and
the many varieties of grapes extinguished soon the memory of past
fatigues.[13.26]

For Wool, on the other hand, there was no repose. Now, as always
during the Mexican war, operations were unspeakably embarrassed by the
necessity of drawing supplies from so great a distance and by sea, and
naturally San Antonio, a town of only some 2000 persons, could furnish
much less than cities like Vera Cruz or even Matamoros. Each particular
article that would be necessary on the expedition had to be provided
now; and departmental errors, like delaying arms and misdirecting parts
of wagons, were therefore peculiarly unfortunate. But the greatest
difficulty was disorder. The command was a chaotic mass like that on the
Rio Grande, turbulent, impatient, insubordinate. Wool, however, attacked
the problem without shrinking, and what a soldier called "the iron hand"
of military discipline soon began to set things right.[13.26]

[HARNEY'S ESCAPADE]

Highly unfortunate, therefore, in this as well as in other regards, was
an escapade of Brevet Colonel Harney, a man as brave as a lion and also
as untamable, who had been occupying San Antonio for some time with
three companies of the Second Dragoons. Obtaining permission to ask
for Texan troops to defend the frontier against the Indians,[13.13]
he called for eight companies, and shortly before Wool's arrival, on
the pretext of a threatened Mexican invasion of which he entertained
little or no fear, he moved off with his entire command, although he
knew of the intended concentration at San Antonio, and advanced to the
Rio Grande.[13.14] Imprudently crossing the river, he was cut off by
one of its quick rises. Only the refusal of his officers to follow him
prevented a ridiculous dash against Monterey. Finally, near the end of
August, he obeyed the order to return, but left three companies behind;
and a part of this detachment, engaged in procuring a large supply of
grain and flour in Mexico, lost the supplies and three of their number,
killed or wounded. The rest of the three companies escaped under fire in
a disgraceful manner, burning public stores to prevent the Mexicans from
taking them; and of course news that Americans had been repulsed flew
like fire through the border.[13.26]

[WOOL'S MARCH]

Such presumption on the part of a regular officer, such imprudence,
and above all such disregard of his government's known intentions
were intolerable, and Wool felt them with peculiar intensity. He was
a high-strung person. Being devoutly pious he loathed swearing, for
example; but on special occasions his feelings got the better of his
tongue, and when this occurred he would instantly raise his eyes to
heaven and implore forgiveness. While not a great man, and apparently
incapable of inspiring soldiers or gaining their sympathetic support,
he understood his profession and lived up to it. When campaigning he
seemed to sleep--if he slept at all--with both eyes open, and the
outposts were liable to receive a visit at any hour of the night. Never
sparing himself, he was equally stern with others; and towards officers,
presumably more intelligent and responsible than privates, he seemed
especially exacting. So now he treated Harney with such rigor that some
of the volunteer officers, little disposed to favor strict discipline,
sympathized with the culprit, and Wool came to be regarded by not a
few as a narrow martinet, jealous and harsh in temper and weak in
judgment. Possibly some ground for these opinions could be found, but
substantially they were unjust.[13.15]

Finally, on September 23, a topographical party went forward to study
routes, inquire about wood, water and forage, and select halting
places; and two days later some 1400 men, the first section of the
"army," advanced into an almost unknown region with about one hundred
and seventy-five wagons and provisions for two months.[13.16] The
distance to Presidio del Rio Grande, a small Mexican town five or
six miles beyond the river, was about 175 or possibly 185 miles.
Much of the country proved to be rough and wild, but there were also
barren prairies, deep "hog-wallows," rich bottom-land and one fine,
broad valley. Several streams had to be crossed, and among these were
counted the Medina and the Leona, not less beautiful than their names.
Population there was almost none, though on the first day's march
Castroville, a German town planted on American soil by a Frenchman
bearing a Spanish name, offered quite cosmopolitan suggestions. A
drought of several weeks had made the roads hard and the streams
fordable, and no serious difficulty was encountered until on October 8
the advance came to the Rio Grande.[13.26]

The river was here swift and rather more than four feet in depth; but
with the aid of boats and a pontoon bridge, provided beforehand by
Wool, the troops effected a crossing safely during the next few days,
established a small fort at each end of the bridge--to hold it and to
guard the boats for the second section under Colonel Churchill, which
was still waiting at San Antonio for the means of transportation--and
then camped three or four miles beyond the town for rest and repairs.
Some of the teams had come all the way from La Vaca, 330 miles, without
stopping for a day. As the small Mexican border force had retired and
the citizens were friendly, there was nothing to fear; and Wool's
amicable assurances, reinforced with strict orders to molest no one,
promoted kind relations. The government had left him without specie, and
the people would accept only hard cash; but with private means and by
dint of borrowing he obtained half-rations of corn. This brightened the
outlook noticeably, for subsistence was to be, of course, the greatest
problem; and the arrival here of Brigadier General Shields,[13.17] who
brought not only another body of the troops but news that Monterey
had fallen, and took command of all the infantry, together with a
small force of mounted men, appeared to strengthen the expedition
materially.[13.26]

  [Illustration: WOOL'S MARCH

Based on Reconnaissances of Capt. Hughes, Lieut. Sitgreaves and Lieut.
Franklin]

Wool had received no definite instructions from Taylor, and on October
16 with about 1800 men he struck out according to his own judgment
for Monclova, taking a circuitous route practicable for wagons and
artillery. This brought the army soon to San Fernando de Rosas, a garden
of roses lying in a beautiful plain on the cool and limpid Hidden River
(the _Escondido_), surrounded with trees and encompassed at a distance
with superbly grand peaks.[13.18] Here the road turned more toward the
south, and the country soon became broken. Formidable mountains upreared
themselves ahead, and before long the troops were among them, traversing
valley after valley in order to turn their huge flanks.[13.26]

The San José range, some 4000 feet high, had to be climbed. It was a
hard task; but when the mists dissolved, Wool and his men gazed with
delight over two beautiful valleys, where meandering lines of dark
foliage marked the watercourses, while on the west, like a battlemented
wall, towered the Sierra de Santa Rosa, its precipitous buttresses
festooned with white and purple clouds. Descending then through a gorge
to the plain of San José, the army next encountered the Alamos and
Sabinos Rivers, each about four feet deep and racing like a torrent. To
get the wagons across looked at first impossible; but with incredible
exertions and the aid of ropes and improvised bridges the feat was
accomplished.[13.26]

At the foot of the next range lay Santa Rosa, a town of some 2500
people, where the troops arrived on October 24. All were Federalists
here. Their interests had suffered greatly from the dishonesty and
inefficiency of the central government, and the presents of cake, fruit
and confectionery offered to the Americans told their own story. Beyond
this point the road entered a sterile region, where almost the sole
inhabitants were sheep and goats. Now and then water could only be
obtained by scooping it from holes in salty ground, and sometimes there
was hardly fuel enough to boil the coffee. At length coffee and sugar
gave out, but the magnificent range on either side helped the men keep
up their spirits. A protest against the American advance was received,
and some 2500 men gathered under Colonel Blanco to enforce it;[13.19]
but as the loss of Monterey had cowed the people, and there were no
funds to stimulate them, Blanco dissolved his army; and on October
29 Wool formally occupied Monclova without opposition. A week later
Churchill with a hundred wagons and nearly all of the rear section came
up.[13.26]

At this town, a place of about 5000 population, lying amid hills on the
fine Monclova River, Wool remained almost four weeks, for on account of
the armistice Taylor forbade a further advance toward the south; and the
army, camping a mile or so from the city, had time to drill, recruit,
reconnoitre and make repairs. It was a pleasant sojourn. Rivulets of
pure water freshened the streets; highly cultivated fields, mostly
planted with corn, filled the wide valley, and far mountains clung to
the horizon like azure clouds. Being now almost 600 miles from La Vaca,
Wool sent for the last supplies waiting with escorts at San Antonio,
prepared to break up his communications with that point, and opened a
connection with Camargo, not more than 200 miles distant. At the same
time he collected some local provisions, though most of the surplus had
already been drawn away by Ampudia, and he studied the routes. Strict
rules were made for both officers and men about entering the town; the
sale of liquor to soldiers was prohibited under penalty; and the arrival
of some gold aided materially.[13.26]

[WOOL'S TRIALS]

Things went substantially well, in fact, yet they did not go smoothly.
Considerable sickness prevailed among the troops. For a time the daily
ration per man had to be fixed at nine ears of corn, ground in the
portable steel mill of each company; and the soldiers grumbled. Orders
were issued requiring every man to shave, as the regulations provided;
and beardless young fellows, lacerating their faces in order to prove
themselves "men," grumbled again. The volunteers abominated the "tarnal
regulars," who were naturally the chief reliance for enforcing rules,
and when an opportunity came, retaliated. Many of their officers were
outspokenly dissatisfied with the conduct of the expedition. Wool's
bearing was denounced as harsh; but perhaps their own deportment had
something to do with that, for the punctilious Mexicans thought his
manners good. Officers as well as men chafed under the discipline;
but the General could easily reply that good-will on the part of the
Mexicans was essential, and that not a single complaint had yet been
made by the people.[13.20] In all probability it was argued that a
flying column of half Wool's numbers would have been far preferable;
but it could be answered that wastage from disease and battle had been
anticipated, that so small a column would probably have been attacked
by Colonel Blanco's irregulars and by other forces,[13.21] and that
after the conclusion of the armistice Ampudia might have to be reckoned
with.[13.26]

Certainly the dissatisfied officers ridiculed unmercifully the number
of wagons. Here their ground was somewhat firmer. Jesup himself had
taken the position that such a train could neither reach Chihuahua nor
be sent back to the base. But in this matter Wool stood at the centre
and the quartermaster general stood at the circumference. It seems very
doubtful whether an adequate mule train could have been organized at
San Antonio in season. Without the wagons the army would probably have
been compelled to live more or less upon the country; and this would
have led to the concealment, or even the destruction of supplies, to
bloodshed, to a state of things not compatible with the conciliatory
methods ordered by Taylor and the government, perhaps to a serious lack
of rations, and possibly to the ruin of this isolated command. Moreover
artillery was essential; and Wool may have reasoned that where cannon
could go, wagons could follow.[13.26]

The wagons and guns were, however, a serious embarrassment, and while
at Monclova Wool satisfied himself that he could not march from
there to Chihuahua by the direct route. A lack of water also was a
grave difficulty. Besides, a large force appeared under the present
circumstances unnecessary. Ampudia retreated to San Luis Potosí; and
although Santa Anna had taken steps, before the American expedition left
the Rio Grande, to prepare for the defence of Chihuahua, the military
forces holding that point had fallen back on Durango. There was indeed
nothing for Wool to conquer now but distance, and he felt that five
or six hundred men could do this as well as more. In his opinion,
therefore, the proper course was to proceed about 180 miles in a
southwesterly direction to Parras, where he would be on a good road to
Chihuahua and only about 90 miles from Saltillo; and indeed he thought
it advisable to join the main army. His views were duly expressed to his
superior officer, and Taylor concurred. The government, concluding that
the revival of the federal system at Mexico would change the sentiment
of the northern states, and that Chihuahua was in effect already in
our grasp, took a similar position;[13.22] and accordingly on the
twenty-fourth of November, leaving four companies to guard the stores at
Monclova, Wool set out for Parras.[13.26]

The long march, generally through deserts and rugged mountains, was
cheered by a halt at a fine estate belonging to gentlemen who had
received their education in Kentucky, and still cherished the most
cordial recollections of their American experiences; and on December 5
the army pitched its gray tents in front of the town. By many Parras,
a place of about the same size as Monclova, was called an Eden. It
lay where a wide plain and a long hill met, and most of the streets
were extremely narrow and crooked; but streams of clean water flowed
through them, and most of the residences were buried in gardens or
vineyards. But even amidst the luxury of romantic nature firm discipline
continued. The soldiers were kept at their drills and parades; their
arms and clothing had to be ready at all times for a close inspection;
as at Monclova, a system of calls and signals made surprises
impossible; and Wool busied himself in procuring corn and flour and in
reconnoitring.[13.26]

[THE CHIHUAHUA EXPEDITION ABANDONED]

All the while he looked for orders, and finally the summons came.
December 17, at a little before two o'clock in the afternoon, he rode
hastily into town with staff and escort, holding despatches in his hand;
and at once the aides and men hurried through the markets crying out,
"Soldiers, to the camp instantly!" As will appear in due time,[13.23]
the call was urgent. But it found Wool ready as usual, and in two hours
his army--leaving the sick under guard and taking with it 350 wagons,
provisions for 60 days, 400,000 cartridges and 200 rounds for the
cannon--set out. No blundering occurred. Thanks to his reconnaissances
Wool knew which of the routes to pursue. And there was no loitering.
Once the troops made thirty-five miles in twenty-four hours; and in
four days they shook hands with General Worth's brave men, then some
twenty miles beyond Saltillo and 110 or perhaps 120 from Parras.[13.26]

"An entire failure," was Taylor's comment on Wool's expedition, and in a
sense his judgment appeared to be correct.[13.24] But this was Polk's
fault. Where there is nothing to do, nothing can be done.[13.25]
Before laying out the campaign the government should have seen what
it had now seen--that Saltillo was the key of Chihuahua, and that a
properly equipped expedition could not reach the latter city without
passing rather close to the former. But in reality Wool accomplished
a great deal. He showed how a real soldier, without fear and without
political yearnings, could lead an expedition through an enemy's
country. Nine hundred miles this army marched. Swift rivers were quickly
crossed, ravines filled, hills cut down, mountains climbed. Provisions
never failed. No wreckage marked the route. Not a drop of blood was
shed; not a shot fired. Wool made enemies only among those who were
under obligations to be friends, and made friends among those who were
under obligations to be enemies. And out of a crude, heterogeneous mass
he forged a keen, tough, highly tempered blade, that was to prove its
value soon in a terrible crisis.[13.26]

  [Illustration: Tampico and Its Environs]

[TAMPICO IN VIEW]

The other lateral expedition moved against the city of Tampico. This
place, the principal town in the state of Tamaulipas, and after Vera
Cruz the chief port of Mexico on the Gulf coast, was physically
remarkable. Land and water are perhaps nowhere more freakishly
intermingled. But for practical purposes one may describe it adequately
as on a low ridge--with the immense lagoon of Carpintero on the one
hand and the deep, wide, heavy, greenish-brown Pánuco on the other--a
little more than five miles from the Gulf, as the river flows. For ten
years beginning in 1835 political upheavals and vexatious commercial
regulations had militated against its prosperity; but the port was
highly prized by the government, and in April, 1846, was taken into its
particular care.[13.38]

All the old fortifications having been demolished lest they should
be turned to account by insurgents, Parrodi, the comandante general,
was ordered to prepare the town for defence, and a number of badly
planned and badly constructed works--particularly a redoubt equipped
with two 8-pounders on the north side of the Pánuco at the bar--gave
a semblance of security. Some twenty-five light or fortress guns were
placed; but efforts to obtain additional heavy ordnance from Vera Cruz
were frustrated by the blockade, and when Ampudia, going north in the
summer, was directed to give his first attention to reinforcing the
garrison, circumstances again intervened. The people were spirited,
however; and the daily Eco voiced their sentiments by exclaiming, "With
such officers, with such troops, with such citizens let the Yankees come
whenever they please!"[13.38]

As a matter of fact the Yankees had thoughts of coming quite soon.
Possession of the town seemed to be desirable, in the first place,
because for some time it was supposed to be the starting-point of a
carriage-road to San Luis Potosí, and apparently could be made a more
convenient base than the Rio Grande for a deep advance into Mexico; but
the war department found before long that wagons and artillery could
not cross the mountains by that route. In the second place occupation
of Tampico appeared to be a logical feature of the Tamaulipas movement,
in which Patterson was expected to play a leading rôle;[13.27] and
moreover, Santa Anna himself had explained to Mackenzie that it would be
advantageous as well as easy to make this conquest.[13.38]

Conner had his eye upon the place, of course; but, aside from the
question of overcoming its defenders, he felt considerable hesitation.
It was regarded as the most dangerous port on the coast, and vessels
could not ride out a gale at anchor off the shore. The bar, on which
eight feet of water stood normally, had only a fathom in August, 1846;
and as the fleet would have to rendezvous and prepare for battle in the
open roadstead, he was afraid that one of the frequent northers would
assail him before he could assail the town. September 22, however,
when deciding upon the Tamaulipas expedition, Polk and his Cabinet
agreed that Conner should attack Tampico, and the order was issued that
day.[13.38]

Santa Anna seems to have remembered the advice given to Mackenzie, and
while at Mexico he instructed Parrodi to retire, if attacked, unless
he could be sure of resisting successfully. On his way to San Luis he
evidently received Marcy's intercepted letter of September 2, which
announced that a movement upon Tampico was contemplated.[13.28] Hence
on October 3, with a view to the confirmation of those instructions, he
directed the war office to notify Parrodi of the American plan. Two days
later the comandante general reported to Santa Anna that he could not
defend the town victoriously, and explained in detail why. His garrison,
including some 200 sick, consisted of less than 1200 men besides 200
available National Guards, ignorant of the use of arms. Only 870 of
these men could be employed, according to a later statement of his, at
the town and the bar, and having but 150 regular gunners he could not
man the numerous and widely separated positions. Indeed he would not be
able to subsist the garrison more than eleven days longer.[13.29] The
enemy, on the other hand, it was said, included a shore party of 3000,
and could attack by water and by land at the same time.[13.38]

[TAMPICO EVACUATED BY THE MEXICANS]

In response, Parrodi received from Santa Anna on October 14 an order,
confirmed three days later, that all the heavy guns, the stores, and
his three gunboats, light but effective craft, should be sent up the
river, and that he himself with his troops and what field pieces could
be taken along, should withdraw to Tula, a place behind the mountains.
Parrodi, who did not believe in the war, liked these instructions, and
proceeded to execute them. The government, however, seemed unwilling
to abandon Tampico, and the comandante general, perplexed by this
difference of sentiment and by the protests of the governor, troops,
people and foreign consuls, offered to Santa Anna some arguments
against his instructions: but the latter, annulling without ceremony
the government's action, impatiently ordered immediate evacuation.
His reasons were, in brief, that he could not reinforce the garrison
adequately without dividing the army in a manner incompatible with
his plans; that, even should he undertake to do so, this aid could
not arrive in time; and that, since a victorious defence could not be
expected, it was important not only to save the men and material, but
especially to avoid the moral effect of another American triumph; and no
doubt, on the assumption that Conner was prepared to make a strenuous,
unflinching attack with such forces as Parrodi described, these reasons
were sound.[13.38]

Excited by the urgency of his instructions, which were received on the
twenty-second, the comandante general now endeavored to atone for the
time lost, and executed a flight instead of an evacuation.[13.30] The
redoubt at the bar was destroyed; large quantities of war material were
thrown into the river; with the aid of the British consul a pretended
sale of the gunboats was effected; and on October 27 and 28 the troops
hastily withdrew.[13.38]

While these events were taking place, timely notice of them was
forwarded to Conner. Chase, the American consul, had been expelled
and had taken refuge on a blockading vessel; but his wife, who was a
British subject, remained in Tampico, and on October 20 she wrote to
the Commodore that Parrodi would evacuate the town on the following
day, and that no resistance would be made against an American attack.
By November 5 Conner received this news, but a lack of provisions made
it impossible for him to set out the next day, as he desired to do. On
the tenth, eleventh and twelfth, however, eleven vessels made sail from
Antón Lizardo with orders to rendezvous fifteen miles from the shore on
a certain east and west line a little south of Tampico. The frigates
_Raritan_ and _Potomac_ did not appear there; but as the weather was
fine, Conner decided to proceed, and at break of day, November 14, the
_Mississippi_, _Princeton_, _St. Mary's_, three small steamers--the
_Spitfire_, _Vixen_ and _Petrel_--and three schooner-gunboats joined the
blockading vessel off Tampico bar. By this time the Commodore knew that
Parrodi had not evacuated the city on the twenty-first, and, supposing
the garrison was still there, expected some hard work;[13.31] but the
weather looked favorable, and he prepared at once to attack.[13.38]

Lieutenant Commanding Hunt, the blockading officer, had examined the
bar; and piloted by him the three small steamers towed the gunboats
across it. By ten o'clock the river was entered successfully, and
the Commodore advanced immediately toward the city. The low shores
were covered with rich vegetation; the huts, thatched with palmetto
leaves, appeared cosey if not grand; broad-leaved bananas and loaded
orange-trees grew beside them; tall cocoanut palms languidly waved their
graceful fronds above; and the long line of steamers and schooners,
followed by nine boats from the frigates packed with officers, marines
and sailors, made an impressive spectacle as they moved slowly up the
smooth but rapid Pánuco under an azure sky.[13.38]

Conner himself was on the _Spitfire_. As he approached the town, he
was met by a deputation from the _ayuntamiento_ (city council), who
stated that having neither the means nor the disposition to resist, they
desired to capitulate. Perry and two other officers then went ashore
with the deputation to arrange terms; but after a long conference,
finding this impossible--though of course the expediency of surrendering
was not in debate--all returned to the _Spitfire_, and at length an
informal agreement was reached. Next morning the chief points of this
were embodied in the following declaration:[13.32]

     "United States Steamer Spitfire. Off the City of Tampico,
     November 15, 1846. Commodore Conner declines a Capitulation with
     the Authorities of Tampico as he considers it unnecessary. He
     accepts the surrender of the City, and takes military possession
     of it. He assures the Inhabitants, at the same time, that he will
     not interfere with their Municipal Regulations, or their Religion;
     and that private property shall be respected, provided that the
     public property of all kinds, be delivered up at once, and in good
     faith. Should an assault be made by the Inhabitants of the City,
     on the American Forces, the Inhabitants will be held responsible
     for the consequences. Commodore Conner, so long as the Authorities
     and Inhabitants of the City observe good faith towards him, will
     consider them under his protection;--a different course will expose
     them to serious evils."[13.38]

The danger of an assault was not imminent, for the National Guards could
find but one hundred serviceable muskets, and all the people of the
town, who usually numbered about 15,000 but were now perhaps half as
many, lined the streets and gazed at the Americans as mere spectators.
All the public property that was movable had been carried away, but the
public buildings were now occupied; and, as the fraudulent sale of the
gunboats was detected, three much needed vessels, built at New York,
were added to our navy.[13.33] Steps were then taken to recover what
Parrodi had transported up the river.[13.34] November 18 Tattnall set
out with the _Spitfire_ and _Petrel_, and the next forenoon he reached
Pánuco town, the head of navigation, some eighty miles from Tampico,
where it was known that heavy guns had been left. Everything had been
concealed but the concealment proved ineffectual. He disabled nine
18-pounders, threw into the river a quantity of balls, and burned some
camp equipage; and a 24-pounder was taken aboard.[13.38]

[TAMPICO GARRISONED]

In ordering the capture of Tampico, the American government had intended
that Patterson should be at hand to occupy the town, and as this
calculation had been upset by Taylor, it now became a question how to
retain the prize. The place of the squadron was at sea; without the help
of every man it looked almost impossible to manage the vessels in bad
weather; and officers of nearly all grades were actually wanting. So
Perry in the steamer _Mississippi_ sailed from Tampico on the evening
of November 15 for Brazos Island, and the next day left an officer
there to explain the situation. Without delay the news was forwarded
to Patterson at Camargo, and he directed that men and cannon should
go "forthwith" to the captured city. His instructions were not waited
for, however. Lieutenant Colonel Belton, who occupied Camp Belknap with
six companies of the so-called artillery, embarked for the mouth of
the river on hearing from Perry; and on November 21 Colonel Gates and
about 500 men sailed from the Brazos in the _Neptune_, leaving two more
companies to follow the next day in the _Sea_.[13.35] Both vessels
were driven ashore, but fortunately the troops were saved in both cases.
By the twenty-third Tampico had therefore a garrison of about 650 good
regulars. Some ordnance also arrived; and Conner, besides landing a
pair of carronades, remained in the harbor with four or five gunboats.
Fortunately the only land approaches were by a neck at each end of the
town between Carpintero Lake and the river; and the work of fortifying
these, begun at once, was prosecuted night and day.[13.38]

Perry, meanwhile, kept at work. November 21 the _Mississippi_, bearing
the red pennant of a vice commodore at the masthead, appeared at New
Orleans.[13.36] Announcing the capture of Tampico, Perry conferred
with General Brooke and the governor of the state, and obtained sixteen
cannon--half of them borrowed from the Louisiana arsenal--and with
these, an engineer officer, 110 regular recruits and a quantity of
ammunition, he arrived off Tampico on the twenty-ninth.[13.37] Before
long the Alabama regiment came from the Rio Grande, and the government,
which heard of the capture of Tampico on November 28, ordered about
460 additional regulars to be sent from the United States. There was
great anxiety at Washington to make the port secure, for, as will soon
be discovered, a particular reason for holding it had now arisen.
Gates issued stringent regulations to govern the citizens in case of
a Mexican attack; and by December 19 Brigadier General Shields was in
command there with an adequate and fairly well-protected garrison. Yet
the Mexicans endeavored to feel cheerful. No battle had been lost, for
none had been fought, said the government with convincing logic; and the
Americans had not triumphed, for they had merely taken what had been
abandoned; but the governor of Tamaulipas recalled bitterly that "in
former times Tampico, almost by herself, had repulsed more than 4000
veterans."[13.38]

[TAYLOR'S POLICY]

Substantially all of northeastern Mexico was now in American hands,
and the question of Taylor's future operations, which had long been
under consideration, became urgent. On that matter the General himself
entertained a definite opinion. He was for adopting a boundary line that
would include enough territory to pay all just American claims, and
standing there on the defensive. As already drawn, the line ran from
Parras, where he expected Wool to remain, and Patos, a rich hacienda
on the Parras route about thirty-five miles from Saltillo, to Saltillo
itself, to Camp Butler, six miles north of that city toward Rinconada
Pass, and to Monterey. Between Monterey and Tampico lay a wide gap,
but the General proposed to fill this now by occupying certain points
in Tamaulipas. Victoria, the capital of that state, was exposed to
attacks proceeding from Tula, and there he planned to have a large
force.[13.41]

How many troops were available is not precisely known; but according to
Meade, who seems to have been in rather close touch with headquarters,
Worth was to have some 2500 at Saltillo and eight guns, Butler 1500 at
Monterey, Taylor and Patterson about 5000, to be divided between the
posts in Tamaulipas and a new position in advance of Saltillo, and the
commanders on the lines of communication about 2000; which meant that
some 14,500 men, including Wool's 2400 or 2500 and about 1000 occupying
Tampico, were to hold lines approximately 800 miles long in an enemy's
country.[13.39] Over against them stood the Mexicans under Santa
Anna, who in Taylor's opinion were potentially, if not actually, more
than 50,000 in number, and were occupying before Christmas a position
only about sixty miles from the Americans;[13.40] and in addition
to these it was necessary to consider the large bands of irregulars,
like those of Colonel Blanco, who were liable to gather suddenly almost
anywhere.[13.41]

When Taylor reported his plan to the war department, a good deal of
anxiety and perhaps distress was felt there. To be sure, he pointed
out that artillery could be moved north by way of Saltillo only, and
that water and provisions were scanty on that road, while doubtless he
as well as others considered the Mexicans too deficient in vigor and
enterprise to be feared. How just were these calculations will appear in
the sequel, and they failed now to satisfy the government. Though not
informed by Taylor precisely how many posts he intended to establish
in Tamaulipas, Marcy was afraid that widely separated forces and lines
of communication would be assailed, and it was clear that a small
Mexican success, doing us no actual harm but diminishing our prestige
materially, might rouse the people against us. Even the line to Monterey
was long, the Secretary feared. Taylor evidently had no thorough
knowledge of the passes, for he was now preparing to take a very hasty
look at a few of them. Besides, it had been Marcy's expectation of
late that Wool's column would be drawn back to Monterey; and at the
end of the year, as well as earlier, he said he did not wish to occupy
territory in advance of that city. Polk appealed in his diary to the
General's own opinion that he could not safely advance beyond it. Scott,
as well as Marcy and the President, believed the troops were being
scattered too much. Officers on the ground also held that view; but such
was Taylor's deliberate policy.[13.41]




                                  XIV

                                SANTA FE

                          June-September, 1846


[THE STATE OF THINGS IN NEW MEXICO]

Not only Tamaulipas and Chihuahua but New Mexico lay within the scope of
the government's war policy, and certain features of the situation made
the outlook in that quarter peculiarly inviting.

The province was cut into an eastern and a western section by the Rio
Grande, which ran approximately north and south; and usage divided
the best settled part of it into the Río Arriba (Upstream) district
near Santa Fe, the capital, which lay some twenty miles east of the
great river, and the Río Abajo (Downstream) district, which had for
its metropolis Albuquerque, a small town on the Rio Grande about
seventy-five miles to the southwest. According to a recent census the
population was 100,000, of which the greater part belonged in the lower
district; and more than half the wealth also was attributed to that
section. The caravan trade, which made its way from Independence,[14.1]
Missouri, to Santa Fe, Chihuahua, Lagos and even Mexico City, gilded
the name of the province, for it had advanced rapidly from the humble
beginnings of 1821, and now employed 1200 men, involved a capital of
some two millions, and usually paid a net profit of thirty or forty per
cent on the goods transported. The favorable climate believed to prevail
in New Mexico was an additional source of interest.[14.2]

The political situation appeared singularly promising. In March, 1845,
the war department of Mexico admitted publicly that the northern
sections of the country were "abandoned and more than abandoned" by
the general government. Sensible Mexicans held that the connection of
the province with their miserable system involved injury instead of
benefit. The people received no protection against the ravages of the
Indians. The national troops were a constant menace to the citizens. If
a man desired to give his note for $3000, he was compelled to pay eight
dollars for stamped paper. The duties and extortions levied upon the
caravan merchants increased the price of their goods; and of late the
central government had been trying to deprive the provincial authorities
of money and the people of comforts by stopping that business
entirely.[14.2]

The citizens appeared weary of oppression. They would not pay the
taxes. It was found necessary in 1845 to excuse them from one of
the most profitable but most annoying imposts. Indifference toward
the general government--a natural return for its neglect and its
vexations--prevailed, and the continual changes in that government
aggravated the lack of patriotism. Indeed, there was more than
indifference. A move to follow the example of Texas had been made in
1837, and the idea of joining the United States, which had existed
in that year, became so strong by the early months of 1846 that
representatives of the province in the national Congress openly avowed
it. Finally, a revolution against misgovernment, that had recently
occurred in the neighboring state of Sonora, appeared to offer a strong
hint.[14.2]

All power, civil and military, lay in the hands of Manuel Armijo,
governor and comandante general; and that of itself was an ample
ground for insurrection. Born of disreputable parents, this precious
adventurer had achieved a career still more disreputable. A man of
unusual energy, though now a mountain of flesh, he could assume at will
an air of ingenuous affability; could threaten, bluster, brag, intrigue
or coax; and when dressed up in his blue frock coat, with blue striped
pantaloons, shoulder straps, a red sash, and plenty of gold lace, could
look--although at heart only a cunning and cowardly robber--quite
impressive. His personal habits were said to be grossly immoral; his
only principle was to succeed; and his type of mind, shrewd though
low, was indicated by one of his favorite sayings, "It is better to be
thought brave than to be so." Such force, cleverness and lack of scruple
had naturally made him rich. His family now owned Albuquerque and the
neighboring estates. His position and close relations with the priests
gave him a firm hold on the ecclesiastical arm; it was believed that
an understanding with the savages enabled him to use them against his
enemies; and he engaged rather deeply in the American trade. Yet his
ambition was not yet satisfied; and he entertained the idea, it would
seem, of making the province an independent country.[14.2]

At St. Louis, Missouri, the New Mexican situation was doubtless fairly
well understood, and a deep interest in the caravan business existed.
The merchants, it was felt when the war became probable, deserved to be
protected, and many urged the prompt despatch of an expedition for that
purpose. Other arguments for such a step were, that it would forestall
Indian troubles on the border, would incline the enemy--by laying open
their weak side--to make terms, would encourage the people of New
Mexico to rise in our favor, and would secure the key to Chihuahua and
California; and in all probability influential men brought these ideas
to the President's notice.[14.4]

The occupation of Santa Fe was in fact decided upon as one of the very
earliest war measures--primarily for the sake of the traders, but also
with a view to the permanent retention of the province. The move was
intended to be pacific, however. Polk doubtless expected that no serious
opposition, if any at all, would be offered by the people; and there
seem to have been hopes that Chihuahua and her sister states could be
persuaded by arguments backed with force to let the caravan trade go on
despite the war. In that case the burdensome duties imposed at Santa Fe
would no longer have had to be paid, and the discrimination in favor of
Mexican competitors, that had prevailed there, would have ceased. On
May 13, therefore, the governor of Missouri was directed to raise eight
companies of mounted troops and two of light artillery for an expedition
to New Mexico, and Colonel S. W. Kearny of the First Dragoons was
directed to command them.[14.4]

[KEARNY'S MARCH]

  [Illustration: GENERAL KEARNY'S MARCH]

So fine an opportunity for adventure appealed instantly to the bold,
hardy and energetic young fellows of Missouri, and as early as June
6 volunteers were hurrying into the service at Fort Leavenworth--a
square of wooden buildings, with a blockhouse at each corner and a plot
of grass in the middle--which crowned a high bluff on the Missouri
River about 312 miles from St. Louis; and about 1660 troops were soon
assembled at that point. Of Kearny's dragoons there were some 300. The
First Regiment of Missouri Mounted Volunteers--which chose Alexander
W. Doniphan as colonel--numbered about 860. The artillery, including
nearly 250 men, consisted of "Battery A" of St. Louis under Captain
Weightman and a company under Captain Fischer, a graduate of the
Prussian artillery service, and formed a battalion commanded by Major
M. L. Clark, a West Pointer.[14.3] There were also two small companies
of volunteer infantry, a St. Louis mounted body of about one hundred
called the Laclede Rangers, which Kearny attached to his regulars, about
fifty Delaware and Shawnee Indians, and finally, though by no means
last in importance, a Roman Catholic priest familiar with the Spanish
language.[14.4]

Without lingering to complete the outfit, Kearny sent the command off
by sections. June 5 a detachment of the dragoons advanced. By the
twenty-eighth all of Doniphan's regiment were on the march for Santa Fe
and--none of them cared how much farther; and two days later Weightman's
fine brass cannon, gleaming radiantly in the bright sunshine, wheeled
into the trail. For several days the troops had to break their way
through a rough country, but about fifteen miles south of the Kansas
River they struck the Santa Fe road, a broad, well marked, natural
highway running toward the southwest.[14.6]

Council Grove, the famous rendezvous of Indians and frontiersmen, was
the last place from which a single person could safely return; and now
for nearly four weeks not one "stick of timber" was to cheer the eye.
After pressing on in the same direction to the Arkansas, the troops
left the main trail, marched wearily along the northern bank of the
river--ascending about seven feet in each mile--till they were beyond
the great bend, and finally, crossing the shallow stream, turned their
faces toward Bent's Fort, a protected trading post, which stood near
the present site of Las Animas, Colorado, about 650 miles from Fort
Leavenworth. Belts had been tightened over and over again by this time.
Drinking water that no horse would touch had sickened many a tough
rider. Mosquitos and buffalo gnats had tormented the flesh day and
night. Faces had been scorched by siroccos, and tongues had swollen
with thirst. Many had become so tired that a rattlesnake in the blanket
seemed hardly worth minding, and so utterly wretched that in blind fury
they sometimes raved and cursed like maniacs. Out of one hundred fine
horses belonging to Battery A sixty had perished. Yet in places there
had been cool breezes, carpets of brilliant and spicy flowers, great
herds of buffalo, curious mirages, and inspiring glimpses of Pike's
Peak, the towering outpost of the Rockies.[14.6]

At length on July 29 Kearny escorted by Doniphan's regiment gained the
rendezvous, a grassy meadow on the Arkansas about nine miles below the
Fort. There within a few days the Army of the West assembled,[14.5] and
two additional companies of the dragoons, which had made an average of
twenty-eight miles a day from Fort Leavenworth, joined their regiment.
Nor were the troops alone. Several merchants had left Independence about
the first of May. Notified by order of the government that war had
begun, they had stopped here; and the Colonel found under his protection
more than four hundred wagons and merchandise worth upwards of a
million.[14.6]

Armijo, for his part, had received ample warnings. In March the central
government informed him that war might be expected, and authorized
him to make preparations for defence. By June 17 news of the coming
invasion reached Santa Fe, and nine days later the first caravan of the
season confirmed it. Manuel Alvarez, the American consul, endeavored
now to persuade Armijo that it would "be better for himself and the
people under his government to capitulate, and far preferable" to
become Americans than to be citizens of a country so disordered and so
impotent as Mexico; but while his advisers and subordinates fancied
they could obtain offices under an elective system, and "were rather
easily won over," the governor himself probably could not believe that
people so long robbed and oppressed would choose the wolf as their
shepherd. Besides, he doubtless had some national spirit and some
desire to justify his gratuitous title of general. After confirming
the news further by a spy, he sent south on July 1 an appeal for
aid--representing the Americans as 6000 in number--and began to prepare
for defence. A letter from Ugarte, the comandante general of Chihuahua,
stating that he could set out on a moment's notice with five hundred
cavalry and as many infantry, seemed encouraging, and no doubt Armijo
was aware that Durango, too, had been ordered by the authorities at
Mexico to aid him.[14.7]

Meanwhile reinforcements for Kearny were gathering in his rear. On the
third of June Marcy informed the governor of Missouri that if Sterling
Price, then a member of the Missouri legislature, and certain other
citizens of the state would raise and organize a thousand mounted
men--that is to say, a regiment and a battalion--to follow Kearny
promptly, they would be appointed to the chief commands. This method of
getting troops aroused considerable opposition among the people, for it
ignored the militia system and the aspirations of the militia officers,
and many felt that a politician like Price was unfit for the command;
but young men were ready to volunteer under any sort of conditions that
promised a chance to reach the front, and about the time Kearny left
Fort Bent this new force, including artillery under regular officers,
was mustered into the service at Fort Leavenworth.[14.8]

At the same time steps were taken to obtain reinforcements of a totally
different character. A large number of Mormons, recently driven from
Nauvoo, Illinois, had gathered at Council Bluffs, and were planning
to settle in California. It was important that feelings of hostility
toward this country should not prevail among them, and apparently their
assistance, not only on the coast but in New Mexico, might be valuable.
Kearny was therefore authorized to accept a body of these emigrants
not larger than a quarter of his entire force, and about five hundred
of them were enlisted in June and taken to Fort Leavenworth by Captain
Allen of the First Dragoons. Allen soon died, but under Lieutenant Smith
of the same regiment this party marched for Santa Fe.[14.8]

On July 31 Kearny issued a proclamation, which declared that he was
going to New Mexico "for the purpose of seeking union with, and
ameliorating the condition of its inhabitants," urged them to follow
their usual vocations, and promised that all who should pursue this
course would be protected in their civil and religious rights; and
the next day he addressed Armijo in the same strain, telling him that
resistance would not only be in vain, but would cause the people to
suffer, and adding that submission would be greatly for his interest and
for theirs.[14.9] Captain Cooke of the dragoons was made the bearer
of this communication, and with an escort of twelve picked men he went
forward under a white flag.[14.16]

August 1 the "long-legged infantry," who were almost able to outmarch
the cavalry, left the rendezvous, and on the following day the so-called
army was all in motion. After crossing the Arkansas a little way above
the Fort, it soon turned off to the southwest, and followed in general
the line of the present Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad. Before
long the troops found on the right a high range of mountains, thrusting
up twin peaks into the region of perpetual snow, while the gleaming
wall of the far Rockies came every day nearer; and on the left gazed
over wide plains--broken with ridge, plateau or butte--which stretched
away toward the east, until one could not say where earth and sky met.
Near the present boundary of New Mexico began the ascent of Raton Pass;
and the men, winding up the rugged valley, discovered most beautiful
flowers. But they were hardly in a condition to enjoy them, for the
rations--cut down one half or more--consisted of flour stirred up in
water, fried, and eaten with a little pork; and the implacable Kearny,
an embodiment of energy and resolution, hurried them along by marches
that were almost incredibly hard. What lay ahead nobody knew. It was
not even certain that the present scanty rations would hold out. But
the watchword was always, Forward; and even the magnificent views at
the summit of the Pass, where Raton Mountain upreared a series of
castellated pinnacles somewhat like those of the Ichang gorge on the
upper Yangtse River, attracted but little attention.[14.16]

[KEARNY'S POLITICAL ACTION]

August 15, at the new and unimportant village of Las Vegas began
Kearny's political work. From the flat roof of a house the General--for
his commission as brigadier general had now overtaken him--said to
the people substantially this: "For some time the United States has
considered your country a part of our territory, and we have come to
take possession of it. We are among you as friends--not as enemies;
as protectors--not as conquerors; for your benefit--not your injury.
I absolve you from all allegiance to the Mexican government and to
Armijo.[14.10] They have not defended you against the Indians, but
the United States will. All who remain peaceably at home shall be
safeguarded in person and in property. Their religion also shall be
protected. A third of my army are Roman Catholics. I was not brought
up in that faith myself, yet I respect your creed, and so does my
government. But listen! If any one promises to be quiet and is found in
arms against me, I will hang him. Resistance would be useless. There are
my soldiers, and many more are coming. You, then, who are in office will
now take the oath of allegiance to the United States, and I will support
your authority."[14.16]

Tecolote also, at the bottom of the valley, witnessed a scene of this
kind; and the next day, crossing the swift Pecos, Kearny followed a
similar course at the red adobe town of San Miguel. Here the alcalde
said he would rather wait until after the capture of Santa Fe. "It is
enough for you to know, Sir, that I have captured your town," was the
stern reply. Doubtless, in their muddled way, the people wondered at
this first illustration of liberty; but with characteristic politeness,
timidity and guile they wrinkled their faces as if pleased. In spite of
orders and sentinels the fields of waving corn, full of ears just prime
for roasting, suffered a little; but Kearny paid for the damage, and
that at least was appreciated.[14.16]

By this time officers sent forward to learn the state of public
sentiment at the city of Taos, an important seat of the Pueblo Indians,
and at Santa Fe had returned with unwelcome reports, and several
American residents had brought warnings of danger. The activity of
Mexican spies--kindly treated when captured, and in some cases released
at once with friendly messages--proved that Armijo was alert; and on
August 14 his reply to the note sent by Cooke, while proposing that
Kearny halt and that negotiations be opened, informed the General that
the people were rising _en masse_ to defend the province, and that
Armijo would place himself at their head.[14.11] Fifteen hundred
dragoons had reached or were near Santa Fe, it was reported; and at a
natural gateway, cutting a ridge about four hundred feet high, a hostile
force was said to be waiting. On hearing this news all the weary men
and their drooping steeds came to life. The banners and guidons were
unfurled. "To horse!" blared the trumpets; "Trot! Gallop! Charge!" And
with sabres glittering under a brilliant sun the troopers dashed round a
sharp turn into the pass, while the artillery thundered after them, and
the infantry scrambled over the ridge. Not an enemy was found; but the
reports agreed that Apache Canyon, some distance farther on, would be
stiffly and strongly defended.[14.16]

This was extremely serious news. To march nearly 2000 soldiers eight
or nine hundred miles through a wilderness involved fearful risks,
and the expedition was now at the breaking point. The men had become
travel-worn and half-starved; many, if not all, were suffering from
the effects of the water, loaded with acrid salts, which they had been
drinking; the horses generally were on their last legs; and hundreds of
horses and mules actually could not march another day. It had already
been necessary to attach cattle to the ammunition wagons, and the
cannon were now dragged along with extreme difficulty. The provisions
had practically been exhausted. And here lay a defile seven or eight
miles long, guarded by several thousand militia, a force of regulars and
considerable artillery.[14.16]

[CROSS-CURRENTS]

As these facts indicate, the New Mexicans did not seem willing to
justify Polk's expectations. Whatever Armijo's own opinions, public
sentiment appeared to demand action. There existed a good deal of
warlike spirit in the province, and naturally the prospect of an armed
invasion excited resentment. The ignorant and suspicious people were
easily persuaded, after their hard experience under Mexican rule, that
the Americans were coming to take their property; and the priests added,
that besides abusing the women these ruffians would brand them on the
cheek as mules were branded. August 8 the governor therefore issued
a proclamation, summoning the people to take up arms in the cause
of "sacred independence"; the prefect of Taos and presumably other
local authorities followed his example; and several thousand of the
people,[14.12] Mexicans or Indians, many of them armed only with bows
and arrows, clubs or lariats, but all apparently eager to fight, were
placed at Apache Canyon under Colonel Manuel Pino.[14.16]

At this juncture, however, Cooke, a Chihuahua merchant named González
and one James Magoffin, a jovial and rich Kentucky Irishman, prominent
in the caravan trade and long a resident of Chihuahua, arrived at
Santa Fe. Magoffin had been introduced by Senator Benton to Polk,
and after some talk had consented to act as a sort of informal
commissioner to Armijo in the interest of peaceful relations. He now
argued, according to the very reasonable statement of the governor,
that American rule would enhance the price of real estate and make New
Mexico prosperous.[14.13] Undoubtedly he dwelt upon the impossibility
of successful resistance; and probably he suggested--though Armijo's
avarice required no hint on this point--that should cordial feelings
prevail, the duties on the approaching merchandise, a fortune in
themselves, would be paid at the Santa Fe customhouse, where the
governor could handle them.[14.16]

On the other hand, no aid was coming from the south. The 1500 dragoons
were not even phantasmal. Ugarte's cheering statement that he could
bring 1000 men to New Mexico had no doubt been intended, and no doubt
was understood, as mere stimulation. According to the latest returns,
New Mexico, Chihuahua, Durango and Zacatecas together had less than
2000 poorly equipped and poorly subsisted troops, the greater part of
whom were the scattered and almost worthless Presidials. The general
government, when officially notified of the coming invasion, merely
issued a few nugatory orders and expressed "profound regret." The
people's loyalty to the government and especially to the governor
appeared uncertain. Armijo understood that he was not a general, and
no doubt understood also that he was a coward; and for all these
reasons he decided--though wavering to the end--that hostilities were
to be avoided, should that be possible. Diego Archuleta also, one of
the chief military officers, was approached by Magoffin, and under
genial manipulation proved to be much less bloodthirsty than had been
supposed. Consul Alvarez, it will be recalled, had previously found
the subordinate officials tractable, and it may safely be supposed in
general that very little desire to fight the Americans existed in the
governor's entourage.[14.16]

Pino seems to have felt differently, however, and when Armijo was on the
road to the canyon, August 16, with two or three hundred soldiers and
about eight guns, he received a message from that officer threatening to
come and fetch him, if he did not join the militia. This augured ill,
and the augury proved correct. The people demanded to be led against
the enemy, but Armijo said the Americans were too strong. Pino offered
to attack if he could have a part of the regulars, but the governor
was determined to keep them all for his own protection. Then he was
called a traitor, and retaliated by calling the people disloyal and
cowardly. They threatened him; and he, more afraid of his own army than
of Kearny's, urged the militia to go home and let the regulars do the
fighting. Threatened again, he forbade the people to come near his camp;
and finally he turned his cannon in their direction.[14.16]

In reality the people themselves had no great hunger for battle.
Besides detesting Armijo, they were doubtless influenced by much
lurking anti-Mexican or pro-American sentiment; had probably learned to
question the diabolical intentions attributed to Kearny's troops; were
fully aware in a general way of American superiority; and felt deeply
impressed by tales about the great number of the invaders, their long
train, their many guns, their enormous horses and the terrible men
themselves--an army, in short, such as they had never dreamed of before.
The quarrels of their leaders both disgusted and disheartened them; and
they began to think, too, of their lives, families and property. August
17, therefore, they broke up, and went every man his own way. A council
of the regular officers favored retreat. The Presidials deserted or
were dismissed; the cannon were spiked and left in the woods; and in
about two weeks Armijo--though offered personal security and freedom at
Santa Fe--turned up at Chihuahua with ninety dragoons. He had proved not
exactly a traitor, perhaps;[14.14] but certainly not a patriot, and
still more certainly, if that was possible, not a hero.[14.16]

[OPPOSITION COLLAPSES]

The result was that on August 17 a fat alcalde rode up to Kearny on his
mule at full speed, and with a roar of laughter cried, "Armijo and his
troops have gone to hell and the Canyon is all clear." The news was
confirmed; and early the next day, instead of turning the pass by a
difficult and circuitous route, of which the General had learned, the
Americans advanced boldly, though still with caution, on their last hard
march--twenty-eight miles to Santa Fe. Just beyond the defile, at a
position that might easily have been made impregnable, were found light
breastworks, a sort of abatis, a spiked cannon, and tracks which guided
some of Clark's men to the rest of Armijo's ordnance. At three o'clock,
after receiving a note of welcome from Vigil, the acting governor,
General Kearny, riding at the head of the troops, came in sight of the
town. Neither man nor beast had been allowed to stop for food that day,
and the column dragged heavily; but the rear was up three hours later,
and then, leaving the artillery on a commanding hill, the rest of the
troops eagerly entered Santa Fe.[14.16]

Alas, the Mecca of so many dreams and hopes was promptly rechristened
"Mud Town," for it proved to be only a straggling collection of adobe
hovels lying in the flat sandy valley of a mountain stream, where a main
line of the Rockies came to an end amidst a gray-brown, dry and barren
country.[14.15] Even the palace, a long one-story adobe building, had
no floor; and after partaking of refreshments, addressing the people
in his usual tone of mingled courtesy and firmness, and listening to
the salute of thirteen guns which greeted the raising of the Stars and
Stripes, Kearny had to sleep on its carpeted ground, while most of the
troops, too exhausted to eat, camped on the hill.[14.16]

[NEW MEXICO OCCUPIED]

The next day Kearny delivered a more formal address, but the style of
his remarks was the same as before; and his kindly, simple, determined
manner produced an excellent impression. Thundering vivas answered him;
and then Vigil, basing his remarks on the conviction that "no one in the
world has resisted successfully the power of the stronger," expressed
a joyless yet hopeful acceptance of the situation. We now belong
to a great and powerful nation, he said, and we are assured that a
prosperous future awaits us. Such of the officials as desired to retain
their places then took an oath of allegiance to the United States. The
following day chiefs of the Pueblo Indians came in and submitted, and on
the twenty-second Kearny issued a proclamation. This embodied the same
assurances and warnings as the addresses, but it added that western as
well as eastern New Mexico was to be occupied, that all the inhabitants
were claimed as American citizens, and that a free government would be
established as soon as possible.[14.17]

By this time a fort, named after Marcy, had begun to be visible on
the hill. The site was not well adapted for a regular work; but as it
commanded the town perfectly at a distance of about six hundred yards
from the palace, and was not commanded by any eminence, it served the
purpose admirably. One point, however, still caused anxiety. There
seemed to be danger that the Río Abajo district, supported by troops
from the south, might rise against the invaders; and reports came that
pointed toward precisely such an event. Kearny went down the river,
therefore, on September 2 with seven hundred men. But he found no enemy.
The Americans were everywhere well received and entertained. Ugarte
had indeed left El Paso del Norte for New Mexico on August 10, but his
troops numbered only four hundred; they had little ammunition and no
artillery; Armijo discouraged him by saying that 6000 Americans were
on their way south; the prospect of marching eighteen days--a part of
the time in a desert--was not inviting; and so the expedition went
home. Kearny returned to Santa Fe on September 11, and about noon on
the twenty-fifth he set out with his effective dragoons for California,
dreaming of a new conquest.[14.17]




                                   XV

                               CHIHUAHUA

                        December, 1846-May, 1847


Foreseeing that more troops would go to Santa Fe than New Mexico
would require, Kearny had written to General Wool on August 22 that
he would have the surplus join that officer at Chihuahua,[15.1] and
shortly before marching for the coast he gave orders that Price with
his command, Clark's artillery, a part of the Laclede Rangers and the
two companies of infantry should hold Santa Fe, and that Doniphan's men
should execute this plan; but on October 6 an order was received from
him that Doniphan should first ensure the security of the people by
settling matters with the Eutaw and Navajo Indians. September 28 Price
arrived, and by the twentieth of October, 1220 new Missouri volunteers
and 500 Mormons were on the scene. The Eutaws had now been reduced,
it was believed, to a peaceable frame of mind; and while the warlike
and superior Navajos proved a harder problem, a remarkable seven-weeks
campaign amid snow and mountains, which ended with a treaty, seemed to
ensure their good behavior. The caravans bound for Chihuahua, becoming
alarmed, had now stopped at Valverde, a point not far south of the
wretched settlement named Socorro, and begged for protection. Without
losing time, therefore, Doniphan concentrated his force at Valverde by
December 12, and with 856 effectives, all mounted and armed with rifles,
prepared to set out on a long, adventurous march into an unknown and
hostile country.[15.6]

[DONIPHAN AND HIS MEN]

No less extraordinary than such an undertaking were the commander and
the men who undertook it. Doniphan was a frontier lawyer, entirely
unacquainted with military science, but a born leader. When in
Washington during the civil war he stood back to back with Abraham
Lincoln, it is said, and overtopped that son of Anak by half an
inch. The only distinguished man he had ever met that "came up to
the advertisement," was the President's comment. High cheek bones, a
prominent chin, thinnish and tightly closed lips, a mop of carroty hair
parted well down on the left, a beard of the same hue under his chin,
small, deep-set eyes, a strongly built nose, spare cheeks and a ruddy
complexion told of enterprise, daring, endurance, wary judgment and
kind, sincere impulses. In council he was shrewd and in danger fearless,
with always a twinkle in his eye, a smile on his lips, and a cheering,
well-timed pleasantry on his tongue.[15.6]

His men, recruited from the rural districts, had felt they were scorned
a little by the St. Louis contingent, and had vowed to show them what
"country boys" were made of; but they proposed to do it in their own
way. While the city men had uniforms and military discipline, the
riflemen neither had nor wanted such embarrassments. As every officer
was a man of their own choice, they felt at liberty to choose also how
far to respect and obey him. Doniphan, who loved his "boys" like a
father, was loved in return, and they were ready to do anything for him;
but a minor authority who meddled with their reserved rights, whatever
these might happen to be, was likely to hear some vigorous cursing.
Any form of manly dissipation was to their taste, as a rule; and they
despised all carefulness, all order, all restraint. Yet they were "good
fellows" at heart, and as full of fight as gamecocks; and now--on half
rations, no salt and no pay[15.2]--they felt ready for whatever Mexico
could offer.[15.6]

At Valverde Doniphan heard that forces were coming from Chihuahua to
defend El Paso, some two hundred miles from Socorro, and sent an order
to Santa Fe that Major Clark with six guns and one hundred men should
march as soon as possible to his assistance; but without waiting for
him the command advanced in three sections on the fourteenth, sixteenth
and eighteenth of December. Below Valverde the Rio Grande makes a great
bend towards the west, and runs through a wild, mountainous region; and
hence travellers bound for the south left it on the right. Adopting
this course, the Americans now marched for ninety or ninety-five
miles through the dreaded Jornada del Muerto (_Dead Man's Journey_),
where they found no settlements except some prairie-dog towns, little
vegetation except sage brush, and no water at all. At the coldest season
of the year, when sentries at Santa Fe were having their feet frozen,
to make such a march at an elevation of more than a mile and a quarter
without fuel or tents[15.3] was clearly a good beginning. At Dona Ana,
the only settlement between El Paso--sixty or sixty-five miles farther
on--and Valverde, the straggling command was supposed to concentrate;
but the concentration seemed rather nominal. Dirty, unshaven and ragged,
the troops marched almost as they pleased. They were determined to
survive, go ahead and fight, but little else appeared to them requisite.
It was now reported that seven hundred soldiers and six guns were
awaiting them at El Paso; but on December 23 the command moved on.[15.6]

The likelihood of invasion from the north had long been foreseen by the
authorities of Chihuahua, and the expediency of making a stand at the
threshold was obvious. But the citizens of El Paso, the border town,
who were practical, industrious and thrifty people, had been greatly
influenced, like those of New Mexico, by interest in the caravan
business, contact with American traders and wagoners, and acquaintance
with the ideas and methods of the United States. Almost openly, men
said the town would thrive more under American rule, argued that it was
the intention of the government at Mexico to sacrifice the people for
the aggrandizement of its partisans and the privileged classes, pointed
out that no substantial forces had come north, and asserted that what
soldiers had arrived were under orders to withdraw without fighting, and
leave the citizens to be punished for their loyalty.[15.6]

Public spirit fell to a low ebb, and there it remained. No one thought
it endangered health to shout "_Viva México!_" But it was believed by
many that in a community so honeycombed with treason, active, determined
efforts in her cause would be liable to bring on an attack of cold steel
or lead in some dorsal area; and when the governor of Chihuahua sent the
prefect instructions on September 19 to retire, on the approach of the
enemy, with all the armed forces, cattle and provisions, collect the
resources of the district, and fight stubbornly on the guerilla system,
no intention of obeying this order could be observed. October 12 an
expedition designed to forestall invasion set out for the north; but at
Dona Ana some of the troops--covertly stimulated by officers--became
insubordinate; the commander understood public sentiment well enough to
take their side; the whole body returned at full speed to El Paso; and
the prefect dared not, or did not wish, to discipline anybody.[15.6]

There were now on the scene and in arms about four hundred and fifty
troops and apparently about seven hundred National Guards with four
guns.[15.4] In general two accepted schools of thought divided the
soldiery. Some were for not fighting hard, and some--including most
of the Presidials and National Guards--for not fighting at all; while
the few and unpopular zealots felt paralyzed by a want of confidence.
Colonel Cuylti, the commander, belonged to the second school of
thought; and on the evening before he was to move against Doniphan,
whose march had been reported about a week before, he fell sick with a
subjective disability officially diagnosed as brain fever, and set out
for Chihuahua with his accommodating surgeon. Lieutenant Colonel Vidal
succeeded to the command and also, it would seem, to the disability,
for after proclaiming martial law and pitching his camp some three
miles from El Paso, he concluded to halt. The American van, described
as consisting of about three hundred straggling countrymen in tatters
without artillery, could be surrounded and lanced like so many rabbits,
he said; but he was not personally in the mood for sport, and hence
conceded this pleasure to the second in command, Brevet Lieutenant
Colonel Ponce de León, assigning to him at least five hundred men[15.5]
and a 2-pound howitzer.[15.6]

[SKIRMISH AT EL BRAZITO]

At about three o'clock on Christmas afternoon Doniphan, with less than
five hundred of his careless, confident volunteers, reached a level spot
on the eastern bank of the Rio Grande named Temascalitos, though often
called El Brazito, approximately thirty miles from El Paso. Pickets and
sentries--but not supper--being superfluous, the men scattered in search
of water, fuel and other conveniences. Mexican scouts were observing
their operations; but, strong in conscious rectitude, the Missourians
neither knew nor cared what the enemy were about. Suddenly armed men
could be seen in fine order on a hill about half a mile distant. The
rally was sounded. The volunteers rushed for their arms, and with all
speed they were loosely formed as a line of infantry, bent back at the
extremities toward the river, and resting at the left on the wagons of
the caravan.[15.6]

With graceful consideration Ponce gave them time by sending a lieutenant
with a black flag to demand that Doniphan should present himself.
Otherwise, added the messenger, we shall charge and take him, neither
giving nor asking quarter. "Charge and be damned!" was of course the
reply; and the Mexicans then advanced, opening fire at about four
hundred yards from our line. Several volleys were delivered while the
Americans, either lying down or standing firmly with cocked rifles,
withheld their fire. But the powder of the Mexicans was mostly bad, they
shot high, and their little gun was mismanaged.[15.6]

By this time they had come within easy range. At command the American
volunteers now fired with great effect, and a flanking movement against
the wagons was received with equal spirit by the traders and their men.
Evidently there was a mistake. These fellows were not rabbits; and the
Presidials and El Paso militia, candidly recognizing Vidal's blunder,
retired in disorder, compelling the rest of the body to do the same.
Speed now compensated for any possible want of courage; and a party of
fifteen or twenty mounted Americans, who pursued the enemy for miles,
could not bring any of them to a stand. Doniphan's loss amounted to
seven men slightly wounded; that of the Mexicans to a howitzer captured
and perhaps a hundred men killed or wounded; and this farcical brush,
lasting thirty or forty minutes in all, has figured in American annals
as the "battle" of Brazito.[15.6]

[EL PASO OCCUPIED]

The Mexican troops now evacuated the district; the National Guards
disbanded; and presently a humble deputation from El Paso was explaining
to Doniphan that arms had been taken up by the citizens under
compulsion. Two days after the skirmish, therefore, amid a general
appearance of satisfaction, he and his rough troopers concluded they had
reached paradise. Along the Rio Grande, mostly on the southern side, ten
or twelve thousand people occupied settlements extending downstream for
many miles. Above, there was a dam; and artificial streams from that
point not only irrigated the rich fields and vineyards, but watered the
orchards, in which many of the houses were buried, and freshened the
long and regular streets, which not only were shaded by lines of trees
full of lively and tuneful birds, but were kept neat by daily sweeping.
To drill, practice twice a day at the targets, and feast on the abundant
fruits in such a place was a most agreeable change from the Jornada del
Muerto.[15.11]

El Paso did not prove, however, to be exactly a paradise. Unlimited
self-indulgence led to considerable sickness, and several men died.
It led also to disorders and to outrages on the people, and before
long two lieutenants, both intoxicated, fought with dirks. Moreover it
was now learned that Wool had not gone to Chihuahua,[15.7] that great
preparations for resistance were making there, and that a serious
insurrection--purposely exaggerated by the Mexican reports--had occurred
in the rear.[15.8] The boldest appeared therefore to be the wisest
course--to push forward, and conquer or die.[15.9] But without cannon
only the second alternative was possible, and the artillery did not
arrive. Price was in fact extremely unwilling to part with it, and owing
to this and other difficulties Clark was unable to set out for El Paso
until January 10. Then his men encountered even more painful hardships
than Doniphan's had undergone, for they had to struggle with snow--to
say nothing of almost perishing with hunger, and being nearly buried in
a sandstorm; and it was not until February 5 that men, guns and wagons
joined the impatient command.[15.11]

Three days afterwards the belated expedition set out on its march for
Chihuahua--nearly three hundred miles distant--with 924 effective
soldiers, besides about three hundred traders and teamsters, who were
sworn into the service by Doniphan and elected a merchant named Owens
as their major. About seven hundred of the troops belonged to the First
Missouri regiment, about one hundred to Clark's artillery, and about
one hundred to a body named the Chihuahua Rangers, made up at Santa
Fe.[15.10] There were four 6-pounders, two 12-pound howitzers, and about
315 goods-wagons besides the wagons belonging to the companies and the
commissary department, each with its quota of attendants; and as the
column, with every banner unfurled, wound into the distance as far as
the eye could see, it made a gallant and picturesque sight. It was
exposed to a rear attack from Sonora; but that state, while alive to the
opportunity, had not the means to take advantage of it.[15.11]

Troubles enough presented themselves, however. The country was bare
and monotonous, producing little except the crooked mezquite and an
occasional willow. A desert sixty-five miles wide and another nearly
as large had to be crossed. Heat alternated with cold, and one day it
was necessary to kindle fires repeatedly to warm benumbed limbs. Tents
were blown down by storms. More than once no fuel and no water could
be had for days. Antelopes and hares could frequently be seen; but the
tarantulas, rattlesnakes and copperheads were far more numerous, and far
more willing to be intimate. One day, when the army was in camp at a
lake, the grass took fire, and in an instant a small flame went scudding
off, burning a narrow trail. Soon this was driven by a whirlwind up the
mountain side, spreading into a vast blaze; and then, gathering force,
it rolled back upon the camp like a tidal wave. By arts known to the
plainsman almost everything was saved; but with a fearful roaring and
crackling a surge of fire swept over the encampment, proving how great
the danger had been.[15.11]

The state of things in the country farther south could not easily
be ascertained, for the authorities at Chihuahua had cut off all
communication with the north; but there were hostile spies, and some of
them, taken prisoners, had to give instead of obtaining information.
About seven hundred Mexican cavalry--said to be twice as many--were
discovered in front looking for a favorable opening, which they did
not find. At length, crossing a handsome plain on February 27, the
expedition came at nightfall to the hacienda of El Sauz, and learned
that strong fortifications had been erected at the Sacramento River,
fifteen miles farther on. That was the next watering-place, and
evidently it would have to be fought for; so a halt was made and a plan
devised. "Cheer up, boys," said Doniphan with a twinkle; "To-morrow
evening I intend to have supper with the Mexicans on the banks of a
beautiful spring."[15.11]

[THE SITUATION AT CHIHUAHUA]

As early as August, 1846, Chihuahua had expected this visit; and the
governor, saying that Kearny's army had occupied New Mexico "as easily
as it would have pitched its tents in the desert," seemed ready to
let the operation be repeated in his own state. Perhaps he was merely
weak, but the same pro-American influences of a commercial nature that
we have observed at El Paso and Santa Fe were rife about him, and there
was also much sentiment in favor of establishing the northern provinces
as an independent republic under the protection of the United States.
Over against these ideas, however, and possibly because of them, existed
a peculiarly intense hatred of us, exasperated now by the loss of New
Mexico and the fear of American outrages.[15.13]

  [Illustration: EL PASO TO ROSALES]

Near the end of August the governor was forced out, and Angel Trias, an
active, ambitious man, rich, and most unfriendly to the Americans, took
his place; and the great body of the citizens, either anxious to defend
themselves against invasion or dreading to be thought disloyal, rallied
about him. The central government became interested, ordered several
northern states to aid Chihuahua, and instructed Reyes, comandante
general of Zacatecas, to assume the defence of New Mexico, Chihuahua and
Durango. But embarrassments then arose; delays ensued; and Santa Anna,
according to his policy of concentrating the military strength of the
country under his own command and disregarding non-essential territory,
frowned upon all national efforts to defend the northern frontier. It
was now November; and the government, appointing the unpopular Heredia
comandante general at Chihuahua, yielded to Santa Anna's views.[15.13]

Trias, however, did not abandon hope. The resources of the state were
scanty indeed. The effective colonial method of protecting the border
had long since been given up, and Indian raids, beginning about 1831,
had fast impoverished the haciendas. During the past year, perhaps
because the savages believed the Mexican troops would be required for
the war, these incursions had been worse than ever before. A single
party of Comanches had numbered more than eight hundred. It was
indispensable, therefore, to employ some of the military forces in the
protection of the settlements; but more than 10,000 men were enrolled
in the National Guard, and Trias felt sure that Chihuahua state was
inherently strong enough to defeat Doniphan, whose approach was duly
reported.[15.13]

The chief needs were money and armament. Artillery had been practically
unknown in that region, but it was found possible to cast and mount a
number of pieces, and infantry soldiers learned to use them. Arms were
gathered and repaired; ammunition and clothing were manufactured; and by
dint of local borrowing the expenses were met. Santa Anna finally had
255 men sent from Durango; and in the end nearly 1200 mounted troops
(many of them Presidials), some 1500 infantry including about seventy
regulars of the Seventh Regiment, 119 artillery, probably more than
1000 rancheros armed with long knives (_machetes_) and rude lances, ten
brass cannon ranging from 4-pounders to 9-pounders, and nine musketoons
on carriages appear to have been assembled.[15.12] The men were
enthusiastic and eagerly obedient, and the leaders--Heredia for chief
and Trias as second in command--felt proud of their army. As for the
Brazito affair, which had caused much discouragement, it seemed now like
a bad dream.[15.13]

[THE SACRAMENTO POSITION]

  [Illustration: BATTLE OF SACRAMENTO
                 Feb. 28, 1847]

February 10 a portly, handsome officer arrived at Chihuahua. This was
General García Conde, and the next day he and the other chiefs, after
reconnoitring the pass at the Sacramento River, fifteen or eighteen
miles to the north, decided to make a stand at that point. It was a wise
decision. The stream, running here toward the east, was crossed at a
ford by the route from El Paso, which had a north and south direction.
Rather more than two miles north of the river and approximately
parallel with it, there was a broad watercourse, now dry and sandy,
known as the Arroyo Seco, which after crossing the El Paso highway
continued in its easterly course about a mile and a half, turned then
toward the south, and joined the river about a mile and a half below the
ford. Along the northern bank of the Arroyo lay a road, which extended
on the eastern side of the highway to the junction of this watercourse
with the Sacramento, while on the western side, bending toward the
south, it crossed that river three miles or so above the ford, passed
the hacienda of El Torreón, penetrated a defile in the steep and rocky
foothills thrust out here by the western cordillera, and rejoined the
highway about six miles farther on toward Chihuahua. A triangular block
of rugged hills lay thus between this road, the highway and the river,
the northeastern corner of which (called Sacramento Hill) almost reached
the solid adobe buildings of Sacramento hacienda near the ford.[15.13]

Between the river and the Arroyo lay elevated ground cut straight across
by the highway. The portion west of the highway was a fairly smooth
plateau ascending very gently toward the western cordillera, but the
other part rose immediately east of the highway about fifty feet, and
formed--roughly speaking--a square one and a half miles on a side, with
a broad, smooth hollow in the middle that debouched at the southeastern
corner toward the Sacramento, and a dominating hill called the Cerro
Frijoles at the northeastern corner, toward which the square sloped
up. On the north and west edges of the square the Mexicans constructed
a series of well-planned and well-executed redoubts alternating with
breastworks--which extended from Cerro Frijoles at the northeast to
what we may call Fort N at the southwest--supplemented near the ford
with fortifications on both banks of the river, and finally with a
redoubt halfway up Sacramento Hill; and these works commanded perfectly
the highway, the Arroyo road and the valley of the river. The Torreón
route seemed impracticable for the American wagons, but even here
fortifications were erected; and still others guarded the Arroyo near
its junction with the Sacramento. The principal camp lay in the hollow
of the square, which not only protected the troops but concealed both
their numbers and their movements.[15.13]

In a word, the position consisted essentially of a tongue of land
crossed near its elevated tip by the El Paso highway, with the
Sacramento River and the Arroyo Seco on its edges, a series of
fortifications round its tip, and an answering fortification beyond the
river on a hill. It seemed to bar the way of the Americans completely.
The Mexicans felt sure that it did so, and on the evening of February
27, jubilant and boastful, they even talked of recovering New Mexico.
Anyhow these presumptuous and contemptible Yankees were to be cut up,
and the booty would include a caravan worth a million. Yet influential
Chihuahuans had a financial interest in that caravan,[15.13] and one may
be sure they were not asleep.[15.14]

[THE BATTLE OF SACRAMENTO]

Next morning the Americans awoke early. Already the horses had been
carefully inured to explosions of powder. Now swords were filed, rifles
loaded afresh, straps tested, and even the linch-pins of the wagons
inspected; and by daybreak the command set out. To make it compact,
ready for attack from any quarter and perplexing to hostile observers,
the wagons were formed in four well-separated columns of about one
hundred each; the artillery and most of the troops marched between
these columns, and the companies of Reid, Parsons and Hudson--regarded
as proper cavalry and not simply mounted men--rode in front as advance
guard and screen; and in this formation, with banners and guidons
flaunting to impress the enemy, it rolled forward through a valley
about four miles wide, bounded on each hand by a massive, barren
cordillera,[15.15] until at about half-past one the troops, coming in
sight of the Mexican works, noticed a quick, sharp flash there: the
Mexican cavalry drawing their sabres.[15.17]

Doniphan and his principal officers now galloped ahead, and at a
distance of two or three miles reconnoitred most carefully with glasses
the Mexican position. It looked impregnable; and when the command was
about a mile and a half distant from it, the Colonel--first ordering his
cavalry screen to keep on advancing--turned the main body sharply to
the right, intending to cross the Arroyo Seco higher up, and gain the
plateau there. It was a brilliant scheme but perilous. Good troops, not
encumbered with artillery or baggage, might undertake such a manoeuvre
even in the face of the enemy, but with four hundred wagons, most of
them extremely heavy, it seemed impossible for untrained volunteers to
cross the Arroyo, and mount the high bank of the plateau; yet not only
was it a chief part of the soldiers' business to protect the wagons, but
it looked as if the wagons might soon be needed to protect the soldiers.
Hence this desperate attempt had to be made. Heredia observed it
immediately; and, concluding that the Americans were aiming, as a last
hope, to avoid his works and follow the Torreón route, he instructed
García Conde, the chief cavalry officer, to hold them in check until the
artillery and infantry could arrive and finish them.[15.17]

But these Americans were no ordinary men; and while they had little
fear of death, it was their belief that defeat would mean dungeons and
torture. After marching for some distance with all possible speed up
the Arroyo road, they stopped at the point selected. Instantly shovels,
pickaxes, crowbars and ropes were out of the supply wagon, and for a
few moments the sand flew as if electrified. Then the drivers yelled
like Apaches; the mules were stimulated by every art known to drivers;
and the swaying wagons headed for the ravine. At the brink many of the
frightened animals, twisting their necks back till they almost broke,
stopped short; but the men pushed them along, and down they all plunged,
floundering, biting and kicking. Across the deep, sandy bottom they
were driven or dragged amid shouts, curses and "hell let loose," as a
soldier put it; and then came the real struggle--the opposite ascent,
forty or fifty feet high. Wild with excitement, pain and fright, the
animals exerted every nerve, scrambling, jumping, rearing and panting;
the teamsters yelled and flogged; and the soldiers tugged and lifted
at the wheels, or pulled with hundreds of ropes. In a few minutes, as
it seemed, the incredible was done, and the command, forming on the
plateau as before, advanced. Already the Mexican horse were dashing on,
brandishing their lances in the sun, fluttering their bright pennons,
and waving a black flag decorated with a skull and crossbones; but, as
Doniphan did not appear to be making for El Torréon, they concluded to
halt, and let the infantry and artillery overtake them.[15.17]

It was now a little before three o'clock, and when enough ground had
been gained so that the traders and teamsters could make the caravan
into a fort, Major Clark's trumpeter sounded "Trot!" and Battery A
emerged from the masking wagons. "Form battery, action front, load and
fire at will!" rang out Weightman's clear voice; and at a range of about
half a mile solid shot, chain-shot and shells, perfectly aimed, saluted
the lancers, who had never listened to such music before. Three rounds,
and they broke. With great efforts they were rallied, but the fourth
round sent them flying to the camp; and Ponce de Léon, the hero of El
Brazito, who had led the advance, also led the flight. The infantry, now
exposed to the American fire, caught the panic, and at the sound of the
cannon-balls men crouched or lay down.[15.17]

An artillery duel followed. Most of the Mexican projectiles, falling
short and bounding once or twice, lost enough velocity to become
visible, and the Americans--laughing till the tears furrowed their dusty
cheeks--quickly became expert in dodging them. After a time, however,
the Mexicans discontinued their fire; and Doniphan, as the last of the
wagons had come up, did the same, wishing to form again and advance.
Heredia now reoccupied his works; but the original defensive attitude
could but very imperfectly be resumed, and the former confidence was
gone. The whole plan of the battle had been blown to pieces, it was
seen. The splendid fortifications now meant very little; the boasted
cavalry were demoralized; the prospect of plundering the wagons had
vanished, and the Brazito rout became a fact once more. Heredia ordered
two guns to occupy the fort on Sacramento Hill, and rake the Americans
from that elevated point; and several other pieces went there without
orders, abandoning the redoubts. A great portion of the infantry leaked
away, and soon Heredia did the same.[15.17]

The Americans felt correspondingly elated; and, obliquing toward the
right in order to avoid the principal mass of the works and approach the
ford, they moved on toward Forts N and O, into which Trias, observing
their approach, now threw the best of his troops--the regular infantry
and a part of the Second Durango squadron. "Storm the fort, storm the
fort!" shouted the Americans; and at the proper distance Weightman and
the howitzer section were ordered to charge the work at N, supported by
the companies of Reid, Parsons and Hudson.[15.16] This order failed to
reach Parsons and Hudson, but Reid and others advanced all the same.
Unfortunately a deep gully was soon encountered in front of the fort,
and the assailants found themselves at a loss. With a few backers Major
Owens, who seems to have desired to die, rushed across, emptied his
pistols into the midst of the enemy, and fell. Still others dismounted
and skirmished. The howitzers, galloping to the left, succeeded in
turning the gully, and unlimbered within fifty yards of the enemy, while
a part of Reid's troopers, now supported by Hudson's, did the same, and
then charged at O. Entrance to the fort was gained.[15.17]

But the enemy there and in the adjacent breastworks, proved too strong,
and the Americans, veering again to the left, passed along the front of
the fortifications, drawing their fire and shooting with some effect,
but discovering no place for a serious blow. The fall of Owens, who was
supposed by the Mexicans to be our leader, and the failure of the attack
upon the fort encouraged the enemy. Trias and García Conde managed to
rally some lancers for a charge, and artillerymen with two guns prepared
to follow them. Before such odds a few of our howitzer force gave
way.[15.17]

The rest did not. A round of canister scattered the lancers, and then a
large body of Americans, rushing in at a gallop, threw themselves from
their horses. Parsons' and Hudson's men joined them, and all pressed up
the slope of O together, firing at will. The Mexicans learned quickly
not to show their heads. Raising their muskets above the parapets at
arm's length and blazing away without effect, they soon used up their
ammunition. By this time the Americans, bravely aided by the howitzers,
were near their goal. Rifles were dropped. A rush was made. "With a
whoop and a yell and a plunge," wrote a soldier, "we were over into
their fort, man to man, grappling in a merciless fray, neither giving
nor receiving quarter." Six-shooters, knives and even stones were made
to serve, and in a moment the fort was taken.[15.17]

Meantime Clark's guns had repulsed a body of cavalry that were making
for the wagons, and then, in coöperation with Parsons and the force of
dismounted troopers, he silenced and captured the works north of Fort O,
while other troops took N, went down into the valley, and occupied the
fortifications near the river. It was now five o'clock, and the battle
had been gained. Yet not quite. The guns on Sacramento Hill, where many
of the Mexican infantry and cavalry had taken refuge, were annoying,
even though aimed so high as to do no actual harm; and Clark turned some
pieces in that direction. The range was 1225 yards; but the first shot
dismounted a cannon, and, as a soldier remarked, every shell knew its
place. Soon Weightman took the howitzers across the river. A part of
the Americans flanked the redoubt on one side by scaling the mountain,
and then a wild gallop up the road on the other side to its rear ended
the fighting. Pursuit followed, but under the first beams of the moon
Doniphan's command re-assembled on the field of victory. Not a man had
lost his life except Owens, and only five had been wounded. Of the
Mexicans three hundred had been killed, it was thought, and an equal
number wounded. Forty at least were captured, and also great numbers
of horses, mules, sheep and cattle, and quantities of provisions and
ammunition.[15.17]

[CHIHUAHUA TAKEN]

Further resistance was out of the question, for the Mexican army
scattered, and the Presidials and National Guards fled to their
homes;[15.18] and the next day Chihuahua, a city of about 14,000
inhabitants, was peaceably occupied. Obviously, however, this triumph
did not end the difficulties of the Americans. To remain in the enemy's
country with no prospect of reinforcement was perilous, yet the
traders and their merchandise could not be left without protection,
and the Mexicans were said to be in great force near Saltillo.
Doniphan therefore undertook to make an arrangement with the state
and city authorities that would free him from responsibility. But the
negotiations failed, for while the officials did not refuse protection,
they would not promise to remain neutral during the war, as Doniphan
insisted; and Heredia proved no less obstinate.[15.19]

Doniphan then determined to retaliate and also appeal to their fears
by marching for Durango, and by capturing on his way the town of El
Parral, where Heredia and the state government had taken refuge. April
5, leaving about three hundred men to protect the merchants, he set out
with the rest of his command, and in three days made fifty miles. Then
he received notice that large Mexican forces were approaching, and at
once retraced his steps. Concluding soon, however, that Doniphan had
been hoaxed and no Mexicans were coming, the men grew impatient. Their
term of service was to end on May 31; and as they had been poorly fed
nearly all of the time, and for nine months had received no money from
the government, they naturally felt dissatisfied.[15.19]

Doniphan seems to have renewed his negotiations, therefore, with the
state authorities; but as large quantities of the merchandise had
already been sold regularly or smuggled into circulation under the
cover of night, he doubtless cared less about the matter than before. A
Missouri trader named John Collins, who had undertaken with a party of
thirteen fearless men to reach Wool and obtain instructions, returned
on April 23 from his daring journey of more than a thousand miles, and
in two sections the command set out for Saltillo a few days later.
May 21, after a series of hardships and perils, a certain amount of
lawlessness, and a little fighting with the Indians, they arrived near
that point.[15.20] The next day Wool reviewed them. In honor of the
occasion they tried to improve their appearance, but it still suggested
a classic line, "The beggars have come to town." Some were dressed like
the Mexicans and some like the Comanches, and all were described by
their commander as "ragged."[15.21]

A few days later they were greeted by Taylor at Monterey; and
finally, after passing down the Rio Grande and sailing to New
Orleans, they regained Missouri, where they had for rewards a speech
of congratulations from Senator Benton, the unstinted admiration of
their fellow-citizens, a series of banquets and barbecues, and the
consciousness of having aided certain American, Mexican and European
traders to dispose of their wares. They had, however, done more than
promote commerce. They had built a large stone into the edifice of
American prestige in Mexico, and had gained for themselves a notable
place in military history.[15.21]




                                  XVI

                        THE CALIFORNIA QUESTION

                               1836-1846


Under Mexican rule California, the Golden West, was anything but
golden. It was poor, shiftless and pitiful; unprotected, undeveloped,
unenlightened, unconsidered; helpless and almost hopeless. Although the
province extended from the Pacific to the Rocky Mountains, only a strip
some fifty miles wide was occupied by white men, and but a small part of
that fraction consisted of farms regularly owned. The famous missions,
wrecked by the Mexican government, lay in ruins. In ten degrees of
latitude there was but one considerable seaport, Monterey, a village
of about one hundred small houses; and the only other sizable town,
Los Angeles, contained some 1500 persons, with perhaps an equal number
in places depending upon it. The total population in 1845 amounted
probably to something like 10,000 whites, 5000 Indians in the stage of
civilization represented by the breech-clout, and 10,000 other savages.
The real inhabitants were the countless horses and cattle, which roamed
for the most part at will. More than half bore the mark of a branding
iron; but probably the greater number even of these rendered no service
to humanity, and many had not even a technical owner.[16.4]

[THE CALIFORNIANS]

The Californians were genial, kindly, hospitable, faithful in their
married life and gracefully polite; but in the view of many, if not the
majority, courage and truthfulness were either follies or luxuries, and
no element of practical efficiency entered into their composition. A man
got up some time before noon. He would not work or even walk. He neither
read nor thought. A monotonous diet of beef, beans, wine, brandy and
chocolate, supplemented with cigarettes and a guitar, satisfied his
appetite perfectly. What he demanded next was a horse. As an infant he
had begun life with a ride to be baptized, and the saddle was his real
home.[16.4]

Given a dashing steed with a long, flowing mane, an arching neck, a
broad chest, full flanks, slender legs and the gentle but fiery eye
that proved its Arabian descent, the Californian was fairly on the
road to happiness; and when dressed up in his dark, glazed sombrero
with a conical crown, wide brim and betasselled silver cord, his close
blue jacket, flashy shawl (_serape_) and red sash--possibly fringed
with gold--his loose trousers, decorated like his jacket with silver
buttons and slashed below the knee to reveal snow-white drawers, his
buckskin leggins and his mammoth spurs--as big as a small plate--he felt
completely satisfied.[16.4]

  [Illustration: CALIFORNIA COAST
                 1846]

He could lasso the foot of a running steer, ride one hundred and forty
miles a day for a week at a time, or check a full gallop and turn
round on a bullock's hide; and anybody less polite, gaudy, dexterous
and lazy he pitied. That a cow could be milked without the aid of a
calf, he was unable to imagine; but he could ride five hundred miles
to a family reunion, and dance two days and nights without stopping
except for something to eat and drink. A glass window and a board floor
were usually beyond his means; but he could afford to pay 24 per cent
interest, and throw his borrowed money away on cards and horse-races.
The women were counterparts to the men. They were affectionate, loyal,
generous. An orphan had its choice of mothers. But, had you entered
the open door of a California house, you would probably have found its
mistress either smoking on the bed with two or three dirty children
about her, or dressed up with an extravagance that made her lord's game
of monte seem economical.[16.4]

  [Illustration: NORTHERN CALIFORNIA]

There was, however, a very different element in the population, composed
of several nationalities but commonly named, and naming itself, "the
foreigners." Some French and Germans could be found among them; the
British--almost all of them naturalized--were still more numerous; but
at the end of 1845 about three out of four were Americans. In 1822 a
Boston trading vessel had, so to speak, discovered California, and from
that date the business of collecting hides and bartering for them such
manufactured articles as the people needed or could be induced to buy,
was almost monopolized by New Englanders.[16.1] This naturally led a
few shrewd, enterprising Americans--among whom were Thomas O. Larkin of
Monterey, Abel J. Stearns of Los Angeles and Jacob Leese of Sonoma--to
establish themselves in this new country as traders. Runaway sailors
from the ships, hunters and trappers from the mountains, and occasional
adventurers from almost anywhere, gradually introduced themselves.[16.4]

By 1836 the foreigners had become an important, if not always highly
esteemed, element. In the autumn of 1840 some two hundred emigrants are
said to have gone there from the Platte country, and in May, 1841, we
know that about one hundred men and thirty women and children set out in
that direction from Independence, Missouri. Many who undertook to settle
in Oregon decided to exchange that wilderness for the more hospitable
region close at hand. By August, 1844, our people were described by
Larkin as "flocking" to California; and Whittier sang,

     "By many a lonely river, and gorge of fir and pine,
     On many a wintry hill-top, their nightly camp-fires shine."[16.4]

[AMERICANS IN CALIFORNIA]

Probably by the end of 1845 there were about eight hundred American
residents--men, women and children--in the province.[16.2] Quite a
number pushed on to the shore of San Francisco Bay, but most of them
lived in the Sacramento valley, because immigrants from the United
States naturally came to that region first, and because the Mexicans
were too much afraid of the savages to settle there; and as a sort
of base they had the fortified trading post of New Helvetia,[16.3]
situated about a hundred miles from the coast on the site of the present
Sacramento City, where Captain John A. Sutter--a German naturalized
in Switzerland--received the wayfarers with an open purse, an open
countenance and an open, hazy head.[16.4]

Some of the Americans took the trouble to go through the process of
acquiring citizenship, and so could become the legal owners of land;
but far the greater number were mere squatters, or else hung about
the ranches of other Americans, working a little, hunting or trapping
more, but mainly waiting for something to turn up. They were in general
a rough-looking set: the vicious, devil-may-care sailor, the gaunt,
awkward, ragged immigrant, and the heavily bearded, leather-coated
hunter with his long hair turbaned in a colored handkerchief; and while
some had excellent brains and hearts of gold, the scale ran down to a
very low point. Little work and less law was the motto of not a few.
Some of the lowest were out-and-out for blood and plunder; some of the
best had practically the same thought--regarding California as a new
Canaan, out of which they were appointed by Providence to drive the
new Hittites, Hivites and Jebusites; and probably almost all agreed in
despising the inefficiency of the native, his passion for dress and
dancing, his guitar, his bland smile and his dainty politeness.[16.4]

With such and so meagre a population, scattered from San Diego to
Sacramento, an air-line distance of about four hundred and fifty miles,
the outlook for progress appeared uncertain enough; and California was
also hampered by a state of chronic misgovernment and rebellion. In 1836
the people, aided by a few Americans and other foreigners, took up the
same battle-cry as Texas, and raised the same blue flag illumined with a
single star. The Mexican troops were expelled; and J. B. Alvarado, M. G.
Vallejo and José Castro, all of them natives, assumed the control of the
province. Two years later Bustamante recognized their government; but in
1843 Santa Anna sent up General Micheltorena, with soldiers that were
mostly convicts and officers that were mostly debauchees, to restore
the national supremacy. Countenanced and protected by their commander
these men, instead of repressing the savages, harassed the people with
insults, outrages and murders. At length, in November, 1844, Alvarado
and Castro took up the sword;[16.5] and the following February, after
some almost bloodless fighting, the Mexicans were driven out.[16.9]

Once more the government abjectly accepted a revolutionary situation,
recognizing as governor the senior member of the provincial assembly,
Pio Pico, and as comandante general José Castro, who had appointed
himself to that position; and meantime her destroying the missions and
selling their property (1835-44) seemed to emphasize these hints that
California was virtually to be thrown away. It has practically been
abandoned, wrote the German traveller, Löwenstern, in 1843; and this
fact was rendered still clearer by the proposal of May, 1846, that
England should take military possession of the province, which Bankhead,
the British minister, described as "an indirect offer of sale," and by
an explicit suggestion that Prussia occupy it. Mexico had substantially
abdicated.[16.9]

In such a state of things the country could not advance. Indeed it was
going backwards. The only source of revenue was the duties collected
at Monterey, and this--amounting to $80,000 or $100,000 a year, and
signifying the virtual confiscation of about one third of all the
property in California--mostly disappeared in official pockets. No
military force able to cope with the savages was maintained. In
consequence of their incursions farms were being abandoned, and they
even raided within the settlements. The laws were openly disregarded.
There were practically no courts and no police, and each man had to
defend his own person and property. No sort of regular postal facilities
existed, and even communication with Mexico was rare and mostly by
chance. The only carriage in the country had been one belonging to
Micheltorena. There were no real schools, not a single newspaper, and of
course hardly any books except in a very few hands.[16.9]

With gold in sight and actually seen, people did not look for it. In
a region where the wild clover grew several feet high and a single
grapevine would yield a barrel of juice, the government did nothing, and
the citizens could do little, to promote the cultivation of the soil.
With all the boundless coast of the Pacific waiting for horses, beef and
lumber, droves of unbroken colts tossed their manes in a wilderness,
beeves were slaughtered for their hides, and huge trees crashed to the
ground amidst the stillness of an untenanted forest. Six-cent muslins
cost fifty cents, and the coarsest of straw hats paid a duty of three
dollars. If a man wanted a kettle mended, he looked for some one trained
abroad; and even a child's torn skirt could not be patched without first
getting a hank of thread from Boston.[16.9]

[MEXICAN RULE DETESTED IN CALIFORNIA]

Naturally the people felt dissatisfied, and their complaints reached
far beyond the misbehaving soldiers. Every official professed
intense loyalty in public, but that signified nothing. The people
were determined to shake off Mexican authority. California will soon
declare its independence, wrote the British minister at Mexico in
1841, while his French colleague, who was in close touch with the
situation, believed it would merely be a question between England and
the United States. California is almost ready to separate from the
mother-country, concluded Sir George Simpson, governor-in-chief of the
Hudson Bay Company, who was there a year later. As a rule the people are
disaffected, it was directly reported in June, 1844. The principal men
have decided, wrote Forbes, the British vice consul, in September, 1844,
that progress under Mexican rule is impossible, and they will not have
it. The Californians are unanimously determined to be rid of the Mexican
military government, declared the British consul at Tepic, under whom
Forbes acted, a few months later; and of course all Mexican rule was
military. A separation is probably inevitable, concluded Lord Aberdeen,
head of the British Foreign Office, at the end of the year. California
"_must_ change owners," said a letter from that coast in July, 1845.
"The people hardly care what Flag is exchanged for their own," stated a
competent American observer two months later, while a Californian was
predicting that the Stars and Stripes would certainly go up there.[16.9]

"The situation of Upper California will cause its separation from Mexico
before many years," predicted Wilkes's book in 1845. The people of
southern California are agreed to cut loose from Mexico, wrote a British
admiral. "Mexican rule had become intolerable," concluded Walpole, a
British officer in 1846. It had long been "only a shadow," said a young
American, afterwards famous as General William T. Sherman; but it was a
shadow that blighted. Another Mexican expedition would not be tolerated,
said Larkin; and in fact a commissioner from California so notified the
government. To get on at all with the people, a Mexican had to become
Californian in head and in heart, and even then he was less welcome than
an Englishman or an American.[16.9]

Nor were such opinions merely expressed--they were made known to Mexico.
Many warnings, both official and private, went from California, and
the province maintained commissioners at the capital, who presented
information regarding the wholly unsatisfactory conditions existing
there. That part of the country has been "forgotten for more than twenty
years," wrote one of these commissioners to the war department in 1844;
and the following year he said that it had been "injured by every one of
our administrations." Alarms were sounded publicly in such newspapers
as the London _Times_ and London _Chronicle_. Notices regarding
the danger of American encroachment--particularly by the method of
emigration, a declaration of independence and early annexation--were
received over and over again from the Mexican minister at Washington,
the Mexican consul at New Orleans, Pakenham, the British minister,
and Bankhead, who succeeded him. This peril was notorious, declared
General Mora y Villamil near the close of 1845; and the government
itself recognized the gravity of the situation. In March of that year
the minister of war and the minister of relations admitted publicly
that California had been grossly misgoverned and was liable to slip
away.[16.6] Yet the government did nothing, and confessed that nothing
could be done.[16.9]

Virtually, we say again, it was abdication. Both morally and physically
Mexico had thrown away and forever lost her control of the province.
She had nothing left except the bare thread of legal proprietorship;
and in certain cases legality is, according to enlightened modern
ideas, nothing. It is our conviction that human welfare is the supreme
test; and the welfare, not merely of California but of all the world,
certainly required that so rich a portion of the earth should be
developed and occupied. In our opinion a child, neglected and abused by
drunken parents who are always fighting each other, has good grounds for
leaving home, though not legally independent. We believe in the right of
revolution, which means that when a country misgoverns persistently a
considerable part of the population, it forfeits all claims to domineer
over them; and California, though her weakness led officials to practice
a lip service that deceived nobody, had more than once rebelled, had
made good her cause, and entertained no thought of accepting Mexican
rule again.[16.9]

She was, therefore, being in every way unable to establish herself
as an independent nation and gain the recognition of the world as
such, quite adrift. The province is now "at the mercy of whoever may
choose to take possession of it," wrote the nearest British consul in
1845. Californians, Mexicans, Britons, French and Americans, who were
qualified to judge, agreed on that. She was the homeless child, whom any
kind, intelligent and well-to-do person may, and some kind, intelligent
and well-to-do person should, provide for. Any one of the nations then
leading the march of civilization, if disposed to perform a parent's
duty toward California, could rightfully have taken charge of her, and
some one of them was under obligation to do so.[16.7] Of those nations
the United States was more favorably situated than any other to fulfil
the trust,[16.8] and she felt ready to accept it.[16.9]

[THE AMERICANS INTERESTED IN CALIFORNIA]

Indeed our people were profoundly interested in the matter. As early as
1839 a Congressional report on Oregon said enough about the territory
farther south to excite attention; and Forbes's history of California,
published the same year, did much to fix it and create the fear that
European powers might encroach there. The seizure of American residents
in 1840, the appearance of Dana's "Two Years Before the Mast," and the
incidents connected with Jones's landing at Monterey deepened these
impressions. By 1842 glowing letters from American settlers began to
appear in our newspapers, and the suspected purposes of England received
ample notice. Gold existed there, it was reported; the country was
attractive, salubrious and rich; the port of San Francisco had a value
that words could not represent, and the British already held a mortgage
on the country. Our Pacific whaling fleet was said by the New Bedford
member of Congress to include before the end of 1844 six hundred and
fifty vessels, which had cost twenty millions and employed 17,000 men;
and not only was this harbor most important, since the bar at the
Columbia River hampered navigation, but American control was needed
there, for the uncertain and vexatious Mexican regulations caused great
annoyance. Besides, it was pointed out, we required a fortified port on
that coast, else in case of war with England our whalers would be unable
to avoid capture.[16.10]

All these ideas took root, and in the spring of 1845 the press from
New York to St. Louis and New Orleans broke into quite a furore about
California. Its value became a popular subject; the known fact that
English holders of Mexican bonds had their eyes upon it was recalled;
the designs of the British government seemed to be clear; and annexation
was not only urged, but represented as near at hand. So keen became the
fear that England would forestall us, that in January, 1846, the ease
with which she could acquire California was dwelt upon in our national
Senate, while in the House the enormous advantages of our holding the
territory attracted attention.[16.10]

Our government was even in advance of the people. In 1835 an attempt
was made to purchase the Bay of San Francisco. The next year Ellis,
who represented the United States at Mexico, expressed the opinion
that northern California would be of "immense importance" to us. Four
years later a personal letter to President Van Buren pointed out that
England, as a great creditor of Mexico, was likely to appropriate the
territory, and steps were taken to obtain information regarding it for
the use of Congress and the Cabinet. Daniel Webster felt strongly by
this time that we should acquire it. In 1842, while he was secretary of
state, our minister at Mexico not only expatiated on the value of the
territory, but reported that England had taken steps to anticipate us;
and the minister was instructed to ascertain whether an offer from this
country would be acceptable. Our strained relations with Mexico and
especially Jones's occupation of Monterey made it unwise to follow up
the matter that year; but after an interval, Tyler and Webster planned
an arrangement which--had it been carried through--would have given us
the port of San Francisco.[16.11]

The expansive course of Great Britain, remarks dropped by English
writers, repeated warnings from our diplomatic and consular agents at
Mexico, and the consensus of opinion in California, Mexico, France and
the United States were quite enough to warrant suspicions of England,
and the circumstances connected with the visit of Duflot de Mofras,
attaché of the French legation at Mexico, to California, and the
publication of his book by order of the king, hinted of danger from
another quarter; but neither country took any positive action, and our
government--doubtless noting that a tide of emigration to the far west
had begun--refrained from every move that could excite the jealousy of
Mexico or Europe. Early in 1843 Larkin, who was deficient in education
but not in shrewdness, activity or patriotism, was appointed consul at
Monterey; but the value of American commerce fully justified the step.
During 1845 he did not receive one letter from the state department,
and for a long time no American war vessel could be seen on the
coast.[16.11]

[OUR GOVERNMENT INTERESTED]

Early in 1845, owing to the annexation of Texas, a breach with Mexico
had seemed probable, and the danger that she would somehow dispose of
California in order to place it beyond our reach had been deemed acute.
But our government did not intend to have war, the tide of emigration to
that quarter was rising, and Polk warned off European interference by
re-asserting the "Monroe Doctrine." On July 10, 1845, however, Larkin
wrote that England was maintaining there a vice consul without consular
business, and that, according to the universal belief in his vicinity,
she was promoting a new Mexican expedition to California; and at about
the same time as this letter, news of an extensive British plan to
colonize in that province arrived from London.[16.11]

The question was then maturely considered at Washington. Apparently the
American emigrants, unless checked, were sure to bring California into
the Union. That was natural and logical; such a peaceful invasion had
given us Texas; and in the opinion of the best qualified observers it
seemed likely to be efficacious again. Larkin, the Californians, the
British vice consul, the Mexican consul at New Orleans, the Mexican
minister at Washington, and Mexican, British, French and American
journals agreed on this. Larkin believed the matter would be settled
in that way by 1848. "Without striking a blow and without incurring
any expense," wrote Vice Consul Forbes, the United States will obtain
a secure foothold in the coveted region. The Americans do not need to
fight for California, said _Le Constitutionnel_ of Paris. "No more
convenient mode of conquest was ever devised," remarked the Baltimore
_American_. To suppose that Polk and the Cabinet failed to see what was
not only obvious but often pointed out, would be absurd. The condition
and political feeling of California, which were quite well known through
Larkin and others, fully warranted a procedure so amicable and so
beneficial; and it only remained to guard against European interference,
which our government now considered a real danger.[16.11]

On October 17, 1845, therefore, confidential instructions, based upon
the fact that British and French consuls having no commercial business
were maintained in California, were issued to Larkin, who was now
to be confidential agent as well as consul. "The interests of our
commerce and our whale fisheries in the Pacific Ocean demand," he was
informed, "that you should exert the greatest vigilance in discovering
and defeating any attempt, which may be made by foreign governments to
acquire a control over that country," Against such an attempt the United
States would "vigourously interpose"; but "should California assert and
maintain her independence, we shall render her all the kind offices in
our power"; and "whilst the President will make no effort and use no
influence to induce California to become one of the free and independent
states of this Union, yet if the people should desire to unite their
destiny with ours, they would be received as brethren, whenever this can
be done without affording Mexico just cause of complaint. Their true
policy for the present in regard to this question, is to let events
take their course, unless an attempt should be made to transfer them
without their consent either to Great Britain or France." On the same
day instructions to ascertain the designs of those powers were issued
to Commodore Sloat, commanding the Pacific squadron, and Lieutenant
Gillespie of the Marine Corps was ordered to California as a co-agent
with Larkin.[16.11]

All this has been called an intrigue; but, if that word is in fairness
applicable, the "intrigue" was only designed, so far as it concerned
Mexico and California, to rescue with a gentle hand the neglected,
abused and lost; so far as it concerned England and France, to ward off
an interposition which, if attempted, would probably have led to war;
and, so far as it concerned the United States, to safeguard and advance
most important national interests while promoting the general good of
the world. Such "intrigues" are among the most legitimate achievements
of true statecraft.[16.11]

This leads us to the more serious charge, that Polk brought upon two
nations the curse of war and endangered the peace of the world, for
the purpose of tearing California from the parent stem; and we find
ourselves here at the best point of view from which to consider it. Not
only, then, have we no sound evidence in support of the charge; not only
was he personally unfitted to play the rôle of conqueror; not only did
he exert himself to restore friendly relations with Mexico; not only
did he virtually forbid Slidell to work for the sale of California, if
so doing would militate against this endeavor; not only did his taking
certain other important steps and refraining from still others imply the
same intentions; but it appears that he looked forward to obtaining the
territory without war, should he be unable to purchase it, by a method
peculiarly suited to his characteristics and to those of Buchanan. We
therefore do not need to consider one of our Presidents a wretch unhung,
as many Americans have seemed eager to do, and should finally dismiss
the charge.[16.12]

[A CHANGE OF RULE IMMINENT]

While the instructions to Larkin were on their way, the year 1846
came in, and to California it brought fresh perplexities. The desire
to escape from what a citizen described as "a positive state of
anarchy" was more pronounced than ever. One plan contemplated a
French protectorate; but the men of that nationality were few, their
government did nothing, and their consul exerted himself only to acquire
unpopularity. A much greater number favored American control. Probably
all of the foreigners thought such a régime preferable to the existing
state of things. Even the British vice consul admitted that his personal
judgment pointed in that direction. Some of the Californians also leaned
our way. They recognized the merits of our institutions and the growth
of our power. The good order maintained by Commodore Jones's forces
had left a favorable impression, and so had the conduct of our naval
officers who went ashore from time to time.[16.16]

But the participation of Americans in the California revolts had
excited suspicion and fear. Our acquisition of Texas, as described by
Mexicans writers, had been resented, and probably it was known that
Mexicans residing there had fared none too well. American hunters--or
men believed to be such--had sometimes helped themselves to property.
In consequence very likely of misdeeds committed by our sailors the
Americans were generally disliked at Monterey. The constantly increasing
immigration despite Mexican laws appeared intrusive and menacing. All
the faults of our people, who were better known than other foreigners,
came to be understood. Their brusque, overbearing, strenuous ways
impressed the polite, indolent Californians as almost ferocious.
Indeed a natural antipathy--social, religious and racial--made harmony
well-nigh impossible. Finally, doubts were felt whether we should
be able to offer immediate and effective protection against Mexico
and the Indians, and whether our flag would not go down after a time,
as when Jones had raised it, leaving our friends to settle with the
mother-country as best they could.[16.16]

The British, on the other hand, while in every way as free and as
responsible as the Americans, were comparatively exempt from such
objections; their government had a strong fleet in the Pacific; and
hence, as was natural, most of the substantial citizens--especially in
the south--desired the shelter of her flag. But Forbes could not meet
their views. Warned not to meddle, save to hinder any other nation
from establishing a protectorate, he could make no promises and give
no encouragement. He conveyed to the government of California the
declaration of England that she would feel greatly displeased to have
the province pass under the control of any other power, but his only
advice was to elude American rule by declaring unqualified independence;
and this plan, as all thoughtful men understood, could not be carried
out.[16.16]

Governor Pico, a fat, swarthy, good-natured farmer of tolerably good
sense but little ability, and educated only about enough to write his
name, was the chief of the British party, and wanted no Americans in the
country. Vallejo--who was now inactive but had great influence--favored
the Americans, for he believed that we held the winning cards, and
foresaw, like many other landowners, that American rule would enhance
the value of real estate. Castro, a man of quick but not profound
intelligence and more ambitious for power and fame than for wealth,
probably desired independence with himself as the autocrat; but he knew
the time had not arrived, and felt that his grip on the customhouse
must not be loosened. For the present, therefore, while he showed
much amiability toward the Americans and occasionally masked his real
views behind cordiality toward France, he posed at Mexico as an ardent
patriot. In order to save his responsibility, whatever might happen,
and perhaps fortify his position, he urged the need of preparing for
war against the United States, and called for plenty of money and a
few soldiers--not more than he could be sure of handling. At the same
time, holding that Pico was only an acting governor, he recommended
that during the crisis, at least, the civil authority should be united
with the military. In March he invited a number of leading citizens to
discuss the situation with him,[16.13] but no agreement on a line of
action could be reached.[16.16]

Forbes congratulated himself that no American of commanding influence,
familiar with the language, customs and prejudices of the people,
resided in California; but Larkin seems to have been on good terms
with all the officials at least. His firm chin, ample brow and correct
side-whiskers inspired respect, while his notable energy, hospitality
and public spirit gained him esteem; and when Gillespie, after crossing
Mexico to Mazatlán in the guise of a mercantile agent and then sailing
perforce to the Hawaiian Islands,[16.14] arrived at Monterey on
April 17, and repeated to him from memory Buchanan's instructions of
precisely six months before, which it had not been thought safe to
bring in writing, he promptly bestirred himself. The main points of his
instructions were transmitted in confidence to friends at other towns;
here and there an official had an opportunity to see a good argument,
written out in Spanish, for American rule; and Castro was assured
that he and his friends might derive personal advantages from such a
change.[16.16]

[A CRASH AT HAND]

As if all these currents and cross-currents did not produce commotion
enough, civil war now loomed up. Both Los Angeles and Monterey desired
to be the capital and possess the customhouse. Herrera had assigned
two thirds of the revenue to Pico and one third to Castro; but Paredes
reversed this arrangement, and Castro improved still further upon it
by taking the whole. In April the comandante general and his officers
repudiated Herrera, on whom Pico's authority depended, came out for
Paredes, and resolved to propose, on the ground of Mexico's threatening
relations with the United States, that the governor should place himself
in Castro's power by coming to Monterey--the latter, in case of a
refusal, to act according to his discretion.[16.16]

Pico, who doubtless knew as well as others, that Castro was aiming to
upset him, appealed to the people and summoned a general convention,
which was to meet at Santa Barbara on June 15, and avert the "external
and internal disasters" that were threatening California. The promoters
of the scheme intended to audit Castro's use of the public funds,
declare for independence, and invite foreign protection--preferably
that of England. Castro denounced it as treasonable, defeated it by
preventing the northern delegates from going to Santa Barbara,[16.15]
and proclaimed martial law; and about the middle of June Pico advanced
against him with all the forces he could raise. It seemed as if a crash
would have to come; and a crash did come.[16.16]




                                  XVII

                       THE CONQUEST OF CALIFORNIA

                               1846-1847


In December, 1845, Brevet Captain John C. Frémont of the United
States army, who was engaged with a party of about fifty or sixty
men--necessarily armed but not soldiers--in looking for a satisfactory
road to the Pacific, reached New Helvetia, and at the end of January
he presented himself at Monterey to obtain funds and supplies, and
ask for permission to recruit his followers and horses in California.
Castro gave this permission; but unfortunately one of the two men
either misunderstood or violated the terms of the agreement, and when
the surveying party was discovered early in March near Monterey, Castro
denounced Frémont as having invaded Mexican territory and aiming to
excite a revolt.[17.1]

It was an admirable opportunity to figure at home and at Mexico as a
dauntless patriot, and the comandante general made the most of it. His
narrow but high forehead, framed with curling black hair, seemed to
expand, and his brilliant black eyes darted fire, as he galloped about
the countryside rallying militia. Frémont placed himself in a strong
position, built some fortifications, raised the American flag and
announced that he would perish fighting; but after cannon were seen in
the distance he retired under cover of darkness, and slowly proceeded
toward Oregon. Castro then put out a bombastic proclamation, of course,
declaring that he had driven the American intruder away.[17.1]

[THE "BEAR" MOVEMENT]

Far to the north Frémont was overtaken early in May by Gillespie, and
went back to the Sacramento.[17.2] On June 6 he decided to act. At
his instance Americans captured a drove of horses that Castro had sent
for. Some days later a sizable company took Sonoma, a military post
north of San Francisco Bay, seized the cannon, arms and munitions,
appropriated horses, cattle and miscellaneous property, carried away
Vallejo and other leading citizens as prisoners, and raised a home-made
flag decorated with a particularly home-made semblance of a bear. Some
hostilities then occurred; some blood was shed; and early in July the
tragi-comedy reached its climax in a declaration of independence, which
probably not one Californian acclaimed.[17.6]

What could have precipitated such an astounding performance? Clearly
no directions from our government.[17.3] A policy calculated, not
to outrage and affright, but on the other hand to conciliate and win
the people, had been enjoined upon Sloat, Larkin and Gillespie; and
under Buchanan's order Gillespie had acquainted Frémont with Larkin's
instructions. But Frémont, like the others, was to counteract foreign
designs, and knowing--for Larkin was aware of the fact on April 17 and
hence Gillespie knew it--that Slidell had been rejected, he said and
presumably believed, that war had by this time begun; and he doubtless
feared that England, supposably in collusion with Mexico, would try to
occupy California before the United States could act there. Forbes, on
behalf of the British, could see that a declaration of independence
would keep the Americans out. Hence possibly Frémont argued that such a
step would help to do as much for the British; and evidently a flag put
up by himself could be lowered any day.[17.6]

Besides, as we learn from the President, Gillespie had secret
instructions; and these, while not contradicting the others, very
possibly stated that Polk was determined to have a complete settlement
with Mexico, and in case of war to acquire California, for such was soon
his policy; and presumably they ordered that Frémont should hover about,
and be ready to coöperate at the proper time. These circumstances,
taken together, presented to his roving imagination a brilliant vista
of achievements and glory; and, as he said, he "resolved to move
forward on the opportunity."[17.4] Moreover many of the Americans
in the Sacramento valley, believing that Castro intended to expel
them shortly from the country, appealed to Frémont for aid;[17.5]
and, finally, that officer probably burned to vindicate himself as a
soldier from the imputation of having run away in March. Hence the
determination to overthrow the government. Cannon, munitions and horses
were logical necessities; and it seemed likely that Vallejo and his
friends could be used to influence the public or possibly at the worst
as hostages.[17.6]

The Californians, however, did not relish Frémont's total disregard
of their feelings and rights. They viewed the Bear uprising as an
inexcusable outrage--predatory, murderous and cruel, and, since Frémont
was an American army officer, as fully justifying every suspicion and
fear entertained against our government. The exasperation was intense;
the resentment bitter. Who could think his person or property safe
under the law of the rifle enforced by robbers? they asked. To make the
situation worse Frémont, under the pretence that he was getting ready
for the long journey home, obtained munitions and supplies from the
United States vessel of war _Portsmouth_, anchored at San Francisco; and
this fact became publicly known. Larkin was kept entirely in the dark,
but probably not one Californian thought so. In short, the plan of the
government was completely upset. Moreover Frémont's operations tended
to defeat his own aim also, for they enabled Pico to solicit British
protection on a definite and substantial ground.[17.6]

These events, however, were soon eclipsed. June 24, 1845, instructions
for his guidance, in view of our strained relations with Mexico, had
been issued to Commodore Sloat of the Pacific squadron. He was told
that he should be "assiduously careful to avoid any act, which could
be construed as an act of aggression"; yet, should he ascertain "with
certainty"--"beyond a doubt"--that Mexico had "declared war," he
was to occupy San Francisco and occupy or blockade such other ports
as he could. In consequence of this order Sloat, so he reported in
November, proceeded to Mazatlán as the likeliest place to receive
information;[17.7] and on May 17 he learned from United States
Consul Parrott of Mazatlán, then at Guadalajara, of Thornton's
defeat. Upon this he decided to execute his orders immediately; but
on considering the June instructions again, he thought action was not
warranted.[17.8] May 31 came news of Palo Alto and the Resaca, and on
June 5 confirmation of the news. That hostilities had begun he felt
no doubt; but, "sicklied o'er" with something that resembled thought
"as the mist resembles rain," and with an anxiety about his personal
fortunes that obscured national interests, his resolution still wavered.
On the seventh of June, however, he learned from Surgeon Wood, recently
of the squadron but now on his way home with Parrott _via_ Mexico City,
that the Mexican government admitted the battles had occurred, and
learned also that an American fleet was blockading Vera Cruz. The next
day he sailed; and on July 2 he was in Monterey harbor,[17.9] fourteen
hundred miles to the northwest, where for some strange reason he made
the usual call on the authorities.[17.15]

Larkin, with whom the Commodore had been instructed to confer, soon
hastened aboard, and opened Sloat's astonished eyes to the situation.
They agreed--for their instructions agreed--that kindness toward the
people was to characterize all action; but Larkin, who did not believe
war had begun, wanted action postponed, hoping that American rule
would be invited, or at least welcomed, by the Californians,[17.10]
while Sloat--though doubtless he now learned of the government's
plan to acquire the province through immigration and a period of
independence--remembered that he was under orders to occupy or blockade
the ports without unnecessary delay, and perceived that the state of
things called upon him to take immediate possession of the interior
also, regarding which no instructions had been given him.[17.11] News
that an American officer, to whom another officer had recently been sent
from Washington, was apparently conducting hostilities at a distance
from the sea appeared like a clue to the maze;[17.12] and, finally,
after several days of anxious and wavering deliberation, the idea that
Sir George Seymour, admiral of the British Pacific fleet, who had seemed
to be watching his movements,[17.13] might appear at any hour and
raise the British flag, drove him into action.[17.15]

July 7, as the sun rose above the mountains on the east, Monterey
in its amphitheatre of pine-clad hills, with trim-looking white and
balconied houses dotted along its two parallel streets among the trees
and along the waters of the broad cove, which lay rippling at its
very feet, presented a very attractive appearance, but certainly was
insignificant enough. Not so, however, what occurred there. Old Captain
Silva, the commandant, when invited at half-past seven to give up the
town, replied that he and the troops had left the place, and there was
nothing--not even a flag--to surrender; and at about half-past ten
Captain Mervine with some two hundred and fifty sailors and marines
landed from boats.[17.15]

[SLOAT OCCUPIES MONTEREY]

Marching to the little customhouse Mervine read a proclamation drawn
by Sloat and Larkin. The United States and Mexico being now at war, I
take possession of upper California, said the Commodore in effect, but
I do so as her best friend; the territory becomes a part of the United
States, and the people shall be protected in all their present rights;
they may stay here as neutrals, or depart; they may choose their own
officials; products of the United States will come in duty-free, and
other articles pay one quarter of the Mexican rate; civil security,
religious freedom and material prosperity will be the fruits of American
rule.[17.14] The Stars and Stripes were then run up on the customhouse
flagstaff, our men--both afloat and ashore--cheered, the boom of
twenty-one guns from the _Savannah_ filled the amphitheatre of hills,
and the great province of California had a future. By July 14 our colors
were flying at every important point, and the Bear ensign had vanished.
Stringent orders to prevent misbehavior and plundering were issued;
measures were adopted to support the flag and repress the Indians; and
Frémont was earnestly invited to coöperate.[17.15]

Both Sloat and Larkin endeavored to bring Castro in, but he would
not come; and he retorted by demanding an explanation of the Sonoma
affair. Doubtless that episode had thoroughly angered him, and he felt
besides that a man in his official position would not be forgiven by
the people, should he condone it. Alvarado and Pico, both of whom
were cordially addressed, held entirely aloof; and before long the
governor and the comandante general, forced into a reconciliation by
Frémont's operations, united their commands. But as the people of
northern California generally, thankful to escape from the clutches of
the Bear and pleased with Sloat's proclamation, appeared willing to
accept the change of flags, these two leaders withdrew to the vicinity
of Los Angeles, where with about eight hundred men and ten cannon
they supported--or pretended to support--the cause of Mexico; and
the situation was further clarified by Admiral Seymour, who arrived
at Monterey on July 16, and a week later, admitting that he could not
interfere, sailed away.[17.15]

July 23 Sloat, who felt ill and probably felt worried, turned over
the command on shore to Robert F. Stockton, who had arrived in the
_Congress_ about a week before,[17.16] and some days later, giving up
the squadron also, left the coast. The new Commodore seems to have been
a smart, but vain, selfish, lordly and rampant individual, thirsting for
glory; and little glory could be seen in following after his predecessor
under so mild a policy. Besides, another character was now on the stage.
July 19 about one hundred and sixty horsemen entered Monterey from
the north--men with gaunt bodies, frames of steel, shaggy beards, and
an air of indomitable courage and endurance, armed with a long, heavy
rifle on the shoulder and a big knife on the hip, and speaking a lingo
sometimes hard to understand. These were the youngest and hardiest of
the Sacramento men, reinforced with the pick of the immigrants just
arrived. At their head rode a short, slender, active man in buckskin
blouse, leggings and moccasins, a blue shirt open at the neck, and a
cotton handkerchief in lieu of a hat, with plenty of hair, a small,
bearded face, and therein eyes--"such eyes." This was Frémont.[17.20]

He was a counsellor far more to Stockton's taste than Larkin; and,
in addition to believing the Californians dangerous and unreliable,
and entertaining deep resentment on account of the March episode, he
doubtless could see that California, reposing contentedly under the
American flag, would make a poor background for his violent operations.
The outcome was a ridiculous address,[17.17] which ranted at length
against Castro, especially for his treatment of Frémont, explained
Sloat's action as due to this, declared that Stockton's only object was
to protect life and property, and announced that when Castro should
be put down and the duties of government be assumed by responsible
officials, he would remove the American forces.[17.20]

July 23, with a view to the conquest of the whole province, Frémont's
men were taken into the naval service as the California Battalion, with
himself as major and Gillespie as captain; and they sailed promptly for
San Diego to gain Castro's rear. A few days later Stockton followed
in the _Congress_, raised the American flag at Santa Barbara, and
anchored at San Pedro, some eighteen miles from Los Angeles. Larkin,
still most anxious to bring about a peaceful arrangement, came with
him. Believing that war had not been and would not be declared, he
urgently recommended through Stearns of Los Angeles that Pico and the
legislature meet the dubious emergency, prevent the country from falling
a prey to disorder, save the interests of all officials, and ensure
lasting prosperity by declaring California independent under American
protection; and Castro proposed that Stockton halt at San Pedro with a
view to negotiations.[17.20]

Alvarado said later that a satisfactory arrangement could probably have
been made, but the Commodore haughtily insisted that Castro should
begin by accepting independence and the American flag.[17.18] To do
this would have left him nothing to trade upon; and hence, apparently
overestimating Stockton's military strength, lacking money, and finding
round him no popular enthusiasm or even genuine harmony, he retired
hastily on August 10 with a handful of men toward Sonora, leaving behind
him a cloud of eloquence;[17.19] and the governor also left the
country.[17.20]

[CALIFORNIA IN AMERICAN HANDS]

On their disappearance all military opposition vanished. Larkin with
a couple of friends took Los Angeles on the twelfth of August; the
Commodore with his marines and sailors, headed by a brass band, and
Frémont with a part of his battalion arrived the next day; and on the
seventeenth, when positive information that war had begun reached the
town, Stockton issued another proclamation. California now belongs to
the United States, he announced in effect, and is under military law;
all who adhere to the new régime will be protected, but no others may
remain in the country. Some of the Californian leaders were arrested
and a number surrendered, but all of them were given their liberty on
parole. Friends rallied of course to the winning side; the Commodore
became attentive and kindly toward the people; and Larkin soon reported
that matters were settling down.[17.20]

Stockton realized that under the law of nations and the law of humanity
a conqueror had the right and the duty of softening military rule,
and felt that pursuing such a course here would tend to confirm the
victory. Already, with his assistance, the first schoolhouse and the
first newspaper of California had made their appearance; steps were
now taken to establish postal facilities; and this very proclamation
announced, that officials elected by the people might govern according
to the prevailing usages. In September regular municipal elections took
place, and good results were obtained.[17.20]

The reign of justice began to dawn. Chaplain Colton, appointed alcalde
of Monterey, gave general satisfaction. American officers recovered a
large number of horses driven off by the Indians, and astonished the
Californians by returning them to their owners. The Commodore, besides
adjusting disputes in a manner that gratified the people, made and
forwarded to Washington for approval what he called laws; announced
that a legislative council would be created, and called himself
governor. This office, however, it was not his intention to hold long.
The fantastic idea of landing at Acapulco and moving upon the capital
had taken possession of his mind. He therefore sent Frémont north to
enlist men for him on the Sacramento, proposed to set out for Mexico in
October, and promised to inaugurate that officer as governor on leaving
California.[17.20]

But he did not leave so promptly. In arranging for the security of the
country he divided it into three military districts, appointing Frémont
commandant at the north and Gillespie at the south. Gillespie's task
was peculiarly important, because news and troops from Mexico would
arrive first at Los Angeles, and because that section had the largest
percentage of restless people, the smallest percentage of Americans,
and the weakest pro-American sentiment. He seems to have been an
elegant, precise man with a stiff, pointed beard and a temper of the
same description; but at any rate he was a soldier, understood his
responsibility, and knew what military government signified.[17.27]

Larkin urged that a respectable command should be given him, but
Stockton had neither men nor funds for land service, and only about
fifty of the disdainful and intolerant volunteers, perhaps including
some of the detested Sonoma "brigands," could be spared for Los Angeles.
A garrison of that strength, far from support, was almost an insult
and certainly a provocation to the people. Though told by Stockton
to temper military law, Gillespie doubtless felt that his only safety
lay in maintaining strict order; and if, unfamiliar with Californian
character and ways, he extended his discipline too rigidly over the free
and easy natives, as he seems to have done, the mistake was but natural.
Stockton himself had given the cue, declaring in his proclamation
of August 17 that men found in arms outside their houses were to be
banished, ordering that all must be at home from ten o'clock at night
until sunrise, and indulging in a general tone that has been thought
supercilious. Here were causes enough of trouble; and behind them lay
an inevitable clash of races, temperaments and customs, unavoidable
friction resulting from a forcible change of flags, and a restlessness
due to the ambition of would-be leaders.[17.27]

[INSURRECTION]

As the signs of disaffection began to show themselves, Gillespie
naturally arrested suspicious persons, and punished those whom he deemed
conspirators. This precipitated an outburst. In the night of September
22 some turbulent fellows made an attack on the American quarters. In
a military way it was contemptible; but, as such affairs often do, it
crystallized popular sentiment. Within a few days about four hundred
Californians were in arms; and when the surrender of Lieutenant Wilson
with some twenty-five men at the Chino farm to about one hundred
and ten insurgents heightened confidence, the movement spread still
more. Some of the malcontents were persons of standing, who felt that
self-respect called upon them to break a lance against the invader, even
though sure to be defeated; but the great majority appear to have been
irresponsible characters ready for anything except work. Lieutenant
Colonel Flores, the leader, and nearly all of his officers had violated
their paroles, of course; but breaking an oath seemed to them a trivial
matter, for they knew they could make another equally good on a moment's
notice.[17.21] Without fortifications, adequate equipment or supplies,
Gillespie could see no hope of resisting such odds, and September 29 he
capitulated on favorable terms.[17.22] The next day he proceeded to
San Pedro with his men, and they soon embarked there on a merchant ship,
the _Vandalia_.[17.27]

About the first of October Stockton, then at San Francisco, learned of
the insurrection. By his order Mervine sailed promptly for San Pedro in
the _Savannah_, and on October 7 with sailors, marines and Gillespie's
command--all on foot--the captain marched for Los Angeles. Stockton,
however, had provided him with no artillery, while the Californians were
supported by a small field piece. When the Americans charged, this gun
was hurried beyond their reach by mounted men with lariats; but as soon
as the Americans halted from exhaustion, it was drawn back and set at
work. The case appeared hopeless, and after losing about a dozen men,
killed or wounded, Mervine found it necessary to retreat. Naturally the
Californians felt immensely encouraged, and large numbers gathered on
the hills behind San Pedro.[17.27]

Late in October Stockton, after lingering a while at San Francisco
to attend a glorification meeting and stopping at Monterey to land
ordnance and men for the defence of that point, arrived at San Pedro and
undertook to accomplish something; but the attempt proved a failure, and
he sailed for San Diego, at that day a small group of adobe houses about
four miles northeast of the present city.[17.23] Insurgents were now
besieging the place, and neither provisions nor horses could be obtained
in the vicinity; but Stockton procured both from lower California, and
began to make ready for land operations.[17.27]

By this time Flores had been elected provisional governor and comandante
general by the legislature, and martial law had been declared; but the
insurgent leader found himself without adequate resources. Foreigners
aided him with a little money at an exorbitant rate of interest, but on
October 24 he stated that only some forty rounds of cannon ammunition
remained, and a thousand for the muskets of his four hundred men.
Campaigning without supplies or funds and driving stock to the interior
were found extremely irksome by the indolent Californians; a general
discouragement prevailed; and the legislature could not obtain a quorum.
Soon disaffection showed itself; and being a Mexican, Flores dared
not adopt strong measures. Finally, in the night of December 3 he was
imprisoned by malcontents; and although the legislature and people
soon extinguished the revolt, much confusion grew out of it. Moreover,
Stockton's troops outnumbered his; other Americans were gathering in
northern California, he knew; and thousands of immigrants were expected
at New Helvetia, he was informed.[17.27]

[KEARNEY'S ARRIVAL]

None of these forces, however, gave him the first blow. May 26 Polk had
proposed an overland expedition to California, and a week later it was
decided upon. Accordingly Kearny was ordered to advance after securing
New Mexico, should the season permit; and on September 25, as we have
seen, he left Santa Fe for the coast. Soon meeting Stockton's bearer
of despatches, he learned that California had been occupied, sent back
all but about one hundred of his dragoons, and with these and a pair of
mountain howitzers marched on. At the beginning of December he reached
Warner's ranch (_Agua Caliente_), the frontier settlement of California,
and, having learned of the insurrection, wrote on to Stockton for aid
and information. Gillespie was therefore sent forward with a brass
4-pounder and thirty-eight men, met him December 5, and told him among
other news that a party of insurgents lay at San Pascual, about eight
miles distant on the road to San Diego. Probably the force numbered
rather less than one hundred. A capable man, however, Andrés Pico,
brother of the ex-governor, commanded them.[17.24]

  [Illustration: Fight at San Pascual]

Kearny sent off a scouting party, which not only saw but was seen, and
reported to him at two o'clock the next morning. An attack upon the
Californians was highly inadvisable. The Americans and the pack-mules
that many of them rode were almost worn out. Some horses recently bought
or captured were accustomed to the terrible Mexican bits, and could
not be controlled by their new riders. Kearny had had no experience in
fighting lancers or California horsemen, and did not know how many were
before him. It was clear that the enemy were aware of his presence.
The dampness of the night made firearms unreliable, and the men were
so chilled they could not use them quickly. Finally, it would not
have been difficult to hold the insurgents off with his three cannon,
and march safely in a compact body to San Diego, now only about forty
miles distant. Kearny decided, however, to attack before daybreak, and
advanced.[17.24]

Pico had not desired nor expected a battle; but, perceiving what kind
of troops were in his front, he did not flinch. Kearny's advance guard
fared very badly, and when his main body came into action, the enemy
adopted the familiar ruse of a pretended flight. In pursuing, the
Americans became separated according to the speed of their mounts;
and then Pico turned furiously upon them. The net result was that
Kearny, Gillespie and thirteen other Americans received ugly wounds,
and eighteen were killed, while the enemy's loss appears to have been
trifling. After ten or fifteen minutes, however, the Californians drew
off, expecting guns and large reinforcements, which Flores had promised.
As one consequence of the revolt against his authority, these did not
arrive. Hence Pico, who had not been prepared for either the fight or
the revolt, made no serious efforts to follow up his advantage; and
Kearny, though he lost his cattle, had to live on mule meat, and was
burdened with his wounded, succeeded, with additional aid sent him by
Stockton, in reaching San Diego on December 12.[17.24]

Stockton's preparations to do something were then resumed. Sailors
felt strongly averse to shore duty, but he overcame their repugnance.
The ships furnished them pikes, carbines and pistols, and shoes were
manufactured out of canvas; and so with Kearny's dragoons, Gillespie's
detachment, some friendly Californians and about four hundred sailors
and marines, drilled somewhat for their new work, the Commodore had a
respectable force.[17.25] It was not, however, his intention to attack
the main body of the insurgents, for he felt afraid the enemy would then
get behind him. His plan was to move up the coast and make a diversion,
expecting Frémont and his riflemen to take the bull by the horns; but
Kearny urged him to march for Los Angeles, about one hundred and forty
miles distant, and at length on December 29, after having brushed away
the Californians operating against San Diego, he set out, greatly
embarrassed by having to drag miserable ox-carts through the deep sand.
Kearny declined the chief command, but finally asked for and was given
the post of lieutenant or executive officer under Stockton.[17.27]

Flores now found himself in a desperate situation. Naturally officers
who knew they had violated their paroles dreaded to give up; but most
of his troops felt half-hearted, people hid to avoid serving, and some
of the Indians were in arms against him. In order to gain time for a
blow at Frémont, he tried to inveigle Stockton into a truce, holding
out as a reason that Mexico and the United States had probably adjusted
their differences; but the Commodore refused to treat with an officer
guilty of breaking his parole. Then, having some four hundred and fifty
badly armed men, though not enough powder for a long fight, he set an
ambuscade where he supposed the Americans would pass; but Stockton
avoided it by turning to the right, and made for the Bartolo ford of the
San Gabriel River, twelve miles from Los Angeles, where the stream was
only knee-deep. The Californians followed suit, and occupied an eminence
fifty feet high, parallel to the stream and about six hundred yards
beyond it.[17.27]

As the Americans crossed--the first of them deploying and waiting
behind the bank, here breast-high and masked with trees--Flores greeted
them from the top of the hill with four small guns; but his inferior
powder and sometimes ill-fitting balls proved ineffective.[17.26]
When the Americans were mostly across the river and formed in a square,
he undertook to charge. But the movement seems to have been rather
faint-hearted or badly managed; his left was demoralized by hearing one
of the aides--who seems to have been seized with a panic--shout "Halt!"
as it was advancing; and his right accomplished nothing. Stockton
then cannonaded the hill, particularly with his two 9-pounders, for
about forty minutes, while most of his troops lay down; and finally he
charged. Crying "New Orleans!" in memory of Jackson's great victory,
gained on the same day of the year, January 8, the men rushed on, and
easily took possession of the ground. The Californians made a fruitless
attack on their rear, and then most of them dispersed.[17.27]

[STOCKTON MOVES AGAINST LOS ANGELES]

The next morning Stockton, leaving the road in order to avoid the danger
of ambuscades, pushed slowly on toward Los Angeles; and after a time
some three hundred Californians, whom Flores had managed to rally,
placed themselves upon his line of march. An ineffective cannonade from
a ravine used up the rest of their ammunition, while the Americans
replied with equally meagre results. As a last effort, Flores now
ordered a charge, giving the signal for it--as he himself reported--by
sending forward a white flag.[17.27]

  [Illustration: Fight near Los Angeles]

The attack was made with considerable spirit but no success at all on
both of the American flanks, and then Flores took post at a point on
the road to Mexico, where Pasadena now stands. He admitted losing only
five killed and twenty-two wounded during the two days, but probably
these figures needed to be multiplied by three; while Stockton lost one
killed and fourteen wounded. That night the Americans encamped near Los
Angeles; and the next day, January 10, after a deputation had come to
arrange matters, they took possession of the town--annoyed a little by
drunken bullies--and replaced Gillespie's flag on the government house.
Most of the California troops now scattered, and those who remained were
insubordinate. Flores could see there was no hope; and the following
night, leaving to Andrés Pico the chief command and probably about one
hundred men, he set out hastily with a few others for Sonora.[17.27]

[FRÉMONT'S OPERATIONS]

Up to this time nothing had been heard of Frémont's operations during
almost three months. Probably that officer did not wish to take part
in the hostilities. Expecting to be governor and seeing before him
a prospect of brilliant opportunities, he desired to conciliate the
people. Stockton, on learning of the revolt in the south, had ordered
him back from the Sacramento, and about October 12 he sailed for Santa
Barbara with instructions to march from that place to Los Angeles.
Learning on the way, however, that Mervine had been defeated, and that
all the horses and cattle had been driven away from Santa Barbara by
insurgents, he returned on his own responsibility to the Sacramento,
and began to collect not only horses but men.[17.28] By the end of
November he found at his back about four hundred mounted riflemen and at
least three guns, the strongest force in California.[17.32]

The _Savannah_ had been sent north expressly to assist him;[17.29]
but, with little reference to his army commission or his naval
obligations, he now proceeded slowly by land to San Luis Obispo, where
he fortunately captured Jesús Pico, a cousin of Andrés; and after his
prisoner had been sentenced to death for breaking parole, he assumed
the authority of pardoning him. Then, for no discoverable reason unless
to spare about sixty insurgents, whom he could have scattered in ten
minutes, he led his command through the mountains, where it suffered
terribly in the stormy weather. At Santa Barbara he took a week for
repose; and finally, with a nicety of calculation or felicity of luck
that excites wonder, he arrived near the scene of action--three months
after receiving orders to go there--precisely as the Americans were
entering Los Angeles.[17.30] Then with his devotee, Jesús Pico, he
betook himself to the camp of Andrés, and finally, although he knew that
American forces had beaten the Californians and entered Los Angeles,
and understood that a superior officer was near, he arranged with the
insurgents a capitulation, which Stockton had refused to grant.[17.32]

This capitulation, the "treaty" of Cahuenga, conceded substantially
all the insurgents could have asked. They promised to give up the
public arms, go home, obey the laws of the United States, and help
restore tranquillity; but on the other hand they and the rest of the
Californians were to be protected in person and property, to enjoy the
same rights as Americans, to be excused from serving under arms or
taking an oath of allegiance during the war, and to leave the country
freely should they wish to do so.[17.31] Naturally such a settlement
was displeasing to Stockton, but he felt extremely anxious to resume
his proper work as a naval officer, and of course was glad to have this
difficult business off his hands; so after hesitating for a time he
confirmed the pact.[17.32]

It was a singular dénouement. Men defeated, without a hope left, and in
danger of execution for breaking parole, virtually dictated terms to the
conquerors. A brevet captain, just blossoming into a lieutenant colonel,
eclipsed a commodore and a brigadier general; and the arch-ruffian of
the Bear cult reappeared as a fairy godmother to save and bless the
Californians, who detested him. But the ending was after all a happy
one. The Americans felt a new respect for the people, and they were able
to see that, although destitute of gunpowder, the insurgents, if driven
to extremities, could have done much harm with lance, dagger and torch,
and could have sown the seeds of perennial hate.[17.32]

On the other hand, while the Californians felt well pleased with their
own audacity and valor, they not only realized that it was impossible
to fight the United States, but were thoroughly disgusted with Flores,
who took away hundreds of horses and mules belonging to his friends, and
with Mexico, which in three and a half months had sent neither a man nor
a peso to encourage and sustain them. Indeed, as their agent in Mexico
frankly said, their political attitude had completely changed. Most of
them intended to abide by the terms. They were disposed to look forward
instead of back. And the curtain was already beginning to rise on the
Golden West that we know.[17.32]




                                 XVIII

                      THE GENESIS OF TWO CAMPAIGNS

                       July, 1846-February, 1847


The operations described in the preceding chapters were all favorable to
American arms, and they placed under our control a very large portion
of the territory belonging to Mexico; but as they proceeded, it became
evident that she had no thought of consenting to negotiate. Indeed
Santa Anna's course and the utterances of the press were unflinchingly
warlike; and our consul at Mexico wrote, "Nothing but some very severe
blow will ever bring them to their senses." The policy and expectations
of the American government were therefore palpably wrong. The programme
of a short and a brisk war was a mistake and a failure. The nation found
itself in a contest of unforeseen duration and extent.[18.4]

Heedless enthusiasm was consequently sobered, if not exactly chilled.
By the end of September, 1846, Pakenham, the British minister at
Washington, reported that a growing distaste for the war could be seen
more clearly each day. Large expenses had to be faced, and heavy losses
of men seemed inevitable. Many believed that neither troops nor money
enough could be raised; many, besides deploring the loss of precious
lives, complained that needed laborers had already been drawn away; and
many others asked themselves whether the outlay would be really worth
while. Taylor's famous letter to Gaines expressed the opinion that even
complete success would be of no advantage; and his idea of simply fixing
and holding a boundary north of which there would be enough territory
to pay all fair claims for indemnity, and throwing upon Mexico the
responsibility for offensive operations naturally appealed to not a few.
Moreover, he argued, no other sort of a peace could be made, since the
enemy had no government sufficiently stable to treat with. Calhoun took
up eagerly the defensive idea. Buchanan favored it; and Polk himself,
dreading to alarm the country by demanding great numbers of men and
fearful that the credit of the nation would not bear the strain of
active warfare, did the same.[18.4]

On the other hand such a plan was clearly unsuited to the enterprising
temper of the American people, and precisely what the Mexicans, whose
ancestors had fought the Moors of Spain for hundreds of years, desired.
It reminded one of the menaces and forays that had been the policy of
Mexico against the Texans. It would have been received by her as a
cheering confession, on our part, of military impotence. Had it been
adopted, her people would have found a chain of profitable markets
established for them; and at any time she could have dashed either
with regular or with irregular troops upon any part of our line, done
what harm she could, and retired like a wave on the beach, to prepare
fresh assaults in a perpetual series. Only one campaign of the sort now
proposed was on record, said Cass--that of Sisyphus. Besides, every mile
of the boundary would have required its guard; even at that a broad
space along the frontier would have become practically uninhabitable;
expenses approaching those of offensive operations would have mounted
up; we could have laid no contributions upon the enemy; national
honor would have been tarnished and national spirit exasperated by a
succession of small defeats; and no progress whatever toward conquering
a peace would have been made.[18.4]

Politically and commercially the unfavorable condition of things
which the United States had been so anxious to end, would have become
chronic. European nations would soon have gained a monopoly of trade
and influence in Mexico; they would have protested against an endless
blockade; and what further steps they would have taken in regard to
a vexatious and apparently aimless contest it was easy to imagine.
Furthermore, simply to seize and hold, with no legal title, provinces
which Mexico had not been able to protect against the Indians would
have seemed to place the United States in the class of mere pilferers.
Honor--at least military honor--demanded that we should meet the enemy,
whom we had challenged, at the centre of their pride and power.
Finally, the weakness exhibited in "backing out" of a war with Mexico,
begun without a question of triumph, would have excited ridicule abroad,
and compromised our international position. Confronted with such
objections to the defensive plan, Polk was "extremely distressed," said
Pakenham. Evidently some decisive achievement was needed to save the
administration, the party and the country; but he dared not face the
cost nor incur the risk of a still more signal failure.[18.4]

[BOLDER IDEAS]

There was, however, no lack of bolder ideas. Not only did every
newspaper come forward with a "cut and dried" plan, as Marcy rather
bitterly said, but the government itself knew what needed to be done.
In fact mere animal instinct was enough to suggest that a blow should
be struck at the enemy's heart, and as the project of maintaining a
line of operations from the Rio Grande to the capital--more than 800
miles--was out of the question, the idea of attacking Mexico City by the
way of Vera Cruz came forward early. On July 4, 1846, Benton formally
suggested landing beyond the range of Ulúa, the island fortress which
guarded that port, attacking the town in the rear, and after its fall
advancing to the capital. Santa Anna advised through Mackenzie almost
exactly that method of approach, adding that three or four thousand men
could easily capture the port; and at nearly the same time a letter from
Taylor, arguing that a lunge from the Rio Grande base would be unwise,
reinforced this project;[18.1] but there was no certainty that an
army could be placed in the rear of Vera Cruz, and a number of other
difficulties had to be considered.[18.4]

In 1838 a French squadron had been unable in six hours to injure
Ulúa seriously, though it had been permitted to choose its positions
unmolested. Such an advantage could not be expected now, and besides, as
Conner reported, the number of guns in the fortress had been increased
fourfold. The parapet of the main work had an elevation of forty feet
above the water; three 10-inch guns throwing shells were twenty feet
higher, and there were outworks--connected with the principal fort only
by drawbridges--commanded so thoroughly by the gun and musketry fire
of the garrison that it would be fatal to enter them, reported the
Commodore.[18.2] In short, said that prudent officer, Ulúa could
certainly, if well garrisoned, resist successfully any naval force
brought against it; while in the opinion of Pakenham, formerly the
British minister to Mexico, a combined army and naval attack on Ulùa and
Vera Cruz would be "a very hazardous undertaking," and, in consequence
of "the deadly nature of that Climate to foreign constitutions, success
would probably prove in the end as disastrous as failure." Moreover,
Conner pointed out, Vera Cruz would be of value solely as a dépôt, and
from that point of view he considered Tampico preferable. Consequently,
although at the end of August Polk brought up the subject of attacking
Mexico City by way of Vera Cruz, nothing was done about it save to ask
the Commodore for additional information.[18.4]

Not long before October 10, however, it was ascertained beyond a doubt
that Vera Cruz could be approached in the rear by a landing force, and
beginning immediately Polk and his advisers, aided by Dimond, recently
our consul at that city, and by other experts, labored on the question
of future operations for nearly two weeks. The result was, first, a
decision that since a farther advance in the north would be hazardous
and would accomplish nothing towards bringing about peace, Monterey and
its vicinity should be the limit of serious operations in that quarter.
Such was the deliberate and unanimous conclusion of the President and
his official family after long discussions. Instructions to General
Taylor were then carefully drafted, studied, amended and agreed upon. To
make sure that he should understand their significance, Major McLane,
son of the minister to England and a graduate from West Point, was taken
into the full confidence of the Executive regarding this matter, and
was then despatched to Monterey with the letter of October 22, which,
as well as the explanations of the envoy, Taylor interpreted, we have
already learned, according to his own ideas. So much for the first
point.[18.4]

The second was a decision to attack Vera Cruz. This did not mean,
however, a decision to proceed against the capital. Though Scott argued,
as Conner had, that gaining possession of the city and then reducing or
starving out Ulúa would practically be sterile triumphs, unless the army
should go farther, it was intended at this time to do no more in that
quarter, and three or four thousand men were thought sufficient for the
undertaking.[18.4]

[A NEW PLAN OF CAMPAIGN]

November 7, however, Benton made an evening call at the White House,
drew the President's attention to the unfavorable results of the
Congressional elections, declared that a bold stroke must be delivered
upon the Mexicans at once, and urged that after capturing Vera Cruz
and Ulúa the army should execute "a rapid crushing movement" against
the capital. Two days later he repeated the lesson, and on the tenth
he amplified it. Polk began to realize now that while it might be
dangerous to call for men and funds, it was even more dangerous not to
do so.[18.4]

Benton kept on calling, and finally he submitted a written plan. Scott
presented a memorial of the same tenor. Taylor wrote that in order to
strike a decisive blow troops must land at Vera Cruz or near that point;
and Conner reported that a descent could be made under cover of the
fleet, batteries could be planted on sand-hills behind the city, and
Ulúa, if not Vera Cruz also, could probably be reduced by starvation. As
early as November 14 Polk decided to call out 6750 men--that is to say,
nine volunteer regiments--for the duration of the war, and to capture
Vera Cruz immediately.[18.3] Yet even this involved no determination
to strike at the capital. Polk was distinctly in favor of so doing,
should that course be necessary to obtain peace; but Buchanan strongly
opposed it, insisting upon the cost of such an expedition, the chances
of failure, and the danger that by leading to a national, racial and
religious conflict it would militate against a settlement; Marcy had no
faith in the project; others of the Cabinet agreed with him; and hence
this question remained open, to be answered by circumstances.[18.4]

The next problem was the choice of a commander. In October Patterson, a
good Democrat, had been selected; but it had been found that, as he was
not a native American, he could not be developed into a Presidential
candidate, that his experience had not been adequate, that his
appointment would involve the retiring of both Taylor and Scott, and
that, as Buchanan learned at this time from Slidell, he did not possess
the confidence of the army. Butler, another Democrat, was Polk's next
choice, but he clearly held no titles to the position.[18.9]

Taylor had to be considered then; but he was regarded by the Executive
and his advisers as professionally unequal to the task and personally
unfitted for it, and both of these opinions were fully warranted. While
events had proved him a born leader of men and a splendid fighter, they
had also demonstrated plainly his lack of generalship and executive
efficiency. He distrusted, loathed and misconstrued the administration,
failed to supply it with plans and information, endeavored to throw upon
it the responsibility for mistakes of his own, lectured it harshly for
misdeeds it had not committed, and frustrated the cardinal intent of its
policy and orders by failing to press the campaign with all possible
vigor during the summer and autumn.[18.5] "I have not the slightest
respect," he wrote, for any member of the Cabinet except the secretary
of the navy. "Evil men bear sway," was another of his remarks.[18.9]

Indeed, the General's natural kindliness and sober judgment seem to have
become largely perverted by this time. He knew that for several months
friends of his had been at work to gain for him the political place long
occupied by Scott, and to use him as a battering ram against the party
in power;[18.6] and it was easy to assume that he would be repaid
in kind. Stories of intrigues and machinations, doubtless exaggerated
in his mind through inexperience and remoteness from the scene, must
have been a constant subject of thought, and he seems to have fallen
gradually into an abnormal state of sensitiveness and suspicion.[18.9]

His private correspondence contained the harshest opinions regarding
nearly all of the chief men thus far prominent in the war. Of Commodore
Perry he entertained "a contemptable opinion." Shields, who was a good
man and officer as men and officers went, he described as "without one
particle of principle to restrain him, save the laws of his country
and ready to minister body and soul to the vilest passions of a vile
administration." Quitman, who deserved high respect, appeared to him
unreliable, of mediocre ability and "afflicted with unbounded vanity."
The quartermaster general, he said, was partially deranged. Of Scott
he had written in August, "He means well on all occasions," but now
he was able to view his superior officer as a military "humbug" and
low politician, eager to advance himself and ruin others by the most
nefarious arts; and he could no longer see, what the administration
fully recognized, that it was essentially for its advantage to have
the generals win victories. So far as the government was concerned,
Taylor had some grounds for apprehension, perhaps. In all probability it
entertained by this time unfriendly feelings toward him. The veteran F.
P. Blair had warned Marcy distinctly that, as even the novice could see,
a Democratic administration was waging war to make a Whig President,
and under our system it was legitimate as well as natural to look for
an avenue of escape. Scott, however, seems to have been his friend,
privately exerting a strong influence in his favor on several occasions;
and while the lawful rights of superior rank were made use of by the
commander-in-chief, the same thing was done by Taylor himself with far
less considerateness.[18.9]

Finally Taylor had a particular moral disability, for he did not
believe in the Vera Cruz expedition actually contemplated. The season
of yellow fever--in his opinion a worse enemy than 100,000 Mexican
bayonets--was now too near, he wrote, and an army besieging that port
would be swept away by the pestilence.[18.7] He lacked, therefore,
some of the most necessary qualifications, and was not in a state of
mind to work harmoniously and effectively with the administration, the
commander-in-chief or his own principal subordinates in the exceedingly
difficult and delicate situations which the proposed expedition was
liable to create.[18.9]

[A COMMANDER SELECTED]

Gaines being out of the question, there was but one man left, and
he moreover, as an officer of experience and the head of the army,
possessed exceptional claims to the appointment. Scott seems to have
accepted his professional and political reverses of May very quietly,
illustrating that fine aphorism of King Stanislaus, "A man greater than
his misfortunes shows that he does not deserve them." Friends fell away
rapidly, yet he kept up his courage. To one of them indeed he wrote,
"Perhaps you might do well to imitate the example of that heathen who
touched his hat to the fallen statue of Jupiter--saying, 'Who knows
but he may be replaced upon his pedestal?'" and about the middle of
September, having learned through several channels that his presence in
Mexico had been desired by Taylor, to whom he generously referred as
"that gallant and distinguished commander," he reminded the government
that he was ready still to serve at the front.[18.8] This merely
brought him another curt rebuff; but when the Vera Cruz expedition
became a practical question he took part in the discussion without
pique, and he suggested incidentally that he, as the highest officer in
the service, was the proper individual to divide the troops between the
two fields of activity, and to command personally in the more important
one.[18.9]

Taylor having pronounced it Scott's duty after the battles of May to
assume the leadership in the field, could not logically object now
to his acting according to his rank; but, though time had vindicated
Scott's military policy and he now was viewed--Marcy admitted--as
politically harmless, Polk still deemed him scientific and visionary,
and still resented his allusion to fire from the rear. Long discussions
were held, but Marcy felt satisfied that Scott was the only fit
commander in sight. By rather cunning management he brought Senator
Benton to that opinion; others of the Cabinet reached the same
conclusion; and finally the President admitted with "reluctance" that
such was "the only alternative." Very likely, too, as many believed,
Polk saw a chance to play one Whig leader against the other. Anyhow,
after demanding "Scott's confidence," which--in view of the intention
to grant his dearest wish--Scott easily gave, he appointed him on
the eighteenth of November to command the expedition. An apparently
heartfelt and complete reconciliation followed. Scott almost shed tears
of emotion, recorded the President; and he received assurances in turn
that his confidence would be reciprocated, and that bygones were to
be considered bygones. A new David and a new Jonathan seemed to have
discovered each other.[18.9]

[SCOTT'S VIEWS]

Scott believed that Ulúa, if properly garrisoned, could not be taken
with naval batteries, or even with naval batteries and an escalade,
except at a disproportionate sacrifice of life, and a loss of time
that might subject the troops to the yellow fever, quadruple the
waste of men, and ruin the campaign. He therefore planned to make a
landing near Vera Cruz, capture the town, reduce the fortress--unless,
as appeared quite probable, it could soon be starved out--by naval
operations and land attacks based upon the city, and then escape the
pestilence by advancing promptly toward the capital. In his opinion
the Mexicans were likely to have 20-30,000 troops on the ground, and
therefore he thought 15,000 men desirable. Relying necessarily on
the figures of the adjutant general, he reckoned (November 16) that
7000 regulars and 13,500 volunteers were, or soon would be, under
Taylor's command, making with the new volunteers and recruits for
the regular army over 27,000,[18.10] and he therefore proposed
(November 21) to take about 5000 of these regulars, 6000 of the
volunteers, and the first 4000 of the new regiments. But he deemed
10,000--to be increased later to double that number--an adequate
minimum, and he felt willing, for the sake of gaining time, to launch
the campaign with the first 8000 soldiers that could be set afloat
off Brazos Island. Anticipating a stubborn resistance at the point of
disembarkation, he desired to have 140 surf-boats in order to land
5000 men and eight guns at once, and he made ample requisitions for
transports, ordnance and ordnance stores.[18.11] As for Taylor,
the General proposed that he should retain forces enough to defend
Monterey and his communications,[18.12] and stand for a time on the
defensive.[18.16]

Scott of course desired official instructions of this tenor, and even
drafted them, but Marcy only wrote as follows (November 23): You have
been ordered by the President himself to go to Mexico, take command
there, and set on foot a Gulf expedition, "if on arriving at the theatre
of action you shall deem it to be practicable. It is not proposed to
control your operations by definite and positive instructions, but you
are left to prosecute them as your judgment, under a full view of all
the circumstances, shall dictate. The work is before you, and the means
provided, or to be provided, for accomplishing it, are committed to you,
in the full confidence that you will use them to the best advantage. The
objects which it is desirable to obtain have been indicated, and it is
hoped that you will have the requisite force to accomplish them. Of this
you must be the judge when the preparations are made, and the time for
action has arrived."[18.16]

Marcy seldom laughed, but occasionally he shook like a bowlful of jelly,
and as he signed this letter he must have shaken prodigiously. Assuming
no responsibility, making no promises, the government simply unloaded
the whole burden of the expedition upon Scott.[18.13] Should he
succeed, a Democratic administration would reap a great profit; should
he fail, a Whig general would have to bear a great reproach. In order to
obtain the essential troops it would be necessary for him to incur the
odium of taking many of them from Taylor, who in Polk's opinion was not
willing to give them up; and thus not only would Taylor's rising star
become clouded, but a bitter quarrel between these two Whig leaders and
their friends would almost certainly be precipitated. Besides, Taylor
might throw up his command in a fit of temper, and relegate himself to
obscurity. No wonder the President felt remarkably in spirits just after
this.[18.16]

[TAYLOR'S WINTER OPERATIONS]

Scott, however, was determined to forestall the danger of a quarrel.
Immediately on suggesting to the government that as head of the army
he was the proper individual to command the Vera Cruz expedition, he
notified Taylor of this action, and only two days after receiving his
appointment he drafted a letter informing that officer about the matter;
but the President, regarding absolute secrecy as a prime requisite,
would not permit him to mention it.[18.14] A few days later (November
25) he wrote from New York to this effect: I am going to Mexico and
shall conduct operations in a new field; where that is to be I cannot
safely state, but with the aid of advices received from Washington you
can imagine; new forces have been called out, yet--as the season of
yellow fever is at hand--I shall have to take most of your troops; your
victories, however, have placed you on such an eminence that you can
afford to act on the defensive for a time, and before spring I think you
will be able to resume active operations; I desire to consult with you,
and plan to be at Camargo for that purpose about the twenty-third of
December.[18.15] The letter was confidential and cordial; and having
now done what he could to conjure the tempest, as well as to prepare for
his work, the General sailed from New York the last day of November. The
voyage to New Orleans, hindered by the weather, took nearly three weeks.
He made a brief and busy stay in that city, and two days after Christmas
he reached Brazos Island.[18.16]

Certain steps tending to facilitate his enterprise had now been
taken by General Taylor. December 10 the temporary Field Division
organized at Camargo was broken up--the Georgia, Mississippi and First
Tennessee regiments reporting to Quitman, and the Ohio and Kentucky
regiments to Butler; the First Division (regulars) under Twiggs was
reorganized;[18.17] on December 13 and 14, a day apart, this division
and Quitman's brigade set out for Victoria, nearly 200 miles distant;
and on the fifteenth Taylor himself, leaving Butler behind to command at
Monterey, followed them.[18.23]

It was not pleasant marching, for a long drought had burned everything
up, the sun blazed with intense heat, and the road, when not covered
with small, sharp stones, was ankle-deep in light dust; but the
inspiring Saddle Mountain seemed to keep company with the troops all
day, Cerralvo Mountain hung like a dark shadow on the left, the cool
blue line of the Sierra Madre extended on the right farther than the
eye could see, and the town first reached--Cadereita, about twenty-five
miles from Monterey--burying its white houses in orange groves, looking
out over gardens, and looking down from a low bluff into the clear
waters of the Topo Grande, was delightful. December 17 the infantry
arrived at Montemorelos, a small town at the foot of the sierra, planted
beside a swift, cool stream, full of trout, that watered a beautiful
valley, and suggesting at a distance under the blue sky--wrote a
surgeon--a pearl set in an azure stone. Here the command absorbed the
Second Infantry and the Second Tennessee; and it now amounted to some
3500 men, of whom rather more than a third were regulars.[18.23]

But Santa Anna was not asleep. Learning of Taylor's proposed march and
believing that Wool had left Parras for Chihuahua, he determined to
advance about December 24, strike at Saltillo and Monterey in person
with 9000 picked infantry, 4000 cavalry and twelve guns, despatch
troops from Tula against the Americans at Victoria, and finally close
in upon Taylor with his own forces; and a large part of these troops
actually set out. Worth got wind of danger, however, on December
16; in accordance with instructions previously given he called for
help;[18.18] and in the evening of the next day four grimy troopers
burst upon Taylor at Montemorelos with the startling intelligence,
that Santa Anna would attack Worth in three days. Ordering Quitman to
proceed, Taylor therefore set out on December 18 with his regulars for
Saltillo. Butler, calling a regiment from Camargo to Monterey, reached
the front with his own forces on December 19, and Wool arrived there
two days later. Santa Anna, discovering Wool's march by December 24,
countermanded his orders; and Taylor, learning on December 20 while
between Monterey and Saltillo, of Wool's advance and the non-appearance
of the Mexicans, and concluding there was no danger, turned
back.[18.23]

On the twenty-third he again left Monterey, and the next day he received
Scott's New York letter.[18.19] His presence with the forces was
not at all requisite. No serious fight was in prospect, for Quitman
had reported nothing of the sort. There was at least one topographical
engineer in the command, who could make better notes of the country than
he.[18.20] Probably his military engineers also, among whom figured
Robert E. Lee, afterwards the famous Confederate leader, were there; and
as for disposing of the troops, General Scott's letter gave him reason
to believe, that a superior officer was now on the ground with new
plans. His obvious duty was therefore to report at Camargo, the place
mentioned by Scott, or at least await instructions at Monterey. But the
stout old gentleman in the loose olive-brown frock-coat, wool socks and
Mexican sombrero had a temper and several ideas of his own. Probably
he did not wish to arrange matters amicably; and he kept straight on
for ten days, plunging farther and farther toward the remotest portion
of his field, inaccessible from any and every point where Scott might
by any reasonable possibility chance to be. Indeed, Scott's letter was
not answered for two days, and eight more passed before the answer,
which stated that General Taylor was going to Victoria, reached
Camargo.[18.23]

[TAYLOR'S MARCH TO VICTORIA]

Beyond Montemorelos a great deal of the country was rough, and it was
intersected with chilly streams, waist-deep, that cut like a knife as
the hot soldiers plunged in; but an incessant variety of novel scenes
kept up their spirits. Groves of ebony sheltered bears and wolves.
Wild turkeys and wild hogs abounded; and almost every evening ten or
twelve deer were brought in. Here flourished pecans, live-oaks and
immense trees of lignum vitæ; there an endless procession of ants
wound along their smoothly worn trail; yonder towered a mountain of
gleaming porphyry set off with dark green foliage, and at all times
fleecy clouds could be seen drifting languidly across the slopes of
the curiously wrought sierra. Finally the troops entered the rich
valley of Linares. On the one hand lay wide cornfields or perhaps a
thousand acres of sugarcane in a single, well-irrigated lot; on the
other apple and peach orchards, orange and lemon groves with tempting
gleams amidst their dark leaves, and half a mile or so of fig-trees.
Then came the gardens and flat houses of the town itself, a dull place,
with some smiling and some tearful eyes looking out from the grated
windows.[18.23]

Then forward again marched the troops, passing out of the valley into
wild country full of chaparral and mesquite, where sometimes wolves
trotted along the road ahead of them like dogs. The need of water
determined the length of the daily march; but usually there was enough
of it, shaded sometimes by noble cypresses dripping with Spanish moss.
Once a real norther set in, and the troops choked for twenty miles in
a driving cloud of dust;[18.21] but through it they caught glimpses
of a high cliff that looked like an immense pink and yellow dome, and
another cheering bit of color now and then was Señor Don So-and-so, the
alcalde, dressed in white and a red sash, with silver coins all over
his clothing, saddle and bridle. Usually the weather held fair, and a
blanket supported by four stakes answered the purpose of a tent well
enough.[18.23]

But the faces of the people grew dark occasionally, and once they
muttered something like "_Fandango poco tiempo_," which signified,
"You'll be fighting pretty soon." Then the soldiers cheered till
they were hoarse. Fatigue and supper were forgotten. "Turn out, turn
out!" was the cry. The column formed, and dashed down the hill at a
double quick; but for enemy it found only the trim white cottage of a
Frenchman, planted beside a rippling stream amid laden orange trees
gilded by the setting sun. There had been rumors of Mexican cavalry
ahead, but no cavalry could be seen;[18.22] and as for irregulars,
both funds and arms were lacking, and the close wall of prickly pear
five or ten feet high, which ran on each side of the road almost without
a break for nearly two hundred miles, would have kept them off as it
did the breeze. And so on January 4 Taylor and the regulars entered
Victoria, a small, neat city at the foot of wooded mountains, which
Quitman had occupied with some formality six days before. "Victoria is
taken. It was a bloodless victory. But where is Victoria?" said the New
York _Herald_.[18.23]

[PATTERSON'S MARCH TO VICTORIA]

Indeed, Victoria was very much taken.[18.24] October 13, when
ordering Taylor to cut short the armistice, Marcy notified Patterson of
this order, and again directed him to occupy southern Tamaulipas as soon
as he could--before December 6 if possible; but Patterson was not able
to set out until General Taylor gave him definite instructions, on the
twenty-eighth of November, to march with the two Illinois regiments and
the regiment of Tennessee horse, about 1500 men, for Victoria. Further
delays occurred because transportation was not promptly furnished
him, and because vessels conveying supplies were lost; and although a
detachment advanced some fifteen miles about the middle of December, the
movement from the point then reached did not begin until one day before
Christmas.[18.26]

  [Illustration: General Patterson’s March]

The distance to be covered was nearly 210 miles,[18.25] and all
found the march hard. The chief engineer said his task was "to make
an impassable road practicable." Sometimes it seemed to contain every
possible stone. Difficult streams had to be crossed, and once the
only feasible method was to cut a straight ramp on each of the nearly
vertical banks, which stood about one hundred feet high, and get the
wagons down and up again with ropes--a prodigious task. The usual
thorns were peculiarly troublesome, and some of the water contained
salt. Sweat and dust almost hid the skin of men's faces at more than one
time; and not only did soldiers drop far behind from exhaustion, but in
some cases water could be given to the faint only by prying their jaws
open. Once the drinking water was so muddy it could scarcely run, we are
assured--to say nothing of an odor derived from dead horses. On the very
first day the troops were ordered to march without breakfast, and they
went hungry more than once afterwards, with cattle, hogs, and actual
clouds of wild turkeys plainly in sight.[18.26]

Some of these facts appear to reflect upon the commanding officers, and
other facts point the same way. Patterson had an impressive person,
somewhat in the style of the English squire, it was thought, and certain
very agreeable qualities of his Irish race, when he chose to display
them; but although Polk felt disposed to make him generalissimo, he
seems to have lacked a familiar acquaintance with his profession as
well as experience in practising it. He also lacked initiative, and
he lorded it over the troops, they felt, with all the severity of a
satrap.[18.26]

Pillow, the second in command, had come to the war like many others for
his personal advantage; and having been the President's partner in a law
office, having contrived through cunning and secret management at the
Baltimore convention in 1844 to secure Polk's nomination, and being now
in confidential correspondence with the White House, he felt specially
authorized to slake his intense ambition. On the score of ill-health
Pillow had left his command at Monterey for a trip to the United States;
but, finding in this expedition a chance of becoming prominent, he
suddenly recovered. No one could fail to see his determination to be
conspicuous, and it was not commended by all. "Ho for the embryo hero!
Great is Diana of the Ephesians!" exclaimed Captain Caswell, a brilliant
officer. Naturally Pillow felt inclined to look upon the soldiers as
merely coal for his furnace, and they in turn generally detested him.
In one stormy scene he called upon them to shoot him, if they dared,
adding grandly, "I'm not afraid to die!" And after that, when angered
by unnecessary harshness on his part, they obtained some comfort by
growling to one another, "_He's_ some!" "_He_ isn't afraid to die"; but
they remembered the scourge none the less, and when Taylor came over on
a mule to visit their camp the very day he and they reached Victoria
(January 4), looking as plain as they and perhaps no less dirty, the
contrast between his democratic simplicity and the pomp and pomposity
they had been contemplating made them burst forth--when they finally
realized that his more impressive orderly was not the General--into an
ecstasy of delight and admiration.[18.26]

While these marches were taking place, General Scott, leaving the
coast on December 29, proceeded to Camargo in order to arrange matters
amicably with Taylor, if he could; but on January 3, finding it would be
impracticable to get into touch with that officer, he sent instructions
to Butler, carefully explaining why they were given to him directly,
to place at the mouth of the Rio Grande about 4000 regular infantry
under Worth, 4000 volunteer infantry, 500 regular cavalry, the best 500
volunteer cavalry and two field batteries--deducting, however, from
these numbers the troops then at Victoria, except an escort for Taylor,
all those at Tampico except about 500 for a garrison, and one volunteer
regiment at Matamoros. Scott added that he hoped eight new volunteer
regiments would be at the Brazos by the end of January, and that three
or four of these would remain in northern Mexico.[18.27]

[SCOTT TAKES TROOPS FROM THE NORTH]

At the same time he notified Taylor of this action, pointing out that
his inaccessibility and the extreme pressure of time had rendered
necessary the orders given to Butler. Taylor was instructed to
concentrate in Tampico all the troops of Patterson, Quitman and Twiggs
except an escort for himself and, if necessary, a garrison for Victoria,
and return then to Monterey. Scott further explained that on account of
the yellow fever he could not wait for the new volunteers, and stated
plainly that, although he greatly wished the Vera Cruz expedition could
be aided by a diversion in the north, Taylor would have to act "for a
time" on a "strict defensive."[18.27]

These orders were the inevitable sequel of past occurrences. Taylor had
suggested that it was advisable to transfer serious operations to the
south, and that a large body of regulars would be needed for a campaign
there; the government ordered the Vera Cruz expedition; Scott--not at
all, however, because he so desired--was appointed to command it; he
possessed full authority over all the troops in the field under one
condition proposed by himself--that Taylor must be left sufficiently
strong for defence--and, as Taylor admitted, this condition was met;
Scott could only obtain an adequate army in season by taking a large
part of it from the field; he endeavored to effect the necessary
division in a kind and friendly manner, spending ten days in travel for
that purpose, although extremely pressed for time; and, when Taylor went
deliberately beyond reach, he simply made such use of his authority as
duty required, taking for the offensive a relatively smaller army--in
view of the prospect, recognized by Taylor himself, that Santa Anna
would meet him at the beach--than he left with that officer for a strict
defensive.[18.27]

Taylor, however, was furious. He alleged that Scott had "wormed himself"
into the command by promising to kill Taylor off as a Presidential
candidate. Of Scott's New York letter he said, "A more contemptible and
insidious communication was never written." Although it was his own
suggestion that volunteers were unfit for the mainstay of an expedition
against Vera Cruz, and that regulars for it should be drawn from the
northern army, he complained now that an underhand "intrigue" had
stripped him of his regulars; and, not satisfied with describing himself
as outraged and degraded "in the most discourteous manner that could be
devised" by "Scott, Marcy and Co." for the purpose of accomplishing his
ruin, he charged, though really not expecting an attack, that he was in
danger of being "sacrificed" on the soil of Mexico. Policy concurred
with fury; political strategy with personal resentment. The idea of
brave Taylor, the People's Pride, thrown to the merciless Mexicans by
partisan Polk and scheming Scott was one to fire the masses; and thus
we see concocted a bit of electioneering melodrama that contributed
powerfully, and perhaps decisively, to bring about one of the chief
consequences of the Mexican war--the overthrow of the Democratic party
and the accession of Taylor to the Presidential chair.[18.27]

Scott now returned to the Brazos, where he arrived on January 8, about a
week before the date fixed by him for the assembling of his expedition
off that point; and there he was forced to endure nearly six weeks of
what he well termed "cruel uncertainties." To combine in haste the
men and material for such an expedition; to do so when the necessary
elements had to be drawn from distant and widely scattered points; to
do it while the waterways, largely relied upon for transportation, were
to a considerable extent frozen; and to do it without the telegraph
and mainly without railroads--this was a most difficult and hazardous
undertaking; and accidents, misunderstandings and errors of judgment
were additional embarrassments.[18.30]

[SCOTT DELAYED]

The prime need was troops; and Worth, acting with notable energy--even
precipitation--placed the first of the regulars at the mouth of the
Rio Grande about three weeks after Scott issued the orders to Butler.
But here the second need, that of vessels, checked them. Scott's
requisitions had been timely and ample; but there was an active
commercial demand for ships, rates were high, and the government,
anxious to economize, did not allow sufficiently for delays and other
contingencies.[18.28] A considerable number of vessels were chartered
at New Orleans, but a month of heavy rains, a scarcity of sailors, a
demand for higher wages from those engaged, a week of fog, and a series
of northers, which were usually only about four days apart, prevented
the first of the vessels from arriving off Brazos Island before February
11, and the storms, frequently very sudden, as well as the loss of
not a few of the indispensable lighters hampered operations there.
"This terrible coast," wrote the General; and for days together ships
would lie off shore, pitching "like mad" and fortunate if they did no
worse, quite unable to communicate with the island. For a week and a
half no mails arrived from New Orleans. As the Rio Grande water proved
unsuitable for the troops, extra casks were ordered to be made and
filled at New Orleans; and this consumed additional time.[18.30]

Minor affairs, too, created trouble for Scott, and one of these
deserves to be mentioned. Care has been taken to bring out the quality
of Colonel Harney, and it only remains to add that for some time his
feelings toward Scott had been openly and unreasonably hostile. As he
was among the men ordered by Butler to the mouth of the Rio Grande,
he proceeded in that direction; but Scott, who knew of his excursion
to the Rio Grande and preferred to have a more efficient and reliable
man for his chief cavalry officer, and one more disposed to coöperate
heartily with the commander-in-chief, directed him to place at the
orders of Major Sumner the dragoons that had come down with him, and
rejoin those of Taylor's army. Harney refused positively to do so. Upon
this Worth laid a formal charge of disobedience against him, and a
court martial of officers, chosen--as General Scott proposed--by Harney
himself, sentenced him to be reprimanded in orders. Harney then wrote
a submissive letter to Worth; and Scott, remitting the sentence of the
court, gave him the position he coveted.[18.30]

This was magnanimous, and tended to promote good-will; but there is
more to tell. On learning of Scott's order that Harney should return
to Monterey Polk, though he insisted that his own subordinates in the
army must be in cordial sympathy with him, became very angry that "a
Democrat" and "one of General Jackson's personal friends" should "be
sacrificed to propitiate the personal and political malice of General
Scott," and insisted upon countermanding the order, thereby violating
the confidence promised that general and disregarding the broad
instructions issued to him by the war department.[18.29] However, the
trouble with Harney was comparatively but a pin-prick. What racked the
General was the conviction that Santa Anna must be gathering a great
army to confront him at Vera Cruz; and on February 15, about half of the
surf-boats and a small part of the ordnance and ordnance stores having
been heard from, he sailed for Tampico, leaving Worth to complete the
embarkation as rapidly as he could.[18.30]

While these events were taking place on the Rio Grande line, the troops
under Taylor lay for ten days at Victoria, growing more and more languid
under the hot sun; and the General realized that his coming to this
remote place had embarrassed himself as well as Scott. Finally something
had to be done, for provisions were becoming short, and on January 12 he
ordered the regular infantry and Patterson's men to set out for Tampico,
supposed to lie about 168 miles distant by the road.[18.31] On the
night of the fourteenth, a duplicate of Scott's despatch of January
3--the original of which had been intercepted by the enemy--arrived, and
then, selecting an escort for himself, Taylor directed Quitman's brigade
to proceed in the same direction as Patterson's. The three bodies,
which marched at intervals of twenty-four hours, beginning on that
day, made an aggregate of 4733, of whom the rank and file numbered 1400
regulars and 3000 volunteers. The rule was to sound reveille at three
o'clock and set out at dawn--the regiments of each column taking turns
in leading it; and the engineer company, usually known as "the pick and
shovel brigade," marched in advance of all to mend the road.[18.32]

There was need enough of its work. The meaning of "Tamaulipas" is high
mountains; and while the blue of the Sierra Madre grew daily fainter,
the principal range of the state rose constantly higher in front,
until the summit was crossed, and the troops began to descend into the
tropical region of the coast. Much of the route was boggy or rocky
or steep; the drinking-water often came from stagnant pools; and for
nearly three days the only chance to see human beings outside of one's
own column was when, on surmounting a hilltop, the gleaming steel and
white wagons of another brigade could be made out, one day's march
away--perhaps only six or eight miles--on another eminence.[18.32]

But as the troops approached their destination they felt repaid for
every hardship and effort. The road became deep sand, indeed, but near
it spread a sunny and many-hued lake full of emerald islets, pirogues
laden with odorous fruits, and myriads of noisy widgeon, teal and
other water-fowl; while on the other hand the live-oak, the bay-tree,
the rubber-tree, the banyan, the palm, the flag-leaved aloe, and many
a nameless tree, bush and vine made a dense forest, illumined with
brilliant orchids and more brilliant parrots and macaws, each of which
seemed like a year of sunsets epitomized. A soft, salubrious breeze
from the Gulf caressed their faces; and when, surmounting the last hill
on the tenth day of their march, they saw the grand, leisurely Pánuco
rolling luxuriously on through fields and forests, a wilderness of spars
and masts filling the harbor of Tampico, and the American flag--dear
emblem of country, home and kindred--waving proudly over white walls and
green gardens, a tear of delight ran down many a tanned cheek.[18.32]

[SCOTT AT TAMPICO]

Stationed mostly at some distance above or below the town according to
the usual policy of the American commanders, they now devoted themselves
to drilling and counting the days. "Shall we ever see that big fandango
in the halls of Montezuma?" they had been asking for some time, and to
wait four weeks on the _qui vive_ for Scott seemed very hard. February
19, however, he arrived in town looking very anxious, and, declining
the superb horse made ready for him, walked unpretentiously to his
lodgings. The impatience to be off was now intense, and the General
did all in his power to gratify it; but he found himself in a hornet's
nest. At this time he enjoyed no popularity among the officers, for he
was personally known to very few. One or two attempts to check rather
pushing young men had been resented; and now the suspicion that he would
give regulars the post of honor at Vera Cruz threatened serious results.
At a recent banquet the toast necessarily offered to the name of the
commander-in-chief had been coldly received, and Worth had been ignored.
Indeed, some of the leading volunteer officers were disposed to mutiny
unless assured of "a place in the picture."[18.35]

Scott diplomatically declared there would be fighting enough for
all, but as the tardiness of the transports threatened to delay a
part of the troops, that assurance failed to give satisfaction;
and apparently only the arrival of an unexpected steamer or two
averted the danger of trouble. One officer, however--a trim, agile
man with a handsome face, quick black eyes, a poorly educated but
most ingenious mind, a ready tongue, and a conscience that gave him
no trouble--was content.[18.33] For him Taylor's harsh rule had
ended; and soon, making the most of his own crafty talents, the urgent
recommendations of Polk and Scott's determination to keep faith with the
President,[18.34] Pillow--for Pillow it was--established himself at
headquarters on a basis of intimacy and importance.[18.35]

Tampico would have been a delightful resting-place for a while. The
markets were full of good things; it possessed excellent cafés; and the
troops coming from Monterey had brought along a theatrical company; but
Scott tarried there only thirty hours. At New Orleans some information
had been obtained with reference to the Lobos Islands, which lay fifty
or sixty miles to the southeast of Tampico and seven or eight from the
coast, offering a broad, safe anchorage; and Scott had written to Conner
for additional facts. These proved to be favorable, and such of the new
volunteers and freight vessels as could be reached in time had been
ordered to go directly there, instead of sailing to the Brazos. Indeed
these islands were fixed upon as the general rendezvous. Some of the
troops had reached it, and word now came to Scott that an outbreak of
smallpox had occurred among them.[18.37]

He set sail therefore on February 20, and making a swift voyage in the
midst of a "screaming" norther, found at the rendezvous the First and
the Second Pennsylvania, two thirds of the new Louisiana regiment,
the "Palmettoes" of South Carolina, and parts of the New York and
Mississippi regiments.[18.36] Twiggs followed him when the bar off
Tampico was quiet enough to permit, and the other troops did the same
as rapidly as they could. Patterson got away on the twenty-ninth, but
even on the fourth of March Quitman and Shields were chafing beside the
Pánuco, and the latter at least had no definite notion when they would
be able to sail. "Days are months now," he exclaimed; but he and many
others had still to wait. Worse yet, perhaps, not a few of those who got
off were packed in small trading craft, picked up by good luck and unfit
for the service; and the skeletons of ships rotting near the bar gave
them ample cause for anxiety. Worth's troops meanwhile were embarking at
the Brazos; but when he left that quarter on February 25, six companies
of dragoons were still in want of transports.[18.37]

Taylor for his part, escorted by a squadron of dragoons under May, the
Mississippi regiment and two field batteries, left Victoria on January
16 and reached Monterey in eight days. His first impulse on receiving
Scott's orders had been to leave the country, but he concluded not
to do so, and soon--apparently satisfied that he now had an issue
on which to challenge both Polk and Scott[18.38]--he distinctly
informed his friend, Senator Crittenden, that he was a candidate for the
Presidency.[18.39]

[TAYLOR'S POLICY]

He then shaped his plans accordingly. The government had notified
him quite plainly that it wished him to hold no territory beyond the
vicinity of Monterey, and Scott instructed him to concentrate there.
What these men wished, he believed, was that he should be effaced or
play a humble rôle, and he was determined not to accept their plan.
He would be as prominent as he possibly could be. Though not able to
fight the Mexicans, he would at least seem willing to do so, and throw
upon Scott and Polk all the odium of his inactivity. Hence, instead of
burying himself and his aspirations in Monterey, he advanced at the
end of the month to Saltillo, and a few days later took post, with
nearly all of the troops not required on the line of communication,
still farther toward the enemy. The dictates of prudence recognized by
himself, the advice and order of his commanding officer, and the wishes
and instructions of the government were all disregarded. He showed
himself, in fact, both unwise and insubordinate.[18.39]




                                  XIX

                     SANTA ANNA PREPARES TO STRIKE

                     September, 1846-February, 1847


While these events were taking place north of the mountains, the
Americans at Saltillo were having a somewhat agitated experience. At
the end of December a great cloud of dust, raised towards the south by
a drove of Mexican horses, convinced Worth he was again in danger, and
preparations were made at once to conquer or die. Butler, who succeeded
him in command, and even the more experienced Wool felt disturbed by
rumors of impending attack, which considerate Mexicans, anxious to
entertain their American visitors, frequently set afloat, though some
of our officers believed that Scott's movement ensured them against
molestation.[19.4]

Finally, the rather approved idea of thorough scouting presented itself;
and on January 19 Major Gaines of the First Kentucky cavalry, with
Captain Cassius M. Clay, Lieutenant Davidson and thirty or forty men,
was detached for this purpose by General Butler.[19.1] After making a
circuitous journey and meeting with only bland, inoffensive Mexicans,
from whom--naturally enough--no important news could be obtained, he
found himself on the twenty-first at the hacienda of La Encarnación,
a point on the main road from San Luis Potosí to Saltillo, and about
fifty-three miles distant from the latter place. Here quite unexpectedly
he lighted upon forty or fifty of the Arkansas cavalry under Major
Borland, whose orders from Wool had been to visit the hacienda and
immediately return. If, however, Taylor could do as he pleased about
instructions, why should not Borland? And when obliging Mexicans told
him of a small force lying at El Salado, only thirty-five or forty
miles farther on, he determined to have the glory of capturing it, and
sent back to his colonel for reinforcements. Gaines's party, added
to his own, seemed adequate, however, and early on the night of the
twenty-second the troopers rode gayly forward.[19.4]

[CARELESSNESS OF TAYLOR'S OFFICERS]

Before long it appeared that the distance was sixty miles and the
Mexican force mythical--besides, rain began to fall; so the Americans
returned to La Encarnación for the night. "The general and the soldier
of each side should ... be always expecting to fall into danger," as
Thucydides wrote long ago, and of course our officers understood that in
a hostile country picket guards were sometimes deemed advisable; but,
operating on the higher plane of action, they felt that a comfortable
sleep was what all needed most, and accordingly at daybreak they found
themselves in the midst of Miñón's cavalry brigade of, say, 1200 men,
magnified in their opinion--doubtless by the fog--to 3000. The Mexican
general was, however, a most accomplished and elegant gentleman, and
he at once relieved their embarrassment by taking them under his
full--indeed, close--protection.[19.4]

Not aware of this comforting fact, Brigadier General Lane detached
eighteen men under Captain Heady of the Kentucky cavalry, two days
later, to look up their comrades. These men found liquor at a ranch
and perhaps--as a letter from Saltillo stated--a fandango, too. Firmly
persuaded that joy should be unconfined, they "got drunk," and so
without using up a grain of powder they ascertained by ocular proof the
fate of the other detachments. Apparently there was some ground for
Wool's remark that the volunteers, though now almost eight months old in
the service, could not easily be made to obey instructions on such duty.
Indeed, even after Borland's mishap and in spite of strict orders, two
outposts now went to sleep without a picket or a sentry.[19.4]

To be sure, the men were ready enough to fight. "Why we have no
more fear of a Mexican than if they were [prairie] Wolves," wrote a
soldier. Wool's men felt particularly keen. On the way from La Vaca
to San Antonio they had passed a spot where about 400 Texans had been
massacred by Santa Anna's order in 1836. A fire had lighted up their
faces that meant, "No mercy," said one of them; and exhausted though
they were after their wonderful march from Parras, they felt very much
dissatisfied on reaching the front, "there being no prospect of a
fight." But the recent disasters had made it seem as if the mountains
were full of the enemy, and one of Gaines's men, who contrived to
escape, brought fearful tales. Even those Americans who did not care
to do picket duty felt little desire to wake up some foggy morning as
prisoners. Signs of a panicky feeling could be observed, and Wool found
it necessary to invoke Taylor's aid.[19.4]

The General's position in his army was now extraordinary. To the troops,
while they gloried in his courage, his achievements had seemed at the
time commonplace enough; but sentiment at home as exhibited in the
newspapers--reacting from painful anxiety, indulging in the common taste
for exaggeration, and instinctively demanding a national figure for this
national crisis--had not only done justice to his great qualities, but,
partly in order to explain victories clearly marked with errors, made
him out a genius and worker of miracles; and all this laudation, read by
the army, created an impression which both duty and interest forbade the
more discriminating to impair.[19.4]

[ARMY FEELING TOWARD TAYLOR]

The General, moreover, though nursing the mammoth conceit that he was
qualified to be President of the United States, was careful to spare
the self-love of all who came in contact with him; and while no one
could enter Scott's presence without feeling himself before a superior
man aware of his superiority, probably most of Taylor's visitors had
an agreeable sense of excelling him in personal appearance, dress,
education and talents, and enjoyed also a flattering conviction of their
insight, because they recognized that he possessed high merits after
all. How the soldiers, oppressed by the lordliness of many generals,
adored his plainness we have seen. They felt they could bow down to such
a man without losing self-respect, since the obeisance was due to their
own choice, not his demand; and when he welcomed one to his unguarded
tent and talked with him about home and friends, or shook a delinquent
by the two ears with a kindly warning not to do so again, he established
a positive dominion over their minds and hearts. It has been said that
no woman loves a man unless she can despise him for something, and the
saying may be extended to the rest of humanity. Taylor had thus a double
hold on his troops. His black body-servant referred to him as "De ole
hoss," but would have died for him; and while the army would probably
have expressed itself about him as lightly as did the street urchins of
Philadelphia:

                    "Old Zack's at Monterey,
                    Bring out your Santa Anner;
                    For every time we raise a gun,
                    Down goes a Mexicanner;"

yet in reality he was now enthroned in the hearts of the soldiers
generally as a father, a hero and almost a fetich.[19.4]

Invoked by Wool, then, Taylor--instead of drawing him back, as the
government wished--appeared at Saltillo on the first or second of
February with about 700 men, and proceeded to occupy the advanced
position already mentioned. Believing, as we have seen, that a lack
of water on the road from San Luis would prevent any strong body of
Mexicans from coming north at that season, and hearing that a great part
of Santa Anna's troops had gone toward Vera Cruz, he scouted alarms;
and in addition to his other grounds for pushing forward, he thought so
doing would tend to restore confidence among the troops and the people
of Saltillo. Moreover, although he had ridiculed Scott's intimation that
he might be able to manoeuvre toward San Luis in the early spring, he
was now planning to do so.[19.4]

Scrambling out of Saltillo by the southern route, which makes a short
but sharp ascent as it leaves the town, Taylor found himself on a
rather smooth plateau elevated nearly or quite 6000 feet above the
sea, and after a ride of about five miles discovered on the left,
near the road, four or five mean adobe buildings, headquarters of the
Buena Vista ranch, where Wool's command had recently been in camp. The
southern outlook from this point was desolate but noble. On both sides
rose high, barren mountains. Those on the west, formed of many rather
thin horizontal slabs of rock, slightly concave toward the sky and
separated by thicker deposits of a softer material eroded at the edges,
formed reddish, flat-topped pyramids like the pictured hanging gardens
of Babylon; while those on the other hand were a true sierra, a line
of saw-tooth peaks buttressed with sharp spurs. Descending easily for
about a mile and a half, the General came to a narrow place called by
Mexicans La Angostura (_The Narrows_), and then traversed lengthwise
for a distance of about three and a half miles the approximately
north-and-south valley of Buena Vista. At the end of this came the
windy, dusty farm of La Encantada, where Butler had stationed Wool for a
time; and then began the smiling valley of Agua Nueva, which broadened
gradually for about seven miles, and ended at the farm or hacienda of
that name. This lay near the mountain on the eastern edge of a wide
plain, generously supplied by nature with fuel and water.[19.4]

Here Taylor pitched his tent on the fifth, and by the fourteenth
substantially all the troops were on the spot--about 650 camping with
him and some 4000 lying with Wool a mile or so away. The General ordered
no scouting, and took about the same precautions against surprise that
Gaines and Borland had taken. On the ground that spies could not be
kept out, he let the Mexicans come and go with perfect freedom. The
engineers, reconnoitring on their own responsibility, concluded that
the mountains were "passable in every direction" by routes familiar to
the enemy but of course blind to the invader.[19.2] Parallel roads lay
beyond the heights on each side. Yet here Taylor decided that he would
meet the enemy, should they care to attack him;[19.3] and he said to
the correspondent of the New York _Tribune_; "Let them come; damned if
they don't go back a good deal faster than they came." In reality the
troops had more reason than ever to feel alarmed; but Dagon was again in
the midst of them, and they stood like mountains. Taylor might be old
and slow and inefficient, and he might know little about the art of war,
but he could stiffen the courage of soldiers. "Every man feels that the
honor of his country is now placed in his hands," wrote Lieutenant Posey
on the nineteenth.[19.4]

SANTA ANNA'S PLANS]

This takes us back to Santa Anna, who left the city of Mexico for
the north on September 28. When his carriage had rolled on for about
thirty miles, he received word that Monterey had fallen, and the news
occasioned many bitter reflections; but there were enough other matters
to divert his thoughts. He understood well the superior strength of the
United States; but from Mackenzie's mission and the conviction that war
expenses would be extremely unpopular in this country, he doubtless
felt sure that we earnestly desired peace. It was therefore clear to
him that his problem was to gain one victory. This would so discourage
us, he seems to have calculated, that he could end the war on fairly
satisfactory terms.[19.7]

To gain this victory, it seemed only necessary to gather large forces,
bar the road from the north with fortifications, make no defence of
outlying sections, worry the Americans perhaps with feints and forays,
await and repulse them should they advance, and at the end of the winter
season, should they not, fall upon some fraction of their army with full
power. One difficulty in this programme was the general hatred which he
must have known the northern provinces entertained for him, because his
policy had always sacrificed their interests; and he thought it wise to
despatch a proclamation to San Luis Potosí, calling upon the people to
see in him only a Mexican soldier fighting for the common country. The
appeal was effectual. A committee met him about a dozen miles from the
city, and on October 8 he entered a town decorated with tapestries and
pots of flowers, and resounding with salvos of artillery, peals of bells
and enthusiastic vivas from the entire population.[19.7]

A number of circumstances occurring now and later appeared favorable.
The government engaged that he should have an adequate remittance of
funds every month, and instructed the heads of seven states to supply
his general wants. A medal was promised to all taking part in the
campaign. The National Guards, now ordered to obey the central instead
of the state authorities, apparently came within his reach. The fight
at Monterey was pictured as creditable to Mexican arms and costly to
the enemy. Every life sacrificed there on the altar of nationality,
proclaimed the government, called to heaven for vengeance, and the
outrages perpetrated by the insolent invaders proved how they would
trample on the whole country, if they could.[19.7]

Once more our wicked administration and its horde of "adventurers" were
denounced in the good old blood-curdling style, and once more the forays
of the savage Indians were laid to our charge. Detestable wretches like
the Americans could not wage war long. Their beloved money-bags were
already feeling pinched. Volunteers did not flock to the banner. Noble
orators like Webster were enlightening the better people. The slavery
question could not fail to paralyze the country. Already the elections
had turned against the administration, and signs of a revolution could
be seen. European countries were certainly preparing to interfere.
Merely by uniting, the Mexicans could "tear from the invader's flag the
symbol of Texas," and at last--so it was declared--union had actually
been achieved. On all sides patriotism had burst into flame. The nation
was rising. It would take account of every injury, great or small,
inflicted by the barbarians of the north, and the day of settlement
would soon arrive. In this fashion talked the government, the orators
and the newspapers; and many observers in Europe and the United States
believed the overdue national movement had now begun.[19.7]

But this radiant picture was only paint-deep. _Don Simplicio_, the
satiric weekly, announced: It is proposed that all give, that all lend,
that all rise, that all go to the field; but "few give, few lend, few
get in motion, few take up arms." The states, restored to a measure of
sovereignty by the adoption of the federal system, became conscious of
their powers. Durango would not help, because threatened by the Indians,
and even denounced the Hero of Tampico. Michoacán held aloof because
Ocampo, her brilliant governor, who could voice his opinions in five
languages, hated Santa Anna even more than he did the Americans. The
great state of Jalisco promised much and did little; and Zacatecas,
which Santa Anna had crushed and robbed in 1835 because it dared to
oppose his ambition,[19.5] not only withheld all aid, but attempted
to form a combination of states against him. A multitude of officials
preferred the triumph of a foreign invader to that of a native tyrant,
and their constituents endorsed their course.[19.7]

The decree taking the National Guards from state control had to be
substantially qualified. Members of that organization could not be
impressed. The law pardoning--that is to say, authorizing--desertion
from the regular army was extended for three months. A secret society
called The Red Comet, which sprang up among the military men at San
Luis, took for motto, "Nobody is bound to obey one that has no right
to command," and annoyed the General constantly. Requena, one of
the best qualified officers, who entertained little respect for the
Liberator's professional ability or plans, made so much trouble that he
was sent away; and General Valencia, a member of the Red Comet society,
who had been refused permission to attack the Americans at Victoria
and was believed now to covet Santa Anna's place, openly defied the
commander-in-chief and left the army.[19.7]

[SANTA ANNA'S EMBARRASSMENTS]

Still more serious were financial difficulties, for the Executive did
not supply the promised funds. The reason was obvious. "Our treasury is
as poor in money as it is rich in obligations," explained the minister.
Santa Anna did not spare the government, however. "I do not consider
myself nor should I be considered by the gentlemen who compose the
provisional administration of the Country as a mere General, commanding
a corps of the army, but as the one leader of the Nation, to whom the
direction of its destinies has been entrusted," he wrote; and in this
tone he conducted the financial correspondence--demanding, reproaching,
protesting, threatening; yet the needful remittances did not arrive.
Popular support was equally unfruitful. "Santa Anna lacks three
things--to wit, money, money and money," announced _Don Simplicio_;
"Very well, let us have a public meeting. What is the result? Nothing."
But somehow, through remittances from the capital and the states, forced
loans, arbitrary seizures and the use of his personal credit, the
General worried along, and built up an army of some 25,000 men.[19.6]
Extensive shops were established for the manufacture of clothing and the
repair of arms; and energetic measures were taken to provide muskets,
ammunition and cannon.[19.7]

Santa Anna's operations were not, however, entirely sagacious. As was
usual in Mexican armies, number outweighed quality. Consisting mostly
of impressed men and to a considerable extent of criminals, the troops
were unreliable. They were drilled in no larger bodies than brigades;
many had no practice in firing; and most of them were very imperfectly
disciplined. The artillery did no manoeuvring. There was no school
for officers. Persons of a notoriously bad reputation as soldiers
occupied high posts. Santa Anna showed marked favoritism toward certain
regiments and certain men. Never visiting the drill-ground, he could not
estimate the relative qualities of the various corps, and he was too
much engrossed in politics and personal interests to concentrate his
attention upon the work in hand. All of the generals who tried to do
their duty gave too much time to the details, and studied the plans of
campaign too little. What was hardly less important, Santa Anna, instead
of instructing the troops regarding the national issues at stake,
talked much about the booty to be stripped from the Americans, and in
particular about an alleged blue wagon containing their military chest.
Still, the army took shape, and the General looked hopefully toward
spring.[19.7]

But now came one of those whirls of fortune that always hover about
leaders of dubious antecedents. November 26 an influential newspaper
of the capital, _El Republicano_, copied from the New York _Herald_ a
letter of September 22, written from Mexico City, which stated that
Santa Anna, acting in collusion with the United States, would abandon
the invaded provinces, resist the enemy feebly, satisfy the nation of
its impotence, bring about a peace agreeable to the United States, and
become the dictator of Mexico.[19.8] Already there had been suspicions,
and now they crystallized instantly round this definite accusation. Why
had the Americans allowed the ablest citizen of Mexico to pass through
their fleet? Why had Tampico and Saltillo been evacuated? Why had not
the passes of the Sierra Madre been fortified? And why had Valencia been
forbidden to attack the enemy at Victoria? The government denounced
the story as a scheme to create discord and break down the national
champion. Santa Anna does not need to become a traitor in order to be
the first Mexican, it was said. Had he made such a bargain, the United
States would have kept it secret in order that he might be able to do
his work. Has he not shed his blood for the country? Has he not recently
declined the supreme power? The defence was plausible, but the facts
looked more than plausible.[19.10]

And the situation had other aspects, too. As Governor Olaguíbel of
México state informed Santa Anna, more things were said against him than
even a long letter could specify. San Luis was described as changing
under his influence into a new Capua, where he was wasting the funds of
the country on his vices--not only gambling, but inducing the officers
to gamble with him. His political attitude was viewed with distrust,
and familiar signs indicating an intention to overthrow the government
were believed to be discernible. Even the correspondent of the London
_Times_ described his policy as "dark and tortuous," and the British
minister deemed it an "enigma." Many said his troops were more dangerous
to Mexico than to the United States. The wide extent of his military
jurisdiction was described in the press as alarming. By January each day
brought fresh rumors of an approaching dictatorship. Olaguíbel's letter
spoke the word frankly. Then came news that the troops at Mazatlán had
pronounced for it, and Santa Anna's repudiation of their course only
convinced the public that he preferred to wait for a time.[19.10]

The military phase of the situation gave equal offence. "Where now,"
it was demanded, "are those great generals of ours, who--covered with
ribbons and crosses from the crown of the head to the sole of the
foot--insulted with their luxuriant splendor the misery of the people?"
"Predictions for 1847," announced _Don Simplicio_: "The officers of
our army will be divided into fugacious and permanent;" and the same
journalistic scorpion asked why the commander-in-chief did not, while
calling for money, "eliminate the superfluous, useless, burdensome,
incapable and cowardly." At the beginning of December Salas had promised
with a flourish that Santa Anna would "very soon" meet the odious
Yankee, and before long the people were inquiring why he did not. "We
are invaded, time presses, and what has Santa Anna done?" demanded a
pamphleteer; "Ah, the silly fellow is waiting for the Americans to
come and hunt him up." At the General's demand, three newspapers were
established to defend him; but the scorpion disposed of them all with
one sting: "Napoleon answered his detractors with victories."[19.10]

[SANTA ANA FORCED TO MOVE]

Under these attacks the army shivered with rage and mortification
from top to bottom. The soldiers deserted in astonishing numbers.
The officers and their infuriated commander felt they must either do
something or sink to perdition in a burning lake of distrust, hatred and
contempt; and therefore Santa Anna decided precipitately to hurl himself
against the Americans.[19.9] Scott's intercepted letter of January
3, which probably found its way to the Mexican headquarters, showed
how Taylor's army had been depleted, and Taylor's volunteers, it was
believed by Santa Anna, would hardly resist a single onslaught; while
their inferiority in numbers, their distance from heavy reinforcements,
their scattered condition, and their isolation in the midst of a hostile
people were other factors offsetting the great difficulty of crossing
deserts to reach them.[19.10]

January 23 Santa Anna ordered the mint of San Luis to work night and
day on ninety-eight bars of silver forcibly appropriated by him. A few
days later, after issuing a manifesto in self-defence, he addressed
the army in eloquent language, pointing out the hardships, the plunder
and the glory that awaited it. On the twenty-eighth, to the plaintive
strains of a popular air called the _Adios_, the troops began to leave
the dust-brown city. The rear guard set out three days later; and on
February 2 headquarters moved.[19.11] Only useless remnants of the
army stayed behind; but on the other hand a great number of adventurers
of both sexes, drawn forward by various motives but especially by the
prospect of booty, accompanied the march.[19.15]

[SANTA ANNA'S MARCH NORTH]

For about thirty miles the route lay through a cultivated region; but
after it bade farewell to the heavy old Spanish church that crowned the
hill of Las Bocas, the country became sterile, and between mountains
now lumpy, now conical, usually rich in silver and always poor in
vegetation, each division rolled on in a billowy cloud of dust, at
one time chilled with icy blasts, and at another melting under an
insupportable sun; cheered only by the prickly cactus, the crooked
mesquite and an occasional group of dwarfish palms. Reckless from
fatigue and unaccustomed to such a burden, the soldiers threw away
thousands of sacks containing food.[19.15]

To Matehuala the distance was about 140 miles, and beyond that point lay
a broad flinty desert. Here provisions and good water began to fail;
and many, though well enough supplied with the poor meat and water
that now composed the rations, grew sick and weak.[19.12] Weather of
unusual severity set in. For several days a storm of snow or chilling
rain buffeted the struggling troops; and at night, destitute of all
shelter, they could only huddle and shiver at a few small fires. Many
died from exposure, and a great number, though expressly warned that
death would be the punishment, risked all the chances of deserting. But
the army as a whole pressed forward, and on February 17-21 arrived at
La Encarnación, nearly 200 miles from San Luis.[19.13] Several thousand
men had been lost from death, sickness or desertion on the way. Others
had been detached at various points, and Miñón had now placed himself at
Potosí hacienda behind the mountains on Taylor's left; but on February
19 the figures for the army were 15,142 officers and men[19.14]--in
general the strongest and most determined that had set out--and a
brilliant review, held the next day, showed no lack of confidence and
enthusiasm. A triumph was considered certain.[19.15]

  [Illustration: MEXICO TO AGUA NUEVA]

Santa Anna had supposed that a part of the American army occupied La
Vaquería, some eight or ten miles west of Taylor's actual position, and
his intention had been to surprise it; but by February 11 he learned
that all had concentrated at Agua Nueva. He now had the choice of three
routes. One was the direct road to that point; the second would have
taken him _via_ La Hedionda to the rear of Buena Vista; and the third
ran by the way of La Vaquería to the north of Agua Nueva.[19.16] Santa
Anna desired, he said later, to pursue one of the lateral routes, and
place himself between Taylor and Saltillo; but both of these routes were
said to be circuitous, difficult if not impracticable for artillery,
and perhaps inadequately supplied with water and provisions. He decided
therefore to surprise Agua Nueva, believing that should his forces be
seen, they would be regarded as a part of Miñón's brigade.[19.17]

That general was ordered to proceed _via_ La Hedionda to the American
rear, and a little after noon on February 21--every soldier having been
ordered to drink his fill, carry all the water he could, and take
rations for the next two days--Santa Anna advanced. Agua Nueva was only
some thirty-five miles away, and he expected to overwhelm it early
the next morning. The march continued well into the night. At Carnero
Pass, five or six miles from Taylor, the troops lay down by columns as
they arrived--the cavalry still holding their reins. It was too cold
for sleep, but they rested; and at six in the morning they rose in the
deepest possible silence, and resumed their march.[19.17]

  [Illustration: MONTEREY TO LA ENCARNACIÓN]

The Americans had at last awakened, however. By February 19 Santa Anna
was expected "hourly," wrote Lieutenant Posey, and the next day Major
McCulloch with his party of Texan scouts was despatched in the direction
of La Encarnación, while Brevet Lieutenant Colonel May with about 400
dragoons and some field pieces proceeded toward La Hedionda.[19.18]
The latter saw a cloud of dust in the direction of Potosí, fell in with
a Mexican deserter[19.19]--who said Miñón was near and Santa Anna at
La Encarnación--and reported at Agua Nueva before sunrise, February
21. At first his party were taken for Mexicans; and when the alarm
subsided, it was followed by a solemn stillness, amidst which groups
of officers could be seen talking eagerly in low tones with mysterious
gestures.[19.22]

[TAYLOR DRAWS BACK]

Suddenly at about noon a solitary horseman on a jaded steed came down
from the mountain, and made straight for the General's tent, bringing
word that a great Mexican army had been seen at La Encarnación. The
combination of this report and May's was understood to mean that Santa
Anna intended to turn Agua Nueva, and before two o'clock the Americans
took flight--that is the polite phrase--for Buena Vista.[19.20]
Colonel Yell with his mounted Arkansas regiment was left behind to
guard the stores, should Santa Anna permit this, until they could be
removed;[19.21] the Second Kentucky and some guns were detached at La
Encantada to support him; and the First Illinois under Colonel Hardin
was posted at La Angostura. About midnight Yell's pickets at Carnero
Pass were driven in. Upon this, firing the buildings and the last of
the stores, and abandoning some wagons, the troops hurried off, lighted
on their way by roaring flames that filled the air with piles of lurid
smoke and the mountains with fantastic shadows; and by morning all
except Hardin's command and the advanced pickets were at Buena Vista.
Taylor, meanwhile, entrusting to Wool the disposition of the troops,
marched with a strong escort of the three arms for Saltillo, to provide
at this late day for the defence of that city against Miñón.[19.22]




                                   XX

                              BUENA VISTA

                             February, 1847


[THE MEXICANS NEAR BUENA VISTA]

Early the next morning (February 22) Santa Anna, hurrying down from
Carnero Pass, learned that Agua Nueva had been evacuated, but on
arriving there he discovered signs, as he justly believed, of a
precipitate flight. Miñón, he thought, was already between Buena Vista
and Saltillo, in a position to hinder the American retreat; the state of
the Mexican supplies, in his opinion, did not allow time for strategic
operations; and therefore, hardly permitting the troops to drink,[20.1]
he dashed ahead with some 2500 horse and a few light battalions of
infantry, swept away the American pickets at La Encantada, and thundered
on down the valley.[20.8]

By this time Wool knew the enemy were at hand; the long roll sounded;
the soldiers leaped to their work; the camp was cleared; and a section
of Captain Washington's battery hurried down the slope toward La
Angostura. It was a beautiful morning; the mountains on the east flung
long shadows across the valley; a gentle breeze languidly stirred
the flags. What was more to the point, this was the twenty-second of
February. The bands struck up Hail Columbia. The watchword, "Honor of
Washington," passed among the men; and they shouted for joy to see the
great cloud of dust, full of galloping Mexicans, approach. None the less
they were unprepared for combat. Had Santa Anna risked a daring charge,
he would probably have triumphed in short order.[20.8]

But he found the American position and the guns at La Angostura
impressive. His bugler sounded "Halt!" just beyond range; and after
reconnoitring a long time he decided to wait for infantry. In fact there
seemed to be danger that his van might be attacked and overpowered;
and hence at about eleven o'clock he sent Dr. Vanderlinden, his chief
medical officer, to General Taylor, who had now returned from Saltillo,
with a note inviting him, on the ground that he was now surrounded
by more than 20,000 Mexicans, to lay down his arms, and probably
with secret instructions to amuse the American commander as long as
possible.[20.2] Very likely, as he intimated later, he would have been
glad to retire from what he called a Pass of Thermopylæ, and operate
strategically; but the American retreat had in effect lured him on, his
provisions were scant, and at this point therefore the issue had to be
decided at once.[20.8]

With good reason Santa Anna disliked the field of battle selected by
Wool,[20.3] for it strongly favored the defence. Running north along the
western side of the road there was a creek, which had excavated near
La Angostura an amazing network of gullies with almost vertical banks
twenty feet or so high, that practically vetoed the passage of troops;
and west of this obstruction the ground rose more and more steeply until
it became a line of high hills, parallel to the creek, which resembled
a huge wave ready to break. On the other side, between the road and
the sierra, there was a space varying from three quarters of a mile
to a mile in width, and this was roughly divided by two east-and-west
ravines--the more northern of which may be called the long and the more
southern the broad ravine--into three parts: the north field, as we may
name it, extending to Buena Vista, the middle field or plateau, and the
south field extending to La Encantada.[20.8]

Of these divisions the plateau was the most distinctive. Along the
base of the sierra there were two or three benches, presumably made of
débris from the mountain; and lighter débris had been washed almost
down to the road, forming a stony plain seamed by a number of minor
ravines--torrents during the rainy season--which grew deeper as they
progressed, until at the western edge of the plateau they descended to
the floor of the valley as ragged gulches, leaving between them several
tongues or spurs, extremely steep and about forty or fifty feet high.
The longest, highest and bluntest of the spurs, which may be called the
first of them, was at La Angostura; and a space of only some forty feet,
through which passed the road, intervened between its point and the
network of gullies. The plateau, some 400 yards wide, north-and-south,
at the base of the mountains, had perhaps twice that width at the
opposite end, toward which it very gradually sloped. Both of the two
main ravines, the long and the broad, were extremely difficult for
cavalry and still more difficult for artillery. Obviously in such a
spot large numbers--and especially large numbers of horse--lost a great
percentage of their value.[20.8]

[THE BUENA VISTA BATTLEFIELD]

The centre of the American position was the first spur, on which
Hardin's men threw up a slight breastwork during the night, with Captain
Washington's battery on the road below, protected now with a ditch and
a parapet, that ran from the gullies nearly to the spur;[20.4] and at
this point, or in reserve just north of it, Wool gathered most of the
Americans, who numbered 4759 officers and men, placing near the mountain
under Colonel Marshall the Kentucky and Arkansas horse and Major
Gorman's rifle battalion (four companies) of the Indiana foot.[20.5]
Over against these forces, the principal body of the Mexicans formed two
lines with heavy reserves behind them and cavalry in the rear, while
Mexican artillery was planted on the road and also on the high ground
east of it; and Miñón's brigade, the duty of which was to cut off the
American retreat, showed itself early in the day at the rear of Buena
Vista.[20.6] On each side the engineers reconnoitred actively, and both
Taylor and Wool visited and addressed the various American corps.[20.8]

Apparently there was an opportunity to outflank our left, and without
waiting for all his tired troops to come up, Santa Anna despatched
Ampudia with a considerable force of light infantry, well supported,
to seize a promising bench at the foot of the mountain. To defeat this
movement the Americans attempted to occupy the point first, but they
blundered and failed. Colonel Marshall then had a part of his force
ascend a spur of the mountain which joined near the summit a spur
leading down to the Mexican position, hoping in this way to outflank the
enemy; but the Mexicans, who were gradually reinforced, adopted the same
tactics.[20.8]

  [Illustration: BATTLE OF BUENA VISTA

                 A _La Angostura, Washington's Battery and two companies
                     1st Illinois Vols._
                 B _Six companies 1st Illinois Regt._
                 C _3rd Indiana Regt._
                 D _2nd Kentucky Regt. and Sherman's Battery_ (_later
                     position_)
                 E _2nd Illinois Regt. and 1st Section Bragg's Battery_
                 F _2nd Indiana Regt. and three pieces Washington's
                     Battery_
                 G _Kentucky Horse Regt. and one squadron 2nd Dragoons_
                 H _Arkansas Horse Regt. and one squadron 1st Dragoons_
                 K _Dismounted Cavalry_, etc.
                 L _2nd Kentucky Regt., Bragg's Artillery and detachment
                     of Horse_ (_early position_)
                 M _2nd Indiana partly rallied here after retreating_
                 N _Heaviest Mexican cannon_
                 O _Blanco's Column_
                 P _Column to force American left_
                 Q _Battery_
                 R _Light Troops_
                 S _Reserve_
                 T _Columns turning American left_
                 V _Mexican Battery_
                 X _Cavalry from head of Column T, attacking Buena
                     Vista_
                 Y _Taylor and Staff_]

At about three o'clock a shell from a Mexican howitzer planted on the
road gave the signal for combat; and the troops on the mountain opened
fire, climbing higher and higher until finally the Mexicans, getting
the better of Marshall, reached the crest. Meanwhile Captain O'Brien,
with three of Washington's eight guns and the Second Indiana under
Colonel Bowles for support, was posted well forward on the plateau, and
a movement on the left wing of the Mexican army led Taylor to place
the Second Kentucky under Colonel McKee, two guns under Bragg and a
detachment of horse on the opposite side of the valley; but after a
time, concluding that Santa Anna would attempt nothing more that day, he
returned to Saltillo,[20.7] escorted by the Mississippi regiment and a
body of the Second Dragoons.[20.8]

At nightfall the roar of musketry on the sierra, answered by the sharp
crack of the American rifles, subsided, and Marshall's troops were
recalled to the foot of the mountain. Aside from losing a number of men,
while on our part none were seriously injured, the Mexicans clearly had
the best of it so far. Santa Anna delivered a stirring harangue to his
troops; and the enthusiastic vivas and triumphant music that followed
it, softened by distance, floated down to the Americans on the evening
breeze in wondrously sweet and haunting tones. Pleasure ended, however,
when they died away. Though so many strong men, soon to fight for
their lives, were present, the solitude of the desert seemed to reign.
The night air was bitterly cold. A drizzling rain fell. Except at the
mountain there was no fuel. The tents of the Americans were now in the
wagons, and the Mexicans had none; and long before daybreak the troops
on both sides felt ready for anything that would stop their teeth from
chattering. For our men especially it was a dismal situation, and the
reported statement of a captured Mexican that Santa Anna had 21,000
troops gave Taylor's army no mental comfort.[20.8]

[THE BATTLE OF BUENA VISTA]

Early the next morning, February 23, Santa Anna had the reveille sounded
in his various corps one after another, in order to give an impression
of great numbers. Mass was then celebrated. All his infantry and cavalry
were drawn up in one long line. The bands, massed in front, rendered
the sacred music with grand effect; the smoke of incense mounted to the
clear, radiant sky; and a body of priests in splendid robes passed along
the line, bestowing their benedictions.[20.19]

The troops then moved to their places with deliberation and precision,
for whether they could shoot or not, Mexican soldiers were always able
to march and wheel. Evolution followed evolution. Eminence beyond
eminence bristled with steel. All the colors of the rainbow--red, green,
yellow, crimson, sky-blue, turkey-blue--clothed the troops. Even the
horses appeared to be in uniform, for those of a corps were alike in
color. Silken banners and plumes of many bright hues floated on the
breeze. Handsomely dressed aides dashed from point to point. Tremendous
vivas rolled in mighty echoes from the mountain. And while Santa Anna
thus built up the morale of his army, most of the dingy Americans
had time enough--as the quartermasters were knocking in the heads of
the cartridge casks and the sergeants gruffly dealing out flints--to
view this grand pageant through the wonderfully clear atmosphere,
and reflect. Out of the desert, as if by magic, had come a great and
brilliant army. It was not what they had expected to see. The mere
breath of its approach had blown the Americans from Agua Nueva like
dust. In comparison with its deliberation and confidence their own hasty
movements appeared ridiculous. The Mexicans had already been successful
at the mountain, and the General was plainly alarmed about the rear.
They began to question his infallibility; and many felt in their hearts
that religion was on the other side.[20.19]

At an early hour a large part of Marshall's command, supported presently
by Major Traill with two companies of the Second Illinois and Conner's
Texas company, reascended the mountain and, favored by the nature of the
ground, maintained for several hours a brisk fight with Ampudia, who,
reinforced with heavy infantry, succeeded at last in outflanking though
not in repulsing the Americans. To aid his operations in this quarter,
perhaps, by creating a diversion, Santa Anna ordered General Blanco to
advance down the road with a heavy column, strongly backed with cannon
placed in battery near the mouth of the broad ravine; but at every
discharge of Washington's guns whole lines of Mexicans appeared to sink,
and the column, unable to deploy, soon fled for shelter to the hilly
ground on its right.[20.19]

A stronger attack, however, was now launched. Pacheco and Lombardini
received orders to advance, unite on the plateau, and force the
American left; and a strong battery was planted on the Mexican right
near the head of the broad ravine to coöperate with them.[20.9]
Both infantry and horse marched forward boldly at parade step; and
the Americans could but admire the showy uniforms, the arms which
gleamed like silver, the belts white with pipeclay, and the freshly
polished brasses. Pacheco soon became engaged with the Second Indiana,
which--perhaps half a mile from any support except O'Brien's three guns
on its right--was the corps nearest Marshall and farthest forward on the
plateau; and after about half an hour of gallant fighting General Lane,
in the hope of both driving Pacheco back and relieving the Indianians
from the enfilading fire of the Mexican artillery, determined to have
them and O'Brien advance. The latter did so; but Colonel Bowles gave and
repeated an order to retreat. His retreat soon became flight,[20.10]
and four companies of Arkansas mounted riflemen joined in the
stampede.[20.19]

O'Brien, though he loaded with double canister, now found himself
compelled to withdraw, sacrificing a 4-pounder--which had neither a
sound man nor a sound horse left--but firing the other pieces as he
drew them back with ropes (prolonges). The Second Illinois, commanded
by Colonel Bissell, a born soldier, which was actively engaged on the
plateau a long distance to O'Brien's right and rear, was then outflanked
by Pacheco, and it had to retire, though in the most orderly manner,
toward the edge of the plateau. Marshall's troops were now entirely
separated from the rest of our army. Discovering their exposed situation
they hurried from the mountain, escaped with considerable difficulty and
some loss from Ampudia and the Mexican cavalry that pressed on with him,
and took refuge at Buena Vista, over three miles from their position.
Here, not long afterwards, a part of them helped other fugitives defeat
a body of lancers under Torrejón, that attempted to raid their asylum
and the wagon train;[20.11] but only a few would return to the field,
and some of them rushed panic-stricken to Saltillo, crying out that all
was lost.[20.19]

McKee and Bragg now made all speed from the other side of the valley to
the plateau. Blanco having been repulsed, four of Hardin's companies
came from the first spur. The squadron of the First Dragoons arrived;
and Bragg, Sherman and O'Brien, handling their eight guns in a masterly
style, drew a line of fire from the first gulch to the long ravine. La
Angostura and the first spur, the double key to the American position,
were thus well defended; but our left had been crushed, the way to our
rear lay open, and in spite of our incessant fire Ampudia, Pacheco and
Lombardini advanced. "One more charge!" cried the Mexicans. Apparently
Santa Anna was to triumph.[20.19]

At this point, about nine o'clock, Taylor and his escort appeared most
fortunately on the scene.[20.12] The General, mounted on Old Whitey,
stationed himself conspicuously on the plateau near the first spur with
the dragoons that accompanied him; but the Mississippi men, to whom
Colonel Bowles and a part of his regiment now attached themselves,
marched from the road in their duck trousers with red shirts outside of
them, swinging along with the light step of hunters, threw themselves
against Ampudia and the cavalry with him in the north field, repulsed
them although greatly outnumbered, and, aided by the Third Indiana,
which had been standing in reserve behind Washington, and by one of
Bragg's guns under Lieutenant Kilburn, forced them back by a withering
fire toward the mountain.[20.19]

By this time a strong Mexican battery had been moved round the head of
the broad ravine by dint of extraordinary exertions, and planted near
the mountain, where it commanded the entire plateau; but in spite of
the skilful San Patricio company--American deserters--who partly or
wholly manned it, the Pacheco-Lombardini column broke almost in the
middle under the American fire, the larger part of it advancing into
the north field and reinforcing Ampudia, while the other part--bearing
with it Santa Anna, whose horse had been killed by a canister ball, and
suffering terribly from our cannon and the close pursuit of Hardin,
Bissell and McKee--shrank back toward the broad ravine. The situation on
the plateau thus became easy. Shelter from the Mexican artillery could
be found in the minor ravines; bread, water and ammunition were brought
up; and the wounded were removed. But there was great danger now that
the large Mexican forces north of the long ravine would either fall upon
Washington's rear or, joining hands with Miñón, capture the American
stores and ammunition at Saltillo. Leaving O'Brien's two guns and one
each of their own on the plateau, therefore, Bragg and Sherman were
ordered to the north field.[20.19]

Here, soon after noon, a brigade of Mexican cavalry supported by
infantry pushed resolutely forward to gain the Saltillo road near the
long ravine. In order to find a better position and avoid the danger
of being enveloped, the Mississippians retired some distance; but soon
they halted, and with the Indiana men, who now rejoined them, formed an
obtuse angle opening toward the mountain. Upon this obstacle the Mexican
cavalry, drawn up in a close column, rushed down at an easy gallop in
the most beautiful style, drawing small circles in the air with the
glittering points of their lances. These men, too, were brilliantly
uniformed, the horses were lavishly caparisoned, and all the plumes and
flags and pennons were fluttering. Had they maintained their impetus,
they could have carried all before them; but the attitude of the
Americans, who made no attempt to form a square and merely stood still
with shouldered arms, puzzled the Mexican leader. He wondered, probably,
what there might be in the ravine close by them, and slackening speed
he almost halted, about seventy yards away, at the very focus of their
angle.[20.19]

But suddenly the muskets and rifles were levelled. Each man picked his
target, and at the word "Fire!"--just as the Mexican bugler sounded the
charge--two sheets of flame converged on that splendid brigade. The head
of it fell to the ground, and the rest were thrown into confusion. Then
the Mississippi men leaped forward, yelling wildly, seized horses by the
bits, threw them back on their haunches, and finished many a helpless
rider with the 18-inch bowie-knife, while the Indianians fired and plied
the bayonet, and Sherman, coming up with a howitzer, blasted out wide,
red gaps. The onslaught was irresistible; the whole brigade with its
infantry support recoiled; and the victors pressed on in pursuit.[20.19]

A deafening thunderstorm of rain and hail now burst upon the contending
armies, but the battle in the north field hardly paused. While Sherman
accompanied the right of the Mississippi and Indiana men, Bragg and
a body of dragoons flanked their left;[20.13] the American artillery
on the plateau, having little to do there, turned its attention upon
the same dense masses; and gradually this whole force of Mexicans was
driven back to the mountain. Retiring then into a recess of the sierra,
they became more and more closely concentrated, and the American fire
more and more destructive; but as the lancers had been stabbing their
wounded enemies, no pity was felt on our side now.[20.19]

Nothing but annihilation appeared to await the panic-stricken mass; but
precisely at this juncture--about one o'clock--several Mexican officers,
who had been separated from their troops, galloped up to Taylor in the
desperate hope of saving their lives, and asked in the name of Santa
Anna what the American general wanted.[20.14] Upon this Wool himself
rode with a white flag toward the spot where Santa Anna was supposed to
be, in order to ascertain the meaning of this extraordinary question,
and to a considerable extent the American fire ceased. As the Mexican
guns, however, kept at work, Wool returned; but during this lull the
troops imprisoned in the recess passed rapidly along the base of the
mountain, girdling it with a belt of shining steel, toward the San
Patricio battery. Their escape was deeply regretted, but at all events
the north field was now clear of them.[20.19]

From the first, Santa Anna had been determined to gain the American
rear, doubtless believing that if taken in reverse the volunteers would
certainly give way, and he had succeeded in completely outflanking us;
yet Ampudia's light brigade, the heavy infantry, Torrejón's cavalry, and
the brilliant corps of lancers that attacked the Mississippi and Indiana
troops had all failed. Upset, perhaps, by this disappointment, he threw
away his chance of triumph, for he should have coöperated with his brave
troops in the north field by hurling upon the American centre all the
forces that could be gathered on the south field and the plateau.[20.15]
But now, for a last and crowning effort, he assembled these forces,
placed them under the command of General Pérez, and advanced the battery
on his right flank to an elevated position.[20.19]

Unwittingly Taylor played into his hands, for now--about four
o'clock--he ordered Hardin to charge;[20.16] and the brave colonel,
whose finely cut, virile face, jet-black eye and tightly closed lips
told what he was, advanced promptly with his six companies. This
movement brought him before long into contact with the Mexicans from
the recess, who, observing the smallness of his command, rallied against
him. Bissell and McKee, seeing that he was overmatched, hastened to
his aid, and all three pushed vigorously forward; but suddenly queer
objects appeared to be moving along the surface of the plateau at their
right, and in another moment out of the ground rose a forest of muskets.
This was the corps of Pérez emerging from the broad ravine. Hardin,
Bissell and McKee poured upon it a hot fire. So did O'Brien with his two
6-pounders, and Chickamauga Thomas with one of Sherman's pieces. But the
fire of the Mexicans, one terrific blaze and roar, was this time low and
true. The air seemed thick with their bullets. Some of the Kentucky men
dropped to the ground to escape them. "Up, up and on!" cried McKee, and
with frantic cheers they sprang again to their work.[20.19]

But they fought in vain. The odds were too great, and the Americans
too exhausted. "Retreat or you are lost!" was the order; and the three
regiments, enveloped by the left wing of Pérez, rushed and rolled in
headlong flight down the second gulch toward the road. Here the fearless
Hardin, defending himself to the last with a sabre, his only weapon,
sank to the ground. Here the son of Henry Clay, wounded in the thigh,
refused to let his men imperil their lives by trying to carry him
farther, and bravely met his fate; and here fell the gallant McKee,
covered with wounds. Indeed, all seemed to be doomed alike, for lancers
hurried on to close the mouth of the gulch; but suddenly Washington's
guns opened with spherical case shot, and under this driving, hissing
blast of iron the Americans ran breathless to La Angostura.[20.19]

On the plateau, during this catastrophe, the right wing of Pérez bore
down upon Taylor's position at the centre. Nothing formidable stood in
its way except O'Brien, for Thomas was fully occupied about one hundred
yards to O'Brien's left and rear. Understanding the crisis and ready to
sacrifice everything if he could only gain a little time, O'Brien fired
canister till not one of his gunners was left, and the Mexicans could
almost lay hands on the pieces, and then just managed to hobble away.
The Mexicans now swept on at a run. The fragments at our centre were on
the point of giving way. The day seemed lost.[20.19]

But by this time Bragg and Sherman, lashing and spurring their tired
horses, came up from the north field; and the Indiana and Mississippi
regiments, hurrying over the ridges and ravines with trailed arms,
appeared on their left some distance away. Without support Bragg whirled
his guns into battery only a few rods from the enemy, and Sherman
followed his example, while the infantry charged the Mexican flank and
rear; and quickly, but none too soon, canister and bullets told. Round
followed round, and volley pursued volley. The infantry shook with
fatigue; the men at the cannon, grimy with powder-stains, gasped for air
as they rammed the charges home; but they all kept at work.[20.19]

Bravely fought the Mexicans, too; but such a staggering fire could not
be resisted, and soon the dark masses of Pérez's column reeled back
in confusion to the broad ravine. It was now about five o'clock. Our
artillery continued to play for a while on the San Patricio battery, but
even Miñón, who had been making feeble demonstrations against Saltillo,
was by this time thoroughly repulsed,[20.17] and the roar of battle
subsided. The terrible conflict was in fact over. Both armies were too
exhausted to fight longer, and in the narrow valley day was already
waning.

     "The guns still roared at intervals; but silence fell at last,
     And on the dead and dying came the evening shadows fast;
     And then above the mountains rose the pale moon's silver shield,
     And patiently and pitying she looked upon the field."[20.19]

[THE BATTLE EXTRAORDINARY]

It was an extraordinary battle. On the part of the Americans it began
in flight and ended in success. Marred by mistakes and failures, it
exhibited even more strikingly both skill and moral grandeur. Taylor
seems to have had but little to do with directing it, and that little
seems to have been poor work; but he did more than engineer success--he
created it. Huddled rather than mounted, a great part of the time, on
Old Whitey, with arms folded and one leg unconcernedly thrown across the
pommel of his saddle, the conspicuous target of the Mexican artillery
yet utterly unmoved even when his clothes were pierced, he was a
fountain of courage and energy.[20.18] In other words, the victory of
Buena Vista was due primarily to Taylor's prestige, valor and gift of
inspiring confidence. Others contributed essentially, however. Wool,
who commanded on our left, played the rôle of the fearless professional
soldier that he was. Many other officers and certain corps exhibited
a heroism of the noblest quality. Our artillery was beyond praise for
both daring and skill. As Wool said in his report, the army could not
have stood for "a single hour" without it; and the batteries served
indispensably, moreover, as rallying-points for the infantry. The
lancers, cantering over the plain and finishing the American wounded,
gave great assistance by exasperating and warning our men; and even
Miñón helped us, for he made it look extremely dangerous, during much of
the time, to set out for Saltillo.[20.19]

Nor should our foes be undervalued. While it was said afterwards that
a number of the higher officers did badly, the troops earned by their
wonderful march, their endurance of hunger and especially thirst,
and their valiant fighting under the terrible fire of the American
artillery, a liberal mead of praise. In fact, when due allowance is made
for the numbers of their almost valueless cavalry and for the position,
equipment, supplies and comparative freshness of the Americans, one
finds the two armies not very unevenly matched, and so far as fighting
was concerned, the engagement proved almost or perhaps quite a drawn
battle.[20.19]

Then followed a night almost as hard as the day. In killed and wounded
Taylor had lost 673 officers and men,[20.20] and in spite of his
personal influence 1500 or 1800 appear to have quit the field. Those
who remained, fatigued not only by their exertions but in consequence
of the rarefied atmosphere, found themselves at the end of their
strength, both physical and moral. Evidently the Mexicans were not so
contemptible. Only one of our regiments had kept its face always toward
the enemy. Some of the bravest leaders had fallen. The death of so many
comrades depressed all. In too many cases officers had lost confidence
in their men, or men in their officers. Many home letters were written
that night, and they were all despondent. The howl of the wolf and the
creaking flap of the buzzard reached the very souls of the sleepless men
shivering in the cold. Wool felt compelled to use the flat of his sword
on some of the officers, and even that did not make them stir. Officer
after officer assured Taylor that no more fighting could be done, or
that it would mean defeat if attempted.[20.24]

Not for a moment, however, would the General admit this. He was
determined to hold the ground, querying only whether Santa Anna would
turn the American position during the night or make another frontal
attack in the morning.[20.21] The Mississippi regiment was ordered to
Saltillo, while most of the troops holding the city were drawn to the
front; and a detachment of the Kentucky mounted volunteers with four
heavy guns, marching that night from Rinconada Pass, thirty-five miles
distant, could be reckoned on. But the General felt deeply mortified by
the skulking, and wondered how many men would give him the slip before
morning.[20.24]

[SANTA ANNA RETIRES]

Still more bitter were the reflections of Santa Anna. His passionate
nature ebbed and flowed, and a reverse always depressed him extremely.
He was tired out, and his old wound had begun to make him trouble.
Probably not less than 1800 of his men had been killed or wounded; 294
had been captured; and he was probably not far from the mark when he
said that more than 4000 had left him during the battle.[20.22] He felt
that the American position, defended by men whose fighting compelled his
admiration, was impregnable. Mexican troops always lacked morale for
long, and especially for unsuccessful, operations; and the troops under
his command were now spent in every way. Confidence in their leader and
in the hope of booty failed them. They remembered how they had been
forced into the ranks and then abused. Surprised by an infantry that
seemed to recognize no defeat, they were dumfounded by an artillery that
seemed to be everywhere at once and always blazing. Hunger, thirst, and
cold tormented them.[20.24]

Such conditions meant wholesale desertion; and, as a Mexican officer
wrote that evening, it was a grave question whether the troops, if
left overnight in their present loose and scattered state, would not
disband.[20.23] The country would then be without a disciplined army
to oppose either Taylor or Scott; and Santa Anna knew what his enemies
would say in that case. If, on the other hand, he should lead back an
organized force bearing the recognized fruits of victory, two banners
and three cannon, he could claim a success even if not a positive
triumph. So, leaving behind the wounded that were not within easy reach
or could not well be transported, he closed up his ranks not long after
nightfall, and set out for Agua Nueva. At first the march was like a
funeral procession, except that dead men appeared to be celebrating
their own obsequies. Nobody spoke; the bands were silent; the groans of
the wounded and the rumble of the artillery and wagons took the place of
conversation and music. But before long the slender crescent of the moon
sank behind the mountain; and then in the greatest confusion the men
stumbled and hurried along, eager to find a resting place.[20.24]

Of this movement the American outposts were not aware. A Mexican brigade
kept fires burning along the whole front, and pickets rode steadily to
and fro singing to themselves a strange, sad air. When the first pale
gleam was visible above the sierra, our soldiers bestirred themselves
for another battle. But as the day began to grow, only the backs of
a Mexican rearguard could be seen. A joyous murmur ran from group to
group. Soon it was confirmed; it swelled to a shout; hard-featured,
battle-worn men became boys again; and Taylor and Wool threw themselves,
with moist eyes, into each other's arms.[20.24]

[THE MEXICAN RETREAT]

About 860 officers and 9000 men gathered round Santa Anna that forenoon
at Agua Nueva. Temporary supplies of food were available,[20.25]
and the troops were at once reorganized by combining companies from
different corps. Before the day was out Major Bliss arrived to propose
an exchange of prisoners and suggest an end of hostilities.[20.26] To
the former proposition Santa Anna acceded, but he rejected the latter;
and, ordering the eyes of the American commissioner to be unbound,
he exhibited to him an army prepared for battle. In general orders
he stated that his purpose in retiring had been to draw Taylor upon
ground where Mexican cavalry could operate; but, as the prospect of
resuming the offensive was extremely slight, provisions were scanty, the
dysentery had already broken out, and the presence of so many wounded
men--more than 700 poor fellows in the most wretched condition--seemed
liable to produce other diseases, a council of war decided the next
day upon retreat, and February 26 in the afternoon the troops moved
south.[20.27]

Now came their real defeat. Like Napoleon returning from Russia,
Santa Anna hurried on in advance, and owing to complications there was
actually no general-in-chief. Divisions and corps marched and lived
as they could. Officers obeyed or disobeyed as they chose. Dysentery,
typhus and all sorts of minor distresses prevailed. The condition of
the troops was enough to make nature shudder, wrote an officer; and
the march was "worse than three retreats from Matamoros put together."
Probably not less than 3000 men were lost in one way or another on the
road; and when the miserable survivors--less than half the number that
had left San Luis full of enthusiasm--began to arrive in that city,
the sensation among the people was described by a witness as "most
profound." Santa Anna, however, had already been accorded triumphal
honors there. By this time a wave of jubilation, soon to break in
plaudits on the far-distant shores of Tabasco River, was in motion;
and he took pains to ensure proper testimony by having a cross of
honor decreed to every officer distinguished in the battle, and by
distributing twenty-seven promotions in the three highest grades.[20.27]

For Taylor also the battle of Buena Vista had a sequel. Impressed, very
likely, by the report of Bliss, he allowed his army to rest where it
was for three days; but late on the twenty-seventh, having ascertained
Santa Anna's retreat through a reconnaissance, he reoccupied Agua Nueva,
where he found a number of Mexican wounded, and on March 1--though his
troops were not yet fresh enough to pursue the enemy or he did not think
it safe to do so--he pushed a detachment on to La Encarnación with a
like result. Provisions and surgical assistance were freely given to the
disabled foemen, but their comrades were evidently beyond reach.[20.29]

Taylor's rear, however, caused him rather serious trouble. The long
shadow cast by Santa Anna's army had spread alarm and confusion all over
northeastern Mexico, and the approach of troops from Tula deepened it.
Even the people of Monclova and Parras, despite their promises to be
neutral, took up arms. The Americans were now to be driven across the
Rio Grande and perhaps the Sabine, it was threatened. Preparations for
defence were made at all our chief posts, and for this reason they were
hardly molested; but the lines of communication could not be maintained,
detachments en route were menaced or assailed, and on the day following
the battle Urrea, a polished ruffian of the distinctive Spanish-American
type, broke up a large wagon train with signal atrocity.[20.28] The
rancheros coöperated eagerly in this profitable work, and the result of
the battle had little effect upon them, for they had seen the Mexican
army come and go at will, and doubtless thought it might appear again.
Taylor therefore proceeded to Monterey about the eighth of March, and
endeavored to restore order. On the twenty-eighth he reported that quiet
had returned; but three weeks later, though he believed that Urrea and
his regulars had withdrawn beyond the Sierra Madre, he admitted that
bands of robbers were still very numerous.[20.29]

Nor was the panic limited to this region. Almost equal alarm prevailed
in the United States. "The sympathy of every human being is elicited,"
wrote Brooke at New Orleans; and the government itself, hurrying off
recruits and authorizing Brooke to accept new volunteers, awaited in
"painful suspense" the result of Santa Anna's advance. The tidings
of his failure, exaggerated of course into news of a brilliant and
overwhelming triumph won by a general robbed of his troops, caused a
tremendous rebound. Polk, holding that only Taylor's blundering and
violation of orders had created the peril, and that his brave men had
rescued him from it, would not permit a general salute in the army; but
the nation saluted, and the General's nomination for the Presidency
became inevitable.[20.29]




                                 NOTES


                         KEY TO THE REFERENCES

In most cases it will not be difficult to determine where the MS.
sources are preserved. Despatches to or from a military or naval
officer, a diplomatic or a consular agent may be understood, if there is
no indication to the contrary, to be in the corresponding archives of
the government addressed. (The connection of the author of a despatch
may be ascertained by looking up his name in the index.) This direction
may seem vague, but the officials at the archives will be found able
to supply the needful details. The principal foreign agents in Mexico
were (U. S.) Poinsett, Butler, Ellis, Thompson, Shannon, Slidell, and
(consuls) Jones, Black, and Dimond; (England) Morier, Ward, Pakenham,
Ashburnham, Bankhead, Doyle, Thornton, and (consul) Giffard; (France)
Cochelet, Martin, Deffaudis, and Cyprey; and (Spain) Bermúdez de Castro
and Lozano. Mexican documents cited in the form "To S. Anna, Apr. 20"
or "S. Anna, Mar. 4," are in the archives of the War Dept. of Mexico,
National Palace. Many unofficial letters can readily be traced by means
of the list of MS. sources. When it has seemed desirable, however,
particularly at the beginning of a chapter, heavy figures referring to
that list have been prefixed to the citation, and also to many citations
of official documents. The MS. sources are given in the appendix of each
volume; the printed sources in the appendix of the second volume.

A formula like "Ho. 60; 30, 1" means House Executive Document no. 60,
of the Thirtieth Congress, first session; and "_Cong. Globe_, 30, 2"
refers to the _Congressional Globe_, Thirtieth Congress, second session.
In some cases it has been found best to cite a document broadly by
mentioning the first page of it; and the same remark applies to passages
in other publications. The year in the date of a cited document is
omitted when it is the same as that of the events referred to in the
corresponding paragraph of the text. _E.g._ a document dated Oct. 15,
1847, attached to a paragraph dealing with Scott's landing at Vera
Cruz (March, 1847) or capturing Mexico City (Sept., 1847) is cited
as of "Oct. 15," not "Oct. 15, 1847." This is done to save space.
The abbreviations are plain. "Gov." means _governor_; "comte. gen.,"
_comandante general_; "comte. mil." _comandante militar_. "Gov. Puebla,"
etc., means _governor of Puebla_, etc. "_Diario_" means the official
newspaper. For fuller titles of books the list of sources may be
consulted.

The want of definiteness and the lack of statistics in numerous cases
(particularly Mexican affairs) may be charged to a dearth of trustworthy
data.




                                 NOTES


                                PREFACE

P.1. Another reason for the neglect of the Mexican War has been its
unpopularity. But for that, it would no doubt have been thoroughly
studied sooner.

P.2. A second reason for preparing this history was that a number of
important topics--such as the conditions existing in the two countries
just before the war, the war in American politics, our conduct and
methods in occupied territory, the finances of the war, its foreign
relations, etc.--had been treated most superficially or not at all.
In the third place it was hoped to handle more carefully the material
previously used. The bound volumes entitled "Archivo de Guerra" in the
Archivo General y Público at Mexico occupy some 200 feet of shelf room,
and the papers examined in the Archivo de Guerra y Marina, which had to
be examined one by one, would probably, if placed one on another, make a
pile sixty feet high.

As will be seen from the detailed account of the MS. sources (appendix),
the author did not visit the archives of all the Mexican states and
cities. This was because nothing further of local value could be hoped
for, and because the practice of communicating from state to state
copies of important documents made it seem unnecessary to continue in
those directions. The results in Peru and Colombia were negative, but
this fact had a positive significance, for there were reasons to look
for an active sympathy and correspondence with Mexico in those quarters.
The author planned to examine the Prussian archives, but the outbreak
of the great war prevented him from doing so. From other trustworthy
sources, mostly unpublished, he fully understood the attitude of that
government, however (chap. xxxv). The reports of the Prussian
representative at Mexico cannot have been reliable, both because of
his personal characteristics and because for several reasons he did
not stand within the inner circle, and probably, since his government
felt scarcely any interest in the war, they were not full. Hence it
is not believed that anything of material value has been lost through
the impossibility of examining them. Of some of the newspaper files
only scattered portions were found. Many newspapers, as well as many
books and pamphlets, were read to ascertain the general temper, social
state, and political conditions of the two countries, and it appeared
unnecessary to set down references--which would have been almost
innumerable--to such literature. The author contemplated at one time a
critical discussion of the sources, but he soon found that this would
require too much space. It would in fact make a volume. For additional
information regarding the sources one may consult an article of the
author's that appeared in _The Military Historian and Economist_, vol.
i, no. 1.

P.3. The printed versions of diplomatic and military documents, when
substantially correct, are usually cited in the notes, because they
are easily accessible; but so far as possible they have been collated
with the originals. On the value of official military reports the
author presented some remarks in the _American Historical Review_, vol.
xxi, p. 96. Gen. Worth said privately that Scott's report on the
battle of Cerro Gordo was "a lie from beginning to end," and in a
sense different from what this language would at first sight appear
to mean, it was fairly correct (chap. xxiii, note 33). Subordinate
officers not infrequently brought all possible influence, both personal
and political, to bear upon the general whose report they knew would
be printed. A general naturally favored in his report the regiment and
the officers with whom he had been formerly associated. An undue regard
for rank was often felt. Taylor asked a promotion for Brig Gen. Twiggs
after the capture of Monterey though Twiggs had been ostensibly ill at
the time and had taken no material part in the fight. Captain (later
General) Bragg wrote: "The feelings succeeding a great victory caused
many things to be forgotten and forgiven which would sound badly in
history, and which will never be known except in private correspondence"
(=210=to Gov. Hammond, May 4, 1848). An important document issued
by our government was privately described by the adj. gen. as "full of
inaccuracies" (=117=R.Jones to B. Mayer, Oct. 10, 1848).

A special reason for leaving no stone unturned has been the
consideration that the omission of a significant fact is even worse than
a positive error, since it is equally misleading and less likely to
be discovered. In many instances an apparently insignificant document
proved to be the keystone of an arch or at least to fill a serious gap,
and the cumulative effect of a number of such documents frequently
established a capital fact. Documents not actually used often prove
helpful by preventing the writer from drawing inferences that look
reasonable but are in fact incorrect (see the last paragraph of the
article in the _Military Historian_ cited above). Even minutiæ enable
one to give life and, so to speak, rotundity to events, and to do this
is to increase the fidelity of the narrative. The more information the
historian possesses, the better he can criticise particular documents.
In consequence of a want of this full acquaintance with the facts,
documents relating to the subject have previously been misunderstood.
Still another valuable fruit of a wide investigation is a higher degree
of confidence on the part of both author and reader that no later
discoveries will upset present conclusions. For Scott's statement see
=65=gen. orders 249, Aug. 6, 1847.

Naturally the author had little occasion to use previous histories of
the war, and indeed he took care not to consult them while writing
this work. No thorough attempt has been made to point out their errors
and no wish is felt to criticize them in general; but it needs to be
explained that while Ripley, Wilcox, Furber and Roa Bárcena present
statements of minor importance, not found elsewhere, which the author
wished to use, he has seldom felt at liberty to do so. As is well known
those authors were not critical historians. They were also too near the
events. It is frequently impossible to be sure whether their statements
rested upon hearsay, upon trustworthy second-hand information, or upon
personal knowledge. Roa Bárcena spoke as a Mexican. Wilcox aimed to
glorify our officers and men; and Ripley intended to exalt the unworthy
Pillow at the expense of Scott (chap. xxiii, note 29; and, for an
interesting though not wholly correct review of Ripley, _So. Qtrly.
Rev._, Jan., 1851, 149-60). Pillow =185=wrote in reference to Ripley's
book, He has torn Scott "the _man_ and the _officer_ all _to pieces_."
The recent work by Rives contains much that is sound as well as
dignified; but his investigations came far short of the requirements.
The present author has frequently taken pains to write in such a way as
to correct errors without mentioning them, and the reader may feel sure
that he has carefully considered all statements not in agreement with
his own.

P.4. Particular reasons why a civilian could venture to prepare
the history of this war were that (1) owing largely to the smallness
of the numbers engaged, the operations were simple; (2) the reports
were written for non-military readers; and (3) a large amount of
good criticism was written at the time or soon afterwards--mostly in
a private way--by competent officers who were personally familiar
with the circumstances. As a matter of fact military men's technical
knowledge does not necessarily enable them to reach correct historical
conclusions. This is proved by their radical differences of opinion
(_e.g._ compare the articles on Wilcox's History of the Mexican War,
_Journal of U.S. Artillery_, July and Oct., 1892) and their manifest
errors of judgment. Gen. U. S. Grant pronounced Scott's strategy on Aug.
20, 1847, faultless as a result of the perfect work of his engineer
officers (Pers. Mems., i, 145); but the engineer from whose report
Scott's essential orders regarding the battle of Churubusco resulted
admitted privately that he blundered (<xxvi, notes, remarks on
Churubusco). The dicta of military authorities are not often quoted by
the author, because war cannot be made by rule and it would be necessary
to consider in each case whether the dictum was applicable.

A very difficult matter was to decide how many military details to
introduce. There is hardly any limit to the names of officers and
commands and the minutiæ of movements that might have been presented.
The principle adopted was to draw the line between historical value and
antiquarian value, to include what was needed to show how the important
results were brought about and allow the curious reader to ascertain the
rest of the details by looking up the references.

The reader who has given no study to the subject may perhaps welcome
a few informal and obviously incomplete remarks on the principles
of war. One proper aim is the occupation of territory, and this may
possibly be accomplished without fighting; but essentially combat is
presupposed, and the purpose is then to destroy or in some other way
eliminate the enemy's military strength, so that he will feel compelled
to accept our terms. Therefore the general should (1) make all possible
preparations; (2) take the initiative and lose no time; (3) secure
unity in plan and in action; (4) obtain as much information as possible
regarding the enemy and beware of despising him; (5) embarrass him and
break down his morale, while building up your own, through rapidity of
movement, surprises, feints, threats against his communications, etc.;
(6) select for objective a point combining, as far as may be, weakness
and decisiveness--qualities often incompatible, of course; (7) running
no avoidable risk of inadequacy, concentrate near and move upon this
an overpowering force, while diverting the enemy's forces from it;
(8) strike with energy and decision; and (9) if successful, pursue to
the limit of endurance and safety. In a general way it may be said
that an "indirect" or "oblique" (_i.e._ flank) attack is preferable,
but obviously the actual conditions must decide whether to adopt that
method. In view of these principles, strategy determines when, where,
and with what forces a battle shall be fought, and tactics directs the
battle itself. It follows that on the defensive one should protect
one's communications, force the enemy to send out detachments and rout
or annoy these; and, if such methods have no saving effect, retire to
a position strong by nature, art, or both, and, while defending it,
watch for opportunities to strike. One may consult on these points
and on the text to which this note refers Clausewitz, On War, book i,
chap. 7; Jomini, Précis, i, 470-2; Murray, Reality of War, 21, 77;
Donat, Strategical Science, 275-6; Henderson, Science of War, 19-20;
Griepenkerl, Applied Tactics, 116; Goltz, Conduct of War, 10-12; _Jour.
Milit. Serv. Instit._, 1908, p. 31; _Am. Hist. Rev._, xi, 388.

P.5. As the author was compelled to depart in many cases from the
familiar method of referring to the sources, he feels bound to explain
how these were handled. All the material, condensed as much as it safely
could be, was marked in the margin with Roman figures, indicating to
what chapter each sentence or larger section would belong. Then the
sections were copied into packets, each of which contained all the
material of a chapter. Next the material of each packet was analyzed
into topical items, and the items were numbered with Arabic figures.
In writing a chapter the author placed after each sentence (or, if the
case demanded, after each clause, phrase or word) the Arabic figures
numbering the items upon which it rested. These figures were retained
through the successive revisions until the MS. was ready to print, and
were used in the re-examination of the work. By this routine every
document was considered at least five times. Of course care was taken
at all stages to ensure correct copying; yet in the final revision the
author went back, unless there was a good reason for not doing so,
to originals or to trustworthy copies from the originals--doing this
not merely to verify the references but also to see, in the light of
the completed investigation of the subject, whether he had omitted or
misunderstood anything of importance in making notes and condensations.
The text and remarks as written looked thus:

     "Gen. Patterson once asserted that Volunteers were no worse
     than regulars 578, but the evidence of other officers 83-4 340
     385 564 568 1266 and of the Mexicans 84 87 340 489 582 1236 was
     overwhelmingly against him. Regulars committed offences, but these
     appear to have been commonly mere pilfering 181 562, and to have
     been chargeable mostly to fresh recruits 83 1103. It is probable,
     however, that the Volunteer troops often bore the blame 109 for
     acts done by soldiers dishonorably discharged 659 981, deserters
     582 601 659 689 945, teamsters and other civilian employees 358
     1315 and the many "black legs" 377 and "human vultures" 1292 who
     followed the army 365 568 639. The great difficulty was to identify
     the culprits 1315. Mexicans were often afraid to testify against
     our soldiers 1266."

The saving of space and labor that resulted from the grouping of
citations can easily be illustrated. Take the case of ten statements
resting upon ten documents, which may be represented by the first ten
letters of the alphabet. Were the usual method followed the references
might be: _acj_, _dfghi_, _be_, _adeghj_, _fij_, _bcf_, _adeg_, _cfh_,
_i_, _bdgh_j; whereas by the group method the references would be
_abcdefghij_--in the former case 35, in the latter 10. The higher
cost of the former method might have enforced the omission of all
references from the printed volumes, if indeed the increased labor of
writing, copying, and proof-reading the references had not deterred
the author--as it might well have done--from completing his task. As it
stands, the book probably represents (including the work of clerical
assistants) nearly twenty years of labor. After all, the chief value
of citations is perhaps their effect upon the author. Few look them
up; but, no matter how conscientious he may be, the fact of constantly
giving such pledges of fidelity keeps him wide-awake to the necessity of
accuracy, and indeed compels him to refer to his sources more than he
might otherwise feel obliged to do.


                       I. MEXICO AND THE MEXICANS

(To the sources mentioned below may be added a residence of more than
a year in Mexico, during which the author met people of numerous
categories and made every possible effort to understand the national
traits.)

1.1. _Physical Mexico._ U. S. War Dept., Monograph. Bureau of Amer.
Republics, Mexico. Encyclopædia Britannica, "Mexico." Numerous books of
travel mentioned in note 8.

1.2. _Population._ The census which served as a basis for the
elections of 1841 and some later years gave the population as 7,016,000
(Dublán, Legislación, v, 152, gives the figures by states). The American
governor of Jalapa, Col. Hughes, =257=wrote, Jan. 28, 1848, that
according to "authentic Mexican official documents" the population
was about 7,500,000, of whom 2,500,000 were under seventeen years of
age, 500,000 were over sixty, and 300,000 were idlers, beggars, etc.,
incapable of work. The population of the United States in 1840 was
17,069,453. _Observador Judicial_, 1842. Consideraciones, 5. _Journal
des Débats_, Sept. 9, 1847. =261=Mémoire. Macgregor, Progress, i,
317. Ward, Mexico, i, 28. Mora, Obras, i, 54. México á través, iii, 19;
iv, p. vii. Relaciones, circular, Aug. 9, 1847. =82=Decree, Dec.
16, 1847. _Diario_, May 4, 1847, claimed 8,000,000.

1.3. _Racial divisions and characteristics._ México á través, iii,
18-21. Humboldt, Essai Polit., i, 367, 381, 411-6; ii, 1-4, 9, 45,
48-52. =52=Poinsett, no. 166, March 10, 1829. Mayer, War, 13,
16. _Commerc. Review_, ii, 165-76. Consideraciones, 5-7. García,
Conquista, 4, 370-2, 397. Thompson, Recolls., 7. Poinsett, Notes, 161.
=13=Hervey, Description of Mexico. =261=Mémoire. Löwenstern,
Le Mexique, 166, 174-89. Mora, Obras, i, 54-6. Cuevas, Porvenir,
12-14. =178=Davis, diary. =162=Conner to wife, Mar. 4, 1846.
Diccionario Universal (_Mexicanos_). =13=Morier, no. 10, Feb. 10,
1825. _Eco del Comercio_, Mar. 22, 1848.

Technically the child of a Spaniard and an Indian was a "mestizo," the
child of a Spaniard and a mestizo was a "castizo," and the child of a
Spaniard and a castizo was a "criollo" (creole); but "criollo" came to
include all these classes and also pure whites born in Mexico. As very
few Spanish women went to Mexico, the mixture of blood was practically
inevitable. As is well known the Spanish blood itself is a singular
mixture. Hence the Mexican was naturally peculiar.

1.4. _The class divisions._ Otero, Cuestión, 37, 47-51.
=13=Morier, no. 12, Feb. 10, 1825. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, i,
232. =26l=Mémoire. Humboldt, Essai Polit., i, 391-5, 400-1, 429-31;
ii, 40. Poinsett, Notes, 162. Constituent Cong. of Mex., Address.
Consideraciones, 18, 19. Mora, Obras, i, 54-6. Paredes, Papers, 136.
=52=Poinsett, no. 166. México á través, iii, 18. Löwenstern, Le
Mexique, 188-9.

1.5. _Church_, _army_, _civil service_. Mayer, War, 20-1, 132. Otero,
Cuestión, 38-46, 59, 60, 71-3. Mora, Obras, i, pp. vii, xcvii-cxviii,
ccxlvii; ii, 122-8. =261=Mémoire. Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 38,
94, 117-28. Humboldt, Polit. Essay (London, 1811), i, 231-2. México á
través, ii, 896; iii, 23; iv, 149, 447, 639. Zavala, Revoluciones, i,
37. Macgregor, Progress, i, 637, 642. Thompson, Recolls., 41, 53, 101-3,
169-74. =52=Poinsett, nos. 2, 12, 36, 55, 166 (May 28; Aug. 5,
1825; Feb. 18; Aug. 26, 1826; March 10, 1829). Consideraciones, 6, 7,
12, 26-30, 37, 39-42. =13=Ashburnham, Oct. 3, 1837; July 26, 1838.
Semmes, Service, 14-5, 21. =11=Martin, Feb. 1; July 20, 1827; Dec.
25, 1828. =11=Cochelet, June 6; Nov. 20, 1829. _Correspondant_,
April 15; July 15, 1846. Calderón, Life, i, 337, 408. =13=Hervey,
Description. _Picayune_, April 22, 1843. Bocanegra, Memorias, i, 32.
Tornel, Reseña, 19-21, 84. =11=Despatch to the French govt.,
about June, 1823 (anon.). =13=Morier, no. 13, Feb. 10, 1825.
=13=Morier and Ward, no. 1, April 10, 1825. =13=Ward, no. 37,
Apr. 29, 1826. =13=Pakenham, nos. 17, Jan. 30, 1830; 25, Feb. 26,
1841; 77, Aug. 29, 1842. =13=Bankhead, nos. 73, Aug. 29, 1844;
56, Apr. 29, 1846. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. Richmond
_Enquirer_, Dec. 30, 1845. Mobile _Commerc. Register_, Aug. 9, 1845.
_Veracruzano Libre_, Dec. 27, 1845. _Revue de Paris_, Dec., 1844.
Memoria de ... Guerra, Nov. 7, 1823, 17, 18. Balbontín, Invasión, 75,
77. _Id._, Estado Militar, 58. =375=Perry to J. Y. Mason, Nov. 16,
1846. Búlnes, Grandes Mentiras, 182. Rivero, Méx. en 1842, 25, 137-9.
Ward, Mexico, i, 307-17, 330-40. London _Times_, Nov. 11, 1845.

According to Otero, an able editor and statesman, the income of the
Church represented in 1829 a capital of $127,000,000, besides the
buildings, etc., used for worship and for the housing of ecclesiastics;
and practically none of its property was taxed. Of its wealth, large
for any period but huge for that day, $18,000,000 were invested in city
and country real estate; and consequently there was an army of agents
looking after Church interests in all quarters, and a great number of
proprietors and financiers were closely associated with the clericals.
One may say, reported a French diplomatic agent, "that religion does not
exist [in Mexico], for its influence is nowhere felt"; and in truth, as
an ardent Roman Catholic said in _Le Correspondant_ of Paris in 1846,
that country needed to be evangelized anew. Trist: "The lazy, ignorant,
and stupid monks, whose views do not extend beyond the round of purely
animal enjoyments, and include no esprit de corps save pecuniary greed
mixed with an idol worship fanaticism" (=52=no. 18, Oct. 25,
1847). Ramírez, México, 219: Christianity merely gross idolatry here.
The Mexican church stood naturally in opposition to the government, for
both claimed the right of ecclesiastical patronage. The influence of the
Church was lessened by Leo XII, who exhorted the Mexicans to return to
Spain (México á través, iv, 149).

=350=Weber: "If the Mexican soldier has something to eat, he eats
it; if not, he goes without. That is all." _Diario_, May 20, 1847: The
army has been burdened with enough generals and field officers for the
army Napoleon led against Russia. (24,000 officers) Duflot de Mofras,
Explor., i, 20. ($21,000,000) =52=Slidell to Buchanan, Jan. 14,
1846. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 400. _Eco del Comercio_, Mar. 22,
1848. =11=Martin: The army belongs to the first who "gives it money
or promises it plunder" (Dec. 25, 1828). =13=Doyle, no. 81, Oct.
30, 1843. _Don Simplicio_, July 19, 1846. _Nacional_, Jan. 19, 1848.

1.6. _Justice_, _education_, _the press_. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 35,
396; ii, 393. Thompson, Recolls., 20-4, 147-52. London _Times_, Jan. 8,
1846. =13=Ward, no. 58, confid., April 18, 1827. =13=Pakenham,
nos. 39, May 27, 1836; 5, Jan. 25, 1841. =13=Bankhead, no. 54,
May 30, 1845. =13=O'Gorman to Pakenham, Jan. 19, 1835. Pakenham,
Nov. 23, 1834, separate; no. 8, March 8, 1835. =56=W. S. Parrott,
Oct. 11, 1845. =52=Jones, June 1, 1837; nos. 168, Oct. 30, 1838;
252, May 5, 1839. Leclerc in _Revue des Deux Mondes_, March 1, 1840, p.
638. =11=French vice-consul, Mex., Aug. 19, 1829; Feb. 3, 1830.
Tornel, Reseña, 288. Consideraciones, 6, 7, 12-4, 43, 48. Memorias de
... Relaciones, Jan., 1825; Feb., 1828; Jan., 1831; May, 1833; Dec,
1846. Memorias, min. of justice, 1833, 1835, 1845. Ward, Mexico, i,
337. =52=Poinsett, no. 166. Constit. Cong, of Mex., Address.
_Liberal Moderado_, Aug. 4, 1846. Mora, Obras, i, pp. clxxxviii-cxcvii.
Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 109-16. Lavalles, Etudes, 31-3. Villar,
Proyecto. Calderón, Life, i, 195, 340-2. Esparza, Informe. Memorias,
min. of treas., May, 1833; July, 1845. Memorias, min. of pub. instr.,
Jan., 1844; July, 1844; March, 1845. Macgregor, Progress, i, 637.

For a long time after 1821 only one slight attempt was made to improve
the old judicial methods, and that was a failure. =11=Vice-consul
of France, Aug. 19, 1829: "Justice is so venal, that with money one
could have the victim arrested and the criminal rewarded." In 1836 the
British minister reported the opinion of an able Mexican lawyer that
certain important court proceedings were nothing but "a conspiracy
authorized and supported by judicial formulas, one more illegal than
another." Mexican minister of justice, 1835: "On all sides is heard a
unanimous outcry against the bad administration of justice" (Memoria).
At a public meeting, Aug. 13, 1846, Pedro Zubieta said: "What have been
thus far the judiciary and the magistracy? A shameful market, in which
those august names have put Justice up at auction" (_Diario_, Sept. 19).
The gov. of Michoacán =76=wrote, Nov. 28, 1845: I am unable to
prevent some judges from favoring criminals. Alamán reported secretly to
Congress in 1830: The tribunals ensure impunity to criminals (Pakenham,
no. 25, Mar. 25, 1830). Ramírez, Mexico, 225: Our magistrates are
usually insignificant (_hombrecitos_), "vigorous to persecute, feeble
to command, and incapable of serving as models of a just and severe
impartiality." The reports of the American ministers and consuls were
full of similar complaints. Once when our consul reminded the minister
of foreign affairs that it was the constitutional duty of the Executive
to have the laws faithfully administered, the latter replied, "Yes,
but it is impossible." In 1838 France took strong ground against the
miscarriages of justice in the Mexican courts.

The Lancastrian system of pupil helpers was tried in the schools;
but it failed, for nobody understood it practically. The educational
authorities gave ear to bright young men who had merely picked up a few
ideas on the boulevards of Europe, and wasted their time in theorizing
and making projects. We have become, said a thoughtful writer in March,
1848, the most persistent of charlatans, glad to talk on any subject
without understanding it, and ready to try all sorts of theories, which
vanish like smoke as soon as put into practice.

1.7. _Industries_, _trade_, _means of communication_. _Revista
Económica_, Dec. 14, 31, 1843. Macgregor, Progress, i, 308, 670, 674.
Ward, Mexico, ii, 3-170. México á través, iii, 18. London _Times_,
Aug. 6; Nov. 11; Dec. 6, 1845. =52=Thompson, no. 4, July 30, 1842.
=13=Ward, nos. 45, 99 (May 20; Aug. 20, 1826). =261=Mémoire.
_Gazette d'Etat de Prusse_, Nov. 11, 1823. Consideraciones, 8-12, 14-8.
Otero, Cuestión, 31-4, 46, 49, 50, 97-8. Pakenham, nos. 25, Mar. 25,
1830; 28, June 11, 1833; 61, July 8, 1841; 4, 49, 123, Jan. 6, June 2,
Dec. 25, 1842; 5, Jan. 24, 1843. =13=Ashburnham, no. 3, Jan. 31,
1838. =13=Bankhead, nos. 44, June 29, 1844; 6 Jan. 29, 1845; 8,
Jan. 30, 1846. =261=_a_Mémoire. =52=Poinsett, reply to Mexico
state (with his no. 176, Aug. 7, 1829). Memorias, Relaciones, Feb.,
1830; March, 1835; Dec, 1846. Memoria, min. of justice, March, 1845.
Mayer. War. 13. Poinsett, no. 166, March 10, 1829. Constituent Cong.,
Address, 1824. Thompson, Recolls., 35. _Journal des Débats_, March 16,
1844; Feb. 18, 1845; April 4; Sept. 9, 1847. Bocanegra, Memorias, ii,
162-3. =52=Dimond, no. 273, Nov. 4, 1845. =11=Martin, Feb. 1,
1827. Banco de Avío, Informe. Memoria, min. of interior, Jan., 1838.
Alamán, Memoria. Robertson, Remins., 88. =76=Mora y Villamil,
report from superior board of engineer corps, Nov. 15, 1845. McSherry,
El Puchero, 147. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 254. _Diario_, July 20-5, 1846
(report on the state of agriculture).

The American minister stated in 1829 that the cost of producing crops in
Mexico was double that in the United States and the expense of marketing
them fourfold. Besides, the farmers had suffered blow after blow during
the revolution and the succeeding commotions. The system of "forced
loans," so familiar in Mexico, consisted in assigning to corporations
and individuals--presumably according to their wealth--amounts that
they were required to hand over in exchange for promissory notes, which
the government did not expect to pay. The prohibition of many foreign
articles reduced the public revenues and promoted smuggling.

1.8. _Country and town: manners and mora's._ Thompson, Recolls., 39,
40, 82, 90, 93, 101-2, 115, 125-8, 132, 135, 160, 163, 217. Calderón,
Life, i, 80, 124, 127, 138, 140, 150-1, 162, 165, 175, 273, 314, 336,
340-5, 395; ii, 126 (Alamán), 137 (village), 237, 247. Ward, no. 52,
secret and confid., Nov. 10, 1825. =52=Thompson, no. 1, 1842.
=52=Poinsett, nos. 2, May 28, 1825; 94, July 8, 1827; 166, Mar.
10, 1829. =52=Butler, July 9, 1834. Arróniz, Manual, 109, 123,
131, 161. Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 36, 47-8, 59, 130, 133, 137, 140,
142, 147-9, 151-4, 159, 163-6, etc. Decaen, México, 22. Rivera, Los
Mexicanos Pintados. _Memorial Histórico_, Jan. 16, 20, 1846. México á
través, iv, 291. Rivera, Gobernantes, ii, 142. _Revue Independante_,
Apr. 25, 1845. _Revue de Paris_, Dec, 1844. _Diario_, Jan. 24, 1841.
Davis, Autobiog., 102. Mayer, War, 14. Bravo in _Boletín Oficial_, Apr.
30, 1846. Ruxton, Adventures (1847), 20, 25, 34-6, 39, 40, 44, 46, 59.
Robertson, Remins., 104-6, 116, 122. Mason, Pictures, i, 17, 19, 110,
201; ii, 23, etc. Vigneaux, Voyage, 286. Orbigny, Voyage, 413, 422,
425, 428. Robertson, Visit, ii, 50, 58, 61-2, 147. _Commerc. Review_,
ii, 165-76. =11=Cochelet, Sept. 29, Nov. 15, 1829. =13=Forbes
(Tepic), July 2, 1846. Kendall, Narrative (1844), ii, 145, 317, 335-6.
Tudor, Tour, ii, 266, 328. Stapp, Prisoners, 133-4. Valois, Le Mexique,
86-7. _Delta_, June 12; Nov. 6, 1847. Sierra, Evolution, _passim_.
=218=Henshaw narrative. (Apathy) Pakenham, no. 15, Mar. 21, 1834.
Morier and Ward, no. 6, Apr. 30, 1825 ("That extraordinary Compound of
Ignorance, Suspicion, and Fanaticism, which now forms the most striking
Feature of the National Character." "Alamán and Esteva represented
that we were dealing with Children, and must suit our Arguments to
their Capacity.") Ward, nos. 20, 60, July 12; Nov. 23, 1825. Zavala,
Revoluciones, ii, 152-3, 365. McSherry, El Puchero, 158.

A ministerial report submitted to Congress in Jan., 1844, showed how
a Mexican could regard himself: "If the present epoch begins to be
brilliant in Europe, Mexico finds herself still more advanced. She has
learned from the wise men of all the world but has contemned their
errors.... The virtues of the Mexican spring from a heart not withered
by the pleasures of sense, a heart still expanding with generous
enthusiasm. His soul rises to sublime regions; it knows how to feel; it
knows how to understand; it knows the celestial origin of virtue; and it
appreciates all that itself contains of spontaneity and magnanimity....
This delicious country breathes into our sentiments the suavity of its
climate; this ardent sun kindles the beautiful flame that makes men love
one another; and amid the sweetness of a natural world so magnificent
and sublime the germ of heroic merits is formed within us."


                 II. THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF MEXICO

2.1. To sketch the political development of Mexico is by no means
easy. No scientific history of it exists, and all those who have written
on the subject with first-hand knowledge have been party men. The best
basis is the reports of the British ministers, for they were men of
ability near the heart of affairs, comparatively without prejudice, and
anxious to give a true account of what was taking place. With these
reports as a _prima facie_ standard, the author has felt able to use
intelligently the statements of other foreign agents--diplomatic and
consular--Mexican authors, the historical and political writers of
several nationalities and a great number of periodicals.

For the colonial régime he consulted the following sources. Humboldt,
Polit. Essay, i, _passim_. =52=Poinsett, nos. 94 of 1827; 166 of
1829. Cuevas, Porvenir, 15. Ward, Mexico, i, 91-120. Rivero, México,
24. =261=Mémoire. =11=Serrurier to "the Duke," Apr. 20,
1818. =11=Villevêque, Feb. 3, 1830. Mora, Obras, i, pp. cx-cxiii.
Macgregor, Progress, _passim_. Tornel, Breve Reseña, 4. Consideraciones,
50-1. =11=Mémoire submitted to the king by a Spaniard. Gage,
Voyages, i, 223. Amer. Antiq. Soc., Proceedings, New Series, xxi,
277-83. Latané, Diplom. Rels., 12-20. _Diario de México_, 1810.
_Pensador_, 1812, 45-6, 49, 51, 53. _Gaceta del Gob. de Méx._, 1810.
Priestley, José de Gálvez, chaps. i and ii. _Esperanza_, Mar. 5, 1846.
=296=Poinsett to the Prest., Apr. 26, 1827.

2.2. _The Revolution._ Cuevas, Porvenir, 15, 17. Ward, Mexico, i,
84, 96, 100, 116-8, 120, 135, 195-6. México á través, ii, pp. x-xiii,
507-8, 525; iii, pp. iv-ix, 30-5, 76, 85-127, 162, 188, 210, 226,
271, 283, 311, 323, 331, 339, 343, 405, 428, 450, 460, 487, 491-2,
656, 661-85, 735-56; iv, pp. iv, vii, 30, 199, 200, 316. Arrangóiz,
México, i, 33-5. Humboldt, Polit. Essay, i. =261=Mémoire. Tornel,
Reseña, 4-6, 162. Otero, Cuestión Social, 51-2. García, Plan. Itúrbide,
Mémoires. Poinsett, Notes, 91; app., 39. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 65,
68, 78-9, 86, 104, 111, 272, 406. =13=Ward, nos. 37, 114 of 1826.
=52=Poinsett, no. 166 of 1829. Constituent Congress, Address, 1824.
Alamán, México, i-iv. =11=Martin, Feb. 1, 1827. Sierra, Evolution,
i, 126, 149. =13=Morier, no. 10 of 1825. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes,
ii, 229-30, 234, 245. Consideraciones, 43, 51-2. Memoria de ... Guerra,
1823, p. 9. Arróñiz, Orizaba. Liceaga, Adiciones, 378. Mora, Obras,
i, p. vii. Mateos, Hist. Parl., ii, 222. Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 293.
S. Anna, Manifiesto, 1823. Suárez y Navarro, Alegato. _Id._, Hist. de
Méx. y del ... S. Anna. Carreño, Jefes, 13. _Sol_, June 15, 24, 1823.
Rivera, Jalapa, ii, 107-26. _Gaceta del Gob. de Méx._, 1810, p. 867
(decree of the Inquisition summoning Hidalgo). Rivera, Gobernantes, ii,
1-72. Puga y Acal, Documentos, 20. Portrait of Itúrbide: City Hall,
Mexico.

2.3. _Itúrbide_, _the Triumvirate_, _and the Constitution_.
=13=Ward, secret and confid., July 14, 1825; no. 114 of 1826.
=52=Poinsett, nos. 94 of 1827; 166 of 1829. =11=Villevêque,
Feb. 3, 1830. =11=Martin, Feb. 1, 1827. =13=Morier, no. 10
of 1825. =11=Cipher despatch to French govt. about July, 1823.
=261=Mémoire. Cuevas, Porvenir, 14, 36, 140-2, 195-206, 211-5,
220-5, 231-3, 239, 245-51, 261, 277, 318-9, 358-9. Bocanegra, Memorias,
i, 13-4, 18, 31-3, 38-40, 49-57, 61-3, 76-82, 97-9, 111-25, 207, 215,
220-4, 226, 231, 241, 284-9, 328-9, 370, 374. Itúrbide, Mémoires.
Tornel, Reseña, 6-15, 18-22, 28, 37. Mora, Obras, i, pp. vii-viii, xii,
xiv. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 113-23, 152, 173, 176, 211, 214-5, 254-62,
274, 294, 347; ii, 294. Ward, Mexico, i, 202-6, 260-82. Poinsett, Notes,
71. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 262. Negrete, México, xiii, 296; xiv,
239. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. Casasus, Deuda. Romero in
_No. Amer. Review_, Jan. 1, 1896. Gutiérrez de Estrada, México. Mata,
Reflecciones. _Arco Iris_, Dec. 7, 1847. _Eco del Comercio_, Mar.
10, 1848. _Cosmopolita_, Aug. 22, 1838. Maza, Código, 263. Rivera,
Jalapa, ii, 225, 228. _Id._, Gobernantes, ii, 73-94. _Esperanza_, Mar.
5, 1846. =208=MS. of the man who proclaimed the empire. Tornel,
Discurso, 17. Alamán, México, v. Constituent Congress, Address, 1824.
Otero, Cuestión Social, 53-5, 75, 108-9. México á través, iv, pp. iv,
vii, 9-21, 26-37, 40-8, 50-9, 65-111, 115, 198, 200-9, 360. Sierra,
Evolution, i, 160-6, 169, 173, 316. F. J. P., Ligeras Reflecciones.
_Reforma_, Jan. 23, 1846. Consideraciones, 46. _Sol_, July 27, 1823.
Mayer, War, 27-8, 135. Richtofen, Zustände, 21. Dictamen of revol.
committee, June 12, 1835. Calderón, Life, i, 336. Löwenstern, Le
Mexique, 294. Thompson, Recolls., 58. Lacombe, Le Mexique, 31.

2.4. It has recently been denied that our Constitution was imitated,
but this was stated by Poinsett (no. 166, March 10, 1829), Bocanegra
(Mems., i, 329), Tornel (Reseña, 14), Otero (Cuestión Social, 121), and
=261=Mémoire; and the Congress itself, in an address to the nation,
said, "In all our proceedings, we have taken for a model the happy
Republic of the United States of the North." The Spanish constitution
of 1812 and that of the French Republic were also in view. There was
a supreme court, but it had no power to hold the balance between the
states and the central government.

2.5. _Victoria's administration._ Portrait in city hall, Mexico.
=52=Poinsett, nos. 12, 20, 24, 32, 55, 60, 92, 94, 96-7, 99,
105, 107, 110, 114, 153, 166, 192 (1825-29). =296=_Id._ to King,
May 16, 1826. =13=Hervey, Dec. 15, 1824. =13=Morier, nos.
10, 19, 1825. =13=Ward, nos. 15, 21, 34, 36, 44, 60, 64 and most
private and confid. (Sept. 30) of 1825; 32, 77, 85, 99, 107, 114, 128,
136, secret and most confid. (Oct. 22/25), and private (Oct. 26/27) of
1826; 3, 11, 15, 19, 24, 52, 58 of 1827. =13=Pakenham, nos. 62,
84, 90 of 1827, 1, 107 of 1828; 22, 32, 38 of 1829; 17, 30 of 1830;
and to Vaughan, Jan. 13, 1829. =11=Martin, Feb. 1; Mar. 30; Apr.
25, 1827; Aug. 25; Dec. 25, 1828. =11=Cochelet, Jan. 16, 1830.
=11=Villevêque, Feb. 3, 1830. =11=Paper submitted to the
French Cabinet, 1828. =11=Instructions of Bresson, 1828. Tornel,
Reseña, 16, 19, 24-5, 28-30, 34, 39, 43, 45-8, 80, 83, 85, 87, 129-30,
133-4, 163-4, 177-82, 200, 238. Bocanegra, Mems., i, 113, 231, 286,
374, 390, 444, 463, 467, 522. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 149, 271, 343,
346-8, 351; ii, 35, 41, 44. México á través, iv, 103-4, 116, 121, 127-9,
131-3, 141, 144-5, 154-67, 170, 172, 193-4, 208-10. Mora, Obras, i, pp.
viii-xii, xiv-xvi. Calderón, Life, i, 42, 96. Richtofen, Zustände, 22.
Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 290. F. J. P., Ligeras Reflecciones. Cuevas,
Porvenir, 268-9, 353, 376, 406, 411-2. Sierra, Evolution, i, 183.
=52=Manifiesto of Vera Cruz legislature, June, 1827. Son Peores
los Gachupines. Ah, Traidores Gachupines. Crimenes de Zavala. Acta del
Pronunciamiento. _Revista Económica_, Dec. 31, 1843. _Cosmopolita_,
Feb. 14, 1838. _Anteojo_, Aug. 1, 1835; and other references in chap.
iii (Poinsett section). Dictamen of revol. committee, June 12, 1835.
=261=Mémoire. Otero, Cuestión Social, 60, 66. Poinsett, Notes, 20.
Rivera, Jalapa, ii, 364.

The following passage illustrates the pamphleteering of the day: "The
country is threatened; and by whom? The Gachupines. Persons in the
midst of us are working for our ruin; and who? The Gachupines. Persons
are laboring to sow discord among us; and who? The Gachupines. Persons
are looking for hostile troops to reduce us to slavery again; and who?
The Gachupines." The popular party, associated with Masonic lodges of
the York Rite, were commonly called Yorkinos, and the aristocratic
party, associated with the Scotch Rite, Escoceses (_i.e._ Scotch). A
particularly unfortunate fact was that under the Mexican constitution
the arbiter between the nation and the states was a political body,
Congress.

2.6. _Guerrero's rise and fall._ =52=Poinsett, nos. 60 of
1826; 105, 151-3, 155, 157-60 of 1828; 166, 173 of 1829, and Apr. 3,
15; Sept. 2; Nov. 20; Dec. 23, 1829. =13=Ward, Nov. 10, 1825.
=13=Pakenham, nos. 89, 99, 110, 122, 132, 143-4, 146, 151, 153
of 1828 ("totally unfit," Aug. 23); 2, 4, 8, 52, 79, 99, 108, 109
of 1829; 8, 17, 25 of 1830; 62 of 1833; to Vaughan, Jan. 13, 1829.
=11=Martin, June 30, 1827; Aug. 25; Sept. 26; Oct. 31; Dec. 1, 10,
19, 25, 31, 1828; Jan. 4, 13, 1829. =11=Cochelet, June 6; Oct.
20; Nov. 29; Dec. 26, 1829. =231=Butler to Jackson, June 6, 1834.
=52=Butler, Dec. 31, 1829; Jan. 5; Mar. 9, 1830. =52=Cameron,
Feb. 14, 1831. =261=Mémoire. =52=Zavala, Exposición to chamber
of deputies, Apr. 23, 1829. _Id._, Revoluciones, i, 146; ii, 47, 57-8,
77, 147, 150-2, 175, 221. Gaxiola, Invasión, 156. Lerdo de Tejada,
Apuntes, ii, 302-6, 336, 396. Cuevas, Porvenir, 285, 383, 413, 458,
475. Tornel, Reseña, 34-6, 45-6, 237, 309-13, 315-8, 323-4, 333-4,
338, 347-9, 383-6, 392, 407, 423-4. Bocanegra, Mems., i, 375, 473-4,
492, 494; ii, 7, 10-1, 25, 34, 57-9, 120, 135, 144, 150-9, 190, 657.
México á través, ii, 612; iv, 98, 102, 166, 177-94, 197, 209-12, 215,
217-37, 267. Sierra, Evolution, i, 177-8. Juicio Imparcial. El Pueblo
Pide Justicia. F. J. P., Ligeras Reflecciones. Mora, Obras, i, pp.
xvi-xx. Bustamante, Manifiesto, 1830. Derrota del Sr. Guerrero. Mateos,
Hist. Parl., iii, 256, 263. Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1830, 11, 13.
Poinsett in _Commerc. Review_, July, 1846, 34-9. =231=T. H. Ellis,
July 8, 1839. _Anteojo_, Aug. 1, 1835. =52=Guerrero to Poinsett,
Nov. 1, 1827. =11=_Id._, Address on becoming President. Rivera,
Gobernantes, ii, 164. Sosa, Biografías, 429, 1101. _American Sentinel_,
June 15, 1836. The Acordada was a conspicuous building at Mexico made
use of in Zavala's insurrection.

2.7. _Bustamante and the change of system._ Pakenham, nos. 88, 108
of 1829; 5, 17, 24-5, 31, 59, 62, 66-7 of 1830; 8 of 1831; 47, 54, 70,
81-3, 87, 96 of 1832; 10, 19, 35, 39, 44, 62, 67, 69, 82-3 of 1833; 15,
22-3, 29, 36, 42, 48, 51, 57, 64 of 1834; 25, 35, 40, 47 of 1835; 24
of 1837. Poinsett, no. 12 of 1825. =52=Butler, Jan. 5; Mar. 9;
June 29; Aug. 26, 1830; Feb. 19; Aug. 20; Oct. 5; Dec. 6, 1831; Jan.
10; Feb. 27; Mar. 22; July 25; Oct. 7; Dec. 12, 1832; Mar. 16; June
5, 1833; Mar. 2, 8, 28; June 2; July 1, 9; Sept. 1; Oct. 20, 1834;
Feb. 8, 1836. =52=Butler to Jackson, July 22, 1831; June 21; July
18; Aug. 30, 1832; Jan. 2, 1833; Feb. 6; July 9; Dec. 24, 1834; Feb.
26, 1835. =52=Ellis, nos. 2, 3, 1836. =52=Ellis to Jackson,
Aug. 26, 1836. =11=Cochelet, Nov. 21, 1829. =261=Mémoire.
=13=Morier, no. 10, 1825. =13=Ward, secret and confid.,
July 14; no. 40, Sept. 25, 1825. =13=Ashburnham, no. 70, 1838.
=52=Jones, no. 71, 1837. =52=W. S. Parrott, no. 15, 1835.
A. Bustamante to Congress, May 23, 1832. C. M. Bustamante, Gobierno,
275. Mora, Obras, i, pp. xx, xxi, xliii-xlvi, xlix, l, lvii, lxi, lxv,
lxxvi-xc, cxii-cxxviii, cxxxix, cxcvii, ccxiv-cclxxxi, cclxv. Lerdo
de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 393, 396-7, 399, 403, 414, 548. _Crepúsculo_,
May 8, 16, 1835. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 157-75, 195-202, 225-8. _Id._,
Gobernantes, ii, 151-3, 168-9, 173, 177-8. Tornel, Reseña, 25. Cuevas,
Porvenir, 342. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 263; ii, 254, 269-70, 289, 365,
367, 369. Zamacois, México, xii, 24-5. Bocanegra, Mems., ii, 150-3,
157, 159, 190, 208, 329-31, 378-85, 417-8, 433-9, 445-60, 546-54, 598.
México á través, iv, 142, 201, 230-1, 235-7, 240, 246-7, 255, 258,
265, 267, 285-6, 289-93, 295, 298-311, 315-9, 321-7, 332-53, 355, 357,
359, 362-82, 386-8, 390-1. Calderón, Life, i, 96; ii, 126. Poinsett in
_Commerc. Review_, July, 1846, 34-9. Thompson, Recolls., 87-8. Sierra,
Evolution, i, 181-2, 184, 187; ii, 494. El Vil y Traidor S. Anna.
Juicio Imparcial. _Imparcial_, June 18, 1906. Búlnes, Grandes Mentiras,
208. Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 284, 287. Aviso á los Estados. S. Anna,
proclam., June 1, 1834.

When Santa Anna resumed the Presidency in May, 1833, he painted himself
in an address to Congress as the ideal patriot and saint, consecrated
to liberty, enlightenment, morality, and the Christian religion,
"straightforward" and "simple" in principles, "mild and tolerant" in
character. His life, he assured the nation, was "entirely devoted to
the freedom and happiness of the people and the preservation of the
Federal system." Before long his picture was drawn in different colors.
"The Vile and Traitorous Santa Anna wishes to be Emperor," cried one
pamphleteer. "Depravity and ambition make up the character of that
miserable Proteus," responded another.

2.8. _Centralism._ =13=Ashburnham, nos. 51, 52, 58, 64 of 1837;
7, 21, 23, 24, 37, 70, 111 of 1838. =13=Pakenham, nos. 11, 12,
67, 76 of 1839; 21, 40, 72, 92, 95 of 1840; 42, 53, 94, 101, 116 of
1841. =13=Pakenham to Harvey, July 20, 1839. =52=W. D. Jones,
June 22; July 19; Aug. 29; Sept. 26; Oct. 7, 17; Nov. 4, 11; Dec. 6,
1837; Apr. 10; Sept. 5, 8, 22; Oct. 1, 30; Dec. 7 (anarchy), 1838; Feb.
16, 19; Mar. 23 (Valencia); Apr. 20, 23; May 11, 1839. =52=W. S.
Parrott, July 29, 1837. =52=Black, no. 307, 1840. =52=Ellis,
no. 29, 1840. =52=Ellis to Jackson, Oct. 15, 1839. Bocanegra,
Mems., ii, 807. Giménez, Mems., 70-3. Rivero, México, 75. Otero,
Cuestión, 62-5. Robertson, Visit, i, 317. México á través, iv, 382, 387,
390-2, 395, 397, 399, 404-16, 419, 423, 427, 430-2, 438, 440, 443-4,
446-8, 451-2, 455-74. Calderón, Life, i, 349; ii, 187, 223-6, 232, 246,
250, 254, 274. El Que me Importa. Noticia Extraordinaria. _Republicano_,
Feb. 3, 1847. London _Times_, Nov. 25, 1841. Lara, _Revista Política_,
1840. _Cosmopolita_, Dec. 28, 1836. =56=Greenhow, Aug. 12, 1837.
Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 284. Sierra, Evolution, i, 185. Búlnes, Grandes
Mentiras, 208.

"I do not believe," wrote the British minister (no. 116, Nov. 8, 1841),
"that history affords an example of the fate of a Country being so
completely dependent upon the will of one man" [as Mexico's now is upon
S. Anna's].

2.9. _Santa Anna as Dictator and President._ =13=Pakenham,
nos. 82 of 1833; 119 of 1841; 20, 57, 77, 99, 121 of 1842; 13 of 1843.
=13=Doyle, nos. 47, 72, 76, 81 of 1843. =13=Bankhead, nos. 4,
43, 54, 66, 72, 73, 96, 105, 108, 110 of 1844; 1, 20, 50 of 1845; 57
of 1846. =231=Butler to Jackson, Dec. 14, 1835. =52=Ellis,
no. 44 of 1841. =52=Thompson, nos. 1, 3 of 1842; 31 of 1843;
40 of 1844. =52=B. E. Green, April 8; May 16; June 7, 21; July
14, 1844. Green to Calhoun, June 15, 1844 (Ho. 2; 28, 2, p. 59). D.
Green to Calhoun, Oct. 28; Nov. 12, 29, 1844 (Jameson, Calh. Corr.,
975, 991, 1000). =52=Consul Burroughs to Ellis, Jan. 10, 1837.
=52=Consul Dimond, no. 200, 1843. =52=Shannon, nos. 3, 4,
5, 1844. =52=_Id._, Jan. 9, 1845. =52=B. Mayer, statement,
Dec. 9, 1842. C. M. Bustamante, Gobierno, 1, 11, 22, 65, 94, 106, 247,
287, 289, 298, 322-4, 384. Giménez, Mems., 263. Bocanegra, Mems.,
ii, 679. Calderón, Life, i, 337; ii, 195, 272-4, 392. Memoria de ...
Relaciones, Mar. 12, 1845; Dec, 1846. Mem. de ... Hacienda, Feb., 1844.
Mem. de ... Justicia, Jan., 1844. Paredes [Letters], Advertencia, 141.
Jones, Memoranda, 433 (Arista). México á través, iv, 474-80, 484-90,
492-9, 506, 509, 517-30, 532-4, 540, 547. Zamacois, México, xii, 280-1,
283, 285, 330. Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 288. Rivero, México, 90, 94.
_Diario del Gobierno_, Jan. 12, 1845. _Journal des Débats_, Sept. 13,
1842; Mar. 16, 1844; Apr. 29, 1845. _Revue de Paris_, Dec., 1844.
_Constitutionnel_, Jan. 6, 1844. Otero, Cuestión, 69-70. Tornel, Reseña,
74. Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 151. =231=Butler to Jackson, June 6,
1834. =11=Martin, Aug. 25, 1828. =11=Cochelet, Feb. 3, 1830.
=52=Butler, July 9, 1834. Alvarez, Manifiesto, 1845. Ellis, Soul of
Spain, 37. Sierra, Evolution, i, 211. Defensa del Gen. S. Anna. Causa
Criminal. S. Anna, Address, 1846. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 507, 545, 612,
647-73. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 502-5, 511. _Texas Register_, Mar.
15, 1845 (Eye-witness). London _Times_, Nov. 15, 1841; Feb. 13; Dec 6,
1845. Thompson, Recolls., 76, 80, 85-6. Tudor, Tour, ii, 164. Proceso
de S. Anna, 1845. =56=W. S. Parrott, Apr. 29, 1845. (S. Anna's
appearance) N. Orl. _Commerc. Bulletin_, July 18, 1836; =52=Consul
Cameron, Feb. 14, 1831; Stapp, Prisoners, 151-2; Mofras, Explor., i,
14; Thompson, Recolls., 66; Ferry, Revols., 253-5; =231=Ellis to
family, July 8, 1839.

"Genius of evil," cried a pamphleteer to Santa Anna, "demon of avarice
and covetousness, you are, like Attila, the scourge of God. Your power
has been, like that of Satan, a power of corruption, of ruin, and of
destruction. You resemble a fury of hell, blind, devastating, and
bloody. Amid the horrors of civil war, amid lakes of blood and mountains
of dead bodies, you always present yourself like a spectre, inciting all
to devastation, slaughter, and revenge"; and such productions almost
whitened the pavements.

2.10. _Herrera's administration._ (In Sept., 1845, Herrera became
President by regular election.) =13=Bankhead, nos. 108 of 1844; [
], 17, 30, 70, 82, 85 of 1845. =56=W. S. Parrott, Apr. 29, 1845;
May 22, 30; June 10, 24; July 12, 15, 26, 30; Aug. 16, 23, 29; Sept.
2, 18, 29; Oct. 11, 1845. =52=Slidell, no. 4, Dec. 27, 1845.
=52=Consul Campbell, June 7, 1845. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec,
1846. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. Zavala, Revoluciones, ii, 47.
=52=Dimond, June 11; Dec. 14, 1845. _Siglo XIX_, Oct. 5, 9; Nov.
15, 22, 30; Dec. 6, 9, 1845. _Diario_, Apr. 19; June 7; Sept. 10, 1845.
_Republicano_, Feb. 3, 1847. _Amigo del Pueblo_, Nov. 30, 1845. London
_Times_, Aug. 6; Oct. 6; Nov. 11; Dec. 6, 1845; Jan. 8, 1846. México
á través, iv, 529, 541-5. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 423-4. Importantes
Recuerdos. _National_, Mar. 18, 1845. _Journal des Débats_, Apr. 29;
Aug. 2, 1845. Wash. _Union_, Sept. 29, 1845. Constituent Congress,
Address, 1824. Cuatro Palabras. Consideraciones, 43-5. _Voz del Pueblo_,
Nov. 12, 1845. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 693-720. Baz, Juárez, 43. Rivera,
Gobernantes, ii, 281-4.

2.11. A thoughtful Mexican analyzed the situation in substance as
follows: Our people as a whole have forgotten morality, sincerity,
patriotism, disinterestedness, and all the other virtues that upbuild
great nations; only selfishness, base and ruinous passions, hatreds and
vile revenges exist among us, and on all sides discords and rancors
force themselves upon the dullest eye; the country, weakened by the
parties, divided by incompatible interests and claims, has been unable
to obtain order and repose, because interested persons have always
promoted anarchy and disorder in every possible way; the liberty that
the army achieved has been used only as brutal license; and each of us,
regarding himself as a judge in the land, has felt entirely emancipated
from all obligations, and fully at liberty to upset everything at his
will.


     III. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, 1825-1843

3.1. As was mentioned in chap. ii (p. 30), the Spaniards had
endeavored to keep foreign ideas out of Mexico, and the people of
Protestant countries had been studiously misrepresented--even as having
tails. See Smith, Annex. of Texas, 419; =231=Butler to Jackson,
June 23, 1831; =13=Pakenham, nos. 29, Apr. 26, 1832; 2, Feb. 14,
1835; =11=Cochelet, Sept. 29, 1829. Evidence without limit could be
cited.

3.2. One does not like to write such things. But (1) if the subject
is to be understood, they must be said; (2) they are not as hard as
things alleged against the United States by the Mexicans; and (3) they
are written of a long past generation. On this point we will confine
ourselves to Mexican testimony and testimony from that nation which
was on the most intimate and friendly terms with Mexico, had the chief
interest there, and enjoyed the lion's share of mercantile profit.
In 1823 the minister of the treasury said that only in the case of
one state could its financial condition be learned even approximately
from the public accounts (=11=despatch to French govt. about
July, 1823). Eleven years later the head of that department announced
that it was impossible to ascertain what the legitimate income of the
government for the previous year had been (Memoria, 1834). In 1838 the
man occupying that post admitted officially that no minister of the
treasury since 1822 had possessed sufficient data to make a satisfactory
report (Memoria, July, 1838), and the British representative stated
that "the most vitally important matters" were "wholly left to chance"
by the government (=13=Ashburnham, no. 37, May 24, 1838). That
the national authorities were evasive and jesuitical, resorting to
subterfuges, shifting their responsibility upon the legislative or the
judicial department, and referring matters repeatedly to distant local
officials, is proved by reports of British ministers from 1825 to 1845
(_e.g._ =13=Ward, no. 143, 1826; =13=Ashburnham, no. 59, 1837;
=13=Pakenham, no. 96, 1841; =13=Bankhead, nos. 5, 12, 1844).
Once at least money was borrowed by hypothecating a fund which the
government did not possess (Trigueros in =52=Mayer, Dec. 9, 1842).
Mortgaged revenues were spent at will (=52=Zavala to Deputies,
Apr. 23, 1829; Bankhead, no. 103, 1844; see also =52=Mayer, Dec.
9, 1842). Definite arrangements made with foreign representatives
were secretly circumvented (Pakenham, no. 23, 1837; Ashburnham, no.
15, 1838). The Cabinet showed itself capable of breaking a direct
promise and even a definite contract (Pakenham, nos. 9, 1843; 44, 1839;
Bankhead, no. 86, 1845). The highest authorities were untruthful in
word, writing, and print (Pakenham, sep. and confid., Mar. 27, 1828;
_Id._, nos. 32, 1833; 98, 1841; 9, 1843; Bankhead, nos. 12, 1844; 98,
1846. See also Poinsett, no 24, 1825); and they did not scruple to utter
injurious calumnies against friendly nations (Pakenham, no. 98, 1841).

Changes of system appeared to make little difference, for these were
national characteristics. The most honorable administration of this
entire period broke a direct and solemn pledge given to the French
minister (Bankhead, no. 86, 1845; see also =56=W. S. Parrott, Sept.
4, 1845); and the best journal of the country, _El Siglo XIX_, told only
the truth when it said, December 2, 1845, "All our governments have been
dishonest," adding that dishonest methods had been practiced "not only
from necessity but from favoritism and for speculative reasons." It
should, of course, be remembered that carelessness about truth, justice
and honesty was the shady side of Mexican amiability, and that other
nations are not faultless.

3.3. For an account of Poinsett's mission and very numerous
citations bearing upon the subject one may refer to a paper by J. H.
Smith in the Proceedings of the Amer. Antiquarian Soc., Apr., 1914.
=52=Poinsett, Contestación. Gamboa, Representación. Causas para
Declarar. (Concessions, etc.) Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 285 (Poinsett). One
would suppose that the prompt recognition of Mexico by the United
States, our efforts to induce Spain to recognize her (_e.g._ Amer. State
Papers, 2 series, vol. vi, 1006; Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 118 (McLane), 119
(Van Ness), 147, 150 (Forsyth); =77=Livingston to Montoya, Oct.
1, 1831), and the "Monroe Doctrine" would have earned us gratitude.
But these were attributed very generally to a desire on the part of
this country to monopolize the western hemisphere (_Diario_, June 17,
18, 1846), and were offset by our opposition to the cherished Mexican
scheme of driving the Spanish from Cuba and by our proposing to have the
retention of Havana guaranteed to Spain (see particularly Ward, no. 53,
secret and confid., May 29, 1826). Denunciations of Poinsett: _e.g._
Bravo, Manifiesto, 1828; _Sol_, Jan. 4, 1830; =261=Mémoire; La
Ruina de los Mexicanos; Bocanegra, Mems., i, 379, 382, 390; Pakenham,
no. 152, 1828; =11=Martin, July 26, 1827; =11=Cochelet, Aug.
7, 1829; N. Orl. _Delta_, July 9, 1847. Pakenham (no. 74, Aug. 26,
1829) reported that owing to Poinsett's course and the fact that his
government kept him in Mexico, the feeling toward the United States was
one of "jealousy, suspicion, and dislike." The prevailing belief was
that the United States, fearing Mexican competition, sent him there to
paralyze Mexico by exciting dissension (Poinsett, no. 94, July 8, 1827;
=52=state dept. to Butler, Apr. 1, 1830; _Diario_, Apr. 17, 1847).

3.4. Poinsett was attacked by the states of Puebla (Pakenham,
no. 98, 1829), Vera Cruz (Manifiesto, 1827), México (Preamble
and resolution, 1829), and Querétaro (Pakenham, no. 73, 1827).
=296=Poinsett to Pres., June 8, 1827. (Protest) =52=Clay to
Poinsett, no. 25, Nov. 19, 1827. (Failure, attitude) Van Buren to
Butler, Oct. 16, 1829 (P. S., Oct. 17). (Sinister, pointedly) Van Buren
to Poinsett, Oct. 16, 1829. (No charges) Van B. to P. and to B. (P. S.,
Oct. 17), Oct. 16, 1829; Bocanegra, Mems., ii, 18-20; =77=Montoya,
no. 30, Dec. 10, 1829; =296=Zavala to Poinsett, June 16, 1827.
Poinsett was secretary of war under Van Buren. _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Nov.,
1850, 429. Nueva Conspiración.

3.5. =52=Clay to Poinsett, Mar. 26, 1825; Sept. 24, 1825;
Mar. 15, 1827; Van Buren to Poinsett, Aug. 25, 1829. =231=Butler
to Jackson, June 23, 1831. Poinsett, no. 12, Aug. 5, 1825.
(Officials) =52=Morfit, no. 7, Sept. 6, 1836; Ho. 35; 24, 2,
p. 17. (Ten times) Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec, 1846, p. 76.
(Indians) =13=Ashburnham to Backhouse, July 26, 1838. (Victoria)
=13=Ward, no. 54, 1825. (Trouble) Clay, _supra_; =135=Jackson,
several letters to Butler.

3.6. Poinsett's correspondence with Clay, Van Buren, and Alamán: Ho.
42; 25, 1, pp. 19-29. Amer. State Papers: Foreign Relations, vi (folio
ed.). =296=Notes in Poinsett papers. _Commerc. Rev._, July, 1846,
21-4, 27-42 (Poinsett). Poinsett, nos. 12, 1825; 113, 115, 1828; 166,
1829. (Urgency) =52=Tornel to Poinsett, June 27, 1827. (Dropping)
=77=Martínez, Nov. 2, 1837; Poinsett, no. 113, 1828; Adams,
Memoirs, ix, 377-8; =52=Consul Taylor, Nov. 7, 1829. He dropped
the project of buying territory because he saw it would give offence.
Treaties and Conventions (Haswell, ed.), 661-3, 675. Ho. 42; 25, 1, pp.
27-8. (Reached, etc.) Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 40 (Van Buren to Butler); 190,
285, etc. (Poinsett). Ho. 42; 25, 1, pp. 8 (Clay); 10 (Van Buren); 38
(Butler, Dec. 21); 46-8. (Charged) Filisola, Memorias, ii, 602; Tornel,
Reseña, 79, 80; Zavala, Revoluciones, i, 384; Richtofen, Zustände, 44.

Before the paper was placed in Poinsett's hands he knew it would reach
Washington too late (to Clay, Apr. 24: Ho. 42; 25, 1, p. 28), and hence
it was unnecessary, as it would have been dishonorable and dangerous,
to withhold it. (May 10) Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 202. As the instructions
to buy territory were repeated in 1829 (note 5) when Mexico was at war
with Spain, it has been urged by some Americans that we showed a mean
disposition to take advantage of a neighbor's difficulties. But it is
rather kind than otherwise to offer even a low price for real estate
when the owner is in straits for cash, and Mexico was free to consult
her own interest about selling. The instructions of 1829 were, however,
wholly inoperative at that time.

That a people so fond of indirect methods and so destitute of principle
in public affairs were suspicious of the United States was not, however,
surprising. It was known of course that up to 1819 we had claimed the
Rio Grande boundary. When Poinsett found that Victoria and Alamán
intended to reassert the boundary pretensions of Spain, he endeavored
to discourage them by replying that in such a case the old claim of the
United States also would be revived (to Clay, Sept. 20, 1825).

In 1827 members of the Chamber of Deputies expressed the opinion
in debate that the United States was at least privy to a recent
insurrection in Texas, and a leading newspaper asserted that we had
encouraged it (Poinsett, no. 74, 1827). Among the attacks upon the
unfortunate Guerrero was the charge--based, it was alleged, upon
documents--that he was plotting to sell us territory in that quarter
(Pakenham, no. 18, 1831). Bravo, after a visit to this country, brought
out a pamphlet in 1829, declaring that "the politicians and journalists"
of the United States were "at present occupied about the dismemberment"
of Mexico. The following July Bocanegra, minister of relations, hearing
of our customary militia drills and armed escorts for traders in the far
west, demanded the meaning of these operations, and in spite of sensible
reassurances from the American minister, he felt so much disturbed as to
commit a real offence against him and the United States by repeating his
inquiry (Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 288, 292). The next year, when our squadron
set out for a cruise in the Gulf, Alamán represented this to Congress
as a threatening movement (Filisola, Memorias, ii, 601). A pamphlet
issued at New York to point out the value of Texas was attributed to our
government (Pakenham, no. 24, 1830), and the Mexican agent at London
endeavored to excite the British cabinet regarding the supposed peril
of his country (=77=Gorostiza, Apr. 22, 1830). European diplomatic
representatives at Mexico fanned this flame. In particular Ward, the
British minister, did his utmost to increase the alarm regarding Texas
(nos. 32, 54, 64, 1825). See W. R. Manning in _Southwest. Hist. Qtrly._,
Jan., 1914. For American feeling toward Mexico see chap. xxxvi, note 1.

3.7. Treaties and Conventions: note 6. Treaties in Force (1899),
389-90. =52=McLane to Butler, Jan. 13, 1834. =52=Butler to
García, Sept. 6, 1833. =231=_Id._, to Jackson, Mar. 7, 1834.
Ho. 42; 25, 1, p. 59 (Livingston). Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 40-53, 556.
=77=Castillo, no. 71, Dec. 7, 1833. (Denounced) =77=Castillo,
no. 2, res., Jan. 22, 1835. The boundary was not run, for the battle of
S. Jacinto occurred just after the exchange of the ratifications.

3.8. Ho. 42; 25, 1, pp. 17, 21; 33 (Butler); 49 (Van Buren).
Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 190, 210, 287 (Poinsett); 369-70, 410. Foreign
Rels., folio ed., vi, 583-600. (Treaty) Ho. 225; 22, 1. Treaties and
Conventions (Haswell, ed.), 664-74. Sen. Exec. Journ., iii, 568-72,
605-6. (Dark) Ward, [no. 103], Sept. 9, 1826. (Victoria) Poinsett, no.
12, Aug. 5, 1825. =77=Montoya, no. 25, Sept. 19, 1829.

One of the two objectionable articles in the treaty of 1828 concerned
the returning of fugitive slaves, and has been characterized by certain
writers in the United States as a gross insult to Mexico; but that
country had not yet abolished slavery, and her Cabinet, which possessed
a full share of pride, accepted the article.

3.9. Sierra, Evolution, i, 178. =77=Montoya, no. 30, Dec. 10,
1829. =52=Van Buren to Butler, Oct. 16 (P. S., Oct. 17), 1829.
(Friend) =77=Tornel, no. 3, res., Mar. 6, 1830; Ho. 351; 25, 2, p.
381; =52=Butler, July 9, 1834. =135=Butler, Notes on Texas.
=135=_Id._ to Jackson, Jan. 4, 1827. =77=Almonte to Mex.
Leg., Washington, July 22, 1834. (Ignorant) Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 381.
(Careless) =52=Ellis, June 25, private; July 16; Oct. 15, 1836;
=52=Forsyth to Butler, Nov. 9, 1835; to Ellis, Jan. 18, 1837.
(Consuls) =52=Wilcocks, Feb. 15, 1833; =52=W. S. Parrott, Oct.
24, 1835. (Spirits) =52=Butler, Aug. 26, 1833.

3.10. Poinsett reached the conclusion that endeavoring to buy Texan
territory would anger Mexico and lead her to seek European support
(Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 286), but Butler stimulated Jackson to take the
matter up. =52=Butler's correspondence, including letters to and
from Mexican officials. Many of these documents were printed with
substantial correctness in Ho. 256; 24, 1; Ho. 42; 25, 1; Ho. 351;
25, 2. =296=Notes from Butler, Wilcocks and Zavala, to Poinsett.
Corresp. with Jackson in =231=Jackson papers and =135=Butler
papers (for deciphering a number of the latter the author is indebted
to Dr. E. C. Burnett of the Dept. of Hist. Research, Carnegie Instit.).
=77=Tornel, no. 3, res., 1830. =77=Castillo, no. 8, res.,
1835. Sen. Exec. Journ., iv, 488, 502. =52=Ellis, May 19; June 25;
July 16; Oct. 15, 1836; to Jackson, Aug. 26. Pakenham, nos. 6, 7, 1830;
11, 1836. Barker in _Nation_, xcii, 600-1; in _Amer. Hist. Rev._, July,
1907, 788-809. Filisola, Mems, ii, 590, 612. Adams, Mems., ix, 377-8.
Benton, View, ii, 659. Bankhead, no. 125, 1845. _Mosquito Mex._, Aug. 4,
1835.

Butler had some excuse for basing hopes on Alamán, for until the war
with Spain ended Alamán wished to be on very good terms with the United
States, and later he was in serious financial troubles. Nothing in the
documents involves Jackson in Butler's dishonor. The American secretary
of state was even less censurable. Our government expressed all due
regrets for Butler's misconduct (Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 184, 750; Forsyth
to Ellis, no. 22, Nov. 16, 1836; =77=Castillo, no. 8, res., 1835).
(Recall) =77=Relaciones to Castillo, Oct. 31, 1835; Ho. 351; 25, 2,
p. 719, and =77=Castillo, no. 8, res., 1835.

3.11. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 11-33. =52=Butler, May 8, 1836.
=231=_Id._ to Jackson, Dec. 14, 1835. Ellis, no. 2, May 19,
1836. Pakenham, nos. 75, 1835; 25, 1836. Ho. 256; 24, 1, pp. 3, 29,
30 (Forsyth); 8 (Castillo); 10 (Monasterio). Sen. 1; 25, 2, pp. 141
(Monasterio); 149 (Forsyth). Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 82 (Livingston); 160
(Forsyth); 571-2 (Tornel, Monasterio). Memoria de ... Interior, Jan.,
1838. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. México á través, iv, 377,
401-3, 512. Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 78. Richtofen, Zustände, 48. The
state of Mexican feeling will come up again.

3.12. _The Gaines episode._ Van Buren to Poinsett, Aug. 25, 1829.
Butler to Jackson, Sept. 26; Oct. 2, 1833; Feb. 6; Mar. 7, 1834.
=231=Jackson to Butler, Nov. 27, 1833. =58=Dickins to Cass,
Aug. 20, 1836. =77=Castillo, Nov. 10, 1835. =39=Gaines to
gov. Tenn., June 28, 1836. =52=Burrough, nos. 39, 40, 1836.
=77=Martínez, no. 10, res., 1838. =77=Relaciones to Martínez,
Oct. 10, 1838. =77=Gorostiza, Apr. 25, 29; May 30; July 12, 24;
Aug. 18, 19; Oct. 4, 5, 1836. Pakenham, nos. 18, 94, 1836. Sen. 1;
24, 2, pp. 46, 92, 105 (Dickins); 60, 85 (Jackson); 84 (memo.); 32,
44, 68, 89, 91, 100 (Gorostiza); 133-4 (Macomb). Sen. 160; 24, 2, p.
157 (Forsyth). Ho. 256; 24, 1, pp. 3, 28, 29, 31-3, 35, 45 (Forsyth);
6, 11 (Castillo); 15, 21, 23, 25, 27 (Gorostiza); 45 (memo.); 40, 43,
48, 54 (Cass to Gaines); 42, 46-8 (Gaines); 55 (Macomb); 58 (Many);
59 (Green; adj. gen.). Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 769-806 (Gaines _et al._);
806 (McCall and documents). Jackson, Message, Dec. 5, 1836. Gorostiza,
Correspondencia. Reply to Gorostiza: Lib. Cong., Mss. Div., "Mex. War,
Miscellaneous." Tex. Dipl. Corr., i, pp. 83 (Carson); 104 (Burnett);
164-5, 177, 202 (Henderson); 175 (Wharton); 156 (Austin); 205 (Catlett).
Brown, Texas, ii, 90. Bocanegra, Mems., ii, 736-69. México á través, iv,
378. Calderón, Life, ii, 123. Kohl, Claims, 24. Barker in _Miss. Valley
Hist. Rev._, i, 1; in _Amer. Hist. Rev._, July, 1907, p. 794 (Jackson
thought the Neches was a branch of the Sabine). N. Y. _Ev. Post_, Aug.
1, 1836. Wash. _Globe_, Aug. 1, 1836 (Cass). Richmond _Enquirer_,
Aug. 12, 1836. Mobile _Commercial Register_, June 27, 1836. _Nat.
Intelligencer_, May 5 (Virginian); July 26, 1836. N. Orl. _Courier_,
Sept. 27, 1836 (Fulton). Sen. 189; 24, 2. (Indorsed) Monasterio to
Gorost., Dec. 21, 1836, in Gor., Correspondencia. (Erroneously) Smith,
Annex. of Texas, 22.

Gorostiza's view, and no doubt that of the Mexicans generally, amounted
practically to this (see Forsyth in Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 157): the
essential point was to respect Mexico's territory; by the right
of occupation, at least, her territory extended to the well-known
Sabine River; the United States forces were therefore bound under all
circumstances to remain east of that stream, and should some of our
citizens be robbed and murdered, we could call upon Mexico to pay
compensation and protect the rest; after almost endless evasions it
would appear that she had no power to fulfill her treaty obligations,
and therefore, since that fact was known to all the world, she should
not be expected to comply with our wishes; and then, should we please,
we could declare war. In other words, for the sake, at most, of a
technicality, they would have had us quietly see irreparable injuries
done that we could have prevented and had known Mexico could not
prevent, and then do irreparable injuries ourselves to punish her for
her involuntary helplessness.

As for the evidence of danger (which Gaines was instructed to examine
carefully), Gorostiza declared it was fabricated in order to excuse the
crossing of the boundary and get American troops into Texas--thus giving
the rebels at least the moral support of their presence and infringing
upon the rights of Mexico (Pakenham, no. 94, 1836; Ho. 256; 24, 1, p.
20; Gor., Correspondencia, xxvii), and he protested that his country was
incapable of stirring up the savages against our border (Sen. 1; 24,
2, p. 84; =77=Gor. to Relaciones, Oct. 4). But there is not the
slightest sign that he made the difficult and extended investigation
requisite as a basis for denying the testimony presented to Gaines,
whereas he was capable of asserting, more than a month after the
battle of San Jacinto, that the news of it was "entirely destitute of
authenticity," and stating that he had "reasons for believing it to have
been expressly forged in Texas" or at least to have been exaggerated
"to the very confines of the ridiculous" (Sen. 1; 24, 2, p. 33). His
contention was therefore valueless, and almost equally so was that of
certain Americans, against the evidence of danger. One such opinion,
however, is entitled to notice. It came from the governor of Louisiana
(Macomb: Ho. 256; 24, 1, p. 55). But (1) the governor, who was far
from the scene, merely expressed a view unsupported by evidence; (2)
there may have been good reasons why he did not wish to have citizens
of Louisiana called out, as Gaines proposed, to do arduous and perhaps
perilous military service; and (3) it may have seemed undesirable to
have the American army, which made a good market in the western part of
the state, move to Nacogdoches and obtain supplies there. Gaines appears
really to have had adequate grounds for crossing the Sabine. A letter
from the Texas secretary of state to the President of Texas (Tex. Dipl.
Corr., i, 84), which no one can imagine was "fabricated," shows that
Gaines insisted upon having the facts, and that strong evidence was
presented to him (see also Bee in Sen. 14; 32, 2, p. 53). May 5, 1836,
the _National Intelligencer_ printed a letter dated April 20, which
stated that the writer heard, when about six miles from Nacogdoches,
that the Indians were coming, felt satisfied the news was correct, and
saw the people fleeing in the utmost alarm. It was deemed necessary to
divert some of the few Texan troops, desperately needed at the front,
in order to ward off the danger from Indians (Brown, Texas, ii, 89,
90). The governor of Arkansas called out forces to protect the frontier
(N. Orl. _Courier_, Sept. 27, 1836). The other evidence cited above in
the references, when taken together and fairly weighed in view of the
circumstances, has also a very substantial value. The part of it most
doubted, probably, is that referring to a Mexican agent engaged in
rousing the Indians against the whites; but we have documentary proof
that early in 1839 Mexicans tried officially to do this, and employed
the very man who was charged with similar activities in 1836 (Sen. 14;
32, 2, pp. 31-6; also 47). See also the =77=reply of Relaciones
to Martínez's despatch of Oct. 10, 1838. It should be remembered (1)
that Gaines, charged with the defence of the frontier against a wily,
treacherous and savage foe, could not afford to take chances; and
(2) that even fabricated evidence, if it possessed all the marks of
credibility, would have been sufficient ground for acting.

But after all the real issue was the good faith of our government in
authorizing Gaines (while requiring him to maintain our neutrality)
to cross under extreme circumstances the Sabine (Gorostiza in Sen. 1;
24, 2, p. 44; Von Holst, U. S., ii, 584, note 1); and this good faith
was clearly maintained at Washington. In the very letter demanding his
passports Gorostiza admitted that Forsyth's assurances appeared to
dispose of the possibility that Gaines's movement had a bearing on the
boundary question (Sen. 1; 24, 2, p. 104). It has been felt that Forsyth
was sometimes rather curt with him, but Gorostiza was almost, if not
quite, insulting. The Mexicans had some reason to be suspicious and a
full right to be on their guard, but they went farther than right and
reason warranted.

3.13. See Smith, Annex. of Texas, pp. 52-63, for a discussion of
this subject and references to the sources. Ethel Z. Rather in _Tex.
State Hist. Assoc. Qtrly._, xiii, 155-256. Sen. 1; 25, 2, pp. 133
(Castillo); 135 (Forsyth); 145 (Monasterio). =52=W. Thompson to
Bocanegra, April 25, 1843. Pakenham, no. 64, 1836. Memoria de ...
Relac., Jan., 1838. Mem. de ... Guerra, Jan., 1844.

The situation of Texas after 1836 was precisely the same as that of
Mexico from 1821 until recognized by the mother-country in 1836, and
during this period she regarded herself and was regarded generally,
except by Spain, as independent. Mexicans refused to accept this obvious
analogy on the ground that the Mexican revolution was mainly the work of
native-born citizens, while most of the Texans had been born elsewhere.
But an adopted child has all the rights of a natural child. See chap.
iv, note 1.

3.14. _Diplomatic strife, 1842-3._ Smith, Annex. of Texas, 38.
Bocanegra to Webster, May 12, 31, 1842: Ho. 266; 27, 2, pp. 5, 15.
Webster to Thompson, nos. 9, 11, 1842; Jan. 31, 1843. Thompson
to Webster, nos. 3, 4 and June 2, 1842; Jan. 5 and no. 15, 1843.
=52=_Id._ to dipl. corps, July 30, 1842. =351=Tyler to
Webster, July 10, 1842. =52=W. S. Parrott, private, July 29,
1837. =52=B. E. Green, no. 8, 1844. =13=Bocanegra to Doyle,
April 19, 1843; reply, April 20. =52=S. Anna, decree, June 17,
1843. =52=Upshur to Thompson, no. 43, 1843. =52=Bocanegra
to Thompson, Sept. 10, 1842. =76=_Id._, circular, May 31, 1842.
Pakenham, nos. 49, 75, 1842. Sen. 341; 28, 1, p. 71 (Thompson). Texas
Diplom. Corresp., i; 567 (Reily); ii, 163 (Eve). Memoria de ...
Relaciones, Jan., 1844. _Diario_, Oct. 4, 1842. Thompson, Recolls., 82.
Zavala, Revols., ii, 152-3. Sen. 1; 27, 3, pp. 146, 156 (Thompson);
146, 157 (Bocanegra). Ho. 266; 27, 2, pp. 7, 17 (Webster); 5, 15, 19
(Bocanegra); 21 (Thompson). Reeves, Amer. Diplom., 97, 99 (Adams).
Smith, Annex. of Texas, 131. (Mexican threats, 1843) _Ibid._, 42.
Richtofen, Zustände, 48. =11=To Deffaudis, no. 28, Apr. 27, 1836.
(The translations of Mexican documents published by our government are
cited, unless there is a particular reason for not doing so. In many
cases they could be better, but they were for the American government
and people the official versions.)

Oct. 4, 1842, the official journal reprinted this from _El Provisional_:
"Who is not aware of that criminal connivance, that stubborn and
insolent protection, which--in violation of righteous law and in
violation of the treaties with Mexico--is given by the policy of North
America to a Department filled with rebels from every land, who are
determined to ruin it completely and to soil the dignity and honor of a
lawfully constituted government?" Webster made the same protest (against
raids) to the Texans as to the Mexicans.

3.15. =52=Thompson, Jan. 5, 1843. =52=_Id._ to Bocanegra,
Dec. 30, 1842. Ho. 166; 27, 3, pp. 1-93. Bancroft, Calif., iv, 302-29.
=285=Narváez to Vanderlhinden, Dec. 10, 1842. Richman, California,
273-4. Bandini, California, 136-8. =13=Letter from S. Gabriel, Nov.
11, 1842. _Diario_, Jan. 7, 1843. =47=Jones, Aug. 31; Sept. 1,
1842. Reeves, Amer. Diplomacy, 103-7. =351=Letters from J. Tyler to
Webster. México á través, iv, 493. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Mar. 14, 1843.
Adams, Memoirs, xi, 346. N. Orl. _Bee_, Jan. 13, 1843. Memphis _Eagle_,
Nov. 5, 1845.

Jones sailed with the frigate _United States_ and the sloop of war
_Cyane_. After leaving Monterey he proceeded to Los Angeles to meet
Micheltorena and explain the affair. Almonte, the Mexican minister at
Washington, demanded that an example should be made of Jones, but he was
merely recalled--a fully sufficient punishment. Indeed, our government
commended his zeal (=47=Jones to Bancroft, Oct. 3, 1845).

3.16. Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 576 (Butler).

3.17. Sen. 390; 28, 1, pp. 6 (Bocanegra; documents); 9 (Thompson,
with extract from treaty). =52=Shannon to Rejón, Sept. 30, 1844.
Tyler, Message, Dec. 3, 1844, in Richardson, Messages, iv, 334. See also
documents cited with reference to the Santa Fe expedition.

3.18. Ellis, no. 24, June 9, 1840. Forsyth to Ellis, Aug. 21, 1840.
=52=Memorial of the prisoners, May 25, 1840. =52=J. O. Jones
to Ellis, June 23, 1840. =52=Statements of prisoners, particularly
Graham's of May 29, 1840. =52=Larkin, Mar. 22; April 20, 1840.
=52=Legaré to Thompson, no. 36, May 12, 1843. =52=Farnham to
Ellis, June 23, 1840. Richman, California, 266. =13=Palmerston to
Mexican minister, Aug. 11, 1841. =11=Captain of _La Danaide_ to
Cyprey, July 8, 1840. Royce, California, 36. Pakenham, nos. 66, 78, 88,
1840; 37, 118 (merely a scheme to weaken the opposing faction in Cal.),
1841. Memoria de ... Guerra, Jan., 1841. Moore, Internat. Arbit., 3242-3
(a judicial review of the case and award of damages to victims. One of
them received $38,125). Pakenham obtained a revocation of the order of
expulsion by demanding his passports (no. 88).

3.19. =45=Ranson to Eve, April 28, 1842. =45=Bee to
Roberts, July 13, 1841. Kendall, Narrative, _passim._ Yoakum, Texas, ii,
321-3. Garrison, Texas, 245-6. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 37. Sen. 325;
27, 2, pp. 3, 6, 8 (Webster); 19, 29 (Ellis); 33, 100 (Bocanegra); 48,
50 (Falconer; Van Ness particularly); 94 (Thompson). Ho. 266; 27, 2, p.
34 (Thompson). Pakenham, no. 15, 1842. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan.,
1844. =11=To Deffaudis, no. 28, Apr. 27, 1836.

3.20. Ho. 42; 25, 2, p. 20, 23 (Alamán). Poinsett, June 18, 22,
1825. Martínez, no. 7, 1832. N. Y. _Herald_, Nov. 11, 1843. Boston
_Atlas_, Jan. 26, 1844. =52=Camacho to Poinsett, May 13, 1826.
=231=Butler to Jackson, Jan. 2, 1833. Sen. 1; 28, 1, p. 36. Tyler,
Tyler, ii, 289. Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 71 (Van Buren, Mar. 1). See also
chap. xiv.

3.21. Upshur to Thompson, no. 51, Oct. 20, 1843. =13=S. Anna,
proclam., Oct. 5, 1843. Sen. 1; 28, 2, p. 21 (Calhoun). Sen. 1; 28, 1,
pp. 30 (Thompson); 31 (decree); 34 (Upshur). Sen. 390; 28, 1, pp. 16,
18 (Thompson). =52=B. E. Green, April 8, 1844. =52=Bocanegra
to Thompson, Oct. 20, 1843. =52=Thompson to Bocanegra, Nov. 23,
1843. =52=Shannon to Rejón, Oct. 25, 1844. =52=Rejón to
Shannon, Oct. 11, 1844; Nov. 22, 1845. Bankhead, nos. 1, 4, 1844.
=13=Foreign Office to Doyle, no. 30, 1843 (While every independent
nation has, _e.g._, an abstract right to close its ports, "the practical
assertion on the part of any Nation of an extreme abstract right may,
and often does, involve, if not actual hostility, at least a degree of
unfriendliness almost amounting to hostility.") France also protested
(Green, _supra_).

3.22. =13=Tornel, order. Sen. 390; 28, 1, pp. 3-15.
=52=Bocanegra to Thompson, Dec. 22, 1843. =53=Almonte, Feb.
6, 1844. =52=Shannon to Rejón, Oct. 10, 1844. Sen. 1; 28, 2, p. 21
(Calhoun). =13=Doyle, nos. 65, 90 (order executed in Sonora), 1843.
=13=E. Barron, no. 10, Oct. 19, 1843.

Another objection to the modified order was that, as the British
minister maintained in another case, while the general government itself
might with justice banish undesirable foreigners, it had no right to
delegate such a power to distant subordinates practically exempt from
supervision, to be exercised by them as prejudice, caprice, and possibly
avarice might suggest and without giving the victim a chance to defend
himself or settle his affairs (Pakenham, no. 78, 1840). Thompson was
described by his French colleague as inexperienced (=11=no. 108,
1842).

3.23. These are too numerous to be catalogued here, but a few can be
cited as illustrations. General Terán seized the schooner _Topaz_ and
compelled her to transport some of his troops. During the voyage the
Mexican officers and soldiers killed the master, and, returning to port,
had the crew imprisoned on the charge of having done it. The vessel was
held, and property on board seized (Moore, Intern. Arbit., 2992). The
schooner _Hannah Elizabeth_, stranded on the Texan coast, was fired upon
by a Mexican vessel of war, and her crew and passengers were put in jail
(Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 85. Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 167). The Mexicans asserted
that the schooner was carrying contraband of war; but if so, the Mexican
officer did not know this when he opened fire, and anyhow no penalty
except the confiscation of the cargo could rightfully have been exacted.
Our acting consul at Tabasco was arrested and publicly ill-treated,
because he would not legalize documents intended, in his opinion, to
defraud an insurance company (Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 89). The brig _Fourth
of July_ was sent to Vera Cruz for sale to the Mexican government, and
before the sale was made officers and soldiers took possession of her,
ran up their flag, arrested the captain, and disregarded the protest of
our consul (_ibid._, p. 91). A boat-load of seamen from our sloop-of-war
_Natchez_ landed at Vera Cruz, became intoxicated while the midshipman
in command of them was in conference with our consul, and, as the result
of a quarrel with a fisherman, were severely handled by the Mexican
guard. As they were now unable to manage the boat in the rough sea,
the midshipman, on the advice of the consul, requested the captain
of the port to take charge of them over night. The next morning the
authorities would not give them up to him, nor was our consul permitted
to communicate with them (_ibid._, p. 93). Two Americans were arrested,
maltreated and imprisoned at Matamoros on the baseless suspicion that
they intended to visit Texas, and the premises of our consul were
forcibly entered, searched and robbed (_ibid._, 94; Ho. 351; 25, 2, p.
172). A lieutenant of the American revenue cutter _Jefferson_, going
ashore at Tampico to see our consul, was arrested, and his boat's crew
were imprisoned. For this outrage the Mexican government removed the
responsible officer, General Gómez, but soon afterwards he was given
a better post at Vera Cruz, and showed his unchastened spirit in the
_Natchez_ affair (Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 98. Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 70: Ellis).

3.24. British complaints were almost numberless: _e.g._ Ward,
no. 77, 1826; Pakenham, nos. 48 of 1827, 119 of 1828, 37 of 1830;
=13=Ashburnham, nos. 16 of 1837 and 74 of 1838 (a man persecuted
with a "tissue of iniquities" for years); Bankhead to Bocanegra, July 4,
1844.

The Foreign Office distinctly stated that contract and treaty rights
were denied (=13=Aberdeen to Mex. min., Nov. 1, 1843; to
Pakenham, no. 19, Aug. 15, 1836). =77=Dec. 31, 1844, it made this
statement: "In Mexico British Subjects have been oppressed, harassed,
and maltreated without redress except that which has been extorted by
unceasing remonstrance.... The expostulations of Great Britain ... have
been with very few exceptions contumeliously set at naught; and the same
illegal exactions which have been the subject of those expostulations
have been repeated, while yet the former grievance was unredressed." The
British minister complained, _e.g._, that the coast officials annoyed
his fellow citizens; that frequently to their injury the constitution
was violated by state authorities; that some of them were persecuted,
imprisoned, or expelled from the country in defiance of law; that
money was extorted from them under threats. A loud =52=protest of
American ship captains, Campeche, May 26, 1835, illustrates well the
tricks and outrages to which our commercial interests were subjected.
What abuse and tyranny our citizens were liable to suffer in the
interior is shown by the memorial of Augustus Storrs and twenty others,
Chihuahua, April 17, 1832, transmitted through C. W. Davis, who was
described by our secretary of state, Nov. 24, 1832, as a respectable
citizen of the U. S. who had long been practising medicine at Chihuahua
(Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 87). (France) Coxe, Review, 69; Barker in _Texas
Review_, Jan., 1917; Rives, U. S. and Mexico, i, 433.

3.25. The international tribunal was established under the Claims
Convention of 1839, and the national tribunal under the treaty of 1848
and a United States Act of 1849. It should be remembered that the
amount of our claims was substantial. The total receipts of the U. S.
government for the fiscal year ending with June, 1845, were less than
$30,000,000. It is true that many of the claims were exaggerated, and
some of them a great deal; but this does not matter, for what the United
States asked was an investigation of the demands, not the payment of
any one at its face. Still, as the inflation of the claims has been
urged as an excuse for inattention to them, a word upon that point is
desirable. The amounts demanded in such cases are always made as great
as possible, and in the instance of Mexico there were special grounds
for exaggeration. Our claimants, so far as just in their demands, were
entitled to as high interest as other creditors of that government, and
the rate it had to pay was very large. In 1832, for instance, this was
four per cent a month (Butler, no. 32, 1832), and in 1844 two per cent a
month besides six per cent for brokerage (Bankhead, no. 112, 1844). At
such rates longstanding claims mounted high, and when the interest was
scaled down to five per cent in the process of adjudication (Sen. 320;
27, 2, p. 237), they naturally seemed to have been exorbitant. Indeed,
the claims were entitled to even a higher interest than loans, for a
good deal of trouble--sometimes an extraordinary deal--was necessary to
prove them. "The authorities here can prove anything," reported even
the philo-Mexican Waddy Thompson (no. 4, 1842); and this was only one
of numerous obstacles. Probably, too, there was more uncertainty as to
eventual payment. Again, if paid at all, the claims were likely to be
settled in treasury notes of little value. In fact, all those accepted
by the international tribunal already mentioned were actually so payable
(Calhoun in Sen. 1; 28, 2, p. 21), and these notes were worth at the
time only about thirty cents on the dollar (Thompson, Recolls., 223).

Yet the degree of inflation was much less than has been supposed. The
most conspicuous instance was that of W. S. Parrott, who demanded
$454,504.01 as principal (Sen. 320; 27, 2). Thompson declared
(=52=Nov. 20, 1843) that Parrott was hardly entitled to two per
cent of what he asked; but on inquiry a very different conclusion is
reached. Parrott was a sufficiently good man to be employed as consul
and confidential diplomatic agent by the United States, yet for some
reason he was deeply disliked by the Mexican government, and the
courts seemed determined to ruin him (Moore, Intern. Arbit., 3011).
He was therefore entitled to punitive damages, but none were allowed
him. The cost and annoyance of prosecuting his case were excessive.
All the excuses for inflation mentioned above applied in his case.
A considerable amount included in his claim had to be thrown out on
purely technical grounds; and a large part had to be ignored because
(in violation of her agreement) Mexico would not let him have certain
specified papers that were needed to prove it. And yet, after all these
deductions had been made, our own treasury paid him under the treaty
of 1848 the sum of $71,000 as principal (Moore, 1284). In many cases
the percentage of inflation was low. For example, in the case of claims
aggregating $595,462 the tribunal awarded $439,393 after scaling the
interest down to five per cent (Ho. Report 1096; 27, 2, p. 8). In fact
the awards were probably a somewhat uncommonly high percentage of the
amount claimed in such cases. It has commonly been said (_e.g._ Von
Holst, U. S., iii, 205) that on the conclusion of the war we discharged
Mexico from all obligation on account of our claims ($8,491,603) yet
bound ourselves to pay only $3,250,000, thus admitting that our claims
were nearly three times too large; but the second of these two sums
corresponds to only a part of the first (Treaty with Mexico, Arts,
xiii-xv: Stat. at Large, ix, 933).

3.26. Itúrbide seized the cargo of the _Louisa_, and the Mexican
government not only acknowledged the debt but paid a fraction of it
(Ho. Report 1056; 25, 2). The Mexican supreme court ordered the money
actually realized from the unlawful sale of the _Cossack_ and her cargo
to be paid to her master, but it was not paid (_ibid._). The decree of
the Mexican supreme court of 1821 in favor of this claim was presented
in support of it by the U. S. secretary of state, yet that government
alleged in Nov., 1837, that the claim had just been "for the first time
brought forward" (_ibid._). Cox and Elkins furnished supplies to General
Herrera (Moore, 3430). Chew and Eckford built war vessels for Mexico
(Moore, 3428-9). Parrott made advances on a bill of exchange drawn by
Herrera (Moore, 3429). Green supplied money to a war vessel that put
in at Key West in distress (Moore, 3425). A sum of money on its way to
Peter Harmony, a New York merchant, from his Mexican consignee, was
seized by the government (Moore, 3044). Contrary to law, a forced loan
was extorted from Ducoing (Moore, 3409). Aaron Leggett carried on an
extensive logwood business in Tabasco; but the action of Mexicans in
seizing vessels of his for military use entirely ruined him (Moore,
1275), and even Santa Anna admitted that his claim was just (Butler,
Feb. 8, 1836). Sixteen bales of wax were confiscated as of Spanish
origin, when the fullest certificates, including that of the Mexican
vice-consul at New York, proved that it came from Russia (Poinsett in
Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 248). Gahagan was inhumanly persecuted and for a time
rendered insane, because in a perfectly lawful and respectful manner
he tried to prevent the authorities from illegally appropriating his
employer's property (Moore, 3240). Santangelo, a naturalized American,
was expelled without trial and thereby ruined, in direct violation of
the treaty of amity (Moore, 3333). A case of which the essentials, at
least, were simple is also worthy of mention. Evidently to drive him
away and get his property, Dr. Baldwin, described by our minister as
"a gentleman of great respectability and intelligence" (Ellis, Nov.
8, 1836), was prosecuted on the basis of depositions which a superior
Mexican court admitted were forgeries, was falsely charged with
murdering a woman and firing on a soldier, was put into the stocks and
then imprisoned while suffering from a freshly broken leg, and in short
was persecuted by the local authorities for a term of years (Moore,
3235-40). Other cases, though less easily stated, were not less clear;
yet Mexico would give no redress. See Forsyth's despatch of May 27, 1837
(Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 105).

3.27. This point was taken advantage of by the clever Mexicans
to the utmost, and it illustrates one of the great embarrassments
encountered in dealing with them. Because they had the words
"constitution," "courts," and "law" they pretended to have the
realities. It was as if they had coined lead at the mint and required us
to accept it as silver, while it passed among themselves for merely what
it was. See also Ashburnham, no. 11, 1838. For the character of Mexican
courts see vol. i, 12-13.

3.28. The Mexican government demanded that Baldwin (note 26), for
example, should seek redress from the very tribunal that had wronged
him (Ellis in Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 64). In 1834 Simon McGillivray, a
director of the United Mexican Mining Company, wrote thus to the British
minister: Even when we obtain report after report and decree after
decree against the confiscation, already effected, of our property, "we
never can succeed in obtaining the enforcement of such Decrees, because
the parties against whom they are given are Mexicans of influence or
connexion in the place, and we, the claimants for justice, are only
foreigners"; and three months later the minister (no. 61, 1834) reported
that a letter from the governor of the state "in substance fully admits"
this. Once when Baldwin obtained a verdict, the judge would not execute
it, and the Doctor had to flee for his life (Ellis in Sen. 160; 24,
2, p. 65). Under such circumstances, to deny the right of injured
foreigners, especially the unpopular Americans, to invoke the aid of
their governments was plainly unfair, and so France and England held as
firmly as did the United States.

3.29. =11=Canning, March 25, 1825. Ho. 266; 27, 2, p. 321
(Webster). This obligation grows out of the benefits conferred by
recognition.

3.30. (Early) Ellis in Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 68. (Avoid) Ho. 351; 25,
2, p. 40 (Van Buren). (Covered) =231=Butler to Jackson, June 23,
1831. (Amicable) Ho. 351; 25, 2, pp. 92 (Livingston); 160 (Forsyth).
As the net result of four years of effort Butler was informed that
full specifications must be given; yet no attention was paid to a
group of cases thus made out and proved (Ho. 351; 25, 2, p. 499). Then
he was told that the claimants must come to the treasury department
in person, that nothing would be done until all the American claims
should have been presented, and that a call from our minister would
not advance matters (_ibid._, 501-3). Evidently all this was to gain
time, and it was fairly characterized by our secretary of state as
a denial of justice (_ibid._, 144). In November, 1832, a bearer of
despatches from Butler to our government was detained on his way to
Vera Cruz by the governor of Perote castle, and was there robbed of
his papers, though a passport from the national government established
his official character. The case was both simple and outrageous. Our
minister insisted upon an investigation; but in February, 1834, he found
that (confessedly "on account of some trifling difficulty") it had been
suspended, and in the following April was merely informed, in reply to
an inquiry, that it was again proceeding (_ibid._, 462, 470, 517, 521).

3.31. Sen. 160; 24, 2, pp. 62, 112, 156 (Ellis). =52=Forsyth to
Ellis, July 20, 1836. =52=Monasterio to Ellis, Oct. 21; Nov. 15,
1836. Pakenham, no. 96, 1841. (Withdrew) Ellis, no. 46, Jan. 12, 1837.
He gave the fortnight's notice on Nov. 4. Gorostiza, Correspondencia.
(Approval) Sen. 160; 24, 2, p. 84 (Monasterio); Sen. 189; 24, 2. Kohl,
Claims, 18. Even the philo-Mexican Thompson said that a discussion with
that government in writing was as "endless as the web of Penelope"
(Recolls., 228).

3.32. =58=Jackson, Mar. 12, 1823 (he thought himself too
sympathetic toward Mexico to be our minister there). (Agreed) Ho. 351;
25, 2, pp. 581, 601. _Diario_, Feb. 2, 1836. Messages, Dec. 5, 1836;
Feb. 6, 1837 (Richardson, Messages). Ho. 139; 24, 2, p. 1. Jackson
has been said by a certain school of historians to have used our
claims (in the February Message) as a bludgeon to force Mexico to sell
Texas. But was his temper such that he did not care to assert American
rights unless to gain territory? What cession was he aiming at when he
enforced our claims against France? And if Mexico felt (as she asserted:
_Diario_, _supra_) that baseless grievances of ours were to be used as
a pretext for trouble, why did she not make haste and refute them? From
every sane point of view, indeed, the charge looks absurd. As early
as March, 1833, Butler was urged to settle the boundary negotiation
at once, lest a step toward independence on the part of Texas should
make it impossible to obtain that territory by arrangement with Mexico
(Smith, Annex. of Texas, 21); yet now, after four years have passed,
and after that province has practically effected its independence,
Jackson is accused of trying to compel a cession of it from Mexico.
Moreover he was at this very time rejecting the petition of Texas to
be annexed (_ibid._, 63). Besides, in April, 1836, the envoys of Texas
at Washington had been instructed to enter a "_solemn protest_ ...
against the right of Mexico to sell or the U. S. to purchase [Texas]"
(Tex. Dipl. Corres., i, 76). Even more surprising, the charge is made by
representatives of the anti-slavery historical school, which denounced
Jackson for wickedly conspiring at this precise juncture to help
establish Texas as an independent nation by precipitately recognizing
her. The truth is that while engaged in no conspiracy, he now favored
the recognition of Texas, and hence one could not accept the opposite
and inconsistent view even were it otherwise possible to do so. Probably
the fact that Jackson had settled our long-standing claims against
France by adopting a firm attitude influenced him in regard to Mexico.
(Rupture) Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1838.

3.33. Ho. Report 281; 24, 2. Sen. 189; 24, 2. =52=Buchanan to
Slidell, no. 1. Tex. Dipl. Corres., i, 181-3, 187-92 (Wharton); 218-21
(Catlett); 273-4 (Greyson); 284-8 (Hunt). Ho. Report 7=52=; 29, 1.
Buchanan, Works, iii, 213, 233, 415.

3.34. Ellis had taken the legation papers to Washington. Sen.
1; 25, 2, pp. 105, 108, 109 (Forsyth). =52=Greenhow, Aug. 12,
1837. Certain historians drawing their views largely from the heated
anti-slavery writers of that period have been led to misrepresent our
relations with Mexico as much as our conduct with reference to Texas. At
this point it has been alleged that the United States required Mexico
to examine and settle a large number of complicated cases within a
week, which our acceptance of the dilatory reply proves that we did not
require. Greenhow was merely directed to say that [for the convenience
of the Mexican government] he would remain seven days and bring back any
communication it should wish to make (=56=Forsyth to Greenhow, May
27, 1837). That country, on the other hand, had decreed in May that all
pending grievances of the two nations might be settled by arbitration,
but that should the United States refuse complete satisfaction of any
demands Mexico should present, or delay it beyond the time fixed under
the arbitration treaty, commercial intercourse with this country should
be cut off and preparations be made for war (Ho. Report, 1056; 25, 2, p.
9; Dublán, Legislación, iii, 392). Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 111 (Cuevas).

3.35. Sen. 1; 25, 2, pp. 113-27 (Martínez); 30 (Forsyth). Forsyth
to Ellis, no. 3, May 3, 1839. Ho. Report, 1056; 25, 2. In respect to
one clear case, already many years old, Martínez promised that "every
exertion" should be made to have it taken up by the next regular
Congress; but when that Congress met, the minister of relations
did not even mention it (_ibid._). Mayer, War, 343. Ho. 351; 25,
2, pp. 758 (Forsyth); 759 (Greenhow). Richardson, Messages, iii,
377-9. =53=Martínez to Forsyth, Apr. 7, 1838; reply, Apr. 21.
=77=Martínez, no. 1, res., 1837. Martínez coupled his proposal of
arbitration with a demand that the United States should reaffirm our
neutrality. This was an affront, but Forsyth merely expressed surprise.

3.36. The plan of arbitration was first brought to the attention of
our government during the latter part of Dec, 1837. Ho. Report, 1056;
25, 2. Ashburnham, no. 42, 1838. (Surprise) =52=W. D. Jones, nos.
132-3, 1838. Mexico proposed arbitration to France also, but met with
a refusal (México á través, iv, 411). Later, Martínez proposed to give
the arbitration a scope that would have included Mexican complaints
regarding Texas. To admit such diplomatic and political questions would
have made the affair practically endless, and thus have nullified it
so far as its essential object, the adjustment of private claims,
was concerned; and our government properly refused to accept this
proposition (Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1217).

3.37. Ho. 252; 25, 3, pp. 24 (Martínez), 27. Ho. 190; 26, 1. Moore,
Internat. Arbit., 1216-8. Forsyth to Ellis, no. 3, May 3, 1839. To save
time, the United States transported Martínez's courier to Vera Cruz, but
the man spent about three weeks in making the four-days' trip from the
port to the capital (_ibid._). =53=Forsyth to Martínez, Mar. 16,
1839. (Excuse) Ho. 252; 25, 3, p. 21 (Jones, Jan. 10); Ho. Report, 320;
25, 3. (Disavowed) Ho. 252; 25, 3, pp. 2, 14.

3.38. Pakenham, no. 60, 1840. (Waived) Memoria de ... Relaciones,
Jan., 1841. Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1221-3. Castillo and León declined
to take an oath in the regular way, saying that each had administered
it to the other. The United States was represented by ex-Senator John
Rowan and W. L. Marcy. Rowan was succeeded by H. M. Breckenridge.
=52=Buchanan to Slidell, no. 1, 1845.

3.39. Ho. 252; 25, 3, p. 11 (Forsyth). Ho. 57; 27, 1. Sen. 320;
27, 2, pp. 185 (Webster); 22-9, 90, 92, etc. Sen. 61; 27, 1 (Marcy and
Rowan, May 26, 1841). Sen. 411; 27, 2 (com. for. rels.). Ho. 269; 27, 2
(Leggett case).

Castillo and León insisted that cases should come before the board only
by documents presented through one of the governments--a process likely
to consume much time. When Rowan withdrew in August, 1841, and Marcy
desired to proceed even under this disadvantage, his Mexican colleagues
gained a delay of about six weeks by refusing to do so (Moore, Inter.
Arbit., 1235. Sen. 320; 27, 2, p. 254). They falsely asserted that four
particular claims, three of which were accepted by our commissioners and
the fourth was paid later by our government, had been withdrawn by the
American minister at Mexico, and by thus holding them back for some two
months defeated them (Sen. 320; 27, 2, pp. 179, 251-3).

Under the treaty, that country was positively bound to furnish the
evidence called for in support of the claims, and W. S. Parrott's
requisition was the first or among the first made out and forwarded.
None of his papers came, however, for seven months, and those received
were taken without leave from the custody of the board by Castillo and
León, and held back for nearly two months more; a part of them had
evidently been mutilated or forged; only about one half of the number
specified were furnished, though it was known that all were under the
control of the government; and more than 2000 pages actually prepared
for transmission seem to have been withheld (Sen. 320; 27, 2, _passim_).
Leggett's case, another of the principal ones, was vitally damaged by
documents afterwards fully proved to be spurious (Moore, Internat.
Arbit., 1277-8), and as the claimant certainly would not have presented
them against himself, they must have come from the Mexican government.

Ho. Report 1096; 27, 2, p. 22: "For the rest, the Committee, while they
abstain [as was proper in official action] from imputations on the
commissioners of the Mexican Republic, yet cannot but perceive that
the instructions under which those commissioners acted, and the course
they pursued, in the organization, proceedings, and final action of the
commission, were of most questionable validity, and operated to the
serious injury of the parties interested." The American commissioners
expressed the belief that had the board been acting half the time
between Aug. 25 and the day it took up the first case on its merits,
all the cases would have been "finally adjusted" (Sen. 320; 27, 2,
p. 197). The claims left undecided in the umpire's hands amounted to
$1,864,939.56, and those which the board had not time to consider to
$3,336,837.05 (Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1232).

Mexico has been given great credit for sending many original documents
on a hazardous journey; but, had they been lost, the claimants would
have suffered and she would have profited. She had time enough and
clerks enough to make this risk unnecessary. Also Mexico has been given
great credit for accepting certain indisputable claims growing out
of her revolutionary war, which pro-Mexican Americans have declared
it was outrageous to present; but as she had formally recognized in
1824 all debts of the revolutionists, there was no escape. Numerous
claims failed to be considered because presented too late, but this
was doubtless mainly or wholly due to the attitude of the Mexican
commissioners, which made it appear more than doubtful for a long time
whether it would be worth while to incur the trouble and expense of
making up the cases. In fact the notice of the state dept. (Washington
_Globe_, Apr. 16, 1840) that the commission would meet was falsified
by the non-appearance of Castillo and León in time (Sen. 320; 27, 2,
p. 23). Much time and expense were needed to get papers from Mexico,
etc. The Mexican commissioners took the unreasonable ground that all
undecided claims, considered by the board, were extinguished (Sen. 411;
27, 2, p. 3).

3.40. Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1232, 1245. Ho. Report 752; 29, 1.
Pakenham, nos. 49, 97, 1842. Ho. 144; 28, 2, p. 20 (Green). Besides the
twenty instalments a preliminary payment, covering the interest that
would be due, April 30, 1843, on the awards, was to be made on that date
(Moore, Internat. Arbit., 1246).

A forced loan was ordered for the payment of the interest and principal
of the awards (Voss in Ho. 133; 29, 1, p. 7. Sen. 85; 29, 1; Negrete,
Invasión, iv, 327); and the goods of all who would not or could not
meet their assessments were confiscated and sold amid the lamentations
of the owners and general curses against the United States (Bustamante,
Gobierno, 130). Nearly all the proceeds of the forced loan were,
however, used for other purposes (Green in Ho. 19; 28, 2, p. 32). Our
agent was finally given drafts for the next instalments after the third,
and supposing these would be cashed, he receipted for them in full
(Buchanan, Nov. 19 in Ho. 133; 29, 1, p. 3); but the government stopped
all such payments (B. E. Green, Dec. 17, 1844) and refused to give up
the receipts (Ho. 133; 29, 1, p. 11). In short, it pursued a course that
was not only dishonorable but positively fraudulent. To make all this
the more exasperating, the nation was permitting Santa Anna to expend
great amounts.

In the treaty of January, 1843, Mexico promised to make a new convention
providing for the settlement of all our outstanding claims, including
those not adjudicated by the joint commission. Delay and evasion
followed, of course; but in October of that year the British minister
severed diplomatic relations with Mexico, and in November, 1843,
probably in order to be on good terms with us in case of a war with
England, she signed the proposed convention (Doyle, no. 79, 1843).
The United States accepted the plan of a joint commission, as Mexico
desired, but required that it should meet at Washington. This appears
to have been just. The claimants were all Americans, were numerous,
had a great number of papers which it was not advisable to take abroad
by sea, and could not, without much inconvenience and loss, expatriate
themselves for an indefinite period. Another objection was even more
serious, perhaps. Pakenham (no. 14, 1842) wrote emphatically to his
government that a commission of this kind should not sit at Mexico,
because the pressure of public sentiment would not allow the Mexican
members to act properly on the claims of aliens, and because the foreign
ministers, from whom the actual umpire would almost necessarily be
selected, were more or less entangled in similar cases, and therefore
would not be thought impartial.

To provide, as Mexico demanded, for the arbitration of private Mexican
grievances, which that government admitted unofficially did not exist,
would have been to cast a gratuitous aspersion upon ourselves; and to
allow the presentation of a national claim on account of Texas (which
also was demanded), besides enabling Mexico to nullify through her
pretensions and endless declamations the essential purpose of the
treaty, would have been to question the good faith of our official
declarations of neutrality, and make it possible for a subject of some
foreign power--the umpire--to impose upon us an immense indemnity,
which would also have been a monumental impeachment of our honor. No
sovereign state would place itself in so dangerous and ridiculous a
position. Accordingly the Senate of the United States eliminated these
features of the agreement signed by Minister Thompson. The justice of
its action Mexico did not undertake seriously to deny, and she promised
immediate attention to the subject; but once more she resorted to
dilatory tactics, and thus her promise of January, 1843, one important
consideration for granting a delay in the payment of our awards, was
evaded.

One difficulty needs to be faced here. The United States defended
itself for certain breaches of neutrality on the part of American
citizens during the revolutionary war of Texas on the ground that they
could not legally be prevented; why then could not Mexico plead the
legal impossibility of preventing local authorities and citizens from
committing outrages against Americans? In reply it may be said (1)
that there was no analogy between the two cases. While our government
may have asked that such outrages be prevented, its real demand was
that compensation be paid; our breaches of neutrality were political
offences, and therefore called for different treatment than the civil
grievances on which these claims were based; the former could not be
proved (Smith, Annex. of Texas, pp. 23-24), while the latter could be;
and the former, unlike the latter, could not properly be redressed by
the payment of a definite amount of money. (2) We have abundant reason
to believe that if Mexico had been able and had desired to present a
bill for damages on account of such breaches of neutrality, it would
have been examined fairly and promptly by the American government. As a
single illustration of the ability of Mexico to pay our claims, it may
be mentioned that in 1844 Santa Anna and the Lizardi banking house, in
combination, robbed the treasury of about $1,200,000 (Mofras, Explor.,
i, 65).


     IV. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, 1843-1846

4.1. See Smith, Annex. of Texas, text, notes, and index, particularly
pp. 68, 74, 78, 85-7, 94, 99, 194-5, 199, 210, 273, 288-95, 409-31, 464.
Webster: _ibid._, 194. See remarks in chap. iii, note 13. =137=Donelson
to Calhoun, Jan. 8, 1848. =77=Doyle, British chargé, to Bocanegra,
April 20, 1843: "The undersigned must remind His Excellency that Texas
has been recognized as an independent nation by the Government of Her
Majesty, and that treaties have been negotiated with that Republic as
independent." =77=Cyprey, the French minister, to Bocanegra, April 20,
1843: "The Mexican Cabinet has doubtless overlooked the fact that with
respect to France and most of the states of Europe Texas is absolutely
in the same position as that in which Mexico was before her independence
had been recognized by Spain."

As early as 1839 Gorostiza admitted privately that Mexico had lost
Texas (=11=E. de Lisle, June 21); and in 1840 the French government
notified Mexico that its recognition of Texas was merely the acceptance
of a _fait accompli_ (=11=to Cyprey, no. 4, May 6). Webster, Writings,
ix, 158: "Nothing can exceed, I have always thought, the obstinacy
and senselessness manifested by Mexico in refusing for so many years
to acknowledge the independence of Texas"; xiii, 351: Our annexing
Texas gave Mexico no just ground of complaint (Sept. 29, 1847). In his
Memoria of Jan., 1849, the Mexican minister of relaciones called the
refusal of Mexico to recognize the annexation of Texas a caprice or whim
(capricho). (Never) See note 5. =137=Gallatin to Calhoun, Mar. 3, 1848.

4.2. Sen. 1; 28, 1, pp. 25 (Bocanegra); 27 (Thompson); 34 (Upshur).

4.3. Sen. 1; 28, 1, pp. 38, 42 (Almonte); 41, 45 (Upshur). =53=Memo. of
conference between Upshur and Almonte. =53=Almonte to Upshur, Apr. 22,
1844. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 194.

4.4. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 199, 288. Sen. 341; 28, 1, p. 53 (Calhoun).

4.5. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 289-295. =77=Relaciones to Almonte, May
30, 1844. According to Santa Anna's published account of the interview,
which doubtless misrepresented the bearer of despatches, Thompson said
the assent of Mexico was an essential preliminary to the annexation of
Texas, and plainly recognized her ownership of the province, and the
President replied that the right of subjugating it would be transmitted
to posterity, and assent would never be given to its absorption in
the United States. In reply to Bocanegra's assertion that the United
States had now recognized Mexico's claim to Texas Calhoun sent word to
the Mexican government that we recognized no such claim, but held that
Texas was an independent nation both in fact and in right (Ho. 2; 28,
2, p. 23). In Tyler, Tyler, ii, 692, is a statement, apparently based
on good authority, that Mexico consented to cede Texas for $15,000,000;
but internal evidence and many facts are decidedly against it, and the
author has not found the slightest evidence in its support. It was made
forty years after the event, and probably was due to a misunderstanding
or defective recollection.

Out of this affair grew a diplomatic tilting-match (Ho. 2; 28, 2).
Bocanegra, though personally agreeable and officially painstaking,
dignified and courteous (Thompson, Recolls., 82) was not a great
logician; and the son of Duff Green could hardly be regarded as an
intellectual giant. Still, certain points emerged from the discussion.
The Mexican planted himself on the technical theory of ownership,
accused the Texans of stealing the territory which they had been
graciously permitted to occupy, and charged the United States in the
usual manner with violating treaties and international law. Green,
on the other hand, relied upon facts: the fact of actual Texan
independence, the fact that Mexico herself owed her existence to a
revolution, and the fact that she had regarded herself as independent
and had been so regarded by other nations long before the mother-country
would recognize her. But the correspondence as a whole was indecisive,
disagreeable, and exasperating.

4.6. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 273-9, 365-7.

4.7. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 416-7. Shannon and Rejón: Sen. 1; 28, 2,
p. 47; Ho. 19; 28, 2. =52=Rejón to Shannon, Nov. 21, 1844. Buchanan to
Shannon, no. 10, 1845. =13=Bankhead, no. 67, 1844. Von Holst, U. S.,
ii, 685. Jameson, Calhoun Correspondence, 662. Tyler, Message, Dec.
18, 1844 (Richardson). N. Y. _Eve. Post_, Dec. 18, 1844. (Rejón) Sosa,
Biografías; =52=B. E. Greene, no. 17, 1844. N. Y. _Herald_, Dec. 16,
1844. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Dec. 20, 1844. _Democ. Review_, Feb., 1847,
99, 100. Richtofen, Zustände, 54-6. Rejón, Justificación.

A recent Mexican author has said that "perfidy," which the Mexicans
loved to charge against the United States at this period, was made
impossible by the publicity of our diplomatic affairs (Búlnes, Mentiras,
167). It should be remembered that we had a perfect right to seek, in
the way we had sought, to acquire Texas--_i.e._ by purchase.

4.8. Sen. 1; 29, 1, pp. 38 (Almonte); 39 (Buchanan). Smith, Annex. of
Texas, 420-3. Shannon, no. 10, Apr. 6, 1845. Bankhead, nos. 30, 38,
1845. Richardson, Messages, iv, 388. O Se Hace la Guerra. _Diario_, May
12. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846.

"Is it possible," exclaimed _La Voz del Pueblo_ of March 26, "that
Mexico is a nation of slaves, a wandering tribe, to be the prey of other
nations? Eleven years of war [to gain our independence], all the victims
executed, all the costly sacrifices made,--have these been in vain? War
and only war can save us"--"war without quarter," "extermination and
death." For other references and quotations see Smith, Annex. of Texas,
425-7. =52=Dimond, nos. 244-5, 249, etc., 1845. Min. of treasury to
Deputies, Apr. 19, 1845 (_Diario_, Apr. 20). =56=W. S. Parrott, Apr. 26.

4.9. _Amigo del Pueblo_, July 17, 1845. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 427.
_Diario_, July 17, 23, 25, 31; Aug. 11; Oct. 11. _Siglo XIX_, Aug. 1.
=52=Dimond, nos. 245, 249, etc., 1845. _Journal des Débats_, Sept. 20.
=56=W. S. Parrott, July 12, 15, 22, 30; Aug. 16. _Patriota Mex._, Nov.
14. =52=Shannon, no. 3, 1844. St. Louis _Republican_, Aug. 18, 1845.
Wash. _Union_, Aug. 1, 14; Sept. 29. =297=Buchanan to McLane, priv.
and pers., Sept. 13. =77=Relaciones to mins., July 30. =52=Campbell,
Havana, Aug. 14. =76=Guerra, circular, July 16. Bankhead, no. 38, 1845.
Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, i, 43-5.

July 30, 1845, the Mexican minister of relations wrote to the Mexican
minister at Paris: "Mexico has been left no choice except to fight the
United States"; "The campaign will soon begin"; 14,000 troops are _en
route_; 6000 will soon be organized to join them (=77=Cuevas to Garro,
res.).

4.10. _Siglo XIX_, July 27. _Picayune_, Sept. 23. St. Louis _Reveille_,
Sept. 14. =52=Black, no. 341, 1845. =56=W. S. Parrott, July 22, 30.
Dimond, nos. 249, 257, 1845. _Diario_, July 31. =297=Polk to Buchanan,
private, Aug. 7.

Spanish-American subtlety was not the only subtlety at work. Aug. 1,
1845, the Mexican agent at London reported: I have told Aberdeen that
war is inevitable; he suggests that we merely suspend relations with
the U. S., since a declaration of war would lawfully be followed by the
occupation of California, the bombardment of Vera Cruz, and a blockade
(=77=Murphy, no. 9). The view that no declaration of war was necessary
and that an attack might be made at once on Texas was well understood in
the United States, as the preceding citations show. As early as Aug. 5
the Mexican commander at Matamoros =52=proclaimed: "Comrades, the moment
has arrived to present ourselves on the field of honor."

4.11. =108=Wikoff to Bancroft, May 10, 1845. =52=Buchanan to Parrott,
Mar. 28, 1845.

In one respect this was an unfortunate appointment, for the Mexican
authorities hated Parrott; but Buchanan, who probably was not aware of
that fact, regarded him as "a discreet man, well acquainted with public
affairs," and entitled to the confidence of the President (=52=to Black,
Sept. 17). He was familiar with Spanish, had an intimate acquaintance
with Mexican politics and politicians, and was available. It is highly
improbable that any one else combined these necessary qualifications;
and, as his errand called for no public recognition and was mainly to be
executed indirectly, prejudice was likely to be disarmed. =162=Bancroft
to Conner, Nov. 20, 1845. =162=_Id._ to Latimer, Nov. 7, 10.

4.12. =56=W. S. Parrott, June 24; Sept. 6. His quoted words, added
to other declarations of a similar character, dispose completely of
the assertion, often found in Mexican and American writings, that we
offered to pay for Texas and thus admitted that we had wickedly annexed
it. Baldly and as of right, Mexico's claim could not be recognized by
this nation; but in a spirit of good-will, under cover of paying for a
satisfactory line, we were disposed to soothe her feelings with a gift.

4.13. Tyler, Tyler, iii, 174 (Green). Slidell, Dec. 17. Shannon, no.
8, 1845. Dimond, nos. 256, 259, 266, 1845. =56=W. S. Parrott, Aug. 16
(Herrera has said, "If a Minister from the United States should arrive,
he would be well received"), 26, 29. (Black, Aug. 23) Polk, Diary,
Sept. 16. =108=Kemble to Bancroft, Sept. 3: letters from men in daily
intercourse with Herrera, Almonte, and the minister of relations say the
government desires peace; and one says: "We know from good authority
that if a Minister were sent from the United States he would be well
received" (note the word "Minister").

4.14. Richmond _Enquirer_, Dec. 9. Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845; to
Slidell, Nov. 10. Dix in _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, app., 176. See also pp.
136-7.

4.15. García, Juárez, 9, 12. =52=W. D. Jones, Sept. 22, 1838. (Estrada)
Valencia, proclam., Oct. 22, 1840, in Papeles Varios. London _Times_,
Mar. 13, 1845. _Picayune_, Dec. 30, 1844; Jan. 25, 1846. McLane, March
3, 1845 (Curtis, Buchanan, i, 583). Feb. 28, 1846, the British Foreign
Office transmitted to Bankhead a letter (delivered to it by the Spanish
minister by order of his court) which pointed toward the establishment
of monarchy in Mexico under a Spanish prince.

4.16. (Believed) =297=Buchanan to McLane, priv. and pers., Sept. 13,
1845.

4.17. Polk, Diary, Sept. 16, 17, 1845. (Caused) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 12
(Buchanan). Slidell had been born and educated at the north.

4.18. Bankhead, nos. 94, 101, 104, 1845. The British government censured
Bankhead for going so far in efforts to restore harmony between the
United States and Mexico (=13=to Bankhead, no. 36, 1845. =77=Murphy, no.
2, 1846). =13=Peña to Bankhead, Oct. 15. México á través, iv, 545. Peña
only said that Mexico would be "inclined" to hear the United States, but
of course he would not, on the ground of a passing mood, have expected
two British ministers to act for his nation.

4.19. Bankhead, nos. 101, 104. _Id._ to Pakenham, Oct. 16. Richardson,
Messages, iv, 437-43. That Mexico knew our claims counted among the
"differences" is proved by the letter of Cuevas to Forsyth, July 29,
1837 (Sen. 1; 25, 2, p. 111): The President is anxious for "that final
and equitable adjustment [of the claims] which is to terminate the
existing difficulties between the two Governments."

4.20. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 12 (Buchanan); 13, 14, 17 (Black). Peña to
Black, Oct. 14 in Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846. _Diario_, Nov. 6.
=341=Black, memorial, Dec. 20, 1847. Sen. 12; 30, 1.

4.21. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 12 (Buchanan). Ho. Report 752; 29, 1. _Monitor
Repub._, Aug. 1, 1846 (Herrera had been determined to settle with the
United States).

4.22. Sen. 325; 27, 2, p. 64. Sen. 337; 29, 1, p. 10. As to Slidell's
Title, cf. together Buchanan to Parrott, Mar. 28; _Id._ to Black, Sept.
17; Peña to council of state; and report of council of state. Polk,
Diary, Nov. 6, 9, 10.

In Tyler, Tyler, iii, 174, may be found a statement from B. E. Green
to the effect that Herrera sent word to him that a minister of the
usual sort could not be received, and that he transmitted this message
to Polk. But (1), if such was Herrera's attitude, why was it not made
clear to Black, who had been expressly commissioned to ascertain whether
a minister would be received; (2) Green, as a member of the Calhoun
faction, and perhaps as an official who had lost a good post in our
legation at Mexico, was not favorable to Polk, and a statement made
by a prejudiced person from memory forty-four years after the event,
regarding a delicate matter in which precision is essential, cannot be
considered at all authoritative. (3) This statement is out of harmony
with a number of material facts. =256=Marcy to Wetmore, Feb. 1, 1846:
Slidell was sent "on an express agreement that a minister would be
received."

4.23. =52=McLane, no. 8, Sept. 26, 1845. =108=Kemble to Bancroft, Sept.
3, 1845. Dimond, no. 269, 1845. _Times_, Oct. 14. (Impatience) Ho. 60;
30, 1, p. 17 (Black). Polk, Diary, Nov. 10.

4.24. Buchanan to Slidell, Nov. 10; Dec. 17. _Veracruzano Libre_, Nov.
30. =52=Comte. princ. to Dimond, Nov. 30. Slidell, Nov. 30; Dec. 17.
Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 22 (Black). (Fleet) Conner to Dimond, Oct. 23, 1845
(Wash. _Union_, Dec. 1, 1847). Conner felt so sure of the conciliatory
spirit of his government that he withdrew without waiting for orders.
California was well known to be in a chronic state of rebellion (chap.
xvi), which Mexico had not the power to subdue, and therefore it was
natural for one who knew very little about the Mexicans to suppose they
would be willing to take a price for the practically worthless claim to
that territory.

The view that Polk explicitly instructed Slidell to give up the plan
to buy California rather than allow that plan to stand in the way of
regaining amicable relations with Mexico does not seem to be correct
(Kelsey, Consulate, 62, note 5). But Buchanan's letter of Dec. 17 to
Slidell lays stress upon his "two last alternatives," which were to
purchase northern California, including (_a_) the Bay of San Francisco
or (_b_) Monterey also; yet he instructs Slidell to drop this matter,
if pressing it would endanger success in endeavoring to obtain the
Rio Grande boundary or a line including all of New Mexico. Now such
a settlement of the Texas-New Mexico boundary would have involved
a restoration of amicable relations with Mexico. The two matters
(boundary and relations) were inextricably interwoven both in fact and
logically. Hence in effect Buchanan instructed Slidell to drop the plan
of purchasing California if pressing it would be liable to prevent the
restoration of amicable relations with Mexico. Rives (U. S. and Mexico,
ii, 69, note 2) takes a different view, but seems to have erred in more
particulars than one.

4.25. See pp. 55-6. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 423-31. =52=Slidell, Dec.
17, 27. _Amigo del Pueblo_, Nov. 1: "It is hardly possible to believe
such perfidy, such baseness and such audacity ... treason more horrible
has never been seen." _Patriota Mexicano_, Nov. 18: "To listen to
talk of peace from these men [the Americans] is to take the road to
perdition, death, ignominy." _Voz del Pueblo_, Dec. 3: "The treason has
been discovered.... We no longer own the very ground on which we walk."

4.26. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 22 (Black). Slidell, Dec. 29, 1845. Bankhead,
no. 127, 1845. México á través, iv, 545. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 19.
Sierra, Evolution, i, 212. Black, Dec. 18.

One of Peña's minor points was that it did not appear from Slidell's
credentials that he had been confirmed by the Senate; and in fact,
since the American Congress had not been in session at the time of
his appointment, he had not been. This was not only to inquire into
our domestic affairs, but to hold that the Executive of the United
States could not appoint a diplomatic agent during a recess of the
Senate. Shannon's letter of credence had said nothing regarding his
confirmation, and Murphy had acted as our chargé in Texas for about
nine months before his name went to the Senate. Another point was that
Slidell's letter of credence did not expressly state that he had full
powers for the business in hand; but it was practically absurd, after
the United States had taken so much trouble and shown its good faith by
withdrawing our fleet, to suppose that we would send an agent to Mexico
without giving him the authority to do what we were evidently so anxious
to bring about. When this complaint was brought to his attention,
Slidell replied that his credentials described him as minister
plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary, and also that it was not usual
to exhibit one's full powers at so early a stage in such negotiations,
adding that he would have done so, however, had any desire to see them
been suggested. Buchanan was doubtless right in calling the objection
a quibble; and one cannot suppose that under different circumstances
it would have been presented. The council of state rejected Peña's
objections in both of these cases.

4.27. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 31, 58 (Peña); 28 (Black). =52=Slidell, Dec. 17.

4.28. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 58 (Peña). =77=Relaciones, circular to govs.,
Dec. 11. Comunicación circular. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1848.
Sen. 337; 29, 1, pp. 21, 24, 25, 28, 32 (Slidell); 22 (Black); 25, 30
(Peña). Slidell, Dec. 17.

Even the unfriendly Mexican correspondent of the London _Times_
wrote, "For once" the United States is right, for the documents prove
that Mexico made no _ad hoc_ condition (_Times_, Mar. 13, 1846). The
matter can be viewed in another light also. Peña agreed to receive a
"comisionado"; later he said he had agreed to receive a "comisionado
_ad hoc_." If the words "_ad hoc_" added anything, they indicated a
difference between his earlier and his later positions; if not, why
were they used? Many Americans, doubtless without perceiving what the
significance of the act would have been, have insisted that the United
States ought to have humored poor little Mexico by sending an envoy _ad
hoc_. Aside from the weightier objection to so doing, such a concession
would probably have led to further demands (see note 34). Peña, instead
of recognizing our magnanimity in taking the first step to heal a breach
caused by Mexico, described our overture as "a tacit but clear and
strong confession of the rights of Mexico [and] of the wrongs done to
her" (=77=circular, Dec. 11). Gallatin stated that treaties of peace
were always negotiated by special commissioners, but this was incorrect
(see _e.g._ Jenkinson, Collection, iii, 355).

4.29. Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846. The council of state said: From
the language in which the ministry "explains the condition of receiving
the proposed envoy (_enviado_), we cannot draw a satisfactory reason for
not receiving Mr. Slidell." Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 28-49, 56. Bankhead, no.
127, 1845.

In his manifesto of July 26, 1846 (_Diario_, July 30), Paredes
mentioned, as third among the causes of the war, the attempt of the
United States to induce Mexico to receive a resident minister, so as to
restore friendly relations without first making amends for the offence
[annexation of Texas] that had broken off official intercourse.

4.30. Webster, Writings, iv, 32. R. C. Winthrop, another leading Whig,
took the same ground (_Union_, Mar. 20, 1847). (Awkward) Calhoun in
Benton's Abr. Debates, xvi, 99.

4.31. _Revolution of Paredes._ Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec, 1846
(including documents). Contestaciones (between Paredes, Arista, and the
government, 1845). Carreño, Jefes, clxiii-clxxvii. _Patriota Mex._, Dec.
23, 1845. Ramírez, México, 80-124. =77=Relaciones, circular, Jan. 3,
1846. México á través, iv, 546-56. =56=Mexican corr. of London _Times_
to W. S. Parrott, Nov. 19; Dec. 18. =76=Guerra, circular, Jan 5. Dimond,
nos. 279, 302, 1845. _Aguila del Norte_, Feb. 11; Mar. 18, 1846. Rivera,
Gobernantes, ii, 281-5, 287-8. Giménez, Mems., 91. =285=Tornel to
Paredes, Nov. 19, 1845. Bankhead, nos. 94, 97, 116, 119, 120, 124, 1845;
2, 1846. Tributo á la Verdad. =56=W. S. Parrott, Aug. 16, 29; Sept. 29,
1845. Black, June 10; Sept. 2, 1845. _Picayune_, Jan. 24, 1846. Portrait
of Herrera: city hall, Mexico. London _Times_, Feb. 10; Mar. 2, 20,
1846. _Monitor Constit._, Jan. 1, 16, 1846. Slidell, Dec. 27, 1845; Jan.
14; Feb. 6, 1846. _Memorial Histórico_, Jan. 14, 1846.

The condition of Mexico on the eve of this revolution was well described
by the _Revista Económica y Comercial_: "The country wavers, goes
backward, loses courage, and loses hope, because all the systems of
government that it has tried, one by one, have failed to give the fruits
promised by their authors, and, worn out and exhausted by so many and
varied medicines that have been applied in vain, it desires only order,
peace, and some degree of security. Our men of merit, education, and
patriotism are silent, live in retirement and sadness in their houses,
occupied solely with private affairs ... we have become a nation of
soldiers, officials, lawyers, clergymen, and smugglers, where the number
who produce bears a miserable proportion to the number of those who
live by the labor and sweat of the producers, and where the continual
political changes, the disorders, the bad administration of justice, and
the bad commercial and financial system offer more or less sustenance
to those who produce nothing, always at the expense of the toilers and
their allies, the merchants." The political situation was thus explained
by _El Siglo XIX_: "When a long series of civil dissensions, of frauds
upon the public, of treasons against the parties, of perjuries to
principles, have mixed up men and things, blotted out the line between
political groups, and confused all ideas, politics must become a genuine
chaos. Mexico is in precisely that condition." When charged with
upsetting public order Paredes replied, "None existed" (_Esperanza_,
Jan. 8, 1846). As late as Aug. 6, 1846, Texas was called upon, like the
other political divisions of the country, to elect members of Congress.

4.32. (Scheme) =52=Black, Dec. 30, 1845; =52=Slidell, Dec. 27;
=297=McLane to Polk, private, Jan. 17, 1846; _Memorial Histórico_, Jan.
26, and the Mexican press generally. Slidell saw grounds for hope: the
delay in furnishing him an escort; a possibility that Paredes might
hold that Herrera had committed Mexico; the improbability that money
to pay the troops could be borrowed while war seemed likely (hence he
sent a hint to the government that money could be obtained by accepting
a boundary satisfactory to the United States); Castillo, with whom he
had talked a number of times before he became minister of relations,
was intelligent and averse to a war with the United States. Buchanan to
Slidell, Jan. 20, 28; Mar. 12.

4.33. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 63 (Slidell). Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846.
The council said that Slidell could not be received on _any_ footing,
unless Taylor (_now at Corpus Christi_) should retire. "The limiting
of the mission of the _comisionado_ to the sole question of Texas,"
it remarked, "was a tacit condition (_una condición tácita_)." This
admitted once more that the condition was not stated. The council
admitted also that _comisionado_ was not the proper term for an envoy
_ad hoc_, which refutes again the contention of a certain American
school that Mexico explicitly required us to send a "commissioner"
instead of a minister. Castillo's reply to Slidell (Mar. 12) said:
Mexico cannot have agreed to receive a regular minister, for it would
have been imprudent to do that; by fraud and violence the fair province
of Texas has been stolen; and now, after robbing and outraging Mexico,
your country seeks to obtain a pretext for war by demanding of us the
impossible humiliation of receiving you (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 67). At this
time Castillo did not know that Taylor was advancing toward the Rio
Grande (_Diario_, Mar. 15, 1846). =166=Slidell to Conner, Feb. 7; Mar.
15.

4.34. Mar. 17 Slidell answered Castillo at some length (Ho. 60; 30,
1, p. 72), vindicating the course of the United States in regard to
Texas. All the threats of war, he pointed out, have come from Mexico;
to suppose that the present Mexican administration in particular does
not intend to fight, would be to accuse it of declaring, in order to
overthrow Herrera, what it did not mean; so far as words can produce
war it already exists by the act of Mexico, and is the United States to
remain entirely passive, taking no precautions, till your army "shall
be prepared to strike, with due effect, the threatened blow?" Slidell
at the same time requested his passports. Castillo to Slidell, March 21
(Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846) declared the discussion closed and
transmitted passports. April 23 Paredes said in a manifesto that he
rejected Slidell because "the dignity of the nation resented this new
insult" (México á través, iv, 559). In view of the grounds on which his
revolution had been launched (=73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 200, res.,
1846) he could not have received Slidell without grave danger to himself
(Black, May 26, 1846; Slidell, no. 11). See chap. viii, note 24. Slidell
sailed from Vera Cruz on March 31, but at Polk's request he retained his
commission and held himself in readiness to go to Mexico again for about
a year (Moore, Buchanan, vii, 211; =52=Slidell, no. 14, 1847).


               V. THE MEXICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR

5.1. _Mexican feeling_. (Subjugate) =52=Consul Black, no. 349, Oct.
9, 1845; =47=Wood to Bancroft, June 4, 1846. =52=Slidell, nos. 3, 10.
=52=Consul McCall, Tampico, no. 65, Sept. 26, 1845. (All of Mexico)
=52=Shannon, no. 3, Oct. 28, 1844. (Threat) _Diario_, Mar. 25, 1845;
=77=Relaciones, circular, Nov. 27, 1846; _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Apr.,
1849, 97, 102; Thompson, Recolls., 238; London _Spectator_, Sept. 26,
1846. (Hinder) =52=Manifiesto of Vera Cruz legislature, [June, 1827];
Poinsett's reply; =52=Poinsett's reply to Méx. state legisl., Aug.,
1829; Shannon, no. 3; La Ruina de los Mexicanos. (Indians) _Mosquito
Mexicano_, Aug. 4, 1835; =75=gov. Durango, Apr. 27, 1846. (Privileged
classes) J. H. Smith in Proceeds. Amer. Antiq. Soc, Apr., 1914, and the
citations there given. (_Siglo XIX_) =56=W. S. Parrott, June 29, 1845.
(Politicians) Green, nos. 8, 103, 1844; Calhoun Corresp., 975; Shannon,
no. 3, 1844, and the Mexican press.

The following citations, which might be indefinitely extended, bear
upon various aspects of the subject. Pakenham, nos. 74 of 1828; 74 of
1829. Bankhead, nos. 38, 1845; 28, 58, 1846. =345=Ellis, Sept. 20, 1839.
Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846. _Voz del Pueblo_, Mar. 29; May 3,
1845. _Amigo del Pueblo_, June 26; Oct. 9, 1845. _Orizaveño_, Mar. 30,
1845. _Patriota Mex._, Nov. 14, 1845. _Monitor Repub._, Jan. 28, 1847.
Reflexiones sobre la Memoria. Comunicación circular que. =77=Almonte,
no. 130, priv., 1844. =77=Arrangóiz, no. 50, res., 1845. Decree of Mex.
Cong., June 4, 1845 (broadside). =56=W. S. Parrott, June 29; July 5,
1845. =108=Kemble to Bancroft, Sept. 3, 1845.

5.2. (Danger) =76= Gov. Ibarra of Puebla, Sept. 5, 1846; _Diario_, Apr.
17, 1846; =77=Relaciones, circular, Nov. 27, 1846; law of June 4, 1845,
in Dublán, Legislación, v, 19; _Monitor Repub._, May 15, 1847; London
_Spectator_, Sept. 26, etc., 1846. C. M. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, i,
45. Castillo; council of state (chap. iv). (Paredes) Bankhead, no. 28,
Feb. 27, 1846. (Chief) Shannon, no. 3, 1844; Negrete, Invasión, iv,
app., 182; _Diario_, Mar. 25, 1845; Mar. 25; Sept. 26; Dec. 6, 1846;
=80=legislat. of Méx. state, address, Apr. 26, 1847; _Patriota Mex._,
Nov. 14, 1845; =77=Arrangóiz, no. 50, res., Mar. 13, 1845; _Siglo
XIX_, Nov. 30, 1845. (Clamored) _Amigo del Pueblo_, Oct. 9, 1845; _Voz
del Pueblo_, Mar. 29, 1845. (Superiority) Tornel, Tejas, 95; _Monitor
Repub._, May 12, 1846.

5.3. (Abject) Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 993. =77=Almonte, June 19,
priv.; Sept. 20, 1844; Mar. 17, priv., 1845. (Panic) _Amer. Review_,
Sept., 1845, 222.

5.4. To precisely what extent European journals were read in Mexico
cannot be determined; but it seems probable that few important
expressions escaped notice there, and certainly the leading journals
were quoted freely.

5.5. (Differences) =77=Almonte, June 19, priv., 1844; =77=Relaciones,
circular, Nov. 27, 1846; Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 994;
_Constitutionnel_, May 12; Aug. 5, 1845. _Times_, Apr. 15, 1845.
_Diario_, Apr. 3, 1845.

5.6. Times, Apr. 15, 1845. Negrete, México, xxi, 130. =13=Elliot, July
3, 1845. Gorostiza, Dictamen. Reflexiones sobre la Memoria. Federación
y Tejas. Tornel, Tejas, 95-7. (Elliot in Mex.) Smith, Annex. of Texas,
411-3. =77=Deffa dis, July 29, 1835.

5.7. _Britannia_, Feb. 15, 1845. (1812) Negrete, México, xxi, 130.
=13=Pakenham to Harvey, July 20, 1839. _Times_, Apr. 5, 1845.
=77=Arrangóiz, no. 65, res., Apr. 23, 1845.

5.8. =345=Poinsett to Van Buren, May 26, 1846 (Swarms of the best
irregular cavalry that I have ever seen). Watson, Taylor, 113-4 (The
British, Spanish, and Prussian ministers at Washington agreed that Scott
would be beaten; Calderón spoke as quoted in the text). (Generals) Wash.
_Union_, Dec. 18, 1846. Elliot, note 6. _Times_, July 5, 1845.

Napoleon said, "The first quality of a soldier is constancy in enduring
fatigue and hardship" (Maxims, 47). In this quality the Mexicans
excelled.

5.9. Requena in _Monitor Repub._, Mar. 9, 1846. Negrete, Mexico,
xxi, 131. (Boasted) =52=W. S. Parrott, Dec. 14, 1835. Memoria de ...
Relaciones, Jan., 1849. _Boletín Oficial_, Apr. 15, 1845. Apuntes, 168.
Thompson, Recolls., 170-1. (Self-confidence) Mofras, Explor., i, 70.
=76=Min. war, circular, Nov. 11. (Ensure) _Diario_, Sept. 25, 1845.
(_Voz del P._) Federación y Tejas.

5.10. (Texas) Tornel, Tejas, 95-7; =13=Bankhead, no. 125, Dec. 30,
1845. =77=Almonte, no. 72, priv., June 19; Sept. 20, 1844; instructions
to G. de la Vega, Apr. 10, 1844. =13=Pakenham, no. 22, Apr. 14, 1844.
Elliot, note 6. (Urged) Negrete, México, xxi, 131-2. Memoria de ...
Relaciones, Jan., 1849.

5.11. Requena in _Monitor Repub_., Mar. 9, 1846. London _Times_, June
11, 1846. =345=Poinsett to Van Buren, May 26, 1846. _Britannia_, June
10, 1844. =169=Rives to Crittenden, Feb. 8, 1847. =137=Clemson to
Calhoun, Mar. 28, 1847. Elliot, note 6.

5.12. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1849. =77=Cuevas, no. 67, 1836.
(_Herald_)_Diario_, June 4, 1845. (_Globe_) Charleston _Mercury_, Sept.
8, 1845. Some of the documents quoted above are later than the beginning
of the war, but the opinions must have existed before.

5.13. (Defensive) Requena, note 11. =77=Arrangóiz, no. 129, res., Nov.
29, 1844. _Times_, Apr. 5, 1845. _Britannia_, June 10, 1844. _Times_ in
_Diario_ of June 8, 1845.

5.14. _Herald_, May 3, 1845. =77=Arrangóiz, note 13; no. 101, res.,
July 8, 1845. (Tornel) =47=Wood to Bancroft, July 4, 1846. (Own) _Nat.
Intelligencer_, Sept. 5; Savannah _Republican_, Aug. 25; N. Y. _Herald_,
Aug. 30, 1845. _Times_ of Apr. 5, 1845, in _Diario_ of June 8.

5.15. _Standard_, Aug. 12, 1845. =13=Pakenham, no. 22, Apr. 14, 1844.
(Fig red) Búlnes, Grandes Mentiras, 150.

5.16. (Endured) =73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 532, res., Sept. 24,
1846; =77=circular, Nov. 27, 1846. (Credit) London _Times_, Apr. 15,
1845; and chap. xxxiii. =77=Arrangóiz, no. 36, res., May 23, 1844.
_Constitutionnel_, Aug. 15, 1845.

5.17. _Benefits._ =77=Cuevas, no. 67, July 13, 1836. _Diario_, Mar. 25,
1845. =52=Green, Apr. 8, 1844. Reflexiones sobre la Memoria. _Times_,
Apr. 15, 1845. =52=Shannon, no. 3, Oct. 28, 1844. =56=W. S. Parrott,
July 5, 1845. _Siglo XIX_, Aug. 1, 1845. (Baptize) La Verdad Desnuda.
(Blockade) =52=Thompson, Oct. 3, 1843; _Macedonian_, Mar. 28, 1845;
=13=Doyle, no. 79, Oct. 30, 1843. (_Voz del P._) Federación y Tejas.
(Crisis) Reflexiones sobre la Memoria.

5.18. _Central and South America._ J. M. L. Mora, pamphlet, 1834.
_Diario_, Sept. 25, 1846. (Press) chap, vi, note 13. =77=Cuevas, no.
67, July 13, 1836. =77=Mex. min., Lima, no. 23, Aug. 15, 1837. (Dorsey)
Savannah _Republican_, Aug. 25, 1842. Adams, Mems., xi, 340, 367.
_Imparcial_, June 13, 1844. _Aurora de la Libertad_, Apr. 6, 1845.
Relaciones, circular, Nov. 27, 1846. =80=Legisl. of Méx. state, address,
Apr. 26, 1847. =76=Gov. Ibarra, Sept. 5, 1846. =312=Basadre to S. Anna,
Apr. 9, 1847. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 243, note.

5.19. _Diario_, Apr. 3, 1845. _Mail_, Aug. 30 in _Diario_, Nov. 1.
London _Times_, Sept. 10, 1845 (War is "clearly the duty" of Mexico).
_Journal des Débats_, Sept. 24, 1845. (The European outlook) Chap xxxv.

5.20. (Jealousy) Mayer, War, 82; _Amer. Review_, Jan., 1846. (Policy) J.
H. Smith in Proceeds. Am. Antiq. Soc, Apr., 1914. _Correspondant_, Jan.
1, 1846. London _Times_, Jan. 1, 1846.

5.21. (Cotton) Smith, Annex. of Texas, 89, 90. (Checked) _Ibid._, 382,
389; Tornel, Tejas, 97; London _Standard_, May 2, 1845; _Times_, Sept.
9; Dec. 15, 1845; Jan. 1, 1846. (Guizot) _Niles_, Mar. 14, 1846, pp.
25-6. (_Journal des Débats_) _National_, Dec. 27, 1845.

5.22. (Texas) Smith, Annex. of Texas, chap, xviii. _Id._ in Mass.
Hist. Soc. Proceeds., June, 1914. _Morning Herald_, Mar. 27, 1845, in
_Diario_, June 4. _Times_, Dec. 15, 1845.

5.23. _Times_, Aug. 6; Sept. 9, 1845. (It was the Mexico correspondent
of the _Times_ who spoke, but evidently the editor allowed him to be
heard.) _Standard_, May 2, 1845. _Journal of Commerce_, Sept. 6, 1845.
_Journal des Débats_, Feb. 4; Sept. 24, 1845. _Constitutionnel_, May
12, 1845. _Monitor Constit._, supplmt., Dec. 21, 1844. _Aurora de la
Libertad_, Apr. 6, 1845.

5.24. _Journal des Débats_, Sept. 24, 1845. =13=Pakenham, no. 22, Apr.
14, 1844. (Blockade) =13=Bankhead, no. 162, Oct. 30, 1846.

5.25. (Fear) _Boletín Oficial_, Apr. 15, 1845. (Guarantee) =13=Bankhead,
no. 117, Nov. 29, 1845.

5.26. =13=Bankhead, nos. 113, Nov. 29, 1845; 125, Dec. 30, 1845; 14,
Jan. 30, 1846; 28, Feb. 27, 1846; =52=McLane, nos. 8, Sept. 26, 1845;
55, June 18, 1846; =52=Shannon, no. 9, Mar. 27, 1845; =52=Slidell, Jan.
14; Feb. 6, 1846; _Correspondant_, May 1, 1846; _Times_, Mar. 13, 1846;
Ho. 2; 29, 1, pp. 139-92; =52=J. Parrott, June 4, 1846. =52=Dimond, no.
332, Apr. 22, 1846: The Mexican thermometer for peace or war is governed
by the prospects of war between us and England. The contemptuous and
abusive tone of the British journals with reference to the United States
encouraged Mexico. Our minister at London reported that the British
press as a whole represented that the United States could not wage war
successfully against Mexico (=297=McLane to Polk, received, June 21,
1846). =77=Murphy, no. 9, Aug. 1, 1845 (Aberdeen would like to see,
etc.).

5.27. =52=Slidell, Jan. 14, 1846. _Times_, Mar. 13, 1846. =52=McLane,
no. 55, June 18, 1846. (Hoped) =13=Bankhead, no. 31, Mar. 10, 1846;
Tornel, Tejas, 97.

5.28. _Diario_, Mar. 25, 1845. (Enthusiasm, veil) Memoria de ...
Relaciones, Jan., 1849. =77=Almonte, no. 72, priv., June 19, 1844.
_Monitor Constit._, supplmt., Dec. 21, 1844. Almonte (who, as recently
minister to the United States, had great influence on the question of
peace or war) held that Mexico ought to fight and protract the war as
long as possible in order to make us so tired of it that we should
never repeat the experiment (=13=Pakenham, no. 119, Sept. 28, 1846).
_Espectador_, Apr. 25, 1846 ("We are profoundly convinced of the triumph
of the Mexican arms"). Reforma, Mar. 9, 1846. =13=Bankhead, nos. 130,
Sept. 7, 1846 ("They cannot be convinced" of their inability to fight
the U. S.); 151, Oct. 10, 1846 (The cry of the government is, "a levy
of 40,000 men and make terms only on the other side of the Nueces").
(Prussian) =256=Memo. (Historians) Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 19-20;
Balbontín, Estado Militar, 58. Ramírez, México, 235. S. Anna, proclam.,
Sept. 16, 1847, in _Monitor Repub_., Oct. 2, 1847. Memoria de ...
Relaciones, Jan., 1849. Kenly, Md. Volunteer, 57: After a long stay in
Mexico, I believe the sentiment of the people was "unanimous for war."
Franklin Pierce, speech, Jan. 27, 1848: After conversing with the most
intelligent men in Mexico I was satisfied that the war was unavoidable
(N. Y. _Herald_, Feb. 5, 1848). Other documents, too numerous to be
cited, assisted the author in reaching his conclusions. This condition
of the Mexican mind helps to explain the rejection of Slidell. See also
chap. ix, pp. 221-2.


              VI. THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR

6.1. Buchanan in _Cong. Globe_, 28, 1, app., 723. For public sentiment
regarding the Santa Fe prisoners see the New Orleans papers of March,
1842 (_e.g._ _Com. Bulletin_, Mar. 18), and Smith, Annex. of Texas,
31-2. =52=Consul Dimond, Jan. 20, 1843. (Sentmanat) =52=Consul Porter,
July 20, 1844. Sentmanat's party included several Americans. (Reptiles)
=77=Clipping from New Orleans _Bee_. _State Sentinel_, Sept. 27, 1845.
(American prisoners) N. Orl. _Comm. Bull._, Mar. 18, 1844. Ark. Hist.
Comm., Bulletin no. 6, p. 182.

6.2. The statements regarding American feeling appear to be
self-evident. In the daily press the author has found abundant proof of
them, but it would require a great deal of space to prove inductively
the state of public sentiment. =42=Delegates, Feb. 12, 1847.

6.3. These statements also are presented as conclusions based upon an
extended examination of the daily press (see Smith, Annex. of Texas,
472), speeches in Congress, etc. For example, the remarks made in
Congress with reference to Jackson's request for authority to adopt
forcible measures (p. 77 of this volume) contained many kind references
to Mexico. This feeling persisted. In the Richmond _Enquirer_, Dec. 9,
1845, its Washington correspondent stated that he found the Democrats of
both houses of Congress sincerely desired the friendship and confidence
of that country. _Id._, Oct. 17, 1845. Note the first page of chap.
xxxvi. For anti-slavery accusations: J. Q. Adams in Boston _Atlas_,
Oct. 17, 1842 (Smith, Annex. of Texas, 131). For the use of money to
influence the American press: _ibid._, 184.

6.4. (Forbearance) N. Orl. _Bee_, Feb. 19, 1846; _Picayune_, May 5,
1846; _Guard_, May 15, 1846; N. Orl. _Comm. Bull._, Mar. 16, 1846, and
_infra_. =52=Van Buren to Butler, Oct. 16, 1829. =13=Count E. de Lillers
to Gutiérrez [Mar., 1830]. (Jackson) Chap. iii, p. 77. (Imbecility)
_Picayune_, June 23, 1842.

6.5. _Picayune_, Apr. 6, 1842. (Webster) Sen. 320; 27, 2, p. 205. Sen.
411; 27, 2. (Less willing) Chap. iii, p. 80. _Jeff. Repub._, Aug. 7,
1845.

6.6. _Republican_, Feb. 2, 1846._Picayune_, Jan. 28, 1846. _Delta_, Jan.
21, 1846. _Mo. Reporter_, Apr. 18, 1846. _Comm. Bulletin_, Mar. 16, 1846.

6.7. Mex. consul, no. 79, Apr. 1, 1842. (Justly) Smith, Annex. of
Texas, "England" in index. (Influence) _Ibid._, 72, 136, 153; =56=W. S.
Parrott, June 4, 1846 ("Mexico may be said to be completely in the hands
of England"). _Commonwealth_, Feb. 23, 1846. _Times_, Nov. 21, 1845.

6.8. Natchez _Courier and Journal_, Apr. 14, 1846. _Courrier des E. U._
in Memphis _Enquirer_, Feb. 24, 1846. _E.g._ _Picayune_, Feb. 5, 1846.
_Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p. 256 (Hannegan).

6.9. _Delta_, Mar. 27: the pending difficulties must be settled
effectually. _La. Courier_, Mar. 6: "The time has arrived when the
U. S. must decide to act firmly and put an end to the uncertainty of
our relations with Mexico." _Picayune_, Jan. 24: "While our relations
remain in this miserable condition, our territory is liable to sudden
invasion and our citizens to arbitrary exactions ... the intrigues
of trans-Atlantic states demand to be counteracted, and the hostile
purposes of Mexico need to be met with peremptory measures." St.
Louis _Reporter_, Jan. 31: "Delay on our part to bring to a positive
settlement all existing difficulties with Mexico would be mere madness
and folly." _Picayune_, May 5: "There is no proposition in mathematics
more absolutely demonstrable than the impossibility of having a good
understanding with Mexico before giving her a sound drubbing." (Designs)
_Id._, Dec. 30, 1845; Feb. 5, 1846. =52=Consul Campbell, Jan. 7, 1846.

6.10. (Abolitionists) N. Orl. _Comm. Bulletin_, Mar. 18, 1842. (Calhoun)
Smith, Annex. of Texas, 209, 211, 213-6. Calhoun's remark was given
to the author by Judge Martin of South Carolina, to whom it was made
in the spring of 1847, and is fully in line with Calhoun's action.
(Mississippi) The author thinks he has heard Dr. Wm. E. Dodd of the
University of Chicago express such an opinion.

6.11. _E.g._ Ills. _State Register_, Dec. 27, 1844: "If war shall ensue,
let it not close until the empire of Mexico" is added to the Union;
Baker of Illinois in House, Jan. 29, 1846: "We must have California, and
perhaps all Mexico" (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p. 279). Besides this feeling
there was a general territorial ambition, which looked in an indefinite
way to a rather distant future and a peaceful, natural extension.

6.12. _American Review_, Sept., 1845, 227. No Burr was needed, however,
to plant these seeds.

6.13. (Consul) =13=Salkeld to Crawford, Feb. 25, 1830. (1835) _Journal
des Débats_, May 25, 1848. =13=Elliot to Pakenham, Apr. 14, 1843. (_News
and Tribune_) Nashville _Union_, Aug. 5, 1845. _Plebeian_, Mar. 1, 1845:
"The whole world cannot resist our onward march, until our proud flag
waves over every inch of territory on the continent of North America."
=253=Sanders to McLean, Dec. 29, 1846: "The people if not wicked are
rapacious and Anglo-Saxon-like prefer conquest to principle." The Oregon
discussion revealed clearly the thirst for territory (_Cong. Globe_, 29,
1, app., _e.g._ Smith, Hunter, Pollock, Rockwell, Toombs, pp. 104, 89,
120, 129, 133. W. H. Seward, Mar. 31, 1846: "The popular passion for
territorial aggrandizement is irresistible" (Works, iii, 409). N. Y.
_Herald_, June 15, 1844. Livermore, War, 12.

6.14. _Herald_, Aug. 30, 1845. (Illinois) Everett, Recolls., 194. W.
E. Dodd in Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans., 1912, p. 17. Indiana _State
Sentinel_, 1845, _passim_. (Debt) Green, Repudiation, 13. _American
Review_, Sept., 1845, p. 227. (Calhoun) Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 692.
Lyell, Second Visit, ii, 257. Livermore, War, 6, 8, 10. Smith, Annex. of
Texas, 49. (Powerful) _New Englander_, v, 318-9; =206=J. Graham to Gov.
G., Jan. 4, 1846.

6.15. _Herald_, Aug. 30, 1845. _News_ in _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 4,
1845. _Journ. of Comm._, May 21, 1845. Gen. Worth wrote in the autumn
of 1845: "Our people will not rest satisfied without a war with some
power" (N. Y. _Times_, July 16, 1916). Claiborne (Quitman, i, 310): the
people "demanded war and were determined to have it." For information
regarding the state of mind prevailing in western Tennessee and the
adjacent regions the author is greatly indebted to Gov. James D. Porter
of Nashville, who was a young man at the time of the Mexican war. The
fact that hunting occupied the place of work had no little influence.
(Hunting) Rose, McCulloch, 29.

6.16. _Comm. Bulletin_, Mar. 17, 1842. (Wealth) Smith, Annex. of Texas,
49. (Willing) _Tribune_, May 11, 1845. =210=I. E. Holmes to Hammond, May
10, 1846 (The Westerners want to despoil the churches and plantations).
(Letter) _Globe_, Aug. 25, 1845. _News_ in Mobile _Herald and Tribune_,
Sept. 7, 1845. The Whigs were of course inclined on partisan grounds
to denounce the Democratic party and the administration for every sign
of hostility to Mexico, and to maintain that if the Texas policy of
their candidate for the Presidency, Henry Clay, had been followed there
would have been no danger of war. Indeed, it would seem at first sight
as if they could have found no logical escape from this position. But
they were able to say, particularly in the south: We opposed immediate
annexation; we predicted that it would cause trouble with Mexico; but
the country voted that way, and now as patriotic Americans we accept
the consequences. Sentiment in favor of fighting Mexico was by no means
confined to the Democrats.

6.17. ("Slaves") N. Orl. _Comm. Bulletin_ in Savannah _Republican_,
Aug. 15, 1845. The popular American idea of a Mexican was a fat face,
a double chin, a muddy complexion, a bloated body, coarse appetites,
a crude organization generally, and no brains to speak of above the
ears--only enough to talk with. Spanish rule and the mixture of Indian
blood had tended naturally to produce something of this sort, but finer
types were very numerous and sometimes brilliant. (Soldiery) N. Y.
_Tribune_, May 11, 1845; =354=Welles papers. (Picture) _Comm. Bulletin_,
Mar. 17, 1842. "_Who's for Mexico?_" ran Colonel Dakin's advertisement
in the New Orleans _Tropic_; "All who may feel disposed to make a
pleasant excursion to the Frontiers of Mexico (and perhaps to explore
some parts of that country) will find all the means and facilities
requisite by enrolling themselves in the Regiment of Louisiana
Volunteers" (Phila. _No. American_, Aug. 27, 1845).

6.18. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 4. _Picayune_, Aug. 27. _Enquirer_,
Aug. 10. _Union_, Aug. 21, 1845; Feb. 10, 1847. _Reveille_, Aug. 28.
("Go") _Picayune_, Aug. 17. =297=Buchanan to McLane, Sept. 13.

6.19. (_News_) Mobile _Herald and Tribune_, Sept. 7; Oct. 22, 1845. Less
was said for a time, but probably no less was felt. Of course the New
Englanders did not share the sentiment very fully. The South Atlantic
states--influenced by Calhoun and, as Poinsett admitted (=192=to Lewis,
Jan. 5, 1846), by the dread of privateers--did not feel sure that the
stake was worth the risk. But the total sentiment in favor of war with
Mexico was tremendous. Calhoun himself recognized that the country stood
that way (Jameson, Cal. Corresp., 704 to T. G. C.). _Correspondent_,
Apr. 15, 1846. _Enquirer_, Jan. 20, 1846. _Mo. Reporter_, Apr. 18, 1846.
=210=Hammond to Simms, Mar. 21, 1847.

6.20. (Glory) =345=Poinsett to Van Buren, Mar. 9, 1848. (Power) Jameson,
Calhoun Corresp., 728. (Oregon) Pendleton, Stephens, 76. (Re-elected)
Johnston and Browne, Stephens, 200. (Bancroft) Schouler, U. S., iv, 498;
Howe, Bancroft, i, 288, 290. The subject of California will be discussed
fully in chap. xvi, but in order to allay prejudice it is touched upon
here.]

6.21. See "Office-seekers" in index of Polk's Diary.

6.22. Anson Jones, the last President of the Texas republic, asserted in
his book that Polk was "pre-determined to have a war" with Mexico (p.
46). As evidence he maintained that Donelson, the United States minister
in Texas, under the pretext of defending Texas against an unreal danger
of invasion, brought into that country American troops in order to
ensure a collision with Mexico; but (1) Donelson fully believed that
Texas was in danger of invasion, and (2) there were ample grounds for
that opinion (Smith, Annex. of Texas, 449). Moreover Donelson, instead
of hurrying our troops into Texas, was very anxious that none should
cross her frontier until after her full acceptance of annexation, which
could not occur before July 4, 1845 (_ibid._, 446, 448, 456); and we
have seen how threatening were the language and movements of Mexico at
that stage. As Texas became to all intents and purposes a part of the
United States on accepting our proposition, the duty to protect her
people was then clear.

Jones also asserted that agents of Polk urged him to send the Texas
militia against Mexico in the spring of 1845 in order to bring about
a war;but this is misleading (Smith, Annex. of Texas, 446-8). The
confidential orders given to Conner and Stockton of the navy and the
correspondence between the state department and Donelson prove that
Polk's administration had not the least intention of adopting at this
time an aggressive course toward Mexico.

Finally, Jones stated that he received clear proof of his charge from
Texan agents at Washington. He admitted, however, that (although he does
not appear to have lost any other important documents) he had mislaid
their reports; and his assertion is inconsistent with known facts.
For example, he said (p. 491) that Lee, one of these agents, reported
about September 13 that he found Polk, Marcy, Walker and Ritchie
"excessively angry" with Jones for not consenting, months before, to
an attack upon Mexico; but Lee did in fact report, September 6 and 8,
that he was received "cordially" by Polk, Walker and Ritchie, and that
Polk sent his "sincere regard" to Jones (Jones, Memoranda, 485, 490;
Tex. Dipl. Corres., ii, 398). Again, according to Jones another Texan
agent informed him "of the deep anxiety expressed by Polk for a war
with Mexico." Now of course Polk may have said that a war was needed
to redress American wrongs, but to suppose that a man who kept his own
counsel so closely would have confessed to this comparative stranger a
dishonorable intention concealed from everybody else, and would have
done so knowing that in reality he and Jones were at swords' points on
a vital matter, annexation, is incredible. When Jones wrote his book
he was a ruined man in consequence of the general and well-founded
belief that he had tried to prevent the incorporation of Texas in the
United States, and he was very bitter against Polk. Not long afterward
he committed suicide. His book, apparently prepared as a defence of
himself, is often untrustworthy; and how clear-headed he was at the time
of writing it is shown by his assertion that Texas was in undisputed
possession of the territory to the Rio Grande, yet that by advancing to
that stream Taylor "produced the Mexican war" (p. 68).

Ashbel Smith, in general a much better witness, stated that agents of
Polk endeavored to have the militia sent against Mexico so as to bring
on a war (Remins., 66-7); but as he was in Europe at the time he had
no personal knowledge regarding the matter, and he also was opposed to
annexation.

Evidence of Polk's alleged desire to provoke a war may be seen by some
in the language of the _Union_, his organ at Washington, which declared
blatantly that the Rio Grande was the boundary of the United States,
and that Mexico would invite ruin, should her troops cross it (May 1;
September 11, 13, 1845, etc.). But (1) the government had reason to
believe that we had been too mild toward Mexico, and may have wished
to suggest to her the danger of being rash; (2) the purpose may have
been to satisfy the many Americans who complained that our national
authorities lacked spirit; (3) as Polk was officially offering Mexico
the olive branch at this time, the bellicose utterances of the _Union_,
which was not recognized by the administration as its organ, could not
have been regarded by the Mexican government as evidence that he desired
a war, but only at most as a suggestion of what might follow should
the olive branch be rejected. From this point of view they would seem
to have tended toward peace rather than war (cf. his policy of having
Taylor and Conner assume bold attitudes--chap. vii, p. 152).

6.23. The author's estimate of Polk is based upon a study of his
conduct and all the documents relating to him. One may consult to
advantage the Welles papers; Schouler, Hist. Briefs, 124, 129, 132;
Poore, Perley's Remins., i, 328-9; Howe, Bancroft, i, 294; Claiborne,
Quitman, i, 228; Jenkins, Polk, 330; McLaughlin, Introd. to Polk's
Diary; Meigs, Ingersoll, 273-4; _Id._, Benton, 382; Reeves on Polk's
Diary in _Polit. Science Review_, 1911, 288. =297=H. M. Field to Mrs.
Polk, Mar. 30, 1889 (Bancroft told me yesterday that Polk was abler than
any member of his Cabinet). Benton, View, ii, 680. (Toombs) Phillips,
Toombs, 37. Though Polk seems personally destitute of humor, he had
known how to make an effective use of it on the stump. It must not be
forgotten that he had served fourteen years in the national House and
been Speaker twice. (Fidelity) Polk, Diary, Aug. 14, 1848 (I had not
been three miles from the White House since July, 1847).

6.24. (Discussions) _E.g._ Smith, Annex. of Texas, p. 264, note
(Benton). =351=Webster to son, Mar. 11, 1845. (Writhings) The reference
is to Polk's anxious and unfriendly expressions about Scott and Taylor,
which grew largely out of political considerations. See chap. ix, pp.
199-200.

6.25. =297=Polk to Haywood, Aug. 9, 1845, confid. =297=Buchanan to
McLane, Sept. 13, 1845.

6.26. =48=To Conner, Mar. 29; July 11; Aug. 16. =48=To Sloat, Mar. 21;
June 24. =48=To _Id._, Aug. 30 (orders to "preserve peace if possible").
The despatch of June 24 to Sloat said further: You and every part of
your squadron "should be assiduously careful to avoid any act which
could be construed as an act of aggression." Dec. 5, 1845, Sloat was
notified that "our relations with Mexico are becoming more friendly."
The instructions to Sloat about occupying San Francisco were made
contingent on _Mexican_ action, indicating that an American declaration
of war was not even contemplated. =52=To Donelson, June 3. (Frémont)
Benton, View, ii, 579. Mrs. Frémont, with the approval of her father,
Senator Benton, held back the order (_ibid._). Richardson, Messages, iv,
427-8. The Washington correspondent of the N. Y. _Sun_ wrote: "It is
the opinion of those best qualified to judge, though not my own, that
the President did not seek or wish the war with Mexico" (_Sun_, June 4,
1846).

6.27. _Republican_, Aug. 19. _Picayune_, Aug. 27. _Globe_, Aug. 25.
_Courier_ in _Picayune_, Aug. 27.

6.28. (Scale) Polk, Diary, Sept. 30, 1845. Sen. 1; 29, 1, pp. 209
(Scott); 649 (Bancroft). Howe, Bancroft, i, 289. (Navy unprepared)
Conner, Home Squadron, 9-10.

6.29. =56=W. S. Parrott to Buchanan, June 29, 1845. The correspondence
between Buchanan and Slidell contains, to be sure, expressions
indicating a design to influence public opinion in the United States.
January 20, 1846, the minister was directed to conduct himself "with
such wisdom and firmness in the crisis" that the voice of the American
people would be "unanimous in favor of redressing the wrongs of our much
injured and long suffering claimants" (Buchanan, no. 5). But as Herrera
had now refused to receive Slidell and a peaceful settlement had become
extremely improbable, this was obviously a wise and proper injunction,
and by no means implied that a rupture had been desired. No one who goes
open-mindedly through the documents can accept the fine-spun theory
that Polk knew Slidell would not be received, and sent him in order
to make a show of pacific intentions and obtain a pretext for war. He
already had better grounds for war; and had he been determined to fight,
he would have been extremely foolish to offer his intended victim an
opportunity to restore friendly relations, for undeniably it was quite
possible--from the American point of view, considering the comparative
weakness of Mexico, far more than possible--that she would seize upon
it. Polk, Diary, Mar. 28-30; Apr. 3. _American (Whig) Review_, 1847, p.
325. Slidell, no. 13, Apr. 2. _Id._, Apr. 9 (Curtis, Buchanan, i, 599).

6.30. _Examiner_, June 13. Ho. 158; 28, 2, p. 3 (Upshur). =13=Ashburnham
to Backhouse, July 6, 1838. Santangelo, Address, 31: "Have a number
of American citizens been unjustly injured by Mexico in their persons
and property, or not? Have our government and nation been gratuitously
outraged by Mexico, or not?"

6.31. Slidell, Mar. 18 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 66). =52=Dimond, no. 265, Oct.
1, 1845. British minister in _Siglo XIX_, Sept. 24, 1845.

6.32. _Times_, Jan. 8, 15. _Picayune_, Dec. 30, 1845. Buchanan to
Slidell, no. 7, Mar. 12, 1847 (Information received from various
quarters that several European powers may be aiming to establish
monarchy in Mexico). Dec. 1, 1847, Olozaga showed in the Spanish Cortes
a statement of large sums spent by Spain in 1846 to place a Spanish
prince on the throne of Mexico (Dix, Speeches, i, 214, note). See also
chap. x, note 21.

6.33. Vattel, Law of Nations (Chitty), book ii, chap. iv, secs. 49-51.

6.34. American trade with Mexico declined from $9,029,221 in 1835
to $1,152,331 in 1845 (_Niles_, Oct. 17, 1846, p. 104). (Contrary)
=52=Buchanan to Slidell, Nov. 10, 1845. The protest of the Mexican
minister at Washington against the annexation of Texas asserted the
right of his country to recover Texas at any time and by all the means
in her power (_Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, 334).

6.35. (Oregon) London _Times_, Sept. 30, 1847. Polk, Diary, Apr. 22,
1846.


                 VII. THE PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONFLICT

7.1. The claims did much to embitter feeling in both countries, were
one reason for Mexico's breaking off and refusing to resume diplomatic
relations, and brought Polk to the point of resolving to recommend
forcible action to Congress (p. 181). The series of diplomatic clashes
led to the danger of a Mexican attack and hence to Taylor's advance; and
his movement, besides exciting further displeasure in Mexico, offered
her a convenient and promising opportunity to strike.

7.2. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 445, 449. =56=Wickliffe, private, May 21,
1845. =63=Marcy to Taylor, confid., May 28, 1845. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp.
79, 804. Donelson, June 4, 1845, in Sen. 1; 29, 1, p. 66. =297=Polk to
Dallas, confid., Aug. 23, 1845.

7.3. Richardson, Messages, iv, 388. =52=J. Y. Mason to Donelson, Aug. 7,
1845.

7.4. M. B. de Arispe in _Niles_, Aug. 17, 1816. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 130
(Cárdenas); 140 (Ampudia); 430 (Taylor, no. 93). _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1,
p. 911 (Stephens). =245=Bliss to Lamar, Oct. 15, 1846. =52=Buchanan to
Slidell, Nov. 10, 1845. Wilson, Slave Power, ii, 8. Z. T. Fulmore in
_Tex. State Hist. Assoc. Qtrly._, v, 28. T. M. Marshall, _ibid._, xiv,
277. I. J. Cox, _ibid._, vi, 81. _Aguila del Norte_, Mar. 11, 1846.
_Nat. Intelligencer_, Nov. 5, 1845; Dec. 12, 1846. Ho. Report 70; 29, 2.
Kennedy, Texas, ii, 30. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 200. Fisher, Memorials.
Bolton, Texas, 1. Bancroft, No. Mex. States, i, 375, 604. Garrison,
Extension, 100, 103-7. Tex. Dipl. Corres., i, 257 (Irion). =52=Consul
Belt, July 5, 1844. Jones, Memoranda, 299 (Hockley). Sen. 18; 30, 1,
p. 8 (Marcy). Garrison, Texas, 262. México á través, iv, 375-6. Sen.
1; 29, 1, p. 90 (Donelson). =351=Storrs to Webster, Oct. 23, 1847.
=52=Woll, proclam., June 20, 1844. Boston _Advertiser_, July 13, 1843.
=64=Ayunt. of Matamoros to Taylor, June 10, 1846. =82=Gov. Tamaul. to
govs., Nov. 27, 1846. South. Hist. Assoc. Pubs., v, 351.

The mere assertion of a boundary by Texas proved nothing. She claimed
Santa Fe, but the U. S. did not regard the claim as valid (=52=Buchanan
to Slidell, Nov. 10, 1845). Her jurisdiction was not established far
beyond the Nueces. Santa Anna, while a prisoner in her hands, made a
convention with her which appeared to recognize her claim, and the
fact that he was under duress did not signify; but he did not possess
Presidential powers at that time; Texas broke the agreement, and Mexico
repudiated it. England appeared to countenance the claim of Texas by
negotiating with her about the Beales grant, which lay in the disputed
region (Wash. _Union_, Feb. 25, 1847), but this was not at all decisive.
Trist's view that any previously existing boundary had been obliterated
by the war does not seem to have been attacked by the Mexican peace
commissioners (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 214). Roa Bárcena argues that if there
was no boundary in Apr., 1846, the United States could not assert that
its territory had been invaded. This is a typically Mexican style of
argument, apparently decisive but not sound. The reply is that while no
_established_ boundary existed, there was a _claimed_ boundary, and that
a serious claim entitles one to act and speak provisionally very much as
if it had been established. Trist made another point: If Mexico does not
consider the wide and swift Bravo a safe boundary, how could Texas feel
satisfied with the little Nueces? The fact that the terms of annexation
specified "the territory rightfully belonging to Texas" was often cited
as evidence that we knew the Nueces-Rio Grande region did not. This was
a mistake. The expression only meant that we were not ready to endorse
all the territorial claims of Texas without investigating them. The most
doubted of her claims had nothing to do with that region; it related to
a part of New Mexico.

7.5. Clay, Works, v, 213. Amer. State Papers: For. Rels., ii, 662; iv,
424, 430, 468-78. _Cong. Globe_, 25, 2, app., 555 (Preston); 29, 1, p.
817 (Adams). Richardson, Messages, iv, 483. Woodbury, Writings, i, 361.
Wash. _Globe_, Feb. 3, 1844 (Walker). Treaties in Force, 593. Buchanan
to Slidell, Nov. 10, 1845. _Forum_, July, 1901 (Boutwell). Ficklen in
So. Hist. Assoc. Pubs., Sept., 1901. Sato, Land Question. Wash. _Union_,
Apr. 27, 1846. =297=Polk to Houston, June 6, 1845; to Donelson, June
15, 1845. Claiborne, Quitman, ii, 14. Richardson, Messages, iv, 479
(Texas as a part of old Louisiana). Ho. Report, 752; 29, 1. =52=Donelson
to Mayfield, July 11, 1845. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 140-4, 457-8.
Chase, Polk Admin., 128. Polk assured Houston that he need feel no
apprehensions regarding the Texas boundary in the event of annexation.
It may be said that Polk was inconsistent in offering to negotiate about
the boundary; but people negotiate about claims they believe in and even
about property they clearly own. He had in mind of course to hold the
Rio Grande boundary by satisfying Mexico.

The aim in this paragraph is to bring out the essential (for the present
purpose) points of a matter that it would require a long article to
discuss fully, and many things have to be left unsaid. Personally the
author regards the American claim and all conclusions based upon it as
unsound. His aim is to show how the matter appeared to Polk. The author
is indebted to Dr. E. C. Barker and Dr. I. J. Cox for assistance in
reference to this statement; but no responsibility rests on them.

7.6. Sen. 1; 29, 1, pp. 236 (Totten); 193 (Marcy); 208 (Scott). Sen.
378; 29, 1, p. 44 (Cooper). Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 81 (Bancroft). Wash.
_Globe_, Sept. 4, 1845. _Journal Milit. Serv. Instit._, xvii (Van
Deusen). Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, i, 32, 36-7, 57. Stevens, Campaigns,
12-3. _Commercial Review_, Dec., 1846, 429 (Poinsett). Capt. Willing in
Prof. Memoirs of Corps of Engineers. _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, 534-5 (Yell
_et al._). Ho. 38; 30, 2 (strength of the regular army, Jan. 1, 1846:
7194). Ho. 24; 31, 1: on Texas frontier, May, 3554 (regulars "present
and absent"). =61=Maynardier, June 15, 1846. Grant, Mems., i, 47-8. Sen.
1; 29, 2, p. 53 (Marcy: May 13, 1846, the entire military force was not
over 7640). In Nov., 1845, the army occupied thirty-seven posts.

Each regiment comprised ten companies, but for economy the army had
virtually been skeletonized in 1842. After that time a company of
infantry and "artillery" included theoretically forty-two privates, a
company of field artillery sixty-four (_Journ. Milit. Serv. Inst. of U.
S._, iii, 415), and a company of cavalry fifty; but the numbers always
ran ten or twenty per cent below what the law allowed (Sen. 1; 29, 1,
p. 193). One or more "grenadier" companies (tall men) formed the right
of the infantry regiment, and it had also one or more "light" companies
(=180=C. F. Smith, Sept. 30, 1846; J. D. Toll in Mich. Pioneer Soc.
Colls., vii, 112).

Most of the infantry carried flintlock muskets, which could not be
relied on for more than a hundred yards. Scott preferred that arm
because it had been thoroughly tested (Rowland, Register, 407) and
perhaps also because flints could be obtained more readily and surely
than could percussion caps. Some 38,000 smooth-bore muskets and 10,000
rifles (calibre 54) were issued during the war. There seem to have been
several models of muzzle-loading rifles: Harper's Ferry (1814), model of
1819, model of 1840 or 1842; and some of Hall's breech-loading rifles
were used (Sen. 54; 30, 1, particularly table C). The First Mississippi
had Whitney rifles (Rowland, Register, 407). The rifles were much more
effective but much slower in operation than the muskets. Some 400,000
flints and 950,000 percussion caps were issued. Regarding arms, etc.,
one may consult Talcott, June 10 (Sen. 54; 30, 1); =39=Maynardier to
gov. Tenn., Sept. 28, 1847; =39=Marcy to _Id._, Sept. 27; Ho. 2; 29,
1, pp. 402, 418, 425; Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 162; Ho. 41; 29, 2 (Talcott's
report); Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 683; Norton, Amer. Breech-Loading Small Arms;
and visit the National Museum (Washington), and the museums at West
Point, Colt's factory (Hartford), and U. S. Cartridge Co. (Lowell).

Our dragoons, who were "light cavalry," were armed with musketoons which
were carried on sling belts except on the march, sabres of the Prussian
dragoon style and horse pistols. The Mounted Rifles had percussion
rifles and Colt's army revolvers but no sabres. The cavalry had sabres,
rifle carbines, and Colt's navy revolvers (Brackett, U. S. Cav., 160).
Some "pepper-box" revolvers were used (Arnold, Jackson, 113). The
regular cartridge (very carefully made) consisted of powder, a bullet,
and three buckshot (=148=Chamberlain, recolls.).

The field batteries were Companies K (Taylor) of the First regiment, A
(Duncan) of the Second, C (Ringgold) of the Third, and B (Washington)
of the Fourth. E (Bragg) of the Third actually served as light
artillery though not officially recognized as such until June, 1847.
Each of these companies had four or six bronze pieces, which included
two or more 6-pounders and usually one or two 12-pound howitzers.
See particularly =61=Maynardier's statement, June 15, 1846, several
letters in the Duncan papers, and _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, iii,
415. In 1839 Capt. Robert Anderson translated the French "System
of Light Artillery." By 1842 a long course of experimenting gave
us suitable bronze for guns (Sen. 1, 30, 1, p. 679). That year the
commander-in-chief ordered a regular course of practice with field
artillery, and a liberal allowance of ammunition was made (_ibid._,
680). This branch of the service was also greatly improved by sending
three ordnance officers abroad to study the subject. Each head of a
battery was chosen for his special fitness, and Ringgold in particular
devoted himself to developing the arm with remarkable intelligence
and zeal (Henry, Camp. Sketches, 105; _Niles_, May 30, 1846, p. 201;
=259=Ridgely to cits., July 24, 1846; Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 679; Wynne,
Ringgold; Benet, Ordnance Reports, ii, 158).

By permission of the French government, Capt. A. J. Swift was sent to
Metz soon after the war with Mexico began to qualify himself to command
and instruct an engineer company. The corps included Swift (who died
before seeing service), G. W. Smith, and G. B. McClellan as officers,
10 sergeants, 10 corporals, 39 artificers, 39 second class privates,
and two musicians (Engineer School, U. S. Army, Occas. Papers no. 16).
The American infantry drill did not differ materially from that of the
British army (Ballentine). Our army was not fully equal to the best
European troops (Poinsett). There had been few opportunities to work the
three arms together. A serious defect of the army was the lack of an
intelligence department.

The privates wore cloth fatigue caps, jackets and trousers, all of
blue; and the officers wore the same, except that at first they had
single-breasted frock coats (=128=Brackett, diary. _Id._, Lane's
Brigade, 250. Ramsey, Other Side, 424). Later, officers frequently had
jackets like the men's, but differently trimmed. Further remarks on our
army may be found in chap. xxxvi.

7.7. _Taylor._ Fry and Conrad, Taylor, _passim_. French, Two Wars, 84.
=224=Hitchcock to brother, Aug. 10, 1845. Howard, Taylor, _passim_.
Robinson, Organization, ii, 6. =147=Chamberlain, diary. =332=Tennery,
diary. Scott, Mems., ii, 382-3. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 198, 203.
Meade, Letters, i, 26. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 253-4. Poore, Perley's
Remins., i, 354. =280=Nunelee, diary. Frost, Taylor, 277. =139=W. B.
to D. Campbell, Apr. 25, 1847. Grant, Mems., i, 100, 139. Donnavan,
Adventures, 21. =180=Pillow to wife, Aug. 8, 1846. Wash. _Union_, Aug.
24, 1846. _Am. Hist. Review_, Apr., 1919, 446, 455-6, 462 (Marcy's
diary). And all of Taylor's correspondence.

7.8. Scott, Mems., ii, 381-2, 386, 408. _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._,
xiv, 444. =224=Williams to Hitchcock, Nov. 8, 1848. Hitchcock, Fifty
Years, 147. Meade, Letters, i, 131. Mrs. W. R. Stauffer of New Orleans,
granddaughter of Gen. Taylor, to whom the author is indebted for
documents and information, told him that the family name for Bliss was
"Perfect Bliss." His precise title was Assistant Adj. Gen., of course.
It is instructive to compare Taylor's autograph letters with the
official reports credited to him.

7.9. =63=Marcy to Taylor, confid., May 28. Sen. 1; 29, 1, pp. 57, 107
(Donelson). Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 81 (Bancroft); 800-2, 806 (Taylor);
804 (Donelson). Sen. 18; 30, 1, pp. 6 (Donelson); 3 (Taylor); 8, 9
(Marcy).Sen. 337; 29, 1, pp. 73-5. Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 44 (Cooper).
_Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, 1882, p. 399. _Autograph_, Dec., 1911
(Taylor). Wash. _Union_, June 25, 1847. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 193.
_So. Qtrly. Rev._, Apr., 1846, pp. 440-3. _Hist. Mag._, Jan., 1870, 19.
Mexico had an outpost customhouse at Point Isabel, just north of the Rio
Grande. Paredes charged that a Mexican reconnoitring party was disarmed
at Laredo, on the north side of the Rio Grande. We have no other
evidence of such an affair. Taylor instructed Maj. Hays, commanding
Texas Rangers at S. Antonio, to send word of any Mexican movements in
the vicinity of Laredo, "with strict injunctions, however, to molest
no Mexican establishments" (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 107), and the orders to
occupy Laredo were not given until Oct. 15, 1846 (=245=Bliss to Lamar).
Possibly a threatening Mexican party may have been disarmed as a measure
of precaution, but the bare statement of Paredes cannot be accepted as
proof.

7.10. Taylor, gen. orders, 1. Henshaw narrative. _So. Qtrly. Review_,
Apr., 1846, pp. 442-4. =66=Sanders to Taylor, Feb. 15, 1846. =197=Gaines
to R. Jones, Sept. 10. N. Orl. _Tropic_, Oct. 16. =42=Gov. Va. to gen.
assembly, Dec. 7, 1846. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 173. =224=Hitchcock
to brother, Feb. 10, 1846. =13=Elliot, no. 21, 1845. =13=Kennedy, no.
22, 1845. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 98, 100, 102-3, 802 (Taylor). Richmond
_Enquirer_, Sept. 13, 1845. =52=J. Y. Mason to Donelson, Aug. 7.
=331=Taylor to Conner, July 16. Mayer, War, 91-2. N. Y. _Tribune_,
Sept. 12. French, Two Wars, 34. J. Davis in _Cong. Globe_, 31, 1, app.,
1034-41. Polk, Messages, May 11; Dec. 8, 1846 (Richardson, Messages).
Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 194. Meade, Letters, i, 26. Grant, Mems., i, 64.
Henry, Camp. Sketches, 17, 32. Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 45.

The Texans were kept at that point as scouts. Corpus Christi had been
held by Texas during her revolutionary contest with Mexico (_Tropic_,
Oct. 25, 1845). The other two companies of the Fourth Infantry were
ordered from Fort Scott to Taylor, and Bragg's artillery came from
Charleston harbor. The New Orleans artillery companies were called out
without authority by Gaines, who commanded the military dept. of the
west. They remained with Taylor the three months for which they engaged
(Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 3). Taylor planned to go on to S. Patricio, now a
name rather than a place, 25 miles up the Nueces--a plan like that which
he soon executed on the Rio Grande. Lieut. Col. E. A. Hitchcock, who had
taught at West Point and now commanded the Third Infantry, pointed out
that, should he do so, his base would be a fine mark for attack. Taylor
would not see the point but he gave up the plan. (For this episode see:
=224=Hitchcock to brother, Feb. 10, 1846; _Id._, Fifty Years, 48, 196;
Grant, Mems., i, 71-2; Meade, Letters, i, 29.) He thought of Pt. Isabel
also; but, having so small a force, no engineers, and little artillery
(at first none), he deemed it unsafe to go there (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 107).

7.11. London _Times_, May 14, 1846. (Knew) Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 195;
_So. Qtrly. Rev._, Apr., 1846, p. 443; Mayer, War, 91. (Accepted) =52=J.
Y. Mason to Donelson, Aug. 7, 1845. =256=Marcy to Wetmore, May 10, 1846
(private): A "liberal confidence" was reposed in Taylor; "His positions
in Texas were left very much to his own judgment except they were to be
taken between the Nueces and the Rio del Norte."

7.12. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 38-9. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 110. Wilhelm,
Eighth Inf., i, 257. J. Davis, in _Cong. Globe_, 31, 1, app., 1034-41.
N. Y. _Tribune_, Sept, 12, 1845.

7.13. =65=Taylor, gen. orders, 2. =61=_Id._ to adj. gen., Feb. 3,
1846, and Scott's comments. =61=Adj. gen. to Taylor, Jan. 5, 1846.
_So. Qtrly. Rev._, Apr., 1846, pp. 440-57 [probably from Bragg].
_Nat. Intelligencer_, Nov. 20, 1845. =13=Elliot, nos. 3, 14, 1846.
=218=Henshaw narrative. =136=Butterfield, recolls. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp.
93, 96. =224=Hitchcock to brother, Aug. 10, 1845; Feb. 10, 1846. Mobile
_Commercial Register_, Aug. 23, 1845. _Autograph_, Jan.-Feb., 1912
(Taylor). =364=Worth to S., Oct. 24; Nov.--, 20, 1845; to daughter,
Nov. 3. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 1847, 388-90. Hitchcock, Fifty
Years, 198, 203, 215. Meade, Letters, i, 31, 37. =13=Letter from Corp.
Chr., Nov. 29 (sent by Elliot). =185=Duncan to Bliss, Jan. 5, 1846;
to court of inquiry, Jan. 7. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 45. =213=Hatch to
sister, Oct. 28, etc. The conditions were probably tolerable until
November.

7.14. Worth to S., Dec. 20, 1845; Jan. 1; Mar. 4, 1846. Meade, Letters,
i, 87. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 204, 206. =60=Worth to Taylor, Mar. 8,
1846, and Scott's comments. =60=Churchill to Scott, Mar. 2. =69=Twiggs
to Bliss, Feb. 18. =69=Worth to Taylor, Feb. 24. =66=Mansfield to
Totten, Apr. 2. Polk, Diary, Mar. 11, 1846. (Concluded) =224=Hitchcock
to brother, Feb. 10, 1846.

7.15. =63=Marcy to Taylor, Aug. 23. (No declaration) =297=Polk to
Dallas, Aug. 23; =52=J. Y. Mason to Donelson, Aug. 7, 1845.

July 30 Marcy =63=instructed Taylor to place some forces south of the
Nueces, but Taylor had anticipated the order. The government was accused
of issuing vague orders with the hope that the General would assume
the responsibility of going to the Rio Grande; but it does not seem to
have shrunk from taking a stand when it had the requisite information.
Mexico did not in fact have all the "posts" north of the Rio Grande that
Marcy seems to have supposed were there, but besides the customs men at
Pt. Isabel, there seem to have been troops at Laredo and soldiers from
Matamoros crossed the river. Aug. 30 Marcy ordered Taylor to drive the
Mexicans beyond the Rio Grande, should they invade Texas (Ho. 60; 30,
1, p. 88). This was proper, for such an invasion would have seemed to
mean war; but the order showed a want of prudence (Upton, Mil. Policy,
197) because (1) Taylor was expected to draw reinforcements from the
states, which could not have provided them in time to save him from the
sudden attack of an overpowering Mexican army, and (2) he was authorized
to cross the river with militia, who could not legally be taken beyond
the border. Oct. 4 Taylor wrote that under his instructions he did not
feel at liberty to go to the Rio Grande. Oct. 16 Marcy directed him to
place his winter quarters (which implied that no aggressive plans were
in mind) as near the Rio Grande as prudence and convenience would permit
(Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 89). This was judicious, for (as Marcy pointed out)
the troops might have to repel Mexican or Indian incursions, and, at a
season when they would be somewhat unprepared to move quickly, it was
particularly desirable to have them as near as possible to scene of
action.

7.16. Polk, Diary, Jan. 13, 1846. The despatches were Slidell's Dec.
17 (with copy of _El Siglo XIX_ containing the council's report) and
Black's Dec. 18, which indicated that the administration and the council
of state had decided against Slidell. Polk, Message, Dec. 8, 1846.
_Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, app., 240-1. =63=Marcy to Taylor, Jan. 13.

7.17. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 103, 108, 111, 116-21 (Taylor); 649, 651-2
(Cross). W. P. Johnston, Johnston, 131. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 207.
=224=_Id._ to brother, Feb. 10, 1846. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 52.
=65=Taylor, gen. orders, 13, 20, 26, 30. =69=Sibley, Feb. 21. =69=Hunt
of the _Porpoise_, Mar. 11. =69=Mansfield to Taylor, Mar. 6. =76=Mejía,
Mar. 14. The soldiers were accompanied by about an equal number of
quadrupeds.

7.18. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 90, 92 (Marcy); 117, 120-4, 127 (Taylor); 651
(Cross). _Diario_, Mar. 30; Apr. 10. C. Christi _Gazette_, Mar. 12.

7.19. _The march._ Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 401-4. Henry, Camp.
Sketches, 53-65. Smith, To Mexico, 22-9. French, Two Wars, 37, 41-5.
Henshaw narrative. =69=Twiggs to Bliss, Mar. 15, 1846. Grant, Mems., i,
69. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 211.

7.20. _Picayune_, Apr. 7, 1846. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 123 (Taylor); 127
(Mejía). =65=Taylor, gen. orders 33. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 404-6.
_Diario_, Apr. 24. =69=Alba to Taylor, Mar. 12. Henshaw narrative.
Smith, To Mexico, 29-31. Grant, Mems., i, 87-8. =69=Statement of
Italian. And from =76=the following. To Mejía, Mar. 1 (Mejía was
forbidden to take the aggressive because the govt. wished first to
gather enough troops to strike a decisive blow: =76=to Vega, Mar. 1).
Mejía, Jan. 18; Feb. 16; Mar. 4, 6, 14, 17, 18. Canales, Feb. 28. Mejía
to Vega, Feb. 16. C. Bravo to Mejía, Mar. 13; reply, Mar. 17. To Vega,
Mar. 1. Mex. officer (spy), Feb. 18. Mejía to Parrodi, Mar. 6; to
Canales, Feb. 16. Ampudia, Mar. 28.

7.21. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 34-7. Henshaw narrative. Ho. 60; 30,
1, pp. 123, 125, 129, 132 (Taylor); 130 (Cárdenas). =224=Hitchcock,
diary, Mar. 25. =66=Mansfield to Totten, Mar. 25; Apr. 23. Taylor,
Letters (Bixby), 173. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 46 (Marcy). =69=Statement of
Italian. _Picayune_, Apr. 7; May 1. Apuntes, 32. _Niles_, Apr. 18, p.
112. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 211-7. Meade, Letters, i, 59, 100. Nebel
and Kendall, 1. Smith, To Mexico, 32-4. =163=Taylor to Conner, Apr. 3.
Robertson, Remins., July 7. _Monitor Repub._, Apr. 17. _Diario_, Mar.
15. =76=Mejía, Mar. 21, 28. =76=To Mejía, Mar. 21; Apr. 3.

On his way to Point Isabel Taylor was presented with a formal protest
against his advance by J. Cárdenas, prefect of northern Tamaulipas.
On the approach of his transports the captain of the port, by Mejía's
orders, set fire to the customhouse and the few poor thatched cottages
of the hamlet, and fled with the officials. Mar. 31 Taylor had present
opposite Matamoros and at Point Isabel 248 officers, 3001 rank and file
(=62=R. Jones to Cass, Jan. 21, 1848).

7.22. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 132-3, 145, 1202 (to Mejía, Mar. 28), 1203
(Taylor); 134 (minutes); 1203 (Mejía). =65=Taylor, gen. orders 38-9, 45.
=61=_Id._ to adj. gen., Mar. 29. =66=Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 2, 23.
=285=Mejía to Paredes, Apr. 3. =76=_Id._ to Guerra, Mar. 28. Negrete,
Invasión, ii, 120. Smith, To Mexico, 34. =118=Berlandier, diary.
=118=_Id._, memo. Meade, Letters, i, 59.

Taylor, a few minutes after his arrival, deputed Worth to reach an
understanding with Mejía. This proved impossible. Worth demanded
permission to confer with the American consul residing at Matamoros,
but was not permitted to do so. He notified the Mexicans that crossing
the river in armed force would be viewed as an act of war. Taylor's
field-work was called Fort Texas or sometimes Fort Taylor at first.
Taylor offered to let the people of Matamoros continue to use their port
on Brazos Island, which was north of the Rio Grande. =76=Jan. 6 he had
proposed to the Mexicans to agree on measures to prevent "exasperation
on either side."

7.23. See p. 117. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 133, 138-9, 142, 145 (Taylor);
140, 144 (Ampudia). (Leave town) =52=Consul Schatzel, July 18. _Niles_,
May 2, p. 132. _Monitor Repub._, Jan. 28, 1847. _Diario_, Apr. 5,
8, 25. =283=Gen. orders, army of the north, Feb. 18; Apr. 3, 14.
Ampudia, To Fellow-Cits. (and docs.). Negrete, Invasión, ii, 154, 157,
160. =52=Black to Castillo, May 1, 9. =52=Castillo to Black, May 5.
=69=Report from spy. And from =76= the following. Mejía, Feb. 4; Mar.
17, 18; Apr. 2. _Id._ to Ampudia, Apr. 5. To Ampudia, Feb. 18; Mar. 28;
Apr. 4. Ampudia, Mar. 28; Apr. 9, 11, 13, 14. _Id._ to gov. Tamaulipas,
Apr. 12. _Id._ to Schatzell, Apr. 11 (order of expulsion; any American
crossing the river to be shot). _Id._ to Mejía, Mar. 30. _Id._ to
Arista, Apr. 14.

Ampudia was thoroughly Mexican in demanding that he should have all
the advantages and Taylor all the disadvantages of the _quasi_ state
of war that he insisted upon, in protesting against Taylor's action
as a declaration of blockade, which it did not pretend to be, and in
ordering Taylor to go beyond the Nueces, which he knew was regarded by
many Americans (though by no Mexican) as the boundary of Mexico. In two
additional ways he indicated that in his view a state of war existed
(Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 144, 147). The American consul, seventy years old,
had to set out on foot and spend the first night in a field during a
norther (_República de Rio Grande_, June 6).

7.24. (Ampudia's orders) =73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 218, res., Mar.
29. México á través, iv, 545. Slidell, Jan. 14. Ramírez, México, 79.
=285=Mejía to Paredes, Apr. 3. Carreño, Jefes, ccii, 141 (Ampudia was a
Cuban by birth). =199=Arista to Paredes, Dec. 15, 1845. =13=Bankhead,
no. 56, 1846. Meade, Letters, i, 61. (Aim) Bustamante, N. Bernal, i,
113. Apuntes, 34-5. And from =76= the following. (A.'s plans) Ampudia,
Mar. 28. _Id._, to Arista, Apr. 14. To Ampudia, Feb. 18. To Arista, Feb.
10; Apr. 4, 20, 22. Arista, Apr. 12, 29. Parrodi, Apr. 29. Ampudia, Apr.
13, 14. _Id._, proclam., Apr. 18. Arista to Ampudia, Apr. 10.

According to Bermúdez de Castro, the Spanish minister, the opposition
writers at Mexico expressed surprise because, after ordering Ampudia
to attack the Americans, the government stated it had not committed
and would not commit an act of aggression against the United States.
Mar. 7 Ampudia ordered Mejía to attack the Americans, but not to risk a
decisive action (=76=Mejía, Mar. 17). The evidence that Ampudia had been
ordered to attack Taylor is supported by the fact that he tried to do so
even after he knew he had been superseded.

7.25. (Orders) =76=Tornel to Arista, Apr. 4; =76=Arista to Guerra,
Apr. 26; May 7; Washington _Union_, Aug. 27; Bankhead, no. 90, 1846.
=76=Arista to Torrejón, Apr. 24. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 132, 140, 1205
(Taylor); 290 (Thornton); 291 (Hardie); 1204 (Arista). =76=Testimony
in the court-martial of Arista (Jáuregui, Torrejón, Carrasco, Canales,
Mendoza). Smith, To Mexico, 39-42. _Spirit of the Times_, May 23.
Campaña contra, 4. =69=Court of Inquiry on Hardee, May 26. Wash.
_Union_, May 9. _Niles_, May 16, pp. 165, 176. Negrete, Invasión, ii,
147. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 74. =169=_Id._ to Crittenden, Sept. 1.

Taylor had called repeatedly for reinforcements to the regular army
(Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 102, 114, 132). Up to May 8 he received 56 recruits
(_ibid._, 142). The conciliatory policy of the Americans made it
impossible to take military precautions against spies, and Thornton was
doubtless betrayed. He did his best. Taylor, with a view to the vigorous
prosecution of the war, called on Texas for two regiments of infantry
and two of horse, and on Louisiana for two of infantry. The order to
attack Taylor was doubtless recommended by Tornel, the minister of war,
who hated the United States; but perhaps he had a particular motive. He
had been at work for S. Anna when Paredes seized the Presidency, and he
knew that it would cripple Paredes (thus opening the way for S. Anna) to
provide funds and send troops from Mexico City for a war with the United
States (=52=Black, May 26; Dimond, Jan. 15).

7.26. Boston _Atlas_, a strong Whig journal, said, Dec. 11, 1846: "There
is no doubt that the conduct of that government [Mexico] towards us has
been such as might have justified the extreme resort to war." Polk,
Diary, Apr. 21, 25, 28; May 3, 5-9.

7.27. C. J. Ingersoll, chrmn. Ho. com. for affairs (_Cong. Globe_,
29, 2, app., 128): I urged Polk to anticipate invasion by crossing
the Rio Grande, but he would not. (Reasons) _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Nov.,
1850, 434-5. =331=Taylor to Conner, Apr. 3. (Effect) =60=Lieut. Irons,
Apr. 20; =76=Arista, Apr. 27; Negrete, Invasión, ii, 120. (Flimsily)
=312=Mejía to Arista, Oct. 6, 1845; =76=Requena in trial of Arista.

7.28. _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, p. 498; 30, 1, app., 64. Polk, Message, Dec.
8, 1846 (Richardson, Messages, iv, 484). (Marcy) Sen. 1; 29, 1, p. 194.
=52=Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 25, 1847. Jan. 27, 1847, a bill establishing
post-routes south of the Nueces passed the Senate unanimously (_Cong.
Globe_, 29, 1, p. 251). (Six months) _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 4,
1846. (People) _Mo. Reporter_, Jan. 6, 1846. It is true that no right
to go _to_ the Rio Grande was explicitly asserted; but as everybody
held that either that stream or the Nueces was the boundary, a claim
extending beyond the latter extended practically to the former. See
Lumpkin's speech (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, 836). More than a month before
Taylor left Corpus Christi the House voted down a motion to ask the
President whether he had ordered our forces to move against Mexico, and
thus became accomplices of Polk (Von Holst, iii, 214-5). The order of
Jan. 13 soon became known to Congress and the public (_Cong. Globe_, 30,
1, p. 279). Feb. 3 Ashmun of Massachusetts offered a resolution calling
upon the President for information regarding the matter (_ibid._, 280).
Mar. 23 Brinkerhoff stated in the House that Taylor's army must be
supposed to be approaching or already upon the Rio Grande; yet no one
in Congress protested (29, 1, 534). Mar. 26, 1846, while discussing an
appropriation bill, McIlvaine of Penn. said that in sending troops to
the Rio Grande Polk had been "invading Mexico" (_ibid._, 558); yet,
though he made a most urgent appeal to the opponents of slavery--in
behoof of which he intimated the step had been taken--and there were
other objections to the bill, it passed the House by 111 to 38 (_ibid._,
573-4). Note also the vote on Delano's motion (chap, ix, note 4). See
chap. xxxiv, note 16, and the corresponding text.

7.29. (1794) Ho. Report 752; 29, 1, p. 44; C. J. Ingersoll in _Cong.
Globe_, 29, 2, app., 129; Chase, Polk Admin., 131-2; Schouler, U. S., i,
296-7. (Fla.) Moore, Amer. Diplom., 163; H. Adams, U. S. v, 310-4, 318.
Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 77 (Pearce). (Hilliard) _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p.
148. (Adams) _Ibid._, p. 127.

7.30. (Weakened) Wash. _Union_, Jan. 11, 1848 (Reverdy Johnson in
Senate); =256=Marcy to Wetmore. May 10, 1846; _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1,
app., 934; 30, 1, app., 65. (Wise) =52=Buchanan to Slidell, Jan. 20,
1846. (Argument) =56=W. S. Parrott, Aug. 5, 1845; Slidell, Feb. 17,
1846; =364=Worth to S., Oct. 2, 1845; Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 107 (Taylor,
Oct. 4); _Niles_, July 18, 1846, pp. 313-4; Polk, Diary, Sept. 1,
1845; =108=Mayer to Bancroft, May 22, 1846; London _Times_, May 30,
1846 (Wash. corr.); Calhoun in _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, p. 499 (Those in
power were confident that the march to the Rio Grande would not bring on
war); M. Brown in _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app., 356 (Polk determined to
convince the Mexicans by hostile demonstrations that they must settle
promptly); Hilliard denounced Polk in the House for using a display of
force to intimidate Mexico (_Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 566), and Calhoun
felt somewhat the same (_ibid._, 497); Boston _Atlas_, May 15, 16, 1846
(Wash. corr.); Howe, Bancroft, i, 282; =345=Poinsett to Van Buren, May
26, 1846; =108=Bradford to Bancroft, Aug. 17, 1845; Coxe, Review, 38.
Public men who talked with Polk probably knew more about his views than
anti-slavery agitators who did not. Calhoun and Brown were criticising,
not defending, Polk. =162=Bancroft to Conner, Jan. 17, 1846. Wash.
_Union_, Oct. 15, 1847. (Conceded) Boston _Atlas_, May 15, 16, 20, 1846.
See also chap. vi, note 22, last paragraph.

7.31. Wash. _Union_, Oct. 15, 1847. =256=Paper indorsed "Projet--Genl.
Scott." Richardson, Messages, iv, 486. (Sabine) =76=Mora, Nov. 15, 1845.
(Prevented) =81=Arista to troops, July 31, 1845; =76=_Id._ to Parrodi,
Dec. 22. Addressing the nation in denunciation of the revolution of
Paredes, Dec., 1845, the Mexican Chamber of Deputies stated that only
his attitude had prevented war upon the United States that year.
=77=Almonte, Sept. 20, 1844. (Mobile) =66=Sanders to Taylor, Feb. 15,
1846; Elliot, chap. v, note 6; _Nat. Intelligencer_, May 29, 1845; Sept.
10, 1846. (180) Stevens, Campaigns, 18. =52=Dimond, no. 257, 1845. W. S.
Parrott, July 22, 1845. =297=Polk to Dallas, Aug. 23, 1845. (Accentuate)
=256=Marcy to Wetmore, Aug. 12, 1845; Jan. 21, 1846 (Our relations with
Mexico "have worsened by the change which has undoubtedly taken place
in that country"). =76=Mejía to Canales, Feb. 16, 1846; to Guerra, Mar.
17. Art. 1, sec. 10 of our Constitution and the Act of Feb. 28, 1795,
show that not only invasion but danger of invasion authorized military
measures. Authorization implied a corresponding duty. To neglect this
duty and throw the matter into Congress, where partisan complications
and ignorance regarding the region and the circumstances prevailed,
would have caused the delay which the Constitution aimed to prevent.
Note also _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app., 209-10, col. 1 (action of com.
for. rels.). Again, had Texas been independent in Jan., 1846, no one
would have censured her for sending troops to the Rio Grande; and the
United States succeeded to all her rights. This right was independent of
our claim to the intermediate region (_Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, app., 425-6).

7.32. _Picayune_, Dec. 12, 1846. (Confessed) =218=Henshaw narrative.
=13=Giffard to Bankhead, May 13, 1846. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 106.

7.33. =297=Scott, memo., undated.

7.34. Von Holst, U. S., iii, 245, note. _Autograph_, Jan.-Feb., 1912
(Taylor, Apr. 7). The proof that Mexico claimed still to the Sabine is
voluminous: _e.g._ Paredes, proclamation, Mar. 21, 1846 (Mexico "does
not acknowledge the right of the American flag on the soil of Texas, and
she will defend her invaded territory"); =76=Gen. Mora, Nov. 15, 1845
("the contest in which the Republic is engaged with the United States
for the possession of the territory of Texas"); _Diario_, Mar. 25; Sept.
18, 26 (the Sabine "is the boundary"), 1846; _Monitor Repub._, June 28,
1847 (Mexico "neither recognizes nor has recognized any boundary except
the Sabine"); Peña, Comunicación circular, Dec. 11, 1845 (indicates
repeatedly that the object of the war would be the recovery of Texas);
Otero, Comunicación. (After Herrera's fall "reconquest [of Texas] again
became our policy"); Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1849. Wash.
_Union_, Nov. 10, 1847. (Probably) =69=Alba to Taylor, Mar. 6, 1846;
=76=Mejía, Jan. 21; Mar. 28; =76=Mora, May 4; Bankhead, no. 47, 1846:
note Mejía's action in Feb. and March, 1846, _supra_; and Ampudia's
orders to him before Taylor left Corpus Christi (note 24). (Notice)
=76=Relaciones to ministers at London and Paris, July 30, 1845. Benton
in _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, p. 497 (the causes of the war existed before
Taylor advanced, and his advance resulted from them). See also the next
note.

7.35. Otero, Comunicación. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 486, 490.
_Monitor Repub._, Oct. 29, 1847. (Arista) Suárez y Navarro, Alegato, 48.
Polk, Message, Dec. 8, 1846 (Richardson, Messages). Paredes to Arista,
Apr. 18 (captured in A.'s baggage, May 9, 1846) in Wash. _Union_,
Aug. 27, 1847, and in _Tex. Democrat_, Nov. 11, 1846. The reader will
not fail to note the decisive bearing of the letter of Apr. 18 on the
question discussed in the preceding paragraph.

7.36. Vattel, Law of Nations, 352. If any substantial arguments against
Polk's course existed, Calhoun, Webster or the _American (Whig) Review_
should have been able to find them. Calhoun (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, p.
500) said Polk should have refrained from sending Taylor to the Rio
Grande and have referred to Congress or the Senate the question of
the boundary. But (1) he forgot that as to the boundary near the east
(the only part of it now under consideration) our government stood
committed; (2) he did not seem to know whether Congress or the Senate
was the proper authority on the subject; (3) he refuted his criticism
by saying that Polk should have referred the question on finding he
could not settle it by negotiation; and Polk, instead of having found
he could not do so, had Taylor advance with the hope of thus inducing
Mexico to negotiate; (4) Calhoun had thought it right in 1844 to place
our military forces virtually at the orders of Texas for defensive uses
(Smith, Annex. of Texas, 367), and she would very likely have sent them
to that river (see Wash. _Union_, Feb. 22, 1847); (5) reference of the
question to Congress would almost certainly have caused long delay and
paralyzed the Executive, for about fifteen unsuccessful attempts were
made in the business of annexing Texas to determine the boundary, and
after the war that subject vexed Congress for nearly two years. (See
also the text.) Calhoun's fundamental objection against the President's
policy, however, was that Polk should have let the Mexican difficulties
alone until after settling the Oregon question (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 2,
p. 498). But (1) it was not certain that the Oregon question could be
settled amicably; at one time, as we have noted, Polk believed it could
not be; and therefore it may well have seemed prudent to get rid of
a smaller but annoying affair before the greater one should reach a
crisis; (2) other important reasons for settling with Mexico have been
given on pp. 118, 120-2, 134-7.

Webster, after thinking on the subject for more than half a year, took
it up in a long speech at Philadelphia (Writings, iv), and said: Polk
ordered the occupation of territory to which we had "no ascertained
title" (p. 26). [But a serious claim may be an adequate basis for
pacific joint occupation.] Polk viewed the Rio Grande as the boundary
[being committed to that position], and "intended to extinguish the
Mexican title by force" (p. 27). [Polk desired to extinguish it through
negotiation, and had not abandoned the effort to do so when he ordered
Taylor to advance. Mexican jurisdiction was not to be attacked. There
were other grounds than that alleged by Webster for the instructions
given to our general.] Taylor was ordered to treat every Mexican
assertion of title as an act of hostility (p. 29). [By no means. Taylor
was ordered not to molest the Mexican posts.] Why did not Polk consult
Congress before ordering Taylor to the Rio Grande (p. 29)? [The matter
could not be laid in definite shape before Congress until the fate of
Slidell's mission should have been decided. Polk's diary shows that he
desired to present the matter to Congress as promptly as he could.] Only
"self-defence" could justify sending troops into a territory claimed
and occupied by a power with which at that time no war existed (p. 29).
[This can hardly be admitted. We claimed the territory; Mexico was
believed to have troops there; it was only fair to place ourselves on an
equality with her.] And "there was, I think, no case of such necessity
for self-defence" (p. 30). [Webster admits that for self-defence
(_i.e._ defence of the Texans, now virtually American citizens) we
had a right to send the troops, and it is believed that the necessity
of such defence has been established in the text.] Taylor's letters
prove that there was no danger of a Mexican invasion (p. 30). [Taylor's
outlook extended, and his letters had reference only, to the immediate
frontier, and even to little of that except Matamoros. He could furnish
no opinion regarding the intentions of the Mexican government. Of the
orders actually given to the Mexican generals he was in total ignorance
until after May 9, 1846. The outlook of the authorities at Washington
was broader and clearer than his, and as the text shows they were
warned officially that Mexico was liable to make secret preparations
and a sudden invasion.] "Ordering the army to the Rio Grande was a step
naturally, if not necessarily, tending to provoke hostilities" (p.
31). [Of course the assertion of a claim denied by another power tends
naturally in the direction of hostilities, but no nation can for that
reason forbear to assert its claims. Webster's suggestion that sending
the troops did not necessarily produce hostilities is noteworthy. If the
President can declare war, what becomes of the Constitution, which gives
that power to Congress (p. 32)? [The President may take steps logically
leading to war; but in this case there was reason to believe that
Taylor's advance might tend toward peace.] Was it Polk's object to force
Mexico to treat? If so, it was an "idle hope" (p. 32). [Here Webster
seems to admit that such might have been Polk's intention. The fact that
Polk failed does not prove that such was not his design. Webster failed
to acquire northern California, but he certainly attempted to do so.] It
will be said that Polk's course was sanctioned by "the act of May 11th,"
1846 (the virtual declaration of war against Mexico, the preamble of
which stated that Mexico had brought on the war), but neither a preamble
nor an act of Congress can "create a fact" (p. 32). [But a preamble can
state an opinion; and Congress thus expressed an opinion justifying the
President's course.] "I hardly suppose" Congress by that act "meant more
than to enable the President to defend the country, to the extent of the
limit claimed by him" (p. 32). [He claimed the Rio Grande as the limit;
and if Congress believed the country was to be defended to that river,
it believed the country extended to it, and consequently that Polk had a
right to send troops thus far.

The most plausible criticisms made by the _American (Whig) Review_
(July, 1846) were the following: Buchanan informed Slidell that the army
had been ordered to advance in view of his probable rejection, and
hence Taylor's advance was not, as Polk asserted, due to the urgent
necessity of defending Texas. [But the probable rejection of Slidell
meant probable fighting of a more or less serious nature north of the
Rio Grande.] Attempts were made from time to time, by throwing out
hints, to induce Taylor to advance on his own responsibility to the Rio
Grande [note 15]. As he did not, Slidell was sent to precipitate the
issue. [There is no evidence in support of this theory and much evidence
against it, as we have seen.] As Slidell failed to do so, Taylor was
positively ordered to the Rio Grande. [January 13 there was every reason
to believe that Slidell would be rejected, and that thus an issue would
be precipitated. December 20 Peña y Peña wrote to Slidell that unless
the pending difficulties were settled by negotiation there must be war.

In January, 1847, the _Review_ repeated Webster's argument that Taylor
reported no danger of invasion. [Note the comment made above.] October
16, Marcy wrote to Taylor that no serious danger from Mexico was
feared, yet gave him authority to advance to the river. [A foray would
not be considered a serious military operation, but it was necessary
to guard against forays.] On January 13, Polk had no reason to expect
that Paredes intended to open hostilities. [He had grave reasons for
expecting hostilities. See p. 100.] He had Slidell's despatch of
December 17, which intimated that it might be more possible to negotiate
with Paredes than with Herrera. [Slidell only said that he might
have greater chances of accomplishing something with a less friendly
but more efficient government.] Besides, it was known that war would
have to proceed from the Congress, not from the President of Mexico.
[Holding that Texas was a part of Mexico and the presence of American
troops there an invasion, Paredes took the ground that attacking us
would not be making war, but merely defending the country as it was
his duty to do. (See his manifesto of April 23, 1846.) Consequently
no action by Congress was necessary.] Polk says the Mexicans did not
place their hostilities on the ground of our occupying non-Texan
territory, but they did do so. [Certain Mexicans took this ground for
the purpose of embarrassing the Americans, among whom there was known
to be a difference of opinion on this point; but the national Mexican
authorities regarded as our essential offence the presence of our troops
on Texan soil: note 34.

In February, 1847, the _Review_ said that on January 13, 1846, Polk did
not know Slidell would be rejected. [Polk carefully avoided stating that
at that date Slidell's rejection was certain. He spoke of it as "highly
probable," which was rather less than could have been said.] April 6,
Taylor referred to the Mexicans of Matamoros as "the enemy." [As the
word occurred in a report to our government it did no harm, even if not
well chosen; but at that date Taylor had been given by the Mexicans
sufficient ground for using it.] Taylor pointed guns at Matamoros for
the purpose of stinging the Mexicans into hostility. [See p. 151.] The
intention of the American government was to manage things so as to make
Taylor the scapegoat if matters should go ill, and take the credit if
they should go well. [The orders of the war department were probably as
definite as they could safely be made. See p. 142.] Polk ordered Taylor
to advance because he did not believe the failure of Slidell would be a
pretext for war that Congress would accept. [This does not agree with
the charge made by Polk's enemies (_e.g. supra_) that he sent Slidell in
order to have him rejected and thus bring about a war. It is also wide
of the mark. In Polk's mind the essential ground for action was not the
rejection of Slidell but our grievances, and his diary shows that he
believed this ground would be accepted by Congress, or at least believed
so to such an extent as to decide upon raising the issue squarely.

In October, 1847, the _Review_ stated the policy which it said Polk
should have adopted: to issue a statement that we would defend Texas,
that Mexico must pay the claims of our citizens, and that we desired
no Mexican territory; next, to take a defensive position in Texas,
perhaps occupy a Pacific port as security for our claims, and then
await developments. [As a military programme this plan of standing on
the defensive was seriously considered by the government and, as we
shall see, was condemned for both political and military reasons. To
say we desired no Mexican territory would have been meaningless unless
we pledged ourselves to take none, and to issue such a promise on the
eve of a war the course of which could not be predicted, and especially
in view of the fact that Mexico could pay no large indemnity except
with territory, would certainly have been imprudent, and the _Review's_
proposition to seize a port as security for our claims suggests as much.
This proposition, by the way, was less justifiable than going to the Rio
Grande, for we had a claim to the intermediate territory and no claim to
a Mexican port. To take a defensive attitude in Texas signified either
going to the Rio Grande in order to obtain a good strategic position,
or maintaining at great expense for an indefinite period an army large
enough to guarantee the Texans against attack at any and every point.
The first of these plans was the one adopted by Polk; the second, on
account of the expense, would have been unjust to our own people, and in
the end would have compelled us to increase our demands for indemnity
against Mexico. Moreover, there were strong objections to waiting
(p. 136); and, had Mexico simply adhered to the policy of passive
resistance, all our trouble and expense would have brought us no nearer
a settlement. Still other objections to the plan of the _Review_ could
be offered.


                  VIII. PALO ALTO, RESACA DE LA PALMA

8.1. The account of the Mexican army is based upon Memorias de ...
Guerra, 1844; Mar., 1845; Dec., 1846; =152=Claiborne, Mems.; _Diario_,
May 30, 1845; Balbontín, Estado Militar; Paz, Invasión; =5=Anaya,
Memoria; Peña, Comunicación circular; _Siglo XIX_, Aug. 19, 21, 1845;
S. Miguel, Repúb. Mex., 133-4, 136; Wash. _Globe_, Oct. 15, 1845;
Molina, recolls.; _Hist. Mag._, Feb., 1870 (Deas); Zirckel, Tagebuch,
13, 111; Semmes, Service, 441, note; =75=Memorias drawn up by war
dept. chiefs, Nov., 1847; =81=_Seminario Polít. del Gob. de N. León_;
Moore, Scott's Camp., 19; =76=Report of superior engineer board, Nov.
15, 1845; Balbontín, Invasión, 77-8; _Monitor Repub._, Nov. 30, 1847;
=148=Chamberlain, recolls.; =69=report of spy, Apr. 5, 1846; N. Orl.
_Commerc. Bulletin_, May 21, 1846; =76=Carrera, report on artillery,
Dec, 1847; =76=reports of the powder mills at Zacatecas and Santa Fé.

Dec., 1843, a special school of application for artillery and engineer
officers was decreed, but lack of money prevented its establishment.
There was a normal school, intended to convey the rudiments of military
knowledge to the privates through the corporals and sergeants, but it
signified little or nothing. Attached to the engineer corps was a body
of sappers, miners, and pontoniers; but, owing to lack of funds to equip
it with, it served as infantry. The poorest cannon, especially at first,
were kept at the fortresses. What horses could be had for artillery
service were too light and frisky. Paredes reorganized this arm, and
assigned to it about 250 officers, 5000 privates, and 200 clerks and
workmen. The bronze cannon manufactured in Mexico during 1846-47 were
not satisfactory, and the grape-shot was so poorly made that its range
was considerably reduced. The importance of artillery had never been
appreciated in that country. There was a good arsenal at Mexico, and
there were old-fashioned powder-mills at Santa Fe (near that city) and
Zacatecas. The latter blew up early in 1845, and, though repaired,
worked at a disadvantage. Mexican powder was usually of an inferior
quality. The Active corps contained fewer men than the Permanent. The
infantry musket carried an ounce ball; and the escopeta bullet was even
heavier and went farther. In both cases the very liberal charge of
powder increased the normal range. Many of the escopetas were merely
sawed-off muskets. The shaft of the lance was usually about six feet
long and the head about one foot. The Line infantry included light
companies (_cazadores_), which sometimes had rifles and sometimes
deserved to be called sharpshooters. There were mounted cazadores also.

Each cavalry regiment consisted of four squadrons, and each infantry
regiment included two battalions, one commanded by the lieutenant
colonel, and the other by the major (_comandante de batallón_). There
were mounted corps called hussars, etc., but the difference of name
signified little or nothing, practically. Owing to the smallness of the
horses, the cavalry had not much shock-value. There were 635 cannon on
hand at the end of 1845, 25,789 muskets, 8155 swords, 100,000 artillery
projectiles, and more than 400,000 bullets. Tornel imported 104 new
cannon early in 1846. Differences of caliber interfered greatly with the
usefulness of the muskets. March 9, 1846, the departments were urged to
complete their legal quotas of troops as soon as possible.

8.2. On the first day when volunteers were to enlist only eleven came
forward at Mexico.

8.3. The figures are based upon the =76=official return of April 17
supplemented by a large number of Mexican and American statements.
Most of the latter were exaggerated. The Americans were doubtless
misled often by the statements of prisoners, who wished to please
their captors. "The information obtained from prisoners ought to be
estimated at its proper value" (Napoleon, Maxims, 53). Mejía, the
regular commander of the first brigade, gave way temporarily to García
on account of ill health.

8.4. =69=Reports of spies. _República de Rio Grande_, June 27.
=118=Berlandier, memo., undated. =66=Mansfield to Totten, May 4.
=217=Henshaw papers. =76=Testimony at the trial of Arista. =76=Mejía,
Feb. 28; Mar. 18. =76=Commander of zapadores, Apr. 8. Henry, Camp.
Sketches, 68, 70. México á través, iv, 561. Campaña contra, 4.

8.5. _Monitor Repub._, Mar. 17. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 113, 117. _Revue
des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 1847, 388-93. =13=Elliot, nos. 12, 14, etc.,
1846. =66=Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 2, 23. =61=Worth to Taylor, Apr. 2.
=61=Scott to Marcy, May 7. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 42. =65=Marcy, gen.
orders 5. Sen. 230; 29, 1. =224=Hitchcock, diary. =62=Twiggs to Davis,
May 4. The principal causes of the absenteeism were assignment to higher
duties elsewhere and the impossibility (owing to the lack of a retired
list) of replacing invalided or superannuated officers. _Locomotor_,
Mar. 27. Campaña contra, 4. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 129-30. Upton, Mil.
Policy. 206. =285=Mejía to Paredes, Apr. 3. =76=Comte. of Zapadores,
Apr. 8. =76=Mejía, Mar. 14, 28; Apr. 2. =76=_Id._ to Arista, Apr. 30.
=76=Ampudia to Arista, Apr. 30.

8.6. =66=Sanders to Totten, Apr. 10 (Ft. B. badly placed). =185=_Id._ to
Duncan, Apr. 27. =69=Requena to Arista, Apr. 30 (might have enfiladed).
Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 217. _República de Rio Grande_, June 27.
_Picayune_, May 10. =118=Berlandier, memo. (Groves) Ampudia, Address
(1846). =52=Wickliffe to Buchanan, May 21, 1845. Giddings, Camp., 36.
_Niles_, May 16, p. 165; 23, p. 179. Kenly, Md. Vol., 42. Polk, Diary,
Apr. 1, 1847. =218=Henshaw narrative. Apuntes, 35. =66=Sanders to
Taylor, May 2. Wash. _Union_, May 9; June 6. Meade, Letters, i, 59-60.
_Journal U. S. Artill._, July, 1892, p. 293. =132=King to Buchanan, June
1. =69=Spy to Taylor, Apr. 11.

Taylor's army lay on the Pt. Isabel road, which connected here with the
principal Matamoros ferry (_Paso Real_). Fort Brown was about a mile and
a half from the site of the present fort. The line of the fort at Pt.
Isabel enclosed about fifty acres, and could not be properly fortified
with the means at hand in the time allowed. May 2 the works were far
from complete. Some at least of the disadvantages of his position were
pointed out to Taylor, but he seemed to feel no concern. Marcy was
surprised that the Mexicans did not cross the Rio Grande near its mouth
and capture Pt. Isabel. The explanation probably was that they believed
the plan they acted upon was better.

8.7. =217=Henshaw papers. =61=Crossman to ... Apr. 23. =66=Mansfield to
Totten, Apr. 23. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 133, 138, 142, 288 (Taylor). _Spirit
of the Times_, May 23. Meade, Letters, i, 66 (the murder of Cross caused
intense resentment). México á través, iv, 561. Campaña contra, 4.
=69=Walker to Taylor, May 2. Walker was absent on service when the men
were surprised. =52=Consul Chase, Tampico, May 1. _National_, June 18.

8.8. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 133, 302 (Taylor). (West Pointers) =224=Bliss
to Hitchcock, June 7. =76=Mejía, Apr. 9. =76=_Id._ to Arista, Apr. 30.
=76=Ampudia, Mar. 28. _Tropic_, May 7 (proclam. of Ampudia). Ballentine,
Eng. Soldier, i, 57-9. Kenly, Md. Vol., 39, 40. (Promises, etc.)
=69=Arista, "Advice," Apr. 20. =69=Report of spy, Apr. 5. Wilhelm,
Eighth Inf., i, 408. Meade, Letters, i, 53. London _Times_, June 8. Ho.
194; 29, 1 (Jones, May 5). _Spirit of the Times_, May 16. _Esperanza_,
Apr. 18. Bustamante, N. Bernal, ii, 11. =69=Mier y Terán to Mejía, May
4. Taylor gave orders to shoot soldiers attempting to cross the river.
Later, British deserters were not accepted.

8.9. =76=Arista, May 1, 7. So. _Advocate_, June 10, 1846. =76=Ampudia
to Arista, Apr. 30. =76=Parrodi, Apr. 8. =69=Arista, "Advice," Apr.
20. =76=Mejía proclam., Mar. 18. (Lasted) Donnavan, Adventures, 102.
=76=Comte. gen. S. L. Potosí, proclam., Mar. 27. =76=Comte. gen.
Zacatecas to troops, Apr. 1. The Mexican press teemed with the ideas
here suggested. To an Indian anything as foreign as a neighboring
estate seemed dreadful. =76=Ampudia, Mar. 28. Apuntes, 33. (Despised)
=162=Conner to wife, May 9; Henshaw narrative; _Niles_, May 16, p. 165;
Sept. 12, p. 22. (Hardee) =224=Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7. Ampudia's
troops had mutinied on the way, but an appeal to their patriotism
had brought them round. There had been, as was usual, a good deal of
desertion; but to a certain extent those who stood by the colors were
for this reason above the average (=76=Ampudia, Mar. 10, 11, 12).
Taylor's method--uniformly despising the enemy and teaching his troops
to do so--was contrary to the practice of Cæsar, Napoleon and the Duke
of Wellington (Napol., Maxims, 49, note).

8.10. (Obvious) Henshaw narrative. =63=Marcy, Jan. 13. =69=Friend, [Apr.
11]. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 138, 140, 142 (Taylor). =65=Taylor, gen. orders
45. (Seven) =69=McCall, report, Apr. 30. May 3 Taylor reported that his
lack of light troops had helped to keep him in ignorance of the enemy's
movements as if that lack had been due to some one else. He did not call
on Texas for troops until Apr. 26. Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 133) says
he did not call in February because such troops could serve only three
months. But had a call been issued then, the troops would probably not
have begun to serve for a month or two; and later he could have called
for a second small body.

8.11. México á través, iv, 561. =76=Arista, Apr. 27; May 1. =76=_Id._
to Ampudia, May 5. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 1847, 394-6.
_Republicano_, June 5. Campaña contra. =76=Arista to Mejía, May 1, 2.
=76=Mejía to Arista, May 1, 3. =69=Diary captured in Arista's papers.
=76=Plana mayor diary. Apuntes, 35-7. Bustamante, N. Bernal, ii, 16.
=76=Testimony at trial of Arista. People in the United States could not
believe Taylor would permit the enemy to get between him and his base
(_e.g._ Mobile _Herald and Tribune_, May 3). At first Arista left only
1007 men at Matamoros, but, becoming anxious about the town, he sent
back the Morelia battalion.

8.12. Henshaw narrative. Mansfield, Mex. War, 35. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 288
(Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 175. _Picayune_, May 12. Nebel and
Kendall, 1. _Niles_, May 23, p. 178. Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1161 (Conner).
=62=Twiggs to Davis, May 4. (Lowd, etc.) Meade, Letters, i, 74-5.
Appleton's Biog. Dict. (art. by J. Davis on Taylor). _Autograph_,
May-June, 1912 (Taylor). Smith, To Mexico, 44. Fry and Conrad, Taylor,
109-10. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 86. =76=Diary of plana mayor. =76=To
Arista, May 15.

Mejía notified Arista that Taylor was preparing to move, but the news
arrived so late that the guns of Matamoros did not open fire upon him.
Arista pursued the Americans but could not overtake them; and a body of
dragoons that he ordered on was equally unsuccessful. On the morning
of May 3 the boom of heavy guns in the direction of Fort Brown (Grant,
Mems., i, 92; Henry, Camp. Sketches, 88) alarmed Taylor, and he gave
orders to set out at one o'clock (Henry, Camp. Sketches, 88; Smith,
To Mexico, 44), which showed that he felt no great confidence in its
defensibility even then; but he desired to strengthen the base and to
receive some ordnance and reinforcements that he then expected (Ho.
60; 30, 1, p. 288), and hence sent Capt. Walker with a small party to
communicate with Brown (Henshaw narrative). This was a hard task; but
after some fighting, Walker reached the fort, stated that Taylor would
return as soon as possible, obtained a reassuring report (Ho. 60; 30, 1,
p. 293), and with great difficulty made his way back (Henshaw papers;
Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 289, 293). May 1 Pt. Isabel had a force, including
civilians who took up arms, of 400-500 (_Niles_, May 16, p. 165; 23, p.
179; _Picayune_, May 10; Wash. _Union_, May 9).

8.13. Meade, Letters, i, 74-8, 93. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 56, 58.
_Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit._, xli, 94. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 288, 292-4
(Taylor); 527 (spec. orders 60). _Autograph_, May-June, 1912 (Taylor).
Nebel and Kendall, 2. Grant, Mems., i, 167-8. Henry, Camp. Sketches,
88-9. (Leaving train, etc.) =224=Larnard to Hitchcock, June 13. Wash.
_Union_, May 9, 29, 30. _Niles_, May 16, p. 162. =62=Twiggs to Davis,
May 4. French, Two Wars, 49. Some of the officers were anxious to wait
for larger reinforcements (=185=L. C. to Duncan, Nov. 21), but Taylor
feared Fort Brown was getting short of ammunition.

8.14. _The battle of Palo Alto._ Sen. 388; 29, 1 (Taylor and officers).
=65=Taylor, gen. orders 58. _Id._, Letters (Bixby), 1. Campaña contra.
México á través, iv, 561-3, 566. =224=Bliss to Hitchcock, July 23.
=61=Arthur to brother, May 10. Meade, Letters, i, 79, 80. =13=Pakenham,
no. 54, 1846. McCall, Letters, 449-54. =224=Larnard to Hitchcock,
June 13. Eyewitness, Complete History, 23. =210=Alvord to Hammond,
May 22. Wash. _Union_, May 30. Map in Map Div., Lib. of Cong. _Nat.
Intelligencer_, May 11, 18; Sept. 3, 10. N. Y. _Journ. of Commerce_,
Feb. 24, 1847. _Diario_, May 29. _Tex. Democrat_, June 24. _Spirit of
the Times_, May 30. Portrait of Arista, city hall, Mex. =350=Weber,
recolls. =213=Hatch, letters. _Picayune_, Aug. 1, 1845; Sept. 24, 1846.
_Delta_, May 24. =118=Berlandier, diary and map. =185=Duncan to adj.
gen., June 19. =185=Marcy to Duncan, July 27. Nebel and Kendall, 2-3.
Smith, To Mexico, 45, 47-9. Fallo Definitivo del Supremo Tribunal [_re_
Arista's conduct]. Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 16. _Niles_, June 6, pp.
215-16; Oct. 24, p. 122. Frost, Taylor, 81. _Hist. Mag._, Feb., 1870,
101-2. Haskin, First Artill., 80. _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, xli,
96. Ampudia ante ... la Opinión Pública. (Stepped aside) Grant, Mems.,
95. Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 57. Sierra, Evolution, i, 214. _Esperanza_, May
23. _Monitor Repub._, June 2. _Autograph_, May-June, 1912 (Taylor).
Ampudia to Fellow-cits. =285=Arista to Paredes, May 14. =285=Segura
to Escudero, June 4. Ramsey, Other Side, 39, note, 48. (Losses) Ho.
24; 31, 1. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 295, 393 (Taylor); 392 (Marcy); 1102
(McIntosh); 403. =185=Duncan to Belknap, May 12. French, Two Wars, 49,
50. =364=Worth to S., June 13. Donnavan, Adventures, 102. Henry, Camp.
Sketches, 90-3, 95. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 36, 39. Sumaria mandada
formar ... J. L. Uraga. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 233. Wilhelm, Eighth
Inf., i, 414-9. Apuntes, 38-41. _So. Qtrly. Rev_., Nov., 1850, p. 446.
And from =76= the following. Testimony at the court-martial of Arista.
To Arista, May 17. Arista, May 7, 8, 13, 1846; July 12, 1847. Ampudia,
May 14. Requena to Arista, May 8. Vázquez to sister, May 25. Arista to
Ampudia, May 5; to Parrodi, May 9. Ampudia to Arista, May 11. Plana
mayor diary.

REMARKS. When first seen, the Mexicans were probably two or
three miles from the Palo Alto pond, but they advanced until about a
mile and a half from that point. Both lines of battle were too long. The
batteries on both sides used solid shot mostly. On the placing of our
gunners in advance of the troops, see Napoleon, Maxims, 45. The Mexican
gunners fired mostly at the American artillery, but the American gunners
mostly at the Mexican infantry. It was said that not more than a dozen
Mexicans were killed with bullets. Many of the Americans were ordered to
sit down or lie down (particularly the Eighth Infantry); and as most of
the Mexican balls approached at a ricochet it was not very difficult to
dodge them. Whatever the Americans accomplished was almost wholly due to
their cannon. Not only the excellence of the ammunition and the accurate
fire, but the boldness and rapidity of the manoeuvres astonished the
Mexicans. It is not known why Taylor decided to rely on artillery, to
which (it was stated) he had referred contemptuously on the morning
of the battle as mere "gun wagons"; but presumably, as the field was
peculiarly well suited for that arm, Ringgold and Duncan, supported
by Bliss, urged him to let it have a chance. The American officers,
though they had not over-much confidence in Taylor, felt a great deal
in one another, and so had a vast advantage over the Mexicans (México
á través, iv, 566). Ringgold was mortally wounded, but would not let
his men leave their work to care for him. During the intermission the
Americans removed their wounded, replenished caissons, and made repairs.
Commodore Conner, hearing Taylor was likely to be attacked, sailed for
that quarter, and on May 8 and 9 landed 500 seamen and marines at Point
Isabel (=166=Conner Letter-book. See also =65=Taylor, gen. orders 60.).
The chief Mexican surgeon and a number of assistants made an early and
rapid retreat. The Mexican loss was estimated by Taylor as 200 killed
and 400 wounded; by Arista as 252 killed, wounded, and missing.

8.15. (May 8 indecisive) =224=Larnard to Hitchcock, June 13; Giffard to
Pakenham, May 28; McCall, Letters, 454; Meade, Letters, i, 80; Wilhelm,
Eighth Inf., i, 416-7. Sen. 388; 29, 1. Taylor, Letters (Bixby),
1. (Consulted) Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 418; Stevens, Campaigns,
20; Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 16; _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, xli,
98; =185=L. C. to Duncan, Nov. 24; Article by J. Davis on Taylor in
Appleton's Biog. Dict. Accounts of this conference differ so much that
little can be said of it. Some of the officers were for entrenching and
awaiting reinforcements. It was known that Conner's fleet had arrived
(note 14). (Defend) Taylor, _supra_; Henry, Camp. Sketches, 94; map
of P. Alto in Map Div., Lib. of Cong. Churchill's 18-pounders and two
12-pounders taken from the baggage were left here. The wounded were sent
to Pt. Isabel. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 153) states that Taylor
marched early May 9 to Resaca de la Palma and parked the train there,
but this is incorrect (Taylor in Sen. 388; 29, 1, p. 6; Henry, Camp.
Sketches, 94; =369=map of Palo Alto; Ripley, War with Mexico, i, 124;
etc.). The point is important because troops were left with the train to
protect the wagons--not as a rear guard (Rives). Rives (p. 154) states
incorrectly that the Eighth Infantry was left with the train.

8.16. _The battle of May 9._ Sen. 388; 29, 1 (Taylor and officers).
Apuntes, 42-7. Suárez y Navarro, Alegato. Campaña contra. Negrete,
Invasión, ii, 230, 233. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 295, 393, 396, 403 (Taylor);
392, 395 (Marcy); 1104 (McIntosh). =69=Canales to Arista, May 9.
=13=Giffard to Bankhead, May 13. Henshaw narrative. =147=Chamberlain,
diary. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 1. =210=Alvord to Hammond, May 22.
=210=Hammond to Simms, Apr. 1, 1847. =213=Hatch, letters. Wash.
_Union_, July 25, 1846. =369=Map of P. Alto. _Spirit of the Times_,
May 30; June 20. _Picayune_, May 19; June 3. Berlandier, diary and
map. Nebel and Kendall, 3-4. México á través, iv, 564, 566. Fallo
Definitivo del Supremo Tribunal, 19. Sen. 4; 29, 2. Ho. 1; 30, 2, p.
1162. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 253. _Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit._, xvii
(Van Deusen); xli, 98. =370=Taylor to ----, June 18. Taylor, Letters
(Bixby), 175. Ampudia ante ... la Opin. Púb. (Uraga). McCall, Letters,
455. Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 57 (Bliss). Grant, Mems., i, 93, 96-8. Meade,
Letters, i, 81-2, 149. =72=Reales Ordenes, Serie de Gobernación, leg.
43. Appleton's Biog. Dict. (art. by J. Davis on Taylor). (Losses) Ho.
24; 31, 1. =285=Arista to Paredes, May 9, 14. French, Two Wars, 51-4.
_Autograph_, May-June, 1912 (Taylor). =210=Bragg to Hammond, Dec. 20,
1847. Ampudia to Fellow-cits. =285=Segura to Escudero, June 4. Smith,
To Mexico, 49-52. =185=Duncan to Belknap, May 10. Eyewitness, Complete
Hist., 25-6. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 422-3. _Niles_, June 6, pp. 211-7;
July 4, p. 277; Sept. 26, p. 57. =224=Larnard to Hitchcock, June 13.
Henry, Camp. Sketches, 96-9. =61=Arthur to brother. _Puritano Mex._,
May 26. =224=Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7. =61=Patton to Polk, July 18,
and enclosure. México á través, iv, 564, 566. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos,
48. The verse is by José de Saltillo, trans. by C. F. Hoffman. And from
=76= the following. Arista, May 9, 10, 13, 1846; July 12, 1847. _Id._ to
Mateos, May 31; to Parrodi, May 13; to Taylor, May 10. Carrera, May 25.
Requena to Arista, May 10. Testimony at the court-martial of Arista. R.
Vázquez to sister, May 25. Plana mayor diary. Ampudia to Arista, May 11,
14. Canales to Tornel, May 10.

REMARKS. It would be unsafe to give fuller information than that of
the text with reference to the positions of the Mexican corps. All
the accounts are unsatisfactory. Owing to the nature of the ground
and the irregular shifting of the troops, this was natural. The
Mexican leaders thought their position would ensure victory. Horses
were unsaddled and mules relieved of their packs. The chief danger to
Ridgely's battery was from Mexicans ambushed--as Taylor had reason
to suppose they would be--on both sides of the road. May, very tall
and straight, with long black hair and a black beard that reached to
his waist, became a newspaper hero, and for reasons that are rather
hard to understand, was promoted several times during the war; but he
seems clearly to have been essentially a cowardly sham. In this fight
he seized a cannon, but only the infantry prevented the enemy from
recapturing it. He claimed the credit of making Gen. Vega his prisoner,
but the real captor was a bugler. By his own account, he could rally
only six of his men after running through the batteries. The horses
appear to have "run away" with the men. Taylor's report laid stress
upon what occurred at the road, and he does not seem to have known--at
that time, to say the least--what mainly caused the sudden collapse of
the enemy; but an abundance of Mexican evidence, partly given under
oath, makes the matter clear. See also Henry, Camp. Sketches, 98. After
Americans were seen at the _placeta_ Arista's secretary went to where
the road crossed the resaca, and found May's dragoons there. This fixes
the order of events. Duncan's battery did nothing during the battle,
for Ridgely had the only opportunity to use artillery without injuring
Americans. Duncan and Kerr followed the Mexicans at some distance; the
Third Infantry coöperated; and so did the Artillery Battalion, after it
reached the scene; but the Mexicans were not aware of any real pursuit.
Fort Brown fired on the throngs of fugitives, but no sally was made.
One might imagine the garrison feared the guns of Matamoros; but they
watched the Mexican fugitives from the parapet. Mejía's ammunition had
been almost used up. Paredes informed Congress, June 6, that after May
9 Arista had 4000 regulars (Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846).
May 13 Arista gave the number as 3758 "men." Arista's chief of staff
estimated the captured, drowned, and dispersed as 500. Arista informed
Parrodi, May 13, that the total number of men, including the wounded,
taken by Taylor was less than 200, and this seems to have been true.
May 11 prisoners were exchanged. Arista reported the number in American
hands as 144, including the wounded.

8.17. When Taylor set out for Point Isabel, though he described the
fort as "in a good state of defense," one side was still open, and the
drawbridge and interior defences had not been begun (=66=Mansfield to
Totten, June 23; diary in _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 3); and not before
the night of the third was the position considered by its defenders
even comparatively secure. The fort had six bastion fronts, which made a
perimeter of 800 yards, a strongly designed wall of earth 9½ feet high
from the natural ground, a parapet 15 feet thick, a ditch about 8 feet
deep and from 15 to 22 feet wide, a gate and a drawbridge (mostly from
=66=Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 23). For about 4 feet from the base the
inside of the wall was fortified with a sort of basket work of willow
twigs. The magazine was made of pork barrels filled with sand, seven
tiers thick and four tiers high, with a timber roof covered with 10
or 12 feet of sand. The fort was a "child of circumstance," admitted
Engineer Mansfield (=66=_supra_), and in addition to the faults of
position already mentioned, the ground was irregular and the defence was
made difficult by the extent of the walls, for as considerable portions
were allowed to remain covered with thick chaparral (=66=Mansfield,
_supra_), its area was evidently too large for the 500 men which it
had been intended to cover; but it was after all a strong work, and in
comparison with it Mansfield regarded the Mexican forts as "trifling"
(=66=to Totten, May 4). Near the end of April the four 18-pounders
were removed from the battery to a bastion of the fort looking toward
Matamoras, where they were protected with merlons faced with sand-bags,
and so attack as well as defence was provided for; but there were only
150 rounds of ammunition for each of these guns. For this note: Henshaw
narrative and papers; =66=Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 23; May 4; June 23;
=65=Taylor, gen. orders 39, 45, 53; Mobile _Herald and Tribune_, May 6;
_Journal of U. S. Artil._, July, 1892, p. 293; Taylor in _Autograph_,
May-June, 1912; _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 3; Robinson, Organization,
ii, 49; _Niles_, June 13, p. 230; McCall, Letters, 441, 443; (300
wagons) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 651 (Cross).

8.18. Sen. 388; 29, 1, pp. 31, 35 (Hawkins); 35 (Arista); 36
(Mansfield). Fry and Conrad, Taylor, 109. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 175.
Apuntes, 37-8. Henshaw narrative and papers. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 288,
296 (Taylor); 293 (Brown). Campaña contra. _Picayune_, May 19, 21; Aug.
28. =69=Diary captured with Arista's papers. =69=Ampudia to Arista, May
5-6. =69=Canales to Arista, May 5, 7. México á través, iv, 561. (Losses)
Ho. 24; 31, 1. =66=Mansfield to Totten, May 4; June 23. =13=Giffard
to Pakenham, May 28. =76=Ampudia to Arista, May 11. =76=Mejía, May
4, 14. =76=Mier y Terán to Mejía, May 3, 4, 5, 7; to Requena, May 4.
=76=Testimony given at the court-martial of Arista. =76=Arista, May
7. =76=_Id._ to Ampudia, May 5. =76=Mejía to Arista, May 3. _Nat.
Intelligencer_, Sept. 3. =76=Requena to Arista, May 5. N. Orl. _Commerc.
Bulletin_, May 18. =364=Worth to S., July 25. Johnson, Thomas, 23.
=76=Canales, May 5. =76=Diary, Apr. 30-May 6.

REMARKS. May 6 the fort was summoned, with an intimation that no
quarter would be given, should the garrison hold out longer (Henshaw).
Brown was mortally wounded by a bomb-shell. He was succeeded by Captain
Hawkins. In all one man was killed; nine officers and men wounded (Ho.
24; 31, 1). An attempt was made to burn Matamoros, but the balls could
not be heated sufficiently (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 293). Perhaps a general
more farseeing than Taylor would have provided a furnace. Ampudia
had about 830 men at first and later drew others from the city. When
Arista called him to Palo Alto on May 8, a small force remained behind
to continue the siege. Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 140) says that
Arista should have reduced the fort. But Arista judged rightly that,
if he should defeat Taylor, the fort would have to fall, and therefore
it would be unwise to risk heavy losses; and probably he did not wish
Ampudia to have the glory of capturing it.

8.19. =13=Giffard to Bankhead, May 13; to Pakenham, May 28.
=118=Berlandier to Arista, undated draft. Sen. I; 29, 2, p. 46 (Marcy,
report). Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 297 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 3.
(Bridge, plank, etc.) Meade, Letters, i, 101-2. Apuntes, 46. =69=Sanders
to Taylor, May 10 ("the scows and flats of the Quarter-Masters Dept.
would give us the means of crossing the river at once"). _Niles_, May
30, p. 202. N. Orl. _Commerc. Bulletin_, May 18. _Nat. Intell._, May
18. =165=Conner to Bancroft, May 28; to Aulick, May 18. Henry, Camp.
Sketches, 132. =166=Wilson to Conner, May 15. =166=Bliss to Wilson,
May 14. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1161-2 (Conner). Parkers Recolls., 56.
(Steamers) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 522; Henry, Camp. Sketches, 115 (the _Neva_
at Matamoros May 24); _Niles_, May 30, p. 203; =166=Munroe to Conner,
May 9; N. Y. _Herald_, June 11. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 59. Ho. 60;
30, 1, pp. 297, 300 (Taylor). Wash. _Union_, May 18, 30; June 17. N.
Y. _Herald_, June 10. =364=Worth to S., June 1. =166=Wilson to Conner,
May 15. =166=Bliss to Munroe, May 9. =166=Sanders to Bliss, May 16.
=166=Bliss to Wilson, May 14. Giddings, Camp., 36.

There was additional help at hand. =69=May 10 Captain Sanders, the
engineer officer at Point Isabel, conferred with Conner about crossing
the river, and Conner said he was "perfectly ready and willing to go
into the river and proceed up as far as Burita," where he would place
all his men and boats at Taylor's disposal. (In fact Conner did assist
in the Burrita expedition actually executed.) This was reported to
Taylor at once. Matamoros had no defences except toward the river.

8.20. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 297 (Taylor); 1206 (Arista). Taylor, Letters
(Bixby), 3. Campaña contra. =69=Arista to Taylor, May 10. =76=Parrodi,
May 22. =76=Plana mayor diary. =13=Giffard to Pakenham, May 28.
=61=Spanish letter to Taylor, undated. =285=Ampudia to Paredes, May 14.
=76=Arista, May 13, 16. (Duty) Jomini, Précis, i, 475; Wagner, Strategy,
45; Henderson, Science of War, 42. Apuntes, 47. Henry, Camp. Sketches,
107. =76=Testimony at court-martial of Arista. Fallo Definitivo (Arista
was entirely exonerated, and at a later day he became President).

8.21. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 298 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 3.
Apuntes, 47-51. Campaña contra. =76=Arista, May 16, 18, 29; June 4.
=76=Prefect of No. Tamaulipas to gov., May 29. =76=Plana mayor diary.
=285=Torrejón to Paredes, June 3. =76=To Arista, May 27; June 9.
=76=Parrodi, May 22-3, 31. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 219. =76=Testimony
at the court-martial of Arista. =76=Ampudia, Sept. 9. =224=Bliss to
Hitchcock, June 7. Fallo Definitivo. Meade, Letters, i, 85, 95. =76=Gen.
orders, June 15, 1848. Arista had a choice between two routes--one
through a settled region, the other through a desert--and for strategic
reasons chose the latter.

8.22. =65=Taylor, gen. orders, 59-61, 78-9, 83. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 297,
300-1 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 3, 175. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf.,
i, 425-6. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 43. =66=Mansfield to Totten, June 23.
=370=Taylor to ... June 18. Henshaw papers. Smith, To Mexico, 52-4.
=76=Parrodi, May 31. Murray, Reality, 75. =69=Garland to ... May 24.
Henry, Camp. Sketches, 106-9, 113. Meade, Letters i, 88. As Roa Bárcena
says (Recuerdos, 40), the Americans were physically stronger than the
Mexicans, had better arms, cannon, artillery horses, and ammunition,
plenty of food, ample and well-served ambulances, were quicker and more
forceful in their movements, and were more obedient; and the officers
had more confidence in one another. They were also cooler and more
intelligent, and had greater reserves of will-power, and the men felt
more confidence in their superiors.

8.23. Meade, Letters, i, 98, 101. _Metrop. Mag._, Dec, 1907 (Hamilton,
July 29, 1846). =139=Campbell to Martin, July 29; (nine tenths) to D.
Campbell, Aug. 9. Polk, Diary, Apr. 1, 1847. =224=Larnard to Hitchcock,
June 13. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 283. =224=Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7.
Schouler, U. S., v, 248. Weed, Autobiography, 571-2. Albany _Evening
Journal_, June 18. Scott, Mems., ii, 389.

Larnard, an excellent officer, wrote to Hitchcock that Taylor did not
give an order to the artillery on May 8 nor a material order to any
one, and that he was no more responsible for winning the two battles
than a rock rolling down a hill for crushing what is before it. This
was intended, no doubt, to be taken with a grain of salt. The editor of
_Niles' Register_ said: Owing to an error in estimating the capacities
of the enemy, the army under Gen. Taylor made a narrow escape from
almost utter annihilation (July 18, p. 309); and, considering the ardor
of the Mexicans as well as the embarrassment caused by the American
wagons, one must believe that had the General carried out the plan
which he seems to have formed, the results would have been unfortunate.
See Semmes, Service, 70. Meade (Letters, i, 99) remarked that Taylor's
neglect of precautions probably helped induce the Mexicans to fight.
This was not true, for Arista's orders were express; but, even had it
been so, one could not excuse a general for really (not seemingly,
as a ruse) neglecting precautions and preparations demanded by the
circumstances. "Boldness is the acme of wisdom" in war, the German
general staff has said (Donat, Russo-Japanese War, 255); but the
distinction between boldness and rashness is real and vital. No doubt
graduates of West Point felt a prejudice against men of antecedents like
Taylor's, but they showed in the course of the war a willingness to
recognize merit. The popular enthusiasm over Taylor's "victories" was
the greater because he had been supposed to be in extreme peril.

8.24. =52=J. Parrott, June 4. Bankhead, nos. 71, 90, 1846. =285=Vega to
Paredes, Apr. 3. =76=Tornel to Arista, May 27. The London _Times_, Feb.
24, 1847, quoted the _Journal des Débats_ as saying in effect that the
Mexican War prevented the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico. Paredes
had no doubt been encouraged by the reports of Mejía regarding the state
of things at Corpus Christi, and very likely these reports helped decide
him to reject Slidell.


                 IX. THE UNITED STATES MEETS THE CRISIS

9.1. Our policy did not permit us to accept a European arbitrator, and
an arbitrator from Central or South America would not have been thought
impartial.

9.2. Polk's Message was based upon the view that the left bank of the
Rio Grande belonged to the United States (p. 139), and this was said
by some to be inconsistent with the idea (involved in the resolutions
annexing Texas and in Slidell's mission) that the boundary was an
open question. But Polk's language amounted only to an assertion of
the American claim; and a claim, however just, may be a subject of
negotiation. His expression (taken from the Washington _Union_ of May
9), "shed American blood upon the American soil," though denounced as
a falsehood, was merely another assertion of the same claim, and was
entirely in accord with the language of Madison, Jefferson, Monroe,
Pinckney, and J. Q. Adams. A claimant, convinced that his cause is just,
declares roundly, "This is mine," even though aware that his contention
is disputed. A more conservative statement would have been: Mexico has
invaded a region that I hold to be ours, and shed American blood on what
I regard as American soil; but Polk seems to have felt no doubts, and in
a trumpet-call to arms qualifications would have appeared out of place.

9.3. Benton, however, reported the House bill, which did not divide the
subject.

9.4. _Incidents preceding and attending the passage of the war bill_
(_May 13_). Richardson, Messages, iv, 388-92, 437-43. Benton, View,
ii, 679. Polk, Diary, Apr. 18, 21, 25, 28; May 3, 5, 8, 9-13, 1846.
=260=Extracts from _National Intelligencer_. =315=Winthrop to Schouler,
Mar. 20, 1848. Webster, Writings, iv, 138. =260=Winthrop, The Mex.
War Bill. =210=Holmes to Hammond, May 10, 1846. =354=Welles papers.
Proceedings of Senate and House in _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p. 257, and
May 11-13; app., 912; Feb. 24, 1847 (Calhoun). Boston _Courier_, May
14. Boston _Atlas_, May 15. N. Y. _Tribune_, Dec. 9, 1847. Calhoun to
A. P. C, May 14; to J. E. C, May 29, 1846: Jameson, C. Corresp., 690,
692. Benton, Abr. Debates, xvi, 99. =345=Dix to Van Buren, May 16,
1846. Wash. _Union_, May 15, 1846; Jan. 2, 1848. Greeley, Am. Conflict,
i, 187. Foster, Am. Diplom., 315. Johnston and Browne, Stephens, 203.
_Nat. Intelligencer_, Dec. 27, 1847. Winthrop, Speeches, i, 573. _Pub.
Ledger_, Dec. 4, 1846. =132=Buchanan, memo. Certain incidents (_Cong.
Globe_, 30, 1, app., 231) emphasize the fact that a regular war was
contemplated by Congress. _E.g._ Holmes moved that the war bill should
apply southwest of the Nueces only for the withdrawal or rescue of our
army; voted down by 8--122. See also notes 9 and 10.

9.5. Benton states that Polk relied for peace upon the project of
replacing Paredes with Santa Anna, which will be mentioned later in
this chapter (View, ii, 680). He also charges (_ibid._) that the
administration--particularly Walker--was influenced by a wish to bring
about the payment of American claims and make good certain speculations
in Texas lands; but it was proper that the claims should be paid, and
there is no proof of the second point.

9.6. Benton hesitated, and May 11 Polk counted on his opposition
(Diary). In the debates on the annexation of Texas the Senator had
denied that her territory extended to the Rio Grande (Smith, Annex.
of Texas, 264, note), and he did not approve of Taylor's going there.
Besides, he desired to see the Oregon issue settled before coming to an
issue with Mexico. Possibly Calhoun's anxiety to prevent or defer war
helped to drive Benton to the opposite side (=354=Welles papers; Polk,
Diary, May 3, 11, 1846).

9.7. One may also view the matter at a slightly different angle. It
was possible for Mexico, on learning that General Taylor had advanced
peaceably to the Rio Grande, to say, Very well, he may occupy the
disputed district jointly with us for the present. England and the
United States maintained a peaceable joint occupation of Oregon for
years. Taylor's advancing, therefore, did not _per se_ and necessarily
create a state of war. Now the United States did nothing else that could
fairly be termed aggressive; but Mexico, by attacking American troops
engaged in peaceful reconnoitring, destroyed the state of potential
harmony, and consequently the state of war that ensued existed by
her act. C. J. Ingersoll stated later (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app.,
125) that the language of the preamble was adopted for the purpose of
conciliating, not offending, the Whigs; and one can see that it might
seem likely to be easier for them to accept the war as an accomplished
fact than to vote for a declaration.

9.8. From what is known of Calhoun's designs (Smith, Annex. of Texas,
209-216) this statement seems reasonable, and it is supported by
positive evidence (chap, vi, note 10). =232=Calhoun to ----, Nov. 7,
1846: The triumph of abolitionism at the north would cause disunion, for
the southern people are determined to defend their rights.

9.9. To justify Calhoun's theory the Constitution should have been
made to read: "Congress shall have power to declare war, and without
such a declaration the United States shall never be at war," which
would have been manifestly ridiculous; and the provision in article
i, sect. 10, that a state, when in imminent danger, might begin war,
should have been cancelled. Doubtless for partisan reasons, Webster
(Curtis, Webster, ii, 301) took the same position as Calhoun, saying
that Congress could not "create a fact"--_i.e._ could not state that
war existed before it had declared war. Von Holst on the other hand,
in order to face the tolerably evident certainty that we had a legal
war with Mexico, says (United States, iii, 253) that Congress made
Polk's lie [that war existed] into a fact! Many members of Congress had
too little confidence (Calhoun to Thompson: _Am. Hist. Rev._, i, 314)
in their knowledge of the situation to feel positive as to the full
justice of the American cause, but this did not affect the validity of
their action. Particularly noticeable was the rejection (27 to 97) of
Delano's proposition that nothing in the war bill should be construed as
approving of the President's conduct in taking armed possession of the
intermediate region. Thus a much discussed question was formally raised
and formally decided. =132=King to Buchanan, June 1.

9.10. _Discussion of the proceedings._ (Feeling) =354=Welles papers.
(Assured) Polk, Diary, May 11, 1846. (Congressmen) Meigs, Benton, 360;
Benton, View, ii, 680. _Tribune_, May 15. _Journal of Commerce_, July
1, 1847. Weekly _Herald_, May 16, 1846. (Dissensions) Boston _Atlas_,
May 18, 1846; Jameson, Calh. Corresp., 1038 (Harris); Polk, Diary, Apr.
30; =345=Polk to Van Buren, Jan. 4; Feb. 22, 25, 1845; =345=Wright
to V. B., Jan. 17, 1845; =345=Butler to Polk, Feb. 27, 1845; =345=V.
B. to Polk, Feb. 27, 1845; =345=S. T. Van Buren to M. V. B., Mar. 2,
3, 4, 1845; =297=Cave Johnson to Polk, June 13, 1844; and see chap,
xxxiv. (Offices) Polk, Diary, May 10; June 22, 1846, and _passim_.
=210=Holmes to Hammond, May 10, 1846. Lalor, Cyclop., iii, 1105. (Whig
vote) =260=Winthrop, Mex. War Bill, 108; _Nat. Intelligencer_, May 16,
1846; N. Y. _Journal of Comm._, Dec. 11, 1847; Wheeler, Hist, of Cong.,
i, 411; Von Holst, U. S., iii, 251. Calhoun to Clemson, Jan. 29, 1846;
to A. P. C, May 14; to J. E. C, May 29; to Clemson, July 11; to J.
E. C, July 29, in Calhoun Corres., 679, 691, 693-4, 700-1; also 707.
=345=Welles to Van Buren, July 28, 1846. Polk, Diary, Apr. 18, 21, 1846.
Calhoun in Sen., Feb. 24, 1847: _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, p. 501. Hunt,
Calhoun, 279. _Niles_, May 16, 1846, p. 162. (Endorsed, etc.) _Cong.
Globe_, 29, 1, p. 802 (Crittenden). _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, app., 367
(Stanton). Johnston and Browne, Stephens, 210. =132=King to Buchanan,
June 1, 1846. Pierce, Sumner, iii, 108, 139. =132=Buchanan, memo. Holmes
of New York proposed in the House, May 11, that sect. one of the war
bill should not apply southwest of the Nueces except for the rescue
of our army. This was rejected by 8--122. May 12 Senator Crittenden,
one of the foremost Whigs, proposed to substitute in the war bill the
words "for the purpose of repelling the invasion" in place of the words
"prosecute said war, etc." This recognized the territory as American.
His proposal was supported by twenty senators (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p.
803).

9.11. Livermore, for example, argued in this way (War, 15): Texas was
annexed for the protection of Southern institutions; the war with Mexico
resulted from the annexation of Texas; therefore the war with Mexico was
due to the slaveholders' interest in slavery. But both of his premises
need qualification; and the conclusion, so far as it suggests that the
war was the necessary and designed consequence of the slaveholders'
action in the Texas matter, does not follow. The abolitionists were
enthusiastic, earnest, and on the outside of things. Hence they were
naturally and almost unavoidably over-suspicious. Von Holst (U. S., iii,
302) says that the radical wing of the southern Democratic party openly
avowed that the war with Mexico was a southern war; but was not Calhoun
the leader and prophet of that wing? A few public men, the Charleston
_Patriot_ and _Courier_, and the _Federal Union_ of Alabama looked upon
the war as for the interest of the South; but it does not appear that
they had any appreciable influence in bringing it about.

9.12. The occasion of the war was Taylor's going to the Rio Grande; but
see chap, vii, p. 154.

9.13. Apparently one might say that--since Polk intended to recommend
redress of our grievances--war was sure, without reference to the
annexation of Texas, to come. But we are tracing the cause of an actual,
not of a possible, war; and the President's recommendation might not
have proved effectual. Benton (View, ii, 679) said that without the
clash of arms it would have been difficult, perhaps impossible, to bring
about war. Calhoun (Sen., Feb. 24, 1847: note 10) said it could not have
been done. This opinion, however, was biased.

9.14. _The cause of the war._ Polk, Diary, Dec. 19, 23, 1846; Jan. 5,
23, 1847. Webster, Private Corresp., ii, 283. =370=Taylor to Davis, Apr.
18, 1848. =32=Buchanan to Shields, April 23, 1847. (Bulwark) Smith,
Annex. of Texas, 132, 134-5, 204-8. (Unsuitable) =132=Donelson to
Buchanan, May 15, 1847. _No. Amer._, Feb. 10, 1847; Thompson in Wash.
_Union_, Oct. 25, 1847, and Greenville (S. C.) _Mountaineer_, Oct. 21.
Bourne, Essays, 227, 235. Charleston _Mercury_, Dec. 30, 1847 (long
argument against annexing Mexican territory). W. Thompson to Calhoun,
Dec. 18, 1847 in Jameson, Calhoun Correspondence, 1149 (slavery will
not exist in Mexico). =137=Fisher to Calhoun, Aug. 22, 1847. =137=J.
A. Campbell to Calhoun, Mar. 1, 1848. (Aiken) Boston _Courier_, Dec.
2, 1847; Mar. 9, 1848. =132=King to Buchanan, June 11, 1847. N. Y.
_Tribune_, Nov. 26, 1847. =157=Lamar to Cobb, June 24, 1846. (Toombs)
_Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, app., 133. _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Nov., 1850, 427-34.
(Benton) Abr. Deb., xvi, 87; Benton, View, ii, 678. (Clay) Schurz,
Clay, ii, 290. (Winthrop) Wash. _Union_, Sept. 30, 1846; Oct. 25, 1847;
Winthrop, Winthrop, 59. (Douglas) Cutts, Questions, 154. (Johnson)
Brown, _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app., 354. (Van B.) Wilson, Rise and Fall,
ii, 9; Smith, Annex. of Texas, 243. Amer. Historical Association Rep.,
1911, ii, 95 (Glenn). (Organs) Mr. Winthrop's Vote. (Sumner) Sumner,
report, 30. (Report) Wash. _Union_, Feb. 25, 1847. (Agree) Winthrop
in Wash. _Union_, Sept. 30, 1846. (Paredes) _Diario_, July 30, 1846.
(Almonte) N. Y. _Sun_, Nov. 26, 1846 (Caractacus); _Monitor Repub._,
May 9, 1847. Gordon, Aberdeen, 183. Mofras, Expédition, 8. Polk,
Message, May 11, 1846 (Richardson). Cole, Whig Party, 121. See also the
conclusion of chap. v.

At the end of March Paredes said: "Peace is not compatible with the
maintenance of the rights and independence of the nation" (Roa Bárcena,
Recuerdos, 22).

9.15. The dates are those of approval.

9.16. The action of Congress was promulgated by the adj. gen. in
=65=gen. orders 14, 18, 21, 34. See an article on the engineer company
by Captain Willing, published by the U. S. engineer school, Washington
Barracks. See also U. S. Statutes at Large, ix, 9-13, 17, 20; Upton,
Milit. Pol., 204; Richardson, Messages, iv, 603-4.

9.17. Polk, Diary, May 13, 1846. Wash. _Union_, May 21. =65=Gen. orders
12. =59=Circular. With the freedom that has commonly marked authors
dealing with the unpopular Polk Von Holst says (U. S., iii, 339) that
his profession of seeking only a peace was a "falsehood." But Polk meant
of course a peace satisfactory to the American government, for a peace
satisfactory to Mexico would not have had to be "conquered," and this
implied in general about the terms that we actually imposed.

9.18. "Germanicus" stated in the N. Y. _Commercial Advertiser_ that in
the Florida war the ratio of expense between regulars and militia was 1
to 6; of efficiency, 1 to 0 (_Nat. Intell._, Nov. 7, 1846). Of course
the volunteers, who wished and expected to fight, were in general better
than the militia, who wished and expected to remain at home. Had the
regular army been increased to 50,000 privates (giving, say, 30,000 in
the field), there would no doubt have been a great saving of time, blood
and treasure (Stevens, Campaigns, 14). Taylor's position gave him a
special responsibility. He should have pointed out the disadvantages of
the volunteer system, recommended enlisting such troops (if at all) for
the duration of the war, and continued to demand regulars.

9.19. _The military measures._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 141. =65=Gen. orders
57, Dec. 22, 1846. Upton, Mil. Pol, 195, 202, 204 (sequel showed).
(1838) R. Johnson in Sen., Jan. 11, 1848 (Wash. _Union_, Jan. 12). _Nat.
Intelligencer_, Nov. 7, 1846. (Cowardly, etc.) =354=Welles papers.
=63=Marcy to Wright, June 3, 1846. =63=Circ. letter, May 19, 1846.
Webster, Letters, 346. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 46-7. Wash. _Union_, June
25, 1846. (Stimulated) Sen. 4; 29, 2, p. 53. Johnson, Douglas, 114.
Polk, Diary, June 20, 22, 1846. (Vacancies) Richardson, Messages, iv,
513-7. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 554 (Jesup). (Might have been) Taylor, Letters
(Bixby), 75.

The authorized maximum of the army was 16,998 officers and men (Sen.
1; 29, 2, p. 53). The volunteer service was more attractive than the
regular because it was easier to get rank there and the discipline was
less severe; and something to offset this difference was needed.

9.20. Many of the volunteer regiments were in fact, owing to the
appreciation of a West Point education shown by some of the states,
commanded by trained men (Henry, Camp. Sketches, 127).

9.21. For numerous details on the subject of this paragraph see an
article by the author in _The Military Historian and Economist_, Jan.,
1917, p. 30, note 12.

9.22. The executive staff of the war dept. consisted of Bvt. Brig. Gen.
R. Jones, adj. gen.; Lieut. Col. George Talcott, head of the ordnance
bureau; Maj. Gen. T. S. Jesup, quartermaster gen.; Brig. Gen. N. Towson,
paymaster gen.; Dr. T. Lawson, surgeon gen.; Bvt. Brig. Gen. G. Gibson,
commissary gen. of subsistence; Col. J. G. Totten, chief engineer; Col.
J. J. Abert, chief topog. engineer (Ho. 143; 29, 1. Ho. 60; 30, 1 p.
547).

9.23. The following remark from J. D. McPherson (in "General Grant's
Political Myth"), who was close to Marcy in the war dept., seems worth
quoting: "His massive intellect, his calm wisdom, his uncalculating
integrity, the justness of all his purposes, the purity of his private
life, and the goodness of his heart inspired me with admiration and
reverence." Marcy loved books, too. Still he was, as Welles said, a
keen, wary and adroit politician, well taught by a wide experience
and fully acquainted with human nature of the sort with which he had
to deal. He had faltered at one juncture in his devotion to orthodox
Democratic principles, and probably felt that he could never regain the
position thus lost.

9.24. _Raising and forwarding Volunteers._ =60=Marcy to Giles, May 19,
1846. For the corresp. with govs., May 15-19, see =60=, =61=, =63=.
=63=Marcy to govs. of Ala., etc., June 5. =63=_Id._ to Wright, June 3.
=65=Gen. orders 15, Wash., May 29. Marcy, report, Dec. 5, in Sen. 1;
29, 2. =61=Memo., May 18. Polk (insists upon energy), Diary, May 19;
June 23-4; Sept. 22, 24. (Marcy) Poore, Perley's Remins., i, 333; Wise,
Seven Decades, 235. (Multitudes) =63=Marcy to govs., May 19. =354=Welles
papers. (Motives) Trans. Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1904, p. 283; 1905,
pp. 194-6; 1906, 174-5; Robertson, Remins., 59, 62-7; =146=Caswell,
diary, Jan. 26, 1847; Lyell, Second Visit, ii, 257; =139=Campbell to D.
C, Nov. 9, 1846; Carleton at mtg. of Mex. veterans; Prickett in Madison
_Record_, 1850; Jamieson, Campaign, 73, 78. (High) _Public Ledger_,
May 18, 1846. Quitman in _Cong. Globe_, 35, 1, p. 970. Lyell, Second
Visit, ii, 343-5. N. Y. _Herald_, June 20, 1846. (Song) N. Y. _Globe_,
June 1, 1846. Cameron in _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p. 826. =149=L'Hommedieu
to Chase, May 20, 1846. Wash. _Union_, May 27; June 12, 1846. Ohio
Arch. and Hist. Qtrly., 1912, p. 280. Ills. State Hist. Lib. Pubs.,
ix, 38. Ark. Hist. Commission, Bulletin no. 6, p. 181. Perry, Indiana,
4-13, 17. I. Smith, Remins., 5. =239=Kemper to daughter, May 30. St.
Louis weekly _Reveille_, May 10. Everett, Recolls., 194-9. McCormack,
Koerner, i, 495-7. Wallace, Autob., 114. Davis, Autob., 94-5. Iowa
adj. gen., Roster, vi, 788-9. Quisenberry, Taylor, 22. =216=Heiman,
Services. Ex-gov. Porter of Tenn. to the author. Memphis _Eagle_, May
15. _Niles_, June 13, p. 227; July 4, p. 288; July 18, p. 313. Scharf,
St. Louis, i, 362-8. =206=Graham, Message, Nov. 17. =14=Fair to Martin,
June 4. =14=Martin to Marcy, May 31. =61=Bullock to war dept., May
8. =14=Placard, May 7. =29=Brown to Duffield, May 11; to Marcy, June
3. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 223-4, 228. =63=Marcy to Brown, June 16.
=225=Cooke to Holt, May 17. (The drums) Poem by W. R. Benjamin, by
permission. Polk, Diary, May 26. =189=Evans, letter. =110=Barbour,
diary. Bishop, Journal, _passim_. For additional details see _The
Military Historian and Economist_, Jan., 1917, p. 32, note 14.

As was natural, many complications arose in preparing the regiments
for the field. The volunteers themselves, as a rule, did not know what
they needed nor even what they wanted. They were ignorant and helpless
regarding all military matters. Such officers as understood the business
were compelled to work almost night and day. Everything had to be
provided, and many of the things had to be made; and the men were
usually ahead of the supplies. Two Tennessee regiments were able to move
south about June 1, but it was not until about July 23 that the last
Illinois regiments advanced in that direction.

9.25. _To Brazos Island._ =300=Prickett, letter, July 30. Robertson,
Remins., June 11, 17, 23. =332=Tennery, diary, Aug. 13. Houstoun, Texas
(1845), 68, 91-2, 147, 255-6. Oswandel, Notes, 31, 38, 44-8. =190=Ewing,
diary, July 12, 19, 21. Perry, Indiana, 83. Everett, Recolls., 197-8.
=274=Neeld, letter. French, Two Wars, 33. =272=Memoir of Gen. Morgan.
=110=Barbour, diary, July 23. Bishop, Journal. =193=Foster to mother,
June 16.

"Brazos Island" is the name on the U. S. Coast Survey map. Gens. Butler,
Marshall, Quitman, Pillow and Shields left New Orleans on the steamer
_New York_, and arrived at the island Aug. 4 (Claiborne, Quitman,
i, 239). The strait between Brazos Id. and Padre Id. on the north
was called the Brazos de Santiago (Giddings, Sketches, 27). Gaines's
proceedings led to great expense, and embarrassed the government very
much. He kept on even after he knew of Taylor's victories, and the total
number called out by him perhaps exceeded 12,000. For most of these
forces there was no place under the law of May 13, and the government
did not regard them as necessary. A few who had actually left their
states were accepted for three months under a law of 1795; but the
requisitions were countermanded, Gaines was peremptorily ordered (May
28) to suspend his operations in this regard, was relieved of his
command, and was placed before a court of inquiry. His intentions were
unquestionably good, and hence the court recommended that no further
action should be taken. The best information on this subject is given
in the record of the court (=68=judge advocate general's office) and in
=65=gen. orders no. 39, Washington, Aug. 20, 1846, which presents the
facts, the conclusions of the court, and the remarks of the President
thereon. See also Polk, Diary, June 5, 20; Aug. 15. =63=Marcy to govs.,
June 5, 1846. =69=_Id._ to Gaines, May 28. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 308. Docs.
in Sen. 378; 29, 1, pp. 50-81. Gaines to Marcy, June 7: Sen. 402; 29, 1.
Sen. 415; 29, 1. =65=Gen. orders (Wash.) 16, 23. =63=Marcy to Taylor,
May 23. Wash. _Union_, June 9. Sen. proceeds., June 24. Gaines was
succeeded by General Brooke. The headquarters of this military dept.
were at New Orleans.

9.26. Scott, a Whig, testified that Polk was "in great alarm" (Coleman,
Crittenden, i, 244). =256=Marcy privately called the state of things
"adverse" (to Wetmore). Holmes of South Carolina said the administration
was prostrated (=210=to Hammond, May 10). Charleston _Mercury_, May 19:
At the first symptom of actual fighting our government is taken all
aback. Had Polk sent Taylor to the Rio Grande to bring on a war, he
would have been rejoicing.

9.27. Polk, whose principal interview with Scott occurred on May 14, did
not at that time believe that 20,000 volunteers would be needed (Diary).

9.28. Scott's information about the region was derived from Anthony
Butler, formerly our minister to Mexico, and Gen. J. T. Mason (Scott
in Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 11), both of whom had been on the ground, and
it led him to think the inactive season somewhat longer than it really
was. Although Taylor with competent engineers had been for about seven
months, while at Corpus Christi, in touch with a stream of traders
and other persons from Matamoros, and might have sent out spies and
reconnoitring parties, and had been on the river nearly two months,
he does not seem to have supplied, despite urgent requests from the
war dept. (_e.g._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 87, 88, 90, 91, 92), any adequate
ideas about conducting a campaign in that quarter or even to have formed
any for himself. Marcy, May 28, 1846 (_ibid._, 282), said, "I wish to
be favored with your views as to what should be the future operations
of the army on the Rio Grande." In submitting such views the General
would have had to present information regarding topographical and other
conditions, about which he seems to have left the government in the dark.

9.29. One should not be in haste to condemn the administration and the
Democratic politicians, for ours is a party system and Scott was in
politics. He should have realized that, standing at the head of the
army, he was bound to serve the country as a whole, and should have
refrained from seeking party honors that evidently might (as they now
did) interfere with the fulfilment of that prime duty.

9.30. _The question of general-in-chief._ (It is believed that later
events render a somewhat full treatment of this topic desirable.)
=191=Fairfield to wife, Apr. 14. Stanwood, Presidency, 195. (Politics)
=13=Pakenham, no. 74, June 13. =253=Peters to McLean, June 26.
Gaines, Sept. 10, 1845 in Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 38. _So. Advocate_,
Apr. 3 (Sanderson). Gaines, June 7 in Sen. 402; 29, 1. (Scott's
personality) Scott, Mems., _passim_; F. Lee, Lee, 49; =354=Welles
papers; =252=Mackall, Dec. 29, 1847; _Mag. of Amer. Hist._, xiv, 562
(Scammon, one of Scott's aides, here says that he never knew a man of
the world less given to vanity than Scott); Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceeds.,
1st ser., ix, 234-9; Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 182; Corwin to Follett,
Mar. 13, 1845, in Ohio Hist. and Phil. Soc. Publics., July-Sept., 1914;
Semmes, Service, 280-1; Grant, Mems., i, 41, 139; Grone, Briefe, 80;
Keyes, Fifty Years, 1-82; =335=Trist on Scott. Sen. 378; 29, 1, pp.
2-4. Richardson, Messages, iv, 448. Wash. _Union_, May 18. Scott-Marcy
correspondence in Sen. 378; 29, 1, pp. 4-18; and in =256=. =60=Scott,
memoranda for gen. staff. Coleman, Crittenden, i, 243-4. Polk, Diary,
Mar. 28; May 13, 14, 19, 21-3, 25-6, 1846; Apr. 1, 1847. _Niles_, June
6, 1846, p. 214. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Aug. 29. Grant, Mems., i, 119. N.
Orl. _Commerc. Bulletin_, June 18. Watson, Taylor, 121. Boston _Atlas_,
June 12. N. Y. _Herald_, June 13. Welles papers. N. Orl. _Picayune_,
June 17. =253=Reed to McLean, Oct. 26. Boston _Courier_, June 15.
=139=W. B. Campbell to D. C., July 3, 1846. =256=Marcy to Wetmore, April
22, 1847.

La Bruyère said, "There is in some men a certain mediocrity of mind that
helps to make them wise." This was not at all true of Scott. It was
characteristic of him that he blamed Marcy for only a want of candor and
nerve, regarding him as merely the instrument of the party (Coleman,
Crittenden, i, 244-6).

Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 204) remarks that the private note of
Scott (addressed to Senator Archer) "was enough to rouse the meekest
of Presidents." But (1) the note charged only what was charged
commonly--that the administration was making its appointments in a
partisan, political way; (2) it was private; and (3) Scott had a
legitimate reason for writing it--to explain why he did not intend to
recommend men for commissions, as Archer probably expected him to do.
In taking cognizance of a private note Polk acted as an eavesdropper,
and he should have recalled the saying, "Eavesdroppers never hear
anything good of themselves." Rives says also (ii, 413) that "for more
than fourteen months before war was actually declared it was evident to
every observer that war was highly probable, but Scott made no plans,
collected no information, and did nothing to prepare for the coming
strain upon the head-quarters organization of the army." But (1) war
was not deemed highly probable, as Rives states, by the President, the
Cabinet, Congress, Wall Street, Taylor or competent observers in general
(see p. 133, etc.); (2) it is a rather bold assertion that Scott "did
nothing to prepare," etc., and the present author, who intended to
examine every war dept. paper relating to the subject, saw no proof of
it; (3) as Rives states (ii, 582), the army had no intelligence bureau,
and Scott possessed no authority to establish one; (4) to collect
reliable data regarding Mexico and our frontier even informally would
have cost a great deal, and the government was so economical that it
would not provide even a pontoon train that was asked for (see p. 177);
(5) before Jan. 13, 1846, Scott had studied the frontier and planned
for Taylor's advance to the Rio Grande (p. 153); (6) May 14 he was
ready with plans so elaborate and far-reaching that Polk thought him
"scientific and visionary," and the next day he issued orders to the
chiefs of the general staff (p. 199). Such plans and orders implied
knowledge.

9.31. May 30, Taylor was brevetted major general and assigned to duty
with that rank (Ho. 119; 29, 2, p. 12. Also Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 283).

9.32. Anti-slavery theorizers represented (see Lalor, Cyclopædia,
iii, 1091) that Polk brought the Oregon issue to the verge of war so
that Mexico should dare--with the expectation of having England for
an ally--to fight us, and when hostilities had begun, made peace with
England at a sacrifice of our claim; but this view has little or nothing
except its ingenuity for support, and has a great number of facts
against it.

9.33. _The Oregon affair._ =206=J. Graham to Gov. G., Jan. 4, 1846. Dr.
Bacon: "The ascendancy of the West is a fact" (_New Englander_, v, 319).
(Cass) =1=---- to Allen, Sept. 1, 1846. =210=Hammond, diary, Feb. 19.
Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 653, 697-8. Polk, Diary, Oct. 21-3, 1845;
Feb. 24-5; Apr. 18; June 3, 1846. Lodge, Webster, 260. =256=Marcy to
Wetmore, Apr. 30, 1845. Johnson, Douglas, 105. (Cabinet) =354=Welles
papers. A. Smith, Remins., 41. Garrison, Extension, 170. _Polit. Sci.
Qtrly._, xxvi, 443-61 (Schuyler). _Amer. Hist. Rev._, xvi, 298-9
(Schafer). Reeves, Amer. Diplom., 243-64. London _Times_, Jan. 26, 1846.
Hume in Ho. Commons, Jan. 23.

9.34. For Santa Anna's banishment see vol. i, p. 53. In May it was
believed at Mexico that Santa Anna's return would mean peace (=56=W. S.
Parrott, June 4, 9); and as late as July 31 and August 12 =166=Pommarès,
a secret agent of Conner at Vera Cruz, said that such was the prevalent
opinion there.

9.35. Atocha, Statement. _Nat. Intelligencer_, June 10, 1845.
=13=Bankhead, no. 41, 1846. =73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 444, res., 1847.
_Monitor Repub._, Feb. 16, 1847.

9.36. Apparently Conner was to obey this order or not as the
circumstances of the moment should render expedient. Consul Campbell of
Havana was directed in June to write often to Conner and express his
opinion on the propriety of allowing Santa Anna to enter Mexico (=166=to
Conner, July 9); at the time Santa Anna sailed for Vera Cruz Campbell
wrote (=166=Aug. 7) to Conner arguing that he should be permitted to
land; and Conner, in a =162=letter to his wife (Aug. 19), explained why
he had thought it best to let him pass. The _Journal des Débats_ (Oct.
6, 1846) believed that the American government had reason to count upon
Santa Anna's intentions though not upon his word; this was no doubt
Polk's view. Those who, in the usual fashion, have charged that Polk's
Message of Dec. 8, 1846, lied about his relations with Santa Anna have
failed to observe that it referred exclusively to the events preceding
the order of May 13 to Conner (Richardson, iv, 491-2). Before Mackenzie
was sent to Havana stronger and more definite information to the effect
that Santa Anna was likely to regain power was received--particularly
from Consul Black (Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 34).

9.37. The United States appears (Consul Campbell, May 25, 1846) to
have sent an earlier agent, who passed at Havana by the name of Brown,
and was commonly said there to have brought proposals to Santa Anna.
Mackenzie's ostensible mission--real enough, too, probably--was to
ascertain whether privateers had been commissioned in Cuba (Polk, Diary,
Jan. 8, 1848). He spoke Spanish fluently. Santa Anna took care to put
out an explanation of Mackenzie's visit.

9.38. _The negotiation with Santa Anna._ Polk, Message, Dec. 8
(Richardson, iv. 492). London _Times_, Oct. 6, 1845; Jan. 31; July
6, 1846. Semmes, Service, 117-8. =52=Dimond, nos. 324-6, 329, 1846.
=52=Campbell, June 9, 1846; April 9, 1847. =166=Campbell to Conner,
May 10. Von Holst, U. S., iii, 282-3. =52=Slidell, Mar. 18; April
2. =166=Dimond to Conner, Sept. 14, 1845. =166=Pommarès to Conner,
July 2; Aug. 12. Chase, Polk Admin., 163. _Monitor Repub._, Feb. 20,
1846. Wash. _Union_, June 21, 1847. _Scribner's Monthly_, xvii, 299.
_Constitutionnel_, Sept. 20, 1846. =73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 441,
1847. Polk, Diary, Feb. 13, 14, 16, 1846; Jan. 8, 1848. _Id._ to Ho.
Repres., Jan. 12, 1848 (Richardson). =46=Bancroft to Conner, May 13,
1846. =297=Mackenzie to Buchanan, July 7, 11; Aug. 15, 1846. =335=_Id._
to Trist, Jan. 2; June 8; Aug. 17, 1846. _Courrier des Etats Unis_, Aug.
11, 1846. (Conspicuous) Benton, View, ii, 680. _Journ. Milit. Serv.
Instit._, xli, 105. Meade, Letters, i, 116.

Polk stated in his diary, Jan. 8, 1848, that Mackenzie "wholly exceeded
his authority" by writing out his recollection of the conversation
with Polk and giving this to S. Anna as a message from the President.
Mackenzie's report reached Washington Aug. 3, and was immediately
followed up by Polk with a request for two million dollars to facilitate
a settlement with Mexico (chap, xxvii).


                         X. THE LEADERS ADVANCE

10.1. Comanches were making raids near Reynosa (=69=Worth to Bliss,
July 28), and the freebooter and cut-throat, Canales, was living on the
country not far away with a band that he said consisted of more than 600
mounted men (June 16).

10.2. Taylor to daughter, June 9, in _Autograph_, July-Aug., 1912. _Nat.
Intelligencer_, Sept. 16, 1848. =76=Berlandier to Mejía, June 9, 1846.
(Reynosa) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 299, 305, 306, 397, 522-3, 550; Henry,
Camp. Sketches, 117; =76=Mejía, June 20; Smith, To Mexico, 57; Henshaw
narrative; Meade, Letters, i, 98; =76=Spanish consul, Matamoros, June
7, 1846; =76=Canales, May 20; June 4, 7, 16, 1846. (McCulloch) Reid,
Scouting Expeds., 43; _Picayune_, June 24; Aug. 15; Ho. 60; 30, 1, p.
551. =139=Campbell to D. C, July 3; Aug. 9. =224=Larnard to Hitchcock,
June 13. Weed, Autobiog., 573. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 4, 6-10, 13-15,
17-20, 31. =370=_Id._ to ----, June 18 (draft): The war dept. has
been "mean and contemptable to the last degree." =375=_Id._ to E. G.
W. Butler, July 1: Madigan, catalogue no. 2, 1914. (Disliked) Meade,
Letters, i, 103. Scott, May 18 in Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 17. This letter
was acknowledged by Taylor July 2 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 329). He wrote
the substance of it to Dr. Wood on June 12 (Bixby). By May 28 U. S.
newspapers stating that 30,000 volunteers were coming reached the Rio
Grande (Meade, Letters, i, 95). "Licking" so many volunteers into shape
involved an immense amount of work, but Taylor did not have to do this
personally.

10.3. The laws recognized only the regulars, the militia (who could
be required to serve but three months: Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 282) and the
twelve-months volunteers. The six-months men, therefore, had to join
one of the other classes or be discharged. Marcy enforced this plain
legal requirement and was roundly abused for so doing. For the case of
the Louisiana men see Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 307, 309, 311, 315-20; Taylor,
Letters (Bixby), 176-7; _La. Courier_, Aug. 6; gen. orders 61 (_Niles_,
Aug. 15); N. Orl. _Bee_, Aug. 3. For the St. Louis men see Scharf, St.
Louis, i, 377.

One has to be extremely careful here about making assertions regarding
dates and numbers. Affairs were in such confusion that even headquarters
would seem to have been to a considerable extent in the dark. Marcy,
June 8, did not know how many troops Taylor had (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 323),
and the statements that one finds are nearly always wanting in precision
or completeness. The facts given in the text are believed, however, to
be adequate for the history of the operations. One may refer also to:
Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 13; Matamoros _News_, July 8; =76=Parrodi, July
8; Hamer in Wash. _Union_, Aug. 18; and Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 547.

The facts about the Texan troops are particularly confused, but it is
plain that while unexpectedly late--none arriving until on or about
June 10--a regiment of foot, under Albert Sydney Johnston, and two
regiments of horse finally appeared in response to Taylor's call for
four regiments. Henderson, who commanded these men, claimed the rank of
a major general, and--apparently because mounted men were particularly
needed--his claim was allowed. See Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 299, 307, 321-2;
Henry, Camp. Sketches, 118; Rose, McCulloch, 69; Henshaw narrative;
Johnston, Johnston, 133; Meade, Letters, i, 104. Scott (Ho. 60; 30, 1,
p. 325) supposed that Taylor would receive about 16,280 twelve-months
volunteers and enough recruits for the regular regiments to make his
aggregate 23,070, besides the three-months and six-months men who would
engage for a longer term. June 14 Meade (Letters, i, 105) thought
Taylor had 10,000 men. By July 30 substantially all the twelve-months
foot intended for Taylor, except those from Illinois and Missouri, had
arrived (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 401).

10.4. Meade, Letters, i, 114-5. =224=Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7.
Robertson, Remins., 76. =139=Campbell to D. C, July 3. =308=Shields to
R. J. Walker, Aug. 3. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 301, 305, 307, 315, 320-1,
329, 550 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 176-7. Marcy, report, Dec.
5, 1846 in Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 46. Nearly 1000 Louisiana vols. arrived at
Brazos Id. or Pt. Isabel on May 13 (Conner in Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1162).

10.5. Later (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 546) Boca Chica was bridged.

10.6. Camp Lomita, a hill of about eight acres in extent, was five miles
by water above Burrita; and above that lay Camp Patterson. Camp Palo
Alto was on elevated ground near what was called Arista's Crossing.
There was also a Camp Lane. Few troops were quartered at Matamoros. It
is hard to understand why the well-behaved regulars were not permitted
to occupy the many vacant houses there (_Picayune_, July 9, 14, 1846).
This town, which looked attractive from the opposite side of the Rio
Grande, dated from 1820. It had prospered for a time, but had been
greatly injured by a hurricane in 1844, and was now falling to pieces
(Meade, Letters, i, 86; "Matamoros" in Diccionario Univ.; =60=Irons,
April 20; _República de Rio Grande_, June 27; Robertson, Remins., 104-6;
=217=Henshaw papers; London _Times_, Oct. 16, 1844; Smith, Remins.,
34-5).

10.7. _The camps and soldier life._ _Picayune_, Apr. 7; May 30; June 14,
24; July 9, 26. Perry, Indiana, 84-5, 87, 97, 100-2. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p.
697 (Thomas). Brackett, Lane's Brigade, 18, 22, 33. Robertson, Remins.,
76-97. Giddings, Sketches, 27, 36-40. =254=McClellan to sister, Oct. 8.
=274=Neeld, letter. =139=Campbell to D. C, July 11, 19, 29, 31; Aug. 9.
=280=Nunelee, diary, July 5; Dec. 10. Meade, Letters, i, 59 (nine feet
of water on Brazos bar; six feet to Pt. Isabel). =218=Henshaw narrative.
Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 571 (Jesup). =332=Tennery, diary, Aug. 12; Sept. 18.
=190=Ewing, diary, July 21-Aug. 17. Wash. _Union_, June 10; Aug. 3, 18;
Sept. 1 (letters). =322=W. B. Smith, diary. Special orders 71 in Ho. 60;
30, 1, p. 528. Reid, Scouting Expeditions, 20. I. Smith, Remins., 9, 25,
34. Matamoros _News_, July 8. =69=Shields, Aug. 28. _Niles_, July 4, p.
288; Sept. 12, pp. 21, 22. (Funds) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 560-1. Taylor,
Letters (Bixby), 176. =61=Carlin to Polk, May 19. Henry, Sketches, 121.
_Nat. Intelligencer_, Aug. 3. Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 4. =69=Miller to
sister. =291=C. Cushing to Pierce, May 4, 1847. Bishop, Journal. Allen,
Pencillings, 25.

10.8. In the N. Y. _Sun_ of Dec. 12, 1915, Major William Wallace showed
why time is needed to make a soldier.

10.9. Hamer was, however, a man of strength and sound judgment, and for
this reason proved very useful to the volunteers.

10.10. =252=Lieut. Mackall wrote with reference to this matter, "I am
determined, with God's aid, to do my duty cheerfully and show no sign of
impatience." The letters and diaries of =6=Robert Anderson and others
give us reason to believe that such a spirit was not uncommon among the
regular officers.

10.11. _Morale of the army._ Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 7, 23, 42. Ewing,
diary, Aug. 17; Sept. 7. "A Soldier's Honor," 22-3. Meade, Letters i,
91, 102-3, 108-10, 115-6, etc. (Brawls, etc.) Henry, Camp. Sketches,
124, 128, 137. W. B. Smith, diary, Aug. 13. Ewing, diary, Sept. 7.
_Niles_, Sept. 19, p. 40. (Months) =69=Bankhead, Apr. 7. St. Louis
_Republican_, Aug. 5. _Vedette_, ix, no. 1 (officer, Aug. 22). =1=Woll
to Allen, July 2. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 425. =139=Campbell to D. C,
July 3; Aug. 28; Nov. 9; Dec. 7. Lawton, Artillery Off., 276. Jamieson,
Campaign, 71. Scott, Mems., ii, 392. =148=Chamberlain, recolls.
=224=Bliss to Hitchcock, July 23 (cf. =139=Campbell to D. C, Aug. 9).
=252=Mackall, Aug. 4. =218=Henshaw narrative. =13=Giffard to Bankhead,
June 9. The fundamental idea of military discipline is that each man is
a factor in a great organization, and must do his part in coöperation
with all the rest. Time is necessary to bring a man to this point of
view. More will be said about the morale of the troops in chap. xxxi.

10.12. Taylor attempted to defend himself (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 558) by
citing his letter of April 26 to the department, in which he said that
he trusted it would "give the necessary orders to the staff department
for the supply" of the new troops from Louisiana and Texas; but this
was by no means what he was bound to do in the premises (see note 13);
and, in particular, river steamboats of an unknown description and
number not only did not come under the head of army supplies, but were
almost certainly not even in his own mind when he wrote that letter.

10.13. _The question of boats._ (View) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 329-32
(Taylor); Taylor to Butler, July 1, 1846 in =375=Madigan, catalogue no.
2, 1914. (Rules) =61=Adj. gen. to Kearny, May 14; Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp.
560, 751 (Jesup). Dec. 26, 1913, the chief clerk of the quartermaster
general's office, Washington, stated to the author (for publication)
that under the regulations in force in 1846 Taylor was bound to specify
the kind and amount of supplies that he wanted. (Knew) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p.
685 (Whiting, Nov. 30). (Assuming) Taylor to Butler, July 1, _supra_.
(Depended) _Ibid._ (Useless) _Ibid._; Taylor in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 547.
(Denunciations) Taylor in Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 547-8, 558, etc.

Marcy to Taylor, June 8, 1846: You are expected to "push your advantages
to the utmost extent it can be done with the means at your command" (Ho.
60; 30, 1, p. 325).

As late as May 24 Taylor knew little about the depth of the river. It
was then being studied (Thomas in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 654). May 18 he
called for only one steamboat (_ibid._, 653), and May 28 for only three
more (_ibid._, 656). By August 11 about twenty were said to be on the
river. The documents appear to show that the quartermaster's department,
notwithstanding Taylor's complaints against it, did about all in this
matter that could reasonably have been expected under the circumstances
(_ibid._, 549, 763). It was difficult to find light-draught boats that
were strong enough to risk a voyage across the Gulf. It should be borne
in mind here and elsewhere that the war bill of May 13 threw suddenly
upon the war department a very extensive and complicated business,
such as it requires years to build up in civil life. Many of Jesup's
subordinates were doubtless old, lazy or fond of "red tape"; others
lacked the necessary capacity; still others were political henchmen;
but they seem in general to have been willing. Taylor said he did not
like the plan of campaign (to Butler, July 1, _supra_), but had not been
willing to obtrude his ideas upon the government. On this point consult
note 28 of chapter ix.

When Taylor found himself in trouble about boats, he undertook to cover
his lack of foresight by denouncing (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 547-8, 558,
etc.) the government for sending a flood of volunteers without supplying
the means of transportation. But evidently, in the first place, if
Taylor, who had been near the Rio Grande for about seven months and then
upon it for nearly two, did not feel sure as late as May 21 whether it
could be made to serve (_ibid._, 300), Jesup, who possessed no definite
and reliable information on the subject of the river (_ibid._, 560)
could not very well know whether Taylor could and would use it, how many
boats he would need, and how much water they should draw. In the second
place, if the General had provided transportation for his regulars and
the men he called out on April 26, he would have been able to establish
the dépôt, leave about 1000 men to guard it, and advance with as many
troops (some 6000) as he planned to throw forward at first (Ho. 60; 30,
1, p. 330 (Taylor), 561 (Jesup); Madigan, cat. no. 2, 1914 (Taylor,
July 1); Taylor, Letters (Bixby) 40, 44; =370=_Id._ to ----, draft,
June 18; Smith, Remins., 14). Thirdly, even if a flood of twelve-months
volunteers came, those he did not require for the forward movement
could have been left at healthy camps in the rear, as he himself pointed
out (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 330), to drill and prepare. Fourthly, instead
of complaining that a lack of boats prevented his advancing (_ibid._,
305, 307), he might--for aught that we know--have pushed forward his
regulars promptly by land, having for this operation a month of good
weather and a wagon train ample for twice that number of men (_ibid._,
560, 651). And, finally, it is worth mention that Scott's letter of
May 18 was probably as early an official notification of the coming
volunteer forces as could prudently have been given. Rives observes (U.
S. and Mexico, ii, 252), "Taylor was thus obviously disabled for some
time [by the sickness of the volunteers resulting from the rainy season
from making any extensive forward movement." But (1) Taylor had a month
of good weather after the capture of Matamoros; (2) the regulars were
not sickly, and might have been pushed forward with little delay; (3)
the sickness near and below Matamoros was not such as to prevent him
from completing his expeditionary force with volunteers; (4) the boats,
which began to arrive about the first of July, would have enabled the
necessary number of volunteers to move promptly; (5) and even the severe
sickliness at Camargo did not prevent advancing with fair promptness
after Taylor had decided to move. Of course it must be remembered that
Taylor had much to think about, and lacked experience.

10.14. There was also a notable want of order and energy, said Worth, in
the control of the steamboats (=69=to Bliss, July 27).

10.15. By August 4 substantially all of the regulars except the cavalry
and two or three batteries set out. June 16, the adj. gen. (Ho. 60; 30,
1, p. 454) estimated that Taylor would have under his immediate command
about 11,840 twelve-months volunteers and would soon receive nearly 800
regulars. This left out of account a regiment and a half from Texas and
some other small corps. Taylor may, then, have had at about this time
(not allowing for discharges) 15,500 men. An account printed in the
Cincinnati _Chronicle_ of Sept. 6 gave him 15,810. Lieut. Col. Clarke,
Eighth Infantry, remained in command at Matamoros, and Major Gardner,
Fourth Artillery, at Point Isabel and Brazos Island (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p.
533). The rank of these officers indicates that but few soldiers were
left behind, and at Reynosa and Mier there were only detachments. During
July Capt. Gillespie with a company of Texas Rangers marched from San
Antonio and passed through Laredo, Guerrero and Mier, finding the people
quiet in those towns (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 402).

10.16. _Occupation of Camargo, etc._ The distance from the Gulf to
Camargo by water was also called 450 miles (Smith, To Mexico, 92).
Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 690-1 (Hunt). (Mishaps) =76=Letter from Matamoros,
July 13; Whiting, Aug. 3 in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 675; _Gaceta de Ciudad
Victoria_, July 21; Matamoros _Reveille_, June 24 ("The channel [of
the river] shifts and fills with incredible rapidity"); _Niles_, July
18, p. 310; Aug. 1, p. 341. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 300, 336-8, 397-402,
408. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 120, 123, 125, 132-151. =69=Smith to Bliss,
July 8. Donnavan, Adventures. =180=Pillow to wife, Aug. 8. Meade,
Letters, i, 106-7, 118. Henshaw narrative. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 239.
Robertson, Remins., 107-9. Brackett, Lane's Brig., 23-4. Tilden, Notes,
10. =69=Miles to Bliss, July 8, 14. (Alcalde) Encarnacion Prisoners, 25.
=76=Comte. gen., Saltillo, July 20. =76=Mejía, July 19. _Picayune_, July
26; Aug. 1, 6, 9, 14, 15. Wilhelm, Eighth Infantry, ii, 279. Taylor,
Letters (Bixby), 25, 30, 39, 40. =65=_Id._, gen. orders 93, July 30.
Ewing, diary, Aug. 20-31, 1846. =76=García to Parrodi, Aug. 10. Grant,
Mems., i, 104. =267=Memo. [apparently from Maj. Smith]. Kenly, Md. Vol.,
61-4. French, Two Wars, 59. _Niles_, Sept. 5, p. 1; 19, p. 56. Sanders,
June 5 in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 551. (Mier) =69=Vinton to Lee, Aug. 1;
Smith, To Mexico, 66; Green, Journal, 82.

10.17. _At Camargo._ =99=Gov. Tamaul. to Tampico ayunt., July 23.
=80=Gov. N. León, July 2, 1846. _Picayune_, Aug. 1, 6, 9, 14, 15; Sept.
12. Smith, Remins., 35. Sanders, June 5 in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 551.
McClellan, diary. Henshaw narrative. Meade, Letters, i, 119, 121. Ewing,
diary, Aug. 31-Sept. 19. Robertson, Remins., 109-11. Wash. _Union_,
Sept. 14; Oct. 5. Bishop, Journal. =185=Worth to Duncan, July 30.
(Worth) Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., ii, 278; Special orders 72 in Ho. 60; 30,
1, p. 529; =61=W. to adj. gen., May 9; =61=Marcy to W., May 11. Henry,
Camp. Sketches, 121, 152-4. Giddings, Sketches, 83. Taylor, Letters
(Bixby), 42, 176. Trans. Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1906, pp. 176-7.
_Vedette_, ix, no. 10. Tennery, diary, Oct. 28. =139=Campbell to D. C.,
Aug. 28. Nashville _Union_, Oct. 17. _Niles_, Sept. 12, p. 23; Jan. 2,
1847, p. 286. =117=Pillow to wife, Sept. 6; Dec. 24. Sedgwick, Corres.,
i, 13, 30. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 1, 1846. (Mier) Ho. 60; 30,
1, p. 1180 (Taylor).

Camargo was the proper place for Taylor's dépôt, but no Americans were
needed there except the quartermaster's force and a guard of regulars.
For these there was sufficient elevated ground. The regulars occupied
this ground (_Picayune_, Aug. 15), and suffered comparatively little;
but we know enough of the conditions existing at Camargo to pronounce
the place unfit for the number of men encamped there.

10.18. May 9 Paredes decided that all the American consuls should cease
to exercise their functions, and four days later orders were issued that
wherever a U. S. war vessel should appear, the Americans should embark
or go twenty leagues into the interior. Mexican consuls in the United
States were soon directed to close their offices. =52=B. E. Green, Apr.
25, 1844: Tornel "hates us with a most envenomed spite." =52=Ellis,
Sept. 20, 1839: Tornel shows a bitter and unrelenting hostility toward
the United States.

10.19. Feb. 4, 1846, _El Tiempo_, the favorite journal of Paredes, had
said: "We are not a people of traders and adventurers, the scum and
dregs of all countries, whose only mission is to rob the Indians of
their land and then seize the fertile regions opened to civilization
by the Spanish race." June 13 _La Esperanza_, of Tampico, close to the
field of war, printed the Address of a Patriotic Junta [Committee] to
raise funds for the campaign, which used the following language about
the Americans: "People without morality, composed of the scum of all
nations; people without honesty, who count their bankruptcies by the
numberless number of their enterprises; people without religion, who
tolerate all beliefs and mock at the most sacred things; people for whom
probity is not a virtue, who value money and know nothing of glory, a
monstrous collection of the most heterogeneous elements united by the
double bond of crime and fear, etc."

10.20. _Paredes, Mexico and the war._ (Paredes' appearance) Portrait,
City Hall, Mexico; _Aguila del Norte_, Mar. 18. London _Times_, Mar. 13,
1846. Bankhead, nos. 13, 45, 72, 92, 100, 1846. =52=Slidell, Feb. 6,
17. México á través, iv, 567-8. Dublán, Legislación, v, 134-6. Apuntes,
68. _Diario_, May 18; June 2, 7, 12, 17, 26-30; July 2, 4, 6, 21, 23,
25, 26, 28, 30. Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846. Bustamante, Nuevo
Bernal, ii, 58. =52=Black, no. 379, July 4. _Monitor Repub._, June 1,
4, 30, 1846. _Imparcial_, July 15, 1846. _Indicador_, June 4; July 24,
1846. _Esperanza_, May 30, 1846. _Pregonero_, June 18, 1846. =84=S. L.
Potosí assembly, procl., May 22, 1846. Wash. _Union_, June 18, 1846.
Balbontín, Estado Militar. =13=Foreign Office to Bankhead, June 1, 1846.
=76=Parrodi, June 8, 1846.

10.21. Mar. 31, 1846 (no. 8), the British Foreign Office wrote to
Bankhead, the minister at Mexico, that according to the British minister
at Madrid the project of setting up a monarch in Mexico was entertained
in Spain. See also chap. iv, note 15 and chap. vi, note 32.

10.22. _The political situation of Paredes._ =52=Slidell, Jan. 14; Feb.
6, 17; Mar. 1, 18, 27; Apr. 2, 1846. =13=Bankhead, nos. 12, 15, 22, 27,
34, 45, 49, 57, 62, 63, 80, 92, 98, 111, 1846. Conner, Mar. 2 in Ho.
60; 30, 1, p. 121. Dublán, Legislación, v, 134-6. _Diario_, April 19;
May 4, 13; June 7, 28, 1846. Tributo á la Verdad. =52=Black, June 1;
July 29; Aug. 12. London _Times_, Mar. 13; Apr. 11; Aug. 7; Sept. 5, 9;
Oct. 7. Gov. Durango to Dur. cong., Nov. 8, 1846 (pamphlet). =47=Wood
to Bancroft, June 4. Bermúdez de Castro, no. 316, res., Aug. 28, 1846.
=76=Acta, Mazatlán, May 7, 1846. =52=Dimond, no. 317, Feb. 2, 1846.
Paredes, Papers (García, ed.), 43, 46. México á través, iv, 556, 558.
=75=Gov. Jalisco, Feb. 24, 1846. =75=Circular, Apr. 18, 1846. _Monitor
Constit._, Jan. 9, 1846. _Boletín de Noticias_, June 1, 1846. _Monitor
Repub._, May 23; June 6, 7, 9, 22; July 5, 14, 1846. _Republicano_, June
27, 1846. =80=Gov. Jalisco, decree, May 25, 1846. Bustamante, Nuevo
Bernal, ii, 15. =76=Paredes, manifiesto, Mar. 21. Memoria de ... Guerra,
Dec., 1846. =76=Comte. gen. Méx., Aug. 2, 1846. _Niles_, June 6, p.
211; June 20, p. 242. =80=Gov. Méx., April 20, 1846. Lerdo de Tejada,
Apuntes, ii, 524, 530, 531, 536. Sierra, Evolution, i, 215. =13=Forbes
to Bankhead, July 2, 1846.

A pamphlet said, "_¡A las armas, Mexicanos!_ People, a horrible treason,
an infamous treason threatens our independence, our adored independence,
for which our fathers gave their lives"; Paredes and his coterie of
wretches are aiming to hand us over, manacled, to the foreigners;
"this is a fact, Mexicans; read, read that newspaper, protected by the
government, called _El Tiempo_."

10.23. _E.g. El Telégrafo_ said in capitals on March 31: "Many a
nation would like to take by the hand" one of the heroes who helped
to establish it, and "the silence of the majestic tomb replies, 'He
no longer lives'; but Santa Anna does live, and his voice proclaims,
'Mexico shall be great, free and happy.'"

10.24. A revolt in favor of Santa Anna occurred at Mazatlán on May 7,
but it was not an integral part of the movement.

10.25. Paredes was imprisoned in the fortress of Ulúa, transferred to
Perote castle, and early in October permitted to leave the country. In
this revolution Tornel miscalculated and stood out against Santa Anna.
The Puebla garrison also was hostile at first. The title of Salas was,
"Most Excellent Señor, General-in-Chief of the Liberating Republican
Army exercising the Supreme Executive Power."

10.26. _The downfall of Paredes._ London _Times_, Aug. 6, 1845; Feb. 10;
May 13; Oct. 7, 1846. W. S. Parrott, June 4. =52=Campbell, Apr. 8, 1845.
Slidell, Mar. 27, 1846. _Imparcial_, June 18, 1906. Dimond, nos. 324-7,
329, 331, Mar. 18, 22, 31; Apr. 1, 5, 17, 1846. Santa Anna's "Plan,"
etc., in Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 34-6. Sierra, Evolution, i, 215-7. Suárez
y Navarro, Causas, 82. Mora, Papeles Ined., 59. Bankhead, nos. 57, 78,
88, 100, 110, 111, 149, 1846. =13=Giffard, April 1; Aug. 1. Memoria
de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846 (and documents). Giménez, Memorias, 92.
Acta, Guadalajara, May 22, 1846 (pamphlet). México á través, iv, 555,
569-76. _Picayune_, April 21. _Diario_, May 4; July 31; Aug. 1-9,
26. =285=Montoya to Paredes, April 1. =285=Parrodi to Paredes, July
25. =182=Almonte to ----, May 13. _Monitor Repub._, June 22; Aug. 4.
=52=Black, Apr. 26; May 21; July 29; Aug. 6, 22, 27; Sept. 17; Oct. 8.
_Plan Salvador_, Feb. 11, 1847. =47=Conner, July 16, 28; Aug. 12., 1846.
=166=Pommarès to Conner, July 31. _Monitor Repub._, Aug. 4. =73=Bermúdez
de Castro, no. 316, res., Aug. 28, 1846. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii,
531-5. Memoria ... de Guerra, Dec., 1846. Dublán, Legislación, v, 146,
155. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 63, 67-74. =94=Circular of Hacienda,
Aug. 15. Also from =76= the following. Letter to Guerra, Acapulco,
Apr. 15. To Garay and Falcon, April 7. To Bravo, April 13. Rea, June
5. Comte. gen. Oaxaca, June 15. Yáñez, Aug. 31. _Id._ to troops, May
20. _Id._, address, June 7. _Id._, proclam., July 16. Acta, Mazatlán,
May 7. Acta, Tepic, May 12. Yáñez to Reyes, May 22. To Morales, Aug.
7. To Parrodi, July 31. Acta, Coatepec, July 20. Comte. gen. V. Cruz,
July 1, 9, 21. Rebolledo to Echagaray, July 20. Paredes, Sept. 12. To
comte. gen. Vera Cruz, Sept. 18. Acta, Jalapa, Aug. 2. Salas to Mora,
Aug. 4. To Paredes, Aug. 4. Agreement, Aug. 6. Salas, proclam., Aug.
6. Circulars, July 27; Aug. 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 15, 17. The Guerra archives
contain a great number of documents relating to internal troubles at
this time. For the Organic Bases see chap, ii, p. 52.

10.27. The captain general of Cuba had been ordered--evidently in the
interest of the Mexican monarchical party--to prevent Santa Anna from
returning to Mexico, but was friendly to him, and gave him a passport on
the grounds that he could not be prevented from going, that an attempt
to hold him (contrary to the rules of neutrality and hospitality) might
be made an excuse for misusing the Spanish residing in that country, and
that, even should the monarchical plan be carried out, its results would
probably not be stable (=72=Reales Ordenes, Serie de Gobernación, legajo
43). He went in a hired vessel called the _Arab_, under British colors.
Near Vera Cruz the _Arab_ was hailed by the U. S. sloop-of-war _St.
Mary's_ and boarded, but was permitted to proceed (S. Anna, Apelación,
17; Semmes, Service, 118; Taylor, Broad Pennant, 254-5). Conner stated
that the _Arab_ was not boarded, but apparently he wrote this before
receiving a report from the _St. Mary's_. The city of Vera Cruz had not
declared for Santa Anna, and did not do so for some time. In fact the
city government appeared so unsympathetic that an effort was immediately
made to overthrow it. Santa Anna was accompanied by Almonte, Rejón and
other partisans. See _Courrier des Etats Unis_, Aug. 22; =313=Letters in
Saunders papers; =297=Mackenzie, July 11; =166=Campbell to Conner, Aug.
7; =166=Conner, Aug. 17; ("Flower") Kenly, Md. Vol., 392-3; =76=comte.
gen. V. Cruz, Aug. 16, 22; Tributo á la Verdad; Semmes, Service, 118-9;
=100=Landero and Pérez, July 31; Bankhead, nos. 121, 122, Aug. 29;
=47=Conner, Aug. 16; _Diario_, Aug. 28; Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec.,
1846.

10.28. _Santa Anna till he reaches El Encero._ Ruxton, Adventures
(1849 ed.), 17, 18, 20, 47. =76=Comte. gen. V. Cruz, Aug. 14, 16, 22.
Encarnacion Prisoners, 45. Stapp, Prisoners, 89, 90, 95. Calderón, Life,
i, 48-50; ii, 121. S. Anna, Apelación, 16-8. Kendall, Narrative, ii,
364. _Am. Sentinel_, June 15, 1836. =297=Mackenzie, July 11. =76=S.
Anna, Aug. 16. Rivera, Gobernantes, ii, 183, 186, 221. London _Times_,
June 25, 1836. Thompson, Recolls., 66. Ferry, Revolutions, 175-206.
=231=Powhatan Ellis, July 8, 1839. =76=Comte. gen. Zacatecas, Aug.
28. =76=Comte. gen. Oaxaca, Aug. 28. =76=Comte. gen. Tamaul., Aug.
26. =76=Comte. gen. Sinaloa, Oct. 14. =13=Bankhead, nos. 120-2, Aug.
29. Taylor, Broad Pennant, 254-5. Semmes, Service, 118-9. Memoria
de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 536.
=47=Conner, Aug. 16 (unofficial), 25, 30; Sept. 5. =166=Conner, Aug. 17.
=76=Circular, Aug. 19. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. _Indicador_,
Aug. 16. Ramírez, México, 134, 137, 139-40. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 777
(S. Anna). Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 86-7. =76=S. Anna, Sept. 7.
_Diario_, Aug. 27-8. =162=Conner to wife, Aug. 19. =52=Campbell, Nov. 10.

10.29. This account is based upon a study of his career and a wide
range of reading. A few sources may be specified: _Atlas_, Feb. 1,
1845. Bankhead, nos. 66, 110, 1844. Calderón, Life, ii, 121. Sierra,
Evolution, i, 190, 198, 203, 210, 216. Mofras, Exploration, i, 14.
Negrete, México, xiii, 370. León, Historia, 480. Defensa de S. Anna.
_Nacional_, Dec 22, 1847. _Arco Iris_, Dec. 7, 1847. _Monitor Repub._,
Oct. 12; Dec. 12, 1847. =166=Campbell to Conner, July 9, 1846. Noticias
Importantes. =73=Reports of the Spanish legation (which give striking
evidence of S. Anna's intellectual qualities and volubility). Proceso
del Gral. S. Anna. Biog. del Gral. S. Anna.

10.30. No doubt Santa Anna had felt at an earlier period and possibly
felt even now an occasional emotion of patriotism inundate his soul,
as a Mexican proclamation would have said. Few are so utterly selfish
as never to bestow a kind wish upon their fellow-creatures, and Santa
Anna was bad in a spontaneous, human way, not in that of cold villainy.
Probably he was largely guided by worse men than himself, who had more
ability to think but needed him to execute their designs.

10.31. The army sent agents to question Santa Anna with reference to
his intentions. It may safely be assumed that he reassured the military
chiefs regarding his real aims.

10.32. The _Boletín Oficial_ of S. L. Potosí said on July 31: "And
liberty! Oh liberty! There also we meet with fine phrases. How beautiful
are phrases! How they fill the heart! Santa Anna instead of Paredes
..., is not this liberty, I ask? A prince from abroad, a dictator from
Mexico,--is not this also liberty, I ask?"

10.33. =47=Conner reported that on August 28 an American urged upon
Santa Anna the necessity of making peace with the United States, and
that Santa Anna replied in substance as follows: I am convinced of that
but will not assume the responsibility of proposing it; I am old; I have
money enough; I will not run the risk of dying in exile; I will assemble
Congress as soon as possible and act as the majority shall decide;
meanwhile I will attempt the arduous task of repelling the invaders.
This American was Hargous, a merchant of Vera Cruz (see Bustamante,
Nuevo Bernal, ii, 90; =166=Pommarès to Conner, Aug. 29). The British
minister believed that Santa Anna had made an arrangement with the
United States at Havana, but was prevented by the unpopularity of his
return from carrying out the agreement (Bankhead, no. 128, Sept. 7).

10.34. A striking glimpse into the situation is given by the fact that
for some time the government could not communicate confidentially with
Santa Anna because there was nobody it dared trust with such a mission,
and no person of importance dared absent himself from the centre of
intrigue (Ramírez, México, 145).

10.35. A series of acts concluded on October 23 restored fully the
externals of the federal system (Ramírez, Memorias, 33-4). This change
metamorphosed departments into states.

10.36. The constitution of 1824 was revived _so far_ as it did not
conflict with the revolution of Aug. 4. Salas was a weak man and longed
to escape from his difficult and trying situation (Bankhead, no. 140,
Sept. 29; Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 101; México á través, iv, 577).

10.37. Other war measures were: (Aug. 28) free importation of arms;
(Aug. 31) severe penalties for civil and military officers refusing to
obey orders during the war; (Sept. 3) the free manufacture and sale
of gunpowder; (Sept. 4) a commission to provide lands for American
deserters; (Sept. 10) naturalization to be gained by entering the army
or navy; (Sept. 10) reëstablishment of the Military Normal School at
Chapultepec under the name Military College; (Sept. 11) regulations for
the National Guard. The purpose of offering a pardon to deserters from
the regular army was probably to transfer men from it to the National
Guards (Bankhead, no. 126, Sept. 7).

10.38. The attitude of the best citizens was probably stated by the
_Monitor Republicano_ of Aug. 25: "We will say to Santa Anna: ... if
you recognize your errors, promote the welfare of the country, pursue
a course entirely different from your former policy, and prove by
acts--not words--that your misdeeds were not crimes but errors, then
Mexico will forget the past and reward liberally the citizen conferring
upon her so marked a benefit."

10.39. Thirteen municipalities of Oaxaca contributed a total of 75 pesos.

10.40. Guadalupe Hidalgo, a suburb on the northern side of Mexico,
contained a deeply venerated shrine of the Virgin.

10.41. _The situation and Santa Anna's course._ =47=Conner, July 28;
Aug. 12, 16 (unofficial), 25; Sept. 5, 13, 22; Oct. 4. =73=Bermúdez de
Castro, no. 316, res., Aug. 28; nos. 345-6, Sept. 28. Ramírez, México,
131-5, 137, 145, 149. =52=Black, Aug. 22, 27; Sept. 12, 22, 28; Oct. 8.
Mora, Papeles Ined., 60. =162=Conner to wife, Aug. 29. Heller, Reisen,
195-6. Sierra, Evolution, i, 215. Tributo á la Verdad. =70=Degrees,
Aug. 22, 28. =76=Salas, proclams., Aug. 28; decrees, Sept. 10, 27.
=13=Gutiérrez de Estrada to Palmerston, Mar. 1, 1847. =76=Circular,
Aug. 28 ("infamous" reports that the govt. aims to destroy the army).
=13=Bankhead, nos. 111, 120-2, 126, 128, 136, 140, 142, 1846. Rivera,
Jalapa, iii, 787-9. =166=Campbell to Conner, July 9, 13. =166=Pommarès
to Conner, Aug. 29; Sept. 23. _Amer. Sentinel_, June 15, 1836. _Revue
des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 1847, p. 404. México á través, iv, 577-9,
590, 628. _Diario_, Aug. 27-Sept. 6, 9, 11-20, 23, 25-30. =47=Black to
Conner, Sept. 24. _Eco de Tampico_, Nov. 4 (If S. Anna beats the enemy
he will be the idol of the Mexicans). =76=Circulars, Aug. 17, 22, 28,
31; Sept. 3, 15, 17, 20, 25, 28. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec. García,
Revol. de Ayutla, 15. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec. =77=Circular,
Sept. 10; Nov. 27. Dublán, Legislación, v, 155-61. _Republicano_, Sept.
15, 29; Nov. 5. =76=To Almonte, Aug. 28. =76=S. Anna, Sept. 7, 13, 14,
21, 24, 25, 26. Apuntes, 67, 115. Tributo á la Verdad. Bustamante,
Nuevo Bernal, ii, 94, 96, 101, 111. =76=Comte. gen. Puebla, Sept. 6.
_Diario_, supplem. to no. 39. =70=Almonte to comte. gen. Méx., Sept.
15. =76=Comte. gen. V. Cr., procl., Oct. 1. _Monitor Repub._, Aug.
25; Sept. 14-15, 18, 25. Ruxton, Advent. (1847), 47, 49. _Imparcial_,
June 18, 1906. =76=Comte. gen. Querétaro, procl., Sept. 29. S. Anna,
Apelación, 20. London _Times_, Oct. 7; Nov. 6. (380) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p.
1046 (Scott).

10.42. (Bulls) =121=Handbill.


                    XI. TAYLOR SETS OUT FOR SALTILLO

11.1. =76=Arista, May 25, 29. =76=To Mejía, May 27. (Monterey)
=169=Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. 9. Apuntes, 50-3. =76=Mejía, June 9,
19; July 2. =76=_Id._, proclam., July 6. The number of officers, each
of whom required baggage and servants, was excessive. Arista eliminated
more than half of them. The cavalry were afoot, and he took steps to
remount them. Contracts were made for mules to draw the cannon, and the
work of putting the artillery in order began. Owing to Mejía's illness,
Requena assumed the actual command in June (Carreño, Jefes, ccii).

11.2. Apuntes, 51, 53. =285=Letter to Paredes, July 13. =285=Segura
to Escudero, June 4. Balbontín, Invasión, 26. =76=Arista, Apr. 24.
=76=Mejía, June 9, 19, 20; July 19, 29; Aug. 19, 21. =76=_Id._ to Baz,
July 29. =76=Ampudia, Aug. 28. =76=Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31. =69=Spy to
Taylor, Apr. 5. In addition to their lack of patriotism, the people had
no arms (=76=gov. N. León, May 24).

11.3. =69=Vinton to Worth, Aug. 19. =285=Mejía to Paredes, July 20.
And from =76= the following. Mejía, June 14 ("The loss of the immense
territory divided by the Sierra is inevitable"); July 9, 19; Aug. 10,
17, 21. _Id._ to Canales, Aug. 10. Gargollo to second alcalde of S.
Fernando, June 5. S. Fernando ayunt. to gov. of Tamaulipas, June 8.
Canales, June 18. _Id._ to Mejía, June 14; June 14, personal. Gov. of N.
León, June 24.

Mejía reported that the officers at Monterey agreed to make no
pronunciamiento and to obey the established authorities, whoever they
might be; but a spy reported "utter confusion" in the public mind there
(Vinton, _supra_) in consequence of the revolution of August 4, and
Worth heard that a state of things existed which might have been taken
advantage of by Taylor (=69=to Bliss, Aug. 27).

11.4. (Intended) June 24 Taylor wrote: "If the gov. think proper to
entrust me with this command for the purpose of carrying the war into
the enemies country I do not feel authorized to decline the same"
(Letters (Bixby), 18). The context shows that Taylor then knew (p. 17)
that he _was_ to have the command. The orders to that effect had been
issued June 8. In fact the orders of Jan. 13 directed Taylor to assume
the offensive, should Mexico begin hostilities, and his report of Apr.
26 recommended operating beyond the Rio Grande (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 91,
141). All that he did and failed to do must therefore be viewed in the
light of the fact that he knew, or should have known, that he ought
to wage a vigorous and aggressive campaign. (Smuggling) Henry, Camp.
Sketches, 19. The smuggling on this border was a familiar theme in the
Mexican press. =76=Arleji to Ampudia, Aug. 31 (some Mexicans are led by
self-interest to serve the Americans more faithfully than they would
serve their own country). =76=Mejía (July 19) classed the people of the
border generally as enemies. Taylor seems to have neglected persistently
the duty of obtaining information (_Niles_, Sept. 12, p. 22; _So. Qtrly.
Rev._, Nov., 1850, p. 457). Apparently he tried interrogating Mexicans
here and there, and was disgusted to find their statements disagreed.
What he should have had was, as Scott recommended (Ho. 60; 30, 1,
p. 327) many carefully selected agents (spies), whose accounts could
have been sifted by comparison. No evidence can be found that he even
attempted to follow this advice, though Worth realized the value of
information, and did something of real utility. Taylor's lack of data
will appear later. Meade, who was in a position to be well-informed,
wrote on Sept. 17 near Marín that the Americans knew no more of the
numbers or defences at Monterey than when they were at Matamoros
(Letters, i, 130). Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 156-60) endeavors to
show that Scott interfered unwarrantably and caused confusion by giving
Taylor instructions on June 12 that were at variance with those given by
Marcy on June 8 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 323, 325). But (1) Marcy knew of and
endorsed Scott's "interference" (_ibid._, p. 328); and (2) there was no
practical variance. Marcy and Scott agreed that Taylor was to advance.
Scott said Taylor would make the high road toward the capital one of his
lines, which was (as Scott said) a matter "of course." Marcy said it had
not been decided whether he should advance _to_ the capital.

11.5. Polk, Diary, Sept. 5, 1846; Mar. 20, 1847. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 545
(Jesup). =76=Gov. Tamaulipas, Aug. 5 (Taylor obtained 1000 mules through
the alcalde of Reynosa). Upton, Military Policy, 215 (not known at
Washington that wagons could be used). Taylor, Letter to Gaines. Ho. 60;
30, 1, pp. 559, 565-6 (Jesup). Smith, Remins., 13-15. Taylor, Letters
(Bixby), 177-8. =61=Worth to alcalde, Aug. 24. Henry, Camp. Sketches,
164. N. Y. _Commerc. Advertiser_, Mar. 29, 1847. May 21 Taylor wrote
that the means of transportation might be pack-mules "chiefly" (Ho. 60;
30, 1, p. 300). (Taylor's plans not known) Sen. 1; 30, 1, 546 (Jesup).
(Complained) =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 1; =61=to adj. gen., Sept.
10; Letter to Gaines; Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 557.

Wagons (drawn usually by eight mules) were more convenient, where they
could be used, than pack-mules; but Santa Anna showed, six months later,
that with no such wagons 24-pound cannon and an army three times as
large as Taylor proposed to take could be moved about twice the distance
from Camargo to Monterey by a route that passed through, not a populated
region like that where Taylor was, but a virtual desert. Taylor not only
knew that Arista had depended upon mules, but captured that general's
entire outfit. It was easy to obtain large numbers of mules through the
alcaldes. Experience proved that unbroken mules could be made fit for
the work in three days (Smith, Remins., 18). The first call for wagons
(May 18) proceeded from a quartermaster at Pt. Isabel, who called for
seventy. There is no evidence that Taylor prompted this requisition,
and it was wholly inadequate for his professed needs. His indifference
about such matters was illustrated by Col. Cross, at the time his chief
quartermaster, who said, "With respect to the means of transportation to
be provided, or other preparations in my branch of the service, I have
never received a line of instructions or any order whatever from Gen.
Taylor" (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 650). It was his duty to call seasonably for
the desired number of wagons, and he did not do it.

When the department found that wagons were wanted, it displayed much
energy in having them purchased or built (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 546-764).
In fact, on an intimation from Scott (May 15), it ordered 200 to be
constructed at Philadelphia as soon as they could be thoroughly made,
and eleven days later sent an agent to Cincinnati for 300 more. Later
the field of operations extended as far as Boston. But much time was
required to find suitable lumber and skilled workmen, build the wagons
properly, and transport them to Mexico. None reached the front in time
for the fall campaign; and indeed, after they arrived, pack-mules
continued to be used (Whiting: Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 688). Taylor complained
particularly (Bixby collection, 185) because 100-150 wagons intended for
him went to Wool, whose expedition will be described in chap. xiii; but
Wool was under Taylor's orders, and the latter neglected to regulate
the matter, while the former was alert and active. Taylor complained
also of lacking mules, harness, pack-saddles, horseshoe nails, etc.;
but, as in the cases of boats and wagons, the fault seems chargeable to
the head of the army. He conceived the absurd idea that the government
was endeavoring to ruin him by crippling his operations, as if success
had not been fully as important for the government as for him. Worth
privately said that any lack of transportation was chargeable to
Taylor, and described the General's complaints as intended to ward off
responsibility in case of failure and augment glory in case of success
(=364=to Capt. S., Sept. 5); and on the maturest consideration this
judgment appears to be substantially correct. For a statement of the
chief clerk, quartermaster's office, Washington, see chap. x, note
13. The practical conclusion is that Taylor, with nearly 300 wagons
and numberless mules at command, was able to move with reasonable
promptness. Jesup, after reaching the scene, contracted for 2000 mules
in one day, and said that Taylor might have collected 10,000 (Ho. 60;
30, 1, p. 567).

One must be extremely cautious about asserting what a general might
have done; but it seems quite clear that Taylor could and should have
organized a systematic spy service that would have given him adequate
information regarding the Mexican army and the defences of Monterey;
have advanced his regulars, about 1000 at least of his best volunteers,
a large supply of provisions, at least six 18-pounders, entrenching
tools, etc. to Camargo in June; have had at least 3000 mules collected
there by August 1; have placed, say, 2000 regulars and 1000 volunteers
at Cerralvo by Aug. 15, and gathered the large stocks of subsistence
available in that district; and have reached Monterey with 9000 men,
heavy guns and ample supplies by Sept. 15. Or Taylor might have gone
to Saltillo _via_ Monclova. The distance would have been considerably
greater, but the Mexicans would have had to abandon Monterey and
Rinconada Pass, and Taylor and Wool would have been able to coöperate.
Both Santa Anna and Mejía feared he would adopt this plan. In reply to
all this it may be said that on pp. 198-9 the author mentioned without
disapproval Scott's plan to begin the campaign about Sept. 25. But the
two cases were not parallel. Taylor was already in the "hot mud" and
needed to bestir himself; and he planned but a small movement, whereas
Scott, not yet in touch with the conditions, planned a large and
decisive one, which probably would not have advanced _via_ Monterey.

11.6. (Knew) Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 46, 51, 177; N. Y. _Herald_, July
25; _Niles_, July 18, p. 309; Scott, Mems., ii, 391-2; _Cong. Globe_,
29, 2, app., 125 (Ingersoll). A resolution was introduced in Congress
asking the reason for the inactivity of the army (_Niles_, July 18, p.
309). One newspaper called Taylor "Gen. Delay." (Sustain) Taylor, Letter
to Gaines. (Consequences) Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 46. (Suspected)
Taylor, _ibid._, 13, 20. (Resistance) Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 1
("I hope to be in possession of Monterey and Saltillo, as soon as our
legs can carry us there"); Bliss, Aug. 14, in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 411
(Taylor "anticipates no serious difficulty in reaching and occupying
Saltillo"); =135=Taylor to Butler, Aug. 26; _Hist. Mag._, x, 207-8
(Backus); =180=Pillow to wife, Aug. 16 (Taylor says he does not think
we shall have to fire another gun in all northern Mexico). Robertson,
Remins., 125.

It has been said that Taylor knew of Polk's negotiations with Santa
Anna, and therefore had good reason to expect no resistance. But this
was a matter for his government to act upon, and the government had
said nothing of that kind to him. As we shall see, Scott, although
negotiating himself later with Santa Anna, did not relax his military
activity in the least. This was the only proper course for a general
in the field under orders to press the war. =185=Aug. 5 Worth ordered
Duncan to make a thorough examination of the routes. Aug. 8 Duncan
reported that the Mexicans were said to be fortifying Monterey. Sept.
3 Taylor wrote (Bixby coll., 51): "The country ... shall not be
disappointed; even if it should turn out to be a disaster." One does
not readily see how Taylor could have supposed that the government
wished to be, or was likely to be, supported by an admittedly inadequate
expedition.

11.7. =61=Ordnance bureau, memo., June 15. See pp. 148, 164, 177. Benet,
Ordnance Reports, 1880, ii, 158. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 329, 417 (Taylor).
For S. Anna's task see note 5 and chap. xix. =66=Sanders to Taylor, Feb.
15. =61=Ridgely to adj. gen., Aug. 2. (Bayonet) Taylor, Letters (Bixby),
178.

11.8. Robertson, Remins., 118. =69=Vinton to Worth, Aug. 19. =69=Wolf
to Bliss, Aug. 10. =69=Duncan to Worth, Aug. 8. =65=Taylor, gen. orders
98-9, 105, 108, 110. =76=Canales to Mejía, Aug. 20. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp.
411-2, 417 (Taylor), 534 (spec. orders 119). =76=Aldrete to Mejía, Aug.
30. _Picayune_, Aug. 25. Meade, Letters, i, 123. _Niles_, Sept. 5, p. 2.
=69=P. F. Smith, memoir, Oct. 14. Rowles, Allen, 93. U. S. Military maps
(War College, Washington). Duncan and also Hays explored the routes.

The army was organized as follows: REGULARS (mostly). A battery of
two 24-pound howitzers and a 10-inch mortar (100 men) from the First
Artillery. _First Division_ (Brig. Gen. Twiggs). Cavalry: Second
Dragoons. Ridgely's battery. Third Brigade (Lieut. Col. Garland):
Bragg's battery, Third and Fourth Infantry, Capt. Shiver's volunteer
company. Fourth Brigade (Lieut. Col. Wilson): First Infantry,
Washington and Baltimore battalion. _Second Division_ (Brevet Brig.
Gen. Worth). First Brigade (Lieut. Col. Staniford): Duncan's battery,
Artillery Battalion, Eighth Infantry. Second Brigade ([G]Brig. Gen. P.
F. Smith): Taylor's (Mackall's) battery, Fifth and Seventh Infantry,
Blanchard's Louisiana volunteer company. VOLUNTEERS. _Field Division_
(Maj. Gen. Butler). First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Hamer): First Kentucky
and First Ohio regiments. Second Brigade (Brig. Gen. Quitman): First
Tennessee and First Mississippi regiments (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 417).
Each of these four regiments was reduced to a strength of about 500
privates by leaving behind the physically unfit. Sept. 20, the numbers
were respectively (aside from 43 sick) 482, 524, 459, 452; also 37
artillery. _Texas Division_ (Maj. Gen. Henderson) First and Second
regiments of mounted volunteers. These and the First Mississippi
were riflemen. About Aug. 13 a regiment of Texas riflemen commanded
by Albert Sidney Johnston decided (except some who formed a company
under Shiver) to go home. Johnston was soon attached to Butler's staff
as acting inspector general (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 536). "Field Division"
simply meant those volunteers (except Texans) selected to make the
present campaign. It was a temporary and local organization. Sept. 11
Meade (Letters, i, 126) analyzed the army as follows: 8 regiments of
regular infantry (2500); 4 regiments of volunteer infantry (2000);
4 light batteries, each of 4 6-pounders (280); one heavy battery
(100); 2 squadrons of regular cavalry (200); one squadron of volunteer
cavalry (150); 2 regiments of volunteer cavalry (1000); total, 6230
men and 4-500 teamsters, hospital attendants, etc., mostly armed. Aug.
15 a man from Monterey said Taylor should not move against the city
without 12,000 well disciplined men. For the assignment of wagons and
pack-mules to the various corps see Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 501.

[G] Smith was colonel of the Mounted Rifles; but, as he had been
brigadier general of Louisiana volunteers and now commanded a brigade,
he was commonly given the higher title. In August, 1847, he was a
regular brevet brigadier general.

A pack-mule (_mula de carga_) was expected to carry 300 pounds. Not a
little skill was required to load the animal quickly in such a manner
that its burden would be secure and would not chafe; but the Mexican
mule-driver was a master of the art. The subject is rather interesting.
One may consult Inman, Old S. Fe Trail (1897), 56-8; Robertson,
Remins., 269; _Picayune_, Mar. 6, 1847 (Hughes); Robertson, Visit, i,
274; Claiborne, Quitman, i, 279 (Holt); Henshaw narrative. The troops
not taken to Monterey were probably distributed about as follows: at
Camargo, 2100 under Brig. Gens. Pillow and Marshall; at Matamoros, 1100
under Col. Clarke; below that city on the Rio Grande, 4500; at Pt.
Isabel, 120 under Maj. Gardner; in hospitals, 1400. Maj. Gen. Patterson
commanded all these forces.

11.9. Henshaw narrative. Claiborne, Quitman, ii, 306 (Taylor). Taylor,
Letters (Bixby), 56. Robertson, Remins., 119-22. =69=P. F. Smith to
Bliss, Aug. 26. =69=Worth to Bliss, Aug. 25. =148=Chamberlain, recolls.
Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 679 (Whiting). Giddings, Sketches, 108. Henry, Camp.
Sketches, 161-77.

11.10. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 54, 56. Robertson, Remins., 122.
Velasco, Geografía, iv, 121. =69=Duncan to Worth, Aug. 8. =69=Worth to
Bliss, Aug. 25. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 419 (Worth), 421 (Taylor). Wilhelm,
Eighth Inf., ii, 281. =76=Arleji to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Henry, Camp.
Sketches, 154, 177-9. Grant, Mems., i, 107. _Picayune_, Sept. 22; Oct.
6. Meade, Letters, i, 124. Kenly, Md. Vol., 85. _Metrop. Mag._, Dec,
1907, p. 316.

Worth wrote on Sept. 3 that he could have bought 5000 bushels of corn
here (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 420). Taylor stated that he found beef, goats,
sheep and corn in abundance at Cerralvo (=180=Pillow to wife, Sept.
20). These facts bear upon Taylor's complaint that the government's
failure to send wagons caused a shortage of provisions and therefore of
men, especially since the wagons used for the transportation of water
as far as Cerralvo were no longer required for that service (=65=gen.
orders. 115). On learning of the corn Taylor might, so far as concerned
subsistence, have brought on another volunteer brigade. One cannot
see why he did not push some troops on to Cerralvo instead of letting
them die at Camargo. One soldier wrote in his diary that there were
unwholesome swamps at Cerralvo, but the statement appears doubtful.
Worth's command remained at this point nearly three weeks and was still
in excellent health. If there were swamps, the camps could no doubt have
been pitched on ground above them, for a fine stream came from a gorge
in the mountain.

11.11. Balbontín, Invasión, 10-24. Apuntes, 54. Negrete, Invasión, ii,
304-5. =93=Memoranda. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. And from =76=
the following. To Ramírez, Aug. 17. Comte. gen. S. L. P., Aug. 15,
28; Sept. 2, 16. Ramírez, Aug. 17. Galindo, Aug. 24. Mejía, Aug. 17,
19. Romero, Aug. 24. To Ampudia, Aug. 17. Ampudia, Aug. 26; Sept. 2,
3, 9. Ponce de León, Sept. 19, 22. _Id._ to Ampudia, Sept. 15. Mejía
to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Returns, Sept. 10, 11. Pacheco, Aug. 25. Ampudia
reported that the First Brigade made about forty-eight miles one day.
This statement, were it not supported by similar facts, would not be
believed. The Fourth Brigade marched for Monterey, but did not arrive.
It was very poorly equipped. It reached S. L. Potosí Aug. 29, was halted
there to maintain order, and did not leave until Sept. 22.

Ampudia organized his infantry as four brigades under Gen. Ramírez, Gen.
Mejía, Col. Uraga, and Col. Mendoza, and his cavalry as two brigades
under Gens. Torrejón and Romero, the former commanding by right of
seniority all the mounted troops. The name of the señorita might excite
suspicion, but there were others who bore it.

The Mexican archives give very few complete, properly attested returns,
but we have one here, and it seems worth while to summarize it in
order to show the fragmentary character of the Mexican armies. The
attached numbers are the rank and file. Staff; a section of engineers;
do. of Plana Mayor; do. of surgeons, 10; sappers, 118; artillery, 211.
Infantry: Second Ligero regt., 220; Third do., 512; Fourth do., 397;
First Line regt., 186; Third do., 345; Fourth do., 187; detachments of
Sixth and Eighth do., 89; Seventh do., 129; Activo Battalion (First)
of Mexico, 136; Do. of Morelia, 77; Do. of S. L. Potosí, 340; Do. of
Querétaro, 340; Do. of Aguascalientes, 383; Auxiliary battalion of
Monterey, 349. Cavalry: Ligero, 80; First Line, 93; Third do., 140;
Eighth do., 99; Jalisco Lancers, 146; Activo of Guanajuato, 132; Do.
of S. L. Potosí, 123; Auxiliary Squadron of Béjar, 68; First Permanent
Co. of Tamaulipas, 41; Second do., 9; Permanent Co. of Lampazos, 23;
Do. of Béjar, 22; Do. of La Bahía, 1; First Activo Co. of N. León, 56;
Defensores [militia] of N. León, 625. Total, 5836. This was duly signed
by Ampudia and J. G. Conde. A party of deserters (mostly Irish) from the
American army, which served at Monterey, was presumably included in the
above return. They became the nucleus of the "San Patricio" corps.

11.12. From =76= the following. To Ampudia, Aug. 20, 23, 24, 28 (four
despatches), 31. Comte. gen. N. León, Aug. 26. S. Anna, Sept. 29. Aug.
24 Ampudia was told to have Mejía suspend his retreat, unless Taylor
had advanced in full force. Aug. 28 he was ordered to destroy the
fortifications and retire, leaving a strong body of cavalry to screen
Monterey and observe the Americans until the latter should arrive within
a few leagues of the town. Aug. 31 Ampudia's decision to hold the city
was endorsed. Evidently the minister of war did not agree with Santa
Anna, and on finding an excuse disregarded the latter's advice. The
comandante general was especially anxious to have the Americans attacked
during their march. He described the garrison as enthusiastic.

11.13. From =76=Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Comte. gen. N. León, Aug. 26.
Ampudia to Mejía, Aug. 24, 26. Ampudia, Aug. 26; Sept. 9. To Ampudia,
Aug. 31.

Ampudia's reasons were: 1. It would take a month to demolish the
fortifications, and during that time the enemy could attack on
advantageous terms; 2. The matériel could not be saved; 3. The
abandonment of Monterey would lead the people to declare their
independence and unite with Taylor, enabling him to hold the mountains
so strongly that 50,000 men could not dislodge him; 4. Public opinion
would blame Ampudia and the government; 5. The effect on the morale
of all the troops concerned in the affair would be fatal. His plan was
to attack the Americans in detail on their march; and then, should he
find them too strong for him, retreat with his artillery and infantry,
leaving the cavalry to fight rear-guard actions.

11.14. Apuntes, 54. From =76= the following. To Mejía, May 27. Mejía,
June 19 (two despatches); July 25. Comte. gen. N. León, Aug. 12.
Ampudia, Sept. 9. Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31.

11.15. =307=Roberts, diary, Nov. 27. Meade, Letters, i, 133, 136.
Richmond _Enquirer_, Oct. 20. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. 9. Henshaw
narrative. Apuntes, 53-4; =176=Davis to Brown, Sept. 20. Balbontín,
Invasión, 24. =92=Map and plan of defence. Negrete, Invasión, ii,
327 (Ampudia). _Picayune_, Nov. 4. Eyewitness, Complete History, 45.
Numerous maps, published and in MS.

11.16. Apuntes, 53-4. Meade, Letters, i, 138 (evidently in error about
the citadel garrison). _Picayune_, Oct. 21. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Nov.
20. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 216. Henshaw narrative. Robertson, Remins.,
126-8. =69=Mansfield, report. =66=_Id._ to Totten, June 30, 1847.
=147=Chamberlain, diary. Balbontín, Invasión, 43. =76=Comte. gen. N.
León, Sept. 20. =76=Ampudia, Sept. 9. The Americans often spoke of
the citadel as the "Black Fort" or the "Old Colored Gentleman." Its
Mexican name was Fort Independencia, but it must not be confounded with
the redoubt on Independence Hill. It stood about 1000 yards from the
densely-built part of the city.

11.17. =69=Mansfield, report. Balbontín, Invasión, 27, 38, 42. =76=Mejía
to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 424 (Taylor). =364=Worth to ----,
Oct. 2. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 46 (Marcy, report). =221=Hill, diary. Henry,
Camp. Sketches, 217.

11.18. From =76=. S. Anna to Ampudia, Aug. 13. Ampudia to Gov.
Tamaulipas, Aug. 23. Relaciones (to Guerra), Sept. 23. Ampudia, Aug. 28.
To Ampudia, Sept. 4. Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31.

11.19. _Diario_, July 4; Sept. 21. _Monitor Repub._, Sept. 25. Reid,
Scouting Expeds., 120. _Picayune_, Sept. 22. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 326.
N. Orl. _Commerc. Bulletin_, Sept. 22. =76=Ampudia, proc., Aug. 31.
=76=Proc. in English, Sept. 15. =76=Circular, Sept. 15.

11.20. _Monitor Repub._, Sept. 18; Oct. 29 (Jáuregui). =13=Bankhead,
no. 155, 1846. Apuntes, 54, 57. Balbontín, Invasión, 26. =76=Nevia to
Ampudia, Aug. 26.

11.21. Tampico _Eco_, Sept. 24. Gov. of Tamaulipas, Aug. 20. Rose,
McCulloch, 73. Mejía to Paredes, July 20. Balbontín, Invasión, 26.
Apuntes, 55-8. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 526 (spec. orders 129). And from =76=
the following. Ampudia, Aug. 31; Sept. 2, res., 15, res. _Id._ to
Torrejón, Sept. 1. Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Canales, Aug. 30. _Id._ to
Ampudia, Aug. 30-1. Mejía to comte. gen. S. L. P., Aug. 17.

Canales said in substance: The spare horses of the enemy cannot be
taken, for they are not turned loose; the roads cannot be broken up, for
they run across stony plains; the woods cannot be fired, for no great
fields of dry grass are near them; the watering places cannot be made
useless, for they are streams coming from the mountains; the wagons and
pack-mules cannot be captured, for my horses are unserviceable.

11.22. Meade, Letters, i, 129. =147=Chamberlain, diary. Giddings,
Sketches, 97. =139=W. B. to D. Campbell, Aug. 28. Nebel and Kendall,
5. Mayer, Mex. War, 159-61. _Picayune_, Nov. 13. =65=Gen. orders 115.
Smith, Chile con Carne, 94, note. Accounts of the costumes naturally
varied.

11.23. _Picayune_, Oct. 6. Greensborough _Morn. Post_, Apr. 5, 1903.
=349=Patridge to Miss W., July 21, 1847. _Metrop. Mag._, Dec., 1907,
316-7. _Spirit of the Times_, Oct. 14. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 183-6,
244. =364=Worth to S., Sept. 16. McCall, Letters, 470. Reid, Scouting
Expeds., 128. =190=Ewing, diary, Nov. 18. Robertson, Remins., 123-4.
Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 57. =69=Duncan to Worth, Aug. 8. Ho. 60; 30, 1,
p. 421-2 (Taylor).

One small mountain in this region had a bare side composed of
crystallized sulphate of lime. Here, as generally, the author draws upon
his own observations of Mexican scenery. There were a number of defiles
between Cerralvo and Monterey and a great deal of rough, bushy country,
where the Mexicans could have made Taylor no little trouble. In all
probability he could have been delayed five to seven days. See _Monitor_
_Repub._, Oct. 20, _remitido_.

11.24. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. 9. _Id._, Letters (Bixby), 57,
59. Henshaw narrative. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 277. Robertson, Remins.,
125-6. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 119-20. Apuntes, 54, 58. Wilhelm, Eighth
Inf., ii, 288. =76=Comte. gen. N. León, Sept. 20. Reid, Scouting
Expeds., 142. _Picayune_, Oct. 6. Rose, McCulloch, 100. _Niles_, Oct.
17, p. 103. =244=Chandler to Lakin, Nov. 23. Henry, Camp. Sketches,
189-91.

Wilhelm, who wrote the history of Worth's old regt. and had the use
of Worth's papers, states that, after arriving at Marín, Taylor was
"firm" in the opinion that he would meet with no serious resistance at
Monterey. Certainly he then estimated Ampudia's regulars at only about
3000 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 422).

11.25. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 15, 1847. _Id._, Letter to
Gaines. _Id._, Letters (Bixby), 178. Thorpe, Our Army at Monterey,
46. Robertson, Remins., 124. Henshaw narrative. French, Two Wars, 67.
Apuntes, 58. Chávez, July 29, 1848. =76=Ampudia, Sept. 19. _Monitor
Repub._, Oct. 20. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 190-2.

Taylor's =61=field return, Sept. 21 (the first of two numbers
represents officers): Hdqtrs. and staff, 22; 23. Webster's battery
(24-lb. howitzers), 3; 24. 1st Div. Hdqtrs. and staff, 3; 10. Ridgely's
batt., 3; 75. 2 Drags. (4 Cos.), 10; 228. Bragg's batt., 2; 64. 3 Inf.
(6 Cos.), 18; 284. 4 Inf. (6 Cos.), 16; 287. Shiver's Co., 3; 55. 1
Inf. (4 Cos.), 12; 179. Balt. and Wash. Battal. (6 Cos.), 20; 314. 2D
DIV. (see below), 93; 1558. FIELD DIV. (see below), 148; 1781. TEX.
DIV. Hdqtrs. and staff, 5 offs. 1st Regt. (10 Cos.), 32; 376. 2d Regt.
(10 Cos.), 35; 527. Surgeons, 5. Sick, 3; 143. 2D DIV. (Sept. 17).
Staffs, 5. _1st brig._: Duncan's batt., 68; Artill. Battal., 532; 8
Inf., 331. _2d brig._: Mackall's batt., 70; 5 Inf., 280; 7 Inf., 282;
Blanchard's Co., 83. (These figures include 88 com. offs.) Sick, 7;
45. 5 Inf., 7 Inf. and 8 Inf. had 6 Cos. each. Art. Battal. had 9 Cos.
FIELD DIV. (Sept. 20). Staff, 12. Artill., 37. Ky. (10 Cos.), 482;
Ohio (10 Cos.), 524; Miss. (8 Cos.), 452; Tenn. (10 Cos.), 459. (These
figures include 139 com. offs.) Sick, 1; 42. Grand totals (Sept. 21),
425; 5795 = 6220.

Taylor's formal report counted the officers twice. Ripley made the same
mistake (War with Mexico, i, 199). The 24-lb. howitzers appear to have
been classed as heavy field guns (=69=memo., ordnance office, June 15).


                             XII. MONTEREY

12.1. =66=Mansfield to Totten, Feb. 1, 1847. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 76,
83 (Taylor). Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., ii, 289. =76=Comte. gen. N. León,
Sept. 20. Stevens, Campaigns, 22. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 192. Nebel and
Kendall, 5, 6. Apuntes, 58.

12.2. Apuntes, 59. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 31 (Berra). Nebel and
Kendall, 6. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Nov. 20. J. Davis in _Cong. Globe_,
31, 1, app., 1034-41. _Picayune_, Oct. 4; Nov. 13. =221=Hill, diary.
Smith, To Mexico, 73-4. =69=Worth to Bliss, Sept. 21, 8:15 A.M.
=147=Chamberlain, diary. Balbontín, Invasión, 25, 36. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p.
102 (Worth).

The Federation 9-pdrs. were classed by the Mexicans as 8-pdrs. The
half-moon battery was designed to come into play after the capture of
the city, annoying the captors and defending the line of retreat to
Saltillo.

12.3. =76=Comte. gen. N. León, Sept. 20. =69=Worth to Bliss, Aug. 28.
=76=Ampudia, Sept. 19, res.

12.4. =221=Hill, diary. =277=Staniford to Pemberton, Sept. 26.
Robertson, Remins., 130. Nebel and Kendall, 6. Chamberlain, diary.
Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 83 (Taylor), 102 (Worth). =76=Comte. gen. N. León,
Sept. 20. _Picayune_, Nov. 13. =245=Hays to Henderson, undated.
_Pennsylvanian_, Nov. 2. Meade, Letters, i, 133. _Metropol. Mag._, Dec,
1907 (Hamilton). _Spirit of the Times_, Nov. 7. (Worth) Robertson,
Remins., Sept. 20; =185=J. Van Buren, oration; Chase, Polk Admin., 156;
=185=W. to Duncan, Apr. 15; Jacksonville (Ala.) _Republican_, Nov. 25;
Grone, Briefe, 83; Semmes, Service, 282; =327=Sutherland to father, Aug.
--.

A part of Hays's four hundred did not march until a little later. It
seems clear, although neither Taylor nor Worth mentions the fact, that
a party of dragoons accompanied the expedition (Chamberlain, diary;
Haskin, First Artillery, 307). It will be recalled that most of our
"artillery" served as infantry. Blanchard's company was made up of
men who did not wish to leave when most of the Louisiana infantry was
ordered home (p. 205).

Worth's movement was in principle extremely hazardous (Halleck, Mil.
Art, 414). Napoleon (Maxims, p. 24): "Nothing is more rash or more
opposed to the principles of war, than a flank march in the presence
of an army in position, especially when that army occupies heights at
the foot of which you must defile." This maxim seems to fit the case
precisely. Stevens (Campaigns, 28) defended the movement on the ground
that Taylor knew what could be expected of Worth's command and of the
Mexicans; but as Ampudia had shown no conspicuous want of ability and
courage on May 8 and 9, Taylor had no reason to suppose he would act
here as badly as he did. Indeed the struggle at Monterey showed that if
Taylor assumed the Mexicans would not fight, he erred. It was doubtless
realized by Taylor and Worth that the small American army, without siege
artillery or adequate supplies, could escape ruin only through extreme
boldness. Apparently the plan originated with Worth, for he knew more
about the terrain than Taylor did. Wilhelm so states, and the N. Y.
_Sun_ also, the editor of which was close to Worth, gave him that credit
(Aug. 14, 1847). Bragg (=210=to Hammond, May 4, 1848) ascribed the plan
to Taylor; but, as Taylor was the commander-in-chief, this was the
natural presumption.

12.5. Meade, Letters, i, 133. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 83 (Taylor). _Picayune_,
Nov. 13. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 29 (Jáuregui), 31 (Berra). =245=Hays to
Henderson, undated. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 152. =218=Henshaw narrative.
Ampudia, Manifiesto. Robertson, Remins., 130-1. =69=Worth to Bliss,
Sept. 20, 9:30 P.M.

12.6. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 83 (Taylor), 102 (Worth). _Monitor Repub._, Oct.
29. =76=Vázquez, Sept. 23. Balbontín, Invasión, 27. =69=Worth to Bliss,
Sept. 20, 9:30 P.M. Meade, Letters, i, 133. Robertson, Remins.,
131-2.

12.7. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 83 (Taylor), 102 (Worth). =185=Duncan to Worth,
Sept. 28. Henshaw narrative. Chamberlain, diary. Apuntes, 59. González,
Aguascalientes, 152. =185=Worth to Marcy, July 14, 1847. =69=Worth to
Bliss, Sept. 21, 8:15 A.M.; 3:40 P.M. _Picayune_, Nov. 13, 1846; Feb.
17, 1847. Meade, Letters, i, 133. Wash. _Union_, Nov. 20. =252=Mackall
to father, Sept. 27. N. Y. _Sun_, Oct. 14. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 17,
31; Nov. 15. =245=Hays to Henderson, undated. Haskin, First Artillery,
309. =180=C. F. Smith to Pemberton, Sept. 30. =277=Staniford to
Pemberton, Sept. 26. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 201. Prieto, Memorias, 205.
Reid, Scouting Expeds., 157-9.

McCulloch, being in advance, did not receive the order to take post
behind the fence, and hence fought in the road.

12.8. _The operations on Federation Ridge._ =69=Worth to Bliss, Sept.
21, 3:40 P.M. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 102 (Worth). =245=Hays to
Henderson, undated. =180=C. F. Smith to Pemberton, Sept. 30. =277=P.
F. Smith to _Id._, Sept. 27. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 31 (Berra).
=252=Mackall to father, Sept. 27. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 201-3. Nebel
and Kendall, 6-7. _Hist. Mag._, Mar., 1874, p. 138. Wash. _Union_, Nov.
12, 20. Chamberlain, diary and recolls. =278=Niehenke, statement. Meade,
Letters, i, 134. _Picayune_, Oct. 4; Nov. 13. Henshaw narrative. Reid,
Scouting Expeds., 162-6. Hill, diary.

Meade (Letters, i, 88) wrote: Worth "has the great misfortune of being
most rash and impetuous, and of constantly doing things which cooler
reflection causes him to repent. This infirmity, in my opinion, renders
him unfit to command, but on the field of battle, under another, his
gallantry and bravery are well known and most conspicuous." U. S. Grant
(Mems., i, 123) said: Worth "was nervous, impatient and restless on the
march, or when important or responsible duty confronted him."

Miles set out about forty-five minutes later than C. F. Smith. On
reaching the ridge he sent off detachments in order to divert attention
from Smith. Still restless, Worth sent Col. Hays and more Texans to the
ridge, but these did not arrive in time to do anything of consequence.
Gen. Smith's attack upon El Soldado, made on his own responsibility,
had a very important bearing upon the movement against Independence
Hill and the Bishop's Palace. Hitchcock said Gen. Smith not only aided
Worth materially but saved his reputation (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 528). The
summit and El Soldado continued to be held by the Americans. Scott and
Blanchard (who was under Scott's orders) were recalled from No. 3 to
El Soldado the next morning to coöperate in the attack on the Palace.
According to some Americans three guns were captured. This mistake
probably arose because one piece was used by the Americans at the summit
and then moved to El Soldado. According to the Mexicans there seem to
have been only 175 of them on the ridge. On both sides the loss of men
on Federation Ridge was insignificant. Worth had 15 or 20 killed and
wounded. Some thought the summit of Federation Ridge not less than 800
feet high. As the Monterey plans are unavoidably based to a large
extent upon sketches and estimates, it has not been thought best to give
a scale of miles.

12.9. _The capture of Independence Hill._ Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 102
(Worth). Ampudia, Manifiesto. =69=Worth to Bliss, Sept. 22, 8:30 A.M.,
5 P.M. French, Two Wars, 64-5. =147=Chamberlain, diary. =148=_Id._,
recolls. Balbontín, Invasión, 38-9. Apuntes, 61-2. =190=Ewing, diary.
=218=Henshaw narrative; =221=Hill, diary. _Picayune_, Nov. 13.
=252=Mackall to father, Sept. 27. Meade, Letters, i, 135-6. Wash.
_Union_, Nov. 20. _Diario_, Sept. 30. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 31
(Berra). =245=Hays to Henderson, undated. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 205.
Nebel and Kendall, 6. =185=Duncan to Worth, Sept. 28. Reid, Scouting
Expeds., 183-5. Ampudia to the People. Some officers thought the hill
nearly 600 feet high, Ampudia tardily ordered reinforcements to the
hill, but they did not arrive. Worth's loss, Sept. 22, was only about a
dozen killed and wounded.

12.10. _Taylor's and Ampudia's operations, Sept. 20-3_; _Worth's,
Sept. 23_. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 76-109 (reports of Taylor and officers).
Ho. 17; 30, 1 (reports of officers). =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Oct.
9, 1846; Jan. 26, 1847. =190=Ewing, diary. =218=Henshaw narrative.
Coleman, Crittenden, i, 309. Claiborne, Quitman, ii, 303-7. =221=Hill,
diary. Numerous reports and letters in =174= and =176=. Smith, Chile
con Carne, 82-97. Thorpe, Our Army at Monterey, 55, 59. Ampudia,
Manifiesto. _Id._ to Fellow-citizens. Robertson, Reminiscences,
136-50. =61=Graham to Polk, April --, 18.7. =61=Quitman to Hamer,
Sept. 28. =69=Capt. Vinton to Worth, Aug. 19. Taylor, gen. orders
115. =69=Worth to Bliss, Sept. 23, 11 P.M. =69=Trowbridge to Stewart,
Feb. 8, 1848. French, Two Wars, 62, 64-6. =66=Mansfield to Totten,
Feb. 1, 1847. =69=Backus to Brady, Sept. 22, 1848. =147=Chamberlain,
diary. =148=_Id._, recolls. Balbontín, Invasión, 24, 27-35, 40-3.
Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 72. Apuntes, 53, 60-4. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp.
419 (Worth), 424 (Taylor). Roberts, diary. _Hist. Mag._, Jan., 1874,
pp. 8-9. _Picayune_, Oct. 23; Nov. 4, 13. Meade, Letters, i, 134-5,
137-8, 163-5. =185=Duncan to Worth, Sept. 28. =242=Kingsbury to
mother, Oct. 14. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 29, 30. Stevens, Camps.,
23-9. =73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 371, res., 1846. _Hist. Mag._, x,
207-13, 255-7. Johnston, A. S. Johnston, 136-40. J. Davis: note 2.
_Pennsylvanian_, Nov. 2 (Peyton). Wash. _Union_, Nov. 20, 1846; Mar.
2, 1847. Balt. _Sun_, Nov. 6. _Monitor Repub._, Nov. 15. _Spirit of
the Times_, Nov. 7, 28, 1846; Jan. 9, 1847. =245=Wood to Henderson,
Sept. 24. =245=Hays to _Id._, undated. _Niles_, Nov. 28, p. 201.
=244=Chandler to Lakin, Nov. 23. =175=Russell, to Davis, Sept. 26; Oct.
18. =175=Cooper to Davis, Sept. --. Wilcox, Mex. War, 119. Kenly, Md.
Vol., 77, 107-27, etc. =139=W. B. to D. Campbell, Sept. 28; Nov. 2, 9,
1846; Feb. 19, 1847. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 193-201, 203-4, 206-12,
221. =130=Brichta, Letter. Nebel and Kendall, 7-10. =139=Campbell to
Quitman, Sept. 27; to wife, Oct. 1. =150=Cheatham to son, Oct. 6;
to sister, Oct. 16. =277=P. F. Smith to Pemberton, Sept. 27. Reid,
Scouting Expeds., 108, 152, 170, 173, 190. =76=Ampudia, Sept. 22, 25.
=76=_Id._ to comte. gen. S. L. P., Sept. 28. =76=Head of Ampudia's
medical service, Sept. 24. The author of the verse was C. F. Hoffman.

REMARKS. Taylor's lack of interest in studying the topography and
fortifications is illustrated by the fact that Butler, second in
command, does not seem to have been shown the map drawn by Meade from
information obtained by Worth, though Taylor certainly saw it (Wilhelm,
Eighth Infantry, ii, 283). Butler stated officially that when he
attacked the city he knew nothing about the locality. Capt. Henry said
Garland's charge was made in "utter ignorance" regarding it (Camp.
Sketches, 194). It has been said that Taylor lacked entrenching tools;
but he had tools for building roads, planting the mortar and howitzers,
and erecting new defences at the Tenería redoubt. Stevens (Campaigns,
29) undertook to defend Taylor's operations on Sept. 21 by saying that
the ardor of Garland's men brought them into action before Mansfield's
reconnaissance had been completed; but (1) Garland was virtually
instructed to follow Mansfield's directions and did so, and (2) Oct.
24 Taylor said he would have pursued the same course, had he known all
that he learned later about the situation--_i.e._ Garland executed
Taylor's ideas and wishes (=61=Graham to Polk, Apr. --, [1847]).
Waiting for a fuller reconnaissance, therefore, would have consumed
time without giving any advantage. It follows, too, from this statement
of Taylor's that he would not have excused Mansfield, had Mansfield
instructed Garland not to charge. Taylor did not recommend a brevet for
Garland. This was an implied censure. Capt. G. M. Graham of Garland's
command therefore addressed a letter to Polk, giving a full account of
Garland's proceedings. This letter was presented to Polk by Gen. George
Gibson, who gave the writer "a high character." It may be added, that
it was impossible for Mansfield to make a complete reconnaissance under
the circumstances. He would not have lived to finish it.

The Fourth Infantry, having been detached to cover the battery, was not
in Garland's charge. The mortar does not seem to have been effective on
Sept. 21 (Giddings, Sketches, 202); had it been so, it would not have
been put out of commission for a considerable time by being sent to
Worth, who does not seem to have asked for it. It appears to have been
used by Taylor only twenty minutes, which suggests that its inefficiency
was speedily discovered. Had the cause been merely the lack of a
platform (Ripley, War with Mexico, i, 206), it could have been removed.
There was timber enough at Walnut Grove. The statements regarding the
number of guns in Tenería redoubt cannot be wholly reconciled. This may
arise from the fact that not all the pieces could be used. The statement
in the text seems to be safe.

The author feels some scepticism about the doings of Backus. No
unanimity prevailed then about him. He is rather too precise in his own
statement. He says (_Historical Magazine_, x, 255) that the distance
from the building he occupied to the tannery was found to be 117-3/4
yards. One can hardly understand how so exact a measurement can have
been made in such a locality. The distance from his position to Tenería
redoubt was considerably more than this. Henry estimated it at 130 yards
(Campaign Sketches, 195). Muskets were not reliable at this distance.
His claims were not accepted by all at the time. Still, many believed
that he contributed materially to the capture of the redoubt. After the
capture of this redoubt Col. Davis undertook to storm El Diablo, but
was recalled. There was a sharp clash between Taylor and Butler in the
course of the operations, Sept. 21. Taylor should, of course, have kept
out of the street fighting (Griepenkerl, Applied Tactics, 187). There
was sufficient demand for head work at that time to absorb his full
attention. It was stated that after the repulse of the Americans, Sept.
21, Mejía asked to have both infantry and cavalry charge them. Had this
been done the results might have been very serious.

The American artillery when in the town was handled as cautiously as
possible. For example, a gun would be loaded and leveled behind a
corner, drawn out by ropes, fired, and drawn back by the ropes (French,
Two Wars, 66). Yet even in a case of this kind four out of the five
gunners were killed. Taylor does not mention the presence of the Fourth
Infantry, Sept. 23, but U. S. Grant does (Mems., i, 115-6); and as he
belonged to that corps, it seems hardly possible that he was mistaken.
It had been so much reduced the day before, that perhaps Taylor did not
think it worth mention. According to Taylor's report the reason for
withdrawing his men from the city on the afternoon of Sept. 23 was to
prepare for a general assault. But considerable time would have been
necessary to do this in concert with Worth, and it is hard to see why
they were withdrawn under fire when they were doing good work in safety,
and night was not far distant. Apparently the best way to arrange for
such concerted operations would have been to leave these troops where
they were, and open a line of communication through the northern part of
the city (Ripley, _op. cit._, i, 264). The rumors that Mexican forces
were approaching by the Saltillo road were correct, but Ampudia sent
them an order to retire. They were not strong enough to accomplish
anything.

When Worth attacked the city, Sept. 23, his right-hand column, headed by
Texan riflemen, dismounted, under Col. Hays, took the Calle de Monterey;
the left-hand column, headed by similar troops under Lieut. Col. Walker,
took the Calle de Itúrbide. Besides the Texans and the field batteries,
the Seventh and Eighth Infantry and the Artillery Battalion joined in
the attack. The detachment that had been sent up the Saltillo road was
recalled and acted as a reserve. The American shells thrown during the
night of Sept. 23 seem to have injured nothing except Ampudia's courage.
Purísima Bridge was about 2300 feet from the cathedral.

It is probably true that Taylor's operations at the eastern end of the
town and the disregard of life exhibited by his troops tended to dismay
Ampudia. But Taylor had no reason to suppose that operations so badly
planned, so ineffective and so costly would have that effect; they were
wasteful; and they demoralized his own men. The Mexicans fought in most
cases with a courage and tenacity deserving of high praise (Henry, Camp.
Sketches, 209). So far as one can see, nothing saved Taylor from a
disaster that would have meant the ruin of his army but the poltroonery
of one man, Ampudia; and as we have remarked, he had no reason to expect
that. The head of Ampudia's medical service reported, Sept. 24, that
only sixty privates had been seriously wounded.

12.11. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 78 (Taylor). =364=Worth to S., Oct. 2. García,
Revolución, 16. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 262-9. Ampudia, Manifiesto.
Apuntes, 64. =13=Pakenham, no. 122, 1846. Balbontín, Invasión, 50-2. Ho.
60; 30, 1, p. 348 (Ampudia), 348 (Taylor), 349 (terms). =76=Ampudia,
Sept. 29. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Oct. 26; Nov. 7. Wash. _Union_, Jan.
18 (Ampudia); Feb. 18, 1847. _Niles_, Nov. 28, p. 197. _Epoca_, Feb.
9, 1847 (Ampudia). _Observador Zacatecano_, Dec. 27, 1846, supplement
(Requena). _Diario_, Oct. 2 (Ampudia). _Republicano_, May 28, 1847.

Worth's cannon were prevented by a fog from opening fire early Thursday
morning. Worth's =364=reasons, as explained privately to a friend, for
giving liberal terms were: (1) Owing to the feelings of the Texans and
resentment occasioned by the American losses in the battle, an assault
would have been attended with the slaughter of many women; (2) The
numbers and the position of the Mexicans rendered them formidable;
(3) "Neither myself nor many others had the slightest confidence in
the _intelligence that directed_" the American operations; (4) Our
government wanted peace. The Mexicans were allowed twenty-one rounds for
their battery.

The principal excuses alleged by Ampudia for surrendering were the
failure to injure the Americans on their march, the lack of the Fourth
Brigade, a want of funds, provisions and artillery ammunition, the
inefficiency and cowardice of a part of his army, the hostility of
the superior officers, and their failure to support him. According to
a Mexican letter from S. Luis Potosí dated October 3, 1846, the loss
of the city was attributed wholly to his cowardice. A number of his
chief officers appear to have been no more courageous than he, but the
decision did not rest with them. Perhaps he thought it necessary to save
the one veteran army of Mexico, but a successful or even heroic defence
of Monterey would have probably been more beneficial to his cause.
There were provisions enough and a large stock of ammunition; but we
are not sure that his supply of artillery ammunition was adequate. The
commission consisted of Worth, Henderson, J. Davis, Requena, Ortega,
Llano. The Mexicans actually carried away three 12-pounders and three
8-pounders (Requena). The British minister at Washington reported: The
armistice seems to be "in direct opposition to the rule laid down in
Mr. Buchanan's letter to Commodore Conner of the 27th July" [Sen. 107;
29, 2, p. 3], by which it was determined that no armistice should be
agreed to until a treaty of peace should have been actually concluded
(=13=Pakenham, no. 122, Oct. 16, 1846). San Fernando de Presas was east
of Linares near the Gulf. See note 12.

12.12. Polk, Diary, Oct. 11, 12. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 79 (Taylor), 106
(Worth). (Instructions) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 323, 333, 355 (Marcy).
Henshaw narrative. Nunelee, diary. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 62.
=364=Worth to S., Oct. 2. Meade, Letters, i, 138. Taylor, Letter to
Gaines. _Pennsylvanian_, Nov. 2 (Peyton). =139=W. B. to D. Campbell,
Nov. 2. Robertson, Remins., 157. =13=Pakenham, no. 127, 1846 (Taylor's
ammunition would not have lasted many hours longer). _Cong. Globe_, 29,
2, p. 316 (Clayton).

Worth: Twiggs's division and the volunteers "were taken into action
without order, direction, support, or command; in fact murdered"
(=364=to S., Oct. 2). Col. Campbell: Taylor showed little generalship
in the handling of my regiment; took too great a risk in coming to
Monterey without more transportation (=139=to D. Campbell, Sept. 28;
Nov. 9). Capt. Cheatham (Campbell's regiment): "I consider, that old
Taylor committed one of the greatest blunders that ever a General was
guilty of, in coming here to attack one of the strongest fortified towns
in Mexico, with nothing in the world but small Artillery, for open
field fighting" (=50=to son, Oct. 6). _Id._: "We were rushed headlong
into the fight and our Generals did not know where we were going"
(=150=to sister, Oct. 16). Capt. Henry (Garland's brigade): "I look
upon the exposure of the field artillery in the streets as perfectly
useless" (_Spirit of the Times_, Nov. 7). Capt. Backus (Garland's
brigade): The Third and Fourth Infantry were "entirely inadequate to
the duty required" of them; "this hazardous and useless enterprize"
(_Hist. Mag._, x, 212). Baltimore Captain: Sept. 21 I was under first
one general and then another till I and my men "became completely worn
out" (_Picayune_, Nov. 7). Engineer Stevens: The eastern attack was
marked by rash and headlong movements; the mortar, instead of being
sent to Worth, should have been placed in Tenería redoubt; Taylor
should not have withdrawn his troops on Wednesday, etc. (Campaigns,
27). Officer: Garland's charge a fatal mistake (Balt. _Sun_, Nov. 6).
Officer: The eastern attack very injudicious (_Nat. Intelligencer_,
Nov. 20). Lieut. Hamilton (West Pointer): The officers who fell at
the east end were "a sacrifice to the blind folly and ignorance of
our general-in-chief" (_Metrop. Mag._, Dec., 1907, p. 321). C. M.
Wilcox, who arrived at Monterey not long after the battle: "Harsh and
unfavorable criticism" of the operations at the east end was "universal"
there (Mex. War, 120). Robertson: The lack of a siege train was due
to Taylor's misunderstanding the intentions of the enemy; the cannon
could easily have been transported (Remins., 129, 160). Smith: Only
Ampudia's personal unfitness saved Taylor from deserved ruin (Remins.,
18). Monterey letter, Oct. 11: 6-pounders were sent to batter down
fortifications that 24-pounders would not have affected. Gen. Requena,
probably the best Mexican officer: Worth made the real attack; Taylor
blundered (_Observador Zacatecano_, Dec. 27, supplem.). G. Ferry:
Prudence forbade Taylor, in view of the too evident discouragement of
his army, to press his advantage; by negotiating he changed almost
certain defeat into victory (_Revue des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 1847,
410). An editorial in _Niles' Register_ of July 18, 1846, is curiously
interesting: "Owing to an error in estimating the capacities of the
enemy" Taylor "made a narrow escape from almost utter annihilation"
in May. "One lesson of this kind, we venture to predict, will be a
sufficient admonition to" Taylor.... "He will be cautious to keep his
troops within reach of supplies, and to have at hand the means of
transportation." The editor proved to be mistaken in every point.

One of Taylor's excuses for the terms was consideration for the
non-combatants (=169=to Crittenden, Oct. 9), and it may have counted
for something; but he had just refused these non-combatants permission
to leave the town (Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 78). Another (_ibid._) was the
propinquity of the citadel, and the impossibility of taking it without
a siege of twenty or thirty days or else a large expenditure of life;
but the citadel had not been able to injure the Americans materially
while they were fighting in the town, and could not injure them at
all in Walnut Grove; and, as Taylor admitted that he would hardly be
able to advance for six weeks (Bixby coll., 62), there was no lack of
time. In point of fact, as could easily have been surmised, the citadel
had neither water nor provisions enough to stand a siege (Balbontín,
Invasión, 46).

The gallant defence of the city was another excuse (Ho. 4; 29, 2, p.
79; Bixby coll., 61); but while that is a just reason for doing honor
to a garrison, it is none for relinquishing the substantial fruits of
a dearly bought victory. It would have cost the lives of fifty or one
hundred soldiers, besides the wounded, to take the city by storm, said
Taylor (=169=to Crittenden, Oct. 9). But this would have been a low
price for the elimination of an army that he said was rated at 7200
besides 2000 irregulars (Bixby coll., 61)--the only army possessed by
Mexico--with its arms, accoutrements, artillery and horses. The moral
effect of such a victory would probably, in the unanimous opinion of
Polk and his Cabinet (Polk, Diary, Oct. 12), have ended the war; and
the desperate fury displayed by Santa Anna when he supposed that such
had been the outcome (=52=Black, Sept. 26; =76=S. Anna, Sept. 29)
tends to support this view. The Mexicans could have escaped, "done
what we might," Taylor urged (_cf._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, 359). But if he
could have captured the city so easily, entrenched as the garrison
were in the strong buildings near the main plaza, he could certainly
have scattered them and captured a large number, had they attempted to
flee with artillery, ammunition and provisions through those narrow
streets commanded by low, flat houses; and indeed no road available for
artillery crossed the mountains except the one (held by Worth) through
Rinconada Pass. Ampudia wrote to his government that even if he could
have cut his way out, his forces would have been dispersed and his
military material captured (Sept. 25). (Taylor seems to have taken no
steps to prevent the Mexicans from escaping during the night of the
twenty-fourth, though their protracting the negotiations until late in
the day might have suggested a design to do this.)

But, suggested Taylor, magnanimous terms were favorable to peace (Bixby
coll., 61). On the other hand the United States had used in vain with
Mexico every method except hostilities; our national authorities had now
instructed him to try vigorous warfare (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 324); and it
was for them to say whether this deliberately adopted policy should--on
a political ground--be abandoned. To meet this obvious view the General
said that a change of régime had occurred at Mexico since the date
of his orders. That was true; but it would be singular indeed if a
political change in the enemy's country--of which nothing definite was
heard except from an enemy notorious for subterfuges--could authorize a
general in the field to violate his instructions. Taylor himself stated
(Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 360) that his "grand motive" in advancing from the
Rio Grande was "to increase the inducements of the Mexican government to
negotiate for peace"--_i.e._ by showing that otherwise it would suffer
the rigors of war; how then could he believe that acting gently and
indulgently would have the desired effect?

Finally, and upon this aspect of the matter Taylor laid great stress
(Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 360), Ampudia stated that his government was now
favorable to peace. But Ampudia transmitted no official proposition,
could present no evidence; and it is impossible to believe that a
shrewd American like Taylor can have taken this argument seriously.
Taylor seems to have had no respect for the Mexicans, and therefore had
no confidence in them; and what he must have heard about Ampudia was
calculated to make him distrust that man peculiarly. Besides, Scott's
letters of June 12 and 15 had intimated (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 326, 328)
that he was not to grant even a short armistice unless met with a
definite formal offer of the Mexicans to treat; and on July 27 Marcy
instructed Taylor to pursue, under similar circumstances, the course
recommended at that time to Conner (Sen. 107; 29, 2, p. 3)--_i.e._
not to grant an armistice even should the Mexican government consent
to negotiate (=256=to Taylor confid.). If a knowledge of Mackenzie's
negotiations with Santa Anna was enough to justify Taylor for violating
such instructions, he should not have attacked Monterey. Moreover,
he did not consider the government of Mexico stable enough to treat
with (=169=to Crittenden, Oct. 9). Taylor defended the armistice on
the ground also that he needed time to bring up cannon, ammunition
and provisions (=169=to Crittenden, Oct. 9); but had he captured or
dispersed the Mexican army he would have had time, cannon, ammunition
and provisions enough. Col. Davis and Taylor also argued that the
explosion of the cathedral by an American shell would have caused great
loss of life (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 359); but if Taylor knew the cathedral
was liable to explode, this was a reason for pressing unconditional
surrender upon Ampudia, since the Mexicans would have been the principal
sufferers.

All the arguments put forth in Taylor's despatches to the government
were formally pronounced unsatisfactory by Polk and the Cabinet (Polk,
Diary, Oct. 12), since the terms made it possible for a Mexican army,
which Taylor said he could have beaten completely without severe loss,
to reorganize and make another stand. The simple facts were that, in
order to escape from the blame due to his inefficiency, Taylor advanced
from Camargo with an inadequate expedition, and, when the result
convicted him of bad judgment, endeavored to excuse himself without
letting the truth be known.

A particularly imprudent point in the terms was that they did not
require the Mexicans to retire well beyond Rinconada Pass. It was
left possible for them to fortify the pass, which was supposed to be
impregnable or almost so, and thus make an advance from Monterey to
Saltillo costly, if not impracticable. Taylor's course in this matter
was not due to an expectation that Wool's column (chap. xiii) would
render Rinconada Pass untenable, for he wrote on Oct. 15 that it formed
"no element" in his calculations (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 351). There was
another singular oversight. Taylor argued in favor of the armistice
that it bound the hands of the Mexicans during the time needed by him
for preparations to advance (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 359); but in fact,
since either government could disallow the armistice and the Mexican
authorities were within easy reach, its terms bound him for six weeks
but bound them for only, say, a fortnight or, as he admitted (Bixby
coll., 62), twenty days. Scott said privately--and one can easily
believe him--that only Taylor's popularity saved him from removal at
this time (=169=to Crittenden, Oct. 19).

When Monterey yielded, according to Taylor, his provisions were
sufficient for "not more" than ten days; but Worth had written privately
on Sept. 16 (four days after the advance from Cerralvo began) that
the army had provisions then for only about ten days (=364=to S.).
According to the Washington correspondent of the Boston _Atlas_ (Feb. 8,
1847) Clayton stated in the Senate, February 3, 1847, that Taylor had
provisions for but three days when Monterey fell. A letter, probably
from Gen. P. F. Smith, said that the provisions would have lasted only
through Sept. 26, and that during the engagement Taylor had to send to
Cerralvo for supplies, of which a sufficient quantity could scarcely
have arrived in time (_Littell's Living Age_, no. 141, p. 191). Col.
Davis stated later that the hope of supplies, when Monterey yielded,
rested on the return of the mule-teams already despatched north for this
purpose (=73=Address). Col. Campbell wrote privately that on the morning
of Sept. 21 Taylor's supply of ammunition was very limited and the
supply of provisions still more so (=139=to D. C, Nov. 2).

The loss of men that Taylor admitted was 488 killed and wounded (later
487: Ho. 24; 31,1), but it must have been considerably more. Lieut.
Hill said in his diary that the losses would never be revealed; but
the inaccuracy of the official statement is evident. A writer quoted
in _Niles_, Nov. 7, 1846, p. 148, said it was "generally supposed" at
Washington that Taylor might have lost more than 1000. A South Carolina
officer, who must have had many opportunities to talk with men who had
been at Monterey, gave the loss as about 950 (Cowan, Cond. Hist., 7).
Kendall, editor of the New Orleans _Picayune_, who was on the ground,
wrote that about 300 (including wounded men finished by the Mexicans)
were killed or mortally wounded, Haile, a trustworthy correspondent of
the same paper, expressed the same opinion. A letter in _Niles_, Oct.
17, 1846, p. 104 gives nearly the same figures. A Tennessee captain
reported the number of killed as 200. To look at the matter more in
detail, Meade (Letters, i, 165) wrote that Garland lost some 265 killed
and wounded. Butler admitted his own division lost about 250. A. S.
Johnston (Johnston, Johnston, 138) wrote that its loss was "perhaps
many more" than that. Bliss admitted that it lost 225, killed, wounded
and missing, on Sept. 21 alone (McCall, Letters, 461). Worth's loss
seems to have been about 70. The Texas division lost not less than 27
(Ho. 24; 31, 1). Here we get at least 612. But Garland did not have the
Fourth Infantry (303 officers and men), which Bliss stated was "almost
destroyed" (McCall, Letters, 461). This must mean a loss (killed and
wounded) of at least one half; yet the official return was 36 (Ho. 24;
31, 1).

Taylor began the fighting with nearly 250 sick, and after three such
days of excitement, fatigue and hardship, this number was probably
quite 400. The guard at the camp--one company from each infantry
regiment--probably amounted to at least 300, and, as some Mexican
cavalry were looking for a chance to strike there, could not safely be
reduced. A considerable number of men were needed to hold the captured
forts, escort supplies of provisions and ammunition and perform other
special services. If we call Taylor's loss 800, deduct 350 for the sick
and allow 400 for guards and others detached on duty, we have about 4650
tired and considerably demoralized men (many of them horse and many
without bayonets) as perhaps available for an assault.

The simple fact that Taylor himself believed he could not, in less
than about six weeks (Bixby coll., 62), be in a condition to resume
his advance, indicated what his situation now was. Finally, it should
be mentioned, he entertained still the false idea of strategy shown at
Matamoros. He only cared to get Monterey, he said, for he could beat
the Mexicans at any time (Coleman, Crittenden, 309). The fact that it
would cost the lives of soldiers to beat the Mexicans did not appear to
signify.

12.13. =147=Chamberlain, diary. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 82 (Taylor), 106
(Worth). =169=Scott to Crittenden, Oct. 19. _Delta_, Feb. 14, 1847.
=169=Peyton to Crittenden, Oct. 2. Grant, Mems., i, 117-8. Welles
papers. Griffis, Perry, 218. Smith, Chile con Carne, 97. Lane,
Adventures, 42. _Spirit of the Times_, Nov. 7. (Hardly) Ripley, War,
268-9. =76=Ampudia, Sept. 28.

As Welles remarked, the people took delight in thinking and talking
about the details of the fight. The capture of Monterey had no strategic
bearing on the aim of the war (Scott, Mems., ii, 412). The demonstration
of our fighting ability (which, however, had already been proved) had a
moral value; but one may well question whether this was not fully offset
by the blundering of Taylor and other officers, our losses and the terms
granted to Ampudia. Many of superior intelligence in the United States
criticised Taylor sharply.


                    XIII. SALTILLO, PARRAS, TAMPICO

13.1. Probably he did not include Wool's troops. A Mexican reported
that on Oct. 14 Taylor had not over 4000 in camp near Monterey, 600
regulars in that city and 1080 men in the hospitals there, and that 600
volunteers, who had arrived Oct. 15, marched with 400 from the camp to
other points. According to Gen. Patterson, commanding, there were in
the Camargo region, Oct. 8, about 7000 effectives, but by Oct. 31 these
numbered only 5700, viz., Second Dragoons, 150; Second Infantry and
Mounted Rifles, 500; Kentucky horse, 450; Tennessee horse, 450; Second
Kentucky, 400; Second Ohio, 500; First Indiana, 550; Second Indiana,
600; Third Indiana, 650; Second Tennessee, 350; Alabama, 400; Third
Illinois, 370; Fourth Illinois, 330. The Mounted Rifles were classed as
cavalry, but had no horses. Nov. 10 the sick at Camargo numbered 1400
or 1500, said a letter. Below Camargo there were troops now at Reynosa,
Matamoros, Camp Belknap, mouth of the river, Point Isabel and Brazos
Island. Nov. 2 Capt. W. S. Henry, a very good regular officer, doubted
whether Taylor had more than 10,000 effectives (Camp. Sketches, 239).
The returns showed only 13,000, he said.

13.2. It was stated, Dec. 1, that fully 120 had deserted. (Priests)
Henry, Camp. Sketches, 240; Roberts, diary, Nov. 27. The Mexican
government went so far as to pay the expense of sending a British
subject named Sinnott to the north for the express purpose of seducing
Taylor's Irish (Roman Catholic) soldiers (=76=Sinnott, Oct. 12;
=76=Guerra to Santa Anna, Dec. 5; =76=to Hacienda, Dec. 2; =76=S. Anna,
Jan. 1, 1847).

13.3. =61=July 21, 1846, Patterson wrote to the war department that he
was born in Ireland and entered the army as a first lieutenant in 1813.
He was then hardly more than a boy. Apparently he did not see much
service. Later he became rather active in the Philadelphia militia.

13.4. Taylor protested twice, and demanded that his subordinates should
be compelled "to keep in their proper places." Due retribution soon
followed. He sent an order to Col. Baker, one of Patterson's officers,
upon which that general demanded sharply that correspondence with his
subordinates should go by the usual channel (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 381,
384). Nov. 5 Taylor wrote a long and studied letter to Gen. Gaines,
defending himself and attacking the administration, and this was
published in the N. Y. _Herald_, Jan. 24, 1847. Evidently it was not a
mere bit of friendly correspondence. To many it seemed to be the opening
gun of a Presidential campaign, and certainty it was improper, for the
writer presented information and opinions about the American military
operations, and said that success would be worth little to the United
States--a view evidently calculated to discourage the Americans and
stimulate the enemy. Taylor was neatly punished for this imprudence by
a public revival of paragraph 650 of the army regulations of March 1,
1825, which forbade private letters or reports from officers regarding
military operations. Doubtless Polk was to a large extent right in
believing that Taylor was now in the hands of political tutors, and he
regarded him as "a vindictive and ignorant political partisan." See
Marcy to Taylor, Jan. 27, 1847, and reply (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 391, 809);
=108=Marcy to Bancroft, April 28; =256=_Id._ to Wetmore, Apr. 25; adj.
gen., gen. orders 3, 1847; Polk, Diary, Jan. 25-7; Phila. _Pub. Ledger_,
Jan. 26-7; Ho. 37; 30, 1.

13.5. A pleasanter outcome of the correspondence was the release of
seven American and a number of Mexican prisoners.

13.6. _Preliminary incidents._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 424 (Wool); 341,
344, 355, 367, 369, 391 (Marcy); 472-3 (Jones); 635 (Jesup); 325, 1270
(Scott); 682 (Whiting); 386, 439, 442 (S. Anna); 350-1, 358, 361, 381,
424, 437-40, 444, 526, 809 (Taylor); 384 (Patterson). =69=Patterson to
Marcy, Oct. 8; to Bliss, Oct. 8, 31; Nov. 23. Meade, Letters, i, 145-6,
152. _Morning News_, New London, Conn., Dec. 10. Henry, Camp. Sketches,
240. =307=Roberts, diary, Nov. 27. =69=Wool to Bliss, Nov. 2. =69=Riley
to Bliss, Dec. 14, 1846. _Niles_, Jan. 9, 1847, p. 290. =65=Patterson,
orders 1, 6, Sept. 5, 29. =169=Scott to Taylor, Sept. 26. =169=Taylor
to Crittenden, Jan. 26, 1847. Sen. 32; 31, 1 (Hughes). Wash. _Union_,
Sept. 26. Polk, Diary, May 14; Sept. 19-22, 24, 26; Oct. 12, 13, 20;
Nov. 21. =69=Patterson to Marcy, Oct. 8. =234=A. Johnson to ----, Dec.
2. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 273-4. Marcy, report in Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 45.
Eyewitness, Complete Hist., 48. =205=Graham, mem. book. _Diario_, Nov.
14, 29; Dec. 15. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 178. =65=_Id._, gen. orders,
no. 139, Nov. 8. =69=González, Sept. --. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 346,
354, 356. Also the following from =76=: Comte. gen. Oaxaca, Dec. 3.
Circular, Nov. 28. S. Anna to Taylor, Dec. 17. S. Anna, Nov. 28; Dec.
12. Sinnott, Oct. 12. Ordóñez to Worth, Nov. 12; to P. F. Smith, Nov.
20, Worth to Ordóñez, Nov. 12. Smith to O., Nov. 20. Ampudia, Oct. 4. J.
F. Rada, Oct. 17. Parrodi, Sept. 16. Worth to alcalde, Nov. 5. On the
origin of the proposed Tamaulipas expedition see chap. xxvii, note 4.

13.7. Lieut. Mackall's battery, the Seventh Infantry, and one company of
the Artillery Battalion were left at Monterey under P. F. Smith.

13.8. The maguey (_agave Americana_) is the century plant, and produces
the liquid known as _pulque_ which, after it ferments, is about as
intoxicating as beer, and is consumed liberally by the common people
of Mexico. The stiff, thick, wide-spreading leaves are protected with
thorns.

13.9. The governor expected a reply, and on finding that none was to be
made he retired to Parras.

13.10. _The occupation of Saltillo._ =65=Gen. orders 139. Ho. 60; 30, 1,
pp. 361, 374, 377, 436, 543, 545 (Taylor); 362-3 (Marcy); 378 (Aguirre).
Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 45. =364=Worth to S., Nov. 20. Taylor, Letters
(Bixby), 71. =267=Memo. (probably from Major Smith). Meade, Letters, i,
144, 152, 155, 157-8. Wilhelm, 8th Inf., ii, 295-9. Balbontín, Invasión,
24. Apuntes, 65. Sen. 32; 31, 1, p. 59. Calendario de Ontiveros, 1847.
=69=Worth to Arnold and Deas, Nov. 19. Smith, Chile con Carne, 175, 192,
195. Henry, Campaign Sketches, 245. Smith, To Mexico, 77. Eyewitness,
Complete History, 48. =299=Posey to Gordon, Feb. 19, 1847. The following
are from =76=. S. Anna to Ampudia, Sept. 30. S. Anna, Sept. 29; Oct.
3; Nov. 21. González, Nov. 19. _Id._ to R. Vázquez, Saltillo, Nov.
16; to S. Anna, Nov. 21; to Mejía, May 27. Mejía, June 9. _Id._ to
Ampudia, Aug. 31. Worth to alcalde, Nov. 17. Memo., dated Nov. 22,
of a conference with Taylor. Wool's advance may have helped to cause
Ampudia's abandonment of Rinconada Pass. The distance from Monterey to
Saltillo by the railroad is about 68 miles, and that by road must be
about the same. (Marcy, Oct. 22) see p. 350.

13.11. The celebrated military writer, Clausewitz, on whose work our
present views of strategy are principally founded, recognized two
distinct kinds of war: that aiming to overthrow the enemy's forces,
and that aiming to make conquests on the frontier, either to be held
permanently or to be used in exchanges on the settlement of peace
(Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, nachricht, par. 1; Donat, Strat. Science, 112).
Polk aimed to accomplish both ends by having the main army bring Mexico
to terms, and at the same time taking possession of territory; but he
did not apply the principle understandingly. He overrated the influence
that the occupation of the northern provinces would have on the Mexican
government; he thought peace was near at hand, and was figuring on the
terms of a treaty when he should have been taking steps to bring Mexico
speedily to the point of making a treaty; and he ordered this expedition
without knowing the conditions under which it would have to be conducted
in Mexico, and without asking proper expert advice. The occupation of
the frontier provinces would have been sagacious had it been part of
a strong coercive military policy. Quotation at the end of the second
paragraph: Meade, Letters, i, 152.

13.12. La Vaca, now Port Lavaca, is on Matagorda Bay.

13.13. In view of the Mexican charge that the Americans incited the
Indians to ravage the southern side of the border, it should be
mentioned that not only Taylor, but Wool, exerted himself to prevent
such raids (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 425).

13.14. Harney committed a further impropriety by raising a company of
Indians for the U. S. service. It was not our policy to employ Indian
troops.

13.15. The author's description of Wool is based largely on the
=147=diary and =148=recollections of Gen. S. E. Chamberlain, who served
as his orderly for a time in the Mexican War; also on =257=Hughes to
Markoe, Dec. 13, 1847; _Niles_, May 8, 1847, p. 156; =61=Horton, Dec.
3; Sen. 32; 31, 1 (Hughes); =371=Mitchell, statement; =316=Bragg to
Sherman, March 1, 1848. Wool was a spare man of medium height, light
complexion and brown hair. His manner was reserved and gentlemanly.

13.16. Buhoup says this section set out with 1244 effectives. Wool soon
joined it with 144 men. At the Rio Grande, Oct. 12, eight companies
(aggregate, 574) of the First Illinois came up. The second section
(not over 1200) did not leave San Antonio until Oct. 14, and some of
the men were detained there still longer. The whole force consisted of
Washington's six-gun battery, to which were attached two small guns
taken by the Texans from the Mexicans years before and destined to be
lost at Buena Vista and recovered at Contreras; a squadron of the First
Dragoons, a squadron of the Second Dragoons, a regiment of Arkansas
horse, three companies of the Sixth Infantry, one company of Kentucky
foot and the First and Second Illinois regiments. The aggregate was
given by Capt. Hughes of the Topog. Engineers as 3400, of whom about 600
were regulars. Wool's route to Monclova was in general that of the So.
Pacific and Mexican International railroads.

13.17. Shields, Irish by birth, practised law in Illinois, became a
judge of the state supreme court and was then appointed commissioner
of the General Land Office, Washington. He became discontented under
Wool's command, and sent Davis, his aide, to Washington in the hope of
obtaining command of the Illinois regiments or possibly of displacing
Wool.

13.18. Frequently not all of the troops arrived at a place on the same
date.

13.19. Possibly news of the restoration of the constitution had reached
Monclova but not Santa Rosa.

13.20. The authorities of Monclova stated that Wool kept every pledge,
and they complained only that the Americans ate up provisions needed
for the people. The officers who criticised Wool most appear to have
been Shields, who--besides being notably egotistical (Ill. State
Hist. Soc. Trans., ix, pp. 36-8)--had been appointed by Polk on a
confidential basis (Davis, Autobiog., 96) and therefore felt entitled
to be ambitious; Harney, whose characteristics have been explained;
Bonneville, who proved himself later incompetent or worse; and Yell,
whose men were soon to disgrace themselves at Buena Vista in consequence
of lacking discipline. Nov. 10 Taylor issued orders detaching Shields
and Harney from Wool's command (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 542). This change
doubtless tended to promote harmony. In December Harney brought charges
against Wool, asserting that his "extreme imbecility and manifest
incapacity" ruined the expedition. The judge advocate general advised
that the charges should be ignored (=61=Horton, Dec. 3).

13.21. Just after leaving Parras Wool learned that 2700 Mexicans
with four guns had moved from Zacatecas against him. One fault of
the expedition was that it could neither support nor be supported by
Taylor's army (see Halleck, Mil. Art, 410 and chap. xi, note 5, of this
history). One asks why Ampudia was not ordered to attack Wool. With
Blanco's irregulars he would have been formidable. The explanation
probably is that Santa Anna wished to build up at S. L. Potosí as large
an army as possible under his own command. Besides, he expected Wool to
turn west.

13.22. Wool received on Nov. 14 Taylor's instructions to give up the
expedition, and on Nov. 26 his instructions to go to Parras and await
orders (=61=Wool, Jan. 17, 1847). He moved, however, in anticipation of
the latter instructions (=61=Wool, Dec. 7). Nov. 16 he reported that he
expected three mounted and two infantry companies as escorts to the last
wagons, and after their arrival would have about 2750 in all. =60=Marcy
to Taylor, May 6, 1847: It is not important to hold Chihuahua, for you
are in advance of it. Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 337), probably to have
a fling at Wool, says Wool "only" wished to give up the expedition in
order to go toward Durango and Zacatecas in pursuit of glory; but the
document he cites does not so state, and Taylor wrote that Wool proposed
to join him (Bixby coll., 71).

13.23. In chap. xix.

13.24. July 2 Taylor had expressed the opinion that the expedition might
prove very important (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 329), but suggested that only
mounted men should be employed.

13.25. Marcy said that the expedition prevented a considerable part of
Mexico from sharing in the campaign against Scott, and to some extent
this was doubtless true.

13.26. _Wool's expedition._ Polk, Diary, May 14, 16; Oct. 20.
=164=Conner to Bancroft, May 31. N. Orl. _Commerc. Bulletin_, Aug.
17. Meade, Letters, i, 152. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 323, 363 (Marcy);
325 (Scott); 458 (Freeman); 328, 454, 466 (Jones); 424, 426 (Wool);
428 (Thomas); 305, 329, 351, 361, 374, 377, 400, 409, 418, 424, 433
(Taylor); 410 (Bliss); 567 (Jesup). =254=Mansfield, report, Apr. 19.
=61=Wool, July 28; Aug. 5, 15; Sept. 2, 15, 28; Oct. 15, 19; Nov. 4;
Dec. 16. =256=Wool, July 29. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 45, 545. Sen. 32; 31,
1 (Hughes and others). =65=Adj. gen., gen. orders 19. Wash. _Union_,
Oct. 19; Nov. 20, 21, 28, 1846 Feb. 8; Mar. 23, 1847. =61=Maynadier,
Aug. 25. =61=Horton, June 23; Aug. 8; Oct. 20; Dec. 3. =69=Harney, Aug.
12. Reavis, Harney, 155. Sen. 178; 29, 2. _Diario_, Sept. 11. =68=P.
F. Smith, Oct. 2. =245=Duvall to Lamar, June 27. Buhoup, Narrative.
Davis, Autobiog., 105-19. =61=Shields, Aug. 28. _Niles_, Oct. 24, p.
118; Dec. 26, p. 263; May 8, 1847, p. 156. =61=Kingsbury to Wool, Oct.
13. Sen. 64; 31, 1. _National Intelligencer_, Nov. 3, 21. Carleton,
Buena Vista, 161-76. Balbontín, Invasión, 76. =65=Wool, orders 89, 117,
121, 126, 143, 144, 148, 155. =61=Wool to Taylor, Jan. 17, 1847. N. Y.
_Eve. Post_, Jan. 4, 1849. =180=McDowell to Newton, Sept. 16, 1846.
=132=Butler, Dec. 10. Wool in Ceremonies. Bishop, Journal. =69=Duncan
to Worth, Aug. 8. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 71. =63=Marcy to Kearny,
Dec. 10. _Picayune_, Mar. 4, 6, 17, 1847. =69=Wood to Taylor, Dec. 7.
=66=Lee to Totten, Dec. 5. Donnavan, Adventures, 41. Wallace, Wallace,
21-9. =69=Wool to Taylor, Dec. 24, 1846; Jan. 20, 1847 Baylies, Wool's
Camp. _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv, 443. Wilhelm, 8th Inf., ii,
301. =82=S. Anna to comte. gen. Zacatecas, Dec. 6. Neville, diary. The
following are from =76=: Gov. Coahuila, Sept. 7, Oct. 8. Gefe Partido
del Rio Grande, Aug. 28; Oct. 2. Comte. gen. Zacatecas to comte. gen.
Durango, Oct. 14; to S. Anna, Oct. 21. Gefe político, Monclova, to
Wool, Oct. 24; reply, Oct. 26. Comte. gen. Durango, Dec. 11. Heredia
to comte. gen. Durango, Dec. 10. Gov. Coahuila to _Id._, Nov. 30. R.
Vázquez to S. Anna, Oct. 1. Castañeda to Vázquez, Sept. 24. S. Anna,
Sept. 29; Nov. 4; Dec. 19, 24. Wool to Arziniega _et al._, Oct. 9.
Aldrete to Mejía, Aug. 30. Ugarte, Sept. 26. Comte. gen. Zacatecas,
Dec. 31. Lobo to R. Vázquez, Nov. 2. Comte. gen. Zacatecas to S. Anna,
Dec. 17. Gov. Coahuila to _Id._, Nov. 30. Comte. gen. Coahuila, Sept.
7. Gefe político, Parras, to S. Anna, Dec. 17. Ampudia, Aug. 25. Rives
(U. S. and Mexico, ii, 208) places Polk in a rather absurd position
with reference to the expedition. He misunderstands a statement in
Polk's Diary, May 28, 1846. The orders to Wool there mentioned had prime
reference to getting volunteers in motion to Taylor (_Military Historian
and Economist_, ii, 32 and note on p. 33).

13.27. The idea that the occupation of Tampico would mask and aid the
expedition against Vera Cruz came forward a little later (Sen. 1; 30, 1,
p. 949).

13.28. This is inferred from the fact that Marcy's letter, which was
published in the _Diario_ of Oct. 6, would naturally have met Santa Anna
about Oct. 3, and from the character of Santa Anna's letter of that date.

13.29. None of these statements should be taken too literally. The
various accounts, which come mainly from Parrodi and Santa Anna, differ
considerably though not essentially, and both men had reasons for
exaggerating the weakness of Tampico.

13.30. Parrodi and the court that tried him declared that he threw away
nothing of value. But many did not believe this, and it is hard to see
why he should have taken the trouble, when in such haste, to transport
a large quantity of material to the river, if it was worthless. The
government naturally wished the evacuation to appear inexpensive.

13.31. This sentence is inferential. Writing to his wife, Nov. 17,
=162=Conner stated that he was much surprised to find the city
evacuated, and that, had the garrison been there, he would have had hard
work. Why Mrs. Chase did not give notice of the evacuation cannot be
explained. No doubt there was a high state of popular excitement and, as
she had been suspected of playing the spy, the people perhaps cut her
off more effectually than the military men had done. Later she presented
a claim to Congress, and it was supported by letters from some of
Conner's officers but by none from himself. This fact may be a hint that
he was not pleased with her course. It seems to have been from her that
Parrodi heard the imaginary tale of Conner's heavy landing force, which
probably counted for a great deal in bringing about the evacuation.
Chase had sent a sketch of Tampico to Conner in June, and later his
wife forwarded a plan with a description of the forts, the number of
guns, etc. We do not know, however, that Conner received these papers.
Taylor belittled the capture of Tampico, saying that Santa Anna's order
to evacuate the town had been printed in the Mexican papers, and that
Conner must have been aware of the fact; but Conner was on a ship at
some distance from any town, and his letter of Nov. 17 shows that he
was not aware of it. The names of the captured gunboats were _Nonata_,
_Bonita_ and _Reefer_.

13.32. Signed by Tattnall and Ingraham; approved by Conner; accepted by
the deputation of the ayuntamiento. The Americans felt that formal terms
would bind them yet could be repudiated by the Mexican government.

13.33. Two merchant vessels also were captured.

13.34. According to Apuntes, pp. 82-6, Dr. Francisco Marchante of the
Mexican medical service, who had charge of other public property, was
not far away, but the Mexicans persuaded Tattnall that he could not be
overtaken. On Tattnall's return to the port, however, a Mexican declared
this could not have been true, and hence a second expedition set out in
all haste. It was unavoidably delayed; and finally, as the Americans
learned that a Mexican force had been sent forward to protect Marchante,
the chase was abandoned. A large amount of ammunition was thrown into
the river at Pánuco by Marchante. The total loss of material was thus of
considerable moment. Some of the ammunition was saved by sending it to
Tuxpán.

13.35. Gates had two companies of his own (Third Artillery). The other
five were Belton's. A steamer carrying ordnance and ordnance stores was
lost.

13.36. Perry flew the pennant of a vice commodore (Conner, Home
Squadron, 12).

13.37. Brooke had at first intended to send also four companies of
Mounted Rifles; and Taylor, on hearing of this, protested sharply to
the government that "a large and efficient force of cavalry," on which
he counted, had been diverted to a place where they were not needed
(Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 382, 388), overlooking the fact that this corps had
no horses (orders no. 149: _ibid._, 512). Now that Tampico had been
captured by the navy, Taylor said it was of no consequence (Letters
(Bixby), 78). These points are mentioned to show his state of mind,
which will need to be understood when we come to Scott's operations. The
Alabama regiment was ordered to Tampico by Patterson (Bliss: Ho. 60; 30,
1, p. 383).

13.38. _Occupation of Tampico. Eco_, June 9; Sept. 12; Oct. 29; Nov.
18, 19, 25. =303=Juanito del Bosque, Jan. 6, 1847. Apuntes, 78-86.
=61=Gates to Barnard, May 4, 1849. =69=Prout to Patterson, Oct. 28.
=164=Chase to Conner, June 4. Parrodi, Memoria (including letters to
and from S. Anna and others). Ampudia, To Fellow-citizens, July 10.
_Commerc. Review_, 1846, p. 165. =47=Conner, Oct. 7; Nov. 5, 21; Dec.
1. Polk, Diary, Sept. 19-22. =297=Mackenzie to Buchanan, July 7. Ho.
60; 30, 1, pp. 480-1 (Jones); 339, 341 (Marcy); 378-9, 387 (Taylor);
252 (Mason); 270 (Conner); 271 (Tattnall and Ingraham); 271 (Cervantes
_et al._). =162=Morris to Conner, Sept. 21. =162=Tattnall to Conner,
Nov. 20. Parker, Recolls., 68. Conner, Home Squad, 11 (Conner),
12. =48=Bancroft to Conner, Aug. 29. =48=Mason to _Id._, Sept. 22.
Balbontín, Estado, 52. _Diario_, Sept. 22; Oct. 6; Nov. 28. S. Anna,
Apelación, 29-31. =99=S. Anna to Tampico ayunt., Oct. 27. =245=_Bee_
to Lamar, Dec. 5. =99=Parrodi to Tamp. ayunt., Oct. 26. =99=Urrea to
_id._, Oct. 29. =99=Gov. Tamaul. to _id._, Oct. 25. =99=Gov. Tamaul.,
circular, Nov. 17. Vindicación del Gen. Parrodi. =69=Worth to Bliss,
Dec. 4. Steele, Amer. Camps., 125. =226=Beauregard to Totten, Nov. 27.
=69=Chase, Dec. 3, 1845. =313=_Id._ to Saunders, May 26, 31. _Public
Ledger_, Jan. 7, 1847 (Mrs. Chase). =52=Mrs. Chase to Conner, Oct. 20.
=316=Judd to Sherman, Feb. 26, 1848. Ballentine, Eng. Sold., i, 267.
=69=Shields to Bliss, Jan. 13, 1847. =60=_Id._ to Barnard, Apr. 20,
1849. Meade, Letters, i, 159-60. =46=Perry to Mason, Nov. 15, 19.
=46=Declaration, Nov. 15. N. Y. _Eve. Post_, Nov. 18, 1847. =165=Conner
letter book, Nov. 13-Dec. 4. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 77-8. Negrete,
Invasión, iii, 170-3. Balbontín, Invasión, 54. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1171,
1173 (Conner); 1174-5 (Tattnall). Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 381. =69=Perry,
memo., [Nov. 16]. =61=Gardner, Dec. 2. =61=Gates, Nov. 20. =61=Brooke,
Nov. 21. =69=Gates, Nov. 26. =163=Perry to Mason, Nov. 16. =61=Patterson
to Marcy, Nov. 23. =162=Tattnall to alcalde, Nov. 19. Bennett, Steam
Navy, 93. _Monitor Repub._, Dec. 2. =166=Patterson to Perry, Nov. 22.
=166=Perry to Conner [about Nov. 30]. =166=Tattnall to _Id._, Nov.
22. =313=Saunders to Taylor, June 5. =61=Jones to Scott, Nov. 28, 30;
to Patterson, Nov. 29; to Taylor, Nov. 30. =313=Letters from Conner
to Saunders, Nov. =61=Gardner to Taylor, Nov. 17. Smith, Remins., 28.
=61=Shields, Dec. 23. _Espía de la Frontera_, no. 7. =76=Gov. Tamaul.,
address, Nov. 27. Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846 (circular, Nov.
21). _Picayune_, Jan. 2, 1847. =112=Barnard, Dec. 20, notes on the
fortifications. =112=_Id._ to Gates, Dec. 11; to Shields, Dec. 28.
=112=Beauregard to Totten, Feb. 2, 1847; to Gates, Feb. 24. =61=Gates
to Barnard, May 4, 1849. =66=Beauregard to Totten, Jan. 9, 1847. The
following are from =76=. Parrodi, Oct. 17. S. Anna to Urrea, Oct. 18.
Prefect Huejutla, Nov. 23, 30. Múñoz, Nov. 21, 23, 26; Dec. 1. Order,
April 24. Gov. Guanajuato, Nov. 27. Gov. Michoacán, Nov. 26. Múñoz to
Gov. Tamaul., Nov. 14. Tampico ayunt. to Conner, Nov. 14. Parrodi,
proclam., June 9. To Parrodi, June 3; Aug. 28. Circular, Nov. 21. To
Bravo, May 14. Bravo, May 18. Mejía, June 9. To comte. gen. Querétaro,
Nov. 21. Parrodi, May 20; June 17; July 8; Sept. 2, 5. Múñoz to Parrodi,
Nov. 14. S. Anna to Parrodi, Oct. 12. To S. Anna, Oct. 15; Nov. 8.
Ampudia, Sept. 29. S. Anna, Oct. 3, 10, 12; Nov. 4, 12, 21. Affidavit
of M. Dorante, Dec. 23. Comte. Nat. Gd., Tampico, to Urrea, Nov. 4. To
Ampudia, Aug. 28. When Perry reached Brazos Id. the weather was so bad
that he could only leave an officer on an anchored vessel.

13.39. An estimate of Taylor's strength on Dec. 9 was 14,000 for the
entire field (_Picayune_, Dec. 27). One of Wool's companies was still
at San Antonio, one on the Rio Grande, and four at Monclova on Dec. 16,
he stated; several were left behind when he marched from Parras, and
he probably had 200 sick. Dec. 24 he reported about 2000 effectives
as with him. At Camargo and doubtless elsewhere in that region there
was considerable sickness. See a letter (probably from P. F. Smith) in
_Littell_, no. 141, p. 191. One may doubt whether Taylor had a fighting
force of over 12,000 at this time. The lines are reckoned as from Point
Isabel or the mouth of the Rio Grande to Camargo, Saltillo and Parras,
and from Monterey to Tampico. They were soon longer, because Taylor
advanced beyond Saltillo. His advance to Victoria began Dec. 13 (chap.
xviii, p. 357).

13.40. Opinions as to the number of men under Santa Anna at this time
differed. Taylor's report on Dec. 4 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 441) was 20,000
infantry and a large cavalry force; Meade, Nov. 24, 35,000; Meade, Dec.
8, 30,000. =69=Wool wrote on Dec. 24 that according to spies sent out
from Parras Santa Anna had 12,000 at San Luis Potosí, 30,000 at some
distance from there, and 9000 on their way from Guadalajara. =69=Butler
wrote from Saltillo on Dec. 20 that Santa Anna appeared to have 35,000
at S. L. P. and 9000 at Tula.

13.41. _Taylor's military policy._ Taylor, Letter to Gaines, Nov. 5
(and in _Picayune_, Feb. 2, 1847). =169=_Id._ to Crittenden, Oct. 9.
=370=_Id._ to Davis, April 18, 1848. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 351-4, 377,
379-82, 441, 514-5 (Taylor); 389-91 (Marcy). =256=Marcy to Wetmore,
Jan. 24; Mar. 29, 1847. Scribner, Campaign, 55. Meade, Letters, i,
152, 168-9. Polk, Diary, Jan. 5, 1847. =61=Wool, Dec. 16. =69=_Id._
to Taylor, Dec. 24. _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv, 443. Taylor,
Letters (Bixby), 71-2. =330=_Id._ to brother, Dec. 12. =256=Scott to
Marcy, Dec. 27, priv. _Morning News_, New London, Conn., Dec. 10.
=267=Memo. (probably from Maj. Smith). P. F. Smith, Memoir, Oct. 15.

There was also the difficulty of supervising lines so extended. At
this very time Taylor was afraid things were going badly in his rear
(=330=to brother, Dec. 12). It is particularly hard to find any good
reason for posting a (necessarily large) force at Victoria, so very far
from support. The pass between that point and Tula was not practicable
for artillery, and was not the only pass by which infantry and cavalry
could cross the mountains. Taylor (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 380) argued that
from Victoria he could threaten the Mexican flank, should Santa Anna
advance. But he would have had to force the pass, and without artillery
he could not have accomplished much. In case of Santa Anna's advancing
and succeeding, this flanking force would have been in great peril,
while in case of his failing it would have been useless. Anyhow it would
have been more useful with the main army. Not only were the Americans
scattered at posts, but they moved about in parties of only 200 or 300
with a carelessness that astounded the Mexicans (Camargo letter: N. Y.
_Journal of Commerce_, Jan. 8, 1847). Taylor could not safely count upon
coöperation between Wool and Worth in the case of an advance of the
Mexicans, for it was likely that Santa Anna's first care would be to
block the road, as probably he could have done.


                             XIV. SANTA FE

14.1. Independence is ten miles east of Kansas City and about
thirty-five from Fort Leavenworth.

14.2. _Conditions in New Mexico; Armijo._ =13=Bankhead, no. 148, 1846.
St. Louis _Weekly Reveille_, May 23. St. Louis _Republican_, Aug. 25.
Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). =60=Leitensdorfer, June 7. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1
(Wislizenus). Inman, Old S. Fe Trail, 27-54, 67-92. =75=Armijo, Jan. 12.
=75=Hacienda to Relaciones, Mar. 16. _Monitor Repub._, Apr. 15. Memoria
de ... Guerra, March, 1845. _Picayune_, March 18. Dublán, Legislación,
v, 10. _Niles_, Sept. 26, p. 52. =52=Alvarez, Feb. 2, 1842; Sept. 4,
1846. =52=Jones, Sept. 20, 1837. =13=Ashburnham, no. 50, 1837. Sen.
90; 22, 1, pp. 30-41. Captain of Vols., Conquest. Pacheco, Exposición.
Ruxton, Adventures (London, 1847), 110, 185-6. Cooke, Conquest, 60.
Kendall, Narrative, i, 295, 314-5, 346-60. _Amigo del Pueblo_, Aug.
19, 1845. México á través, iv, 403. Wash. _Globe_, Sept. 2, 1845. N.
Orl. _Courier_, July 5, 1845. Houston _Telegraph_, Jan. 24, 1844.
=77=Arrangóiz, no. 63, res., 1843. =77=Almonte, no. 4, 1844. Amer.
Antiquarian Soc. Proceeds., new series, viii, 324-41. And the following
from =76=. Assembly of N. Méx., Feb., 1846 (petition for comte. gen.).
Re-extracto on N. Méx. (Sambrano). Ayunt., Hermosillo, Son., proclam.
Comte. gen. N. Méx., May 17, 1845. Tornel, Mar. 10, 1846. To Hacienda,
Mar. 6. Trial of Magoffin (testimony). A merchant's estimate of Santa Fe
caravan business for 1846 was that the first cost of the goods amounted
to $937,500 (Captain of Vols., Conquest, 11).

14.3. The text includes two companies of dragoons that joined Kearny on
the march. On account of the scarcity of grass at Santa Fe and because
he considered infantry the chief reliance, Kearny did not wish so large
a proportion of mounted men. Fischer's company enlisted to serve as
horse. The artillery had twelve brass 6-pounders and four 12-pound
howitzers. Kearny's army, being near states abounding in resources, was
more readily set in motion than Taylor's or Wool's, but on account of
its long march 459 horses, 3658 mules, 14,904 oxen, 1556 wagons, and
516 pack mules were required to transport it, its reinforcements, and
its supplies. (This account is not complete, but on the other hand it
refers not only to Kearny's expedition but to troops that followed him.
Rives's account in U.S. and Mexico, ii, 214-5, is therefore misleading,
and makes the short rations endured on the march seem incredible.) The
Indians drove off many of the cattle, robbed trains and killed not a few
drivers (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 545).

14.4. _S. Fe expedition ordered and organized._ S. Louis _Weekly
Reveille_, May 11, 23. Polk, Diary, May 13, 14, 16, 30. =69=Jones to
Kearny, May 13. =63=Marcy to Kearny, May 27. =240=Kennerly, Narrative.
Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). =69=Kearny, orders, June 19; July 31. Richardson,
Journal, 3-6. =61=Kearny to gov. Mo., June 16; to Cummins, June
20. =60=Marcy to gov. Mo., May 13. Wash. _Union_, Sept. 24. _Nat.
Intelligencer_, Oct. 2. _Monitor Repub._, Mar. 27, 1847. Scharf, St.
Louis, i, 369, 372-3. St. Louis _Republican_, May 13, 22, 30; June 26.
Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 545. _Niles_, July 4, 1846, p. 281; July 3, 1847, p.
279. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 326. Elliott, Notes, 217, 221. Ruxton, Adventures
(1849), 312-3. St. Louis _New Era_, Aug. 20. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls.,
ii, no. 4. =212=Hastings, diary. =256=Penn, Jr., [May 23]. Bancroft,
Pac. States, xii, 410, note (names of officers). Hughes, Doniphan's
Expedition, 24-7. Cooke, Conquest, 2.

14.5. The route taken by Kearny was not the shortest but it seemed
the best for his purpose (Cooke, Conquest, 13). Distances from Fort
Leavenworth: to Council Grove, 126 miles; to the Arkansas River, 393; to
Bent's Fort, 564; to S. Fe, 873 (Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 236).

14.6. _To and at Bent's Fort._ Mexico in 1842, 128. Sen. 7; 30, 1.
=63=Marcy to Howard, May 13, 1846. Ho. 41; 30, 1. =61=Kearny, June 5;
Aug. 1. =61=Kearny, orders, June 27; July 31. =61=Capt. Johnston, diary.
=201=Gibson, diary. Prince, Concise Hist., 164-74, 178. _Niles_, Aug. 1,
1846, p. 343. Cooke, Conquest, 3-4. Elliott, Notes, 222-3. =58=Cooke,
Map of S. Fe Trace. Captain of Vols., Conquest. Ho. 45; 31, 1. Sen.
23; 30, 1. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., ii, no. 4. Richardson, Journal.
Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, pp. 5-13. Connelley, Doniphan's Exped., 179-81.
=212=Hastings, diary. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 151, 168. Ruxton, Far West,
189. =69=Kearny, July 17. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 30-59. =76=Kearny
to Armijo, Aug. 1. =76=Heredia to S. Anna, Dec. 31, 1846. Bent's Fort
lay about fifteen miles above the mouth of Las Animas River (Cooke,
Conquest, 12).

14.7. _Armijo's motives and preparations._ Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory).
Gibson, diary, Sept. 5. _Republicano_, Jan. 13; Feb. 5, 1847 (Armijo).
Twitchell, Milit. Occup., 60. Read, Guerra, 219. Prince, Concise Hist.,
179. =52=Alvarez, Sept. 4, 1846. From =76= the following. M. E. to F.
Pino. N. to F. Pino. J. F. to J. E. Ortiz. J. F. Ortiz to P. Armendaris.
M. Ramírez to Señora Casanoba. N. Quintanar to L. Téllez. D. Vigil to
J. F. Zubia. Decision of the _mesa_. Testimony given at the trial of
Magoffin. S. Anna, Dec. 8, 1846. Summary of four packets of letters,
and conclusion of the _mesa_. Armijo, Sept. 8, 1846; Jan. 20; Mar. 30,
1847. Tornel, Mar. 10, 1846. _Id._ to Ugarte, Mar. 10; June 25; July 25.
Segundo cabo, Chihuahua, July 10. Armijo to Ugarte, July 1. To Armijo,
July 25. Comte. gen. Durango, July 16. Ugarte, July 17; Aug. 23. Letter
from El Paso, Aug. 9.

14.8. The regiment under Price numbered at first about 1000, and the
battalion, commanded by Lieut. Col. Willock, about 300. In July a third
force (infantry) was ordered to take the same route but it was found
unnecessary, and the plans were given up (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 162).

_The second (Price's; Mormons) and third (abortive) expeditions._ Polk,
Diary, May 30; June 2, 3, 5; July 18, 1846; Apr. 28, 1847. =62=Marcy to
gov. Mo., May 11, 1847. =62=Jones to Price, May 18, 22, 1847. =63=Marcy
to gov. Mo., Apr. 28; May 6, 11, 1847. =69=Jones to Scott, Apr. 20,
1847. =61=Doniphan to Marcy, Oct. 20, 1846. =61=Shields, Aug. 9, 1846.
=62=Marcy to gov. Mo., July 18, 1846. Wash. _Union_, Sept. 24, 1846.
Scharf, St. Louis, i, 375-6. _Niles_, July 18, 1846, p. 312. =2=Allred,
recolls. Sen. 439; 29, 1, p. 2. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 49. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p.
171. Bancroft, Pac. States, xii, 410, note (names of officers). Cooke,
Conquest, 2. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 134, 137-8.

14.9. Kearny's letter to Armijo, found in the Mexican archives, is
stated to have been translated by the American consul from a certified
copy of the original. A little later an American trader, who had married
a Santa Fe woman, was despatched to distribute the proclamation and
sound the people at Taos. A scouting party under Bent went forward to
examine the route.

14.10. Kearny was criticised for undertaking to release the people from
their allegiance to Mexico; but since, as our Supreme Court decided in
the Castine case, the inhabitants of conquered territories pass under
at least a temporary allegiance to the conquering power, they must
necessarily be absolved from their former obligations. See Washington
_Union_, August 21, 1847.

14.11. Kearny returned a conciliatory message by the bearer of Armijo's
letter. See note 13.

14.12. Estimates of the number of the people in arms vary from about
1800 (=76=Armijo) to 4-5000 (Cooke). Armijo's reports minified all his
means of defence. Apparently there were about 3000. So Magoffin stated
on his =76=trial, and this was the conclusion of the war department at
Mexico. Probably Armijo felt surprised and embarrassed by the response
of the people.

14.13. It was charged by Mexicans that Armijo was bought by American
agents. But Kearny had no money to use in this way, and in the absence
of substantial evidence there seems to be no good ground to suppose
that the merchants had a sufficient reason for buying him. Armijo sent
Dr. Henry Connelly back with Cooke to treat in his behalf with Kearny
(Cooke, Conquest, 31, 33), but nothing seems to have been accomplished.
Kearny probably desired (=76=Connelly to Armijo, Aug. 19) that Armijo
should surrender with his troops, and presumably Armijo asked for
impossible concessions. Magoffin went on to Chihuahua, was arrested,
tried, and imprisoned until the end of the war, and later was paid
$30,000 by the U.S. government for his services and losses (Benton,
View, ii, 683). There is little reason to suppose that his services were
of much value.

14.14. The Mexican archives contain many letters from New Mexico bearing
upon Armijo's conduct and motives. Most of the writers called him a
traitor; and a war department board (_mesa_), after reviewing the
evidence, decided that he ought to be tried. But of course this was
the opportunity for his enemies to turn upon him. The popular party
naturally insisted that the people wanted to fight, and were betrayed
by him. But he denied this, demanding why, in that case, they did not
select some other chief, and hold their ground. Armijo hovered about for
a time, pretending to coöperate with Ugarte; but, not being permitted to
remain in Chihuahua, he went south with a train of wagons filled with
American merchandise and guarded by Missourians, and finally, making his
way to the capital under an order to come and answer for his conduct, he
repeatedly demanded to be put on trial.

14.15. The population of Santa Fe was about 3000.

14.16. _Events from Aug. 1 to 18 inclusive._ Mexico in 1842, p. 128.
Sen. 7; 30, 1. Polk, Diary, June 15, 17, 1846. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, pp.
17-20. Sen. 18; 31, 1, p. 237. =61=Kearny, Aug. 1. =61=Capt. Johnston,
diary. =62=Marcy to Kearny, June 18. =201=Gibson, diary. _Republicano_,
Sept. 10, 1846; Jan. 13; Feb. 5, 1847. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii,
104. Connelley, Doniphan's Exped., 181, 184. _Anzeiger des Westens_,
Aug. 6; Sept. 5, 7, 24, 1846. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 168-70. Wash. _Union_,
Sept. 14; Oct. 2, 27, 1846; July 12, 1847. _Diario_, Sept. 9, 10; Oct.
5. Read, Guerra, 220. Prince, Concise Hist., 179-80. _Niles_, Oct. 10,
pp. 90-2. Robinson, Sketches, 20-1. Elliott, Notes, 225, 231, 234-5,
237, 241. =52=Alvarez, Sept. 4. Sen. 23; 30, 1. Ruxton, Adventures
(London, 1847), 110. Benton, View, ii, 683. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls.,
ii, no. 4. =212=Hastings, diary. =268=Kearny, letter book. =337=Capt.
Turner, diary. Cutts, Conquest, 44. Cooke, Conquest, 5-43. Richardson,
Journal. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 59-87. From =76= the following.
Letters from N. Mex. (undated letters in note 7). Testimony at trial
of Magoffin. S. Anna, Dec. 8. Summary of four packets of letters and
conclusion of the _mesa_. Armijo, Sept. 8. Armijo to Kearny, Aug. 12.
Connelly to Armijo, Aug. 19. Armijo, Jan. 20; Mar. 30, 1847. Re-extracto
from statement of Sambrano. Reyes, Aug. 25, 1846. Ugarte, Aug. 23; Sept.
5. Kearny to Armijo, Aug. 1. Estados of troops in Zac., Dur., Chih., and
N. Mex.

14.17. _Events from Aug. 19 to Sept. 25 inclusive._ =61=Wooster, Sept.
25. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 169-74 (Kearny). Sen. 7; 30, 1. Sen. Misc. 26;
30, 1, pp. 55, etc. =61=Kearny, Aug. 30; Sept. 24. =69=Kearny, orders,
Aug. 27; Sept. 12. =201=Gibson, diary. _Anzeiger des Westens_, Sept.
26; Nov. 16. =243=Kribben, home letter, Aug. 28. Wash. _Union_, Oct.
27. Prince, Concise Hist., 180, 182. _Niles_, Oct. 10, p. 90. Hastings,
diary. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 169-70. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 100-19.
=76=Vigil, reply to Kearny, Aug. 19. =76=Letter from El Paso, Aug. 9.
=76=Heredia, Oct. 17. Some of the force did not set out until Sept. 26
(Cooke, Conquest, 71).


                             XV. CHIHUAHUA

15.1. Willock's battalion was under Price's command. The Mormons were
intended for California. Kearny's order to Doniphan anticipated a
suggestion made independently by Scott and by Benton in November, and
forwarded, with Polk's approval, to Kearny on December 10 by Marcy.
Doniphan was anxious to be ordered to Wool, and his men, reacting from
the atrocious conditions prevailing at Santa Fe--of which quite enough
will be heard in chapter xxxi--were eager to be off.

15.2. Arriving at Santa Fe without provisions, the soldiers soon ate up
what supplies could be obtained there, and as the people were declared
to be American citizens, nothing could be taken without the consent
of the owners. Besides, Kearny had no adequate funds. By a surprising
blunder the contracts for the supplies that followed him called for
delivery, not at Santa Fe, but at Bent's Fort. Doniphan's setting out
for the south was delayed by a lack of provisions. The description of
his men is based upon a large number of documents (particularly the
diaries of Gibson and Hastings and Ruxton's Adventures) which will be
cited when the occupation of New Mexico comes to be considered (chap.
xxxi).

15.3. Ruxton speaks of tents, but perhaps he was thinking of Clark's
men. Doniphan stated that they marched across the Jornada without tents
(St. Louis _Republican_, July 3, 1847).

15.4. December 19 Heredia reported to Santa Anna that there were 108
infantry and 320 cavalry at El Paso. There is no reason to suspect the
honesty of this report, and none of the other troops in the state had
time to reach that town before Christmas. Some ex-soldiers, however, are
said in Apuntes, 141, to have joined the colors, making some 1200 in
all, including militia.

15.5. It is impossible to state positively how many men Ponce de León
had. The American accounts run as high as 1300 (Hughes), but evidently
they were not based on reliable information, and very likely the
writers assumed that all of Vidal's troops were under Ponce. From the
Mexican accounts it would appear that such was not the case. Vidal
would naturally keep men back to act as a reserve, hold what he called
his "line of defence," and guard his person; and this probability is
strengthened by the fact that three of his four guns were not used in
the fight. The figures of several Mexican accounts are about 500. The
reports of the details of the skirmish are equally irreconcilable. El
Brazito (The Little Arm) was the smaller (eastern) of the two channels
into which the river was here divided by an island.

15.6. _Doniphan's operations to Dec. 25 inclusive; Mex. preparations
at the Chihuahua frontier._ =61=Wooster, Sept. 25. =268=Portrait of
Doniphan. =240=Kennerly, narrative. =61=Kearny, special orders 11. Sen.
7; 30, 1. Richardson, Journal. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, p. 61. =61=Kearny,
orders, Sept. 23. =61=Doniphan, Oct. 20. =61=Price, Feb. 26, 1847.
=61=Scott, Nov. 24 and Marcy's endorsement, Dec. 9. Cooke, Conquest, 51.
=201=Gibson, diary. _Republicano_, Jan. 26; Apr. 10, 1847. _Picayune_,
Mar. 6, 18, 1847. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 105. _Anzeiger des
Westens_, Apr. 11, 14; May 17, 18, 1847. =243=Kribben, letters, Oct. 20,
etc., 1846. Wash. =Union=, Mar. 18, 21, 1847. St. Louis _Republican_,
July 3, 1847. _Niles_, Mar. 6, 1847, p. 7; Apr. 3, p. 71; July 3, p.
279. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 496-7 (Don.). Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 171, 1128.
Apuntes, 141-3. Elliott, Notes, 227, 229. Sen. 23; 30, 1, pp. 90-6. Sen.
439; 29, 1, p. 2. (Loss) Ho. 24; 31, 1. Ruxton, Adventures (London,
1847), 171-2, 176, 178, 183. Statement _re_ Doniphan from Hon. Champ
Clark, Jan. 27, 1906. Benton, View, ii, 686-8. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls.,
ii, no. 4. =212=Hastings, diary. Cooke, Conquest, 39. Hughes, Doniphan's
Exped., 256-67. Connelley, Doniphan's Exped., 589. From =76= the
following. Trias, proclam., Nov. 19, 1846. _Id._, Nov. 23; Dec. 18.
Balmúdez, El Paso, Oct. 28. Vidal, proclam., Dec. 21. _Id._, Dec. 26.
Heredia, Dec. 25. Ponce to Vidal, Dec. 26. Gov. Chih. to prefect El
Paso, Sept. 19.

15.7. October 22 Marcy, learning from Kearny that surplus troops might
be ordered to report to Wool at Chihuahua, directed Taylor to notify
and instruct any such detachment in case he (Taylor) should decide to
have Wool join him (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 365). It was probably possible to
have a Mexican spy go from Parras to Chihuahua and thence north to meet
Doniphan, but so far as we are aware no attempt to do this was made.

15.8. The insurrection will be described in chap. xxxi.

15.9. During the stay at El Paso some of the traders stole away, went to
Chihuahua, and sold ammunition to the enemy.

15.10. Lieut. Col. Mitchell had been ordered south by Price in December
to open communication with Wool, who was believed to be approaching
Chihuahua, and Mitchell had organized the Rangers as an escort.
Christian Kribben, who commanded one of the two companies, wrote (Nov.
30) that Mitchell selected the best men then at S. Fe. The commander was
named Hudson. (See also Richardson, Journal.) Mitchell nearly reached
El Paso while Doniphan was engaged with the Indians; but, alarmed by
reports of Mexican troops, he returned and joined Doniphan. There was no
engineer in Doniphan's command.

15.11. _Events from Dec. 26 to Feb. 27 inclusive._ Sen. Misc. 26; 30,
1, p. 61. =61=Price, Feb. 26, 1847. =61=Wooster, Mar. 7. Gibson, diary.
_Picayune_, Mar. 18. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 105. Wash. _Union_,
Mar. 18. Richardson, Journal. =228=Hughes to Miller, Jan. 26. _Id._
to war dept., Jan. 25. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 498-9 (Don.), 503 (Gilpin).
Apuntes, 143. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 365, 1128. Elliott, Notes, 245.
Ruxton, Adventures (London, 1847), 156, 158, 168. Kendall, Narrative,
ii, 35. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., ii, no. 4. Hastings, diary. Hughes,
Doniphan's Exped., 256, 269, 271-4, 280, 286, 289-95, 301-2. From =76=
the following. García Conde, Apr. 5. Comte. gen. Chih., Oct. 10, 1846.
Heredia, Jan. 9, 1847. _Id._ to S. Anna, Dec. 31, 1846; Jan. 5, 1847.
Gov. Sonora to Bustamante, Feb. 28, 1847. Trias, Feb. 7. The artillery
arrived on Feb. 1, but the baggage and provision train not until Feb. 5.

15.12. After the battle the Mexicans represented their forces as small;
but, as Trias himself wrote on February 20 that he would set out the
next day from Chihuahua City with 2000 troops (it is not probable that
he looked upon the rancheros as troops), and García Conde was then north
of the Sacramento with about 800 cavalry, it seems impossible to reduce
the total given in the text.

15.13. _Mexican preparations to defend Chihuahua; the ground and
the fortifications._ Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, p. 53. Gibson, diary.
_Republicano_, Mar. 25; Apr. 10; June 8. _Anzeiger des Westens_, May
17, 18. _Diario_, Nov. 5, 1846. Edwards, Campaign, 127. Sen. 1; 30, 1,
pp. 498-513. Apuntes, 143-6. Ruxton, Adventures (London, 1847), 159.
=47=Conner, May 31, 1846. Memoria de ... Guerra, Mar., 1845, p. 28.
Kendall, Narrative, ii, 63. Hastings, diary. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped.,
303-5. From =76= the following. García Conde, Apr. 5, 1847. Martínez,
Oct. 10, 1846. Reyes, Oct. 9, 1846. J. M. Conde, Feb. 24; Mar. 15, 1847.
S. Anna, Oct. 12; Nov. 11; Dec. 24, 1846; Jan. 4, 1847. Tornel, June
25, 1846. Gov. Durango, July 27; Sept. 3, 1846. Re-extracto of Sambrano
letter. Boletín no. 8, Chih. Reyes to Trias, Oct. 7, 1846. Comte. gen.
Durango, Aug. 22; Sept. 3; Oct. 30, 1846. To Reyes, Aug. 31; Sept. 9,
18, 25, 1846. Reyes, Aug. 25; Sept. 14; Oct. 2, 6, 1846. Memo., Sept 9.
To director gen. of artill., Sept. 18. Patriotic junta, plan, July 27,
1846 (reported upon by generals, Sept. 4). Comte. gen. Chih., [Sept.]
15, 1846. Trias, Sept. 19; Dec. 26, 1846; Feb. 20; Oct. 26, 1847. Gov.
Chih., July 23, 1846. Comte. gen. Zacatecas, July 31. Segundo cabo,
Chih., July 18, res., 21, 25; Aug. 17. Estados of troops in Zac., Dur.,
Chih. and N. Mex. Heredia to S. Anna, Dec. 31, 1846; Jan. 5; Feb. 13,
20, 1847. To Heredia, Mar. 13, 1847. Memo, on defence of Chih. Heredia,
Oct. 10; Nov. 2; Dec. 7, 1846; Jan. 19, 26, 30; Feb. 20; Mar. 2, 22,
1847. Estado of Dur. troops sent to Chih., dated Feb. 20, 1847. To
comte. gen. Dur., Sept. 9, 1846. And many others.

15.14. A letter of May 18, 1847, from Chihuahua said that in the opinion
of sensible persons commercial interest in the caravan had much to do
with Doniphan's victories, and that certain extraordinary events could
be explained in no other way (_Republicano_, June 8). =76=Heredia
suspected that Chihuahua merchants were secretly working to bring about
the arrival of the caravan.

15.15. Doniphan might have crossed the cordillera bounding the eastern
side of the valley and turned the Mexican position entirely, wrote
=76=García Conde; but he did not say that the wagons could have gone
that way. If they could not, the plan was impracticable.

15.16. Doniphan said later: "There was no particular generalship at
the battle. You were marched within the proper distance, when you were
turned loose. The enemy first recoiled, then gave way, then fled." To
a great extent this was true. Doniphan knew that he was not a general,
and did not try to play the part. For a time at least he merely watched
and whittled (Edwards, Campaign, 112). Affairs were mostly in the hands
of his subordinates. But he gave some directions. Lieut. Wooster of the
Fourth Artillery, who had arrived at Santa Fe on August 28, was on the
ground, and according to his own report was mainly responsible for the
conduct of the battle.

15.17. _Events of Feb. 28._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 498 (Doniphan),
502 (Mitchell), 503 (Gilpin), 508 (Clark). (Loss) Ho. 24; 31, 1.
=201=Gibson, diary. =212=Hastings, diary. _American Eagle_, V. Cruz, May
26. Richardson, Journal, 61-4. Polk, Diary, May 4. =188=Edwards, diary.
Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, p. 53. =61=Wooster, Mar. 7. _Republicano_, Mar.
25; Apr. 10. México á través, iv, 644. _Anzeiger des Westens_, May 18
(Kribben). Wash. _Union_, July 12. _Diario_, Mar. 17; Apr. 8. Edwards,
Campaign, 111-2, 117. _Niles_, July 3, 1847, p. 279. Robinson, Sketches,
57-8. Apuntes, 146-9. Elliott, Notes, 245. =13=Bankhead, no. 29, 1847.
Captain of Vols., Conquest, 38. Ruxton, Adventures (1847), 159. Mo.
Hist. Soc. Colls., ii, no. 4. Benton, View, ii, 686. Cooke, Conquest,
89. =240=Kennerly, narrative. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 306-13.
Connelley, Doniphan's Exped., 418, 590. From =76= the following. García
Conde, Apr. 5. J. M. Conde, Mar. 15. Yáñez, Mar. 23. To Heredia, Mar.
2, 13. Heredia, Mar. 2; Apr. 1. Ugarte, Mar. 10. It is hardly necessary
to point out that howitzers and cavalry should not ordinarily be used
in storming entrenched positions. Ibarra's list of officers killed
during the war (p. 8) mentions but one as falling here. This fact seems
to suggest the true character of the battle. Drawing the fire of the
Mexican fortifications by sweeping to the left prepared the way for our
decisive charge.

15.18. Trias made active efforts but in vain. Heredia had only 200 men
on April 10; and Ugarte on April 15 merely expected to have two small
parties afoot before long. Arlégui, comandante general of Durango,
was anxious to protect his own state by recovering Chihuahua, but the
governor showed no interest in that project.

15.19. Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1, pp. 61-2. Frost, Taylor, 304. =61=Wooster,
Mar. 7. Gibson, diary. _Republicano_, Apr. 10; June 8. Wash. _Union_,
July 12. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 501 (Doniphan); 503 (Mitchell). Apuntes,
149. Robinson, Sketches, 62. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1088 (Mora); 1128
(Doniphan). Rondé, Voyage, 136. Hastings, diary. Hughes, Doniphan's
Exped., 316, 327, 335. Richardson, Journal. From =76= the following.
Ugarte, Mar. 15; Apr. 8, 15. To comtes. gen. in Jalisco, Zacat., Guanaj.
and Dur., Mar. 13. To Filisola, Apr. 1, 30. Gov. Dur. to comte. gen.,
Mar. 7; Apr. 3. Arlégui, Mar. 31. _Id._, proclam., Apr. 11. Heredia,
Mar. 2, 18; Apr. 8. Trias, May 26. Olivares and Maceyra to Doniphan,
Mar. 5. Gov. Zacatecas, Mar. 18. The news that Mexican forces were
coming was not without foundation. Gen. Filisola, a veteran officer, had
now been given Heredia's place, the comandantes general of three states
had been ordered to the north, and the governor of Durango was expecting
1000 men.

15.20. About sixty-five Comanches had raided Parras just before the
Americans arrived there, killing eight or ten persons. As the people of
the town had been friendly to Wool, Captain Reid with about thirty-five
men pursued the Indians, and without losing a life killed seventeen,
wounded at least twenty-five, and recaptured nineteen boys and girls
besides hundreds of horses and mules. Doniphan's men were reviewed by
Wool at Buena Vista.

15.21. _The return home._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1127, 1131, 1136, 1143,
1170 (Taylor); 1128 (Doniphan); 1144 (Reid). Richardson, Journal.
Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 339-51, 359, 363-5, etc. Sen. Misc. 26;
30, 1, pp. 62-82. =61=Wooster, Mar. 7. =65=Wool, gen. orders 293.
Cutts, Conquest, 89. _Republicano_, June 8. Richardson, Journal.
_Independiente_, May 29. Wash. _Union_, July 12. Scharf, St. Louis, i,
379. Connelley, Doniphan's Exped., 591. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 502. Captain
of Vols., Conquest, 37, 39. Cooke, Conquest, 90, note. =148=Chamberlain,
recolls. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 59. S. Anna, Apelación, app.,
15-7. Connelley, Doniphan's Exped., 596. Mo. Hist. Soc. Colls., ii,
no. 4. Hastings, diary. _Niles_, July 3, 1847, p. 279; July 17, p.
316; Aug. 14, p. 372. Robinson, Sketches, 64-71. =76=Ugarte, May 3.
=76=Relaciones, May 20. =76=Arlégui, May 7, 14. =76=Aguirre, May 14.
=76=Jefe político, Mapimi, May 10. The distance from Chihuahua to
Saltillo was called 675 miles. Doniphan resumed the practice of law,
managed his fine farm, and served in the Missouri senate. When the Civil
War broke out, he supported the Union; but apparently he felt too much
tenderness for his neighbors to take up arms.


                      XVI. THE CALIFORNIA QUESTION

16.1. In 1845 there entered at Monterey, the only port of entry,
twenty-seven American vessels (9435 tons), eighteen Mexican (2620), four
British (966), three French (756) and three German (525).

16.2. Mexico tried to keep the emigrants out with proclamations and
orders to the California authorities, but the Americans appealed
successfully to the treaty of amity and commerce and (it may be
presumed) to the self-interest of local authorities.

16.3. The Mexican government was urged to buy New Helvetia, and
negotiations began; but it was said that the Americans in the valley
declared they would not permit Sutter to sell, and it seemed doubtful
whether Mexico could hold the place even if she purchased it.

16.4. _California and its population._ =13=Pakenham, nos. 66, 78, 1840;
1, 1842. =13=Capt. Jones to Pakenham, Nov. 30, 1841. _Revue de Paris_,
Jan., 1849. =13=Forbes, no. 2, 1846. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Apr. 26,
1842; Nov. 5, 1844. _Madisonian_, Dec. 24, 1842. =77=To gov. Calif.,
June 1, 1842. =77=Almonte, no. 84, 1844. =13=Barron, May 5, 1837; Jan.
20, 1844. _Id._ to Seymour, Jan. 28, 1845. =12=Blake to Seymour, July
5, 1846. =52=Vessels entering at Monterey, 1845. Forbes, Calif., 155,
225, 276. Bulletin de la Soc. de Géog., no. 77, May, 1844, 99-102. Dana,
Two Years, 83-8, 90-3, 200. Colton, Three Years, 19-22, 37-8, 45, 68,
111, 118, 155, 158, 172-3, 231. Whittier, "The Crisis." =61=R. B. Mason,
Sept. 18, 1847. Sherman Letters, 43. Duflot de Mofras, Explor., i, 319,
402; ii, 24. Wise, Gringos, 42, 49. Ho. 70; 30, 1, pp. 7-8. =61=Kearny,
Mar. 15; Apr. 28, 1847. =77=Covarrubias, Apr. 5, 1846. =247=March to
Larkin. =247=Sutter to Larkin, Oct. 3, 1845. Bidwell, Calif., 157,
161. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Dec. 15, 1845, p. 1039. Sherman, Sloat,
xv, xxxix. St. Amant, Voyages, 513. Richman, Calif., 265, 267, 276.
=13=Forbes to Barron, Jan. 27, 1845. =13=Elliott, July 3, 1845. Royce,
Bidwell. Boston _Post_, Nov. 27, 1845. Jameson, Calhoun Corres., 946.
=247=Sutter to Larkin, Oct. 3, 1845. =372=Hyde, statement, 6. Farnham,
Life, 358-60. _Diario_, Mar. 21, 1846. Soulé, Annals, 168, 201. Sherman,
Home Letters, 114. _Niles_, June 6, 1846, p. 211. Schafer, Pac. Slope,
231. Simpson, Narrative, i, 287, 297. Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. 97. Revere,
Tour, 70. Sen. Rep. 75; 30, 1, p. 50. Sherman, Mems., i, 20. Bryant,
What I Saw, 447. Royce, Calif., 31-2, 38-9, 41. =123=Bidwell, statement.
Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). Larkin, Calif. prior to 1846 (=52=Cons. letters,
Monterey, i, 1). Letter from S. Fe, July 29, 1841; Mex. in 1842, p. 128.
London _Times_, June 18, 1841. Phila. _No. American_, Oct. 31, 1843.
=52=Larkin, nos. 7, June 20; 9, Aug. 18, 1844; 12, Mar. 22; 22, June 6;
26, Sept. 29, 1845.

16.5. Startled by this affair, the Mexican government now proposed
to send 1200 men to California with the idea of establishing them as
military colonists; and in May, 1845, Ignacio Iniestra, a Mexican
educated at Paris and regarded as a competent officer, was appointed
to the chief command. No such number of troops was, however, provided;
Iniestra refused to set out until sure his men would be paid and fed;
and the requisite money was not supplied. In August U. S. Consul Parrott
and the _Amigo del Pueblo_ of Mexico stated that a commissioner had
come from California to inform the government that the troops would not
be admitted. About this time the lack of funds caused a mutiny; but
that was suppressed, and the dwindling forces lingered on until, at
the end of the year, a large part of them were swept by Paredes into
the vortex of his revolution. For nearly two months they were cantoned
near Mexico; but finally another sham effort was put forth. Though
Iniestra died, the men proceeded under various embarrassments--receiving
accessions _en route_ from the prisons of Guadalajara--to the port of
Mazatlán, and the arms, munitions and provisions made their way under
equal difficulties to Acapulco, where seven small vessels were gathered
to receive them. But the restless Juan Alvarez, called "The Tiger of
the South," seized the effects of the expedition, giving his brigandage
a color of respectability by pronouncing, as we have seen, against
Paredes, and three weeks later the troops at Mazatlán, commanded now
by Col. Rafael Téllez, took a similar step--being determined on the
one hand not to go to California, and quite willing on the other to
live riotously on the funds of the expedition and the ample revenues
of the customhouse. They pronounced for Santa Anna; and soon after the
revolution of the citadel took place, August 4, 1846, the government,
promising to make up his command to 1000, ordered Téllez to sail, but
the necessary reinforcements were not provided. Téllez advised giving up
the expedition, and on Sept. 7 the government expressed its concurrence
in this recommendation. Thus ended even the pretence of taking the
California situation in hand. Téllez stated that according to documents
in his possession Paredes never intended to have the expedition sail;
and it is certain that secret instructions were given to Iniestra,
which the government was extremely anxious to keep from the knowledge
of the public. In all probability the real purpose of proposing the
expedition was merely to make people feel that something was to be
done. (=13=Bankhead, nos. 13, 1845; 74, 1846. _Diario_, May 4, 1846.
London _Times_, Jan. 8, 1846. =47=Wood to Bancroft, June 4, 1846.
Comunicación Circular que ... Peña. _Amigo del Pueblo_, Aug. 14, 1845.
Of the author's very numerous =76=documents relating to the expedition
the following are enough to cite. Bustamante to Moreno, Mar. 26, 1847.
Tornel to gov. Calif., May 13, 1846. N. Flores, Mar. 8, 1846. Yáñez,
Mar. 10, 23, 1846. Alvarez, Mar. 17; Apr. 7, 1846. M. Gutiérrez, May 19;
June 16, 1846. To J. I. Gutiérrez, May 13, 1846. Téllez to prest. of
consejo de gob., July 25, 1846; reply, Aug. 18. J. I. Gutiérrez, May 9,
1846. To Iniestra, Mar. 31; May 9, 1845. Iniestra, July 31; Aug. 24, 29;
Sept. 23; Dec. 2, 24, 1845; Jan. 5, 18, 24; Feb. 28, 1846. Castañares,
Oct. 27, 1845. To Monterde, Apr. 10, 1846. T. Moreno, Mar. 3, 1846.
Baneneli to Téllez, May 7, 1846. Moreno to Gutiérrez, Apr. 16, 24, 1846.
Téllez, Feb. 9, 27; Mar. 2; Apr. 11; Aug. 24, 26; Sept. 2, 1846. To
Téllez, Sept. 7, 1846. See also chap. xxx, note 27.)

16.6. _Mexico fully warned._ London _Times_, June 18, 1841; Aug. 6;
Oct. 6, 1845. =77=Almonte, no. 84, P., July 16; 153, P., Dec. 12, 1844.
=13=Pakenham, no. 2, Jan. 6, 1842. =13=Bankhead, nos. 31, Mar. 31, 1845;
42, 1846. =77=Arrangóiz, Sept. 17, 1842; nos. 64, res., June 28, 1844;
41, res., Feb. 28; 70, res., May 7; 101, res., July 8, 1845. London
_Chronicle_, Aug. 13, 1845. Castañares, Documentos. =75=Sánchez, Apr.
2, 1846. Bancroft, Pac. States, xvii, 32. =76=Mora y Villamil, Nov. 15,
1845. =76=Bustamante, Nov. 13, 1845. =76=Mil. comte., Acapulco, July
22, 1845. =76=J. Castro to Castañares, Oct. 6, 1845. =76=_Id._, May 30,
1845. =76=Bustamante to Moreno, Mar. 26, 1847. In November, 1845, the
Mexican minister of relations told Bankhead that Castro could not be
punished for revolting (=13=Bankhead, no. 113).

16.7. If anyone doubts this, let him look at the present populous, rich,
happy state of California, think how much it contributes to the world,
and consider what it would now be, had it remained a part of Mexico, and
suffered from the anarchy, devastations and massacres of recent years.

16.8. France had at one time cast longing glances at California. In the
early forties Duflot de Mofras made a visit there, and according to the
British vice consul in California a formal offer of protection was made
by him, Admiral Du Petit Thouars and Capt. Laplace in the name of their
government (=13=Forbes to Barron, Sept. 5, 1844); but the time for such
a move was not then ripe, and France, aside from maintaining a consular
representative on the ground, became inactive. England was even less
responsive. While many British subjects, particularly the correspondent
of the London _Times_ at Mexico (_e.g._ _Times_, Sept. 9, 1845), felt
that England should take California, the British government, though
doubtless extremely anxious that the territory should not fall into the
possession of the United States, refused to move or countenance any move
in that direction. December 31, 1844, the Foreign Office wrote to Consul
Barron at Tepic, Mexico, who had charge of Vice Consul Forbes at San
Francisco, that in the California agitation the British agents were to
be entirely passive, and that the idea of a British protectorate could
not be countenanced, adding that the authorities of California "should
be clearly made to understand that Great Britain would view with much
dissatisfaction the establishment of a protectoral power over California
by any other foreign State." Other documents bearing on the subject are
the following. =13=Forbes to Barron, Sept. 5, 1844. Kennedy in London
_Times_, June 18, 1841. =13=Pakenham, nos. 91, Aug. 30, 1841; 61, July
21, 1842. =13=To _Id._, Dec. 15, 1841. Bankhead, nos. 74, July 30, 1845;
73, May 30, 1846. =13=To Bankhead (exactly in line with the despatch
addressed to Barron on the same day), nos. 53, Dec. 31, 1844; 18, May
31, 1845; 16, June 1; 4, Aug. 15, 1846. =108=Ashburton to Sturgis, Apr.
2, 1845 ("we certainly do not want colonies, and least of all such as
would be unmanageable from this distance, and only serve to embroil us
with our neighbours"). =13=Mora to Palmerston, Dec. 15, 1847. London
_Times_, Oct. 6, 1845. =12=For. Off. to Admty., June 19, 1846. Webster,
Writings, xviii, 192. =12=Seymour to Admty., Apr. 27, 1846. _Monitor
Repub._, Apr. 16, 1846. =52=Everett, Mar. 28, 1845. Gordon, Aberdeen,
183. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 155, 230, 417. Mackintosh, Brit. consul
at Mex., proposed to place 500,000 European colonists in California in
twenty years (=13=to Bankhead, July 26, 1845) with a view to turning
over to England the control of the province (=13=Bankhead, no. 73,
May 30, 1846). Paredes promised to give "every possible facility" for
the execution of this plan (=13=Bankhead, no. 73), but the British
government would not take it up.

16.9. _Mexican rule to the end of 1845._ =13=Forbes, nos. 1, Oct. 19,
1843; 2, Jan. 26, 1846. Boston _Advertiser_, Sept. 26, 1842. _Nat.
Intelligencer_, May 11, 1844. London _Times_, Aug. 6; Oct. 6; Nov. 11,
1845; Mar. 13, 1846. _Revue de Paris_, Jan., 1849. =77=Almonte, nos. 84,
P., July 16; 153, P., Dec. 12, 1844. =13=Barron, May 5, 1837; Feb. 18,
1845. =13=_Id._ to Seymour, Jan. 28, 1845. =13=Pakenham, nos. 13, 1837;
66, 1840; 91, 1841; 2, 1842. =13=Doyle, no. 79, 1843. =13=Bankhead, nos.
108, 1844; 31, 52, 113, 1845; 73, 1846. Paredes, address on opening
Cong., June 6, 1846 (_Diario_). Mobile _Commercial Register_, June 13,
1843. _Diario_, Mar. 27; June 3; Aug. 21, 1845. Wash. _Globe_, May
29; Oct. 21, 1845. _Amigo del Pueblo_, Aug. 14, 1845. St. Louis _New
Era_, Aug. 20, 1845. Memphis _Eagle_, Oct. 1; Nov. 5, 1845. =52=Black,
Sept. 2, 1845. _Britannia_, May 15, 1847. =52=Virmond to Jones, Feb.
4, 1837. =52=Larkin, nos. 9, Aug. 18; 11, Oct. 30; 12, Dec. 9, 1844;
16, Jan. 1; 1, Mar. 22; 2, Mar. 22; 20, Mar. 24; 25, July 10; 26, Sept.
29, 1845. =247=Stearns to Larkin, May 14, 1846. =52=Parrott, Aug. 26,
1845. =12=Blake to Seymour, July 5, 1846. =12=Seymour, June 13. Otero,
Cuestión Social, 117. Giménez, Memorias, 90. México á través, iv, 404.
=52=Burroughs to Ellis, Jan. 10, 1837. =77=Castillo, no. 119, 1835.
(Simpson) _Amer. Hist. Rev._, xiv, pp. 88-9. Memoria de ... Relaciones,
Mar., 1845. Royce, Calif., 202. Memoria de ... Guerra, Jan., 1844;
Mar., 1845. Mateos, Hist. Parl., v, 98. Bandini, Calif., 138. =13=Jones
to Pakenham, Nov. 30, 1841. Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 84. =13=Diaz to
Barron, Sept. 29, 1845. London _Chronicle_, Aug. 13, 1845. =47=Wood to
Bancroft, June 4, 1846. St. Louis _Reveille_ (weekly), May 18, 1846.
=77=Arrangóiz, Jan. 9; Sept. 17, 1842; nos. 64, res., 1844; 70, res.,
76, res., 101, res., 1845. Gordon, Aberdeen, 183. Forbes, Calif.,
146-52. Bulletin de la Soc. de Géog., no. 77, p. 186. Castañares,
Documentos. Colton, Three Years, 20, 22, 32. _Argonaut_, Feb. 2, 1878
(Sutter's diary). Sherman Letters, 43-4. =13=Forbes to Barron, Aug.
9; Sept. 5, 1844; Jan. 27; Mar. 10, 1845. Ho. 70; 30, 1, pp. 7-8, 42.
=75=P. Pico, July 1, 1845; Feb. 13, 1846. =75=Covarrubias, Apr. 5,
1846. =75=Sánchez, Apr. 2, 1846. =75=Calif. Commission, Aug. 10, 1846.
_Reforma_, Feb. 10, 1846. =122=Bidwell, Calif., 119, 123. =3=Alvarado,
Calif., v, 129. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Dec. 15, 1845, p. 1037.
Richman, Calif., 273-9. =334=Torres, Peripecias, 49. Blackmar, Span.
Instits., 10-12. Walpole, Four Years, ii, 205. N. Y. _Journ. Commerce_,
Dec. 30, 1846. =11=Cyprey to Guizot, no. 58, 1841. Wilkes, Narrative, v,
171. =13=Aberdeen to Bankhead, no. 53, 1844. Sen. 7; 30, 1. =52=Larkin,
Calif, prior to 1846 (Cons. letters, Monterey, i, 1). Dana, Two Years,
90-1, 200. (Prussia) =52=Everett, no. 284, confid., Mar. 28, 1845. And
from =76= the following. To gov. Calif., Apr. 1, 1845; May 9, 1846.
Téllez, Mar. 23, 1846. Alvarez, Mar. 17, 1846. Guerra, circular, Apr.
1, 1845. Comte. gen. Iguala, Mar. 13, 1846. Mora y Villamil, Nov. 15,
1845. Bustamante, Nov. 13, 1845. J. Castro, memo., undated. _Id._, Oct.
6, 1845. Castañares, Jan. 27, 1846. Estado, Monterey, June 15, 1845.
Castro and Alvarado, May 30, 1845. Sutter to Mex. commr., Nov. 19, 1845.
Castañeda to P. Pico, Feb. 10, 1846. Carrera, Apr. 8, 1846.

16.10. _Interest of the American people in California._ =13=Pakenham,
no. 63, 1841. N. Orl. _Commercial Bulletin_, Feb. 19, 1840; May 21;
Oct. 12, 1841. London _Times_, June 18, 1841; Aug. 1, 1845. N. Y.
_Journ. Commerce_, Oct. 9, 1841; Feb. 23, 1842. St. Louis _Reveille_,
Sept. 17, 1845. Wash. _Globe_, Feb. 27; Aug. 23; Oct. 21; Nov. 4, 1845.
Nashville _Union_, Mar. 13, 1845. Memphis _Eagle_, May 2; Nov. 5,
1845. N. Orl. _Picayune_, Apr. 21, 1842; Apr. 5, 1844; Nov. 25, 1845;
Mar. 31, 1846. =13=Bankhead, no. 113, 1845. Savannah _Republican_,
Apr. 25, 1845. N. Orl. _Courier_, Feb. 17, 1840; Apr. 26; July 10,
1845. _American Review_, Jan., 1846, 82-99. _Diario_, Nov. 3, 1845.
Charleston _Courier_, July 11, 1845. _Journal des Débats_, June 1, 1846.
Richmond _Enquirer_, Sept. 12, 1845. Balt. _Clipper_, Mar. 2, 1840.
N. Y. _Herald_, Feb. 22, 1845. (Regulations) =52=Larkin, no. 8, June
24, 1844. Charleston _Mercury_, Feb. 24, 1845. N. Orl. _Bee_, Apr. 19,
1842. Phila. _North American_, Nov. 1, 1845. N. Y. _Tribune_, Apr. 5,
1845. Forbes, Calif., 147-8. Dana, Two Years, 200. _Southwestern Hist.
Qtrly._, xviii, nos. 1-3 (R. G. Cleland). (Whalers) _Hunt's Merchants'
Mag._, Jan., 1845. _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p. 197 (Allen); app., Hunter,
Jan. 10, 1846. Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. 98. =77=Almonte, no. 84, P., July 16,
1844. =77=Arrangóiz, 71, res., May 12, 1845.

16.11. _Views and policy of U. S. government._ Ho. 42; 25, 1, p.
18 (Forsyth, Aug. 6, 1835). =52=Ellis, Sept. 24, 1836. =108=Hooper
to Bancroft, June 25, 1846. =52=Slidell, no. 3, Dec. 17, 1845.
=13=Pakenham, nos. 43, 1833; 63, 91, 1841. =13=Forbes, no. 2, Jan. 26,
1846. London _Times_, June 18, 1841; Aug. 6; Sept. 9; Oct. 6; Nov. 19,
1845; Apr. 11, 1846. =77=Mex. commrs., Feb. 16, 1842. =52=Larkin to
Stearns et al., Apr. 17, 1846. _Journal des_ _Débats_, July 10, 1843;
Jan. 12; June 1, 1846. México á través, iv, 399. Wash. _Globe_, Feb.
27, 1845. =52=Everett, no. 284, confid., Mar. 28, 1845. =52=Shannon,
Jan. 9, 1845. Gilmer in U. S. Ho. Repres., Jan. 28, 1843. N. Y.
_Courier and Enquirer_, Nov. 17, 1845. =77=Almonte, no. 4, res., Jan.
10, 1843; 84, P., July 16, 1844. =52=Thompson, nos. 1, Apr. 29; 4 July
30, 1842. =56=W. S. Parrott, May 13; Sept. 2, 1845. _Constitutionnel_,
Oct. 13, 1844; Mar. 29, 1845; July 9, 1846. _National_, Sept. 4, 1845.
=52=Wickliffe to Buchanan, private, [June] 3, 1845. N. Y. _Journ.
Commerce_, Feb. 23, 1842. Harvey, Webster, 203-4. =52=Buchanan to
Slidell, no. 1, Nov. 10, 1845. Adams, Mems., xi, 346, 355. Curtis,
Webster, ii, 250. Forbes to Barron, Mar. 10, 1845. _Nat. Intelligencer_,
Apr. 19. Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845. Charleston _Mercury_, July
12, 1845. Charleston _Courier_, Nov. 12, 1845. Forbes, Calif., 149.
Mofras, Exploration, i, 517. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 109. Polk, Diary,
Oct. 24, 1845. St. Louis _Reveille_, Apr. 29, 1846. Bustamante, Nuevo
Bernal, i, 45. =247=Hastings to Larkin, Mar. 3, 1846. =247=Allerton to
Larkin, Mar. 4, 1846. =247=Sutter to Larkin, Oct. 3, 1845. =1=Allen in
U. S. Sen., Aug. 6, 1846. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Dec. 15, 1845, pp.
1037, 1043. Vallejo, Documentos. Van Tyne, Letters of Webster, 269.
_Texas Review_, Jan., 1917, p. 217 (Barker). Schafer, Pac. Slope, 229.
Reeves, Amer. Diplomacy, 280-1. =52=Flower to Van Buren, Feb. 8, 1840.
=52=Kelley to Webster, Jan. 2, 1842. Kelsey, Consulate, 7, 35, etc.
=52=Larkin, nos. 8, June 24; 9, Aug. 18, 1844; Mar. 22; 25, July 10; 26,
Sept. 29; 29, Dec. 31, 1845; 37, Mar. 9; 42, Apr. 17; 44, June 1, 1846.
Webster, Writings, xviii, 203-4. N. Orl. _Picayune_, Nov. 25, 1845.
Jameson, Calhoun Corres., 978. =351=Thompson to Webster, Jan. 30, 1843.
_Monitor Repub._, Apr. 16, 1846. Royce, Calif., 38-9. =122=Bidwell,
Calif., 138. Richardson, Messages, iv, 398, 539-40. Richmond _Enquirer_,
Sept. 12, 1845. =77=Arrangóiz, no. 41, res., Feb. 28, 1845. =13=Crampton
to Palmerston, no. 63, 1848. London _Chronicle_, Aug. 13, 1845.
_Democratic Review_, July, 1845, p. 9. =48=Bancroft to Sloat, Mar. 21,
secret and confid., Oct. 17, 1845. _Southwestern Hist. Qtrly._, xviii,
nos. 1-3 (R. G. Cleland). Meade, Letters, i, 65.

16.12. For the facts merely alluded to here see pp. 127-8, 130-4.
(Virtually forbid) chap. iv, note 24. Polk's announcement that he
should endeavor to obtain California (Schouler, United States, iv,
498) is sufficiently explained by his attempts to purchase it. When he
determined to lay our grievances before Congress, it is not certain
that he expected war to result. He seems to have felt that a determined
stand on our part might bring Mexico to terms. And his promptly taking
advantage of the rights conferred by the state of war to occupy the
territory and bar out foreign interference counts for nothing as proof
that he brought on the war for the alleged purpose. See _e.g._ Von
Holst, U. S., iii, 266.

[16.13. Bancroft's history of California, which at times is rather free
in its conclusions, denies that such a meeting was held (Pacific States,
xvii, 61-2). His principal reasons are lack of corroborative evidence,
the silence of Larkin, and the inconsistencies in the accounts of it.
But (1) we have corroborative evidence from several persons; (2) Larkin
may not have wished to mention a confidential talk held under his own
roof--especially as it accomplished nothing; and (3) inconsistencies are
found in the accounts of many events. On the other hand some accounts of
the meeting have no doubt been exaggerated and embellished.

16.14. Bancroft (Pacific States, xvii, 200) says there is no evidence
that Gillespie had official relations with Sloat; but Sloat's
=47=report, February 25, 1846, said that in accordance with "the verbal
orders he delivered me," Gillespie was immediately sent forward.

<p>16.15. Although no formal meeting took place at Santa Barbara, Capt.
Blake, of the British warship _Juno_, who went there, was appealed
to for protection on the ground that Mexico and England were allied
nations (=12=Seymour to Admiralty, Aug. 27, 1846). Some proposed,
should England refuse it, to address France. About this time an Irish
priest named McNamara arrived in a British vessel with a grand scheme
of colonization, and obtained an immense grant of land. The scheme
was much talked about, but signified nothing. The grant was illegally
made. Mexico, though she treated McNamara pleasantly did not endorse
the plan, and in all probability would not have confirmed such a grant,
had California remained under her jurisdiction, for she was extremely
suspicious of England, and could see that 10,000 British colonists would
be a dangerous element. Indeed, McNamara was suspected at Mexico of
acting in the interest of England. A few of the documents bearing on
this subject are: Ramírez, Méx., 246; Ho. 17; 31, 1 (Halleck, Cuevas,
Castillo y Lanzas); Bancroft, Pac. States, xvii, 215-23; Sen. Report 75;
30, 1 (testimony of Frémont and others; the McNamara papers); Royce,
California, 166; =52=Larkin, no. 56, Aug. 22, 1846; =335=McNamara,
proposition, May 17, 1845.

16.16. _Politics in California, Jan.-June, 1846._ =13=Jones to Pakenham,
Nov. 30, 1841. =108=Hooper to Bancroft, June 25, 1846. =13=Forbes, no.
2, Jan. 26, 1846. Boston _Advertiser_, May 27, 1843. =13=Forbes to
Barron, Sept. 5, 1844; Jan. 27; Mar. 10, 1845. =13=To Barron, Dec. 31,
1844. _Diario_, Aug. 21, 1845. =52=J. Castro to P. Pico, June 8, 1846.
=12=Blake to Seymour, July 5, 1846. =52=Larkin to Stearns _et al._, Apr.
17, 1846. =13=To Bankhead, no. 53, 1844. =47=Sloat to Bancroft, Feb.
25, 1846. =47=Wood to Bancroft, June 4, 1846. =12=Seymour to admty.,
Aug. 27, 1846. Colton, Three Years, 429. =247=Stearns to Larkin, May
14, 1846. =13=Forbes to Calif. govt., Jan. 28, 1846. =13=Seymour to
Bankhead, June 13, 1846. =13=Pico to Forbes, June 29, 1846. =13=Barron,
Aug. 12, 1846. =52=Military junta, Monterey, Apr. 11, 1846. =52=Larkin
to Gillespie, Apr. 23, 1846. =52=Larkin, circular (in Spanish).
Sherman Letters, 43. =13=J. A. to A. Forbes, July 9, 1846. Sen. 18;
31, 1, p. 574 (Stevenson). =75=P. Pico to Relaciones, Feb. 13, 1846.
=75=Covarrubias to Relaciones, Apr. 5, 1846. =75=Sánchez to Relac., Apr.
2, 1846. Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 41-75, 215-22. =247=Allerton
to Larkin, Mar. 4, 1846. =247=Larkin to Bennett, May 26, 1846; to
Stearns, May 24, 1846. =247=Stearns to Larkin, June 12, 1846. Revere,
Tour, 24. Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845. =122=Bidwell, Calif.,
138, 147, 151. Alvarado, Calif., v, 129-43, 222, 241. =126=Botello,
Anales, 133, 136. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 284. _Amer. Hist. Rev._, xiv,
88-9. Richman, Calif., 316, 474. Ramírez, México, 246. Lancey, Cruise.
=343=Vallejo, Documentos. =334=Torres, Peripecias, 48-9. Walpole, Four
Years, ii, 208. Ho. 17; 31, 1, p. 121. Hall, S. José 143. Sen. 33; 30,
1, p. 377. McGroarty, Calif., 190-1. Sen. Report, 75; 30, 1, pp. 12,
16 (Frémont), 19, 31, 33 (Gillespie), 37 (Hensley), 44 (Minor), 46
(Childs). Sherman, Sloat, 56, xv. =263=Mervine to Sloat, July 1, 1846.
Swasey, Early Days, 57, 81. _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, pp. 604-7 (Benton).
Willey, Transition Period, 19. Kelsey, Consulate, 45, 51. Royce, Calif.,
36, 166. =123=Bidwell, statement. =52=Larkin, Calif. prior to 1846
(Consular letters, Monterey, i, 1). =52=_Id>._, nos. 4, Apr. 16; 9,
Aug. 18, 1844; 20, Mar. 24; 26, Sept. 29, 1845; 39, Apr. 2; 42, Apr.
17; 44, June 1; 48, June 18; 54, July 20; 56, Aug. 22, 1846; 63, Jan.
14, 1847. =13=Crampton to Palmerston, nos. 35, 63, 1848. =76=P. Pico to
Relac., June 29, 1846. =76=_Id._, proclams., May [13]; June 23, 1846.
=76=Vallejo, Nov. 24, 1845. =76=Pico, May 25, 1846. =76=J. Castro, Mar.
5; Apr. 1, 2; May 30, 1846. =76=Castro and Alvarado, May 30, 1845.


                    XVII. THE CONQUEST OF CALIFORNIA

17.1. _Frémont's clash with Castro._ =13=Forbes to Barron,
Jan. 26. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 50-1. Benton, View, ii, 580, 688.
=67=Abert to Frémont, Feb. 12, 1845. =13=Pakenham, no.
130, 1846. =13=Forbes to Calif. govt., Feb. 28. =62=Adj.
gen. to Benton, Nov. 2, 1847. =75=J. Castro to P. Pico, Jan.
30, 1846. =75=Frémont to J. Castro, Jan. 29. =247=Larkin's
memoranda and correspondence with Frémont and others on the subject.
=52=_Id._, nos. 36, 38, Mar. 5, 27; 41, Apr. 17, 1846; 63, Jan. 14,
1847. =3=Alvarado, Hist. de Calif., 239. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 279.
Bancroft, Pac. States, xvii, 4-23. Frémont, Mems., i, 454-70. _Id._,
Geog. Memoir. _Niles_, Nov. 21, 1846, pp. 188-9. _Diario_, Apr. 24. Sen.
33; 30, 1, pp. 372-4 (Frémont here states that he was given permission
to explore south of the Colorado, and was on his way to do so when
stopped by Castro. This permission does not appear in the documents of
March, 1846. It may have been given very incidentally, and this may have
been the cause of the trouble). Bandini, Calif., 139. Sen. Report 75;
30, 1, pp. 12, 16. Richman, Calif., 308. Tuthill, Calif., 163. Sherman,
Sloat, xv. _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, pp. 604-5. Kelsey, Consulate, 96.
=76=Castro, Mar. 6; Apr. 1. =76=Larkin to alcalde, Mar. 10.
_Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit._, xxxi, 711.

Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 172-3) decides roundly against Frémont,
and cites for support a letter from the prefect to Larkin demanding the
reason for Frémont's movements; but it was perfectly in accord with
Mexican methods that such a letter should have been written purely to
satisfy the authorities at Mexico.

17.2. _Gillespie's mission._ _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 605.
=247=Gillespie to Larkin, May 24. =13=J. A. to A. Forbes, July
9. Polk, Diary, Oct. 30, 1845. =247=Leidesdorff to Larkin, Apr.
25, 1846. Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845. _Atlantic Monthly_, Oct.,
1890, pp. 548, etc. Sen. 33; 30, 1, 373. Ho. Report 817; 30, 1. Sen.
Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 12, 30. Frémont, Mems., i, 489. _Century Mag._,
N. S., xix, 923. Calif. Hist. Soc. Papers, i, pt. 1 (1887), pp. 69-72.
=52=Larkin, no. 44, June 1. =52=_Id._ to Stearns _et al._,
Apr. 17. Benton, View, ii, 689. Cooke, Conquest, 203-4. Royce, Bidwell.

Gillespie took to Frémont a letter of introduction from Buchanan and
letters from Frémont's father-in-law, Senator Benton. The former
was entirely non-committal; and the latter, while very likely they
contained veiled allusions to conversations in which the desire of the
administration to acquire California had been mentioned, must have been
like it in that respect, else Gillespie would not have dared to carry
them through Mexico.

17.3. The evidence on this point, including Frémont's positive
statements made not long after the event, is conclusive (Polk, Diary,
March 21, 1848; Senate Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 13, 32; =132=Benton,
Feb. 18, 1848; Ho. Report 817; 30, 1, p. 4; =52=Larkin to P. Pico,
July 5, 1846. Speaking in the Senate, April 10, 1848 (_Cong. Globe_,
30, 1, p. 604), Benton, though feeling extremely bitter toward Polk
and no doubt fully informed by his son-in-law and client regarding all
the facts, did not intimate that any instructions inconsistent with
the instructions of Larkin were sent to Frémont. Indeed he stated the
contrary. See also his Thirty Years View, ii, 689.

17.4. Frémont stated before a committee of the Senate that he had
learned from Bancroft that Polk's plan, in case of war, contemplated the
occupation of California; but Frémont wrote to Capt. Montgomery of the
_Portsmouth_, June 16, 1846, that even in the case of war he was not
expected to prosecute "active hostilities." In 1886 Bancroft stated that
Gillespie was to inform Frémont of the President's intentions.

17.5. First, many of the settlers had ample reasons to feel
alarmed: the illegality of their presence; Castro's sudden and cruel
seizure of Americans in 1840; his attack upon Frémont in violation
(the Americans believed) of a promise; official notices, issued about
May 1, to the effect that the majority of the Americans were liable to
be expelled at the convenience of the authorities; Castro's warlike
preparations; his talk of moving against the immigrants with armed
forces (=52=Larkin, no. 42, April 17); and reports, more or less
authentic and reliable, from various persons regarding what he said or
intended. Secondly, the contemporary testimony of Frémont, Gillespie and
other Americans--some of it given under oath--that alarm was actually
felt is too strong to be rejected (see note 6). Much has been made of
Bidwell, a clerk of Sutter's, who tells us that alarm was not felt. But
(1) his =123=Statement was made thirty years after the events; (2)
he admits that he was not on good terms with Frémont, and the Statement
aims to show that Frémont invented the story of alarm as an excuse for
his conduct; (3) his Statement is in other respects clearly inaccurate;
(4) it assumes that he knew the sentiments of all the persons on the
Sacramento, yet proves that an important fact may have been known to
but few; (5) it shows that at the critical time he was absent in the
mountains; (6) it says, "Californians were always talking of expelling
Americans" [and therefore were talking of it in April, 1846]; (7)
his book mentions that in 1845 an attack upon New Helvetia was so
confidently expected that he rode day and night to warn Sutter; (8) he
undertakes to disprove positive testimony with negative. The legitimate
settlers had no direct occasion to feel alarmed; but, as Bidwell himself
points out, they could not have held aloof, had an attempt been made to
expel their fellow-countrymen. It would be a mistake to suppose that the
Americans who joined Frémont in these operations were actuated solely by
patriotism and the idea of self-defence.

17.6. _The Bear movement._ (Starred citations refer, among other
facts, to the alarm felt by Americans.) *=12=Blake of _Juno_ to
Seymour, July 5. Benton, View, ii, 691. =12=Seymour to admty.,
Aug. 27, 1846. =75=M. Castro to Calif. govt., Jan. 29. _Niles_,
Nov. 21, 1846, p. 191; Oct. 16, 1847, p. 110. Colton, Three Years,
175. Cooke, Conquest, 204-11. =13=J. A. to A. Forbes, July 9,
14. =13=P. Pico to J. A. Forbes, June 29. =52=M. Castro to
----, [Apr. 30]. =52=Larkin to M. Castro, June 14. *=52=Ide,
proclams., June 15, 18. =52=J. Castro, proclams., June 17.
=52=P. Pico, proclam., June 23. =52=_Id_. to Larkin, June 29.
Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 51-2. Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845. =52=J.
Castro to Larkin, undated. =247=Larkin to Stearns, Apr. 17.
=52=Larkin to Pico, July 5. =48=Bancroft to Sloat, June 24;
Oct. 17, 1845. =123=Bidwell, statement. Royce, Bidwell. Willey,
Thirty Years, 10. =256=Marcy to Wetmore, Dec. 5, 12. McGroarty,
Calif., 192. Bancroft, Pac. States, xvii, 39-48, 101-86, 199. Apuntes,
353-4. =247=Gillespie to Larkin, May 24; June 7. =247=Larkin
to Mott, Talbot & Co., June 18. Peters, Kit Carson, 269.
=247=Leidesdorff to Larkin, Mar. 19; June 19. =247=Montgomery
to Larkin, July 2. =247=Vallejo to Larkin, Sept. 15; to J. Castro,
July 23. =122=Bidwell, Calif., *141-2, 161, etc. *=3=Alvarado,
Calif., 184. *Phelps, Fore and Aft, 279, 284, 291. Oakland (Cal.)
_Tribune_, June 30, 1914. *Richman, California, 308-14. =249=Leese,
Bear Flag Papers, 9. =105=Baldridge, Days of 1846. _Diario_,
Dec. 27, 1846. *Colton, Deck and Port, 389. =247=Guerrero to
Leidesdorff, Apr. 30. =314=Sawyer papers. Polk, Diary, Sept. 1.
_Niles_, Nov. 14, 1846, p. 174; Nov. 21, p. 191 (Frémont to Benton,
July "25"); Oct. 16, 1847, p. 110 (Frémont's declaration of June 6).
*Upham, Frémont, 228. _Century Mag._, N. S., xix, 1917 (Mrs. F.), 780
(Royce), 782. Schafer, Pacific Slope, 258. =263=Mervine to Sloat,
July 1. _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 606 (Benton). =52=Larkin, Calif,
prior to 1846. *Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. 374. Ho. Report, 817, 30, 1, p. 4.
Bandini, Calif., 142. Revere, Tour, 64. *Sen. Report, 75; 30, 1, pp.
12, 13, 25-9, 32-4, 38-40. *Sherman, Sloat, xv (Gillespie's note).
*Swasey, Early Days, 49. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Nov. 11. *Willey,
Transition Period, 39, 42. Kelsey, Consulate, 15, 72. Royce, Calif.,
132. _Atlantic Monthly_, Oct., 1890, pp. 548-57. =52=Larkin, nos.
*41, Apr. 17; *48, June 18; 53, July 18; 54, July 20, 1846; 63, Jan.
14, 1847. *Californian, i, nos. 3-5. =76=Pico to Relac., June 29.
=76=Pico, procl., June 23. =76=M. Castro to Pico, June 19.
=76=Alvarado, June 28. =76=Narváez (undated). *_Journ. Mil.
Serv. Instit._, xxxi, 715.

17.7. As Sloat was in personal intercourse with Gillespie about Feb.
20-22, he probably learned from him something more about the intentions
of our government.

17.8. =48=Oct. 17, 1845, Bancroft wrote to Sloat, "In the event
of actual hostilities between the Mexican Government and our own," you
will carry out "the instructions [of June 24] forwarded to you from
the Dept. in view of such a contingency." Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii,
168) draws a sharp distinction between the "actual hostilities" of this
order and the "declaration of war" of June 24. But (1) Bancroft said,
Oct. 17, "actual hostilities" [not between forces in the field but
between the two governments; and (2) in his last quoted words above he
indicated that the two orders contemplated precisely the same [not, as
Rives holds, a different] contingency. As, therefore, the order of June
24 was the formal and fundamental one, Sloat had a technical ground for
falling back upon it, whereas an officer of broad, clear views, decided
character and unselfish loyalty would have acted more promptly, even
at a slight personal risk. To do him justice, the reader should recall
that many Senators refused to believe that the border hostilities were
hostilities between the two governments (p. 182); and also that Sloat
was old and not robust, and that he had the case of T. A. C. Jones
before his eyes.

17.9. We find both July 1 and 2 given as the date of his arrival.
The log book of his vessel says that she anchored at Monterey July 1,
and that Larkin came aboard July 2. As he would have gone aboard as soon
as possible, it seems probable that the vessel arrived July 1 at night.

17.10. Capt. Mervine wrote, July 6, to Capt. Montgomery that Larkin
believed Castro, Pico and others would meet the following day to
deliberate about declaring independence and hoisting the American flag.

17.11. Sloat stated later that he acted on his own responsibility in
taking possession of California; and in fact the orders of May 13 did
not reach their destination until about August 28 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p.
229).

17.12. It has been said (Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 250)
that Sloat merely pretended to have based his action on Frémont's
operations, so as to have a way of escape should he be blamed; but (1)
we should not without evidence accuse him of lying, (2) he showed strong
feeling when he learned that Frémont had acted without authority (_e.g._
Baldridge, Days of 1846; Sen. 33; 30, 1, p. 178), and (3) as a rational
man he could not fail to be influenced greatly. Bancroft says (_ibid._,
227) that Sloat learned from Larkin that Frémont's coöperation with the
insurgents was not certain; but he admits (_ibid._, 228-9) that on July
5 a launch from the _Portsmouth_, then lying at San Francisco, brought
proof that Frémont was so doing; and the next day Sloat and Larkin,
according to the log book of the _Savannah_, were busy preparing the
proclamation, etc. Royce (California, 158) places against Frémont's
testimony (that Sloat said his action had resulted from Frémont's) the
fact that Larkin did not so state; but silence is not equal in strength
to assertion, and Frémont is supported by Gillespie (Sen. Report 75;
30, 1, p. 32), by Wilson of the _Savannah_ (_ibid._, 41), by Sloat's
private secretary (Baldridge, Days of 1846), by Sloat's anxiety to
obtain Frémont's coöperation, and by the resentment that he exhibited
on finding that Frémont had acted without authority (Sen. 33; 30, 1, p.
178). See also Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 17.

17.13. August 27, 1846, =12=Seymour wrote to the Admiralty: "My
principal object has been, for many months, to be at hand to prevent
or retard it [the American occupation of California], if I should be
directed to take any proceedings for these purposes." It was presumably
to wait for orders that he placed himself at San Blas. What led him
to sail for Monterey, however, as he did on June 14, was not Sloat's
leaving Mazatlán, but news that the Santa Barbara convention was likely
to declare for independence (=13=Seymour to Bankhead, June 13).
Had that been done, he would have felt that he had a ground on which
to oppose American occupation, though he thought that a large body of
reliable colonists would be necessary to establish British ascendancy
(=12=_Id._, Aug. 27). When he arrived at Monterey he was aware that
the United States and Mexico were at war, and this was in his opinion
an additional reason for inaction (=12=_Id._, Aug. 27); but he
wrote to Pico that American occupation should be regarded as merely
provisional (=12=to Pico, July 23). Sir Thomas Johnson, commanding
a British sloop-of-war off Mazatlán, showed his sympathies by constantly
giving the Mexicans information about our vessels (=76=Gutiérrez,
Apr. 8, 1846, res.).

17.14. Sloat also guaranteed land titles. This was impracticable. In
annexing California he exceeded his authority.

17.15. _Sloat's operations, etc._ =47=Sloat, Nov. 19; Dec. 3, 1845;
Feb. 25; Mar. 17; Apr. 8, 30; May 31; June 6, 1846. =47=_Id._ to
Howison, Apr. 1, 1846; to Montgomery, Apr. 1. =47=Wood to Bancroft,
June 4. Benton, View, ii, 692. Bulletin de la Soc. de Géog., no.
77. =12=Seymour to admty., no. 47, Aug. 27, 1846; to Pico, July 23.
Dana, Two Years, 78-9, 90. Sherman, Address. Wise, Gringos, 47. Ho.
60; 30, 1, pp. 258-64. =247=Sloat to Larkin, May 18. =247=Larkin to
Stearns, Aug. --. N. Y. _Herald_, Mar. 4, 1880. Davis, Sixty Years,
196. Hist. Soc. of So. Calif., viii, 77 (Barrows). =47=Conner, Oct.
9, 1846. =13=Seymour to Bankhead, June 13. =13=A. Forbes to Bankhead,
Aug. 1. =13=J. A. Forbes to A. Forbes, July 14. =52=J. Parrott, June
4. =13=Letter from Mazatlán, Aug. 4. =13=Seymour to J. A. Forbes,
July 22. =52=Larkin to J. Castro, July 8; reply July 9. =52=_Id._
to Alvarado, July 8; reply, July 9. =142=Carson, recolls. =52=Sloat,
gen. orders, July 14. =47=Conner, Aug. 26. =48-9=Bancroft to Sloat,
June 24; Oct. 17, 1845; May 13, 15; June 8; July 12; Aug. 13 (two),
1846. =108=J. Parrott to Buchanan, private, July 23, 1846. Duflot de
Mofras, Explor., i, 400-6. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 378-9. Bancroft, Pac.
States, xvii, 204, etc. =247=Larkin to Ten Eyck, Sept. 19. =247=Frazer
to Larkin, Aug. 27. =4=Amador, mems., 169. =247=Atherton to Larkin,
Dec. 3. =3=Alvarado, Hist., 214-9. Proceeds. U. S. Naval Institute,
1888, pp. 539-40. Bennett, Steam Navy, 91. N. Orl. _Picayune_, Oct.
23, 1848. Sherman, Sloat, _passim_. =120=Fauntleroy to Biddle, Mar.
12, 1847. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 291. Richman, Calif., 315. México á
través, iv, 643-4. _Diario_, Aug. 16; Oct. 16, 1846. =106=Lancey,
cruise (logbook of _Savannah_). =105=Baldridge, Days of 1846. Walpole,
Four Years, ii, 204. Wash. _Union_, Sept. 24; Oct. 3, 26. Ho. 1; 30, 2,
pp. 1013-4, 1019-20. Dunbar, Romance, 38. Sherman, Home Letters, 85.
_Niles_, Oct. 10, 1846, p. 87. Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 13, 32, 40,
44, 70-4. _Century Mag._, N. S., xviii, 794. N. Y. _Nation_, xlviii,
141. Hittell, Calif., ii, 466. =295=Pinto, Apuntaciones, 104. Sen. 33;
30, 1, pp. 374, 377. Ho. Rep. 817; 30, 1, pp. 4-5. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp.
649-67. Revere, Tour, 55, 77. Frémont, Mems., 534, 539. =172=_Cyane_
log book. =263=Mervine, letter book. Swasey, Early Days, 60. _Cong.
Globe_, 30, 1, pp. 606-7. Royce, Calif., 157-61. =52=Larkin, nos. 1
(descript. of Calif.); 52, July 10; 53, July 18; 54 and 55, July 20.
=76=Gutiérrez, no. 42, res., Apr. 8. =76=To Castro, May 9; July 25.
=76=To comte. gen. Sonora, July 25. =76=To min. of eccles. affrs., July
25. =76=Monterey estado, Apr. 1. =76=S. Anna, Oct. 30.

17.16. Stockton sailed from Norfolk on the _Congress_ in October,
1845. Some mystery has been attached to his sealed orders (Bancroft,
Pacific States, xvii, 251); but they were merely to sail _via_ the
Sandwich Islands for Monterey, deliver the original of the despatch of
October 17 to Larkin, and then join Sloat's squadron. For his character
see _e.g._ Royce, California, 179; =330=Taylor to brother, January
19, 1848; =108=Appleton to Bancroft, April 27, 1847; Porter,
Kearny, 6, 7; Sherman, Home Letters, 108; Quincy, Figures, 230-40.

17.17. One aim of the proclamation was doubtless to provide a way
of escape for the United States and its agents in case there should
be no war, but even from this point of view it was ridiculous. Sloat
repudiated the reasons for his action that were ascribed to him by
Stockton.

17.18. Castro and the Californians generally did not believe that
war had been declared, and of course Larkin's letter to Stearns tended
to confirm their opinion. Had it proved correct, Stockton would soon
have been making apologies like T. A. C. Jones. This may help to explain
Castro's firm attitude. The Life of Stockton attempts to explain his
haughty and menacing language as due to Castro's military preponderance
and the necessity of intimidating him. Stockton himself said later that,
as Castro had no authority from the central government to make terms, it
would have been useless to treat with him; but Castro could have laid
down his arms, and that was the vital point just then. Stockton's other
reasons (Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1041-2) are equally unsatisfactory. Bancroft
(Pacific States, xvii, 269) expresses the belief that Stockton did not
wish to make terms with Castro and the other officials, but to eliminate
them. This is quite possible. Probably temperament and thirst for glory
counted. Stockton's pretence (in his reply to Castro) that since the two
countries were at war, he could not suspend hostilities until Castro
should raise the American flag, was absurd. Truces have often been made
during war, and never during peace. This was enough--especially as it
came after Larkin's overture--to show Castro he could expect nothing
from Stockton.

17.19. =76=Later Castro complained bitterly that after
forsaking all for Mexico he had to beg for bread.

17.20. _Stockton's régime to Sept._ 30. Memoria de ... Relaciones,
Dec., 1846. Colton, Three Years, 16, 25, 28-9, 32, 56, 175, 180.
Cooke, Conquest, 213-6. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 265-8. =247=Larkin to
Stearns, Aug.--, 1846. =61=R. B. Mason, Sept. 23, 1847. Sec. navy
to Stockton, Aug. 18, 1846. =13=J. A. to A. Forbes, July 14; Sept.
22, 1846. =13=Seymour to Bankhead, July 22, 1846. _Californian_,
i, no. 1. =47=Stockton, proclam., Aug. 22. =47=_Id._ to
Frémont, July 23; Aug. 24, 1846. =47=Flores to Stockton, Aug. 7.
=47=Stockton to Bancroft, July 25; Aug. 22; Sept. 19; Oct. 1; Nov.
23. _Id._ to Mervine, Sept. 19. Bancroft to Sloat, Aug. 13. Mason to
Stockton, Nov. 5, 1846; Jan. 11, 1847. Bancroft to Stockton, Oct. 17,
1845. =108=Appleton to Bancroft, Apr. 27, 1847. Wise, Gringos,
50, 70. Royce, Bidwell. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 52, 379. Sen. 31; 30, 2,
pp. 1-3. Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 143. =4=Amador, mems.,
169. =115=Belden, statement, 48. =3=Alvarado, Calif., v,
239-41. =161=Journal of the _Congress_, 1846. =171=Journal
of the _Cyane_, 1846. Cutts, Conquest, 125. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 299,
300. Richman, Calif., 318. =109=Bandini, documentos. Walpole,
Four Years, ii, 215. Sen. 31; 30, 2, pp. 9-14. Wash. _Union_, Oct. 26;
Dec. 4, 1846. =295=Pinto, Apuntaciones, 104. _Diario_, Oct. 16.
Statement to the author by Asst. Sec. of the navy Roosevelt. Sherman,
Home Letters, 108. Du Pont, Official Despatches, 1. Quincy, Figures,
230, etc. _Proceeds. of U. S. Naval_ _Instit._, xxiv., pt. 1, 270
(Neeser). Sen. 33; 30, 1, pp. 10, 83, 109-10, 118-9, 175, 178-83, 374,
377. Ho. 70; 30, 1, pp. 36-41, 43-5. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 657-8. Ho. 1;
30, 2, pp. 1034-42. Ho. 19; 29, 2, p. 104. McGroarty, Calif., 199.
Bandini, Calif., 143. Revere, Tour, 55, 77-80. Sen. Report 75; 30,
1, pp. 17, 47, 51. Ho. Report 817; 30, 1, p. 9. =263=Mervine to
Stockton, Sept. 16. Swasey, Early Days, 73. Porter, Kearny, 6-7. Life
of Stockton, 120-3, 157-8. Bryant, What I Saw, 330, 366. Royce, Calif.,
177-84. =123=Bidwell, statement. =52=Larkin, nos. 54, 55, 58,
1846. And the following from =76=. J. Castro, July 13; Sept. 9,
1846; June 5, 1847. To comte. gen. Calif., May 9; July 25. To comte.
gen. Sonora, July 25. Stockton to Castro, Aug. 7. Castro to Stockton,
Aug. 7. _Id._, procls., Aug. 9, 10. _Id._ to consuls, Aug. 9. Moreno to
Bustamante, Mar. 20, 1847. Castañeda to Pico, Feb. 10, 1846. Bustamante
to Castro, June 23, 1847.

17.21. In a proclamation of October 1 Flores charged that the
Americans were dictating "arbitrary and despotic laws" and crushing
the people with exactions intended to ruin them. His aim was announced
as the expulsion of the Americans. All Mexicans and Californians
15-60 years old, not joining the insurgents, were declared to be
traitors and under penalty of death. All Americans acting directly
or indirectly against the insurgents were to lose their property
and be sent into Mexico as prisoners. It cannot be denied that many
Californians, especially in the north, had been deprived of their
property--particularly horses and saddles--by Frémont's men in the
name of the United States, and that many had suffered personal abuse
(Sen. 33; 30, 1; pp. 97, etc.; Ho. Report, 817; 30, 1; Sen. Report 75;
30, 1; Colton, Three Years, 155). Colton estimated that in all 1200
Californians were in arms at one time.

17.22. Flores charged that Gillespie violated the terms and
Gillespie denied this vigorously. Gillespie seems to have interpreted
the terms, which were loosely drawn, with a view to the advantage of his
side, and Flores to have judged largely, if not entirely, from what he
supposed to be Gillespie's intentions. We have not sufficient data to
say more. A misunderstanding was very natural, and possibly Gillespie,
since he was dealing with perjured men, thought it right to take every
advantage he could. Flores sent parties to San Diego and Santa Barbara,
and captured those places. Capt. Merritt of the California Battalion,
commanding at the former place, took refuge on a whale-ship. Lieut.
Talbot, commanding at Santa Barbara, refused to surrender, and with his
eight or ten men made an extremely brave escape through the mountains.

17.23. At this point Mervine's log book was extremely bitter with
reference to Stockton, whom it described as vain, selfish, cowardly,
false and ignorant of naval life and duties. The Captain was doubtless
smarting under his repulse, due (he asserted) to Stockton's selfishness
in retaining all his field pieces. Stockton explained his going to San
Diego by saying that San Pedro was not a good base, and there was force
in this view; but it was much nearer to Los Angeles, and certainly he
should have decided whether it was a good base before attempting to
use it as such. San Diego had been recovered by Merritt and others
(_Proceeds. U. S. Naval Instit._, 1888, p. 544). Lieut. Minor of the
navy now commanded there.

17.24. _Kearny's march; battle of S. Pascual._ Colton, Three
Years, 153, 180. Cooke, Conquest, 84-6. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 153, 242.
Hist. Soc. So. Calif., iii, pt. 2, pp. 55-66. =337=Turner, diary.
=61=Kearny to adj. gen., Oct. 3, 11. =62=Marcy to gov. Mo.,
June 3. Ho. 41; 30, 1, pp. 551-63, 567-614. =47=Stockton, Feb. 4,
1847. Polk, Diary, May 25, 30; June 2, 1846. =61=Emory to adj.
gen., Feb. 2, 1847. Hughes, Doniphan's Exped., 204-30. =61=Wooster
to adj. gen., Sept. 25, 1846. Apuntes, 359-60. Bidwell, Calif.,
200. =126=Botello, Anales, 154-6. Phelps, Fore and Aft, 315.
=177=Davis, statement. =290=Pico, documentos, 105, 115. _Nat.
Intelligencer_, Apr. 23, 1847. _Journal U. S. Artillery_, July, 1892, p.
294; Oct., 1892, p. 413. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 513-6. Sen. 33; 30, 1, pp.
31, 41, 46, 64-5, 129-33, 161, 186-9, 204, 272, 331. McGroarty, Calif.,
261. Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 236, 1049-50. Sen. 31; 30,
2, pp. 24-7. (Losses) Ho. 24; 31, 1. Peters, Kit Carson, 281. Porter,
Kearny, 14-23. Life of Stockton, 134-6. =76=Flores, Dec. 11, 1846;
Mar. 31, 1847. =207=Griffin, journal.

Including servants and quartermaster's men, Kearny probably had at
least 150; but precisely how many took part in the fighting one cannot
say--perhaps not more than 80. Some of the men had to guard the baggage
and manage the howitzers, and probably others did not reach the front
in time. The howitzers were tied up with rawhide; when made ready
they could not fire at first because the two parties were mixed in a
hand-to-hand struggle; and when they were preparing to do so later, one
was carried away by frightened mules and captured by the enemy. Botello,
who talked with Pico after the fight, says that Pico was afraid forces
from San Diego would attack him, should he continue to operate against
Kearny, and also that Pico's horses were now too much exhausted to be
serviceable. =207=Griffin thought the Californians drew off to make
sure of keeping the howitzer. It seems clear that Pico did not retire
from fear of Kearny--unless possibly from fear of his guns. Dec. 7
Kearny advanced a short distance, drove some Californians from a rocky
hill near San Bernardo, and occupied it. In the night of Dec. 10-11
Lieut. Gray and about 215 men from San Diego reinforced him. Lieut.
Beale of the navy and the scout Christopher ("Kit") Carson made their
way past the enemy with remarkable courage and endurance, to inform
Stockton of Kearny's desperate situation, and arrived just as Gray was
setting out.

17.25. The troops were all on foot except Gillespie's men. Stockton
had two 9-pounders and four smaller pieces.

17.26. Only six shells were captured with the howitzer at San
Pascual, and owing to its construction the gun could use no other
ammunition. Flores reported that he had also a 6-pounder, a 3-pounder,
and a 2-pounder (=76=Mar. 31).

17.27. _The insurrection in the south._ =330=Taylor to brother,
Jan. 19, 1848. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 266-8. Hist. Soc. So. Calif., iii,
pt. 1, pp. 47-54; ix, p. 19. =237=Kearny to Stockton, [Jan.
13, 1847]. =47=Flores, procl., Oct., 1846. =47=_Id._ to
Stockton, Jan. 1, 1847. =47=Stockton to Bancroft, Nov. 23, 1845;
Jan. 11, 15; Feb. 4, 5, 1846. =51=Queen to Henderson, Apr. 30,
1848. =61=R. B. Mason, Oct. 7, 1847. =61=Emory, Feb. 2,
1847. =373=Evans, narrative. =376=Nicholson, recolls. Kell,
Recolls., 29, 80. =12=Admty. records, class 1, 5577, enclosure in
Y 93. Apuntes, 355-61. =247=Gillespie to Larkin, Nov. 29, 1846.
=247=Larkin to wife, Dec. 14, 1846. =115=Belden, statement.
=3=Alvarado, Calif., v, 220, 240, 267-8. =126=Botello, Anales,
140, 158-61. Colton, Three Years, 64, 74, 78, 82, 95, 98, 123, 131,
169-70, 201. _Proceeds. U. S. Naval Instit._, 1888, pp. 139, 539-49.
Phelps, Fore and Aft, 311, 316-19. Parker, Recolls., 50. Richman,
Calif., 317. =334=Torres, Peripecias, 49. =103=Avila, notas.
=258=Marshall, recolls. Upham, Frémont, 258. Morrell, Four Voyages,
201. =171=Journal of the _Cyane_. Wash. _Union_, Apr. 23; May 7;
July 24, 1847. N. Y. _Journ. Commerce_, Apr. 2, 1847. _Diario_, Dec.
1, 1846; Jan. 24, 1847. Sherman, Home Letters, 100. Schafer, Pacific
Slope, 266. Sen. 33; 30, 1, pp. 47-323. Ho. 70; 30, 1, p. 45. Sen. 1;
30, 1, pp. 516-7. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1045-54, 1065-70. McGroarty, Calif.,
246-52. Bandini, Calif., 143, 146. Revere, Tour, 164-6. Sen. 7; 30, 1
(Emory). Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 49-52. Sen. 31; 30, 2, pp. 15-20,
22-4, 30-6 (Stockton). =207=Griffin, diary. (Losses) Ho. 24; 31,
1. =172=_Cyane_ log book. =263=Mervine to Stockton, Oct. 25
(2). _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 608 (Benton). Porter, Kearny, 7-9, 25-9.
Life of Stockton, 129-48 and appendices. Cutts, Conquest, 156, 197, 203,
207. Bryant, What I Saw, 330. Royce, Calif., 185-94. =47=Stockton
to Bancroft, July 25, 1846. =52=Larkin, no. 63, Jan. 14, 1847.
And from =76= the following. Flores, Sept. 30; Oct. 7, 9, 24,
25, 1846; undated; Jan. 2; Mar. 31 (2), 1847. Carrillo, Oct. 8, 1846.
Gillespie to Flores, Oct. 2 (2), 3 (2), 4. Flores to Gillespie, Oct.
4 (2). Flores-Gillespie, terms of capitulation, Sept. 29. Carrillo to
Flores, Oct. 9. To Flores, Feb. 6, 1847. Bustamante, Mar. 8, 13, 1847.
Moreno to Bust., Mar. 20, 1847. Stockton, procl., Jan. 5, 1847. Flores
to Stockton, Jan. 1, 1847. And others of minor importance. Jan. 9 some
Mexicans charged our front.

17.28. Frémont's methods were unscrupulous. He promised the men
large pay, and took horses, saddles, etc., where he could get them (Sen.
Report 75; 30, 1, particularly Wilson, p. 42). Probably he intended to
pacify the owners later by paying liberally. Apparently one must accept
the explanation of his policy proposed in the text, or ascribe to him a
tenderness not suggested by his choice of a profession and his conduct
in June, or accuse him--as did many at the time--of a cowardice that
would explain, after all, only a part of the facts.

17.29. It is particularly singular that Frémont did not use the
_Savannah_ to communicate with Stockton.

17.30. The reports of Flores show that Frémont's approach
embarrassed the insurgents. Frémont now had six guns. January 10 Kearny
wrote a note to Frémont stating that the Americans were entering Los
Angeles.

17.31. For later events see chap. xxxi. Disturbances, resulting
partly from the insurrection in the south and partly from depredations
committed by Americans, occurred in the north. Monterey was threatened,
and some fighting occurred near San Francisco Bay; but those who had
taken up arms to protect their property gladly laid them down (about
the time Stockton entered Los Angeles) when satisfied there would be
no more plundering, and the treaty of Cahuenga quieted those still
acting in sympathy with Flores. (See particularly Colton, Three Years,
73-6, 86, 152, 155, 158, 170; Bancroft, Pacific States, xvii, 378-383;
=10=Aram, statement; =4=Amador, memorias, 175; Aldrich, Marine
Corps, 95.) During these troubles Larkin was made a prisoner, and but
for the fear of reprisals might have suffered severely for what the
Californians regarded as double-dealing. Just before leaving California
Flores released him. (See particularly =52=Larkin, no. 63, January
14, 1847; Bryant, What I Saw, 361; =263=Mervine to Frémont, Nov.
21.)

17.32. _Frémont's operations._ =316=Fulsom to Sherman, Jan.
9, 1848. =47=Stockton to Bancroft, Nov. 23, 1846; Jan. 11, 15,
1847. Colton, Three Years, 98. =47=Frémont, orders, Jan. 12, 1847.
=122=Bidwell, Calif., 203. =258=Marshall, recolls. Bryant,
What I Saw, 365-94. Sen. 33; 30, 1, pp. 6, 73-7, 119-21, 131, 184,
194, 260, 377-9, 405. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1045, 1052, 1067-9. Revere,
Tour, 78. Sen. Report 75; 30, 1, pp. 40-2 (Wilson), 50 (Russell). Sen.
31; 30, 2, pp. 18, 21-2. Tuthill, Calif., 222. Porter, Kearny, 29.
Life of Stockton, 148-9. Royce, Calif., 194. Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory).
=76=Flores, Mar. 31, 1847 (2). =76=Moreno to Bustamante, Mar.
20, 1847. Cutts, Conquest, 156-64. Sherman, Home Letters, 113.


                  XVIII. THE GENESIS OF TWO CAMPAIGNS

18.1. As early as August 16 Pillow wrote to his wife that Taylor
thought it would be necessary to attack the city of Mexico by way of
Vera Cruz.

18.2. The fortress of San Juan de Ulúa stood on a reef about
three-quarters of a mile from the strong fort which guarded the north
end of Vera Cruz at the water line. U. S. Consul Campbell of Havana
informed Conner before June 10, 1846, that the defences of Ulúa on the
side facing the city were partially undermined and poorly armed, and
that, as all the Mexican preparations had been founded on the belief
that future assailants would adopt the French plan of attack, he could
place his vessels on that side at night with little or no injury, and
easily take the fortress by escalade; but Conner does not appear to have
endorsed this opinion. An American named Jobson, who resided at Vera
Cruz, wrote to the war department, Feb. 14, 1847, that nobody except
the Americans was afraid of Ulúa; that in September, 1846, it had been
garrisoned by only 180 men, who, being neither paid nor fed, ran up
the American flag on the night of Sept. 17; and that Conner might have
passed in by the south channel, put 500 men ashore, and captured the
fortress in half an hour. See chap. xxx, note 20.

18.3. These regiments were to come from Mass., New York, Penn.,
Va., No. and So. Carolina, Miss., La. and Texas (mounted men)--one from
each; and in December a second regiment was invited from Penn. There
was considerable hesitation about calling on Massachusetts, but it was
concluded that should she fail to supply her quota, the country would
take note of her attitude. Marcy issued the calls on Nov. 16 (Nov. 27
Florida was asked for a company), and the abruptness of the change
wrought by Benton is shown by the fact that only five days earlier Marcy
had stated that the volunteers then in service were "deemed sufficient
for the prosecution of the war" (Wash. _Union_, May 28, 1847). The field
and staff officers were to be a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, a major,
an adjutant (a lieutenant from one of the companies), a sergeant major,
a quartermaster sergeant and two principal musicians. Each of the ten
companies of a regiment was to have a captain, a lieutenant, two second
lieutenants, four sergeants, four corporals, two musicians and eighty
privates, but a company including sixty-four effective privates was to
be accepted. These privates were to be in physical vigor and apparently
18-45 (inclusive) years of age. The field and company officers were to
be men appointed and commissioned under the laws of their state. The
rendezvous of the infantry were to be Boston, New York, Pittsburgh,
Guiandotte (Va.), Wilmington, Charleston, Vicksburg, New Orleans. Most
of the regiments were made up rather slowly, and there was so much
difficulty in Virginia that her recruiting officers went into Maryland.
This difficulty appears to have been due to a lack of enthusiasm for
the war (first part of chap. xxxiv). The supposedly brilliant victory
at Monterey had exercised a favorable influence, but the obligation to
serve the war out had a contrary effect, and the terms of the law, which
required the independent action of the state governments, caused delay
in some instances. The First Pennsylvania reached New Orleans Dec. 29
and 30, and at that time the Mississippi regiment was expected to arrive
there by Jan. 10. The South Carolina regiment was ready on Dec. 22.

Special efforts were made at the same time to bring the regular army up
to 15,000 men. The authorized maximum was at this time 16,998 (including
780 commissioned officers), but in spite of energetic recruiting only
10,381 were actually serving in the two regiments of dragoons, one of
Mounted Riflemen, four of "artillery," eight of infantry, and a co.
of engineer soldiers (Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 62-3). Nov. 3 the recruiting
officers were authorized to pay a citizen, non-commissioned officer,
or soldier $2.00 for each accepted man brought to the rendezvous
(=65=gen. orders 48). The minimum height was reduced to five feet
and three inches (=65=gen. orders 51). Men desiring to enlist had
probably felt more drawn to the briefer volunteer service, and had
waited for a second call. Besides, the widows and orphans of volunteers
(but not of regulars) were to be pensioned, and the prevailing high
wages for labor deterred many from wishing to enlist. The lack of
officers in the regular army still continued serious. On July 30, 1846,
less than one third of the regimental field officers were available. The
regiments in Mexico did not average one field officer apiece.

According to the report of the adjutant general dated Dec. 5, 1846,
Taylor had (including the garrison at Tampico and troops en route,
but subject to some deductions) 7406 regulars and 10,926 volunteers,
besides 621 and 2039 respectively under Wool. Adding to these 446 and
3546 respectively under Kearny, and the New York regiment en route
to California, one finds that the land forces amounted to 25,750 men
before the November calls were issued; but subtractions of an unknown
magnitude needed to be made from these figures so far as availability
was concerned. These and further details may be found in Sen. 1; 29, 2.
See also the following. =62=Marcy to govs., Nov. 16. Sen. 1; 29, 2,
p. 46 (Marcy, report). =61=Bowman to Jones, Dec. 4; to Polk, Dec.
29. =61=Brooke to Jones, Dec. 29. Wash. _Union_, Nov. 30, 1846;
May 28, 1847. =61=Jones to Scott, Dec. 17. Polk, Diary, Nov. 7,
10, 14-16. =62=Marcy to gov. Fla., Dec. 27. =63=Marcy to gov.
Mass., Nov. 16; to gov. Tex., Nov. 20; to gov. Iowa, Nov. 25. _Niles_,
Nov. 21, 1846, p. 179; Jan. 16, 1847, p. 308. =29=Brown to Marcy,
Oct. 6. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 62. =13=Pakenham, no. 132, Nov. 23.
_Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 428 (Cabell). Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 478 (Freeman),
873 (Marcy). West Va. dept. arch. and hist., report, 1910, p. 186.

18.4. _Genesis of the Vera Cruz expedition._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 45
(Marcy, report). =52=Black, Oct. 29. Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 63.
=13=Pakenham, nos. 119, 130, 132, 140, 150. =228=G. Flagg to
A. Flagg, Dec. 17. _Picayune_, Apr. 30; Oct. 5; Dec. 11, 1846; Feb. 2,
1847 (Taylor to Gaines). (Calhoun) _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app., 323.
Polk, Diary, July 2; Aug. 29; Oct. 10, 17-22; Nov. 7-17; Dec. 1, 2,
1846; Jan. 2, 1847. Meigs, Benton, 361. =108=Bancroft to Polk, Dec.
3. Benton; View, ii, 693-4. =108=Buchanan to Bancroft, priv., Dec.
29. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 273. =335=Letter from P. F. Smith (with
Trist's letter to Buchanan, Sept. 28, 1847, private). Wash. _Union_,
Sept. 29; Oct. 2. _Niles_, Mar. 13, 1847, p. 20. =206=James Graham
to Gov. Graham, Jan. 10, 1847. =256=Marcy to Wetmore, Nov. 1.
Scott, Mems., ii, 404. Johnston, A. S. Johnston, 134. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp.
333, 355, 363, 1231 (Marcy); 1268-1270, 1273-4 (Scott); 351 (Taylor).
=297=Benton, memo., July 4. =297=Mackenzie to Buchanan, July
7. =47=Conner, June 11; July 22; Oct. 4. Meade, Letters, i, 148.
=52=Campbell, June 9. Schouler, Hist. Briefs, 155. =58=Jobson,
Feb. 14, 1847. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 170. Bancroft to Conner, May 30.
Conner, Castle of Ulloa. =256=Totten to Marcy, Nov. 23, 1847.
=180=Pillow to wife, Aug. 16. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Sept.
1. =13=Doyle, no. 79, 1843. =69=P. F. Smith, memoir, Oct. 14.
=354=Welles papers. =152=Mason to Conner, Nov. 29, priv. and
confid. _Journal des Débats_, Nov. 4. Boston _Atlas_, Dec. 17. Buchanan,
Works, viii, 365. Diccionario Universal (_Ulúa_). _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2,
app., 191. (Ulúa) See chaps. xxii, p. 21, xxx.

18.5. It is believed that the preceding text and notes afford ample
support for this sentence. Note 27 contains additional references;
and see Ripley, War with Mexico, i, 361-2. Taylor seems never to have
perceived that Polk could have superseded him with a Democrat by
merely sending Jesup or Wool to the army with reinforcements before
brevetting him major general and ordering him to serve with his
brevet rank. Nov. 10 Polk asserted in his diary that he had known no
politics with reference to Taylor. The diary shows that he was aware
how Taylor felt about him. This was not at all surprising. Pillow's
letters indicate plainly that he understood the matter and he was in
confidential correspondence with the President. Pillow wrote to his
wife that Taylor systematically proscribed Polk's friends, and this may
offset some of Taylor's assertions that he himself was persecuted by the
administration.

18.6. Dec. 10 (Bixby) Taylor wrote to his son-in-law that he would
not say he would refuse to serve, if elected President. This meant
of course that he was a candidate. His formal announcement came the
following month.

18.7. It is probable that the administration knew how Taylor felt
about the Vera Cruz expedition, for he was outspoken, and Polk had more
than one correspondent in his camp.

18.8. Scott, like nearly all the Whigs, disapproved of a war
made by a Democratic administration for (as the Whigs generally
alleged) party reasons, but was ready to do his duty as a soldier
(=13=Pakenham, separate and confidential, Sept. 28).

18.9. _The selection of the commander._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp.
363, 367, 369, 373 (Marcy); 372, 1268-70 (Scott); 383 (Bliss); 384
(Patterson). =169=Scott to Taylor, Sept. 26 ("I never, for a
moment, ceased to watch over your fame and interests with the liveliest
solicitude"). Polk, Diary, Sept. 5, 15; Oct. 22; Nov. 10, 14, 17-19,
21, 1846; May 6, 1847; Jan. 4, 1848. Scott, Mems., ii, 386, 399.
London _Times_, June 30, 1847. =132=Slidell to Buchanan, Nov. 5.
=169=Scott to Crittenden, Sept. 17. =169=Taylor to Crittenden,
Jan. 26; Mar. 25, 1847. =354=Welles papers. Note particularly
Taylor's political exchanges with. =169=Crittenden and Wood (Bixby
coll.) during the summer and autumn. =180=Pillow to wife, Oct.
27; Dec. 8. =330=Taylor to brother, Dec. 12, 1846; Jan. 19, 1848.
_Id._, Letters (Bixby), June 3; Aug. 23; Nov. 26; Dec. 10, 13, 1846;
Jan. 26; Feb. 9; May 9; Aug. 29, 1847. =345=Blair to Van Buren,
July 7. Coleman, Crittenden, i, 243-4. =169=Scott to Marcy, Sept.
12. =62=Marcy to Scott, Sept. 14. =256=_Id._ to Wetmore, June
28. Watson, In Memoriam, 115. Grant, Mems., i, 120. Meade, Letters, i,
175. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Aug. 29. Garrison, Extension, 242. Bancroft,
Pacific States, viii, 375. _Mag. of Amer. Hist._, xiv, 564. Slidell to
Buchanan, Nov. 5, 1846, private: "The fate of the Administration depends
on the successful conduct of the war" (Curtis, Buchanan, i, 601).

18.10. Scott's figures were slightly below the adjutant general's.
Possibly the latter used returns of later dates. Taylor did not have
so many available troops, and accused Scott of stating what he knew or
should have known to be false (Bixby coll., 181); but if the adjutant
general was incorrectly informed as to the strength of the forces, the
fault was Taylor's. See note 3.

18.11. Scott was severely criticised by Marcy (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p.
1239) and others for ordering so many boats, guns and shells, and it was
triumphantly proclaimed that, as the result proved, he did not need so
large an outfit. But this argument was not sound. He had to reckon on a
failure to produce and deliver at the point of shipment in season all
that he specified, on a heavy loss through wreckage and other accidents,
on the probability that his landing would be opposed, and on the
expected necessity of reducing Ulúa; nor did he know that naval guns (to
which he actually was compelled to have recourse) would be available.
It has been said, too, that the army could have landed in the boats of
the blockading squadron, but Scott found on inquiry that only about 500
could go ashore in them at a single trip (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1274). Scott
on the other hand was unreasonably bitter in charging the war department
with negligence. More could have been done by the government, and
errors were committed, but shortcomings and mistakes were inevitable.
Marcy's reply to Scott's charges (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1218, 1227) needs
to be scrutinized carefully. Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 14) ridicules
Scott (for asking for a pontoon train) on the ground that every stream
between Vera Cruz and Mexico was fordable. But (1) Scott could not be
sure his operations would be confined to that line; (2) he operated in
fact on the lower Alvarado River, where it was not fordable; (3) had the
national bridge been blown up, pontoons might have been useful there for
wagons and heavy guns. Río del Plan was a small stream, but the enemy
caused the Americans much trouble by destroying the bridge at Plan del
Río. See Ripley, _op. cit._, ii, 165.

18.12. The proof that Scott and the administration intended that
Taylor should not be placed in jeopardy is superabundant: Ho. 60; 30, 1,
pp. 357, 366, 389 (Marcy); 844, 1272, 1276 (Scott). Scott even intended
to give Taylor his personal aid, should the Mexicans attack him in
force; and this was one of his reasons for going to Camargo (_ibid._,
844; =61=Scott to Brooke, Dec. 28).

18.13. As late as Jan. 2, 1847, every member of the Cabinet except
Clifford was opposed to Scott's marching against the city of Mexico,
though Polk favored taking that step should it be necessary in order to
obtain peace (Polk, Diary).

18.14. Taylor alleged bitterly (Bixby, 182) that discourtesy
and injury were done him by the failure to notify him promptly of
the expedition, but Polk's precaution was wise. Some despatches were
intercepted or lost, and soon a most important letter from Scott to
Taylor, marked "confidential" both outside and within, was opened by a
subordinate at Monterey and publicly discussed (Scott, Mems., ii, 402).
See note 15.

18.15. Nov. 25 Marcy wrote guardedly to Taylor with reference to
the new expedition, but the despatch went astray (=62=adj. gen.
to Taylor, May 5, 1847). It is surprising that cipher was not used. It
seems as if a ciphered letter giving the necessary explanations and
ordering Taylor to place the required forces at specified points by
specified dates should have been sent to Taylor in triplicate by trusty
messengers not later than Nov. 30.

18.16. _Scott's operations, etc., up to Dec. 27._ Ho. 60; 30,
1, pp. 373, 838-41, 1218, 1268, 1270, 1273-5 (Scott); 369, 372, 873,
1231 (Marcy); 1253 (Jesup); 1100 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby),
95, 181. Senex, Myth. Wise, Seven Decades, 235. Polk, Diary, Nov.
10, 20, 1846; Jan. 2, 1847. Jameson, Calhoun Corres., 727-8. _Journ.
of Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv, 442. =234=A. Johnson to ----,
Dec. 2. =191=Fairfield to wife, Dec. 13. Scott, Mems., ii, 402.
=256=_Id._ to Marcy, Dec. 27, private. =61=H. L. Scott, Nov.
24. =61=W. Scott, memo., Nov. 29. =62=Jones to Taylor, May 5,
1847. =164=Scott to Conner, Dec. 26 (P. S. Dec. 27). _Picayune_,
Dec. 24. "The Brazos" signified loosely a region comprising Brazos
_Id._, Pt. Isabel, and sometimes the mouth of the Rio Grande.

Scott blamed Marcy for permitting him to spend only four days at
Washington in preparatory work (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1218). Marcy replied
that Scott passed twenty-six days in going from the capital to New
Orleans _via_ New York when he might have reached that place in seven
(_ibid._, 1228). The reply looks effective but does not cover the
ground. Marcy said Scott was not needed at the war department, where the
initial work had to be done; and hence the General did well to fortify
himself for the campaign and gain time for reflection by choosing the
sea route. The voyage took nineteen days instead of twelve on account of
head winds.

While he was at New Orleans a newspaper published there stated that the
expedition (which Scott intimated was bound for San Luis Potosí) would
strike at Vera Cruz, and Polk showed what he meant in promising Scott
his full confidence by charging that he had betrayed the secret (Diary,
Jan. 14; Feb. 27). The secret was out at New Orleans in reality about
two weeks before Scott arrived there, and the newspaper stated later
that its information did not come from any person connected with the
army (_Niles_, Feb. 13, 1847, p. 370). (See =256=Scott to Marcy,
Jan. 27, priv.) Polk also complained--another mark of confidence--that
Scott's vanity was causing him to make "extravagant preparations," as
if Taylor had not shown at Monterey the consequences of failing to
prepare adequately. In fact Scott, instead of insisting upon extravagant
preparations, wrote Dec. 23 that he would move against Vera Cruz if he
could land even 5000 men there early in February (=374=to Conner).

18.17. The new First Division included Harney's (Third) Brigade,
now consisting of Co. C (Bragg's light battery) of the Third Artillery,
companies B, C, D and E of the Second Dragoons, the Second Infantry and
the Third Infantry; and P. F. Smith's (Fourth) Brigade, now consisting
of Co. E (Sherman's light battery) of the Third Artillery, two companies
of the Mounted Riflemen (without horses), the First and the Seventh
Infantry. The rest of the Second Dragoons were to be assigned whenever
they should join. Five companies of the Second Infantry had been for
some weeks at Montemorelos; the rest, like the Second Tennessee, marched
to that point from Camargo. The Fourth Infantry and two companies of the
First Artillery were to occupy the citadel. The Washington and Baltimore
battalion, which had belonged to the First Division, was now attached
to Quitman's brigade. It will be noted that Taylor, who was incorrectly
said to have been exposed with inadequate forces to Mexican attack, now
treated Worth in precisely that way, exposing also Saltillo, which he
himself called "our most important point" in that region (Ho. 60; 30, 1,
p. 381). Taylor overtook Quitman Dec. 16. Nearly 2000 wagons were now
under Taylor's orders, yet pack-mules were used mainly for the train. By
the railroad Victoria is 284 kilometers from Monterey.

18.18. As the Americans had no positive information regarding Santa
Anna's intentions and movements, Worth was blamed for giving a false
alarm. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 304) says S. Anna was unable to
leave S. L. Potosí. Worth really did expect the Mexicans to reach him
considerably sooner than they could have done. Major Gaines with three
companies of Kentucky cavalry, previously ordered to Saltillo, seems to
have arrived there on Dec. 17. Butler was now ordered to take command at
that point.

18.19. In one letter Taylor stated that he received Scott's note
when two days from Monterey, but this must mean "second day." Dec. 20
Scott had written to him from New Orleans, explaining his plans more
fully, but this letter did not reach him until January 16 (Ho. 60; 30,
1, 1101).

18.20. From Montemorelos Taylor sent a topographical engineer,
escorted by a squadron of dragoons under May, to examine Santa Rosa Pass
and rejoin the command at Linares. Ten men of May's rear guard and the
baggage were cut off in the pass (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 387-8, 1095. Maury,
Recolls., 31. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 284).

18.21. "Norther" was the name given to an extremely violent wind
which blew at frequent intervals from October to April, lasting usually
about three days. During Scott's operations one lasted seventy-six
hours. It grew more violent as one went south toward Vera Cruz,
probably because the cordillera approached the coast and produced
somewhat the effect of a funnel. Its merit was that it prevented yellow
fever.

18.22. The real Mexican cavalry numbered about 1000 under Gen.
Romero, who was sent by Valencia, now commanding at Tula, because the
governor of Tamaulipas had asked for 1000 infantry. The cavalry arrived
at Victoria on Dec. 24. Only 200 were regulars. The rest were badly
armed and munitioned, and cavalry were not suitable for a region covered
with woods and intersected with rivers. The people, however, prepared
to coöperate with them; but arms were lacking, and the revenues of the
state had mostly been cut off by the occupation of Matamoros and Tampico
(_Gaceta de C. Victoria_, July 23, 1846). Valencia was very anxious to
attack the Americans, but Santa Anna would not permit this--probably
because he did not wish Valencia either to be defeated or to win éclat
by succeeding. December 26 Romero received positive orders not to risk
an action, and two days later he retired (=82=gov. Tamaul. to gov.
Puebla, Jan. 6, 1847. =77=_Id._ to Relaciones, Apr. 23). Taylor
strongly desired to capture Valencia (Roberts, diary).

18.23. _Taylor's march to Victoria (including Worth's alarm)._
Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 513 (orders 156); 361, 379, 381, 385, 387-8, 848,
1100 (Taylor); 839, 851, 1156 (Scott). Meade, Letters, i, 170, 172.
_Autograph_, July-Aug., Nov.-Dec., 1912 (Taylor). Diccionario Universal
(_Itinerario_). =307=Roberts, diary. Sen. 32; 31, 1, p. 8, note.
Henshaw narrative. Velasco, Geog., iv, 150. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 277
(Holt's journal). Henry, Camp. Sketches, 262-287. Robertson, Remins.,
185-198. _Vedette_, ii, no. 9 (Townes). =193=Foster to father, Dec.
10. =139=W. B. Campbell to D. C., Jan. 2, 1847. =69=Worth
to Bliss, Dec. 16; to Butler, Dec. 18. =69=Butler to Bliss, Dec.
20. =69=Wool to Worth, Dec. 24. =69=Riley to Bliss, Dec.
10. =69=Quitman to Bliss, Dec. 30. =69=Worth to Bliss, Dec.
4. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 160, Dec. 22. =169=_Id._ to
Crittenden, Jan. 26, 1847. _Id._, Letters (Bixby), 180. Wilhelm, Eighth
Inf., ii, 300-1. =61=Clarke to McCall, Dec. 27. Apuntes, 86-7.
Scott, Mems., ii, 402. =69=Wool to Butler, Dec. 25. _Delta_, Jan.
24; Feb. 13, 1847. =52=Black, Oct. 8. =299=Posey to Gordon,
Feb. 19, 1847. N. Y. _Herald_, Feb. 6, 1847. Scott wrote privately
(=256=Jan. 16) that "friend Taylor ... turned his back upon the
appointment I gave him ... saying he would be back, at Monterey, in
36 days, the 1st of February!!" Taylor actually wrote that he _might_
return "early in Feb." (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 848). Also the following
from =76=. S. Anna, Dec. 22, muy priv. _Id._, Dec. 24; Jan. 1.
Gov. Tamaul., Oct. 22; Dec. 3. E. González, Dec. 29. Comte. Nat. Gd.,
Catorce, Dec. 30. Instead of admitting that his journey to Victoria
delayed the receipt of Scott's letter of Jan. 3 to him, Taylor
complained in his characteristic fashion that it should have been sent
by a special messenger (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1101).

18.24. One naturally inquires why Taylor concentrated more than
5000 men at Victoria. He stated that he went in that direction to
examine the passes and establish one or more posts, and that he sent
Patterson's command there because Mexican parties were going from Tula
to that point; but he had been ordered, Oct. 22, to have 4000 men ready
to embark for Vera Cruz, if he could spare them (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 366),
and presumably had this in mind. But see his letter, Bixby coll., 72.

18.25. Such was the regular Mexican measure. In this as in some
other cases the American estimates were higher.

18.26. _Patterson's march to Victoria._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 358
(Marcy); 379, 387-8 (Taylor); 383 (Bliss); 383-4 (Patterson); 569,
571 (Jesup). =60=Patterson, Dec. 8. =292=Pillow to wife,
Dec. 15. _Amer. Flag_, Matamoros, Dec. 26. =332=Tennery, diary.
=254=McClellan, diary. =322=Smith, diary. Diccionario
Universal (_Itinerario_). Ho. 13; 31, 2 (G. W. Smith). Engineer School,
U. S. A., Occasional Papers, no. 16 (G. W. Smith). =60=Belknap,
memo, (with Patterson, Nov. 1). =193=Heiman to Mrs. Foster, Feb.
28. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 16. Furber, Twelve Months Vol., 275-318.
=335=Trist, draft of address. Welles papers (Pol. Hist. of U. S.).
=139=Campbell to D. C., Nov. 2, 1846; Jan. 2; Feb. 19, 1847. Scott,
Mems., ii, 423. =159=Collins, diary. _Hist. Teacher's Mag._, Apr.,
1912, p. 75. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 250-1. N. Y. _Herald_, Nov. 3,
1857 (Scott). =146=Caswell, diary. =275=Nelson to Coe, Oct.
14, 1846 ("The General in making a speech to us a day or two ago said
that we should go on, or if it so happened that we _had_ to stay that he
(Pillow) would remain with us. This would make our situation _deplorable
indeed_. Our Brigadier General I am sorry to say is universally
unpopular"). Two soldiers wrote: "We do not charge Gen. Pillow with
that wholesale abuse that has been heaped upon him by many. It is his
misfortune to be cursed with unalloyed selfishness" (McLean County Hist.
Soc. Trans., i, 24). =280=Nunelee, diary. Claiborne, Quitman, i,
277 (Holt's journal). =180=Pillow to wife, Oct. 27. Taylor, Letters
(Bixby), 180. Trans. Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1906, 177-8. McCall,
Letters, 474. =273=Mullan, diary. Bishop, Journal.

18.27. _Scott's operations, Dec. 27-Jan. 7, including the division
of the troops._ =61=H. L. Scott, Dec. 28. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 842,
844, 848, 851, 853, 875, 1156 (Scott); 858-9 (Butler); 860-1 (Worth).
=61=Butler, Jan. 8, 1847. Wash. _Union_, Jan. 13, 1847. (Suggested)
Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 353; Taylor, Letter to Gaines. (Ordered) Polk, Diary,
Nov. 17-19. (Appointed) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 372 (Marcy). (Authority)
Polk, Diary, Mar. 21, 1847; _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 502 (Douglas).
(Condition) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 390, 1276. (Admitted) _Ibid._, 1102.
(Manner) _Ibid._, 373, 839, 848, 851. (Purpose) _Ibid._, 373, 839;
Scott, Mems., ii, 403. (Reach) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 848, 852. (Required)
_Ibid._, 864; Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 47. (Recognized) =169=Taylor to
Crittenden, Jan. 26, 1847. ("Wormed") _Ibid._; =370=Taylor to
Davis, Apr. 18, 1848. (Kill) =330=Taylor to brother, May 29, 1847.
("Contemptible") Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 180. (Suggestion) Ho. 60;
30, 1, pp. 337, 375 (Taylor). ("Intrigue") Taylor, Letters (Bixby),
84. (Outraged) _Ibid._, 180. (Degraded) _Ibid._, 181. ("Discourteous")
_Ibid._, 179. (Ruin) _Ibid._, 90, 95. (Expecting) =169=Taylor
to Crittenden, Jan. 26, 1847; Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 890, 1109-10, 1113.
("Sacrificed") _Ibid._, 863; Bixby coll., 114. The New Orleans _Comm.
Bulletin_ said a fearful responsibility rested on the government for
exposing Taylor. See also =330=Taylor to brother, Feb. 8; Apr. 5,
22; May 29, 1847; Jan. 19, 1848.

For a particular reason both Scott and Taylor (=169=to Crittenden,
Jan. 26) felt sure that Santa Anna would go to Vera Cruz promptly. This
reason was the capture of Scott's original letter of Jan. 3 to Taylor,
borne by Lieut. Richey (French, Two Wars, 71; Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 876,
890; Meade, Letters, i, 182; Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 82). It was
believed that the letter was in Santa Anna's hands by about Jan. 15. For
this reason and the tardiness of the new volunteer regiments Scott felt
that he needed more and Taylor fewer troops than he otherwise would have
estimated (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 893). Indeed, Taylor wrote to Scott on Jan.
26 that Santa Anna had already left the north (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 890).
Scott was so confident that he would meet serious opposition at Vera
Cruz that he employed five or six agents to obtain information about the
forces assembling there. Marcy entertained the same expectation (Ho. 60;
30, 1, p. 369). Ripley (_op. cit._, i, 358) argues that S. Anna had a
better chance of success in attacking Taylor than he would have had in
attacking Scott, and therefore Scott should not have believed that S.
Anna would oppose his debarkation. But Ripley could not have proved his
premise; and, even were that true, the additional advantage that would
have been gained by guarding the route from Vera Cruz to Mexico City
looked like a decisive consideration. S. Anna's moving against Taylor
was largely due to political considerations not understood by either
Scott or Ripley.

Taylor gradually settled down upon the idea that the aim of Polk and
Scott was to cause him to leave Mexico in disgust (=330=to brother,
Feb. 8; Apr. 5). Later he changed "Scott, Marcy & Co." to "Scott, Polk &
Co." (=330=to brother, Jan. 19, 1848), thus smiting at one stroke a
rival in his own party (see =330=letter to brother, Apr. 5, 1848)
and a supposed rival in the other.

The number of troops left with Taylor for defence against an enemy
who was not expected to advance was about 800 regulars and 6-7000
well seasoned and respectably trained volunteers (=169=Taylor
to Crittenden, March 25, 1847) besides several regiments of new
volunteers--say 2400-2800 men--who were expected to arrive soon; while
Scott had less than 13,000 to face (with all the disadvantages of
debarking) the garrisons of Vera Cruz and Ulúa, the army that Santa Anna
was believed to be leading against him, and all such reinforcements
as the Mexican government could raise when threatened at the vital
point. Moreover Scott's new volunteers were to land with practically
no training whatever, and could hardly be counted on for the initial
fighting. Taylor said that for a blow at the capital 25,000 men (10,000
of them regulars) would be required (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 353). As Scott
pointed out, Taylor now had really nothing to do except defend Texas
(Memoirs, ii, 409) and, should it be practicable, aid Scott's offensive
by threatening to advance. Scott took Robert E. Lee from Taylor's army.

On receiving Scott's orders of Jan. 3 Taylor replied in a style
corresponding to his state of mind (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 863). Scott
answered: "There are some expressions in those letters [of Jan. 15
which, as I shall wish to forget them, I shall not specify or recall"
(_ibid._, 864); and to Marcy Scott wrote privately: "However, he
[Taylor] is still the same excellent man" (=256=Jan. 23). In his
correspondence on this subject Taylor appeared to regard the troops
placed under his command as his personal property. The battle of Buena
Vista has commonly been cited as the cause of Taylor's election, but it
was the idea that he had been deliberately exposed to the Mexicans which
gave that victory its remarkable political effect (=210=Simms to
Hammond, Jan. 15, 1847; _So. Qtrly. Review_, Jan., 1851, p. 37). It may
be observed further that for the government to sacrifice him, his army
and all the public property in northern Mexico, and give Santa Anna an
opportunity to ravage Texas would have been to commit suicide. The idea
was unreasonable.

18.28. Scott, who was a great soldier but not a great lawyer, had
the imprudence to attack Marcy, a master of fence, in regard to the
supply of vessels, and he fared rather badly. Marcy's defence was,
however, by no means wholly sound. He himself called it privately a
"special plea" (=256=to Wetmore, Apr. 11, 1848). For example, Dec.
15, 1846, he notified Scott (and also Jesup, who had gone to the front)
that he was ordering ten transports in ballast to the Brazos, but later,
on receiving a letter dated Jan. 27 from Jesup (then at the Brazos)
which over-confidently stated that all needed vessels could be chartered
there, he countermanded the order; and this looks like a satisfactory
defence against Scott's complaint that none of the ten transports
specified by him in his requisition appeared. But Marcy neglected to
inform Jesup or Scott that the order had been countermanded, and, as
Jesup's letter could not have reached Washington before about Jan. 7,
Jesup naturally assumed that the ten transports had got under way.
Indeed, Jan. 23 the adjutant general wrote what Scott understood to
mean that the latter might soon expect ten ships in ballast (Ho. 60;
30, 1, p. 897). Therefore Jesup and Scott counted upon them (_ibid._,
896), and naturally did not exert themselves to obtain shipping (when
disappointed about vessels already engaged) as otherwise they doubtless
would have done. (See Scott, Marcy, Jesup, Hetzel in Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp.
894, 1218, 1227, 1253.) Besides, it was found necessary to send a number
of the Brazos vessels to Tampico for the troops of Patterson, Twiggs and
Quitman. Jesup (_supra_) charged Scott with causing delay by changing
the assignation of certain regiments; but Scott certainly did not desire
to waste time, and it is only fair to suppose that he made the changes
for adequate reasons. Jesup complained that many of his officers were
inefficient, and Marcy with well feigned naïveté replied that their
names had been presented to Polk [by politicians] with "the highest
testimonials."

18.29. Harney soon disobeyed Scott's positive orders at Medellín
bridge (chap. xxii, note 25), and his biographer admits that he might
justly have been shot (Reavis, Harney, 186). Scott, however, merely
refrained from reporting the affair, whereupon Harney complained that
he had been unjustly ignored. One of the best reasons for studying the
Mexican war is to observe how political considerations interfered with
military affairs. The Harney episode was enough to justify Scott's
apprehensions of a fire from the rear, but it was not the only instance
of executive meddling (=213=Hatch to sister, Feb. 11, 1847).
Another incident also, which occurred at this time, illustrates his
magnanimity and good sense. Lieut. Col. Ethan Allen Hitchcock, a man of
notable talents and attainments and formerly instructor in tactics at
West Point, was admirably qualified to act as inspector general, and
Scott gave him the post although Hitchcock had repeatedly opposed him,
and was personally unfriendly to him. Experience soon made Hitchcock
one of Scott's firmest admirers and partisans (Hitchcock, Fifty Years,
234-6).

18.30. _Scott's operations, Jan. 8-Feb. 15._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp.
844, 855-6, 866, 875, 880, 882, 890-1, 893, 896, 1218, 1273 (Scott);
874, 1227 (Marcy); 568, 571, 1253 (Jesup); 884, 894 (Hetzel); 868, 870,
887-9, 893, 1164-6 (H. L. Scott); 867, 869, 888 (Harney); 860-1, 870
(Worth); 858-9 (Butler). _Niles_, Feb. 13, p. 369; Feb. 27, p. 401.
=63=Marcy to qtrmr. officer, Dec. 11, 15, 1846. Lawton, Artillery
Officer, 42-3. =358=Williams to father, Jan. 17. Ballentine,
English Soldier, i, 257. _Picayune_, Feb. 3; Mar. 12. =180=Pillow
to wife, Feb. 14. =65=Scott, gen. orders. 8, 11. Polk, Diary,
Dec. 14, 1846; Feb. 20, 1847. Reavis, Harney, 186. Grant, Mems., i,
123-4. =61=Worth to adj. gen., Feb. 17. Meade, Letters, i, 176.
=60=Scott to Marcy, April 5, 1847. =256=_Id._ to _Id._, Jan.
23, 1847, private. _Amer. Flag_, Matamoros, Feb. 17. Oswandel, Notes,
48. =62=Stanton, Nov. 29; Dec. 7, 13, 20, 1846; Jan. 5; Feb.
16, 1847; Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 91 (Hitchcock). =322=Smith, diary.
=364=Worth to S., Feb. 17; to wife, Feb. 18. Smith, To Mexico,
84-103 (Worth's march from Saltillo).

18.31. An American estimate was 130 miles. This is partially
explained perhaps by the fact that the pioneers made some "short cuts"
(mule paths) available. Meade (Letters, i, 159) even cut the distance to
about 100 miles, but this appears to have been little more than a guess.
By the railroad the distance is about 141 miles.

18.32. _From Victoria to Tampico._ =146=Caswell, diary.
Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1097 (Taylor); 879 (Patterson). Diccionario
Universal (_Itinerario_). =303=Orders 3, Jan. 12. Robertson,
Remins., 199-207. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 181. U. S. Engineer School,
Occasional Papers, no. 16 (G. W. Smith). Ho. 13; 31, 2 (_Id._). Prieto,
Tamaulipas, 229. =332=Tennery, diary. =273=Mullan, diary.
Lawton, Artillery Officer, 27. =322=Smith, diary. =169=Taylor
to Crittenden, Jan. 26. =69=Colección de Itinerarios.
=307=Roberts, diary. Meade, Letters, i, 174-5. _Defensor de
Tamaul._, Jan. 18. =76=Cos, Feb. 1. =218=Henshaw narrative.
=139=W. B. Campbell to wife, Jan. 25. Furber, Twelve Months Vol.,
342-93.

18.33. The author's opinion of Pillow is based upon his letters to
his wife, Polk, Scott, Duncan and others, the Trist papers, the Campbell
papers, the records of two courts of inquiry regarding his conduct, and
a large number of additional documents, most of which will be cited
later, particularly in chaps. xxvi and xxix. An army correspondent of W.
T. (_later_ Gen.) Sherman described Pillow, Feb. 26, 1848, as "a mass
of vanity, conceit, ignorance, ambition and want of truth." There was
good warrant for this characterization, but one should add plausibility,
cunning, energy and a genial disposition. For his personal appearance:
Semmes, Service, 165.

18.34. Scott had not yet heard from Washington regarding Harney.

18.35. _At Tampico._ =332=Tennery, diary. =273=Mullan,
diary. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 10-64. =146=Caswell, diary.
Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 896, 899, 900, 1169 (Scott); 901 (Totten);
850 (Clarke); 896 (Hetzel). Robertson, Remins., 207-13. Bishop,
Journal. =180=Pillow to wife, Dec. 8, 1846; Feb. 23, 1847.
=111=Beauregard to Totten, Jan. 9, 14; to Gates, Feb. 24.
Kenly, Md. Vol., 241-5. =330=J. T. Taylor to Scott, Feb. 12.
=280=Nunelee, diary. Apuntes, 88. Meade, Letters, i, 177, 184-5.
=218=Henshaw narrative, Feb. 20. =254=McClellan, diary.
=303=Shields to Quitman, Mar. 4. =159=Collins, diary, Feb.
19, 25. Davis, Autobiog., 121-3. =65=Scott, gen. orders 21, Feb.
19. =76=Cos, Feb. 19. =76=Anon. letters to Garay, Jan. 25,
28, etc. =139=Campbell to wife, Feb. 3, 7, 16. Mason, Lee, 37.
Furber, Twelve Months Vol., 394-415. Works defending the two land
approaches to Tampico were now ready, and Col. Gates of the Third
Artillery with a company of artillery, the Md. and D. C. battalion
and the new Louisiana regiment--about 1200 men in all--were detached
as a garrison. Rumors came that Taylor was in danger, but the air
was full of rumors about the enemy, and Scott had ample ground for
disregarding these, though criticised for doing so. Von Moltke said
(Franco-German War, 71): "It would have been unjustifiable to entirely
change the line of march on the ground of rumors that might, after all,
prove unfounded." Feb. 19 Scott announced his staff appointments. The
possession of Tampico was extremely useful to him. Fresh provisions
abounded there, and the embarking of about 5000 men on the dangerous
coast at the Brazos was avoided.

18.36. The Louisiana men went from Lobos Islands to Tampico. Col.
De Russey and the other part of the regiment were wrecked about Feb. 6
on the coast nearly opposite those islands, but after some hardships and
considerable danger of being captured by Gen. Cos, commanding at Tuxpán
about forty miles distant, they made their way to Tampico, meeting en
route an expedition sent to rescue them (Meade, Letters, i, 179; Lawton,
Artillery Officer, 32-5; =270=Moore, diary; =76=F. de Garay,
Mar. 5).

18.37. _To Lobos Islands._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1256 (Hetzel); 1259
(Babbitt); 878 (Conner); 568 (Jesup); 840, 841, 846, 880, 891, 896
(Scott). =65=Scott, gen. orders 1, 6, 8, Jan. 15, 30, 30. Lawton,
Artillery Officer, 23, 65. =61=Brooke to Munroe, Jan. 11; to Scott,
Jan. 9, 21. =62=Stanton to Jesup, Feb. 16. Scott, Mems., ii, 413.
=298=Porter, diary. =254=McClellan, Feb. 23. =193=Foster
to mother, Feb. 26. Ho. 59; 30, 1, p. 41. Smith, To Mexico, 105, 108.
=164=Scott to Conner, Dec. 26, 1846. _Niles_, Mar. 13, p. 21; 20,
p. 48. Hartman, Journal, 6. Oswandel, Notes, 54-6. _Picayune_, Feb. 18.
=159=Collins, diary. =146=Caswell, diary. Ballentine, English
Soldier, i, 266. Bishop, Journal.

18.38. Polk and Marcy felt that he was looking for an issue
(=256=Marcy to Wetmore, April 25, 1847), and his course warrants
that supposition.

18.39. _Taylor's movements._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 861, 890, 1097
(Taylor), 875 (Scott). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 72, 85, 87, 180-2.
=169=_Id._ to Crittenden, Jan. 26. Polk, Diary, Oct. 20, 1846;
Jan. 5; Mar. 21-23; Apr. 1, 1847. =256=Marcy to Wetmore, Mar. 11.
_Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit._ xiv, 443.

Jan. 26 Scott wrote to Taylor: "I must ask you to abandon Saltillo,
and to make no detachments, except for _reconnaisances_ and immediate
defence, much beyond Monterey. I know this to be the wish of the
government, founded on reasons in which I concur" (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p.
864). In reply Taylor wrote on Feb. 7 that he was going to remain at
his advanced position unless "positively ordered to fall back by the
government at Washington" (_ibid._, 1162). In addressing the government
on the same day (_ibid._, 1110) he referred to Scott's instructions as
advice. But such language from a superior officer was clearly an order
courteously phrased, and this interpretation is confirmed by the fact
that Scott deemed it necessary to give Taylor express authority later to
make a diversion toward San Luis Potosí (_ibid._, p. 876). Polk (Diary,
April 7, 1847, and elsewhere) remarked that Taylor had violated his
orders by taking his advanced position.

Taylor's ostensible reasons for so doing as given by himself (Bixby
coll., 182) were these: 1. It would be safest to fight, should the
Mexicans advance, immediately on their getting across the desert region
that lay between San Luis Potosí and the advanced American position,
rather than let them recuperate and use Saltillo as a base. 2. Had the
Americans fallen back to Monterey, Santa Anna would have invested it,
the Mexicans of that section would have risen, every animal at Monterey
would have starved or been destroyed, the troops--disheartened by
retreating, and beyond succor--would have surrendered or been cut to
pieces, and every American dépôt in the rear would have been abandoned
or captured. 3. Doniphan would have been ruined. But (1), as we have
seen (note 27), Taylor believed on Jan. 26, Feb. 4, 7, and 14 (_i.e._
both before and after taking the advanced position) that he was in no
real danger of being attacked by Santa Anna, and hence had not the
warrant of a supposed emergency for disregarding his instructions. (2)
This advanced position was not, as his explanation assumes, a good
place at which to meet the Mexicans, and he retired from it before the
battle of Buena Vista. (3) Rinconada Pass, on the other hand, could
probably have been made virtually impregnable toward the south, and,
if properly defended, could at least have held out for a considerable
time. (4) It was not reasonable to suppose that Santa Anna, learning
that Scott was about to strike at the vitals of Mexico, would undertake
to carry the Pass and besiege a city like Monterey, prepared in all
ways--as Marcy had instructed Taylor on Oct. 13, 22 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp.
356, 364) to prepare it--for a stubborn resistance (Howard, Taylor,
238). (5) If, however, Santa Anna were going to do so, as Taylor's
explanation assumes, the policy of Scott and the administration was
certainly the true one, since it would have contributed to a triumph
on the line from Vera Cruz to the capital. (6) Taylor's retirement
to Monterey and vicinity would have entailed no loss of prestige or
confidence on the part of the Americans, since it would have formed one
part of a bold offensive plan; but would only have diminished somewhat
Taylor's personal effulgence. (7) It was not reasonable to believe that
the men with whom Taylor (Bixby coll., 86) was ready to meet Santa
Anna in the field could not hold their own against him in strong works
(Meade, Letters, i, 179), and a success at Monterey would have been not
only more certain but more decisive and less costly than at Buena Vista
(Scott, Mems., ii, 412). Moreover Taylor would have had the Monterey
garrison as well as the troops who actually fought at Buena Vista. (8)
Taylor represented that he could not transport siege guns from Camargo
to Monterey, and how could he have expected Santa Anna to bring them to
Monterey from San Luis Potosí? (9) If Monterey did not contain ample
forage for the animals, the fault was Taylor's; and, if he was to stand
a siege, most of the animals could have been sent to the Rio Grande
(Ripley, War with Mex., i, 435). (10) Reinforcements from the north
were _en route_, and succor from Scott could have reached Monterey more
easily than a position far in advance. (11) Doniphan could have retired
from Chihuahua by the way he had gone there or (like a party of only
forty men: _Hughes, Doniphan's Exped._, 335) _via_ Presidio del Rio
Grande; and before moving toward Saltillo it was his duty to ascertain,
as he actually did, whether he could safely go there.

Another point brought forward by Taylor was that had he remained at
Monterey, the Mexicans could more effectually have annoyed his flanks
and lines of communication (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1110); but (1) evidently,
had he remained at Monterey, his flanks and lines of communication
would have been less extended and more easily protected than when he
was about eighty-five miles farther on (Polk, Diary, Mar. 23, 1847),
and (2) as a matter of fact his flanks were effectually annoyed and his
communications entirely cut off. (For certain points in this discussion
the author is indebted to Ripley's "War with Mexico.") In short,
the only rational explanation of Taylor's course appears to be that
suggested in the text. Oct. 15 Taylor wrote: Every day's march beyond
Saltillo will weaken our position and strengthen the enemy's (Ho. 60;
30, 1, p. 352). Nov. 26 he wrote: "We have advanced as far from our base
in this quarter as we ought to venture" (Bixby coll., 72).

The troops that Taylor now had were: _regulars_--two squadrons of
cavalry, four batteries (16 guns), and at Monterey one company of
artillery; _volunteers_--two regiments of horse, eight regiments of
foot, and two guns at Monterey, Saltillo and beyond Saltillo; and three
regts. of volunteer foot holding the line to Camargo and down the river
(Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1098).


                   XIX. SANTA ANNA PREPARES TO STRIKE

19.1. Butler returned to Monterey about the first of February.

19.2. The statements regarding Taylor's negligence are from
Gen. Benham, who was on the ground as an engineer officer. His
"Recollections" was published in 1871, and whether it was based on
documents is not known. But, being an engineer, he was a man of clear
and trained intelligence; he possessed superior ability; and on careful
inquiry the author was told by Major Lukesh, director of the engineer
school, Washington Barracks, that in 1878 his faculties appeared to
be entirely sound. Moreover his account shows internal evidences of
credibility. The alleged negligence of Taylor was in accordance with
his temperament and previous record, and he probably thought it would
reassure the troops.

19.3. Taylor wrote nothing and did nothing indicating an intention
to make his stand at Carnero Pass, and the evidence that he intended
to fight at Agua Nueva seems to be decisive. He might, however, have
endeavored to annoy the enemy at the Pass.

19.4. _Affairs with Taylor up to Feb. 20._ Carleton, Buena Vista,
2-8, 50, 179-80. =190=Ewing, diary. =330=Taylor to brother,
Feb. 8. Raleigh (N. C.) _Star_, Aug. 18, 1847. Taylor, Letters (Bixby),
86, 182. =69=Wool to Taylor, Jan. 20, 29. =69=Warren to Wool,
Feb. 14. =147=Chamberlain, diary. =148=_Id._, recollections.
=61=Am. offs. to S. Anna, Mar. 24. =61=Heady to Marshall,
Aug. 30, 1848. =61=Gaines to Scott, May 3, 1847. =65=Wool,
orders 222. C. M. Clay, Mems., i, 143. _Vedette_, ii, no. 2 (Oury);
no. 8 (Lee). =61=[Wool] to adj. gen., Jan. 17. Article on Taylor
(by J. Davis) in Appleton's Biog. Dict. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 248-9.
=185=Bragg to Duncan, Apr. 4. =299=Posey to friend, Feb.
19. Smith, Chile con Carne, 161. Smith, Remins., 41-5. Upton, Mil.
Policy, 209. _Amer. Flag_, Matamoros, Feb. 17. N. Y. _Tribune_, Mar.
29. =367=Yell to ----, Jan. 19. Ho. Report 413; 30, 1. Encarnacion
Prisoners, 35-8, 92-4. Meade, Letters, i, 169, 182. =300=Prickett,
letters. Bishop, Journal. =8=Anon. diary. =245=Bee to
Lamar, Dec. 5, 1846. Rápida Ojeada, 6, 8. Coleman, Critt., i, 308-10.
Balbontín, Invasión, 70. Benham, Recollections. =253=Harney to
McLean, June 13. =349=Pattridge to Miss W., July 21. _Spirit of
the Times_, May 1 (H. von S.). _Hist. Teacher's Mag._, Apr., 1912.,
p. 75. N. Y. _Eve. Post_, Jan. 4, 1849. =316=Bragg to Sherman,
Mar. 4, 1848. =146=Caswell, diary, Jan. 12. =139=Campbell
to D. C., Nov. 2, 9, 1846. Senex, Myth. N. Y. _Sun_, Jan. 28. (Urrea)
_Delta_, Jan. 16. _Picayune_, Mar. 11; Apr. 14 (Taylor); June 25.
_Niles_, Mar. 20, p. 60; May 8, p. 156. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 441, 1098,
1106-10, 1162 (Taylor); 864, 876 (Scott); 1108 (Wool); 1111-2, 1182
(lists). _Monitor Repub._, Jan. 14. =76=S. Anna, Jan. 26; Feb. 27.
=76=Zambonino, Jan. 23. =76=Auxil. inspector of N. León to
Canales, Jan. 20.

Col. Campbell (First Tenn. regt.): "Old Zack's" manners are such that he
excites no jealousy; "no one feels that he [Taylor] is his superior, but
his equal or inferior, and each thinks he can control and manage such a
mind" (=139=to D. Campbell, Apr. 25, 1847). U. S. Grant: We thought
the battles on the Rio Grande pretty important, but had "only a faint
conception of their magnitude until they were fought over in the North
by the Press and the reports came back to us" (Mems., i, 99). It will be
noted that Taylor pursued now the same anti-Cæsarean, anti-Napoleonic
policy of teaching his troops to despise the enemy that had been
followed by him before the battles of May, 1846 (chap. viii, note 9).
The distance by rail from Saltillo to Agua Nueva station is eighteen
miles. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 350) speaks of the buildings at
Buena Vista as "laid out in regular streets"; but, as the text states,
Buena Vista was only a poor farm, not a rich hacienda. A soldier, there
present, called it an "insignificant, dirty little rancho."

19.5. _El Crepusculo_, May 16, 1835, said that Santa Anna triumphed
over Zacatecas "with the tranquillity of the tiger, which, sated with
the flesh of its prey, lies down on what it does not wish to devour."
During December, 1846, very sharp =76=letters were exchanged by
Governor González and Santa Anna.

19.6. This estimate is based upon about thirty statements, none of
them official. About the middle of August Salas ordered to the north the
troops that had been fighting in Jalisco. About 5500 regulars preceded
or accompanied Santa Anna's journey to the north, and later he called
other troops from the capital and the states. Though accounts varied,
Ampudia seems to have brought nearly 6000; the Fourth Brigade, which
had failed to reach Monterey, and the former garrison of Tampico were
substantial additions; Guanajuato state, roused personally by Valencia,
contributed more than 5000; the Jalisco regiment, which arrived at
the end of October, numbered 1345 foot; the state of S. Luis Potosí
did well, and other states did more or less; and an artillery company
was made up from American deserters, mostly Irishmen, under the name
of San Patricio (see chap. xi, note 11); but desertion--due to the
inborn distaste of the masses for war, to bad treatment and to poor
subsistence--was constantly unraveling the work of accumulation.

It seems to have been a mistake to draw Ampudia's army to San Luis at
so early a date. It was in no danger before the end of the armistice;
it could have encouraged the people near Saltillo to act as guerillas;
and it needed time to regain its morale. Besides, this backward movement
had a bad effect on the other troops, and so much was said at San Luis
by Ampudia's men about the prowess of the Americans, that a general
order forbidding such talk had to be issued. Ampudia and a number of
his officers were put on trial; but the trials were suspended, and
most of the accused were exonerated in orders. Several thousand men
(successively under Urrea, Valencia and Vázquez) were kept at Tula,
about 125 miles northeast of San Luis. Santa Anna knew the Americans
could not bring artillery _via_ Tula, and did not fear them without it;
but he looked forward to operating _via_ Victoria against Taylor's line
of communication. Another body was kept at Matehuala. Smaller forces
were echeloned in the same general direction; and Miñón's brigade was
thrown still farther forward as a screen, corps of observation and means
of annoying the enemy. In order to prevent the Americans from learning
about his operations, Santa Anna gave orders to the cavalry at his front
that no one should be permitted to go to Saltillo or Monterey without a
pass signed by himself.

19.7. _Santa Anna's arrival, plans and operations at S. L. P.; his
financial difficulties there._ _Amer. Eagle_, Apr. 8. =52=J.
Parrott, Feb. 6. =52=Black, Nov. 17, 1846. London _Times_, Dec. 18,
1846; Mar. 11; Apr. 20, 1847. Matamoros _Amer. Flag_, Mar. 13. Giménez,
Mems., 96-7, 264. _Journal des Débats_, Feb. 22. _Constitutionnel_,
Dec. 5, 12, 1846; Jan. 17, 31, 1847. =69=Worth to Bliss, Nov. 29,
1846. =69=Shields to Bliss, Jan. 13, 1847. =58=Jobson, Feb.
14. =61=Shields to adj. gen., Jan. 19. =47=Black to Conner,
Sept. 24, 1846. =47=Conner, Oct. 26; Nov. 5; Dec. 1. Memoria de ...
Guerra, Dec., 1846. Doblado, Memoria que contiene. =70=Canalizo to
S. Anna, Jan. 7. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 249, 271. Gamboa, Impug., 26.
Negrete, Invasión, ii, 351; iii, app., 444; iv, app., 177, 417. Ramírez,
México, 9, 10, 12. México á través, iv, 579, 591-2. _Don Simplicio_,
Oct. 10, 1846; Jan. 9, 30; Feb. 17, 1847. _Observador Zacat._, Dec.
27, 1846, suplem. =100=Jefe dept. of V. Cruz to ayunt., Dec. 21,
1846. _Eco de Tampico_, Oct. 8, 14, 1846. Escudero, Mems., 6. Durango
congress, Dec. 11, 1846. _Republicano_, Oct. 15, 1846; Feb. 2, 1847.
=80=Méx. state, decree, Nov. 26, 1846. _Epoca_, Sept. 26; Oct. 13,
1846; Jan. 19, 26, 30; Feb. 16. =77=_Relaciones_, circulars, Sept.
30; Oct. 6, 19, 20, 22, 1846. =75=_a_Hacienda, circular, Oct. 14,
1846. =83=Gov. Querétaro to other govs., Oct. 16, 1846; to Farías,
Oct. 18; to S. Anna, Nov. 21; Dec. 21. Rivera, Gobernantes, ii, 309.
Balbontín, Invasión, 53-4, 58, 61. Apuntes, 69, 70, 73, 75. Defensa de
... Estrada. Donnavan, Adventures, 51, 76. =13=Bankhead, nos. 140,
144, 151, 173, 178, 1846. Muro, Miscelánea, 65, 68, 70. García, Revol.
de Ayutla, 27. Sierra, Evolution, i, 217. _Crepúsculo_, May 16, 1835.
Puga y Acal, Docs., 57. García, Juárez, 65. Bustamante, Apuntes ...
S. Anna, 289. S. Anna, Apelación, 24-5; app., 3, 14, 18-24, 30, 30-9,
66-7. =80=_Id._ to gov. Méx. state, Nov. 26, 1846; Jan. 31, 1847.
_Picayune_, Mar. 10. _Delta_, Jan. 22. _Independiente_, May 22. Wash.
_Union_, Nov. 16, 30, 1846; Mar. 17, 1847. N. Y. _Journ. of Commerce_,
Jan. 8. =80=Gov. to legislature, Feb. 15, 1847. _Diario_, Oct.
1, 2, 6, 7, 16, 21, 22, 24; Nov. 2, 14, 19, 27; Dec. 4, 6, 8, 16,
20, 24, 25, 28, 1846; Jan. 30; Feb. 15, 17, 1847. _Monitor Repub._,
Oct. 18, 31; Nov. 17, 18, 20, 21; Dec. 21, 1846; Jan. 8, 29; Feb. 11,
16; Apr. 22; Nov. 30, 1847. Mora, Papeles, 64, 66. =162=Conner,
Dec. 1, 1846 =166=Black to Conner. Sept. 24, 1846. _Niles_,
Mar. 27, p. 57. Meade, Letters, i, 160. =52=J. Parrott, June 4,
1846. =73=Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 343, 346, 1846. =75=Gov.
Michoacán to Relaciones: circ. no. 252 of Relac. Parrodi, Memoria (S.
Anna, Oct. 18). Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 776, no. 4. =366=Letters from
S. Anna to gov. S. L. P., Nov. 1. And from =76= the following.
Carrera, Nov. 10. Plana mayor, Dec. 1. Valencia, addresses, Oct. 6, 30.
Gov. to cong. Durango, Nov. 8. M. Escandón, July 21. Salas, proclams.,
Aug. 28; Nov. 11. Piña to Carrera, Dec. 10. Decrees, Sept. 27; Dec. 2.
Memo, of artill. sent to S. L. P. Circular, Aug. 4. Report on artillery,
Nov. 13. Comte. gen. Chiapas, Oct. 3. Comisario gen. to S. Anna, Nov.
30; Dec. 5. Juan Morales, Nov. 2. Comte. gen. Durango, address, Oct. 16.
Guerra, circulars, Oct. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; Nov. 30; Dec. 2, 1846. S. Anna,
Sept. 29; Oct. 3, 4, 10, 14, 17, 19, 22, 22, res., 25, res., 28, 30,
31; Nov. 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 16, 18, 19, 28, 30; Dec. 3, 4, 7, 9, 11, 14,
19, 22, 28, 30, 1846; Jan. 1, 4, 7, 15, 19, 20; Feb. 27, 1847. Mora,
Apr. 22, 1847. Comte. gen. Guanajuato, Oct. 30; Nov. 13; Dec. 28, 1846.
S. L. P. assembly, decree, June 17, 1846. Ampudia to S. Anna, Oct. 18.
Relaciones, Jan. 11. J. G. P. Garay, June 8, 1846. Valencia, proclam.,
Dec., 1844. Yáñez, Oct. 9; Nov. 6, 1846. Ampudia, Oct. 1, 1846.
Valencia, Nov. 8. To S. Anna, Oct. 17. S. Anna to gov. Zacatecas, Dec.
17.

19.8. Copies of the _Herald_ containing this letter arrived at Vera
Cruz, but were seized. Later Santa Anna denied flatly that he had had
any dealings with the United States (Apelación, 16).

19.9. As Santa Anna's movement rested essentially upon non-military
reasons, Scott's forecast of his operations naturally proved incorrect.
The American attack upon Vera Cruz, though known to be planned, was not
yet known certainly to be coming. Santa Anna defended himself later for
not going to Vera Cruz by saying that he was merely commander of the
northern army, but in fact he did not so regard himself. The truth is
that he urged and expected the government to provide for Vera Cruz, that
the government assured him it had been provided for, and that, had it
been tenaciously defended, it could have held out until he could have
arrived in that vicinity (=76=S. Anna, Oct. 14, 20, 1846; Jan. 14,
18, 1847. _Id._, Apelación, 33. =76=To S. Anna, Jan. 30, 1847).
Taylor's moving away from Scott caused the intercepting of Scott's
letter of January 3, which revealed Taylor's weakness, and thus may have
been the cause of the battle of Buena Vista.

19.10. _Why Santa Anna marched north_ (_complaints of his conduct_).
=52=Black, Aug. 27; Oct. 8; Nov. 17, 1846; Jan. 28, 1847. Sierra,
Evolution, 218. _Soldado de la Patria_, no. 13. London _Times_, Jan.
28. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. _Courrier des Etats Unis_,
June 20; July 9, 1846. =335=Mackenzie to Trist, Nov. 25, 1846.
Gamboa, Impug., 15-19, 21-2. Kenly, Md. Vol., 390. Ramírez, Mexico,
173, 192. _Don Simplicio_, Jan. 9, 20, 27; Feb. 3. =82=MS.
apparently written in Jan., 1847. =77=Relaciones, circular, Nov.
27, 1846. _Republicano_, Jan. 21, 31. =13=Pakenham, no. 127, 1846.
=83=Gov. Querétaro to S. Anna, Nov. 21, 1846. Biog. del Gen. S.
Anna, 1847. =13=Pakenham to Palmerston, Oct. 29, 1846. Negrete,
Invasión, iii, app., 483 (Otero); iv, app., 177. Balbontín, Invasión,
59. Apuntes, 77. Pacheco, Exposición. =13=Bankhead, nos. 121,
140, 141, 157, 169, 1846; 5, 1847. García, Juárez, 65. Tributo á la
Verdad, 27. S. Anna, Manifiesto, Méx., 1847, 6. _Id._, Apelación, 16,
23. _Picayune_, Mar. 9, 10. Acta, Mazatlán, Jan. 18. =80=Olaguíbel
to S. Anna, Jan. --, 1847. Wash. _Union_, Oct. 10, 1846 (from _La
Patria_); Mar. 17, 1847. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 5, 1846. Richmond
_Times_, Sept. 2, 1846. _Diario_, Nov. 24; Dec. 6, 8, 1846; Jan. 30,
1847. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 22; Nov. 20, 29; Dec. 28, 1846; Jan. 4,
6, 8, 14, 19, 22 (calling attention to the scattered state of Taylor's
forces), 26, 29, 1847. Mora, Papeles, 70. _Niles_, Mar. 27, p. 57.
=73=Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 343, res., 410, 1846. Bustamante,
Nuevo Bernal, ii, 90. =76=Relaciones, Jan. 11. =76=S. Anna,
Feb. 27. =76=_Id._, Manifiesto, Jan. 26.

Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 341) doubts whether S. Anna had learned
from Richey's despatches (chap. xviii, note 27) that Taylor's forces had
been depleted, and cites in evidence S. Anna's declaration in defence
of himself for going against Taylor when Scott was about to attack
Vera Cruz (Apelación, 32). But (1) S. Anna was not a person to admit
unnecessarily the strongest point of an accusation against him, and in
fact the other point of his defence, cited by Rives, was not honest; (2)
S. Anna here representing that he feared Scott was coming from Tampico
to S. Luis Potosí shows again the disingenuousness of his defence, for
he must have known that such a movement was impracticable; (3) it is
hardly conceivable that Scott's intercepted letter of Jan. 3 did not,
like Marcy's of Sept. 2, find its way to headquarters.

19.11. The forces taking part in the campaign seem to have been 9500
infantry from San Luis, 4000 (under Mejía) stationed at Matehuala, and
1000 (under Parrodi) from Tula, 6000 cavalry in four brigades (Torrejón
at Las Bocas near S. L. P., Juvera at Venado, Andrade at Cedral, and
Miñón at La Encarnación), and 900 engineers, artillery and sappers--a
total of 21,400 including officers. These numbers are taken from Rápida
Ojeada and from a San Luis letter (the figures of which were stated
positively to have come from a member of Santa Anna's staff) printed in
_El Republicano_ of February 12, which substantially agree. Santa Anna's
figures were smaller but perhaps did not include Miñón's and Parrodi's
troops. Those of the Spanish minister were somewhat larger. There seem
to have been seventeen guns (three 24-pounders and three 16's, all of
which were siege or fortress guns, and for field pieces five 12's, five
8's and a 7-inch howitzer) which, as well as most of the ammunition,
appear to have gone forward January 27. Urrea was at the same time to
pass from Tula into Tamaulipas, strike at Taylor's communications and
threaten Monterey. Probably there were bodies of irregulars at points
not named above.

It occurs to the author at this point to remark that consistency in the
use of the article in geographical names is hardly practicable. Even
Mexican maps have not been consistent; and for us it would (_e.g._) be
an affectation to use the article with such well-known names as Puebla
and Saltillo.

19.12. At certain points in the desert there were large wells; and in
each of these a wide wheel, carrying buckets, was turned by mule power.

19.13. The main part of the army arrived Feb. 17-19 (Apuntes, 96).
Taylor thought he could not move more than about 6000 men some 125
miles (supposed to be about 140) from a well-stocked base, Camargo,
through a region supplied with water, subsistence and forage, and could
not transport 18-pounders (chap. xi, note 5). After Miñón advanced to
Potosí, Andrade occupied La Encarnación (night of Feb. 11). The wheel
pumps were then set in operation, but by Feb. 19 they were worn out. The
only ample supply of water was then seven or eight miles away, but it
had to be used for the animals. The distance from S. L. Potosí to Agua
Nueva by rail is about 223 miles.

19.14. Feb. 19 two brigades of cavalry had not arrived. The figures
may or may not have included these and Miñón's force. Probably they did
include many whose duties kept them from the firing line (_Republicano_,
May 3, 1847). The original reports of the officers regarding numbers and
operations have disappeared from =76=.

19.15. _To and at La Encarnación._ Carleton, Buena Vista, 23, 229.
León, Méx., 474. García, Juárez, 67. London _Times_, May 10. _Journal
Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv, 443. Giménez, Mems., 98. Sierra, Evolution,
219. Le Clercq, Voyage, 31-49. Calendario de Ontiveros, 1847. Sen. 32;
31, 1, p. 8, note. Rápida Ojeada, 4, 7-9, etc. Ordóñez, Refutación,
5, 8, etc. =61=Lamar to Bliss, Apr. 21. Rodríguez, Breve Reseña,
1848, 57. _Republicano_, Feb. 12; Mar. 24; May 3. =80=S. Anna to
gov. México state, Jan. 27. _Epoca_, Jan. 19, 26; Feb. 25. Negrete,
Invasión, ii, 389. Balbontín, Invasión, 60-9, 78. Apuntes, 88, 91-7.
S. Anna, Manifiesto, Mar., 1848. _Id._, Apelación, 24-7, 32; app., 67.
Muro, Miscelánea, 73-5. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 153-8. De Peyster, Kearny,
127. _Diario_, June 13. _Monitor Repub._, Nov. 30. _Journal of U. S.
Artillery_, July, 1892, p. 294. Rápida Ojeada, ii, 4, 6, 7. _Niles_,
Mar. 27, p. 62. =73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 445, 1846. Encarnacion
Prisoners, 43. Steele, Amer. Campaigns, i, 125. =76=S. Anna, Jan.
19, 26; Feb. 2, 11, 17, 27. The author has been over the greater part of
the route.

19.16. One cannot be sure enough now regarding the truth of the
various allegations regarding the lateral routes to say what Santa Anna
might have done. If he had reason (as he seems to have had) to believe
that he could surprise Agua Nueva, it would have been unwise to choose a
circuitous route of doubtful practicability. No Mexican came to give him
information about the ground (=76=Mora, April 23, 1847).

19.17. _From La Encarnación to Carnero Pass._ Carleton, Buena Vista,
232. Semmes, Service, 121. Gamboa, Impug., 23. _Epoca_, Feb. 25.
Balbontín, Invasión, 69, 70, 79. Apuntes, 97. S. Anna, Apelación, 25.
Ordóñez, Refutación. _Republicano_, Mar. 24. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 156-8.
_Diario_, June 13 (Ordóñez). Diccionario Universal (_Itinerarios_).
=76=Mora, Feb. 25. =76=S. Anna, Feb. 27.

19.18. McCulloch had made a previous expedition to La Encarnación and
found cavalry there.

19.19. Santa Anna attributed to a deserter named Váldez the failure
of his plan to surprise Taylor (Apelación, 26), but the story of
Váldez in itself probably would not have had much effect on Taylor. At
La Hedionda May sent Lieut. Sturgis on a scouting expedition. Firing
was heard later, and Sturgis, being captured, did not return. This La
Hedionda was often called La Hedionda Grande.

19.20. Chamberlain's =147=diary states in detail, quoting the
remarks made, how Wool, supported by the officers, forced the withdrawal
from Agua Nueva by threatening to lead the troops back himself rather
than see them sacrificed. This is startling, but cannot easily be
rejected. Of all the military men known to the author Chamberlain
was the most sternly soldierlike. He rose from the ranks to a brevet
brigadier-generalship, and he vouched for the correctness of his diary,
which had been kept strictly for himself. When not acting as Wool's
orderly he served as one of May's dragoons, who were commonly used by
Taylor as a sort of bodyguard. The reason given by Taylor for retreating
(Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 132) was that his position could be turned on either
side; but he knew that long before, or should have known it.

As the route _via_ La Hedionda debouched in the rear of Buena Vista,
one asks why the reason which seems mainly to have caused the retreat
did not veto the stand actually taken. Wool must have seen this point;
and one suspects that he used the alarm produced by the reports of
the scouts to bring about a withdrawal to the position he had long
preferred, reckoning also that, should it prove necessary to retire
farther, this could much more easily be done from Buena Vista than from
Agua Nueva. Evidently the sudden retreat fatigued the troops as well as
discouraged them; and not having become acquainted with the peculiar
ground on which they were to fight, they were repeatedly taken by
surprise during the battle that followed. By retreating Taylor gave up
the advantage, on which he had insisted, of forcing S. Anna to fight at
the very edge of a desert (chap. xviii, note 39).

19.21. At night wagons were sent to Agua Nueva for the stores, but
the Gentlemen-Volunteers under Yell refused to load them. Hence the
First Dragoons (regulars), who had slept only some three hours in as
many days, were sent up to do the work (Chamberlain, diary). Marshall's
Kentucky horse reinforced Yell. The haste of the Americans was such
that corn and beans, instead of being loaded into waiting wagons or
destroyed, were thrown into a spring, where the Mexicans found them
(officer's diary in _Republicano_, May 3, 1847). Yell's instructions
were to retire before midnight, taking the Second Kentucky with him from
La Encantada.

19.22. _Taylor's operations Feb. 20-21 (including night of Feb. 21)._
=299=Posey to friend, Feb. 19. =69=Wool to Bliss, Feb. 7.
=147=Chamberlain, diary. =148=_Id._, recollections. Madison
_Record_, 1850 (Prickett). =300=Prickett, letters. Semmes, Service,
121-2. Tampico _Sentinel_, Mar. 27. Scribner, Camp., 59. Smith, Remins.,
37, 42. _Picayune_, Apr. 14 (Taylor). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 97, 99, 132
(Taylor); 144 (Wool). J. Davis in _Cong. Globe_, 31, 1, app., 1034-41.
=173=_Id._, Address. Benham, Recolls. _Journ. U. S. Artillery_,
July, 1892, p. 294. Davis, J. Davis, i, 336. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1168,
1176 (Taylor). Carleton, Buena Vista, 4, 12-21, 24-6, 45. _Journ. Milit.
Serv. Instit._, xiv, 199 (No one can tell why Taylor did not fortify
Saltillo before the battle), 443. N. Y. _Eve. Post_, Jan. 4, 1849.
=76=Mora, Feb. 25.

The reason that led Taylor to neglect preparing Saltillo was no doubt
the same that had led him previously to neglect preparations when the
circumstances called for them.


                            XX. BUENA VISTA

20.1. Many of the Mexicans marched nearly forty-five miles in less
than twenty-four hours. See Stevens, Camps., 18.

20.2. The statements regarding the time of day differ, but the account
of the text appears to rest upon the most reliable evidence. See
Wallace, Wallace, 40. Taylor's verbal reply to the summons of Santa Anna
is said to have been more forcible than elegant, but a courteous answer
in writing was sent by Bliss.

20.3. Several officers seem to have noted the advantages of this
battlefield, but Wool recommended it near the end of December and is
entitled to the credit of the choice. The author visited the ground
twice, and found that a good route for infantry and cavalry ran from
La Encantada behind the hills west of Buena Vista valley, and entered
this valley north of La Angostura. Apparently it could have been made
practicable for cannon easily, and could have been used effectively by
either general for a feint at least. Engineer Mansfield had a picket
guard it during the afternoon and night of February 22.

20.4. This space was to be closed, if necessary, with two wagons
loaded with stone. The parapet was occupied by two companies of the
First Illinois under Lieut. Col. Weatherford. The main American position
was over-manned. S. Anna could not have carried it against Washington's
guns and infantry flanking fire from the edge of the plateau, and men
were urgently needed for the American left.

20.5. =330=The American forces in action at Buena Vista were as
follows: Dragoons under Bvt. Lieut. Col. May (First, 133; Second, 76),
209; Third Artillery (Co. C under Capt. Bragg, three guns--the fourth
being at Saltillo; Co. E under Capt. Sherman, four guns), 150; Fourth
Artillery, Capt. Washington, eight guns, 117; Arkansas horse, Col. Yell,
479; First Kentucky (two squadrons of cavalry and a battalion of mounted
riflemen), Col. Marshall, 330; Second Kentucky, Col. McKee, 571; First
Mississippi, Col. Davis, 368; Indiana Brigade (Second regt. under Col.
Bowles and Third under Col. Lane), Gen. Lane, 1253, including a rifle
battalion of four companies under Major Gorman; First Illinois, Col.
Hardin, 580; Second Illinois, Col. Bissell, 573; Texas volunteer company
(attached to Second Illinois), Capt. Conner, 61; Major McCulloch's Texan
scouts, 27. The figures include officers and men. The general staff
numbered forty-one. Three hundred and sixty-four of the men were on the
sick list. A company of the First Artillery, a few men of the Third
Artillery, two Mississippi companies and four Illinois companies were at
Saltillo. All except the dragoons and artillery were volunteers. Only
the artillery, dragoons, Mississippi regiment, and Conner's company had
been under fire, and some of these men were raw recruits; but Col. Davis
and all the field officers of the Second Kentucky were West Pointers.
Mostly Wool's men had been well trained. McCulloch's company probably
served under May. All the corps not otherwise described were infantry.
In the volunteer horse certain companies appear to have been regarded as
true cavalry and certain others as only mounted infantry. A similar fact
was noted in connection with the battle of Sacramento (p. 309).

20.6. Miñón issued from the Palomas de Adentro pass.

20.7. No satisfactory explanation of Taylor's trips to Saltillo was
made. The city had been in greater danger of attack from Miñón while
the Americans were eighteen miles away at Agua Nueva than after they
retired. Taylor should have ascertained seasonably that Palomas Pass
was practicable for cavalry, and have done whatever was necessary. Wool
appears to have barricaded the streets of Saltillo before going to Agua
Nueva (N. Y. _Eve. Post_, Jan. 4, 1849), and Butler began a redoubt,
which seems to have been the only external defence. Taylor's escort were
not needed as laborers. Major Warren, the governor of Saltillo, Capt.
Webster of the First Artillery, who had charge of the redoubt, and First
Lieut. Shover, of the Third Artillery, stationed not far away in the
old camp, were competent officers; and the first two made no allusion
in their reports to Taylor's visits, while the third only said that
the General ordered him to watch Miñón, and, if attacked, defend his
post to the last extremity--which were his obvious duties. There seems
to have been no particular reason to anticipate a night attack. Taylor
did not suggest this as a reason for going to the city. Especially is
it surprising that he left his work at Saltillo, whatever it was, so
incomplete on the morning of February 22 that he had to return in the
evening. Santa Anna, after the exhausting march just made, could not
be expected to strike decisively that day, whereas such an attack was
almost certain to be made the next morning, and it was Taylor's duty to
be on the ground at that time.

20.8. _Events of Feb. 22; the battlefield._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp.
97-9 (Taylor); 98 (S. Anna); 144 (Wool); 163 (Marshall); 169 (Fry);
171 (Roane); 174 (Weatherford); 175 (Bissell); 181 (Gen. Lane); 186
(Col. Lane); 189 (Gorman); 197 (May); 203 (Sherman); 205 (Warren);
206 (Webster); 207 (Shover). Carleton, B. Vista, 5-9, 27-49, 177-86.
González, Aguascalientes, 158. French, Two Wars, 77-8. _Journ. Milit.
Serv. Instit._, xiv, 443. =190=Ewing, diary. Raleigh _Star_, Aug.
18. =276=Neville diary. _Delta_, Mar. 14, 1848. =69=Wool to
Taylor, Jan. 20. =147=Chamberlain, diary. =148=_Id._, recolls.
=110=Barbour, diary. _Vedette_, iv, no. 8 (Lee). =8=Anon.
diary. =61=[Wool] to Jones, Jan. 17. =300=Prickett, letters.
Rápida Ojeada. _Diario_, Apr. 17. Matamoros _Amer. Flag_, Mar. 20.
_Republicano_, May 3. =80=Ampudia to gov. Méx. state, Oct. 10.
Balbontín, Invasión, 71-3. Apuntes, 98-100. Taylor and his Generals,
166. S. Anna, Apelación, 25-7. Eyewitness, Complete Hist., 55.
Scribner, Camp., 62, note. Smith, Chile con Carne, 214-5. Smith,
Remins., 37, 48. _Picayune_, Apr. 14 (Taylor); May 21; Sept. 7; Oct.
19; Dec. 3. _Delta_, July 11. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 413-4.
Benham, Recolls. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Apr. 7. _Spirit of the Times_,
May 1. Napoleon, Maxims, p. 26. Wallace, Wallace, 40. Davis, J. Davis,
i, 340. Profess. Memoirs corps of engineers, no. 31, p. 110. Stevens,
I. I. Stevens, i, 145. Carreño, Jefes, ccxxxii. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1168
(Taylor). Stevens, Camps., 18. Encarnacion Prisoners, 34, 38-9. N. Y.
_Eve. Post_, Jan. 4, 1849. _Littell_ no. 155. Romero, Geog. and Stat.
Notes. =76=Reports of S. Anna, Uraga, Memontesdeoca, Zamara, Mig.
Andrade, Guzman, Trejo, Juvera, Mora.

20.9. The data relating to the Mexican batteries, when collated,
cannot be fully harmonized. _E.g._ Carleton puts the 24-pounders on
the American left near the mountain, but from Mexican sources it seems
clear that they remained near the road, and Wallace (Wallace, 50) says
the same. Washington states that he was most of the time under the fire
of heavy guns. Of course the Mexican left had to be protected, and it
would have been very hard to move these clumsy iron pieces on the rough
ground. Gen. Pérez stated after the battle that from lack of forage the
draught animals had been too weak to draw the artillery up the hills.

20.10. Bowles was personally brave, but had been away much of the
time and did not understand his work (=65=orders 281). His men
keenly realized this (Perry, Indiana, 292), and hence went into the
battle shaky. Lane knew how they felt (Scribner, Camp., 62); and
apparently he should not have placed them far in advance and alone to
meet overwhelming numbers. It should be added, however, that (1) he
intended to give his personal attention to the regiment (Scribner,
Camp., 62), and (2) the Mississippi Rifles (to whom a position had
been assigned the previous evening) were expected to join the Second
Indiana at an early hour (Barbour, diary). Had they not been absent
with Taylor, one may fairly say, Bowles would not have given his fatal
order, and the American flank would in all probability not have been
turned; or, had the order been given, the Second Indiana would almost
certainly have rallied upon the Mississippians, and the virtual loss
of Marshall's troops would have been avoided. The gap created by the
absence of the Mississippi regiment should have been filled by recalling
McKee and Bragg from the west side as soon as the formation of Santa
Anna's columns indicated where he intended to strike and by ordering the
reserved artillery to the plateau. The cause of Bowles's order is not
certain; but O'Brien's horses, when attached to the guns for the purpose
of advancing, faced of course to the rear, and it seems probable that
Bowles misunderstood this as a sign of withdrawal. The worst feature of
his order was that he specified no place to stop.

Lieut. Col. Haddon of the Second Indiana stated in 1848 that the
regiment was rallied on the south edge of a ravine, but was ordered by
Taylor himself, who had then arrived, to cross to the other side of
it, and, as a body of Mexicans charged it just then, it broke and ran
(Perry, Indiana, 292). Certainly Taylor exhibited a peculiar resentment
toward the regiment, opposed having the affair investigated (_ibid._,
163, 313) and endeavored to hush it up (_ibid._, 276). Other officers
were doubtless as censurable as Bowles, but he was the most conspicuous
delinquent and became the scapegoat.

20.11. The failure of this attack on Buena Vista was said by a Mexican
officer to have been due to Gen. Andrade, who failed to coöperate,
and prevented a large force of infantry from doing so
(_Republicano_, May 3, 1847). Yell was a gallant but negligent officer.
He did not know how to manoeuvre his men, and only a portion of them
fought here (_Niles_, May 8, 1847, p. 157; _Spirit of the Times_, May
1). He was far in advance of them when he fell (Carleton, B. Vista, 93).
American guns came up and also some dragoons, and helped complete the
repulse of the enemy. The skirmish lasted only a few minutes.

What the Arkansas men lacked was not courage, but the discipline (and
the resulting skill and confidence) against which they had protested
while on the Chihuahua expedition (p. 274). Benham states that Marshall
would not go back to the field though urged by Taylor personally to
do so (Recolls.). All this resulted from a mistake of Wool's. He
understood that the bench was an extremely valuable position, and should
therefore have occupied it in advance, and thrown up a breastwork
there, dismounting the volunteer cavalry, and placing them behind this
and other works (Chamberlain). One part of the lancers ("cuirassiers")
retreated; the other part crossed to the opposite side of the valley,
and returned behind the hills (see note 3) to Santa Anna's position.
On reappearing they were taken for Americans and caused great alarm
(Balbontín, Invasión, 87). This suggests what the effect might have been
had either Santa Anna or Taylor used this route for a feint or attack.

20.12. A bitterly contested question was whether Wool advised retreat
during the battle. The truth appears to be that, as Benham fully
explains, he advised preparing to retire, that Taylor gave an order
accordingly to Washington, and that a zealous subaltern began to move;
but that Taylor, almost instantly reflecting on the moral effect that a
sign of retreat would have on the volunteers, countermanded the order.
Wool would not have advised retreating from what he considered the best
position, except in the case of absolute necessity.

20.13. Bragg now had three guns, for the one that had been under
Lieut. Kilburn had rejoined him. It is worth mention that Bragg gives
his ammunition expenditure, Feb. 23, as about 250 rounds per gun (Sen.
1; 30, 1, p. 202), an unparalleled record for muzzle-loading cannon.

20.14. The Americans looked upon this as a ruse of Santa Anna,
designed to save the men in the recess of the mountain; but the Mexicans
give the view of the text (_e.g._ Apuntes, 102), and a field officer
(probably Col. Bissell), who went with Hardin and McKee to meet the
Mexican officers, stated that they had no white flag (Littell, no. 155,
p. 234). The fact that so much consideration was paid to their absurd
question suggests that Taylor was not averse to a parley. Many of the
Mexicans in the recess endeavored to escape by scaling the mountain
(Carleton, B. Vista, 105).

20.15. As the Mexican artillery could not cross the long ravine, the
Mexicans in the north field were almost predestined to fail, but had
Santa Anna attacked the centre vigorously at this time with all his
remaining forces, the American artillery would have had to stay on
the plateau, and hence in that respect the two sides would have been
equal in the north field. Santa Anna's critics charged that he simply
threw his troops into the battle, and left them without guidance or
support. Not knowing how much he was hampered by misconduct on the part
of subordinates one must be cautious, but the criticism seems mainly
just. He should have concentrated on the American left and centre,
sending merely a small force to amuse Washington, and making feints on
the west side of the road and from behind the western hills. Again,
as we see from the Mexican reports, he gave too much attention to the
details of the operations, and he was unable to adapt his plans to the
quick manoeuvring of the American artillery. He attributed his defeat
to Miñón's failing to attack Taylor's rear (Negrete, Invasión, ii,
378); but Miñón had not force enough to do this effectively, and such
a duty had not been assigned to him (Balbontín, Invasión, 71). Giménez
(Memorias) charged it to the want of subordination, precision and morale
on the part of the officers and the effect of their criticisms of Santa
Anna upon the soldiers.

20.16. Benham (Recollections, 24) states that (as he learned from
Mansfield) Chilton, Taylor's aide, told Mansfield that he carried
this order, and was cautioned by Mansfield not to mention the fact.
Wallace (Wallace, 47) says Chilton carried the order, and gives his
language. Wool states that this final affair occurred under Taylor's
eye and direction (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 149). W. A. Richardson, a captain
in one of these regiments, and also Col. Bissell stated that the order
emanated from Taylor (Charleston _Courier_, Jan. 20, 1854). Weatherford,
who succeeded Hardin, gives the language of the order in his report.
Lombardini, general-in-chief of the Mexican infantry, had been wounded,
and hence Pérez, second in that command, took his place. It has been
said that Santa Anna should have led the charge, but he stated that his
old wound had reopened (=76=Feb. 23).

20.17. The redoubt at Saltillo commanded most of the approaches. It
was held by Capt. Webster with two 24-pound howitzers, a company of the
First Artillery, and an Illinois company. At the train and headquarters
camp on the right of the redoubt Lieut. Shover had one of Bragg's
6-pounders and two Mississippi companies. The three remaining Illinois
companies (two having been detached from each of the regiments) remained
in the city. Miñón found that on account of the broken ground he could
do nothing (Miñón in _Delta_, June 16, 1847), and soon retired. Shover
pursued him for some distance with his gun, the Mississippians and a
yelling crowd of stragglers and teamsters, followed by Lieut. Donaldson
of Webster's company with one of the howitzers. It was believed that
Miñón lost fifty or sixty men. Many Mexican irregulars gathered near
Saltillo but they accomplished nothing.

20.18. Once, it was said, Col. McKee sent his adjutant to inform
the General that he was surrounded, and to ask what should be done.
With convincing energy Taylor replied, "Go and tell your Colonel that
he has got them just where he wants them, and now is the time to give
them Jesse"; upon which the adjutant, whose face had been a picture
of despair, clapped spurs to his horse, rushed back and delivered the
message at the top of his voice with a spirit that every soldier caught
instantly. Whether the story is literally true or not, it doubtless
represents the most important part played by Taylor, and this was
invaluable. If Taylor made the remark, however, he doubtless used a
stronger Biblical word than "Jesse." According to Gen. Chamberlain,
instead of saying, "Give them a little more grape, Mr. Bragg," he
exclaimed, "Double-shot your guns and give 'em hell!" Rev. Theodore
Parker said (Sermon) that the following anecdote appeared to be "very
well authenticated." Seeing McKee's regiment stagger, Taylor cried as
if the men could hear him, "By God, this will not do; this is not the
way for Kentuckians to behave." Then they rallied, and rising in his
stirrups he shouted, "Hurrah for Old Kentuck! That's the way to do it.
Give 'em hell, damn 'em!" There is ample reason to believe that such
Taylor could be on the battlefield.

20.19. _The battle of Feb. 23_. The reports of Taylor and his officers
in Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 97-209. =267=Reports of Miss. captains.
Perry, Indiana, contains numerous letters. Carleton, Buena Vista,
_passim_. Calderón, Rectif. Ceballos, Capítulos, 122-3. González,
Aguascalientes, 159-60. Puga y Acal, Doc., 59. Rápida Ojeada, Segunda
Parte, 9. Zarco, Historia, i, 259. French, Two Wars, 78-83. _Journ.
Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv, 443-4; xvii (Van Deusen). Neville, diary.
Sierra, Evolution, i, 219. _Delta_, Mar. 14. Claiborne, Quitman, i,
291. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 182. =69=Wool to Taylor, Mar. 30.
=147=Chamberlain, diary. =148=_Id._, recolls. =69=Bragg
to [Bliss], Mar. 5. =190=Ewing, diary. Davis, Recolls., 212-3. Dix,
Speeches, i, 210. =330=Taylor to brother, Mar. 27; Apr. 25; Sept.
--. Raleigh _Star_, Apr. 28; July 21; Aug. 18. Charleston _Mercury_,
Apr. 8. Rowland, Register, 407, 410-12. Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans.,
1904, pp. 49-50, 53-6; 1905, p. 209. =61=Gorman, report, Mar.
2. =61=O'Brien court of inquiry. =61=Gen. Lane, statement,
May 19, 1849. =65=Gen. Lane court of inquiry. =65=Bowles
court of inquiry. Eyewitness, Complete Hist., 63. =110=Barbour,
diary. Greensborough (N. C.) _Morn. Post_, Apr. 5, 1903 (O. R. Smith).
=8=Anon. diary. =61=[Wool] to Jones, Jan. 17. Madison
_Record_, 1850 (Prickett). =300=Prickett, letters. Sen. 32; 31,
1 (Hughes). Zirckel, Tagebuch, 9. Appleton's Biog. Dict. (_Taylor_ by
J. Davis). Johnson, Thomas, 24. McCormack, Koerner, i, 499, 504-5.
Parker, Sermon. =256=Gen. Lane to Wool, May 20. =256=Wool to
Marcy, June 12. =277=Taylor to Coombs, May 23. Wallace, Wallace,
44-51. Nebel and Kendall, The War Illustrated, 11-16. Semmes, Service,
120-2. Rápida Ojeada, i. =5=Anaya, memoria, [Nov., 1847]. S.
Anna, Mi Historia, 60-5. _Id._, Apelación, 28. Gamboa, Impug., 24-5.
=185=Bragg to Duncan, Apr. 4, 1847; Jan. 13, 1848. Kenly, Md. Vol.,
264. Tampico _Sentinel_, Mar. 27. _Diario_, Apr. 16. _Republicano_,
Mar. 24; Apr. 17; May 3; June 20. =80=Ampudia to gov. Méx., Oct.
10. =208=Herran to Acal, Mar. 6. Noticia hist. de todos los
Cuerpos. =212=Hastings, diary. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 33-5.
Balbontín, Invasión, 80-8. Apuntes, 100-4. Taylor and his Generals, 166.
Scribner, Campaign, 21, 59-71. Ordóñez, Refutación, i, ii. Hitchcock,
Fifty Years, 349. Grant, Memoirs, i, 138. Muro, Miscelánea, 75. Smith,
Chile con Carne, 215-49. Smith, Reminiscences, 6, 50, 112. N. Orl.
_Picayune_, Mar. 27; Apr. 14, 22; May 21; June 24. _Delta_, Apr. 4;
May 30; June 6, 16; July 11. _Tropic_, Mar. 31. Upton, Milit. Policy,
209-10. _Boletín de la Democracia_, no. 11. Buhoup, Narrative, 120,
123. =210=Bragg to Hammond, May 4; Dec. 20. =349=Pattridge
to Miss W., Aug. 25. Piatt, Thomas, 69. Quisenberry, Taylor, 34-5.
_Revue des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, pp. 413-7. Benham, Recolls. Wash.
_Union_, Apr. 6, 7; June 16; Aug. 25. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Apr. 7,
23; May 7, 21, 1847; Mar. 23, 1848. N. Y. _Journ. of Commerce_, Apr.
16. _Monitor Repub._, May 6, 16; Nov. 30. _Spirit of the Times_ (H.
von S.), May 1. _Journ. of U. S. Artillery_, July, 1892, p. 296;
Oct., 1892, pp. 415-8. Halleck, Milit. Art, i, p. 415. Dodd, Davis,
87. Charleston _Courier_, Apr. 20, 1847; Jan. 20, 1854. N. Y. _Eve.
Post_, Jan. 4, 1849. Ceremonies. =367=Moore to Moore, Apr. 15.
Davis, J. Davis, i, 341-50. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 145. Carreño,
Jefes, ccxxxiv-v. _Niles_, Apr. 3, p. 80; Apr. 10, pp. 83-4; Apr. 24,
p. 117; May 8, p. 156. =92=Accusación del Gral. S. Anna. Ho. 60;
30, 1, pp. 1115, 1169, 1181. Dix, Dix, i, 210-3. Madigan, cat. no. 2,
1914 (Bragg). =210=Alvord to Hammond, Feb. 24, 1848. Griepenkerl,
Applied Tactics, 187. Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans. ix, 50. _South.
Qtrly. Rev._, Jan., 1851, 169-89. _Littell_, no. 155, pp. 233-5.
=251=Lowry, narrative. Albert Pike, poem. =76=S. Anna, Feb.
23. =76=_Id._ to Adame, Feb. 26. =76=Mora, Mar. 31, res.

A German ex-officer under Taylor said the battle was won, in spite of
an unexampled ignorance of all tactical rules on the part of field
officers, by the lion-like courage of the soldiers of certain regiments
assisted by other fortunate circumstances (Zirckel, Tagebuch, 9). W. H.
L. Wallace, adjutant of First Illinois, wrote: "I've no doubt--_inter
nos_--had it been just as convenient for us, as for Santa Anna, to
_vamos_ [_i.e._ retreat] we would have been off for Monterey"; but we
knew Miñón was in our rear, and believed that larger Mexican forces
had been sent toward Monterey, and that the mountains were full of
irregulars (Wallace, Wallace, 51; see also Balbontín, Invasión, 84).

20.20. Killed, 265; wounded, 408 (Ho. 24; 31, 1). Missing, 6. The
Mississippi regiment lost more heavily than any other--one out of 3.75
men (Carleton, B. Vista, 212).

20.21. Aside from pluck and patriotism Taylor had a good reason
for not giving up. Had he been defeated, he would probably have been
punished for disobeying orders in advancing so far (see Polk, Diary,
March 23, 1847). (Querying) =173=J. Davis, Address.

20.22. The greater part of the deserters appear to have gone to Agua
Nueva (Balbontín, Invasión, 83), where they hoped to find provisions
and water. Santa Anna should have had a guard on the road to check and
reorganize these men. His policy of holding out expectations of booty
reacted now, for many men left the ranks to rob the dead and wounded
(Uraga in _Monitor Repub._, Nov. 30, 1847).

20.23. Balbontín (Invasión, 89) said that the troops felt confident
of triumphing the next day, and therefore would not have deserted; but
while this may have been true of the artillery (always a superior body)
to which he belonged, it cannot have been true of the army in general.
Thousands had deserted already.

20.24. _The night of Feb. 23._ Semmes, Service, 122. Ceballos,
Capítulos, 122. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1115 (Taylor). =69=Wool to
Taylor, Mar. 30. Chamberlain, diary. _Id._, recolls. Barbour, diary.
Prickett, letters. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 99, 137 (Taylor); 144 (Wool).
_Delta_, June 16; July 11. Benham, Recolls. Rápida Ojeada, i, ii.
Ordóñez, Refutación, i, ii. =5=Anaya, Memoria. =185=Bragg
to Duncan, Apr. 4. _Republicano_, Mar. 24; May 3. Carleton, B. Vista,
125-31, 191. French, Two Wars, 81-2. _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv,
443-4. Ewing, diary. Dix, Speeches, i, 213. =330=Memo. in Taylor's
letters to his brother. =330=Taylor to brother, Mar. 27. Nebel and
Kendall, 13. =267=Bradford to J. Davis, Mar. 2. Perry, Indiana,
178, etc. Polk, Diary, Mar. 23. Sierra, Evolution, etc., i, 219.
_Independiente_, Apr. 10. Balbontín, Invasión, 83, 89, 90-1, 93, 100-1.
Apuntes, 104-7. =118=Berlandier, journal. S. Anna, Apelación, 29,
32, etc. Gamboa, Impug., 23-5. Scribner, Camp., 66. =52=Black,
Mar. 6. _Picayune_, Mar. 24 (_Sold. de la Patria_); Apr. 11. _Monitor
Repub._, May 6; Nov. 30. _Niles_, Apr. 10, p. 83. N. Y. _Eve. Post_,
Jan. 4, 1849. Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans., ix, 50. =316=Bragg to
Sherman, Mar. 1, 1848. =76=S. Anna, Feb. 23, 26, 27. =76=_Id._
to Adame, Feb. 26. =76=J. M. Aguirre, Jan. 27, 1848. Wallace,
Wallace, 40.

The Kentucky horse and the guns (First Artillery) should have been
ordered up from Rinconada Pass as soon as Taylor found there was to be
a battle (Ripley, War with Mex., i, 437-8). They could have guarded La
Angostura, and Washington's field pieces would have been invaluable on
the plateau.

20.25. The Mexicans were not driven away by hunger. Statements from
persons knowing the facts regarding the provisions available at Agua
Nueva differ so radically that we can reach no precise conclusion on
that point; but certainly there were enough to support the army more
than two days, and then enable it to move. Whatever provisions were
at that place could have been brought to the battlefield (Balbontín,
Invasión, 89). It seems as if there must also have been supplies at
Patos and La Vaquería; and Miñón asserted later that, as he sent word to
Santa Anna, he had plenty of provisions for the army (_Delta_, June 16).
The question of water is more difficult; but there were many wagons, and
enough could have been transported for say 6000 picked men. Apparently
some water must have been brought up on Feb. 22 and 23. In short, had
Santa Anna felt any assurance of being able to rout the Americans on
Feb. 24, he would have tried to do so, knowing that abundant supplies
lay at Saltillo. Possibly he might have remained in the vicinity and
prepared for another battle, even if he could not fight again the next
day; but probably he remembered Scott, and he had not counted upon
remaining long at the north.

20.26. Taylor doubtless expected to obtain the men captured at La
Encarnación, but they had gone south (see Encarnacion Prisoners). Santa
Anna had very few to give up, for almost all Americans who had been
or might have been captured were killed by his excited troops (Rápida
Ojeada; Balbontín, Invasión, 81; _Republicano_, March 24, 1847).

20.27. _The Mexican sequel._ Rápida Ojeada, i, ii. Gamboa, Impug.,
23-5, 27-9. Otero, Comunicación, 11. _Republicano_, Mar. 24; May 3.
_Epoca_, Mar. 2, 11. =208=Herran to Acal, Mar. 6, 13. Balbontín,
Invasión, 95-100. Apuntes, 108-15. S. Anna, Apelación, app., 39-55, 67.
Ordóñez, Refutación, i, ii. Muro, Miscelánea, 77-8. =52=Black, Mar.
6. _Picayune_, Mar. 24 (_Sold. de la Patria_). _Independiente_, Apr.
10. _Boletín de la Democracia_, no. 21. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 99 (Taylor).
_Diario_, Mar. 31 (S. Anna); June 13. _Monitor Repub._, Mar. 31; May
6; Nov. 30. Carreño, Jefes, ccxlii. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1115 (Taylor);
1125 (S. Anna). Dublán, Legislación, v, 267. =82=Gil to Ruano,
Mar. 6. =76=S. Anna, Feb. 26, 27. =76=_Id._ to Adame, Feb.
26. =76=Comte. gen. Puebla, Mar. 3. =76=Comte. gen. Tabasco,
proclam., Mar. 11. =76=Mora, Mar. 31, res. =76=Comte. gen. S.
L. Potosí, Mar. 6. =76=A. Bustamante, Mar. 9. =76=Comte. gen.
V. Cruz, Mar. 4. =76=Guerra, circular, Mar. 1.

20.28. The fortifications of Monterey had already been greatly
improved. Col. Morgan, Lieut. Col. Irwin and Major Wall of the Second
Ohio occupied respectively Cerralvo, Marín and Punta Aguda (Ho. 60; 30,
1, p. 1123). Morgan distinguished himself by a march executed in the
face of great odds, and Irwin went to his aid (_ibid._). Urrea attacked
at least one other train (Mar. 6), and did a large amount of damage. So
great became the alarm of the Americans that Col. Curtis, now in charge
at Camargo, sent an officer to Washington with a requisition for 50,000
volunteers (_Nat. Intelligencer_, Mar. 23).

20.29. _The American sequel._ =330=J. T. Taylor to Scott, Feb.
12. =330=Taylor to brother, Mar. 27. Perry, Indiana, 127-8, 137,
149. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 95. Polk, Diary, Jan. 5; Mar. 21-3; Apr.
1, 7. =69=Mesa to Trist, Mar. 3. =169=Taylor to Crittenden,
Mar. 25; May 15. =251=Lowry, narrative. _Amer. Pioneer_, Mar.
8. =272=Memoir of Morgan. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 327-9. Rápida
Ojeada, 9. =139=Campbell to D. C., Mar. 20. Meade, Letters, i, 143,
182. =69=Wool to Taylor, Mar. 7. =60=Marcy to Brooke, Mar.
22. _Picayune_, Feb. 18; Mar. 13, 28; Apr. 8. Kenly, Md. Vol., 263-4.
Tampico _Sentinel_, Mar. 27. Carleton, B. Vista, 153-4. =60=Marcy,
Mar. 22, to Pierce; to Brooke; to Scott; to govs. Grant, Mems., i,
123. Smith, Chile con Carne, 151-71. _Delta_, Jan. 19. Matamoros
_Amer. Flag_, Feb. 13, 17. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1118-9, 1123-5, 1131
(Taylor). Wash. _Union_, Mar. 23. N. Y. _Journ. of Commerce_, Jan. 8.
_Nat. Intelligencer_, Mar. 23. _Niles_, Mar. 27, p. 59; May 1, p. 131;
May 8, pp. 151-2. =185=Thomas to Duncan, Mar. 18. Sen. 32; 31, 1
(Hughes). Parrodi, Memoria. Benham, Recolls. =76=S. Anna, Feb. 27.
=76=Carbajal to Urrea, Mar. 8. =76=Mora to S. Anna, Mar. 17.
Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 49, 99, 210-5. =245=Curtis to Lamar, Mar. 1.
=108=Buchanan to Bancroft, June 14.




                         APPENDIX--THE SOURCES


                   A. MANUSCRIPT AND PERSONAL SOURCES

As a number of the owners or holders of MSS. (whose names are preceded
below by colons) did not desire to receive applications for the use of
their papers, it has been thought best to omit all addresses.

Some documents belonging to large collections are, for convenience of
citation, listed separately. A few verbal statements (so described) are
included. The numbers preceding collections, etc., correspond to numbers
preceding citations of MS. documents in the notes.

The complete Appendix follows the Notes of volume ii.

     Allen, William. =1=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Allred, R. N. =2=Recollections: R. R. Allred, Esq.

     Alvarado, J. B. =3=Hist. de California: Bancroft Coll.,
          Univ. of California.

     Amador, J. M. =4=Memorias sobre la Hist. de California:
          Bancroft Coll.

     Anaya, P. M. =5=Memoria: Señ. Lic. D. Genaro García.

     Anderson, Robert. =6=Papers: Mrs. James M. Lawton.

     Anderson, W. E. =7=Document.

     Anonymous. =8=Soldier's Diary sent anonymously to the
          author.

     Antrim, Jay. =9=Sketches: Library of Congress.

     Aram, Joseph. =10=Narrative: Mrs. Grace Aram.

     Archives of France. =11=Dépt. des Affaires Etrangères,
          Paris.

     Archives of Great Britain. =12=Admiralty Papers;
          =13=Foreign Office Papers: Public Record Office, London.

     Archives of States. =14=Alabama, =15=Arkansas,
          =16=Connecticut, =17=Delaware, =18=Georgia,
          =19=Florida, =20=Illinois, =21=Indiana,
          =22=Iowa, =23=Kentucky, =24=Louisiana,
          =25=Maine, =26=Maryland, =27=Massachusetts,
          =28=Michigan, =29=Mississippi, =30=Missouri,
          =31=New Hampshire, =32=New Jersey, =33=New York,
          =34=North Carolina, =35=Ohio, =36=Pennsylvania,
          =37=Rhode Island, =38=South Carolina, =39=Tennessee,
          =40=Texas, =41=Vermont, =42=Virginia,
          =43=Wisconsin.

     Archives of the =44=U. S. Embassy at Mexico.

     Archives of the =45=U. S. Legation in Texas: State Dept.,
          Washington.

     Archives of U. S. Navy Dept. =46=Captain's Letters;
          =47=Squadron Letters; =48=Confidential Letter Books;
          =49=Orders; =50=Executive Letters; =51=Marine Corps.

     Archives of U. S. State Dept. =52=Correspondence (and
          enclosures) with diplomatic and consular agents in Mexico, Great
          Britain, France, Spain, Prussia and Texas; =53=Notes to and
          from the legations of those countries; =54=Report Books;
          =55=Confidential Report Books; =56=Special Missions
          and Correspondence with confidential agents in Mexico, Texas and
          California; =57=Domestic Letter Books; =58=Miscellaneous
          Letters and Replies; =59=Circulars issued to diplomatic and
          consular agents. See also Claims Commission.

     Archives of U. S. War Dept. =60=Secretary of War's
          files; =61=Adjutant General's files; =62=Quartermaster
          General's files; =63=Military Book; =64=Adjutant
          General, Miscellany; =65=Orders; =66=Engineer's
          office; =67=Bureau of Topog. Engineers; =68=Judge
          Advocate General's office, courts martial, courts of inquiry;
          =69=Discontinued Commands, etc.

     Archivo =69a=del Distrito Federal, Mexico.

     Archivo =70=General y Público (particularly "Guerra"),
     Mexico.

     Archivo =71=Histórico-Nacional, Madrid.

     Archivo =72=Nacional de Cuba.

     Archivo =73=Particular del Ministerio de Estado, Madrid.

     Archivos (_National_) de =74=Fomento (Maps);
          =75=Gobernación (formerly called "Relaciones Interiores");
          =75a=Hacienda; =76=Guerra y Marina; =77=Relaciones
          (_i.e._, Exteriores). At Mexico City.

     Archivos (_State_) de =78=Coahuila, =79=Jalisco,
          =80=México, =81=Nuevo León, =82=Puebla,
          =83=Querétaro, =84=San Luis Potosí, =85=Tamaulipas,
          =86=Vera Cruz, =87=Zacatecas. At the state capitals.

     Archivos (_Municipal_) de =88=Córdoba,
          =89=Guadalajara, =90=Jalapa, =91=Matamoros,
          =92=México, =93=Monterey, =94=Orizaba,
          =95=Puebla, =96=Querétaro, =97=Saltillo,
          =98=San Luis Potosí, =99=Tampico, =100=Vera Cruz,
          =101=Victoria, =102=Zacatecas.

     Avila, Juan. =103=Notas Californianas: Bancroft Coll.

     Ayer =104=Collection: Newberry Library, Chicago.

     Baldridge, William. =105=The Days of 1846: Bancroft Coll.

     Bancroft =106=Collection: Univ. of California.

     Bancroft =107=Papers: New York City Public Library.

     Bancroft, George. =108=Papers: Massachusetts Hist. Soc.

     Bandini, Juan. =109=Documentos para la Hist. de
          California: Bancroft Coll.

     Barbour, H. H. =110=Diary: Mrs. Barbour.

     Beauregard, P. G. T. =111=Papers: C. S. Hook, Esq.

     Beauregard, P. G. T. =112=Papers: Justin H. Smith.

     Beauregard, P. G. T. =113=Reminiscences (done by him from
          diary and notes): Claiborne papers, Mississippi Dept. of Hist.

     Beeler, Louis F. =114=Recollections.

     Belden, Josiah. =115=Statement: Bancroft Coll.

     Bell, A. N. =116=Document.

     Benjamin, W. R. =117=Collection.

     Berlandier, Luis. =118=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Bevan, William. =119=Statement.

     Biddle, James. =120=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Biddle, Charles J. =121=Papers: Charles Biddle, Esq.

     Bidwell, John. =122=California, 1841-8: Bancroft Coll.

     Bidwell, John. =123=Statement: Harvard Univ. Library.

     Blocklenger, Benjamin. =124=Letter.

     Bonham, Milledge L. =125=Letters: Dr. Milledge Lake
          Bonham, Ill.

     Botello, Narciso. =126=Anales del Sur de la California:
          Bancroft Coll.

     Boyle, John. =127=Letter: Miss Esmeralda Boyle.

     Brackett, A. G. =128=Diary: Mrs. Brackett.

     Breckenridge, Robert J. =129=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Brichta, A. C. =130=Letter: belonging to the family.

     Brindle, William. =131=Statement: J. D. Parrish, Esq.

     Buchanan, James. =132=Papers: Pennsylvania Hist. Soc.

     Buck, Dr. Solon J. =133=Collection.

     Burton, C. M. =134=Collection, Public Library, Detroit.

     Butler, Anthony. =135=Papers: Univ. of Texas.

     Butterfield, James. =136=Recollections.

     Calhoun, John C. =137=Papers: Clemson Coll.

     Calhoun, John C. =137a=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Campbell, William B. =138=Letters: John DeWitt, Esq.

     Campbell, William B. (and David). =139=Papers: Lemuel R.
          Campbell, Esq.; Mrs. James S. Pilcher.

     Cantwell, John L. P. =140=Letter: Miss Jessica R. Smith.

     Carson, J. C. =141=Statement: Bancroft Coll.

     Carson, J. H. =142=Gold Mines of 1848: Bancroft Coll.

     Cary, T. G. =143=California Papers: Boston Public Library.

     Cassidy, P. A. =144=Recollections.

     Castro, Manuel. =145=Documentos para la Hist. de
          California: Bancroft Coll.

     Caswell, William R. =146=Diary and Letters: Massachusetts
          Hist. Soc.

     Chamberlain, S. E. =147=Diary: loaned by the writer.

     Chamberlain, S. E. =148=Recollections (verbal).

     Chase, Salmon P. =149=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Cheatham, B. F. =150=Diary and Papers: Mrs. Telfair
          Hodgson.

     Claiborne, J. F. H. =151=Papers: State of Mississippi,
          Dept. of Hist.

     Claiborne, Thomas. =152=Memoirs: belonging to the family.

     Claims Commission of 1849. =153=Book of Awards;
          =154=Book of Opinions; =155=Journal: U. S. State
          Dept.

     Clay, Henry. =156=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Cobb, Howell. =157=Papers (printed later by the Amer.
          Hist. Assoc.): Dr. U. B. Phillips.

     Cobb, Howell. =158=Papers: Dr. R. P. Brooks.

     Collins, Francis. =159=Papers (published later in the
          Qtrly. Publication of the Hist. and Philos. Soc. of Ohio,
          1915, Nos. 2-3).

     _Columbus_. =160=Record of Punishments, 1846-7: U. S.
          Naval Academy Library.

     _Congress_. =161=Journal of a Cruise, 1846: U. S. Naval
          Academy Library.

     Conner, David. =162=Papers: Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt.

     Conner, David. =163=Papers: P. F. Madigan, Esq.

     Conner, David. =164=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Conner, David. =165=Papers: Navy Dept. Library.

     Conner, David. =166=Papers: New York City Library.

     Coutts. =167=Diary of a March to California: Bancroft
          Coll.

     Crallé, R. K. =168=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Crittenden, J. J. =169=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Crooker Family (of South Carolina). =170=Papers: Dr. E.
          M. Shealy.

     _Cyane._ =171=Journal of a Cruise; Abstract of Journal:
          U. S. Naval Academy Library.

     _Cyane._ =172=Log Book: Library, U. S. Navy Dept.

     Davis, Jefferson. =173=Address: Library of Congress
          (reading-room desk).

     Davis, Jefferson. =174=Papers: Confederate Memorial, New
          Orleans.

     Davis, Jefferson. =175=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Davis, Jefferson. =176=Papers: State of Mississippi,
          Dept. of Hist.

     Davis, John W. =177=Statement of the Battle of San
          Pascual: Bancroft Coll.

     Davis, T. F. =178=Diary: belonging to the family.

     Diario =179=Esactísimo de lo ocurrido en México, etc.:
          Bancroft Coll.

     Dreer =180=Collection: Pennsylvania Hist. Soc.

     Donelson, A. J. =181=Papers: Mrs. Wm. A. Donelson (now in
          the Library of Congress).

     Dormitzer, Walter. =182=Collection.

     Drum, R. C. =183=Recollections (verbal).

     Duke, Moses S. =184=Letters: Miss Winnie V. Lynch.

     Duncan, James. =185=Papers: U. S. Military Academy.

     Duncan, W. L. =186=Notes on Bishop's Journal: McLean
          County (Ill.) Hist. Soc.

     Eddy =187=Manuscripts: Charles Carroll, Esq.

     Edwards, Marcellus B. =188=Diary: Missouri Hist. Soc.

     Evans, Mrs. Lucy. =189=Letter: belonging to the family.

     Ewing, J. C. =190=Diary: belonging to the family.

     Fairfield, John. =191=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Ford. =192=Collection: New York City Public Library.

     Foster, R. C. =193=Letters: Mrs. Edward W. Foster.

     Fourth (Mexican) Infantry. =194=Book of Accounts: New
          York Hist. Soc.

     Fowler, W. P. =195=Collection.

     Frémont, John C. =196=Statement: Library of Harvard Univ.

     Gaines, E. P. =197=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Gallatin, Albert. =198=Papers: New York Hist. Soc.

     García, Señ. Lic. D. Genaro. =199=Collection.

     Gibbes, W. H. =200=Collection.

     Gibson, George R. =201=Diary: Missouri Hist. Soc.

     Giménez, M. M. =202=Papers: Señ. Lic. D. Genaro García.

     Gleason, James. =203=Letter.

     Gouverneur, S. L. =204=Diary: Mrs. Rose Gouverneur Hoes.

     Graham, L. P. =205=Memorandum Book: E. W. McGlenen, Esq.

     Graham, W. A. =206=Papers: A. W. Graham, Esq.

     Griffin, John S. =207=Journal of 1846: Bancroft Coll.

     Guadalajara (Public Library) =208=Collection.

     Guitar, Aldon. =209=Letter.

     Hammond, J. H. =210=Diary and Papers: Library of Congress.

     Hardie, James A. =211=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Hastings, D. H. =212=Diary: loaned by the writer.

     Hatch, John P. =213=Letters: Library of Congress.

     Hays, John C., and Caperton, John. =214=Life and
          Adventures of John C. Hays: Bancroft Coll.

     Heald, Nathan. =215=Papers: Univ. of Wisconsin Library.

     Heiman, A. =216=Services of the First Regt. of Tennessee:
          Tennessee Hist. Soc.

     Henshaw, J. C. =217=Papers: Massachusetts Hist. Soc.

     Henshaw, J. C. =218=Narrative, prepared by Mrs. Henshaw
          from his papers: Massachusetts Hist. Soc.

     Heráldica =219=del Ejército Mex., etc.: Biblioteca
          Nacional.

     Higgins, H. H. =220=Plans and letters: Mrs. T. M. Coxe.

     Hill, D. H. =221=Diary: Pres. D. H. Hill.

     Hiney, E. F. =222=Diary.

     Hirschorn, Jacob. =223=Recollections: Justin H. Smith.

     Hitchcock, E. A. =224=Diary and Papers: Mrs. E. A.
          Hitchcock (now in the Library of Congress).

     Holt, Joseph. =225=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Hook, C. S. =226=Collection.

     Hoyle, E. D. =227=Recollections.

     Illinois University. =228=Collection.

     Indiana State Library. =229=Collection.

     Itúrbide, Agustín de. =230=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Jackson, Andrew. =231=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Jameson, J. Franklin. =232=Collection.

     Janssens, Agustín. =233=Documentos para la Hist. de
          California: Bancroft Coll.

     Johnson, Andrew. =234=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Jones, Roger. =235=Papers: W. R. Benjamin, Esq.

     Judah, H. M. =236=Diary: Library of Congress.

     Kearny, S. W. =237=Letter Book: Missouri Hist. Soc.

     Keating, E. H. =238=Map of Monterey, Mex.: Monterey City
          Govt.

     Kemper, Jackson. =239=Papers: Univ. of Wisconsin Library.

     Kennerly, W. C. =240=Narrative.

     Kent, James. =241=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Kingsbury, D. M. =242=Letters to his Mother.

     Kribben, Christian. =243=Home Letters: B. D. Kribben, Esq.

     Lakin, George W. =244=Papers: Univ. of Wisconsin Library.

     Lamar, M. B. =245=Papers: Texas State Library.

     Lane, Joseph. =246=Autobiography: Bancroft Coll.

     Larkin, T. O. =247=Papers: Bancroft Coll.

     Lasselle, Stanislaus. =248=Papers: Indiana State Library.

     Leese, Jacob P. =249=Bear Flag Papers: Bancroft Coll.

     Lieber, Francis. =250=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Lowry, Robert. =251=Narrative.

     Mackall, W. W. =252=Letters: belonging to the family.

     McLean, John. =253=Papers: Library of Congress.

     McClellan, Geo. B. =254=Diary and Papers: Library of
          Congress.

     Mangum, W. P. =255=Papers: A. W. Graham, Esq.

     Marcy, W. L. =256=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Markoe and Maxcy. =257=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Marshall, Henry. =258=Recollections: Bancroft Coll.

     Maryland Hist. Soc. =259=Collection.

     Massachusetts Hist. Soc. =260=Collection.

     Mémoires. =261=I, Apparently prepared by the French agent
          in Mexico; =261a=II, Sur les Revolutions du Mexique:
          Dépt. des Affaires Etrangères, Paris.

     Memorias. =262=Reports issued under this title by
          Depts. of the Mexican government (see also "Memorias" under
          the head of Books and Pamphlets. A number of the Memorias were
          not published--unless in newspapers--but exist in MS. in the
          library of the Sría. de Relaciones).

     Mervine, William. =263=Letter Books and Papers: Navy
     Dept. Library.

     Mexican Hist. =264=Documents: Museo Nacional, Mexico.

     Miller, N. C. =265=Letter.

     Miller, W. D. =266=Papers: belonging to the family.

     Mississippi Dept. of Hist. =267=Collections (Dr. Dunbar
          Rowland, Director).

     Missouri Hist. Soc. =268=Collection.

     Molina, Señ. D. Ignacio. =269=Recollections (verbal).

     Moore, H. Judge. =270=Diary.

     Morales, J. B. =271=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Morgan, George. =272=Memoir of: Col. J. M. Morgan.

     Mullan, James. =273=Diary: belonging to the family.

     Neeld, Peter C. =274=Letter.

     Nelson, T. B., Jr. =275=Letter: Mrs. Annie J. Holland.

     Neville, Harvey. =276=Diary: Chicago Hist. Soc.

     New York Hist. Soc. =277=Collection.

     Niehenke, R. =278=Statement.

     Notes. =279=Sur les Possessions Espagnoles en Amérique:
          Dépt. des Affaires Etrangères, Paris.

     Nunelee, S. F. =280=Diary: James Howell Nunelee, Esq.

     O'Keefe, Michael. =281=Statement: Justin H. Smith.

     Olivera, Agustín. =282=Documentos para la Hist. de
          California: Bancroft Coll.

     Orders (General and Special). =283=Army of the North
          under Mejía, Ampudia and Arista: New York Hist. Soc.

     Otero, M. =284=Comunicación que sobre las Negoc. Diplom.,
          etc.: Yale Univ. Library.

     Paredes y Arrillaga, Mariano. =285=Papers: Señ. Lic. D.
          Genaro García.

     Parker, James. =286=Statement.

     Parrish, P. C. =287=Diary.

     Pennsylvania Hist. Soc. =288=Collection.

     Pérez de Acal. =289=Papers: Guadalajara Public Library.

     Pico, Pio (_Familia Pico_). =290=Documentos para la Hist.
          de California: Bancroft Coll.

     Pierce, Franklin. =291=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Pillow, Gideon J. =292=Letters: W. R. Benjamin Collection.

     Pillow, Gideon J. =293=Letters: Library of Congress.

     Pillow, Gideon J. =294=Letters: Pennsylvania Hist. Soc.

     Pinto, Rafael. =295=Apuntaciones para la Hist. de
          California: Bancroft Coll.

     Poinsett, Joel R. =296=Papers: Pennsylvania Hist. Soc.

     Polk, James K. =297=Papers: Library of Congress
          (including the Polk papers examined by the author at the
          Chicago Hist. Soc.).

     Porter, Andrew. =298=Papers: Major John Biddle Porter.

     Posey, Carnot. =299=Letters: Dr. Walter L. Fleming.

     Pricket, John A. =300=Letters.

     Primer Battn. Activo de Oaxaca. =301=Libro de Servicios:
          Rhode Island Hist. Soc.

     Puryear, J. F. =302=Document.

     Quitman, John A. =303=Papers: in possession of the family.

     Quitman, John A. =304=Papers in the Claiborne Papers.

     Richardson, C. T. =305=Recollections: Justin H. Smith.

     Riser, J. J. =306=Recollections (Mormon Battalion).

     Roberts, B. S. =307=Diary and letters: Brigadier General
          B. K. Roberts.

     Roberts, Charles. =308=Autograph Collection: Haverford
          Coll.

     Roessler, Edward. =309=Diary: belonging to the family.

     Roque, J. K. =310=Document.

     Santa Anna, A. L. de. =311=Papers: Señ. Lic. D. Genaro
          García.

     Santa Anna, A. L. de. =312=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Saunders, J. L. =313=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Sawyer, Charles H. =314=Documents for the Hist. of the
          Conquest of California: Bancroft Coll.

     Schouler, William. =315=Papers: Massachusetts Hist. Soc.

     Sherman, W. T. =316=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Sibley, H. H. =317=Papers: Minnesota Hist. Soc.

     Smith, C. B. =318=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Smith, George. =319=Diary: belonging to the family.

     Smith, Persifor F. =320=Papers: State Normal School, West
          Chester, Pa.

     Smith, T. F. =321=Diary: belonging to the writer.

     Smith, W. B. =322=Diary: belonging to the family.

     Stevenson, J. D. =323=Letter Book; =324=General
          Order Book; =325=Regimental Order Book: New York Hist.
          Soc.

     Sumner, Charles. =326=Papers: Harvard Univ. Library.

     Sutherland, D. H. =327=Letters: belonging to the family.

     Sweet, G. N. =328=Statement.

     Taliaferro, William B. =329=Papers: Miss L. S. Taliaferro.

     Taylor, Zachary. =330=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Taylor, Zachary. =331=Papers: Henkels catalogue.

     Tennery, Thomas D. =332=Diary: Rev. John S. Cook, D.D.

     Tlacotálpam, Mex. =333=Judicial Archives.

     Torres, Manuel. =334=Peripecias de la Vida California:
          Bancroft Coll.

     Trist, Nicholas P. =335=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Turner, C. B. =336=Letter: belonging to the family.

     Turner, H. S. =337=Diary: Missouri Hist. Soc.

     U. S. House of Representatives. =338=Files: Capitol,
          Washington.

     U. S. House of Representatives. =339=Papers: Library of
          Congress.

     U. S. Military Academy (West Point). =340=Collection.

     U. S. Senate. =341=Files: Capitol, Washington.

     University of Illinois. =342=Collection.

     Vallejo, M. G. =343=Documentos para la Hist. de
          California: Bancroft Coll.

     Vallejo, M. G. =344=Recuerdos Hist. y Personales:
          Bancroft Coll.

     Van Buren, Martin. =345=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Wade, W. P. =346=Document: belonging to the family.

     Washburne, Elihu B. =347=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Watterston, George. =348=Notes on U. S. History: Library
          of Congress.

     Watterston, George. =349=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Weber, Juan L. =350=Recollections (verbal).

     Webster, Daniel. =351=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Weeks, J. W. =352=Reminiscences: Bancroft Coll.

     Welles, Edgar T. =353=Collection: Connecticut Hist. Soc.

     Welles, Gideon. =354=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Wheaton, Henry. =355=Papers: Massachusetts Hist. Soc.

     Whitcomb, T. M. =356=Diary: T. J. Whitcomb, Esq.

     Wilcox, C. M. =357=Diary (portions copied by him):
          Claiborne papers, Mississippi Dept. of History.

     Williams, Thomas. =358=Letters: Rt. Rev. G. Mott Williams.

     Winthrop-Clifford. =359=Correspondence: Massachusetts
          Hist. Soc.

     Winthrop-Kennedy. =360=Correspondence: Massachusetts
          Hist. Soc.

     Woods, William. =361=Recollections.

     Worth, G. A. =362=Papers: Library of Congress.

     Worth, W. J. =363=Papers: W. R. Benjamin Collection.

     Worth, W. J. =364=Papers: Mrs. K. S. Hubbell.

     Wyse, F. O. =365=Papers: Miss Mary Wyse.

     Yale University. =366=Collection (University Library).

     Yell, Archibald. =367=Papers: Mrs. R. H. Fitzgerald.

     Map Division, Library of Congress. =369=Map of Palo Alto.

     Taylor, Zachary. =370=Papers: Mrs. W. R. Stauffer.

     Mitchell, W. I. =371=Statement.

     Hyde, George. =372=Statement of Hist. Facts on
          California: Bancroft Coll.

     Evans, Joseph. =373=Narrative: Justin H. Smith.

     Conner, David. =374=Letters: Henkels catalogue.

     Madigan, P. F. =375=Collection.

     Nicholson, A. S. =376=Recollections (verbal).

     Willing, Wildurr. =377=Paper on Scott's operations
     (published later).

     Winthrop, R. C. =378=The Mexican War Bill (Massachusetts
     Hist. Soc.)

     De Witt, John. =379=Collection (see also No. 138).


                          Transcriber's Note

There are three types of notes in the text. The lettered notes
(originally asterisks) were printed as standard footnotes on each page.
References to these notes now appear in brackets as [A], [B] and so on.
The notes themselves have been moved to directly follow the paragraph
within which they are referenced. Occasionally, an asterisk is used for
some other purpose, usually preceding rather than following a word or
phrase, and remain asterisks.

Numeric references referring to the extensive Notes section of the text
appear as bracketed numbers, e.g., [1.3].  Unlike standard footnotes,
the references to those notes in the text are themselves not necessarily
consecutive, nor are they unique. To assist in consulting those notes
using search features, the chapter number has been prefixed to each,
using Arabic numerals, as [2.1], [2.2], [3.3], etc. Notes for the
Preface are prefixed with 'P'. Any internal references directing
attention to another note have also been changed.

Within the Notes, there are =bold= numbers prefixed to key words (e.g.,
'=123=keyword') which serve as references to sources, to be found
in the Appendix. There may be multiple references to the same source.

The logic behind this system is explained by the author in his Preface,
and in more detail in [P.5] of the Notes to that Preface.

In general, Spanish names, when used in English phrases, are printed
without accents. The country is referred to as 'México' when the
language is Spanish, and 'Mexico', without the accent, when in English.
On occasion, the printer fails to observe this distinction, as on p.
xviii: "and a plan in [Mexico] á través de los Siglos". These are
considered as printer's errors, and have been corrected here.

Where variants in spelling occur in quoted passages, they are always
retained.

The name of the town of Matamoros is spelled, occasionally (pp. 177,
468), as 'Matamoras'. The variants are retained.

The word 'manoeuvre' is sometimes printed with an 'oe' ligature. In this
text, as noted above, no distinction can be made.

At the end of the final paragraph of Chapter III, there is a reference
to Note 41 of that chapter, which does not exist. Either the note was
not included, or the reference was misnumbered. The anchor is retained.

The following table describes other textual issues, and the resolution
of each. The [x/y] annotations mark the additions, deletions or
substitutions made to the text. Minor inconsistencies of punctuation in
the Notes have been silently corrected. On several occasions, letters
or numbers have gone missing from the images used to prepare this text.
Where no reasonable conjecture is supportable, an empty bracket [ ]
indicates the spot.

p. xviii [9]. Battles of Monterey. Central          '9' is missing.
              Operations

         and a plan in M[e/é]xico á través de los   Corrected.
             Siglos

p. 57    to accomplish anything[.]                  Added.

p. 91    extend our ter[r]itory by conquest         Corrected.

p. 95    the minister proce[e]ded to Vera Cruz      Added missing 'e'.

p. 99    "the i[n]gnominious loss of national       Removed spurious
            integrity"                                  'n'.

p. 149   made Arista commander[-]in-chief           The hyphen is
                                                      missing on the
                                                      line break.

p. 177   rei[e]nforcements                          Removed extraneous
                                                      'e'.

         could probably h[o/a]ave taken             Corrected.

p. 301   seven hundred National [oe/G]uards         Corrected printer's
                                                      error.

p. 372   tha[t] he might be able                    Added missing 't'.

p. 402   Coch[e]let                                 Added missing 'e'.

p. 412   dates given as 'fractions'

p. 415   Bankhead, nos. 108 of 1844; [ ], 17,       The first numeral
                                                      is indistinct,
                                                      may be 2, 3, 8.

p. 424   (_[i]bid._, 94; Ho. 351; 25, 2,            Added missing 'i'.

p. 431   to cast a gratuit[u]ous aspersion          Removed gratuitous
                                                      'u'.

p. 438   Carreño, Je[f]es                           Added missing 'f'.

p. 440   Watson, Taylo[e/r], 113-4                  A reference to
                                                     Watson, Taylor
                                                     appears earlier.
                                                     None to 'Tayloe'.

p. 476   Housto[u]n, Texas                          May refer to
                                                     'Houston', but is
                                                     retained.