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RELATIONS OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION.

Uniform with this Volume.

=I. NATURE AND THE BIBLE.=

A Course of Lectures on the Morse Foundation of the Union Theological
Seminary, by J. W. DAWSON, LL.D. 12mo. $1.75.

    "Professor Dawson discusses his topic from the various
    standpoints of a student of nature, not from the single
    standpoint which has mostly been occupied by theologians The
    book is not a _partisan_ publication. It will be found by those
    opposed to be perfectly candid and fair, admitting difficulties
    in their full force, and not seeking to evade, misinterpret, or
    exaggerate any fact or argument"--_Interior_.

=II. CHRISTIANITY AND POSITIVISM.=

A Series of Lectures to the Times on Natural Theology and Apologetics.
By JAMES MCCOSH, D.D., LL.D., President of Princeton College. 12mo.
$1.75.

    "This book grapples directly with the vital questions. Every
    reader must admire its fairness It is all the better adapted to
    popular reading from having been written to be delivered to an
    audience. Indeed, the thinking is generally so clear, and the
    style so animated and luminous, that any person of average
    intelligence and culture may understand and enjoy the discussion
    and no such person who has begun to read the work will be likely
    to rest satisfied till he has finished it. It is in some parts
    eloquent and beautiful, and is throughout forcible and effective
    for its end. Would that thousands of the young people of our
    country, and of all classes whose faith may be in peril, might
    read it with the attention it deserves" _Independent_.

=III. CHRISTIANITY AND SCIENCE.=

A Series of Lectures. By Rev. A. P. PEABODY, D.D., of Harvard College.
$1.75.

    "One of the best books we have read in a long time,--a manly,
    candid, noble, reasonable defence of the Christian faith. We do
    not see how any thoughtful person can read it in vain. Dr
    Peabody plants himself fairly on the very postulates of
    scientific men, and proceeds to show how all that they claim for
    true science is fulfilled in the religion of
    Jesus"--_Illustrated Christian Weekly_.

ROBERT CARTER AND BROTHERS.


[Illustration: NERVE CELLS

1 MULTIPOLAR 2 BIPOLAR 3 UNIPOLAR 4 CELL WITH RAMIFICATION. NUCLEUS OR
LIFE CENTRE IS MARKED IN EACH]

[Illustration: NERVE FIBRES

1 SECTION, SHOWING NERVE SHEATH CUT AND NERVE LINE PROJECTING 2 BUNDLE
OF NERVES SPLIT UP INTO FILAMENTS 3 COMBINATION OF NERVES 4 NERVE LOOPS
5 SENSORY CORPUSCLES ON THE NERVE FIBRES]




  THE RELATIONS

  OF

  SCIENCE AND RELIGION.

  The Morse Lecture, 1880,

  _CONNECTED WITH THE UNION THEOLOGICAL
  SEMINARY, NEW YORK._

  BY

  HENRY CALDERWOOD, LL.D.,

  PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH, AUTHOR
  OF "RELATIONS OF MIND AND BRAIN," ETC.

  NEW YORK:
  ROBERT CARTER & BROTHERS,

  530 BROADWAY.

  1881.


  Copyright, 1881,
  BY ROBERT CARTER & BROTHERS.

  CAMBRIDGE:
  PRESS OF
  JOHN WILSON AND SON.

  ST. JOHNLAND
  STEREOTYPE FOUNDRY
  SUFFOLK CO., N. Y.




_EXTRACT FROM THE DEED OF TRUST, ESTABLISHING THE MORSE LECTURESHIP._


"The general subject of the Lectures, I desire to be:

"The relation of the Bible to any of the Sciences, as Geography,
Geology, History, and Ethnology, the vindication of the inspiration and
authenticity of the Bible, against attacks made on scientific grounds,
and the relation of the facts and truths contained in the Word of God,
to the principles, methods and aims of any of the Sciences.

"Upon one or more of these topics a course of ten public Lectures shall
be given at least once in two or three years, by a Lecturer, ordinarily
to be chosen two years in advance of the time for delivering of the
Lectures.

"The appointment of the Lecturer shall be by the concurrent action of
the Founder of the Lectureship, during his life, the Board of Directors,
and the faculty of said Seminary.

"The funds shall be securely invested, and the interest of the same
shall be devoted to the payment of the Lecturer, and to the publication
of the Lectures within a year after the delivery of the same.

"The copyright of the Lectures shall be vested in the Seminary."

  (_Signed_) SAMUEL F. B. MORSE.




PREFACE.


The aim of the present volume is to indicate the measure of harmony
traceable between recent advances in science, and the fundamental
characteristics of religious thought, and the extent to which harmony is
possible. This attempt has been made in the hope of contributing towards
a better understanding of the relative positions of scientists and
theologians, thereby aiding the formation of public opinion on questions
appearing to involve serious antagonism.

The plan followed is to bring under review the great fields of
scientific inquiry, advancing from unorganized existence to Man; to
present the most recent results of research in these separate fields,
without extending to minute details; as far as possible, to allow
scientific observers to state results in their own words; and then to
examine carefully the reasonings deduced from ascertained facts, and the
bearing of facts and inferences on religious thought.

The general result is that marked modifications of thought concerning
the structure and order of the universe have arisen on account of
scientific discoveries, to be accepted by theologians, as by all
thinkers; that the bearing of these modifications on religious
conceptions has been greatly mistaken by many scientific observers; and
that it must be held clear by scientists and theologians alike, that
while scientific methods are reliable within their own spheres, science
can bear no testimony, and can offer no criticism, as to the
supernatural, inasmuch as science is only an explanation of ascertained
facts by recognition of natural law. In accordance with this last
statement, it is maintained, that science does not reach, far less deal
with, the problem concerning the origin of Nature, the solution of which
can be found only by transcending Nature, that is, by recognizing the
supernatural.

In the course followed I believe the purpose of the eminent Physicist
who founded the lecture, has been rigidly kept in view.

I desire here to express to the President and Professors of Union
Theological Seminary, my sense of their great kindness while I delivered
the course of lectures in New York, and specially for so arranging as to
allow of including the full course within eight lectures,--a form which
has been retained in publication.

I have also to express my thanks for the kind manner in which these
lectures were received in Edinburgh, where, with the exception of the
two first, the course was, by request, redelivered.

  H. C.

  UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH,
  _January 31st, 1881_




CONTENTS.


LECTURE I.

CONDITIONS OF THE INQUIRY.

  Advantages resulting from recent advances in physical science
  -- Advance does not unsettle the whole mass of conviction --
  Religion and science agree in seeking a rational basis, and
  both present a body of harmonized conceptions -- Diversity of
  view is to be expected in both spheres -- Needless anxiety as
  to alleged conflict between science and religion -- The first
  requisite is to trace the boundaries of the two departments
  of thought -- Description of religion, natural and revealed
  -- Description of science, its method and sphere -- Common
  starting ground for both -- Each supplies inducement for
  seeking a harmony                                                   9


LECTURE II.

EXPERIENCE GATHERED FROM PAST CONFLICTS.

  Value of the lessons from past failures -- Discussions as to
  "spontaneous generation" -- Range of experiments and mode of
  conducting them -- Difficulties in excluding germinal forms,
  and in determining the temperature at which their destruction
  was ensured -- Hopefulness awakened by earlier investigations
  -- Acknowledged failure as the result of more rigid tests --
  Conclusions of Pasteur, Roberts, Tyndall -- Close of the
  discussion as maintained by Bastian -- Dr. Draper's "History
  of the Conflict between Religion and Science" -- Objections
  to the plan of the book -- Misleading representations of
  conflict -- Alleged scriptural view of the nature of the
  world, incapable of vindication -- The Bible not a book of
  science, but a revelation of the way of deliverance for
  sinful man                                                         43


LECTURE III.

INORGANIC ELEMENTS IN THE UNIVERSE.

  Two forms of existence to be recognized -- Matter and Energy
  -- Distinction of the two -- Tait on energy -- MATTER -- Its
  indestructibility and uncreatability by any process at the
  command of man -- The atomic theory as related to the
  divisibility and compressibility of matter -- Scientific
  belief, as analogous to theologic -- ENERGY -- Perpetual
  change in form and distribution of materials -- Position,
  motion, and force -- Transmutation or conversion of energy --
  Conservation of Energy -- Deterioration and dissipation of
  energy -- Heat as a form of motion -- Results of scientific
  research are such as to support religious thought concerning
  the origin of the world -- The changeable can not be the
  eternal -- Science here reaches its _ultimatum_ as to the
  structure of the world, and gives all the support possible to
  the reality of the supernatural                                    82


LECTURE IV.

ORGANIZED EXISTENCE. LIFE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT.

  The new problem -- Origin of life, relation of the organized
  to the unorganized -- Origin of species -- Darwin's theory of
  evolution by natural selection -- Characteristics of life --
  The prominent features of Mr. Darwin's theory -- Power of
  adaptability to environment inherent in organism -- History
  of the steps by which the author was led to the adoption of
  his theory -- Wallace's "Contributions" -- Darwin's
  acknowledgment that science does not favor the belief that
  living creatures are produced from inorganic matter --
  Admission of creation of life -- Favorable impression made by
  the theory -- Common ancestry of allied species -- Rejection
  of fixedness of species -- Difficulties which beset the
  theory -- All change does not indicate progress -- Difficulty
  connected with the early stages of evolution -- Persistence
  of species                                                        119


LECTURE V.

RELATIONS OF LOWER AND HIGHER ORGANISMS.

  Fertilization of flowering plants -- Relation of pollen to
  the seed vessels -- Need for transference of pollen -- Means
  to prevent self-fertilization -- Relation between animal life
  and vegetable -- Search for honey by bees and other insects
  -- Bearing the pollen to distant flowers -- Distribution of
  work among insects and birds -- Evidence of adaptation --
  Interdependence of lower and higher organisms -- ANTS --
  Their exclusion from certain flowers -- Their work,
  perseverance, intelligence, slave-holding, extracting honey
  from other insects, constructing bridges                          162


LECTURE VI.

HIGHER ORGANISMS; -- RESEMBLANCES AND CONTRASTS.

  Sensibility and motor activity characteristic of animal life
  -- Both uniformly provided for by identical arrangements of
  nerve system -- Two distinct lines of nerve fibre combined in
  a nerve centre -- Structure of nerve fibre -- Isolation --
  Combination -- Brain structure -- White matter, and grey --
  Subdivisions of the organ -- Complexity of brain structure
  according to complexity of organism -- Brain in insects,
  fishes, reptiles, smaller quadrupeds, larger quadrupeds,
  monkeys, apes, man -- Close resemblance of the brain of the
  ape to the human brain -- Researches as to brain function by
  means of electric excitation of the organ -- Fritsch and
  Hitzig -- Ferrier -- Identification of sensory and of motor
  centres -- Silence of front and back regions -- Confirmatory
  evidence from brain diseases                                      204


LECTURE VII.

MAN'S PLACE IN THE WORLD.

  Human organism modelled on the same plan as lower organisms
  -- Prevailing opinion opposes an attempt to refer all human
  activity to organism -- Religious thought not directly
  involved -- Science must include the study of human life --
  Science by discovery of the structure and functions of the
  nerve system has explained many phases of action formerly
  regarded as voluntary -- The contrast remains between
  muscular action and human conduct -- Acquired aptitudes --
  Intellectual superiority -- Hæckel's suggestion of "mind
  cells" -- Adverse evidence -- Nerve cells, varied sizes, the
  largest found in the spinal canal, as well as in the brain --
  Government of human conduct -- Man's application of a higher
  law -- Benevolence, as an illustration -- Contrast with
  struggle for existence -- Man's ideal law, constituting the
  _ought_ in human conduct                                          239


LECTURE VIII.

DIVINE INTERPOSITION FOR MORAL GOVERNMENT.

  Summary of recent scientific conclusions with which religious
  thought is to be harmonized -- Religious conceptions as to
  divine interposition, in their relation to fixed law --
  MIRACLE -- Its place as evidence for the Messiahship of Jesus
  Christ -- Credibility of miracles -- Our Saviour's miracles
  -- Their benevolent purpose as bearing on their evidential
  value -- How related to the laws of nature -- Incapable of
  explanation by these laws -- They do not conflict with these
  laws in any intelligible sense -- Meaning of the old formula,
  "a violation of the laws of nature" -- Importance of the
  scientific position that violation of natural law is
  inconsistent with our knowledge of the government of the
  world -- Method and result in miracle-working, as related to
  natural law -- Explanation of the antagonism of scientific
  thought to the conception of miracle -- PRAYER -- How its
  answer stands related to natural law -- The cruder thoughts
  concerning the province of prayer -- All law, fixed law,
  whether physical, intellectual, or moral -- These laws a
  harmony -- It is in recognition of this, with subordination
  of physical to moral, that the spirit of prayer lives --
  Fixed law is concerned with varying conditions, and with
  varying results -- Interpretation of "fixed law" --
  Dependence of physical results on moral action -- That there
  are two spheres is no help out of difficulty -- Nothing in
  scientific teaching to warrant denial of the doctrine that
  God interposes for moral ends -- Warrant for prayer rests on
  a divine promise, involving moral conditions -- To ask
  evidence of its answer, irrespective of these conditions, is
  to seek evidence in neglect of that which is essential for
  the result -- The answer of prayer must be in all cases more
  an evidence of divine righteousness than it is of divine
  power                                                             275


  APPENDIX.

  I. Relations of Science and Religion                              313

  II. Spontaneous Generation                                        313

  III. Energy and Force                                             314

  IV. All Organized Existence is Constructed on a Common Plan       314

  V. Embryology                                                     316

  VI. Non-advancement of Lower Orders                               319

  VII. Protoplasm                                                   319

  VIII. Number of Species of Insects                                320

  IX. Fertilization of Flowers by Insects                           320

  X. Ants                                                           320

  XI. Likeness of the Ape's Brain to the Human Brain                321

  XII. The Large Sized or Multipolar Cells                          322

  XIII. The Conception of Duty                                      323




RELATIONS OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION.




LECTURE I.

CONDITIONS OF THE INQUIRY.


Among the many advantages enjoyed by the present generation, one of the
most conspicuous is that arising from the large advance made in physical
science. The high value of this is apparent from whatever standpoint it
is regarded. The vastly wider range of knowledge, the increase of
appliances for inquiry, the greater facilities for work of all kinds,
the freer intercommunion of all the divisions of our race, and the
greater altitude from which the whole realm of existence can be
contemplated; all these involve an immense gain for the present century.

With these advantages, however, there comes the difficulty of using them
aright, a difficulty which we may expect to be greater when we are
dealing with wider and more general aspects of existence, than when we
are concerned with more restricted ranges of knowledge. It may be a much
easier thing to state precisely how recent advances have affected a
particular branch of science, such as astronomy or geology, than to say
how they bear upon the general conception of the universe. Yet, while
the latter is the more difficult question, it is that with which men
generally must be more concerned. Only a very limited number of men can
belong to the ranks of specialists devoted to a single branch of
science. All men, specialists as well as others, are concerned with the
wider question as to the true conception of the universe, and the
bearing it has on human life and destiny. It is impossible to imagine
that marked advance can be made in any of the sciences, without its
having some bearing on the more general problem in which all men are
practically interested. Each specialist perceives this more or less
clearly as he is working out the result of complicated observations or
calculations. The public mind may be said rather to _feel_ that some
modification of common belief is taking place, while there is great
uncertainty as to the actual change. What gives a sense of security to
the general conviction of educated men is that all increase of
knowledge is clear gain, and that all advance is secured on familiar and
well-tried lines. Progress is transition, and in a sense unsettling; but
it is also accumulation, and thus in a more enduring sense,
consolidating. Fresh observation in some one department of research does
not overthrow all that was credited previously. It extends the area of
knowledge, or carries us into a more minute acquaintance with
particulars, and only in a restricted way modifies accepted positions,
by introducing relations formerly unrecognized. Thus, progress in a
particular science does not unsettle scientific belief.

In a manner exactly analogous, because resting on the same intellectual
conditions, the combined advance of the whole order of sciences does not
unsettle the mass of conviction belonging to instructed and ordinarily
reflective men. It must, indeed, modify the form of general conviction,
as it quickens intellectual interest, for the public mind receives, not
reluctantly but gladly, additional results gathered under carefully
tested scientific methods. This is nothing more than saying, that love
of truth, and submission to the laws of evidence, are characteristic of
all disciplined intelligence. Scientific inquirers are the trained
instructors of the race, and others receive what they communicate, with
true sense of its abiding worth. At the same time, such inquirers work
from an intellectual basis which is common to all, finding application
in all fields of activity. Upon that basis all men lean as they shape
and regulate their life, finding themselves involved in disaster, or
confirmed in a wise course, according as they are partial or thorough in
their adherence to the conditions of rational life. As the mass of human
interests can not be isolated from the results discovered in the path of
advancing science; so neither can any form of inquiry be separated from
the conditions which are common to all intellectual life, including even
the least cultivated. So it happens that the race as a whole has a clear
share in all the products of science, such as it has not in the products
of industry. Rational conditions provide for a community of interest in
intellectual work and results, greater than can be approached by all the
value of material production.

These few general and very obvious considerations bring us into direct
line with the relations of religion and science. Religion has a rational
basis, as the condition of its practical worth. It takes its start from
that common intellectual basis, which affords to science its essential
conditions. Religion and science are exactly alike in these respects,
that both present a body of harmonized conceptions, a clearly defined
circle of intelligible statements, and both have a definite bearing on
human action. Their practical value depends upon conformity with the
common requirements of intelligence, and harmony with recognized fact. I
place this declaration in the foreground of the present discussion, not
only as a clear avowal of the footing on which religion presents its
claims to acceptance, but more especially as a distinct and broad
acknowledgment that the whole range of tests afforded by the entire
circle of the sciences is legitimately applied to religion, and is to be
deliberately met.

The object of the present course of lectures is to consider the
relations of science to the Christian religion, as authoritatively
revealed in the Bible, and as understood and accepted by those who
profess themselves Christians, in grateful acknowledgment of what the
Scriptures declare. The relations now to be dealt with are those
subsisting between religion as presented in the Bible, (which is in the
hands of all, to be examined and dealt with by scientific inquirers),
and science as presented to us in the present day, for the acceptance of
all. The claim to universal acceptance found here on both sides, is that
which gives special interest and true logical importance to the problem.
Christianity professes to discover a religion to be accepted of all men,
and a practice to be observed by all: science professes to give an
account of the state of things around us in the world, to be accepted by
all, and acknowledged in practice if men would adapt themselves to the
natural conditions of their life. This claim to universal acceptance is
not affected on either side by the fact that diversities of
interpretation and application emerge among the upholders of
Christianity, and the expounders of science. Such diversities are well
known to exist in both spheres of thought. It needs to be recognized at
all times, and prominently stated in such a discussion as the present,
that under the conditions determining the attainment of knowledge,
there must be diversity of opinion. Indeed, the wider the area of
acquired truth, the more extensive becomes the field of possible
differences, both in respect of what is involved under conclusions
already reached, and of what may transcend the boundaries of present
knowledge. It is, therefore, no marvel that there is large diversity of
opinion among scientific men, on many problems arising out of
universally accepted positions. It is only by the same necessity that
there is diversity of opinion on matters of religion. The materials of
study are set before us in the mass, and our knowledge is to be obtained
by the slow processes of intellectual procedure, in accordance with
which some things become clear, while many more remain obscure. Whether
we are dealing with book knowledge, or with knowledge obtained by direct
observation of existing things, does not affect this matter. The
intellectual conditions are the same in both cases, and it is from
exactly the same intellectual source that inevitable conflict of opinion
arises.

The simple and obvious truth is that there can be no field of human
inquiry in which diversity of opinion can be avoided, for two reasons,
that all knowledge possessed by us is incomplete, and active
intelligence can not rest in the incomplete. Neither science nor
theology can afford to dispense with hypothesis, that is conjecture, and
where conjecture is, there is a wide region for devious wandering.
Conjecture means inquiry into the unknown, and this is essential to
intellectual life, equally necessary for science and religion, and
accordingly diversity of opinion is inevitable in the history of both,
as in the history of all forms of human activity. In every region of
human knowledge there is a realm of the certain, and another of the
uncertain, and accordingly there is diversity of opinion and conviction.
Occasionally, in controversial writing, it is suggested that there is
greater diversity of view in matters religious, than in matters
scientific; and it is implied that such diversity is a reasonable ground
of reproach. Both allegations are at fault, and the error arises from
want of observation, involving imperfect acquaintance with the facts.
Religion as it is concerned with the life of man himself, and is the
subject of interest to all, has not only its common positions generally
recognized, but also many of its phases of conflicting thought.
Science, as it is beyond the range of the great majority as a subject of
personal research, and within reach of only a limited number as a
subject even of book knowledge, has its questions of conflict concealed
to some extent from the public view. But, even moderate acquaintance
with science makes us aware of the fact that there is conflict of
opinion in every region of inquiry. Indeed it should be alien to the
reflective observer, to marvel at the discovery of diversity of thought
in any region, or to make its existence a ground for adverse criticism.
Commonly accepted conclusions must afford the basis for competent
criticism, whatever be the field of inquiry brought under review;
diversity of opinion beyond and around these, must be accepted as the
uniform attendant of human knowledge, indicating at once the provision
for intellectual progress and the inducement to it. Thus, on grounds
indisputable from a scientific basis, we escape the need for vindicating
religion from the charge of having its claims to rational homage
weakened, by the diversity of opinion found within the boundaries of
religious thought. Such diversity is in strict accordance with familiar
facts connected with every branch of science. Whatever may be said of
the strong and paradoxical, because one-sided, utterance of Lessing,[A]
it must be manifest that in all directions we are of necessity searchers
after truth, and it is in such circumstances an intellectual weakness to
object to the reliability of generally accepted conclusions, because
they become starting-points for many lines of conflicting speculation.
In religious thought, as in scientific, there are on all hands the marks
of the unfinished; and the varieties of opinion associated with
generally accepted conviction only afford needful evidence of healthy
intellectual activity.

As we daily hear much of the conflict between science and religion, and
as it is one part of the purpose of the present course to deal with what
is loudly proclaimed to be a serious feature in modern thought, it
becomes needful to clear the ground considerably, with the view of
discovering where the alleged conflict is, and what form it assumes. In
this, as in many conflicts, there is much more din and tumult, than
damage. We shall by and by hear much less of _conflict_ than we are
hearing at present. Meanwhile, however, the work is considerable which
needs to be done in clearing the field, tracing boundaries, and
disclosing the exact position of parties. In the ruder warfare of
nations, this clearing work is undertaken by the combatants themselves,
and if not accomplished by preliminary measures, it is at length
achieved by the actual events of the struggle. But in this case, it may
be done quietly enough by non-combatants, while it may contribute
largely to the restricting of the conflict, and the establishment of
peace. This I desire to attempt, in the hope that some service may be
rendered both to the scientific, and non-scientific, by contributing
towards a general understanding of the actual position of affairs. A
quiet survey of events occurring during the last twenty-five years or
so, which have influenced the relations of science and religion, may
suffice to convince us that there has been on both sides needless
planting of batteries, and pouring forth of shot. In many cases, the
shot has only sunk into sand banks with no other result than heavy
expenditure; in other cases, it has only shattered timber defences which
were going at any rate, and soon to be abandoned. The worst result has
been that the whole district around has been thrown into trouble under
fear of disastrous results. This description must be held to apply to
outbreaks of theological fury, as well as of scientific. I apprehend
that there are few friends of religion conversant with the higher phases
of intellectual life during the period to which reference is here made,
who will not grant that scientific theories have been assailed with
undue severity, and quite needless apprehension, under the influence of
religious zeal. On the other hand, it is equally beyond dispute that
there has been in some scientific quarters an eagerness to interpret
scientific theories in a manner adverse to theological belief, and often
with undisguised pleasure in the task, as if some real gain to thought
and practical interests were to be secured by injury to religion. The
best work on both sides has been done quite apart from these outbreaks
of antagonism. But it would be unwise to omit reference to them here,
or to overlook the lesson they convey, all the more that both sides
admit reasonable ground for regret. There has been, on the one hand, too
great readiness in charging an atheistic conclusion as the logical
result of scientific theory; and, on the other, too hasty an assumption
that newly recognized facts must prove damaging to Christian faith.
Detailed illustration would be in every sense undesirable here, but
outstanding examples will readily occur. Take the theory of the
Development of Species by Natural Selection, to which detailed reference
will be made hereafter, which has a great multitude of facts to favor
it, and at the same time a mass of facts presenting most serious logical
difficulties; it is obvious that even if this theory were accepted in
the form in which it is at present propounded, not only would the
rational basis for belief in the Divine existence and government not be
affected by it, but the demand on a Sovereign Intelligence would be
intensified. The contrast in the form of the general question may be
represented thus: in the one case, to account for the origin of varied
forms of life entirely distinct and independent; in the other, to
account for an origin in the simplest germinal form, or in a few
primordial forms, which shall nevertheless provide for the appearance of
all the varieties of species of animal life now known to us. In
presenting the latter hypothesis, science presses into notice a much
greater perplexity affecting the origin of the universe, originating a
difficulty towards the solution of which it is altogether unable to
offer the slightest contribution. In this single illustration, there is
much to convince theologians and scientific men that each division of
thinkers will best fulfil its own part, and most honor religion and
science, by working unreservedly on data within its own reach, without
apprehension as to ultimate conflict.

From the other side, it is not difficult to find evidence that continued
inquiry and reflection have led to the abatement, if not the actual
withdrawal, of scientific hypotheses which seemed at variance with
common belief, and which might be taken as adverse to religious thought.
For example, as a branch of the inquiry connected with the theory of
development of species, and coming directly upon the position of man in
the scale of being, we had for a time a wonderful amount of
observation, description, and discussion concerning monkeys and apes.
Laborious inquiries became provocative of grotesque fancy. In the train
of science came the workers who minister to the popular imagination, and
there appeared a whole series of comic pictures, amusing narratives, and
even musical compositions, representing monkeys and apes as taking part
in human occupations. These have left their testimony to the power of
scientific hypothesis in determining the thought and interest of the
time during which they find favor. It was demonstrated incontestably
that the anatomical structure of the ape was much more like to that of
man than the structure of the dog, or the horse; and that the brain of
the ape was so like in form and arrangement to the human brain, that it
might be represented as a smaller and undeveloped example of the human
brain. But when the work of observation and description had been well
nigh completed; when the work of deliberate thinking was commenced with
the assurance that the facts were pretty fully and fairly before us,
there came a considerable abatement for the enthusiasm of scientific
speculation in the new line of discovery. Next came the acknowledgment
that even with all the analogies and homologies of structure, seen and
unseen, there was a vast chasm between the ape and man. Forthwith, the
stimulus to comic talent began to die away; and it must be confessed
that the department of anthropology has not been greatly advanced from
this new region of observation.

These examples may suffice to impress at once upon theologians and
scientists,--and upon the public mind also,--the obvious, but easily
forgotten lesson, that there is need for deliberation before we can
clearly decide the exact significance of new scientific discoveries.
Neither the spirit of religion, nor the scientific spirit, disposes
inquirers to make haste. There is a basis of certainty, sufficiently
broad and deep to deliver the mind from concern lest intellectual
confusion should arise from continued observation and thought.
Enthusiasm, acuteness, patience, and also boldness of speculation, are
needed in order to widen the range of our knowledge of the mysteries of
existence; but caution is as certainly a necessary feature in the
gathering of appliances which must lie at the command of theologians
and also of scientific observers. In fact, there is at every fresh
advance in science, much _thinking_ to be done, after observation and
exposition have accomplished their part, and this thinking can not be
quickly done.

Towards a clear marking out of the boundaries of science and religion,
it is needful that some definition or description of both be attempted.
It is easy to be religious without sharply marking off for one's self
the exact boundaries of religion; and equally easy to be scientific,
without exactly laying down the limits of science. But any intelligent
view of the relations of the two is not to be had without carefully
marking off the territory which they respectively occupy. Science at
least should seek for itself "a scientific boundary," and though this is
not always easily found, it is essential for keeping up friendly
relations with neighboring states. In view, therefore, of the
requirements of the present subject, something must here be done in the
way of definition, or at least, description, delicate and difficult as
is the task.

The object of these lectures is, to vindicate the place of the Christian
religion within the region of human intelligence, to show its rational
harmony with science, and to promote active co-operation between the
two. And this is to be done for the Christian religion in view of all
the advantages, and of all the alleged disadvantages too, of what has
been reproachfully named "a book religion," which assuredly it is, just
as all science must become "book science," if it is to become a living
and abiding intellectual power among men. For all reliable knowledge
must be formulated, must take a definite orderly shape, if it is to find
a place and dominion. In the history of intelligent being in this world,
religion first of all met this requirement, and subjected itself to this
test, adapting itself also to successive ages, and submitting itself to
their criticism. Science owns a like intellectual necessity, and has had
to write and rewrite, to correct and expand, in order that the
book-science might be the true science of the day. Whatever be the
nature of the truth received by man, its statement is greatly enhanced
in value when it has been reduced to written form, suitable not only for
being passed from hand to hand, but for being pondered with all
deliberation.

While, however, it is a great advantage to Christianity that it can be
described as the religion of the Bible,--and it is to Christianity that
reference is directly made here when religion is named,--there is in
religion as in science that which comes before the written form.
Observation and reflection are natural avenues to religion, as well as
to science. The Bible appeals to the intelligence of man for its
acceptance, subjecting to rational test not only its evidence but also
its teaching. Its uniform demand is that men put its teaching to proof.
It thus presupposes a natural religion as the prerequisite for special
revelation of the supernatural. The full breadth of the argument in
exposition and defence of Christianity is seen only by starting from
this position, that all religion, whatever its form, rests on a rational
basis. And its correlative is this, irreligion is the irrational. The
vindication of the Christian religion thus implies at its basis the
defence of religious thought and feeling in whatever associations they
may be found. For though it is true that the Christian religion may be
said to war against all religions besides, seeking to supplant them, in
order to become the universal religion, it does so only on the footing
that religious thought and feeling wherever found have a genuine
intellectual value, which must work towards deliverance from what is
immoral and what is inconsistent in tradition. If it be here remarked
that science also tends to the destruction of the traditional beliefs
belonging to many of the religions of the world, it may thereby appear
that science becomes a fellow-worker with Christianity in a process of
demolition required in the interests equally of intelligence, morality,
and religion. But whatever may be said of this destructive process as
one in which Christianity performs a conspicuous part, the religion of
Jesus recognizes a voice in the works of creation speaking to the hearts
of men, in all lands, insomuch that "there is no speech nor language
where their voice is not heard." Religious belief is thus recognized as
a natural possession, and reverence for the Most High as following by
rational sequence.

When therefore we offer a defence of the Christian faith and practice,
we necessarily undertake some defence of the varied manifestations of
natural religion presenting themselves in the world's history. We are
not precluded from assigning value to the loftier and purer thought of
ancient civilization testifying against "the gods many and lords many"
of the popular religion; nor do we refuse to make acknowledgment of
those ruder and baser examples of religious observance appearing among
tribes of uncivilized men in modern times. In defending religion, we are
upholding the lofty conceptions of the Greek philosopher, who said that
"God is not the author of evil, but of good only;" who declared that God
"is one and the same, immutably fixed in his own proper nature," and
that "God and his attributes are absolutely perfect."[B] On the other
hand, we can not escape the serious entanglement found among heathen
idolatries, for even while such idolatries are utterly condemned, we are
ready to maintain that the most irrational idolatries have more of
reason in them than the life which has been emptied of religious faith
and exercise.

In view of the wide range of natural religion, and the defence of it
here implied, we may define religion, as the recognition of a Sovereign
Intelligence originating and governing all dependent being, with the
homage due from intelligent beings to the Sovereign Intelligence. This
is the definition which will include all natural religion, and present
the ground of its defence in view of scientific suggestions and
perplexities.

But taking the Christian religion as the crown and centre of religious
life in the world, we have a more full and commanding testimony as to
the glory of the divine nature, and the genuine exercises of a religious
life. He is God creating and sustaining all, ruling in righteousness,
revealing himself in Jesus Christ, whose glory is "the glory as of the
only begotten of the Father full of grace and truth." He is a God
seeking the reconciliation of the guilty with himself. He is a God of
mercy, calling all intelligent creatures to fellowship with him, and
requiring them all to be "holy even as he is holy." Such is a summary of
the teaching of Scripture as to the Divine Being, and our relation to
him. Thus are we guided in our utterance before him, "O Lord of hosts,
God of Israel, that dwellest between the cherubim, thou art the God,
even thou alone, of all the kingdoms of the earth: thou hast made heaven
and earth" (Isa. xxxvii. 16).

I content myself with a mere summary; for a full knowledge we must take
the Bible itself, knowledge of which must be presumed as the condition
of criticism, though criticism has been abundant which has borne witness
to ignorance of the revelation criticised,--ignorance so marked that had
it applied to science it would have been held a proof of incompetence
for criticism. We are now to take the Bible representation of God, and
of his relation to us; and on the other hand of man's faith in him, and
spiritual devotion and service. These are the materials to be harmonized
with the teachings of science, by demonstrating that the testimony of
science points to a government of the universe harmonizing with the
testimony of Scripture. And here it is needful that there be
explicitness, that our thesis may be placed beyond doubt. The purpose is
not merely to show that science lays no foundation for denial of a
Supreme Intelligence, or for an atheistic conception of the universe;
nor merely that it affords no place for belief in Deity without
knowledge of his nature, for utterance of an empty name, without
intelligible content, or an agnosticism, which affects to celebrate the
praises of Ignorance, in homage to the name of science; nor merely an
immanent or indwelling Deity, who is in all things, and all things in
him, so that he is the unifying power, the soul and life of all that is,
including those strange contrasts which we call good and evil; but
passing all these representations as strange and alien to the Bible, to
show that religion and science find their harmony in recognition of a
Transcendent Deity, a personal Deity, distinct from the universe,--a
personality ruling in righteousness, and delighting to meet the desires
of intelligent beings longing after the perfection of holiness.

I can imagine that some devoted students of science are prepared to
object to having any share in a discussion which is to include as one of
its terms such a purely spiritual conception as this, involving a
spiritual relation,--and having as its practical expression a spiritual
life.

Not a few scientific men may be prepared to say that all this is quite
remote from the region with which they are familiar,--that science can
hardly be said to come into contact with such a spiritual region of
inquiry. And I grant that there is reason for urging such a
consideration. Science can not occupy the place of religion, any more
than religion can occupy the place of science. But if there be any on
that account feeling themselves precluded from entering on the
discussion, they do thereby proclaim themselves disqualified for making
any affirmation as to conflict between the two courses of thought and
interest. The logical fairness of this argument admits of no challenge.
Either scientists must refrain from assertions of conflict,--or they
must take the declarations of the Bible, and prove their antagonism to
the teachings of science, recognized as belonging to a different sphere
of inquiry. As well propose to criticise the conclusions of astronomy in
disregard of spectrum analysis, as propose to criticise the intellectual
worth of religion in neglect of its spiritual significance.

I next pass over to inquire what Science is, taking its own testimony
concerning its province and purpose, as I have taken the testimony of
religion. Science has for its sphere or province the whole field of
outward observation; and has for its purpose the explanation of facts
within this field, either by means of direct observations as to the
relations of things, or by logical inference from such observations.
This field of study is full of interest, and practically inexhaustible.
The trustworthiness of the method admits of no doubt, whether we
consider direct observation, or guarded and careful inference from
things observed. To trust our powers of observation, and to rely on our
reasoning faculty, are the fundamental conditions of all knowledge.
Through these avenues religious knowledge must come, as well as
scientific. The risk of conflict is thus excluded here. Nor will any one
dispute the inherent value of scientific knowledge.[C] Least of all
could such a challenge come from a religious basis, for the book of
nature is to the religious mind the revelation of God in its own place
and form, just as the Bible is in a different and higher form. The
reverence belonging to religion will not derogate from the dignity of
science. The natural and genuine tendency of religious thought must be
to exalt science, in its proper sense, as a verified explanation of the
facts of existence. A contrary tendency can arise only in one of two
ways, either when religion is driven back on the defensive on account of
scientific theory assuming an attitude of antagonism; or when religious
thought has been contracted into narrow and hardened form, such as to
encourage isolation from regions of investigation personally disliked.
In the one case, dishonor is reflected on scientific thinking, in the
other, dishonor is cast on religious thought.

These considerations will indicate the true intellectual spirit in which
we should face the question concerning the relations of religion and
science. To our rational nature, every thing which is entitled to rank
as genuine knowledge must be matter of interest; and reliance on common
means of acquiring knowledge, must involve confidence in the unity of
all truth, and the possibility of demonstrating such unity, if only it
be possible for us to penetrate deep enough, and extend our researches
wide enough,--a confidence which will not be sacrificed even when the
actual unity waits discovery. As each one of the planets diffuses its
own share of light, and all combine to constitute the solar system, so
each science must be a centre of knowledge, and all combined must
constitute a system of truth.

This being granted on purely intellectual grounds, our concluding point
is connected with competency to enter upon critical inquiry as to the
harmony of religion and science. What has been said as to knowledge of
the Bible as a prerequisite for the discussion of our problem, must
equally hold as to science. One thing, however, needs to be fairly
stated and deliberately allowed; the possibility of intelligent and
adequate criticism does not imply full acquaintance with scientific
methods, and personal ability to test the results of their application.
Most of us must be content to take our scientific knowledge on trust, as
Chaucer did, when he declined to enter upon the intricacies of
astronomical study, because he was too old for making satisfactory
progress.[D] To accept scientific conclusions without personal
verification is simply inevitable. When scientific men themselves have
come to a general agreement, and are not any longer in conflict on a
particular conclusion, this must be enough for the great majority of
intelligent inquirers. There is not, in this, absolute security for
accuracy, but neither is there such security in the circumstances for
scientific men themselves, and there can be no reasonable ground for
hesitancy or complaint, either on our part or on theirs, if we are ready
to accept general agreement as sufficient testimony for the time. It
would be utterly impracticable and unreasoning to insist that we can not
intelligently accept the conclusions of astronomy unless we are able to
go through the mathematical processes; or the main facts of human
physiology unless we have verified each position by personal
investigation into the structure of the organs, and the conditions of
functional activity. Conjectures find from an intelligent public no
higher acknowledgment than is due to conjecture, simply because those
who have devoted themselves to research in the department concerned are
not agreed in attributing to them any higher significance. On the other
hand, conclusions are accepted as true, however much they may be at
variance with previously existing conviction, when the great majority of
scientific inquirers have admitted the observations to be undoubted or
the reasonings conclusive. This is the only conceivable test. It is
that which scientific thinkers must themselves recognize as the rule of
credence in all departments of investigation lying beyond their own
familiar field of study; and it is that which is naturally accepted by
the whole body of non-scientific readers and thinkers interested in the
advance of knowledge. All practiced theologians, and all upholders of
religion on the ground of intelligent warrant for belief and practice,
only take the ground of common intelligence when they accept implicitly
the conclusions reached by scientific procedure.

Whatever then may be the evidence of conflict between science and
religion, and whatever the difficulties lying in the way of working out
reconciliation, there is clear warrant for claiming common ground from
which to start, and that so ample and secure that it is provided by
scientific inquiry itself, and generally accepted by educated men of all
classes. There can be no patchwork contrivance, made up of what may be
taken to be final statements of theological and scientific positions. We
do not aim at some agglomeration of materials gathered from opposite
quarters and brought together with the design of constructing a compact
and durable unity. Neither from the side of religion, nor from that of
science, could such a proposal find countenance. Each must work from its
own basis, the one from Revelation, the other from Nature. Each must go
on its own course of development and active service, unaided and
undeterred by the other. And from age to age in the world's progress it
must continue part of the task connected with intelligent existence, to
go from one to the other, in search of the lines of harmony. From both
sides must come an impulse to this search for agreement. From the
scientific side, by an intellectual necessity, for all intelligent
research presses on towards unity in a complete conquest of the region
of investigation, pushing out in distinct lines with full conviction of
the harmony of being, and of conclusions expressing so much of this
harmony as has been definitely ascertained. And what is no less certain,
though not so freely admitted, all investigation as to the laws of
existence, even that which proclaims confidence only in observation,
with inference from what it discloses, is urging the human mind onward
to a higher range of questions as to existence beyond observation, and
the causes of things visible. Impotent in the extreme has been the voice
of a "positive" philosophy, denouncing the search for causes, sounding
its trumpet call to rally all divisions of scientific workers to search
exclusively for facts, as if such workers were but a band of quarrymen,
boring, blasting, and gathering up shattered fragments of rock. For
facts must science ever search; with nothing short of ascertained facts
can it be satisfied; but, having found them, it must classify and
harmonize, seeking for the laws which regulate their occurrence, and for
the causes by which they may be rationally explained.

On the other hand, from the sphere of religion must ever arise a
powerful impulse to seek harmony of conviction with the verified results
of scientific research. This may be expected to prove a more urgent and
practical necessity than that which operates from within the region of
science. The belief in a personal Deity, as the source of all dependent
existence, and the controller of all, leads by a necessity both
intellectual and spiritual to a search for order in all things, and a
harmony of the universe. Viewed only as an intellectual
discipline,--and this is an important though partial view of
it,--religion develops what may be described as the intellectual
instinct, craving for knowledge, with expectation of order and harmony
everywhere, and with prospect of ample reward for patient research.
Religion, beginning with the conception of a transcendent Being,--seeing
in finite existence a creation and a cosmos,--gives more powerful
stimulus to search for harmony of truth, than can be said to spring from
science. The latter by the necessity of its procedure begins by
contracting thought in order to concentrate, and is apt to encourage its
most devoted servants to work on isolated divisions of existence,
relegating to a distant future the greater and more puzzling task of
contemplating the harmony of all sciences. It is, then, by pressing into
view an urgent practical and personal need, that religion may be said in
the history of individual life to contribute the strongest motive power
towards such intellectual effort as is concerned with the harmonizing of
all truth. This will appear in personal experience according to the
intellectual activity of the individual, under the requirements of his
religious life, and in study of all that belongs to the system of the
universe. This being recognized and avowed, as following from the very
nature of religion, it devolves on the Church in all its divisions,--the
brotherhood of believers,--to manifest a genuine and profound interest
in the progress of science, making felt in the world the full influence
of the spirit, at once scientific and religious, which seeks to discover
and demonstrate the harmony of created existence.

FOOTNOTES:

[A] "If God had held all truth in his right hand, and in his left the
ever-living desire for truth, although with the condition that I should
remain in error for ever, and if he should say to me 'choose,' I should
humbly incline towards his left, and say, 'Father, give: pure truth is
for thee alone?'"--_Wolferbuttel Fragments_. See Zimmern's _Life of
Lessing_, p. 361.

[B] Plato's _Republic_ II. 380, 381.

[C] See Appendix I.

[D]

    "'Wilt thou learne of sterres ought?'
    'Nay, certainly,' quod I, 'right naught.'
    'And why?' quod he. 'For I am old.'"

HOUSE OF FAME, B. II, 487.




LECTURE II.

EXPERIENCE GATHERED FROM PAST CONFLICTS.


There have been within quite recent times conflicts as to the relations
of science and religion, which have now lost their living interest. All
classes greatly affected by current literature, and scientific
discussion, whether ranking themselves on the side of religion, or
otherwise, were deeply moved by them. It appeared at the time, as if
some new position were to be marked off, destined to affect our whole
conception of the government of the universe. The expectation was not
verified; public interest died away; and preparations for conflict were
abandoned, on account of the unexpected discovery that there was nothing
to fight about.

It is a wise rule affecting our busy life, crowded with present-day
duties, that we allow subjects quietly to drop out of view which have
lost living interest. But this wise rule is turned to unwise ends, if
it make us forgetful of the lessons of the past. Scientific progress
consists in the abandonment of untenable positions, for occupancy of
others proved to be more reliable. Accordingly the conflict which seems
to threaten the interests of religion wears now one aspect and now
another, as determined by the stage of scientific progress which has
been reached. But all intellectual progress is an evolution, bearing at
every moment some trace of what has been left behind, as well as
evidence of accretion. A large amount of the experience connected with
intellectual life is gathered from events connected with abandoning
positions of past interest, as well as from those associated with what
is new. I propose, therefore, though within comparatively narrow limits,
to refer to past conflicts, quite recent, but practically at an end. The
ebb and flow of intellectual interests follow in such rapid succession,
and each is so absorbing during its continuance, that we readily forget
the tangled waste buried from sight under the spring-tide of rising
expectation. We easily lose sight of the past, even though it lie close
at hand, and as we feel the pulse of life beat high in proportion to
the vividness and apparent value of our prospects, we are ever liable to
overestimate the importance of the present position, thus severing
ourselves too readily from all that lies behind. There may be reason for
cutting down bridges in the rear, if there be apprehension of cowardice
in the ranks; but where the calmness and courage of resolute progress
are found, there is no need for a yawning chasm behind. It is true,
indeed, that just beyond some bridges recently crossed, there lie a good
many traces of humiliation. And it is according to the tendency of human
nature, whether religious or anti-religious, to turn away from that
which occasions uneasiness. But there is a moral, as well as an
intellectual demand, for thoroughness in recognizing the continuity of
events. The scientific spirit can not excuse a covering up of past
failures, as the formulating of verified results must imply testimony
concerning them. It is of the very nature of religious conviction that
we should learn from the failures of the past, and should advance out of
them with higher wisdom. By common consent, therefore, we can have no
accurate survey of the present situation, without making account of what
has been recently passed, as well as what may be regarded as pressing
upon our notice in these days.

We do not need to travel a long way to the rear in order to discover how
far astray we may be, both in expectations and in apprehensions; how
readily we may get into confusion as to the interests involved in
exciting controversies; and how much we need caution, making allowance
for our partial survey of facts, and our uncertainty as to what may open
up.

By way of illustration, I shall refer to the history of discussions
concerning so-called "_spontaneous generation_," mixed up with
ascertained facts as to protoplasm, bathybius, or "living slime," as it
has been called, and bacterium. The question eagerly discussed was
whether there might be origin of life, without development from germ,
seed, or ovum. The problem was one of those suggestions apt to arise
under pressure of new conjectures and theories. While the scientific
world was astir on the question of development, attention was turned for
a time towards the possibility of a fresh beginning of organic forms,
life which should be no development, but should rather seem as an
uncaused existence,--"spontaneous generation." It might have been urged
that the suggestion was contrary to reason; that "inexorable logic," of
which we often hear from scientific observers, forbade the supposition;
that all the conditions of scientific thought were against it; that the
very conception of "spontaneous generation" was a logical inconsistency,
alien to the requirements of scientific thought, as implying uncaused
existence; but we were reminded that we are prohibited from supposing
any thing is impossible in the pathway of science, that observation must
be first, and reason only second, and accordingly the needful
experiments went on under all due precautions. The brief chapter in the
history of science which records expectations and results connected with
these experiments, well deserves to be remembered. It is here selected
for illustration, both on account of its inherent importance, and its
relation to the theory of development, which must afterwards have
special attention.

Some descent is required from ordinary scientific observation to the
level where this question is discussed. From the germ-cell, we pass
down to an albuminous substance spread over the ocean-bed, said to have
life, or we descend to microscopic organisms, such as bacteria; and a
step lower down still, we are introduced to the question whether in
water passed through the boiling process so as to guard against the
presence of germinal forms, we may not witness the origin of life.

The question so raised had additional interest because of the bearing it
might have on the first appearance of life in the history of this world.
This interest was shared on both sides, by those who held that creation
is a conception not only alien to scientific thought (which it may well
be[E]), but inconsistent with it; and by those who regarded creation as
the only conception adequate to meet rational requirements. The question
had at the same time a direct practical interest connected with public
health, on account of its bearing upon the diffusion and vital tenacity
of spores or germinal forms capable of spreading contagious disease.[F]

The controversy on this subject was at its height in the years 1876,
and 1877, having a large amount of most careful and difficult experiment
devoted to it. The result has been a valuable addition to scientific
knowledge as to the vitality of germinal forms, and a quietus to
theories as to "spontaneous generation."

The direct object placed before the scientific mind when the discussion
arose was this,--to ascertain whether an origin of vital activity could
be observed in the midst of materials from which all germinal forms of
life were certainly excluded.

The selection of materials to experiment upon was for a time according
to the fancy of the experimenter. It was not proposed that a vacuum
should be made by withdrawal of all air from a glass vessel, thereafter
watching for the appearance of some organic form. Nor was it suggested
that pure water might be taken from a spring, and boiled, and left
standing under daily observation. A great variety of materials was
selected to provide an infusion which might afford the conditions for
application of scientific tests. In this way the following materials
were used and tested, infusion of turnip, of pounded cheese, hay, meat,
fish, besides egg-albumen, blood, and urine. Vegetable productions,
animal tissue, and secretions of the human body closely connected with
vital processes, were thus subjected to test. In the history of
investigation, attention ultimately concentrated on the infusion of hay
and on urine. Observations were conducted in Paris and London; results
were published from time to time; singular divergence became apparent in
these recorded results; this led to controversy, which became so keen,
that the Academy of Sciences in Paris appointed a commission of three to
adjudicate upon a challenge given by M. Pasteur of Paris to Dr. Bastian
of London; which Commission met in Paris on 15th July, 1877, but never
adjudicated in the matter.[G]

The perplexities encountered in conducting observations arose chiefly
from two causes: the difficulty of ascertaining the temperature at which
living organisms were certainly destroyed, and the materials sterilized;
and that of guarding against interference with this state when
established, by contact with the atmosphere. The latter perplexity,
involving much care, skilful manipulation, and mechanical contrivance,
was at last overcome by the construction of glass tubes, separating for
a time the distinct materials, with facility for their mixture at the
proper moment without contact with the air.

The true scientific difficulty, however, was determination of a reliable
test for destruction of germinal forms, either adhering to the
materials, embedded in them, or floating in the atmosphere. The history
of observations bearing on this question is deeply interesting. In the
earlier tentative experiments, the material placed under observation was
boiled; it was concluded that no vital organism could endure this
process; and the material was kept for a time in a temperature of from
seventy to eighty degrees Fahr., which was regarded as favorable to the
development of life. In process of time, a deposit appeared in the tube,
and this when examined under the microscope was found to contain
bacteria,[H] living, moving germinal forms so minute as to require high
magnifying power for their discovery. Here then was "spontaneous
generation." Who could be so credulous as to believe that minute
organic forms could live through the boiling process? If this appeared
too absurd to fancy, then spontaneous generation, or actual origin of
life out of non-organized matter, must be held to be established. It was
only the audacity of prejudice, and hopeless alienation from the
"advanced thought" of the time, which could induce any one to doubt, in
face of these experiments, carefully recorded and published.[I]
Scientific observers of great experience and reputation felt it needful
to express themselves with caution, leaving results to be tested.

A considerable number of investigators began to turn their attention to
the subject, and a period of seven years was occupied before the results
became so certain as to be practically final. Pasteur, Pouchet, and
Joubert were at work in France, Crookes, Child, Beale, Roberts, Bastian,
Tyndall and others in England.

All experiments concentrated upon certainty in sterilizing the substance
operated upon. Pasteur pointed out that the chemical properties of the
infusion affected the vitality of the microscopic germs inclosed in it;
and Roberts at a later stage confirmed this by independent
investigation, proving "that slightly alkaline liquids are more
difficult to sterilize by heat than slightly acid liquids."[J] In this
way, it was shown that distinct records of temperature were needful,
greater intensity of heat being required in some cases than in others,
in order to secure destruction of germs. The facts were illustrated by
hay infusion, "the acid infusion invariably remaining barren after a few
minutes' boiling, and the neutralized infusion invariably becoming
fertile after a similar boiling."[K] The neutralizing element was liquor
potassæ, and the next question started was this, Did the liquor potassæ
enable the germs to live longer under the boiling process, or did its
infusion operate so as to originate life where germs no longer had any
existence? A contrivance was adopted by which the boiling could be
applied to the hay infusion, while the liquor potassæ was kept enclosed
in another part of the tube, ready to be added without exposure to the
air, after the boiling process was over. When added in this way, "the
liquor potassæ had not any power to excite germination:" the expectation
that a certain mixture of acid and alkali would originate life was
disappointed; all the earlier experiments were discredited. Still, some
clung to their expressed belief, for there is a prejudice of advanced
thought, as there is a prejudice of old beliefs. Tenacity of avowed
opinion, with strong love of research, prolonged the inquiry, and led to
more decided evidence.

The controversy was conducted by Dr. Roberts against Dr. Bastian, while
all the experiments of Professor Tyndall were converging upon the same
conclusions as those reached by Roberts.[L] That Bastian had obtained
bacteria after boiling, admitted of no doubt, and he naturally clung to
this fact as encouraging; others regarded it as only misleading. Bastian
maintained that the alkali had a positive power of originating life, and
stated one hundred and twenty-two degrees Fahr. as favorable to the
appearance of life. Roberts took ten examples of sterilized urine, and
twenty-nine examples of fermentible liquids which had remained over
from the earlier experiments of 1873-74, and these thirty-nine examples
were subjected to careful experiment and observation. In the first ten
cases, the tube was heated in oil for fifteen minutes up to two hundred
and eighty degrees Fahr.; the ten tubes were then set in a warm place
(from seventy degrees to eighty degrees Fahr.) for a fortnight; the
contents were transparent; the alkali was then allowed to mingle with
it, and the tubes were placed in an incubator kept at a temperature of
one hundred and fifteen degrees Fahr.; at the end of two days there was
a sediment, and the liquor was clear; the tubes were replaced in the
incubator, the temperature being raised to one hundred and twenty-two
degrees Fahr. as recommended by Dr. Bastian; there they continued for
three days; they were then withdrawn and placed under the microscope,
but no trace of living organism was found either in the fluid or in the
deposit under it. The twenty-nine cases, including a variety of
vegetable and animal preparations were next treated in like manner, and
with like results. Tyndall's experiments were reported to the Royal
Society of London at the same time, with exactly the same result. M.
Pasteur had previously reported to the Academy of Sciences in Paris to
the same effect. It was thus proved by a mass of evidence that if proper
precautions were taken to destroy germinal forms, no mixture of alkali
with acid, whatever the variety of materials selected, was adequate to
produce life.

A few months later than the communications of Roberts and Tyndall, that
is, May, 1877, the results of ten years' experiment, first by Mr.
Dallinger himself, and thereafter by Mr. Dallinger and Mr. Drysdale
conjointly, were communicated to the Royal Institution, London, on "the
origin and development of minute and lowly life forms.[A]" The purpose
of these experiments was to watch the growth of the minutest germs,
capable of being seen only under a powerful microscope, putting to
actual test their tenacity of life. The largest objects were
one-thousandth of an inch, the smallest, the four-thousandth of an inch.
Six distinct forms were selected for observation, and their history was
made out. A magnifying power of five thousand degrees was used. In the
glairy fluid a monad larger than usual seized on a smaller; they became
fused after swimming about together; the single object then appeared a
motionless spec; this proved to be a sac, from which at the close of a
period varying from ten to thirty-six hours, it burst, and young spores
became visible in the fluid, which were kept under observation till they
reached maturity. Special interest was connected with these observations
not only as illustrating the growth of spores, or germs; but as allowing
application of the test of heat at different stages of growth. When this
test was applied, it was found that one hundred and forty degrees Fahr.
was sufficient to cause the death of adults, whereas the young spores
were able to live notwithstanding the application of three hundred
degrees Fahr. for ten minutes. In this direction fresh discovery was to
be made.

In June 1877,--a month later,--Professor Tyndall gave the record of
further researches.[M] These presented additional results as to degrees
of temperature requisite for destroying microscopic organisms. It had
been already shown that alkaline liquids are more difficult to
sterilize, than acid liquids; it was further shown that the death point
was higher in air, than in water; for Professor Tyndall extended his
researches to air, as well as liquid. First dealing with the fluid form,
he found germs possessed of vitality so singular that five or six hours
of boiling did not destroy them, and in one case eight hours was
insufficient for the purpose. In this connection, he came to the
conclusion that some germinal orders were more easily destroyed than
others.

When dealing with bacteria, he found that they differed from other forms
in this, that they rose to the air as if it were a requisite, whereas
other germs, such as those belonging to the process of fermentation,
could exist without oxygen. This led to an additional form of
experiment, with the view of deciding whether bacteria could be
destroyed by withdrawal of air; and if so, whether the bacteria would
reappear after the existing microscopic life had been stifled. Tyndall
began by applying the air-pump. Under this process the bacteria were
enfeebled greatly, but not destroyed. Thereafter Sprengel pumps were
used, by means of which the air dissolved in the infusions was
withdrawn, as well as that diffused in the spaces above. In numerous
cases there was success in destroying the germs by removal of the air in
this way without any boiling process. In these cases, the air was
carefully restored, precautions being adopted to guard against admission
of germinal forms, and in no case did life reappear in the infusions. As
in the more common style of experiment, the warmth suitable could not
charm the life back again; so in this, the restoration of oxygen, could
not secure restoration of life.

Thus evidence from all sides directed surely to the conclusion that the
alleged discovery of "spontaneous generation" was a delusion, the result
of hasty and insufficient experiment. Dr. Bastian, nevertheless, stuck
heroically to his original position, and came into conflict with M.
Pasteur of Paris, by means of a communication which the English
Professor had sent to the Academy of Sciences in July of the previous
year, 1876. In the beginning of 1877, M. Pasteur threw down an explicit
challenge to Professor Bastian, which resulted in the appointment of a
commission to observe the experiments and adjudicate. With this
terminates the history of nearly ten years of curious and singular
investigation, and Dr. Bastian himself has supplied the history of the
closing scene, laying open the whole correspondence to public
investigation, as if he were unconscious of the complete demolition of
his favorite theory of "spontaneous generation." The 15th of July, 1877,
witnessed the close of a battle he had been fighting against steadily
increasing odds, and which he had begun in June, 1870. Dr. Bastian's
position was "that a solution of boiled potash caused bacteria to appear
in sterile urine at fifty degrees Cent., added in a quantity sufficient
to neutralize the latter." These he regarded as the physico-chemical
conditions for spontaneous generation of bacteria.

The challenge from M. Pasteur was in these terms;--"I defy Dr. Bastian
to obtain, in the presence of competent judges, the result to which I
have referred with sterile urine, on the sole condition that the
solution of potash which he employs be pure, _i. e._, made with pure
water and pure potash, both free from organic matter. If Dr. Bastian
wishes to use a solution of impure potash, I freely authorize him to
take any in the English or any other Pharmacopœia, being diluted or
concentrated, on the sole condition that that solution shall be raised
beforehand to one hundred and ten degrees for twenty minutes, or to one
hundred and thirty degrees for five minutes."

A Commission was appointed by the Academy, and Dr. Bastian agreed to
appear before it, but only on conditions he laid down greatly
restricting the range of inquiry. He ignored the first and most
searching form of M. Pasteur's challenge; claimed that the adjudication
of the Commission should be only on the second; and further stated that
if the Commission were "to express an opinion upon the interpretation of
the fact attested, and upon its bearings on 'the germ theory of
fermentation,' or 'spontaneous generation,'" he would respectfully
decline to take part in this wider inquiry. The Commission refused to be
restricted to the worst form of the experiment, and to be bound to
withhold an opinion as to its bearing on the question of "spontaneous
generation." Dr. Bastian went to Paris, but the members of the
Commission declined to deal with less than the challenge given, and the
meeting was never properly constituted. "Thus ended," as Dr. Bastian has
said, "the proceedings of this remarkable Commission of the French
Academy." The proceedings ended before they had begun. Dr. Bastian by
his restrictions, surrendered the real question at issue, and
practically acknowledged that he would not submit it to the judgment of
the Commission. He sought only testimony as to his own form of
experiment, which there was then good reason to know was accurate,
because M. Pasteur had stated a temperature too low, and a time too
short, but which was at the same time an experiment of no scientific
value for establishing "spontaneous generation." Thus ended a battle
which had been protracted long after it was to all observers manifestly
lost.

The discussion thus narrated may be easily overestimated, but there
seems even more risk that the manifest failure should lead to an
oversight of the value of the protracted investigations. These convey
lessons of special value to scientific inquirers on the one hand, and to
theologians on the other. They are of great value for illustrative
purposes in such a course of lectures as the present, and that because
they provide needful training for intelligent observation of the advance
of science.

The promulgation of the development theory of species has given a
conception of the unity of organic life in the world, which even in its
most modified form has an imposing grandeur. Influenced by this,
scientific men are naturally concerned to make out, if possible, some
connection between inorganic and organic being. To work at this, is part
of the inevitable task of science, even though the result should be only
to establish the helplessness of science in dealing with it.

We have chemical and dynamical theories of life which stimulate
repetition of experiments, in the hope that some grand discovery may be
made. Those just described present a curious illustration. In the
circumstances, we can well understand the persistence with which Dr.
Bastian clung to his supposed discovery of the physico-chemical
conditions for production of living organism.

Science finds in these experiments a fresh lesson of the need for
caution, guarding against the hampering influence of popular notions, as
in reference to the probable effects of the boiling process. For if the
experiments have proved a failure so far as support to a theory of
spontaneous generation is concerned, they have revealed a tenacity of
life belonging to the lowest microscopic organisms, far beyond higher
organic forms, and the consequent weakness of ordinary human devices in
struggling against the development of such germs. These experiments also
emphasize the need for attention to the laws of rational procedure, as
well as to skill in experimental observation, if science is to be
exempted from needless toils.

Theology has here also a lesson of patience, for it may well leave
science to do its own work, undisturbed by apprehensions as to possible
consequences to morality and religion. All that the telescope can
reveal, and the microscope can make known, through years of
experimenting, we wish to have discovered, for only thus shall we come
to understand the world's lessons of wisdom and power lying far beyond
the range of our unaided vision. All the churches of Christ have reason
to hail the extension of scientific knowledge. Those who set high
account on patient interpretation of the written Revelation, have reason
to value this laborious reading out of the lessons written in the book
of Nature.

A wider and more general result may be expected than that which bears
directly on the relations of science and religion. All intelligent
readers of scientific discussions will find discipline from pondering
these experiments. They illustrate the toil connected with scientific
research, the risks which beset such inquiry, and the limits of
scientific investigations. There lies in these experiments a warning of
the constant need for falling back not only on the laws of evidence, but
also on the laws of reason. The mere conception of "spontaneous
generation," rigidly interpreted, were a curiosity, coming wonderfully
near a contradiction of scientific thought itself, which seeks for
causes, and repudiates uncaused occurrences. There may naturally enough
be a discovery of the chemical elements belonging to definite types of
organism, or of the form and measure of energy operating in life. Even
when surmising "that possibly we may by the help of physical principles,
especially that of the dissipation of energy, sometime attain to a
notion of what constitutes life, mere vitality, nothing higher,"
Professor Tait has thought it needful to add, "but let no one imagine
that, should we ever penetrate this mystery, we shall thereby be enabled
to produce, except from life, even the lowest form of life."[N] If it
were suggested that physico-chemical elements could originate life,
chemistry would easily supply the ingredients. If it were hinted that
reliance might be placed exclusively on the action of air or of heat for
producing living organism from inorganic matter, this were to fall back
on the old elemental philosophy of ancient Greece, which the thought of
Greece easily repudiated without the aid of experimental science.

Attention is, however, here concentrated on the failure of these
experiments meant to establish "spontaneous generation," and in this
failure we find illustration of the fact that supposed conflicts between
science and religion are often misunderstandings and nothing more, based
on unreliable experiments or unwarranted expectations.

One other fact deserves to be recorded and placed in companionship with
that just stated, that some of the alleged conflicts between science and
religion are delusively so described, on account of misunderstanding or
misrepresentation of religion. They are fictitious articles, requiring
to be properly branded, and quietly laid aside. A single illustration
may suffice, taken from Dr. Draper's _History of the Conflict between
Religion and Science_, which is easily accessible, and reasonably claims
some attention in connection with the present subject. The criticism
here offered is not meant to carry a general condemnation of the book.
This work includes a vast deal more than it's title suggests; in the
midst of much that is extraneous, there is not a little of valuable
historical matter written in a clear and attractive style. The book is,
however, in many parts misleading, often by its style suggesting that
the author has allowed himself to be carried away in his eagerness to
make out serious conflict. The plan of the book is hardly compatible
with fairness. This may be illustrated by reference to the grounds for
selecting illustrations of Christianity. Our author says, "In speaking
of Christianity reference is generally made to the Roman Church, partly
because its adherents compose the majority of Christendom, partly
because its demands are the most pretentious, and partly because it has
commonly sought to enforce those demands by the civil power."[O] In view
of these explanations, it may be in a sense satisfactory, as suggesting
more harmony between science and religion than the general tenor of the
book conveys, that Professor Draper has "had little to say" respecting
the Protestant and Greek Churches. But the reasons for making the Roman
division of the Church representative of the whole are far from
satisfactory. It is as if one were bent on fighting, but determined
always to select the weakest antagonist to be found. Nor is the case
improved by the defence offered. Dr. Draper says, "In thus treating the
subject, it has not been necessary to pay much regard to more moderate
or intermediate opinions, for, though they may be intrinsically of great
value, in conflicts of this kind it is not with the moderates, but with
the extremists, that the impartial reader is mainly concerned. Their
movements determine the issue."[P] This is, I think, an unwise
conclusion. Extremists may determine the erratic deflections of a
movement; they do not decide its issues. They discover the heat, rather
than the thought, involved in intellectual conflict. They contribute to
vortex movement, rather than onward.

In consequence of his plan of procedure, Dr. Draper gives often a
misleading view of the relative positions of religion and science. A
reference to Chapter VI. will afford illustration. The subject is,
"Conflict Respecting the Nature of the World." The two prominent
contrasts placed at the head of this chapter are these:--"Scriptural
view of the world; the earth a flat surface: scientific view; the earth
a globe." These are, indeed, complete contrasts; but the question is,
Are they accurately stated? Is there any warrant for saying that
Scripture teaches that the earth is a flat surface? Most Bible readers
of the present day will take this as quite a discovery. That there was
long and earnest discussion of the question whether the earth was flat
or a globe, is certain. But it is erroneous to refer to Scripture as the
source of the former position. The opening of the chapter sufficiently
disposes of the suggestion. Dr. Draper says,--"An uncritical observation
of the aspect of nature persuades us that the earth is an extended level
surface which sustains the dome of the sky, a firmament dividing the
waters above from the waters beneath; that the heavenly bodies--the sun,
the moon, the stars--pursue their way moving from east to west, their
insignificant size, and motion round the motionless earth, proclaiming
their inferiority. Of the various organic forms surrounding man none
rival him in dignity, and hence he seems justified in concluding that
every thing has been created for his use--the sun for the purpose of
giving him light by day, the moon and stars by night. Comparative
theology shows that this is the conception of nature universally adopted
in the early phase of intellectual life. It is the belief of all nations
in all parts of the world in the beginning of their civilization."[Q]

In determining the relations of religion and science it is impossible to
accept a passage so general, and full of mixed references as this. There
is, indeed, no reason to complain of statements as to the general
impressions resulting from "an uncritical observation" of nature, and of
the testimony which may be drawn from "comparative theology." Such
references are to be valued, as belonging to an important branch of
inquiry; but they are not to be mixed up with statements concerning
Scripture teaching. Such commingling leads to confusion, and deprives a
discussion of historical accuracy and scientific precision. In view of
the immense practical, as well as scientific interests involved, it is
needful to guard against loose statements encouraging a belief in
conflict between religion and science, where no such conflict exists.
The passage here selected is taken as an example, and its criticism will
indicate what claims religion has a right to make upon scientific men in
their management of such discussions. It may be that with equal reason a
similar claim can be turned upon defenders of religion in view of their
criticisms of scientific discussions. But the real value of such
investigations, from whatever side they come, depends upon accurate and
guarded statement. It is to be feared, however, that Dr. Draper's theory
that "extremists determine the issue," may tempt him to favor a
different rule.

To state that the scriptural view of the world is, that "the earth is a
flat surface," is misrepresentation. And the variety of form into which
this statement is thrown throughout the chapter makes it greatly worse.
Thus our author speaks of "the flat figure of the earth, as revealed in
the Scriptures,"[R] as if this quasi-scientific statement were part of
Bible revelation. Again he speaks of "the theological doctrine of the
flatness of the earth" being irretrievably overthrown.[S] Once more,
where speaking of the Copernican system of astronomy, he speaks of
Copernicus not only as influenced by his exposure to punishment from the
Roman Church, but as being "aware that his doctrines were totally
opposed to revealed truth."[T] These successive statements involve
additional exaggeration.

Our author gives no references which the reader may examine for himself.
There can be little doubt that he points to the exceedingly grand and
impressive passage at the opening of the book of Genesis. But in that
passage there is nothing to support the statement that "the flat figure
of the earth" is part of Bible revelation. That the earth has been
supposed flat, and that this is really taught in Scripture, are two very
different things. The Bible which says, that "the earth was without form
and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep," and records the
will of the Supreme Ruler at a later stage in these words, "And God said
let the waters under the heaven be gathered together into one place, and
let the dry land appear,"[U] does something quite the opposite of
teaching that "the earth is a flat surface."

Nor do the Scriptures teach that "the earth sustains the dome of the
sky." In remote times such an opinion as to the resting-place for the
great dome had its supporters. But there is no pretext for attributing
the teaching of this to the Bible. The scriptural statement is "God made
the firmament, and divided the waters which were under the firmament
from the waters which were above the firmament; and it was so. And God
called the firmament Heaven." There is no reader of these words, even if
he have only "an uncritical observation of the aspect of nature," who
can suppose that the "firmament" here means "the dome of the sky." This
statement places certain waters "_above_ the firmament," and there is no
one who is at once a reader of the Bible, and an observer of nature, who
thinks of the clouds as above the sky; but every one knows that there
is an expanse which bears these water treasures far up from the earth's
surface. The word rendered "firmament,"[V] from the Vulgate
_firmamentum_, really means "expanse," and most naturally and obviously
refers to the atmosphere surrounding the earth, upon which the clouds
are borne aloft, and carried to and fro. Taking into account the want of
scientific knowledge of the structure of the earth in far past ages, and
the representations inconsistent with facts which found currency, the
true marvel is that the statements of Scripture so simply and naturally
harmonize with discoveries not made till the sixteenth century of the
Christian era. This is a marvel which will more deeply impress us the
longer it is pondered.

If we extend our consideration to the cruder notions which found
acceptance in the dark ages, such as that to which Bruno referred, that
the earth is a flat surface, _supported on pillars_, the scriptural
evidence pled in its favor appears grotesquely inadequate. The passages
are these. First stands Hannah's outburst of devotional feeling on the
occasion of presenting her son Samuel before the Lord. In magnifying the
greatness of God, she says, "the pillars of the earth are the Lord's,
and he hath set the world upon them."[W] Next come the utterances of
Job, when enlarging on the power of the Almighty. In one of his replies
to his irritating counsellors, when speaking of the works of Jehovah, he
says, "which shaketh the earth out of her place, and the pillars thereof
tremble."[X] In another passage of similar construction, he says of God,
"He hath compassed the waters with bounds, until the day and night come
to an end. The pillars of heaven tremble, and are astonished at his
reproof."[Y] There is no Bible reader who can readily fall into such an
obvious mistake as to treat these highly figurative utterances, as if
they were formal revelations concerning the structure of the universe.
As well might we, in reading the words of Paul concerning the position
and influence of prominent disciples in the early church, in which he
says that James, Cephas, and John "seemed to be pillars," proceed to
deduce from this statement the revelation that the spiritual kingdom is
a flat surface on which are based the pillars upholding the heavenly
kingdom into which the Saviour has entered.

This short reference to the structure and relative position of the
earth, will suffice to illustrate the fact that in dealing with the
alleged conflicts between religion and science, it is needful to cast
aside a number of manufactured difficulties, which do not arise from
legitimate interpretation of Scripture. The particular criticism here
introduced is adopted for a general purpose,--to lessen complications,
and secure a proper understanding of the actual relation of the Bible to
scientific research.

From a very early period in the history of scientific inquiry, it has
been more or less clearly recognized that the Bible is not a
science-revelation, but a revelation of religious truth and duty,
discovering the true ideal and destiny of man in fellowship with God.
Let us have it kept clear on both sides, that there is no divine
revelation of scientific truth. Nature is its own revelation, and the
only revelation, whose secrets must be laboriously sought out by
successive generations of investigators, from all of whom is required
patient, persevering research, with undeviating and single love of
truth. Those early inquirers who found themselves in painful contact
with the persecuting power of the Roman Church, such as Galileo, and
Bruno, recognized to some extent that conflict with the Church and
conflict with the Bible were not exactly identical. And those of us who
are clearly and resolutely on the side of religious faith and religious
life, have need to ponder this lesson of history, that those defending
the Bible have not always been guided by its teaching in their defence,
and have not always fully apprehended the Bible teaching on the subject
with which their efforts were concerned.

But what we most need in these days to keep conspicuous is the true view
of the Bible as a professed revelation from God. It does not profess to
be a revelation of facts such as scientific appliances are adequate to
ascertain, while it does profess to discover facts both as to the
universe and as to man, which science can not approach. It is not a
history of the earth, but it includes within it, historical records of
events closely connected with man's moral and spiritual well-being. It
does not train man "to regard himself as the principal object of the
care of Nature";[Z] it does not even suggest thought in this direction,
but it teaches that God cares for righteousness more than he cares for
material things; that man as a being of flesh and blood is unspeakably
insignificant, his life being "even a vapor that appeareth for a little
time, and then vanisheth away";[AA] that his spiritual life, in the love
of God and in fellowship with him, is immeasurably great, the purpose of
the Bible concerning man, as revealed by Jesus Christ, God's Son, being
this, that man shall be like to God in moral purity.

From these few statements it may readily appear what is the attitude of
the Bible towards science. It leaves man to his own research for the
structure of science in all its divisions; it proffers no help in such
work; but has a range of application quite beyond the area traversed by
science.

In this way we find the natural interpretation of inevitable conflicts
in the past, which have been roughly and often inaccurately described as
conflicts between religion and science. These conflicts were in the
strictest sense inevitable, simply because thought and discovery have
been progressive; and it is impossible for those not personally engaged
in research to accept without reluctance new representations of familiar
facts. If men long continued unwilling to admit that the earth moves
round the sun, and that the rising and setting of the luminary are
delusions, while the succession of light and darkness is real, we can
not wonder at this slowness of assent, or charge it to the power of
religious thought. The conflict was not between religion and science,
but between popular notions and scientific observations. Often in the
earlier periods of awakened thought, following the slumber of the middle
ages, the contest accidentally wore a religious aspect, but it was so
only because the higher intelligence and the general work of instruction
belonged to the religious orders.

If, however, we give due weight to historical facts, it will appear that
the rectification of common thought as to the form of the earth, and its
place in relation to the heavenly bodies, was achieved through the
conflict of a later science with an earlier. Science has first taught
one thing, and then abandoned its old positions to teach something
different, and if religious thought was at times found in the ranks of
the antagonists of change, it was only as the popular thought was
opposed, and as all had been placed in opposition by the earlier forms
of scientific teaching. We rightly interpret the facts, only in
representing that science both makes its own difficulties and clears
them; first presents the imperfect or erroneous views which are to be
swept away, and afterwards trains men to more careful sifting of
evidence and exercise of thought, thereby clearing and widening its own
path.

Thus are we enabled to trace the boundaries of two distinct regions of
thought, closely related, yet clearly separated. Science can not do the
work of religion, nor can religion do the work of science. Each must
fulfil its own part, and abide its proper tests. Science has its own
place and its own task. Religion will simply wait upon science, leaving
it to make its own discoveries, gladly accepting each one of them as it
is established. The most reverend students of the Bible do not regard it
as a revelation presenting a key to scientific research; though they do
not hesitate to express their conviction that neither in express
statement, nor in the spirit inculcated, does it place itself in
antagonism to the search for truth, or the claims of any conclusions
which can be legitimately described as philosophical or scientific. But
its upholders press this consideration specially on scientific men, that
the Bible has this title to be regarded as a book for all nations and
for all ages, that it has proved itself intelligible to men in ages the
least enlightened, and has also maintained a commanding influence in
ages specially distinguished and favored by the advance of science and
the widening power of literature.

FOOTNOTES:

[E] Science can not reach the beginning of things.

[F] See _Disease Germs, their Nature and Origin_, by Beale. London,
Churchill; Philadelphia, Lindsay and Blaikiston.

[G] _Nature_ vol. xvi. p. 276.

[H] Examples of the bacteria magnified 1,800, 3,000, and 5,000 times are
given in Plate I. p. 16, of Beale's _Disease Germs_.

[I] For Dr. Bastian's experiments see _Times_, April 13, 1870; and
_Nature_, June and July, 1870.

[J] Contribution to Royal Society of London. _Nature_ xv. p. 302, Feb.
I, 1877.

[K] _Ib._

[L] _Nature_ vol. xv. p. 302, and Appendix II.

[M] _Nature_ vol. xvi. p. 127.

[N] _Recent Advances in Physical Science_, p. 24.

[O] _Preface_ x.

[P] _Preface_ x.

[Q] _History of the Conflict between Religion and Science_, by J. W.
Draper, M.D., LL.D., Professor in the University of New York, 12 ed., p.
152.

[R] _History of the Conflict between Religion and Science_, p. 163.

[S] _Ib_. p. 165.

[T] _Ib_. p. 167.

[U] Genesis i. 2, 9.

[V] רָקׅיַע, Raqia, from רָקַע, to spread out.

[W] I Samuel ii. 8.

[X] Job xi. 6.

[Y] Job xxvi. 10, 11.

[Z] _Conflict between Religion and Science_, p. 172.

[AA] James iv. 14.




LECTURE III.

INORGANIC ELEMENTS IN THE UNIVERSE.


In view of the wide range of materials at command, and the limits of the
present inquiry, there is need for some definite method of selection,
which may secure a careful, though necessarily very general survey of
the whole ground. That which seems to give most promise of meeting these
requirements is the contemplation in order of the great leading
conceptions which have received prominence within recent years in
consequence of continued research under strictly scientific methods.
These may be said to constitute the scientific revolution of the
nineteenth century, giving occasion for reconstructing the popular
conceptions of the universe. They claim to mark the truly scientific
period, inaugurated by command of instruments never before within reach,
allowing an immense advance in the modes of research, and placing the
secrets of nature within compass of human observation as they had never
been before. The intellectual conditions for observation and inference
no doubt remain simply what they have been; the laws of intelligent
inquiry are the same, determining sufficiency of evidence, and
trustworthiness in reasoning; but the range of observation has been
indefinitely multiplied, and things transcending previous conjecture
have become matters of certain observation. The telescope and the
microscope provided for this revolution. They brought the universe
within range as it had never previously been, and thus making an
enormous addition to the sum of human knowledge, suggested new modes of
contemplating and explaining the facts which had been familiar through
all the ages. There can be no reversal of all this--no return on the old
methods. Nor can there be reversal in the sense of overturning presently
recognized conclusions. There are indeed hosts of theories of which it
may be safely predicted that they will be overturned and forgotten; but
a veritable knowledge has been acquired, which will certainly be
preserved among the treasures of the race. We now know the constituent
elements of many forms of existence, and the laws which determine change
and continuance, as these were never previously known; and thus there
has been vastly extended for us the range of recognized facts.

To this advance, the whole human race has to adapt itself. It is not
merely one class of men, but all; not merely one department of thought,
but all departments which must adjust themselves to this new order of
things. Religious thought is not thrown into any singular position; it
merely shares in the common experience, that is, the common advantage.
And we may say religious thought is most prepared for the mighty
revolution. This startling success in unlocking the mysteries of nature;
this sudden accession to the wealth of our ideas, apt to have an
intoxicating effect upon those who value science and nothing higher,
awakens reverence and gratitude in the religious thinker. The greater
the application of human intelligence to the study of nature, and the
greater the discoveries which reward such labor, so much greater becomes
the demand upon intelligence in accounting for the origin and
continuance of the universe, involving innumerable phases of activity
never to be witnessed by ordinary observers who are absorbed in their
daily avocations. The supernatural is not more remote from us by such
discoveries as science can boast, but is in reality brought nearer. The
fancy that enlarged knowledge of the natural, is steadily driving before
it all recognition of the supernatural, is one of which thinking men
will by and by be ashamed. That men should consider the discovery of the
component parts of certain forms of existence, or of the laws of well
known movements, as a _final_ disposal of the demands of intelligence,
only shows how little the intellect of inquirers has been prepared for
appreciation of the full demands of reason. In this connection, it
should be remembered that the most profoundly scientific, have been the
most cautious, least inclined to boast of discovery, or to anticipate
the overthrow of the deeper convictions of the moral and spiritual life,
which, as the necessaries of life in all ages, are least liable to be
touched by any thing belonging to the region of science. Even after
every allowance has been made for sanguine and passionate temperament,
and for reaction against untenable forms of religious belief among
opponents of religion,[AB] the award can not be otherwise than
suggested. The facts are already on record bearing on the most testing
period,--the transition from an old and restricted knowledge, to a new
and greatly enlarged knowledge of the universe,--and the roll of names
standing high in the annals of science, while devoted to religious faith
and practice, may be accepted as a reasonable forecast of coming
results.[AC]

That greater knowledge of nature by discovery of the natural causes in
operation, intensifies the rational demand for recognition of
Supernatural Intelligence, is the position to be maintained throughout
this argument. The most rigid test of this position is to be found in
the outstanding scientific conceptions concerning inorganic and organic
nature, and the contrasts recognized between lower and higher organisms.
The order most suitable for application of this test is progress upwards
from the most subordinate forms of existence to the most complex
organism. A beginning will, therefore, be male with the inorganic world,
after which lower organisms may be considered, after that the relative
place of higher organisms, and finally the whole class of questions
concerning the powers and requirements of mind. In each of these
relations, I desire to inquire into the reasonableness of our
acknowledgment of the supernatural.

As the world presents a vast range of inorganic existence, we have to
consider the most prominent scientific conceptions concerning inorganic
elements, as these afford a general view of the material structure of
the earth.

Concentrating on this region of observation, and taking no account,
meanwhile, of the manifold phases of life, there are two forms of
existence to be recognized, Matter and Energy. Matter is solid, visible,
tangible; Energy is invisible and intangible, but measurable by the work
it is capable of doing. The one may be represented as the solid inert
mass, the other as the moving power whose action is the source of
continual change. This duality we must regard as essential to the
structure of the universe, for it is impossible to identify the two, so
as to regard the world as merely a mass of matter. This duality is now
commonly admitted as the result of recent scientific investigations. To
quote the words of Professor Tait,--"It is only within comparatively
recent years that it has been generally recognized that there is
something else in the physical universe which possesses to the full as
high a claim to objective reality as matter possesses, though it is by
no means so tangible, and therefore the conception of it was much longer
in forcing itself upon the human mind."[AD] This is Energy. "Just as
gold, lead, oxygen, etc., are different kinds of matter, so sound,
light, heat, etc., are now ranked as different forms of energy."[AE]

Here, then, is one of the conspicuous results of recent scientific
research to which all our thoughts and theories need to adapt
themselves. And it must be obvious without argumentation, that
theological thought will not experience any serious shock, or even
jolt, in passing over to this new line of rails prepared for it.

Taking these two, Matter and Energy, as distinct, let us concentrate for
a little upon each of them separately. Let us first turn attention upon
MATTER. This form of existence is most easily contemplated, as most
directly presenting itself to observation. A piece of metal may best
serve for illustration, such as the _iron_ out of which we form so many
of our industrial implements. This metal may be mingled through earth or
rock; it may be held in solution in water, or made to flow out in liquid
form from the furnace; it may be hardened either in the more brittle
form of cast iron, or in the more rigid form known as malleable; but
through all these changes the material is the same. Further, suppose we
were to receive a quantity of ore, and for the sake of experiment were
to have part presented in each one of these forms, the quantity would
continue exactly the same as was originally received. To quote again
from the same author:--"The grand test of the reality of what we call
Matter, the proof that it has an objective existence, is its
indestructibility and uncreatability--if the term may be used--by any
process at the command of man. The value of this test to modern
chemistry can scarcely be estimated. In fact we can barely believe that
there could have existed an exact science of chemistry had it not been
for the early recognition of this property of matter; nor in fact would
there be the possibility of a chemical analysis, supposing that we had
not the assurance by enormously extended series of previous experiments,
that no portion of matter, however small, goes out of existence, or
comes into existence in any operation whatever. If the chemist were not
certain that at the end of his operations, provided he has taken care to
admit nothing and to let nothing escape, the contents of his vessels
must be precisely the same in quantity as at the beginning of the
experiment, there could be no such thing as chemical analysis."[AF]

If now we press our inquiry further, seeking some explanation of the
ultimate nature or structure of matter, that is, the common physical
characteristics of matter in all its forms, whether air, water, or solid
mass, science has no certain answer to give. There is no theory of the
ultimate structure of matter which has secured general acceptance. On
the contrary, there is the acknowledgment that the complexity of the
problem is so great as completely to baffle the present resources of
science. There have been discussions, and careful investigations as to
the _divisibility of matter_, and it has been generally admitted on
rational grounds, that there must be in all matter particles or atoms so
minute as to be quite beyond the range of the microscope. This has led
to the acceptance of an _atomic theory_ as in one form or another
applicable to the structure of matter, _belief_ in such particles or
molecules being a natural result of scientific procedure. I say
_belief_, for the existence of such ultimate atoms is not established on
experimental evidence, and yet is generally acknowledged; for it is
clearly enough recognized that there is a region of faith for science,
as for theology, just as there must be for all ordinary exercise of
human intelligence. Besides the actual divisibility of matter, we have
in the same connection to consider its _compressibility_, for the
recognized facts as to compression of iron, for example, or of any
metal, seem to imply that there are certain particles related to each
other, which can be pressed in upon each other, or brought into nearer
proximity. There is, however, a clear limit to compressibility, as there
is to divisibility of matter. Even if this be granted, however, we are
still without a scientific account of the ultimate structure of matter.
This is still a perplexity to be handed on to future workers. There may,
indeed, seem to be promise of aid in the analysis of different forms of
matter, as in the reduction of water to its constituent gases by the
action of a galvanic battery; but such processes, however rich in
suggestiveness, are insufficient to advance the main inquiry. It is
oftentimes in this very class of experiments, that science at once
manifests its power, and discovers the limits which encircle and
restrain its efforts. It can decompose, what it can not recompose, thus
leaving difficulties as perplexing as before. And besides, even when by
analysis the ultimate parts or chemical constituents, of compound
substances have been discovered, science is unable to demonstrate that
the constituent elements are ultimately composed of distinct atoms, as
for example that oxygen and hydrogen are so constituted. We are thus
without a science of the ultimate nature of matter. There is, indeed,
the suggestion of Sir William Thomson that matter of all kinds may be
regarded as of a common nature, only variously compounded, filling space
in a fluid state, and that its compressibility can be accounted for on
the supposition that its ultimate forms are vortex rings capable of
compression and expansion like an india-rubber ball; but this can not be
regarded otherwise than as a bold conjecture, beset with a host of
difficulties both physical and mathematical which neither Thomson nor
any of his fellow-workers in physical science, professes to have yet
grappled with.

There are thus before us the chief results of physical science, as to
the nature of MATTER, when we specify that it is indestructible, that it
consists of ultimate molecules or atoms, and that its compressibility is
to be explained by pressure upon such atoms, or cohesion, or comparative
closeness of relation between them, this being greater in solids, less
in liquids, and least in gases.

From the structure of matter, we are led by science to the consideration
of ENERGY, as distinct from matter. These two stand in some respect in
contrast with each other. In taking a survey of the physical aspects of
the world, we can not limit attention to the mere mass, or to questions
bearing on its structure. Observation must now be turned on the
perpetual change going on in form, arrangement, and distribution of
materials. There is need for a science of all this, in accordance with
which the perpetual round of change may be reduced to order by reference
to causality and the laws of its operation. Thus we are introduced to
our ordinary conceptions concerning _position_, that is, the situation
or place of objects, or of masses of material, or even of worlds, to
each other; _motion_, or change of position, modifying or altering the
relations of objects; and _force_, that is the relative amount or
proportion of energy at work for the accomplishment of such changes as
those already mentioned. In these connections we are introduced to
recently formulated doctrines of _energy_, reached in searching for "the
cause which alters or tends to alter a body's natural state of rest," as
this problem was indicated in Newton's first law of motion. In the
earlier stages of inquiry, attention was directed mainly on the active
forces of nature, as these are recognized in operation, admitting of
calculation as to rate of movement on the one hand, and relative amount
of force on the other. Computations of this kind were necessarily
involved in research connected with the movements of the heavenly
bodies. When astronomical theory had been matured and a truly scientific
understanding of the solar system had been reached, physical science had
next to deal with the more general problem raised by the contemplated
forces of nature, having a reference at once wider and more minute. It
is not possible here to do more than give a very summary view of the
doctrine of energy, its mutations, dissipation, and conservation, as
developed through study of the laws of gravitation, electricity, light,
heat, etc., and now generally accepted. An outline will, however,
suffice for an understanding of the general conclusions.

Energy is the term now employed to designate every form of power
belonging to the physical world capable of doing work, and of being
estimated according to the comparative amount of work it can perform.
The whole phenomena of motion thus belong to this department of inquiry.
The first distinction here has been described as the difference between
_energy of position_ and _energy of motion_.[AG] Both of these must be
taken into account in order to have a full view of the facts. ENERGY OF
POSITION, is illustrated by a water-head, or reservoir, where an
accumulation of water is laid up in store, ready to be drawn upon for
motive power when machinery set up in a position somewhat lower is to be
brought into action and made to do the work for which it has been
constructed. ENERGY OF MOTION is seen when the storehouse of water is
opened and the rush of the current sweeps along the prepared channel
descending upon the great wheel, which sets in motion the whole
machinery. In such a case as this, the amount of work done by the
revolutions of the great wheel is an exact measure of the amount of
water which has passed to a lower level. Or let us suppose there is only
a limited supply in the water-head, and that there are no feeders, but
that the streamlets and springs from which it is supplied, have ceased
to flow, and let us suppose that the mill comes to a stand because of
failure of motive power, the amount of work done up to that moment is
the measure of the energy stored in the water-head before the sluice
was opened. This illustration indicates the mode of calculation to be
applied to energy in all its forms, including the great forces of
nature, before which human power is as nothing. Taking thus the
correlatives position and motion, we may regard the former as
preparation for the latter, for, as Professor Balfour Stewart has said,
"It is the fate of all kinds of energy of position to be ultimately
converted into energy of motion."[AH] On this account, energy of motion
most naturally exemplifies what we understand by energy; but on the
other hand what has been called the energy of position must be regarded
as a power distinctly calculable. If a stone be thrown into the air, the
energy expended in propelling it to a certain height, is the exact
measure of the energy expended in its descent. There is no need for
entering here upon the calculations of the relation between energy and
velocity, showing the exact proportion of the one to the other, or the
ratio of increase according to velocity, which is expressed in the
formula "that the energy varies as the square of the velocity," giving
us an exact measure of force.

Aided by the conceptions of position and motion, we take the next step
when we advance to _transmutation or conversion of energy_. What is made
visible to us by motion is the transference of energy from one object or
portion of matter to another. And this is the sole explanation of what
occurs. There is no such thing known to physical science as the origin
or creation of energy; all that is recognized is the disappearance of
energy from one position and its appearance in another. If work has been
done, energy was somewhere stored capable of doing it; a transmutation
has taken place; and the work accomplished is the record of the process.
In recognition of this, every machine is merely a more or less skilful
contrivance for transmuting energy into a form more convenient or
suitable for human purposes. The intelligence of man simply recognizes
the law of transmutation, and deals with the problems which arise
connected with the mechanical arrangements facilitating the process.

We next advance a further step, only to embrace another phase of the
same truth,--the complement of what has been already stated,--that is,
the _conservation of energy_. As we have seen, all that appears in
motion, is transmutation or conversion of energy; accordingly it
follows, that there is change of position, but no destruction of energy,
or absolute disappearance of it from existence. This generalization is
illustrated by a most attractive series of observations, introducing to
a fuller knowledge of the laws of heat. The natural tendency of ordinary
observation is to favor the opinion that when work has been done, energy
is spent or lost. And this popular notion, which has a kind of accuracy,
in so far as it is needful to make fresh draughts upon available
resources, is favored by reference to the economy of our bodily
existence constantly renewing its demand for fresh food supply. But this
popular tendency is easily explained by the circumstance that ordinary
observation makes much more account of the phenomena of motion, than of
the development of heat as a direct consequence. The machinist can not,
indeed, afford to make little of the consequences of friction; but the
ordinary observer makes much more of mass, and complication of
mechanical contrivance, and velocity of movement. From this he passes
easily to the fabric, or other production, sent forth; and then he may
occupy himself with calculations bearing on the expenditure for coals
and labor, along with tear and wear of machinery. But scientific
observation has concentrated much more on the evolution of heat, and out
of this has come the completed theory of the laws of energy. In this
way, it became matter of distinct calculation that friction and
percussion convert energy into heat.

Along with these observations we have to remark upon an attendant
conclusion, which has an important bearing on all speculation concerning
the destiny of the universe. I refer to the fact that transmutation of
energy involves a deterioration and dissipation of energy. As in the
history of energy, improved position adds to the advantage for the doing
of work, so transmutation tends to diminish the advantage or utility of
the energy for human purposes. Thus the energy expended in working a
machine gives return in a product of recognized value, but the energy
spent in contending with friction generates heat which is of no
practical value in respect of accomplished work. Or as the latter fact
has been stated by Professor Balfour Stewart, friction proves "itself
to be, not the destroyer of energy, but merely the converter of it into
some less apparent, and perhaps less useful form."[AI] In this
connection, scientific observation was directed upon the appearance of
heat simultaneously with the disappearance of visible energy. Gradually
the conception dawned upon scientific observers that _heat is a form of
motion_, and this has found general acceptance, although it is
impossible to give direct proof of the doctrine. The conclusion has been
supported by all the experiments of Davis, Rumford, Joule, Colding, and
Helmholtz. This conception having been launched as to the probable
explanation of heat, it immediately found, in accordance with the
analogies of scientific thought, a greatly extended circle of
application. Light and sound came to be classified with heat, as only
different forms of motion. It would involve too extended a range to
include here a detailed account of these experiments, or to consider
what is involved in dissipation of energy, as bearing upon a still wider
aspect of the order of things in the universe. I must, therefore, be
content with the reference just given to the conception of heat as a
form of molecular motion; and in doing so may revert to the
consideration already adduced, that this is another doctrine of
scientific _belief_, of which there is a constant tendency to increase
the number, as science widens the range of its inquiries and
speculations.

The outstanding general results of science as to the nature of energy
are now before us. All observations concerning motion only present to
view transmutations of energy, all of them imply that there is no such
thing as the origin of energy, and no such thing as its extinction.
There is indeed a constant tendency towards the degradation of energy,
and a constant equalizing process which may bring to an end the present
order of things in the universe. But the leading scientific conception
with which we have specially to deal is that expressed in the phrase,
"_Conservation of energy_," which must be regarded as completing our
view of inorganic existence along with the other doctrine of the
indestructibility of matter. As Professor Tait has expressed it,--"The
grand principle of conservation of energy, which asserts that no portion
of energy can be put out of existence, and no amount of energy can be
brought into existence by any process at our command, is simply a
statement of the invariability of the quantity of energy in the
universe,--a companion statement to that of the invariability of the
quantity of matter."[AJ]

The position is now reached at which it becomes possible to combine the
results of scientific research as to matter and energy into a harmonious
unity, with which to test the view of the world recognized by religious
thought. Religion as an intelligent and devotional acknowledgment of a
Supreme Being, involves a very clear and definite conception concerning
the origin of the universe and its continuance. What is thus implied
will be best indicated by negative as well as positive statements, in
some such form as the following. First, _negatively_, the world we
inhabit does not carry _within it_ any explanation of the origin of its
own existence; that is to say, neither the materials existing, nor the
forces operating, are sufficient to account for its origin; neither can
it have had existence without beginning. In _positive_ form, the
universe can be accounted for only by that which _transcends_ itself;
the supernatural is the key to the natural; Nature is a creation to be
attributed to an Intelligent First Cause.

Are science and religion here in harmony in the form and measure
compatible in the circumstances? This qualified and guarded form of the
question is obviously required, for religious thought does not profess
to be scientific, or in any sense authoritative as to the phenomena of
nature, that is, as to the facts which observation alone can ascertain,
or as to the immediate causes by which these facts are to be explained.
On the other hand, science is exclusively a knowledge of nature,
consisting of methodized observations concerning distinct orders of
facts, and rational inferences founded upon these. It can not in true
sense be concerned with the supernatural, but can only present
conclusions as to the order and processes of nature, which by subsequent
and independent exercise of our intelligence may be contemplated in
their relation to the conception of the supernatural, as Intelligent
First Cause. This subsequent exercise of thought, whether critical or
constructive, is more properly the task of philosophy, in prosecution of
those reflective and speculative exercises, which, proceeding from
scientific conclusions as accepted data, consider their intellectual
value as contributing towards a theory of the universe. Scientific men
will, of course, more or less readily pass over to take some share in
such philosophic speculation; just as religious men, purely under the
impulse of religious interests, will be more or less disposed to do, in
proportion to the range of their intellectual life. What is here said is
not intended as an argument for any restriction upon such speculation on
the part either of scientific or of religious men, for such questions
are common property, and the arguments bearing upon them are to be
tested by all. But it is of some consequence, specially in the present
unsettled and sensitive state of the public mind, that it be clearly
recognized that science is not itself responsible for the thoughts of
scientific men on these questions; and that religion is not responsible
for the thoughts of religious men upon them. Science can not determine
any thing as to a philosophy of the supernatural, any more than religion
can determine any thing as to a science of nature. Whether we take the
violent and even passionate antipathy to any acknowledgment of the
supernatural which is found in the Essays of Clifford, or the profoundly
reverential acknowledgment of the Deity in the writings and life of
Faraday, science is to be credited with neither. And so in like manner,
when we have violent denunciations of science professedly in the name of
religion, or intelligent appreciation of its high value from accredited
upholders of religious truth, religion itself is to be credited with
neither the one nor the other. This is a matter which comes within the
range of ordinary intelligence. It may indeed belong to philosophy to
formulate and develop the arguments in strict harmony with the
recognized laws of mind; but it belongs equally to all men to estimate
the general sweep and range of acquired knowledge as to the structure
and order of the universe, as bearing upon the more general conceptions
to be rationally entertained regarding its government. With this branch
of the subject, ordinary thought may readily deal without entanglement
in technicalities.

There is as we have seen a _duality_ of existence in the inorganic
structure of the world, and a continual succession of changes, on
account of the interaction of these two. Different forms of matter stand
in different relations; and these relations are being constantly
interchanged by the transmutation of energy. Thus taking the world as
presented to us, it has a constitution which requires for its
explanation that we go beyond every thing to be found within itself. The
matter in the universe can not account for the energy; nor can the
energy account for the matter; and the relations between the two must
find explanation in something higher than both. What their source may
be, science is incapable of telling; it can not contribute towards
satisfying the requirements of the law of causality in view of the
mutual relations of matter and energy which it has itself revealed. But
equally by what it has revealed, and by acknowledgment of its inability
to transcend the limits of its own discoveries, does it present harmony
with religious thought in the form and measure in which it is possible
that such harmony could be manifested. Discovering the objective
existence of matter and energy, and the laws in accordance with which
the latter acts upon the former, it presents an unsolved problem
affording the most direct and positive testimony possible to science in
support of the existence of a First Cause, transcending the universe
itself. How matter and energy came into being, it can not tell; but it
most explicitly declares that by no power existing and operating within
range of observation is it possible either to add to the sum of
existence, or in the least degree to diminish it. Religious thought
could expect nothing more direct and explicit in the form of scientific
testimony as confirmation of its fundamental position. Scientific
thought while dealing with inorganic existence could not, even by a
single line of approach, be brought nearer to the actual support of
religious belief.

Here the question may be raised,--May not the world have existed from
eternity? In the answer to this question there are several
considerations requiring to be distinguished. First, science has no
testimony to offer, inasmuch as it does not get beyond the area of laws
now operating. Second, the testimony of science concerning the world as
now existing is inconsistent with the supposition of its eternal
existence. The matter which is constantly operated upon by energy
distinct from itself, does not possess the property of self-subsistence;
neither does the energy which is constantly undergoing change. Continual
transition or change from one phase of existence, or set of relations,
to another, is a mark of the not-abiding, an evidence of subjection to,
and dependence on, what is beyond and above itself. The non-enduring, or
ever-changing, is constantly pointing to the ever-enduring.

Full understanding of the situation of things as discovered by science
will produce a much deeper impression on the public mind than has yet
been effected. The reasonableness of this expectation will readily
appear, if only some few of the positions be placed conspicuously in
view.

It is of special consequence to note that science has in this direction
_finished its work_, and reached its _ultimatum_, in demonstrating the
physical impossibility of either increasing or diminishing the existing
sum total of matter, or of energy. The conclusions are not such as can
be regarded as provisional, liable to be overreached, modified, or
enlarged, by what may afterwards be discovered. We are so much
influenced at present,--and scientific men share in the experience, as
well as others,--by the general and well-grounded expectation of the
unceasing advance of science, that it is peculiarly easy in sight of a
great general problem such as the origin and government of the world, to
overlook the significance of ultimate conclusions in given directions.
In this way, we too readily fall into the delusive tendency of regarding
accredited conclusions as still hanging in a measure of uncertainty, or
at least as having a dubious future before them, because they border
upon the region of the unknown so far as science is concerned, or upon a
realm of mystery, which science regards either with aversion, or with
cherished determination of attack. In the present singularly favorable
position of science, it is impossible for the public mind to escape this
tendency; but it becomes only the more imperative to distinguish as
occasion offers, those conclusions which are to be taken as final. This
is of immense consequence as bearing upon general conceptions concerning
the universe.

That matter can not be originated, and can not by even a single atom be
destroyed, is one of those ultimate statements, upon which physical
science itself relies as on a foundation. This is a universally
accredited truth, that "no portion of matter, however small, goes out of
existence or comes into existence in any operation whatever."[AK] The
wonderful chemical laboratory of living organism may change many forms
of matter into living tissue, but all returns again to its place in the
inorganic mass. Material may pass from one phase into another, but there
is nothing more than change. The sum total of material existence is
unaltered. To suggest the contrary,--and specially to do so in the name
of science,--were to bring science face to face with the conceptions
rejected as alien to its very nature; for to say that matter may be
originated, is to affirm _creation_; to say that it may be destroyed, is
to affirm the possibility of _annihilation_; and these two are beyond
the range of science, and if once admitted within its boundaries, they
would destroy science itself.

So it is when we pass over to the doctrine of energy. The same clear and
ultimate conclusion is proclaimed. The doctrine of the conservation of
energy is the _ultimatum_ on which physical science finds sure and firm
foothold. In those two ultimate positions of scientific research
concerning inorganic existence, religion finds support, and that of a
kind so powerful, that science itself depends upon its immovability.

There is, however, a further point connected with the doctrine of
energy, which deserves consideration as bearing on the tendency to
anticipate an indefinite line of progression in the history of this
world, that is, deterioration or degradation in the form of energy,
while it continues of equal amount. The efficient value of energy is
according to the possibilities of transformation or transmutation. But
its use implies limitation of the available forms, or steady
deterioration of value. "Thus the energy of the universe is, on the
whole, constantly passing from higher to lower forms, and therefore the
possibility of transformation is becoming smaller and smaller, so that
after the lapse of sufficient time all higher forms of energy must have
passed from the physical universe, and we can imagine nothing as
remaining, except those lower forms which are incapable, so far as we
yet know, of any further transformation."[AL] Such a statement of the
position, though it can not be regarded as an ultimate one in scientific
research, is so obviously a deduction from present knowledge that it
must to some extent modify prevailing conceptions. It may, indeed be
suggested that some catastrophe may terminate the present order of
things, and that some action of the law of gravitation may combine the
fragments of worlds, and give a fresh start with new combinations of
energy; but the bare suggestion of this implies a much wider range for
scientific research than any thing yet known to us, and at the same time
a larger demand upon intelligence in the control and regulation of what
must nevertheless seem to us violent catastrophes. Such speculation, if
it may warrantably find encouragement under purely scientific
conditions, religious thought will neither gainsay nor resist; but will
find itself in no perplexity to accept.

Waiving, however, all speculation as to the possible future of the
physical universe, we here concentrate attention on the past; we take
the most recent scientific testimony as to the structure of the physical
universe, as it bears on the problem concerning the origin of our
world. Here the testimony of science is clearly and unmistakably in
favor of the creation or absolute origin of matter and energy, in the
only form in which science can bear any testimony on the subject. It is,
of course, impossible that science should present direct testimony to
the fact of creation, as it is impossible that history should; for such
a fact as creation must be entirely beyond the range of science. But in
testifying to the indestructibility and uncreatability of matter under
the conditions capable of being investigated by observational science;
and in bearing the same testimony as to the energy in the world, it
offers all the support it is capable of offering to the reality of the
supernatural,--testifying to the dependence of nature on some power
altogether transcending itself. But here I prefer rather to use the
words of a purely scientific observer. When dealing with the doctrine of
energy, and specially with the consequences of dissipation of energy,
Professor Tait uses these words,--"As it alone is able to lead us, by
sure steps of deductive reasoning, to the necessary future of the
universe--necessary, that is, if physical laws remain forever
unchanged--so it enables us distinctly to say that the present order of
things has _not_ been evolved through infinite past time by the agency
of laws now at work; but must have had a distinctive beginning, a state
beyond which we are totally unable to penetrate; a state, in fact, which
must have been produced by other than the now visibly acting
causes."[AM] This is the utmost that science can say, bearing on the
great problem of the origin of the universe; and nothing more powerful
could be said in direct testimony to the reality of the supernatural,
and the reasonableness of Christian faith, thus shown to be in complete
harmony with science.

It is not here suggested that all scientific men would employ such
language as that now quoted, or even readily acquiesce in its use. I
have been careful to indicate, that a passionately excited antagonism to
any recognition of the supernatural is avowed by some scientific men.
Accordingly, it must be granted that the conclusion here stated is not
so manifest a deduction as to preclude denial. The testimony of the
senses commonly terminates dispute, but such testimony is not available
as to the reality of the supernatural. The only testimony that can be
given here must be of a different kind; and if there be some who refuse
to credit anything save what comes within range of the senses, or is
deducible directly and simply from what the senses make known, there is
no help for them. Neither science, nor philosophy, nor religion can
deliver them from the narrow round of materialism. But neither science,
nor philosophy, nor religion, can restrict itself to the testimony of
the senses. A deeper, and wider range of inquiry is demanded of the man
who would walk at large in the vast field spread out in nature. All
human life is subjected to the test of accepting evidence other than
that the senses supply. If some refuse to submit to this deeper and
wider test, narrowing their convictions accordingly, others are not to
be restricted in this way, nor are they to be influenced by such
determination even on the part of highly distinguished scientific men.
For, it can not be overlooked that this is not a question of science,
nor does it imply any thing but an ordinary exercise of intelligence.
The one test for the public mind is this,--Is it or is it not true that
not an atom of matter can be originated or destroyed? Is the doctrine
of the conservation of energy to be taken as scientifically
demonstrated? These things science must decide, and beyond these, all is
clear for ordinary intelligence. Of the testimony of science on these
two questions there is no doubt whatever. Religion, therefore, has no
conflict with science here; it simply accepts the teaching of science,
finding in it ample support for its fundamental position. What creation
really means, or how we can fittingly represent it to our minds, does
not in the least affect the question here under discussion, for these
are not points on which science can offer any testimony. Nor have the
defenders of religion any complaint to urge against the claims which
science makes to explain all that belongs to nature. But when those who
make the largest claims for science, acknowledge that science is baffled
here, their testimony gains in value by reason of the strength of their
antipathy to the acknowledgment of the miraculous. When from an
accredited scientific witness we have these words:--"The investigation
of nature does not shrink from enrolling life and the processes of life
in the world of the comprehensible," followed up by this explicit
statement, "We are foiled only at the conception of matter and
force";[AN] the claims of science are raised to the highest pitch; and
yet its insuperable limits are clearly defined. The defender of the
harmony of scientific with religious thought has nothing more to desire.
The very place where science comes to a halt, acknowledging that its
utmost boundary has been reached, is the place where it is demonstrated
that scientific thought and religious are not involved in real conflict.


FOOTNOTES:

[AB] These allowances may well be made for Professor Clifford, one of
the most extravagant assailants of religious faith.

[AC] Professor Tait in answer to Mr. Froude has advanced the evidence.
_International Review_, Nov. 1878, vol. v. No. 6. The collected papers
have been republished, _Atlas Series_, No. 11.

[AD] _Recent Advances in Physical Science_, by P. G. Tait, Professor of
Natural Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, p. 17.

[AE] _Ib_. p. 2.

[AF] _Recent Advances in Physical Science_, p. 14.

[AG] See Appendix III.

[AH] _The Conservation of Energy_, by Balfour Stewart, p. 26.

[AI] _The Conservation of Energy_, p. 36.

[AJ] _Recent Advances of Physical Science_, p. 17.

[AK] Tait's _Recent Advances_, p. 15.

[AL] _Recent Advances_, p. 20.

[AM] _Recent Advances_, p. 22.

[AN] _The Doctrine of Descent_, by Oscar Schmidt, p. 20.




LECTURE IV.

ORGANIZED EXISTENCE: LIFE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT.--(DARWIN'S "THEORY OF
EVOLUTION.")


In prosecuting our inquiry as to the most recent advances in science, we
pass now from inorganic to organic existence; from the testimony of
physicists, to that of zoölogists. This transition in itself starts a
scientific problem, beyond which we are carried onward to a distinct and
very complicated area of existence, higher in order, and pressing upon
attention an incalculable variety of details, exceedingly difficult to
harmonize. In the earlier stage of physical research, all observation
and experiment lead forward to general results, which gain ready
acceptance because they may be said to be involved in scientific
procedure itself. In this more advanced stage it is otherwise. In the
former, unorganized matter is the same everywhere; and the laws of
energy can be studied with equal facility in Europe or in America, in
northern latitudes or in southern. But when we begin to direct attention
upon life in its manifold forms, as these are scattered all over the
world, multitudes of distinct observations have to be prosecuted, and
their results slowly accumulated, before even the most competent workers
can occupy a position from which it is possible to make a beginning with
our forecast of general conclusions. Even in the most favorable
circumstances, a great deal must be left to problematic inference, and
even to imagination. Gatherings of facts may be recorded in a manner
which places them beyond reach of doubt, while theories founded upon
them hang long in suspense, waiting confirmation on condition of being
able to endure protracted criticism, and manifold applications. This
accounts for the difficulty experienced in finding ready to hand general
conclusions which have secured universal acceptance, when we begin to
move somewhat freely over the wide regions presenting the manifold
problems of organized existence. And as it is solely with general
conclusions, that religious thought is concerned, some share of
perplexity must attach to the attempt to discuss the question of
harmony. We must here therefore be considerably involved in questions
affecting theories which have gained wide favor in scientific circles,
as well as with clearly recorded and certain results. Some general
questions, such as that affecting the classification of animals, must be
regarded as peculiarly scientific. Whether the classification of
Linnæus, or of Cuvier, or some other more recently suggested, is to be
preferred, is a matter which does not here concern us. But a theory of
the origin of species must be considered, because it is not purely
scientific, but brings science into direct relation with common thought
as to the order of the universe, and may therefore stand related to
religious thought.

Immediately on directing attention to organized existence,--to LIFE in
any form,--we encounter a new problem, namely the relation of the
organized to the unorganized. How is the appearance of this higher order
of existence to be accounted for? Can we find in the nature of matter,
and in the mechanical and chemical laws influencing its position and
combination, any explanation of the appearance of life in the world? Or
must we regard life as a new and higher fact, unexplained by reference
to the lower form of existence, and incapable of explanation in this
way? Whether there is a clear line of demarcation between vegetable and
animal life is a comparatively subordinate question. It is the wider and
more perplexing question which most fundamentally affects our general
conceptions as to the history and government of the world? And when this
question is pressed singly,--how can we account for the appearance of
life in the world?--science has no answer to present. Life still remains
a mystery in scientific times, as it had been in past ages. Much has
been written as to the origin of species; nothing to any purpose has yet
been said as to the origin of life itself. The secrets of the universe
in this respect have eluded discovery, and a constrained silence is the
consequence.

But if science itself has nothing to say as to this fundamental problem,
scientific men have much to say as to the probability of a true solution
of the mystery being forthcoming. There is in many quarters an
expectation that we may yet understand the physical principles, that is,
the mechanical and chemical combinations, which go to explain life as a
working organism.[AO] The suggestions of Rumford and Joule may yet bear
results in this direction, for it is matter of general agreement that
living organism may be regarded as an engine doing a given amount of
work, on condition of being supplied with a given amount of fuel in the
form of nourishment. When therefore Rumford suggests that the animal is
a more economical engine than any of the mechanical contrivances which
man constructs, and when Joule advances considerably beyond this to
suggest that the animal more resembles an electro-magnetic engine, than
a heat engine, it seems quite within the range of possibility that in
some such direction discovery may yet be made of the physical principles
involved in life.

This, however, leaves untouched the deeper question as to the _origin of
life_. We are entirely ignorant of any beginning of life which is not
traced directly to a preceding living organism. Either, as in the case
of plants, there is increase of life by fission, or separation from an
earlier growth, or by means of seed grown upon the parent plant; or, as
in the case of animals, by germ or ovum. But the question of the origin
of life is remote from us historically, and perplexing to us
experimentally. If we seek guidance historically, we turn to geology,
and learn that the structure of the earth has involved successive
formations. The materials of the earth's crust are not thrown together
confusedly, but "exhibit a certain order of arrangement";[AP] the
mineral masses are partly aqueous, partly igneous, in formation;
according as they are one or other, they contain organic remains, or are
marked by their absence. All that can be inferred from the data thus
afforded is that at a certain period in the world's history, when
temperature and other conditions affecting the possibility of organic
existence were favorable, life appeared. As to the cause of its
appearance, geology can give no testimony. If next, we refer to
palæontology, we learn of the existence of colossal animals which have
long since become extinct; but such researches only widen our
acquaintance with different orders of animals, contributing nothing
towards the solution of the problem concerning the origin of life. The
experimental science of the present day, with all the advantages
arising from microscopical observation, is altogether unable to offer
any explanation. Experiments for the purpose of testing the probability
of "spontaneous generation" have been already described, and their
failure leaves experimental science without any direct testimony; while
their history yields powerful indirect evidence in support of the
position that origin of life apart from germ is unknown.

It is, however, desirable here, in order to give completeness to our
view of the present situation, to remark that among scientific men there
are some who have no expectation of a scientific explanation of the
origin of life; while others are exceedingly hopeful that such
explanation may be reached, in the latter class appearing naturally all
those who openly proclaim against what they name an "incomprehensible
act of creation," and voluntarily place themselves in antagonism to
religious thought. It is, therefore, of some consequence to indicate the
grounds on which such opposite views rest. On the one side, Professor
Tait, while suggesting the possibility of yet discovering the physical
principles which determine life, nevertheless adds, "Let no one imagine
that, should we ever penetrate this mystery, we shall thereby be enabled
to produce, except from life, even the lowest form of life."[AQ] On the
other hand Professor Schmidt of Strasburg maintains the opposite view,
affirming that "the investigation of nature does not shrink from
enrolling _life_, and the processes of life in the world of the
comprehensible."[AR] This latter assertion is not to be accounted for on
the ground that Schmidt is the ardent admirer and defender of the theory
of origin of species by natural selection, for it is clear, as he
maintains in replying to Max Müller, that "the origin of life has in
fact nothing to do with actual Darwinism, or natural selection, unless
the principle of selection be extended to the inorganic world of
matter."[AS] Mr. Darwin himself does not suggest any such extension, and
his theory of species is not chargeable with it. It should, indeed, be
clearly recognized on all hands that the naturalist confines himself to
a narrower range of inquiry, taking existing phases of life as the
subject of his study. Accordingly, whoever claims that the origin of
life comes within the compass of science, does so on the ground that
there is no demarcation between the organic and the inorganic,--that the
former may arise directly from the latter,--and so he commits himself to
a doctrine of descent world-wide in its application, involving
development in the world of all its varied phases of existence from a
mass of unorganized matter.

This explains the difference of opinion among scientific men as to the
possibility of accounting for the origin of life. A certain number deny
the possibility, as they do the possibility of explaining scientifically
the origin of matter on the explicit ground indicated by
Laplace,--"Present events are connected with the events of the past by a
link resting on the obvious principle, that a thing can not begin to
exist without a cause which produces it."[AT] They do not find in
inorganic matter sufficient cause to account for life, and their
expectations are restricted accordingly. Those who cherish a contrary
expectation, do not vindicate it by contradiction of the obvious
principle enunciated by Laplace, or even by maintaining that inorganic
matter is adequate to produce living organism. They cling to the more
general and doubtful position that no limits are to be assigned to
science, or as it is often stated, all nature belongs to the
comprehensible. The failure of past experiments is no proof that
inevitable failure awaits other experiments which may yet be made. To
abandon expectation seems to them to be unfaithful to science. In this
fashion, Professor Schmidt declares that "to any one who holds open the
possibility that, even now, animate may be evolved from inanimate,
without the mediation of progenitors, _the first origin of life in this
natural method is at once self-evident_."[AU] To this view the other
side may legitimately reply, that if the origin of life be as easily
accounted for, as provision is here made for the "self-evident," science
will soon be at a discount. To those regarding the matter from without,
and waiting for testimony as to what is scientifically established, it
is clear that there is no explanation of the origin of life; and I think
it will be most commonly held that the weight of reason as to
expectations for the future lies with those who abandon the anticipation
of any scientific explanation. There is, however, in actual conclusions
on scientific evidence nothing involving conflict with religious
conviction; and allowance will be made for continued and extended
experiments, provided only that the "holding open the possibility," does
not make the probability "self-evident."

Passing thus from the unsolved problem of the origin of life,--with the
attendant acknowledgment that there is no scientific theory of the
world's descent from primordial atoms, we advance to the testimony of
science concerning different orders of life, and their relations to each
other. Here there is no restriction as to the use of scientific methods;
there is wide range for free action by the hosts of observers required
for the work. A sense of the relief which this implies, in contrast with
the hampering restraints surrounding the earlier question, imparts to
the words of Schmidt a more jubilant tone, as he says, "Between
beginning and end, we naturalists may do as we please."[AV]

In this region it will be universally admitted that the development of
species by selection is the conception which has gained greatest hold
upon the scientific mind within recent times. Accordingly it seems
better to begin with an outline of this theory, and of its history as
developed by Mr. Darwin, keeping, however, steadily in view the range of
problem with which the theory has to deal.

As already remarked the origin of life is a problem quite distinct, and
the theory of selection does not entangle itself by maintaining origin
of life by development from unorganized matter. Mr. Darwin clearly
guarded himself against responsibility for such a conception of its
origin.[AW] Restricting thus far, we have to keep in view the vast range
of the problem demanding scientific explanation.

Animal life manifests itself by spontaneous movement,--movement from
within the living organism, in contrast with movement caused by energy
applied from without. This holds true of every living germ, from which a
mature animal form may be developed. This is the test of the presence of
life under the microscope in minute germinal structures otherwise
incapable of observation. In its lowest known form life appears in a
minute vessel containing so much nourishment, which is within a nucleus
or vital centre from which movement originates.[AX] This depends for
its development on external conditions such as heat and moisture.[AY]
Advance in the scale is connected with greater complexity in the
organism. As we ascend, separate organs appear, fulfilling distinct
functions, and controlled by means of a nerve system whose ramifications
are according to the intricacy of the organism. The appearance of such a
nerve system implies sensibility and motor activity, provision for an
_experience_ more or less varied, and _movement_ in some measure
according with it, or adapted to it. From a nerve system consisting of a
centre and a few fibres, we gradually ascend, until in the higher
vertebrate orders, we find a vast system of nerves harmonized and
governed from a grand centre or terminus constituting the brain.[AZ]
With the steadily advancing complexity of nerve system, there is great
diversity in the orders of animals, in the variety of actions of which
they are capable, in adaptation to different conditions of life, and in
the modes in which they obtain subsistence. The scientific problem
is--How far can we account for all this complex system of things by the
action of natural causes?

As we are here specially concerned with ruling conceptions, and only
indirectly with details, the relations of the animal and vegetable
kingdoms may be passed, with the acknowledgment that the two are
obviously distinct, and yet that the vegetable very nearly merges into
the animal at certain points, as illustrated by sensibility, if not by
locomotion. So may we waive discussion of the classification of animals,
which involves important points closely connected with the main
question. Allowing that the wonderful diversity in animal organization,
may admit of different modes of classification; and yet granting that
the structure of the animal economy in all its forms proceeds on common
principles, which must lead to practical agreement as to modes of
classification; we deal with the single question as to the natural
causes serving to explain different orders.

Mr. Darwin's suggestion, largely supported by evidence from many
quarters, and now commanding a very general support is, that all this
diversity may be regarded as the product of a long process of
development. This theory takes the whole orders of existence into one
sweep. The lowest type of animal life presents to view the beginning of
a protracted history; the highest order of animate existence indicates
the stage of advance at which we observe things at the present period.
For such a theory the history of individual development belonging to
whatever order, and the history of distinct orders as indicating
improvement and deviation of whatever aspect, present evidence of
special value. The most important causes relied upon as contributing to
the formation of a scientific theory may be presented under these four
heads--(1) The action of external causes as provided for by environment;
(2) power of adaptability within each organism, providing for changes
according to requirement from without, which may be described as
"adaptive changes of structure;" (3) "the struggle for existence," in
accordance with which the strongest gain the mastery and consequent
advantage in obtaining the means of subsistence; and (4) "natural
selection" among the sexes, giving to the offspring all advantages
according to the laws of hereditary descent.

The essential feature in this theory is the _power of adaptability
inherent in the organism_. This is postulated as characteristic of all
organized existence; and it is implied, that this power of adaptability
multiplies in a degree approximating to the measure of complexity
belonging to the organism. The inherent capacity for deviation is thus
much less in the mollusk than in the bird; and in the bird much less
than in the quadruped. Thus the development process which must,
according to this view, have been exceedingly slow in the earlier
stages, must have been greatly accelerated when more complex organisms
had come into existence, and all the advantages accrued from greater
diversity of materials. Such is a brief outline of the theory; and
looked at simply as a theory, there is a manifest attraction in the
boldness of the conception, and the wide sweep of the generalization
which it includes. Taken merely as an intellectual representation
setting forth a conceivable order of things in the universe, it has a
great deal to command attention and awaken interest. It is, indeed, a
novelty in the history of scientific thought, and as such at variance
with previous conceptions, both scientific and non-scientific. But it is
no more at variance with religious thought, than with ordinary notions
of preceding times; while to the author whose name is now associated
with it all over the scientific world, it is a more striking testimony
of the marvels of creative power,[BA] than notions previously current,
which regarded it as historically true that every existing variety of
animal was launched into being by a distinct creative act. Whatever may
be the ultimate view of the history of life on the earth, based on
purely scientific data,--and we are still a far way removed from what
may be regarded as scientific evidence for such a view,--the fewer the
primordial forms to which the multiplicity of existing species can be
traced, the greater is the marvel which science presents, and the more
convincing becomes the intellectual necessity by which we travel back to
a Supernatural Intelligence as the source of all. On the other hand, the
slow process by which scientific research tends to make out the natural
history of living organisms far removed from each other in the scale of
being, tracing many groups to a common parentage, and assigning their
appearance in the world to distinct periods in its history, will be
seen to be so far anticipated and favored by the graphic description of
the introduction of animal life given in the opening page of revelation,
where different orders are assigned to successive epochs.

While, however, these things are said at the outset, as affording
commencement for the study of an evolution theory, and delivering us
from the supposition that there is an inevitable antagonism between
science and recognition of the supernatural, we revert to the ruling
principle for this whole inquiry, that science must prosecute its own
researches, unfettered by forecast of consequences; and that the Bible
is not to be handled as if it were a book of science, for it neither
lays restraints upon human inquiry, nor delivers us from the need for
it.

The best method for entering upon a study of the theory of evolution by
natural selection is to take Mr. Darwin's own account of the manner in
which it began to take shape before his mind. In his "historical sketch
of the recent progress of opinion on the origin of species,"[BB] he
traces to Lamark the first suggestions on the subject, directing public
attention to the question in 1801; thereafter a succession of
naturalists including St. Hilaire, Wells, and Patrick Matthew, from
separate and incidental observations, dwelt upon the difficulty of
distinguishing species, and on the evidence of an archetypal idea, or
common plan of structure, being applicable in the history of whole
orders. Mr. Darwin then gives the following biographical references at
the outset,--"When on board H. M. S. 'Beagle,' as naturalist, I was much
struck with certain facts in the distribution of the organic beings
inhabiting South America, and in the geological relations of the present
to the past inhabitants of that continent. These facts seemed to throw
some light on the origin of species--that mystery of mysteries, as it
has been called by one of our greatest philosophers. On my return home,
it occurred to me in 1837, that something might perhaps be made out on
this question by patiently accumulating and reflecting on all sorts of
facts which could possibly have any bearing on it. After five years'
work I allowed myself to speculate on the subject, and drew up some
short notes; these I enlarged in 1844 into a sketch of the conclusions
which then seemed to me probable: from that period to the present day I
have steadily pursued the same object."[BC] Such is Mr. Darwin's opening
paragraph in the now celebrated _Origin of Species_. No one interested
in such investigations will hesitate to approve and trust the "patiently
accumulating and reflecting on all sorts of facts;" nor can there be any
hesitation in granting the warrantableness of his beginning to speculate
as to the probable results. On the other hand, even the most ardent
admirers of the evolution theory can not refuse to allow that only its
principles are certain, while its ultimate form is still matter of
conjecture and speculation. Quite divergent lines of speculation have
found a start within the compass of the phenomena brought under review,
and it is already apparent that opposite tendencies of thought have
effected a lodgment under the common name of evolution. In these
circumstances there is no direct call, as there are no proper materials,
for attempting a reconciliation between the principles of religion, and
definite scientific conclusions as to the origin of species. We are
still occupying that position which makes historical treatment of the
subject the most appropriate, leaving to speculation the probable lines
of adjustment which may render possible a wider induction bearing on a
general theory of the universe.

The observations of Alfred Russell Wallace in the Malay Archipelago led
towards the same conclusions as those indicated by Darwin, to whom Mr.
Wallace dedicated his book,[BD] giving the results of research extending
from 1854 to 1862, and in confirmation of Darwin's theory, though
differing on important points, Wallace published in 1870 his
_Contribution to the Theory of Natural Selection_. Mr. Darwin's views
when first promulgated received decided though somewhat guarded support
from Sir Charles Lyell, whose geological studies marked him out as a
highly qualified witness on the subject, and were strongly favored by
Dr. Hooker, author of _Introduction to the Australian Flora_, while they
encountered not a little criticism, and were met with announcements of
formal reservations, on the part of distinguished naturalists.

A fuller statement as to the history of his own thought was given by Mr.
Darwin in the fifth edition of his work, and also in a letter to Hæckel,
author of the bolder venture as to the _History of the Creation_, and
the _Evolution of Man_. This letter to Hæckel may be given here as
having considerable value in its bearing on the formation of the theory
of evolution. After referring to his early researches as to lower forms
of life, Mr. Darwin proceeds thus--"Having reflected much on the
foregoing facts, it seemed to me probable that _allied species_ were
descended from a common ancestor. But during several years I could not
conceive how each form could have been modified so as to become
admirably adapted to its place in nature. I began therefore to study
domesticated animals and cultivated plants, and after a time perceived
that _man's power of selecting and breeding_ from certain individuals
was the most powerful of all means in the production of _new races_.
Having attended to the habits of animals and their relations to the
surrounding conditions, I was able to realize the severe _struggle for
existence_ to which all organisms are subjected; and my geological
observations had allowed me to appreciate to a certain extent the
duration of past geological periods. With my mind thus prepared, I
fortunately happened to read Malthus's _Essay on Population_; and the
idea of natural selection through the struggle for existence at once
occurred to me. Of all the subordinate points in the theory, the last
which I understood was the cause of the _tendency_ in the descendants
from a common progenitor _to diverge_ in character."[BE] This short
passage in personal history may considerably aid others in their study
of the theory.

This letter may with advantage be supplemented by one or two brief
extracts from _The Origin of Species_. In one of his most recent
editions, our author says,--"It may be metaphorically said, that natural
selection is daily; and hourly scrutinizing throughout the world the
slightest variations, rejecting those that are bad, preserving and
adding up all that are good; silently and insensibly working, whenever
and wherever opportunity offers, at the improvement of each organic
being in relation to its organic and inorganic conditions of life."
Such a metaphorical representation attributing to nature different
processes, such as scrutinizing, rejecting, preserving, and working,
considerably aids us by pointing to the _intellectual_ conditions
involved in the acceptance of the theory of evolution. To this it may
suffice if there be added the closing passage in our author's work on
species, indicating his view of the relation of all to the supernatural.
It is in these words--"Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and
death, the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving,[BF]
namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows. There is
grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been
originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and
that whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law
of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and
most wonderful have been, and are being evolved."[BG] On this passage,
Schmidt has remarked--"In this concession, Darwin has certainly been
untrue to himself; and it satisfies neither those who believe in the
continuous work of creation by a personal God, nor the partisans of
natural evolution." In this criticism we have a good example of the
manner in which an impression of conflict is fostered. The rejoinder to
Schmidt is obvious. Those who value religion seek no concessions, but
desire to banish from scientific and philosophic writing all thought
tending in this direction. If, however, needless complications are to be
avoided, we must have exact statements of the relative positions. The
sentence just quoted involves a misrepresentation equally of religion
and science. Belief in the supernatural does not imply belief in _a
continuous work of creation_, and therefore does not carry any thing
inherently antagonistic to the conception of evolution under natural
law. On the other hand, belief in evolution of species under the action
of natural law does not decide the question, concerning _the origin of
life_, just as a science of nature can decide nothing concerning the
supernatural.

Professor Schmidt is, however, so far from clearly and consistently
recognizing the exact limit of the theory, that within the compass of a
single page he first affirms the limitation, and then denies it. First
vindicating Darwin from the attack of Max Müller as to beginning and
end of living organism, he says, "The origin of life has in fact nothing
to do with actual Darwinism, or natural selection, unless the principle
of selection be extended to the inorganic world of matter,"[BH] an
entanglement which Schmidt is willing to avoid, and which Darwin
carefully shuns, distinctly stating that "Science in her present state
does not countenance the belief that living creatures are now ever
produced from inorganic matter."[BI] But Schmidt has no sooner placed
himself behind this line of defence, than he attacks Darwin for
acknowledging origin of life by creation, maintaining that "it is
directly incompatible with the doctrine of descent."[BJ] The theorist
must take either one side or the other. Either he must maintain that the
theory of descent has "nothing to do with the origin of life," and in
that case there is no conflict with religious thought; or that the
theory of descent is incompatible with creation, and in that case there
is conflict with religious thought, and at the same time inconsistency
with science, in respect of its own definition as an explanation of
nature, and in respect of its own results which do not involve
"spontaneous generation," but do include the position that not a single
particle of matter can be originated or destroyed by any power
recognized in operation. No one will "dispute the claims of the
investigation of nature to its logical inferences," but "where the
material substratum is deficient," most reasonable men will demand that
distinct acknowledgment be made of the fact, and that the boundaries of
science be defined accordingly. If, however, any one be inclined to
maintain that "where the material substratum is deficient," all inquiry
must terminate, and human thought must refuse to go further, or to
attempt to rise higher, this certainly is not science, but an illogical
attempt to make the science of nature commensurate with the boundaries
of thought,--an arbitrary declaration that "the causal series" within
the material universe is the sum total of causality. Such an affirmation
can not warrantably attach itself to a theory of descent, as it can not
be tested by observational methods, but altogether by reference to the
laws of thought determining the value of rationalizing processes. The
theory of "natural evolution," implies evolution from something; it
postulates a beginning from which it takes procedure, and it exhausts
itself in observations concerning such deviations as occur in the annals
of natural history. If, therefore, any of "the partisans of natural
evolution," take up a position involving denial of a rational
acknowledgment of the supernatural, they isolate themselves in so doing,
leaving the theory free from responsibility as to their attitude, and
taking upon themselves the logical necessity for vindicating their
position on grounds with which the theory of evolution itself has no
concern.

Having thus vindicated the theory of natural evolution from all share in
the denial of creation, and having entered a protest upon purely
scientific grounds against the attempt to translate a scientific theory
concerning a limited order of facts within the universe into a
metaphysical theory concerning the origin of the universe, we are in a
position to concentrate upon the theory itself as an attempt to provide
a scientific explanation of the history of living organism. And this is
here done with the view of ascertaining, in a general and necessarily
restricted manner, the value of the evidence presented for its
acceptance, thereby ascertaining its relations to the essential
characteristics of religious thought.

The first and simplest part of the task is to indicate the favorable
impression it has made on the minds of men,--the conquest it has already
won for itself,--as a theory carrying within it a large amount of truth,
whatever may be its final form, after the very intricate and difficult
questions involved have been carefully examined. The theory has carried
general approval for the position that "allied species are descended
from a common ancestor," or, stating the same view in the manner
suggested by experiment, that it is possible to obtain in the history of
a single race of animals, considerable deviations in structure, and to
give these deviations fixedness or permanence by continuance of selected
features along the line of hereditary descent. This has been amply
illustrated by the examples of the various orders of pigeons, and of
dogs; both classes of animals having been largely experimented upon, and
the distinct varieties being easily recognized and popularly known.
Comparatively little hesitation exists as to acknowledging that the
different orders of pigeons have had a common ancestry; and that the
same may be said of the different races of dogs. These examples afford
the governing conception of the evolution theory, presenting the type of
evidence which has led on to the wider generalization. Under the
discussions which the theory has originated facts previously familiar
have been contemplated in a different light, as bearing upon a general
plan or order of procedure apparent in the history of organized
existence. The consequent gain for the theory is altogether favorable to
the restricted doctrine that allied species have had a common descent,
or that a single type of organism may under the law of evolution lead to
the appearance of different orders or races of animals.

The clear advance thus made in our conceptions of the history of the
universe will appear by simple statement of negative results following
from the admission of the modified form of doctrine just given. These
involve the rejection of views previously held, not by religious men in
religious interests, but by men generally, as the natural consequence
of the want of scientific investigations fitted to guide the public
mind. So far as a general conclusion has gained assent, men show no
reluctance to accept the clear logical inferences following from the
investigation of nature.

Among these results is _rejection of fixedness of species_ as implying
impossibility of deviation from a single normal type of structure. The
possibility of adaptive changes being granted, the absolute fixedness of
species in the rigid sense formerly acknowledged is abandoned. How great
the modification of view must be, is much more difficult to decide, and
hardly admits of exact statement. There is certainly no denial of
distinction of species, nor can such denial ever find acceptance,
whatever be the advance of theory, for the distinctions are so broad as
to render this impossible. But the whole work of classification of the
different orders of animal life, exceedingly difficult in any case, has
been rendered much more perplexing in consequence of the accumulation of
evidence favoring the doctrine of evolution. What can properly be
regarded as the origin of a new species, and what as a mere modification
or advance in a species already recognized, are questions for which it
is difficult to find an exact answer. The theory of the "origin of
species" by natural selection seems placed in an awkward perplexity as
to what constitutes _origin_ of a new order of life. And this difficulty
must be regarded as a constant attendant on the scheme of thought, since
"adaptive changes" must be of slow progress, and historically obscure,
inasmuch as a succession of very slight differences must contribute to a
general result. In this way it may even become matter of keen discussion
what actually constitutes organic advance. Mr. Darwin admits serious
difficulty at this point. He says, "Here we enter on a very intricate
subject, for naturalists have not defined to each other's satisfaction
what is meant by an advance in organization."[BK] Thus there is dispute
among competent authorities as to which may properly be considered the
highest order of plants, and which the highest order of fishes. On the
other hand, it is comparatively easy to decide among the more highly
organized animals, when an advance is made, by reference to increased
complexity in structure, or provision of separate organs for
accomplishment of distinct functions. These considerations, however,
suffice to indicate how many and complicated are the subjects requiring
to be examined on evidence, and adjusted in their relations to each
other, before it can be possible to get beyond surmise, in order to
formulate a complete scientific theory. That "adaptive changes" by
natural law of evolution are not only possible, but that they frequently
occur under observation, admits of no question; but whether this
includes changes of structure such as imply origin of species may still
be subject of grave doubt. The alterations made by Mr. Darwin in
successive editions of his book, from the first edition in 1859, to the
sixth edition in 1872,[BL] introduced, as he explains, "according as the
evidence has become somewhat stronger or weaker," are sufficient to
suggest that a vast amount of work remains to be done before a
well-defined theory can be formulated. While there is universal
agreement as to the possibility of "adaptive changes" to which Mr.
Darwin provisionally restricted his theory on account of the
investigations of Nageli as to plants, and those of Broca as to
animals, there is much diversity of opinion concerning the wider
application of the theory of evolution. This diversity arises in part
from the varying estimate of the value of evidence as now accumulated,
and in part from the varying conception of the completeness of our
records of the ancient history of organism as presented by geology.
There is as yet no general consensus of opinion, nor is there likely to
be for a long time to come. Mr. Darwin himself is sufficiently cautious
and faithful to observational methods, to admit that there are serious
difficulties, of some of which he ventures only to say that they "are
greatly diminished," while some have disappeared. Other writers, such as
Hæckel, with greatly less caution, and with much greater alacrity in
leaping over chasms, are prepared to go much further and faster than
Darwin. Many more are exceedingly doubtful as to the scientific value of
the evidence at command, being, as Mr. Darwin has said, "much shaken in
their former belief."[BM] And of many it must be said that they are
convinced that the evidence is far from warranting the conclusion that
all organized existence can be traced to "only a few forms," or to
"one," according to the alternatives suggested by Darwin in the closing
sentence of his book.

Waiving, then, meanwhile, as the state of scientific evidence warrants
us to do, the question of the probable number of primordial forms in
which organized existence appeared, there is at least another definite
result to be recorded as following from even a modified recognition of a
theory of development, that is the _rejection of belief in the
simultaneous origin of all species_ or orders of animal life existing
now in the world. The scientific conception of the history of animal
life is, that there has been a historical progression in the appearance
of animals, in so far as lower orders took precedence of higher, while
the higher have shown large power of adaptation to the circumstances in
which they have been placed. In accordance with the whole principles
regulating the relations of religion and science, religious men,
scientific and non-scientific, will readily acquiesce in this
modification of general belief, as largely favored by evidence which
geology supplies, and supported by testimony drawn from the actually
existing order of things; and they will do so with clear recognition
that this view involves no conflict with scriptural statement, and is so
far from containing in it any thing antagonistic to the fundamental
conception of the supernatural origin of existence, that it harmonizes
with it, even intensifying the demand upon a transcendent cause for the
rational explanation of the admitted order of things.

Having thus indicated in definite form the favorable impression made on
the public mind by the theory of evolution under a law of natural
selection, it will suffice to indicate very briefly the more prominent
difficulties with which the theory has grappled, but from which it has
not escaped. In doing so, it should be said that the careful and
deliberate manner in which Mr. Darwin has faced the host of difficulties
which have gathered around is deserving of highest praise, as in harmony
with the scientific spirit, and in marked contrast with the
light-and-go-easy style in which others, such as Hæckel, and even
Schmidt, pass over the ground, announcing things as undoubted facts, and
even "self-evident" truths, of which no man can speak with any degree
of certainty. On the other hand, it seems a reasonable ground of
complaint against many opponents of the theory, which Mr. Darwin urges
specially against Mr. St. George Mivart, that it is no part of their
plan "to give the various facts and considerations opposed to their own
conclusions," while marshalling the difficulties against an evolution
theory. And yet it should be remembered that a great service is done to
science in a period of transition, when difficulties are powerfully
urged against a popular hypothesis, as an injury is done to science by
precipitate and ill-considered arguments in support of such a
hypothesis.

Of the most serious difficulties in the way of a theory of descent by
evolution, the _first_ concerns _the nature of the evidence_, inasmuch
as all change coming under observation does not indicate progression or
improvement in the organism. The importance of this may be best
indicated by quoting Mr. Darwin's explanatory words as to alterations in
the fifth edition of his book on species. He says, "In the earlier
editions of my _Origin of Species_, I probably attributed too much to
the action of natural selection or survival of the fittest. I have
altered the fifth edition of the _Origin_ so as to confine my remarks to
adaptive changes of structure. I had not formerly sufficiently
considered the existence of many structures, which appear to be, as far
as we can judge, neither beneficial nor injurious, and this I believe to
be one of the greatest oversights as yet detected in my work." When it
is certain that deviation from the normal structure may take place which
is a disadvantage to the individual, and that this may descend to
offspring; when it is also shown that deviation may occur which appears
to serve no end, that is, contributes to no phase of functional
activity; when besides advantages gained are lost, and the race returns
to its original type of structure; and when farther there are examples
of degeneration, as in parasitic races,--such facts interpose special
difficulties in the way of an all-embracing theory of progress by
natural selection. Besides, as deviations occur of an unfavorable kind
among domesticated animals under the care of man, it becomes obvious
that progress may be readily lost even in most favorable circumstances.

The next outstanding difficulty is that of _meeting the requirements of
logical inference_. This has been specially urged by Mr. Mivart as
bearing upon the "incipient stages" of advance, and the difficulty
certainly presses heavily at that point. Natural selection may account
for much in the history of higher organisms where powers of sensibility
and locomotion are great, but how can we find in natural selection an
adequate explanation of progress in organisms within which these powers
are at the lowest. The difficulty is to get a cause sufficient to
account for the start of a movement so vast as that which is to
culminate in man. Mr. Darwin feels the force of this difficulty, and
replies thus, "as we have no facts to guide us, speculation on the
subject is almost useless."[BN] But this perplexity which is most
glaring at the beginning of the upward course, clings to the theory at
every stage in the combination of struggle and improvement,--descent
involving a real _ascent_. Whether the organism be more or less complex,
it depends upon _external causes_ for its improvement, and the
dependence continues at every stage. Granting that there is everywhere
struggle for existence and survival of the fittest, are these sufficient
to account for results so great as are involved in unceasing advance of
organism?

If it be argued that they are sufficient, a serious perplexity comes
from the opposite quarter,--How does it happen that all organic
existence does not advance together to a common elevation? If the theory
accounts for advance, how shall we account for the want of it? The
difficulties are as great for the theory in view of the large body of
facts it does not attempt to include, as in the facts it strives to
embrace. Agassiz put this difficulty with much force in 1857, and it has
not received any satisfactory answer. He said, "It is a fact which seems
to be entirely overlooked by those who assume an extensive influence of
physical causes upon the very existence of organized beings, that the
most diversified types of animals and plants are everywhere found under
identical circumstances."[BO] If, as Mr. Darwin says, "looking to the
first dawn of life," we may believe that "all organic beings presented
the simplest structure"; if the struggle for existence is uniformly
encountered and leads to survival of the fittest, how is it that within
the same area, organism has not advanced to similar complexity? If under
constraint of the evidence for the theory, we surrender the doctrine of
inevitable fixedness of species, how shall we nevertheless account for
the permanence of species? It is not suggested that there is at
successive stages "new and simple forms continually being produced by
spontaneous generation." This hypothesis of Lamark is rejected by Mr.
Darwin,[BP] as it is by almost all scientific observers? How, then, can
we explain the facts? We are told that certain orders have "fallen out"
in the march of progress; but we need a scientific account of this which
shall harmonize with a theory of action of environment, and such an
account is not forthcoming. It may be said that the very success of the
theory by accumulation of most striking and important evidence, is
bringing it into difficulty, and suggesting its insufficiency. The more
powerful and imposing the action of the law of natural selection, the
more pressing becomes the need for a scientific explanation, at once
distinct and harmonious, which will account for the persistence of
species, when struggle for existence goes on under similar or even
analogous action of environment. The presence everywhere of these lower
forms alongside of the higher, adds greatly to the attractiveness of
nature, and not even the grandeur of a universal advance towards the
higher levels of organization would make up for the disappearance of the
marvels of lower orders of animals. A monotony of grandeur may compare
unfavorably with the wealth of variety and adversity; and so a law of
continuity or persistence may be found adding to the greatness of a
universe in which a law of progress or evolution also finds uniform
application.

Upon this contrast between persistence and progress, general attention
will henceforth be concentrated in judging of the place and value of a
theory of descent. There is no need for hurry or impatience in this
matter. The words of Mr. Darwin will find ready assent as he says, "No
one ought to feel surprise at much yet remaining unexplained on the
origin of species, if we make due allowance for our profound ignorance
on the mutual relations of the inhabitants of the world at the present
time, and still more during past ages."[BQ] In accordance with this
acknowledgment, a wide range of scientific research still remains to be
undertaken, and religious thought can have nothing but friendly interest
in the work, as it may well be assured of drawing thence fresh
contributions of great value for higher speculation concerning the
government of the universe.

FOOTNOTES:

[AO] Tait's _Recent Advances_, p. 23.

[AP] Lyell's _Elements of Geology_, p. 2.

[AQ] _Recent Advances_, p. 24.

[AR] _Doctrine of Descent_, p. 20.

[AS] _Ib._ p. 161.

[AT] _Introduction to the Theory of Science_.

[AU] _Doctrine of Descent_, p. 163.

[AV] _Doctrine of Descent_, p. 162.

[AW] _Origin of Species_, p. 577.

[AX] See Appendix VII.

[AY] See Appendix V.

[AZ] See Appendix IV.

[BA] _Origin of Species_, p. 577.

[BB] _The Origin of Species_, xiii. 4th ed.

[BC] _The Origin of Species_, p. 1.

[BD] _Malay Archipelago_, 1869.

[BE] The passage is quoted as given by Schmidt in his _Doctrine of
Descent_, p. 132. Italics are inserted to guide the eye of the reader to
the successive stages.

[BF] Referring to organized being.

[BG] _Origin of Species_, p. 577.

[BH] _Doct. of Descent_, p. 161-2.

[BI] _Origin of Species_, 4th ed. p. 143.

[BJ] _Doct. of Descent_, 162.

[BK] _Origin of Species_, 4th ed. p. 141.

[BL] It may be well to mention here that the _third_ American edition is
from the _fifth_ English edition.

[BM] _Origin of Species_, 6th ed., p. 289.

[BN] _Origin of Species_, 6th. ed. chap. iv. p. 100.

[BO] _Contributions to the Natural History of the United States_,
Introduction, Boston, 1857; and _Essay on Classification_, p. 15,
published separately; London, 1859. See Appendix VI.

[BP] _Origin_, 4th ed. p. 143.

[BQ] _Origin of Species_, 6th. ed. chap. iv. p. 100.




LECTURE V.

RELATIONS OF LOWER AND HIGHER ORGANISMS.


From the general aspects of the theory of species, we pass to the
consideration of distinct groups of organism, with the view of
ascertaining their relations to each other. In doing so, it is better to
begin at the lower end of the scale, leaving for a more advanced stage
of inquiry the higher types of organism. In this department of the
subject, special obligations are due to the wide range of investigations
either occasioned or stimulated by the theory of evolution. For,
whatever may be the ultimate award passed on this theory, there will be
a unanimous recognition of the great value to science attending on the
varied forms of inquiry stimulated by the writings of Mr. Charles
Darwin. And one obvious and strong reason for such acknowledgment is
that so many of the results of these researches have an inherent value
quite distinct from their testimony in favor of the theory that the
struggle for existence is the principal factor in the origin of new
species.

One of the most interesting fields of observation thus opened, is that
concerned with the fertilization of plants by the intervention of
insects and birds. A beginning in this department was made by the German
naturalist, Christian Konrad Sprengel, who published in 1793 the report
of his observations. In this he has been followed by Darwin, in 1862; by
Dr. Hooker, Professor Asa Gray whose contributions appeared in the
_American Journal of Science and Art_ in 1862, and 1863, Moggridge,
Fritz Müller, and Sir John Lubbock. The facts now accumulated, rank as
an important contribution to botany and zoölogy, and naturally fall
within the circle of recent advances to which it is desirable that
attention be turned.

The general result is one of great interest, as illustrating a striking
degree of interdependence between lower and higher organisms,--the
vegetable and animal kingdom contributing to each other's subsistence
and propagation. Flowers present special attractions to insects flying
around, alluring them by varied colors, and providing for them by
secreting stores of honey; on the other hand, these insects (flies,
bees, wasps, etc.), seeking the honey which satisfies their wants, at
the same time carry the pollen from one flower to another, thus
providing for the fertilizing of the plants. In some cases,
fertilization is secured by a natural process within the organism
itself; in other cases, the pollen is scattered over a region by the
wind; but the most wonderful, and at the same time efficient mode of
providing for the growth of vigorous plants, is fertilization by the
agency of insect life.

A brief outline of the ordinary structure of the flower will introduce
to a ready appreciation of the scientific interest attaching to this
last mode of fertilization, both as concerning the functions of
different portions of the flowers, and the relation of dependence
established between higher and lower forms of organism, so that each is
dependent on the other.

Every flower as it unfolds from the bud, consists of a series of whorls,
or layers of substance twined or twirled round in such a manner as to
unfold or coil back, as the flower opens. The _outermost_ of these
whorls (_calyx_) is a mere covering or sheath, usually of a green
color, which protects the bud during the more tender period, curling up
and withering as the flower opens, spreading forth its beauty. The
_second_ whorl (_corolla_) is what we more commonly regard as the flower
proper, the colored leaves, or cup, or bell, according to the specific
shape distinguishing the plant. The _third_ whorl consists of a series
of stalks or filaments (_stamens_) which as the flower matures or ripens
stand up distinct from each other, each one having at its summit a
little tuft or cushion (_anther_) covered with a fine dust or powder
(_pollen_). The _fourth_ or inner-most whorl, the centre piece of the
flower (_pistil_) is that in which the seed is generated and brought to
maturity. We may thus say of the flower, that its outermost whorl is a
temporary covering which withers and shrinks out of view, when the
beauty of the inner structure is laid open; that the second is that
which attracts the eye by the loveliness of its hues; while the two
which belong to the internal structure of the flower are concerned with
the reproduction or propagation of the plant, providing for the healthy
germ from which a fresh plant of the same order may spring up. The
relation of the fine yellow powder produced at the tips of the third
whorl, to the seeds which are gathered together within the fourth whorl,
is the matter to which special attention has been directed by the recent
discoveries which have rewarded patient research. The fine powder or
pollen needs to be carried to the seed, so that its properties may
operate upon that seed, if it is to be fertilized, or so matured, as to
fulfil its function in generating a new plant when it is committed to
the soil. In many cases it is enough that the fine powder should fall
down from its elevation on the seeds below. This is self-fertilization,
and is easily provided for by the mere bending of the head of the flower
as it approaches maturity, or by the swaying of it in the breeze. But a
more difficult, and as we might be inclined to add, more precarious,
because less certain, method for fertilization is required in many
cases. The experiments carried on by all our gardeners, and in a still
more extended scale in all our centres of botanic research, have
established the fact that in many cases, the yellow powder of one plant
must be in some manner carried over to the seed produced within another
flower, if that seed is to yield a satisfactory result to the
horticulturist.

We have thus two prominent facts here. The one is _the essential
importance of the pollen_ for fertilization; and the other, _the need
for the transference of the pollen_ from one plant to another in order
to secure reproduction of vigorous growth by the sowing of the seed. As
to the first, the pollen, which appears a fine powder or flour contains
fluid protoplasm, that which Professor Huxley has described as the
"single physical basis of life under all the diversities of vital
existence."[BR] These pollen grains falling on the seed discharge their
protoplasmic fluid upon it, and by this means contribute to
fertilization. This original or primordial form of vitalising agency is
carried from one part of the flower to another, and this transference is
the law regulating the propagation of flowering plants.

But, just at this point, we come upon the most striking results of
recent research. Though all pollen is of this primary nature, named
protoplasm, it is not found to hold true that pollen is of the same
value for fertilization from whatever quarter it comes. On the
contrary, most important differences result according to the source of
the pollen. There is first the process of self-fertilization. But in
many cases,--Mr. Darwin has shown that this holds of the majority of the
orchids,--transference of the pollen from one plant to another proves to
be a great advantage, if not an actual necessity for propagation of the
plant. This process, known as cross-fertilization, gives a healthy and
vigorous growth; want of it, will lead to degeneration, and ultimate
extinction. This discovery has introduced a whole series of the most
striking observations, throwing a flood of light on the distribution and
interdependence of distinct forms of organism. The necessary relation
between the pollen and the seed having been acknowledged, and next the
value of transference of pollen from one plant to another, the first
step in the line of discovery was made by the observation of a natural
provision to _prevent self-fertilization_ by rendering it impossible
that the pollen of a plant should fall on the seed of that plant. This
entrance on the line of discovery was made by Sprengel so far back as
1790, by whom it was observed that in many plants the pollen and the
seed did not come to ripeness at the same time.[BS] In some cases, the
pollen is ripened before the seeds are ready; in other cases, the order
of events is reversed. This observation naturally suggested transference
of pollen from one plant to another; and this, connected with the
continual coming and going of flies, bees, and butterflies, led to the
further discovery, that _insects_ unwittingly perform a large part of
the work needful in order to _provide for fertilization_. Mr. Darwin has
pointed out that from the paper of Robert Brown in the _Linnean
Transactions_, in 1833; and from that of Dr. Hooker in the _Philosophic
Transactions_ for 1854, the peculiar phenomena had begun to awaken
scientific interest. It was, however, when the researches as to origin
of species had given fresh motive to observation concerning the
relations of different types of organism, that the whole facts were
brought to view, separately recorded, and at length systematized so as
to lead to their full interpretation. Mr. Darwin himself concentrated on
the orchids as peculiarly interesting and suggestive, while a host of
workers all over the world were turning their energies into this new
field of observation which promised ample return for patient research.

As a reward of these investigations important facts have been
established on ample evidence. First, it has been confirmed by varying
lines of evidence that transference of pollen, or cross-fertilization,
is of special value in the development of plant life. Investigation has
strengthened the evidence of disadvantage arising from fertilization by
exclusive dependence on self-produced pollen. Fritz Müller has recorded
a variety of observations that the pollen of some flowers has so little
influence on the seed produced on the same stem that when it falls upon
the seeds no effect is produced; the pollen lies there as if possessed
of no more vitalizing power than grains of dust. And, what is even more
surprising, Müller has found examples in which the pollen does act upon
the seeds of its own flower, but acts _injuriously_, insomuch that the
flower, the pollen, and the seed-producing portion of the plant begin to
decay.[BT] So deep has been the impression made on Mr. Darwin's mind by
the evidence of provision for transference of pollen, that he closes his
valuable and interesting book on the _Fertilization of Orchids_ with the
following statements. Having remarked that "self-fertilization would
have been an incomparably safer and easier process than the transportal
of pollen from flower to flower," he adds these words,--"It is hardly an
exaggeration to say that Nature tells us, in the most emphatic manner,
that she abhors perpetual self-fertilization."[BU]

The next result secured presents an important relation between animal
life and vegetable. These flowers do not depend for their fertilization
upon the action of the wind, which in scattering profusely in all
directions must occasion large waste of pollen. There is found to be
distinct provision for carrying the pollen from one flower to another by
insects, such as the bees, whose industry in gathering honey has been
celebrated from ancient times, specially because of our interest in the
storehouse, but with little suspicion of the double work being done by
the bees, who add to their other industry that of horticulturists. These
bees are the pollen-bearers,--the recognized local carriers, regularly
on the road,--doing the work which the flowers, in lack of locomotive
power, could not do for each other. Or, looking at the relation of
things from another point of view, the bees are at the same time
gathering the honey, and sowing the seed for a future harvest. This
reference to the honey, however, introduces to notice a companion series
of facts, showing the provision in completed form for an interchange of
services. The plants supply an attraction to the animals, while the
animals render a service to the plants. This phase of interdependence is
made more conspicuous by the contrast apparent in the structure and
functions of plants fertilized by the wind, such as the larger shrubs
and trees, which as they present a greater surface to the breeze, do not
call for the same detailed provision for carrying the pollen. In
contrast with these more bulky representatives of the vegetable kingdom,
the more lowly and insignificant in size, as well as more short-lived,
present many attractions in color, scent, and secretion of honey, all
adapted to the nature of insects, suited for the work of pollen
carrying. The attractions of form, color, and scent in the flowers are
well known to us; but they are also appreciated by the insects,--a fact
which may possibly suggest that a high degree of intellectual power is
not required for appreciation of these qualities, as no one professes
that bees rank high intellectually. At the same time, if comparisons are
to be made at this point, the farther suggestion may also be introduced,
that there is little testimony to intelligence where search for food is
concerned, and while the human race do not feed on flowers, insects are
constantly feeding from them. The attractions in the two cases therefore
vary considerably in their significance. Restricting attention, however,
to the special field of observation now before us, with the view simply
of ascertaining the relations of plants and insects, color and honey
present the two most prominent attractions accounting for the perpetual
hum of life heard amongst the flowering plants. Different parts of the
flower provide for variegated coloring, and stores of honey; these
present attractions to the insects; and the structure of the flowers as
they provide for the landing of the insects, and require that they
penetrate to their centre for the secreted honey, secures that the work
needful for fertilization be effectually done. This last feature of
adaptation is that on which attention may be specially concentrated
here. Mr. Darwin in treating of orchids has described this part of their
structure in these words;--"In almost all the species, one of the petals
(or leaves of the flower) which is properly the upper one, is larger
than the others and stands on the lower side of the flower, where it
offers a landing-place for insects."[BV] Towards the inner or root end
of this leaf (_labellum_) is the gland, in some flowers appearing only
as a slit, in others forming like a tube, (_nectary_) which secrets the
honey. Just over the entrance to the part where the honey is to be found
stands that which secrets the pollen prepared for fertilizing some other
flower. So soon as the bee or other insect presses its head well into
the centre of the flower, some of the pollen adheres to it; when the
head is withdrawn, this pollen is borne off to the flower which the bee
next visits; and as the head is pressed into the core of this flower
the pollen is deposited, and provision for fertilization is complete.
Special features appearing in certain classes of the orchids illustrate
how it is possible for the bee so laden to visit many flowers without
depositing the pollen, yet a little later accomplish the object quite
simply. The following illustration from Mr. Darwin's account of the
first orchid selected, will suffice. Just _above_ the entrance to the
honey store, lies a pouch connected with the pollen store. As the head
of the bee is pressed down towards the honey, this pouch is burst open,
and from it issues a little sticky gland or disc, or it may be two of
these discs. These adhere at once to the head of the bee, and being
connected by a slight band with packets of pollen grains so soon as the
animal retires the pollen is drawn with it, standing out like a seed
vessel on the head. The strangest part of the contrivance appears in
what thereafter follows. "The viscid matter has the peculiar chemical
quality, of setting like cement, hard and dry in a few minutes." Suppose
both the little viscid balls have been withdrawn, the bands bearing the
pollen will appear "projecting up like horns." "How then can the flower
be fertilized? This is effected by a beautiful contrivance; though the
viscid surface remains immovably affixed, the apparently insignificant
and minute disc of membrane to which the caudicle adheres is endowed
with a remarkable power of contraction, which causes the pollinium to
sweep through an angle of about ninety degrees, always in one direction
towards the apex of the proboscis, in the course of thirty seconds on an
average."[BW] That is, the two erections bearing packets of pollen which
formerly stood up almost perpendicular, like horns, begin to lower until
they reach the horizontal; in this way when the bee enters a flower the
packets of pollen inevitably touch the seed stores, communicating what
is required for their fertilization. Nor have we even yet the whole of
the contrivances adapted for this end. "Here comes into play another
pretty adaptation." The seed vessel to be fertilized is very sticky,
"but not so viscid as when touched by a pollinium to pull the whole off
an insect's head." But it is sufficiently adhesive "to break the elastic
threads by which the packets of pollen grains are tied together." In
this way, it tears off so much from the store adhering to the head of
the bee, and still leaves there what may supply the requirements of many
flowers besides. The description thus given will suffice to indicate how
close is the relation of the lower orders of animal life with vegetable
life, and will illustrate how the lower organism may be dependent for
existence on the higher, an illustration in some respect the converse of
the facts illustrating origin of species by development.

There remains in this department of inquiry only one additional set of
facts, to which reference may be made, as illustrating _distribution of
work among insects and birds_, assigning them to different orders of
plants. This will illustrate contrivance on a still wider scale,
discovering distinct sets of affinity, which imply common localization
for given plants and animals. In this it appears that flies, humble
bees, and birds with long slender bills, such as the humming birds, all
have a share in the work required for fertilizing plants.

There is one example, _epipactis latifolia_, with a cup-shaped labellum,
in which honey is secreted, and which bees are never seen to frequent.
What, however, the bees pass, the wasps suck eagerly, and by them it is
fertilized. Of this flower, Mr. Darwin says,--"It is very remarkable
that the sweet nectar of this _epipactis_ should not be attractive to
any kind of bee. If wasps were to become extinct in any district, so
probably would the _Epipactis Latifolia_."[BX]

Another example there is of an orchid _(Spiranthes Autumnalis_),
commonly known as _Ladies' Tresses_, having a series of spikes, of which
the lowest flowers are first matured, the others following in order as
they rise towards the summit. This plant is frequented by bees, whose
practice it is to begin with the lowest flowers and ascend gradually to
the top. This order in seeking to extract the honey, proves to be the
proper one for fertilizing of the plant, because the pollen which the
bee brings will be received by the riper flower on which it lands, and
when that has been deposited, fresh pollen will adhere to the bee as it
rises to the less matured flowers, and thus it departs laden with pollen
destined for the lowest flowers of the next plant it visits.[BY]

[Illustration: 1 SECTION OF ORCHID FLOWER SHOWING POLLEN VESSEL, SEED
STORE AND HONEY STORE 2 BEE ENTERING 3 POLLEN VESSEL 4 BEE RETREATING 5
BEE PREPARED FOR ENTERING ANOTHER FLOWER]

These examples introduce us to a general plan for fertilization of
plants by the intervention of insects, so complete in the order of
distribution that we may classify the plants according to the insect by
which they are fertilized, making it natural to speak of fly orchids,
spider orchids, wasp orchids, and bee orchids. In all cases the search
for honey determines the visits made, leaving still unexplained,
however, the fact that the nectar of some plants is shunned by certain
insects, and eagerly absorbed by others. With the general source of
attraction in the flowering plants, there are diversities of arrangement
among the insects, according to the comparative size of the flower, and
strength required in order to penetrate to the inner chamber where the
honey is stored. Because of the minuteness of the aperture, there are
flowers from which the bee can not draw supplies; on the other hand,
because of the size and strength of the flower, there are cases in which
the ordinary bee is incapable of reaching the store, and the stronger
humble bee alone succeeds in effecting an entrance.

There is thus presented in mere outline a general view of the
interdependence of lower and higher orders of organism. While each
flower develops pollen and seed, there are arrangements connected with
the ripening of these two, which restrain or even prevent
self-fertilization. Along with this there are distinct lines of evidence
to establish the rule that cross-fertilization, or transference of
pollen from one flower to the seed of another, secures the growth of a
much healthier and more vigorous order. Where such transference is
provided for otherwise than by the wind, the attractiveness of the
flowers brings to them at the proper season, the insects which carry the
pollen, and to each class of insect is distributed a distinct share in
the work. In these facts we have a natural law for preservation of
species, discovering in a very striking manner the dependence of lower
organism on higher. As Mr. Darwin has said,--" The _meaning_ of these
facts is clear." Referring to the examples in which the insects have to
bore holes in order to reach the honey, where there is need for time to
allow for the hardening of the viscid matter, he has used the following
words which are most fitly applied,--"If this double relation is
accidental, it is a fortunate accident for the plants; but I can not
believe it to be so, and it appears to me one of the most wonderful
cases of adaptation which has ever been recorded."[BZ] It is most
obviously true, as Sir John Lubbock has said, that "neither plants nor
insects would be what they are, but for the influence which each has
exercised on the other."[CA] In view of the facts here very briefly
described it will generally be allowed that Mr. Darwin's expectation
from the study of orchids will be verified,--"An examination of their
many beautiful contrivances will exalt the whole vegetable kingdom in
most persons' estimation."[CB] We have enough before us to enable us to
appreciate our author's feeling when he says, "Hardly any fact has
struck me so much as the endless diversities of structure,--the
prodigality of resources for gaining the very same end."[CC] Again when
giving us his prevailing impression he says,--"The more I study nature,
the more I become impressed with ever-increasing force, that the
contrivances and beautiful adaptations, slowly acquired through each
part occasionally varying in a slight degree, but in many ways, with the
preservation of those variations which were beneficial to the organism
under complex and ever varying conditions of life, transcend in an
incomparable manner the contrivances and adaptations which the most
fertile imagination of man could invent."[CD]

In preparing the present summary of recent advances in this department
of natural history, I have resorted freely to quotation, because of the
obvious rule, that it is better for scientific interest, for proper
understanding, and for regulation of all subsequent reasoning on the
facts, that we have the observations presented as nearly as possible by
those who made them, and that we have more general inferences in the
very words of those whose minds have been filled and swayed by
impressions made in the field of observation itself. In now proceeding
to consider the bearing of these advances on religious thought, I shall
keep as far as possible by the same rule, desiring that science may
interpret itself, and translate its own special conclusions into their
fit place within a scheme of the universe. And whatever there may be
here of material for detailed inference, it will be taken by religious
men as abundantly clear, that science in slowly unfolding to general
view these secrets of nature, renders a lasting and most valuable
service to religion. Our religious convictions and emotions rest on a
wider intellectual basis according to the fulness with which we
understand the marvels of adaptation and contrivance which lie covered
from ordinary observation under the attractive surface of nature.

Altogether beyond such a general admission as this, however, it must be
obvious that in the mass of deeply interesting material now before us,
there lies a considerable number of truths needing to be gathered into
generalized form, bearing upon the laws of nature applying to living
organism. As records of details are extended before us, the marvels of
structure are obvious. The multifarious contrivances become quite
startling, until we are ready to lose our reckoning in the very
multiplicity of facts narrated. In order to make sure of general result,
we need to draw off somewhat from details,--to be content even to lose
sight of many of them,--in order to gain a position, sufficiently
removed for a sight of general relations. In attempting this it is clear
that there are certain truths bearing on the preservation and
development of species in the vegetable kingdom, and an analogous set
of truths as to the animal kingdom, and above these, possibly still more
important for general appreciation of the universe as a whole, a body of
truth as to the relations of plants and animals.

As to the first of these, it seems obvious that within the single field
of observation presented by orchids,--comparatively narrow, in view of
the wide domain of the vegetable kingdom, and yet astonishingly
extensive, on account of the richness of detail,--there is a large body
of evidence to support the theory of origin of species by selection and
adaptation. Whether all the orchideæ now found in existence have sprung
from one order of plant, or from several, the testimony appears ample to
support at least the following conclusion as presented in the words of
Mr. Darwin, "that the now wonderfully changed structure of the flower is
due to a long course of slow modification,--each modification having
been preserved which was useful to the plant, during the incessant
changes to which the organic and inorganic world has been exposed."[CE]


By a line of inference exactly similar, a like conclusion, must be
reached as to insect life. For, important as the observations are,
bearing on the transference of pollen from the place where it is
generated to the place where it is wanted, we must notice that the whole
work is done in consequence of search for honey by flies, moths, ants,
wasps, and bees. It naturally follows that all these insects have been
going through some measure of adaptation, as well as the plants. The
same law must have been operating in their history while prosecuting the
unceasing search for food. It may be exceedingly difficult to fill up
the line of progress, or trace the causes in operation, which could
favor the conclusion that all the insects named have sprung from a
common stock. Still more perplexing might it be to maintain the argument
that these very insects have sprung according to a sure law of descent,
from vegetable life itself. But there is ample evidence to warrant the
inference that in length of proboscis, formation of limbs, and other
features in their structure, modifications have resulted from the
struggle needful to reach the nectar secreted in the flowers.

But it is clearly impossible to stop here in our inferences. There is
interdependence of lower and higher organisms, to which a distinct place
needs to be assigned in our theory of the universe. Even if it be
granted, as it readily will be by those who have studied the results of
recent research, that there is a vast body of evidence to prove that
there is development of species by adaptation and selection, it is
equally evident that this is not the only law affecting the existence of
different orders of organized beings. Just as clear as it is that pollen
and seed are both required to provide for the continuance of plant life,
so clear is it that plants are needed to support insects, and insects to
propagate plants. Proceeding on the same lines of reasoning as have been
already employed, we must inquire how this interdependence is to be
accounted for under natural law? The struggle for existence is clearly
performing an important part in the development of plants, and also of
animals; and so long as we regard these two orders singly, it seems
obvious how changes in structure may be accounted for; but observations
have become so interlaced, that a new problem has been raised in
connection with facts manifestly abating the struggle for existence. In
view of this problem Dr. Hooker has said,--"The adjustment of the parts
of the flower to the form and habits of the insect or bird, and of these
to the flower, is so accurate, that it is in vain to speculate whether
the plant was adapted to feed the animal, or the animal adapted to
fertilize the plant."[CF] This suggestion of the needlessness of
speculation is natural from a scientific point of view, and we may do
well to remember the warnings against risks attending the search for
final causes, which have been sounded from the days of Spinoza to the
present time; but there is a problem here which science can not leave in
abeyance. The facts are undoubted, and the natural causes must be
sought. The parts of the flowers are adapted to the forms and habits of
the insects; the insects are adapted to the work of fertilizing the
plants; the question is, How are these two things secured? The inquiry
which has awakened general interest as to the development of species in
the history of distinct orders such as orchids, insects, pigeons, and
dogs, must strive to complete its work, by pressing on to this more
complicated question concerning the adaptation of distinct organisms to
influence and aid each other in the work of development. In what way
science may deal with this question, and how far it may be able to
advance in the search for an answer, it may be difficult to decide. For
it is much easier to indicate the logical necessity for an advance, than
to say in what manner the advance is to be accomplished. The one is a
simple question of logical requirement; the other must be a matter of
continued observation, and scientific inference. Whether science may yet
discover an answer; or whether it may prove true at this point, as at
other points already mentioned, that science has here reached clear
marks of its own limits, must be left to the future, to be determined by
those devoted to scientific research. As long, however, as this question
of interdependence remains without a scientific explanation, it must be
obvious that there are important facts which seem to imply some
modification of the theory of descent, or evolution of species by means
of selection, under the severe struggle for existence. Or, to put it
from another point of view, nature has marvellously provided for
mitigation of the struggle for existence, by contrivances providing both
for vegetable and animal life; therefore the theory of the origin and
development of life which depends chiefly on the struggle for existence
must be adjusted to allow for a theory of the effects arising from the
natural provision for obviating the struggle, and providing for a large
increase of life.

Quite beyond this, as a matter entirely distinct, is the question as to
the primordial forms of existence in the history of plants and insects.
As to this, science may be able to give very little testimony, as it is
a question of the remote past, on which present facts may afford little
evidence. Still, beyond these primordial forms, in a region which
science can not enter, there lies the question of origin, of actual
beginning, creation of life, as to the reality of which science can
speak only indirectly by discovery of its own limits, in the terms of
its _ultimatum_, nature has provided that such and such things shall be.

Before leaving the department of insect life, there is a collateral and
complementary series of observations, bearing upon the nature and
activity of ANTS, which deserves attention. The ants are a race of
insects as diligently industrious as the bees, like them also fond of
honey and of all sweet substances; but unlike them ready to devour other
insects. Along with the industry of the bee, they have predatory
tendencies, leading them into conflict with other races, or even
involving different orders of their own race in warfare. It is a curious
fact, in this connection, that many of the flowering plants have
contrivances which guard them from the approach of ants. Creeping
insects find the way barred against them while the flying insect at once
and easily reaches the stores of honey, not knowing any thing of the
difficulties in the path of the less favored rival. Spikes grow with
their points in a downward direction, against which no creeping insect
can make way; waxy or glutinous matter is spread over the leaves, which
insects shun as a trap; and there are velvety flexible leaves from the
edge of which the insect easily slips off. Special attention has been
turned to this field of research by Kerner,[A] an interesting outline of
the results of his observations being given by Sir John Lubbock.[CG]
The conclusion reached as to the utility of these contrivances for
exclusion of creeping insects, is that they perform an auxiliary part in
the general plan for fertilization which has been described. To allow
the store of honey to go to the ants would be merely to feed them
without any equivalent advantage to the flowers. To diminish the supply
in this way, might cause the bees to abandon many flowers, and so
greatly diminish fertilization. This would ultimately lead to short
supplies, and probable extinction of several orders of plants and
animals, and accordingly these contrivances to hinder the access of
ants, must be added to those for facilitating the approach of bees, and
other flying insects, affording further evidence of the adjustment of
rival interests involved in the relations of the vegetable and animal
kingdoms. The serried spikes are a phalanx of bayonets planted for
resistance of an advancing foe.

Contemplating now the ants as in some respects an excluded race, which
with a large share of pugnacity can not find a basis of operations for
contending against the bees, we have to turn attention briefly on their
modes of life. The industry of the ant is proverbial, and can not fail
to arrest the attention of any one who spends a few minutes before an
ant-hill. But carefully recorded observations prove it to be much
greater than could have been imagined. Sir John Lubbock has rendered
special service here by carefully noting the time occupied, as well as
the amount of work done, thus preserving a series of observations
exceedingly suggestive in many ways, and having an important bearing on
a considerable number of difficult questions connected with the relative
powers of lower and higher orders of life. A similar service has been
rendered in America in the work of the Rev. H. C. McCook of
Philadelphia, on _The Natural History of the Agricultural Ant of
Texas_,--a book recording careful and most important observations,
adding much to the stores of knowledge concerning ants.[CH]

The work of the ants is directed mainly to the two great objects of
animal life, procuring food, and caring for the young, to which falls to
be added, the repelling of attacks upon their nests, or removal of any
thing obnoxious. They destroy great numbers of smaller insects, bearing
them to their nests for consumption, besides going off in search of
honey which may be within reach, and not guarded with spikes. This mode
of providing implies a very busy life, and they do not as a rule grudge
work. Besides procuring supplies, however, there is a large amount of
labor in the care bestowed upon their young. Without attempting to
distinguish various orders, of which "more than seven hundred kinds are
known,"[CI] a general description of their young will suffice. In the
earliest stage of their existence, the larvæ are small conical shaped
grubs, without power of movement. In this state they are fed, carried
about from place to place as if their seniors were seeking change of air
and temperature for them; and in process of these removals and
arrangements, they are often grouped together in separate companies, and
in exact order according to their size. In their next stage, they become
pupæ, sometimes quite exposed, in other cases covered with a thin silken
covering. From this, they pass into the mature state as perfect insects,
and in process of this transition older ants render assistance by way of
aiding the transition, "carefully unfolding their legs and smoothing
out their wings."

In the ant nest there is a singular distinction of orders which prevents
us speaking of the _parent_ ants as doing all this work for the young.
The great majority in every nest are neuters, not producing young; these
are the workers, and they are destitute of wings. The smaller numbers
only are the males and females producing the young. The workers, shorn
of wings, and entrusted with all that is required in household and
out-door duties, labor assiduously. These neuter ants have occasioned
special perplexity to Mr. Darwin as bearing on the theory of evolution,
a difficulty which is seriously increased by the fact that in some cases
they "differ from each other, sometimes to an almost incredible degree,
and are thus divided into two or even three castes," and these "do not
commonly graduate into each other," but are "as distinct from each other
as any two species."[CJ] Without following Mr. Darwin through his
reasoning as to the adaptation of neuters for their task in life, it may
be well to quote his words towards its close, where he says, "I must
confess, that, with all my faith in natural selection, I should never
have anticipated that this principle could have been efficient in so
high a degree, had not the case of these neuter insects led me to this
conclusion."[CK] Besides the fact that these neuters are the workers,
there is an additional circumstance, established by Mr. Frederick Smith
by observations in England, confirmed by the observations of Pierre
Huber in Switzerland, and afterwards verified in the clearest way by Mr.
Darwin, that there is a species of ant (_formica sanguinea_) which
captures slaves of a weaker order, making war against the weaker race,
carrying off their young, rearing them within their own nests, and
training them to serve. Mr. Darwin was himself sceptical of such a
statement, but gives an interesting narrative of distinct observations
by which it was confirmed.

The amount of labor undertaken by the workers from an ants' nest, may be
judged by one or two extracts from the records of Sir John Lubbock. He
says, "I once watched an ant from six in the morning, and she worked
without intermission till a quarter to ten at night," and in that time
she had carried one hundred and eighty-seven larvæ into the nest.[CL]
There is evidence not only of coöperation, but of division of labor
among the workers. The observations of Mr. Forel lead to the conclusion
that "very young ants devote themselves at first to the care of the
larvæ and pupæ, and that they do not take share in the defence of the
nest or other out-of-door work, until they are some days old."[CM] By a
distinct set of observations, watching all ants that came and went from
the nest, and laying up in captivity some of the number, Mr. Lubbock
came to the conclusion "that certain ants are told off as foragers."[CN]
And in the winter season, when in the case of some orders little food is
required, a few only of the inhabitants of the nest come and go, for the
purpose of carrying in supplies. This makes observation much more easy
at that season, rendering it possible to number and identify individual
workers. The results as applicable to one of the nests are given in the
following sentences. "From the 1st of November to the 5th of January,
with two or three casual exceptions, the whole of the supplies were
carried in by three ants, one of whom, however, did comparatively
little. The other two were imprisoned, and then, but not till then, a
fresh ant appeared on the scene. She carried in the food for a week, and
then she being imprisoned, two others undertook the task."[CO]

One consideration more bearing upon obtaining supplies deserves to be
recorded as altogether singular. Some species of ants watch over a
distinct order of insects, the aphides, which exude a sweet fluid, using
them exactly as we do cows for obtaining supplies of milk. The ant comes
up to the aphis, gently strokes it with her feelers, forthwith the aphis
gives forth its supply of honey, which the ant drinks up and departs.
The facts were observed by Pierre Huber, and verified by Mr. Darwin.
This verification was so interesting, that I give the narrative in a
slightly condensed form. Mr. Darwin says,--"I removed all the ants from
a group of about a dozen aphides on a dock-plant, and prevented their
attendance during several hours." Mr. Darwin tried in vain by stroking
the aphides with a hair, in imitation of the play of the feelers of the
ants, to induce them to give up the honey. "Afterwards," he says, "I
allowed an ant to visit them, and it immediately seemed, by its eager
way of running about, to be well aware what a rich flock it had
discovered; it then began to play with its antennæ on the abdomen first
of one aphis and then of another; and each, as soon as it felt the
antennæ, immediately lifted up its abdomen and excreted a limpid drop of
sweet juice, which was eagerly devoured by the ant."[CP] So the ants
have their "cows" and milk them.

To attempt any account of the ants of tropical countries, where ants are
most numerous, swarming in the regions they inhabit, and marching in
hosts, would occupy too much space. I give, therefore, only a single
reference extracted from the testimony of Mr. Savage concerning the
driver ant of Western Africa (_Anomma Arcens_), so called because of the
success with which it drives every thing before it. Mr. Savage annoyed
by the proximity of a large settlement, discovered its quarters in some
decaying granite. Kindling a fire around it, he believed he had
succeeded in disposing of that settlement. Two days after, he went back
to the spot, and instead of desolation and death, he found "a tree at a
short distance, about eighteen inches in diameter, to the height of four
feet from the ground, with the adjacent plants and earth perfectly black
with them." The most striking thing, however, was that the ants had made
festoons from the lower branches to the ground, formed in the following
manner, as witnessed by Mr. Savage: "ant after ant coming down from
above, extending their long limbs, and opening wide their jaws,
gradually lengthening out the living chain" until first it was swaying
to and fro, and ultimately fastened to the ground, when "others were
ascending and descending upon them, thus holding free and ready
communication with the lower and upper portions of this dense mass." In
this same manner these ants provide for the crossing of water when on
the march. "They make a line or chain of one another, gradually
extending themselves by numbers across till the opposite side is
reached."[CQ] This is exactly similar to the manner in which some
monkeys are known to construct a natural bridge, only that the monkeys
have the advantage of greater size and muscular strength, as well as
prehensile power by the use of their tails. With such characteristics as
have been briefly described, there is little wonder that a high place in
the scale of intelligence has been claimed for these small insects. Sir
John Lubbock, who has so patiently conducted his observations as to
their modes of life, has stated this in the following manner,--"The
anthropoid apes no doubt approach more to man in bodily structure than
do any other animals; but when we consider the habits of ants, their
social organization, their large communities, elaborate habitations,
their roadways, their possession of domestic animals, and even in some
cases of slaves, it must be admitted that they have a fair claim to rank
next to man in the scale of intelligence."[CR] Whether, even with all
this evidence, we may be able to rank the ants quite as high as Lubbock
here suggests, may be open to question. There may, for example, be
reasonable debate whether the dog does not present still higher signs of
intelligence, but it says a great deal for the ants that debate in the
case should be possible. A question of very great scientific importance
is here raised, affecting the whole scheme of interpretation applicable
to animal life, as connected with development of brain.

Without attempting to enter upon the argument yet to be conducted
through the wider relations concerned, it must be obvious that the facts
bearing on insect life must erelong have a larger share than they have
yet had in influencing our generalizations. By reference to these, it
becomes apparent, that anatomical structure is not in itself an adequate
guide in determining comparative importance on the scale of organic
existence; and, what is still more startling, that even comparative
brain structure can not be taken as the sole test of the measure of
intelligence belonging to animals. The whole orders of ants, taken
collectively, must be regarded as presenting quite exceptional
difficulties, not only for a theory of evolution regarded as an
all-embracing science of life; but also for that theory of intelligence
which seeks to account for diversities of power by the comparative
complexity of brain structure.

Passing from more detailed discussion, it is needful to observe how wide
and valuable are the results of these researches concerning the
relation of the vegetable kingdom with lower orders of animals. Facts
now recorded in multitudes of scientific journals, and more elaborate
treatises, illustrate wonderful minuteness of contrivance and
completeness of adaptation in the works of nature, giving to the range
of knowledge possessed only a century ago an aspect of insignificance.
What the microscope has done by enlarging the range of human vision,
subdivision of labor among scientific inquirers, and proportionate
concentration, have done, in the way of embracing the vast and
complicated field, of observation lying open to all eyes. The results
exalt to a greatly higher place in our appreciation the evidence of
design in the world. The consequence is that while the line of thought
followed by Paley, in what he designated _Natural Theology_, has become
a thousand-fold more interesting, the familiar and now almost antiquated
illustration of the _watch_, taken as a model of human design, by the
comparative simplicity of its adjustments, seems strangely inadequate to
represent even in the most temporary form, a minuteness of design quite
overwhelming to the human mind in its attempts to bring it within a
uniform scheme. Whether all this was provided for by manifold creative
acts, or by development from a few primordial forms, does not affect the
argument; the latter suggestion only greatly increases its force. To
those who are swayed only by an intellectual interest, the facts of
vegetable and insect life must be full of significance, suggestive of
far-reaching reflection. But to no body of men can these results of
scientific research be so attractive as to those who require for all
nature a supernatural explanation.

FOOTNOTES:

[BR] _Lay Sermons_, chap, vii., p. 134.

[BS] Darwin's _Fertilization of Orchids_, p. 2; Lubbock's _Scientific
Lectures_, p. 8.

[BT] Sir John Lubbock's _Scientific Lectures_, p. 3. Mr. Darwin refers
to Fritz Müller's papers as reported in _Botanische Zeitung_, 1869-70.
Appendix IX.

[BU] _The Various Contrivances by which Orchids are fertilized by
Insects_, 2d ed. p. 293.

[BV] _Fertilization_, p. 5.

[BW] _Fertilization_, p. 12.

[BX] _Fertilization_, p. 102.

[BY] _Ib._ p. 113.

[BZ] _Fertilization_, p. 44.

[CA] _Scientific Lectures_, p. 31.

[CB] _Fertilization_, p. 2.

[CC] _Ib._ p. 284.

[CD] _Fertilization_, p. 285.

[CE] _Fertilization_, p. 246.

[CF] _Botany_, (Science Primers) by Dr. J. D. Hooker, C.B., P.R.S., p.
79.

[CG] _Scientific Lectures_, p. 36.

[CH] See Appendix X.

[CI] See Appendix VIII.

[CJ] _Origin of Species_, 6th ed. p. 230.

[CK] _Origin of Species_, 6th ed. p. 233.

[CL] _Scient. Lects._ p. 73.

[CM] _Ib._ p. 78.

[CN] _Ib._ p. 135.

[CO] _Scientific Lectures_, p. 135.

[CP] _Origin of Species_ 6th ed. p. 207.

[CQ] _Museum of Natural History_ edited by Richardson, Dallas, Cobbold,
Baird, and White, vol. ii. p. 184.

[CR] _Scient. Lects._ p. 68.




LECTURE VI.

HIGHER ORGANISMS.--RESEMBLANCES AND CONTRASTS.--BRAIN STRUCTURE.


The stage of investigation now reached requires us to consider recent
advances in our knowledge of more complicated organisms. This leads into
the line of observation disclosing steadily advancing complexity of
structure, and brings us into contact with the claim that man be
included within the area of scientific inquiry, and regarded as a more
fully organized life to which lower orders are not only pointing, but
actually tending.

As to this last claim, about which more must be said as we approach the
close of these investigations, it may be remarked by way of preliminary,
that as man belongs to nature, all the characteristics of his life must
come within the area of scientific inquiry, and indeed the test of any
theory of existence which may be offered, will be found in the measure
of success with which it explains our own nature. That man stands
highest in the scale of organism belonging to this world admits of no
doubt, therefore the explanation of human nature may be regarded as the
supreme effort of science. Around this subject, however, serious
differences have arisen among scientific men, but these differences do
not concern the very simple question whether all that belongs to nature
comes within the range of the science of nature. This is granted by all,
whether there be a preference for including all such inquiry under the
single name of science, or for distinguishing between physical science
and mental philosophy. This is simply a matter of defining terms, and
tracing the boundaries of recognized departments of inquiry. But whether
a continued study of organism will conduct us to an adequate
understanding of human nature, must be a matter of observation and
inference. If it do, science has completed its work. If it do not, there
remains a still higher question, how shall we account for features of
life for which organism affords no scientific explanation? The whole
field is certainly free to science, and the whole task which this
immense field of research imposes must be undertaken, and persistently
prosecuted to a rational issue.

Entering now, therefore, on the contemplation of animal life, regarded
as a higher order, distinguishable from vegetable life, we have the
outstanding characteristics of sensibility and locomotion. Whether there
is a distinct line of demarcation between vegetable and animal does not
require special attention, for no matter of controversy on this point
can delay procedure. There is, as already remarked, in the vegetable
kingdom a singular approximation towards animal life, in so far as we
have evidence of sensibility to touch among the plants, to a degree
which appears wonderful chiefly by contrast with the common
characteristics of the vegetable kingdom.

On the other hand, sensibility to influences operating from without is a
common feature of animal life. Even the very lowest orders of animals
are sensitive to touch, and as this form of experience is closely
connected with power of locomotion, all animals have the conditions of
their life largely affected by interference with their own movements, or
resistance offered, whether by objects lying in their way, or by some
force restraining their progress, or causing movement in an opposite
direction. Now these two characteristics--sensibility to impression from
without, and movement caused by an exercise of energy from within the
organism itself--are both provided for by means of the nerve system
belonging to the animal. This nerve system varies in the number and
complexity of its arrangements, according to the complexity of the
organism with which it is associated. As, therefore, we rise in the
scale, passing from the soft pulpy form of the lowest orders, to those
formed in segments or rings, next to those with distinct portions of
organism fulfilling separate functions, as in insect life, with head,
body, and legs; and next pass up to the vertebrates, with back-bone and
skeleton, on which is built up a more or less complicated muscular
system, we find a nerve system, growing in complexity along with the
appearance of different organs of the body. And in all cases, this
system fulfils these two functions--sensibility to touch, and movement
of the body. These two are provided for by distinct lines or nerve
fibres; and in all cases, these two sets are combined in a centre,
thereby securing that the two sets be coöperative, unitedly
contributing to the management of the living organism. This appears even
if we take for illustration an organism so low as the _ascidian
mollusk_, which floats in the water as if it were a sack drawn together
towards the top, bulging out below; and which is nourished simply by the
passing of a current of water in at the mouth, and out at a vent towards
the lower end of the sac. A series of nerve lines comes from the mouth;
a distinct ramification spreads over the lower portion of the sac; and
these two are united in a single knot or ganglion, a little above the
vent. By these contrivances, this little body, though for the most part
stationary, is sensitive to the approach of any thing injurious, and by
contraction of its mass expels the water with considerable force,
driving the injurious matter to a distance. This combination of the two
sets of nerves appears more strikingly in such an animal as the
_centipede_, along whose body are successive groups of nerves, combined
in regular order in a series of knots, and united longitudinally by
connecting threads, attaching the successive knots. The same plan is
carried up into a more articulated form in the case of the _winged
insect_, with head, antennæ or feelers projecting from the head, wings,
and legs, leading to a more marked appearance of separate combinations,
giving greater prominence to the head. When from this we rise to the
_fish_, thence to the _bird,_ thence to the _quadruped_, we find the
head made conspicuously the central organ of the entire nerve system of
the animal, while it occupies the front position in the body. It is no
longer one of a set or series of knots; nor even the largest or more
conspicuous in a graduated order of centres; but in the head of the
animal is found that which is the true nerve centre for the whole nerve
system, designated the brain. In the case of the vertebrates, not only
does the skeleton afford the solid frame-work on which the muscular
system is built, but the back-bone contains within it the main column of
nerve fibres, which are given out at the several joints according to the
requirements of the body.

If meanwhile we concentrate attention on our own bodies, we may by the
aid of personal experience find easy illustration of the prominent
features of the nerve system. We shall take first the _two distinct
lines_ of nerves already mentioned, the one set concerned with
sensibility, the other with movement of the muscles. From the tips of
the fingers there run lines of nerve fibre, which are brought into
combination at the wrist, and are carried up the arm, and onward by the
shoulder and upper portion of the back-bone to the head. These are the
nerves of _sensibility_, by means of which, as by telegraph wires, the
slightest impression made on the tips of the fingers is instantly
conveyed to the great nerve centre in the brain. Distinct from these is
another set of nerves issuing from the brain, and descending the arm,
giving off its fibres as it passes to the several muscles above the
elbow, next to those above the wrist, and next to the muscles of the
hand and fingers. These are the nerves of _movement_, by means of which
the whole arm may be brought into action at pleasure, or the hand may be
set to work, while the arm is at rest.

These two sets of nerves--the sensory and motor--are exactly _similar in
structure_, consisting of an outer covering, within which floating in a
white fluid is a thread which constitutes the nerve proper. The outer
covering provides for _isolation_ of the fibre, from other fibres laid
alongside of it, just as copper wire is isolated by a gutta-percha
covering when the two connecting lines from an electric battery are laid
down in close proximity as in the arrangement for electric bells. By
this provision the nerve fibres are completely isolated making it
possible to distinguish sensory impressions so as to tell which finger
has been touched. The similarity of structure in the two lines of nerves
is a striking fact in view of the completely distinct functions
fulfilled. This leads to a special explanation of the provision for
different modes of action. This is secured by _diversity in the terminal
arrangements_ for the two classes of nerves. The nerves of sensibility
have a peculiarly sensitive arrangement spread under the skin,
constituting an end-bulb or touch organ. In certain parts of the body
more sensitive than others, such as the tips of the fingers, there are
additional minute corpuscles, grouped alongside of the nerve, liable to
contract under the slightest pressure, and which add greatly to the
sensitiveness of the particular parts about which they cluster. The
terminal arrangements of the motor nerves are quite different. The nerve
fibres pass into the substance of the muscle to be moved by them, and
the nerve fibre is subdivided and distributed, so as to bring the
several parts of the muscle under control. These fibres are so laid and
connected, that a whole set of muscles can be moved simultaneously,
being made to work in perfect harmony.

_The vital activity_ of this whole arrangement of nerve fibres,
including sensory and motor in one system, depends upon living
connection of all with the great nerve centre in the brain, where the
nerve energy is provided which keeps all in functional activity. Only,
there is this striking difference with the two sets of fibres, that in
the case of the sensory nerve the pulsation of energy is upwards to the
brain, in the case of the motor nerve it is downwards towards the
muscle. There is no scientific explanation yet reached of this contrast
of molecular action. But by means of it the one order of nerves plays
the part of a vehicle of impression providing for knowledge of what is
without, the other order fulfils the part of an instrument for moving
the muscular system which is part of the organism itself.

[Illustration: DIAGRAM OF CEREBRO-SPINAL NERVE CENTRES. DARK
REPRESENTING SENSORY; THE LIGHT, MOTOR CENTRES. THE ARROWS INDICATE THE
DIRECTION OF THE CURRENT OF INFLUENCE.]

[Illustration: NERVE SYSTEM OF THE INSECT, SHOWING DISTINCT CENTRES.]

These two orders are not, however, to be regarded as separate systems
quite apart from each other, but as two sides of one system, which are
essentially and closely related to each other. There is a provision for
_combined action_ of the two sets, so that an impulse communicated along
a sensory nerve or set of nerves, may pass over to the motor system and
terminate in muscular activity. This is most simply illustrated by the
circumstance that the nerves of sensibility become instruments of
_pain_, when a severe shock or blow is given, or some injury is
inflicted. Suffering becomes a signal of risk and instantly the injured
part shrinks or starts away from the source of suffering. This is a
phase of sensori-motor activity illustrating a law which has a wide
range of application in animal life. This sketch of the arrangements and
functions of the two sides of the nerve system though traced in view of
its application to human nature, will suffice to indicate the general
plan in accordance with which sensibility and muscular activity are
provided for in the animal kingdom generally. The ramification of the
nerve lines will in each case be according to the simplicity or
complexity of structure belonging to the animal; but the provisions for
sensitiveness to touch, and power of movement are in all cases the same.
Fish, bird, and quadruped are alike sensitive to touch, and they are
alike capable of movement, though the mechanical contrivances by which
locomotion is secured vary greatly; but a double distribution of nerve
fibres in all cases provides for these two characteristics of animal
life.

From this, we advance to the nerve centre,--the brain,--to which the
nerves of sensibility run up, and from which the nerves of motion come
forth. Here also there is identity in the nature of the organ, while
there is variety in its size, with more or less complicated plans of
arrangement, according to the extent of the nerve system of which it is
the central organ. Still keeping to the human body for illustration, we
may find in the most complex organism known to us illustration of what
holds good in the main so far as essential structure is concerned.

The brain is made up of two entirely distinct substances. In the
interior of the organ, and altogether concealed from view when a drawing
of it is made, or the organ itself is exposed to observation, is _a
white mass_ consisting of a multitude of fibres. These are simply
crowds of nerve lines gathered together, led up from the extremities and
trunk, or provided for intercommunication with the several parts of this
central organ. Gathered all round about this, and constituting the
external mass, on the summit, sides, and base of the brain, is a
completely distinct substance known as _the grey matter_, folded up in
wavings, twistings, or convolutions, enclosing myriads of cells from
which nerve energy is discharged. These cells differ considerably in
form and size, suggesting the possibility of distinct functions being
assigned to cells of different structure, some being smaller and less
intimately connected with those around, others so much larger and more
important as to have suggested the name of pyramidal cells, and also
having lines of connection between themselves and other parts much more
numerous than in the case of the smaller cells. Every cell has a nucleus
or central point, which is the centre of vitality, while the fibres
which they send out, varying in number from one to four or five,
establish connection between cells, or pass into the nerves proper.
These cells are packed together in a soft glutinous substance, in the
outer layer of which they are fewer in number; approaching the interior,
they become more numerous; and they are both more abundant, larger in
size, and more distinguished by the number of their protoplasmic[CS]
fibres as they lie nearer to the mass of nerve fibres. In this crowd of
nerve cells are the stores of nerve energy supplied to the nerve system,
with every exercise of which molecular changes in the brain are believed
to take place. On this account there must be regular and ample supply of
nourishment for the brain, for which such provision has been made that,
according to Haller's computation, one fifth part of the whole blood
supply goes to the brain.

[Illustration: HUMAN BRAIN, WITH CENTRES OF ELECTRIC EXCITATION.]

Regarded as the great central organ, the brain is divided into two
halves or hemispheres, from each one of which goes forth supply of nerve
fibres and nerve energy for the opposite side of the body. Its greatest
depth is in the central part, the front and back being rounded down, the
frontal region being, however, considerably more massive than the rear.
Besides this great central body, there are several dependent subordinate
bodies, placed underneath, and directly above the upper part of the
spine. Most important of these is the _cerebellum_, or little brain,
whose functions are now generally believed to be closely connected with
the equilibrium of the body when moving. Somewhat nearer the centre, and
quite under the brain proper is the _pons_ or bridge, providing for the
interlacing of the fibres on their way out from the the central organ,
and just below that are certain elongated bodies (_medulla oblongata_),
consisting of masses of fibre just above the spinal cord.

Before closing this very brief and hasty description of the nerve
system, there is one peculiarly striking arrangement to which special
reference may be made. The mass of nerve fibre which passes down within
the back-bone constituting the spinal column, which is formed in two
divisions equivalent to the hemispheres of the brain, gives out at each
of the vertebræ or spinal joints a supply of nerve for the portion of
the body contiguous. This supply is sent out from each side of the
column, and issues in two roots, a posterior and anterior; the posterior
root being a body of sensory nerves, the anterior root of motor nerves.
Shortly after passing out, these two form into one, uniting to
constitute a nerve trunk. Just after they have thus united, the trunk
again opens up into two, and in each one of these two a share of the
sensory and motor roots finds a place, and thus preparation is made for
sending out towards both the front and back of the body suitable
proportion of both sets of nerves. The two roots drawn together as if to
bind them into one, are by some inexplicable process subdivided, and the
two bands issuing from the united band are found to have each a share of
the contents of each root. Of all the singular occurrences coming under
scientific observation there is nothing more surprising. The fact is
certain, but there is no scientific explanation of the contrivance by
which such a singular result is secured.

[Illustration: BRAIN OF THE CRAB.]

[Illustration: BRAIN OF THE COD, THE TWO LARGER LOBES BEING THOSE OF
VISION, THE BRAIN BEING IN FRONT OF THESE.]

Having now before us in outline a representation of the nervous system
of man, and having in this a guide to the understanding of the prominent
features involved in the distribution of two orders of nerves over the
body, and their concentration in a central organ, we are prepared for
considering the comparative brain development presented to view as we
ascend the scale of animal life. The main features of gradation may be
shortly stated. In all cases, the brain is a soft pulpy body, composed
as described, the exterior portion being cellular tissue, the interior
fibrous, from the gathering of nerve lines. In the lowest orders of
animals, the brain is of very small size. In the _insects_, such as the
ant, bee, and wasp, it is only a slight band stretching from eye to eye.
In the whole order of _fishes_ an advance in organization appears,
though the brain is small relatively to the size of the body, a fact
which seems readily explained by the fact that there is little
articulation in the structure of the fish, the whole body moving in one
mass, by simple management of the fins and tail. The brain as a rule is
simply two small round lobes of smooth surface laid together; and what
is most to be remarked is that the brain proper is quite inferior in
size to lobes of vision.[CT] In front of the brain are slight strands
connected with the organ of smell; and behind it are the two large lobes
known as optic lobes, before which the brain appears comparatively
insignificant. This is the ordinary arrangement, but in the case of the
shark the brain extends to much larger proportions, greatly surpassing
the optic lobes, and having in front of it unusually ample provision for
the organ of smell.[CU]

When we reach the _reptiles_ the normal order appears which continues
thereafter up the whole range of animal life. The brain takes precedence
of the lobes of special sense, and is the most important organ. This
appears quite decisively in the brain of the frog. On account of the
possession of four limbs, and its power of locomotion by forward leaps,
provided for by the superior size and strength of the hind legs, there
is much greater need for distribution of nerve lines, to place distinct
muscles under control, and as a consequence the brain or central organ
assumes a position of greater importance.

[Illustration: BRAIN OF THE BIRD.]

[Illustration: BRAIN OF THE CAT, WITH BULB OF SMELL IN FRONT, AND LITTLE
BRAIN BEHIND.]

Passing next to _birds_, we find a marked advance in the structure of
the brain. The two hemispheres are considerably extended towards the
rear, and the two optic lobes underneath the back part of the brain are
separated from each other, being placed somewhat to the side. The
cerebellum, or little brain, regulating equilibrium becomes more
important in size and form, being laid up in transverse furrows. These
important advances indicate a life of much more varied activity than in
the lower orders. This animal walks, hops, perches on branches by the
clutching of its claws, and flies from place to place. To provide for
these varied forms of activity, there must be a more detailed
arrangement of nerve system, which is clearly indicated in the
complexity of the central organ.

The next advance introduces to notice the _smaller quadrupeds_, known as
the rodents, of which the rat, rabbit, and hare may be taken as the most
familiar examples. Here we still have the smooth surface of the brain,
without any subdivision and twining into folds such as afterwards
appears, but it is somewhat elongated in shape. An additional element
here comes into view, that is, extra provision for acuteness of smell,
in accordance with the well-known characteristics of the class of
animals. Set out in front of the brain are two distinct lobes, which are
the olfactory lobes. Wherever these are so placed in front of the
brain, it is a clear proof that the life of the animal is largely
directed by smell, that is, in a relatively greater degree than by
sight, though constantly using the organs of vision with rapidity and
acuteness. The cerebellum is in all cases prominent to the rear,
presenting the laminated appearance always distinctive of the organ.

We now make a very marked transition in the development of brain,
introducing to view the doubled or convoluted form occasioned by the
folding of the material in a series of windings,--a form which is in
complete contrast from the smooth surface characteristic of the brain in
all lower orders. This series of windings or convolutions appears quite
decidedly in the brain of the _cat_, in a manner very similar in the
brain of the _dog_, and with still greater beauty and amplitude of fold
in the brain of the _horse_. This folding process which is resorted to
in the case of all the higher quadrupeds, seems a contrivance by which
it is possible to pack a greater amount of material in such a way as to
expose a greater degree of surface, within the narrow space at command
inside the cranium. In all the three examples named, great prominence
is given to the bulbs of smell, which are spread out quite conspicuously
in front of the brain,--implying, as in lower examples, a life largely
governed by sense of smell.

[Illustration: BRAIN OF HORSE, WITH BULB OF SMELL IN FRONT, LITTLE BRAIN
IN REAR.]

[Illustration: DIAGRAM OF SENSORY AND MOTOR APPARATUS. THE UPPER IS THE
SENSORY, WITH BULB, NERVE LINE, AND NERVE CELL. THE UNDER IS THE MOTOR,
WITH MUSCLE, NERVE LINE, AND NERVE CELL.]

Omitting special reference to animals of great bulk, and possessing
enormous muscular power, such as the elephant and the whale, both of
which have singularly complicated and beautiful brains, I pass to the
races of _monkeys_ and _apes_, which are nearest in structure to man. In
these animals the configuration of body is certainly the nearest
approach to the human figure which is to be found anywhere in the animal
kingdom. They can not, indeed, assume the perfectly erect posture of
man, but they come very near to it; and though they move on all four
limbs, feeling themselves more secure in that mode of advance, they have
a formation of hand analogous to that of man, with a distinctly formed
thumb, enabling them to grasp an object in a manner closely resembling
the human grasp. The apes have even an advantage over the human race,
for they have a thumb on the foot, as well as on the hand; which may
also have its own disadvantages, for it might prove no convenience to us
if we were so endowed. But the presence of the thumb on the lower
extremities suggests the use which it serves in the animal's ordinary
life, in grasping the branches along which it moves. If from the
similarity of outward configuration, we pass to contemplate the brain,
we find here also great similarity of structure. And indeed if the
relations of muscle, nerve, and brain be as already indicated, it
follows from the resemblances of outward form that there must be a
greater resemblance between the brain of man and the brain of the monkey
and of the ape, than between the human brain and that of any other
animal known to us. And so it proves to be. The brain of the monkey has
its subdivisions and convolutions very similar to those of the human
brain, only the convolutions are simpler in arrangement. In outline it
is deficient only in the diminished bulk of the front part, and also the
back part of the organ; but in its expansion it resembles the human
brain in this, that to the rear it spreads back over the cerebellum, so
as to cover it. The brain of the ape, including under this designation
the orang, gorilla, and chimpanzee, is in still closer resemblance to
the human, being still, however, somewhat simpler in the arrangement
of its convolutions, but so closely approximating that the exact state
of the case is as nearly as possible described, if we say that the brain
of the ape, while it is decidedly smaller, appears like a miniature of
the human brain in a slightly undeveloped state.[CV]

[Illustration: HUMAN BRAIN]

[Illustration: BRAIN OF MONKEY, WITH CEREBELLUM BENEATH]

The human brain is an elaborate organ, exceedingly complicated in its
convolutions. We can not, indeed, describe it as the most convoluted,
for the brain of the elephant is at least as distinguished for the
beauty and complication of its folding, and the brain of the whale is
far more minute and detailed, presenting quite a multitude of minute
convolutions. For descriptive purposes, the human brain is divided into
four superficial areas, known as lobes, and pretty clearly defined by
certain natural boundaries. From the lower part of the organ, entering
at a point scarcely half way back is a fissure or cutting running up
into the mass in a direction uniformly inclining towards the rear, known
as the Sylvian fissure; while coming over the summit, at a point near
the middle, and inclining down towards that just described, is another
fissure, known as the fissure of Rolando. By these two deeply cut
hollows, the brain is marked off into four separate areas superficially,
a front and a rear lobe; and two central lobes, the one upper and the
other under. Besides this there is a concealed and isolated lobe,
described on account of its situation as an island, which is covered
from view by the overlapping of the two sides of the Sylvian fissure.
Such is a description in outline of the configuration of the human
brain, to which must be added the statement that each lobe is filled in
with its own special arrangement of convolutions, each one having at
least three well defined lines of convolution. Each of the hemispheres
is similarly arranged, though not by any means quite identical in
disposal of convolutions, yet the general description now given is
strictly applicable to both. The two hemispheres, connected mainly with
the ramification of nerve fibre running to the opposite sides of the
body, are united together a considerable way down by a transverse band
of nerve fibres, which at once unite the two into one organ, and make
the union so effected a living efficient union by carrying a multitude
of lines of communication from the one side to the other. Just below
this, in the interior of the organ are two great central bodies, known
as the basal ganglia, and consisting of nerve fibres massed together
with grey matter around them, that in front being chiefly motor nerves
brought to a junction, the latter sensory nerves combined in like
manner. The same arrangement holds in both hemispheres, thereby
providing that the respective masses of motor, and of sensory nerves lie
exactly opposite each other. Behind these in the centre, lying in a
position under both hemispheres are four small bulbs connected with the
nerves of vision, and also with the cerebellum; and behind them, covered
by the posterior lobe of the brain is the cerebellum itself, or little
brain, largely concerned with coördination of movements, or equilibrium
of the two sides of the system. Just below these arrangements the two
great cords of nerve fibre descend towards the body, which are covered
by a transverse mass, known as the bridge, appearing complete as a
crossing, and containing transverse fibres from the cerebellum, as well
as a series of longitudinal fibres. Immediately underneath the bridge
are pillars or masses of nerve, constituting the crowning portion of
the spinal system, and formed in eight distinct bodies, the two in front
and the two in rear being elongated and known as pyramids, those in the
centre being rounded in figure. From the elongated bodies, the nerve
fibres pass across to the opposite sides of the body. This gathering is
known as the _medulla oblongata._ Just beneath comes the spinal canal,
from which at the different joints of the spine are given out a suitable
supply of sensory and motor nerves as previously described.

Having thus given a general account of the central arrangements of the
nerve system of the human body, it is important to state that an order
of things closely analogous obtains in other and lower orders of
organism, in respect of interior plan, so that if the interior of the
brain of the dog were laid open to view it would present a plan of
distribution very similar to that now described.

To complete the view of the functions of the brain as indicated by
recent research, I have next to give a brief account of an extended
course of experiments of great delicacy designed to ascertain whether it
may be possible to localize certain functions within a definite area of
the brain. All are familiar with the fanciful subdivisions of the outer
surface of the human skull, under the name of phrenology, represented on
moulds of the head, all marked with dividing lines and figures. This
pretentious and unscientific assumption of knowledge which no one
possessed, has had its time of popularity, aided by a general
recognition of comparative superiority in head formation in persons of
known ability. Any thing equivalent to an exact partition of the bony
covering protecting the brain, has not been favored by scientific
observations; but these fanciful maps of the head, which have been sold
cheap, and fully certified, may serve as a guide to a general notion of
what has been attempted on the surface of the brain itself, after
removal of the skull. The illustrative aid, however, consists in nothing
more than the suggestion of distinct areas, for there is no analogy
between what has been discovered by the observations now to be
described, and the "bumps" alleged to be found on the cranium.

The conjecture which may be said to have originated experiments as to
localization was that there was a close resemblance between the action
of nerve energy, and an electric current. The attempt made was to
similate the action of the nerve cells, by discharging a current of
electricity upon the grey matter of the brain, and recording the results
which came under observation. Experiments were begun in 1870 in Germany
by Fritsch and Hitzig, the dog being the animal experimented upon. The
investigation was undertaken also by Dr. Ferrier of King's College
London, and much more extended and varied results were published by him
in 1873. Confirmatory work, executed with many precautions, was
undertaken on the subject in 1874 by a committee of the New York Society
of Neurology and Electrology,--a committee which included Drs. Dalton,
Arnold, Beard, Flint, and Masson,--testing results by frequent renewal
of the experiments; and at the same time, a similar course of inquiry
was being conducted in Paris by Carville and Duret.[CW]

By these investigations, the possibility of electric stimulation of the
cortical or grey matter of the brain, and consequent activity of the
nerve system has been fully established; and though there is still
considerable diversity of opinion concerning the interpretation of the
facts, it can not be disputed that by directing the electrode on certain
well defined areas of the surface of the brain, it is possible to bring
into natural activity certain portions of the muscular system, as
controlled by the motor nerves.

The plan adopted is, after putting the animal into an insensible state
by use of chloroform, and removing the cranium so as to expose the
brain, to apply the electrode connected with an electric battery to a
given point on the surface, record the result, and gradually shift the
needle round the original spot until a new result is obtained, in which
the spot previously tested becomes an index for the boundary of one
circle, and this marks the fact that a new circle has been entered.

By this process of investigation a series of centres for active
stimulation have been discovered. These number, in the brain of the rat,
six; in the brain of the rabbit, seven; of the cat, eleven; of the dog,
thirteen; and of the monkey, at least, seventeen. A curious limitation
to the area of experiment has been encountered here, for all the centres
identified are found to cluster over the central region of the brain,
and both the front and rear parts of the organ are silent, offering no
response however greatly stimulated. The explanation of this silence
remains a matter of doubt. It may be that these portions of the brain
are concerned with movements which do not come under the observation of
the operator, or that they are centres of sensibility from which no
movement can naturally follow, or that they fulfil functions which can
not be recognized by this mode of experiment. Uncertainty hangs over
this department in the investigation.

The actual results may be indicated by a few examples. At a point well
forward in the brain of the dog, marked number one by Ferrier, is a
centre which when stimulated leads to movement of the hind leg on the
opposite side; and by exciting another portion of the brain quite
contiguous, marked number four, movement of the opposite fore leg is
produced. By exciting a point situated over these two and on a distinct
convolution, wagging of the tail is induced. By transferring the needle
to a point much lower down, towards the base of the brain, but still
well forward, marked by Ferrier nine, the mouth is opened and the tongue
moved, while in many cases a decided bark is emitted. These examples
may suffice to indicate the class of results obtained; and similar
results have been seen in all animals subjected to this test, with such
variations as may be considered inevitable in view of the configuration
of the animal.

While distinct areas or circles of the brain have thus been marked,
warranting localizing of certain functions, the facts connected with
these experiments do not favor the view that each area is to be taken as
so rigidly distinct that it may be supposed to operate separately in a
quite isolated manner. On the contrary, a conjoint action of several
centres seems more commonly implied when the natural activity of the
brain is contemplated in line of these results. Additional weight must
be given to this consideration, when it is noticed that the centres are
nominally _motor centres_,--movement and not sensibility being the
result most patent to the observer,--nevertheless on closer scrutiny it
proves true, that many of the movements occasioned by electric
stimulation are those induced naturally as the result of sensation. Such
for example are the movements of the eyelids consequent upon a dazzling
of the eyes, or movement of the ears because of a startling sound. In
this way it becomes clear that within a given area a centre of
sensibility is in communication with a motor centre close by, or it may
be even at some little distance. Thus this most delicate and difficult
course of investigation supports the view that much of the activity of
the animal organism is provided for by an established connection between
nerve cells respectively presenting the terminus in the brain for a
sensory nerve, and the starting point for a motor nerve, or point of
communication with such a nerve. From this conclusion, it follows that a
very large amount of the activity which we witness in the case of
animals, often attributed to instinct, or even to voluntary
determination, is to be described as _sensori-motor activity_. That is
to say, the action is brought about by a contrivance which may be
described as partly mechanical, partly chemical. Its history may be
sketched in this way: an impression is made on one of the nerves of
sensibility, or on one of the organs of special sense, such as the eye
or ear; a wave of impulse passes along the incarrying nerve fibre,
leading to molecular change in the nerve cell, and to sensibility in
some way unknown; the excitation occasioned there is extended along a
connecting fibre to a second nerve cell, which is the starting point for
a motor nerve; along that line the impulse is instantly and inevitably
continued; and as an almost instantaneous result, without any form of
sensibility to indicate what is taking place, the muscular energy is
liberated, and action is the direct consequence. The problem which
immediately arises is this,--How far may the activity of all living
organism be accounted for in this way, including even the activity of
man? This is a problem which will present an interesting subject for
discussion in the next stage of this inquiry, the import of which must
now be made apparent by the sketch of the structure of the nerve system,
and the results of the experiments as to localization.

Nothing more is now required to complete this narrative leading up to
this problem, and discovering its proportions, than a brief account of
correlative inquiry which has afforded strong confirmatory evidence as
to the truth of the conclusions favoring localization, and coördinate
action of different portions of the brain as the central organ governing
the whole nerve system. The corroborative evidence at once supporting
the conclusions as to localization and favoring their extension to human
nature is obtained by reference to the results of injury to the nerve
system at various parts of the body, and injury to the brain as
ascertained after death. Continuing experiments on the animals, it has
been shown that even if a portion of the brain be cut away, it is still
possible to operate on the nerve lines in the usual manner by means of
electricity. Pushing experiment in this direction still further it has
been found that more serious injury permanently destroys the centre, and
entails paralysis of the muscles controlled by it when in a healthy
state. In like manner it has been proved that if the nerve itself be
cut, the communication is at an end, and movement by stimulation has
become impossible.

By perpetually occurring cases of paralysis in human experience, and
careful examination after death of the exact situation and extent of
disease in the brain, it has been shown by accumulation of evidence,
that the laws which provide for sensibility and for muscular activity in
the history of the lower animals, do also hold in the case of man. While
the brain continues in full vigor, all the usual forms of sensibility,
and modes of action are simple; where these have become disturbed,
restricted or impossible, some injury has been accidentally inflicted on
the brain of the sufferer, or disease has begun in the organ, and has
gained a hold exactly proportionate to the forms of restraint and
disturbance which have become outwardly manifest. These are results
which show how much is due by way of sympathy, and patience, and
encouragement to those who suffer under any degree of brain injury or
disease, due from all around them whose conduct may have any part in
determining their experience. These results testify how closely the
human organism stands allied to lower orders of organism around; how
many homologies of structure there are, and how many analogies in
experience. These things declare that science has a clear and
unchallengeable field of inquiry in seeking an explanation of human
nature on the same lines of procedure as those which have been followed
in ascending the scale of living organism. The nature and extent of
materials at its disposal as the result of the most recent
investigations have now been indicated. The problem is, How far can the
anatomy and physiology of the human frame account for the facts of human
life? The strength and practical power of religious thought in the world
will depend upon the answer, for science must here carry some test of
religion. On the other hand, the problem which human life presents is by
far the most severe test which science has to encounter. In facing the
facts, science is engaged with the settlement of its own
boundaries,--the demonstration of its own limits. In facing this highest
problem which human observation encounters,--man's explanation of
himself,--let us cease from comparisons between scientific claims and
religious, and let us face with patience and resolution the
question--What is the exact place, and what the destiny of man, who has
piled up the sciences, and midst the turmoil and conflict of life, has
found his most elevating exercise, and most profound calm, in worship of
"the King eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise God"?

FOOTNOTES:

[CS] Protoplasm, see Appendix VII.

[CT] Unless references are otherwise given, illustration of the
structure of brain here referred to, will be found in my work, _The
Relations of Mind and Brain_, from p. 125, onwards.

[CU] _The Brain as the Organ of Mind_, by Dr. Bastian, p. 115.

[CV] See Appendix XI.

[CW] For detailed narrative, see my work on _The Relations of Mind and
Brain_, chap. iv. p. 79.




LECTURE VII.

MAN'S PLACE IN THE WORLD.


The accumulated interest gathered around the direct and collateral
investigations bearing on the development of species, has naturally
turned greatly increased attention on man's position in the universe. As
has been shown by study of the nervous system belonging to animal life,
all organism has been constructed on a uniform plan, advancing in
complication as the organism becomes more intricate in structure, having
separate parts assigned to distinct functions. This uniform plan is seen
to culminate in man. Thus it follows, that man appears to the scientific
observer, as the last or most advanced figure in a gradually ascending
scale. That this is man's place in the field of organized existence no
one will doubt.

The prevailing view of our nature, however, recognizes more in it than
bone, muscle, nerve, and cellular tissue, while observational science
is capable of recognizing no more than these, so that, if there be any
thing more, it is quite beyond the range of physical science, and within
the territory of mental philosophy. Here then, is preparation for
conflict, which may be accepted as inevitable, because of the advance of
science. The occasion for this expectation should, however, be fully
understood. Its certainty may be maintained on two obvious grounds. The
first is concerned with the history of scientific progress. Science is
pushing its way up the extended scale of existence with no exact
knowledge of its own limits; knowing what its achievements have been,
animated to a high degree by the vastness of the problems still before
it, but knowing nothing quite definite as to its own boundaries. The
aggressive force of science at such a stage must be great. On the other
hand, there is a large body of settled conviction, which has swayed men
and moulded society in all ages, which is an opposing force operating on
that very line along which science is advancing, and which must be
encountered whenever man's place in the universe becomes the subject of
inquiry. This opposing conviction is not necessarily religious in type,
though it is supported by the whole range of thought concerned with the
supernatural. The conviction here referred to, as lying more obviously
across the path on which science is travelling, is that concerned with
the personality of man, with the rights and responsibilities of
individuals, implying accepted conclusions on which the government, and
police, and administration of affairs in every nation are based. It
must, then, be clearly recognized that the conflict anticipated as
inevitable is the conflict of knowledge of one order, with knowledge of
a different order. It is conflict of knowledge obtained by the slow and
difficult processes available to science, with knowledge possessed by
all, applied in the regulation of individual and social life, and
systematized in the annals of mental philosophy; or, we may more nearly
describe the condition of matters by saying that the occasion of
conflict is the determination of science to include all within its own
area, rather than the possession of actual knowledge as to the highest
order of life, for science is only seeking, and can not profess to have
found, an explanation of the functions of human life, as it can profess
to have done in the case of lower orders. There could, therefore, be no
more mistaken representation of the pending conflict than the allegation
that it is a conflict of knowledge with ignorance. To put it in the best
light for science, it is the conflict of one kind of knowledge with
another; but there is a nearer approach to accuracy if we say that the
conflict is occasioned by the _want of verified conclusions_ within the
boundaries of science itself, in contrast with very definite conclusions
belonging to men generally, and verified by practical tests which
scientific men can not refuse. It is not essential to the point, but may
be of consequence in view of the range of application belonging to this
inquiry, to remark that religious thought is not itself directly
involved here; nevertheless, religious thought is deeply concerned in
the issue of the conflict.

Having thus briefly indicated the occasion of the conflict, and the
contending forces, it is desirable to find the standpoint of science.
The nature and origin of life having been passed as problems for which
no solution has yet been found, science has concentrated on the
functions of the various portions of each organism, and on the
contrivances for its protection and continuance in the world; and still
more in advance, on the laws favoring the development of species. From
outward form it has passed to inward structure, and pressing still more
closely towards the secrets of life has endeavored to ascertain by
microscopic investigation what provision has been made for maintaining
the vital processes involved in the action of organism. Travelling up
the advancing orders of animate existence, science has discovered a
uniform plan adapted to varying complexity of structure. Thus entered
and far advanced on the course of investigation, science sees no limit
to its field of inquiry save the limits of organism itself. What has
already been achieved, gives full warrant for the claim of inclusion, in
which all scientific men naturally concur, and with which men generally
will readily agree. This agreement, however, lies on the very boundary
line of disagreement and dissension. Immediately when an attempt is made
to set forth what is implied, it becomes clear that some scientific men
include very large expectations as to what science is yet to
accomplish, while others, showing more of the caution of the scientific
spirit, decline to commit themselves to dogmatic assertions. Up to the
line of agreement indicated we are dealing with science; beyond that
line, where we come upon disagreements, we are not dealing with science,
but with the comparative sanguineness or caution of scientific men.

What we have before us as clearly admitted on all sides is that human
life presents the common characteristics of organic life, and is
subjected to the ordinary laws of organism. The problem with which we
have now to deal in view of this admission is this,--How far do the
functions of organism account for the universally recognized
characteristics of human life?

In facing this problem there are not a few scientific inquirers who look
upon the mere raising of it as a claim to include all that belongs to
human nature within the realm of physical science. They have allowed
themselves to regard the two things as interchangeable, and all their
researches are in their view so involved in this identification, that
they resent the challenging of it, as if it implied antagonism to
science. But the scientific inconsistency of this is easily shown. That
science must extend its investigations to human organism, admits of no
doubt; that by means of this investigation all the phenomena of human
life will be traced to organism, is the very thing to be proved, and
until established on clear and full evidence is not to be regarded
otherwise than problematic. If we are in this matter to be influenced by
regard to the slow and difficult procedure in cases of much greater
simplicity, we shall be guarded in the utterance of expectations; if we
make account of the enormous difficulties to be encountered in arranging
the facts to be explained, we shall be still more guarded; and if we
remember that the practical demands of life must all be met day by day
without waiting for science as an aid, it will not appear strange that
the non-scientific thinker regards the whole scientific investigation as
wide of the sphere in which questions of self-government are settled,
even though this view seems to affirm, without knowledge of both sides,
that there is a sphere belonging to human life into which science can
not enter.

Still, it must be allowed that in the pathway of science nothing is to
be foreclosed, and no area, whether large or small, is to be shut off on
which the appliances of science can be brought to bear. Science can not
exclude man from the range of investigation; can not on any warrant
supplied by the conditions of its own procedure, draw a line within the
circumference of nature, even though it may be constrained to allow that
there are many things within nature of which it can offer no
explanation.

That science has by recent research done much to explain phases of human
activity previously unexplained, may be clearly shown. The modification
of previously received opinion may be indicated thus,--that many forms
formerly regarded as in the true sense voluntary, and so described in
the life not only of man, but also of the higher animals, can be
explained by the action of brain and nerve. This involves a considerable
extension of the area of the mechanical in human action, and a
considerable restriction of the area of the voluntary. In seeking to
indicate roughly the form of this restriction, we may find enough for
our purpose in the distinction between what we may describe as
_muscular action_, and what we would more naturally denominate _personal
conduct_. This contrast will serve throughout, as we proceed to estimate
the explanations which science has reached in dealing with the
characteristics of human life.

The proved superiority of brain and nerve in man affords an adequate
explanation of his generally recognized superiority in the variety of
the forms of his muscular activity. In mere muscular power man can not
compete with the more powerful animals. His practical superiority is
seen in manipulation and the vastly greater variety of occupations to
which he can turn; and in the greater wisdom he has for self-government.
Leaving meanwhile out of account comparative intelligence, we have only
to consider the superior use man has of the general sensibilities of the
body, and of the special senses of touch and sight; the greater variety
of the joints and muscles in his body; the more complicated arrangements
of his nerve system; and the relation of all these in a single economy,
in order to perceive a distinct phase of the superiority of man,
sufficiently accounted for by clearly recognized facts, anatomical and
physiological. In a multitude of well-known forms of action, of which
the mechanical arts afford illustration, man can do what can not be
attempted by lower forms of organism.

Another step higher is taken by the advance of physiological science,
involving an explanation of _acquired aptitudes_. The interaction of
sensibility and motor activity has been shown to be great. A message
conveyed along a sensory line is readily transferred to a motor line;
the sense of touch becomes a natural guide to familiar forms of action;
a form of sensibility may thus be connected with a given range of motor
apparatus, just as the history of the blind illustrates how much more
can be accomplished by aid of touch without sight, than is ordinarily
achieved. By these means, what at first requires consideration and care
(neither of which is accounted for by physiological explanations), comes
at last to be done without deliberation, and with so much facility, that
it does not seem to engage much attention. Physiological science thus
accounts for a considerable amount of superior activity characteristic
of man in his daily engagements. It must, however, be noticed that the
explanation is not a complete one, inasmuch as the action of the sensory
and motor apparatus referred to, presupposes consideration and care,
that is intellectual and voluntary guidance commensurate with the
initial difficulties of attainment, in order that the nerve system may
be brought to accomplish what becomes possible afterwards by mere
mechanical and chemical contrivance within the living organism.

Having thus briefly indicated the advances in knowledge of the working
of our own organism gained by recent research, and the explanation thus
afforded of much of the superiority manifest in human life, we come upon
the grand difficulty of science,--How to account for _intellectual
superiority_. It is obvious that animals give proofs of intelligence as
well as men; and that the human brain has a marked superiority in the
frontal region, to which intelligence is commonly referred, as it
certainly is superior also in the back part of the organ, to which
intelligence is not so commonly referred. But the pressing difficulty is
this, to show how nerve cells, confessedly concerned with the
development of nerve energy, and the production of sensory and motor
activity, can be further considered capable of performing the function
of thought, covering the whole variety of mental occupations. Attention
has been directed to the recognized diversities of nerve cells, which
are unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar, on the hypothesis that these
diversities may point to differences of function so great as to provide
what is required. But there is a total failure of evidence to
substantiate this hypothesis. The differences among the nerve cells of
the brain are differences in size, and in the number of the lines of
communication taking rise from them. In accordance with the plan of
arrangement everywhere recognized, the number of protoplasmic lines
originating from a cell gives an index to the points of contact it has
in the surrounding tissue, and thus to the part it may perform in the
work of coördination or interaction. A small cell with only a single
line or fibre proceeding from it, must be regarded as a cell conveying
nerve stimulus in only a single direction, and to only a single
destination. A bipolar cell in accordance with the same rule of
interpretation, is a cell having communication in two opposite
directions, and thus may be capable of transmitting stimulus by the one
channel or by the other, besides which it is possible, so far as
structure is concerned, that such a cell may receive stimulus from one
direction and send it forth in an opposite, thus proving a centre of
intercommunication. On the same plan, a multipolar cell, being of
greater size, and having from five to ten fibres proceeding from it,
holds a more important place in the manifold ramifications of cellular
tissue, sending out stimulus in an increased variety of courses
according to the number of the lines pertaining to it, and proving thus
an intermediate station in communication with a variety of distinct
centres. No observation yet directed upon the nerve cells has proved
sufficient to establish all this, but the supposition is in strict
harmony with what has been ascertained as to the laws governing the
action of the nerve system.

When, however, an attempt is made to proceed farther, selecting the
largest cells as "mind cells,"[CX] or cells generating thought and
volition, there is a complete break away from evidence, and from the
clear lines of interpretation already established. We are dealing with
conjecture, not with science. There is no reason in the interests of
truth to object to hypothesis in this region, any more than in another,
for conjecture has often proved the handmaid of discovery, and it is
likely to be so in a still larger degree. But an essential condition of
this acknowledgment is, that conjecture do not claim any respect beyond
what its nature warrants, and specially do not take to itself the name
of science,--knowledge, or certainty. Beyond this, it must be recognized
in every intelligent circle, that conjectures, like men of different
character, are entitled to different degrees of respect, some to only a
moderate and guarded measure, others to a very high degree, and some to
very little indeed. In a case like the present, we can have no sure test
for a provisional judgment entitled to regulate provisional procedure,
other than the harmony of the conjecture with scientific knowledge
already acquired as to the same region of existence. Judged by this
test, the conjecture that the intellectual life of man is to be
accounted for by the presence in the brain of myriads of thought cells,
volitional cells, memory cells, imagination cells, and emotional cells,
has little on which to claim a high degree of consideration. Its most
obvious scientific difficulties are these two, that it implies a
departure from the scheme of brain action scientifically established,
and that it passes away from the scientific appliances employed to
obtain knowledge of brain action. The real discoveries which have been
made are the existence of sensory and motor apparatus, and the
interaction of these two branches or divisions of the system. Beyond
this, science has made no advance. The scientific appliances by which
these discoveries have been reached are those available in post-mortem
dissection, and in experiment under such exposure of the brain tissue as
has been found compatible with functional activity of the organ. This
conjecture of "mind-cells" does not either experimentally or logically
connect itself with the recent advances in knowledge of the brain. The
system of sensory and motor apparatus spread over the body for which the
brain is the great central and governing organ does not under the
scientific explanation of it already obtained, lead on by natural
sequence to the conjecture of additional and greatly higher functions
being assigned to the brain. Besides, the suggestion that place should
be found in the brain for something more and higher than sensori-motor
activity, does not come from any necessity which has arisen in the
course of scientific observation. It is only because we know, in a
manner quite different from that in which scientific knowledge of nerve
and brain has been acquired, that man does observe, and reason,
construct hypotheses and cherish expectations, contemplate rules of
conduct and regulate his actions in accordance with them, that
scientific inquirers, attempting to include the whole range of human
powers, have felt themselves urged forward to seek an explanation of the
characteristics of mental life which are the familiar facts of man's
experience. The course of _experiment_ has not brought them up to these
facts; common acquaintance with them has pressed on scientific inquirers
the need for dealing with them in order to make good the claim that
science contains the explanation of all existence, man included. The
dilemma for this conjecture that the brain thinks and wills is serious.
If the brain is capable of what is commonly named _mental_ activity, all
that science has demonstrated is susceptibility and motor activity, that
is nerve impulse involving molecular and muscular action, and this
carries no explanation of mental action.

In this, as in previous cases, it is better to take purely scientific
statements concerning the structure and functions of the nerve cells,
without regard to theoretical result. The following quotations will show
what account has been given of the variety of appearance and position of
the nerve cells. Professor Turner says, nerve cells are "the
characteristic structures in the nerve centres, are susceptible to
impressions or nervous impulses, and are the texture in which the
molecular changes occur that produce or disengage the special form of
energy named nerve energy, the evolution of which is the distinctive
mark of a nerve centre."[CY] "The central extremities of the nerve
fibres lie in relation to, and are often directly connected with the
nerve cells." From opposite points of the surface of the _bipolar cell_
"a strong process is given off, which is directly continued into a nerve
fibre.[CZ]" When we pass next to _multipolar cells_, we have the
following explanations. "In many localities they present characteristic
forms. In the gray matter of the _spinal cord_, more especially in its
anterior horn,[DA] they give rise to numerous processes, and have a
stellate or radiate form. In the gray matter on the surface of the
convolutions of the cerebrum they are pyramidal in shape; the apex is
directed to the surface of the convolution, the base towards the white
matter; the processes arise from the base, apex, and sides of the
pyramid."[DB] "The processes which arise from a multipolar nerve cell as
a rule divide and subdivide as they pass away from the body of the cell,
until at last they give rise to branches of extreme tenuity. These
branching processes apparently consist exclusively of cell protoplasm,
and have been called protoplasm processes. Gerlach has described the
protoplasm processes of the multipolar nerve cells of the brain and
spinal cord as forming an excessively minute net-work, from which
minute medullated _nerve fibres_ arise."[DC] "From the observations of
Lockhart Clark, Arndt, Cleland and Meynert, there can be no doubt that
the pyramidal nerve cells vary in relative size and in numbers in the
different layers of the gray cortex, and that the largest sized
pyramidal cells lie in the third and fourth layers."[DD] "Large
pyramidal cells are found in the _frontal lobe_ in considerable
numbers," but it is added, "there is no difficulty in recognizing in the
occipital lobe" (the back region of the brain) "a small proportion of
cells quite equal in magnitude to the largest cells of the frontal
lobe."[DE]

From these statements, it is easy to judge what value can be attached to
the conjecture that multipolar or pyramidal cells are to be regarded as
"_mind-cells_." The result may be summarized thus; (1) The larger cells
are invariably distinguished by the number of fibres given off, or the
lines of communication they have with other parts of the tissue; (2) As
to distribution of these cell-fibres appearing in the brain, it is found
that as the cells themselves are in the lower strata of the gray matter,
the majority of their fibres stretch downwards, the mass of the nerve
fibres thus communicating with the organism; (3) These pyramidal cells
are not peculiar to any part of the brain, and they do not belong to the
brain alone, but are found in the gray matter of the spinal cord, and
also of the sympathetic system, which provides for the action of the
heart, lungs, and other vital organs. All these characteristics are
adverse to the conjecture that for the larger sized cells a claim can be
made assigning to them distinctively intellectual or mental functions.

In contrast with this view, I shall here introduce an extract from
Hæckel's _Evolution of Man_, as he may be accounted the most advanced
advocate of the theory of "mind-cells." He says,--"The nerve cell of the
brain is an extremely one-sided formation. It can not, like the
egg-cell, develop from itself numerous generations of cells, of which
some transform themselves into skin-cells, some into flesh-cells, and
others into bone-cells, etc. But instead, the nerve-cell, which is
formed for the highest activities of life, possesses the capacity to
feel, to will, to think. It is a true mind-cell, an elementary organ of
mental activity. Correspondingly, it has an extremely complex minute
structure. Innumerable filaments of exceeding fineness, which may be
compared to the numerous electric wires of a great central telegraph
station, traverse (crossing each other again and again), the finely
granulated protoplasm of the nerve-cell, and pass into branched
processes, which proceed from this mind-cell, and connect with other
nerve-cells and nerve-fibres. It is scarcely possible to trace, even
approximately, the tangled paths of these filaments in the fine
substance of the protoplasmic body. We thus, have before us a highly
complex apparatus, the more minute structure of which we have hardly
begun to know, even with the help of our strongest microscope, and the
significance of which we rather guess than know. Its complex mechanism
is capable of the most intricate physical functions. But even this
elementary organ of mental activity, of which there are thousands in our
brain, is only a single cell. Our whole intellectual life is but the sum
of the results of all such nerve-cells, or mind-cells."[DF]

From this passage it will be seen that ascertained facts are given in
harmony with previous descriptions; but that while naming some as
sensory, others as motor, there is no distinct evidence for classifying
certain cells as "mind-cells." Along with the admission of our
comparative ignorance of the minute structure of the cell, is the
assertion that this cell "possesses the capacity to feel, to will, to
think." This latter statement is advanced without any trace of
scientific evidence, and has no better substratum on which to rest than
the admission that man not only feels, but also thinks and wills.
Further, when we recall the singular variety of situation in which these
cells are found, as they lie within the spinal canal, subordinate
centres, and the brain, the insufficiency of the whole theory of
"mind-cells" is apparent. Still more conspicuous does this become when
we turn to Hæckel's illustrative diagram, and read underneath it this
description,--"A large branched nerve-cell, or 'mind-cell' from the
brain of an electric fish." The investigator who makes in the directest
manner statements as to thinking and willing, which he has not verified
and can not verify; and who with undisturbed composure of mind proceeds
to illustrate and support his position by giving a drawing of the
"mind-cell of an electric fish," does almost every thing that can be
done to discredit his testimony on scientific subjects.

Having now set forth the grounds on which I think it clearly shown that
physiological science has done no more than identify sensory and motor
cells; and that the search for the true "mind-cell" has proved a
failure; I pass from this division of the subject with the
acknowledgment that the front and back portions of the brain still
present area for fresh research, and to this must be added the striking
fact that in all the brains subjected to electric excitation these two
portions have uniformly remained silent. These considerations may
possibly hereafter afford valuable suggestions towards guidance of the
work yet to be done in the investigation of brain structure and
functions.

In view of the limits of the present discussion, I shall at this point
pass over at once and directly to the region concerned with _the
government of human conduct_, with the view of illustrating in what
respects human life differs from merely animal life. On this single
test, I must here be content to rest an argument for the insufficiency
of physiology, and the necessity for observation of our own experience,
if we are to have an intelligible account of the most familiar
characteristics of human life. By way of securing a sharp contrast
serviceable for illustrative and argumentative purposes, I take an
extract from Mr. Darwin. His statement is this,--"There is no evidence
that any animal performs an action for the exclusive good of
another."[DG] Alongside of this statement, for the purpose of comparison
and contrast, let me place this. It is an essential law of human life,
having daily application, that man shall so act as to make the good of
his fellowman the express end of his action. This is a law of moral life
which we do not dream of applying to any lower order of beings, but
which we do regard as binding on all men equally. Explicit testimony to
this law of human life may be drawn from the philosophy of Greece and of
China in times so remote as to precede the Christian era, or from the
teaching of our Saviour, or from the daily life of men in any land in
this nineteenth century. The contrast is thus sharp enough, and it
presents the most perplexing difficulty for physiologists of the school
of Hæckel; while it affords the strongest line of evidence for that
philosophy which accounts for the higher characteristics of human life
by reference to mind as distinct from brain, and immeasurably higher in
function.

Whether Mr. Darwin's account of animal conduct will be uniformly
accepted by naturalists, need not concern us, as the possibility of
dissension would not seriously affect the argument, the main stress of
which must fall on these two points, that the law of pure benevolence is
a law of human life, and that the mere recognition of this law (I do not
say _obedience to it_, which is a stage further in advance), can not be
included within the functions of brain.[DH]

From what has been written by some naturalists as to the "benevolence"
of animals, it is probable that some may be prepared to take exception
to the statement of Mr. Darwin. There is no need for here entering upon
discussion which might thus be raised, and which would entail the task
of criticising multitudes of statements made in a singularly loose and
unscientific manner. There is not any more careful observer than Mr.
Darwin, the whole record of whose observations gives confidence in his
testimony, and his patient reflection on the real significance of what
he has seen. We may, however, leave this matter to naturalists, that
they may decide whether this conclusion as to animals requires some
modification. The purpose of the present argument is to show that an
authoritative law of benevolence does apply to human life, in direct
contrast with the ordinary law of animal life, giving special force to
the struggle for existence as witnessed in the history of the lower
orders of beings.

One possible entanglement for the present argument must, however, be
carefully shunned. In the comparison between man and animal, we are apt
to diverge into a discussion of what men and animals severally _do_.
This is a question considerably different from that now under
discussion, and yet it lies in such close proximity as to afford the
greatest facilities for confusion of thought. We are not here comparing
what animals do, with what men do; we are comparing the actions of
animals with what we _know men ought to do_. It is this question of
_ought_ which appears as the outstanding and distinguishing feature in
human life, on which we are now seeking to direct attention with all the
concentration which physiologists secure when the microscope is directed
on brain tissue. The true feature here is elevation and complexity of
_intellectual_ action, and the possibility of assigning this to brain
action. The question is no doubt concerned with conduct both in the
animal, and in man,--but what we wish to ascertain is, how far action or
conduct in the two cases throws light on the exercise of intelligence
possible to man and to animal. It is admitted that to act on a law of
benevolence requires a higher exercise of intelligence, than to act
under a law of desire or sensitive impulse; and we wish to reach
definite conclusions on two points; _first_, and subordinately, whether
animals ever act on the higher law; _second_, and chiefly, whether such
action does not involve as its condition an intellectual exercise of a
higher order than can be assigned to brain. The former of these
questions, subordinate to the present inquiry, may be left to
naturalists. The second concerns us directly here, in the more
important discussion as to man.

With the view of completing the defence against disturbing entanglement,
it may be well further to insert here the explicit statement that men do
very commonly act in neglect of the law of benevolence, and even in
violation of it. The fact is too well known in society to be overlooked.
It may be enough, however, in the present connection, to admit that men
do often act like the animals; or, to state the fact more precisely in
form, the animal nature is often found governing men, so as to make
their action resemble that of the lower animals in the struggle for
existence.

These lines of severance will now make clear what is our main
question,--Is man capable of recognizing a higher law of life? Does a
law of benevolence apply to him as a rational creature, as it can not
apply in the history of the animals around us? And if this question be
answered in the affirmative, does such answer imply the exercise of a
higher power than can be scientifically assigned to brain cells?

That man recognizes a law of benevolence as determining personal
conduct will not be formally disputed by any one. Yet so very much
bearing on the present argument is involved in the interpretation to be
assigned to this admission, that it is desirable to present at least in
outline, the evidence on which the statement rests. If we look at the
facts in view of the ordinary actions of the lower animals, a series of
contrasts is presented. The animals are seen to compete with each other
for what is a common object of desire, such as a favorite article of
food; and to fight with each other for possession; the consequence is
that the strongest and most daring get what they seek, while the weaker
and more timid must be content with what is of less value for
gratification of their desire. These facts are so conspicuous and so
constant in their influence on the whole race of animals that the theory
of the origin of species by descent founds upon them. A complete
contrast appears in what man recognizes as the rule of his conduct, when
he admits the obligation to benevolence. There is a reflective exercise
concerned with the right and wrong in human conduct which regards it as
a wrong thing for a man to snatch from another the enjoyment within his
reach, or subvert his opportunity for happiness in order to increase his
own pleasure. On the other hand, there is an exercise of thought which
contemplates effort for the good of others as right, even extending the
application of this law of moral life so far as to require self-denial,
and, in circumstances of special importance, self-sacrifice, for the
good of others. These are facts so elementary, that the statement of
them would be felt to be uncalled for, were we not seeking to
distinguish the elements of our ordinary experience. In accordance with
what has been said, we are agreed in regarding it as a wrong done to
another if we deprive him of enjoyment simply for the sake of our own
satisfaction. Such conduct is what we condemn as _selfishness_ in the
agent, and a _wrong_ to the sufferer. When on the contrary we
subordinate personal pleasure in order to secure the happiness of
another, we commend the benevolent disposition in which the act
originates, and we honor attention shown to the rights of a fellowman.
As the contrary lines of conduct are so often followed, and even
vindicated as permissible in the competitions of life, we need to show
with some care that the law of benevolence is uniformly regarded as a
law of human conduct even when its requirements are unfulfilled. This
becomes obvious if we look along another line of observation. If we pass
from what a man does to his fellowmen to what he is seen to expect of
them, we at once perceive that the authoritative feature alleged to
belong to the principle of benevolence is admitted by him. He resents
the selfishness from which he has suffered, complains of the unmanly act
which found its pleasure in his injury, and an appeal to public opinion,
on any occasion sufficiently important to involve a question of the
interests of society, at once calls forth general condemnation of the
selfish act as a real injustice.

That such a form and direction of thought belongs naturally to man has
been further shown by the ready assent of the young to the law of
benevolence, and their unhesitating test of their seniors by reference
to it. If their irritability and resentment have been stirred, it may
be difficult to gain their assent to the special application of the law
of benevolence in the circumstances. This, however, is only an example
in early life, of what we find in more advanced years, that it is hard
to do the right, and easy to excuse the wrong we do, while resenting the
wrong done to us. But, apart from exciting causes, and simply in the
exercise of a quiet reflection, the child recognizes the duty of
benevolence; and, notwithstanding the disadvantages of weakness and
inexperience, proceeds to test others by this standard, and is felt by
others to be powerful by reason of the force belonging to the law,
however superior in years, and in authority may be the persons of whom
the child expects that he be kindly treated. These are in very condensed
form the facts of human life, which are as outstanding as the contrary
facts insisted upon as characteristic of animal life. We need an
explanation which shall put the nature of man as truly in contrast with
the nature of the animal, while it is at the same time allowed that man
has an animal nature which may operate to the influence of his conduct,
in neglect of this higher law of intelligence.

Now the most advanced results of physiological science carry no
explanation of this simple, ordinary fact, man's recognition of a law of
benevolence as authoritative. After we have assigned full value to the
_sensibilities_ of a physical nature overspread with a sensitive
nerve-system; after we have made account of the motor activity possible
to an animal possessed of a complicated muscular system controlled by
motor nerves, we have not come near a region in which the reflective
process takes place which applies the law of benevolence for the
regulation of conduct. We discover within the range of physiological
possibility, sensitiveness to impression from without, and to the
influence of the cravings and appetites of a nature requiring support
and satisfaction, and impelling power which urges to action for the sake
of present satisfaction. All these things we find easily explained under
the teaching of physiology; but we have no explanation of the act of
intelligence in perceiving a law of benevolence and owning submission to
it. We do not even find a scientific account of the subordinate
intellectual exercises involved in the application of the law of
benevolence when recognized. There is a form of discrimination here,
including the distinction of men as persons, the claims involved in
personal rights, and the phase of individual duty ascertained while
contemplating the circumstances in the midst of which it is needful to
act. All this is outside the range of the formulated results of
physiological research. There can be no hesitation in accepting all that
has been established as to nerve-sensibility,--the subjection of human
life to the interaction of external influences,--and the inevitable
forms of experience which result in individual history. But we see in
these, only conditions in the midst of which man by exercise of his
intelligence is to undertake the management of life on a higher level
than that of animal life. We clearly recognize the laws of motor
activity, including the full bearing of outward influences, and inward
tendencies upon human action. But with these things we see what is meant
when it is recognized that intellect must govern passion: while we see
physiological science laying open to us only the laws of passion, and
not the law for its government. We admit the convincing nature of the
evidence by which it is shown that our nature with all the special
phases of individuality, often involving strange perils and
perplexities, has been inherited by us, gathering within the boundaries
of our life a task which we would willingly have shunned. We perceive in
this a science of the specialities of individual nature, standing
alongside the science explaining the common characteristics of man which
come within the range of physiological research. But it is beyond this,
that the problem arises concerning the moral government of life, so that
equally what is common, and what is peculiar to man shall be regulated
according to rational law. For this all see to be true, excepting always
cases of manifest infirmity and disorder, that equally the common and
the special powers of the individual are to be regulated by the law of
benevolence. There are no exemptions for special temperament, whatever
diversities there may be in the task which application of the law may
involve for some. The _ought_ has ascendency over human life;[DI] the
bare perception of this grand reality, taken with all the distinctions
involved in its application to personal conduct, and all the forms of
personal control exercised for its fulfilment, lies apart from the
discoveries of physiology. In these things we see most clearly what mind
is, and what mind does in the management of human life. We discover
clearly thus what it is which makes human life superior to the life of
the animals around us; what it is which makes the best in human life
stand essentially connected with the subordination of the animal nature
to a higher nature within; and in what respect it stands true that
physiology is a science of only a part of our nature, and that the
lower, because the subject part. In this man knows, apart from all
science, and quite independently of philosophy too, that he has a higher
life, working, rejoicing, and advancing to nobler excellence, just as he
governs his body, keeping it in subjection, while revering an ideal of
moral and spiritual excellence towards the attainment of which it is the
duty and honor of humanity to strive.

FOOTNOTES:

[CX] Hæckel's _Evolution of Man_, vol. i. p. 129.

[CY] _Human Anatomy_, i. p. 198.

[CZ] _Human Anatomy_, i. p. 199.

[DA] From which motor nerves emerge.

[DB] _Human Anat._, i. p. 200.

[DC] _Human Anat._, i. p. 201.

[DD] _Ib._ p. 282.

[DE] See Appendix XII.

[DF] _Evolution of Man_, i. p. 129.

[DG] _Origin of Species_, 6th ed. p. 208.

[DH] Whether some of the animals may possess an inferior order of mind,
is a question which need not be here discussed.

[DI] See Appendix XIII.




LECTURE VIII.

RELATION OF SCIENCE TO OUR CONCEPTIONS OF DIVINE INTERPOSITION FOR MORAL
GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD.


The view given in previous lectures of the most prominent features of
the recent advances in scientific knowledge most intimately concerning
our religious conceptions of the origin and government of the world, may
afford some aid towards forming a judgment of the points of contact and
apparent conflict. A brief summary will afford the best introduction to
the lines of inquiry with which the present discussion may be brought to
a close.

First, as to the inorganic in the universe, recent investigations favor
the conclusion that neither the matter in the world, nor the energy, can
be increased or diminished by operation of any laws known to apply to
such existence. The laws under which these two forms of being hold their
place in the world involve only change of distribution and relation.
Both matter and energy are, however, perpetually undergoing change or
transformation, and whether the change be for the better or for the
worse in the history of the universe as a whole, the fact of unceasing
change in subordination to fixed law, is clear evidence that matter and
energy are not eternal or self-subsisting, but are dependent on some
transcendent existence imposing the laws determining their relations.

Second, as to organized existence, recent researches go to prove that
there is in all animals a measure of adaptability to surrounding
conditions of life, providing for "adaptive changes" in the organism,
which become fixed, and are transmitted to succeeding generations of the
same order under the law of heredity. On warrant of the evidence for
this, it is to be taken as certain that the various orders of animals
now familiar to us did not at first come into being with all the
characteristics now pertaining to them. The law of their life has
provided for a progression in development, in accordance with which we
have distinct orders of the pigeon, the dog, and the horse, with
variations in animals of every class. This law of development,
applicable to all animal life, admits of greater or less diversity of
result in the history of distinct races, according to the complexity of
the organism.

Third, as to the relations of different orders in the scale of animal
life, it is proved that all vital organism has been modelled on a common
plan as appears in the arrangement and functions of the nerve system,
providing for sensibility and motor activity. In accordance with this,
we find in different orders of animal life not merely analogies or
resemblances in structure, but homologies or examples of complete
identity of structure and function. Thus the brain, and the two sets of
nerve lines, namely sensory and motor, are the same in nature and
functions in all animals, from the frog to man inclusive, and they
differ only in complexity of arrangement within the central organ, and
extent of ramification of the nerve lines. Diversity of nature thus far
appears in the relative complexity of organism. This is a conclusion
which assigns to man his place in the scale of animal life; that is, in
so far as we regard man exclusively by reference to his animal nature,
he stands highest in the scale of organism,--first in rank, judged
simply by complexity of brain structure, and minuteness of nerve system.

Fourth, in respect of moral life, that is, ability to contemplate a law
of life absolutely authoritative as well as universally applicable
amongst intelligent beings,--such for example as the law of benevolence;
ability to control the whole animal nature so as to subject it to this
higher law of benevolence; ability to strive after the harmonizing of
all dispositions and actions in accordance with the law of
benevolence,--man occupies a distinct place in the order of beings
existing in the world, no other living being standing associated with
him. There are innumerable forms of organized being in the world; but
only a single representative of moral life in it. No being save man
contemplates a general law of life, making its fulfilment a deliberate
end of action; no being save man possesses a conception of duty or
oughtness, which, if it be regarded simply as an intellectual exercise,
can be apprehended only under application of a law of conduct such as
benevolence. That man stands entirely alone in these respects, and is,
therefore, to be ranked as a distinct order of being, appears from the
following definite lines of evidence: no animal contemplates a general
law of conduct, or intelligible rule of life applicable for the
government of the order to which it belongs; no animal subordinates
physical impulse at the bidding of such a law; no animal aims at the
perfecting of its nature under a general conception of the excellence of
its own nature, as dog, horse, or ape. Therefore we conclude that man
alone of all living beings known to us in this world is a moral being.

Taking now these four aspects of existence as known to us in this
world,--without advancing to deal directly with the phases and
conditions of religious life,--the whole four can be freely accepted by
religious men in strict harmony with all the requirements of religious
thought. The three first named are distinct advances in the history of
physical science, and will be generally admitted to include the most
important accessions to our knowledge of the physical universe having
any bearing on the conceptions lying at the basis of religious thought.
The fourth is the product of philosophical inquiry, proceeding in
accordance with direct observation of personal experience, and by means
of simple analysis of our intelligent activity as that is concerned with
the government of personal life, especially in view of the relations
subsisting in society. This last as a philosophic conclusion, not
attained by physiological research, not properly any part of physical
science, but reached only by distinguishing properly certain contents of
our every-day thought, may be liable to rejection from those who rely
only on the methods peculiar to physical science. But such treatment of
the propositions has no bearing on their truth; as denial of them will
not deliver any man from the obligations of benevolence, or exempt him
from the demands of his fellowmen, requiring that in seeking his own
satisfaction he shall not be selfish, and certainly not harsh, as if the
strongest might have all they desire, and the weakest must be content to
wait on their pleasure. Denial of the recognition of a law of
benevolence will not exempt him from the experience consequent on the
expectations of his fellowmen as they seek help for the suffering, or
sympathy for the sorrowful, or rescue for the perishing. Though what
has been said as to the law of benevolence implies that it is
universally authoritative, there is no express philosophic theory here
introduced as to the mode by which this knowledge is attained, or the
grounds on which its universality is asserted. The bare fact that each
man expects his fellowman to be benevolent is enough for the present
purpose. The simple declaration that the man who seeks only his own
gratification, setting at defiance all the rights of his fellowmen, is
unworthy the name of man and acts a brute's part, is all that any one
needs who would make good the argument that human nature is distinct
from that of the brutes. No man can escape the obligation to benevolent
disposition; no man except the man of gross character attempts to live
as if he regarded the violation of it as capable of vindication. These
two things being so, the testimony is as strong as that establishing the
elementary truths of science, which demonstrates that man owns a
universal moral law, and so distinguishes himself from the animals. The
conditions of human life are too clearly recognized, and too constantly
insisted upon in ordinary society, to allow cover for ambiguities, and
denials which would favor the position of those who accept only what is
ascertained by the methods of physiological investigation. Hence it
happens that popular favor runs deeply and strongly for the kind and
good; and science itself must yield when the testimony of the race is
uniform.

Before closing this inquiry, it is desirable to pass over from the
outstanding conceptions of science and philosophy, to distinctive and
prominent conceptions belonging to religious thought, with the view of
considering whether these can be held in harmony with the teaching of
science. Of these, reference may be made specially to two which
encounter opposition on professedly scientific grounds:--Miracle as an
evidence of the Messiahship of our Lord Jesus Christ; and the efficacy
of Prayer in the economy of spiritual life. These two conceptions have
encountered strong opposition on the allegation of inconsistency with
the unchangeableness of the laws of nature. It becomes, therefore, an
important part of the present investigation, to ascertain how far these
two articles of Christian faith, miraculous testimony to the divinity
of our Saviour, and habitual answer to the prayer offered to God by
those who approach Him in the merit of the Redeemer, are consistent with
the teaching of science. These two conceptions are naturally included in
the one question as to the compatibility with the laws of nature of the
interposition of supernatural agency for attainment of moral and
spiritual ends in the history of the world.

First in order stands the question of MIRACLE as involved in the
evidence of divine power and authority given by our Lord, during His
sojourn in this world to accomplish the great work of redemption.[DJ]
The testimony of miracle as presented in the historical narrative of
Christ's life is frequent and abundant in variety; and its connection
with His work for the redemption of sinful men is everywhere proclaimed.
It is impossible to contemplate the scriptural testimony to the glory of
Christ's nature without including miracle as a conspicuous part of it;
and it is equally impossible to detach this testimony from relation to
the mediatorial work of the Redeemer as concerned with the pardon of
sin, and restoration of man to holiness of character. It thus becomes an
essential test of the validity of Christian evidence to settle the
compatibility of miracle with the knowledge now possessed of the laws of
nature.

It is not necessary here to discuss the credibility of miracles, as
affected by the question whether there can be sufficiency of testimony
to support the occurrence of a miracle,--a question which has engaged an
amount of attention disproportionate to its intellectual worth. The
suggestion of the question was nothing better than an example of
misleading ingenuity, allowed to stand on the page on which it was
indited in manifest violation of the laws of evidence and the essential
conditions of human knowledge. The value of testimony does not depend on
the nature of the thing to which it applies, but on the character of the
witness, and the opportunity for observing and testing the facts
described. There are, for example, a series of surgical operations being
performed in Edinburgh for removal of tumors (Ovariotomy), and being
repeated at intervals of two or three weeks, which have hitherto been
declared by the profession to be impossible without sacrifice of life;
and yet they are successfully accomplished, leaving only an exceedingly
small percentage of death. The whole combined testimony of preceding
ages has been against the possibility of such operations; but this is a
consideration of no value whatever in view of the testimony of the
surgeons who take part in the hazardous and responsible, but most
beneficent work, and of those professional men who have come from
France, and Russia, and other lands, to witness the operation, and of
citizens well acquainted with patients who have been delivered from a
burdened life, overshadowed with prospect of early death. The laws of
evidence are too well understood to call for abstract reasoning as to
the credibility of the witnesses who are at present giving their
testimony to the scientific world, of the successful repetition of an
operation hitherto believed to be impossible. The bearing of such an
illustration on the discussions raised concerning the credibility of the
evidence of our Lord's disciples to the miracles He performed is
obvious. Nor is there need for occupying time in trampling out the
beaten straw by lingering over the argument that no evidence can be
sufficient to establish a miracle, _because_ a miracle is contrary to
common experience; for, it is obvious that a miracle must be contrary to
common experience, since that which is matter of common experience can
not be a miracle, but must be an event determined by some law of nature.
The uniformity of the laws of nature is even a necessary condition for
the evidential value of miracles.

We pass to the real merits of the question in discussing the possibility
of the miracles of Christ without violation of any of the laws of nature
as ascertained by the most recent advances of science.

The miracles of Jesus Christ profess to be supernatural interpositions
for accomplishment of an immediate benevolent purpose, while in
combination they afford a body of evidence testifying to the power and
benevolent mission of a divine Saviour of the sinful. Their directly
benevolent aim is conspicuous throughout. Jesus never performs any
wonderful work for display of power; when a desire is indicated for
signs in the heavens, these are refused; when His own wants are
concerned, there is no exercise of power to deliver Himself from
suffering; but when a poor sufferer appeals for deliverance, He is ready
to act; or when the feeble, oppressed condition of one who has been a
long time in this case comes under His eye, He is moved to compassion
and gives unexpected deliverance even without intervention of a request.
All this is done, not as if it were any part of the divine purpose to
keep men exempt from suffering, nor as if it were inconsistent with the
divine benevolence to allow its return and continuance, for He is at
pains to warn that even a worse thing may come; but as if deliverance
from suffering were in harmony with His mission, and peculiarly
appropriate as illustrative of a Saviour's design as well as of His
divine power. By way of sign He would rescue from disease, in order
thereby to point to a grander deliverance, even from sin which causes
all the world's sorrow.

The question here calling for attention is, How do these miracles stand
related to the laws of nature which we now recognize as fixed and
unchangeable? The _first_ portion of the answer must be that they are
incapable of explanation under these laws. They are veritable
examples,--referring for the present exclusively to their nature, not to
the evidence on which we acknowledge that they occurred,--they are
veritable examples of results incapable of being attained under the
operation of natural law. The effects secured were indeed only such as
would have been attained had medical science been able to accomplish the
result, for the great majority of them belong to the region in which the
grand healing art works out its beneficent contribution to human well
being. But in respect of the mode of their execution they were in _no
sense analogous_ to what is achieved by unexpected advance in scientific
knowledge and skill. There was nothing in the whole course of our Lord's
life, bearing resemblance to the work of him who laboriously ponders the
varied aspects of some selected form of disease, and ultimately attains
to skill in a new mode of treatment, or a dangerous and difficult form
of operation. The word spoken to the leper or the paralytic; the
anointing of the eyes with clay and sending the blind man with his
clay-covered eyelids to wash in a pool; the command to Jairus's
daughter, "Maid, arise;" and the call to the man of Bethany, "Lazarus,
come forth,"--present no likeness to the conduct of one merely
exercising a deeper knowledge of the remedial measures which are
constantly being employed in some mode or other for relief of suffering.
What we witness in the varied forms of His works is supernatural
intervention, exercise of divine authority and power. There is no
competent vindication of the sacred narrative by reduction of our Lord's
works to the level of those forms of knowledge and skill which are
within the reach of human discovery. The sacred writings offer no
suggestion pointing in this direction; Christian faith, in the defence
it offers for its recognition of the miraculous in Christ's life, does
not shelter itself behind such a poor breastwork, as that which is
gained by eliminating the supernatural,--seeking to defend itself by
surrendering all that is distinctive of the God-man, who not only spake
as man never spake, but who with profuse liberality performed works of
healing which made the ears of the nation to tingle, compelling
reluctant witnesses to testify, that it was never so seen in Israel. The
supernatural works of Jesus belong to the same place in history, as
that which records the supernatural attributes belonging to His
personality.

To the question, How do the works of Jesus stand related to the laws of
nature? the _next_ portion of the answer is that they do not conflict
with these laws in any intelligible sense. The believer in Christ's
miracles, as he meets the manifest requirements of science, may fairly
ask of scientific critics that they state any law of nature which was
violated in any example of the Saviour's benevolent doings, in a sense
of the word "violation" which conflicts with the indubitable teaching of
science concerning the unchangeableness of the laws of nature. It might
well suffice for exposition of Christian thought at an earlier period of
Bible interpretation when the sole object was to set forth the
transcendent grandeur of Christ's works, to represent a miracle as "a
violation of the laws of nature," meaning thereby to concentrate on the
fact that equally by its character, and by profession of the agent, it
was a work which ordinary power was insufficient to explain. By parity
of reasoning, it may equally be allowed that a legitimate course is
followed, and an important service is rendered to the advance of
Christian evidence, if it be urged by scientific men that a violation of
the laws of nature is inconsistent with what is now ascertained as to
the government of the physical world. This collision between old forms
of statement and new forms of test is a gain to all interests concerned.
It must press into notice the inquiry as to the sense in which the old
terminology was employed, and also the sense in which this new test is
presented. If this comparison be prosecuted to its final result, no
Christian believer will find himself disturbed by apprehension of a
possible call to conflict with science, and no scientific men will feel
themselves drawn into antagonism with the accredited forms of Christian
belief as to the miraculous. A few carefully stated propositions should
help towards making this clear, if only these can be so drawn as to meet
the demands of science, and also accurately represent Christ's life.

The testimony of science dealing with the evidence open to observation
is that the laws of nature, such as the laws of gravitation,
transmutation of energy, and the development and support of living
organism, are fixed and unchangeable, so that persistent antagonism to
them is only conflict of a weaker force with a stronger which must end
in disaster or destruction to the weaker. Over against this we do not
find it possible to place any statement, either in the form of direct
affirmation, or of inference deducible from the implications of Christ's
actions or words, which can be regarded as directly contradictory. On
the contrary the deeds and sayings of Christ carry a multitude of
suggestions in strict harmony with this general teaching of science.
When He would indicate to His hearers how they are guided in their
judgment by the uniformity of natural law, He points to the signs which
they interpret in the aspect of the atmosphere morning and evening. When
the suggestion is placed before Him that He should cast Himself from an
eminence in token of His superiority to ordinary risks, He does not hint
at a suspension of the law of gravitation, but teaches that man should
not transgress the divine will by rashly exposing himself to danger.
When He would teach men to combine labor and trust, He points them to
the uniform provision for the clothing and adorning of the vegetable
world which can not in any measure care for itself. And so we might
proceed, were there any need for multiplying evidence as to a feature of
Christ's teaching manifest to every Bible reader.

The record of Scripture presenting the narratives of Christ's miracles
does not at any time represent our Saviour as interposing to stay for a
brief period the action of fixed law, or to prevent the application of
such law in the history of a particular individual. In all these wonders
of healing nothing more happens as to actual _result_, having a general
bearing on procedure in the physical world, than does happen when a cure
of a critical phase of disease is accomplished by some newly discovered
appliance at command of medical art. These two cases are essentially
different as to _mode_ of action, but they are strictly identical as to
_result_, and this identity amounts to a demonstration of harmony with
scientific requirements, as these actually guide men to the discovery of
new methods. That there is identity of result only _in some cases_ does
not affect the argument, but arises from the essential features of the
comparison, as a product of supernatural intervention must transcend
what is ultimately attained by laborious processes of human research.
But that there is in any case an identity of result under the very
different conditions, is an indication that supernatural intervention is
not an interference with the laws of nature such as would be involved in
their suspension or subversion. There is a great difference between
recovery from suspended animation and resurrection from the dead as in
the case of Lazarus, but the fixed order of the universe is no more
disturbed in the latter case than in the former.

A further consideration bearing on the miracles of Christ needs to be
stated, though it comes more directly into relation with philosophy than
with science properly so called. Every one of these miracles was
performed avowedly for moral ends, and under application of moral
conditions, while for immediate physical effects. There is moral law as
well as physical law, and our Saviour subordinates the latter to the
former in determining the use He makes of supernatural agency. The
evidence of this is interwoven through the very texture of the
narrative, so that an attempt to sever His miracles from their
moral purpose can result only in tearing the narrative into
fragments,--mutilating the record which must be studied and interpreted
as it has been put into our hands. Moral law is as unchangeable as
physical law, though the character and form of its sway differ from
those of physical law, and it is easier for man wilfully to violate the
higher law of life than to violate the lower. Yet so closely are the
higher and lower connected in human history, that the easy violation of
moral law is followed by painful consequences under the reign of
physical law. It lay within the purpose of Jesus to deliver from both,
and it is only in recognition of this combined or complex purpose that
we discover the rational basis on which supernatural deliverance from
disease becomes a natural vehicle for presenting to rational beings
requisite evidence of divine intervention on their behalf as they are
entangled in the disastrous consequences of violating unchangeable moral
law. If on other grounds it be apparent that supernatural interference
for restoration of health or life does not involve interference with
physical law by which the government of the universe could be in any
degree affected; on the grounds now contemplated we come to recognize a
harmony of higher and lower orders of fixed law bearing on the history
of the human race, and for this harmony of law our Saviour manifested a
supreme concern.

With these brief statements before us, we are now prepared for turning
in a different direction to ascertain what is the special view of
miracle which has found currency within some scientific circles,
carrying the explanation of intense antipathy to its acknowledgment, and
unhesitating declaration that the whole body of scientific teaching, and
even the characteristics of scientific method, are adverse to the very
conception of miracle. For the purpose now in view it may be well to
present in close connection the successive utterances of a single
author, who may be taken as representative of a class. The work of
Professor Schmidt on _The Doctrine of Descent and Darwinism_ will supply
illustrations of the kind to which reference has been made, as this
author states at the outset that the doctrine of descent finds its
antagonists among those "who perceive, more or less distinctly, the
danger with which the new doctrine threatens their standpoint of
miracle."[DK] From this allusion it appears that he regards a doctrine
of descent as opposed to what he describes as an "incomprehensible act
of creation."[DL] Accordingly he celebrates the praises of this theory
in these terms,--"it interprets by a single principle those great
phenomena which without its aid remain a mass of unintelligible
miracles."[DM] In harmony with these utterances he speaks of gradual
evolution of the organs of special sense, such as the organs of hearing
and smell, as giving a negative to "the sudden and incomprehensible
origination of these organs in an immediate state of completion."[DN]

These few extracts may suffice to indicate the mental attitude of those
who show aversion to the acknowledgment of miracle. With Schmidt the
"miraculous" is another name for the incomprehensible; to him the
suggestion of miracle is disagreeable as implying the impossibility of
scientific explanation. If these things be kept in mind, it will be
clear how widely apart this notion is from the Christian conception of
miracle. The one view is that observational science can make no account
of miracle: the other is that thought concerning a supernatural Being
really involved the conception of miracle. Science can assign no place
to the incomprehensible, can make no account of it. Religion finds a
higher sphere of comprehensibility in the action of supernatural power.
The two positions are radically distinct, and do not come into actual
conflict. Hence religion has no opposition to the view of miracle just
stated, which amounts to little more than a negative definition of
science. To say that science can take no account of the miraculous, is
only in other words to say that science is explanation of natural
phenomena by recognition of the action of natural causes, consequently

the miraculous does not come within the boundaries of science. This is
self-evident, and on this footing theology has no account to make of
what is only a semblance of opposition, involving no real conflict.
Creation, for example, can not come within the compass of observational
science; but creation may nevertheless be a rational conception in
dealing with a purely rational problem, which does not at all belong to
physical science. In the same manner it appears that the whole series
of our Lord's miracles are outside the area of science, which, as it has
nothing of authority to advance against them, has not even a basis on
which to offer any testimony concerning their possibility.

One topic more requires to be briefly considered as constituting an
essential of religious thought, namely the acknowledgment of divine
interposition for the answer of PRAYER. Our question is, How this
conception of divine answer to prayer stands related to scientific
thought concerning the government of the world by fixed law? If the laws
of nature are fixed, how can the government of the world allow for
fulfilment of human desire as expressed in supplication? The question to
be discussed has two sides, the one concerned with the conditions on
which an answer to prayer is expected; the other with the exact
significance of the scientific conception of the government of the world
by fixed law. If there be a rational basis for prayer as encouraged by
the teaching of Scripture, there can be no such dilemma as would be
implied in supposing that law is fixed yet not fixed, or that law is
unchangeable in all cases save in the history of the man of prayer, in
whose behalf the laws of nature are liable to be held in check. There
may be among Christian men considerable diversity in the clearness of
apprehension with which they grasp the meaning of the divine promise to
answer prayer; but there is no one taught by the Scriptures as to the
privilege of prayer, who thinks of it as implying that the laws of the
universe are liable to be held in suspension because the desires of his
heart are rising to God in humble, earnest supplication. The man trained
to recognize this truth affecting God's government that "He maketh His
sun to rise on the evil and on the good; and sendeth rain on the just,
and on the unjust," does not readily fall into the mistake of supposing
that all the laws of the universe are at His bidding, because of the
divine encouragement to prayer. The Christian prays only under divine
warrant, and this does not convey any such suggestion.

First, then, we can clear away at once the cruder thoughts of the
unintelligent believer in the power of prayer; and those of the
scientific objector to prayer, who is not instructed in scriptural
doctrine. Prayer does not imply a probable reversal of the laws of
nature; but it does imply a moral government in the midst of the
physical world, and the subordination of the physical to the moral under
regulation of an all-wise and almighty Ruler. The question before us
concerns this subordination, and the possibilities which it implies.

Towards the attainment of exact conceptions here the first requisite is
a clear understanding of the scientific doctrine of the government of
the world by fixed law. In whatever sense we take the word "_law_" as
applicable to God's government of the universe, there is no law which is
fluctuating, or liable to have one signification at one time, and a
quite different signification at another time; a narrower range of
application at one period, and a wider range at a later. Such
fluctuation would imply a suspension of a law of nature, and the
conception of such a thing is inconsistent with absolute rational
government, alien equally to the principles of science and of religion.
Laws physical, moral, and spiritual are equally fixed laws.

But the laws of the universe are a harmony, and in the midst of the
interdependence of laws distinct in character, the harmony of the whole
is secured by the subordination of physical law to moral and spiritual.
It is in the midst of this harmonized relationship of the diverse laws
of the divine government that the spirit of prayer lives, and makes good
its rational consistency. And it is only on condition of acknowledgment
of diverse laws, including moral with physical, that the scientific man
can interpose any criticism as to the efficacy of prayer. Any denial of
a moral government in the midst of the physical universe, under sway of
a God of righteousness, places an objector entirely out of the sphere in
which criticism can proceed. Physical law determining conditions of
bodily life is fixed law; moral law deciding the conditions of right
conduct in intelligent life is fixed law; spiritual law deciding the
conditions of fellowship with the Father of our spirits is fixed law.
The believer in the Bible has no hesitancy in acknowledgment of all
this; he is a believer in fixed law in a higher and grander sense than
scientific teaching indicates, and he believes in the harmony of all
existence under an unchangeable government, notwithstanding all the
wrong doing in the world, and the dreadful misery resulting from it.
His belief in the harmony of the universe rests on his belief in the
fixedness of law physical as well as moral, and moral as well as
physical.

But the _fixedness_ belonging to various orders of law, subsisting in a
state of interdependence, and involving subordination of lower to
higher, needs some more exact interpretation. The fixedness of law,
physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual, in no case involves
fixedness of result, but _varying results according to diversity of
conditions_. There is fixedness of physical law, but withal there is
diversity of weather, and seasons, and harvests, and that because a
variety of conditions are harmonized under fixed law. There is fixedness
of intellectual law in accordance with which accuracy of thought is
determined, but diversity of result according to the materials with
which we deal. And so it is with moral and spiritual law, providing for
the regulation of our higher life.

What then needs to be pondered by way of reaching an ampler
interpretation of the formula of "fixed law" is that it does not in any
case imply an iron rigidity of result, an undeviating uniformity of
occurrence. There is no region in which perpetual change can be more
accurately postulated than in the physical world. But there is order and
system in these changes, admirably illustrated in the weather forecasts
of the present advanced stage of physical science, which are attainable
only by continual watching of shifting conditions with application of
fixed law to the appearance of wind and cloud and rain. But there are no
forecasts without these two things, fixed laws and varying conditions
for their application. With the wider generalization which admits of
recognition of fixed law, there is always the narrower, concerned with
variable conditions to which the wider is to be applied. So it is under
moral law, and so under spiritual. So also does it hold when our
observation is directed on interdependence of two orders of law, such as
the moral and physical. This combination we have in human life, as it is
subjected to both. Physical law reigns in human history as illustrated
by the laws of health, which are fixed irrespective of moral law, so
that sewerage gas will be prejudicial to health, apart from the moral
character of a man. Moral law reigns in human life, and truthfulness in
utterance, or justice in action, will maintain a harmony of the inner
life, whether outwardly there be poverty or wealth. These two orders of
law are independent, yet interwoven in their application to the complex
life of man. Immorality will find its accompaniment in physical
disorder; the repentance which has healing power within the mind will
not heal the body, yet may there be advance in moral life by reason of
the weakness and suffering which repentance can not remove. Such is at
once the independence and the interdependence of physical and moral law,
in accordance with the fixedness of law in each case, and the harmony of
both under one government, by means of subordination of the physical to
the moral.

There are thus _two spheres_, physical and moral, but _one life_,
brought to harmony under the laws of both spheres. What then is the
bearing of this distinction of spheres on the problem of the efficacy of
prayer, viewing the question only in the light of science and
philosophy? An obvious bearing, in so, far as the conditions of physical
and moral life are set forth and distinguished; but no determining
value for interpretation of the possible influence of prayer as
concerning a life subject at once to physical and moral conditions.
Prayer can be exercised in accordance with scientific teaching, only by
intelligent recognition of the physical conditions of life; in
accordance with philosophy, only by intelligent acknowledgment of the
subordination of physical life to moral. If then, we turn to the
teaching of science, making account of all that it includes as to fixed
laws applicable to ever-varying conditions, there is nothing in it to
warrant the conclusion that there can be no interposition from a higher
sphere in order to secure application of physical law for attainment of
moral ends. The whole product of scientific investigation leaves clear
the possibility of the administration of a moral government in
accordance with subordination of physical law to the attainment of its
higher ends. It does not help the understanding of the government of the
world, but rather hampers our reflection, if it be suggested that there
are two spheres, physical and moral, and that the application of prayer
is restricted to one of these spheres. Human life can not be so severed
into parts; it is a unity self-regulated by harmony of submission to
moral and physical law, and it must be governed by the Supreme Ruler in
the harmonious application of these laws. There is no sphere of life
into which the moral does not enter, and accordingly no sphere within
which prayer, which necessarily rests on moral conditions, may not
apply.

If next we pass to Scripture teaching concerning prayer, where alone we
find full instruction on the subject, in precept, example, and a variety
of encouragements, it will appear that the warrant for prayer is found
exclusively in the divine promise, and that the application of that
promise is to every phase of life, subject to moral conditions which are
explicitly revealed. Prayer is a privilege divinely bestowed through the
Saviour, in accordance with which fellowship with God is granted on the
merits of the Redeemer. Its nature reveals the true harmony between God
and the moral creature, as a reality transcending all physical existence
and all knowledge coming from study of physical law. The accepting of
this privilege, and the continuance of its exercise are the tokens of
returning harmony of sinful man with the holy God. Elevation in the
exercise by steadily extending inclusion of a wider circle of personal
desire and activity within the area of conscious fellowship with God, is
the advance of the moral nature into fuller harmony with God, and with
the whole government of the universe. The teaching of Scripture which
assures of all this, and guides man towards realization of it, clearly
distinguishes between material and moral good, yet does not exclude the
one any more than the other, but subordinates the physical to the moral,
harmonizing the two in recognition of the supreme importance of all that
is moral. It does not exclude desire of temporal good, but restricts its
illustration to desire of "daily bread,"--assures us that our Father
knoweth we have need of such good, and will supply it,--and promises
that having given most freely what is best, he will assuredly give that
which is least.

If then it be said that the answer to prayer is a miracle of divine
interposition in human history, of which science finds no trace, we do
not marvel, for science does not extend its observations to the
inclusion of what pertains to the higher life of man. If any man asks
for evidence in an exclusively physical sphere that God answers prayer,
he asks that evidence should be discovered apart from the conditions
involved. A more unscientific demand there could not be. When he refuses
to admit that there can be any trustworthy evidence of the answer of
prayer apart from the test he proposes, he either misunderstands the
Christian doctrine of prayer, or he is criticising a conception of
prayer other than the Christian one. If we turn to the philosophy of
human life as subjected to moral law, and called to its perfect
fulfilment, we do not find any thing but harmonious truth in the
suggestion that God cares more for the moral life of man than for the
physical universe. If we turn to Scripture, receiving its teaching as to
prayer, we find that the promised interposition in man's behalf is even
less an illustration of divine power than of Divine righteousness; an
evidence that the Divine Ruler seeks righteousness above all things, for
the entire significance of the exercise is this, trust in the holy One,
and fellowship with Him through life. On this ground alone does He
promise an answer to prayer, in this promise making moral conditions the
essential test for use of the privilege, requiring the suppliant to
subordinate to these all desire of material good. It is towards success
in attaining true fellowship with Himself that God is ever giving
promise of blessing. It is in full view of the transcendent value of a
life of holiness, that the Supreme Ruler is daily condescending to stoop
towards His children, that they may be helped in all that pertains to
holiness of character and life. The Bible makes it essential to the
government of the world, in harmony with fixed law, that God should be
the hearer and answerer of the prayer of His intelligent creatures,
always pointing to reliance on the Saviour's work as the test of the
reality of the exercise, in the case of all who possess the written
revelation of His will, in the glorious Gospel of Jesus Christ.

FOOTNOTES:

[DJ] The limits of the present discussion make it impossible to include
a wider range; but this really embraces the whole question of the
miracles of Scripture.

[DK] p. 6.

[DL] p. 11.

[DM] p. 12

[DN] p. 151.




APPENDIX.




APPENDIX.


I.

RELATIONS OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION. _Page_ 34.

"He who contemplates the universe from the religious point of view, must
learn to see that this which we call science, is one constituent of the
great whole; and as such ought to be regarded with a sentiment like that
which the remainder excites. While he who contemplates the universe from
the scientific point of view, must learn to see that this which we call
Religion is similarly a constituent of the great whole; and being such,
must be treated as a subject of science with no more prejudice than any
other reality. It behooves each party to strive to understand the other,
with the conviction that the other has something worthy to be
understood; and with the conviction that when mutually recognized this
something will be the basis of a complete reconciliation."--HERBERT
SPENCER, _First Principles_, p. 21.


II.

SPONTANEOUS GENERATION. _Page_ 54.

Professor Tyndall, describing his own experiments, says, "The
experiments have already extended to 105 instances, not one of which
shows the least countenance to the doctrine of spontaneous generation."
Communicated to Royal Society of London, December 21, 1876.--_Nature_,
vol. xv. p. 303.


III.

ENERGY AND FORCE. _Page_ 96.

The term Force is by many authors used as equivalent to Energy, rather
than as a distinct term for the amount of Energy. Force is thus used by
Sir W. R. Groves. "The term Force, although used in very different
senses by different authors, in its limited sense may be defined as that
which produces or resists motion." ... "I use the term Force ... as
meaning that active principle inseparable from matter which is supposed
to induce its various changes." ... "All we know or see is the effect;
we do not see Force--we see motion or moving matter."--_The Correlation
of Physical Forces_, sixth edition, by the Hon. Sir W. R. Grove, pp. 10,
11.


IV.

ALL ORGANIZED EXISTENCE IS CONSTRUCTED ON A COMMON PLAN. _Page_ 131.

"Biologists turn to the physical organization of man. They examine his
whole structure, his bony frame, and all that clothes it. They resolve
him into the finest particles into which the microscope will enable them
to break him up. They consider the performance of his various functions
and activities, and they look at the manner in which he occurs on the
surface of the world. Then they turn to other animals, and taking the
first handy domestic animal--say a dog,--they profess to be able to
demonstrate that the analysis of the dog leads them, in gross, to
precisely the same results as the analysis of the man; that they find
almost identically the same bones, having the same relations; that they
can name the muscles of the dog by the names of the muscles of the man,
and the nerves of the dog by those of the nerves of the man, and that
such structures and organs of sense as we find in the man, such also we
find in the dog; they analyze the brain and spinal cord, and they find
that the nomenclature which fits the one answers for the other.
Moreover, they trace back the dog's and the man's development, and they
find that at a certain stage of their existence, the two creatures are
not distinguishable the one from the other; they find that the dog and
his kind have a certain distribution over the surface of the world
comparable in its way to the distribution of the human species.... Thus
biologists have arrived at the conclusion that a fundamental uniformity
of structure pervades the animal and vegetable worlds, and that plants
and animals differ from one another simply as modifications of the same
great plan. Again they tell us the same story in regard to the study of
function. They admit the large and important interval which, at the
present time, separates the manifestations of the mental faculties
observable in the higher forms of mankind, and even in the lowest forms,
such as we know them, mentally from those exhibited by other animals;
but, at the same time, they tell us that the foundations or rudiments
of almost all the faculties of man are to be met with in the lower
animals; that there is a unity of mental faculty, as well as of bodily
structure, and that here also, the difference is a difference of degree
and not of kind."--Lecture on "The Study of Biology," by Professor
Huxley, _Nature_, vol. xv. p. 219. Delivered at South Kensington Museum,
London, December 16, 1876. On the grounds here admirably summarized, it
is clear that the whole organism of our world has been constructed on a
common plan. This being true, similarities will appear in process of
development, and in the structure and functions of different orders.
This similarity, however, does not help us to explain "the large and
important interval" which appears when mental characteristics are
considered. It makes the diversity of mental power more difficult to
explain by reference to organism, in fact contributing to the strength
of evidence for mind as a form of existence distinct from organism.


V.

EMBRYOLOGY. _Page_ 131.

I have not felt warranted to include in the text any summary of results
secured by the important, but very difficult, investigations concerning
the growth of animal life in the womb. This whole department of inquiry
is in such an unfinished and uncertain state, that there is not warrant
to found upon the evidence already obtained any general argument as to
its bearing on a theory of evolution. The most competent observers
admit that they are perplexed by facts ascertained, and confess that
they can not as yet offer an explanation. To others all is as plain as
possible; embryology supplies a convincing proof of the accuracy of an
evolution theory; but these are scientific theorists who see by
imagination, and are impatient of uncertainty. There are certain general
considerations which must interpose difficulties in the way of
constructing an argument from Embryology to evolution of species. (1)
The action of environment before birth is altogether different from the
action of environment after birth. (2) The theory of the evolution of
species emphasizes this difference by insisting on the struggle for
existence. (3) This difference being admitted, an argument from the one
to the other can not hold. In the line of discovery the point of chief
interest has been the fact that in some cases embryonic life shows a
transition through lower forms analogous to lower orders of animal
existence prior to reaching the mature stage when birth occurs. But in
connection with the facts ascertained, two things are to be remarked.
(1) Evidence of transition is most striking in the history of animal
life developed external to the parental life, as in the transition from
_larvæ_ to _pupæ_ among insects, and in the changes in the life of the
tadpole. (2) If it be admitted that there is a common plan of structure
for all organism, it is implied that there must be similarities in
process of development. The question requiring answer, therefore, is
whether in the gradual development from the germ, any further
resemblance to lower orders appears than is to be anticipated on the
admission of a common plan for organic structure. There are singular
examples of transition. But there are no illustrations of uniform
progress in the case of the higher orders such as would warrant the
supposition that a history of evolution of the species can be read in
the development of the fœtus. The supposition has, however, found
currency in not a little of our scientific teaching. The incompleteness
of this evidence may appear from examples. Take the tadpole. Huxley
states the facts thus,--"The tadpole is first a fish, then a tailed
amphibian, provided with gills and lungs, before it became a frog." This
is development outside parental life, and does not belong to evidence in
Embryology. Confining attention to embryonic life, let us take Huxley's
statement, biologists "trace back the dog's and the man's development,
and they find that at a certain stage of their existence, the two
creatures are not distinguishable the one from the other." What is the
inference to be drawn? If the two are not distinguishable, our powers of
distinguishing are insufficient, for no biologist suggests that the two
are alike. The difficulty of distinguishing two germs, or two examples
of fœtus, is analogous to the difficulty which Darwin has pointed out
of distinguishing the orders of dogs when they are six-days-old puppies,
or the breed of three-days-old colt, or of nestling pigeons. At these
stages, the animals may be so similar, that it is hardly possible to
distinguish them, and yet in the full grown state they are quite
different (Darwin's _Origin of Species_, sixth edition, p. 391). Mr.
Darwin has presented the outstanding facts thus;--"The very general,
though not universal, difference in structure between the embryo and the
adult;--the various parts in the same individual embryo, which
ultimately become very unlike and serve for diverse purposes, being at
an early period of growth alike;--the common, but not invariable
resemblance between the embryos or larvæ of the most distinct species in
the same class;--the embryo often retaining whilst within the egg or
womb, structures which are of no service to it, either at that or at a
later period of life."


VI.

NON-ADVANCEMENT OF LOWER ORDERS. _Page_ 158.

Mr. Darwin's answer to the difficulty put by Agassiz is this;--"On our
theory the continued existence of lowly organisms offers no difficulty;
for natural selection, or the survival of the fittest, does not
necessarily include progressive development,--it only takes advantage of
such variations as arise and are beneficial to each creature under its
complex relations of life."--_Origin of Species_, sixth edition, p. 98.
This wears the aspect of a limitation of the theory, and to that extent
an acknowledgment of the force of the reasoning of Agassiz.


VII.

PROTOPLASM. _Page_ 131.

"Protoplasm, simple or nucleated, is the formal basis of all life;" thus
"all living forms are fundamentally of one character." "All the forms of
Protoplasm which have yet been examined contain the four elements,
carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, in very complex union." Thus
there is "a general uniformity in the character of the Protoplasm, or
physical basis of life, in whatever group of living beings it may be
studied."--HUXLEY'S _Lay Sermons_, p. 142.


VIII.

NUMBER OF SPECIES OF INSECTS. _Page_ 193.

Professor Huxley mentions that "Gerstsæcker in the new edition of
Broun's 'Thier-Reich' gives 200,000 as the total number of species of
_Arthropoda_." In this connection Mr. McLauchlan, when claiming that
there are 200,000 species of Insects, adds, "In one order alone
(_Coleoptera_) it is estimated that 80,000 species have been
described."--_Nature_, xv. p. 275.


IX.

FERTILIZATION OF FLOWERS BY INSECTS. _Page_ 170.

Dr. Hermann Müller's Observations are described in _Nature_, vol. xiv.
p. 175; vol. xv. pp. 317, 473; vol. xvi. pp. 265, 507.


X.

ANTS. _Page 192._

Mr. McCook's Observations are summarized in _Nature_, vol. xvii. p.
433.


XI.

LIKENESS OF THE APE'S BRAIN TO THE HUMAN BRAIN. _Page_ 225.

The close resemblance of the brain of the ape to that of man, has been
held to prove that the ape comes next to man in intelligence. But the
facts bearing on this suggestion are fitted to occasion serious
perplexity to its upholders. First stands the resemblance of bodily
structure as largely explaining similarity of brain. The results of
electric stimulation of the monkey's brain lend additional force to this
consideration. Again, facts are wanting to support the claim for
superior intelligence in behalf of the monkey and ape. The habits of the
ape in its natural state afford little evidence of an encouraging kind.
The ape gathers together a few sticks for a nest, in comparison with
which the work of very small birds presents marvels of architecture. And
nest-building seems the highest evidence gathered from the natural
habits of the animal, when we compare it with leaning the back against a
tree for rest, or staunching the blood of a wound. In the captive state
the ape gives no such evidence of superior intelligence as the
similarity of its brain to the human, would lead us to expect, if brain
structure afford the test of intellectual power. Even after allowance
has been made for sudden transition from the wild state to the captive,
the evidence of capability does not appear which the theory requires.
The highest results reached by training monkeys, do not support a claim
for intellectual superiority. These are mainly forms of mimicry,
generally inferior to the efforts of some other animals. Add to these
considerations the evidence as to the singular intelligence shown by
ants, and the theory which measures intellect by brain structure is
placed at a great disadvantage. Whether science may not ere long point
to some theory of mind connected with animal existence must be matter of
uncertainty. If, however, the easy and familiar operations of our own
intelligence are analyzed and classified; and if a statement of the
ascertained functions of the brain is laid alongside, it will appear
that nothing known to us in the action of brain, can supply a science of
the operations of the human mind.


XII.

THE LARGE SIZED OR MULTIPOLAR CELLS. _Page_ 257.

On the functions of the large sized cells, it seems desirable to add a
few words as to the direction in which evidence as to their functions
actually points. For this purpose, a further quotation is desirable,
referring to the number of fibres or processes passing off from these
large cells, distinguishing those which branch out into a fine net-work,
and those which pass directly to a nerve fibre. "One at least of the
processes of a multipolar nerve cell does not branch, but becomes
directly continuous with a nerve fibre, and has been named the
axial-cylinder process."--Professor Turner's _Human Anatomy_, i. 201.
This taken with the facts given in Lecture VII, seems to favor the
conclusions, (1) that the large cell spreads nerve energy through the
tissue of the brain, while each has at least one direct line of
communication with the system of nerve fibres; (2) that the large cell
has intimate and extended relations with the motor system.


XIII.

THE CONCEPTION OF DUTY. _Page_ 273.

"Duty! Thou great, thou exalted name! Wondrous thought that workest
neither by fond insinuation, flattery, nor by any threat, but by merely
holding up thy naked law in the soul, and so extorting for thyself
always reverence, if not always obedience,--before whom all appetites
are dumb, however secretly they rebel,--whence thy original?"--KANT'S
_Critique of Practical Reason_.




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Transcriber's Notes:

Italics are noted by _underscores_ surrounding the word/words.

Bold words are surrounded by =equal signs=.

Footnote V

[V] רָקׅיַע, Raqia, from רָקַע, to spread out.

Hebrew: raḳiya‘ and raḳa‘

Page 145

(an arbitrary declaration)

Changed (arbitary) to (arbitrary).

Page 212 Illustration

(direction of the current of influence.)

Changed (currnt) to (current).

Page 235

(whole nerve system. The corroborative)

Changed (corroberative) to (corroborative).

Page 237

(has a clear and unchallengeable field of)

Changed (unchallangeable) to (unchallengeable).