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                              TRÜBNER'S

                           ORIENTAL SERIES.




                                 THE

                        SARVA-DARŚANA-SAṂGRAHA

                                  OR

        _REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY._



                                  BY

                           MÁDHAVA ÁCHÁRYA.


                            TRANSLATED BY

                          E. B. COWELL, M.A.

      PROFESSOR OF SANSKRIT AND FELLOW OF CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE
      IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, AND HONORARY LL.D. OF THE
      UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.

                                 AND

                          A. E. GOUGH, M.A.

      PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE PRESIDENCY COLLEGE, AND
      PRINCIPAL OF THE MADRASA, CALCUTTA.






                               LONDON:

                     TRÜBNER & CO., LUDGATE HILL.

                                1882.

       *       *       *       *       *




PREFACE.


I well remember the interest excited among the learned Hindus of
Calcutta by the publication of the Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha of Mádhava
Áchárya in the Bibliotheca Indica in 1858. It was originally edited by
Paṇḍit Íśvarachandra Vidyáságara, but a subsequent edition, with no
important alterations, was published in 1872 by Paṇḍit Táránátha
Tarkaváchaspati. The work had been used by Wilson in his "Sketch of
the Religious Sects of the Hindus" (first published in the Asiatic
Researches, vol. xvi., Calcutta, 1828); but it does not appear to have
been ever much known in India. MS. copies of it are very scarce; and
those found in the North of India, as far as I have had an opportunity
of examining them, seem to be all derived from one copy, brought
originally from the South, and therefore written in the Telugu
character. Certain mistakes are found in all alike, and probably arose
from some illegible readings in the old Telugu original. I have
noticed the same thing in the Nágarí copies of Mádhava's Commentary on
the Black Yajur Veda, which are current in the North of India.

As I was at that time the Oriental Secretary of the Bengal Asiatic
Society, I was naturally attracted to the book; and I subsequently
read it with my friend Paṇḍit Maheśachandra Nyáyaratna, the present
Principal of the Sanskrit College at Calcutta. I always hoped to
translate it into English; but I was continually prevented by other
engagements while I remained in India. Soon after my return to
England, I tried to carry out my intention; but I found that several
chapters, to which I had not paid the same attention as to the rest,
were too difficult to be translated in England, where I could no
longer enjoy the advantage of reference to my old friends the Paṇḍits
of the Sanskrit College. In despair I laid my translation aside for
years, until I happened to learn that my friend, Mr. A. E. Gough, at
that time a Professor in the Sanskrit College at Benares, was thinking
of translating the book. I at once proposed to him that we should do
it together, and he kindly consented to my proposal; and we
accordingly each undertook certain chapters of the work. He had the
advantage of the help of some of the Paṇḍits of Benares, especially of
Paṇḍit Ráma Miśra, the assistant Professor of Sáṅkhya, who was himself
a Rámánuja; and I trust that, though we have doubtless left some
things unexplained or explained wrongly, we may have been able to
throw light on many of the dark sayings with which the original
abounds. Our translations were originally published at intervals in
the Benares Paṇḍit between 1874 and 1878; but they have been carefully
revised for their present republication.

The work itself is an interesting specimen of Hindu critical ability.
The author successively passes in review the sixteen philosophical
systems current in the fourteenth century in the South of India, and
gives what appeared to him to be their most important tenets, and the
principal arguments by which their followers endeavoured to maintain
them; and he often displays some quaint humour as he throws himself
for the time into the position of their advocate, and holds, as it
were, a temporary brief in behalf of opinions entirely at variance
with his own.[1] We may sometimes differ from him in his judgment of
the relative importance of their doctrines, but it is always
interesting to see the point of view of an acute native critic. In the
course of his sketches he frequently explains at some length obscure
details in the different systems; and I can hardly imagine a better
guide for the European reader who wishes to study any one of these
Darśanas in its native authorities. In one or two cases (as notably in
the Bauddha, and perhaps in the Jaina system) he could only draw his
materials second-hand from the discussions in the works of Brahmanical
controversialists; but in the great majority he quotes directly from
the works of their founders or leading exponents, and he is
continually following in their track even where he does not quote
their exact words.[2]

The systems are arranged from the Vedánta point of view,--our author
having been elected, in A.D. 1331, the head of the Smárta order in
the Maṭh of Śṛingeri in the Mysore territory, founded by Śaṃkara
Áchárya, the great Vedántist teacher of the eighth century, through
whose efforts the Vedánta became what it is at present--the
acknowledged view of Hindu orthodoxy. The systems form a gradually
ascending scale,--the first, the Chárváka and Bauddha, being the
lowest as the furthest removed from the Vedánta, and the last, the
Sáṅkhya and Yoga, being the highest as approaching most nearly to it.

The sixteen systems here discussed attracted to their study the noblest
minds in India throughout the mediæval period of its history. Hiouen
Thsang says of the schools in his day: "Les écoles philosophiques sont
constamment en lutte, et le bruit de leurs discussions passionnées s'élève
comme les flots de la mer. Les hérétiques des diverses sectes s'attachent
à des maîtres particuliers, et, par des voies différentes, marchent tous
au même but." We can still catch some faint echo of the din as we read the
mediæval literature. Thus, for instance, when King Harsha wanders among
the Vindhya forests, he finds "seated on the rocks and reclining under the
trees Árhata begging monks, Śvetapadas, Mahápáśupatas, Páṇḍarabhikshus,
Bhágavatas, Varṇins, Keśaluñchanas, Lokáyatikas, Kápilas, Káṇádas,
Aupanishadas, Ísvarakárins, Dharmaśástrins, Pauráṇikas, Sáptatantavas,
Śábdas, Páñcharátrikas, &c., all listening to their own accepted tenets
and zealously defending them."[3] Many of these sects will occupy us in
the ensuing pages; many of them also are found in Mádhava's poem on the
controversial triumphs of Śaṃkara Áchárya, and in the spurious prose work
on the same subject, ascribed to Anantánandagiri. Well may some old poet
have put into the mouth of Yudhishṭhira the lines which one so often hears
from the lips of modern paṇḍits--

    Vedá vibhinnáḥ smṛitayo vibhinná,
    Násau munir yasya mataṃ na bhinnam,
    Dharmasya tattvaṃ nihitaṃ guháyáṃ,
    Mahájano yena gataḥ sa pantháḥ.[4]

And may we not also say with Clement of Alexandria,

μιᾶς τοίνυν οὔσης τῆς ἀληθείας, τὸ γὰρ ψεῦδος μυρίας
ἐκτροπὰς ἔχει, καθάπερ αἱ βάκχαι τὰ τοῦ Πενθέως διαφορήσασαι
μέλη αἱ τῆς φιλοσοφίας τῆς τε βαρβάρου τῆς τε
Ἑλληνικῆς αἱρέσεις, ἑκάστη ὅπερ ἔλαχεν, ὡς πᾶσαν αὐχεῖ
τὴν ἀλήθειαν, φωτὸς δ', οἶμαι, ἀνατολῇ πάντα φωτίζεται.

E. B. C.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: The most remarkable instance of this philosophical
equanimity is that of Váchaspati Miśra, who wrote standard treatises
on each of the six systems except the Vaiśeshika, adopting, of course,
the peculiar point of view of each, and excluding for the time every
alien tenet.]

[Footnote 2: An index of the names of authors and works quoted is
given in Dr. Hall's Bibliographical Catalogue, pp. 162-164, and also
in Professor Aufrecht's Bodleian Catalogue, p. 247.]

[Footnote 3: Śríharsha-charita, p. 204 (Calcutta ed.)]

[Footnote 4: Found in the Mahábh. iii. 17402, with some variations. I
give them as I have heard them from Paṇḍit Rámanáráyaṇa Vidyáratna.]




CONTENTS.

                                                                 Page

    I.    The Chárváka System (E. B. C.)                           2

   II.    The Bauddha System (A. E. G.)                           12

  III.    The Árhata or Jaina System (E. B. C.)                   36

   IV.    The Rámánuja System (A. E. G.)                          64

    V.    The Púrṇa-prajña System (A. E. G.)                      87

   VI.    The Nakulíśa-Páśupata System (A. E. G.)                103

  VII.    The Śaiva System (E. B. C.)                            112

 VIII.    The Pratyabhijñá or Recognitive System (A. E. G.)      128

   IX.    The Raseśvara or Mercurial System (A. E. G.)           137

    X.    The Vaiśeshika or Aulúkya System (E. B. C.)            145

   XI.    The Akshapáda or Nyáya System (E. B. C.)               161

  XII.    The Jaiminíya System (E. B. C.)                        178

 XIII.    The Páṇiníya System (E. B. C.)                         203

  XIV.    The Sáṅkhya System (E. B. C.)                          221

   XV.    The Pátañjala or Yoga System (E. B. C.)                231

  XVI.    The Vedánta or System of Saṃkara Áchárya               273

          APPENDIX--On the Upádhi (E. B. C.)                     275

       *       *       *       *       *




THE SARVA-DARŚANA-SAṄGRAHA.


THE PROLOGUE.


1. I worship Śiva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of
supreme felicity; by whom the earth and the rest were produced, in
_him_ only has this all a maker.

2. Daily I follow my Guru Sarvajña-Vishṇu, who knows all the Ágamas,
the son of Śárṅgapáṇi, who has gone to the further shore of the seas
of all the systems, and has contented the hearts of all mankind by the
proper meaning of the term Soul.

3. The synopsis of all the systems is made by the venerable Mádhava
mighty in power, the Kaustubha-jewel of the milk-ocean of the
fortunate Sáyaṇa.

4. Having thoroughly searched the Śástras of former teachers, very
hard to be crossed, the fortunate Sáyaṇa-Mádhava[5] the lord has
expounded them for the delight of the good. Let the virtuous listen
with a mind from which all envy has been far banished; who finds not
delight in a garland strung of various flowers?

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 5: Dr. A. C. Burnell, in his preface to his edition of the
Vaṃśa-Bráhmaṇa, has solved the riddle of the relation of Mádhava and
Sáyaṇa. Sáyaṇa is a pure Draviḍian name given to a child who is born
after all the elder children have died. Mádhava elsewhere calls Sáyaṇa
his "younger brother," as an allegorical description of his body,
himself being the eternal soul. His use of the term Sáyaṇa-Mádhavaḥ
here (not the dual) seems to prove that the two names represent the
same person. The body seems meant by the Sáyaṇa of the third śloka.
Máyaṇa was the father of Mádhava, and the true reading may be
_śríman-máyaṇa_.]




CHAPTER I.

THE CHÁRVÁKA SYSTEM.


[We have said in our preliminary invocation "salutation to Śiva, the
abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of supreme felicity,"] but
how can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme
felicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Chárváka,
the crest-gem of the atheistical school, the follower of the doctrine
of Bṛihaspati? The efforts of Chárváka are indeed hard to be
eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current
refrain--

    While life is yours, live joyously;
    None can escape Death's searching eye:
    When once this frame of ours they burn,
    How shall it e'er again return?

The mass of men, in accordance with the Śástras of policy and
enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, and
denying the existence of any object belonging to a future world, are
found to follow only the doctrine of Chárváka. Hence another name for
that school is Lokáyata,--a name well accordant with the thing
signified.[6]

In this school the four elements, earth, &c., are the original
principles; from these alone, when transformed into the body,
intelligence is produced, just as the inebriating power is developed
from the mixing of certain ingredients;[7] and when these are
destroyed, intelligence at once perishes also. They quote the Śruti
for this [Bṛihad Áraṇy. Up. ii. 4, 12], "Springing forth from these
elements, itself solid knowledge, it is destroyed when they are
destroyed,--after death no intelligence remains."[8] Therefore the
soul is only the body distinguished by the attribute of intelligence,
since there is no evidence for any soul distinct from the body, as
such cannot be proved, since this school holds that perception is the
only source of knowledge and does not allow inference, &c.

The only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual pleasures. Nor
may you say that such cannot be called the end of man as they are
always mixed with some kind of pain, because it is our wisdom to enjoy
the pure pleasure as far as we can, and to avoid the pain which
inevitably accompanies it; just as the man who desires fish takes the
fish with their scales and bones, and having taken as many as he
wants, desists; or just as the man who desires rice, takes the rice,
straw and all, and having taken as much as he wants, desists. It is
not therefore for us, through a fear of pain, to reject the pleasure
which our nature instinctively recognises as congenial. Men do not
refrain from sowing rice, because forsooth there are wild animals to
devour it; nor do they refuse to set the cooking-pots on the fire,
because forsooth there are beggars to pester us for a share of the
contents. If any one were so timid as to forsake a visible pleasure,
he would indeed be foolish like a beast, as has been said by the
poet--

    The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects,
    Is to be relinquished as accompanied by pain,--such is the reasoning
        of fools;
    The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white grains,
    What man, seeking his true interest, would fling away because covered
        with husk and dust?[9]

If you object that, if there be no such thing as happiness in a future
world, then how should men of experienced wisdom engage in the
agnihotra and other sacrifices, which can only be performed with great
expenditure of money and bodily fatigue, your objection cannot be
accepted as any proof to the contrary, since the agnihotra, &c., are
only useful as means of livelihood, for the Veda is tainted by the
three faults of untruth, self-contradiction, and tautology;[10] then
again the impostors who call themselves Vaidic pundits are mutually
destructive, as the authority of the jñána-káṇḍa is overthrown by
those who maintain that of the karma-káṇḍa, while those who maintain
the authority of the jñána-káṇḍa reject that of the karma-káṇḍa; and
lastly, the three Vedas themselves are only the incoherent rhapsodies
of knaves, and to this effect runs the popular saying--

     The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves,
     and smearing oneself with ashes,--

     Bṛihaspati says, these are but means of livelihood for those
     who have no manliness nor sense.

Hence it follows that there is no other hell than mundane pain
produced by purely mundane causes, as thorns, &c.; the only Supreme is
the earthly monarch whose existence is proved by all the world's
eyesight; and the only Liberation is the dissolution of the body. By
holding the doctrine that the soul is identical with the body, such
phrases as "I am thin," "I am black," &c., are at once intelligible,
as the attributes of thinness, &c., and self-consciousness will reside
in the same subject [the body]; like and the use of the phrase "my
body" is metaphorical "the head of Ráhu" [Ráhu being really _all
head_].

All this has been thus summed up--

    In this school there are four elements, earth, water, fire, and air;
    And from these four elements alone is intelligence produced,--
    Just like the intoxicating power from kiṇwa, &c., mixed together;
    Since in "I am fat," "I am lean," these attributes[11] abide in the
        same subject,
    And since fatness, &c., reside only in the body,[12] it alone is the
        soul and no other,
    And such phrases as "my body" are only significant metaphorically.

"Be it so," says the opponent; "your wish would be gained if
inference, &c., had no force of proof; but then they have this force;
else, if they had not, then how, on perceiving smoke, should the
thoughts of the intelligent immediately proceed to fire; or why, on
hearing another say, 'There are fruits on the bank of the river,' do
those who desire fruit proceed at once to the shore?"

All this, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy.

Those who maintain the authority of inference accept the _sign_ or
middle term as the causer of knowledge, which middle term must be
found in the minor and be itself invariably connected with the
major.[13] Now this invariable connection must be a relation destitute
of any condition accepted or disputed;[14] and this connection does
not possess its power of causing inference by virtue of its
_existence_, as the eye, &c., are the cause of perception, but by
virtue of its being _known_. What then is the means of this
connection's being known?

We will first show that it is not _perception_. Now perception is
held to be of two kinds, external and internal [_i.e._, as produced by
the external senses, or by the inner sense, mind]. The former is not
the required means; for although it is possible that the actual
contact of the senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the
particular object thus brought in contact, yet as there can never be
such contact in the case of the past or the future, the universal
proposition[15] which was to embrace the invariable connection of the
middle and major terms in every case becomes impossible to be known.
Nor may you maintain that this knowledge of the universal proposition
has the general class as its object, because if so, there might arise
a doubt as to the existence of the invariable connection in this
particular case[16] [as, for instance, in this particular smoke as
implying fire].

Nor is internal perception the means, since you cannot establish that
the mind has any power to act independently towards an external
object, since all allow that it is dependent on the external senses,
as has been said by one of the logicians, "The eye, &c., have their
objects as described; but mind externally is dependent on the others."

Nor can _inference_ be the means of the knowledge of the universal
proposition, since in the case of this inference we should also
require another inference to establish it, and so on, and hence would
arise the fallacy of an _ad infinitum_ retrogression.

Nor can _testimony_ be the means thereof, since we may either allege
in reply, in accordance with the Vaiśeshika doctrine of Kaṇáda, that
this is included in the topic of inference; or else we may hold that
this fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier
that stopped the progress of inference, since it depends itself on
the recognition of a _sign_ in the form of the language used in the
child's presence by the old man;[17] and, moreover, there is no more
reason for our believing on another's word that smoke and fire are
invariably connected, than for our receiving the _ipse dixit_ of Manu,
&c. [which, of course, we Chárvákas reject].

And again, if testimony were to be accepted as the only means of the
knowledge of the universal proposition, then in the case of a man to
whom the fact of the invariable connection between the middle and
major terms had not been pointed out by another person, there could be
no inference of one thing [as fire] on seeing another thing [as
smoke]; hence, on your own showing, the whole topic of inference for
oneself[18] would have to end in mere idle words.

Then again _comparison_,[19] &c., must be utterly rejected as the
means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since it is
impossible that they can produce the knowledge of the unconditioned
connection [_i.e._, the universal proposition], because their end is
to produce the knowledge of quite another connection, viz., the
relation of a name to something so named.

Again, this same absence of a condition,[20] which has been given as
the definition of an invariable connection [_i.e._, a universal
proposition], can itself never be known; since it is impossible to
establish that all conditions must be objects of perception; and
therefore, although the absence of perceptible things may be itself
perceptible, the absence of non-perceptible things must be itself
non-perceptible; and thus, since we must here too have recourse to
inference, &c., we cannot leap over the obstacle which has already
been planted to bar them. Again, we must accept as the definition of
the condition, "it is that which is reciprocal or equipollent in
extension[21] with the major term though not constantly accompanying
the middle." These three distinguishing clauses, "not constantly
accompanying the middle term," "constantly accompanying the major
term," and "being constantly accompanied by it" [_i.e._, reciprocal],
are needed in the full definition to stop respectively three such
fallacious conditions, in the argument to prove the non-eternity of
sound, as "being produced," "the nature of a jar," and "the not
causing audition;"[22] wherefore the definition holds,--and again it
is established by the śloka of the great Doctor beginning
_samásama_.[23]

But since the knowledge of the condition must here precede the
knowledge of the condition's absence, it is only when there is the
knowledge of the condition, that the knowledge of the universality of
the proposition is possible, _i.e._, a knowledge in the form of such a
connection between the middle term and major term as is distinguished
by the absence of any such condition; and on the other hand, the
knowledge of the condition depends upon the knowledge of the
invariable connection. Thus we fasten on our opponents as with
adamantine glue the thunderbolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle.
Hence by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a
proposition it becomes impossible to establish inference, &c.[24]

The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke, &c., to the
knowledge of fire, &c., can be accounted for by its being based on a
former perception or by its being an error; and that in some cases
this step is justified by the result, is accidental just like the
coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms,
drugs, &c.

From this it follows that fate, &c.,[25] do not exist, since these can
only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you thus do
not allow adṛishṭa, the various phenomena of the world become
destitute of any cause.

But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena
can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things.
Thus it has been said--

    The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn;
    By whom came this variety? from their own nature was it born.

And all this has been also said by Bṛihaspati--

    There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world,
    Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, &c., produce any real
        effect.
    The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and
        smearing one's self with ashes,
    Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge
        and manliness.
    If a beast slain in the Jyotishṭoma rite will itself go to heaven,
    Why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father?[26]
    If the Śráddha produces gratification to beings who are dead,
    Then here, too, in the case of travellers when they start, it is
        needless to give provisions for the journey.
    If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the Śráddha here,
    Then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the
        housetop?
    While life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even
        though he runs in debt;
    When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again?
    If he who departs from the body goes to another world,
    How is it that he comes not back again, restless for love of his
        kindred?
    Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Brahmans have
        established here
    All these ceremonies for the dead,--there is no other fruit anywhere.
    The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves, and demons.
    All the well-known formulæ of the pandits, jarpharí, turpharí, &c.[27]
    And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in the Aśwamedha,
    These were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of
        presents to the priests,[28]
    While the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by night-prowling
        demons.

Hence in kindness to the mass of living beings must we fly for refuge
to the doctrine of Chárváka. Such is the pleasant consummation.

E. B. C.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 6: "Śaṅkara, Bháskara, and other commentators name the
Lokáyatikas, and these appear to be a branch of the Sect of Chárváka"
(Colebrooke). Lokáyata may be etymologically analysed as "prevalent in
the world" (_loka_ and _áyata_). Laukáyatika occurs in Páṇini's
ukthagaṇa.]

[Footnote 7: _Kiṇwa_ is explained as "drug or seed used to produce
fermentation in the manufacture of spirits from sugar, bassia, &c."
Colebrooke quotes from Śaṅkara: "The faculty of thought results from a
modification of the aggregate elements in like manner as sugar with a
ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor; and as
betel, areca, lime, and extract of catechu chewed together have an
exhilarating property not found in those substances severally."]

[Footnote 8: Of course Śaṅkara, in his commentary, gives a very
different interpretation, applying it to the cessation of individual
existence when the knowledge of the Supreme is once attained. Cf.
Śabara's Comm. Jaimini Sút., i. i. 5.]

[Footnote 9: I take _kaṇa_ as here equal to the Bengali _kunṛ_. Cf.
Atharva-V., xi. 3, 5. _Aśváḥ kaṇá gávas taṇḍulá maśakás tusháḥ._]

[Footnote 10: See Nyáya Sútras, ii. 57.]

[Footnote 11: _I.e._, personality and fatness, &c.]

[Footnote 12: I read _dehe_ for _dehaḥ_.]

[Footnote 13: Literally, "must be an attribute of the subject and have
invariable concomitance (_vyápti_)."]

[Footnote 14: For the _sandigdha_ and _niśchita upádhi_ see Siddhánta
Muktávali, p. 125. The former is accepted only by one party.]

[Footnote 15: Literally, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance
(as of smoke by fire).]

[Footnote 16: The attributes of the class are not always found in
every member,--thus idiots are men, though man is a rational animal;
and again, this particular smoke might be a sign of a fire in some
other place.]

[Footnote 17: See Sáhitya Darpaṇa (Ballantyne's trans. p. 16), and
Siddhánta-M., p. 80.]

[Footnote 18: The properly logical, as distinguished from the
rhetorical, argument.]

[Footnote 19: "_Upamána_ or the knowledge of a similarity is the
instrument in the production of an inference from similarity. This
particular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a
name to something so named." Ballantyne's Tarka Sangraha.]

[Footnote 20: The upádhi is the condition which must be supplied to
restrict a too general middle term, as in the inference "the mountain
has smoke because it has fire," if we add wet fuel as the condition of
the fire, the middle term will be no longer too general. In the case
of a true vyápti, there is, of course, no upádhi.]

[Footnote 21: 'Αντιστρἑφει (Pr. Anal., ii. 25). We have here our A
with distributed predicate.]

[Footnote 22: If we omitted the first clause, and only made the upádhi
"that which constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly
accompanied by it," then in the Naiyáyika argument "sound is
non-eternal, because it has the nature of sound," "being produced"
would serve as a Mímáṃsaka upádhi, to establish the _vyabhichára_
fallacy, as it is reciprocal with "non-eternal;" but the omitted
clause excludes it, as an upádhi must be consistent with _either_
party's opinions, and, of course, the Naiyáyika maintains that "being
produced" _always_ accompanies the class of sound. Similarly, if we
defined the upádhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term and
constantly accompanied by the major," we might have as an upádhi "the
nature of a jar," as this is never found with the middle term (the
class or nature of sound only residing in sound, and that of a jar
only in a jar), while, at the same time, wherever the class of jar is
found there is also found non-eternity. Lastly, if we defined the
upádhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term, and constantly
accompanying the major," we might have as a Mímáṃsaka upádhi "the not
causing audition," _i.e._, the not being apprehended by the organs of
hearing; but this is excluded, as non-eternity is not always found
where this is, ether being inaudible and yet eternal.]

[Footnote 23: This refers to an obscure śloka of Udayanáchárya, "where
a reciprocal and a non-reciprocal universal connection (_i.e._,
universal propositions which severally do and do not distribute their
predicates) relate to the same argument (as _e.g._, to prove the
existence of smoke), there that non-reciprocating term of the second
will be a fallacious middle, which is not invariably accompanied by
the other reciprocal of the first." Thus "the mountain has smoke
because it has fire" (here fire and smoke are non-reciprocating, as
fire is not found invariably accompanied by smoke though smoke is by
fire), or "because it has fire from wet fuel" (smoke and fire from wet
fuel being reciprocal and always accompanying each other); the
non-reciprocating term of the former (fire) will give a fallacious
inference, because it is also, of course, not invariably accompanied
by the special kind of fire, that produced from wet fuel. But this
will not be the case where the non-reciprocating term _is_ thus
invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal, as "the mountain has
fire because it has smoke;" here, though fire and smoke do not
reciprocate, yet smoke will be a true middle, because it is invariably
accompanied by heat, which is the reciprocal of fire. I wish to add
here, once for all, that I own my explanation of this, as well as many
another, difficulty in the Sarva-darśana-śaṅgraha to my old friend and
teacher, Paṇḍit Maheśa Chandra Nyáyaratna, of the Calcutta Sanskrit
College.]

[Footnote 24: Cf. Sextus Empiricus, P. Hyp. ii. In the chapter on the
Buddhist system _infra_, we have an attempt to establish the authority
of the universal proposition from the relation of cause and effect or
genus and species.]

[Footnote 25: _Adṛishṭa_, _i.e._, the merit and demerit in our actions
which produce their effects in future births.]

[Footnote 26: This is an old Buddhist retort. See Burnouf, Introd., p.
209.]

[Footnote 27: Rig-Veda, x. 106. For the Aśwamedha rites, see Wilson's
Rig-Veda, Preface, vol. ii. p. xiii.]

[Footnote 28: Or this may mean "and all the various other things to be
handled in the rites."]




CHAPTER II.

THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM.


At this point the Buddhists remark: As for what you (Chárvákas) laid
down as to the difficulty of ascertaining invariable concomitance,
your position is unacceptable, inasmuch as invariable concomitance is
easily cognisable by means of identity and causality. It has
accordingly been said--

     "From the relation of cause and effect, or from identity as
     a determinant, results a law of invariable concomitance--not
     through the mere observation of the desired result in
     similar cases, nor through the non-observation of it in
     dissimilar cases."[29]

On the hypothesis (of the Naiyáyikas) that it is concomitance and
non-concomitance (_e.g._, A is where B is, A is not where B is not)
that determine an invariable connection, the unconditional attendance
of the major or the middle term would be unascertainable, it being
impossible to exclude all doubt with regard to instances past and
future, and present but unperceived. If one (a Naiyáyika) rejoin that
uncertainty in regard to such instances is equally inevitable on our
system, we reply: Say not so, for such a supposition as that an effect
may be produced without any cause would destroy itself by putting a
stop to activity of any kind; for such doubts alone are to be
entertained, the entertainment of which does not implicate us in
practical absurdity and the like, as it has been said, "Doubt
terminates where there is a practical absurdity."[30]

1. By ascertainment of an effectuation, then, of that (viz., of the
designate of the middle) is ascertained the invariable concomitance
(of the major); and the ascertainment of such effectuation may arise
from the well-known series of five causes, in the perceptive cognition
or non-cognition of cause and effect. That fire and smoke, for
instance, stand in the relation of cause and effect is ascertained by
five indications, viz., (1.) That an effect is not cognised prior to
its effectuation, that (2.) the cause being perceived (3.) the effect
is perceived, and that after the effect is cognised (4.) there is its
non-cognition, (5.) when the (material) cause is no longer cognised.

2. In like manner an invariable concomitance is ascertained by the
ascertainment of identity (_e.g._, a sisu-tree is a tree, or wherever
we observe the attributes of a sisu we observe also the attribute
arboreity), an absurdity attaching to the contrary opinion, inasmuch
as if a sisu-tree should lose its arboreity it would lose its own
self. But, on the other hand, where there exists no absurdity, and
where a (mere) concomitance is again and again observed, who can
exclude all doubt of failure in the concomitance? An ascertainment of
the identity of sisu and tree is competent in virtue of the reference
to the same object (_i.e._, predication),--This tree is a sisu. For
reference to the same object (predication) is not competent where
there is no difference whatever (_e.g._, to say, "A jar is a jar," is
no combination of diverse attributes in a common subject), because the
two terms cannot, as being synonymous, be simultaneously employed; nor
can reference to the same object take place where there is a
reciprocal exclusion (of the two terms), inasmuch as we never find,
for instance, horse and cow predicated the one of the other.

It has thus been evinced that an effect or a self-same supposes a
cause or a self-same (as invariable concomitants).

If a man does not allow that inference is a form of evidence,
_pramáṇa_, one may reply: You merely assert thus much, that inference
is not a form of evidence: do you allege no proof of this, or do you
allege any? The former alternative is not allowable according to the
maxim that bare assertion is no proof of the matter asserted. Nor is
the latter alternative any better, for if while you assert that
inference is no form of evidence, you produce some truncated argument
(to prove, _i.e._, infer, that it is none), you will be involved in an
absurdity, just as if you asserted your own mother to be barren.
Besides, when you affirm that the establishment of a form of evidence
and of the corresponding fallacious evidence results from their
homogeneity, you yourself admit induction by identity. Again, when you
affirm that the dissentiency of others is known by the symbolism of
words, you yourself allow induction by causality. When you deny the
existence of any object on the ground of its not being perceived, you
yourself admit an inference of which non-perception is the middle
term. Conformably it has been said by Tathágata--

     "The admission of a form of evidence in general results from
     its being present to the understanding of others.

     "The existence of a form of evidence also follows from its
     negation by a certain person."

All this has been fully handled by great authorities; and we desist
for fear of an undue enlargement of our treatise.

These same Bauddhas discuss the highest end of man from four
standpoints. Celebrated under the designations of Mádhyamika,
Yogáchára, Sautrántika, and Vaibháshika, these Buddhists adopt
respectively the doctrines of a universal void (nihilism), an external
void (subjective idealism), the inferribility of external objects
(representationism), and the perceptibility of external objects
(presentationism).[31] Though the venerated Buddha be the only one
teacher (his disciples) are fourfold in consequence of this diversity
of views; just as when one has said, "The sun has set," the adulterer,
the thief, the divinity student, and others understand that it is time
to set about their assignations, their theft, their religious duties,
and so forth, according to their several inclinations.

It is to be borne in mind that four points of view have been laid out,
viz., (1.) All is momentary, momentary; (2.) all is pain, pain; (3.)
all is like itself alone; (4.) all is void, void.

Of these points of view, the momentariness of fleeting things, blue
and so forth (_i.e._, whatever be their quality), is to be inferred
from their existence; thus, whatever _is_ is momentary (or fluxional)
like a bank of clouds, and all these things _are_.[32] Nor may any one
object that the middle term (existence) is unestablished; for an
existence consisting of practical efficiency is established by
perception to belong to the blue and other momentary things; and the
exclusion of existence from that which is not momentary is
established, provided that we exclude from it the non-momentary
succession and simultaneity, according to the rule that exclusion of
the continent is exclusion of the contained. Now this practical
efficiency (here identified with existence) is contained under
succession and simultaneity, and no medium is possible between
succession and non-succession (or simultaneity); there being a
manifest absurdity in thinking otherwise, according to the rule--

     "In a reciprocal contradiction there exists no ulterior
     alternative;

     "Nor is their unity in contradictories, there being a
     repugnance in the very statement."[33]

And this succession and simultaneity being excluded from the permanent,
and also excluding from the permanent all practical efficiency, determine
existence of the alternative of momentariness.--Q.E.D.

Perhaps some one may ask: Why may not practical efficiency reside in
the non-fluxional (or permanent)? If so, this is wrong, as obnoxious
to the following dilemma. Has your "permanent" a power of past and
future practical efficiency during its exertion of present practical
efficiency or no? On the former alternative (if it has such power), it
cannot evacuate such past and future efficiency, because we cannot
deny that it has power, and because we infer the consequence, that
which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at that
time, as, for instance, a complement of causes, and this entity is
thus powerful. On the latter alternative (if the permanent has no such
power of past and future agency), it will never do anything, because
practical efficiency results from power only; what at any time does
not do anything, that at that time is unable to do it, as, for
instance, a piece of stone does not produce a germ; and this entity
while exerting its present practical efficiency, does not exert its
past and future practical efficiency. Such is the contradiction.

You will perhaps rejoin: By assuming successive subsidiaries, there
is competent to the permanent entity a successive exertion of past and
future practical efficiency. If so, we would ask you to explain: Do
the subsidiaries assist the entity or not? If they do not, they are
not required; for if they do nothing, they can have nothing to do with
the successive exertion. If they do assist the thing, is this
assistance (or supplementation) other than the thing or not? If it is
other than the thing, then this adscititious (assistance) is the
cause, and the non-momentary entity is not the cause: for the effect
will then follow, by concomitance and non-concomitance, the
adventitious supplementation. Thus it has been said:

     "What have rain and shine to do with the soul? Their effect
     is on the skin of man;

     "If the soul were like the skin, it would be non-permanent;
     and if the skin were like the soul, there could be no effect
     produced upon it."

Perhaps you will say: The entity produces its effect, _together with_
its subsidiaries. Well, then (we reply), let the entity not give up
its subsidiaries, but rather tie them lest they fly with a rope round
their neck, and so produce the effect which it has to produce, and
without forfeiting its own proper nature. Besides (we continue), does
the additament (or supplementation) constituted by the subsidiaries
give rise to another additament or not? In either case the
afore-mentioned objections will come down upon you like a shower of
stones. On the alternative that the additament takes on another
additament, you will be embarrassed by a many-sided regress _in
infinitum_. If when the additament is to be generated another
auxiliary (or additament) be required, there will ensue an endless
series of such additaments: this must be confessed to be one infinite
regress. For example, let a seed be granted to be productive when an
additament is given, consisting of a complement of objects such as
water, wind, and the like, as subsidiaries; otherwise an additament
would be manifested without subsidiaries. Now the seed in taking on
the additament takes it on with the need of (ulterior) subsidiaries;
otherwise, as there would always be subsidiaries, it would follow that
a germ would always be arising from the seed. We shall now have to add
to the seed another supplementation by subsidiaries themselves
requiring an additament. If when this additament is given, the seed be
productive only on condition of subsidiaries as before, there will be
established an infinite regression of additaments to (or
supplementations of) the seed, to be afforded by the subsidiaries.

Again, we ask, does the supplementation required for the production of
the effect produce its effect independently of the seed and the like,
or does it require the seed and the like? On the first alternative (if
the supplementation works independently), it would ensue that the seed
is in no way a cause. On the second (if the supplementation require
the seed), the seed, or whatever it may be that is thus required, must
take on a supplementation or additament, and thus there will be over
and over again an endless series of additaments added to the
additament constituted by the seed; and thus a second infinite
regression is firmly set up.

In like manner the subsidiary which is required will add another
subsidiary to the seed, or whatever it may be that is the subject of
the additions, and thus there will be an endless succession of
additaments added to the additaments to the seed which is supplemented
by the subsidiaries; and so a third infinite regression will add to
your embarrassment.

Now (or the other grand alternative), let it be granted that a
supplementation identical with the entity (the seed, or whatever it
may be) is taken on. If so, the former entity, that _minus_ the
supplementation, is no more, and a new entity identical with the
supplementation, and designated (in the technology of Buddhism)
_kurvad rúpa_ (or effect-producing object), comes into being: and thus
the tree of my desires (my doctrine of a universal flux) has borne
its fruit.

Practical efficiency, therefore, in the non-momentary is inadmissible.
Nor is practical efficiency possible apart from succession in time;
for such a possibility is redargued by the following dilemma. Is this
(permanent) entity (which you contend for) able to produce all its
effects simultaneously, or does it continue to exist after production
of effects? On the former alternative, it will result that the entity
will produce its effects just as much at one time as at another; on
the second alternative, the expectation of its permanency is as
reasonable as expecting seed eaten by a mouse to germinate.

That to which contrary determinations are attributed is diverse, as
heat and cold; but this thing is determined by contrary attributions.
Such is the argumentation applied to the cloud (to prove that it has
not a permanent but a fluxional existence). Nor is the middle term
disallowable, for possession and privation of power and impotence are
allowed in regard to the permanent (which you assert) at different
times. The concomitance and non-concomitance already described (viz.,
That which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at
that time, and What at any time does not do anything, that at that
time is unable to do it) are affirmed (by us) to prove the existence
of such power. The negative rule is: What at any time is unable to
produce anything, that at that time does not produce it, as a piece of
stone, for example, does not produce a germ; and this entity (the
seed, or whatever it may be), while exerting a present practical
efficiency, is incapable of past and future practical efficiencies.
The contradiction violating this rule is: What at any time does
anything, that at that time is able to do that thing, as a complement
of causes is able to produce its effect; and this (permanent) entity
exerts at time past and time future the practical efficiencies proper
to those times.

(To recapitulate.) Existence is restricted to the momentary; there
being observed in regard to existence a negative rule, that in regard
to permanent succession and simultaneity being excluded, existence
which contains succession and simultaneity is not cognisable; and
there being observed in regard to existence a positive rule, in virtue
of a concomitance observed (viz., that the existent is accompanied or
"pervaded" by the momentary), and in virtue of a non-concomitance
observed (viz., that the non-momentary is accompanied or "pervaded" by
the non-existent). Therefore it has been said by Jñána-śrí--

     "What is is momentary, as a cloud, and as these existent
     things;

     "The power of existence is relative to practical efficiency,
     and belongs to the ideal; but this power exists not as
     eternal in things eternal (ether, &c.);

     "Nor is there only one form, otherwise one thing could do
     the work of another;

     "For two reasons, therefore (viz., succession and
     simultaneity), a momentary flux is congruous and remains
     true in regard to that which we have to prove."

Nor is it to be held, in acceptance of the hypothesis of the
Vaiśeshikas and Naiyáyikas, that existence is a participation in the
universal form existence; for were this the case, universality,
particularity, and co-inhesion (which do not participate in the
universal) could have no existence.

Nor is the ascription of existence to universality, particularity, and
co-inhesion dependent on any _sui generis_ existence of their own; for
such an hypothesis is operose, requiring too many _sui generis_
existences. Moreover, the existence of any universal is disproved by a
dilemma regarding the presence or non-presence (of the one in the
many); and there is not presented to us any one form running through
all the diverse momentary things, mustard-seeds, mountains, and so
forth, like the string running through the gems strung upon it.
Moreover (we would ask), is the universal omnipresent or present
everywhere in its subjicible subjects? If it is everywhere, all things
in the universe will be confounded together (chaos will be eternal),
and you will be involved in a tenet you reject, since Praśasta-páda
has said, "Present in all its subjects." Again (if the universal is
present only in its proper subjects), does the universal (the nature
of a jar) residing in an already existing jar, on being attached to
another jar now in making, come from the one to attach itself to the
other, or not come from it? On the first alternative (if it comes),
the universal must be a substance (for substances alone underlie
qualities and motions); whereas, if it does not come, it cannot attach
itself to the new jar. Again (we ask), when the jar ceases to exist,
does the universal outlast it, or cease to exist, or go to another
place? On the first supposition it will exist without a subject to
inhere in; on the second, it will be improper to call it eternal (as
you do); on the third, it will follow that it is a substance (or base
of qualities and motions). Destroyed as it is by the malign influence
of these and the like objections, the universal is unauthenticated.

Conformably it has been said--

     "Great is the dexterity of that which, existing in one
     place, engages without moving from that place in producing
     itself in another place.

     "This entity (universality) is not connected with that
     wherein it resides, and yet pervades that which occupies
     that place: great is this miracle.

     "It goes not away, nor was it there, nor is it subsequently
     divided, it quits not its former repository: what a series
     of difficulties!"

If you ask: On what does the assurance that the one exists in the many
rest? You must be satisfied with the reply that we concede it to
repose on difference from that which is different (or exclusion of
heterogeneity). We dismiss further prolixity.

That all transmigratory existence is identical with pain is the common
verdict of all the founders of institutes, else they would not be
found desirous to put a stop to it and engaging in the method for
bringing it to an end. We must, therefore, bear in mind that all is
pain, and pain alone.

If you object: When it is asked, like what? you must quote an
instance,--we reply: Not so, for momentary objects self-characterised
being momentary, have no common characters, and therefore it is
impossible to say that this is like that. We must therefore hold that
all is like itself alone, like itself alone.

In like manner we must hold that all is void, and void alone. For we
are conscious of a determinate negation. This silver or the like has
not been seen by me in sleeping or waking. If what is seen were
(really) existent, then reality would pertain to the corresponding act
of vision, to the (nacre, &c.), which is the basis of its particular
nature (or haecceity), to the silver, &c., illusorily superposed upon
that basis, to the connection between them, to the co-inherence, and
so forth: a supposition not entertained by any disputant. Nor is a
semi-effete existence admissible. No one imagines that one-half of a
fowl may be set apart for cooking, and the other half for laying eggs.
The venerated Buddha, then, having taught that of the illusorily
superposed (silver, &c.), the basis (nacre, &c.), the connection
between them, the act of vision, and the _videns_, if one or more be
unreal it will perforce ensue that all are unreal, all being equally
objects of the negation; the Mádhyamikas excellently wise explain as
follows, viz., that the doctrine of Buddha terminates in that of a
total void (universal baselessness or nihilism) by a slow progression
like the intrusive steps of a mendicant, through the position of a
momentary flux, and through the (gradual) negation of the illusory
assurances of pleasurable sensibility, of universality, and of
reality.

The ultimate principle, then, is a void emancipated from four
alternatives, viz., from reality, from unreality, from both (reality
and unreality), and from neither (reality nor unreality). To exemplify
this: If real existence were the nature of a water-pot and the like,
the activity of its maker (the potter) would be superfluous.

If non-existence be its nature the same objection will accrue; as it
is said--

     "Necessity of a cause befits not the existent, ether and the
     like, for instance;

     "No cause is efficacious of a non-existent effect, flowers
     of the sky and the like, for instance."

The two remaining alternatives, as self-contradictory, are
inadmissible. It has accordingly been laid down by the venerated
Buddha in the Alaṅkárávatára[34]--

     "Of things discriminated by intellect, no nature is
     ascertained;[35]

     "Those things are therefore shown to be inexplicable and
     natureless."

And again--

     "This matter perforce results, which the wise declare, No
     sooner are objects thought than they are dissipated."

That is to say, the objects are not determined by any one of the four
alternatives. Hence it is that it has been said--

     "A religious mendicant, an amorous man, and a dog have three
     views of a woman's person, respectively that it is a
     carcass, that it is a mistress, and that it is a prey."

In consequence, then, of these four points of view, when all ideas are
come to an end, final extinction, which is a void, will result.
Accordingly we have overtaken our end, and there is nothing to be
taught to us. There consequently remain only two duties to the
student--interrogation and acceptance. Of these, interrogation is the
putting of questions in order to attain knowledge not yet attained.
Acceptance is assent to the matters stated by the sacred teacher.
These (Bauddha nihilists) are excellent in assenting to that which the
religious teacher enounces, and defective in interrogation, whence
their conventional designation of Mádhyamikas (or mediocre).

Certain other Buddhists are styled Yogácháras, because while they
accept the four points of view proclaimed by the spiritual guide, and
the void of external things, they make the interrogation: Why has a
void of the internal (or baselessness of mental phenomena) been
admitted? For their technology is as follows:--Self-subsistent
cognition must be allowed, or it will follow that the whole universe
is blind. It has conformably been proclaimed by Dharmakírti: "To one
who disallows perception the vision of objects is not competent."

An external _percipibile_ is not admissible in consequence of the
following dilemma. Does the object cognitively apprehensible arise
from an entity or not? It does not result from an entity, for that
which is generated has no permanence. Nor is it non-resultant, for
what has not come into being is non-existent. Or (we may proceed) do
you hold that a past object is cognitively apprehensible, as begetting
cognition? If so, this is childish nonsense, because it conflicts with
the apparent presentness of the object, and because on such a
supposition the sense organs (and other imperceptible things) might be
apprehended. Further (we ask), Is the _percipibile_ a simple atom or a
complex body? The latter it cannot be, this alternative being ejected
by the dilemma as to whether part or whole is perceived. The former
alternative is equally impossible, an atom being supersensible, and it
not being able to combine simultaneously with six others; as it has
been said--

     "If an atom could simultaneously combine with six, it would
     have six surfaces;

     "And each of these being taken separately, there would be a
     body of atomic dimension."

Intellect, therefore, as having no other _percipibile_ but itself, is
shown to be itself its own _percipibile_, self-subsistent, luminous
with its own light, like light. Therefore it has been said--

     "There is naught to be objectified by intellect; there is no
     cognition ulterior thereto;

     "There being no distinction between percept and percipient,
     intellect shines forth of itself alone."

The identity of percipient and percept is inferrible, thus: That which
is cognised by any cognition is not other than that cognition, as
soul, for instance, is not other than the cognition of soul; and blue
and other momentary objects are cognised by cognitions. For if there
were a difference (between percept and percipient), the object could
not now have any connection with the cognition, there being no
identity to determine a constancy of connection, and nothing to
determine the rise of such a connection. As for the appearance of an
interval between the object and subject consciousnesses, this is an
illusion, like the appearance of two moons when there is only one. The
cause of this illusion is ideation of difference in a stream without
beginning and without interruption; as it has been said--

     "As invariably cognised together, the blue object and the
     cognition thereof are identical;

     "And the difference should be accounted for by illusory
     cognitions, as in the example of the single moon."

And again--

     "Though there is no division, the soul or intellect, by
     reason of illusory perceptions,

     "Appears to possess a duality of cognitions, of percepts and
     of percipient."

Nor must it be supposed that (on this hypothesis) the juice, the
energy, and the digestion derivable from an imaginary and an actual
sweetmeat will be the same; for it cannot be questioned that though
the intellect be in strictness exempt from the modes of object and
subject, yet there is competent to it a practical distinction in
virtue of the succession of illusory ideas without beginning, by
reason of its possessing diverse modes percept and percipient,
conformably to its illusory supposition of practical agency, just as
to those whose eyes are dim with some morbid affection a hair and
another minute object may appear either diverse or identical; as it
has been said--

     "As the intellect, not having object and subject modes,
     appears, by reason of illusory cognitions,

     "Illuded with the diverse forms of perception, percept and
     percipient;

     "So when the intellect has posited a diversity, as in the
     example of the differences of the cognition of a hair and
     the like,

     "Then it is not to be doubted that it is characterised as
     percipient and percept."

Thus it has been evinced that intellect, as affected by beginningless
ideation, manifests itself under diverse forms.

When, therefore, by constancy of reflection (on the four points of
view) aforesaid, all ideation has been interrupted, there arises
knowledge purged from the illusions which take the form of objects,
such illusions being now melted away; and this is technically called
_Mahodaya_ (the grand exaltation, emancipation).

Others again (the Sautrántikas) hold that the position that there is
no external world is untenable, as wanting evidence. Nor (they
contend) can it be maintained that invariability of simultaneous
cognition is an evidence, for this simultaneous cognition which you
accept as proof of the identity of subject and object is indecisive,
being found in dubious and in contrary instances. If you rejoin (they
proceed): Let there be a proof of this identity, and let this proof be
invariability of simultaneous cognition,--we refuse this, because
inasmuch as cognition must ultimately have some object, it is
manifested in duality, and because such invariability of simultaneity
as to time and place is impossible. Moreover (they continue), if the
object, blue or whatever it be, were only a form of cognition, it
should be presented as _Ego_, not as _Hoc aliquid_, because the
cognition and the object would be identical. Perhaps you will say: A
blue form consisting of cognition is illusorily presented as external
and as other than self, and consequently the Ego is not suggested; and
so it has been said--

     "This side of knowledge which appears external to the other
     portion,

     "This appearance of duality in the unity of cognition is an
     illusion."

And again--

     "The principle to be known as internal also manifests itself
     as if it were external."

To this we reply (say the Sautrántikas): This is untenable, for if
there be no external objects, there being no genesis of such, the
comparison "as if they were external" is illegitimate. No man in his
senses would say, "Vasumitra looks like the son of a childless
mother." Again, if the manifestation of identity be proved by the
illusoriness of the presentment of duality, and the presentment of
duality be proved illusory by the manifestation of identity, you are
involved in a logical circle. Without controversy we observe that
cognitions take external things, blue or whatever they may be, as
their objects, and do not take merely internal modifications as such,
and we see that men in their everyday life overlook their internal
states. Thus this argument which you adduce to prove that there is
difference between subject and object, turns out a mere absurdity,
like milky food made of cow-dung. When then you say "as if it were
external," you must already suppose an external _percipibile_, and
your own arrow will return upon you and wound you.

If any one object that the externality of an object synchronous with
the cognition is inadmissible, we (Sautrántikas) reply that this
objection is inadmissible, inasmuch as the subject in juxtaposition to
the sensory imposes its form upon the cognition then in production,
and the object is inferrible from the form thus imposed. The
interrogation and response on this point have been thus summarised--

     "If it be asked, How can there be a past _percipibile_? They
     recognise perceptibility,

     "And a competent inferribility of the individual thing is
     its imposition of its form."

To exemplify. As nourishment is inferred from a thriving look, as
nationality is inferred from language, and as affection is inferred
from flurried movements, so from the form of knowledge a knowable may
be inferred. Therefore it has been said--

     "With half (of itself) the object moulds (the cognition)
     without losing the nature of a half;

     "The evidence, therefore, of the recognition of a knowable
     is the nature of the knowable."

For consciousness of the cognition cannot be the being of the
cognition, for this consciousness is everywhere alike, and if
indifference were to attach itself to this, it would reduce all things
to indifference. Accordingly the formal argument for the existence of
external things: Those things which while a thing exists appear only
at times, all depend upon something else than that thing; as, for
instance, if I do not wish to speak or to walk, presentments of
speaking or walking must suppose others desirous of speaking or
walking; and in like manner the presentments of activity under
discussion, while there exists the recognition of a subject of them,
are only at times manifested as blue and so forth. Of these, the
recognition of a subject is the presentation of the Ego, the
manifestation as blue and so forth is a presentment of activity, as
it has been said--

     "That is a recognition of a subject which is conversant
     about the Ego:

     "That is a presentment of activity which manifests blue and
     the rest."

Over and above, therefore, the complement of subject-recognitions, let
it be understood that there is an external object world perceptible,
which is the cause of presentments of activity; and that this external
world does not rise into being only from time to time on occasion of
presentments resulting from ideation.

According to the view of the Sensationalists (_vijñánavádin_),
ideation is a power of generating such and such sensations (or
presentments of activity) in subject-recognitions which exist as a
single stream. The maturescence of this power is its readiness to
produce its effect; of this the result is a presentment (or
sensation); the antecedent momentary object (sensation) in the mental
train is accepted as the cause, no other mental train being admitted
to exercise such causality. It must therefore be stated that all
momentary objects (fleeting sensations) in the subject-consciousness
are alike able to bring about that maturescence of ideation in the
subject-consciousness, which maturescence is productive of
presentments of activity. If any one (of these fleeting sensations)
had not this power, none would possess it, all existing alike in the
stream of subject-recognitions. On the supposition that they all have
this power, the effects cannot be diversified, and therefore any
intelligent man, however unwilling, if he has a clear understanding,
must decide, without putting out of sight the testimony of his
consciousness, that to account for the occasional nature (of sense
percepts) the six cognitions of sound, touch, colour, taste, and
smell, of pleasure, and so forth, are produced on occasion of four
conditions. These four conditions are known as (1.) the data, (2.) the
suggestion, (3.) the medium, and (4.) the dominant (organ). Of these,
the form of blue or the like arises from the condition of blue data in
the understanding in which there is a manifestation of blue or the
like, which manifestation is styled a cognition. The resuscitation of
forms or cognitions arises from suggestion as a condition. The
restriction to the apprehension of this or that object arises from the
medium, light, for instance, as a condition, and from the dominant,
the eye, for example, as another condition. The eye, as determinant of
one particular cognition (form) where taste, &c., might have been
equally cognised, is able to become dominant; for in everyday life he
who determines is regarded as dominant. We must thus recognise four
causes of pleasure and the rest which constitute the understanding and
its modifications.

So also the universe, which consists of mind and its modifications, is
of five kinds, entitled (1.) the sensational, (2.) the perceptional,
(3.) the affectional, (4.) the verbal, and (5.) the impressional. Of
these, the sensible world (_rúpa-skandha_) is the sense organs and
their objects, according to the etymology, viz., that objects are
discriminated (_rúpyante_) by these. The perceptional world is the
stream of subject-recognitions and of presentments of activity. The
affectional world is the stream of feelings of pleasure and pain
generated by the two aforesaid worlds. The verbal (or symbolical)
world is the stream of cognitions conversant about words--the words
"cow," and so forth. The impressional world is the miseries, as
desire, aversion, &c., caused by the affectional world, the lesser
miseries, as conceit, pride, &c., and merit and demerit.

Reflecting, therefore, that this universe is pain, an abode of pain,
and an instrument of pain, a man should acquire a knowledge of the
principles, the method of suppressing this pain. Hence it has been
said--

     "The principles sanctioned by Buddha are to the saint the
     four methods of suppressing the aggregate of pain."[36]

In these words the sense of pain is known to every one; the
"aggregate" means the cause of pain. This aggregate is twofold, as
(1.) determined by concurrence; or (2.) determined by causation. Of
these, there is an aphorism comprising the aggregate determined by
concurrence, "which other causes resort to this effect;" the condition
of these causes thus proceeding is concurrence; the concurrence of
causes is the result of this only, and not of any conscious
being,--such is the meaning of the aphorism. To exemplify this. A
germ, caused by a seed, is generated by the concurrence of six
elements. Of these, earth as an element produces hardness and smell in
the germ; water as an element produces viscidity and moisture; light
as an element produces colour and warmth; air as an element produces
touch and motion; ether as an element produces expansion and sound;
the season as an element produces a fitting soil, &c. The aphorism
comprising the aggregate determined by causation is: "With the
Tathágatas the nature of these conditions is fixed by production, or
by non-production; there is continuance as a condition, and
determination by a condition, and conformity of the production to the
cause;" that is to say, according to the doctrine of the Tathágata
Buddhas, the nature of these conditions, that is, the causal relation
between the cause and effect, results from production or from
non-production. That which comes into being, provided that something
exists, is the effect of that as its cause; such is the explanation of
the nature (or causal relation). Continuance as a condition is where
the effect is not found without its cause. The (abstract) affix _tal_
(in the word _sthititā_) has the sense of the concrete. Determination
by a condition is the determination of the effect by the cause. Here
some one might interpose the remark that the relation of cause and
effect cannot exist apart from some conscious agent. For this reason
it is added that there existing a cause, conformity of the genesis to
that cause is the nature which is fixed in conditions (that is, in
causes and effects); and in all this no intelligent designer is
observed.[37] To illustrate this, the causal determination of a
genesis to be gone through is as follows:--From the seed the germ,
from the germ the stalk, from the stalk the hollow stem, from the
hollow stem the bud, from the bud the spicules, from the spicules the
blossom, from the blossom the fruit. In this external aggregate
neither the cause, the seed and the rest, nor the effect, the germ and
the rest, has any consciousness of bringing a germ into being, or of
being brought into being by the seed. In like manner in mental facts
two causes are to be recognised. There is a whole ocean of scientific
matter before us, but we desist, apprehensive of making our treatise
unduly prolix.

Emancipation is the suppression of these two causal aggregates, or the
rise of pure cognition subsequent to such suppression. The method
(path, road) is the mode of suppressing them. And this method is the
knowledge of the principles, and this knowledge accrues from former
ideas. Such is the highest mystery. The name Sautrántika arose from
the fact that the venerated Buddha said to certain of his disciples
who asked what was the ultimate purport (_anta_) of the aphorism
(_sútra_), "As you have inquired the final purport of the aphorism, be
Sautrántikas."

Certain Bauddhas, though there exist the external world, consisting of
odours, &c., and the internal, consisting of colours, &c., in order to
produce unbelief in these, declared the universe to be a void. These the
venerated Buddha styled Práthamika (primary) disciples. A second school,
attached to the apprehension of sensations only, maintain that sensation
is the only reality. A third school, who contend that both are true (the
internal and the external), and maintain that sensible objects are
inferrible. Others hold all this to be absurd language (_viruddhá
bháshá_), and are known under the designation of Vaibháshikas. Their
technical language springs up as follows:--According to the doctrine of
inferrible sensibles, there being no perceptible object, and consequently
no object from which a universal rule can be attained, it will be
impossible that any illation should take place, and therefore a
contradiction will emerge to the consciousness of all mankind. Objects,
therefore, are of two kinds, sensible and cogitable. Of these apprehension
is a non-discriminative instrument of knowledge as other than mere
representation; cognition which is discriminative is not a form of
evidence, as being a merely ideal cognition. Therefore it has been said--

     "Apprehension, exempt from ideality and not illusory, is
     non-discriminative. Discrimination, as resulting from the
     appearances of things, is without controversy an illusion.

     "The perceptible evidence of things is perception: if it
     were aught else,

     "There could neither be things, nor evidence of things
     derived from verbal communication, inference, or sense."

Here some one may say: If discriminative cognition be unauthentic, how
is the apprehension of real objects by one energising thereon and the
universal consentiency of mankind to be accounted for? Let it be
replied: This question does not concern us, for these may be accounted
for by the possibility of an indirect apprehension of objects, just as
if we suppose the light of a gem to be a gem (we may yet handle the
gem, because it underlies the light, while if we were to take nacre
for silver, we could not lay hold of any silver). The rest has been
fully discussed in describing the Sautrántikas (cf. p. 27), and
therefore need not here be further detailed.

It should not be contended that a diversity of instruction according
to the disciples' modes of thought is not traditional (or orthodox);
for it is said in the gloss on the Bodha-chitta--

     "The instructions of the leader of mankind (Buddha)
     accommodating themselves to the character and disposition
     (of those who are to be taught),

     "Are said to be diverse in many ways, according to a
     plurality of methods.

     "For as deep or superficial, and sometimes both deep and
     superficial,

     "Instructions are diverse, and diverse is the doctrine of a
     universal void which is a negation of duality."

It is well known in Buddhist doctrine that the worship of the twelve
inner seats (_áyatana_) is conducive to felicity.

     "After acquiring wealth in abundance, the twelve inner seats

     "Are to be thoroughly reverenced; what use of reverencing
     aught else below?

     "The five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action,

     "The common sensory and the intellect have been described by
     the wise as the twelve inner seats."

The system of the Buddhists is described as follows in the
Viveka-vilása:--

     "Of the Bauddhas Sugata (Buddha) is the deity, and the
     universe is momentarily fluxional;

     "The following four principles in order are to be known by
     the name of the noble truths:--

     "Pain, the inner seats, and from them an aggregate is
     held,[38]

     "And the path (method); of all this let the explication be
     heard in order.

     "Pain, and the _skandhas_ of the embodied one, which are
     declared to be five,--

     "Sensation, consciousness, name, impression, and form.

     "The five organs of sense, the five objects of sense, sound
     and the rest, the common sensory,

     "And (the intellect) the abode of merit,--these are the
     twelve inner seats.

     "This should be the complement of desire and so forth, when
     it arises in the heart of man.

     "Under the name of soul's own nature, it should be the
     aggregate.

     "The fixed idea that all impressions are momentary,

     "This is to be known as the path, and is also styled
     emancipation.

     "Furthermore, there are two instruments of science,
     perception and inference.

     "The Bauddhas are well known to be divided into four sects,
     the Vaibháshikas and the rest.

     "The Vaibháshika highly esteems an object concomitant to the
     cognition;

     "The Sautrántika allows no external object apprehensible by
     perception;

     "The Yogáchára admits only intellect accompanied with forms;

     "The Mádhyamikas hold mere consciousness self-subsistent.

     "All the four (sects of) Bauddhas proclaim the same
     emancipation,

     "Arising from the extirpation of desire, &c., the stream of
     cognitions and impressions.

     "The skin garment, the water-pot, the tonsure, the rags, the
     single meal in the forenoon,

     "The congregation, and the red vesture, are adopted by the
     Bauddha mendicants."[39]

A. E. G.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 29: This śloka is quoted in the "Benares Pandit," vol. i. p.
89, with a commentary, and the latter part of the second line is there
read more correctly, _'darśanán na na darśanát_.]

[Footnote 30: Kusumánjali, iii. 7.]

[Footnote 31: The Bauddhas are thus divided into--

(1.) Mádhyamikas or Nihilists.

(2.) Yogácháras or Subjective Idealists.

(3.) Sautrántikas or Representationists.

(4.) Vaibháshikas or Presentationists.]

[Footnote 32: Cf. Ferrier's Lectures and Remains, vol. i. p. 119.

"Suppose yourself gazing on a gorgeous sunset. The whole western
heavens are glowing with roseate hues, but you are aware that within
half an hour all these glorious tints will have faded away into a dull
ashen grey. You see them even now melting away before your eyes,
although your eyes cannot place before you the conclusion which your
reason draws. And what conclusion is that? That conclusion is that you
never, even for the shortest time that can be named or conceived, see
any abiding colour, any colour which truly _is_. Within the millionth
part of a second the whole glory of the painted heavens has undergone
an incalculable series of mutations. One shade is supplanted by
another with a rapidity which sets all measurement at defiance, but
because the process is one to which no measurement applies,... reason
refuses to lay an arrestment on any period of the passing scene, or to
declare that it is, because in the very act of being it is not; it has
given place to something else. It is a series of fleeting colours, no
one of which _is_, because each of them continually vanishes in
another."]

[Footnote 33: Principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria.]

[Footnote 34: Query, Laṅkávatára?]

[Footnote 35: Cf. Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic, p. 213. "If
every _completed_ object of cognition must consist of object _plus_
the subject, the object without the subject must be incomplete, that
is, inchoate--that is, no possible object of knowledge at all. This is
the distressing predicament to which matter is reduced by the tactics
of speculation; and this predicament is described not unaptly by
calling it a _flux_--or, as we have depicted it elsewhere, perhaps
more philosophically, as a never-ending redemption of nonsense into
sense, and a never-ending relapse of sense into nonsense."]

[Footnote 36: Cf. Burnouf, _Lotus_, p. 520.--Should we read
_samudaya_?]

[Footnote 37: Cf. G. H. Lewes' History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 85.
"We not only see that the architect's plan determined the arrangement
of materials in the house, but we see why it must have done so,
because the materials have no spontaneous tendency to group themselves
into houses; that not being a recognised property of bricks, mortar,
wood, and glass. But what we know of organic materials is that they
_have_ this spontaneous tendency to arrange themselves in definite
forms; precisely as we see chemical substances arranging themselves in
definite forms without the intervention of any extra-chemical
agency."]

[Footnote 38: These are not the usual four 'sublime truths;' cf. p.
30.]

[Footnote 39: Mádhava probably derived most of his knowledge of
Buddhist doctrines from Brahmanical works; consequently some of his
explanations (as, _e.g._, that of _samudáya_ or _samudaya_, &c.) seem
to be at variance with those given in Buddhist works.]




CHAPTER III.

THE ÁRHATA SYSTEM.


The Gymnosophists[40] (Jainas), rejecting these opinions of the
Muktakachchhas,[41] and maintaining continued existence to a certain
extent, overthrow the doctrine of the momentariness of everything.
(They say): If no continuing soul is accepted, then even the
arrangement of the means for attaining worldly fruit in this life will
be useless. But surely this can never be imagined as possible--that
one should act and another reap the consequences! Therefore as this
conviction, "I who previously did the deed, am the person who now reap
its consequences," establishes undoubtedly the existence of a
continuing soul, which remains constant through the previous and the
subsequent period, the discriminating Jaina Arhats reject as untenable
the doctrine of momentary existence, _i.e._, an existence which lasts
only an instant, and has no previous or subsequent part.

But the opponent may maintain, "The unbroken stream (of momentary
sensations) has been fairly proved by argument, so who can prevent it?
In this way, since our tenet has been demonstrated by the argument,
'whatever is, is momentary, &c.,' it follows that in each parallel
line of successive experiences the previous consciousness is the agent
and the subsequent one reaps the fruit. Nor may you object that, 'if
this were true, effects might extend beyond all bounds'--[_i.e._, A
might act, and B receive the punishment]--because there is an
essentially controlling relation in the very nature of cause and
effect. Thus we see that when mango seeds, after being steeped in
sweet juices, are planted in prepared soil, there is a definite
certainty that sweetness will be found in the shoot, the stalk, the
stem, the branches, the peduncle, &c., and so on by an unbroken series
to the fruit itself; or again, when cotton seeds have been sprinkled
with lac juice, there will be a similar certainty of finding, through
the same series of shoot, &c., an ultimate redness in the cotton. As
it has been said--

     "'In whatever series of successive states the original
     impression of the action was produced,

     "'There verily accrues the result, just like the redness
     produced in cotton.

     "'When lac juice, &c., are poured on the flower of the
     citron, &c.,

     "'A certain capacity is produced in it,--do you not see
     it?'"

But all this is only a drowning man's catching at a straw, for it is
overthrown by the following dilemma:--

In the example of the "cloud," &c. [_supra_, p. 15], was your
favourite "momentariness" proved by this very proof or by some other?
It could not be the former, because your alleged momentariness is not
always directly visible in the cloud, and consequently, as your
example is not an ascertained fact, your supposed inference falls to
the ground. Nor can it be the latter--because you might always prove
your doctrine of momentariness by this new proof (if you had it), and
consequently your argument regarding all existence ["whatever is, is
momentary," &c.] would become needless. If you take as your definition
of "existence" "that which produces an effect," this will not hold, as
it would include even the bite of a snake imagined in the rope, since
this undoubtedly produces the effect [of fear]. Hence it has been
said that the definition of an existence is "that which possesses an
origin, an end, and an [intermediate] duration."

As for what was said [in p. 16] that "the momentariness of objects is
proved by the fact that the contrary assumption leads to contradictory
attributes of capacity and want of capacity existing contemporaneously,"
_that_ also is wrong--for the alleged contradiction is not proved, as the
holders of the Syád-váda[42] doctrine [_vide infra_] willingly admit the
indeterminateness of the action of causes. As for what was said of the
example of the cotton, that is only mere words, since no proof is given,
and we do not accept even in that instance a separate destruction [at each
moment]. And again, your supposed continued series cannot be demonstrated
without some subject to give it coherence, as has been said, "In
individual things which are of the same class or successively produced or
in mutual contact, there may be a continued series; and this series is
held to be one [throughout all"].

Nor is our objection obviated by your supposed definite relation
between causes and effects. For even on your own admission it would
follow that something experienced by the teacher's mind might be
remembered by that of the pupil whom he had formed, or the latter
might experience the fruits of merit which the former had acquired;
and thus we should have the twofold fault that the thing done passed
away without result, and that the fruit of the thing not done was
enjoyed. This has been said by the author of the Siddhasenávákya--

"The loss of the thing done,--the enjoyment of the fruit of a thing
not done,--the dissolution of all existence,--and the abolition of
memory,--bold indeed is the Buddhist antagonist, when, in the teeth of
these four objections, he seeks to establish his doctrine of momentary
destruction!"

Moreover, (on your supposition of momentary existence), as at the time
of the perception (the second moment) the object (of the first moment)
does not exist, and similarly at the time of the object's existence
the perception does not exist, there can be no such things as a
perceiver and a thing perceived, and consequently the whole course of
the world would come to an end. Nor may you suppose that the object
and the perception are simultaneous, because this would imply that,
like the two horns of an animal, they did not stand in the relation of
cause and effect [as this relation necessarily involves succession],
and consequently the _Álambana_, or the object's data [_supra_, p.
29], would be abolished as one of the four concurrent causes
(_pratyaya_).[43]

If you say that "the object may still be perceived, inasmuch as it
will impress its form on the perception, even though the one may have
existed in a different moment from the other," this too will not hold.
For if you maintain that the knowledge acquired by perception has a
certain form impressed upon it, you are met by the impossibility of
explaining how a momentary perception can possess the power of
impressing a form; and if you say that it has no form impressed upon
it, you are equally met by the fact that, if we are to avoid
incongruity, there must be some definite condition to determine the
perception and knowledge in each several case. Thus by perception the
abstract consciousness, which before existed uninfluenced by the
external object, becomes modified under the form of a jar, &c., with a
definite reference to each man's personality [_i.e._, I see the jar],
and it is not merely the passive recipient of a reflection like a
mirror. Moreover, if the perception only reproduced the form of the
object, there would be an end of using such words as "far," "near,"
&c., of the objects.[44] Nor can you accept this conclusion, "as
exactly in accordance with your own views," because, in spite of all
our logic, the stubborn fact remains that we do use such phrases as
"the mountain is nearer" or "further," "long" or "large." Nor may you
say that "it is the object (which supplies the form) that really
possesses these qualities of being 'further,' &c., and they are
applied by a fashion of speech to the perception [though not really
belonging to it]"--because we do not find that this is the case in a
mirror [_i.e._, it does not become a _far_ reflection because it
represents a far object.] And again, as the perception produced by an
object follows it in assuming the form of blue, so too, if the object
be insentient, it ought equally to assume its form and so become
itself insentient. And thus, according to the proverb, "wishing to
grow, you have destroyed your root," and your cause has fallen into
hopeless difficulties.

If, in your wish to escape this difficulty, you assert that "the
perception does not follow the object in being insentient," then there
would be no perception that the object is insentient,[45] and so it is
a case of the proverb, "While he looks for one thing which he has
lost, another drops." "But what harm will it be if there is no
perception of a thing's being insentient?" [We reply], that if its
being insentient is not perceived, while its blue form is perceived,
the two may be quite distinct [and as different from each other as a
jar and cloth], or it may be a case of "indeterminateness" [so that
the two may be only occasionally found together, as smoke with fire].
And again, if insentience is not perceived contemporaneously with the
blue form, how could there then be conformity between them [so that
both the blue and the insentience should together constitute the
character of the thing?] We might just as well maintain that, on
perceiving a post, the unperceived universe entered into it as also
constituting its character.[46]

All this collection of topics for proof has been discussed at full
length by the Jaina authors, Pratápachandra and others, in the
_Prameyakamalamártaṇḍa_, &c., and is here omitted for fear of swelling
the book too much.

Therefore those who wish for the _summum bonum_ of man must not accept
the doctrine of Buddha, but rather honour only the Árhata doctrine.
The Arhat's nature has been thus described by Arhachchandra-súri,[47]
in his _Áptaniśchayálaṅkára_.

"The divine Arhat is the supreme lord, the omniscient one, who has
overcome all faults, desire, &c.,--adored by the three worlds, the
declarer of things as they are."

But may it not be objected that no such omniscient soul can enter the
path of proof, since none of the five affirmative proofs can be found
to apply, as has been declared by Tautátita [Bhaṭṭa Kumárila[48]]?

1. "No omniscient being is seen by the sense here in this world by
ourselves or others; nor is there any part of him seen which might
help us as a sign to infer his existence.

2. "Nor is there any injunction (_vidhi_) of scripture which reveals
an eternal omniscient one, nor can the meaning of the explanatory
passages (_arthaváda_) be applied here.

3. "His existence is not declared by those passages which refer to
quite other topics; and it cannot be contained in any emphatic
repetitions (_anuváda_), as it had never been mentioned elsewhere
before.

4. "An omniscient being who had a beginning can never be the subject
of the eternal Veda; and how can he be established by a made and
spurious Veda?

5. "Do you say that this omniscient one is accepted on his own word?
How can you establish either when they thus both depend on reciprocal
support?

6. "[If you say,] 'The saying is true because it was uttered by one
omniscient, and this proves the Arhat's existence;' how can either
point be established without some previously established foundation?

7. "But they who accept a [supposed] omniscient on the baseless word
of a parviscient know nothing of the meaning of a real omniscient's
words.

8. "And again, if we now could see anything like an omniscient being,
we might have a chance of recognising him by the [well-known fourth]
proof, comparison (_upamána_).

9. "And the teaching of Buddha [as well as that of Jina], which
embraces virtue, vice, &c., would not be established as authoritative,
if there were not in him the attribute of omniscience,[49] and so on."

We reply as follows:--As for the supposed contradiction of an Arhat's
existence, derived from the failure of the five affirmative
proofs,--this is untenable, because there _are_ proofs, as inference,
&c., which _do_ establish[50] his existence. Thus any soul will become
omniscient when, (its natural capacity for grasping all objects
remaining the same), the hindrances to such knowledge are done away.
Whatever thing has a natural capacity for knowing any object, will,
when its hindrances to such knowledge are done away, actually know it,
just as the sense of vision cognises form, directly the hindrances of
darkness, &c., are removed. Now there _is_ such a soul, which has its
hindrances done away, its natural capacity for grasping all things
remaining unchanged; therefore there is an omniscient being. Nor is
the assertion unestablished that the soul has a natural capacity for
grasping all things; for otherwise the Mímáṃsist could not maintain
that a knowledge of all possible cases can be produced by the
authoritative injunction of a text,[51]--nor could there otherwise be
the knowledge of universal propositions, such as that in our favourite
argument, "All things are indeterminate from the very fact of their
existence" [and, of course, a follower of the Nyáya will grant that
universal propositions can be known, though he will dispute the truth
of this particular one]. Now it is clear that the teachers of the
Púrva Mímáṃsá accept the thesis that the soul has a natural capacity
for grasping all things; since they allow that a knowledge embracing
all things can be produced by the discussion of injunctions and
prohibitions, as is said [by Śabara in his commentary on the Sútras,
i. 1, 2], "A precept makes known the past, the present, the future,
the minute, the obstructed, the distant, &c." Nor can you say that "it
is impossible to destroy the obstructions which hinder the soul's
knowing all things," because we [Jainas] are convinced that there are
certain special means to destroy these obstructions, viz., the three
["gems"], right intuition, &c. By this charm also, all inferior
assaults of argument can be put to flight.

But the Naiyáyika may interpose, "You talk of the pure intelligence,
which, after all hindrances are done away, sees all objects, having
sense-perception at its height; but this is irrelevant, because there
can be no hindrance to the omniscient, as from all eternity he has
been always liberated." We reply that there is no proof of your
eternally liberated being. There cannot be an omniscient who is
eternally "liberated," from the very fact of his being "liberated,"
like other liberated persons,--since the use of the term "liberated"
necessarily implies the having been previously bound; and if the
latter is absent, the former must be too, as is seen in the case of
the ether. "But is not this being's existence definitely proved by his
being the maker of that eternal series of effects, the earth, &c.?
according to the well-known argument, 'the earth, &c., must have had a
maker, because they have the nature of effects, as a jar.'" This
argument, however, will not hold, because you cannot prove that they
have the nature of effects. You cannot establish this from the fact of
their being composed of parts, because this supposition falls upon the
horns of a dilemma. Does this "being composed of parts" mean (i.) the
being in contact with the parts; or (ii.) "the being in intimate
relation to the parts; or (iii.) the being produced from parts;" or
(iv.) the being a substance in intimate relation; or (v.) the being
the object of an idea involving the notion of parts?

Not _the first_, because it would apply too widely, as it would
include ether [since this, though not itself composed of parts, is in
contact with the parts of other things;] nor _the second_, because it
would similarly include genus, &c. [as this resides in a substance by
intimate relation, and yet itself is not composed of parts;] nor _the
third_, because this involves a term ("produced") just as much
disputed as the one directly in question;[52] nor _the fourth_,
because its neck is caught in the pillory of the following
alternative:--Do you mean by your phrase used above that it is to be a
substance, and to have something else in intimate relation to
itself,--or do you mean that it must have intimate relation to
something else, in order to be valid for your argument? If you say the
former, it will equally apply to ether, since this is a substance, and
has its qualities resident in it by intimate relation; if you say the
latter, your new position involves as much dispute as the original
point, since you would have to prove the existence of intimate
relation in the parts, or the so-called "intimate causes," which you
mean by "something else." We use these terms in compliance with your
terminology; but, of course, from our point of view, we do not allow
such a thing as "intimate relation," as there is no proof of its
existence.

Nor can _the fifth_ alternative be allowed, because this would reach
too far, as it would include soul, &c., since soul can be the object
of an idea involving the notion of parts, and yet it is acknowledged
to be not an effect.[53] Nor can you maintain that the soul may still
be indiscerptible in itself, but by reason of its connection with
something possessing parts may itself become metaphorically the object
of an idea involving the notion of parts, because there is a mutual
contradiction in the idea of that which has no parts and that which is
all-pervading, just as the atom [which is indiscerptible but not
all-pervading].

And, moreover, is there only one maker? Or, again, is he independent?

In the former case your position will apply too far, as it will extend
erroneously to palaces, &c., where we see for ourselves the work of
many different men, as carpenters, &c., and [in the second case] if
all the world were produced by this one maker, all other agents would
be superfluous. As it has been said in the _Vítarágastuti_, or "Praise
of Jina"--

1. "There is one eternal maker for the world, all-pervading,
independent, and true; they have none of these inextricable delusions,
whose teacher art _thou_."

And again--

2. "There is here no maker acting by his own free will, else his
influence would extend to the making of a mat. What would be the use
of yourself or all the artisans, if Íśwara fabricates the three
worlds?"

Therefore it is right to hold, as we do, that omniscience is produced
when the hindrances are removed by the three means before alluded to.

Nor need the objection be made that "right intuition," &c., are
impossible, as there is no other teacher to go to,--because this
universal knowledge can be produced by the inspired works of former
omniscient Jinas. Nor is our doctrine liable to the imputation of such
faults as _Anyonyáśrayatá_,[54] &c., because we accept an eternal
succession of revealed doctrines and omniscient teachers, like the
endless series of seed springing from shoot and shoot from seed. So
much for this preliminary discussion.

The well-known triad called the three gems, right intuition, &c., are
thus described in the _Paramágamasára_ (which is devoted to the
exposition of the doctrines of the Arhats)--"Right intuition, right
knowledge, right conduct are the path of liberation." This has been
thus explained by Yogadeva:--

(_a._) When the meaning of the predicaments, the soul, &c., has been
declared by an Arhat in exact accordance with their reality, absolute
faith in the teaching, _i.e._, the entire absence of any contrary
idea, is "right intuition." And to this effect runs the
_Tattvártha-sútra_, "Faith in the predicaments[55] is right
'intuition.'" Or, as another definition gives it, "Acquiescence in the
predicaments declared by a Jina is called 'right faith;' it is
produced either by natural character or by the guru's instruction."
"Natural character" means the soul's own nature, independent of
another's teaching; "instruction" is the knowledge produced by the
teaching of another in the form of explanation, &c.

(_b._) "Right knowledge" is a knowledge of the predicaments, soul,
&c., according to their real nature, undisturbed by any illusion or
doubt; as it has been said--

"That knowledge, which embraces concisely or in detail the
predicaments as they actually are, is called 'right knowledge' by the
wise."

This knowledge is fivefold as divided into _mati_, _śruta_, _avadhi_,
_manas-paryáya_, and _kevala_; as it has been said, "_Mati_, _ś_ruta,
_avadhi_, _manas-paryáya_, and _kevala_, these are knowledge." The
meaning of this is as follows:--

1. _Mati_ is that by which one cognises an object through the
operation of the senses and the mind, all obstructions of knowledge
being abolished.

2. _Śruta_ is the clear knowledge produced by _mati_, all the
obstructions of knowledge being abolished.

3. _Avadhi_ is the knowledge of special objects caused by the
abolition of hindrances, which is effected by "right intuition,"
&c.[56]

4. _Manas-paryáya_ is the clear definite knowledge of another's
thoughts, produced by the abolition of all the obstructions of
knowledge caused by the veil of envy.

5. _Kevala_ is that pure unalloyed knowledge for the sake of which
ascetics practise various kinds of penance.

The first of these (_mati_) is not self-cognised, the other four are.
Thus it has been said--

"True knowledge is a proof which nothing can overthrow, and which
manifests itself as well as its object; it is both supersensuous and
itself an object of cognition, as the object is determined in two
ways."

But the full account of the further minute divisions must be got from
the authoritative treatise above-mentioned.

(_c._) "Right conduct" is the abstaining from all actions tending to
evil courses by one who possesses faith and knowledge, and who is
diligent in cutting off the series of actions and their effects which
constitutes mundane existence. This has been explained at length by
the Arhat--

1. "Right conduct is described as the entire relinquishment of
blamable impulses; this has been subjected to a fivefold division, as
the 'five vows,' _ahiṃsá_, _súnṛita_, _asteya_, _brahmacharyá_, and
_aparigraha_.[57]

2. "The 'vow' of _ahiṃsá_ is the avoidance of injuring life by any act
of thoughtlessness in any movable or immovable thing.

3. "A kind, salutary, and truthful speech is called the 'vow' of
_súnṛita_. That truthful speech is not truthful, which is unkind to
others and prejudicial.

4. "The not taking what is not given is declared to be the 'vow' of
_asteya_; the external life is a man's property, and, when it is
killed, it is killed by some one who seizes it.

5. "The 'vow' of _brahmacharyá_ (chastity) is eighteen-fold, viz., the
abandonment of all desires,[58] heavenly or earthly, in thought, word,
and deed, and whether by one's own action or by one's consent, or by
one's causing another to act.

6. "The 'vow' of _aparigraha_ is the renouncing of all delusive
interest in everything that exists not; since bewilderment of thought
may arise from a delusive interest even in the unreal.

7. "When carried out by the five states of mind in a fivefold order,
these great 'vows' of the world produce the eternal abode."

The full account of the five states of mind (_bhávaná_) has been given
in the following passage [of which we only quote one śloka]--

"Let him carry out the 'vow' of _súnṛita_ uninterruptedly by the
abstinence from laughter, greed, fear, and anger, and by the
deliberate avoidance of speech,"[59]--and so forth.

These three, right intuition, right knowledge, and right conduct, when
united, produce liberation, but not severally; just as, in the case of
an elixir, it is the knowledge of what it is, faith in its virtues,
and the actual application of the medicine,[60] united, which produce
the elixir's effect, but not severally.

Here we may say concisely that the _tattvas_ or predicaments are two,
_jíva_ and _ajíva_; the soul, _jíva_, is pure intelligence; the
non-soul, _ajíva_, is pure non-intelligence. Padmanandin has thus
said--

"The two highest predicaments are 'soul' and 'non-soul;'
'discrimination' is the power of discriminating these two, in one who
pursues what is to be pursued, and rejects what is to be rejected. The
affection, &c., of the agent are to be rejected; these are objects for
the non-discriminating; the supreme light [of knowledge] is alone to
be pursued, which is defined as _upayoga_."

_Upayoga_ [or "the true employment of the soul's activities"] takes
place when the vision of true knowledge recognises the manifestation
of the soul's innate nature; but as long as the soul, by the bond of
_pradeśa_ and the mutual interpenetration of form which it produces
[between the soul and the body], considers itself as identified with
its actions [and the body which they produce], knowledge should rather
be defined as "the cause of its recognising that it is other than
these."[61]

Intelligence (_chaitanya_) is common to all souls, and is the real
nature of the soul viewed as _pariṇata_ [_i.e._, as it is in itself];
but by the influence of _upaśamakshaya_ and _kshayopaśama_ it appears
in the "mixed" form as possessing both,[62] or again, by the influence
of actions as they arise, it assumes the appearance of foulness,
&c.[63] As has been said by Váchakáchárya [in a sútra]--

"The _aupaśamika_, the _Ksháyika_, and the 'mixed' states are the
nature of the soul, and also the _audayika_ and the _Páriṇámika_."

1. The _aupaśamika_ state of the soul arises when all the effects of
past actions have ceased, and no new actions arise [to affect the
future], as when water becomes temporarily pure through the defiling
mud sinking to the bottom by the influence of the clearing
nut-plant,[64] &c.

2. The _Ksháyika_ state arises when there is the absolute abolition of
actions and their effects, as in final liberation.

3. The "mixed" (_miśra_) state combines both these, as when water is
partly pure.

4. The _audayika_ state is when actions arise [exerting an inherent
influence on the future]. The _Páriṇámika_ state is the soul's innate
condition, as pure intelligence, &c., and disregarding its apparent
states, as (1), (2), (3), (4).[65] This nature, in one of the
above-described varieties, is the character of every soul whether
happy or unhappy. This is the meaning of the sútra quoted above.

This has been explained in the _Svarúpa-sambodhana_--

"Not different from knowledge, and yet not identical with it,--in some
way both different and the same,--knowledge is its first and last;
such is the soul described to be."

If you say that, "As difference and identity are mutually exclusive,
we must have one or the other in the case of the soul, and its being
equally both is absurd," we reply, that there is no evidence to
support you when you characterise it as absurd. Only a valid
non-perception[66] can thus preclude a suggestion as absurd; but this
is not found in the present case, since (in the opinion of us, the
advocates of the _Syád-váda_) it is perfectly notorious that all
things present a mingled nature of many contradictory attributes.

Others lay down a different set of _tattvas_ from the two mentioned
above, _jíva_ and _ajíva_; they hold that there are five _astikáyas_
or categories,--_jíva_, _ákáśa_, _dharma_, _adharma_, and _pudgala_.
To all these five we can apply the idea of "existence" (_asti_),[67]
as connected with the three divisions of time, and we can similarly
apply the idea of "body" (_káya_),[68] from their occupying several
parts of space.

The _jívas_ (souls) are divided into two, the "mundane" and the
"released." The "mundane" pass from birth to birth; and these are also
divided into two, as those possessing an internal sense (_samanaska_),
and those destitute of it (_amanaska_). The former possesses _saṃjñá_,
_i.e._, the power of apprehension, talking, acting, and receiving
instruction; the latter are those without this power. These latter are
also divided into two, as "locomotive" (_trasa_), or "immovable"
(_sthávara_).

The "locomotive" are those possessing at least two senses [touch and
taste], as shell-fish, worms, &c., and are thus of four kinds [as
possessing two, three, four, or five senses]; the "immovable" are
earth, water, fire, air, and trees.[69] But here a distinction must be
made. The dust of the road is properly "earth," but bricks, &c., are
aggregated "bodies of earth," and that soul by whom this body is
appropriated becomes "earthen-bodied," and that soul which will
hereafter appropriate it is the "earth-soul." The same four divisions
must also be applied to the others, water, &c. Now the souls which
have appropriated or will appropriate the earth, &c., as their bodies,
are reckoned as "immovable;" but earth, &c., and the "bodies of
earth," &c., are not so reckoned, because they are inanimate.[70]
These other immovable things, and such as only possess the one sense
of touch, are considered as "released," since they are incapable of
passing into any other state of existence.

_Dharma_, _adharma_, and _ákáśa_ are singular categories [and not
generic], and they have not the attribute of "action," but they are
the causes of a substance's change of place.

_Dharma_, "merit," and _adharma_, "demerit," are well known. They
assist souls in progressing or remaining stationary in the universally
extended[71] sky [or ether] characterised by light, and also called
Lokákáśa; hence the presence of the category "merit" is to be inferred
from progress, that of "demerit" from stationariness. The effect of
_ákáśa_ is seen when one thing enters into the space previously
occupied by another.

_Pudgala_, "body," possesses touch, taste, and colour. Bodies are of
two kinds, atomic and compound. Atoms cannot be enjoyed;[72] the
compounds are the binary and other combinations. Atoms are produced by
the separation of these binary and other compounds, while these arise
from the conjunction of atoms. Compounds sometimes arise from
separation and conjunction [combined]; hence they are called
_pudgalas_, because they "fill" (_púr_), and "dissolve" (_gal_).
Although "time" is not properly an _astikáya_, because it does not
occupy many separate parts of space [as mentioned in the definition],
still it is a _dravya_ [or _tattva_], as the definition will hold;
"substance" (_dravya_) possesses "qualities and action."[73] Qualities
reside in substance but do not themselves possess qualities, as the
general qualities, knowledge, &c., of the _jíva_, form, &c., of the
body, and the power of causing progress, stationariness, and motion
into a place previously occupied, in the case respectively of "merit,"
"demerit," and _ákáśa_. "Action" (_paryáya_) has thus been defined;
the actions (_paryáyáḥ_) of a substance are, as has been said, its
existence, its production, its being what it is, its development, its
course to the end, as, _e.g._, in the _jíva_, the knowledge of
objects, as of a jar, &c., happiness, pain, &c.; in the _pudgala_, the
lump of clay, the jar, &c.; in merit and demerit, the special
functions of progress, &c. Thus there are six substances or _tattvas_
[_i.e._, the five above mentioned and "time"].

Others reckon the _tattvas_ as seven, as has been said--

"The _tattvas_ are _jíva_, _ajíva_, _ásrava_, _bandha_, _saṃvara_,
_nirjará_, and _moksha_." _Jíva_ and _ajíva_ have been already described.
_Ásrava_ is described as the movement of the soul called _yoga_,[74]
through its participation in the movement of its various bodies,
_audárika_, &c. As a door opening into the water is called _ásrava_,
because it causes the stream to descend through it,[75] so this _yoga_ is
called _ásrava_, because by it as by a pipe actions and their consequences
flow in upon the soul. Or, as a wet garment collects the dust brought to
it from every side by the wind, so the soul, wet with previous sins,
collects, by its manifold points of contact with the body, the actions
which are brought to it by _yoga_. Or as, when water is thrown on a heated
lump of iron, the iron absorbs the water altogether, so the _jíva_, heated
by previous sins, receives from every side the actions which are brought
by _yoga_. _Kasháya_ ("sin," "defilement") is so called because it "hurts"
(_kash_) the soul by leading it into evil states; it comprises anger,
pride, delusion, and lust. _Ásrava_ is twofold, as good or evil. Thus
abstaining from doing injury is a good _yoga_ of the body; speaking what
is true, measured, and profitable is a good _yoga_ of the speech.

These various subdivisions of _ásrava_ have been described at length
in several _Sútras_. "_Ásrava_ is the impulse to action with body,
speech, or mind, and it is good or evil as it produces merit or
demerit," &c. Others, however, explain it thus:--"_Ásrava_ is the
action of the senses which impels the soul towards external objects;
the light of the soul, coming in contact with external objects by
means of the senses, becomes developed as the knowledge of form,
&c."[76]

_Bandha_, "bondage," is when the soul, by the influence of "false
intuition," "non-indifference," "carelessness," and "sin" (_kasháya_),
and also by the force of _yoga_, assumes various bodies occupying many
parts of space, which enter into its own subtile body, and which are
suited to the bond of its previous actions. As has been said--

     "Through the influence of sin the individual soul assumes
     bodies suitable to its past actions, this is, 'bondage.'"

In this quotation the word "sin" (_kasháya_) is used to include the
other three causes of bondage as well as that properly so termed.
Váchakáchárya has thus enumerated the causes of bondage: "The causes
of bondage are false intuition, non-indifference, carelessness, and
sin."

(_a_) "False intuition" is twofold,--either innate from one's natural
character, as when one disbelieves Jaina doctrines from the influence
of former evil actions, irrespectively of another's teaching,--or
derived, when learned by another's teaching.

(_b_) "Non-indifference" is the non-restraint of the five senses, and
the internal organ from the set of six, earth, &c.

(_c_) "Carelessness" (_pramáda_) is a want of effort to practise the
five kinds of _samiti_, _gupti_, &c.

(_d_) "Sin" consists of anger, &c. Here we must make the distinction
that the four things, false intuition, &c., cause those kinds of
bondage called _sthiti_ and _anubháva_; _yoga_ [or _ásrava_] causes
those kinds called _prakṛiti_ and _pradeśa_.

"Bondage" is fourfold, as has been said: "_Prakṛiti_, _sthiti_,
_anubháva_, and _pradeśa_ are its four kinds."

1. _Prakṛiti_ means "the natural qualities," as bitterness or
sweetness in the vimba plant or molasses. This may be subdivided into
eight _múla-prakṛitis_.[77]

Thus obstructions (_ávaraṇa_)[78] cloud the knowledge and intuition,
as a cloud obscures the sun or a shade the lamp. This is (_a_)
_jnánávaraṇa_, or (_b_) _darśanávaraṇa_. (_c_) An object recognised as
simultaneously existing or non-existing produces mingled pleasure and
pain, as licking honey from a sword's edge,--this is _vedaníya_. (_d_)
A delusion (_mohaníya_) in intuition produces want of faith in the
Jaina categories, like association with the wicked; delusion in
conduct produces want of self-restraint, like intoxication. (_e_)
_Áyus_ produces the bond of body, like a snare.[79] (_f_) _Náman_, or
"the name," produces various individual appellations, as a painter
paints his different pictures. (_g_) _Gotra_ produces the idea of
noble and ignoble, as the potter fashions his pots. (_h_) _Antaráya_
produces obstacles to liberality, &c., as the treasurer hinders the
king by considerations of economy.

Thus is the _prakṛiti-bandha_ eightfold, being denominated as the
eight _múla-prakṛitis_, with subdivisions according to the different
actions of the various subject-matter.

And thus has Umáswáti-váchakáchárya[80] declared: "The first kind of
_bandha_ consists of obstructions of the knowledge and the intuition,
_vedaníya_, _mohaníya_, _áyus_, _náman_, _gotra_, and _antaráya_;" and he
has also reckoned up the respective subdivisions of each as five, nine,
twenty-eight, four, two, forty, two, and fifteen. All this has been
explained at full length in the _Vidyánanda_ and other works, and here is
omitted through fear of prolixity.

2. _Sthiti._ As the milk of the goat, cow, buffalo, &c., have continued
unswerving from their sweet nature for so long a period, so the first
three _múla-prakṛitis_, _jnánávaraṇa_, &c., and the last, _antaráya_, have
not swerved from their respective natures even through the period
described in the words, "_sthiti_ lasts beyonds crores of crores of
periods of time measured by thirty _ságaropamas_."[81] This continuance is
_sthiti_.

3. _Anubháva._ As in the milk of goats, cows, buffaloes, &c., there
exists, by its rich or poor nature, a special capacity for
producing[82] its several effects, so in the different material bodies
produced by our actions there exists a special capacity (_anubháva_)
for producing their respective effects.

4. _Pradeśa._ The _bandha_ called _pradeśa_ is the entrance into the
different parts of the soul by the masses, made up of an endless
number of parts, of the various bodies which are developed by the
consequences of actions.

_Saṃvara_ is the stopping of _ásrava_--that by which the influence of
past actions (_karman_) is stopped from entering into the soul. It is
divided into _gupti_, _samiti_, &c. _Gupti_ is the withdrawal of the
soul from that "impulse" (_yoga_) which causes mundane existence,--it
is threefold, as relating to body, speech, or mind. _Samiti_ is the
acting so as to avoid injury to all living beings. This is divided
into five kinds, as _íryá_,[83] _bháshá_, &c., as has been explained
by Hemachandra.

1. "In a public highway, kissed by the sun's rays, to walk
circumspectly so as to avoid injuring living beings, this the good
call _íryá_.

2. "Let him practise[84] a measured utterance in his intercourse with
all people; this is called _bháshá-samiti_, dear to the restrainers of
speech.

3. "The food which the sage takes, ever free from the forty-two faults
which may accrue to alms, is called the _eshaṇá-samiti_.[85]

4. "Carefully looking at it and carefully seating himself upon it, let
him take a seat, &c., set it down, and meditate,--this is called the
_ádána-samiti_.

5. "That the good man should carefully perform his bodily evacuations
in a spot free from all living creatures,[86]--this is the
_utsarga-samiti_.[87] Hence _samvara_ has been etymologically analysed
as that which closes (_sam_ + _vṛiṇoti_) the door of the stream of
_ásrava_,[88] as has been said by the learned, '_Ásrava_ is the cause
of mundane existence, _saṃvara_ is the cause of liberation;[89] this
is the Árhat doctrine in a handful; all else is only the amplification
of this.'"

_Nirjará_ is the causing the fruit of past actions to decay by
self-mortification, &c.; it destroys by the body the merit and demerit
of all the previously performed actions, and the resulting happiness
and misery; "self-mortification" means the plucking out of the hair,
&c. This _nirjará_ is twofold,[90] "temporary" (_yathákála_) and
ancillary (_aupakramaṇika_). It is "temporary" as when a desire is
dormant in consequence of the action having produced its fruit, and at
that particular time, from this completion of the object aimed at,
_nirjará_ arises, being caused by the consumption of the desire, &c.
But when, by the force of asceticism, the sage turns all actions into
means for attaining his end (liberation), this is the _nirjará_ of
actions. Thus it has been said: "From the decaying of the actions
which are the seeds of mundane existence, _nirjará_ arises, which is
twofold, _sakámá_ and _akámá_. That called _sakámá_ belongs to
ascetics, the _akámá_ to other embodied spirits."[91]

_Moksha._ Since at the moment of its attainment there is an entire
absence of all future actions, as all the causes of bondage (false
perception, &c.) are stopped,[92] and since all past actions are
abolished in the presence of the causes of _nirjará_, there arises the
absolute release from all actions,--this is _moksha_; as it has been
said: "_Moksha_ is the absolute release from all actions by the decay
(_nirjará_) of the causes of bondage and of existence."

Then the soul rises upward to the end of the world. As a potter's
wheel, whirled by the stick and hands, moves on even after these have
stopped, until the impulse is exhausted, so the previous repeated
contemplations of the embodied soul for the attainment of _moksha_
exert their influence even after they have ceased, and bear the soul
onward to the end of the world; or, as the gourd, encased with clay,
sinks in the water, but rises to the surface when freed from its
encumbrance, so the soul, delivered from works, rises upward by its
isolation,[93] from the bursting of its bonds like the elastic seed of
the castor-oil plant, or by its own native tendency like the flame.

"Bondage" is the condition of being unseparated, with a mutual
interpenetration of parts [between the soul and the body]; _saṅga_ is
merely mutual contact. This has been declared as follows:--

"[Liberation] is unhindered, from the continuance of former impulses,
from the absence of _saṅga_, from the cutting of all bonds, and from
the natural development of the soul's own powers of motion, like the
potter's wheel, the gourd with its clay removed, the seed of the
castor-oil plant, or the flame of fire."

Hence they recite a śloka:--

     "However often they go away, the planets return, the sun,
     moon, and the rest;

     "But never to this day have returned any who have gone to
     Álokákáśa."

Others hold _moksha_ to be the abiding in the highest regions, the
soul being absorbed in bliss, with its knowledge unhindered and itself
untainted by any pain or impression thereof.

Others hold nine _tattwas_, adding "merit" and "demerit" to the
foregoing seven,--these two being the causes of pleasure and pain.
This has been declared in the _Siddhánta_, "_Jíva_, _ajíva_, _puṇya_,
_pápa_, _ásrava_, _saṃvara_, _nirjaraṇa_, _bandha_, and _moksha_, are
the nine _tattwas_." As our object is only a summary, we desist here.

Here the Jainas everywhere introduce their favourite logic called the
_sapta-bhaṅgí-naya_,[94] or the system of the seven paralogisms, "may
be, it is," "may be, it is not," "may be, it is and it is not," "may
be, it is not predicable," "may be, it is, and yet not predicable,"
"may be, it is not, and not predicable," "may be, it is and it is not,
and not predicable." All this Anantavírya has thus laid down:--

1. "When you wish to establish a thing, the proper course is to say
'may be, it is;' when you wish to deny it, 'may be, it is not.'

2. "When you desire to establish each in turn, let your procedure
likewise embrace both; when you wish to establish both at once, let it
be declared 'indescribable' from the impossibility to describe it.

3. "The fifth process is enjoined when you wish to establish the first
as well as its indescribableness; when the second as well as its
indescribableness, the occasion for the sixth process arises.

4. "The seventh is required when all three characters are to be
employed simultaneously."

_Syát_, "may be," is here an indeclinable particle in the form of a
part of a verb, used to convey the idea of indeterminateness; as it
has been said--

     "This particle _syát_ is in the form of a verb, but, from
     its being connected with the sense, it denotes
     indeterminateness in sentences, and has a qualifying effect
     on the implied meaning."

If, again, the word _syát_ denoted determinateness, then it would be
needless in the phrase, "may be, it is;" but since it really denotes
indeterminateness, "may be, it is," means "it is somehow;" _syát_,
"may be," conveys the meaning of "somehow," _kathaṃchit_; and so it is
not really useless. As one has said--

"The doctrine of the _syád-váda_ arises from our everywhere rejecting
the idea of the absolute;[95] it depends on the _sapta-bhaṅgí-naya_,
and it lays down the distinction between what is to be avoided and to
be accepted."

If a thing absolutely exists, it exists altogether, always,
everywhere, and with everybody, and no one at any time or place would
ever make an effort to obtain or avoid it, as it would be absurd to
treat what is already present as an object to be obtained or avoided.
But if it be relative (or indefinite), the wise will concede that at
certain times and in certain places any one may seek or avoid it.
Moreover, suppose that the question to be asked is this: "Is _being_
or _non-being_ the real nature of the thing?" The real nature of the
thing cannot be _being_, for then you could not properly use the
phrase, "It is a pot" (_ghaṭósti_), as the two words "is" and "pot"
would be tautological; nor ought you to say, "It is not a pot," as the
words thus used would imply a direct contradiction; and the same
argument is to be used in other questions.[96] As it has been
declared--

     "It must not be said 'It is a pot,' since the word 'pot'
     implies 'is;'

     "Nor may you say 'it is not a pot,' for existence and
     non-existence are mutually exclusive," &c.

The whole is thus to be summed up. Four classes of our opponents
severally hold the doctrine of existence, non-existence, existence and
non-existence successively, and the doctrine that everything is
inexplicable (_anirvachaníyatá_);[97] three other classes hold one or
other of the three first theories combined with the fourth.[98] Now,
when they meet us with the scornful questions, "Does the thing exist?"
&c., we have an answer always possible, "It exists in a certain way,"
&c., and our opponents are all abashed to silence, and victory accrues
to the holder of the _Syád-váda_, which ascertains the entire meaning
of all things. Thus said the teacher in the _Syádváda-mañjarí_--

"A thing of an entirely indeterminate nature is the object only of the
omniscient; a thing partly determined is held to be the true object of
scientific investigation.[99] When our reasonings based on one point
proceed in the revealed way, it is called the revealed _Syád-váda_,
which ascertains the entire meaning of all things."

"All other systems are full of jealousy from their mutual propositions
and counter-propositions; it is only the doctrine of the Arhat which
with no partiality equally favours all sects."

The Jaina doctrine has thus been summed up by Jinadatta-súri--

"The hindrances belonging to vigour, enjoyment, sensual pleasure,
giving and receiving,--sleep, fear, ignorance, aversion, laughter,
liking, disliking, love, hatred, want of indifference, desire, sorrow,
deceit, these are the eighteen 'faults' (_dosha_) according to our
system.[100] The divine Jina is our Guru, who declares the true
knowledge of the _tattwas_. The path[101] of emancipation consists of
knowledge, intuition, and conduct. There are two means of proof
(_pramáṇa_) in the _Syád-váda_ doctrine,--sense-perception and
inference. All consists of the eternal and the non-eternal; there are
nine or seven _tattwas_. The _jíva_, the _ajíva_, merit and demerit,
_ásrava_, _saṃvara_, _bandha_, _nirjará_, _mukti_,--we will now
explain each. _Jíva_ is defined as intelligence; _ajíva_ is all other
than it; merit means bodies which arise from good actions, demerit the
opposite; _ásrava_ is the bondage of actions,[102] _nirjará_ is the
unloosing thereof; _moksha_ arises from the destruction of the eight
forms of _karman_ or "action". But by some teachers "merit" is
included in _saṃvara_,[103] and "demerit" in _ásrava_.

"Of the soul which has attained the four infinite things[104] and is
hidden from the world, and whose eight actions are abolished, absolute
liberation is declared by Jina. The Śwetámbaras are the destroyers of
all defilement, they live by alms,[105] they pluck out their hair,
they practise patience, they avoid all association, and are called the
Jaina _Sádhus_. The Digambaras pluck out their hair, they carry
peacocks' tails in their hands, they drink from their hands, and they
eat upright in the giver's house,--these are the second class of the
Jaina Ṛishis.

"A woman attains not the highest knowledge, she enters not Mukti,--so
say the Digambaras; but there is a great division on this point
between them and the Śwetámbaras."[106]

E. B. C.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 40: _Vivasanas_, "without garments."]

[Footnote 41: "The Buddhists are also called _Muktakachchhas_,
alluding to a peculiarity of dress, apparently a habit of wearing the
hem of the lower garment untucked."--_Colebrooke._]

[Footnote 42: In p. 26, line 3, read _Syád-vádinám_.]

[Footnote 43: I propose to read in p. 26, line 5, _infra_, _gráhyasya_
for _agráhyasya_.]

[Footnote 44: As these terms necessarily relate to the perceiver.]

[Footnote 45: I correct the reading _tasyágrahaṇaṃ_ to _tasyá
grahaṇaṃ_ (_tasyá_ being _jaḍatáyáḥ_).]

[Footnote 46: _I.e._, if you say that the _avayava_ may be not seen
though the _avayavin_ is seen, then I may say that the post is the
_avayavin_, and the unperceived three worlds its _avayava_!]

[Footnote 47: I read _arhatsvarúpam arhachchandra_ in p. 27, line 3,
_infra_.]

[Footnote 48: The following passage occurs in some part of Kumárila's
writings in an argument against the Jainas. It is curious that in the
Sáṅkara-digvijaya, chap. lv., it is mentioned that Kumárila had a
little relenting towards the Jainas at the end of his life. He
repented of having so cruelly persecuted them, and acknowledged that
there was some truth in their teaching. _Jainagurumukhát kaśchid
vidyáleśo játaḥ._]

[Footnote 49: Kumárila tries to prove that no such being can exist, as
his existence is not established by any one of the five recognised
proofs,--the sixth, _abháva_, being negative, is, of course, not
applicable. I understand the last śloka as showing the inapplicability
of "presumption" or _arthá-patti_. A Jaina would say, "If the Arhat
were not omniscient, his words would not be true and authoritative,
but we see that they are, therefore he is omniscient." He answers by
retorting that the same argument might be used of Buddha by a
Buddhist; and as the Jaina himself would disallow it in that case, it
cannot be convincing in his own.]

[Footnote 50: In p. 29, line 2, read _tatsadbhávávedakasya_ for
_tatsadbhávádekasya_.]

[Footnote 51: In p. 29, line 9, for _nikhilárthajñanát notpatty_, I
propose to read _nikhilárthajñánotpatty_.]

[Footnote 52: _Janya_ is included in _Kárya_ and equally disputed.]

[Footnote 53: Thus "I am possessed of a body" (_aham Śarírí_), "my
hand," &c., are all sentences in which a predicate involving the
notion of parts is applied to the soul "I."]

[Footnote 54: Reasoning in a circle. I suppose the &c. includes the
_Anavasthádosha_ or reasoning _ad infinitum_. He accepts the supposed
fault, and holds that it is actually borne out in a case before
everybody's eyes.]

[Footnote 55: In p. 31, line 5, _infra_, read _tattvárthe_ for
_tattvártham_.]

[Footnote 56: I read in p. 32, line 9, _Samyagdarśanádi_ for
_asamyagdarśanádi_; but the old text may mean "caused by the abolition
of hindrances produced by the qualities, wrong intuition," &c.]

[Footnote 57: Cf. the five _yamas_ in the _Yoga-sútras_, ii. 30.
Hemachandra (_Abhidh_ 81) calls them _yamas_.]

[Footnote 58: I read _kámánám_ for _kámáṇám_ in p. 33, line 7 (2 × 3 × 3 =
18).]

[Footnote 59: For _abháshaṇa_, see Hemach. 16.]

[Footnote 60: I propose in p. 33, line 17,
_raśayanajñánaśraddhávacháraṇáni_ for _rasáyaṇajñanaṃ
śraddhánávaraṇáni_. For _avacháraṇa_, see _Suśruta_, vol. ii. p. 157,
&c. If _anávaraṇa_ be the true reading, I suppose it must mean "the
absence of obstructions."]

[Footnote 61: This is a hard passage, but some light is thrown on it
by the scholiast to Hemachandra, _Abhidh_. 79.]

[Footnote 62: Or this may mean "by the influence of _upaśamakshaya_ or
_kshayopaśama_, it appears characterised by one or the other."]

[Footnote 63: I read in p. 34, line 7, _kalushádyákáreṇa_ for
_kalushányákáreṇa_. The _upaśamakshaya_ and _kshayopaśama_ seem to
correspond to the _aupaśamika_ and _ksháyika_ states about to be
described.]

[Footnote 64: _Strychnos potatorum._]

[Footnote 65: Just as in the Sánkhya philosophy, the soul is not
really bound though it seems to itself to be so.]

[Footnote 66: A valid non-perception is when an object is not seen,
and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, such as
the eye, light, &c.]

[Footnote 67: I read in p. 35, line 5, _'stíti_ for _sthiti_.]

[Footnote 68: Hence the term here used for "category"--_astikáya_.]

[Footnote 69: These (by Hemach. _Abhidh._ 21), possess only one
sense--touch. In p. 35, line 10, I read _śaṅkhagaṇḍolakaprabhṛitayas
trasáś chaturvidháḥ pṛithivyaptejo_.]

[Footnote 70: In p. 35, line 16, I read _teshám ajívatvát_ for _tesháṃ
jívatvát_. If we keep the old reading we must translate it, "because
the former only are animate."]

[Footnote 71: In p. 35, line 3 from bottom, I read _sarvatrávasthite_ for
_sarvatrávasthiti_. In the preceding line I read _álokenávachchhinne_ for
_álokenávichchhinne_.]

[Footnote 72: Cf. Siddhánta-muktávali, p. 27. The _vishaya_ is
_upabhoga-sádhanam_, but it begins with the _dvyaṇuka_. This category
takes up the forms of _sthávara_ which were excluded from _jíva_.]

[Footnote 73: It is an interesting illustration how thoroughly Mádhava
for the time throws himself into the Jaina system which he is
analysing, when we see that he gives the Jaina terminology for this
definition of _dravya_,--cf. _Vaiśesh. Sútra_, i. 1, 15. _Paryáya_ is
explained as _karman_ in Hemach. _Anek_. _Paryáya_, in p. 36, line 11
(_infra_, p. 53, line 9), seems used in a different sense from that
which it bears elsewhere. I have taken it doubtingly as in Hemach.
_Abhidh_. 1503, _paryáyo 'nukramaḥ kramaḥ_.]

[Footnote 74: _Yoga_ seems to be here the natural impulse of the soul
to act.]

[Footnote 75: In line 18, read _ásravaṇakáraṇatvád_.]

[Footnote 76: The _jnána_ is one, but it becomes apparently manifold
by its connection with the senses and external objects.]

[Footnote 77: These are also called the eight _karmans_ in
Govindánanda's gloss, _Ved. Sút._, ii. 2, 33.]

[Footnote 78: The Calcutta MS. reads _ádaraṇíyasya_ for
_ávaraṇíyasya_, in p. 37, last line. But _ávaraṇíya_ may be used for
_ávarana_ (_Páṇ._ iii. 4, 68). Cf. _Yoga Sút._, ii. 52, where Vyása's
Comm. has _ávaraṇíya_.]

[Footnote 79: _Jálavat_? The printed text has _jalavat_.]

[Footnote 80: Umásvámi-?]

[Footnote 81: For the _ságaropama_, see Wilson's _Essays_, vol. i. p.
309. In p. 38, line 16, I read _ityádyuktakálád úrdhvam api_ for the
obscure _ityádyuktaṃ káladurddhánavat_. I also read at the end of the
line _prachyutiḥ sthitiḥ_ for _prachyutisthitiḥ_.]

[Footnote 82: In p. 38, line 18, read _svakáryakaraṇe_.]

[Footnote 83: In p. 39, line 2 and line 5, for _írshyá_ read
_íryá_,--a bad misreading.]

[Footnote 84: In p. 39, line 6, I read _ápadyetá_ for _ápadyatá_.]

[Footnote 85: In p. 39, line 9, for _seshaṇá_ read _saishaṇá_.]

[Footnote 86: In p. 39, line 12, join _nirjantu_ and _jagatítale_.]

[Footnote 87: Mádhava omits the remaining divisions of _saṃvara_.
Wilson, _Essays_, vol. i. p. 311, gives them as _parishahá_,
"endurance," as of a vow; _yatidharma_, "the ten duties of an ascetic,
patience, gentleness," &c.; _bhávaná_, "conviction," such as that
worldly existences are not eternal, &c.; _cháritra_, "virtuous
observance."]

[Footnote 88: In p. 39, line 14, read _ásravasrotaso_.]

[Footnote 89: For _moha_, in line 16, read _moksha_.]

[Footnote 90: In p. 39, line 2 _infra_, I read _yathákála-_ for _yathá
kála-_.]

[Footnote 91: This passage is very difficult and not improbably
corrupt, and my interpretation of it is only conjectural. The ordinary
_nirjará_ is when an action attains its end (like the lulling of a
passion by the gratification), this lull is temporary. That _nirjará_
is "ancillary" which is rendered by asceticism a means to the
attainment of the highest good. The former is _akámá_, "desireless,"
because at the moment the desire is satisfied and so dormant; the
latter is _sakámá_, because the ascetic conquers the lower desire
under the overpowering influence of the higher desire for liberation.]

[Footnote 92: I read _nirodhe_ for _nirodhah_ in p. 40, line 6; cf. p.
37, line 13. The causes of bondage produce the assumption of bodies in
which future actions are to be performed.]

[Footnote 93: Literally "absence of _sanga_."]

[Footnote 94: In p. 41, line 7, read _sapta-bhaṅgí-naya_, see Ved. S.
Gloss., ii. 2, 23.]

[Footnote 95: I cannot understand the words at the end of the first
line, _kim vṛitatadvidheḥ_, and therefore leave them untranslated.]

[Footnote 96: Thus Govindánanda applies it (_Ved. Sút._, ii. 2, 33) to
"may be it is one," "may be it is many," &c.]

[Footnote 97: 'Ακαταληψἱα. This is Śriharsha's tenet in the
_Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khádya_.]

[Footnote 98: In p. 42, line 17, for _matenámiśritáni_ read _matena
miśritáni_.]

[Footnote 99: In p. 43, line 2, for _na yasya_ read _nayasya_.]

[Footnote 100: This list is badly printed in the Calcutta edition. It is
really identical with that given in Hemachandra's _Abhidhána-chintámaṇi_,
72, 73; but we must correct the readings to _antaráyás_, _rágadwesháv
aviratiḥ smaraḥ_, and _háso_ for _himsá_. The order of the eighteen
_doshas_ in the Calcutta edition is given by Hemachandra as 4, 5, 1, 2, 3,
10, 11, 12, 7, 9, 17, 16, 18, 8, 6, 15, 13, 14.]

[Footnote 101: In p. 43, line 13, for _vartini_ read _vartiniḥ_.]

[Footnote 102: This seems corrupt,--a line is probably lost.]

[Footnote 103: In last line, for _saṃsrave_ read _saṃvare_.]

[Footnote 104: Does this mean the knowledge of the world, the soul,
the liberated and liberation? These are called _ananta_. See Weber's
_Bhagavatí_, pp. 250, 261-266.]

[Footnote 105: _Sarajoharaṇáh_ is explained by the _rajoharaṇadhárin_
(= _vratin_) of Haláyudha, ii. 189.]

[Footnote 106: Cf. Wilson, _Essays_, i. 340. For _strím_ read _strí_.]




CHAPTER IV.

THE RÁMÁNUJA SYSTEM.


This doctrine of the Árhatas deserves a rational condemnation, for
whereas there is only one thing really existent, the simultaneous
co-existence of existence, non-existence and other modes in a
plurality of really existing things is an impossibility. Nor should
any one say: Granting the impossibility of the co-existence of
existence and non-existence, which are reciprocally contradictory, why
should there not be an alternation between existence and
non-existence? there being the rule that it is action, not _Ens_, that
alternates. Nor let it be supposed that the whole universe is
multiform, in reliance upon the examples of the elephant-headed Gaṇeśa
and of the incarnation of Vishṇu as half man, half lion; for the
elephantine and the leonine nature existing in one part, and the human
in another, and consequently there being no contradiction, those parts
being different, these examples are inapplicable to the maintenance of
a nature multiform as both existent and non-existent in one and the
same part (or place). Again, if any one urge: Let there be existence
in one form, and non-existence in another, and thus both will be
compatible; we rejoin: Not so, for if you had said that at different
times existence and non-existence may be the nature of anything, then
indeed there would have been no vice in your procedure. Nor is it to
be contended: Let the multiformity of the universe be like the length
and shortness which pertain to the same thing (in different
relations); for in these (in this length and shortness) there is no
contrariety, inasmuch as they are contrasted with different objects.
Therefore, for want of evidence, existence and non-existence as
reciprocally contradictory cannot reside at the same time in the same
thing. In a like manner may be understood the refutation of the other
_bhaṅgas_ (Árhata tenets).

Again, we ask, is this doctrine of the seven _bhaṅgas_, which lies at
the base of all this, itself uniform (as excluding one contradictory),
or multiform (as conciliating contradictories). If it is uniform,
there will emerge a contradiction to your thesis that all things are
multiform; if it is multiform, you have not proved what you wished to
prove, a multiform statement (as both existent and non-existent)
proving nothing.[107] In either case, there is rope for a noose for
the neck of the Syád-Vádin.

An admirable author of institutes has the founder of the Árhata
system, dear to the gods (uninquiring pietist), proved himself to be,
when he has not ascertained whether his result is the settling of nine
or of seven principles, nor the investigator who settles them, nor his
organon, the modes of evidence, nor the matter to be evidenced,
whether it be ninefold or not!

In like manner if it be admitted that the soul has (as the Árhatas
say), an extension equal to that of the body, it will follow that in
the case of the souls of ascetics, who by the efficacy of asceticism
assume a plurality of bodies, there is a differentiation of the soul
for each of those bodies. A soul of the size of a human body would not
(in the course of its transmigrations) be able to occupy the whole
body of an elephant; and again, when it laid aside its elephantine
body to enter into that of an ant, it would lose its capacity of
filling its former frame. And it cannot be supposed that the soul
resides successively in the human, elephantine, and other bodies, like
the light of a lamp which is capable of contraction and expansion,
according as it occupies the interior of a little station on the
road-side in which travellers are supplied with water, or the interior
of a stately mansion; for it would follow (from such a supposition)
that the soul being susceptible of modifications and consequently
non-eternal, there would be a loss of merits and a fruition of good
and evil unmerited.

As if then we had thrown their best wrestler, the redargution of the
rest of their categories may be anticipated from this exposition of
the manner in which their treatment of the soul has been vitiated.

Their doctrine, therefore, as repugnant to the eternal, infallible
revelation, cannot be adopted. The venerated Vyása accordingly
propounded the aphorism (ii. 2, 33), "Nay, because it is impossible in
one;" and this same aphorism has been analysed by Rámánuja with the
express purpose of shutting out the doctrine of the Jainas. The tenets
of Rámánuja are as follows:--Three categories are established, as
soul, not-soul, and Lord; or as subject, object, and supreme disposer.
Thus it has been said--

     "Lord, soul, and not-soul are the triad of principles: Hari
     (Vishṇu)

     "Is Lord; individual spirits are souls; and the visible
     world is not-soul."

Others, again (the followers of Śaṅkaráchárya), maintain that pure
intelligence, exempt from all differences, the absolute, alone is
really existent; and that this absolute whose essence is eternal,
pure, intelligent, and free, the identity of which with the
individuated spirit is learnt from the "reference to the same object"
(predication), "That art thou," undergoes bondage and emancipation.
The universe of differences (or conditions) such as that of subject
and object, is all illusorily imagined by illusion as in that (one
reality), as is attested by a number of texts: Existent only, fair
sir, was this in the beginning, One only without a second, and so
forth. Maintaining this, and acknowledging a suppression of this
beginningless illusion by knowledge of the unity (and identity) of
individuated spirits and the undifferenced absolute, in conformity
with hundreds of texts from the Upanishads, such as He that knows
spirit passes beyond sorrow; rejecting also any real plurality of
things, in conformity with the text condemnatory of duality, viz.,
Death after death he undergoes who looks upon this as manifold; and
thinking themselves very wise, the Śáṅkaras will not tolerate this
division (viz., the distribution of things into soul, not-soul, and
Lord). To all this the following counterposition is laid down:--This
might be all well enough if there were any proof of such illusion. But
there is no such ignorance (or illusion), an unbeginning entity,
suppressible by knowledge, testified in the perceptions, I am
ignorant, I know not myself and other things. Thus it has been said
(to explain the views of the Śáṅkara)--

     "Entitative from everlasting, which is dissolved by
     knowledge,

     "Such is illusion. This definition the wise enunciate."

This perception (they would further contend) is not conversant about
the absence of knowledge. For who can maintain this, and to whom? One
who leans on the arm of Prabhákara, or one to whom Kumárila-bhaṭṭa
gives his hand? Not the former, for in the words--

     "By means of its own and of another's form, eternal in the
     existent and non-existent,

     "Thing is recognised something by some at certain times.

     "Non-entity is but another entity by some kind of relation.
     Non-entity is but another entity, naught else, for naught
     else is observed."

They deny any non-entity ulterior to entity. Non-entity being
cognisable by the sixth instrument of knowledge (_anupalabdhi_), and
knowledge being always an object of inference, the absence of
knowledge cannot be an object of perception. If, again, any one who
maintains non-entity to be perceptible should employ the above
argument (from the perceptions, I am ignorant, I know not myself, and
other things); it may be replied: "Is there, or is there not, in the
consciousness, I am ignorant, an apprehension of self as characterised
by an absence, and of knowledge as the thing absent or non-existent?
If there is such apprehension, consciousness of the absence of
knowledge will be impossible, as involving a contradiction. If there
is not, consciousness of the absence of knowledge, which consciousness
presupposes a knowledge of the subject and of the thing absent, will
not readily become possible." Inasmuch (the Śáṅkaras continue) as the
foregoing difficulties do not occur if ignorance (or illusion) be
entitative, this consciousness (I am ignorant, I know not myself, and
other things) must be admitted to be conversant about an entitative
ignorance.

All this (the Rámánuja replies) is about as profitable as it would be
for a ruminant animal to ruminate upon ether; for an entitative
ignorance is not more supposable than an absence of knowledge. For (we
would ask), is any self-conscious principle presented as an object and
as a subject (of ignorance) as distinct from cognition? If it is
presented, how, since ignorance of a thing is terminable by knowledge
of its essence, can the ignorance continue? If none such is presented,
how can we be conscious of an ignorance which has no subject and no
object? If you say: A pure manifestation of the spiritual essence is
revealed only by the cognition opposed to ignorance (or illusion), and
thus there is no absurdity in the consciousness of ignorance
accompanied with a consciousness of its subject and object; then we
rejoin:--Unfortunately for you, this (consciousness of subject) must
arise equally in the absence of knowledge (for such we define illusion
to be), notwithstanding your assertion to the contrary. It must,
therefore, be acknowledged that the cognition, I am ignorant, I know
not myself and other things, is conversant about an absence of
cognition allowed by us both.

Well, then (the Śáṅkaras may contend), let the form of cognition
evidentiary of illusion, which is under disputation, be inference, as
follows:--Right knowledge must have had for its antecedent another
entity (_sc._ illusion), an entity different from mere prior
non-existence of knowledge, which envelops the objects of knowledge,
which is terminable by knowledge, which occupies the place of
knowledge, inasmuch as it (the right knowledge) illuminates an object
not before illuminated, like the light of a lamp springing up for the
first time in the darkness. This argument (we reply) will not stand
grinding (in the dialectic mill); for to prove the (antecedent)
illusion, you will require an ulterior illusion which you do not
admit, and a violation of your own tenets will ensue, while if you do
not so prove it, it may or may not exist; and, moreover, the example
is incompatible with the argument, for it cannot be the lamp that
illumines the hitherto unillumined object, since it is knowledge only
that illumines; and an illumination of objects may be effected by
knowledge even without the lamp, while the light of the lamp is only
ancillary to the visual organ which effectuates the cognition,
ancillary mediately through the dispulsion of the obstruent darkness.
We dismiss further prolixity.

The counterposition (of the Rámánujas) is as follows:--The illusion
under dispute does not reside in Brahman, who is pure knowledge,
because it is an illusion, like the illusion about nacre, &c. If any
one ask: Has not the self-conscious entity that underlies the illusion
about nacre, &c., knowledge only for its nature? they reply: Do not
start such difficulties; for we suppose that consciousness by its bare
existence has the nature of creating conformity to the usage about
(_i.e._, the name and notion of) some object; and such consciousness,
also called knowledge, apprehension, comprehension, intelligence, &c.,
constitutes the soul, or knowledge, of that which acts and knows. If
any one ask: How can the soul, if it consists of cognition, have
cognition as a quality? they reply: This question is futile; for as a
gem, the sun, and other luminous things, existing in the form of
light, are substances in which light as a quality inheres--for light,
as existing elsewhere than in its usual receptacle, and as being a
mode of things though a substance, is still styled and accounted a
quality derived from determination by that substance,--so this soul,
while it exists as a self-luminous intelligence, has also intelligence
as its quality. Accordingly the Vedic texts: A lump of salt is always
within and without one entire mass of taste, so also this soul is
within and without an entire mass of knowledge; Herein this person is
itself a light; Of the knowledge of that which knows there is no
suspension; He who knows, smells this; and so also, This is the soul
which, consisting of knowledge, is the light within the heart; For
this person is the seer, the hearer, the taster, the smeller, the
thinker, the understander, the doer; The person is knowledge, and the
like texts.

It is not to be supposed that the Veda also affords evidence of the
existence of the cosmical illusion, in the text, Enveloped in untruth
(_anṛita_); for the word untruth (_anṛita_) denotes that which is
other than truth (_ṛita_). The word _ṛita_ has a passive sense, as
appears from the words, Drinking _ṛita_. _Ṛita_ means works done
without desire of fruit; having as its reward the attainment of the
bliss of the Supreme Spirit through his propitiation. In the text in
question, untruth (_anṛita_) designates the scanty fruit enjoyed
during transmigratory existence as opposed to that (which results from
propitiation of the Supreme Spirit), which temporal fruit is
obstructive to the attainment of supreme existence (_brahman_); the
entire text (when the context is supplied) being: They who find not
this supreme sphere (_brahma-loka_) are enveloped in untruth. In such
texts, again, as Let him know illusion (_máyá_) to be the primary
emanative cause (_prakṛiti_), the term (_máyá_) designates the
emanative cause, consisting of the three "cords" (_guṇa_), and
creative of the diversified universe. It does not designate the
inexplicable illusion (for which the Śáṅkaras contend).

In such passages as, By him the defender of the body of the child,
moving rapidly, the thousand illusions (_máyá_) of the barbarian were
swooped upon as by a hawk, we observe that the word "illusion"
(_máyá_) designates the really existent weapon of a Titan, capable of
projective diversified creation. The Veda, then, never sets out an
inexplicable illusion. Nor (is the cosmical illusion to be inferred
from the "grand text," That art thou), inasmuch as the words, That art
thou, being incompetent to teach unity, and indicating a conditionate
Supreme Spirit, we cannot understand by them the essential unity of
the mutually exclusive supreme and individual spirits; for such a
supposition (as that they are identical) would violate the law of
excluded middle. To explain this. The term That denotes the Supreme
Spirit exempt from all imperfections, of illimitable excellence, a
repository of innumerable auspicious attributes, to whom the
emanation, sustentation, retractation of the universe is a
pastime;[108] such being the Supreme Spirit, spoken of in such texts
as, That desired, let me be many, let me bring forth. Perhaps the word
Thou, referring to the same object (as the word That), denotes the
Supreme Spirit characterised by consciousness, having all individual
spirits as his body; for a "reference to the same object" designates
one thing determined by two modes. Here, perhaps, an Advaita-vádin may
reply: Why may not the purport of the reference to the same object in
the words, That art thou, be undifferenced essence, the unity of
souls, these words (That and thou) having a (reciprocally) implicate
power by abandonment of opposite portions of their meaning; as is the
case in the phrase, This is that Devadatta. In the words, This is that
Devadatta, we understand by the word That, a person in relation to a
different time and place, and by the word This, a person in relation
to the present time and place. That both are one and the same is
understood by the form of predication ("reference to the same
object"). Now as one and the same thing cannot at the same time be
known as in different times and places, the two words (This and That)
must refer to the essence (and not to the accidents of time and
place), and unity of essence can be understood. Similarly in the text,
That art thou, there is implicated an indivisible essence by
abandonment of the contradictory portions (of the denotation), viz.,
finite cognition (which belongs to the individual soul or Thou), and
infinite cognition (which belongs to the real or unindividual soul).
This suggestion (the Rámánujas reply) is unsatisfactory, for there is
no opposition (between This and That) in the example (This is that
Devadatta), and consequently not the smallest particle of
"implication" (_lakshaṇá_, both This and That being used in their
denotative capacity). The connection of one object with two times past
and present involves no contradiction. And any contradiction supposed
to arise from relation to different places may be avoided by a
supposed difference of time, the existence in the distant place being
past, and the existence in the near being present. Even if we concede
to you the "implication," the (supposed) contradiction being avoidable
by supposing one term (either That or Thou) to be implicative, it is
unnecessary to admit that both words are implicative. Otherwise (if we
admit that both words are implicative), if it be granted that the one
thing may be recognised, with the concomitant assurance that it
differs as this and as that, permanence in things will be
inadmissible, and the Buddhist assertor of a momentary flux of things
will be triumphant.

We have, therefore (the Rámánujas continue), laid it down in this
question that there is no contradiction in the identity of the
individual and the Supreme Spirit, the individual spirits being the
body and the Supreme Spirit the soul. For the individual spirit as the
body, and therefore a form, of the Supreme Spirit, is identical with
the Supreme Spirit, according to another text, Who abiding in the
soul, is the controller of the soul, who knows the soul, of whom soul
is the body.

Your statement of the matter, therefore, is too narrow. ALL words are
designatory of the Supreme Spirit. They are not all synonymous, a
variety of media being possible; thus as all organised bodies, divine,
human, &c., are forms of individual spirits, so all things (are the
body of Supreme Spirit), all things are identical with Supreme Spirit.
Hence--

God, Man, Yaksha, Piśácha, serpent, Rákshasa, bird, tree, creeper,
wood, stone, grass, jar, cloth,--these and all other words, be they
what they may, which are current among mankind as denotative by means
of their base and its suffixes, as denoting those things, in denoting
things of this or that apparent constitution, really denote the
individual souls which assumed to them such body, and the whole
complexus of things terminating in the Supreme Spirit ruling within.
That God and all other words whatsoever ultimately denote the Supreme
Spirit is stated in the Tattva-muktávalí and in the Chaturantara--

     "God, and all other words, designate the soul, none else
     than That, called the established entity,

     "Of this there is much significant and undoubted
     exemplification in common speech and in the Veda;

     "Existence when dissociated from spirit is unknown; in the
     form of gods, mortals, and the rest

     "When pervading the individual spirit, the infinite has made
     a diversity of names and forms in the world."

In these words the author, setting forth that all words, God, and the
rest, designate the body, and showing in the words, "No unity in
systems," &c., the characteristic of body, and showing in the words,
"By words which are substitutes for the essence of things," &c., that
it is established that nothing is different from the universal Lord,
lays down in the verses, Significant of the essence, &c., that all
words ultimately designate the Supreme Spirit. All this may be
ascertained from that work. The same matter has been enforced by
Rámánuja in the Vedártha-saṅgraha, when analysing the Vedic text about
names and forms.

Moreover, every form of evidence having some determinate object, there
can be no evidence of an undetermined (unconditionate) reality. Even
in non-discriminative perception it is a determinate (or conditioned)
thing that is cognised. Else in discriminative perception there could
not be shown to be a cognition characterised by an already presented
form. Again, that text, That art thou, is not sublative of the
universe as rooted in illusion, like a sentence declaratory that what
was illusorily presented, as a snake is a piece of rope; nor does
knowledge of the unity of the absolute and the soul bring (this
illusory universe) to an end; for we have already demonstrated that
there is no proof of these positions.

Nor is there an absurdity (as the Śáṅkaras would say), on the
hypothesis enunciatory of the reality of the universe, in affirming
that by a cognition of one there is a cognition of all things: for it
is easily evinced that the mundane egg, consisting of the primary
cause (_prakṛiti_), intellect, self-position, the rudimentary
elements, the gross elements, the organs (of sense and of action), and
the fourteen worlds, and the gods, animals, men, immovable things, and
so forth, that exist within it, constituting a complex of all forms,
is all an effect, and that from the single cognition of absolute
spirit as its (emanative) cause, when we recognise that all this is
absolute spirit (there being a tautology between cause and effect),
there arises cognition of all things, and thus by cognition of one
cognition of all. Besides, if all else than absolute spirit were
unreal, then all being non-existent, it would follow that by one
cognition all cognition would be sublated.

It is laid down (by the Rámánujas) that retractation into the universe
(_pralaya_) is when the universe, the body whereof consists of souls
and the originant (_prakṛiti_), returns to its imperceptible state,
unsusceptible of division by names and forms, existing as absolute
spirit the emanative cause; and that creation (or emanation) is the
gross or perceptible condition of absolute spirit, the body whereof is
soul and not soul divided by diversity of names and forms, in the
condition of the (emanative) effect of absolute spirit. In this way
the identity of cause and effect laid down in the aphorism (of Vyása)
treating of origination, is easily explicable. The statements that the
Supreme Spirit is void of attributes, are intended (it is shown) to
deny thereof phenomenal qualities which are to be escaped from by
those that desire emancipation. The texts which deny plurality are
explained as allowed to be employed for the denial of the real
existence of things apart from the Supreme Spirit, which is identical
with all things, it being Supreme Spirit which subsists under all
forms as the soul of all, all things sentient and unsentient being
forms as being the body of absolute Spirit.[109]

What is the principle here involved, pluralism or monism, or a
universe both one and more than one? Of these alternatives monism is
admitted in saying that Supreme Spirit alone subsists in all forms as
all is its body; both unity and plurality are admitted in saying that
one only Supreme Spirit subsists under a plurality of forms diverse as
soul and not-soul; and plurality is admitted in saying that the
essential natures of soul, not-soul, and the Lord, are different, and
not to be confounded.

Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirits, or souls,
consisting of uncontracted and unlimited pure knowledge, but enveloped
in illusion, that is, in works from all eternity, undergo contraction
and expansion of knowledge according to the degrees of their merits.
Soul experiences fruition, and after reaping pleasures and pains
proportionate to merits and demerits, there ensues knowledge of the
Lord, or attainment of the sphere of the Lord. Of things which are
not-soul, and which are objects of fruition (or experience of pleasure
and pain), unconsciousness, unconduciveness to the end of man,
susceptibility of modification, and the like, are the properties. Of
the Supreme Lord the attributes are subsistence, as the internal
controller (or animator) of both the subjects and the objects of
fruition; the boundless glory of illimitable knowledge, dominion,
majesty, power, brightness, and the like, the countless multitude of
auspicious qualities; the generation at will of all things other than
himself, whether spiritual or non-spiritual; various and infinite
adornment with unsurpassable excellence, singular, uniform, and
divine.

Veṅkaṭa-nátha has given the following distribution of things:--

     "Those who know it have declared the principle to be
     twofold, substance and non-substance;

     "Substance is dichotomised as unsentient and sentient; the
     former being the unevolved (_avyakta_), and time.

     "The latter is the 'near' (_pratyak_) and the 'distant'
     (_parák_); the 'near' being twofold, as either soul or the
     Lord;

     "The 'distant' is eternal glory and intelligence; the other
     principle some have called the unsentient primary."

Of these--

     "Substance undergoes a plurality of conditions; the
     originant is possessed of goodness and the other cords;

     "Time has the form of years, &c.; soul is atomic and
     cognisant; the other spirit is the Lord;

     "Eternal bliss has been declared as transcending the three
     cords (or modes of phenomenal existence), and also as
     characterised by goodness;

     "The cognisable manifestation of the cognisant is
     intelligence; thus are the characteristics of substance
     summarily recounted."

Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirits, called
souls, are different from the Supreme Spirit and eternal. Thus the
text: Two birds, companions, friends, &c. (Rig-Veda, i. 164, 20).
Accordingly it is stated (in the aphorisms of Kaṇáda, iii. 2, 20),
Souls are diverse by reason of diversity of conditions. The eternity
of souls is often spoken of in revelation--

     "The soul is neither born, nor dies, nor having been shall
     it again cease to be;

     "Unborn, unchanging, eternal, this ancient of days is not
     killed when the body is killed" (Bhagavad-gítá, ii. 20).

Otherwise (were the soul not eternal) there would follow a failure of
requital and a fruition (of pleasures and pains) unmerited. It has
accordingly been said (in the aphorisms of Gautaṃa, iii. 25): Because
no birth is seen of one who is devoid of desire. That the soul is
atomic is well known from revelation--

     "If the hundredth part of a hair be imagined to be divided a
     hundred times,

     "The soul may be supposed a part of that, and yet it is
     capable of infinity."

And again--

     "Soul is of the size of the extremity of the spoke of a
     wheel. Spirit is to be recognised by the intelligence as
     atomic."

The visible, unsentient world, designated by the term not-soul, is
divided into three, as the object, the instrument, or the site of
fruition. Of this world the efficient and substantial cause is the
Deity, known under the names Purushottama (best of spirits), Vásudeva
(a patronymic of Kṛishṇa), and the like.

     "Vásudeva is the supreme absolute spirit, endowed with
     auspicious attributes,

     "The substantial cause, the efficient of the worlds, the
     animator of spirits."

This same Vásudeva, infinitely compassionate, tender to those devoted
to him, the Supreme Spirit, with the purpose of bestowing various
rewards apportioned to the deserts of his votaries in consequence of
pastime, exists under five modes, distinguished as "adoration"
(_archá_), "emanation" (_vibhava_), "manifestation" (_vyúha_), "the
subtile" (_súkshma_), and the "internal controller." (1.) "Adoration"
is images, and so forth. (2.) "Emanation" is his incarnation, as Ráma,
and so forth. (3.) His "manifestation" is fourfold, as Vásudeva,
Saṅkarshaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. (4.) "The subtile" is the
entire Supreme Spirit, with six attributes, called Vásudeva. His
attributes are exemption from sin, and the rest. That he is exempt
from sin is attested in the Vedic text: Passionless, deathless,
without sorrow, without hunger, desiring truth, true in purpose. (5.)
The "internal controller," the actuator of all spirits, according to
the text: Who abiding in the soul, rules the soul within. When by
worshipping each former embodiment a mass of sins inimical to the end
of the soul (_i.e._, emancipation) have been destroyed, the votary
becomes entitled to practise the worship of each latter embodiment. It
has, therefore, been said--

     "Vásudeva, in his tenderness to his votaries, gives, as
     desired by each,

     "According to the merits of his qualified worshippers, large
     recompense.

     "For that end, in pastime he makes to himself his five
     embodiments;

     "Images and the like are 'adoration;' his incarnations are
     'emanations;'

     "As Saṅkarshaṅa, Vásudeva, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, his
     manifestation is to be known to be fourfold; 'the subtile'
     is the entire six attributes;

     "That self-same called Vásudeva is styled the Supreme
     Spirit;

     "The internal controller is declared as residing in the
     soul, the actuator of the soul,

     "Described in a multitude of texts of the Upanishads, such
     as 'Who abiding in the soul.'

     "By the worship of 'adoration,' a man casting off his
     defilement becomes a qualified votary;

     "By the subsequent worship of 'emanation,' he becomes
     qualified for the worship of 'manifestation;' next,

     "By the worship thereafter of 'the subtile,' he becomes able
     to behold the 'internal controller.'"

The worship of the Deity is described in the Pañcha-rátra as
consisting of five elements, viz., (1.) the access, (2.) the
preparation, (3.) oblation, (4.) recitation, (5.) devotion. Of these,
access is the sweeping, smearing, and so forth, of the way to the
temple. The preparation is the provision of perfumes, flowers, and the
like appliances of worship. Oblation is worship of the deities.
Recitation is the muttered ejaculation of sacred texts, with attention
to what they mean, the rehearsal of hymns and lauds of Vishṇu, the
commemoration of his names, and study of institutes which set forth
the truth. Devotion is meditation on the Deity. When the vision of the
visible world has been brought to a close by knowledge accumulated by
the merit of such worship, the infinitely compassionate Supreme
Spirit, tender to his votaries, bestows upon the votary devoted to his
lord and absorbed in his lord, his own sphere infinite and endless,
marked by consciousness of being like him, from which there is no
future return (to the sorrows of transmigratory existence). So the
traditionary text--

     "When they have come to me, the high-souled no longer
     undergo future birth, a receptacle of pain, transitory,
     having attained to the supreme consummation.

     "Vásudeva, having found his votary, bestows upon him his own
     mansion, blissful, undecaying, from whence there is no more
     return."

After laying up all this in his heart, leaning upon the teaching of
the great Upanishad, and finding the gloss on the Vedánta aphorisms by
the venerated Bodháyanachárya too prolix, Rámánuja composed a
commentary on the Śárírakamímánsá (or Vedánta theosophy). In this the
sense of the first aphorism, "Then hence the absolute must be desired
to be known," is given as follows:--The word _then_ in this aphorism
means, after understanding the hitherto-current sacred rites. Thus the
glossator writes: "After learning the sacred rites," he desires to
know the absolute. The word _hence_ states the reason, viz., because
one who has read the Veda and its appendages and understands its
meaning is averse from sacred rites, their recompense being
perishable. The wish to know the absolute springs up in one who longs
for permanent liberation, as being the means of such liberation. By
the word _absolute_ is designated the Supreme Spirit, from whom are
essentially excluded all imperfections, who is of illimitable
excellence, and of innumerable auspicious attributes. Since then the
knowledge of sacred rites and the performance of those rites is
mediately through engendering dispassionateness, and through putting
away the defilement of the understanding, an instrument of the
knowledge of the absolute; and knowledge of sacred rites and knowledge
of the absolute being consequently cause and effect, the former and
the latter Mímánsá constitute one system of institutes. On this
account the glossator has described this system as one with the
sixteenfold system of Jaimini. That the fruit of sacred rites is
perishable, and that of the knowledge of the absolute imperishable,
has been laid down in virtue of Vedic texts, such as: Scanning the
spheres gained by rites, let him become passionless; Not wrought by
the rite performed, accompanied with inference and disjunctive
reasoning. Revelation, by censuring each when unaccompanied by the
other, shows that it is knowledge together with works that is
efficacious of emancipation, in the words: Blind darkness they enter
who prefer illusion, and a greater darkness still do they enter who
delight in knowledge only; knowledge and illusion, he who knows these
both, he passing beyond death together with illusion, tastes
immortality by knowledge. Conformably it is said in the
Pañcharátra-rahasya--

     "That ocean of compassion, the Lord, tender to his votaries,

     "For his worshipper's sake takes five embodiments upon him.

     "These are styled Adoration, Emanation, Manifestation, the
     Subtile, the Internal Controller,

     "Resorting whereto souls attain to successive stages of
     knowledge.

     "As a man's sins are worn away by each successive worship,

     "He becomes qualified for the worship of each next
     embodiment.

     "Thus day by day, according to religion, revealed and
     traditional,

     "By the aforesaid worship Vásudeva becomes propitious to
     mankind.

     "Hari, when propitiated by devotion in the form of
     meditation,

     "At once brings to a close that illusion which is the
     aggregate of works.

     "Then in souls the essential attributes, from which
     transmigration has vanished,

     "Are manifested, auspicious, omniscience, and the rest.

     "These qualities are common to the emancipated spirits and
     the Lord,

     "Universal efficiency alone among them is peculiar to the
     Deity.

     "Emancipated spirits are ulterior to the infinite absolute,
     which is unsusceptible of aught ulterior;

     "They enjoy all beatitudes together with that Spirit."

It is therefore stated that those who suffer the three kinds of pain
must, for the attainment of immortality, investigate the absolute
spirit known under such appellations as the Highest Being. According
to the maxim: The base and the suffix convey the meaning conjointly,
and of these the meaning of the suffix takes the lead, the notion of
desire is predominant (in the word _jijñásitavya_), and desired
knowledge is the predicate (in the aphorism, Then hence the absolute
must be desired to be known). Knowledge is cognition designated by
such terms as meditation, devotion; not the merely superficial
knowledge derived from verbal communication, such being competent to
any one who hears a number of words and understands the force of each,
even without any predication; in conformity with such Vedic texts as:
Self indeed it is that is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought, to
be pondered; He should meditate that it is self alone; Having known,
let him acquire excellent wisdom; He should know that which is beyond
knowledge. In these texts "to be heard" is explanatory, hearing being
understood (but not enounced) in the text about sacred study (viz.,
_shaḍaṅgena vedo'dhyeyo jñeyaścha_, the Veda, with its six appendages,
is to be studied and known); so that a man who has studied the Veda
must of his own accord, in acquiring the Veda and its appendages,
engage in "hearing," in order to ascertain the sense by examining it
and the occasion of its enouncement. The term "to be thought" (or "to
be inferred") is also explanatory, cogitation (or inference) being
understood as the complementary meaning of hearing, according to the
aphorism: Before its signification is attained the system is
significant. Meditation is a reminiscence consisting of an unbroken
succession of reminiscences like a stream of oil, it being revealed in
the text, in continuity of reminiscence there is a solution of all
knots,--that it is unintermittent reminiscence that is the means of
emancipation. And this reminiscence is tantamount to intuition.

     "Cut is his heart's knot, solved are all his doubts,

     "And exhausted are all his works, when he has seen the
     Highest and Lowest,"

because he becomes one with that Supreme. So also in the words, Self
indeed is to be seen, it is predicated of this reminiscence that it is
an intuition. Reminiscence becomes intuitional through the vivacity of
the representations. The author of the Vákya has treated of all this
in detail in the passage beginning Cognition is meditation. The
characters of this meditation are laid out in the text: This soul is
not attainable by exposition, nor by wisdom, nor by much learning;
Whom God chooses by him God may be attained. To him this self unfolds
its own nature. For it is that which is dearest which is
choice-worthy, and as the soul finds itself most dear, so the Lord is
of Himself most dear, as was declared by the Lord Himself--

     "To them always devoted, who worship me with love,

     "I give the devotion of understanding whereby they come to
     me."

And again--

     "That Supreme Spirit, Arjuna, is attainable by faith
     unwavering."

But devotion (or faith) is a kind of cognition which admits no other
motive than the illimitable beatitude, and is free from all other
desires; and the attainment of this devotion is by discrimination and
other means. As is said by the author of the Vákya: Attainment
thereof results from discrimination (_viveka_), exemption (_vimoka_),
practice (_abhyása_), observance (_kriyá_), excellence (_kalyáṇa_),
freedom from despondency (_anavasáda_), satisfaction (_anuddharsha_),
according to the equivalence (of the definition), and the explication
(of these terms). Of these means, discrimination is purity of nature,
resultant from eating undefiled food, and the explication (of
discrimination) is From purity of diet, purity of understanding, and
by purity of understanding the unintermittent reminiscence. Exemption
is non-attachment to sensuous desires; the explication being, Let the
quietist meditate. Practice is reiteration; and of this a traditionary
explication is quoted (from the Bhagavad-gítá) by (Rámánuja) the
author of the commentary: For ever modified by the modes thereof.
Observance is the performance of rites enjoined in revelation and
tradition according to one's ability; the explication being (the Vedic
text), He who has performed rites is the best of those that know the
supreme. The excellences are veracity, integrity, clemency, charity
(alms-giving), and the like; the explication being, It is attained by
veracity. Freedom from despondency is the contrary of dejection; the
explication being, This soul is not attained by the faint-hearted.
Satisfaction is the contentment which arises from the contrary of
dejection; the explication being, Quiescent, self-subdued. It has thus
been shown that by the devotion of one in whom the darkness has been
dispelled by the grace of the Supreme Spirit, propitiated by certain
rites and observances, which devotion is meditation transformed into a
presentative manifestation of soul, without ulterior motive, as
incessantly and illimitably desired, the sphere of the Supreme Spirit
(Vaikuṇṭha) is attained. Thus Yámuna says: Attainable by the final and
absolute devotion of faith in one internally purified by both (works
and knowledge); that is, in one whose internal organ is rectified by
the devotion of works and knowledge.

In anticipation of the inquiry, But what absolute is to be desired to
be known? the definition is given (in the second aphorism). From which
the genesis, and so forth, of this. The genesis, and so forth, the
creation (emanation), sustentation, and retractation (of the
universe). The purport of the aphorism is that the emanation,
sustentation, and retractation of this universe, inconceivably
multiform in its structure, and interspersed with souls, from Brahmá
to a tuft of grass, of determinate place, time, and fruition, is from
this same universal Lord, whose essence is contrary to all qualities
which should be escaped from, of illimitable excellences, such as
indefeasible volition, and of innumerable auspicious attributes,
omniscient, and omnipotent.

In anticipation of the further inquiry, What proof is there of an
absolute of this nature? It is stated that the system of institutes
itself is the evidence (in the third aphorism): Because it has its
source from the system. To have its source from the system is to be
that whereof the cause or evidence is the system. The system, then, is
the source (or evidence) of the absolute, as being the cause of
knowing the self, which is the cause of knowing the absolute. Nor is
the suspicion possible that the absolute may be reached by some other
form of evidence. For perception can have no conversancy about the
absolute since it is supersensible. Nor can inference, for the
illation, the ocean, and the rest, must have a maker, because it is an
effect like a water-pot, is worth about as much as a rotten pumpkin.
It is evinced that it is such texts as, Whence also these elements,
that prove the existence of the absolute thus described.

Though the absolute (it may be objected) be unsusceptible of any other
kind of proof, the system, did it not refer to activity and cessation
of activity, could not posit the absolute aforesaid. To avoid by
anticipation any queries on this point, it is stated (in the fourth
aphorism): But that is from the construction. This is intended to
exclude the doubt anticipated. The evidence, then, of the system is
the only evidence that can be given of the absolute. Why? Because of
the construction, that is because the absolute, that is, the highest
end for man, is construed as the subject (of the first aphorism, viz.,
Then thence the absolute is to be desired to be known). Moreover, a
sentence which has nothing to do either with activity or with
cessation of activity is not therefore void of purpose, for we observe
that sentences merely declaratory of the nature of things, such as, A
son is born to you, This is not a snake, convey a purpose, viz., the
cessation of joy or of fear. Thus there is nothing unaccounted for. We
have here given only a general indication. The details may be learnt
from the original (viz., Rámánuja's Bháshya on the Vedánta aphorisms);
we therefore decline a further treatment, apprehensive of prolixity;
and thus all is clear.[110]

A. E. G.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 107: Cf. "The argument in defence of the Maxim of
Contradiction is that it is a postulate employed in all the particular
statements as to matters of daily experience that a man understands
and acts upon when heard from his neighbours; a postulate such that,
if you deny it, no speech is either significant or trustworthy to
inform and guide those who hear it. You may cite innumerable examples
both of speech and action in the detail of life, which the
Herakleitean must go through like other persons, and when, if he
proceeded upon his own theory, he could neither give nor receive
information by speech, nor ground any action upon the beliefs which he
declares to co-exist in his own mind. Accordingly the Herakleitean
Kratylus (so Aristotle says) renounced the use of affirmative speech,
and simply pointed with his finger."--Grote's Aristotle, vol. ii. pp.
297, 298.]

[Footnote 108: Cf. the dictum of Herakleitus: Making worlds is Zeus's
pastime; and that of Plato (Laws, Book vii. p. 803): Man is made to be
the plaything of God.]

[Footnote 109: "Whose body nature is, and God the soul."--_Pope._]

[Footnote 110: For further details respecting Rámánuja and his system,
see Wilson's Works, vol. i. pp. 34-46; and Banerjea's Dialogues, ix.
The _Tattva-muktávalí_ was printed in the _Pandit_ for September 1871;
but the lines quoted in p. 73 are not found there.]




CHAPTER V.

THE SYSTEM OF PURNA-PRAJNA.


Ánanda-tírtha (Púrṇa-prajña, or Madhva) rejected this same Rámánuja
system, because, though like his own views, it teaches the atomic size
of the soul, the servitude of the soul, the existence of the Veda
without any personal author, the authenticity of the Veda, the
self-evidence of the instruments of knowledge, the triad of evidences,
dependency upon the Pañcha-rátra, the reality of plurality in the
universe, and so forth,--yet, in accepting three hypotheses as to
reciprocally contradictory divisions, &c., it coincides with the
tenets of the Jainas. Showing that He is soul, That art thou, and a
number of other texts of the Upanishads bear a different import under
a different explanation, he set up a new system under the guise of a
new explication of the Brahma-Mímáṇsá (or Vedánta).

For in his doctrine ultimate principles are dichotomised into
independent and dependent; as it is stated in the Tattva-viveka:--

     "Independent and dependent, two principles are received;

     "The independent is Vishṇu the Lord, exempt from
     imperfections, and of inexhaustible excellences."

Here it will be urged (by the Advaita-vádins): Why predicate of the
absolute these inexhaustible excellences in the teeth of the Upanishads,
which lay down that the absolute principle is void of homogeneity and
heterogeneity, and of all plurality in itself? To this be it replied: Not
so, for these texts of the Upanishads, as contradictory of many proofs
positive of duality, cannot afford proof of universal unity; perception,
for example, in the consciousness, This is different from that, pronounces
a difference between things, blue and yellow, and so forth. The opponent
will rejoin: Do you hold that perception is cognisant of a perceptional
difference, or of a difference constituted by the thing and its opposite?
The former alternative will not hold: for without a cognition of the thing
and its opposite, the recognition of the difference, which presupposes
such a cognition, will be impossible. On the latter alternative it must be
asked, Is the apprehension of the difference preceded by an apprehension
of the thing and its contrary, or are all the three (the thing, its
contrary, and the contrariety) simultaneously apprehended? It cannot be
thus preceded, for the operation of the intellect is without delay (or
without successive steps), and there would also result a logical seesaw
(apprehension of the difference presupposing apprehension of the thing and
its contrary, and apprehension of the thing and its contrary presupposing
apprehension of the difference). Nor can there be a simultaneous
apprehension (of the thing, its contrary, and the difference); for
cognitions related as cause and effect cannot be simultaneous, and the
cognition of the thing is the cause of the recognition of the difference;
the causal relation between the two being recognised by a concomitance and
non-concomitance (mutual exclusion), the difference not being cognised
even when the thing is present, without a cognition of its absent
contrary. The perception of difference, therefore (the opponent
concludes), is not easily admissible. To this let the reply be as
follows:--Are these objections proclaimed against one who maintains a
difference identical with the things themselves, or against one who
maintains a difference between things as the subjects of attributes? In
the former case, you will be, as the saying runs, punishing a respectable
Bráhman for the offence of a thief, the objections you adduce being
irrelevant. If it be urged that if it is the essence of the thing that is
the difference, then it will no longer require a contrary counterpart; but
if difference presuppose a contrary counterpart, it will exist everywhere;
this statement must be disallowed, for while the essence of a thing is
first known as different from everything else, the determinate usage (name
and notion) may be shown to depend upon a contrary counterpart; for
example, the essence of a thing so far as constituted by its dimensions is
first cognised, and afterwards it becomes the object of some determinate
judgment, as long or short in relation to some particular counterpart (or
contrasted object). Accordingly, it is said in the Vishṇu-tattva-nirṇaya:
"Difference is not proved to exist by the relation of determinant and
determinate; for this relation of determinant and determinate (or
predicate and subject) presupposes difference; and if difference were
proved to depend upon the thing and its counterpart, and the thing and its
counterpart to presuppose difference, difference as involving a logical
circle could not be accounted for; but difference is itself a real
predicament (or ultimate entity). For this reason (viz., because
difference is a _thing_) it is that men in quest of a cow do not act (as
if they had found her) when they see a gayal, and do not recall the word
_cow_. Nor let it be objected that (if difference be a real entity and as
such perceived) on seeing a mixture of milk and water, there would be a
presentation of difference; for the absence of any manifestation of, and
judgment about, the difference, may be accounted for by the force of (the
same) obstructives (as hinder the perception of other things), viz.,
aggregation of similars and the rest." Thus it has been said (in the
Sáṅkhya-káriká, v. vii.)--

     "From too great remoteness, from too great nearness, from
     defect in the organs, from instability of the common
     sensory,

     "From subtilty, from interposition, from being overpowered,
     and from aggregation of similars."

There is no perception respectively of a tree and the like on the peak
of a mountain, because of its too great remoteness; of collyrium
applied to the eyes, and so forth, because of too great proximity; of
lightning and the like, because of a defect in the organs; of a jar or
the like in broad daylight, by one whose common sensory is bewildered
by lust and other passions, because of instability of the common
sensory; of an atom and the like, because of their subtility; of
things behind a wall, and so forth, because of interposition; of the
light of a lamp and the like, in the day-time, because of its being
overpowered; of milk and water, because of the aggregation of
similars.

Or let the hypothesis of difference in qualities be granted, and no
harm is done; for given the apprehension of a subject of attributes
and of its contrary, the presentation of difference in their modes is
possible. Nor let it be supposed that on the hypothesis of difference
in the modes of things, as each difference must be different from some
ulterior difference, there will result an embarrassing progression to
infinity, there being no occasion for the occurrence of the said
ulterior difference, inasmuch as we do not observe that men think and
say that two things are different as differenced from the different.
Nor can an ulterior difference be inferred from the first difference,
for there being no difference to serve as the example in such
inference, there cannot but be a non-occurrence of inference. And thus
it must be allowed that in raising the objection you have begged for a
little oil-cake, and have had to give us gallons of oil. If there be
no difference for the example the inference cannot emerge. The bride
is not married for the destruction of the bridegroom. There being,
then, no fundamental difficulty, this infinite progression presents no
trouble.

Difference (duality) is also ascertained by inference. Thus the
Supreme Lord differs from the individual soul as the object of its
obedience; and he who is to be obeyed by any person differs from that
person, a king, for instance, from his attendant. For men, desiring
as they do the end of man, Let me have pleasure, let me not have the
slightest pain, if they covet the position of their lord, do not
become objects of his favour, nay, rather, they become recipients of
all kinds of evil. He who asserts his own inferiority and the
excellence of his superior, he it is who is to be commended; and the
gratified superior grants his eulogist his desire. Therefore it has
been said:--

     "Kings destroy those who assert themselves to be kings,

     "And grant to those who proclaim their kingly pre-eminence
     all that they desire."

Thus the statement of those (Advaita-vádins) in their thirst to be one
with the Supreme Lord, that the supreme excellence of Vishṇu is like a
mirage, is as if they were to cut off their tongues in trying to get a
fine plantain, since it results that through offending this supreme Vishṇu
they must enter into the hell of blind darkness (_andha-tamasa_). The same
thing is laid down by Madhya-mandira in the
Mahábhárata-tátparya-nirṇaya:--

     "O Daityas, enemies of the eternal, Vishṇu's anger is waxed
     great;

     "He hurls the Daityas into the blind darkness, because they
     decide blindly."

This service (or obedience of which we have spoken) is trichotomised
into (1.) stigmatisation, (2.) imposition of names, (3.) worship.

Of these, (1.) stigmatisation is (the branding upon oneself) of the
weapons of Náráyaṇa (or Vishṇu) as a memorial of him, and as a means
of attaining the end which is needful (emancipation). Thus the sequel
of the Sákalya-samhitá:--

     "The man who bears branded in him the discus of the immortal
     Vishṇu, which is the might of the gods,

     "He, shaking off his guilt, goes to the heaven (Vaikuṇṭha)
     which ascetics, whose desires are passed away, enter into:

     "The discus Sudarśana by which, uplifted in his arm, the
     gods entered that heaven;

     "Marked wherewith the Manus projected the emanation of the
     world, that weapon Bráhmans wear (stamped upon them);

     "Stigmatised wherewith they go to the supreme sphere of
     Vishṇu;

     "Marked with the stigmas of the wide-striding (Vishṇu), let
     us become beatified."

Again, the Taittiríyaka Upanishad says: "He whose body is not branded,
is raw, and tastes it not: votaries bearing it attain thereto." The
particular parts to be branded are specified in the Ágneya-puráṇa:--

     "On his right hand let the Bráhman wear Sudarśana,

     "On his left the conch-shell: thus have those who know the
     Veda declared."

In another passage is given the invocation to be recited on being
branded with the discus:--

     "Sudarśana, brightly blazing, effulgent as ten million suns,

     "Show unto me, blind with ignorance, the everlasting way of
     Vishṇu.

     "Thou aforetime sprangest from the sea, brandished in the
     hand of Vishṇu,

     "Adored by all the gods; O Páṅchajanya, to thee be
     adoration."

(2.) Imposition of names is the appellation of sons and others by such
names as Keśava, as a continual memorial of the name of the Supreme
Lord.

(3.) Worship is of ten kinds, viz., with the voice, (1.) veracity,
(2.) usefulness, (3.) kindliness, (4.) sacred study; with the body,
(5.) alms-giving, (6.) defence, (7.) protection; with the common
sensory, (8.) mercy, (9.) longing, and (10.) faith. Worship is the
dedication to Náráyaṇa of each of these as it is realised. Thus it has
been said:--

     "Stigmatisation, imposition of names, worship; the last is
     of ten kinds."

Difference (or duality between the Supreme Being and the universe) may
also be inferred from cognisability and other marks. So also
difference (or duality) may be understood from revelation, from texts
setting out duality in emancipation and beatitude, such as: "All
rejoice over truth attained; truthful, and celebrating the gift of the
divine Indra, they recount his glory;" "Sarva, among those that know
the truth, O Bráhman, is in the universe, true spirit; true is
individual spirit; truth is duality, truth is duality, in me is
illusion, in me illusion, in me illusion."

Again:--

     "After attaining this knowledge, becoming like unto me,

     "In creation they are not born again, in retractation they
     perish not" (Bhagavad-gítá, xiv. 2).

According also to such aphorisms as, "Excepting cosmical operation
because of occasion, and because of non-proximity."

Nor should suggestion be made that individual spirit is God in virtue
of the text, He that knows the absolute becomes the absolute; for this
text is hyperbolically eulogistic, like the text, Worshipping a
Bráhman devoutly a Śúdra becomes a Bráhman, _i.e._, becomes exalted.

If any one urge that according to the text:--

     "If the universe existed it would doubtless come to an end,"

this duality is merely illusory, and in reality a unity, and that
duality is learnt to be illusorily imagined; it may be replied: What
you say is true, but you do not understand its meaning; for the real
meaning is, If this world had been produced, it would, without doubt,
come to an end; therefore this universe is from everlasting, a
fivefold dual universe; and it is not non-existent, because it is mere
illusion. Illusion is defined to be the will of the Lord, in virtue
of the testimony of many such passages as:--

     "The great illusion, ignorance, necessity, the bewilderment,

     "The originant, ideation,--thus is thy will called, O
     Infinite.

     "The originant, because it originates greatly; ideation,
     because it produces ideas;

     "The illusion of Hari, who is called _a_, is termed
     (_avidyá_) ignorance:

     "Styled (_máyá_) illusion, because it is pre-eminent, for
     the name _máyá_ is used of the pre-eminent;

     "The excellent knowledge of Vishṇu is called, though one
     only, by these names;

     "For Hari is excellent knowledge, and this is characterised
     by spontaneous beatitude."

That in which this excellent knowledge produces knowledge and effects
sustentation thereof, that is pure illusion, as known and sustained,
therefore by the Supreme Lord duality is not illusorily imagined. For
in the Lord illusory imagination of the universe is not possible,
illusory imagination arising from non-perception of differences (which
as an imperfection is inconsistent with the divine nature).

If it be asked how then that (illusory duality) is predicated, the
answer is that in reality there is a non-duality, that is in reality,
Vishṇu being better than all else, has no equal and no superior.
Accordingly, the grand revelation:--

     "A difference between soul and the Lord, a difference
     between the unsentient and the Lord,

     "A difference among souls, and a difference of the
     unsentient and the soul each from the other.

     "Also the difference of unsentient things from one another,
     the world with its five divisions.

     "This same is real and from all eternity; if it had had a
     beginning it would have an end:

     "Whereas it does not come to an end; and it is not
     illusorily imagined:

     "For if it were imagined it would cease, but it never
     ceases.

     "That there is no duality is therefore the doctrine of those
     that lack knowledge;

     "For this the doctrine of those that have knowledge is known
     and sustained by Vishṇu."

The purpose, then, of all revelations is to set out the supreme
excellence of Vishṇu. With this in view the Lord declared:--

     "Two are these persons in the universe, the perishable and
     the imperishable;

     "The perishable is all the elements, the imperishable is the
     unmodified.

     "The other, the most excellent person, called the Supreme
     Spirit,

     "Is the undecaying Lord, who pervading sustains the three
     worlds.

     "Since transcending the perishable, I am more excellent than
     the imperishable (soul),

     "Hence I am celebrated among men and in the Veda as the best
     of persons (_Purushottama_);

     "He who uninfatuated knows me thus the best of persons, he
     all-knowing worships me in every wise.

     "Thus this most mysterious institute is declared, blameless
     (Arjuna):

     "Knowing this a man may be wise, and may have done what he
     has to do, O Bhárata" (Bhagavad-gítá, xv. 16-20).

So in the Mahá-varáha--

     "The primary purport of all the Vedas relates to the supreme
     spouse of Śrī;

     "Its purport regarding the excellence of any other deity
     must be subordinate."

It is reasonable that the primary purport should regard the supreme
excellence of Vishṇu. For emancipation is the highest end of all men,
according to the text of the Bhállaveya Upanishad: While merit,
wealth, and enjoyment are transitory, emancipation is eternal;
therefore a wise man should strive unceasingly to attain thereto. And
emancipation is not won without the grace of Vishṇu, according to the
text of the Náráyaṇa Upanishad: Through whose grace is the highest
state, through whose essence he is liberated from transmigration,
while inferior men propitiating the divinities are not emancipated;
the supreme object of discernment to those who desire to be liberated
from this snare of works. According also to the words of the
Vishṇu-puráṇa--

"If he be propitiated, what may not here be won? Enough of all wealth
and enjoyments. These are scanty enough. On climbing the tree of the
supreme essence, without doubt a man attains to the fruit of
emancipation."

And it is declared that the grace of Vishṇu is won only through the
knowledge of his excellence, not through the knowledge of non-duality.
Nor is there in this doctrine any confliction with texts declaratory
of the identity (of personal and impersonal spirit) such as, That art
thou (for this pretended identity) is mere babbling from ignorance of
the real purport.

     "The word That, when undetermined, designates the eternally
     unknown,

     "The word Thou designates a knowable entity; how can these
     be one?"

And this text (That art thou) indicates similarity (not identity) like
the text, The sun is the sacrificial post. Thus the grand
revelation:--

     "The ultimate unity of the individual soul is either
     similarity of cognition,

     "Or entrance into the same place, or in relation to the
     place of the individual;

     "Not essential unity, for even when it is emancipated it is
     different,

     "The difference being independence and completeness (in the
     Supreme Spirit), and smallness and dependence (in the
     individual spirit)."

Or to propose another explanation of the text, _Átmá tat tvam asi_,
That art thou, it may be divided, _átmá tat tvam asi_. He alone is
soul as possessing independence and other attributes, and thou art
not-that (_atat_) as wanting those attributes; and thus the doctrine
of unity is utterly expelled. Thus it has been said:--

     "Or the division may be _Atat tvam_, and thus unity will be
     well got rid of."

According, therefore, to the Tattva-váda-rahasya, the words in the
nine examples (in the Chhándogya Upanishad), He like a bird tied with
a string, &c., teach unity with the view of giving an example of
non-duality. Accordingly the Mahopanishad:--

     "Like a bird and the string; like the juices of various
     trees;

     "Like rivers and the sea; like fresh and salt water;

     "Like a robber and the robbed; like a man and his energy;

     "So are soul and the Lord diverse, for ever different.

     "Nevertheless from subtilty (or imperceptibility) of form,
     the supreme Hari

     "Is not seen by the dim-sighted to be other than the
     individual spirit, though he is its actuator;

     "On knowing their diversity a man is emancipated: otherwise
     he is bound."

And again--

     "Brahmá, Śiva, and the greatest of the gods decay with the
     decay of their bodies;

     "Greater than these is Hari, undecaying, because his body is
     for the sustentation of Lakshmí.

     "By reason of all his attributes, independence, power,
     knowledge, pleasure, and the rest,

     "All they, all the deities, are in unlimited obedience to
     him."

And again:--

     "Knowing Vishṇu, full of all excellences, the soul, exempted
     from transmigration,

     "Rejoices in his presence for ever, enjoying painless bliss.

     "Vishṇu is the refuge of liberated souls, and their supreme
     ruler.

     "Obedient to him are they for ever; he is the Lord."

That by knowledge of one thing there is knowledge of all things may be
evinced from its supremacy and causality, not from the falsity of all
things. For knowledge of the false cannot be brought about by
knowledge of real existence. As we see the current assurance and
expression that by knowing or not knowing its chief men a village is
known or not known; and as when the father the cause is known, a man
knows the son; (so by knowing the supreme and the cause, the inferior
and the effect is known). Otherwise (on the doctrine of the
Advaita-vádins that the world is false and illusory) the words _one_
and _lump_ in the text, By one lump of clay, fair sir, all that is
made of clay is recognised, would be used to no purpose, for the text
must be completed by supplying the words, By reason of clay
recognised. For the text, Utterance with the voice, modification,
name, clay (or other determinate object),--these alone are real,
cannot be assumed to impart the falsity of things made; the reality of
these being admitted, for what is meant is, that of which utterance
with the voice is a modification, is unmodified, eternal; and a name
such as clay, such speech is true. Otherwise it would result that the
words _name_ and _alone_ would be otiose. There is no proof anywhere,
then, that the world is unreal. Besides (we would ask) is the
statement that the world is false itself true or false. If the
statement is true, there is a violation of a real non-duality. If the
statement is untrue, it follows that the world is true.

Perhaps it may be objected that this dilemma is a kind of fallacious
reasoning, like the dilemma: Is transitoriness permanent or
transitory? There is a difficulty in either case. As it is said by the
author of the Nyáya-nirváṇa: The proof of the permanence of the
transitory, as being both permanent and transitory, is a paralogism.
And in the Tárkika-rakshá--

     "When a mode cannot be evinced to be either such and such,
     or not such and such,

     "The denial of a subject characterised by such a mode is
     called Nitya-sama."

With the implied mention of this same technical expression it is
stated in the Prabodha-siddhi: Equality of characteristic modes
results from significancy. If it be said, This then is a valid
rejoinder, we reply, This is a mere scaring of the uninstructed, for
the source of fallacy has not been pointed out. This is twofold,
general and particular: of these, the former is self-destructive, and
the latter is of three kinds, defect of a requisite element, excess of
an element not requisite, and residence in that which is not the
subjicible subject. Of these (two forms of the fallacy), the general
form is not suspected, no self-pervasion being observed in the dilemma
in question (viz., Is the statement that the world is unreal itself
true or false? &c.) So likewise the particular; for if a water-jar be
said to be non-existent, the affirmation of its non-existence is
equally applicable to the water-jar as that of its existence.

If you reply: We accept the unreality (or falsity) of the world, not
its non-existence; this reply is about as wise as the procedure of the
carter who will lose his head rather than pay a hundred pieces of
money, but will at once give five score; for falsity and non-existence
are synonymous. We dismiss further prolixity.

The meaning of the first aphorism, viz., Then hence the absolute is to
be desired to be known, is as follows:--The word _then_ is allowed to
purport auspiciousness, and to designate subsequency to the
qualification (of the aspirant). The word _hence_ indicates a reason.

Accordingly it is stated in the Gáruḍa-puráṇa:--

     "All the aphorisms begin with the words Then and Hence
     regularly; what then is the reason of this?

     "And what is the sense of those words, O sage? Why are those
     the most excellent?

     "Tell me this, Brahmá, that I may know it truly."

Thus addressed by Nárada, the most excellent Brahmá replied:--

     "The word Then is used of subsequency and of competency, and
     in an auspicious sense,

     "And the word Thence is employed to indicate the reason."

It is laid down that we must institute inquiries about the absolute,
because emancipation is not attained without the grace of Náráyana,
and his grace is not attained without knowledge. The absolute, about
which the inquiry is to be instituted, is described in the words (of
the second aphorism): From which the genesis, and so forth, of this.
The meaning of the sentence is that the absolute is that from which
result emanation, sustentation, and retractation; according to the
words of the Skanda-puráṇa--

     "He is Hari the sole ruler, the spirit from whom are
     emanation, sustentation, retractation, necessity, knowledge,
     involution (in illusion), and bondage and liberation;"

and according to such Vedic texts, From which are these. The evidence
adducible for this is described (in the third aphorism): Because it
has its source from the system. That the absolute should be reached by
way of inference is rejected by such texts as, He that knows not the
Veda cogitates not that mighty one; Him described in the Upanishads.
Inference, moreover, is not by itself authoritative, as is said in the
Kaurma-puráṇa--

     "Inference, unaccompanied by revelation, in no case

     "Can definitely prove a matter, nor can any other form of
     evidence;

     "Whatsoever other form of evidence, companioned by
     revelation and tradition,

     "Acquires the rank of probation, about this there can be no
     hesitation."

What a Śástra (or system of sacred institutes) is, has been stated in
the Skanda-puráṇa:--

     "The Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sáma-veda, the
     Atharva-veda, the Mahábhárata, the Pañcha-rátra, and the
     original Rámáyaṇa, are called Śástras.

     "That also which is conformable to these is called Śástra.

     "Any aggregate of composition other than this is a
     heterodoxy."

According, then, to the rule that the sense of the sacred institutes
is not to be taken from other sources than these, the Monist view,
viz., that the purport of the texts of the Veda relates not to the
duality learnt from those but to non-duality, is rejected: for as
there is no proof of a God from inference, so there is no proof of the
duality between God and other things from inference. Therefore there
can be in these texts no mere explanation of such duality, and the
texts must be understood to indicate the duality. Hence it is that it
has said:--

     "I ever laud Náráyaṇa, the one being to be known from
     genuine revelation, who transcends the perishable and the
     imperishable, without imperfections, and of inexhaustible
     excellences."

It has thus been evinced that the sacred institutes are the evidence
of (the existence of) this (ultimate reality, _Brahman_). (The fourth
aphorism is): But that is from the construction. In regard to this,
the commencement and other elements are stated to be the marks of the
construction, in the Bṛihat-saṃhitá:--

     "Commencement, conclusion, reiteration, novelty, profit,
     eulogy, and demonstration, are the marks by which the
     purport is ascertained."

It is thus stated that in accordance with the purport of the
Upanishads the absolute is to be apprehended only from the sacred
institutes. We have here given merely a general indication. What
remains may be sought from the Ánandatírtha-bháshya-vyákhyána (or
exposition of the Commentary of Ánanda-tírtha). We desist for fear of
giving an undue prolixity to our treatise. This mystery was
promulgated by Púrṇa-prajña Madhya-mandira, who esteemed himself the
third incarnation of Váyu:--

     "The first was Hanumat, the second Bhíma,

     "The third Púrṇa-prajña, the worker of the work of the
     Lord."

After expressing the same idea in various passages, he has written the
following stanza at the conclusion of his work:--

     "That whereof the three divine forms are declared in the
     text of the Veda, sufficiently

     "Has that been set forth; this is the whole majesty in the
     splendour of the Veda;

     "The first incarnation of the Wind-god was he that bowed to
     the words of Ráma (Hanumat); the second was Bhíma;

     "By this Madhva, who is the third, this book has been
     composed in regard to Keśava."

The import of this stanza may be learnt by considering various Vedic
texts.

The purport of this is that Vishṇu is the principle above all others
in every system of sacred institutes. Thus all is clear.[111]

A. E. G.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 111: For a further account of Ánanda-tírtha or Madhva see
Wilson, Works, vol. i. pp. 138-150. His Commentary on the
Brahma-sútras has been printed in Calcutta.]




CHAPTER VI.

THE PÁŚUPATA SYSTEM OF NAKULÍŚA.


Certain Máheśvaras disapprove of this doctrine of the Vaishṇavas known
by its technicalities of the servitude of souls and the like, inasmuch
as bringing with it the pains of dependence upon another, it cannot be
a means of cessation of pain and other desired ends. They recognise as
stringent such arguments as, Those depending on another and longing
for independence do not become emancipated, because they still depend
upon another, being destitute of independence like ourselves and
others; and, Liberated spirits possess the attributes of the Supreme
Deity, because at the same time, that they are spirits they are free
from the germ of every pain as the Supreme Deity is. Recognising these
arguments, these Máheśvaras adopt the Páśupata system, which is
conversant about the exposition of five categories, as the means to
the highest end of man. In this system the first aphorism is: Now then
we shall expound the Páśupata union and rites of Paśupati. The meaning
is as follows:--The word _now_ refers to something antecedent, and
this something antecedent is the disciple's interrogation of the
spiritual teacher. The nature of a spiritual teacher is explicated in
the Gaṇakáriká:--

     "But there are eight pentads to be known, and a group, one
     with three factors;

     "He that knows this ninefold aggregate is a self-purifier, a
     spiritual guide.

     "The acquisitions, the impurities, the expedients, the
     localities, the perseverance, the purifications,

     "The initiations, and the powers, are the eight pentads; and
     there are three functions."

The employment in the above line of the neuter numeral three
(_tríṇi_), instead of the feminine three (_tisraḥ_), is a Vedic
construction.

(_a._) Acquisition is the fruit of an expedient while realising, and
is divided into five members, viz., knowledge, penance, permanence of
the body, constancy, and purity. Thus Haradattáchárya says: Knowledge,
penance, permanence, constancy, and purity as the fifth.

(_b._) Impurity is an evil condition pertaining to the soul. This is
of five kinds, false conception and the rest. Thus Haradatta also
says:--

     "False conception, demerit, attachment, interestedness, and
     falling,

     "These five, the root of bondage, are in this system
     especially to be shunned."

(_c._) An expedient is a means of purifying the aspirant to
liberation.

These expedients are of five kinds, use of habitation, and the rest.
Thus he also says:--

     "Use of habitation, pious muttering, meditation, constant
     recollection of Rudra,

     "And apprehension, are determined to be the five expedients
     of acquirements."

(_d._) Locality is that by which, after studying the categories, the
aspirant attains increase of knowledge and austerity, viz., spiritual
teachers and the rest. Thus he says:--

     "The spiritual teachers, a cavern, a special place, the
     burning-ground, and Rudra only."

(_e._) Perseverance is the endurance in one or other of these pentads
until the attainment of the desired end, and is distributed into the
differenced and the rest. Thus it is said:--

     "The differenced, the undifferenced, muttering, acceptance,
     and devotion as the fifth."

(_f._) Purification is the putting away, once for all, of false
conception and the other four impurities. It is distributed into five
species according to the five things to be put away. Thus it is said--

     "The loss of ignorance, of demerit, of attachment, of
     interestedness,

     "And of falling, is declared to be the fivefold purification
     of the state of bondage."

(_g._) The five initiations are thus enumerated:--

     "The material, the proper time, the rite, the image, and the
     spiritual guide as the fifth."

(_h._) The five powers are as follow:--

     "Devotion to the spiritual guide, clearness of intellect,
     conquest of pleasure and pain,

     "Merit and carefulness, are declared the five heads of
     power."

The three functions are the modes of earning daily food consistent
with propriety, for the diminution of the five impurities, viz.,
mendicancy, living upon alms, and living upon what chance supplies.
All the rest is to be found in the standard words of this sect.

In the first aphorism above recited, the word _now_ serves to
introduce the exposition of the termination of pain (or emancipation),
that being the object of the interrogation about the putting away of
pain personal, physical, and hyperphysical. By the word _paśu_ we are
to understand the effect (or created world), the word designating that
which is dependent on something ulterior. By the word _pati_ we are to
understand the cause (or _principium_), the word designating the Lord,
who is the cause of the universe, the _pati_, or ruler. The meaning of
the words sacrifices and rites every one knows.

In this system the cessation of pain is of two kinds, impersonal and
personal. Of these, the impersonal consists in the absolute
extirpation of all pains; the personal in supremacy consisting of the
visual and active powers. Of these two powers the visual, while only
one power, is, according to its diversity of objects, indirectly
describable as of five kinds, vision, audition, cogitation,
discrimination, and omniscience. Of these five, vision is cognition of
every kind of visual, tactual, and other sensible objects, though
imperceptible, intercepted, or remote. Audition is cognition of
principles, conversant about all articulate sounds. Cogitation is
cognition of principles, conversant about all kinds of thoughts.
Discrimination is cognition of principles conversant about the whole
system of institutes, according to the text and according to its
significance. Omniscience is cognition of principles ever arising and
pervaded by truth, relative to all matters declared or not declared,
summary or in detail, classified and specialised. Such is this
intellectual power.

The active power, though one only, is indirectly describable as of
three kinds, the possession of the swiftness of thought, the power of
assuming forms at will, and the faculty of expatiation. Of these, the
possession of the swiftness of thought is ability to act with
unsurpassable celerity. The power of assuming forms at will is the
faculty of employing at pleasure, and irrespective of the efficacy of
works, the organs similar and dissimilar of an infinity of organisms.
The faculty of expatiation is the possession of transcendent supremacy
even when such organs are not employed. Such is this active power.

All that is effected or educed, depending on something ulterior, it is
threefold, sentiency, the insentient, and the sentient. Of these,
sentiency is the attribute of the sentients. It is of two degrees
according to its nature as cognitive or incognitive. Cognitive
sentiency is dichotomised as proceeding discriminately and as
proceeding indiscriminately. The discriminate procedure, manifestable
by the instruments of knowledge, is called the cogitative. For by the
cogitant organ every sentient being is cognisant of objects in
general, discriminated or not discriminated, when irradiated by the
light which is identical with the external things. The incognitive
sentiency, again, is either characterised or not characterised by the
objects of the sentient soul.

The insentient, which while unconscious is dependent on the conscious,
is of two kinds, as styled the effect and as styled the cause. The
insentient, styled the effect, is of ten kinds, viz., the earth and
the other four elements, and their qualities, colour, and the rest.
The insentient, called the causal insentient, is of thirteen kinds,
viz., the five organs of cognition, the five organs of action, and the
three internal organs, intellect, the egoising principle, and the
cogitant principle, which have for their respective functions
ascertainment, the illusive identification of self with not-self, and
determination.

The sentient spirit, that to which transmigratory conditions pertain,
is also of two kinds, the appetent and non-appetent. The appetent is
the spirit associated with an organism and organs; the non-appetent is
the spirit apart from organism and organs. The details of all this are
to be found in the Pañchártha-bháshyadípiká and other works. The cause
is that which retracts into itself and evolves the whole creation.
This though one is said to be divided according to a difference of
attributes and actions (into Maheśvara, Vishṇu, &c.) The Lord is the
possessor of infinite, visual, and active power. He is absolutely
first as connected eternally with this lordship or supremacy, as
possessing a supremacy not adventitious or contingent. This is
expounded by the author of the Ádarśa, and other institutional
authorities.

Union is a conjunction of the soul with God through the intellect, and
is of two degrees, that characterised by action, and that
characterised by cessation of action. Of these, union characterised by
action consists of pious muttering, meditation, and so forth; union
characterised by cessation of action is called consciousness, &c.

Rite or ritual is activity efficacious of merit as its end. It is of
two orders, the principal and the subsidiary. Of these, the principal
is the direct means of merit, religious exercise. Religious exercise
is of two kinds, acts of piety and postures. The acts of piety are
bathing with sand, lying upon sand, oblations, mutterings, and
devotional perambulation. Thus the revered Nakulíśa says:--

     "He should bathe thrice a day, he should lie upon the dust.
     Oblation is an observance divided into six members."

Thus the author of the aphorisms says:--

     "He should worship with the six kinds of oblations, viz.,
     laughter, song, dance, muttering _hum_, adoration, and pious
     ejaculation."

Laughter is a loud laugh, Aha, Aha, by dilatation of the throat and
lips. Song is a celebration of the qualities, glories, &c., of
Maheśvara, according to the conventions of the Gandharva-śástra, or
art of music. The dance also is to be employed according to the _ars
saltatoria_, accompanied with gesticulations with hands and feet, and
with motions of the limbs, and with outward indications of internal
sentiment. The ejaculation _hum_ is a sacred utterance, like the
bellowing of a bull, accomplished by a contact of the tongue with the
palate, an imitation of the sound _hudung_, ascribed to a bull, like
the exclamation Vashat. Where the uninitiated are, all this should be
gone through in secret. Other details are too familiar to require
exposition.

The postures are snoring, trembling, limping, wooing, acting absurdly,
talking nonsensically. Snoring is showing all the signs of being
asleep while really awake. Trembling is a convulsive movement of the
joints as if under an attack of rheumatism. Limping is walking as if
the legs were disabled. Wooing is simulating the gestures of an
_innamorato_ on seeing a young and pretty woman. Acting absurdly is
doing acts which every one dislikes, as if bereft of all sense of what
should and what should not be done. Talking nonsensically is the
utterance of words which contradict each other, or which have no
meaning, and the like.

The subsidiary religious exercise is purificatory subsequent ablution
for putting an end to the sense of unfitness from begging, living on
broken food, &c. Thus it is said by the author of the aphorisms:
Bearing the marks of purity by after-bathing.

(It has been stated above that omniscience, a form of the cognitive
power, is cognition of principles ever arising and pervaded by truth,
relative to all matters declared or not declared, summary, or in
detail). The summary is the enouncement of the subjects of attributes
generally. This is accomplished in the first aphorism: (Now then we
shall expound the Páśupata union and rites of Paśupati). Detail is the
fivefold enouncement of the five categories according to the
instruments of true knowledge. This is to be found in the
Ráśíkara-bháshya. Distribution is the distinct enouncement of these
categories, as far as possible according to definitions. It is an
enumeration of these according to their prevailing characters,
different from that of other recognised systems. For example, the
cessation of pain (or emancipation) is in other systems (as in the
Sānkhya) the mere termination of miseries, but in this system it is
the attainment of supremacy or of the divine perfections. In other
systems the create is that which has become, and that which shall
become, but in this system it is eternal, the spirits, and so forth,
the sentient and insentient. In other systems the _principium_ is
determined in its evolution or creative activity by the efficacy of
works, whereas in this system the _principium_ is the Lord not thus
determined. In other institutes union results in isolation, &c., while
in these institutes it results in cessation of pains by attainment of
the divine perfections. In other systems paradise and similar spheres
involve a return to metempsychosis, but in this system they result in
nearness to the Supreme Being, either followed or not followed by
such return to transmigratory experiences.

Great, indeed, an opponent may say, is this aggregate of illusions,
since if God's causality be irrespective of the efficacy of works,
then merits will be fruitless, and all created things will be
simultaneously evolved (there being no reason why this should be
created at one time, and that at another), and thus there will emerge
two difficulties. Think not so, replies the Páśupata, for your
supposition is baseless. If the Lord, irrespective of the efficacy of
works, be the cause of all, and thus the efficacy of works be without
results, what follows? If you rejoin that an absence of motives will
follow, in whom, we ask, will this absence of motives follow? If the
efficacy of works be without result, will causality belong to the doer
of the works as to the Lord? It cannot belong to the doer of the
works, for it is allowed that the efficacy of works is fruitful only
when furthered by the will of the creator, and the efficacy so
furthered may sometimes be fruitless, as in the case of the works of
Yayáti, and others. From this it will by no means follow that no one
will engage in works, for they will engage in them as the husbandman
engages in husbandry, though the crop be uncertain. Again, sentient
creatures engage in works because they depend on the will of the
creator. Nor does the causality pertain to the Lord alone, for as all
his desires are already satisfied, he cannot be actuated by motives to
be realised by works. As for your statement, continues the Páśupata,
that all things will be simultaneously evolved, this is unreasonable,
inasmuch as we hold that causal efficiency resides in the unobstructed
active power which conforms itself to the will of the Lord, whose
power is inconceivable. It has accordingly been said by those versed
in sacred tradition:--

     "Since he, acting according to his will, is not actuated by
     the efficacy of works,

     "For this reason is he in this system the cause of all
     causes."

Some one may urge: In another system emancipation is attained through
a knowledge of God, where does the difference lie? Say not so, replies
the Páśupata, for you will be caught in a trilemma. Is the mere
knowledge of God the cause of emancipation, or the presentation, or
the accurate characterisation, of God? Not the mere knowledge, for
then it would follow that the study of any system would be
superfluous, inasmuch as without any institutional system one might,
like the uninstructed, attain emancipation by the bare cognition that
Mahádeva is the lord of the gods. Nor is presentation or intuition of
the deity the cause of emancipation, for no intuition of the deity is
competent to sentient creatures burdened with an accumulation of
various impurities, and able to see only with the eyes of the flesh.
On the third alternative, viz., that the cause of emancipation is an
accurate characterisation of the deity, you will be obliged to consent
to our doctrine, inasmuch as such accurate characterisation cannot be
realised apart from the system of the Páśupatas. Therefore it is that
our great teacher has said:--

     "If by mere knowledge, it is not according to any system,
     but intuition is unattainable;

     "There is no accurate characterisation of principles
     otherwise than by the five categories."

Therefore those excellent persons who aspire to the highest end of man
must adopt the system of the Páśupatas, which undertakes the
exposition of the five categories.

A. E. G.




CHAPTER VII.

THE ŚAIVA-DARŚANA.


[The seventh system in Mádhava's Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha is the
Śaiva-darśana. This sect is very prevalent in the South of India,
especially in the Tamil country; it is said to have arisen there about
the eleventh century A.D. Several valuable contributions have been
lately made to our knowledge of its tenets in the publications of the
Rev. H. R. Hoisington and the Rev. T. Foulkes. The former especially,
by his excellent articles in the American Oriental Society's Journal,
has performed a great service to the students of Hindu philosophy. He
has there translated the Tattuva-Kaṭṭalei, or law of the Tattwas, the
Śiva-Gnánapotham, or instruction in the knowledge of God, and the
Śiva-Pirakásam, or light of Śiva, and the three works shed immense
light on the outline as given by Mádhava. One great use of the latter
is to enable us to recognise the original Sanskrit names in their
Tamil disguise, no easy matter occasionally, as _aṛul_ for _anugraha_
and _tíḍchei_ for _díkshá_ may testify.

The Śaivas have considerable resemblance to the Theistic Sánkhya; they
hold that God, souls, and matter are from eternity distinct entities,
and the object of philosophy is to disunite the soul from matter and
gradually to unite it to God. Śiva is the chief deity of the system,
and the relation between the three is quaintly expressed by the
allegory of a beast, its fetters, and its owner. Paśupati is a
well-known name of Śiva, as the master or creator of all things.

There seem to be three different sets of so-called Saiva sútras. One is in
five books, called by Colebrooke the Paśupati-śástra, which is probably
the work quoted by Mádhava in his account of the Nakulíśa Páśupatas;
another is in three books, with a commentary by Kshemarája, with its first
sútra, _chaítanyam átmá_. The third was commented on by Abhinava-gupta,
and opens with the śloka given in the Sarva-Darśana-Saṅgraha, p. 91, lines
1-4. The MS. which I consulted in Calcutta read the first words--

    _Kathañchid ásádya Maheśvarasya dásyam._

None of these works, however, appear to be the authority of the
present sect. They seem chiefly to have relied on the twenty-eight
Ágamas and some of the Puráṇas. A list of the Ágamas is given in Mr.
Foulkes' "Catechism of the Śaiva Religion;" and of these the Kiraṇa
and Karaṇa are quoted in the following treatise.]


THE ŚAIVA-DARŚANA.

Certain, however, of the Máheśvara sect receiving the system of truth
authoritatively laid down in the Śaiva Ágama,[112] reject the
foregoing opinion that "the Supreme Being is a cause as independent of
our actions, &c.," on the ground of its being liable to the imputation
of partiality and cruelty. They, on the contrary, hold the opinion
that "the Supreme Being is a cause in dependence on our actions, &c.;"
and they maintain that there are three categories distinguished as the
Lord, the soul, and the world (or literally "the master," "the
cattle," and "the fetter"). As has been said by those well versed in
the Tantra doctrines--

     "The Guru of the world, having first condensed in one sútra
     the great tantra, possessed of three categories and four
     feet, has again declared the same at full length."

The meaning of this is as follows:--Its three categories are the three
before mentioned; its four feet are learning, ceremonial action,
meditation, and morality, hence it is called the great Tantra,
possessed of three categories and four feet. Now the "souls" are not
independent, and the "fetters" are unintelligent, hence the Lord, as
being different from these, is first declared; next follows the
account of the souls as they agree with him in possessing
intelligence; lastly follow the "fetters" or matter, such is the order
of the arrangement.[113] Since the ceremony of initiation is the means
to the highest human end, and this cannot be accomplished without
knowledge which establishes the undoubted greatness of the hymns, the
Lords of the hymns, &c., and is a means for the ascertainment of the
real nature of the "cattle," the "fetter," and the "master," we place
as first the "foot" of _knowledge_ (_jñána_) which makes known all
this unto us.[114] Next follows the "foot" of _ceremonial action_
(_kriyá_) which declares the various rules of initiation with the
divers component parts thereof. Without meditation the end cannot be
attained, hence the "foot" of _meditation_ (_yoga_) follows next,
which declares the various kinds of _yoga_ with their several parts.
And as meditation is worthless without practice, _i.e._, the
fulfilling what is enjoined and the abstaining from what is
forbidden, lastly follows the fourth "foot" of practical duty
(_charyá_), which includes all this.

Now Śiva is held to be the Lord (or master). Although participation in
the divine nature of Śiva belongs to liberated souls and to such
beings as Vidyeśvara, &c., yet these are not independent, since they
depend on the Supreme Being; and the nature of an effect is recognised
to belong to the worlds, &c., which resemble him, from the very fact
of the orderly arrangement of their parts. And from their thus being
effects we infer that they must have been caused by an intelligent
being. By the strength of this inference is the universal
acknowledgment of a Supreme Being confirmed.

"But may we not object that it is not proved that the body is thus an
effect? for certainly none has ever, at any time or place, seen a body
being made by any one." We grant it: yet it is not proper to deny that
a body has some maker on the ground that its being made has not been
seen by any one, since this can be established from inference [if not
from actual perception]. Bodies, &c., must be effects, because they
possess an orderly arrangement of parts, or because they are
destructible, as jars, &c.; and from their being effects it is easy to
infer that they must have been caused by an intelligent being. Thus
the subject in the argument [sc. bodies, &c.] must have had a maker,
from the fact that it is an effect, like jars, &c.; that which has the
afore-mentioned middle term (_sádhana_) must have the afore-mentioned
major (_sádhya_); and that which has not the former will not have the
latter, as the soul, &c.[115] The argument which establishes the
authority of the original inference to prove a Supreme Being has been
given elsewhere, so we refrain from giving it at length here. In fact,
that God is the universal agent, but not irrespective of the actions
done by living beings, is proved by the current verse[116]--

     "This ignorant _jívátman_, incapable of its own true
     pleasures or pains, if it were only under God's direction
     [and its own merits not taken into account], would always go
     to heaven or always to hell."[117]

Nor can you object that this opinion violates God's independence,
since it does not really violate an agent's independence to allow that
he does not act irrespectively of means; just as we say that the
king's bounty shows itself in gifts, but these are not irrespective of
his treasurer. As has been said by the Siddha Guru--

     "It belongs to independence to be uncontrolled and itself to
     employ means, &c.;

     "This is an agent's true independence, and not the acting
     irrespectively of works, &c."

And thus we conclude that inference (as well as Śruti) establishes the
existence of an agent who knows the various fruits [of action], their
means, material causes, &c., according to the laws of the various
individual merits. This has been thus declared by the venerable
Bṛihaspati--

     "He who knows the fruits to be enjoyed, their means and
     material causes,--

     "Apart from him this world knows not how the desert that
     resides in accumulated actions should ripen."--

     "The universe is the subject of our argument, and it must
     have had an intelligent maker,

     "This we maintain from its being an effect, just as we see
     in any other effect, as jars, &c."

God's omniscience also is proved from his being identical with
everything, and also from the fact that an ignorant being cannot
produce a thing.[118] This has been said by the illustrious
Mṛigendra[119]--

     "He is omniscient from his being the maker of all things:
     for it is an established principle

     "That he only can make a thing who knows it with its means,
     parts, and end."

"Well," our opponents may say, "we concede that God is an independent
maker, but then he has no body.[120] Now experience shows that all
effects, as jars, &c., are produced by beings possessed of bodies, as
potters, &c.; but if God were possessed of a body, then he would be
like us subject to trouble, and no longer be omniscient or
omnipotent." We, however, deny this, for we see that the incorporeal
soul does still produce motion, &c., in its associated body; moreover,
even though we conceded that God _did_ possess a body, we should still
maintain that the alleged defects would not necessarily ensue. The
Supreme Being, as he has no possible connection with the fetters of
matter, such as _mala_,[121] action, &c., cannot have a material body,
but only a body of pure energy (Sákta),[122] since we know that his
body is composed of the five hymns which are forms of Śakti, according
to the well-known text: "The Supreme has the _Iśána_ as his head, the
_Tatpurusha_ as his mouth, the _Aghora_ as his heart, the _Vámedeva_
as his secret parts, and the _Sadyojáta_ as his feet."[123] And this
body, created according to his own will, is not like our bodies, but
is the cause of the five operations of the Supreme, which are
respectively grace, obscuration, destruction, preservation, and
production.[124] This has been said in the Śrímat Mṛigendra--

     "From the impossibility of its possessing _mala_, &c., the
     body of the Supreme is of pure energy, and not like ours."

And it has also been said elsewhere--

     "His body is composed of the five mantras which are
     subservient to the five operations,

     "And his head, &c., are formed out of the Ísa, Tatpurusha,
     Aghora, Váma, and other hymns."

If you object to this view that "such passages in the Ágamas as 'He is
five-faced and fifteen-eyed,' assert prominently the fact that the
Supreme Being is endowed with a body, organs, &c.," we concede what
you say, but we maintain that there is no contradiction in his
assuming such forms to show his mercy to his devoted servants, since
meditation, worship, &c., are impossible towards a Being entirely
destitute of form. This has been said in the Paushkara--

     "This form of his is mentioned for the preservation of the
     devotee."

And similarly elsewhere--

     "Thou art to be worshipped according to rule as possessed of
     form;

     "For the understanding cannot reach to a formless object."

Bhojarája[125] has thus detailed the five operations--

     "Fivefold are his operations, creation, preservation,
     destruction, and obscuration,

     "And to these must be added the active grace of him who is
     eternally exalted."

Now these five operations, in the view of the pure Path, are held to
be performed directly by Śiva, but in that of the toilsome Path they
are ascribed to Ananta,[126] as is declared in the Śrímat
Karaṇa[127]--

     "In the Pure Path Śiva is declared to be the only agent, but
     Ananta in that which is opposed to the One Supreme."

It must here be understood that the word Śiva includes in its proper
meaning "the Lord," all those who have attained to the state of Śiva,
as the Lords of the Mantras, Maheśwara, the emancipated souls who have
become Śivas, and the inspired teachers (_váchakas_), together with
all the various means, as initiation, &c., for obtaining the state of
Śiva. Thus has been explained the first category, the Lord (_pati_).

We now proceed to explain the second category, the soul (_paśu_). The
individual soul which is also known by such synonyms as the
non-atomic,[128] the _Kshetrajña_, or knower of the body,[129] &c., is
the _Paśu_. For we must not say with the Chárvákas that it is the same
as the body, since on this view we could not account for memory, as
there is a proverb that one man cannot remember what another has seen.
Nor may we say with the Naiyáyikas that it is cognisable by
perception,[130] as this would involve an _ad infinitum_ regressus. As
has been said--

     "If the soul were cognisable, there would need to be again a
     second knower;[131]

     "And this would require another still, if the second were
     itself to be known."

Nor must we hold it non-pervading with the Jainas, nor momentary with
the Bauddhas, since it is not limited by space or time. As has been
said--

     "That object which is unlimited in its nature by space or
     time,

     "They hold to be eternal and pervading,--hence the soul's
     all-pervadingness and eternity."

Nor may we say with the Vedántin that it is only one, since the
apportionment of different fruits proves that there are many
individual souls; nor with the Sánkhyas that it is devoid of action,
since, when all the various "fetters" are removed, Śruti informs us of
a state of identity with Śiva, which consists in intelligence in the
form of an eternal and infinite vision and action.[132] This has been
declared in the Śrímat Mṛigendra--

     "It is revealed that identity with Śiva results when all
     fetters are removed."

And again--

     "Intelligence consists in vision and action, and since in
     his soul

     "This exists always and on every side, therefore, after
     liberation, Śruti calls it that which faces every way."

It is also said in the Tattva-prakáśa--

     "The liberated souls are themselves Śivas, but these are
     liberated by his favour;

     "He is to be known as the one eternally liberated, whose
     body is the five Mantras."

Now the souls are threefold, as denominated _vijñánákaláḥ_,
_pralayákaláḥ_, and _sakaláḥ_.[133] (_a._) The first are those who are
under the influence of _mala_ only, since their actions are cancelled by
receiving their proper fruits, or by abstraction, contemplation, and
knowledge, and since they have no "fetters" in the form of enjoyments,
such as _kalá_, &c. (which fetters would, however, be the cause of
cancelling actions by bringing about their proper fruit). (_b._) The
second are those who are under the influence of _mala_ and _karman_, since
in their case _kalá_, &c., are destroyed by mundane destructions, hence
their name _pralayákala_. (_c._) The third are those who are bound in the
three fetters of _mala_, _máyá_, and _karman_, hence their name _sakala_.
The first class are again subdivided into _samápta-kalusháḥ_ and
_asamápta-kalusháḥ_, according as their inherent corruption is perfectly
exhausted or not. The former,--having received the mature penalties of
their corruptions,--are now, as foremost of men and worthy of the
privilege, raised by Śiva's favour to the rank of the Lords of Knowledge
(the Vidyeśvaras), Ananta, and the rest. This ogdoad of the Lords of
Knowledge is described in the Bahudaivatya--

     "Ananta, and Súkshma, and Śivottama,

     "Ekanetra, and again Ekarudra and Trimúrttika,

     "Śríkaṇṭha and Śikhaṇḍin,--these are declared to be the
     Vidyeśvaras."

The latter Śiva, in his mercy, raises to the rank of the seventy million
Mantras.[134] All this is explained in the Tattva-prakáśa.[135] Similarly
Soma-Śambhu has said--

     "One class is named _vijñánákala_, the second _pralayákala_,

     "The third _sakala_,--these are the three whom the Śástra
     regards as objects of mercy.

     "The first is united to _mala_ alone, the second to _mala_
     and _karma_,

     "The third are united to all the tattvas beginning with
     _kalá_ and ending with 'earth.'"[136]

The _Pralayákaláḥ_ are also twofold, as being _pakvapáśadvaya_ or not,
_i.e._, those in whom the two remaining fetters are matured, and those in
whom they are not. The former attain liberation, but the latter, by the
power of _karman_, are endowed with the _puryashṭaka_[137] body, and pass
through various births. As has been said in the Tattva-prakáśa--

     "Those among the Pralayákalas whose _karman_ and _mala_ are
     immature,

     "Go, united with the _puryashṭaka_ body, into many births by
     the power of _karman_."

The _puryashṭaka_ is also thus described in the same work--

     "The _puryashṭaka_ is composed of the internal organ,
     thought (_dhí_), _karman_, and the instruments."

This is thus explained by Aghora Śiva Áchárya, "the _puryashṭaka_ is a
subtile body apportioned to each individual soul, which continues from
the creation until the close of the kalpa, or until liberation: it is
composed of the thirty[138] tattvas beginning with 'earth' and ending
with _kalá_." As has been said in the Tattva-sangraha--

     "This set of tattvas, commencing with 'earth' and ending
     with _kalá_, is assigned to each soul,

     "And wanders by the law of _karman_ through all the bodies
     produced by the world."

The following is the full meaning of this passage:--The word
"_internal organ_," which properly includes "mind," "intelligence,"
"egoism," and "reason,"[139] includes also the seven tattvas which
enter into the production of enjoyment [or experience], viz., those
called _kalá_, time, fate, knowledge, concupiscence, nature, and
quality;[140] the words "_thought_" (_dhí_) and _karman_ signify the
five cognisable gross elements, and their originators, the subtile
rudiments. By the word "_instruments_" are comprehended the ten organs
of sense and action.

"But is it not declared in the Śrímat Kálottara that 'The set of five,
sound, touch, form, taste and smell, intelligence, mind and egoism,
these constitute the _puryashṭaka_?'"

How, then, can any different account be maintained? We grant this, and
hence the venerable Ráma Kaṇṭha has explained that sútra in its
literal meaning [_i. e_., as _puryashṭaka_, is derived from _ashṭa_,
"eight"], so why should we be prolix in the discussion? Still, if you
ask how we can reconcile our account with the strict nominal
definition of _puryashṭaka_, we reply that there is really no
contradiction, as we maintain that it is composed of a set of eight in
the following manner:--(1.) The five elements; (2.) the five
rudiments; (3.) the five organs of knowledge; (4.) those of action;
(5.) the fourfold internal organ; (6.) their instrument;[141] (7.)
nature [prakṛiti]; and (8.) the class composed of the five, beginning
with _kalá_, which form a kind of case.[142]

Now in the case of some of those souls who are joined to the
_puryashṭaka_ body, Maheśvara Ananta having compassionated them as
possessed of peculiar merit, constitutes them here as lords of the
world; as has been said--

     "Maheśvara pities some and grants them to be lords of the
     world."

The class called _sakala_ is also divided into two, as _pakvakalusha_
and _apakvakalusha_. As for the former, the Supreme Being, in
conformity with their maturity (_paripáka_), puts forth a power
agreeable thereto, and transfers them to the position of the hundred
and eighteen Lords of the Mantras, signified by the words Maṇḍalí,
&c., as has been said--

     "The rest are denominated _sakala_, from their connection
     with _Kalá_, &c., seized by time whose mouths are days;

     "The Supreme of his own will makes one hundred and eighteen
     of these the Lords of the Mantras.

     "Eight of these are called _Maṇḍalins_; eight again are
     Krodha, &c.;

     "Víreśa, Śríkaṇṭha, and the hundred Rudras,--these together
     are the hundred and eighteen."

In their case again, the Supreme, having assumed the form of a
teacher, stops the continued accession of maturity and contracts his
manifested power, and ultimately grants to them liberation by the
process of initiation; as has been said--

     "These creatures whose _mala_ is matured, by putting forth a
     healing power,

     "He, assuming the form of a teacher, unites by initiation to
     the highest principle."

It is also said in the Srímad Mṛigendra--

     "He removes from that infinitesimal soul all the bonds which
     previously exerted a contrary influence over it."[143]

All this has been explained at great length by Náráyaṇa-Kaṇṭha, and
there it is to be studied; but we are obliged to pass on through fear
of prolixity.

But as for the second class, or those called _apakvakalusha_, the
Supreme Being, as impelled by the desert of their respective actions,
appoints them, as bound and endued with infinitesimal bodies, to enjoy
the rewards of their previous actions.[144] As has been said--

     "The other souls, bound [in their material bonds] he
     appoints to enjoy their various deserts,

     "According to their respective actions: such are the various
     kinds of souls."

We now proceed to describe the third category, matter (or _páśa_).
This is fourfold, _mala_,[1] _karman_, _máyá_, and _rodha-śakti_.[145]
But it may be objected, "Is it not said in the Śaiva Ágamas that the
chief things are the Lord, souls, and matter? Now the Lord has been
shown to mean Śiva, 'souls' mean atoms (or beings endowed with atomic
bodies), and matter (or 'bond') is said to be the pentad,[146] hence
matter will be fivefold. How then is it now reckoned to be only
fourfold?" To this we reply as follows:--Although the _vindu_ or nasal
dot, which is the germinal atom of _máyá_, and is called a
Śiva-tattva, may be well regarded as material in comparison with the
highest liberation as defined by the attainment of the state of Śiva,
still it cannot really be considered as matter when we remember that
it is a secondary kind of liberation as causing the attainment of the
state of such deities as Vidyeśvara, &c. Thus we see there is no
contradiction. Hence it has been said in the Tattva-prakáśa--

     "The bonds of matter will be fourfold."

And again in the Srímad Mṛigendra--

     "The enveloper-controller (_mala_), the overpowerer
     (_rodha_), action, and the work of Máyá,

     "These are the four 'bonds,' and they are collectively
     called by the name of 'merit.'"

The following is the meaning of this couplet:--

(1.) "Enveloping," because _mala_ exceedingly obscures and veils the
soul's powers of vision and action; "controlling," because _mala_, a
natural impurity, controls the soul by its independent influence. As
has been said--

     "_Mala_, though itself one, by manifold influence interrupts
     the soul's vision and action;

     "It is to be regarded as the husk in rice or rust on
     copper."[147]

(2.) The "overpowerer" is the obscuring power; this is called a "bond"
[or matter] in a metaphorical sense, since this energy of Śiva
obscures the soul by superintending matter [rather than by itself
partaking of the nature of matter].

Thus it has been said--

     "Of these I am the chief energy, and the gracious friend of
     all,

     "I am metaphorically called _páśa_,[148] because I follow
     desert."

(3.) Action [or rather its consequences, _karman_] as being performed
by those who desire the fruit. It is in the form of merit or demerit,
like the seed and shoot, and it is eternal in a never-beginning
series. As has been said in the Śrímat Kiraṇa--

     "As _Mala_ has no beginning, its least actions are
     beginningless:

     "If an eternal character is thus established, then what
     cause could produce any change therein?"

(4.) "_Máyá_," because herein as an energy of the Divine Being all
the world is potentially contained (_máti_) at a mundane destruction,
and again at a creation it all comes (_yáti_) into manifestation,
hence the derivation of the name. This has been said in the Śrímat
Saurabheya--

     "The effects, as a form of the Divine energy, are absorbed
     therein at a mundane destruction,

     "And again at a renovation it is manifested anew in the form
     of effects as _kalá_, &c."[149]

Although much more might be added on this topic, yet we stop here
through fear of extending this treatise too far. Thus have the three
categories been declared,--the Lord, the soul, and matter.

A different mode of treating the subject is found in the
Jñánaratnávalí, &c., in such lines as--

     "The Lord, knowledge, ignorance, the soul, matter, and the
     cause

     "Of the cessation thereof,--these are collectively the six
     categories."

But our readers must seek for full information from the work itself.
Thus our account of the system is complete.

E. B. C.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 112: Colebrooke speaks of the _Paśupati-sástra_
(_Maheśvara-siddhánta or Sivágama_), as the text-book of the Páśupata
sect. The Ágamas are said to be twenty-eight (see their names in the
Rev. T. Foulkes' "Catechism of the Śaiva Religion").]

[Footnote 113: "There must be three eternal entities, Deity, soul,
matter;" "as the water is co-eternal with the sea and the salt with
the water, so soul is co-eternal with the Deity, and _páśa_ is
eternally co-existent with soul" (J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 67, 85). In p.
58 we find the _advaita_ of the Vedánta attacked. In p. 62 it is said
that the soul is eternally entangled in matter, and God carries on his
five operations (see _infra_) to disentangle it, bringing out all that
is required for previous desert.]

[Footnote 114: These four feet are the four stages of religious life
(see J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 135, 180), called in Tamil _sarithei_,
_kirikei_, _yokam_, and _gnánam_. The first is the stage of practical
piety and performance of the prescribed duties and rites; the second
is that of the "confirmatory sacrament" and the five purifications
involved in true _pújá_; the third is that of the eight observances of
the yogin; the fourth is that of knowledge which prepares the soul for
intimate union with God.]

[Footnote 115: Cf. Colebrooke, _Essays_ (2d ed.), vol. i. p. 315.]

[Footnote 116: _Nyáyena_ may here mean "argument."]

[Footnote 117: _Scil._ if there were only one cause there would be
only one invariable effect. The very existence of various effects
proves that there must be other concurrent causes (as human actions)
necessary. The argument seems to me to require here this unnatural
stress to be laid on _eva_, but this is certainly not the original
meaning of the passage; it occurs Mahábhárata, iii. 1144 (cf.
Gauḍapáda, S. Kár. 61).]

[Footnote 118: In p. 82, line 3, _infra_, I read
_Karaṇásambhaváchcha_.]

[Footnote 119: This may be the same with the Meykáṇḍa of the Tamil
work in J. A. O. S. His poem was called the _Mṛigendra_(?).]

[Footnote 120: Should we read _távad anaśaríraḥ_ in p. 83, line 2?]

[Footnote 121: I retain this word, see _infra._]

[Footnote 122: "_Máyá_ (or Prakṛiti) is the material, Śakti the
instrumental, and Deity the efficient cause" (J. A. O. S. iv. p. 55).]

[Footnote 123: These are the five first names of the eleven mantras
which are included in the five _kalás_ (J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 238-243).
The Śivalinga (the visible object of worship for the enlightened) is
composed of mantras, and is to be regarded as the body of Śiva (see J.
A. O. S. iv. p. 101). These five mantras are given in the inverse
order in Taitt. Áraṇyaka, x. 43-47 (cf. _Nyáyá-málávist._ p. 3).]

[Footnote 124: These are the operations of the five manifestations of
Śiva (see J. A. O. S. iv. 8, 18) which in their descending order are
_Sáthákkiyam_ (_i.e._, _Sadákshaya?_) or _Sadá-Śiva_, who is Śiva and
Śakti combined, and the source of grace to all souls; _Ichchuran_ or
_Mayesuran_, the obscure; _Sutta-vittei_ (_Śuddhavidyá_) which is
properly the Hindu triad, _Rudra_, _Vishṇu_, and _Brahma_. They are
respectively symbolised by the _náda_, _vindu_, _m_, _u_, and _a_ of
Om.]

[Footnote 125: In Wilson's Mackenzie Cat. i. p. 138, we find a Tántrik
work, the _Narapati-jaya-charyá_, ascribed to Bhoja the king of Dhár.]

[Footnote 126: Ananta is a name of Śiva in the Atharva-śiras Upanishad
(see Indische Stud. i. 385).]

[Footnote 127: This is the fourth of the twenty-eight Ágamas (see
Foulkes' Catechism).]

[Footnote 128: _Aṇu?_ "The soul, when clothed with these primary
things (desire, knowledge, action, &c.), is an exceedingly small body"
(Foulkes). Anaṇu is used as an epithet of Brahman in Bṛihad Ar. Up.
iii. 8. 8.]

[Footnote 129: See Ind. Studien, i. 301.]

[Footnote 130: The mind or internal sense perceives soul (see Bháshá
Parichchheda, śloka 49).]

[Footnote 131: Delete the _iti_ in p. 84, line 5, _infra_.]

[Footnote 132: Cf. the Nakulíśa Páśupatas, p. 76, 4 (_supra_, p.
103).]

[Footnote 133: For these three classes see J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 87,
137. They are there described as being respectively under the
influence of _áṇavam malam_ only, or this with _kanmam malam_, or
these with _mayei malam_. The _áṇavam_ is described as original sin,
or that source of evil which was always attached to the soul; _kanmam_
is that fate which inheres in the soul's organism and metes out its
deserts; _mayei_ is matter in its obscuring or entangling power, the
source of the senses. Mádhava uses "_kalá_," &c., for _máyá_. The
reason is to be found in J. A. O. S. p. 70, where it is said that the
five _vidyátattvas_ (_kalá_, _vidyá_, _rága_, _niyati_, and _kalá_)
and the twenty-four _átmatattvas_ (_sc._ the gross and subtile
elements, and organs of sense and action, with the intellectual
faculties _manas_, _buddhi_, _ahaṃkára_, and _chitta_), are all
developed from _máyá_. This exactly agrees with the quotation from
Soma Śambhu, _infra_. We may compare with it what Mádhava says, p. 77,
in his account of the Nakulíśa Páśupatas, where he describes _kalá_ as
unintelligent, and composed of the five elements, the five
_tanmátras_, and the ten organs, with _buddhi_, _ahaṃkára_ and
_manas_.]

[Footnote 134: See J. A. O. S. iv. p. 137. I read _anugrahakaraṇát_ in
p. 86, line 3.]

[Footnote 135: I omit the quotation, as it only repeats the preceding.
It, however, names the three classes as _vijñána-kevala_,
_pralaya-kevala_, and _sakala_.]

[Footnote 136: _I.e._, thus including five of the _vidyátattvas_ and
all the twenty-four _átmatattvas_.]

[Footnote 137: This term seems to be derived from _purí_, "body" (cf.
_puriśaya_ for _purusha_, Bṛihad Ár. Up. ii. 5, 18), and _ashṭaka_
(cf. also the Sánkhya Pravachana Bháshya, p. 135).]

[Footnote 138: Or rather thirty-one?]

[Footnote 139: _Manas_, _buddhi_, _ahaṃkára_, _chitta_.]

[Footnote 140: These are the seven _viḍyá-tattvas_, _kalá_, _kála_,
_niyati_ (fate), _vidyá_, _rága_, _prakṛiti_, and _guṇa_. Hoisington,
however, puts _purushan_ "the principle of life," instead of _guṇa_,
which seems better, as the three _guṇas_ are included in _prakṛiti_.
He translates _kalá_ by "continency," and describes it as "the power
by which the senses are subdued and the carnal self brought into
subjection."]

[Footnote 141: This "instrument" (_karaṇa_) seems to mean what
Hoisington calls _purushan_ or "the principle of life which
establishes or supports the whole system in its operation;" he makes
it one of the seven _vidyátattvas_. According to Mádhava, it should be
what he calls _guṇa_.]

[Footnote 142: The thirty-one _tattvas_ are as follow:--Twenty-four
_átmatattvas_, five elements, five _tanmátras_, ten organs of sense
and action, four organs of the _antaḥkaraṇa_, and seven _vidyátattvas_
as enumerated above. (See J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 16-17.)]

[Footnote 143: I take _aṇu_ in this verse as the soul, but it may mean
the second kind of _mala_ mentioned by Hoisington. The first kind of
_mala_ is the _máyá-mala_, the second _áṇava-mala_, the third
_kanma-mala_ (_karman_).]

[Footnote 144: "The soul, when clothed with these primary things
(desire, knowledge, action, the _kaládipanchaka_, &c.), is an
exceedingly small body" (Foulkes). One of the three _malas_ is called
_áṇava_, and is described as the source of sin and suffering to
souls.]

[Footnote 145: The first three are the three kinds of _mala_ in the J.
A. O. S., viz., _áṇavam_, _kanmam_, and _máyei_, the last is the
"obscuring" power of Máyesuran (cf. vol. iv. pp. 13, 14). The Śaivas
hold that Páśa, like the Sánkhya Prakṛiti, is in itself eternal,
although its connection with any particular soul is temporary (see J.
A. O. S. iv. p. 228).]

[Footnote 146: These are the five, _vindu_, _mala_, _karman_, _máyá_,
and _rodhaśakti_. _Vindu_ is described in Foulkes' translation of the
Śiva-prakáśa-patalai: "A sound proceeds out of the mystical syllable
_om_;... and in that sound a rudimentary atom of matter is developed.
From this atom are developed the four sounds, the fifty-one Sanskrit
letters, the Vedas, Mantras, &c., the bodily, intellectual, and
external enjoyments of the soul that have not attained to spiritual
knowledge at the end of each period of the world's existence, and have
been swept away by the waters of the world-destroying deluge; after
these the three stages of heavenly happiness are developed, to be
enjoyed by the souls that have a favourable balance of meritorious
deeds, or have devoted themselves to the service of God or the
abstract contemplation of the Deity, viz., (1.) the enjoyment of the
abode of Śiva; (2.) that of near approach to him; (3.) that of union
with him." _Vindu_ is similarly described, J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 152,
153 (cf. also Weber, _Rámatápanyía Up_. pp. 312-315).]

[Footnote 147: See the same illustrations in J. A. O. S. iv. p. 150.]

[Footnote 148: Some forced derivation seems here intended as of _páśa_
from _paśchát_.]

[Footnote 149: In p. 90, line 2, read _sá káryeṇa_.]




CHAPTER VIII.

THE PRATYABHIJNA-DARSANA, OR RECOGNITIVE SYSTEM.


Other Máheśvaras are dissatisfied with the views set out in the Śaiva
system as erroneous in attributing to motiveless and insentient things
causality (in regard to the bondage and liberation of transmigrating
spirits). They therefore seek another system, and proclaim that the
construction of the world (or series of environments of those spirits)
is by the mere will of the Supreme Lord. They pronounce that this
Supreme Lord, who is at once other than and the same with the several
cognitions and _cognita_, who is identical with the transcendent self
posited by one's own consciousness, by rational proof, and by
revelation, and who possesses independence, that is, the power of
witnessing all things without reference to aught ulterior, gives
manifestation, in the mirror of one's own soul, to all entities[150]
as if they were images reflected upon it. Thus looking upon
recognition as a new method for the attainment of ends and of the
highest end, available to all men alike, without any the slightest
trouble and exertion, such as external and internal worship,
suppression of the breath, and the like, these Máheśvaras set forth
the system of recognition (_pratyabhijñá_). The extent of this system
is thus described by one of their authorities--

     "The aphorisms, the commentary, the gloss, the two
     explications, the greater and the less,

     "The five topics, and the expositions,--such is the system
     of recognition."

The first aphorism in their text-book is as follows[151]:--

     "Having reached somehow or other the condition of a slave of
     Maheśvara, and wishing also to help mankind,

     "I set forth the recognition of Maheśvara, as the method of
     attaining all felicity."

[This aphorism may be developed as follows]:--

"Somehow or other," by a propitiation, effected by God, of the lotus
feet of a spiritual director identical with God, "having reached,"
having fully attained, this condition, having made it the
unintercepted object of fruition to myself. Thus knowing that which
has to be known, he is qualified to construct a system for others:
otherwise the system would be a mere imposture.

Maheśvara is the reality of unintermitted self-luminousness,
beatitude, and independence, by portions of whose divine essence
Vishṇu, Viriñchi, and other deities are deities, who, though they
transcend the fictitious world, are yet implicated in the infinite
illusion.

The condition of being a slave to Maheśvara is the being a recipient
of that independence or absoluteness which is the essence of the
divine nature, a slave being one to whom his lord grants all things
according to his will and pleasure (_i.e._, _dásya_, from _dá_).

The word _mankind_ imports that there is no restriction of the
doctrine to previously qualified students. Whoever he may be to whom
this exposition of the divine nature is made, he reaps its highest
reward, the emanatory _principium_ itself operating to the highest end
of the transmigrating souls. It has been accordingly laid down in the
Śiva-dṛishṭi by that supreme guide the revered Sománandanátha--

     "When once the nature of Śiva that resides in all things
     has been known with tenacious recognition, whether by proof
     or by instruction in the words of a spiritual director,

     "There is no further need of doing aught, or of any further
     reflection. When he knows Suvarṇa (or Śiva) a man may cease
     to act and to reflect."

The word _also_ excludes the supposition that there is room in self
which has recognised the nature of Maheśvara, and which manifests to
itself its own identity with him, and is therefore fully satisfied,
for any other motive than felicity for others. The well-being of
others is a motive, whatever may be said, for the definition of a
motive applies to it: for there is no such divine curse laid upon man
that self-regard should be his sole motive to the exclusion of a
regard for others. Thus Akshapáda (i. 24) defines a motive: A motive
is that object towards which a man energises.

The preposition _upa_ in _upapádayami_ (I set forth) indicates
proximity: the result is the bringing of mankind near unto God.

Hence the word _all_ in the phrase _the method of attaining all
felicities_. For when the nature of the Supreme Being is attained, all
felicities, which are but the efflux thereof, are overtaken, as if a
man acquired the mountain Rohaṇa (Adam's Peak), he would acquire all
the treasures it contains. If a man acquire the divine nature, what
else is there that he can ask for? Accordingly Utpaláchárya says--

     "What more can they ask who are rich in the wealth of
     devotion? What else can they ask who are poor in this?"

We have thus explained the motive expressed in the words _the method
of attaining all felicities_, on the supposition that the compound
term is a Tatpurusha genitively constructed. Let it be taken as a
Bahuvríhi or relative compound. Then the recognition of Maheśvara, the
knowing him through vicarious idols, has for its motive the full
attainment, the manifestation, of all felicities, of every external
and internal permanent happiness in their proper nature. In the
language of everyday life, recognition is a cognition relative to an
object represented in memory: for example, This (perceived) is the
same (as the remembered) Chaitra. In the recognition propounded in
this system,--there being a God whose omnipotence is learnt from the
accredited legendaries, from accepted revelation, and from
argumentation,--there arises in relation to my presented personal self
the cognition that I am that very God,--in virtue of my recollection
of the powers of that God.

This same recognition I set forth. To set forth is to enforce. I
establish this recognition by a stringent process which renders it
convincing. [Such is the articulate development of the first aphorism
of the Recognitive Institutes.]

Here it may be asked: If soul is manifested only as consubstantial
with God, why this laboured effort to exhibit the recognition? The
answer is this:--The recognition is thus exhibited, because though the
soul is, as you contend, continually manifested as self-luminous (and
therefore identical with God), it is nevertheless under the influence
of the cosmothetic illusion manifested as partial, and therefore the
recognition must be exhibited by an expansion of the cognitive and
active powers in order to achieve the manifestation of the soul as
total (the self being to the natural man a part, to the man of insight
the whole, of the divine pleroma). Thus, then, the syllogism: This
self must be God, because it possesses cognitive and active powers;
for so far forth as any one is cognitive and active, to that extent he
is a lord, like a lord in the world of everyday life, or like a king,
therefore the soul is God. The five-membered syllogism is here
employed, because so long as we deal with the illusory order of
things, the teaching of the Naiyáyikas may be accepted. It has thus
been said by the son of Udayákara--

     "What self-luminous self can affirm or deny that
     self-active and cognitive is Maheśvara the primal being?

     "Such recognition must be effected by an expansion of the
     powers, the self being cognised under illusion, and
     imperfectly discerned."

And again--

     "The continuance of all living creatures in this
     transmigratory world lasts as long as their respiratory
     _involucrum_; knowledge and action are accounted the life of
     living creatures.

     "Of these, knowledge is spontaneously developed, and action
     (or ritual), which is best at Káśi,

     "Is indicated by others also: different from these is real
     knowledge."

And also--

     "The knowledge of these things follows the sequence of those
     things:

     "The knower, whose essence is beatitude and knowledge
     without succession, is Maheśvara."

Sománandanátha also says--

     "He always knows by identity with Śiva: he always knows by
     identity with the real."

Again at the end of the section on knowledge--

     "Unless there were this unity with Śiva, cognitions could
     not exist as facts of daily life:

     "Unity with God is proved by the unity of light. He is the
     one knower (or illuminator of cognitions).

     "He is Maheśvara, the great Lord, by reason of the unbroken
     continuity of objects:

     "Pure knowledge and action are the playful activity of the
     deity."

The following is an explanation of Abhinava-gupta:--The text, "After
that as it shines shines the all of things, by the light of that
shines diversely this ALL," teaches that God illumines the whole round
of things by the glory of His luminous intelligence, and that the
diversity or plurality of the object world, whereby the light which
irradiates objects is a blue, a yellow light, and the like, arises
from diversity of tint cast upon the light by the object. In reality,
God is without plurality or difference, as transcending all
limitations of space, time, and figure. He is pure intelligence,
self-luminousness, the manifester; and thus we may read in the Śaiva
aphorisms, "Self is intelligence." His synonymous titles are
Intelligential Essence, Unintermitted Cognition, Irrespective
Intuition, Existence as a mass of Beatitude, Supreme Domination. This
self-same existing self is knowledge.

By pure knowledge and action (in the passage of Sománandanátha cited
above) are meant real or transcendent cognition and activity. Of
these, the cognition is self-luminousness, the activity is energy
constructive of the world or series of spheres of transmigratory
experience. This is described in the section on activity--

     "He by his power of bliss gives light unto these objects,
     through the efficacy of his will: this activity is
     creativeness."

And at the close of the same section--

     "The mere will of God, when he wills to become the world
     under its forms of jar, of cloth, and other objects, is his
     activity worked out by motive and agent.

     "This process of essence into emanation, whereby if this be
     that comes to be, cannot be attributed to motiveless,
     insentient things."

According to these principles, causality not pertaining either to the
insentient or to the non-divine intelligence, the mere will of
Maheśvara, the absolute Lord, when he wills to emanate into thousands
of forms, as this or that difference, this or that action, this or
that modification of entity, of birth, continuance, and the like, in
the series of transmigratory environments,--his mere will is his
progressively higher and higher activity, that is to say, his
universal creativeness.

How he creates the world by his will alone is clearly exhibited in the
following illustration--

     "The tree or jar produced by the mere will of
     thaumaturgists, without clay, without seed, continues to
     serve its proper purpose as tree or jar."

If clay and similar materials were really the substantial cause of the
jar and the rest, how could they be produced by the mere volition of
the thaumaturgist? If you say: Some jars and some plants are made of
clay, and spring from seeds, while others arise from the bare volition
of the thaumaturgist; then we should inform you that it is a fact
notorious to all the world that _different_ things must emanate from
different materials.

As for those who say that a jar or the like cannot be made without
materials to make it of, and that when a thaumaturgist makes one he
does so by putting atoms in motion by his will, and so composing it:
they may be informed that unless there is to be a palpable violation
of the causal relation, _all_ the co-efficients, without exception,
must be desiderated; to make the jar there must be the clay, the
potter's staff, the potter's wheel, and all the rest of it; to make a
body there must be the congress of the male and female, and the
successive results of that congress. Now, if that be the case, the
genesis of a jar, a body, or the like, upon the mere volition of the
thaumaturgist, would be hardly possible.

On the other hand, there is no difficulty in supposing that Mahádeva,
amply free to remain within or to over-step any limit whatever, the
Lord, manifold in his operancy, the intelligent principle, thus
operates. Thus it is that Vasuguptáchárya says--

"To him that painted this world-picture without materials, without
appliances, without a wall to paint it on,--to him be glory, to him
resplendent with the lunar digit, to him that bears the trident."

It may be asked: If the supersensible self be no other than God, how
comes this implication in successive transmigratory conditions? The
answer is given in the section treating of accredited institution--

     "This agent of cognition, blinded by illusion, transmigrates
     through the fatality of works:

     "Taught his divine nature by science, as pure intelligence,
     he is enfranchised."

It may be asked: If the subject and the object are identical, what
difference can there be between the self bound and the self liberated
in regard to the objects cognisable by each? The answer to this
question is given in a section of the Tattvártha-Saṅgraha--

     "Self liberated cognises all that is cognisable as identical
     with itself, like Maheśvara free from bondage: the other (or
     unliberated) self has in it infinite plurality."

An objection may be raised: If the divine nature is essential to the
soul, there can be no occasion to seek for this recognition; for if
all requisites be supplied, the seed does not fail to germinate
because it is unrecognised. Why, then, this toilsome effort for the
recognition of the soul? To such an objection we reply: Only listen to
the secret we shall tell you. All activity about objects is of two
degrees, being either external, as the activity of the seed in
developing the plant, or internal, as the activity which determines
felicity, which consists in an intuition which terminates in the
conscious self. The first degree of activity presupposes no such
recognition as the system proposes, the second does presuppose it. In
the Recognitive System the peculiar activity is the exertion of the
power of unifying personal and impersonal spirit, a power which is the
attainment of the highest and of mediate ends, the activity consisting
in the intuition I am God. To this activity a recognition of the
essential nature of the soul is a pre-requisite.

It may be urged that peculiar activity terminating in the conscious
self is observed independent of recognition. To this it is replied: A
certain damsel, hearing of the many good qualities of a particular
gallant, fell in love with him before she had seen him, and agitated
by her passion and unable to suffer the pain of not seeing him, wrote
to him a love-letter descriptive of her condition. He at once came to
her, but when she saw him she did not recognise in him the qualities
she had heard about; he appeared much the same as any other man, and
she found no gratification in his society. So soon, however, as she
recognised those qualities in him as her companions now pointed them
out, she was fully gratified. In like manner, though the personal self
be manifested as identical with the universal soul, its manifestation
effects no complete satisfaction so long as there is no recognition of
those attributes; but as soon as it is taught by a spiritual director
to recognise in itself the perfections of Maheśvara, his omniscience,
omnipotence, and other attributes, it attains the whole pleroma of
being.

It is therefore said in the fourth section--

     "As the gallant standing before the damsel is disdained as
     like all other men, so long as he is unrecognised, though he
     humble himself before her with all manner of importunities:
     In like manner the personal self of mankind, though it be
     the universal soul, in which there is no perfection
     unrealised, attains not its own glorious nature; and
     therefore this recognition thereof must come into play."

This system has been treated in detail by Abhinava-gupta and other
teachers, but as we have in hand a summary exposition of systems, we
cannot extend the discussion of it any further lest our work become
too prolix. This then may suffice.[152]

A. E. G.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 150: Read _bháván_ for _bhávát_.]

[Footnote 151: Cf. _supra_, p. 113. Mádhava here condenses Abhinava
Gupta's commentary. Abhinava Gupta lived in the beginning of the
eleventh century (see Bühler's Tour in Cashmere, pp. 66, 80).]

[Footnote 152: I have seen in Calcutta a short Comm. on the Śiva
sútras by Utpala, the son of Udayákara (cf. pp. 130, 131).--E. B. C.]




CHAPTER IX.

THE RASEŚVARA-DARŚANA OR MERCURIAL SYSTEM.[153]


Other Máheśvaras there are who, while they hold the identity of self
with God, insist upon the tenet that the liberation in this life
taught in all the systems depends upon the stability of the bodily
frame, and therefore celebrate the virtues of mercury or quicksilver
as a means of strengthening the system. Mercury is called _párada_,
because it is a means of conveyance beyond the series of
transmigratory states. Thus it has been said--

     "It gives the farther shore of metempsychosis: it is called
     _párada_."

And again in the Rasárṇava--

     "It is styled _párada_ because it is employed for the
     highest end by the best votaries.

     "Since this in sleep identical with me, goddess, arises from
     my members, and is the exudation of my body, it is called
     _rasa_."

It may be urged that the literal interpretation of these words is
incorrect, the liberation in this life being explicable in another
manner. This objection is not allowable, liberation being set out in
the six systems as subsequent to the death of the body, and upon this
there can be no reliance, and consequently no activity to attain to it
free from misgivings. This is also laid down in the same treatise--

     "Liberation is declared in the six systems to follow the
     death of the body.

     "Such liberation is not cognised in perception like an
     emblic myrobalan fruit in the hand.

     "Therefore a man should preserve that body by means of
     mercury and of medicaments."

Govinda-bhagavat also says--

     "Holding that the enjoyments of wealth and of the body are
     not permanent, one should strive

     "After emancipation; but emancipation results from
     knowledge, knowledge from study, and study is only possible
     in a healthy body."

The body, some one may say, is seen to be perishable, how can its
permanency be effected? Think not so, it is replied, for though the
body, as a complexus of six sheaths or wrappers of the soul, is
dissoluble, yet the body, as created by Hara and Gaurí under the names
of mercury and mica, may be perdurable. Thus it is said in the
Rasahṛidaya--

     "They who, without quitting the body, have attained to a new
     body, the creation of Hara and Gaurí,

     "They are to be lauded, perfected by mercury, at whose
     service is the aggregate of magic texts."

The ascetic, therefore, who aspires to liberation in this life should
first make to himself a glorified body. And inasmuch as mercury is
produced by the creative conjunction of Hara and Gaurí, and mica is
produced from Gaurí, mercury and mica are severally identified with
Hara and Gaurí in the verse--

     "Mica is thy seed, and mercury is my seed;

     "The combination of the two, O goddess, is destructive of
     death and poverty."

This is very little to say about the matter. In the
Raseśvara-siddhánta many among the gods, the Daityas, the Munis, and
mankind, are declared to have attained to liberation in this life by
acquiring a divine body through the efficacy of quicksilver.

     "Certain of the gods, Maheśa and others; certain Daityas,
     Śukra and others;

     "Certain Munis, the Bálakhilyas and others; certain kings,
     Someśvara and others;

     "Govinda-bhagavat, Govinda-náyaka,

     "Charvaṭi, Kapila, Vyáli, Kápáli, Kandaláyana,

     "These and many others proceed perfected, liberated while
     alive,

     "Having attained to a mercurial body, and therewith
     identified."

The meaning of this, as explicated by Parameśvara to Parameśvarí, is
as follows:--

     "By the method of works is attained, O supreme of goddesses,
     the preservation of the body;

     "And the method of works is said to be twofold, mercury and
     air,

     "Mercury and air swooning carry off diseases, dead they
     restore to life,

     "Bound they give the power of flying about."

The swooning state of mercury is thus described--

     "They say quicksilver to be swooning when it is perceived,
     as characterised thus--

     "Of various colours, and free from excessive volatility.

     "A man should regard that quicksilver as dead, in which the
     following marks are seen--

     "Wetness, thickness, brightness, heaviness, mobility."

The bound condition is described in another place as follows:--

     "The character of bound quicksilver is that it is--

     "Continuous, fluent, luminous, pure, heavy, and that it
     parts asunder under friction."

Some one may urge: If the creation of mercury by Hara and Gaurí were
proved, it might be allowed that the body could be made permanent; but
how can that be proved? The objection is not allowable, inasmuch as
that _can_ be proved by the eighteen modes of elaboration. Thus it is
stated by the authorities--

     "Eighteen modes of elaboration are to be carefully
     discriminated,

     "In the first place, as pure in every process, for
     perfecting the adepts."

And these modes of elaboration are enumerated thus--

     "Sweating, rubbing, swooning, fixing, dropping, coercion,
     restraining,

     "Kindling, going, falling into globules, pulverising,
     covering,

     "Internal flux, external flux, burning, colouring, and
     pouring,

     "And eating it by parting and piercing it,--are the eighteen
     modes of treating quicksilver."

These treatments have been described at length by Govinda-bhagavat,
Sarvajña-rámeśvara and the other ancient authorities, and are here
omitted to avoid prolixity.

The mercurial system is not to be looked upon as merely eulogistic of
the metal, it being immediately, through the conservation of the body,
a means to the highest end, liberation. Thus it is said in the
Rasárṇava--

"Declare to me, O god, that supremely efficacious destruction of the
blood, that destruction of the body, imparted by thee, whereby it
attained the power of flying about in the sky. Goddess (he replied),
quicksilver is to be applied both to the blood and to the body. This
makes the appearance of body and blood alike. A man should first try
it upon the blood, and then apply it to the body."

It will be asked: Why should we make this effort to acquire a
celestial body, seeing that liberation is effected by the
self-manifestation of the supreme principle, existence, intelligence,
and beatitude? We reply: This is no objection, such liberation being
inaccessible unless we acquire a healthy body. Thus it is said in the
Rasahṛidaya--

     "That intelligence and bliss set forth in all the systems
     in which a multitude of uncertainties are melted away,

     "Though it manifest itself, what can it effect for beings
     whose bodies are unglorified?

     "He who is worn out with decrepitude, though he be free from
     cough, from asthma, and similar infirmities,

     "He is not qualified for meditation in whom the activities
     of the cognitive organs are obstructed.

     "A youth of sixteen addicted to the last degree to the
     enjoyment of sensual pleasures,

     "An old man in his dotage, how should either of these attain
     to emancipation?"

Some one will object: It is the nature of the personal soul to pass
through a series of embodiments, and to be liberated is to be
extricated from that series of embodiments; how, then, can these two
mutually exclusive conditions pertain to the same bodily tenement? The
objection is invalid, as unable to stand before the following
dilemmatic argument:--Is this extrication, as to the nature of which
all the founders of institutes are at one, to be held as cognisable or
as incognisable? If it is incognisable, it is a pure chimera; if it is
cognisable, we cannot dispense with life, for that which is not alive
cannot be cognisant of it. Thus it is said in the Rasasiddhánta--

     "The liberation of the personal soul is declared in the
     mercurial system, O subtile thinker.

     "In the tenets of other schools which repose on a diversity
     of argument,

     "Know that this knowledge and knowable is allowed in all
     sacred texts;

     "One not living cannot know the knowable, and therefore
     there is and must be life."

And this is not to be supposed to be unprecedented, for the adherents
of the doctrine of Vishṇu-svámin maintain the eternity of the body of
Vishṇu half-man and half-lion. Thus it is said in the Sákára-siddhi--

     "I glorify the man-lion set forth by Vishṇu-svámin,

     "Whose only body is existence, intelligence, and eternal and
     inconceivably perfect beatitude."

If the objection be raised that the body of the man-lion, which
appears as composite and as coloured, is incompatible with real
existence, it may be replied: How can the body of the man-lion be
otherwise than really existent, proved as it is by three kinds of
proof: (1.) by the intuition of Śanaka and others; (2.) by Vedic texts
such as, A thousand heads has Purusha; and (3.) by Puráṇic texts such
as, That wondrous child, lotus-eyed, four-armed, armed with the
conch-shell, the club, and other weapons? Real existence and other
like predicates are affirmed also by Śríkánta-miśra, the devoted
adherent of Vishṇu-svámin. Let, then, those who aspire to the highest
end of personal souls be assured that the eternity of the body which
we are setting forth is by no means a mere innovation. It has thus
been said--

     "What higher beatitude is there than a body undecaying,
     immortal,

     "The repository of sciences, the root of merit, riches,
     pleasure, liberation?"

It is mercury alone that can make the body undecaying and immortal, as
it is said--

     "Only this supreme medicament can make the body undecaying
     and imperishable."

Why describe the efficacy of this metal? Its value is proved even by
seeing it, and by touching it, as it is said in the Rasárṇava--

     "From seeing it, from touching it, from eating it, from
     merely remembering it,

     "From worshipping it, from tasting it, from imparting it,
     appear its six virtues.

     "Equal merit accrues from seeing mercury as accrues from
     seeing all the phallic emblems

     "On earth, those at Kedára, and all others whatsoever."

In another place we read--

     "The adoration of the sacred quicksilver is more beatific
     than the worship of all the phallic emblems at Káśi and
     elsewhere,

     "Inasmuch as there is attained thereby enjoyment, health,
     exemption from decay, and immortality."

The sin of disparaging mercury is also set out--

     "The adept on hearing quicksilver heedlessly disparaged
     should recall quicksilver to mind.

     "He should at once shun the blasphemer, who is by his
     blasphemy for ever filled with sin."

The attainment, then, of the highest end of the personal soul takes
place by an intuition of the highest principle by means of the
practice of union (ἕνωσις) after the acquisition of a divine body in
the manner we have described. Thereafter--

     "The light of pure intelligence shines forth unto certain
     men of holy vision,

     "Which, seated between the two eyebrows, illumines the
     universe, like fire, or lightning, or the sun:

     "Perfect beatitude, unalloyed, absolute, the essence whereof
     is luminousness, undifferenced,

     "From which all troubles are fallen away, knowable,
     tranquil, self-recognised:

     "Fixing the internal organ upon that, seeing the whole
     universe manifested, made of pure intelligence,

     "The aspirant even in this life attains to the absolute, his
     bondage to works annulled."

A Vedic text also declares: That is Rasa (mercury), having obtained
this he becomes beatitude.

Thus, then, it has been shown that mercury alone is the means of
passing beyond the burden of transmigratory pains. And conformably we
have a verse which sets forth the identity between mercury and the
supreme self--

     "May that mercury, which is the very self, preserve us from
     dejection and from the terrors of metempsychosis,

     "Which is naturally to be applied again and again by those
     that aspire to liberation from the enveloping illusion,

     "Which perfected endures, which plays not again when the
     soul awakes,

     "Which, when it arises, pains no other soul, which shines
     forth by itself from itself."

A. E. G.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 153: Cf. Marco Polo's account of the Indian yogís in Colonel
Yule's edit. vol. ii. p. 300. _Párada-pána_ is one of the practices of
the Siddhopásakas in the Śaṅkara-digvijaya, § 49, to obviate
_apamṛityu_, _akálamṛityu_, &c.]




CHAPTER X.

THE VAIŚESHIKA OR AULÚKYA DARŚANA.[154]


Whoso wishes to escape the reality of pain, which is established by
the consciousness of every soul through its being felt to be
essentially contrary to every rational being, and wishes therefore to
know the means of such escape,--learns that the knowledge of the
Supreme Being is the true means thereof, from the authority of such
passages as these (_Śvetáśvatara Upan_. vi. 20)--

     "When men shall roll up the sky as a piece of leather,

     "Then shall there be an end of pain without the knowledge of
     Śiva."

Now the knowledge of the Supreme is to be gained by hearing
(_śravaṇa_), thought (_manana_), and reflection (_bhávaná_), as it has
been said--

     "By scripture, by inference, and by the force of repeated
     meditation,--

     "By these three methods producing knowledge, he gains the
     highest union (_yoga_)."

Here thought depends on inference, and inference depends on the
knowledge of the _vyápti_ (or universal proposition), and the
knowledge of the _vyápti_ follows the right understanding of the
categories,--hence the saint Kaṇáda[155] establishes the six
categories in his tenfold treatise, commencing with the words, "Now,
therefore, we shall explain duty."

In the first book, consisting of two daily lessons, he describes all
the categories which are capable of intimate relation. In the first
_áhnika_ he defines those which possess "genus" (_játi_), in the
second "genus" (or "generality") itself and "particularity." In the
similarly divided second book he discusses "substance," giving in the
first _áhnika_ the characteristics of the five elements, and in the
second he establishes the existence of space and time. In the third
book he defines the soul and the internal sense, the former in the
first _áhnika_, the latter in the second. In the fourth book he
discusses the body and its adjuncts, the latter in the first _áhnika_,
and the former in the second. In the fifth book he investigates
action; in the first _áhnika_ he considers action as connected with
the body, in the second as belonging to the mind. In the sixth book he
examines merit and demerit as revealed in Śruti; in the first _áhnika_
he discusses the merit of giving, receiving gifts, &c., in the second
the duties of the four periods of religious life. In the seventh book
he discusses quality and intimate relation; in the first _áhnika_ he
considers the qualities independent of thought, in the second those
qualities which are related to it, and also intimate relation. In the
eighth book he examines "indeterminate" and "determinate" perception,
and means of proof. In the ninth book he discusses the characteristics
of intellect. In the tenth book he establishes the different kinds of
inference.[156]

The method of this system is said to be threefold, "enunciation,"
"definition," and "investigation."[157] "But," it may be objected,
"ought we not to include 'division,' and so make the method fourfold,
not threefold?" We demur to this, because "division" is really
included in a particular kind of enunciation. Thus when we declare
that substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and
intimate relation are the only six positive categories,--this is an
example of enunciation. If you ask "What is the reason for this
definite order of the categories?" we answer as follows:--Since
"substance" is the chief, as being the substratum of all the
categories, we enounce this first; next "quality," since it resides in
its generic character in all substances [though different substances
have different qualities]; then "action," as it agrees with
"substance" and "quality" in possessing "generality;"[158] then
"generality," as residing in these three; then "particularity,"
inasmuch as it possesses "intimate relation;"[159] lastly, "intimate
relation" itself; such is the principle of arrangement.

If you ask, "Why do you say that there are only six categories since
'non-existence' is also one?" we answer: Because we wish to speak of
the six as positive categories, _i.e._, as being the objects of
conceptions which do not involve a negative idea. "Still," the
objector may retort, "how do you establish this definite number 'only
six'? for either horn of the alternative fails. For, we ask, is the
thing to be thus excluded already thoroughly ascertained or not? If it
is thoroughly ascertained, why do you exclude it? and still more so,
if it is not thoroughly ascertained? What sensible man, pray, spends
his strength in denying that a mouse has horns? Thus your definite
number 'only six' fails as being inapplicable." This, however, we
cannot admit; if darkness, &c., are allowed to form certainly a
seventh category (as "non-existence"), we thus (by our definite
number) deny it to be one of the six _positive_ categories,--and if
others attempt to include "capacity," "number," &c., which we allow
to be certainly positive existences, we thus deny that they make a
_seventh_ category. But enough of this long discussion.

Substantiality, &c. (_dravyatvádi_), _i.e._, the genera of substance,
quality, and action, are the definition of the triad substance,
quality, and action respectively. The genus of substance (_dravyatva_)
is that which, while it alike exists with intimate relation in the
(eternal) sky and the (transitory) lotus, is itself eternal,[160] and
does not exist with intimate relation in smell.[161]

The genus of quality (_guṇatva_) is that which is immediately
subordinate to the genus existence, and exists with intimate relation
in whatever is not an intimate or mediate cause.[162] The genus of
action (_karmatva_) is that which is immediately subordinate to the
genus existence, and is not found with intimate relation in anything
eternal.[163] Generality (or genus, _sámánya_) is that which is found
in many things with intimate relation, and can never be the
counter-entity to emergent non-existence.[164] Particularity[165]
(_viśesha_) exists with intimate relation, but it is destitute of
generality, which stops mutual non-existence.[166] Intimate relation
(_samaváya_) is that connection which itself has not intimate
relation.[167] Such are the definitions of the six categories.

Substance is ninefold,--earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space,
soul, and mind. The genera of earth, &c. (_pṛithivítva_), are the
definitions of the first four. The genus of earth is that generality
which is immediately subordinate to substance, and resides in the same
subject with colour produced by baking.[168]

The genus of water is that generality which is found with intimate
relation in water, being also found in intimate relation in river and
sea. The genus of fire is that generality which is found with intimate
relation in fire, being also found with intimate relation in the moon
and gold. The genus of air is that which is immediately subordinate to
substance, and is found with intimate relation in the organ of the
skin.[169]

As ether, space, and time, from their being single, cannot be
subordinate genera, their several names stand respectively for their
technical appellations. Ether is the abode of particularity, and is
found in the same subject with the non-eternal (_janya_) special
quality which is not produced by contact.[170]

Time is that which, being a pervading substance, is the abode of the
mediate cause[171] of that idea of remoteness (_paratva_) which is
not found with intimate relation in space;[172] while space is that
pervading substance which possesses no special qualities and yet is
not time.[173] The general terms _átmatva_ and _manastva_ are the
respective definitions of soul (_átman_) and mind (_manas_). The
general idea of soul is that which is subordinate to substance, being
also found with intimate relation in that which is without form[174]
(_amúrtta_). The general idea of mind is that which is subordinate to
substance, being also found existing with intimate relation in an
atom, but [unlike other atoms] not the intimate cause of any
substance. There are twenty-four qualities; seventeen are mentioned
directly in Kaṇáda's Sútras (i. 1, 6), "colour, taste, smell, touch,
number, quantity, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness,
proximity, intelligence, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and
effort;" and, besides these, seven others are understood in the word
"_and_," viz., gravity, fluidity, viscidity, faculty, merit, demerit,
and sound. Their respective genera (_rúpatva_, &c.) are their several
definitions. The class or genus of "colour" is that which is
subordinate to quality and exists with intimate relation in blue. In
the same way may be formed the definitions of the rest.

"Action" is fivefold, according to the distinction of throwing
upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding, and going:
revolution, evacuating, &c., being included under "going." The genus
of throwing upwards, &c., will be their respective definitions. The
genus of throwing upwards is a subordinate genus to action; it exists
with intimate relation, and is to be known as the mediate cause of
conjunction with a higher place. In the same manner are to be made the
definitions of throwing downwards, &c. Generality (or genus) is
twofold, extensive and non-extensive; existence is extensive as found
with intimate connection in substance and quality, or in quality and
action; substance, &c., are non-extensive. The definition of
generality has been given before. Particularity and intimate relation
cannot be divided,--in the former case in consequence of the infinite
number of separate particularities, in the latter from intimate
relation being but one; their definitions have been given before.

There is a popular proverb--

"Duality, change produced by baking, and disjunction produced by
disjunction,--he whose mind vacillates not in these three is the true
Vaiśeshika;" and therefore we will now show the manner of the
production of duality, &c.

There is here first the contact of the organ of sense with the object;
thence there arises the knowledge of the genus unity; then the
distinguishing perception _apekshábuddhi_ [by which we apprehend "this
is one," "this is one," &c.]; then the production of duality, _dvitva_
(in the object);[175] then the knowledge of the abstract genus of
duality (_dvitvatva_); then the knowledge of the quality duality as it
exists in the two things; then imagination[176] (_saṃskára_).[177]

But it may here be asked what is the proof of duality, &c., being thus
produced from _apekshábuddhi_? The great doctor (Udayana) maintained
that _apekshábuddhi_ must be the producer of duality, &c., because
duality is never found separated from it, while, at the same time, we
cannot hold _apekshábuddhi_ as the cause only of its being known [and
therefore it follows that it must be the cause of its being
produced[178]], just as contact is with regard to sound. We, however,
maintain the same opinion by a different argument; duality, &c.,
cannot be held to be made known (_jñápya_) by that non-eternal
apprehension whose object is two or more individual unities (_i.e._,
_apekshábuddhi_), because these are qualities which reside in a
plurality of subjects [and not in any one individual[179]] just as
"severalty" does [and, therefore, as _apekshábuddhi_ is not their
_jñápaka_, it must be their _janaka_].

Next we will describe the order of the successive destructions. From
_apekshábuddhi_ arises, simultaneously with the production of duality
(_dvitva_), the destruction of the knowledge of the genus of unity;
next from the knowledge of the genus of duality (_dvitvatva_) arises,
simultaneously with the knowledge of the quality duality, the
destruction of _apekshábuddhi_; next from the destruction of
_apekshábuddhi_ arises, simultaneously with the knowledge of the two
substances, the destruction of the duality; next from the knowledge of
the two substances arises, simultaneously with the production of
imagination (_saṃskára_), the destruction of the knowledge of the
quality; and next from imagination arises the destruction of the
knowledge of the substances.

The evidence for the destruction of one kind of knowledge by another,
and for the destruction of another knowledge by imagination, is to be
found in the following argument; these knowledges themselves which are
the subjects of the discussion _are_ successively destroyed by the
rise of others produced from them, because knowledge, like sound, is a
special quality of an all-pervading substance, and of momentary
duration.[180] I may briefly add, that when you have the knowledge of
the genus of unity simultaneously with an action in one of the two
things themselves, producing that separation which is the opposite to
the conjunction that produced the whole, in that case you have the
subsequent destruction of duality produced by the destruction of its
abiding-place (the two things); but where you have this separate
action taking place simultaneously with the rise of _apekshábuddhi_,
there you have the destruction of duality produced by the united
influence of both.[181]

_Apekshábuddhi_ is to be considered as that operation of the mind
which is the counter-entity to that emergent non-existence (_i.e._,
destruction) which itself causes a subsequent destruction.[182]

Next we will inquire in how many moments, commencing with the
destruction of the compound of two atoms (the _dvyaṇuka_), another
compound of two atoms is produced, having colour, &c. In the course of
this investigation the mode of production will be explained. First,
the compound of two atoms is gradually destroyed by the series of
steps commencing with the contact of fire;[183] secondly, from the
conjunction of fire arises the destruction of the qualities black,
&c., in the single atom; thirdly, from another conjunction of fire
arises the production of red, &c., in the atom; fourthly, from
conjunction with a soul possessing merit arises an action[184] in the
atom for the production of a substance; fifthly, by that action is
produced a separation of that atom from its former place; sixthly,
there is produced thereby the destruction of its conjunction with that
former place; seventhly, is produced the conjunction with another
atom; eighthly, from these two atoms arises the compound of two atoms;
ninthly, from the qualities, &c., of the causes (_i.e._, the atoms)
are produced colour, &c., the qualities of the effect (_i.e._, the
_dvyaṇuka_). Such is the order of the series of nine moments. The
other two series,[185] that of the ten and that of the eleven moments,
are omitted for fear of prolixity. Such is the mode of production, if
we hold (with the Vaiśeshikas) that the baking process takes place in
the atoms of the jar.[186] The Naiyáyikas, however, maintain that the
baking process takes place in the jar.

"Disjunction produced by disjunction" is twofold,--that produced by
the disjunction of the intimate [or material] causes only, and that
produced by the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause
[_i.e._, the place]. We will first describe the former kind.

It is a fixed rule that when the action of breaking arises in the
[material] cause which is inseparably connected with the effect
[_i.e._, in one of the two halves of the pot], and produces a
disjunction from the other half, there is not produced at that time a
disjunction from the place or point of space occupied by the pot; and,
again, when there is a disjunction from that point of space occupied
by the pot, the disjunction from the other half is not contemporary
with it, but has already taken place. For just as we never see smoke
without its cause, fire, so we never see that effect of the breaking
in the pot which we call the disjunction from the point of space,[187]
without there having previously been the origination of that
disjunction of the halves which stops the conjunction whereby the pot
was brought into being. Therefore the action of breaking in the parts
produces the disjunction of one part from another, but not the
disjunction from the point of space; next, this disjunction of one
part from another produces the destruction of that conjunction which
had brought the pot into existence; and thence arises the destruction
of the pot, according to the principle, _cessante causâ cessat
effectus_. The pot being thus destroyed, that disjunction, which
resides in both the halves (which are the material or intimate causes
of the pot) during the time that is marked by the destruction of the
pot or perhaps having reference only to one independent half,
initiates, in the case of that half where the breaking began, a
disjunction from the point of space which had been connected with the
pot; but not in the case of the other half, as there is no cause to
produce it.[188]

But the second kind is as follows:--As action which arises in the
hand, and causes a disjunction from that with which it was in contact,
initiates a disjunction[189] from the points of space in which the
original conjunction took place; and this is "the disjunction of the
intimate cause and the non-cause." When the action in the hand
produces an effect in relation to any points of space, it initiates
also in the same direction a disjunction of the intimate effect and
the non-effect; thus the disjunction of the body [the intimate effect]
and the points of space arises from the disjunction of the hand and
the points of space [the hand being an intimate or material cause of
the body, but the points of space being not a cause]. This second
disjunction is not produced by the action of the body, because the
body is supposed to be at the time inactive; nor is it produced by the
action of the hand, because it is impossible that an action residing
in some other place [as the hand] should produce the effect of
disjunction [in the body]. Therefore we conclude by exhaustion that we
must accept the view--that it is the disjunction of the intimate cause
and the non-cause[190] which causes the second disjunction of the
body and the points of space.

But an opponent may here object that "what you formerly stated (p.
147) as to existence being denied of darkness, &c., is surely
unreasonable; for, in fact, there are no less than four different
opinions maintained on this point,--thus (_a._) the Bháṭṭa Mímáṃsakas
and the Vedántins hold that darkness is a substance; (_b._) Śrídhara
Áchárya[191] holds that the colour of dark blue is imposed [and thus
darkness will be a quality]; (_c._) some of the Prábhákara Mímáṃsakas
hold that it is the absence of the cognition of light; (_d._) the
Naiyáyikas, &c., hold that it is the absence of light." In reply, we
assert that as for the first alleged opinion (_a._) it is quite out of
the question, as it is consistent with neither of the two possible
alternatives; for if darkness is a substance, it must either be one of
the nine well-known substances, earth, &c.,[192] or some different
one. But it cannot be any one of the nine, since, under whichever one
you would place it, all the qualities of that substance should
certainly be found in it; nor can you, on the other hand, assert that
it is some substance different from these nine, since, being in itself
destitute of qualities, it cannot properly be a substance at all [the
very definition of substance being "that which is the substratum of
qualities"], and therefore, of course, it cannot be a different
substance from the nine. But you may ask, "How can you say that
darkness is destitute of qualities, when it is perceived as possessed
of the dark blue of the tamála blossom?" We reply, that this is merely
an error, as when men say that the [colourless] sky is blue. But
enough of this onslaught on ancient sages.[193] (_b._) Hence it
follows that darkness cannot have its colour imposed upon it, since
you cannot have an imposition of colour without supposing some
substratum to receive it;[194] and again, we cannot conceive the eye
as capable of imposing a colour when deprived of the concurrent cause,
the external light. Nor can we accept that it is an impression
independent of the eye [_i.e._, produced by the internal sense, mind],
because the concurrence of the eye is not a superfluous but an
indispensable condition to its being produced. Nor can you maintain
that "absence or non-existence (_abháva_[195]) is incapable of being
expressed by affirmative tense affixes [and, therefore, as we _do_ use
such phrases as _tenebræ oriuntur_, darkness cannot be a mere
non-existence"]; because your assertion is too broad, as it would
include such cases of non-existence as a mundane collapse,
destruction, inattention,[196] &c. [and yet we all know that men do
speak of any of these things as past, present, or future, and yet all
are cases of _abháva_]. (_c._) Hence darkness cannot be the absence of
the cognition of light, since, by the well-known rule that that organ
which perceives a certain object can also perceive its absence, it
would follow that darkness would be perceived by the mind [since it is
the mind which perceives cognitions].[197] Hence we conclude that the
fourth or remaining opinion must be the true one, viz., that darkness
is only the absence of light. And it need not be objected that it is
very difficult to account for the attribution to non-existence of the
qualities of existence, for we all see that the quality happiness _is_
attributed to the absence of pain, and the idea of separation is
connected with the absence of conjunction. And you need not assert
that "this absence of light must be the object of a cognition produced
by the eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an
object possessing colour,[198] as we see in the case of a jar's
absence," because by the very rule on which you rely, viz., that that
on which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on
to perceive that object's absence, it follows that as there is no
dependence of the eye on light to perceive light, it need not depend
thereon to perceive this light's absence. Nor need our opponent retort
that "the cognition of darkness [as the absence of light] necessitates
the cognition of the place where the absence resides [and _this_ will
require light]," as such an assertion is quite untenable, for we
cannot admit that in order to have a conception of absence it is
necessary to have a conception of the place where the absence resides,
else we could not have the perception of the cessation of sound, as is
implied in such an expression as "the tumult has ceased."[199] Hence,
having all these difficulties in his mind, the venerable Kaṇáda
uttered his aphorism [as an _ipse dixit_ to settle the question]:
"_Dravya-guṇa-karma-nish-patti-vaidharmyád abhávas tamas_" (_Vaiś.
Sút._ v. 2, 19), "Darkness is really non-existence, since it is
dissimilar to the production of substances, qualities, or actions."
The same thing has been also established by the argument that darkness
is perceived by the eye[200] [without light, whereas all substances,
if perceptible at all, require the presence of light as well as of the
eye to be visible].

Non-existence (_abháva_) is considered to be the seventh category, as
established by negative proofs. It may be concisely defined as that
which, itself not having intimate relation, is _not_ intimate
relation;[201] and this is twofold, "relative non-existence"[202] and
"reciprocal non-existence."

The former is again divided into "antecedent," "emergent," and
"absolute." "Antecedent" is that non-existence which, though without
any beginning, is not everlasting; "emergent" is that which, though
having a beginning, is everlasting; "absolute" is that non-existence
which abides in its own counter-entity;[203] "reciprocal
non-existence" is that which, being different from "absolute," has yet
no defined limit [_i.e._, no _terminus ad quem_ nor _terminus a quo_,
as "antecedent" and "emergent" have].

If you raise the objection that "'reciprocal non-existence' is really
the same as 'absolute non-existence,'" we reply that this is indeed to
lose one's way in the king's highroad; for "reciprocal non-existence"
is that negation whose opposite is held to be identity, as "a jar is
not cloth;" but "absolute non-existence" is that negation whose
opposite is connection, as "there is no colour in the air."[204] Nor
need you here raise the objection that "_abháva_ can never be a means
of producing any good to man," for we maintain that it is his _summum
bonum_, in the form of final beatitude, which is only another term for
the absolute abolition of all pain [and therefore comes under the
category of _abháva_].

E. B. C.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 154: The Vaiśeshikas are called Aulúkyáḥ in Hemachandra's
_Abhidhána-chintámaṇi_; in the Váyu-puráṇa (quoted in Aufrecht's
_Catal_. p. 53 b, l. 23), Akshapáda, Kaṇáda, Ulúka, and Vatsa are
called the sons of Śiva.]

[Footnote 155: He is here called by his synonym Kaṇabhaksha.]

[Footnote 156: It is singular that this is inaccurate. The ninth book
treats of that perception which arises from supersensible contact,
&c., and inference. The tenth treats of the mutual difference of the
qualities of the soul, and the three causes.]

[Footnote 157: For this extract from the old _bháshya_ of Vátsyáyana,
see Colebrooke's _Essays_ (new edition), vol. i. p. 285.]

[Footnote 158: Cf. _Bháshá-parichchheda_, śloka 14.]

[Footnote 159: "Particularity" (_viśesha_) resides by "intimate
relation" in the eternal atoms, &c.]

[Footnote 160: This clause is added, as otherwise the definition would
apply to "duality" and "conjunction."]

[Footnote 161: This is added, as otherwise the definition would apply
to "existence" (_sattá_), which is the _summum genus_, to which
substance, quality, and action are immediately subordinate.]

[Footnote 162: Existence (_sattá_) is the genus of _dravya_, _guṇa_,
and _kriyâ_. _Dravya_ alone can be the intimate cause of anything; and
all actions are the mediate (or non-intimate) cause of conjunction and
disjunction. _Some_ qualities (as _saṃyoga_, _rúpa_, &c.) may be
mediate causes, but this is accidental and does not belong to the
essence of _guṇa_, as many gunas can never be mediate causes.]

[Footnote 163: As all karmas are transitory, _karmatva_ is only found
in the _anitya_. I correct in p. 105, line 20, _nityá-samavetatva_;
this is the reading of the MS. in the Calcutta Sanskrit College
Library.]

[Footnote 164: _I.e._, it can never be destroyed. Indestructibility,
however, is found in time, space, &c.; to exclude these, therefore,
the former clause of the definition is added.]

[Footnote 165: "Particularity" (whence the name Vaiśeshika) is not
"individuality, as of this particular flash of lightning,"--but it is
the individuality either of those eternal substances which, being
single, have no genus, as ether, time, and space; or of the different
atomic minds; or of the atoms of the four remaining substances, earth,
water, fire, and air, these atoms being supposed to be the _ne plus
ultra_, and as they have no parts, they are what they are by their own
indivisible nature. Ballantyne translated _viśesha_ as "ultimate
difference." I am not sure whether the individual soul has _viśesha_.]

[Footnote 166: Mutual non-existence (_anyonyábháva_) exists between
two notions which have no property in common, as a "pot is not cloth;"
but the genus is the same in two pots, both alike being pots.]

[Footnote 167: "_Samaváyasambandábhávát samaváyo na játiḥ_," Siddh.
Mukt. (_Saṃyoga_ being a _guṇa_ has _guṇatva_ existing in it with
intimate relation).]

[Footnote 168: The feel or touch of earth is said to be "neither hot
nor cold, and its colour, taste, smell, and touch are changed by union
with fire" (Bháshá-parichchheda, _sl._ 103, 104).]

[Footnote 169: The organ of touch is an aërial
integument.--_Colebrooke._]

[Footnote 170: Sound is twofold,--"produced from contact," as the
_first_ sound, and "produced from sound," as the _second_. _Janya_ is
added to exclude God's knowledge, while _saṃyogájanya_ excludes the
soul's, which is produced by contact, as of the soul and mind, mind
and the senses, &c.]

[Footnote 171: The mediate cause itself is the conjunction of time
with some body, &c., existing in time,--this latter is the intimate
cause, while the knowledge of the revolutions of the sun is the
instrumental cause. In p. 106, line 12, read _adhikaraṇaṃ_.]

[Footnote 172: _Paratva_ being of two kinds, _daiśika_ and _kálika_.]

[Footnote 173: Time, space, and mind have no special qualities; the
last, however, is not pervading but atomic.]

[Footnote 174: The three other _padárthas_, beside soul, which are
_amúrtta_,--time, ether, and space,--are not genera.]

[Footnote 175: All numbers, from duality upwards, are artificial,
_i.e._, they are made by our minds; unity alone exists in things
themselves--each being _one_; and they only become two, &c., by our
choosing to regard them so, and thus joining them in thought.]

[Footnote 176: _Saṃskára_ is here the idea conceived by the
mind--created, in fact, by its own energies out of the material
previously supplied to it by the senses and the internal organ or
mind. (Cf. the tables in p. 153.)]

[Footnote 177: Here and elsewhere I omit the metrical summary of the
original, as it adds nothing new to the previous prose.]

[Footnote 178: Every cause must be either _jñápaka_ or _janaka_;
_apekshábuddhi_, not being the former, must be the latter.]

[Footnote 179: _Apekshábuddhi_ apprehends "this is one," "this is
one," &c.; but duality, for instance, does not reside in either of
these, but in _both_ together.]

[Footnote 180: The Vaiśeshikas held that the jívátman and space are
each an all-pervading substance, but the individual portions of each
have different special qualities; hence one man knows what another is
ignorant of, and one portion of ether has sound when another portion
has not. Dr. Röer, in his version of the Bháshá-Parichchheda, has
mistranslated an important Sútra which bears on this point. It is said
in Sútra 26--

     _----athákáśaśaríriṇam, avyápyavṛittiḥ kshaṇiko viśesha-guṇa
     ishyate,_

which does not mean "the special qualities of ether and soul are
limitation to space and momentary duration," but "the special
qualities of ether and soul (_i.e._, sound, knowledge, &c.) are
limited to different portions and of momentary duration."]

[Footnote 181: The author here mentions two other causes of the
destruction of _dvitva_ besides that already given in p. 152, l. 14
(_apekshábuddhi-náśa_), viz., _áśrayanáśa_, and the united action of
_both_:--

1. Ekatva-jñána        |Avayava-kriyá              |    . . .
2. Apekshábuddhi       |Avayava-vibhága            |Avayava-kriyá.
3. Dvitvotpatti and    |Avayava-saṃyoga-náśa       |Avayava-vibhága.
   ekatva-jñána-náśa   |                           |
4. Dvitvatvajñána      |Dvitvádhárasya             |Avayava-saṃyoga-náśa.
                       |(_i.e._,                   |
                       |avayavinaḥ) náśaḥ           |
5. Dvitvaguṇa-buddhi|Dvitva-náśa                    |Ádhára-náśa
   and                 |of avayavin). (_i.e._,     |
   apekshábuddhi-náśa  |(of avayavin).             |
6. Dvitva-náśa  and    |         . . .             |Dvitva-náśa.
   dravya-buddhi       |                           |

The second and third columns represent what takes place when, in the
course of the six steps of _ekatvajñána_, &c., one of the two parts is
itself divided either at the _first_ or the _second_ moment. In the
first case, the _dvitva_ of the whole is destroyed in the fifth
moment, and therefore its only cause is its immediately preceding
_dvitvádhára-náśa_, or, as Mádhava calls it, _áśrayanivṛitti_. In the
second case, the _náśa_ arrives at the same moment simultaneously by
both columns (1) and (3), and hence it may be ascribed to the united
action of two causes, _apekshábuddhi-náśa_ and _ádhára-náśa_. Any
_kriyá_ which arose in one of the parts after the second moment would
be unimportant, as the _náśa_ of the _dvitva_ of the whole would take
place by the original sequence in column (1) in the sixth moment; and
in this way it would be too late to affect that result.]

[Footnote 182: _I.e._, from the destruction of _apekshábuddhi_ follows
the destruction of _dvitva_; but the other destructions previously
described were followed by some production,--thus the knowledge of
_dvitvatva_ arose from the destruction of _ekatvajñána_, &c. (cf.
Siddh. Mukt., p. 107). I may remind the reader that in Hindu logic the
counter-entity to the non-existence of a thing is the thing itself.]

[Footnote 183: From the conjunction of fire is produced an action in
the atoms of the jar; thence a separation of one atom from another;
thence a destruction of the conjunction of atoms which made the black
(or unbaked) jar; thence the destruction of the compound of two
atoms.]

[Footnote 184: _I.e._, a kind of initiative tendency.]

[Footnote 185: These are explained at full length in the Siddhánta
Muktávalí, pp. 104, 105. In the first series we have--1. the
destruction of the _dvyaṇuka_ and simultaneously a disjunction from
the old place produced by the disjunction (of the parts); 2. the
destruction of the black colour in the _dvyaṇuka_, and the
simultaneous destruction of the conjunction of the _dvyaṇuka_ with
that place; 3. the production of the red colour in the atoms, and the
simultaneous conjunction with another place; 4. the cessation of the
action in the atom produced by the original conjunction of fire. The
remaining 5-10 agree with the 4-9 above.]

[Footnote 186: The Vaiśeshikas hold that when a jar is baked, the old
black jar is _destroyed_, its several compounds of two atoms, &c.,
being destroyed; the action of the fire then produces the red colour
in the separate atoms, and, joining these into new compounds,
eventually produces a new red jar. The exceeding rapidity of the steps
prevents the eye's detecting the change of the jars. The followers of
the Nyáya maintain that the fire penetrates into the different
compounds of two or more atoms, and, without any destruction of the
old jar, produces its effects on these compounds, and thereby changes
not the jar but its colour, &c.,--it is still the same jar, only it is
red, not black.]

[Footnote 187: In p. 109, line 14, I read
_gagaṇavibhágakartṛitvasya_.]

[Footnote 188: The Siddhánta Muktávalí, p. 112, describes the series
of steps:--1. An action, as of breaking, in one of the halves; 2. the
disjunction of the two halves; 3. the destruction of the conjunction
which originally produced the pot; 4. the destruction of the pot; 5.
by the disjunction of the two halves is produced a disjunction of the
severed half from the old place; 6. the destruction of the conjunction
with that old place; 7. the conjunction with the new place; 8. the
cessation of the original impulse of fracture. Here the second
disjunction (viz., of the half of the pot and the place) is produced
by the previous disjunction of the halves, the intimate causes of the
pot.]

[Footnote 189: The original has a plural _vibhágán_, _i.e._,
disjunctions from the several points.]

[Footnote 190: _I.e._, the disjunction of the hand and the points of
space.]

[Footnote 191: The author of a commentary on the Bhagavad Gítá.]

[Footnote 192: For _dravyádi_ read _pṛithivyádi_.]

[Footnote 193: I am not sure that it would not be better to read
_viddhavevidhayá_, rewounding the wounded, instead of _vṛiddhavívadhayá_.]

[Footnote 194: Unless you _see_ the rope you cannot mistake it for a
serpent.]

[Footnote 195: In p. 110, last line, read _'bháve_.]

[Footnote 196: Read in p. 110, last line, _anavadhánádishu_.
_Vidhipratyaya_ properly means an imperative or potential affix implying
"command;" but the pandit takes _vidhi_ here as _bhávabodhaka-kriyá_. It
has that meaning in Kávya-prakáśa, V. (p. 114, l. 1).]

[Footnote 197: The mind perceives _áloka-jñána_, therefore it would
perceive its absence, _i.e._, darkness, but this last is perceived by
the _eye_.]

[Footnote 198: _I.e._, light possesses colour, and we cannot see a
jar's absence in the dark.]

[Footnote 199: Sound resides in the imperceptible ether, and cessation
is the _dhvaṃsábháva_, or "emergent non-existence."]

[Footnote 200: The reading _pratyayavedyatvena_ seems supported by p.
110, last line, but it is difficult to trace the argument; I have,
therefore, ventured hesitatingly to read _pratyakshavedyatvena_, and
would refer to the commentary (Vaiś. Sút. p. 250), "_yadi hi
níla-rúpavan nílaṃ rúpam eva vá tamaḥ syát, váhyálokapragraham
antareṇa chakshushá na gṛihyeta_."]

[Footnote 201: Intimate relation has also no intimate relation.]

[Footnote 202: "Relative non-existence" (_saṃsargábháva_) is the
negation of a relation; thus "the jar is not in the house" is
"absolute non-existence," "it was not in the house" is "antecedent,"
and "it will not be in the house" is "emergent," non-existence.]

[Footnote 203: _I.e._, the absolute absence of the jar is found in the
jar, as, of course, the jar does not reside in the jar, but in the
spot of ground,--it is the _játi ghaṭatva_ which resides in the jar.]

[Footnote 204: The opposite is "there _is_ colour in the air."]




CHAPTER XI.

THE AKSHAPÁDA (OR NYÁYA) DARŚANA.


The principle that final bliss, _i.e._, the absolute abolition of
pain, arises from the knowledge of the truth [though in a certain
sense universally accepted], is established in a special sense as a
particular tenet[205] of the Nyáya school, as is declared by the
author of the aphorisms in the words "proof, that which is to be
proved, &c.,--from knowledge of the truth as to these things there is
the attainment of final bliss." This is the first aphorism of the
Nyáya Śástra. Now the Nyáya Śástra consists of five books, and each
book contains two "daily portions." In the first daily portion of the
first book the venerable Gotama discusses the definitions of nine
categories, beginning with "proof," and in the second those of the
remaining seven, beginning with "discussion" (_váda_). In the first
daily portion of the second book he examines "doubt," discusses the
four kinds of "proof," and refutes the suggested objections to their
being instruments of right knowledge; and in the second he shows that
"presumption," &c., are really included in the four kinds of "proof"
already given [and therefore need not be added by the Mímáṃsakas as
separate ones]. In the first daily portion of the third book he
examines the soul, the body, the senses, and their objects; in the
second, "understanding" (_buddhi_), and "mind" (_manas_). In the first
daily portion of the fourth book he examines "volition" (_pravṛitti_),
the "faults," "transmigration," "fruit" [of actions], "pain," and
"final liberation;" in the second he investigates the truth[206] as to
the causes of the "faults," and also "wholes" and "parts." In the
first daily portion of the fifth book he discusses the various kinds
of futility (_játi_), and in the second the various kinds of "occasion
for rebuke" (_nigrahasthána_, or "unfitness to be argued with").

In accordance with the principle that "to know the thing to be
measured you must first know the measure," "proof" (_pramáṇa_) is
first enunciated, and as this must be done by defining it, we have
first a definition of "proof." "Proof" is that which is always
accompanied by right knowledge, and is at the same time not disjoined
from the proper instruments [as the eye, &c.], and from the site of
knowledge [_i.e._, the soul];[207] and this definition thus includes
the peculiar tenet of the Nyáya School that God is a source of right
knowledge,[208] as the author of the aphorisms has expressly declared
(ii. 68), "and the fact of the Veda's being a cause of right
knowledge, like spells and the medical science, follows from the fact
that the fit one who gave the Veda was a source of right knowledge."
And thus too hath the universally renowned teacher Udayana, who saw to
the farthest shore of the ocean of logic, declared in the fourth
chapter of the Kusumáñjali:

"Right knowledge is accurate comprehension, and right knowing is the
possession thereof; authoritativeness is, according to Gotama's
school, the being separated from all absence thereof.

"He in whose intuitive unerring perception, inseparably united to Him
and dependent on no foreign inlets, the succession of all the various
existing objects is contained,--all the chaff of our suspicion being
swept away by the removal of all possible faults as caused by the
slightest want of observation in Him,--He, Śiva, is my authority; what
have I to do with others, darkened as their authority must ever be
with rising doubts?"

"Proof" is fourfold, as being divided into perception, inference,
analogy, and testimony. The "thing to be proved" [or the "object of
right notion"] is of twelve kinds, viz., soul, body, the senses, their
objects, understanding, mind, volition, faults, transmigrations,
fruit, pain, and final liberation. "Doubt" is a knowledge whose nature
is uncertainty; and this is threefold, as being caused by the object's
possessing only qualities which are common to other things also, and
therefore not distinctive,--or by its possessing only irrelevant
qualities of its own, which do not help us in determining the
particular point in question,[209]--or by conflicting testimony. The
thing which one proposes to one's self before proceeding to act, is "a
motive" (_prayojana_); this is twofold, _i.e._, visible and invisible.
"An example" is a fact brought forward as a ground for establishing a
general principle, and it may be either affirmative or negative.[210]
A "tenet" (_siddhánta_) is something which is accepted as being
authoritatively settled as true; it is of four kinds, as being "common
to all the schools," "peculiar to one school," "a pregnant assumption"
[leading, if conceded, to a further conclusion], and "an implied
dogma" (i. 26-31). The "member" (of a demonstration) is a part of the
sentence containing an inference for the sake of another; and these
are five, the proposition, the reason, the example, the application,
and the conclusion (i. 32-38). "Confutation" (_tarka_, i. 39) is the
showing that the admission of a false minor necessitates the admission
of a false major[211] (cf. Sút. i. 39, and iv. 3); and this is of
eleven kinds, as _vyágháta_, _átmáśraya_, _itaretaráśraya_, &c.

"Ascertainment" (_nirṇaya_, i. 40) is right knowledge or a perception
of the real state of the case. It is of four kinds as produced by
perception, inference, analogy, or testimony. "Discussion" (_váda_) is
a particular kind of conversation, having as its end the ascertainment
of truth (i. 41). "Wrangling" (_jalpa_) is the talk of a man only
wishing for victory, who is ready to employ arguments for either side
of the question (i. 42). "Cavilling" (_vitaṇdá_) is the talk of a man
who does not attempt to establish his own side of the question (i.
43). "Dialogue" (_kathá_) is the taking of two opposite sides by two
disputants. A "fallacy" is an inconclusive reason which is supposed to
prove something, and this may be of five kinds, the "erratic," the
"contradictory," the "uncertain," the "unproved," and the "precluded"
or "mistimed" (Sút. i. 44-49). "Unfairness" (_chhala_) is the bringing
forward a contrary argument by using a term wilfully in an ambiguous
sense; this is of three kinds, as there may be fraud in respect of a
term, the meaning, or a metaphorical phrase (i. 50-54). "Futility"
(_játi_) is a self-destructive argument (i. 58). This is of
twenty-four kinds (as described in the fifth book of the Nyáya
aphorisms) (1-38). "Occasion for rebuke" is where the disputant loses
his cause [by stupidity], and this is of twenty-two kinds (as
described in the fifth book of the aphorisms, 44-67). We do not insert
here all the minute subdivisions through fear of being too
prolix,--they are fully explained in the aphorisms.

But here an objector may say, "If these sixteen topics, proof, &c.,
are all thus fully discussed, how is it that it has received the name
of the Nyáya Śástra, [as reasoning, _i.e._, _Nyáya_, or logic,
properly forms only a small part of the topics which it treats of?]"
We allow the force of the objection; still as names are proverbially
said to be given for some special reason, we maintain that the name
Nyáya was rightly applied to Gotama's system, since "reasoning," or
inference for the sake of another, is justly held to be a predominant
feature from its usefulness in all kinds of knowledge, and from its
being a necessary means for every kind of pursuit. So it has been said
by Sarvajña, "This is the pre-eminent science of Nyáya from its
establishing our doctrines against opponents, and from its producing
action;"[212] and by Pakshila Swámin, "This is the science of
reasoning (_ánvíkshikí_) divided into the different categories,
'proof,' &c.; the lamp of all sciences, the means for aiding all
actions, the ultimate appeal of all religious duties, well proved in
the declarations of science."[213]

But here an objector may say, "When you declare that final liberation
arises from the knowledge of the truth, do you mean that liberation
ensues immediately upon this knowledge being attained?" We reply,
"No," for it is said in the second Nyáya aphorism, "Pain, birth,
activity, faults, false notions,--on the successive annihilation of
these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before it,"
by means of this knowledge of the truth. Now false notions are the
thinking the body, &c., which are not the soul, to be the soul;
"faults" are a desire for those things which seem agreeable to the
soul, and a dislike to those things which seem disagreeable to
it,[214] though in reality nothing is either agreeable or disagreeable
to the soul. And through the mutual reaction of these different
"faults" the stupid man desires and the desiring man is stupid; the
stupid man is angry, and the angry man is stupid. Moreover the man,
impelled by these faults, does those things which are forbidden: thus
by the body he does injury, theft, &c.; by the voice, falsehood, &c.;
by the mind, malevolence, &c.; and this same sinful "activity"
produces demerit. Or, again, he may do laudable actions by his body,
as alms, saving others, &c., truthful speaking, upright counsel, &c.,
by his voice, and guilelessness, &c., by his mind; and this same right
activity produces merit. But both are forms of activity, and each
leads to a similar laudable or blamable birth or bodily manifestation;
and while this birth lasts there arises the impression of "pain,"
which we are conscious of as of something that jars against us. Now
this series, beginning with "false notions" and ending with "pain," is
continually going on, and is what we mean by the words "mundane
existence," which rolls on ceaselessly, like a waterwheel. And
whenever some pre-eminent man, by the force of his previous good
deeds, obtains through the teaching of a great teacher the knowledge
that all this present life is only a scene of pain and bound up with
pain, he recognises that it is all to be avoided, and desires to
abolish the ignorance, &c., which are the causes that produced
it.[215] Then he learns that the one means to abolish it is the
knowledge of the truth; and as he meditates on the objects of right
knowledge divided into the four sciences,[216] there arises in his
mind the knowledge of the truth, or, in other words, a right view of
things as they are; and from this knowledge of the truth false notions
disappear. When false notions disappear, the "faults" pass away; with
them ceases "activity;" and with it ceases "birth;" and with the
cessation of "birth" comes the entire abolition of "pain," and this
absolute abolition is final bliss. Its absoluteness consists in this,
that nothing similar to that which is thus abolished can ever revive,
as is expressly said in the second aphorism of the Nyáya Sútras:
"Pain, birth, activity, faults, false notions,--since, on the
successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of
the one next before it, there is [on the annihilation of the last of
them] final beatitude."

"But is not your definition of the _summum bonum_, liberation, _i.e._,
'the absolute abolition of pain,' after all as much beyond our reach
as treacle on the elbow is to the tongue;[217] why then is this
continually put forth as if it were established beyond all dispute?"
We reply that as all those who maintain liberation in any form do
include therein the absolute abolition of pain, our definition, as
being thus a tenet accepted in all the schools, may well be called the
royal highway[218] of philosophy. No one, in fact, maintains that pain
is possible without the individual's activity. Thus even the
Mádhyamika's opinion that "liberation consists in the abolition of
soul," does not controvert our point, so far at any rate as that it is
the abolition of pain. But if you proceed to argue that the soul, as
being the cause of pain, is to be abolished just like the body, &c.,
we reply that this does not hold, since it fails under either
alternative. For do you mean by "the soul," (_a._) the continued
succession of cognitions, or (_b._) something different therefrom?
(_a._) If the former, we make no objection, [since we Naiyáyikas allow
that cognition is evanescent,[219] and we do desire to abolish
cognition as a cause of _pravṛitti_ or action[220]], for who would
oppose a view which makes for his own side? (_b._) But if the latter,
then, since it must be eternal,[221] its abolition is impossible; and,
again, a second objection would be that no one would try to gain your
supposed "_summum bonum_;" for surely no sensible person would strive
to annihilate the soul, which is always the dearest of all, on the
principle that "everything else is dear for the soul's pleasure;"
and, again, everybody uses such a phrase as "liberated," [and this
very term refutes the idea of annihilation or abolition].

"But why not say with those Bauddhas who hold the doctrine of pure
intelligence [_i.e._, the Yogácháras and the Sautrántikas[222]], that
'the _summum bonum_' is the rising of pure intelligence consequent on
the cessation of the conscious subject?" To this view we object that
there is an absence of means; and also it cannot be established that
the locus [or subject] of the two states is the same. For the former,
if it is replied that the well-known fourfold set of Bauddha
contemplations[223] are to be accepted as the cause, we answer that,
as [according to the Bauddha tenet of the momentary existence of all
things] there cannot be one abiding subject of these contemplations,
they will necessarily exercise a languid power like studies pursued at
irregular intervals, and be thus ineffectual to produce any distinct
recognition of the real nature of things.

And for the latter, since the continued series of cognitions when
accompanied by the natural obstacles[224] is said to be "bound," and
when freed from those obstacles is said to be "liberated," you cannot
establish an identity of the subject in the two states so as to be
able to say that the very same being which _was_ bound _is_ now
liberated.

Nor do we find the path of the Jainas, viz., that "Liberation is the
releasing from all 'obstructions,'" a path entirely free from bars to
impede the wayfarer. Pray, will our Jaina friend kindly inform us what
he means by "obstruction"?[225] If he answers "merit, demerit, and
error," we readily grant what he says. But if he maintains that "the
body is the true obstruction, and hence Liberation is the continual
upspringing of the soul consequent on the body's annihilation, as of
a parrot released from its cage," then we must inquire whether this
said soul possesses form or not. If it possesses form, then has it
parts or not? If it has no parts, then, since the well-known
definition of an atom will apply here as "that which has form without
parts," it will follow that the attributes of the soul are, like those
of an atom, imperceptible to the senses.[226] If you say that it has
parts, then the general maxim that "whatever has parts is
non-eternal," would necessitate that the soul is non-eternal; and if
this were conceded, then two grand difficulties [against the
Providential course of the world] would burst in unopposed, viz., that
what the soul has done would, at its cessation, perish with it [and
thus fail of producing the proper fruit], while it would have reaped
during life the effects of what it had not done [as the good and evil
which happened to it would not be the consequences of its actions in a
former birth]. If, on the other hand, the Jaina maintains that the
soul does not possess form at all, then how can he talk of the soul's
"upspringing," since all such actions as motion necessarily involve an
agent possessing form?[227]

Again, if we take the Chárváka's view "that the only bondage is
dependence on another, and therefore independence is the true
liberation,"--if by "independence" he means the cessation of pain, we
have no need to controvert it. But if he means autocratic power, then
no sensible man can concede it, as the very idea of earthly power
involves the idea of a capability of being increased and of being
equalled.[228]

Again, the Sánkhya opinion, which first lays down that nature and soul
are utterly distinct, and then holds that "liberation is the soul's
remaining as it is in itself after nature [on being known] has
withdrawn,"--even this opinion accepts our tenet of the abolition of
pain; but there is left a difficulty as to whether this cognition of
the distinction between nature and soul resides in the soul or in
nature. It is not consistent to say that it resides in the soul, since
the soul is held to be unchangeable, and this would seem to involve
that previously it had been hampered by ignorance; nor can we say that
it resides in nature, since nature is always held to be unintelligent.
Moreover, is nature spontaneously active or inactive? If the former,
then it follows that there can be no liberation at all, since the
spontaneous actions of things cannot be set aside; and if the latter,
the course of mundane existence would at once cease to go on.

Again, we have the same recognition of our "abolition of pain" in the
doctrine of Bhaṭṭa Sarvajña and his followers, that "Liberation is the
manifestation of an eternal happiness incapable of being increased;"
but here we have the difficulty that an eternal happiness does not
come within the range of definite proof. If you allege Śruti as the
proof, we reply that Śruti has no place when the thing itself is
precluded by a valid non-perception;[229] or if you allow its
authority, then you will have to concede the existence of such things
as floating stones.[230]

"But if you give up the view that 'liberation is the manifestation of
happiness,' and then accept such a view as that which holds it to be
only the cessation of pain, does not your conduct resemble that of the
dyspeptic patient who refused sweet milk and preferred sour
rice-gruel?" Your satire, however, falls powerless, as fitter for some
speech in a play [rather than for a grave philosophical argument]. The
truth is that all happiness must be included under the category of
pain, since, like honey mixed with poison, it is always accompanied by
pain, either as admitting of increase,[231] or as being an object of
perception, or as being exposed to many hostile influences, or as
involving an irksome necessity of seeking all kinds of instruments for
its production. Nor may you retort on us that we have fulfilled the
proverb of "seeking one thing and dropping another in the search,"
since we have abolished happiness as being ever tainted by some
incidental pain, and, at the same time, our own favourite alternative
is one which no one can consider desirable. For the truth is that any
attempt to establish happiness as the _summum bonum_, since it is
inevitably accompanied by various causes of pain, is only like the man
who would try to grasp a red-hot ball of iron under the delusion that
it was gold. In the case of objects of enjoyment got together by
rightful means, we may find many firefly-like pleasures; but then how
many are the rainy days to drown them? And in the case of those got
together by wrong means, the mind cannot even conceive the future
issue which will be brought about. Let our intelligent readers
consider all this, and not attempt to disguise their own conscious
experience. Therefore it is that we hold it as indisputable that for
him, pre-eminent among his fellows, who, through the favour of the
Supreme Being, has, by the regular method of listening to the revealed
Śruti, &c., attained unto the knowledge of the real nature of the
soul, for him the absolute abolition of pain is the true Liberation.

But it may be objected, "Is there any proof at all for the existence
of a Supreme Being, _i.e._, perception, inference, or Śruti? Certainly
perception cannot apply here, since the Deity, as devoid of form, &c.,
must be beyond the senses. Nor can inference hold, since there is no
universal proposition or true middle term which can apply.[232] Nor
can Śruti, since neither of the resulting alternatives can be
sustained; for is it supposed to reveal, as being itself eternal, or
as non-eternal? Under the former view an established tenet of our
school would be contradicted [viz., that the Veda is non-eternal];
under the latter, we should be only arguing in a circle.[233] As for
comparison and any other proof which might be adduced [as that
sometimes called presumption, &c.], they need not be thought of for a
moment, as their object matter is definitely limited, and cannot apply
to the present case.[234] Therefore the Supreme Being seems to be as
unreal as a hare's horn." But all this elaborate disputation need
excite no flurry in the breast of the intelligent, as it can be at
once met by the old argument, "The mountain, seas, &c., must have had
a maker from their possessing the nature of effects just like a jar."
(_a._) Nor can our middle term [possessing the nature of effects] be
rejected as unproved (_asiddha_), since it can be established beyond a
doubt by the fact of the subject's possessing parts. "But what are we
to understand by this 'possessing parts'? Is it 'existing in contact
with parts,' or 'in intimate relation with parts'? It cannot be the
first, since this would equally apply to such eternal things as
ether,[235] &c.; nor can it be the second, since this would prove too
much, as applying to such cases as the [eternal] species, thread,
which abides in intimate relation with the individual threads. It
therefore fails as a middle term for your argument." We reply, that it
holds if we explain the "possessing parts" as "belonging to the class
of those substances which exist in intimate relation."[236] Or we may
adopt another view and maintain that it is easy to infer the
"possessing the nature of effects" from the consideration of their
possessing intermediate magnitude.[237]

(_b._) Nor can our middle term be rejected as "contradictory"
(_viruddha_),[238] since there is no such acknowledged universal
proposition connected with it as would establish the opposite major term
to that in our syllogism [_i.e._, that they must have had no maker].
(_c._) Nor is our middle term too general (_anaikánta_), since it is never
found in opposite instances [such as the lake, which is the _vipaksha_ in
the argument, "The mountain has fire because it has smoke"]. (_d._) Nor
again is it precluded (_bádhita_ or _kálátyayopadishṭa_), for there is no
superior evidence to exercise such a precluding power. (_e._) Nor is it
counter-balanced (_sat-pratipakshita_), for there does not appear to be
any such equally valid antagonist.

If you bring forward as an antagonistic syllogism, "The mountains,
&c., cannot have had a maker, from the fact that they were not
produced by a body, just as is the case with the eternal ether,"--this
pretended inference will no more stand examination than the young fawn
can stand the attack of the full-grown lion; for the additional words
"by a body" are useless, since "from the fact that they were not
produced" would be a sufficient middle term by itself [and the
argument thus involves the fallacy called _vyápyatvásiddhi_].[239] Nor
can you retort, "Well, let this then be our middle term;" for you
cannot establish it as a real fact. Nor again is it possible to raise
the smallest shadow of a fear lest our middle term should be liable
to limitation by any suggested condition (_upádhi_),[240] [such as
"the being produced by a corporeal agent," to limit our old reason
"from having the nature of effects"], because we have on our side a
valid line of argument to establish our view, viz., "If the mountains,
&c., had no maker, then they would not be effects" [but all do
acknowledge that they have the nature of effects], for in this world
that is not an effect which can attain its proper nature independently
of any series of concurrent causes. And this series inevitably
involves the idea of some sort of maker; and I mean by "being a maker"
the being possessed of that combination of volition, desire to act,
and knowledge of the proper means, which sets in motion all other
causes, but is itself set in motion by none. And hence we hold that if
the necessity of a maker were overthrown, the necessity of the action
of all the other causes would be simultaneously overthrown, since
these are dependent thereon; and this would lead to the monstrous
doctrine that effects could be produced without any cause at all.
There is a rule laid down by Śaṅkara-kiṅkara which applies directly to
the present case--

     "When a middle term is accompanied by a sound argument to
     establish its validity,

     "Then you cannot attempt to supply a limiting condition on
     account of the [supposed] non-invariable concomitance of the
     major term."

If you maintain that there are many sound counter-arguments, such as
"If the Supreme Being were a maker, He would be possessed of a body,"
&c., we reply, that all such reasoning is equally inconsistent,
whether we allow that Supreme Being's existence to be established or
not.[241]

As has been said by Udayana Áchárya [in the Kusumáñjali, iii. 5]--

     "If Śruti, &c., have any authority, your negative argument
     fails from being precluded; if they are fallacious, our old
     objection of a 'baseless inference' returns stronger than
     ever."

Nor need we fear the possibility of any other contradiction to our
argument, since it would be overthrown by either alternative of God's
being known or unknown.[242]

"Well, let all this be granted; but the activity of God in creating
the world, what end did it have in view? His own advantage or some
other being's? If it was for the former end, was it in order to attain
something desired, or to avoid something not desired? It could not be
the first, because this would be quite incongruous in a being who
possesses every possible desire gratified; and for the same reason too
it could not be the second. If it was for the latter end [the
advantage of another] it would be equally incongruous; for who would
call that being "wise" who busied himself in acting for another? If
you replied that His activity was justified by compassion, any one
would at once retort that this feeling of compassion should have
rather induced Him to create all living beings happy, and not
checkered with misery, since this militates against His compassion;
for we define compassion as the disinterested wish to avoid causing
another pain. Hence we conclude that it is not befitting for God to
create the world." This has been said by Bhaṭṭáchárya--

     "Not even a fool acts without some object in view;

     "Suppose that God did not create the world, what end would
     be left undone by  Him?"--

We reply, O thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school, be pleased for
a moment to close thy envy-dimmed eyes, and to consider the following
suggestions. His action in creation is indeed solely caused by
compassion; but the idea of a creation which shall consist only of
happiness is inconsistent with the nature of things, since there
cannot but arise eventual differences from the different results which
will ripen from the good or evil actions of the beings who are to be
created. Nor need you object that this would interfere with God's own
independence [as He would thus seem to depend on others' actions],
since there is the well-known saying, "One's own body does not hinder
one;" nay rather it helps to carry out one's aims;[243] and for this
there is authority in such passages of the Veda as that (in the
Śvetáśvatara Upanishad, iii. 2), "There is one Rudra only; he
admits[244] not of a second," &c. "But then how will you remedy your
deadly sickness of reasoning in a circle? [for you have to prove the
Veda by the authority of God, and then again you have to prove God's
existence by the Veda"]. We reply, that we defy you to point out any
reasoning in a circle in our argument. Do you suspect this "reciprocal
dependence of each," which you call "reasoning in a circle," in regard
to their being produced or in regard to their being known?[245] It
cannot be the former, for though the production of the Veda is
dependent on God, still as God Himself is eternal, there is no
possibility of _His_ being produced; nor can it be in regard to their
being known, for even if our knowledge of God were dependent on the
Veda, the Veda might be learned from some other source; nor, again,
can it be in regard to the knowledge of the non-eternity of the Veda,
for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by any _yogin_
endowed with the transcendent faculties (_tívra_,[246] &c.)

Therefore, when God has been rendered propitious by the performance of
duties which produce His favour, the desired end, Liberation, is
obtained; thus everything is clear.

E. B. C.

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTE ON PAGES 172, 173.

We have here an exemplification of the five fallacies or _hetvábhásas_
of the modern Hindu logic (cf. _Siddhántamukt._, § 71, _Tarkasaṃgr._,
55-67), viz., _anaikánta_, _viruddha_, _asiddha_, _kálátyayopadishṭa_
or _bádhita_, and _pratipakshita_ or _sat-pratipaksha_. The four first
of these generally correspond to the _savyabhichára_ or "erratic,"
_viruddha_ or "contradictory," _sádhyasama_ or "unproved," and
_atítakála_ or "mistimed," _i.e._, "precluded," as given in the list
of fallacies of the older logic in p. 164; but _pratipakshita_
corresponds imperfectly to _prakaraṇasama_. The _prakaraṇasama_ or
"uncertain" reason is properly that reason which is equally available
for both sides, as, _e.g._, the argument, "Sound is eternal because it
is audible," which could be met by the equally plausible argument,
"Sound is non-eternal because it is audible;" or, according to other
authorities, it is that reason which itself raises the same
difficulties as the original question, as, _e.g._, "sound is
non-eternal because eternal qualities are not perceived in it;" here
this alleged reason is as much the subject of dispute as the old
question, "Is sound eternal?" But the _pratipakshita_ reason is one
which is counter-balanced by an equally valid reason, as "Sound is
eternal because it is audible," and "Sound is non-eternal because it
is a product."

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 205: Cf. Nyáya Sútras, i. 29.]

[Footnote 206: In p. 112, line 16, of the Calcutta edition, I read
_doshanimitta-tattva_ for _doshanimittakatva_ (compare Nyáya Sút. iv.
68).]

[Footnote 207: Without this last clause the definition might include
the objects (_vishaya_), as these are, of course, connected with right
knowledge.]

[Footnote 208: Íśvara is a cause of right knowledge (_pramáṇa_)
according to the definition, because he is _pramáyá áśrayaḥ_.]

[Footnote 209: On this compare Siddhánta-Muktávali, p. 115.]

[Footnote 210: On these compare my note to Colebrooke's Essays, vol.
i. p. 315.]

[Footnote 211: "Our coming to the conclusion that there can be no
smoke in the hill if there be no fire, while we _see_ the smoke, is
the confutation of there being no fire in the hill" (_Ballantyne_).
Or, in other words, "the mountain must have the absence-of-smoke
(_vyápaka_) if it has the absence-of-fire (the false _vyápya_").]

[Footnote 212: Action (_pravṛitti_) follows after the ascertainment of
the truth by _nyáya_.]

[Footnote 213: Cp. Vátsyáyana's Comment., p. 6. The Calcutta edition
reads _prakírtitá_ for _paríkshitá_.]

[Footnote 214: The printed text omits the third fault, "a stupid
indifference, _moha_," which is however referred to presently.]

[Footnote 215: In p. 116, line 3, I would read _tannirvartakam_ for
_tannivartakam_.]

[Footnote 216: This refers to the couplet so often quoted in Hindu
authors, "Logic, the three Vedas, trade and agriculture, and the
eternal doctrine of polity,--these four sciences are the causes of the
stability of the world" (cf. Manu, vii. 43). It occurs in Kámandaki's
_Nítisára_, ii. 2, and seems to be referred to in Vátsyáyana's Com. p.
3, from which Mádhava is here borrowing.]

[Footnote 217: Compare the English proverb, "As soon as the cat can
lick her ear."]

[Footnote 218: Literally the "bell-road," _i.e._, "the chief road
through a village, or that by which elephants, &c., decorated with
tinkling ornaments, proceed."--_Wilson's Dict._]

[Footnote 219: The cognition is produced in the first moment, remains
during the second, and ceases in the third.]

[Footnote 220: See Nyáya Sút. i. 2.]

[Footnote 221: As otherwise why should we require liberation at all?
Or rather the author probably assumes that other Naiyáyikas have
sufficiently established this point against its opponents, cf. p. 167,
line 11.]

[Footnote 222: See _supra_, pp. 24-32.]

[Footnote 223: All is momentary, all is pain, all is _sui generis_,
all is unreal.]

[Footnote 224: In the form of the various _kleśas_ or "afflictions."]

[Footnote 225: _Ávaraṇa_, cf. pp. 55, 58.]

[Footnote 226: But the Nyáya holds that the attributes of the soul, as
happiness, desire, aversion, &c., are perceived by the internal sense,
mind (Bháshá P. § 83).]

[Footnote 227: The reading _múrtapratibandhát_ is difficult, but I
believe that _pratibandha_ means here _vyápti_, as it does in Sánkhya
Sútras, i. 100.]

[Footnote 228: The true _summum bonum_ must be
_niratiśaya_,--incapable of being added to.]

[Footnote 229: _Yogyánupalabdhi_ is when an object is not seen, and
yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, as the eye,
light, &c.]

[Footnote 230: Alluding to the Vedic phrase, "_grávánaḥ plavanti_,"
see Uttara Naishadha, xvii. 37. The phrase _aśmánaḥ plavanti_ occurs
in Shaḍv. Br. 5, 12.]

[Footnote 231: Or perhaps "capable of being surpassed."]

[Footnote 232: Since the Supreme Being is a single instance.]

[Footnote 233: Since the Veda, if non-eternal, must [to be
authoritative] have been created by God, and yet it is brought forward
to reveal the existence of God.]

[Footnote 234: The Nyáya holds presumption to be included under
inference, and comparison is declared to be the ascertaining the
relation of a name to the thing named.]

[Footnote 235: Since ether is connected by contact with the parts of
everything, as _e.g._, a jar.]

[Footnote 236: The whole (as the jar) resides by intimate relation in
its parts (as the jar's two halves). But the eternal substances,
ether, time, the soul, mind, and the atoms of earth, water, fire, and
air, do not thus reside in anything, although, of course, the category
_viśesha_ does reside in them by intimate relation. The word
"substances" excludes _tantutva_, and "existing in intimate relation"
excludes ether, &c.]

[Footnote 237: Intermediate between infinite and infinitesimal, all
eternal substances being the one or the other.]

[Footnote 238: The _viruddha-hetu_ is that which is never found where
the major term is.]

[Footnote 239: This and much more of the whole discussion is taken
from the Kusumáñjali, v. 2, and I extract my note on the passage
there. "The older Naiyáyikas maintained that the argument 'the
mountain has fire because it has blue smoke,' involved the fallacy of
vyápyatvásiddhi, because the alleged middle term was unnecessarily
restricted (see Siddhánta Muktáv. p. 77). The moderns, however, more
wisely consider it as a harmless error, and they would rather meet the
objection by asserting that there is no proof to establish the
validity of the assumed middle term."]

[Footnote 240: For the _upádhi_ cf. pp. 7, 8.]

[Footnote 241: As in the former case it would be clear that it is a
subject for separate discussion; and in the latter you would be liable
to the fault of _áśrayásiddhi_, a "baseless inference," since your
subject (or minor term), being itself non-existent, cannot be the
locus or subject of a negation (cf. Kusumáñjali, iii. 2). "Just as
that subject from which a given attribute is excluded cannot be
unreal, so neither can an unreal thing be the subject of a negation."]

[Footnote 242: If God is known, then His existence must be granted; if
He is not known, how can we argue about Him? I read lines 15, 16, in
p. 120 of the Calcutta edition, _vikalpaparáhatatvát_, and then begin
the next clause with _syád etat_. The printed text, _vikalpaparáhataḥ
syát tad etat_, seems unintelligible.]

[Footnote 243: The aggregate of the various subtile bodies constitutes
Hiraṇyagarbha, or the supreme soul viewed in His relation to the world
as creator, while the aggregate of the gross bodies similarly
constitutes his gross body (viráj).]

[Footnote 244: The usual reading is _tasthur_ for _tasthe_.]

[Footnote 245: For these divisions of the _anyonyáśraya_ fallacy, see
_Nyáyasútra vṛitti_, i. 39 (p. 33).]

[Footnote 246: For _tívra_ cf. _Yoga sútras_, i. 21, 22.]




CHAPTER XII.

THE JAIMINI-DARŚANA.


An objector may here ask, "Are you not continually repeating that
merit (_dharma_) comes from the practice of duty (_dharma_), but how
is duty to be defined or proved?" Listen attentively to my answer. A
reply to this question has been given in the older[247] Mímáṃsá by the
holy sage Jaimini. Now the Mímáṃsá consists of twelve books.[248] In
the first book is discussed the authoritativeness of those collections
of words which are severally meant by the terms injunction (_vidhi_),
"explanatory passage" (_arthaváda_), hymn (_mantra_), tradition
(_smṛiti_), and "name." In the second, certain subsidiary discussions
[as _e.g._, on _apúrva_] relating to the difference of various rites,
refutation of (erroneously alleged) proofs, and difference of
performance [as in "constant" and "voluntary" offerings]. In the
third, _Śruti_, "sign" or "sense of the passage" (_liṅga_), "context"
(_vákya_), &c., and their respective weight when in apparent
opposition to one another, the ceremonies called _pratipatti-karmáṇi_,
things mentioned incidentally (_anárabhyádhíta_), things accessory to
several main objects, as _prayájas_, &c., and the duties of the
sacrificer. In the fourth, the influence on other rites of the
principal and subordinate rites, the fruit caused by the _juhú_ being
made of the _butea frondosa_, &c., and the dice-playing, &c., which
form subordinate parts of the _rájasúya_ sacrifice. In the fifth, the
relative order of different passages of _Śruti_, &c., the order of
different parts of a sacrifice [as the seventeen animals at the
_vájapeya_], the multiplication and non-multiplication of rites, and
the respective force of the words of _Śruti_, order of mention, &c.,
in determining the order of performance. In the sixth, the persons
qualified to offer sacrifices, their obligations, the substitutes for
enjoined materials, supplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory
rites, the _sattra_ offerings, things proper to be given, and the
different sacrificial fires. In the seventh, transference of the
ceremonies of one sacrifice to another by direct command in the Vaidic
text, and then as inferred by "name" or "sign." In the eighth,
transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or obscurely expressed
"sign," or by the predominant "sign," and cases where no transference
takes place. In the ninth, the beginning of the discussion on the
adaptation of hymns when quoted in a new connection (_úha_), the
adaptation of _sámans_ and _mantras_, and collateral questions
connected therewith. In the tenth, the discussion of occasions where
the non-performance of the primary rite involves the "preclusion" and
non-performance of the dependent rites, and of occasions where rites
are precluded because other rites produce their special result,
discussions connected with the _graha_ offerings, certain _sámans_,
and various other things, and a discussion on the different kinds of
negation. In the eleventh, the incidental mention and subsequently the
fuller discussion of _tantra_[249] [where several acts are combined
into one], and _ávápa_ [or the performing an act more than once]. In
the twelfth, a discussion on _prasaṅga_ [where the rite is performed
for one chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference],
_tantra_, cumulation of concurrent rites (_samuchchaya_) and option.

Now the first topic which introduces the discussions of the
Púrva-Mímáṃsá arises from the aphorism, "Now therefore a desire to
know duty [is to be entertained by thee"]. Now the learned describe a
"topic" as consisting of five members, and these are (_a._) the
subject, (_b._) the doubt, (_c._) the _primâ facie_ argument, (_d._)
the demonstrated conclusion, and (_e._) the connection (_saṅgati_).
The topic is discussed according to the doctrines held by the great
teachers of the system. Thus the "subject" to be discussed is the
sentence, "The Veda is to be read." Now the "doubt" which arises is
whether the study of Jaimini's _śástra_ concerning duty, beginning
with the aphorism, "Duty is a thing which is to be recognised by an
instigatory passage," and ending with "and from seeing it in the
_anváhárya_," is to be commenced or not. The _primâ facie_ argument is
that it is not to be commenced, whether the injunction to read the
Veda be held to have a visible and present or an invisible and future
fruit. (_a._) If you say that this injunction must have a visible
fruit, and this can be no other[250] than the knowledge of the meaning
of what is read, we must next ask you whether this said reading is
enjoined as something which otherwise would not have been thought of,
or whether as something which otherwise would have been optional, as
we see in the rule for shelling rice.[251] It cannot be the former,
for the reading of the Veda is a means of knowing the sense thereof
from its very nature as reading, just as in the parallel instance of
reading the Mahábhárata; and we see by this argument that it would
present itself as an obvious means quite independently of the
injunction. Well, then, let it be the latter alternative; just as the
baked flour cake called _puroḍása_ is made only of rice prepared by
being unhusked in a mortar, when, but for the injunction, it might
have been unhusked by the finger-nails. There, however, the new moon
and full moon sacrifices only produce their unseen effect, which is
the principal _apúrva_, by means of the various minor effects or
subordinate _apúrvas_, produced by the various subordinate parts of
the whole ceremony; and consequently the minor _apúrva_ of the
unhusking is the reason there for the restricting injunction. But in
the case which we are discussing, there is no such reason for any such
restriction, as the rites can be equally well performed by gaining the
knowledge of the Veda's meaning by reading a written book, or by
studying under an authorised teacher. Hence we conclude that there is
no injunction to study the Púrva Mímáṃsá as a means of knowing the
sense of the Veda. (_b._) "What, then, becomes of the Vedic
injunction, 'The Veda is to be read'?" Well, you must be content with
the fact that the injunction will have heaven as its [future] fruit,
although it merely enjoins the making oneself master of the literal
words of the Vedic text [without any care to understand the meaning
which they may convey], since heaven, though not expressly mentioned,
is to be assumed as the fruit, according to the analogy of the
Viśvajit offering. Just as Jaimini, in his aphorism (iv. 3, 15), "Let
that fruit be heaven, since it equally applies to all," establishes
that those who are not expressly mentioned are still qualified to
offer the Viśvajit sacrifice, and infers by argument that its
characteristic fruit is heaven, so let us assume it to be in the
present case also. As it has been said--

"Since the visible fruit would be equally obtained without the
injunction, this cannot be its sole object; we must rather suppose
heaven to be the fruit from the injunction's significance, after the
analogy of the Viśvajit, &c."

Thus, too, we shall keep the Smṛiti rule from being violated: "Having
read the Veda, let him bathe." For this rule clearly implies that no
long interval is to take place between reading the Veda and the
student's return to his home; while, according to your opinion, after
he had read the Veda, he would still have to remain in his preceptor's
house to read the Mímáṃsá discussions, and thus the idea of no
interval between would be contradicted. Therefore for these three
reasons, (_a._) that the study of Mímáṃsá is not enjoined, (_b._) that
heaven can be obtained by the simple reading of the text, and (_c._)
that the rule for the student's return to his home is thus fulfilled,
we maintain that the study of the Mímáṃsá discussions on duty is not
to be commenced.

The "authoritative conclusion" (_siddhánta_), however, is as
follows:--

We grant that it cannot be a case of _vidhi_, for it might have been
adopted on other grounds; but not even Indra with his thunderbolt
could make us lose our hold of the other alternative that it is a case
of _niyama_. In the sentence, "The Veda is to be read," the affix
_tavya_ expresses an enforcing power in the word,[252] which is to be
rendered visible by a corresponding action in man, bringing a certain
effect into existence; and this enforcing power seeks some
corresponding end which is connected with the man's creative effort.
Now it cannot be the act itself of reading, as suggested by the whole
word _adhyetavya_, which it thus seeks as an end; for this act of
reading, thus expressed by the word, could never be regarded as an
end, since it is a laborious operation of the voice and mind,
consisting in the articulate utterance of the portion read. Nor could
the portion read, as suggested by the whole sentence, be regarded as
the end. For the mass of words called "Veda," which is what we really
mean by the words "portion read," being eternal and omnipresent, could
never fulfil the conditions of the four "fruits of action,"
production, &c.[253] Therefore the only true end which remains to us
is the knowledge of the meaning, as obtained by carrying out the
sense of the words of the injunction. According to the old rule, "He
has the right who has the want, the power, and the wit," those who are
aiming to understand certain things, as the new and full moon
sacrifices, use their daily reading to learn the truth about them. And
the injunction for reading, since it virtually excludes the reading of
written books, &c. [from the well-known technical sense of the word
"read" when used in this connection], conveys the idea that the
reading the Veda enjoined has a consecrated character [as taught by a
duly authorised teacher]. Therefore, as the principal _apúrva_,
produced by the great new and full moon sacrifices, necessitates and
establishes the subordinate _apúrvas_ produced by the inferior
sacrificial acts, as unhusking the rice, &c., so the mass of _apúrva_
produced by all the sacrifices necessitates and establishes a previous
_apúrva_ produced by the restricting injunction (_niyama_), which
prescribes reading the Veda as the means to know how to perform these
sacrifices. If you hesitate to concede that a _niyama_ could have this
future influence called _apúrva_, the same doubt might equally
invalidate the efficacy of a _vidhi_ [as the two stand on the same
level as to their enjoining power]. Nor is the supposition a valid one
that heaven is the fruit, according to the analogy of the _Viśvajit_
offering, since, if there is a present and visible fruit in the form
of a knowledge of the meaning of the sacred text, it is improper to
suppose any other future and unseen fruit. Thus it has been said--

     "Where a seen fruit is obtained, you must not suppose an
     unseen one; but if a _vidhi_ has the restricting meaning of
     a _niyama_, it does not thereby become meaningless."

But an objector may say, "Although a man who reads the simple text of
the Veda may not attain to a knowledge of its meaning, still, as he
who reads the Veda with its _aṅgas_, grammar, &c., may attain to this
knowledge, the study of Mímáṃsá will be useless." But this is not
true: for even though he may attain to a simple knowledge of the
literal meaning, all deeper investigation must depend on this kind of
discussion. For instance, when it is said, "He offers anointed
gravel," neither grammar nor _nigama_[254] nor _nirukta_ will
determine the true meaning that it is to be anointed with ghee and not
with oil, &c.; it is only by a Mímáṃsá discussion that the true
meaning is unravelled from the rest of the passage, "Verily, ghee is
brightness."[255] It is therefore established that the study of
Mímáṃsá is enjoined. Nor need it be supposed that this contradicts the
passage of Smṛiti, "Having read the Veda, let him bathe," which
implies that he should now leave his teacher's house, and prohibits
any further delay; as the words do not necessarily imply that the
return to the paternal roof is to follow immediately on his having
read the Veda, but only that it is to follow it at some time, and that
both actions are to be done by the same person, just as we see in the
common phrase, "Having bathed, he eats." Therefore from the purport of
the injunction we conclude that the study of the Púrva Mímáṃsá Śástra,
consisting of a thousand "topics,"[256] is to be commenced. This topic
is connected with the main subject of the Śástra as being a subsidiary
digression, as it is said, "They call that a subsidiary digression
which helps to establish the main subject."[257]

I now proceed to give a sketch of the discussion of the same "topic"
in accordance with the teaching of the Guru Prabhákara.

In the Smṛiti rule,[258] "Let him admit as a pupil the Brahman lad when
eight years old (by investing him with the sacred cord), let him instruct
him," the object of the direction appears to be the pupil's instruction.
Now a direction must have reference to somebody to be directed; and if you
ask who is here to be directed, I reply, "He who desires to be a teacher,"
since, by Páṇini's rule (i. 3, 36), the root _ní_ is used in the
_átmanepada_ when honour, &c., are implied, _i.e._, here the duty which a
teacher performs to his pupils. He who is to be directed as to admitting a
pupil is the same person who is to be directed as to teaching him, since
both are the object of one and the same command. Hence the inspired sage
Manu has said (ii. 140), "The Bráhman who girds his pupil with the
sacrificial cord and then instructs him in the Veda, with its subsidiary
_aṅgas_ and mystic doctrines, they call a spiritual teacher (_áchárya_)."
Now the teaching which is the function of the teacher cannot be fulfilled
without the learning which is the function of the pupil, and therefore the
very injunction to teach implies and establishes a corresponding
obligation to learn, since the influencer's efforts fail without those of
one to be influenced. If you object that this view does not make reading
the Veda the object of definite injunction, I reply, What matters it to us
if it is not? For even if there is no reason for us to admit a separate
injunction for reading the Veda, it will still remain perpetually enjoined
as a duty, because the passage which mentions it is a perpetual _anuváda_
or "supplementary repetition."[259] Therefore the former _primâ facie_
argument and its answer, which were given before under the idea that there
was a definite injunction to read the Veda, must now be discussed in
another way to suit this new view.

Now the _primâ facie_ argument was that the study of Mímáṃsá, not
being authoritatively enjoined, is not to be commenced; the
"conclusion" was that it is to be commenced as being thus
authoritatively enjoined.

Now the upholders of the former or _primâ facie_ view argue as
follows:--"We put to the advocates of the conclusion the following
dilemma: Does the injunction to teach imply that the pupil is to
understand the meaning of what is read, or does it only refer to the
bare reading? It cannot be the former, for obviously the act of
teaching cannot depend for its fulfilment on the pupil's understanding
what is taught [as this will depend on his ability as a recipient];
and the latter will not help you, as, if the bare reading is
sufficient, the Mímáṃsá discussions in question will have no subject
or use. For their proper subject is a point in the Veda, which is
doubted about from having been only looked at in a rough and impromptu
way; now if there is no need of understanding the meaning at all, why
should we talk of doubts and still more of any hope of ascertaining
the true meaning by means of laborious discussion? And therefore in
accordance with the well-known principle, 'That which is a thing of
use and not a matter of doubt is an object of attainment to an
intelligent man, as, for instance, a jar which is in broad light and
in contact with the external and internal senses,' as there is in the
present case no such thing as a subject to exercise it upon, or a
useful end to be attained by it, we maintain that the study of Mímáṃsá
is not to be commenced."

We grant, in reply, that the injunction to teach does not imply a
corresponding necessity that the student must understand the meaning;
still when a man has read the Veda with its subsidiary _aṅgas_, and
has comprehended the general connection of the words with their
respective meanings, this will imply an understanding of the meaning
of the Veda, just as it would in any ordinary human compositions. "But
may we not say that, just as in the case of the mother who said to her
son, 'Eat poison,' the meaning literally expressed by the words was
not what she wished to convey, since she really intended to forbid his
eating anything at all in such and such a house; so if the literal
meaning of the Veda does not express its real purport, the old
objection will recur with full force that the study of Mímáṃsá will
have neither subject nor end [as there will be no use in understanding
the literal meaning, since, as in the mother's case, it may only lead
astray, and so common sense must be the ultimate judge"]. We reply,
that your supposed illustration and the case in question are not
really parallel. In the supposed illustration the primary meaning of
the words would be obviously precluded, because a direction to eat
poison would be inconceivable in the mouth of an authoritative and
trustworthy speaker like a mother, and you would know at once that
this could not be what she wished to say; but in the case of the Veda,
which is underived from any personal author, why should not the
literal meaning be the one actually intended? And it is just the
doubts that arise, as they occasionally will do, in reference to this
intended meaning, which will be the proper "subject" of Mímáṃsá
discussion; and the settlement of these doubts will be its proper
"end." Therefore, whenever the true meaning of the Veda is not
obtained[260] by that reading which is virtually prescribed by the
authoritative injunction to a Brahman to teach, it will be a proper
subject for systematic discussion; and hence we hold that the study of
Mímáṃsá _is_ enjoined, and should be commenced.

"Well,[261] be it so" [say the followers of the Nyáya], "but how can
the Vedas be said to be underived from any personal author, when there
is no evidence to establish this? Would you maintain that they have no
personal author because, although there is an unbroken line of
tradition, there is no remembrance of any author, just as is the case
with the soul"?[262] This argument is weak, because the alleged
characteristics [unbroken tradition, &c.] are not proved; for those
who hold the human origin of the Vedas maintain that the line of
tradition was interrupted at the time of the dissolution of the
universe. And, again, what is meant by this assertion that the author
is not remembered? Is it (1.) that no author is believed, or (2.) that
no author is remembered? The first alternative cannot be accepted,
since we hold that God is proved to have been the author. Nor can the
second, because it cannot stand the test of the following dilemma,
viz., is it meant (_a._) that no author of the Veda is remembered by
some one person, or (_b._) by any person whatever? The former
supposition breaks down, as it would prove too much, since it would
apply to such an isolated stanza as "He who is religious and has
overcome pride and anger," &c.[263] And the latter supposition is
inadmissible, since it would be impossible for any person who was not
omniscient to know that no author of the Veda was recollected by any
person whatever. Moreover, there is actual proof that the Veda had a
personal author, for we argue as follows:--The sentences of the Veda
must have originated from a personal author, since they have the
character of sentences like those of Kálidása and other writers. And,
again, the sentences of the Veda have been composed by a competent
person, since, while they possess authority, they have, at the same
time, the character of sentences, like those of Manu and other sages.

But [ask the Mímáṃsakas] may it not be assumed that "all study of the
Veda was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor,
since the study of the Veda must always have had one common character
which was the same in former times as now;" and therefore this
uninterrupted succession has force to prove the eternity of the Veda?
This reasoning, however [the Naiyáyikas answer], cannot rise to the
height of proof, for it has no more validity than such obviously
illusory reasoning, as "All study of the Mahábhárata was preceded by
an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since it is the study
of the Mahábhárata, which must have been the same in former times as
now." But [the Mímáṃsakas will ask whether there is not a difference
between these two cases, since] the Smṛiti declares that [Vishṇu
incarnate as] Vyása was the author of the Mahábhárata, in accordance
with the line, "Who else than the lotus-eyed Vishṇu could be the maker
of the Mahábhárata?" [while nothing of this sort is recorded in any
Smṛiti in regard to the Veda]. This argument, however, is pithless,
since those words of the Purushasúkta (Rig V., x. 90), "From him
sprang the Ṛich and Sáman verses; from him sprang the Metres; from
him the Yajus arose;" prove that the Veda had a maker.

Further [proceed the Naiyáyikas] we hold that sound is
non-eternal[264] because it has genus, and is also perceptible to the
external organs of beings such as ourselves, just as a jar is.[265]
"But," you may object, "is not this argument refuted by the proof
arising from the fact that we recognise the letter _g_ (for example)
as the same we have heard before?" This objection, however, is
extremely weak, for the recognition in question is powerless to refute
our argument, since it has reference only to identity of _species_, as
in the case of a man whose hair has been cut and has grown again, or
of a jasmine which has blossomed afresh. "But [asks the Mímáṃsaka] how
can the Veda have been uttered by the incorporeal Parameśvara, who has
no palate or other organs of speech, and therefore cannot have
pronounced the letters?" "This objection [answers the Naiyáyika] is
not happy, because, though Parameśvara is by nature incorporeal, he
can yet assume a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his
worshippers. Consequently the arguments in favour of the doctrine that
the Veda had no personal author are inconclusive."

I shall now [says the Mímáṃsaka] clear up the whole question. What is
meant by this _paurusheyatva_ ["derivation from a personal author"]
which it is sought to prove? Is it (1.) mere procession (_utpannatva_)
from a person, like the procession of the Veda from persons such as
ourselves, when we daily utter it? or (2.) is it the arrangement--with
a view to its manifestation--of knowledge acquired by other modes of
proof, as in the case of treatises composed by persons like ourselves?
If the first meaning be intended, there will be no dispute between
us.[266] If the second sense be meant, I ask whether it is established
(_a._) by inference,[267] or (_b._) by supernatural testimony? (_a._)
The former alternative cannot be correct, because your argument would
equally apply to the sentences in dramas such as the Málatímádhava
[which, of course, being a work of fiction, has no authoritative
character]. If you qualify your argument by inserting the saving
clause, "while they possess authority,"[268] [as supra, p. 188, line
21], even this explanation will fail to satisfy a philosopher. For the
sentences of the Veda are universally defined to be sentences which
prove things that are not provable by other evidence. But if you could
establish that these Vedic sentences only prove what is provable by
other evidence, this definition would be at once contradicted, just
as if a man were to say that his mother was a barren woman. And even
if we granted that Parameśvara might assume a body in sport, in order
to show kindness to his worshippers, it would not at all follow that
he would perceive things beyond the reach of the senses, from the want
of any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place, in
time, and in nature.[269] Nor is it to be assumed that his eyes and
other senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge,
for we can only draw upon our imagination in accordance with our past
experience. This has been declared by the Guru [Prabhákara] when he
refutes the supposition of an omniscient author--

     "Wherever we do find the power of an organ intensified,[270]
     it is done without its going beyond its own proper objects;
     thus it may appear in the power of seeing the very distant
     or the very minute, but not in the ear's becoming cognisant
     of form."

Hence (_b._) we also maintain that your position cannot be established
by any supposed supernatural testimony [as that quoted above from the
Rig-Veda, "from him sprang the Ṛich and Sáman verses"]. For the
rule of Páṇini (iv. 3, 101) will still remain inviolate, that the
grammatical affixes with which such names as Káṭhaka, Kálápa, and
Taittiríya are formed, impart to those derivatives the sense of
"uttered by" Kaṭha, Kalápin, &c., though we maintain that these names
have reference [not to those parts of the Veda as first composed by
these sages, but] to the fact that these sages instituted certain
schools of traditional study. And in the same way we hold [in
reference to this verse from the Rig-Veda] that it only refers to the
institution of certain schools of traditional study of these Vedas.

Nor will any supposed inference establish the non-eternity of sound,
because [as we said before] it is opposed to the evidence of our
consciousness, [since we certainly recognise the letter now heard as
the one heard before]. Nor is it reasonable to reply that, although
the letters are not the same, they seem to be so on account of their
identity of species. For here we ask our opponents a question--Is this
idea that "the apparent sameness arises from identity of species" put
forward from a wish to preclude entirely any idea of the letters being
the same, or only [from an imagined fear of error] because experience
shows that the recognition will sometimes be erroneous [as in the
cases of the hair and jasmine mentioned above]? (_a._) If it arises
from the latter reason, we Mímáṃsakas, who hold that the Veda is its
own evidence, have said in reference to this timid imagination--

     "He who foolishly imagines that something as yet unknown to
     him will come hereafter to stop his present conclusion, will
     go to utter ruin in every transaction of life, his mind a
     mass of doubts."

(_b._) "But [the Naiyáyikas will ask] does not this recognition of _g_
and other letters [as the same which we heard before] refer to the
species which exists the same in each, and not to the several
individual letters, since, in fact, we perceive that they are
different as uttered by different persons, otherwise we could not make
such distinctions as we do when we say 'Somaśarman is reading'?" This
objection, however, has as little brilliancy as its predecessors, for
as there is no proof of any distinction between the individual _g_'s,
there is no proof that we ought to assume any such thing as a species
_g_; and we maintain that, just as to the man who does not understand
[the Naiyáyika doctrine of] the species _g_, the one species [in the
Naiyáyika view] will by the influence of distinction of place,
magnitude, form, and individual sounds, appear as if it were variously
modified as itself distinct in place, as small, as great, as long, as
short; so to the man who does not understand our [Mímáṃsaka doctrine
of] one individual _g_, the one _g_ (in our view) will by the
diversity of "manifesters,"[271] appear to him associated with their
respective peculiarities; and as contrary characters are in this way
ascribed [to the letter _g_], there is a fallacious appearance of
distinction [between different _g_'s]. But does this ascription of
contrary characters, which is thus regarded as creating a difference
[between the _g_'s], result (1.) from the nature of the thing, or (2.)
from our imagination? There is no proof of the former alternative;
for, if it were true, as an inherent difference would have to be
admitted between different _g_'s, we should have to say, "Chaitra has
uttered ten _g's_," and not "Chaitra has uttered the same _g_ ten
times." On the latter supposition, there is no proof of any inherent
distinction between _g_'s, for inherent oneness is not destroyed by a
difference of external disguises. Thus we must not conceive, from the
apparent distinction caused by such external disguises as jars, &c.,
that there is any inherent distinction, as of parts, in the one
indivisible ether. The current use of the rejected phrase [_i.e._,
"different" as applied to the _g_'s] is really caused by the _noise_,
which in each case is different. This has been said by the great
teacher--

     "The object which the Naiyáyikas seek by supposing a species
     is, in fact, gained from the letter itself; and the object
     which they aim at by supposing an individuality in letters,
     is attained from audible noises;[272] so that the assumption
     of species is useless."

And again--

     "Since in regard to sounds such an irresistible instinct of
     recognition is always awake within us, it precludes by its
     superior evidence all the inferences to prove sound's
     non-eternity."

This at once refutes the argument given in the [Naiyáyika] treatise
by Vágíśwara, entitled _Mána-manohara_, "sound is non-eternal from the
fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of
sense[273] (_sc._ the ear), just as colour is to the eye."

We can also refute it in the following ways: (_a._) If we follow the
[Sáṅkhya and Vedánta] view that sound is a substance, it is evidently
overthrown[274] [as in that case sound cannot be a quality]; (_b._) if
we take it as referring to the _noise_, not the _sound_, we have no
dispute, as it only establishes what we ourselves allow; and (_c._)
the inference is overthrown by the "limiting condition" [_upádhi_] of
_aśrávaṇatva_, or "the not causing audition."[275] So Udayana tries at
great length to establish that, although ether, the site of sound, is
imperceptible, the non-existence of that which abides in this site is
perceptible; and he then brings forward as an evidence for the
non-eternity of sound, that sense perception which causes the use of
such common expressions as "The tumult is stopped," "The sound has
arisen."[276] But he is sufficiently answered[277] by our old reply
[in p. 193], that the fallacious appearance of distinction arises
from contrary characters being erroneously ascribed, just as, in the
story, the demon Tála went away [as well as Betála] when the offering
of blood was given to the latter.[278] And as for the objection raised
by the author of the _Nyáyabhúshaṇa_,[279] that, if sound were
eternal, the conclusion must follow that it would be either always
perceptible or always imperceptible, this also is obviated by our
allowing that we only perceive that sound which is manifested by our
articulate noise.[280] And as for the (Naiyáyika) argument against the
existence[281] of such a constant relation as this which is supposed
between the manifested "sound" and the manifesting "noise," since they
both come simultaneously in contact with the sense of hearing, this is
invalid, as it will indisputably apply with equal force in the case of
the soul.[282]

Therefore as the Veda is thus proved to have not originated from any
personal author, and as the minutest germ of suspicion against it is
thus absolutely destroyed, we hold it as satisfactorily demonstrated
that it has a self-established authority in all matters relating to
duty.

"Well"[283] [say our opponents], "let this question rest; but how
about another well-known controversy? It is said--

"'The Sáṅkhyas hold that both authoritativeness and non-authoritativeness
are self-proved; the followers of the Nyáya hold that both are proved by
something else [as inference, &c.]; the Buddhists hold that the latter is
self-proved and the former proved by something else; the teachers of the
Veda maintain that authoritativeness is self-proved and
non-authoritativeness proved by something else.' Now we ask, amidst all
this discussion, how do the Mímáṃsakas accept as established their tenet
that the authoritativeness of duty is self-proved? And what is the meaning
of this so-called self-proved authoritativeness? Is it (_a._) that
authoritativeness springs from itself? or (_b._) that it springs from the
right knowledge in which it resides? or (_c._) that it springs from the
instrumental causes [as the eye, &c.] which produced the right knowledge
in which it resides? or (_d._) that it resides in a particular knowledge
produced by the instrumental causes which produced the right
knowledge?[284] or (_e._) that it resides in a particular knowledge
produced by the instrumental causes _only_ which produced the right
knowledge?

"(_a._) It cannot be the _first_, because wherever the relation of
cause and effect is found there must be a difference, and therefore
these two cannot reside in the same subject [_i.e._, authoritativeness
cannot cause itself]. (_b._) It cannot be the _second_, because if
knowledge, which is a quality, were the cause of authoritativeness, it
would have to be a substance, as being an intimate cause.[285] (_c._)
It cannot be the _third_, because 'authoritativeness' cannot properly
be 'produced' at all,[286] whether we call it a general
characteristic (_upádhi_) or a species (_játi_);[287] for if we call
it an _upádhi_, it is defined as the absolute non-existence of any
contradiction to a certain kind of knowledge which does not possess
the nature of recollection;[288] and this cannot be produced, for we
all allow that absolute non-existence is eternal; and still less can
we speak of its being produced, if we regard it as a species. (_d._)
Nor can it be the _fourth_, for wrong knowledge [as well as right
knowledge] is a particular kind of knowledge, and the instrumental
causes which produce the general are included in those which produce
the particular,[289] just as the general idea 'seed,' as applied to
'tree,' is included in the particular seed of any special tree, as,
_e.g._, the Dalbergia Sisu; otherwise we might suppose that the
particular had no instrumental cause at all. Your definition would
therefore extend too far [and include erroneous as well as true
knowledge]; for non-authoritativeness, which Vedantists and most
Mímáṃsakas allow to be produced by something external, must also be
considered as residing in a particular knowledge [_i.e._, a wrong
knowledge] produced [in part] by the instrumental causes which
produced the right knowledge. (_e._) As for your _fifth_ view, we ask
whether by being produced by the instrumental causes _only_ which
produced right knowledge, you mean to include or exclude the absence
of a 'defect'? It cannot be the former alternative; because the
followers of the Nyáya who hold that authoritativeness is proved by
something external [as inference, &c.], would at once grant that
authoritativeness is produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge
combined with the absence of a 'defect.' Neither can it be the latter
alternative; for, inasmuch as it is certain that the absence of a
'defect' is found combined with the various instrumental causes, this
absence of a 'defect' is fixed as by adamantine glue to be a cause of
right knowledge, since right knowledge will always accompany its
presence, and be absent if it is absent,[290] and it will at the same
time be not an unimportant condition.[291] If you object that
non-existence (or absence) cannot be a cause, we reply by asking you
whether non-existence can be an effect or not? If it cannot, then we
should have to allow that cloth is eternal, as its "emergent
non-existence" or destruction would be impossible. If it can be an
effect, then why should it not be a cause also? So this rope binds you
at both ends. This has also been said by Udayana [in his Kusumáñjali,
i. 10]--

     "'As existence, so too non-existence is held to be a cause
     as well as an effect.'

"The argument, in my opinion, runs as follows:--Right knowledge
depends on some cause[292] other than the common causes of knowledge,
from the very fact that, while it is an effect, it is also knowledge,
just as wrong knowledge does.[293] Authoritativeness is known through
something external to itself [_e.g._, inference], because doubt arises
in regard to it in an unfamiliar case, as we also see in
non-authoritativeness.

"Therefore, as we can prove that authoritativeness is both produced
and recognised by means of something external, the Mímáṃsá tenet that
'authoritativeness is self-proved' is like a gourd overripe and
rotten."

This long harangue of our opponent, however, is but a vain attempt to
strike the sky with his fist; for (_a._) we mean by our phrase
"self-proved" that while right knowledge is produced by the
instrumental causes of knowledge, it is not produced by any other
cause (as "defect," &c.) The following is our argument as drawn out in
full:--Right knowledge is not produced by any other instrumental
causes than those of knowledge, while, at the same time, it is
produced by these, because it is not the site of wrongness of
knowledge,--just like a jar.[294] Nor can Udayana's[295] argument be
brought forward as establishing the dependence of authoritativeness on
something external, for it is swallowed up by the dragon of the
equally potent contradictory argument. "Right knowledge is not
produced by any cause which is other than the causes of knowledge and
is also other than 'defect,'[296] from the very fact of its being
knowledge--like wrong knowledge." Again, since right knowledge can
arise from the causes of knowledge _per se_, it would be a needless
complexity to suppose that anything else is a cause, whether you call
it a _guṇa_ or the absence of a "defect" (_dosha_).[297]

"But surely if the presence of a defect is the cause of wrong
knowledge, it is difficult to deny that its absence must be a cause of
right knowledge?" We meet this, however, by maintaining that the
absence of defect is only an indirect and remote cause, as it only
acts negatively by preventing wrong knowledge. As it has been said--

     "Therefore we reasonably conclude from the presence of
     _guṇas_ the absence of 'defects,'[298] from their absence
     the non-existence of the two kinds of
     non-authoritativeness,[299] and from this the general
     conclusion."[300]

(_b._) We maintain that the recognition of right knowledge is produced
by the same causes only which make us perceive the first
knowledge[301] [_sc._ the eye, mind, &c.] Nor can you object that this
view is precluded, because it would imply that there could be no such
thing as doubt; for we answer that doubt arises in cases where,
although all the causes which produce knowledge are present, there is
also the simultaneous presence of some opposing cause, as a "defect,"
&c.

As for your argument [O Naiyáyika! given _supra_, in p. 198, lines
17-24], I ask, Is your own argument an authoritative proof by itself
or not? If it is, it proves too much [for it would properly apply to
itself and lead us to infer its own dependence on external proof,
whereas you hold it to be independent of such]; and if it is not, we
should have a case of _regressus in infinitum_, for it will want some
other proof to confirm its authoritativeness, and this too in its turn
will want some fresh proof, and so on for ever.

As for the argument urged by Udayana[302] in the Kusumáñjali, when he
tries to establish that immediate and vehement action does not depend
on the agent's certainty as to the authoritativeness of the speech
which sets him acting: "Action depends on wish, its vehemence on that
of the wish,[303] wish on the knowledge that the thing wished for is
a means to attain some wished-for end, and this is only ascertained by
an inference based on some 'sign' which proves that the thing is
closely connected with the wished-for end, and this inference depends
on the things being in direct contact with the agent's senses; but
throughout the whole series of antecedent steps the Mímáṃsá idea of
the perception of authoritativeness is never once found as a cause of
action." All this appears to us simple bluster, like that of the thief
who ostentatiously throws open all his limbs before me, when I had
actually found the gold under his armpit. It is only the knowledge
that the thing is a means to attain the desired end, and this
knowledge recognised as authoritative and right knowledge, which
causes the definite volition to arise at all; and in this we can
distinctly trace the influence of that very perception of
authoritativeness [whose existence he so vehemently pretended to
deny]. If unhesitating action ever arose in any case from doubt, then,
as it might always arise so in every given case, all ascertainment of
authoritativeness would be useless; and as the very existence of what
is unascertained is rendered uncertain, poor authoritativeness would
have to be considered as dead and buried! But enough of this prolix
controversy; since it has been said--

     "Therefore the authoritativeness of a cognition, which
     (authoritativeness) presented itself as representing a real
     fact, may be overthrown by the perception of a 'defect,'
     which perception is produced by some sign that proves the
     discrepancy between the cognition and the fact."[304]

Now with regard to the Veda, which is the self-proved and
authoritative criterion in regard to duty, [we have the following
divergency between the two great Mímáṃsá schools]:--The Veda is
composed of three portions, respectively called "hymns" (_mantra_),
"explanatory passages" (_arthaváda_), and "injunctions" (_vidhi_); and
by "injunction" we mean such sentences as "Let him who desires heaven
sacrifice with the jyotishṭoma." Here _ta_, the affix of the third
person singular, denotes an enjoining power, which is "coloured" [or
rendered definite] by the meaning of the root, according to the
opinion of the followers of Bhaṭṭa Kumárila, who maintain that words
signify[305] something definite by themselves [apart from the
sentence]. The followers of Guru Prabhákara, on the contrary, hold
that the whole sentence is a command relating to the sacrifice, as
they maintain that words only signify an action or something to be
done.[306] Thus all has been made plain.

E. B. C.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 247: Mádhava here calls it the _práchí Mímáṃsá_.]

[Footnote 248: Cf. _J. Nyáyamálávist_, pp. 5-9.]

[Footnote 249: Thus it is said that he who desires to be a family
priest should offer a black-necked animal to Agni, a parti-coloured
one to Soma, and a black-necked one to Agni. Should this be a case for
_tantra_ or not? By _tantra_ one offering to Agni would do for both;
but as the offering to Soma comes between, they cannot be united, and
thus it must be a case of _ávápa_, _i.e._, offering the two separately
(_J. Nyáyamálá_, xi. 1, 13).]

[Footnote 250: In p. 123, line 4, I read _vilakshaṇa-dṛishṭaphala_.]

[Footnote 251: In the former case it would be a _vidhi_, in the latter
a _niyama_. Cf. the lines _vidhir atyantam aprápto niyamaḥ pákshike
sati, tatra chányatra cha práptau parisaṃkhyá vidhíyate_.]

[Footnote 252: The Mímáṃsá holds that the potential and similar
affixes, which constitute a _vidhi_, have a twofold power; by the one
they express an active volition of the agent, corresponding to the
root-meaning (_artha-bhávaná_); by the other an enforcing power in the
word (_śabda-bhávaná_). Thus in _svargakámo yajeta_, the _eta_ implies
"let him produce heaven by means of certain acts which together make
up a sacrifice possessing a certain mystic influence;" next it implies
an enforcing power residing in itself (as it is the word of the
self-existent Veda and not of God) which sets the hearer upon this
course of action.]

[Footnote 253: These four "fruits of action" are obscure, and I do not
remember to have seen them alluded to elsewhere. I was told in India
that they were a thing's coming into being, growing, declining, and
perishing. If so, they are the second, third, fifth, and sixth of the
six _vikáras_ mentioned in Śaṅkara's Vajrasúchi, 2, _i.e._, _asti_,
_jáyate_, _vardhate_, _vipariṇamate_, _apakshíyate_, _naśyati_. I do
not see how there could be any reference to the four kinds of
_apúrva_, sc. _phala_, _samudáya_, _utpatti_, and _aṅga_, described in
Nyáya M. V. ii. 1, 2.]

[Footnote 254: The _nigamas_ are the Vedic quotations in Yáska's
_nirukta_.]

[Footnote 255: See Nyáya-málá-vistara, i. 4, 19.]

[Footnote 256: The exact number is 915.]

[Footnote 257: This is to explain the last of the five members, the
_saṃgati_.]

[Footnote 258: Cf. Aśvaláyana's Gṛihya Sútras, i. 19, 1.]

[Footnote 259: The _anuváda_, of course, implies a previous _vidhi_,
which it thus repeats and supplements, and so carries with it an equal
authority. The _anuváda_ in the present case is the passage which
mentions that the Veda is to be read, as it enforces the previous
_vidhi_ as to teaching.]

[Footnote 260: I read in p. 127, line 12, _anava-gamyamánasya_, and so
the recension given in the Nyáya M. V. p. 14, _na budhyamánasya_.]

[Footnote 261: In the next two or three pages I have frequently
borrowed from Dr. Muir's translation in his _Sanskrit Texts_, vol.
iii. p. 88.]

[Footnote 262: The soul may be traced back through successive
transmigrations, but you never get back to its beginning.]

[Footnote 263: Mádhava means that the author of this stanza, though
unknown to many people, was not necessarily unknown to all, as his
contemporaries, no doubt, knew who wrote it, and his descendants might
perhaps still be aware of the fact. In this case, therefore, we have
an instance of a composition of which some persons did not know the
origin, but which, nevertheless, had a human author. The stanza in
question is quoted in full in Böhtlingk's Indische Sprüche, No. 5598,
from the MS. anthology called the _Subháshitárṇava_. For _muktaka_,
see _Sáh. Darp._, § 558.]

[Footnote 264: The eternity of the Veda depends on this tenet of the
Mímáṃsá that sound is eternal.]

[Footnote 265: Eternal things (as the atoms of earth, fire, water, and
air, minds, time, space, ether, and soul) have _viśesha_, not
_sámánya_ or genus, and they are all imperceptible to the senses.
Genera are themselves eternal (though the individuals in which they
reside are not), but they have not themselves genus. Both these
arguments belong rather to the Nyáya-vaiśeshika school than to the
Nyáya.]

[Footnote 266: The Mímáṃsaka allows that the _uchcháraṇa_ or utterance
is non-eternal.]

[Footnote 267: The inference will be as follows: "The Vedas were
arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, with a view to
their manifestation, from the very fact of their having the nature of
sentences, just like the compositions of Manu, &c."]

[Footnote 268: The argument will now run, "The Vedas were arranged
after being acquired by other modes of proof, because, while they
possess authority, they still have the nature of sentences, like the
composition of Manu, &c."]

[Footnote 269: In assuming a material body, he would be subject to
material limitations.]

[Footnote 270: The Jainas allow thirty-four such superhuman
developments (_atiśayáḥ_) in their saints.]

[Footnote 271: Jaimini maintains that the vibrations of the air
"manifest" the always existing sound.]

[Footnote 272: "What is meant by 'noise' (_náda_) is these
'conjunctions' and 'disjunctions,' occasioned by the vibrations of the
air."--_Ballantyne_, _Mímáṃsá Aphorisms_, i. 17.]

[Footnote 273: The Nyáya holds that colour and sound are respectively
special qualities of the elements light and ether; and as the organs
of seeing and hearing are composed of light and ether, each will, of
course, have its corresponding special quality.]

[Footnote 274: In p. 131, line 7, I read _pratyakshásiddheḥ_.]

[Footnote 275: Cf. my note pp. 7, 8, (on the Chárváka-darśana) for the
_upádhi_. The _upádhi_ or "condition" limits a too general middle
term; it is defined as "that which always accompanies the major term,
but does not always accompany the middle." Thus if the condition
"produced from wet fuel" is added to "fire," the argument "the
mountain has smoke because it has fire" is no longer a false one.
Here, in answer to the Nyáya argument in the text, our author objects
that its middle term ("from the fact of its being a special quality
belonging to an organ of sense") is too wide, _i.e._, it is sometimes
found where the major term "non-eternal" is not found, as, _e.g._, in
_sound_ itself, according to the Mímáṃsá doctrine. To obviate this he
proposes to add the "condition," "not causing audition," as he will
readily concede that all those things are non-eternal which, _while
not causing audition_, are special qualities belonging to an organ of
sense, as, _e.g._, colour. But I need scarcely add that this addition
would make the whole argument nugatory. In fact, the Púrva Mímáṃsá and
the Nyáya can never argue together on this question of the eternity of
sound, as their points of view are so totally different.]

[Footnote 276: In the former case we have the _dhwaṃsa_ of sound, in
the latter its _prágabháva_.]

[Footnote 277: In p. 131, line 12, I read _samapauhi_ for _samápohi_,
_i.e._, the passive aorist of _sam_ + _apa_ + _úh_.]

[Footnote 278: I do not know this legend. Tála and Betála are the two
demons who carry Vikramáditya on their shoulders in the
Siṃhásan-battísí. It appears to be referred to here as illustrating
how one answer can suffice for two opponents.]

[Footnote 279: This is probably a work by Bhásarvajña (see Dr. Hall's
_Bibl. Index_, p. 26).]

[Footnote 280: _Dhvani_, or our "articulate noise," produces the
vibrations of air which render manifest the ever-existing sound. There
is always an eternal but inaudible hum going on, which we modify into
a definite speech by our various articulations. I take _saṃskṛita_
here as equivalent to _abhivyakta_.]

[Footnote 281: I read in p. 131, line 15,
_saṃskárakasaṃskáryabhávábhávánumánam_.]

[Footnote 282: It would be a case of _vyabhichára_. The Naiyáyika
argument would seem to be something as follows:--Sound is not thus
manifested by noise, since both are simultaneously perceived by the
senses, just as we see in the parallel case of the individual and its
species; these are both perceived together, but the individual is not
manifested by the species. But the Mímáṃsá rejoins that this would
equally apply to the soul and knowledge; as the internal sense
perceives both simultaneously, and therefore knowledge ought not to be
manifested by the soul, which is contrary to experience. But I am not
sure that I rightly understand the argument.]

[Footnote 283: Here begins a long _púrva-paksha_, from p. 131, line
18, down to p. 133, line 9; see p. 198 _infra_.]

[Footnote 284: This is Prabhákara's view (see Siddh. Muktáv., p. 118).
The first knowledge is in the form "This is a jar;" the second
knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive
the jar;" and this latter produces authoritativeness (_prámáṇya_),
which resides in it as its characteristic.]

[Footnote 285: Substances are "intimate causes" to their qualities,
and only substances have qualities; now if authoritativeness, which is
a characteristic of right knowledge, were caused by it, it would be a
quality of it, that is, right knowledge would be its intimate cause
and therefore a substance.]

[Footnote 286: The eye, &c., would be its instrumental causes.]

[Footnote 287: The first three categories "substance," "quality," and
"action," are called _játis_ or species; the last four, "genus,"
"_viśesha_," "intimate relation," and "non-existence," are called
_upádhis_ or "general characteristics."]

[Footnote 288: The Púrva Mímáṃsá denies that recollection is right
knowledge.]

[Footnote 289: Wrong knowledge is produced by the same instrumental
causes (as the eye, &c.) which produced right knowledge, but by these
_together with a "defect,"_ as biliousness, distance &c.]

[Footnote 290: _Scil._ if there be _doshábháva_ there is _pramá_; if
not, not. In p. 132, line 20, I read _doshábhávatvena_ for
_doshábhávasahakṛitatvena_.]

[Footnote 291: _Anyathásiddhatvam_ means _niyatapúrvavartitve sati
anávaśyakatvam_.]

[Footnote 292: _Scil._ or the absence of "defect," _doshábháva_.]

[Footnote 293: Wrong knowledge has _doshábháva_ or the presence of a
"defect" as its cause, in addition to the common causes.]

[Footnote 294: Wrongness of knowledge (_apramátva_) can only reside in
knowledge as a characteristic or quality thereof; it cannot reside in
a jar. The jar is, of course, produced by other instrumental causes
than those of knowledge (as, _e.g._, the potter's stick, &c.), but it
is not produced by these other causes _in combination_ with being also
produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge (with which it has
nothing directly to do); and so by a quibble, which is less obvious in
Sanskrit than in English, this wretched sophism is allowed to pass
muster. The jar is not
produced-by-any-other-instrumental-causes-than-those-of-knowledge,-while-
at-the-same-time-it-is-produced-by-these.]

[Footnote 295: I suppose this is the argument given at the close of
the previous long púrva-paksha.]

[Footnote 296: These words "and is other than defect"
(_dosha-vyatirikta_) are, of course, meaningless as far as right
knowledge is concerned; they are simply added to enable the author to
bring in "wrong knowledge" as an example. Wrong knowledge is caused by
the causes of knowledge _plus_ "defect;" right knowledge by the former
alone.]

[Footnote 297: The Nyáya holds that wrong knowledge is produced by a
"defect," as jaundice, &c., in the eye, and right knowledge by a
_guṇa_ or "virtue" (as the direct contact of the healthy organ with a
true object), or by the absence of a "defect."]

[Footnote 298: The _guṇa_ (or βελτἱστη ἕξις) of an organ is not
properly a cause of _pramá_ but rather _doshábháva-bodhaka_.]

[Footnote 299: _Scil._ "doubtful" (_sandigdha_) and "ascertained
non-authoritativeness" (_niśchitáprámáṇya_).]

[Footnote 300: _Utsarga_ is a general conclusion which is not
necessarily true in every particular case; but here it means the
conclusion that "right knowledge has no special causes but the common
causes of knowledge, the eye," &c.]

[Footnote 301: The first knowledge is "This is a jar," the second
knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive
the jar;" and simultaneously with it arises the cognition of the truth
of the perception, _i.e._, its authoritativeness or _prámáṇya_.]

[Footnote 302: This seems to be a quotation of Udayana's own words,
and no doubt is taken from his very rare prose commentary on the
Kusumáñjali, a specimen of which I printed in the preface to my
edition. This passage must come from the fifth book (v. 6?).]

[Footnote 303: I read _tat-práchuryam_ for _tatpráchurye_ in p. 134,
line 7.]

[Footnote 304: This stanza affirms that according to the Mímáṃsá
school, while authoritativeness is self-proved, non-authoritativeness
is proved from something else (as inference, &c.)]

[Footnote 305: I take _vyutpatti_ here as used for _śakti_; _siddhe_
means _ghaṭádau_.]

[Footnote 306: These are the two great Mímáṃsá schools. The former, called
_abhihitánvaya-vádinaḥ_, hold (like the Naiyáyika school) that words by
themselves can express their separate meaning by the function _abhidhá_ or
"denotation;" these are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing
one connected idea. The latter, called _anvitábhidhána-vádinaḥ_, hold that
words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence and grammatically
connected with each other; they only mean an action or something connected
with an action. In _gám ánaya_, _gám_ does not properly mean _gotva_, but
_ánayanánvita-gotva_, _i.e._, the bovine genus as connected with
"bringing." We cannot have a case of a noun without some governing verb,
and _vice versâ_. Cf. Waitz, as quoted by Professor Sayce (_Comparative
Philology_, page 136): "We do not think in words but in sentences; hence
we may assert that a living language consists of sentences, not of words.
But a sentence is formed not of single independent words, but of words
which refer to one another in a particular manner, like the corresponding
thought, which does not consist of single independent ideas, but of such
as, connected, form a whole, and determine one another mutually."]




CHAPTER XIII.

THE PÁṆINI-DARŚANA.[307]


If any one asks, "Where are we to learn how to separate a root and an
affix so as to be able to say, 'This part is the original root and
this is an affix,'" may we not reply that to those who have drunk the
waters of Patañjali this question produces no confusion, since it is
notorious that the rules of grammar have reference to this very point
of the separation of the original roots and affixes? Thus the very
first sentence of the venerable Patañjali, the author of the "Great
Commentary," is "_atha śabdánuśásanam_," "Now comes the exposition of
words." The particle _atha_ ("now") is used here as implying a new
topic or a commencement; and by the phrase, "exposition of words," is
meant the system of grammar put forth by Páṇini. Now a doubt might
here arise as to whether this phrase implies that the exposition of
words is to be the main topic or not; and it is to obviate any such
doubt that he employed the particle _atha_, since this particle
implies that what follows is to be treated as the main topic to the
exclusion of everything else.

The word "exposition" (_anuśásana_), as here used, implies that thereby
Vaidic words, such as those in the line _śaṃ no devír abhishṭaye_,[308]
&c., and secular words as ancillary to these, as the common words for
"cow," "horse," "man," "elephant," "bird," &c., are made the subject of
the exposition, _i.e._, are deduced from their original roots and properly
formed, or, in other words, are explained as divided into root and affix.
We must consider that the compound in this phrase represents a genitive of
the object [_śabdánuśásanam_ standing for _śabdasyánuśásanam_], and as
there is a rule of Páṇini (_karmaṇi cha_, ii. 2, 14), which prohibits
composition in such a construction, we are forced to concede that the
phrase _śabdánuśásanam_ does not come before us as a duly authorised
compound.

Here, however, arises a discussion [as to the true application of the
alleged rule of Páṇini], for we hold that, by ii. 3, 66, wherever an
object and an agent are both expressed in one and the same sentence in
connection with a word ending with a _kṛit_ affix, there the object
alone can be put in the genitive and not the agent;[309] this
limitation arising from our taking _ubhayaprápti_ in the sútra as a
_bahuvríhi_ compound.[310] Thus we must say, "Wonderful is the milking
of cows by an unpractised cowherd." We may, however, remark in passing
that some authors do maintain that the agent may in such cases be put
in the genitive (as well as the object); hence we find it stated in
the Káśiká Commentary: "Some authors maintain that there should be an
option in such cases without any distinction, and thus they would
equally allow such a construction as 'the exposition of words _of_ the
teacher' or '_by_ the teacher.'" Inasmuch, however, as the words of
the phrase in question really mean that the "exposition" intended
relates to _words_ and not to _things_, and since this can be at once
understood without any mention of the agent, _i.e._, the teacher, any
such mention would be plainly superfluous; and therefore as the object
and the agent are _not_ both expressed in one and the same sentence,
this is not an instance of the genitive of the object (coming under
ii. 3, 66, and ii. 2, 14), but rather an instance of quite another
rule, viz., ii. 3, 65, which directs that an agent or an object, in
connection with a word ending with a kṛit affix, is to be put in the
genitive [which in this instance is expressed by the _tatpurusha_
compound]; and the compound in question will be strictly analogous to
such recognised forms as _idhma-pravraśchana_, _paláśa-śátana_,
&c.[311] Or we might argue that the genitive case implied in this
_shashṭhítatpurusha_ is one of the class called "residual," in
accordance with Páṇini's rule (ii. 3, 50), "Let the genitive be used
in the residuum," [_i.e._, in the other constructions not provided for
by special rules];[312] and in this way we might defend the phrase
against the opponent's attack. "But," it might be replied, "your
alleged 'residual genitive' could be assumed everywhere, and we should
thus find all the prohibitions of composition in constructions with a
genitive case rendered utterly nugatory." This we readily grant, and
hence Bhartṛihari in his _Vákyapadíya_ has shown that these rules are
mainly useful where the question relates to the _accent_.[313] To this
effect are the words of the great doctor Vardhamána--

     "In secular utterances men may proceed as they will,

     "But in Vaidic paths let minute accuracy of speech be
     employed.

     "Thus have they explained the meaning of Páṇini's sútras,
     since

     "He himself uses such phrases as _janikartuḥ_ and
     _tatprayojakaḥ_."[314]

Hence it follows that the full meaning of the sentence in question
(of the _Mahábháshya_) is that "it is to be understood that the rules
of grammar which may be taken as a synonym for 'the exposition
concerning words' are now commenced."

"Well, then, for the sake of directly understanding this intended
meaning, it would have been better to have said 'now comes grammar,'
as the words 'now comes the exposition of words' involve a useless
excess of letters." This objection cannot, however, be allowed, since
the employment of such a word as _śabdánuśásanam_, the sense of which
can be so readily inferred from its etymology, proves that the author
intends to imply an end which shall establish that grammar is a
subordinate study (_aṅga_) to the Veda.[315] Otherwise, if there were
no such end set forth, there would be no consequent application of the
readers to the study of grammar. Nor may you say that this application
will be sufficiently enforced by the injunction for study, "the Veda
with its six subordinate parts must be read as a duty without any
(special) end,"[316] because, even though there be such an injunction,
it will not follow that students will apply to this study, if no end
is mentioned which will establish that it is an _aṅga_ of the Veda.
Thus in old times the students, after reading the Veda, used to be in
haste to say--

     "Are not Vaidic words established by the Veda and secular by
     common life,

     "And therefore grammar is useless?"

Therefore it was only when they understood it to be an _aṅga_ of the
Veda that they applied themselves to its study. So in the same way the
students of the present day would not be likely to apply themselves to
it either. It is to obviate this danger that it becomes necessary to
set forth some end which shall, at the same time, establish that
grammar is an _aṅga_ of the Veda. If, when the end is explained, they
should still not apply themselves, then, being destitute of all
knowledge of the true formation of secular words, they would become
involved in sin in the course of sacrificial acts, and would
consequently lose their religious merit. Hence the followers of
sacrifice read, "One who keeps up a sacrificial fire, on using an
incorrect word, should offer an expiatory offering to Saraswatí." Now
it is to declare this end which establishes that it is an _aṅga_ of
the Veda that he uses the words _atha śabdánuśásanam_ and not _atha
vyákaraṇam_. Now the rules of grammar must have an end, and a thing's
end is determined by men's pursuit of it with a view thereto. Just as
in a sacrifice undertaken with a view to heaven, heaven is the end; in
the same way the end of the exposition of words is instruction
concerning words, _i.e._, propriety of speech. "But," an objector may
say, "will not the desired end be still unattained for want of the
true means to it? Nor can it be said that reading the Veda word by
word is the true means; for this cannot be a means for the
understanding of words, since their number is infinite, as divided
into proper and improper words.[317] Thus there is a tradition that
Bṛihaspati for a thousand divine years taught to Indra the study of
words as used in their individual forms when the Veda is read word by
word,[318] and still he came not to the end. Here the teacher was
Bṛihaspati, the pupil was Indra, and the time of study a thousand
years of the gods; and yet the termination was not reached,--how much
less, then, in our day, let a man live ever so long? Learning is
rendered efficient by four appropriate means,--reading, understanding,
practising, and handing it on to others; but in the proposed way life
would only suffice for the bare time of reading; therefore the reading
word by word is not a means for the knowledge of words, and
consequently, as we said at first, the desired end is not
established." We reply, however, that it was never conceded that the
knowledge of words was to be attained by this reading word by word.
And again, since general and special rules apply at once to many
examples, when these are divided into the artificial parts called
roots, &c. (just as one cloud rains over many spots of ground), in
this way we can easily comprehend an exposition of many words. Thus,
for instance, by the general rule (iii. 2, 1), _karmaṇi_, the affix
_aṇ_ is enjoined after a root when the object is in composition with
it; and by this rule we learn many words, as _kumbhakára_, "a potter,"
_káṇḍaláva_, "a cutter of stems," &c. But the supplementary special
rule (iii. 2, 3), _áto 'nupasarge kaḥ_, directing that the affix _ka_
is to be used after a root that ends in long _á_ when there is no
_upasarga_, shows how impracticable this reading word by word would be
[since it would never teach us how to distinguish an _upasarga_]. "But
since there are other _aṅgas_, why do you single out grammar as the
one object of honour?" We reply, that among the six _aṅgas_ the
principal one is grammar, and labour devoted to what is the principal
is sure to bear fruit. Thus it has been said--

     "Nigh unto Brahman himself, the highest of all religious
     austerities,

     "The wise have called grammar the first _aṅga_ of the Veda."

Hence we conclude that the exposition of words is the direct end of
the rules of grammar, but its indirect end is the preservation, &c.,
of the Veda. Hence it has been said by the worshipful author of the
great Commentary [quoting a Várttika], "the end (or motive) is
preservation, inference, scripture, facility, and assurance."[319]
Moreover prosperity arises from the employment of a correct word; thus
Kátyáyana has said, "There is prosperity in the employment of a word
according to the _śástra_; it is equal to the words of the Veda
itself." Others also have said that "a single word thoroughly
understood and rightly used becomes in Swarga the desire-milking cow."
Thus (they say)--

     "They proceed to heaven, with every desired happiness, in
     well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech;

     "But those who use such false forms as _achíkramata_ must
     trudge thither on foot."[320]

Nor need you ask "how can an irrational word possess such power?"
since we have revelation declaring that it is like to the great god.
For the Śruti says, "Four are its horns, three its feet, two its
heads, and seven its hands,--roars loudly the threefold-bound bull,
the great god enters mortals" (Rig-Veda, iv. 58, 3). The great
commentator thus explains it:--The "four horns" are the four kinds of
words--nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles; its "three feet"
mean the three times, past, present, and future, expressed by the
tense-affixes, _laṭ_, &c.; the "two heads," the eternal and temporary
(or produced) words, distinguished as the "manifested" and the
"manifester;" its "seven hands" are the seven case affixes, including
the conjugational terminations; "threefold bound," as enclosed in the
three organs--the chest, the throat, and the head. The metaphor "bull"
(_vṛishabha_) is applied from its pouring forth (_varshaṇa_), _i.e._,
from its giving fruit when used with knowledge. "Loudly roars,"
_i.e._, utters sound, for the root _ru_ means "sound;" here by the
word "sound" developed speech (or language)[321] is implied; "the
great god enters mortals,"--the "great god," _i.e._, speech,--enters
mortals, _i.e._, men endowed with the attribute of mortality. Thus is
declared the likeness [of speech][322] to the supreme Brahman.

The eternal word, called _sphoṭa_, without parts, and the cause of the
world, is verily Brahman; thus it has been declared by Bhartṛihari in
the part of his book called the Brahmakáṇḍa--

     "Brahman, without beginning or end, the indestructible
     essence of speech,

     "Which is developed in the form of things, and whence
     springs the creation of the world."

"But since there is a well-known twofold division of words into nouns
and verbs, how comes this fourfold division?" We reply, because this,
too, is well known. Thus it has been said in the Prakírṇaka--

     "Some make a twofold division of words, some a fourfold or a
     fivefold,

     "Drawing them up from the sentences as root, affix, and the
     like."

Helárája interprets the fivefold division as including
_karmapravachaníyas_.[323] But the fourfold division, mentioned by the
great commentator, is proper, since _karmapravachaníyas_ distinguish a
connection produced by a particular kind of verb, and thus, as marking
out a particular kind of connection and so marking out a particular
kind of verb, they are really included in compounded prepositions
(_upasargas_).[324]

"But," say some, "why do you talk so much of an eternal sound called
_sphoṭa_? This we do not concede, since there is no proof that there
is such a thing." We reply that our own perception is the proof. Thus
there is one word "cow," since all men have the cognition of a word
distinct from the various letters composing it. You cannot say, in the
absence of any manifest contradiction, that this perception of the
word is a false perception.

Hence you must concede that there is such a thing as _sphoṭa_, as
otherwise you cannot account for the cognition of the meaning of the
word. For the answer that its cognition arises from the letters cannot
bear examination, since it breaks down before either horn of the
following dilemma:--Are the letters supposed to produce this cognition
of the meaning in their united or their individual capacity? Not the
first, for the letters singly exist only for a moment, and therefore
cannot form a united whole at all; and not the second, since the
single letters have no power to produce the cognition of the meaning
[which the word is to convey]. There is no conceivable alternative
other than their single or united capacity; and therefore it follows
(say the wise in these matters) that, as the letters cannot cause the
cognition of the meaning, there must be a _sphoṭa_ by means of which
arises the knowledge of the meaning; and this _sphoṭa_ is an eternal
sound, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which causes
the cognition of the meaning. "It is disclosed (_sphuṭyate_) or
revealed by the letters," hence it is called _sphoṭa_, as revealed by
the letters; or "from it is disclosed the meaning," hence it is called
_sphoṭa_ as causing the knowledge of the meaning,--these are the two
etymologies to explain the meaning of the word. And thus it hath been
said by the worshipful Patañjali in the great Commentary, "Now what is
the word '_cow_' _gauḥ_? It is that word by which, when pronounced,
there is produced the simultaneous cognition of dewlap, tail, hump,
hoofs, and horns." This is expounded by Kaiyaṭa in the passage
commencing, "Grammarians maintain that it is the word, as distinct
from the letters, which expresses the meaning, since, if the letters
expressed it, there would be no use in pronouncing the second and
following ones [as the first would have already conveyed all we
wished]," and ending, "The _Vákyapadíya_ has established at length
that it is the _sphoṭa_ which, distinct from the letters and revealed
by the sound, expresses the meaning."[325]

Here, however, an objector may urge, "But should we not rather say
that the _sphoṭa_ has no power to convey the meaning, as it fails
under either of the following alternatives, for is it supposed to
convey the meaning when itself manifested or unmanifested? Not the
latter, because it would then follow that we should find the effect of
conveying the meaning always produced, since, as _sphoṭa_ is supposed
to be eternal, and there would thus be an ever-present cause
independent of all subsidiary aids, the effect could not possibly fail
to appear. Therefore, to avoid this fault, we must allow the other
alternative, viz., that _sphoṭa_ conveys the meaning when it is itself
manifested. Well, then, do the manifesting letters exercise this
manifesting power separately or combined? Whichever alternative you
adopt, the very same faults which you alleged against the hypothesis
of the letters expressing the meaning, will have to be met in your
hypothesis that they have this power to manifest _sphoṭa_." This has
been said by Bhaṭṭa in his Mímáṃsá-śloka-várttika--

     "The grammarian who holds that _sphoṭa_ is manifested by the
     letters as they are severally apprehended, though itself one
     and indivisible, does not thereby escape from a single
     difficulty."

The truth is, that, as Páṇini (i. 4, 14) and Gotama (Sút. ii. 123) both
lay it down that letters only then form a word when they have an affix at
the end, it is the letters which convey the word's meaning through the
apprehension of the conventional association of ideas which they
help.[326] If you object that as there are the same letters in _rasa_ as
in _sara_, in _nava_ as in _vana_, in _díná_ as in _nadí_, in _mára_ as in
_ráma_, in _rája_ as in _jára_, &c., these several pairs of words would
not convey a different meaning, we reply that the difference in the order
of the letters will produce a difference in the meaning. This has been
said by Tautátita--

     "As are the letters in number and kind, whose power is
     perceived in conveying any given meaning of a word, so will
     be the meaning which they convey."

Therefore, as there is a well-known rule that when the same fault
attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one
alone, we maintain that the hypothesis of the existence of a separate
thing called _sphoṭa_ is unnecessary, as we have proved that it is the
letters which express the word's meaning [your arguments against our
view having been shown to be irrelevant].

All this long oration is really only like a drowning man's catching at
a straw;[327] for either of the alternatives is impossible, whether
you hold that it is the single letters or their aggregation which
conveys the meaning of the word. It cannot be the former, because a
collection of separate letters, without any one pervading cause,[328]
could never produce the idea of a word any more than a collection of
separate flowers would form a garland without a string. Nor can it be
the latter, because the letters, being separately pronounced and done
with, cannot combine into an aggregate. For we use the term
"aggregate" where a number of objects are perceived to be united
together in one place; thus we apply it to a Grislea tomentosa, an
Acacia catechu, a Butea frondosa, &c., or to an elephant, a man, a
horse, &c., seen together in one place; but these letters are not
perceived thus united together, as they are severally produced and
pass away; and even on the hypothesis of their having a "manifesting"
power, they can have no power to form an aggregate, as they can only
manifest a meaning successively and not simultaneously. Nor can you
imagine an artificial aggregate in the letters, because this would
involve a "mutual dependence" (or reasoning in a circle); for, on the
one hand, the letters would only become a word when their power to
convey one meaning had been established; and, on the other hand,
their power to convey one meaning would only follow when the fact of
their being a word was settled. Therefore, since it is impossible that
letters should express the meaning, we must accept the hypothesis of
_sphoṭa_. "But even on your own hypothesis that there is a certain
thing called _sphoṭa_ which expresses the meaning, the same untenable
alternative will recur which we discussed before; and therefore it
will only be a case of the proverb that 'the dawn finds the smuggler
with the revenue-officer's house close by.'"[329] This, however, is
only the inflation of the world of fancy from the wide difference
between the two cases. For the first letter, in its manifesting power,
reveals the invisible _sphoṭa_, and each successive letter makes this
_sphoṭa_ more and more manifest, just as the Veda, after one reading,
is not retained, but is made sure by repetition; or as the real nature
of a jewel is not clearly seen at the first glance, but is definitely
manifested at the final examination. This is in accordance with the
authoritative saying (of the teacher): "The seed is implanted by the
sounds, and, when the idea is ripened by the successive repetition,
the word is finally ascertained simultaneously with the last uttered
letter." Therefore, since Bhartṛihari has shown in his first book that
the _letters_ of a word [being many and successive] cannot manifest
the meaning of the word, as is implied by the very phrase, "We gain
such and such a meaning from such and such a _word_," we are forced to
assume the existence[330] of an indivisible _sphoṭa_ as a distinct
category, which has the power to manifest the word's meaning. All this
has been established in the discussion (in the Mahábháshya) on "genus"
(_játi_), which aims at proving that the meaning of all words is
ultimately that _summum genus_, _i.e._, that existence whose
characteristic is perfect knowledge of the supreme reality[331]
(Brahman).

"But if all words mean only that supreme existence, then all words
will be synonyms, having all the same meaning; and your grand logical
ingenuity would produce an astonishing result in demonstrating the
uselessness of human language as laboriously using several words to no
purpose at the same time!" Thus it has been said--

     "The employment of synonymous terms at the same time is to
     be condemned; for they only express their meaning in turn
     and not by combination."

     "Therefore this opinion of yours is really hardly worth the
     trouble of refuting."

All this is only the ruminating of empty ether; for just as the
colourless crystal is affected by different objects which colour it as
blue, red, yellow, &c., so, since the _summum genus_, Brahman, is
variously cognised through its connection with different things, as
severally identified with each, we thus account for the use of the
various conventional words which arise from the different
species,[332] as cow, &c., these being "existence" (the _summum
genus_) as found in the individual cow, &c. To this purport we have
the following authoritative testimony--

     "Just as crystal, that colourless substance, when severally
     joined with blue, red, or yellow objects, is seen as
     possessing that colour."

And so it has been said by Hari, "Existence [pure and simple] being
divided, when found in cows, &c., by reason of its connection with
different subjects, is called this or that species, and on it all
words depend. This they call the meaning of the stem and of the root.
This is existence, this the great soul; and it is this which the
affixed _tva_, _tal_, &c., express" (Páṇini v. 1, 119).

"Existence" is that great _summum genus_ which is found in cows,
horses, &c., differentiated by the various subjects in which it
resides; and the inferior species, "cow," "horse," &c., are not really
different from it; for the species "cow" and "horse" (_gotva_ and
_aśvatva_) are not really new subjects, but each is "existence" as
residing in the subject "cow" and "horse." Therefore all words, as
expressing definite meanings, ultimately rest on that one _summum
genus_ existence, which is differentiated by the various subjects,
cows, &c., in which it resides; and hence "existence" is the meaning
of the stem-word (_prátipadika_). A "root" is sometimes defined as
that which expresses _bháva_;[333] now, as _bháva_ is "existence," the
meaning of a root is really existence.[334] Others say that a root
should be defined as that which expresses "action" (_kriyá_); but here
again the meaning of a root will really be "existence," since this
"action" will be a genus, as it is declared to reside in many
subjects, in accordance with the common definition of a genus, in the
line--

     "Others say that action (_kriyá_) is a genus, residing in
     many individuals."

So, too, if we accept Páṇini's definition (v. 1, 119), "Let the
affixes _tva_ and _tal_ come after a word [denoting anything], when we
speak of the nature (_bháva_) thereof," it is clear from the very fact
that abstract terms ending in _tva_ or _tá_ [as _aśvatva_ and
_aśvatá_] are used in the sense of _bháva_, that they do express
"existence." "This is pure existence" from its being free from all
coming into being or ceasing to be; it is eternal, since, as all
phenomena are developments thereof, it is devoid of any limit in
space, time, or substance: this existence is called "the great soul."
Such is the meaning of Hari's two _kárikás_ quoted above. So, too, it
is laid down in the discussion on _sambandha_ [in Hari's verses] that
the ultimate meaning of all words is that something whose
characteristic is perfect knowledge of the real meaning of the word
Substance.

"The true Reality is ascertained by its illusory forms; the true
substance is declared by words through illusory disguises; as the
object, 'Devadatta's house,' is apprehended by a transitory cause of
discrimination,[335] but by the word 'house' itself, the pure idea
[without owners] is expressed."[336]

So, too, the author of the Mahábháshya, when explaining the
Várttika,[337] "a word, its meaning, and its connection being fixed,"
in the passage beginning "substance is eternal," has shown that the
meaning of all words is Brahman, expressed by the word "substance" and
determined by various unreal[338] conditions [as "the nature of
horse," &c.]

According to the opinion of Vájapyáyana, who maintains that all words
mean a genus, words like "cow," &c.,[339] denote a genus which resides
by intimate relation in different substances; and when this genus is
apprehended, through its connection with it we apprehend the
particular substance in which it resides. Words like "white," &c.,
denote a genus which similarly resides in qualities; through the
connection with genus we apprehend the quality, and through the
connection with the quality we apprehend the individual substance. So
in the case of words expressing particular names, in consequence of
the recognition that "this is the same person from his first coming
into existence to his final destruction, in spite of the difference
produced by the various states of childhood, youth, adolescence, &c.,"
we must accept a fixed genus as Devadatta-hood,[340] &c. [as directly
denoted by them]. So, too, in words expressing "action" a genus is
denoted; this is the root-meaning, as in _paṭhati_, "he reads," &c.,
since we find here a meaning common to all who read.

In the doctrine of Vyáḍi, who maintained that words meant individual
things [and not classes or genera], the individual thing is put
forward as that which is primarily denoted, while the genus is implied
[as a characteristic mark]; and he thus avoids the alleged faults of
"indefiniteness," and "wandering away from its proper subject."[341]

Both views are allowed by the great teacher Páṇini; since in i. 2, 58,
he accepts the theory that a word means the genus, where he says that
"when the singular is used to express the class the plural may be
optionally used" [as in the sentence, "A Bráhman is to be honoured,"
which may equally run, "Bráhmans are to be honoured"]; while in i. 2,
64, he accepts the theory that a word means the individual thing,
where he says, "In any individual case there is but one retained of
things similar in form" [_i.e._, the dual means Ráma and Ráma, and the
plural means Ráma, and Ráma and Ráma; but we retain only one, adding a
dual or plural affix]. Grammar, in fact, being adapted to all
assemblies, can accept both theories without being compromised.
Therefore both theories are in a sense true;[342] but the real fact is
that all words ultimately mean the Supreme Brahman.

As it has been said--

     "Therefore under the divisions of the meanings of words, one
     true universal meaning, identical with the one existent,
     shines out in many forms as the thing denoted."

Hari also, in his chapter discussing _sambandha_, thus describes the
nature of this true meaning--

     "That meaning in which the subject, the object, and the
     perception [which unites them] are insusceptible of
     doubt,[343] _that_ only is called the truth by those who
     know the end of the three Vedas."

So too in his description of substance, he says--

     "_That_ which remains as the Real during the presence of
     modification, as the gold remains under the form of the
     earring,--_that_ wherein change comes and goes, _that_ they
     call the Supreme Nature."

The essential unity of the word and its meaning is maintained in order
to preserve inviolate the non-duality of all things which is a
cardinal doctrine of our philosophy.

"This [Supreme Nature] is the thing denoted by all words, and it is
identical with the word; but the relation of the two, while they are
thus ultimately identical, varies as does the relation of the two
souls."[344]

The meaning of this Káriká is that Brahman is the one object denoted
by all words; and this one object has various differences imposed upon
it according to each particular form; but the conventional variety of
the differences produced by these illusory conditions is only the
result of ignorance. Non-duality is the true state; but through the
power of "concealment"[345] [exercised by illusion] at the time of the
conventional use of words a manifold expansion takes place, just as is
the case during sleep. Thus those skilled in Vedánta lore tell us--

     "As all the extended world of dreams is only the development
     of illusion in me, so all this extended waking world is a
     development of illusion likewise."

When the unchangeable Supreme Brahman is thus known as the existent
joy-thought and identical with the individual soul, and when primeval
ignorance is abolished, final bliss is accomplished, which is best
defined as the abiding in identity with this Brahman, according to the
text, "He who is well versed in the Word-Brahman attains to the
Supreme Brahman."[346] And thus we establish the fact that the
"exposition of words" is the means to final bliss.

Thus it has been said--

     "They call it the door of emancipation, the medicine of the
     diseases of speech, the purifier of all sciences, the
     science of sciences."[347]

And so again--

     "This is the first foot-round of the stages of the ladder of
     final bliss, this is the straight royal road of the
     travellers to emancipation."

Therefore our final conclusion is that the Śástra of grammar should be
studied as being the means for attaining the chief end of man.

E. B. C.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 307: Mádhava uses this peculiar term because the grammarians
adopted and fully developed the idea of the Púrva-Mímáṃsá school that
sound is eternal. He therefore treats of _sphoṭa_ here, and not in his
Jaimini chapter.]

[Footnote 308: Rig-Veda, x. 9, 4.]

[Footnote 309: _Śabdánuśásana_, if judged by the apparent sense of
Páṇini, ii. 2, 14, would be a wrong compound; but it is not so,
because ii. 2, 14 must be interpreted in the sense of ii. 3, 66,
whence it follows that the compound would only be wrong if there were
an agent expressed _as well as_ an object, _i.e._, if such a word as
_ácháryeṇa_ followed. In the example given, we cannot say _áścharyo
godoho śikshitena gopálena_ (as it would violate ii. 2, 14), neither
can we say _áścharyo gaváṃ doho' śikshitasya gopálasya_ (as it would
violate ii. 3, 66).]

[Footnote 310: That is, the _ubhayaprápti_ of ii. 3, 66, is a
_bahuvríhi_ agreeing with _kṛiti_ in ii. 3, 65. These points are all
discussed at some length in the Commentaries on Páṇini.]

[Footnote 311: These actually occur in the Commentaries to Páṇini, ii.
2, 8; iii. 3, 117, &c.]

[Footnote 312: This takes in all cases of relation, _sambandha_
(_i.e._, _shashṭhí-sambandha_).]

[Footnote 313: As in such rules as vi. 2, 139.]

[Footnote 314: These compounds occur in Páṇini's own sútras (i. 4, 30,
and i. 4, 55), and would violate his own rule in ii. 2, 15, if we were
to interpret the latter without some such saving modification as
_shashṭhí śeshe_.]

[Footnote 315: The very word _śabda_ in _śabdánuśásanam_ implies the
Veda, since this is pre-eminently _śabda_.]

[Footnote 316: Compare Max Müller, _Sansk. Liter._, p. 113. It is
quoted as from the Veda in the Mahábháshya.]

[Footnote 317: In the Calcutta text, p. 138, dele _daṇḍa_ in line 3
after _bhavet_, and insert it in line 4 after _śabdánám_.]

[Footnote 318: As in the so-called _pada_ text.]

[Footnote 319: See Ballantyne's _Mahábháshya_, pp. 12, 64.]

[Footnote 320: _Achíkramata_ seems put here as a purposely false form
of the frequentative of _kram_ for _achaṅkramyata_.]

[Footnote 321: Or it may mean "the developed universe." Compare the
lines of Bhartṛihari which immediately follow.]

[Footnote 322: One would naturally supply _śabdasya_ after _sámyam_,
but the Mahábháshya has _naḥ sámyam_ (see Ballantyne's ed., p. 27).]

[Footnote 323: _I.e._, prepositions used separately as governing cases
of their own, and not (as usually in Sanskrit) in composition.]

[Footnote 324: The _karmapravachaníyas_ imply a verb other than the one
expressed, and they are said to determine the relation which is produced
by this understood verb. Thus in the example, _Śákalyasaṃhitám anu
právarshat_, "he rained after the Śákalya hymns," _anu_ implies an
understood verb _niśamya_, "having heard," and this verb shows that there
is a relation of cause and effect between the hymns and the rain. This
_anu_ is said to determine this relation.]

[Footnote 325: See Ballantyne's ed., p. 10.]

[Footnote 326: This is not very clear, the _anu_ in _anugraha_ might
mean _krameṇa_, and so imply the successive order of the letters.]

[Footnote 327: In the Calcutta edition, p. 142, line 11, I read
_kalpam_ for _kalpanam_.]

[Footnote 328: In p. 142, line 3, I add _viná_ after _nimittam_.]

[Footnote 329: The ghaṭṭa is the place where dues and taxes are
collected. Some one anxious to evade payment is going by a private way
by night, but he arrives at the tax-collector's house just as day
dawns and is thus caught. Hence the proverb means _uddeśyásiddhi_.]

[Footnote 330: In p. 143, line 13, I read _sphoṭakabhávam_ for
_sphoṭábhávam_.]

[Footnote 331: Cf. Ballantyne's Transl. of the Mahábháshya, pp. 9,
32.]

[Footnote 332: The Mímáṃsâ holds that a word means the genus (_játi_)
and not the individual (_vyakti_); the Nyáya holds that a word means
an individual as distinguished by such and such a genus (or species).]

[Footnote 333: Cf. Rig-Veda Prátiś. xii. 5.]

[Footnote 334: He here is trying to show that his view is confirmed by
the commonly received definitions of some grammatical terms.]

[Footnote 335: Since Devadatta is only its transient owner.]

[Footnote 336: So by the words "horse," "cow," &c., Brahman is really
meant, the one abiding existence.]

[Footnote 337: Cf. Ballantyne's Mahábháshya, pp. 44, 50.]

[Footnote 338: In p. 145, line 8, read _asatya_ for _aśvattha_.]

[Footnote 339: We have here the well-known four grammatical
categories, _játi_, _guna_, _dravya_ or _saṅjná_, and _kriyá_.]

[Footnote 340: But cf. Siddh. Muktáv., p. 6, line 12.]

[Footnote 341: Thus we read in the Siddhánta Muktávali, p. 82, that
the Mímáṃsá holds that a word means the genus and not the individual,
since otherwise there would be _vyabhichára_ and _ánantya_ (cf. also
Maheśachandra Nyáyaratna's note, Kávya-prakáśa, p. 10). If a word is
held to mean only _one_ individual, there will be the first fault, as
it will "wander away" and equally express others which it should not
include; if it is held to mean _many_ individuals, it will have an
endless variety of meanings and be "indefinite."]

[Footnote 342: This seems the meaning of the text as printed _tasmát
dvayaṃ satyam_, but I should prefer to read conjecturally _tasmád
advayaṃ satyam_, "therefore non-duality is the truth."]

[Footnote 343: _Scil._ they can only be the absolute Brahman who alone
exists.]

[Footnote 344: _Scil._ the individual soul (_jíva_) and Brahman.]

[Footnote 345: The _Saṃvṛiti_ of the text seems to correspond to the
_ávaraṇa_ so frequent in Vedánta books.]

[Footnote 346: This passage is quoted in the Maitrí Upanishad, vi.
22.]

[Footnote 347: _Adhividyam_ occurs in Taitt. Upanishad, i. 3, 1, where
it is explained by [']Saṃkara as _vidyásv adhi yad dar[']sanaṃ tad
adhividyam_.]




CHAPTER XIV.

THE SÁNKHYA-DARŚANA.


"But how can we accept the doctrine of illusory emanation [thus held
by the grammarians, following the guidance of the _púrva_ and _uttara_
Mímáṃsá schools], when the system of development propounded by the
Sáṅkhyas is still alive to oppose it?" Such is their loud vaunt. Now
the Śástra of this school may be concisely said to maintain four
several kinds of existences, viz., that which is evolvent[348] only,
that which is evolute only, that which is both evolute and evolvent,
and that which is neither. (_a._) Of these the first is that which is
only evolvent, called the root-evolvent or the primary; it is not
itself the evolute of anything else. It evolves, hence it is called
the evolvent (_prakṛiti_) since it denotes in itself the equilibrium
of the three qualities, goodness, activity, and darkness. This is
expressed [in the Sáṅkhya Káriká], "the root-evolvent is no evolute."
It is called the root-evolvent, as being both root and evolvent; it is
the root of all the various effects, as the so-called "great one,"
&c., but of it, as the primary, there is no root, as otherwise we
should have a _regressus ad infinitum_. Nor can you reply that such a
_regressus ad infinitum_ is no objection, if, like the continued
series of seed and shoot, it can be proved by the evidence of our
senses,[349]--because here there is no evidence to establish the
hypothesis. (_b._) The "evolutes and evolvents" are the great one,
egoism, and the subtile elements,--thus the Sáṅkhya Káriká (§ 3),
"the seven, the great one, &c., are evolute-evolvents." The seven are
the seven principles, called the great one, &c. Among these the great
principle, called also the intellect,[350] &c., is itself the evolute
of nature and the evolvent of egoism; in the same manner the principle
egoism, called also "self-consciousness" (_abhimána_), is the evolute
of the great one, intellect; but this same principle, as affected by
the quality of darkness, is the evolvent of the five rudiments called
subtile elements; and, as affected by the quality of goodness, it is
the evolvent of the eleven organs, viz., the five organs of
perception, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin; the five organs of
action, the voice, hands, feet, anus, and generative organ; and the
mind, partaking of the character of both; nor can you object that in
our arrangement the third quality, activity, is idle, as it acts as a
cause by producing action in the others. This has been thus declared
by Íśvara Kṛishṇa in his Kárikás[351] (§ 24-27), "Self-consciousness
is egoism. Thence proceeds a twofold creation, the elevenfold set and
the five elemental rudiments. From modified[352] egoism originates the
class of eleven imbued with goodness; from egoism as the source of the
elements originate the rudimentary elements, and these are affected by
darkness; but it is only from egoism as affected by activity that the
one and the other rise. The intellectual organs are the eyes, the
ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin; those of action are the
voice, feet, hands, anus, and organ of generation. In this set is
mind, which has the character of each; it determines, and it is an
organ (like the other ten) from having a common property with
them."[353] All this has been explained at length by the teacher
Váchaspati Miśra in the Sáṅkhya-tattva-kaumudí.

(_c._) The "evolute only" means the five gross elements, ether, &c.,
and the eleven organs, as said in the Káriká, "The evolute consists of
sixteen;" that is, the set of sixteen is evolute only, and not
evolvent. Although it may be said that earth, &c., are the evolvents
of such productions as cows, jars, &c., yet these are not a different
"principle" (_tattva_) from earth, &c., and therefore earth, &c., are
not what we term "evolvents;" as the accepted idea of an evolvent is
that which is the material cause of a separate principle; and in cows,
jars, &c., there is the absence of being any such first principle, in
consequence of their being all alike gross [_i.e._, possessed of
dimensions] and perceptible to the senses. The five gross elements,
ether, &c., are respectively produced from sound, touch, form, taste,
and smell, each subtile element being accompanied by all those which
precede it, and thus the gross elements will have respectively one,
two, three, four, and five qualities.[354] The creation of the organs
has been previously described. This is thus propounded in the Sáṅkhya
Káriká (§ 22)--

     "From nature springs the great one, from this egoism, from
     this the set of sixteen, and from five among the sixteen
     proceed the five gross elements."

(_d._) The soul is neither,--as is said in the Káriká, "The soul is
neither evolvent nor evolute." That is, the soul, being absolute,
eternal, and subject to no development, is itself neither the evolvent
nor the evolute of aught beside. Three kinds of proof are accepted as
establishing these twenty-five principles; and thus the Káriká (§ 4).

"Perception, inference, and the testimony of worthy persons are
acknowledged to be the threefold proof, for they comprise every mode
of demonstration. It is from proof that there results belief of that
which is to be proven."

Here a fourfold discussion arises as to the true nature of cause and
effect. The Saugatas[355] maintain that the existent is produced from
the non-existent; the Naiyáyikas, &c., that the (as yet) non-existent
is produced from the existent; the Vedántins, that all effects are an
illusory emanation from the existent and not themselves really
existent; while the Sáṅkhyas hold that the existent is produced from
the existent.

(_a._) Now the first opinion is clearly untenable, since that which is
itself non-existent and unsubstantial can never be a cause any more
than the hare's horn; and, again, the real and unreal can never be
identical.

(_b._) Nor can the non-existent be produced from the existent; since
it is impossible that that which, previous to the operation of the
originating cause, was as non-existent as a hare's horn should ever be
produced, _i.e._, become connected with existence; for not even the
cleverest man living can make blue yellow.[356] If you say, "But are
not existence and non-existence attributes of the same jar?" this is
incorrect, since we cannot use such an expression as "its quality" in
regard to a non-existent subject, for it would certainly imply that
the subject itself did exist. Hence we conclude that the effect is
existent even previously to the operation of the cause, which only
produces the manifestation of this already existent thing, just like
the manifestation of the oil in sesame seed by pressing, or of the
milk in cows by milking. Again, there is no example whatever to prove
the production of a thing previously non-existent.

Moreover, the cause must produce its effect as being either connected
with it or not connected; in the former alternative the effect's
existence is settled by the rule that connection can only be between
two existent things; in the latter, any and every effect might arise
from any and every cause, as there is nothing to determine the action
of an unconnected thing. This has been thus put by the Sáṅkhya
teacher:--"From the supposed non-existence of the effect, it can have
no connection with causes which always accompany existence; and to him
who holds the production of a non-connected thing there arises an
utter want of determinateness." If you rejoin that "the cause, though
not connected with its effect, can yet produce it, where it has a
capacity of so doing, and this capacity of producing is to be inferred
from seeing the effect actually produced," still this cannot be
allowed, since in such a case as "there is a capacity for producing
oil in sesame seeds," you cannot determine, while the oil is
non-existent, that there is this capacity in the sesame seeds,
whichever alternative you may accept as to their being connected or
not with the oil [since our before-mentioned dilemma will equally
apply here].

From our tenet that the cause and effect are identical, it follows
that the effect does not exist distinct from the cause; thus the cloth
is not something distinct from the threads, as it abides in the latter
[as its material cause]; but where this identity is not found, there
we do not find the relation of cause and effect; thus a horse and a
cow are distinct from each other [for one is not produced from the
other, and therefore their qualities are not the same]; but the cloth
is an acknowledged effect, and therefore not anything different from
its cause.[357] If you object that, if this were true, the separate
threads ought to fulfil the office of clothing, we reply, that the
office of clothing is fulfilled by the threads manifesting the nature
of cloth when they are placed in a particular arrangement. As the
limbs of a tortoise when they retire within its shell are concealed,
and, when they come forth, are revealed, so the particular effects,
as cloth, &c., of a cause, as threads, &c., when they come forth and
are revealed, are said to be produced; and when they retire and are
concealed, they are said to be destroyed; but there is no such thing
as the production of the non-existent or the destruction of the
existent. As has been said in the Bhagavad Gítá (ii. 16)--

     "There is no existence for the non-existent, nor
     non-existence for the existent."

And, in fact, it is by inference from its effects that we establish
the existence of the great evolvent, Nature (_prakṛiti_). This has
been said [in the Káriká, § 9]--

     "Effect exists, for what exists not can by no operation of
     cause be brought into existence; materials, too, are
     selected which are fit for the purpose; everything is not by
     every means possible; what is capable does that to which it
     is competent; and like is produced from like."[358]

Nor can we say [with the Vedántin] that the world is an illusory
emanation from the one existent Brahman, because we have no
contradictory evidence to preclude by its superior validity the _primâ
facie_ belief that the external world is real [as we have in the case
of mistaking a rope for a snake, where a closer inspection will
discover the error]; and again, where the subject and the attributed
nature are so dissimilar as the pure intelligent Brahman and the
unintelligent creation, we can no more allow the supposed attribution
to be possible than in the case of gold and silver [which no one
mistakes for each other]. Hence we conclude that an effect which is
composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, must imply a cause
similarly composed; and our argument is as follows:--The subject of
the argument, viz., the external world, must have a material cause
composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, because it is itself
endued therewith; whatever is endued with certain attributes must have
a cause endued with the same,--thus a ring has gold for its material
cause, because it has the attributes of gold; our subject is a similar
case, therefore we may draw a similar conclusion. What we call "being
composed of happiness" in the external world is the quality of
goodness; the "being composed of misery" is the quality of
activity;[359] the "being composed of stupidity" is the quality of
darkness; hence we establish our cause composed of the three qualities
(_i.e._, _prakṛiti_, Nature). And we see that individual objects are
found by experience to have these three qualities; thus Maitra's
happiness is found in his wife Satyavatí, because the quality of
"goodness" in her is manifested towards him; but she is the misery of
her fellow-wives, because the quality of "activity" is manifested
towards them; while she causes indifference to Chaitra who does not
possess her, because towards him the quality of "darkness" is
manifested. So, too, in other cases also; thus a jar, when obtained,
causes us pleasure; when seized by others it causes us pain; but it is
viewed with indifference by one who has no interest in it. Now this
being regarded with no interest is what we mean by "stupidity," since
the word _moha_ is derived from the root _muh_, "to be confused,"
since no direct action of the mind arises towards those objects to
which it is indifferent. Therefore we hold that all things, being
composed of pleasure, pain, and stupidity, must have as their cause
Nature, which consists of the three qualities. And so it is declared
in the Śvetáśvatara Upanishad (iv. 5)--

     "The one unborn, for his enjoyment, approaches the one
     unborn (Nature) which is red, white, and black, and produces
     a manifold and similar offspring; the other unborn abandons
     her when once she has been enjoyed."

Here the words "red," "white," and "black," express the qualities
"activity," "goodness," and "darkness," from their severally
possessing the same attributes of colouring, manifesting, and
concealing.

Here, however, it may be objected, "But will not your unintelligent
Nature, without the superintendence of something intelligent, fail to
produce these effects, intellect, &c.? therefore there must be some
intelligent superintendent; and hence we must assume an all-seeing,
supreme Lord." We reply that this does not follow, since even
unintelligent Nature will act under the force of an impulse; and
experience shows us that an unintelligent thing, without any
intelligent superintendent, does act for the good of the soul, just as
the unintelligent milk acts for the growth of the calf, or just as the
unintelligent rain acts for the welfare of living creatures; and so
unintelligent Nature will act for the liberation of the soul. As it
has been said in the Káriká (§ 57)--

     "As the unintelligent milk acts for the nourishment of the
     calf, so Nature acts for the liberation of soul."

But as for the doctrine of "a Supreme Being who acts from compassion,"
which has been proclaimed by beat of drum by the advocates of his
existence, this has well-nigh passed away out of hearing, since the
hypothesis fails to meet either of the two alternatives. For does he
act thus _before_ or _after_ creation? If you say "before," we reply
that as pain cannot arise in the absence of bodies, &c., there will be
no need, as long as there is no creation, for his desire to free
living beings from pain [which is the main characteristic of
compassion]; and if you adopt the second alternative, you will be
reasoning in a circle, as on the one hand you will hold that God
created the world through compassion [as this is His motive in acting
at all], and on the other hand[360] that He compassionated after He
had created. Therefore we hold that the development of unintelligent
Nature [even without any intelligent superintendent]--in the order of
the series intellect, self-consciousness, &c.,--is caused by the union
of Nature and Soul, and the moving impulse is the good of Soul. Just
as there takes place a movement in the iron in the proximity of the
unmoved magnet, so there takes place a movement in Nature in the
proximity of the unmoved Soul; and this union of Nature and Soul is
caused by mutual dependence, like the union of the lame man and the
blind man. Nature, as the thing to be experienced, depends on Soul the
experiencer; and Soul looks to final bliss, as it seeks to throw off
the three kinds of pain, which, though really apart from it, have
fallen upon it by its coming under the shadow of intellect through not
recognising its own distinction therefrom.[361] This final bliss [or
absolute isolation] is produced by the discrimination of Nature and
Soul, nor is this end possible without it; therefore Soul depends on
Nature for its final bliss. Just as a lame man and a blind man,[362]
travelling along with a caravan, by some accident having become
separated from their companions, wandered slowly about in great
dismay, till by good luck they met each other, and then the lame man
mounted on the blind man's back, and the blind man, following the path
indicated by the lame man, reached his desired goal, as did the lame
man also, mounted on the other's shoulders; so, too, creation is
effected by Nature and the soul, which are likewise mutually
dependent. This has been said in the Káriká (§ 21)--

     "For the soul's contemplation of Nature and for its final
     separation the union of both takes place, as of the lame man
     and the blind man. By that union a creation is formed."

"Well, I grant that Nature's activity may take place for the good of
the soul, but how do you account for its ceasing to act?" I reply,
that as a wilful woman whose faults have once been seen by her husband
does not return to him, or as an actress, having performed her part,
retires from the stage, so too does Nature desist. Thus it is said in
the Káriká (§ 59)--

     "As an actress, having exhibited herself to the spectators,
     desists from the dance, so does Nature desist, having
     manifested herself to Soul."

For this end has the doctrine of those who follow Kapila, the founder
of the atheistic Sáṅkhya School, been propounded.

E. B. C.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 348: I borrow this term from Dr. Hall.]

[Footnote 349: Compare Kusumáñjali, i. 4.]

[Footnote 350: One great defect in the Sáṅkhya nomenclature is the
ambiguity between the terms for intellect (_buddhí_) and those for
mind (_manas_). Mádhava here applies to the former the term
_antaḥkaraṇa_ or "internal organ," the proper term for the latter. I
have ventured to alter it in the translation.]

[Footnote 351: It is singular that this is Mádhava's principal Sáṅkhya
authority, and not the Sáṅkhya Sútras.]

[Footnote 352: _Vaikṛita_ is here a technical term meaning that
goodness predominates over darkness and activity. On this Káriká,
comp. Dr. Hall's preface to the Sáṅkhya-sára, pp. 30-35.]

[Footnote 353: As produced, like them, from modified egoism. The
reading _saṃkalpavikalpátmakam_ must be corrected by the Sáṅkhya
Káriká.]

[Footnote 354: Cf. Colebrooke Essays, vol. i. p. 256. The _tanmátras_
will reproduce themselves as the respective qualities of the gross
elements.]

[Footnote 355: A name of the Buddhists.]

[Footnote 356: _I.e._, the nature of a thing (_Svabháva_) cannot be
altered--a man cannot be made a cow, nor a woman a man.]

[Footnote 357: I take _arthántaram_ here as simply _bhinnam_ (cf.
Táránátha Tarkaváchaspati's note, _Tattva Kaumudí_, p. 47).]

[Footnote 358: Colebrooke's translation.]

[Footnote 359: Or "passion," _rajas_.]

[Footnote 360: In other words--on the one hand the existing misery of
beings induced God to create a world in order to relieve their misery,
and on the other hand it was the existence of a created world which
caused their misery at all.]

[Footnote 361: Bondage, &c., reside in the intellect, and are only
_reflected_ upon soul through its proximity (cf.
_Sáṅkhyapravachanabháshya_, i. 58).]

[Footnote 362: This apologue is a widely spread piece of folk-lore. It
is found in the Babylonian Talmud, _Sanhedrim_, fol. 91, _b_, and in
the Gesta Romanorum.]




CHAPTER XV.

THE PATANJALI-DARSÁNA.


We now set forth the doctrine of that school which professes the
opinions of such Munis as Patañjali and others, who originated the
system of the Theistic Sáṅkhya philosophy. This school follows the
so-called Yoga Śástra promulgated by Patañjali, and consisting of four
chapters, which also bears the name of the "Sáṅkhya Pravachana," or
detailed explanation of the Sáṅkhya.[363] In the first chapter thereof
the venerable Patañjali, having in the opening aphorism, "Now is the
exposition of Concentration" (_yoga_), avowed his commencement of the
Yoga Śástra, proceeds in the second aphorism to give a definition of
his subject, "Concentration is the hindering of the modifications of
the thinking principle," and then he expounds at length the nature of
Meditation (_samádhi_). In the second chapter, in the series of
aphorisms commencing, "The practical part of Concentration is
mortification, muttering, and resignation to the Supreme," he expounds
the practical part of _yoga_ proper to him whose mind is not yet
thoroughly abstracted (iii. 9), viz., the five external subservients
or means, "forbearance," and the rest. In the third chapter, in the
series commencing "Attention is the fastening [of the mind] on some
spot," he expounds the three internal subservients--attention,
contemplation, and meditation, collectively called by the name
"subjugation" (_saṃyama_), and also the various superhuman powers
which are their subordinate fruit. In the fourth chapter, in the
series commencing, "Perfections spring from birth, plants, spells,
mortification, and meditation," he expounds the highest end,
Emancipation, together with a detailed account of the five so-called
"perfections" (_siddhis_). This school accepts the old twenty-five
principles [of the Sáṅkhya], "Nature," &c.; only adding the Supreme
Being as the twenty-sixth--a Soul untouched by affliction, action,
fruit, or stock of desert, who of His own will assumed a body in order
to create, and originated all secular or Vaidic traditions,[364] and
is gracious towards those living beings who are burned in the charcoal
of mundane existence.

"But how can such an essence as soul, undefiled as the [glossy] leaf
of a lotus, be said to be burned, that we should need to accept any
Supreme Being as gracious to it?" To this we reply, that the quality
Goodness develops itself as the understanding, and it is this which
is, as it were, burned by the quality Activity; and the soul, by the
influence of Darkness, blindly identifying itself with this suffering
quality, is also said itself to suffer. Thus the teachers have
declared--

     "It is Goodness which suffers under the form of the
     understanding and the substances belonging to Activity which
     torment,[365]

     And it is through the modification of Darkness, as wrongly
     identifying, that the Soul is spoken of as suffering."

It has been also said by Patañjali,[366] "The power of the enjoyer,
which is itself incapable of development or of transference, in an
object which is developed and transferred experiences the
modifications thereof."

Now the "power of the enjoyer" is the power of intelligence, and this is
the soul; and in an object which is "developed" and "transferred," or
reflected,--_i.e._, in the thinking principle or the understanding,--it
experiences the modifications thereof, _i.e._, the power of intelligence,
being reflected in the understanding, receives itself the shadow of the
understanding, and imitates the modifications of it. Thus the soul, though
in itself pure, sees according to the idea produced by the understanding;
and, while thus seeing at second-hand, though really it is different from
the understanding, it appears identical therewith. It is while the soul is
thus suffering, that, by the practice of the eight subservient means,
forbearance, religious observance, &c., earnestly, uninterruptedly, and
for a long period, and by continued resignation to the Supreme Being, at
length there is produced an unclouded recognition of the distinction
between the quality Goodness and the Soul; and the five "afflictions,"
ignorance, &c., are radically destroyed, and the various "stocks of
desert," fortunate or unfortunate, are utterly abolished, and, the
undefiled soul abiding emancipated, perfect Emancipation is accomplished.

The words of the first aphorism, "Now is the exposition of
concentration," establish the four preliminaries which lead to the
intelligent reader's carrying the doctrine into practice, viz., the
object-matter, the end proposed, the connection [between the treatise
and the object], and the person properly qualified to study it. The
word "now" (_atha_) is accepted as having here an inceptive meaning,
[as intimating that a distinct topic is now commenced]. "But," it may
be objected, "there are several possible significations of this word
_atha_; why, then, should you show an unwarranted partiality for this
particular 'inceptive' meaning? The great Canon for nouns and their
gender [the Amara Kosha Dictionary] gives many such meanings. '_Atha_
is used in the sense of an auspicious particle,--after,--now
(inceptive),--what? (interrogatively),--and all (comprehensively).'
Now we willingly surrender such senses as interrogation or
comprehensiveness; but since there are four senses certainly
suitable, _i.e._, 'after,' 'an auspicious particle,' 'reference to a
previous topic,' and 'the inceptive now,' there is no reason for
singling out the _last_." This objection, however, will not stand, for
it cannot bear the following alternative. If you maintain the sense of
"after," then do you hold that it implies following after anything
whatever, or only after some definite cause as comprehended under the
general definition of causation,[367] _i.e._, "previous existence
[relatively to the effect]"? It cannot be the former, for, in
accordance with the proverb that "No one stands for a single moment
inactive," everybody must always do everything after previously doing
something else; and since this is at once understood without any
direct mention at all, there could be no use in employing the particle
_atha_ to convey this meaning. Nor can it be the latter alternative;
because, although we fully grant that the practice of concentration
does in point of fact follow after previous tranquillity, &c., yet
these are rather the necessary preliminaries to the work of
exposition, and consequently cannot have that avowed predominance
[which the presumed _cause_ should have]. "But why should we not hold
that the word _atha_ implies that this very exposition is avowedly the
predominant object, and does follow after previous tranquillity of
mind, &c.?" We reply, that the aphorism uses the term "exposition"
(_anuśásana_), and this word, etymologically analysed, implies that by
which the _yoga_ is explained, accompanied with definitions,
divisions, and detailed means and results; and there is no rule that
such an exposition must follow previous tranquillity of mind, &c., the
rule rather being that, as far as the teacher is concerned, it must
follow a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to
others; for it is rather the student's desire to know and his derived
knowledge, which should have quiet of mind, &c., as their precursors,
in accordance with the words of Śruti: "Therefore having become
tranquil, self-subdued, loftily indifferent, patient, full of faith
and intent, let him see the soul in the soul."[368] Nor can the word
_atha_ imply the necessary precedence, in the teacher, of a profound
knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others; because,
even granting that both these are present, they need not to be
mentioned thus prominently, as they are powerless in themselves to
produce the necessary intelligence and effort in the student. Still
[however we may settle these points] the question arises, Is the
exposition of the _yoga_ ascertained to be a cause of final beatitude
or not? If it is, then it is still a desirable object, even if certain
presupposed conditions should be absent; and if it is not, then it
must be undesirable, whatever conditions may be present.[369] But it
is clear that the exposition in question _is_ such a cause, since we
have such a passage of the Śruti as that [in the Kaṭha Upanishad, ii.
12]: "By the acquirement of _yoga_ or intense concentration on the
Supreme Soul, the wise man having meditated leaves behind joy and
sorrow;" and again, such a passage of the Smṛiti as that [in the
Bhagavad Gítá, ii. 53]: "The intellect unwavering in contemplation
will then attain _yoga_." Hence we conclude that it is untenable to
interpret _atha_ as implying that the exposition must follow "after" a
previous inquiry on the part of the student, or "after" a previous
course of ascetic training and use of elixirs, &c. [to render the body
strong].

But in the case of the Vedánta Sútras, which open with the aphorism,
"Now, therefore, there is the wish to know Brahman," Śaṅkara Áchárya
has declared that the inceptive meaning of _atha_ must be left out of
the question, as the wish to know Brahman is not to be undertaken [at
will]; and therefore it must be there interpreted to mean "after,"
_i.e._, that this desire must follow a previous course of
tranquillity, &c., as laid down by the well-known rule which enjoins
the practice of tranquillity, self-control, indifference, endurance,
contemplation, and faith, the object being to communicate the teaching
to a proper student as distinguished by the possession of the four
so-called "means."[370]

"Well, then, let us grant that _atha_ cannot mean 'after;' but why
should it not be simply an auspicious particle?" But this it cannot
be, from the absence of any connection between the context and such
auspicious meaning. Auspiciousness implies the obtaining of an
unimpeached and desired good, and what is desired is so desired as
being the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain; but this
auspiciousness cannot belong to the exposition of _yoga_, since it is
in itself neither pleasure nor the cessation of pain.[371] Therefore
it cannot be at all established that the meaning of the aphorism is
that "the exposition of the _yoga_ is auspicious;" for auspiciousness
cannot be either the primary meaning of _atha_ or its secondary
meaning by metonymy, since it is its very sound which is in itself
auspicious [without any reference to the meaning], like that of a
drum. "But why not say that just as an implied meaning may enter into
the direct meaning of a sentence, so an effect [like this of
auspiciousness] may also be included, since both are equally
unexpressed so far as the actual words are concerned?"[372] We reply,
that in the meaning of a sentence the connection must be between the
meaning of one word and that of another; otherwise we should be guilty
of breaking the seal which the rule of the grammarians has set, that
"verbal expectancy[373] can be fulfilled by _words_ alone."

"But ought not a prayer for an auspicious commencement to be put at
the beginning of a Śástra, in order to lay the hosts of obstacles that
would hinder the completion of the work which the author desires to
begin, and also to observe the immemorial practice of the good, since
it has been said by the wise, 'Those śástras become widely famous
which have auspicious commencements, auspicious middles, and
auspicious endings, and their students have long lives and are
invincible in disputation'?[374] Now the word _atha_ implies
'auspiciousness,' since there is a Smṛiti which says,

     "'The word _Om_ and the word _atha_,--these two in the
     ancient time,

     "'Cleaving the throat of Brahman, came forth; therefore they
     are both auspicious.'

"Therefore let the word _atha_ stand here as signifying
'auspiciousness,' like the word '_vṛiddhi_' used by Páṇini in his
opening sútra '_vṛiddhir ád aich_.'"[375] This view, however, is
untenable; since the very word _atha_, when heard, has an auspicious
influence, even though it be employed to convey some other special
signification, just as the hearing the sound of lutes, flutes, &c. [is
auspicious for one starting on a journey]. If you still object, "How
can the particle _atha_ have any other effect, if it is specially used
here to produce the idea that the meaning of the sentence is that a
new topic is commenced?" we reply that it certainly _can_ have such
other additional effect, just as we see that jars of water brought for
some other purpose are auspicious omens at the commencement of a
journey.[376] Nor does this contradict the smṛiti, since the smṛiti
will still hold good, as the words "they are both auspicious" mean
only that they produce an auspicious effect.

Nor can the particle _atha_ have here the meaning of "reference to a
previous topic," since the previously mentioned faults will all equally
apply here, as this meaning really involves that of "after" [which we have
already discussed and rejected]. And again, in such discussions as this,
as to whether this particular _atha_ means "the inceptive now" or "after,"
if another topic had been previously suggested, then "reference thereto"
would be a possible meaning; but in the present case [where no other topic
has been previously suggested] it is not a possible meaning. Therefore, by
exhaustion, the commentator finally adopts, for the _atha_ of the sútra,
the remaining meaning of "the inceptive now." So, when it is said [in the
Táṇḍya Bráhmaṇa, xvi. 8, 1; xvi. 10, 1], "Now this is the Jyotis," "Now
this is the Viśvajyotis,"[377] the particle _atha_ is accepted as
signifying the commencement of the description of a particular sacrifice,
just as the _atha_ in the commencement of the Mahábháshya, "now comes the
exposition of words," signifies the commencement of the Institutes of
Grammar. This has been declared by Vyása in his Commentary on the Yoga
Aphorisms, "the _atha_ in this opening aphorism indicates a commencement;"
and Váchaspati has similarly explained it in his gloss; therefore it may
be considered as settled that the _atha_ here indicates a commencement and
also signifies auspiciousness. Therefore, accepting the view that this
_atha_ implies a commencement, let the student be left in peace to strive
after a successful understanding of the śástra through the attainment of
the _yoga_, which is its proposed subject, by means of the teacher's
explanation of its entire purport. But here some one may say, "Does not
the smṛiti of Yájñavalkya say, 'Hiraṇyagarbha is the promulgator of the
Yoga, and no other ancient sage?' how then is Patañjali the teacher
thereof?" We reply that it was for this reason that the venerable
Patañjali,[378] that ocean of compassion, considering how difficult it was
to grasp all the different forms of Yoga scattered up and down in the
Puráṇas, &c., and wishing to collect together their essence, commenced his
_anuśásana_,--the preposition _anu_ implying that it was a teaching which
followed a primary revelation and was not itself the immediate origin of
the system.

Since this _atha_ in the aphorism signifies "commencement," the full
meaning of the sentence comes out as follows: "be it known that the
institute for the exposition of the _yoga_ is now commenced." In this
institute the "object-matter," as being that which is produced by it,
is _yoga_ [or the "concentration of the mind"], with its means and its
fruit; the producing this is its inferior "end;" supreme absorption
(_kaivalya_) is the highest "end" of the _yoga_ when it is produced.
The "connection" between the institute and _yoga_ is that of the
producer and the thing to be produced; the "connection" between _yoga_
and supreme absorption is that of the means and the end; and this is
well known from Śruti and Smṛiti, as I have before shown. And it is
established by the general context that those who aim at liberation
are the duly qualified persons to hear this institute. Nor need any
one be alarmed lest a similar course should be adopted with the
opening aphorism of the Vedánta sútras, "Now, therefore, there is a
wish to know Brahman;" and lest here, too, we should seek to
establish by the general context that all persons who aim at
liberation are duly qualified students of the Vedánta. For the word
_atha_, as there used, signifies "succession" [or "after"]; and it is
a settled point that the doctrine can only be transmitted through a
regular channel to duly qualified students, and consequently the
question cannot arise as to whether any other meaning is suggested by
the context. Hence it has been said, "When Śruti comes [as the
determining authority] 'the subject-matter' and the rest have no
place."[379] The full meaning of this is as follows: Where a thing is
not apprehended from the Veda itself, there the "subject-matter" and
the rest can establish the true meaning, not otherwise; but wherever
we can attain the meaning by a direct text, there the other modes of
interpretation are irrelevant. For when a thing is declared by a text
of the Veda which makes its meaning obvious at once, the
"subject-matter" and the rest either establish a contrary conclusion
or one not contrary. Now, in the former case, the authority which
would establish this contrary conclusion is [by the very nature of
"_śruti_"] already precluded from having any force; and in the latter
it is useless. This is all declared in Jaimini's aphorism [iii. 3,
14]; "A definite text, a 'sign,' the 'sentence,' the 'subject-matter,'
the 'relative position,' or 'the title,'--when any of these come into
collision, the later in order is the weaker because its meaning is
more remote"[380] [and therefore less obvious]. It has been thus
summed up--

     "A text always precludes the rest; the 'title' is always
     precluded by any of the preceding modes;

     "But whether any intervening one is precluded, or itself
     precludes, depends on circumstances."

Therefore [after all this long discussion] it may be now considered as
settled that, since it has an "object," as well as the other
preliminaries, the study of the Śástra, which teaches the Yoga, is to
be commenced like that of the Vedánta, which discusses the nature of
Brahman. "But," it may be objected, "it is the Yoga which was said to
be the object-matter, since it is this which is to be produced, not
the Śástra." We grant that the Yoga is the principal object, as that
which is to be produced; but since it is produced by the Śástra,
especially directed thereto, this Śástra is the means for its
production, and, as a general rule, the agent's activity is directly
concerned with the means rather than with the end. Just as the
operations of Devadatta the woodcutter, _i.e._, his lifting his arm up
and down, &c., relate rather to the instrument, _i.e._, the axe, than
to the object, _i.e._, the tree, so here the speaker, Patañjali, in
his immediate action of speaking, means the Yoga-Śástra as his primary
object, while he intends the Yoga itself in his ultimate action of
"denotation." In consequence of this distinction, the real meaning is
that the commencing the Yogaśástra is that which primarily claims our
attention; while the "yoga," or the restraint of the modifications of
the mind, is what is to be expounded in this Sáśtra. "But as we read
in the lists of roots that the root _yuj_ is used in the sense of
'joining,' should not the word _yoga_, its derivative, mean
'conjunction,' and not 'restraint'? And indeed this has been said by
Yájñavalkya:[381]--

     'The conjunction of the individual and the supreme souls is
     called _yoga_.'"

This, however, is untenable, since there is no possibility of any such
action,[382] &c., in either as would produce this conjunction of the two
souls. [Nor, again, is such an explanation needed in order to remove the
opposition of other philosophical schools]; for the notion of the
conjunction of two eternal things is opposed to the doctrines of the
Vaiśeshika and Nyáya schools [and therefore they would still oppose our
theory]. And even if we accepted the explanation in accordance with the
Mímáṃsá [or Vedánta], our Yogaśástra would be rendered nugatory by this
concession [and the very ground cut from under our feet]; because the
identity of the individual and supreme souls being in that school
something already accomplished, it could not be regarded as something to
be produced by our Śástra. And lastly, as it is notorious that roots are
used in many different senses, the root _yuj_ may very well be used here
in the sense of "contemplation."[383] Thus it has been said--

     "Particles, prepositions, and roots--these three are all
     held to be of manifold meaning; instances found in reading
     are their evidence."

Therefore some authors expressly give _yuj_ in this sense, and insert
in their lists "_yuj_ in the sense of _samádhi_." Nor does this
contradict Yájñavalkya's declaration, as the word _yoga_, used by him,
may bear this meaning; and he has himself said--

     "_Samádhi_ is the state of identity of the individual and
     supreme souls; this abiding absolutely in Brahman is the
     _samádhi_ of the individual soul."

It has been also said by the venerable Vyása [in his Commentary on the
Yoga-sútras, i. 1], "_Yoga is samádhi_."

An objection however, may be here raised that "the term _samádhi_ is
used by Patañjali [in ii. 29] in the sense of one of the eight
ancillary parts[384] of the eightfold concentration (or _yoga_); and
the whole cannot be thus itself a part as well as a whole, since the
principal and the ancillary must be completely different from each
other, as all their attendant circumstances must be different, just as
we see in the _darśapúrṇamása_ sacrifices and their ancillary rites
the _prayájas_, and therefore _samádhi_ cannot be the meaning of
_yoga_." We however reply that this objection is incorrect; for
although the term _samádhi_ is used for etymological reasons[385] to
express the ancillary part which is really defined [in iii. 3] as "the
contemplation which assumes the form of the object, and is apparently
devoid of any nature of its own;" still the further use of this term
to describe the principal state is justified by the author's wish to
declare the ultimate oneness of the two states [as the inferior
ultimately merges into the superior]. Nor can you hold that etymology
alone can decide where a word can be used; because if so, as the word
_go_, "a bull," is derived by all grammarians from the root _gam_, "to
go," we ought never to use the phrase "a standing bull" [as the two
words would be contradictory], and the man Devadatta, when going,
would properly be called _go_, "a bull;" and, moreover, the Sútra, i.
2, distinctly gives us a definite justification for employing the word
in this sense when it declares that "concentration (_yoga_) is the
suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle." [The
second or principal sense of _samádhi_ will therefore be quite
distinct from the first or inferior.]

"But surely if _yoga_ is held to be the suppression of the
modifications of the thinking principle, then as these modifications
abide in the soul as themselves partaking of the nature of knowledge,
their suppression, or in other words their 'destruction,' would also
abide in the soul, since it is a principle in logic that the
antecedent non-existence and destruction abide in the same subject as
the counter-entity to these negations;[386] and consequently in
accordance with the maxim, 'This newly produced character will affect
the subject in which it resides,' the absolute independence of the
soul itself would be destroyed." This, however, we do not allow;
because we maintain that these various modifications which are to be
hindered,[387] such as "right notion," "misconception," "fancy,"
"sleep," and "memory" (i. 6), are attributes of the internal organ
(_chitta_), since the power of pure intelligence, which is
unchangeable, cannot become the site of this discriminative
perception. Nor can you object that this unchangeable nature of the
intelligent soul[388] has not been proved, since there is an argument
to establish it; for the intelligent soul must be unchangeable from
the fact that it always knows, while that which is not always knowing
is not unchangeable, as the internal organ, &c. And so again, if this
soul were susceptible of change, then, as this change would be
occasional, we could not predicate its always knowing these
modifications. But the true view is, that while the intelligent soul
always remains as the presiding witness, there is another essentially
pure substance[389] which abides always the same; and as it is this
which is affected by any given object, so it is this perceptible
substance which is reflected as a shadow on the soul, and so produces
an impression;[390] and thus Soul itself is preserved in its own
proper independence, and it is maintained to be the always knowing,
and no suspicion of change alights upon it. That object by which the
understanding becomes affected is known; that object by which it is
not affected is not known; for the understanding is called
"susceptible of change," because it resembles the iron, as it is
susceptible of being affected or not by the influence or want of
influence of the object which resembles the magnet,--this influence or
want of influence producing respectively knowledge or the want of
knowledge. "But inasmuch as the understanding and the senses which
spring from egoism are all-pervading, are they not always connected
with all objects, and thus would it not follow that there should be a
knowledge everywhere and always of all things?" We reply that even
although we grant that they are all-pervading, it is only where a
given understanding has certain modifications in a given body, and
certain objects are in a connection with that body, that the knowledge
of these objects only, and none other, is produced to that
understanding; and therefore, as this limitation is absolute, we hold
that objects are just like magnets, and affect the understanding just
as these do iron,--coming in contact with it through the channels of
the senses. Therefore, the "modifications" belong to the
understanding, not to the soul; and so says the Śruti, "Desire,
volition, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, want of
firmness,--all this is only the mind." Moreover, the sage Pañchaśikha
declared the unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul, "The power
that enjoys is unchangeable;" and so Patañjali also (iv. 18), "The
modifications of the understanding are always known,--this arises from
the unchangeableness of the Ruling Soul." The following is the
argument drawn out formally to establish the changeableness of the
understanding. The understanding is susceptible of change because its
various objects are now known and now not known, just like the organ
of hearing and the other organs of sense. Now, this change is
notoriously threefold, _i.e._, a change of "property," of
"aspect,"[391] and of "condition." When the subject, the
understanding, perceives the colour "blue," &c., there is a change of
"property" just as when the substance "gold" becomes a bracelet, a
diadem, or an armlet; there is a change of "aspect" when the property
becomes present, past, or future; and there is a change of "condition"
when there is a manifestation or non-manifestation[392] of the
perception, as of blue, &c.; or, in the case of gold, the [relative]
newness or oldness [at two different moments] would be its change of
condition. These three kinds of change must be traced out by the
reader for himself in different other cases. And thus we conclude that
there is nothing inconsistent in our thesis that, since "right notion"
and the other modifications are attributes of the understanding, their
"suppression" will also have its site in the same organ.

[Our opponent now urges a fresh and long objection to what we have
said above.] "But if we accept your definition that '_yoga_ is the
suppression of the modifications of the _chitta_,' this will apply
also to 'sound sleep,' since there too we may find the suppression [or
suspension] of the modifications found in _kshipta_, _vikshipta_,
_múḍha_,[393] &c.; but this would be wrong, because it is impossible
for the 'afflictions' to be abolished so long as those states called
_kshipta_, &c., remain at all, and because they only hinder the
attainment of the _summum bonum_. Let us examine this more closely.
For the understanding is called _kshipta_, 'restless,' when it is
restless [with an excess of the quality _rajas_], as being tossed
about amidst various objects which engage it. It is called _múḍha_,
'blinded,' when it is possessed by the modification 'sleep' and is
sunk in a sea of darkness [owing to an excess of the quality _tamas_].
It is called _vikshipta_, 'unrestless,' when it is different from the
first state[394] [as filled with the quality _sattva_]." We must here,
however, note a distinction; for, in accordance with the line of the
Bhagavad Gítá (vi. 34), 'The mind, O Kṛishṇa, is fickle, turbulent,
violent, and obstinate,' the mind, though naturally restless, may
occasionally become fixed by the transient fixedness of its objects;
but restlessness is innate to it, or it is produced in it by sickness,
&c., or other consequences of former actions; as it is said [in the
Yoga Sútras, i. 30], 'Sickness, languor, doubt, carelessness,
laziness, addiction to objects, erroneous perception, failure to
attain some stage, and instability,--these distractions of the mind
are called "obstacles".' Here 'sickness' means fever, &c., caused by
the want of equilibrium between the three humours; 'languor' is the
mind's want of activity; 'doubt' is a sort of notion which embraces
two opposite alternatives; 'carelessness' is a negligence of using the
means for producing meditation; 'laziness' is a want of exertion from
heaviness of body, speech, or mind; 'addiction to objects' is an
attachment to objects of sense; 'erroneous perception' is a mistaken
notion of one thing for another; 'failure to attain some stage' is the
failing for some reason or other to arrive at the state of abstract
meditation; 'instability' is the mind's failure to continue there,
even when the state of abstract meditation has been reached. Therefore
we maintain that the suppression of the mind's modifications cannot be
laid down as the definition of _yoga_.

We reply, that even although we allow that, so far as regards the
three conditions of the mind called _kshipta_, _múḍha_, and
_vikshipta_, which [as being connected with the three qualities] are
all to be avoided as faulty states, the suppression of the
modifications in these conditions is itself something to be avoided
[and so cannot be called _yoga_], this does not apply to the other two
conditions called _ekágra_ and _niruddha_, which are to be pursued and
attained; and therefore the suppression of the modifications in these
two praiseworthy conditions is rightly to be considered as _yoga_. Now
by _ekágra_ we mean that state when the mind, entirely filled with the
_sattva_ quality, is devoted to the one object of meditation; and by
_niruddha_ we mean that state when all its developments are stopped,
and only their latent impressions [or potentialities] remain.

Now this _samádhi_, "meditation" [in the highest sense], is twofold: "that
in which there is distinct recognition" (_saṃprajñáta_), and "that in
which distinct recognition is lost" (_asaṃprajñáta_) [Yoga S., i. 17,
18].[395] The former is defined as that meditation where the thought is
intent on its own object, and all the "modifications," such as "right
notion," &c., so far as they depend on external things, are suppressed,
or, according to the etymology of the term, it is where the intellect[396]
is thoroughly recognised (_samyak prajñáyate_) as distinct from Nature. It
has a fourfold division, as _savitarka_, _savichára_, _sánanda_, and
_sásmita_. Now this "meditation" is a kind of "pondering" (_bhávaná_),
which is the taking into the mind again and again, to the exclusion of all
other objects, that which is to be pondered. And that which is thus to be
pondered is of two kinds, being either Íśwara or the twenty-five
principles. And these principles also are of two kinds--senseless and not
senseless. Twenty-four, including nature, intellect, egoism, &c., are
senseless; that which is not senseless is Soul. Now among these objects
which are to be pondered, when, having taken as the object the gross
elements, as earth, &c., pondering is pursued in the form of an
investigation as to which is antecedent and which consequent,[397] or in
the form of a union of the word, its meaning, and the idea which is to be
produced [cf. i. 42]; then the meditation is called "argumentative"
(_savitarka_). When, having taken as its object something subtile, as the
five subtile elements and the internal organ, pondering is pursued in
relation to space, time, &c., then the meditation is called "deliberative"
(_savichára_). When the mind, commingled with some "passion" and
"darkness," is pondered, then the meditation is called "beatific"
(_sánanda_), because "goodness" is then predominant, which consists in the
manifestation of joy.[398] When pondering is pursued, having as its object
the pure element of "goodness," unaffected by even a little of "passion"
or "darkness," then that meditation is called "egoistical" (_sásmita_),
because here personal existence[399] only remains, since the intellectual
faculty becomes now predominant, and the quality of "goodness" has become
quite subordinate [as a mere stepping-stone to higher things].

But the "meditation, where distinct recognition is lost," consists in
the suppression of all "modifications" whatever.

"But" [it may be asked] "was not 'concentration' defined as the
suppression of all the modifications? How, then, can the 'meditation
where there is distinct recognition' be included in it at all, since
we still find active in it that modification of the mind, with the
quality of goodness predominant, which views the soul and the quality
of goodness as distinct from each other?" This, however, is untenable,
because we maintain that concentration is the suppression of the
"modifications" of the thinking power, as especially stopping the
operation of the "afflictions," the "actions," the "fructifications,"
and the "stock of deserts."[400]

The "afflictions" (_kleśa_) are well known as five, viz., ignorance,
egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of mundane existence. But here
a question is at once raised, In what sense is the word _avidyá_,
"ignorance," used here? Is it to be considered as an _avyayíbháva_
compound, where the former portion is predominant, as in the word
"above-board"?[401] or is it a _tatpurusha_ [or _karmadháraya_]
compound, where the latter portion is predominant, as in the word
"town-clerk"? or is it a _bahuvríhi_ compound, where both portions are
dependent on something external to the compound, as "blue-eyed"? It
cannot be the first; for if the former portion of the compound were
predominant, then we should have the negation the emphatic part in
_avidyá_ (_i.e._, it would be an instance of what is called the
express negation, or _prasajya-pratishedha_);[402] and consequently,
as _avidyá_ would be thus emphatically a negation, it would be unable
to produce positive results, as the "afflictions," &c., and the very
form of the word should not be feminine, but neuter. It cannot be the
second; for any knowledge, whatever thing's absence it may be
characterised by (_a_ + _vidyá_), opposes the "afflictions," &c., and
cannot therefore be their source. Nor can it be the third; for
then,--in accordance with the words of the author of the Vṛitti,[403]
"there is a _bahuvríhi_ compound which is formed with some word
meaning 'existence' used after 'not,' with the optional elision of
this subsequent word"[404]--we must explain this supposed _bahuvríhi_
compound _avidyá_ as follows: "That _buddhi_ is to be characterised as
_avidyá_ (_sc._ an adjective), of which there is not a _vidyá_
existing." But this explanation is untenable; for such an _avidyá_
could not become the source of the "afflictions;"[405] and yet, on the
other hand, it ought to be their source,[406] even though it were
associated with the suppression of all the "modifications,"[407] and
were also accompanied by that discriminative knowledge of the soul and
the quality of goodness [which is found in the _sásmita_ meditation].

Now it is said [in the Yoga Sútras, ii. 4], "Ignorance is the field
[or place of origin, _i.e._, source] of the others, whether they be
dormant, extenuated, intercepted, or simple." They are said to be
"dormant" when they are not manifested for want of something to wake
them up; they are called "extenuated" when, through one's meditating
on something that is opposed to them, they are rendered inert; they
are called "intercepted" when they are overpowered by some other
strong "affliction;" they are called "simple" when they produce their
several effects in the direct vicinity of what co-operates with them.
This has been expressed by Váchaspati Miśra, in his Gloss on Vyása's
Commentary, in the following memorial stanza:--

     "The dormant 'afflictions' are found in those souls which
     are absorbed in the _tattvas_ [_i.e._, not embodied, but
     existing in an interval of mundane destruction]; the
     'extenuated'[408] are found in _yogins_; but the
     'intercepted' and the 'simple' in those who are in contact
     with worldly objects."

"No one proposes the fourth solution of the compound _avidyá_ as a
_dvandva_ compound,[409] where both portions are equally predominant,
because we cannot recognise here two equally independent subjects.
Therefore under any one of these three admissible alternatives[410]
the common notion of ignorance as being the cause of the 'afflictions'
would be overthrown."

[We do not, however, concede this objector's view], because we may
have recourse to the other kind of negation called _paryudása_ [where
the affirmative part is emphatic], and maintain that _avidyá_ means a
contradictory [or _wrong_] kind of knowledge, the reverse of _vidyá_;
and so it has been accepted by ancient writers. Thus it has been
said--

     "The particle implying 'negation' does not signify 'absence'
     [or 'non-existence'] when connected with a noun or a root;
     thus the words _abráhmaṇa_ and _adharma_ respectively
     signify, 'what is other than a Bráhman' and 'what is
     contrary to justice.'"

And again--

     "We are to learn all the uses of words from the custom of
     the ancient writers; therefore a word must not be wrested
     from the use in which it has been already employed."

Váchaspati also says,[411] "The connection of words and their meanings
depends on general consent for its certainty; and since we
occasionally see that a _tatpurusha_ negation, where the latter
portion is properly predominant, may overpower the direct meaning of
this latter portion by its contradiction of it, we conclude that even
here too [in _avidyá_] the real meaning is something contrary to
_vidyá_" [_i.e._, the negative "non-knowledge" becomes ultimately the
positive "ignorance"[412]]. It is with a view to this that it is said
in the Yoga Aphorisms [ii. 5], "Ignorance is the notion that the
non-eternal, the impure, pain, and the non-soul are (severally)
eternal, pure, pleasure, and soul." _Viparyaya_, "misconception," is
defined as "the imagining of a thing in what is not that thing,"[413]
[_i.e._, in its opposite]; as, for instance, the imagining the
"eternal" in a "non-eternal" thing, _i.e._, a jar, or the imagining
the "pure" in the "impure" body,[414] when it has been declared by a
proverbial couplet[415]--

     "The wise recognise the body as impure, from its original
     place [the womb],--from its primal seed,--from its
     composition [of humours, &c.],--from perspiration,--from
     death [as even a Bráhman's body defiles],--and from the fact
     that it has to be made pure by rites."

So,--in accordance with the principle enounced in the aphorism (ii.
15), "To the discriminating everything is simply pain, through the
pain which arises in the ultimate issue of everything,[416] or through
the anxiety to secure it [while it is enjoyed], or through the latent
impressions which it leaves behind, and also from the mutual
opposition of the influences of the three qualities" [in the form of
pleasure, pain, and stupid indifference],--ignorance transfers the
idea of "pleasure" to what is really "pain," as, _e.g._, garlands,
sandal-wood, women, &c.; and similarly it conceives the "non-soul,"
_e.g._, the body, &c., as the "soul." As it has been said--

     "But ignorance is when living beings transfer the notion of
     'soul' to the 'non-soul,' as the body, &c.;

     "This causes bondage; but in the abolition thereof is
     liberation."

Thus this ignorance consists of four kinds.[417]

But [it may be objected] in these four special kinds of ignorance
should there not be given some general definition applying to them
all, as otherwise their special characteristics cannot be
established? For thus it has been said by Bhaṭṭa Kumárila--

     "'Without some general definition, a more special definition
     cannot be given by itself; therefore it must not be even
     mentioned here.'"

This, however, must not be urged here, as it is sufficiently met by
the general definition of misconception, already adduced above, as
"the imagining of a thing in its opposite."

"Egoism" (_asmitá_) is the notion that the two separate things, the
soul and the quality of purity,[418] are one and the same, as is said
(ii. 6), "Egoism is the identifying of the seer with the power of
sight." "Desire" (_rága_) is a longing, in the shape of a thirst, for
the means of enjoyment, preceded by the remembrance of enjoyment, on
the part of one who has known joy. "Aversion" (_dvesha_) is the
feeling of blame felt towards the means of pain, similarly preceded by
the remembrance of pain, on the part of one who has known it. This is
expressed in the two aphorisms, "Desire is what dwells on pleasure;"
"Aversion is what dwells on pain" (ii. 7, 8).

Here a grammatical question may be raised, "Are we to consider this
word _anuśayin_ ('dwelling') as formed by the _kṛit_ affix _ṇini_ in
the sense of 'what is habitual,' or the _taddhita_ affix _ini_ in the
sense of _matup_? It cannot be the former, since the affix _ṇini_
cannot be used after a root compounded with a preposition as _anuśí_;
for, as the word _supi_ has already occurred in the Sútra, iii. 2, 4,
and has been exerting its influence in the following sútras, this word
must have been introduced a second time in the Sútra, iii. 2, 78,
_supy ajátau ṇinis táchchhílye_,[419] on purpose to exclude
prepositions, as these have no case terminations; and even if we did
strain a point to allow them, still it would follow by the Sútra, vii.
2, 115, _acho ñṇiti_,[420] that the radical vowel must be subject to
_vṛiddhi_, and so the word must be _anuśáyin_, in accordance with the
analogy of such words as _atiśáyin_, &c. Nor is the latter view
tenable (_i.e._, that it is the _taddhita_ affix _ini_[421]), since
_ini_ is forbidden by the technical verse--

     'These two affixes[422] are not used after a monosyllable
     nor a _kṛit_ formation, nor a word meaning 'genus,' nor with
     a word in the locative case;'

and the word _anuśaya_ is clearly a _kṛit_ formation as it ends with
the affix _ach_[423] [which brings it under this prohibition, and so
renders it insusceptible of the affix _ini_]. Consequently, the word
_anuśayin_ in the Yoga aphorism is one the formation of which it is
very hard to justify."[424] This cavil, however, is not to be
admitted; since the rule is only to be understood as applying
generally, not absolutely, as it does not refer to something of
essential importance. Hence the author of the Vṛitti has said--

     "The word _iti_, as implying the idea of popular
     acceptation, is everywhere connected with the examples of
     this rule[425] [_i.e._, it is not an absolute law]."

Therefore, sometimes the prohibited cases are found, as _káryin_,
_káryika_ [where the affixes are added after a _kṛit_ formation],
_taṇḍulin_, _taṇḍulika_ [where they are added after a word meaning
"genus"]. Hence the prohibition is only general, not absolute, after
_kṛit_ formations and words meaning "genus," and therefore the use of
the affix _ini_ is justified, although the word _anuśaya_ is formed by
a _kṛit_ affix. This doubt therefore is settled.

The fifth "affliction," called "tenacity of mundane existence"
(_abhiniveśa_), is what prevails in the case of all living beings,
from the worm up to the philosopher, springing up daily, without any
immediate cause, in the form of a dread, "May I not be separated from
the body, things sensible, &c.," through the force of the impression
left by the experience of the pain of the deaths which were suffered
in previous lives, this is proved by universal experience, since every
individual has the wish, "May I not cease to be," "May I be." This is
declared in the aphorism, "Tenacity of mundane existence, flowing on
through its own nature, is notorious even in the case of the
philosopher" [ii. 9]. These five, "ignorance," &c., are well known as
the "afflictions" (_kleśa_), since they afflict the soul, as bringing
upon it various mundane troubles.

[We next describe the _karmáśaya_ of ii. 12, the "stock of works" or
"merits" in the mind.] "Works" (_karman_) consist of enjoined or
forbidden actions, as the _jyotishṭoma_ sacrifice, bráhmanicide, &c.
"Stock" (_áśaya_) is the balance of the fruits of previous works,
which lie stored up in the mind in the form of "mental deposits" of
merit or demerit, until they ripen in the individual soul's own
experience as "rank," "years," and "enjoyment" [ii. 13].

Now "concentration" [_yoga_] consists [by i. 2] in "the suppression of
the modifications of the thinking principle," which stops the
operation of the "afflictions," &c.; and this "suppression" is not
considered to be merely the non-existence of the modifications
[_i.e._, a mere negation], because, if it were a mere negation, it
could not produce positive impressions on the mind; but it is rather
the site of this non-existence,[426]--a particular state of the
thinking principle, called by the four names [which will be fully
described hereafter], _madhumatí_, _madhupratíká_, _viśoká_, and
_saṃskáraśeshatá_. The word _nirodha_ thus corresponds to its
etymological explanation as "that in which the modifications of the
thinking principle, right notion, misconception, &c., are suppressed
(_nirudhyante_). This suppression of the modifications is produced by
"exercise" and "dispassion" [i. 12]. "Exercise is the repeated effort
that the internal organ shall remain in its proper state" [i. 13].
This "remaining in its proper state" is a particular kind of
development, whereby the thinking principle remains in its natural
state, unaffected by those modifications which at different times
assume the form of revealing, energising, and controlling.[427]
"Exercise" is an effort directed to this, an endeavour again and again
to reduce the internal organ to such a condition. The locative case,
_sthitau_, in the aphorism is intended to express the object or aim,
as in the well-known phrase, "He kills the elephant for its
skin."[428] "Dispassion is the consciousness of having overcome desire
in him who thirsts after neither the objects that are seen nor those
that are heard of in revelation" [i. 15]. "Dispassion" is thus the
reflection, "These objects are subject to me, not I to them," in one
who feels no interest in the things of this world or the next, from
perceiving the imperfections attached to them.

Now, in order to reduce the "afflictions" which hinder meditation and
to attain meditation, the _yogin_ must first direct his attention to
practical concentration, and "exercise" and "dispassion" are of
especial use in its attainment. This has been said by Kṛishṇa in the
Bhagavad Gítá [vi. 3]--

     "Action is the means to the sage who wishes to rise to
     _yoga_;

     But to him who has risen to it, tranquillity is said to be
     the means."

Patañjali has thus defined the practical _yoga_: "Practical
concentration is mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation
to the Lord" [ii. 1]. Yájñavalkya has described "mortification"--

     "By the way prescribed in sacred rule, by the difficult
     chándráyaṇa fast, &c.,

     "Thus to dry up the body they call the highest of all
     mortifications."[429]

"Recitation of texts" is the repetition of the syllable Om, the
_gáyatrí_, &c. Now these _mantras_ are of two kinds, Vaidik and
Tántrik. The Vaidik are also of two kinds, those chanted and those not
chanted. Those chanted are the _sámans_; those not chanted are either
in metre, _i.e._, the _ṛichas_, or in prose, _i.e._, the _yajúṃshi_,
as has been said by Jaimini,[430] "Of these, that is a _ṛich_ in which
by the force of the sense there is a definite division into _pádas_
[or portions of a verse]; the name _sáman_ is applied to chanted
portions; the word _yajus_ is applied to the rest." Those _mantras_
are called Tántrik which are set forth in sacred books that are
directed to topics of voluntary devotion;[431] and these are again
threefold, as female, male, and neuter; as it has been said--

     "The _mantras_ are of three kinds, as female, male, and
     neuter:

     "The female are those which end in the wife of fire (_i.e._,
     the exclamation _sváhá_); the neuter those which end in
     _namas_;

     "The rest are male, and considered the best. They are
     all-powerful in mesmerising another's will, &c."

They are called "all-powerful" (_siddha_) because they counteract all
defects in their performance, and produce their effect even when the
ordinary consecrating ceremonies, as bathing, &c., have been omitted.

Now the peculiar "consecrating ceremonies" (_saṃskára_) are ten, and
they have been thus described in the _Śáradá-tilaka_--

     "There are said to be ten preliminary ceremonies which give
     to _mantras_ efficacy:

     "These mantras are thus made complete; they are thoroughly
     consecrated.

     "The 'begetting,' the 'vivifying,' the 'smiting,' the
     'awakening,'

     "The 'sprinkling,' the 'purifying,' the 'fattening,'

     "The 'satisfying,' the 'illumining,' the
     'concealing,'--these are the ten consecrations of _mantras_.

     "The 'begetting' (_janana_) is the extracting of the
     _mantra_ from its vowels and consonants.

     "The wise man should mutter the several letters of the
     _mantra_, each united to Om,

     "According to the number of the letters. This they call the
     'vivifying' (_jívana_).

     "Having written the letters of the _mantra_, let him smite
     each with sandal-water,

     "Uttering at each the mystic 'seed' of air.[432] This is
     called the 'smiting' (_táḍana_).

     "Having written the letters of the _mantra_, let him strike
     them with oleander flowers,

     "Each enumerated with a letter. This is called the
     'awakening' (_bodhana_).

     "Let the adept, according to the ritual prescribed in his
     own special _tantra_,

     "Sprinkle the letters, according to their number, with
     leaves of the Ficus religiosa. This is the 'sprinkling'
     (_abhisheka_).

     "Having meditated on the _mantra_ in his mind, let him
     consume by the _jyotir-mantra_

     "The threefold impurity of the _mantra_. This is the
     'purification' (_vimalí-karaṇa_).

     "The utterance of the _jyotir-mantra_, together with Om, and
     the _mantras_ of Vyoman and Agni,

     "And the sprinkling of every letter with water from a bunch
     of kuśa grass,

     "With the mystical seed of water[433] duly muttered,--this
     is held to be the 'fattening' (_ápyáyana_).

     "The satiating libation over the _mantra_ with
     _mantra_-hallowed water is the 'satisfying' (_tarpaṇa_).

     "The joining of the _mantra_ with Om and the 'seeds' of
     Máyá[434] and Ramá[435] is called its 'illumining'
     (_dípana_).

     "The non-publication of the _mantra_ which is being
     muttered--this is its 'concealing' (_gopana_).

     "These ten consecrating ceremonies are kept close in all
     _tantras_;

     "And the adept who practises them according to the tradition
     obtains his desire;

     "And _ruddha_, _kílita_, _vichhinna_, _supta_, _śapta_, and
     the rest,

     "All these faults in the _mantra_ rites are abolished by
     these excellent consecrations."

But enough of this venturing to make public the _tantra_ mysteries
connected with _mantras_, which has suddenly led us astray like an
unexpected Bacchanalian dance.[436]

The third form of practical _yoga_, "resignation to the Lord"
(_íśvara-praṇidhána_), is the consigning all one's works, whether
mentioned or not, without regard to fruit, to the Supreme Lord, the
Supremely Venerable. As it has been said--

     "Whatever I do, good or bad, voluntary or involuntary,

     "That is all made over to thee; I act as impelled by thee."

This self-resignation is also sometimes defined as "the surrender of
the fruits of one's actions," and is thus a peculiar kind of faith,
since most men act only with a selfish regard to the fruit. Thus it is
sung in the Bhagavad Gítá [ii. 47]--

     "Let thy sole concern be with action and never with the
     fruits;

     "Be not attracted by the fruit of the action, nor be thou
     attached to inaction."

The harmfulness of aiming at the fruit of an action has been declared
by the venerable Nílakaṇṭha-bháratí--

     "Even a penance accomplished by great effort, but vitiated
     by desire,

     "Produces only disgust in the Great Lord, like milk which
     has been licked by a dog."

Now this prescribed practice of mortification, recitation, and
resignation is itself called _yoga_, because it is a means for
producing _yoga_, this being an instance of the function of words
called "superimponent pure Indication," as in the well-known example,
"Butter is longevity." "Indication" is the establishing of another
meaning of a word from the incompatibility of its principal meaning
with the rest of the sentence, and from the connection of this new
meaning with the former; it is twofold, as founded on notoriety or on
a motive. This has been declared in the _Kávya-prakáśa_ [ii. 9]--

     "When, in consequence of the incompatibility of the
     principal meaning of a word, and yet in connection with it,
     another meaning is indicated through notoriety or a motive,
     this is 'Indication,' the superadded function of the word."

Now the word "this" [_i.e._, _tat_ in the neuter, which the neuter
_yat_ in the extract would have naturally led us to expect instead of
the feminine _sá_] would have signified some neuter word, like
"implying," which is involved as a subordinate part of the verb "is
indicated." But _sá_ is used in the feminine [by attraction to agree
with _lakshaṇá_], "this is indication," _i.e._, the neuter "this" is
put in the feminine through its dependence on the predicate. This has
been explained by Kaiyaṭa, "Of those pronouns which imply the identity
of the subject and the predicate, the former takes the gender of the
former, the latter of the latter."[437] Now "expert (_kuśala_) in
business" is an example of Indication from notoriety; for the word
_kuśala_, which is significant in its parts by being analysed
etymologically as _kuśaṃ_ + _láti_, "one who gathers kuśa grass for
the sacrifice," is here employed to mean "expert" through the relation
of a similarity in character, as both are persons of discernment; and
this does not need a motive any more than Denotation does, since each
is the using a word in its recognised conventional sense in accordance
with the immemorial tradition of the elders. Hence it has been said--

     "Some instances of 'indication' are known by notoriety from
     their immediate significance, just as is the case in
     'denotation' [the primary power of a word]."

Therefore indication based on notoriety has no regard to any motive.
Although a word, when it is employed, first establishes its principal
meaning, and then by that meaning a second meaning is subsequently
indicated, and so indication belongs properly to the principal meaning
and not to the word; still, since it is superadded to the word which
originally established the primary meaning, it is called [improperly
by metonymy] a function of the word. It was with a view to this that
the author of the Kávya-prakáśa used the expression, "This is
'Indication,' the superadded function of the word." But the indication
based on a motive is of six kinds: 1. inclusive indication,[438] as
"the lances enter" [where we really mean "men _with_ the lances"]; 2.
indicative indication, as "the benches shout" [where the spectators
are meant _without_ the benches]; 3. qualified[439] superimponent
indication, as "the man of the Panjáb is an ox" [here the object is
not swallowed up in the simile]; 4. qualified introsusceptive
indication, as "that ox" [here the man is swallowed up in the simile];
5. pure superimponent indication, as "_ghí_ is life;" 6. pure
introsusceptive indication, as "verily this is life." This has been
all explained in the Kávya-prakáśa [ii. 10-12]. But enough of this
churning of the depths of rhetorical discussions.

This _yoga_ has been declared to have eight things ancillary to it
(_aṅga_); these are the forbearances, religious observances, postures,
suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and
meditation [ii. 29]. Patañjali says, "Forbearance consists in not
wishing to kill, veracity, not stealing, continence, not coveting"
[ii. 30]. "Religious observances are purifications, contentment,
mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation to the Lord" [ii.
32]; and these are described in the Vishṇu Puráṇa [vi. 7, 36-38]--

     "The sage who brings his mind into a fit state for attaining
     Brahman, practises, void of all desire,

     "Continence, abstinence from injury, truth, non-stealing,
     and non-coveting;

     "Self-controlled, he should practise recitation of texts,
     purification, contentment, and austerity,

     "And then he should make his mind intent on the Supreme
     Brahman.

     "These are respectively called the five 'forbearances' and
     the five 'religious observances;'

     "They bestow excellent rewards when done through desire of
     reward, and eternal liberation to those void of desire."

"A 'posture' is what is steady and pleasant" [ii. 46]; it is of ten
kinds, as the _padma_, _bhadra_, _víra_, _svastika_, _daṇḍaka_,
_sopáśraya_, _paryaṅka_, _krauñchanishadana_, _ushṭranishadana_,
_samasaṃsthána_. Yájñavalkya has described each of them in the passage
which commences--

     "Let him hold fast his two great toes with his two hands,
     but in reverse order,

     "Having placed the soles of his feet, O chief of Bráhmans,
     on his thighs;

     "This will be the _padma_ posture, held in honour by all."

The descriptions of the others must be sought in that work.--When this
steadiness of posture has been attained, "regulation of the breath" is
practised, and this consists in "a cutting short of the motion of
inspiration and expiration" [ii. 49]. Inspiration is the drawing in of
the external air; expiration is the expelling of the air within the
body; and "regulation of the breath" is the cessation of activity in
both movements. "But [it may be objected] this cannot be accepted as a
general definition of 'regulation of breath,' since it fails to apply
to the special kinds, as _rechaka_, _púraka_, and _kumbhaka_." We
reply that there is here no fault in the definition, since the
"cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration" is found
in all these special kinds. Thus _rechaka_, which is the expulsion of
the air within the body, is only that regulation of the breath, which
has been mentioned before as "expiration;" and _púraka_, which is the
[regulated] retention of the external air within the body, is the
"inspiration;" and _kumbhaka_ is the internal suspension of breathing,
when the vital air, called _práṇa_, remains motionless like water in a
jar (_kumbha_). Thus the "cutting short of the motion of inspiration
and expiration" applies to all, and consequently the objector's doubt
is needless.

Now this air, beginning from sunrise, remains two _ghaṭikás_ and a
half[440] in each artery[441] (_náḍi_), like the revolving buckets on
a waterwheel.[442] Thus in the course of a day and night there are
produced 21,600 inspirations and expirations. Hence it has been said
by those who know the secret of transmitting the _mantras_, concerning
the transmission of the _ajapámantra_[443]--

     "Six hundred to Gaṇeśa, six thousand to the self-existent
     Brahman,

     "Six thousand to Vishṇu, six thousand to Śiva,

     "One thousand to the Guru (Bṛihaspati), one thousand to the
     Supreme Soul,

     "And one thousand to the soul: thus I make over the
     performed muttering."

So at the time of the passing of the air through the arteries, the
elements, earth, &c., must be understood, according to their different
colours, by those who wish to obtain the highest good. This has been
thus explained by the wise--

     "Let each artery convey the air two _ghaṭís_ and a half from
     sunrise.

     "There is a continual resemblance of the two arteries[444]
     to the buckets on a revolving waterwheel.

     "Nine hundred inspirations and expirations of the air take
     place [in the hour],

     "And all combined produce the total of twenty-one thousand
     six hundred in a day and night.

     "The time that is spent in uttering thirty-six _guṇa_
     letters,[445]

     "That time elapses while the air passes along in the
     interval between two arteries.

     "There are five elements in each of the two conducting
     arteries,--

     "They bear it along day and night; these are to be known by
     the self-restrained.

     "Fire bears above, water below; air moves across;

     "Earth in the half-hollow; ether moves everywhere.

     "They bear along in order,--air, fire, water, earth, ether;

     "This is to be known in its due order in the two conducting
     arteries.

     "The _palas_[446] of earth are fifty, of water forty,

     "Of fire thirty, of air twenty, of ether ten.

     "This is the amount of time taken for the bearing; but the
     reason that the two arteries are so disturbed

     "Is that earth has five properties,[447] water four,

     "Fire has three, air two, and ether one.

     "There are ten _palas_ for each property; hence earth has
     fifty _palas_,

     "And each, from water downwards, loses successively. Now the
     five properties of earth

     "Are odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and audibleness;
     and these decrease one by one.

     "The two elements, earth and water, produce their fruit by
     the influence of 'quiet,'

     "But fire, air, and ether by the influence of 'brightness,'
     'restlessness,' and 'immensity.'[448]

     "The characteristic signs of earth, water, fire, air, and
     ether are now declared;--

     "Of the first steadfastness of mind; through the coldness of
     the second arises desire;

     "From the third anger and grief; from the fourth fickleness
     of mind;

     "From the fifth the absence of any object, or mental
     impressions of latent merit.

     "Let the devotee place his thumbs in his ears, and a middle
     finger in each nostril,

     "And the little finger and the one next to it in the corners
     of his mouth, and the two remaining fingers in the corners
     of his eyes,

     "Then there will arise in due order the knowledge of the
     earth and the other elements within him,

     "The first four by yellow, white, dark red, and dark blue
     spots,[449]--the ether has no symbol."

When the element air is thus comprehended and its restraint is
accomplished, the evil influence of works which concealed
discriminating knowledge is destroyed [ii. 52]; hence it has been
said--

     "There is no austerity superior to regulation of the
     breath."[450]

And again--

     "As the dross of metals, when they are melted, is consumed,

     "So the serpents of the senses are consumed by regulation of
     the breath."[451]

Now in this way, having his mind purified by the "forbearances" and
the other things subservient to concentration, the devotee is to
attain "self-mastery" (_saṃyama_)[452] and "restraint" (_pratyáhára_).
"Restraint" is the accommodation of the senses, as the eye, &c., to
the nature of the mind,[453] which is intent on the soul's unaltered
nature, while they abandon all concernment with their own several
objects, which might excite desire or anger or stupid indifference.
This is expressed by the etymology of the word; the senses are drawn
to it (_á_ + _hṛi_), away from them (_pratípa_).

"But is it not the mind which is then intent upon the soul and not the
senses, since these are only adapted for external objects, and
therefore have no power for this supposed action? How, therefore,
could they be accommodated to the nature of the mind?" What you say
is quite true; and therefore the author of the aphorisms, having an
eye to their want of power for this, introduced the words "as it
were," to express "resemblance." "Restraint is, as it were, the
accommodation of the senses to the nature of the mind in the absence
of concernment with each one's own object" [ii. 54]. Their absence of
concernment with their several objects for the sake of being
accommodated to the nature of the mind is this "resemblance" which we
mean. Since, when the mind is restrained, the eye, &c., are
restrained, no fresh effort is to be expected from them, and they
follow the mind as bees follow their king. This has been declared in
the Vishṇu-puráṇa [vi. 7, 43, 44]--

     "Let the devotee, restraining his organs of sense, which
     ever tend to pursue external objects,

     "Himself intent on restraint, make them conformable to the
     mind;

     "By this is effected the entire subjugation of the unsteady
     senses;

     "If they are not controlled, the _yogin_ will not accomplish
     his _yoga_."[454]

"Attention" (_dháraṇá_) is the fixing the mind, by withdrawing it from
all other objects, on some place, whether connected with the internal
self, as the circle of the navel, the lotus of the heart, the top of
the _sushumṇá_ artery, &c., or something external, as Prajápati,
Vásava, Hiraṇyagarbha, &c. This is declared by the aphorism,
"'Attention' is the fixing the mind on a place" [iii. 1]; and so, too,
say the followers of the Puráṇas--

     "By regulation of breath having controlled the air, and by
     restraint the senses,

     "Let him next make the perfect asylum the dwelling-place of
     his mind."[455]

The continual flow of thought in this place, resting on the object to
be contemplated, and avoiding all incongruous thoughts, is
"contemplation" (_dhyána_); thus it is said, "A course of uniform
thought there, is 'contemplation'" [iii. 2]. Others also have said--

     "A continued succession of thoughts, intent on objects of
     that kind and desiring no other,

     "This is 'contemplation,'--it is thus effected by the first
     six of the ancillary things."

We incidentally, in elucidating something else, discussed the
remaining eighth ancillary thing, "meditation" (_samádhi_, see p.
243). By this practice of the ancillary means of _yoga_, pursued for a
long time with uninterrupted earnestness, the "afflictions" which
hinder meditation are abolished, and through "exercise" and
"dispassion" the devotee attains to the perfections designated by the
names Madhumatí and the rest.

"But why do you needlessly frighten us with unknown and monstrous
words from the dialects of Karṇáṭa, Gauḍa,[456] and Láṭa?"[457] We do
not want to frighten you, but rather to gratify you by explaining the
meaning of these strange words; therefore let the reader who is so
needlessly alarmed listen to us with attention.

i. The _Madhumatí_ perfection,--this is the perfection of meditation,
called "the knowledge which holds to the truth," consisting in the
illumination of unsullied purity by means of the contemplation of
"goodness," composed of the manifestation of joy, with every trace of
"passion" or "darkness" abolished by "exercise," "dispassion," &c.
Thus it is said in the aphorisms, "In that case there is the knowledge
which holds to the truth" [i. 48]. It holds "to the truth," _i.e._, to
the real; it is never overshadowed by error. "In that case," _i.e._,
when firmly established, there arises this knowledge to the second
yogin. For the _yogins_ or devotees to the practice of _yoga_ are
well known to be of four kinds, viz.,--

i. The _práthamakalpika_, in whom the light has just entered,[458]
but, as it has been said, "he has not won the light which consists in
the power of knowing another's thoughts, &c.;" 2. The _madhubhúmika_,
who possesses the knowledge which holds to the truth; 3. The
_prajñájyotis_, who has subdued the elements and the senses; 4. The
_atikránta-bhávaníya_, who has attained the highest dispassion.

ii. The _Madhupratíká_ perfections are swiftness like thought, &c.
These are declared to be "swiftness like thought, the being without
organs, and the conquest of nature" [iii. 49]. "Swiftness like
thought" is the attainment by the body of exceeding swiftness of
motion, like thought; "the being without bodily organs"[459] is the
attainment by the senses, irrespective of the body, of powers directed
to objects in any desired place or time; "the conquest of nature" is
the power of controlling all the manifestations of nature. These
perfections appear to the full in the third kind of yogin, from the
subjugation by him of the five senses and their essential
conditions.[460] These perfections are severally sweet, each one by
itself, as even a particle of honey is sweet, and therefore the second
state is called _Madhupratíká_ [_i.e._, that whose parts are sweet].

iii. The _Viśoká_ perfection consists in the supremacy over all
existences, &c. This is said in the aphorisms, "To him who possesses,
to the exclusion of all other ideas, the discriminative knowledge of
the quality of goodness and the soul, arises omniscience and the
supremacy over all existences" [iii. 50]. The "supremacy over all
existences" is the overcoming like a master all entities, as these are
but the developments of the quality of "goodness" in the mind [the
other qualities of "passion" and "darkness" being already abolished],
and exist only in the form of energy and the objects to be energised
upon.[461] The discriminative knowledge of them, as existing in the
modes "subsided," "emerged," or "not to be named,"[462] is
"omniscience." This is said in the aphorisms [i. 36], "Or a luminous
immediate cognition, free from sorrow[463] [may produce steadiness of
mind]."

iv. The _Saṃskáraśeshatá_ state is also called _asaṃprajñáta_, _i.e._,
"that meditation in which distinct recognition of an object is lost;"
it is that meditation "without a seed" [_i.e._, without any object]
which is able to stop the "afflictions" that produce fruits to be
afterwards experienced in the shape of rank, length of life, and
enjoyment; and this meditation belongs to him who, in the cessation of
all modifications of the internal organ, has reached the highest
"dispassion." "The other kind of meditation [_i.e._, that in which
distinct recognition of an object is lost] is preceded by that
exercise of thought which produces the entire cessation of
modifications; it has nothing left but the latent impressions" [of
thought after the departure of all objects] [_i.e._, _saṃskáraśesha_,
i. 18]. Thus this foremost of men, being utterly passionless towards
everything, finds that the seeds of the "afflictions," like burned
rice-grains, are bereft of the power to germinate, and they are
abolished together with the internal organ. When these are destroyed,
there ensues, through the full maturity of his unclouded
"discriminative knowledge," an absorption of all causes and effects
into the primal _prakṛiti_; and the soul, which is the power of pure
intelligence, abiding in its own real nature, and escaped from all
connection with the phenomenal understanding (_buddhi_), or with
existence, reaches "absolute isolation" (_kaivalya_). Final liberation
is described by Patañjali as two perfections: "Absolute isolation is
the repressive absorption[464] of the 'qualities' which have
consummated the ends of the soul, _i.e._, enjoyment and liberation,
or the abiding of the power of intelligence in its own nature" [iv.
33]. Nor should any one object, "Why, however, should not the
individual be born again even though this should have been attained?"
for that is settled by the well-known principle that "with the
cessation of the cause the effect ceases," and therefore this
objection is utterly irrelevant, as admitting neither inquiry nor
decision; for otherwise, if the effect could arise even in the absence
of the cause, we should have blind men finding jewels, and such like
absurdities; and the popular proverb for the impossible would become a
possibility. And so, too, says the Śruti, "A blind man found a jewel;
one without fingers seized it; one without a neck put it on; and a
dumb man praised it."[465]

Thus we see that, like the authoritative treatises on medicine, the
Yoga-śástra consists of four divisions; as those on medicine treat of
disease, its cause, health, and medicine, so the Yoga-śástra also
treats of phenomenal existence, its cause, liberation, and its cause.
This existence of ours, full of pain, is what is to be escaped from;
the connection of nature and the soul is the cause of our having to
experience this existence; the absolute abolition of this connection
is the escape; and right insight is the cause thereof.[466] The same
fourfold division is to be similarly traced as the case may be in
other Śástras also. Thus all has been made clear.

The system of Śaṅkara, which comes next in succession, and which is
the crest-gem of all systems, has been explained by us elsewhere; it
is therefore left untouched here.[467]

E. B. C.

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTE ON THE YOGA.

There is an interesting description of the Yogins on the Mountain
Raivataka in Mágha (iv. 55):--

"There the votaries of meditation, well skilled in benevolence
(_maitrí_) and those other purifiers of the mind,--having successfully
abolished the 'afflictions' and obtained the 'meditation possessed of
a seed,' and having reached that knowledge which recognises the
essential difference between the quality Goodness and the
Soul,--desire yet further to repress even this ultimate meditation."

It is curious to notice that _maitrí_, which plays such a prominent
part in Buddhism, is counted in the Yoga as only a preliminary
condition from which the votary is to take, as it were, his first
start towards his final goal. It is called a _parikarman_ (=
_prasádhaka_) in Vyása's Comm. i. 33 (cf. iii. 22), whence the term is
borrowed by Mágha. Bhoja expressly says that this purifying process is
an external one, and not an intimate portion of yoga itself; just as
in arithmetic the operations of addition, &c., are valuable, not in
themselves, but as aids in effecting the more important calculations
which arise subsequently. The Yoga seems directly to allude to
Buddhism in this marked depreciation of its cardinal virtue.

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTE ON P. 237, LAST LINE.

For the word _vyákopa_ in the original here (see also p. 242, l. 3
_infra_), cf. Kusumáñjali, p. 6, l. 7.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 363: On this see Dr. Hall's Pref. to Sáṅkhya Pr. Bhásh., p.
20; S. Sára, p. 11.]

[Footnote 364: _I.e._, he revealed the Veda, and also originated the
meanings of words, as well as instructed the first fathers of mankind
in the arts of life.]

[Footnote 365: I read _ye_ for _te_ with Dr. Hall's MS. _Tapya_ means
rather "susceptible of suffering."]

[Footnote 366: This is really Vyása's comm. on Sút., iv. 21.]

[Footnote 367: Cf. _Bháshá-parichchheda_, 15, _a_.]

[Footnote 368: Śatapatha Br., xiv. 7, 2, 28.]

[Footnote 369: I read in the second clause _tadbháve'pi_,
understanding by _tad_ the different conditions which _atha_ is
supposed to assume as being necessarily present.]

[Footnote 370: These are, i., the discrimination of the eternal from
the phenomenal; ii., the rejection of the fruit of actions here or
hereafter; iii., the possession of the six qualities, tranquillity,
&c.; and, iv., the desire for liberation.]

[Footnote 371: It may be _sukha-janaka_, but it is not itself
_sukha_.]

[Footnote 372: Granting that _atha_ does not here mean "auspicious,"
why should not this be the implied meaning, as all allow that the
particle _atha_ does produce an auspicious influence?]

[Footnote 373: _i.e._, a word's incapacity to convey a meaning without
some other word to complete the construction.]

[Footnote 374: This is found with some variations in the Mahábháshya
(p. 7, Kielhorn's ed.)]

[Footnote 375: The commentators hold that the word _vṛiddhiḥ_ is
placed at the beginning of the first sútra, while _guṇaḥ_ in the
second is placed at the end (_ad eṅ guṇaḥ_), in order to ensure an
auspicious opening, _vṛiddhi_ meaning "increase," "prosperity," as
well as "the second strengthening of a vowel."]

[Footnote 376: In the old Bengali poem Chaṇḍí, we have an interesting
list of these omens. The hero Chandraketu, starting on a journey, has
the following good omens: On his right hand a cow, a deer, a Bráhman,
a full-blown lotus; on his left, a jackal and a jar full of water. He
hears on his right hand the sound of fire and a cowherdess calling
"milk" to buyers. He sees a cow with her calf, a woman calling "jaya,"
_dúrvá_ grass, rice, garlands of flowers, diamonds, sapphires, pearls,
corals; and on the left twelve women. He hears drums and cymbals, and
men dancing and singing "Hari." It is, however, all spoiled by seeing
a guana (_godhiká_). The author adds, "This is a bad omen according to
all śástras, and so is a tortoise, a rhinoceros, the tuberous root of
the water-lily, and a hare." Elsewhere, a vulture, a kite, a lizard,
and a woodman carrying wood are called bad omens.]

[Footnote 377: These are the names of two out of the four sacrifices
lasting for one day, in which a thousand cows are given to the
officiating Bráhmans.]

[Footnote 378: He is here called _phaṇipati_, "lord of
snakes,"--Patañjali, the author of the Mahábháshya, being represented
as a snake in mythology.]

[Footnote 379: Cf. Śaṅkara, Vedánta-Sút., iii. 3, 49.]

[Footnote 380: This is the Mímáṃsá rule for settling the relative
value of the proofs that one thing is ancillary to another. 1.
_Śruti_, "a definite text," as "let him offer with curds," where curds
are clearly an ancillary part of the sacrifice. 2. _Liṅga_, "a sign,"
or "the sense of the words," as leading to an inference, as in the
text "he divides by the ladle;" here we infer that the thing to be
divided must be a liquid like ghee, since a ladle could not divide
solid things like the baked flour cakes. 3. _Vákya_, "the being
mentioned in one sentence," _i.e._, the context, as in the text "'(I
cut) thee for food,' thus saying, he cuts the branch;" here the words
"(I cut) thee for food" are ancillary to the action of cutting; or in
the text, "I offer the welcome (oblation) to Agni," the words "the
welcome (oblation) to Agni," as they form one sentence with the words
"I offer," are ancillary to the act of offering. 4. _Prakaraṇa_, "the
subject-matter viewed as a whole, with an interdependence of its
parts," as in the _darśa-púrṇamása_ sacrifice, where the _prayája_
ceremonies, which have no special fruit mentioned, produce, as parts,
a mystic influence (_apúrva_) which helps forward that influence of
the whole by which the worshippers obtain heaven. Here the _prakaraṇa_
proves them to be ancillary. 5. _Sthána_ (or _krama_), "relative
position" or "order," as the recital of the hymn _Śundhadhvam_, &c.,
"Be ye purified for the divine work," in connection with the mention
of the _sánnáyya_ vessels, where this position proves that the hymn is
ancillary to the action of sprinkling those vessels. 6. _Samákhyá_,
"title;" thus the Yajur-veda is called the special book for the
_adhvaryu_ priests; hence in any rite mentioned in it they are _prima
facie_ to be considered as the priests employed. The order in the
aphorism represents the relative weight to be attached to each; the
first, _śruti_, being the most important; the last, _samákhyá_, the
least. Cf. Jaimini's Sútras, iii. 3, 14; _Mímáṃsáparibháshá_, pp. 8,
9.]

[Footnote 381: _I.e._, Yogi-Yájñavalkya, the author of the
_Yájñavalkya-gítá_. See Hall, _Bibl. Index_, p. 14; Aufrecht, _Bodl.
Catal._, p. 87 _b_.]

[Footnote 382: _Karman_ seems here used for _kriyâ_, which properly
belongs only to the body, as the soul is _drashṭṛi_.]

[Footnote 383: _Scil. samádhi_, or the restraining the mind and senses
to profound contemplation.]

[Footnote 384: _Scil._ "forbearance, religious observance, postures,
suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and
meditation (_samádhi_)."]

[Footnote 385: See Bhoja, Comm. iii. 3, _samyag ádhíyate mano yatra sa
samádhiḥ_.]

[Footnote 386: Thus, _e.g._, the antecedent non-existence and the
destruction of the pot are found in the two halves in which the pot
itself (the counter-entity to its own non-existence) resides by
intimate relation (_samaváya-sambandha_).]

[Footnote 387: I read _niroddhavyánám_ for _nirodhánám_.]

[Footnote 388: _Chit-śakti_ and _chiti-śakti_ = soul.]

[Footnote 389: The _sattva_ of the _buddhi_ or the internal organ.]

[Footnote 390: This second substance, "mind" or "understanding"
(_buddhi_, _chitta_), is like a looking-glass, which reflects the
image of the object on a second looking-glass (_sc._ soul).]

[Footnote 391: Váchaspati explains _lakshaṇa_ as _kálabheda_.]

[Footnote 392: I take _ádi_ as meaning _asphuṭatva_. The change of state
takes place between the several moments of the _lakshaṇa-pariṇáma_. Cf.
the Commentaries on iii. 13.]

[Footnote 393: These are generally called the five states of the
thinking principle, _chittabhúmayas_ or _avasthás_. Cf. Commentary, i.
2, 18.]

[Footnote 394: These three conditions respectively characterise men,
demons, and gods.]

[Footnote 395: Much of this is taken from Bhoja's Commentary, and I
have borrowed Ballantyne's translation.]

[Footnote 396: Can _chitta_ mean "soul" here?]

[Footnote 397: _I.e._, as, _e.g._, whether the senses produce the
elements or the elements the senses, &c.]

[Footnote 398: In p. 164, line 4 _infra_, read _sukhaprakáśamayasya_.]

[Footnote 399: In p. 164, line 2 _infra_, read _sattámátra_ for
_sattva-_. Bhoja well distinguishes _asmitá_ from _ahaṃkára_.]

[Footnote 400: For these see _infra_, and cf. Yoga S., ii. 3, 12, 13.]

[Footnote 401: I have ventured to alter the examples, to suit the
English translation.]

[Footnote 402: Where the negation is prominent it is called
_prasajya-pratishedha_; but where it is not prominent, we have the
_paryudása_ negation. In the former the negative is connected with the
verb; in the latter it is generally compounded with some other word,
as, _e.g._--

(a.) "Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note."

(b.) "Unwatched the garden bough shall sway."

The former corresponds to the logician's _atyantábháva_, the latter to
_anyonyábháva_ or _bheda_.]

[Footnote 403: Cf. the _várttika_ in Siddhánta Kaum., i. 401.]

[Footnote 404: Thus _adhana_ stands for _avidya-mánadhana_, with
_vidyamána_ omitted in the compound.]

[Footnote 405: As its subject would confessedly be _buddhi_.]

[Footnote 406: As it is _avidyá_ after all.]

[Footnote 407: In p. 165, lines 16, 17, read (with my MS. of Váchaspati's
Gloss), _sarvavṛittinirodhasampannáyá api tathátvaprasaṅgát_.]

[Footnote 408: I read _tanvavastháścha_ with the printed edition of
Váchaspati's Gloss. If _tanudagdháścha_ is correct, it must mean
_tanutvena dagdháh_.]

[Footnote 409: As in _rámalakshmaṇau_, Ráma and Lakshmaṇa.]

[Footnote 410: I read _pakshatraye_ for _pakshadvaye_.]

[Footnote 411: In his Comm. on Sút., ii. 5.]

[Footnote 412: Thus _inimicus_ is not a "friend," nor, on the other
hand, a "non-friend," but something positive, an "enemy." So
_agoshpada_ is said to mean "a forest."]

[Footnote 413: Cf. Yoga Sút., i. 8.]

[Footnote 414: In p. 166, line 4 _infra_, read _káyádau_ for
_káryádau_.]

[Footnote 415: This couplet is quoted by Vyása in his Comm. on Yoga
Sútras, ii. 5, and I have followed Váchaspati in his explanation of
it; he calls it _vaiyásakí gáthá_.]

[Footnote 416: Since the continued enjoyment of an object only
increases the desire for more, and its loss gives correspondent regret
(cf. Bhag. G. xviii. 38).]

[Footnote 417: Literally, "it has four feet."]

[Footnote 418: Thus "sight," or the power of seeing, is a modification
of the quality of _sattva_ unobstructed by _rajas_ and _tamas_.]

[Footnote 419: "Let the affix _ṇini_ be used after a root in the sense
of what is habitual, when the _upapada_, or subordinate word, is not a
word meaning 'genus' and ends in a case."]

[Footnote 420: "Let _vṛiddhi_ be the substitute of a base ending in a
vowel, when that which has an indicatory _ñ_ or _ṇ_ follows;" _ṇini_
has an indicatory _ṇ_.]

[Footnote 421: Sc. _anuśaya_ + _ini_ = _anuśayin_.]

[Footnote 422: _Ini_ and _ṭhan_, which respectively leave _in_ and
_ika_; thus _daṇḍa_ gives _daṇḍin_ and _daṇḍika_. The line is quoted
by Boehtlingk, vol. ii. p. 217, on Páṇ. v. 2, 115, and is explained in
the _Káśiká_, _ad loc_. The different prohibitions are illustrated by
the examples:--(1.) _svaván_, _khaván_; (2.) _kárakaván_; (3.)
_vyághraván_, _siṃhaván_; (4.) _daṇḍavatí śálá_ (_i.e._, _daṇḍá asyáṃ
santi_).]

[Footnote 423: By iii. 3, 56.]

[Footnote 424: It is curious to see the great grammarian's favourite
study obtruding itself here on such a slender pretext.]

[Footnote 425: See the _Káśiká_ on Páṇ. v. 2, 115. For _vivakshártha_
(meaning "general currency"), compare Commentary on Páṇ. ii. 2, 27.
The edition in the Benares _Pandit_ reads _vishayaniyamártha_.]

[Footnote 426: _i.e._, Thus _nirodha_ is not _vṛitter abhávaḥ_, but
_abhávasyáśryaḥ_.]

[Footnote 427: I read in p. 168, last line,
_prakáśapravṛittiniyamarúpa_, from Bhoja's comment on i. 12.]

[Footnote 428: See Káśiká, ii. 3, 36.]

[Footnote 429: This passage probably occurs in the _Yájñavalkya-gítá_
of Yogi-yájñavalkya. See Colebrooke's Essays (ed. 2), vol. i. p. 145,
note.]

[Footnote 430: Mímáṃsá Sútras, ii. 1, 35-37.]

[Footnote 431: The tantras are not properly concerned with what is
_nitya_ or _naimittika_; they are _kámya_.]

[Footnote 432: The _víja_ of air is the syllable _jaṃ_.]

[Footnote 433: The _víja_ of water is the syllable _baṃ_.]

[Footnote 434: _Hríṃ._]

[Footnote 435: _Śríṃ._]

[Footnote 436: _Táṇḍava_ is the frantic dance of the god. Śiva and his
votaries.]

[Footnote 437: Literally "they take severally in order the gender of
one of the two." Cf. "Thebæ ipsæ quod Bœotiæ caput est," _Livy_, xlii.
44; "Animal hoc providum, acutum, plenum rationis et consilii, quem
vocamus hominem," _Cic._, _Legg_, i. 7.]

[Footnote 438: I have borrowed these terms from Ballantyne's
translation of the Sáhitya-darpaṇa.]

[Footnote 439: Qualified indication arises from likeness, as the man
is like an ox from his stupidity; pure indication from any other
relation, as cause and effect, &c., thus butter is the cause of
longevity.]

[Footnote 440: _I.e._, an hour, a _ghaṭiká_ being twenty-four
minutes.]

[Footnote 441: The _náḍís_ or tubular vessels are generally reckoned
to be 101, with ten principal ones; others make sixteen principal
_náḍís_. They seem taken afterwards in pairs.]

[Footnote 442: Mádhava uses the same illustration in his commentary on the
passage in the Aitareya Bráhmaṇa (iii. 29), where the relation of the
vital airs, the seasons, and the mantras repeated with the offerings to
the seasons, is discussed. "The seasons never stand still; following each
other in order one by one, as spring, summer, the rains, autumn, the cold
and the foggy seasons, each consisting of two months, and so constituting
the year of twelve months, they continue revolving again and again like a
waterwheel (_ghaṭíyantravat_); hence the seasons never pause in their
course."]

[Footnote 443: This refers to a peculiar tenet of Hindu mysticism,
that each involuntary inspiration and expiration constitutes a mantra,
as their sound expresses the word _so'haṃ_ (i.e., _haṃsaḥ_), "I am
he." This mantra is repeated 21,600 times in every twenty-four hours;
it is called the _ajapámantra_, _i.e._, the mantra uttered without
voluntary muttering.]

[Footnote 444: _I.e._, that which conveys the inhaled and the exhaled
breath.]

[Footnote 445: I cannot explain this. We might read _guruvarṇánám_ for
_guṇavarṇánáṃ_, as the time spent in uttering a _guruvarṇa_ is a
_vipala_, sixty of which make a _pala_, and two and a half _palas_
make a minute; but this seems inconsistent with the other numerical
details. The whole passage may be compared with the opening of the
fifth act of the _Málatímádhava_.]

[Footnote 446: Sixty _palas_ make a _ghaṭiká_ (50 + 40 + 30 + 20 + 10
= 150, _i.e._, the _palas_ in two and a half _ghaṭikás_ or one hour).]

[Footnote 447: Cf. Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 256.]

[Footnote 448: Literally "the being ever more."]

[Footnote 449: For these colours cf. _Chhándogya Up._, viii. 6;
_Maitri Up._, vi. 30.]

[Footnote 450: This is an anonymous quotation in Vyása's Comm.]

[Footnote 451: This seems a variation of Śloka 7 of the _Amṛita-náda
Up._ See Weber, _Indische Stud._, ix. 26.]

[Footnote 452: This is defined in the Yoga Sút., iii. 4, as consisting
of the united operation towards one object of contemplation,
attention, and meditation.]

[Footnote 453: _I.e._, the internal organ (_chitta_).]

[Footnote 454: This couplet is corrupt in the text. I follow the
reading of the Bombay edition of the Puráṇa (only reading in line 3
_chalátmanám_).]

[Footnote 455: Vishṇu-pur., vi. 7, 45, with one or two variations. The
"perfect asylum" is Brahman, formless or possessing form.]

[Footnote 456: The old name for the central part of Bengal.]

[Footnote 457: A country comprising Khandesh and part of Guzerat; it
is the Λαρικἡ of Ptolemy.]

[Footnote 458: In p. 178, l. 2, _infra_, read _pravṛitta_ for
_pravṛitti_. Cf. Yoga S., iii. 52 in Bhoja's Comm. (50 in Vyása's
Comm.)]

[Footnote 459: Read _vikaraṇabhávaḥ_; Váchaspati explains it as
"_videhánám indriyáṇáṃ karaṇabhávaḥ_."]

[Footnote 460: Vyása has _karaṇapañchakarúpajaya_; Váchaspati explains
_rúpa_ by _grahaṇádi_ (cf. iii. 47).]

[Footnote 461: I read in p. 179, l. 11, _vyava-sáyavyavaseyátmakánám_,
from Vyása's Comm.]

[Footnote 462: _I.e._, as past, present, or future.]

[Footnote 463: _Viśoká._]

[Footnote 464: This is explained by Váchaspati, "The latent
impressions produced by the states of the internal organ called
_vyutthána_ (when it is chiefly characterised by 'activity,' or
'darkness,' iii. 9) and _nirodha_ (when it is chiefly characterised by
the quality of 'goodness'), are absorbed in the internal organ itself;
this in 'egoism' (_asmitá_); 'egoism' in the 'merely once resolvable'
(_i.e._, _buddhi_); and _buddhi_ into the 'irresolvable' (_i.e._,
_prakṛiti_)." _Prakṛiti_ consists of the three 'qualities' in
equilibrium; and the entire creation, consisting of causes and
effects, is the development of these 'qualities' when one or another
becomes predominant.]

[Footnote 465: This curious passage occurs in the Taittiríya-Áraṇyaka
i. 11, 5. Mádhava in his Comment, there explains it of the soul, and
quotes the Śvetáśv. Up., iii. 19. Mádhava here takes _avindat_ as "he
pierced the jewel," but I have followed his correct explanation in the
Comm.]

[Footnote 466: This is taken from Váchaspati's Comm. on Yoga S. ii.
15. Cf. the "four truths" of Buddhism.]

[Footnote 467: This probably refers to the Pañchadaśí. A Calcutta
Pandit told me that it referred to the Prameya-vivaraṇa-saṅgraha (cf.
Dr. Burnell's preface to his edition of the Devatádhyáya-bráhmaṇa, p.
x), but, if this is the same as the vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha, it is
by Bháratítírthavidyáraṇya (see Dr. Burnell's Cat of Tanjore MSS. p.
88).]




APPENDIX.

ON THE UPÁDHI (cf. _supra_, pp. 7, 8, 174, 194).


[As the _upádhi_ or "condition" is a peculiarity of Hindu logic which
is little known in Europe, I have added the following translation of
the sections in the Bháshá-parichchheda and the Siddhánta-muktávalí,
which treat of it.]

     cxxxvii. _That which always accompanies the major term
     (sádhya), but does not always accompany the middle (hetu),
     is called the Condition (upádhi); its examination is now set
     forth._

Our author now proceeds to define the _upádhi_ or condition,[468]
which is used to stop our acquiescence in a universal proposition as
laid down by another person;--"that which always accompanies," &c. The
meaning of this is that the so-called condition, while it invariably
accompanies that which is accepted as the major term, does not thus
invariably accompany that which our opponent puts forward as his
middle term. [Thus in the false argument, "The mountain has smoke
because it has fire," we may advance "wet fuel," or rather "the being
produced from wet fuel," as an _upádhi_, since "wet fuel" is
necessarily found wherever smoke is, but not always where fire is, as
_e.g._, in a red-hot iron ball.]

"But," the opponent may suggest, "if this were true, would it not
follow that (_a_) in the case of the too wide middle term in the
argument, 'This [second] son of Mitrá's, whom I have not seen, must be
dark because he is Mitrá's son,' we could not allege 'the being
produced from feeding on vegetables'[469] as a 'condition,'--inasmuch
as it does not invariably accompany a dark colour, since a dark colour
does also reside in things like [unbaked] jars, &c., which have
nothing to do with feeding on vegetables? (_b_) Again, in the
argument, 'The air must be perceptible to sense[470] because it is the
site of touch,' we could not allege the 'possessing proportionate
form' as a 'condition;' because perceptibility [to the internal sense]
is found in the soul, &c., and yet soul, &c., have no form [and
therefore the 'possessing proportionate form' does not invariably
accompany perceptibility]. (_c_) Again, in the argument,'Destruction
is itself perishable, because it is produced,' we could not allege as
a 'condition' the 'being included in some positive category of
existence'[471] [destruction being a form of non-existence, called
"emergent," _dvaṃśábháva_], inasmuch as perishability is found in
antecedent non-existence, and this certainly cannot be said to be
included in any positive category of existence."

We, however, deny this, and maintain that the true meaning of the
definition is simply this,--that whatever fact or mark we take to
determine definitely, in reference to the topic, the major term which
our condition is invariably to accompany, that same fact or mark must
be equally taken to determine the middle term which our said condition
is not invariably to accompany. Thus (_a_) the "being produced from
feeding on vegetables" invariably accompanies "a dark colour," as
determined by the fact that it is Mitrá's son, whose dark colour is
discussed [and this very fact is the alleged middle term of the
argument; but the pretended contradictory instance of the dark jar is
not in point, as this was not the topic discussed]. (_b_) Again,
"possessing proportionate form" invariably accompanies perceptibility
as determined by the fact that the thing perceived is an external
object; while it does not invariably accompany the alleged middle term
"the being the site of touch," which is equally to be determined by
the fact that the thing perceived is to be an external object.[472]
(_c_) Again, in the argument "destruction is perishable from its being
produced," the "being included in some positive category of existence"
invariably accompanies the major term "perishable," when determined by
the attribute of being produced. [And this is the middle term
advanced; and therefore the alleged contradictory instance,
"antecedent non-existence," is not in point, since nobody pretends
that this is produced at all.]

But it is to be observed that there is nothing of this kind in valid
middle terms, _i.e._, there is nothing _there_ which invariably
accompanies the major term when determined by a certain fact or mark,
and does not so accompany the middle term when similarly determined.
This is peculiar to the so-called condition. [Should the reader object
that "in each of our previous examples there has been given a separate
determining mark or attribute which was to be found in each of the
cases included under each; how then, in the absence of some general
rule, are we to find out what this determining mark is to be in any
particular given case?" We reply that] in the case of any middle term
which is too general, the required general rule consists in the
constant presence of one or other of the following alternatives, viz.,
that the subjects thus to be included are either (i.) the acknowledged
site of the major term, and also the site of the condition,[473] or
else (ii.) the acknowledged site of the too general middle term, but
excluding the said condition;[474] and it will be when the case is
determined by the presence of one or other of these alternatives that
the condition will be considered as "always accompanying the major
term, and not always accompanying the middle term."[475]

     cxxxviii. _All true Conditions reside in the same subjects
     with their major terms;[476] and, their subjects being thus
     common, the (erring) middle term will be equally too general
     in regard to the Condition and the major term._[477]

     cxxxix. _It is in order to prove faulty generality in a
     middle term that the Condition has to be employed._

The meaning of this is that it is in consequence of the middle term
being found too general in regard to the condition, that we infer that
it is too general in regard to the major term; and hence the use of
having a condition at all. (_a._) Thus, where the condition invariably
accompanies an unlimited[478] major term, we infer that the middle
term is too general in regard to the major term, from the very fact
that it is too general in regard to the condition; as, for example, in
the instance "the mountain has smoke because it has fire," where we
infer that the "fire" is too general in regard to "smoke," since it is
too general in regard to "wet fuel;" for there is a rule that what is
too general for that which invariably accompanies must also be too
general for that which is invariably accompanied. (_b._) But where we
take some fact or mark to determine definitely the major term which
the condition is invariably to accompany,--there it is from the middle
term's being found too general in regard to the condition in cases
possessing this fact, or mark that we infer that the middle term is
equally too general in regard to the major term. Thus in the argument,
"B is dark because he is Mitrá's son," the middle term "the fact of
being Mitrá's son" is too general in regard to the _sádhya_, "dark
colour," because it is too general in regard to the _upádhi_, "feeding
on vegetables," as seen in the case of Mitrá's second son [Mitrá's
parentage being the assumed fact or mark, and Mitrá herself not having
fed on vegetables previous to his birth].

[But an objector might here interpose, "If your definition of a
condition be correct, surely a pretended condition which fulfils your
definition can always be found even in the case of a valid middle
term. For instance, in the stock argument 'the mountain must have fire
because it has smoke,' we may assume as our pretended condition 'the
being always found elsewhere than in the mountain;' since this
certainly does not always 'accompany the middle term,' inasmuch as it
is not found in the mountain itself where the smoke is acknowledged to
be; and yet it apparently does 'always accompany the major term,'
since in every other known case of fire we certainly find it, and as
for the present case you must remember that the presence of fire in
this mountain is the very point in dispute." To this we reply] You
never may take such a condition as "the being always found elsewhere
than in the subject or minor term" (unless this can be proved by some
direct sense-evidence which precludes all dispute); because, in the
first place, you cannot produce any argument to convince your
antagonist that this condition does invariably accompany the major
term [since he naturally maintains that the present case is exactly
one in point against you]; and, secondly, because it is
self-contradictory [as the same nugatory condition may be equally
employed to overthrow the contrary argument].

But if you can establish it by direct sense-evidence, then the "being
always found elsewhere than in the subject" becomes a true condition,
[and serves to render nugatory the false argument which a disputant
tries to establish]. Thus in the illusory argument "the fire must be
non-hot because it is artificial," we can have a valid condition in
"the being always found elsewhere than in fire," since we can prove by
sense-evidence that fire is hot,[479] [thus the _upádhi_ here is a
means of overthrowing the false argument].

Where the fact of its always accompanying the major term, &c., is
disputed, there we have what is called a disputed condition.[480] But
"the being found elsewhere than in the subject" can never be employed
even as a disputed condition, in accordance with the traditional rules
of logical controversy.[481]

E. B. C.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 468: The _upádhi_ is the "condition" which must be supplied
to restrict a too general middle term. If the middle term, as thus
restricted, is still found in the minor term, the argument is valid;
if not, it fails. Thus, in "The mountain has smoke because it has
fire" (which rests on the false premise that "all fire is accompanied
by smoke"), we must add "wet fuel" as the condition of "fire;" and if
the mountain _has_ wet fuel as well as fire, of course it will have
smoke. Similarly, the alleged argument that "B is dark because he is
Mitrá's son" fails, if we can establish that the dark colour of her
former offspring A depended not on his being her son, but on her
happening to have fed on vegetables instead of ghee. If we can prove
that she still keeps to her old diet, of course our amended middle
term will still prove B to be dark, but not otherwise.]

[Footnote 469: The Hindus think that a child's dark colour comes from
the mother's living on vegetables, while its fair colour comes from
her living on ghee.]

[Footnote 470: By Bháshá-parich. śl. 25, the four elements, earth,
water, air, and fire, are _sparśavat_, but by śl. 27 of these air is
neither _pratyaksha_ nor _rúpavat_.]

[Footnote 471: This condition would imply that we could only argue
from this middle term "the being produced" in cases of positive
existence, not non-existence.]

[Footnote 472: "Soul," of course, is not external; but our topic was
not _soul_, but _air_.]

[Footnote 473: As, _e.g._, the mountain and Mitrá's first son in the
two false arguments, "The mountain has smoke because it has fire"
(when the fire-possessing red-hot iron ball has no smoke), and
"Mitrá's first son A is dark because he is Mitrá's offspring" (when
her second son B is fair). These two subjects possess the respective
_sádhyas_ or major terms "smoke" and "dark colour," and therefore are
respectively the subjects where the conditions "wet fuel" and "the
mother's feeding on vegetables" are to be respectively applied.]

[Footnote 474: As, _e.g._, the red-hot ball of iron and Mitrá's second
son; as these, though possessing the respective middle terms "fire"
and "the being Mitrá's offspring" do not possess the respective
conditions "wet fuel" or "the mother's feeding on vegetables," nor,
consequently, the respective major terms (_sádhya_) "smoke" and "dark
colour."]

[Footnote 475: This will exclude the objected case of "dark jars" in
(_a_), as it falls under neither of these two alternatives; for,
though they are the sites of the _sádhya_ "dark colour," they do not
admit the condition "the feeding on vegetables," nor the middle term
"the being Mitrá's son."]

[Footnote 476: _I.e._, wherever there is fire produced by wet fuel
there is smoke. The condition and the major term are "equipollent" in
their extension.]

[Footnote 477: Where the _hetu_ is found and not the _sádhya_ (as in
the red-hot ball of iron), there the _upádhi_ also is not applicable.]

[Footnote 478: _I.e._, one which requires no determining fact or mark,
such as the three objected arguments required in § 137.]

[Footnote 479: The disputant says, "Fire must be non-hot because it is
artificial." "Well," you rejoin, "then it must only be an
artificiality which is always found elsewhere than in fire,--_i.e._,
one which will not answer your purpose in trying to prove your point."
Here the proposed _upádhi_ "the being always found elsewhere than in
fire" answers to the definition, as it does not always accompany the
_hetu_ "possessing artificiality," but it does always accompany the
_sádhya_ "non-hot," as fire is proved by sense-evidence to be hot.]

[Footnote 480: As in the argument, "The earth, &c., must have had a
maker because they have the nature of effects," where the Theist
disputes the Atheistic condition "the being produced by one possessing
a body." See Kusumáñjali, v. 2.]

[Footnote 481: In fact, it would abolish all disputation at the
outset, as each party would produce a condition which from his own
point of view would reduce his opponent to silence. In other words, a
true condition must be consistent with _either_ party's opinions.]

THE END.

       *       *       *       *       *




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     which this complicated system of philosophy, religion,
     literature, and ritual is set forth."--_British Quarterly
     Review._

     "The whole volume is replete with learning.... It deserves
     most careful study from all interested in the history of the
     religions of the world, and expressly of those who are
     concerned in the propagation of Christianity. Dr. Edkins
     notices in terms of just condemnation the exaggerated praise
     bestowed upon Buddhism by recent English
     writers."--_Record._

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. 496, cloth, price 10s. 6d.

LINGUISTIC AND ORIENTAL ESSAYS.

WRITTEN FROM THE YEAR 1846 TO 1878.

BY ROBERT NEEDHAM CUST,

Late Member of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service; Hon. Secretary to
the Royal Asiatic Society; and Author of "The Modern Languages of the
East Indies."

     "We know none who has described Indian life, especially the
     life of the natives, with so much learning, sympathy, and
     literary talent."--_Academy._

     "They seem to us to be full of suggestive and original
     remarks."--_St. James's Gazette._

     "His book contains a vast amount of information. The result
     of thirty-five years of inquiry, reflection, and
     speculation, and that on subjects as full of fascination as
     of food for thought."--_Tablet._

     "Exhibit such a thorough acquaintance with the history and
     antiquities of India as to entitle him to speak as one
     having authority."--_Edinburgh Daily Review._

     "The author speaks with the authority of personal
     experience.... It is this constant association with the
     country and the people which gives such a vividness to many
     of the pages."--_Athenæum._

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. civ.-348, cloth, price 18s.

BUDDHIST BIRTH STORIES; or, Jataka Tales.

The Oldest Collection of Folk-lore Extant:

BEING THE JATAKATTHAVANNANA,

For the first time Edited in the original Pāli.

BY V. FAUSBOLL;

And Translated by T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

Translation. Volume I.

     "These are tales supposed to have been told by the Buddha of
     what he had seen and heard in his previous births. They are
     probably the nearest representatives of the original Aryan
     stories from which sprang the folk-lore of Europe as well as
     India. The introduction contains a most interesting
     disquisition on the migrations of these fables, tracing
     their reappearance in the various groups of folk-lore
     legends. Among other old friends, we meet with a version of
     the Judgment of Solomon."--_Times._

     "It is now some years since Mr. Rhys Davids asserted his
     right to be heard on this subject by his able article on
     Buddhism in the new edition of the 'Encyclopædia
     Britannica.'"--_Leeds Mercury._

     "All who are interested in Buddhist literature ought to feel
     deeply indebted to Mr. Rhys Davids. His well-established
     reputation as a Pali scholar is a sufficient guarantee for
     the fidelity of his version, and the style of his
     translations is deserving of high praise."--_Academy._

     "No more competent expositor of Buddhism could be found than
     Mr. Rhys Davids. In the Jātaka book we have, then, a
     priceless record of the earliest imaginative literature of
     our race; and ... it presents to us a nearly complete
     picture of the social life and customs and popular beliefs
     of the common people of Aryan tribes, closely related to
     ourselves, just as they were passing through the first
     stages of civilisation."--_St. James's Gazette._

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. xxviii.-362, cloth, price 14s.

A TALMUDIC MISCELLANY;

OR, A THOUSAND AND ONE EXTRACTS FROM THE TALMUD, THE MIDRASHIM, AND
THE KABBALAH.

Compiled and Translated by PAUL ISAAC HERSHON, Author of "Genesis
According to the Talmud," &c.

With Notes and Copious Indexes.

     "To obtain in so concise and handy a form as this volume a
     general idea of the Talmud is a boon to Christians at
     least."--_Times._

     "Its peculiar and popular character will make it attractive
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     scholar.... Contains samples of the good, bad, and
     indifferent, and especially extracts that throw light upon
     the Scriptures."--_British Quarterly Review._

     "Will convey to English readers a more complete and truthful
     notion of the Talmud than any other work that has yet
     appeared."--_Daily News._

     "Without overlooking in the slightest the several
     attractions of the previous volumes of the 'Oriental
     Series.' we have no hesitation in saying that this surpasses
     them all in interest."--_Edinburgh Daily Review._

     "Mr. Hershon has ... thus given English readers what is, we
     believe, a fair set of specimens which they can test for
     themselves."--_The Record._

     "This book is by far the best fitted in the present state of
     knowledge to enable the general reader to gain a fair and
     unbiased conception of the multifarious contents of the
     wonderful miscellany which can only be truly understood--so
     Jewish pride asserts--by the life-long devotion of scholars
     of the Chosen People."--_Inquirer._

     "The value and importance of this volume consist in the fact
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     throws some light, direct or refracted, upon those
     Scriptures which are the common heritage of Jew and
     Christian alike."--_John Bull._

     "It is a capital specimen of Hebrew scholarship; a monument
     of learned, loving, light-giving labour."--_Jewish Herald._

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. xii.-228, cloth, price 7s. 6d.

THE CLASSICAL POETRY OF THE JAPANESE.

BY BASIL HALL CHAMBERLAIN, Author of "Yeigo Heñkaku Shirañ."

     "A very curious volume. The author has manifestly devoted
     much labour to the task of studying the poetical literature
     of the Japanese, and rendering characteristic specimens into
     English verse."--_Daily News._

     "Mr. Chamberlain's volume is, so far as we are aware, the
     first attempt which has been made to interpret the
     literature of the Japanese to the Western world. It is to
     the classical poetry of Old Japan that we must turn for
     indigenous Japanese thought, and in the volume before us we
     have a selection from that poetry rendered into graceful
     English verse."--_Tablet._

     "It is undoubtedly one of the best translations of lyric
     literature which has appeared during the close of the last
     year."--_Celestial Empire._

     "Mr. Chamberlain set himself a difficult task when he
     undertook to reproduce Japanese poetry in an English form.
     But he has evidently laboured _con amore_, and his efforts
     are successful to a degree."--_London and China Express._

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. xii.-164, cloth, price 10s. 6d.

THE HISTORY OF ESARHADDON (Son of Sennacherib), KING OF ASSYRIA, B.C.
681-668.

     Translated from the Cuneiform Inscriptions upon Cylinders
     and Tablets in the British Museum Collection; together with
     a Grammatical Analysis of each Word, Explanations of the
     Ideographs by Extracts from the Bi-Lingual Syllabaries, and
     List of Eponyms, &c.

BY ERNEST A. BUDGE, B.A., M.R.A.S., Assyrian Exhibitioner, Christ's
College, Cambridge.

     "Students of scriptural archæology will also appreciate the
     'History of Esarhaddon.'"--_Times._

     "There is much to attract the scholar in this volume. It
     does not pretend to popularise studies which are yet in
     their infancy. Its primary object is to translate, but it
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     its results."--_Academy._

     "Mr. Budge's book is, of course, mainly addressed to
     Assyrian scholars and students. They are not, it is to be
     feared, a very numerous class. But the more thanks are due
     to him on that account for the way in which he has acquitted
     himself in his laborious task."--_Tablet._

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. 448, cloth, price 21s.

THE MESNEVI

(Usually known as THE MESNEVIYI SHERIF, or HOLY MESNEVI) OF MEVLANA
(OUR LORD) JELALU 'D-DIN MUHAMMED ER-RUMI.

Book the First.

_Together with some Account of the Life and Acts of the Author, of his
Ancestors, and of his Descendants._

Illustrated by a Selection of Characteristic Anecdotes, as Collected
by their Historian,

MEVLANA SHEMSU-'D-DIN AHMED, EL EFLAKI, EL 'ARIFI.

Translated, and the Poetry Versified, in English,

BY JAMES W. REDHOUSE, M.R.A.S., &c.

     "A complete treasury of occult Oriental lore."--_Saturday
     Review._

     "This book will be a very valuable help to the reader
     ignorant of Persia, who is desirous of obtaining an insight
     into a very important department of the literature extant in
     that language."--_Tablet._

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-280, cloth, price 6s.

EASTERN PROVERBS AND EMBLEMS

ILLUSTRATING OLD TRUTHS.

BY REV. J. LONG,

Member of the Bengal Asiatic Society, F.R.G.S.

     "We regard the book as valuable, and wish for it a wide
     circulation and attentive reading."--_Record._

     "Altogether, it is quite a feast of good things."--_Globe._

     "It is full of interesting matter."--_Antiquary._

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. viii.-270, cloth, price 7s. 6d.

INDIAN POETRY;

     Containing a New Edition of the "Indian Song of Songs," from
     the Sanscrit of the "Gita Govinda" of Jayadeva; Two Books
     from "The Iliad of India" (Mahabharata), "Proverbial Wisdom"
     from the Shlokas of the Hitopadesa, and other Oriental
     Poems.

BY EDWIN ARNOLD, C.S.I., Author of "The Light of Asia."

     "In this new volume of Messrs. Trübner's Oriental Series,
     Mr. Edwin Arnold does good service by illustrating, through
     the medium of his musical English melodies, the power of
     Indian poetry to stir European emotions. The 'Indian Song of
     Songs' is not unknown to scholars. Mr. Arnold will have
     introduced it among popular English poems. Nothing could be
     more graceful and delicate than the shades by which Krishna
     is portrayed in the gradual process of being weaned by the
     love of

                 'Beautiful Radha, jasmine-bosomed Radha,'

     from the allurements of the forest nymphs, in whom the five
     senses are typified."--_Times._

     "No other English poet has ever thrown his genius and his
     art so thoroughly into the work of translating Eastern ideas
     as Mr. Arnold has done in his splendid paraphrases of
     language contained in these mighty epics."--_Daily
     Telegraph._

     "The poem abounds with imagery of Eastern luxuriousness and
     sensuousness; the air seems laden with the spicy odours of
     the tropics, and the verse has a richness and a melody
     sufficient to captivate the senses of the
     dullest."--_Standard._

     "The translator, while producing a very enjoyable poem, has
     adhered with tolerable fidelity to the original
     text."--_Overland Mail._

     "We certainly wish Mr. Arnold success in his attempt 'to
     popularise Indian classics,' that being, as his preface
     tells us, the goal towards which he bends his
     efforts."--_Allen's Indian Mail._

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-296, cloth, price 10s. 6d.

THE MIND OF MENCIUS;

OR, POLITICAL ECONOMY FOUNDED UPON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

A SYSTEMATIC DIGEST OF THE DOCTRINES OF THE CHINESE PHILOSOPHER
MENCIUS.

Translated from the Original Text and Classified, with Comments and
Explanations,

By the REV. ERNST FABER, Rhenish Mission Society.

Translated from the German, with Additional Notes,

By the REV. A. B. HUTCHINSON, C.M.S., Church Mission, Hong Kong.

     "Mr. Faber is already well known in the field of Chinese
     studies by his digest of the doctrines of Confucius. The
     value of this work will be perceived when it is remembered
     that at no time since relations commenced between China and
     the West has the former been so powerful--we had almost said
     aggressive--as now. For those who will give it careful
     study, Mr. Faber's work is one of the most valuable of the
     excellent series to which it belongs."--_Nature._

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. 336, cloth, price 16s.

THE RELIGIONS OF INDIA.

BY A. BARTH.

Translated from the French with the authority and assistance of the
Author.

The author has, at the request of the publishers, considerably
enlarged the work for the translator, and has added the literature of
the subject to date; the translation may, therefore, be looked upon as
an equivalent of a new and improved edition of the original.

     "Is not only a valuable manual of the religions of India,
     which marks a distinct step in the treatment of the subject,
     but also a useful work of reference."--_Academy._

     "This volume is a reproduction, with corrections and
     additions, of an article contributed by the learned author
     two years ago to the 'Encyclopédie des Sciences
     Religieuses.' It attracted much notice when it first
     appeared, and is generally admitted to present the best
     summary extant of the vast subject with which it
     deals."--_Tablet._

     "This is not only on the whole the best but the only manual
     of the religions of India, apart from Buddhism, which we
     have in English. The present work ... shows not only great
     knowledge of the facts and power of clear exposition, but
     also great insight into the inner history and the deeper
     meaning of the great religion, for it is in reality only
     one, which it proposes to describe."--_Modern Review._

     "The merit of the work has been emphatically recognised by
     the most authoritative Orientalists, both in this country
     and on the continent of Europe. But probably there are few
     Indianists (if we may use the word) who would not derive a
     good deal of information from it, and especially from the
     extensive bibliography provided in the notes."--_Dublin
     Review._

     "Such a sketch M. Barth has drawn with a
     master-hand."--_Critic (New York)._

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. viii.-152, cloth, price 6s.

HINDU PHILOSOPHY.

THE SĀNKHYA KĀRIKA OF IS'WARA KRISHNA.

An Exposition of the System of Kapila, with an Appendix on the Nyāya
and Vais'eshika Systems.

BY JOHN DAVIES, M.A. (Cantab.), M.R.A.S.

The system of Kapila contains nearly all that India has produced in
the department of pure philosophy.

     "The non-Orientalist ... finds in Mr. Davies a patient and
     learned guide who leads him into the intricacies of the
     philosophy of India, and supplies him with a clue, that he
     may not be lost in them. In the preface he states that the
     system of Kapila is the 'earliest attempt on record to give
     an answer, from reason alone, to the mysterious questions
     which arise in every thoughtful mind about the origin of the
     world, the nature and relations of man and his future
     destiny,' and in his learned and able notes he exhibits 'the
     connection of the Sānkhya system with the philosophy of
     Spinoza,' and 'the connection of the system of Kapila with
     that of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann.'"--_Foreign Church
     Chronicle._

     "Mr. Davies's volume on Hindu Philosophy is an undoubted
     gain to all students of the development of thought. The
     system of Kapila, which is here given in a translation from
     the Sānkhya Kārikā, is the only contribution of India to
     pure philosophy.... Presents many points of deep interest to
     the student of comparative philosophy, and without Mr.
     Davies's lucid interpretation it would be difficult to
     appreciate these points in any adequate manner."--_Saturday
     Review._

     "We welcome Mr. Davies's book as a valuable addition to our
     philosophical library."--_Notes and Queries._

       *       *       *       *       *

Second Edition. Post 8vo, pp. x.-130, cloth, price 6s.

A MANUAL OF HINDU PANTHEISM. VEDÂNTASÂRA.

Translated, with copious Annotations,

BY MAJOR G. A. JACOB,

Bombay Staff Corps; Inspector of Army Schools.

The design of this little work is to provide for missionaries, and for
others who, like them, have little leisure for original research, an
accurate summary of the doctrines of the Vedânta.

     "The modest title of Major Jacob's work conveys but an
     inadequate idea of the vast amount of research embodied in
     his notes to the text of the Vedantasara. So copious,
     indeed, are these, and so much collateral matter do they
     bring to bear on the subject, that the diligent student will
     rise from their perusal with a fairly adequate view of Hindû
     philosophy generally. His work ... is one of the best of its
     kind that we have seen."--_Calcutta Review._

            *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. xii.-154, cloth, price 7s. 6d.

TSUNI--||GOAM:

THE SUPREME BEING OF THE KHOI-KHOI.

BY THEOPHILUS HAHN, Ph.D.,

Custodian of the Grey Collection, Cape Town; Corresponding Member of the
Geogr. Society, Dresden; Corresponding Member of the Anthropological
Society, Vienna, &c., &c.

     "The first instalment of Dr. Hahn's labours will be of
     interest, not at the Cape only, but in every University of
     Europe. It is, in fact, a most valuable contribution to the
     comparative study of religion and mythology. Accounts of
     their religion and mythology were scattered about in various
     books; these have been carefully collected by Dr. Hahn and
     printed in his second chapter, enriched and improved by what
     he has been able to collect himself."--_Prof. Max Müller in
     the Nineteenth Century._

     "It is full of good things."--_St. James's Gazette._

            *       *       *       *       *

In Four Volumes. Post 8vo, Vol. I., pp. xii.-392, cloth, price 12s. 6d.,
Vol. II., pp. vi.-408, cloth, price 12s. 6d., Vol. III., pp. viii.-414,
cloth, price 12s. 6d., Vol. IV., pp. viii.-340, cloth, price 10s. 6d.

A COMPREHENSIVE COMMENTARY TO THE QURAN.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED SALE'S PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE, WITH ADDITIONAL NOTES
AND EMENDATIONS.

Together with a Complete Index to the Text, Preliminary Discourse, and
Notes.

By Rev. E. M. WHERRY, M.A., Lodiana.

     "As Mr. Wherry's book is intended for missionaries in India,
     it is no doubt well that they should be prepared to meet, if
     they can, the ordinary arguments and interpretations, and
     for this purpose Mr. Wherry's additions will prove
     useful."--_Saturday Review._

       *       *       *       *       *

Second Edition. Post 8vo, pp. vi.-208, cloth, price 8s. 6d.

THE BHAGAVAD-GÎTÂ.

Translated, with Introduction and Notes.

BY JOHN DAVIES, M.A. (Cantab.)

     "Let us add that his translation of the Bhagavad Gîtâ is, as
     we judge, the best that has as yet appeared in English, and
     that his Philological Notes are of quite peculiar
     value."--_Dublin Review._

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. 96, cloth, price 5s.

THE QUATRAINS OF OMAR KHAYYAM.

Translated by E. H. WHINFIELD, M.A., Barrister-at-Law, late H.M.
Bengal Civil Service.

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. xxxii.-336, cloth, price 10s. 6d.

THE QUATRAINS OF OMAR KHAYYAM.

The Persian Text, with an English Verse Translation.

By E. H. WHINFIELD, late of the Bengal Civil Service.

     "Mr. Whinfield has executed a difficult task with
     considerable success, and his version contains much that
     will be new to those who only know Mr. Fitzgerald's
     delightful selection."--_Academy._

     "The most prominent features in the Quatrains are their
     profound agnosticism, combined with a fatalism based more on
     philosophic than religious grounds, their Epicureanism and
     the spirit of universal tolerance and charity which animates
     them."--_Calcutta Review._

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-268, cloth, price 9s.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS AND ANCIENT INDIAN METAPHYSICS.

As exhibited in a series of Articles contributed to the _Calcutta
Review_.

By ARCHIBALD EDWARD GOUGH, M.A., Lincoln College, Oxford; Principal of
the Calcutta Madrasa.

     "For practical purposes this is perhaps the most important
     of the works that have thus far appeared in 'Trübner's
     Oriental Series.'... We cannot doubt that for all who may
     take it up the work must be one of profound
     interest."--_Saturday Review._

       *       *       *       *       *

In Two Volumes. Vol. I., post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-230, cloth, price 7s. 6d.

A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF THE EGYPTIAN AND MESOPOTAMIAN RELIGIONS.

By DR. C. P. TIELE.

Vol. I.--HISTORY OF THE EGYPTIAN RELIGION.

Translated from the Dutch with the Assistance of the Author.

By JAMES BALLINGAL.

     "It places in the hands of the English readers a history of
     Egyptian Religion which is very complete, which is based on
     the best materials, and which has been illustrated by the
     latest results of research. In this volume there is a great
     deal of information, as well as independent investigation,
     for the trustworthiness of which Dr. Tiele's name is in
     itself a guarantee; and the description of the successive
     religions under the Old Kingdom, the Middle Kingdom, and the
     New Kingdom, is given in a manner which is scholarly and
     minute."--_Scotsman._

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. xii.-302, cloth, price 8s. 6d.

YUSUF AND ZULAIKHA.

A POEM BY JAMI.

Translated from the Persian into English Verse.

BY RALPH T. H. GRIFFITH.

     "Mr. Griffith, who has done already good service as
     translator into verse from the Sanskrit, has done further
     good work in this translation from the Persian, and he has
     evidently shown not a little skill in his rendering the
     quaint and very oriental style of his author into our more
     prosaic, less figurative, language.... The work, besides its
     intrinsic merits, is of importance as being one of the most
     popular and famous poems of Persia, and that which is read
     in all the independent native schools of India where Persian
     is taught."--_Scotsman._

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. viii.-266, cloth, price 9s.

LINGUISTIC ESSAYS.

BY CARL ABEL.

     "An entirely novel method of dealing with philosophical
     questions and impart a real human interest to the otherwise
     dry technicalities of the science."--_Standard._

     "Dr. Abel is an opponent from whom it is pleasant to differ,
     for he writes with enthusiasm and temper, and his mastery
     over the English language fits him to be a champion of
     unpopular doctrines."--_Athenæum._

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. ix.-281, cloth, price 10s. 6d.

THE SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA;

OR, REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.

BY MADHAVA ACHARYA.

Translated by E. B. COWELL, M. A., Professor of Sanskrit in the
University of Cambridge, and A. E. GOUGH, M.A., Professor of
Philosophy in the Presidency College, Calcutta.

This work is an interesting specimen of Hindu critical ability. The
author successively passes in review the sixteen philosophical systems
current in the fourteenth century in the South of India; and he gives
what appears to him to be their most important tenets.

     "The translation is trustworthy throughout. A protracted
     sojourn in India, where there is a living tradition, has
     familiarised the translators with Indian
     thought."--_Athenæum._

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. lxv.-368, cloth, price 14s.

TIBETAN TALES DERIVED FROM INDIAN SOURCES.

Translated from the Tibetan of the KAH-GYUR.

BY F. ANTON VON SCHIEFNER.

Done into English from the German, with an Introduction,

BY W. R. S. RALSTON, M.A.

     "Mr. Ralston, whose name is so familiar to all lovers of
     Russian folk-lore, has supplied some interesting Western
     analogies and parallels, drawn, for the most part, from
     Slavonic sources, to the Eastern folk-tales, culled from the
     Kahgyur, one of the divisions of the Tibetan sacred
     books."--_Academy._

     "The translation ... could scarcely have fallen into better
     hands. An Introduction ... gives the leading facts in the
     lives of those scholars who have given their attention to
     gaining a knowledge of the Tibetan literature and
     language."--_Calcutta Review._

     "Ought to interest all who care for the East, for amusing
     stories, or for comparative folk-lore."--_Pall Mall
     Gazette._

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-224, cloth, price 9s.

UDÂNAVARGA.

A COLLECTION OF VERSES FROM THE BUDDHIST CANON.

Compiled by DHARMATRÂTA.

BEING THE NORTHERN BUDDHIST VERSION OF DHAMMAPADA.

Translated from the Tibetan of Bkah-hgyur, with Notes, and Extracts
from the Commentary of Pradjnavarman,

BY W. WOODVILLE ROCKHILL.

     "Mr. Rockhill's present work is the first from which
     assistance will be gained for a more accurate understanding
     of the Pali text; it is, in fact, as yet the only term of
     comparison available to us. The 'Udanavarga,' the Thibetan
     version, was originally discovered by the late M. Schiefner,
     who published the Tibetan text, and had intended adding a
     translation, an intention frustrated by his death, but which
     has been carried out by Mr. Rockhill.... Mr. Rockhill may be
     congratulated for having well accomplished a difficult
     task."--_Saturday Review._

       *       *       *       *       *

In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-566, cloth, accompanied by a
Language Map, price 18s.

A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF AFRICA.

BY ROBERT NEEDHAM CUST,

Barrister-at-Law, and late of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service.

     "Any one at all interested in African languages cannot do
     better than get Mr. Cust's book. It is encyclopædic in its
     scope, and the reader gets a start clear away in any
     particular language, and is left free to add to the initial
     sum of knowledge there collected."--_Natal Mercury._

     "Mr. Cust has contrived to produce a work of value to
     linguistic students."--_Nature._

       *       *       *       *       *

Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. xv.-250, cloth, price 7s. 6d.

OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF RELIGION TO THE SPREAD OF THE UNIVERSAL
RELIGIONS.

BY C. P. TIELE,

Doctor of Theology, Professor of the History of Religions in the
University of Leyden.

Translated from the Dutch by J. ESTLIN CARPENTER, M.A.

     "Few books of its size contain the result of so much wide
     thinking, able and laborious study, or enable the reader to
     gain a better bird's-eye view of the latest results of
     investigations into the religious history of nations. As
     Professor Tiele modestly says, 'In this little book are
     outlines--pencil sketches, I might say--nothing more.' But
     there are some men whose sketches from a thumb-nail are of
     far more worth than an enormous canvas covered with the
     crude painting of others, and it is easy to see that these
     pages, full of information, these sentences, cut and perhaps
     also dry, short and clear, condense the fruits of long and
     thorough research."--_Scotsman._

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. xii.-312, with Maps and Plan, cloth, price 14s.

A HISTORY OF BURMA.

Including Burma Proper, Pegu, Taungu, Tenasserim, and Arakan. From the
Earliest Time to the End of the First War with British India.

BY LIEUT.-GEN. SIR ARTHUR P. PHAYRE, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., and C.B.,
Membre Correspondant de la Société Académique Indo-Chinoise de France.

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       *       *       *       *       *

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RELIGION IN CHINA.

By JOSEPH EDKINS, D.D., PEKING.

Containing a Brief Account of the Three Religions of the Chinese, with
Observations on the Prospects of Christian Conversion amongst that People.

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     intimate knowledge of them as they at present
     exist."--_Saturday Review._

     "Dr. Edkins' valuable work, of which this is a second and
     revised edition, has, from the time that it was published,
     been the standard authority upon the subject of which it
     treats."--_Nonconformist._

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     first authorities on Chinese religion and
     language."--_British Quarterly Review._

       *       *       *       *       *

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THE LIFE OF THE BUDDHA AND THE EARLY HISTORY OF HIS ORDER.

Derived from Tibetan Works in the Bkah-hgyur and Bstan-hgyur. Followed
by notices on the Early History of Tibet and Khoten.

Translated by W. W. ROCKHILL, Second Secretary U.S. Legation in China.

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     documents bearing upon his remarkable subject."--_Times._

     "Will be appreciated by those who devote themselves to those
     Buddhist studies which have of late years taken in these
     Western regions so remarkable a development. Its matter
     possesses a special interest as being derived from ancient
     Tibetan works, some portions of which, here analysed and
     translated, have not yet attracted the attention of
     scholars. The volume is rich in ancient stories bearing upon
     the world's renovation and the origin of castes, as recorded
     in these venerable authorities."--_Daily News._

            *       *       *       *       *

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THE SANKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA.

With Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries.

Translated by J. R. BALLANTYNE, LL.D., late Principal of the Benares
College.

Edited by FITZEDWARD HALL.

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BUDDHIST RECORDS OF THE WESTERN WORLD,

Translated from the Chinese of Hiuen Tsiang (A.D. 629).

BY SAMUEL BEAL, B.A.,

(Trin. Coll., Camb.); R.N. (Retired Chaplain and N.I.); Professor of
Chinese, University College, London; Rector of Wark, Northumberland,
&c.

An eminent Indian authority writes respecting this work:--"Nothing
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translation of the 'Si-yu-ki' appears."

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     known."--_Times._

       *       *       *       *       *

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THE ORDINANCES OF MANU.

Translated from the Sanskrit, with an Introduction.

By the late A.C. BURNELL, Ph.D., C.I.E.

Completed and Edited by E.W. HOPKINS, Ph.D., of Columbia College, N.Y.

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     translated."--_Scotsman._

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     rendered into English by Sir William Jones. Burnell was not
     only an independent Sanskrit scholar, but an experienced
     lawyer, and he joined to these two important qualifications
     the rare faculty of being able to express his thoughts in
     clear and trenchant English.... We ought to feel very
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     be published of the translation left by Burnell."--F. MAX
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       *       *       *       *       *

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THE LIFE AND WORKS OF ALEXANDER CSOMA DE KOROS,

     Between 1819 and 1842. With a Short Notice of all his
     Published and Unpublished Works and Essays. From Original
     and for most part Unpublished Documents.

By THEODORE DUKA, M.D., F.R.C.S. (Eng.), Surgeon-Major H.M.'s Bengal
Medical Service, Retired, &c.

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     Csoma de Koros. It is forty-three years since his death, and
     though an account of his career was demanded soon after his
     decease, it has only now appeared in the important memoir of
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MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS RELATING TO INDO-CHINA.

Reprinted from "Dalrymple's Oriental Repertory," "Asiatic Researches,"
and the "Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal."

_CONTENTS OF VOL. I._

I.--Some Accounts of Quedah. By Michael Topping.

II.--Report made to the Chief and Council of Balambangan, by Lieut. James
Barton, of his several Surveys.

III.--Substance of a Letter to the Court of Directors from Mr. John Jesse,
dated July 20, 1775, at Borneo Proper.

IV.--Formation of the Establishment of Poolo Peenang.

V.--The Gold of Limong. By John Macdonald.

VI.--On Three Natural Productions of Sumatra. By John Macdonald.

VII.--On the Traces of the Hindu Language and Literature extant amongst
the Malays. By William Marsden.

VIII.--Some Account of the Elastic Gum Vine of Prince-Wales Island. By
James Howison.

IX.--A Botanical Description of Urceola Elastica, or Caoutchouc Vine of
Sumatra and Pulo-Pinang. By William Roxburgh, M.D.

X.--An Account of the Inhabitants of the Poggy, or Nassau Islands, lying
off Sumatra. By John Crisp.

XI.--Remarks on the Species of Pepper which are found on Prince-Wales
Island. By William Hunter, M.D.

XII.--On the Languages and Literature of the Indo-Chinese Nations. By J.
Leyden, M.D.

XIII.--Some Account of an Orang-Outang of remarkable height found on the
Island of Sumatra. By Clarke Abel, M.D.

XIV.--Observations on the Geological Appearances and General Features of
Portions of the Malayan Peninsula. By Captain James Low.

XV.--Short Sketch of the Geology of Pulo-Pinang and the Neighbouring
Islands. By T. Ware.

XVI.--Climate of Singapore.

XVII.--Inscription on the Jetty at Singapore.

XVIII.--Extract of a Letter from Colonel J. Low.

XIX.--Inscription at Singapore.

XX--An Account of Several Inscriptions found in Province Wellesley. By
Lieut.-Col. James Low.

XXI.--Note on the Inscriptions from Singapore and Province Wellesley. By
J. W. Laidlay.

XXII.--On an Inscription from Keddah. By Lieut.-Col. Low.

XXIII.--A Notice of the Alphabets of the Philippine Islands.

XXIV.--Succinct Review of the Observations of the Tides in the Indian
Archipelago.

XXV.--Report on the Tin of the Province of Mergui. By Capt. G. B
Tremenheere.

XXVI.--Report on the Manganese of Mergui Province. By Capt. G. B.
Tremenheere.

XXVII.--Paragraphs to be added to Capt. G. B. Tremenheere's Report.

XXVIII.--Second Report on the Tin of Mergui. By Capt. G. B. Tremenheere.

XXIX.--Analysis of Iron Ores from Tavoy and Mergui, and of Limestone from
Mergui. By Dr. A. Ure.

XXX.--Report of a Visit to the Pakchan River, and of some Tin Localities
in the Southern Portion of the Tenasserim Provinces. By Capt. G. B.
Tremenheere.

XXXI.--Report on a Route from the Mouth of the Pakchan to Krau, and thence
across the Isthmus of Krau to the Gulf of Siam. By Capt. Al. Fraser and
Capt. J. G. Forlong.

XXXII.--Report, &c., from Capt. G. B. Tremenheere on the Price of Mergui
Tin Ore.

XXXIII.--Remarks on the Different Species of Orang-utan. By E. Blyth.

XXXIV.--Further Remarks. By E. Blyth.

_CONTENTS OF VOL. II._

XXXV.--Catalogue of Mammalia inhabiting the Malayan Peninsula and Islands.
By Theodore Cantor, M.D.

XXXVI.--On the Local and Relative Geology of Singapore. By J. R. Logan.

XXXVII.--Catalogue of Reptiles inhabiting the Malayan Peninsula and
Islands. By Theodore Cantor, M.D.

XXXVIII.--Some Account of the Botanical Collection brought from the
Eastward, in 1841, by Dr. Cantor. By the late W. Griffith.

XXXIX.--On the Flat-Horned Taurine Cattle of S.E. Asia. By E. Blyth.

XL.--Note, by Major-General G. B. Tremenheere.

General Index.

Index of Vernacular Terms.

Index of Zoological Genera and Sub-Genera occurring in Vol. II.

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     philology, economy, geography, geology--and constitute a
     very material and important contribution to our accessible
     information regarding that country and its
     people."--_Contemporary Review._

       *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. xii.-72, cloth, price 5s.

THE SATAKAS OF BHARTRIHARI.

Translated from the Sanskrit

By the REV. B. HALE WORTHAM, M.R.A.S.,

Rector of Eggesford, North Devon.

     "A very interesting addition to Trübner's Oriental
     Series."--_Saturday Review._

     "Many of the Maxims in the book have a Biblical ring and
     beauty of expression."--_St. James' Gazette._

            *       *       *       *       *

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ANCIENT PROVERBS AND MAXIMS FROM BURMESE SOURCES;

Or, THE NITI LITERATURE OF BURMA.

BY JAMES GRAY,

Author of "Elements of Pali Grammar," "Translation of the Dhammapada," &c.

The Sanscrit-Pâli word Nîti is equivalent to "conduct" in its abstract,
and "guide" in its concrete signification. As applied to books, it is a
general term for a treatise which includes maxims, pithy sayings, and
didactic stories, intended as a guide to such matters of everyday life as
form the character of an individual and influence him in his relations to
his fellow-men. Treatises of this kind have been popular in all ages, and
have served as a most effective medium of instruction.

            *       *       *       *       *

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MASNAVI I MA' NAVI:

THE SPIRITUAL COUPLETS OF MAULANA JALALU-'D-DIN MUHAMMAD I RUMI.

Translated and Abridged by E. H. WHINFIELD, M.A., Late of H.M. Bengal
Civil Service.

            *       *       *       *       *

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MANAVA-DHARMA-CASTRA: THE CODE OF MANU.

ORIGINAL SANSKRIT TEXT, WITH CRITICAL NOTES. BY J. JOLLY, Ph.D.,

Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Wurzburg; late Tagore Professor
of Law in the University of Calcutta.

The date assigned by Sir William Jones to this Code--the well-known Great
Law Book of the Hindus--is 1250-500 B.C., although the rules and precepts
contained in it had probably existed as tradition for countless ages
before. There has been no reliable edition of the Text for Students for
many years past, and it is believed, therefore, that Prof. Jolly's work
will supply a want long felt.

            *       *       *       *       *

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LEAVES FROM MY CHINESE SCRAP-BOOK.

BY FREDERIC HENRY BALFOUR.

Author of "Waifs and Strays from the Far East," "Taoist Texts," "Idiomatic
Phrases in the Peking Colloquial," &c. &c.

            *       *       *       *       *

Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-548, with Six Maps, cloth, price 21s.

LINGUISTIC AND ORIENTAL ESSAYS.

WRITTEN FROM THE YEAR 1847 TO 1887. _Second Series._

BY ROBERT NEEDHAM CUST, LL.D.,

Barrister-at-Law; Honorary Secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society; Late
Member of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service.

            *       *       *       *       *

In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. x.-308 and vi.-314, cloth, price 25s.

MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS RELATING TO INDO-CHINA.

Edited by R. ROST, Ph.D., &c. &c., Librarian to the India Office.

SECOND SERIES.

Reprinted for the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society from the
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            *       *       *       *       *

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FOLK-TALES OF KASHMIR.

By the REV. J. HINTON KNOWLES, F.R.G.S., M.R.A.S., &c.

(C.M.S.) Missionary to the Kashmiris.

            *       *       *       *       *

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MEDIÆVAL RESEARCHES FROM EASTERN ASIATIC SOURCES.

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BY E. BRETSCHNEIDER, M.D.,

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ALBERUNI'S INDIA:

     AN ACCOUNT OF ITS RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE,
     GEOGRAPHY, CHRONOLOGY, ASTRONOMY, CUSTOMS, LAW, AND
     ASTROLOGY (ABOUT A.D. 1031).

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH.

With Notes and Indices by Prof. EDWARD SACHAU, University of Berlin.

∵ The Arabic Original, with an Index of the Sanskrit Words, Edited by
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       *       *       *       *       *

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THE LIFE OF HIUEN TSIANG.

BY THE SHAMANS HWUI LI AND YEN-TSUNG.

With a Preface containing an account of the Works of I-TSING.

BY SAMUEL BEAL, B.A.

(Trin. Coll., Camb.); Professor of Chinese, University College,
London; Rector of Wark, Northumberland, &c.

Author of "Buddhist Records of the Western World," "The Romantic
Legend of Sakya Buddha," &c.

When the Pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang returned from his travels in India, he
took up his abode in the Temple of "Great Benevolence;" this convent
had been constructed by the Emperor in honour of the Empress,
Wen-te-hau. After Hiuen Tsiang's death, his disciple, Hwui Li,
composed a work which gave an account of his illustrious Master's
travels; this work when he completed he buried, and refused to
discover its place of concealment. But previous to his death he
revealed its whereabouts to Yen-tsung, by whom it was finally revised
and published. This is "The Life of Hiuen Tsiang." It is a valuable
sequel to the Si-yu-ki, correcting and illustrating it in many
particulars.

       *       *       *       *       *

_IN PREPARATION:--_

Post 8vo.

A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF OCEANIA.

BY R. N. CUST, LL. D.

Author of "Modern Languages of the East," "Modern Languages of
Africa," &c.

       *       *       *       *       *

LONDON: TRÜBNER & CO., 57 AND 59 LUDGATE HILL.

       *       *       *       *       *






End of Project Gutenberg's The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha, by Madhava Acharya