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James Gillespie Blaine


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Title: Twenty Years of Congress, Volume 2 (of 2)
       From Lincoln to Garfield, with a Review of the Events Which Led to the Political Revolution of 1860


Author: James Gillespie Blaine



Release Date: December 8, 2006  [eBook #20065]

Language: English

Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII)


***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS, VOLUME 2
(OF 2)***


E-text prepared by an anonymous volunteer



Transcriber's note:

   The chapter summaries in the Table of Contents are repeated
   in the text at the start of each chapter.

   Footnotes are at the end of the chapter (or section of a Table
   of Congress), referenced by parenthesized numbers, e.g. (1).

   The capitalization of hyphenated words is inconsistent,
   following the text, as is the use of the comma in lists.

   The tables of the 39th and 40th Congresses are moved to the
   Appendices.

   Line  2874:  "gauge of battle" changed to "gage of battle"

   Line 12981:  missing numerator in "3/10" supplied from preceding text.

   Non-standard spellings:  domicil; hinderance; cotemporary]





TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS:

From Lincoln to Garfield

With a Review of the Events Which Led to the Political Revolution of 1860.

by

JAMES G. BLAINE.

Volume II.







Norwich, Conn.:
The Henry Bill Publishing Company.
1886.
Copyright, 1884,
by James G. Blaine.
All rights reserved.

Electrotyped and Printed
By Rand, Avery, and Company,
Boston, Mass




CONTENTS OF VOLUME II.

CHAPTER I.

ANDREW JOHNSON INSTALLED AS PRESIDENT.--CABINET AND SENATORS WITNESSES
TO THE CEREMONY.--RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEW PRESIDENT DELICATE IN
CHARACTER.--REQUIRING THE HIGHEST ORDER OF STATESMANSHIP.--THE QUESTION
OF RECONSTRUCTION.--ITS PECULIAR DIFFICULTIES.--NEW AND PERPLEXING
QUESTIONS.--CHARACTER AND CAREER OF MR. JOHNSON.--BORN IN NORTH
CAROLINA.--MIGRATES TO TENNESSEE.--HIS RAPID PROMOTION IN THAT STATE.--
A TAILOR BY TRADE.--WITHOUT EDUCATION--TAUGHT TO READ AT FIFTEEN.--
MAYOR OF TOWN AT TWENTY-TWO.--IN THE LEGISLATURE AT TWENTY-SEVEN.--
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTOR IN 1840 AT THIRTY-TWO.--IN CONGRESS AT THIRTY-
FIVE.--GOVERNOR FROM 1853 TO 1857.--HIS HOMESTEAD POLICY.--NECESSARY
ANTAGONISM WITH SLAVERY.--HIS IDEAL OF A RURAL POPULATION.--BOLDNESS OF
HIS POLITICAL COURSE IN TENNESSEE.--HIS LOYALTY TO THE UNION.--
SEPARATES FROM THE DEMOCRATIC CONSPIRATORS.--HIS CAREER IN THE CIVIL
WAR.--APPOINTED MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE.--HIS ABLE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE OFFICE.--FORESHADOWS A SEVERE POLICY AS
PRESIDENT.--CONTRAST WITH MR. LINCOLN.--ANALYSIS OF JOHNSON'S POSITION.
--HIS BRIEF INAUGURAL ADDRESS.--EFFECT PRODUCED BY IT.--HIS ADDRESS TO
AN ILLINOIS DELEGATION.--SIGNIFICANT INDICATION OF A HARSH POLICY
TOWARDS THE REBELS.--PRESTON KING'S INFLUENCE.--PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO
A CHRISTIAN COMMISSION.--TO LOYAL SOUTHERNERS.--TO A PENNSYLVANIA
DELEGATION.--PRESIDENT'S TONE GROWS STERNER TOWARDS "TRAITORS."--
STRIKING CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR WADE.--FUNERAL CEREMONIES OF THE
LATE PRESIDENT.--REMAINS CARRIED TO ILLINOIS.--IMPRESSIVE SCENE IN
BALTIMORE.--IN PHILADELPHIA.--BODY REPOSES IN INDEPENDENCE HALL.--
CONTRAST WITH FOUR YEARS BEFORE.--UNPARALLELED DISPLAY OF FEELING IN
NEW YORK.--ORATION BY GEORGE BANCROFT.--ELEGIAC ODE BY WILLIAM CULLEN
BRYANT.--INTERMENT IN ILLINOIS.--CEREMONIES COMPARED WITH THOSE OF
ROYALTY.--PROFOUND FEELING THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.--PUBLIC
MANIFESTATION OF MOURNING.

CHAPTER II.

MILITARY REVIEW IN HONOR OF UNION VICTORY.--THE EASTERN AND WESTERN
ARMIES.--THEIR GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS.--SPECIAL INTEREST.--NUMBER OF
BATTLES DURING THE WAR.--NUMBER EACH YEAR.--STRUGGLE OF 1861-65.--
DISCIPLINE OF THE ARMY.--MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CONTINUING THE
CONTEST.--NEEDLESS SLAUGHTER OF MEN.--CONFEDERATE RESPONSIBILITY.--
SPEECH OF ROBERT M. T. HUNTER, FOLLOWED BY JUDAH P. BENJAMIN.--
EXTREME MEASURES ADVOCATED BY HIM.--HIS OVER-ZEAL.--MR. BENJAMIN SEEKS
REFUGE IN ENGLAND.--HIS SUCCESS THERE DUE TO ENGLISH SYMPATHY WITH THE
REBELLION.--HIS MALIGNITY TOWARDS THE UNION.--SOUTHERN CHARACTER.--ITS
STRONG POINTS AND ITS WEAK POINTS.--CONDUCT OF CONFEDERATE CONGRESS.--
THEIR INFLAMMATORY ADDRESS.--ITS EXTRAVAGANCE AND ABSURDITY.--JEFFERSON
DAVIS'S ADDRESS TO CONGRESS.--HIS LACK OF MORAL COURAGE.--DISBANDMENT
OF UNION ARMY, 1,00,516 MEN.--ANOTHER MILLION GONE BEFORE.--SELF-
SUPPORT AND SELF-ADJUSTMENT.--COMPARISON WITH THE ARMY OF THE
REVOLUTION.--UNION OFFICERS ALL YOUNG MEN.--AGES OF OFFICERS IN OTHER
WARS.--AGES OF REGULAR ARMY OFFICERS.--OF VOLUNTEER OFFICERS.--HARMONY
OF THE TWO.--SPECIAL EFFICIENCY OF THE VOLUNTEERS.--MAGNITUDE OF THE
UNION ARMY.--THE INFANTRY, CAVALRY, ARTILLERY.--NUMBER OF GENERALS.--
NUMBER OF REGIMENTS.--MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE REPUBLIC.--ITS SECURITY
IN TIME OF DANGER.

CHAPTER III.

THE RECONSTRUCTION PROBLEM.--THE PRESIDENT'S PUBLIC ADDRESSES.--TIME
FOR ACTION ARRIVED.--PROCLAMATION DECLARING HOSTILITIES CEASED.--MANNER
OF DEALING WITH INSURRECTIONARY STATES.--MR. LINCOLN'S FIRST EFFORTS AT
RECONSTRUCTION.--ELECTION IN LOUISIANA.--FLANDERS AND HAHN.--MR.
LINCOLN'S NOTE TO GENERAL SHEPLEY.--TO CUTHBERT BULLETT.--MR. LINCOLN'S
DEFINITE PLAN.--"ONE-TENTH" OF VOTERS TO ORGANIZE LOYAL STATE
GOVERNMENT.--FREE-STATE CONVENTION IN LOUISIANA.--MICHAEL HAHN ELECTED
GOVERNOR.--CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.--MR. LINCOLN'S CONGRATULATIONS.--
SIMILAR ACTION IN ARKANSAS.--ISAAC MURPHY ELECTED GOVERNOR.--
REPRESENTATION IN CONGRESS DENIED TO THESE STATES.--MR. SUMNER'S
RESOLUTION.--ADOPTED BY SENATE.--SIMILAR ACTION IN HOUSE.--CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS.--CONGRESSIONAL PLAN OF
RECONSTRUCTION.--THREE FUNDAMENTAL CONDITIONS.--BILL PASSED JULY 4,
1864.--NOT APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT.--HIS REASONS GIVEN IN A PUBLIC
PROCLAMATION.--SENATOR WADE AND H. WINTER DAVIS CRITICISE THE
PROCLAMATION.--THEIR PROTEST.--SUBSEQUENT RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS.--THE
PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO IT.--MR. LINCOLN'S PROBABLE COURSE ON THE SUBJECT
OF RECONSTRUCTION.--RECONSTRUCTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF TENNESSEE.--THE
QUICK PROCESS OF DOING.--RATIFIED BY POPULAR VOTE, 25,293 TO 48.--
PARSON BROWNLOW CHOSEN GOVERNOR.--PATTERSON AND FOWLER ELECTED
SENATORS.--JOHNSON'S INAUGURATION AS VICE-PRESIDENT.--HIS SPEECH.--WERE
THE REBEL STATES OUT OF THE UNION?--JOHNSON'S VIEWS.--MR. LINCOLN'S
VIEWS.--RADICAL AND CONSERVATIVE.--EXTRA SESSION DEBATED.--ADVERSE
DECISION.--ILL-LUCK OF EXTRA SESSIONS.

CHAPTER IV.

PRESIDENT JOHN AND THE CABINET.--EFFECT OF VICE-PRESIDENT'S ACCESSION.
--EXAMPLE OF TYLER IN 1841 AND FILLMORE IN 1850.--A VICE-PRESIDENT'S
DIFFICULT POSITION.--PERSONNEL OF CABINET IN 1865.--ITS NEARLY EVEN
DIVISION ON RECONSTRUCTION ISSUES.--PRESUMED POSITION OF EACH MEMBER.--
STANTON, HARLAN, AND DENNISON RADICAL.--WELLES, McCULLOCH, AND SPEED
CONSERVATIVE.--MR. SEWARD'S RELATION TO THE PRESIDENT.--HIS POSITION
EXPLAINED.--MR. SEWARD REGAINS HIS HEALTH.--DISPLAY OF HIS PERSONAL
POWER.--CHARACTERISTICS OF MR. SEWARD.--SUPERIORITY OF HIS MIND.--
TENDENCY OF THE PRESIDENT'S MIND.--SOCIAL INFLUENCES AT WORK UPON HIM.
--HIS RADICAL CHANGE OF POSITION.--PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION MAY 29.--
AMNESTY AND PARDON TO REBELS.--THIRTEEN EXCEPTED CLASSES.--THE "TWENTY-
THOUSAND-DOLLAR" DISABILITY.--WARMLY OPPOSED BY MR. SEWARD.--CLEMENCY
PROMISED TO EXCEPTED CLASSES.--PARDONS APPLIED FOR.--FOURTEEN THOUSAND
GRANTED IN NINE MONTHS.--ANOTHER PROCLAMATION OF SAME DATE.--
PROVISIONAL GOVERNORS APPOINTED.--FIRST FOR NORTH CAROLINA.--EXISTING
GOVERNMENTS IN VIRGINIA, LOUISIANA, ARKANSAS, AND TENNESSEE
RECOGNIZED.--PRESIDENT'S RECONSTRUCTION POLICY.--NOW FULLY DISCLOSED.--
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE PRESCRIBED.--PROVISIONAL GOVERNORS TO ASSEMBLE
CONVENTIONS.--THE CONVENTIONS TO FORM CONSTITUTIONS.--LEGISLATURES THEN
TO ASSEMBLE.--WHOLE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT IN MOTION.--REBELS IN
POSSESSION OF STATE GOVERNMENTS.--COLORED MEN EXCLUDED FROM ALL
PARTICIPATION.--SUFFRAGE LEFT TO THE STATES.--PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL
POSITION ON SUFFRAGE.--RECONSTRUCTION SCHEME COMPLETE IN JULY.--THE
PRESIDENT AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY.--HIS BELIEF THAT THE PARTY WOULD
FOLLOW HIM.--HIS HOSTILITY TO RADICALS.--PRESIDENT DEPENDS ON CONDUCT
OF THE SOUTH.--PUBLIC INTEREST TRANSFERRED TO THAT SECTION.

CHAPTER V.

GREAT OPPORTUNITY GIVEN TO THE SOUTH.--THEIR RESPONSE TO THE
PRESIDENT'S TREATMENT.--NORTHERN DESIRE FOR RESTORATION OF THE UNION.--
SOUTH DOES NOT RESPOND TO IT.--SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION CONVENTIONS.--
INCOMPLETE AND ILL-DIGESTED PROCEEDINGS.--REBELS APPLY FOR SEATS IN
CONGRESS.--IRON-CLAD OATH IN THEIR WAY.--THEY DENOUNCE IT AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.--COURSE OF ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS.--SOUTHERN FEELING
TOWARDS THE UNION.--THEIR CONVENTIONS EXHIBIT HATRED.--HOSTILE
MANIFESTATIONS.--EXPRESSIONS OF PRESS AND STUMP ORATORS.--LEADING
REBELS NOMINATED FOR OFFICE.--SOUTH DESCRIBED BY MR. FESSENDEN'S
COMMITTEE.--SOUTH MISLED BY NORTHERN DEMOCRACY IN 1865.--FORMER
CALAMITY FROM SAME CAUSE IN 1861.--WHAT CONGRESS WOULD DEMAND OF THE
SOUTH.--THREE INDISPENSABLE REQUIREMENTS.--SOUTHERN LEGISLATURES
DEFIANTLY RESIST.--CHARACTER OF THOSE LEGISLATURES.--PRACTICAL
RE-ENACTMENT OF THE SLAVE-CODE.--CRUELTY OF ALABAMA STATUTES.--
FRAUDULENT IN THEIR NATURE.--COURSE OF THE CITY OF MOBILE.--STATUTES
OF FLORIDA STILL WORSE.--UNFAIR TAXATION.--POLL-TAX OF THREE DOLLARS.--
A LIEN UPON THE NEGRO'S LABOR.--OPPRESSION OF THE NEGRO.--ENACTMENTS IN
SOUTH CAROLINA.--CHARACTERIZED BY RANK INJUSTICE.--PENAL ENACTMENTS IN
MISSISSIPPI.--ATROCIOUS PROVISIONS.--LAWS OF LOUISIANA WORST OF ALL.--
CAPITATION TAX IN THE SOUTH.--ITS UNJUST EFFECT.--SCHOOL LAWS.--
EDUCATION PRACTICALLY DENIED TO THE NEGRO.-HE IS TAXED FOR THE
EDUCATION OF THE WHITES.--DISPROPORTION OF BURDENS PLACED UPON HIM.--
REVIEW OF THE BLACK CODE.--SOME DETAILS OF ITS PROVISIONS.--INCREDIBLY
CRUEL.--THE SOUTH WITHOUT EXCUSE FOR ITS ENACTMENT.--THEIR
DETERMINATION TO VINDICATE SLAVERY.--TO BRING REPROACH ON THE NORTH.--
INFLUENCE OF THESE PROCEEDINGS ON MR. SEWARD.--HIS MODE OF SELF-
JUSTIFICATION.--SEVERELY CENSURED BY HIS OLD SUPPORTERS.--MISLED BY THE
COURSE OF EVENTS.--HIS LOSS OF POPULARITY.

CHAPTER VI.

MEETING OF THE THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS.--RE-ELECTION OF SPEAKER COLFAX.--
HIS ADDRESS ON TAKING THE CHAIR.--THADDEUS STEVENS MOVES FOR A
COMMITTEE OF RECONSTRUCTION.--RESISTED BY DEMOCRATS.--REBEL CONTESTANTS
DENIED ADMISSION TO THE FLOOR.--MUCH FEELING ON THE QUESTION.--
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE.--PROPOSITIONS OF MR. SUMNER.--ANNUAL MESSAGE
OF THE PRESIDENT.--OUTLINE OF ITS CONTENTS.--APPARENTLY CONSERVATIVE IN
TONE.--NOT PERSONALLY AGGRESSIVE.--LEADING MEN OF THE THIRTY-NINTH
CONGRESS.--DEATH OF BOTH VERMONT SENATORS.--NEW SENATORS.--NEW MEMBERS
OF THE HOUSE.--SKETCHES OF PROMINENT SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVES.--
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S PATRONAGE.--UNPRECEDENTED VOLUME OF IT DUE LARGELY
TO THE WAR.--DANGER OF ITS USE AGAINST REPUBLICANS.--APPREHENSIONS OF
REPUBLICANS.--RECONSTRUCTION RESOLUTION IN THE SENATE.--AMENDED IN THAT
BODY.--CONCURRENCE OF HOUSE.--APPOINTMENT OF COMMITTEE.--STRONG
CHARACTER OF ITS MEMBERS.--HOUSE RESOLUTIONS.--DEBATE ON
RECONSTRUCTION.--LONGEST DEBATE IN THE HISTORY OF CONGRESS.--OPENED BY
MR. STEVENS.--VERY RADICAL IN ITS TONE.--HE SKETCHES CHANGED BASIS OF
REPRESENTATION.--GIVES OFFENSE TO THE ADMINISTRATION.--MR. HENRY J.
RAYMOND.--HIS REPLY TO MR. STEVENS.--HIS STRONG ATTACHMENT TO MR.
SEWARD.--THEORY OF DEAD STATES.--SPEECH OF MR. SPALDING.--MR.
SHELLABARGER REPLIES TO MR. RAYMOND.--EXHAUSTIVE SPEECH.--GAVE HIM A
LEADING PLACE IN THE HOUSE.--SEVERE ATTACK ON THE SOUTH.--RESOLUTIONS
OF MR. VOORHEES SUSTAINING ADMINISTRATION.--SPEECH IN SUPPORT OF THEM.
--MR. BINGHAM'S REPLY.--HOUSE REFUSES TO INDORSE THE ADMINISTRATION.--
TWO REPUBLICANS JOIN DEMOCRATIC VOTE.--DISAPPOINTMENT OF MR. RAYMOND.--
THINKS DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT A MISFORTUNE.--CHARACTER OF MR. RAYMOND.--HIS
GREAT ABILITY.--HIS LIFE SHORTENED.--DIED AT FORTY-NINE.

CHAPTER VII.

SENATE DEBATE ON RECONSTRUCTION.--SPEECH OF MR. WILSON.--DENOUNCES THE
PRO-SLAVERY STATUTES OF SOUTHERN STATES.--REPLY OF REVERDY JOHNSON.--
MR. SUMNER SUSTAINS MR. WILSON.--SPEECHES OF WILLARD SAULSBURY AND MR.
COWAN.--EARNEST DEBATE BEFORE HOLIDAYS.--EMBARRASSMENT OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY.--THE PRESIDENT'S PRESUMED STRENGTH.--POSITION OF
COMMERCIAL MEN.--FIRMNESS OF REPUBLICAN MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.--
CONTRASTED WITH CONDUCT OF WHIGS IN 1841.--COVODE AND SCHURZ CALLED
FOR.--PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL MESSAGE.--SENDS REPORT OF MR. SCHURZ AND
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT.--CALLS SPECIAL ATTENTION TO GENERAL GRANT'S
REPORT.--REPORT APPARENTLY SUSTAINS THE ADMINISTRATION.--MR. SUMNER
DENOUNCES PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.--COMPARES JOHNSON TO PIERCE.--MR.
SCHURZ'S REPORT SUBMITTED.--HIS PICTURE OF THE SOUTHERN CONDITION.--HIS
RECOMMENDATIONS.--FAVORS NEGRO SUFFRAGE.--HOW MR. SCHURZ WAS SELECTED.
--EXTENT OF HIS TOUR IN THE SOUTH.--DIVERGENT CONCLUSIONS OF THE TWO.--
SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF POSITION OF BOTH.--INTERESTING CASE IN THE UNITED-
STATES SENATE.--JOHN P. STOCKTON SWORN IN AS SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY.--
PROTEST AGAINST HIS RIGHT TO A SEAT.--JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT IN HIS
FAVOR.--DEBATE IN THE SENATE.--MR. CLARKE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.--ABLE
SPEECH OF MR. FESSENDEN.--HE EXAMINES THE CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND.--HIS
CONCLUSIVE REASONING.--LONG DEBATE.--DECISION AGAINST MR. STOCKTON.--
IMPORTANT RESULTS FLOWING FROM IT.--CONGRESS REGULATES TIME AND MANNER
OF ELECTING SENATORS.--CHANGE FROM STATE CONTROL TO NATIONAL CONTROL.--
ALEXANDER G. CATTELL SUCCEEDS MR. STOCKTON.--DEATH OF MR. WRIGHT.--
FREDERICK T. FRELINGHUYSEN SUCCEEDS HIM.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PRESIDENT OFFENDED.--ADVERSE VOTE IN CONGRESS SURPRISES HIM.--
FREEDMEN'S BUREAU ESTABLISHED.--MAJOR-GENERAL HOWARD APPOINTED
COMMISSIONER.--HIS CHARACTER.--DEFICIENCY OF THE BUREAU.--SUPPLEMENTARY
ACT.--ITS PROVISIONS.--CONFLICT WITH STATE POWER.--LONG DEBATE.--SPEECH
OF IGNATIUS DONNELLY.--THE PRESIDENT'S VETO.--SEVERE ATTACK UPON THE
POLICY.--EXPENSE OF THE BUREAU.--SENATE FAILS TO PASS BILL OVER VETO.--
ANOTHER BILL TO SAME EFFECT PASSED.--MORE GUARDED IN ITS PROVISIONS.--
PRESIDENT VETOES THE SECOND BILL.--SENATE AND HOUSE PASS IT OVER THE
VETO.--UNPOPULARITY OF THE MEASURE.--SENATOR TRUMBULL INTRODUCES CIVIL
RIGHTS BILL.--ITS PROVISIONS.--RADICAL IN THEIR EFFECT.--SPEECH OF
REVERDY JOHNSON.--DEBATE IN THE HOUSE.--PRESIDENT VETOES THE BILL.--
MAKES ELABORATE ARGUMENT AGAINST IT.--EXCITING DEBATE ON VETO.--MR.
TRUMBULL'S SPEECH.--SEVERE REVIEW OF PRESIDENT'S COURSE.--EXCITING
SPEECH OF MR. WADE.--ILLNESS OF MR. WRIGHT.--SEVERE REMARKS OF MR.
McDOUGAL AND MR. GUTHRIE.--DEBATE IN THE HOUSE.--BOTH BRANCHES PASS
BILL OVER VETO.--RADICAL CHARACTER OF THE MEASURE.--RELATIONS OF
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS.--OPENLY HOSTILE.--POPULAR MEETING IN
WASHINGTON.--PRESIDENT'S ACTION APPROVED.--PRESIDENT' SPEECH 22D OF
FEBRUARY.--ITS UNDIGNIFIED AND VIOLENT CHARACTER.--CALLS MEN BY NAME.--
UNFAVORABLE IMPRESSION UPON THE COUNTRY.--THE PRESIDENT LOSING GROUND.
--REPUBLICANS IN CONGRESS ANXIOUS.--EXCITING PERIOD.--SENATOR LANE OF
KANSAS.--HIS POLITICAL DEFECTION.--HIS SUICIDE.--PERSONAL HISTORY.--HIS
PUBLIC SERVICES.--SUICIDE OF PRESTON KING.--SUPPOSED REASONS FOR THE ACT.

CHAPTER IX.

CONTEST BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS.--POINTS OF DIFFERENCE.--WHAT
CONGRESS INSISTED ON.--REQUIRED DEFINITION OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP.--
POLITICAL DISABILITIES.--THE PUBLIC CREDIT.--PROTECTION OF NATIONAL
PENSIONS.--REPUDIATION OF REBEL DEBT.--POSSIBLE PAYMENT FOR SLAVES.--
APPREHENSIONS OF CAPITALISTS.--DANGER HANGING OVER NATIONAL TREASURY.--
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.--SHOULD REBEL STATES
PARTICIPATE.--MR. SEWARD'S VIEW.--MR. THADDEUS STEVENS'S VIEW.--
PROCEEDINGS OF RECONSTRUCTION COMMITTEE.--PROPOSED BASES OF
REPRESENTATION.--AMENDMENT PROPOSED BY MR. SPALDING.--BY MR. BLAINE.--
BY MR. CONKLING.--SPEECH OF MR. JENCKES OF RHODE ISLAND.--BY MR. BAKER
AND MR. INGERSOLL OF ILLINOIS.--BY MR. SHELLABARGER.--BY MR. PIKE OF
MAINE.--MR. SCHENCK'S AMENDMENT.--HOUSE ADOPTS AMENDMENT.--OPPOSED IN
THE SENATE.--LONG SPEECH OF MR. SUMNER.--REPLY OF MR. FESSENDEN.--
SPEECH OF SENATOR HENDERSON.--HIS RADICAL PROPOSITION.--SENATE DEFEATS
HOUSE AMENDMENT.--NEW PROPOSITION FROM THE RECONSTRUCTION COMMITTEE.--
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED.--ITS ORIGINAL FORM.
--DEBATE IN THE HOUSE.--PROCEEDINGS IN THE SENATE.--LONG DEBATE.--
SPEECHES BY MR. HOWARD, MR. HENDRICKS, MR. SHERMAN, MR. REVERDY
JOHNSON, MR. DOOLITTLE.--FINAL ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT BY
BOTH BRANCHES.--NOTIFICATION TO THE STATES JUNE 16.--PROMPT ADOPTION BY
TENNESSEE.--TENNESSEE RE-ADMITTED TO REPRESENTATION.--ACTION OF SENATE
AND HOUSE THEREON.--REASONS ASSIGNED FOR PASSING THE BILL.--PRESIDENT
APPROVES THE BILL, BUT DISAPPROVES THE REASONS FOR ITS PASSAGE.--HIS
INGENIOUS CENSURE OF CONGRESS.--ADJOURNMENT OF CONGRESS.--IMPENDING
POLITICAL CONTEST.--STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS.

CHAPTER X.

A CABINET CRISIS.--RESIGNATION OF WILLIAM DENNISON, POSTMASTER-GENERAL,
JAMES SPEED, ATTORNEY-GENERAL, AND JAMES HARLAN, SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR.--SUCCEEDED RESPECTIVELY BY ALEXANDER W. RANDALL, HENRY
STANBURY, AND ORVILLE H. BROWNING.--POLITICAL CAMPAIGN OF 1866.--FOUR
NATIONAL CONVENTIONS.--TWO FAVORING THE PRESIDENT; TWO ADVERSE.--
PHILADELPHIA CONVENTION, AUGUST 14, FAVORING THE PRESIDENT.--IMPRESSIVE
IN NUMBERS, DISTINGUISHED IN DELEGATES.--PHILADELPHIA CONVENTION OF
SEPTEMBER 13.--SOUTHERN LOYALISTS AND NORTHERN SYMPATHIZERS.--LIST OF
PROMINENT MEN IN ATTENDANCE.--MARKED EFFECT OF ITS PROCEEDINGS.--
SPEECH OF HONORABLE JAMES SPEED.--ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE.--WRITTEN BY
THE HONORABLE J. A. J. CRESWELL.--SOLDIERS' CONVENTION AT CLEVELAND.--
FAVORABLE TO THE PRESIDENT.--SPEECH OF GENERAL EWING.--CONVENTION
PRINCIPALLY DEMOCRATIC IN MEMBERSHIP.--ITS PROCEEDINGS INEFFECTIVE.--
SOLDIERS' CONVENTION AT PITTSBURG.--HOSTILE TO PRESIDENT.--GENERAL COX
PRESIDES.--DISTINGUISHED OFFICERS PRESENT.--TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND
SOLDIERS PRESENT.--GREAT EFFECT FOLLOWED IT IN THE COUNTRY.--FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT THE RALLYING-POINT.--POLITICAL EVENTS OF THE SUMMER.--HOSTILE
TO PRESIDENT.--NEW-ORLEANS RIOT OF JULY 30.--GREAT SLAUGHTER.--REBEL
OFFICERS IN LOUISIANA RESPONSIBLE.--INVESTIGATED BY CONGRESS.--ALSO BY
MILITARY AUTHORITIES.--REPORTS SUBSTANTIALLY AGREE.--CENSURE OF THE
PRESIDENT.--RESULT HURTFUL TO HIS ADMINISTRATION.--HIS FAMOUS TOUR.--
INJURIOUS TO HIS ADMINISTRATION.--REPUBLICANS VICTORIOUS IN ELECTIONS
THROUGHOUT THE NORTH.--DEMOCRATS VICTORIOUS THROUGHOUT THE SOUTH.--
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPUBLICAN BY THREE TO ONE.--PRESIDENT
DEPRESSED.--IMPORTANCE OF THE ELECTIONS OF 1866.--NEGRO SUFFRAGE.--THE
DIFFICULTY OF IMPOSING IT ON THE SOUTH.--FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT THE TEST
FOR RECONSTRUCTION.

CHAPTER XI.

SECOND SESSION THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS.--PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.--REPEATS
THE FORMER RECOMMENDATIONS.--MISCHIEVOUS EFFECT PRODUCED IN THE SOUTH.
--THE TEN CONFEDERATES STATES VOTE ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.--
REJECTED BY EVERY ONE.--DEFIANCE TO CONGRESS.--MADNESS OF THE SOUTHERN
LEADERS.--DETERMINATION OF THE NORTH.--NEW PLAN OF RECONSTRUCTION.--
BILL REPORTED BY MR. STEVENS.--SOUTH DIVIDED INTO MILITARY DISTRICTS.--
BILL ELABORATELY DEBATED.--VIEWS OF LEADING MEMBERS.--EXTRACTS FROM
SPEECHES.--BLAINE AMENDMENT.--DEBATED IN THE HOUSE.--OPPOSED BY MR.
STEVENS.--REJECTED IN THE HOUSE.--ADOPTED IN DIFFERENT FORM IN THE
SENATE.--FINALLY INCORPORATED IN RECONSTRUCTION BILL.--PRESIDENT VETOES
THE BILL.--PASSED OVER HIS VETO.--CHARACTER OF THE MEASURE.--THE SOUTH
FORCES THE ADOPTION OF NEGRO SUFFRAGE.--NOT CONTEMPLATED ORIGINALLY BY
THE NORTH.--CHARACTER OF THE STRUGGLE.--EXECUTIVE PATRONAGE.--
PRESIDENT'S POLICY TO BE SUSTAINED BY IT.--THE POWER OF REMOVAL.--EARLY
DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT.--VIEWS OF MR. MADISON AND MR. WEBSTER.--OF
HAMILTON AND OF WASHINGTON.--REPUBLICAN LEADERS DETERMINED TO CURTAIL
THE POWER.--MR. WILLIAMS INTRODUCES TENURE OF OFFICE BILL.--SPEECHES
OF EDMUNDS, HOWE, AND OTHERS.--PRESIDENT VETOES THE BILL.--PASSED OVER
HIS VETO.--DOUBTFUL CHARACTER OF THE MEASURE.--REPUBLICAN DISTRUST OF
IT.--NEW STATES IN THE NORTH-WEST.--MR. LINCOLN'S POLICY SHOWN IN THE
CASE OF NEVADA.--INCREASE OF FREE TERRITORIES.--NEBRASKA AND COLORADO
APPLY FOR ADMISSION.--PRESIDENT JOHNSON VETOES THE BILL.--ADMISSION OF
COLORADO PREVENTED.--POWER OF PARDON AND AMNESTY BY PROCLAMATION TAKEN
FROM THE PRESIDENT.--SCANDALS REPORTED.

CHAPTER XII.

MEETING OF FORTIETH CONGRESS, MARCH 4TH, 1867.--CONSPICUOUS CHANGES IN
SENATE AND HOUSE.--CAMERON, CONKLING, MORTON, IN SENATE.--BUTLER,
PETERS, BECK, IN HOUSE.--MR. JAMES BROOKS OBJECTS TO THE ORGANIZATION
OF THE HOUSE.--SEVENTEEN STATES ASSENT.--THE CLERK DECLINES TO RECEIVE
HIS MOTION.--THIRD ELECTION OF MR. COLFAX AS SPEAKER.--SUPPLEMENTARY
RECONSTRUCTION ACT.--THE PRESIDENT'S PROMPT VETO.--PASSED OVER HIS
OBJECTIONS.--CONGRESS ADJOURNS TO JULY 3D.--SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY ACT OF
RECONSTRUCTION.--ANOTHER VETO.--OMINOUS WORDS FROM THE PRESIDENT.--
REPUBLICANS DISQUIETED.--CONGRESS ADJOURNS TO NOVEMBER.--THE SOUTH
PLACED UNDER MILITARY GOVERNMENT.--PRACTICAL RECONSTRUCTION.--
CONVENTIONS IN THE SOUTHERN STATES.--CONSTITUTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE
PEOPLE.--SECOND SESSION FORTIETH CONGRESS.--AGGRESSIVE MESSAGE FROM THE
PRESIDENT.--SOUTHERN STATES RE-ADMITTED TO REPRESENTATION.--ANOTHER
VETO FROM THE PRESIDENT.--RECONSTRUCTION CONTEST PRACTICALLY ENDED.--
REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATORS FROM THE SOUTH.--MISTAKES OF FORMER
SLAVE-HOLDERS.--UNFORTUNATE BLUNDERS.--PECULIAR MENTAL QUALITIES OF
PRESIDENT JOHNSON.--THE VETO POWER.--ITS INFREQUENT USE BY EARLIER
PRESIDENTS.--EXAMPLE OF JACKSON.--FOLLOWED BY HIS SUCCESSORS.--
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC AND WHIG PRESIDENTS.--MR. TYLER AND MR.
JOHNSON.--RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.--PROCLAIMED BY MR.
SEWARD.--IMPORTANCE OF ITS PROVISIONS.--SINGULAR HOSTILITY OF THE
DEMOCRATS.--A NEW CHARTER OF FREEDOM.--SWEEPS AWAY OPPRESSION AND
EVERY DENIAL OF JUSTICE.--CREDIT OF IT CONCEDED TO THE REPUBLICANS.

CHAPTER XIII.

GOVERNMENT FINANCES AFTER THE WAR.--DIFFICULTIES OF THE SITUATION.--
INTREPIDITY OF CONGRESS.--ITS GREAT TASK.--$600,000,000 BILL.--SUMMARY
OF PUBLIC DEBT, DECEMBER, 1865.--FUNDED AND FLOATING OBLIGATIONS.--
AGGREGATE DEBT, JANUARY 1, 1866, $2,730,491,745.--$1,600,000,000
FLOATING OBLIGATIONS.--MR. McCULLOCH'S ESTIMATES.--HIS FINANCIAL
POLICY.--CONTRACTION THE LEADING FEATURE.--WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE
REPORT A FUNDING BILL.--HOUSE DEBATES THEREON.--SENATE DEBATE.--FINAL
PASSAGE.--REVENUE LAWS IN CONGRESS.--CONTRASTED WITH BRITISH
PARLIAMENT.--LARGE REDUCTION OF INTERNAL TAXES.--SECOND REDUCTION OF
INTERNAL TAXES.--CONTRACTION POLICY OPPRESSIVE.--INDIRECT RELIEF.--
HOSTILITY RAPIDLY INCREASES.--PROGRESS OF FUNDING BILL.--REPEAL OF
CONTRACTION BILL.--ITS EVIL EFFECTS.--FURTHER REDUCTION OF INTERNAL
TAXES.--FINANCIAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT.--LARGE REDUCTION OF
NATIONAL DEBT.--VALUABLE TREASURY OFFICIALS.--PURCHASE OF ALASKA.--
PRICE, $7,200,000 IN GOLD COIN.--PURCHASE AT FIRST UNPOPULAR.--
RESISTANCE IN THE HOUSE.--MR. WASHBURNE AND GENERAL BUTLER OPPOSE.--
TREATY ABLY SUSTAINED BY GENERAL BANKS.--INTERESTING DEBATE.--MANY
PARTICIPANTS.--POWER OF THE HOUSE RESPECTING TREATIES.--CHRONIC
CONTROVERSY.--THE BILL PASSED.--OPINION OF JUDGE McLEAN.--OF MR.
JEFFERSON.--EXTENT OF ALASKA.--VALUE OF IT.--ITS ELEMENTS OF WEALTH.--
FIRST NORTHERN TERRITORY ACQUIRED BY THE UNITED STATES.--NEGOTIATION
ABLY CONDUCTED BY MR. SEWARD.

CHAPTER XIV.

IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON.--FIRST MOVEMENT THERETO.--MR.
ASHLEY'S GRAVE CHARGES.--GENERAL GRANT'S IMPORTANT TESTIMONY.--
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE DIVIDE.--IMPEACHMENT DEFEATED, DECEMBER, 1867.--
ANALYSIS OF VOTE.--SUSPENSION OF MR. STANTON.--TENURE-OF-OFFICE LAW.--
SENATE DISAPPROVES MR. STANTON'S SUSPENSION.--MR. STANTON RESTORED AS
SECRETARY OF WAR.--AN UNWELCOME CABINET OFFICER.--PREVIOUS VIEWS OF
LEADING STATESMEN.--PRESIDENT'S ANOMALOUS SITUATION.--HE REMOVES MR.
STANTON.--APPOINTS LORENZO THOMAS _Ad Interim_.--SENATE CONDEMNS THE
PRESIDENT'S COURSE.--IMPEACHMENT MOVED IN THE HOUSE.--EXCITING DEBATE.
--IMPEACHMENT CARRIED.--MANAGERS APPOINTED.--ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT
PRESENTED TO THE SENATE.--THOMAS EWING NOMINATED FOR SECRETARY OF WAR.
--NOT CONFIRMED.--COURT OF IMPEACHMENT.--THE CHIEF JUSTICE.--THE
PRESIDENT'S COUNSEL.--JUDGE CURTIS.--MR. EVARTS.--MR. GROESBECK.--THE
PRESIDENT'S ANSWER.--GENERAL BUTLER'S ARGUMENT.--TESTIMONY PRESENTED BY
MANAGERS.--ARGUMENT OF JUDGE CURTIS.--THE PRESIDENT'S WITNESSES.--
REJECTION OF TESTIMONY BY SENATE.--TESTIMONY CONCLUDED.--ARGUMENT OF
GENERAL LOGAN.--OF MR. BOUTWELL.--OF MR. NELSON.--OF MR. GROESBECK.--
OF THADDEUS STEVENS.--OF THOMAS WILLIAMS.--OF MR. EVARTS.--OF MR.
STANBERY.--OF MR. BINGHAM.--TWENTY-NINE SENATORS FILE THEIR OPINIONS.--
FIRST VOTE ON LAST ARTICLE.--GENERAL INTEREST AND EXCITEMENT.--THE
RESULT.--ACQUITTAL OF PRESIDENT.--VIEWS OF REPUBLICANS.--CONDEMNATION
OF CERTAIN SENATORS.--SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF OPINION.--THE PRESIDENT
UNWISELY IMPEACHED.--ACTUAL OFFENSES OF THE PRESIDENT.--THEIR GRAVITY.
--IMPEACHED ON OTHER GROUNDS.--THE REAL TEST.--NATURE OF AN IMPEACHABLE
OFFENSE.--LAWYERS DIFFER.--EFFECT ON MR. STANTON.--HIS POLITICAL
ATTITUDE.--HIS RESIGNATION.--APPOINTED SUPREME JUSTICE.--HIS DEATH.--
GENERAL SCHOFIELD SECRETARY OF WAR.--MR. EVARTS ATTORNEY-GENERAL.

CHAPTER XV.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1868.--REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION AT
CHICAGO.--GENERAL GRANT THE CLEARLY INDICATED CANDIDATE OF HIS PARTY.--
CONTEST FOR THE VICE-PRESIDENCY.--WADE, COLFAX, FENTON, WILSON, CURTIN.
--SPIRITED BALLOTING.--COLFAX NOMINATED.--PLATFORM.--DEMOCRATIC
NATIONAL CONVENTION.--MEETS IN NEW YORK, JULY 4.--NUMEROUS CANDIDATES.
--GEORGE H. PENDLETON MOST PROMINENT.--AN ORGANIZED MOVEMENT FOR CHIEF
JUSTICE CHASE.--HIS ALLIANCE WITH THE DEMOCRACY.--HIS EAGERNESS FOR THE
NOMINATION.--HIS FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH VALLANDINGHAM.--PRESIDENT
JOHNSON.--SEEKS DEMOCRATIC INDORSEMENT.--MR. AUGUST BELMONT'S OPENING
SPEECH.--HORATIO SEYMOUR PRESIDENT OF THE CONVENTION.--HIS ARRAIGNMENT
OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY.--CHARACTER OF HIS MIND.--THE DEMOCRATIC
PLATFORM.--FAVORS PAYING THE PUBLIC DEBT IN PAPER MONEY.--DECLARES THE
RECONSTRUCTION ACTS TO BE USURPATIONS.--WADE HAMPTON'S PROMINENCE.--
VARIOUS NAMES PRESENTED FOR THE PRESIDENCY.--VARYING FORTUNES OF
CANDIDATES.--SEYMOUR NOMINATED.--THE VICE-PRESIDENCY.--FRANK BLAIR
NOMINATED BY ACCLAMATION.--AGGRESSIVE CAMPAIGN OF BOTH SIDES.--MR.
SEYMOUR'S POPULAR TOUR.--FINAL RESULT.--GENERAL GRANT'S ELECTION.

CHAPTER XVI.

REPUBLICAN VICTORY OF 1868 ANALYZED.--MR. SEYMOUR'S STRENGTH
UNEXPECTEDLY GREAT.--ASTOUNDING DEFECTION OF CERTAIN STATES.--
DEMOCRATIC VICTORY IN NEW YORK, NEW JERSEY, AND OREGON.--EVIL OMENS.--
DEMOCRATIC VICTORY IN LOUISIANA.--WON BY FRAUD AND VIOLENCE.--THE
FIGURES EXAMINED.--ACTION OF CONGRESS THEREON.--FRAUD SUSPECTED IN
GEORGIA.--DEMOCRATIC DUTY UNPERFORMED.--IMPARTIAL SUFFRAGE.--VARIOUS
PROPOSITIONS.--AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION.--MR. HENDERSON OF
MISSOURI.--MR. STEWART OF NEVADA.--MR. GARRETT DAVIS.--PROCEEDINGS IN
THE HOUSE.--SPEECH OF MR. BOUTWELL.--ANSWERED BY MR. BECK AND MR.
ELDRIDGE.--PASSAGE OF AMENDMENT BY HOUSE.--ACTION THEREON IN SENATE.--
AMENDMENT OF MR. WILSON.--PROPOSITION OF MR. MORTON AND MR. BUCKALEW.--
DISAGREEMENT OF THE TWO BRANCHES.--CONFERENCE COMMITTEE.--FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENT REPORTED.--PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES.--FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT NOW MODIFIED.--ITS EFFECT AND POTENCY LESSENED.--ITS FAILURE
TO REMOVE EVILS.--GREAT VALUE OF THE THREE AMENDMENTS.--THEIR ASSURED
ENFORCEMENT.--HONOR TO THEIR AUTHORS.--LESSON TAUGHT BY MR. LINCOLN.--
ITS SIGNIFICANCE.

CHAPTER XVII.

INAUGURATION OF GENERAL GRANT FOR FIRST TERM.--POPULAR ENTHUSIASM.--
HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS.--APPROVES FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT.--ANNOUNCEMENT OF
HIS CABINET.--GENERAL SURPRISE.--E. B. WASHBURNE.--JACOB D. COX.--E.
ROCKWOOD HOAR.--JOHN A. J. CRESWELL.--ALEXANDER T. STEWART.--
INELIGIBLE.--NAME WITHDRAWN.--GEORGE S. BOUTWELL APPOINTED.--ADOLPH E.
BORIE.--HAMILTON FISH.--GEORGE M. ROBESON.--GENERAL SCHOFIELD.--GENERAL
RAWLINS.--GENERAL BELKNAP.--GENERAL OF THE ARMY.--THE SUCCESSION.--
SHERMAN APPOINTED.--LIEUTENANT-GENERAL.--SHERIDAN APPOINTED.--HALLECK.
--MEADE.--THOMAS.--HANCOCK.--CONGRESS CONVENES.--ELECTION OF SPEAKER.--
MR. BLAINE CHOSEN.--MR. KERR THE DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE.--VARIOUS
MEMBERS.--MR. WHEELER.--MR. POTTER.--JUDGE NOAH DAVIS.--GENERAL SLOCUM.
--MR. HALE.--THOMAS FITCH.--THE PENNSYLVANIA DELEGATION.--MR. S. S.
COX.--MR. GEORGE F. HOAR.--NEW ERA POLITICALLY UNDER PRESIDENT GRANT.--
THE OPPOSITION PARTY IN THE HOUSE.--ITS STRONG LEADERS.--THEIR MANLY
CHARACTER.

CHAPTER XVIII.

SENATE IN THE FORTY-FIRST CONGRESS.--HANNIBAL HAMLIN ELECTED FOR THE
FOURTH TERM.--MATTHEW H. CARPENTER.--HIS DOUBLE LOAD OF WORK.--CARL
SCHURZ.--ALLEN G. THURMAN.--WILLIAM G. BROWNLOW.--THOMAS FRANCIS
BAYARD.--GOVERNOR FENTON.--WILLIAM A. BUCKINGHAM.--DANIEL D. PRATT.--
JOHN SCOTT.--JOHN P. STOCKTON.--SOUTHERN REPRESENTATION COMPLETE.--
CHARACTER OF SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVES.--UNJUST ABUSE.--SOUTHERN
RESISTANCE TO CARPET-BAG RULE.--ADMISSION OF A COLORED SENATOR.--HIRAM
B. REVELS OF MISSISSIPPI.--SUCCESSOR TO JEFFERSON DAVIS.--THE MORAL OF
IT.--PRESIDENT GRANT AND THE TENURE-OF-OFFICE ACT.--HOUSE VOTES TO
REPEAL THE ACT.--DELAY IN SENATE.--POSITION OF MR. TRUMBULL, MR.
EDMUNDS, AND MR. SCHURZ.--DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN SENATE AND HOUSE.--
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE.--PRACTICAL REPEAL OF THE ACT.--DEATH OF WILLIAM
PITT FESSENDEN.--HIS CHARACTER.

CHAPTER XIX.

EVENTS OF INTEREST.--IN DIPLOMACY AND RECONSTRUCTION.--THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC.--ANNEXATION TREATY.--DEFEATED BY SENATE.--PRESIDENT GRANT
RENEWS THE EFFORT.--COMMISSION SENT TO SAN DOMINGO.--THEIR REPORT.--
OPPOSITION OF MR. SUMNER.--THE PRESIDENT AND MR. SUMNER--RECONSTRUCTION
MEASURES COMPLETED.--VIRGINIA, MISSISSIPPI AND TEXAS.--RE-ADMITTED TO
REPRESENTATION.--PECULIAR CASE OF GEORGIA.--HER RECONSTRUCTION
POSTPONED.--LAST STATE RE-ADMITTED TO REPRESENTATION.--FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENT.--ADOPTED.---PROCLAIMED MARCH 30, 1870.--PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.
--COURSE OF THE SOUTHERN STATES.--HOSTILITY TO RECONSTRUCTION
GOVERNMENTS.--DETERMINATION TO BREAK THEM DOWN.--MILITARY INTERPOSITION
OF THE GOVERNMENT.--KU-KLUX-KLANS.--VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH.--LEGISLATION
TO PREVENT IT.--DIFFICULT TASK.--MOTIVE INSPIRING THE SOUTH.--CARPET-
BAG IMMIGRATION.--COTTON-REARING ORIGINAL MOTIVE.--POLITICAL
CONSEQUENCE.--DISABILITIES IN THE SOUTH.--CAUSE THEREOF.--
RESPONSIBILITY OF SOUTHERN STATES.--ORIGINAL MISTAKE OF THE SOUTH--THE
AIMS OF THE NORTH.

CHAPTER XX.

RESENTMENT AGAINST ENGLAND.--POPULAR FEELING IN THE UNITED STATES.--
CONDUCT OF THE PALMERSTON MINISTRY.--HOSTILE SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS.--MR. ROEBUCK.--LORD ROBERT CECIL.--CONDUCT OF THE TORIES.--OF
THE LIBERALS.--CRITICISMS OF THE BRITISH PRESS.--SOUTH COMPARED WITH
IRELAND.--UNITED STATES DEMANDS COMPENSATION.--REFUSED BY ENGLAND.--
NEGOTIATIONS.--JOHNSON-CLARENDON TREATY.--REJECTED BY SENATE.--
CHARACTER OF TREATY.--SPEECH OF MR. SUMNER.--POSITION OF PRESIDENT
GRANT.--NEGOTIATION CLOSED.--ENGLAND ASKS THAT IT BE RE-OPENED.--JOINT
HIGH COMMISSION.--ITS DELIBERATIONS.--ITS BASIS OF SETTLEMENT.--GENEVA
AWARD.--PRIVATE CLAIMS ADJUSTED.--THE SAN JUAN QUESTION.--ITS FINAL
SETTLEMENT.--HON. GEORGE BANCROFT.

CHAPTER XXI.

OPENING FORTY-SECOND CONGRESS.--DEPOSITION OF CHARLES SUMNER FROM
CHAIRMANSHIP OF FOREIGN RELATIONS.--EXCITING DEBATE.--GRAVE INJUSTICE
TO MR. SUMNER.--DEMOCRATIC SENATORS OPPOSE THE ACT.--NEW SENATORS.--
MATT W. RANSOM.--FRANK P. BLAIR, JUN.--HENRY G. DAVIS--POWELL CLAYTON.
--ORGANIZATION OF THE HOUSE.--MR. BLAINE RE-ELECTED SPEAKER.--DEMOCRATS
CONTROL MORE THEN ONE-THIRD OF HOUSE.--VALUABLE ACCESSIONS TO
MEMBERSHIP.--POLITICAL DISABILITIES.--REMOVED FROM INDIVIDUALS.--
GENERAL AMNESTY PROCLAIMED.--CIVIL-RIGHTS BILL.--COURSE OF COLORED
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE.--THEIR JUSTICE AND MAGNANIMITY.

CHAPTER XXII.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1872.--LIBERAL REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT.--ITS
ORIGIN.--DIVISION IN MISSOURI.--GRATZ BROWN, BLAIR, SCHURZ.--CONTEST IN
NEW YORK.--GREELEY, FENTON, CONKLING.--CONKLING'S TRIUMPH.--LIBERAL
REPUBLICAN CONVENTION.--MEETS AT CINCINNATI.--NOMINATION OF MR.
GREELEY.--ADJUSTMENT OF TARIFF ISSUES.--CHAGRIN OF FREE-TRADERS AND
DEMOCRATS.--MR. GREELEY'S LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE.--NATIONAL REPUBLICAN
CONVENTION.--MEETS IN PHILADELPHIA.--RENOMINATES GENERAL GRANT.--
HENRY WILSON NOMINATED FOR VICE-PRESIDENT.--DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL
CONVENTION.--MEETS IN BALTIMORE.--ENDORSES GREELEY AND BROWN.--ACCEPTS
THE CINCINNATI PLATFORM.--MR. GREELEY'S LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE.--CONTEST
BETWEEN GRANT AND GREELEY.--CHARACTER OF MR. GREELEY.--HIS STRENGTH AND
HIS WEAKNESS.--NORTH CAROLINA ELECTION.--CLAIMED BY BOTH SIDES.--
FAVORABLE TO REPUBLICANS.--SEPTEMBER ELECTIONS.--REPUBLICAN GAINS.--
NOMINATION OF O'CONNOR AND ADAMS.--MR. GREELEY'S WESTERN TOUR.--OCTOBER
ELECTIONS.--STRONG NOMINATION FOR STATE OFFICERS.--ENORMOUS MAJORITIES
FOR GENERAL GRANT.--HIS OVERWHELMING ELECTION.--DEATH OF MR. GREELEY.

CHAPTER XXIII.

PRESIDENT GRANT'S SECOND INAUGURATION.--COMPLAINS OF PARTISAN ABUSE.--
ORGANIZATION OF FORTY-THIRD CONGRESS.--PROMINENT MEMBERS OF SENATE AND
HOUSE.--DEATH OF CHARLES SUMNER.--IMPRESSIVE FUNERAL CEREMONIES.--
SINGULAR REMINISCENCE BY MR. DAVIS.--SPEECH BY MR. LAMAR.--CAREER OF
ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS.--GOVERNMENT OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.--RADICAL
CHANGE.--GREAT IMPROVEMENT.--ALEXANDER R. SHEPHERD.--REPUBLICAN
REVERSE, 1874.--DEMOCRATIC HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.--MICHAEL C. KERR,
SPEAKER.--MEMBERS OF SENATE AND HOUSE.--RADICAL CHANGES.--ANDREW
JOHNSON IN THE SENATE.--HIS SPEECH.--DIES AT HIS HOME IN TENNESSEE.--
CONDITION OF THE SOUTH.--AMNESTY.--AMENDMENT TO EXCEPT JEFFERSON DAVIS.
--BILL DEFEATED.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE PUBLIC CREDIT.--FIRST LAW ENACTED UNDER PRESIDENT GRANT.--
DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION.--THURMAN, GARRETT DAVIS, BAYARD.--PRESIDENT
GRANT'S FIRST MESSAGE.--FUNDING BILLS DISCUSSED.--ACTION OF BOTH
HOUSES.--DEBATES.--FURTHER REDUCTION OF REVENUE.--PREMIUM ON GOLD.--
MEETING OF FORTY-SECOND CONGRESS.--FINANCIAL DEBATES.--FINANCIAL PANIC
OF 1873.--FORTY-THIRD CONGRESS MEETS.--PRESIDENT GRANT'S POSITION.--
ABOLITION OF MOIETIES.--SPECIE PAYMENTS.--RESUMPTION ACT.--SPECIAL
MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT.--ADMISSION OF COLORADO.--DEATH OF SPEAKER
KERR.--SAMUEL J. RANDALL HIS SUCCESSOR.

CHAPTER XXV.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1876.--REPUBLICAN CANDIDATES FOR NOMINATION.--
CONVENTION AT CINCINNATI, JUNE 14, 1876.--REPUBLICAN PLATFORM.--
BALLOTING.--NOMINATION OF HAYES AND WHEELER.--DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL
CONVENTION.--SAMUEL J. TILDEN THE PRINCIPAL CANDIDATE.--HIS CAREER.--
OTHER DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES.--TILDEN AND HENDRICKS NOMINATED.--
DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM.--THE CANVASS.--THE RESULT.--DOUBTFUL STATE.--
POPULAR EXCITEMENT.--DISPUTE IN LOUISIANA, FLORIDA, SOUTH CAROLINA.--
PRESIDENT GRANT'S COURSE.--A PORTENTOUS QUESTION.--ELECTORAL
COMMISSION.--MEMBERS.--QUESTIONS BEFORE THEM.--DECISION.--HAYES AND
WHEELER ELECTED.--SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION.--POTTER COMMISSION.--
DISCOVERY OF TELEGRAMS.--ATTEMPTS AT BRIBERY IN THE SOUTH.

CHAPTER XXVI.

INAUGURATION OF PRESIDENT HAYES.--HIS SOUTHERN POLICY.--APPOINTMENT OF
HIS CABINET.--ORGANIZATION OF SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.--RE-
ELECTION OF SPEAKER RANDALL.--SILVER DISCUSSION.--COINAGE OF SILVER
DOLLAR.--REPORT OF SILVER COMMISSION.--DISCUSSION ON SILVER QUESTION.--
PRODUCT OF SILVER AND GOLD.--THIRTY-TWO YEARS OF EACH.--NAVIGATION
INTERESTS.--LOSS OF GROUND BY THE UNITED STATES.--REASON THEREFOR.--
HOW CAN IT BE REGAINED?

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE QUESTION OF THE FISHERIES.--ORIGIN OF AMERICAN RIGHTS.--EARLY
DISPUTES.--TREATY OF 1782.--TREATY OF GHENT.--TREATY OF 1818.--
RECIPROCITY TREATY.--JOINT HIGH COMMISSION.--FISHERIES QUESTION TO BE
ARBITRATED.--SELECTION OF ARBITRATORS.--NEGOTIATION FOR RECIPROCITY
TREATY.--THE HALIFAX AWARD.--ITS LARGE AMOUNT.--DISSATISFACTION.--
ACTION OF SENATE.--CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.--MR.
EVARTS AND LORD SALISBURY.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

FORTY-SIXTH CONGRESS.--EXTRA SESSION.--ORGANIZATION OF HOUSE.--OF
SENATE.--LEADING MEN IN EACH.--DEMOCRATIC GAIN IN INFLUENCE.--CONTROL
OF BOTH SENATE AND HOUSE.--DEATH OF SENATOR CHANDLER.--QUESTION OF
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM.--THE PATRONAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT.--ITS
ILLEGITIMATE INFLUENCE.--THE QUESTION OF CHINESE LABOR.--LEGISLATION
THEREON.

CHAPTER XXIX.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1880.--THIRD TERM SUGGESTED.--CHICAGO
CONVENTION.--EXCITING CONTEST.--MANY BALLOTINGS.--NOMINATION OF GENERAL
GARFIELD.--DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION.--NOMINATION OF GENERAL HANCOCK.--THE
CONTEST.--THE RESULT.--THE SOLID SOUTH.--ITS MEANING.--ITS EFFECT.--ITS
END.--REVIEW OF THE TWENTY YEARS.--PROGRESS OF THE PEOPLE.--MAJESTY OF
THE REPUBLIC.


LIST OF STEEL PORTRAITS

ULYSSES S. GRANT
ANDREW JOHNSON
HANNIBAL HAMLIN
SCHUYLER COLFAX
HENRY WILSON
WILLIAM A. WHEELER
ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS
SAMUEL J. RANDALL
LUCIUS Q. C. LAMAR
THOMAS F. BAYARD
BENJAMIN H. HILL
AUGUSTUS H. GARLAND
JAMES B. BECK
B. K. BRUCE
H. R. REVELS
JAMES T. RAPIER
JOHN R. LYNCH
J. H. RAINEY
ALLEN G. THURMAN
TIMOTHY O. HOWE
BENJAMIN F. BUTLER
ROSCOE CONKLING
GEORGE P. EDMUNDS
MATTHEW HALE CARPENTER
WILLIAM A. BUCKINGHAM
RUTHERFORD B. HAYES
JAMES A. GARFIELD


TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS

CHAPTER I.

Abraham Lincoln expired at twenty-two minutes after seven o'clock on
the morning of April 15, 1865.  Three hours later, in the presence of
all the members of the Cabinet except Mr. Seward who lay wounded and
bleeding in his own home, the oath of office, as President of the
United States, was administered to Andrew Johnson by Chief Justice
Chase.  The simple but impressive ceremony was performed in Mr.
Johnson's lodgings at the Kirkwood Hotel; and besides the members of
the Cabinet, who were present in their official character, those
senators who had remained in Washington since the adjournment of
Congress were called in as witnesses.  While the death of Mr. Lincoln
was still unknown to the majority of the citizens of the Republic, his
successor was installed in office, and the administration of the
Federal Government was radically changed.  It was especially fortunate
that the Vice-President was at the National Capital.  He had arrived
but five days before, and was intending to leave for his home in
Tennessee within a few hours.  His prompt investiture with the Chief
Executive authority of the Nation preserved order, maintained law, and
restored confidence to the people.  With the defeat and disintegration
of the armies of the Confederacy, and with the approaching disbandment
of the armies of the Union, constant watchfulness was demanded of the
National Executive.  It is a striking tribute to the strength of the
Constitution and of the Government that the orderly administration of
affairs was not interrupted by a tragedy which in many countries might
have been the signal for a bloody revolution.

The new President confronted grave responsibilities.  The least
reflecting among those who took part in the mighty struggle perceived
that the duties devolved upon the Government by victory--if less
exacting and less critical than those imposed by actual war--were more
delicate in their nature, and required statesmanship of a different
character.  The problem of reconstructing the Union, and adapting its
varied interests to its changed condition, demanded the highest
administrative ability.  Many of the questions involved were new, and,
if only for that reason, perplexing.  No experience of our own had
established precedents; none in other countries afforded even close
analogies.  Rebellions and civil wars had, it is true, been frequent,
but they had been chiefly among peoples consolidated under one
government, ruled in all their affairs, domestic and external, by one
central power.  The overthrow of armed resistance in such cases was the
end of trouble, and political society and public order were rapidly
re-formed under the restraint which the triumphant authority was so
easily able to impose.

A prompt adjustment after the manner of consolidated governments was
not practicable under our Federal system.  In the division of functions
between the Nation and the State, those that reach and affect the
citizen in his every-day life belong principally to the State.  The
tenure of land is guaranteed and regulated by State Law; the domestic
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward,
together with the entire educational system, are left exclusively to
the same authority, as is also the preservation of the public peace by
proper police-systems--the National Government intervening only on the
call of the State when the State's power is found inadequate to the
suppression of disorder.  These leading functions of the State were
left in full force under the Confederate Government; and the
Confederate Government being now destroyed, and the States that
composed it being under the complete domination of the armies of the
Union, the whole framework of society was in confusion, if not indeed
in chaos.  To restore the States to their normal relations to the
Union, to enable them to organize governments in harmony with the
fundamental changes wrought by the war, was the embarrassing task which
the Administration of President Johnson was compelled to meet on the
very threshold of its existence.

The successful issue of these unprecedented and complicated
difficulties depended in great degree upon the character and temper of
the Executive.  Many wise men regarded it as a fortunate circumstance
that Mr. Lincoln's successor was from the South, though a much larger
number in the North found in this fact a source of disquietude.  Mr.
Johnson had the manifest disadvantage of not possessing any close or
intimate knowledge of the people of the Loyal States.  It was feared
moreover, that his relations with the ruling spirits of the South in
the exciting period preceding the war specially unfitted him for
harmonious co-operation with them in the pending exigencies.

The character and career of Mr. Johnson were anomalous and in many
respects contradictory.  By birth he belonged to that large class in
the South known as "poor whites,"--a class scarcely less despised by
the slave-holding aristocracy than were the human chattels themselves.
Born in North Carolina, and bred to the trade of a tailor, he reached
his fifteenth year before he was taught even to read.  In his
eighteenth year he migrated to Tennessee, and established himself in
that rich upland region on the eastern border of the State, where by
altitude the same agricultural conditions are developed that
characterize the land which lies several degrees further North.
Specially adapted to the cereals, the grasses, and the fruits
of Southern Pennsylvania and Ohio, East Tennessee could not
employ slave-labor with the profit which it brought in the rich
cotton-fields of the neighboring lowlands, and the result was that
the population contained a large majority of whites.

Owing much to a wise marriage, pursuing his trade with skill and
industry, Johnson gained steadily in knowledge and in influence.
Ambitious, quick to learn, honest, necessarily frugal, he speedily
became a recognized leader of the class to which he belonged.
Before he had attained his majority he was chosen to an important
municipal office, and at twenty-two he was elected mayor of his town.
Thenceforward his promotion was rapid.  At twenty-seven he was sent
to the Legislature of his State; and in 1840, when he was in his
thirty-second year, he was nominated for the office of Presidential
elector and canvassed that State in the interest of Mr. Van Buren.
Three years later he was chosen representative in Congress where he
served ten years.  He was then nominated for governor, and in the
elections of 1853 and 1855 defeated successively two of the most
popular Whigs in Tennessee, Gustavus A. Henry and Meredith P. Gentry.
In 1857 he was promoted to the Senate of the United States, where he
was serving at the outbreak of the civil war.

While Mr. Johnson had been during his entire political life a member
of the Democratic party, and had attained complete control in his
State, the Southern leaders always distrusted him.  Though allied to
the interests of slavery and necessarily drawn to its defense, his
instincts, his prejudices, his convictions were singularly strong on
the side of the free people.  His sympathies with the poor were acute
and demonstrative--leading him to the advocacy of measures which in a
wide and significant sense were hostile to slavery.  In the early part
of his career as a representative in Congress, he warmly espoused, if
indeed he did not originate, the homestead policy.  In support of that
policy he followed a line of argument and illustration absolutely and
irreconcilably antagonistic to the interests of the slave system as
those interests were understood by the mass of Southern Democratic
leaders.

The bestowment of our public domain in quarter-sections (a hundred
and sixty acres of land) upon the actual settler, on the simple
condition that he should cultivate it and improve it as his home, was
a more effective blow against the spread of slavery in the Territories
than any number of legal restrictions or _provisos_ of the kind
proposed by Mr. Wilmot.  Slavery could not be established with success
except upon the condition of large tracts of land for the master, and
the exclusion of the small farmer from contact and from competition.
The example of the latter's manual industry and his consequent thrift
and prosperity, must ultimately prove fatal to the entire slave system.
It may not have been Mr. Johnson's design to injure the institution of
slavery by the advocacy of the homestead policy; but such advocacy was
nevertheless hostile, and this consideration did not stay his hand or
change his action.

Mr. Johnson' mode of urging and defending the homestead policy was at
all times offensive to the mass of his Democratic associates of the
South, many of whom against their wishes were compelled to support the
measure on its final passage, for fear of giving offense to their
landless white constituents, and in the still more pressing fear,
that if Johnson should be allowed to stand alone in upholding the
measure, he would acquire a dangerous ascendency over that large
element in the Southern population.  Johnson spoke with ill-disguised
hatred of "an inflated and heartless landed aristocracy," not applying
the phrase especially to the South, but making an argument which tended
to sow dissension in that section.  He declared that "the withholding
of the use of the soil from the actual cultivator is violative of the
principles essential to human existence," and that when "the violation
reaches that point where it can no longer be borne, revolution begins."
His argument startlingly outlined a condition such as has long existed
in Ireland, and applied it with suggestive force to the possible fate
of the South.

He then sketched his own ideal of a rural population, an ideal
obviously based on free labor and free institutions.  "You make a
settler on the domain," said he, "a better citizen of the community.
He becomes better qualified to discharge the duties of a freeman.  He
is, in fact, the representative of his own homestead, and is a man in
the enlarged and proper sense of the term.  He comes to the ballot-box
and votes without the fear or the restraint of some landlord.  After
the hurry and bustle of election day are over, he mounts his own horse,
returns to his own domicil, goes to his own barn, feeds his own stock.
His wife turns out and milks their own cows, churns their own butter;
and when the rural repast is ready, he and his wife and their children
sit down at the same table together to enjoy the sweet product of their
own hands, with hearts thankful to God for having cast their lots in
this country where the land is made free under the protecting and
fostering care of a beneficent Government."

The picture thus presented by Johnson was not the picture of a home in
the slave States, and no one knew better than he that it was a home
which could not be developed and established amid the surroundings and
the influences of slavery.  It was a home in the North-West, and not in
the South-West.  Proceeding in his speech Johnson became still more
warmly enamored of his hero on the homestead, and with a tongue that
seemed touched with the gift of prophecy he painted him in the possible
career of a not distant future.  "It has long been near my heart," said
he in the House of Representatives in July, 1850, "to see every man in
the United States domiciled.  Once accomplished, it would create the
strongest tie between the citizen and the Government; what a great
incentive it would afford to the citizen to obey every call of duty!
At the first summons of the note of war you would find him leaving his
plow in the half-finished furrow, taking his only horse and converting
him into a war-steed: his scythe and sickle would be thrown aside, and
with a heart full of valor and patriotism he would rush with alacrity
to the standard of his country."

Such appeals for popular support subjected Johnson to the imputation of
demagogism, and earned for him the growing hatred of that dangerous
class of men in the South who placed the safety of the institution of
slavery above the interest and the welfare of the white laborer.  But
if he was a demagogue, he was always a brave one.  In his early
political life, when the mere nod of President Jackson was an edict in
Tennessee, Johnson did not hesitate to espouse the cause of Hugh L.
White when he was a candidate for the Presidency in 1836, nor did he
fear to ally himself with John Bell in the famous controversy with
Jackson's _protege_, James K. Polk, in the fierce political struggle of
1834-5.  Though he returned to the ranks of the regular Democracy in
the contest between Harrison and Van Buren, he was bold enough in 1842
to propose in the Legislature of Tennessee that the apportionment of
political power should be made upon the basis of the white population
of the State.  He saw and keenly felt that a few white men in the
cotton section of the State, owning many slaves, were usurping the
power and trampling upon the rights of his own constituency, among
whom slaves were few in number and white men numerous.  Those who
are familiar with the savage intolerance which prevailed among the
slave-holders can justly measure the degree of moral and physical
courage required in any man who would assail their power at a vital
point in the framework of a government specially and skilfully devised
for their protection.

In all the threats of disunion, in all the plotting and planning for
secession which absorbed Southern thought and action between the years
1854 and 1861, Mr. Johnson took no part.  He had been absent from
Congress during the exciting period when the Missouri Compromise was
overthrown; and though, after his return in 1857, he co-operated
generally in the measures deemed essential for Southern interests, he
steadily declared that a consistent adherence to the Constitution was
the one and the only remedy for all the alleged grievances of the
slave-holders.  It was natural therefore, that when the decisive hour
came, and the rash men of the South determined to break up the
Government, Johnson should stand firmly by the Union.

Of the twenty-two senators from the eleven States that afterwards
composed the Confederacy, Johnson was the only one who honorably
maintained his oath to support the Constitution; the only one who did
not lend his aid and comfort to the enemies of the Union.  He remained
in his seat in the Senate, loyal to the Government, and resigned a year
after the outbreak of the war (in March, 1862), upon Mr. Lincoln's
urgent request that he should accept the important post of Military
Governor of Tennessee.  His administration of that office and his firm
discharge of every duty under circumstances of great exigency and
oftentimes of great peril, gave to him an exceptional popularity in all
the Loyal States, and led to his selection for the Vice-Presidency in
1864.  The national calamity had now suddenly brought him to a larger
field of duty, and devolved upon him the weightiest responsibility.

The assassination of Mr. Lincoln naturally produced a wide-spread
depression and dread of evil.  His position had been one of exceptional
strength with the people.  By his four years of considerate and
successful administration, by his patient and positive trust in the
ultimate triumph of the Union--realized at last as he stood on the edge
of the grave--he had acquired so complete an ascendancy over the public
mind in the Loyal States that any policy matured and announced by him
would have been accepted by a vast majority of his countrymen.  But the
same degree of faith could not attach to Mr. Johnson; although after
the first shock of the assassination had subsided, there was a generous
revival of trust, or at least of hope, that the great work which had
been so faithfully prosecuted for four years would be faithfully
carried forward in the same lofty spirit to the same noble ends.  The
people of the North waited with favorable disposition and yet with
balancing judgment and in exacting mood.  They had enjoyed abundant
opportunity to acquaint themselves with the principles and the opinions
of the new President, and confidence in his future policy was not
unaccompanied by a sense of uncertainty and indeed by an almost painful
suspense as to his mode of solving the great problems before him.  As
has already been indicated, the more radical Republicans of the North
feared that his birth and rearing as a Southern man and his long
identification with the supporters of the slave system might blind him
to the most sacred duties of philanthropy, while the more conservative
but not less loyal or less humane feared that from the personal
antagonisms of his own stormy career he might be disposed to deal too
harshly with the leaders of the conquered rebellion.  The few words
which Mr. Johnson had addressed to those present when he took the oath
of office were closely scanned and carefully analyzed by the country,
even in the stunning grief which Mr. Lincoln's death had precipitated.
It was especially noted that he refrained from declaring that he should
continue the policy of his predecessor.  By those who knew Mr.
Johnson's views intimately, the omission was understood to imply that
Mr. Lincoln had intended to pursue a more liberal and more generous
policy with the rebels than his successor deemed expedient or prudent.

It was known to a few persons that when Mr. Johnson arrived from
Fortress Monroe on the morning of April 10, and found the National
Capital in a blaze of patriotic excitement over the surrender of Lee's
army the day before at Appomattox, he hastened to the White House, and
addressed to the unwilling ears of Mr. Lincoln an earnest protest
against the indulgent terms conceded by General Grant.  Mr. Johnson
believed that General Lee should not have been permitted to surrender
his sword as a solider of honor, but that General Grant should have
received the entire command as prisoners of war, and should have held
Lee in confinement until he could receive instructions from the
Administration at Washington.  The spirit which these views indicated
was understood by those who knew Mr. Johnson to be contained, if not
expressed, in this declaration of his first address: "As to an
indication of any policy which may be pursued by me in the conduct of
the Government, I have to say that that must be left for development as
the Administration progresses.  The message or the declaration must be
made by the acts as they transpire.  The only assurance I can now give
of the future is by reference to the past."

The effect produced upon the public by this speech, which might be
regarded as an Inaugural address, was not happy.  Besides its evasive
character respecting public policies which every observing man noted
with apprehension, an unpleasant impression was created by its evasive
character respecting Mr. Lincoln.  The entire absence of eulogy of the
slain President was remarked.  There was no mention of his name or of
his character or of his office.  The only allusion in any way whatever
to Mr. Lincoln was Mr. Johnson's declaration that he was "almost
overwhelmed by the announcement of the sad event which has so recently
occurred."  While he found no time to praise one whose praise was on
every tongue, he made ample reference to himself and his own past
history.  Though speaking not more than five minutes, it was noticed
that "I" and "my" and "me" were mentioned at least a score of times.
A boundless egotism was inferred from the line of his remarks: "My
past public life which has been long and laborious has been founded, as
I in good conscience believe, upon a great principle of right which
lies at the basis of all things."  "I must be permitted to say, if I
understand the feelings of my own heart, I have long labored to
ameliorate and alleviate the condition of the great mass of the
American people."  "Toil and an honest advocacy of the great principles
of free government have been my lot.  The duties have been mine, the
consequences God's."  Senator John P. Hale of New Hampshire, who was
present on the occasion, said with characteristic wit, that "Johnson
seemed willing to share the glory of his achievements with his Creator,
but utterly forgot that Mr. Lincoln had any share of credit in the
suppression of the Rebellion."

Three days later (April 18) a delegation of distinguished citizens of
Illinois called upon Mr. Johnson under circumstances at once
extraordinary and touching.  The dead President still lay in the White
House.  Before the solemn and august procession should leave the
National Capital to bear his mortal remains to the State which had
loved and honored him, the Illinois delegation called to assure his
successor of their respect and their confidence.  Governor Oglesby who
spoke for his associates, addressed the President in language
eminently befitting the occasion.  "In the midst of this sadness," said
he, "through the oppressive gloom that surrounds us, we look to you and
to a brighter future for our country. . . . The record of your past
life, familiar to all, your noble efforts to stay the hand of treason
and restore our flag to the uttermost bounds of the Republic, give
assurance to the great State we represent that we may safely trust the
nation's destinies in your hands."

Mr. Johnson responded in a speech of much greater length than his
first, embodying a wider range of topics than seemed to be demanded by
the proprieties of the occasion.  He evidently strove to repair the
error of his former address.  He now diminished the number of
gratulatory allusions to his own career, and made appropriate and
affecting reference to his predecessor.  He spoke with profound emotion
of the tragical termination of Mr. Lincoln's life: "The beloved of all
hearts has been assassinated."  Pausing thoughtfully he added, "And
when we trace this crime to its cause, when we remember the source
whence the assassin drew his inspiration, and then look at the result,
we stand yet more astounded at this most barbarous, most diabolical
act. . . . We can trace its cause through successive steps back to that
source which is the spring of all our woes.  No one can say that if the
perpetrator of this fiendish deed be arrested, he should not undergo
the extremest penalty of the law known for crime; none will say that
mercy should interpose.  But is he alone guilty?  Here, gentlemen, you
perhaps expect me to present some indication of my future policy.  One
thing I will say: every era teaches its lesson.  The times we live in
are not without instruction.  The American people must be taught--if
they do not already feel--that treason is a crime and must be punished.
The Government must be strong not only to protect but to punish.  When
we turn to the criminal code we find arson laid down as a crime with
the appropriate penalty.  We find theft and murder denounced as crimes,
and their appropriate penalty prescribed; and there, too, we find the
last and highest of crimes,--treason. . . . The people must understand
that treason is the blackest of crimes and will surely be punished
. . . . Let it be engraven on every mind that treason is a crime and
traitors shall suffer its penalty. . . . I do not harbor bitter or
resentful feelings towards any. . . . When the question of exercising
mercy comes before me it will be considered calmly, judicially--
remembering that I am the Executive of the Nation.  I know men love to
have their names spoken of in connection with acts of mercy, and how
easy it is to yield to that impulse.  But we must never forget that
what may be mercy to the individual is cruelty to the State."

This speech was reported by an accomplished stenographer, and was
submitted to Mr. Johnson's inspection before publication.  It contained
a declaration intimating to his hearers, if not explicitly assuring
them, that "the policy of Mr. Lincoln in the past shall be my policy in
the future."  When in reading the report he came to this passage, Mr.
Johnson queried whether his words had not been in some degree
misapprehended; and while he was engaged with the stenographer in
modifying the form of expression, Mr. Preston King of New York, who was
constantly by his side as adviser, interposed the suggestion that all
reference to the subject be stricken out.  To this Mr. Johnson promptly
assented.  He had undoubtedly gone farther than he intended in speaking
to Mr. Lincoln's immediate friends, and the correction--inspired by one
holding the radical views of Mr. King--was equivalent to a declaration
that the policy of Mr. Lincoln had been more conservative than that
which he intended to pursue.  By those who knew the character of Mr.
Johnson's mind, the ascendancy of Mr. King in his councils, and the
retirement of Mr. Seward from the State Department were foregone
conclusions.  The known moderation of Mr. Seward's views would not
consist with the fierce vigor of the new administration as now clearly
foreshadowed.  Mr. Seward and Mr. King, moreover, were not altogether
in harmony in New York; and this was so far recognized by the public
that Mr. King's displacement from the Senate by the election of
Governor Morgan two years before was universally attributed to the
Seward influence skilfully directed by Mr. Thurlow Weed.  The
resentment felt by Mr. King's friends had been very deep, and the
opportunity to gratify it seemed now to be presented.

As soon as the Illinois delegation had retired, the members of the
Christian Commission then in session at Washington called upon the
President.  In reply to their earnest address, he begged them as
intelligent men representing the power of the Christian Church, to
exert their moral influence "in erecting a standard by which everybody
should be taught to believe that treason is the highest crime known to
the laws, and that the perpetrator should be visited with the
punishment which he deserves."  This substantial repetition of the
views expressed in his Illinois speech derived significance from the
fact that the clergyman who spoke for the Christian Commission (Rev.
Dr. Borden of Albany) had expressed the hope in his address to the
President that "in the administration of justice, mercy would follow
the success of arms."

While the remains of the late President were yet reposing in the
National Capital, and still more while his funeral-train was on the
way to his tomb, the reception of official deputations and political
bodies was continued by his successor.  Mr. Johnson was always ready
to explain with some iteration and with great emphasis his views of
the Government's duty respecting those who had been engaged in
rebellion against its authority.  To a representative body of loyal
Southerners who by reason of their fidelity to the Union had been
compelled to flee from home, Mr. Johnson was especially demonstrative
in his sympathy, and positive in his assurances.  In reply to their
address he said: "It is hardly necessary for me on this occasion to
declare that my sympathies and impulses in connection with this
nefarious rebellion beat in unison with yours.  Those who have passed
through this bitter ordeal and who participated in it to a great
extent, are more competent, as I think, to judge and determine the true
policy that should be pursued.  I know how to appreciate the condition
of being driven from one's home.  I can sympathize with him whose all
has been taken from him: I can sympathize with him who has been
driven from the place that gave his children birth. . . . _I have
become satisfied that mercy without justice is a crime,_ and that when
mercy and clemency are exercised by the Executive it should always be
done in view of justice.  In that manner alone the great prerogative of
mercy is properly exercised.  The time has come, as you who have had to
drink this bitter cup are fully aware, when the American people should
be made to understand the true nature of crime.  Of crime generally our
people have a high understanding as well as of the necessity of its
punishment; but in the catalogue of crimes there is one, and that the
highest known to the laws and the Constitution, of which since the
days of Aaron Burr they have become oblivious.  That crime is
_treason_.  The time has come when the people should be taught to
understand the length and breadth, the height and depth, of treason.
One who has become distinguished in the rebellion says that 'when
traitors become numerous enough, treason becomes respectable, and to
become a traitor is to constitute a portion of the aristocracy of the
country.'  God protect the American people against such an aristocracy!
. . . When the Government of the United States shall ascertain who are
the conscious and intelligent traitors the penalty and the forfeit
should be paid."

A delegation of Pennsylvanians called upon him with ex-Secretary Simon
Cameron as their spokesman.  In reply Mr. Johnson said, "There has been
an effort since this rebellion began, to make the impression that it
was a mere political struggle, or, as I see it thrown out in some of
the papers, a struggle for the ascendency of certain principles from
the dawn of the government to the present time, and now settled by the
final triumph of the Federal arms.  If this is admitted, the Government
is at an end; for no question can arise but they will make it a party
issue, and then to whatever length they carry it, the party defeated
will only be a party defeated, with no crime attaching thereto.  But I
say that treason is a crime, the very highest crime known to the law,
and there are men who ought to suffer the penalty of their treason!
. . . To the unconscious, the deceived, the conscripted, in short, to
the great mass of the misled, I would say mercy, clemency,
reconciliation, and the restoration of their government.  But to those
who have deceived, to the conscious, intelligent, influential traitor
who attempted to destroy the life of a nation, I would say, on you be
inflicted the severest penalties of your crime."

The inflexible sternness of Mr. Johnson's tone and the frequent
repetition of his intention to inflict the severest penalty of the law
upon the leading traitors, began to create apprehension in the North.
It was feared that the country might be called upon to witness, after
the four years' carnival of death on the battle-field and in the
hospital, an era of "bloody assizes," made the more rigorous and
revengeful from the peculiar sense of injury which the President, as a
loyal Southerner, had realized in his own person.  This feeling was
probably still further aggravated by his avowed sympathy with the
thousands in the South who had been maimed, driven from home, stripped
of all their property, simply because of the fidelity to the
Constitution and the Union of their fathers.  The spirit of the
_Vendetta_, unknown in the Northern States, was frequently shown in the
South, where it had long been domesticated with all its Corsican
ferocity.  It had raged in many instances to the extermination of
families, and in many localities to the destruction of peace and the
utter defiance of law--not infrequently indeed paralyzing the
administration of justice in whole counties.  Often seeking and waging
open combat with ferocious courage, it did not hesitate at secret
murder, at waylaying on lonely roads with superior numbers, and it
sometimes went so far as to torture an unhappy victim before the final
death-blow.  The language of Mr. Johnson was interpreted by the
merciful in the North as indicating that his own injuries and fierce
conflicts during the war has possibly inspired him with the fell
spirit of revenge, which in his zeal he might mistake for the
rational demands of justice.

A personal and somewhat curious illustration of Mr. Johnson's temper
and purpose at the time is afforded by a conference between himself
and Senator Wade of Ohio.  Mr. Wade was widely known as among the
radical and progressive members of the Republican party.  His immediate
constituents of the Western Reserve were a just and God-fearing people,
amply endowed with both moral and physical courage; but they were not
men of blood, and they were not in sympathy with the apparent purposes
of the President.  It is not improbable that Mr. Wade's views were
somewhat in advance of those held by the majority of the people he
represented, but he was evidently not in accord with the threatenings
and slaughter breathed out by the President.

"Well, Mr. Wade, what would you do were you in my place and charged
with my responsibilities?" inquired the President.  "I think," replied
the frank and honest old senator from Ohio, "I should either force into
exile or hang about ten or twelve of the worst of those fellows;
perhaps by way of full measure, I should make it thirteen, just a
baker's dozen."--"But how," rejoined the President, "are you going to
pick out so small a number and show them to be guiltier than the rest?"
--"It won't do to hang a very large number," rejoined Wade, "and I
think if you would give me time, I could name thirteen that stand at
the head in the work of rebellion.  I think we would all agree on Jeff
Davis, Toombs, Benjamin Slidell, Mason, and Howell Cobb.  If we did no
more than drive those half-dozen out of the country, we should
accomplish a good deal."

The interview was long, and at its close Mr. Johnson expressed surprise
that Wade was willing to let "the traitors," as he always styled them,
"escape so easily."  He said that he had expected the heartiest support
from Wade in a policy which, as he outlined it to the senator, seemed
in _thoroughness_ to rival that of Strafford.  Mr. Wade left the
Executive Mansion with his mind divided between admiration for the
stern resolve and high courage of the President on the one hand, and
his fear on the other that a policy so determined and aggressive as Mr.
Johnson seemed bent on pursuing might work a re-action in the North,
and that thus in the end less might be done in providing proper
safeguards against another rebellion, than if too much had not been
attempted.

The remains of the late President lay in state at the Executive Mansion
for four days.  The entire city seemed as a house of mourning.  It was
remarked that even the little children in the streets wore no smiles
upon their faces, so deeply were they impressed by the calamity which
had brought grief to every loyal heart.  The martial music which had
been resounding in glad celebration of the national triumph had ceased;
public edifice and private mansion were alike draped with the insignia
of grief; the flag of the Union, which had been waving more proudly
than ever before, was now lowered to half-mast, giving mute but
significant expression to the sorrow that was felt wherever on sea or
land that flag was honored.

Funeral services, conducted by the leading clergymen of the city, were
held in the East Room on Wednesday the 19th of April.  Amid the solemn
tolling of church-bells, and the still more solemn thundering of
minute-guns from the vast line of fortifications which had protected
Washington, the body, escorted by an imposing military and civic
procession, was transferred to the rotunda of the Capitol.  The day was
observed throughout the Union as one of fasting, humiliation, and
prayer.  The deep feeling of the people found expression in all the
forms of religious solemnity.  Services in the churches throughout the
land were held in unison with the services at the Executive mansion,
and were everywhere attended with exhibition of profound personal
grief.  In all the cities of Canada business was suspended, public
meetings of condolence with a kindred people were held, and prayers
were read in the churches.  Throughout the Confederate States where war
had ceased but peace had not yet come, the people joined in significant
expressions of sorrow over the death of him whose very name they had
been taught to execrate.

Early on the morning of the 21st the body was removed from the Capitol
and placed on the funeral-car which was to transport it to its final
resting-place in Illinois.  The remains of a little son who had died
three years before, were taken from their burial-place in Georgetown
and borne with those of his father for final sepulture in the stately
mausoleum which the public mind had already decreed to the illustrious
martyr.  The train which moved from the National Capital was attended
on its course by extraordinary manifestations of grief on the part of
the people.  Baltimore, which had reluctantly and sullenly submitted to
Mr. Lincoln's formal inauguration and to his authority as President,
now showed every mark of honor and of homage as his body was borne
through her streets, Confederate and Unionist alike realizing the
magnitude of the calamity which had overwhelmed both North and South.
In Philadelphia the entire population did reverence to the memory of
the murdered patriot.  A procession of more than a hundred thousand
persons formed his funeral _cortege_ to Independence Hall, where the
body remained until the ensuing day.  The silence of the sorrowful
night was in strange contrast with the scene in the same place, four
years before, when Mr. Lincoln, in the anxieties and perils of the
opening rebellion, hoisted the National flag over our ancient Temple of
Liberty, and before a great and applauding multitude defended the
principles which that flag typifies.  He concluded in words which,
deeply impressive at the time, proved sadly prophetic now that his dead
body lay in a bloody shroud where his living form then stood: _"Sooner
than surrender these principles, I would be assassinated on this spot."_

In the city of New York the popular feeling was, if possible, even more
marked than in Philadelphia.  The streets were so crowded that the
procession moved with difficulty to the City Hall, where amid the
chantings of eight hundred singers, the body was placed upon the
catafalque prepared for it.  Throughout the day and throughout the
entire night the living tide of sorrowful humanity flowed past the
silent form.  At the solemn hour of midnight the German musical
societies sang a funeral-hymn with an effect so impressive and touching
that thousands of strong men were in tears.  Other than this no sound
was heard throughout the night except the footsteps of the advancing
and receding crowd.  At sunrise many thousands still waiting in the
park were obliged to turn away disappointed.  It was observed that
every person who passed through the hall, even the humblest and
poorest, wore the insignia of mourning.  In a city accustomed to large
assemblies and to unrestrained expressions of popular feeling, no such
scene had ever been witnessed.  On the afternoon appointed for the
procession to move Westward, all business was suspended, and the grief
of New York found utterance in Union Square before a great concourse of
people in a funeral oration by the historian Bancroft and in an elegiac
ode by William Cullen Bryant.

Similar scenes were witnessed in the great cities along the entire
route.  Final obsequies were celebrated in Oakridge Cemetery near
Springfield on the fourth day of May.  Major-General Joseph Hooker
acted as chief marshal upon the occasion, and an impressive sermon was
pronounced by Bishop Simpson of the Methodist-Episcopal church.
Perhaps in the history of the world no such outpouring of the people,
no such exhibition of deep feeling, had ever been witnessed as on this
funeral march from the National Capital to the capital of Illinois.
The pomp with which sovereigns and nobles are interred is often formal
rather than emotional, attaching to the rank rather than to the person.
Louis Philippe appealed to the sympathy of France when he brought the
body of the Emperor Napoleon from St. Helena twenty years after his
death; but the popular feeling among the French was chiefly displayed
in connection with the elaborate rites which attended the transfer of
the dead hero to the _Invalides_, where the shattered remains of his
valiant and once conquering legions formed for the last time around
him.  Twelve years later the victorious rival by whom the imperial
warrior was at last overcome, received from the populace of London, as
well as from the crown, the peers, and the commons of England, the
heartiest tribute that Britons ever paid to human greatness.

The splendor of the ceremonials which aggrandize living royalty as much
as they glorify dead heroism, was wholly wanting in the obsequies of
Mr. Lincoln.  No part was taken by the Government except the provision
of a suitable military escort.  All beyond was the spontaneous movement
of the people.  For seventeen hundred miles, through eight great States
of the Union whose population was not less than fifteen millions, an
almost continuous procession of mourners attended the remains of the
beloved President.  There was no pageantry save their presence.  There
was no tribute but their tears.  They bowed before the bier of him who
had ben prophet, priest, and king to his people, who had struck the
shackles from the slave, who had taught a higher sense of duty to the
true man, who had raised the Nation to a loftier conception of faith
and hope and charity.  A countless multitude of men, with music and
banner and cheer and the inspiration of a great cause, presents a
spectacle that engages the eye, fills the mind, appeals to the
imagination.  But the deepest sympathy of the soul is touched, the
height of human sublimity is reached, when the same multitude, stricken
with a common sorrow, stands with uncovered head, reverent and silent.


CHAPTER II.

From saddening associations with the tragical death of Mr. Lincoln,
popular attention was turned three weeks after his interment to a
great military display in the Capital of the Nation in honor of the
final victory for the Union.  The exigencies of the closing campaign
had transferred the armies commanded by General Sherman from the
Mississippi Valley to the Atlantic coast.  The soldiers of Port Hudson
and Vicksburg, the heroes of Donelson, Chattanooga, and Atlanta, had
been brought within a day's march of the bronzed veterans whose
battle-flags were emblazoned with the victories of Antietam and
Gettysburg and with the crowning triumph at Appomattox.  It was the
happy suggestion of Secretary Stanton which assembled all these forces
in the National Capital to be viewed by the Commander-in-Chief.
Through four years of stern and perilous duty, there had been no
holiday, no parade of ceremony, no evolution for mere display, either
by the troops of the East or of the West.  Their time had been passed
in camp and in siege, in march and in battle, with no effort relaxed,
no vigor abated, no vigilance suspended, during all the long period
when the fate of the Union was at stake.  It was now fitting that the
President, attended by the chief officers of the Government, should
welcome them and honor them in the name of the Republic.  They had
brought from the field the priceless trophy of American Nationality as
the reward of their valorous struggle.  By the voice of the people a
"triumph" as demonstrative, if not as formal, as that given to a
conqueror in Ancient Rome was now decreed to them.  They had earned
the right to be applauded on the _via sacra_, and to receive the
laurel-wreath from the steps of the Capitol.

The first day's review, Wednesday, May 23, was given to the Army of the
Potomac, of which General Meade had remained the commander since the
victory at Gettysburg, but whose operations during the closing year of
the struggle had been under the personal direction of General Grant.  A
part only of its vast forces marched through Washington on that day of
loyal pride and gladness; but the number was large beyond the power of
the eye to apprehend, beyond any but the skilled mind to reckon.  An
approximate conception of it can be reached by stating that one hundred
and fifty-one regiments of infantry, thirty-six regiments of cavalry,
and twenty-two batteries of artillery passed under the eye of the
President, who reviewed the whole from a platform in front of the
Executive Mansion.

On the ensuing day the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of Georgia,
constituting the right and left wing of General Sherman's forces, were
reviewed.  There was naturally some rivalry of a friendly type between
the Eastern and Western soldiers, and special observation was made of
their respective qualities and characteristics.  The geographical
distinction was not altogether accurate, for Western troops had always
formed a valuable part of the Army of the Potomac; while troops from
the East were incorporated in Sherman's army, and had shared the
glories of the Atlanta campaign and of the March to the sea.  It was
true, however, that the great mass of the Army of the Potomac came from
the eastern side of the Alleghanies, while the great mass of Sherman's
command came from the western side.  The aggregate number reviewed on
the second day did not differ materially from the number on the first
day.  There were some twenty more regiments of infantry on the second
day, but fewer cavalry regiments and fewer batteries of artillery.

The special interest which attached to the review, aside from the
inestimable significance of a restored Union, consisted in the fact
that the spectators, who were reckoned by tens of thousands, saw before
them an actual, living, fighting army.  They were not holiday troops
with bright uniforms, trained only for display and carrying guns that
were never discharged against a foe.  They were a great body of
veterans who had not slept under a roof for years, who had marched over
countries more extended than those traversed by the Legions of Caesar,
who had come from a hundred battle-fields on which they had left dead
comrades more numerous than the living who now celebrated the final
victory of peace.  It was the remembrance of this which in all the glad
rejoicing over the past and all the bright anticipation of the future
lent a tinge of sadness to the splendid and inspiring spectacle of the
day.  The applause so heartily given for the soldiers who were present
could not be unaccompanied by tears for the fate of that vast host
which had gone down to death without even the consolation of knowing
that they had not died in vain.

In the four years of their service the armies of the Union, counting
every form of conflict, great and small, had been in twenty-two
hundred and sixty-five engagements with the Confederate troops.  From
the time when active hostilities began until the last gun of the war
was fired, a fight of some kind--a raid, a skirmish, or a pitched
battle--occurred at some point on our widely extended front nearly
eleven times a week upon an average.  Counting only those engagements
in which the Union loss in killed, wounded, and missing exceeded one
hundred, the total number was three hundred and thirty,--averaging one
every four and a half days.  From the northernmost point of contact to
the southernmost, the distance by any practicable line of
communications was more than two thousand miles.  From East to West the
extremes were fifteen hundred miles apart.

During the first year of hostilities--one of preparation on both sides
--the battles were naturally fewer in number and less decisive in
character than afterwards, when discipline had been imparted to the
troops by drill, and when the _materiel_ of war had been collected and
stored for prolonged campaigns.  The engagements of all kinds in 1861
were thirty-five in number, of which the most serious was the Union
defeat at Bull Run.  In 1862 the war had greatly increased in magnitude
and intensity, as is shown by the eighty-four engagements between the
armies.  The net result of the year's operations was highly favorable
to the Rebellion.  In 1863 the battles were one hundred and ten in
number--among them some of the most significant and important victories
for the Union.  In 1864 there were seventy-three engagements, and in
the winter and early spring of 1865 there were twenty-eight.

In fact, 1864-65 was one continuous campaign.  The armies of the Union
did not go into winter-quarters to the extent of abandoning or
suspending operations.  They felt that it was in their power to bring
the struggle to an end at once, and they pressed forward with
prodigious vigor and with complete success.  General Grant with his
characteristic energy insisted that "active and continuous operations
of all the troops that could be brought into the field regardless of
season and weather were necessary to a speedy termination of the war."
He had seen, as he expressed it in his own terse, quaint language, that
"the armies of the East and the West had been acting independently and
without concert, like a balky team, no two of them ever pulling
together."  Under his direction the forces of the Union, however
distant from each other, were brought into harmonious co-operation and
with the happiest results.  The discipline of the Union army was never
so fine, its vigor was never so great, its spirit was never so high, as
at the close of that terrible campaign which under Grant's command in
the East began at the Wilderness and ended with Lee's surrender, and
which under Sherman's command in the West began with the march towards
Atlanta, and closed with the complete conquest of Georgia and the
Carolinas.

A grave moral responsibility rests upon those who continue a contest
of arms after it is made clear that there is no longer a possibility of
success.  However far the laws of war may justify a belligerent in
deceiving an enemy, the laws of honorable and humane dealing are
violated with one's own partisans when a brave and confiding soldiery
are led into a fight known by their commanders to be hopeless.  Early
in January, 1865, Jefferson Davis indicated the desire of the
Confederate authorities to negotiate with the National Government for
the arrangement of the terms of peace, and as a result the famous
conference was held at Fortress Monroe.  This step was taken by Mr.
Davis because he saw that further effort on the part of the
Confederates must be utterly futile.  When he failed at this conference
to secure any recognition of his government, he spitefully turned to
the prolongation of the struggle.  Every life destroyed in the conflict
thereafter was needless slaughter, and the blood of the victims cries
out against the Confederate Government for compelling the sacrifice.

When at last through sheer exhaustion the Confederate Armies ceased
resistance and surrendered, they did so on precisely the same terms
that had been offered by the Government of the Union three months
before.  In the _interim_ the Confederate leaders had been deluding
their people with the pretense that the "Lincoln Government" had
outraged the South in refusing to recognize Confederate Nationality
even long enough to treat with it for peace.  "Nothing beyond this,"
exclaimed Mr. Robert M. T. Hunter in a speech delivered at a meeting
in Richmond held immediately after the Peace Conference to which he
had been one of the commissioners,--"Nothing beyond this is needed to
stir the blood of Southern men."  In the course of his inflammatory
address Mr. Hunter made the _naive_ confession: "If our people exhibit
the proper spirit they will bring forth the deserters from their
caves; and the skulkers, who are avoiding the perils of the field, will
go forth to share the dangers of their countrymen."  The "skulkers" and
"deserters" referred to were no doubt brave men who, having fought as
long as there was hope, were not ambitious to sacrifice their lives to
carry on the shameless bravado of the political leaders of the
Rebellion.

Mr. Hunter spoke with singular intemperance of tone for one who was
usually cool, guarded, and conservative.  He was followed by the
_Mephistopheles_ of the Rebellion, the brilliant, learned, sinister
Secretary of State, Judah P. Benjamin.  He spoke as one who felt that
he had the _alias_ of an English subject for shelter, or possibly the
Spanish flag for protection, when the worst should come, and thus he
might continue to play the part of Confederate citizen so long as it
favored his ambition and his fortune.  He delivered a speech full of
desperate suggestion--so desperate indeed that it re-acted and
injured the cause for which he was demanding harsh sacrifices on the
part of others.  He urged upon his hearers that the States of the
Confederacy had nearly seven hundred thousand male slaves of the age
for military service.  He gave the assurance that if freedom should
be conceded to these men they would fight in aid of the Rebellion.
Besides advocating a guaranty of emancipation to all these black
men,--for the right to keep whom in slavery the war had been
undertaken,--Mr. Benjamin urged that every bale of cotton, every
hogshead of tobacco, every pound of bacon, every barrel of flour,
should be seized for the benefit of the common cause.

Happily Mr. Benjamin went too far.  His over-zeal had tempted him to
prove too much.  The Southern people who had desired to build up a
slave empire, and who despised the negro as a freeman, were asked by
Mr. Benjamin to surrender this cherished project, and join with him in
the ignoble design of founding a confederacy whose corner-stone should
rest on hatred of the Northern States, and whose one achievement
should be the revival and extension of English commercial power on
this continent.  When the end came, Mr. Benjamin did not share the
disasters and sacrifices with the sincere and earnest men whom he had
done so much to mislead, and to whom he was bound in an especial manner
by the tie which unites the victims of a common calamity.  Instead of
this magnanimous course which would in part have redeemed his
wrong-doing, Mr. Benjamin took quick refuge under the flag to whose
allegiance he was born.  He left America with the full consciousness
that to the measure of his ability, which was great, he had inflicted
injury upon the country which had sheltered and educated him, and
which had opened to him the opportunity for that large personal
influence which he had used so discreditably to himself and so
disastrously to the cause he espoused.

Mr. Benjamin became a resident of London and subsequently won
distinction at the English Bar--rising to the eminence of Queen's
counsel.  His ability and learning were everywhere recognized, but it
was at the same time admitted that he owed much of his success to the
sympathy and the support of that preponderating class among British
merchants who cordially wished and worked for our destruction,--who,
covertly throughout the entire civil conflict, and openly where safe
opportunity was presented, did all in their power to embarrass and
injure the Union.  If Mr. Benjamin had been loyal, and had honorably
observed the special oath which he had taken to maintain and defend
the Constitution, he might in vain have sought the patronage of that
large number of Englishmen who enriched him with generous retainers.
No one grudged to Mr. Benjamin the wages of his professional work, the
reward of ability and industry; but the manner in which he was lauded
into notoriety in London, the effort constantly made to lionize and to
aggrandize him, were conspicuous demonstrations of hatred to our
Government, and were significant expressions of regret that Mr.
Benjamin's treason had not been successful.  Those whom he served
either in the Confederacy or in England in his efforts to destroy the
American Union may eulogize him according to his work; but every
citizen of the Great Republic, whose loyalty was unswerving, will
regard Mr. Benjamin as a foe in whom malignity was unrelieved by a
single trace of magnanimity.

The Confederates had failed in war, but their leaders had not the moral
courage to accept the only practicable peace.  Their subsequent course
in Congress, in the Cabinet, and in the field, exposed in very striking
outline the strong points and the weak points of Southern character.
It exhibited Southern men as possessed of the utmost physical
courage--often carried indeed to foolish audacity.  It exhibited them
at the same time as singularly deficient in the attribute of moral
courage.  When the Southern leaders knew the Confederate cause to be
hopeless not a single man among them displayed sufficient heroism to
brave public opinion with the declaration of his honest belief.  The
absolute suppression of free discussion which had long prevailed in
the South, the frequent murder of those who attempted to express an
unpopular opinion however honestly entertained, had deprived brave
men of every trait of that higher form of courage which has given
immortality of fame to the moral heroes of the world.

Not individually alone but in combined action this weak trait of
Southern character was made manifest.  Only a month before the time
when the Confederacy was in ruins and the members of its Congress were
fugitives from its Capital, they united in an inflammatory address to
the people of the South, urging them to continue the contest.  They
made assertions and employed arguments which as men of intelligence
they could not themselves believe and accept.  They strove by exciting
evil passions and blind animosities to hurl the soldiers of the
Confederacy once more into a desperate fight with all its suffering and
with certain defeat.  In this address, which was the unanimous vote of
the Confederate Senate and the Confederate House of Representatives,
the people were told that if they failed in the war, "the Southern
States would be held as conquered provinces by the despotic government
at Washington;" that they "would be kept in subjugation by the stern
hand of military power as Venice and Lombardy have been held by
Austria, as Poland is held by the Russian Czar."  A still more terrible
fate was foretold.  "Not only," continued the address, "would we be
deprived of every political franchise dear to freemen, but socially we
would be degraded to the level of slaves. . . . Not only would the
property and estates of vanquished rebels be confiscated, but they
would be divided and distributed among our African bondsmen."

Even the extravagance and absurdity of the foregoing declarations were
outdone in other parts of the address.  These senators and
representatives--not ignorant men themselves--presumed so far upon the
ignorance of their constituents as to assure them that "our enemies
with a boastful insolence unparalleled in the history of modern
civilization have threatened not only our subjugation, but some of them
have announced their determination if successful in this struggle to
deport our entire white population, and supplant it with a new
population drawn from their own territory and from European countries.
. . . Think of it!  That we the descendants of a brave ancestry who
wrested from a powerful nation by force of arms the country which we
inhabit--bequeathed to us by them, and upon which we have been born and
reared; that we should be uprooted from it and an alien population
planted in our stead is a thought that should inspire us with undying
hostility to an enemy base enough to have conceived it."

The white population of the eleven Confederate States was at that time
between five and six millions.  Of course no man who signed the address
believed its statements.  No one believed that the Government of the
United States or the loyal people of the North were so inhuman and so
unpatriotic as to advocate the deportation of this vast population, or
so foolish as to think that such a task would be practicable even if it
were desirable.  The address was read in the North immediately after it
was issued, and created a mingled feeling of astonishment, amusement,
and sorrow.  The severest comment made upon it was the remark of a
Republican representative in Congress who had a most kindly feeling for
the men of the South--that "the deportation for life of the men who
signed and issued the libel would not only be a just punishment for the
offense, but would be an undoubted advantage to both North and South."
The close of the address was in harmony with its opening, and contained
an argument which to some minds relieved the whole document from
wickedness by making it ludicrous.  Its last words insisted that
"failure makes us vassals of an arrogant people--secretly if not openly
hated by the most enlightened and elevated portions of mankind.
Success records us forever in letters of light upon one of the most
glorious pages of history.  _Failure will compel us to drink the cup of
humiliation even to the bitter dregs of having the history of our
struggle written by New-England historians_."

The same lack of moral courage to face the inevitable and deal frankly
with friends and supporters was still more palpably shown by Jefferson
Davis when he sent a message to the Confederate Congress on March 13,
three weeks before the fall of Richmond, in a tone similar to that of
the famous address.  Even after he was a fugitive, and the Capital of
the Confederacy was in the possession of the Union Army, Mr. Davis
halted long enough at Danville, to issue a proclamation in which he
said, "We have now entered upon a new phase of the struggle.  Relieved
from the necessity of guarding particular points, our army will be
free to move from point to point to strike the enemy in detail far from
his base.  Let us but will it, and we are free. . . . Let us not
despond, my countrymen, but, relying on God, meet the foe with fresh
defiance, with unconquered and unconquerable hearts."  It is clearly
established that Mr. Davis was fully aware of the state of affairs
when he issued this misleading and inexcusable proclamation.  Four
days after its publication the army upon which he relied even for
personal protection surrendered to General Grant, and Mr. Davis again
sought safety in flight.

These extravagant misrepresentations do infinite damage to the
Confederate cause and to the Confederate leaders in history.  They
reveal in strong light the method by which those leaders were
willing to impose and actually did impose upon the almost unlimited
credulity of the white population of their States.  Prejudice on the
question of slavery could be easily stimulated, and no effort was
spared to poison the minds of the Southern people against the National
Government and against the Northern people.  But the exaggerations at
the close of the struggle were no greater than those which had been
employed at its commencement.  From beginning to end the Rebellion was
based upon the suppression of that which was true and the suggestion of
that which was untrue.  To mete out the proper share of responsibility
to the leaders who organized the insurrection would be a task at once
ungracious and impossible.  The aggressive character of the movement
was not concealed, and the motives underlying it were understood.  That
which was not understood, and which still remains to be accounted for,
was the conduct of the thousands of Southern Unionists who did not
express their opinions and maintain their faith with the firmness and
effectiveness which had been widely hoped for and expected in the
North.  From the timidity of the friends of the Union and the boldness
of the advocates of Secession, it is not difficult to understand how
the large class of poor whites in the South could be urged into a
contest in which every blow struck by them was in support of a system
to whose baleful influence they owed their own ignorance, their social
degradation, their pitiable poverty.

The wonder excited by the raising of the vast army which saved the
Union from destruction was even surpassed by the wonder excited by
its prompt and peaceful dissolution.  On the day that the task of
disbandment was undertaken, the Army of the United States bore upon its
rolls the names of one million five hundred and sixteen men
(1,000,516).  The killed, and those who had previously retired on
account of wounds and sickness and from the expiration of shorter terms
of service, aggregated, after making due allowance for re-enlistments
of the same persons, at least another million.  The living among these
had retired gradually during the war, and had resumed their old
avocations, or, in the great demand for workmen created by the war
itself, had found new employment.  But with the close of hostilities
many industries which had been created by the demands of war ceased,
and thousand of men were thrown out of employment.  The disbandment of
the Volunteer Army would undoubtedly add hundreds of thousands to this
number, and thus still further overstock and embarrass the labor-market.
The prospect was not encouraging, and many judicious men feared the
result.

Happily all anticipations of evil proved groundless.  By an instinct of
self-support and self-adjustment, that great body of men who left the
military service during the latter half of the year 1865 and early in
the year 1866 re-entered civil life with apparent contentment and even
with certain advantages.  Their experience as soldiers, so far from
unfitting them for the duties and callings of Peace, seem rather to
have proved an admirable school, and to have given them habits of
promptness and punctuality, order and neatness, which added largely to
their efficiency in whatever field they were called to labor.  After
the Continental Army was dissolved, its members were found to be
models of industry and intelligence in all the walks of life.  The
successful mechanics, the thrifty tradesmen, the well-to-do farmers in
the old thirteen States were found, in great proportion, to have held a
commission or carried a musket in the Army of the Revolution.  They
were, moreover, the strong pioneers who settled the first tier of
States to the westward, and laid the solid foundation which assured
progress and prosperity to their descendants.  Their success as civil
magistrates, as legislators, as executives was not less marked and
meritorious than their illustrious service in war.  The same cause
brought the same result a century later in men of the same blood
fighting with equal valor the same battle of Constitutional liberty.
The inspiration of a great cause does not fail to ennoble the humblest
of those who do battle in its defense.  Those who stood in the ranks of
the Union Army have established this truth by the twenty years of
honorable life through which they have passed since their patriotic
service was crowned with victory.

The officers who led the Union Army throughout all the stages of the
civil conflict were in the main young men.  This feature has been a
distinguishing mark in nearly all the wars in which the American
people have taken part, and with a few notable exceptions has been
the rule in the leading military struggles of the world.  Alexander
the Great died in his thirty-second year.  Caesar entered upon the
conquest of Gaul at forty.  Frederick the Great was the leading
commander of Europe at thirty-three.  Napoleon and Wellington, born in
the same year, fought their last battle at forty-six years of age.  On
the exceptional side Marlborough's greatest victories were won when
he was nearly sixty (though he had been brilliantly distinguished at
twenty-two), and in our own day the most skillful campaign in Europe
was under the direction of Von Moltke when he was in the seventieth
year of his age.

Washington took command of the Continental Army at forty-three.
Lafayette was a major-general at twenty.  Nathaniel Greene was a
general officer in the military establishment of the Revolution at
thirty-three, and entered upon his memorable campaign in the South at
thirty-eight.  Winfield Scott was but twenty-eight when he commanded
at Chippewa and Lundy's Lane.  Macomb was thirty-two when he gained the
famous victory over Sir George Prevost at Plattsburg.  Jackson was
forty-seven when he won the decisive battle over Pakenham at New
Orleans.  On the other hand, Taylor was sixty-three when he conquered
at Buena Vista, and Scott was sixty-one when he made his celebrated
march from Vera Cruz to the Capital.  Scott enjoys the rare distinction
of having held high and successful command in two wars which were a
full generation of men apart.  In 1847 he commanded in Mexico the sons
of those officers who aided in his brilliantly successful campaign
against the British on the borders of Canada in 1814.

At the opening of the war of the Rebellion General Scott again
assumed command, but his seventy-five years pressed heavily upon him,
and he soon gave way to younger men who came rapidly forward with
patriotic ardor and with worthy ambition.  Nearly all the graduates of
the United-States Military Academy who achieved distinction were in
what might be termed their middle youth; a few were in their twenties;
none were old.  General Grant won his campaign of the Tennessee, and
fought the battles of Henry, Donelson, and Shiloh when he was
thirty-eight years of age.  Sherman entered upon his onerous work in
the South-West when he was forty-one, and accomplished the march to
the sea when he was forty-four.  Thomas began his splendid career in
Kentucky when he was forty-three, and fought the critical and
victorious battle of Nashville when he was forty-six.  Sheridan was
but thirty-three when he confirmed a reputation, already enviable, by
his great campaign of 1864 in the Shenandoah Valley.  Meade won the
decisive battle of Gettysburg when he was forty-seven.  McClellan was
but thirty-five when he succeeded General Scott in command of the
army.  McDowell was forty-five when he fought the first battle of
magnitude in the war.  Buell was forty-two when he joined forces with
Grant's army on the second day's fight at Shiloh.  Pope was scarcely
over forty when he attained the highest credit for his success in the
South-West.  Hancock was forty-one when he approved himself one of
the most brilliant commanders in the army by his superb bearing on the
field of Spotsylvania. Hooker was forty-six when he assumed command of
the Army of the Potomac.

General Schofield was thirty-four when he commanded with signal ability
and success in the battle of Franklin.  John Reynolds was forty-three
when he fell at the head of his corps in the first day's fight at
Gettysburg.  Rosecrans was forty-two when he gained the important
victory at Stone River.  Burnside was thirty-seven when he made the
admirable record of his North-Carolina campaign.  Howard was thirty-two
when he was assigned to the command of a corps, and only a year older
when he succeeded McPherson in the command of the army of the
Tennessee.  McPherson was thirty-five when he gave up his heroic life
on the bloody field before Atlanta.  Slocum was thirty-eight when he
handled his division with consummate skill at White-Oak Swamp.  Joseph
J. Reynolds was a major-general before he was forty.  Parke was at the
head of a corps when he was thirty-five.  Hazen was thirty-four when he
led in the important capture of Fort McAllister.  McKenzie, Custer,
Kilpatrick, and Ames had each won his star before he had passed his
twenty-sixty hear.  The only West-Point man who became conspicuous in
the command of troops after he was fifty years of age was David Hunter.
He entered upon his sixtieth year on the day of the unfortunate battle
of Bull Run, and engaged thenceforth in severe and meritorious
field-service.  Montgomery C. Meigs, one of the ablest graduates of
the Military Academy, was kept from the command of troops by the
inestimably important services he performed as quartermaster-general,
in which office he succeeded Joseph E. Johnston when the latter cast
his fortunes with the Confederacy.  Perhaps in the military history of
the world there was never so large an amount of money disbursed upon
the order of a single man as by the order of General Meigs.  The
aggregate sum could not have less during the war than fifteen hundred
millions of dollars, accurately vouched and accounted for to the last
cent.  General Meigs is still living, vigorous in mind and body, active
in good works, and enjoying the unstinted confidence and admiration of
his countrymen.

Among the officers who volunteered from civil life the success of young
men as commanders was not less marked than among the graduates of West
Point.  General Logan, to whom is conceded by common consent the
leading reputation among volunteer officers, and who rose to the
command of an army, went to the field at thirty-five.  General Butler
was forty-two when he was placed at the head of the Army of the Gulf,
and began his striking career in Louisiana.  General Banks was
forty-four when with the rank of major-general he took command of the
Department of Maryland.  Alfred Terry, since distinguished in the
regular service, achieved high rank as a volunteer at thirty-five.
Garfield was a major-general at thirty-one with brilliant promise as a
solider when he left the field to enter Congress.  Frank Blair at
forty-one was a successful commander of a division in the arduous
campaign which ended with the fall of Vicksburg.  Jacob D. Cox had
achieved his reputation in the field at thirty-four.  Sickles was
forty-one when, desperately wounded, he was borne from the head of his
corps at Gettysburg.  Cadwallader Washburn in his forty-third year was
in command of an important district in the South-West.  Rawlins was
high in General Grant's confidence and favor at thirty when he filled
the important post of chief of staff.  James B. Steedman was forty-four
when he received Mr. Lincoln's special encomium for bravery.  Franz
Sigel was in command of a corps before he was thirty-five.  Crawford
was thirty-three when his division did its noble work at Gettysburg.
Chamberlain was thirty-four when he associated his name indelibly with
the defense of Little Round-Top.  Corse was but twenty-nine when he
held the pass at Altoona.  Beaver was still younger when he received
his terrible wound and his promotion.  Grenville Dodge had risen to the
rank of a major-general and approved his merit in the Atlanta campaign
before his was thirty-three.  Hawley did splendid service in the field
at thirty-five, and rose rapidly to the rank of brigadier-general.
Gresham had made his brave record at thirty-two, and bears wounds to
attest his service.  The McCooks were all young, all gallant, all
successful.  Negley was a brigadier-general at thirty-two.  Robert
Potter commanded a corps before he was thirty-seven.  Joseph B. Carr
achieved an honorable reputation in his early thirties.  Hartranft was
highly distinguished before he was thirty-seven.  Nelson A. Miles left
his counting-room at twenty-one, enlisted as a private, and in two
years was a brigadier-general.  Selden Connor was rewarded with the
same rank for his conduct at the battle of the Wilderness before he was
twenty-seven.  Nicholas L. Anderson was under thirty when he received
his brevet of major-general for a military career worthy in all
respects of his eminent kinsman who fired the first gun in defense of
the Union.  The only general of volunteers beyond fifty years of age
who acquired special distinction was James S. Wadsworth who in his
fifty-seventh year fell in one of the most sanguinary battles of the war.

The list, both of regulars and volunteers, who achieved high command
while still young, might be largely increased.  The names given are
selected from a roll of honor that has never been surpassed for
gallantry of spirit and intrepidity of action in the military service
of any country,--a roll too long to have full justice done to all the
names borne upon it.  Indeed, one of the obstacles to widespread
popular fame for many, was in the great number of generals who fairly
earned the laurels due to exalted heroism.  In a military establishment
so vast that the major-generals number one hundred and fifty, and the
generals of brigade nearly or quite six hundred, with battles,
engagements, and skirmishes in full proportion to the force which such
a number of commanders implies, it is difficult to give even the names
of all who are worthy of lasting renown.  Battles such as established
Scott's fame in the Niagara campaign, or Jackson's at New Orleans, or
Taylor's at Buena Vista, were in magnitude repeated a hundred times
during the civil conflict under commanders whose names are absolutely
forgotten by the public.  A single corps of Grant's army at the
Wilderness, or of Sherman's at Atlanta, or of Meade's at Gettysburg, or
of McClellan's on the Peninsula, or of Hooker's at Chancellorsville,
contained a large number of troops than Washington or Scott ever
commanded on the field, a larger number than Taylor or Jackson ever saw
mustered.  A more correct conception of the real magnitude of the Union
Army can be reached by measuring the proportions of the several
branches of the service, than by simply stating the aggregate number of
men.  There were in all some seventeen hundred regiments of infantry,
over two hundred and seventy regiments of cavalry, and more than nine
hundred batteries of artillery.  These numbers are without parallel
in the military history of the world.

There was a very strong and patriotic disposition to engage in the
war, on the part of the sons of the Northern statesmen who had been
prominent during the generation preceding the outbreak of hostilities.
It was no doubt felt by the juniors to be a chivalric duty to defend
on the field what had been advanced by the seniors in Congress and in
Cabinet.  A very notable instance was that of the brothers Ewing,--Hugh,
Thomas, and Charles, sons of the eminent Thomas Ewing of Ohio,--each
of which attained through gradual promotion, fairly earned by
meritorious service in the field, the rank of brigadier-general.  They
were all young, the eldest not being over thirty-five when he received
his commission, the youngest under thirty.  Senator Fessenden of Maine
had two sons who rose to the rank of brigadier-general; a third with
the rank of captain, was killed in the second battle of Bull
Run. Vice-President Hamlin had one son who attained the rank of
brigadier-general; another who served as colonel.  William H. Seward,
jun., also reached the rank of brigadier-general.  William H. Harris, son
of Mr. Seward's successor in the Senate, honorably distinguished himself
in the service.  Benjamin Harrison of Indiana commanded a brigade before
he was thirty, and made a military record which did honor to the
illustrious name which he inherits.  Fletcher Webster lost his life
while bravely commanding a Massachusetts regiment in a war which his
illustrious father's exposition of the Constitution had served the arm
of the Government to maintain.  Similar instances in the Union Army
might be cited in great number.  The same disposition was manifested on
the Confederate side, and it may be said with truth that almost every
name which grew into prominence in the long political contention
between the North and the South was represented in the conflict of arms
to which it led.

That men without previous military education should prove to be
intelligent, brave, efficient, and skillful officers, was a constant
surprise to the foreign critics of our campaigns.  The commanders of
batteries, of regiments, of brigades, not to speak of battalions and
companies, were almost wholly from the volunteer service.  Many of the
volunteers, as already indicated, rose to the command of divisions, a
few to the command of corps, and in some marked instances to the
command of separate armies and to the military direction of vast
districts.  At the same time the value of strict military training was
shown by the superior prominence attained in proportion to their
numbers by the officers who had been educated at the West Point
Military Academy.  The wisdom of maintaining that institution was
abundantly vindicated by the results of the war.  Its graduates worked
in harmony with the volunteers, and, as matter of fact, the field
offices they held during the war were, with few exceptions, under the
law for the organization of the volunteer forces.  They imparted to the
entire army the discipline, the organization, and the efficiency of a
regular military establishment.  There was naturally at the beginning
of the war a certain jealousy between the regulars and the volunteers,
but none that did not yield to the patriotism and good sense of both.
The two services were rapidly and most happily combined, and
demonstrated by their joint prowess the strength of the country for
defense, and, if need by, for offense.  Without maintaining a large
military establishment, which besides its expense entails multiform
evils, it was shown that the Republic possesses in the strong arms and
patriotic hearts of its sons an unfailing source of military power.


CHAPTER III.

Mr. Johnson continued his public receptions, his interviews
and his speeches for nearly a month after his accession to the
Presidency--until indeed, in the judgment of his most anxious and most
cautious friends, he had talked too much.  All were agreed that the
time had now come when he must do something.  He evidently sought to
impress the country with the belief that his Administration was to be
marked by a policy of extraordinary vigor, that the standard of
loyalty was to be held high, that the leaders of the Rebellion were
to be dealt with in a spirit of stern justice.  His position gave
satisfaction to those who thought the chief conspirators against the
Union could not be punished too severely; but it led to uneasiness
among the anti-slavery philanthropists, lest, in wreaking vengeance
upon white traitors, the President might leave the loyal negroes
unprotected in their newly acquired civil rights.

On the 10th of May the President issued a proclamation declaring
substantially that actual hostilities had ceased, and that "armed
resistance to the authority of the Government in the insurrectionary
States may be regarded as at an end."  This great fact being officially
recognized, the President found himself face to face with the momentous
duty of bringing the eleven States of the Confederacy into active and
harmonious relations with the Government of the Union.  He had reached
the point where he must take the first step in the serious task of
Reconstruction, and the country awaited it with profound interest.  He
had in other official stations given distinct intimations of the
conditions which he considered essential to the restoration of a rebel
State to its place in the Union, but in the numerous speeches he had
delivered since his accession to the Presidency he had studiously
avoided a repetition of his former position, and had with equal care
refrained from a public committal to any specific line of action.

The manner in which the insurrectionary States should be dealt with at
the close of hostilities had been the object of solicitous inquiry
throughout the war.  It was indeed often a question of angry
disputation in Congress, in the press, and among the people.  The
tentative and somewhat speculative efforts in this field, which had
been made or at least encouraged by Mr. Lincoln, had confused rather
than solved the problem, and yet his action could not fail to exert an
embarrassing and possibly a decisive influence upon the course of his
successor.  Difficult as it might have proved to Mr. Lincoln himself to
go forward on the line he had marked out, it would obviously prove far
more difficult to Mr. Johnson to maintain the same policy with the
inevitable result of renewing the conflict with Congress which Mr.
Lincoln had only allayed and postponed--not removed.  A brief review of
what Mr. Lincoln had done in the field of Reconstruction will give a
more accurate knowledge of President Johnson's policy, which afterwards
became the subject of prolonged and bitter controversy.  Mr. Lincoln
had naturally been anxious from the beginning of the war to re-establish
civil government in any and every one of the Confederate States where
actual resistance should cease.  A military autocracy controlling people
who were engaged in the ordinary avocations of life was altogether
contrary to his views of expediency, altogether repugnant to his
conceptions of right.

At the end of the first year of the war (April, 1862) the rebel
fortifications on the Lower Mississippi and the city of New Orleans
surrendered to the guns of Farragut, and not long afterwards a
movement was made to re-establish in Louisiana a civil government that
would be loyal to the Union.  The first step was the election on the
third of December, 1862, of Benjamin F. Flanders and Michael Hahn, old
citizens of Louisiana, as Representatives in Congress.

On the 9th of February, 1863, when the Thirty-seventh Congress was
drawing to its close, Messrs. Flanders and Hahn were admitted to their
seats, though not without contention and misgiving.  They had been
chosen at an election ordered by the military governor of Louisiana
(General George F. Shepley), and their credentials bore the signature
of that official.  General Shepley had undoubtedly been permitted, if
not specifically authorized, by the National Administration to take
this step; though it was afterwards perceived by all friends of the
Union to be useless if not mischievous, and its repetition for the
ensuing Congress was seriously opposed.  On the 21st of November--only
a fortnight before the election ordered by General Shepley--Mr. Lincoln
addressed him a note which in effect was a warning that Federal
officers, not citizens of Louisiana, must not be chosen to represent
the State in Congress.  "We do not," said the President, referring to
the South, "particularly need members of Congress from those States to
enable us to get along with legislation here.  What we do want is the
conclusive evidence that respectable citizens of Louisiana are willing
to be members of Congress and to swear support to the Constitution, and
that other respectable citizens are willing to vote for them and send
them.  To send a parcel of Northern men here as representatives,
elected as would be understood (and perhaps really so) at the point of
the bayonet, would be disgraceful and outrageous."

Previous to this instruction to Governor Shepley, Mr. Lincoln had been
in correspondence with Cuthbert Bullett, Esq., a Southern gentleman,
who enjoyed his personal regard and confidence.  In a letter to Mr.
Bullett of July 28, 1862, the President reviewed some of the
impracticable methods of re-establishing civil authority desired by
certain citizens of Louisiana who were very anxious to prevent any
interference with property in slaves.  Mr. Thomas Durant was the
spokesman for this large class of men who professed anxiety for the
fate of the Union but were unwilling to do any thing to aid in saving
it.  Mr. Lincoln's letter is very characteristic.  He says, "Mr. Durant
speaks of no duty, apparently thinks of none resting upon Southern
Union men.  He even thinks it injurious to the Union cause that they
should be restrained in trade and passage without taking sides.  They
are to touch neither a sail nor a pump, live merely as passengers
('dead-heads' at that) to be carried snug and dry throughout the storm
and safely landed right side up.  Nay, more, even a mutineer is to go
untouched, lest these sacred passengers receive an accidental wound.
Of course the Rebellion will never be suppressed in Louisiana if the
professed Union men there will neither help to do it nor permit the
Government to do it without their help. . . . What would _you_ do in my
position?  Would you drop the war where it is, or would you prosecute
it in the future with elder-stalk squirts charged with rose-water?
Would you deal lighter blows rather than heavier ones?  Would you give
up the contest leaving every available means unapplied?  I am in no
boastful mood: I shall not do more than I can, but I _shall_ do _all_
I can to save the Government, which is my sworn duty as well as my
personal inclination.  I shall do nothing in malice.  What I deal with
is too vast for malicious dealing."

The pressure of these political events in Louisiana had increased Mr.
Lincoln's desire to attempt some form of reconstruction, and the
admission of Messrs. Flanders and Hahn to seats in the House of
Representatives had to a certain degree misled him as to the temper and
tendency of Congress on the whole subject of re-establishing civil
government in the insurrectionary States.  During the year 1862, when
the original movements were made in Louisiana, the military situation
grew so critical and so discouraging that the Administration had no
time for the consideration of any other subject than the raising of men
and money.  But in 1863 the Government was incalculably strengthened by
General Meade's victory at Gettysburg and by the opening of the
Mississippi River to navigation in consequence of General Grant's
capture of the rebel stronghold of Vicksburg.  The latter event
practically destroyed the military power of the Rebellion on the
western side of the Mississippi, and opened, as Mr. Lincoln hoped, a
great opportunity for the formation of State governments loyal to the
Union and able to aid effectively in the overthrow of the Rebellion.

To this end the President proposed a definite plan of reconstruction in
his message of December 8, 1863, sent to the Thirty-eighth Congress at
its first session.  He accompanied the message with a public
proclamation which more fully embodied his conception of the
necessities of the situation and the duties of the loyal people.
According to the message of the President "the constitutional
obligation to guarantee to every State in the Union a Republican form
of government and to protect the State in such cases is explicit and
full. . . . This section of the Constitution contemplates a case
wherein the elements within a State favorable to Republican government
in the Union may be too feeble for an opposite and hostile element
external to or even within the State, and such are precisely the cases
with which we now are dealing.  An attempt to guarantee and protect a
revived State government constructed in whole or in preponderating
part from the very element against whose hostility and violence it is
to be protected is simply absurd.  There must be a test by which to
separate the opposing elements so as to build only from the sound, and
that test is a sufficiently liberal one which accepts as sound whoever
will make a sworn recantation of his former unsoundness."

In his proclamation the President made known that "to all persons who
have directly or by implication participated in the existing rebellion
except as herein after excepted, a full pardon is hereby granted with
restoration of all rights of property except as to slaves, upon
condition that every such person shall take and subscribe an oath, and
thenceforward maintain said oath inviolate," to the following effect:
viz., to "henceforth faithfully support and defend the Constitution and
the Union of the States thereunder," and to abide by all laws and
proclamations "made during the existing rebellion, having reference to
slaves, so long and so far as not modified or declared void by
decision of the Supreme Court."  Those excepted from the benefits of
the pardon were first the civil and diplomatic officers of the
Confederate Government; second, those who left judicial stations in
the United-States Government to aid the rebellion; third, military
officers of the Confederacy above the rank of colonel, and naval
officers above the rank of lieutenant; fourth, all who left seats in
the Congress of the United States to aid the rebellion; fifth, all
who left the National Army or Navy to aid the rebellion; sixth, all
who had treated colored persons found in the military or naval service
of the United States otherwise than as prisoners of war.

The President was willing to intrust the task of establishing State
governments to a population whose loyalty to the Union should be tested
by taking the prescribed oath, _provided_ that the population should be
sufficiently numerous to cast a vote one-tenth as large as that cast at
the Presidential election of 1860.  A government thus established, the
President declared, "shall be recognized as the true government of the
State, and the State shall receive thereunder the benefits of the
constitutional provision which declares that the United States shall
guarantee to each State a Republican form of government."  At the same
time the President was careful to affirm that "whether members sent to
Congress from any State shall be admitted to seats constitutionally
rests exclusively with the respective Houses, and not to any extent
with the Executive."

The Union men in Louisiana had been so encouraged by the admission of
Flanders and Hahn to seats in Congress, that they were active in the
year 1863 in maturing schemes for re-establishing a loyal State
government.  But the decisive step was not taken until the opening of
the ensuing hear.  On the 8th of January, 1864, a large Free-State
Convention was held in New Orleans, which proved to be in harmony with
the National Administration at all points, accepting the emancipation
policy of the President as the basis of all their action.  General
Banks, then in command of the military district, at once issued a
proclamation as requested by the convention, appointing an election for
State officers on the 22d of February--the officers chosen, to be
installed on the 4th of March.  Michael Hahn was elected governor as
the especial representative of the President's firm yet cautious and
moderate policy.  B. F. Flanders and C. Roselius were the opposing
candidates, the former representing a more radical the latter a more
conservative policy than the President was willing to accept.

Mr. Hahn was duly installed in office on the 4th of March, and on the
15th the President issued an order declaring the new governor to be
"invested until further orders with the powers exercised hitherto by
the military governor of Louisiana."  In a personal note to Governor
Hahn at the same time the President said, "I congratulate you on having
fixed your name in history as the first Free-State Governor of
Louisiana.  Now you are about to have a convention which among other
things will probably define the elective franchise.  I barely suggest
for your private consideration whether some of the colored people may
not be let in, as for instance the very intelligent and especially
those who have fought gallantly in our ranks.  They would probably help
in some trying time in the future to keep the jewel of Liberty in the
family of Freedom."  The form of the closing expression, quite unusual
in Mr. Lincoln's compact style, may have been pleonastic, but his
meaning was one of deep and almost prophetic significance.  It was
perhaps the earliest proposition from any authentic source to endow
the negro with the right of suffrage, and was an indirect but most
effective answer to those who subsequently attempted to use Mr.
Lincoln's name in support of policies which his intimate friends
instinctively knew would be abhorrent to his unerring sense of justice.

The scheme of reconstruction in Louisiana was completed by the
assembling of a convention to form a constitution for the State.  The
convention was organized early in April, and its most important act
was the prompt incorporation of an anti-slavery clause in the organic
law.  By a vote of seventy to sixteen the convention declared slavery
to be forever abolished in the State.  The constitution was adopted
by the people on the fifth day of the ensuing September by a vote of
6,836 in its favor to 1,566 against it.  As the total vote of Louisiana
at the Presidential election of 1860 was 50,510, the new State
government had obviously fulfilled the requirement of the President's
proclamation in demonstrating that it was sustained by more than
one-tenth of that number.  The President's scheme had therefore so far
succeeded that Louisiana was at least in form under a loyal government.
It was, however, a government that could not sustain itself for a day
if the military support of the Nation should be withdrawn, and therein
lay the weakness of the President's plan.

The action of Louisiana was accompanied, indeed in some parts preceded,
by a similar action in Arkansas.  A loyal governor (Isaac Murphy) was
elected, an anti-slavery constitution adopted, a government duly
installed over the State, and senators and representatives in Congress
were elected in due form.  These successive steps were taken in the
early spring of 1864.  But when the senators, Messrs. Fishback and
Baxter, presented themselves for admission to the body to which they
were thus chosen, it was found that Congress was not in sympathy with
what was derisively termed the "short-hand" method of reconstruction
proposed in Mr. Lincoln's proclamation.  Mr. Sumner, when the
credentials were presented, offered a resolution declaring that "a
State pretending to secede from the Union, and battling against the
General Government to maintain that position, must be regarded as a
rebel State subject to military occupation and without representation
on this floor until it has been re-admitted by a vote of both Houses of
Congress; and the Senate will decline to entertain any such application
from any such rebel State until after such a vote of both Houses."

Mr. Sumner's resolution embodied a radical and absolute dissent from
the President's scheme of reconstruction.  The Senate, however, was
not quite ready for so emphatic a declaration, and the resolution was
referred with the credentials to the Judiciary Committee.  A few weeks
alter, on the 27th June (1864), the committee made a report covering
substantially the ground of Mr. Sumner's resolution.  By a vote of
twenty-seven to six the State declared that "the rebellion is not so
far suppressed in Arkansas as to entitle that State to representation
in Congress, and therefore Messrs. Fishback and Baxter are not entitled
to admission as senators."  Similar action was taken in the House--the
representatives not being allowed to take seats.

The conflict between the President and Congress on the subject of
reconstruction was made still more apparent by the further action of
each.  After the Arkansas case had been disposed of, Congress passed a
bill embodying its own views of the proper process of reconstruction.
By this measure it was directed that the President should appoint a
provisional governor for each of the States declared to be in
rebellion; that said governor should, as soon as military resistance
to the United States ceased, make an enrolment of the white male
citizens, submitting to each an oath to support the Constitution.  If a
majority of the citizens should take and subscribe the oath, the
governor was to order an election of delegates to a constitutional
convention.

It was made the duty of the convention as its initial proceeding to
declare on behalf of the people of the State their submission to the
Constitution of the United States, and to incorporate in their own
organic law three fundamental provisions: First, No one who has held
any office under the Confederate Government except civil offices merely
ministerial, or military office below the rank of colonel, shall vote
for or be a member of the Legislature, or shall vote for or be elected
governor.  Second, Involuntary servitude shall be forever prohibited,
and the freedom of all persons in the State guaranteed.  Third, No
debt, State or Confederate, created in aid of the rebellion shall ever
be paid.  In the event of a constitution being framed with these
provisions inserted, and then adopted by a majority of the popular vote
as already enrolled, the governor shall certify that fact to the
President, and thereupon the President, _after obtaining the assent of
Congress_, shall recognize the State government so established as a
legitimate and constitutional government competent to elect senators
and representatives in Congress and electors of President and
Vice-President.

This bill was passed on the last day of the session, July 4, 1864.  It
was commonly regarded as a rebuke to the course of the President in
proceeding with the grave and momentous task of reconstruction without
waiting the action or invoking the counsel of Congress.  Some of the
more radical members of both Houses considered the action of the
President as beyond his constitutional power, and they were very
positive and peremptory in condemning it.  But Mr. Lincoln, with his
habitual caution and wise foresight, had specially avoided any form of
guaranty, or even suggestion to the States whose reconstruction he was
countenancing and aiding, that their senators and representatives would
be admitted to seats in Congress.  Admission to membership he took care
to advise them was a discretion lodged solely in the respective Houses.
What he had done was in his own judgment clearly within his power as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Union, and was thus obviously
and solely an Executive act.

Mr. Lincoln was not therefore in the humor to be rebuked by Congress.
Though the least pretentious of men, he had an abounding self-respect
and a full appreciation of the dignity and power of his office.  He had
given careful study to the duties, the responsibilities, and the
limitations of the respective departments of the Government, and he was
not willing that his judgment should be revised or his course censured,
however indirectly, by a co-ordinate branch of the Government.  He
therefore declined to sign the bill.  He did not veto it but let it
quietly die.  Four days after the session had closed, he issued a
proclamation in which he treated the bill merely as the expression of
an opinion by Congress as to the plan of Reconstruction--"which plan,"
he remarked, "it is thought fit to lay before the people for their
consideration."

The President further stated in his proclamation that he had "already
propounded one plan of restoration," and that he was "unprepared by a
formal approval of this bill to be inflexibly committed to any single
plan of restoration," and also "unprepared to declare that the Free-State
constitutions and governments already adopted and installed in
Louisiana and Arkansas shall be set aside and held for naught, thereby
repelling and discouraging the loyal citizens who have set up the same
as to further effort;" and also "unprepared to declare a constitutional
competency in Congress to abolish slavery in the States"--though
"sincerely hoping at the same time that a constitutional amendment
abolishing slavery in all the States might be adopted."  While with
these objections Mr. Lincoln could not approve the bill, he concluded
his proclamation in these words: "Nevertheless I am fully satisfied
with the plan of restoration contained in this bill as one very proper
for the loyal people of any State choosing to adopt it, and I am and at
all times shall be prepared to give executive aid and assistance to any
such people so soon as the military resistance to the United States
shall have been suppressed in any such State and the people thereof
shall have sufficiently returned to their obedience to the Constitution
and Laws of the United States--in which cases military governors will
be appointed with directions to proceed according to the bill."

It must be frankly admitted that Mr. Lincoln's course was in some of
its aspects extraordinary.  It met with almost unanimous dissent on
the part of Republican members of Congress, and violent opposition
from the more radical members of both Houses.  If Congress had been in
session at the time, a very rancorous hostility would have been
developed against the President.  Fortunately the senators and
representatives had returned to their States and districts before the
proclamation was issued, and they found the people united and
enthusiastic in Mr. Lincoln's support.  No contest was raised,
therefore, by the great majority of those who had sustained the bill
which the President had refused to approve.  The pending struggle for
the Presidency demanded harmony, and by common consent agitation on the
question was abandoned.  Two of the ablest, most fearless, most
resolute men then in public life--Senator Wade of Ohio, and
Representative Henry Winter Davis of Maryland--were exceptions to the
general rule of acquiescence.  They were respectively the chairmen in
Senate and House of the "Committees on the Rebellious States," and were
primarily and especially responsible for the bill which the President
criticized in his proclamation.  They united over their own signatures
in a public "Protest" against the action of Mr. Lincoln.  The paper was
prepared by Mr. Davis, which of itself was guaranty that it would be
able, caustic, and unqualified.  Mr. Wade was known to be a man of
extraordinary courage, both physical and moral.  To these qualities Mr.
Davis added a highly cultivated mind and a style of writing which in
political controversy has rarely been surpassed--a style at once
severe, effective, and popular.

The "Protest" embodied a sharp contrast between the President's plan of
Reconstruction in his proclamation of December 8 (1863), and that
contained in the bill presented by Congress for his approval.  "The
bill," said Messrs. Wade and Davis, "requires a majority of the voters
to establish a State government, the proclamation is satisfied with
one-tenth; the bill requires one oath, the proclamation another; the
bill ascertains voters by registering, the proclamation by guess; the
bill exacts adherence to existing territorial limits, the proclamation
admits of others; the bill governs the rebel States _by law_ equalizing
all before it, the proclamation commits them to the lawless discretion
of military governors and provost marshals; the bill forbids electors
for President (in the rebel States), the proclamation with the defeat
of the bill threatens us with civil war for the exclusion of such votes."

The criticisms of the President's course closed with the language of
stern admonition if not indeed of absolute menace.  The act of the
President was denounced as "rash and fatal," and as "a blow at the
friends of the Administration, at the rights of humanity, and at the
principles of Republican government."  The President was warned that
the support of the Republican party was "of a cause and not of a man,"
that the "authority of Congress is paramount and must be respected,"
that the "whole body of Union men of Congress will not submit to be
impeached by him or rash and unconstitutional legislation," that he
must "confine himself to his Executive duties--to obey and execute,
not make the laws;" that he "must suppress armed rebellion by arms
and leave political re-organization to Congress."

No political result followed the publication of this remarkable paper
save that it probably defeated the renomination of Mr. Davis for
Congress.  The Democrats were of course hostile to it in spirit and in
letter, and the leading Republicans saw in it the seeds of a
controversy between the President and Congress which might rapidly grow
into dangerous proportions.  The very strength of the paper was, by
one of the paradoxes that frequently recur in public affairs, its
special weakness.  It was so powerful an arraignment of the President
that of necessity it rallied his friends to his support with
that intense form of energy which springs from the instinct of
self-preservation.  It was at once seen and profoundly realized by
the great majority of the loyal people that even if the President had
fallen into an error, no result could possibly flow from adhering to it
that would prove half so perilous to the Union cause as would
dissension and division in the ranks of those who were relied upon to
keep the Government in the control of an Administration, devoted heart
and soul to the preservation of the Union.  It was, they thought, safer
to follow Mr. Lincoln who had all the power in his hands than to follow
Messrs. Wade and Davis who had no power in their hands.

When Congress convened in December (1864), Mr. Lincoln, who had
meanwhile been re-elected to the Presidency, studiously refrained from
any reference in his annual message to the controversy over his
proclamation.  With the intuitive sagacity and caution which never
failed him, he did not touch upon the question of reconstruction.  He
had foreseen that the unhappy differences with which the close of the
previous session of Congress had been marked might be renewed, and
thence lead the party into warring factions if he should again attempt
to urge his own views.  This was undoubtedly a disappointment to those
who had regarded the controversy with the President as only postponed
till the assembling of Congress, and who were impatiently awaiting its
renewal.  The assumed views of the President were antagonized later in
the session by the passage of a joint resolution "declaring certain
States not entitled to representation in the electoral college."  This
was done to cut off the electoral votes (should any such votes be
returned) of Louisiana and Arkansas, satirically referred to by the
opponents of the Administration policy as Mr. Lincoln's "ten per cent
States"--in allusion to the permission given to one-tenth of the
population to organize a State government.

The passage of this joint resolution, to which great importance was
attached by the critics of the President, was met by Mr. Lincoln in a
spirit and with a tact which deprived its authors of all sense of
triumph.  In a brief special message (February 8, 1865) the President
declared that he had "signed the joint resolution in defence to the
view of Congress implied in its passage and presentation."  In his own
view, however, the two Houses of Congress, convened under the twelfth
article of the Constitution, "have complete power to exclude from
counting all electoral votes deemed by them to be illegal, and it is
not competent for the Executive to defeat or obstruct the power by a
veto, as would be the case if his action were at all essential to the
matter."  The President further informed Congress that "he disclaims
all right on the part of the Executive to interfere in any way in the
matter of canvassing or counting the electoral votes, and he also
disclaims that by signing said resolution he has expressed any opinion
of the recitals of the preamble or any judgement of his own upon the
subject of the resolution."

The message was indeed throughout a sarcastic reflection upon the
action of Congress.  It was as if the President had said, "You have
passed a resolution making certain declarations which nobody
controverts: you have claimed certain powers which nobody denies.
If I should sign your resolution without explanation, it might imply
my right to veto it, and thereby take from you your undoubted
Constitutional power.  You are really guilty of weakening your own
prerogatives under the Constitution by asking me to assent to their
existence.  If you intended your resolution as a reflection on my
policy of reconstruction, you might have spared yourself the trouble,
for that policy never contemplated the slightest violation of the
rights and prerogatives of Congress."  The message throughout was
a singularly apt illustration of that keen perception and abounding
common sense which made Mr. Lincoln so formidable an antagonist in
every controversy political and official in which he became involved.
His triumph was complete both in the estimation of Congress and of the
people.

Mr. Lincoln really adhered with unexpected tenacity to the plan of
reconstruction which he had attempted, and which, putting aside the
opprobrious names applied to it, was called by himself "The Louisiana
Plan."  He had stubbornly maintained his ground against the almost
unanimous protest of Republican senators and representatives, and he
justified himself by elaborate argument.  He had been much influenced
by the representations made by General Banks who was commander of the
Military District, and much impressed by the perfect faith in its
success entertained by leading men of the State.  In the last speech
he ever made (April 11, 1865), referring to the twelve thousand men
who had organized the Louisiana Government, the President said, "If we
now reject and spurn them, we do our utmost to disorganize and disperse
them.  We say to the white man, you are worthless or worse.  We will
neither help you nor be helped by you.  To the black man we say, this
cup of liberty which these, your old masters, hold to your lips, we
will dash from you, and leave you to the chances of gathering the
spilled and scattered contents in some vague and undefined when and
where and how.  If this course, discouraging and paralyzing to both
white and black, has any tendency to bring Louisiana into proper
practical relations with the Union, I have so far been unable to
perceive it.  If, on the contrary, they recognize and sustain the new
government of Louisiana, the converse of all this is made true.  We
encourage the hearts and nerve the arms of twelve thousand men to
adhere to their work and argue for it, and proselyte for it, and fight
for it, and grow it, and ripen it to a complete success.  The colored
man too, in seeing all united for him, is inspired with vigilance and
with energy and daring to the same end.  Grant that he desired the
elective franchise.  He will yet attain it sooner by saving the already
advanced steps towards it than by running backward over them.  Concede
that the new government of Louisiana is only to what it should be as
the egg is to the fowl, we shall sooner have the fowl by hatching the
egg than by smashing it."

Mr. Lincoln described also at some length the process by which he had
been induced to try the Louisiana plan.  Like all his conclusions it
was reached after much consultation and serious reflection.  He was
conscientiously convinced that, all things considered, it was the
promptest and most feasible process of re-establishing civil government
in the insurrectionary States.  Mr. Lincoln was especially anxious that
neither the ruling power nor the conquered rebels should be needless
procrastination become accustomed to military government--a form of
administration which he regarded as very tempting, but very sure to
undermine, and in time to destroy, the real spirit of independence and
self-government.  It was his belief, as he expressed it himself, that
"We must begin with and mold from disorganized and discordant elements,
nor is it a small additional embarrassment that we, the loyal people,
differ among ourselves as to the mode, manner, and measure of
reconstruction.  As a general rule I abstain from reading the reports
of attacks upon myself, wishing not to be provoked by that to which I
cannot properly make answer.  In spite of this precaution, however, it
comes to my knowledge that I am much censured for some supposed agency
in setting up and seeking to sustain the new State Government of
Louisiana.  In this I have done just so much and no more than the
public knows."  He then gave somewhat full details of the successive
steps he had taken in his attempt at reconstruction,--steps already
detailed with precision in this chapter.  After completing his recital
he stated with entire frankness that he had done nothing else.  "Such,"
said he, "has been my only agency in setting up the Louisiana
Government."  He was thus explicit because certain members of Congress,
in the excitement caused by the hostility to the President's plan, had
been rash enough to insinuate that the President had a secret
understanding with certain rebels, who, as soon as the President's hand
was withdrawn, would turn the control of the State over to the
unrepentant Democracy who had been so active in precipitating the war.

Concluding his remarks to an audience loath to leave and eager to hear
every word from lips which seemed then to be those of an oracle, Mr.
Lincoln dwelt with great seriousness, even with solemnity, upon this
subject which now wholly engrossed his mind.  The contest of arms was
over, but the President realized that the great pressure of duty which
had been weighing him down was not removed by the coming of peace.  Its
character was changed, its exactions were perhaps less urgent, but
withal he felt that the war would have been in vain unless, in exchange
for all its agonies and all its burdens, there should come to the
institutions of the country some great reforms, and to the people a new
baptism of patriotic interest and philanthropic duty.  He dwelt with
deep solicitude on the situation in the rebellious States, and, unable
to speak as fully as he desired, and with evident emotion, "It may be
my duty to make some new announcement to the people of the South.  I am
considering, and shall not fail to act when satisfied that action will
be proper."

The "new announcement" to the South was never made.  Three days after
it was promised, Mr. Lincoln met his fate.  What changes might have
been wrought if he had lived to make the promised exposition can only
be surmised.  It may be well believed however that the confidence
reposed in him universally in the North, and the respect he had as
universally won in the South, would have given such commanding power to
his counsel as would have seriously influenced, if not promptly
directed, the mode of reconstruction.  Mr. Lincoln's position when he
spoke his closing words was very different from that which he held
when Senator Wade and Henry Winter Davis ventured upon a controversy
with him the preceding summer--boldly assailing his measures and
challenging his judgment.  He was at that time a candidate for
re-election, undergoing harsh criticism and held rigidly accountable for
the prolongation of the war.  Now he stood triumphant in every public
relation--chosen by an almost unprecedented vote to his second term,
the rebellion conquered, the Union firmly re-established!  Never since
Washington's exalted position at the close of the Revolution, or his
still more elevated station when he entered upon the Presidency, has
there been a man in the United States of so great personal power and
influence as Mr. Lincoln then wielded.

It was perhaps not unnatural that from the day of Mr. Lincoln's death,
his views as to the proper mode of reconstruction should become a
subject of warm dispute between the partisans of different theories;
yet no controversy could be less profitable for the single reason that
it was absolutely incapable of settlement.  Beyond his experiment with
the "Louisiana plan" Mr. Lincoln had never given the slightest
indication either by word or deed as to the specific course he would
adopt in the rehabilitation of the insurrectionary States.  His
characteristic anecdote of the young preacher who was exhorted "not to
cross 'Big Muddy' until he reached it" was a perfect illustration of
the painstaking, watchful habit in which he dealt with all public
questions.  He invariably declined to anticipate an issue or settle a
question before it came to him in its natural, logical order.
Louisiana was wholly in the possession of the Union troops in 1862-3,
and presented a question that to his view had ripened for decision.
Hence his prompt and definite procedure in that State.  Severely
challenged for what his accusers deemed a blunder, Mr. Lincoln defended
himself with fair and full statements of fact, and was apparently
justified in adopting the policy he had chosen.  He had fortified his
own judgment, as he frankly declared, "by submitting the Louisiana plan
in advance to every member of the Cabinet, and every member approved
it."  His "promise was out," he said, to sustain this policy, but "bad
promises," he significantly added, "are better broken than kept, and I
shall treat this as a bad promise and break it whenever I shall be
convinced that keeping it is adverse to the public interest."

It is apparent therefore that Mr. Lincoln had no fixed plan for the
reconstruction of the States.  Pertinently questioned on the subject
by one whose personal relations entitled him to unreserved confidence,
the President answered by one of his homely and apt illustrations:
"The pilots on our Western rivers steer from _point to point_ as they
call it--setting the course of the boat no farther than they can see;
and that is all I propose to myself in this great problem."  This
position was practically re-affirmed in the speech, already copiously
quoted.  "So great peculiarities pertain to each State, and such
important and sudden changes occur in the same State, and withal so
new and so unprecedented is the whole case, that no exclusive and
inflexible plan can safely be prescribed in details and collaterals.
Such exclusive and inflexible plan would only become a new
entanglement."  Such was the latitude of judgment which the President
reserved to himself, such the liberty of action which he deemed
essential to the complex problem, for whose solution there was no
prescribed rule, no established precedent.  On all questions of
expediency the President maintained not only the right but the
frequent necessity of change.  "Principle alone," said he, "must be
inflexible."

Encouraged by the result of the controversy, if it may be so termed,
between the President and Congress as to the mode of reconstruction,
Andrew Johnson determined to re-organize the government of his State.
Though Vice-President he was still discharging the functions of
military governor of Tennessee.  A popular convention, originating
from his recommendation and assembling under his auspices, was
organized at Nashville on the ninth day of January, 1865.  Membership
of the body was limited to those who "give an active support to the
Union cause, who have never voluntarily borne arms against the
Government, who have never voluntarily given aid and comfort to the
enemy."  The manifest purpose, indeed the proclaimed intention, was to
re-organize the State, so as to bring all its powers distinctly and
unreservedly under the control of that small minority of the population
which had remained loyal to the Government of the Union.  The preamble
which prefaced their action cited the Declaration of Rights in the
constitution of Tennessee to the effect that "all power is inherent in
the people, and the people have an inalienable right to alter, reform,
to abolish the Government in such manner as they may think proper."
This was followed by a declaration which might well be viewed as a _non
sequitur_.  "Therefore," said the convention, "_a portion of the
citizens_ of the State of Tennessee and of the United States of America
in convention assembled do propound the following amendments to the
Constitution, which when ratified by the sovereign, loyal people shall
be and constitute a part of the permanent constitution of the State of
Tennessee."

It was very easy by strict logic to state grave objections to this mode
of procedure.  It was easy to say that "a portion of the people" did
not constitute "the people" in the sense in which the phrase was used
in the constitution of Tennessee.  It was easy to charge that the
proposed mode of proceeding embodied all the heresy of the Dorr
Rebellion of Rhode Island in 1842-43, which had fallen under the
animadversion of every department of the United States Government.  But
in answer to such objections, Governor Johnson, and those who co-operated
with him, could urge that the objections and cavilings of all critics
seemed to ignore the controlling fact that they were acting in
a time of war, and were pursuing the only course by which the power of
civil government in Tennessee could be brought to the aid of the
military power of the National Government.  Tennessee, as Johnson
bluntly maintained, could only be organized and controlled as a State
in the Union by that portion of her citizens who acknowledged their
allegiance to the Government of the Union.

Under this theory of procedure the popular convention proposed an
amendment to the State constitution "forever abolishing and prohibiting
slavery in the State," and further declaring that "the Legislature
shall make no law recognizing the right of property in man."  The
convention took several other important steps, annulling in whole and
in detail all the legislation which under Confederate rule had made
the State a guilty participant in the rebellion.  Thus was swept away
the ordinance of Secession, and the State debt created in aid of the
war against the Union.  All these proceedings were submitted to a
popular vote on the 22d of February, and were ratified by an
affirmative vote of 25,293 against a negative vote of 48.  The total
vote of the State at the Presidential election of 1860 was 145,333.
Mr. Lincoln's requirement of one-tenth of that number was abundantly
complied with by the vote on the questions submitted to the popular
decision.  Small as was the ratio of avowed Union men at the time, Mr.
Johnson argued with much confidence that Tennessee, freed from
coercion, would adhere to the Union by a large majority of her total
vote.  His faith was based on the fact that when the plain and direct
question of Union or Disunion was submitted to the people in the winter
of 1860-61, the vote for the former was 91,813, and for the latter only
24,749.

Under this new order of things, William G. Brownlow, better known to
the world by his _soubriquet_ of "Parson" Brownlow, was chosen
governor without opposition on the fourth day of March, 1865, the day
of Mr. Lincoln's second inauguration.  The new Legislature met at
Nashville a month later, on the 3d of April, and on the 5th ratified
the Thirteenth Amendment; thus adding the abolition of slavery by
National authority to that already decreed by the State.  The
Legislature completed its work by electing two consistent Union men,
David T. Patterson and Joseph S. Fowler, to the United-States Senate.
The framework of the new Government was thus completed and in operation
before the death of Mr. Lincoln.  It had not received the recognition
and approval of the National Government in any specific or direct
manner.  But Andrew Johnson was inaugurated as Vice-President on the
4th of March, and the only form of government left in Tennessee was
that of which Brownlow was the acknowledged head.  The crucial test
would come when the senators and representatives, elected under the
Brownlow government, should apply for their seats in Congress.

The course pursued in Tennessee afforded a significant index to Mr.
Johnson's conception of what was deemed necessary to prepare a State
that had been in rebellion, for its full rehabilitation as a member
of the Federal Union.  His position was rendered still more pronounced
and positive by his declarations in the remarkable speech delivered by
him when he took the oath of office as Vice-President: "Before I
conclude this brief Inaugural address in the presence of this audience,
. . . I desire to proclaim that Tennessee, whose representative I have
been, is free.  She has bent the tyrant's rod, she has broken the yoke
of slavery, she stands to-day redeemed.  She waited not for the
exercise of power by Congress; it was her own act; and she is now as
loyal, Mr. Attorney-General, as the State from which you come.  It is
the doctrine of the Federal Constitution that no State can go out of
this Union.  Thank God, Tennessee has never been out of the Union!
It is true the operations of her government were for a time
interrupted; there was an interregnum; but she is in the Union, and I
am her representative.  This day (March 4, 1865) she elects her
Governor and her Legislature, which will be convened on the first
Monday of April, and her senators and representatives will soon mingle
with those of her sister States; and who shall gainsay it, for the
Constitution provides that to every State shall be guaranteed a
Republican form of government."

The very positive declaration by Mr. Johnson that "Tennessee has never
been out of the Union" indicated the side he would take in a pending
controversy which was waxing warm between the disputants.  Whether the
act of Secession was void _ab initio_ and really left the State still
a member of the Union, or whether it did, however wrongfully, carry the
State out of the Union as claimed by those engaged in the Rebellion,
was one of the purely abstract political questions concerning which men
will argue without ceasing,--reaching no conclusion because there is
no conclusion to be reached.  Both propositions were at the time
affirmed and denied with all the earnestness, indeed with all the
temper, which distinguished the mediaeval theologians upon points of
doctrine once regarded as essential to salvation, but the very meaning
of which is scarcely comprehended by modern ecclesiastics.  With his
mental acumen and with his never-failing common sense, Mr. Lincoln
declined to take part in the discussion.  In his last public speech he
treated this question with admirable perspicuity, and with his wonted
felicity of homely illustration: "I have been shown what is supposed
to be an able letter," said he, "in which the writer expresses regret
that my mind has not seemed to be definitely fixed upon the question
whether the seceded States, so called, are in the Union or out of it.
. . . It would perhaps add astonishment to his regret to learn that as
it appears to me, that question has not been and is not a practically
material one, and that any discussion of it could have no effect other
than the mischievous one of dividing friends.  As yet, whatever it may
become, the question is bad as the basis of a controversy--a merely
pernicious abstraction.  We all agree that the seceded States, so
called, are out of their proper practical relation with the Union, and
that the sole object of the Government is to get them back into their
proper practical relation.  I believe it is easier to do this without
deciding or even considering whether those States have ever been out of
the Union.  The States finding themselves once more at home, it would
seem immaterial to me to inquire whether they had ever been abroad."

The essential difference between the upholders and the opponents of
this theory was not shown in the practical treatment proposed for the
States which had been in rebellion.  It was in truth a difference only
in degree.  The stoutest defenders of the dogma that the States had
not been out of the Union did not propose to permit the re-organization
of their local governments except upon conditions prescribed by the
National authority, and did not assert the rightfulness of their
claims to representation in the Senate and House until the prescribed
conditions were complied with.  Those who protested against the dogma
did not assert the right to keep the States out of the Union, but only
claimed an unrestricted power to exact as the prerequisite of
re-admission such conditions as might be deemed essential to the public
safety--especially such as would most surely prevent another rebellion
against National authority.  The two schools in short marked the
dividing line between the radical and the conservative.  Perhaps
another feature might still more clearly indicate the difference
between the two.  The conservatives thought the process of
reconstruction could be accomplished under the sole authority and
direction of the Executive Department of the Government, while the
radicals held it to be a matter for the exclusive determination of
Congress, affirming that the President's right of intervention was
limited to approval or veto of the bills which Congress should send to
him, and to the execution of all laws which should be constitutionally
enacted.

An extra session of Congress seemed specially desirable at the time,
and had one been summoned by the President, many of the troubles
which subsequently resulted might have been averted.  The propriety
of ordering an earlier assemblage of the Thirty-ninth Congress than
that already provided by the Constitution had been discussed to a
very considerable extent among the members of the Thirty-eighth, as its
final adjournment (March 3, 1865) approached.  The rebellion seemed
tottering to its fall, and it was the belief of many of the leading men
both of the Senate and the House, that it might be a special advantage
if Congress should be in session when the final surrender of the
Confederate forces should be made.  But the prevailing opinion was in
favor of leaving the matter to Mr. Lincoln's discretion.  It was felt
by the members that if the situation should demand the presence of
Congress, Mr. Lincoln would promptly issue his proclamation, and if the
situation should not demand it, the presence of Congress might prove
hurtful, and would certainly not be helpful.  The calamity of Mr.
Lincoln's death had never entered into the public mind, and therefore
no provision was made with any view of its remotest possibility.

Mr. Johnson, however, is scarcely to be blamed for not calling an extra
session of Congress.  Aside from his confidence in his own power to
deal with the problems before him, he shared, no doubt, in the general
dislike which Presidents in recent years have shown for extra sessions.
Indeed, to the Executive Department of the Government, Congress, even
in its regular sessions, is a guest whose coming is not welcomed with
half the heartiness with which its departure is speeded.  But an
extra session, especially at the beginning of an Administration, is
looked upon with almost superstitious aversion, and is always to be
avoided if possible.  It was remembered that all the woes of the
elder Adams' Administration, all the intrigues which the choleric
President fancied that Hamilton was carrying on against him in
connection with our French difficulties, had their origin in the extra
session of May, 1797.  It was remembered also that the unpopularity
which attached to the Presidency of Mr. Madison was connected with the
two extra sessions which his timid Administration was perhaps too ready
to assemble.  So deeply was the hostility to extra sessions implanted
in the minds of political leaders by the misfortunes of Adams and
Madison that another was not called for a quarter of a century.  In
September, 1837, Mr. Van Buren inaugurated the ill-fortune of his
Administration by assembling Congress three months in advance of its
regular session.  John Tyler in turn never recovered from the
dissensions and disasters of the extra session of May, 1841,--though it
was precipitated upon him by a call issued by President Harrison.  All
those extra sessions except the one in Mr. Van Buren's Administration
had been held in May, and even in his case the proclamation summoning
Congress was issued in May.  No wonder, therefore, that ill-luck came
to be associated with that month.  When the necessity of assembling
Congress was forced upon Mr. Lincoln by the firing on Sumter, Mr.
Seward warned him that in any event he must not have the session begin
in May.  It must be confessed therefore that the precedents were
sufficiently alarming to influence Mr. Johnson against an extra
session.  Nor was there any popular demand for it because the
President's policy had not as yet portended trouble or strife in the
ranks of the Republican party.


CHAPTER IV.

Declining to seek the advice of Congress in the embarrassments of his
position, President Johnson necessarily subjected himself to the
counsel and influence of his Cabinet.  He had inherited from Mr.
Lincoln an organization of the Executive Department which, with the
possible exception of Mr. Seward, was personally agreeable to him and
politically trusted by him.  He dreaded the effect of changing it, and
declined upon his accession to make room for some eminent men who by
long personal association and by identity of views on public questions
would naturally be selected as his advisers.  He had not forgotten the
experience and the fate of the chief magistrates who like himself had
been promoted from the Vice-Presidency.  He instinctively wished to
avoid their mistakes and to leave behind him an administration which
should not in after years be remembered for its faults, its blunders,
its misfortunes.

The Federal Government had existed fifty-two years before it
encountered the calamity of a President's death.  The effect which such
an event would produce upon the _personnel_ of the Government and upon
the partisan aspects of the Administration was not therefore known
prior to 1841.  The Vice-President in previous years had not always
been on good terms with the President.  In proportion to his rank there
was no officer of the Government who exercised so little influence.
His most honorable function--that of presiding over the Senate--was
purely ceremonial, and carried with it no attribute of power except in
those rare cases when the vote of the Senate was tied--a contingency
more apt to embarrass than to promote his political interests.  He was,
of course, neither sought nor feared by the crowds who besieged the
President.  He was therefore not unnaturally thrown into a sort of
antagonism with the Administration--an antagonism sure to be stimulated
by the _coterie_ who, disappointed in efforts to secure favor with the
President, were disposed to take refuge in the Cave of Adullam, where
from chagrin and sheer vexation the Vice-President had too frequently
been found.  The class of disappointed men who gathered around the
Vice-President held a political relation not unlike that of the class
who in England have on several occasions formed the Prince of Wales'
party--composed of malcontents of the opposition, who were on the worst
possible terms with the Ministry.

John Tyler, as President Johnson well knew from personal observation,
began his Executive career with an apparent intention of following in
the footsteps of the lamented Harrison, to which course he had been
indeed been enjoined by the dying President in words of the most solemn
import.  Tyler gave assurances to his Cabinet that he desired them to
retain their places.  But the suggestion--which he was too ready to
adopt--was soon made, that he would earn no personal fame by
submissively continuing in the pathway marked out by another.  With
this uneasiness implanted in his mind, it was impossible that he should
retain a Cabinet in whose original selection he had no part, and whose
presence was the symbol of a political subordination which constantly
fretted him.  A cause of difference was soon found; difference led to
irritation, irritation to open quarrel, and quarrel ended in a
dissolution of the Cabinet five months after Mr. Tyler's accession to
the Executive chair.  The dispute was then transferred to his party,
and grew more angry day by day until Tyler was driven for political
shelter and support to the Democratic Party, which had opposed his
election.

Mr. Fillmore had not been on good terms with General Taylor's
Administration, and when he succeeded to the Presidency he made haste
to part with the illustrious Cabinet he found in power.  He accepted
their resignations at once, and selected heads of departments
personally agreeable to himself and in political harmony with his
views.  He did not desert his party, but he passed over from the
anti-slavery to the pro-slavery wing, defeated the policy of his
predecessor, secured the enactment of the Fugitive-slave Law, and
neutralized all efforts to prohibit the introduction of slavery in the
Territories.  In this course Mr. Fillmore had the support of the
great leaders of the party, Mr. Clay and Mr. Webster, but he
disregarded the young Whigs who under the lead of Mr. Seward were
proclaiming a new political dispensation in harmony with the advancing
public opinion of the world.  Mr. Fillmore did not leave his party,
but he failed to retain the respect and confidence of the great mass
of Northern Whigs; and his administration came to an end in coldness
and gloom for himself, and with the defeat, and practically the
destruction, of the party which had chosen him to his high place four
years before.  His faithlessness to General Scott gave to the
Democratic candidate an almost unparalleled victory.  Scott encountered
defeat.  Fillmore barely escaped dishonor.

With the ill-fortune of these predecessors fresh in his memory, Mr.
Johnson evidently set out with the full intention not merely of
retaining the Cabinet of his predecessor, not merely of co-operating
with the party which elected him, but of espousing the principles of
its radical, progressive, energetic section.  A Southern man, he
undoubtedly aspired to lead and control Northern opinion--the opinion
which had displayed the moral courage necessary to the prolonged
anti-slavery struggle in Congress, and had exhibited the physical
courage to accept the gage of battle and prosecute a gigantic war
in support of deep-rooted convictions.  The speeches of the President
had defined his position, and the Nation awaited the series of
measures with which he would inaugurate his policy.  Public interest
in the subject would indeed have caused greater impatience if public
attention had not in every Northern State been intently occupied in
welcoming to their homes the troops, who in thinned ranks and with
battered standards were about to close their military career and resume
the duties of peaceful citizens.

The personal character and political bias of the members of the
Cabinet, and especially their opinions respecting the policy which the
President had indicated, became therefore a matter of controlling
importance.  The Cabinet had undergone many changes since its original
organization in March, 1861.  The substitution of Mr. Stanton for Mr.
Cameron and of Mr. Fessenden for Mr. Chase has already been noticed;
but on the day of Mr. Lincoln's second inauguration Mr. Fessenden
returned to the Senate, resuming the seat which he had left the July
previous, and which had in the interim been filled by Nathan A.
Farwell, an experienced ship-builder and ship-master of Maine, who
possessed an extraordinarily accurate knowledge of the commercial
history of the country.  Mr. Farwell is still living, vigorous in
health and in intellect.

When Mr. Fessenden left the Treasury, he was succeeded by Hugh
McCulloch, whose valuable service as Comptroller of the Currency had
secured for him the promotion with which Mr. Lincoln now honored him.
Mr. McCulloch was a native of Maine, who had gone to the West in his
early manhood, and had earned a strong position as a business man in
his Indiana home.  He was a descendant of that small but prolific
colony of Scotch and Scotch-Irish who had settled in northern New
England, and whose blood has enriched all who have had the good fortune
to inherit it.  Mr. McCulloch was a devoted Whig, and was so loyal to
the Union that during the war he could do nothing else than give his
influence to the Republican party.  But he was hostile to the creed of
the Abolitionist, was conservative in all his modes of thought, and
wished the Union restored quite regardless of the fate of the negro.
He believed that unwise discussion of the slavery question had brought
our troubles upon us, and that it would be inexcusable to continue an
agitation which portended trouble in another form.  The policy which he
desired to see adopted was that which should restore the Rebel States
to their old relations with the Union upon the freest possible
conditions and within the shortest possible time.

Mr. Stanton, though originally a pro-slavery Democrat, had by the
progress of the war been converted to the creed of the most radical
wing of the Republican party.  The aggressive movement, the
denunciatory declarations made by Mr. Johnson against the "rebels" and
"traitors" of the South, immediately after his accession to the
Presidency, were heartily re-echoed by Mr. Stanton, who looked forward
with entire satisfaction to the vigorous policy so vigorously
proclaimed.  Mr. Stanton's tendency in this direction had been
strengthened by the intolerance and hatred of his old Democratic
friends,--of whom Judge Black was a type,--who lost no opportunity to
denounce him as a renegade to his party, as one who had been induced
by place to forswear his old creed of State rights.  Such hostility
should, however, be accounted a crown of honor to Mr. Stanton.  He
certainly came to the public service with patriotic and not with
sordid motives, surrendering a most brilliant position at the bar, and
with it the emolument of which in the absence of accumulated wealth his
family was in daily need.

Mr. Stanton's observation and wide experience through the years of the
war had taught him to distrust the Southern leaders.  Now that they
had been subdued by force, yielding at the point of the bayonet when
they could no longer resist, he did not believe that they should be
regarded as returning prodigals to be embraced and wept over, for whom
fatted calves should be killed, and who should be welcomed at once to
the best in their father's house.  He thought rather that works meet
for repentance should be shown by these offenders against the law both
of God and man, that they should be held to account in some form for
the peril with which they had menaced the Nation, and for the agony
they had inflicted upon her loyal sons.  Mr. Stanton was therefore, by
every impulse of his heart and by every conviction of his mind,
favorable to the policy which the President had indicated, if not
indeed assured, to the people.

Gideon Welles of Connecticut, Secretary of the Navy, was a member of
the original Cabinet of Mr. Lincoln.  He belonged by habit of thought
and former affiliation to the Democratic party: he had united with
the Republicans solely upon the slavery issue.  With the destruction
of slavery his sympathies with the party were lessened.  The industrial
policy which the Republicans had adopted during the war was distasteful
to Mr. Welles in time of peace.  He had been a bureau-officer in the
Navy Department during Mr. Polk's administration, and believed in the
wisdom of the tariff of 1846, to which he gave the support of his pen.
He possessed a strong instinct, but manifested little warmth of feeling
or personal attachment to any one.  He was a man of high character,
but full of prejudices and a good hater.  He wrote well, but was
disposed to dip his pen in gall.  He was careful as to matters of fact,
fortified his memory by an accurate diary, and had an innate love of
controversy.  With slavery abolished, the tendency of his mind was
towards a lenient policy in Southern matters and for the promptest
mode of reconstruction.

James Harlan of Iowa was Secretary of the Interior.  Caleb B. Smith,
who was a member of Mr. Lincoln's original Cabinet, had resigned in
order to accept a Federal judgeship in Indiana, and his able
assistant-secretary, John P. Usher, had been promoted to the head of
the department, fulfilling his trust to Mr. Lincoln's satisfaction.
He in turn resigned, and was succeeded by Mr. Harlan who was nominated
by Mr. Lincoln, and unanimously confirmed by the Senate on the 9th of
March--the confirmation to take effect on the 15th of May.  It was an
exceptional form of appointment; but when the date was reached,
President Johnson insisted that the new Secretary should assume the
duties of the office.  Mr. Harlan was a well-educated man with strong
natural parts.  He had shown admirable capacity for public affairs in
various positions in Iowa, and had served that State efficiently in the
Senate of the United States, which he entered March 4, 1855, at
thirty-five years of age.  He was a pronounced and unflinching
Republican, ready from personal attachment to Mr. Lincoln to follow him
in any public policy, and while somewhat distrustful of Johnson was
undoubtedly gratified and re-assured by the tone of his speeches.  Mr.
Harlan was not hasty in judgment but thoughtful and reflective, and
aimed always to be just in his conclusions.

William Dennison of Ohio was Postmaster-General.  He had succeeded
Montgomery Blair during the Presidential campaign of 1864, when that
officer's resignation was asked by the President as a means of
appeasing the unreasonable and unreasoning body of men who had
attempted to divide the Republican party at the height of the war by
the nomination of General Fremont as a candidate for the Presidency.
Mr. Dennison was an amiable man of high principles and just intentions,
but he was not endowed with executive force or the qualities of a
leader.  He had secured the warm friendship of Mr. Lincoln during
his service as war governor of Ohio.  His selection of president of
the convention that nominated Mr. Lincoln a second time was due to the
zeal and the warmth with which he had supported the National
Administration.  His sympathies and associations were all with the
strong Republican element of the country, and he was sure to be firm
and exacting in his views of a reconstruction policy.

James Speed was Attorney-General.  He had succeeded Edward Bates in
December, 1864, and was selected for reasons which were partly
personal, partly public.  He was a Kentuckian and a Clay Whig, two
points in his history which strongly attracted the favor of Mr.
Lincoln.  But more than all, he was the brother of Joshua Speed, with
whom in young manhood, if not indeed in boyhood, Mr. Lincoln had been
closely associated in Illinois.  Of most kindly and generous nature,
Mr. Lincoln was slow to acquire intimacies, and had few close
friendships.  But those who knew him well cannot fail to remember the
kindling eye, the warmth of expression, the depth of personal interest
and attachment with which he always spoke of "Josh Speed," and the
almost boyish fervor with which he related incidents and anecdotes of
their early association.  James Speed, to whom Mr. Lincoln had been
thus drawn, was a highly respectable lawyer, and was altogether a fit
man to succeed Mr. Bates as the Border-State member of the Cabinet.  As
a Southern man, he was expected to favor a lenient policy towards his
offending brethren, and was supposed to look coldly upon much that was
implied in the President's declarations.

Of the six Cabinet ministers thus enumerated, it will be seen that
three--Mr. McCulloch, Mr. Welles, and Mr. Speed--might be regarded as
favoring a conservative plan of reconstruction, and three--Mr. Stanton,
Mr. Harlan, and Mr. Dennison--a radical plan.  These positions were
thus assigned from circumstantial evidence rather than from direct
declarations of the gentlemen themselves.  At a time so critical,
responsible officials were naturally reserved and cautious in the
expression of opinions.  But it was instinctively perceived by close
observers of public events, that in correctly estimating the influence
of the Cabinet upon the policy of President Johnson, great
consideration must be given to the attitude which Mr. Seward might
assume.  If his strength should go with Mr. Stanton and the radical
wing of the Cabinet, the President would be readily and completely
confirmed in the line of policy frequently forecast in his speeches.
If on the other hand, Mr. Seward should follow the generally
anticipated course, and take ground against the harsh and vengeful
spirit indicated by the President, a struggle would ensue, of which
the issue would be doubtful.

During the period in which Mr. Johnson had been copiously illustrating
the guilt of treason, and avowing his intention to punish traitors with
the severest penalty known to the law, Mr. Seward lay wounded and
helpless.  His injuries, received at the hands of the assassin, Payne,
at almost the same moment in which Booth fired his fatal shot at the
President, were at first considered mortal.  The murderous assault came
only a short time after a severe injury Mr. Seward had received in
consequence of being violently thrown from his carriage.  The shock to
his nervous system from the attack of the assassin was so great that
his physicians did not for some days permit him to learn the fate of
the President, or even to know that his own son, Mr. Frederick Seward,
who had been his faithful and able assistant at the State Department,
was also one of the victims of the plot of assassination, and was
lying, as it was feared, and indeed generally believed, at the point of
death.

To the joy no less than to the surprise of the entire country Mr.
Seward rallied and regained his strength very rapidly.  He was wounded
on the night of the 14th of April.  By the first of May he had so far
recovered as to be informed somewhat minutely of the sorrowful
situation.  By the tenth of the month he received visits from the
President and his fellow-members of the Cabinet, and conferred with
them on the engrossing questions that pressed upon the Administration.
On the 20th he repaired to the Department of State--which then occupied
the present site of the north front of the Treasury building--and held
conference with foreign ministers, especially with the minister of
France, touching the complication in Mexico.  From that time onward,
though still weak, and bowed down with grief by the death of Mr.
Lincoln and the possibly impeding death of one still nearer to him, Mr.
Seward gave close attention to public affairs.  The need of action and
of energy so pressed upon him that he found no time to utter
lamentation, none to indulge even in the most sacred personal grief.
The heroic element of the man was displayed at its best.  His moral
strength, his mental fibre, his wiry constitution were all tested to
their utmost, and no doubt to the serious shortening of his days.

Mr. Seward feared that the country was in danger of suffering very
seriously from a possible, if not indeed probable, mistake of the
Administration.  In the creed of his own statesmanship, there was no
article that comprehended revenge as a just motive for action.  No man
had suffered more of personal obloquy from the South than he, no one
living had received deeper personal injury from the demoniac spirit,
the wicked inspiration of the rebellion.  But he did not for one
moment permit those causes which would have powerfully influenced lower
natures to control his action, or even to extort a single word of
passionate resentment.

It had been Mr. Seward's fortune at different epochs in the country's
history and in different phases of his own career to incur the harshest
censure from political associates.  He had been accused at one time of
urging the anti-slavery cause so far as to endanger the Union; and,
when the Union was endangered, he was accused of being willing to
sacrifice the anti-slavery cause to save it.  "The American people,"
said he in February, 1861, "have in our day two great interests,--one
the ascendency of freedom, the other the integrity of the Union.  The
slavery interest has derived its whole political power from bringing
the latter object into antagonism with the former.  Twelve years ago
Freedom was in danger, and the Union was not. . . . To-day practically
Freedom is not in danger, and the Union is.  With the loss of the
Union, all would be lost."  Mr. Seward, influenced by this belief,
went farther in the direction of conciliation for the avoidance of war
than his associates were willing to follow.  His words gave offense to
some who had long been his most earnest supporters,--a fact thus
pointedly recognized by him: "I speak now singly for Union, striving
if possible to save it peaceably; if not possible, then to cast the
responsibility upon the party of slavery.  For this singleness of
speech, I am suspected of infidelity to freedom."  But Mr. Seward held
his course firmly, and waited for vindication as men of rectitude and
true greatness can afford to wait.  "I refer myself not to the men of
my time, but to the judgment of history."

A similar dedication of himself to the judgment of history was in Mr.
Seward's opinion again demanded of him.  He was firmly persuaded that
the wisest plan of reconstruction was the one which would be speediest;
that for the sake of impressing the world with the strength and the
marvelous power of self-government, with its Law, its Order, its Peace,
we should at the earliest possible moment have every State restored to
its normal relations with the Union.  He did not believe that
guarantee of any kind beyond an oath of renewed loyalty was needful.
He was willing to place implicit faith in the coercive power of
self-interest operating upon the men lately in rebellion.  He agreed
neither with the President's proclaimed policy of blood, nor with that
held by the vast majority of his own political associates, which,
avoiding the rigor of personal punishment, sought by exclusion from
political honor and emolument to administer wholesome discipline to the
men who had brought peril to the Government and suffering to the people.

Mr. Seward was undoubtedly influenced in no small degree in these
conclusions by the habit of mind he had acquired in conducting the
foreign affairs of the Government during the period of the war.  He had
keenly felt the reproach, the taunt, and the open or ill-disguised
satisfaction reflected by a large number of the public men of Europe
that we were no longer and could never again be "the _United_ States of
America."  He felt that the experiment of Imperial Government in
Mexico, then in progress under Maximilian, was a disturbing element,
and tended by possible conflicts on this continent to embroil us with
at least two great European powers.  The defense against that unwelcome
alternative, and the defense against its evil result, if it should
come, would in his judgment be found in a completely restored Union--with
the National Government supreme, and all its parts working in
harmony and in strength.  He believed moreover that the legislation
which should affect the South, now that peace had returned, should be
shared by representatives of that section, and that as such
participation must at last come if we were to have a restored Republic,
the wisest policy was to concede it at once, and not nurture by delay
a new form of discontent, and induce by withholding confidence a new
phase of distrust and disobedience among the Southern people.

Entertaining these views, and deeply impressed with the importance of
incorporating them in the plan of reconstruction, Mr. Seward rose
from his sick-bed, pale, emaciated, and sorrowful, to persuade his
associates in the Government, of the wisdom and necessity of adopting
them.  He had undoubtedly a hard task with the President.  The two men
were naturally antagonistic on so many points that agreement and
cordiality seemed impossible upon a question in regard to which they
held views diametrically opposite.  Mr. Johnson inherited all his
political principles from the Democratic party.  He had been filled
with an intense hatred of the Whigs and with an almost superstitious
dread of the Federalists.  Mr. Seward and he were therefore political
antipodes.  The one was the eulogist and follower of John Quincy Adams,
the other was a sincere believer in the creed and the measures of
Andrew Jackson.  As Adams and Jackson had agreed only in devotion to
the Union, so now Seward and Johnson seemed to have no other principle
of Government in common, and that principle was equally strong in each.

Not only was this obstacle of inherent difference of political view in
Mr. Seward's way, but he also encountered an intense personal
prejudice which even while he was disabled by wounds had been
insinuated into the President's mind.  Nor had Mr. Seward any force of
popularity at the time with the Republican party of the country.  It
had fallen to his lot during the four eventful years of the war to
assume unpleasant responsibilities and to perform ungracious acts.  He
was not at the head of a department where popular applause awaited his
ablest work, or where popular attention was attracted by the most
brilliant triumphs of his diplomatic correspondence.

The successful placing of a vast loan among the people redounded
everywhere to the praise of Mr. Chase.  The gaining of a victory in
the field reflected credit upon Mr. Stanton.  But a series of
diplomatic papers far outreaching in scope and grasp those of any
statesman or publicist with whom he was in correspondence, recalling in
skill the best efforts of Talleyrand, and in spirit the loftiest ideals
of Jefferson, did not advance the popularity of Mr. Seward because the
field of his achievements and triumphs was not one in which the masses
of the people took an active interest.  The most difficult and in many
cases the most successful of diplomatic work is necessarily
confidential for long periods.  In legislative halls, discussion on
questions of interest enlists public attention and holds the popular
mind in suspense before the fate of the measure is decided.  But the
dispatches and arguments of a minister of Foreign Affairs, which may
lead to results of great consequence to his country, are not gazetted
till long after they have borne their fruit; and the public rejoicing
in the conclusion, seldom turns to examine the toilsome process by
which it was attained.  It was from the comparative isolation of the
Department of State, four years removed from active contact with the
people, that Mr. Seward now assumed the task of controlling the new
President and directing his policy on the weightiest question of his
Administration.

Those who thoroughly knew Mr. Seward through all the stages of his
political career were aware that, great as he was in public speech, in
the Senate, at the Bar, before popular assemblies, cogent and powerful
as he had so often proved with his pen, his one peculiar gift, greater
perhaps than any other with which he was endowed, was his faculty, in
personal intercourse with one man or with a small number of men, of
enforcing his own views and taking captive his hearers.  With the
President alone, or with a body no larger than a Cabinet, where the
conferences and discussion are informal and conversational, Mr. Seward
shone with remarkable brilliancy and with power unsurpassed.  He
possessed a characteristic rare among men who have been long accustomed
to lead,--he was a good listener.  He gave deferential attention to
remarks addressed to him, paid the graceful and insinuating compliment
of seeming much impressed, and offered the delicate flattery, when he
came to reply, of repeating the argument of his opponent in phrase far
more affluent and eloquent than that in which it was originally stated.

In his final summing up of the case, when those with whom he was
conferring were, in Dr. Johnson's phrase, "talked out," Mr. Seward
carried all before him.  His logic was clear and true, his illustration
both copious and felicitous, his rapid citation of historical
precedents surprising even to those who thought they had themselves
exhausted the subject.  His temper was too amiable and serene for
stinging wit or biting sarcasm, but he had a playful humor which kept
the minds of his hearers in that receptive and compliant state which
disposed them the more readily to give full and generous consideration
to all the strong parts of his argument.  It might well indeed be said
of Mr. Seward as Mr. Webster said of Samuel Dexter, "The earnestness
of his convictions wrought conviction in others.  One was convinced and
believed and assented because it was gratifying and delightful to think
and feel and believe in unison with an intellect of such evident
superiority."

Equipped with these rare endowments, it is not strange that Mr. Seward
made a deep impression upon the mind of the President.  In conflicts of
opinion the superior mind, the subtle address, the fixed purpose, the
gentle yet strong will, must in the end prevail.  Mr. Seward gave to
the President the most luminous exposition of his own views, warm,
generous, patriotic in tone.  He set before him the glory of an
Administration which should completely re-establish the union of the
States, and re-unite the hearts of the people, now estranged by civil
conflict.  He impressed him with the danger of delay to the Republic
and with the discredit which would attach to himself if he should
leave to another President the grateful task of reconciliation.  He
pictured to him the National Constellation no longer obscured but with
every star in its orbit, all revolving in harmony, and once more
shining with a brilliancy undimmed by the smallest cloud in the
political heavens.

By his arguments and his eloquence Mr. Seward completely captivated the
President.  He effectually persuaded him that a policy of anger and
hate and vengeance could lead only to evil results; that the one
supreme demand of the country was confidence and repose; that the ends
of justice could be reached by methods and measures altogether
consistent with mercy.  The President was gradually influenced by Mr.
Seward's arguments, though their whole tenor was against his strongest
predilections and against his pronounced and public committals to a
policy directly the reverse of that to which he was now, almost
imperceptibly to himself, yielding assent.  The man who had in April
avowed himself in favor of "the halter for intelligent, influential
traitors," who passionately declared during the interval between the
fall of Richmond and the death of Mr. Lincoln that "traitors should be
arrested, tried, convicted, and hanged," was now about to proclaim a
policy of reconstruction without attempting the indictment of even one
traitor, or issuing a warrant for the arrest of a single participant in
the Rebellion aside from those suspected of personal crime in
connection with the noted conspiracy of assassination.

In this serious struggle with the President, Mr. Seward's influence
was supplemented and enhanced by the timely and artful interposition
of clever men from the South.  A large class in that section quickly
perceived the amelioration of the President's feelings, and they used
every judicious effort to forward and develop it.  They were ready to
forget all the hard words of Johnson, and to forgive all his harsh
acts, for the great end to be gained to their States and their people
by turning him aside from his proclaimed policy of punishing a great
number of rebels with the utmost severity of the law.  Johnson's wrath
was evidently appeased by the complaisance shown by leading men of
the South.  He was not especially open to flattery, but it was noticed
that words of commendation from his native section seemed peculiarly
pleasing to him.

The tendency of his mind under such influences was perhaps not
unnatural.  It is a common instinct of mankind to covet in an especial
degree the good will of the community among whom the years of childhood
and boyhood are spent.  Applause from old friends and neighbors is the
most grateful that ever reaches human ears.  When Washington's renown
filled two continents, he was still sensitive respecting his popularity
among the freeholders of Virginia.  When Bonaparte had kingdoms and
empires at his feet, he was jealous of his fame with the untamed
spirits of Corsica, where among the veterans of Paoli he had received
the fiery inspiration of war.  The boundless admiration and gratitude
of American never compensated Lafayette for the failure of his career
in France.  This instinct had its full sway over Johnson.  It was not
in the order of nature that he should esteem his popularity among
Northern men, to whom he was a stranger, as highly as he would esteem
it among the men of the South, with whom he had been associated during
the whole of his career.  In that section he was born.  There he had
acquired the fame which brought him national honors, and after his
public service should end he looked forward to a peaceful close of life
in the beautiful land which had always been his home.

Still another influence wrought powerfully on the President's mind.  He
had inherited poverty in a community where during the slave system
riches were especially envied and honored.  He had been reared in the
lower walks of life among a people peculiarly given to arbitrary social
distinction and to aristocratic pretensions as positive and tenacious
as they were often ill-founded and unsubstantial.  From the ranks of
the rich and the aristocratic in the South, Johnson had always been
excluded.  Even when he was governor of his State or a senator of the
United States, he found himself socially inferior to many whom he
excelled in intellect and character.  His sentiments were regarded as
hostile to slavery, and to be hostile to slavery was to fall inevitably
under the ban in any part of the South for the fifty years preceding
the war.  His political strength was with the non-slave-holding white
population of Tennessee which was vastly larger than the slave-holding
population, the proportion indeed being twenty-seven to one.  With
these a "good fellow" ranked all the higher for not possessing the
graces or, as they would term them, the "airs" of society.

As Mr. Johnson grew in public favor and increased in reputation, as his
talents were admitted and his power in debate appreciated, he became
eager to compel recognition from those who had successfully proscribed
him.  A man who is born to social equality with the best of his
community, and accustomed in his earlier years to its enjoyment, does
not feel the sting of attempted exclusion, but is rather made
pleasantly conscious of the _prestige_ which inspires the adverse
effort and can look upon its bitterness in a spirit of lofty disdain.
Wendell Phillips, descended from a long line of distinguished ancestry,
was amused rather than disconcerted by the strenuous but futile
attempts to ostracize him for the maintenance of opinions which he
lived to see his native city adopt and enforce.  But the feeling is far
different in a man who has experienced only a galling sense of
inferiority.  To such a one, advancing either in fortune or in fame,
social prominence seems a necessity, without which other gifts
constitute only the aggravations of life.

It was therefore with a sense of exaltation that Johnson beheld as
applicants for his consideration and suppliants for his mercy many of
those in the South who had never recognized him as a social equal.  A
mind of true loftiness would not have been swayed by such a change of
relative positions, but it was inevitable that a mind of Johnson's
type, which if not ignoble was certainly not noble, should yield to
its flattering and seductive influence.  In the present attitude of
the leading men of the South towards him, he saw the one triumph
which sweetened his life, the one requisite which had been needed to
complete his happiness.  In securing the good opinion of his native
South, he would attain the goal of his highest ambition, he would
conquer the haughty enemy who during all the years of his public career
had been able to fix upon him the bade of social inferiority.

On the 29th of May (1865), nineteen days after Mr. Seward's first
interview with President Johnson, and nine days after his first visit
to the State Department, two decisive steps were taken in the work of
reconstruction.  Both steps proceeded on the theory that every act
needful for the rehabilitation of the seceded States could be
accomplished by the Executive Department of the Government.  This was
known to be the favorite doctrine of Mr. Seward, and the President
readily acquiesced in its correctness.  There in nothing of which a
public officer can be so easily persuaded as of the enlarged
jurisdiction which pertains to his station.  If the officer be of bold
mind, he arrogates power for purposes of ambition; and even with timid
men power is often assumed as a measure of protection and defense.  Mr.
Johnson was a man of unquestioned courage, and was never afraid to
assume personal and official responsibility when circumstances
justified and demanded it.  Mr. Seward had therefore no difficulty in
persuading him that he possessed, as President, every power needful to
accomplish the complete reconstruction of the rebellious States.

The first of these important acts of reconstruction, upon the
expediency of which the President and Mr. Seward had agreed, was the
issuing of a Proclamation of Amnesty and Pardon to "all persons who
have directly or indirectly participated in the existing Rebellion"
upon the condition that such persons should take and subscribe an oath
--to be registered for permanent preservation--solemnly declaring that
henceforth they would "faithfully support, protect, and defend the
Constitution of the United States and the union of the States
thereunder;" and that they would also "abide by and faithfully support
all laws and proclamation which have been made during the existing
Rebellion, with reference to the emancipation of slaves."  It was the
first official paper which Mr. Seward attested as Secretary of State
under President Johnson.  He undoubtedly intended to signalize his
return to health and his resumption of official duty by public
participation in an act which he regarded as one of wisdom and mercy
--an act which was wise because merciful.

The general declaration of amnesty was somewhat narrowed in its scope
by the enumeration, at the end of the proclamation, of certain classes
which were excepted from its benefit.  In naming these classes a keen
discrimination had been made as to the character and degree of guilt
on the part of those who had participated in the Rebellion.

--First, "All diplomatic officers and foreign agents of the Confederate
Government" were excluded.  Their offense was ranked high because of
their efforts to embroil us with other nations.

--Second, "All who left judicial stations under the United States to
aid the Rebellion."  They were held to be specially culpable because
they had been highly honored by their Government, and because they
could not, like many, plead in excuse the excitement and antagonisms
which spring from an active participation in political affairs.

--Third, "All military and naval officers of the Confederacy above the
rank of colonel in the army or lieutenant in the navy."  The men who
actually bore arms were, of course, the chief offenders; but holding
officers only of high grade accountable, was intended as an act of
marked and significant leniency to the multitude of the rank and file.

--Fourth, "All who left seats in the Congress of the United States to
join the Rebellion."  These should, indeed, have been first named, for
they, above all other men, fomented the Rebellion in its early stages.

--Fifth, "All who resigned, or tendered resignations, in the Army or
Navy of the United States to evade duty in resisting the Rebellion."
These men were even more culpable than those who joined the Rebellion.
They were not openly traitors, but were popularly and significantly
termed "sneaks."

--Sixth, "All who have been engaged in treating otherwise than as
lawful prisoners of war, persons found in the United-States service as
officers, soldiers, or seamen."  This was specially directed against
those who had maltreated negro troops and attempted, by personal
cruelty, to frighten them from the National service.

--Seventh, "All persons who have been, or are, absentees from the
United States for the purpose of aiding the Rebellion."  The men who
had misled public opinion in England, and who hovered along the
Canadian border during the war, concocting schemes for burning Northern
cities, and for spreading the infection of yellow-fever and the plague
of small-pox in the loyal States, were especially aimed at in this
exclusion.

--Eighth, "All officers in the rebel service who had been educated at
the United-States Military or Naval Academy."  These men had received
the bounty of the Government, shared its confidence, and were under
peculiar obligation to defend it.

--Ninth, "All men who held the pretended offices of governors of
States in insurrection against the United States."  As the civil war
had for its basis the dogma of _State-rights_, the chief executive
officers of States represented in an especial manner the guilt of the
Rebellion.

--Tenth, "All persons who left their homes within the jurisdiction and
protection of the United States, and passed beyond the Federal military
lines into the pretended Confederate States for the purpose of aiding
the Rebellion."  The personal guilt of these men lay in the fact that,
according to their own theory of _State-rights_, they were traitors.
They did not adhere to the States which gave them birth, or to the
States of which they were citizens.

--Eleventh, "All persons who have been engaged in the destruction of
the commerce of the United States upon the high seas, and all persons
who have been engaged in destroying the commerce of the United States
upon the lakes and rivers that separate the British Provinces from the
United States."  The acts of these men were specially reprobated
because they did not proceed according to the laws of war.  In the
popular mind they were held amenable to the charge of piracy.

--Twelfth, "All persons who, at the time when they seek to obtain
amnesty and pardon, are in military, naval, or civil confinement, as
prisoners of war, or persons detained for offenses of any kind either
before or after conviction."  Many prisoners in the custody of the
Government were charged with acts of peculiar cruelty or perfidy,
especially with the committal of personal outrages which did not, in
any degree, affect the fortunes of the war, and were not therefore
entitled to the excuse of having been the necessities of a bad cause.

--Thirteenth, "All participants in the Rebellion, the estimated value
of whose taxable property is over twenty thousand dollars."  The
intention of this exception was to draw the line between the men who
could exert influence in their respective communities, and those who
were necessarily led by others.  Fixing this partition between
voluntary and involuntary guilt on the property line was a favorite
measure with President Johnson.  It met with much opposition from the
loyal as well as the disloyal.

A fourteenth class was excepted, not from the benefits of the
proclamation of amnesty, but from the necessity of taking the oath
demanded from the other classes.  Full pardon was granted, without
further act on their part, to all who had taken the oath prescribed
in President Lincoln's proclamation of December 8, 1863, and who had
thenceforward kept and maintained the same inviolate.  The status of
every man in the Confederate States was thus determined and proclaimed,
--a procedure which was intended to be the corner-stone of the work of
reconstruction.

Standing naked and unqualified these thirteen exceptions might seem to
imply a harshness of treatment inconsistent with the spirit of
forgiveness and generosity upon which Mr. Seward had been insisting,
and to which the President had apparently assented.  The classes
excepted were more numerous and far more comprehensive than those
excluded from amnesty under the proclamation issued by Mr. Lincoln on
the 8th of December, 1863.  That proclamation not only embodied the
views of Mr. Lincoln, but was approved by Mr. Seward in whole and in
detail.  The difference between the two proclamations was not, however,
radical, and was readily reconcilable with Mr. Seward's purpose.  He
had indeed equalized their attributes of mercy by inducing President
Johnson to insert a proviso declaring that "special application may be
made to the President for pardon by any person belonging to the
excepted classes," and the assurance was added that "such clemency will
be liberally extended for amnesty and pardon."  Applications came in
great numbers from the South.  In the archives of the State Department
there are some twenty-four large volumes recording the pardons granted
in less than nine months after the proclamation.  The aggregate number
is nearly fourteen thousand, and the list includes prominent men of all
classes in the South, who, recognizing the fact that the Rebellion had
failed, turned, as the only alternative, to the Government which had
conquered and was now ready to extend a magnanimous forgiveness.  Many
of those sought to place themselves in harmony with the restored Union,
and looked forward hopefully to the events of the future.  Many others,
as it must be regretfully but truthfully recorded, appeared to have no
proper appreciation of the leniency extended to them.  They accepted
every favor with an ill grace, and showed rancorous hatred to the
National Government even when they knew it only as a benefactor.

Having by the proclamation extended amnesty on the simple condition of
an oath of loyalty to the Union and the Constitution, and obedience to
the Decree of Emancipation, the President had established a definite
and easily ascertainable constituency of white men in the South to
whom the work of reconstructing civil government in the several States
might be intrusted.  A circular from Mr. Seward accompanied the
proclamation, directing that the oath might "be taken and subscribed
before any commissioned officer, civil, military, or naval, in the
service of the United States, or before any civil or military officer
of a loyal State or Territory, who, by the laws thereof, may be
qualified to administer oaths."  Every one who took the oath was
entitled to a certified copy of it, as the proof of his restoration
to all civil rights, and a duplicate, properly vouched, was forwarded
to the State Department, to be "deposited and remain in the archives
of the Government."  Mr. Seward had thus adapted the simplest, most
convenient, and least expensive process for the administration of the
oath of loyalty.  Indeed the certifying officer was almost brought to
the door of every Southern household.  The mercy and grace of the
Government fell upon the great mass of those who had been engaged in
rebellion as gently and as plenteously as the rain from heaven upon
the place beneath the feet of the offenders.

With these details complete, a second step of great moment was taken
by the Government on the same day (May 29).  A proclamation was
issued appointing William W. Holden provisional governor of the State
of North Carolina, and intrusting to him, with the co-operation of the
constituency provided for in the first proclamation, the important work
of reconstructing civil government in the State.  The proclamation made
it the duty of Governor Holden "at the earliest practicable period, to
prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper for
assembling a convention--composed of delegates who are loyal to the
United States and no others--for the purpose of altering or amending
the Constitution thereof, and with authority to exercise, within the
limit of said State, all the powers necessary and proper to enable the
loyal people of the State of North Carolina to restore said State to
its constitutional relations to the Federal Government and to present
such a Republican form of State Government as will entitle the State to
the guaranty of the United States therefor and its people against
invasion, insurrections, and domestic violence."

It was especially provided in the proclamation that in "choosing
delegates to any State Convention no person shall be qualified as an
elector or eligible as a member unless he shall have previously taken
the prescribed oath of allegiance, and unless he shall also possess the
qualifications of a voter as defined under the Constitution and Laws of
North Carolina as they existed on the 20th of May, 1861, immediately
prior to the so-called ordinance of secession."  Mr. Lincoln had in
mind, as was shown by his letter to Governor Hahn of Louisiana, to try
the experiment of negro suffrage, beginning with those who had served
in the Union Army, and who could read and write; but President
Johnson's plan confined the suffrage to white men, by prescribing the
same qualifications as were required in North Carolina before the war.
The convention that might be chosen by the voters whose qualifications
were thus preliminarily defined, or the Legislature which the
convention might order to meet, were empowered to prescribe the
permanent qualifications of voters and the eligibility of persons to
hold office under the Constitution and Laws of the State--"a power,"
as the President was careful to declare, "which the people of the
several States composing the Federal Union have rightfully exercised
from the origin of the Government to the present time."

The military commander of the Department of North Carolina and all
officers and persons in the military and naval service of the United
States were directed to aid and assist in carrying the proclamation
into effect, and they were specially ordered to "abstain from
hindering, impeding, or discouraging the loyal people in any manner
whatever from the organization of a State Government as herein
authorized."  The several heads of the Executive Departments were
directed to re-establish the entire machinery of the National
Government within the limits of North Carolina.  The Secretary of the
Treasury was directed to nominate for appointment, collectors of
customs, assessors and collectors of internal revenue, and such other
officers of the Treasury Department as were authorized by law.  The
Postmaster-General was directed to re-establish the post-offices and
postmasters.  The United-States district judge was directed to hold
courts in North Carolina, and the Attorney-General was ordered to
"enforce the administration and jurisdiction of the Federal courts."
In short, every power of the National Government in North Carolina
was re-asserted, every function re-established, every duty re-assumed.
In making appointments for office, it was ordered in the proclamation
that "preference shall be given to qualified loyal persons residing
within the districts where their respective duties are to be performed.
But if suitable residents of the districts shall not be found, then
persons residing in other States or districts shall be appointed."

A fortnight later, on the 13th of June, a proclamation was issued for
the reconstruction of the civil government of Mississippi, and William
L. Sharkey was appointed provisional governor.  Four days later, on
the 17th of June, a similar proclamation was issued for Georgia with
James Johnson for provisional governor, and for Texas with Andrew J.
Hamilton for provisional governor.  On the 21st of the same month
Lewis E. Parsons was appointed provisional governor of Alabama, and on
the 30th Benjamin F. Perry was appointed provisional governor of South
Carolina.  On the 13th of July the list was completed by the
appointment of William Marvin as provisional governor of Florida.  The
precise text of the North-Carolina proclamation, _mutatis mutandis_,
was repeated in each one of those relating to these six States.  The
process was designed to be exhaustive by fully restoring every
connection existing under the Constitution between the States and the
National Government.  Viewed merely as a theory it was perfect.  The
danger was that in the test of actual practice it might end like so
many similar experiments in other countries.  An opponent wittily
characterized it as Government by _diagram_, accurately drawn on an
Executive blackboard.

For the reconstruction of the other four States of the Confederacy
different provisions were made.  In Virginia Francis H. Pierpont had
been made governor after the State had seceded and the State of West
Virginia had been established.  He was the head of the Loyal Government
of Virginia, which gave its assent to the division of the State.  His
Government, the shell of which had been preserved after West Virginia's
separate existence had been recognized by the National Government,
with its temporary capital at Alexandria, was accepted by President
Johnson's Administration as the legitimate Government of Virginia.  All
its archives, property, and effects, as was afterwards said by
Thaddeus Stevens, were taken to Richmond in an ambulance.  As early as
the 9th of May President Johnson had issued a proclamation recognizing
Mr. Pierpont as governor of the State, and assuring him that he would
be "aided by the Federal Government, so far as may be necessary, in
the lawful measures he may take for the extension and administration
of the State Government throughout the geographical limits of said
State."  The same proclamation declared that "All acts and proceedings
of the political, military, and civil organizations which have been in
a state of insurrection and rebellion within the State of Virginia
against the laws and authority of the United States are declared null
and void."  The proclamation further declared that any person assuming
to exercise any authority in Virginia by virtue of a military of civil
commission issued by Jefferson Davis, President of the so-called
Confederate States, or by John Letcher, or William Smith, Governors of
Virginia, "shall be deemed and taken as in rebellion against the
United States, and dealt with accordingly."

A course not dissimilar to that adopted in Virginia was followed in
Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee.  In all of them the so-called "ten
per cent" governments established under Mr. Lincoln's authority were
now recognized.  Governor Hahn was held to be the true executive of
Louisiana,--a concession all the more readily made, because, under the
revised constitution of the State, the people would be called upon in
the approaching autumn to choose his successor.  In Arkansas also, the
Government, with Isaac Murphy at its head, was now recognized; and in
Tennessee the authority of William G. Brownlow as governor was promptly
accepted as constitutional and regular.  This Government, as already
narrated, had been brought into existence by the earnest effort of Mr.
Johnson in the period which had elapsed between his election and
inauguration as Vice-President.  The direct committal of the President
to the legality of his own work was the controlling cause which led to
the recognition of the Governments of the four States under
consideration.  But for the impossibility of disowning or in any way
discrediting the existing Government of Tennessee, it is probably that
the plan by which provisional governments were established in seven of
the rebellious States would have been uniformly applied to the entire
eleven which formed the Confederacy.  The same executives would
doubtless have been selected for provisional service, but there would
have been evident advantage in treating all the States in precisely the
same manner.

The scope and design of the President's reconstruction policy were
thus made fully apparent.  The work was committed to the white men of
the several States, who, outside of the excepted classes, were ready
to take the oath of allegiance to the Government.  They were empowered
to form the Convention which should shape the organic law of the
State, and in that law they were authorized to establish the basis of
suffrage,--a right which the President held to belong to the State, to
be, indeed, inalienable from the State.  It was, therefore, evident
that the white men who were allowed to regain all the rights of
citizenship by a mere oath of fidelity would not, in framing an organic
law for the State, exclude the classes whom the President had excepted
from pardon.  The excluded classes had been the leaders, the
commanders, the men of position, the friends and the patrons of those
who, only less guilty because less influential and powerful, were now
intrusted with the initial work in the re-establishment of civil
Government in their respective States.

It was not a possible supposition that these men, when they assembled
in convention, would exclude the entire leading class of the South, or
even one member of it, from the full constitutional privileges and
benefits of the civil Government they were about to re-organize.  The
suffrage conferred on others would, in like manner, be conferred on
them: the offices of rank and emolument in the new Government would
likewise be open to them, and it would thus be made evident that the
President's exclusion of these classes was merely an inhibition from
doing a preliminary work which others would do equally well for them.
Unless, therefore, some other form of denial or exclusion should be
announced,--and none other apparently was intended,--the President's
policy would end in promptly handing over to the authors and designers
of the Rebellion the complete control of the States whose civil power
they had willfully perverted and turned against the National authority.
Mr. Seward's magnanimity, his boundless confidence in human nature, had
led him to believe that this was wise policy.  He believed it so firmly
that he had persuaded the President--against his own will and purpose
--to adopt it, and to attempt its enforcement.

It soon became evident that President Johnson realized how completely
he had excluded men of the colored race from any share of political
power in the Southern States by his process of reconstruction.  It is
true that he stood loyally by the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, which had been submitted to Congress before his accession
to the Presidency but had not yet been ratified by the States.  He used
his influence, which was commanding, to induce the Southern States to
accept it in good faith.  But he saw, as others had seen before him,
that this was not going far enough to satisfy the reasonable desire of
many in the North whom he felt it necessary to conciliate.  To
emancipate the negro and conceded to him no possible power wherewith to
protect his freedom would, in the judgment of many Northern
philanthropists, prove the merest mockery of justice.  This sentiment
wrought on Mr. Johnson so powerfully that against his own wish he was
compelled to address a circular to his provisional governors,
suggesting that the elective franchise should be extended to all
persons of color "who can read the Constitution of the United States,
and write their names, and also to those who own real estate valued at
not less than two hundred and fifty dollar, and pay taxes thereon."

In writing to Governor Sharkey of Mississippi in relation to this
subject the President argued that his recommendations touching colored
suffrage could be adopted "with perfect safety," and that thereby "the
Southern States would be placed, with reference to free persons of
color, upon the same basis with the free States."  That Mr. Johnson
made this recommendation simply from policy and not from any proper
conception of its inherent justice is indicated by the closing
paragraph in his letter to Governor Sharkey.  Indeed, by imprudent
language the President made an unnecessary exposure of the character
of his motives, and deprived himself of much of the credit which might
otherwise have belonged to him.  "I hope and trust," he wrote to his
Mississippi governor, "that your convention will do this, and as a
consequence the Radicals, who are wild upon negro franchise, will be
completely foiled in their attempt to keep the Southern States from
renewing their relations to the Union by not accepting their senators
and representatives."

At this period the President did not contemplate a break with the
Republican party, much less a coalition with its opponents.  He had the
vanity to believe, or was at least under the delusion of believing that
--with the exception of those whom he denominated Radicals--he could
induce the party to follow him.  Mr. Seward had undoubtedly influenced
him to this conclusion, as the Secretary of State indulged the same
hopeful anticipation himself.  The President seemed to have no
comprehension of the fact that with inconsiderable exceptions the
entire party was composed of Radicals, men who in aim and sympathy were
hostile to the purposes indicated by his policy.  His own radicalism,
from which Mr. Seward had succeeded in turning him, was the radicalism
of revenge upon the authors of the Rebellion.  The radicalism to which
he now contemptuously indicated his opposition was that which looked to
the broadening of human rights, to philanthropy, to charity, and to
good deeds.  Every intelligent Republican saw that the attempt which
the President was now making with his provisional governors to secure a
partial franchise to the colored man, was really only a petition to the
States to act in a certain manner upon a subject over which, by his own
proclamation, their power of control was declared to be absolute.  With
the prejudices which inspired the South,--prejudices made still more
intense by the victory of the Union,--it was altogether certain that
the Southern Conventions would not extend the elective franchise or
civil right of any kind to the colored men of any class.  The Southern
States would undoubtedly agree _pro forma_ to the Thirteenth Amendment
as a means of regaining their representation in Congress.  Beyond that,
so long as the National Government conceded their right of control, it
was probable that every step which did not conflict with the
Constitution and Laws of the United States would be taken by the
Southern States to deprive the negro of all power or opportunity for
advancement.  Mr. Seward, by the generous instinct of his own
philanthropy, believed all things for the Union, which had been
regenerated by the emancipation of the slave, and hoped all things for
the Southern people, who had been chastened by defeat.  His
philanthropy taught him a faith in others as strong as his own
consciousness of right; and, by assuming the full responsibility of
the President's position, he brought to its support thousands of
advocates who, but for his personal influence and persuasive power,
would have opposed and spurned it.

The whole scheme of reconstruction, as originated by Mr. Seward and
adopted by the President, was in operation by the middle of July, three
months after the assassination of Mr. Lincoln.  Every step taken was
watched with the deepest solicitude by the loyal people.  The rapid and
thorough change in the President's position was clearly discerned and
fully appreciated.  His course of procedure was dividing the Republican
party, and already encouraging the hopes of those in the North who had
been the steady opponents of Mr. Lincoln's war policy, and of those in
the South who had sought for four years to destroy the Great Republic.
It soon became evident that the Northern Democrats who had been opposed
to the war, and the Southern Democrats who had been defeated in the
war, would unite in political action, and that the course of the
National Administration would exercise a potential influence upon their
success or failure.  In turn, the course of the National Administration
would certainly be influenced, and its fate in large degree determined,
by the conduct of the Southern men, in whom the President was placing
unbounded trust.  Public interest was therefore transferred for the
time from the acts of the President at the National Capital to the
acts of the Reconstruction conventions about to assemble in the
Southern States.


CHAPTER V.

A great opportunity was now given to the South.  It was given
especially to the leading men of the South.  Only a few weeks before,
they had all been expecting harsh treatment, many, indeed, anticipated
punishment, not a few were dejectedly looking forward to a life of
exile and want.  The President's policy, which had been framed for him
by Mr. Seward, charged all this.  Confidence took the place of
apprehension, the fear of punishment was removed, those who conscious
of guilt had been dreading expatriation were bidden by the supreme
authority of the Nation to stay in their own homes, and to assist in
building up the waste and desolate places.

Never in the history of the world had so mighty a rebellion been
subdued.  Never had any rebellion been followed by treatment so
lenient, forgiving, and generous on the part of the triumphant
Government.  The great mass of those who had resisted the National
authority were restored to all their rights of citizenship by the
simple taking of an oath of future loyalty, and those excepted from
immediate re-instatement were promised full forgiveness on the
slightest exhibition of repentance and good works.  Mr. Seward
believed, and had induced the President to believe, that frank and
open generosity on the part of the Government would be responded to in
like spirit on the part of those who had just emerged from rebellion.
The Administration, therefore, waited with confidence for its
justification, which could be made complete only by the display of a
manly appreciation and noble course on the part of those who had
participated in the Rebellion.

The desire for a complete restoration of all the States to their normal
position, as pictured so attractively by Mr. Seward, was general and
deep throughout the North.  The policy of the President was therefore
essentially aided by the patriotic and ardent love for the Union,--a
love always present with the loyal people of the free States, but
developed in an extraordinary degree by the costly struggle which the
slaveholders' rebellion had precipitated.  If the Southern States
should meet the overture of the Administration in the spirit in which
it was made, the probability was decidedly in favor of their
restoration to their old places without condition, without promise,
without sacrifice.  Observing men in the loyal States regarded such a
policy not only as weak and maudlin, but as utterly insufficient and
assuredly dangerous to the future safety of the Government.  But they
realized at the same time that the most important demands of far-seeing
statesmanship and of true patriotism might be disregarded, and even
contemned, by a wild, unreasoning wish of the people to see the old
Government, in all its parts, promptly and fully re-established.  The
popular cry which demanded "the Union as it was, the Constitution as
it is," was echoed by many from emotional love of country, and by many
more from a conviction that the financial interests of the Government
and the commercial interest of the people called for the speediest
settlement of all political questions.  The Administration believed,
and with good reason, that the combined influence of sentiment for the
Union and the supposed necessities of trade would overcome all
obstacles, and that the rebellious States would be so promptly and
completely reconstructed that their senators and representatives would
be admitted at the beginning of the next session of Congress.

In forming an estimate of the probably response of the South to the
plan of reconstruction now submitted, the Administration was certainly
justified in believing that its own spirit of liberality and good will
would be met with like spirit by those who, having failed in war, were
specially interested in promptly securing all the conditions of a
magnanimous peace.  It could not anticipate that quibbles would be
made by the defeated and lately suppliant parties, that captious
objections would be interposed, that carping criticism would be
indulged, that gross outrages would be perpetrated, that absurd
conditions would be demanded, and that finally a postponement of the
whole procedure would be hazarded, indeed its utter failure secured,
by the lack of tact, by the willfulness, and by the apparent ignorance
of the Southern men who were in control.

The kindness, consideration, gentleness of Mr. Seward's
recommendations, instead of securing a return of like feeling, seemed
rather to inflame the misjudging men of the South with a new sense of
resentment.  Instead of calling forth the natural and proper response,
it appeared rather to impress them afresh with that vain imagination
of Northern timidity which had always been the besetting weakness of
the South.  It seemed impossible at the time, it seems even more
plainly impossible on a review of the facts after the lapse of years,
that any body of reasonable men could behave with the ineffable folly
that marked the proceedings of the Reconstruction Conventions in the
South, and the still greater folly that governed the succeeding
Legislatures of the lately rebellious States.

In the President's proclamation accompanying the appointment of
provisional governors he had taken the ground that "the Rebellion, in
its revolutionary progress, has deprived the people (of the revolting
States) of all civil Government."  It is evident, therefore, that the
President--eager and even impatient as he was for the process of
reconstruction to be completed--expected that a new Government would
be built on the full recognition of the new order of things, casting
behind all that pertained to the old, or had the spirit of the old.
"No man putteth a piece of new cloth unto an old garment, for that
which is put in to fill it up taketh from the garment, and the rent
is made worse."  This Scripture was exactly applicable to the Southern
Conventions which assembled for reconstruction.  They could begin anew
with organic laws adapted to the great revolution which had swept over
them, or they could patch up the old constitutions now become
indissolubly associated with a rebellion which had been fostered and
protected under their provisions.  In every State the Southern leaders
chose the latter form of procedure.  They assumed that the old
constitutions were still in full force and vigor, and they made only
such amendments to them as would in their judgment promptly insure to
their States the right of representation in Congress.  They did not
even stop to submit these changes to the popular vote, but assumed for
their own assemblages of oligarches the full power to modify the
organic laws of their States--an assumption without precedent and
without repetition in the history of State constitutions in this
country, and utterly subversive of the fundamental idea of Republican
Government.

With these incomplete and ill-digested changes in the organic laws of
their respective States, the Reconstruction conventions usurped
legislative power, and hastily proceeded to order the election of
representatives in Congress.  The Congressional elections proved to be
little else than partisan assemblages under the dictatorial direction
of rebel authorities--just as the Reconstruction Conventions were, in
their membership and their organization, little else than consulting
bodies of Confederate officers under the rank of brigadier-general,
actually sitting throughout their deliberations in the uniform of the
rebel service, and apparently dictating to the Government of the Union
the grounds on which they would consent to resume representation in the
National Congress.  A joint committee of Congress subsequently
commented with appropriate directness upon this offensive phase of the
Southern Conventions.  "Hardly is the war closed," said the committee,
"before the people of the insurrectionary States come forward and
haughtily claim, as a right, the privilege of participating at once in
that Government which they have for four years been fighting to
overthrow.  Allowed and encouraged by the Executive to organize State
Governments, they at once placed in power leading rebels, unrepentant
and unpardoned, excluding with contempt those who had manifested an
attachment to the Union, and preferring in many instances those who
had rendered themselves peculiarly obnoxious.  In the face of the law
requiring an oath that would necessarily exclude all such men from
Federal offices, they have elected, with very few exceptions, as
senators and representatives in Congress, the very men who have
actively participated in the Rebellion, insultingly denouncing the law
as unconstitutional."

The oath referred to in the foregoing extract from the committee's
report is that popularly known as the "Ironclad oath," prescribed by
the Act of July 2, 1862, to be taken by every person elected or
appointed to any office of honor or profit under the Government of the
United States, either in the civil, military, or naval departments of
the public service, the President alone excepted.  The officer, before
entering upon his duties or receiving any emolument, was compelled to
swear that he had "never voluntarily borne arms against the United
States;" that he had "voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel,
or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility to the National
Government;" that he had "neither sought nor accepted nor attempted to
exercise the functions of any office whatever under authority or
pretended authority in hostility to the United States;" that he had
"never yielded a voluntary support to any pretended Government within
the United States, hostile or inimical thereto."  Of course the men who
had been waging war against the Government could not take this oath
except by committing perjury and risking its pains and penalties.  But
nothing daunted by the existence of this obstacle at the threshold of
public service, the most notorious rebels sought election to the Senate
and House, boasting that they would prove the unconstitutionality of
the Ironclad oath, and demand their seats.

Alexander H. Stephens "had the assurance," as the committee already
quoted declared, "with that oath staring him in the face, to lay his
credentials on the table of the Senate as a senator-elect from
Georgia."  When Congress adjourned, March 3, 1865, Mr. Stephens was
acting as the Vice-President of the rebel Confederacy.  Six weeks later
the Confederacy was destroyed, and with a political agility
unparalleled, with a degree of presumption unprecedented, Mr. Stephens
secured an election to the Senate, and was in Washington at the
ensuing session of Congress, asking admission to a seat as cooly as if
every living man had forgotten that for four years he had been exerting
his utmost effort to destroy the Constitution under which he now
claimed the full rights of a citizen.  In his astounding effrontery Mr.
Stephens even went so far as to insist on interpreting to those loyal
men, who had been conducting the Government of the United States
through all its perils, the Constitution under which they had been
acting, and to point out how they were depriving him of his rights by
demanding an oath of loyalty and good faith as the condition on which
he should be entitled to take part in legislating for the restored
Union.  The same committee, worthy at all times to be cited, declared
further, that "Other rebels of scarcely less note and notoriety than
Mr. Stephens were selected from other quarters.  Professing no
repentance, glorying apparently in the crime they had committed,
avowing still, as the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Stephens and
many others proves, an adherence to the pernicious doctrine of
secession, and declaring that they yielded only to necessity, they
insist with unanimous voice upon their rights as States, and proclaim
that they will submit to no conditions whatever as preliminary to their
resumption of power under that Constitution _which they still claim
the right to repudiate_."

Not only were the official acts of the Southern Conventions inspired
by a spirit of apparently irreconcilable hatred of the Union, but the
popular manifestations in the South were for more decided in the same
direction.  A sense of official propriety, no doubt, in some degree
governed the conduct and modified the language of the members of the
conventions.  It was left to the press and the stump-orators of the
South to give full expression to what they knew to be the ruling
sentiment of the people.  The report of the Congressional Committee,
whose members had closely investigated all the facts, stated that
"the Southern press, with few exceptions, abounds with weekly and daily
abuse of the institutions and people of the loyal States; defends the
men who led, and the principles which incited, the Rebellion; denounces
and reviles Southern men who adhered to the Union; and strives
constantly and unscrupulously, by every means in its power, to keep
alive the fire and hate and discord between the sections; calling upon
the President to violate his oath of office, overturn the Government by
force of arms, and drive the representatives of the people from their
seats in Congress.  The National banner is openly insulted and the
National airs scoffed at, not only by an ignorant populace, but at
public meetings, and once, among other notorious instances, at a dinner
given in honor of a notorious rebel, who had violated his oath and
abandoned his flag.  The same individual is elected to an important
office in the leading city of his State, although an unpardoned rebel,
and so offensive that the President refused to allow him to enter upon
his official duties.  In another State the leading general of the
rebel armies in openly nominated for governor by the House of
Delegates, and the nomination is hailed by the people with shouts of
satisfaction and openly indorsed by the press."

These representations of the prevailing spirit in the South and of
the conduct of Southern men were not the loose and exaggerated
statements of Northern partisans put forth in influence political
opinion in the loyal States.  They were the deliberate and
conscientious statements of an eminent committee of the two Houses of
Congress, of which Senator Fessenden of Maine was chairman.  The
quotations already made are from the same official report--a report
based upon exhaustive testimony and prepared with scrupulous care.
In that report, which is to be taken as an absolutely truthful
picture of the Southern States at the time, it is averred that
"witnesses of the highest character testify that, without the
protection of United-States troops, Union men, whether of Northern or
Southern origin, would be obliged to abandon their homes.  The feeling
in many portions of the country toward the emancipated slaves,
especially among the ignorant and uneducated, is one of vindictive
and malicious hatred.  The deep-seated prejudice against color is
assiduously cultivated by the public journals and leads to acts of
cruelty, oppression, and murder, which the local authorities are at
no pains to prevent or punish."

It was further declared by Mr. Fessenden's committee "that the evidence
of an intense hostility to the Federal Union, and an equally intense
love for the late Confederacy, nurtured by the war, is decisive.  While
it appears that nearly all are willing to submit, at least for the time
being, to the Federal authority, it is equally clear that the ruling
motive is a desire to obtain the advantages which will be derived from
a representation in Congress."  It was also proved before the
committee, on the testimony, or rather the admissions, of witnesses
who had been prominent in the Rebellion, that "the generally prevailing
opinion in the late Confederacy defends the legal right of secession
and upholds the doctrine that the first allegiance of the people is due
to the States and not to the United States."  It was further admitted
by the same class of witnesses that "the taxes levied by the United
States will be paid only on compulsion and with great reluctance," and
that "the people of the rebellious States would, if they could see a
prospect of success, repudiate the National debt."  It was stated by
witnesses from the South, with evident pride, that "officers of the
Union Army, on duty in the South, and Northern men who go there to
engage in business, are generally detested and proscribed," and that
"Southern men who adhered to the Union are bitterly hated and
relentlessly persecuted."

Upon the conclusion of the work of the respective conventions, the
election of State Legislatures and of senators and representatives
in Congress followed as promptly as was practicable in the several
States.  The Legislatures were all in session before the close of the
year 1865, and their proceedings startled the country.  If any need
existed for proof of the spirit that animated the conventions, or of
the ends to which they had directed their work, it was furnished in
full by the action of the Legislatures.  Indeed, when the latter bodies
assembled, they were inspired with a fresh accession of courage and
daring, imparted by the example of the former and the apparent
acquiescence of the North in their proceedings.  The period between
the adjournment of the conventions and the assembling of the
Legislatures was so short that there was no time for the maturing of
public opinion in the North, and still less for bringing it to bear in
any way upon Southern action.  It is, moreover, doubtful whether any
representation, however strong, from the North, would have exerted the
slightest influence in holding the South back from its mad course.
Emboldened by the support of the National Administration, the Southern
leaders believed that they could carry their designs through, and,
instead of being restrained by the protest or the advice of
Republicans, they chose with apparent gladness the course that would
prove most offensive to them.  It would indeed, according to their own
boasts, add a peculiar gratification to their anticipated triumph if
they could feel assured that it would bring chagrin or a sense of
humiliation to the Republican masses of the loyal States.

At this critical period it was the ill fortune of the South to be
misled by the Democratic press and the Democratic orators of the North,
as it had been before on perilous occasions.  The South had been
induced by the same press and the same orators to believe, in the
winter of 1860-61, that efforts at secession would not be resisted by
arms.  Many Northern Democrats had indeed given the assurance that if
any attempt at coercion should be made by the Republican National
Administration, they would themselves meet it with force, and that, if
war should come, it would be in the free States and not in the slave
States.  The South, in 1865, had apparently forgotten these baseless
assurances; they had forgotten that, in the hour of conflict, the
Democrats who did not become loyal, at once became silent, and that
the few--scattering exceptions to a general rule--who were
demonstrative and loud in their sympathy for the rebels were compelled
to flee or accept imprisonment in Fort Lafayette.  They seemed again
ready and eager to believe all the unsupported assertions which the
Northern Democrats, in a spirit of effrontery and not without
gasconade, ventured to put forth.  It might be difficult to determine
which displayed the greater folly--those who made false
representations, or those who, warned by previous deception, appeared
so ready to be influenced anew by deception equally gross.

The truth was that the Republicans of the North, constituting, as was
shown by the elections of 1865, a majority in every State, were deeply
concerned as to the fate and fortune of the colored population of the
South.  Only a minority of Republicans were ready to demand suffrage
for those who had been recently emancipated, and who, from the
ignorance peculiar to servitude, were presumably unfit to be intrusted
with the elective franchise.  The minority, however, was composed of
very earnest men of the same type as those who originally created and
combined the anti-slavery sentiment of the country, and who now
espoused the right of the negro to equality before the law.  Equality,
they believed, could neither be conferred nor maintained unless the
negro were invested with the badge of American manhood--the right to
vote--a right which they were determined to guarantee as firmly to the
colored man as it was already guaranteed to the white man.

The great mass of the Republicans stopped short of the demand for the
conferment of suffrage on the negro.  That privilege was indeed, still
denied him in a majority of the loyal States, and it seemed illogical
and unwarrantable to expect a more advanced philanthropy, a higher
sense of justice, from the South than had been yet attained by the
North.  But without raising the question of suffrage, there were rights
with which the negro must be endowed before he could essentially
better his material condition or advance in knowledge.  It was, first
of all, required that he should have the full protection of the law of
marriage, of which he had always been deprived, and that with the
privilege he should be subjected to the honest observance of the
obligations which marriage imposes--to the end that good morals should
be inculcated, and that every child should have a responsible father.
It was, in the second place, in the highest degree necessary that he
should have the benefit of such laws as would assure to him the wages
of his labor and confer upon him the right to acquire and hold real
estate and other property, with the same security and protection
enjoyed by the whites.  In the third place, it was imperatively
demanded that some provision be made for the rudimentary instruction
of colored children, in order that they might learn the mechanical
arts and have the privilege of working at such callings as were best
adapted to them.  The list of requirements might be enlarged, but the
three which are given represent primary and indisputable necessities,
without the concession and free establishment of which the negro, with
nominal freedom, would be in a worse condition than if he had been left
in slavery.

In view of these facts, the course of the new organized Legislatures
was watched with deep and jealous interest.  It was in their power to
repair, in large degree, the blunders of policy--nay, the crimes
against human rights--which the Reconstruction Conventions had abetted
if not committed.  The membership of the Legislatures in all the States
was composed wholly of those who, either in the military or civil
service, had aided the Rebellion.  If in such an organization a spirit
of moderation and justice should be shown, if consideration should be
exhibited for the negro, even so far as to assure to him the inherent
rights of human nature, a deep impression would be made on the
conscience and the public opinion of the North.  Such a course in the
South might, indeed, open the way for the success of the simple and
speedy process of reconstruction, upon which Mr. Seward had staked his
reputation as a statesman, and to which Mr. Johnson had pledged the
power and committed the fortunes of his Administration.

As soon as the Southern Legislatures assembled, it was made evident
that their members disregarded, and even derided, the opinion of those
who had conquered the Rebellion and held control of the Congress of the
United States.  If the Southern men had intended, as their one special
and desirable aim, to inflame the public opinion of the North against
them, they would have proceeded precisely as they did.  They treated
the negro, according to a vicious phrase which had at one time wide
currency, "as possessing no rights which a white man was bound to
respect."  Assent to the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution by
the Southern States was but a gross deception as long as they
accompanied it with legislation which practically deprived the negro of
every trace of liberty.  That which was no offense in a white man was
made a misdemeanor, a heinous crime, if committed by a negro.  Both in
the civil and criminal code his treatment was different from that to
which the white man was subjected.  He was compelled to work under a
series of labor laws applicable only to his own race.  The laws of
vagrancy were so changed as, in many of their provisions, to apply only
to him, and under their operation all freedom of movement and transit
was denied.  The liberty to sell his time at a fair market rate was
destroyed by the interposition of apprentice laws.  Avenues of
usefulness and skill in which he might specially excel were closed
against him lest he should compete with white men.  In short his
liberty in all directions was so curtailed that it was a bitter mockery
to refer to him in the statutes as a "freedman."  The truth was, that
his liberty was merely of form and not of fact, and the slavery which
was abolished by the organic law of a Nation was now to be revived by
the enactments of a State.

Some of these enactments were peculiarly offensive, not to say
atrocious.  In Alabama, which might indeed serve as an example for the
other rebellious States, "stubborn or refractory servants" and
"servants who loiter away their time" were declared by law to be
"vagrants," and might be brought before a justice of the peace and
fined fifty dollars; and in default of payment they might be "hired
out," on three days' notice by public outcry, for the period of "six
months."  No fair man could fail to see that the whole effect, and
presumably the direct intent, of this law was to reduce the helpless
negro to slavery for half the year--a punishment that could be
repeated whenever desired, a punishment sure to be desired for that
portion of each recurring year when his labor was specially valuable
in connection with the cotton crop, while for the remainder of the
time he might shift for himself.  By this detestable process the
"master" had the labor of the "servant" for a mere pittance; and even
that pittance did not go to the servant, but was paid into the treasury
of the county, and thus relived the white men from their proper share
of taxation.  There may have been more cruel laws enacted, but the
statute-books of the world might be searched in vain for one of meaner
injustice.

The foregoing process for restoring slavery in a modified form was
applicable to men or women of any age.  But for "minors" a more speedy
and more sweeping methods was contrived by the law-makers of Alabama,
who had just given their assent to the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.  They made it the "duty of all sheriffs, justices of the
peace, and other civil officers of the several counties," to report
the "names of all minors under the age of eighteen years, whose parents
have not the means or who refuse to support said minors," and thereupon
it was made the duty of the Court to "apprentice said minor to some
suitable person on such terms as the Court may direct."  Then follows
a suggestive _proviso_ directing that "if said minor be the child of a
freedman" (as if any other class were really referred to!) "the _former
owner_ of said minor shall have the preference;" and "the judge of
probate shall make a record of all the proceedings," for which he
should be entitled to a fee of one dollar in each case, to be paid, as
this atrocious law directed, by "the master or mistress."  To tighten
the grasp of ownership on the minor who was now styled an apprentice,
it was enacted in almost the precise phrase of the old slave-code that
"whoever shall entice said apprentice from his master of mistress, or
furnish food or clothing to him or her, without said consent, shall be
fined in a sum not exceeding five hundred dollars."

The ingenuity of the Alabama legislators in contriving schemes to
re-enslave the negroes was not exhausted by the odious and
comprehensive statutes already cited.  They passed an Act to
incorporate the city of Mobile, substituting a new charter for the old
one.  The city had suffered much from the suspension and decay of trade
during the war, and it was in great need of labor to make repairs to
streets, culverts, sewers, wharves, and all other public property.  By
the new charter, the mayor, aldermen, and common council were empowered
"to cause all vagrants," . . . "all such as have no visible means of
support," . . . "all who can show no reasonable cause of employment or
business in the city," . . . "all who have no fixed residence or cannot
give a good account of themselves," . . . "or are loitering in or
about tippling-houses," "to give security for their good behavior for
a reasonable time and to indemnify the city against any charge for
their support, and in case of their inability or refusal to give such
security, to cause them to be confined to labor for a limited time, not
exceeding six calendar months, which said labor shall be designated by
the said mayor, aldermen, and common council, for the benefit of said
city."

It will be observed even by the least intelligent that the charge made
in this city ordinance was, in substance, the poverty of the classes
quoted--a poverty which was of course the inevitable result of slavery.
To make the punishment for no crime effective, the city government was
empowered "to appoint a person or persons to take those sentenced to
labor from their place of confinement to the place appointed for their
working, and to watch them while at labor and return them before
sundown to their place of confinement; and, if they shall be found
afterwards offending, such security may again be required, and for want
thereof the like proceeding may again be had from time to time, as
often as may be necessary."  The plain meaning of all this was, that
these helpless and ignorant men, having been robbed all their lives of
the fruit of their labor by slavery, and being necessarily and in
consequence poor, must be punished for it by being robbed again of all
they had honestly earned.  If they stubbornly continued in their
poverty, the like proceeding (of depriving them of the fruits of their
labor) "may again be had from time to time, as often as may be
necessary."  It would, of course, be found "necessary" just as long as
the city of Mobile was in need of their labor without paying for it.

It has been abundantly substantiated, by impartial evidence, that when
these grievous outrages were committed under the forms of law, by the
joint authority of the Alabama Legislature and the city government of
Mobile, the labor of thousands of willing men could be hired for the
low wages of twenty-five cents per day, with an allowance of a peck of
corn-meal and four pounds of bacon for each man per week.  It does not
change the character of the crime against these humble laborers, but
it certainly enhances its degree that the law-makers of Alabama
preferred an oppressive fraud to the honest payment of a consideration
so small as to be almost nominal.  A man must be in abject poverty when
he is willing to work an entire week for a sum usually accorded in the
Norther States for the labor of one day.  But only a community blind to
public justice and to public decency as well, could enact a law that in
effect declares the poverty of the laborer to be a crime, in
consideration of which he shall be deprived of the beggarly mite for
which he is willing to give the sweat of his face.

Apparently fearing that the operations of the law already referred to
would not secure a sufficient number of laborers for the work required
in the city, the law-makers of Alabama authorized the municipal
government of Mobile to "restrain and prohibit the nightly and other
meetings or disorderly assemblies of all persons, and to punish for
such offenses by affixing penalties not exceeding fifty dollars for
any one offense; and in case of the inability of any such person to
pay and satisfy said fine or penalty and the cost thereof, to sentence
such person to labor for said city for such reasonable time, not
exceeding six calendar months, for any one offense, as may be deemed
equivalent to such penalty and costs, which labor shall be such as may
be designated by the mayor, aldermen, and common council of the city."

Power was thus given to consider any evening meeting of colored persons
a disorderly one, and to arrest all who were participating in it.
Nothing was more natural than that the negroes, with their social and
even gregarious habits, should, in their new estate of freedom, be
disposed to assemble for the purpose of considering their own interests
and their future prospects.  It is eminently to the discredit of the
State of Alabama and of the city of Mobile that so innocent a purpose
should be thwarted, perverted, made criminal and punished.

The fact will not escape attention that in these enactments the words
"master," "mistress," and "servant" are constantly used, and that under
the operation of the laws a form of servitude was re-established, more
heartless and more cruel than the slavery which had been abolished.
Under the institution of slavery a certain attachment would spring up
between the master and his salve, and with it came a certain protection
to the latter against want and against suffering in his old age.  With
all its wrongfulness and its many cruelties, there were ameliorations
in the slave system which softened its asperities and enabled vast
number of people possessing conscience and character to assume the
relation of master.  But in the treatment of the colored man, now
proposed, there was absolute heartlessness and rank injustice.  It was
proposed to punish him for no crime, to declare the laborer not worthy
of his hire, to leave him friendless and forlorn, without sympathy,
without rights under the law, socially an outcast and industrially a
serf--a serf who had no connection with the land he tilled, and who had
none of the protection which even the Autocracy of Russia extended to
the lowliest creature that acknowledged the sovereignty of the Czar.

These laws were framed with malignant cunning so as not to be limited
in specific form of words to the negro race, but they were exclusively
confined to that race in their execution.  It is barely possible that
a white vagrant of exceptional depravity might, now and then, be
arrested; but the negro was arrested by wholesale on a charge of
vagrancy which rested on no foundation except an arbitrary law
specially enacted to fit his case.  Loitering around tippling-shops,
one of the offenses enumerated, was in far larger proportions the habit
of white men, but they were left untouched and the negro alone was
arrested and punished.  In the entire code this deceptive form, of
apparently including all persons, was a signally dishonest feature.
The makers of the law evidently intended that it should apply to the
negro alone, for it was administered on that basis with rigorous
severity.  The general phrasing was to deceive people outside, and,
perhaps, to lull the consciences of some objectors at home, but it made
no difference whatever in the execution of the statutes.  White men,
who had no more visible means of support than the negro, were left
undisturbed, while the negro, whose visible means of support were in
his strong arms and his willingness to work, was prevented from using
the resources conferred upon him by nature, and reduced not merely to
the condition of a slave, but subjected to the demoralization of being
adjudged a criminal.

In Florida the laws resembled those of Alabama, but were perhaps more
severe in their penalties.  The "vagrant" there might be hired out for
full twelve months, and the money arising from his labor, in case the
man had no wife and children, was directed to be applied for "the
benefit of the orphans and poor of the county," although the negro had
been declared a vagrant because he had no visible means of support, and
was therefore quite as much in need of the avails of his labor as those
to whom the law diverted them.  Among the curious enactments of that
State was one to establish and organize a criminal court for each
county, empowered to exercise jurisdiction in the trial of all offenses
where the punishment did not affect the life of the offender.  It is
obvious that the law was originated mainly for the punishment of
negroes; and to expedite its work it was enacted that "in the
proceedings of said court, no presentment, indictment, or written
pleading shall be required, but it shall be sufficient to put the party
accused upon his or her trial, that the offense and facts are plainly
set forth with reasonable certainty in the warrant of arrest."  It was
further provided that when fines were imposed and the party was unable
to pay them, "the county commissioner may hire out, at public outcry,
the said party to any person who will take him or her for the shortest
time, and pay the fine imposed and the cost of prosecution."  The fines
thus paid went in the county treasury for the general expenses of the
county.  The law was thus cunningly contrived to hurry the negro into
an odious form of slavery, and to make the earnings which came from his
hard labor pay the public expenses, which were legitimately chargeable
upon the property of the county.

Accompanying the Act establishing this court was a law prescribing
additional penalties for the commission of offenses against the State;
and this, like the former, was framed especially for the negro.  Its
first section provided that where punishment of an offense had hitherto
been limited to fine or imprisonment, there should be superadded, as
an alternative, the punishment of standing in the pillory for one hour,
or whipping, not exceeding thirty-nine lashes, on the bare back.  The
latter punishment was reserved expressly for the negro.  It was
provided further that it "shall not be lawful for any negro, mulatto,
or person of color to own, use, or keep and bowie-knife, dirk, sword,
fire-arms, or ammunition of any kind, unless he first obtain a license
to do so from the judge of probate for the county in which he is a
resident."  The judge could issue the license to him only upon
recommendation of two respectable white men.  Any negro attempting to
keep arms of any kind was to be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
compelled to "forfeit the arms for the use of the informer, stand in
the pillory" (and be pelted by the mob) "for one hour, and then whipped
with thirty-nine lashes on the bare back."  The same penalty was
prescribed for any person of color "who shall intrude himself into any
religious or other public assembly of white persons, or into any
railroad-car or other vehicle set apart for the accommodation of
white persons," and with a mock show of impartiality it was provided
that a white man intruding himself into an assembly of negroes, or
into a negro-car, might be subjected to a like punishment.  This
restriction upon the negro was far more severe than that imposed in
the days of slavery, when, in many of the Southern States, the gallery
of the church was permitted to be freely occupied by them.  A
peculiarly atrocious discrimination against the negro was included in
the sixth section of the law from which these quotations are made.  It
was provided therein that "if any person or persons shall assault a
white female with intent to commit rape, or be accessory thereto, he
or they, upon conviction, shall suffer death;" but there was no
prohibition and no penalty prescribed for the same crime against a
negro woman.  She was left unprotected by law against the brutal lust
and the violence of white men.

In the laws of South Carolina the oppression and injustice towards the
negro were conspicuously marked.  The restriction as to fire-arms,
which was general to all the States, was especially severe.  A negro
found with any kind of weapon in his possession was punished by "a fine
equal to twice the value of the weapon so unlawfully kept, and, if that
be not immediately paid, by corporal punishment."  Perhaps the most
radically unjust of all the statutes was reserved for this State.  The
Legislature enacted that "no person of color shall pursue the practice,
art, trade, or business of an artisan, mechanic, or shopkeeper, or any
other trade or employment besides that of husbandry, or that of a
servant under contract for labor, until he shall have obtained a
license from the judge of the District Court, which license shall be
good for one year only."  If the license was granted to the negro to
be a shopkeeper or peddler, he was compelled to pay a hundred dollars
a year for it; and if he wished to pursue the rudest mechanical
calling, he was compelled to pay a license-fee of ten dollars.  No such
fees were exacted of white men and no such fees were exacted of the
free black man during the era of slavery.  Every avenue for improvement
was closed against him; and in a State which boasted somewhat
indelicately of its chivalric dignity, the negro was mercilessly
excluded from all chances to better his condition individually, or to
improve the character of his race.

Mississippi followed in the general line of penal enactments prescribed
in South Carolina, though her code was possibly somewhat less severe in
the deprivations to which the negro was subjected.  It was, however,
bad enough to stir the indignation of every lover of justice.  The
Legislature had enacted a law that "if the laborer shall quit the
service of the employer before the expiration of his term of service
without just cause, he shall forfeit his wages for the year up to the
time of quitting."  Practically the negro was himself never permitted
to judge whether the cause which drove him to seek employment elsewhere
was just, the white man being the sole arbiter in the premises.  It
was provided that "every civil officer shall, and every person may,
arrest and carry back to his or her legal employer any freedman, free
negro or mulatto, who shall have quit the service of his or her
employer before the expiration of his term of service without good
cause, and said officer shall be entitled to receive for arresting and
carrying back every deserting employee aforesaid the sum of five
dollars, and ten cents per mile from the place of arrest to the place
of delivery, and these sums shall be held by the employer as a set-off
for so much against the wages of said deserting employee; _provided_
that said arrested party, after being so returned home, may appeal to
a justice of the peace, or a member of the Board of Police, who shall
summarily try whether said appellant is legally employed by the
alleged employer."

It required little familiarity with Southern administration of justice
between a white man and a negro to know that such appeal was always
worse then fruitless, and that its only effect, if attempted, would be
to secure even harsher treatment than if the appeal had not been made.
The provisions for enticing a negro from his employer, included in this
Act, were in the same spirit and almost in the same language as the
provisions of the slave-code applicable to the negro before the era
of emancipation.  The person "giving or selling to any deserting
freedman, free negro or mulatto, any food, raiment, or other things,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor," and might be punished by a fine of
two hundred dollars and costs, or he might be put in prison, and be
also sued by the employer for damages.  For attempting to entice any
freedman or free negro beyond the limits of the State, the person
offending might be fined five hundred dollars; and if not immediately
paid, the court could sentence the delinquent to imprisonment in the
county jail for six months.  The entire code of Mississippi for
freedmen was in the spirit of the laws quoted.  Justice was defied, and
injustice incorporated as the very spirit of the laws.  It was
altogether a shameless proclamation of indecent wrong on the part of
the Legislature of Mississippi.

Louisiana probably attained the worst eminence in this vicious
legislation.  At the very moment when the Thirty-ninth Congress was
assembling to consider the condition of the Southern States and the
whole subject of their reconstruction, it was found that a bill was
pending in the Legislature of Louisiana providing that "every adult
freed man or woman _shall furnish themselves with a comfortable home
and visible means of support within twenty days after the passage of
this act,_" and that "any freed man or woman failing to obtain a home
and support as thus provided shall be immediately arrested by any
sheriff or constable in any parish, or by the police officer in any
city or town in said parish where said freedman may be, and by them
delivered to the Recorder of the parish, and by him hired out, by
public advertisement, to some citizen, being the highest bidder, for
the remainder of the year."  And in case the laborer should leave his
employer's service without his consent, "he shall be arrested and
assigned to labor on some public works without compensation until
his employer reclaims him."  The laborers were not to be allowed to
keep any live-stock, and all time spent from home without leave was
to be charged against them at the rate of two dollars per day, and
worked at that rate.  Many more provisions of the same general
character were contained within the bill, the whole character and
scope of which were forcibly set before the Senate by Mr. Wilson of
Massachusetts.  It was not only a proof of cruelty enacted into law,
but was such a defiance to the spirit of the Emancipation amendment
that it subjected the Legislature which approved the amendment and
enacted these laws, to a charge of inconsistency so grave as to make
the former act appear in the light of both a legal and moral fraud.
It was declaring the negro to be free by one statute, and immediately
proceeding to re-enslave him by another.

By a previous law Louisiana had provided that all agricultural laborers
should be compelled to "make contracts for labor during the first ten
days of January for the entire year."  With a demonstrative show of
justice it was provided that "wages due shall be a lien on the crop,
one-half to be paid at times agreed by the parties, the other half to
be retained until the completion of the contract; but in case of
sickness of the laborer, wages for the time shall be deducted, and
where the sickness is supposed to be feigned for the purpose of
idleness, double the amount shall be deducted; and should the refusal
to work extend beyond three days, the negro shall be forced to labor
on roads, levees, and public works without pay."  The master was
permitted to make deduction from the laborer's wages for "injuries done
to animals or agricultural implements committed to his care, or for bad
or negligent work," he, of course, being the judge.  "For every act of
disobedience a fine of one dollar shall be imposed upon the laborer;"
and among the cases deemed to be disobedience were "impudence,
swearing, or using indecent language in the presence of the employer,
his family, or his agent, or quarreling or fighting among one another."
It has been truthfully said of this provision that the master or his
agent might assail the ear with profaneness aimed at the negro man, and
outrage every sense of decency in foul language addressed to the negro
woman; but if one of the helpless creatures, goaded to resistance and
crazed under tyranny, should answer back with impudence, or should
relieve his mind with an oath, or retort indecency upon indecency, he
did so at the cost to himself of one dollar for every outburst.  The
agent referred to in the statute was the well-known overseer of the
cotton region, who was always coarse and often brutal, sure to be
profane, and scarcely knowing the border-line between ribaldry and
decency.  The care with which the law-makers of Louisiana provided that
his delicate ears and sensitive nerves should not be offended with an
oath or with an indelicate word from a negro, will be appreciated by
all who have heard the crack of the whip on a Southern plantation.

The wrongs inflicted under the name of law, thus far recited, were
still further aggravated in a majority of the rebellious States by the
exaction of taxes from the colored man to an amount altogether
disproportionate to their property.  Indeed, of property they had none.
Just emerging from a condition of slavery in which their labor had
been constantly exacted without fee or reward of any kind, it was
impossible that they could be the owners of any thing except their own
bodies.  Notwithstanding this fact, the negroes, _en masse,_ were held
to be subjects of taxation in the State Governments about to be
re-organized.  In Georgia, for example, a State tax of three hundred
and fifty thousand dollars was levied in the first year of peace.  The
property of the State, even after all the ruin of the war, exceeded
two hundred and fifty million dollars.  This tax, therefore, amounted
to less than one-seventh of one per cent upon the aggregate valuation
of the State,--equal to the imposition of only a dollar and a half upon
each thousand dollars of property.  The Legislature of the State
decreed, however, that a large proportion of this small levy should be
raised by a poll-tax of a dollar per head upon every man in the State
between the ages of twenty-one and sixty years.  There were in Georgia
at the time from eighty-five thousand to ninety thousand colored men
subject to the tax: perhaps, indeed, the number reached one hundred
thousand.  It was thus ordained that the negroes, who had no property
at all, should pay one-third as much as the white men, who had two
hundred and fifty millions of property in possession.  This odious and
unjust tax was stringently exacted from the negro.  To make sure that
not one should escape, the tax was held as a lien upon his labor, and
the employer was under distraint to pay it.  In Alabama they devised
for the same purpose two dollars on every person between the ages of
eighteen and fifty, causing a still larger proportion of the total tax
to fall on the negro than the Georgia law-makers deemed expedient.

Texas followed with a capitation tax of a dollar per head, while
Florida levied upon every inhabitant between the ages of twenty-one
and fifty-five years a capitation tax of three dollars, and upon
failure or refusal to pay the same the tax-collector was "authorized
and required to seize the body of the delinquent, and hire him out,
after five days' public notice before the door of the Court House, to
any person who will pay the said tax and the costs incident to the
proceedings growing out of said arrest, for his services for the
shortest period of time."  As the costs as well as the capitation tax
were to be worked out by the negro, it is presumable that, in the
spirit of this tax-law, they were enlarged to the utmost limit that
decency, according to the standard set up by this law, would permit.
It is fair to presume that, in any event, the costs would not be less
than the tax, and might, indeed, be double or treble that amount.  As
a negro could not, at that time, be hired out for more than seven
dollars and a half per month, the plain inference is that for the
support of the State of Florida the negro might be compelled to give
one month's labor yearly.  Even by the capitation tax alone, without
the incident of the costs, every negro man was compelled to give the
gains and profits of nearly two weeks' labor.

A poll-tax, though not necessarily limited in this manner, has usually
accompanied the right of suffrage in the different States of the Union,
but in the rebellious States it conferred no franchise.  It might be
supposed that ordinary generosity would have devoted it to the
education of the ignorant class from which it was forcibly wrung, but
no provision of the kind was even suggested.  Indeed, in those States
there was scarcely an attempt made to provide for the education of the
freedmen, and the suggestions made in that direction carried with them
another display of studied wrong.  As an example of rank injustice the
course of the Legislature of Florida may be profitably cited.  That
body passed an Act concerning schools for freedmen, in which the
governor was authorized to appoint a superintendent of common schools
for freedmen, and in each county the county commissioners were
authorized to appoint assistant superintendents.  These officers were
directed to "establish schools for freedmen when the number of colored
children in any county will warrant the same, provided" (and the
proviso is one of great significance) "that the sums hereinafter
authorized shall be sufficient to meet the expenses thereof."  The
funds provided for this seemingly philanthropic design were to be
derived exclusively from a tax upon the colored man.  The law directed
that all colored men between the ages of twenty-one and fifty-five
years should pay annually a dollar each, to be collected at the same
time and in the same manner as the three-dollar poll-tax, which should
be paid into the treasury of the State for the use of the freedmen, and
should constitute a fund to be denominated "the common-school fund for
the education of freedmen."  It was further provided in this law, that
"a tuition-fee shall be collected from each pupil, under such
regulations as the superintendents shall prescribe, and paid into the
treasury as a portion of the common-school fund for freedmen."

The salary of the superintendents of the schools for freedmen was fixed
at a thousand dollars, and of the county superintendents at two
hundred dollars.  There were, at that time, about twelve thousand negro
men subject to the capitation tax of three dollars, already referred
to, and under that law they paid thirty-six thousand dollars annually
into the State Treasury of Florida; but the school law forbade that the
salary of superintendents and assistant superintendents should be paid
from the fund derived from the poll-tax.  They provided that it should
be chargeable solely to the fund raised for common schools.  As there
were thirty-seven counties in Florida at that time, it is a fair
presumption that twenty-five of them had assistant superintendents,
whose aggregate salaries would amount to five thousand dollars.  With
the superintendent's salary, which was a thousand dollars, a draft of
six thousand dollars for the salaries of white men was at once made
upon the twelve thousand dollars which were to be collected from
freedmen.  Every teacher who was to teach in these schools was required
to pay five dollars for his certificate, which also went into the
school-fund; and the end of the whole matter was, that a bare pittance
was left for the thirty thousand negro children in Florida of the
school age.  The whole scheme was a ghastly wrong, one which, if
attempted upon that class of any population in the North which is able
to pay only a poll-tax, would consign the party attempting it to defeat
and disgrace, and, if its enforcement were attempted, would lead to
riot and bloodshed.

These laws, with all their wrong (even a stronger word might be
rightfully employed), were to become, and were, indeed, already an
integral part of the reconstruction scheme which President Johnson had
devised and proclaimed.  Whoever assented to the President's plan of
reconstruction assented to these laws, and, beyond that, assented to
the full right of the rebellious States to continue legislation of this
odious type.  It was at once seen that if the party which had insisted
upon the emancipation of the slave as a final condition of peace,
should now abandon him to his fate, and turn him over to the anger and
hate of the class from whose ownership he had been freed, it would
countenance and commit an act of far greater wrong than was designed
by the most malignant persecutor of the race in any one of the Southern
States.  When the Congress of the United States, acting independently
of the Executive power of the Nation, decreed emancipation by amending
the Constitution, it solemnly pledged itself, with all its power, to
give protection to the emancipated at whatever cost and at whatever
sacrifice.  No man could read the laws which have been here briefly
reviewed without seeing and realizing that, if the negro were to be
deprived of the protecting power of the Nation that had set him free,
he had better at once be remanded to slavery, and to that form of
protection which cupidity, if not humanity, would always inspire.

The South had no excuse for its course, and the leaders of its public
opinion at that time will always, and justly, be held to a strict
accountability.  Even the paltry pretext, afterwards so often advanced,
that they were irritated and maddened by the interposition of carpet-bag
power, does not avail in the least degree for the outrages in the
era under consideration.  When Mr. Johnson issued his proclamation of
reconstruction, the hated carpet-bagger was an unknown element in the
Southern states.  What was done during the year immediately following
the surrender of the rebel armies was done at Southern suggestion, done
by Southern men, done under the belief that the President's policy
would protect them in it, done with a fixed and merciless determination
that the gracious act of emancipation should not bring amelioration to
the colored race, and that the pseudo-philanthropy, as they regarded
the anti-slavery feeling in the North, should be brought into contempt
before the world.  They deliberately resolved to prove to the public
opinion of mankind that the negro was fit only to be a chattel, and
that in his misery and degradation, sure to follow the iniquitous
enactments for the new form of his subjection, it would be proved that
he had lost and not gained by the conferment of freedom among a
population where it was impossible for him to enjoy it.  They resolved
also to prove that slavery was the normal and natural state of the
negro; that the Northern people, in taking any other ground, had been
deceived by a sentiment and had been following a chimera; that the
Southern people alone understood the question, and that interference
with them by war or by law should end in establishing their
justification before the public opinion of the world.  The Southern men
believed and boasted that they would subject to general reproach and
expose to open shame that whole class of intermeddlers and fanatics
(as they termed opponents of slavery) who had destroyed so many lives
and wasted so much treasure in attempting the impossible and, even if
possible, the undesirable.

There can be no doubt that the objectionable and cruel legislation of
the Southern States--examples of which might be indefinitely cited in
addition to those already given--exerted a strong influence upon Mr.
Seward's mind.  It is well known that, to those who were on intimate
terms with him, he expressed a sorrowful surprise that the South
should respond with so ill a grace to the liberal and magnanimous
tenders of sympathy and friendship from the National Administration.
He could not comprehend why confidence did not beget confidence, why
generosity should not call forth generosity in return.  There are
good reasons for believing that Mr. Seward desired some modification
of the President's policy of Reconstruction after he comprehended the
spirit which had been exhibited by the Southern Conventions, and the
still more objectionable spirit shown by the Southern Legislatures.
His philanthropic nature, the record of his public life, his great
achievements in the anti-slavery field, all forbid the conclusion that
he could knowingly and willingly consent to the maltreatment and the
permanent degradation of the freedmen.  If he had no higher motives,
the selfish one of preserving his own splendid fame must have inspired
him.

Mr. Seward had reached the age of sixty-five years, and he surely could
not consent to undo the entire work of his mature manhood.
Consistency, it is true, is not the highest trait of statesmanship.
Crises often arise in the conduct of National affairs when cherished
opinions must be sacrificed and new departures taken.  But this
necessity can never apply to that class of political questions closely
and inseparably allied with moral obligation.  Mr. Seward had himself
taught the nation that conflict on questions involving the rights of
human nature is irrepressible.  The slavery against which he had warred
so long and so faithfully had been abolished in vain if another form of
servitude, even more degrading in some of its aspects, was to take its
place.  To desert the colored man, and leave him to his fate,
undefended, and defenseless against the wrongs already perpetrated and
the greater wrongs foreshadowed, would do dishonor to the entire spirit
of Mr. Seward's statesmanship, and would certainly be unworthy of his
fame.

He strove no doubt to persuade himself, as Mr. Marcy had done in the
Cabinet of President Pierce, that even if he did not approve the policy
pursued, it was better for him to remain and prevent many evils sure to
follow if he should resign.  Mr. Seward felt moreover a certain
embarrassment in deserting the Administration after he had induced the
President to adopt the very policy which was now resulting adversely.
But for his energetic interposition the President would have been
executing an entirely different policy--one of severe and perhaps
sanguinary character.  After persuading Mr. Johnson to abandon his
proposed line of action and to adopt that which Mr. Seward had himself
originated, it might well occur to the distinguished Secretary of State
that good faith to the President required him to remain at his post and
aid in working out the best result possible.  It would to Mr. Seward's
apprehension be an act of unpardonable selfishness if in such a crisis
to the Republic he should seek to increase his own popularity in the
Northern States by separating from Mr. Johnson who had generously
trusted him and cordially accepted his leadership.  By resigning he
could only add to the excitement which he especially desired to allay,
whereas he might by continuing in his place of power be able to hold a
part of the ground which would all be finally lost if he should join
the crusade against the Administration.  Under these motives Mr. Seward
retained his portfolio.  He staid on and on, continually hoping to do
some act of patriotic service, and steadily losing that great host of
friends who for twenty years had looked to him with unfaltering faith
for counsel and direction.

Many who had been steadfastly devoted to Mr. Seward for the whole
generation in which he had been prominent in public affairs, never
could become reconciled to his course at this period.  Some, indeed,
refused to concede to him the benefit of worthy motives.  He had, as
they believed and declared, been incurably wounded in his pride, and
disappointed in his ambition, when Mr. Lincoln, then a comparatively
unknown man, was preferred to him by the Republican party as a
candidate for the Presidency in 1860.  He had, as they believed, bided
his time for revenge.  During the war, the pressure of patriotic duty,
as his new but reluctant enemies alleged, held him steadily to his
old faith; but now, when he could do it without positive danger to the
country, he was bent on administering discipline to the party and its
leaders.  They likened him to Mr. Van Buren, revengefully defeating
General Cass in 1848; to Mr. Webster, who on his death-bed gave his
sympathy to the party which had always reviled him; to Mr. Fillmore,
who deserted his anti-slavery professions in the hour of most pressing
responsibility.  Comments even more severe were made by many who had
been deeply attached to Mr. Seward, and had deplored his defeat at
Chicago.  At such a period of excitement, it was not possible that a
man of Mr. Seward's exalted position could in any degree change his
party relations without great exasperation on the part of old friends,
--an exasperation sure to lead to extravagance of expression and to
personal injustice.

Mr. Seward's course at this period must not be judged harshly by a
standard established from a retrospective view of the circumstances
surrounding him.  It is more just to consider the situation as it
appeared to his own observation when his eyes were turned to the
future.  He no doubt looked buoyantly forward, according to his
temperament, trusting always to the healing influences of time and to
that re-action in the headlong course of Southern men which he felt
sure would be brought about by the sting of personal reflection and the
power of public opinion.  A silver lining to the darkest cloud was
always visible to his eye of faith, and he now brought to the
contemplation of the adverse elements in the political field a full
measure of that confidence which had always sustained him when adverse
elements in the field of war caused many strong hearts to faint and
grow weary.

The course of events developed occasions when Mr. Seward's influence
proved valuable to the country, but it did not serve to recall his
popularity.  He was thwarted and defeated at all points by the Southern
leaders whom he had induced the President to forgive and re-instate.
These men had originally established their relations with Mr. Johnson
by reason of Mr. Seward's magnanimous interposition.  But once
established they had been able, from motives adverted to in the
previous chapter, to fasten their hold upon Mr. Johnson even to the
exclusion of Mr. Seward.  When Mr. Seward was beaten for the
Presidential nomination in a convention composed of anti-slavery men
who had learned their creed from him, Senator Toombs, in a tone full of
exultation but not remarkable for delicacy, declared that "Actaeon had
been devoured by his own dogs."  The fable would be equally applicable
in describing the manner in which the Southern men, who owed their
forgiveness and their immunity to Mr. Seward, turned upon him with
hatred and with imprecation.  They were graciously willing to accept
benefits and favors at his hands so long as he would dispense them, but
they never forgave him for the work of that grand period of his life,
between his election to the Senate and the outbreak of the civil war,
when he wrought most nobly for humanity and established a fame which no
error of later life could blot from the minds of a grateful people.

Mr. Seward could not have been surprised at the treatment he thus
received.  He had for nearly half a century been an intelligent
observer of the political field, and he could not recall a single
Northern man who had risked his popularity at home in defense of what
were termed the rights of the South who had not in the supreme crisis
of his public life been deserted by the South.  Mr. Webster, General
Cass, William L. Marcy, Mr. Douglas, and President Pierce were among
the most conspicuous of those who had been thus sacrificed.  The last
sixty days of Mr. Buchanan's Presidency furnished the most noted of all
the victims of Southern ingratitude.  Men of lower rank but similar
experience were to be found in the years preceding the war in nearly
every Norther State--men who had ventured to run counter to the
principles and prejudices of their own constituency to serve those who
always abandoned a political leader when they feared he might have lost
the power to be useful to them.  The pro-slavery men of the South, in
following this course, presented a striking contrast to the anti-slavery
men of the North who, under all circumstances and against all
temptation, were faithful to the leaders who proved faithful to their
cause.


CHAPTER VI.

During the progress of events in the South, briefly outlined in the
preceding chapter, the Thirty-ninth Congress came together--on the
first Monday of December, 1865.  The Senate and House each contained a
large majority of Republicans.  In the House Mr. Colfax was re-elected
Speaker, receiving 139 votes to 36 cast for James Brooks of New York.
The address of the Speaker on taking the chair is usually confined to
thanks for his election and courteous assurance of his impartiality
and good intentions.  But Mr. Colfax, instinctively quick, as he always
was, to discern the current of popular thought, incorporated in the
ceremonial address some very decisive political declarations.
Referring to the fact that the Thirty-eighth Congress has closed nine
months before, with "the storm-cloud of war still lowering over us,"
and rejoicing that "to-day, from shore to shore in our land there is
peace," he proceeded to indicate the line of policy which the people
expected.  "The duties of Congress," said he, "are as obvious as the
sun's pathway in the heavens.  Its first and highest obligation is to
guarantee to every State a republican form of government, to establish
the rebellious States anew on such a basis of enduring justice as will
guarantee all safeguards to the people and protection to all men in
their inalienable rights." . . . "In this great work," he said, "the
world should witness the most inflexible fidelity, the most earnest
devotion to the principles of liberty and humanity, the truest
patriotism and the wisest statesmanship."

The remarks of Mr. Colfax had evident reference to the perverse action
of the Southern rebels, and were so entirely in harmony with the
feeling of the House that at different stages of the brief address the
Republican side of the chamber broke forth into loud applause.  As soon
as the election of Speaker and of the subordinate officers of the House
was completed, Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, recognized as the leader of the
majority, offered a resolution for the appointment of a "joint
committee of fifteen members--nine from the House and six from the
Senate--who shall inquire into the condition of the States which formed
the so-called Confederate States of America, and report whether they,
or any of them, are entitled to be represented in either House of
Congress, with leave to report at any time by bill or otherwise."  His
resolution demanded that "until such report shall have been made and
finally acted upon by Congress, no member shall be received into either
House from any of the so-called Confederate States," and further
directed that "all papers relating to the representation of the said
States shall be referred to the said committee without debate."  Mr.
Eldridge of Wisconsin objected to the introduction of the resolution,
and was met by Mr. Stevens with a motion to suspend the rules, which
was carried by 129 _ayes_ to 35 _noes_.  Mr. John L. Dawson of
Pennsylvania inquired whether it would not be in order to postpone the
resolution until after the receipt of the President's message; but the
House was in no disposition to testify respect for Mr. Johnson, and the
resolution was adopted by as large a vote as that by which it had been
received.

Mr. Niblack of Indiana offered a resolution that "pending the question
as to the admission of persons claiming to have been elected
representatives to the present Congress from the States lately in
rebellion, such persons be entitled to the privileges of the floor of
the House."  This was a privilege always accorded to contestants for
seats, but Mr. Wilson of Iowa now objected; and, on motion of Mr.
Stevens, the House adjourned without even giving the courtesy of a vote
to the resolution.  No action of a more decisive character could have
been taken to indicate, on the threshold of Congressional proceedings,
the hostility of the Republican party, not merely to the President's
plan of reconstruction, but to the men who, under its operation in the
South, had been chosen to represent their districts in Congress.
Against a bad principle a good one my be opposed and the contest
proceed in good temper.  But his is not practicable when personal
feeling is aroused.  The presence in Washington of a considerable
number of men from the South, who, when Congress adjourned in the
preceding March, were serving in the Confederate Army, and were now at
the Capital demanding seats in the Senate and House, produced a feeling
of exasperation amounting to hatred.  The President's reconstruction
policy would have been much stronger if the Southern elections to
Congress had been postponed, or if the members elect had remained at
home during the discussion concerning their eligibility.  The presence
of these obnoxious persons inflamed minds not commonly given to
excitement, and drove many men to act from anger who were usually
governed by reason.

In the Senate the proceedings were conducted with even more disregard
of the President than had been manifested in the House.  An entire
policy was outlined by Mr. Sumner, without the slightest reference to
what the President might communicate "on the state of the Union," and
a system of reconstruction proposed which was in absolute hostility to
the one that Mr. Johnson had devised.  Mr. Sumner submitted resolutions
defining the duty of Congress in respect to guarantees of the National
security and National faith in the rebel States.  While the conditions
were not put forth as a finality, they were significant, if not
conclusive, of the demands which would be made, first by the more
advanced Republicans, and ultimately by the entire party.  These
resolutions declared that, in order to provide proper guarantees for
security in the future, "Congress should take care that no one of the
rebellious States should be allowed to resume its relations to the
Union until after the satisfactory performance of five several
conditions, which must be submitted to a popular vote, and be
sanctioned by a majority of the people in each of those States
respectively."  These condition were, in some respects, marked by
Mr. Sumner's lack of tact and practical wisdom as a legislator.  He
required stipulations, the fulfillment of which could not really be
ascertained.

Mr. Sumner demanded, first, "the complete re-establishment, in loyalty,
as shown by an honest recognition of the unity of the Republic, and the
duty of allegiance to it at all times, without mental reservation or
equivocation of any kind."  How Mr. Sumner could determine that "the
recognition of the unity of the Republic" was _honest_, how he could
know whether there was not, after all, a mental reservation on the
part of the rebels now swearing allegiance, he did not attempt to
inform the Senate.  The next or second condition was somewhat more
practical in fact, but might have been expressed in simpler form.  He
demanded "the complete suppression of all oligarchical pretensions, and
the complete enfranchisement of all citizens, so that there shall be
no denial of rights on account of race or color."  His third condition
was "the rejection of the rebel debt, and the adoption, in just
proportions, of the National debt and the National obligations to Union
soldiers, with solemn pledges never to join in any measure, directly
or indirectly, for their repudiation, or in any way tending to impair
the National credit."  His fourth condition was "the organization of an
educational system for the equal benefit of all, without distinction of
color or race."  His fifth had some of the objectionable features of
his first, demanding "the choice of citizens for office, whether State
or National, of constant and undoubted loyalty, whose conduct and
conversation shall give assurance of peace and reconciliation."  The
rebel States were not to be, in Mr. Sumner's language, "precipitated
back to political power and independence, but must wait until these
conditions are, in all respects, fulfilled."  In addition, he desired
a declaration of the Senate that "the Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing
slavery, has become and is a part of the Constitution of the United
States, having received the approval of the Legislatures of three-fourths
of the States adhering to the Union."  He declared that "the votes
of the States in rebellion are not necessary, in any way, to its
adoption, but they must all agree to it through their Legislatures, as
a condition precedent to their restoration to their full rights as
members of the Union."  With these resolutions Mr. Sumner submitted
another long series declaratory of the duty of Congress in respect to
loyal citizens in the rebel States.  His first series had defined what
the lately rebellious States must agree to by popular vote, and he
now outlined quite fully what would be the duty of Congress respecting
the admission of those States to representation in the Senate and the
House.  The sum of the whole, or the central fact of the whole series,
was that the color of the skin must not exclude a loyal man from civil
rights.

On the succeeding day, the President, having received notice of the
organization of the two Houses, communicated his annual message.  It
had been looked for with great interest and with varying speculations
as to its character.  It was expected, and as the event proved with
good reason, that it would affect the relation of parties in the
Northern States; that it would produce ill-feeling between the
President and the Republicans, who had chosen him; and that it would
lead, with equal certainty, to a tender of support from the Democrats
who had hitherto opposed him.  But Mr. Johnson had evidently resolved
to exhibit a spirit of calmness and firmness in his official
communication, and, while steadily maintaining his own ground, to avoid
all harsh words that might give offense to those who differed from him.
The moderation in language and the general conservatism which
distinguished the message were perhaps justly attributed to Mr. Seward,
who had no doubt hoped, by kindly words of conciliation, to avert the
threatened break in the ranks of the Republican party.  Mr. Seward had
never in his Congressional career been a compromiser, but he now worked
most earnestly to bring about an accommodation between the
Administration and Congress.  His argument was the one skillfully
employed by all who seek an adjustment between those who ought to be
friends: Let each party give way a little; let a common ground of
action be established; and, above all, let the calamity of a party
division be averted.

The President in his message dwelt at some length in a tone of
moderation upon the condition of affairs in the South.  He saw before
him but two modes of dealing with the insurrectionary states,--one
was "to bring them back into practical relations with the Union;" the
other was to "hold them in military subjection." . . . "Military
government," said the President, "established for an indefinite period,
would offer no security for the suppression of discontent, would divide
the people into the vanquishers and the vanquished, and would envenom
hatred rather than restore affection. . . ."  The President set forth
the danger of permanent arbitrary rule.  "Once established, no
precise limit to the continuance of the military governments is
conceivable.  They would occasion an incalculable and exhausting
expense.  Peaceful emigration would be prevented, for what emigrant
abroad, what industrious citizen at home, would willingly place himself
under military rule?"--"Besides," asked the President, "would not the
policy of military rule imply that the States whose inhabitants may
have taken part in the rebellion have, by the act of those inhabitants,
ceased to exist? whereas the true theory is, that all pretended acts of
secession were from the beginning null and void."  The President then
briefly explained how he had proceeded in the appointment of
provisional governors, the calling of conventions, the election of
civil governors and Legislatures, the choosing of senators and
representatives in Congress,--compactly sketching the progress of
events from the date of his accession until the date of the message.

Discussing his proposed policy he said with great frankness, "I know
very well that for its success it requires, at least, the acquiescence
of those States which it concerns; that it implies an invitation to
those States, by renewing their allegiance to the United States, to
resume their functions as States of the Union; but it is a risk that
must be taken, and in the choice of difficulties, it is the smallest
risk."  He urged very earnestly the adoption of the Thirteenth
Amendment in order that the negro should be freed, and with equal
strength maintained that, as respected the qualifications for suffrage
in each of the States "the General Government should not interfere, but
leave that matter where it was originally left,--in the Federal
Constitution."  But the most partial friend of the President could
hardly claim that he frankly communicated the proceedings or the
spirit of the Southern conventions and Legislatures.  He chose to
ignore that subject, to hide it by fluent and graceful phrase from
public criticism, and thus to keep from the official knowledge of
Congress the most important facts in the whole domain of
reconstruction.  It was a great mistake in the President to pass over
this subject in silence.  Such a course enforced one of two
impressions, either of which was hurtful to him.  He must, according
to the common understanding of Congress, have thought the character
of Southern legislation so offensive that he could find no excuse for
it and therefore would not mention it; or he must have regarded it as
outside the line of his observation and beyond the pale of his power
of review.  Either construction was bad, but the second and more
probable one was especially offensive.

The leading men of the Thirty-ninth Congress were mainly those of the
Thirty-eighth, though there had been a few important changes.  The
eminent senator from Vermont, Jacob Collamer, died on the 9th of
November (1865); and Luke P. Poland, afterwards a member of the House
of Representatives, appeared as his successor.  Mr. Solomon Foot, who
announced Judge Collamer's death, survived him but a few months.  On
the 28th of March Mr. Sumner announced his death to the Senate; and
eight days later--on the 5th of April (1866)--George F. Edmunds was
sworn in as his successor.  His first speech was in eulogy of his
predecessor.  Mr. Edmunds rose rapidly to prominence in the Senate and
after the habit of his State has been maintained for a long period in
his position.

Honorable James Guthrie of Kentucky, who had been Secretary of the
Treasury under President Pierce, now entered the Senate as the
successor of Lazarus W. Powell.  He was a man of strong parts,
possessing a steady industry and thrift not common to the South.  He
had for many years occupied a commanding financial position in the
South-West.  Richard Yates, the War Governor of Illinois, displaced
William A. Richardson, the intimate friend of Douglas.  John P. Hale
gave way to Aaron H. Cragin.  In recognition of Mr. Hale's ability and
long and faithful public service, Mr. Lincoln nominated him to the
Spanish Mission.  John A. J. Creswell came from Maryland as the
successor of Anthony Kennedy.  George H. Williams, a Republican, came
from Oregon to take the place of Benjamin F. Harding, a Democrat.  John
P. Stockton of New Jersey, a Democrat, took the place of John C. Ten
Eyck, a Republican.  Samuel J. Kirkwood entered as the successor of
James Harlan to fill his unexpired term, and performed a somewhat
unusual service in presenting the credentials of James Harlan as his
successor for the first full term, beginning March 4, 1867.  This was
the first appearance of Mr. Kirkwood in the National field, though he
had long been well known for honorable and eminent service in his State.

In the House the changes were more significant than in the Senate.
Gilman Marston entered anew, having been absent serving with great
credit as a brigadier-general in the war.  General Banks resumed the
seat which he had left to accept the governorship of Massachusetts in
1857.  His checkered and remarkable career, both civil and military,
during the eight intervening years had greatly increased his
reputation.  Henry C. Deming of Connecticut entered fresh from the
field of war, choosing a political life rather than a return to
literary labor.  New York was greatly strengthened in her delegation.
Roscoe Conkling resumed the seat which he had lost in the political
reverses of 1862.  Among the new members were Henry J. Raymond, the
able founder and editor of _The New-York Times_, Robert S. Hale, who
became at once distinguished in the arena of debate, and Hamilton
Ward, afterwards Attorney-General of his State.  These additions gave
to the delegation a prestige which its numbers did not always secure.
John H. Ketcham, who had attained the rank of brigadier-general by
successful service in the field, took his seat in this Congress,
destined to hold it for a long period, destined also to exert large
political influence without ever once addressing the House of
Representatives or an assembly of the people.  Reuben E. Fenton, after
long and able service in the House, was now transferred to the
gubernatorial chair of his State.

Three new men of note entered from Pennsylvania--John M. Broomall, an
independent thinker and keen debater, inflexible in principle,
untiring in effort; Ulysses Mercur, whose learning as a lawyer and
whose worth as a man have since received their reward in a promotion
to the Supreme Bench of his State; George V. Lawrence, one of the best
known and most sagacious political leaders of Western Pennsylvania,
inheriting his capacity from his honored father, Joseph Lawrence, who
died during his membership of the Twenty-seventh Congress.  John L.
Thomas, junior, entered as the representative of the city of Baltimore;
and the venerable Francis Thomas returned from his hermitage and his
weird life in the Alleghanies.

Ohio grew even stronger than before, and her delegation was again
recognized as the leading one of the House.  Samuel Shellabarger, John
A. Bingham and Columbus Delano re-entered with reputation already
established by previous service in Congress.  William Lawrence, a
conscientious legislator and careful lawyer, entered from the
Bellefontaine District.  Martin Welker, since promoted to the bench
in his State, came from the Wooster District.  One of the Cincinnati
districts was represented by Benjamin Eggleston, a man of great force
and energy; and the other, by a modest man, without experience in
legislation, but who had been a good and true soldier in the war for
the Union and was highly esteemed by his neighbors.  He did not take
an active part in Congress, but was destined to a prominence of which
he little dreamed--Rutherford B. Hayes.

The Indiana delegation was strengthened on the Democratic side by the
return of William E. Niblack, who had made a good record in the
Thirty-seventh Congress, and by the entrance of Michael C. Kerr, who
served for a long period and ultimately became Speaker of the House.
Messrs. Julian, Orth, and Dumont were again elected.  The last-named had
made a reputation in the preceding Congress as a keen and able man.  The
Illinois delegation, which had contained a large majority of Democrats
in the Thirty-eighth Congress, now returned strongly Republican,--Mr.
Lincoln's victory of 1864 having, with three exceptions, carried with
it every Congressional district.  Four men of marked characteristics
were among the new members of the delegation, one of whom was already
widely known: the three others were destined to become so in different
degrees--John Wentworth, Shelby M. Cullom, Burton C. Cook, and Jehu
Baker.  Wentworth had been in the House as a Democrat prior to the
war, having represented the Chicago District continuously from March
4, 1843 to March 4, 1851; and again from March 4, 1853 to March 4,
1855.  He was endowed by nature with a mind as strong as his body, and
that was of Titanic proportions.  He was an ardent partisan in behalf
of any cause he espoused; was willful, aggressive, and dominating.  He
was, at the same time, genial and kindly in many relations of life, not
without gifts of both wit and humor, and courageous to the point of
absolute fearlessness.  He had been well educated at Dartmouth College
in his native State, and long practice had made him a dangerous
antagonist in debate.  He had been an intense Democrat, but he refused
to join Douglas in the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and
subsequently united with the Republicans.--Shelby M. Cullom, with good
natural parts and sound education, amiable, pleasing, and endowed with
the gracious quality which attracts and holds friends, won his way
promptly in the House and gave early promise of the success which
afterwards elevated him to the governorship of Illinois, and thence
transferred him to the Senate of the United States.--Burton C. Cook was
recognized as an able lawyer from the beginning of his service.  He
constantly grew in influence and strength during the eight years of
his continuous membership, and at its close returned to the bar with an
enviable reputation and with the assurance of that eminent success
which has since attended his professional career.--Jehu Baker was a man
of peculiarities, not to say oddities, of bearing; but these did not
conceal his worth and ability, nor retard the growing reputation which
has since retained him in a diplomatic position.

Missouri, then under the control of the Republican party, included in
her delegation Robert T. Van Horn, a Pennsylvanian by birth, who had
borne a conspicuous part in the contest with the disloyal elements of
the State of his adoption; and John Hogan, a genial Irish Democrat
from the St. Louis District.  The Michigan delegation was the same as
in the Thirty-eighth Congress, with the exception of Thomas W. Ferry,
who now entered for the first time, and Roland E. Trowbridge, who had
served in the Thirty-seventh Congress.  The Iowa delegation was the
same as in the Thirty-eighth Congress,--a very able body of men with
growing influence in the House.  The Wisconsin delegation was also in
large part the same.  But the new members were men of note.  Among them
were Halbert E. Paine and Philetus Sawyer.  General Paine had served
with distinction in the war and had lost a leg in battle.  He was a
lawyer in full practice, a man of the highest integrity, without fear
and without reproach.  Born in the Western Reserve, he was radical in
his views touching the slavery question and progressive in all matters
of governmental reform.--Philetus Sawyer was a native of Vermont, who,
when a young man, had emigrated to Wisconsin.  Without early
advantages, either of education or fortune, he was in the best sense
of the phrase a self-made man.  He engaged in the business of lumbering
and by sagacity had acquired wealth.  It is easy to supply superlatives
in eulogy of popular favorites; but Mr. Sawyer, in modest phrase,
deserves to be ranked among the best of men,--honest, industrious,
generous, true to every tie and to every obligation of life.  He
remained for ten years in the House, with constantly increasing
influence, and was afterward promoted to the Senate.  California sent
an excellent delegation--McRuer, Higby, and Bidwell; and West Virginia
contributed a valuable member in the person of Chester D. Hubbard.

The members of the House had been elected in 1864--borne to their seats
by the force of the same popular expression that placed Mr. Lincoln in
the Presidential chair for a second term.  It is scarcely conceivable
that had Mr. Lincoln lived any serious differences could have arisen
between himself and Congress respecting the policy of reconstruction.
The elections of 1865, held amid the shouts of triumph over a restored
union, went by default in favor of the Republicans, who were justly
credited with the National victory so far as any one political party
was entitled to such honor.  The people had therefore given no
expression, in any official or registered form, touching the policy
outlined by Mr. Johnson.  He was the duly-elected Vice-President.  He
had come to the magistracy in presumed sympathy and close affiliation
with the Republicans whose suffrages he had received.  All beyond these
facts was surmise or inference.  No one knew any thing with precision
respecting the new President's intentions.

He undoubtedly had control of an enormous public patronage.  The Peace
establishment of the Army, it was thought at that time, would not be
less than seventy-five regiments, and this, with the necessary staff,
would give to him the appointment of nearly two thousand officers
without disturbing the commissions of those already in the regular
service.  A like increase was expected in the naval establishment.
The internal-revenue system, devised for the support of the war, was
all-pervasive in its character, and required for its administration a
great number of officers and agents, all removable and appointable at
the pleasure of the Executive.  The customs' service was
correspondingly large, having grown immensely during the war.  In
proportion to the population of the country there never had been,
there has never since been, and perhaps there will never again be,
so vast an official patronage placed at the absolute disposal of the
President.

Public opinion, which has in later years tended to restrain the
Executive Department from the personal use of the patronage of the
Government, did not at that time exert a perceptible influence in this
direction.  The maxim originating with William L. Marcy, but frequently
attributed to President Jackson, that "to the victor belong the
spoils," was then held in full honor; and though it was deprecated by
many and openly opposed in Congress by a few, it was acquiesced in by
the vast majority and was the rule and practice of the National
Administration.  The patronage placed a formidable weapon in the hands
of the President which could be so used as to annoy or help every
Republican representative in Congress,--so used, indeed, as to prevent
the election of many who were peculiarly offensive to Mr. Johnson.  He
had been reared in the Democratic school of proscription, and had
measured the force and indulged in the use of patronage throughout all
his political life in Tennessee.  Though a man of the strictest
personal integrity, he had apparently no scruples on this subject, but
believed that the patronage of the Government might be honestly used to
build up his own political power.  When he entered political life he
imbibed this doctrine from the teachings of President Jackson; he
afterwards received its advantage under Van Buren; he aided in its
enforcement under Polk; and when a senator, during the Administration
of Buchanan, he witnessed its prodigious power in the overthrow of
Douglas as a Presidential candidate, though a large majority of the
rank and file of his party desired his nomination.  While the
Democratic masses were, in fact, clamorous for Douglas, he was
defeated by combinations brought about through the active
instrumentality of United-States district attorneys, collectors,
marshals, and their deputies--all acting, as they had good reason to
know, in harmony with the wishes of the Administration from whose
favor they had received their places.

The Republicans of the loyal States, whose convictions and whose
prejudices were strongly developed by the controversy between the
President and Congress, had grave apprehensions as to the ultimate
issue.  At various times during the fifteen years preceding the war,
they had seen men of strong anti-slavery professions, with strong
anti-slavery constituencies, "palter in a double sense" when intrusted
with the duties of a representative in Congress, and fall from the
faith, influenced by what were termed the blandishments of power, or
as was sometimes more plainly said, corrupted by the gifts of
patronage.  They had seen this results brought about by an
Administration which the tempted and yielding representatives had
been specially chosen to oppose.  They had now double ground to fear
that many more would prove treacherous to their professions of
principle, since they could take refuge under the protection of an
Administration chosen by their own party and still nominally professing
to be Republican.  The magnitude of the patronage at the President's
disposal intensified the popular alarm; and the promptness with which
a large proportion of those holding office echoed the President's
sentiments and defended his policy, was taken as a signal that
acquiescence therein would be the one condition upon which the honors
and emoluments of public place could be enjoyed.

The great mass of loyal Republicans had descried a peculiar danger in
the gentle, persuasive, insinuating words with which the President,
in his annual message, sought to commend his policy.  Phrasing of a
specious type can deceive an individual far more easily that it can
deceive a multitude of men.  The quick comprehension of the people so
far transcends that of a single person as to amount almost to the
possession of a sixth sense.  While the single person might be misled
by fallacious statements and suppressions of truth by the President,
the people discerned with keen precision the absolute facts of the
case.  They saw that the policy of the President was at war with the
creed and the spirit of the Republican party, and that, if carried into
effect, the legitimate fruits of the bloody struggle which had
afflicted the Nation would be lost to posterity, the laws of humanity
would be violated, and a fresh rebellion against National authority
would be invited.  The ancient maxim, that the voice of the people is
the voice of God, is illogical in its direct statement, and like all
adages it covers both a truth and an untruth.  Its truth was now
signally vindicated, when, against the authority of those in high
places, against the instruction of those who had always before been
trusted, the mass of the Republican party stood with heroic firmness
for what they believed to be right.  They stood against the seductions
of patronage in the hands of the President whom they had elected, and
against the eloquent pleadings of the Secretary of State who for ten
years before the war had been their sagacious guide, their profound
philosopher, their trusted friend.

It was this common instinct and prompt expression by the people which
rescued Congress from the danger of injurious complication.  The first
test in the Senate, as to the solidity of the Republican party, was
made on the 12th of December, when the resolution to form a select
committee of reconstruction, passed by the House on the first day of
the session, came up for consideration.  It was amended on the motion
of Mr. Anthony, by striking out that portion of it which provided that
no member should be received into either House from the so-called
Confederate States until the report of the committee was received and
acted upon.  This was held to impinge on the power of each House to be
the judge of its own elections, and was expunged by general consent.
On the propriety of the resolution thus amended a brief debate
occurred, which to a certain extent enabled senators to define their
position; and before it was concluded it was made evident that Mr.
Cowan of Pennsylvania, Mr. Dixon of Connecticut, and Mr. Doolittle of
Wisconsin, would separate from the mass of their Republican associates,
would support the reconstruction policy of the President, and would
ultimately become merged in the Democratic party.  Mr. Norton of
Minnesota not long afterwards became one of the supporters of the
President, making a net loss of four to the Republican side of the
chamber.  The Senate, at that time, contained fifty members, twenty-five
States being represented.  Of this number the Democrats had but
eleven.  The loss of four still left the Republicans in possession of
more than two-thirds of the seats in the Senate.  The House had even a
larger proportion of Republican members.  These facts were destined to
exert a wide and then unforseen influence upon the legislation of
Congress and upon the political affairs of the country.

The House concurred promptly in the amendment which the Senate had
made to the resolution providing for a joint committee on the subject
of Reconstruction.  It is not often that such solicitude is felt in
Congress touching the membership of a committee as was now developed
in both branches.  It was foreseen that in an especial degree the
fortunes of the Republican party would be in the keeping of the fifteen
men who might be chosen.  The contest, predestined and already
manifest, between the President and Congress might, unless conducted
with great wisdom, so seriously divide the party as to compass its
ruin.  Hence the imperious necessity that no rash or ill-considered
step should be taken.  Both in Congress and among the people the
conviction was general that the party was entitled to the services of
its best men.  There was no struggle among members for positions on
the committee; and when the names were announced they gave universal
satisfaction to the Republicans.  There was some complaint by the
Democrats that they had only one representative upon the committee in
the Senate and two in the House, but the relative strength of parties
in both branches scarcely justified a larger representation of the
minority.(1)

Even before the announcement of the names a great number of resolutions
were offered in the House, intended to call forth expressions of
opinion that should operate as instructions to the new committee, but
none of them were of marked importance, except one indicating the
pronounced divergence of the two parties regarding the mode of
reconstruction.  Each political party, in such parliamentary
declarations, seeks to get the advantage of the other and each is in
the habit of overrating the importance of expressions in this form.
They are diligently contrived for catches and committals to be
subsequently used in political campaigns, but it may well be doubted
whether they ever produce substantial effect upon legislation or
prove either gainful or hurtful in partisan contests.  The practice
is somewhat below the dignity of a legislative body, has never been
resorted to in the Senate and might with great advantage be abandoned
by the House.

The debate on Reconstruction, perhaps the longest in the history of
National legislation, was formally opened by Mr. Thaddeus Stevens on
the 18th of December (1865).  He took the most radical and pronounced
ground touching the relation to the National Government of the States
lately in rebellion.  He contended that "there are two provisions in
the Constitution, under one of which the case must fall."  The Fourth
Article says that "new States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union."  "In my judgment," said Mr. Stevens, "this is the controlling
provision in this case.  Unless the law of Nations is a dead letter,
the late war between the two acknowledged belligerents severed their
original contracts and broke all the ties that bound them together.
The future condition of the conquered power depends on the will of the
conqueror.  They must come in as new States or remain as conquered
provinces."  This was the theory which Mr. Stevens had steadily
maintained from the beginning of the war, and which he had asserted
as frequently as opportunity was given in the discussions of the House.
He proceeded to consider the probable alternative.  "Suppose," said he,
"as some dreaming theorists imagine, that these States have never been
out of the Union, but have only destroyed their State governments, so
as to be incapable of political action, then the fourth section of the
Fourth Article applies, which says, 'The United States shall guarantee
to every State in this Union a republican form of government.'"  "But,"
added he, "who is the United States?  Not the Judiciary, not the
President; but the sovereign power of the people, exercised through
their representatives in congress, with the concurrence of the
Executive.  It means political government--the concurrent action of
both branches of Congress and the Executive."  He intended his line
of debate to be an attack, at the very beginning, upon the assumption
of the President in his attempt at Reconstruction.  "The separate
action of the President, or the Senate or the House," added Mr.
Stevens, "amounts to nothing, either in admitting new States or
guaranteeing republican forms of government to lapsed or outlawed
States."  "Whence springs," asked he, "the preposterous idea that any
one of these, acting separately, can determine the right of States to
send representatives or senators to the Congress of the Union?"

Though many others had foreseen and appreciated the danger, Mr. Stevens
was the first to state in detail the effect which might be produced by
the manumission of the slaves upon the Congressional representation of
the Southern States.  He pointed out the fact that by counting negroes
in the basis of representation, the number of representatives from the
South would be eighty-three; excluding negroes from the basis of
representation, they would be reduced to forty-six; and so long as
negroes were deprived of suffrage he contended that they should be
excluded from the basis of representation.  "If," said he, "they
should grant the right of suffrage to persons of color, I think there
would always be white men enough in the South, aided by the blacks,
to divide representation and thus continue loyal ascendency.  If they
should refuse to thus alter their election laws it would reduce the
representation of the late slave States, and render them powerless for
evil."  Mr. Stevens's obvious theory at that time was not to touch
the question of suffrage by National interposition, but to reach it
more effectively perhaps by excluding the entire colored population
from the basis of Congressional representation, until by the action of
the Southern States themselves the elective franchise should be
conceded to the colored population.  As he proceeded in his speech, Mr.
Stevens waxed warm with all his ancient fire on the slavery question.
"We have," said he, "turned or are about to turn loose four million
slaves without a hut to shelter them or a cent in their pockets.  The
diabolical laws of slavery have prevented them from acquiring an
education, understanding the commonest laws of contract, or of managing
the ordinary business of life.  This Congress is bound to look after
them until they can take care of themselves.  If we do not hedge them
around with protecting laws, if we leave them to the legislation of
their old masters, we had better have left them in bondage.  Their
condition will be worse than that of our prisoners at Andersonville.
If we fail in this great duty now when we have the power, we shall
deserve to receive the execration of history and of all future ages."

In conclusion Mr. Stevens declared that "Two things are of vital
importance: first, to establish a principle that none of the rebel
States shall be counted in any of the Amendments to the Constitution,
until they are duly admitted into the family of States by the law-making
power of their conqueror; second, it should now be solemnly declared
what power can revive, re-create and re-instate these provinces
into the family of States and invest them with the rights of
American citizens.  It is time that Congress should assert the
sovereignty and assume something of the dignity of a Roman Senate."
He denounced with great severity the cry that "This is a white man's
Government."  "If this Republic," said he with great earnestness, "is
not now made to stand on solid principle, it has no honest foundation,
and the Father of all men will still shake it to its centre.  If we
have not yet been sufficiently scourged for our national sin to teach
us to do justice to all God's creatures, without distinction of race or
color, we must expect the still more heavy vengeance of an offended
Father, still increasing his afflictions, as he increased the severity
of the plagues of Egypt until the tyrant consented to do justice, and
when that tyrant repented of his reluctant consent and attempted to
re-enslave the people, as our Southern tyrants are attempting to do
now, he filled the Red Sea with broken chariots and drowned horses,
and strewed the shore with the corpses of men.  Sir, this doctrine of
a white man's Government is as atrocious as the infamous sentiment
that damned the late Chief Justice to everlasting fame, and I fear to
everlasting fire."

The speech of Mr. Stevens gave great offense to the Administration.  He
had not directly assailed the President by name, and had even assumed
to construe one of the paragraphs of the message as referring the
question of reconstruction anew to Congress; but this assumption was
simply for effect and was well known by Mr. Stevens to be unfounded.
The Administration did not misapprehend the drift and intention of
Mr. Stevens, and its members saw that it was the first gun fired in a
determined war to be waged against its policy and its _prestige_.  They
were especially anxious that its defense should not be undertaken by
Democrats, or at least that Democrats should not take the lead in
defending it.  Mr. Stevens spoke on the 18th of December, and Congress
had already voted to adjourn on the 21st for the Christmas recess.  The
Administration desired the Mr. Stevens's speech should not be permitted
to go unanswered to the country and thus hold public attention until
Congress should re-assemble in January.  It was important that some
response be made to it at once; and Mr. Henry J. Raymond, widely known
to the political world but now in Congress for the first time, was
selected to make the reply.

In a political career that was marked by many inconsistencies, as
consistency is measured by the party standard, with a disposition not
given to close intimacies or warm friendships, Mr. Raymond had
continuously upheld the public course of Mr. Seward, and had maintained
a singular steadiness of personal attachment to the illustrious
statesman from New York.  On the other hand, he was the rival of Horace
Greeley in the field of journalism and had become personally estranged
from the founder of the _Tribune;_ though in his early manhood he had
been one of his editorial assistants.  The fact that the _Tribune_ was
against the Administration would of itself dispose Mr. Raymond to
support it.  But aside from this consideration, the chivalric devotion
of Mr. Raymond to Mr. Seward would have great weight in determining his
position in the pending conflict.  Mr. Seward's committal to the policy
and the assault upon it by the _New-York Tribune_ would therefore
through affection on the one side and prejudice on the other, naturally
fix Mr. Raymond's position.  He had acquired wide and worthy fame as
conductor of the _New-York Times_, had achieved a high reputation as a
polemical writer, was well informed on all political issues and added
to his power with the pen the gift of ready and effective speech.

On the twenty-fist day of December, the last day before the recess, Mr.
Raymond, desiring the floor, was somewhat chagrined to find himself
preceded by Mr. Finck of Ohio, a respectable gentleman of the
Vallandingham type of Democrat,--representing a political school whose
friendship to the Administration at that time was a millstone about its
neck.  Mr. Raymond followed Mr. Finck late in the day, and could not
help showing his resentment that the ground which the Administration
intended to occupy should be so promptly pre-empted by the anti-war
party of the country.  "I have," said Mr. Raymond at the opening of his
speech, "no party feeling which would prevent me from rejoicing in the
indications apparent on the Democratic side of the House, of a purpose
to concur with the loyal Administration of the Government and with the
loyal majorities in both Houses of Congress in restoring peace and
order to our common country.  I cannot, however, help wishing, sir,
that these indications in the preservation of our Government had come
somewhat sooner.  I cannot help feeling that such expressions cannot
now be of as much use to the country as they might once have been.  If
we could have had from that side of the House such indications of an
interest in the preservation of the Union, such heartfelt sympathy with
the friends of the Government for the preservation of the Union, such
hearty denunciations for all those who were seeking its destruction,
while the war was raging, I am sure we might have been spared some
years of war, some millions of money and rivers of blood and tears."
This utterance was sharpened and made significant by the manner and by
the accent of Mr. Raymond.  No more pointed rebuke, no more keen
reproach (not intended for Mr. Finck personally, but for his party)
could have been administered.  What the Administration or especially
what Mr. Seward desired, and what Mr. Raymond was to speak for, was
Republican support; and the prior indorsement of Mr. Johnson's position
by the Democracy was a hinderance and not a help to the cause he had
espoused.

Mr. Raymond's principal aim was to join issue with Mr. Stevens on his
theory of _dead States_.  "The gentleman from Pennsylvania," said Mr.
Raymond, "believes that what we have to do is to create new States
out of this conquered territory, at the proper time, many years
distant, retaining them meanwhile in a territorial condition, and
subjecting them to precisely such a state of discipline and tutelage
as Congress and the Government of the United States may see fit to
prescribe.  If I believed in the premises he assumes, possibly though
I do not think probably, I might agree with the conclusion he has
reached; but, sir, I cannot believe that these States have ever been
out of the Union or that they are now out of the Union.  If they were,
sir, how and when did they become so?  By what specific act, at what
precise time, did any one of those States take itself out of the
American Union?  Was it by the ordinance of secession?  I think we
all agree that an ordinance of secession passed by any State of the
Union is simply a nullity because it encounters the Constitution of
the United States which is the supreme law of the land.

"Did the resolutions of those States," continued Mr. Raymond, "the
declarations of their officials, the speeches of the members of their
Legislatures, or the utterances of their press, accomplish the result
desired?  Certainly not.  All these were simply declarations of a
purpose to secede.  Their secession, if it ever took place, certainly
could not date from the time when their intention to secede was first
announced.  They proceeded to sustain their purpose of secession by
arms against the force which the United States brought to bear against
them.  Were their arms victorious?  If they were, then their secession
was an accomplished fact.  If not, it was nothing more than an abortive
attempt--a purpose unfulfilled.  They failed to maintain their ground
by force of arms.  In other words, they failed to secede."

Mr. Raymond's speech was listened to with profound attention, and
evoked the high compliment of frequent interruptions from leading men
on the Republican side of the House.  Messrs. Schenck, Bingham and
Spalding of Ohio, Mr. Jenckes of Rhode Island, and Mr. Kelley of
Pennsylvania, all put pointed questions and were at once answered with
undoubted tact and cleverness.  Mr. Raymond was helped to a specious
point by Mr. Niblack of Indiana, of which he made prompt and vigorous
use, to the effect that the theory of Mr. Stevens, if carried to its
legitimate consequences, would make those who resisted the Confederacy
in the insurrectionary states guilty of treason to that power; and that
therefore "we would be unable to talk of loyal men in the South.  Loyal
to what?  Loyal to a foreign and independent power, which the gentleman
from Pennsylvania was really maintaining the Confederacy for the
time being to represent."

Immediately after the recess the Reconstruction debate was resumed, and
an able speech made by Mr. Spalding of Ohio, reviewing the subject
generally rather than specifically replying to Mr. Raymond.
Representing one of the districts of the Western Reserve (the most
radical section of the United States), it is interesting to see what
Mr. Spalding declared would be satisfactory to the mass of his
constituents as conditions precedent to the re-admission of the rebel
States.  He laid down five requirements: _First_, "to give a qualified
right of suffrage to the freedmen in the District of Columbia;"
_second_, to "so amend the Constitution of the United States that
people of color shall not be counted with the population in making up
the ratio of representation in Congress, except in those States where
they are permitted to exercise the elective franchise;" _third_, "to
insert a provision in the Constitution prohibiting nullification and
secession;" _fourth_, "to insert a provision in the Constitution
prohibiting the repudiation of the National debt and also prohibiting
the assumption of the rebel debt;" _fifth_, to provide in the
Constitution that "no person who has at any time taken up arms against
the United States shall ever be admitted to a seat in the Senate or
House of Representatives."

On the eighth day of January, two days after the re-assembling of
Congress, Mr. Shellabarger of Ohio specifically answered the speech of
Mr. Raymond.  He spoke with care and preparation, as was his habit.
He wasted no words, but in clear, crisp sentences subjected the whole
question to the rigid test of logic.  "I shall inquire," said Mr.
Shellabarger, "whether the Constitution deals with States.  I shall
discuss the question whether an organized rebellion against a
government is an organized State in that government; whether that
which cannot become a State until all its officers have sworn
to support the Constitution, remains a State after they have all sworn
to overthrow that Constitution.  If I find it does continue to be a
State after that, then I shall strive to ascertain whether it will so
continue to be a Government--a State--after, by means of universal
treason, it has ceased to have any constitution, laws, legislatures,
courts, or citizens in it."

"If, in debating this question," continued Mr. Shellabarger, "I debate
axioms, my apology is that there are not other questions to debate in
Reconstruction.  If," said he with well-timed sarcasm, "in the
discussion, I make self-evident things obscure or incomprehensible, my
defense shall be that I am conforming to the usages of Congress.  I
will not inquire whether any subject of this Government, by reason of
the revolt, passed from under its sovereignty or ceased to owe it
allegiance; nor shall I inquire whether any territory passed from under
that jurisdiction, because I know of no one who thinks that any of
these things did occur.  I shall not consider, whether, by the
Rebellion, any State lost its territorial character or its defined
boundaries or subdivisions, for I know of no one who would obliterate
these geographical qualities of the States.  These questions, however
much discussed, are in no practical sense before Congress."

"What is before Congress?" asked Mr. Shellabarger.  "I at once define
and affirm it in a single sentence.  It is, under our Constitution,
possible to, and the late Rebellion did in fact, so overthrow and
usurp, in the insurrectionary States, the loyal State Governments, as
that during such usurpation such States and their people ceased to
have any of the rights or powers of Government as States of the Union,
and this loss of the rights and powers of Government was such that the
United States may, and ought to, assume and exercise local powers of
the lost State Governments, and may control the re-admission of such
States to their powers of Government in this Union, subject to, and
in accordance with, the obligation to guarantee to each State a
republican form of Government."

Upon the broad proposition thus laid down by Mr. Shellabarger, he
proceeded to submit an argument which, for closeness, compactness,
consistency and strength had rarely, if ever, been surpassed in the
Congress of the United States.  Other speeches have gained greater
celebrity, but it may well be doubted whether any speech in the House
of Representatives ever made a more enduring impression, or exerted
greater convincing power, upon the minds of those to whom it was
addressed.  It was a far more valuable exposition of the Reconstruction
question than that given by Mr. Stevens.  It was absolutely without
acrimony, it contained no harsh word, it made no personal reflection;
but the whole duty of the United States, and the whole power of the
United States to do its duty, were set forth with absolute precision of
logic.  The Reconstruction debate continued for a long time and many
able speeches were contributed to it.  While much of value was added
to that which Mr. Shellabarger had stated, no position taken by him
was ever shaken.

Mr. Raymond had asked repeatedly and with great emphasis _what specific
act_ had deprived these rebellious States of their rights as States of
the Union.  Mr. Shellabarger gave an answer to that question, which, as
a caustic summary, is worthy to be quoted in full.  "I answer him,"
said the member from Ohio, "in the words of the Supreme Court, 'The
causeless waging against their own Government of a war which all the
world acknowledge to have been the greatest civil war known in the
history of the human race.'  That war was waged by these people as
States, and it went through long, dreary years.  In it they threw off
and defied the authority of your Constitution, your laws, and your
Government.  They obliterated from their State constitutions and laws
every vestige of recognition of your Government.  They discarded all
their official oaths, and took, in their places, oaths to support
your enemies' government.  They seized, in their States, all the
Nation's property.  Their senators and representatives in your Congress
insulted, bantered, defied and then left you.  They expelled from
their land or assassinated every inhabitant of known loyalty.  They
betrayed and surrendered your arms.  They passed sequestration and
other Acts in flagitious violation of the law of nations, making every
citizen of the United States an alien enemy, and placing in the
treasury of their rebellion all money and property due such citizens.
They framed iniquity and universal murder into law.  For years they
besieged your Capital and sent your bleeding armies in rout back here
upon the very sanctuaries of your national power.  Their pirates
burned your unarmed commerce upon every sea.  They carved the bones
of your unburied heroes into ornaments and drank from goblets made
out of their skulls.  They poisoned your fountains, put mines under
your soldiers' prisons, organized bands whose leaders were concealed
in your homes, and whose commissions ordered the torch to be carried
to your cities, and the yellow-fever to your wives and children.
They planned one universal bonfire of the North, from Lake Ontario
to the Missouri.  They murdered, by systems of starvation and
exposure, sixty thousand of your sons as brave and heroic as ever
martyrs were.  They destroyed, in the four years of horrid war,
another army so large that it would reach almost around the globe
in marching-column.  And then to give to the infernal drama a fitting
close, and to concentrate into one crime all that is criminal in
crime and all that is detestable in barbarism, they murdered the
President of the United States."

"I allude to these horrid events," continued Mr. Shellabarger, "not
to revive frightful memories, or to bring back the impulses towards
the perpetual severance of this people which they provoke.  I allude
to them to remind us how utter was the overthrow and the obliteration
of all government, divine and human, how total was the wreck of all
constitutions and laws, political, civil and international.  I allude
to them to condense their monstrous enormities of guilt into one
crime, and to point the gentleman from New York to it and tell him
that that was the _specific act_."

Mr. Voorhees of Indiana followed on the day succeeding Mr.
Shellabarger's speech, in support of a series of resolutions which he
had offered on the same day that Mr. Raymond addressed the House, and
further embarrassing Mr. Raymond by the proffer of Democratic support,
and proportionately discouraging the Republicans from coming forward
in aid of the Administration.  The resolutions of Mr. Voorhees declared
in effect that "the President's message is regarded by the House as an
able, judicious and patriotic State paper;" that "the principles
therein advocated are the safest and most practicable that can be
applied to our disordered domestic affairs;" that "no State or number
of States confederated together can in any manner sunder their
connection with the Federal Union;" and that "the President is entitled
to the thanks of Congress and the country for his faithful, wise and
successful efforts to restore civil government, law and order to the
States lately in rebellion."  Mr. Voorhees made an exhaustive speech in
support of these resolutions, indicating very plainly the purpose of
the Democratic party to combine in support of the President.  He was
answered promptly and eloquently, though not without some display of
temper, by Mr. Bingham of Ohio, who at the close of his speech moved
a substitute for the series of propositions made by Mr. Voorhees--simply
declaring that "this House has an abiding confidence in the President,
and that in the future as in the past, he will co-operate with Congress
in restoring to equal position and rights with the other States in the
Union, the States lately in insurrection."

Up to this period there had been no outbreak of the Republican party
against the President.  There had been coolness and general distrust,
with resentment and anger on the part of many, but the hope of his
co-operation with the party had not yet been entirely abandoned.  Mr.
Bingham's resolution represented this hope, if not expectation, but
the Republican members of the House were not willing to make so
emphatic a declaration of their confidence as that resolution would
imply; and when Mr. Bingham demanded the previous question he was
interrupted by Mr. Stevens, who suggested that the whole subject be
referred to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction.  Mr. Bingham changed
his motion accordingly; and the roll being called, the series of
resolutions offered by Mr. Voorhees, with the substitute of Mr.
Bingham, were sent to the Committee on Reconstruction by 107 _ayes_
against 32 _noes_.  Mr. Raymond and his colleague, Mr. William A.
Darling, were the only Republicans who voted with the Democrats.  The
act was simple in a parliamentary sense, but its significance was
unmistakable.  A House, four-fifths of whose members were Republicans,
had refused to pass a resolution expressing confidence in the President
who, fourteen months before, had received the vote of every Republican
in the Nation.  From that day, January 9th, 1866, the relation of the
dominant party in Congress to the President was changed.  It may not be
said that all hope of reconciliation was abandoned, but friendly
co-operation to any common end became extremely difficult.

Mr. Raymond was bitterly disappointed.  Few members had ever entered
the House with greater personal _prestige_ or with stronger assurance
of success.  He had come with a high ambition--an ambition justified
by his talent and training.  He had come with the expectation of a
Congressional career as successful as that already achieved in his
editorial life.  But he met a defeat which hardly fell short of a
disaster.  He had made a good reply to Mr. Stevens, had indeed gained
much credit by it, and when he returned home for the holidays he had
reason to believe that he had made a brilliant beginning in the
parliamentary field.  But the speech of Mr. Shellabarger had destroyed
his argument, and had given a rallying-point for the Republicans, so
incontestably strong as to hold the entire party in allegiance to
principle rather than in allegiance to the Administration.  If any
thing had been needed to complete Mr. Raymond's discomfiture after the
speech of Mr. Shellabarger, it was supplied in the speech of Mr.
Voorhees.  He had been ranked among the most virulent opponents of
Mr. Lincoln's Administration, had been bitterly denunciatory of the war
policy of the Government, and was regarded as a leader of that section
of the Democratic party to which the most odious epithets of disloyalty
had been popularly applied.  Mr. Raymond, in speaking of the defeat,
always said that he could have effected a serious division in the ranks
of Republican members if he could have had the benefit of the hostility
of Mr. Voorhees and other anti-war Democrats.

Three weeks after Mr. Shellabarger's reply Mr. Raymond made a
rejoinder.  He struggled hard to recover the ground which he had
obviously lost, but he did not succeed in changing his _status_ in the
House, or in securing recruits for the Administration from the ranks
of his fellow Republicans.  To fail in that was to fail in every thing.
That he made a clever speech was not denied, for every intellectual
effort of Mr. Raymond exhibited cleverness.  That he made the most of
a weak cause, and to some extent influenced public opinion, must also
be freely conceded.  But his most partial friends were compelled to
admit that he had absolutely failed to influence Republican action in
Congress, and had only succeeded in making himself an apparent ally
of the Democratic party--a position in every way unwelcome and
distasteful to Mr. Raymond.  His closing speech was marked by many
pointed interruptions from Mr. Shellabarger and was answered at some
length by Mr. Stevens.  But nothing, beyond a few keen thrusts and
parries and some sharp wit at Mr. Raymond's expense, was added to the
debate.

Mr. Raymond never rallied from the defeat of January 9th.  His talents
were acknowledged; his courteous manners, his wide intelligence, his
generous hospitality, gave him a large popularity; but his alliance
with President Johnson was fatal to his political fortunes.  He had
placed himself in a position from which he could not with grace
retreat, and to go forward in which was still further to blight his
hopes of promotion in his party.  It was an extremely mortifying fact
to Mr. Raymond that with the power of the Administration behind him
he could on a test question secure the support of only one Republican
member, and he a colleague who was bound to him by ties of personal
friendship.

The fate which befell Mr. Raymond, apart from the essential weakness
of the issue on which he staked his success, is not uncommon to men
who enter Congress with great reputation already attained.  So much is
expected of them that their efforts on the floor are almost sure to
fall below the standard set up for them by their hearers.  By natural
re-action the receive, in consequence, less credit than is their due.
Except in a few marked instances the House has always been led by men
whose reputation has been acquired in its service.  Entering
unheralded, free from the requirements which expectation imposes, a
clever man is sure to receive more credit than is really his due when
his is so fortunate as to arrest the attention of members in his first
speech.  Thenceforward, if he be discreet enough to move slowly and
modestly, he acquires a secure standing and may reach the highest
honors with the House can confer.

If, ambitious of a career, Mr. Raymond had been elected to Congress
when he was chosen to the New-York Legislature at twenty-nine years of
age, or five years later when he was made Lieutenant-governor of his
State, he might have attained a great parliamentary fame.  It has long
been a tradition of the House that no man becomes its leader who does
not enter it before he is forty.  Like most sweeping affirmations this
has its exceptions, but the list of young men who have been advanced
to prominent positions in the body is so large that it may well be
assumed as the rule of promotion.  Mr. Raymond was nearly forty-six
when he made his first speech in the House.  While he still exhibited
the intellectual acuteness and alertness which had always been his
characteristics, there was apparent in his face the mental weariness
which had come from the prolonged and exacting labor of his profession.
His parliamentary failure was a keen disappointment to him, and was not
improbably one among many causes which cut short a brilliant and useful
life.  He died in 1869, in the forty-ninth year of his age.

This first debate on reconstruction developed the fact that the
Democrats in Congress would endeavor to regain the ground they had lost
by their hostility to Mr. Lincoln's Administration during the war.  The
extreme members of that party, while the war was flagrant, adhered to
many dogmas which were considered unpatriotic and in none more so than
the declaration that even in the case of secession "there is no power
in the Constitution to coerce a State."  They now united in the
declaration, as embodied in the resolution of Mr. Voorhees, that "no
State or number of States confederated together can in any manner
sunder their connection with the Federal Union."  This was intended as
a direct and defiant answer to the heretical creed of Mr. Stevens, that
the States by their attempted secession were really no longer members
of the Union and could not become so until regularly re-admitted by
Congress.  By antagonizing this declaration the Democrats strove to
convince the country that it was the accepted doctrine of their
political opponents, and that they were themselves the true and tried
friends of the Union.

The great majority of the Republican leaders, however, did not at all
agree with the theory of Mr. Stevens and the mass of the party were
steadily against him.  The one signal proof of their dissent from the
extreme doctrine was their absolute unwillingness to attempt an
amendment to the Constitution by the ratification of three-fourths of
the Loyal States only, and their insisting that it must be three-fourths
of all the States, North and South.  Mr. Stevens deemed this a fatal
step for the party, and his extreme opinion had the indorsement
of Mr. Sumner; but against both these radical leaders the party was
governed by its own conservative instincts.  They believed with Mr.
Lincoln that the Stevens plan of amendment would always be questioned,
and that in so grave a matter as a change to the organic law of the
Nation, the process should be unquestionable--one that could stand
every test and resist every assault.

The Republicans, as might well have been expected, did not stand on the
defensive in such a controversy with their opponents.  They became
confidently aggressive.  They alleged that when the Union was in danger
from secession the Northern Democrats did all in their power to
inflame the trouble, urged the Southern leaders to persevere and not
yield to the Abolitionists, and even when war was imminent did nothing
to allay the danger, but every thing to encourage its authors.  Now
that war was over, the Democrats insisted on the offending States being
instantly re-invested with all the rights of loyalty, without promise
and without condition.  At the beginning of the war and after its
close, therefore, they had been hand in hand with the offending rebels,
practically working at both periods to bring about the result desired
by the South.  Their policy, in short, seemed to have the interests of
the guilty authors of the Rebellion more at heart than the safety of
the Union.  Their efforts now to clothe the Southern conspirators with
fresh power and to take no note of the crimes which had for four years
drenched the land in blood, constituted an offense only less grave in
the eyes of the Republicans than the aid and comfort given to the
Rebellion in the hour of its inception.

These were the accusations and criminations which were exchanged
between the political parties.  They lent acrimony to the impending
canvass and increased the mutual hostility of those engaged in the
exciting controversy.  The Republicans were resolved that their action
should neither be misinterpreted by opposing partisans nor
misunderstood by the people.  They were confident that when their
position should be correctly apprehended it would still more strongly
confirm their claim to be the special and jealous guardians of the
Union of the States--of a Union so strongly based that future rebellion
would be rendered impossible, the safety and glory of the Republic made
perpetual.

[(1)NOTE.--The members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction were as
follows:--

_On the part of the Senate_.--William P. Fessenden of Maine, James W.
Grimes of Iowa, Ira Harris of New York, Jacob M. Howard of Michigan,
George H. Williams of Oregon, and _Reverdy Johnson_ of Maryland.

_On the part of the House_.--Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, Elihu
B. Washburne of Illinois, Justin S. Morrill of Vermont, John A. Bingham
of Ohio, Roscoe Conkling of New York, George S. Boutwell of
Massachusetts, Henry T. Blow of Missouri, _A. J. Rogers_ of New Jersey,
and _Henry Grider_ of Kentucky.]


CHAPTER VII.

The debate on the direct question of Reconstruction did not begin at
so early a date in the Senate as in the House, but kindred topics led
to the same line of discussion as that in which the House found itself
engaged.  During the first week of the session Mr. Wilson of
Massachusetts had submitted a bill for the protection of freedman,
designed to overthrow and destroy the odious enactments which in many
of the Southern States were rapidly reducing the entire negro race to
a new form of slavery.  Mr. Wilson's bill provided that "all laws,
statutes, acts, ordinances, rules and regulations in any of the States
lately in rebellion, which, by inequality of civil rights and
immunities among the inhabitants of said States is established or
maintained by reason of differences of color, race or descent, are
hereby declared null and void."  For the violation of this statute a
punishment was provided by fine of not less than five hundred dollars
nor more than ten thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not less than
six months nor more than five years.

In debating his bill Mr. Wilson declared that he had "no desire to say
harsh things of the South nor of the men who have been engaged in the
Rebellion.  I do not ask their property or their blood; I do not wish
to disgrace or degrade them; but I do wish that they shall not be
permitted to disgrace, degrade or oppress anybody else.  I offer
this bill as a measure of humanity, as a measure that the needs of
that section of the country imperatively demand at our hands.  I
believe that if it should pass it will receive the sanction of
nineteen-twentieths of the loyal people of the country.  Men may differ
about the power or the expediency of giving the right of suffrage to the
negro; but how any humane, just and Christian man can for a moment
permit the laws that are on the statute-books of the Southern States
and the laws now pending before their Legislatures, to be executed
upon men whom we have declared to be free, I cannot comprehend."

Mr. Reverdy Johnson replied to Mr. Wilson in a tone of apology for the
laws complained of, but took occasion to give his views of the status
of the States lately in rebellion.  "I have now," said Mr. Johnson,
"and I have had from the first, a very decided opinion that they are
States in the Union and that they never could have been placed out of
the Union without the consent of their sister States.  The insurrection
terminated, the authority of the Government was thereby re-instituted;
_eo instanti_ they were invested with all the rights belonging to them
originally--I mean as States. . . In my judgment our sole authority for
the acts which we have done during the last four years was the
authority communicated to Congress by the Constitution to suppress
insurrection.  If the power can only be referred to that clause, in my
opinion, speaking I repeat with great deference to the judgment of
others, the moment the insurrection was terminated there was no power
whatever left in the Congress of the United States over those States;
and I am glad to see, if I understand his Message, that in the view I
have just expressed I have the concurrence of the President of the
United States."

Mr. Sumner sustained Mr. Wilson's bill in an elaborate argument
delivered on the 20th of December.  There was an obvious desire in
both branches of Congress and in both parties--those opposed to the
President's policy and those favoring it--to appeal to the popular
judgment as promptly as possible, and this led to a prolonged and
earnest debate prior to the holidays, an occurrence unusual and almost
unprecedented.  Mr. Sumner declared that Mr. Wilson's bill was simply
to maintain and carry out the Proclamation of Emancipation.  The pledge
there given was that the Executive Government of the United States,
including the military and naval authority thereof, would recognize
and maintain the freedom of such persons.  "This pledge," said Mr.
Sumner, "is without limitation in space or time.  It is as extended
and as immortal as the Republic itself, to that pledge we are solemnly
bound; wherever our flag floats, as long as time endures, we must see
that it is sacredly observed.  The performance of that pledge cannot
be intrusted to another, least of all to the old slave-masters,
embittered against their slaves.  It must be performed by the National
Government.  The power that gives freedom must see that freedom is
maintained."

"Three of England's greatest orators and statesmen," continued Mr.
Sumner, "Burke, Canning and Brougham, at successive periods unite in
declaring, from the experience of the British West Indies, that
whatever the slave-masters undertook to do for their slaves was always
arrant trifling; that whatever might be its plausible form it always
wanted the executive principle.  More recently the Emperor of Russia,
in ordering the emancipation of the serfs, declared that all previous
efforts had failed because they had been left to the spontaneous
initiative of the proprietors." . . . "I assume that we shall not leave
to the old slave-proprietors the maintenance of that freedom to which
we are pledged, and thus break our own promise and sacrifice a race."
In concluding his speech Mr. Sumner referred to the enormity of the
wrongs against the freedmen as something that made the blood curdle.
"In the name of God," said he, "let us protect them; insist upon
guarantees; pass the bill under consideration; pass any bill, but do
not let this crying injustice rage any longer.  An avenging God cannot
sleep while such things find countenance.  If you are not ready to be
the Moses of an oppressed people, do not become their Pharaoh."

Mr. Willard Saulsbury of Delaware made a brief reply to Mr. Sumner, not
so much to argue the points put forward by the senator from
Massachusetts, not so much to deny the facts related by him or to
discuss the principles which he had presented, as to announce that
"it can be no longer disguised that there is in the party which elected
the President an opposition party to him.  Nothing can be more
antagonistic than the suggestions contained in his Message and the
speeches already made in both Houses of Congress."  He adjured the
President to be true and faithful to the principles he had
foreshadowed, and pledged him "the support of two million men in the
States which have not been in revolt, and who did not support him for
his high office."

Mr. Cowan of Pennsylvania, one of the Republican senators who had
indicated a purpose to sustain the President, was evidently somewhat
stunned by Mr. Sumner's speech.  He treated the outrages of which Mr.
Sumner complained as exceptional instances of bad conduct on the part
of the Southern people.  "One man out of ten thousand," said Mr. Cowan,
"is brutal to a negro, and that is paraded here as a type of the whole
people of the South; whereas nothing is said of the other nine thousand
nine hundred and ninety-nine men who treat the negro well."  Mr.
Cowan's argument was altogether inapposite; for what Mr. Sumner and Mr.
Wilson had complained of was not the action of individual men in the
South, but of laws solemnly enacted by Legislatures whose right to act
had been recognized by the Executive Department of the National
Government, and which had indeed been organized in pursuance of the
President's Reconstruction policy,--almost in fact by the personal
patronage of the President.  The situation was one very difficult to
justify by a man with the record of Mr. Cowan.  He had been not merely
a Republican before his entrance into the Senate but a radical
Republican, taking ground in the campaign of 1860 only less advanced
than that maintained by Mr. Thaddeus Stevens himself.

These debates in both Senate and House, at so early a period of the
session, give a full and fair indication of the temper which prevailed
in the country and in Congress.  The majority of the members had not,
at the opening of the session, given up hope of some form of co-operation
with the President.  As partisans and party leaders they looked
forward with something of dismay to the rending of all relations
with the Executive, and to the surrender of the political advantage
which comes to the party and to the partisan from a close alliance
between the Executive and Legislative Departments.  On the re-assembling
of Congress after the holidays a great change was seen and realized
by all.  It was feared by many, even of the most conservative,
that the policy of Congress and the policy of the President might come
into irreconcilable conflict, and that the party which had successfully
conducted the Government through the embarrassments, the trials and
the perils of a long civil war, might now be wrecked by an angry
controversy between two departments of the Government, each owing its
existence to the same great constituency,--the loyal people of the North.

Circumstances suggested the impossibility of a successful contest
against the President and the Democratic party united.  Even those
elections which result, in the exuberant language of the press, in
an overwhelming victory on the one side and an overwhelming defeat,
on the other, are often found, upon analysis, to be based on very
narrow margins in the popular result, the reversal of which requires
only the change of a few thousand votes.  This was demonstrated in
many of the great States, even in the second election of Mr. Lincoln,
when to the general apprehension he was almost unanimously sustained.
From this fact it was well argued by Republicans in Congress that
great danger to the party was involved in the impending dissension.
Even the most sanguine feared defeat, and the naturally despondent
already counted it as certain.  Never before had so stringent a test
of principle been applied to the members of both Houses.  The situation
was indeed peculiar.  The great statesman who had been honored as the
founder of the Republican party was now closely allied with the
Administration.  His colleague who had sat next him in the Cabinet of
Mr. Lincoln, and who, in the judgment of his partial friends, was the
peer of Mr. Seward both in ability and in merit, did not hesitate to
show from the exalted seat of the Chief Justice his strong sympathy
with the President.

The leading commercial men, who had become weary of war, contemplated
with positive dread the re-opening of a controversy which might prove
as disturbing to the business of the country as the struggle of arms
had been, and without the quickening impulses to trade which active
war always imparts.  The bankers of the great cities, whose capital
and whose deposits all rested upon the credit of the country and were
invested in its paper, believed that the speedy settlement of all
dissension and the harmonious co-operation of all departments of the
Government were needed to maintain the financial honor of the nation
and to re-instate confidence among the people.  Against obstacles so
menacing, against resistance so ominous, against an array of power so
imposing, it seemed to be an act of boundless temerity to challenge the
President to a contest, to array public opinion against him, to
denounce him, to deride him, to defy him.

It is to the eminent credit of the Republican members of Congress that
they stood in a crisis of this magnitude true to principle, firm
against all the power and all the patronage of the Administration.  No
unmanly efforts to compromise, no weak shirking from duty, sullied the
fame of the great body of senators and representatives.  Even the Whig
party in 1841, with Mr. Clay for a leader, did not stand so solidly
against John Tyler as the Republican party, under the lead of Fessenden
and Sumner in the Senate and of Thaddeus Stevens in the House, now
stood against the Administration of President Johnson.  The Whigs of
the country, in the former crisis, lost many of their leading and most
brilliant men,--a sufficient number indeed to compass the defeat of Mr.
Clay three years later.  The loss to the Republican party now was so
small as to be unfelt and almost invisible in the political contests
into which the party was soon precipitated.  The Whigs of 1841 were
contending only for systems of finance, and they broke finally with the
President because of his veto of a bill establishing a fiscal agency
for the use of the Government,--merely a National Bank disguised under
another name.  The Republicans of 1866 were contending for a vastly
greater stake,--for the sacredness of human rights, for the secure
foundation of free government.  Their constancy was greater than that
of the Whigs because the rights of person transcend the rights of property.

On the 12th of December Mr. Cowan had submitted a resolution requesting
the President to furnish to the Senate information of "the condition of
that portion of the United States lately in rebellion; whether the
rebellion has been suppressed and the United States again put in
possession of the States in which it existed; whether the United-States
post-offices are re-established and the revenues collected therefrom;
and also, whether the people of those States have re-organized their
State governments; and whether they are yielding obedience to the laws
and Government of the United States."  Mr. Sumner moved an amendment,
directing the President to furnish to the Senate at the same time
"copies of such reports as he may have received from the officers or
agents appointed to visit this portion of the Union, including
especially any reports from the Honorable John Covode and Major-General
Carl Schurz."  The President's message, sent to the Senate a week
later, in response to this resolution, was brief, being simply a
statement of what had been accomplished by his Reconstruction policy,
with an expression of his belief that "sectional animosity is surely
and rapidly merging itself into a spirit of nationality; that
representation, connected with a properly adjusted system of taxation,
will result in a harmonious restoration of the relations of the States
to the National Union."  He transmitted the report of Mr. Schurz
and also invited the attention of the Senate to a report of
Lieutenant-General Grant, who had recently made a tour of the
inspection through several of the States lately in rebellion.

The President evidently desired that General Grant's opinions
concerning the South should be spread before the public.  From the high
character of the General-in-Chief and his known relations with the
prominent Republicans in Congress, the Administration hoped that great
influence would be exerted by the communication of his views.  His
report was short and very positive.  He declared his belief that "the
mass of thinking men of the South accept the present situation of
affairs in good faith."  At the same time he thought that "four years
of war have left the people possibly in a condition not ready to yield
that obedience to civil authority which the American people have been
in the habit of yielding, thus rendering the presence of small
garrisons throughout these States necessary until such time as labor
returns to its proper channels and civil authority is fully established."

It was General Grant's opinion however that acquiescence in the
authority of the General Government was so universal throughout the
portions of the country he visited, that "the mere presence of a
military force, without regard to numbers, is sufficient to maintain
order."  He urged that only white troops be employed in the South.
The presence of black troops, he said, "demoralizes labor" and
"furnishes in their camps a resort for freedmen."  He thought there was
danger of collision from the presence of black troops.  His
observations led him to the conclusion that "the citizens of the
Southern States are anxious to return to self-government within the
Union as soon as possible;" that "during the process of reconstruction
they want and require protection from the Government;" that "they are
in earnest, and wishing to do what they think is required by the
Government, not humiliating to them as citizens;" and that "if such a
course were pointed out they would pursue it in good faith."  "The
questions," continued General Grant, "heretofore dividing the people
of the two sections--slavery and the right of secession--the Southern
men regard as having been settled forever by the tribunal of arms.  I
was pleased to learn from the leading men whom I met that they not
only accepted the decision as final, but now that the smoke of battle
has cleared away and time has been given for reflection, that this
decision has been a fortunate one for the whole country."  He suggested
that the Freedmen's Bureau be put under command of military officers in
the respective departments, thus saving the expense of a separate
organization.  This would create a responsibility that would secure
uniformity of action throughout the South.  His general
characterization of the Bureau was, that it tended to impress the
freedman with the idea that he would not be compelled to work, and that
in some way the lands of his former master were to be divided among
the colored persons.

The supporters of the Administration considered General Grant's report
a strong justification of their position towards the South, and they
used it with some effect throughout the country.  The popularity of
the Lieutenant-General was boundless, and of course there was strong
temptation to make the most of whatever might be said by him.  Mr.
Sumner immediately demanded the reading of the report of Mr. Schurz.
He likened the message of the President to the "whitewashing" message
of President Pierce with regard to the enormities in Kansas.  "That,"
said he, "is its parallel."  Mr. Doolittle criticized the use of the
word "whitewashing," and asked Mr. Sumner to qualify it, but the
Massachusetts senator declared that he had "nothing to modify, nothing
to qualify, nothing to retract.  In former days there was one Kansas
that suffered under a local power.  There are now eleven Kansases
suffering as one: therefore, as eleven is more than one so is the
enormity of the present time more than the enormity of the days of
President Pierce."  Later in the debate, Mr. Sumner indirectly
qualified his harsh words, saying that he had no reflection to make on
the patriotism or the truth of the President of the United States.
"Never in public or in private," said he, "have I made such reflection
and I do not begin now.  When I spoke I spoke of the document that had
been read at the desk.  I characterized it as I though I ought to
characterize it."  The distinction he sought to make was not clearly
apparent, the only importance attaching to it being that Mr. Sumner had
not yet concluded that a bitter political war was to be made upon the
President of the United States.

The character of Mr. Schurz's report at once disclosed the reason of
Mr. Sumner's anxiety to have it printed with the report of General
Grant.  It was made after a somewhat prolonged investigation in the
States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and the
Department of the Gulf.  Mr. Schurz's conclusions were that the loyalty
of the masses and of most of the leaders in the South "consists of
submission to necessity."  Except in individual instances, he found
"an entire absence of that national spirit which forms the basis of
true loyalty and patriotism."  He found that "the emancipation of the
slaves is submitted to only in so far as chattel-slavery in the old
form could not be kept up; and although the freeman is no longer
considered the property of the individual master he is considered the
slave of society, and all independent State legislation will share the
tendency to make him such.  The ordinances abolishing slavery, passed
by the conventions under the pressure of circumstances, will not be
looked upon as barring the establishment of a new form of servitude."
"Practical attempts," Mr. Schurz continued, "on the part of the
Southern people to deprive the negro of his rights as a freedman may
result in bloody collision, and will certainly plunge Southern society
into resistless fluctuations and anarchical confusion."

These evils, in the opinion of Mr. Schurz, "can be prevented only by
continuing the control of the National Government in the States lately
in rebellion, until free labor is fully developed and firmly
established.  This desirable result will be hastened by a firm
declaration on the part of the Government that national control in the
South will not cease until such results are secured."  It was Mr.
Schurz's judgment that "it will hardly be possible to secure the
freedman against oppressive legislation and private persecution
unless he be endowed with a certain measure of political power."  He
felt sure of the fact that the "extension of the franchise to the
colored people, upon the development of free labor and upon the
security of human rights in the South, being the principal object in
view, the objections raised upon the ground of the ignorance of the
freedmen become unimportant."

Mr. Schurz made an intelligent argument in favor of negro suffrage.  He
was persuaded that the Southern people would never grant suffrage to
the negro voluntarily, and that "the only manner in which the Southern
people can be induced to grant to the freemen some measure of
self-protecting power, in the form of suffrage, is to make it a condition
precedent to re-admission."  He remarked upon the extraordinary
delusion then pervading a portion of the public mind regarding the
deportation of the freedmen.  "The South," he said, "stands in need of
an increase and not a diminution of its laboring-force, to repair the
losses and disasters of the last four years.  Much is said of importing
European laborers and Northern men.  This is the favorite idea among
planters, who want such emigrants to work on their plantations, but
they forget that European and Northern men will not come to the South
to serve as hired hands on the plantations, but to acquire property for
themselves; and even if the whole European emigration, at the rate of
two hundred thousand a year, were turned into the South, leaving not
a single man for the North and West, it would require between fifteen
and twenty years to fill the vacuum caused by the deportation of
freedmen."

Mr. Schurz desired not to be understood as saying that "there are no
well-meaning men among those who are compromised in the Rebellion.
There are many, but neither their number nor their influence is strong
enough to control the manifest tendency of the popular spirit."
Apprehending that his report might be antagonized by evidence of a
contrary spirit shown in the South by the action of their conventions,
Mr. Schurz declared that it was "dangerous to be led by such evidence
into any delusion."  "As to the motives," said Mr. Schurz, "upon which
the Southern people acted when abolishing slavery (in their
conventions) and their understanding of the bearings of such acts, we
may safely accept the standard they have set up for themselves."  The
only argument of justification was that "they found themselves in a
situation where _they could do no better_."  A prominent Mississippian
(General W. L. Brandon) said in a public card, according to Mr. Schurz,
"My honest conviction is that we must accept the situation until we
can once more get control of our own State affairs. . . . I must submit
for the time to evils I cannot remedy."  Mr. Schurz expressed his
conviction that General Brandon had "only put in print what a majority
of the people say in more emphatic language."

The report of Mr. Schurz was quoted even more triumphantly by the
opponents of the President's policy than was General Grant's by its
friends.  It was a somewhat singular train of circumstances that
produced the two reports, while the sequel, so far as the authors were
involved, was quite as remarkable as the contradictory character of
the views set forth.  In the early summer (1865) when Mr. Johnson had
yielded many of his preconceived views of reconstruction to the
persuasions of Mr. Seward, but was still adhering tenaciously to some
exactions which the Secretary of State deemed unwise if not cruel, it
had occurred to the President to procure an accurate and intelligent
report of the Southern situation by a man of capacity.  Mr. Johnson
held at that particular time a middle ground, measuring from the
original point of his extreme antagonism towards the Southern rebels
to the subsequent point of his extreme antagonism towards the Northern
Republicans.  His selection of Mr. Schurz for the special duty was
deemed significant, because at that period of a political career
consistent only in the frequency and agility of its changes Mr. Schurz
happened to take an extreme position on the Southern question--one
that was in general harmony with the views entertained and avowed by
Mr. Sumner.  Mr. Schurz, according to his own declaration, had
communicated his "views to the President in frequent letters and
conversations," and added an assurance, the truth of which all who
know Mr. Schurz will readily concede--"I would not have accepted the
mission had I not felt that whatever preconceived opinions I might
carry with me to the South I should be ready to abandon or modify, as
my perception of facts and circumstances might command their
abandonment or modification."

Mr. Schurz started on his mission in the early part of July, and was
engaged in traveling, observing and taking copious notes until the
middle of the ensuing autumn.  His report did not reach the President
until the month of November.  In the intervening months Mr. Johnson
had been essentially and rapidly changing his views,--growing more and
more favorable to the Southern leaders, less and less in harmony with
the Republican leaders.  He had gone far beyond the balancing-point of
impartiality, where he stood when he was willing to intrust the task
of Southern investigation to a man of the radical views which Mr.
Schurz then professed.  He was now altogether unwilling to submit the
report of Mr. Schurz to Congress as an _ex cathedra_ exposition.  If
not in some way counterbalanced it would necessarily be considered
authoritative, and in a certain sense accredited by the Administration.

It was the President's desire to neutralize the effect of Mr. Schurz's
representations, which led to the report of General Grant, the chief
points of which have been already quoted.  The Commander of the Army
was necessarily in close relations with the Executive Department,
and was recognized by the President as possessing an extraordinary
popularity in the Northern States.  During the months that had passed
since the war closed General Grant had been received, wherever he
had been induced to visit, with a display of enthusiasm never surpassed
in our country.  The people looked upon him simply as the illustrious
soldier who had led the armies of the Union to victory.  They
attributed to him no political views except those of undying loyalty
to his country, and they sought no party advantage from the use of
his name.  He had indeed made no partisan expressions, either during
the war or since its close, on any subject whatever, except the
necessity of maintaining the Union--and this was a partisan question
only in consequence of the evil course pursued by the Democratic party
during the closing years of the war.

On the civil and political aspects of the situation General Grant had
not deemed it necessary to mature his views.  He desired above all
things the speedy restoration of the Southern States to the Union as
the legitimate result of the victories in the field.  But so far as
action or even the exertion of any positive influence was involved, he
confined himself strictly to his duties as Commander of the United-States
Army.  President Johnson saw an opportunity for turning the
_prestige_ of General Grant to the benefit of his Administration.
Towards the close of November the general was starting South on a tour
of military inspection "to see what changes were necessary in the
disposition of the forces, and to ascertain how they could be reduced
and expenses curtailed."  The President requested him "to learn during
his tour, as far as possible, the feelings and intentions of the
citizens of the Southern States towards the National Government,"--a
request with which the general complied in a perfunctory manner,
giving merely the impressions formed in the rapid journey of a few
days.  He left Washington on the 27th of November and passed through
Virginia "without conversing or meeting with any of its citizens."  He
spent one day in North Carolina, one in South Carolina and two in
Georgia.  This was the whole extent of the observation upon which
General Grant had innocently given his views, without the remotest
suspicion that his brief report was to figure largely in the
discussions of Congress upon the important and absorbing question of
reconstruction.

The divergent conclusions which were thus made to appear between the
authors of the conflicting reports did not cease with this single
exhibition.  It was soon perceived that in the President's anxiety to
parry the effect of Mr. Schurz's report he had placed General Grant in
a false position,--a position which no one realized more promptly than
the General himself.  Further investigation led him to a thorough
understanding of the subject and to a fundamental change of opinion.
It led him to approve the reconstruction measures of the Republican
party, and in a subsequent and more exalted sphere to continue the
policy which these measures foreshadowed and implied.  Mr. Schurz, on
the other hand, received new light and conviction in the opposite
direction, and from the point of extreme Republicanism he gradually
changed his creed and became, first a distracting element in the ranks
of the party, and afterwards one of its malignant opponents in a great
national struggle in which General Grant was the leader,--the aim of
which struggle was really to maintain the views which Mr. Schurz had,
with apparent sincerity, endeavored to enforce in his report to
President Johnson.  These changes and alternations in the position of
public men are by no means unknown to political life in the United
States, but in the case under consideration the actors were
conspicuous, and for that reason their reversal of position was the
more marked.

An interesting and important case, relating to the mode of electing
United-States senators, came up for decision at this session and led to
a prolonged debate, which was accompanied with much personal feeling
and no little acrimony.--In the winter and spring of 1865 the
Legislature of New Jersey was engaged in the duty of choosing a senator
of the United States to succeed John C. Ten Eyck, whose term was about
to expire.  After many efforts at election it had been found that no
candidate was able to secure "a majority of the votes of all the
members elected to both Houses of the Legislature," which was described
in the rule adopted by the joint convention of the two Houses as the
requisite to election.  On the 15th of March the convention rescinded
this stringent rule and declared that "any candidate receiving a
plurality of votes of the members present shall be declared duly
elected."  The Legislature was composed of a Senate with twenty-one
members and an Assembly with sixty members.  The resolution giving to
a plurality the power to elect was carried in the joint convention by
a majority of one--forty-one to forty.  In this vote eleven senators
were in the affirmative and ten in the negative, and of the members of
the House thirty were in the affirmative and thirty in the negative.
It was therefore numerically demonstrated that the resolution could not
have been carried with the two Houses acting separately.  There would
have been a majority of one in the Senate and a tie in the House.

Proceeding to vote under this new rule, John P. Stockton, the
Democratic candidate, received forty votes, John C. Ten Eyck, the
Republican candidate, thirty-seven votes, and four other candidates
one vote each.  Forty-one votes were thus cast against Mr. Stockton,
but as he had secured a plurality he was duly elected according to the
rule adopted by the joint convention.--Mr. Stockton was thirty-nine
years of age at the time of his election.  His family had been for
several generations distinguished in the annals of New Jersey.  His
great-grandfather Richard Stockton was a member of the Continental
Congress and was a signer of the Declaration of Independence; his
grandfather Richard Stockton was a senator of the United States under
the administrations of Washington and John Adams; his father was the
well-known Commodore Robert F. Stockton, who was conspicuously
effective as a naval officer in the conquest of California, and
afterwards a senator of the United States.  Mr. Stockton entered the
Senate, therefore, with personal _prestige_ and a good share of
popularity with his party.

On the 20th of March, five days after the alleged election of Mr.
Stockton, seven senators and thirty-one members of the Assembly
forwarded to the Senate of the United States a protest against his
admission, for the reason that he was not elected by a majority of the
votes of the joint meeting of the Legislature.  The substantial ground
on which the argument in the protest rested, was that a Legislature
means at least a majority of what constitutes the Legislature as
convened at the moment of election.  This had been, as they set forth
at length, the undoubted law and the unbroken usage of New Jersey, and
an election falling short of this primary requirement was necessarily
invalid.  "The Constitution of the United States direct," said this
memorial, "that a senator must be chosen by the Legislature, and a
minority does not constitute the Legislature."  They illustrated the
wrongfulness of the position by the _reductio ad absurdum._  "The
consequences which are possible," argued the protestants, "from
admitting the right to elect by a plurality vote, furnish a conclusive
argument against it.  If two members vote for one person and every
other member, by himself, for different individuals, the person having
two votes would have a plurality.  Can it be that in such a case he
would be senator?  This indeed is an extreme case, but such cases test
the propriety of legal doctrine, and many equally unjust but less
extreme may easily be offered."

Mr. Stockton took his seat on the first day of the ensuing session
(December 4, 1865) and was regularly sworn in.  At the same time the
protest was presented by Mr. Cowan of Pennsylvania and referred to the
Judiciary Committee.  That committee was composed of five Republicans
and two Democrats, and was therefore politically biased, if at all,
against Mr. Stockton.  On the 30th of January, after a patient
examination of nearly two months, the committee, greatly to the
surprise of the Republican side of the chamber, reported that "Mr.
Stockton was duly elected and entitled to his seat."  The report was
said to have been approved by every member of the committee except
Mr. Clark of New Hampshire.  The validity or invalidity of the election
hinged upon the ability of the joint convention of the two branches to
declare a plurality sufficient to elect.  The committee decided that
the convention possessed that power, and the report, drawn by Mr.
Trumbull, argued the point with considerable ingenuity.

The subject came up for consideration in the Senate on the 22d of March
(1866), Mr. Clark, the dissenting member of the committee, leading off
in debate.  He was ably sustained by Mr. Fessenden, who left little to
be said, as was his habit in debating any question of constitutional
law.  He maintained that "the Legislature, in the election of a
United-States senator, is merely the agent of the Constitution of the
United States to perform a certain act.  It is therefore under the
control of no other power.  No provision of the Constitution of New
Jersey, directing the mode in which a senator shall be elected, or the
course that shall be taken, or the rules of the proceeding, would bind
in any way the Legislature which is to perform the act.  Nor would any
law of a previous Legislature have binding force.  The existing
Legislature is independent of every thing except the Constitution of the
United States; but while it is thus independent and may disregard those
provisions, being the mere agent of the Federal Constitution, still it
must necessarily act as a Legislature in the performance of that duty.
There must be a _legislative_ act. . . . Whatever is done in relation
to the election of a senator, must be done as a consequence of
legislative action, otherwise it is no election by the Legislature.
They vote to form a convention for the purpose of choosing a senator,
and when they meet in convention that choice may be made.  If there is
legislative action previously that is sufficient.  The convention can
choose a senator because there has been legislative action which
authorizes them to choose a senator in that form.  The Legislature,
when it votes to go into a convention of the two branches, may provide
the mode of election.  If it desires to change the ordinary and
received law on the subject it may provide how the election shall be
made.  It may say that a plurality shall elect if it pleases.  It may
make any provision that it pleases, but it must be done by the
Legislature.  It must be the legislative body which gives the power
that is to settle the mode of action.  Now what are the facts in this
case?  There was no provision whatever made by the Legislature of the
State of New Jersey as to the mode in which the senator should be
chosen.  The legislative action which authorized the convention was
perfectly silent upon that subject.  What then had the Legislature the
right to conclude?  Was it not this, and this only?--that when it
authorized a body other than itself, though constituted of the same
members, a convention to choose a senator, that body must proceed in
the choice of a senator according to the universally received
Parliamentary and common law upon the subject of elections.  But this
convention in New Jersey, without any legislative act, without any
such authority conferred upon it, without any thing done on the subject
by the Legislature which formed the body, undertook to say that they
would change the received and acknowledged Parliamentary and common law
in their mode of proceedings, and instead of acting according to that
law, as the Legislature must have intended that it should do, would
elect in a totally different manner from that prescribed by law,
namely, by a plurality vote, for which they had no legislative sanction
and for which there was no authority but their own will."

There was a long debate on the question, but the argument submitted
by Mr. Fessenden was never refuted by his opponents, and it was
practically repeated by every one who concurred in his general views.
Mr. Stockton made an able presentation of his own case, perhaps
better than any made for him, but he was never able to evade the point
of Mr. Fessenden's argument, or even to dull it.  The case came to a
vote on the 23d of March, the first test coming upon an amendment to
the committee's report, which declared Mr. Stockton "not entitled to
a seat."  This amendment was defeated--_yeas_ 19, _nays_ 21.  The
vote was then taken on the direct question of declaring him entitled
to his seat.  At the conclusion of the roll-call the _yeas_ were 21,
the _nays_ 20, when Mr. Morrill of Maine rose and asked to have his
name called.  He voted in the negative and produced a tie.  Thereupon
Mr. Stockton rose and asked to vote.  No objection being interposed
his vote was received.  The result was then announced 22 _yeas_ to 21
_nays_, thereby confirming Mr. Stockton in his seat.  Mr. Stockton,
disclaiming any intention to reflect upon Mr. Morrill, intimated that
he was under the obligation of a pair with Mr. William Wright (the
absent colleague of Mr. Stockton) and therefore should not have voted.
The two had undoubtedly been _paired_, but Mr. Morrill considered that
the time had expired and acted accordingly.  He was not only a
gentleman of scrupulous integrity, but in this particular case he had
taken counsel with his colleague, Mr. Fessenden, and with Mr. Sumner,
safe mentors, and was advised by both that he had a clear right to
vote.  It cannot be denied however that Mr. Morrill's action created
much ill-feeling on the Democratic side of the Senate.

Mr. Stockton's determination to vote must have been taken very hastily,
without due reflection on his own part and without the advice of his
political associates, who should have promptly counseled him against
his unfortunate course.  The Parliamentary position of the question,
at the moment he committed the blunder of voting, was advantageous to
him on the record.  The Senate had defeated by a majority of two the
declaration that he was not entitled to a seat, and the declaration
in his favor, even after Mr. Morrill's negative vote, stood at a tie.
Nothing therefore had been done to unseat him, and if he had left it
at that point he would still have remained a member by the _prima
facie_ admission upon his regular credentials.

These proceedings took place on Friday and the Senate adjourned until
Monday.  Meanwhile the obvious impropriety of Mr. Stockton's vote upon
his own case had deeply impressed many senators, and on Monday,
directly after the Journal was read, Mr. Sumner raised a question of
privilege and moved that the Journal of Friday be amended by striking
out the vote of Mr. Stockton on the question of his seat in the Senate.
He did this because, being on the defeated side, he could not move a
reconsideration; but Mr. Trumbull and Mr. Poland, who had sustained
Mr. Stockton's right to a seat, both offered to move a reconsideration,
because they believed that he had no right to vote on the question.
Mr. Poland made the motion and it was unanimously agreed to.  Then,
instead of urging the correction of the Journal of Friday, Mr. Sumner
proposed a resolution declaring that "the vote of Mr. Stockton be not
received in determining the question of his seat in the Senate," which
was agreed to without a division.  The original resolution being again
before the Senate, Mr. Clark renewed his amendment declaring that John
P. Stockton was not elected a senator from New Jersey, on which the
_yeas_ were 22 and the _nays_ 21.  As thus amended the resolution
passed by 23 _yeas_ to 20 _nays_.  Mr. Riddle of Delaware voted with
the majority for the purpose of moving a reconsideration on a
succeeding day--a privilege from which he was excluded by the action
of Mr. Clark of New Hampshire, who made the motion at once with the
object of securing its defeat and thereby exhausting all power to
renew the controversy.  Mr. Clark of course voted against his own
motion, and with its rejection Mr. Stockton ceased to be a member of
the Senate.

More than half of those who sustained Mr. Stockton's right to his seat
were Republicans, or had, until the current session of Congress, acted
with the party.  The majority of a single vote by which he was ejected
would have been neutralized if Mr. Stockton's colleague could have
been present.  Mr. Wright was ill at his home in Newark and
contradictory reports were made as to the time when he could probably
be present.  Some of the Republicans justified their urgent demand for
a final vote on the belief entertained by them that Mr. Wright would
never appear in the Senate again.  As matter of fact he resumed his
seat eight days after the decision of Mr. Stockton's case.  His vote
would have changed the result.  The haste with which the question was
brought to a decision can hardly be justified, and is a striking
illustration of the intense party-feeling which had been engendered by
the war.  In a matter so directly affecting the interests and the
feelings of the people of New Jersey it was certainly a hardship that
the voice of the State was not heard.  With one senator excluded from
voting by parliamentary law and the other absent by reason of physical
disability, Mr. Stockton had good ground for declaring that the Senate
had not treated him with magnanimity or generosity.  It is due to Mr.
Stockton to say that under very trying circumstances he bore himself
with moderation and dignity.

In the decision itself, however, there has been general acquiescence,
and it led to an important reform in the manner of choosing United-States
senators.  The well-known Act of July 26, 1866, "regulating the
time and manner of holding elections for senators in Congress," was
the direct fruit of the Stockton controversy.  Though it may not be
perfect in all its details that law has done much to insure the fair
and regular choice of senators.  It has certainly accomplished a great
deal by preventing various objectionable devices, which prior to its
enactment had marked the proceedings of every senatorial election
where the Legislature was almost equally divided between political
parties.  The reluctance to interfere with the supposed or asserted
rights of States had too long delayed the needful exercise of National
power.  The Constitution provides that "the times, places and manner of
holding elections for senators and representatives in Congress shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; _but the Congress
may, at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to
the places of choosing senators._"

There was a reluctance in the early administration of the Federal
Government to assume any function which had been given alternatively
to the States.  It thus came to pass that many methods were developed
in different States for choosing senators,--methods that widely
differed in their essential characteristics.  Hence there was variety,
and even contrariety, where there should have been only unity and
harmony.  These divergent practices had been allowed to develop for
seventy-seven years of the nation's life, when, admonished by the
Stockton case of the latitudinary results to which loose methods might
lead, Congress took jurisdiction of the whole subject.  The exercise
of this power was a natural result of the situation in which the
nation was placed by the war.  Previous to the civil conflict every
power was withheld from the National Government which could by any
possibility be exercised by the State Government.  Another theory and
another practice were now to prevail; for it had been demonstrated to
the thoughtful statesmen who then controlled the Government, that
every thing which may be done by either Nation or State may be better
and more securely done by the Nation.  The change of view was important
and led to far-reaching consequences.

Alexander G. Cattell succeeded Mr. Stockton and served in the Senate
with usefulness and high credit until March 4, 1871.  He had been all
his life engaged in commercial affairs, but had taken active part in
politics and had held many positions of trust in his native State.
In 1844, at twenty-eight years of age, he was a member of the
Constitutional Convention of New Jersey and made his mark in its
proceedings.  His upright character, his recognized ability and his
popular manners had given him a strong hold upon the people of his
State.

William Wright, the colleague of Mr. Stockton, who was unable from
illness to vote on his case, died the ensuing November (1866) at
seventy-two years of age.  He served two terms (1843-47) in the House
of Representatives from the Newark district as a Whig, and was a
zealous supporter of Mr. Clay in 1844.  He was a wealthy manufacturer,
largely engaged in trade with the South, and the agitation of the
slavery question became distasteful to him.  In 1850 he united with the
Democratic party and was sent to the Senate in 1853.

Frederick Theodore Frelinghuysen was chosen as Mr. Wright's successor.
He was in his fiftieth year when he entered the Senate, but was known
as a distinguished member of the New-Jersey bar and had served as
Attorney-General of his State.  His grandfather, Frederick
Frelinghuysen, was a senator during the first term of Jackson and ran
for Vice-President on the ticket with Mr. Clay in 1844.  The family
came with the early emigration from Holland and soon acquired a hold
upon the confidence of the people of New Jersey which has been long
and steadily maintained.--Mr. Frelinghuysen soon attained prominence
in the Senate, and grew in strength and usefulness throughout his
service in that body.


CHAPTER VIII.

With the disposition manifested in both Houses of Congress it was
feared that the conflict between the Legislative and Executive
Departments of the Government would assume a virulent and vindictive
spirit.  It was known that President Johnson was deeply offended by the
indirect refusal of the House to pass any resolution in the remotest
degree approving his course.  He had doubtless been led to believe that
the influence of such eminent Republicans as Mr. Seward in his Cabinet,
Mr. Cowan and Mr. Doolittle in the Senate and Mr. Raymond in the House,
would bring about so considerable a division in the Republican ranks
as to give the Administration, by uniting with the Democratic party,
the control of Congress, or at least of one branch.  The test vote of
January 9th was an unwelcome demonstration of the degree to which the
President had almost wilfully deceived himself and had been innocently
deceived by others.  He foresaw the struggle and with his combative
nature prepared for it.

On the last day of the preceding Congress, March 3, 1865, an Act had
been passed to establish a bureau for the relief of freedmen and
refugees.  It was among the very last Acts approved by Mr. Lincoln,
and was primarily designed as a protection to the freedmen of the
South and to the class of white men known as "refugees,"--driven from
their homes by the rebels on account of their loyalty to the Union.
Protection was needed by both classes during the disorganization
necessarily incident to so great and sudden a change in their condition
and in their relations to society.  The total destruction of the
long-established labor system of the South--based as it had been on
chattel-slavery--led inevitably to great confusion, indeed almost to
social anarchy.  The result was that many of the freedmen, removed from
the protection of their old masters, were exposed to destitution and to
many forms of suffering.  But for the interposition of the National
Government there was serious danger that thousands of them might be
reduced to starvation.  Having taken the responsibility of freeing
them, first by Proclamation of the President and then by Amendment of
the Constitution, it would have been a lasting reproach to the
Government not to extend protection and assistance to such of them as
were thrown into dire extremity of want.  They could not be left to
the chance relief of the alms-giver, for their number was too large.
The white population of the South were themselves reduced almost to
poverty by the long struggle; and even if they had been able they were
in no mood to extend relief to negroes who, as they believed, had been
wrongfully released from slavery.

The Act provided that the Bureau should have supervision and management
of all abandoned lands and control of all subjects relating to freedmen
and refugees from the Rebel States, under such regulations as might be
prescribed by the Commissioner at the head of the Bureau and by the
President.  The Secretary of War was authorized "to direct such issues
of provisions, clothing and fuel as he may deem needful for the
immediate and temporary shelter and supply of destitute and suffering
refugees and freedmen and their wives and children, under such rules
and regulations as he may approve."  The Commissioner was authorized
to lease, for a term of three years, to every male citizen, whether
refugee or freedman, not more than forty acres of the lands which had
been abandoned by their owners or confiscated to the United States,
at a rental of six per cent on the last appraised value.  At the end
of three years the occupant was entitled to purchase and receive the
land, with such title as the United States could convey, at a price
proportioned to the rental value.  Very little permanent advantage came
to the negro from this provision; for the abandoned lands were legally
reclaimed by their owners and the confiscations, few in number, would,
by the Constitution, be only for the life of the owner.  Temporary
relief however was afforded; but much harm was done by creating in the
minds of ignorant freedmen, just redeemed from slavery, the belief that
the Government would give to each of them "forty acres of land and a
mule."

The Commissioner selected was Major-General Oliver O. Howard, who had
gone through the war with marked honor.  He was a lieutenant of
ordnance when Sumter was fired upon and a brigadier-general in the
regular army three years later.  He had discharged his military duties
with steadiness, intelligence, earnestness and courage.  He was a man
of pure character, of deep religious faith, and was somewhat an
exception to West-Point graduates in being from the outset thoroughly
anti-slavery in his intellectual and moral convictions.  It was the
possession of these characteristics which led Secretary Stanton to
select General Howard for the important trust.  For his ease and his
peace of mind he should have declined the place, as he might well
have done, since it was not a military duty to accept.  During his
administration of the office he was subjected to unreasonable
fault-finding, often to censure and obloquy; but throughout the whole
he bore himself with the honor of a soldier and the purity of a
Christian,--triumphantly sustaining himself throughout a Congressional
investigation set on foot by political malice, and confronting with
equal credit a military inquiry which had its origin in the jealousy
that is often the bane of army service.

On the first attempt to enforce the provisions of the original Act, its
advocates and sympathizers found that it did not go far enough, nor
give power enough to its agents to effect the desired object.  On the
12th of January, therefore, Mr. Trumbull introduced from the Judiciary
Committee a supplementary Act to enlarge the powers of the Freedmen's
Bureau.  By the new bill the President was authorized to "divide the
section of country containing the refugees into districts, not
exceeding twelve in number, each containing one or more States, and
with the advice and consent of the Senate to appoint an Assistant
Commissioner for each district."  The Bureau, at the discretion of the
President, might be placed under a Commissioner and Assistant
Commissioners to be detailed from the Army.  Sub-districts, not to
exceed the number of counties or parishes in each State, were provided
for; and to each sub-district an agent, either a citizen or officer of
the Army, might be detailed for service.  Each Assistant Commissioner
might employ not more than six clerks.  The President of the United
States, through the War Department and through the Commissioner, was
authorized to extend military jurisdiction and protection over all
employees, agents and officers of the Bureau; and the Secretary of War
was authorized to issue such provisions, clothing, fuel and other
supplies, including medical stores, and to afford such aid, as he might
deem needful for the immediate and temporary shelter and supply of
destitute refugees and freedmen, their wives and children, under such
rules and regulations as he might direct.  The President was also
authorized to reserve from sale or settlement under the Homestead and
Pre-emption Laws, public lands in Florida, Mississippi and Arkansas,
not to exceed three millions of acres of good land in all, for the use
of the freedmen, at a certain rental to be named in such manner as the
Commissioner should be regulation prescribe; or the Commissioner could
purchase or rent such tracts of land in the several districts as might
be necessary to provide for the indigent refugees and freedmen
depending upon the Government for support.

It was further provided that wherever in consequence of any State or
local law any of the civil rights or immunities belonging to white
persons, such as the right to enforce contracts, to sue, to give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold or convey real and
personal property, were refused or denied to freedmen on account of
race or color or any previous condition of slavery or involuntary
servitude, or whenever they were subjected to punishment for crime
different from that provided for white persons, it was made the duty of
the President, through the Commissioner, to extend military
jurisdiction and protection over all cases affecting persons against
whom such unjust discriminations were made.  It was made the duty of
the officers and agents of the Bureau to take jurisdiction of and to
hear and determine all cases, in which by local law discrimination was
made against the freedmen.  This was to be done under such rules and
regulations as the President, through the Commissioner, might
prescribe.  But the jurisdiction was to cease "whenever the
discrimination on account of which it is conferred shall cease," and
was in no event to be exercised in any State "in which the ordinary
course of judicial proceeding has not been interrupted by the
Rebellion, nor in those States after they shall have been fully
restored to their constitutional relations to the United States, and
when the courts of the State and of the United States, within their
limits, are not disturbed or stopped in the peaceable course of justice."

In the time of peace, these provisions seemed extraordinary, but the
condition of affairs, in the judgment of leading Republican statesmen,
justified their enactment.  The Thirteenth Amendment, about to be
formally promulgated by the Executive Department of the Government,
as incorporated in the Constitution, had made every negro a free man.
The Southern States had responded to this Act of National authority by
enacting a series of laws which really introduced, as has already been
shown, a new, offensive and most oppressive form of servitude.  Thus
not only was rank injustice contemplated by the States lately in
rebellion, but they conveyed also an insulting challenge to the
authority of the Nation.  It was as if they had said to the National
Government: "In order to destroy the Confederacy and restore the Union
you have manumitted these black men; but we will demonstrate to you, by
our local legislation, that you are powerless to give them any further
freedom than we are willing to concede, and we defy you to show by
what means you can achieve it!"

The first answer of the National Government to this defiance was Mr.
Trumbull's bill conferring upon the Freedmen's Bureau a degree of
power which combated and restrained the Southern authorities at every
point where wrong was committed or menaced.  It was designed for the
purpose of extending to the freeman protection against all the wrongs
of local legislation, and to make him feel that the Government which
had freed him would not desert him and allow his release from slavery
to be made null and void.  Mr. Johnson's policy of declaring all the
States at once restored to the Union and in full possession of their
powers of local legislation, would carry with it necessarily the
confirmation of the odious laws already enacted in those States, and
also the power to make them as stringent and binding upon the freedmen
as the discretion of Southern legislators might dictate.  The war would
thus have practically injured the negro, for after taking from him that
form of protection which slavery afforded, it would have left him an
object of still harsher oppression than slavery itself--an oppression
that would be inspired and quickened by a spirit of vengeance.

The bill was debated at full length, nearly every prominent man in the
Senate taking part.  Mr. Hendricks of Indiana and Mr. Garrett Davis of
Kentucky opposed it in speeches of excessive bitterness, and Mr.
Guthrie of Kentucky with equal earnestness but less passion.  It was
sustained with great ability by all the leading Republican senators;
and on the final passage, in an unusually full Senate, the vote in its
favor was 37; those opposed were 10.  There were only three absentees.
Even those Republican senators who had given strong evidence of
sympathy with the Administration did not unite with the Democrats on
this issue.  Mr. Cowan declined to vote, while Messrs. Dixon,
Doolittle and Norton voted in the affirmative.  The public opinion of
the country unmistakably sustained this legislation--the purpose to
extend protection to the freedmen being deep-set and all-pervading
among the men of the North who had triumphed in the war.  When the
bill reached the House it was referred to the Select Committee on
Freedmen's Affairs, of which Mr. Thomas D. Eliot of Massachusetts was
chairman.  It was promptly reported and came to a final vote on the 6th
of February, when it was passed on a call of yeas and nays by 136 to
33.  It was a clear division upon the line of party, the nays being
composed entirely of Democrats, with the possible exception of Mr.
Rousseau of Kentucky, who had been elected with the aid of Republican
votes.

One of the most striking speeches made in the House upon the subject
was by Mr. Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota.  He had carefully prepared
for the debate and dwelt with great force upon the educational feature.
"Education," said he, "means the intelligent exercise of liberty; and
surely without this liberty is a calamity, since it means simply the
unlimited right to err.  Who can doubt that if a man is to govern
himself he should have the means to know what is best for himself, and
what is injurious to himself, what agencies work against him and what
for him?  The avenue to all this is simply education.  Suffrage without
education is an edged tool in the hands of a child,--dangerous to
others and destructive to himself.  Now what is the condition of the
South in reference to all this?  I assert that it is such as would
bring disgrace upon any despotism in Christendom.  The great bulk of
the people are rude, illiterate, semi-civilized: hence the Rebellion;
hence all the atrocious barbarities that accompanied it. . . . I
repeat, the condition of the South in this respect would be shameful
to any semi-civilized people, and is such as to render a republican
government, resting upon the intelligent judgment of the people, an
impossibility."

It is worthy of remark that the question so cogently presented and
enforced by Mr. Donnelly--that of the connection between education and
suffrage--disclosed the general fact that even among Republicans there
was no disposition at this period to confer upon the negro the right
to vote.  Even so radical a Republican as Mr. Fessenden, during the
debate in the Senate on this question, said, "I take it that no one
contends--I think the Honorable Senator from Massachusetts himself (Mr.
Sumner), who is the great champion of universal suffrage, would
hardly contend--that now, at this time, the whole of the population of
the recent slave States is fit to be admitted to the exercise of the
right of suffrage.  I presume no man who looks at the question
dispassionately and calmly could contend that the great mass of those
who were recently slaves (undoubtedly there may be exceptions), and
who have been kept in ignorance all their lives, oppressed and more or
less forbidden to acquire information, are fitted at this stage to
exercise the right of suffrage, or could be trusted to do it unless
under such good advice as those better informed might be prepared to
give them."

The bill, as finally passed by both Houses, reached the President on
the 10th of February.  On the 19th he sent a message to Congress
informing each House that, having with much regret come to the
conclusion that it would not be consistent with the public welfare to
give his approval to the measure, he returned the bill to the Senate,
stating his objections to its becoming a law.  The main argument of the
President was based upon the principle that legislation such as that
contained in the bill was not proper for States that were deprived of
their right of representation in both branches of Congress.  "The
Constitution," he said, "imperatively declares, in connection with
taxation, that each State shall have at least one representative,
and fixed the rule for the number to which in future times each State
shall be entitled.  It also provides that the Senate of the United
States shall be composed of two senators from each State, and adds with
peculiar force that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived
of its equal suffrage in the Senate. . . . Burdens have now to be borne
by all the country, and we may best deem that they shall be borne
without murmur when they are voted by a majority of the representatives
of all the people. . . . At present all the representatives of eleven
States are excluded, those who were the most faithful during the war
not less than others.  The State of Tennessee, for instance, whose
authorities were engaged in rebellion, was restored to all her
Constitutional relations to the Union by the patriotism and energy of
her patriot people.  I know no reason why the State of Tennessee should
not fully enjoy all her Constitutional relations. . . . The bill under
consideration refers to certain of the States as thought they had not
been fully restored in all their Constitutional relations to the United
States.  If they have not let us at once act together to secure that
desirable end at the earliest possible moment.  In my judgment most of
these States, so far at least as depends upon their own acts, have
already been fully restored and should be deemed as entitled to enjoy
their Constitutional rights as members of the Union."

He reviewed at some length the minor provisions of the bill, objected
to them as unwarrantably interfering with the local administration of
justice, and declared that a system for the support of indigent persons
in the United States was never contemplated by the authors of the
Constitution.  "Nor can any good reason be advanced," said the
President, "why as a permanent establishment it should be founded for
one class or color of our people more than another."  He objected to it
on the ground of its expense.  "The appropriations asked for by the
Freedmen's Bureau, as already established, for the current year,
amount," he said, "to $11,745,000; and it may be safely estimated
that the cost to be incurred under the pending bill will require double
that amount,--more than any sum expended in any one year of the
Administration of John Quincy Adams."

The argument of the message based on expense and extravagance was much
applauded by the opponents of the Republican party, and there was a
great expectation that it would create a strong re-action in favor of
the President; but those who thus reckoned utterly failed to appreciate
the temper of the public mind.  The disbursement of vast sums in the
war had accustomed the people to large appropriations of money, and
the pecuniary aspect of the case, upon which the President had much
relied, made far less impression than he anticipated.  The philanthropists
did not deem the question at issue to be one of dollars and cents;
and those less disposed to sympathize with the humanitarian
aspects of the subject had not yet learned the lesson of economy which
the adversity of after years taught them.  The great expansion of our
currency, the ease with which money had been obtained, and the
extravagance with which it had been expended in all the walks of life,
produced in the minds of the people an indifference to the question of
economy.  The President, in his own long career, had exercised a rigid
watchfulness over the disbursements of public money, and he did not
fully realize the great change which had been wrought in the people--a
change sure to follow the condition of war if historic precedents may
be trusted--a change in which economy gives way to lavishness and
careful circumspection is followed by loose disregard of established
rules.  It is a condition not implying dishonesty or even recklessness,
but one which follows from a positive inability in the public mind to
estimate the expenditure of money by the standards which are applied
in the era of peaceful industry, careful supervision and prudent
restraint.

The Senate voted upon the veto the day after it was received.  Greatly
to the surprise of the public the dominant party was unable to pass the
bill against the objections of the President.  Messrs. Dixon,
Doolittle, Morgan, Norton and Van Winkle had voted for it, but now
changed their votes and thereby reversed the action of the Senate.
These senators, with the addition of Nesmith and Willey, who did not
vote on the passage of the bill, gave the final count of 30 in favor
of the passage to 18 against--lacking the two-thirds and therefore
failing to pass the bill.  The result was wholly unlooked for and the
vote of Governor Morgan of New York gave great uneasiness to his
political associates.  It was for a time believed that under the
persuasive influence of Mr. Seward, with whom he had long been on terms
of close intimacy, Mr. Morgan might be intending to join the
Administration party.  The same was thought possible with regard to Mr.
Van Winkle of West Virginia, his location suggesting the possibility
of such a change.  The excitement among Republicans was great for a
time, because if they should so far lose control of either branch of
Congress as to be unable to override the vetoes of the President, all
attempts to enforce a more radical policy of Reconstruction than Mr.
Johnson could be induced to approve would necessarily be futile.  It
was soon ascertained however, that the apprehension of danger was
unfounded and that Messrs. Morgan and Van Winkle did not design any
change of political relations, but were only more cautious and perhaps
wiser than the other Republican senators.

A few weeks later, the disaster of the veto--for such it was esteemed
by Republicans--was repaired by the passage of another bill,
originating in the House.  This was simply a bill to continue in
force the original Freedmen's Bureau Act, with some enlarging
provisions to make it more effective.  The Act was so framed as to
escape the objections which had controlled some of the Republican
votes that sustained the President's veto.  Among the most important
of the changes were the limitation of the statute to the term of two
years and a serious modification of the judicial powers accorded to
the officers of the Bureau in the preceding bill.  It was not so
elaborately debated in either branch as was the original act, but its
passage was retarded by the interposition of other measures and it did
not reach the President until the first week in July.

The President promptly returned the bill to the House with his veto.
He found it to fall within the objections which he had assigned in his
message vetoing the Senate bill on the same subject.  He believed that
the only ground upon which this kind of legislation could be justified
was that of the war-making power.  He admitted therefore that the
original Act organizing a Freedmen's Bureau, passed during the
existence of the war, was proper and Constitutional.  By its own terms
it would end within one year from the cessation of hostilities and
the declaration of peace.  It would probably continue in force, he
thought, as long as the freedmen might require the benefit of its
provisions.  "It will certainly," said he, "remain in operation as a
law until some months subsequent to the meeting of the next session of
Congress, when, if experience shall make evident the necessity of
additional legislation, the two Houses will have ample time to mature
and pass the requisite measures."  The President renewed in varied
forms the expression of his belief that all the States should be
admitted to the privilege of legislation, especially in matters
affecting their own welfare.  The House proceeded at once to vote upon
the reconsideration of the bill, and by 104 in the affirmative and 33
in the negative passed it over the veto of the President.  The Senate
voted on the same day with the House, and passed it against the
President's objections by 33 in the affirmative and 12 in the negative.
A measure of very great importance to the colored race was thus
completed, after serious agitation in both Houses and against two
vetoes by the President.  It required potent persuasion, re-enforced
by the severest exercise of party discipline to prevent a serious break
in both Houses against the bill.  The measure had lost, under
discussion, much of the popularity which attended its first
introduction in Congress.

On the same day that Mr. Trumbull introduced his original bill to
enlarge the powers of the Freedmen's Bureau, he introduced another
bill, more important in its scope and more enduring in its character,
--a bill "to protect all persons of the United States in their civil
rights and furnish the means of their vindication."  It was referred
to the Judiciary Committee on the 5th day of January and was reported
back on the 11th.  The bill was one which exemplified in a most
striking manner the revolution produced by the war.  It declared that
"there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among
the inhabitants of any State or Territory of the United States on
account of race, color or previous condition of servitude; but the
inhabitants of every race and color shall have the same right to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property, and
to full and equal benefits of all laws and provisions for the security
of personal property; and shall be subject to like punishments, fines
and penalties, and none other,--any law, statute, ordinance, regulation
or custom to the contrary notwithstanding."

Any person who under any law, statute or regulation of any kind should
attempt to violate the provisions of the Act, would be punished by a
fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year.  Very stringent provisions were made, and a whole
framework of administration devised, by which the rights conferred
under this enactment could be enforced through "the judicial power of
the United States."  The district attorneys, marshals, deputy marshals
of the United States, the commissioners appointed by the Circuit and
Territorial Courts of the United States, the officers and agents of the
Freedmen's Bureau, and every other officer who was sufficiently
empowered by the President of the United States, were, by the Act,
specially authorized and required, at the expense of the United States,
to institute proceedings against every person who should violate its
provisions, and "cause him or them to be arrested and imprisoned for
trial at such court of the United States or Territorial court as, by
this Act, has cognizance of the case."  Any person who should obstruct
or hinder an officer in the performance of his duty or any person
lawfully assisting him in the arrest of an offender, or who should
attempt to rescue any person from the custody of an officer, was in
turn subjected to severe penalties.

The bill was designed, in short, to confer upon the manumitted negro
of the South the same civil rights enjoyed by the white man, with the
exception of the right of suffrage; to give him perfect equality in
all things before the law, and to nullify every State law wherever
existing, that should be in conflict with the enlarged provisions of
the Federal statute.  It left no loophole for escape on the question
of the citizenship of the negro.  As the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States then stood he was not a citizen of the
United States; and to prevent this question being raised the word
_inhabitant_ was used,--thus making the conferment of civil rights so
broad that it was impossible to defeat the full intent of the law by
any technical evasion.  It was undoubtedly a very sweeping enactment,
the operation of which was not confined to the States which had been
slave-holding, but bore directly upon some of the free States where
the negro had always been deprived of certain rights fully guaranteed
to the white man.

Lest "inhabitant" might be held to mean "citizen" in the connection
in which it was used Mr. Trumbull proposed, at the initial point of
the discussion, to amend by inserting the declaration that "all persons
born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power are
hereby declared to be citizens of the United States without distinction
of color."  Mr. Guthrie of Kentucky and Mr. Howard of Michigan both
asked whether that would naturalize all the Indians in the United
States.  Mr. Trumbull thought not, because "we deal with the Indians
as foreigners--as separate nations;" but he was willing to change it
so as specifically to exclude Indians.  Mr. Cowan asked "whether the
amendment would not have the effect of naturalizing children of Chinese
and gypsies born in this country."  Mr. Trumbull replied that it
undoubtedly would.  Mr. Cowan then thought it would be proper to hear
the senators from California on that question, because "at the present
rate of emigration the day may not be very distant when California,
instead of belonging to the Indo-European race, may belong to the
Mongolians, may belong to the Chinese."  Mr. Trumbull inquired if the
children of Chinese born in this country were not citizens?  Mr. Cowan
thought they were not.

Mr. Reverdy Johnson of Maryland pointed out a difficulty not
anticipated by Mr. Trumbull.  By using the word _inhabitant_ in the
bill he made it impossible for any State in the Union to "draw any
distinction between citizens who have been there from birth, or have
been residents for a long time, and him who comes into the State for
the first time as a foreigner.  He becomes at once an inhabitant.
If he comes from England or from any of the countries of the world he
becomes that moment an inhabitant; and if this bill is to pass in the
shape it stands he can buy, he can sell, he can hold, he can inherit
and be inherited from and possess all the rights of a native-born
citizen," without being naturalized.  Mr. Johnson pointed out another
difficulty which perhaps the senator from Illinois did not foresee.
Many of the States in the North as well as in the South forbade the
marriage of a black man with a white woman or a white man with a black
woman.  This law would destroy all State power over the subject; and
the man who offended in the matter of marriage between the races, so
far from being punished himself, could bring the judge who attempted
to enforce the law against him into punishment.  The bill, after much
elaboration of debate and many amendments offered and defeated, came
to a vote on the 2d of February and was passed by 33 _yeas_ to 12
_nays_.  Mr. Dixon of Connecticut, one of the Administration
Republicans, voted for the bill; Mr. Cowan and Mr. Norton against it;
Mr. Doolittle did not vote.

The bill immediately went to the House, and on the 1st of March that
body proceeded to consider it without its reference to the Judiciary
Committee.  Mr. Wilson of Iowa, chairman of that committee, said they
had considered it informally, and in order to save time it was brought
up for action at once.  The first amendment offered was to strike out
"inhabitants" and insert "citizens of the United States," and thus
avoid the embarrassments that might result from giving it so broad an
extension.  The amendment was promptly agreed to.  Mr. Wilson, by
another amendment, removed the difficulties suggested in the Senate by
Reverdy Johnson, touching the question of marriage between the races.
He supported the bill in a speech of great strength and legal research.
He admitted at the outset that "some of the questions presented by the
measure are not entirely free from defects.  Precedents, both judicial
and legislative, are found in sharp conflict concerning them.  The
line which divides these precedents is generally found to be the same
which separates the early from the later days of the Republic.  The
farther the Republic drifted from the old moorings of the equality of
human rights, the more numerous became the judicial and legislative
utterances in conflict with some of the leading features sought to be
re-established by this bill."

The debate was continued by Mr. Rogers of New Jersey, in the
opposition, by Mr. Russell Thayer of Pennsylvania, who made an
uncommonly able speech in its favor, and by Mr. Eldridge of Wisconsin,
who tersely presented the objections entertained by the Democratic
party to such legislation.  There were some apprehensions in the
minds of the members on both sides of the House that the broad
character of the bill might include the right of suffrage, but to
prevent that result Mr. Wilson moved to add a new section declaring
that "nothing in this Act shall be so construed as to affect the laws
of any State concerning the right of suffrage."  Mr. Wilson said that
the amendment he proposed did not change his own construction of the
bill; he did not believe the term "civil rights" included the right of
suffrage; he offered it simply from excessive caution, because certain
gentlemen feared trouble might arise from the language of the bill.
The amendment was unanimously agreed to, not one voice on either side
of the House being raised against it.  Mr. Bingham, Mr. Raymond and
other prominent members of the House, to the number of forty in all,
debated the bill exhaustively.  It was passed by 111 _yeas_ to 38 _nays_.

The bill reached the President on the 18th of March (1866), and on the
27th he sent to the Senate a message regretting that it contained
provisions which he could not approve.  "I am therefore constrained,"
he said, "to return it to the Senate, in which it originated, with my
objections to its becoming a law."  The President stated that by the
first section the Chinese of the Pacific States, Indians subject to
taxation, the people called gypsies, as well as the entire race
designated as black,--people of color, negroes, mulattoes, and persons
of African blood,--"are made citizens of the United States."  The
President did not believe that this class possessed "the requisite
qualifications to entitle them to all the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States."  He sought to raise prejudice against
the bill because it proposed "to discriminate against large number of
intelligent, worthy and patriotic foreigners, in favor of the negro,
to whom, after long years of bondage, the avenues to freedom and
intelligence have now suddenly been opened."  "It is proposed," he
said, "by a single legislative enactment to confer the rights of
citizens upon all persons of African descent born within the extended
limits of the United States, while persons of foreign birth who make
our land their home must undergo a probation of five years, and can
then only become citizens of the United States upon the proof that they
are of good moral character, attached to the principles of the
Constitution of the United States, and well disposed towards the good
order and happiness of the same."

The President sought to impress upon Congress, in strong language, the
injustice of advancing four millions of colored persons to citizenship
"while the States in which most of them reside are debarred from any
participancy in the legislation."  He found many provisions of the bill
in conflict with the Constitution of the United States as it had been
hitherto construed, and argued elaborately against its expediency or
necessity in any form.  "The white man and the black race," said the
President, "have hitherto lived in the South in the relation of master
and slave,--capital owning labor.  Now suddenly the relation is changed
and as to the ownership, capital and labor are divorced.  In this new
relation, one being necessary to the other, there will be a new
adjustment, which both are deeply interested in making harmonious. . . .
This bill frustrates this adjustment.  It intervenes between capital
and labor and attempts to settle questions of political economy through
the agency of numerous officials, whose interest it will be to foment
discord between the two races, for as the breach widens their
employment will continue and when the breach is closed their occupation
will terminate."

"The details of this bill," continued the President, "establish for the
security of the colored race safeguards which go infinitely beyond any
that the General Government has ever provided for the white race; in
fact, the distinction between white and colored is by the provisions
of this bill made to operate in favor of the colored and against the
white race."  "The provisions of the bill," he maintained, "are an
absorption and assumption of power by the General Government, which,
being acquiesced in, must eventually destroy our federative system of
limited power and break down the barriers which preserve the rights of
States.  It is another step, or rather stride, towards centralization
and the concentration of all legislative power in the General
Government.  The tendency of the bill must be to resuscitate rebellion
and to arrest the progress of those influences which are more closely
thrown around the States--the bond of union and peace."

The debate upon the President's veto was not very prolonged but was
marked by excitement approaching to anger.  Mr. Trumbull, who had
charge of the bill, analyzed the President's argument with consummate
ability and readily answered him on every point of Constitutional law
which he had adduced.  He did more than this.  He pointed out with
unflinching severity what he considered the demagogical features of
the message.  "The best answer," said Mr. Trumbull, "to the President's
objection that the bill proposes to make citizens of Chinese and
gypsies and his reference to the discrimination against foreigners, is
to be found in a speech delivered in this body by the President
himself, on the occasion of a message being sent to the Senate by
Mr. Buchanan, then President of the United States, returning with his
objections what was known as the Homestead Bill.  On that occasion
Senator Johnson of Tennessee said, 'This idea about poor foreigners
somehow or other bewilders and haunts the imagination of a great many.
I am constrained to say that I look upon this objection to the bill as
a mere quibble on the part of the President, as being hard pressed for
some excuse in withholding his approval of the measure.  His allusion
to foreigners in this connection looks to me more like the _ad
captandum_ of the mere politician or demagogue, than a grave and sound
reason to be offered by the President of the United States in a veto
message on so important a measure as the Homestead Bill.'"

In exposing the inconsistency between Andrew Johnson, President of the
United States, and Andrew Johnson, Senator from Tennessee, Mr. Trumbull
said that he would not use as harsh language as Mr. Johnson had used
towards President Buchanan when he accused him of "quibbling and
demagogery."  Mr. Trumbull argued with great force that the citizen
has a counter-claim upon the Government for the comprehensive claim
which the Government has upon the citizen.  "It cannot be that we have
constituted a government," said Mr. Trumbull, "which is all-powerful to
command the obedience of the citizen but has no power to afford him
protection."  "Tell it not, sir," said he, "to the father whose son was
starved at Andersonville, or the widow whose husband was slain at
Mission Ridge, or the little boy who leads his sightless father
through the streets of your city, of the thousand other mangled heroes
to be seen on every side of us to-day, that this Government, in defense
of which the son and the husband fell, the father lost his sight and
the others were maimed and crippled, had the right to call those
persons to its defense, but now has no power to protect the survivors
or their friends in any rights whatever in the States.  Such, sir, is
not the meaning of our Constitution: such is not the meaning of
American citizenship.  Allegiance and protection are reciprocal rights."

During the progress of the debate a curious incident showed the temper
engendered in the Senate.  Mr. Trumbull, on the 5th of April, intimated
his readiness to have the vote taken if the Senate was ready.  It was
late in the evening.  Mr. Cowan interposed the suggestion that two
senators detained at home by illness, Mr. Dixon of Connecticut and Mr.
Wright of New Jersey, could not with safety come out at night.  The
point of courtesy was strongly insisted upon by Mr. Guthrie, Mr.
Hendricks and other members.  Mr. Wade spoke very excitedly in reply
to it.  "If the President of the United States," said he, "can impose
his authority upon a question like this and can by a veto compel
Congress to submit to his dictation, he is an emperor and a despot.
Because I believe the great question of Congressional power and
authority is at stake here, I yield to no importunities on the other
side.  I feel myself justified in taking every advantage which the
Almighty has put in my hands to defend the power and authority of this
body.  I will not yield to these appeals of comity on a question like
this, but I will tell the President and everybody else that if God
Almighty has stricken a member of this body so that he cannot be here
to uphold the dictation of a despot, I thank him for it and I will take
every advantage of it I can."

Mr. Wade was answered with great severity by Mr. McDougal of
California.  Mr. Guthrie spoke with much spirit, but not with the
temper of Mr. McDougal.  "I should not like it to go out from this
body," said the senator from Kentucky, "that Mr. Stockton was removed
to get rid of his vote.  I do not want it to go out from this body
that we would not extend a courtesy to sick senators because we could
pass a bill without their votes when we might not pass it if they were
here.  The time will come when the people, being convinced of these
things, will say that there is more to be feared from a combined
Congress than from a President, in relation to the liberties of the
people."  The angry position of Mr. Wade was not sustained by the
Senate and the motion to adjourn was carried by 33 to 12.  The debate
continued throughout the next day and disclosed during its progress
that Senator Lane of Kansas had joined the small band of Administration
Republicans.  He attempted to take part in the debate but was
unmercifully dealt with by Mr. Wade, Mr. Trumbull and others, and paid
dearly for his personal defection.  When the vote was taken upon
passing the bill over the President's veto the _ayes_ were 33 and the
_noes_ 15.  Every senator was present except Mr. Dixon of Connecticut,
still detained from the Senate from illness.  There was one vacancy,
Mr. Stockton's seat not having yet been filled.  Among the nays were
Mr. Cowan, Mr. Doolittle, Mr. Lane of Kansas, Mr. Norton and Mr. Van
Winkle.

The bill went to the House and after a very brief debate came to a vote
on the 9th of April--_yeas_ 122, _nays_ 41.  Speaker Colfax directed
that his name should be called in order that he might have the honor of
recording himself for the bill.  He then announced that having received
the vote of two-thirds of each House the Civil Rights Bill had become a
law, the President's objections to the contrary notwithstanding.  The
announcement was received with an outburst of applause, in which the
members of the House as well as the throng of spectators heartily
joined--the speaker being unable to restore order for several minutes.
It recalled the scene of a little more than a year before, when the
rejoicing over the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment was equally
demonstrative.

To many persons of conservative mind the bill seemed too radical--to
many it seemed positively rash.  It was an illustration of how rapidly
public opinion is changed, and with what force it may be brought to
bear upon a given question in a period that is filled with the spirit
of revolutionary excitement.  If five years before the most pronounced
anti-slavery man in the country had been told that not only would
slavery be abolished, not only would the slave be transformed into a
citizen, but that the National Government would confer upon him all the
civil rights pertaining to the white man and would stretch forth its
arm to protect him in those rights throughout the limits of the
Republic, it would have seemed to him as the wildest fancy of a
distempered brain.  But his had actually come to pass through the
ordinary forms of legislation, and by such a preponderating display
of senatorial and representative strength as had scarcely ever before
controlled a public policy since the foundation of the Government.

It was not, of course, without some misgiving, without a certain
timidity and distrust, that many Republicans were brought to the
support of these measures.  They did not object to their inherent and
essential justice and rightfulness, but with instinctive caution they
feared that an attempt to wipe away the prejudices of two centuries in
a single day might lead to a dangerous re-action, and to a consequent
change in the political control of the country.  Many who were borne
along in the irresistible current of aggressive reform dreaded all the
more the effect of the votes which the moral and political pressure of
their constituents compelled them to give.  In the Constitutional
amendment abolishing slavery they went forward without distrust, with
complete approbation of conscience, with undoubting belief in the
expediency of the act.  They knew that the great mass of the North was
heartily opposed to slavery: they knew that its abolition was not
merely right but was destined to be popular.  It affected moreover only
that great section of country which had engaged in the crime of
rebellion; and if it were viewed only as a punishment of those who had
sought the destruction of the Government, they felt more than justified
in inflicting it.

But the legislation now accomplished was of a different type.  In no
State of the North had there ever been social equality between the
negro and the white man.  It had been most nearly approached in New
England, but still there were points of prejudice which time had not
effaced nor custom changed.  In the Middle and Western States the
feeling was much deeper.  In many of their laws a discrimination was
made against the negro, and a direct interference with the habits of
loyal communities on this subject involved many considerations which
did not in any degree attach to legislation affecting only the Southern
States.  There was among Democratic leaders a confidence as marked as
the timidity on the part of the Republicans.  They were sure of a
re-action in their favor; they believed that the Republicans had taken
the step which would prove fatal to them, and that with the prejudices
of the people supplemented by the patronage of the President a serious
division would ensue, which would prove fatal to Radical ascendency in
a majority of the Northern states.  Overcome in both chambers by the
aggressive force of a majority which transcended the limit of two-thirds,
they congratulated themselves that this very power, beyond the
restraint of the Executive and exercised in defiance of his opinions,
would prove the pitfall of Republicanism wherever race prejudice was
kept alive.

The passage of these bills by Congress, their persistent veto by the
President and their re-enactment against his objections, produced, as
had been anticipated, not only an open political hostility, but one
which rapidly advanced to a condition in which violent epithet
and mutual denunciation indicated the deplorable relations of
the two great departments of the Government.  The veto of the
Freedmen's-Bureau Bill, on the 19th of February, was followed by a large
popular meeting in Washington, on the 22d, to approve the President's
action. The meeting adjourned to the White House to congratulate the
President, and he in turn made a long speech in which he broke through
all restraint, and spoke his mind with exasperating frankness.  "I
have," said the President, "fought traitors and treason in the South.
I opposed Davis, Toombs, Slidell, and a long list of others whose names
I need not repeat, and now, when I turn around at the other end of the
line, I find men--I care not by what name you call them (a voice:
'Call them traitors')--who still stand opposed to the restoration to
the Union of these States.  (A voice: 'Give us their names.')  A
gentleman calls for their names.  Well! suppose I should give them?
I look upon them, I repeat it as President or citizen, as being as much
opposed to the fundamental principles of this Government, and believe
they are as much laboring to pervert or destroy them, as were the men
who fought against them in the Rebellion.  (A voice: 'Give us the
names.')  I say Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania.  (Tremendous
applause.)  I say Charles Sumner.  (Tremendous applause.)  I say
Wendell Phillips and others of the same stripe are among them.  (A
voice: 'Give it to Forney.')  Some gentleman in the crowd says, 'Give
it to Forney.'  I have only to say that I do not waste my ammunition
upon dead ducks."  (Laughter and applause.) . . . "They may traduce
me," continued the President, "they may slander me, they may
vituperate, but let me say to you that it has no effect upon me; and
let me say in addition that I do not intend to be bullied by my
enemies. . . . There is an earthquake coming, gentlemen: there is a
ground-swell coming of popular judgment and indignation.  The American
people will speak for their interests, and they will know who are their
friends and who their enemies.  What positions have I held under this
Government?--beginning with an alderman and running through all the
branches of the Legislature.  (A voice: 'From a tailor up.')  Some
gentleman says I have been a tailor.  (Tremendous applause.)  Now that
did not discomfit me in the least; for when I used to be a tailor I
had the reputation of being a good one and of making close fits (great
laughter); always punctual with my customers and always did good work.
(A voice: 'No patchwork.')  No: I do not want any patchwork.  I want
a whole suit.  But I will pass by this little facetiousness. . . . I
was saying that I held nearly all positions, from alderman, through
both branches of Congress, to that which I now occupy; and who is there
that will say Andrew Johnson ever made a pledge that he did not redeem
or made a promise that he did not fulfill?"

Some one had spoken in Congress about the Presidential obstacle to be
gotten out of the way.  Mr. Johnson interpreted this as meaning
personal violence to himself.  "I make use," said he, "of a very strong
expression when I say that I have no doubt the intention was to incite
assassination and so get out of the way the obstacle to place and
power.  Whether by assassination or not, there are individuals in this
Government, I doubt not, who want to destroy our institutions and
change the character of the Government.  Are they not satisfied with
the blood which has been shed?  Does not the murder of Lincoln appease
the vengeance and wrath of the opponents of this Government?  Are they
still unslaked?  Do they still want more blood?  I am not afraid of the
assassin attacking me where a brave and courageous man would attack
another.  I only dread him when he would go in disguise, his footsteps
noiseless.  If it is blood they want let them have courage enough to
strike like men."

The speech produced a very unfavorable impression upon the country.
Its low tone, its vulgar abuse, recalled Mr. Johnson's unhappy words at
the time of his inauguration as Vice-President, and produced throughout
the country a feeling of humiliation.  His effort to make it appear
that his political opponents meditated assassination was regarded as
a thoroughly unscrupulous declaration, as an unworthy attempt to place
himself beside Lincoln in the martyrdom of duty--to suggest that as
Lincoln had fallen, sacrificed to the spirit of hostility in the South,
so he, in pursuing his line of duty, was in danger of being sacrificed
to hostility in the North.  The delivery of this speech was the formal
forfeiture of the respect and confidence of the great majority of the
people who had elected him to his place, and he failed to secure
compensation by gaining the respect or confidence of those who had
opposed him.  A few Democrats who wished to worry and divide the
Republican party, the place-hunters who craved the favor of the
Executive, a few deserters from the Republican ranks unable to pursue
the path of exacting duty, represented by their combination a specious
support for the President.  Natives of the border States, who had been
unwilling to join in treasonable demonstrations against the Government
but who had not been inspired with sufficient loyalty to join actively
in its defense, now naturally rallied around Mr. Johnson.  The
residents of Washington, consisting at that time of Southern men and
Southern sympathizers, now applauded the President because they saw an
opportunity to distract and defeat the Republican party.  But the
entire mass of those who were now eager to sustain the President
exhibited but a pitiable contrast with the magnificent party which he
had voluntarily abandoned.

The increasing fierceness of the struggle between the President and
Congress gave rise to every form of evil suspicion and evil imputation.
The close vote on the Civil Rights Bill admonished the Republicans
of their danger.  If Mr. Dixon had not been confined to his house by
illness, if Mr. Stockton had not been a few days before deprived of his
seat, the Administration would have been able to rally seventeen votes
in the negative, leaving but thirty-three to the Republicans out of a
Senate of fifty members.  The exigencies of the situation presented the
strongest possible temptation to take every fair advantage, and this
naturally led to the imputation of unfair advantage.  A large number of
honest-minded opponents believed that a careful calculation had been
made by the Republican leaders, and that they had found the margin so
close as to be unsafe in a contest with the President.  If the margin
had been broader and the two-thirds vote assured past all reasonable
danger, it was asserted, and no doubt believed, that the Constitution
would not have been strained to exchange Mr. Stockton for a Republican
senator, who was sure to succeed him.  It was the first attempt in our
history to establish the policy of the Government without regard to
the President, and indeed against his power.  In the case of President
Tyler the reverse had been practically attempted.  In his controversy
with the Whigs his friends constituted more than a third in each House
--thus making his veto effective and leading him to attempt the
administration of the Government without regard to the opinions of
Congress.  Mr. Tyler had failed; but thus far in the controversy with
Johnson, Congress had succeeded.  It was said, however, with great
pertinacity by the friends of the President, that Congress was enabled
to do this only by the exclusion of eleven States of the Union from
representation; and from this fact came the Democratic denunciation of
the Republican party for administering the affairs of the Government in
a revolutionary spirit.

The narrow escape of the measure again created great uneasiness, not
only among the Republicans in Congress but throughout the country.
One or two more defections would imperil Republican control of the
Senate.  The loyalty of every member to his party was therefore
scanned with closest observation.  Rumors, gossip, inventions of all
kinds were set afloat in the public press,--hinting first at one man
and then at another among the Republican senators as likely to weaken,
as about going over to the Administration, as having just had a
confidential interview with Mr. Seward, as dining the evening before
with the President, or as being concerned in some matter of even less
consequence.  When public interest is heightened the imagination of the
people is stimulated, until trifles light as air have fatal
significance in one direction or the other.  Throughout the spring and
early summer of 1866 (the tentative period, as it may be called, in
fixing the relations of the President and Congress) this suggestion of
doubt, this latent apprehension, continued, and was not indeed wholly
removed until the political lines were definitely drawn by the
elections for representatives to Congress in the ensuing autumn.

The situation in all its bearings was one of peculiar embarrassment,
beset with extraordinary difficulties to those who directed the
proceedings of Congress.  In reviewing the events of that day, whatever
may be thought respecting their wisdom and expediency, candid men of
all parties will concede that the Republican leaders exhibited great
determination of purpose, remarkable steadiness of nerve and unflagging
devotion to principle.  They were absolutely without precedent to guide
them in the exigencies and emergencies of the situation.  It was well
said at the time that the framers of the Constitution in 1787 were not
confronted with difficulties so grave or surrounded with problems so
complex and unproved, as were the leaders of Congress during the period
of Reconstruction.  The framers of the Constitution met for one
purpose, upon which all were agreed.  They had only to reconcile
differences of detail and to adjust the jealousies of local interest;
but in 1866 Congress was called upon to exclude the President
practically from all share in the law-making power, and to charge him
on his oath of duty to faithfully execute laws, against which he had
constantly entered his solemn protest, not only as inexpedient but as
unconstitutional.  Perhaps a man of more desperate resolution than Mr.
Johnson might have used his Executive power more effectively against
Congress, but he must have done so at the expense of his fidelity to
sworn obligations.  The practical deduction as to the working of our
Governmental machinery, from the whole experience of that troublous
era, is that two-thirds of each House, united and stimulated to one
end, can practically neutralize the Executive power of the Government
and lay down its policy in defiance of the efforts and the opposition
of the President.

The defection of Senator Lane of Kansas from the ranks of the most
radical Republicans caused great surprise to the country.  He had been
so closely identified with all the tragic events in the prolonged
struggle to keep slavery out of Kansas, that he was considered to be
an irreconcilable foe to the party that tolerated or in any way
apologized for its existence.  The position he had taken in voting
against the Civil Rights Bill worried and fretted him.  He keenly felt
his separation from the sympathy of such men as Sumner, Chandler, Wade,
and the whole host who had nobly fought the battle of Kansas in the
halls of Congress.  He felt still more keenly the general and somewhat
indignant disapproval of his action, freely expressed by the great mass
of his constituents.  One of his intimate friends said that on the very
day of his vote he received a telegram warning him that if he voted
against the bill it would be the mistake of his life.  The telegram
reached him after the roll had been called.  He said excitedly, "The
mistake has been made.  I would give all I possess if it were undone."
He was still further disturbed by imputations upon his integrity in
connection with some transactions of the Indian Bureau--imputations
which were pronounced baseless by the two senators from Indiana (Thomas
A. Hendricks and Henry S. Lane), one a political opponent and the
other a political friend, who had impartially examined all the facts.
But under the mortification caused by parting with old political
associates, and the humiliation to which he was subjected by
groundless imputations upon his character, his mind gave way and on the
11th of July, 1866 he committed suicide.

General Lane was a native of Indiana, son of a reputable lawyer, Amos
Lane, who was a representative in Congress during the Administrations
of Jackson and Van Buren.  He thus inherited Democracy of the most
aggressive type.  He was a man of violent passions and marked courage.
He commanded a regiment of Indiana volunteers at the battle of Buena
Vista, and in 1852 was elected a member of the House of
Representatives.  He was a warm supporter of Douglas and voted for the
repeal of the Missouri Compromise.  He immediately afterwards emigrated
to Kansas, as he said, "to see fair play under the doctrine of popular
sovereignty."  His career thenceforward formed a large part of the
history of Kansas.  He contributed perhaps as largely as any other one
man to the victory of the Free-State policy, and became as violent in
his hostility to the Democratic party as he had formerly been in its
advocacy.  When his State was admitted to the Union in 1861 he was
rewarded with the honor of being one of her first senators in Congress.
His course in the Senate, until the time of his defection, had been
specially marked for its aggressiveness in support of the war and the
destruction of the institution of slavery.  He was profoundly attached
to Mr. Lincoln and had received many marks of his friendship.  The
motive for his strange course under President Johnson was never clearly
disclosed.  He was in the full vigor of life when he closed it with his
own hands, being a few weeks beyond his fifty-first birthday.

The Administration of Mr. Johnson had, before the death of Mr. Lane,
been unhappily associated in the popular mind with another suicide.
A few days before the assembling of Congress Mr. Preston King,
collector of the port of New York, had drowned himself in the Hudson
River by leaping from a ferry-boat.  He had been for more than twenty
years an intimate friend of Mr. Johnson and held, as already narrated,
a confidential relation to him at the time of his accession to the
Presidency.  He had been especially influential in the National
Republican Convention of 1864 in securing for Mr. Johnson the
nomination for the Vice-Presidency.  The original disagreement with Mr.
Seward was generally ascribed to the influence of Mr. King upon the
President, but when, with Mr. Seward in the Cabinet, Mr. King was
appointed collector of customs for the port of New York, it was
understood to mean that a perfect reconciliation had taken place
between all the Republican factions in his State.  The change in the
President's position was a complete surprise to Mr. King and left him
in a peculiarly embarrassing situation.  He was essentially a radical
man in all his political views, and the evident tendency of the
President towards extreme conservatism on the question of
reconstruction was a keen distress to him.  He was at a loss to
determine his course of action.  If he should resign his position it
would be the proclamation of hostility to one to whom he was deeply
attached.  If he should remain in office he feared it might be at the
expense of forfeiting the good will of the tens of thousands of New-York
Republicans who had always reposed the utmost confidence in his
fidelity to principle, and who had rewarded him with the highest honors
in their power to bestow.  He had not desired the collectorship, and
consented to accept it only from his sincere friendship for the
President and from his earnest desire to harmonize the Republican party
in New York and bring its full strength to the support of the
Administration.  The office had given him no pleasure.  It had indeed
brought him nothing but care and anxiety.  The applications for place
were numerous and perplexing, the daily routine of duty was onerous and
exacting, and his pecuniary responsibility to the Government, much
exaggerated by his worried mind, constantly alarmed him.  Mr. King
found himself therefore so situated that, whichever way he turned, he
faced embarrassment in his career, and as he imagined, disaster to his
reputation.  In the conflicting emotions incident to his entangled
position, his brain was fevered, and his intellect became disordered.
From the anguish which his sensitive nature could not endure, he sought
relief in the grave.

Mr. King was born in 1806 at Ogdensburg, St. Lawrence County, New York,
which throughout his life continued to be his home.  He became
prominent in political affairs, while still a young man, as a zealous
supporter of President Jackson in whose interest he edited a paper.
He attached himself to that strong school of New-York Democrats of
whom Silas Wright was the acknowledged leader.  After conspicuous
service in the New-York Legislature, he entered Congress in 1845 and
remained until 1851.  When the South demanded the abrogation of the
Missouri Compromise Mr. King followed his personal convictions, broke
from his Democratic associations and aided in the organization of the
Republican party.  He adhered steadily to the fortunes of the new party
and brought with him a strong popular support--the large Republican
majorities in Northern New York being originally due in no small degree
to his personal influence and earnest efforts.


CHAPTER IX.

The controversies between the President and Congress, thus far
narrated, did not involve what have since been specifically known as
the Reconstruction measures.  Those were yet to come.  The
establishment of the Freedmen's Bureau was at best designed to be a
temporary charity; and the Civil Rights Bill, while growing out of
changes effected by the war, was applicable alike to all conditions
and to all times.  The province of the Special Committee on
Reconstruction was to devise and perfect those measures which should
secure the fruits of the Union victory, by prescribing the essential
grounds upon which the revolted States should be re-admitted to
representation in Congress.  The principal objects aimed at were at
least four in number.  That which most largely engaged popular
attention at the outset was the increased representation which the
South was to secure by the manumission of the negroes.  In the original
Constitution only three-fifths of the slaves were permitted to be
enumerated in the basis of apportionment.  Two-fifths were now added
and an increase of political power to the South appeared probably as
the somewhat startling result of the civil struggle.  There was an
obvious injustice in giving to the white men of the South the right to
elect representatives in Congress apportioned to their section by
reason of the four and a half million of negroes, who were enumerated
in the census but not allowed to exercise any political power.  By
permitting this, a Confederate soldier who fought to destroy the Union
would be endowed with a larger power of control in the National
Government than the loyal soldier who fought to maintain the Union.
To allow this to be accomplished would be a mere mockery of justice,
the utter subversion of fair play between man and man.

Another subject deeply engaging Northern thought was the definition of
American citizenship.  There was a strong desire to place it on such
substantial foundation as should prevent the possibility of sinister
interpretation by the Judiciary, and guard it at the same time against
different constructions in different States.  This was an omission in
the original Constitution--so grave an omission, indeed, that the
guarantee entitling citizens of each State to the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several States, was in many cases
ignored, often indeed defied and destroyed.  If we were now to have a
broader nationality as the result of our civil struggle, it was
apparent to the mass of men, as well as to the publicist and statesman,
that citizenship should be placed on unquestionable ground--on ground
so plain that the humblest man who should inherit its protections
would comprehend the extent and significance of his title.

A third point had taken possession of the popular mind, quickened and
intensified as it was by the conflict between the President and
Congress.  The President, as already stated, had by the lavish use of
the pardoning power signalized his change on the subject of
Reconstruction.  Many of the worst offenders in the Confederate cause
had received Executive clemency.  Not only had the general mass of
rebels been pardoned by the amnesty proclamation of May 29th, but
many thousands of the classes excepted in that instrument had
afterwards received special pardons from the President.  The crime of
treason, which they had committed, was thus condoned, and the
Executive pardon could be pleaded against any indictment or any
attempt to punish by process of law.  If there should be no provision
to the contrary, these pardoned men would thus become as eligible to
all the honors and emoluments of the Republic as though they had not
for four years been using their utmost efforts to destroy its
existence.  It was therefore the general expectation of the people that
by some law, either statute or organic, the political privileges of
these men, so far as the right to hold office was involved, should be
restricted, and that, without contravening the full force and effect of
the President's pardon, they might justly be deprived of all right to
receive the honors of the Nation and of the State.  From the crime of
rebellion they had been freed by the President, but it was expected
that Congress would clearly define the difference between pardoning a
rebel for treason to his county and endowing him with the right to
enjoy the honors and emoluments of office.

Other subjects had entered into the public apprehension and were
brought prominently to the attention of Congress, and by Congress
referred to the Reconstruction Committee.  There was a fear that if, by
a political convulsion, the Confederates of the South should unite with
the Democratic opponents of the war in the North and thus obtain
control of the Government, they might, at least by some indirect
process if not directly, impair the public obligations of the United
States incurred in suppressing the Rebellion.  They feared that the
large bounties already paid to Union soldiers, and the generous
pensions already provided or which might afterwards be provided, for
those who had been maimed or for the orphan and the widow of those who
had fallen, might, in the advent of the same adverse political power
in the Government, be objected to, unless at the same time a similar
concession should be granted to the misled and deceived masses of the
South, who had with reckless daring been forced into the service of the
ill-starred Confederacy.  It was therefore expected that Congress
would, so far as organic law could attain that end, guard the
sacredness of the public debt and the equal sacredness of the National
pensions, and that to do this effectively it should be provided that
no recognition should ever be made, either by the National Government
or by any State Governments, of debts incurred in aid of the Rebellion.

Still another subject was considered to be of grave consequence.
Preventive measures of the most stringent character were demanded
against a threatened danger to the National credit.  With the single
exception of land, which is the basis of all property, the South had
lost the largest aggregate investment held in one form in the entire
country.  The money value of Southern slaves, reckoned at current
prices, was larger when the war broke out than the money value of
railroads or of manufacturing establishments in the United States.  For
the defense of this great interest the war had been avowedly
undertaken.  Perhaps it would be more truthful to say that the
ambitions and conspiring politicians of the South had assumed the
danger to this vast investment as the pretext for destroying the
Government; and they had met with the fate so solemnly foretold in
Sacred Writ,--they had drawn the sword and perished by the sword.  As
the one grand consummation of the struggle, the institution of slavery
had disappeared.  It was probably, nay, it was certainly to be
expected, that in the destruction of so large an investment great
suffering would come to many who had not participated in the Rebellion;
to many indeed who had opposed it.  That remuneration for losses should
be asked was apparently inevitable.

Men of financial skill and experience saw that if such a contingent
liability should overhang the National Treasury the public credit might
be fatally impaired.  The acknowledged and imperative indebtedness of
the Government was already enormous; contingencies yet to be
encountered would undoubtedly increase it, and its weight would press
heavily upon the people until a firmly re-established credit should
enable the Government to lower the rate of interest upon its bonds.
So long as the Government was compelled to pay its interest in coin,
while the business of the country was conducted upon the basis of
suspended paper, the burden upon the people would be great.  It would
be vastly increased in imagination (and imagination is rapidly
transformed to reality in the tremulous balance which decides the
standard of public credit) if the Nation should not be able to define
with absolute precision the metes and bounds of its aggregate
obligation.  Hence the imperious necessity of excluding all possibility
of the payment of from two to three thousand millions of dollars to
the slave-holders of the South.  If that were not accomplished, the
burden would be so great that the Nation which had survived the shock
of arms might be engulfed in the manifold calamities of bankruptcy.

The magnitude of the reforms for which the popular desire was
unmistakable, may in some degree be measured by the fact that they
involved the necessity of radical changes in, and important additions
to, the Federal Constitution.  It was frankly acknowledged that if
the President's plan of Reconstruction should be followed, involving
the instant admission of senators and representatives from the
revolted States, these Constitutional changes could not be effected,
because the party desiring them would no longer control two-thirds of
both Senate and House.  Mr. Seward, in his persuasive mode of
presenting his views, had urged as a matter of justice that legislation
affecting the Southern States should be open to the participation of
representatives from those States; but Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, who had
as keen an intellect as Mr. Seward and a more trenchant style, declared
that view to involve an absurdity.  He avowed his belief that there
was no greater propriety in admitting Southern senators and
representatives to take part in considering the financial adjustments
and legislative safeguards rendered necessary by their crime, than it
would have been to admit the Confederate generals to the camp of the
Union Army, when measures were under consideration for the overthrow
of the Rebellion.

The great mass of Republicans in Congress maintained that it was not
only common justice but common sense to define, without interposition
or advice from the South, the conditions upon which the insurrectionary
States should be re-clothed with the panoply of National power.  "In
no body of English laws," said Mr. Stevens, in an animated conversation
in the House, "have I ever found a provision which authorizes the
criminal to sit in judgment when the extent of his crime and its proper
punishment were under consideration."  The argument, therefore, which
Mr. Seward had made with such strength for the President was, in the
judgment of the great majority of Norther people, altogether ill-founded.
By the caustic sentence of Mr. Stevens it had been totally overthrown.
The average judgement approved the sharply defined and stringent
policy of Congress as set forth by Mr. Stevens, rather than
the policy so comprehensively embodied and so skilfully advocated by
Mr. Seward on behalf of the Administration.  Whatever may have been the
temptations presented by the apparent magnanimity and broad charity of
Mr. Seward's line of procedure, they were more than answered by the
instincts of justice and by the sense of safety embodied in the plan of
Reconstruction announced and about to be pursued by Congress.

The Joint Special Committee on Reconstruction, appointed at the
opening of the Thirty-ninth Congress in December, did not meet for
organization until the 6th of January, 1866.  As an indication of the
respectful manner in which they desired to treat the President, and
the care with which they would proceed in their important duties, they
appointed a sub-committee to wait on Mr. Johnson and advise him that
the committee desired to avoid all possible collision or
misconstruction between the Executive and Congress in regard to their
relative positions.  They informed the President that in their
judgment it was exceedingly desirable that while this subject was
under consideration by the joint committee no further action in regard
to Reconstruction should be taken by him unless it should become
imperatively necessary.  The committee plainly declared that mutual
respect would seem to require mutual forbearance on the part of the
President and Congress.  Mr. Johnson replied in effect that, while
desiring the question of Reconstruction to be advanced as rapidly as
would be consistent with the public interest, he earnestly sought for
harmony of action, and to that end he would take no further steps
without advising Congress.  This promise of each branch of the
Government to wait patiently on the other was no doubt sincere, but it
soon proved difficult, if not impossible, to maintain the compact.
When two co-ordinate departments were holding antagonistic views on
the vital question at issue, collisions between them could not be
averted.  As matter of fact the resolution, as has been seen by events
already narrated, so far from proving itself to be an adjustment did
not serve even as a truce between the President and Congress.  It was
found impracticable to secure repression and the contest went forward
with constantly accelerating speed.

The first question on the subject of Reconstruction which engaged the
attention of Congress, was the re-adjustment of the basis of
representation; and for a time it absorbed all others.  The first
proposition to amend the Constitution in this respect had been made
by Mr. Stevens on the 5th of December, providing "that representatives
shall be apportioned among the States which may be within the Union
according to their respective legal voters, and for this purpose none
shall be named as legal voters who are not either natural born citizens
of the United States or naturalized foreigners."  During the month of
December the question of representation was discussed, partly in public
debate, but more in conference among members; and the plan of placing
the basis upon legal voters, at first warmly urged, was quickly
abandoned as its probable results were scrutinized.  When Congress
convened after the holidays, on Friday the 5th of January, Mr. Spalding
of Ohio, in a speech already referred to, proposed an amendment to the
Constitution in regard to representation in Congress, directing that
"people of color shall not be counted with the population in making up
the ratio of representation, except it be in States where they are
permitted to exercise the elective franchise," and this was probably
the earliest foreshadowing of the real change in the basis of
representation that was made by the Fourteenth Amendment.

On the ensuing Monday Mr. Blaine of Maine proposed the following, in
lieu of the Constitutional provision then existing: "Representatives
and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which
shall be included within this Union according to their respective
numbers, which shall be determined by taking the whole number of
persons, _except those whose political rights or privileges are denied
or abridged by the constitution of any State on account of race or
color_."  Mr. Blaine objected to taking voters as the basis of
representation.  "If," said he, "voters instead of population shall be
made the basis of representation, certain results will follow, not
fully appreciated perhaps by some who are now urgent for the change.
I shall confine my examination of these results to the nineteen free
States, whose statistics are presented in the census of 1860, and the
very radical change which the new basis of apportionment would produce
among those States forms the ground of my opposition to it.  The ratio
of voters to population differs very widely in different sections,
varying, in the States referred to, from a minimum of nineteen per
cent to a maximum of fifty-eight per cent; and some of the changes
which its effect would work in the relative representation of certain
States would be monstrous.  For example, California has a population of
358,110 and Vermont a population of 314,369, and each has three
representatives on this floor to-day.  But California has 207,000
voters and Vermont had only 87,000.  Assuming voters as the basis of
apportionment and allowing to Vermont three representatives, California
would be entitled to eight.  The great State of Ohio, with nearly
seven times the population of California, would have but little more
than two and a half times the number of representatives; and New York,
with quite eleven times the population of California, would have, in
the proposed method of apportionment, less than five times as many
members of this House."

Mr. Blaine adduced some other examples less extreme than those quoted,
but the generalization was no doubt too broad and presented in some
respects an erroneous conclusion.  The only mode of getting at the
number of voters was by the ballots cast at the general elections,
and the relative ratio was varied by so many considerations that
it did not correctly represent the actual number of voters in each
State.  But the facts presented by Mr. Blaine and elaborated by other
speakers turned the attention of the House away from an apportionment
based on voters.

Mr. Conkling, a few days later, in referring to Mr. Blaine's argument,
maintained that "the ratio, in dividing the whole population of the
United States into two hundred and forty-one representative districts,
leaving out such extreme cases as California, would not be seriously
affected by assuming the white male voters as the basis of
apportionment."  On the 15th of January Mr. Conkling submitted a
Constitutional amendment on the subject, in two forms; making the
proviso in one case that "whenever in any one State the political
rights or privileges of any man shall be denied or abridged on
account of race or color, all persons of such race or color shall be
excluded from the basis of representation," and the other providing
that "when the elective franchise in any State shall be denied or
abridged on account of race or color, all persons of such race or color
so denied shall be excluded from the basis of representation."

On the 22d of January the Reconstruction Committee, both in the Senate
and House, reported their proposed amendment to the Constitution on
this subject.  It was in these words: "Representatives and direct
taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be
included within this Union according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each State--excluding Indians
not taxed; provided, that whenever the elective franchise shall be
denied or abridged in any State on account of race or color, all
persons of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of
representation."  The amendment was substantially the second form of
that proposed by Mr. Conkling.  He was a member of the Reconstruction
Committee and opened the discussion on the subject with a carefully
prepared speech.  The peculiar feature of this amendment was that if
any portion of the people should be excluded by reason of race or
color, every individual of that race or color would be excluded from
the basis of apportionment.  As Mr. Stevens expressed it, if one man
should be excluded from the ballot-box on account of his race, then
the whole race should be excluded from the basis of apportionment.

The proposition led to a long debate, the differences being to a great
extent among members on the Republican side.  Mr. Jenckes of Rhode
Island objected to it, because it would not effect the object aimed
at.  "Suppose," said he, "this amendment is adopted by three-fourths
of the States and becomes a part of the Constitution, and after its
adoption the State of South Carolina should re-instate her old
constitution, striking out the word 'white,' and re-establishing the
property qualification of fifty acres of land or town-lots or the
payment of taxes, there would then be no discrimination of color in
South Carolina; yet, while the number of her voters would not be
enlarged five hundred, the representation would be exactly as it is,
with the addition of two-fifths of the enfranchised freedmen."  Mr.
Blaine objected that "if by ordinary fair play we exclude any class
from the basis of representation they should be excluded from the
basis of taxation, and therefore we should strike out the word 'taxes.'
Ever since the Government was founded taxation and representation
have gone hand in hand.  If we exclude that principle from this
amendment we shall be accused of narrow, illiberal, mean-spirited,
money-grasping policy."

Mr. Donnelly of Minnesota supported the measure, not as a finality
but as a partial step,--as one of a series of necessary laws.  Mr.
Sloan of Wisconsin made an urgent argument for the basing of
representation upon voters, "as those voters are determined by the
States."  Mr. John Baker of Illinois objected to the amendment,
because it "leaves any State of the Union perfectly free to narrow
her suffrage to any extent she pleases, imposing proprietary and other
disqualifying tests and strengthening her aristocratic power over the
people, provided only she steers clear of a test based on race or
color."  Mr. Ingersoll of Illinois followed the speech of his
colleague, Mr. Baker, by moving to add to the Constitutional amendment
these words: "and no State within this Union shall prescribe or
establish any property qualifications which may or shall in any way
abridge the elective franchise."  Mr. Jenckes of Rhode Island argued
against Mr. Ingersoll's amendment as needlessly abridging the power of
the States.  On the 24th of January Mr. Lawrence of Ohio moved that
"the pending resolution and all amendments be recommitted to the
Committee on Reconstruction, with instructions to report an amendment
to the Constitution, which shall, first, apportion direct taxation
among the States according to the property in each, and second,
apportion the representation among the States upon the basis of male
voters who may be citizens of the United States."

Mr. Shellabarger followed his colleague, giving objections to the
amendment as reported by the Committee on Reconstruction: "First, it
contemplates and provides for and in that way authorizes the States to
wholly disfranchise an entire race of people; second, the moral
teaching of the clause offends the free and just spirit of the age,
violates the foundation principle of our own Government and is
intrinsically wrong; third, associated with that clause in our
Constitution relating to the States being republican this amendment
makes it read thus: 'the United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a republican form of government, provided, however, that
a government shall be deemed republican when whole races of its people
are disfranchised, unrepresented and ignored.'"  Mr. Eliot of
Massachusetts moved an amendment that representation should be based
upon the whole number of persons, "and that the elective franchise
shall not be denied or abridged in any State on account of race or
color."

Mr. Pike of Maine made a strong speech against the amendment, the
spirit of which was in favor of declaring universal suffrage.  He
added to the illustrations already given of the inefficacy of the
proposed amendment to reach the desired end, one of special force
and pertinency.  "Suppose," said he, "this Constitutional amendment
to be in full force, and a State should provide that the right of
suffrage should not be exercised by any person who had been a slave
or who was the descendant of a slave, whatever his race or color?"
He suggested that it was "a serious matter to tell whether this simple
provision would not be sufficient to defeat the Constitutional
amendment which we here so laboriously enact and submit to the States."
Mr. Conkling argued that "the amendment we are proposing is not for
Greece or Rome, or anywhere where anybody besides Africans were held
as slaves.  It is to operate in this country, where one race, and
only one, has been held in servitude."  Mr. Pike replied that "in no
State has slavery been confined to one race."  "So far," added he,
"as I am acquainted with their statutes, slavery has not been confined
to the African race.  I have examined the matter with some care, and
I know of no slave-statute which says that Africans alone shall be
slaves.  Well-authenticated instances exist in every slave State,
where men of Caucasian descent, of Anglo-Saxon blood, have been
confined in slavery and they and their posterity held as slaves, so
that not only were free blacks found everywhere but white slaves
abounded."

On the 29th of January the debate closed, and the resolutions
originally reported from the Committee on Reconstruction, together with
the suggested amendments, were again referred to that committee.
Especial interest was taken by many members in the language proposed
by Mr. Schenck of Ohio: "Representatives shall be apportioned among
the several States which may be included within this Union, according
to the number of male citizens of the United States over twenty-one
years of age having the qualifications of electors of the most numerous
branch of the Legislature;" and also in the proposition of Mr. Broomall
of Pennsylvania, providing that "when the elective franchise shall be
denied by the constitution or laws of any State, to any proportion of
its male citizens over the age of twenty-one years, the same proportion
of its entire population shall be excluded from the basis of
representation."  Two days afterwards, on the 31st of January, Mr.
Stevens reported from the Joint Committee on Reconstruction the
proposition in this form: "Representatives shall be apportioned among
the several States which may be included within this Union according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State--excluding Indians not taxed; _provided that whenever the
elective franchise shall be denied or abridged in any State on account
of race or color, the persons therein of such race or color shall be
excluded from the basis of representation._"  Mr. Schenck submitted his
amendment basing apportionment upon the number of male citizen of the
United States who are voters, but it was rejected by an overwhelming
vote, only twenty-nine of the entire House voting in the affirmative.
The amendment, as reported from the committee, was then adopted,--yeas
120, nays 46.  It was substantially a party division, though some
half-dozen Republicans voted in the negative.

The amendment reached the Senate on the thirty-first day of January and
on the sixth of February was taken up for consideration.  Mr.
Fessenden, chairman of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, was
entitled to open the debate, but yielded to Mr. Sumner.  Mr. Sumner,
with his rigid adherence to principle, opposed the amendment.  "Knowing
as I do," said he, "the eminent character of the committee which
reports this amendment, its intelligence, its patriotism and the moral
instincts by which it is moved, I am at a loss to understand the origin
of a proposition which seems to me nothing else than another compromise
of human rights, as if the country had not already paid enough in
costly treasure and more costly blood for such compromise in the past."
He declared that he was "painfully impressed by the discord and
defilement which the amendment would introduce into the Constitution."
He quoted the declaration of Madison in the convention of 1787, that it
was wrong to admit into the Constitution the idea of property in man.
"Of all that has come to us from that historic convention, where
Washington sat as President and Franklin and Hamilton sat as members,
there is nothing having so much of imperishable charm.  It was wrong to
admit into the Constitution the idea than man could hold property in
man.  Accordingly, in this spirit the Constitution was framed.  This
offensive idea was not admitted.  The text at least was kept blameless.
And now, after generations have passed, surrounded by the light of
Christian truth and in the very blaze of human freedom, it is proposed
to admit into the Constitution the twin idea of inequality in rights,
and thus openly set at naught the first principles of the Declaration
of Independence and the guarantee of republican government itself,
while you blot out a whole race politically.  For some time we have
been carefully expunging from the statute-books the word 'white,' and
now it is proposed to insert into the Constitution itself a distinction
of color."

Upon this foundation Mr. Sumner spoke at great length, his speech
filling forty-one columns of the _Congressional Globe_.  It would
hardly be proper indeed to call it a speech.  It was a great historic
review of the foundation of the Republics of the world, an exhaustive
analysis of what constituted a true republic, closing with an eloquent
plea for the ballot for the freedmen.  He demanded "enfranchisement
for the sake of the public security and public faith."  He pleaded for
the ballot as "the great guarantee."  The ballot, he declared, "is a
peacemaker, a schoolmaster, a protector."  "Show me," said he, as he
approached the conclusion of his speech--"show me a creature with erect
countenance and looking to heaven, made in the image of God, and I show
you a man who, of whatever country or race--whether darkened by
equatorial sun or blanched with the northern cold--is an equal with you
before the heavenly Father, and equally with you entitled to all the
rights of human nature." . . . "You cannot deny these rights without
impiety.  God has so linked the National welfare with National duty
that you cannot deny these rights without peril to the Republic.  It is
not enough that you have given liberty.  By the same title that we
claim liberty do we claim equality also. . . . The Roman Cato, after
declaring his belief in the immortality of the soul, added, that if
this were an error it was an error that he loved; and now, declaring
my belief in liberty and equality as the God-given birthright of all
men, let me say in the same spirit, if this be an error it is an error
which I love; if this be a fault it is a fault which I shall be slow to
renounce; if this be an illusion it is an illusion which I pray may
wrap the world in its angelic form."

Mr. Sumner's speech may be regarded as an exhaustive and masterly
essay, unfolding and illustrating the doctrine of human rights.  As
such it remains a treatise of great value; but as a political
argument calculated to shape and determine the legislation of Congress,
it was singularly inapt.  As a counter-proposition he submitted a
preamble and joint resolution in these words: "Whereas it is provided
by the Constitution that the United States shall guarantee to every
State of the Union a republican form of government, and whereas, by
reason of the failure of certain States to maintain governments which
Congress might recognize, it has become the duty of the United States,
standing in the place of guarantor," . . . "Therefore be it resolved,
that there shall be no oligarchy, aristocracy, caste or monopoly
invested with peculiar privileges or powers, and there shall be no
denial of rights, civil or political, on account of race or color
within the limits of the United States or the jurisdiction thereof,
but all persons therein shall be equal before the law, whether in the
court-room or at the ballot-box, and this statute, made in pursuance
of the Constitution, shall be the supreme law of the land, any thing
in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

Mr. Fessenden replied to Mr. Sumner in an elaborate speech in
justification of the amendment proposed by the Reconstruction
Committee.  His argument was marked with all his peculiar ability,
and the two speeches contain within themselves the fullest exposition
of the difference in mental quality of the two eminent New-England
statesmen who were so long rivals in the Senate of the United States.
Mr. Fessenden was above all things practical; he was unwilling at any
time to engage in legislation that was not effective and direct; he
had no sympathy with mere declarations, was absolutely free from the
vanity so often exhibited in legislative bodies, of speaking when there
was no question before the body for decision, or of submitting
resolutions merely in response to a popular sentiment, without
effecting any valuable result.  In short, Congress was with him a
law-making body.  It met for that business and so far as he could
direct its proceedings, Mr. Fessenden, as chairman at different times
of leading committees, held it to its work.  He was felicitous with his
pen beyond the rhetorical power of Mr. Sumner, though not so deeply
read, nor so broad in scholarship and general culture.

He made an able argument for the pending amendment as the most
effective method of bringing the South to do justice to the colored
race.  He believed that if the Southern States should feel that they
could derive larger political power in the Government of the United
States by admitting colored men to the elective franchise, they would
in time conclude to do so; and doing so they would be compelled in the
mere process to realize their indebtment to that race, and thus from
self-interest, if not from a sense of justice, would extend equal
protection to the whole population.  Mr. Fessenden could not refrain
from some good-natured ridicule of the declaratory resolutions which
Mr. Sumner had offered.  "Sir," said he, "does the Constitution
authorize oligarchy, aristocracy, caste or monopoly?  Not at all.  Are
you not as safe under the Constitution as you are under an Act of
Congress?  Why re-enact the Constitution merely to put it in a bill?
What do you accomplish by it?  What remedy does it afford?  It is
merely as if it read this way: 'Whereas it is provided in the
Constitution that the United States shall guarantee to every State of
the Union a republican form of government, therefore we declare that
there shall be a republican form of government, and nothing else.'
That is all there is of it.  Of what particular use it is as a bill,
practically, is more than I can tell.  I presume the Honorable
Senator from Massachusetts will very easily explain it, but it reminds
me (I say it with all due respect to him) of a political travesty of
a law argument by an eminent lawyer of his own State, running somewhat
in this way;--

  'Let my opponents do their worst,
   Still my first point is point the first,
   Which fully proves my case, because,
   All statute laws are statute laws.'

The _sequitur_ is obvious,--the case is proved because, inasmuch as the
Constitution provides that there shall be no aristocracy, no oligarchy,
no monopoly, therefore Congress has resolved that there shall not be
any thing of the kind."

Mr. Fessenden would not admit the essential justice of the argument
which Mr. Sumner made in behalf of universal suffrage, and showed that
he was not consistent in the ground which he took.  "While," said he,
"the Honorable Senator from Massachusetts argued with great force that
every man should have the right of suffrage, his argument, connected
with the other principle that he laid down, and the application of it,
--that taxation and representation should go together,--would apply
with equal force and equal equity to woman as to man; but I notice that
the Honorable Senator carefully and skillfully evaded that part of the
proposition.  If a necessary connection between taxation and
representation applies to the individuals in a State, and that is the
application which the Honorable Senator made of it,--an application
never made by our ancestors, but applied by them to communities and
not to individuals,--I should like him to tell me why, according to
his own argument, every female that is taxed should not be allowed to
have the right of suffrage."

"There are," said Mr. Fessenden, "but two propositions to be considered
in the pending amendment; one is whether you will base representation
on voters, and the other is the proposition which is before the Senate.
I suppose the proposition to base representation upon actual voters
would commend itself to the Honorable Senator from Massachusetts.  I
believe I have in my desk a proposition he made to amend the
Constitution (laid before the Senate so early in the session that the
bell which called us together had hardly struck its note before it was
laid upon the table), in which he proposed that representation in the
United States should be based on voters.  Let me ask him if that does
not leave in the hands of the States the same power that exists there
now, and has existed heretofore?  What is the difference?  How does the
Honorable Senator find the pending proposition so objectionable, and
the one he offered so suitable to accomplish the purpose which he
desires to accomplish?  The two propositions, in respect to the point
upon which the gentleman has made his speech, are identical in effect."

The Constitutional amendment was debated earnestly until the 9th of
March.  One of the boldest and most notable speeches was made by Mr.
Henderson of Missouri, who surprised the Senate by taking a more
radical ground than the Reconstruction Committee.  He moved the
following as a substitute for the committee's proposition to amend
the Constitution: "_No State, in prescribing the qualifications
requisite for electors therein, shall discriminate against any person
on account of color or race._"  Mr. Henderson, though representing a
State lately slave-holding, was in advance of the majority of his
associates from the free States; but he defended his amendment with
great ability.  He said, "I am aware that the Senate will vote it
down now.  Let them vote it down.  It will not be five years from
to-day before this body will vote for it.  You cannot get along without
it.  You may adopt the other proposition, but the States will not
accept it.  The Northern States in my judgement will not accept it,
because they will misapprehend the meaning of it."  When the vote was
reached ten senators, including Mr. Henderson, sustained his
proposition in favor of negro suffrage.  The resolution of the
Reconstruction Committee, after several attempts to modify it, came
to a vote,--_yeas_ 25, _nays_ 22.  Two-thirds being required the
amendment was defeated.  A reconsideration was made for the purpose
of resuming the discussion, but the resolution was never taken up
again, having become merged in a new proposition.

Pending the consideration of the Constitutional amendment so long
before Congress, the Reconstruction Committee reported, and both
Houses of Congress agreed to adopt, a resolution declaring that "No
senator or representative shall be admitted into either branch of
Congress from any of said States until Congress shall have declared
such State entitled to representation."  It was the pressure of the
State of Tennessee for admission which brought about this declaration.
Her condition was regarded as peculiar, and her senators and
representatives were seeking admission to their appropriate bodies,
claiming exemption from the general requirements of the
Reconstruction policy, because they had, without the aid of Congress,
established a loyal State government.  This was regarded as totally
inexpedient, and the committee reported the resolution, as they
declared, "in order to close agitation upon a question which seems
likely to disturb the action of the Government, as well as to quiet
the uncertainty which is agitating the minds of the people of the
eleven States which have been declared to be in insurrection."  The
objection to this course was, that in a certain degree it involved the
renunciation on the part of both Senate and House of their right to
be the exclusive judge of the qualification of members of their
respective bodies.  Mr. Stevens was the author of the resolution and it
really included, as its essential basis, the view which he had so
strenuously insisted upon, that the insurrectionary States must be
treated by Congress, in all that related to their restoration to the
Union, as if they were new States seeking admission for the first time.
Instead of each House acting as the judge of the qualifications of its
members, both Houses agreed that neither should take a step in that
regard until there had been common action declaring the State entitled
to representation.  A similar proposition at the opening of the session
had been defeated in the Senate: its ready adoption now showed how the
contest between the President and Congress was driving the latter day
by day to more radical positions.

After the defeat in the Senate of the amendment touching
representation, and the postponement by the House of another amendment
reported from the Committee on Reconstruction touching the protection
of citizens in their rights and immunities, there was a general
cassation of discussion on the question of changing the Constitution,
and a common understanding in both branches to await the formal and
final report of the Committee.  That report was made by Mr. Stevens
on Monday, the 30th of April.(1)  It consisted of a joint resolution
proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in
which were consolidated under one article the several amendments which
had been proposed, and which in their aggregate, as finally shaped,
made up the famous Fourteenth Amendment.  In addition to this was a
bill reciting the desirability of restoring the lately revolted States
to full participation in all political rights, and enacting in
substance that when the Constitutional amendment should be agreed to by
them, their senators and representatives in Congress might be admitted.
A further bill was reported, declaring certain persons who had been
engaged in rebellion to be ineligible to office under the Government
of the United States.

The debate on the consolidated Fourteenth Amendment was opened on the
8th of May by Mr. Stevens.  The House had agreed that all speeches
should be limited to half an hour.  The debate was therefore condensed
and direct.  Mr. Stevens complained of the Senate for having defeated
the amendment relating to representation, and though assenting to
that which was now reported by the committee, thought it inferior to,
and less effective than, the one which had failed.  The third section
he thought too lenient.  "There is," said he, "a morbid sensibility
sometimes called mercy, which affects a few of all classes from the
priest to the clown, which has more sympathy for the murderer on the
gallows than for his victim.  I hope I have a heart as capable of
feeling for human woe as others.  I have long since wished that
capital punishment were abolished.  But I never dreamed that all
punishment could be dispensed with in human society.  Anarchy, treason
and violence would reign triumphant.  The punishment now prescribed
is the mildest ever inflicted upon traitors.  I might not consent
to the extreme severity pronounced upon them by a provisional
Governor of Tennessee--I mean the late lamented Andrew Johnson of
blessed memory--but I would have increased the severity in this
section. . . . In my judgment we do not sufficiently protect the loyal
men in the rebel States from the vindictive persecutions of their
rebel neighbors."

Mr. Blaine of Maine called the attention of Mr. Stevens to the fact
that on the 17th of July, 1862, Congress had passed an Act of which the
following was one section: "That the President is hereby authorized,
at any time hereafter, by proclamation, to extend to persons who may
have participated in the existing rebellion in any State or part
thereof, pardon and amnesty, with such exceptions, at such times and
on such conditions as he may deem expedient for the public welfare."
"Under and in pursuance of this Act," said Mr. Blaine, "the late
President Lincoln issued a proclamation granting a great number of
pardons upon certain specified conditions, and subsequently President
Johnson issued his celebrated amnesty proclamation granting pardons to
certain specified classes in the South that had participated in the
Rebellion. . . . Do we not by the proposed action place ourselves in
the attitude of taking back by Constitutional amendment that which has
been given by Act of Congress, and by Presidential proclamation issued
in pursuance of the law? and will not this be justly subjected to the
charge of bad faith on the part of the Federal Government?"

Mr. Stevens replied that a pardon, whether by the President having the
power or specifically by Act of Parliament or Congress, extinguishes
the crime.  "After that," said he, "there is no such crime in the
individual.  A man steals and he is pardoned.  He is not then a thief
and you cannot call him a thief, or if you do you are liable to an
action for slander.  None of those who have been fully pardoned are
affected by this provision."

Mr. Blaine replied that the Constitutional amendment would be held to
override the President's proclamation, being organic in its nature and
therefore supreme.  "That," said Mr. Blaine, "is my understanding and
that, it seems to me, would be the legal construction; but if the
gentleman from Pennsylvania is correct, then I maintain that it is
the bounded duty of this House to make the language so plain that he
who runs may read--that there may be no doubt about its construction."

Mr. Garfield said that "the point made by the gentleman from Maine
shows that, whatever may be the intention of the committee or of the
House, the section is at least susceptible of double construction.
Some may say that it revokes and nullifies in part the pardons that
have already been granted in accordance with law and the proclamation
of the President.  Others may say that it does not apply to the rebels
who have been pardoned."

Mr. Stevens interrupted Mr. Garfield and said, "I was not perhaps
sufficiently explicit in what I stated in answer to the interrogatory
of the gentleman from Maine.  I admit that a pardon removes all
liability to punishment for a crime committed, but there is a vast
difference between punishment for a crime and withholding a privilege.
While I admit that the pardon will be full and operative so far as
the crime is concerned, it offers no other advantage than an exemption
from punishment for the crime itself."

Mr. Garfield, resuming, said that he was about to remark that "if the
section does not apply to those who have been pardoned then it would
apply to so small a number of people as to make it of no practical
value, for the excepted classes in the general system of pardons form
a very small fraction of the rebels."

Mr. Boyer, a Democratic member from Pennsylvania, declared that the
effect of the amendment if adopted would be to disfranchise for a
period of four years nine-tenths of the voting population of eleven
States.

The point was subsequently alluded to by the leading lawyers of the
House, with the general admission that, whatever might have been the
implied pledge of the President or of Congress, or whatever might be
the effect of the pardon of the President, it did not in any limit
the power of the people to amend their Constitution.  To the
proposition to exclude those who had been engaged in the Rebellion
from the right of suffrage for National office until 1870, there was
a strong hostility from two classes--one class opposing because it was
a needless proscription, and the other, equally large, because it did
not go far enough in proscribing those who had been guilty of
rebellion.  The amendment came to a vote on the 10th of May and the
result was 128 _ayes_ to 37 _noes_.  Not a single Republican vote was
cast against it.  Mr. Raymond voted in the affirmative, and his ringing
response elicited loud applause both on the floor and in the galleries.

When the Senate proceeded to consider the Constitutional amendment it
soon became evident that it could not be adopted in the form in which
it came from the House.  The first important change was suggested by
Mr. Howard of Michigan on behalf of the Senate members of the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction.  He proposed to prefix these words to the
first clause of the amendment: "All persons born in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the States wherein they reside."  Mr. Doolittle moved
to insert "excluding Indians not taxed," but Mr. Howard made a
pertinent reply that "Indians born within the limits of the United
States, who maintain their tribal affiliations, are not in the sense
of this amendment _born subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States._"  Mr. Doolittle's amendment was supported by only ten senators
on a call of the _ayes_ and _noes_, and the amendment proposed by Mr.
Howard was then agreed to without division.  Mr. Howard next proposed
to amend the second section of the constitutional amendment by striking
out the word "citizens" and inserting "inhabitants, being citizens of
the United States."  This was done, as Mr. Fessenden explained, "to
prevent a State from saying that though a person is a citizen of the
United States he is not a citizen of the State, and to make it conform
to the first clause as just amended."

Mr. Howard offered next to change the third clause as it came from the
House by inserting a substitute, which is precisely that which became
formally incorporated in the amendment as it passed.  Mr. Hendricks of
Indiana moved to amend by inserting after the word "shall" the words
"during the term of his office," so as to read, "shall, during the term
of his office, have engaged in insurrection or rebellion."  Mr.
Hendricks understood "the idea upon which this section rests, to be
that men who held office, and upon assuming the office took the oath
prescribed by the Constitution, became obligated by that oath to stand
by the Constitution and the oath," and that "going into the Rebellion
was not only a breach of their allegiance but a breach of their oath,"
and that "persons who had violated the oath to support the Constitution
of the United States ought not to be allowed to hold any office."  Mr.
Howard hoped the amendment would not be adopted.  "If," said he, "I
understand the senator from Indiana right, he holds that although a
person may have taken that Constitutional oath, if he has not committed
insurrection during the continuance of the term of his office, but
committed that act after the expiration of that term, the previous
taking of the oath by him adds to the act no additional moral guilt.  I
do not concur with him in that view.  It seems to me that where a
person has taken a solemn oath to support the Constitution of the
United States, there is a fair implication that he cannot afterwards
commit an act which in its effect would destroy the Constitution of the
United States, without incurring at least the moral guilt of perjury."

Mr. Reverdy Johnson supported Mr. Hendricks's amendment.  "The effect
of the amendment of the committee," said he, "would be to embrace
nine-tenths, perhaps, of the gentlemen of the South, to disfranchise
them until Congress shall think proper, by a majority of two-thirds
of each branch, to remove the restriction.  If the suggestion of the
senator from Indiana is not adopted," continued Mr. Johnson, "then all
who have at any time held any office under the United States, or who
have been in any branch of the Legislature of a State, which they
could not be without taking the oath required by the Constitution of
the United States, are to be excluded from holding the office or
senator or representative, or that of an elector for President or
Vice-President, or any office, civil or military, under the United
States." Mr. Fessenden reminded the senator from Maryland that the
provision, as proposed by the committee, included exactly those classes
to whom the obligation of an oath to support the Constitution was
prescribed in the sixth article of the Constitution, namely "Senators and
representatives and the members of the several State Legislatures, and
all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and the
several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this
Constitution."

Mr. Sherman of Ohio pointed out that the amendment of Mr. Hendricks
would exclude from the operation of the section those who had left the
army of the United States to join the Rebellion.  Mr. Hendricks's
amendment received but eight votes in the Senate, falling short of the
admitted Administration strength.  Mr. Reverdy Johnson moved to strike
out the words which included members of the State Legislatures, but
the amendment secured only ten votes.  He also moved to strike out the
words "having previously taken," and insert "at any time within ten
years preceding the 1st of January, 1861, had taken;" and this also
received but ten votes.  Mr. Van Winkle moved to amend so that a
majority of all the members elected to each House should be empowered
to remove the disability, instead of two-thirds as required by the
amendment.  This also received but ten votes.

In further discussion of the extent to which the pardon of the
President goes, Mr. Reverdy Johnson cited a case which had just been
argued by himself and others but was not yet decided, in the Supreme
Court of the United States, as to whether an attorney in that court
could be bound to take the ironclad oath as prescribed by Act of
Congress, January 24, 1865.  He had no doubt, he said, that the
operation of the pardon was to clear the party pardoned from the
obligation to take that oath.  The case referred to was that since
so widely known as _ex parte_ Garland, and decided by the Supreme
Court adversely to the Constitutionality of the statute.  Mr. Howe
of Wisconsin interrupted the senator from Maryland and asked him
whether he knew "of any authority which has gone to the extent of
declaring that either an amnesty or a pardon can impose any limitation
whatever upon the power of the people of the United States, through
an amendment to their Constitution, to fix the qualifications of
officers."  Mr. Johnson replied, "That is not the question to which
I spoke.  It is quite another inquiry.  I was speaking of the operation
of a _statute._"

Mr. Doolittle also answered his colleague by saying, "I know it may be
said that by an amendment to the Constitution, which is the supreme
law of the land, you can annul all existing rights.  You could,
perhaps, by an amendment to the Constitution, enact a provision which
would deprive individual citizens of their property, and vest the
whole of it in the Government of a State or in the Government of the
United States.  You might, perhaps, by a Constitutional amendment, pass
a bill of attainder by which certain men would be sentenced to death
and to corruption of blood.  But, sir, would it be right?  That is the
question."  Mr. Doolittle was discussing it on the ground of its moral
rightfulness and not upon the ground of the power of the people to
amend their Constitution.  An attempt was made to insert the word
"voluntarily" in the amendment, so that only those would be under
disabilities who had voluntarily taken part in the Rebellion; but this
received only ten votes.  The Senate rejected it for the obvious reason
that it would open the entire amendment to evasion.

The amendment, as supported by Mr. Howard, was finally agreed to with
only ten votes in the negative.  Mr. Hendricks, in lieu of the
amendment on the subject of representation, moved to add a clause
excluding two-fifths of "such persons as have been discharged from
involuntary servitude since the year 1861, and to whom the elective
franchise may be denied."  He did this in order that representation
should be maintained on the same numerical basis that existed before
the war.  The amendment was rejected without a division.  Mr. Doolittle
offered an amendment on the subject of representation, embodying the
two propositions of making voters the basis of representation and
providing that "direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States according to the value of the real and personal taxable property
situated in each State, not belonging to the State or to the United
States;" but after elaborate debate it received only seven votes.  On
motion of Mr. Williams of Oregon the amendment to section two was still
further amended by substituting the words "the right to vote" for
"elective franchise," as already agreed to.  Mr. Clarke of New
Hampshire, who had shown throughout the discussion great aptness at
draughting Constitutional provisions in appropriate language, now
moved to substitute for section four, which had gone through various
mutations not necessary to recount here, the precise section as it now
stands in the Constitution.

In the course of the discussion Mr. Doolittle had moved that in
imposing political disabilities, those should be excepted "who have
duly received pardon and amnesty under the Constitution and laws."
He had just admitted the broadest possible power of a Constitutional
amendment duly adopted, and, recognizing that the amendment as it stood
would certainly include those who had received pardon from the
President, desired to avert that result.  His amendment was very
briefly debated and on a call of the _ayes_ and _noes_ received only
ten votes.  The effect of this vote unmistakably settled, in the
judgment of the law-making power of the Government, that the operation
of the Fourteenth Amendment would not in the least degree be affected
by the President's pardon.  Before the proposed amendment of Mr.
Doolittle, Mr. Saulsbury had tested the sense of the Senate practically
on the same point, by moving to make the clause of the amendment read
thus: "Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House and the
President may by the exercise of the pardoning power, remove such
disabilities;" but it was rejected by a large majority, and every
proposition to permit the pardon of the President to affect the
disabilities prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment in any way whatever
was promptly overruled.

As a result of this decision, Southern men who, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, had incurred disabilities by reason of participation in the
Rebellion, _could not assume office under the National Government until
their disabilities should be removed by a vote of two-thirds of the
Senate and House of Representatives, even though they had previously
been pardoned by the President._  The language of the amendment, the
very careful form in which the tense was expressed, appeared to leave
no other meaning possible, and the intention of legislators was
definitively established by the negative votes already referred to.
The intention indeed was in no wise to interfere with the pardon of the
President, leaving to that its full scope in the remission of penalty
which it secured to those engaged in the Rebellion.  The pertinent
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was regarded as merely prescribing
a qualification for office, and the Constitutional lawyers considered
it to be within the scope of the amending power as much as it would be
to change the age at which a citizen would be eligible to the Senate
or the House of Representatives.(2)

One of the singular features attending the discussion and formation
of this amendment, was that all the Democratic senators preferred the
third section as embodied in the Constitutional amendment finally
passed, to that which had been proposed as it passed the House.  The
amendment could not probably be incorporated in the Constitution for
a year and according to the original proposition of the House,
therefore, it would only have excluded those who participated in the
Rebellion from the ballot-box for a period of three years,--until the
4th of July, 1870; whereas the third section, as adopted, perpetually
excluded the great mass of the leading men of the South from holding
public office, either in Nation or State, unless their disabilities
should be removed by a vote of two-thirds in each House of Congress.
No adequate explanation was given for the preference, and the final
vote substituting that which was incorporated in the Constitution for
the House proposition was 42 in the affirmative to 1 in the negative.
The negative vote was given by Reverdy Johnson; while such staunch
Democrats as Guthrie of Kentucky, Hendricks of Indiana, McDougal of
California and Willard Saulsbury of Delaware voted to prefer the one
to the other.  Mr. Johnson afterward explained that he voted under a
misapprehension; so that the substitution was made, in effect, by a
unanimous vote of the Senate.

On the final passage in the Senate of the consolidated amendment the
_ayes_ were 33 and the _noes_ 11.  When the amendment was returned to
the House, Mr. Stevens briefly explained the changes that had been made
in the Senate.  The first section was altered to define who are
citizens of the United States and of the States.  Mr. Stevens declared
this to be an excellent amendment, long needed to settle conflicting
decisions between the several States and the United States.  He said
the second section had received but slight alteration.  "I wish," he
continued, "it had received none.  It contains much less power than I
could wish.  It has not half the vigor of the amendment which was lost
in the Senate."  The third section, he said, had been wholly changed
by substituting the ineligibility of certain high officials for the
disfranchisement of all rebels until 1870.  Mr. Stevens declared that
he could not look upon this as an improvement.  "It opens the elective
franchise to such as the States may choose to admit.  In my judgment
it endangers the government of the country, both State and National,
and may give the next Congress and President to the reconstructed
rebels."  The fourth section, "which renders inviolable the public debt
and repudiates the rebel debt, will secure the approbation of all but
traitors."  "While I see," concluded Mr. Stevens, "much good in the
proposition I do not pretend to be satisfied with it; yet I am anxious
for its speedy adoption, for I dread delay.  The danger is that before
any Constitutional guard shall have been adopted, Congress will be
flooded by rebels and rebel sympathizers."  The House came to a final
test on the Senate amendments on the 13th of June and concurred in all
of them by a single vote--_ayes_ 120, _noes_ 32.  The work of Congress
in securing the Fourteenth Amendment was thus made complete.

The Constitutional amendment not requiring the assent of the President
(for the good reason that the two-thirds of each House which can
override a veto are here required in advance), was submitted to the
Senate without delay.  The notification to the States was dated June
16th.  Connecticut was the first to assent to the amendment.--her
Legislature being in session and her ratification made complete on the
30th,--precisely a fortnight from the date of submission.  New
Hampshire followed on the 7th of July.  The third State was Tennessee.
Her Legislature ratified the amendment on the 19th of July, by a vote
of 58 to 17, counting both branches.  Many of the States would
doubtless have held extra sessions of their Legislatures to expedite
the adoption of the amendment if such a course had been considered
desirable by the leading members of Congress.  It was deemed best,
however, to leave the question open to discussion and deliberation, in
order that the provisions of the amendment, in all their length and
breadth, should be completely understood by the people before the
formal assent of the States should be urged.  The three States named
were the only ones which ratified the amendment before Congress
adjourned.(3)

When the Reconstruction Committee reported the Fourteenth Amendment,
they reported with it a bill declaring that "whenever said amendment
shall become a part of the Constitution of the United States, and
any State lately in insurrection shall have ratified the same and shall
have modified its constitution and laws in conformity therewith," such
State should be admitted to representation.  There had been during the
entire session of Congress a disposition to make an exception in favor
of the State of Tennessee.  She had of her own motion elected her loyal
governor, and now for a year and a half the administration of the State
was in a comparative degree orderly and regular.  When telegraphic
intelligence of the action of the Tennessee Legislature reached the
Capitol Mr. Bingham of Ohio moved a joint resolution, reciting in
effect by preamble, that as the "State of Tennessee has in good faith
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, and has also shown to the
satisfaction of Congress, by a proper spirit of obedience in the body
of her people, her return to due allegiance to the Government, laws
and authority of the United States; therefore, be it resolved that the
State of Tennessee is hereby restored to her former, proper, practical
relations to the Union, and is again entitled to be represented in
Congress by senators and representatives duly elected and qualified,
upon their taking the oaths of office required by existing laws."  Mr.
Boutwell of Massachusetts desired to add a condition that Tennessee, as
a prerequisite to the privilege of representation, should provide "an
equal and just system of suffrage for the male citizens within its
jurisdiction who are not less than twenty-one years of age."  Mr.
Bingham declined to admit it, shutting off all amendments by the force
of the previous question, for which the House sustained his demand.
After a few hours' debate the House passed the joint resolution by 125
_ayes_ to 12 _noes_.  The Democrats all supported the measure, though
they objected strenuously to some of the implications of the preamble.
The few votes in the negative were given by some radical Republicans,
though Mr. Stevens, the leader of that wing of the party, supported
the bill.

When the bill admitting Tennessee reached the Senate, there was a
discussion of some length in regard to changing the preamble which had
been adopted by the House, the principal aim being to insert the
declaration that "said State Government can only be restored to its
former political relations in the Union by the consent of the law-making
power of the United States."  There was division among the Republican
senators in regard to the expedience of this change.  It was the
judgment of the more conservative Republicans who followed Mr.
Fessenden, that it was needless to risk a veto of an important bill of
this character by confronting the President with a distinct negative of
his own theory in a place where it practically availed nothing.  After
much discussion however it was concluded to change the preamble for
the sake of establishing a precedent in the first one of the
Confederate States restored to the right of representation in Congress.
The phrase, "hereby restored to her former, proper, practical relations
to the Union," was one much cherished, because it was the original
expression of Mr. Lincoln in his last public speech.  The House readily
concurred in the change of preamble.

The President accepted the challenge of his theory embodied in the
preamble, not by veto, but in the more innocent form of argument.
"If," said he, in a special message of July 25th, "the ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
be one of the conditions of admitting Tennessee, and if, as is also
declared by the preamble, said State Government can only be restored
to its former political relations to the Union by the consent of the
law-making power of the United States, it would really seem to follow
that the joint resolution, which at this late day has received the
sanction of Congress, should have been passed, approved and placed on
the statute-books before any amendment to the Constitution was
submitted to the State of Tennessee for ratification.  Otherwise the
inference is plainly deducible that while in the opinion of Congress
the people of a State may be too disloyal to be entitled to
representation, they may nevertheless have an equally potent voice
with other States in amending the Constitution, upon which so
essentially depends the stability, prosperity and very existence of
the nation."

The argument in the message was regarded as an ingenious censure of
Congress by the President, and was loudly applauded on the Democratic
side of the House.  He concluded by declaring that notwithstanding the
anomalous character of the resolution, he had affixed his signature to
it.  "My approval, however," he added, "is not to be construed as an
acknowledgment of the right of Congress to pass laws preliminary to the
admission of duly qualified representatives from any of the States."
The senators and representatives of the State were sworn in and took
their seats as soon as the President's message approving the bill was
read, and the reconstruction of Tennessee was complete.  She had
regained all her rights as a member of the Union, coming in through the
gateway of two Constitutional Amendments, the Thirteenth and the
Fourteenth.  It was evident from that moment that no one of the
Confederate States would ever again be admitted, so long as the
Republican party held power in the country, except by giving their
assent to the incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the
Constitution.  The bill from the Reconstruction Committee requiring
this as a condition was not enacted into law, but the admission of
Tennessee was a precedent stronger than law.  Of all the seceding
States Tennessee was held to be the least offending, and the feeling
of kindliness towards her had been manifest from the first among
Republicans.  It was evident therefore to the least observing, that
no other State which had been engaged in the Rebellion would be
permitted to resume the privilege of representation on less exacting
conditions than had been imposed on Tennessee.  It might be that their
own conduct would cause more exacting conditions to be imposed.

Congress adjourned on the 28th of July.  Elections were to be held
in the ensuing autumn for representatives to the Fortieth Congress,
and an opportunity was thus promptly afforded to test the popular
feeling on the issue raised by the President's plan of Reconstruction.
The appeal was to be made to the same constituency which two years
before had chosen him to the Vice-Presidency,--augmented by the vote
of Tennessee, now once more authorized to take part in electing the
representatives of the nation.  Seldom in the history of the country
has a weightier question been submitted to popular arbitrament;
seldom has a popular decision been evoked which was destined to
exercise so far-reaching an influence upon the progress of the nation,
upon the prosperity of the people.  It was not an ordinary political
contest between partisans of recognized and chronic hostility.  It was
a deadly struggle between the Executive and Legislative Departments of
the Government, both of which had been chosen by the same party.  This
peculiar fact imparted to the contest a degree of personal acrimony
and political rancor never before exhibited in the biennial election
of representatives in Congress.

[(1) The following is the form in which the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution (consolidated from various propositions previously
discussed) was originally reported from the Committee on Reconstruction
by Mr. Stevens:--

"ARTICLE XIV.

"SECT. 1.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

"SECT. 2.  Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed.  But whenever in any State the elective
franchise shall be denied to any portion of its male citizens not
less than twenty-one years of age, or in any way abridged, except for
participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation
in such State shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of such male citizens
not less than twenty-one years of age.

"SECT. 3.  Until the fourth day of July in the year 1870, all persons
who voluntarily adhered to the late insurrection, giving it aid and
comfort, shall be excluded from the right to vote for representatives
in Congress and for electors for President and Vice-President of the
United States.

"SECT. 4.  Neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay
any debt or obligation already incurred, or which may hereafter be
incurred, in aid of insurrection or war against the United States, or
any claim for compensation for loss of involuntary service or labor.

"SECT. 5.  The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."]

[(2) Among the prominent Southern men who had received the pardon of the
President, and who, desiring to hold office under the National
Government, had their disabilities under the Fourteenth Amendment
subsequently removed by Congress, were: M. C. Butler, James L. Orr,
and William Aitken of South Carolina; Joseph E. Brown, Henry W.
Hilliard, and Lafayette McLaws of Georgia; F. M. Cockrell, George G.
Vest, and John B. Clarke of Missouri; J. D. C. Atkins and George Maney
of Tennessee; Randall Gibson of Louisiana; Otho R. Singleton of
Mississippi; Alexander R. Boteler of Virginia; Allen T. Caperton and
Charles J. Faulkner of West Virginia; M. W. Ransom, Thomas S. Ashe,
and A. M. Scales of North Carolina; W. B. Machen of Kentucky; John T.
Morgan and James L. Pugh of Alabama.

These gentlemen had all held high positions either in the civil or
military service of the Confederacy.  A great number of additional
names might be cited of persons who, having been fully pardoned by the
President, were afterwards relieved of their disabilities by Congress.
The names quoted are but a few of the more conspicuous of those who
have, since the Rebellion, held high official positions under the
Government of the United States.]

[(3) The form of the Fourteenth Amendment, as finally agreed upon by
Congress and submitted to the States for ratification, is as follows:--

"ARTICLE XIV.

"SECT. 1.  All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

"SECT. 2.  Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective number, counting the whole number
of persons in each, excluding Indians not taxed.  But when the right
to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and
Vice-President of the United States, representatives in congress, the
executive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion,
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced
in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to
the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such
State.

"SECT. 3.  No person shall be a senator or representative in Congress,
or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil
or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of
the United States, or as a member of any State Legislature, or as an
executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution
of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.  But
Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds in each House, remove such
disability.

"SECT. 4.  The validity of the public debt of the United States,
authorized by law, including debts incurred for the payment of
pensions, and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or
rebellion, shall not be questioned.  But neither the United States
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in
aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts,
obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void.

"SECT. 5.  The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."]


CHAPTER X.

The hostility of the President to all measures which the Republican
party deemed necessary for the proper reconstruction of the Southern
States, had made a deep impression upon certain members of his Cabinet,
and before midsummer it was known that a crisis was impeding.  On the
11th of July Mr. William Dennison, the Postmaster-general, tendered his
resignation, alleging as the chief cause the difference of opinion
between himself and the President in regard to the proposed Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.  He had for some months felt that it
would be impossible for him to co-operate with the President, and the
relations between them were no longer cordial, if they were not indeed
positively hostile.  Alexander W. Randall of Wisconsin, the first
assistant Postmaster-general, was an outspoken supporter of the
measures of the Administration, and was using every effort to prejudice
Mr. Johnson's mind against Mr. Dennison, whom he was ambitious to
succeed.  Mr. Dennison felt that he was seriously compromising his
position at home by remaining in the Cabinet, though he had been urged
to that course by some zealous opponents of the Administration, who
desired, as long as possible, to restrain the President from using the
patronage of the Government in aid of his policy.  Mr. Randall was
promptly nominated as Mr. Dennison's successor and proved, in all
respects, a faithful follower of his chief.

A week later Mr. James Speed resigned his post as Attorney-general.  He
had been regarded as very conservative on all pending issues relating
to Reconstruction, but he now saw plainly that the President was
inevitably drifting, not only to extreme views on the issue presented,
but to an evident alliance with the Democratic party and perhaps a
return to its ranks.  Against this course Mr. Speed revolted.  His
inheritance of Whig principles, his anti-slavery convictions, his
personal associations, all forbade his following the President in his
desertion of the Republican party.  He saw his duty, and promptly
retired from a position which he felt that he could not hold with
personal consistency and honor.  His successor was Henry Stanbery of
Ohio, a lawyer of high reputation and a gentleman of unsullied
character.  He belonged to that association of old Whigs who, in
their extreme conservatism on the slavery question, had been driven
to a practical union with the Democratic party.

A few days after Mr. Speed's resignation Mr. James Harlan retired from
the Interior Department.  He would have broken his relations with the
President long before, but for the same cause that had detained Mr.
Dennison.  He was extremely reluctant to surrender the large patronage
of the Interior Department to the control of a successor who would
undoubtedly use it to promote the Reconstruction policy of the
President, just as Mr. Randall would use the patronage of the Post-office
Department.  Mr. Harlan had therefore remained in the Cabinet as
long as was consistent with his personal dignity, for the purpose of
protecting the Republican principles which the President and he were
alike pledged to uphold.  He was succeeded by Mr. Orville H. Browning
of Illinois, who had been a devoted friend of Mr. Lincoln, and had done
much to secure his nomination at Chicago.  He had served for two years
in the Senate after the death of Mr. Douglas, and but for the immediate
control over his course by President Lincoln would have been a co-laborer
with those who were hostile to the mode in which the war was prosecuted.
His faith in Mr. Lincoln, his great admiration for his talents and
his strong personal attachment to him, had for the time maintained
Mr. Browning in loyalty to the Republican party; but with the
restraining influence of the great President gone, Mr. Browning, by
reason of his prejudices not less than his convictions, at once
affiliated and co-operated with the Democratic party.  He was a man of
fair ability and of honorable intentions, but always narrow in his
views of public policy.  Any thing that could possibly be considered
radical inevitably encountered his hostility.

The political campaign of 1866 was one of greater excitement than had
ever been witnessed in this country, except in the election of a
President.  The chief interest was in choosing members of the House of
Representatives for the Fortieth Congress, and in controlling the
Legislatures which were to choose senators of the United States and
pass upon the Fourteenth Amendment.  In elections of this character,
even in periods of deepest interest, the demonstrations of popular
feeling are confined to the respective States, but in this instance
there were no less than four National Convention, three of them, at
least, of imposing magnitude and exerting great influence on popular
action.

The first was called by the friends of President Johnson to meet in
Philadelphia on the 14th of August.  The object was to effect a
complete consolidation of the Administration Republicans and the
Democratic party, under the claim that they were the true conservators
of the Union, and that the mass of the Republican party, in opposing
President Johnson, were endangering the stability of the Government.
A large majority of the delegates composing the convention were
well-known Democrats, and they were re-enforced by some prominent
Republicans, who had left their party and followed the personal
fortunes of President Johnson.  The most conspicuous of these were
Montgomery Blair (who for some years had been acting with the
Republicans), Thurlow Weed, Marshall O. Roberts, Henry J. Raymond,
John A. Dix and Robert S. Hale in New York, Edgar Cowan of
Pennsylvania, James R. Doolittle and Alexander W. Randall of Wisconsin,
O. H. Browning of Illinois, and James Dixon of Connecticut.  The
Democrats were not only overwhelmingly in the majority, but they had a
very large representation of the leaders of the party in several
States.  So considerable a proportion of the whole number were men who
had been noticeably active as opponents of Mr. Lincoln's
Administration, that the convention was popularly described as a
gathering of malignant copperheads, who, during the war, could not have
assembled in the city where they were now hospitably received, without
creating a riot.  Among the most conspicuous and most offensive of this
latter class,--those who had especially distinguished themselves for
the bitterness, and in some cases for the vulgarity, of their personal
assaults upon Mr. Lincoln,--were Mr. Vallandingham of Ohio, Fernando
Wood, Benjamin Wood and James Brooks of New York, Edmund Burke and John
G. Sinclair of New Hampshire, Edward J. Phelps of Vermont, George W.
Woodward, Francis W. Hughes and James Campbell of Pennsylvania, and
R. B. Carmichael of Maryland.  Among the leading Democrats, less noted
for virulent utterances against the President, were Samuel J. Tilden,
Dean Richmond and Sanford E. Church of New York, John P. Stockton and
Joel Parker of New Jersey, David R. Porter, William Bigler and Asa
Packer of Pennsylvania, James E. English of Connecticut, Robert C.
Winthrop and Josiah G. Abbott of Massachusetts, William Beach
Lawrence of Rhode Island, and Reverdy Johnson of Maryland.

Mr. Vallandingham's participation in the proceedings was met with
objection.  He had not spoken more violently and offensively against
President Lincoln and against the conduct of the war than some other
members of the convention, but his course had been so notorious and
had been rendered so odious by his punishment, both in being sent
beyond the rebel lines and afterwards in being defeated for governor
of his State by more than one hundred thousand majority, that many of
the delegates were not content to sit with him,--a sentiment which Mr.
Vallandingham is said to have considered one of mawkish sentimentality,
but one to which he deferred by quietly withdrawing from all
participation in the proceedings.  It was believed, and indeed openly
asserted, at the time, that if he had chosen to remain the attempt to
eject him by resolution, as was threatened, would have led to a
practical dissolution of the convention.

The work of the convention was embodied in a long series of resolutions
reported by Mr. Cowan of Pennsylvania, and an address prepared and read
by Mr. Henry J. Raymond.  Both the resolutions and the address simply
emphasized the issue already presented to the country by the
antagonistic attitude of the President and Congress.  In the
resolutions, in the address, and in all the speeches, the one refrain
was the right of every State to representation in Congress.  The
convention challenged the right of Congress to deny representation to
a State, for a single day after the war was ended and submission to
the National authority had been proclaimed throughout the area of the
Rebellion.  In every form in which the argument could be presented,
they disputed the right of power to attach any condition whatever to
the re-admission of the rebel States to a free participation in the
proceedings of Congress.  One of the resolutions declared that
"representation in the Congress of the United States or in the
Electoral College is a right recognized by the Constitution as abiding
in every State and as a duty imposed upon its people, fundamental in
its nature and essential to the exercise of our republican
institutions; and neither Congress nor the General Government has any
authority or power to deny the right to any State, or withhold its
enjoyment under the Constitution from the people thereof; and we call
upon the people of the United States to elect to Congress, as members
thereof, none but men who admit this fundamental right of
representation and who will receive to seats in Congress their loyal
representatives from every State in allegiance to the United States."
This sentiment was embodied in many forms in Mr. Raymond's address,
was, in fact, the one fundamental article in the creed of the
Administration and the Democratic party, and afforded the common ground
for their political co-operation.

Mr. Raymond undoubtedly marred the general effect of his address by
carrying his argument to an extreme point.  "It is alleged," said he,
"that the condition of the Southern States and people is not such
as renders safe their re-admission to a share in the government of the
country, that they are still disloyal in sentiment and purpose, and
that neither the honor, the credit, nor the interest of the Nation
would be safe if they were re-admitted to a share in its counsels."
Mr. Raymond maintained, even if the truth of this premise were granted,
that it was sufficient to reply that "we have no right, for such
reasons, to deny to any portion of the States or people rights
expressly conferred upon them by the Constitution of the United States,
and we have no right to distrust the purpose or the ability of the
people of the Union to protect and defend, under all contingencies and
by whatever means may be required, its honor and its welfare."

This assertion of the right of the Southern States to take part at
once and peremptorily in the legislation of a country they had sought
to ruin, was not conceded by the people of the loyal States.  They did
not require any refinement of argument to convince them that men who
attempt to destroy a Government should not be permitted at once to
share in its administration.  They believed that the Congress of the
United States would be guilty of a great wrong if it should
unconditionally surrender its power to the men who demanded admission
to peaceful control of the National only because they had failed to
disrupt it by war.  Mr. Raymond's personal friends and admirers, who
were not confined to any one party, were amazed at the recklessness of
his position.  He did violence to sound logic by claiming more than
was necessary to his argument, and he seriously injured his reputation
for political shrewdness by attempting to enforce a policy which grated
on the sensibilities and aroused the prejudices of the vast majority
of those who had filled the ranks of the Union Army.

Great advantage was expected by the President's supporters from
the fact that the convention, as they averred, was so truly
"National"--having delegates from every State of the Union.  This feature
was presented as in hurtful contrast with Republican conventions, whose
members came almost entirely from the loyal States.  A striking
spectacle was attempted by having members from Northern and Southern
States enter the great wigwam (which had been specially prepared for
the meetings of the convention) arm in arm.  To intensify the effect
Massachusetts and South Carolina headed the procession, General Couch
and ex-Speaker Orr typifying in this display the thorough cordiality
of Unionist and Confederate in the return of peace and amicable
relations.  The danger of all such exhibitions is that they may be
made a subject of ridicule.  This did not escape.  The "wigwam" was
parodied by the political wits of the Republican party as "Noah's Ark,"
into which there went, as described in Genesis, "_in two and two,_"
"_of clean beasts, and of beasts that are not clean, and of fowls, and
of every thing that creepeth upon the earth._"  The humor which this
comparison evoked was of a kind especially adapted to the stump and
was used most effectively.  Indeed the President's supporters, long
before the canvass closed, heartily regretted that they had ever
resorted to dramatic scenes as a method of promoting a political cause.

The convention of the President's supporters was followed a fortnight
later (September 3rd) in the same city--Philadelphia--by a still more
imposing assemblage called by the loyalists of the South, who, desiring
to explain their exact situation to co-operating friends, invited
delegations from the Northern States to meet them.  Prominent
Republicans from every loyal Commonwealth responded in full force to
these men who were endeavoring to reconstruct their States on an
enduring basis of Constitutional liberty.  Pennsylvania sent a
generous delegation as hosts to those who were to enjoy the
hospitalities of the State.  Governor Curtin haded the list.
Associated with him were General Geary, already named as his successor,
General Simon Cameron, at that time a private citizen, Colonel John
W. Forney, then editor of the _Philadelphia Press_, and representatives
from every Congressional district in the State.  Other States responded
with equal cordiality.  Senators Morgan and Harris, Horace Greeley,
and John Jacob Astor, came from New York.  Massachusetts sent her
governor, her senators, and all her living ex-governors.  It became,
indeed, the fashion for the New-England States to send governors and
ex-governors, and every State was represented in this way.  New Jersey
did likewise.  The Western States were fully represented by their
ablest and most zealous men.  Two future Presidents were on the
delegation from Ohio, with General Schenck and Stanley Matthews and
the influential German editor Frederick Hassaurek.  Oliver P. Morton
came from Indiana, Lyman Trumbull from Illinois, Fairchild and Howe
from Wisconsin, Zachariah Chandler and Carl Schurz (then editor of the
_Detroit Post_) from Michigan.  The border slave States sent strong
men.  N. B. Smithers came from Delaware; Senator Creswell, Francis
Thomas, and C. C. Fulton of the _Baltimore American_, from Maryland;
Governor Boreman, A. W. Campbell and Nathan Goff from West Virginia;
Robert J. Breckenridge accompanied ex-Attorney-general Speed from
Kentucky; while Missouri sent Governor Fletcher, sustained by an able
delegation, of whom Van Horn, Finkelnburg and Louis Gottschalk were
prominent members.  A number of business men, headed by E. W. Fox,
came from St. Louis.

Many of the Southern States were somewhat scantily represented.  It was
not safe in certain sections of the South to hold a convention for the
selection of delegates, and yet one or more appeared from every one of
the lately rebellious States.  Thomas J. Durant and H. C. Warmoth came
from Louisiana; D. H. Bingham and M. J. Safford from Alabama; G. W.
Ashburn from Georgia; and Governor A. J. Hamilton, Lorenzo Sherwood
and George W. Paschal from Texas.  Albion W. Tourgee, who has since won
a brilliant reputation in literature, came from North Carolina with a
strong delegation; J. W. Field and H. W. Davis from Mississippi.
Virginia and Tennessee, of the original Confederacy, sent a large
number of good men.  From the former came John Minor Botts, George W.
Somers, Lucius H. Chandler, Daniel H. Hoge, Lewis McKenzie, James M.
Stewart, and some hundred and fifty others; the latter was represented
by Governor Brownlow, Joseph S. Fowler, Samuel Arnell, A. W. Hawkins,
Thomas H. Benton, General John Eaton, Barbour Lewis, and many others
whose loyalty had been tested by many forms of personal peril.

These names give a fair indication of the character and weight of the
convention.  It was intended to be, and was, a representative body of
true Union men, of the men who had borne persecution for Loyalty's
sake, of the men who, having aided in achieving great victory, were
resolved that it should not fail to bear its legitimate fruits.  The
delegates from all the States first assembled in Independence Square,
and after a meeting of congratulation, marked by great enthusiasm,
proceeded to form into two conventions,--one containing the loyalists
who had called the convention, and the other the Northern delegates who
had met to welcome them.  Of the Southern Convention Mr. Thomas J.
Durant of Louisiana was selected as temporary chairman, and Honorable
James Speed of Kentucky as permanent chairman; and of the Northern
Convention Governor Curtis of Pennsylvania was both temporary and
permanent chairman.  The motive for thus separating was to leave the
Southern loyalists entirely untrammeled in their proceedings, in order
that their voice might have greater weight in the country than if it
were apparently directed by a large majority of Northern men assembling
in the same body with them.

The Northern Convention concluded its proceedings on the third day with
a mass-meeting larger than any that had ever assembled in Philadelphia.
The Southern Convention remained in session full five days.  The
interest was sustained from beginning to end, and besides the delegates
present, a vast assemblage of people thronged the streets of
Philadelphia during all the sessions of the conventions.  In an off
year, as partisans call it, there had never been seen so great
excitement, enthusiasm and earnestness in any political assemblage.
Mr. Durant called the Southern Convention to order with the same gavel
that had been used in the Secession Convention in South Carolina.
Governor Hamilton of Texas, who presented it for the occasion,
reminded his audience that the whirligig of time brings about its
revenges, and that it seemed a poetic retribution that a convention
of Southern loyalists should be called to order with the same
instrument that had rapped the South into disunion and anarchy.

On taking the chair as permanent president of the Southern Convention,
Mr. Speed spoke of the Administration, of which for the past few
months he had been a reluctant member, with a freedom which, during his
connection with it, would have been improper if not impossible.  He
described the late convention in this place as one with which "we could
not act."  "Why was that convention here?  It was here in part because
the great cry came up from the white man of the South,--My
Constitutional and my natural rights are denied me; and then the cry
came up from the black man of the South--My Constitutional and my
natural rights are denied me.  These complaints are utterly
antagonistic, the one to the other; and this convention is called to
say which is right.  Upon that question, if upon the truth as you feel
it, speak the truth as you know it, speak the truth as you love
permanent peace, as you may hope to establish the institutions of this
Government so that our children and our children's children shall enjoy
a peace that we have not known. . . . The convention to which I have
referred, as I read its history, came here to simply record in abject
submission the commands of one man.  That convention did his commands.
The loyal Congress of the United States had refused to do his commands;
and whenever you have a Congress that does not resolutely and firmly
refuse, as the present Congress has done, to merely act as the
recording secretary of the tyrant at the White House, American liberty
is gone forever."

Mr. Speed's language was a complete revelation, more emphatic than
had yet been made, of the great differences which had prevailed in the
Cabinet of the President with respect to his policy; and his words
naturally created a sensation, not alone in the convention, but
throughout the country.  The fact of his identification with the
President, in the closest official intercourse, ever since his
accession, added vastly to the weight of Mr. Speed's address and gave
to it an influence which he had not, perhaps, anticipated when he
delivered it.  This influence was doubtless enhanced by the fact that
the author of the speech was a native and citizen of the South.  It was
a stimulus to the patriotic zeal of Northern Republicans to find a man
from the South taking advanced ground that possibly involved peril
to himself before the angry contest should be finally settled.

--The address agreed upon in the Southern Convention was in the form
of an appeal "from the loyal men of the South to their fellow-citizens
of the United States."  It declared that the representatives of eight
millions of American citizens "appeal for protection and justice to
their friends and brothers in the States that have been spared the
cruelties of the Rebellion and the direct horrors of civil war."
"Having," said the address, "lost our champion, we return to you who
can make presidents and punish traitors.  Our last hope, under God,
is in the unity and firmness of the States that elected Abraham
Lincoln and defeated Jefferson Davis."

--"We cannot better define at once our wrongs and our wants than by
declaring, that since Andrew Johnson affiliated with his early
slanderers and our constant enemies, his hand has been laid heavily
upon every earnest loyalist of the South."

--"History, the just judgment of the present and the certain
confirmation of the future, invites and commands us to declare, that
after neglecting his own remedies for restoring the Union, Andrew
Johnson has resorted to the weapons of traitors to bruise and beat
down patriots."

--"After declaring that none but the loyal should govern the
reconstructed South, he has practiced upon the maxim that none but
traitors shall rule."

--"In the South he has removed the proved and trusted patriot from
office, and selected the unqualified and convicted traitor."

--"After brave men, who had fought the great battle for the union, had
been nominated for positions, their names were recalled and avowed
rebels substituted."

--"Every original Unionist in the South, who stands fast to Andrew
Johnson's covenants from 1861 to 1865, has been ostracized."

--"He has corrupted the local courts by offering premiums for the
defiance of the laws of Congress, and by openly discouraging the
observance of the oath against treason."

--"While refusing to punish one single conspicuous traitor, though
great numbers have earned the penalty of death, more than one thousand
devoted Union soldiers have been murdered in cold blood since the
surrender of Lee, and in no cases have their assassins been brought to
judgment."

--"He has pardoned some of the worst rebel criminals, North and South,
including some who have taken human life under circumstances of
unparalleled atrocity."

--"While declaring against the injustice of leaving eleven States
unrepresented, he has refused to authorize the liberal plan of
Congress, simply because they have recognized the loyal majority and
refused to perpetuate the traitor minority."

--"In every State south of Mason and Dixon's line his policy has
wrought the most deplorable consequences,--social, moral, and
political."

Upon these indictments a powerful address was based, giving argument,
illustration, fact and indisputable conclusion.  The address was
framed by Senator Creswell of Maryland, and the style and tone were
beyond praise.  It was received with great applause in the convention,
was adopted with unanimity, and created a profound influence upon the
public opinion of the North.  It was the deliberate, well-conceived
and clearly stated opinion of thoughtful and responsible men, was
never disproved, was practically unanswered, and its serious
accusations were in effect admitted by the South.  The one objective
point proclaimed in the address, repeated in the resolutions, echoed
and re-echoed by every speaker, both in the Northern and Southern
Conventions, was the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.  It was
evidently the unalterable determination of the Republicans to make
that the leading feature of the campaign, to enforce it in every party
convention, to urge it through the press, to present it on the stump,
to proclaim it through every authorized exponent of public opinion.
They were determined that the Democratic party of the North should not
be allowed to ignore it or in any way to evade it.  It was to be the
Shibboleth of the Republican canvass, and the rank and file in every
loyal State were engaged in its presentation and its exposition.

The friends of the Administration, feeling the disadvantage under
which they labored by an apparent combination of all the earnest
supporters of the war for the Union against them, sought to create a
re-action in their favor by calling a soldiers' convention to meet at
Cleveland, on the 17th of September.  A considerable number of
respectable officers responded to the summons; but relatively the
demonstration was weak, ineffective and in the end hurtful to the
Administration.  The venerable General Wool of the regular army, the
oldest major-general in the United States at the time, was made
president of the convention and his selection was significant of the
proceedings.  He had been all his life a solider and nothing but a
soldier.  He was a major of infantry in the war of 1812 and had been
in continuous service thereafter.  He denounced the Abolitionists after
the manner that had been the custom in the regular army prior to the
war.  He thought the convention had been called to protest against
another war which he was sure the Abolitionists were determined to
force on the county.  "Another civil war is foreshadowed," said he,
"unless the freedmen are placed on an equality with their previous
masters.  If this cannot be accomplished, radical partisans, with a
raging thirst for blood and plunder, are again ready to invade the
Southern States and lay waste the country not already desolated, with
the sword in one hand and the torch in the other.  These revengeful
partisans would leave their country a howling wilderness for the want
of more victims to gratify their insatiable cruelty. . . . Let there
be peace!  Yet there are those among us who are not sufficiently
satiated with blood and plunder, and cry for more war."  General Wool
would have been severely criticised if it had not been remembered that
for nearly sixty years he had been a faithful soldier and had loyally
followed the flag of the Union in three wars.

Many members of the convention were outspoken Democrats and their
presence, therefore, did not indicate and division in the Republican
ranks,--the objective point to which all the efforts of the
Administration were steadily addressed.  Conspicuous representatives
of this class were Generals John A. McClernand of Illinois, J. W.
Denver of California, Willis A. Gorman of Minnesota, James B. Steedman
of Ohio.  The delegates who had been Republicans were all of the most
conservative type, and it is believed that every one of them became
permanently identified with the Democratic party.  The most prominent
of these were General Thomas Ewing of Kansas, Governor Bramlette and
General Rousseau of Kentucky, and Honorable Lewis D. Campbell of Ohio.
General Gordon Granger and General George A. Custer of the regular army
were very active in organizing the convention.  It was evident that the
number of soldiers present was small; and the convention really failed
in its principal aim, which was to strengthen the President in the
loyal States.

A telegram, expressing sympathy with its proceedings, was received by
the convention from a number of Confederate officers who were gathered
at Memphis.  But it was unfortunate that General N. B. Forrest was a
conspicuous signer; still more unfortunate that the convention passed
a resolution of thanks to Forrest and his rebel associates for the
"magnanimity and kindness" of their message.  Forrest's name was
especially odious in the North for his alleged guilty participation in
the massacre at Fort Pillow.  All other circumstances united did not
condemn the convention in Northern opinion so deeply as this incident.
Further investigation of the Fort Pillow affair has in some degree
ameliorated the feeling against General Forrest, but at that time his
name among the soldiers of the Union was as bitterly execrated as was
that of the Master of Stair among the Macdonalds of Glencoe, or of
Haynau, at a later day, among the patriots of Hungary.

The only noteworthy speech in the convention was delivered by General
Thomas Ewing.  It was able, but extreme in its hostility to the policy
of Congress.  He and Mr. Browning were law-partners at the time of
Mr. Johnson's accession to the Presidency.  Both had supported Mr.
Lincoln, and both now resolved to oppose the Republican party.  General
Ewing's loss was regretted by a large number of friends.  He had
inherited talent and capacity of a high order, was rapidly rising in
his profession, and seemed destined to an inviting political career in
the party to which he had belonged from its first organization.  In
supporting the policy of President Johnson he made a large
sacrifice,--large enough certainly to free his action from the slightest
suspicion of any other motive than conviction of duty.  General Ewing
has since adhered steadily to the Democratic party.

The fourth of the National Conventions which this remarkable year
witnessed, was that of the citizen soldiers and sailors, held at
Pittsburg on the 25th and 26th of September.  Nine out of ten, perhaps
even a larger proportion, of those who had defended the Union with
arms, were hostile to the President's policy.  As soon therefore as it
was attempted to secure a political advantage for the Administration
by calling the Cleveland Convention, the great mass of Union soldiers
demanded that a convention be held in which their true position might
be proclaimed.  The response was overwhelming both in numbers and
enthusiasm.  Pittsburg was literally overrun.  In addition to the large
number of regimental and company officers who had done their duty in
the service, there was an immense outpouring of privates.  It was said
that not less than twenty-five thousand who had served in the ranks of
the Union army were present.  A private soldier, L. Edwin Dudley, was
chosen temporary president, and a majority of the prominent officers
of the convention were privates and non-commissioned officers.  Mr.
Dudley was a clerk in the Treasury Department at Washington, and being
refused a leave of absence for two days to attend the convention, he
promptly resigned his place and joined his brethren at Pittsburg.  The
incident of the resignation strikingly illustrates the depth of feeling
which the contest between the President and Congress had developed
among the soldiery of the Union.

Officers of high rank in the volunteer service were not wanting.
Generals Butler and Banks of Massachusetts, Palmer and Farnsworth of
Illinois, Negley, Geary, Hartranft and Collis of Pennsylvania,
Cochrane, Barnum and Barlow of New York, Chamberlain from Maine,
Schenck and Cox from Ohio, Duncan and Harriman from New Hampshire,
Daniel McCauley of Indiana, and many of their fellow-officers, took
active and zealous part in the convention.  Every loyal State except
possibly Oregon was represented.  Far-off California and Nevada, then
without the facility of railway connection, sent delegates.  The border
States of the South were present in full force, and Union men who had
borne their part in the civil contest came from every Confederate
State.  General John A. Logan had been unanimously elected as permanent
president of the convention, but at the last moment he found himself
unable to attend and his place was filled, with equal unanimity of
selection, by General Jacob D. Cox of Ohio.  General Cox, on taking the
chair, made an address of great firmness.  It was even radical in its
positions and aggressive in its general tone.

He said it was "unpleasant to recognize the truth that it is in the
minds of some to exalt the Executive Department of the Government into
a despotic power and to abase the representative portion of our
Government into the mere tools of despotism.  Learning that this is
the case, we now, as heretofore, know our duty, and knowing, dare
maintain it.  The citizen soldiery of the United States recognize the
Congress of the United States as the representative government of the
people.  We know and all traitors know that the will of the people has
been expressed in the complexion and character of the existing
Congress. . . . We have expressed our faith that the proposition which
has been made by Congress for the settlement of all difficulties in the
country [the Fourteenth Amendment] is not only a wise policy, but one
so truly magnanimous that the whole world stood in wonder that a people
could, under such circumstances, be so magnanimous to those whom they
had conquered.  And when we say we are ready to stand by the decision
of Congress, we only say as soldiers that we follow the same flag and
the same principles which we have followed during the war."

The resolutions, read by General B. F. Butler, were explicit and
unqualified in their declarations, and were indorsed with absolute
unanimity.  They declared that "the action of the present Congress in
passing the pending Constitutional amendment is wise, prudent and just.
That amendment clearly defines American citizenship and guarantees all
his rights to every citizen.  It places on a just and equal basis the
right of representation, making the vote of a man in one State equally
potent with the vote of another man in any State.  It righteously
excludes from places of honor and trust the chief conspirators and
guiltiest rebels, whose perjured crimes have drenched the land in
blood.  It puts into the very frame of our Government the inviolability
of our National obligations, and nullifies forever the obligations
contracted in support of the Rebellion."  The resolutions further
declared it to be "unfortunate for the country that the propositions
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment have not been received with the
spirit of conciliation, clemency and fraternal feeling in which they
were offered, as they are the mildest terms ever granted to subdued
rebels."

The members of the convention were in a tempest of anger against the
President.  They declared "that his attempt to fasten his scheme of
Reconstruction upon the country is as dangerous as it is unwise; that
his acts in sustaining it have retarded the restoration of peace and
unity; that they have converted conquered rebels into impudent
claimants to rights which they have forfeited and to places which they
have desecrated.  If the President's scheme be consummated it would
render the sacrifice of the Nation useless, the loss of her buried
comrades vain, and the war in which we have so gloriously triumphed a
failure, as it was declared to be by President Johnson's present
associates in the Democratic National Convention of 1864."  Many other
propositions of an equally decisive character were announced by the
convention, and General John Cochrane declared that "a more complete,
just and righteous platform for a whole people to occupy has never
before been presented to the National sense."

Of the four conventions held, this, of the soldiers who had fought the
battles of the Union, was far the most influential upon public opinion.
In its membership could be found representatives of every great
battle-field of the war.  Their testimony was invaluable.  They spoke
for the million comrades with whom they had stood in the ranks, and
their influence consolidated almost _en masse_ the soldier vote of the
country in support of the Republican party as represented by Congress.
Their enthusiasm was greater, their feeling more intense, their
activity more marked than could be found among the civilians of the
country who were supporting the same principles.  They declared the
political contest to be _their own fight_, as they expressed it, and
considered themselves bearing the banner of loyalty as they had borne
it in the actual conflict of arms.  Their convention, their
expressions, their determination were felt throughout the entire Union
as an aggressive, irresistible force.  From their ranks came many of
the most attractive and most eloquent speakers, who discussed the
merits of the Constitutional amendment before popular audiences as ably
as they had upheld the flag of the Union through four years of bloody
strife.  Their convention did more to popularize the Fourteenth
Amendment as a political issue than any other instrumentality of the
year.  Not even the members of Congress, who repaired to their
districts with the amendment as the leading question, could commend it
to the mass of voters with the strength and with the good results which
attended the soldier orators who were inspired to enter the field.

Other events powerfully contributed to the political overthrow of the
President.  After the change in his policy in the summer and autumn of
1865, which has already been noted, the Southern rebels, who had at
first been cast down and discouraged, saw before them the prospect of
regaining complete ascendency in their respective States.  As the
division between the President and Congress widened, their confidence
increased; and as their confidence increased, a reign of lawlessness
and outrage against the rights of the defenseless was inaugurated.  The
negroes, who had begun to learn their freedom, were not only subjected
to laws of practical re-enslavement, but to a treatment whose brutality
could not have been foreseen.  It was estimated that before the
adjournment of Congress more than a thousand negroes and many white
Unionists had been murdered in the South, without even the slightest
attempt at prosecuting the murderers.  Though the aggregate number of
victims was so great, they were scattered over so vast a territory that
it was difficult to impress the public mind of the North with the real
magnitude of the slaughter.  But this incredulity vanished in a
moment when the nation was startled on the 30th of July, two days after
the adjournment of Congress, by a massacre at New Orleans, which had
not the pretense of justification or even or provocation.

The circumstances that led to it may be briefly stated.  The convention
which formed the free constitution of the State in 1864 was ordered to
re-assemble by its president, upon authority which, he held, was
conferred upon him by the convention at the time the constitution was
formed.  Apprehending that some measures were to be taken hostile to
the re-establishment of rebel power in the State of Louisiana, it was
resolved by the opponents of the Republican party that the members of
the convention should not be allowed to come together and organize.
Threats were insufficient to effect this end.  Intimidation of every
character had been tried in vain.  The men who thought they had the
right, as American citizens, to meet for conference refused to be
bullied out of their plain privileges under the guarantees of the
National Constitution.  There was a dispute as to their legal right to
take any action touching the constitution of the State--a dispute
altogether proper for judicial inquiry.  Even if they had assembled
and proceeded to amend the constitution, their action could have had
no binding effect until approved by the vote of the people.  The
question which lay at the bottom of the agitation was that of negro
suffrage; but the negroes were not entitled to vote under the
constitution as its stood, nor could they vote upon an amendment to
the constitution conferring the right of suffrage upon them.  Whatever
the convention might do, therefore, would be ineffectual until approved
by a majority of the white men of the State.  It obviously followed
that the men who violently resisted the assembling of the convention
could not justify themselves by the declaration that negro suffrage was
about to be imposed upon them.  Their position practically was that a
majority of the white population should not exercise the right of
giving suffrage to the negro.

When the convention attempted to assemble against the desire and
remonstrance of their political opponents, a bloody riot ensued--not a
riot precipitated by the ordinary material that makes up the mobs of
cities, but one sustained by the obvious sympathy and the indirect
support of the municipal authorities of New Orleans, and by the leading
rebels of the State.  General Absalom Baird, an able and prudent
officer of the regular army, was in command of the district, but was
purposely deceived by the municipal authorities, to the end that troops
might not be at hand to quell the riot and stop the assassination which
had been planned with diabolical ingenuity.  The slaughter, in point of
numbers, resembled that of a brisk military engagement in the field.
The number killed outright was about forty.  The wounded exceeded one
hundred and fifty, of whom perhaps one-third were severely injured,
many of them mortally.  The city police of New Orleans aided the
rioters.  General Sheridan, in command of the department, officially
reported that "the killing was in a manner so unnecessary and
atrocious as to compel me to say it was murder."  The lamentable
transaction was investigated by a committee of Congress, composed of
Messrs. Eliot of Massachusetts, Shellabarger of Ohio, and Boyer of
Pennsylvania, the first two being Republicans, the last-named a
Democrat.  An investigation was also made under the direction of the
War Department, by a commission of military officers, composed of
Generals Mower, Quincy, Gregg, and Baldy.  These officers reported that
in their opinion "the whole drift and current of the evidence tend
irresistibly to the conclusion that there was among the class of
_violents_ known to exist in the State, and among the members of the
ex-Confederate associations, a preconcerted plan and purpose of attack
upon the convention, provided any possible pretext therefor could be
found."

The majority of the Congressional Committee took the same view,
declaring that "the riotous attack upon the convention with its
terrible results of massacre and murder was not an accident.  It was
the determined purpose of the mayor of the city of New Orleans to
break up this convention by armed force."  The Congressional Committee
did not make their investigation until the succeeding winter session of
1866-7.  "We state one fact," said the committee, "significant both as
bearing upon the question of preparation and as indicating the true and
prevailing feeling of the people of New Orleans.  Six months have
passed since the convention assembled, when the massacre was
perpetrated and more than two hundred men were slain and wounded.  This
was done by city officials and New-Orleans citizens, but not one of
those men has been punished, arrested or even complained of.  These
officers of the law, living in the city and known to that community,
acting under the eye of superiors, clothed with the uniform of office,
and some of them known, as the proof shows, to the chief officer of
police, have not only escaped punishment but have been continued in
their places."

Not only were the men who instigated and committed the terrible murders
left unpunished, but, as the committee said, "the gentlemen who
composed the convention have not, however, been permitted to escape.
Prosecutions in the criminal court, under an old law passed in 1805,
were at once commenced and are now pending against them for breach of
the peace."  Another authority declares that "the judge of the criminal
court in New Orleans instructed the grand jury to find bills of
indictment against the members of the convention and the spectators,
charging them with murder; giving the principle of law and applying it
in this case, that whoever is engaged in an unlawful proceeding from
which death ensues to a human being, is guilty of murder, and alleging
that as the convention had no right to meet and the police had killed
many men on the day of its meeting, the survivors were, therefore,
guilty of murder."  The Congressional Committee did not hesitate to
declare that "the facts tend strongly to prove that the criminal actors
in the tragedy were the agents of more criminal employes, and
demonstrate the general sympathy of the people in behalf of the men who
did the wrong against those who suffered the wrong."

The President came in for a full share of censure in connection with
this unhappy event.  The committee reported that "The President knew
that riot and bloodshed were apprehended.  He knew what military orders
were in force, and yet, without the confirmation of the Secretary of
War or the General of the Army, upon whose responsibility these
military order had been issued, he gave orders by telegraph, which if
enforced, as they would be, would have compelled our soldiers to aid
the rebels against the men in New Orleans who had remained loyal during
the war, and sought to aid and support, by official sanction, the
persons who designed to suppress, by arrest and criminal process under
color of law, the meeting of the convention; and all this, although the
convention was called with the sanction of the governor, and by one of
the judges of the Supreme Court of Louisiana claiming to act as
President of the convention.  The effect of the action of the President
was to encourage the heart, to strengthen the hand, and to hold up the
arms of those who intended to prevent the convention from assembling."
Mr. Boyer, the minority member of the committee, submitted a report
dissenting from the conclusions of the majority, and making, as nearly
as could be done, a defense of the men who had really been the guilty
aiders and abettors of the crime; but he did not deny the fact of the
riot nor of the great number of its victims.

The substantial correctness of the report made by the majority of the
Congressional Committee was never shaken, though it was angrily
attacked by the supporters of the Administration.  Aside from the
credit imparted to it by the conscientious character of both Mr. Eliot
and Mr. Shellabarger, the corroboration of all its material statements
by the Commission of Army officers was invaluable.  The military men
were not suspected of partisan motives.  They had no political theories
to maintain, no animosities to indulge, no personal revenges to
cherish.  They proceeded as coolly as though they were investigating
alleged frauds by army contractors or were hearing evidence touching
the damage to frontier settlers by an Indian raid.  The intelligence
and impartiality of investigations entrusted to army officers have
become proverbial, and their report of the facts in the New Orleans
riot arrested the attention of the North in an unprecedented degree.
Every thing possible was done by the opponents of the Republican party
to break the force of the damaging facts, but apparently without
success.  Indeed the people of the United States have rarely been
stirred to greater excitement than that aroused by the full details of
this nefarious transaction as it came to them through the public press
and through official reports.  The effect was disastrous to the
President, and was hurtful, in the extreme, to the cause of prompt
reconstruction.  The Northern people shrank from the responsibility of
transferring the government of States to the control of men who had
already shown themselves capable of desperate deeds.  In their wrathful
zeal for justice they would hear no apology and no defense of the
President.  They held him as an accomplice in the crime,--as one having
in advance a guilty knowledge of the pre-arranged assassination.  In
every way in which public indignation can be expressed, in every form
in which public anger can vent itself, the loyal people of the Northern
states manifested their feelings, and did not spare in their bitter
denunciations the personal character of the President or the
unspeakable guilt of his Southern supporters.

The bloody tragedy of midsummer, which had weighed down the people with
a sense of the gravest solicitude, was followed by what might well be
termed its comedy.  During the early spring the President had accepted
an invitation from the citizens of Chicago to attend the ceremony of
laying a corner-stone for a monument to be erected to the memory of
Stephen A. Douglas.  The date fixed for the President's visit was
September 6th, and he left Washington on the 28th of August,
accompanied by Secretary Welles, Postmaster-general Randall,
General Grant, Admiral Farragut, by a considerable number of army
officers and by a complement of private secretaries and newspaper
reporters,--apparently intending to convert the journey into a political
canvass. Mr. Seward joined the company in New York.  The somewhat
ludicrous effect produced by combining a series of turbulent partisan
meetings to be addressed by the President with the solemn duty of paying
respect to the memory of a dead statesman, did not fail to have its
effect upon the appreciative mind of his countrymen, and from the
beginning to the end of the tour there was a popular alternation between
harsh criticism and contemptuous raillery of Mr. Johnson's conduct.

His journey was by way of Philadelphia and New York, to Albany; thence
westward to Chicago.  At all the principal cities and towns along the
route large bodies of people assembled.  Democrat and Republican,
Administration and anti-Administration, were commingled.  The President
spoke everywhere in an aggressive and disputatious tone.  It has been
the decorous habit of the Chief Magistrate of the country, when upon a
tour among his fellow-citizens, to refrain from all display of
partisanship, and to receive popular congratulations with brief and
cordial thanks.  President Johnson, however, behaved as an ordinary
political speaker in a heated canvass, receiving interruptions from the
crowd, answering insolent remarks with undignified repartee, and
lowering at every step of his progress the dignity which properly
appertains to the great office.  At Cleveland the meeting resembled
occasions not unfamiliar to our people, where the speaker receives from
his audience constant and discourteous demonstrations that his words
are unwelcome.  The whole scene was regarded as lamentable and one
which must have been deeply humiliating to the eminent men who
accompanied the President.

He made the tour the occasion for defending at great length his own
policy of Reconstruction, and arraigned with unsparing severity the
course of Congress in interposing a policy of its own.  The most
successful political humorist of the day(1), writing in pretended support
of the President, described his tour as being undertaken "to arouse
the people to the danger of concentrating power in the hands of
Congress instead of diffusing it through one man."  Wit and sarcasm
were lavished at the expense of the President, gibes and jeers and
taunts marked the journey from its beginning to its end.  "My policy"
was iterated and reiterated, until the very boys in the streets,
without knowing its meaning, knew it was the source and subject of
ridicule, and made it a jest and a by-word at Mr. Johnson's expense.
The whole journey came to be known as "swinging around the circle,"
and its incidents entered daily into the thoughts of the people only
as subjects of disapprobation on the part of the more considerate,
and of persiflage and ribaldry on the part of those who regarded it
only as a matter of amusement.  With whatever strength or prestige the
President left Washington, he certainly returned to the Capital
personally discredited and politically ruined.  Upon the direct public
issue which he had raised he would undoubtedly have been beaten in
nearly all the Northern states, but when his weakness had brought him
within fair range of ridicule, he became powerless even in the place of
power.

Meanwhile, during the National Conventions referred to and during the
remarkable tour of the President, the cause of his opponents was urged
in every State and in every district, with extraordinary energy on the
part of leaders, with corresponding interest on the part of the people.
The contest for the governorship of New York between Reuben E. Fenton
and John T. Hoffman, and for the governorship of Pennsylvania between
John W. Geary and Hiester Clymer, excited deep interest far beyond the
borders of either State.  The vote for these candidates was looked to
as giving the aggregate popular expression touching the merits of the
Administration, and carried with it the united interest which attached
to all the Congressional districts.  When at last a test was reached
and the people had an opportunity to speak the Administration was
overwhelmingly defeated.  Vermont, usually so strong in its Republican
vote, now increased the ordinary majority by thousands.  Maine elected
General Chamberlain governor by twenty-eight thousand majority.

Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Iowa were then all known in current
phrase as October States.  They voted for members of Congress and State
officers on the second Tuesday of that month.  The result was a
significant verdict against the Administration.  In Pennsylvania Geary,
on a much fuller vote than was cast at the Presidential election two
years before, led Clymer by nearly as large a majority as that by
which Lincoln led McClellan.  The Congressional elections resulted in
the choice of eighteen Republicans to six Democratic representatives.
Ohio, on her State ticket, gave forty-three thousand majority against
the Administration, and elected sixteen Republican representatives in
Congress, leaving only three districts to the Democrats.  In Indiana,
a State always hotly contested, the Republicans secured the popular
vote by a majority of nearly fifteen thousand and carried every
Congressional district except three.  Iowa gave a popular majority of
thirty-six thousand and carried every Congressional district for the
Republicans.

Under the impulse and influence of these great victories in October the
November States recorded a like result.  New York, of course, absorbed
the largest share of public interest.  Two years before, Lincoln had
beaten McClellan by less than seven thousand votes.  Fenton had now
double that majority over Hoffman and the Republicans carried two-thirds
of the Congressional districts.  Throughout the West, Republican
victory swept every thing before it.  Michigan gave thirty-nine
thousand popular majority and a unanimous Republican delegation in
Congress.  Illinois gave fifty-six thousand popular majority, with
nearly all the representatives.  Wisconsin gave twenty-four thousand
popular majority and elected every Republican candidate for
representative except one.  Northern States which had been tenaciously
Democratic gave way under the popular pressure.  New-Jersey Republicans
elected a majority of the members of Congress and a majority of each
branch of the State Legislature.  Connecticut was carried by Governor
Hawley against the most popular Democrat in the State, James E.
English.  California gave seven thousand majority for the Republicans,
while Oregon elected a Republican governor and Republican
representative in Congress.

The aggregate majority for the Republicans and against the
Administration in the Northern States was about three hundred and
ninety thousand votes.  In the South the elections were as significant
as in the North, but in the opposite direction.  Wherever Republican
or Union tickets were put forward for State or local offices in the
Confederate States, they were defeated by prodigious majorities.
Arkansas gave a Democratic majority of over nine thousand, Texas over
forty thousand, and North Carolina twenty-five thousand.  The border
slave States were divided.  Delaware, Maryland and Kentucky gave strong
majorities for the Democrats, while West Virginia and Missouri were
carried by the Republicans.  The unhappy indication of the whole result
was that President Johnson's policy had inspired the South with a
determination not to submit to the legitimate results of the war, but
to make a new fight and, if possible, regain at the ballot-box the
power they had lost by war.  The result of the whole election was to
give to the Republicans one hundred and forty-three representatives in
Congress and to the Democrats but forty-nine.  The defeat was so
decisive that if the President had been wise he would have sought a
return of friendly relations with the party which had elected him, or
at least some form of compromise which would have averted constant
collision, with the certainty of defeat and humiliation.  But his
disposition was unyielding.  His prejudices obscured his reason.

It was well known that the President felt much cast down by the
result.  He had, as is usual with Presidents, been surrounded by
flatterers, and had not been advised of the actual state of public
opinion.  Political deserters, place-seekers and personal sycophants
had constantly assured the President that his cause was strong and
his strength irresistible.  They had discovered that one of his
especial weaknesses was an ambition to be considered as firm and
heroic in his Administration as General Jackson had proved in the
Executive chair thirty years before.  He received, therefore, with
evident welcome the constant adulation of a comparison between his
qualities and those of General Jackson, and he came to fancy that he
would prove, in his contest for the unconditional re-admission of
Southern States to representation, as mighty a power in the land as
Jackson had proved in his struggle with the Bank monopolists and with
the Disunionists of South Carolina.  But those who had studied the
character of Johnson knew that aside from the possession of personal
integrity, he had few qualities in common with those which
distinguished Jackson.  Johnson was bold and fluent in public speech,
irresolute and procrastinating in action: Jackson wasted no words, but
always acted with promptness and courage.  Johnson was vain,
loquacious, and offensively egotistic: Jackson, on the other hand, was
proud, reserved, and with such abounding self-respect as excluded
egotism.  The two men, instead of being alike, were in fact signal
contrasts in all that appertains to the talent for administration, to
the quick discernment of the time for action, and to the prompt
execution of whatever policy might be announced.

The Republicans had found an easier victory over Johnson than they had
anticipated.  They were well led in the great contest of 1866.  In New
England the President really secured no Republican support whatever.
Soon after his accession to the Presidency he had induced Hannibal
Hamlin, with whom he had been on terms of personal intimacy in
Congress, to accept the Collectorship of Customs at Boston, but as soon
as Mr. Hamlin discovered the tendency of Johnson's policy he made
haste, with that strict adherence to principle which has always marked
his political career, to separate himself from the Administration by
resigning the office.  It was urged upon him that he could maintain his
official position without in any degree compromising his principles,
but his steady reply to earnest friends who presented this view, was
that he was an old-fashioned man in his conception of public duty, and
he would not consent to hold a political office under a President from
whose policy he instinctively and radically dissented.  Mr. Hamlin's
course was highly applauded by the mass of Republicans throughout the
country, and especially by his old constituents in Maine.  His action
took from Mr. Johnson the last semblance of a prominent Republican
friend in New England and gave an almost unprecedented solidity to the
public opinion of that section.

The adherence of Mr. Seward to the Administration, the loss of Thurlow
Weed as an organizer, and the desertion of the _New-York Times_, had
created great fear as to the result in New York, but the popularity of
Governor Fenton, supplemented by the support of Senator Morgan and of
the younger class of men then coming forward, of whom Roscoe Conkling
was the recognized chief, imparted an energy and enthusiasm to the
canvass which proved irresistible.  In Pennsylvania the contest was
waged with great energy by both parties.  The result would determine
not merely the control of the local administration, not merely the
character of the delegation in Congress, but the future leadership of
the Republican party of the State.  Simon Cameron sought a restoration
to his old position of power by a return to the Senate.  During the
five years that had elapsed since he retired from the War Department
Mr. Cameron's supremacy had been challenged by the political _coterie_
that surrounded Governor Curtin.  They boastfully proclaimed indeed
that the sceptre of power was in their hands and could not be wrenched
from them.  But the reaction against them was strong and did not cease
until Cameron had driven his leading enemies to seek refuge in the
Democratic party.

In the West the hostility to the President and the support of the
policy of Congress were even more demonstrative than in the East.  All
the prominent Republicans of Ohio were on the stump and the canvass
was extraordinarily heated, even for a State which has had an animated
contest every year since the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.
Governor Morton's candidacy for the Senate gave great earnestness to
the struggle in Indiana, while Senator Chandler not only rallied
Michigan to the necessity of giving an immense majority, but with his
tremendous vitality added nerve and zeal to every contest in the
North-western States.  The whole result proved to be one of commanding
influence on the future course of public events.  The Republicans
plainly saw that the triumph of President Johnson meant a triumph of
the Democratic party under an _alias_, that the first-fruits of such
a victory would be the re-establishment of the late Confederate States
in full political power inside the Union, and that in a little more
than five years from the firing upon Sumter, and a little more than
one year from the surrender of Lee, the same political combination
which had threatened the destruction of the Union would be recalled to
its control.

The importance, therefore, of the political struggle of 1866 cannot be
overestimated.  It has, perhaps, been underestimated.  If the contest
had ended in a victory for the Democrats the history of the subsequent
years would, in all probability, have been radically different.  There
would have been no further amendment to the Constitution, there would
have been no conditions of reconstruction, there would have been such
a neutralization of the anti-slavery amendment as would authorize and
sustain all the State laws already passed for the practical re-enslavement
of the negro, with such additional enactments as would have made
them cruelly effective.  With the South re-admitted and all its
representatives acting in cordial co-operation with the Northern
Democrats, the result must have been a deplorable degradation of the
National character and an ignoble surrender to the enemies of the
Union, thenceforth to be invested with the supreme direction of its
government.

There was an unmistakable manifestation throughout the whole political
canvass of 1866, by the more advanced section of the Republican party,
in favor of demanding impartial suffrage as the basis of reconstruction
in the South.  It came from the people rather than from the political
leaders.  The latter class, with few exceptions, shunned the issue,
preferring to wait until public sentiment should become more
pronounced in favor of so radical a movement.  But a large number of
thinking people, who gave more heed to the absolute right of the
question than to its political expediency, could not see how, with
consistency, or even with good conscience and common sense, the
Republican party could refrain from calling to its aid the only large
mass of persons in the South whose loyalty could be implicitly trusted.
To their apprehension it seemed little less than an absurdity, to
proceed with a plan of reconstruction which would practically leave the
State governments of the South under the control of the same men that
brought on the civil war.

They were embarrassed, however, in this step by the constantly
recurring obstacle presented by the constitutions of a majority of the
loyal States.  In five New-England States suffrage to the colored man
was conceded, but in Connecticut only those negroes were allowed to
vote who were admitted freedmen prior to 1818.  New York permitted a
negro to vote after he had been three years a citizen of the State and
had been for one year the owner of a freehold worth two hundred and
fifty dollars, free of all incumbrances.  In every other Northern
State none but "white men" were permitted to vote.  Even Kansas, which
entered the Union under the shadow of the civil war, after a prolonged
and terrible struggle with the spirit of slavery, at once restricted
suffrage to the white man; while Nevada, whose admission to the Union
was after the Thirteenth Amendment had been passed by Congress, denied
suffrage to "any negro, Chinaman or mulatto."  A still more recent test
was applied.  The question of admitting the negro to suffrage was
submitted to popular vote in Connecticut, Wisconsin and Minnesota in
the autumn of 1865, and at the same time in Colorado, when she was
forming her constitution preparatory to seeking admission to the Union.
In all four, under the control of the Republican party at the time, the
proposition was defeated.

With these indisputable evidences of the unpopularity of negro suffrage
in the great majority of the Northern States, there was ample excuse
for the reluctance of leading statesmen to adopt it as a condition of
reconstruction, and force it upon the South by law before it had been
adopted by the moral sense of the North.  The period, however, was one
calculated to bring about very rapid changes in public opinion; and
there had undoubtedly been great advance in the popular judgment
concerning this question since the elections of the preceding year.
The question was really in the position where it would be materially
influenced by the course of events in the South.  The violence and
murder at New Orleans in July had changed the views of many men; and,
while the more considerate and conservative tried to regard that
outbreak as an exceptional occurrence, the mass of the Northern people
feared that it indicated a dangerous sentiment among a people not yet
fitted to be entrusted with the administration of a State Government.

While these views were rapidly taking form throughout the North, they
were strongly tempered and restrained by the better hope that the
people of the South would be able to restore such a feeling of
confidence as would prevent the exaction of other conditions of
reconstruction and the consequent postponement of the re-admission of
the Southern States to representation.  The average Republican
sentiment of the North was well expressed by the Republican State
Convention of New York, which, after reciting the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and declaring that "That amendment commends
itself, by its justice, humanity, and moderation, to every patriotic
heart," made this important declaration: "_That when any of the late
insurgent States shall adopt that amendment, such State shall, at once,
by its loyal representatives, be permitted to resume its place in
Congress._"  This view was generally concurred in by the Western
States; and, if the Southern States had accepted the broad invitation
thus given, there is little doubt that before the close of the year
they might have been restored to the enjoyment of every power and
privilege under the National Constitution.  There would have been
opposition to it, but the weight of public influence, and the majority
in both branches of Congress, would have been sure to secure this result.

[(1) Petroleum V. Nasby.]


CHAPTER XI.

The rejoicing over the result of the elections throughout the free
States had scarcely died away when the Thirty-ninth Congress met in its
second session (December 3, 1866).  There was no little curiosity to
hear what the President would say in his message, in regard to the
issue upon which he had sustained so conclusive a defeat.  He was known
to be in a state of great indignation, and as he had broken forth
during the campaign in expressions altogether unbecoming his place,
there was some apprehension that he might be guilty of the same
indiscretion in his official communication to Congress.  But he was
saved from such humiliation by the evident interposition of a judicious
adviser.  The message was strikingly moderate and even conciliatory in
tone.  The President re-argued his case with apparent calmness and
impartiality, repeating and enforcing his position with entire
disregard of the popular result which had so significantly condemned
him.  After rehearsing all that had been done in the direction of
reconstruction, so far as his power could reach it, and so far as the
Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution was an essential part of it,
the President expressed his regret that Congress had failed to do its
duty by re-admitting the Southern States to representation.

"It was not," said he, "until the close of the eighth month of the
session that an exception was made in favor of Tennessee by the
admission of her senators and representatives."  "I deem it," he
continued, "a subject of profound regret that Congress has thus far
failed to admit to seats loyal senators and representatives from the
other States, whose inhabitants with those of Tennessee had engaged
in the Rebellion.  Ten States, more than one-fourth of the whole
number, remain without representation.  The seats of fifty members
in the House and twenty members in the Senate are yet vacant, not by
their own consent, nor by a failure of election, but by the refusal of
Congress to accept their credentials.  Their admission, it is believed,
would have accomplished much towards the renewal and strengthening of
our relations as one people, and would have removed serious cause for
discontent upon the part of the inhabitants of those States."  The
President did not discuss the ground of difference between his policy
and that of Congress, simply contenting himself with a restatement of
the case, in declaratory rather than in argumentative form.  He did
not at all seem to realize, or even to recognize, the vantage ground
which Congress had obtained by the popular decision in the recent
elections.  He apparently did not understand that every issue dividing
the Executive and Legislative Departments of the Government had been
decided in favor of the latter by the masters of both--decided by those
who select and control Presidents and Congresses.

The President's position in pursuing a policy which had been so
pointedly condemned, excited derision and contempt in the North, but
it led to mischievous results in the South.  The ten Confederate States
which stood knocking at the door of Congress for the right of
representation, were fully aware, as was well stated by a leading
Republican, that the key to unlock the door had been placed in their
own hands.  They knew that the political canvass in the North had
proceeded upon the basis, and upon the practical assurance (given
through the press, and more authoritatively in political platforms),
that whenever any other Confederate State should follow the example
of Tennessee, it should at once be treated as Tennessee had been
treated.  Yet, when this position had been confirmed by the elections
in all the loyal States, and was, by the special warrant of popular
power, made the basis of future admission, these ten States, voting
upon the Fourteenth Amendment at different dates through the winter
of 1866-67, contemptuously rejected it.  In the Virginia Legislature
only one vote could be found for the Amendment.  In the North-Carolina
Legislature only eleven votes out of one hundred and forty-eight were
in favor of the Amendment.  In the South-Carolina Legislature there
was only one vote for the Amendment.  In Georgia only two votes out of
one hundred and sixty-nine in the Legislature were in the affirmative.
Florida unanimously rejected the Amendment.  Out of one hundred and six
votes in the Alabama Legislature only ten could be found in favor of
it.  Mississippi and Louisiana both rejected it unanimously.  Texas,
out of her entire Legislature, gave only five votes for it, and the
Arkansas Legislature, which had really taken its action in the
preceding October, gave only three votes for the Amendment.

This course on the part of the Southern States was simply a declaration
of defiance to Congress.  It was as if they had said in so many words:
"We are entitled to representation in Congress, and we propose to
resume it on our own terms; and therefore we reject your conditions
with scorn.  We will not consent to your Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.  We will not consent that the freedom of the negro shall
be made secure by endowing him with citizenship.  We demand that
without giving negroes the right to vote, they shall yet be counted in
the basis of representation, thus increasing our political power when
we re-enter Congress beyond that which we enjoyed before we rebelled,
and beyond that which white men in the North shall ever enjoy.  We
decline to give any guarantee for the validity of the public debt.
We decline to guarantee the sacredness of pensions to soldiers disabled
in the War for the Union.  We decline to pledge ourselves that the
debts incurred in aid of the Rebellion shall not in the future be paid
by our States.  We decline, in brief, to assent to any of the
conditions or provisions of the proposed amendment to the Constitution,
and we deny your right to amend it without our consent."

The madness of this course on the part of the Southern leaders was
scarcely less than the madness of original secession; and it is
difficult, in deliberately weighing all the pertinent incidents and
circumstances, to discover any motive which could, even to their own
distorted view, justify the position they had so rashly taken.  Strong
as the Republican party had shown itself in the elections, it grew
still stronger in all the free States, as each of the Confederate
States proclaimed its refusal to accept the Fourteenth Amendment as
the basis of their return to representation.  The response throughout
the North, in the mouths of the loyal people, was in effect: "If these
rebel States are not willing now to resume representation on the
terms offered, let them stay out until their anger ceases and their
reason returns.  If they are not willing to concede the guarantee of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and to give that pledge to the country of
their future loyalty and their common sense of justice, they shall find
that we can be as resolute as they, and we shall insist on the right as
stubbornly as they persist in the wrong."  These were not merely the
declamations of statesmen, or of the press, or of the popular speakers
of the Republican party.  They came spontaneously, as if by
inspiration, from the mass of the people, and were based on that
instinctive sense of justice which the multitude rarely fails to exhibit.

It was naturally inferred and was subsequently proved, that the
Southern States would not have dared to take this hostile attitude
except with the encouragement and the unqualified support of the
President.  He was undoubtedly in correspondence, directly and
indirectly, with the political powers that were controlling the action
of the insurrectionary States, and he was determined that the policy
of Congress should not have the triumph that would be implied in a
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment by those States.  Telegraphic
correspondence clearly establishing the President's position,
subsequently came to light.  Governor Parsons of Alabama telegraphed
him indicating that the rejection of the Fourteenth Amendment might be
reconsidered by the Alabama Legislature, if in consequence thereof an
enabling Act could be passed by Congress for the admission of the State
to representation.  Johnson promptly replied on the same day: "What
possible good can be obtained by reconsidering the Constitutional
Amendment?  I know of none in the present posture of affairs, and I
do not believe the people of the country will sustain any set of
individuals in attempts to change the whole character of our Government
by enabling Acts or otherwise.  I believe on the contrary, that they
will eventually uphold all those who have patriotism and courage to
stand by the Constitution and who place their confidence in the people.
There should be no faltering on the part of those who are honest in a
determination to sustain the several co-ordinate Departments of the
Government in accordance with the original design."  It was evident
from this disclosure that Johnson's hand was busy throughout the South,
secretly as well as openly, and that he inspired the resolute obstinacy
with which the insurrectionary States resisted the fair and magnanimous
offers of Reconstruction made by Congress.  The Rebel element of the
South had gradually come to repose implicit confidence in Johnson, and
this fact increased his power to sow dissension and produce discord.
His stubborn and apparently malicious course at this time, was inspired
in large part by a desire to be avenged on the Northern States and
Northern leaders for the stinging rebuke administered to him in the
recent election.

Sustained by the same popular sentiment which had given offense to the
President, Congress did not doubt its duty or hesitate in its action.
Its course, indeed, was firm to the point of severity.  It met the
spirit of defiance on the part of the South with an answer so decisive,
that the misguided people of that section were rapidly undeceived as
to their power to command the situation, even with all the aid the
President could bring.  The principal debates for the first two months
of the session related wholly to the condition of the South, and on the
6th of February (1867) Mr. Stevens, from the Committee on
Reconstruction, reported a bill which after sundry amendments became
the leading measure of the Thirty-ninth Congress.  In its original form
the preamble declared that "whereas the pretended State governments of
the late so-called Confederate States afford no adequate protection
for life or property, but countenance and encourage lawlessness and
crime; and whereas it is necessary that peace and good order should be
enforced in said so-called Confederate States, until loyal State
governments can be legally established; _therefore_ be it enacted that
said so-called Confederate States shall be divided into military
districts, and made subject to the military authority of the United
States, as hereinafter prescribed; and for that purpose Virginia shall
constitute the first district, North Carolina and South Carolina the
second district, Georgia, Alabama and Florida the third district,
Mississippi and Arkansas the fourth district, and Louisiana and Texas
the fifth district."

It was made the duty of the General of the Army to assign to the
command of each of said districts an officer not below the rank of
Brigadier-general, and to detail a sufficient force to enable such
officer to perform his duties and enforce his authority within the
district to which he was assigned.  The protection of life and
property, the suppression of insurrections, disorders, and violence,
and the punishment of all criminals and disturbers of the public
peace, were entrusted to the military authority, with the power to
allow civil tribunals to take jurisdiction and try offenders; and if
that was not sufficient in the officer's judgment, he was authorized
to organize military commissions, "any thing in the constitutions and
laws of these so-called Confederate States to the contrary
notwithstanding."  It was further declared that all legislative acts
or judicial processes to prevent the proceedings of such tribunals,
and all interference by "said pretended State governments with the
exercise of military authority under this Act, shall be void and have
no effect."  The courts and judicial officers of the United States
were forbidden to issue writs of _habeas corpus_, except under certain
restrictions which further established the military authority over the
people.  Prompt trials were guaranteed to all persons arrested, cruel
and unusual punishments were forbidden, and no sentence could be
executed until it was approved by the officer in command of the district.

Mr. Stevens, in his speech upon introducing the bill, did not attempt
to conceal its positive and peremptory character.  "It provides," said
he, "that the ten disorganized States shall be divided into five
military districts; that the Commander of the Army shall take charge
of them, through his officers not below the rank of Brigadier-general,
who shall have the general supervision of the peace, quiet and
protection of the people, loyal and disloyal, who reside within those
precincts; and that to do so, he may use, as the law of nations would
authorize him to do, the legal tribunals whenever he may deem them
competent; but these tribunals are to be considered of no validity
_per se_, of no intrinsic force, of no force in consequence of their
origin; the question being wholly within the power of the conqueror,
and to remain until that conqueror shall permanently supply their
place with something else.  That is the whole bill.  It does not need
much examination.  One night's rest after its reading is enough to
digest it."

Mr. Brandegee of Connecticut followed Mr. Stevens in a speech strongly
supporting the measure.  "Mr. Speaker, something must be done," said
he.  "The American people demand that we shall do something, and
quickly.  Already fifteen hundred Union men have been massacred in cold
blood (more than the entire population of some of the towns in my
district), whose only crime has been loyalty to your flag. . . . In
all the revolted states, upon the testimony of your ablest generals,
there is no safety to the property or lives of loyal men.  Is this
what the loyal North has been fighting for?  Thousands of loyal white
men, driven like partridges over the mountains, homeless, houseless,
penniless, to-day throng this capital.  They fill the hotels, they
crowd the avenues, they gather in these marble corridors, they look
down from these galleries, and with supplicating eye ask protection
from the flag that hangs above the Speaker's chair--a flag which thus
far has unfurled its stripes, but concealed the promise of its stars."

--Mr. Le Blond of Ohio declared that "the provisions of this bill
strike down every important provision in the Constitution.  You have
already inaugurated enough here to destroy any government that was
ever founded. . . . Now, Mr. Speaker, I do not predict any thing.  I
do not declare war, but as one American citizen I do prefer war to
cowardly submission to a total destruction of the fundamental
principles of our Government."

--He was followed by his colleague, Mr. Finck, who declared that "no
member on this floor who understands the Constitution of the United
States, and who is friend of our Government, will pretend to urge that
we have any Constitutional power to pass this bill. . . . I declare it
as my solemn conviction that no government can long continue to be
free when one-third of its people and one-third of the States are
controlled by military power."

--Mr. Bingham of Ohio, speaking for a more conservative type of
republicanism than Mr. Stevens represented, begged gentlemen to "make
haste slowly in the exercise of this highest possible power conferred
by the Constitution upon the Congress of the United States.  For
myself, sir, I am not going to yield to the proposition of the
chairman of the committee, for a single moment, that one rood of the
territory within the line of the ten states enumerated in this bill is
conquered territory.  The Government of the United States does not
conquer any territory that is under the jurisdiction of the Constitution."

--Mr. William Lawrence of Ohio said, "For myself I am ready to set
aside by law all these illegal governments.  They have rejected all
fair terms of reconstruction.  They have rejected the Constitutional
amendments we have tendered them.  They are engines of oppression
against all loyal men.  They are not republican in form or purpose.
Let them not only be ignored as legal governments, but set aside
because they are illegal."  Mr. Lawrence suggested some amendments
that would give to all the people the protection of the judiciary
under National authority.

--Mr. Russell Thayer of Pennsylvania argued warmly for the bill, and
said, "This measure will be of brief duration, and will be followed,
as I am informed, by other measures, which will secure the permanent
and peaceful restoration of these States to their proper and just
position in the Union, upon their acceptance of such terms as are
necessary for the future security of the country.  When that is done,
and when order is restored, and permanent protection is guaranteed to
all the citizens of that section of the country, this measure will be
abrogated and abandoned."

--Mr. Shellabarger argued in favor of the bill, and said in conclusion,
"This measure, taken alone, is one which I could not support
unaccompanied by provisions for the rapid and immediate establishment
of civil government based upon the suffrages of the loyal people of the
South.  I could not support a military measure like this if it was to
be regarded as at all permanent in its character.  It is because it is
entirely the initiative, because it is only the employment of the Army
of the United States as a mere police force, to preserve order until
we can establish civil government based upon the loyal suffrages of
the people, that I can support this measure at all.  If it stood by
itself, I could not, with my notions of the possibility and
practicability of establishing civil governments in the South, based
upon loyal suffrage, vote for this bill."

--Mr. Dawes made the pertinent inquiry whether, "after the General of
the Army has, under this bill, assigned a competent and trustworthy
officer to the duties prescribed, there is any thing to hinder the
President of the United States, under virtue of his power as
Commander-in-Chief, from removing that officer and putting in his
place another of an opposite character, thus making the very
instrumentality we provide one of terrible evil?"

--Mr. John A. Griswold, who became the Republican candidate for
governor of New York the ensuing year, earnestly opposed the bill.  "By
it," said he, "we are proceeding in the wrong direction.  For more than
two years we have been endeavoring to provide civil governments for
that portion of our country, and yet by the provisions of this bill
we turn our backs on our policy of the last two years, and by a single
stride proceed to put all that portion of the country under exclusively
military control. . . . For one, I prefer to stand by the overtures
we have made to these people, as conditions of their again
participating in the government of the country.  We have already placed
before them conditions which the civilized world has indorsed as
liberal, magnanimous, and just.  I regret exceedingly that those very
liberal terms have not been accepted by the South, but I prefer giving
those people every opportunity to exhibit a spirit of obedience and
loyalty."

--Mr. Henry J. Raymond opposed the bill in a vigorous speech.  "Because
we cannot devise any thing of a civil nature adequate to the
emergency," said he, "it is urged that we must fly to the most violent
measure the ingenuity of man could devise.  Let me remind gentlemen
that this has been the history of popular governments everywhere, the
reason of their downfall, their decadence, and their death."

--Mr. Garfield indicated his support of the measure if it could be
amended.  "But," said he, "I call attention to the fact that from the
collapse of the Rebellion to the present hour, Congress has undertaken
to restore the States lately in rebellion by co-operation with their
people, and that our efforts in that direction have proven a complete
and disastrous failure."  Alluding to the fact that the Fourteenth
Amendment had been submitted as the basis of reconstruction, Mr.
Garfield continued, "The constitutional amendment did not come up to
the full height of the great occasion.  It did not meet all I desired
in the way of guarantees to liberty, but if the rebel States had
adopted it as Tennessee did, I should have felt bound to let them in
on the same terms prescribed for Tennessee.  I have been in favor of
waiting to give them full time to deliberate and to act.  They have
deliberated.  They have acted.  The last one of the sinful ten has at
last, with contempt and scorn, flung back in our teeth the magnanimous
offer of a generous nation.  It is now our turn to act.  They would
not co-operate with us in building what they destroyed.  We must remove
the rubbish, and build from the bottom. . . . But there are some words
which I want stricken out of this bill, and some limitations which I
wish added, and I shall at least ask that they be considered."

--Mr. Kasson objected that the bill was too sweeping in its provisions,
that it affected the loyally disposed in the South with the same
severity as it did the disloyally disposed.  "Instead of erecting,"
said he, "this great military power over people of some portions of
the South who are, in fact, at peace and observing law and order, our
rule should be so flexible that we may apply martial law wherever
peace and law and order do not prevail, without imposing it upon people
whose subordination to the law renders military rule unnecessary."

--Mr. Boutwell said, "To-day there are eight millions and more of
people, occupying six hundred and thirty thousand square miles of
territory in this country, who are writhing under cruelties nameless
in their character, and injustice such as has not been permitted to
exist in any other country of modern times; and all this because in
this capital there sits enthroned a man who, so far as the Executive
Department of the Government is concerned, guides the destinies of the
Republic in the interest of the rebels; and because, also, in those
ten former States, rebellion itself, inspired by the Executive
Department of this Government, wields all authority, and is the
embodiment of law and power everywhere. . . . It is the vainest
delusion, the wildest of hopes, the most dangerous of all aspirations,
to contemplate the reconstruction of civil government until the rebel
despotisms enthroned in power in these ten States shall be broken up."

--Mr. Banks asked for deliberation and delay in the discussion.  He
believed that "we might reach a solution in which the two Houses of
Congress will agree, which the people of this country will sustain,
and in which the President of the United States will give us his
support.  And if we should agree on a measure satisfactory to
ourselves, in which we should be sustained by the people, and the
President should resist it, then we should be justified in dropping the
subject of reconstruction, and considering the condition of the country
in a different sense."  The allusion of General Banks, though thus
veiled, was understood to imply the possible necessity of impeaching
the President.  It attracted attention because General Banks had been
reckoned among the determined opponents of that extreme measure.

--Mr. Kelley of Pennsylvania declared that "the passage of this bill or
its equivalent is required by the manhood of this Congress, to save it
from the hissing scorn and reproach of every Southern man who has been
compelled to seek a home in the by-ways of the North, from every
homeless widow and orphan of a Union soldier in the South, who should
have been protected by the Government, and who, despite widowhood and
orphanage, would have exalted in the power of our country had it not
been for the treachery of Andrew Johnson."

--Mr. Allison of Iowa said, "Believing as I do, that this measure is
essential to the preservation of the Union men of the South, believing
that their lives, property and liberty cannot be secured except through
military law, I am for this bill."

--Mr. Blaine of Maine expressed his unwillingness to support any
measure that would place the South under military government, if it
did not at the same time prescribe the methods by which the people of
a State could by their own action re-establish civil government.  He
therefore asked Mr. Stevens to admit an amendment declared that "when
any one of the late, so-called, Confederate States shall have given its
assent to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, and conformed
its constitution and laws thereto in all respects, and when it shall
have provided, by its constitution, that the elective franchise shall
be enjoyed equally and impartially by all male citizens of the United
States twenty-one years of age and upwards, without regard to race,
color, or previous condition of servitude, except such as may be
disfranchised for participating in the late rebellion, and when such
constitution shall have been submitted to the voters of said State as
then defined, for ratification or rejection, and when the constitution,
if ratified by the popular vote, shall have been submitted to Congress
for examination and approval, said State shall, if its constitution be
approved by Congress, be declared entitled to representation in
Congress, and senators and representatives shall be admitted therefrom
on their taking the oath prescribed by law, and then and thereafter the
preceding sections of this bill shall be inoperative in said State."

--Mr. Blaine added, "It happened, Mr. Speaker, possibly by mere
incident, that I was the first member of this House who spoke in
Committee of the Whole on the President's message at the opening of
this session.  I then said that I believed the true interpretation of
the election of 1866 was that, in addition to the proposed
constitutional amendment, impartial suffrage should be the basis of
reconstruction.  Why not declare it so?  Why not, when you send out
this military police through the lately rebellious States, send with it
that impressive declaration?"

--Mr. Schenck of Ohio earnestly urged that before calling the previous
question, Mr. Stevens would allow a vote upon the amendment offered by
Mr. Blaine.  Mr. Stevens declined, and a motion by Mr. Blaine to refer
the bill to the Judiciary Committee with instructions to report back
the amendment, was defeated by _ayes_ 69, _noes_ 94.  The bill was
then passed by a vote of 109 to 55.  The Republicans who voted against
it were Baker of Illinois, Banks of Massachusetts, Davis of New York,
Defrees of Indiana, Dodge of New York, Kuykendall of Illinois, Loan of
Missouri, Randall of Kentucky, Francis Thomas and John L. Thomas, jun.,
of Maryland.

The bill reached the Senate on the 13th of February.  On the 14th Mr.
Williams of Oregon gave notice that he would offer an amendment, which
was almost literally the same as that offered by Mr. Blaine in the
House, but fearing that it might obstruct the passage of the bill he
withdrew it.  Mr. Reverdy Johnson of Maryland renewed it, with the
remark that if it should be adopted it would make the bill very much
less objectionable than it then was, and upon the amendment debate
proceeded.

Mr. Stewart of Nevada warmly sustained the amendment, regretting that
the senator from Oregon had changed his mind with regard to it.  Mr.
Stewart said that the history of military bills was that they were
always temporary in the beginning.  "But suppose the President of the
United States approved it, or the next President, if you please, should
like the bill, and should veto your measure repealing it, or suppose a
bare majority in either House of Congress should like it, then you
could not repeal it.  It may be years after you desire to get rid of it
before you can.  I say, when you use the military for temporary
purposes you should give the people of the South a chance to comply
with all the requirements which you propose to make.  If in the Blaine
Amendment, as it is called, there are not sufficient guarantees, not
enough conditions, then put in more and make it sufficient."

--Mr. Henderson of Missouri said, "If I understand the extent and scope
of this bill, it will simply to give the sanction of Congress to
military administration in the Southern States by the President.  If
there is any thing else in it, I desire to have it understood now,
before we proceed any further.  I am not exceedingly favorable to
military government anywhere, and if I can get along without it in the
Southern States I am anxious to do so.  I am not pleased with it
anywhere."  Mr. Henderson expressed the opinion that the President of
the United States could command General Grant in making the assignments
of officers to the respective districts.

--Mr. Willard Saulsbury of Delaware declared that "there is not a
single provision in the bill that is constitutional or will stand the
test in any court of justice."

--Mr. Buckalew and Mr. Hendricks pointed out that the amendment, as Mr.
Johnson had submitted it, made suffrage universal, just as the
amendment had been framed in the House.

--Mr. Johnson explained that he had taken it as prepared by the senator
from Oregon.

--Mr. Howard of Michigan objected to the amendment because it would
permit the increase of representatives in Congress, and of Presidential
electors, from the Confederate States.

--After a prolonged debate on the amendment offered by the senator from
Maryland, it was agreed to lay it aside by common consent, that Senator
Sherman might offer a substitute for the entire bill, the fifth section
of which substantially embodied the amendment offered by the senator
from Maryland and which had been known as the Blaine Amendment in the
House.  Mr. Sherman's substitute gave to the President his rightful
power to control the assignment of officers of the army to the command
of the military districts in the South.  After debate the substitute of
Mr. Sherman was passed by a party vote,--twenty-nine to ten.

When the bill went to the House it was violently opposed by Mr. Stevens
and Mr. Boutwell.  Mr. Boutwell said, "My objection to the proposed
substitute of the Senate is fundamental and conclusive, because the
measure proposes to reconstruct the State governments at once through
the agency of disloyal men."

--Mr. Stevens said, "When this House sent the bill to the Senate it was
simply to protect the loyal men of the Southern States.  The Senate has
sent us back an amendment which contains every thing else but
protection.  It has sent us back a bill which raises the whole question
in dispute as to the best mode of reconstructing the States, by making
distant and future pledges which this Congress has no authority to make
and no power to execute."

--Mr. Blaine argued against Mr. Stevens's proposition to send the
measure to a Conference Committee, and he begged those "who look to any
measure that shall guarantee a republican form of government to the
rebel states, with universal suffrage for loyal men," to vote for
this bill as it came from the Senate.

--Mr. Wilson of Iowa sustained the bill.  "Although it does not
attain," said he, "all that I desire to accomplish, it embraces much
upon which I have insisted, and seems to be all that I can get at
this session.  It reaches far beyond anything which the most sanguine
of us hoped for a year ago."

--Mr. Bingham declared that "the defeat of this bill to-day is really
a refusal to enact any law whatever for the protection of any man in
that vast portion of our country which was so recently swept over by
our armies from the Potomac to the Rio Grande."

--General Schenck spoke with great force in favor of the bill,
answering the somewhat reckless objections of Mr. Stevens in the most
effective manner.

--General Garfield replied to those who objected to the Senate
provision giving the command of officers in the South directly to the
President.  He said, "I want this Congress to give the command to the
President of the United States, and then, perhaps, some impeachment
hunters will have a chance to impeach him.  They will if he does not
obey."  He rebuked the gentlemen "who, when any measure comes here
that seems almost to grasp our purpose, resist and tell us that it is
a surrender of liberty.  I remember that this was done to us at the
last session, when everybody knows that if the Republican party lived,
it must live by the strength of the Constitutional amendment, and when
we agreed to pass it the _previous question_ was waived to allow
certain gentlemen to tell us that it was too low and too unworthy, too
mean and too unstatesmanlike."

--Mr. Russell Thayer of Pennsylvania supported the bill.  He said, "I
see in this provision, as I believe, what the deliberate judgment of
the American people will regard as ample guarantees for the future
loyalty and obedience of the South.  Those conditions are: _first_,
that the Southern States shall adopt a constitution in conformity with
the Constitution of the United States; _second_, that it shall be
ratified by a majority of the people of the States, without distinction
of race, color, or condition; _third_, that such constitution shall
guarantee universal and impartial suffrage; _fourth_, that such
constitution shall be approved by Congress; _fifth_, that the States
shall adopt the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution; and _sixth_,
that the amendment shall become a part of the Constitution of the
United States.  All this is required to be done before representation
is accorded to the States lately in rebellion, and then no
representative presenting himself for admission, can be received
unless he can take the test oath."

--Mr. Eldridge of Wisconsin denounced the whole measure as most wicked
and abominable.  "It contains," said he, "all that is vicious, all that
is mischievous in any of the propositions which have come either from
the Committee on Reconstruction or from any gentleman upon the other
side of the House."

--Mr. Elijah Hise of Kentucky declared that, "under such a system as
this bill proposes, the writ of _habeas corpus_ cannot exist, because
even if the civil tribunals are not entirely abolished, they will
exist only at the will of the military tyrant in command."

--Mr. Davis of New York spoke of the danger of suddenly enfranchising
the whole body of rebels.  "The State of Kentucky," he said, "has
enfranchised every rebel who has been in the service of the Confederate
States.  What to-day is the condition of affairs in that State?  Why,
sir, her political power is wielded by rebel hands.  Rebel generals,
wearing the insignia of the rebel service, walk the streets of her
cities, admired and courted; while the Union officers with their
wounds yet unhealed, are ostracized in political, commercial and
social life."

--Mr. Niblack of Indiana, one of the leading Democrats of the House,
thought the bill had been much improved by the action of the Senate.
"Though," said he, "it still retains many of the first features to
which I objected when it was before the House for discussion, it is
not now properly a military bill, nor is it properly a measure of
civil administration.  It is a most extraordinary attempt to blend the
two principles together."

When a vote was reached, the House rejected the Senate amendment--_ayes_
73, _noes_ 98.  This result was effected by a coalition of all the
Democrats with a minority of extreme Republicans.  But thirteen
days of the session remained, and it looked as if by a disagreement of
Republicans all legislation on the subject of Reconstruction would be
defeated.  Under the pressure of this fear Republican differences were
adjusted, and the Senate and the House found common ground to stand
upon by adding two amendments to the bill as the Senate had framed it.
It was agreed, on motion of Mr. Wilson of Iowa, to add a _proviso_ to
the fifth section, in these words: "that no person excluded from the
privilege of holding office by said proposed amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, shall be eligible as a member of a
convention to frame a constitution for any of said rebellious States,
nor shall any such person vote for members of such convention."  It was
also agreed, on motion of Mr. Shellabarger, that "until the people of
said rebel States shall be admitted to representation in the Congress
of the United States, any civil governments which may exist therein
shall be deemed provisional only, and in all respects subject to the
paramount authority of the United States at any time to abolish,
modify, control, or supersede. . . . All persons shall be entitled to
vote, and none others, who are entitled to vote under the fifth section
of this act; and no person shall be eligible to any office under such
provisional government, who shall be disqualified from holding office
under the provisions of the Third Article of such Constitutional
amendment."  With these modifications both Senate and House passed the
bill by a party vote.  During the discussion in the Senate Mr.
Doolittle moved that "nothing in this act shall be construed to
disfranchise any persons in any of said States from voting or holding
office who have received pardon and amnesty in accordance with the
Constitution and Laws."  The proposition received but eight votes.  The
bill went to the President for approval on the 20th of February,
leaving but a small margin of time for passage over his veto if as
anticipated he should decline to sign it.  The decisive character of
the measure had evoked fierce opposition, and this in turn had
stimulated Republican advocacy to a degree of great earnestness.

On the 2d of March the President sent to the House, in which branch the
bill had originated, a long veto message of very comprehensive
character.  He had summed up all the arguments that had been made
against the measure in both Houses, and he arrayed them with greater
strength than when they were originally presented.  His argument
against placing the States under military government was cogently
stated.  "This bill," said he, "imposes martial law at once, and its
operation will begin as soon as the general and his troops can be put
in place.  The dread alternative between its harsh rule and compliance
with the terms of this measure is not suspended, nor are the people
afforded any time for free deliberation.  The bill says to them, 'Take
martial law first, and then deliberate.'  And when they have done all
that this measure requires them to do, other conditions and
contingencies, over which they have no control, yet remain to be
fulfilled before they can be relieved from martial law.  Another
Congress must approve the constitutions made in conformity with the law
of this Congress, and must declare these States entitled to
representation in both branches.  The whole question thus remains open
and unsettled, and must again occupy the attention of Congress; and in
the mean time the agitation which now prevails will continue to
disturb all portions of the people."

The President's veto reached the House on the afternoon of Saturday.
On Monday, March 4th, at noon, Congress would expire by Constitutional
limitation.  The President had communicated his veto on the last day
permitted by the Constitution, and it was generally believed that his
motive for the postponement was to give the minority in one branch or
the other the power to defeat the bill either by dilatory motions or
by "talking against time."  Mr. Le Blond and Mr. Finck or Ohio, and Mr.
Boyer of Pennsylvania, frankly indicated their intention to employ all
means within their power to compass this end.  A system of
parliamentary delay was thus foreshadowed, but was prevented by Mr.
Blaine moving that the rules be suspended and a vote immediately taken
on the question required by the Constitution; namely, "_Will the House,
on reconsideration, agree to the passage of the bill, the President's
objection to the contrary notwithstanding?_"  The Speaker decided that
the motion in this form cut off all dilatory proceedings.  Mr. Finck
appealed from the decision of the Chair, but only four members
sustained him.  The rules were suspended, and the House, by a vote of
one hundred and thirty-five _ayes_ to forty-eight _noes_, passed the
bill over the veto of the President.  The Senate concurred in the
action of the House by _ayes_ thirty-eight, _noes_ ten; and the famous
Reconstruction law, from which flowed consequences of great magnitude,
was thus finally enacted against every effort of the Executive
Department of the Government.(1)

The successive steps of this legislation have been given somewhat in
detail because of its transcendent importance and its unprecedented
character.  It was the most vigorous and determined action ever taken
by Congress in time of peace.  The effect produced by the measure was
far-reaching and radical.  It changed the political history of the
United States.  But it is well to remember that it never could have
been accomplished except for the conduct of the Southern leaders.
The people of the States affected have always preferred as their
chief grievance against the Republican party, that negro suffrage was
imposed upon them as a condition of their re-admission to
representation; but his recital of the facts in their proper sequence
shows that the South deliberately and wittingly brought it upon
themselves.  The Southern people knew, as well as the members of
Congress knew, that the Northern people during the late political
canvass were divided in their opinion in regard to the requirements
of reconstruction, but that the strong preponderance was in favor of
exacting only the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment as the condition
of representation in Congress.  It was equally plain to all who cared
to investigate, or even to inquire, that if that condition should be
defiantly rejected, the more radical requirements would necessarily be
exacted as a last resort,--rendered absolutely necessary indeed by the
truculence of the Southern States.

The arguments that persuaded the Northern States of the necessity of
this step were simple and direct.  "We are willing," said they, "that
the Southern States shall themselves come gradually to recognize the
necessity and the expediency of admitting the negro to suffrage; we
are content, for the present, to invest him with all the rights of
citizenship, and to except him from the basis of representation,
allowing the South to choose whether he shall remain, at the expense of
their decrease in representation, outside the basis of enumeration."
It was the belief of the North that as the passions of the civil
contest should die out, the Southern States, if not inspired by a sense
of abstract justice, would be induced by the highest considerations of
self-interest to enfranchise the negro, and thus increase their power
in Congress by thirty-five to forty members of the House.  It was the
belief that when they should come to realize that the negro had
brought to them this increased power and prestige in the National
councils, they would treat him with justice and with fairness.  It was,
therefore, not merely with surprise, but with profound regret, and even
with mortification, that the North found the South in an utterly
impracticable frame of mind.  They would do nothing: they would listen
to nothing.  They had been inspired by the President with the same
unreasoning tenacity and stubbornness that distinguished his own
official conduct.  They believed that, even against the popular verdict
in the North, the President would in the end prevail.  They had
unbounded faith in the power of patronage, and they constantly exhorted
the President to turn every opponent of his policy out of office, and
give only to his friends the honors and emoluments of the National
Government.  They had full faith that this would carry consternation
to the Republican ranks, and would establish the President's power on
a firm foundation.

Unless, therefore, the Loyal States were willing to allow the Rebel
States to come back on their own terms, in a spirit of dictation to the
Government of the Union, they were under the imperious necessity of
providing some other basis of reconstruction than the one which the
South had unitedly rejected.  Congress was charged, in the name of
loyalty, to see that no harm should come to the Republic, and the point
was now reached where three ways were open: _first_, Congress might
follow the Administration, and allow the States to come in at once
without promise, without condition, without guarantee of any kind;
_second_, it might adopt the plan of Mr. Stevens, which had just been
narrowly defeated, and place the Southern States under military
government, with no date assigned for its termination by National
authority, and no condition held out by which the South itself could
escape from it; _third_, it might place the Southern States temporarily
under a military government, for the sake of preserving law and order
and the rights of property, during the prescribed period of
reconstruction--upon the basis that all loyal men, regardless of color
or previous condition of servitude, should take part in the movement.

Reduced to the choice of these three methods, the considerate,
well-pondered, conclusive judgment of the Republican party was in favor
of the last named, and the last named was adopted.  If, therefore,
suffrage was prematurely granted to the negro; if, in consequence, harm
came to the Southern States; if hardship was inflicted upon Southern
people, the responsibility for it cannot be justly laid upon Northern
sentiment or upon the Republican party.  It is true, and was not
denied, that the vast mass of the negroes thus admitted to suffrage
were without property and without education, and that it might have
been advantageous, if just treatment could have been assured them, that
they should tarry for a season in a preparatory state.  While it was
maintained as an abstract proposition that the right of the negro to
vote was well grounded, many thought it desirable, as Mr. Lincoln
suggested, that at first only those who were educated and those who
had served in the Union Army should be enfranchised.  But the North
believed, and believed wisely, that a poor man, an ignorant man, and
a black man, who was thoroughly loyal, was a safer and a better voter
than a rich man, an educated man, and a white man, who, in his heart,
was disloyal to the Union.  This sentiment prevailed, not without
hesitation, not without deep and anxious deliberation; but in the end
it prevailed with the same courage and with the same determination
with which the party had drawn the sword and fought through a long war
in aid of the same cause, for which the negro was now admitted to
suffrage.

During the civil war the negro had, so far as he was able, helped the
Union cause--his race contributing nearly a quarter of a million troops
to the National service.  If the Government had been influenced by a
spirit of inhumanity, it could have made him terribly effective by
encouraging insurrection and resistance on his part against his master.
But no such policy was ever entertained in counsels controlled in the
Cabinet by Seward and Chase and Stanton, or in operations in the field
directed by Grant and Sherman and Sheridan.  The negro was left to
raise the crops that supplied the Confederate armies with bread, when
a policy of cruelty, no worse than that of Andersonville and Belle
Isle, might have made him a terror to the Southern population.  The
humane policy thus pursued would have been scorned by European warriors
who have become the heroes of the world, but there is not a Northern
man who does not look back with profound satisfaction upon the
philanthropic determination that forbade the encouragement of a single
insurrection, or the destruction of a single Southern life, except
under the recognized and restricted laws of war.

Peace had now come, and the question was, whether the power of these
four and a half millions of men should be continually used against
the Northern States, against the loyalty which had saved the Union.
Only three-fifths of their number, in the day when the Southern States
were true to the Union, were admitted in the basis of representation.
Should the disloyalty of the South which had failed to destroy the
Government only by lack of power, be now rewarded by admitting the
whole number of negroes into the basis of representation, and at the
same time giving them no voice in the selection of representatives?
Surely, if this were conceded, it would offer such a premium upon
rebellion as no government guided by reason should confer; and,
therefore, the question came by the instinct of justice, and with the
precision of logic, to this point--the negro shall not be admitted
into the basis of representation until he is himself empowered to
participate in the choice of the representative.  The North had hoped
that the South would cordially accept the justice of this principle,
but whether the South accepted it or not, the North resolved that it
should become part of the organic law of the Republic.

As matter of historical truth which has been ingeniously and
continuously, whether ignorantly or malignantly, perverted, this
point cannot be too fully elaborated nor too forcibly emphasized:--_The
Northern states or the Republican party which then wielded the
aggregate political power of the North, did not force negro suffrage
upon the South or exact it as a condition of re-admitting the Southern
States to the right and privilege of representation in Congress until
after other conditions had been rejected by the South_.  The privilege
of representation in Congress had in effect been tendered to the
Southern States, upon the single condition that they would ratify the
Fourteenth Amendment, which provided among other safeguards for the
future, that so long as the negro was denied suffrage, he should not
be included in the basis of Federal enumeration,--in other words, that
the white men of the South should not be allowed to elect thirty-five
or forty representatives to Congress, based on the negro population,
in addition to the representatives duly apportioned to their own
numbers.  When all the Southern States--with the exception of Tennessee
--declined to accept this basis of reconstruction by their rejection
of the Fourteenth Amendment, they ought to have measured the
consequences.  The imperative question thenceforward was whether the
loyal or the disloyal--the victorious Union or the defeated Confederacy
--should prescribe the terms of Reconstruction.

The Northern States were thus compelled to consider whether they
would unconditionally surrender to the Rebel element of the South or
devise some other plan of reconstruction.  At that point, in the order
of time and in the order of events, and not until then, the just
resolve was made by the Republicans to reconstruct the South on the
basis of Loyalty, regardless or race or color.  By refusing to
co-operate with the Republicans in the work of rehabilitating their
States, the Southern rebels forced the Northern States to make
impartial suffrage the corner-stone of the restored Union.  The South
had its choice, and it deliberately and after fair warning decided to
reject the magnanimous offer of the North and to insist upon an
advantage in representation against which a common sense of justice
revolted.  The North, foiled in its original design of reconstruction
by the perverse course of the South, was compelled, under the
providence of the Ruler of Nations, to deal honestly and justly with
the colored people.  It was the insane folly of the South, in drawing
the sword against the life of the Nation, that led irresistibly to the
abolition of slavery.  In a minor degree the folly was now repeated,
in resisting the mode of Reconstruction first tendered, and thus
forcing Congress to confer civil rights and suffrage upon the
emancipated slave.  A higher than human power controlled these great
events.  The wrath of man was made to praise the righteous works of
God.  Whatever were the deficiencies of the negro race in education,
for the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, they had exhibited
the one vital qualification of an instinctive loyalty, and as far as
lay in their power a steadfast helpfulness to the cause of the National
Union.

As the strife between the Executive and Legislative Departments had
grown in intensity, President Johnson naturally sought to increase his
own prestige by the use of the patronage of the Government.  To this
end he had already removed certain conspicuous Republicans from office,
especially those who had been recommended and were now sustained by
senators and representatives prominently engaged in frustrating his
plan of reconstruction.  The wonder in the political world was, that
the President had not resorted to this form of attack more promptly,
and pursued it more determinedly.  His delay could be explained only
by what was termed his talent for procrastination, and to a certain
indecision which was fatal to him as an executive officer.  But as
the breach between himself and Congress widened, as the bitterness
between the partisans of the Executive and of the Legislative
Departments grew more intense, the belief became general, that, as
soon as Congress should adjourn, there would be a removal of all
Federal officers throughout the Union who were not faithful to the
principles, and did not respond to the exactions, of the
Administration.  Outside of his Cabinet, the President was surrounded
by the class of men who had great faith in the persuasive power of
patronage, and the pressure upon him to resort to its use was constant
and growing.  Inside of his Cabinet, there were men of the same belief,
but their power was somewhat neutralized by the attitude of Mr.
Seward, whose faith always lay in the strength of ideas, and not in the
use of force, or in the temptation of personal advantage.  Mr. Seward's
influence had constantly tended to hold the President back from a
ruthless removal of the whole body of officers who declined to take
part against the policy of Congress.

According to long-accepted construction of the Constitution, the
President's power of removal was absolute and unqualified.  Appointment
to office could not be made unless the consent of the Senate was
given in each and every case--but the consent of the Senate had not
been held as requisite to the removal of an officer.  The Constitution
was silent upon the subject, and the existence or non-existence of
power in the Senate to prevent a removal from office had been matter
of dispute from the foundation of the Government.  Those who contended
for the right of the President to remove without consulting the Senate
were fortified by the early legislation of Congress and the early
practice of the Executive.  The First Congress of the Union had
provided for officers whose appointment depended upon confirmation by
the Senate as required by the Constitution, but whose removal was left
in explicit terms to the President alone.  The decision to that effect
was made after debate in which Madison had strenuously contended for
that construction, and his high authority gave to the conclusion great
weight with subsequent administrations of the Government.  But there
was undoubtedly a divided opinion in the Congress that conceded it, and
that division has continued among Constitutional lawyers and statesmen
to this day.  In 1835 Mr. Webster, "after considering the question
again and again," made this declaration in the Senate: "I am willing
to say that, in my deliberate judgment, the original decision was
wrong.  I cannot but think that those who denied the power in 1789 had
the best of the argument.  It appears to me, after thorough and
repeated and conscientious examination, that an erroneous
interpretation was given to the Constitution in this respect by the
decision of the First Congress. . . . I have the clearest conviction
that the Convention which formed the Constitution looked to no other
mode of displacing an officer than by impeachment or the regular
appointment of another to the same place. . . . I believe it to be
within the just power of Congress to reverse the decision of 1789,
and I mean to hold myself at liberty to act hereafter on that question
as the safety of the Government and of the Constitution may require."

Mr. Webster's words would have exerted a far wider influence upon
public opinion if his argument had not been made under the pressure of
a partisan excitement caused by General Jackson's removal of officers
who were not in sympathy with the measures of his Administration.  He
was effectively though not directly answered by the venerable
ex-President Madison.  In October, 1834, in a letter to Edward Coles,
Mr. Madison said, "The claim of the Senate on Constitutional ground
to a share in removal as well as appointment of officers is in direct
opposition to the uniform practice of the Government from its
commencement.  It is clear that the innovation would not only vary
essentially the existing balance of power, but expose the Executive
occasionally to a total inaction, and at all times to delays fatal to
the due execution of the laws."  A year later, and only a few months
before his death, Mr. Madison in a letter to Charles Francis Adams
thus repeated his views: "The claims for the Senate of a share in the
removal from office, and _for the Legislature an authority to regulate
its tenure_, have had powerful advocates.  I must still think, however,
that the text of the Constitution is best interpreted by reference to
the tripartite theory of Government, to which practice had conformed,
and which so long and uniform a practice would seem to have
established.  The face of the Constitution and the journalized
proceedings of the Convention strongly indicate a partiality to that
theory then at the zenith of favor among the most distinguished
commentators on the organization of political power."  Chief Justice
Marshall fortified the position of Mr. Madison, by declaring that the
action of the First Congress on this question "has ever been considered
as a full expression of the sense of the Legislature on this important
part of the American Constitution."

Of the thirty-nine members of the Convention of 1787 who signed the
Constitution, thirteen, including Mr. Madison, were members of the
first Congress; Alexander Hamilton was Secretary of the Treasury under
the new Government; and above all, General Washington, who had presided
over the deliberations of the Convention, had attentively listened to
every discussion, and had carefully studied every provision, was
President of the United States.  More than one-third of the members of
the Constitutional Convention were therefore engaged in the Executive
and Legislative Departments of the new Government in applying the
organic instrument which they had taken so large a part in creating.
The cotemporaneous interpretation was by those facts rendered valuable
if not authoritative.  Cotemporaneous interpretations of organic law
are not always, it is true, to be regarded as conclusive, but they are
entitled to the most careful and respectful consideration, and cannot
be reversed with safety unless the argument therefor is unanswerable
and the motive which suggests the argument altogether patriotic and
unselfish.  The familiar rule laid down by Lord Coke is as pertinent
to-day as when first announced: "Great regard ought, in construing a
law, to be paid to the construction which the sages, who lived about
the time soon after it was made, put upon it, because they were best
able to judge of the intention of the makers at the time when the law
was made.  _Contemporania exposito est fortissima in legem_."

Against the early decision of the founders of the Government, against
the ancient and safe rule of interpretation prescribed by Lord Coke,
against the repeatedly expressed judgment of ex-President Madison,
against the equally emphatic judgment of Chief Justice Marshall, and
above all, against the unbroken practice of the Government for
seventy-eight years, the Republican leaders now determined to deprive the
President of the power of removing Federal officers.  Many were induced
to join in the movement under the belief that it was important to test
the true meaning of the Constitution in the premises, and that this
could be most effectively done by directly restraining by law the power
which had been so long conceded to the Executive Department.  To that
end Mr. Williams of Oregon on the first Monday of December, 1866,
introduced a bill "to regulate the tenure of civil offices."  It was
referred to the Committee on Retrenchment, and reported back with
amendment by Mr. Edmunds of Vermont, who thenceforward assumed
parliamentary control of the subject.

The bill came up for discussion on the 10th day of January.  Its first
section provided that every person _except members of the Cabinet_,
"holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who shall
hereafter be appointed to such office, shall be entitled to hold such
office until a successor shall have been, in like manner, appointed and
duly qualified, except as herein otherwise provided."  The second
section declared that "when any officer shall, during the recess of the
Senate, be shown by evidence satisfactory to the President, to be
guilty of misconduct in office, or crime, or for any reason shall
become legally disqualified or incapable of performing the duties of
his office; in such case, and in no other, the President may suspend
such officer and designate some suitable person to perform temporarily
the duties of such office, until the next meeting of the Senate, and
until the case shall be acted upon by the Senate: and in such case it
shall be the duty of the President, within twenty days after the first
day of such meeting of the Senate, to report to the Senate such
suspension, with the evidence and reasons for the same, and if the
Senate shall concur in such suspension, and advise and consent to the
removal of such officer, they shall so certify to the President, who
shall thereupon remove such officer, and by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate appoint another person to such office; but if
the Senate shall refuse to concur in such suspension, such officer
so suspended shall forthwith resume the functions of his office, and
the powers of the person so performing its duties in his stead shall
cease."

Mr. Howe wished to know why members of the Cabinet should be excepted.
"Each one of those officers," he said, "is created by statute, and
created not for the personal benefit of the Executive, but created for
the benefit of the public service, just as much as a deputy postmaster
or an Indian agent."  Mr. Edmunds, in reply to Mr. Howe, said that
the Committee, "after a great deal of consultation and reflection,"
had resolved to except members of the Cabinet from the scope of the
proposed Act.  He gave reasons therefor, which from the foundation of
the Government have been considered conclusive--reasons founded on the
personal and confidential relations necessarily existing between the
President and his Constitutional advisers.  The reasons did not satisfy
Mr. Howe.  He thought "the tenure of Cabinet officers should be under
the control of law and independent of any undue exercise of Executive
influence."  He therefore moved to amend the bill so as to put the
members of the Cabinet on the same basis as other civil officers--_not
removable by the President, except with the advice and consent of the
Senate_.  But the Senate was decidedly averse to so radical a change
in the practice of the Government, and Mr. Howe secured the votes of
only eight senators to join him in support of his amendment.

Mr. Edmunds moved, subsequently, to amend the bill by the addition of
several clauses, one declaring it a high misdemeanor for "any person,
contrary to the provisions of this Act, to accept any appointment or
employment in office, or to hold or attempt to hold, or exercise, any
office or employment."  The signing, sealing, countersealing, or
issuing of any commission, or letter of authority, contrary to the
provisions of the Act, was made punishable by a fine not exceeding ten
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding five years, or by
both.  Various other provisions of great severity were incorporated,
and were adopted after brief debate.

When the bill reached the House, every provision of it was readily
agreed to except that which excluded Cabinet officers from its
operation.  An amendment offered by Mr. Williams of Pennsylvania to
strike that out was defeated--_ayes_ 76, _noes_ 78.  Later in the
day, just as the bill was passing its engrossment, Mr. Farquhar of
Indiana, having voted with the majority, moved to reconsider the vote
by which the amendment was rejected.  The vote was taken the ensuing
day, and by the zealous work of the intervening night, the motion to
reconsider prevailed--_ayes_ 75, _noes_ 69--and the amendment was at
once adopted.  The bill was then passed by a party vote--_ayes_ 111,
_noes_ 38.  When it was returned to the Senate, that body refused, by
a decisive vote, to concur in the amendment which placed members of
the Cabinet on the same basis with other officers respecting the
President's power of removal.  Upon a conference between the two
branches on this disagreement, a substitute was adopted, declaring
that the members of the Cabinet "shall hold their offices,
respectively, for and during the term of the President by whom they
may have been appointed, and for one month thereafter, subject to
removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."  Both
Houses agreed to the bill in this form.  Mr. Farquhar's change of
mind and his motion to reconsider led to the incorporation in the bill
of the provision whose alleged violation by President Johnson was the
direct cause of his impeachment by the House of Representatives a
year later.

The final action on the measure by the Senate was on the 20th of
February, so that the President had the opportunity to endanger its
passage by postponing the veto, and it was generally anticipated that
he would do so.  He communicated it, as in the case of the
Reconstruction Bill, on the 2d of March.  In reviewing the measure Mr.
Johnson said: "In effect it provides that the President shall not
remove from their places any of the civil officers whose terms of
service are not limited by law, without the advice and consent of the
Senate of the United States.  The bill conflicts, in my judgment, with
the Constitution of the United States.  The question, as Congress is
well aware, is by no means a new one.  That the power of removal is
constitutionally vested in the President of the United States, is a
principle which has been not more distinctly declared by judicial
authority and judicial commentators, than it has been uniformly
practiced upon by the Legislative and Executive Departments of the
Government. . . . The question has often been raised in subsequent
times of high excitement, and the practice of the Government has
nevertheless conformed in all cases to the decision thus made.
Having at an early period accepted the Constitution, in regard to the
Executive office, in the sense in which it was interpreted with the
concurrence of its founders, I have found no sufficient grounds in the
arguments now opposed to that construction, or in any assumed necessity
of the times, for changing those opinions. . . . For these reasons, I
return the bill to the Senate, in which House it originated, for the
further consideration of Congress which the Constitution prescribes.
Experience, I think, has shown that it is the easiest, as it is also
the most attractive, of studies to frame constitutions for the
self-government of free states and nations; but I think that experience
has equally shown that it is the most difficult of all political labors
to preserve and maintain such free constitutions of self-government when
once happily established."

The veto message was a very able document.  In all official papers of
importance the President appeared at his best.  He had the inestimable
advantage of Mr. Seward's calm temper and of his attractive and
forcible statement of the proper argument.  Few among the public men
of the United States have rivaled Mr. Seward in the dignity, felicity,
and vigor which he imparted to an official paper.  No one ever
surpassed him.  In the veto message under consideration his hand was
evident in every paragraph; and if it had been President Johnson's good
fortune to go down to posterity on this single issue with Congress, he
might confidently have anticipated the verdict of history in his favor.
The delicate, almost humourous sarcasm in the closing words above
quoted from the message, afford a good specimen of Mr. Seward's
facility of stating the gravest of organic propositions in a form
attractive to the general reader.  He wrote as one who felt that in
this particular issue with Congress, whatever might be the adverse
votes of the Senate and House, time would be sure to vindicate the
position of the President.  But the message did not arrest the action,
indeed scarcely the attention, of Congress, and the bill was promptly,
even hurriedly, passed over the veto,--in the Senate by 35 _ayes_ to
11 _noes;_ in the House by 133 _ayes_ to 37 _noes_.

The bill was not passed, however, without considerable misgiving on
the part of many members of both Houses who voted for it.  It was an
extreme proposition,--a new departure from the long-established usage
of the Federal Government, and for that reason, if for no other,
personally degrading to the incumbent of the Presidential office.  It
could only have grown out of the abnormal excitement created by the
dissensions between the two great Departments of the Government.  The
bitterness engendered resembled that which always distinguishes a
family quarrel.  The measure was resorted to as one of self-defense
against the alleged aggressions and the unrestrained power of the
Executive Department.  But the history of its operation, and of its
subsequent modification, which practically amounted to its repeal, is
one to which the Republican party cannot recur with any sense of pride
or satisfaction.  As matter of fact, a Republican Congress, largely
composed of the same members who had enacted the law, indirectly
confessed two years later that it could not be maintained.  Regarded
only in the light of expediency at the time, it could readily be
demonstrated (as was afterwards admitted by candid men among those who
supported it) to be a blunder,--a blunder all the more censurable
because the Act was not needed to uphold the Reconstruction policy of
Congress, in aid of which it was devised.  That policy relied for its
vindication upon the judgment and conscience of the loyal people, and
it was an impeachment of their good faith to say that either could be
affected by the removal of one man, or of many men, from official
position under the Federal Government.  The Reconstruction policy stood
upon a strong and enduring principle,--as strong and enduring as the
question of human right,--and was sustained with vigor and enthusiasm
by the great party which was responsible for the war measures
that had saved the Union.  The same sentiment did not attach to the
Tenure-of-office Law, which indeed was only the cause of subsequent
humiliation to all who had taken part in its enactment.(2)

It was part of the fixed policy of Mr. Lincoln's administration to
increase the number of distinctively free States from that section of
the public domain which had never been in any way contaminated by the
institution of slavery.  To this end he was anxious to encourage the
settlement of the Territories already organized west of the Missouri
river.  To provide for the still more rapid creation of North-western
States, two additional Territories, Idaho and Montana, were organized
from the area which had been included in Dakota.  Mr. Lincoln's evident
motive was to place beyond the calculation, or even the hope of the
disloyal States the possibility of ever again having sufficient
political power to compete in the Senate for the mastery of the
Republic.  He was persuaded that the sectional contest would be
fatally pursued as long as the chimerical idea of equality in the
Senate should stimulate Southern ambition.  He knew, moreover, that
the war could not close with victory for the Union, without the
proposal of certain changes in the Constitution, and to this end it
was desirable that the loyal States should as early and as nearly as
possible constitute three-fourths of the entire Union.  With this
motive, he had towards the close of his first term, somewhat
prematurely it was believed by many, stimulated the desire of the
settlers of Nevada for a State government.  He had faith not only in
the justice, but in the popularity, of this policy; for he took pains
to issue the proclamation declaring Nevada a State in the Union only
a week preceding the Presidential election of 1864, when the existence
of his administration was at stake, and when every public measure was
scanned with special scrutiny.

Nebraska had been organized as a Territory in the original Douglas bill
repealing the Missouri Compromise, in 1854; and Colorado was made a
Territory the week preceding Mr. Lincoln's first inauguration.  After
Nevada, these Territories offered the earliest promise of becoming
States.  They were both parts of the old Louisiana purchase from
France, and had in popular estimation and in the classification of the
earlier geographers been included within the borders of the Great
American Desert.  But settlers has swarmed upon the plains of Nebraska,
and the waving fields of grain and the innumerable herds of cattle
browsing on her rich pasture-land soon dispelled that misconception,
and gave promise of the prosperous development which the State has
since attained.  Earlier than the farmer or the grazier could reach its
soil, Colorado was settled by an intelligent mining population, whose
industry has extracted from her mountains more than two hundred
millions of the precious metals, contributed in the last quarter of a
century to the wealth of the world.  Encouraged by the policy of the
Administration, and especially by the precedent of Nevada, both
Territories sought an enabling Act from Congress in the winter of
1862-63.  Neither succeeded at the time; but in the next Congress a
bill "to enable the people of Colorado to form a constitution and State
government, and for the admission of said State into the Union on an
equal footing with the original States," passed both Houses, and was
approved by Mr. Lincoln of the 21st of March, 1864.  A month later
(April 19, 1864) a similar bill for Nebraska was signed by the President.

It appeared that the citizens of each Territory who had been forward
in asking an enabling Act from Congress were somewhat in advance of
popular sentiment, for when the question of forming a State
government was submitted to direct vote in Colorado it was rejected,
and the same action was taken in Nebraska.  But soon afterward (in the
year 1865) the movement for a State government gained strength in both
Territories.  Through duly organized conventions and the formation and
adoption of State constitutions, the people indicated a willingness, if
not an active desire, to be admitted to the Union.  In Colorado 5,895
votes were cast when the constitution was submitted, and the majority
in favor of the new State was but 155.  William Gilpin was elected
governor, and John Evans and Jerome W. Chaffee were chosen senators of
the United States.  But when the new senators reached Washington (early
in the year 1866) they found that the policy of the National
Administration on the subject of new States had changed, and that
instead of a friend in the White House, as Mr. Lincoln had steadily
proved, they had a determined opponent in the person of Mr. Johnson.
Congress with reasonable promptness passed the bill in both Houses for
the admission of Colorado, though it was opposed by the more radical
class of Republicans because negroes were excluded from the right of
suffrage.  It is a striking illustration of the rapid change of public
sentiment, that in the winter and early spring of 1866 a bill
containing that provision could pass a Congress in which the
Republicans had more than two-thirds of the membership of each branch,
whereas in less than a year negro suffrage was required as the
condition of re-admission of the Southern States.

The Colorado bill passed the Senate by a vote of nineteen to thirteen,
and the House by eighty-one to fifty-seven.  It reached the President
on the fifth day of May and was promptly vetoed.  Mr. Johnson did not
believe that the establishment of a state government was necessary to
the welfare of the people of Colorado; "nor was it satisfactorily
established that a majority of the citizens of Colorado desire, or are
prepared for, an exchange of the Territorial for a State government."
He thought that Colorado, instead of increasing, had declined in
population.  "At an election for a Territorial Legislature in 1861,
10,580 votes were cast; at an election in 1864 only 6,192 votes were
cast; while at the election of 1865 only 5,905 votes have been cast."
He said, "I regret this apparent decline of population in Colorado,
but it is manifest that it is due to emigration which is going out
from that Territory into other regions of the United States, which
either are in fact, or are believed to be by the citizens of Colorado,
richer in mineral wealth and agricultural resources."  The President
commented upon the injustice of creating from so small a population a
State with senatorial strength equal to that of the largest State in
the Union.  He thought Colorado did not have a population of more than
twenty thousand persons "whereas one hundred and twenty-seven thousand
are required in other States for a single representative in Congress."
The President did not neglect his one constant theme--the unrepresented
condition of the Southern States.  He insisted that "so long as eleven
of the old States remain unrepresented in Congress, no new State should
be prematurely and unnecessarily admitted to a participation in the
political power which the Federal Government wields."  The strong
minority which had opposed the Colorado bill gave no hope of overriding
the President's veto, which was simply laid on the table and ordered to
be printed.

The bill for the admission of Nebraska came later in the session, not
being introduced for consideration until the 23d of July.   It passed
very promptly by a vote of twenty-four to eighteen in the Senate, and
by sixty-two to fifty-two in the House.  As in the case of Colorado the
constitution excluded the negro from the right of suffrage, and for
that reason a very considerable proportion of the Republicans of each
branch voted against the bill.  The vote was so close in the House that
but for a frank and persuasive statement made by Mr. Rice of Maine,
from the Committee on Territories, it would have been defeated.  He
pictured the many evils that would come to the people of Nebraska, now
more than sixty thousand in number, if they could not do for
themselves, as a State, many things which the National Government would
not do for them as a Territory.  Under the influence of his speech a
majority of ten was found for the bill, but Congress adjourned the day
after it was finally passed by both branches, and the President quietly
"pocketed" the bill; and thus the earnest and prolonged effort to
create two new States came to naught for the time.

Nothing daunted by the President's veto of the bill admitting Colorado,
and his pocketing the bill admitting Nebraska, Mr. Wade promptly
introduced both bills anew, at the beginning of the second session of
the Thirty-ninth Congress.  The case of Nebraska was, in popular
judgment, stronger than the case of Colorado.  The population was
larger, and being devoted to agriculture, was naturally regarded as
more stable than that of Colorado, which was based principally upon the
somewhat fortuitous discovery of mines of the precious metals.  But
there was an admitted political embarrassment in regard to both
Territories, the principal debate on which occurred when the bill
admitting Nebraska was under consideration.  Congress was, at the time,
engaged in passing the Reconstruction Act for the States lately in
rebellion, and had made it imperative that negroes should be endowed
with suffrage by those States.  While insisting on this condition for
the Southern States it was obviously impossible for Congress to admit
two Northern States with constitutions prohibiting suffrage to the
negro.  In the months of the Congressional vacation public opinion in
the North had made great strides on this question.

A minority of Republicans were intent on sending the bill back and
having the question of negro suffrage submitted for popular decision,
but in the opinion of the majority of the party this was a needless
postponement of a pressing question, and all propositions looking to
such postponement were rejected.  A final compromise of views was
reached, by inserting in the Act of admission an additional section
declaring "that this Act shall not take effect except upon the
fundamental condition that within the State of Nebraska there shall
be no denial of the elective franchise or of any other right to any
person, by reason of race or color, excepting Indians not taxed; and
upon the further fundamental condition that the Legislature of said
State, by a solemn public act, shall declare the assent of said State
to the said fundamental condition and shall transmit to the President
of the United States an authentic copy of said Act."  When notified
of this solemn public act by the Legislature, it was made the duty of
the President to announce the fact by proclamation, and thereupon the
admission of the State to the Union, without further proceedings of
Congress, was to be considered complete.  The objection to this
compromise by those who opposed it and by others who reluctantly
supported it, was that it did not have the force of Organic Law; that
the proposed act of the Legislature would not be rendered any more
binding by reason of being called a solemn act, and that it might be
repealed by any subsequent Legislature.  Much argument was expended
upon this point, but the general judgment was that an act of the
Legislature, made in pursuance of such an understanding with Congress,
was in the nature of a compact which, without discussing the question
of power, would certainly be regarded as binding upon the State.  With
this understanding, Congress passed a bill admitting the State, but the
vote in both branches was divided on the line of party.

This action was accomplished late in January (1867), and on the 29th
of that month the President vetoed the bill.  He objected especially
to the clause just referred to, because it was an addition to the
enabling Act which Congress had no moral right to make, and because
it required of Nebraska a condition not theretofore required of States,
--contradicting flatly the declaration of the first section of the
bill, in which the State was declared to be "admitted into the Union
upon an equal footing with the original States in all respects
whatever."  He argued that the imposition of the condition prescribed
in the bill, and its acceptance by the Legislature, was practically
a change in the organic law of the State without consulting the people,
which he regarded as an innovation upon the safe practice of the
Government.  But his arguments fell upon unwilling ears, and the bill
was passed over the veto by a vote of thirty to nine in the Senate,
and in the House by one hundred and twenty to forty-three.

Colorado did not fare so well.  The bill was passed by both branches
of Congress, though not with so full a vote nor with so much confidence
in the propriety and necessity of the measure.  Precisely the same
condition in regard to suffrage was inserted as in the case of the
Nebraska bill.  It met with a prompt veto, more elaborately argued and
presented with more confidence by the President than in the case of
Nebraska.  He said, "I cannot perceive and reason for the admission of
Colorado that would not apply with equal force to nearly every other
Territory now organized, and I submit whether, if this bill becomes a
law, it will be possible to resist the logical conclusion that such
Territories as Dakota, Montana, and Idaho must be received as States
whenever they present themselves, without regard to the number of
inhabitants they may respectively contain."  He dwelt forcibly upon the
necessity of requiring population enough to secure one representative.
"The plain facts of our history," said he, "will attest that the
leading States admitted since 1845, namely, Iowa, Wisconsin, California,
Minnesota, and Kansas (including Texas, which was admitted in that
year), have all come in with an ample population for one
representative, and some of them with nearly, if not quite, enough for
two."

There were really no facts before Congress tending to prove the
existence of those great resources which have since advanced Colorado
so rapidly in population and prosperity.  Little was known of the
Territory.  It was several hundred miles beyond the Western border of
continuous settlement, and the men who came from it were regarded as
adventurous pioneers on the very outposts of civilization.  Under this
condition of affairs it is not strange that the Senate failed to pass
the bill for the admission of the State over the veto of the President.
Edmunds, Fessenden, Foster, Grimes, Harris, Morgan, and some other
Republicans, less prominent, voted in the negative.  The result was
twenty-nine in favor of passing it over the veto, and nineteen against.
Defeated in the Senate the bill did not go to the House, and the
admission of Colorado was by this action postponed for several years.

The President gave specious reasons for his vetoes, especially in the
case of Colorado, but they did not conceal the fact that his position
was radically different from that which Mr. Lincoln had held--radically
different from the position which he would himself had assumed if he
had maintained in good faith the principles he had professed when he
secured the suffrages of the Republican party for the Vice-Presidency.
Having allied himself with the South and compromised his patriotic
record by espousing the cause he had so hotly opposed, he naturally
adopted all its principles and its worst prejudices.  For nearly half
a century the leading exponents of Southern sentiment had been envious
of the growth of the free North-West, and so far as lay in their power
they had obstructed it--being unwilling for a long period to admit one
of its giant Territories to the Union until its power could be
politically offset by one of less population and wealth in the South.
Mr. Johnson in his new associations at once adopted this jealous and
ungenerous policy--which had indeed lost something of its significance
by the abolition of slavery, but was still stimulated by partisan
considerations and was invariable hostile to the admission of a
Republican State.  The most bitter prejudices could not blind Mr.
Johnson or the Southern leaders to the inevitable growth of free
commonwealths in the North-West, but it seemed to be an object with
both to keep them from participation in the government of the Union so
long as possible, and to accomplish this end by every expedient that
could be adopted.

An Act in relation to the President's power to grant pardon and
amnesty, passed at this session, was more important in its spirit than
in its results.  By the thirteenth section of the Confiscation Act of
July 17, 1862, the President was authorized, at any time, by
proclamation, "to extend to any persons who may have participated in
the existing rebellion in any state or part thereof, pardon and
amnesty."  Under a suspension of the rules, the House of
Representatives, by a vote of one hundred and twelve to twenty-nine,
repealed this section on the first day of the session (December 3,
1866).  There was anxiety on the part of many, under the lead of Mr.
Chandler of Michigan, to repeal it so promptly in the Senate, but it
was referred to the Judiciary Committee and passed after discussion.
Mr. Chandler said, "It is a notorious fact, as notorious as the records
of a court, that pardons have been for sale around this town, for sale
by women--by more than one woman.  The records of your court in the
District of Columbia show this.  Any senator who desires this
disgraceful business to go on, of course desired that this clause shall
remain."

The repeal of the clause, however, would not take from the President
his constitutional power of pardoning, but in the judgment of Mr.
Trumbull, who had charge of the bill in the Senate, it took from him
the power to pardon by proclamation and confined him to his right of
issuing individual pardons.  The difference between pardon and amnesty
was defined by Mr. Trumbull.  Pardon is an act of mercy extended to
an individual.  It must be by deed.  It must be pleaded.  According to
Chief Justice Marshall, it is essential to its validity that it be
delivered to the person pardoned.  But an amnesty is a general pardon
by proclamation.  Mr. Trumbull thought the repeal would be a "valuable
expression of opinion on the part of Congress that general pardons and
restoration of property will not be continued, and if they President
continues to pardon rebels and restore their property by individual
acts under the Constitution, let him do so without having the sanction
of Congress for his act."

Mr. Reverdy Johnson took issue with Mr. Trumbull.  He maintained that
the President's powers to grant pardons, as conferred by the
Constitution, had not been affected by the provision of law whose
repeal was now urged.  He declared that the power of the President
"to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United
States" was as broad, as general, as unrestricted as language could
make it.  He could find no logical ground for the distinction made
by Mr. Trumbull between individual pardons and general amnesties by
proclamation--in illustration of which he said President Washington
had by proclamation pardoned the offenders engaged in the Whiskey
Insurrection.  The enactment of the provision had not, in Mr. Johnson's
opinion, enlarged the President's pardoning power, and its repeal
would not restrict it.

It was thought that a majority of the Senate concurred in Mr. Johnson's
interpretation of the Constitution, but they passed the bill as a
rebuke to the scandalous sale of pardons which Mr. Chandler had brought
to the attention of the Senate.  This vile practice had no doubt been
pursued to some extent, but only by a class of "middle men" who had
neither honor nor sensibility.  They had in some form the opportunity
to secure the interposition of men who could reach the ear of the
President or the Attorney-General.  It is hardly necessary to add that
neither of those high officials was in the remotest degree reflected
upon even by their bitterest opponents.  However wrong-headed Mr.
Johnson and Mr. Stanbery might have been considered on certain
political issues, the personal integrity of both was unblemished.  It
was believed that the nefarious practice was stopped by Mr. Chandler's
action in the Senate.  Exposure made public men careful to examine
each application for pardon before they would consent to recommend it
to the President.

The President neither approved the bill nor objected to it, but
allowed it to become a law by the expiration of the Constitutional
limit of ten days.  He obviously took the same view that had been
advanced by Mr. Reverdy Johnson, and did not take the trouble to sign
it, much less to veto it.  It was _brutum fulmen_, and the President
used his Constitutional power to pardon by proclamation just as freely
after its enactment as before.

[NOTE.--"Pocketing a bill" is the phrase commonly used to describe the
President's course when he permits a bill which reaches him within the
last ten days of the session, to die without action on his part.  It
is frequently termed the "pocket veto."]

[(1) The original Reconstruction Act and the several supplementary Acts
are given in full in Appendix A.]

[(2) The full text of the Act to regulate the tenure of certain civil
offices, is given in Appendix B.]


CHAPTER XII.

The Fortieth Congress met at the very moment the Thirty-ninth
closed--on the fourth day of March, 1867.  The valedictory words of the
presiding officers in both branches were followed immediately by the
calling to order of the succeeding bodies.  The contest between the
President and Congress had grown so violent, the mutual distrust had
become so complete, that the latter was unwilling to have its power
suspended for the customary vacation of nine months between the 4th of
March and the first Monday of the ensuing December; and therefore at
the preceding session a law had been passed directing that each
Congress should be organized immediately after the existence of its
predecessor had closed.  The Republican leaders felt that without the
supervising and counteracting power of Congress, full force and effect
might not be given to the Reconstruction laws by the President; that
they might possibly be neutralized by hostile action from the office
of the Attorney-General, and that for this reason it would be well,
nay, it was imperatively demanded, that the legislative power should be
kept ready to interpose with fresh enactments, the very moment those
already in force should be dulled by adverse construction, or haltingly
administered by Executive agents not in sympathy with the policy of
Congress.

The membership of the Fortieth Congress was changed in some important
respects in both branches.  Simon Cameron, at sixty-eight years of
age, returned from Pennsylvania as the successor of Edgar Cowan in the
Senate.  It was the third time he had entered that body, and now, as
it proved, for a longer period than ever before.--Roscoe Conkling, who
had been steadily growing in strength, with the Republican party of
New York, was transferred from the House and took the seat of Ira
Harris.--Justin S. Morrill of Vermont, after twelve years of useful
and honorable service in the House, was now promoted to the Senate for
a still longer and equally honorable and useful service in that
body.--Oliver P. Morton, bearing his great reputation as the War Governor
of Indiana, now took the seat of Henry S. Lane, whom, six years before,
he had succeeded in the gubernatorial chair of his State.--James W.
Patterson of New Hampshire had grown rapidly in favor by four years'
service in the House and now entered the Senate as the successor of
Daniel Clark.--Orris S. Ferry, who but for physical disability would
have acquired wider fame, succeeded Lafayette S. Foster as senator from
Connecticut.--James Harlan returned from Iowa after a somewhat
extraordinary experience with the President during his two years'
absence.--Charles D. Drake, fresh from bitter political controversies,
entered from Missouri as the successor of B. Gratz Brown.--Cornelius
Cole, who had already served in the House, came from California.--Henry
W. Corbett, a successful merchant, came from Oregon.  The Senate on the
whole had received valuable accessions.  Some of the men who entered
that day became prominent and influential in the public councils for
many years.

The House also received some noteworthy additions among the new
members.  Two marked men from the North-West, who had served as
representatives in opposing parties, before the Rebellion, now returned
as members of the same political organization, having in the four
intervening years acquired great distinction in the war for the Union
--John A. Logan of Illinois, and Cadwalader C. Washburn of
Wisconsin.--Grenville M. Dodge, who had attained high rank in the
volunteer service, entered from Iowa.--Norman B. Judd, who had gained
much influence by his long membership of the State Senate of Illinois
between 1844 and 1860, and by his service as minister to Berlin under
Mr. Lincoln, now came from one of the Chicago districts.

The New-York delegation was strengthened by the advent of some new men.
--Dennis McCarthy, an enterprising and successful merchant, with wide
knowledge of public affairs, entered from the Syracuse district.  He
proved a most intelligent and useful member of the House, as he already
had of the Legislature of New York.  His ability, his industry, and his
broadly liberal views have given him a high standing among the people
of his State.--William H. Robertson entered at the same time from the
Westchester district.  He was a member of the House for only a single
term, but he left a clear imprint of the high character which has since
been put to severe tests and was never found wanting.  Able and frank,
conscientious and careful in the discharge of every trust, Mr.
Robertson has established a reputation without spot or blemish.--Orange
Ferriss, since of honorable repute as one of the Auditors in the
Treasury Department, John C. Churchill, who had already attained a good
standing at the Bar, and Addison H. Laflin, afterwards appointed to an
important customs office in the city of New York, all entered at this
session.

John Coburn, who had made a good record in the war, came from the
State of Indiana.  Firm and tenacious in his opinions, even to the
point of obstinacy, he was for years an active and useful
representative of the people.  He could not be deflected from what he
regarded as the line of duty and he soon acquired the respect of both
sides of the House.--Morton C. Hunter, who had done good service in the
Army of the Tennessee, as Colonel of an Indiana regiment, and
afterwards commanded a brigade in Sherman's Atlanta campaign, now
entered from the Bloomington district.--Austin Blair, who had won
great praise as Governor of Michigan during the war, now entered as
representative from the Jackson district.  He exhibited talent in
debate, was distinguished for industry in the work of the House and
for inflexible integrity in all his duties.  He was not a party man in
the ordinary sense of the word, but was inclined rather to independence
of thought and action.  This habit separated him from many friends who
had wished to promote his political ambition, and estranged him for a
time from the Republican party.  But it never lost him the confidence
of his neighbors and friends, and did not impair the good reputation
he had earned in his public career.--George A. Halsey, a successful
manufacturer and a most intelligent, worthy man, entered from the
Newark district of New Jersey, bringing to the House a thorough and
valuable knowledge of the trade relations of the country, both domestic
and foreign.--The New-Hampshire delegation, not present at the
organization of the House, had been entirely changed by the late
election.  Aaron F. Stevens, a lawyer of high standing, Jacob H. Ela,
afterwards for many years an Auditor in the Treasury Department, and
Jacob Benton, well known in the politics of his State, were the new
members.--Worthington C. Smith, an experienced man of affairs, entered
from Vermont as the successor Justin S. Morrill.--Henry L. Cake, an
enthusiastic representative of the Pennsylvania Germans and of the
anthracite-coal minters, came from the Schuylkill district.--Green
B. Raum, afterward for a considerable period Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, entered from Illinois.--William A. Pile and Carman A. Newcomb,
two active and earnest young Republicans, came as representatives of
the city of St. Louis.

Benjamin F. Butler now took his seat in Congress for the first time.
He was sent from a Massachusetts district of which he was not a
resident, thus breaking a long established and approved custom.
Though his military career had been the subject of adverse and bitter
criticism, it had been marked by certain features which pleased the
people, and he came out of the war with an extraordinary popularity in
the loyal States.  He engaged at once in political strife.  During the
canvass against the President's policy in 1866 he went through the
country, it may with truth be said, at the head of a triumphal
procession.  He was received everywhere with a remarkable display of
enthusiasm, and was fortunate in commending himself to the good will of
the most radical section of the Republican party.  He naturally
affiliated with that side because it never was General Butler's habit
to be moderate in the advocacy of any public policy.  When he was a
Democrat he sustained the extreme Southern wing of the party with all
his force and zeal; and when the course of his political associates
pointed to a disruption of the Government he turned upon them with
savage hostility, declared without hesitation for the support of the
Union, offered his services as a soldier, and was constantly in the
vanguard of those who demanded the most aggressive and most destructive
measures in the prosecution of the war.  He entered Congress,
therefore, with apparent advantages and in the full maturity of his
powers, at forty-nine years of age.

--General Butler had long been regarded as a powerful antagonist at the
bar and he fully maintained his reputation in the parliamentary
conflicts in which he became at once involved.  He exhibited an
extraordinary capacity for agitation, possessing in a high degree what
John Randolph described as the "talent for turbulence."  His mind was
never at rest.  While not appearing to seek controversies, he possessed
a singular power of throwing the House into turmoil and disputation.
The stormier the scene, the greater his apparent enjoyment and the
more striking the display of his peculiar ability.  His readiness of
repartee, his great resources of information, his familiarity with all
the expedients and subtleties of logical and illogical discussion,
contributed to make him not only prominent but formidable in the House
for many years.  He was distinguished by habits of industry, had the
patience and the power required for thorough investigation, and seemed
to possess a keen insight into the personal defects, the motives, and
the weaknesses of his rivals.  He was audacious in assault, apparently
reckless in his modes of defense, and in all respects a debater of
strong and notable characteristics.  Usually merciless in his
treatment of an aggressive adversary, he not infrequently displayed
generous and even magnanimous traits.  He had the faculty of attaching
to himself, almost as a personal following, those members of the House
who never came in conflict with him, while he regarded his intellectual
peers of both political parties as natural foes whom he was destined
at some time to meet in combat, and for whose overthrow he seemed to
be in constant preparation.

Another marked character came from New England,--John A. Peters of
Maine,--a graduate of Yale, a man of ability, of humor, of learning
in the law.  He had enjoyed the advantage of a successful career at
the bar and was by long training and indeed by instinct devoted to
his profession.  In his six years' service in the House he acquired
among his fellow-members a personal popularity and personal influence
rarely surpassed in Congressional experience.  He made no long speeches
and was not frequently on the floor, but when he rose he spoke
forcibly, aptly, attractively, and with that unerring sense of justice
which always carried him to the right side of a question, with
unmistakable influence upon the best judgment of the House.  Since
his retirement from Congress his career on the Supreme Bench of Maine,
and more recently as its Chief Justice, has given roundness and
completeness to a character whose integrity, generosity, and candor
have attracted not only the confidence and respect of an entire State,
but the devoted attachment of a continually enlarging circle of friends.

James B. Beck took his seat for the first time as representative from
the Ashland District of Kentucky.  He was born in Scotland in 1822, and
though he came to the United States while yet a lad, he has retained
in strength and freshness all the characteristics and peculiarities
of his race.  He has a strong mind in a strong body.  Well grounded in
the rudiments of education in his native land, he completed his
intellectual training in Kentucky and bears the diploma of Transylvania
University--in whose list of graduates may be found many of the ablest
men of the South-West.  Originally a Whig, Mr. Beck followed John C.
Breckinridge into the Democratic party at a period when the pro-slavery
crusaders had gone mad and were commanding, indeed morally coercing,
the services of a great majority of the able and ambitious young men
of the South.  He became the law partner of Breckinridge, and was
zealously and devoted attached to him to the end.  Had Beck been a
native of the South he would undoubtedly followed Breckinridge hastily
and hot-headedly into the rebellion.  He was saved from that fate by
the abundant caution and the sound sense which he inherited with his
Scotch blood.

--But Mr. Beck had all the sympathy with the Rebellion which was
necessary to secure popular support in Kentucky--without which, indeed,
a Democrat in that State has had no chance for promotion since the war
closed.  He has grown steadily in Congress from the day of his
entrance.  He is honest-minded, straightforward, extreme in his views
on many public questions, and though a decided partisan of Southern
interests has always had the tact and the good fortune to maintain kindly
relations with his political opponents--a desirable end to which his
generous gift of Scotch humor has essentially aided him.  It is among
the singular revolutions of political opinion and political power in
this country, that the State and the very city made memorable by Mr.
Clay's impassioned devotion to the National Union and his prolonged
advocacy of protection, should be represented in Congress by a disciple
of the extreme State-rights school and by a radical defender of free trade.

As soon as the Clerk of the House finished the calling of the roll and
announced that a quorum had answered to their names, Mr. Brooks of New
York rose and called attention to the fact that there were seventeen
absent States, ten of which, belonging to the late Confederacy, were
not called at all, and the remaining seven--New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, Connecticut, Kentucky, Tennessee, Nebraska, and California--had
presented no credentials of members, inasmuch as under their respective
laws, Representatives to the Fortieth Congress had not yet been chosen.
Among the absent were seven of the "old thirteen"--an absolute majority
of the States which founded the Republic.  The absentees in all
amounted to eighty members; and on behalf of his political associates
Mr. Brooks presented a formal protest, signed by every Democratic
member present, "against any and every action tending to the
organization of this House until the absent States be more fully
represented."  He asked that it be entered upon the Journal as the
protest of the minority of the House.  Under the rules the Clerk
refused to receive or submit the paper for consideration, and the House
immediately proceeded to the election of Speaker.  Mr. Colfax was
chosen for the third and last time.  He received one hundred and
twenty-seven votes against thirty cast for Mr. Samuel S. Marshall, a
highly respectable Democrat member from Illinois.  As before, Mr.
Colfax, in his remarks when he took the chair, sought to present an
embodiment of Republican policy on the current issues.  He declared
that "the freeman's hands should wield the freeman's ballot;" that
"none but loyal men should govern a land which loyal sacrifices have
saved;" that "there can be no safe or loyal reconstruction on a
foundation of unrepentant treason or disloyalty."

The principal business of the session was to provide supplementary
legislation to the Reconstruction Act which had been passed over the
President's veto only two days before the new Congress assembled.
That Act, from a variety of circumstances, had been forced through at
the last under whip and spur.  Upon close examination by the leading
Republicans of both Senate and house it was found to be defective in
many important respects, and especially to lack the detail necessary
to give life and vigor to proceedings looking to the practical
reconstruction of the Southern States.  The two Houses therefore
addressed themselves promptly to the task of supplying the necessary
amendments and additions.  On the 19th of March they sent to the
President an Act prescribing in detail the mode for the registering of
voters in the insurrectionary States, and for the summoning of a
convention to frame a constitution preparatory to the re-admission of
each State to representation.  The Act declared that "if the
constitution shall be ratified by a majority of the votes of the
registered electors qualified to vote, at least one-half of all the
registered voters voting upon the question, a copy of the same, duly
certified, shall be transmitted to the President of the United States,
who shall forthwith transmit the same to Congress and if it shall
appear to Congress that the election was one at which all the
registered and qualified electors in the State had an opportunity to
vote freely and without restraint, fear, or the influence of fraud,
and if Congress shall be satisfied that such constitution merits the
approval of a majority of all the qualified electors in the State,
and if the said constitution shall be declared by Congress to be in
conformity with the provisions of the Act to which this is
supplementary, and the other provisions of said Act shall have been
complied with, and the said constitution shall be approved by Congress,
the State shall be declared entitled to representation, and senators
and representatives shall be admitted therefrom as therein provided."

The President promptly vetoed the bill.  Among various objections he
said, "This supplemental bill superadds an oath to be taken by every
person, before his name can be admitted upon the registration, that
he 'has not been disfranchised for participation in any rebellion or
civil war against the United States.'  It thus imposes upon every
person the necessity and responsibility of deciding for himself, under
the penalty of punishment by a military commission if he makes a
mistake, what works disfranchisement by participation in rebellion and
what amounts to such participation. . . . The question with the citizen
to whom this oath is to be proposed must be a fearful one, for while
the bill does not declare that perjury may be assigned for such false
swearing nor fix any penalty for the offense, we must not forget that
martial law prevails and that every person is answerable to a military
commission, without previous presentment by a grand jury, for any
charge that may be made against him, and that the supreme authority of
the military commander determines the question as to what is an offense
and what is to be the measure of punishment. . . . I do not deem it
necessary further to investigate the details of this bill.  No
consideration could induce me to give my approval to such an election
law for any purpose, and especially for the great purpose of framing
the constitution of a State.  If ever the American citizen should be
left to the free exercise of his own judgment, it is when he is
engaged in the work of forming the fundamental law under which he is
to live.  That is his work and it cannot properly be taken out of his
hands."

The whole issue presented by this bill was but another of the countless
phases of that prolonged and fundamental contest between those who
believed that guarantees should be exacted from the rebel States, and
those who believed that these States should be freely admitted, without
condition and without restraint, to all the privileges which they had
recklessly thrown away in their mad effort to destroy the Government.
The strength of each side had again been well stated in the debates of
the Senate and House and in the veto-message of the President, and no
change of opinion was expected by either party from the reasoning or
the protest of the other.  The President's argument was therefore met
by a prompt vote passing the bill over his veto, in the House by 114
_ayes_ to 25 _noes_, and in the Senate by 40 _ayes_ to 7 _noes_.  The
resistance was very slight, and the fruit of the great Republican
victory of 1866 was now realized in the formidable strength which the
President's opponents exhibited in both branches.

The session lasted until the thirtieth day of March, and though
Congress had then completed all the business pressing upon its
attention the Republican leaders would not permit an adjournment _sine
die_.  They decided to meet again in midsummer.  The same necessity
that had induced them to convene in March persuaded them that the
President should not be allowed to have control of events for eight
months without the supervision of the legislative branch of the
Government.  It was resolved therefore that Congress should meet on
Wednesday, July 3d.  The vigilance and determination evinced by this
action did not prove useless or go unrewarded.  Only a few weeks after
Congress had taken its recess the danger anticipated by the Republican
leaders, from hostile interpretation of the Reconstruction Acts by the
Attorney-General, was made fully apparent.  On the 24th of May and the
12th of June Mr. Stanbery gave two opinions to the President, which in
many respects neutralized the force both of the original and
supplementary acts of Reconstruction.  His adverse views were
elaborately and skilfully presented, and tended to embarrass the
military commanders of the Southern districts in the administration of
law, and to hinder the registration of voters and the holding of
elections for constitutional conventions.  Republican leaders therefore
felt not only justified in the precautions they had taken to keep the
power of Congress alive, but esteemed it peculiarly fortunate that
they could so promptly prevent the evil effects which might otherwise
flow from the unfriendly constructions of the Attorney-General.  The
principal business of the July session was to provide a second
supplementary Act which effectually remedied all the objections and
obstructions which Mr. Stanbery's acute legal knowledge had suggested.
The bill passed both branches by the 13th of July and reached the
President on the 14th--meeting at his hands the same fate that its
predecessors had incurred.  On the 19th he vetoed it--rehearsing the
objections he had repeatedly stated on the same issues.

The President complained that within less than a year Congress had
attempted to strip the Executive Department of the Government of some
of its essential powers.  "The military commander," said he, "is, as to
the power of appointment, made to take the place of the President, and
the General of the Army the place of the Senate, and any attempt on
the part of the President to assert his own Constitutional power may,
under pretense of law, be met by official insubordination.  It is to
be feared that these military officers, looking to the authority given
by these laws, rather than to the letter of the Constitution, will
recognize no authority but the commander of the district or the General
of the Army. . . . If there were no other objection than this to the
proposed legislation it would be sufficient.  While I hold the chief
executive authority of the United States, while the obligations rests
upon me to see that all laws are faithfully executed, I can never
willingly surrender that trust or the powers given for its execution.
I can never give my assent to be made responsible for the faithful
execution of laws, and at the same time surrender that trust and the
powers which accompany it to any other executive officer, high or low,
or to any number of executive officers."

Many of those who kept closest watch of the controversy between the
President and Congress saw in the foregoing words something ominous.
In their apprehensions of evil they construed it as a threat that the
President would exercise his power as Commander-in-Chief of the Army
and Navy with which he was fully invested by the Constitution, to
change the assignment of military officers at will.  Should he
stubbornly or capriciously assert this power he might seriously
embarrass the entire administration of the Reconstruction Acts in the
approaching registrations and elections in the Southern States.  A
change of officers at a single point might frustrate all the
preparations for the reconstruction of a State, and a general change
might produce chaos in the South and possibly develop a spirit of
violence of which no man could measure the effect.  The President's
words made a deep impression on Congress.  Mr. Boutwell saw in them a
deadly intent "which provokes and demands the exercise of the highest
and gravest duty of this House"--meaning that the President should be
impeached.  Mr. Randall of Pennsylvania taunted Mr. Boutwell with the
declaration that all the talk of impeachment was "mere bluster;" while
Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, though believing that Mr. Johnson deserved
impeachment, considered it "a vain and futile thing."  "There are,"
said he, "unseen agencies at work, invisible powers operating
everywhere in the country, which will protect a man like Johnson when
called upon."  Debate, however, was very brief, and the House passed
the bill over the veto by _ayes_ 108, _noes_ 25.  In the Senate there
was no discussion whatever on the President's message, that body being
content to pass the bill against his objections by 30 _ayes_ to 6 _noes_.

The Senate and the House were both ready to adjourn on the 20th of
July, but Mr. Sumner, Mr. Howard of Michigan, and others of the most
radical type in both branches, desired that Congress might remain in
session for the summer and autumn, or at least have such short
vacations as would practically amount to a continuous session.  Their
object was to keep constant watch of the course of the Administration
and be at all times ready to neutralize its evil purpose.  Aside from
the great personal inconvenience which this would occasion to many
members, the judgment of the majority was against so radical a step.
The more conservative members of the Republican party feared that a
continuous session of Congress would seriously increase the uneasiness
and excitement in the country by creating the impression that the
Senate and House were sitting as a committee of public safety, in the
apprehension of a civil revolution.  The reply of those who opposed
the adjournment was that the condition of public affairs did actually
tend to revolution, and that instead of fanning the popular excitement
by remaining in session, Congress would be thus most wisely allaying
the fears which had entered the minds of so large a number of the
people.  But this argument did not prevail, and the conservative view
secured a majority in both Houses.  The vote in the Senate however
was very close, there being only one more Republican in the affirmative
that in the negative, leaving to Democratic votes, really, the decision
of the question.  A very inconvenient compromise was made by an
adjournment to the 21st of November--only a fortnight before Congress
would convene in regular annual session on the first Monday of
December.  No good reason was assigned for so extraordinary a step, and
no benefit resulted from it.

The Reconstruction Acts, both original and supplementary, were now in
full operation throughout the South.  The President did not interpose
serious objection to the assignment of the Army officers whose names
were suggested by General Grant, and the ten insurrectionary States not
yet re-admitted to representation were remanded to military government
with apparent quiet and order.  General Schofield was directed to take
charge of the district of Virginia; General Sickles was placed in
command of the district of North Carolina and South Carolina; General
John Pope was assigned to the district of Georgia, Alabama, and
Florida; General Ord to the district of Mississippi and Arkansas; and
General Sheridan to the district of Louisiana and Texas.  These
assignments were made with due promptness after the enactment of the
laws, and the several commanders at once proceeded to their novel and
responsible duties.(1)

Under the enlargements of suffrage in the direction of loyalty, and its
restrictions in the direction of disloyalty, the Southern States once
more turned their attention to the question of Reconstruction.  They
saw, as the law intended them to see, that military government would
exist until the loyal inhabitants of those States should present
themselves before Congress with a constitution adapted to the
changed circumstances resulting from the war, and to the necessities
superinduced by the abolition of slavery.  The Southern men who had
defiantly rejected the Fourteenth Amendment, and had with confidence
relied upon the power of President Johnson to vindicate their position,
now discovered their mistake, and were reluctantly but completely
convinced that the only road to representation in Congress for their
States was through submission to the conditions imposed by the Acts
of Reconstruction,--conditions far more exacting than those which had
been required by the preceding Congress and which they had so unwisely
refused to accept.

The assignments of Army officers to the Southern districts were made
early in the spring of 1867.  From that time onward it was hoped that
the preservation of order would be secured in the South, and that the
rights of all classes would be adequately protected.  But
notwithstanding the anticipation of this desirable result, there
was throughout the summer and autumn of 1867 a feeling of great
anxiety concerning the condition of the Southern States,--a constant
apprehension that some outbreak similar to that in New Orleans the
preceding year might lead to deplorable consequences, among the least
of which would be the postponement of the organization of State
governments.  The cause of this solicitude among Northern people was
the novel experiment in the South of allowing loyal men regardless of
race or color to share in the suffrage and to participate in the
administration of the Government.  Under any less authoritative mandate
than that which is conveyed in a military order with the requisite
force behind it, the Southern communities would never have accepted
or submitted to the conditions thus imposed.  But the sympathy which
their condition under other circumstances might have evoked in the
North, was stifled by the pertinent consideration that they had
refused other forms of Reconstruction, and had wilfully drawn upon
themselves all that was unwelcome in the one now about to be enforced.
It was to be noted moreover that the feature which was most unwelcome
--impartial suffrage--was the one especially founded upon justice,
abstract as well as practical.

Conventions were held successively in all the States, the elections
being conducted in good order, while every man entitled to vote was
fully secured in his suffrage.  The conventions were duly assembled,
constitutions formed, submitted in due time, and approved by popular
vote.  State governments were promptly organized under these organic
laws, Legislatures were elected, and the Fourteenth Amendment ratified
in each of the States with as hearty a unanimity as in the preceding
winter it has been rejected by the same communities.  The proceedings
were approximately uniform in all the States, and the constitutions,
with such minor differences and adaptations as circumstances required,
were in all essential points the same.  All were ordained in the spirit
of liberty, all prohibited the existence of any form of slavery, and
all heartily recognized the supreme sovereignty of the National
Government as having been indisputably established by the overthrow of
the Rebellion which was undertaken to confirm the adverse theory of
State-rights.

These proceedings in the South were in full progress when the second or
long session of the Fortieth Congress began, on the first Monday of
December, 1867.  While President Johnson had not interposed any
obstructions to the working of the Reconstruction Act which had not
been effectively cured by the two supplementary Acts, he had neither
concealed nor abated his utter hostility to the policy of Congress,--a
form of hostility that grew in rancor in proportion as he had been
thwarted and rendered powerless by the enactment of the laws over his
veto.  When Congress came together he seemed to have gathered all his
strength for a final assault upon its Reconstruction work and for a
final vindication of his own policy.  His message was laden with every
form of attack which ingenuity could devise to throw discredit upon
Congress, and if possible to affright the people by the dismal
consequences destined in his judgment to follow the flagrant violation
of the Constitution which he saw in the Reconstruction policy.  He
appealed to the people on the ground of patriotism, public safety, and
personal interest.  He pictured anew the advantage and the grandeur of
having the old Union fully restored; he warned the people of the danger
of sowing the seeds of another rebellion by allowing continued
maltreatment of the Southern people; and he appealed to the commercial
and financial interests of the country by pointing out how every form
of property was endangered by the chaotic conditions of affairs to
which, in his belief, the policy of Congress was steadily tending.
Beyond these considerations he endeavored to arouse among the people
all possible prejudice against negro suffrage.  He declared that "of
all the dangers which our Nation has yet encountered, none are equal
to those which must result from the success of the effort now making
to Africanize the half of our country."  "We must not," said he,
"delude ourselves.  It will require a strong standing army, and
probably more than two hundred millions per annum, to maintain the
supremacy of negro governments after they are established,--a sum
thus thrown away which would, if properly used, form a sinking-fund
large enough to pay the whole National debt in less than fifteen years."

The argument of the President however was not merely a twice-told tale.
It had been repeated many times and though never more artfully stated
than now, it fell upon unlistening ears, making no impression whatever
upon Congress and very little upon the country.  The process of
Reconstruction went on, and its first fruit was the presentation of a
constitution from Arkansas, framed in exact accordance with the
requirements prescribed by Congress, and accompanied by proof that the
State had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.  A
bill was introduced in the House by Mr. Stevens, on the 7th of May
(1868), to admit the State of Arkansas to representation in Congress.
The question of Reconstruction had been debated so elaborately and for
so long a period of time that there was little disposition now to open
the subject afresh, and with far less resistance than had been
anticipated the Arkansas bill was passed in both branches, and the
State declared entitled to all those rights in the Union which she,
with her sisters in rebellion, had so flippantly thrown aside in 1861.
A fundamental condition was attached to the admission, declaring "that
the Constitution of Arkansas shall never be so amended or changed as
to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States of the
right to vote, who are entitled to vote by the Constitution herein
recognized, except as a punishment for such crimes as are now felonies
at common law, whereof they shall have been duly convicted under laws
equally applicable to all the inhabitants of said State."

The Act re-admitting Arkansas to the right of representation was
followed immediately by one of the same general scope with respect to
the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia,
Alabama, and Florida.  The same fundamental condition already cited
as imposed on Arkansas was imposed on all these States, and the further
condition was exacted from Georgia that certain provisions in her
Constitution should be a solemn Act of her Legislature be declared null
and void.  The provision to be thus annulled related to the collection
of debts, and their spirit and intent may be inferred from the opening
declaration that "no court in the State shall have jurisdiction to try
or determine any suit against any resident of this State upon any
contract or agreement made or implied prior to the first day of June,
1865, or upon any contract made in renewal of any debt existing prior
to the date named."  The provision as the Georgia convention had framed
it would have wrought great injury to a large number of creditors in
the North.  It was a complete outlawry of thousands of dollars legally
and equitably due to honest creditors, and Georgia was compelled to
agree to its nullification before her senators and representatives
could be admitted to seats in Congress.

The bills admitting these States to representation did not secure
Executive approval.  On the 20th of June (1868) the President sent a
message to the House of Representatives with his objections to the
Arkansas bill.  "The approval of this bill," said he, "would be an
admission on the part of the Executive that the Act for the more
efficient government of the rebel States, passed March 2, 1867, and the
Act supplementary thereto, were proper and constitutional.  My opinion
however in reference to these measures has undergone no change, but
on the contrary has been strengthened by the results which have
attended their execution."  He then proceeded to state his objections
as he had so often done before, with no variation of argument, without
the production of new facts.--Five days later, on the 25th of June,
the President communicated his objections to the bill admitting the
other Southern States to representation.  He had apparently become
fatigued with the reiteration of his arguments, and he frankly stated
that he would not "undertake at this time to re-open the discussion
upon the grave Constitutional question involved in the Reconstruction
Acts."  He declared that "the bill assumed authority over the States
which has never been delegated to Congress," and "imposes conditions
which are in derogation of equal rights."  The vetoes did not evoke
long debate in either House, and both bills were promptly passed over
the objections of the President by a party vote, amounting indeed to
more than three to one in both Senate and House.

In the arguments which the President had found such frequent occasion
to submit, he quietly ignored the facts of secession, the crime of
rebellion, the ruthless sundering of Constitutional bonds which these
States had attempted.  He took no note of the immense losses both of
life and property which they had inflicted upon the Nation, and gave
no consideration to the suffering which they had causelessly brought
upon the people.  If the President's logic should be accepted as
indicting the true measure of Constitutional obligation imposed on the
different members of the Union, then any State might rebel at any
time, seize and destroy the National property, levy war, form alliances
with hostile nations, and thus subject the Republic to great peril and
great outlay, her citizens to murder and to pillage.  If the rebellious
State be finally subdued, the National Government must not attach the
slightest condition to her re-admission to the Union; must not impose
discipline or even administer reproof.  The fact that the rebellion
fails is the full warrant for its guilty authors to be at once
repossessed of all the rights and all the privileges which in the
frenzy of anger and disobedience they had thrown away.  Such was in
effect the argument of the President throughout the Reconstruction
contest; such was the demand of the leaders of the Rebellion; such was
the concession which the Democratic party constantly urged in Congress,
through the press, and in all the channels through which its great
power was exerted.

The position of the Republicans was steadily the opposite of that
described.  They held that the States which had rushed into a rebellion
so wicked, so causeless, and so destructive, should not be allowed to
resume their places of authority in the Union except under such
conditions as would guard, so far as human foresight could avail,
against the outbreak of another insurrection.  They should return to
the Union on precisely the same terms as those on which the loyal
States held their places; they should have the same privileges and be
subjected to the same conditions.  As slavery had been the chief
inciting cause of disunion, slavery should die.  As the vicious theory
of State-rights had been constantly at enmity with the true spirit of
Nationality, the Organic Law of the Republic should be so amended that
no standing-room for the heresy would be left.  As the basis of
representation in the Constitution has always given the slave States an
advantage, these States, now that slavery was abolished, should not be
permitted to oppress the negro population and use them merely for an
enlarged Congressional power to the white men who had precipitated the
rebellion.  As the war to maintain Union and Liberty had cost a vast
treasure and sacrificed countless lives, the States that had forced
the bloody contest should agree by solemn amendment to the
Constitution that the National debt and the pension to the soldier
should be secured.  Those conditions--applying to all the States alike,
to the loyal and the disloyal in the same measure--must be honorably
agreed to by the States that had gone into Disunion before they should
be permitted to resume and enjoy the blessings of Union.  History and
the just judgment of mankind will vindicate the wisdom and the
righteousness of the Republican policy, and that vindication will
always carry with it the condemnation of Andrew Johnson.

The long contest over Reconstruction, so far as it involved the
re-admission of the States to representation, was practically ended.
Eight of the eleven Confederate States, at the close of June 1868,
had their senators and representatives in Congress.  Three--Virginia,
Mississippi, and Texas--were prevented by self-imposed obstacles from
enjoying the same privilege until after President Johnson had retired
from office.  Of the representatives on the floor of the Fortieth
Congress from the eight states lately in rebellion, only two were
Democrats.  The senators were unanimously Republican.  Of the aggregate
number about one-half were natives of the South.  The war upon the
"Carpet-bagger" had not yet reached the era of savage atrocity, but the
indignation pervading the governing classes of the South, as they were
termed, was poured forth in unstinted measure upon the heads of all
native Southerners who consented to accept offices conferred by negro
votes.  It was evident that the admission of the States to
representation was to be taken as the signal for a new contest in the
South--embittered in its character and sanguinary in its results.  The
men who had been foremost in plunging their States into the vortex of
rebellion were determined to rule them--their determination being of
that type which disregards the restraint of law and considers that the
end justifies the means.

With all the advantages of old association and in numberless instances
of kindly relation with the colored race, the former masters showed
themselves singularly deficient in the tact and management necessary
to win the negroes and bind them closely to their interest, in the
new conditions which emancipation had created.  Of the evil results
that flowed from the contest now about to ensue--a contest that had
many elements of provocation and of wrong on both sides--one of the
most remarkable features was the complete control which the white men
from the North, entire strangers to the negro, to his habits and to
his prejudices, so readily obtained over him.  The late slave-masters
did not adapt themselves to the new situation.  They gave way to
repining and regretting, to sulking and to anger, to resentment and
revenge, and thereby lost a great opportunity for binding together the
two races in those ties of sympathy and confidence which must be
maintained as an indispensable condition of prosperity, or even of
domestic order and the reign of law, in the Southern States.  The lack
of moral courage among the physically brave men of the South has
already been indicated and illustrated.  It was something of this
same defect that held back the slave-masters from the condescension, as
they esteemed it, of establishing any relation whatever with the negro
in his new condition of freedom.  Such action was frowned upon by the
public opinion of this class throughout the South, and for lack of
bold leadership at the critical period, for lack of that consideration
which in many subsequent instances has been lavished upon the colored
man, the current of fatal prejudice was set strongly against the old
master in the mind of his former slave.  Events, as they developed in
the stirring and sorrowful years that followed, were but a continual
proof of that form of original blunder on the part of the Southern
whites, which in affairs of civil administration is worse than a crime.

In excuse, or at least in explanation, of this unfortunate blunder on
the part of Southern men, the obstinacy and wrong-headed course of
President Johnson must be pleaded.  It was his causeless, voluntary,
unpardonable quarrel with his party which misled Southern men at the
time when they most needed lessons of wisdom and moderation.  The
different result which we may well conceive might have followed in the
South under the considerate and kindly spirit which Mr. Lincoln would
have brought to the problem, gives us by contrast some faint
appreciation of the enormity of Johnson's conduct and of the evil
effects flowing from it.  At the very moment when the President should
have stood as a generous mediator, calming the irritation of the South
--an irritation inevitably incident to defeat--and restraining
somewhat, at least in the manner of preferring them, the demands and
requirements which the Government in its hour of victory was justified
in making, Johnson committed the grievous fault of espousing the
Southern cause and quarreling with the party which had confided to him
the power he was abusing.

Under the patronage and protection of the President, Southern men
would have been more or less than human if they had not grown arrogant
and defiant towards the men of the North.  The chivalric sympathy which
always moves the magnanimous in their treatment of a fallen foe, was
therefore drowned in the indignation to which Northern men were
naturally moved by provocations as unexpected as they were
extraordinary.  Stimulated by the protection of the President and
encouraged by his contumacious quarrel with Congress, the South was
driven from one unwise step to another, until the entire situation
became hopelessly entangled, and every movement affected by anger
and passion;--the North resolving more and more to insist on the fruits
of victory, the South resolving more and more to act as though they
had conquered in the contest.  It was not unnatural, under the
anxieties and discouragements of the crisis, that the South should
have clung to Mr. Johnson for protection; but in the calm review
which the lapse of twenty years affords, the most ardent Southern
partisan must see that the President's policy was at enmity with the
interest and happiness of his section.

It is not to be forgotten, however, that Mr. Johnson's course was
marked by the inherent qualities of his mind.  He had two signal
defects, either of which would impair his fitness for Executive duty;
united they rendered him incapable of efficient administration:--he
was conceited and he was obstinate.  Conceit without obstinacy may be
overcome by the advice of judicious counselors; united with obstinacy
it carries its possessor beyond the bounds of prudence, almost beyond
the control of reason.  Obstinacy united with good judgment is softened
into the virtue of firmness.  It has often been said that self-made
men, as they are termed, are necessarily conceited.  Like all
aphorisms, this must be taken with numberless exceptions, but it was
singularly applicable to Johnson, who was in all respects a self-made
man.  His great career was never absent from his thoughts, and he was
always looking at himself as he fancied he would appear in history.  He
came to regard himself as the hero upon a remarkable stage of action,
and naturally made the reflection that if he could have had in his
early years the advantages which so many possess without improving,
he would have made strides in life which would have left him without
rivals.  It would be impossible to gain a full and correct apprehension
of Mr. Johnson's character without taking into account these qualities
--qualities which were both the remote and immediate cause of his
extraordinary career as Chief Magistrate.

The earlier Presidents, filled with the spirit of the convention that
formed the Constitution, were extremely careful in the use of the
veto-power.  In eight years Washington used it but twice.  Neither John
Adams nor Thomas Jefferson used it even once.  Madison resorted to it
three times, Monroe only once, John Quincy Adams in not a single
instance.  Under the first six Presidents, the veto-power had been used
but six times in all; unless there should be included some private
bills sent back for correction and not in any sense furnishing matter
of contest between parties.  The country had thus been educated by the
sages of the era of the Constitution in the belief that only an
extraordinary occasion justified a resort to what, in the popular
dislike of its character, had received the name of "the one-man power."
President Jackson, therefore, surprised the country and shocked
conservative citizens by his frequent employment of this great
prerogative.  During his term he thwarted the wish and the expressed
resolve of Congress no less than eleven times on measures of great
public consequence.  Seven of these vetoes were of the kind which,
during his Presidency, received the name of "pocket-vetoes."

In Madison's administration a bill which reached the President during
the last ten days of the session failed by accident or inadvertence
to receive the President's signature, and did not become a law.  Mr.
Webster is authority for saying that there was not a single instance
prior to the administration of General Jackson in which the President
by design omitted to sign a bill and yet did not return it to Congress.
"The silent veto," said he, "is the executive adoption of the present
administration."  There had been instances in which, during a session
of Congress, a President, unwilling to approve and yet not prepared
to veto a measure, suffered it to become a law by the lapse of the
Constitutional period of ten days; but it was an entirely new device,
to defeat a bill by permitting the period of less than ten days to
expire at the close of the session--defeat it without action, without
expression of opinion, without the responsibility which justly attaches
to the Executive office.  Commenting with great power, at the time,
upon the new use of the veto-power in all its forms by President
Jackson, Mr. Webster declared its tendency was "to disturb the harmony
which ought always to exist between Congress and the Executive, and to
turn that which the Constitution intended only as an extraordinary
remedy for extraordinary cases, into a common means of making Executive
discretion paramount to the discretion of Congress in the enactment of
laws."  It was literally making the extreme medicine of the
Constitution its daily bread.

An example set by so strong a ruler as Jackson, especially in the
establishment of a practice so congenial to man's natural love of
power, was certain to be followed by other Presidents.  It was
followed so vigorously indeed that the forty years succeeding Jackson's
advent to power presented a strong contrast with the forty years that
preceded it.  The one began with Washington, the other ended with
Andrew Johnson.  Mr. Van Buren, though in all respects a lineal heir
to the principles of Jackson, did not imitate him in the frequent use
of the veto-power.  But Mr. Tyler on nine different occasions ran
counter to the action of Congress by the interposition of his veto.
Mr. Polk resorted to it in three signal instances, but neither General
Taylor nor Mr. Fillmore came in conflict with Congress on a single
measure.  President Pierce almost rivaled General Jackson in the ten
vetoes with which he emphasized his own views as distinct from those of
Congress.  Mr. Buchanan used his arbitrary power on four occasions
during his term.  Mr. Lincoln permitted one bill to be defeated, as
already noted in these pages, by expiration of Congress, and arrested
the passage of another by direct use of his veto.  President Johnson,
who in many features of his career has been suspected of an attempted
imitation of Jackson, far surpassed his great prototype in the use of
the veto-power, employing it directly in no less than twenty-one
instances, besides pocketing at least two bills of public importance.
The aggregate number of vetoes, therefore, in the forty years that
followed General Jackson's first election exceeded fifty, as against
six for the forty years preceding it.

It will not escape observation that the most frequent resort to the
veto has been by those Presidents who were chosen by the political
organization which has always declared its hostility to Executive
power.  The Democratic party had its origin and its early growth in
the cry against the overshadowing influence of the Presidential office
--going so far in their denunciations as to declare that it was
aping royalty in its manners and copying monarchy in its prerogatives.
The men who made this outcry defeated John Quincy Adams who never used
the veto, and installed Jackson who resorted to it on all occasions
when his judgment differed from the conclusion of a majority of
Congress.  Neither Taylor nor Fillmore--both reared in the Whig school
--ever attempted to defeat the will of Congress, though each wielded
Executive power at a time when questions even more exciting than
those of Jackson's era engaged public attention.  Mr. Lincoln
presents a strong contrast with his predecessors,--Pierce and
Buchanan,--illustrating afresh the contradiction that the party
declaiming most loudly against Executive power has constantly abused
it.  Mr. Tyler and Mr. Johnson were both chosen by the opponents of
the Democracy, but they were both reared in that school, and both
returned to it--exhibiting in their apostasy the readiness with which
the Democratic mind turns to the tyranny of the veto.

The success of reconstruction in the South carried with it the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment by the requisite number of
States.  The result was duly certified by Mr. Seward as Secretary of
State, on the twenty-eighth day of July, 1868, and the Amendment was
thenceforward a part of the organic law of the nation.  It had been
carried, from first to last, as a party measure--unanimously supported
by the Republicans, unanimously opposed by the Democrats.  Its grand
and beneficent provisions failed to attract the vote of a single
Democratic member in any State Legislature in the whole Union.
Wherever the Democrats were in majority the Legislature rejected it,
and in every Legislature where the Republicans had control the
Democrats in minority voted against it.  Not only was this true, but
the States of Ohio and New Jersey, which had ratified it in 1866-67
when their Legislatures were Republican, formally voted in 1868, when
the Democrats had come into power, to recall their assent to the
Amendment and to record their opposition to its adoption.  It is very
seldom in the history of political issues, even when partisan feeling
is most deeply developed, that so absolute a division is found as was
recorded upon the question of adopting the Fourteenth Amendment.  It
has not been easy in succeeding years to comprehend the deep-seated,
all-pervading hostility of the Democratic party to this great measure.
Even on the Thirteenth Amendment, containing the far more radical
proposition to abolish slavery, a few Democrats, moved by philanthropic
motives, broke from the restraint of party and honored themselves by
recording their votes on the side of humanity and justice; but on the
Fourteenth Amendment the line of Democratic hostility in Nation and
in State was absolutely unbroken.

It seems incredible that Democrats can be satisfied with the record
made by their party on this most grave and important question.  Every
one of the many objects aimed at in the Fourteenth Amendment is
founded upon a basis of justice, of liberty, of an enlarged and
enlightened nationality.  Its minor provisions might be regarded as
temporary in their nature, but its leading provisions are permanent
and are essential to the vitality of a true republic. Even those which
may be held as temporary deeply affect more than one generation of
American citizens, and are of themselves sufficiently important to
justify a great struggle for their adoption.

It was certainly of inestimable concern to the honor of the country
that those who had shed their blood and those who had given their
treasure for its defense, should have their claims upon the national
justice placed beyond the whim, or the caprice, or the malice of an
accidental majority in Congress.  Nor would it have been wise to leave
open to those who in the conflict of arms had lost their slaves, the
temptation to besiege Congress and the Legislatures of their States
for compensation.  Such an opportunity would have been a menace to the
public credit, and would have proved a constant source of corruption.
The Republican therefore said, "We shall incorporate the right of the
soldier to repayment, in the very Constitution of the Republic; and
shall in the same solemn manner decree that as slavery instigated the
drawing of the sword against the life of the nation, and justly
perished by the sword, its assumed value shall not be placed upon the
free people of the United States as a mortgage whose payment may be
exacted from their property and their toil."  Against these just
provisions, which in their nature are limited as to time, the Democrats
in Congress and in every Legislature of the Union recorded an
absolutely unanimous vote.

Another provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, temporary in its
application, indeed necessarily limited to the existing generation,
was demanded by the Republicans.  The great mass of those engaged in
the Rebellion were pardoned the moment their arms were laid down.  But
the leaders who, in official position before the war, had solemnly
sworn to support the Constitution, were held to be far more guilty
than the multitude who followed them.  They deliberately rebelled
against a government to which, on their consciences and on their oaths,
they had given their personal pledge of fidelity.  The Republicans did
not propose to visit even these chief offenders with pains and
penalties; but they resolved to place in the Constitution a prohibition
upon their holding office under the National government until after
two-thirds of both branches of Congress, satisfied of their good
intentions, should remove their disabilities.  The Democrats
unanimously voted against even this mild discipline to those who
precipitated the desperate war, thereby declaring their willingness,
if not their desire, that the most guilty should fare as well as the
innocent; that for example Mr. Toombs might resume his seat as a
senator from Georgia, Mr. Breckinridge as a senator from Kentucky, Mr.
Benjamin as a senator from Louisiana, Mr. Jefferson Davis as a senator
from Mississippi.

Still another provision of the Amendment which might prove temporary
in its application, or might prove permanent, as the South should
decide, was that relating to representation in Congress.  On this point
the Republicans held, as has been so often repeated, that the negro
should not be included in the basis of representation until he was
admitted to suffrage.  There is such absolute justice and fair dealing
in this proposition, that no reply which deserves to be called an
argument has ever been made to it.  The original provision in the
Constitution by which three-fifths of the slaves were enumerated in
the basis of representation, agreed to originally as a compromise in
connection with the subject of direct taxation, had lost its relevancy
by reason of emancipation as decreed in the Thirteenth Amendment.  The
question now before Congress was therefore a new one.  It affected the
rights of States and the equality of citizens.  To concede four and a
half millions of negroes to the basis of Southern representation, and
at the same time to confine the suffrage to the whites, was not merely
a harsh injustice to the colored race, but it was an insulting
discrimination against Northern white men.  It gave, as was well said
at the time, a far greater influence in National affairs to the vote of
the Confederate solider in the South than to the vote of the Union
soldier in the North.  In Congressional districts where the colored
race constituted one-half of the total population (and in many
instances the proportion was even larger), the vote of one white man
offset the vote of two in a Northern district where suffrage was
impartial.  This ratio of influence went into the Electoral College,
and gave to the white men of South Carolina, Mississippi and Louisiana
double the power of that enjoyed by white men in New York, Illinois
and California.  The loss of Representatives to the Northern States, or
more properly speaking the gain to the Southern States on existing
numbers, would be nearly one-eighth of the entire House, and fully
one-quarter of those likely to occupy seats on the Democratic side of
the chamber.  In the Electoral College, the loss to the North and the
gain to the South would be nearly in the same ratio.  In the rapid
increase of the negro race the offensive discrimination against the
North would be continually enlarging in its proportions.  The
corrective provision in the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
prevent this grave injustice both to the negro and to the white
man--but every Democrat in Congress and in the State Legislatures
voted against it through all the stages of its enactment and its
ratification, and thereby expressed a willingness to give an unfair
advantage to the Southern white man, and to establish an unfair
discrimination against the Northern white man.

Important and essential as are the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment just cited, indispensable as they have proved in the system
of Southern Reconstruction, they are relatively of small consequence
when compared with that great provision which is for all time:--that
provision which establishes American citizenship upon a permanent
foundation, which gives to the humblest man in the Republic ample
protection against any abridgment of his privileges and immunities by
State law, which secures to him and his descendants the equal
protection of the law in all that relates to his life, his liberty,
and his property.  The first section of the Constitutional amendment
which includes these invaluable provisions is in fact a new charter
of liberty to the citizens of the United States; is the utter
destruction of the pestilent heresy of State-rights, which constantly
menaced the prosperity and even the existence of the Republic; and is
the formal bestowment of Nationality upon the wise Federal system
which was the outgrowth of our successful Revolution against Great
Britain.

Before the adoption of this Amendment citizenship of the United States
was inferred from citizenship of some one of the States, for there was
nothing in the Constitution defining or even implying National
citizenship as distinct from its origination in or derivation from a
State.  It was declared in Article IV, Section 2, of the Federal
Constitution, that "Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States;" but
nothing was better known than that this provision was a dead letter
from its very origin.  A colored man who was a citizen of a Northern
State was certain to be placed under the surveillance of the police if
he ventured south of the Potomac or the Ohio, destined probably to be
sold into slavery under State law, or permitted as a special favor to
return at once to his home.  A foreign-born citizen, with his
certificate of naturalization in his possession, had prior to the war
no guarantee or protection against any form of discrimination or
indignity, or even persecution, to which State law might subject him,
as has been painfully demonstrated at least twice in our history.  But
this rank injustice and this hurtful inequality were removed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.  Its opening section settled all conflicts and
contradiction on this question by a comprehensive declaration which
defined National citizenship and gave to it precedence of the
citizenship of a State.  "_All persons born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of
the United States and of the States wherein they reside_."  These
pregnant words distinctly reversed the origin and character of
American citizenship.  Instead of a man being a citizen of the United
States because he was a citizen of one of the States, he was now made
a citizen of any State in which he might choose to reside, because he
was antecedently a citizen of the United States.

The consequences that flowed from this radical change in the basis of
citizenship were numerous and weighty.  Nor were those consequences
left subject to construction or speculation.  They were incorporated
in the same section of the Amendment.  The abuses which were formerly
heaped on the citizens of one State by the legislative and judicial
authority of another State were rendered thenceforth impossible.  The
language of the Fourteenth Amendment is authoritative and mandatory:
"_No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws_."  Under the force of these weighty
inhibitions, the citizen of foreign birth cannot be persecuted by
discriminating statutes, nor can the citizen of dark complexion be
deprived of a single privilege or immunity which belong to the white
man.  Nor can the Catholic, or the Protestant, or the Jew be placed
under ban or subjected to any deprivation of personal or religious
right.  The provision is comprehensive and absolute, and sweeps away
at once every form of oppression and every denial of justice.  It
abolishes _caste_ and enlarges the scope of human freedom.  It
increases the power of the Republic to do equal and exact justice to
all its citizens, and curtails the power of the States to shelter the
wrong-doer or to authorize crime by a statute.  To Congress is
committed the authority to enforce every provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the humblest man who is denied the equal protection
of the laws of a State can have his wrongs redressed before the
Supreme Judiciary of the Nation.

It is perhaps not strange that the Democrats of the South were hostile
to the great results wrought for freedom, for justice, and for popular
rights by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Their education, their prejudices,
their personal interests had all been in the opposite direction, and it
was doubtless too much to hope that all these would be overcome by a
victory for the Union--a victory which carried to their minds a sense
of personal humiliation and of remediless ruin.  If their course was
unwise it is not altogether unintelligible.  But the action of the
Northern Democrats cannot be accounted for and cannot be excused.  They
stood stubbornly, solidly, without reason, without justification,
against a great enlargement of popular rights.  It is a matter of
wonder that a political organization which claims Jefferson for its
founder and Jackson for its exemplar, should have surrendered to its
rival the sole glory of an achievement which may well be compared with
that increase of liberty attained by our ancestors, when the dependence
of Colonies was exchanged for the independence of States.

Two eminent judges of the Supreme Court who died after the close of the
war are entitled to the admiration and gratitude of the loyal citizens
of the United States.  When Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated there were
three judges on the Supreme Bench from the States which afterwards
formed the Confederacy,--James M. Wayne of Georgia, John Catron of
Tennessee, and John A. Campbell of Alabama.  The last-named was placed
upon the bench in 1853, and was undoubtedly the choice of Jefferson
Davis, who as the leading Southern member of President Pierce's Cabinet
exerted large influence, if not absolute control, over appointments
from the slave-holding States.  The personal and political associations
of Judge Campbell led him to resign his position on the Supreme Bench,
and to give the weight of his name and his learning to the Confederate
cause.

Judge Wayne was appointed by President Jackson in 1835, and Judge
Catron by President Van Buren immediately after his inauguration in
1837, under a bill enlarging the Court, which had been approved by
General Jackson.  Judge Catron had long been a favorite of General
Jackson in Tennessee, and it was understood that in appointing him
to the Bench Mr. Van Buren was carrying out the expressed wishes of his
predecessor.  Both judges came from that earlier and better school of
Southern Democracy which resisted the injurious heresies of State-rights
and Nullification, sustained the Force Bill under President Jackson,
and stood loyally by the Union of the States.  They were allied
to the South by birth, by education, and by the associations of
a lifetime.  Their friends, their kindred, even members of their own
families, joined in the Rebellion.  But these patriotic men, one of
whom was born during the Revolutionary war and the other during the
first term of Washington's Presidency, maintained their judicial
positions and were unshaken in their loyalty to the Union.  Their
example was followed by few officials from the states that seceded,
but the steadfastness of their faith was a striking illustration of the
difference between the South of Jefferson and Jackson and the South of
Calhoun and Davis.  They sat on the Bench throughout the entire civil
struggle,--Judge Catron dying in May, 1865, in the eighty-seventh year
of his age, and Judge Wayne in July, 1867, in his seventy-eighth year.

The conduct of these venerable judges is all the more to be praised
because they did not personally sympathize in any degree with the
Republican leaders.  They did not believe in the creed or the policies
of the party, and feared the result of its administration of the
National Government.  Their views in regard to the Constitutional
rights of the slave-holders were the same as those held by the
Confederate chieftains.  They had both concurred with Chief Justice
Taney in the Dred Scott decision.  But it was enough for them now to
know that Mr. Lincoln had been Constitutionally chosen President of the
United States, and had been Constitutionally installed in his great
office.  It was not for them as Justices of the Supreme Court to know
any thing of his Executive acts, except as they might properly come
for review before their high tribunal.  They illustrated the honorable
line of duty for a Judge under the Government of the United States.
Off the Bench, his right to political opinions is no more to be
questioned than that of any other citizen.  On the Bench, he falls
short of the full measure of his exalted duty if by any way or any
expression he discloses his sympathy with one political party or his
prejudice against another.

It is a tribute of honor to the Supreme Court that through all the
mutations of its existence only a single Justice has proved unfaithful
to the Union of the States; and prior to the war three-fifths of all
the Justices were appointed from the South.  Southern men in all other
departments of the Public Service--those eminent in our Congressional
annals, in the Army, in the Navy, in the field of Diplomacy, and even
one who had occupied the Presidential chair--followed the lead of their
States in rebellion against the Union; or rather it may with truth be
said, they led their States into rebellion against the Union.  Judge
Campbell, in furnishing the sole exception to the record of judicial
loyalty, did not yield without a struggle.  He was surrounded with
peculiar embarrassments, and was not strong enough to overcome them.
He realized his position, and did what he could to avert war; but when
war was inevitable, he upheld the Confederate cause and became one of
its directing minds.  In contrast with the fall from his high estate
and over against all the evil influences which forced Judge Campbell
to his fate, the names of Catron and Wayne will shine in history as
examples of the just judge and the incorruptible patriot.

[(1) The President's personal hostility to some of the officers thus
assigned was well known, and surprise was expressed that he did not
countermand or qualify the order of General Grant when first issued.
He was especially unfriendly to General Sheridan, and late in the
summer of 1867 relieved him from his command.  General Hancock was
gazetted as Sheridan's successor, but he did not reach his post until
late in November, the district meanwhile being under the command,
first, of General Charles Griffin, and, second, of General Joseph A.
Mower.  General Hancock's order assuming command, issued on the 29th
of November, had a certain political significance.  He expressed
gratification "that peace and quiet reign in the Department," and that
in his purpose to preserve this condition of things, he regarded "the
maintenance of the civil authorities in the faithful execution of the
laws as the most efficient under existing circumstances."  He said
that when insurrectionary force had been overthrown and peace
established, "the military power should cease to lead, and the civil
administration resume its natural and rightful dominion."  "Solemnly
impressed with these views," the General announced that "the great
principles of American liberty are still the lawful inheritance of
the people and ever should be.  The right of trial by jury, the
_habeas corpus_, the liberty of the press, the freedom of speech, the
natural rights of persons, and the rights of property, must be
preserved."

General Sheridan had issued an order defining the qualifications of
those who might sit on juries during the period of Reconstruction.  One
of the first acts of General Hancock was to annul this order.  He
declared "that the determination of who shall and who shall not be
jurors appertains to the legislative power," and he indicated his
intention of carrying out the existing law of Louisiana in regard to
the selection of juries.  General Sheridan had distributed certain
memoranda of disqualification, together with questions to be proposed,
for the registrars.  Their effect in substance was to disqualify all
persons who, having acted, prior to January 26, 1861, as _United-States
senators and representatives, electors, officers of the Army and Navy,
civil officers of the United States_, and State officers provided for
by the Constitution of the State, had afterwards engaged in the
Rebellion; and also all those who in 1862 and 1864 claimed the
protection of foreign powers.  General Hancock set aside this action,
declaring that he dissented from the construction given to the
Reconstruction laws therein, and ordered the registrars to be guided
by their own interpretation of the laws and of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  It was the popular understanding that General Hancock, in
these successive steps, was acting in full sympathy with the wishes
and designs of the Administration, in all of which he readily concurred
as a Democrat.

The appointment of General Pope for the District of Georgia, Alabama,
and Florida, had not been agreeable to the President.  General Pope's
political convictions were of a very positive character, and they were
not at all in sympathy with the National Administration.  He
administered the Reconstruction laws, therefore, in their full spirit
and with an entire belief in their justice and equity.  He insisted on
fair dealing, and suppressed all interference with voters by violence
or threats of violence on the part of the late rebels.  He would not
permit the menace of military organizations, and expressly refused to
allow any parading of armed men, except of United-States troops.  It
was General Pope's opinion that the South had seen quite enough of
men in arms within the past four years, and he believed that safety
and order would be best maintained by having no uniform worn except
that of the Army of the United States, and no other flag shown than
the flag of the Union.  Holding these pronounced views, aggressively
loyal in every thought and action, General Pope was naturally in
antagonism with the policy of the President.  Towards the close of the
year he was relieved of his command and General Meade ordered to take
his place.

General Sickles, of the District of North Carolina and South Carolina,
was relieved of his command early in September (1867), and General
E. R. S. Canby appointed as his successor.  General Sickles had been
very energetic in the administration of affairs in his department, and
had shown remarkable aptitude and efficiency in the discharge of his
peculiar duties,--exhibiting in his administration the very qualities
most likely to prove offensive to the President.  He had perhaps the
most difficult command of any of the generals on duty in the South,
as the State of South Carolina had from the beginning of the Rebellion
presented certain phases of disobedience to Federal authority peculiar
to her population and naturally arising from her antecedent history.
General Sickles had some trouble with Attorney-General Stanbery, and
asked for a court of inquiry, that he might vindicate himself from the
accusations of that official.

General Schofield and General Ord alone of the original commanders in
the Southern military districts were left to carry through the work of
Reconstruction.  They both discharged their duties with intelligence
and fidelity.  Nor was the work of Reconstruction essentially hindered
by the changed in other departments.  It is the trained habit of the
officers of the United-States Army to carry out their orders with
implicit faith, and there is seldom a conflict as to the line of duty
to be followed.  If there was any exception, it was in regard to
the course pursued by General Hancock.  His conduct became a subject
of controversy, and the popular division respecting its merits was on
the political line.  The National Administration and the Democratic
party, both North and South, applauded every thing which General
Hancock said and did in Louisiana.  The Republican party throughout
the country, and the General commanding the army, who was about to be
nominated for the Presidency, united in strong disapproval of his
course.  But General Hancock's construction of the laws under which he
was acting was the same as that held by the Attorney-General of the
United States, and he thus felt abundantly justified and fortified in
his position.  He disobeyed no specific order of the General
commanding the army, and, even if there had been a difference between
them, General Hancock was sure of the sympathy and support of their
common superior--the President of the United States.

It was however the subsequent opinion of General Grant that much of the
disorder and bloodshed in the State of Louisiana during the national
election of 1868 had resulted from the military government of General
Hancock.  It was not his belief that General Hancock had the slightest
desire or design to produce such results, but that they were the
outgrowth of the encouragement which the rebels of Louisiana received
from the changes which General Hancock inaugurated in the manner of
administering the Reconstruction Laws.  Aside however from the conduct
of General Hancock, the removal of General Sheridan from the Louisiana
District was unqualifiedly offensive to General Grant in a personal
sense, and contrary to his best judgment on ground of public policy
and safety.  His attachment to Sheridan was very strong, and a wrong
against the latter was sooner or later sure to be resented by General
Grant.  His feelings of the question were promptly and significantly
shown when he became President.  Inaugurated on the 4th of March, he
caused an army order to be issued on the morning of the 5th, restoring
General Sheridan to his former command in Louisiana, and ordering
General Hancock to the remote and peaceful Department of Dakota.]


CHAPTER XIII.

The financial experience of the Government of the United States in the
years following the war is without precedent among nations.  When
Congress first met after the close of hostilities (December, 1865), it
was as a ship sailing into dangerous and unknown seas without chart
of possible channels.  The Reconstruction problem before the country
seemed at the time to be less difficult than the financial problem.
Other nations had incurred great expenditures for war purposes, but had
always left them in chief part as a heritage for the future.  Great
Britain will probably never pay the total principal of her public debt.
France will be burdened perhaps as long as her nationality endures by
the debts heaped upon her through the ambition of her sovereigns, and
in her own struggles to enlarge the liberty of her people.  But in this
country the purpose was early formed, not simply to provide for the
interest upon the debt incurred in the war for the Union, but to begin
its payment at once, and to arrange for its rapid liquidation.  In view
of the magnitude of the sum involved this was a new undertaking in the
administration of Government finances.

The difficulties of the situation were undoubtedly aggravated and
complicated by the questions which arose from the condition of the
Southern States.  Could Congress expect at once that the populations in
those States would begin to contribute to the revenue, would cease to
require large expenditures for the maintenance of the National
authority, would again add to the volume of our exports, to our
commerce, and our general prosperity?  Serious re-action had in other
lands followed the financial expansion created by great wars, even
without complications similar to those which the disturbed condition
of the South seemed to render unavoidable.  Ought Congress to accept
such a re-action as the necessary condition of the restoration of our
currency, of return to a normal situation, of adjustment of expenditure
to revenue on a peace footing?  Could the possibility be entertained of
such a return and such an adjustment, without panic, without paralysis
of industry, without temporary interruption and prostration of
commerce?  Grave apprehensions were felt as to the possible effect upon
production and trade of the legislation required to maintain the
National credit.  These apprehensions derived force and peculiar
seriousness from the growing conflict between President Johnson and
Congress upon measures of Reconstruction and upon removals from office.

In spite however of all suggested fears and doubts, a feeling of
confidence pervaded the country, and was fully shared by Congress, that
the power which had saved the Union could re-establish its credit
without panic and without dangerous and prolonged depression.  Faith
in the resources which had equipped and supported the National armies,
now embraced the plainer and less exciting duties of funding and paying
the debt and of protecting the notes of the United States.  The loans
had been placed, the money borrowed, under the excitement of
war,--sometimes under the pressure of defeat, sometimes in the
exaltation of victory.  Without this pressure, without this exaltation,
could money be secured at a rate adequate to build up a National credit
worthy to be compared with that of the older and richer nations beyond
the Atlantic?

The intrepidity with which Congress met its task will always compel the
admiration of the student of American history.  While the war lasted,
the contributions by taxes and by loans had been on a munificent scale.
The measures adopted at the close of the Thirty-eighth Congress, after
four years of desperate struggle and on the very eve on National
victory, showed as great readiness to make sacrifices, as little
disposition to count the cost of saving the Union, as had marked
previous legislation.  Less than six weeks before the surrender of Lee
the internal taxes were increased, the duties on imports were
adjusted to that increase, and a new Loan Bill was enacted.  The bill
provided for borrowing, in addition to the authority given by previous
Acts, any sum not exceeding $600,000,000 in bonds, or treasury notes
convertible into bonds, at six per cent interest in coin or seven and
three-tenths per cent interest in currency.  This provision was found
to be so comprehensive that it not only provided a strong
instrumentality for meeting the immense demands incident to the
disbanding of the armies and the final settlement of claims connected
with that momentous change in our affairs, but also laid the foundation
for the policy of funding the debt at a reduced rate of interest.
These results testify to the magnificent proportions of the financial
legislation during the period of hostilities.

When the Thirty-ninth Congress met in December, 1865, gold stood at
147-7/8 @ 148-1/2.  A month later, on the 1st of January, 1866, the
legal-tender notes and fractional currency amounted to $452,231,810;
notes bearing 7-3/10 per cent interest, to $830,549,041; compound-interest
notes payable three years from date (a considerable proportion
of which time had elapsed), to $188,549,041; certificates of
indebtedness, payable at various dates within the current year, to
$50,667,000; and the temporary loan, practically payable on demand,
had reached the large sum of $97,257,194.  These might all be called
floating and pressing obligations, and their grand aggregate was
$1,618,705,045.  At the same time the amount represented by bonds
(6's of 1861, 5-20's, and 10-40's) was $1,120,786,700,--showing a
total National debt on New-Year's Day, 1866, of $2,739,491,745.  If
the National credit was to be maintained these sixteen hundred millions
of floating obligations must be promptly placed on a basis that would
give time to the Government to provide means for their ultimate
redemption.  President Johnson, in his message at the opening of the
session, spoke of the debt not as a public blessing, but as a heavy
burden on the industry of the country, to be discharged without
unnecessary delay.  This was the popular sentiment in all sections of
the country, although in financial circles arguments were frequently
heard in favor of creating interminable obligations and of adjusting
the debt on a basis of permanency, after the European fashion.  The
reduction had indeed already begun, since the maximum of debt had
been attained in the preceding August.

The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Hugh McCulloch, estimated that for
the fiscal year ending with June, 1867 (for which Congress was about
to provide), the revenue would exceed the expenditures by $111,682,818,
and that the whole of our vast debt could be liquidated by annual
payments within thirty years.  Mr. McCulloch's plans were to take from
the compound-interest notes their legal-tender quality, from the date
of their maturity, and to sell six per cent bonds, redeemable at the
pleasure of the Government, for the purpose of retiring both the
compound-interest notes and the plain legal-tenders.  He believed that
the entire debt might be funded at five per cent, while the average of
the annual interest now stood at 6-62/100 per cent.  He pointed to
harmony between the different parts of the Union and to the settlement
of the relations of labor in the Southern States, as essential
conditions to the best management of the National obligations.

The leading feature of Mr. McCulloch's financial policy was the
immediate and persistent contraction of the currency.  His argument in
support of the policy, as given in his annual report, was not accepted
by the country or by Congress without serious reservation; but his
belief in the theory was strong and determined, and so far as the laws
permitted he went on reducing the volume of paper in circulation until
on the 12th of April, 1866, the sum of legal-tenders was brought down
to $421,907,103.  Financiers of the Eastern cities favored the policy
of contraction, although the logical plea was urged against them that
the country would grow up to the volume of currency if not harried and
disturbed by new legislation.  Manufacturers and the holders of their
products, and many who had incurred pecuniary obligations in the
expanded currency, took alarm at the rapidity with which the Treasury
notes were withdrawn.  The argument was urged that the heavy taxes
could not be met if the withdrawal were so rapid, and that industry
and trade would in consequence be paralyzed by the enforced fall in
prices.

These opinions and apprehensions were developed in the debate which led
to the passage of the Act of April 12, 1866.  The subject was first
introduced by Mr. Alley of Massachusetts.  On the 18th of December
(1865) he offered a resolution concurring in the views of the
Secretary of the Treasury, in relation to the necessity for a
contraction of the currency, with a view to as early a resumption of
specie payment as the business interests of the country would permit.
Under a suspension of the rules, without debate, 144 voted for the
resolution, 6 against it, and 32 were not recorded.  Two months later,
on the 21st of February, 1866, Mr. Morrill, from the Committee on Ways
and Means, reported a bill which, as he explained, would expand the
authority provided by the Act of March 3, 1865, for funding
interest-bearing obligations, so as to include non-interest-bearing
obligations. The measure authorized the Secretary to exchange the bonds
prescribed by the Act for notes or certificates, and power was given to
negotiate them and make them payable either in the United States or
elsewhere, but if beyond the sea at not over five per cent interest.

--Mr. Thaddeus Stevens declared that the bill put over _sixteen hundred
millions_ of Government paper under the absolute and uncontrolled
discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury.  "This is a tremendous
bill," said he.  "It proposes to confer more power upon Mr. McCulloch
than was ever before conferred upon any one man in a government
claiming to have a constitution."

--Mr. Hooper of Massachusetts magnified the financial achievements of
the Government, urged the policy embodied in the bill, and insisted
on the importance of restoring the currency to a sound condition at
the earliest practicable moment.  He controverted the suggestion which
had been made to increase United-States notes to $1,000,000,000, on the
ground that the value of that dollar would be constantly fluctuating.
A minority of the commissioners appointed by the preceding Congress to
inquire into the state of trade and commerce had presented a specious
argument in favor of debasing the coinage, but Mr. Hooper dismissed
the proposition summarily and argued strongly for a contraction of
legal-tender notes.

--Mr. Hulburd of New York maintained that taxation could not be
increased to meet the existing and maturing obligations of the
Government.  He held that under the Acts of June, 1864, and March,
1865, the Secretary had power to sell at home or abroad six per cent
coin bonds in any amount to meet short obligations of the Government.
"Under the proposed measure," he said, "authority is specifically
asked to withdraw the fractional currency and legal-tender notes, in
whole or in part, and to substitute bonds for them.  The like power
was never asked for Neckar or for Pitt.  As a principle the proposition
is dangerous."  He protested vigorously against making any part of
the public debt payable in foreign countries.

--Mr. John Wentworth of Illinois argued in favor of contraction,
maintaining that the purpose of the pending bill was to make the
Secretary of the Treasury master of the situation.  "If we expect him
to compete successfully with the most desperate body of men in the
world we must confer upon him the necessary powers.  The real question
is, Shall our Government pay its pensions and all its employees and
creditors in depreciated paper, when by borrowing a little money at
six per cent it can bring its paper to par?"  He charged that an
immense lobby against the bill had thronged the hall, and was surprised
to find importers among them.  "But the importers have found," said he,
"that a bloated currency bloats the fashions."  He earnestly indorsed
Mr. McCulloch as a cautious man, who would not be precipitate, no
matter what power might be conferred upon him: "If we adopt his policy
we shall wake up some morning and find the paper of our country at par."

--Mr. Pike of Maine doubted the necessity of enforced contraction; but
if contraction was necessary, he was for taxing the circulation of
national banks out of existence, and afterwards retiring greenbacks.
"Once upon a specie basis," said he, "let the business of the country
regulate itself."  He proposed also to allow the States to tax the
bonds of the United States.

--Mr. Price of Iowa asked: "Would any prudent and sensible business
man who had given his note payable at his own option, without interest,
be likely to give for it another note for the same amount payable at
a certain time, with interest at six per cent semi-annually, in gold
coin?"

--Mr. Scofield of Pennsylvania asked if the legal-tender notes were
not, upon their face, payable on demand.

--Mr. Allison of Iowa insisted that "the Secretary of the Treasury does
not propose to return to specie payments immediately, but he expresses
the opinion that the reduction of greenbacks by the sum of one hundred
million dollars will secure that result."

--Mr. Boutwell of Massachusetts was content to try the experiment of
converting the interest-bearing obligations into long bonds, but was
unwilling to go farther.

--Mr. Sloan of Wisconsin proposed an amendment to make "bonds and all
other obligations of the United States hereafter issued payable in
lawful money," but the suggestion met with no favor.

--Mr. Roscoe Conkling maintained that "in the first place, the
Secretary of the Treasury has now the power, under the Act of March
3, 1865, to exchange any securities of the Government which bear
interest for any other securities which bear interest.  In the second
place, he has the power to call in, to cancel, to annihilate, so that
it shall never go out again, every particle of currency issued prior
to June 30,1864; and the truth is, that substantially if not literally
the whole of the currency was issued previous to that time." . . .
"Only one power," said Mr. Conkling, "remains to be conferred upon him;
and that is, the power to put his bonds upon the market when he
pleases, where he pleases, as he pleases, sell them for money, and with
that money purchase the outstanding obligations of the Government."

--Mr. Garfield argued that "under existing law, the Secretary can
issue compound-interest notes and 7-30 bonds to meet current
indebtedness; but these are the most expensive forms of government
obligations, and therefore he ought not to use the power."  He thought
the proposed bill was necessary in the interest of the Government.  He
would "trust the Secretary to proceed cautiously in the path required
by honor, to place our currency on a sound basis. . . . We have
travelled one-third of the way since Congress met.  Gold was then 148.
It is now 130.  Defeat this bill, and there will be a jubilee on
Wall Street."

--Mr. Lawrence of Ohio opposed the bill, and presented a letter from
Mr. Freeman Clarke, then Comptroller of the Currency, saying, "We have
full power to fund every dollar of the floating debt without any
legislation, and with no occasion for making any loan whatever."

--Mr. Morrill closed debate on the 16th of March; and the bill coming
to a vote, was defeated,--_ayes_ 65; _noes_ 70.  But on a motion to
reconsider, it was again brought before the House on the 19th of March,
and after brief debate was recommitted.  When it re-appeared, four
days later, it contained a _proviso_ "that the Secretary of the
Treasury shall not retire more than ten million dollars of legal-tender
notes in the first six months after the passage of the Act, and not
more than four million dollars a month afterwards; and shall make a
report to Congress of his action under this provision."  Mr. Morrill
submitted a letter from Mr. McCulloch, expressing the opinion that "it
will be a national calamity if Congress shall fail to grant additional
powers to the Secretary."  He added, that "the apprehension which
exists, that if power is given to the Secretary to retire legal-tender
notes the circulation will be ruinously contracted, is without any
special foundation."  The effect of the discussion was to strengthen
the bill in the House where it was passed by _ayes_ 83; _noes_ 53.

The bill was favorably reported to the Senate from the Finance
Committee, and came up for consideration on the 9th of April, under
the charge of Mr. Fessenden.

--Mr. Sherman re-affirmed the objections made in the House, that the
power conferred was greater than had ever been granted to any Secretary
of the Treasury since the foundation of the Government.  "The power,"
said he, "is absolute.  The Secretary may sell securities of any form
at any time and fund the whole debt.  No present necessity exists for
such grant of authority.  The _proviso_ for restricting contraction
is not adequate for that purpose.  By retaining a large balance in the
Treasury, the Secretary can contract the currency without violating the
_proviso_."  He deemed it unwise "to place in the hands of any mortal
man this absolute and extreme control over the currency."

--Mr. Fessenden said the true principle of this bill was, "that as
soon as it can be done with safety, Congress means that we shall get
back to the old system of specie payments.  That is about all there
is of it.  The effect of rejecting the measure will be to say to
everybody that the Government intends to keep depreciated paper in the
financial market."

--Mr. Chandler of Michigan believed the measure "to be evil, and evil
only; containing dangerous powers which should not be conferred, and
which no man should be willing to accept."  Mr. Howe of Wisconsin
agreed with him.

--Mr. Guthrie of Kentucky (Secretary of the Treasury under President
Pierce) pronounced it "necessary and proper to give this power to the
Secretary."  And Mr. Morgan of New York, agreeing with him, declared
that he desired the bill "just as it is."

--An amendment to strike out the words authorizing the sale of the
bonds elsewhere than in the United States was overwhelmingly defeated,
_ayes_ 7, _noes_ 35.  The bill was then passed by _ayes_ 32, _noes_ 7,
and by the President's signature became a law on the 12th of April,
1866.

The discussion of this important financial measure illustrates the
various phases of opinion prevailing both in Congress and in the
country.  The desire to return to a specie basis was general, and yet
not a few clung to the legal-tender notes as a permanent and standard
currency.  While the argument in favor of contraction was prosecuted
with great force, the possibility of going too fast, even in the right
direction, was conceded by the wisest financiers.  The natural
disinclination of the American people to entrust unrestricted power to
any officer was frequently and forcibly expressed.  The policy of
funding the obligations bearing interest was admitted on all hands, and
for this purpose the sale as well as the direct exchange of bonds was
approved.  But the repugnance to accepting less than par, or allowing
the possibility of such a rate, had its origin and support in the
patriotic instincts and in the sound judgment of the people.  The
requirement of a report from the Secretary and the limitation of the
extent of contraction, were the essential changes which made the
measure acceptable.

The enactment of this bill presents in an instructive light the
character of our financial legislation and the methods by which it is
accomplished.  As originally presented the bill had the approval of the
Secretary of the Treasury and came before the House with the favorable
report of the Committee on Ways and Means.  Yet it had no such standing
as in the British Parliament is given to a financial project of the
Government.  There, such a proposition would be definitely framed at
the Treasury, and its details would be elaborated when first presented.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer would state the full character of the
measure and the reasons for asking its adoption.  Opposition or
question would be expected only from the benches of the rival party.
Here, on the other hand, after the House, using its own judgment, had
modified the bill, criticism and hostility came from the Treasury that
had originally proposed it.  Several prominent members of the dominant
party were pronounced in opposition.  Saved by parliamentary strategy
when once defeated, the bill was started into new life by the adoption
of restrictions upon the power and the action of the Secretary of the
Treasury.  These restrictions were shown to be necessary in the
progress of the debate.  Individual judgment asserted itself and the
Act became the harmonious resultant of the conflicting opinions of the
entire House.

Congress therefore did not enact anybody's theory.  It put into the
statute the prudent, cautious sense of the people.  Recognizing the
principle of funding the floating obligations, and of contraction as
a means to resumption, Congress only responded to the common sense of
its great constituency, in forbidding reckless haste, and in defining
the rate of speed.  The purpose of keeping in Congress the control of
the rate of contraction was only a part of the general determination
that the representatives of the people and of the States shall
prescribe the methods of conduct as well as the principles and broad
measures of administration.  Every Government finds by practice the
system of legislation and administration best adapted to its own wants.
While ministerial power and a trained following, such as obtain in
England, may possess advantages under the circumstances existing in
the British Empire, it is the settled judgment of this country that
a perfectly free discussion, enlightened but not restrained by
departmental recommendation or by dictation of committees, is best
adapted to the varied and conflicting wants of the whole people.  And
this was never better illustrated than in the financial bill whose
important provisions have been under consideration.

The revenue laws received careful attention during this session.  The
chief measure was the Act of July 13, 1866.  It came before the House
with the assurance from the Ways and Means Committee that it would
steadily and materially reduce internal taxes.  The system of internal
revenue which had been so elaborately and intelligently constructed
for war purposes, yielded $310,906,984 for the fiscal year ending June
30, 1866.  Reduction were now made in the taxes on several hundred
articles of manufacture, on savings banks, on the gross receipts of
certain corporations; and the income tax was in some degree mitigated.
The total reductions were estimated at $75,684,000, but an increase
was proposed on raw cotton amounting to nearly one-third of this sum.
Prolonged discussion arose over this tax and resulted in a disagreement
between the two Houses.  The bill was finally perfected in a conference
committee and ended by reducing the total internal revenue to
$265,920,474 per annum--with all allowance made for the growth of the
country and the elasticity of Government receipts.

Not satisfied with the large reduction of taxes made at the first
session after the close of the war, Congress resumed the subject at
the second session.  Early in February, 1867, Mr. Morrill, from the
Committee of Ways and Means, reported a bill for the further reduction
of taxes, which became a law on the 2d of March.  The taxes removed
were returning a yearly revenue of more than $36,000,000 to the
National Treasury.  The principal reductions were $19,500,000 from the
income tax; $4,000,000 from clothing; $3,500,000 from woolens;
$3,250,000 from leather; $1,000,000 from engines; $600,000 from
sugar-refiners; $600,000 from tinware; $500,000 from castings; $500,000
from doors, sashes and blinds; with many others yielding less sums.
All these formed a part of what were termed war taxes, and the steady
purpose of Congress was to remove them as rapidly as the obligations
of the Treasury would permit.  As matter of fact they were removed long
before such action was expected by the people, and before the special
interests subjected to the burden had time to petition for relief or
even to complain of hardship.

During the winter of 1866-67 there was a prolonged discussion in
Congress over an Act finally passed March 2, 1867, authorizing the
Secretary of the Treasury to exchange three per cent certificates of
indebtedness for compound-interest notes, and allowing these
certificates to be counted as a part of the reserve of National Banks.
The first proposition was to allow interest at 3-65/100 per cent.  The
exchange of notes not bearing interest for those bearing compound
interest was proposed by Mr. Stevens, and at first supported by a
majority, but on reconsideration it was defeated.  Objections was made
to the bill that it was a scheme for giving to the banks interest on
their reserves, which they could not otherwise receive when the
compound-interest notes should be retired.  Of these notes the banks
held $90,000,000 and the limit proposed for the certificates was
$100,000,000.  Congress finally limited the amount of certificates to
$50,000,000 at three per cent, and allowed them to stand for two-fifths
of the reserve of any bank.

While this arrangement was an obvious advantage to the National banks,
no such motive inspired Congress in passing the bill.  Quite another
object was aimed at in its enactment.  The influence of contraction,
which had gone into operation by the Act of the preceding summer, was
already felt in the business of the country.  The real significance
of the Act just passed was that to a certain degree it checked and
even neutralized the operation of the statute which ordered
contraction.  The compound-interest notes served the National banks as
a part of their reserve, and as rapidly as they were cancelled,
legal-tender notes were to be held in their stead.  Their withdrawal
from circulation for this purpose led therefore to a direct and forcible
contraction of the actual currency of the country.  By substituting the
certificates of indebtedness as available for reserve this contraction
was prevented, and by the concession of interest, even at three per
cent, the banks were induced to surrender the securities which cost the
Government a higher rate.  The limit of these certificates was
subsequently raised to $75,000,000,--a limit which in fact was often
reached,--but as legal-tenders were needed the certificates were
surrendered to the Treasury.

This is substantially the history of contraction, or of attempts at
contraction made by the Thirty-ninth Congress.  The successful effort
to parry its effect, as already described, shows how unwelcome it had
proved to the business community, and how Congress, without resorting
at once to an absolute repeal of the act, sought an indirect mode of
neutralizing its effect.  Mr. McCulloch, in trying to enforce the
policy of contraction, represented an apparently consistent theory in
finance; but the great host of debtors who did not wish their
obligation to be made more onerous, and the great host of creditors who
did not desire that their debtors should be embarrassed and possibly
rendered unable to liquidate, united on the practical side of the
question and aroused public opinion against the course of the Treasury
Department.  An individual, by an effort of will, can bring himself
to endure present inconvenience and even suffering, for a great good
that lies beyond, but it was difficult for forty millions of people
to adopt this resolve.  Nor were the cases quite similar in motive
and influence, for although it might be admitted that the entire
nation would be benefitted by the ultimate result, the people knew that
the process would bring embarrassment to vast numbers and would reduce
not a few to bankruptcy and ruin.  It was easy to see, therefore, that
as each month the degree of contraction was made public, the people
more and more attributed their financial troubles to its operation.
Perhaps, in large degree, this was the result of imagination, and of
that common desire in human nature to ascribe one's faults and
misfortunes to some superior power.  The effect nevertheless was
serious and lasting.  In the end, outside of banking and financial
centres, there was a strong and persistent demand for the repeal of
the Contraction Act.

The process of funding and paying the National debt, and of contracting
the currency, went on with vigor and persistency during the summer and
autumn of 1867.  The Treasury statements for the year showed that up
to November 1, 1867, the long obligations of the Government had been
increased to $1,781,462,050; while the short obligations, other than
currency, had been reduced to $441,655,120.63, and the currency in
greenbacks, fractional notes and certificates of deposit for gold, to
$402,385,677.39.  The Treasury held $133,998,398.02; so that the
National debt, less this cash, stood at $2,491,504,450.  It thus
exhibited an average reduction of the debt from its maximum, August
31, 1865, to November 1, 1867, of more than $10,000,000 per month.

Gold was lower than it had been, but great disappointment was felt
because the premium, which had ranged in January, 1867, at 32-1/8 @
37-7/8, was in November 37-1/2 @ 48-5/8, and the latter figure was
higher than the quotation at the beginning of the first session of
the Thirty-ninth Congress.  The charge was current, and was believed
by many, that the premium had been advanced by speculators to compel
Congress to enforce the policy of contraction.  On the other hand, it
was declared to be demonstrably true that the reduction of the volume
of paper did not lower the premium on gold.  It only depressed
production and placed the markets of every kind under the control of
reckless operators.  Surely, it was argued, the contraction had been
severe enough to satisfy the advocates of the most stringent
Procrustean policy.  The short obligations had been cut down
nearly one-half since January, 1866.  If account were taken of
compound-interest notes the reduction in currency ought to be reckoned
at $100,000,000, and even at twice that sum, since the cash held by
the Treasury had been taken from the circulation of the country.

The Secretary of the Treasury still adhered to the policy of contraction,
and yet was charged with putting into circulation legal-tender notes
that had been once withdrawn, in order to affect the market.  Thus in
August, 1866, between the 8th and the 23d inclusive, he had withdrawn
and destroyed $12,530,111, and of the 31st of that month he issued
$12,500,000.  He had again in October, 1866, cancelled $500,000
on the 24th, and issued anew the same sum on the 25th.  On the
31st of January, 1867, he had issued anew $4,000,000, May 31
$2,500,000, and during December, 1867, $1,842,400.  In answer to
remonstrance against this practice the Secretary maintained that the
authority to contract and to cancel the legal-tender notes did not
require him to do it, but left it within his discretion.  This was
unquestionably the law of the case.

Mr. McCulloch in his official report insisted on the funding or payment
of the balance of interest-bearing notes, and upon a continued
contraction of the currency, as the first measure for promoting the
National prosperity; and he presented a strong argument in favor of
permanent specie payment.  He reported that he had not always retired
notes in each month to the extent permitted, but he declared that
the effect of the policy as carried out had been salutary and that its
continuation would be obviously wise.  Yet he feared that financial
views were inculcated, which if not corrected might lead to its
abandonment.  The truth was that the Secretary's policy was counter to
the popular wish, and evidence was accumulating that Congress would not
sustain him in its continued enforcement.  The Secretary had
confidently relied upon the bankers and commercial men of the country;
but the serious fact was now developed, that many of the most prudent
financiers had concluded that the changes in the volume of the currency
were causing mischief, and that the process of contraction had been
carried as far as was desirable.

The Secretary argued bravely and wisely in his report, in favor of
paying the principal and interest of the Government bonds in coin.
His argument was designed to meet heresies which had found favor in
unexpected quarters.  The plea was urged by the new and short-lived
school of finance that the notes of the National banks should be
withdrawn and greenbacks substituted for them, that all payments by the
Government on the principal of the bonds should be in its own paper.
It was admitted by these novel theorists that the bonds on their face
promised coin for interest; but they maintained that the bonds had
been issued in large part when gold was at a heavy premium for paper,
and could rightfully be liquidated in paper at its advanced value.
Propositions were frequently presented to stop the issue of bonds and
to pay out notes for any obligations of the Government offered at the
Treasury on becoming due in any form.  The pressure of rapid
contraction secured a hearing for every extravagant proposition.
Prejudice against speculators in gold, who during the war had grown
rich on the disasters of the Union, was added to the discussion,
especially while the premium was maintained and the National credit
charged with odium on its account.

At the opening of the second session of the Fortieth Congress
(December, 1867) numerous resolutions and bills demanding the stoppage
of contraction were referred to the Committee on Ways and Means.
Five days afterwards Mr. Schenck reported a bill of four lines, by
which the "further reduction of the currency by retiring and cancelling
United-States notes is prohibited."  It had the unanimous approval of
the Committee on Ways and Means, and was passed by the House,--_ayes_
127, _noes_ 32.  The minority included a goodly number of leading
Republicans.  In the Senate Mr. Sherman, in supporting the bill, stated
the amount of contraction since August 1, 1866, at $140,122,168.  He
argued from these figures that "contraction should go no farther while
industry is in a measure paralyzed, and that Congress ought to resume
control of the currency, which should not be delegated to any single
officer."  He declared that the measure was entirely preliminary to
other legislation, "which must include the banking system, the time
and manner of resuming specie payments, the payment of the debt and
the kind of money in which it may be paid, and the reduction of
expenditures and taxes."  Debate was somewhat prolonged, and a
conference committee gave final form to the measure, which failed to
receive the President's signature, but became a law without it.  It
is known as the "Act of February 4, 1868, prohibiting any further
reduction of the currency, and authorizing the replacing of mutilated
notes."  By this Act the minimum limit of legal-tender notes was
fixed at $356,000,00,--the volume then afloat after Mr. McCulloch's
policy of contraction had done its work.

The actual legislation of the second session of the Fortieth Congress
included also the repeal of the tax on raw cotton, and the further
reduction of internal revenue, by the Acts of March 31 and July 20
(1868).  Great relief was given to manufactures by the abolition of
the five per cent tax on a variety of products.  The surrender of
revenue was estimated at $23,000,000 on cotton at $45,000,000 on
manufactures.  These concessions were much needed, for the producers
of cotton were crippled by the condition of their States, and
manufacturers found that prices did not justify the payment of these
war charges.

In his annual message to Congress in December, 1868, President Johnson
argued "that the holders of our securities have already received upon
their bonds a larger amount than their original investments, measured
by the gold standard.  Upon this statement of fact it would seem but
just and equitable that the six per cent interest now paid by the
Government should be applied to the reduction of the principal, in
semi-annual installments, which in sixteen years and eight months would
liquidate the entire National debt."  This bold and shameless advocacy
of repudiation was less mischievous than it would have been if Mr.
Johnson had held a longer lease of power, and if the people had not in
the Presidential election pronounced so clear and positive a verdict
in favor of the maintenance of the National credit.  The Senate deemed
it worth while to put on record a resolution condemning this part of
Mr. Johnson's message.  Mr. Hendricks of Indiana moved a substitute
indorsing the statement in the message, and closing with the words of
the Democratic National Convention in favor of paying the bonds in
_lawful_ money.  Only seven senators supported his substitute, while
forty-five opposed it; and President Johnson's proposal for repudiation
was, by the action of the Senate, "utterly disapproved and condemned,"
--_ayes_ 43, _noes_ 6.  In the House of Representatives a similar
resolution was passed by a vote of 155 _ayes_ to 6 _noes_, 60 not
voting.  No Democratic member in that body seemed willing to assume
the objectionable position taken by Mr. Hendricks in the Senate, and a
declaration "that all forms of repudiation are odious to the American
people" was adopted without a division.

The financial achievement of the National Government herein reviewed,
for the four years following the war, may be briefly summarized.  The
National debt was reduced by the sum of nearly $300,000,000, while at
the same time the Government reduced its revenue to the amount of
$140,000,000 per annum by the repeal of a long series of internal
taxes.  During this period more than $35,000,000 had been paid from the
Treasury towards the construction of the Union and Central Pacific
Railroads, and $7,200,000 was paid to the Russian Government on account
of the purchase of the Territory of Alaska.  It is also to be noted
that within this period were embraced all the expenses incident to the
disbandment of the Union army, and also a very large addition to the
pension-list.  Notwithstanding all these enormous expenditures the
business interests of the country continued prosperous, and the fact
that so large a reduction had been made in internal taxes gave promise
that within a comparatively short period the Government would be able
to remove all levies that were in any degree oppressive or even
vexatious to private interests.

By reason of his official and personal connection with the President,
Mr. McCulloch had failed to secure cordial support from Congress, and
had moreover given offense by his obvious sympathy with the free-traders,
who were already beginning to assault the protective tariff
which the necessities of war had led the country to adopt.  The
Secretary had also gone far beyond the popular wish and the best
business judgment of the country in regard to the rapid contraction of
the currency.  But while his politics and his policies were not
acceptable to Congress or to the people, he is entitled to high
credit for his direct, honest, intelligent administration of the
Treasury Department.  In the peculiar embarrassments to the
administration of the Government, caused by the course of President
Johnson, it was a matter of sincere congratulation that a Secretary
of the Treasury, so competent and trustworthy as Mr. McCulloch had
approved himself, was firmly in place before the serious political
disturbances began--a congratulation in which his most ardent
Republican opponents were ready to join, knowing how fatal it might
prove if President Johnson had the opportunity to nominate his
successor.

Throughout the more difficult period of his administration of the
department, Mr. McCulloch was aided by two most intelligent and
efficient officers.  Mr. William E. Chandler, though only twenty-nine
years of age, was appointed First Assistant Secretary in March, 1865,
and exhibited great aptitude, discrimination, and ability in his
position.  He developed an admirable talent for details, a quick
insight into the most difficult problems that came before the
Department, and at all times an honorable devotion to public duty.  The
Bureau of Internal Revenue, the most important of the Treasury
Department, was under the direction of another citizen of New
Hampshire, Edward Ashton Rollins.  The Bureau for a time collected more
than half the revenue of the United States, and required in its
Commissioner integrity, administrative talent, and singular skill in
providing against every form of fraud.  No department of the Government
had to contend against so many corrupt combinations to rob the
Government, and the slightest relaxation of vigilance on the part of
the Commissioner might involve at any time a loss of millions to the
National Treasury.  In the complex and difficult duties of this
station, Mr. Rollins proved himself equal to every requirement.

The purchase of Alaska was completed by the Act of July 27, 1868, which
appropriated the amount agreed upon in the treaty of March 30, 1867,--
negotiated by Mr. Seward on behalf of the United States, and by Baron
Stoeckl representing the Emperor of all the Russias.  The Russian
Government had initiated the matter, and desired to sell much more
earnestly than the United States desired to buy.  There is little doubt
that a like offer from any other European government would have been
rejected.  The pressure of our financial troubles, the fact that gold
was still at a high premium, suggested the absolute necessity of
economy in every form in which it could be exercised; and in the
general judgment of the people the last thing we needed was additional
territory.  There was, however, a feeling of marked kindliness towards
Russia; and this, no doubt, had great weight with Mr. Seward when he
assented to the obvious wishes of that government.  But while there was
no special difficulty in securing the ratification of the treaty by the
Senate, a more serious question arose when the House was asked to
appropriate the necessary amount to fulfill the obligation.  Seven
million two hundred thousand dollars in gold represented at that time
more than ten million dollars in the currency of the Government; and
many Republicans felt, on the eve, or rather in the midst, of a
Presidential canvass, that it was a hazardous political step (deeply
in debt as the Government was, and with its paper still at a heavy
discount) to embark in the speculation of acquiring a vast area of
"rocks and ice," as Alaska was termed in the popular and derisive
description of Mr. Seward's purchase.

When the bill came before the House, General Banks, as Chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, urged the appropriation with great
earnestness, not merely because of the obligation imposed upon the
Government by the treaty, which he ably presented; not merely by reason
of the intrinsic value of the territory, which he abundantly
demonstrated; but especially on account of the fact that Russia was
the other party to the treaty, and had for nearly a century shown a
most cordial disposition towards the United States.  General Banks
maintained that at every step of our history, from 1786 to the moment
when he was speaking, Russia had been our friend.  "In the darkest hour
of our peril," said he, "during the Rebellion, when we were enacting
a history which no man yet thoroughly comprehends, when France and
England were contemplating the recognition of the Confederacy, the
whole world was thrilled by the appearance in San Francisco of a fleet
of Russian war vessels, and nearly at the same time, whether by
accident or design, a second Russian fleet appeared in the harbor of
New York.  Who knew how many more there were on their voyage here?
From that hour France, on the one hand, and England on the other,
receded, and the American Government regained its position and its
power. . . . Now, shall we flout the Russian Government in every court
in Europe for her friendship?  Whoever of the representatives of the
American people in this House, on this question, turns his back, not
only upon his duty, but upon the friends of his country, upon the
Constitution of his Government, and the honor of his generation,
cannot long remain in power."

Mr. Cadwalader C. Washburn answered the speech of General Banks on the
succeeding day (July 1, 1868).  He assumed the leadership of the
opposition to the treaty.  He proposed to demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the House five distinct propositions: "_First_, that
at the time the treaty for Alaska was negotiated, not a soul in the
whole United States asked for it; _second_, that it was secretly
negotiated, and in a manner to prevent the representatives of the
people from being heard; _third_, that by existing treaties we possess
every right that is of any value to us, without the responsibility and
never-ending expense of governing a nation of savages; _fourth_, that
the country ceded is absolutely without value; _fifth_, that it is the
right and duty of the House to inquire into the treaty, and to vote or
not vote the money, according to its best judgment."  Mr. Washburn made
an able speech in support of his radical propositions.

General Butler sustained Mr. Washburn's position in a characteristic
speech, especially answering General Banks's argument that we should
pay this amount from a spirit of friendship for Russia.  "If," said
General Butler, "we are to pay this price as usury on the friendship
of Russia, we are paying for it very dear indeed.  If we are to pay
for her friendship, I desire to give her the seven million two hundred
thousand dollars in cash, and let her keep Alaska, because I think it
may be a small sum to give for the friendship if we could only get
rid of the land, or rather the ice, which we are to get by paying for
it."  He maintained that it was in evidence before the House
officially, "that for ten years the entire product of the whole country
of Alaska did not exceed three million dollars."

--Mr. Peters of Maine pronounced the territory "intrinsically
valueless; the conclusive proof of which is found in the fact that
Russia is willing to sell it."  He criticised the action of the Senate
in negotiating the treaty.  "If the treaty-making power can buy, they
can sell.  If they can buy land with money, they can buy money with
land.  If they can buy a part of a country, they can buy the whole of
a country.  If they can sell a part of our country, they can sell the
whole of it!"

--Mr. Spalding of Ohio, on the other hand, maintained that
"notwithstanding all the sneers that have been cast on Alaska, if it
could be sold again, individuals would take it off our hand and pay us
two or three millions for the bargain."

--General Schenck thought the purchase in itself highly objectionable,
but was "willing to vote the money because the treaty has been made
with a friendly power; one of those that stood by us,--almost the only
one that stood by us when all the rest of the powers of the world
seemed to be turning away from us in our recent troubles."

--Mr. Stevens supported the measure on the ground that it was a
valuable acquisition to the wealth and power of the country.  He
argued also in favor of the right of the Senate to make the treaty.

--Mr. Leonard Myers was sure that if we did not acquire Alaska it
would be transferred to Great Britain.  "The nation," said he, "which
struggled so hard for Vancouver and her present Pacific boundary,
and which still insists on having the little island of San Juan, will
never let such an opportunity slip.  Canada, as matters now stand,
would become ours some day could her people learn to be Americans;
but never, if England secures Alaska."

--Mr. Higby of California answered the objections relating to climate.
"I do not know," said he, "whether the people of the East yet believe
what has been so often declared, that our winters on the Pacific are
nearly as mild as our summers, and yet such is the fact.  In my own
little village, situated over fourteen hundred feet above the level
of the ocean, I have seen a plant growing in the earth green through
all the months from October to April."

--Mr. Shellabarger opposed the purchase.  He said those nation which
had been compact and solid had been the most enduring, while those
which had the most extended territory lasted the least space of time.

--Mr. Price of Iowa thought that it was "far better to expend the
$7,200,000 in improving the Mississippi River, in order that
bread-stuffs may be transported cheaply from the West to the seaboard."
He had no faith in the value of the territory proposed to be purchased.

--Mr. McCarthy of New York rejected the plea that we should purchase
Alaska because Russia is a friendly power.  "I ask this House," said
he, "whence this friendship comes.  It comes from self-interest.  She
is the absorbing power of the Eastern continent, and she recognizes
us as the absorbing power of the western continent; and through
friendship for us she desires to override and overbalance the
governments of Europe which are between her and us."

--General Butler moved a proviso, that "the payment of $500,000 of said
appropriation be withheld until the Imperial Government of Russia shall
signify its willingness to refer to an impartial tribunal all such
claims by American citizens against the Imperial Government as have
been investigated by the State Department of the United States and
declared to be just, and the amounts so awarded to be paid from said
$500,000 so withheld."

--General Garfield, presiding at the time over the Committee of the
Whole, ruled it out of order, and on an appeal being taken the decision
was sustained by _ayes_ 93, _noes_ 27.  After dilatory motions and the
offer of various amendments, which were rejected, the bill was passed
by _ayes_ 113, _noes_ 43.

--The House prefaced the bill by a preamble, asserting in effect that
"the subjects embraced in the treaty are among those which by the
Constitution are submitted to the power of Congress, and over which
Congress has jurisdiction; and for these reasons, it is necessary that
the consent of Congress should be given to the said stipulations before
the same can have full force and effect."  There was no mention of the
Senate's ratification, merely a reference to the fact that "the
President has entered into a treaty with the Emperor of Russia, and
has agreed to pay him the sum of seven million two hundred thousand
dollars in coin."  The House by this preamble evidently claimed that
its consent to the treaty was just as essential as the consent of the
Senate,--that it was, in short, a subject for the consideration of
Congress.

The Senate was unwilling to admit such a pretension, especially when
put forth by the House in this bald form, and therefore rejected it
unanimously.  The matter was sent to a conference, and by changing the
preamble a compromise was promptly effected, which preserved the rank
and dignity of both branches.  It declared that "whereas the President
had entered into a treaty with the Emperor of Russia, and _the Senate
thereafter gave its advice and consent to said treaty, . . . and
whereas said stipulations cannot be carried into full force and effect,
except by legislation to which the consent of both Houses of Congress
is necessary;_ therefore be it enacted that there be appropriated the
sum of $7,200,000" for the purpose named.  With this compromise the
bill was readily passed, and became a law by the President's approval
July 27, 1868.

The preamble finally agreed upon, though falling far short of the one
first adopted by the House, was yet regarded as a victory for that
branch.  The issue between the Senate and the House, now adjusted by a
compromise, is an old one, agitated at different periods ever since
the controversy over the Jay treaty in 1794-95.  It is simply whether
the House is bound to vote for an appropriation to carry out a treaty
Constitutionally made by the President and the Senate, without judging
for itself whether, on the merits of the treaty, the appropriation
should be made.  After the appropriation required under the Jay treaty
had been voted by the House, that body declared in a resolution which
was adopted by _ayes_ 57, _noes_ 35, "that it is the Constitutional
right and duty of the House of Representatives, in all such cases, to
deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of carrying such treaty
into effect, and to determine and act thereon as in their judgment
may be most conducive to the public good."  But that was the
declaration of the House only; whereas the preamble agreed to in the
appropriation of money for the purchase of Alaska contained the assent
of both branches.

Though the Constitutional principle involved may not be considered as
one settled beyond a fair difference of opinion, there has
undoubtedly been a great advance, since the controversy between the
two branches in 1794, in favor of the rights of the House when an
appropriation of money is asked to carry out a treaty.  The change
has been so great indeed that the House would not now in any case
consider itself under a Constitutional obligation to appropriate money
in support of a treaty, the provisions of which it did not approve.  It
is therefore practically true that all such treaties must pass under
the judgment of the House as well as under that of the Senate and the
President.  Judge McLean of the Supreme Court delivered an opinion
which is often referred to as embodying the doctrine upon which the
House rests its claim of power.*  "A treaty," said the learned Justice,
"is the supreme law of the land only when the treaty-making power can
carry it into effect.  A treaty which stipulates for the payment of
money undertakes to do that _which the treaty-making power cannot do;
therefore the treaty is not the supreme law of the land_.  To give it
effect the action of Congress is necessary, and in this action the
representatives and senators act on their own judgment and
responsibility and not on the judgment and responsibility of the
treaty-making power.  _A foreign government may be presumed to know
that the power of appropriating money belongs to Congress_.  No act of
any part of the Government can be held to be a law which has not all
the sanctions to make it law."(2)

The territory which we thus acquired is of vast extent, exceeding in
its entire area a half million square miles.  Its extreme length is
about eleven hundred miles; its extreme width about eight hundred.
It stretches nearly to the seventy-second degree of north latitude,
three hundred and fifty miles beyond Behring's Straits; and borders
upon the Arctic Ocean for more than a thousand miles.  The adjacent
islands of the Aleutian group are included in the transfer, and reach
two-thirds of the way across the North Pacific in the latitude of
60 degrees,--the westernmost island being within six hundred miles of
the coast of Kamtchatka.  The resources of the forests of Alaska are
very great,--the trees growing to a good height on the mountain sides
as far as two thousand feet above the tide level.  The timber is of
the character generally found in Northern climates: yellow cedar of
durable quality, spruce, larch, fir of great size, and hemlock.  In
the world's rapid and wasteful consumption of wood, the forests of
Alaska will prove not merely a substantial resource for the interests
of the future, but a treasure-house in point of pecuniary value.  To
this source of wealth on land that of the water must be added, in the
seal and food fish which are found in immeasurable quantities along
the coast of the mainland and the islands.

From the time of the acquisition of Louisiana until the purchase of
Alaska, the additions of territory to the United States had all been
in the interest of slavery.  Louisiana, stretching across the entire
country from South to North, was of equal value to each section; but
the acquisition of Florida, the annexation of Texas, the territory
acquired from Mexico by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, with the
addition of Arizona under the Gadsden treaty, were all made under the
lead of Southern statesmen to strengthen the political power and the
material resources of the South.  Meanwhile, by the inexcusable errors
of the Democratic party, and especially of Democratic diplomacy, we
lost that vast tract on the north known as British Columbia, the
possession of which, after the acquisition of Alaska, would have given
to the United States the continuous frontage on the Pacific Ocean from
the south line of California to Behring's Straits.  Looking northward
for territory, instead of southward, was a radical change of policy in
the conduct of the Government,--a policy which, happily and
appropriately, it was the good fortune of Mr. Seward to initiate under
impressive and significant circumstances.

[(1) Turner _vs_. The American Baptist Missionary Union, 5 McLean, 544.]

[(2) Mr. Jefferson, more promptly than other great statesmen of his
generation, appreciated the degree of power residing in the House of
Representatives.  In a private letter discussing the subject he
expressed views in harmony with Justice McLean's opinion, long before
that opinion was delivered.  He wrote to Mr. Monroe: "We conceive
the Constitutional doctrine to be, that though the President and Senate
have the general power of making treaties, yet whenever they include
in a treaty matters confided by the Constitution to the three branches
of the Legislature, an act of legislation will be necessary to confirm
these articles, and that the House of Representatives, as one branch of
the Legislature, are perfectly free to pass the act or to refuse it,
governing themselves by their own judgment whether it is for the good
of their constituents to let the treaty go into effect or not.  On
this depends whether the powers of legislation shall be transferred
from the President, Senate, and House of Representatives, to the
President, Senate, and Piamingo, or any other Indian, Algerine, or
other chief."]


CHAPTER XIV.

As the result of the great victory over the President in the political
contest of 1866, and of his stubborn maintenance of a hostile attitude,
the ardent and extreme men of the Republican party began, in the autumn
of that year, to discuss the propriety of ending the whole struggle by
impeaching Mr. Johnson and removing him from office.  They believed
that his contumacious and obstinate course constituted a high crime
and misdemeanor, and the idea of Impeachment, as soon as suggested,
took deep root in minds of a certain type.  When Congress came together
in December the agitation increased; and on the 7th of January (1867),
directly after the holidays, two Missouri representatives (Loan and
Kelso) attempted in turn to introduce resolutions in the House
proposing an Impeachment, but each was prevented by some parliamentary
obstruction.  At a later hour of the same day Mr. James M. Ashley of
Ohio rose to a question of privilege and formally impeached the
President of high crimes and misdemeanors.  "I charge him," said Mr.
Ashley, "with an usurpation of power and violation of the law: in
that he has corruptly used the appointing power; in that he has
corruptly used the pardoning power; in that he had corruptly used the
veto power; in that he has corruptly interfered in elections and
committed acts which in contemplation of the Constitution are high
crimes and misdemeanors."

Mr. Ashley's charges were very grave, but they created slight
impression upon the House and did not alarm the country.  Every one
present felt that they were gross exaggerations and distortions of
fact, and could not be sustained by legal evidence or indeed by
reputable testimony of any kind.  They were however referred in due
form to the Judiciary Committee, with full power to send for persons
and papers, to administer the customary oath to witnesses, and to make
in all respects a thorough investigation.  Nothing was heard from the
committee until the 2d of March, when on the eve of the expiration of
Congress they reported that many documents had been collected, a large
number of witnesses examined, and every practicable thing done to
reach a conclusion of the case; but that not having fully examined all
the charges preferred against the President, they did not deem it
expedient to submit any conclusion beyond the statement that sufficient
testimony had been brought to the committee's notice to justify and
demand a further prosecution of the investigation.  They therefore
passed the testimony they had taken into the custody of the Clerk of
the House, as a notification to the succeeding Congress that inquiry
into the matter should be pursued.  The report was made by Mr. James
F. Wilson of Iowa, chairman of the committee, and concurred in by all
the Republican members.  Mr. Rogers, a Democratic member from New
Jersey, made a minority report, stating that he had carefully examined
all the testimony in the case; that there was not one particle of
evidence to sustain any of the charges which had been made; that the
case was entirely void of proof; and that most of the testimony taken
was of a secondary character, such as could not be admitted in any
court of justice.  He objected to continuing the subject and thereby
keeping the country in a feverish state.  No action was taken by the
House except to lay both reports upon the table.

There was on the part of conservative Republicans a sincere hope that
nothing more would be heard of the Impeachment question.  If a
committee industriously at work for sixty days could find nothing on
which to found charges against the President, they thought that
wisdom suggested the abandonment of the investigation.  But Mr. Ashley,
with his well-known persistency, was determined to pursue it; and on
the 7th of March, the third day after the new Congress was organized,
he introduced a resolution directing the Judicial Committee to continue
the investigation under the same instructions as in the preceding
Congress, with the additional power to sit during the recess.  Mr.
Ashley expressed the hope that "this Congress will not hesitate to do
its duty because the timid in our own ranks hesitate, but will
proceed to the discharge of the high and important trust imposed upon
it, uninfluenced by passion and unawed by fear."  He was answered
with indignation by Mr. Brooks and Mr. Fernando Wood of New York, and
the question becoming a party issue Mr. Ashley's resolution was
carried without a division after an ineffectual attempt to lay it on
the table,--a motion which was sustained by only thirty-two votes.
The committee proceeded in their work during the recess of Congress,
and reported the testimony on the 25th of the ensuing November (1867).

Some ninety-five witnesses had been examined, and the report of
testimony covered twelve hundred octavo pages.  Much of the evidence
seemed irrelevant, and that which bore directly upon the question of
the President's offense fell far below the serious character assigned
to it by previous rumors.  This was especially true in regard to the
testimony given by General Grant.  There were secret and ominous
intimations that General Grant had been approached by the President
with the view of ascertaining whether, if it should be determined to
constitute a Congress of Democratic members from the North and rebel
members from the South (leaving the Republicans to come in or stay out
as they might choose), the Army could be relied upon to sustain such
a movement.  There is no doubt that many earnest Republicans were so
impressed by the perverse course of President Johnson that they came
to believe him capable of any atrocious act.  They gave credulous ear,
therefore, to these extravagant rumors; and in the end they succeeded
in making a deep impression upon the minds of certain members of the
Committee charged with the investigation into the President's official
conduct.

The persons who were giving currency to these rumors never seemed to
realize that General Grant, with his loyalty, his patriotism, and his
high sense of personal and official honor, could not for a moment have
even so much as listened to a proposition which involved an attack
upon the legitimacy of the Congress of the United States, and
practically contemplated its overthrow through means not different from
those by which Cromwell closed the sessions of the Long Parliament.
Nothing can be more certain than the fact that if President Johnson had
ever made such an intimation to General Grant, it would have been at
once exposed and denounced with a soldier's directness; and the
President would have been promptly impeached for an offense in which
his guilt would not have been doubtful.

It was not surprising, therefore, that by General Grant's testimony,(1)
the entire charge was dissipated into thin air, and proved to be only
one of the thousand baseless rumors which in that exciting period were
constantly filling the political atmosphere.  It was perhaps the
intention of the Committee in examining General Grant on this point,
to give him an opportunity in an official report to stamp the current
rumors as utterly false.  It can hardly be possible that a single
member of the Committee believed that General Grant had silently
received from the President a deliberate proposition to revolutionize
the Government.  When the essential truth of the matter was reached, it
was found that General Grant had never heard any thing from the
President, on the question of organizing Congress, at all different
from the premises he had assumed in the series of disreputable
speeches delivered by him in his extraordinary tour through the
country the preceding year.

There was a marked divergence of views in the recommendations from
the Judiciary Committee.  The majority, Messrs. George S. Boutwell of
Massachusetts, Francis Thomas of Maryland, Thomas Williams of
Pennsylvania, William Lawrence of Ohio, and John C. Churchill of New
York, reported a resolution directing that "Andrew Johnson, President
of the United States, be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors."
Mr. Wilson of Iowa and Mr. Frederic Woodbridge of Vermont, submitted
a minority report, with a resolution directing that "the Committee on
the Judiciary be discharged from further consideration of the proposed
impeachment of the President of the United States, and that the subject
be laid upon the table."  The two Democratic members of the committee,
Mr. Marshall of Illinois and Mr. Eldridge of Wisconsin, while agreeing
with the resolution submitted by Mr. Wilson, desired to express certain
views from the Democratic stand-point.  They therefore submitted a
separate report, reviewing the entire proceeding in language more
caustic than Mr. Wilson and Mr. Woodbridge had seen fit to employ.

The effect of Mr. Boutwell's report was seriously impaired by the fact
that the chairman of the committee and another Republican member had
refused to concur, and it was at once evident from the position in
which this division left the question, that the House would not sustain
an Impeachment upon the testimony submitted.  By an arrangement to
which only a few members objected, the discussion of the reports was
confined to two speeches, one by Mr. Boutwell and one by Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Boutwell's was delivered on the 5th and 6th of December, and Mr.
Wilson's reply immediately after Mr. Boutwell had concluded on the
second day.  Both speeches were able and positive, holding the
attention of members in a marked and exceptional degree.  A large
majority of the House desired the vote to be taken as soon as Mr.
Wilson had concluded; but some dilatory motions kept off the decision
until the succeeding day (December 7, 1867), when amid much excitement,
and some display of angry feeling between members, the resolution
calling for the impeachment of the President was defeated by an
overwhelming majority,--_ayes_ 57, _noes_ 108.(2)  The affirmative vote
was composed entirely of Republicans, but a larger number of
Republicans were included in the negative; so that apart from any
action of the Democratic party the advocates of Impeachment were in the
minority.

By this decisive vote the project of impeaching the President was in
the public belief finally defeated.  But those best acquainted with
the earnestness of purpose and the determination of the leading men,
who had persuaded themselves that the safety of the Republic depended
upon the destruction of Johnson's official power, knew that the closest
watch would be kept upon every action of the President, and if an
apparently justifying cause could be found the project of his removal
would be vigorously renewed.  It is difficult to understand the
intensity of conviction which had taken possession of certain minds
on this subject--difficult to understand why the same causes and the
same reasons which operated so powerfully on certain Republicans in
favor of Impeachment, should prove so utterly inadequate to affect
others.  Why should Mr. Boutwell be so decidedly on one side and Mr.
Dawes with equal firmness on the other?  Why should General Schenck and
William Lawrence vote for impeachment and General Garfield and John A.
Bingham against it?  Why should Thaddeus Stevens and Judge Kelley vote
in the affirmative and the four Washburns in the negative?

Geographically there was a traceable division in the vote.  In New
England, usually so radical, only five members favored Impeachment.
New York gave but two votes for it and Pennsylvania gave but six.
The large majority of those who exhibited such an earnest desire to
force the issue to extremes came from the West, but even in that
section the Republicans who opposed it were nearly equal in number to
those who favored it.  The vote led to no little recrimination inside
the ranks of the party--each side regarding the other as pursuing an
unwise and unjustifiable course.  The advocates of Impeachment were
denounced as rash, hot-headed, sensational, bent on leading the party
into an indefensible position; while its opponents were spoken of as
faint-hearted, as truckling to the Administration, as afraid to strike
the one blow imperatively demanded for the safety of the Republic.  But
outside of this quarrel of partisans the great mass of quiet citizens
and more especially the manufacturing, commercial, and financial
communities, were profoundly grateful that the country was not, as
they now believed, to be disturbed by a violent effort to deprive the
President of his great office.

The prophets of Peace were disappointed in their hopes and their
predictions.  A train of circumstances, not unnaturally growing out of
the political situation, led in the ensuing month to the renewal of
the scheme of Impeachment because of the President's attempt to
appoint a new Secretary of War.  The President himself narrates what
he had done to secure the resignation of Mr. Stanton: "I had come to
the conclusion that the time had arrived when it was proper for Mr.
Stanton to retire from my Cabinet.  The mutual confidence and general
accord which should exist in such a relation had ceased.  I supposed
that Mr. Stanton was well advised that his continuance in the Cabinet
was contrary to my wishes, for I had repeatedly given him to
understand by every mode short of an express request that he should
resign."  On the fifth day of August (1867), the President addressed
Mr. Stanton a brief note in these words: "Public considerations of
a high character constrain me to say that your resignation as Secretary
of War will be accepted."  Mr. Stanton replied immediately,
acknowledging the receipt of the letter and adding: "I have the honor
to say that public considerations of a high character, which alone have
induced me to continue at the head of this Department, constrain me
not to resign the Secretaryship of War before the next meeting of
Congress."

Not acting with angry haste, but reflecting for a week upon the
situation resulting from Mr. Stanton's refusal to resign, the President
on the 12th of August suspended him from the Secretaryship of War under
the power conferred by the Tenure-of-office Act, and added in a note
to him: "You will at once transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who
has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War
_ad interim_, all records, books, papers and other public property
now in your custody and charge."  Mr. Stanton replied to the
President: "Under a sense of public duty I am compelled to deny your
right under the Constitution and laws of the United States, without
the advice and consent of the Senate and without legal cause, to
suspend me from the office of Secretary of War, or the exercise of any
of the functions pertaining to the same; but inasmuch as the General
commanding the armies of the United States has been appointed _ad
interim_ and has notified me that he has accepted the appointment, I
have no alternative but to submit, under protest, to superior force."
It is evident that General Grant and his legal advisers saw no force
in Mr. Stanton's denial of the President's power to suspend him from
office.  The General's acceptance of the Secretaryship of War was
plain proof that he recognized the President's course as entirely
lawful and Constitutional.  General Grant's willingness to succeed Mr.
Stanton was displeasing to a certain class of Republicans, who thought
he was thereby strengthening the position of the President; but the
judgement of the more considerate was that as Mr. Johnson had
determined in any event to remove Stanton, it was wise in General Grant
to accept the trust and thus prevent it from falling into mischievous
and designing hands.

By the provisions of the Tenure-of-office Law the President was under
obligation to communicate the suspension to the Senate, with his
reasons therefor, within twenty days after its next meeting.  He did
this in his message of the 12th of December (1867), in which he
reviewed with much care the relations between himself and the Secretary
of War.  He certainly exhibited to an impartial judge, uninfluenced by
personal or party motives, strong proof of the utter impossibility of
Mr. Stanton and himself working together harmoniously in the
administration of the Government.  If the President of the United
States has the right to Constitutional advisers who are personally
agreeable to him and who share his personal confidence, then surely
Mr. Johnson gave unanswerable proof that Mr. Stanton should not remain
a member of his Cabinet.  But the Senate was not influenced either by
the general considerations affecting the case or by the special reasons
submitted by the President.  The question was not finally decided by
the Senate until the 13th of January (1868), when by a party vote it
was declared that "having considered the evidence and reasons given by
the President in his report of December 12, 1867, for the suspension of
Edwin M. Stanton from the office of Secretary of War, the Senate does
not concur in such suspension."  The Secretary of the Senate was
instructed to send an official copy of the resolution to the President,
to Mr. Stanton, and to General Grant.

Upon receipt of the resolution of the Senate, General Grant at once
locked the door of the Secretary's office, handed the key to the
Adjutant-General, left the War-Department building and resumed his post
at Army Headquarters on the opposite side of the street.  Secretary
Stanton soon after took possession of his old office, as quietly and
unceremoniously as if he had left it but an hour before.  Perhaps
with some desire to emphasize the change of situation, he dispatched a
messenger to Headquarters to say in the phrase of the ranking position
that "the Secretary desires to see General Grant."  General Grant did
not like the way in which Mr. Stanton had resumed control of the War
Office.  He did not think that he had been treated with the same
courtesy which he had shown to Mr. Stanton when he succeeded him the
preceding August.  In fact, he had not expected, nor did he desire, the
restoration of Mr. Stanton, and but for differences that arose between
him and the President might have used his influence against Mr.
Stanton's remaining.  He had indeed warmly seconded a suggestion of
General Sherman (who was then in Washington), made the day after Mr.
Stanton's restoration, that the President should immediately nominate
Governor Cox of Ohio for Secretary of War.

The President did not accept the suggestion respecting the name of
Governor Cox.  His chief purpose was to get rid of Mr. Stanton, and he
did not believe the Senate would consent in any event to his removal.
He expressed surprise that General Grant did not hold the office until
the question of Mr. Stanton's Constitutional right to resume it could
be judicially tested.  A heated controversy ensued a fortnight later on
this point, leading to the exchange of angry letters between the
President and General Grant.  Mr. Johnson alleged that the fair
understanding was that General Grant should, by retaining his
portfolio, aid in bringing the case before the Supreme Court of the
United States.  General Grant denied this with much warmth, declaring
in a letter addressed to the President that the latter had made "many
and gross misrepresentations concerning this subject."  It was
doubtless in the beginning a perfectly honest misapprehension between
the two.  General Grant had on a certain occasion remarked that "Mr.
Stanton would have to appeal to the courts to re-instate him," and the
President, hastily perhaps, but not unnaturally, assumed that by this
language General Grant meant that he would himself aid in bringing the
matter to judicial arbitrament.  But the President ought to have seen
and realized that such a step would be altogether foreign to the duty
of the Commander of the Army, and that with General Grant's habitual
prudence he never could have intended to provoke a controversy
with Congress, and get himself entangled in the meshes of the
Tenure-of-office Law.  The wrath of both men was fully aroused, and
the controversy closed by leaving them enemies for life--unreconciled,
irreconcilable.

The severance of friendly relations between the President and General
Grant was not distasteful to the Republicans of the country.  Indeed
it had been earnestly desired by them.  Many of those who were looking
forward to General Grant's nomination as the Republican candidate
for the Presidency in 1868, had been restless lest he might become
too much identified with the President, and thus be held in some
degree accountable for his policy.  General Grant's report on the
condition of the South in 1865 had displeased Republicans as much as
it had pleased the President.  He had created still further uneasiness
in Republican ranks by accompanying the President in 1866 on his famous
journey to Chicago, when he "swung around the circle."  His acceptance
of the War Office in 1867 as the successor to Mr. Stanton was naturally
interpreted by many as a signal mark of confidence in the President.
It was said by General Grant's nearest friends that in his position as
the Commander of the Army he was bound in courtesy to comply with the
President's requests; but others maintained that as these requests all
lay outside his official duties, and were in fact political in their
nature, he might decline to respond to them if he chose.  It was in
fact known to a few persons that General Grant had declined (though
requested by the President) to accompany Minister Lewis D. Campbell to
Mexico and hold an interview with the officials of the Juarez
Government, in the autumn of 1866.  The President, however, did not
insist on General Grant's compliance with his request, and at the
suggestion of the latter readily substituted Lieutenant-General
Sherman, who went upon the mission, with results--according to his
own narrative--more laughable than valuable.  General Grant always
believed that Mr. Seward had originated the suggestion, and had
desired him to go upon the mission from some motives of his own not
made fully apparent.  The incident did not interfere with the kindly
relations between the President and General Grant, as was shown by
General Grant's acceptance of the War Office ten months after the
Mexican Mission had come to its profitless conclusion.

From all the circumstances of the case, it is not difficult therefore
to understand why the quarrel between the President and General Grant
should be viewed with substantial satisfaction by the Republicans of
the country.  The National Convention of the party of 1868 had already
been called, and it might be awkward for its members, while denouncing
President Johnson in the platform, to be reminded that the candidate
of their party was on terms of personal friendship with him, and had
been so throughout his administration.  Such a fact would embarrass the
canvass in many ways, and would dull the edge of partisan weapons
already forged for the contest.  General Grant as a Presidential
candidate was likely to draw heavily on the Democratic voters of the
Northern States, and Republicans felt assured that his quarrel with
Johnson would cause no loss even in that direction.  In every point of
view, therefore, the political situation was satisfactory to the
Republicans--the last possible suggestion of discontent with General
Grant's expected nomination for the Presidency having been banished
from the ranks of the party.

By the Senate's refusal to concur in the suspension of Secretary
Stanton, a confidential adviser under the Constitution was forced upon
the President against his earnest and repeated protest.  This action
appears the more extraordinary, because when the Tenure-of-office Bill
was pending before the Senate, the expression of opinion on the part
of the majority was against any attempt to compel the President to
retain an unwelcome adviser.  In fact the Senate voted by a large
majority to except Cabinet officers from the operation of the law.  The
expressions of opinion by individual senators were very pointed on
this question.

--Mr. Edmunds said it was "right and just that the Chief Executive of
the Nation in selecting these named Secretaries, who, by law and by
the practice of the country, and officers analogous to whom, by the
practice of all other countries, are the confidential advisers of the
Executive respecting the administration of all his Departments, should
be persons who are personally agreeable to him and in whom he can
place entire confidence and reliance; and whenever it should seem to
him that the state of relations between him and any of them had become
so as to render this relation of confidence and trust and personal
esteem inharmonious, he should in such case be allowed to dispense
with the services of that officer in vacation and have some other
person act in his stead."

--Mr. Williams of Oregon sustained the position of Mr. Edmunds, but
added: "I do not regard the exception as of any great practical
consequence, because I suppose if the President and any head of
Department should disagree so as to make their relations unpleasant,
and the President should signify a desire that that head of Department
should retire from the Cabinet, that would follow without any positive
act of removal on the part of the President. . . . It has seemed to me
that if we revolutionize the practice of the Government in all other
respects, we might let this power remain in the hands of the President
of the United States; that we should not strip him of this power,
which is one that it seems to me is necessary and reasonable that he
should exercise."

--Mr. Fessenden said: "A man who is the head of a Department naturally
wants the control of that Department.  He wants to control all his
subordinates. . . . In my judgment, in order to the good and proper
administration of all the Departments, it is necessary that that
power should exist in the head of it, and quite as necessary that the
power should exist in the President with reference to the few men who
are placed about him to share his counsel and to be his friends and
agents."

--Mr. Sherman said: "If a Cabinet officer should attempt to hold his
office for a moment beyond the time when he retains the entire
confidence of the President, I would not vote to retain him, nor would
I compel the President to have about him in these high positions a man
whom he did not entirely trust both personally and politically.  It
would be unwise to require him to administer the Government without
agents of his own choosing. . . . And if I supposed that either of
these gentlemen was so wanting in manhood, in honor, as to hold his
place after the politest intimation from the President of the United
States that his services were no longer needed, I certainly, as a
senator, would consent to his removal at any time, and so would we all."

Still more significant and conclusive was the action of both Senate
and House on the final passage of the Tenure-of-office Act.  That
action was based upon the report of a conference committee, of which
Mr. Sherman was chairman on the part of the Senate, and General
Schenck on the part of the House.  It will be remembered that the
Senate had insisted that officers of the Cabinet should be excepted
from the operation of the Tenure-of-office Act, and the House had
insisted that they should not be excepted.  A compromise was made by
the conference committee, the result of which was thus explained to
the Senate by Mr. Sherman: "In this case the committee of conference
--I agreed to it, I confess, with some reluctance--came to the
conclusion to qualify to some extent the power of removal over a
Cabinet minister.  We provide that a Cabinet minister shall hold his
office, _not for a fixed term, not until the Senate shall consent to
his removal, but as long as the power that appoints him holds the
office_."  General Schenck, representing the original House amendment,
said: "A compromise was made, by which a further amendment is added
to this portion of the bill, so that the term of office of the heads
of Departments _shall expire with the term of the President who
appointed them_, allowing these heads of Departments one month longer."
These were the well-considered explanations made to their respective
branches by the chairmen of the committees that composed the
conference.  It was upon this uncontradicted, unqualified, universally
admitted construction of the Bill that the House and Senate enacted it
into a law.

It must not be forgotten that if the Senate had consented to the
removal of Mr. Stanton, as was confidently anticipated from the
expressions of opinion above quoted, no new Secretary could have been
installed without the Senate's explicit consent, and that meanwhile
the War Department would remain under the control of General Grant, in
whose prudent and upright discharge of duty every senator had perfect
confidence.  The complaint of the President's friends, therefore, was
that senators, while perfectly able to exclude from the control of the
War Department a man in whom they had no confidence, demanded that the
President should retain at the head of that Department an officer in
whom he had no confidence.  Hence it was that for the first time in
the history of the United States, an officer distasteful to the
President and personally distrusted and disliked by him was forced upon
him as one of his confidential advisers in the administration of the
Government.  In the _prima facie_ statement of this case the Senate
was in the wrong.  Upon the record of its votes and the expression of
opinion by its own members, the Senate was in the wrong.  The history
of every preceding Administration and of every subsequent
Administration of the Federal Government proves that the Senate was in
the wrong.

The situation in which the President was left by this action was
anomalous and embarrassing.  One of the most important Departments of
the Government--especially important at that era--was left under the
control of a man with whom he did not even hold personal relations.  If
this could be done in one Department it could with equal justice be
done in all, and the extraordinary spectacle would be presented of
each Executive Department under the control of an officer, who in
matters of personal feeling and in public policy was deadly hostile to
the President of the United States.  Even those who insisted most
warmly upon Mr. Stanton's being retained in his position, must have
seen that such a course would contradict the theory of the National
Constitution and be in direct contravention of the practice of the
Federal Government.  Every one could see that these circumstances had
brought about an unnatural situation--a situation that must in some way
be relieved.  It presented a condition of affairs for which there was
no precedent, and the wisest could not foresee to what end it might lead.

The issue was brought to a head by the President, who informed the
senate on the 21st of February (1868), that in the exercise of the
power and authority vested in him by the Constitution of the United
States, he had that day removed Mr. Stanton from office and designated
the Adjutant-General of the Army--Lorenzo Thomas--as Secretary of War
_ad interim_.  The communication was received with great astonishment
by the Senate and with loud expressions of indignation against the
President.  With short debate and with little delay the Senate passed
a resolution declaring "that under the Constitution and laws of the
United States, the President has no power to remove the Secretary of
War and to designate any other officer to perform the duties of that
office _ad interim_."  The Senate could do nothing more than express
and record this opinion, but it did that promptly, resentfully, almost
passionately.

The House took up the matter in hot temper and in hot haste.  A
flagrant offense against the Constitution and the laws had, in the
judgment of a majority of its members, been committed by the President.
In defiance of the letter and spirit of the Tenure-of-office Act he had
removed the Secretary of War from office.  He had done this under
circumstances of peculiar aggravation, because the Senate had passed
upon all his reason therefor when the question of Mr. Stanton's
suspension was before that body; and if even the suspension was not
justifiable, how very grave must be the offense of removing the
Secretary from office!  These views and the discussion to which they
led engrossed the attention of the House as soon as it was known that
the President had sent a message to the Senate communicating his
action in regard to Mr. Stanton.  The Senate had no sooner recorded
its dissent from the Executive power of removal than Mr. Covode of
Pennsylvania, on the same day, rose to a privileged question in the
House and offered a resolution that "_Andrew Johnson, President of the
United States, be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors_."  The
resolution was referred to the Committee on Reconstruction and the
House adjourned.  On the next day (February 22d) Mr. Stevens, chairman
of the Reconstruction Committee, reported the resolution back to the
House with the recommendation that it pass, suggesting that the
question might immediately be taken without debate.

--Mr. Brooks of New York had hoped for time to prepare a minority
report, but contented himself with a long speech earnestly protesting
against the Impeachment.  "Suppose," said he, "you succeed.  You settle
that hereafter a party having a sufficient majority in the House and
the Senate can depose the President of the United States.  You
establish a precedent which all future parties in all time to come will
look to.  The curse of other countries, the curse of France, the curse
of the South-American Republics, has been that they followed such a
precedent as you call upon us to establish here to-day--the overthrow
of their Executive, not by law, not by the Constitution, but by the
irregular and arbitrary and revolutionary exercise of power, in order
merely to obtain a temporary possession of the Government."

--Mr. Spalding of Ohio followed Mr. Brooks, earnestly supporting the
Impeachment.  There seemed to be an inordinate desire among gentlemen
who had hitherto been conservative on the question, as well as among
those who had been constantly in favor of Impeachment, to place
themselves on record against the President.

--Mr. John A. Bingham said that "the President having criminally
violated the Constitution and the laws, I propose for one to put him
on trial."

--Mr. Farnsworth of Illinois declared that "no student of our
Constitution, no citizen, can doubt that Andrew Johnson has been guilty
of a flagrant violation of our Constitution, which is justly
impeachable."

--Judge Kelley of Pennsylvania warned "those who have spoken on the
other side to-day, that they had better exercise the privilege of
revising their words, and that it will be well for others to pause
before they speak in defense of the great criminal whom the American
people arraign for thousands of crimes."

--General Logan, answering those who feared that Impeachment might
lead to some form of revolution, said "that a country which in time
of war and excitement can stand the assassination of so good and just
a President as Abraham Lincoln, can and will stand the Impeachment of
as bad a President as Andrew Johnson."

--Mr. Ingersoll of Illinois, in the course of his remarks sustaining
Impeachment, read a telegram from Governor Oglesby, declaring his
belief "that the people of Illinois demand the Impeachment of Andrew
Johnson, and will heartily sustain such action by our Congress."  Mr.
Ingersoll declared that the telegram from the Governor of Illinois "is
but the voice of the people of the whole country on the question.
There have been grave doubts with regard to the policy and the right
of impeaching the President upon the facts as presented heretofore,
but at the present hour I know of no man who loves his country more
than party who will not pronounce a verdict against the President.
And, sir, I shall for one be grievously disappointed if, within ten
days from this time, honest old Ben Wade (now President of the Senate)
is not President of the United States."

The proceedings were carried far into the night, and their deep
seriousness had been somewhat relieved by amusing effort on the part
of several Democratic members to have Washington's Farewell Address
read in honor of the day.  But they failed to accomplish it, because
a resolution to that effect could not take precedence of the privileged
subject which was holding the attention of the House.  At a late hour
Mr. Holman of Indiana, unable to secure the reading of the address,
obtained leave to print it in connection with his remarks, and thus
left in the columns of the _Globe_ a somewhat striking contrast--on the
one hand, the calm words of Washington counseling peace and good will
among his countrymen, and warning them of the evils of party spirit; on
the other, the exciting and inflammatory attempt to remove one of
Washington's successors from office by impeaching him of high crimes
and misdemeanors.

The hours of the intervening Sunday did not appease the temper or cool
the ardor of the Republican representatives, now so evidently bent on
impeaching the President.  The House had adjourned on Saturday night to
meet at ten o'clock Monday morning, with the declared intention on the
part of the majority to force the resolution of Impeachment to a vote
on that day.  Mr. Ashley of Ohio opened the debate with a fierce attack
upon the President, and was followed by Mr. Burton C. Cook of Illinois
in a brief but pointed legal argument to prove that the President had
violated the letter and spirit of the law.

--Mr. Julian of Indiana made a somewhat remarkable speech.  "Is it not
most fortunate," said he, "that this single act of lawlessness has
been evoked which so beautifully consolidates into a unit all the
friends of the country in this House and throughout the nation?  _It
is true the removal of the Secretary of War is relatively a simple
matter_.  It is scarcely a peccadillo when considered beside the
New-Orleans massacre and many other of the wholesale enormities of which
he has been known to be guilty for many months past, _but I believe it
would be regarded as scarcely sufficient ground for this proceeding
if not considered in the light of far greater previous offenses_."

--Mr. James F. Wilson of Iowa said: "I will vote for the pending
resolution to the end that law may be vindicated by the removal of an
unworthy public servant from an official position, which he has
dishonored by his perverse disregard of duty and his unjustifiable
contempt for the supremacy of the law."

--General Butler, after a careful recital of the acts of the President,
said: "For a tithe of these acts of usurpation, lawlessness and
tyranny our fathers dissolved their connection with the government of
King George; for less than this King James lost his throne, and King
Charles lost his head; while we, the representatives of the people,
adjudge only that there is probable cause shown why Andrew Johnson
should be deprived of the office he has desecrated and the power he has
abused, and if convicted by the court to which we shall send him, be
forever incapable of filling that office--the ambition to be again
nominated to which has been the moving spring of all these crimes."

--Mr. Washburne of Illinois said: "In my judgment the safety of the
country, the cause of good government, the preservation of
Constitutional right and public liberty, depend upon the prompt
impeachment of the President of the United States."

--Mr. Woodward of Pennsylvania, a bitter anti-war Democrat, formerly
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of his State, protested earnestly
against Impeachment, on the ground that all the States not being
represented either in House or Senate, there was no competent branch to
impeach and none to try an officer.  "If I were the President's
counselor," said he, "I would advise him, if you preferred Articles of
Impeachment, to demur to your jurisdiction and to that of the Senate,
and issue a proclamation giving you and all the world notice that
while he held himself impeachable for misdemeanors in office before the
Constitutional tribunal, he never would subject the office he holds in
trust to the irregular, unconstitutional, and fragmentary bodies who
propose to strip him of it."

--Mr. Boutwell spoke very earnestly and ably in favor of Impeachment.
"I can but indicate," said he, "the plot in which the President is
engaged.  He desires first to get control of the War Department, in
order that, as in 1861, the munitions of war, arms and material might
be used for te purpose of enabling him to succeed in his aspirations
to be President of the United States.  He knew that if he could corrupt
the leaders of the Army, if he could bend these men to his will, these
ten States were in his control, and that he could send to the
Democratic Convention, to be holden on the 4th of July next, men who
would sustain his claim for the Presidency.  Then, upon the allegation
which he could well carry out and which no other man could make good,
that with the Army and his influence among the rebels of the South,
whom he had brought to his support by his previous violations of law,
he could secure the electoral votes of those ten States by excluding
the negroes whom we have enfranchised from all participation in the
election.  Succeeding in this, we were to be met next February with the
electoral votes of those ten States given for himself as President of
the United States.  If by fortune, as was his hope, he should receive
a sufficient number of votes in the North to make a majority, then,
with the support of the Army which he had corrupted, he had determined
to be inaugurated President of the United States at the hazard of civil
war.  To-day, sir, we escape from these evils and dangers."

--Mr. Kerr of Indiana, speaking for the Democrats, said: "I and those
with whom I act in this House had no knowledge whatever of the purpose
of the Executive to do the act for which the movement is again
inaugurated for his deposition.  We are therefore free in every sense
to submit to the guidance alone of reason and duty."

Late in the afternoon Mr. Stevens rose to close the debate.  He said:
"In order to sustain Impeachment under our Constitution I do not hold
that it is necessary to prove a crime as an indictable offense, or any
act _malum in se_.  I agree with the distinguished gentleman from
Pennsylvania, on the other side of the House (Mr. Woodward), who holds
this to be a purely political proceeding.  It is needed as a remedy
for malfeasance in office and to prevent the continuance thereof.
Beyond that it is not intended as a punishment for past offenses or
for future example."  He made one of his peculiarly pungent speeches,
which for some unexplained reason was scarcely less bitter on General
Grant than upon President Johnson.  The whole day's proceedings had
been extraordinary.  Never before had so many members addressed the
House on a single day.  The speeches actually delivered and the
speeches for which leave to print was given, fill more than two hundred
columns of the _Congressional Globe_.  When Mr. Stevens closed the
debate, many members who still desired to be heard were cut off by
the previous question.

The vote on the resolution impeaching the President resulted in _ayes_
126, _noes_ 47, not voting 17.(3)  Mr. Stevens immediately offered a
resolution directing the "appointment of a committee of two members
to appear at the bar of the Senate, and in the name of the House of
Representatives and of the people of the United States to impeach
Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, of high crimes and
misdemeanors in office, and to acquaint the Senate that the House will
in due time exhibit particular Articles of Impeachment against him and
make good the same, and that the committee demand that the Senate take
order for the appearance of Andrew Johnson to answer to said
Impeachment."  Mr. Stevens further moved that "a committee of seven be
appointed to prepare and report Articles of Impeachment against Andrew
Johnson, President of the United States, with power to send for persons
and papers."  The resolutions were adopted by a strict party vote.  The
Speaker appointed Mr. Stevens and Mr. Bingham the committee to notify
the Senate of the impeachment of the President, and further appointed
Mr. Boutwell, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Bingham, Mr. J. F. Wilson, Mr. Logan,
Mr. Julian, and Mr. Hamilton Ward of New York, the committee to prepare
Articles of Impeachment against the President.

Five days afterwards, on the 29th of February, Mr. Boutwell, chairman
of the committee appointed to prepare Articles of Impeachment against
the President, made his report.  The Articles were debated with
even greater manifestation of feeling than had appeared in the
discussion on the resolution of Impeachment.  They were adopted March
2d, by a party vote.  The House then proceeded to elect managers of
the Impeachment by ballot, and the following gentlemen were chosen
(their names being given in the order of the number of votes which
each received): John A. Bingham, George S. Boutwell, James F. Wilson,
Benjamin F. Butler, Thomas Williams, John A. Logan, and Thaddeus
Stevens.  The votes for the several managers did not widely differ.
The highest, 114, was given to Mr. Bingham; the lowest, 105, to Mr.
Stevens.  The latter was failing in health and was considered by many
members unequal to the arduous work thus imposed on him.  The Democrats
presented no candidates and took no part in the election of managers.

The aggregate ability and legal learning of the Managers were
everywhere conceded.  Mr. Stevens in the period of his active practice
held a very high rank at the bar of Pennsylvania.  General Butler was
in the profession of the law, as in all other relations, somewhat
peculiar in his methods, but his intellectual force and his legal
learning were recognized by his friends and his enemies--and he had a
full quota of each.  Mr. Bingham, Mr. Boutwell, Mr. Wilson, General
Logan, and Mr. Williams represented the strength of the Republican
party in the House.  Each was well known at the bar of his State, and
each was profoundly convinced of the necessity of convicting the
President.  The most earnest--if there was any difference in zeal among
the Managers--were Mr. Boutwell and Mr. Williams.  Mr. Boutwell, for a
man of cool temperament, thoroughly honest mind, and sober judgment,
had wrought himself into a singularly intense belief in the supreme
necessity of removing the President; while Mr. Williams, who tended
towards the radical side of all public questions, could not with
patience hear any thing said against the wisdom and expediency of
Impeachment.  Mr. Bingham and Mr. Wilson were the only Managers who on
the first effort to impeach the President had voted in the negative.

President Johnson was well advised during this exciting period in
Congress and betrayed no uneasiness.  He was guarded against the folly
of talking, which was his easily besetting sin, and he sought to
fortify his position by promptly submitting a nomination for Secretary
of War.  On Saturday, February 22d, the day following the removal of
Mr. Stanton, he sent to the Senate the name of Thomas Ewing (senior)
of Ohio as his successor.  The Senate had adjourned when the
President's Secretary reached the Capitol, but the nomination was
formally communicated on the following Monday.  No name could have
given better assurance of good intentions and upright conduct than that
of Mr. Ewing.  He was a man of lofty character, of great eminence in
his profession of the law, and with wide and varied experience in
public life.  He had held high rank as a senator in the Augustan period
of the Senate's learning and eloquence, and he had been one of the
ablest members of the distinguished Cabinets organized by the only two
Presidents elected by the Whig party.  He had reached the ripe age of
seventy-eight years but was still in complete possession of all his
splendid faculties.  He had voted for Mr. Lincoln at both elections,
had been a warm supporter of the contest for the Union, and was
represented by his own blood on many of the great battle-fields of the
war.  The Lieutenant-General of the army, with his illustrious record
of service, second only to that of General Grant, was his son-in-law.

Of whatever deadly designs Mr. Johnson might be suspected, there was
no man of intelligence in the United States willing to believe that
Mr. Ewing could be tempted to do an unpatriotic act, to violate the
Constitution, or to fail in executing with fidelity the laws of the
land.  If the President intended to corrupt the army, as charged by
Mr. Boutwell, he had certainly chosen a singular co-laborer in the
person of Mr. Ewing.  Wild rumors had been in circulation that the
President was determined to install General Thomas by military force,
and to eject Mr. Stanton with violence from the War Office which he
refused to surrender.  The public uneasiness resulting from these
sensational reports was in large degree allayed, when it was announced
that the President had signified his desire that a grave and
considerate man with long-established reputation for ability and
probity should serve as Secretary of War.  The surprise in the whole
matter was that the President should have selected Mr. Ewing, who, as
was known to a few friends, had earnestly advised Mr. Johnson against
removing Secretary Stanton.

The Senate however was in no mood to accept any nomination for the
War Office from President Johnson.  The issue was not whether Mr.
Ewing was a judicious and trustworthy man for the vacancy, but whether
any vacancy existed.  If Mr. Johnson had removed or attempted to remove
Mr. Stanton from office in an unlawful and unconstitutional manner, the
Senate, in the judgment of those who were directing its action, would
be only condoning his offense by consenting to the appointment of a
successor.  Mr. Johnson's right to nominate any one was denied, and
when the name of Mr. Ewing was received it was known by all that a
committee of Representatives might at any moment appear at the bar of
the Senate to present an Impeachment against the President for
unlawfully attempting to remove Mr. Stanton.  The course of the Senate
had been fully anticipated by the President and his advisers, and they
had, in their own judgment at least, obtained an advantage before the
public by so complete an abnegation of all partisan purposes as was
implied in the offer to confide the direction of the War Department to
Mr. Ewing.

The formal presentment of the charges against the President at the bar
of the Senate, presided over by the Chief Justice of the United States,
and sitting as a Court of Impeachment, was made on the fifth day of
March (1868), when the House of Representatives, the grand inquest of
the nation, attended the Managers as they came to the discharge of
their solemn duty.  Mr. Bingham, the chairman of the managers, read the
Articles of Impeachment against Andrew Johnson.  At the conclusion of
the reading the Senate adjourned to the 13th, when the counsel of the
President appeared and asked that forty days be allowed for the
preparation of his answer to the charges.  The time was regarded as
unreasonably long, and the Senate voted to adjourn until the 23d of
March, when it was expected that the President's counsel would present
his answer.  The President's cause was represented by an imposing array
of ability and legal learning.  The Attorney-General, Henry Stanbery,
had from an impulse of chivalric devotion resigned his post for the
purpose of defending his chief.  His reputation as a lawyer was of the
first rank in the West, where for nearly forty years he had been
prominent in his profession.  But though first named, on account of his
personal and official relations with the President, he was not the
leading counsel.  The two men upon whom the success of the President's
cause chiefly rested were Judge Curtis and Mr. Evarts.

Benjamin R. Curtis, when he appeared in the Impeachment case, was in
the fullness of his powers, in the fifty-ninth year of his age.  At
forty-one he had been appointed to the Supreme Bench of the United
States at the earnest request and warm recommendation of Mr. Webster,
then Secretary of State.  Mr. Webster is reported to have said that
he had placed the people of Massachusetts under lasting obligation to
him by inducing Governor Lincoln, in 1830, to appoint Lemuel Shaw Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the State, a position which he honored
and adorned for thirty years.  Mr. Webster thought he was doing an
equal service to the people of the entire Union when he induced the
President to call Mr. Curtis to the Supreme Bench.  But judicial life
had not proved altogether agreeable to Judge Curtis, and after a
remarkable and brilliant career of six years he resigned, in October,
1857, and returned to the practice of the law--his learning increased,
his mind enriched and broadened by the grave national questions
engaging the attention of the court during the period of his service.
Thenceforward during his life no man at the bar of the United States
held higher rank.  He was entirely devoted to his profession.  He had
taken no interest in party strife, and with the exception of serving
two sessions in the Massachusetts Legislature he had never held a
political office.  In arguing a case his style was peculiarly
felicitous--simple, direct, clear.  In the full maturity of his powers
and with all the earnestness of his nature he engaged in the
President's defense; and he brought to it a wealth of learning, a
dignity of character, an impressiveness of speech, which attracted the
admiration and respect of all who had the good fortune to hear his
great argument.

William M. Evarts, who was associated with him, was nine years the
junior of Mr. Curtis.  He had followed his profession with equal
devotion, and, like his illustrious colleague, had never been deflected
from its pursuit by participation in the honors of political life.  His
career had been in the city of New York, where, against all the rivalry
of the Metropolitan bar, he had risen so rapidly that at forty years of
age his victory of precedence was won and his high rank established.
A signal tribute was paid to his legal ability and his character when,
in the early stages of the civil war, the National Government sent him
abroad on an important and delicate errand in connection with our
international relations,--an errand which could be safely entrusted
only to a great lawyer.  As an advocate Mr. Evarts early became
conspicuous, and, in the best sense, famous.  But he is more than an
advocate.  He is an orator,--affluent in diction, graceful in manner,
with all the rare and rich gifts which attract and enchain an audience.
He possesses a remarkable combination of wit and humor, and has the
happy faculty of using both effectively, without inflicting deadly
wounds, without incurring hurtful enmities.  Differing in temperament
and in manner from Judge Curtis, the two seemed perfectly adapted for
professional co-operation, and united they constituted an array of
counsel as strong as could be found at the English-speaking bar.

It was expected that Judge Jeremiah S. Black would add his learning and
ability to the President's counsel, but at the last moment before the
trial began he withdrew, and his place was filled by William S.
Groesbeck of Cincinnati.  Mr. Groesbeck was favorably known to the
country by his service as a Democratic representative in the
Thirty-sixth Congress, but little had been heard of his legal learning
outside of Ohio.  He took no part in the conduct of the Impeachment
case, but his final argument was a surprise to the Senate and to his
professional brethren, and did much to give him a high reputation as a
lawyer.--The counsel for the President was completed by the addition of
a confidential friend from his own State, Hon. T. A. R. Nelson.  Mr.
Nelson had been closely associated with Mr. Johnson in the Tennessee
struggles for the Union, had gained reputation as a representative in
the Thirty-sixth Congress, and had acquired a good standing at the bar
of his State.

The answer of the President to the Articles of Impeachment having been
presented on the 23d, the replication of the House duly made, and all
other preliminary and introductory steps completed, the actual trial
began on Monday, the thirtieth day of March (1868), when General
Butler, one of the Managers on behalf of the House of Representatives,
made the opening argument.  It was very voluminous, prepared with great
care in writing, and read to the Senate from printed slips.  It was
accompanied by a brief of authorities upon the law of impeachable
crimes and misdemeanors, prepared by Hon. William Lawrence of Ohio
with characteristic industry and learning.  While every point in the
charges preferred by the House was presented by General Butler with
elaboration, the weight of his argument against the President lay
in the fact that the removal of Mr. Stanton from the office of
Secretary of War was, as he averred, an intentional violation of the
Tenure-of-office Act, an intentional violation of the Constitution of
the United States.  This was set forth in every possible form, and
argued in every possible phase, with the well-known ability of General
Butler; and though other charges were presented against the President,
the House of Representatives relied mainly upon this alleged offense
for his conviction.

General Butler in his argument was evidently troubled by the proviso
in the Tenure-of-office Act, that members of the Cabinet should hold
their offices "during the term of the President by whom they were
appointed, and for one month longer."  He sought to anticipate his
opponents' argument on this point.  "By whom was Mr. Stanton
appointed?" asked General Butler.  "By Mr. Lincoln.  Whose Presidential
term was he holding under when the bullet of Booth became the proximate
cause of this trial?  Was not his appointment in full force at that
hour?  Had any act of President Johnson up to the twelfth day of August
last vitiated or interfered with that appointment?  Whose Presidential
term is Mr. Johnson now serving out?  His own or Mr. Lincoln's?  If
his own, he is entitled to four years up to the anniversary of the
murder, because each Presidential term is four years by the
Constitution, and the regular recurrence of those terms is fixed by the
Act of May 8, 1792.  If he is serving out the remainder of Mr.
Lincoln's term, then his term of office expires on the 4th of March,
1868, if it does not before."

At the conclusion of General Butler's argument, the Managers submitted
their testimony in support of the charges brought by the House.  Some
twenty-five witnesses in all were introduced by the prosecution.  Many
of them were merely for the verification of official papers which were
submitted in evidence.  The President's speeches defaming Congress were
produced and sworn to by the reporters who took the notes when the
President delivered them.  The Managers concluded their testimony on
the fourth day of April and the Senate took a recess for five days.

On the 9th of April Judge Curtis of the President's counsel opened for
the defense.  He had no labored introduction, but went directly to his
argument.  He struck his first blow at the weak point in General
Butler's strong speech.  Judge Curtis said: "There is a question
involved which enters deeply into the first eight Articles of
Impeachment and materially touches two of the others; and to that
question I desire in the first place to invite the attention of the
court, namely, _whether Mr. Stanton's case comes under the
Tenure-of-office Act?_ . . . I must ask your attention therefore to
the construction and application of the first section of that Act, as
follows: 'that every person holding an official position to which he
has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office
and shall become duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be
entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in
like manner appointed and duly qualified, except as herein _otherwise
provided_.'  Then comes what is 'otherwise provided.'  '_Provided_
however that the Secretaries of the State, Treasury, War, Navy, and
Interior Departments, the Postmaster-General and Attorney-General,
shall hold their offices respectively _for and during the term of the
President by whom they may have been appointed and for one month
thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate_.'

"The first inquiry which arises on this language," said Judge Curtis,
"is to the meaning of the words 'for and during the term of the
President.'  Mr. Stanton, as appears by the commission which has been
put into the case by the honorable Managers, was appointed in January,
1862, during the first term of President Lincoln.  Are these words,
'during the term of the President,' applicable to Mr. Stanton's case?
That depends upon whether an expounder of this law judicially, who
finds set down in it as a part of the descriptive words, '_during the
term of the President_,' has any right to add '_and during any other
term for which he may be afterwards elected_.'  I respectfully submit
no such judicial interpretation can be put on the words.  Then if you
please, take the next step.  'During the term of the President by whom
he was appointed.'  At the time when this order was issued for the
removal of Mr. Stanton, was he holding during the term of the President
by whom he was appointed?  The honorable Managers say, Yes; because,
as they say, Mr. Johnson is merely serving out the residue of Mr.
Lincoln's term.  But is that so under the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States? . . . Although the President, like
the Vice-President, is elected for a term of four years, and each is
elected for the same term, the President is not to hold his office
absolutely during four years.  The limit of four years is not an
absolute limit.  Death is a limit.  A 'conditional limitation,' as the
lawyers call it, is imposed on his tenure of office.  And when the
President dies his term of four years, for which he was elected and
during which he was to hold provided he should so long live, terminates
and the office devolves upon the Vice-President.  For what period of
time?  _For the remainder of the term for which the Vice-President was
elected_.  And there is no more propriety, under those provisions of
the Constitution of the United States, in calling the time during which
Mr. Johnson holds the office of President, after it was devolved upon
him, a part of Mr. Lincoln's term than there would be propriety in
saying that one sovereign who succeeded another sovereign by death
holds part of his predecessor's term."

Judge Curtis consumed two days in the delivery of his argument.  He
made a deep impression, not only on the members of the Senate but on
all who had the privilege of listening to him.  His manner was quiet
and undemonstrative, with no gestures, and with no attempt at loud
talk.  His language expressed his meaning with precision.  There was
no deficiency and no redundancy.  He seldom used a word more or a word
less than was needed to give elegance to his diction, explicitness to
his meaning, completeness to his logic.  He analyzed every argument
of the Impeachment with consummate skill.  Those who dissented from
his conclusions united with those who assented to them in praise of
his masterly presentment of the President's defense.

After Judge Curtis had concluded, witnesses were called on behalf of
the President.  The struggle that followed for the admission or
exclusion of testimony obviously strengthened the President's case in
popular opinion, which is always influenced by considerations of what
is deemed fair play.  Exclusion of testimony by an arbitrary vote on
mere technical objections, especially where men equally learned in the
law differ as to its competency and relevancy, is not wise in a
political case that depends for its ultimate judgment upon the sober
thought of the people.  Judge Curtis had maintained with cogent
argument that the President was entitled to a judicial interpretation
of the Tenure-of-office Law, and his associate counsel, Mr. Evarts, in
the progress of the case made this proposition:--

"We offer to prove that the President at a meeting of the Cabinet while
the bill was before him for his approval, laid the Tenure-of-office
Bill before the Cabinet for their consideration and advice respecting
his approval of the bill, and thereupon the members of the Cabinet
then present gave their advice to the President that the bill was
unconstitutional and should be returned to Congress with his
objections, _and that the duty or preparing the message setting forth
the objections to the constitutionality of the bill was devolved upon
Mr. Seward and Mr. Stanton_."  The Managers of the House objected to
the admission of the testimony and the question of its admissibility
was argued at length by General Butler, by Judge Curtis, and by Mr.
Evarts.  Chief Justice Chase decided "that the testimony is admissible
for the purpose of showing the intent with which the President has
acted in this transaction."  Mr. Howard of Michigan thereupon demanded
that the question be submitted to the Senate, and by a vote of 29 to
20 the decision of the Chief Justice was overruled and the testimony
excluded.  This exclusion impressed the public most unfavorably.

Mr. Evarts offered further on behalf of the President, "to prove that
at the meeting of the Cabinet, at which Mr. Stanton was present, held
while the Tenure-of-office Bill was before the President for his
approval, the advice of the Cabinet in regard to the same was asked
by the President and given by the Cabinet, and thereupon the question
whether Mr. Stanton and the other Secretaries who had received their
appointment from Mr. Lincoln were within the restriction upon the
President's power of removal from office created by said Act, was
considered, and the opinion was expressed that the Secretaries
appointed by Mr. Lincoln were not within such restrictions."  The Chief
Justice decided "that this testimony is proper to be taken into
consideration by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment,"
whereupon Senator Drake of Missouri demanded that the question be
submitted to the Senate, and by a vote of 26 to 22 the Chief Justice
was again overruled and the testimony declared to be inadmissible.

On behalf of the President, Mr. Evarts then offered "to prove that at
the Cabinet meetings between the passage of the Tenure-of-office Act
and the order of the 21st of February, 1868, for the removal of Mr.
Stanton, upon occasions when the condition of the public service was
affected by the operation of that bill and it came up for consideration
and advice by the Cabinet, it was considered by the President and
the Cabinet that a proper regard for the public service made it desirable
that upon some proper case a judicial determination of the
constitutionality of the law should be obtained."  The Managers
objected to the admission of the testimony, and the Chief Justice,
apparently tired of having his decisions overruled, submitted the
question at once to the Senate.  By a vote of 30 to 19 the testimony
was declared to be inadmissible.  All the proffered testimony on
these several points was excluded while the Hon. Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy, was on the stand.  He was to be the first
witness to substantiate the offer of proof which the President's
counsel had made; to be corroborated, if need by, by other members
of the Cabinet--possibly by Mr. Stanton himself.

The testimony on both sides having been concluded, on the 22d of April
General John A. Logan, one of the Managers on the part of the House
of Representatives, filed his argument in the case.  It was carefully
prepared, well written, and throughout logical in its analysis.  It
was uncompromisingly pungent in tone and severe in its method of
dealing with President Johnson.  "The world," said General Logan, "in
after times will read the history of the depth to which political and
official perfidy can descend.  His great aim and purpose has been to
subvert law, usurp authority, insult and outrage Congress, reconstruct
the rebel States in the interest of treason, and insult the memories
and resting-places of our heroic dead."

Mr. Boutwell on the two succeeding days made a strong arraignment of
the President.  Indeed he made all that well could be made out of
the charges preferred by the House.  He exhibited throughout his
address the earnestness and the eloquence which come from intense
conviction.  He believed that the President had committed high crimes
and misdemeanors, and he believed that the safety of the Republic
required his removal from office.  With this belief his argument was
of course impressive.  "The House of Representatives," said he in
closing, "have presented this criminal at your bar with equal
confidence in his guilt and in your disposition to administer exact
justice between him and the people of the United States.  I do not
contemplate his acquittal: it is impossible.  Therefore I do not
look beyond; but, senators, the people of the United States of America
will never permit an usurping Executive to break down the securities
for liberty provided in the Constitution.  The cause of the Republic
is in your hands.  Your verdict of _Guilty_ is PEACE to our beloved
country."  Mr. Nelson of Tennessee followed Mr. Boutwell with a long
and earnest plea in behalf of the President, somewhat effusive in its
character but distinguished for the enthusiasm with which he defended
his personal friend.

Mr. Groesbeck next addressed the Senate on behalf of the President.  He
made a clear, forcible presentation of the grounds of defense.  Mr.
Boutwell had asserted "that the President cannot prove or plead the
motive by which he professes to have been governed in his violation of
the laws of the country. . . . The necessary, the inevitable
presumption in law is that he acted under the influence of bad motives
in so doing, and no evidence can be introduced controlling or coloring
in any degree this necessary presumption of the law."  In reviewing
this position, Mr. Groesbeck reminded the Senate that President Lincoln
had "claimed and exercised the power of organizing military commissions
under which he arrested and imprisoned citizens within the loyal
States.  He had no Act of Congress warranting it, and the Supreme Court
has decided that the act was against the express provisions of the
Constitution.  According to the gentleman on the other side, then, Mr.
Lincoln must be convicted. . . . The gentleman seems to acknowledge
that there must have been a motive.  There can be no crime without
motive; but when the party comes forward and offers to prove his
motive, the answer is, 'You shall not prove it.'  When he comes forward
and offers to prove it from his warm, living heart, the answer is, 'We
will make up your motive out of the presumptions of law and conclude
you upon that subject.  We will not hear you.'"

Mr. Boutwell renewed with vigor the argument that the exception made
in the Tenure-of-office Act, in regard to members of the Cabinet, did
not give the President power to remove Mr. Stanton.  "We maintain,"
said Mr. Boutwell, "that Mr. Stanton was holding the office of
Secretary of War for and in the term of President Lincoln, by whom he
had been appointed. . . . It was not a new office; it was not a new
term.  Mr. Johnson succeeded to Mr. Lincoln's office and for the
remainder of Mr. Lincoln's term of office.  He is serving out Mr.
Lincoln's term as President."

Mr. Groesbeck's reply on this point was effective: "The gentleman has
said this is Mr. Lincoln's term.  The dead have no ownership in offices
or estate of any kind.  Mr. Johnson is President of the United States
with a term, and this is his term.  _But it would make no difference if
Mr. Lincoln were living to-day.  If Mr. Lincoln were the President to-day
he could remove Mr. Stanton.  Mr. Lincoln would not have appointed
him during this term.  It was during Mr. Lincoln's first term that Mr.
Stanton received his appointment, and not this term; and an appointment
by a President during one term, by the operation of this law, will not
extend the appointee during another term because that same party may
happen to be re-elected to the Presidency.  Mr. Stanton therefore
holds under his commission and not under the law_."

Mr. Thaddeus Stevens attempted to address the Senate, but found himself
too much exhausted and handed his manuscript to General Butler, who
read it to the Senate.  The argument had many of the significant
features of Mr. Stevens's style, but lacked the vigor which in the day
of his strength he had always shown.  He was rapidly failing in health
and was then within a few weeks of his death.  Hon. Thomas Williams of
Pennsylvania followed Mr. Stevens with a written argument, rhetorically
finished and read with great emphasis.  It presented in new and
attractive form the arguments already submitted, but towards the close
contained the imprudent expression that "the eyes of an expectant
people are upon the Senate."

Mr. Evarts followed with an argument of great length, reviewing every
phase and feature of the case and making a remarkably effective plea
on behalf of his eminent client.  It was as strong in its logic as it
was faultless in its style.  The concluding portion of the address was
especially eloquent and convincing.  "We never dreamed," said he, "that
an instructed and equal people, with a government yielding so readily
to the touch of popular will, would have come to the trial of force
against it.  We never thought that the remedy to get rid of a ruler
would bring assassination into our political experience.  We never
thought that political differences under an elective Presidency would
bring in array the departments of the Government against one another
to anticipate by ten months the operation of the regular election.  And
yet we take them all, one after another, and we take them because we
have grown to the full vigor of manhood.  But we have met by the powers
of the Constitution these great dangers--prophesied when they would
arise as likely to be our doom--the distractions of civil strife, the
exhaustions of powerful war, the intervention of the regularity of
power through the violence of assassination.  We could summon from the
people a million of men and inexhaustible treasure to help the
Constitution in its time of need.  Can we summon now resources enough
of civil prudence and of restraint of passion to carry us through this
trial, so that whatever result may follow, in whatever form, the people
may feel that the Constitution has received no wound?  To this court,
the last and best resort for its determination, it is to be left."

Mr. Stanbery, unable to deliver his well-prepared argument, employed
one of the officers of the Attorney-General's department to read the
greater part of it.  During his service as Attorney-General he had
become personally and deeply attached to the President, and now made
an earnest plea in his behalf.  "During the eighty years of our
political existence," said Mr. Stanbery, "we have witnessed the
fiercest contests of party. . . . A favorite legislative policy has
more than once been defeated by the obstinate and determined resistance
of the President, upon some of the gravest and most important questions
we have ever had or are ever likely to have.  The Presidential policy
and the legislative policy have stood in direct antagonism.  During
all that time this fearful power of Impeachment was in the hands of
the legislative department, and more than once a resort to it has been
advised by extreme party men, as a sure remedy for party purposes; but
happily that evil hitherto has not come upon us."

Hon. John A. Bingham summed up the case on behalf of the House and
reviewed all the charges against the President, answering point by
point the argument of his counsel.  "I ask you, senators," said Mr.
Bingham, "how long men would deliberate upon the question of whether
a private citizen, arraigned at the bar of one of your tribunals of
justice for criminal violation of law, should be permitted to interpose
a plea in justification of his criminal act that his only purpose was
to interpret the Constitution and laws for himself, that he violated
the law in the exercise of his prerogative to test its validity
hereafter, at such day as might suit his own convenience, in the courts
of justice.  Surely, senators, it is as competent for the private
citizen to interpose such justification in answer to crime as it is
for the President of the United States to interpose it, and for the
simple reason that the Constitution is no respecter of persons, and
vests neither in the President nor in the private citizen judicial
power. . . . For the Senate to sustain any such plea would in my
judgment be a gross violation of the already violated Constitution and
laws of a free people."

When the counsel on both sides had finished, a certain period was
allowed for senators to prepare and file their opinions on the case.
This was done by twenty-nine senators(4) and the question was thus
re-argued with consummate ability, for the Senate contained a number
of lawyers of high rank and long experience at the bar.  On the 11th of
May the Senate was ready to vote, and the interest in the result was
intense.  There had been much speculation as to the position of certain
senators, but as all the members of the body had maintained discreet
silence during the trial, it was impossible to forecast the result
with any degree of certainty.  The only judgment that had the least
significance was founded on the votes given to admit or to reject
certain testimony proposed by the President's counsel.  This of course
gave no certain indication of the vote of senators; though the general
belief was that the Impeachment would fail.  The transfer of the
entire House to the floor of the Senate, the galleries crowded with
citizens from all parts of the Republic, the presence of all the
foreign ministers in the Diplomatic Gallery eagerly watching the
possible and peaceful deposition of a sovereign ruler, the large
attendance of the representatives of the press,--all attested the
profound impression which the trial had made and the intense anxiety
with which its conclusion was awaited.

By an order of the Senate the first vote was taken on the last Article,
which was a summary of many of the charges set forth at greater length
in some of the preceding Articles of Impeachment.  Upon the call of his
name each senator was required to rise and answer "Guilty" or "Not
guilty."  The roll was called in breathless silence, with hundreds of
tally-papers in the hands of eager observers on the floor and in the
gallery, carefully noting each response as given.  The result,
announced at once by the Chief Justice, showed that _thirty-five_
senators had declared the President "_guilty_" and _nineteen_ had
declared him "_not guilty_."(5)  As conviction required two-thirds the
Impeachment on the Eleventh Article had failed.  A debate then arose
on a proposition to rescind the resolution in regard to the order in
which the vote should be taken upon the other Articles of Impeachment,
but without reaching a conclusion, the Senate as a Court of Impeachment
adjourned, on motion of Mr. Cameron of Pennsylvania, until Tuesday
the 26th day of May.

During the intervening period of fifteen days the air was filled with
rumors that the result would be different when the Senate should come
to vote on the remaining Articles.  A single senator changing against
the President would give _thirty-six_ for conviction, and leave only
_eighteen_ for acquittal.  This would be fatal to the President, as it
would give the two-thirds necessary for conviction.  But it was not so
ordained.  When the Senate re-assembled on the 26th, the vote was
taken on the Second Article, and then upon the Third, with precisely
the same results as was previously reached on the Eleventh Article.
When Mr. Ross of Kansas answered "_Not guilty_," there was an audible
sensation of relief on the part of some, and of surprise on the part
of others, showing quite plainly that rumor had been busy with his
name as that of the senator who was expected to change his position.
Satisfied that further voting was useless, the Senate abandoned the
remaining Articles, and as a Court of Impeachment adjourned _sine die_.

The great trial was over, and the President retained his high office.
In the ranks of the more radical portion of the Republican party there
was an outbreak of indignation against the Republican senators who had
voted "_Not guilty_."  In the exaggerated denunciations caused by the
anger and chagrin of the moment, great injustice was done to statesmen
of spotless character.  But until time had been given for reflection
on the part of the excited mass of disappointed men, it was idle to
interpose a word in defense, much less in justification, of the
senators who had conscientiously differed from the main body of their
political associates.  While, however, the majority of Republicans
shared in the chagrin caused by the defeat of Impeachment, a large and
increasing number of the cool-headed and more conservative members of
the party rejoiced at the result as a fortunate exit from an
indefensible position, which had been taken in the heat of just
resentment against the President for his desertion of those important
principles of public policy to which he had been solemnly pledged.
Still another class, even more numerous than the last-named, took a
less conscientious but more sanguine view of the situation--rejoicing
both in the act of Impeachment and in the failure to convict.  Their
specious belief was that the narrow escape which the President had made
would frighten him out of all mischievous designs for the remainder of
his term; while the narrow escape which the party had made, left to it
in the impending Presidential contest all the advantage of a political
power so firmly held by Congress, and at the same time imposed upon the
Democrats the responsibility for a discredited and disgraced
Administration of the Government.

The sober reflection of later years has persuaded many who favored
Impeachment that it was not justifiable on the charges made, and that
its success would have resulted in greater injury to free institutions
than Andrew Johnson in his utmost endeavor was able to inflict.  No
impartial reader can examine the record of the pleadings and arguments
of the Managers who appeared on behalf of the House, without feeling
that the President was impeached for one series of misdemeanors, and
tried for another series.  This was perhaps not unnatural.  The
Republicans had the gravest cause to complain of the President's course
on public affairs.  He had professed the most radical creed of their
party, had sought their confidence, had received their suffrages.
Entrusted with the chief Executive power of the Nation by Republican
ballots, he professed upon his accession to office the most entire
devotion to the principles of the party; but he had, with a baseness
hardly to be exaggerated, repudiated his professions, deserted the
friends who had confided in him, and made an alliance with those who
had been the bitterest foes of the Union in the bloody struggle which
had just closed.

In the outraged and resentful minds of those who had sustained the
Union cause through its trials, the real offenses of the President
were clearly seen, and bitterly denounced:--his hostility to the
Fourteenth Amendment; his unwillingness to make citizenship National;
his opposition to all efforts to secure the safety of the public debt,
and the sacredness of the soldier's pension; his resistance to measures
that would put the rebel debt beyond the possibility of being a burden
upon the whole nation or even upon the people of the Southern States;
his determination that freedmen should not be placed within the
protection of Organic law; his eagerness to turn the Southern States
over to the control of the rebel element, without condition and without
restraint; his fixed hostility to every form of reconstruction that
looked to national safety and the prevention of another rebellion; his
opposition to every scheme that tended to equalize representation in
Congress, North and South, and his persistent demand that the negro
should be denied suffrage, yet be counted in the basis of
apportionment; his treacherous and malignant conduct in connection with
the atrocious massacre at New Orleans; his hostility to the growth of
free States in the North-West, while he was constantly urging the
instant re-admission of all the rebel States; his denial of a morsel
of food to the suffering and starving negro and white Unionist of
the South in their dire extremity, as shown by his veto of the
Freedmen's-bureau Bill; his cruel attempt to exclude the colored man
from the power to protect himself by law, in his shameless veto of the
Civil Rights Bill; and last, and worst of all, his heartless abandonment
of that Union-loving class of white men in the South who became the
victims of rebel hatred, from which he had himself escaped only by the
strength of the National arms.  In recounting all the acts which made
up the roll of his political dishonor, Johnson had, in Republican
opinion, committed none so hideous as his turning over the Southern
Unionists to the vengeance of those who, as he well knew, were
incapable of dealing with them in a spirit of justice, and who were
unwilling to show mercy, even after they had themselves received it in
quality that was not strained.

Could the President have been legally and constitutionally impeached
for these offenses he should not have been allowed to hold his office
for an hour beyond the time required for a fair trial.  But the
Articles of Impeachment did not even refer to any charge of this kind,
and a stranger to our history, in perusing them, could not possibly
infer that behind the legal verbiage of the Articles there was in the
minds of the representatives who presented them a deadly hostility to
the President for offenses totally different from the technical
violation of a statue, for which he was arraigned,--a statute that
never ought to have been enacted, as was practically confessed by its
framers, when, within less than a year after the Impeachment trial had
closed, they modified its provisions by taking away their most
offensive features.

The charges on which the House actually arraigned the President were
in substance, that he had violated the Tenure-of-office Act; that he
had conspired with Lorenzo Thomas to violate it; that he had consulted
with General Emory to see whether, independent of the General-in-Chief,
he could not issue orders to the army to aid him in his determination
to violate it; and lastly, that he had spoken of Congress in such a
manner as tended to bring a co-ordinate branch of the Government into
"disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt, and reproach."  The charge of
conspiring with Lorenzo Thomas, as well as that in respect to General
Emory, appeared in the end to be not only unsustained, but trivial.
The President had conspired in precisely the same way with General
Sherman when he urged him to accept the post of Secretary of War as Mr.
Stanton's successor.  The charge that he had attempted to bring
Congress into "disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt, and reproach," was
laughingly answered in popular opinion, by the fact that he not been
able to say half so many bitter things about Congress as Congress had
said about him; and that, as the elections had shown, Congress had
triumphed, and turned the popular contempt and ridicule against the
President.  Besides, the offense charged against the President had been
committed nearly two years before, and seemed to be recalled now for
popular effect in the construction of the Articles of Impeachment.
This charge richly deserved the satire it received at the hands of
Judge Curtis when he spoke of "the House of Representatives erecting
itself into a school of manners, and desiring the judgment of the
Senate whether the President has not been guilty of an indecorum;
whether he has spoken properly?" . . . "Considering the nature of our
government," said Judge Curtis, "and the experience we have had on this
subject, that is a pretty lofty claim!"

In fact there was but one charge of any gravity against the President
--that of violating the Tenure-of-office Act.  But on the charge there
was a very grave difference of opinion among those equally competent
to decide.  Mr. Fessenden, one of the ablest lawyers, if not indeed the
very ablest that has sat in the Senate since Mr. Webster, believed on
his oath and his honor--an oath that was sacred and an honor that was
stainless--that the President had a lawful and Constitutional right to
remove Mr. Stanton at the time and in the manner he did.  Mr. Trumbull,
whose legal ability had been attested by his assignment to the
chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee, believed with Mr. Fessenden,
as did Mr. Grimes of Iowa, one of the strongest members of the Senate,
and Mr. Henderson of Missouri, whose legal attainments have since given
him a high professional reputation.  Let it be frankly admitted that
lawyers of equal rank conscientiously believed in the President's
guilt.  This only proves that there was ground for a substantial and
fundamental difference of opinion, and that it could not therefore with
certainty be charged that the President, "unmindful of the high duties
of his office, did this act in violation of the Constitution of the
United States."  This was the very question in dispute,--the question
in regard to which lawyers of eminent learning and impartial mind,
members of the Republican party and zealous opponents of the
President's policy, radically differed in judgment.  Opinions of
distinguished lawyers on the Democratic side of the Senate, like
Reverdy Johnson, are not quoted, because partisan motives would be
ascribed to their conclusions.

Perhaps the best test as to whether the act of the President in
removing Mr. Stanton was good ground for impeachment, would be found
in asking any candid man if he believes a precisely similar act by
Mr. Lincoln, or General Grant, or any other President in harmony with
his party in Congress, would have been followed by impeachment, or by
censure, or even by dissent.  It is hardly conceivable, nay, it is
impossible, that under such circumstances the slightest notice would be
taken of the President's action by either branch of Congress.  If there
was a difference of opinion as to the intent and meaning of a law, the
general judgment in the case supposed would be that the President had
the right to act upon his own conscientious construction of the
statute.  It might not be altogether safe to concede to the Executive
the broad scope of discretion which General Jackson arrogated to
himself in his celebrated veto of the Bank Bill, when he declared that
"The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be
guided by its own opinion of the Constitution.  Each public officer
who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will
support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by
others."  But without approving the extreme doctrine which General
Jackson announced with the applause of his party, it is surely not an
unreasonable assumption that in the case of a statute which has had no
judicial interpretation and whose meaning is not altogether clear,
the President is not to be impeached for acting upon his own
understanding of its scope and intent:--especially is he not to be
impeached when he offers to prove that he was sustained in his opinion
by every member of his Cabinet, and offers further to prove by the
same honorable witnesses that he took the step in order to subject the
statute in dispute to judicial interpretation.

It is to be noted that in the progress of the trial the Managers on the
part of the House and the counsel of the President proceeded upon
entirely different ground as to what constituted an offense punishable
with impeachment.  General Butler, who opened the case against the
President with circumspection and ability, took care to exclude the
idea that actual crime on the part of the officer was essential to
justify impeachment.  Speaking for all the Managers he said, "We define
an impeachable high crime or misdemeanor to be one in its nature or
consequences subversive of some fundamental or essential principle of
government _or highly prejudicial to the public interest; and this may
consist of a violation of the Constitution, of law, of an official
oath, or of duty, by an act committed or omitted; or, without violating
a positive law, by the abuse of discretionary powers from improper
motives or for any improper purpose_."  This of course would give
great latitude in proceedings against the President.  It would
challenge his discretion, erect sins of omission into positive
offenses, and make inquest of his motives and purposes.  There has not
been an occupant of the Executive Chair since the organization of the
Government, who did not at some period in his career commit an act
which in the judgment of his political opponents was "highly
prejudicial to the public interest," and therefore if his opponents
should happen to be in the majority they might impeach him, simply
for disagreement upon an issue of expediency upon which men equally
competent to judge might reasonable and conscientiously hold different
opinions.  This was in effect the same position assumed by Mr. Thaddeus
Stevens, that "in order to sustain impeachment under the Constitution
it is not necessary to prove a crime as an indictable offense, or any
act _malum in se_.  It is a purely _political_ proceeding."  The
counsel for the President dissented altogether from this definition of
the grounds of Impeachment as given by the Managers.  Judge Curtis
declared that "when the Constitution speaks of treason, bribery, and
other high crimes and misdemeanors, it refers to and includes only
high criminal offenses against the United states, made so by some law
of the United States existing when the acts complained of were done. .
. . _Noscitur a sociis_.  High crimes and misdemeanors! so high that
they belong in this company with _treason_ and _bribery_."  The
position of Judge Curtis was fortified by the fact that in the five
cases of Impeachment trial before the President was accused--the cases
of Blount, of Pickering, of Chase, of Peck, and of Humphries--the
charges preferred by the House involved criminality.

Outside of professional opinion there was supposed to be a popular
demand, so far as the Republican party represented the people, for the
President's conviction--a demand found to be based, when analyzed, upon
other acts of the President than those for which he was arraigned in
the Articles of Impeachment.  The people in this respect followed
precisely in the line of their Representatives.  It was certainly not
a praiseworthy procedure that this supposed popular wish should have
been mentioned at all as an argument for conviction.  The most
dignified of the many comments which this feature of the trial elicited
was by Senator Fessenden, in the official _opinion_ which accompanied
his vote:--"To the suggestion that popular opinion demands the
conviction of the President on these charges, I reply that he is not
now on trial before the people, but before the Senate.  In the words of
Lord Eldon, upon the trial of the Queen, 'I take no notice of what is
passing out of doors, because I am supposed constitutionally not to be
acquainted with it. . . . It is the duty of those upon whom a judicial
task is imposed to meet reproach, and not to court popularity.' . . .
_The people_ have not taken an oath to do impartial justice according
to the Constitution and the law.  _I have_ taken that oath."

The trial of President Johnson is the most memorable attempt made by
any English-speaking people to depose a sovereign ruler in strict
accordance with all forms of law.  The order, dignity and solemnity
which marked the proceedings may therefore be realized with pride by
every American citizen.  From the beginning to the end there was no
popular menace, or even suggestion of disturbance or violence, let the
trial end as it might.  If the President had been convicted he would
have quietly retired from the Executive Mansion and Benjamin F. Wade,
President of the Senate, sworn by the Chief Justice in the presence
of the two Houses of Congress, would have assumed the power and
performed the duties of Chief Magistrate of the Nation.  During the
original agitation of Impeachment in the House of Representatives some
imprudent expressions had been made by hot-headed partisans, in regard
to the right of the President to disperse Congress and appeal directly
to the people to vindicate his title to his office.  But these
declarations were of no weight and their authors would have promptly
retracted them in the hour of danger.

The time within which the trial of the President was comprised, from
the presentation of the charges by the House of Representatives until
the final adjournment of the Senate as a Court of Impeachment, was
eighty-two days.  Within that period the amplest opportunity was
afforded to submit testimony and to hear the pleas of counsel.  The
gravity of the procedure was fully realized by all who took part in it,
and no pains were spared to secure the observance of every
Constitutional requirement to the minutest detail.  In conserving its
own prerogatives Congress made no attempt to curtail the prerogatives
of the President during his trial.  The army and the navy were under
his control, together with the power to change that vast host of
Federal officers and employees whose appointment does not require the
confirmation of the Senate.  Confidence in the reign of law was so
absolute that no one ever dreamed it possible for the President to
resist the force of its silent decree against him if one more voice in
the Senate had pronounced him guilty.

The trial of Warren Hastings is always quoted as a precedent of
imposing authority and consequence.  But that was simply the
arraignment of a subordinate official, upon charges of peculation and
cruelty--misdemeanors not uncommon with the Englishmen of that day who
were entrusted with Colonial administration.  The great length of the
Hastings trial, and especially the participation of Edmund Burke as
original accuser and chief manager, have given it an extraneous
importance to students of English history and law.  The Articles of
Impeachment, drawn by Mr. Burke, were presented at the bar of the House
of Lords in April, 1786.  They were so elaborate as to fill a stately
octavo volume of five hundred pages.  Mr. Burke's opening speech was
not made for two years thereafter, and his closing plea was made in
June 1794.  During these eight years his splendid eloquence was the
admiration and pride of the English people, and gave to the arraignment
of Hastings an extrinsic interest far beyond the real importance.  It
bore no comparison in any of its essential aspects with a change of
Rulership in a Republic of forty millions of people.  Scarcely an
incident of Hastings' life in India would be known to the popular
reader, except for the association of his name with the most celebrated
period of Mr. Burke's majestic career.  Baron Plassy, a far greater
man in the same field of achievement, is, compared with Hastings,
little known--the title not being remembered even by the mass of his
countrymen to-day as part of the reward to Robert Clive for founding
the British Empire in India.

But the importance of the President's Impeachment does not depend upon
the fame of his accusers or upon the length of his trial.  The case in
itself possesses intrinsic and enduring interest.  It was not affected
by factitious circumstances.  It is notable especially because of the
extreme tension to which it subjected the Constitution, and the
attestation it affords of the restraint which a free people
instinctively impose upon themselves in times of public excitement.
It will be studied as a precedent, or as a warning, by the citizens of
the Great Republic during the centuries through which, God grant, it
may pass with increasing prosperity and renown.  And it may well happen
that in the crises of a distant future the momentous trial of 1868,
though properly resulting in acquittal of the accused, will be recalled
as demonstrating the ease and the serenity with which, if necessity
should demand it, the citizens of a free country can lawfully deprive
a corrupt or dangerous Executive of the office he has dishonored and
the power he has abused.

Mr. Stanton promptly resigned his post when the Impeachment failed and
returned to private life and to the practice of his profession.  He was
accompanied into his retirement by a vote of thanks from Congress for
"the great ability, purity and fidelity with which he had discharged
his public duties"; and in confirming his successor, the Senate adopted
a resolution that Mr. Stanton was not legally removed, but had
relinquished his office.  He was broken in health and very keenly
disappointed by the failure of the Impeachment.  He supported General
Grant for the Presidency and made one or two important public speeches
in aid of his election.  On the 20th of December, 1869, he was
appointed by President Grant an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States.  For many years of his eminent professional life
this high judicial position was the one ambition which Mr. Stanton had
cherished.  But its realization came too late.  His prolonged labors,
his anxieties and his disappointments had done their work, and on the
24th of December, five days after he had completed his fifty-fifth
year, he sank to his grave, after herculean labors for the safety and
honor of his country.

General John M. Schofield was nominated by the President as Mr.
Stanton's successor and was confirmed by the Senate.  He had an
unexceptional record as a soldier, was a man of spotless personal
character, and possessed of sound judgment and discretion.  His ability
for civil administration had been tested and satisfactorily
demonstrated during his command of the District of Virginia in the
period of reconstruction, and also in a certain degree during the war
when Mr. Lincoln entrusted to him the difficult task of preserving
loyal ascendency in Missouri.  He took charge of the War Department at
a difficult and critical time, but his administration of it was in all
respects successful and received the commendation of fair-minded men in
all parties.

Immediately after his acquittal the President renominated Mr. Stanbery
for Attorney-General.  The Senate, in a spirit of resentment not
altogether praiseworthy or intelligible, rejected him.  It was rumored
that Mr. Stanbery's previous course as Attorney-general "in construing
the Reconstruction Acts" had given offense to certain senators.  No
reason, however, was assigned and indeed no good reason could be given,
for this personal injustice to an able lawyer and an honorable man.  He
was simply a victim to the political excitement of the hour.  Upon Mr.
Stanbery's rejection the President nominated Mr. Evarts to his first
official position under the National Government.  He was promptly
confirmed, and, it need not be added, discharged the duties of
Attorney-General with eminent ability and with a popularity which
tended to re-establish in some degree those relations of personal
courtesy always so desirable between Congress and the Executive
Departments.

[(1) The following is General Grant's testimony in full, touching the
point referred to.  It was given under oath before the Judiciary
Committee on the 18th of July, 1867.

MR. BOUTWELL: "Have you at any time heard the President make any
remark in reference to the admission of members of Congress from the
rebel States into either House?"

GENERAL GRANT: "I cannot say positively what I have heard him say on
the subject.  I have heard him say as much, perhaps, in his published
speeches last summer, as I ever heard him say at all upon that subject.
I have heard him say--and I think I have heard him say it twice in his
speeches--that if the North carried the elections by members enough
to give them, with the Southern members, a majority, why would they
not be the Congress of the United States?  I have heard him say that
several times."

MR. THOMAS WILLIAMS: "When you say 'the North,' you mean the
Democratic party of the North; or, in other words, the party favoring
his policy?"

GENERAL GRANT: "I mean if the North carried enough members in favor
of the admission of the South.  I did not hear him say that he would
recognize them as the Congress.  I merely heard him ask the question,
'Why would they not be the Congress?'"

MR. JAMES F. WILSON: "When did you hear him say that?"

GENERAL GRANT: "I heard him say that in one or two of his speeches.
I do not recollect when."

MR. BOUTWELL: "Have you heard him make a remark kindred to that
elsewhere?"

GENERAL GRANT: "Yes, I have heard him say that, aside from his
speeches, in conversation.  I cannot say just when: it was probably
about that same time."

MR. BOUTWELL: "Have you heard him at any time make any remark or
suggestion concerning the legality of Congress with the Southern
members excluded?"

GENERAL GRANT: "He alluded to that subject frequently on his tour
to Chicago and back last summer.  His speeches were generally reported
with considerable accuracy.  I cannot recollect what he said, except
in general terms; but I read his speeches at the time, and they
were reported with considerable accuracy."

MR. BOUTWELL: "Did you hear him say any thing in private on that
subject, either during that trip or at any other time?"

GENERAL GRANT: "I do not recollect specially."

MR. BOUTWELL: "Did you at any time hear him make any remark concerning
the Executive Department of the Government?"

GENERAL GRANT: "No: I never hear him allude to that."

MR. BOUTWELL: "Did you ever hear him make any remark looking to any
controversy between Congress and the Executive?"

GENERAL GRANT: "I think not."]

[(2) The following is the vote of the House, in detail, on the first
Impeachment resolution.  Republicans are given in Roman; Democrats in
Italic:--

AYES.--Messrs. Anderson, Arnell, James M. Ashley, Boutwell, Bromwell,
Broomall, Butler, Churchill, Reader W. Clarke, Sidney Clarke, Cobb,
Coburn, Covode, Cullom, Donnelly, Eckley, Ela, Farnsworth, Gravely,
Harding, Higby, Hopkins, Hunter, Judd, Julian, Kelley, Kelsey, William
Lawrence, Loan, Logan, Loughridge, Lynch, Maynard, McClurg, Mercur,
Mullins, Myers, Newcomb, Nunn, O'Neill, Orth, Paine, Pile, Price,
Schenck, Shanks, Aaron F. Stevens, Thaddeus Stevens, Stokes, Thomas,
John Trimble, Trowbridge, Robert T. Van Horn, Ward, Thomas Williams,
William Williams, and Stephen F. Wilson--57.

NOES.--Messrs. _Adams_, Allison, Ames, _Archer_, Delos R. Ashley,
_Axtell_, Bailey, Baker, Baldwin, Banks, _Barnum_, Beaman, _Beck_,
Benjamin, Benton, Bingham, Blaine, _Boyer, Brooks_, Buckland, _Burr,
Cary, Chanler_, Cook, Dawes, Dixon, Dodge, Driggs, Eggleston,
_Eldridge_, Eliot, Ferriss, Ferry, Fields, Garfield, _Getz,
Glossbrenner, Golladay_, Griswold, _Grover, Haight_, Halsey, Hamilton,
Hawkins, Hill, _Holman_, Hooper, _Hotchkiss_, Asahel W. Hubbard,
Chester D. Hubbard, _Richard D. Hubbard_, Hulburd, _Humphrey_,
Ingersoll, _Johnson, Jones, Kerr_, Ketcham, _Knott_, Koontz, Laflin,
George V. Lawrence, Lincoln, _Marshall_, Marvin, McCarthy, _McCullogh_,
Miller, Moorhead, _Morgan, Mungen, Niblack, Nicholson_, Perham, Peters,
_Phelps_, Pike, Plants, Poland, Polsley, _Pruyn, Randall_, Robertson,
_Robinson, Ross_, Saywer, _Sitgreaves_, Smith, Spalding, Starkweather,
_Stewart, Stone, Taber_, Taylor, Upson, Van Aernam, _Van Aucken, Van
Trump_, Van Wyck, Cadwalader C. Washburn, Elihu B. Washburne, Henry
D. Washburn, William B. Washburn, Welker, James F. Wilson, John T.
Wilson, Woodbridge, and _Woodward_--108.

ABSENT OR NOT VOTING.--Messrs. _Barnes_, Blair, Cake, Cornell, Finney,
_Fox_, Jenckes, Kitchen, Mallory, Moore, Morrell, _Morrissey_, Pomeroy,
Ram, Scofield, Seelye, Shellabarger, Taffe, Twichell, Burt Van Horn,
Windom, and _Wood_--22.]

[(3) The following is the vote of the House, in detail, on the second
Impeachment resolution, February 24, 1868.  Republicans are given in
Roman; Democrats in Italic:--

AYES.--Messrs. Allison, Ames, Anderson, Arnell, Delos R. Ashley, James
M. Ashley, Bailey, Baker, Baldwin, Banks, Beaman, Beatty, Benton,
Bingham, Blaine, Blair, Boutwell, Bromwell, Broomall, Buckland, Butler,
Cake, Churchill, Reader W. Clarke, Sidney Clarke, Cobb, Coburn, Cook,
Cornell, Covode, Cullom, Dawes, Dodge, Driggs, Eckley, Eggleston,
Eliot, Farnsworth, Ferriss, Ferry, Fields, Gravely, Griswold, Halsey,
Harding, Higby, Hill, Hooper, Hopkins, Asahel W. Hubbard, Chester D.
Hubbard, Hulburd, Hunter, Ingersoll, Jenckes, Judd, Julian, Kelley,
Kelsey, Ketcham, Kitchen, Laflin, George V. Lawrence, William Lawrence,
Lincoln, Loan, Logan, Loughridge, Lynch, Mallory, Marvin, McCarthy,
McClurg, Mercur, Miller, Moore, Moorhead, Morrell, Mullins, Myers,
Newcomb, Nunn, O'Neill, Orth, Paine, Perham, Peters, Pike, Pile,
Plants, Poland, Polsley, Price, Raum, Robertson, Sawyer, Schenck,
Scofield, Seelye, Shanks, Smith, Spalding, Starkweather, Aaron F.
Stevens, Thaddeus Stevens, Stokes, Taffe, Taylor, Trowbridge, Twichell,
Upson, Van Aernam, Burt Van Horn, Van Wyck, Ward, Cadwalader C.
Washburn, Elihu B. Washburne, William B. Washburn, Welker, Thomas
Williams, James F. Wilson, John T. Wilson, Stephen F. Wilson, Windom,
Woodbridge, and the Speaker--126.

NOES.--_Messrs. Adams, Archer, Axtell, Barnes, Barnum, Beck, Boyer,
Brooks, Burr, Cary, Chanler, Eldridge, Fox, Getz, Glossbrenner,
Golladay, Grover, Haight, Holman, Hotchkiss, Richard D. Hubbard,
Humprhey, Johnson, Jones, Kerr, Knott, Marshall, McCormick, McCullough,
Morgan, Morrissey, Mungen, Niblack, Nicholson, Phelps, Pruyn, Randall,
Ross, Sitgreaves, Stewart, Stone, Taber, Lawrence S. Trimble, Van
Aukern, Van Trump, Wood_, and _Woodward_--47.

ABSENT OR NOT VOTING.--Messrs. Benjamin, Dixon, Donnelly, Ela, Finney,
Garfield, Hawkins, Koontz, Maynard, Pomeroy, _Robinson_, Shellabarger,
Thomas, John Trimble, Robert T. Van Horn, Henry D. Washburn, and
William Williams.--17.]

[(4) The following senators filed opinions:--

Messrs. Ferry of Connecticut, Trumbull and Yates of Illinois,
_Hendricks_ of Indiana, Grimes and Harlan of Iowa, Pomeroy of Kansas,
_Davis_ of Kentucky, Fessenden and Morrill of Maine, _Johnson_ and
_Vickers_ of Maryland, Sumner and Wilson of Massachusetts, Howard of
Michigan, Henderson of Missouri, Tipton of Nebraska, Stewart of Nevada,
Patterson of New Hampshire, Frelinghuysen and Cattell of New Jersey,
Sherman of Ohio, Williams of Oregon, _Buckalew_ of Pennsylvania,
Edmunds and Morrill of Vermont, Van Winkle of West Virginia, Howe and
DOOLITTLE of Wisconsin.]

[(5) The following is the vote of the Senate in detail.  Republicans
are given in Roman, Democrats in Italic, Administration Republicans in
small capitals.  Every senator was present and voted.

GUILTY.--Messrs. Anthony of Rhode Island, Cameron of Pennsylvania,
Cattell of New Jersey, Chandler of Michigan, Cole of California,
Conkling of New York, Conness of California, Corbett of Oregon, Cragin
of New Hampshire, Drake of Missouri, Edmunds of Vermont, Ferry of
Connecticut, Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, Harlan of Iowa, Howard of
Michigan, Howe of Wisconsin, Morgan of New York, Morrill of Maine,
Morrill of Vermont, Morton of Indiana, Nye of Nevada, Patterson of New
Hampshire, Pomeroy of Kansas, Ramsey of Minnesota, Sherman of Ohio,
Sprague of Rhode Island, Stewart of Nevada, Sumner of Massachusetts,
Thayer of Nebraska, Tipton of Nebraska, Wade of Ohio, Willey of West
Virginia, Williams of Oregon, Wilson of Massachusetts, and Yates of
Illinois.--35.

NOT GUILTY.--Messrs. _Bayard_ of Delaware, _Buckalew_ of Pennsylvania,
_Davis_ of Kentucky, DIXON of Connecticut, DOOLITTLE of Wisconsin,
Fessenden of Maine, Fowler of Tennessee, Grimes of Iowa, Henderson of
Missouri, _Hendricks_ of Indiana, _Johnson_ of Maryland, _McCreery_ of
Kentucky, NORTON of Minnesota, PATTERSON of Tennessee, Ross of Kansas,
_Saulsbury_ of Delaware, Trumbull of Illinois, Van Winkle of West
Virginia, and _Vickers_ of Maryland.--19.]


CHAPTER XV.

The stirring events which preceded the Presidential campaign of 1868
brought both parties to that contest with aroused feeling and earnest
purpose.  The passionate struggle of which President Johnson was the
centre, had inspired the Republicans with an ardor and a resolution
scarcely surpassed during the intense period of the war.  The failure,
on the 16th of May, to find the President guilty as charged in the
Eleventh Article of Impeachment, was received by the public as a
general acquittal, without waiting for the vote of the 26th.  A large
proportion of the delegates to the Republican National Convention which
met at Chicago on the 20th of May, gathered under the influence of
keen disappointment at the President's escape from what they believed
to be merited punishment.  Though baffled in their hope of deposing
the man whom they regarded with the resentment that always follows the
political apostate, they were none the less animated by the high spirit
which springs from conscious strength and power.  They were the
representatives of an aggressive and triumphant party, and felt that
though suffering an unexpected chagrin they were moving forward with
certainty to a new and brilliant victory.  The chief work of the
Convention was determined in advance.  The selection of General Grant
as the candidate for the Presidency had for months been clearly
foreshadowed and universally accepted by the Republican party.  At an
earlier stage there had been an effort to direct public thought towards
some candidate who was more distinctively a party chief, and who held
more pronounced political views; but public sentiment pointed so
unmistakably and irresistibly to General Grant that this effort was
found to be hopeless and was speedily abandoned.  The enthusiasm for
General Grant was due to something more than the mere fact that he was
the chief hero of the war.  It rested upon broader ground than popular
gratitude for his military services--great as that sentiment was.
During the conflict between Congress and the President, General Grant
had been placed in a trying position, and he had borne himself with a
discretion and dignity which deepened the popular confidence in his
sound judgment and his tact.  The people felt that besides the great
qualities he had displayed in war, he was peculiarly fitted to lead in
restoring peace and the reign of law.

Though the main work of the Convention was simply to ratify the popular
choice, the party sent many conspicuous men as delegates.  Joseph R.
Hawley, William Claflin, Eugene Hale, George B. Loring, and William
E. Chandler were present from the New-England States.  New York was
especially strong in the number of its prominent men.  General Daniel
E. Sickles, with his honorable war record, Lyman Tremaine, who had
been Attorney-General of the State, Charles Andrews, since its Chief
Justice, Moses H. Grinnell, Chauncey M. Depew, Ellis H. Roberts, Frank
Hiscock, and others of scarcely less rank made up the notable
delegation.  Pennsylvania sent Colonel Forney and General Harry White,
while Colonel A. K. McClure appeared in the Convention as a substitute.
Maryland sent John A. J. Creswell, afterward in General Grant's
Cabinet.  John A. Bingham came from Ohio.  The Indiana delegation
included Richard W. Thompson and Senator Henry S. Lane.  John A. Logan
and Emory A. Storrs represented the great State of which General Grant
was a citizen.  Governor Van Zandt of Rhode Island, Senator Cattell and
Cortlandt L. Parker of New Jersey, Ex-Attorney-General Speed of
Kentucky, Carl Schurz and Governor Fletcher of Missouri, added strength
and character to the roll of delegates.

The Convention rapidly completed its work, being in session but two
days.  The opening speech by the Chairman of the National Committee,
Governor Ward of New Jersey, was short and pointed.  He expressed the
dominant thought in the minds of all when he said: "If, as indicated
by the unanimity of feeling which prevails here, you shall designate
as our leader the great Captain of the age, whose achievements in the
field have been equaled by his wisdom in the Cabinet, the Nation will
greet is as the precursor of victory to our cause, of peace to the
Republic."  Carl Schurz was selected as temporary chairman, and his
speech reflected the prevalent feeling of all Republicans.  He exulted
in the great achievements of the party, now freshly recalled in its
first National Convention since the successful close of the war, and
proclaimed its purpose to finish and perfect the work of reconstructing
the Union on the broad basis of equal rights.

For permanent President of the Convention General Sickles and General
Hawley had both been prominently mentioned and warmly advocated.  The
vote between them in the committee on permanent organization was a tie.
But New York bent every thing to the purpose of nominating Governor
Fenton for the Vice-Presidency, and feared that the selection of
General Sickles for the highest honor of the Convention might prejudice
his chances.  By the casting vote of Hamilton Harris of Albany, a
special friend of Governor Fenton and a man of marked sagacity in
political affairs, the choice fell upon General Hawley.  His speech on
taking the chair was earnest and impressive.  He briefly reviewed what
the party had accomplished, in war and in peace, and emphasized the
obligation of crowning these triumphs with the permanent establishment
of equal and exact justice.  He was especially forcible in rebuking the
current financial heresies and in insisting that the full demands of
the Nation's honor should be scrupulously observed.  "For every dollar
of the national debt," he declared, "the blood of a soldier is
pledged."  "Every bond, in letter and in spirit, must be as sacred as
a soldier's grave."  As these patriotic maxims were pronounced by
General Hawley, the whole Convention broke forth in prolonged applause.

The platform, reported on the second day, succinctly stated the
Republican policy.  It made two principles conspicuous: first, equal
suffrage; and second, the maintenance of the public faith.  These were
the pivots on which the political controversy of the year turned.  They
embraced the two supreme questions left by the war.  The one involved
the restoration of public liberty, in harmony with public safety, in
the lately rebellious States.  The other involved the honor of the
Republic in observing its financial obligations.  The Reconstruction
policy rested on equal suffrage as its corner-stone, and the Convention
congratulated the country on its established success, as shown by its
acceptance already in a majority of the Southern States, and its
assured acceptance in all.  Equal suffrage was still regarded however
rather as an expedient of security against disloyalty than as a
measure of National right, rather as an incident to the power of
re-organizing rebellious communities than as a subject of National
jurisdiction for all the States.

The Fourteenth Amendment was about to be proclaimed, and would place
American citizenship under Constitutional protection.  The Fifteenth
Amendment, ordaining equal political and civil rights, had not yet
come.  In this period of transition the platform asserted that the
guarantee of suffrage to the loyal men of the South must be maintained,
but that the question of suffrage in the loyal States belonged to the
States themselves.  This was an evasion of duty quite unworthy of the
Republican party, with its record of consistent bravery through
fourteen eventful years.  It was a mere stroke of expediency to escape
the prejudices which negro suffrage would encounter in a majority of
the loyal States, and especially in Indiana and California, where a
close vote was anticipated.  The position carried with it an element of
deception, because every intelligent man knew that it would be
impossible to force negro suffrage on the Southern States by National
authority, and leave the Northern States free to exclude it from their
own domain.  It was an extraordinary proposition that the South, after
all the demoralization wrought by the war, should be called upon to
exhibit a higher degree of political justice and virtue than the North
was willing to practice.

On the financial issue the platform was earnest and emphatic.  It
denounced all forms of repudiation as a national crime, and demanded
the payment of the public debt in the utmost good faith, according to
the letter and the spirit of the law.  The resolutions reflected
universal Republican feeling in an impassioned arraignment of President
Johnson.  At the same time they commended the spirit of magnanimity
and forbearance with which those who had taken up arms against the
Union were received into fellowship with loyal men, and favored the
removal of all political disabilities as rapidly as was consistent with
public safety.

When the preliminary business of the Convention had been concluded,
John A. Logan, in a vigorous and eloquent speech, presented the name
of General Grant for President.  On a call of the roll the nomination
was repeated by the entire Convention without a dissenting voice.  The
announcement of his unanimous nomination was received with a great
outburst of enthusiasm.  The parallel to his unanimity could be found
in but few instances in our political history, and it augured well
for the success of the canvass in which General Grant was thus made
the standard-bearer.

The absence of any contest on the chief nomination imparted unusual
spirit and interest to the struggle for the Vice-Presidency.  Three
candidates were urged by their respective friends with great zeal and
earnestness.  Benjamin F. Wade, of Ohio, President _pro tempore_ of
the Senate, was already acting Vice-President.  If the Impeachment
trial had ended in the conviction of President Johnson, Mr. Wade would
have succeeded him for the unexpired term, and from this coign of
vantage would doubtless have secured the nomination for the second
office.  The failure of Impeachment, though fatal to his success, did
not dissipate the support which his long services and marked fidelity
had commanded, without any of the adventitious aids of power.  He had
entered the Senate seventeen years before and found there but four
members devoted to the cause of free soil.  Seward, Sumner, Chase, and
John P. Hale had preceded him.  Less favored than these senators in
the advantages of early life, less powerful in debate, he yet brought
to the common cause some qualities which they did not possess.  His
bluff address, his aggressive temper, his readiness to meet the
champions of slavery in physical combat as well as in intellectual
discussion, drew to him a large measure of popular admiration.

For several years Governor Fenton had been rising to leadership among
New-York Republicans.  His political skill had been shown while a
member of the House, in forming the combination which made Galusha A.
Grow Speaker of the Thirty-seventh Congress.  Though not conspicuous
in debate he had gained a high reputation as a sagacious counselor and
a safe leader.  Of Democratic antecedents, he had never been in favor
with the political dynasty which so long ruled New York, and of which
Thurlow Weed was the acknowledged head.  With his conservative views
that consummate politician could not keep pace with his party during
the war, and thus lost the mastery which he had so long held without
dispute.  Thereupon Mr. Fenton quietly seized the sceptre which Mr.
Weed had been compelled to relinquish.  Elected Governor over Horatio
Seymour in 1864, he was re-elected in 1866 over John T. Hoffman, and
his four years in that exalted office not only increased his reputation
but added largely to his political power.  The New-York delegation to
the National Convention was chosen under his own eye and was admirably
fitted to serve its purpose.  It was not only earnest in its loyalty
but strong in character and ability.  It embraced an unusual number of
representative men, and with the favorable estimate which Republicans
everywhere held of Governor Fenton's services and administration, their
efforts made a marked impression upon the Convention.

The friends of Schuyler Colfax relied less on thorough organization and
systematic work than upon the common judgment that he would be a fit
and available candidate.  He was then at the height of his successful
career.  He was in the third term of his Speakership, and had acquitted
himself in that exacting place with ability and credit.  Genial and
cordial, with unfailing tact and aptitude, skilful in cultivating
friendships and never provoking enmities, he had in a rare degree the
elements that insure popularity.  The absence of the more rugged and
combative qualities which diminished his force in the stormy struggles
of the House, served now to bring him fewer antagonisms as a candidate.

Beside the names of Wade, Fenton, and Colfax, two or three others were
presented, though not so earnestly urged or so strongly supported.
Senator Wilson of Massachusetts had warm friends and was fourth in the
rank of candidates.  Pennsylvania presented Governor Curtin, but with
a divided and disorganized force which crippled at the outset the
effort in his behalf.  The delegation was nominally united for him,
but fourteen of the number were friends of Senator Cameron, and were
at heart hostile to Governor Curtin.  Mr. J. Donald Cameron, son of
the senator, appeared in person as a contesting delegate.  The State
Convention had assumed the authority to name the delegates from the
several Congressional districts.  Mr. Cameron denied that the State
Convention had any such prerogative.  He presented himself with the
Dauphin credentials as the champion of the right of district
representation.  He was admitted to nothing more than an honorary seat,
but the opposition of himself and his friends had the desired effect
in preventing the candidacy of Governor Curtin from becoming formidable.

On the first ballot Mr. Wade led with 147 votes.  Mr. Fenton was next
with 126, Mr. Colfax followed with 125, and Mr. Wilson with 119.  Mr.
Curtin had 51, and the remainder were scattering.  Several of the minor
candidates immediately dropped out, and on the second ballot the vote
for Wade was raised to 170, for Colfax to 145, and for Fenton to 144.
The third and fourth ballots showed nearly equal gains for Wade and
Colfax, while Fenton made no increase.  All other names were withdrawn.
Wade had been weakened by the fact that after the first ballot his own
State of Ohio had given several votes for Colfax, to whom the tide now
turned with great strength.  Iowa was the first State to break solidly.
Pennsylvania turned her vote to Colfax instead of Wade whose friends
had confidently counted upon it.  Other changes rapidly followed, until
the fifth ballot, as finally announced, showed 541 for Colfax, 38 for
Wade, and 69 for Fenton.  The result was received with general and
hearty satisfaction, and the Convention adjourned with undoubting
faith in a great victory for Grant and Colfax.  General Grant's brief
letter of acceptance followed within a week, and its key-note was
found in the memorable expression, "Let us have peace!"  It was spoken
in a way and came from a source which gave it peculiar strength and
significance.

The Democratic National Convention of 1868 was invested with remarkable
interest, less from any expectation that it would seriously contest and
jeopard Republican ascendency, than from the several personal issues
which entered into it, and the audacious public policies which would be
urged upon it.  The general drift of the party was clear and
unmistakable, but its personal choice and the tone of its declarations
would determine how bold a stand it would take before the country.
Would it openly proclaim the doctrine of paying the public debt in
depreciated paper money, and emphasize its action by nominating Mr.
George H. Pendleton, the most distinct and conspicuous champion of the
financial heresy?  Would it attempt a discussion and review of its
tendency and designs, and make what would approach a new departure,
in appearance if not in fact, by going outside of its own ranks and
nominating Chief Justice Chase?  Would the recreancy of President
Johnson to his own party and his hope of Democratic support find any
considerable response?  And aside from the issue of virtually
repudiating the public debt, would the party now re-assert its hostile
and revolutionary attitude towards the well-nigh completed work of
Reconstruction?  These various possibilities left a degree of
uncertainty which surrounded the Convention with an atmosphere of
curious expectation.

The movement most deliberately planned and most persistently pressed
was that on behalf of Mr. Pendleton.  The Greenback heresy had sprung
up with rapid growth.  The same influence which had resisted the issue
of legal-tender notes during the war, when they were deemed vital to
the National success, now demanded that they be used to pay the public
debt, though depreciated far below the standard of coin.  "_The same
currency for the bond-holder and the plough-holder_" was a favorite
cry in the mouths of many.  This plausible and poisonous fallacy
quickly took root in Ohio, whose political soil has often nourished
rank and luxuriant outgrowth of Democratic heresies, and it came to
be known distinctively as "The Ohio Idea."  The apt response of the
Republicans was, _the best currency for both plough-holder and
bond-holder!_  Mr. Pendleton was peculiarly identified with the _Ohio
Idea_.  If not its author he had been its zealous advocate, and had become
widely known as its representative.  The policy which typified the easy
way of paying debts spread through the West and South, and brought to
Mr. Pendleton a wide support.  His popular address and attractive style
of speech increased his strength as a candidate, and his partisans
came to the Convention under the lead of able politicians, with the
only movement which was well organized and which had positive and
concentrated force behind it.

While the Pendleton canvass was earnestly, openly, and skilfully
promoted it was also adroitly opposed.  The keen and crafty politicians
of New York were neither demonstrative nor frank in indicating their
course, but they were watchful, sinuous, and efficient.  Their plot was
carefully concealed.  They were ready to have a New-York candidate
thrust upon them by other sections.  If called upon to look outside of
their own State and select from the list of avowed aspirants, they
modestly suggested Mr. Hendricks of Indiana, a friend and co-laborer
of Mr. Pendleton.  But the favorite scheme in the inner councils of the
New-York Regency, was to strike beyond the Democratic lines and
nominate Chief Justice Chase.  This proposition was little discussed in
public, but was deeply pondered in private by influential members of
the Democratic party.  Mr. Chase himself presented no obstacle and no
objection.  He cherished an eager ambition to be President.  He had
desired and sought the Republican nomination in 1864, and though the
overwhelming sentiment for Mr. Lincoln had soon driven him from the
field, the differences he had encouraged led to his retirement from the
Cabinet.  His elevation to the highest judicial office in the land did
not subdue or even check his political aspirations.  For a time he
looked forward with hope to the Republican nomination in 1868; but when
it became evident that none but General Grant could be the chosen
leader, his thoughts evidently turned towards the Democratic Convention.

Certain circumstances made the possible selection of the Chief Justice
as the Democratic candidate a less inconsistent procedure than his long
antagonism to the party might at first suggest.  In the beginning of
his political career Judge Chase had leaned towards the Democratic
party, and at a more recent period had been promoted to the Senate
by the aid of Democrats.  He had consistently advocated the fundamental
principles which originally distinguished the party.  Recent
circumstances had separated him from active sympathy with the
Republicans and placed him in opposition to the policy of some of its
leading members.  He had taken occasion to criticise what he called
the military governments in the Southern States.  Other causes had
tended to separate him from the Republican party and to commend him to
the Democracy.  When he took his seat on the bench of the Supreme
Court a majority of the judges belonged to the Democratic party, and
with them he soon acquired personal intimacy and confidential
relations.  He had secured many friends in the South by joining in the
opinions pronounced by Mr. Justice Field for the court in 1867, in
regard to the test-oaths prescribed in the Missouri constitution, and
also in regard to the test-oath of lawyers known as the case _ex parte_
Garland.  All the impressions touching his Democratic tendencies had
been deepened and increased during the Impeachment trial.  It was
evident that he was not in harmony with the Republican senators, and he
took no pains to conceal his willingness to thwart them, so far as was
consistent with his duty, in the position of Presiding officer.

This demonstration of political sympathy, made manifest through
judicial channels, had brought Judge Chase and the Democratic managers
nearer together.  Both realized however that a complete change of
position would defeat its own purpose.  On one important point indeed
Judge Chase never wavered and was unwilling to compromise.  In all
utterances and all communications he firmly maintained the principle
of universal suffrage as the primary article of his political creed.
If the Democrats should accept him they must accept this doctrine
with him.  Six weeks prior to the Convention Mr. August Belmont in a
private letter advised him that the leading Democrats of New York
were favorable to his nomination, and urged upon him that with the
settlement of the slavery question, the issue which separated him from
the Democratic party had disappeared.  Judge Chase replied that the
slavery question had indeed been settled, but that in the question of
Reconstruction it had a successor which partook largely of the same
nature.  He had been a party to the pledge of freedom for the
enfranchised race, and the fulfillment of that pledge required, in his
judgment, "the assurance of the right of suffrage to those whom the
Constitution has made freemen and citizens."

Not long after this correspondence the Chief Justice caused a formal
summary of his political views to be published, with the evident
purpose of gaining the good will of the "American Democracy."  The
summary touched lightly on most of the controversial political
questions, and contained nothing to which the Democrats would not have
readily assented except the declaration for universal suffrage.  To
this policy all Democratic acts and expressions had been
uncompromisingly hostile, and the sentiment of the party might not
easily be brought to accept a change which was at once so radical and
so repugnant to its temper and its training.  Judge Chase hoped to
induce its acquiescence and believed that such an advance might open
the way to success.  But his tenacity on this point was undoubtedly
an obstacle to his nomination.  Another difficulty was the strenuous
opposition of the Ohio delegates and the zealous preference for Mr.
Pendleton.  Superadded to all these objections was a popular aversion
to any thing which looked like a subordination of judicial trust to
political aims.  Incurring this reproach through what seemed to be
inordinate ambition, Judge Chase had forfeited something of the
strength to secure which could be the only motive for his nomination
by his old political opponents.

Notwithstanding all these apparent obstacles, there was among the most
considerate men of the Convention a settled purpose to secure the
nomination of the Chief Justice.  They intended to place him before the
people upon the issues in regard to which he was in harmony with the
Democratic party, and omit all mention of issues in regard to which
there was a difference of view.  This was a species of tactics not
unknown to political parties, and might be used with great effect if
Mr. Chase should be the nominee.  The astute men who advocated his
selection saw that the great need of the Democracy was to secure a
candidate who had been unquestionably loyal during the war, and who
at the same time was not offensive to Southern feeling.  The prime
necessity of the party was to regain strength in the North--to recover
power in that great cordon of Western States which had for so many
years prior to the rebellion followed the Democratic flag.  The States
that had attempted secession were assured to the Democracy as soon as
the party could be placed in National power, and to secure that end
the South would be wise to follow the lead of New York as obediently
as in former years New York had followed the lead of the South.  It
was a contest which involved the necessity of stooping to conquer.

The Chief Justice was, so far as his position would permit, active in
his own behalf.  He was in correspondence with influential Democrats
before the Convention, and in a still more intimate degree after the
Convention was in session.  On the 4th of July he wrote a significant
letter to a friend who was in close communication with the leading
delegates in New York.  His object was to soften the hostility of the
partisan Democrats, especially of the Southern school.  Referring to
the policy of Reconstruction, he said, "I have always favored the
submission of the questions of re-organization after disorganization
by war to the entire people of the whole State."  This was intended
to assure Southern men that if he believed in the justice of giving
suffrage to the negro, he did not believe in the justice of denying
it to the white man.

The strangest feature in Judge Chase's strange canvass was the
apparent friendship of Vallandingham, and the apparent reliance of the
distinguished candidate upon the strength which the notorious anti-war
Democrat could bring to him.  Vallandingham had evidently been sending
some kind messages to the Chief Justice, who responded while the
Democratic Convention was in session, in these warm words: "The
assurance you give me of the friendship of Mr. V., affords me real
satisfaction.  He is a man of whose friendship one may well be proud.
Even when we have differed and separated most widely, I have always
admired his pluck and consistency, and have done full justice to his
abilities and energies."  The plain indication was that Vallandingham,
who had come to the Convention as an earnest friend of Pendleton, was
already casting about for an alternative candidate in the event of
Pendleton's failure, and was considering the practicability of
nominating the Chief Justice.

President Johnson had also aspired to the Democratic candidacy.
Ambitious, untiring, and sanguine, this hope of reward had served him
in the bitter quarrel with his own party.  The fate of Tyler and
Fillmore had no terrors and no lessons for one who eagerly and blindly
sought a position which would at once gratify his ambition and minister
to his revenge.  He was using all the powers of the Executive in a vain
fight to obstruct and baffle the steadily advancing Republican policy.
The Democrats, instead of following a settled chart of principles,
were making the cardinal mistake of supporting him in all his tortuous
course of assumptions and usurpations, and it was not strange that he
should expect them to turn towards him in choosing a leader to continue
the contest.  But it is an old maxim, repeatedly illustrated, that
while men are ready to profit by the treason, they instinctively detest
the traitor.  Mr. Johnson had embittered the party he had sought to
serve.  By his attempt to re-establish the political power of the
elements which had carried the South into rebellion he had acquired
some friends in that section, but his intemperate zeal had so greatly
exasperated public feeling in the North that even those who applauded
his conduct were unwilling to take the hazard of his candidacy.

The re-awakened opposition and designs of the Southern leaders were
shown in the active participation of several of the conspicuous
Confederate chiefs in the Convention.  When the last preceding National
Convention was held they were in arms against the Government.  This
was the first occasion upon which they could re-appear in the arena
of National politics.  It had been suggested to them from friendly
sources that while the memory of their part in the bloody strife was
still so fresh it would be prudent for them to remain in the
background, but they vigorously resented this proposed exclusion.
General Forrest of Tennessee published an indignant letter, in which he
referred to "the counsel of timid men" that those who had prominently
borne the flag of rebellion should abstain from any share in political
action.  He vehemently repelled the suggestion.  Instead of exacting
only secondary places he boldly asserted the highest claims.  He
appealed to the people and directly urged upon his associates, "that
we, who are the true representatives of the greater portion of the
true Constitutional men of the States, shall not exclude ourselves from
the Democratic Convention."  This spirit found a hearty response, and a
large number of Confederate officers appeared in the National council
of the party; of whom the foremost were Generals Forrest, Wade Hampton,
John B. Gordon, and William Preston.

The Convention met in New York on the fourth day of July.  Besides
those active in the rebel armies, there were several leaders who had
been conspicuous in the civil councils of the Confederacy.  A. H.
Garland of Arkansas, Benjamin H. Hill of Georgia, Zebulon B. Vance
of North Carolina, and R. Barnwell Rhett of South Carolina were the
most widely known.  Louisiana sent two delegates whom she has since
advanced to the Senate--Randall L. Gibson and James B. Eustis.  Thomas
S. Bocock, fourteen years a representative in the National Congress,
afterwards Speaker of the Confederate Congress, came from Virginia.
Montgomery Blair, who like his more impulsive brother Frank had fallen
back into the party which seemed to be the natural home of the Blair
family, came from Maryland as the colleague of William Pinckney Whyte.
New York presented a strong array of delegates, among whom the most
conspicuous were Horatio Seymour, Samuel J. Tilden, Henry C. Murphy,
Augustus Schell, and Francis Kernan.  Several of the regularly chosen
delegates from Ohio gave way in order that the State might, in Mr.
Pendleton's interest, secure greater parliamentary and debating talent;
and to this end, Allen G. Thurman, Clement L. Vallandingham, George E.
Pugh, and George W. Morgan appeared on the floor of the Convention.
Pennsylvania sent ex-Senator Bigler and Judge George W. Woodward,
whose ability was equaled by his rank Bourbonism.  William R. Morrison
and William A. Richardson of Illinois, William W. Eaton of Connecticut,
Josiah G. Abbott of Massachusetts, James A. Bayard of Delaware, John
G. Carlisle of Kentucky, Joseph E. McDonald and Daniel W. Voorhees of
Indiana, were names familiar in Democratic councils.

Mr. August Belmont's lurid speeches had become the accepted signal-guns
of national Democratic conventions, and he did not disappoint
expectation on this occasion.  His prophetic vision and historic
recital were even more expanded and alarming than before.  He drew a
dark picture of evils which he charged upon the Republican party, and
then proceeded: "Austria did not dare to fasten upon vanquished
Hungary, nor Russia to impose upon conquered Poland, the ruthless
tyranny now inflicted by Congress on the Southern States.  Military
satraps are invested with dictatorial powers, overriding the decisions
of the courts and assuming the functions of the civil authorities; and
now this same party which has brought all these evils upon the country
comes again before the American people asking for their suffrages!  And
whom has it chosen for its candidate?  The General commanding the
armies of the United States.  Can there be any doubt as to the designs
of the Radicals if they should be able to keep their hold on the reins
of government?  They intend Congressional usurpation of all the
branches and factions of the Government, to be enforced by the bayonet
of a military despotism."

Apparently it never occurred to Mr. Belmont that each succeeding
sentence of his speech carried with it its own disproof.  With loud
voice and demonstrative manner, speaking in public before a multitude
of people, with his words certain to be quoted in the press on account
of the accident of his position, Mr. Belmont denounced the policy of
our Government as more tyrannical than that of Russia or Austria.  What
did Mr. Belmont suppose would have been his fate if on the soil of
Russia or Austria he had attempted the slightest denunciation of the
policy of those empires?  How long would he have ventured upon a tithe
of the unrestrained vituperation which he safely indulged in here?  In
his visions he now saw General Grant upholding a Congressional
usurpation with bayonets.  Four years before, he saw in Mr. Lincoln's
election "the utter disintegration of our whole political and social
system amid bloodshed and anarchy."  Mr. Belmont had evidently not
proved a true prophet and did not aspire even to be a trustworthy
historian.

Mr. Henry M. Palmer of Wisconsin, who was chosen temporary chairman,
did not delay the Convention, and the organization was speedily
completed by the election of Governor Seymour as permanent president.
He had filled the same position in the convention of 1864.  He was
destined to hold a still more important relation to the present body,
but that was not yet foreseen.  His admirers looked to him as a
political sage, who if not less partisan than his associates was more
prudent and politic in his counsels.  No other leader commanded so
large a share of the confidence and devotion of his party.  No other
equaled him in the art of giving a velvety touch to its coarsest and
most dangerous blows, or of presenting the work of its adversaries in
the most questionable guise.  It was his habit to thread the mazes
of economic and fiscal discussion, and he was never so eloquent or
apparently so contented as when he was painting a vivid picture of the
burdens under which he imagined the country to be suffering, or giving
a fanciful sketch of what might have been if Democratic rule had
continued.  From the beginning of the war he had illustrated the
highest accomplishments of political oratory in bewailing, like the
fabled prophetess of old, the coming woes--which never came.  In his
address on the present occasion he arraigned the Republican party for
imposing oppressive taxes, for inflicting upon the country a
depreciated currency, and for enforcing a military despotism.  Like all
the other speakers he affected to see a serious menace in the
nomination of General Grant.  Referring to the Republican platform and
candidate he said, "Having declared that the principles of the
Declaration of Independence should be made a living reality on every
inch of American soil, they put in nomination a military chieftain who
stands at the head of that system of despotism which crushes beneath
its feet the greatest principles of the Declaration of Independence."
And with this allusion he proceeded to condemn an assumed military rule
with all its asserted evils.

Extreme as was the speech of Mr. Seymour, it was moderate and
conservative in spirit compared with other displays and other
proceedings of the Convention.  The violent elements of the Democratic
party obtained complete mastery in the construction of the platform.
They presented in the resolutions the usual declarations on many
secondary questions, together with an elaborate and vehement
arraignment of Republican rule.  But the real significance of the new
Democratic creed was embodied in two salient and decisive propositions.
The first was the declaration "_that all the obligations of the
Government, not payable by their express terms in coin, ought to be
paid in lawful money_."  This was a distinct adoption of the Greenback
heresy.  The movement to nominate Mr. Pendleton did not succeed in its
personal object, but it did succeed in embodying its ruling thought in
the Democratic creed.  It proved to be the guiding and mastering force
of the Convention.  The greenback issue went there with the positive,
resolute support of a powerful candidate, and of a formidable array of
delegates who knew precisely what they wanted.  It was organized under
a name and had the strength of a personality.  There was opposition,
but it was not coherent, organized or well led.  In fact the platform
was expressly framed to fit Mr. Pendleton; and if, as often happens,
the champion and the cause did not triumph together, he compelled his
party to commit itself fully and unreservedly to his doctrine.

The second vital proposition related to the policy and Acts of
Reconstruction.  If Chief Justice Chase was to be nominated, the
party must accept the broad principle of universal suffrage or it
must abandon his lifelong professions.  But universal suffrage,
especially if ordained by National authority, was irreconcilable with
Democratic traditions and Democratic prejudices.  The Democrats had
uniformly maintained that the right of suffrage was a question which
came within the political power of the States and did not belong to
National jurisdiction.  They denied that the States had in any degree,
even by rebellion, forfeited their prerogatives or changed their
relations.  They insisted that nothing remained but to recognize them
as restored to their old position.  In framing the present platform
they re-affirmed this doctrine, under the declaration that "any attempt
of Congress, on any pretext whatever, to deprive any State of its
right (to regulate suffrage), or interfere with its exercise, is a
flagrant usurpation of power, which cannot find any warrant in the
Constitution."  This broad assertion was designed to deny even the
right of Congress to make impartial suffrage in the revised
constitutions a condition precedent to the re-admission of the
rebellious States to representation.  But the platform did not stop
here.  With a bolder sweep it declared "_that we regard the
Reconstruction Acts of Congress as usurpations, unconstitutional,
revolutionary, and void_."  This extreme proposition, deliberately
adopted, was calculated to produce a profound public impression.  It
was not a mere challenge of the policy or rightfulness of the
Reconstruction Acts; it was not a mere pledge of opposition to their
progress and completion; but it logically involved their overthrow,
with the subversion of their results, in case the Democratic party
should acquire the power to enforce its principles and to execute its
threats.

The import of this bold declaration received additional light from
the history of its genesis and adoption.  Its immediate paternity
belonged to Wade Hampton of South Carolina.  In a speech at Charleston,
within two weeks from the adjournment of the Convention, General
Hampton recounted the circumstances which attended its insertion in
the platform, and proudly claimed it as his own plank.  He himself
was a member of the Committee on Resolutions, and took an active part
in its deliberations.  All the members, he said, agreed that the
control of suffrage belonged to the States; but General Hampton himself
contended that the vital question turned on what were the States.  In
order that there might be no room for dispute he proposed that the
platform should specifically say "the States as they were before
1865."  To this however some of the members objected as impolitic
and calculated to raise distrust, and it was accordingly dropped.
General Hampton then proposed to insert the declaration that the
"Reconstruction Acts are unconstitutional, revolutionary, and void;"
and the manner in which this suggestion was received is given by
General Hampton himself: "When I presented that proposition every
member, and the warmest were from the North, came forward and pledged
themselves to carry it out."  He further reported to his people that
the Democratic leaders declared their "willingness to give us every
thing we could desire; but they begged us to remember that they had
a great fight to make at the North, and they therefore besought us not
to load the platform with a weight that they could not carry against
the prejudices which they had to encounter.  _Help them once to regain
the power, and then they would do their utmost to relieve the Southern
States and restore to us the Union and the Constitution as it had
existed before the war_."

This declaration received still further emphasis from at least one of
the nominations to which the Convention was now ready to proceed.  The
New-York delegation, which was believed to be friendly to Chief Justice
Chase, had determined to mask itself for the present behind a local
candidate, and it chose Sanford E. Church for that purpose.
Pennsylvania, whose ultimate design was less certain, put forward Asa
Packer in the same way.  James E. English of Connecticut, Joel Parker
of New Jersey, and several minor candidates, were presented as local
favorites.  The first ballot verified the claims of Mr. Pendleton's
friends, and showed him to be decisively in the lead, though still far
short of the number necessary to nominate.  He had 105, while Andrew
Johnson had 65, Judge Church 34, General Hancock 33, Packer 26, English
16, with the remainder scattering.  President Johnson had a higher vote
than was expected, but after the first ballot it immediately and
rapidly declined.  On the second ballot Pendleton fell of to 99, but
recovered on the third, rising to 119, and thereafter slowly declining.
The first day of voting, which was the third of the Convention, ended
after six ballots without any material change or decisive indication.

The name of Mr. Hendricks of Indiana had been brought forward just at
the close of the third day with thirty votes, and at the opening of the
following day he immediately developed more strength.  The adroit use
of his name, devised by the New-York regency, was fatal to Mr.
Pendleton.  Coming from the adjoining State Mr. Hendricks divided a
section on which the Ohio candidate relied.  A majority of the Indiana
delegation deserted to his banner.  New York, with an air of gratified
surprise, withdrew Church and voted solidly for Hendricks.  Pendleton
reached his highest vote of 156-1/2 on the eighth ballot and
thenceforward steadily declined.  Meanwhile Hancock had been gaining
as well as Hendricks.  South Carolina, Virginia, and several other
States changed to his support.  Then Illinois broke from Pendleton
and cast half her vote for Hendricks.  On the twelfth ballot the
announcement of 1/2 a vote from California for Chief Justice Chase was
received with a great and prolonged outburst of cheering.  It was
suspected that a single delegate from the Pacific coast had cast the
vote at the instigation of the New-York managers, in order to test the
sense of the galleries as well as of the Convention.  The day closed
with the eighteenth ballot, on which Hancock had 144-1/2, Hendricks 87,
and Pendleton 56-1/2.  With such an apparent lead after so many
ballots, the nomination of General Hancock on the ensuing day would,
under ordinary circumstances, have been reckoned as a probable result.
But it was not expected.  It was indeed against the logic of the
situation that a Democratic Convention could at that time select a
distinguished Union general, of conservative record and cautious mind,
for a Presidential candidate.  General Hancock's name was in fact used
only while the actual contestants of the Convention were fencing for
advantageous position in the final contest.

The outlook for Mr. Hendricks was considered flattering by his
immediate supporters, but to the skilled political observer it was
evident that the figures of the eighteenth ballot gave no assurance to
the friends of any candidate.  After the adjournment of the Convention,
and throughout the night that followed, calculation and speculation
took every shape.  The delegations from New York and Ohio absorbed
the interest of the politicians and the public.  The two delegations
were playing at cross-purposes--each trying to defeat the designs of
the other, and each finding its most available candidate in the State
of the other.  The tactics of New York had undoubtedly defeated
Pendleton, and the same men were now planning to nominate Chief Justice
Chase.  The leading and confidential friends of Mr. Pendleton were
resolved that the New York plot should not succeed, and that Mr. Chase
should not, in any event, be the candidate.  In a frame of mind which
was half panic, half reason, they concluded that it would be impossible
to defeat the Chief Justice if his name should be placed before the
Convention by the united delegation of New York speaking through the
glowing phrases of Mr. Seymour, who, as it was rumored, would next
morning leave the chair for that purpose.  It was concluded, therefore,
in the consultations of Mr. Pendleton's friends, that the movement
should be anticipated by proposing the name of Mr. Seymour himself.
The consultations in which these conclusions were reached were made up
in large part of the aggressive type of Western Democrats, who had been
trained to political fighting under the lead of Stephen A. Douglas.
Among the most active and combative was Washington McLean of the
Cincinnati _Enquirer_.  It was this class of Democrats that finally
rendered the nomination of the Chief Justice impossible.

On the following morning (of the last day of the Convention, as it
proved), the Ohio delegation took the first and most important step, in
formally withdrawing the name of Mr. Pendleton.  The voting was then
resumed, and the nineteenth and twentieth ballots showed a slight loss
for Hancock, and a corresponding gain for Hendricks.  On the
twenty-first ballot Hancock had 135-1/2, and Hendricks 132; with 48-1/2
divided among minor candidates.  At this point the Ohio delegation,
having been absent in conference, entered the hall, and amid a hush
of expectation and interest proposed the name of Horatio Seymour.  Mr.
Seymour had been frequently mentioned, and would have been formidable
from the first if he had permitted the use of his name, but he had
invariably met the proposition with the answer that he could under no
circumstances become a candidate.  He now repeated this statement from
the chair, but Ohio insisted and New York assented.  With a whirl of
excitement all the States followed, and the nomination was made on the
twenty-second ballot by a unanimous vote.  Mr. Seymour had, no doubt,
been sincere in declining to be a candidate; but the prolonged
balloting had produced a great anxiety among the delegates, and the
pressure had at last come in a form which he could not resist.

The ticket was completed without delay.  Just prior to the Convention
General Frank Blair had written a remarkable letter to Colonel
Brodhead, one of the Missouri delegates.  General Blair's name had been
mentioned as a Presidential candidate, and in this letter he defined
his position.  He insisted, as the supreme issue, that the
Reconstruction Acts and their fruits must be overthrown.  How they
should be overthrown he thus indicated: "There is but one way to
restore the Government and the Constitution, and that is for the
President to declare these Acts null and void, compel the army to
undo its usurpations at the South, dispossess the carpet-bag State
governments, allow the white people to re-organize their own
governments and elect senators and representatives."  General Blair
contended that this was "the real and only question," and that until
this work was accomplished "it is idle to talk of bonds, greenbacks,
the public faith, and the public credit."  This letter, as will be
noted, harmonized in thought and language with the plank which Wade
Hampton had inserted in the platform, and its audacious tone commended
its author to those who had been potential in committing the Convention
to this extreme position.  General Preston of Kentucky, who had won
his stars in the Confederate army, presented General Blair for
Vice-President.  General Wade Hampton, distinguished in the same cause,
seconded it, and the nomination was made of acclamation.

The Democratic party thus determined, through its platform and
partially through its candidates, to fight its battle on the two issues
of paying the debt in depreciated paper currency and overthrowing
Reconstruction.  Other questions practically dropped out.  The whole
discussion of the canvass turned on these two controlling propositions.
No violence of design which the Republicans imputed to their
adversaries exceeded their open avowals.  The greater positiveness of
General Blair, the keener popular interest in the Southern question
and the broader realization of its possible dangers, made the issue on
Reconstruction overshadow the other.  The utterances of Southern
leaders confirmed its superior importance in the public estimate.  The
jubilant expressions of Wade Hampton at Charleston