Produced by Steven Gibbs and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net






THE LIFE OF NELSON

THE EMBODIMENT OF THE SEA POWER OF GREAT BRITAIN

BY

CAPTAIN A.T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D.
UNITED STATES NAVY

AUTHOR OF
"THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783,"
"THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE,"
AND OF A "LIFE OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT"


IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. I.


LONDON
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, & COMPANY, _LIMITED_
1897




PREFACE.


The Life of Nelson has been written so often, that an
explanation--almost an apology--seems due for any renewal of the
attempt; but, not to mention the attractiveness of the theme in
itself, it is essential to the completeness and rounding off of the
author's discussion of the Influence of Sea Power, that he present a
study, from his own point of view, of the one man who in himself
summed up and embodied the greatness of the possibilities which Sea
Power comprehends,--the man for whom genius and opportunity worked
together, to make him the personification of the Navy of Great
Britain, the dominant factor in the periods hitherto treated. In the
century and a half embraced in those periods, the tide of influence
and of power has swelled higher and higher, floating upward before the
eyes of mankind many a distinguished name; but it is not until their
close that one arises in whom all the promises of the past find their
finished realization, their perfect fulfilment. Thenceforward the name
of Nelson is enrolled among those few presented to us by History, the
simple mention of which suggests, not merely a personality or a
career, but a great force or a great era concrete in a single man, who
is its standard-bearer before the nations.

Yet, in this process of exaltation, the man himself, even when so very
human and so very near our own time as Nelson is, suffers from an
association which merges his individuality in the splendor of his
surroundings; and it is perhaps pardonable to hope that the subject is
not so far exhausted but that a new worker, gleaning after the
reapers, may contribute something further towards disengaging the
figure of the hero from the glory that cloaks it. The aim of the
present writer, while not neglecting other sources of knowledge, has
been to make Nelson describe himself, — tell the story of his own
inner life as well as of his external actions. To realize this object,
it has not seemed the best way to insert numerous letters, because, in
the career of a man of action, each one commonly deals with a variety
of subjects, which bear to one another little relation, except that,
at the moment of writing, they all formed part of the multifold life
the writer was then leading. It is true, life in general is passed in
that way; but it is not by such distraction of interest among minute
details that a particular life is best understood. Few letters,
therefore, have been inserted entire; and those which have, have been
chosen because of their unity of subject, and of their value as
characteristic.

The author's method has been to make a careful study of Nelson's
voluminous correspondence, analyzing it, in order to detect the
leading features of temperament, traits of thought, and motives of
action; and thence to conceive within himself, by gradual familiarity
even more than by formal effort, the character therein revealed. The
impression thus produced he has sought to convey to others, partly in
the form of ordinary narrative,--daily living with his hero,--and
partly by such grouping of incidents and utterances, not always, nor
even nearly, simultaneous, as shall serve by their joint evidence to
emphasize particular traits, or particular opinions, more forcibly
than when such testimonies are scattered far apart; as they would be,
if recounted in a strict order of time.

A like method of treatment has been pursued in regard to that purely
external part of Nelson's career in which are embraced his military
actions, as well as his public and private life. The same aim is kept
in view of showing clearly, not only what he did, but the principles
which dominated his military thought, and guided his military actions,
throughout his life; or, it may be, such changes as must inevitably
occur in the development of a man who truly lives. This cannot be done
satisfactorily without concentrating the evidence from time to time;
and it is therefore a duty a writer owes to his readers, if they wish
such acquaintance with his subject as he thinks he has succeeded in
acquiring for himself.

The author has received individual assistance from several persons. To
a general expression of thanks he wishes to add his special
acknowledgments to the present Earl Nelson, through whose aid he has
obtained information of interest which otherwise probably would have
escaped him; and to Lords Radstock and De Saumarez, both of whom have
been good enough to place in his hands letters contemporary with
Nelson, and touching incidentally matters that throw light on his
career. Material of the same kind has also been furnished him by
Professor John Knox Laughton, whose knowledge of Nelson and of the
Navy of that period is second to none; it is not the least of the
writer's advantages that he has had before him, to check possible
errors in either fact or conclusions, the admirable, though brief,
Life of Nelson published by Mr. Laughton two years since.

Illustrative anecdotes have also been supplied by Admiral Sir William
R. Mends, G.C.B., who has shown his continued interest in the work by
the trouble he has taken for it; by Mr. Stuart J. Reid, of Blackwell
Cliff, East Grinstead; and by Mr. Edgar Goble, of Fareham, Hants. Mr.
B.F. Stevens, of 4 Trafalgar Square, has also kindly exerted himself
on several occasions to obtain needed information. To Mrs. F.H.B.
Eccles, of Sherwell House, Plymouth, granddaughter of Josiah Nisbet,
Nelson's stepson, the author is indebted for reminiscences of Lady
Nelson, and for her portrait here published; and his thanks are also
due to Lieutenant-Colonel W. Clement D. Esdaile, of Burley Manor,
Ringwood, Hants, through whom he was brought into communication with
Mrs. Eccles, and who has in other ways helped him.

Throughout the writing of the book constant assistance has been
received from Mr. Robert B. Marston, to whom cordial acknowledgment is
made for the untiring pains taken in prosecuting necessary inquiries,
which could not have been done without great delay by one not living
in England. Suggestions valuable to the completeness of the work have
been given also by Mr. Marston.

For the portrait of Mrs. Philip Ward, the "Horatia" whom Nelson called
generally his adopted daughter, but at times spoke of as his daughter
simply, and whom, on the last morning of his life, he commended to the
care of his Country, the author has to thank Mr. and Mrs. Nelson Ward,
of 15 Lancaster Road, Belsize Park, London. Mr. Nelson Ward is her
son.

To the more usual sources of information already in print, it is not
necessary to refer in detail; but it is right to mention especially
the collection of Hamilton and Nelson letters, published by Mr. Alfred
Morrison, a copy of which by his polite attention was sent the writer,
and upon which must necessarily be based such account of Nelson's
relations with Lady Hamilton as, unfortunately, cannot be omitted
wholly from a life so profoundly affected by them.

A.T. MAHAN.

MARCH, 1897.




CONTENTS OF VOL. I.


CHAPTER I.

THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS.

Distinction of Nelson's career
His extensive and varied correspondence
Parentage and birth
Delicacy of constitution
First entry in the Navy
Anecdotes of childhood
Cared for by his uncle, Captain Maurice Suckling
Serves in a West India merchantman
Expedition to the Arctic Sea
Cruise to the East Indies
Acting lieutenant in the Channel Fleet
Promoted lieutenant in the "Lowestoffe"
Goes to the West Indies
Incidents of service
Transferred to the flagship "Bristol"
Promoted to Commander and to Post-Captain
Personal appearance, 1780
Youth when promoted
Scanty opportunities for war service
The Nicaragua Expedition
Health breaks down
Returns to England
Appointed to the "Albemarle"
Short trip to the Baltic
Goes to the North American Station
At New York, and transferred to the West Indies
Personal appearance, 1782
Sentiments concerning honor and money
Returns to England and goes on half-pay
Visit to France
Unsuccessful courtship


CHAPTER II.

CRUISE OF THE "BOREAS."--CONTROVERSY OVER THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE
NAVIGATION ACT.--RETURN TO ENGLAND.--RETIREMENT UNTIL THE OUTBREAK OF
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.--APPOINTED TO COMMAND THE "AGAMEMNON."

1784-1793.

Appointed to command the "Boreas"
Sails for the Leeward Islands
Traits of character and manners
Refuses to recognize a commodore's pendant, of a captain "not
in commission"
Indications of character in this act
Controversy over the Navigation Act
Refuses obedience to the Admiral's order, as illegal
Persists in seizing vessels violating the Act
Consequent legal proceedings
Conduct approved by the Home Government
Results of his action
Characteristics shown by it
Meets his future wife, Mrs. Nisbet
Contemporary description of him
Progress of courtship
Reconciliation with the Admiral
Characteristics manifested by Nelson in the controversy
Left senior officer on the Station
Health and marriage
The "Boreas" returns to England
Employed on the Impress Service
Annoyances and dissatisfaction
Prejudices against him
The "Boreas" paid off
Sensitiveness under censure
Flattering reception at Court
Efforts to suppress frauds in West Indies
Breadth and acuteness of intellect
Results of his efforts against frauds
Prejudices against him at the Admiralty
His partisanship for Prince William Henry
Insubordinate conduct of the latter
Nelson's difference with Lord Hood
Out of favor at Court
On half-pay, 1788-1792
Progress of the French Revolution
Nelson applies for a ship
Appointed to the "Agamemnon," 64
France declares war against Great Britain


CHAPTER III.

NELSON'S DEPARTURE FROM ENGLAND IN THE "AGAMEMNON."--SERVICES IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN UNTIL THE RECOVERY OF TOULON BY THE FRENCH.--LORD HOOD
IN COMMAND.

FEBRUARY-DECEMBER, 1793.

Significance of Nelson's career
Intimate association of the "Agamemnon" with his name
Delay in her equipment
Nelson's hatred for the French
Sails for Spithead
Cruising in the Channel
Departure for Mediterranean, and arrival off Toulon
Remarks on the Spanish Navy
Professional utterances
Services off Toulon and at Naples
Toulon surrendered to the British and Spaniards
Nelson's reconcilement with Hood
Hardships of the cruise
His intelligence and zeal
Rejoins fleet off Toulon
Constantly on detached, semi-independent, service
Sent to Tunis
Action with four French frigates
Negotiations at Tunis
Nelson's wish to go to the West Indies
Ordered to command a division blockading Corsica
The allies are forced to quit Toulon


CHAPTER IV.

REDUCTION OF CORSICA BY THE BRITISH.--DEPARTURE OF LORD HOOD FOR
ENGLAND.--THE "AGAMEMNON" REFITTED AT LEGHORN.

JANUARY-DECEMBER, 1794.

Importance of Corsica
Hood orders Nelson to open communications with Paoli
Operations begun at San Fiorenzo
Bastia blockaded by Nelson
Description of Bastia
The army refuses to undertake the siege
Destitute condition of the "Agamemnon"
Quarrel between Hood and General Dundas
Nelson's opinions about besieging Bastia
Comments
Strength of the place
Nelson's military character as shown by his opinion
Instances in his correspondence
Progress of the siege
The place capitulates
Nelson's part in the operations
Inadequate credit from Hood
Nelson's dissatisfaction, but continued zeal
Loftiness of his motives
Arrival of General Stuart to command army in Corsica
Preparations for siege of Calvi
News of the sailing of French Toulon fleet
Hood sails in pursuit
Development of Nelson's military opinions
"Agamemnon" sent back to Bastia
Proceeds thence to San Fiorenzo
Nelson's meeting with General Stuart
His opinions on a "fleet in being"
Arrival off Calvi
Nelson lands with the troops
Arrival of Lord Hood
Nelson's part in the siege of Calvi
Defences of Calvi
Nelson loses his right eye
Friction between Army and Navy
Nelson's tact towards both
Feeling between Hood and Moore
Progress of the siege
Calvi capitulates
Sickness among the British
Condition of "Agamemnon's" crew
Repose given at Leghorn
Hood is relieved by Hotham and returns to England
Nelson's criticisms on naval actions
His distress at prolonged continuance in port
Broods over Hood's inadequate mention of him
Compliment from the Viceroy of Corsica


CHAPTER V.

NELSON'S SERVICES WITH THE FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDER ADMIRAL
HOTHAM.--PARTIAL FLEET ACTIONS OF MARCH 13 AND 14, AND JULY
13.--NELSON ORDERED TO COMMAND A DETACHED SQUADRON CO-OPERATING WITH
THE AUSTRIAN ARMY IN THE RIVIERA OF GENOA.

JANUARY-JULY, 1795.

General military conditions in Europe and Italy
Importance of the British conquest of Corsica
General character of Nelson's service
He rejoins the fleet
His speculations as to the French objects
The French put to sea
Action between "Agamemnon" and "Ça Ira"
Characteristics displayed by Nelson
Partial fleet action, March
Nelson's urgency with Hotham
Discussion of Hotham's action
Nelson's share in the general result
His affectionate correspondence with his wife
Anxiety for Corsica
Regret at Hood's detachment from command
Receives Honorary Colonelcy of Marines
Sent on detached service to the Riviera
Encounters French fleet
Rejoins Hotham at San Fiorenzo
Partial fleet action of July
Nelson's dissatisfaction with it
Discussion of his criticisms
Effects of Hotham's inertness


CHAPTER VI.

NELSON'S COMMAND OF A DETACHED SQUADRON ON THE RIVIERA OF GENOA, UNTIL
THE DEFEAT OF THE AUSTRIANS AT THE BATTLE OF LOANO.--SIR JOHN JERVIS
APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

JULY-DECEMBER, 1795.

Nelson takes command of a squadron on the Riviera
Conditions of belligerents and neutrals on the Riviera
Nelson's "political courage"
Disregards Hotham's orders
Hotham approves his action
Effect of his action upon the enemy
Evasion of his efforts by the coasters
He proposes to the Austrians to occupy San Remo
Discussion of this proposal
The effect in his mind of a "fleet in being"
Inactivity of the Austrians and of the fleet
Menacing attitude of the French
Hotham succeeded by Hyde Parker
Battle of Loano.--Defeat of the Austrians
Nelson's condemnation of the British admirals
Increase of his own reputation
Forcible letter repudiating an attack on his integrity
Generally congenial character of his service on the Riviera
Correspondence with home
Passing desire to return to England


CHAPTER VII.

NELSON'S SERVICES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN DURING THE YEAR
1796.--BONAPARTE'S ITALIAN CAMPAIGN.--THE BRITISH ABANDON CORSICA, AND
THE FLEET LEAVES THE MEDITERRANEAN.

JANUARY-DECEMBER, 1796.

The "Agamemnon" refits at Leghorn
Nelson's sensitiveness to censure
His vindication of his recent conduct
His erroneous conceptions of French military aims
Importance of Vado Bay
First meeting between Nelson and Jervis
Nelson's anxiety to remain on the station
Coincidence of views between Nelson and Jervis
Nelson sent again to the Riviera
Reconnoitres Toulon
Expects a French descent in force near Leghorn
Analogy between this and Napoleon's plans in 1805
Nelson urges the Austrians to occupy Vado
He hoists his broad pendant as Commodore
The Austrian general, Beaulieu, advances
Nelson accompanies the movement with his ships
Premature attack by Austrians
Nelson receives news of their defeat by Bonaparte
Austrians retreat behind the Apennines
Nelson resumes operations against the coasting-traffic
His singleness of purpose and resoluteness
His activity, difficulties encountered, and plans
Transferred from the "Agamemnon" to the "Captain"
Subsequent fortunes of the "Agamemnon"
Bonaparte's designs upon Corsica
The French seize Leghorn
Nelson's inferences from that act
Nelson and Bonaparte compared
British blockade of Leghorn
Occupation of Elba by the British
The Austrians under Wurmser attack Bonaparte
Nelson plans an assault on Leghorn
He learns the Austrian defeat at Castiglione
His gradual change of opinion as to leaving the Mediterranean
His pride in the British fleet
Genoa closes her ports against the British
The fleet ordered to quit the Mediterranean
Effect on Nelson
He superintends the evacuation of Bastia
The fleet withdraws to Gibraltar
Growth of Nelson's reputation
His susceptibility to flattery
His home relations
His inadequate appreciation of the character of the war


CHAPTER VIII.

THE EVACUATION OF ELBA.--NIGHT COMBAT WITH TWO SPANISH
FRIGATES.--BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT.--NELSON PROMOTED TO
REAR-ADMIRAL.--SERVICES BEFORE CADIZ.

DECEMBER, 1796-JUNE, 1797.

Nelson sent to Elba to remove naval material
Combat with Spanish frigates
Arrival at Elba
Hesitations of the General about evacuating
Nelson leaves Elba with the naval vessels
Deliberate reconnoissance of the enemy's coast
Characteristic action of Nelson throughout this expedition
Night encounter with the Spanish fleet
Rejoins Jervis off Cape St. Vincent
Battle of Cape St. Vincent
Nelson's exceptional action
His merit in taking it
Takes possession of two Spanish ships-of-the-line
Characteristics here evinced
Controversy with Vice-Admiral William Parker
Comments upon this
Jervis's neglect to mention special services
His sense of Nelson's merit
Nelson's preferences in the matter of rewards
Made a Knight of the Bath
Promoted Rear-Admiral
Cruises for treasure-ships from Mexico
Anxiety about the Elba troops
Sent by Jervis to escort them to Gibraltar
Safe return to Gibraltar
Provides protection for American merchant-ships against French privateers
Rejoins Jervis off Cadiz
Operations against Cadiz
General good health and happiness
Pride in his reputation


CHAPTER IX.

THE UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT AGAINST TENERIFFE.--NELSON LOSES HIS RIGHT
ARM.--RETURN TO ENGLAND.--REJOINS ST. VINCENT'S FLEET, AND SENT INTO
THE MEDITERRANEAN TO WATCH THE TOULON ARMAMENT.

JULY, 1797-MAY, 1798.

Origin of the Teneriffe Expedition
Conditions conducive to success
Orders to Nelson to undertake it
Failure of the first attempt
Nelson determines to storm the town
The assault and the repulse
Nelson loses his right arm
Rejoins the Commander-in-Chief off Cadiz
Returns to England on sick-leave
Painful convalescence
Restoration to health
His flag hoisted again, on board the "Vanguard"
Rejoins St. Vincent off Cadiz
Ordered to the Mediterranean to watch the Toulon Armament
Close of the first period of his career
Contrasts between his career hitherto and subsequently
Relations with his wife while in England
Quits the fleet to repair off Toulon

CHAPTER X.

THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF THE NILE.

MAY-SEPTEMBER, 1798.

Changed political conditions in Europe, 1798
The British Cabinet decides to take the offensive
The quarter in which to strike determined by the Toulon armament
Orders issued to St. Vincent
Preference for Nelson indicated by Government
Nelson's flagship, the "Vanguard," dismasted at sea
Indications of character elicited by the accident
He is joined by ten ships-of-the-line, raising his squadron to thirteen
Pursuit of the expedition under Bonaparte
Nelson's fixedness of purpose
Attitude of Naples
Perplexities of the pursuit
The light of the single eye
Embarrassment from the want of frigates
Squadron reaches Alexandria before the French
Renewed perplexity
Nelson returns to the westward
Anchors at Syracuse
Again goes east in search of the French
The French fleet discovered at anchor in Aboukir Bay
Prompt resolution to attack
Disposition of the French fleet for battle
Steadiness and caution of Nelson's advance
The Battle of the Nile
Nelson severely wounded
The French flagship blows up
Nelson's dissatisfaction with the results
His orders after the battle
Subsequent measures
Effect of the news in Great Britain
Nelson's rewards
Reception of the news in Europe generally
Nelson's concern about Troubridge
Immediate effect of the victory upon the French in Egypt
Nelson ordered with his fleet to the westward
Sails for Naples


CHAPTER XI.

NELSON'S RETURN FROM EGYPT TO NAPLES.--MEETING WITH LADY
HAMILTON.--ASSOCIATION WITH THE COURT OF NAPLES.--WAR BETWEEN NAPLES
AND FRANCE.--DEFEAT OF THE NEAPOLITANS.--FLIGHT OF THE COURT TO
PALERMO.

SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER, 1798.

Voyage to Naples
Recovery from wound
His views as to future operations
Change of view after reaching Naples
Arrival at Naples
Meeting with the Hamiltons
Previous career of Lady Hamilton
Her political influence in Naples
Her characteristics
Her influence over Nelson
Rapid progress of the intimacy
His association with the Court
He urges Naples to declare war against France
Political situation of Naples relatively to France
Nelson goes off Malta
Returns to Naples
Neapolitans advance against the French in Rome
Their overthrow and rout
The royal family and Court fly to Palermo
Nelson in Palermo
Scandals about his residence there
Troubridge's remonstrances with him


CHAPTER XII.

NELSON'S CAREER, AND GENERAL EVENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY,
FROM THE OVERTHROW OF THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN NAPLES TO THE INCURSION
OF THE FRENCH FLEET UNDER ADMIRAL BRUIX.

JANUARY-MAY, 1799.

The French enter Naples
Nelson's distress and comments
The Sidney Smith mission
Nelson's indignation
Modification of Smith's orders
Nelson's diplomatic capacity
Jealousy of Russian progress in the Mediterranean
His expectations of Russian assistance
Precautions against Russians in Malta
His poor opinion of the Neapolitan troops
Difficulties with the Barbary States
Nelson's dealings with them
His hatred of the French
Deep depression of spirits
Fears for Sicily
French reverses in Germany and Italy
British and Neapolitan successes about Naples
The French evacuate the kingdom of Naples
News of the approach of the French fleet under Bruix


CHAPTER XIII.

FROM THE INCURSION OF THE FRENCH FLEET UNDER BRUIX TO THE RESTORATION
OF THE ROYAL AUTHORITY AT NAPLES.--THE CARACCIOLO EXECUTION.--NELSON'S
DISOBEDIENCE TO ADMIRAL LORD KEITH.

MAY-JULY, 1799.

Nelson's measures to meet Bruix's fleet
His perplexity and mental distress
Concentrates his division off Maritimo
His sagacity and resolution
Growing infatuation about Lady Hamilton
Learns that Bruix has gone to Toulon
Takes his squadron to Palermo
Distress at St. Vincent's intention to go home
Movements of St. Vincent and of Keith with the main fleet
Nelson starts from Palermo for Naples
News from Keith causes him to return off Maritimo
Dissatisfaction with Keith's measures
Resolves to go to Naples with the squadron
Arrival at Naples
State of affairs there
Nelson's powers as representative of the King of Naples
Annuls the existing armistice
Capitulation of the castles Uovo and Nuovo
Discussion of Nelson's action at this time
Justification of his conduct
The Caracciolo incident
Execution of Caracciolo
Discussion of Nelson's action in this case
His profound attachment to the royal family of Naples
The King establishes his court on board Nelson's flagship
Mutual admiration of Nelson and the Hamiltons
Castle of St. Elmo capitulates
Troubridge sent against Capua
Keith orders Nelson to send ships to Minorca
Nelson disobeys
Keith repeats his orders
Nelson again refuses obedience
Discussion of this incident
The Admiralty censure Nelson
Nelson's discontent
His complaints of his health




CHAPTER I.

THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS.

1758-1783.


It is the appointed lot of some of History's chosen few to come upon
the scene at the moment when a great tendency is nearing its crisis
and culmination. Specially gifted with qualities needed to realize the
fulness of its possibilities, they so identify themselves with it by
their deeds that they thenceforth personify to the world the movement
which brought them forth, and of which their own achievements are at
once the climax and the most dazzling illustration. Fewer still, but
happiest of all, viewed from the standpoint of fame, are those whose
departure is as well timed as their appearance, who do not survive the
instant of perfected success, to linger on subjected to the searching
tests of common life, but pass from our ken in a blaze of glory which
thenceforth forever encircles their names. In that evening light break
away and vanish the ominous clouds wherewith human frailties or tyrant
passions had threatened to darken their renown; and their sun goes
down with a lustre which the lapse of time is powerless to dim. Such
was the privilege of the stainless Wolfe; such, beyond all others,
that of Nelson. Rarely has a man been more favored in the hour of his
appearing; never one so fortunate in the moment of his death.

Yet, however accidental, or providential, this rarely allotted
portion, this crowning incident of an heroic career, it is after all
but an incident. It the man has not contrived; but to it he has
contributed much, without which his passing hour would have faded to
memory, undistinguished among those of the myriads, great and small,
who have died as nobly and are forever forgotten. A sun has set; but
before its setting it has run a course, be it long or short, and has
gathered a radiance which fixes upon its parting beams the rapt
attention of beholders. The man's self and the man's works, what he
was and what he did, the nature which brought forth such fruits, the
thoughts which issued in such acts, hopes, fears, desires, quick
intuitions, painful struggles, lofty ambitions, happy opportunities,
have blended to form that luminous whole, known and seen of all, but
not to be understood except by a patient effort to resolve the great
result into its several rays, to separate the strands whose twisting
has made so strong a cord.

Concerning the man's external acts, it will often happen that their
true value and significance can best be learned, not from his own
personal recital, but from an analytic study of the deeds themselves.
Yet into them, too, often enters, not only the subtile working of
their author's natural qualities, but also a certain previous history
of well-defined opinions, of settled principles firmly held, of trains
of thought and reasoning, of intuitions wrought into rational
convictions, all of which betray both temperament and character. Of
these intellectual antecedents, the existence and development may be
gleaned from his writings, confirming the inference reached somewhat
mechanically by the scrutiny of his actions. They play to the latter
the part of the soul to the body, and thus contribute to the rather
anatomical result of the dissecting process a spiritual element it
would otherwise lack. But if this is so even of the outward career, it
is far more deeply true of the inner history, of that underlying
native character, which masterfully moulds and colors every life, yet
evades the last analysis except when the obscure workings of heart and
mind have been laid bare by their owner's words, recording the
feelings of the fleeting hour with no view to future inspection. In
these revelations of self, made without thought of the world outside,
is to be found, if anywhere, the clue to that complex and often
contradictory mingling of qualities which go to form the oneness of
the man's personality. This discordance between essential unity and
superficial diversities must be harmonized, if a true conception of
his being is to be formed. We know the faces of our friends, but we
see each as one. The features can, if we will, be separately
considered, catalogued, and valued; but who ever thus thinks
habitually of one he knows well? Yet to know well must be the aim of
biography,--so to present the traits in their totality, without
suppression of any, and in their true relative proportions, as to
produce, not the blurred or distorted outlines seen through an
imperfect lens, but the vivid apprehension which follows long intimacy
with its continual, though unconscious, process of correction.

For such a treatment of Nelson's character, copious, if imperfect,
material is afforded in his extensive and varied correspondence. From
it the author aims, first, to draw forth a distinct and living image
of the man himself, as sketched therein at random and loosely by his
own hand. It is sought to reach the result by keeping the reader in
constant contact, as by daily acquaintance, with a personality of
mingled weakness and strength, of grave faults as well as of great
virtues, but one whose charm was felt in life by all who knew it. The
second object, far less ambitious, is to present a clear narrative of
the military career, of the mighty deeds of arms, of this first of
British seamen, whom the gifts of Nature and the course of History
have united to make, in his victories and in their results, the
representative figure of the greatest sea-power that the world has
known.

It will not be thought surprising that we have, of the first thirty
years of Nelson's life, no such daily informal record as that which
illustrates the comparatively brief but teeming period of his active
fighting career, from 1793 to 1805, when he at once, with inevitable
directness and singular rapidity, rose to prominence, and established
intimate relations with numbers of his contemporaries. A few
anecdotes, more or less characteristic, have been preserved concerning
his boyhood and youth. In his early manhood we have his own account,
both explicit and implied in many casual unpremeditated phrases, of
the motives which governed his public conduct in an episode occurring
when, scarcely yet more than a youth, he commanded a frigate in the
West Indies,--the whole singularly confirmatory, it might better be
said prophetic, of the distinguishing qualities afterwards so
brilliantly manifested in his maturity. But beyond these, it is only
by the closest attention and careful gleaning that can be found, in
the defective and discontinuous collection of letters which remains
from his first thirty years, the indisputable tokens, in most
important particulars, of the man that was to be.

The external details of this generally uneventful period can be
rapidly summarized. He was born on the 29th of September, 1758, the
fifth son and sixth child of Edmund Nelson, then rector of the parish
of Burnham Thorpe, in Norfolk, a county which lies along the eastern
coast of England, bordering the North Sea. His mother, whose name
before marriage was Catherine Suckling, was grandniece to Sir Robert
Walpole, the famous prime minister of Great Britain during twenty
years of the reigns of the first two Georges. Sir Robert's second
brother was called Horatio; and it was from the latter, or from his
son, that the future hero took his baptismal name, which, in a more
common form, was also that of Sir Robert's younger son, the celebrated
letter and memoir writer, Horace Walpole.

Of the eleven children borne by Nelson's mother in her eighteen wedded
years, only two lived to grow old. She herself died at forty-two; and
her brother, Captain Maurice Suckling, of the Royal Navy, was also cut
off in the prime of his age. As the earlier Nelsons were unusually
long-lived, it seems probable that a certain delicacy of constitution
was transmitted through the Sucklings to the generation to which the
admiral belonged. He was himself, at various periods through life, a
great sufferer, and frequently an invalid; allusions to illness, often
of a most prostrating type, and to his susceptibility to the
influences of climate or weather, occur repeatedly and at brief
intervals throughout his correspondence. This is a factor in his
career which should not be lost to mind; for on the one hand it
explains in part the fretfulness which at times appears, and on the
other brings out with increased force the general kindly sweetness of
his temper, which breathed with slight abatement through such
depressing conditions. It enhances, too, the strength of purpose that
trod bodily weakness under foot, almost unconsciously, at the call of
duty or of honor. It is notable, in his letters, that the necessity
for exertion, even when involving severe exposure, is apt to be
followed, though without apparent recognition of a connection between
the two, by the remark that he has not for a long time been so well.
He probably experienced, as have others, that it is not the greater
hardships of the profession, much less the dangers, but its
uncertainties and petty vexations, which tell most severely on a
high-strung organization like his own.

The immediate occasion of his going to sea was as follows. In 1770 the
Falkland Islands, a desolate and then unimportant group, lying in the
South Atlantic, to the eastward of Patagonia, were claimed as a
possession by both Spain and Great Britain. The latter had upon them
a settlement called Port Egmont, before which, in the year named, an
overwhelming Spanish squadron suddenly appeared, and compelled the
British occupants to lower their flag. The insult aroused public
indignation in England to the highest pitch; and while peremptory
demands for reparation were despatched to Spain, a number of ships of
war were ordered at once into commission. Among these was the
"Raisonnable," of sixty-four guns, to the command of which was
appointed Nelson's uncle, Captain Maurice Suckling. The latter had
some time before promised to provide for one of his sister's children,
the family being very poor; and, the custom of the day permitting
naval captains, as a kind of patronage, to take into the King's
service on board their own ships a certain number of lads, as
midshipmen or otherwise, the opportunity of giving a nephew a start in
life was now in his hands. The story is that Horatio, though then but
twelve years old, realized the burden of pecuniary care that his
father was carrying, and himself volunteered the wish that his uncle
would take him to sea. However it happened, the suggestion staggered
Suckling, who well knew the lad's puny frame and fragile constitution.
"What has poor little Horatio done," cried he, "that he, being so
weak, should be sent to rough it at sea? But let him come, and if a
cannon-ball takes off his head, he will at least be provided for."
Under such gloomy foreboding began the most dazzling career that the
sea, the mother of so many heroes, has ever seen.[1] Spain, after a
short hesitation, yielded the British demands, so that war did not
come, and the "Raisonnable," with other ships, was again put out of
commission. The incident of the Falkland Islands, however, had served
the purpose of introducing Nelson to his profession, for which
otherwise the opportunity might not have offered. Being so young when
thus embarked, he, in common with many of the most successful seamen
of that day, got scanty schooling; nor did he, as some others did, by
after application remedy the eccentricities of style, and even of
grammar, which are apt to result from such early neglect. His letters,
vigorous and direct as they are, present neither the polished diction
of Collingwood, nor the usual even correctness of St. Vincent and
Saumarez, but are, on the contrary, constantly disfigured by awkward
expressions and bad English. There was rarely, however, danger of
mistaking his meaning, as was sometimes charged against Lord Howe.

Here, before fairly parting with the humble home life, of which the
motherless boy had seen, and was throughout his career to see so
little, is a fit place to introduce two anecdotes associated with
those early days which his biographers have transmitted to us. We of
these critical times have learned to look with incredulity, not always
unmixed with derision, upon stories relating to the childhood of
distinguished men; but it can safely be said that the two now to be
given are in entire keeping, not merely with particular traits, but
with the great ruling tenor of Nelson's whole life. He and his elder
brother were going to school one winter day upon their ponies.
Finding the snow so deep as to delay them seriously, they went back,
and the elder reported that they could not get on. The father very
judiciously replied: "If that be so, I have of course nothing to say;
but I wish you to try again, and I leave it to your honour not to turn
back, unless necessary." On the second attempt, the elder was more
than once for returning; but Horatio stuck it out, repeating
continually, "Remember it was left to our honour," and the difficult
journey was accomplished.

The children in this instance seem to have felt that there was danger
in going on. The other recorded occurrence shows in the lad that
indifference to personal benefit, as distinguished from the sense of
conspicuous achievement, which was ever a prominent characteristic of
the man. The master of his school had a very fine pear-tree, whose
fruit the boys coveted, but upon which none dared hazard an attempt.
At last Nelson, who did not share their desires, undertook the risk,
climbed the tree by night, and carried off the pears, but refused to
eat any of them,--saying that he had taken them only because the
others were afraid.

Trivial though these incidents may seem, they are so merely because
they belong to the day of small things. To those accustomed to watch
children, they will not appear unworthy of note. Taken together, they
illustrate, as really as do his greatest deeds, the two forms assumed
at different times by the one incentive which always most powerfully
determined Nelson's action through life,--the motive to which an
appeal was never made in vain. No material considerations, neither
danger on the one hand, nor gain on the other, ever affected him as
did that idealized conception which presented itself, now as duty, now
as honor, according as it bore for the moment upon his relations to
the state or to his own personality. "In my mind's eye," said he to
his friend Captain Hardy, who afterwards bent over him as his spirit
was parting amid the tumult of his last victory, "I ever saw a radiant
orb suspended which beckoned me onward to renown." Nelson did not
often verge upon the poetical in words, but to the poetry of lofty
aspiration his inmost being always answered true.

To the young naval officer of a century ago, especially if without
political or social influence, it was a weighty advantage to be
attached to some one commanding officer in active employment, who by
favorable opportunity or through professional friendships could push
the fortunes of those in whom he was interested. Much of the promotion
was then in the hands of the admirals on foreign stations; and this
local power to reward distinguished service, though liable to abuse in
many ways, conduced greatly to stimulate the zeal and efforts of
officers who felt themselves immediately under the eye of one who
could make or mar their future. Each naval captain, also, could in his
degree affect more or less the prospects of those dependent upon him.
Thus Suckling, though not going to sea himself, continued with
intelligent solicitude his promised care of the young Nelson. When the
"Raisonnable" was paid off, he was transferred to the command of the
"Triumph," of seventy-four guns, stationed as guard-ship in the river
Medway; and to her also he took with him his nephew, who was borne
upon her books for the two following years, which were, however, far
from being a period of inactive harbor life. Having considerable
professional interest, he saw to the lad's being kept afloat, and
obtained for him from time to time such service as seemed most
desirable to his enterprising spirit.

The distinction between the merchant seaman and the man-of-war's man,
or even the naval officer, in those days of sailing ships and simple
weapons was much less sharply marked than it has since become. Skill
in seamanship, from the use of the marlinespike and the sail-needle
up to the full equipping of a ship and the handling of her under
canvas, was in either service the prime essential. In both alike,
cannon and small arms were carried; and the ship's company, in the
peaceful trader as well as in the ship of war, expected to repel force
with force, when meeting upon equal terms. With a reduced number of
naval vessels in commission, and their quarter-decks consequently
over-crowded with young officers, a youth was more likely to find on
board them a life of untasked idleness than a call to professional
occupation and improvement. Nelson therefore was sent by his careful
guardian to a merchant-ship trading to the West Indies, to learn upon
her, as a foremast hand, the elements of his profession, under
conditions which, from the comparative fewness of the crew and the
activity of the life, would tend to develop his powers most rapidly.
In this vessel he imbibed, along with nautical knowledge, the
prejudice which has usually existed, more or less, in the merchant
marine against the naval service, due probably to the more rigorous
exactions and longer terms of enlistment in the latter, although the
life in other respects is one of less hardship; but in Nelson's day
the feeling had been intensified by the practice of impressment, and
by the severe, almost brutal discipline that obtained on board some
ships of war, through the arbitrary use of their powers by captains,
then insufficiently controlled by law. In this cruise he seems to have
spent a little over a year; a time, however, that was not lost to him
for the accomplishment of the period of service technically required
to qualify as a lieutenant, his name continuing throughout on the
books of the "Triumph," to which he returned in July, 1772.

Suckling's care next insured for him a continuance of active,
semi-detached duty, in the boats of the "Triumph,"--an employment very
different from, and more responsible than, that in which he had
recently been occupied, and particularly calculated to develop in so
apt a nature the fearlessness of responsibility, both professional
and personal, that was among the most prominent features of Nelson's
character. "The test of a man's courage is responsibility," said that
great admiral and shrewd judge of men, the Earl of St. Vincent, after
a long and varied experience of naval officers; and none ever shone
more brightly under this supreme proof than the lad whose career is
now opening before us. It may be interesting, too, to note that this
condition of more or less detached service, so early begun, in which,
though not in chief command, he held an authority temporarily
independent, and was immediately answerable for all that happened on
the spot, was the singular characteristic of most of his brilliant
course, during which, until 1803, two years before Trafalgar, he was
only for brief periods commander-in-chief, yet almost always acted
apart from his superior. Many a man, gallant, fearless, and capable,
within signal distance of his admiral, has, when out of sight of the
flag, succumbed with feeble knees to the burden of independent
responsible action, though not beyond his professional powers. This
strength, like all Nature's best gifts, is inborn; yet, both for the
happy possessor and for the merely average man, it is susceptible of
high development only by being early exercised, which was the good
fortune of Nelson.

Of these two years of somewhat irregular service, while nominally
attached to the "Triumph," it will be well to give the account in his
own words; for, having been written a full quarter of a century later,
they record the deepest and most lasting impressions made upon him
during that susceptible period when first becoming familiar with the
calling he was to adorn:--

    "The business with Spain being accommodated, I was sent in a
    West India ship belonging to the house of Hibbert, Purrier, and
    Horton, with Mr. John Rathbone, who had formerly been in the
    Navy, in the Dreadnought with Captain Suckling. From this voyage
    I returned to the Triumph at Chatham in July, 1772; and, if I
    did not improve in my education, I returned a practical Seaman,
    with a horror of the Royal Navy, and with a saying, then
    constant with the Seamen, _'Aft the most honour, forward the
    better man_!' It was many weeks before I got the least
    reconciled to a Man-of-War, so deep was the prejudice rooted;
    and what pains were taken to instil this erroneous principle in
    a young mind! However, as my ambition was to be a Seaman, it was
    always held out as a reward, that if I attended well to my
    navigation, I should go in the cutter and decked long-boat,
    which was attached to the Commanding officer's ship at Chatham.
    Thus by degrees I became a good pilot, for vessels of that
    description, from Chatham to the Tower of London, down the Swin,
    and the North Foreland; and confident of myself amongst rocks
    and sands, which has many times since been of great comfort to
    me. In this way I was trained, till the expedition towards the
    North Pole was fitted out; when, although no boys were allowed
    to go in the Ships, (as of no use,) yet nothing could prevent my
    using every interest to go with Captain Lutwidge in the Carcass;
    and, as I fancied I was to fill a man's place, I begged I might
    be his cockswain; which, finding my ardent desire for going with
    him, Captain Lutwidge complied with, and has continued the
    strictest friendship to this moment. Lord Mulgrave, whom I then
    first knew, maintained his kindest friendship and regard to the
    last moment of his life. When the boats were fitting out to quit
    the two Ships blocked up in the ice, I exerted myself to have
    the command of a four-oared cutter raised upon, which was given
    me, with twelve men; and I prided myself in fancying I could
    navigate her better than any other boat in the Ship."

It will be recognized from this brief yet suggestive and
characteristic narrative, that, however valuable and even
indispensable may have been his uncle's assistance in forwarding his
wishes, it was his own ambition and his own impulse that even at this
early day gave direction to his course, and obtained opportunities
which would scarcely have been offered spontaneously to one of his
physical frailty. In this Arctic expedition he underwent the
experiences common to all who tempt those icebound seas. During it
occurred an incident illustrative of Nelson's recklessness of personal
danger,--a very different thing from official recklessness, which he
never showed even in his moments of greatest daring and highest
inspiration. The story is so hackneyed by frequent repetition as to
make its relation a weariness to the biographer, the more so that the
trait of extreme rashness in youth is one by no means so rare as to be
specially significant of Nelson's character. It will be given in the
words of his first biographers:--

    "There is also an anecdote recollected by Admiral Lutwidge,
    which marked the filial attention of his gallant cockswain.
    Among the gentlemen on the quarter-deck of the Carcass, who were
    not rated midshipmen, there was, besides young Nelson, a daring
    shipmate of his, to whom he had become attached. One night,
    during the mid-watch, it was concerted between them that they
    should steal together from the ship, and endeavour to obtain a
    bear's skin. The clearness of the nights in those high latitudes
    rendered the accomplishment of this object extremely difficult:
    they, however, seem to have taken advantage of the haze of an
    approaching fog, and thus to have escaped unnoticed. Nelson in
    high spirits led the way over the frightful chasms in the ice,
    armed with a rusty musket. It was not, however, long before the
    adventurers were missed by those on board; and, as the fog had
    come on very thick, the anxiety of Captain Lutwidge and his
    officers was very great. Between three and four in the morning
    the mist somewhat dispersed, and the hunters were discovered at
    a considerable distance, attacking a large bear. The signal was
    instantly made for their return; but it was in vain that
    Nelson's companion urged him to obey it. He was at this time
    divided by a chasm in the ice from his shaggy antagonist, which
    probably saved his life; for the musket had flashed in the pan,
    and their ammunition was expended. 'Never mind,' exclaimed
    Horatio, 'do but let me get a blow at this devil with the
    but-end of my musket, and we shall have him.' His companion,
    finding that entreaty was in vain, regained the ship. The
    captain, seeing the young man's danger, ordered a gun to be
    fired to terrify the enraged animal. This had the desired
    effect; but Nelson was obliged to return without his bear,
    somewhat agitated with the apprehension of the consequence of
    this adventure. Captain Lutwidge, though he could not but admire
    so daring a disposition, reprimanded him rather sternly for such
    rashness, and for conduct so unworthy of the situation he
    occupied; and desired to know what motive he could have for
    hunting a bear? Being thought by his captain to have acted in a
    manner unworthy of his situation, made a deep impression on the
    high-minded cockswain; who, pouting his lip, as he was wont to
    do when agitated, replied, 'Sir, I wished to kill the bear, that
    I might carry its skin to my father.'"

Upon his return to England from the Arctic Seas, Nelson again by his
own choice determined his immediate future. Within a fortnight of
leaving the "Carcass," he was, through his uncle's influence, received
on board by the captain of the "Seahorse," of twenty guns, one of the
ships composing a squadron that was just then fitting out for the East
Indies. To quote himself, "Nothing less than such a distant voyage
could in the least satisfy my desire of maritime knowledge." During an
absence of three years he for much of the time, as formerly in his
West India cruise, did the duty of a seaman aloft, from which he was
afterwards rated midshipman, and placed, this time finally, upon the
quarter-deck as an officer. In the ordinary course of cruising in
peace times, he visited every part of the station from Bengal to
Bussorah; but the climate, trying even to vigorous Europeans, proved
too much for his frail health. After a couple of years he broke down
and was invalided home, reaching England in September, 1776. His
escape from death was attributed by himself to the kind care of
Captain Pigot of the "Dolphin," in which ship he came back. At this
period we are told that, when well, he was of florid countenance,
rather stout and athletic; but, as the result of his illness, he was
reduced to a mere skeleton, and for some time entirely lost the use of
his limbs,--a distressing symptom, that returned upon him a few years
later after his Central American expedition in 1780, and confirms the
impression of extreme fragility of constitution, which is frequently
indicated in other ways.

During this absence in the East Indies Captain Suckling, in April,
1775, had been named Comptroller of the Navy,--a civil position, but
one that carried with it power and consequent influence. This probably
told for much in obtaining for Nelson, who was but just eighteen, and
had not yet passed the examinations for his first promotion, an acting
appointment as lieutenant. With this he joined a small
ship-of-the-line, the "Worcester," of sixty-four guns, on board which
he remained for six months, engaged in convoy duty between the Channel
and Gibraltar, seeing from her decks for the first time the waters of
the Mediterranean and its approaches, since then indissolubly
associated with his name and his glory. He took with him a letter from
his uncle to the captain of his new ship; but while such introduction,
coming from so influential a quarter, doubtless contributed powerfully
to clear from his path the obstacles commonly encountered by young
men, Nelson had gained for himself a reputation for professional
capacity, which, here as throughout his life, quickly won him the full
confidence of his superiors. In later years, when his admiral's flag
was flying, he recorded, with evident pride in the recollection, that
while on board the "Worcester," notwithstanding his youth, his captain
used to say, "He felt as easy when I was upon deck as any officer of
the ship." It is doubtful, indeed, whether Nelson ever possessed in a
high degree the delicate knack of handling a ship with the utmost
dexterity and precision. He certainly had not the reputation for so
doing. Codrington,--a thorough Nelsonian, to use his own somewhat
factious expression--used to say in later years, "Lord Nelson was no
seaman; even in the earlier stages of the profession his genius had
soared higher, and all his energies were turned to becoming a great
commander." His apprenticeship, before reaching command, was probably
too short; and, as captain, his generous disposition to trust others
to do work for which he knew them fitted, would naturally lead him to
throw the manipulation of the vessel upon his subordinates. But
although, absorbed by broader and deeper thoughts of the
responsibilities and opportunities of a naval commander, to which he
was naturally attracted by both his genius and his temperament, he was
excelled in technical skill by many who had no touch of his own
inspiration, he nevertheless possessed a thoroughly competent
knowledge of his profession as a simple seaman; which, joined to his
zeal, energy, and intelligence, would more than justify the confidence
expressed by his early commander. Of this knowledge he gave full proof
a year later, when, before a board of captains, strangers to him, he
successfully passed his examinations for a lieutenancy. His uncle
Suckling, as Comptroller of the Navy, was indeed on the Board; but he
concealed the fact of relationship until the other members had
expressed themselves satisfied.

His examination was held within a week of his leaving the "Worcester,"
on the 8th of April, 1777; and Suckling once more, but for the last
time in his life, was able to exert his influence in behalf of his
relative by promptly securing for him, not only his promotion to
lieutenant, which many waited for long, but with it his commission,
dated April 10, to the "Lowestoffe," a frigate of thirty-two guns.
This class of vessel was in the old days considered particularly
desirable for young officers, being more active than
ships-of-the-line, while at the same time more comfortable, and a
better school for the forming of an officer, than were the smaller
cruisers; and his uncle probably felt that Nelson, whose service
hitherto had been mainly upon the latter, needed yet to perfect the
habits and methods distinctive of a ship of war, for he now wrote him
a letter upon the proprieties of naval conduct, excellently conceived,
yet embracing particulars that should scarcely have been necessary to
one who had served his time on board well-ordered ships. The
appointment to the "Lowestoffe" was further fortunate, both for him
and for us, as in the commander of the vessel, Captain William Locker,
he found, not only an admirable officer and gentleman, but a friend
for whom he formed a lasting attachment, ending only with Locker's
death in 1800, two years after the Battle of the Nile. To this
friendship we owe the fullest record, at his own hands, of his early
career; for Locker kept the numerous letters written him by Nelson
while still an unknown young man. Of sixty-seven which now remain,
covering the years from 1777 to 1783, all but thirty were to this one
correspondent.

In another respect the appointment to the "Lowestoffe" was fortunate
for Nelson. The ship was destined to the West Indies--or, to speak
more precisely, to Jamaica, which was a command distinct from that of
the eastern Caribbean, or Lesser Antilles, officially styled the
Leeward Islands Station. Great Britain was then fully embarked in the
war with her North American colonies, which ended in their
independence; and the course of events was hastening her to the
rupture with France and Spain that followed within a year. In this
protracted contest the chief scene of naval hostilities was to be the
West Indies; but beyond even the casualties of war, the baneful
climate of that region insured numerous vacancies by prostration and
death, with consequent chances of promotion for those who escaped the
fevers, and found favor in the eyes of their commander-in-chief. The
brutal levity of the old toast, "A bloody war and a sickly season,"
nowhere found surer fulfilment than on those pestilence-stricken
coasts. Captain Locker's health soon gave way. Arriving at Jamaica on
the 19th of July, 1777, we find Nelson in the following month writing
to him from the ship during an absence produced by a serious illness,
from which fatal results were feared. The letter, like all those to
Locker, was marked by that tone of quick, eager sympathy, of genial
inclination always to say the kindest thing, that characterized his
correspondence, and, generally, his intercourse with others,--traits
that through life made him, beyond most men, acceptable and beloved.
He was, from first to last, not merely one of those whose services are
forced upon others by sheer weight of ability, because
indispensable,--though this, too, he was,--but men wanted him because,
although at times irritable, especially after the wounds received in
later years, he was an easy yoke-fellow, pleasant to deal with,
cordial and ready to support those above him, a tolerant and
appreciative master to subordinates. It may even be said that, in
matters indifferent to him, he too readily reflected the feelings,
views, and wishes of those about him; but when they clashed with his
own fixed convictions, he was immovable. As he himself said in such a
case, "I feel I am perfectly right, and you know upon those occasions
I am not famous for giving up a point."

Of his connection with the "Lowestoffe" he himself, in the short
autobiographical sketch before quoted, mentions two circumstances,
which, from the very fact of their remaining so long in his memory,
illustrate temperament. "Even a frigate," he says, "was not
sufficiently active for my mind, and I got into a schooner, tender to
the Lowestoffe. In this vessel I made myself a complete pilot for all
the passages through the [Keys] Islands situated on the north side
Hispaniola." This kind of service, it will be noted, was in direct
sequence, as to training, to his handling of the "Triumph's" long-boat
in the lower waters of the Thames, and would naturally contribute to
increase that "confidence in himself among rocks and sands," which
was afterwards to be so "great a comfort" to him. In his later career
he had frequent and pressing need of that particular form of
professional judgment and self-reliance for which these early
experiences stood him in good stead. As he afterwards wrote to the
First Lord of the Admiralty, when pleading the cause of a daring and
skilful officer who had run his ship ashore: "If I had been censured
every time I have run my ship, or fleets under my command, into great
danger, I should long ago have been _out_ of the service, and never
_in_ the House of Peers." At the critical instants of the Nile and
Copenhagen, as well as in the less conspicuous but more prolonged
anxieties of the operations off Corsica and along the Riviera of
Genoa, this early habit, grafted upon the singularly steady nerve
wherewith he was endowed by nature, sustained him at a height of
daring and achievement to which very few have been able to rise.

The other incident recorded by him as happening while on board the
"Lowestoffe," he himself cites as illustrative of temperament. "Whilst
in this frigate, an event happened which presaged my character; and,
as it conveys no dishonour to the officer alluded to, I shall insert
it. Blowing a gale of wind, and a very heavy sea, the frigate captured
an American letter-of-marque. The first Lieutenant was ordered to
board her, which he did not do, owing to the very heavy sea. On his
return, the Captain said, 'Have I no officer in the ship who can board
the prize?' On which the Master ran to the gangway, to get into the
boat: when I stopped him, saying, 'It is my turn now; and if I come
back, it is yours.' This little incident," he continues, "has often
occurred to my mind; and I know it is my disposition, that
difficulties and dangers do but increase my desire of attempting
them." An action of this sort, in its results unimportant, gives
keener satisfaction in the remembrance than do greater deeds, because
more purely individual,--entirely one's own. It is upon such as this,
rather than upon his victories, that Nelson in his narrative dwells
caressingly. His personal daring at St. Vincent, and against the
gunboats off Cadiz, ministered more directly to his self-esteem, to
that consciousness of high desert which was dear to him, than did the
Battle of the Nile, whose honors he, though ungrudgingly, shared with
his "band of brothers."

When the "Lowestoffe" had been a year upon the station, it became very
doubtful whether Locker could continue in her, and finally he did go
home ill. It was probably due to this uncertainty that he obtained the
transfer of Nelson, in whom he had become most affectionately
interested, to the "Bristol," flagship of Sir Peter Parker, the
commander-in-chief. Here, under the admiral's own eye, warmly
recommended by his last captain, and with a singular faculty for
enlisting the love and esteem of all with whom he was brought into
contact, the young officer's prospects were of the fairest; nor did
the event belie them. Joining the "Bristol" as her third lieutenant,
not earlier than July, 1778, he had by the end of September risen "by
succession"--to use his own phrase--to be first; a promotion by
seniority whose rapidity attests the rate at which vacancies occurred.
Both Parker and his wife became very fond of him, cared for him in
illness, and in later years she wrote to him upon each of the
occasions on which he most brilliantly distinguished himself--after
St. Vincent, the Nile, and Copenhagen. "Your mother," said she after
the first, "could not have heard of your deeds with more affection;
nor could she be more rejoiced at your personal escape from all the
dangers of that glorious day;" and again, after the Nile, "Sir Peter
and I have ever regarded you as a son." The letter following the
victory at Copenhagen has not been published; but Nelson, whose heart
was never reluctant to gratitude nor to own obligation, wrote in
reply: "Believe me when I say that I am as sensible as ever that I
owe my present position in life to your and good Sir Peter's
partiality for me, and friendly remembrance of Maurice Suckling."

This last allusion indicates some disinterestedness in Parker's
patronage, and its vital importance to Nelson at that time. Captain
Suckling had died in July, 1778, and with him departed the only
powerful support upon which the young lieutenant could then count,
apart from his own merits and the friends obtained by them. There was
in those days an immense difference in prospects between the nephew of
the Comptroller of the Navy and a man unknown at headquarters. By what
leading principles, if any, Sir Peter Parker was guided in the
distribution of his favors, can scarcely now be ascertained; but that
he brought rapidly forward two men of such great yet widely differing
merit as Nelson and Collingwood, is a proof that his judgment was
sound and the station one where vacancies were frequent. Collingwood,
who was then a lieutenant on board a sloop-of-war, went to the
"Lowestoffe" in Nelson's place. When the latter, in December, 1778,
was made commander into the brig "Badger," the other was transferred
to the vacant room in the "Bristol;" and when Nelson, on the 11th of
June, 1779, became post-captain in the "Hinchinbrook" frigate,
Collingwood again followed him as commander of the "Badger." Finally,
when through a death vacancy a better frigate offered for Nelson,
Collingwood also was posted into the "Hinchinbrook;" this ship thus
having the singular distinction of conferring the highest rank
obtainable by selection, and so fixing the final position of the two
life-long friends who led the columns at Trafalgar, the crowning
achievement of the British Navy as well as of their own illustrious
careers. The coincidence at the earlier date may have been partly
factitious, due to a fad of the commander-in-chief; but it assumes a
different and very impressive aspect viewed in the light of their
later close association, especially when it is recalled that
Collingwood also succeeded, upon Nelson's death, to the Mediterranean
command, and was there worn out, as his predecessor fell, in the
discharge of his duty upon that important station, which thus proved
fatal to them both. Few historic parallels are so complete. Sir Peter
Parker, living until 1811, survived both his illustrious juniors, and
at the age of eighty-two followed Nelson's coffin, as chief mourner at
the imposing obsequies, where the nation, from the highest to the
lowest, mingled the exultation of triumph with weeping for the loss of
its best-beloved.

Of Nelson's exterior at this time, his early biographers have secured
an account which, besides its value as a portrait, possesses the
further interest of mentioning explicitly that charm of manner which
was one of his best birth-gifts, reflecting, as it did, the generous
and kindly temper of his heart. "The personal appearance of Captain
Nelson at this period of his life, owing to his delicate health and
diminutive figure, was far from expressing the greatness of his
intellectual powers. From his earliest years, like Cleomenes, the hero
of Sparta, he had been enamoured of glory, and had possessed a
greatness of mind. Nelson preserved, also, a similar temperance and
simplicity of manners. Nature, as Plutarch adds of the noble Spartan,
had given a spur to his mind which rendered him impetuous in the
pursuit of whatever he deemed honourable. The demeanour of this
extraordinary young man was entirely the demeanour of a British
seaman; when the energies of his mind were not called forth by some
object of duty, or professional interest, he seemed to retire within
himself, and to care but little for the refined courtesies of polished
life." No saving sense of humor seems to have suggested that the
profane might here ask, "Is this the British seaman?" "In his dress he
had all the cleanliness of an Englishman, though his manner of wearing
it gave him an air of negligence; and yet his general address and
conversation, when he wished to please, possessed a charm that was
irresistible."[2]

In June, 1779, when posted into the "Hinchinbrook," Nelson wanted
still three months of being twenty-one. By the custom of the British
Navy, then and now, promotions from the grade of Captain to that of
Admiral are made by seniority only. Once a captain, therefore, a man's
future was assured, so far as concerned the possibility of juniors
passing over his head,--neither favor nor merit could procure that;
his rank relatively to others was finally fixed. The practical
difficulty of getting at a captain of conspicuous ability, to make of
him a flag-officer, was met by one of those clumsy yet adequate
expedients by which the practical English mind contrives to reconcile
respect for precedent with the demands of emergency. There being then
no legal limit to the number of admirals, a promotion was in such case
made of all captains down to and including the one wanted; and Lord
St. Vincent, one of the most thorough-going of naval statesmen, is
credited with the declaration that he would promote a hundred down the
list of captains, if necessary, to reach the one demanded by the needs
of the country. Even with this rough-riding over obstacles,--for the
other officers promoted, however useful in their former grade, not
being wanted as admirals, remained perforce unemployed,--the advantage
of reaching post-rank betimes is evident enough; and to this chiefly
Nelson referred in acknowledging his permanent indebtedness to Sir
Peter Parker. With this early start, every artificial impediment was
cleared from his path; his extraordinary ability was able to assert
itself, and could be given due opportunity, without a too violent
straining of service methods. He had, indeed, to wait eighteen years
for his flag-rank; but even so, he obtained it while still in the very
prime of his energies, before he was thirty-nine,--a good fortune
equalled by none of his most distinguished contemporaries.[3]

A somewhat singular feature of this early promotion of Nelson is that
it was accorded without the claim of service in actual battle,--a
circumstance that seems yet more remarkable when contrasted with the
stormy and incessant warfare of his later career. While he was thus
striding ahead, his equals in years, Saumarez and Pellew, were
fighting their way up step by step, gaining each as the reward of a
distinct meritorious action, only to find themselves outstripped by
one who had scarcely seen a gun fired in anger. The result was mainly
due to the nature of the station, where sickness made vacancies more
rapidly than the deadliest engagement. But while this is true, and
must be taken into the account, it was characteristic of Nelson that
his value transpired through the simplest intercourse, and amid the
commonplace incidents of service. Locker and Parker each in turn felt
this. A little later, while he and Collingwood were still unknown
captains, the latter, usually measured and formal in his language,
wrote to him in these singularly strong words: "My regard for you, my
dear Nelson, my respect and veneration for your character, I hope and
believe, will never lessen." So, some years afterwards, but before he
became renowned or had wrought his more brilliant achievements, an
envious brother captain said to him, "You did just as you pleased in
Lord Hood's time, the same in Admiral Hotham's, and now again with Sir
John Jervis; it makes no difference to you who is Commander-in-chief."
This power of winning confidence and inspiring attachment was one of
the strongest elements in Nelson's success, alike as a subordinate and
when himself in chief command.

With his mind ever fixed upon glory, or rather upon honor,--the word
he himself most often used, and which more accurately expresses his
desire for fame; honor, which is to glory what character is to
reputation,--the same hard fortune persisted in denying to him, during
the War of the American Revolution, the opportunities for distinction
which he so ardently coveted. In the "Badger" and in the
"Hinchinbrook," during the year 1779, his service was confined to
routine cruising about Jamaica and along the Mosquito coast of Central
America. A gleam of better things for a moment shone upon him in
August of that year, when the French fleet, under Count D'Estaing,
appeared in Haiti, numbering twenty-two ships-of-the-line, with
transports reported to be carrying twenty thousand troops. All Jamaica
was in an uproar of apprehension, believing an attack upon the island
to be imminent; for its conquest was known to be one of the great
objects of the enemy. Nelson was at the time living on shore, the
"Hinchinbrook" seemingly[4] not having returned to the port since his
appointment to her, and he eagerly accepted the duty of commanding the
land batteries. The odds were great,--"You must not be surprised to
hear of my learning to speak French," he wrote, laughingly, to Locker
in England,--but if so, the greater the honor attendant, whether upon
success or defeat. D'Estaing, however, passed on to America to
encounter disaster at Savannah, and Nelson's hopes were again
disappointed.

In January, 1780, an opportunity for service offered, which ended in
no conspicuous or permanent result, but nevertheless conferred
distinction upon one who, to use his own expression, was determined to
climb to the top of the tree, and to neglect no chance, however
slight, that could help him on. War with Spain had then been about
seven months declared, and the British governor of Jamaica had
sagaciously determined to master Lake Nicaragua, and the course of the
river San Juan, its outlet to the Caribbean Sea. The object of the
attempt was twofold, both military and commercial. The route was
recognized then, as it is now, as one of the most important, if not
the most important, of those affording easy transit from the Pacific
to the Atlantic by way of the Isthmus. To a nation of the mercantile
aptitudes of Great Britain, such a natural highway was necessarily an
object of desire. In her hands it would not only draw to itself the
wealth of the surrounding regions, but would likewise promote the
development of her trade, both north and south, along the eastern and
western coasts of the two Americas. But the pecuniary gain was not
all. The military tenure of this short and narrow strip, supported at
either end, upon the Pacific and the Atlantic, by naval detachments,
all the more easily to be maintained there by the use of the belt
itself, would effectually sever the northern and southern colonies of
Spain, both by actual interposition, and by depriving them of one of
their most vital lines of intercommunication. To seek control of so
valuable and central a link in a great network of maritime interests
was as natural and inevitable to Great Britain a century ago, as it
now is to try to dominate the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, which
fulfil a like function to her Eastern possessions and Eastern
commerce.

Preoccupied, however, with numerous and more pressing cares in many
quarters of the world, and overweighted in a universal struggle with
outnumbering foes, Great Britain could spare but scanty forces to her
West India Islands, and from them Governor Dalling could muster but
five hundred men for his Nicaraguan undertaking. Nelson was directed
to convoy these with the "Hinchinbrook" to the mouth of the San Juan
del Norte, where was the port now commonly called Greytown, in those
days a fine and spacious harbor. There his charge ended; but his
mental constitution never allowed him to look upon a military task as
well done while anything remained to do. In the spirit of his famous
saying, fifteen years later, "Were ten ships out of eleven taken, I
would never call it well done if the eleventh escaped, if able to get
at her," he determined to go with the troops. With his temperament it
was impossible to turn his back upon the little body of soldiers,
whose toilsome advance up the tropical stream might be aided and
hastened by his ready seamen.

The first objective of the expedition was Fort San Juan, a powerful
work controlling the river of the same name, and thereby the only
natural water transit between the sea and Lake Nicaragua. Upon the
possession of this, as a position of vantage and a safe depot for
supplies and reinforcements, Dalling based his hopes of future
advance, both west and south. Nelson took with him forty-seven seamen
and marines from his ship's company; the former, aided by some
Indians, doing most of the labor of forcing the boats against the
current, through shoal and tortuous channels, under his own constant
supervision and encouragement. A small outpost that withstood their
progress was by him intrepidly stormed, sword in hand, by sudden
assault; and upon reaching Fort San Juan he urgently recommended the
same summary method to the officer commanding the troops. The latter,
however, was not one of the men who recognize the necessity for
exceptional action. Regular approaches, though the slower, were the
surer way of reducing a fortified place, and entailed less bloodshed.
Professional rule commonly demanded them, and to professional rule he
submitted. Nelson argued that through delays, which, however incurred,
were now past discussion, the expedition had reached its destination
in April, at the end of the healthy, dry season, instead of shortly
after its beginning, in January. Consequently, owing to the fall of
the water, much additional trouble had been experienced in the
advance, the men were proportionately weakened by toil and exposure,
and the wet months, with their dire train of tropical diseases, were
at hand. Therefore, though more might fall by the enemy's weapons in a
direct attack, the ultimate loss would be less than by the protracted
and sickly labors of the spade; while with San Juan subdued, the force
could receive all the care possible in such a climate, and under the
best conditions await the return of good weather for further progress.

In military enterprises there will frequently arise the question, Is
time or life in this case of the greater value? Those regularly
ordered and careful procedures which most economize the blood of the
soldier may, by their inevitable delays, seriously imperil the objects
of the campaign as a whole; or they may even, while less sanguinary,
entail indirectly a greater loss of men than do prompter measures. In
such doubtful matters Nelson's judgment was usually sound; and his
instinct, which ever inclined to instant and vigorous action, was
commonly by itself alone an accurate guide, in a profession whose
prizes are bestowed upon quick resolve more often than upon deliberate
consultation. The same intuition that in his prime dictated his
instant, unhesitating onslaught at the Nile, depriving the French of
all opportunity for further preparation,--that caused him in the
maturity of his renown, before Copenhagen, to write, "every hour's
delay makes the enemy stronger; we shall never be so good a match for
them as at this moment,"--that induced him at Trafalgar to modify his
deliberately prepared plan in favor of one vastly more hazardous, but
which seized and held the otherwise fleeting chance,--led him here
also at San Juan, unknown, and scarcely more than a boy, to press the
policy of immediate attack.

The decision was not in his hands, and he was overruled; whereupon,
with his usual readiness to do his utmost, he accepted the course he
disapproved, and, without nursing a grievance, became at once active
in erecting batteries and serving the guns. "When unfortunate
contentions," says one dispassionate narrator, "had slackened the
ardour for public service, Captain Nelson did not suffer any narrow
spirit to influence his conduct. He did more than his duty: where
anything was to be done, he saw no difficulties." Great as his merits
were, he was never insensible to them; and, in the sketch of his
career, furnished by him to his chief biographers, he records his
exploits with naïve self-satisfaction, resembling the sententious
tablets of Eastern conquerors: "I boarded, if I may be allowed the
expression, an outpost of the enemy, situated on an island in the
river; I made batteries, and afterwards fought them, and was a
principal cause of our success." But this simple, almost childlike,
delight in his own performances, which continually crops out in his
correspondence, did not exaggerate their deserts. Major Polson,
commanding the land forces, wrote to Governor Dalling: "I want words
to express the obligations I owe to Captain Nelson. He was the first
on every service, whether by day or night. There was not a gun fired
but was pointed by him, or by Captain Despard, Chief Engineer."
Dalling, after some delay, wrote in the same sense to the Minister of
War in London, warmly recommending Nelson to the notice of the home
Government.

While the siege was in progress, Nelson received word of his
appointment to a better ship, the "Janus," of forty-four guns, and it
became necessary for him to join her. He left Fort San Juan only the
day before it surrendered, and returned to Jamaica; but his health now
gave way wholly, and his command of the "Janus," for the most part
merely nominal, soon came to an end altogether. Dalling had truly
said, "Captain Nelson's constitution is rather too delicate for
service in this northern ocean."[5] Before starting on the
expedition, he had himself written to his friend Locker: "If my health
is not much better than it is at present, I shall certainly come home
after this trip, as all the doctors are against my staying so long in
this country. You know my old complaint in my breast: it is turned out
to be the gout got there. I have twice been given over since you left
this country with that cursed disorder, the gout." In such weakness he
lived and worked through a month of a short campaign, in which, of the
"Hinchinbrook's" crew of two hundred, one hundred and forty-five were
buried in his time or that of his successor, Collingwood,--a mortality
which he justly cites as a further proof of the necessity for
expedition in such climates. But, though he survived, he escaped by
the skin of his teeth. Worn out by dysentery and fatigue, he was
carried ashore in his cot, and soon after taken to Sir Peter Parker's
house, where Lady Parker herself nursed him through. Her kindness to
him and his own debility are touchingly shown by a note written from
the mountains, where he was carried in his convalescence: "Oh, Mr.
Ross, what would I give to be at Port Royal! Lady Parker not here, and
the servants letting me lay as if a log, and take no notice." By
September, 1780, it was apparent that perfect restoration, without
change of climate, was impossible, and in the autumn, having been
somewhat over three years on the station, he sailed for home in the
"Lion," of sixty-four guns, Captain Cornwallis,[6] to whose careful
attention, as formerly to that of Captain Pigot, he gratefully
attributed his life. The expedition with which he had been associated
ended in failure, for although a part of the force pushed on to Lake
Nicaragua, sickness compelled the abandonment of the conquests, which
were repossessed by the Spaniards.

Arriving in England, Nelson went to Bath, and there passed through a
period of extreme suffering and tedious recovery. "I have been so ill
since I have been here," says one of his letters, "that I was obliged
to be carried to and from bed, with the most excruciating tortures."
Exact dates are wanting; but he seems to have been under treatment
near three months, when, on the 28th of January, 1781, he wrote to
Locker, in his often uncouth style: "Although I have not quite
recovered the use of my limbs, yet my inside is a new man;" and again,
three weeks later, "I have now the perfect use of all my limbs, except
my left arm, which I can hardly tell what is the matter with it. From
the shoulder to my fingers' ends are as if half dead." He remained in
Bath until the middle of March, latterly more for the mild climate
than because feeling the necessity of prosecuting his cure; yet that
his health was far from securely re-established is evident, for a
severe relapse followed his return to London. On the 7th of May, 1781,
he writes to his brother: "You will say, why does not he come into
Norfolk? I will tell you: I have entirely lost the use of my left arm,
and very near of my left leg and thigh." In estimating Nelson's
heroism, the sickly fragility of his bodily frame must be kept in
memory; not to excuse shortcomings of nerve or enterprise, for there
were none, but to exalt duly the extraordinary mental energy which
rather mocked at difficulties than triumphed over them.

While yet an invalid he had again applied for employment, and, as the
war was still raging, was appointed in August, 1781, to the
"Albemarle," a small frigate of twenty-eight guns. He was pleased with
the ship, the first commissioned by himself at home, with a long
cruise in prospect; and, together with his expressions of content with
her, there appears that manifestation of complete satisfaction with
his officers and crew, with those surrounding him as subordinates,
that so singularly characterized his habit of mind. "I have an
exceeding good ship's company. Not a man or officer in her I would
wish to change.... I am perfectly satisfied with both officers and
ship's company." Down to the month before Trafalgar, when, to the
bidding of the First Lord of the Admiralty to choose his own officers,
he replied, "Choose yourself, my lord; the same spirit actuates the
whole profession, you cannot choose wrong," there is rarely, it might
almost be said never, anything but praise for those beneath him. With
the "Agamemnon," "We are all well; indeed, nobody can be ill with my
ship's company, they are so fine a set." At the Nile, "I had the
happiness to command a band of brothers; therefore night was to my
advantage. Each knew his duty, and I was sure each would feel for a
French ship. _My friends_ readily conceived my plan." His ships in the
Mediterranean, in 1803, "are the best commanded and the very best
manned" in the navy. So his frequent praise of others in his
despatches and letters has none of the formal, perfunctory ring of an
official paper; it springs evidently from the warmest appreciation and
admiration, is heartfelt, showing no deceptive exterior, but the true
native fibre of the man, full of the charity which is kind and
thinketh no evil. It was not always so toward those above him. Under
the timid and dilatory action of Hotham and Hyde Parker, under the
somewhat commonplace although exact and energetic movements of Lord
Keith, he was restive, and freely showed what he felt. On the other
hand, around Hood and Jervis, who commanded his professional respect
and esteem, he quickly threw the same halo of excellence, arising from
his tendency to idealize, that colored the medium through which he
invariably saw the men whom he himself commanded. The disposition to
invest those near to him with merits, which must in part at least have
been imaginary, is a most noteworthy feature of his character, and
goes far to explain the attraction he exerted over others, the
enthusiasm which ever followed him, the greatness of his success, and
also, unhappily, the otherwise almost inexplicable but enduring
infatuation which enslaved his later years, and has left the most
serious blot upon his memory.

Though thus pleased with his surroundings, his own health continued
indifferent. He excuses himself for delay in correspondence, because
"so ill as to be scarce kept out of bed." In such a state, and for one
whose frame had been racked and weakened by three years spent in the
damp heat of the tropics, a winter's trip to the Baltic was hardly the
best prescription; but thither the "Albemarle" was sent,--"it would
almost be supposed," he wrote, "to try my constitution." He was away
on this cruise from October to December, 1781, reaching Yarmouth on
the 17th of the latter month, with a large convoy of a hundred and ten
sail of merchant-ships, all that then remained of two hundred and
sixty that had started from Elsinore on the 8th. "They behaved, as all
convoys that ever I saw did, shamefully ill; parting company every
day." After being several days wind-bound in Yarmouth Roads, he
arrived in the Downs on the first day of 1782. The bitter cold of the
North had pierced him almost as keenly as it did twenty years later in
the Copenhagen expedition. "I believe the Doctor has saved my life
since I saw you," he wrote to his brother. The ship was then ordered
to Portsmouth to take in eight months' provisions,--a sure indication
that she was intended for a distant voyage. Nelson himself surmised
that she would join the squadron of Sir Richard Bickerton, then
fitting out to reinforce the fleet in the East Indies. Had this
happened, he would have been on hand to hear much and perchance see
something of one of his own professional forerunners, the great French
Admiral Suffren, as well as of the latter's doughty antagonist, Sir
Edward Hughes; for Bickerton arrived in time to take part in the last
of the five pitched battles between those two hard fighters.
Unluckily, a severe accident had befallen the "Albemarle,"--a large
East Indiaman having dragged down upon her during a heavy gale in the
Downs. The injuries received by this collision were so extensive that
the ship was under repairs at Portsmouth for six weeks, during which
time Bickerton sailed.

While thus detained in one of the principal dockyards and naval
stations of the kingdom, another large detachment, belonging to the
Channel fleet, assembled before Nelson's eyes. It comprised twelve
sail-of-the-line, under Admiral Barrington; and among these was the
"Foudroyant," the most famous ship of her time, then commanded by
Captain John Jervis, with whom, as the Earl of St. Vincent, Nelson was
afterwards closely associated; but the young frigate captain did not
now come in contact with his stately superior, who in later years so
highly valued and loved him. It was for him still the day of small
things. Though thus thrown in the midst of the din and bustle of
extensive naval preparations, he had not the fortune to be directly
connected with them; and consequently no occasion arose for becoming
known to admirals who could recognize his worth, and give him the
opportunities without which distinction cannot be achieved. It is,
however, a significant and instructive fact that, while thus
persistently dissociated from the great operations then in progress,
and employed wholly in detached service, Nelson's natural genius for
war asserted itself, controlling the direction of his thoughts and
interests, and fixing them to that broad field of his profession from
which he was as yet debarred. "The height of his ambition," an
acquaintance of this period tells us, "was to command a line-of-battle
ship; as for prize money," for which frigates offered the best
chances, "it never entered his thoughts." A few months later, while
still in the "Albemarle," it was said of him by Lord Hood, the most
original tactician of the day, that he knew as much about naval
tactics as any officer in the fleet. When this high encomium was
bestowed, Nelson had barely passed his twenty-fourth birthday.

Meanwhile the "Albemarle" was again ordered upon convoy duty, this
time to Quebec. This destination also was distasteful on account of
the climate. "I want much to get off from this d----d voyage," he
wrote. "Mr. Adair," an eminent London surgeon, who the year before had
treated him for the paralysis of his limbs, "has told me that if I was
sent to a cold damp climate it would make me worse than ever." He
himself had scruples about applying for an exchange, and the efforts
of some friends who interfered proved useless. The "Albemarle" started
with a convoy of thirty-odd vessels on the 10th of April, 1782; and
after a short stop at Cork, anchored at St. John's, Newfoundland, on
May 27, whence she reached Quebec July 1. Three days later she again
sailed on a cruise that lasted over two months, spent chiefly about
Boston Bay and Cape Cod. During this time several enemy's vessels were
taken or destroyed; but, with the bad luck that so often followed
Nelson in the matter of prize-money, none of the captures reached
port, and the cruise was pecuniarily unprofitable. It afforded him,
however, an opportunity for displaying conduct and gaining deserved
reputation, which he valued more highly. On the 14th of August the
sudden lifting of a fog showed the "Albemarle" within gunshot of a
French squadron, of four ships-of-the-line and a frigate, that had
just come out of Boston. A close chase followed, lasting nine or ten
hours; but Nelson threw off the heavy ships by running among the
shoals of George's Bank, which he ventured to do, trusting to the cool
head and aptitude for pilotage acquired in earlier life. The frigate
followed warily, watching for a chance to strike at advantage; but
when the ships-of-the-line had been dropped far enough to be unable to
help their consort, the British vessel hove-to[7] in defiance, and the
enemy fell back upon his supports.

Shortly after this escape, so many of the ship's company fell ill
with scurvy that Nelson decided to go back to Quebec, where he arrived
on the 17th of September. "For eight weeks," he wrote, "myself and all
the officers lived upon salt beef; nor had the ship's company had a
fresh meal since the 7th of April." The fears for his health that he
had expressed before sailing from England had happily proved
groundless, and a month's stay in port which now followed, at the most
delightful and invigorating of the American seasons, wrought wonders
for him. His letters to Locker state that the voyage agreed with him
better than he had expected; while from the St. Lawrence he wrote to
his father, "Health, that greatest of blessings, is what I never truly
enjoyed until I saw _Fair_ Canada. The change it has wrought, I am
convinced, is truly wonderful." This happy result had been due, in
part at least, to surroundings that told favorably upon his sensitive
nervous system, and not to the bracing climate alone. He had been
actively occupied afloat, and had fallen desperately in love with a
fair Canadian, around whom his ardent imagination threw that glamour
of exaggerated charm in which he saw all who were dear to him, except
his wife. Her he seems from the first to have looked upon with
affection indeed, but without rapture or illusion. The Canadian affair
came near ending in an imprudent offer, from which he was with
difficulty deterred by a cool-headed friend. The story runs that, the
ship being ordered to New York and ready for sea, he had bidden her
good-bye and gone on board, expecting to sail next day; but that,
unable to bear the approaching separation, he returned to the city,
and was on his way to the lady's home when his friend met him.

Tearing himself away from his mistress by a violent effort, Nelson, on
the 20th of October, sailed for New York. Arriving on the 13th of
November, he found there a large part of the West India fleet, under
Lord Hood, who had been second in command to Rodney on the occasion
of the latter's celebrated victory over De Grasse in the previous
April. Rodney had since then been recalled to England, while Hood had
gone to Boston to look after a division of the beaten French fleet,
which was there refitting. He was now on his return to the islands,
where the enemy was expected to make a vigorous aggressive campaign
the following spring. Extensive preparations were in fact on foot for
the reduction of Jamaica, frustrated six months before by De Grasse's
mishap. Nelson thus found himself again in tantalizing contact with
the stirring circumstance that preludes hostilities, in which he
himself had little hope to share; for the "Albemarle" belonged to the
North American station, where all active naval operations had ceased
with the surrender of Cornwallis the year before. He went, therefore,
to Hood, and begged to be transferred to his squadron. In vain did
Admiral Digby, his own commander-in-chief, tell him that he was on a
good station for prize-money. "Yes," he replied, "but the West Indies
is the station for honour."

Digby was reluctant to part with a frigate, as all admirals were; but
Hood, either from an intuitive faculty for judging men, or from his
conversations with Nelson eliciting the latter's singular knowledge of
the higher part of his profession, wished to push an officer of so
much promise, and succeeded in obtaining the transfer of the
"Albemarle" to his squadron. "I am a candidate with Lord Hood for a
line-of-battle ship," wrote Nelson to Locker; "he has honoured me
highly, by a letter, for wishing to go off this station to a station
of service, and has promised me his friendship." A few months later he
wrote again: "My situation in Lord Hood's fleet must be in the highest
degree flattering to any young man. He treats me as if I were his son,
and will, I am convinced, give me anything I can ask of him." This was
really the beginning, the outstart, of Nelson's great career; for
Hood's interest in him, then aroused, and deepened by experience to
the utmost confidence and appreciation, made itself felt the instant
the French Revolutionary War began. Nelson then came at once under his
orders, went with him to the Mediterranean, and there speedily made
his mark, being transferred from admiral to admiral with ever-growing
tokens of reliance. Despite the lapse of time, and the long interval
of peace, it is no exaggeration to say that there is a direct
connection of cause and effect between his transfer to Hood's fleet,
in the harbor of New York, and the battle of Cape St. Vincent, in
1797, when he emerged from merely professional distinction to national
renown, standing head and shoulders above all competitors. In the four
days that followed his arrival in New York, Nelson took the tide at
the flood, and was borne on to fortune. Yet in this, as in many other
instant and happy decisions, we may not see the mere casting of a die,
the chance result of an irreflective impulse. The determination to
change into Hood's squadron, with its powerful, far-reaching effect
upon his future, was in necessary logical sequence to Nelson's whole
habit of thought, and wish, and previous preparation. He was swept
into the current that carried him on to fame by the irresistible
tendency of his own conscious will and cherished purpose. Opportunity
flitted by; he was ready, and grasped it.

At this turning-point the commendable diligence of his principal
biographers has again secured for us a striking description of the
young captain's personal appearance, and of the impression produced by
his manner upon an interested acquaintance, who afterwards became a
warm friend and admirer as well as a frequent correspondent. The
narrator--then Prince William Henry, afterwards King William IV.--gave
the following account, apparently at some period between 1805, when
Nelson fell, and 1809, when the first edition of Clarke and M'Arthur's
Life appeared. "I was then a midshipman on board the Barfleur," Lord
Hood's flagship, "lying in the Narrows off Staten Island, and had the
watch on deck, when Captain Nelson, of the Albemarle, came in his
barge alongside, who appeared to be the merest boy of a captain I ever
beheld; and his dress was worthy of attention. He had on a full-laced
uniform; his lank unpowdered hair was tied in a stiff Hessian tail, of
an extraordinary length; the old-fashioned flaps of his waistcoat
added to the general quaintness of his figure, and produced an
appearance which particularly attracted my notice; for I had never
seen anything like it before, nor could I imagine who he was, nor what
he came about. My doubts were, however, removed when Lord Hood
introduced me to him. There was something irresistibly pleasing in his
address and conversation; and an enthusiasm, when speaking on
professional subjects, that showed he was no common being." The
Countess of Minto, in her Life of Lord Minto, speaks of Nelson's
"shock head" at the time (1794) when he was a frequent visitor at the
house of Minto, then Sir Gilbert Elliott, and Viceroy of Corsica; a
trivial detail, but confirmatory, so far, of the picture drawn by the
prince. The latter continued: "Nelson, after this, went with us to the
West Indies, and served under Lord Hood's flag during his
indefatigable cruise off Cape François.... I found him warmly attached
to my father [King George III.], and singularly humane. He had the
honour of the King's service and the independence of the British navy
particularly at heart; and his mind glowed with this idea as much when
he was simply captain of the Albemarle, and had obtained none of the
honours of his Country, as when he was afterwards decorated with so
much well-earned distinction."

The war of 1778 was now fast drawing to its close; the preliminaries
of peace being signed in January, 1783, though not ratified till the
following September. Hood cruised off Cap François, a naval station of
the French at the west end of Haiti, to intercept the fleet from
Boston, which was understood to be on its way to the Caribbean; but
the enemy, learning his whereabouts, went through the Mona Passage,
east of the island, thus avoiding a meeting, and was next heard of by
the British as being off Curaçao far to the southward. Nelson,
therefore, had no opportunity to show his prowess in battle; and as
only three letters remain covering this uneventful period, little is
known of his movements, except that he made an abortive attempt to
recapture Turk's Island from the French with a small force of ships he
was able to gather at short notice. An interesting indication of the
spirit which animated him transpires in the first of the three letters
mentioned. He had received unexpected orders to wait in New York after
Hood's leaving. "I was to have sailed with the fleet this day, but for
some private reasons, when my ship was under sail from New York to
join Lord Hood, at Sandy Hook, I was sent for on shore, and told I was
to be kept forty-eight hours after the sailing of the fleet. It is
much to my private advantage," allowing more latitude for picking up
prizes, without having to share with the other ships, "but I had much
rather have sailed with the fleet." "Money," he continues, "is the
great object here," on the North American Station, "nothing else is
attended to,"--a motive of action which he always rejected with
disdain, although by no means insensible to the value of money, nor
ever thoroughly at his ease in the matter of income, owing largely to
the lavish liberality with which he responded to the calls upon his
generosity or benevolence. A year later he wrote in the same strain:
"I have closed the war without a fortune; but I trust, and, from the
attention that has been paid to me, believe, that there is not a speck
in my character. True honour, I hope, predominates in my mind far
above riches."

When news of the peace reached the West Indies, Hood was ordered to
return with his fleet to England. Nelson went home at the same time,
being directed first to accompany Prince William Henry in a visit to
Havana. The "Albemarle" reached Spithead on the 25th of June, 1783,
and was paid off a week later, her captain going on half-pay until the
following April. The cruise of nearly two years' duration closed with
this characteristic comment: "Not an officer has been changed, except
the second lieutenant, since the Albemarle was commissioned;
therefore, it is needless to say, I am happy in my ship's company."
And again he writes: "My ship was paid off last week, and in such a
manner that must flatter any officer, in particular in these turbulent
times. The whole ship's company offered, if I could get a ship, to
enter for her immediately." Nelson was keenly alive to the impolicy
and injury to the service involved in the frequent changes of officers
and men from ship to ship. "The disgust of the seamen to the Navy," he
wrote immediately after leaving the Albemarle, "is all owing to the
infernal plan of turning them over from ship to ship, so that men
cannot be attached to their officers, or the officers care twopence
about them." This element of personal attachment is never left out of
calculation safely.

Nelson was now nearly twenty-five. In direct achievement he had
accomplished little, and to most he was unknown; but he did not
deceive himself in believing that his reputation was established, and
his promise, as a capable man of action, understood by those who knew
him, and especially by the brilliant admiral under whom he had last
served. Within a week of his release from the ship Hood carried him to
Court, and presented him to the King,--an evident proof of his
approbation; and Nelson notes that the sovereign was exceedingly
attentive. The next few months were spent in London, or at his old
home in Norfolk, to which and to his family he was always fondly
attached. Toward the end of October he obtained a leave of absence, in
order to visit France and acquire the French language. His impressions
of that country, as far as he went,--from Calais to St. Omer,--are
given in lively enough style in a few letters; but they differ little
from what might be expected from any very young man deeply tinged with
insular prejudice. "I hate their country and their manners," he wrote,
soon after his return; and his biographers were quite right in saying
that he had been brought up in the old anti-Gallican school, with
prejudices not to be eradicated by a flying visit. He duly records his
disgust with two British naval captains, one of whom was afterwards
among his most valued and valuable friends, for wearing epaulettes, at
that time confined to the French service. "I hold them a little
_cheap_," he said, "for putting on any part of a Frenchman's uniform."

It is more interesting to notice that his impressionable fancy was
again taken by an attractive young Englishwoman, the daughter of a
clergyman named Andrews, living at St. Omer. "Two very beautiful young
ladies," he writes to Locker and to his brother; "I must take care of
my heart, I assure you." "My heart is quite secured against the French
beauties; I almost wish I could say as much for an English young lady,
the daughter of a clergyman, with whom I am just going to dine, and
spend the day. She has such accomplishments that, had I a million of
money, I am sure I should at this moment make her an offer of them."
"The most accomplished woman my eyes ever beheld," he repeats, a month
later. The sentimental raptures of a young man about a handsome girl
have in themselves too much of the commonplace to justify mention.
What is remarkable, and suggests an explanation of the deplorable
vagary of his later years, is that his attachment to his wife, even in
the days of courtship, elicited no such extravagance of admiration as
that into which he freely lapses in his earlier fancies, and yet more
in his last absorbing passion. Respect and tenderness for her he
certainly felt and expressed; but there is no indication that she ever
enkindled his ardent imagination, or filled for him the place of an
ideal, which his mental constitution imperatively demanded as an
object of worship. The present attachment went so far with him that he
wrote to his uncle William Suckling, asking for an allowance to enable
him to marry. "If nothing can be done for me," said he, gloomily, "I
know what I have to trust to. Life is not worth preserving without
happiness; and I care not where I may linger out a miserable
existence. I am prepared to hear your refusal, and have fixed my
resolution if that should happen.... I pray you may never know the
pangs which at this instant tear my heart." If, as is said by the
gentlemen into whose hands this letter passed, Suckling consented to
help him, as he certainly did at the time of his actual marriage, it
seems probable that the lady refused him.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The precise date of Nelson's entering the Navy, which would be that of
his being rated upon the books of the "Raisonnable," is not stated.
Accepting the times during which he was borne upon the books of different
ships, as given by Sir Harris Nicolas (Letters and Despatches of Lord
Nelson, vol. i. p. 4, note), and with them calculating back from October
15, 1773, the day mentioned by Nelson himself as that on which he was paid
off from the "Carcass" (Nicolas, p. 5), the date of entry upon the books of
the "Raisonnable" would be November 27, 1770; unless, which is unlikely,
there were any lost days. The news of the Port Egmont business reached
England in October, 1770. Clarke and M'Arthur (Life of Nelson, vol. i. p.
14, note) infer January 1, 1771, for his entry upon the "Raisonnable's"
books; but this would not allow the times which Nicolas gives with minute
exactness. For his actually joining the "Raisonnable" they give, loosely,
the spring of 1771,--March or April. This is very possible, as rating back,
for the sake of gaining constructive time needed to qualify for promotion,
was tolerated by the practice of the day.

[2] Clarke and M'Arthur, vol. i. p. 31.

[3] Collingwood was nearly fifty when he got his flag. Howe was forty-five,
St. Vincent fifty-three, Saumarez forty-four, Exmouth (Pellew) forty-eight.

[4] This appears certain from his letters of July 28 and August 12, which
explicitly mention that ship's absence.

[5] The Caribbean was formerly thus styled in contradistinction to the
South Sea, the Pacific, which was so called because its first discoverers
saw it to the south from the Isthmus.

[6] Cornwallis was an officer of marked gallantry and conduct, who
distinguished himself on several occasions, as captain, during the War of
1778, and as admiral during the wars of the French Revolution. He was
brother to Lord Cornwallis, who surrendered at Yorktown, in 1781.

[7] That is, stopped.




CHAPTER II.

THE CRUISE OF THE "BOREAS."--CONTROVERSY OVER THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE
NAVIGATION ACT.--RETURN TO ENGLAND.--RETIREMENT UNTIL THE OUTBREAK OF
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.--APPOINTED TO COMMAND THE "AGAMEMNON," 64.

1784-1793. AGE, 26-34.


Whatever the cause, Nelson's visit to France ended prematurely and
abruptly. Early in January, 1784, after an absence of two months, he
went back to England, announcing to his friends that his coming was
only temporary, partly on business, partly for treatment; for his
delicate health again occasioned him anxiety. "The frost, thank God,
is broke," he wrote; "cold weather is death to me." But even while
speaking confidently of his speedy return to the Continent, he dropped
a hint that he was disposed to resume the active pursuit of his
profession, although on leaving the "Albemarle," six months before, he
had said that he could not afford to live afloat, in peace times, in
the style then prevalent. "My stay in England will be but very short,
without the First Lord in the Admiralty thinks proper to employ me. I
shall offer my services." He did see Lord Howe, at that time First
Lord, asking him for a ship; and he renewed his cordial relations with
Hood, then living in London. On the 18th of March Howe appointed him
to the command of the frigate "Boreas." Occupation in peace, with a
reduced establishment, was not easy to get, and his brother, an
inveterate wirepuller, must needs know to whose favor Nelson owed it.
"You ask," replied the hero, "by what interest did I get a ship? I
answer, having served with credit was my recommendation to Lord Howe.
Anything in reason that I can ask, I am sure of obtaining from his
justice." The statement was no more than fair to Howe; but in his
knowledge of the merits of Nelson, whose claim lay rather in evident
promise than in conspicuous performance, we can probably trace the
friendly intervention of Lord Hood.

Nelson's wish was that the "Boreas" should go to the East Indies. To
this he inclined, apparently, because the station was to be under the
command of Commodore Cornwallis, in whose ship he had returned from
Jamaica as an invalid in 1780, and to whom on that occasion he was
indebted for the most friendly care. He was not long allowed to
indulge this hope, for five days after receiving his appointment he
wrote that the ship was bound to the Leeward Islands, and that he had
been asked to take as passengers the wife and family of the
commander-in-chief, Sir Richard Hughes, who had already gone out. In a
small vessel, for such the "Boreas" was, the request, which he could
not well refuse, gave Nelson cause of reasonable discontent, entailing
crowding and a large outlay of money. "I shall be pretty well filled
with _lumber_," he wrote; and later, on the voyage out, "I shall not
be sorry to part with them, although they are very pleasant, good
people; but they are an incredible expense." The incident, annoying
though it was, was not without compensations. After arriving on the
station, he soon became involved in a serious difference with Sir
Richard Hughes; and the latter, though a weak man and in the wrong,
might have acted more peremptorily, had he not laid himself under such
obligations. On the other hand, Lady Hughes, many years later, shortly
after Nelson's death, committed to writing some recollections of his
personal traits and actions during the passage, so characteristic,
even though trivial, that we could ill have spared them.

"I was too much affected when we met at Bath," wrote she to Mr.
Matcham, Nelson's brother-in-law, "to say every particular in which
was always displayed the infinite cleverness and goodness of heart of
our dearly beloved Hero. As a woman, I can only be a judge of those
things that I could comprehend--such as his attention to the young
gentlemen who had the happiness of being on his quarter-deck. It may
reasonably be supposed that among the number of thirty, there must be
timid as well as bold; the timid he never rebuked, but always wished
to show them he desired nothing of them that he would not instantly do
himself: and I have known him say, 'Well, Sir, I am going a race to
the masthead, and beg I may meet you there.' No denial could be given
to such a wish, and the poor fellow instantly began his march. His
Lordship never took the least notice with what alacrity it was done,
but when he met in the top, instantly began speaking in the most
cheerful manner, and saying how much a person was to be pitied that
could fancy there was any danger, or even anything disagreeable, in
the attempt. After this excellent example, I have seen the timid youth
lead another, and rehearse his captain's words. In like manner, he
every day went into the school-room, and saw them do their nautical
business, and at twelve o'clock he was the first upon deck with his
quadrant. No one there could be behindhand in their business when
their captain set them so good an example. One other circumstance I
must mention which will close the subject, which was the day we landed
at Barbadoes. We were to dine at the Governor's. Our dear captain
said, 'You must permit me, Lady Hughes, to carry one of my
aid-de-camps with me;' and when he presented him to the Governor, he
said, 'Your Excellency must excuse me for bringing one of my
midshipmen, as I make it a rule to introduce them to all the good
company I can, as they have few to look up to besides myself during
the time they are at sea.' This kindness and attention made the young
people adore him; and even his wishes, could they have been known,
would have been instantly complied with."

The charm and wisdom of such a bearing is patent; but it was the
natural character of the man that thus shone out, and no mere result
of conscientious care. To the last, through all his ill-health,
anxiety, and sufferings, the same genial sweetness of manner, the
outcome of an unaffected, cordial good-will to all, was shown to those
who came in contact with him. Captain Duff, who met him for the first
time three weeks before Trafalgar, and who fell in the battle, wrote
to his wife in almost the same words as Lady Hughes: "You ask me about
Lord Nelson, and how I like him. I have already answered that question
as every person must do that ever served under him. He is so good and
pleasant a man, that we all wish to do what he likes, without any kind
of orders. I have been myself very lucky with most of my admirals, but
I really think the present the pleasantest I have met with." There do,
it is true, occur in Nelson's letters occasional, though very rare,
expressions of that passing annoyance with individuals which is
inseparable from the close and long-continued contact of ship life.
Thus, shortly before leaving the "Boreas," he writes: "I begin to be
very strict in my Ship. Whenever I may set off in another, I shall be
indifferent whether I ever speak to an Officer in her, but upon duty."
One wonders what passing and soon forgotten breeze, was responsible
for this most un-Nelson-like outburst. But to the end it remained true
that between the officers and crews under Nelson's command and their
chief, there was always that cordial regard which can only spring from
the hearty sympathy of the commander with those beneath him.

While thoughtful and considerate, even to gentleness, for the weak and
dependent, the singular energy that quickened Nelson's frail and puny
frame showed itself on occasion in instant resentment of any official
slight to himself or his ship, or injury to the interests of the
country. During the "Boreas's" stay at Madeira, the British Consul
neglected to return his visit, on the plea that the Government allowed
him no boat. Nelson declined any further intercourse with him. While
lying in the Downs, he learns that sixteen British seamen are detained
by force on board a Dutch Indiaman. He requires their delivery to him;
and when their effects were withheld, on the alleged ground of their
being in debt to the ship, he stops all intercourse between it and the
shore, sending an armed cutter to enforce his order. "The Admiralty,"
he wrote, "have fortunately approved my conduct in the business," and
added grimly, "a thing they are not very guilty of where there is a
likelihood of a scrape." When entering the harbor of Fort Royal,
Martinique, the principal French island in the Lesser Antilles, the
officer at the citadel neglected to hoist the colors, a ceremonial
observance customary when a ship of war approached. Nelson at once
demanded an explanation and received ample amends; the offending party
being placed under arrest. To the governor of some of the British West
India islands, he wrote making suggestions for the better discharge of
certain duties, in which both of them were interested. He received, it
is said, a testy message that "old generals were not in the habit of
taking advice from young gentlemen." "I have the honour, Sir," replied
Nelson, "of being as old as the prime minister of England, and think
myself as capable of commanding one of his majesty's ships as that
minister is of governing the state;" and throughout he held to the
stand he had taken.

The most remarkable instance, however, of this promptness to assert
the dignity and rights of his official position, allowing no man to
despise his youth, occurred very soon after his arrival upon the
station, and brought him to a direct issue with his
commander-in-chief,--if not, indeed, with an authoritative precedent
set by so great a man as Lord Rodney. Young though he still was in
years,--only twenty-six,--Nelson was by date of commission the senior
captain in the small squadron, of some half-dozen vessels, to which
the economies of the administration had reduced the Leeward Islands
station. Being thus next in rank to the admiral, the latter, who made
his headquarters at Barbadoes in the southern part of the station,
sent him to the northern division, centring about the island of
Antigua. Having remained in harbor, as was usual, during the hurricane
months, Nelson cruised during the winter and until February, 1785,
when some damage received compelled the "Boreas" to put into Antigua
for repairs. Here he found a vessel of the squadron, whose own captain
was of course junior to him, flying a Commodore's broad pendant, which
asserted the official presence of a captain superior to himself in
rank and command, and duly qualified to give him orders. He at once
asked the meaning of this from the ship's proper commander, and was
informed by him that Captain Moutray, an old officer, twenty years his
senior on the post list, and then acting as Commissioner of the Navy,
a civil office connected with the dockyard at Antigua, had directed it
to be hoisted, and claimed to exercise control over all men-of-war in
the harbor, during the admiral's absence.

Nelson was not wholly unprepared for this, for Hughes had notified him
and the other captains that Moutray was authorized by himself to take
this step. Being then away from the island, he had replied guardedly
that if Commissioner Moutray _was put into commission_, he would have
great pleasure in serving under him,--thus reserving his decision to
the moment for action. He now took the ground that an officer not
commissioned afloat, but holding only a civil appointment, could not
exercise naval command,--that an order authorizing him to do so was
invalid,--that to entitle him to such command he must be put into
military commission by being attached to a ship in commission. He
therefore flatly declined to obey Moutray's orders, refusing to admit
his claim to be considered a commodore, or entitled to military
obedience, unless he produced a commission. This he held to when
Moutray gave him a written order to put himself under his command.

On technical points of this kind Nelson was a clear and accurate
thinker, and in the admiral he had to do with a muddle-headed,
irresolute superior. Hughes had already been badly worried and
prodded, on matters concerning his own neglected duties, by his
unquiet young subordinate, who was never satisfied to leave bad enough
alone, but kept raising knotty points to harass an easy-going old
gentleman, who wanted only to be allowed to shut his eyes to what went
on under his nose. He was now exasperated by Nelson's contumacy, but
he was also a little afraid of him, and supported his own order by no
more decisive action than laying the case before the Admiralty, who
informed Nelson that he should have referred his doubts to the
admiral, instead of deciding for himself in a matter that concerned
"the exercise of the functions of his [the admiral's] appointment."
This was rather begging the question, for Nelson expressed no doubts,
either to Hughes or in his explanatory letter to the Admiralty. The
latter in turn shirked thus the decision of the question,--for, if
Nelson was right, Hughes's order was illegal and not entitled to
obedience; if he was wrong, he had been guilty of flagrant
insubordination, and should have been sharply dealt with. The
Government probably thought that the admiral had blundered in
undertaking to give military authority to a civil official,--a step so
generally disastrous in experience that it is now explicitly forbidden
by the regulations of most navies. It is worthy of note that twenty
years later, when commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, Nelson
directed the captains of ships cruising in the Straits of Gibraltar
to consult on all occasions with the Commissioner of the Navy resident
in Gibraltar, as well as to receive his advice, if proffered,--adding
that the commissioner's opinion of their conduct would have great
weight with himself; but he did not put them under his orders.[8]

Reasoning from Nelson's position, as the pendant was flying without
proper authority on board a ship under his immediate command, he
should, as senior captain afloat, have gone further and hauled it
down. Of his authority to do so he felt no doubt, as is evident from
his letter to the Admiralty; but his motive for refraining was
characteristic. He was unwilling to wound Moutray; just as, before
Trafalgar, in direct disregard of the Admiralty's orders, he allowed
an admiral going home under charges to take with him his flagship, a
vessel of the first force and likely to be sorely needed in the
approaching battle, because he was reluctant to add to the distress
the officer was undergoing already. "I did not choose to order the
Commissioner's pendant to be struck, as Mr. Moutray is an old officer
of high military character; and it might hurt his feelings to be
supposed wrong by so young an officer." The question solved itself
shortly by the Commissioner's returning to England; but the
controversy seems to have made no change in the friendly and even
affectionate relations existing between him and his wife and Nelson.
For Mrs. Moutray the latter had formed one of those strong idealizing
attachments which sprang up from time to time along his path. "You may
be certain," he writes to his brother at the very period the
discussion was pending, "I never passed English Harbour without a
call, but alas! I am not to have much comfort. My dear, sweet friend
is going home. I am really an April day; happy on her account, but
truly grieved were I only to consider myself. Her equal I never saw in
any country or in any situation. If my dear Kate [his sister] goes to
Bath next winter she will be known to her, for my dear friend promised
to make herself known. What an acquisition to any female to be
acquainted with, what an example to take pattern from." "My sweet,
amiable friend sails the 20th for England. I took my leave of her
three days ago with a heavy heart. What a treasure of a woman."
Returning to Antigua a few weeks later, he writes again in a
sentimental vein very rare in him: "This country appears now
intolerable, my dear friend being absent. It is barren indeed. English
Harbour I hate the sight of, and Windsor I detest. I went once up the
hill to look at the spot where I spent more happy days than in any one
spot in the world. E'en the trees drooped their heads, and the
tamarind tree died:--all was melancholy: the road is covered with
thistles; let them grow. I shall never pull one of them up." His
regard for this attractive woman seems to have lasted through his
life; for she survived him, and to her Collingwood addressed a letter
after Trafalgar, giving some particulars of Nelson's death. Her only
son also died under the latter's immediate command, ten years later,
when serving in Corsica.

The chief interest of the dispute over Moutray's position lies not in
the somewhat obscure point involved, but in the illustration it
affords of Nelson's singular independence and tenacity in a matter of
principle. Under a conviction of right he throughout life feared no
responsibility and shrank from no consequences. It is difficult for
the non-military mind to realize how great is the moral effort of
disobeying a superior, whose order on the one hand covers all
responsibility, and on the other entails the most serious personal and
professional injury, if violated without due cause; the burden of
proving which rests upon the junior. For the latter it is, justly and
necessarily, not enough that his own intentions or convictions were
honest: he has to show, not that he meant to do right, but that he
actually did right, in disobeying in the particular instance. Under no
less rigorous exactions can due military subordination be maintained.
The whole bent of advantage and life-long training, therefore, draws
in one direction, and is withstood by nothing, unless either strong
personal character supplies a motive, or established professional
standing permits a man to presume upon it, and to exercise a certain
right to independence of action. At this time Nelson was practically
unknown, and in refusing compliance with an order he took a risk that
no other captain on the station would have assumed, as was shown by
their failure a few months later to support their convictions in an
analogous controversy, upon which Nelson had entered even before the
Moutray business. In both cases he staked all upon legal points,
considered by him vital to the welfare of the navy and the country.
The spirit was identically the same that led him to swing his ship out
of the line at Cape St. Vincent without waiting for signals. After
that day and the Nile he could afford to take liberties, and sometimes
took them with less justification than in his early career.

When the Moutray question arose, Nelson was already engaged in a more
far-reaching dispute, not only with his commander-in-chief, but with
the colonial authorities and the popular sentiment of the West India
Islands. Like most men, great and small, he shared the prepossessions
of his day and generation; differing, however, from others, in that he
held his opinions as principles, from asserting which he was not to be
deterred by the ill-will or dislike of those immediately about him.
Upon arriving in the West Indies he found nourishing a system of trade
extremely beneficial to the islands, but which his education condemned
as hurtful to Great Britain, as it certainly was contrary to then
existing laws that had for a century previous regulated the commerce
of the kingdom. In 1784, a year only had elapsed since the United
States had been formally recognized as independent, thereby becoming,
in British estimation as well as in their own, a nation foreign to the
British flag. By the Navigation Laws, first established by Cromwell,
but continued under the restored monarchy without serious modification
until 1794, trade with the Colonies was reserved to vessels built in
Great Britain or her dependencies, and manned in three-fourths part by
British subjects. The chief object and advantage of the law were
conceived to be, not merely a monopoly of the trade,--concerning the
economical wisdom of which serious doubts began to be felt,--but the
fostering of the British merchant service as a nursery of seamen, upon
whom, in time of war, the navy could draw. The military strength of
the Empire was thought to be involved in the enforcement of the
Navigation Act.[9]

Before the United States declared their independence, they, as British
colonies, enjoyed the privilege of trading with their fellow-colonists
under what was then the common flag; and the nearness of the two
regions contributed to the advantage of both in this traffic, in which
the continental communities were the chief suppliers of many articles
essential to the islands, notably provisions and lumber. This mutual
intercourse and dependence promoted a sympathy which was scarcely
disguised in the West Indies during the War of Independence; indeed,
Nelson wrote that many of the inhabitants were as arrant rebels as
those who had renounced their allegiance. Under these conditions, when
peace was restored, the old relations were readily resumed; and as
there had really been considerable inconvenience and loss to the
islanders from the deprivation of American products, the renewal was
eagerly promoted by popular sentiment. The local authorities, as
usual and natural, yielded to the pressure around them, and in entire
disregard of the known policy of the home government permitted
American vessels to trade openly under their own colors. In Jamaica
the governor had even gone so far as to authorize formally a free
trade, during pleasure, with the United States, contrary to the
explicit orders of his superiors in Great Britain. Where scruples were
felt or hesitation was shown, advantage was taken of the exceptions of
the law, which allowed vessels in distress to sell so much of their
cargoes as would pay for necessary repairs. With the tendency of
commerce to evade restrictions by liberal stretching of the
conscience, the merchant captain and the colonial officer found little
difficulty in arranging that the damage should be great enough to
cover the sale of the whole lading.

After laying up in Antigua during the hurricane season of 1784, Nelson
was summoned to Barbadoes in November, with the other captains, to
receive orders for the winter's cruising. These, when issued, were
found to direct only the examination of anchorages, and the gathering
of information about supplies of wood and water. Nelson's attention
had been drawn already to the American traffic; and he, with his
friend Collingwood, who was again on the station, went to the admiral,
and urged that it was the duty of ships of war to enforce the
Navigation Laws. The admiral professed ignorance of these; and Nelson
himself remarks that British vessels up to that time had been so much
cheaper built than others, that they had, without artificial
protection, naturally absorbed their own colonial trade,--the
question, therefore, had dropped out of sight till it was revived by
American competition. A copy of the Act being then produced, Hughes
gave an order requiring his vessels to enforce it; making special
mention of the changed relations of the United States to Great
Britain, whereby they were "to be considered as foreigners, and
excluded from all commerce with the islands in these seas."

With these instructions Nelson sailed again for the north, where the
Virgin Islands, with those of Montserrat, Nevis, and St. Christopher,
were put under his especial charge,--the sloop "Rattler," Captain
Wilfred Collingwood, a brother of the well-known admiral, being
associated with the "Boreas." At first the two officers confined their
action to warning off American vessels, and at times forcing them to
leave ports where they had anchored; but they found that either the
vessels returned during the absence of the ships of war, or that
permissions to land, upon what they thought trivial grounds, were
given by the Customs' officials, in virtue of the exceptions to the
law above mentioned.

There matters stood until the 11th of January, 1785, Nelson acting by
the authority of the commander-in-chief, but exercising his own
discretion, and with forbearance, in carrying out his instructions. On
the day named he received another order from the admiral, modifying
the first upon the grounds of a more mature consideration, and of "the
opinion of the King's Attorney-General" in the islands. Nelson was now
directed, in case of a foreign merchant-ship coming within the limits
of his station, to cause her to anchor near his own vessel and to
report her arrival, and situation in all respects, to the governor of
the colony where he then was; "and if, after such report shall have
been made and received, the governor or his representative shall think
proper to admit the said foreigner into the port or harbour of the
island where you may be, _you are on no account to hinder or prevent
such foreign vessel from going in accordingly, or to interfere any
further in her subsequent proceedings_."

Here the admiral not only raised, but also decided, the point as to
whether the enforcement of the Navigation Act rested with naval
officers, or was vested only in the civil authorities of the islands.
Nelson was convinced that an essential part of the duty of ships of
war, and especially when peace took from them so much of their
military function, was to afford to the commerce of the nation proper
protection, of which a necessary feature, according to the ideas of
the age, was the interdiction of foreign traders. A seaman, he
plausibly argued, could decide better than an unprofessional man the
questions of injuries and distress upon which the unlawful traffic
largely hinged. "In judging of their distress, no person can know
better than the sea officers," he wrote to Hughes. "The governors may
be imposed upon by false declarations; we, who are on the spot,
cannot." He was aware, also, that a petition for relaxing the Act in
favor of the American trade with the West Indies had been referred to
the home government, by which it had been explicitly rejected.
Strengthened by this knowledge, but actuated, after all, chiefly by
his invariable resoluteness to assume responsibility where he felt he
was right, he replied to the admiral's letter with a clear statement
of the facts, concluding with the words: "Whilst I have the honour to
command an English man-of-war, I never shall allow myself to be
subservient to the will of any Governor, nor coöperate with him in
doing _illegal acts_.... If I rightly understand your order of the
29th of December, it is founded upon an Opinion of the King's
Attorney-General, viz.: 'That it is legal for Governors or their
representatives to admit foreigners into the ports of their
government, if they think fit.' How the King's Attorney-General
conceives he has a right to give an illegal opinion, which I assert
the above is, he must answer for. I know the Navigation Laws." As he
summed up the matter in a letter to his friend Locker: "Sir Richard
Hughes was a delicate business. I must either disobey my orders, or
disobey Acts of Parliament, which the admiral was disobeying. I
determined upon the former, trusting to the uprightness of my
intention. In short, I wrote the Admiral that I should decline obeying
his orders, till I had an opportunity of seeing and talking to him, at
the same time making him an apology."

Hughes's first impulse was to supersede his recalcitrant subordinate,
and bring him to trial. He learned, however, that many of the other
captains, of whom the court must be formed, shared his junior's views,
although they shrank, with the submissiveness of military men, from
the decisive act of disobedience. The result of a trial must therefore
be doubtful. He was, moreover, a fiddler, as Nelson continually styled
him, shifting back and forth, from opinion to opinion, and to be
relied upon for only one thing,--to dodge responsibility, if possible.
Consequently, no official action was taken; the commander-in-chief
contented himself with washing his hands of all accountability. He had
given orders which would clear himself, in case Nelson's conduct was
censured in England. If, on the contrary, it was approved, it would
redound to the credit of the station.

The matter was soon brought to a test. The governors and all the
officials, particularly of the Custom House, resented the action of
the naval officers; but the vigilance of the latter so seriously
interrupted the forbidden traffic under American colors, that recourse
was had to giving British registers to the vessels concerned, allowing
them to trade under British flags. This, however, was equally contrary
to the Navigation Act, which forbade British registry to foreign-built
ships, except when prizes taken in war; and the disguise wast too thin
to baffle men like Collingwood and Nelson. The latter reported the
practice to the home Government, in order that any measures deemed
necessary might be taken. Meanwhile he patiently persisted in turning
away all vessels, not British built, which he encountered, confining
himself for the time to this merely passive prevention; but finding at
last that this was not a sufficient deterrent, he gave notice that
after the 1st of May, 1785, he would seize all American vessels
trading to the islands, "let them be registered by whom they might."
Accordingly, on the 2d of May he arrested an American-built schooner,
owned in Philadelphia and manned entirely by Americans, but having a
British register issued at the island of St. Christopher.

The Crown lawyer was now called upon to prosecute the suit. He
expressed grave doubts as to a naval captain's power to act by virtue
simply of his commission, the sole authority alleged by the captor;
and, although he proceeded with the case, his manner so betrayed his
uncertainty that Nelson felt it necessary to plead for himself. To the
confusion of all opponents the judge decided in his favor, saying he
had an undoubted right to seize vessels transgressing the Navigation
Laws. The principle thus established, Nelson on the 23d of the same
month, at the island of Nevis, upon the same grounds, seized four
vessels,--one of which had been registered at Dominica by Governor
Orde, a naval captain senior in rank to himself, and with whom he came
into unpleasant contact upon several occasions in his later life.

There was no serious question as to the condemnation of the four last
seizures, the facts being clear and the principle settled;[10] but the
rage of the inhabitants of Nevis led them to seek revenge upon Nelson
for the injury they could no longer prevent. He had summoned the
masters of the ships on board the "Boreas," and, after satisfying
himself that the vessels were not entitled to British registers, had
sent marines to hold them, and to prevent essential witnesses from
leaving them, until the cases were tried. Upon these circumstances was
based an accusation of assault and imprisonment, the masters swearing
that they had made their statements under bodily fear. Writs were
issued against Nelson, damages being laid at four thousand pounds, a
sum which to him meant ruin. Although he asserted that there was
absolutely no truth in the charges, which are certainly in entire
contradiction to the general, if not invariable, tenor of his life and
conduct, he was advised by the Crown lawyers not to subject himself to
trial, as in the state of public feeling he could not expect a fair
verdict. To avoid arrest, he was forced to confine himself to the ship
for seven weeks, during which the marshal made several attempts to
serve the writ, but without success. On the day that the case of the
seized ships came up, he was able to be present in court only by the
safe conduct of the judge.

Two days after the seizure of the four vessels, Sir Richard Hughes,
who was making a tour of the station under his command, arrived at
Nevis; but he had no support to give his zealous lieutenant. "He did
not appear to be pleased with my conduct," wrote Nelson to Locker. "At
least he did not approve it, but told me I should get into a scrape.
Seven weeks I was kept a close prisoner to my ship; nor did I ever
learn that the admiral took any steps for my release. He did not even
acquaint the Admiralty Board how cruelly I had been treated; nor of
the attempts which had been made to take me out of my ship by force,
and that indignity offered under the fly of his flag." "I had the
governor, the Customs, all the planters upon me; subscriptions were
soon filled to prosecute; and my admiral stood neuter, although his
flag was then in the roads." To this lack of countenance on the part
of his superior, and direct persecution by those injuriously affected
by his action, there was added a general social ostracism, to which he
frequently alludes, and which was particularly emphasized by its
contrast with the habits of hospitality prevalent among the small and
wealthy planter community. One friend, however, stood by him, and
offered to become his bail in the sum of ten thousand pounds,--Mr.
Herbert, the President of Nevis, and one of the wealthiest men in the
island. He had, Nelson said, suffered more than any one else from the
interruption of the trade, but he considered that the young captain
had done only his duty. Possibly there may have been a warmer feeling
underlying this esteem, for he was the uncle of the lady whom Nelson
afterwards married, and to whom he seems to have been paying attention
already.

Despite his indomitable pluck and resolve, the confinement,
uncertainty, and contention told heavily on Nelson's health and
spirits. His temper was too kindly and social not to feel the general
alienation. It could not affect his purpose; but the sense of
right-doing, which sustained him in that, did not make his road
otherwise easier. It is, indeed, especially to be noticed that there
was not in him that hard, unyielding fibre, upon which care, or
neglect, or anxiety, makes little impression. He was, on the contrary,
extremely sympathetic, even emotional; and although insensible to
bodily fear, he was by no means so to censure, or to risk of other
misfortune. To this susceptibility to worry, strong witness is borne
by an expression of his, used at the very time of which we are now
writing. One of his friends--Captain Pole of the Navy--had detained
and sent in a neutral vessel for breach of belligerent rights. After
long legal proceedings, extending over five years, she was condemned,
and proved to be a very valuable prize to the captors. "Our friend
Charles Pole," he writes, "has been fortunate in his trial; but the
lottery is so very much against an officer, that never will I
knowingly involve myself in a doubtful cause. Prize-money is doubtless
very acceptable; but my mind would have suffered so much, that no
pecuniary compensation, at so late a period, would have made me
amends." Contrasting this utterance with the resolution shown by him
at this time, in fighting what he considered the cause of his country
in the West Indies, it can be seen how much stronger with him was the
influence of duty than that exercised by any considerations of merely
material advantage. In the one he could find support; in the other
not. But in neither case was he insensible to care, nor could he
escape the physical consequences of anxiety upon a delicate frame and
nervous organization. Of this, his harassment in the pursuit of the
French fleet in 1798, during Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition, gave a
very conspicuous illustration.

With such a temperament, being now very much in the position of an
individual fighting a corporation, he appealed to the home Government;
addressing, on the 29th of June, 1785, a memorial to the King, setting
forth the facts of the case, as already given, adding that his health
was much impaired, and asking for assistance. He received a reply to
this in the following September, informing him that the King had
directed that he should be defended by the Crown lawyers. This implied
approval of his course was succeeded, in November, by a letter from
the Secretary of the Treasury, through the usual official channels of
the Admiralty, acquainting him that the Government was "of opinion
that the commander-in-chief of the Leeward Islands, and officers under
him, have shown a very commendable zeal, in endeavouring to put a stop
to the very illicit practices which were carrying on in the islands,
in open violation of the law, and to the great detriment of the
navigation and trade of his Majesty's dominions." Verily, Hughes had
his reward. Here he was commended in express terms for doing that
which he had been too prudent to do, for zeal which he had never
shown, for maintaining a law which he had given orders not to
maintain. "I own I was surprised," wrote Nelson, "that the
commander-in-chief should be thanked for an act which he did not
order, but which, if I understand the meaning of words, by his order
of the 29th December, 1784, he ordered not to be." "To the end of the
station,[11] his order of the 29th of December was never repealed, so
that I always acted with a rod over me." How heavily the
responsibility he assumed was felt by others, is clearly shown in
another statement made by him. "The Captains Collingwood were the only
officers, with myself, who ever attempted to hinder the illicit trade
with America; _and I stood singly with respect to seizing_, for the
other officers were fearful of being brought into scrapes."

Backed by the royal approval, and with his legal expenses guaranteed,
Nelson's course was now smooth. He continued in all parts of the
station to suppress the contraband trade, and his unpopularity, of
course, also continued; but excitement necessarily subsided as it
became clear that submission was unavoidable, and as men adapted
themselves to the new conditions. The whole procedure now looks
somewhat barbarous and blundering, but in no essential principle
differs from the methods of protection to which the world at present
seems again tending. It is not for us to throw stones at it. The
results, then, were completely successful, judged by the standards of
the time. "At this moment," wrote Nelson some few months later, "there
are nearly fifty sail employed in the trade between the Islands of St.
Kitts, Nevis, and America, which are truly British built, owned, and
navigated. Had I been an idle spectator, my firm belief is that not a
single vessel would have belonged to those islands in the foreign
trade." His own action was further endorsed by the ministry, which now
gave captains of ships-of-war much more extensive powers, thereby
justifying his contention that it was within their office to enforce
the Navigation Act. Nor was this increased activity of the executive
branch of the government the only result of Nelson's persistence. His
sagacious study of the whole question, under the local conditions of
the West Indies, led to his making several suggestions for more surely
carrying out the spirit of the Law; and these were embodied the next
year in a formal Act of the Legislature.

With so vivid a career as that of Nelson ahead, the delay imposed by
this wrangling episode is somewhat dreary; but it undeniably shows his
characteristics in the strongest light. Duty, not ease; honor, not
gain; the ideal, not the material,--such, not indeed without frailty
and blemish, were ever his motives. And, while he craved his reward in
the approval and recognition of those around and above him, he could
find consolation for the lack of them in his own sense of right-doing.
"That thing called Honour," he writes to a friend soon after the
"Boreas" cruise, "is now, alas! thought of no more. My integrity
cannot be mended, I hope; but my fortune, God knows, has grown worse
for the service; so much for serving my country. But I have invariably
laid down, and followed close, a plan of what ought to be uppermost in
the breast of an officer: that it is much better to serve an
ungrateful Country than to give up his own fame. Posterity will do him
justice; a uniform conduct of honour and integrity seldom fails of
bringing a man to the goal of fame at last."

This struggle with Sir Richard Hughes, in which Nelson took the
undesirable, and to a naval officer invidious, step of disobeying
orders, showed clearly, not only the loftiness of his motives, but the
distinguishing features which constituted the strength of his
character, both personal and military. There was an acute perception
of the right thing to do, an entire readiness to assume all the
responsibility of doing it, and above all an accurate judgment of the
best way to do it,--to act with impunity to himself and with most
chances of success to his cause. Its analogy to a military situation
is striking. There was a wrong condition of things to be righted--a
victory to be won. To achieve this a great risk must be taken, and he
was willing to take it; but in so doing he made such choice of his
ground as to be practically unassailable--to attain his end without
lasting harm to himself. That Nelson would have managed better had he
been ten years older is very probable. Likely enough he betrayed some
of the carelessness of sensibilities which the inexperience of youth
is too apt to show towards age; but, upon a careful review of the
whole, it appears to the writer that his general course of action was
distinctly right, judged by the standards of the time and the
well-settled principles of military obedience, and that he pursued an
extremely difficult line of conduct with singular resolution, with
sound judgment, and, in the main, with an unusual amount of tact,
without which he could scarcely have failed, however well purposing,
to lay himself open to serious consequences. Certainly he achieved
success.

It was in the midst of this legal warfare, and of the preoccupations
arising from it, that Nelson first met the lady who became his wife.
She was by birth a Miss Frances Woolward, her mother being a sister of
the Mr. Herbert already mentioned as President of the Council in
Nevis. She was born in the first half of 1758,[12] and was therefore a
few months older than Nelson. In 1779 she had married Dr. Josiah
Nisbet, of Nevis, and the next year was left a widow with one son, who
bore his father's full name. After her husband's death, being
apparently portionless, she came to live with Herbert, who looked
upon and treated her as his own child, although he also had an only
daughter. When Nelson first arrived at Nevis, in January, 1785,[13]
she was absent, visiting friends in a neighboring island, so that they
did not then meet,--a circumstance somewhat fortunate for us, because
it led to a description of him being sent to her in a letter from a
lady of Herbert's family, not improbably her cousin, Miss Herbert.
Nelson had then become a somewhat conspicuous factor in the contracted
interests of the island society, owing to the stand he had already
publicly assumed with reference to the contraband trade. People were
talking about him, although he had not as yet enforced the extreme
measures which made him so unpopular. "We have at last," so ran the
letter, "seen the little captain of the Boreas of whom so much has
been said. He came up just before dinner, much heated, and was very
silent; but seemed, according to the old adage, to think the more. He
declined drinking any wine; but after dinner, when the president, as
usual, gave the three following toasts, 'the King,' 'the Queen and
Royal Family,' and 'Lord Hood,' this strange man regularly filled his
glass, and observed that those were always bumper toasts with him;
which, having drank, he uniformly passed the bottle, and relapsed into
his former taciturnity. It was impossible, during this visit, for any
of us to make out his real character; there was such a reserve and
sternness in his behaviour, with occasional sallies, though very
transient, of a superior mind. Being placed by him, I endeavoured to
rouse his attention by showing him all the civilities in my power; but
I drew out little more than 'Yes' and 'No.' If you, Fanny, had been
there, we think you would have made something of him, for you have
been in the habit of attending to these odd sort of people."

Mrs. Nisbet very quickly made something of him. Little direct
description has been transmitted to us concerning the looks or
characteristics of the woman who now, at the time when marriage was
possible to him, had the misfortune to appear in the line of
succession of Nelson's early fancies, and to attract the too easily
aroused admiration and affection of a man whose attachment she had not
the inborn power to bind. That Nelson was naturally inconstant, beyond
the volatility inherent in youth, is sufficiently disproved by the
strength and endurance of his devotion to the one woman, in whom he
either found or imagined the qualities that appealed to the heroic
side of his character. How completely she mastered all the approaches
to his heart, and retained her supremacy, once established, to the
end, is evidenced by the whole tenor of his correspondence with her,
by his mention of her in letters to others, by the recorded
expressions he used in speaking to or about her. Despite all that he
certainly knew of her, and much more that it is unreasonable to doubt
he must have known of her history, there is no mistaking the profound
emotions she stirred in his spirit, which show themselves continually
in spontaneous outbreaks of passionate fondness and extravagant
admiration, whose ring is too true and strong for doubt concerning
their reality to find a place.

Many men are swayed by strong and wayward impulses; but to most the
fetters imposed by social conventions, by inherited or implanted
standards of seemliness and decorum, suffice to steady them in the
path of outward propriety. Of how great and absorbing a passion Lord
Nelson was capable is shown by the immensity of the sacrifice that he
made to it. Principle apart,--and principle wholly failed him,--all
else that most appeals to man's self-respect and regard for the esteem
of others was powerless to exert control. Loyalty to friendship, the
sanctity which man is naturally fain to see in the woman he loves,
and, in Nelson's own case, a peculiar reluctance to wound
another,--all these were trampled under foot, and ruthlessly piled on
the holocaust which he offered to her whom he worshipped. He could
fling to the winds, as others cannot, considerations of interest or
expediency, as he flung them over and over in his professional career.
My motto, he said once and again, is "All or nothing." The same
disregard of consequences that hazarded all for all, in battle or for
duty, broke through the barriers within which prudence, reputation,
decency, or even weakness and cowardice, confine the actions of lesser
men. And it must be remembered that the admitted great stain upon
Nelson's fame, which it would be wicked to deny, lies not in a general
looseness of life, but in the notoriety of one relation,--a notoriety
due chiefly to the reckless singleness of heart which was not ashamed
to own its love, but rather gloried in the public exhibition of a
faith in the worthiness of its object, and a constancy, which never
wavered to the hour of his death.[14] The pitifulness of it is to see
the incongruity between such faith, such devotion, and the distasteful
inadequacy of their object.

To answer the demands of a nature capable of such energetic
manifestation--to fulfil the imagination of one who could so cast
himself at the feet of an ideal--was beyond the gentle, well-ordered,
and somewhat prosaic charms with which alone Mrs. Nisbet was invested
by Nelson, even when most loverlike in tone. "My greatest wish," he
writes in the first of his letters to her that has been preserved,
"is to be united to you; and the foundation of all conjugal happiness,
real love and esteem, is, I trust, what you believe I possess in the
strongest degree toward you." Fifteen months later, and but a short
time before their wedding, he says again: "His Royal Highness often
tells me, he believes I am married; for he never saw a lover so easy,
or say so little of the object he has a regard for. When I tell him I
certainly am not, he says, 'Then he is sure I must have a great esteem
for you, and that it is not what is (vulgarly), I do not much like the
use of that word, called love.' He is right: my love is founded on
esteem, the only foundation that can make the passion last." But
general maxims, even when less disputable than this, do not admit of
universal application; and if an affection was to hold its own in a
nature enthusiastic and imaginative as that of Nelson, it had need to
strike root deeper than that surface soil indicated by mere esteem, at
least when the latter rests simply upon an assemblage of upright and
amiable qualities, and not upon that force of character which compels
dependence as well as appreciation. At their last parting he solemnly
avowed that his esteem was not lessened; while he was destined also to
afford a conspicuous illustration of how enduring a passion may
flourish where no just title to esteem exists.

The progress of his wooing was rapid enough. On the 12th of May he
mentions their first meeting; on the 28th of June he writes to his
brother: "_Entre, nous_.--Do not be surprised to hear I am a
_Benedict_, for if at all, it will be before a month. Do not tell." On
the 11th of September is dated his first letter to her, already
quoted, in which he addresses her as "My dear Fanny," and alludes to
the understanding existing between them. At the expiration of six
months he wrote, formally announcing his engagement, to Mr. William
Suckling, his mother's brother. He anticipates the latter's doubts as
to the permanence of this fancy: "This Horatio, you will say, is for
ever in love;" but he considers that six months without change
settles that question. "My present attachment is of pretty long
standing; but I was determined to be fixed before I broke this matter
to any person." He then explains the situation,--that the lady herself
has little or nothing; that Mr. Herbert, though rich, is not likely to
help the young couple much, and he asks his uncle's assistance. This
Suckling consented to give, and for several years continued liberally
to extend. But still, impatient though Nelson always was to complete
whatever he had on hand, various causes delayed the wedding for
another year. Even with Suckling's help the question of means was
pressing; and while, with pardonable self-justification, he gloried to
his betrothed that "the world is convinced that I am superior to
pecuniary considerations in my public and private life, as in both
instances I might have been rich," he nevertheless owned to regretting
that he "had not given greater attention to making money." Besides, as
he wrote to his brother, "What should I do carrying a wife in a ship,
and when I marry I do not mean to part with my wife." The cruising
duty of the "Boreas" took her from port to port of the limited area
embraced in the Leeward Islands Station, and Nevis was among the least
important of the points demanding his attention. He was, therefore,
frequently away from his betrothed during this period, and absence
rather fanned than cooled the impetuous ardor which he carried into
all his undertakings. Whether it were the pursuit of a love affair, or
the chase of an enemy's fleet, delays served only to increase the
vehemence with which Nelson chafed against difficulties. "Duty," he
tells Mrs. Nisbet, "is the great business of a sea officer,--all
private considerations must give way to it, however painful it is;"
but he owns he wishes "the American vessels at the Devil, and the
whole continent of America to boot," because they detain him from her
side.

There is no singularity in the experience that obstacles tend rather
to inflame than to check a lover's eagerness. What is noteworthy in
Nelson's letters at this time is the utter absence of any illusions,
of any tendency to exaggerate and glorify the qualities of the woman
who for the nonce possessed his heart. There is not a sign of the
perturbation of feeling, of the stirring of the soul, that was
afterwards so painfully elicited by another influence. "The dear
object," he writes to his brother, "you must like. Her sense, polite
manners, and, to you I may say, beauty, you will much admire. She
possesses sense far superior to half the people of our acquaintance,
and her manners are Mrs. Moutray's." The same calm, measured tone
pervades all his mention of her to others. His letters to herself, on
the other hand, are often pleasing in the quiet, simple, and generally
unaffected tenderness which inspires them. In a more ordinary man,
destined to more commonplace fortunes, they might well be regarded as
promising that enduring wedded love which strikes root downward and
bears fruit upward, steadily growing in depth and devotion as the
years roll by. But Nelson was not an ordinary man, and from that more
humble happiness a childless marriage further debarred him. He could
rise far higher, and, alas! descend far lower as he followed the
radiant vision,--the image of his own mind rather than an external
reality,--the ideal, which, whether in fame or in love, beckoned him
onward. The calm, even, and wholly matter-of-fact appreciation of his
wife's estimable traits can now be seen in the light of his after
career, and its doubtful augury descried; for to idealize was an
essential attribute of his temperament. Her failure, even in the
heyday of courtship, to arouse in him any extravagance of emotion, any
illusive exaltation of her merits, left vacant that throne in his mind
which could be permanently occupied only by a highly wrought
excellence,--even though that were the purely subjective creation of
his own enthusiasm. This hold Lady Nelson never gained; and the long
absence from 1793 to 1797, during the opening period of the war of the
French Revolution, probably did to death an affection which owed what
languid life it retained chiefly to propinquity and custom. Both
Saumarez and Codrington, who served under him, speak passingly of the
lightness with which his family ties sat upon Nelson in the years
following his short stay at home in 1797. The house was empty, swept,
and garnished, when the simple-minded, if lion-hearted, seaman came
under the spell of one whose fascinations had overpowered the
resistance of a cool-headed man of the world, leading him in his old
age, with open eyes, to do what every prepossession and every
reasonable conviction of his life condemned as folly.

In the summer of 1786 Sir Richard Hughes was recalled to England.
During the later part of his association with Nelson, the strain which
had characterized their earlier relations had not only disappeared,
but had been succeeded by feelings approaching cordiality. The
Government's approval of his subordinate's action, and of himself as
credited with supporting it, had removed that element of apprehension
which in timid men induces irritation; and Hughes, who, though
irresolute, was naturally kindly, had been still farther placated by
the prize-money falling to him from the vessels condemned through the
zeal of Nelson. The latter, who never harbored malice, easily forgave
the past, and responded to this change of tone. "I have been upon the
best terms with the Admiral," he wrote from Barbadoes to his intended
wife in April, 1786, "and I declare I think I could ever remain so. He
is always remarkably kind and civil to every one;" and again, a few
days earlier, "The admiral is highly pleased with my conduct here, as
you will believe, by sending me such fine lines with a white hat. I
well know I am not of abilities to deserve what he has said of me: but
I take it as they are meant, to show his regard for me; and his
politeness and attention to me are great: nor shall I forget it. I
like the man, although not all his acts." He then directs that the
lines shall not be shown to any one, "as the compliment is paid to me
at the expense of the officers of the squadron," an injunction
thoroughly characteristic of the man's kindly consideration for
others. It was creditable to Hughes that, after being so braved, and
his instructions set at naught, by his junior, he had candor enough to
see and acknowledge his merit; but the fact still remained that in the
hour of trial he had failed Nelson, nor did the latter, though he
forgave, forget it. As he wrote to Locker in September, 1786, after
the admiral's departure, "Instead of being supported by my admiral, I
was obliged to keep him up, for he was frightened at this business;"
of which business he truly said, emphasizing, but not at all
exaggerating, the gravity of the responsibility he had taken in
defiance of his superior: "After loss of health and risk of fortune,
another is thanked for what I did against his orders. _Either I
deserved to be sent out of the service_,[15] or at least to have had
some little notice taken of me."

Nelson indeed, in the West Indies, as an unknown captain, had done
that which as a junior admiral he did later at Copenhagen, at a moment
far more critical to Great Britain. By his own unusual powers of
impulse and resolve he had enforced, as far as was possible against
the passive, inert lethargy--not to say timidity--of his superior, the
course of action which at the moment was essential to the interests of
his country. Truly great in his strength to endure, he knew not the
perturbations nor the vacillations that fret the temper, and cripple
the action, of smaller men; and, however harassed and distressed
externally, the calmness of a clear insight and an unshaken purpose
guided his footsteps, unwavering, in the path of duty, through all
opposition, to the goal of success. It is reported that an officer of
the "Boreas," speaking to him of the vexations and odium he had
undergone, used the word "pity." Nelson's reply showed the profound
confidence which throughout had animated him, keenly as he had
undoubtedly felt the temporary anxieties. "Pity, did you say? I shall
live, Sir, to be envied; and to that point I shall always direct my
course."

By the departure of Sir Richard Hughes Nelson was left senior officer
upon the station until his own return home, a twelvemonth later. In
November he renewed his acquaintance with Prince William Henry, whom
he had known as a midshipman in 1782, and who now came to the Leeward
Islands a post-captain, in command of the frigate "Pegasus." The two
young men were not far apart in age, and an intimacy between them soon
arose, which ended only with the death of Nelson. The latter had a
profound reverence for royalty, both as an institution and as
represented in its members; and to this, in the present case, was
added a strong personal esteem, based upon the zeal and efficiency in
the discharge of official duties, which he recognized in one whose
rank would assure him impunity for any mere indifference. The prince,
on the other hand, quickly yielded to the charm of Nelson's
intercourse, so vividly felt by most who knew him, and to the
contagious enthusiasm which animated his conversation when talking of
his profession. This, also, his ardent imagination endowed with
possibilities and aspirations, not greater, indeed, than its deserts,
but which only the intuitions of a genius like his could realize and
vivify, imparting to slower temperaments something of his own fire. To
this association the prince afterwards attributed the awakening of
that strong interest in maritime affairs which he retained to the day
of his death. The two friends dined alternately one with the other,
and, in their association of some six months at this time, they
together fought over all the naval battles that during the recent war
had illustrated the waters through which they were then cruising.

The incessant energy displayed by Nelson, and the agitations through
which he passed during the three years of this stay upon the West
Indian station, again produced distressing symptoms in his general
health. To use his own words, the activity of the mind was "too much
for my puny constitution." "I am worn to a skeleton," he writes to Mr.
Suckling in July, 1786; and three months later to Locker, "I have been
since June so very ill that I have only a faint recollection of
anything which I did. My complaint was in my breast, such a one as I
had going out to Jamaica [in 1777]. The Doctor thought I was in a
consumption, and quite gave me up." This fear, however, proved
unfounded; nor does there appear at any time to have been any serious
trouble with his lungs.

On the 11th[16] of March, 1787, the marriage of Captain Nelson to Mrs.
Nisbet took place at Nevis. Prince William Henry, whose rule it was
never to visit in any private house, made an exception on this
occasion, having exacted from Nelson a promise that the wedding should
wait until he could be present; and he gave away the bride. Three
months later, on the 7th of June, the "Boreas" sailed for England, and
on the 4th of July anchored at Spithead. Whether Mrs. Nelson
accompanied him in the ship does not appear certainly; but from
several expressions in his letters it seems most probable that she
did. Five days after his arrival he sent a message from her to
Locker, in terms which indicate that she was with him.

A newly married man, who had just concluded a full cruise of such
arduous and unremitting exertions, might reasonably have wished and
expected a period of relaxation; but the return of the "Boreas"
coincided with a very disturbed state of European politics. In the
neighboring republic of Holland two parties were striving for the
mastery; one of which was closely attached to France, the other, that
of the Stadtholder, to Great Britain. In 1785 the former had gained
the upper hand; and, by a treaty signed on Christmas Day of that year,
a decided preponderance in the councils of the United Provinces had
been given to France. The enfeebled condition of the latter country,
however, had allowed little prospect of permanence to this
arrangement; and, in the summer of 1787, an insult offered by the
French party to the wife of the Stadtholder led to a forcible
intervention by the King of Prussia, whose sister she was. Louis XVI.
prepared to support his partisans, and notified his purpose to Great
Britain; whereupon the latter, whose traditional policy for over a
century had been to resist the progress of French influence in the Low
Countries, replied that she could not remain a quiet spectator, and at
once began to arm. "The Dutch business," wrote Nelson, "is becoming
every day more serious; and I hardly think we can keep from a war,
without giving forever the weight of the Dutch to the French, and
allowing the Stadtholdership to be abolished,--things which I should
suppose hardly possible." Already his eager spirit was panting for the
fray. "If we are to have a bustle, I do not want to come on shore; I
begin to think I am fonder of the sea than ever." Only five months
married!

The threatening aspect of affairs necessitated the "Boreas" being kept
in commission,--the more so because the economies introduced by Mr.
Pitt into the administration of the two military services had reduced
the available naval force below that which France could at once send
out. "The Boreas is kept in readiness to go to sea with the squadron
at Spithead," wrote Nelson; "but in my poor opinion we shall go no
further at present. The French have eight sail in Brest water ready
for sea: therefore I think we shall not court the French out of
port,"--singular illustration of the unreadiness of Great Britain in
the years immediately preceding the French Revolution. He looks for
war, however, the following summer. As not only ships, but men also,
were urgently needed, the impress service was hastily organized. His
friend Locker was summoned from his long retirement to superintend
that work in Exeter, and the "Boreas" was ordered to the Thames on the
same business, arriving on the 20th of August at the Nore. There her
duty was to board passing vessels, and take from them as many of their
crew as were above the number barely necessary for the safety of the
ship. She herself, besides acting as receiving ship for the men thus
pressed, was to be kept in readiness to sail at a moment's warning.
Mrs. Nelson had therefore to leave her and go to London. "Here we
are," wrote Nelson on the 23d of September, "laying seven miles from
the land on the Impress service, and I am as much separated from my
wife as if I were in the East Indies;" and he closes the letter with
the words, "I am this moment getting under sail after some ships."

His early biographers say that Nelson keenly felt and resented the
kind of service in which he was then engaged; so much so that, moved
also by other causes of irritation, he decided at one time to quit the
Navy. No indication of such feeling, however, appears in his letters.
On the contrary, one of the surest signs with him of pleasurable, or
at least of interested, excitement, was now manifested in his
improving health. As he himself said, many years later, "To say the
truth, when I am actively employed I am not so bad."[17] A month
after reaching England, though then midsummer, he wrote: "It is not
kind in one's native air to treat a poor wanderer as it has me since
my arrival. The rain and cold at first gave me a sore throat and its
accompaniments; the hot weather has given me a slow fever, not
absolutely bad enough to keep my bed, yet enough to hinder me from
doing anything;" and again, "I have scarcely been able to hold up my
head." In blustering October, on the other hand, while in the midst of
the detested Impress work, he says: "My health, thank God, was never
better, and I am fit for any quarter of the globe;" although "it rains
hard, and we have had very bad weather of late." Whatever momentary
vexation he may have vented in a hasty expression, it was entirely
inconsistent with his general tone to take amiss an employment whose
vital importance he would have been the first to admit. Lack of zeal,
or haggling about the duty assigned him, was entirely foreign to his
character; that the country needed the men who were to be pressed was
reason sufficient for one of his temper. If, indeed, there had been an
apparent intention to keep him in such inglorious occupation, and out
of the expected war, he might have chafed; but his orders to be
constantly ready indicated the intention to send him at once to the
front, if hostilities began. Doubtless he was disappointed that the
application he made for a ship-of-the-line was not granted; but he
knew that, being still a very young captain, what he asked was a
favor, and its refusal not a grievance, nor does he seem to have
looked upon it otherwise.

There were, however, some annoyances, which, joined to the lack of
appreciation for his eminent services to the interests of the nation
in the West Indies, must have keenly stung him. Without the slightest
necessity, except that laid upon him by his own public spirit, he had
fought and struggled, and endured three years of hot water to serve
the Government. He might have gone easy, as did the admiral and the
other captains; but instead of so doing he had destroyed the
contraband trade, and re-established the working of laws upon which
the prosperity and security of the kingdom were thought to depend. For
this he had received a perfunctory, formal acknowledgment, though none
apparently from the Admiralty, the head of his own service. But he
soon found that, if slow to thank, they were prompt to blame, and that
with no light hand nor disposition to make allowances. He had run his
head against various regulations of the bureaucracy; and this let him
know, with all the amenities of official censure, that if they could
not recognize what he had done well, they were perfectly clear-sighted
as to where he had gone wrong.

So far from appreciation, there seems even to have been a prejudice
against Nelson in high quarters, due not only to the discomposure felt
by the routine official, at the rude irregularities of the man who is
more concerned to do his work than nice about the formalities
surrounding it, but also to misrepresentation by the powerful
interests he had offended through his independent course in the West
Indies. After Hughes had gone home, Nelson, as senior officer on the
station, began to examine the modes of conducting government business,
and especially of making purchases. Conceiving that there were serious
irregularities in these, he suggested to the Civil Department of the
Navy, under whose cognizance the transactions fell, some alterations
in the procedure, by which the senior naval officer would have more
control over the purchases than simply to certify that so much money
was wanted. The Comptroller of the Navy replied that the old forms
were sufficient,--"a circumstance which hurt me," wrote Nelson; while
all the civil functionaries resented his interference with their
methods, and seem to have received the tacit support, if not the
direct sympathy, of the Navy Board, as the Civil Department was then
called. His disposition to look into matters, however, had become
known, and the long struggle over the contraband trade had given him
in the islands a reputation for tenacity and success. It was probably
in dependence upon these that two merchants came to him, two months
before he left the station, and told him of the existence of very
extensive frauds, dating back several years, in which were implicated
both civil officials of the Navy and private parties on shore. It is
possible that the informants themselves had shared in some of these
transactions, and they certainly demanded in payment a part of the
sums recovered; but, as Nelson truly said, the question was not as to
their character, but how to stop the continuance of embezzlements
which had then amounted to over two millions sterling.

The reports made by him upon this subject reached London about a month
before the return of the "Boreas;" but the war scare, and the urgent
call upon all departments of the Navy to mobilize the available force,
prevented any immediate steps being taken. His letters were
acknowledged, and the intention expressed to investigate the matter,
but nothing more was then done. October, however, the Prussian troops
occupied Amsterdam, reinstating the Stadtholder in all his privileges,
and restoring to power the partisans of Great Britain; while France
remained passive, her power for external action paralyzed by the dying
convulsions of the monarchy. The curtain had just risen upon the
opening scene in the great drama of the Revolution,--the first
Assembly of Notables. Warlike preparations consequently ceased, and on
the 30th of November, 1787, the cruise of the "Boreas" came to an end.

It was during this last month of servitude, and immediately before
quitting the ship, that Nelson is said to have used the vehement
expressions of discontent with "an ungrateful service," recorded by
his biographers, concluding with his resolve to go at once to London
and resign his commission. In the absence of the faintest trace, in
his letters, of dissatisfaction with the duty to which the ship was
assigned, it is reasonable to attribute this exasperation to his
soreness under the numerous reprimands he had received,--a feeling
which plainly transpires in some of his replies, despite the forms of
official respect that he scrupulously observed. Even in much later
days, when his distinguished reputation might have enabled him to
sustain with indifference this supercilious rudeness, he winced under
it with over-sensitiveness. "Do not, my dear lord," he wrote to Earl
Spencer a year after the battle of the Nile, "let the Admiralty write
harshly to me--my generous soul cannot bear it, being conscious it is
entirely unmerited." This freedom of censure, often felt by him to be
undeserved, or at least excessive, and its sharp contrast with the
scanty recognition of his unwearied efforts,--of whose value he
himself was by no means forgetful,--though not unusual in the
experience of officers, are quite sufficient to account for the sense
of neglect and unjust treatment by which he was then outraged. This
feeling was probably accentuated, also, by a renewal of the legal
persecution which had been begun in the West Indies; for towards the
end of the year he received formal notice of suits being instituted
against him for the seizure of the American vessels, and it is likely
enough that some intimation of what was coming reached him before
leaving the "Boreas." Scanty thanks, liberal blame, and the prospect
of an expensive lawsuit based upon his official action, constituted,
for a poor man lately married, causes of disturbance which might well
have upset his equanimity.

Lord Howe, who was then at the head of the Admiralty, though formal
and unbending in outward bearing, was a just and kind man, and one
fully appreciative of professional worth. A mutual friend acquainted
him with Nelson's irritation, and Howe wrote a private letter asking
that he would call upon him as soon as he came to town. Though quick
to resent, Nelson was easily soothed by attention and pleased by
compliment, even when it rose to flattery,--which Howe's was not
likely to do. A short interview gave the First Lord a clearer idea
than he before had of the extent, value, and wholly voluntary
character of the services rendered by the young captain in the West
Indies; and he indicated the completeness of his satisfaction by
offering to present him to the King, which was accordingly done at the
next levee. George III. received him graciously; and the resentment of
Nelson, whose loyalty was of the most extreme type, melted away in the
sunshine of royal favor.

Thus reconciled to the service, and convinced, as in his less morbid
moods he often said, that gratitude and honor, though long deferred,
were sure to follow upon steadfast performance of duty, he speedily
renewed his efforts to bring to light the frauds practised in the
colonies. His letters on the subject to Mr. Pitt, the Prime Minister,
had been turned over to the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. George
Rose, and upon the latter Nelson now called. Rose received him at
first with that courteous nonchalance which is the defensive armor of
the beset official,--the name of his visitor, and the business with
which it was connected, had for the moment slipped his mind. Nelson's
mastery of his subject, however, and his warmth in it, soon roused the
attention of his hearer, who, being then pressed for time, asked to
see him again the next day, stipulating only that the interview should
be early, before office hours. "It cannot be too early for me,"
replied Nelson, whose habit, in his career as admiral, was to get
through his correspondence before eight o'clock,--"six o'clock, if
you please."

The arrangement was so made, and the consequent meeting lasted from
six to nine the next morning. Of its general nature and results we
have an authentic outline, given in later years to Nelson's
biographers by Rose, who became, and to the last remained, his warm
personal friend. The conversation ranged, apparently, over all the
chief occurrences in the West Indies during the cruise of the
"Boreas," including both the naval frauds and the contraband trade.
The breadth and acuteness of Nelson's intellect have been too much
overlooked, in the admiration excited by his unusually grand moral
endowments of resolution, dash, and fearlessness of responsibility.
Though scarcely what could be called an educated man, he was one of
close and constant observation, thereby gaining a great deal of
information; and to the use of this he brought a practical sagacity,
which coped with the civil or political questions placed before it,
_for action_, much as it did with military questions--for, after all,
good generalship, on its intellectual side, is simply the application,
to the solution of a military problem, of a mind naturally gifted
therefor, and stored with experience, either personal or of others. As
a strategist and tactician, Nelson made full proof of high native
endowments, of wisdom garnered through fruitful study and meditation,
and of clear insight into the determining conditions of the various
military situations with which he had to deal. To Mr. Rose, the young
captain of barely thirty years displayed a precise knowledge of
several political subjects, connected with the commerce of the
country, that would not naturally come under his notice as an officer,
and which therefore the mere seaman would probably not have imbibed.
Not only so, but his suggestions for dealing practically with the
interests at stake were so judicious, that Rose, a valued associate of
Pitt and intimately acquainted with the financial measures of that
brilliant administrator, complimented him warmly upon the justice and
correctness of his views, the result, as they were, of reflection
based upon a mastery of the data involved. With Nelson's consent, he
undertook to lay them before the prime minister, as the direct
testimony of a singularly competent first-hand observer.

It is to be noted, however, of Nelson, that this accuracy of mental
perception, this power of penetrating to the root of a matter,
disregarding unessential details and fastening solely on decisive
features, was largely dependent upon the necessity laid upon him for
action; which is probably equivalent to saying that it was usually
elicited by a sobering sense of responsibility. In his letters and
despatches may be found many wild guesses, inconsistent from week to
week, colored by changing moods and humors,--the mere passing comments
of a mind off guard,--the records of evanescent impressions as
numerous, fickle, and unfounded as those of the most ordinary mortal.
It is when urgency presses and danger threatens, when the need for
action comes, that his mental energies are aroused, and he begins to
speak, as it were, _ex cathedrâ_. Then the unsubstantial haze rolls
away; and the solid features of the scene one by one appear, until,
amid all the unavoidable uncertainties of imperfect information, it
becomes plain that the man has a firm grasp upon the great landmarks
by which he must guide his course. Like the blind, who at first saw
men as trees walking, and then saw everything clearly, so his mental
illumination gradually reduces confusion to order, and from perplexity
evolves correct decision. But what shall be said of those flashes of
insight, as at Cape St. Vincent, elicited in a moment, as by the
stroke of iron on rock, where all the previous processes of ordered
thought and labored reasoning are condensed into one vivid
inspiration, and transmuted without a pause into instant heroic
action? Is that we call "genius" purely a mystery, of which our only
account is to give it a name? Or is it true, as Napoleon said, that
"on the field of battle the happiest inspiration is often but a
recollection"?

From Rose Nelson went to the Comptroller of the Navy, Sir Charles
Middleton, who afterwards, as Lord Barham, sent him forth to
Trafalgar. Middleton had replied promptly to the first report of the
fraudulent transactions, giving assurance of his readiness to act, and
urging that all the information possible should be secured, as he
feared that the allegations were substantially true. He now showed the
instructions of the Navy Board, under which its colonial employees
acted, to Nelson, who said that, if honestly followed, they must
prevent the unlawful practices; but that he believed they were
habitually violated, and that he himself, though senior officer on the
station, had never before seen the instructions. This failure to
intrust supervision to the one person upon whom all responsibility
should ultimately have rested, practically neutralized the otherwise
laudable methods prescribed by the Board. It was simply another
instance of the jealousy between the civil and military branches of
the naval organization, which, as is well known, resulted in constant
strained relations between the Admiralty and the Naval Commissioners,
until the latter Board was at last abolished.

It is, fortunately, unnecessary to follow farther this dreary record
of old-time dishonesty. Nelson continued to interest himself
strenuously in the matter for two years after his return to England,
both by letter and interview with persons in authority. His own
position and influence were too insignificant to effect anything,
except by moving the home officials, whose administration was
compromised and embarrassed by the malpractices of their
representatives. Though uphill work, it was far from fruitless. "His
representations," said Mr. Rose, in a memorandum furnished to his
biographers, "were all attended to, and every step which he
recommended was adopted. He thus put the investigation into a proper
course; which ended in the detection and punishment of some of the
parties whose conduct was complained of." The broad result appears to
have been that the guilty for the most part escaped punishment,
unless, indeed, some of them lost their positions, of which no certain
information exists; but the corrupt combination was broken up, and
measures were adopted to prevent the recurrence of the same
iniquities. Upon Nelson himself the effect was twofold. His energy and
intelligence could not fail to impress the powerful men with whom he
was in this way brought into contact. The affair increased his
reputation, and made him more widely known than as a simple captain in
the Navy he would otherwise have been. As the various public Boards
whose money had been stolen realized the amount of the thefts, and the
extent of the conspiracy to rob the Government, they felt their
obligations to him, and expressed them in formal, but warm, letters of
thanks. On the other hand, the principal culprits had command of both
money and influence; and by means of these, as so often happens, they
not only impeded inquiry, but, according to Southey, who wrote not
very long after the events, "succeeded in raising prejudices against
Nelson at the Board of Admiralty which it was many years before he
could subdue." Clarke and M'Arthur make the same assertion.

That these prejudices did at one time exist is beyond doubt, and that
they should have been fostered by this means is perfectly in keeping
with common experience. Such intrigues, however, work in the dark and
by indirection; it is not often easy to trace their course. The
independence and single-mindedness with which Nelson followed his
convictions, and the outspoken frankness with which he expressed his
views and feelings, not improbably gave a handle to malicious
misrepresentation. His known intimacy with Prince William Henry, upon
whose favor he to some extent relied, was also more likely to do him
harm than good; and he entertained for the royal captain
prepossessions not far removed from partisanship, at a time when the
prince avowed himself not a friend to the present minister. "Amidst
that variety of business which demanded his attention on his return to
England," say his biographers, "he failed not, by every means in his
power, to fulfil the promise which he had made to his Royal Highness
Prince William of counteracting whatever had been opposed to the
merited reputation of his illustrious pupil, and to the friendship
they had invariably preserved for each other." It was a difficult
task. Opinionated and headstrong as the King, his father, the young
man was an uneasy subordinate to the Admiralty, and made those above
him realize that he was full as conscious of his personal rank as of
his official position as a captain in the Navy. It was, indeed, this
self-assertive temperament that afterwards frustrated his natural
ambition to be the active head of the service. Having such an ally,
there is something ominous for Nelson's own prospects to find him
writing in evident sympathy: "The great folks above now see he will
not be a cypher, therefore many of the rising people must submit to
act subordinate to him, which is not so palatable; and I think a Lord
of the Admiralty is hurt to see him so able, after what he has said
about him. He has certainly not taken a leaf out of his book, for he
is steady in his command and not violent." Upon this follows, "He has
wrote Lord Hood what I cannot but approve,"--a sentence unquestionably
vague, but which sounds combative. Nelson had already felt it
necessary to caution the prince to be careful in the choice of those
to whom he told his mind.

In fact, at the time when the letter just quoted was written, the
conduct of the prince had been such as necessarily, and not wholly
unjustly, to prejudice an officer who displayed marked partisanship
for him, such as certainly was indicated by Nelson's expressions. He
had brought his ship from Newfoundland to Ireland in flat
disobedience of orders, issued by the commander of the station, to go
to Quebec. When this action became known to the Admiralty by his
arrival at Cork, in December, 1787, it was at once reported to the
King, who himself directed that the prince should proceed to Plymouth
with his ship, should remain within the limits of the port for as many
months as he had been absent from his station, and should then be sent
back to Halifax. The Prince of Wales, afterwards George IV., who was
already at variance with the King, took advantage of this flagrant
breach of discipline to flaunt his opposition before the world. In
company with his second brother, the Duke of York, he went down to
Plymouth, and paid a ceremonious visit to Prince William on board his
ship. The round of festivities necessitated by their presence
emphasized the disagreement between the sovereign and the heir to the
throne, and drew to it public attention. Immediately after this, in
January, 1788, Nelson also visited the prince, having been summoned by
him from London. He could, indeed, scarcely decline, nor was he at all
the man to turn his back on a friend in difficulty; but, in his fight
against corruption, the matter could scarcely fail to be represented
by his opponents under the worst light to the King, to whom corruption
was less odious than insubordination. If, in conversation, Nelson
uttered such expressions as he wrote to his friend Locker, he had only
himself to blame for the disfavor which followed; for, to a naval
officer, the prince's conduct should have appeared absolutely
indefensible. In the course of the same year the King became insane,
and the famous struggle about the Regency took place. The prince had
meantime returned to America, in accordance with his orders, and by
the time he again reached England the King had recovered. He could,
therefore, have refrained from any indication of his own sympathies;
but instead of this he openly associated himself with the party of the
Prince of Wales, whose course throughout, when it became known to his
father, had bitterly displeased the latter, and accentuated the breach
between them. At a banquet given by the Spanish ambassador in
celebration of the King's recovery, the three princes sat at a table
separate from the rest of the royal family. A formal reconciliation
took place in September, 1789; but the Duke of Clarence, as he had
then become, continued attached to the Prince of Wales's clique. Those
who know how party considerations influenced naval appointments at
that time, will in these facts find at least a partial explanation of
the cloud which then hung over Nelson.

Lord Chatham, brother of the minister to whom Prince William was not a
friend, became head of the Admiralty in July, 1788, and so remained
until after the war with France began in 1793. With him was associated
Lord Hood, between whom and Nelson there arose what the latter called
"a difference of opinion," which led to a cessation of "familiar
correspondence." The exact date at which this occurred does not
appear, but it was probably before May, 1790; for Hood refused to use
his influence to get Nelson a ship, in the armament which was then
ordered on account of a difficulty with Spain, whereas eighteen months
before he had assured him that in case of hostilities he need not fear
not having a good ship. This refusal was the more marked, because
"almost the whole service was then called out." On the same occasion,
Nelson wrote, "he made a speech never to be effaced from my memory,
viz.: that the King was impressed with an unfavourable opinion of me."
Knowing Nelson's value as an officer as well as Hood did, there can
scarcely remain a doubt that some serious indiscretion, real or
imagined, must have caused this alienation; but of what it was there
is no trace, unless in his evident siding with the prince, who was
then out of favor with both the King and the administration.

The five years--from 1788 to 1792 inclusive--intervening between the
cruise of the "Boreas" and the outbreak of war with the French
Republic, were thus marked by a variety of unpleasant circumstances,
of which the most disagreeable, to a man of Nelson's active
temperament, was the apparently fixed resolve of the authorities to
deny him employment. He was harassed, indeed, by the recurring threats
of prosecution for the West India seizures; but both the Admiralty and
the Treasury agreed that he should be defended at the expense of the
Crown,--a fact which tends to show that his subsequent disfavor arose
from some other cause than disapproval of his official action, however
some incidents may have been misrepresented. On its private side, his
life during this period seems to have been happy, though uneventful;
but in the failure of children he was deprived, both then and
afterwards, of that sweetest of interests, continuous yet ever new in
its gradual unfolding, which brings to the most monotonous existence
its daily tribute of novelty and incident. The fond, almost rapturous,
expressions with which he greeted the daughter afterwards born to him
out of wedlock, shows the blank in his home,--none the less real
because not consciously realized.

The lack of stimulus to his mind from his surroundings at this time is
also manifested by the fewness of his letters. But thirty remain to
show his occupation during the five years, and seventeen of these are
purely official in character. From the year 1791 no record survives.
His wife being with him, one line of correspondence was thereby
closed; but even to his brother, and to his friend Locker, he finds
nothing to write. For the ordinary country amusements and pursuits of
the English gentry he had scant liking; and, barring the occasional
worry over his neglect by the Admiralty, there was little else to
engage his attention. The first few months after his release from the
"Boreas" were spent in the West of England, chiefly at Bath, for the
recovery of Mrs. Nelson's health as well as his own; but toward the
latter part of 1788 the young couple went to live with his father at
the parsonage of Burnham Thorpe, and there made their home until he
was again called into active service. "It is extremely interesting,"
say his biographers, "to contemplate this great man, when thus removed
from the busy scenes in which he had borne so distinguished a part to
the remote village of Burnham Thorpe;" but the interest seems by their
account to be limited to the energy with which he dug in the garden,
or, from sheer want of something to do, reverted to the bird-nesting
of his boyhood. His favorite amusement, we are told, was coursing, and
he once shot a partridge; but his habit of carrying his gun at full
cock, and firing as soon as a bird rose, without bringing the piece to
his shoulder, made him a dangerous companion in a shooting-party. His
own account is somewhat different: "Shoot I cannot, therefore I have
not taken out a license; but notwithstanding the neglect I have met
with I am happy;" and again, to his brother, he says: "It was not my
intention to have gone to the coursing meeting, for, to say the truth,
I have rarely escaped a wet jacket and a violent cold; besides, to me,
even the ride to the Smee is longer than any pleasure I find in the
sport will compensate for." The fact is that Nelson cared for none of
these things, and the only deduction of real interest from his letters
at this time is the absolute failure of his home life and affections
to content his aspirations,--the emptiness both of mind and heart,
which caused his passionate eagerness for external employment to fill
the void. Earnestness appears only when he is brooding over the slight
with which he was treated, and the resultant thwarting of his career.
For both mind and heart the future held in store for him the most
engrossing emotions, but it did not therefore bring him happiness.

Of his frames of mind during this period of neglect and disfavor, his
biographers give a very strongly colored picture, for which, it is to
be presumed, they drew upon contemporary witnesses that were to them
still accessible. "With a mortified and dejected spirit, he looked
forward to a continuance of inactivity and neglect.... During this
interval of disappointment and mortification, his latent ambition
would at times burst forth, and despise all restraint. At others, a
sudden melancholy seemed to overshadow his noble faculties, and to
affect his temper; at those moments the remonstrances of his wife and
venerable father alone could calm the tempest of his passions." That
Nelson keenly felt the cold indifference he now underwent, is
thoroughly in keeping with the sensitiveness to censure, expressed or
implied, which his correspondence frequently betrays, while his frail
organization and uncertain health would naturally entail periods of
depression or nervous exasperation; but the general tenor of his
letters, few as they at this time were, shows rather dignified
acceptance of a treatment he had not merited, and a steady resolve not
to waver in his readiness to serve his country, nor to cease asking an
opportunity to do so. Many years later, at a time of still more
sickening suspense, he wrote: "I am in truth half dead, but what man
can do shall be done,--I am not made to despair;" and now, according
to a not improbable story, he closed an application for employment
with the words, "If your Lordships should be pleased to appoint me to
a cockle boat, I shall feel grateful." Hood, whose pupil he in a sense
was, and who shared his genius, said of himself, when under a
condition of enforced inactivity: "This proves very strongly the
different frames of men's minds; some are full of anxiety, impatience,
and apprehension, while others, under similar circumstances, are
perfectly cool, tranquil, and indifferent."

The latter half of the year 1792 was marked by the rapid progress in
France of the political distemper, which was so soon to culminate in
the worst excesses of the Revolution. The quick succession of
symptoms, each more alarming than the other,--the suspension of the
royal power at the tumultuous bidding of a mob, the September
massacres, the abolition of royalty, the aggressive character of the
National Convention shown by the decrees of November 19 and December
15,--roused the apprehensions of most thoughtful men throughout
Europe; and their concern was increased by the growing popular
effervescence in other countries than France. The British cabinet, as
was natural, shifted more slowly than did the irresponsible members of
the community; nor could Pitt lightly surrender his strong instinctive
prepossessions in favor of peace, with the continuance of which was
identified the exercise of his own best powers.

During this stormy and anxious period, Nelson shared the feelings of
his day and class. It is noteworthy, however, that, in regarding the
perils of the time, he was no mere panic-monger, but showed the same
discriminating carefulness of observation that had distinguished him
as captain of the "Boreas," and had elicited the admiration of Mr.
Rose. Strenuous and even bigoted royalist as he always was, satisfied
of the excellence of the British Constitution, and condemning utterly
the proceedings of the more or less seditious societies then forming
throughout the kingdom, he yet recognized the substantial grievances
of the working-men, as evident in the district immediately under his
eye. The sympathetic qualities which made him, fortune's own favorite
in his profession, keenly alive to the hardships, neglect, and
injustice undergone by the common seaman, now engaged him to set forth
the sad lot of the ill-paid rural peasantry. In his letters to the
Duke of Clarence, he on the one hand strongly blames the weakness and
timidity of the justices and country gentlemen, in their attitude
towards the abettors of lawlessness; but, on the other, he dwells upon
the sufferings of the poor, prepares a careful statement of their
earnings and unavoidable expenses, and insists upon the necessity of
the living wage. The field laborers, he said, "do not want loyalty,
many of their superiors, in many instances, might have imitated their
conduct to advantage; but hunger is a sharp thorn, and they are not
only in want of food sufficient, but of clothes and firing."

Under the threatening outlook, he considers that every individual will
soon "be called forth to show himself;" and for his own part, he
writes on the 3d of November, he sees no way so proper as asking for a
ship. But, even at that late moment, neither Pitt nor his associates
had abandoned the hope of peace, and this, as well as other
applications of Nelson's, received only a formal acknowledgment
without encouragement. Roused, however, by the Convention's decree of
November 19, which extended the succor of France to all people who
should wish to recover their liberty, and charged the generals of the
republic to make good the offer with the forces under their command,
the ministry decided to abandon their guarded attitude; and their new
resolution was confirmed by the reception, on the 28th of November, of
deputations from British revolutionary societies at the bar of the
Convention, on which occasion the president of the latter affected to
draw a dividing line between the British government and the British
nation. On the 1st of December the militia was called out by
proclamation, and Parliament summoned to meet on the 15th of the
month. On the latter day the Convention put forth another decree,
announcing in the most explicit terms its purpose to overthrow all
existing governments in countries where the Republican armies could
penetrate. Pitt now changed his front with an instantaneousness and
absoluteness which gave the highest proof of his capacity as a leader
of men. It was not so much that war was then determined, as that the
purpose was formed, once for all, to accept the challenge contained in
the French decree, unless France would discontinue her avowed course
of aggression. Orders were immediately given to increase largely the
number of ships of war in commission.

When danger looms close at hand, the best men, if known, are not left
in the cold shade of official disfavor. "Post nubila Phoebus," was the
expression of Nelson, astonished for a rarity into Latin by the
suddenness with which the sun now burst upon him through the clouds.
"The Admiralty so smile upon me, that really I am as much surprised as
when they frowned." On the 6th of January, 1793, the First Lord, with
many apologies for previous neglect, promised to give him a
seventy-four-gun ship as soon as it was in his power to do so, and
that meanwhile, if he chose to take a sixty-four, he could have one as
soon as she was ready. On the 30th he was appointed to the
"Agamemnon," of the latter rate. Within the preceding fortnight Louis
XVI. had been beheaded, and the French ambassador ordered to leave
England. On February 1, 1793, two days after Nelson's orders were
issued, the Republic declared war against Great Britain and Holland.

FOOTNOTES:

[8] Nicolas, vol. v. p. 356.

[9] Thus Collingwood, rarely other than sober and restrained in his
language, wrote to Hughes: "It is from the idea that the greatness and
superiority of the British navy very much depends upon preserving inviolate
the Act of Navigation, excluding foreigners from access to the colonies,
that I am induced to make this representation to you." Nicolas, vol. i. p.
172.

[10] Nelson's letters are contradictory on this point. In a letter to
Locker of March 3, 1786, he says, "Before the first vessel was tried I had
seized four others;" whereas in the formal and detailed narrative drawn
up--without date, but later than the letter to Locker--he says the first
vessel was tried and condemned May 17, the other four seized May 23.
(Nicolas, vol. i. pp. 177, 178.) The author has followed the latter,
because from the particularity of dates it seems to have been compiled from
memoranda, that of Locker written from memory,--both nearly a year after
the events.

[11] This word is used by Nelson, apparently, as equivalent to
"season,"--the cruising period in the West Indies. "The admiral wishes to
remain another station," he writes elsewhere.

[12] Lady Nelson's tombstone in Littleham Churchyard, Exmouth, reads that
she died May 6, 1831, "aged 73." She would then have been born before May
6, 1758. Nicolas (vol. i. p. 217) says that she died May 4, 1831, aged 68,
but does not mention his authority.

[13] Prior to May, 1785, the only stops of the "Boreas" at Nevis were
January 6-8, February 1-4, and March 11-15. (Boreas's Log in Nicolas's
Letters and Despatches of Lord Nelson, vol. vii. Addenda, pp. viii, ix.)

[14] The author is satisfied, from casual expressions in Nelson's letters
to Lady Hamilton, that his famous two years' confinement to the ship,
1803-1805, and, to a less extent, the similar seclusion practised in the
Baltic and the Downs, proceeded, in large part at least, from a romantic
and chivalrous resolve to leave no room for doubt, in the mind of Lady
Hamilton or of the world, that he was entirely faithful to her.

[15] The author has italicized these words because they accurately express
the just penalty that military law would have required of Nelson, had he
not shown adequate grounds for his disobedience. They measure, therefore,
the responsibility he shouldered, and the reward he deserved.

[16] Sir Harris Nicolas (Nelson's Despatches and Letters, vol. i. p. 217)
gives March 12 as the day of the wedding, upon the ground of a letter of
Lady Nelson's. Her mention of the date is, however, rather casual; and
March 11 is given in the parish register of the church in Nevis.

[17] The same symptom will be noted in the anxious pursuit of Villeneuve to
the West Indies in 1805, where he grew better, although for some months he
had had in his hands the Admiralty's permission to return home on account
of his health.




CHAPTER III.

NELSON'S DEPARTURE FROM ENGLAND IN THE "AGAMEMNON."--SERVICES IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN UNTIL THE RECOVERY OF TOULON BY THE FRENCH.--LORD HOOD
IN COMMAND.

FEBRUARY-DECEMBER, 1793. AGE, 34.


Nelson's page in history covers a little more than twelve years, from
February, 1793, to October, 1805. Its opening coincides with the
moment when the wild passions of the French Revolution, still at
fiercest heat, and which had hitherto raged like flame uncontrolled,
operative only for destruction, were being rapidly mastered, guided,
and regulated for efficient work, by the terrors of the Revolutionary
Tribunal and the Committee of Public Safety. In the object to which
these tremendous forces were now about to be applied lay the threat to
the peace of Europe, which aroused Great Britain to action, and sent
into the field her yet unknown champion from the Norfolk parsonage.
The representatives of the French people had imparted to the original
movement of their nation,--which aimed only at internal reforms,
however radical,--a new direction, of avowed purposeful aggression
upon all political institutions exterior to, and differing from, their
own. This became the one characteristic common to the successive forms
of government, which culminated in the pure military despotism of
Napoleon.

To beat back that spirit of aggression was the mission of Nelson.
Therein is found the true significance of his career, which mounts
higher and higher in strenuous effort and gigantic achievement, as the
blast of the Revolution swells fiercer and stronger under the mighty
impulse of the great Corsican. At each of the momentous crises, so far
removed in time and place,--at the Nile, at Copenhagen, at
Trafalgar,--as the unfolding drama of the age reveals to the onlooker
the schemes of the arch-planner about to touch success, over against
Napoleon rises ever Nelson; and as the latter in the hour of victory
drops upon the stage where he has played so chief a part, his task is
seen to be accomplished, his triumph secured. In the very act of dying
he has dealt the foe a blow from which recovery is impossible. Moscow
and Waterloo are the inevitable consequences of Trafalgar; as the
glories of that day were but the fit and assured ending of the
illustrious course which was begun upon the quarter-deck of the
"Agamemnon."

With the exception of the "Victory," under whose flag he fell after
two years of arduous, heart-breaking uncertainties, no ship has such
intimate association with the career and name of Nelson as has the
"Agamemnon." And this is but natural, for to her he was the captain,
solely, simply, and entirely; identified with her alone, glorying in
her excellences and in her achievements, one in purpose and in spirit
with her officers and seamen; sharing their hopes, their dangers, and
their triumphs; quickening them with his own ardor, moulding them into
his own image, until vessel and crew, as one living organism,
reflected in act the heroic and unyielding energy that inspired his
feeble frame. Although, for a brief and teeming period, he while in
command of her controlled also a number of smaller vessels on detached
service, it was not until after he had removed to another ship that he
became the squadron-commander, whose relations to the vessel on which
he himself dwelt were no longer immediate, nor differed, save in his
bodily presence, from those he bore to others of the same division. A
personality such as Nelson's makes itself indeed felt throughout its
entire sphere of action, be that large or small; but, withal,
diffusion contends in vain with the inevitable law that forever
couples it with slackening power, nor was it possible even for him to
lavish on the various units of a fleet, and on the diverse conflicting
claims of a great theatre of war, the same degree of interest and
influence that he concentrated upon the "Agamemnon," and upon the
brilliant though contracted services through which he carried her.
Bonds such as these are not lightly broken, and to the "Agamemnon"
Nelson clave for three long years and more, persistently refusing
larger ships, until the exhausted hulk could no longer respond to the
demands of her masters, and separation became inevitable. When he
quitted her, at the moment of her departure for England, it was simply
a question whether he would abandon the Mediterranean, and the
prospect of a great future there opening before him, or sever a few
weeks earlier a companionship which must in any event end upon her
arrival home.

There is yet another point of view from which his command of the
"Agamemnon" is seen to hold a peculiar relation to Nelson's story.
This was the period in which expectation passed into fulfilment, when
development, long arrested by unpropitious circumstances, resumed its
outward progress under the benign influence of a favoring environment,
and the bud, whose rare promise had long been noted by a few
discerning eyes, unfolded into the brilliant flower, destined in the
magnificence of its maturity to draw the attention of a world. To the
fulness of his glorious course these three years were what the days of
early manhood are to ripened age; and they are marked by the same
elasticity, hopefulness, and sanguine looking to the future that
characterize youth, before illusions vanish and even success is found
to disappoint. Happiness was his then, as at no other time before or
after; for the surrounding conditions of enterprise, of difficulties
to be overcome, and dangers to be met, were in complete
correspondence with those native powers that had so long struggled
painfully for room to exert themselves. His health revived, and his
very being seemed to expand in this congenial atmosphere, which to him
was as life from the dead. As with untiring steps he sped onward and
upward,--counting naught done while aught remained to do, forgetting
what was behind as he pressed on to what was before,--the ardor of
pursuit, the delight of achievement, the joy of the giant running his
course, sustained in him that glow of animation, that gladness in the
mere fact of existence, physical or moral, in which, if anywhere, this
earth's content is found. Lack of recognition, even, wrung from him
only the undaunted words: "Never mind! some day I will have a gazette
of my own." Not till his dreams were realized, till aspiration had
issued in the completest and most brilliant triumph ever wrought upon
the seas, and he had for his gazette the loud homage of every mouth in
Europe,--not till six months after the battle of the Nile,--did Nelson
write: "There is no true happiness in this life, and in my present
state I could quit it with a smile. My only wish is to sink with
honour into the grave."

The preparation of the Mediterranean fleet, to which the "Agamemnon"
was assigned, was singularly protracted, and in the face of a
well-ordered enemy the delay must have led to disastrous results.
Nelson himself joined his ship at Chatham on the 7th of February, a
week after his orders were issued; but not until the 16th of March did
she leave the dockyard, and then only for Sheerness, where she
remained four weeks longer. By that time it seems probable, from
remarks in his letters, that the material equipment of the vessel was
complete; but until the 14th of April she remained over a hundred men
short of her complement. "Yet, I think," wrote Nelson, "that we shall
be far from ill-manned, even if the rest be not so good as they ought
to be." Mobilization in those days had not been perfected into a
science, even in theory, and the difficulty of raising crews on the
outbreak of war was experienced by all nations, but by none more than
by Great Britain. Her wants were greatest, and for supply depended
upon a merchant service scattered in all quarters of the globe. "Men
are very hard to be got," Nelson said to his brother, "and without a
press I have no idea that our fleet can be manned." It does not appear
that this crude and violent, yet unavoidable, method was employed for
the "Agamemnon," except so far as her crew was completed from the
guard-ship. Dependence was placed upon the ordinary wiles of the
recruiting-sergeant, and upon Nelson's own popularity in the adjacent
counties of Suffolk and Norfolk, from which the bulk of his ship's
company was actually drawn. "I have sent out a lieutenant and four
midshipmen," he writes to Locker, "to get men at every seaport in
Norfolk, and to forward them to Lynn and Yarmouth; my friends in
Yorkshire and the North tell me they will send what men they can lay
hands on;" but at the same time he hopes that Locker, then
Commander-in-chief at the Nore, will not turn away any who from other
districts may present themselves for the "Agamemnon." Coming mainly
from the same neighborhood gave to the crew a certain homogeneousness
of character, affording ground for appeal to local pride, a most
powerful incentive in moments of difficulty and emulation; and this
feeling was enhanced by the thought that their captain too was a
Norfolk man. To one possessing the sympathetic qualities of Nelson,
who so readily shared the emotions and gained the affections of his
associates, it was easy to bind into a living whole the units animated
by this common sentiment.

His stepson, Josiah Nisbet, at this time about thirteen years old, now
entered the service as a midshipman, and accompanied him on board the
"Agamemnon." The oncoming of a great war naturally roused to a yet
higher pitch the impulse towards the sea, which in all generations
has stirred the blood of English boys. Of these, Nelson, using his
captain's privilege, received a number as midshipmen upon his
quarter-deck, among them several from the sons of neighbors and
friends, and therefore, like the crew, Norfolk lads. It is told that
to one, whose father he knew to be a strong Whig, of the party which
in the past few years had sympathized with the general current of the
French Revolution, he gave the following pithy counsels for his
guidance in professional life: "First, you must always implicitly obey
orders, without attempting to form any opinion of your own respecting
their propriety; secondly, you must consider every man as your enemy
who speaks ill of your king; and thirdly, you must hate a Frenchman as
you do the devil." On the last two items Nelson's practice was in full
accord with his precept; but to the first, his statement of which,
sound enough in the general, is open to criticism as being too
absolute, he was certainly not obedient. Not to form an opinion is
pushing the principle of subordination to an indefensible extreme,
even for a junior officer, though the caution not to express it is
wise, as well as becoming to the modesty of youth. Lord Howe's advice
to Codrington, to watch carefully all that passed and to form his own
conclusions, but to keep them to himself, was in every respect more
reasonable and profitable. But in fact this dictum of Nelson's was
simply another instance of hating the French as he did the devil. The
French were pushing independence and private judgment to one extreme,
and he instinctively adopted the other.

It was not till near the end of April that the "Agamemnon" finally
left the Thames, anchoring at Spithead on the 28th of that month.
Still the fleet which Lord Hood was to command was not ready. While
awaiting her consorts, the ship made a short cruise in the Channel,
and a few days later sailed as one of a division of five
ships-of-the-line under Admiral Hotham, to occupy a station fifty to
a hundred miles west of the Channel Islands. Nelson's disposition not
to form any opinion of his own respecting the propriety of orders was
thus evidenced: "What we have been sent out for is best known to the
great folks in London: to us, it appears, only to hum the nation and
make tools of us, for where we have been stationed no enemy was likely
to be met with, or where we could protect our own trade." There can be
no doubt that not only was the practical management of the Navy at
this time exceedingly bad, but that no sound ideas even prevailed upon
the subject. Hotham's squadron gained from neutral vessels two
important pieces of information,--that Nantes, Bordeaux, and L'Orient
were filled with English vessels, prizes to French cruisers; and that
the enemy kept eight sail-of-the-line, with frigates in proportion,
constantly moving in detachments about the Bay of Biscay. Under the
dispositions adopted by the British Admiralty, these hostile divisions
gave, to the commerce destroying of the smaller depredators, a support
that sufficiently accounts for the notorious sufferings of British
trade during the opening years of the war. Nelson had no mastery of
the terminology of warfare,--he never talked about strategy and little
about tactics,--but, though without those valuable aids to precision
of thought, he had pondered, studied, and reasoned, and he had,
besides, what is given to few,--real genius and insight. Accordingly
he at once pierced to the root of the trouble,--the enemy's squadrons,
rather than the petty cruisers dependent upon them, to which the
damage was commonly attributed. "They are always at sea, and England
not willing to send a squadron to interrupt them." But, while
instancing this intuitive perception of a man gifted with rare
penetration, it is necessary to guard against rash conclusions that
might be drawn from it, and to remark that it by no means follows that
education is unnecessary to the common run of men, because a genius
is in advance of his times. It is well also to note that even in him
this flash of insight, though unerring in its indications, lacked the
definiteness of conviction which results from ordered thought. However
accurate, it is but a glimmer,--not yet a fixed light.

Hotham's division joined the main body under Lord Hood, off the Scilly
Islands, on the 23d of May, the total force then consisting of eleven
sail-of-the-line, with the usual smaller vessels. It remained cruising
in that neighborhood until the 6th of June, keeping the approaches of
the Channel open for a homeward-bound convoy of merchantmen, which
passed on that day. The fleet then bore up for the Straits, and on the
14th six ships, the "Agamemnon" among them, parted company for Cadiz,
there to fill up with water, in order to avoid the delays which would
arise if the scanty resources of Gibraltar had to supply all the
vessels. On the 23d this division left Cadiz, reaching Gibraltar the
same evening; and on the 27th Hood, having now with him fifteen of the
line, sailed for Toulon.

Nelson's mind was already busy with the prospects of the campaign, and
the various naval factors that went to make up the military situation.
"Time must discover what we are going after," he writes to his
brother; while to Locker he propounds the problem which always has
perplexed the British mind, and still does,--how to make the French
fight, if they are unwilling. So long as that question remains
unsolved, the British government has to bear the uncertainties,
exposure, and expense of a difficult and protracted defensive. "We
have done nothing," he says, "and the same prospect appears before us:
the French cannot come out, and we have no means of getting at them in
Toulon." In "cannot come out," he alludes to the presence of a Spanish
fleet of twenty-four ships-of-the-line. This, in conjunction with
Hood's force, would far exceed the French in Toulon, which the
highest estimate then placed at twenty-one of the line. He had,
however, already measured the capabilities of the Spanish Navy. They
have very fine ships, he admits, but they are shockingly manned,--so
much so that if only the barges' crews of the six British vessels that
entered Cadiz, numbering at the most seventy-five to a hundred men,
but all picked, could have got on board one of their first-rates, he
was certain they could have captured her, although her ship's company
numbered nearly a thousand. "If those we are to meet in the
Mediterranean are no better manned," he continues, "much service
cannot be expected of them." The prediction proved true, for no sooner
did Hood find the Spanish admiral than the latter informed him he must
go to Cartagena, having nineteen hundred sick in his fleet. The
officer who brought this message said it was no wonder they were
sickly, for they had been sixty days at sea. This excited Nelson's
derision--not unjustly. "From the circumstance of having been longer
than that time at sea, do we attribute our getting healthy. It has
stamped with me the extent of their nautical abilities: long may they
remain in their present state." The last sentence reveals his
intuitive appreciation of the fact that the Spain of that day could in
no true sense be the ally of Great Britain; for, at the moment he
penned the wish, the impotence or defection of their allies would
leave the British fleet actually inferior to the enemy in those
waters. He never forgot these impressions, nor the bungling efforts of
the Spaniards to form a line of battle. Up to the end of his life the
prospect of a Spanish war involved no military anxieties, but only the
prospect of more prize money.

Among the various rumors of that troubled time, there came one that
the French were fitting their ships with forges to bring their shot to
a red heat, and so set fire to the enemy's vessel in which they might
lodge. Nelson was promptly ready with a counter and quite adequate
tactical move. "This, if true," he wrote, "I humbly conceive would
have been as well kept secret; but as it is known, we must take care
to get so close that their red shots may go _through_ both sides, when
it will not matter whether they are hot or cold." It is somewhat odd
that the extremely diligent and painstaking Sir Harris Nicolas, in his
version of this letter, should have dropped the concluding sentence,
one of the most important and characteristic occurring in Nelson's
correspondence at this time.

On the 14th of July Nelson notes that the fleet had received orders to
consider Marseilles and Toulon as invested, and to take all vessels of
whatever nation bound into those ports. He at once recognized the
importance of this step, and the accurate judgment that dictated it.
The British could not, as he said, get at the enemy in his fortified
harbor; but they might by this means exercise the pressure that would
force him to come out. Undoubtedly, whether on a large or on a small
scale, whether it concern the whole plan of a war or of a campaign, or
merely the question of a single military position, the best way to
compel an unwilling foe to action, and to spoil his waiting game which
is so onerous to the would-be assailant, is to attack him elsewhere,
to cut short his resources, and make his position untenable by
exhaustion. "This has pleased us," Nelson wrote; "if we make these
red-hot gentlemen hungry, they may be induced to come out."

The investment by sea of these two harbors, but especially of Toulon,
as being an important dockyard, was accordingly the opening move made
by the British admiral. On the 16th of July he approached the latter
port, and from that time until August 25 a close blockade was
maintained, with the exception of a very few days, during which Hood
took the fleet off Nice, and thence to Genoa, to remonstrate with that
republic upon its supplying the south of France with grain, and
bringing back French property under neutral papers. "Our being here is
a farce if this trade is allowed," said Nelson, and rightly; for so
far as appearances then went, the only influence the British squadrons
could exert was by curtailing the supplies of southern France. That
district raised only grain enough for three months' consumption; for
the remainder of the year's food it depended almost wholly upon Sicily
and Barbary, its communications with the interior being so bad that
the more abundant fields of distant French provinces could not send
their surplus.

In the chaotic state in which France was then plunged, the utmost
uncertainty prevailed as to the course events might take, and rumors
of all descriptions were current, the wildest scarcely exceeding in
improbability the fantastic horrors that actually prevailed throughout
the land during these opening days of the Reign of Terror. The
expectation that found most favor in the fleet was that Provence would
separate from the rest of France, and proclaim itself an independent
republic under the protection of Great Britain; but few looked for the
amazing result which shortly followed, in the delivery of Toulon by
its citizens into the hands of Lord Hood. This Nelson attributed
purely to the suffering caused by the strictness of the blockade. "At
Marseilles and Toulon," wrote he on the 20th of August, "they are
almost starving, yet nothing brings them to their senses. Although the
Convention has denounced them as traitors, yet even these people will
not declare for anything but Liberty and Equality." Three days later,
Commissioners from both cities went on board Hood's flagship to treat
for peace, upon the basis of re-establishing the monarchy, and
recognizing as king the son of Louis XVI. The admiral accepted the
proposal, on condition that the port and arsenal of Toulon should be
delivered to him for safe keeping, until the restoration of the young
prince was effected. On the 27th of August the city ran up the white
flag of the Bourbons, and the British fleet, together with the
Spanish, which at this moment arrived on the scene, anchored in the
outer port. The allied troops took possession of the forts commanding
the harbor, while the dockyards and thirty ships-of-the-line were
delivered to the navies.

"The perseverance of our fleet has been great," wrote Nelson, "and to
that only can be attributed our unexampled success. Not even a boat
could get into Marseilles or Toulon, or on the coast, with provisions;
and the old saying, 'that hunger will tame a lion,' was never more
strongly exemplified." In this he deceived himself, however natural
the illusion. The opposition of Toulon to the Paris Government was
part of a general movement of revolt, which spread throughout the
provinces in May and June, 1793, upon the violent overthrow of the
Girondists in the National Convention. The latter then proclaimed
several cities outlawed, Toulon among them; and the bloody severities
it exercised were the chief determining cause of the sudden treason,
the offspring of fear more than of hunger,--though the latter
doubtless contributed,--which precipitated the great southern arsenal
into the arms of the Republic's most dangerous foe. Marseilles fell
before the Conventional troops, and the resultant panic in the sister
city occasioned the hasty step, which in less troubled moments would
have been regarded with just horror. But in truth Nelson, despite his
acute military perceptions, had not yet developed that keen political
sagacity, the fruit of riper judgment grounded on wider information,
which he afterwards showed. His ambition was yet limited to the sphere
of the "Agamemnon," his horizon bounded by the petty round of the
day's events. He rose, as yet, to no apprehension of the mighty crisis
hanging over Europe, to no appreciation of the profound meanings of
the opening strife. "I hardly think the War can last," he writes to
his wife, "for what are we at war about?" and again, "I think we shall
be in England in the winter or spring." Even some months later, in
December, before Toulon had reverted to the French, he is completely
blind to the importance of the Mediterranean in the great struggle,
and expresses a wish to exchange to the West Indies, "for I think our
Sea War is over in these seas."

It is probable, indeed, that in his zeal, thoroughness, and fidelity
to the least of the duties then falling to him, is to be seen a surer
indication of his great future than in any wider speculations about
matters as yet too high for his position. The recent coolness between
him and Lord Hood had been rapidly disappearing under the admiral's
reviving appreciation and his own aptitude to conciliation. "Lord Hood
is very civil," he writes on more than one occasion, "I think we may
be good friends again;" and the offer of a seventy-four-gun ship in
place of his smaller vessel was further proof of his superior's
confidence. Nelson refused the proposal. "I cannot give up my
officers," he said, in the spirit that so endeared him to his
followers; but the compliment was felt, and was enhanced by the
admiral's approval of his motives. The prospective occupation of
Toulon gave occasion for a yet more nattering evidence of the esteem
in which he was held. As soon as the agreement with the city was
completed, but the day before taking possession, Hood despatched him
in haste to Oneglia, a small port on the Riviera of Genoa, and thence
to Naples, to seek from the latter court and that of Turin[18] a
reinforcement of ten thousand troops to hold the new acquisition. The
"Agamemnon" being a fast sailer undoubtedly contributed much to this
selection; but the character of the commanding officer could not but
be considered on so important, and in some ways delicate, a mission.
"I should have liked to have stayed one day longer with the fleet,
when they entered the harbour," he wrote to Mrs. Nelson, "but service
could not be neglected for any private gratification,"--a sentiment
she had to hear pretty often, as betrothed and as wife, but which was
no platitude on the lips of one who gave it constant demonstration in
his acts. "Duty is the great business of a sea officer," he told his
intended bride in early manhood, to comfort her and himself under a
prolonged separation. "Thank God! I have done my duty," was the spoken
thought that most solaced his death hour, as his heart yearned towards
those at home whom he should see no more.

About this time he must have felt some touch of sympathy for the
effeminate Spaniards, who were made ill by a sixty days' cruise. "All
we get here," he writes, "is honour and salt beef. My poor fellows
have not had a morsel of fresh meat or vegetables for near nineteen
weeks; and in that time I have only had my foot twice on shore at
Cadiz. We are absolutely getting sick from fatigue." "I am here
[Naples] with news of our most glorious and great success, but, alas!
the fatigue of getting it has been so great that the fleet generally,
and I am sorry to say, my ship most so, are knocked up. Day after day,
week after week, month after month, we have not been two gun shots
from Toulon." The evident looseness of this statement, for the ship
had only been a little over a month off Toulon, shows the impression
the service had made upon his mind, for he was not prone to such
exaggerations. "It is hardly possible," he says again, "to conceive
the state of my ship; I have little less than one hundred sick." This
condition of things is an eloquent testimony to the hardships endured;
for Nelson was singularly successful, both before and after these
days, in maintaining the health of a ship's company. His biographers
say that during the term of three years that he commanded the "Boreas"
in the West Indies, not a single officer or man died out of her whole
complement,--an achievement almost incredible in that sickly
climate;[19] and he himself records that in his two months' chase of
Villeneuve, in 1805, no death from sickness occurred among the seven
or eight thousand persons in the fleet. He attributed these remarkable
results to his attention, not merely to the physical surroundings of
the crews, but also to the constant mental stimulus and interest,
which he aroused by providing the seamen with occupation, frequent
amusements, and change of scene, thus keeping the various faculties in
continual play, and avoiding the monotony which most saps health,
through its deadening influence on the mind and spirits.

The "Agamemnon" reached Naples on the 12th of September, and remained
there four days. Nelson pressed the matter of reinforcements with such
diligence, and was so heartily sustained by the British minister, Sir
William Hamilton, that he obtained the promise of six thousand troops
to sail at once under the convoy of the "Agamemnon." "I have acted for
Lord Hood," he wrote, "with a zeal which no one could exceed;" and a
few weeks later he says: "The Lord is very much pleased with my
conduct about the troops at Naples, which I undertook without any
authority whatever from him; and they arrived at Toulon before his
requisition reached Naples." It appears, therefore, that his orders
were rather those of a despatch-bearer than of a negotiator; but that
he, with the quick initiative he always displayed, took upon himself
diplomatic action, to further the known wishes of his superior and the
common cause of England and Naples. It was upon this occasion that
Nelson first met Lady Hamilton, who exercised so marked an influence
over his later life; but, though she was still in the prime of her
singular loveliness, being yet under thirty, not a ripple stirred the
surface of his soul, afterward so powerfully perturbed by this
fascinating woman. "Lady Hamilton," he writes to his wife, "has been
wonderfully kind and good to Josiah [his stepson]. She is a young
woman of amiable manners, and who does honour to the station to which
she is raised." His mind was then too full of what was to be done; not
as after the Nile, when, unstrung by reaction from the exhausting
emotions of the past months, it was for the moment empty of aspiration
and cloyed with flattery only.

The prospect of sailing with the convoy of troops, as well as of a few
days' repose for the wearied ship's company, was cut short by the news
that a French ship of war, with some merchant vessels in convoy, had
anchored on the Sardinian coast. Although there were at Naples several
Neapolitan naval vessels, and one Spaniard, none of them moved; and as
the Prime Minister sent the information to Nelson, he felt bound to
go, though but four days in port. "Unfit as my ship was, I had nothing
left for the honour of our country but to sail, which I did in two
hours afterwards. It was necessary to show them what an English
man-of-war would do." The expected enemy was not found, and, after
stretching along the coast in a vain search, the "Agamemnon" put into
Leghorn on the 25th of September, nine days after leaving Naples,--to
"absolutely save my poor fellows," wrote her captain to his brother.
But even so, he purposed staying at his new anchorage but three days,
"for I cannot bear the thought of being absent from the scene of
action" at Toulon. In the same letter he mentions that since the 23d
of April--five months--the ship had been at anchor only twenty days.

The unwavering resolution and prompt decision of his character thus
crop out at every step. In Leghorn he found a large French frigate,
which had been on the point of sailing when his ship came in sight. "I
am obliged to keep close watch to take care he does not give me the
slip, which he is inclined to do. I shall pursue him, and leave the
two Courts [Great Britain and Tuscany] to settle the propriety of the
measure, which I think will not be strictly regular. Have been up all
night watching him--ready to cut the moment he did." The enemy,
however, made no movement, and Nelson was not prepared to violate
flagrantly the neutrality of the port. On the 30th of September he
sailed, and on the 5th of October rejoined Lord Hood off Toulon, where
four thousand of the Neapolitan troops, for which he had negotiated,
had already arrived.

The high favor in which the admiral had held him ten years before in
the West Indies, though slightly overcast by the coolness which arose
during the intervening peace, had been rapidly regained in the course
of the present campaign; and the customary report of his proceedings
during the six weeks' absence could not but confirm Hood in the
assurance that he had now to deal with a very exceptional character,
especially fitted for separate and responsible service. Accordingly,
from this time forward, such is the distinguishing feature of Nelson's
career as a subordinate. He is selected from among many competitors,
frequently his seniors, for the performance of duty outside the reach
of the commander-in-chief, but requiring the attention of one upon
whose activity, intelligence, and readiness, the fullest dependence
could be placed. Up to the battle of the Nile,--in which, it must
always be remembered, he commanded a squadron detached from the main
fleet, and was assigned to it in deliberate preference to two older
flag-officers,--Nelson's life presents a series of detached commands,
independent as regarded the local scene of operations, and his method
of attaining the prescribed end with the force allotted to him, but
dependent, technically, upon the distant commanders-in-chief, each of
whom in succession, with one accord, recognized his singular fitness.
The pithy but characteristic expression said to have been used by Earl
St. Vincent, when asked for instructions about the Copenhagen
expedition,--"D--n it, Nelson, send them to the devil your own
way,"--sums up accurately enough the confidence shown him by his
superiors. He could not indeed lift them all to the height of his own
conceptions, fearlessness, and enterprise; but when they had made up
their minds to any particular course, they were, each and all,
perfectly willing to intrust the execution to him. Even at Copenhagen
he was but second in command, though conspicuously first in
achievement. It was not till the opening of the second war of the
French Revolution, in May, 1803, that he himself had supreme charge of
a station,--his old familiar Mediterranean.

Being held in such esteem, it was but a short time before Nelson was
again sent off from Toulon, to which he did not return during the
British occupation. He was now ordered to report to Commodore Linzee,
then lying with a detachment of three ships-of-the-line in the harbor
of Cagliari, at the south end of Sardinia. On her passage the
"Agamemnon" met and engaged a French squadron, of four large frigates
and a brig. Though without decisive results, Nelson was satisfied with
his own conduct in this affair, as was also Lord Hood when it came to
his knowledge; for, one of the frigates being badly crippled, the
whole force, which was on its way to Nice, was compelled to take
refuge in Corsica, where it was far from secure. Two days later, on
the 24th of October, Cagliari was reached, and the "Agamemnon"
accompanied the division to Tunis, arriving there on the 1st of
November.

Linzee's mission was to try and detach the Bey from the French
interest, and it was hoped he could be induced to allow the seizure
of a number of French vessels which had entered the port, under the
convoy of a ship-of-the-line and four frigates. When the British
entered, the frigates had disappeared, being in fact the same that
Nelson had fought ten days before. In accordance with his
instructions, Linzee strove to persuade the Bey that the Republican
government, because of its revolutionary and bloodthirsty character,
should receive no recognition or support from more regular states, not
even the protection usually extended by a neutral port, and that in
consequence he should be permitted to seize for Great Britain the
vessels in Tunis. The Turk may possibly have overlooked the fallacy in
this argument, which assumed that the protection extended by neutral
governments was rather for the benefit of the belligerent than for the
quiet and safety of its own waters; but he was perfectly clear-sighted
as to his personal advantage in the situation, for the French owners,
in despair of getting to France, were selling their cargoes to him at
one third their value. To the argument that the French had beheaded
their king, he drily replied that the English had once done the same;
and he decisively refused to allow the ships to be molested. Nelson
was disgusted that his consent should have been awaited. "The English
seldom get much by negotiation except the being laughed at, which we
have been; and I don't like it. Had we taken, which in my opinion we
ought to have done, the men-of-war and convoy, worth at least
£300,000, how much better we could have negotiated:--given the Bey
£50,000, he would have been glad to have put up with the insult
offered to his dignity;" and he plainly intimates his dissatisfaction
with Linzee. This irresponsible and irreflective outburst was,
however, only an instance of the impatience his enterprising,
energetic spirit always felt when debarred from prompt action, whether
by good or bad reasons; for almost on the same day he expresses the
sounder judgment: "Had we latterly attempted to take them I am sure
the Bey would have declared against us, and done our trade some
damage." No advantage could have accrued from the seizure of the
French vessels, at all proportioned to the inconvenience of having the
hostility of Tunis, flanking as it did the trade routes to the Levant.
The British had then quite enough on their hands, without detaching an
additional force from the north coast of the Mediterranean, to support
a gratuitous quarrel on the south. As a matter of mere policy it would
have been ill-judged.

Nelson, however, did not as yet at all realize the wideness of the
impending struggle, for it was in these very letters that he expressed
a wish to exchange to the West Indies. "You know," he writes to his
old friend Locker, "that Pole is gone to the West Indies. I have not
seen him since his order, but I know it was a thing he dreaded. Had I
been at Toulon I should have been a candidate for that service, for I
think our sea war is over in these seas." Perhaps his intrinsic merit
would have retrieved even such a mistake as we can now see this would
have been, and he would there have come sooner into contact with Sir
John Jervis--to whom, if to any one, the name of patron to Nelson may
be applied--for Jervis then had the West India command; but it is
difficult to imagine Nelson's career apart from the incidents of his
Mediterranean service. The Mediterranean seems inseparable from his
name, and he in the end felt himself identified with it beyond all
other waters.

His longing for action, which prompted the desire for the West Indies,
was quickly gratified, for orders were received from Hood, by Linzee,
to detach him from the latter's command. The admiral sent him a very
handsome letter upon his single-handed combat with the French
frigates, and directed him to go to the north end of Corsica, to take
charge of a division of vessels he would there find cruising, and to
search for his late enemies along that coast and through the
neighboring waters, between the island and the shores of Italy. He was
also to warn off neutral vessels bound to Genoa, that port being
declared blockaded, and to seize them if they persisted in their
voyage thither. "I consider this command as a very high compliment,"
wrote Nelson to his uncle Suckling, "there being five older captains
in the fleet." This it certainly was,--a compliment and a prophecy as
well.

In pursuance of these orders Nelson left Tunis on the 30th of
November, and on the 8th of December discovered the French squadron,
protected by shore batteries, in San Fiorenzo Bay, in Corsica. This
island, which during the middle ages, and until some twenty years
before the beginning of the French Revolution, was a dependency of
Genoa, had then by the latter been ceded to France, against the
express wishes of the inhabitants, whose resistance was crushed only
after a prolonged struggle. Although it was now in open revolt against
the Revolutionary government, the troops of the latter still held
three or four of the principal seaports, among them the northern one
in which the frigates then lay, as well as Bastia upon the east coast
of the island, and Calvi on the west. His force being insufficient to
engage the works of any of these places, there was nothing for Nelson
to do but to blockade them, in hopes of exhausting their resources and
at least preventing the escape of the ships of war. In this he was
successful, for the latter either were destroyed or fell into the
hands of Great Britain, when the ports were reduced.

Meanwhile affairs at Toulon were approaching the crisis which ended
its tenure by the British and their allies. The garrison had never
been sufficient to man properly the very extensive lines, which the
peculiar configuration of the surrounding country made it necessary to
occupy for the security of the town; and the troops themselves were
not only of different nations, but of very varying degrees of
efficiency. Under these conditions the key of the position,
accurately indicated by Napoleon Bonaparte, then a major and in
command of the artillery, was held in insufficient force, and was
successfully stormed on the night of December 16, 1793. It was
immediately recognized that the ships could no longer remain in the
harbor, and that with them the land forces also must depart. After two
days of hurried preparations, and an attempt, only partially
successful, to destroy the dockyard and French ships of war, the
fleets sailed out on the 19th of December, carrying with them, besides
the soldiery, as many as possible of the wretched citizens, who were
forced to fly in confusion and misery from their homes, in order to
escape the sure and fearful vengeance of the Republican government.
The "Agamemnon" was in Leghorn, getting provisions, when the fugitives
arrived there, and Nelson speaks in vivid terms of the impression made
upon him by the tales he heard and the sights he saw. "Fathers are
here without families, and families without fathers, the pictures of
horror and despair." "In short, all is horror. I cannot write all: my
mind is deeply impressed with grief. Each teller makes the scene more
horrible." He expressed the opinion that the evacuation was a benefit
to England, and it unquestionably was. He had not always thought so;
but it must be allowed that the hopes and exultation with which he
greeted the acquisition of the place had sufficient foundation, in the
reported attitude of the people of Southern France, to justify the
first opinion as well as the last. The attempt was worth making,
though it proved unsuccessful. As it was, the occupation had resulted
in a degree of destruction to the French ships and arsenal in Toulon,
which, though then over-estimated, was a real gain to the allies.

FOOTNOTES:

[18] Turin was capital of the Kingdom of Sardinia, which embraced the
island of that name and the Province of Piedmont.

[19] This statement, which apparently depends upon a memoir supplied many
years later by the first lieutenant of the "Boreas," is not strictly
accurate, for Nelson himself, in a letter written shortly after her arrival
in the West Indies, mentions that several of her ship's company had been
carried off by fever (Nicolas, vol. i. p. 111); but it can doubtless be
accepted as evidence of an unusually healthy condition.




CHAPTER IV.

REDUCTION OF CORSICA BY THE BRITISH.--DEPARTURE OF LORD HOOD FOR
ENGLAND.--THE "AGAMEMNON" REFITTED AT LEGHORN.

JANUARY-DECEMBER, 1794. AGE, 35.


By the loss of Toulon the British fleet in the Mediterranean was left
adrift, without any secure harbor to serve as a depot for supplies and
a base for extended operations. Hood took his ships to Hyères Bay, a
few miles east of Toulon, a spot where they could lie safely at
anchor, but which was unsuitable for a permanent establishment,--the
shores not being tenable against French attack. He now turned his eyes
upon Corsica, whence the celebrated native chieftain, Paoli, who had
led the natives in their former struggle against France, had made
overtures to him, looking to the union of the island to the British
crown. Nelson in person, or, during his brief absence in Leghorn, his
division, had so closely invested the shores, that neither troops nor
supplies of any kind had been able to enter since the early part of
December, nor had the blockaded vessels been able to get out. The
thoroughness with which this work was done brought him, on the 6th of
January, 1794, yet further compliments from Hood, who wrote him that
"he looked upon these frigates as certain, trusting to my zeal and
activity, and knows, if it is in the power of man to have them, I will
secure them." At the same time he was instructed to enter into
communication with Paoli, and settle plans for the landing of the
troops. In attending to this commission his intermediary was
Lieutenant George Andrews, brother to the lady to whom he had become
attached at St. Omer, and who had afterwards been a midshipman with
him on board the "Boreas." "This business going through my hands," he
wrote with just pride, "is a proof of Lord Hood's confidence in me,
and that I shall pledge myself for nothing but what will be acceptable
to him." It was indeed evident that Hood was more and more reposing in
him a peculiar trust, a feeling which beyond most others tends to
increase by its own action. Nelson repaid him with the most unbounded
admiration. "The Lord is very good friends with me," he writes; "he is
certainly the best officer I ever saw. Everything from him is so clear
it is impossible to misunderstand him." "His zeal, his activity for
the honour and benefit of his country," he says at another time, "are
not abated. Upwards of seventy, he possesses the mind of forty years
of age. He has not a thought separated from honour and glory." The
flattering proofs of his superior's esteem, and the demand made upon
his natural powers to exert themselves freely, had a very beneficial
effect upon his health and spirits. It was not effort, however
protracted and severe, but the denial of opportunity to act, whether
by being left unemployed or through want of information, that wore
Nelson down. "I have not been one hour at anchor for pleasure in eight
months; but I can assure you I never was better in health."

Meanwhile a commission from the fleet arrived in Corsica. Sir Gilbert
Elliot, the representative of the British government in the island,
was at its head, and with him were associated two army officers, one
of whom afterwards became widely celebrated as Sir John Moore. A
satisfactory agreement being concluded, Hood sailed from Hyères Bay
with the ships and troops, and operations began against San Fiorenzo,
terminating in the evacuation of the place by the French, who upon the
19th of February retreated by land to Bastia. Nelson was not
immediately connected with this undertaking; but he had the
satisfaction of knowing that two of the four frigates, of whose
detention in the island he was the immediate cause, were here lost to
the enemy. He was during these weeks actively employed harrying the
coast--destroying depots of stores on shore, and small vessels laden
with supplies. These services were mainly, though not entirely,
rendered in the neighborhood of Bastia, a strongly fortified town,
which was to become the next object of the British efforts, and the
scene of his own exertions. There, also, though on a comparatively
small scale, he was to give striking evidence of the characteristics
which led him on, step by step, to his great renown.

When Hood himself took command at San Fiorenzo, he relieved Nelson
from that part of his charge, and sent him on the 7th of February to
blockade Bastia,--a strictly detached service, and one of the utmost
importance, as upon the intercepting of supplies the issue of the
siege largely turned. Three weeks later, on the 1st of March, Nelson
wrote: "We are still in the busy scene of war, a situation in which I
own I feel pleasure, more especially as my actions have given great
satisfaction to my commander-in-chief. The blocking up of Corsica he
left to me: it has been accomplished in the most complete manner, not
a boat got in, nor a soldier landed, although eight thousand men were
embarked at Nice;" and, he might have added, although a vessel was
said to sail from Nice every thirty-six hours. Nor was his activity
confined to blockading. He continually reconnoitered the town and the
works, in doing which on the 23d of February he engaged the batteries
at short range, with the "Agamemnon" and two frigates,--the action
lasting for nearly two hours. While it was at its height, the heads of
the British columns, coming from San Fiorenzo, only twelve miles
distant by land, were seen upon the heights overlooking Bastia from
the rear. "What a noble sight it must have been" to them! wrote Nelson
enthusiastically, in the ardor of his now opening career,--for it
must be remembered that this hero of a hundred fights was even then
but beginning to taste that rapture of the strife, in which he always
breathed most freely, as though in his native element.

Bastia, as he saw it and reported to Lord Hood, was a walled town with
central citadel, of some ten thousand inhabitants, on the east coast
of Corsica, and twenty miles south of Cape Corso, the northern
extremity of the island. The main fortifications were along the
sea-front; but there was, besides, a series of detached works on
either flank and to the rear. The latter not only guarded the
approaches from the interior, but also, being situated on the hills,
much above the town, were capable of commanding it, in case of an
enemy gaining possession. Nelson, while modestly disclaiming any
presumptuous dependence upon his own judgment, expressed a decided
opinion, based upon the engagement of the 23d, that the "Agamemnon"
and the frigates could silence the fire of the sea-front, batter down
the walls, and that then five hundred troops could carry the place by
assault. "That the works on the hills would annoy the town afterwards
is certain, but the enemy being cut off from all supplies--the
provisions in the town being of course in our possession--would think
of nothing but making the best terms they could for themselves." To
his dismay, however, and to the extreme annoyance of the admiral,
General Dundas, commanding the army, refused to move against Bastia,
condemning the attempt as visionary and rash. Meantime the French,
unmolested except by the desultory efforts of the insurgent Corsicans,
were each day strengthening their works, and converting the
possibilities Nelson saw into the impossibilities of the cautious
general.

Hood on the 25th of February came round from San Fiorenzo to Bastia;
but he purposely brought with him no captain senior to Nelson, in
order that the latter might remain in charge of the operations he had
begun so well. When Dundas retreated again to San Fiorenzo, Hood on
the 3d of March followed him there with the flagship, to urge his
co-operation; leaving Nelson with six frigates to conduct the blockade
and take such other steps as the opportunities might justify. By the
middle of March, nearly three months having elapsed since her last
hasty visit to Leghorn, the "Agamemnon" was wholly destitute of
supplies. "We are really," wrote Nelson to Hood, "without firing,
wine, beef, pork, flour, and almost without water: not a rope, canvas,
twine, or nail in the ship. The ship is so light she cannot hold her
side to the wind.... We are certainly in a bad plight at present, not
a man has slept dry for many months. Yet," he continues, with that
indomitable energy which made light of mere difficulties of material,
and conveys so impressive a lesson to our modern days, when slight
physical defects appear insurmountable, and ships not wholly up to
date are counted obsolete,--"yet if your Lordship wishes me to remain
off Bastia, I can, by going to Porto Ferrajo, get water and stores,
and twenty-four hours in Leghorn will give us provisions; and our
refitting, which will take some time, can be put off a little. My wish
is to be present at the attack of Bastia."

On the 18th of March Hood summoned him to San Fiorenzo. The difference
between him and Dundas had become a quarrel, and the latter had
quitted his command. Hood wished to strengthen the argument with his
successor, by a report of the observations made by Nelson; but the
latter records that, after expressing his opinion that eight hundred
troops with four hundred seamen could reduce the place, it was found
that all the army was united against an attack, declaring the
impossibility of taking Bastia, even if all the force were
united,--and this, notwithstanding that an engineer and an artillery
officer had visited the scene, and agreed with Nelson that there was a
probability of success. On the north side both they and he considered
the place weak, and at the same time found the ground favorable for
establishing the siege guns. Moreover, even during the winter gales,
he had succeeded in so closing the sea approaches, while the revolted
Corsicans intercepted those by land, that a pound of coarse bread was
selling for three francs. The spring equinox was now near at hand, and
with better weather the blockade would be yet more efficient. Between
actual attack and famine, he argued, the place must fall. "Not
attacking it I could not but consider as a national disgrace. If the
Army will not take it, we must, by some way or other."

If every particular operation of war is to be considered by itself
alone, and as a purely professional question, to be determined by
striking a balance between the arguments pro and con, it is probable
that the army officers were right in their present contention. In
nothing military was scientific accuracy of prediction so possible as
in forecasting the result and duration of a regular siege, where the
force brought to bear on either side could be approximately known.
But, even in this most methodical and least inspired of processes, the
elements of chance, of the unforeseen, or even the improbable, will
enter, disturbing the most careful calculations. For this reason, no
case must be decided purely on its individual merits, without taking
into account the other conditions of the campaign at large. For good
and sufficient reasons, the British had undertaken, not to conquer a
hostile island, but to effect the deliverance of a people who were
already in arms, and had themselves redeemed their country with the
exception of two or three fortified seaports, for the reduction of
which they possessed neither the materials nor the technical skill. To
pause in the movement of advance was, with a half-civilized race of
unstable temperament, to risk everything. But besides, for the mere
purpose of the blockade, it was imperative to force the enemy as far
as possible to contract his lines. Speaking of a new work thrown up
north of the town, Nelson said with accurate judgment: "It must be
destroyed, or the Corsicans will be obliged to give up a post which
the enemy would immediately possess; and of course throw us on that
side at a greater distance from Bastia." The result would be, not
merely so much more time and labor to be expended, nor yet only the
moral effect on either party, but also the uncovering of a greater
length of seaboard, by which supplies might be run into the town.

The strength of the place, in which, when it fell, were found
"seventy-seven pieces of ordnance with an incredible amount of
stores," was far superior to that estimated by the eye of Nelson,
untrained as an engineer. Not only so, but the force within the walls
was very much larger than he thought, when he spoke with such
confidence. "I never yet told Lord Hood," he wrote nearly a year
later, "that after everything was fixed for the attack of Bastia, I
had information given me of the enormous number of troops we had to
oppose us; but my own honour, Lord Hood's honour, and the honour of
our Country must have all been sacrificed, had I mentioned what I
knew; therefore you will believe what must have been my feelings
during the whole siege, when I had often proposals made to me by men,
now rewarded, to write to Lord Hood to raise the siege." "Had this
been an English town," he said immediately after the surrender, "I am
sure it would not have been taken by them. The more we see of this
place, the more we are astonished at their giving it up, but the truth
is, the different parties were afraid to trust each other." The last
assertion, if correct, conveys just one of those incidents which so
frequently concur to insure the success of a step rightly taken, as
that of Nelson and Hood in this instance certainly was. "Forty-five
hundred men," he continues, "have laid down their arms to under twelve
hundred troops and seamen. If proofs were wanting to show that
perseverance, unanimity, and gallantry, can accomplish almost
incredible things, we are an additional instance."

"I always was of opinion," he wrote in the exultation of reaction from
the weight of responsibility he had assumed by his secrecy,--"I always
was of opinion, have ever acted up to it, and never have had any
reason to repent it, that one Englishman was equal to three
Frenchmen." This curious bit of the gasconade into which Nelson from
time to time lapsed, can scarcely be accepted as a sound working
theory, or as of itself justifying the risk taken; and yet it
undoubtedly, under a grossly distorted form, portrays the temperament
which enabled him to capture Bastia, and which made him what he
was,--a man strong enough to take great chances for adequate ends.
"All naval operations undertaken since I have been at the head of the
government," said Napoleon, "have always failed, because the admirals
see double, and have learned--where I do not know--that war can be
made without running risks." It is not material certainty of success,
the _ignis fatuus_ which is the great snare of the mere engineer, or
of the merely accomplished soldier, that points the way to heroic
achievements. It is the vivid inspiration that enables its happy
possessor, at critical moments, to see and follow the bright clear
line, which, like a ray of light at midnight, shining among manifold
doubtful indications, guides his steps. Whether it leads him to
success or to failure, he may not know; but that it is the path of
wisdom, of duty, and of honor, he knows full well by the persuasion
within,--by conviction, the fortifier of the reason, though not by
sight, the assurance of demonstration. Only a man capable of incurring
a disaster like that at Teneriffe could rise to the level of daring,
which, through hidden perils, sought and wrought the superb triumph of
Aboukir Bay. Such is genius, that rare but hazardous gift, which
separates a man from his fellows by a chasm not to be bridged by
human will. Thus endowed, Nelson before the walls of Bastia showed,
though in a smaller sphere, and therefore with a lighter hazard, the
same keen perception, the same instant decision, the same unfaltering
resolve, the same tenacity of purpose, that, far over and beyond the
glamour of mere success, have rendered eternally illustrious the days
of St. Vincent, of the Nile, and of Copenhagen.

Of the spirit which really actuated him, in his unwavering support of
Lord Hood's inclination to try the doubtful issue, many interesting
instances are afforded by his correspondence. "I feel for the honour
of my Country, and had rather be beat than not make the attack. If we
do not try we can never be successful. I own I have no fears for the
final issue: it will be conquest, certain we will deserve it. My
reputation depends on the opinion I have given; but I feel an honest
consciousness that I have done right. We must, we will have it, or
some of our heads will be laid low. I glory in the attempt." "What
would the immortal Wolfe have done?" he says again, refreshing his own
constancy in the recollection of an equal heroism, crowned with
success against even greater odds. "As he did, beat the enemy, if he
perished in the attempt." Again, a fortnight later: "We are in high
health and spirits besieging Bastia; the final event, I feel assured,
will be conquest." When the siege had already endured for a month, and
with such slight actual progress as to compel him to admit to Hood
that the town battery had been "put in such a state, that firing away
many shot at it is almost useless till we have a force sufficient to
get nearer," his confidence remains unabated. "I have no fears about
the final issue," he writes to his wife; "it will be victory, Bastia
will be ours; and if so, it must prove an event to which the history
of England can hardly boast an equal." Further on in the same letter
he makes a prediction, so singularly accurate as to excite curiosity
about its source: "I will tell you as a secret, Bastia will be ours
between the 20th and 24th of this month"--three weeks after the date
of writing--"if succours do not get in." It surrendered actually on
the 22d. One is tempted to speculate if there had been any such
understanding with the garrison as was afterwards reached with Calvi;
but there is no other token of such an arrangement. It is instructive
also to compare this high-strung steadfastness of purpose to dare
every risk, if success perchance might be won thereby, with his
comment upon his own impulses at a somewhat later date. "My
disposition cannot bear tame and slow measures. Sure I am, had I
commanded our fleet on the 14th, that either the whole French fleet
would have graced my triumph, or I should have been in a confounded
scrape." Surely the secret of great successes is in these words.

The siege of Bastia was not in its course productive of striking
events. Having reasoned in vain with the two successive generals, Hood
demanded that there should be sent back to him a contingent of troops,
which had originally been detailed to serve as marines in the fleet,
but which he had loaned to the army for the operations against San
Fiorenzo. Having received these, he returned to Bastia, and on the 4th
of April, 1794, the besieging force, twelve hundred troops and two
hundred and fifty seamen, landed to the northward of the town. They at
once began to throw up batteries, while the Corsicans harassed the
landward approaches to the place. Nelson being with the troops, the
"Agamemnon" with some frigates was anchored north of the city, Hood
with his ships south of it. During the nights, boats from the fleet
rowed guard near to the sea-front, with such diligence that few of the
craft that attempted to run in or out succeeded in so doing. When
darkness covered the waters, British gunboats crept close to the
walls, and by an intermitting but frequent fire added much to the
distress of the enemy. On the 11th of April the garrison was formally
summoned, and, the expected refusal having been received, the British
batteries opened. There was not force enough, however, to bring the
place to terms as a consequence of direct attack, and after three
weeks Nelson, while betraying no apprehension of failure, practically
admitted the fact. "Although I have no doubt but even remaining in our
present situation, and by strict guard rowing close to the town, and
the Corsicans harassing them on the hills, and the gunboats by night,
but that the enemy must surrender before any great length of time,
yet, if force can be spared, a successful attack on the heights must
much facilitate a speedy capture. I own it will give me the highest
pleasure to assist in the attack."

It was by such an attack, or rather by the fear of it, coming upon the
long and exhausting endurance of cannonade and hunger, that Bastia
finally fell. "We shall in time accomplish the taking of Bastia,"
wrote Nelson on the 3d of May. "I have no doubt in the way we proposed
to attempt it, by bombardment and cannonading, joined to a close
blockade of the harbour." "If not," he adds, "our Country will, I
believe, sooner forgive an officer for attacking his enemy than for
letting it alone." On the 12th a large boat was captured coming out
from the port; and on her were found letters from the governor,
Gentili, confessing the annoyance caused by the British fire, and
saying that if relief did not arrive by the 29th, the place must be
looked upon as lost. Three nights later another boat was caught
attempting to enter. On board her was a brother of the Mayor of
Bastia. This man, while talking with Hood's secretary, expressed his
fears for the result to his relatives, if the town were carried by
assault. The secretary replied that Hood could not prevent those
evils, if the garrison awaited the attack, and gave the Corsican to
understand that it was imminent, troops being expected from San
Fiorenzo. At the urgent request of the prisoner, one of the seamen
taken with him was permitted to land with a letter, stating the
impending danger. By a singular coincidence, or by skilful
contrivance, the San Fiorenzo troops appeared on the heights upon the
evening, May 19, following this conversation. Flags of truce had
already been hoisted, negotiations were opened, and on the 22d the
French colors were struck and the British took possession. "When I
reflect what we have achieved," confessed the hitherto outwardly
unmoved Nelson, "I am all astonishment. The most glorious sight that
an Englishman can experience, and which, I believe, none but an
Englishman could bring about, was exhibited,--4,500 men laying down
their arms to less than 1,000 British soldiers, who were serving as
marines." As towards the French this account is perhaps somewhat less
than fair; but it does no more than justice to the admirable firmness
and enterprise shown by Hood and Nelson. As a question of Bastia only,
their attempt might be charged with rashness; but having regard to the
political and military conditions, to the instability of the Corsican
character, and to the value of the island as a naval station, it was
amply justified, for the risks run were out of all proportion less
than the advantage to be gained.

Thus the siege of Bastia ended in triumph, despite the prior
pronouncement of the general commanding the troops, that the attempt
was "most visionary and rash." These epithets, being used to Hood
after his own expressions in favor of the undertaking, had not
unnaturally provoked from him a resentful retort; and, as men are
rarely conciliated by the success of measures which they have
ridiculed, there arose a degree of strained relations between army and
navy, that continued even after the arrival of a new commander of the
land forces, and indeed throughout Hood's association with the
operations in Corsica.

During this busy and laborious period, despite his burden of secret
anxiety, Nelson's naturally delicate health showed the favorable
reaction, which, as has before been noted, was with him the usual
result of the call to exertion. His letters steadily reflect, and
occasionally mention, the glow of exultation produced by constant
action of a worthy and congenial nature. "We are in high health and
spirits besieging Bastia," he writes to his wife soon after landing;
and shortly before the fall of the place he says again: "As to my
health, it was never better, seldom so well." Yet, although from
beginning to end the essential stay of the enterprise, the animating
soul, without whose positive convictions and ardent support Lord Hood
could scarcely have dared so great a hazard, he was throughout the
siege left, apparently purposely, in an anomalous position, and was at
the end granted a recognition which, though probably not grudging, was
certainly scanty. No definition of his duties was ever given by the
commander-in-chief. He appears as it were the latter's unacknowledged
representative ashore, a plenipotentiary without credentials. "What my
situation is," he writes to a relative, "is not to be described. I am
everything, yet nothing ostensible; enjoying the confidence of Lord
Hood and Colonel Villettes, and the captains landed with the seamen
obeying my orders." A fortnight later he writes to Hood: "Your
Lordship knows exactly the situation I am in here. With Colonel
Villettes I have no reason but to suppose I am respected in the
highest degree; nor have I occasion to complain of want of attention
to my wishes from any parties; but yet I am considered as not
commanding the seamen landed. My wishes may be, and are, complied
with; my orders would possibly be disregarded. Therefore, if we move
from hence, I would wish your Lordship to settle that point. Your
Lordship will not, I trust, take this request amiss: I have been
struggling with it since the first day I landed."

Hood apparently gave him full satisfaction as regards his own view of
the situation. "I am happy," Nelson wrote, when acknowledging his
reply, "that my ideas of the situation I am in here so perfectly agree
with your Lordship's;" but he did not settle the matter by a decisive
order. His object, as he seems to have explained, was to bestow a
certain amount of prominence upon a young captain, Hunt, who had
recently lost his ship, and who, Hood thought, would be sooner
provided with another, if he appeared as in command at the guns.
Nelson acceded to this arrangement with his usual generosity. "Your
kind intention to Captain Hunt," he wrote, "I had the honour of
telling your Lordship, should be furthered by every means in my power;
and my regard for him, I assure you, is undiminished. He is a most
exceeding good young man, nor is any one more zealous for the service.
I don't complain of any one, but an idea has entered into the heads of
some under him, that his command was absolutely distinct from me; and
that I had no authority over him, except as a request." Unfortunately,
Hood, in his desire to serve Hunt, not only unduly but absurdly
minimized Nelson's relations to the whole affair. His despatch ran:
"Captain Nelson, of his Majesty's ship Agamemnon, who had the command
and directions of the seamen _in landing the guns, mortars and
stores_,[20] and Captain Hunt _who commanded at the batteries_,[20]
... have an equal claim to my gratitude." To limit Nelson's share in
the capture of Bastia to the purely subsidiary though important
function of landing the guns, was as unjust as it was unnecessary to
the interests of Hunt. The latter, being second in command ashore, and
afterwards sent home with the despatches, was sure to receive the
reward customarily bestowed upon such services.

The incident singularly and aptly illustrates the difference, which in
a military service cannot be too carefully kept in mind, between
individual expressions of opinion, which may be biassed, and
professional reputation, which, like public sentiment, usually
settles at last not far from the truth. Despite this curious inversion
of the facts by Lord Hood, there probably was no one among the naval
forces, nor among the soldiery, who did not thoroughly, if perchance
somewhat vaguely, appreciate that Nelson was the moving spirit of the
whole operation, even beyond Hood himself. As the Greek commanders
after Salamis were said to have voted the award of merit each to
himself first, but all to Themistocles second, so at Bastia, whatever
value individuals might place on their own services, all probably
would have agreed that Nelson came next.

The latter meantime was happily unconscious of the wrong done him, so
that nothing marred the pleasure with which he congratulated the
commander-in-chief, and received the latter's brief but hearty general
order of thanks, wherein Nelson's own name stood foremost, as was due
both to his seniority and to his exertions. When the despatch reached
him, he freely expressed his discontent in letters to friends; but
being, at the time of its reception, actively engaged in the siege of
Calvi, the exhilaration of that congenial employment for the moment
took the edge off the keenness of his resentment. "Lord Hood and
myself were never better friends--_nor, although his Letter does_,[21]
did he wish to put me where I never was--in the rear. Captain Hunt,
who lost his ship, he wanted to push forward for another,--a young man
who never was on a battery, or ever rendered any service during the
siege; if any person ever says he did, then I submit to the character
of a story-teller. Poor Serocold, who fell here,[22] was determined to
publish an advertisement, as he commanded a battery under my orders.
The whole operations of the siege were carried on through Lord Hood's
letters to me. I was the mover of it--I was the cause of its success.
Sir Gilbert Elliot will be my evidence, if any is required. I am not
a little vexed, but shall not quarrel." "I am well aware," he had
written to Mrs. Nelson a few days before, "my poor services will not
be noticed: I have no interest; but, however services may be received,
it is not right in an officer to slacken his zeal for his Country."

These noble words only voiced a feeling which in Nelson's heart had
all the strength of a principle; and this light of the single eye
stood him in good stead in the moments of bitterness which followed a
few months later, when a lull in the storm of fighting gave the sense
of neglect a chance to rankle. "My heart is full," he writes then to
his uncle Suckling, speaking not only of Bastia, but of the entire
course of operations in Corsica, "when I think of the treatment I have
received: every man who had any considerable share in the reduction
has got some place or other--I, only I, am without reward.... Nothing
but my anxious endeavour to serve my Country makes me bear up against
it; but I sometimes am ready to give all up." "Forgive this letter,"
he adds towards the end: "I have said a great deal too much of myself;
but indeed it is all too true." In similar strain he expressed himself
to his wife: "It is very true that I have ever served faithfully, and
ever has it been my fate to be neglected; but that shall not make me
inattentive to my duty. I have pride in doing my duty well, and a
self-approbation, which if it is not so lucrative, yet perhaps affords
more pleasing sensations." Thus the consciousness of duty done in the
past, and the clear recognition of what duty still demanded in the
present and future, stood him in full stead, when he failed to receive
at the hands of others the honor he felt to be his due, and which, he
never wearied in proclaiming, was in his eyes priceless, above all
other reward. "Corsica, in respect of prizes," he wrote to Mrs.
Nelson, "produces nothing but honour, far above the consideration of
wealth: not that I despise riches, quite the contrary, yet I would
not sacrifice a good name to obtain them. Had I attended less than I
have done to the service of my Country, I might have made some money
too: however, I trust my name will stand on record, when the
money-makers will be forgot,"--a hope to be abundantly fulfilled.

At the moment Bastia fell there arrived from England a new
commander-in-chief for the land forces, General Stuart, an officer of
distinguished ability and enterprise. Cheered by the hope of cordial
co-operation, Hood and Nelson resumed without delay their enthusiastic
efforts. Within a week, on the 30th of May, the latter wrote that the
"Agamemnon" was taking on board ammunition for the siege of Calvi, the
last remaining of the hostile strongholds. In the midst of the
preparations, at eleven P.M. of June 6, word was received that nine
French ships-of-the-line had come out of Toulon, and were believed to
be bound for Calvi, with reinforcements for the garrison. At seven the
next morning the squadron was under way; the "Agamemnon," which had
two hundred tons of ordnance stores to unload, sailing only half an
hour after her less encumbered consorts, whom she soon overtook.

Hood shaped his course for Calvi, being constrained thereto, not only
by the rumor of the enemy's destination, but also by the military
necessity of effecting a junction with the rest of his fleet. Admiral
Hotham, who commanded the British division of seven ships in front of
Toulon, instead of waiting to verify the report brought to him of the
enemy's force,--which was actually the same, numerically, as his
own,--bore up hastily for Calvi, intending, so wrote Nelson at the
time, to fight them there, rather than that they should throw in
succors. Whatever their numbers, thus to surrender touch of them at
the beginning was an evident mistake, for which, as for most mistakes,
a penalty had in the end to be paid; and in fact, if the relief of
Calvi was the object of the sortie, the place to fight was evidently
as far from there as possible. Off Toulon, even had Hotham been
beaten, his opponents would have been too roughly handled to carry out
their mission. As it was, this precipitate retirement lost the British
an opportunity for a combat that might have placed their control of
the sea beyond peradventure; and a few months later, Nelson, who at
first had viewed Hotham's action with the generous sympathy and
confident pride which always characterized his attitude towards his
brother officers, showed how clearly he was reading in the book of
experience the lessons that should afterwards stand himself in good
stead. "When 'Victory' is gone," he wrote, "we shall be thirteen sail
of the line [to the French fifteen], when the enemy will keep our new
Commanding Officer [Hotham] in hot water, who missed, unfortunately,
the opportunity of fighting them, last June." Ten years later, in his
celebrated chase of Villeneuve's fleet, he said to his captains: "If
we meet the enemy we shall find them not less than eighteen, I rather
think twenty, sail of the line, and therefore do not be surprised if I
should not fall on them immediately [he had but eleven]--_we won't
part_[23] without a battle;" and he expressed with the utmost decision
his clear appreciation that even a lost battle, if delivered at the
right point or at the right moment, would frustrate the ulterior
objects of the enemy, by crippling the force upon which they depended.
As will be seen in the sequel, Hotham, throughout his brief command as
Hood's successor, suffered the consequences of permitting so important
a fraction of the enemy's fleet to escape his grasp, when it was in
his power to close with it.

The British divisions met off the threatened port two days after
leaving Bastia, and two hours later a lookout frigate brought word
that the French fleet had been seen by her the evening before, to the
northward and westward, some forty miles off its own coast. Hood at
once made sail in pursuit, and in the afternoon of the 10th of June
caught sight of the enemy, but so close in with the shore that they
succeeded in towing their ships under the protection of the batteries
in Golfe Jouan, where, for lack of wind, he was unable to follow them
for some days, during which they had time to strengthen their position
beyond his powers of offence. Hotham's error was irreparable. The
"Agamemnon" was then sent back to Bastia, to resume the work of
transportation, which Nelson pushed with the untiring energy that
characterized all his movements. Arriving on the 12th, fifteen hundred
troops were embarked by eight the next morning, and at four in the
afternoon he sailed, having with him two smaller ships of war and
twenty-two transports. On the 15th he anchored at San Fiorenzo.

Here he met General Stuart. The latter was anxious to proceed at once
with the siege of Calvi, but asked Nelson whether he thought it proper
to take the shipping to that exposed position; alluding to the French
fleet that had left Toulon, and which Hood was then seeking. Nelson's
reply is interesting, as reflecting the judgment of a warrior at once
prudent and enterprising, concerning the influence of a hostile "fleet
in being" upon a contemplated detached operation. "I certainly thought
it right," he said, "placing the firmest reliance that we should be
perfectly safe under Lord Hood's protection, who would take care that
the French fleet at Gourjean[24] should not molest us." To Hood he
wrote a week later: "I believed ourselves safe under your Lordship's
wing." At this moment he thought the French to be nine
sail-of-the-line to the British thirteen,--no contemptible inferior
force. Yet that he recognized the possible danger from such a
detachment is also clear; for, writing two days earlier, under the
same belief as to the enemy's strength, and speaking of the expected
approach of an important convoy, he says: "I hope they will not
venture up till Lord Hood can get off Toulon, or wherever the French
fleet are got to." When a particular opinion has received the extreme
expression now given to that concerning the "fleet in being," and
apparently has undergone equally extreme misconception, it is
instructive to recur to the actual effect of such a force, upon the
practice of a man with whom moral effect was never in excess of the
facts of the case, whose imagination produced to him no paralyzing
picture of remote contingencies. Is it probable that, with the great
issues of 1690 at stake, Nelson, had he been in Tourville's place,
would have deemed the crossing of the Channel by French troops
impossible, because of Torrington's "fleet in being"?

Sailing again on June 16, the expedition arrived next day off Calvi.
Although it was now summer, the difficulties of the new undertaking
were, from the maritime point of view, very great. The town of Calvi,
which was walled and had a citadel, lies upon a promontory on the west
side of an open gulf of the same name, a semicircular recess, three
miles wide by two deep, on the northwest coast of Corsica. The western
point of its shore line is Cape Revellata; the eastern, Point Espano.
The port being fortified and garrisoned, it was not practicable to
take the shipping inside, nor to establish on the inner beach a safe
base for disembarking. The "Agamemnon" therefore anchored outside,
nearly two miles south of Cape Revellata, and a mile from shore, in
the excessive depth of fifty-three fathoms; the transports coming-to
off the cape, but farther to seaward. The water being so deep, and the
bottom rocky, the position was perilous for sailing-ships, for the
prevailing summer wind blows directly on the shore, which is steep-to
and affords no shelter. Abreast the "Agamemnon" was a small inlet,
Porto Agro, about three miles from Calvi by difficult approaches.
Here Nelson landed on the 18th with General Stuart; and, after
reconnoitring both the beach and the town, the two officers decided
that, though a very bad landing, it was the best available. On the
19th, at 7 A.M., the troops disembarked. That afternoon Nelson himself
went ashore to stay, taking with him two hundred and fifty seamen. The
next day it came on to blow so hard that most of the ships put to sea,
and no intercourse was had from the land with those which remained.
The "Agamemnon" did not return till the 24th. Lord Hood was by this
time in San Fiorenzo Bay, having abandoned the hope of attacking the
French fleet in Golfe Jouan. On the 27th he arrived off Calvi, and
thenceforth Nelson was in daily communication with him till the place
fell.

As the army in moderate, though not wholly adequate, force conducted
the siege of Calvi, under a general officer of vigorous character, the
part taken by Nelson and his seamen, though extremely important, and
indeed essential to the ultimate success, was necessarily subordinate.
It is well to notice that his journal, and correspondence with Lord
Hood, clearly recognize this, his true relation to the siege of Calvi;
for it makes it probable that, in attributing to himself a much more
important part at Bastia, and in saying that Hood's report had put him
unfairly in the background, he was not exaggerating his actual though
ill-defined position there. That Nelson loved to dwell in thought upon
his own achievements, that distinction in the eyes of his fellows was
dear to him, that he craved recognition, and was at times perhaps too
insistent in requiring it, is true enough; but there is no indication
that he ever coveted the laurels of others, or materially misconceived
his own share in particular events. Glory, sweet as it was to him,
lost its value, if unaccompanied by the consciousness of desert which
stamps it as honor. It is, therefore, not so much for personal
achievement as for revelation of character that this siege has
interest in his life.

Besides the defences of the town proper, Calvi was protected by a
series of outworks extending across the neck of land upon which it
lay. Of these the outermost was on the left, looking from the place.
It flanked the approaches to the others, and commanded the
communications with the interior. It was, by Nelson's estimate, about
twenty-two hundred yards from the town, and had first to be reduced.
By the 3d of July thirteen long guns, besides a number of mortars and
howitzers, had been dragged from the beach to the spot by the seamen,
who also assisted in placing them in position, and for the most part
worked them in battle, an artillerist from the army pointing. Nelson,
with Captain Hallowell, already an officer of mark and afterwards one
of distinction, took alternate day's duty at the batteries, a third
captain, Serocold, having fallen early in the siege. Fearing news
might reach his wife that a naval captain had been killed, without the
name being mentioned, he wrote to her of this sad event, adding
expressively: "I am very busy, yet own I am in all my glory; except
with you, I would not be anywhere but where I am, for the world." On
July 7th the first outwork fell. The attack upon the others was then
steadily and systematically prosecuted, until on the 19th all had been
captured, and the besiegers stood face to face with the town walls.

During this time Nelson, as always, was continually at the front and
among the most exposed. Out of six guns in the battery which he calls
"ours," five were disabled in six days. On the 12th at daylight, a
heavy fire opened from the town, which, he says, "seldom missed our
battery;" and at seven o'clock a shot, which on the ricochet cleared
his head by a hair's breadth, drove sand into his face and right eye
with such violence as to incapacitate him. He spoke lightly and
cheerfully of the incident to Lord Hood, "I got a little hurt this
morning: not much, as you may judge by my writing," and remained
absent from duty only the regular twenty-four hours; but, after some
fluctuations of hope, the sight of the eye was permanently lost to
him. Of General Stuart's conduct in the operations he frequently
speaks with cordial admiration. "He is not sparing of himself on any
occasion, he every night sleeps with us in the advanced battery. If I
may be allowed to judge, he is an extraordinary good judge of ground.
No officer ever deserved success more." At the same time he expresses
dissatisfaction with some of the subordinate army officers, to whose
inefficiency he attributes the necessity for undue personal exertion
on the general's part: "The General is not well. He fatigues himself
too much, but I can't help seeing he is obliged to do it. He has not a
person to forward his views,--the engineer sick, the artillery captain
not fit for active service; therefore every minute thing must be done
by himself, or it is not done at all."

The work was tedious and exhausting, and the malaria of the hot
Corsican summer told heavily on men's health and patience. The supply
of ammunition, and of material of war generally, for the army seems to
have been inadequate; and heavy demands were made upon the fleet, not
only for guns, which could be returned, but for powder and shot, the
expenditure of which might prove embarrassing before they could be
renewed. The troops also were not numerous enough, under the climatic
conditions, to do all their own duty. In such circumstances, when two
parties are working together to the same end, but under no common
control, each is prone to think the other behindhand in his work and
exacting in his demands. "Why don't Lord Hood land 500 men to work?"
said Colonel Moore, the general's right-hand man. "Our soldiers are
tired." Nelson, on the other hand, thought that Moore wanted over-much
battering done to the breach of a work, before he led the stormers to
it; and Hood, who was receiving frequent reports of the preparations
of the French fleet in Toulon, was impatient to have the siege pushed,
and thought the army dilatory. "The rapidity with which the French are
getting on at Toulon," he wrote confidentially to Nelson, "makes it
indispensably necessary for me to put the whole of the fleet under my
command in the best possible state for service; and I must soon apply
to the general for those parts of the regiments now on shore, ordered
by his Majesty to serve in lieu of marines, to be held in readiness to
embark at the shortest notice. I shall delay this application as long
as possible."

Nelson, being a seaman, sympathized of course with his own service,
and with Hood, for whom he had most cordial admiration, both personal
and professional. But at the same time he was on the spot, a constant
eye-witness to the difficulties of the siege, a clear-headed observer,
with sound military instincts, and fair-minded when facts were before
him. The army, he wrote to Hood, is harassed to death, and he notices
that it suffers from sickness far more than do the seamen. He repeats
the request for more seamen, and, although he seems to doubt the
reasonableness of the demand, evidently thinks that they should be
furnished, if possible. Hood accordingly sent an additional detachment
of three hundred, raising the number on shore to the five hundred
suggested by Moore. "I had much rather," he wrote, "that a hundred
seamen should be landed unnecessarily, than that one should be kept
back that was judged necessary." On the other hand, when the general,
after a work bearing on the bay had been destroyed, suggests that the
navy might help, by laying the ships against the walls, Nelson takes
"the liberty of observing that the business of laying wood before
walls was much altered of late," and adds the common-sense remark,
that "the quantity of powder and shot which would be fired away on
such an attack could be much better directed from a battery on shore."
This conversation took place immediately after all the outworks had
been reduced. It was conducted "with the greatest politeness," he
writes, and "the General thanked me for my assistance, but it was
necessary to come to the point whether the siege should be persevered
in or given up. If the former, he must be supplied with the means,
which were more troops, more seamen to work, and more ammunition."
Nelson replied that, if the requisite means could not be had on the
spot, they could at least hold on where they were till supplied from
elsewhere.

It will be noticed that Nelson was practically the intermediary
between the two commanders-in-chief. In fact, there appears to have
been between them some constraint, and he was at times asked to
transmit a message which he thought had better go direct. In this
particularly delicate situation, one cannot but be impressed with the
tact he for the most part shows, the diplomatic ability, which was
freely attributed to him by his superiors in later and more
influential commands. This was greatly helped by his cordial good-will
towards others, combined with disinterested zeal for the duty before
him; the whole illumined by unusual sagacity and good sense. He sees
both sides, and conveys his suggestions to either with a
self-restraint and deference which avert resentment; and he preserves
both his calmness and candor, although he notices in the camp some
jealousy of his confidential communication with his immediate
superior, the admiral. Though never backward to demand what he thought
the rights of himself or his associates, Nelson was always naturally
disposed to reconcile differences, to minimize causes of trouble, and
this native temperament had not yet undergone the warping which
followed his later wounds--especially that on the head received at the
Nile--and the mental conflict into which he was plunged by his
unhappy passion for Lady Hamilton. At this time, in the flush of
earlier enthusiasm, delighting as few men do in the joy of battle, he
strove to promote harmony, to smooth over difficulties by every
exertion possible, either by doing whatever was asked of him, or by
judicious representations to others. Thus, when Hood, impatient at the
disturbing news from Toulon, wishes to hasten the conclusion by
summoning the garrison, in the hope that it may yield at once, the
general objected, apparently on the ground that the statement of their
own advantages, upon which such a summons might be based, would be
prejudicial, if, as was most probable, the demand was rejected.
Whatever his reason, Nelson, though indirectly, intimates to Hood that
in this matter he himself agrees, upon the whole, with the general,
and Hood yields the point,--the more so that he learns from Nelson
that the outposts are to be stormed the next night; and sorely was the
captain, in his judicious efforts thus to keep the peace, tried by the
postponement of the promised assault for twenty-four hours. "_Such
things are_," he wrote to Hood, using a favorite expression. "I hope
to God the general, who seems a good officer and an amiable man, is
not led away; but Colonel Moore is his great friend."

The feeling between the land and sea services was emphasized in the
relations existing between Lord Hood and Colonel Moore, who
afterwards, as Sir John Moore, fell gloriously at Corunna. To these
two eminent officers fortune denied the occasion to make full proof of
their greatness to the world; but they stand in the first rank of
those men of promise whose failure has been due, not to their own
shortcomings, but to the lack of opportunity. Sir John Moore has been
the happier, in that the enterprise with which his name is chiefly
connected, and upon which his title to fame securely rests, was
completed, and wrought its full results; fortunate, too, in having
received the vindication of that great action at the hands of the
most eloquent of military historians. His country and his profession
may well mourn a career of such fair opening so soon cut short. But
daring and original in the highest degree as was the march from
Salamanca to Sahagun, it did not exceed, either in originality or in
daring, the purposes nourished by Lord Hood, which he had no
opportunity so to execute as to attract attention. Condemned to
subordinate positions until he had reached the age of seventy, his
genius is known to us only by his letters, and by the frustrated plans
at St. Kitts in 1782, and at Golfe Jouan in 1794, in the former of
which, less fortunate than Moore, he failed to realize his
well-grounded hope of reversing, by a single blow, the issues of a
campaign.

It is to be regretted that two such men could not understand each
other cordially. Hood, we know from his letters, was "of that frame
and texture that I cannot be indifferent,"--"full of anxiety,
impatience, and apprehension,"--when service seemed to him slothfully
done. Moore, we are told by Napier, "maintained the right with
vehemence bordering upon fierceness." Had he had the chief command on
shore, it is possible that the two, impetuous and self-asserting
though they were, might have reached an understanding. But in the most
unfortunate disagreement about Bastia,--wherein it is to a naval
officer of to-day scarcely possible to do otherwise than blame the
sullen lack of enterprise shown by the army,--and afterwards at Calvi,
Moore appeared to Hood, and to Nelson also, as the subordinate, the
power behind the throne, who was prompting a line of action they both
condemned. No position in military life is more provocative of trouble
than to feel you are not dealing with the principal, but with an
irresponsible inferior; and the situation is worse, because one in
which it is almost impossible to come to an issue. Moore's
professional talent and force of character naturally made itself felt,
even with a man of Stuart's ability. Hood and Nelson recognized this,
and they resented, as inspired by a junior, what they might have
combated dispassionately, if attributed to the chief. There was
friction also between Moore and Elliot, the viceroy of the island.
Doubtless, as in all cases where suspicion, not to say jealousy, has
been begot, much more and worse was imagined by both parties than
actually occurred. The apportionment of blame, or prolonged discussion
of the matter, is out of place in a biography of Nelson. To that it is
of moment, only because it is proper to state that Nelson, on the spot
and in daily contact,--Nelson, upon whose zeal and entire
self-devotion at this period no doubt is cast,--agreed in the main
with Hood's opinion as to what the latter called the San Fiorenzo
leaven, of which Moore was to them the exponent. It is true that
Nelson naturally sympathized with his profession and his admiral, whom
he heartily admired; but some corrective, at least, to such
partiality, was supplied by his soreness about the latter's omission
duly to report his services at Bastia, of which he just now became
aware. The estrangement between the two commanders-in-chief was
doubtless increased by the apparent reluctance, certainly the lack of
effort, to see one another frequently.

The principal work, called by Nelson the Mozelle battery, was carried
before daylight of July 19, and before dark all the outposts were in
the hands of the British. "I could have wished to have had a little
part in the storm," wrote Nelson, characteristically covetous of
strenuous action, "if it was only to have placed the ladders and
pulled away the palisadoes. However, we did the part allotted to us."
That day a summons was sent to the garrison, but rejected, and work
upon batteries to breach the town walls was then pushed rapidly
forward; for it was becoming more and more evident that the siege must
be brought to an end, lest the entire force of besiegers should become
disabled by sickness. On the 28th the batteries were ready, and
General Stuart sent in word that he would not fire upon the hospital
positions, where indicated by black flags. The besieged then asked for
a truce of twenty-five days, undertaking to lay down their arms, if
not by then relieved. The general and admiral refused, but were
willing to allow six days. This the garrison in turn rejected; and on
the night of the 30th four small vessels succeeded in eluding the
blockading frigates and entering supplies, which encouraged the
besieged. On the 31st the batteries opened, and after thirty-six
hours' heavy cannonade the town held out a flag of truce. An
arrangement was made that it should surrender on the 10th of August,
if not relieved; the garrison to be transported to France without
becoming prisoners of war.

No relief arriving, the place capitulated on the day named. It was
high time for the besiegers. "We have upwards of one thousand sick out
of two thousand," wrote Nelson, "and the others not much better than
so many phantoms. We have lost many men from the season, very few from
the enemy." He himself escaped more easily than most. To use his own
quaint expression, "All the prevailing disorders have attacked me, but
I have not strength enough for them to fasten upon. I am here the reed
amongst the oaks: I bow before the storm, while the sturdy oak is laid
low." The congenial moral surroundings, in short,--the atmosphere of
exertion, of worthy and engrossing occupation,--the consciousness, to
him delightful, of distinguished action, of heroic persistence through
toil and danger,--prevailed even in his physical frame over
discomfort, over the insidious climate, and even over his distressing
wound. "This is my ague day," he writes when the batteries opened; "I
hope so active a scene will keep off the fit. It has shaken me a good
deal; but I have been used to them, and now don't mind them much."
"Amongst the wounded, in a slight manner, is myself, my head being a
good deal wounded and my right eye cut down; but the surgeons flatter
me I shall not entirely lose the sight. It confined me, thank God,
only one day, and at a time when nothing particular happened to be
doing." "You must not think my hurts confined me," he tells his wife;
"no, nothing but the loss of a limb would have kept me from my duty,
and I believe my exertions conduced to preserve me in this general
mortality." In his cheery letters, now, no trace is perceptible of the
fretful, complaining temper, which impaired, though it did not
destroy, the self-devotion of his later career. No other mistress at
this time contended with honor for the possession of his heart; no
other place than the post of duty before Calvi distracted his desires,
or appealed to his imagination through his senses. Not even Lord
Hood's report of the siege of Bastia, which here came to his
knowledge, and by which he thought himself wronged, had bitterness to
overcome the joy of action and of self-contentment.

Not many days were required, after the fall of Calvi, to remove the
fleet, and the seamen who had been serving on shore, from the
pestilential coast. Nelson seems to have been intrusted with the
embarkation of the prisoners in the transports which were to take them
to Toulon. He told his wife that he had been four months landed, and
felt almost qualified to pass his examination as a besieging general,
but that he had no desire to go on with campaigning. On the 11th of
August, the day after the delivery of the place, he was again on board
the "Agamemnon," from whose crew had been drawn the greatest
proportion of the seamen for the batteries. One hundred and fifty of
them were now in their beds. "My ship's company are all worn out," he
wrote, "as is this whole army, except myself; nothing hurts me,--of
two thousand men I am the most healthy. Every other officer is
scarcely able to crawl." Among the victims of the deadly climate was
Lieutenant Moutray, the son of the lady to whom, ten years before, he
had been so warmly attracted in the West Indies. Nelson placed a
monument to him in the church at San Fiorenzo.

On the 10th of August the "Agamemnon" sailed from Calvi, and after a
stop at San Fiorenzo, where Hood then was, reached Leghorn on the
18th. Now that the immediate danger of the siege was over, Nelson
admitted to his wife the serious character of the injury he had
received. The right eye was nearly deprived of sight,--only so far
recovered as to enable him to distinguish light from darkness. For all
purposes of use it was gone; but the blemish was not to be perceived,
unless attention was drawn to it.

At Leghorn the ship lay for a month,--the first period of repose since
she went into commission, a year and a half before. While there, the
physician to the fleet came on board and surveyed the crew, finding
them in a very weak state, and unfit to serve. This condition of
things gave Nelson hopes that, upon the approaching departure of Lord
Hood for England, the "Agamemnon" might go with him; for he was loath
to separate from an admiral whose high esteem he had won, and upon
whom he looked as the first sea-officer of Great Britain. Hood was
inclined to take her, and to transfer the ship's company bodily to a
seventy-four. This he considered no more than due to Nelson's
distinguished merit and services, and he had indeed offered him each
ship of that rate whose command fell vacant in the Mediterranean; but
the strong sense of attachment to those who had shared his toils and
dangers, of reluctance that they should see him willing to leave them,
after their hard work together,--that combination of sympathy and tact
which made so much of Nelson's success as a leader of men,--continued
to prevent his accepting promotion that would sever his ties to them.

The exigencies of the war in the Mediterranean forbade the departure,
even of a sixty-four with a disabled crew. A full month later her
sick-list was still seventy-seven, out of a total of less than four
hundred. "Though certainly unfit for a long cruise," Nelson said, "we
are here making a show,"--a military requirement not to be neglected
or despised. He accepted the disappointment, as he did all service
rubs at this period, with perfect temper and in the best spirit. "We
must not repine," he wrote to his wife on the 12th of October, the day
after Hood sailed for England. "Lord Hood is very well inclined
towards me, but the service must ever supersede all private
consideration. I hope you will spend the winter cheerfully. Do not
repine at my absence; before spring I hope we shall have peace, when
we must look out for some little cottage." She fretted, however, as
some women will; and he, to comfort her, wrote more sanguinely about
himself than the facts warranted. "Why you should be uneasy about me,
so as to make yourself ill, I know not. I feel a confident protection
in whatever service I may be employed upon; and as to my health, I
don't know that I was ever so truly well. I fancy myself grown quite
stout." To his old captain, Locker, he admitted that he could not get
the better of the fever.

Corsica being now wholly in the power of its inhabitants, allied with
and supported by Great Britain, his attention and interest were
engrossed by the French fleet centring upon Toulon, the dominant
factor of concern to the British in the Mediterranean, where
Vice-Admiral Hotham had succeeded Hood as commander-in-chief. Nelson
realizes more and more the mistake that was made, when a fraction of
it was allowed to escape battle in the previous June. The various
reasons by which he had at first excused the neglect to bring it to
action no longer weigh with him. He does not directly blame, but he
speaks of the omission as an "opportunity lost,"--a phrase than which
there are few more ominous, in characterizing the closely balanced,
yet weighty, decisions, upon which the issues of war depend. Nothing,
he thinks, can prevent the junction of the two fragments,--then in
Golfe Jouan and Toulon,--one of which, with more resolution and
promptitude on Hotham's part, might have been struck singly at sea a
few months before; and if they join, there must follow a fleet action,
between forces too nearly equal to insure to Great Britain the
decisive results that were needed. The thought he afterwards
expressed, "Numbers only can annihilate," was clearly floating in his
brain,--inarticulate, perhaps, as yet, but sure to come to the birth.
"If we are not completely victorious,--I mean, able to remain at sea
whilst the enemy must retire into port,--if we only make a Lord Howe's
victory, take a part, and retire into port, Italy is lost." Criticism
clearly is going on in his mind; and not mere criticism, (there is
enough and to spare of that in the world, and not least in navies),
but criticism judicious, well considered, and above all fruitful. The
error of opportunity lost he had seen; the error of a partial
victory--"a Lord Howe's victory," another opportunity lost--he
intuitively anticipated for the Mediterranean, and was soon to see. He
was already prepared to pass an accurate judgment instantly, when he
saw it. May we not almost hear, thundering back from the clouds that
yet veiled the distant future of the Nile, the words, of which his
thought was already pregnant, "You may be assured I will bring the
French fleet to action the moment I can lay my hands upon them."

The year closed with the British fleet watching, as best it could, the
French ships, which, according to Nelson's expectation, had given the
blockaders the slip, and had made their junction at Toulon. There was
now no great disparity in the nominal force of the two opponents, the
British having fourteen ships-of-the-line, the French fifteen; and it
was quite in the enemy's power to fulfil his other prediction, by
keeping Hotham in hot water during the winter. In the middle of
November the "Agamemnon" had to go to Leghorn for extensive repairs,
and remained there, shifting her main and mizzen masts, until the 21st
of December. Nelson, who had endured with unyielding cheerfulness the
dangers, exposure, and sickliness of Calvi, found himself unable to
bear patiently the comfort of quiet nights in a friendly port, while
hot work might chance outside. "Lying in port is misery to me. My
heart is almost broke to find the Agamemnon lying here, little better
than a wreck. I own my sincere wish that the enemy would rest quiet
until we are ready for sea, and a gleam of hope sometimes crosses me
that they will." "I am uneasy enough for fear they will fight, and
Agamemnon not present,--it will almost break my heart; but I hope the
best,--that they are only boasting at present, and will be quiet until
I am ready." "It is misery," he repeats, "for me to be laid up
dismantled."

It was during this period of comparative inactivity in port, followed
by monotonous though arduous winter cruising off Toulon, which was
broken only by equally dreary stays at San Fiorenzo, that Nelson found
time to brood over the neglect of which he thought himself the victim,
in the omission of Lord Hood to notice more markedly his services in
Corsica. It is usually disagreeable to the uninterested bystander to
see an excessive desire for praise, even under the guise of just
recognition of work done. Words of complaint, whether heard or read,
strike a discord to one who himself at the moment is satisfied with
his surroundings. We all have an instinctive shrinking from the tones
of a grumbler. Nelson's insistence upon his grievances has no
exemption from this common experience; yet it must be remembered that
these assertions of the importance of his own services, and
dissatisfaction with the terms in which they had been mentioned, occur
chiefly, if not solely, in letters to closest relations,--to his wife
and uncle,--and that they would never have become known but for the
after fame, which has caused all his most private correspondence to
have interest and to be brought to light. As a revelation of character
they have a legitimate interest, and they reveal, or rather they
confirm, what is abundantly revealed throughout his life,--that
intense longing for distinction, for admiration justly earned, for
conspicuous exaltation above the level of his kind, which existed in
him to so great a degree, and which is perhaps the most
potent--certainly the most universal--factor in military achievement.
They reveal this ambition for honor, or glory, on its weak side; on
its stronger side of noble emulation, of self-devotion, of heroic
action, his correspondence teems with its evidence in words, as does
his life in acts. To quote the words of Lord Radstock, who at this
period, and until after the battle of Cape St. Vincent, was serving as
one of the junior admirals in the Mediterranean, and retained his
friendship through life, "a perpetual thirst of glory was ever raging
within him." "He has ever showed himself as great a despiser of riches
as he is a lover of glory; and I am fully convinced in my own mind
that he would sooner defeat the French fleet than capture fifty
galleons."

After all allowance made, however, it cannot be denied that there is
in these complaints a tone which one regrets in such a man. The
repeated "It was I" jars, by the very sharpness of its contrast, with
the more generous expressions that abound in his correspondence. "When
I reflect that I was the cause of re-attacking Bastia, after our
_wise_ generals gave it over, from not knowing the force, fancying it
2,000 men; that it was I, who, landing, joined the Corsicans, and with
only my ship's party of marines, drove the French under the walls of
Bastia; that it was I, who, knowing the force in Bastia to be upwards
of 4,000 men, as I have now only ventured to tell Lord Hood, landed
with only 1,200 men, and kept the secret till within this week
past;--what I must have felt during the whole siege may be easily
conceived. Yet I am scarcely mentioned. I freely forgive, but cannot
forget. This and much more ought to have been mentioned. It is known
that, for two months, I blockaded Bastia with a squadron; only fifty
sacks of flour got into the town. At San Fiorenzo and Calvi, for two
months before, nothing got in, and four French frigates could not get
out, and are now ours. Yet my diligence is not mentioned; and others,
for keeping succours out of Calvi for a few summer months, are
handsomely mentioned. _Such things are_. I have got upon a subject
near my heart, which is full when I think of the treatment I have
received.... The taking of Corsica, like the taking of St. Juan's, has
cost me money. St. Juan's cost near £500; Corsica has cost me £300, an
eye, and a cut across my back; and my money, I find, cannot be repaid
me."

As regards the justice of his complaints, it seems to the author
impossible to read carefully Hood's two reports, after the fall of
Bastia and that of Calvi, and not admit, either that Nelson played a
very unimportant part in the general operations connected with the
reduction of Corsica, with which he became associated even before it
was effectively undertaken, and so remained throughout; or else that
no due recognition was accorded to him in the admiral's despatches.
Had he not become otherwise celebrated in his after life, he would
from these papers be inferred to stand, in achievement, rather below
than above the level of the other captains who from time to time were
present. That this was unfair seems certain; and notably at Calvi,
where, from the distance of the operations from the anchorage, and the
strained relations which kept Hood and Stuart apart, he was
practically the one naval man upon whose discretion and zeal success
depended. It is probable, however, that the failure to do him justice
proceeded as much from awkward literary construction, phrases badly
turned, as from reluctance to assign due prominence to one subordinate
among several others.

How readily, yet how keenly, he derived satisfaction, even from
slight tributes of recognition, is shown by the simplicity and
pleasure with which he quoted to Mrs. Nelson the following words of
Sir Gilbert Elliot, the Viceroy of Corsica, then and always a warm
friend and admirer: "I know that you, who have had such an honourable
share in this acquisition, will not be indifferent at the prosperity
of the Country which you have so much assisted to place under His
Majesty's government." "Whether these are words of course and to be
forgotten," wrote Nelson, "I know not; they are pleasant, however, for
the time." Certainly his demands for praise, if thus measured, were
not extreme.

FOOTNOTES:

[20] The italics are the author's.

[21] The italics are Nelson's.

[22] Written at the siege of Calvi.

[23] Author's italics.

[24] Golfe Jouan; on the coast of France between Toulon and Nice.




CHAPTER V.

NELSON'S SERVICES WITH THE FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDER ADMIRAL
HOTHAM.--PARTIAL FLEET ACTIONS OF MARCH 13 AND 14, AND JULY
13.--NELSON ORDERED TO COMMAND A DETACHED SQUADRON CO-OPERATING WITH
THE AUSTRIAN ARMY IN THE RIVIERA OF GENOA.

JANUARY-JULY, 1795. AGE, 36.


From the naval point of view, as a strategic measure, the acquisition
of Corsica by the British was a matter of great importance. It was,
however, only one among several factors, which went to make up the
general military and political situation in the Mediterranean at the
end of the year 1794. Hitherto the exigencies of the well-nigh
universal hostilities in which France had been engaged, and the
anarchical internal state of that country, had prevented any decisive
operations by her on the side of Italy, although she had, since 1792,
been formally at war with the Kingdom of Sardinia, of which Piedmont
was a province.

At the close of 1794 the conditions were greatly modified. In the
north, the combined forces of Great Britain, Austria, and Holland had
been driven out of France and Belgium, and the United Provinces were
on the point of submission. On the east, the Austrians and Prussians
had retreated to the far bank of the Rhine, and Prussia was about to
withdraw from the coalition, which, three years before, she had been
so eager to form. On the south, even greater success had attended the
French armies, which had crossed the Pyrenees into Spain, driving
before them the forces of the enemy, who also was soon to ask for
peace. It was therefore probable that operations in Italy would assume
greatly increased activity, from the number of French soldiers
released elsewhere, as well as from the fact that the Austrians
themselves, though they continued the war in Germany, had abandoned
other portions of the continent which they had hitherto contested.

The political and military conditions in Italy were, briefly, as
follows. The region north of the Maritime Alps and in the valley of
the Po was, for the most part, in arms against France,--the western
province, Piedmont, as part of the Kingdom of Sardinia, whose capital
was at Turin, and, to the eastward of it, the duchies of Milan and
Mantua, as belonging to Austria. The governments of the numerous small
states into which Northern and Central Italy were then
divided--Venice, Genoa, Tuscany, the States of the Church, and
others--sympathized generally with the opponents of France, but, as
far as possible, sought to maintain a formal though difficult
neutrality. The position of Genoa was the most embarrassing, because
in direct contact with all the principal parties to the war. To the
westward, her territory along the Riviera included Vintimiglia,
bordering there on the county of Nice, and contained Vado Bay, the
best anchorage between Nice and Genoa. To the eastward, it embraced
the Gulf of Spezia, continually mentioned by Nelson as Porto Especia.

The occupation of the Riviera was of particular moment to the French,
for it offered a road by which to enter Italy,--bad, indeed, but
better far than those through the passes of the upper Alps. Skirting
the sea, it afforded a double line of communications, by land and by
water; for the various detachments of their army, posted along it,
could in great degree be supplied by the small coasting-vessels of the
Mediterranean. So long, also, as it was in their possession, and they
held passes of the Maritime Alps and Apennines, as they did in 1794,
there was the possibility of their penetrating through them, to turn
the left flank of the Sardinian army in Piedmont, which was, in fact,
what Bonaparte accomplished two years later. These inducements had led
the French to advance into the county of Nice, then belonging to
Sardinia, which in the existing state of war it was perfectly proper
for them to do; but, not stopping there, they had pushed on past the
Sardinian boundary into the neutral Riviera of Genoa, as far as Vado
Bay, which they occupied, and where they still were at the end of
1794.

Genoa submitted under protest to this breach of her neutrality, as she
did both before[25] and after to similar insults from parties to the
war. She derived some pecuniary benefit from the condition of
affairs,--her ports, as well as those of Tuscany, immediately to the
southward, becoming depots of a trade in grain, which supplied both
the French army and the southern provinces of France. These food
stuffs, absolutely essential to the French, were drawn chiefly from
Sicily and the Barbary States, and could not be freely taken into
French ports by the larger class of sea-going vessels, in face of the
British fleet. They were, therefore, commonly transshipped in Leghorn
or Genoa, and carried on by coasters. As so much Genoese sea-coast was
occupied by French divisions, it was practically impossible for
British cruisers to distinguish between vessels carrying corn for the
inhabitants and those laden for the armies, and entirely impossible to
know that what was intended for one object would not be diverted to
another. If, too, a vessel's papers showed her to be destined for
Vintimiglia, near the extreme of the Genoese line, there could be no
certainty that, having got so far, she might not quietly slip by into
a French port, either Nice or beyond. The tenure of the neutral
Riviera of Genoa by the French army was a threat to the allies of
Great Britain in Piedmont and Lombardy, as well as to the
quasi-neutrals in Genoa, Tuscany, Venice, and the Papal States. Its
further advance or successes would imperil the latter, and seriously
affect the attitude of Naples, hostile to the Republic, but weak,
timid, and unstable of purpose. On the other hand, the retention of
its position, and much more any further advance, depended upon
continuing to receive supplies by way of the sea. To do so by the
shore route alone was not possible. Southern France itself depended
upon the sea for grain, and could send nothing, even if the then
miserable Corniche road could have sufficed, as the sole line of
communications for forty thousand troops.

Thus the transfer of Corsica to Great Britain had a very important
bearing upon the military and political conditions. At the moment when
Italy was about to become the scene of operations which might, and in
the event actually did, exercise a decisive influence upon the course
of the general war, the British position was solidified by the
acquisition of a naval base, unassailable while the sea remained in
their control and the Corsicans attached to their cause, and centrally
situated with reference to the probable scenes of hostilities, as well
as to the points of political interest, on the mainland of Italy. The
fleet resting upon it, no longer dependent upon the reluctant
hospitality of Genoese or Tuscan ports, or upon the far distant
Kingdom of Naples, was secure to keep in its station, whence it
menaced the entire seaboard trade of France and the Riviera, as well
as the tenure of the French army in the latter, and exerted a strong
influence upon the attitude of both Genoa and Tuscany, who yielded
only too easily to the nearest or most urgent pressure. The fleet to
which Nelson belonged had spent the greater part of the year 1794 in
securing for itself, as a base of operations, this position, by far
the most suitable among those that could be considered at all. It
remained now to utilize the advantage obtained, to make the situation
of the French army in Italy untenable, by establishing an indisputable
control of the sea. To this the holding of Corsica also contributed,
indirectly; for the loss of the island forced the French fleet to go
to sea, in order, if possible, to expedite its re-conquest. In all the
operations resulting from these various motives, Nelson bore a part as
conspicuous and characteristic as he had done in the reduction of
Corsica. Almost always on detached service, in positions approaching
independent command, he was continually adding to his reputation, and,
what was far more important, maturing the professional character, the
seeds of which had been so bountifully bestowed upon him by nature.
His reputation, won hard and step by step, obtained for him
opportunity; but it was to character, ripened by experience and
reflection, that he owed his transcendent successes.

The scheme for the government of the island as a British dependency,
stated broadly, was that it should be administered by the Corsicans
themselves, under a viceroy appointed by the British crown. Its
military security was provided for by the control of the sea, and by
British soldiers holding the fortified ports,--a duty for which the
Corsicans themselves had not then the necessary training. Nelson, who
did not yet feel the impossibility of sustaining a successful over-sea
invasion, when control of the sea was not had, was anxious about the
expected attempts of the French against the island, and urged the
viceroy, by private letter, to see that Ajaccio, which he regarded as
the point most favorable to a descent, was garrisoned sufficiently to
keep the gates shut for a few days. This caution did not then proceed
from a distrust of the Corsicans' fidelity, without which neither
France nor England could hold the island, as was shown by the
quickness of its transfer two years later, when the inhabitants again
revolted to France. "With this defence," he wrote, "I am confident
Ajaccio, and I believe I may say the island of Corsica, would be
perfectly safe until our fleet could get to the enemy, when I have no
doubt the event would be what every Briton might expect."

The repairs of the "Agamemnon" were completed before Nelson's anxious
apprehensions of a battle taking place in his absence could be
fulfilled. On the 21st of December, 1794, he sailed from Leghorn with
the fleet, in company with which he remained from that time until the
following July, when he was sent to the Riviera of Genoa on special
detached service. He thus shared the severe cruising of that winter,
as well as the abortive actions of the spring and early summer, where
the admiral again contrived to lose opportunities of settling the sea
campaign, and with it, not improbably, that of the land also. There
were plain indications in the port of Toulon that a maritime
enterprise of some importance was in contemplation. In the outer road
lay fifteen sail-of-the-line, the British having then fourteen; but
more significant of the enemy's purpose was the presence at Marseilles
of fifty large transports, said to be ready. "I have no doubt," wrote
Nelson, "but Porto Especia is their object." This was a mistake,
interesting as indicating the slight weight that Nelson at that time
attributed to the deterrent effect of the British fleet "in being"
upon such an enterprise, involving an open-sea passage of over a
hundred miles, though he neither expressed nor entertained any
uncertainty as to the result of a meeting, if the enemy were
encountered. The French Government, not yet appreciating the
inefficiency to which its navy had been reduced by many concurrent
circumstances, was ready to dispute the control of the Mediterranean,
and it contemplated, among other things, a demonstration at Leghorn,
similar to that successfully practised at Naples in 1792, which might
compel the Court of Tuscany to renounce the formally hostile attitude
it had assumed at the bidding of Great Britain; but it does not appear
that there was any serious purpose of exposing a large detachment, in
the attempt to hold upon the Continent a position, such as Spezia,
with which secure communication by land could not be had.

Though none too careful to proportion its projects to the force at its
disposal, the Directory sufficiently understood that a detachment at
Spezia could not be self-dependent, nor could, with any certainty,
combine its operations with those of the army in the Riviera; and also
that, to be properly supported at all, there must be reasonably secure
and unbroken communication, either by land or water, neither of which
was possible until the British fleet was neutralized. The same
consideration dictated to it the necessity of a naval victory, before
sending out the expedition, of whose assembling the British were now
hearing, and which was actually intended for Corsica; although it was
known that in the island there had already begun the revulsion against
the British rule, which culminated in open revolt the following year.
Owing to the dearth of seamen, the crews of the French ships were
largely composed of soldiers, and it was thought that, after beating
the enemy, four or five thousand of these might be at once thrown on
shore at Ajaccio, and that afterwards the main body could be sent
across in safety. First of all, however, control of the sea must be
established by a battle, more or less decisive.

On the 24th of February, 1795, the British fleet arrived at Leghorn,
after a very severe cruise of over a fortnight. On the 2d of March
Nelson mentioned, in a letter to his wife, that the French were said
then to have a hundred and twenty-four transports full of troops, from
which he naturally argued that they must mean to attempt something. On
the evening of the 8th, an express from Genoa brought Hotham word that
they were actually at sea, fifteen ships-of-the-line, with half a
dozen or more smaller vessels. He sailed in pursuit early the next
morning, having with him thirteen[26] British ships-of-the-line and
one Neapolitan seventy-four. Of the former, four were three-decked
ships, carrying ninety-eight to one hundred guns, a class of vessel of
which the French had but one, the "Sans Culottes," of one hundred and
twenty, which, under the more dignified name of "L'Orient,"
afterwards, met so tragic a fate at the Battle of the Nile; but they
had, in compensation, three powerful ships of eighty guns, much
superior to the British seventy-fours. As, however, only partial
engagements followed, the aggregate of force on either side is a
matter of comparatively little importance in a Life of Nelson.

Standing to the northward and westward, with a fresh easterly wind,
the British fleet through its lookouts discovered the enemy on the
evening of the day of sailing, and by the same means kept touch with
them throughout the 10th and 11th; but the baffling airs, frequent in
the Mediterranean, prevented the main body seeing them until the
morning of the 12th. At daylight, then, they were visible from the
"Agamemnon," in company with which were five British ships and the
Neapolitan; the remainder of the fleet being so far to the eastward
that their hulls were just rising out of the water. The British lying
nearly becalmed, the French, who were to windward, bore down to within
three miles; but although, in Nelson's judgment, they had a fair
opportunity to separate the advanced British ships, with which he was,
from the main body, they failed to improve it. Nothing happened that
day, and, a fresh breeze from the west springing up at dusk, both
fleets stood to the southward with it, the French being to windward.
That night one of the latter, a seventy-four, having lost a topmast,
was permitted to return to port.

The next morning the wind was still southwest and squally. Hotham at
daylight ordered a general chase, which allowed each ship a certain
freedom of movement in endeavoring to close with the French. The
"Agamemnon" had been well to the westward, from the start; and being a
very handy, quick-working ship, as well as, originally at least, more
than commonly fast, was early in the day in a position where she had a
fair chance for reaching the enemy. A favorable opportunity soon
occurred, one of those which so often show that, if a man only puts
himself in the way of good luck, good luck is apt to offer. At 8 A.M.
the eighty-gun ship "Ça Ira," third from the rear in the French order,
ran on board the vessel next ahead of her, and by the collision lost
her fore and main topmasts. These falling overboard on the lee
side--in this case the port,[27]--not only deprived her of by far the
greater part of her motive power, but acted as a drag on her progress,
besides for the time preventing the working of the guns on that side.
The "Ça Ira" dropped astern of her fleet. Although this eighty-gun
ship was much bigger than his own,--"absolutely large enough to take
Agamemnon in her hold," Nelson said,--the latter saw his chance, and
instantly seized it with the promptitude characteristic of all his
actions. The "Agamemnon," if she was not already on the port tack,
opposite to that on which the fleets had been during the night, must
have gone about at this time, and probably for this reason. She was
able thus to fetch into the wake of the crippled vessel, which a
frigate had already gallantly attacked, taking advantage of the
uselessness of the Frenchman's lee batteries, encumbered with the
wreckage of the masts.

At 10 A.M., the "Ça Ira" and the "Agamemnon" having passed on opposite
tacks, the latter again went about and stood in pursuit under all
sail, rapidly nearing the enemy, who at this time was taken in tow by
a frigate. But although in this position the French ship could not
train her broadside guns upon her smaller opponent, she could still
work freely the half-dozen stern guns, and did so with much effect.
"So true did she fire," noted Nelson, "that not a shot missed some
part of the ship, and latterly the masts were struck every shot, which
obliged me to open our fire a few minutes sooner than I intended, for
it was my intention to have touched his stern before a shot was
fired." At quarter before eleven, the "Agamemnon" was within a hundred
yards of the "Ça Ira's" stern, and this distance she was able to keep
until I P.M. Here, by the use of the helm and of the sails, the ship
alternately turned her starboard side to the enemy to fire her
batteries, and again resumed her course, to regain the distance
necessarily lost at each deviation. This raking fire not only killed
and wounded many of the "Ça Ira's" crew, and injured the hull, but,
what was tactically of yet greater importance, preventing the
replacing of the lost spars. Thus was entailed upon the French that
night a crippled ship, which they could not in honor abandon, nor yet
could save without fighting for her,--a tactical dilemma which was the
direct cause of the next day's battle.

Brief and cursory as is the notice of this action of the "Agamemnon"
in Hotham's despatches, he mentions no other ship-of-the-line as
engaged at this time, and states that she and the frigate were so far
detached from the fleet, that they were finally obliged to retire on
account of other enemy's vessels approaching. Nelson's journal says
that two French ships, one of one hundred and twenty guns and a
seventy-four, were at gunshot distance on the bow of the "Ça Ira" when
he began to attack her. These, with several others of their fleet,
went about some time before one, at which hour the frigate, towing the
disabled ship, tacked herself, and also got the latter around. The
"Agamemnon" standing on, she and the "Ça Ira" now crossed within half
pistol-range; but, the French guns being too much elevated, the shot
passed over their antagonist, who lost in this day's work only seven
men wounded. Nelson then again tacked to follow, but by this time the
French admiral had apparently decided that his crippled vessel must be
rescued, and his fleet no longer defied by a foe so inferior in
strength. Several of the enemy were approaching, when Hotham made a
signal of recall, which Nelson on this occasion at least had no
hesitation in obeying, and promptly. There was no pursuit, the hostile
commander-in-chief being apparently satisfied to save the "Ça Ira" for
the moment, without bringing on a general engagement.

In this affair, what is mainly to be noted in Nelson is not the
personal courage, nor yet even the professional daring, or the skill
which justified the daring. It may be conceded that all these were
displayed in a high degree, but they can scarcely be claimed to have
exceeded that shown by other officers, not a few, when equally tried.
What is rather striking, account for it how we will, is that Nelson,
here as always, was on hand when opportunity offered; that after three
days of chase he, and he only, was so far to the front as to be able
to snatch the fleeting moment. "On looking round," he says at ten
o'clock, when about to begin the action, "I saw no ship-of-the-line
within several miles to support me; the Captain was the nearest on our
lee-quarter." With the looseness and lack of particularity which
characterize most logs and despatches remaining from those days, and
make the comprehension of naval engagements, other than the greatest,
a matter of painful and uncertain inference, it is impossible
accurately to realize the entire situation; but it seems difficult to
imagine that among all the other thirteen captains, "where emulation
was common to all and zeal for his Majesty's service the general
description of the fleet," to use Hotham's words, none could have been
on the spot to support so promising an attempt, had there been
"common" that sort of emulation which takes a man ever to the front,
not merely in battle but at all times,--the spirit that will not and
cannot rest while anything remains to be done, ever pressing onward to
the mark. To this unquestionably must be added the rapid comprehension
of a situation, and the exceeding promptitude with which Nelson seized
his opportunity, as well as the tenacious intrepidity with which he
held to his position of advantage, despite the imminent threat to his
safety from the uninjured and gigantic "Sans Culottes," barely out of
gunshot to windward. It is right also to note the accessibility to
advice, a feature of his genial and kindly temperament, to which he
admitted much of the success was due. The trait is not rare in mankind
in general, but it is exceptional in men of a character so
self-reliant and decided as Nelson. "If the conduct of the Agamemnon
on the 13th," he generously wrote, "was by any means the cause of our
success on the 14th, Lieutenant Andrews has a principal share in the
merit, for a more proper opinion was never given by an officer than
the one he gave me on the 13th, in a situation of great difficulty."

The same hot spirit, the same unwearying energy, made itself still
more manifest the next day, when were to be garnered the results of
his own partial, yet, in its degree, decisive action of the 13th.
"Sure I am," said he afterwards, "had I commanded our fleet on the
14th, that either the whole French fleet would have graced my triumph,
or I should have been in a confounded scrape." A confounded scrape he
would have been in on the 13th, and on other days also, great and
small, had there been a different issue to the risks he dared, and
rightly dared, to take. Of what man eminent in war, indeed, is not the
like true? It is the price of fame, which he who dare not pay must
forfeit; and not fame only, but repute.

During the following night the "Sans Culottes" quitted the French
fleet. The wind continued southerly, both fleets standing to the
westward, the crippled "Ça Ira" being taken in tow by the "Censeur,"
of seventy-four guns. At daylight of March 14, being about twenty
miles southwest from Genoa, these two were found to be much astern and
to leeward, of their main body,--that is, northeast from it. The
British lay in the same direction, and were estimated by Nelson to be
three and a half miles from the disabled ship and her consort, five
miles from the rest of the French. At 5.30 A.M. a smart breeze sprang
up from the northwest, which took the British aback, but enabled them
afterwards to head for the two separated French ships. Apparently,
from Nelson's log, this wind did not reach the main body of the enemy,
a circumstance not uncommon in the Mediterranean. Two British
seventy-fours, the "Captain" and the "Bedford," in obedience to
signals, stood down to attack the "Censeur" and the "Ça Ira;" and,
having in this to undergo for twenty minutes a fire to which they
could not reply, were then and afterwards pretty roughly handled. They
were eventually left behind, crippled, as their own fleet advanced.
The rest of the British were meantime forming in line and moving down
to sustain them. The French main body, keeping the southerly wind,
wore in succession to support their separated ships, and headed to
pass between them and their enemies. The latter, having formed, stood
also towards these two, which now lay between the contestants as the
prize to the victor.

Apparently, in these manoeuvres, the leading British ships ran again
into the belt of southerly wind,--which the French kept
throughout,--while part of the centre and rear were left becalmed, and
had little or no share in the cannonade that followed. Under these
conditions the resolution of the French admiral seems to have
faltered, for instead of passing to leeward--north--of his endangered
ships, which was quite in his power, and so covering them from the
enemy, he allowed the latter to cut them off, thus insuring their
surrender. His fleet kept to windward of the British, passing fairly
near the two leading ships, the "Illustrious" and the "Courageux," who
thus underwent a "concentration by defiling," that took the main and
mizzen masts out of both, besides killing and wounding many of their
people. The "Princess Royal" and "Agamemnon," which came next, could
only engage at long range. "The enemy's fleet kept the southerly
wind," wrote Nelson in his journal, "which enabled them to keep their
distance, which was very great. At 8 A.M. they began to pass our line
to windward, and the Ça Ira and Le Censeur were on our lee side;
therefore the Illustrious, Courageux, Princess Royal, and Agamemnon
were obliged to fight on both sides of the ship." At five minutes past
ten A.M. both the French vessels struck, the "Ça Ira" having lost her
three masts, and the "Censeur" her mainmast. It was past one P.M. when
firing wholly ceased; and the enemy then crowded all possible sail to
the westward, the British fleet lying with their heads to the
southeast.

When the British line was forming, between seven and eight in the
morning, Nelson was directed by Vice-Admiral Goodall, the second in
command, to take his station astern of his flagship, the "Princess
Royal," of ninety guns. Immediately behind the "Agamemnon" came the
"Britannia," carrying Hotham's flag. This position, and the lightness
of the wind, serve to explain how Nelson came to take the step he
mentions in several letters; going on board the "Britannia," after the
two French vessels struck, and urging the commander-in-chief to leave
the prizes in charge of the British frigates and crippled
ships-of-the-line, and vigorously to pursue the French, who having
lost four ships out of their fleet, by casualty or capture, were now
reduced to eleven sail. "I went on board Admiral Hotham as soon as our
firing grew slack in the van, and the Ça Ira and the Censeur had
struck, to propose to him leaving our two crippled ships, the two
prizes, and four frigates, to themselves, and to pursue the enemy;
but he, much cooler than myself, said, 'We must be contented, we have
done very well.' Now, had we taken ten sail, and had allowed the
eleventh to escape, when it had been possible to have got at her, I
could never have called it well done. Goodall backed me; I got him to
write to the admiral, but it would not do: we should have had such a
day as I believe the annals of England never produced."

Nelson here evidently assumes that it was possible to have got at the
French fleet. After a man's reputation has been established, there is
always the danger of giving undue weight to his opinions, expressed at
an earlier time, somewhat casually, and not under the sobering sense
of responsibility. Hotham may have questioned the possibility of
getting at the French effectively, having regard to the fickle
lightness of the wind then prevalent, and to the fact that, besides
the two ships partially dismasted and for the moment useless, two
others, the "Captain" and the "Bedford," had suffered severely in
sails and rigging. He would also doubtless consider that the
three-decked ships, of which he had four, were notoriously bad
sailers, and sure to drop behind if the chase lasted long, leaving to
eight ships, including the "Neapolitan," the burden of arresting the
enemy, who had shown very fair offensive powers in the morning. Nelson
was not blind to these facts, and not infrequently alludes to them.
"Had we only a breeze, I have no doubt we should have given a
destructive blow to the enemy's fleet." "Sure I am, that had the
breeze continued, so as to have allowed us to close with the enemy, we
should have destroyed their whole fleet." Whether these remarks apply
to the heat of the engagement, or to the proposed chase, which Hotham
declined to permit, is not perfectly clear; but inasmuch as the second
part of the action of the 14th consisted, actually, in the French
filing by the "Courageux" and the "Illustrious," upon whom their fire
was thus concentrated, while the rest of the British were becalmed
out of gunshot, it is very possible he was thinking of that incident
only, which doubtless would have taken a very different turn had the
main body been able to come down. His wish to pursue is
unquestionable, both from his assertion and from the whole character
of his career before and after; and a casual remark, written ten days
after the affair, shows his opinion confirmed by time. "Had our good
admiral followed the blow, we should probably have done more, but the
risk was thought too great."

The question attracts attention, both impersonally, as of military
interest, and also as bearing upon Nelson's correctness of judgment,
and professional characteristics, at this time. As regards the amount
of wind, it is sufficient to say that the French fleet, having borne
away to the westward in the afternoon, was next day out of sight.[28]
Most of the British might equally have been out of sight from the
position in which they remained. As for the risk--of course there was
risk; but the whole idea of a general chase rests upon the fact that,
for one reason or another, the extreme speed of the ships in each
fleet will vary, and that it is always probable that the fastest of
the pursuers can overtake the slowest of the pursued. The resulting
combats compel the latter either to abandon his ships, or to incur a
general action, which, from the fact of his flight, it is evident he
has reason to avoid. In this case many of the retreating French were
crippled,--some went off towed by frigates, and some without
bowsprits. Unquestionably, the pursuers who thus engage may be
overpowered before those following them come up; but the balance of
chances is generally in their favor, and in the particular instance
would have been markedly so, as was shown by the results of the two
days' fighting, which had proved the superior quality of the British
ships' companies.

The fact is, neither Hotham nor his opponent, Martin, was willing to
hazard a decisive naval action, but wished merely to obtain a
temporary advantage,--the moment's safety, no risks. "I have good
reason," wrote Hotham in his despatch, "to hope, from the enemy's
steering to the westward after having passed our fleet, that whatever
might have been their design, _their intentions are for the present
frustrated_." It is scarcely necessary to say that a man who looks no
further ahead than this, who fails to realize that the destruction of
the enemy's fleet is the one condition of permanent safety to his
cause, will not rise to the conception presented to him on his
quarter-deck by Nelson. The latter, whether by the sheer intuition of
genius, which is most probable, or by the result of well-ordered
reasoning, which is less likely, realized fully that to destroy the
French fleet was the one thing for which the British fleet was there,
and the one thing by doing which it could decisively affect the war.
As he wrote four years later to St. Vincent, "Not one moment shall be
lost in bringing the enemy to battle; for I consider the best defence
for his Sicilian Majesty's dominions is to place myself alongside the
French."

Yet Nelson was far from unconscious of the difficulties of Hotham's
position, or from failing duly to allow for them. "Admiral Hotham has
had much to contend with, a fleet half-manned, and in every respect
inferior to the enemy; Italy calling him to her defence, our newly
acquired kingdom[29] calling might and main, our reinforcements and
convoy hourly expected; and all to be done without a force by any
means adequate to it." Add to this the protection of British trade, of
whose needs Nelson was always duly sensible. Yet, as one scans this
list of troubles, with the query how to meet them running in his mind,
it is scarcely possible not to see that each and every difficulty
would have been solved by a crushing pursuit of the beaten French,
preventing their again taking the sea. The British admiral had in his
control no means to force them out of port. Therefore, when out, he
should by no means have allowed them to get back. It is only just to
Hotham, who had been a capable as well as gallant captain, to say that
he had objected to take the chief command, on account of his health.

Nelson was delighted with his own share in these affairs, and with the
praise he received from others for his conduct,--especially that on
the 13th. He was satisfied, and justly, that his sustained and daring
grapple with the "Ça Ira," in the teeth of her fleet, had been the
effective cause of the next day's action and consequent success. It
was so, in truth, and it presented an epitome of what the 14th and
15th ought to have witnessed,--a persistent clinging to the crippled
ships, in order to force their consorts again into battle. "You will
participate," he wrote to his uncle, "in the pleasure I must have felt
in being the great cause of our success. Could I have been supported,
I would have had Ça Ira on the 13th." Elliot, the Viceroy of Corsica,
wrote to him: "I certainly consider the business of the 13th of March
as a very capital feature in the late successful contest with the
French fleet; and the part which the Agamemnon had in it must be felt
by every one to be one of the circumstances that gave lustre to this
event, and rendered it not only useful, but peculiarly honourable to
the British arms." "So far," added Nelson, in quoting this to his
wife, "all hands agree in giving me the praises which cannot but be
comfortable to me to the last moment of my life." He adds then a
reflection, evincing that he was assimilating some of the philosophy
of life as well as of fighting. "The time of my being left out here by
Lord Hood," which he had so much regretted, "I may call well spent;
had I been absent, how mortified should I now be. What has happened
may never happen to any one again, that only one ship-of-the-line out
of fourteen should get into action with the French fleet for so long
a time as two hours and a half, and with such a ship as the Ça Ira."
It may be of interest to mention that the French fleet, upon this
occasion, was largely composed of the vessels which three years later
were destroyed by him at the Battle of the Nile.

In all his interests, ambitions, and gratification with success and
praise, he at this period writes fully and intimately to his wife,
between whom and himself there evidently still existed, after these
two years of absence, a tender and affectionate confidence. "It is
with an inexpressible pleasure I have received your letters, with our
father's. I rejoice that my conduct gives you pleasure, and I trust I
shall never do anything which will bring a blush on your face. Rest
assured you are never absent from my thoughts." When looking forward
to the action of March 14, he tells her: "Whatever may be my fate, I
have no doubt in my own mind but that my conduct will be such as will
not bring a blush on the face of my friends: the lives of all are in
the hands of Him who knows best whether to preserve mine or not; to
His will do I resign myself. My character and good name are in my own
keeping. Life with disgrace is dreadful. A glorious death is to be
envied;" and he signs himself with unwonted tenderness, "Ever your
most faithful and affectionate husband." Save of the solemn hours
before Trafalgar, when another image occupied his thoughts, this is
the only personal record we have of the feelings with which this man,
dauntless above his fellows, went into battle. He refrains
thoughtfully from any mention of his health that may cause her
anxiety, which she had shown herself over weak and worrying to bear;
but he speaks freely of all that passes, confiding that with her he
need have no reserves, even in a natural self-praise. "This I can say,
that all I have obtained I owe to myself, and to no one else, and _to
you_ I may add, that my character stands high with almost all Europe.
Even the Austrians knew my name perfectly." While silent on the
subject of illness, he admits now that his eye had grown worse, and
was in almost total darkness, besides being very painful at times;
"but never mind," he adds cheeringly, "I can see very well with the
other."

It is instructive to note, in view of some modern debated questions,
that, despite the recent success, Nelson was by no means sure that the
British fleet could defend Corsica. "I am not even now certain Corsica
is safe," he wrote on the 25th of March, "if they undertake the
expedition with proper spirit." The threat, never absent while the
French fleet remained, was emphasized by the arrival of six
ships-of-the-line from Brest, which reached Toulon on the 4th of
April, materially altering the complexion of affairs in the
Mediterranean, and furnishing an instructive instance of the probable
punishment for opportunity imperfectly utilized, as on the 14th of
March. Great discontent was felt at the apparent failure of the
Admiralty to provide against this chance. "Hotham is very much
displeased with them," wrote Nelson, "and certainly with reason;" and
doubtless it is satisfactory to believe, rightly or wrongly, that our
disadvantages are due to the neglect of others, and not to our own
shortcomings.

Although the nominal force of the French was thus raised to twenty of
the line, the want of seamen, and the absence of discipline, prevented
their seizing the opportunity offered by the temporary inferiority of
the British, reduced to thirteen besides two Neapolitans, in whose
efficiency, whether justly or not, Nelson placed little confidence. At
this critical moment, with a large British military convoy expected,
and the fleet, to use his impatient expression, "skulking in port," a
Jacobin outbreak occurred in Toulon, and the seamen assumed the
_opéra-bouffe_ rôle of going ashore to assist in deliberations upon
the measures necessary to save the country. Before they were again
ready to go to sea, the convoy had arrived. On the 7th of June,
however, the French again sailed from Toulon, seventeen
ships-of-the-line; and the following day Nelson, writing to his
brother, thus gave vent to the bitterness of his feelings: "We have
been cruising off Minorca for a long month, every moment in
expectation of reinforcements from England. Great good fortune has
hitherto saved us, what none in this fleet could have expected for so
long a time. Near two months we have been skulking from them. Had they
not got so much cut up on the 14th of March, Corsica, Rome, and Naples
would, at this moment, have been in their possession, and may yet, if
these people [the Admiralty] do not make haste to help us. I am out of
spirits, although never better in health."

His depression was due less to the inadequacy of the British fleet
than to the dismissal of Lord Hood from the command, news of which was
at this time received. When about to sail from England, to resume his
duty as commander-in-chief, he got into a controversy with the
Government about the force necessary in the Mediterranean, and, giving
offence by the sharpness of his language, was ordered to haul down his
flag. He never again went to sea. Nelson deplored his loss in terms
unusually vivacious: "Oh, miserable Board of Admiralty! They have
forced the first officer in our service away from his command." In
more temperate but well-weighed words, he said: "This fleet must
regret the loss of Lord Hood, the best officer, take him altogether,
that England has to boast of. Lord Howe is certainly a great officer
in the management of a fleet, but that is all. Lord Hood is equally
great in all situations which an admiral can be placed in." In the
judgment of the present writer, this estimate of Hood is as accurate
as it is moderate in expression. It was nothing less than providential
for the French that he was not in command on the 14th of March, or in
the yet more trivial and discreditable affair of July 13th, when, to
use again Nelson's words, "To say how much we wanted Lord Hood at
that time, is to say, will you have all the French fleet or no
action?"

On the 14th of June the expected reinforcement from England, nine
ships-of-the-line, joined the fleet off Minorca; and a few days later
a large convoy also arrived, with which the whole body of ships of war
put into San Fiorenzo Bay on the 29th. This concluded for Nelson a
period of three months, counting from the action of March 14th, of
pretty monotonous cruising with the fleet, the last in which he was to
take part until his admiral's flag was hoisted, two years later.
Though unmarked by any event of importance, the time was passed not
unprofitably to himself, for his correspondence bears marks of
fruitful reflection, not merely upon the evident inadequacy of his
commander-in-chief to the position he unwillingly occupied, but upon
the character of the operations and the line of conduct that ought to
be followed. If he does criticise the former's want of head for
enterprise, he formulates for himself a general principle which showed
its vital influence in his future career. "After all my complaints, I
have no doubt but, if we can get close to the enemy, we shall defeat
any plan of theirs; _but we ought to have our ideas beyond mere
defensive measures_."

Among other matters for reflection, he had at this time a curious
cause of anxiety, lest he should be promoted to flag rank, or rather
that, being promoted, he should be obliged to return to England at
once, as there would be too many admirals in the Mediterranean to
permit his retention. A rumor was current, which proved to be correct,
that there would be a large promotion on the 1st of June, the first
anniversary of the victory celebrated by that name. Being then
forty-six on the list of captains, Nelson feared that it might include
him; in which case, if not permitted to hoist his flag where he was,
not only would he lose his ardently desired opportunities for
distinction,--"not an hour this war will I, if possible, be out of
active service,"--but he would be put to much inconvenience and loss.
"If they give me my flag, I shall be half ruined: unless I am
immediately employed in this country, I should, by the time I landed
in England, be a loser, several hundred pounds out of pocket." To be
taken "from actual service would distress me much, more especially as
I almost believe these people will be mad enough to come out." He
escaped this disappointment, however, for the promotion left him still
on the post-captains' list, seven from its head; but he received, what
was both complimentary and profitable, the honorary rank of Colonel of
Marines,--a sinecure appointment, of which there were then four, given
to post-captains of distinguished services, and vacated by them upon
promotion. These are now discontinued, and replaced, as a matter of
emolument, by Good Service Pensions. Nelson heard later that this
reward had been conferred upon him, not merely as a favor, but with a
full recognition of all his claims to it. "The Marines have been given
to me in the handsomest manner. The answer given to many was, the King
knew no officer who had served so much for them as myself."

These promotions came timely to insure for him an employment
particularly suited to his active temperament and fearlessness of
responsibility, but which, though the fittest man for it, he might,
with less seniority, not have received from Hotham, despite the
well-known confidence in him shown by Hood. Since the spring opened,
the Austrians and their allies, the Sardinians, had been waiting,
ostensibly at least, for assistance from the Navy, to begin a forward
movement, the first object of which was the possession of Vado Bay as
a safe anchorage for the fleet. Until the arrival of Man and the
convoy, Hotham had not felt strong enough to spare the required force;
but now, after the ships had filled their wants from the transports,
he, on the 4th of July, detached Nelson, with the "Agamemnon" and six
smaller vessels, to co-operate with the Austrian commander-in-chief.
The latter had begun his movement on the 13th of June, passing through
Genoese territory despite the remonstrances of the Republic, whose
neutrality could claim but slight regard from one belligerent, when
she had already permitted the occupation of so much of her shore line
by the other. The French had fallen back, when attacked, abandoning
Vado Bay to the enemy, whose headquarters were established at that
point.

Nelson, having sailed with four of his squadron, fell in with the
French fleet of seventeen of the line, off the Riviera, on the 6th of
July. He had, of course, to retreat, which he did upon San Fiorenzo,
to join the body of the fleet. On the morning of the 7th the
"Agamemnon" and her followers, with the French in close pursuit, were
sighted from the anchorage, much to the surprise of the admiral, who
knew the enemy had come out, but, upon the information of the Austrian
general, believed them returned to Toulon. Why he had not more
accurate news from lookout frigates is not clear; but, as Nelson said,
he took things easy, and he had persuaded himself that they had left
harbor only to exercise their men. As it was, the "Agamemnon" was hard
pressed, but escaped, chiefly through the enemy's lack of seamanship.
The fleet, when she arrived, was in the midst of refitting and
watering, but succeeded in getting to sea the following morning in
search of the enemy, who meantime had disappeared.

Precise information of the French whereabouts could not be obtained
until the evening of the 12th, when two of the British lookout ships
reported that they had been seen a few hours before to the southwest,
south of the Hyères Islands. The fleet made sail in that direction.
During the night a heavy gale came on from west-northwest, out of the
Gulf of Lyons, which split the main-topsails of several British ships.
At daybreak the enemy were discovered in the southeast, standing
north to close the land. After some elaborate manoeuvring--to reach
one of those formal orders, often most useful, but which the irregular
Mediterranean winds are prone to disarrange as soon as completed--the
admiral at 8 A.M. signalled a general chase. The British being to
windward, and the breeze fresh, the half-dozen leading ships had at
noon closed the enemy's rear within three-quarters of a mile; but,
from their relative positions, as then steering, the guns of neither
could be used effectively. At this time a shift of wind to north
headed off both fleets, which put their bows to the eastward, throwing
the British advanced vessels, to use Nelson's expression, into line
abreast, and bringing to bear the broadsides of the ships, of both
fleets, that were within range. The action then began, the British
fire being directed mainly upon the French rear ship, the "Alcide,"
which surrendered at about 2 P.M., and soon afterwards blew up. The
wind had meanwhile changed again to the eastward, giving the
weather-gage to the French, most of whom were considerably nearer the
shore than their opponents, and better sailers.

Up to this time Nelson, who in the forenoon had thought there was
every prospect of taking every ship in the French fleet, still felt
almost certain that six would be secured; but, to use his own words,
it was now "impossible to close." In the space between the ships
engaged, and to leeward, the light air seems to have been killed by
the cannonading; whereas the French, who were now to windward, still
received enough to draw slowly away. Hotham, being in one of the very
worst sailers in the fleet, if not in the Navy, had fallen eight miles
astern, and not seeing clearly how things were going, made at this
time a signal of recall, which was certainly premature. It seems a not
improper comment that, in light and baffling weather, such as that of
the Mediterranean, the commander-in-chief should have been in a fast
and handy ship, able at the least to keep him within eyeshot of the
decisive scene. Remaining in the "Britannia" may have been due to the
natural unwillingness of an invalid to quit his well-ordered
surroundings, by which even St. Vincent was led to take a first-rate
ship away with himself at a critical moment; but, if so, it only
emphasizes the absolute necessity of physical vigor to a
commander-in-chief.

Nelson had again managed to keep the "Agamemnon" well to the front,
for the other ships that succeeded in getting into action were almost
wholly from among those which had recently arrived from England with
Rear-Admiral Man. These, being fresh from home, should naturally
outsail a ship now two and a half years in commission, and which, not
long after, had to be wrapped with hawsers to hold her together. In
his comments on the action he says comparatively little of the signal
of recall, which, though ill-timed, he does not seem to have thought
affected the result materially; but he was utterly dissatisfied with
the previous management of the business, and into the causes of this
dissatisfaction it is desirable to look, as bearing at once upon his
natural military characteristics, and the development they received
from time and thought. "The scrambling distant fire was a farce," he
wrote; "but if one fell by such a fire, what might not have been
expected had our whole fleet engaged? Improperly as the part of the
fleet which fired got into action, we took one ship; but the subject
is unpleasant, and I shall have done with it." The criticism, though
far from explicit, evidently bears upon the manner in which the fleet
was handled, from the moment the enemy was sighted until the firing
began. During the latter, Man was the senior officer on the spot, and
Nelson does not blame him; on the contrary, punning on the name, says,
"He is a good _man_ in every sense of the word."

The precise working of his thought can only be inferred. "The whole
fleet" failed to get into action. Why? Because the signal for a
general chase was delayed from 4 to 8 A.M., pending certain
drill-ground manoeuvres, upon whose results, however well intended, no
dependence could be placed in Mediterranean weather. During these four
hours the wind was fresh,--the heel of a short summer's gale,
invaluable to both sides,--and the enemy were using it to close the
shore, where wind, the sole dependence for motive power, baffles most.
Had the fastest British ships, under a competent flag-officer,
utilized that time and that wind, there was, to put the case most
mildly, the chance that they could repeat, upon the French rear, the
same part the "Agamemnon" alone had played with the "Ça Ira,"--and
such a chance, were it no more, should not have been dawdled with.
"Missed the opportunity,"--the fatal words, "it might have been." Is
it far-fetched to see in his reflections upon "this miserable action,"
as it is styled independently by James and himself, the forecast of
the opening sentence of his celebrated order before
Trafalgar?--"Thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of forty
sail-of-the-line[30] into a line of battle in variable winds, thick
weather, and other circumstances which must occur, _without such a
loss of time that the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing
the enemy to battle in such a manner as to make the business
decisive_, I have therefore made up my mind--" Or, again, as he saw
Man dragged off--with too little remonstrance, it may be--by a
superior, who could by no means see what was the state of the action,
is there not traceable a source of the feeling, partly inborn, partly
reasoned, that found expression in the generous and yet most wise
words of the same immortal order?--"The second in command will [in
fact command his line and],[31] after my intentions are made known to
him, have the entire direction of his line to make the attack upon
the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or
destroyed." Whether such words be regarded as the labored result of
observation and reflection, or whether as the flashes of intuition,
with which genius penetrates at once to the root of a matter, without
the antecedent processes to which lesser minds are subjected,--in
either case they are instructive when linked with the events of his
career here under discussion, as corroborative indications of natural
temperament and insight, which banish altogether the thought of mere
fortuitous valor as the one explanation of Nelson's successes.

With this unsatisfactory affair, Nelson's direct connection with the
main body of the fleet came to an end for the remainder of Hotham's
command. It is scarcely necessary to add that the prime object of the
British fleet at all times, and not least in the Mediterranean in
1795,--the control of the sea,--continued as doubtful as it had been
at the beginning of the year. The dead weight of the admiral's having
upon his mind the Toulon fleet, undiminished in force despite two
occasions for decisive action, was to be clearly seen in the ensuing
operations. On this, also, Nelson did much thinking, as passing events
threw light upon the consequences of missing opportunities. "The
British fleet," he wrote, five years later, and no man better knew the
facts, "could have prevented the invasion of Italy; and, if our friend
Hotham had kept his fleet on that coast, I assert, and you will agree
with me, no army from France could have been furnished with stores or
provisions; even men could not have marched." But how keep the fleet
on the Italian coast, while the French fleet in full vigor remained in
Toulon? What a curb it was appeared again in the next campaign, and
even more clearly, because the British were then commanded by Sir John
Jervis, a man not to be checked by ordinary obstacles. From the decks
of his flagship Nelson, in the following April, watched a convoy
passing close in shore. "To get at them was impossible before they
anchored under such batteries as would have crippled our fleet; and,
had such an event happened, _in the present state of the enemy's
fleet_, Tuscany, Naples, Rome, Sicily, &c., would have fallen as fast
as their ships could have sailed along the coast. Our fleet is the
only saviour at present for those countries."

FOOTNOTES:

[25] In the year 1793 the French frigate "Modeste" had been forcibly taken
from the harbor of Genoa by an English squadron.

[26] The "Berwick," seventy-four, had been left in San Fiorenzo for
repairs. Putting to sea at this time, she fell in with the French fleet,
and was taken.

[27] The port side, or, as it was called in Nelson's day, the larboard
side, is the left, looking from the stem to the bow of a ship.

[28] Nelson to the Duke of Clarence, March 15, 1795. (Nicolas.)

[29] Corsica.

[30] There were twenty-three present on July 13, 1795.

[31] The words in brackets were erased in the rough draft, but are here
inserted, because they emphasize the underlying thought, that the second
was to have real command, not wait nor look for signals, nor yet fear them.




CHAPTER VI.

NELSON'S COMMAND OF A DETACHED SQUADRON ON THE RIVIERA OF GENOA, UNTIL
THE DEFEAT OF THE AUSTRIANS AT THE BATTLE OF LOANO.--SIR JOHN JERVIS
APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

JULY-DECEMBER, 1795. AGE, 37.


After the action of July 13, Nelson was again despatched upon his
mission to co-operate with the Austrians on the Riviera. His orders,
dated July 15, were to confer first with the British minister at
Genoa, and thence to proceed with his squadron to the Austrian
headquarters at Vado Bay. The seniority he had now attained made his
selection for this detached and responsible service less evidently
flattering than Hood's preferment of him to such positions when he was
junior in rank; but the duty had the distinction of being not only
arduous from the purely naval standpoint, but delicate in the
diplomatic management and tact required. Although Great Britain at
that period was rarely slack in resorting to strong and arbitrary
measures in dealing with neutrals, when her interests seemed to demand
it, she was always exceedingly desirous to avoid causes of needless
offence. The exigencies of Southern France, and of both the opposing
armies in the Riviera, had created a busy neutral trade, occupied in
supplying all parties to the war, as well as the inhabitants of
Genoese towns then in military occupation by the French. Although the
latter and the Austrians had both openly disregarded the neutrality of
Genoa, it was the policy of Great Britain now to manifest respect for
it as far as possible, and at the same time not to raise causes of
diplomatic contention over the neutral trade, although this was well
known to be supporting the enemy's army.

When Nelson left the fleet, he had, besides his special orders for his
own mission, a circular letter from the admiral to all vessels under
his command, framed upon instructions received from England a month
before, directing special care "not to give any just cause of offence
to the foreign powers in amity with his Majesty, and whenever any
ships or vessels belonging to the subjects of those powers shall be
detained, or brought by you into port, you are to transmit to the
Secretary of the Admiralty a complete specification of their cargoes,
and not to institute any legal process against such ships or vessels
until their lordships' further pleasure shall be known."

To the naval officers on the spot this order was calculated to
increase vastly the perplexities, which necessarily arose from the
occupation of the Genoese coast by French troops. But, besides
questions of trade, the weaker States, Genoa and Tuscany,--the latter
of which had recently made peace with France,--were driven to manifold
shifts and compromises, in order to maintain in their ports such
semblance of impartial neutrality as would save them from reprisals by
either party. These measures, while insuring to some extent the end in
view, gave rise also to a good deal of friction and recrimination
between the neutral and the belligerents. The vessels of the latter
were admitted, under certain limitations as to number, into the
neutral port, where they lay nearly side by side, jealously watching
each other, and taking note of every swerving, real or presumed, from
an exact and even balance. Each sailed from the neutral port to carry
on war, but it is obvious that the shelter of such a port was far more
useful to the belligerent who did not control the water, who moved
upon it only by evasion and stealth, and who was therefore tempted, in
order to improve such advantages, to stretch to the verge of abuse
the privileges permitted to him by the neutral. "The Genoese allow the
French," wrote Nelson, "to have some small vessels in the port of
Genoa, that I have seen towed out of the port, and board vessels
coming in, and afterwards return into the mole; the conduct of the
English is very different." He elsewhere allows, however, that, "in
the opinion of the Genoese, my squadron is constantly offending; so
that it almost appears a trial between us, who shall first be tired,
they of complaining, or me of answering them."

After the first successes of the Austrians and Sardinians, in the
previous June, the French commander-in-chief, Kellerman, feeling his
inferiority to be such as compelled him to a defensive attitude, had
carefully selected the most advanced line that he thought could be
held. His right rested upon the sea, near the village of Borghetto,
some fifty or sixty miles east of Nice, extending thence to and across
the mountains, to Ormea. The Austrian front was parallel, in a general
sense, to that of the enemy, and a couple of leagues to the eastward;
thus securing for the British Vado Bay, considered the best anchorage
between Genoa and Nice. In rear of Vado, to the eastward, and on the
coast road, lay the fortress of Savona, esteemed by Bonaparte of the
first importance to an army operating in the Riviera and dependent
upon the control of the road. The town was occupied by the Austrians,
but they were excluded from the citadel by Genoese troops,--a
condition of weakness in case of sudden retreat. It ought, said
Bonaparte, to be the object of all the enemy's efforts. In these
positions, both armies depended for supplies partly upon the sea,
partly upon the land road along the Riviera. Across the mountains, in
Piedmont, lay the Sardinian forces, extending perpendicularly to the
main front of the French operations, and, so far as position went,
threatening their communications by the narrow land road. The
character of the ground intervening between the French and Austrians
rendered an attack upon either line, once fairly established, very
difficult; and it was doubtless a fault in the Austrian commander, De
Vins, while superior in force, to allow the enemy to strengthen
himself in a position which at the first had its weak points; the more
so as the plainly approaching peace between Spain and France foretold
that the Army of Italy would soon be reinforced. Having, however, made
this mistake, the Austrian settled himself in his works, shrugged the
responsibility off his own shoulders, and awaited that either the
Sardinians by land, or the British by sea, should, by choking the
communications of the French, compel them to abandon their lines.

Such was the situation when Nelson, on the 21st of July, had his first
interview with De Vins; on the 22d peace between Spain and France was
formally concluded. Within a month, Bonaparte, who then occupied a
prominent position in Paris, as military adviser to the Government,
was writing: "Peace with Spain makes offensive war in Piedmont
certain; my plan is being discussed; Vado will soon be taken;" and a
few days later, on the 25th of August, "Troops from Spain are marching
to Italy." It was incumbent upon the French to repossess Vado, for, by
affording safe anchorage to small hostile cruisers, it effectually
stopped the trade with Genoa. De Vins had there equipped several
privateers, under the Austrian flag. Of it Bonaparte said: "By
intercepting the coasters from Italy, it has suspended our commerce,
stopped the arrival of provisions, and obliged us to supply Toulon
from the interior of the Republic. It is recognized that our commerce
and subsistence require that communication with Genoa be promptly
opened." Having in view Bonaparte's remarkable campaign of the
following year, and the fact that Vado was now held in force by the
Austrians, the importance of British co-operation by the fleet, at
this critical moment, becomes strikingly apparent. The future thus
throws back a ray of illuminating significance upon the otherwise
paltry and obscure campaign of 1795, dragging out into broad daylight
the full meaning of lost opportunities in the early year, and of
Nelson's strenuous efforts in his detached command.

Immediately upon his arrival in Genoa, on July 17, the effect of the
neutral trade, if unchecked, upon the operations of both armies, was
brought before him by the British minister. Unless the supplies thus
received by the French could be stopped, the Austrian general would
not only be unable to advance, but feared he could not hold his
present position. If, on the other hand, the forage and grain thus
brought to them could be intercepted, they would be forced to retreat,
and there were hopes that the Austrians might reach Nice before
winter, thus covering the excellent and advanced harbor of
Villefranche as an anchorage for their British allies. Nelson readily
understood the situation, and admitted the necessity of the service
demanded of his squadron, which was simply a blow at the enemy's
communications; but he pointed out to the minister that the circular
instructions, before quoted, tied his hands. Not only would the
ordinary difficulties of proving the ownership and destination of a
cargo give rise to the usual vexatious disputes, and irritate
neutrals, contrary to the spirit of the order; but there was a
particular complication in this instance, arising from the occupation
of Genoese towns by French troops, and from the close proximity of the
neutral and hostile seaboards. These embarrassments might be met, were
it permissible to sell the cargoes, and hold the money value, subject
to the decision of an admiralty court upon the propriety of the
seizure; but this the circular explicitly forbade, until the case was
referred to England. If the decision there was adverse to the captors,
the other party would look to the responsible naval officer for
pecuniary redress, and as, during the delay, the cargo would be
spoiled, costs could come only out of the captor's pocket. Nelson's
experiences in the West Indies, ten years before, naturally made him
cautious about further legal annoyances.

All this he stated with his usual lucidity; but the case was one in
which his course could have been safely predicted by a person familiar
with his character. The need for the proposed action was evident. "The
whole of the necessity of stopping all the vessels is comprised in a
very few words: that, if we will not stop supplies of corn, etc.,
going to France, the armies will return from whence they came, and the
failure of this campaign, from which so much is expected, will be laid
to our want of energy; for the only use of the naval co-operation is
the keeping out a supply of provisions." He therefore, after a night's
reflection, told the minister that if he would tell him, officially,
that it was for the benefit of his Majesty's service that he should
stop all trade between the neutral towns and France, and places
occupied by the armies of France, he would give the proper directions
for that purpose. It would have been possible for him, though with
some delay, to refer the matter to Hotham, but he knew the latter's
temperament, and distrusted it. "Our admiral has no political courage
whatever," he wrote to Collingwood, "and is alarmed at the mention of
any strong measure; but, in other respects, he is as good a man as can
possibly be." With a superior so little decided, it was better, by his
own independent initiative, to create a situation, which the former
would be as backward to reverse as he would have been to change the
previous and wholly different state of things. Like the American
frontiersman, whose motto was, "Be sure you're right, then go ahead,"
Nelson, when convinced, knew no hesitations; but further, he
unquestionably derived keen enjoyment from the sense that the thing
done involved risk to himself, appealed to and brought into play his
physical or moral courage, in the conscious exercise of which he
delighted. "I am acting, not only without the orders of my
commander-in-chief, but in some measure contrary to them. However, I
have not only the support of his Majesty's ministers, both at Turin
and Genoa, but a consciousness that I am doing what is right and
proper for the service of our King and Country. Political courage in
an officer abroad is as highly necessary as military courage." "The
orders I have given are strong, and I know not how my admiral will
approve of them, for they are, in a great measure, contrary to those
he gave me; but the service requires strong and vigorous measures to
bring the war to a conclusion."

The case bore some resemblance to that in which he had disobeyed
Hughes in the West Indies; but the disregard of the superior's orders
on the earlier occasion was more direct, and the necessity for it less
urgent. In both he disobeyed first, and referred afterwards, and in
both his action was practically sustained; for, whatever the technical
fault, the course taken was the one demanded by the needs of the
situation. It is possible to recognize the sound policy, the moral
courage, and the correctness of such a step in the particular
instance, without at all sanctioning the idea that an officer may be
justified in violating orders, because he thinks it right. The
justification rests not upon what he thinks, but upon the attendant
circumstances which prove that he _is_ right; and, if he is mistaken,
if the conditions have not warranted the infraction of the fundamental
principle of military efficiency,--obedience,--he must take the full
consequences of his error, however honest he may have been. Nor can
the justification of disobedience fairly rest upon any happy
consequences that follow upon it, though it is a commonplace to say
that the result is very apt to determine the question of reward or
blame. There is a certain confusion of thought prevalent on this
matter, most holding the rule of obedience too absolutely, others
tending to the disorganizing view that the integrity of the intention
is sufficient; the practical result, and for the average man the
better result, being to shun the grave responsibility of departing
from the letter of the order. But all this only shows more clearly the
great professional courage and professional sagacity of Nelson, that
he so often assumed such a responsibility, and so generally--with,
perhaps, but a single exception--was demonstrably correct in his
action.

Hotham in this case very heartily approved what had been done, and
issued, to the fleet in general, orders similar to those given by
Nelson; but he did not like the difficulties that surrounded the
question of co-operation, and left the conduct of affairs on the spot
wholly to his eager and enterprising subordinate. The latter directed
the seizure of all vessels laden with corn for France or the French
armies, an order that was construed to apply to the Genoese towns
occupied by them. The cargoes appear to have been sold and the money
held. The cruisers in his command were stationed along the Riviera,
east and west of Genoa itself. Those to the eastward, in the
neighborhood of Spezia, where no French were, gave great offence to
the Government of the Republic, which claimed that their chief city
was blockaded; but Nelson refused to remove them. They are not
blockading Genoa, he said, but simply occupying the station best
suited to intercept a contraband trade. The various British vessels
displayed the full activity that might have been expected from the
character of their leader, and the pressure was speedily felt by the
enemy, and by the neutrals whose lucrative trade was summarily
interrupted. The traffic in vessels of any considerable size,
sea-going vessels, soon ceased, and Nelson entertained at first great
hopes of decisive results from the course adopted by him. "We have
much power here at present to do great things, if we know how to apply
it," he wrote, after being ten days on the ground; and at the end of a
month, "The strong orders which I judged it proper to give on my first
arrival, have had an extraordinary good effect; the French army is now
supplied with almost daily bread from Marseilles; not a single boat
has passed with corn." The enemy themselves admitted the stringency of
their situation. But Nelson had yet to learn how ingenuity and
enterprise could find a way of eluding his care. The coasting-trade
soon began to take on a large development. The Spaniards, now at peace
with France, supplied Marseilles, and from both that port and Genoa
grain was carried by small boats, that could be moved by oar as well
as sail, could hug closely the rocky shore, and run readily under the
batteries with which the French had covered the small bays of the
western Riviera, whither the cruisers could not follow. The operations
of the latter, dependent only upon their canvas, could not always be
extended to within easy gunshot of the beach, along which the
blockade-runners kept, usually under cover of night.

Hence, although seriously inconvenienced, the French did not find
their position untenable. There were two ways by which the pressure
might be increased. A flotilla of small vessels, similar to the
coasters themselves, but armed and heavily manned, might keep close in
with the points which the latter had to round, and prevent their
passage; but the British had no such vessels at their disposal, and,
even if they had, the operations would be exposed to danger from the
weather upon a hostile, iron-bound coast, whose shelter was forbidden
them by the enemy's guns. The Neapolitans had such a flotilla, and it
seems probable that its co-operation was asked, for Nelson speaks of
it as a desirable aid on the 23d of August; but it did not actually
join him until the 15th of September, when the season for its acting
was almost past. "Had I the flotilla," wrote he, "nothing should be on
this coast. A few weeks more and they will not stay a night at sea to
save an empire." Prior to its arrival the British attempted to harass
the traffic with their ships' boats, but these were undecked, and of
limited capacity compared to those against which they were to act.
They were occasionally successful, but the results were too uncertain
and hazardous to warrant perseverance, although Bonaparte had to admit
that "The audacity of the English boats and the indolence of the
Genoese, who allow their own vessels to be taken in their own roads,
make it necessary to erect a battery for hot shot at a proper point,
which you will exact shall be done by the governor of San Remo."

Nelson's active mind, clinging with its usual accurate insight to the
decisive factor in the situation, now fixed upon the idea of seizing a
suitable point upon the Riviera to the westward of the French, upon
their line of communication with Nice. A body of troops there, strong
enough to hold the position, would stop the passage of supplies by
land, and, if they controlled an anchorage, a condition indispensable
to their support,--and to their retreat, if necessary to retire,--the
small vessels based upon that could better interrupt the coasting
business. In pursuance of this plan, he in the first week of September
made a cruise with the "Agamemnon" as far to the westward as Nice,
reconnoitring carefully all recesses of the shore line that seemed
available for the purpose. Upon his return, he wrote to De Vins what
he had done, and described San Remo as the only available spot. He
mentioned its disadvantages as well as its advantages, but undertook
positively to land there five thousand men with field-guns, and
provisions for a few days, to maintain their supplies by sea, and to
cover their embarkation in case retreat became imperative. In short,
he guaranteed to land such a force safely, and to be responsible for
its communications; for both which he practically pledged his
professional reputation. He added, what was indisputable, that the
French army must abandon its present lines for want of supplies, if
San Remo were held for some time.

De Vins replied on the 14th of September, expressing his interest in
the matter thus broached to him, but carefully evading the issue. He
addressed his remarks to the comparative merits of Vado and San Remo
as anchorages, upon which Nelson had touched barely, and only
incidentally, for the gist of his proposal was simply to intercept the
enemy's communications; if this were feasible, all other
considerations were subsidiary and matters of detail. San Remo was
admitted to be the poorer anchorage, unfit for the fleet, but open to
small vessels, which could carry the supplies to the Austrian
detachment, and stop those of the enemy. The move proposed was
intended to effect by sea, substantially, the object which De Vins
himself had told Nelson, three weeks before, that he was trying to
secure through the co-operation of the Sardinian land forces. "He has
been long expecting," wrote Nelson on the 13th of August, "an attack
by General Colli with the Piedmontese near Ormea, directly back from
Vintimiglia. This is the great point to be carried, as the Piedmontese
army would then get Vintimiglia, and ... probably, unless the enemy
are very active, their retreat to Nice will be cut off. De Vins says
he has flattered and abused the Piedmontese and Neapolitans, but
nothing will induce them to act." Colli was a good soldier, but his
relations with the Austrian were very strained, and coalitions rarely
act cordially. This plan, however, becoming known to the French, was
commended by Bonaparte as well conceived. "We have examined
attentively the project attributed to the enemy in the enclosed note.
We have found it conformable to his real interests, and to the present
distribution of his troops. The heights of Briga are in truth the key
to the Department of the Maritime Alps, since from there the high-road
may be intercepted and we be obliged to evacuate Tende. We charge you
to pay serious attention to this matter."[32] Disappointed in
Sardinian support, Nelson and De Vins had then discussed a plan, of
which the former's present proposal was the very clear and practical
outcome. Some risk must be run, he said; but De Vins, when it came to
the point, saw the dangers too plainly. He did not distinctly refuse,
but talked only, and instead of San Remo proposed to land west of
Nice, between it and the Var. Nothing, however, was done, or even
attempted, and Hotham refused co-operation.

Having regard to the decisive effect exercised upon any strategic
position, or movement, by a valid threat against the
communications,--considering, for example, the vital influence which
the French occupation of Genoa in 1800 had upon the campaign which
terminated at Marengo,--it is impossible to speak otherwise than with
respect of this proposal of Nelson's. Nevertheless, serious reflection
can scarcely fail to affirm that it was not really practicable. There
is an immeasurable difference between the holding of a strongly
fortified city with an army corps, and the mere seizure of a
comparatively open position by a detachment, which, if it means to
remain, must have time to fortify itself, in order to withstand the
overwhelming numbers that the enemy must at once throw upon it. The
time element, too, is of the utmost importance. It is one thing to
grasp a strong position with a few men, expecting to hold it for some
hours, to delay an advance or a retreat until other forces can come
into play, and quite another to attempt to remain permanently and
unsupported in such a situation. In the case before us, De Vins would
have landed five thousand men in a comparatively exposed position;
for, although the town of San Remo was in possession of the French,
who might be driven out for the moment, the only strong point, the
citadel, was occupied--as in the case of Savona, to the eastward of
the Austrians--by the Genoese, who would doubtless have refused
admission. Before his main body would still lie the works which the
French had been diligently strengthening for more than two months, and
which, with his whole force in hand, he did not care to assail. The
enemy, knowing him thus weakened, could well afford to spare a number
greatly superior to the detachment he had adventured, certain that,
while they were dislodging it, he could make no serious impression
upon their lines. As for retreat and embarkation under cover of the
guns of a squadron, when pressed by an enemy, the operation is too
critical to be hazarded for less than the greatest ends, and with at
least a fair possibility of success for the undertaking whose failure
would entail it.

Nelson's confidence in himself and in his profession, and his accurate
instinct that war cannot be made without running risks, combined with
his lack of experience in the difficulties of land operations to
mislead his judgment in the particular instance. In a converse sense,
there may be applied to him the remark of the French naval critic,
that Napoleon lacked "le sentiment exact des difficultés de la
marine." It was not only to British seamen, and to the assured control
of the sea, that Nelson thought such an attempt offered reasonable
prospect of success. He feared a like thing might be effected by the
French,--by evasion. "If the enemy's squadron comes on this coast, and
lands from three to four thousand men between Genoa and Savona, I am
confident that either the whole Austrian army will be defeated, or
must inevitably retreat into Piedmont, and abandon their artillery and
stores." These words, the substance of which he frequently repeats,
though written immediately before the disastrous Battle of Loano, do
not apply to the purpose entertained by the French on that occasion,
of endeavoring, by a small detachment at Voltri, to check the Austrian
retreat till their pursuers came up. He is contemplating a much more
considerable and sustained effort, strategic in character, and
identical in aim with his own proposal to De Vins about San Remo. It
is clear that Nelson, in his day, did not attach absolute deterrent
effect to a fleet in being, even to such an one as the British then
had in the Mediterranean. Important a factor as it was, it might
conceivably be disregarded, by a leader who recognized that the end in
view justified the risk.

There was yet another motive actuating Nelson in his present
proposals. Justly impatient of the delays and colorless policy of both
De Vins and the British leaders, he foresaw that the latter would be
made to take the blame, if the campaign proved abortive or disastrous.
The Austrians had at least something to show. They had advanced, and
they had seized Vado Bay, cutting off the intercourse between Genoa
and France, which Bonaparte deemed so important, and at the same time
securing an anchorage for the fleet. The latter had done nothing,
although its co-operation had been promised; except Nelson's little
squadron, in which was but one small ship-of-the-line out of the
twenty-three under Hotham's command, it had not been seen.[33] Nelson
was determined, as far as in him lay, to remove all grounds for
reproach. He urged the admiral to send him more ships, and abounded in
willingness towards De Vins. For the latter he had at first felt the
esteem and confidence which he almost invariably showed, even to the
point of weakness, towards those associated with him; but he now
became distrustful, and devoted himself to stopping every loophole of
excuse which might afterwards be converted into reproaches to the
navy.

The cause for the inadequacy of the force left under his command, of
which he often complains, is not apparent. The question was put direct
to the admiral whether he would co-operate with the fleet in the
proposed descent of the Austrians. He said that he could not, owing to
the nature of his instructions from home; but that he would answer
for it that the French navy should not interfere. Six weeks later the
question was repeated; but the admiral replied that, after a
consultation with the flag-officers under his command, he refused
co-operation in what he considered a wild scheme. In this opinion he
was probably right, though Nelson possibly was reminded of Dundas's
objections to besieging Bastia. Nelson then went in person to Leghorn,
and saw Hotham. He asked to be given two seventy-fours and the
transports, to make the attempt himself. Hotham again refused a single
ship; but not only so, reduced Nelson's squadron, and ordered him, in
addition to his present duties, to reconnoitre Toulon continually,
"whilst he," said Nelson, scornfully, "lies quiet in Leghorn Roads."
It would almost seem as if the admiral thought that the time had come
for a little judicious snubbing, and repression of ardor in the
uncomfortable subordinate, whose restless energy conflicted so much
with his repose of mind. The fleet spent its time chiefly in San
Fiorenzo Bay or in Leghorn, making occasional cruises off Toulon to
observe the French navy in that port. The latter was undoubtedly its
principal care; but, being distinctly inferior to the British, it is
impossible to say why Nelson should not have been reinforced. If it
was due to the wish to continue so largely superior in numbers, it
certainly illustrates with singular appositeness the deterrent effect
of an inferior "fleet in being," and that that effect lies less in the
nature of things than in the character of the officer upon whom it is
produced. Moreover, the employment of adequate force upon the Riviera,
in active aggressive work under Nelson during the summer, when it was
practicable to do so, would have compelled the French fleet to come
out and fight, or the French army to fall back.

On the 1st of November Hotham struck his flag in Genoa, and departed,
bequeathing to his successors a military estate encumbered by the old
mortgage of the French fleet, still in being, which he might have
cleared off, and by a new one in the numerous and powerful batteries
of the Riviera, built and controlled by troops whose presence to erect
them might have been prevented by a timely action on his part. The
harm, being done, was thenceforth irreparable. As time passed, the
situation became more and more favorable to the French. The
reinforcements from Spain arrived, and gunboats and flatboats, fitted
out at Toulon, began to come upon the scene. Their appearance revived,
in Nelson the apprehension, so consonant to his military ideas at this
time, of an attempt upon the coast road in rear of the Austrians. He
even feared for Genoa itself, and for the "Agamemnon," while she lay
there, as the result of such a dash. The recurrence of this
prepossession is illustrative of his view of possibilities. The true
and primary object of the French was to consolidate their
communications; nor, with Bonaparte in the influential position he
then occupied, was any such ex-centric movement likely. For useful
purposes, Genoa was already at his disposal; the French subsistence
department was, by his plans, to collect there rations of corn for
sixty thousand men for three months, preparatory to an advance. For
the same object the coasting activity redoubled along the Riviera,
from Toulon to the French front. By November 1st a hundred
sail--transports and small ships of war--had assembled fifteen miles
behind Borghetto, in Alassio Bay, whither Nelson had chased them.
Depots and supplies were collecting there for the prospective
movement. Nelson offered to enter the bay with three
ships-of-the-line, specified by name, and to destroy them; but this
was declined by Sir Hyde Parker, who had temporarily succeeded Hotham
in command, and who at a later day, in the Baltic, was to check some
of Nelson's finest inspirations. "I pretend not to say," wrote the
latter, a month afterwards, when the Austrians had been driven from
their lines, "that the Austrians would not have been beat had not the
gunboats harassed them, for, on my conscience, I believe they would;
but I believe the French would not have attacked had we destroyed all
the vessels of war, transports, etc." As to the practicability of
destroying them, Nelson's judgment can safely be accepted, subject
only to the chances which are inseparable from war.

So far from reinforcing the squadron on the Riviera, Sir Hyde Parker
first reduced it, and then took away the frigates at this critical
moment, when the indications of the French moving were becoming
apparent in an increase of boldness. Their gunboats, no longer
confining themselves to the convoy of coasters, crept forward at times
to molest the Austrians, where they rested on the sea. Nelson had no
similar force to oppose to them, except the Neapolitans, whom he
ordered to act, but with what result is not clear. At the same time
the French partisans in Genoa became very threatening. On the 10th of
November a party of three hundred, drawn from the ships in the port,
landed at Voltri, about nine miles from Genoa, seized a magazine of
corn, and an Austrian commissary with £10,000 in his charge. The place
was quickly retaken, but the effrontery of the attempt from a neutral
port showed the insecurity of the conditions. At the same time a rumor
spread that a force of between one and two thousand men, partly
carried from Genoa in the French ships of war then lying there, partly
stealing along shore in coasters from Borghetto, was to seize a post
near Voltri, and hold it. Nelson was informed that men were absolutely
being recruited on the Exchange of Genoa for this expedition. When the
attack at Voltri was made, the "Agamemnon" was lying in Vado Bay.
Leaving a frigate there, Nelson started immediately for Genoa, in
order, by the presence of a superior naval force and the fear of
retaliation, both to compel the Republic to have its neutrality
observed, and to check similar undertakings in the future. The
"Agamemnon" was laid across the harbor's mouth, and no French vessel
was allowed to sail. Urgent representations were made to Nelson by
the Austrian minister and commander-in-chief, that, if the ship were
withdrawn, the consequences to the army would be most serious.
Contrary, therefore, to his personal inclinations, which were always
to be at the front, he remained, although the demonstrations of the
gunboats continued, and it was evident that they would at least annoy
the Austrian flank in case of an assault. The latter evil, however,
was much less disquieting than a descent on the army's line of
retreat, at the same moment that it was assailed in front in force;
and it was evident that the Austrian general was feeling an
uneasiness, the full extent of which he did not betray. De Vins had by
this time quitted his command, ill, and had been succeeded by General
Wallis.

In this condition of affairs, a general attack upon the Austrian
positions was made by the French on the morning of November 24. As had
been feared, the gunboats took part, in the absence of any British
ships,--the frigate having been removed, Nelson asserts, without his
knowledge; but the matter was of very secondary importance, for the
weight of the enemy's attack fell upon the positions in the mountains,
the centre and right, which were routed and driven back. Swinging
round to their own right, towards the sea, the victorious French
pushed after the disordered enemy, seeking to intercept their retreat
by the coast. Had there then been established, in a well-chosen point
of that narrow road, a resolute body of men, even though small, they
might well have delayed the fliers until the main body of the pursuers
came up; but the presence of the "Agamemnon" controlled the departure
of the intended expedition from Genoa, upon which alone, as an
organized effort, the projected obstruction depended. Thus she was the
efficient cause, as Nelson claimed, that many thousands of Austrians
escaped capture. As it was, they lost in this affair, known as the
Battle of Loano, seven thousand men, killed, wounded, or prisoners.
The entire Riviera was abandoned, and they retreated across the
Apennines into Piedmont.

When things go wrong, there is always a disposition on the part of
each one concerned to shift the blame. The Austrians had complained
before the action, and still more afterwards, of the failure of the
fleet to aid them. Nelson thought their complaint well founded. "They
say, and true, they were brought on the coast at the express desire of
the English, to co-operate with the fleet, which fleet nor admiral
they never saw." On his own part he said: "Our admirals will have, I
believe, much to answer for in not giving me that force which I so
repeatedly called for, and for at last leaving me with Agamemnon
alone. Admiral Hotham kept my squadron too small for its duty; and the
moment Sir Hyde took the command of the fleet he reduced it to
nothing,--only one frigate and a brig; whereas I demanded two
seventy-four-gun ships and eight or ten frigates and sloops to insure
safety to the army."

It is unnecessary to inquire into the motives of the two admirals for
the distribution of their force. Unquestionably, the first thing for
them to do was to destroy or neutralize the French fleet; and next to
destroy, or at least impede, the communications of the French army.
That it was possible to do this almost wholly may be rested upon the
authority of Nelson, whose matured opinion, given five years later,
has already been quoted. Two opportunities to cripple the Toulon fleet
were lost; but even so, after the junction of Man, in June, the
superiority over it was so great that much might have been spared to
the Riviera squadron. The coast was not at this time so extensively
fortified that coasting could not, in Nelson's active hands, have been
made a very insufficient means of supply. As an illustration of the
operations then possible, on the 26th of August, six weeks after the
naval battle of July 13, the "Agamemnon," with her little squadron,
anchored in the Bay of Alassio, three cables' length from the fort in
the centre of the town, and with her boats took possession of all the
French vessels in the harbor. Two months later, so much had the place
been strengthened, he could not vouch for success with less than three
ships-of-the-line; but had the pressure been consistently applied
during those months, the French position would long before have become
untenable. That a shore line, by great and systematic effort, could be
rendered secure throughout for coasters, was proved by Napoleon's
measures to cover the concentration of the Boulogne flotilla in
1803-5; but such conditions did not obtain between Nice and Vado in
1795.

Despite the abortive and ignominious ending to the campaign, Nelson's
own reputation issued from it not only unscathed, but heightened; and
this is saying much, for, although due public recognition of his
services had scarcely been extended,--except in conferring the Marines
upon him,--he had already, before its beginning, made upon all who
were brought into contact with him that impression of unusual
efficiency, zeal, and sound judgment, to which subsequent employment
and opportunity apply a sure and searching test. As he entered upon
his detached duties, the Viceroy of Corsica, who had necessarily seen
and known much of his past conduct, wrote to him thus: "Give me leave,
my dear Sir, to congratulate you on the Agamemnon's supporting
uniformly, on all occasions, the same reputation which has always
distinguished that ship since I have been in the Mediterranean. It
gives me great pleasure also to see you employed in your present
important service, which requires zeal, activity, and a spirit of
accommodation and co-operation, qualities which will not be wanting in
the Commodore of your squadron. I consider the business you are about,
I mean the expulsion of the enemy from the Genoese and Piedmontese
territories, as the most important feature in the southern campaign."
These anticipations of worthy service and exceptional merit were
confirmed, after all the misfortunes and disappointments of the
campaign, by the singularly competent judgment of the new
commander-in-chief, Sir John Jervis. The latter at his first interview
with Nelson, nearly two months after his arrival on the station, so
that time enough had elapsed to mature his opinion, asked him to
remain under his command, as a junior admiral, when he received his
promotion. Having regard to Jervis's own high endowments, it was not
then in the power of the British Navy to pay an officer of Nelson's
rank a higher compliment.

During these months of service upon the Riviera, there occurred an
incident, which, from the reflection made upon Nelson's integrity,
drew from him a letter, struck off at such white heat, and so
transparently characteristic of his temperament, aspirations, and
habit of thought, as to merit quotation. A report had been spread that
the commanders of the British ships of war connived at the entry of
supply-vessels into the ports held by the French, and a statement to
that effect was forwarded to the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs. The latter sent the paper, for investigation, to the Minister
to Genoa, who mentioned its tenor to Nelson. The latter, justly
stigmatizing the conduct imputed to him and his officers as
"scandalous and infamous," requested a copy of the accusation, in
order that by his refutation he might convince the King, that he was
"an officer who had ever pursued the road of honour, very different
from that to wealth." Having received the copy, he wrote to the
Secretary as follows:--

    AGAMEMNON, GENOA ROAD, 23d November, 1795.

    MY LORD,--Having received, from Mr. Drake, a copy of your
    Lordship's letter to him of October, enclosing a paper highly
    reflecting on the honour of myself and other of His Majesty's
    Officers employed on this Coast under my Orders, it well becomes
    me, as far as in my power lies, to wipe away this ignominious
    stain on our characters. I do, therefore, in behalf of myself,
    and much injured Brethren, demand, that the person, whoever he
    may be, that wrote, or gave that paper to your Lordship, do
    fully, and expressly bring home his charge; which, as he states
    that this agreement is made by numbers of people on both sides,
    there can be no difficulty in doing. We dare him, my Lord, to
    the proof. If he cannot, I do most humbly implore, that His
    Majesty will be most graciously pleased to direct his
    Attorney-General to prosecute this infamous libeller in His
    Courts of Law; and I likewise feel, that, without impropriety, I
    may on behalf of my brother Officers, demand the support of His
    Majesty's Ministers: for as, if true, no punishment can be too
    great for the traitors; so, if false, none can be too heavy for
    the villain, who has dared to allow his pen to write such a
    paper. Perhaps I ought to stop my letter here; but I feel too
    much to rest easy for a moment, when the honour of the Navy, and
    our Country, is struck at through us; for if nine [ten]
    Captains, whom chance has thrown together, can instantly join in
    such a traitorous measure, it is fair to conclude we are all
    bad.

    As this traitorous agreement could not be carried on but by
    concert of all the Captains, if they were on the Stations
    allotted them, and as they could only be drawn from those
    Stations by orders from me, I do most fully acquit all my
    brother Captains from such a combination, and have to request,
    that I may be considered as the only responsible person for what
    is done under my command, if I approve of the conduct of those
    under my orders, which in this most public manner I beg leave to
    do: for Officers more alert, and more anxious for the good, and
    honour, of their King and Country, can scarcely ever fall to the
    lot of any Commanding Officer: their Names I place at the bottom
    of this letter.

    For myself, from my earliest youth I have been in the Naval
    Service; and in two Wars, have been in more than one hundred and
    forty Skirmishes and Battles, at Sea and on shore; have lost an
    eye, and otherwise blood, in fighting the Enemies of my King and
    Country; and, God knows, instead of riches, my little fortune
    has been diminished in the Service: but I shall not trouble your
    Lordship further at present, than just to say--that at the close
    of this Campaign, where I have had the pleasure to receive the
    approbation of the Generals of the Allied Powers; of his
    Excellency Mr. Drake, who has always been on the spot; of Mr.
    Trevor, who has been at a distance; when I expected and hoped,
    from the representation of His Majesty's Ministers, that His
    Majesty would have most graciously condescended to have
    favourably noticed my earnest desire to serve Him, and when,
    instead of all my fancied approbation, to receive an accusation
    of a most traitorous nature--it has almost been too much for me
    to bear. Conscious innocence, I hope, will support me.

    I have the honour to be,

    My Lord,

    Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

    HORATIO NELSON.

Except this vexatious but passing cloud, his service upon the Riviera,
despite the procrastinations and final failure of his associates in
the campaign, was pleasant both personally and officially. He earned
the warm esteem of all with whom he acted, notably the British
ministers at Turin and Genoa; and though necessarily in constant
collision with the Genoese authorities upon international questions,
he upheld the interests and policy of his own government, without
entailing upon it serious cause of future reclamations and
disputes.[34] Hotham's very indifference and lethargy, while crippling
his enterprise, increased his independence. "I cannot get Hotham on
the coast," he said, "for he hates this co-operation;" but he owns to
the fear that the admiral, if he came, might overrule his projects.
The necessity for exertion delighted him. "My command here is so far
pleasant," he wrote to his friend Collingwood, "as it relieves me from
the inactivity of our fleet, which is great indeed, as you will soon
see." "At present," he tells his wife, "I do not write less than from
ten to twenty letters every day; which, with the Austrian general, and
aide-de-camps, and my own little squadron, fully employ my time: this
I like; active service or none." As usual, when given room for the
exercise of his powers, he was, for him, well. He had a severe attack
of illness very soon after assuming the duty--"a complaint in the
breast"--the precursor perhaps of the similar trouble from which he
suffered so much in later years; but it wore off after an acute attack
of a fortnight, and he wrote later that, except being at home, he knew
no country so pleasant to serve in, nor where his health was so good.
This well-grounded preference for the Mediterranean, as best suited to
his naturally frail constitution, remained with him to the end.

Besides his official correspondence, he wrote freely and fully to
those at home, unburdening to them the thoughts, cares, and
disappointments of his career, as well as the commendations he
received, so dear to himself as well as to them. Mrs. Nelson and his
father lived together, and to her most of his home letters were
addressed. "I have been very negligent," he admits to her, "in writing
to my father, but I rest assured he knows I would have done it long
ago, had you not been under the same roof.... Pray draw on me," he
continues, "for £200, my father and myself can settle our accounts
when we meet; at present, I believe I am the richer man, therefore I
desire you will give my dear father that money." One wonders whether,
in the slightly peremptory tone of the last sentence, is to be seen a
trace of the feeling she is said, by one biographer, to have shown,
that he was too liberal to his relatives; an indication of that lack
of sympathy, which, manifested towards other traits of his, no less
marked than openhandedness, struck a jarring note within him, and
possibly paved the way to an indifference which ended so unfortunately
for both. An absent husband, however, very possibly failed to realize
what his extreme generosity might mean, to one who had to meet
household expenses with narrow means.

The political surmises with which his correspondence at this period
abounds were often crude, though not infrequently also characterized
by the native sagacity of his intellect, as yet undisciplined, and to
some extent deficient in data for accurate forecasts. The erroneous
military conception which colored much of his thought, the
propositions for ex-centric movements in an enemy's rear, by bodies
comparatively small, out of supporting distance from the rest of the
army, and resting upon no impregnable base, contributed greatly to the
faulty anticipations entertained and expressed by him from time to
time. When applied to operations directed by the consummate and highly
trained genius of Bonaparte, speculations so swayed naturally flew
wide of the mark. His sanguine disposition to think the best of all
persons and all things--except Frenchmen--made him also a ready prey
to the flattering rumors of which war is ever fertile. These
immaturities will be found to disappear, as his sphere widens and his
responsibilities increase.

After the close of the campaign, Nelson made a short cruise from Genoa
to the westward, seeing the French on November 29 in full possession
of Vado Bay. He then went to Leghorn, where he arrived on the 6th of
December and remained till the middle of January, repairing, to make
the "Agamemnon" "as fit for sea as a rotten ship can be." The longing
for rest and for home, after nearly three years' absence, was again
strong upon him in this moment of relaxation. "I fear our new admiral
is willing to keep me with him," he wrote to his brother. "He has
wrote me, I am sorry to say, a most nattering letter, and I hear I am
to be offered St. George or Zealous [much larger ships], but, in my
present mind, I shall take neither. My wish is to see England once
more, and I want a few weeks' rest." But here again, having regard to
that fame which was to him most dear, he was mistaken, as he now owned
he had been in the wish, a year before, to accompany Lord Hood on his
return. In Sir John Jervis he was to meet, not only one of the most
accomplished and resolute officers of the British Navy, closely akin
to himself in enterprise and fearlessness, though without his
exceptional genius, but also a man capable of appreciating perfectly
the extraordinary powers of his subordinate, and of disregarding every
obstacle and all clamor, in the determination to utilize his qualities
to the full, for the good of the nation.

FOOTNOTES:

[32] Correspondance de Napoléon, August 30, 1795. The letter was from
Bonaparte's hand, though signed by the Committee of Public Safety.

[33] The fleet passed once, August 14, in sight of Vado Bay. Nelson went on
board, and tried to induce Hotham to go in and meet De Vins. He refused,
saying he must go to Leghorn, but would return, and water the fleet in
Vado; but he never came.

[34] A year later, when all his transactions with Genoa as an independent
republic were concluded, Nelson received from the British Minister of
Foreign Affairs, through the Admiralty, the following strong and
comprehensive endorsement of his political conduct:--

"I esteem it an act of justice due to that officer, to inform your
lordships that His Majesty has been graciously pleased entirely to approve
of the conduct of Commodore Nelson in all his transactions with the
Republic of Genoa. I have the honour to be, &c, &c. GRENVILLE."

The First Lord of the Admiralty about the same time expressed "the great
satisfaction derived here from the very spirited, and at the same time
dignified and temperate manner, in which your conduct has been marked both
at Leghorn and Genoa."




CHAPTER VII.

NELSON'S SERVICES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN DURING THE YEAR
1796.--BONAPARTE'S ITALIAN CAMPAIGN.--THE BRITISH ABANDON CORSICA, AND
THE FLEET LEAVES THE MEDITERRANEAN.

JANUARY-DECEMBER, 1796. AGE, 38.


While the "Agamemnon" was refitting in Leghorn, the sensitive mind of
her captain, no longer preoccupied with the cares of campaigning and
negotiations, dwelt with restless anxiety upon the reflections to
which the British Navy was liable, for its alleged failure to support
the Austrians throughout the operations, and especially at the
critical moment of the Battle of Loano, when the left flank of their
army was harassed with impunity by the French gunboats. Nelson felt
rightly that, with the British superiority at sea, this should have
been impossible; and he feared that his own name might be unpleasantly
involved, from the fact that the "Agamemnon" had remained throughout
at Genoa, instead of being where the fighting was. He was by nature,
and at all times, over-forward to self-vindication,--an infirmity
springing from the innate nobility of his temperament, which was
impatient of the faintest suspicion of backwardness or negligence, and
at the same time resolved that for any shortcoming or blunder,
occurring by his order or sanction, no other than himself should bear
blame, directly or indirectly.

After the first unsuccessful pursuit of Bonaparte's expedition to
Egypt, in 1798, in the keenness of his emotions over a failure that
might by some be charged to a precipitate error of judgment, he drew
up for Lord St. Vincent a clear and able statement of all the reasons
which had determined his action, arraigning himself, as it were, at
the bar of his lordship's opinion and that of the nation, and assuming
entire responsibility for the apparent mistake, while at the same time
justifying the step by a review of the various considerations which at
the time had occasioned it. His judicious friend and subordinate,
Captain Ball, whom he consulted, strongly advised him not to send the
paper. "I was particularly struck," he wrote, "with the clear and
accurate style, as well as with the candour of the statement in your
letter, but I should recommend a friend never to begin a defence of
his conduct before he is accused of error." Nevertheless, in February,
1805, when he once more went to Alexandria in search of Villeneuve,
this time really misled by the elaborate mystifications of Napoleon,
he again brought himself before the Admiralty. "I am entirely
responsible to my King and Country for the whole of my conduct ... I
have consulted no man, therefore the whole blame of ignorance in
forming my judgment must rest with me. I would allow no man to take
from me an atom of my glory, had I fallen in with the French fleet,
nor do I desire any man to partake any of the responsibility--all is
mine, right or wrong."

In 1795, being a much younger man, of less experience of the world,
and with a reputation, already brilliant indeed, but still awaiting
the stamp of solidity which the lapse of time alone can give, Nelson
felt strongly, and not improperly, that it was necessary to be
vigilant against any possible imputations upon his action. This was
the more true, because blame certainly did attach to the service of
which he was the representative on the spot, and the course he had
been obliged to follow kept him to the rear instead of at the front.
There would have been no greater personal danger to a man on board the
"Agamemnon" in one place than in the other; but current rumor, seeking
a victim, does not pause to analyze conditions. Not only, therefore,
did he draw up for Sir John Jervis a succinct synopsis of occurrences
subsequent to his taking command of the operations along the Riviera,
in which he combined a justification of his own conduct with the
general information necessary for a new commander-in-chief, but to all
his principal correspondents he carefully imparted the facts necessary
to clear him from blame, and to show just what the Navy had effected,
and where it had fallen short through inadequate force.

To the British minister to Genoa, who was constantly at the Austrian
headquarters, he wrote with clear emphasis, as to one cognizant of all
the truth, and so a witness most important to himself. Having first
asked certain certificates, essential to be presented in the Admiralty
Courts when Genoese prizes came to be adjudicated, he continued
characteristically: "The next request much more concerns my honour,
than the other does my interest--it is to prove to the world, to my
own admiral, or to whoever may have a right to ask the question, why I
remained at Genoa. I have therefore to desire that you will have the
goodness to express, in writing, what you told me, that the Imperial
minister and yourself were assured, if I left the port of Genoa
unguarded, not only the Imperial troops at St. Pierre d'Arena and
Voltri would be lost, but that the French plan for taking post between
Voltri and Savona would certainly succeed; and also, that if the
Austrians should be worsted in the advanced posts, the retreat by the
Bocchetta would be cut off: to which you added, that if this happened,
the loss of the Army would be laid to my leaving Genoa, and
recommended me most strongly not to think of it. I am anxious, as you
will believe, to have proofs in my possession, that I employed to the
last the Agamemnon as was judged most beneficial to the common cause."

A week later he wrote again, having heard that the Austrian
commander-in-chief, General Wallis, had declared that the defeat was
due to the failure of the British to co-operate. Nelson thought that
they had a strong hold on Wallis, and he therefore enclosed a letter
to him, which he asked might be forwarded by the minister. The
experience and training of the latter, however, here interposed to
prevent his sensitive uneasiness leading to a false step, and one that
might involve him farther than he foresaw. While bearing the clearest
and strongest witness to the facts which Nelson had asked him to
establish, he hinted to him, tactfully and with deference, that, it
was scarcely becoming a public servant to justify his conduct to a
foreign official, he being accountable only to his own government.
Nelson accepted the suggestion, and in so doing characterized aptly
enough the temperament which then and at other times carried him
farther than discretion warranted. "My feelings ever alive, perhaps,
to too nice a sense of honour, are a little cooled."

Along with this care for the stainless record of the past, there went
on in his mind a continual reasoning upon the probable course of the
next year's operations. In his forecasts it is singular to notice how,
starting from the accurate premise that it is necessary for the French
to get into the plains of Italy,--"the gold mine,"--he is continually
misled by his old prepossession in favor of landing in rear of the
enemy a body of troops, supported neither by sure communication with
their main army, nor by a position in itself of great strength. The
mistake, if mistake it was, illustrates aptly the errors into which a
man of great genius for war, of quick insight, such as Nelson
indisputably had, can fall, from want of antecedent study, of
familiarity with those leading principles, deduced from the experience
of the past, which are perhaps even more serviceable in warning
against error than in prompting to right. Everything assures him that
the French will carry some twenty thousand men to Italy by sea. "If
they mean to carry on the war, they must penetrate into Italy. I am
convinced in my own mind, that I know their very landing-place." This,
it appears afterwards, he believed would be between Spezia and
Leghorn, in the districts of Massa and Carrara, whence also they would
doubtless turn upon Leghorn, though neutral, as a valuable and
fortified seaport. "The prevention," he continues, "requires great
foresight; for, if once landed, our fleet is of no use."

The importance of Vado Bay, so discreditably lost the year before,
strikes him from this point of view, as it did also Bonaparte from his
more closely coherent plan of operations. Nelson reasoned that, if
Vado were possessed by the allies, the French, in their attempt to
reach the Tuscan coast, would be compelled to put to sea, where they
would be exposed to the British fleet, while such an anchorage would
enable the latter, when necessary, to keep the coast close aboard, or
would provide a refuge to a small squadron, if threatened by the
sudden appearance of a superior force. Bonaparte thought Vado
important, because, on the one hand, essential to uninterrupted
coasting-trade with Genoa, and on the other as advancing his water
line of communications--that by land being impassable for heavy
articles, such as siege-guns and carriages--to Savona, from which
point the mountains could be crossed at their lowest elevation, and by
their most practicable passes.

Nelson's analysis of the conditions, in other respects than the one
mentioned, was not unworthy of his great natural aptitudes. There are
three things to be guarded against, he says. One is that pet scheme of
his imagination, the transport of a corps by sea to Tuscany; the other
two are an invasion of Piedmont, and the entrance into Italy by the
pass of the Bocchetta, behind Genoa. "If three are to be attended to,
depend upon it one will fall, and the Emperor, very possibly, may be
more attentive to the Milanese than to Piedmont." Upon this divergence
of interests in a coalition Bonaparte also explicitly counted; and
his plan, in its first inception, as laid before the Directory in the
summer of 1795, looked primarily to the subjugation of Piedmont, by
separating it from the support of the Austrian Army. The bearing of
Vado Bay upon this project is not definitely recognized by Nelson. He
sees in the possession of it only the frustration of both the enemy's
supposed alternatives,--invasion of Italy by the Bocchetta, and of
Tuscany by sea.

With these views Nelson arrived, at San Fiorenzo, on the 19th of
January, and had his first interview with Jervis. His reception by the
latter, whom he never before had met, was not only cordial but
flattering. He was at once offered the choice of two larger ships,
which were declined, "but with that respect and sense of obligation on
my part which such handsome conduct demanded of me." The admiral then
asked him if he would have any objection to remain on the station,
when promoted, as he soon must be. Nelson's longing to go home had
worn off with his disgust, occasioned by the impotent conclusions of
last year's work. Then he was experiencing the feeling voiced by the
great Frenchman, Suffren, some dozen years before: "It was clear that,
though we had the means to impose the law, all would be lost. I
heartily pray you may permit me to leave. War alone can make bearable
the weariness of certain things." Now his keen enjoyment of active
service revived as the hour of opening hostilities drew near. With
these dispositions, the graciousness of his reception easily turned
the scale, and before long he was not only willing to remain, but
fearful lest he should be disappointed, despite the application for
his retention which the admiral hastened to make.

"The credit I derive from all these compliments," he wrote to his
wife, "must be satisfactory to you; and, should I remain until peace,
which cannot be very long, you will, I sincerely hope, make your mind
easy." But more grateful than open flattery, to one so interested in,
and proud of, his military activities, was the respect paid by Jervis
to his views and suggestions relative to the approaching operations.
"He was so well satisfied with my opinion of what is likely to happen,
and the means of prevention to be taken, that he had no reserve with
me respecting his information and ideas of what is likely to be done;"
or, as he wrote a month later, "he seems at present to consider me
more as an associate than a subordinate officer; for I am acting
without any orders. This may have its difficulties at a future day;
but I make none, knowing the uprightness of my intentions. 'You must
have a larger ship,' continued the admiral, 'for we cannot spare you,
either as captain or admiral.'" Such were the opening relations
between these two distinguished officers, who were in the future to
exert great influence upon each other's career.

It is far from improbable that the ready coincidence of Jervis's views
with those of Nelson, as to future possibilities, arose, partly indeed
from professional bias and prepossession as to the potency of navies,
but still more from the false reports, of which Bonaparte was an apt
promoter, and which a commission of the allies in Genoa greedily
swallowed and transmitted. The deterrent effect of their own fleet,
"in being," seems not to have prevented either of them from believing
that the attempt upon Tuscany by sea was seriously intended. True,
Nelson does at times speak of the French as being so unreasonable that
one may expect anything from them; but this scheme, which probably had
not even a paper existence in France, was accepted by him as imminent,
because he thought it suitable. As he cogently remarked to Beaulieu,
it is likely that your enemy will not do the thing which you wish him
to do; and conversely, in this case, what to him appeared most
threatening to his own cause was just what he expected to occur.
Jervis, sharing his views, and already knowing his man, despatched
him again to the Gulf of Genoa, within forty-eight hours of his
arrival in San Fiorenzo, somewhat to the disgust of the other
captains, weary of being ever under the eye of an observant and
exacting admiral. "You did as you pleased in Lord Hood's time," said
one grumbler, "the same in Admiral Hotham's, and now again with Sir
John Jervis; it makes no difference to you who is commander-in-chief."
The tone of these words, which in the reading are almost flattering,
is evident from Nelson's comment: "I returned a pretty strong answer
to this speech."

The object of his present mission was to ascertain what preparations
for the expected descent were being made along the Riviera, and to
frustrate them as far as lay in the power of his squadron. He soon
reported to Jervis that there was as yet no collection of vessels
between Nice and Genoa. He then went on to reconnoitre Toulon, where
he saw thirteen sail-of-the-line and five frigates lying in the outer
roads, ready for sea, while five more of the line he learned were
fitting at the arsenal. During the six days he remained off the port
he noted that continual progress was being made in the enemy's
preparations. At the end of this time, on the 23d of February, 1796,
the admiral joined with the fleet, and the same afternoon the
"Agamemnon" again parted company for Genoa, where she anchored on the
2d of March.

The bustle on board the French ships confirmed Nelson's belief in the
descent upon Tuscany; and it is interesting here to quote his words
upon the possibilities of the operation, regarded from the naval point
of view by one of the ablest of sea-generals. His opinion throws light
upon the vexed question of the chances for and against Napoleon's
projected invasion of England in 1805,--so far, that is, as the purely
naval part of the latter project is concerned. He imagines as
perfectly feasible ("I firmly believe," are his words) a combination
at Toulon, of the fleet already there with divisions arriving from
Cadiz and Brest, giving a total much superior to that actually with
Jervis. This anticipates Napoleon's projected concentration under
Villeneuve in the Channel. Nelson then continues: "One week's very
superior fleet will effect a landing between Port Especia and Leghorn,
I mean on that coast of Italy.... We may fight their fleet, but unless
we can destroy them [i.e. the transports], their transports will push
on and effect their landing. What will the French care for the loss of
a few men-of-war? It is nothing if they can get into Italy." "Make us
masters of the channel for three days, and we are masters of the
world," wrote Napoleon to his admirals, with preparations far more
complete than those Nelson was considering in 1796, and the distance
across the Channel is less than from Vado to Spezia.[35]

With these convictions, Nelson immediately began to urge the necessity
of again occupying Vado upon the Austrian commander-in-chief, through
the medium of the British ministers to Genoa and Turin, with whom he
was in frequent correspondence. If this were not done, he assured
them, the enemy's fleet could with ease convoy a body of troops in
transports to Italy, which they could not do with their present force
unless they held Vado. It was also the only means, he added, by which
the French could be prevented from receiving plenty of provisions from
Genoa. "Unless the Austrians get possession of a point of land, we
cannot stop the coasting-trade." The latter argument, at any rate, was
incontestable; and it was also true that only by an advance to Vado
could communication between the army and the British fleet be
restored and maintained. Beaulieu, who had lately acquired a high
reputation on the battle-fields of Belgium, had now succeeded De Vins
in the command. He was averse to opening the campaign by an advance to
the sea, a feeling shared by the Austrians generally. He wished rather
to await the enemy in the plains of Lombardy, and to follow up by a
decisive blow the victory which he confidently expected there. It was
in this connection that Nelson warned him, that he must not reckon
upon the French following the line of action which he himself would
prefer.

The time for hostilities had now arrived; from February to August
being the period that Bonaparte, who knew the wars of Italy
historically, considered the most proper for operations in the field,
because the least sickly. But for the backwardness of the spring,--for
snow that year lay upon the mountains late into March,--the campaign
doubtless would have been begun before. At the same time came fresh
reports, probably set afloat by the French, of large reinforcements of
seamen for the fleet and transports, in Toulon and Marseilles; and
Nelson furthermore received precise information that the enemy's
movement would be in three columns,--one upon Ceva, which was
Bonaparte's original scheme, one by the Bocchetta, and the third
either to march through Genoese territory to Spezia, or to be carried
thither by sea. Nelson felt no doubt that the last was the real plan,
aiming at the occupation of Leghorn and entrance into the plains of
Italy. The others he considered to be feints. There will in this
opinion be recognized the persistency of his old ideas. In fact, he a
month later revived his proposal of the previous year, to occupy San
Remo,--this time with British troops.

The urgency of the British, aided, perhaps, by the reports of the
French designs, prevailed at last upon Beaulieu to advance as
requested; nor can it be denied that the taking of Vado was in itself
a most proper and desirable accessory object of the campaign.
Unfortunately, the Austrian general, as is well known, fastening his
eyes too exclusively upon the ulterior object of his movement,
neglected to provide for the immediate close combination and mutual
support of the organized forces,--his own and the Piedmontese,--upon
which final success would turn. Manoeuvring chiefly by his own left,
towards the Riviera, and drawing in that direction the efforts of the
centre and right, he weakened the allied line at the point where the
Austrian right touched the Sardinian left. Through this thin curtain
Bonaparte broke, dividing the one from the other, and, after a series
of combats which extended over several days, rendering final that
division, both political and military, for the remainder of the war.

To one who has accustomed himself to see in Nelson the exponent of the
chief obstacle Napoleon had to meet,--who has recognized in the Nile,
in Copenhagen, and in Trafalgar, the most significant and
characteristic incident attending the failure of each of three great
and widely separated schemes,--there is something impressive in noting
the fact, generally disregarded, that Nelson was also present and
assisting at the very opening scene of the famous campaign in Italy.
This was not, certainly, the beginning of Napoleon's career any more
than it was of Nelson's, who at the same moment hoisted for the first
time his broad pendant as commodore; but it was now that, upon the
horizon of the future, toward which the world was fast turning, began
to shoot upward the rays of the great captain's coming glory, and the
sky to redden with the glare from the watchfires of the unseen armies
which, at his command, were to revolutionize the face of Europe,
causing old things to pass away, never to be restored.

The Austrians had asked for a clear assurance that their movement to
the seashore should receive the support of the fleet, whether on the
Riviera or at Spezia, upon the possession of which also Nelson had
laid stress, as a precaution against the invasion of Tuscany. These
engagements he readily made. He would support any movement, and
provide for the safety of any convoys by water. He told the
aid-de-camp whom Beaulieu sent to him that, whenever the general came
down to the sea-coast, he would be sure to find the ships; and to the
question whether his squadron would not be risked thereby, he replied
that it would be risked at all times to assist their allies, and, if
lost, the admiral would find another. "If I find the French convoy in
any place where there is a probability of attacking them," he wrote
about this time, "you may depend they shall either be taken or
destroyed at the risk of my squadron, ... which is built to be risked
on proper occasions." Here was indeed a spirit from which much might
be expected. The fleet, doubtless, must be husbanded in coastwise work
so long as the French fleet remained, the legacy of past errors,--this
Nelson clearly maintained; but such vessels as it could spare for
co-operation were not to be deterred from doing their work by fear of
harm befalling them. Warned by the recriminations of the last
campaign, he had minutes taken of his interview with the Austrian
officer, of the questions he himself put, as well as of the
undertakings to which he pledged himself; and these he caused to be
witnessed by the British consul at Genoa, who was present.

On the 8th of April the "Agamemnon," having shortly before left the
fleet in San Fiorenzo Bay, anchored at Genoa; and the following
morning the port saluted the broad pendant of the new commodore. The
next day, April 10, Beaulieu attacked the French at Voltri. The
"Agamemnon," with another sixty-four-gun ship, the "Diadem," and two
frigates, sailed in the evening, and stood along the shore, by
preconcerted arrangement, to cover the advance and harass the enemy.
At 11 P.M. the ships anchored abreast the positions of the Austrians,
whose lights were visible from their decks--the sails hanging in the
clewlines, ready for instant movement. They again got under way the
following day, and continued to the westward, seeing the French troops
in retreat upon Savona. The attack, Nelson said, anticipated the hour
fixed for it, which was daylight; so that, although the ships had
again started at 4 A.M. of the 11th, and reached betimes a point from
which they commanded every foot of the road, the enemy had already
passed. "Yesterday afternoon I received, at five o'clock, a note from
the Baron de Malcamp [an aid-de-camp], to tell me that the general had
resolved to attack the French at daylight this morning, and on the
right of Voltri. Yet by the Austrians getting too forward in the
afternoon, a slight action took place; and, in the night, the French
retreated. They were aware of their perilous situation, and passed our
ships in the night. Had the Austrians kept back, very few of the
French could have escaped." Whether this opinion was wholly accurate
may be doubted; certain it is, however, that the corps which then
passed reinforced betimes the positions in the mountains, which
steadfastly, yet barely, checked the Austrian attack there the
following day. Beaulieu wrote that the well-timed co-operation of the
squadron had saved a number of fine troops, which must have been lost
in the attack. This was so far satisfactory; but the economizing of
one's own force was not in Nelson's eyes any consolation for the
escape of the enemy, whose number he estimated at four thousand. "I
beg you will endeavour to impress on those about the general," he
wrote to the British minister, "the necessity of punctuality in a
joint operation, for its success to be complete."

There was, however, to be no more co-operation that year on the
Riviera. For a few days Nelson remained in suspense, hoping for good
news, and still very far from imagining the hail-storm of ruinous
blows which a master hand, as yet unrecognized, was even then dealing
to the allied cause. On the 15th only he heard from Beaulieu, through
the minister, that the Austrians had been repulsed at Montenotte; and
on the 16th he wrote to Collingwood that this reverse had been
inflicted by the aid of those who slipped by his ships. On the 18th
news had reached him of the affairs at Millesimo and Dego, as well as
of further disasters; for on that day he wrote to the Duke of Clarence
that the Austrians had taken position between Novi and Alessandria,
with headquarters at Acqui. Their loss he gave as ten thousand. "Had
the general's concerted time and plan been attended to," he repeats,
"I again assert, none of the enemy could have escaped on the night of
the 10th. By what has followed, the disasters commenced from the
retreat of those troops."

There now remained, not the stirring employment of accompanying and
supporting a victorious advance, but only the subordinate, though most
essential, duty of impeding the communications of the enemy, upon
which to a great extent must depend the issues on unseen and distant
fields of war. To this Nelson's attention had already been turned, as
one of the most important functions intrusted to him, even were the
allies successful, and its difficulties had been impressed upon him by
the experience of the previous year. But since then the conditions had
become far more onerous. The defeat of the Austrians not only left
Vado Bay definitively in the power of the French, but enabled the
latter to push their control up to the very walls of Genoa, where they
shortly established a battery and depot on the shore, at St. Pierre d'
Arena, within three hundred yards of the mole. Thus the whole western
Riviera, from the French border, was in possession of the enemy, who
had also throughout the previous year so multiplied and strengthened
the local defences, that, to use Nelson's own words, "they have
batteries from one end of the coast to the other, within shot of each
other." Such were the means, also, by which Napoleon, the true
originator of this scheme for securing these communications, insured
the concentration of the flotilla at Boulogne, eight or ten years
later, without serious molestation from the British Navy.

It may not unnaturally cause some surprise that, with the urgent need
Nelson had felt the year before for small armed vessels, to control
the coastwise movements of the enemy, upon which so much then
depended, no serious effort had been made to attach a flotilla of that
kind to the fleet. The reply, however, to this very obvious criticism
is, that the British could not supply the crews for them without
crippling the efficiency of the cruising fleet; and it was justly felt
then, as it was some years later at the time of the Boulogne flotilla,
that the prime duty of Great Britain was to secure the sea against the
heavy fleets of the enemy. If, indeed, the Italian States, whose
immediate interests were at stake, had supplied seamen, as they might
have done, these could quickly have been formed to the comparatively
easy standard of discipline and training needed for such guerilla
warfare, and, supported by the cruising fleet, might have rendered
invaluable service, so long as the system of coast defence was
defective. How far the rulers of those States, trained heretofore to
the narrowest considerations of personal policy, could have been
induced to extend this assistance, is doubtful. They did nothing, or
little.

Nelson measured the odds against him accurately, and saw that the
situation was well-nigh hopeless. Nevertheless, there was a chance
that by vigorous and sustained action the enemy might be not only
impeded, but intimidated. He sought earnestly to obtain the
co-operation of the Sardinians and Neapolitans in manning a flotilla,
with which to grapple the convoys as they passed in shore. By this
means, and the close scouring of the coast by the vessels of his
squadron, something might be effected. He contemplated also using the
crews of the British vessels themselves in gunboats and light-armed
feluccas; but he said frankly that, important as was the duty of
intercepting communications, the efficiency of the fleet was more
important still, and that to divert their crews over-much to such
objects would hazard the vessels themselves, and neutralize their
proper work. The resort, therefore, could only be occasional. The
general political complexion of affairs in the Mediterranean depended
greatly upon the presence and readiness of the British fleet, and its
efficiency therefore could not be risked, to any serious extent,
except for the object of destroying the enemy's naval forces, to which
it was then the counterpoise.

Acting, however, on his determination to co-operate effectively, at
whatever risk to his own squadron,--to the detachment, that is, which
the commander-in-chief thought could safely be spared from his main
force for the secondary object,--Nelson applied all his intelligence
and all his resolution to the task before him. In words of admirable
force and clearness, he manifests that exclusiveness of purpose, which
Napoleon justly characterized as the secret of great operations and of
great successes. "I have not a thought," he writes to the minister at
Genoa, "on any subject separated from the immediate object of my
command, nor a wish to be employed on any other service. So far the
allies," he continues, with no unbecoming self-assertion, "are
fortunate, if I may be allowed the expression, in having an officer of
this character." He felt this singleness of mind, which is so rare a
gift, to be the more important, from his very consciousness that the
difficulty of his task approached the border of impossibility. "I
cannot command winds and weather. A sea-officer cannot, like a
land-officer, form plans; his object is to embrace the happy moment
which now and then offers,--it may be this day, not for a month, and
perhaps never." Nothing can be more suggestive of his greatest
characteristics than this remark, which is perhaps less applicable to
naval officers to-day than it was then. In it we may fairly see one of
those clearly held principles which serve a man so well in moments of
doubt and perplexity. At the Nile and at Trafalgar, and scarcely less
at St. Vincent and Copenhagen, the seizure of opportunity, the
unfaltering resolve "to embrace the happy moment," is perhaps even
more notable and decisive than the sagacity which so accurately chose
the proper method of action.

Nelson's deeds did not belie his words. Immediately after definite
news of Beaulieu's retreat to the Po was received, Sir John Jervis
appeared off Genoa with the fleet. The "Agamemnon" joined him, and
remained in company until the 23d of April, when by Nelson's request
she sailed on a cruise to the westward. From that time until the 4th
of June she was actively employed between Nice and Genoa, engaging the
batteries, and from time to time cutting out vessels from the
anchorages. His attempts were more or less successful; on one occasion
he captured a considerable portion of the French siege-train going
forward for the siege of Mantua; but upon the whole, the futility of
the attempt became apparent. "Although I will do my utmost, I do not
believe it is in my power to prevent troops or stores from passing
along shore. Heavy swells, light breezes, and the near approach to the
shore which these vessels go are our obstacles.... You may perceive I
am distressed. Do you really think we are of any use here? If not, we
may serve our country much more by being in other places. The Levant
and coast of Spain call aloud for ships, and they are, I fancy,
employed to no purpose here." The position was almost hopelessly
complicated by the Genoese coasters, which plied their trade close to
the beach, between the mother city and the little towns occupied by
the French, and which Nelson felt unable to touch. "There are no
vessels of any consequence in any bay from Monaco to Vado," he wrote
to Jervis; "but not less than a hundred Genoese are every day passing,
which may or may not have stores for the French." "The French have no
occasion to send provisions from France. The coasts are covered with
Genoese vessels with corn, wine, hay, &c., for places on the coast;
and they know I have no power to stop the trade with the towns. I saw
this day not less than forty-five Genoese vessels, all laden, passing
along the coast. What can I do?"

Although not definitely so stated, it is shown, by an allusion, that
Nelson at this time entertained, among other ideas, the project of
keeping afloat in transports a body of three thousand troops, which
should hover upon the coast, and by frequent descents impose a
constant insecurity upon the long line of communications from Nice to
Genoa. The same plan was advocated by him against the Spanish
peninsula in later years.[36] Of this conception it may be said that
it is sound in principle, but in practice depends largely upon the
distance from the centre of the enemy's power at which its execution
is attempted. Upon the Spanish coast, in 1808, in the hands of Lord
Cochrane, it was undoubtedly a most effective secondary operation; but
when that distinguished officer proposed to apply a like method, even
though on a much greater scale, to the western coast of France,
against the high-road south of Bordeaux, it can scarcely be doubted
that he would have met a severe disappointment, such as attended
similar actions upon the Channel in the Seven Years' War. On the
Riviera, in 1795, this means might have been decisive; in 1796, in the
face of Bonaparte's fortified coast, it could scarcely have been more
than an annoyance. At all events, the advocacy of it testifies to the
acuteness and energy with which Nelson threw himself into the
operations especially intrusted to him.

His letters during this period reflect the varying phases of hope and
of discouragement; but, upon the whole, the latter prevails. There is
no longer the feeling of neglect by his superior, of opportunity
slipping away through the inadequate force which timid counsels and
apathetic indolence allowed him. He sees that the chance which was
permitted to pass unimproved has now gone forever. "As the French
cannot want supplies to be brought into the Gulf of Genoa, for their
grand army," he writes to the admiral, "I am still of opinion that if
our frigates are wanted for other services, they may very well be
spared from the Gulf." And again, "As the service for which my
distinguishing pendant was intended to be useful, is nearly if not
quite at an end, I assure you I shall have no regret in striking it."
Sir John Jervis, he asserts with pride, has cruised with the fleet in
the Gulf of Genoa, close to shore, "where I will venture to say no
fleet ever cruised before--no officer can be more zealous or able to
render any service in our profession to England;" yet from the decks
of the flagship he and Nelson had helplessly watched a convoy passing
close in shore, and directly to windward, but wholly out of reach of
their powers of offence. At times, indeed, somewhat can be
accomplished. For several days the "Agamemnon" "has kept close to
shore, and harassed the enemy's troops very much. Field pieces are
drawn out on our standing in shore. You must defend me if any Genoese
towns are knocked down by firing at enemy's batteries. I will not fire
first." Six weeks later he writes again: "Our conduct has so
completely alarmed the French that all their coasting trade is at an
end; even the corvette, gunboats, &c., which were moored under the
fortress of Vado, have not thought themselves in security, but are all
gone into Savona Mole, and unbent their sails."

This movement, however, which he notes under the date of June 23,
proceeded probably less from fear than from the growing indifference
of the French concerning their communications by water, now that their
occupation of the line of the Adige River had solidified their
control over the ample resources of Piedmont and Lombardy. At the very
hour when Nelson was thus writing, he learned also the critical
condition of Leghorn through the approach of a French division, the
mere sending of which showed Bonaparte's sense of his present security
of tenure.

Nelson had severed by this time his long and affectionate connection
with the battered "Agamemnon." On the 4th of June the old ship
anchored at San Fiorenzo, having a few days before, with the
assistance of the squadron, cut out from under the French batteries
the vessels carrying Bonaparte's siege-train, as well as the gunboats
which convoyed them. There was then in the bay the "Egmont,"
seventy-four, whose commander had expressed to the admiral his wish to
return to England. Jervis, therefore, had ordered Nelson to the spot,
to make the exchange, and the latter thought the matter settled; but
to his surprise he found the captain did not wish to leave the station
unless the ship went also. This did away with the vacancy he looked to
fill; and, as the "Agamemnon," from her condition, must be the first
of the fleet to go home, it seemed for the moment likely that he would
have to go in her with a convoy then expected in the bay. "I remained
in a state of uncertainty for a week," he wrote to his wife; "and had
the corn ships, which were momentarily expected from Naples, arrived,
I should have sailed for England." The dilemma caused him great
anxiety; for the longing for home, which he had felt in the early part
of the winter, had given away entirely before the pride and confidence
he felt in the new admiral, and the keen delight in active service he
was now enjoying. "I feel full of gratitude for your good wishes
towards me," he wrote to Jervis in the first moment of disappointment,
"and highly flattered by your desire to have me continue to serve
under your command, which I own would afford me infinite
satisfaction." The following day he is still more restless. "I am not
less anxious than yesterday for having slept since my last letter.
Indeed, Sir, I cannot bear the thoughts of leaving your command." He
then proposed several ways out of the difficulty, which reduced
themselves, in short, to a readiness to hoist his pendant in anything,
if only he could remain.

No violent solution was needed, as several applicants came forward
when Nelson's wish was known. On the 11th of June, 1796, he shifted
his broad pendant to the "Captain," of seventy-four guns, taking with
him most of his officers. Soon afterwards the "Agamemnon" sailed for
England. Up to the last day of his stay on board, Nelson, although a
commodore, was also her captain; it was not until two months after
joining his new ship that another captain was appointed to her,
leaving to himself the duties of commodore only. In later years the
"Agamemnon" more than once bore a share in his career. She was present
at Copenhagen and at Trafalgar, being in this final scene under the
command of an officer who had served in her as his first lieutenant,
and was afterwards his flag-captain at the Nile. In 1809 she was
totally lost in the river La Plata, having run aground, and then
settled on one of her anchors, which, upon the sudden shoaling of the
water, had been let go to bring her up.[37] It is said that there were
then on board several seamen who had been with her during Nelson's
command.

On the 13th of June the "Captain" sailed from San Fiorenzo Bay, and on
the 17th joined the fleet off Cape Sicie, near Toulon, where Jervis,
six weeks before, had established the first of those continuous close
blockades which afterwards, off Brest, became associated with his
name, and proved so potent a factor in the embarrassments that drove
Napoleon to his ruin. There were then twelve British ships off the
port, while inside the enemy had eleven ready for sea, and four or
five more fitting. The following day Nelson again left the fleet, and
on the 21st of June arrived at Genoa, where very serious news was to
be received.

The triumphant and hitherto unchecked advance of Bonaparte had greatly
encouraged the French party in Corsica, which had been increased by a
number of malcontents, dissatisfied with their foreign rulers. Owing
to the disturbed condition of the interior, the British troops had
been drawn down to the sea-coast. Bonaparte, from the beginning of his
successes, had kept in view the deliverance of his native island,
which he expected to effect by the exertions of her own people,
stimulated and supported by the arrival upon the spot of Corsican
officers and soldiers from the French armies. These refugees,
proceeding in parties of from ten to twenty each, in small boats,
movable by sail or oars, and under cover of night, could seldom be
stopped, or even detected, by the British cruisers, while making the
short trip, of little more than a hundred miles, from Genoa, Nice, and
Leghorn. The latter port, from its nearness, was particularly
favorable to these enterprises; but, although neutral, and freely
permitting the ingress and egress of vessels belonging to both
belligerents, its facilities for supporting a Corsican uprising were
not so great as they would be if the place were held for the French.
For this reason, partly, Bonaparte had decided to seize it; and he was
still more moved to do so by the fact that it was a centre of British
trade, that it contributed much to the supply and repair of the
British fleet, and that the presence of vessels from the latter
enabled an eye to be kept upon the movements of the Corsicans, and
measures to be taken for impeding them.

"The enemy possessing themselves of Leghorn," Nelson had written in
the middle of March, when expecting them to do so by a coastwise
expedition, "cuts off all our supplies, such as fresh meat, fuel, and
various other most essential necessaries; and, of course, our fleet
cannot always [in that case] be looked for on the northern coast of
Italy." Bonaparte had not, indeed, at that time, contemplated any such
ex-centric movement, which, as things then were, would have risked so
large a part of his army out of his own control and his own support;
but in the middle of June, having driven the Austrians for the moment
into the Tyrol, consolidated his position upon the Adige, established
the siege of Mantua, and enforced order and submission throughout the
fertile valley of the Po, which lay in rear of his army and amply
supplied it with the necessaries of subsistence, he felt not only able
to spare the force required, but that for the security of the right
flank and rear of his army it had become essential to do so. The
Papacy and Naples, although they had contributed little to the active
campaigning of the allies, were still nominally at war with France,
and might possibly display more energy now that operations were
approaching their own frontiers. Should the British take possession of
Leghorn with a body of troops,--their own or Neapolitan,--the port
would remain a constant menace to the operations and communications of
the French, and especially at the critical moments when the Austrians
advanced to the relief of Mantua, as they must be expected to do, and
actually did on four several occasions during the succeeding six
months.

Bonaparte, as he was ever wont, diligently improved the opportunity
permitted to him by the need of the Austrians to reorganize and
reinforce Beaulieu's beaten army before again taking the field.
Threatened, as often again in later years, by enemies in divergent
directions, he with the utmost promptitude and by the most summary
measures struck down the foe on one side, before the other could stir.
Occupying Verona in the first days of June, he immediately afterwards
detached to the southward a corps under Augereau to enter the Papal
States; and at the same time another small division, commanded by
General Vaubois, started from the upper valley of the Po, ostensibly
destined to proceed against Rome by passing through Tuscany. The
effect of Augereau's movement, which was closely followed by the
commander-in-chief in person, was to bring both Naples and the Pope
speedily to terms. An armistice was signed by the former on the 5th,
and by the latter on the 24th of June. Vaubois, on the other hand,
after passing the Arno below Florence, instead of continuing on to
Siena, as the Grand Duke had been assured that he would, turned sharp
to the westward, and on the 28th of June entered Leghorn, which was
thenceforth held by the French. Thus within a brief month were the
British deprived of two allies, lethargic, it is true, in actual
performance, but possessed of a degree of potential strength that
could not but enter largely into Bonaparte's anxieties; while at the
same time they lost the use of a seaport that had heretofore been
considered essential to their support.

Rumors of Vaubois' movement reached Nelson in Genoa at noon of June
23, but somewhat vaguely. "Reports are all we have here," he wrote to
Jervis the same day, "nothing official from the armies;" but he
thought the situation critical, and started without delay for Leghorn.
Arriving there on the morning of June 27, after a passage rendered
tedious by light airs and calms, he found the British merchant vessels
that had been in the harbor, to the number of nearly forty sail,
already under way, laden with British merchants and their property,
and standing out under convoy of several ships of war; while in
pursuit of them--a singular indication of the neutrality possible to
small States like Tuscany and Genoa at that time--were a dozen French
privateers, which had been lying beside them within the mole. One or
two of the departing vessels were thus taken.

The first impression upon Nelson's mind was that the occupation of
Leghorn was only the prelude to an invasion of Corsica in force. "I
have no doubt," he wrote to the Viceroy, "but the destination of the
French army was Corsica, and it is natural to suppose their fleet was
to amuse ours whilst they cross from Leghorn." Thus reasoning, he
announced his purpose of rejoining the admiral as soon as possible, so
as not to lose his share in the expected battle. "My heart would
break," he says to Jervis, "to be absent at such a glorious time;" but
it is difficult to understand why he imagined that the French would
transfer their army into the destitution of the Corsican mountains
from the fertile plains of Lombardy, abandoning the latter to their
enemy, and exchanging their assured communications with France for the
uncertainties and irregularities of a water transit over seas
commanded by the British fleet. The tenure of the island, as he well
knew, depended upon the willing support of the Corsicans themselves;
in the equal balance of the existing war, neither belligerent could
maintain its control against the opposition of the natives.

This anticipation, in its disregard of the perfectly obvious
conditions, was scarcely worthy of Nelson's real native sagacity, and
shows clearly how much a man, even of genius, is hampered in the
conclusions of actual life by the lack of that systematic ordering and
training of the ideas which it is the part of education to supply.
Genius is one thing, the acquirements of an
accomplished--instructed--officer are another, yet there is between
the two nothing incompatible, rather the reverse; and when to the
former, which nature alone can give,--and to Nelson did give,--is
added the conscious recognition of principles, the practised habit of
viewing, under their clear light, all the circumstances of a
situation, assigning to each its due weight and relative importance,
then, and then only, is the highest plane of military greatness
attained. Whether in natural insight Nelson fell short of Napoleon's
measure need not here be considered; that he was at this time far
inferior, in the powers of a trained intellect, to his younger
competitor in the race for fame, is manifest by the readiness with
which he accepted such widely ex-centric conjectures as that of an
attempt by sea upon Leghorn at the opening of the campaign, and now
upon Corsica by a great part, if not the whole, of the army of Italy.

"On the side of the French," says Jomini, speaking of Bonaparte at
this very period, "was to be seen a young warrior, trained in the best
schools, endowed with an ardent imagination, brought up upon the
examples of antiquity, greedy of glory and of power, knowing
thoroughly the Apennines, in which he had distinguished himself in
1794, and already measuring with a practised eye the distances he must
overpass before becoming master of Italy. To these advantages for a
war of invasion, Bonaparte united an inborn genius, and clearly
established principles, the fruits of an enlightened theory."

Jomini doubtless may be considered somewhat too absolute and pedantic
in his insistence upon definite formulation of principles; but in
these words is nevertheless to be recognized the fundamental
difference between these two great warriors, a difference by which the
seaman was heavily handicapped in the opening of his career. As time
passed on, responsibility, the best of educators, took under her firm
and steady guidance the training of his yet undeveloped genius, gleams
of which from time to time, but fitfully and erratically, illumine his
earlier correspondence. The material was there from the first, but
inchoate, ill-ordered, confused, and therefore not readily available
to correct passing impressions, wild rumors, or even to prevent the
radically false conceptions of an enemy's possible movements, such as
we have had before us. Bonaparte, furthermore, whose career began amid
the troubled scenes of a revolution which had shattered all the
fetters of established custom,--so strong in England to impede a man's
natural progress,--had enjoyed already for some time the singular
advantage of being military adviser to the Directory, a duty which
compelled him to take a broad view of all current conditions, to
consider them in their mutual relations, and not narrowly to look to
one sphere of operations, without due reference to its effects upon
others.

As to the invasion of Corsica after the manner he had imagined, Nelson
was soon undeceived. Bonaparte himself, after a hurried visit to
Leghorn, again departed to press the siege of Mantua, having assured
himself that for a measurable time he had nothing to apprehend from
movements on his flank and rear. Orders were received from Jervis on
the 2d of July to institute a commercial blockade of Leghorn,
permitting no vessels to enter or depart. The conduct of this
business, as well as the protection of British trade in that district,
and the support of the Viceroy in securing Corsica against the
attempts of French partisans, were especially intrusted to Nelson,
whose movements during the following months, until the first of
October, were consequently confined to the waters between Corsica and
Tuscany, while the Riviera west of Genoa saw him no more. Leghorn
became the chief centre of his activities. These redoubled with the
demands made upon him; his energy rose equal to every call. A few
weeks before, he had made a conditional application to the admiral,
though with evident reluctance, for a short leave of absence on
account of his health. "I don't much like what I have written," he
confessed at the end of his diffident request, and some days later he
again alludes to the subject. "My complaint is as if a girth was
buckled taut over my breast, and my endeavours, in the night, is to
get it loose. To say the truth, when I am actively employed, I am not
so bad. If the Service will admit of it, perhaps I shall at a future
day take your leave." The service now scarcely admitted it, and the
active duty apparently restored his health; at all events we now hear
no more of it. Everything yielded to the requirements of the war.
"The Captain has wants, but I intend she shall last till the autumn:
for I know, when once we begin, our wants are innumerable."

In his still limited sphere, and on all matters directly connected
with it and his professional duties, his judgment was sound and acute,
as his activity, energy, and zeal were untiring. The menace to Corsica
from the fall of Leghorn was accurately weighed and considered. Midway
between the two lay the since famous island of Elba, a dependence of
Tuscany, so small as to be held readily by a few good troops, and
having a port large enough, in Nelson's judgment, to harbor the
British fleet with a little management. "The way to Corsica," he wrote
to the Viceroy, "if our fleet is at hand, is through Elba; for if they
once set foot on that island, it is not all our fleet can stop their
passage to Corsica." The Viceroy took upon himself to direct that the
island be occupied by the British. Nelson complied without waiting for
Jervis's orders, and on the 10th of July a detachment of troops,
convoyed by his squadron, were landed in the island, and took charge,
without serious opposition, of the town of Porto Ferrajo and the works
for the defence of the harbor. The measure was justified upon the
ground that the seizure of Leghorn by the French showed that Tuscany
was unable to assure Elba against a similar step, prejudicial to the
British tenure in Corsica. The administration remained in the hands of
the Tuscan officials, the British occupation being purely military,
and confined to the places necessary for that purpose.

The blockade of Leghorn was enforced with the utmost rigor and great
effectiveness. For a long time no vessels were allowed to go either
out or in. Afterwards the rule was gradually relaxed, so far as to
permit neutrals to leave the port in ballast; but none entered. The
trade of the place was destroyed. Nelson hoped, and for a time
expected, that the populace, accustomed to a thriving commerce, and
drawing their livelihood from its employments, would rise against the
feeble garrison, whose presence entailed upon them such calamities;
but herein, of course, he underestimated the coercive power of a few
resolute men, organized for mutual support, over a mob of individuals,
incapable of combined action and each uncertain of the constancy of
his fellows.

The Austrian preparations in the Tyrol gradually matured as the month
of July wore on. Towards its end Marshal Wurmser, the successor of
Beaulieu, advanced for the relief of Mantua and the discomfiture of
Bonaparte, whose numbers were much inferior to his opponents. The
projected movement was of course known to the British, and its first
results in raising the siege of Mantua, and throwing reinforcements
into the place, gave them great hopes. Amid the conflicting rumors of
the succeeding days, the wonderful skill and success of Bonaparte, who
overthrew in detail forces greatly superior in the aggregate to his
own, escaped notice for the time; the superficial incidents of his
abandoning his previous positions alone received attention, and
nothing less than his retreat in confusion was confidently expected.
Nelson, justly estimating the importance of Leghorn, and over-sanguine
of the support he might hope from the inhabitants, projected a sudden
assault upon the town, by troops to be drawn from the garrisons in
Corsica, supported by seamen of the squadron. Speaking of the steady
intercourse between, that island and the mainland by way of Leghorn,
he says: "The only way is to cut at the root, for whilst Leghorn is
open, this communication must constantly be going on. This moment
brings to my eyes a body of about 200 men, with the Corsican flag
carrying before them; they are partly from Nice, and joined by
Genoese, &c., on the road. The time approaches," he rightly forecasts,
"when we shall either have to fight them in Corsica or Leghorn." The
imminence of the danger was evident. "Our affairs in Corsica are
gloomy," he had already written to the Duke of Clarence. "There is a
very strong republican party in that island, and they are well
supported from France; the first favourable moment, they will
certainly act against us."

The details of the intended assault upon Leghorn do not appear, and it
is probable that they never passed beyond the stage of discussion to
that of acceptance, although he alludes to the plans as "laid."
Clear-sighted for the key of a situation, and ardent to strike "at the
root," as five years later in the Baltic he was eager to cut away the
Russian root of the Armed Neutrality, instead of hewing off the Danish
branch, Nelson urged the speedy adoption of the measure, and pressed
his own fitness to harmonize the land and sea forces under one
command, in virtue of his rank as Colonel of Marines. "Leghorn is in
such a state," he writes to Elliot on the 5th of August, "that a
respectable force landed, would, I have every reason to suppose,
insure the immediate possession of the town. Not less than a thousand
troops should be sent, to which I will add every soldier in my
squadron, and a party of seamen to make a show. In every way, pray
consider this as private, and excuse my opinions. I well know the
difficulty of getting a proper person to command this party. Firmness,
and that the people of Leghorn should know the person commanding, will
most assuredly have a great effect. A cordial co-operation with me
(for vanity apart, no one is so much feared or respected in Leghorn as
myself) is absolutely necessary. I am going further: we know the
jealousy of the army against the navy, but I am by the King's
commission a Colonel in the army from June 1st, 1795." After
discussing this difficult question of professional susceptibilities,
he concludes: "You will consider, Sir, all these points, and form a
much better judgment than I can, only give me credit that the nearest
wish of my heart is to serve my King and my Country, at every
personal risk and consideration. It has ever pleased God to prosper
all my undertakings, and I feel confident of His blessing on this
occasion. I ever consider my motto, _Fides et Opera_."[38]

Having, with true strategic insight, chosen the place where the blow
ought to be struck for the preservation of Corsica, he pressed, with
characteristic fervor, the necessity of taking risks. He discusses
details indeed; he proposes no mere adventure, real as was his
personal enjoyment of danger and action. What man can do, shall be
done; but being done, still "something must be left to chance. Our
only consideration, is the honour and benefit to our Country worth the
risk? If it is (and I think so), in God's name let us get to work, and
hope for His blessing on our endeavours to liberate a people who have
been our sincere friends." Hearing at the same time that an army
officer of general rank will have the command instead of himself, he
adds: "Pray assure him there is nothing I feel greater pleasure in
than hearing he is to command. Assure him of my most sincere wishes
for his speedy success, and that he shall have every support and
assistance from me." Truly, in generosity as in ardor, Nelson was, to
use the fine old phrase, "all for the service."

The project upon Leghorn had the approval of the Viceroy and of
Jervis; but the latter, while expressing perfect reliance upon "the
promptitude of Commodore Nelson," was clear that the attempt must
depend upon the contimied advance of the Austrians. This was also
Nelson's own view. "All will be well, I am satisfied, provided Wurmser
is victorious; upon this ground only have I adopted the measure." This
qualification redeems the plan from the reproach of rashness, which
otherwise might have been applied to the somewhat desperate
undertaking of carrying a fortified town by such a feat of hardihood.
It loses thus the color of recklessness, and falls into place as one
part of a great common action, to harass the retreat of a beaten
enemy, and to insure the security of one's own positions.

On the 15th of August, when the above words were written, Nelson was
still ignorant of the Austrian defeats at Lonato and Castiglione,
nearly two weeks before, and of their subsequent retreat to the Tyrol.
A rumor of the reverse had reached him through Florence, but he gave
it little attention, as the French in Leghorn were not claiming a
victory. On the 19th he knew it definitely, and had to abandon the
expectation, confided to his brother, that the next letter seen from
him would be in the "Public Gazette." "An expedition is thought of,
and of course I shall be there, for most of these services fall to my
lot." "One day or other," he had written to his wife, apparently with
this very enterprise in mind, "I will have a long Gazette to myself; I
feel that such an opportunity will be given me. I cannot," he
continued with prophetic self-reliance, "if I am in the field of
glory, be kept out of sight."

During the remainder of the month he continued to be amused with those
unfounded reports of victories, which are among the invariable
concomitants of all wars, and which his sanguine temperament and
peculiar readiness to trust others made him especially ready to
accept. He was not wholly unaware of this tendency in himself, though
he continued to repeat with apparent belief reports of the most
startling and erroneous character, and never seems to have
appreciated, up to the time of his leaving the Mediterranean, the
astonishing quickness and sagacity with which Bonaparte frustrated the
overwhelming combinations against him. "We hear what we wish," he says
on one occasion. "The Toulon information is, as I always thought it,
pleasant to know but never to be depended upon; all is guess. I have
long had reason to suspect great part is fabricated in Genoa;" but he
was continually deceived by it.

Throughout the discomfitures of the Austrians on shore, the purely
naval part of the war continued to be successfully maintained. Jervis,
with unrelaxing grip, kept his position before Toulon, effectually
checking every attempt of the French fleet to escape unobserved into
the open, while Nelson shut up Leghorn so rigorously that the enemy
lost even the partial advantage, as a port of supply, which they had
before drawn from its neutrality. But, during this pregnant summer,
grave causes for anxiety were rolling up in the western basin of the
Mediterranean. The attitude of Spain had long been doubtful, so much
so that before Sir John Jervis left England, in the previous autumn,
the ministry had deliberated upon the contingency of her declaring
war, and a conditional decision had been reached to evacuate Corsica,
if that event occurred. During the spring of 1796 reports of coming
hostilities were current in the fleet. Nelson's first opinion was
that, if they ensued, there was no object in remaining in the
Mediterranean, except to preserve Corsica from the French. This, he
thought, was not a sufficient motive, nor had the conduct of the
natives entitled them to protection. With all the powers making peace
with France, he hoped Great Britain would leave the Mediterranean.
This, however, was but a passing expression of discouragement, whence
he soon rallied, and, with a spirit worthy of his race, which was soon
to face all Europe undismayed, his courage mounted continually as the
storm drew nearer.

The summer of 1796 was in truth the period of transition, when the
victories of Bonaparte, by bringing near a cessation of warfare upon
the land, were sweeping from the scene the accessories that confused
the view of the future, removing conditions and details which
perplexed men's attention, and bringing into clear relief the one
field upon which the contest was finally to be fought out, and the
one foe, the British sea-power, upon whose strength and constancy
would hinge the issues of the struggle. The British Navy, in the
slight person of its indomitable champion, was gradually rising to the
appreciation of its own might, and gathering together its energies to
endure single-handed the gigantic strife, with a spirit unequalled in
its past history, glorious as that had often been. From 1796 began the
rapid ascent to that short noontide of unparalleled brilliancy, in
which Nelson's fame outshone all others, and which may be said to have
begun with the Spanish declaration of war, succeeded though that was
by the retreat in apparent discomfiture from the Mediterranean, now at
hand.

The approach of this extraordinary outburst of maritime vigor is aptly
foretokened in the complete change, gradual yet rapid, that passed
over Nelson's opinions, from the time when rumors of a Spanish war
first assumed probability, up to the moment when the fact became
tangible by the appearance of the Spanish fleet in the waters of
Corsica. Accentuated thus in a man of singular perceptions and heroic
instincts, it further affords an interesting illustration of the
manner in which a combative race--for Nelson was through and through a
child of his people--however at first averse to war, from motives of
well-understood interest, gradually warms to the idea, and finally
grows even to welcome the fierce joy which warriors feel, as the clash
of arms draws near. "If all the states of Italy make peace," he writes
on the 20th of May, "we have nothing to look to but Corsica; which in
the present state of the inhabitants, is not, in my opinion, an object
to keep us in the Mediterranean: we shall, I hope, quit it, and employ
our fleet more to our advantage." "Reports here," on the 20th of June,
"are full of a Spanish war. If that should be the case, we shall
probably draw towards Gibraltar and receive large reinforcements."

On the 15th of August, however, he writes to Jervis, betraying the
incipient revulsion, as yet not realized, against abandoning the
Mediterranean, which was already affecting the current of his
thoughts. "I hope we shall have settled Leghorn before the Dons, if
they intend it, arrive. I have still my doubts as to a Spanish war;
and if there should be one, with your management I have no fears.
Should the Dons come, I shall then hope I may be spared,[39] in my own
person, to help to make you at least a Viscount." A few days later,
having meantime heard of Wurmser's disasters at Castiglione: "Austria,
I suppose, must make peace, and we shall, as usual, be left to fight
it out: however, at the worst, we only give up Corsica, an acquisition
which I believe we cannot keep, and our fleet will draw down the
Mediterranean;" but at the same time, August 19, he writes to the Duke
of Clarence with glowing hopes and rising pride: "I hope Government
will not be alarmed for our safety--I mean more than is proper. Under
such a commander-in-chief as Sir John Jervis nobody has any fears. We
are now twenty-two sail of the line; the combined fleet will not be
above thirty-five sail of the line. I will venture my life Sir John
Jervis defeats them. This country is the most favourable possible for
skill with an inferior fleet; for the winds are so variable, that some
one time in twenty-four hours you must be able to attack a part of a
large fleet, and the other will be becalmed, or have a contrary wind."
That the Duke trembled and demurred to such odds is not wonderful; but
the words have singular interest, both as showing the clear tactical
apprehensions that held sway in Nelson's mind, and still more, at the
moment then present, as marking unmistakably his gradual conversion to
the policy of remaining in the Mediterranean, and pursuing the most
vigorous aggressive measures.

A fortnight after this letter was written, Genoa, under pressure from
Bonaparte, closed her ports against British ships, interdicting even
the embarkation of a drove of cattle, already purchased, and ready for
shipment to the fleet off Toulon. Nelson immediately went there to
make inquiries, and induce a revocation of the orders. While the
"Captain" lay at anchor in the roads, three of the crew deserted, and
when her boats were sent to search for them they were fired upon by a
French battery, established near the town. Nelson, in retaliation,
seized a French supply ship from under the guns of the battery,
whereupon the Genoese forts opened against the "Captain," which had
meantime got under way and was lying-to off the city. Nelson did not
return the fire of the latter, which was kept up for two hours, but
threw three shot into the French battery, "to mark," as he said, the
power of the English to bombard the town, and their humanity in not
destroying the houses and innocent Genoese inhabitants. In the
communications which followed under a flag of truce, Nelson was
informed, verbally, that all the ports of the Republic were closed
against Great Britain. This stand, and the firing on the ship, being
considered acts of hostility, the little island of Capraia, between
Corsica and Genoa, and belonging to the latter, was seized by Nelson,
acting under the counsel of the Viceroy of Corsica. This was done both
as a retaliatory measure, and to put a stop to the use which French
privateers and parties of Corsicans had hitherto made of it, under
cover of Genoese neutrality.

As Jervis was already under apprehension of an outbreak of scurvy in
the fleet, consequent upon the failure of supplies of live cattle
following the French occupation of Leghorn, the closure of the Genoese
ports was a severe blow. It was, however, but one among several
incidents, occurring nearly simultaneously, which increased his
embarrassments, and indicated the close approach of the long-muttering
storm. To use his own words, "The lowering aspect of Spain, with the
advanced state of the equipment of the French fleet in Toulon,"
impelled him to concentrate his force. Rear-Admiral Man, who had been
blockading Cadiz since his detachment there by Hotham, in October,
1795, was ordered up to the main fleet. Swayed by fears very unlike to
Nelson's proud confidence in his admiral and his service, he acted
with such precipitation as to leave Gibraltar without filling with
provisions, and arrived so destitute that Jervis had to send him back
at once, with orders to replenish with stores and then to rejoin
without delay. Under the influence of the panic which prevailed at
Gibraltar, Man had also sent such advices to the coast of Portugal as
caused the commander-in-chief to fear that expected supplies might be
arrested. "Oh, our convoy!" cried Nelson; "Admiral Man, how could you
quit Gibraltar?" Yet, as he wrote to Jervis, he had expected some such
step, from what he had already seen "under his hand to you."

Thus, for the time at least, there were lost to the British seven of
the ships-of-the-line upon which Nelson had reckoned in his letter to
the Duke of Clarence. It was possibly on this account that Jervis
wrote him to shift his commodore's pendant to a frigate, and send the
"Captain" to the fleet. Nelson obeyed, of course, and at once; but
taking advantage of the fact that no captain had yet joined his ship,
he thought it "advisable to go in her myself." In this he doubtless
was influenced chiefly by his unwillingness to miss a battle,
especially against such great numerical odds. "I take for granted," he
admitted to the Viceroy, "that the admiral will send me back in a
cutter, but I shall give him a good ordered seventy-four, and take my
chance of helping to thrash Don Langara, than which few things, I
assure you, would give me more real pleasure." The particular
emergency seems, however, soon to have passed; for after two days with
the fleet he returned off Leghorn in the "Captain," somewhat comforted
as to the apprehensions of the British Cabinet. "Whatever fears we
may have for Corsica, it is certain Government at home have none, by
taking so very respectable a part of your force away." A regiment had
been transferred to Gibraltar with Man's squadron, when the latter
returned there.

These rising hopes and stirring expectations of brilliant service were
speedily dashed. On the 25th of September Jervis received orders from
the Admiralty to abandon Corsica, to retreat from the Mediterranean,
and to proceed with the fleet to England. In pursuance of these
instructions Nelson was directed to superintend the evacuation of
Bastia, the "most secret" letter to that effect reaching him at that
port on the 29th of September,--his birthday. The purpose of the
ministry filled him with shame and indignation. Confronted abruptly
with the course which four months before had seemed to him natural and
proper, the shock brought out the fulness of the change through which
he had passed meantime. He has no illusions about Corsica. The
inhabitants had disappointed all the expectations of the British,--"At
a peace I should rejoice at having given up the island." But the days
passing over his head had brought wider and maturer views of the
general policy of Great Britain, as well as increasing faith in the
powers of the fleet, vigorously used in aggressive warfare. "Whilst we
can keep the combined fleet in the Mediterranean [by our own
presence], so much the more advantageous to us; and the moment we
retire, the whole of Italy is given to the French. If the Dons detach
their fleet out of the Mediterranean, we can do the same--however,
that is distant. Be the successes of the Austrians on the other hand
what they may, their whole supply of stores and provisions comes from
Trieste, across the Adriatic to the Po, and when this is cut off [as
by our uncovering the sea it must be], they must retire." Above all he
grieves for Naples. If a weak and vacillating ally, there was no doubt
her heart was with them. "I feel more than all for Naples. The King
of Naples is a greater sacrifice than Corsica. If he has been induced
to keep off the peace, and perhaps engaged in the war again by the
expectation of the continuance of the fleet in the Mediterranean, hard
indeed is his fate; his kingdom must inevitably be ruined." In the
impression now made upon him, may perhaps be seen one cause of
Nelson's somewhat extravagant affection in after days for the royal
family of Naples, independent of any influence exerted upon him by
Lady Hamilton.

With these broad views of the general strategic situation, which are
unquestionably far in advance of the comparatively narrow and vague
conceptions of a year, or even six months before, and doubtless
indicate the results of independent command and responsibility, acting
upon powers of a high order, he at the same time shows his keen
appreciation of the value of the organized force, whose movements,
properly handled, should dominate the other conditions. "When Man
arrives, who is ordered to come up, we shall be twenty-two sail of
such ships as England hardly ever produced, and commanded by an
admiral who will not fail to look the enemy in the face, be their
force what it may: I suppose it will not be more than thirty-four of
the line. There is not a seaman in the fleet who does not feel
confident of success." "The fleets of England," he says again, "are
equal to meet the world in arms; and of all fleets I ever saw, I never
beheld one in point of officers and men equal to Sir John Jervis's,
who is a commander-in-chief able to lead them to glory."

Reasoning so clearly and accurately upon the importance to Great
Britain's interests and honor, at that time, of maintaining her
position in the Mediterranean, and upon the power of her fleet in
battle, it is not strange that Nelson, writing in intimate confidence
to his wife, summed up in bitter words his feelings upon the occasion;
unconscious, apparently, of the great change they indicated, not
merely in his opinions, but in his power of grasping, in well-ordered
and rational sequence, the great outlines of the conditions amid which
he, as an officer, was acting. "We are all preparing to leave the
Mediterranean, a measure which I cannot approve. They at home do not
know what this fleet is capable of performing; anything, and
everything. Much as I shall rejoice to see England, I lament our
present orders in sackcloth and ashes, so dishonourable to the dignity
of England." To the British minister at Naples his words were even
stronger: "Till this time it has been usual for the allies of England
to fall from her, but till now she never was known to desert her
friends whilst she had the power of supporting them. I yet hope the
Cabinet may, on more information, change their opinion; it is not all
we gain elsewhere which can compensate for our loss of honour. The
whole face of affairs is totally different to what it was when the
Cabinet formed their opinion."

Nevertheless, although Nelson's perceptions and reasoning were
accurate as far as they went, they erred in leaving out of the
calculation a most important consideration,--the maintenance of the
communications with England, which had assumed vital importance since
the general defection of the Italian States, caused by Bonaparte's
successes and his imperious demands. It would be more true to say that
he underestimated this factor than that he overlooked it; for he had
himself observed, six weeks earlier, when the approach of a Spanish
war first became certain: "I really think they would do us more damage
by getting off Cape Finisterre;[40] it is there I fear them," and the
reason for that fear is shown by his reproach against Man, already
quoted, for his neglect of the convoy. The position of the Spanish
Navy in its home ports was in fact intermediate--interior--as
regarded the British fleet and the source of its most essential
supplies. So long as its future direction remained uncertain, it lay
upon the flank of the principal British line of communications. Nelson
did not use, perhaps did not know, the now familiar terms of the
military art; and, with all his insight and comprehensive sagacity, he
suffered from the want of proper tools with which to transmute his
acute intuitions into precise thought, as well as of clearly
enunciated principles, which serve to guide a man's conclusions, and
would assuredly have qualified his in the present instance. Upon the
supposition that the Spanish Navy, practically in its entirety,
entered the Mediterranean and appeared off Corsica,--as it
did,--Nelson's reasoning was correct, and his chagrin at a retreat
justified; but, as he himself had wisely remarked to Beaulieu, it is
not safe to count upon your enemy pursuing the course you wish. Had
the Spanish Government chosen the other alternative open to it, and
struck at the communications, such a blow, or even such a threat, must
have compelled the withdrawal of the fleet, unless some other base of
supplies could be found. The straitness of the situation is shown by
the fact that Jervis, after he had held on to the last moment in San
Fiorenzo Bay, sailed for Gibraltar with such scanty provisions that
the crews' daily rations were reduced to one-third the ordinary
amount; in fact, as early as the first of October they had been cut
down to two-thirds. Whether, therefore, the Government was right in
ordering the withdrawal, or Nelson in his condemnation of it, may be
left to the decision of those fortunate persons who can be cocksure of
the true solution of other people's perplexities.

In evacuating the Mediterranean, Jervis determined, upon his own
responsibility, to retain Elba, if the troops, which were not under
his command, would remain there. This was accordingly done; a strong
garrison, adequately provisioned, thus keeping for Great Britain a
foothold within the sea, at a time when she had lost Minorca and did
not yet possess Malta. Nelson hoped that this step would encourage the
Two Sicilies to stand firm against the French; but, however valuable
Elba would be to the fleet as a base, if held until its return, it was
useless to protect Naples in the absence of the fleet, and upon the
news of the latter's proposed retirement that Kingdom at once made
peace.

After the receipt of his orders for the evacuation of Bastia, and
pending the assembling of the transports, Nelson was despatched by the
admiral to Genoa, to present reclamations for injuries alleged to have
been done to Great Britain, and to propose terms of accommodation. The
little Republic, however, under the coercive influence of Bonaparte's
continued success, was no longer in doubt as to the side which policy
dictated her to take, between the two belligerents who vexed her
borders. During this visit of Nelson's, on the 9th of October, she
signed a treaty with France, stipulating, besides the closure of the
ports against Great Britain, the payment of a sum of money, and free
passage to troops and supplies for the army of Italy. Thus was Genoa
converted formally, as she for some time had been actually, into a
French base of operations. Returning from this fruitless mission,
Nelson rejoined the commander-in-chief on the 13th of October, at San
Fiorenzo, and the same afternoon left again for Bastia, where he
arrived the following day.

During the fortnight intervening since he left the place, the fact
that the Spanish fleet was on its way to Corsica had become known, and
the French partisans in the island were proportionately active. It was
impossible for the British to go into the interior; their friends, if
not in a minority, were effectually awed by the preponderance of their
enemies, on land and sea. Nelson, wishing to cross overland to San
Fiorenzo to visit Jervis, was assured he could not do so with safety.
In Bastia itself the municipality had wrested the authority from the
Viceroy, and consigned the administration to a Committee of Thirty.
The ships of war and transports being blown to sea, the inhabitants
became still more aggressive; for, foreseeing the return of the
French, they were naturally eager to propitiate their future masters
by a display of zeal. British property was sequestered, and shipping
not permitted to leave the mole.

Nelson was persuaded that only the arrival of the ships accompanying
him saved the place. Except a guard at the Viceroy's house, the
British troops had been withdrawn to the citadel. Even there, at the
gates of the citadel, and within it, Corsican guards were present in
numbers equal to the British, while the posts in the towns were all
held by them. Arriving at early dawn of the 14th, Nelson at once
visited the general and the Viceroy. The former saw no hope, under the
conditions, of saving either stores, cannon, or provisions. "The
Army," said Nelson in a private letter to Jervis, with something of
the prejudiced chaff of a seaman of that day, "is, as usual, well
dressed and powdered. I hope the general will join me cordially, but,
as you well know, great exertions belong exclusively to the Navy."
After the evacuation, however, he admitted handsomely that it was
impossible to "do justice to the good dispositions of the general."

Between the heads of the two services such arrangements were perfected
as enabled almost everything in the way of British property--public
and private--to be brought away. By midday the ships, of which three
were of the line, were anchored close to the mole-head, abreast the
town, and the municipality was notified that any opposition to the
removal of the vessels and stores would be followed by instant
bombardment. Everything yielded to the threat, made by a man whose
determined character left no doubt that it would be carried into
execution. "Nothing shall be left undone that ought to be done," he
wrote to Jervis, "even should it be necessary to knock down Bastia."
From time to time interference was attempted, but the demand for
immediate desistence, made, watch in hand, by the naval officer on the
spot, enforced submission. "The firm tone held by Commodore Nelson,"
wrote Jervis to the Admiralty, "soon reduced these gentlemen to order,
and quiet submission to the embarkation." Owing to the anarchy
prevailing, the Viceroy was persuaded to go on board before nightfall,
he being too valuable as a hostage to be exposed to possible
kidnappers.

On the 18th of October a large number of armed French landed at Cape
Corso, and approached the town. On the 19th they sent to the
municipality a demand that the British should not be permitted to
embark. Under these circumstances even Nelson felt that nothing more
could be saved. The work of removal was continued actively until
sunset, by which time two hundred thousand pounds worth of cannon,
stores, and provisions had been taken on board. At midnight the troops
evacuated the citadel, and marched to the north end of the town, where
they embarked--twenty-four hours ahead of the time upon which Nelson
had reckoned four days before. It was then blowing a strong gale of
wind. Last of all, about six o'clock on the morning of the 20th,
Nelson and the general entered a barge, every other man being by that
time afloat, and were pulled off to the ships, taking with them two
field-guns, until then kept ashore to repel a possible attack at the
last moment. The French, who "were in one end of Bastia before we
quitted the other," had occupied the citadel since one in the morning,
and the Spanish fleet, of over twenty sail-of-the-line, which had
already arrived, was even then off Cape Corso, about sixty miles
distant; but the little British squadron, sailing promptly with a fair
wind, in a few hours reached Elba, where every vessel was safely at
anchor before night. On the 24th Nelson joined the commander-in-chief
in Martello Bay, the outer anchorage of San Fiorenzo. Everything was
then afloat, and ready for a start as soon as the transports, still at
Elba, should arrive. The evacuation of Corsica was complete, though
the ships remained another week in its waters.

The Spanish fleet continued cruising to the northward of the island,
and was every day sighted by the British lookout frigates. Jervis held
grimly on, expecting the appearance of the seven ships of Admiral Man,
who had been ordered to rejoin him. That officer, however, acting on
his own responsibility, weakly buttressed by the opinion of a council
of his captains, had returned to England contrary to his instructions.
The commander-in-chief, ignorant of this step, was left in the sorely
perplexing situation of having his fleet divided into two parts, each
distinctly inferior to the Spanish force alone, of twenty-six ships,
not to speak of the French in Toulon. Under the conditions, the only
thing that could be done was to await his subordinate, in the
appointed spot, until the last moment. By the 2d of November further
delay had become impossible, from the approaching failure of
provisions. On that day, therefore, the fleet weighed, and after a
tedious passage anchored on the first of December at Gibraltar. There
Nelson remained until the 10th of the month, when he temporarily
quitted the "Captain," hoisted his broad pendant on board the frigate
"Minerve," and, taking with him one frigate besides, returned into the
Mediterranean upon a detached mission of importance.

Nelson's last services in Corsica were associated with the momentary
general collapse of the British operations and influence in the
Mediterranean; and his final duty, by a curious coincidence, was to
abandon the position which he more than any other man had been
instrumental in securing. Yet, amid these discouraging circumstances,
his renown had been steadily growing throughout the year 1796, which
may justly be looked upon as closing the first stage in the history
of British Sea Power during the wars of the French Revolution, and as
clearing the way for his own great career, which in the repossession
of the Mediterranean reached its highest plane, and there continued in
unabated glory till the hour of his death. It was not merely the
exceptional brilliancy of his deeds at Cape St. Vincent, now soon to
follow, great and distinguished as those were, which designated him to
men in power as beyond dispute the coming chief of the British Navy;
it was the long antecedent period of unswerving continuance in
strenuous action, allowing no flagging of earnestness for a moment to
appear, no chance for service, however small or distant, to pass
unimproved. It was the same unremitting pressing forward, which had
brought him so vividly to the front in the abortive fleet actions of
the previous year,--an impulse born, partly, of native eagerness for
fame, partly of zeal for the interests of his country and his
profession. "Mine is all honour; so much for the Navy!" as he wrote,
somewhat incoherently, to his brother, alluding to a disappointment
about prize money.

Nelson himself had an abundant, but not an exaggerated, consciousness
of this increase of reputation; and he knew, too, that he was but
reaping as he had diligently sowed. "If credit and honour in the
service are desirable," he tells his brother, "I have my full share. I
have never lost an opportunity of distinguishing myself, not only as a
gallant man, but as having a head; for, of the numerous plans I have
laid, not one has failed." "You will be informed from my late
letters," he writes to his wife, "that Sir John Jervis has such an
opinion of my conduct, that he is using every influence, both public
and private, with Lord Spencer, for my continuance on this station;
and I am certain you must feel the superior pleasure of knowing, that
my integrity and plainness of conduct are the cause of my being kept
from you, to the receiving me as a person whom no commander-in-chief
would wish to keep under his flag. Sir John was a perfect stranger to
me, therefore I feel the more flattered; and when I reflect that I
have had the unbounded confidence of three commanders-in-chief, I
cannot but feel a conscious pride, and that I possess abilities." "If
my character is known," he writes to the Genoese Government, which
knew it well, "it will be credited that this blockade [of Leghorn]
will be attended to with a degree of rigour unexampled in the present
war." "It has pleased God this war," he tells the Duke of Clarence,
"not only to give me frequent opportunities of showing myself an
officer worthy of trust, but also to prosper all my undertakings in
the highest degree. I have had the extreme good fortune, not only to
be noticed in my immediate line of duty, but also to obtain the
repeated approbation of His Majesty's Ministers at Turin, Genoa, and
Naples, as well as of the Viceroy of Corsica, for my conduct in the
various opinions I have been called upon to give; and my judgment
being formed from common sense, I have never yet been mistaken."

Already at times his consciousness of distinction among men betrays
something of that childlike, delighted vanity, half unwitting, which
was afterward forced into exuberant growth and distasteful prominence,
by the tawdry flatteries of Lady Hamilton and the Court of Naples.
Now, expressed to one who had a right to all his confidence and to
share all his honors, it challenges rather the sympathy than the
criticism of the reader. "I will relate another anecdote, all vanity
to myself, but you will partake of it: A person sent me a letter, and
directed as follows, 'Horatio Nelson, Genoa.' On being asked how he
could direct in such a manner, his answer, in a large party, was,
'Sir, there is but one Horatio Nelson in the world.' I am known
throughout Italy," he continues; "not a Kingdom, or State, where my
name will be forgotten. This is my Gazette. Probably my services may
be forgotten by the great, by the time I get home; but my mind will
not forget, nor cease to feel, a degree of consolation and of applause
superior to undeserved rewards. Wherever there is anything to be done,
there Providence is sure to direct my steps. Credit must be given me
in spite of envy. Had all my actions been gazetted, not one fortnight
would have passed during the whole war without a letter from me. Even
the French respect me." After the conclusion of the campaign, when on
the way to Gibraltar, he tells her again: "Do not flatter yourself
that I shall be rewarded; I expect nothing, and therefore shall not be
disappointed: the pleasure of my own mind will be my reward. I am more
interested, and feel a greater satisfaction, in obtaining yours and my
father's applause than that of all the world besides." The wholesome
balance between self-respect and a laudable desire for the esteem of
men was plainly unimpaired.

Though devoid of conspicuous events, the year 1796, from the opening
of the campaign, early in April, up to the evacuation of the
Mediterranean, had been to Nelson one of constant and engrossing
occupation. There is therefore little mention by him of his private
affairs and feelings. In the home correspondence there is no
diminution in the calm tenderness of affection always shown by him
towards his wife and father, who continued to live together; rather,
perhaps, the expressions to Mrs. Nelson are more demonstrative than
before, possibly because letters were less frequent. But there is
nothing thrilling in the "assurance of my unabated and steady
affection, which, if possible, is increasing by that propriety of
conduct which you pursue." He is clearly satisfied to remain away; the
path of honor has no rival in his heart; there is no suggestion of an
inward struggle between two masters, no feeling of aloneness, no
petulant discontent with uneasy surroundings, or longing for the
presence of an absent mistress. The quiet English home, the "little
but neat cottage," attracts, indeed, with its sense of repose,--"I
shall not be very sorry to see England again. I am grown old and
battered to pieces, and require some repairs "--but the magnet fails
to deflect the needle; not even a perceptible vibration of the will is
produced.

Yet, while thus engrossed in the war, eager for personal distinction
and for the military honor of his country, he apparently sees in it
little object beyond a mere struggle for superiority, and has no
conception of the broader and deeper issues at stake, the recognition
of which intensified and sustained the resolution of the peace-loving
minister, who then directed the policy of Great Britain. Of this he
himself gives the proof in a curious anecdote. An Algerine official
visiting the "Captain" off Leghorn, Nelson asked him why the Dey would
not make peace with the Genoese and Neapolitans, for they would pay
well for immunity, as the Americans at that period always did. His
answer was: "If we make peace with every one, what is the Dey to do
with his ships?" "What a reason for carrying on a naval war!" said
Nelson, when writing the story to Jervis; "but has our minister a
better one for the present?" Jervis, a traditional Whig, and opposed
in Parliament to the war, probably sympathized with this view, and in
any case the incident shows the close confidence existing between the
two officers; but it also indicates how narrowly Nelson's genius and
unquestionable acuteness c£ intellect confined themselves, at that
time, to the sphere in which he was visibly acting. In this he
presents a marked contrast to Bonaparte, whose restless intelligence
and impetuous imagination reached out in many directions, and surveyed
from a lofty height the bearing of all things, far and near, upon the
destinies of France.

FOOTNOTES:

[35] This indicates no opinion as to the fortune of the military operations
in England, a landing once effected. It has, however, seemed to the author
singular that men fail to consider that Napoleon would not have hesitated
to abandon an army in England, as he did in Egypt and in Russia. A few
hours' fog or calm, and a quick-pulling boat, would have landed himself
again in France; while the loss of 150,000 men, if it came to that, would
have been cheaply bought with the damage such an organized force could have
done London and the dockyards, not to speak of the moral effect.

[36] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxi. p. 60.

[37] An account of this disaster, said to be that of an eye-witness, is to
be found in Colburn's United Service Journal, 1846, part i.

[38] This motto was subsequently adopted by Nelson, when arms were assigned
to him as a Knight of the Bath, in May, 1797.

[39] That is, apparently, from detached service, and ordered to the main
fleet.

[40] On the northwest coast of Spain, at the entrance of the Bay of Biscay,
and therefore right in the track of vessels from the Channel to the Straits
of Gibraltar.




CHAPTER VIII.

THE EVACUATION OF ELBA.--NIGHT COMBAT WITH TWO SPANISH
FRIGATES.--BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT.--NELSON PROMOTED TO
REAR-ADMIRAL.--SERVICES BEFORE CADIZ.

DECEMBER, 1796-JUNE, 1797. AGE, 38.


"When we quitted Toulon," wrote Nelson to his old captain, Locker,
while on the passage to Gibraltar, "I remember we endeavoured to
reconcile ourselves to Corsica; now we are content with Elba--such
things are." Even this small foothold was next to be resigned. Upon
reaching Gibraltar, Jervis received orders from the Admiralty to
evacuate the island.

This was the duty upon which Nelson was so soon despatched again to
the Mediterranean. Though "most important," wrote he to his wife, "it
is not a fighting mission, therefore be not uneasy." The assurance was
doubtless honestly given, but scarcely to be implicitly accepted in
view of his past career. Leaving the admiral on the evening of
December 14, with the frigates "Blanche" and "Minerve," his
commodore's pendant flying in the latter, the two vessels, about 11
p.m. of the 19th, encountered two Spanish frigates close to Cartagena.
The enemies pairing off, a double action ensued, which, in the case of
the "Minerve," ended in the surrender of her opponent, "La Sabina," at
half-past one in the morning. Throwing a prize-crew on board, the
British ship took her late antagonist in tow and stood away to the
southeast. At half-past three another Spanish frigate came up, and, in
order to meet this fresh enemy on fairly equal terms, the "Minerve"
had to drop her prize. The second fight began at 4.30, and lasted
half an hour, when the Spaniard hauled off. With daylight appeared
also two hostile ships-of-the-line, which had been chasing towards the
sound of the guns. These had already been seen by the "Blanche," which
was by them prevented from taking possession of her antagonist, after
the latter struck. The pursuit lasted through the day, the "Minerve"
being hard pressed in consequence of the injuries received by all her
masts during the engagement; but both British frigates succeeded in
shaking off their pursuers. "La Sabina" was recaptured; she had
already lost one mast, and the remaining two were seen to go over the
side as she was bringing-to, when the enemy overtook her. It is
interesting to note that her captain, Don Jacobo Stuart, was descended
from the British royal house of Stuart. He, with many of his crew, had
been transferred to the "Minerve," and remained prisoners.

Nelson reached Porto Ferrajo a week later, on the 26th of December.
"On my arrival here," wrote he to his brother, "it was a ball night,
and being attended by the captains, I was received in due form by the
General, and one particular tune was played:[41] the second was 'Rule
Britannia.' From Italy I am loaded with compliments." Having regard to
comparative strength, the action was in all respects most creditable,
but it received additional lustre from being fought close to the
enemy's coast, and in full view of a force so superior as that from
which escape had been handsomely made, under conditions requiring both
steadiness and skill. Though on a small scale, no such fair stand-up
fight had been won in the Mediterranean during the war, and the
resultant exultation was heightened by its contrast with the general
depression then weighing upon the British cause. Especially keen and
warmly expressed was the satisfaction of the veteran
commander-in-chief at Lisbon, who first learned the success of his
valued subordinate through Spanish sources. "I cannot express to you,
and Captain Cockburn, the feelings I underwent on the receipt of the
enclosed bulletin, the truth of which I cannot doubt, as far as
relates to your glorious achievement in the capture of the Sabina, and
dignified retreat from the line-of-battle ship, which deprived you of
your well-earned trophy; your laurels were not then within their
grasp, and can never fade."

General De Burgh, who commanded the troops in Elba, had received no
instructions to quit the island, and felt uncertain about his course,
in view of the navy's approaching departure. Nelson's orders were
perfectly clear, but applied only to the naval establishment. He
recognized the general's difficulty, though he seems to have thought
that, under all the circumstances, he might very well have acted upon
his own expressed opinion, that "the signing of a Neapolitan peace
with France ought to be our signal for departure." "The army," wrote
Nelson to the First Lord of the Admiralty, "are not so often called
upon to exercise their judgment in political measures as we are;
therefore the general feels a certain diffidence." He told De Burgh
that, the King of Naples having made peace, Jervis considered his
business with the courts of Italy as terminated; that the Admiralty's
orders were to concentrate the effort of the fleet upon preventing the
allied fleets from quitting the Mediterranean, and upon the defence of
Portugal, invaluable to the British as a base of naval operations. For
these reasons, even if he had to leave the land forces in Elba, he
should have no hesitation in following his instructions, which were to
withdraw all naval belongings. "I have sent to collect my squadron,
and as soon as they arrive, I shall offer myself for embarking the
troops, stores, &c.; and should you decline quitting this post, I
shall proceed down the Mediterranean with such ships of war as are not
absolutely wanted for keeping open the communication of Elba with the
Continent."

The necessary preparations went on apace. Vessels were sent out to
summon the scattered cruisers to the port. A frigate was despatched to
Naples to bring back Sir Gilbert Elliot, the late Viceroy of Corsica,
who, since the abandonment of the latter island, had been on a
diplomatic visit to Rome and Naples. It is to this incident that we
owe the fullest account transmitted of the Battle of Cape St. Vincent;
the narrator, Colonel Drinkwater, being then a member of the Viceroy's
suite, and attending him upon his return with Nelson's squadron. The
Spanish prisoners were sent to Cartagena in a cartel, Nelson restoring
to the captain of the "Sabina" the sword which he had surrendered. "I
felt this consonant to the dignity of my Country, and I always act as
I feel right, without regard to custom." By the 16th of January all
the naval establishment was embarked, ready for departure, though some
of the ships of war had not yet returned, nor had the Viceroy arrived.
The delay allowed the "Minerve" to be completely refitted, two of her
masts and most of her rigging having to be renewed.

When Elliot came, it was decided in a consultation between him,
Nelson, and De Burgh, that the troops should remain. The transports
had been completely victualled, and so prepared that every soldier
could be embarked in three days. With them were left two frigates and
a few smaller ships of war. On the 29th of January, Nelson sailed with
the rest of his force and the convoy, divided into three sections,
which proceeded for the Straits by different routes, to diminish the
chances of total loss by capture. Nelson himself, with another
frigate, the "Romulus," in company, intended to make a round of the
enemy's ports, in order to bring the admiral the latest information of
the number of ships in each, and their state of preparation. "I hope
to arrive safe in Lisbon with my charge," he wrote to his wife on the
eve of sailing, "but in war much is left to Providence: however, as I
have hitherto been most successful, confidence tells me I shall not
fail: and as nothing will be left undone by me, should I not always
succeed, my mind will not suffer; nor will the world, I trust, be
willing to attach blame, where my heart tells me none would be due."
The habit of taking risks had wrought its beneficial influence upon
mind and temper, when he thus calmly and simply reasoned from the
experience of the past to the prospective fortnight, to be passed in
sight of a hostile coast, and in waters where he could meet no
friendly sail. "It has ever pleased Almighty God to give his blessing
to my endeavours," was his New Year greeting to his father at this
time.

During this month in Elba a slight political reference shows how his
views and purpose were changing with the rapidly shifting political
scene. In this hour of deepening adversity he no longer looks for
peace, nor seeks the reason for the current war, which a few months
before he had failed to find. "As to peace, I do not expect it; Lord
Malmesbury will come back as he went. But the people of England will,
I trust, be more vigorous for the prosecution of the war, which can
alone insure an honourable peace."

The "Minerve" and the "Romulus" looked first into the old British
anchorage in San Fiorenzo Bay, which was found deserted. Standing
thence to Toulon, they remained forty-eight hours off that port, in
which were to be seen no ships in condition for sailing. From there
they passed off Barcelona, showing French colors, but without
succeeding in drawing out any vessel there lying. The wind not being
fair for Minorca, where Nelson had purposed to reconnoitre Port Mahon,
the frigates next went to Cartagena, and ascertained that the great
Spanish fleet was certainly not there. As Toulon also had been found
empty, it seemed clear that it had gone to the westward, the more so
as the most probable information indicated that the naval enterprises
of the French and their allies at that time were to be outside of the
Mediterranean. Nelson therefore pushed ahead, and on the 9th of
February the "Minerve" and "Romulus" anchored in Gibraltar. All three
divisions from Elba passed the Straits within the same forty-eight
hours.

The Spanish grand fleet had been seen from the Rock, four days before,
standing to the westward into the Atlantic. Two ships-of-the-line and
a frigate had been detached from it, with supplies for the Spanish
lines before Gibraltar, and had anchored at the head of the bay, where
they still were when Nelson arrived. On board them had also been sent
the two British lieutenants and the seamen, who became prisoners when
the "Sabina" was recaptured. Their exchange was effected, for which
alone Nelson was willing to wait. The fact that the Spanish fleet had
gone towards Jervis's rendezvous, and the continuance of easterly
winds, which would tend to drive them still farther in the same
direction, gave him uneasy premonitions of that coming battle which it
would "break his heart" to miss. It was, besides, part of his
ingrained military philosophy, never absent from his careful mind,
that a fair wind may fall or shift. "The object of a sea-officer is to
embrace the happy moment which now and then offers,--it may be to-day,
it may be never." Regretting at this moment the loss even of a tide,
entailed by the engagements of the Viceroy, whom he had to carry to
Jervis, and therefore could not leave, he wrote, "I fear a _westerly_
wind." The Providence in which he so often expresses his reliance, now
as on many other occasions, did not forsake the favored son, who never
by sluggishness or presumption lost his opportunities. The wind held
fair until the 13th of February, when Nelson rejoined the
commander-in-chief. That night it shifted to the westward, and the
following day was fought the Battle of Cape St. Vincent.

Taken in its entirety, the episode of this nearly forgotten mission to
Elba is singularly characteristic, not only of Nelson's own qualities,
but also of those concurrences which, whatever the origin attributed
to them by this or that person, impress upon a man's career the stamp
of "fortunate." An errand purely of evasion, not in itself of prime
importance, but for an object essentially secondary, it results in a
night combat of unusual brilliancy, which would probably not have been
fought at all could the British have seen the overwhelming force ready
to descend upon conqueror and conquered alike. With every spar
wounded, and a hostile fleet in sight, the "Minerve" nevertheless
makes good her retreat. Solitary, in an enemy's sea, she roams it with
premeditated deliberateness, escaping molestation, and, except in the
first instance, even detection. She carries the fortunes of a Caesar
yet unknown, who is ready to stake them at any moment for adequate
cause; but everything works together, not merely for his preservation,
but to bring him up just in time for the exceptional action, which
showed there was more to him than even his untiring energy and
fearlessness had so far demonstrated. As when, in later years, burning
anxiety pressed him to hasten after Villeneuve, yet failed so to
discompose him as to cause the neglect of any preparation essential to
due provision for the abandoned Mediterranean; so now, with every
power at highest tension to rejoin the admiral, eager not to waste a
moment, he mars his diligence by no precipitancy, he grudges no hour
necessary to the rounded completion of the present task,--to see, and
know, and do, all that can be seen and done. He might almost have used
again, literally, the expression before quoted: "I have not a thought
on any subject separated from the immediate object of my command."

Leaving the "Romulus" in Gibraltar, the "Minerve" sailed again on the
11th. The Spanish ships-of-the-line followed her at once. The east
wind blows in wild and irregular puffs upon the anchorages immediately
under the lofty Rock, where the frigate lay. Farther up, where the
Spaniards were, it crosses the low neck joining the peninsula to the
mainland, and is there more equable and more constant. The "Minerve"
was consequently at a disadvantage until she got fairly from under its
lee, and the chase through the Straits became close enough to draw the
idlers of the town and garrison in crowds to the hillsides. It soon
became evident that the leading ship-of-the-line was gaining upon the
frigate, and the latter cleared for action. Nelson had but a poor
opinion of the Spanish navy of his day, and doubtless chose, before
surrendering, to take his chance of one of those risks which in war
often give strange results. He said to Drinkwater that he thought an
engagement probable, but added, "Before the Dons get hold of that bit
of bunting I will have a struggle with them, and sooner than give up
the frigate, I'll run her ashore."

About this time the officers' dinner was announced. Drinkwater went
below, and was just congratulating Lieutenant Hardy, who had been
captured in the "Sabina," upon his exchange, when the cry "Man
overboard!" was heard. The party dispersed hurriedly, in sympathy with
the impulse which invariably causes a rush under such circumstances;
and Drinkwater, running to the stern windows, saw a boat already
lowering with Hardy in it, to recover the man, who, however, could not
be found. The boat therefore, making signal to that effect, soon
turned to pull to the ship. The situation was extremely embarrassing,
not to say critical; on the one hand, the natural reluctance to
abandon any one or anything to the enemy, on the other, the imminent
risk of sacrificing the ship and all concerned by any delay,--for the
leading Spaniard, by himself far superior in force, was nearly within
gunshot. Temperament and habit decide, in questions where reason has
little time and less certainty upon which to act; by nature and
experience Nelson was inclined to take risks. It was evident the boat
could not overtake the frigate unless the latter's way was lessened,
and each moment that passed made this step more perilous, as the
pursuer was already overhauling the "Minerve." "By God, I'll not lose
Hardy!" he exclaimed; "back the mizzen-topsail." The ship's speed
being thus checked, the boat came alongside, and the party scrambled
on board. Singularly enough, the enemy, disconcerted by Nelson's
action, stopped also, to allow his consort to come up,--a measure
wholly inexcusable, and only to be accounted for by that singular
moral effect produced in many men by a sudden and unexpected
occurrence. The daring deed had therefore the happiest results of a
stratagem, and the frigate was troubled no further.

Steering that night to the southward, to throw off her pursuers, the
"Minerve" found herself unexpectedly in the midst of a fleet, which,
from the signals made, was evidently not that of Jervis, and therefore
must be hostile. The hazy atmosphere veiled the British frigate from
close observation, and, by conforming her movements to those of the
strangers, she escaped suspicion. Nelson was uncertain whether it was
the Spanish grand fleet, or, possibly, a detached body proceeding to
the West Indies. He had heard a rumor of such an expedition, and the
impression was probably confirmed by these ships being met when
steering southerly from the Straits; Cadiz, the known destination of
the grand fleet, being north. As the British commercial interests in
the Caribbean were of the first importance, and would be much
endangered, he told Drinkwater, who lay awake in his cot, that, if he
became convinced the ships in sight were bound there, he should give
up the attempt to join the commander-in-chief, and should start at
once for the Islands, to forewarn them of the approaching danger. The
colonel was naturally startled at the prospect of an involuntary trip
across the Atlantic, and represented the equally urgent necessity--as
he thought--of Jervis and the British Cabinet getting the information,
which Elliot was bringing, of the views and intentions of the Italian
governments. This Nelson admitted, but replied that he thought the
other consideration greater, and that--the condition arising--he must
do as he had said. The incident illustrates the activity of his mind,
in comprehending instantly the singular opportunity thrust
unexpectedly upon him, as well as the readiness to accept
responsibility and to follow his own judgment, which he showed on so
many other occasions, both before and after this.

Later in the night the hostile ships went about, evidencing thereby a
desire to keep to windward, which pointed much more toward Cadiz than
to any western destination. The "Minerve" imitated them, but altered
her course so as to edge away gradually from her dangerous neighbors.
Nelson, some time after, again entered the cabin, and told Drinkwater
and Elliot, the latter having also waked, that he had got clear of the
enemy, but that at daylight the course would be altered so as to sight
them once more, if they were really going west. Should it prove to be
so, they must make up their minds to visit the West Indies. Nothing,
however, being seen during the 12th, the commodore, satisfied at last
that he had been in the midst of the grand fleet, hastened on, and
towards noon of the 13th joined the admiral. Before doing so, some of
the Spaniards were again sighted. They had been seen also by the
regular British lookouts, one at least of which had kept touch with
them through the preceding days of hazy weather. Nelson, after an
interview with Jervis, went on board the "Captain," where his broad
pendant was again hoisted at 6 P.M.

At daybreak, the position of the two fleets was twenty-five miles west
of Cape St. Vincent, a headland on the Portuguese coast, a hundred and
fifty miles northwest of Cadiz. During the night the wind had shifted
from the eastward to west by south, and, being now fair, the Spaniards
were running for their port, heading about east-southeast; but they
were in disorder, and were divided into two principal fragments, of
which the headmost, and therefore leewardmost, numbered six ships. It
was separated from the other division of twenty-one by a space of six
or eight miles. In the whole force, of twenty-seven ships, there were
seven of three decks, the least of which carried one hundred and
twelve guns; the remainder were principally seventy-fours, there
being, however, one of eighty-four guns. Jervis's fleet consisted of
fifteen ships-of-the-line,--two of one hundred guns, four of
ninety-eight or ninety, eight seventy-fours, and one sixty-four. From
the intelligence received the previous day of the enemy's proximity,
the admiral kept the command throughout the night in two columns, in
close order, a formation suited by its compactness to a hazy night,
and at the same time manageable in case of encountering an enemy
suddenly. The course was south by west, almost perpendicular to that
of the Spaniards. The two fleets were thus running, one from the
westward, and the other from the northward, to a common crossing.[42]

At daylight the enemy's fleet was partly visible to the leading ships
of the British columns. As the morning advanced, and the situation
developed, it was seen that the Spanish line was long and straggling,
and the gap began to show. As the British were heading directly
towards it, Jervis ordered a half-dozen of his ships, which were all
still under moderate canvas, to press on and interpose between the
enemy's divisions. An hour or so later he made the signal to form the
single column, which was the usual fighting order of those days. The
fleet being already properly disposed for manoeuvres, this change of
order was effected, to use his own words, "with the utmost celerity."
Nelson's ship was thirteenth in the new order, therefore nearly the
last. Next after him came the sixty-four, the "Diadem," while
Collingwood, in the "Excellent," brought up the rear. Immediately
ahead of Nelson was the "Barfleur," carrying the flag of one of the
junior admirals, to whom naturally fell the command in that part of
the line.

Three of the larger Spanish body succeeded in crossing ahead of the
British column and joining the lee group, thus raised to nine ships.
No others were able to effect this, the headmost British ships
anticipating them in the gap. Jervis's plan was to pass between their
two divisions with his one column, protracting this separation, then
to go about in succession and attack the eighteen to windward, because
their comrades to leeward could not help them in any short time. This
was done. The lee ships did attempt to join those to windward by
breaking through the British order, but were so roughly handled that
they gave it up and continued to the south-southwest, hoping to gain a
better opportunity. The weather ships, on the other hand, finding they
could not pass, steered to the northward,--nearly parallel, but
opposite, to the course which both the British and their own lee group
were then following.

A heavy cannonade now ensued, each British ship engaging as its
batteries came to bear, through the advance of the column to the
south-southwest. After an hour of this, the admiral made the signal to
tack in succession. This was instantly obeyed by the leader, the
"Culloden," which was expecting it, and each following ship tacked
also as it reached the same point. But as the Spaniards were
continually receding from this point, which the British rear was
approaching, it was evident that in time the latter would leave
uncovered the ground that had so far separated the two hostile
divisions. This the Spanish admiral expected to be his opportunity; it
proved to be Nelson's.

At 1 P.M.,[43] by Nelson's journal, the "Captain," standing south by
west, had come abreast the rearmost of the eighteen weather ships,
having passed the others. He then noticed that the leaders of that
body were bearing up before the wind, to the eastward, to cross behind
the British column. If this were carried out unmolested, they could
join the lee ships, which heretofore had been separated from them by
the centre and rear of the British line, and at this moment were not
very far distant, being still engaged with the British centre; or
else, so Nelson thought, they might fly before the wind, making
ineffective all that had been done so far. "To prevent either of their
schemes from taking effect, I ordered the ship to be wore, and passing
between the Diadem and Excellent, at a quarter past one o'clock, was
engaged with the headmost, and of course leewardmost of the Spanish
division. The ships which I know were, the Santissima Trinidad, 126;
San Josef, 112;[1] Salvador del Mundo, 112;[1] San Nicolas, 80;[44]
another first-rate, and seventy-four, names not known. I was
immediately joined and most nobly supported by the Culloden, Captain
Troubridge. The Spanish fleet,[45] from not wishing (I suppose) to
have a decisive battle, hauled to the wind [again] on the larboard
tack, which brought the ships afore-mentioned to be the leewardmost
and sternmost ships in their fleet."

By this spontaneous and sudden act, for which he had no authority, by
signal or otherwise, except his own judgment and quick perceptions,
Nelson entirely defeated the Spanish movement. Devoting his own ship
to a most unequal contest, he gained time for the approaching British
van to come up, and carry on the work they had already begun when
first passing these ships--before the moment of tacking. The British
column being then in a V shape,--part on one tack, part on the other,
the point of the V being that of tacking,--he hastened across, by a
short cut, from the rear of one arm of the V to a position on the
other side, toward which the van was advancing, but which it, being
more distant, could not reach as soon as he, and therefore not to as
good effect. To quote Jervis's words concerning this incident,
"Commodore Nelson, who was in the rear on the starboard tack, _took
the lead_ on the larboard, and contributed very much to the fortune of
the day." On the intellectual side, the side of skill, this is what he
did; on the side of valor, it is to be said that he did it for the
moment single-handed. The "Culloden," the actual leader, came up
shortly, followed afterwards by the "Blenheim;" and the "Excellent"
was ordered by Jervis to imitate Nelson's movement, and strengthen the
operation which he had initiated. It was the concentration of these
ships at the point which Nelson seized, and for a moment held alone,
that decided the day; and it was there that the fruits of victory were
chiefly reaped.

It must not be understood, of course, that all the honors of the day
are to be claimed for Nelson, even conjointly with those present with
him at the crucial moment. Much was done, both before and after, which
contributed materially to the aggregate results, some of which were
missed by the very reluctance of men of solid military qualities to
desist from seeking enemies still valid, in order to enjoy what Nelson
called the "parade of taking possession of beaten enemies." It seems
probable that more Spanish ships might have been secured, had it not
been for the eagerness of some British vessels to push on to new
combats. But, while fully allowing the merits of many others, from the
commander-in-chief down, it is true of St. Vincent, as of most
battles, that there was a particular moment on which success or
failure hinged, and that upon the action then taken depended the chief
outcome,--a decisive moment, in short. That moment was when the enemy
attempted, with good prospect, to effect the junction which Nelson
foiled. As Collingwood afterwards summed up the matter: "The highest
rewards are due to you and Culloden; you formed the plan of
attack,--we were only accessories to the Dons' ruin; for had they got
on the other tack, they would have been sooner joined, and the
business would have been less complete."

When Collingwood came up with the "Excellent," the "Captain" was
practically disabled for further movement, had lost heavily in men,
and was without immediate support. The "Culloden" had dropped astern,
crippled, as had two of the Spanish vessels; the "Blenheim," after
passing the "Culloden" and the "Captain," between them and the enemy,
had drawn ahead. The "Excellent," steering between the two Spanish
ships that had fallen behind, fired into both of them, and Nelson
thought both then struck; but Collingwood did not stop to secure them.
"Captain Collingwood," says Nelson, in his account, "disdaining the
parade of taking possession of beaten enemies, most gallantly pushed
up, with every sail set, to save his old friend and messmate, who was
to appearance in a critical state. The Excellent ranged up within ten
feet of the San Nicolas, giving a most tremendous fire. The San
Nicolas luffing up, the San Josef fell on board her, and the Excellent
passing on for the Santissima Trinidad, the Captain resumed[46] her
situation abreast of them, and close alongside. At this time the
Captain having lost her fore-topmast, not a sail, shroud,[47] or rope
left, her wheel shot away, and incapable of further service in the
line, or in chase, I directed Captain Miller to put the helm
a-starboard, and calling for the boarders, ordered them to board."[48]

The "Captain" fetched alongside of the "San Nicolas," her bow touching
the lee (starboard) quarter of the Spanish vessel, her spritsail yard
hooking in the other's mizzen shrouds. Commander Berry, a very young
man, who had lately been first lieutenant of the "Captain," leaped
actively into the mizzen chains, the first on board the enemy; he was
quickly supported by others, who passed over by the spritsail yard.
The captain of the ship was in the act of following, at the head of
his men, when Nelson stopped him. "No, Miller," he said, "_I_ must
have that honour;" and he directed him to remain. One of the soldiers
of the Sixty-ninth Regiment, who were serving on board as marines,
broke open the upper quarter-gallery window of the "San Nicolas," and
through this Nelson entered, with a crowd of followers, to find
himself in the cabin of the enemy's ship. The doors being fastened,
they were held there a few moments, while Spanish officers from the
quarter-deck discharged their pistols at them; but the doors were soon
broken down, and the party, after firing a volley, sallied on the spar
deck, which the enemy yielded to them,--a Spanish commodore falling by
the wheel as he retreated. Berry had by this time reached the poop,
where he hauled down the colors, while Nelson passed to the forward
part of the ship, meeting on his way several Spanish officers, who,
being by this time in the hands of British seamen, gave up to him
their swords. The Spanish guns on the lower decks still continued
firing for some moments, apparently at the "Prince George," which had
passed to leeward of the "Captain," and now kept her batteries playing
upon the hull of the "San Nicolas" forward of the part where the
"Captain" touched her.

At this moment a small-arm fire was opened from the stern galleries of
the "San Josef" upon the British party in the "San Nicolas." Nelson
caused the soldiers to reply to it, and ordered reinforcements sent to
him from the "Captain." Parties were stationed at the hatchways of the
"San Nicolas" to control the enemy and keep them below decks, and then
the boarders charged again for the Spanish three-decker. Nelson was
helped by Berry into her main chains; but he had got no farther before
a Spanish officer put his head over the rail and said they
surrendered. "From this most welcome information," continues Nelson,
in his narrative, "it was not long before I was on the quarter-deck,
when the Spanish captain, with a bow, presented me his sword, and said
the admiral was dying of his wounds below. I asked him, on his honour,
if the ship were surrendered? he declared she was; on which I gave him
my hand, and desired him to call to his officers and ship's company,
and tell them of it--which he did; and on the quarter-deck of a
Spanish First-rate, extravagant as the story may seem, did I receive
the swords of vanquished Spaniards; which, as I received, I gave to
William Fearney, one of my bargemen, who put them with the greatest
sangfroid under his arm. I was surrounded by Captain Berry, Lieutenant
Pierson, 69th Regiment, John Sykes, John Thomson, Francis Cook, all
old Agamemnons, and several other brave men, seamen and soldiers: thus
fell these ships." The firing from the lower deck of the "San Nicolas"
was by this time stopped, and the "Prince George" was hailed that both
the enemy's vessels were in possession of the British. The "Victory,"
Jervis's flagship, passed a few moments later and cheered, as did
every ship in the fleet.

The dramatic and picturesque surroundings which colored the seizure of
these two Spanish ships have doubtless given an exaggerated idea of
the danger and difficulty attending the exploit. The impression made
upon a sympathetic and enthusiastic eye-witness, Sir Gilbert Elliot,
who saw the affair from the decks of the frigate "Lively," has been
transmitted to posterity with little diminution. "Nothing in the world
was ever more noble than the transaction of the Captain from beginning
to end, and the glorious group of your ship and her two prizes, fast
in your gripe, was never surpassed, and I dare say never will." Yet it
may better be looked upon as another of those "fortunate" occurrences
which attend--and in Nelson's career repeatedly attended--the happy
meeting of opportunity and readiness. Doubtless they were beaten
ships, but other beaten ships have escaped in general actions--did at
St. Vincent. "I pretend not to say," wrote Nelson a week later, "that
these ships might not have fell, had I not boarded them; but truly it
was far from impossible but they might have forged into the Spanish
fleet as the other two ships did." He was there, he could do nothing
else, he saw with his rapid glance that he might do this, and he did
it. And, after all, it was a big thing,--this boarding a first-rate
ship over the decks of another hostile ship, not inaptly characterized
in the fleet as "Nelson's patent bridge." We must mark, too, or we
shall miss significant indications of character, that the same
qualities which led him to the quarter-deck of the "San Josef" had led
him but an hour before from the rear of the fleet to the van to save
the fight,--the same quickness to see opportunity, the same promptness
to seize it, the same audacity to control it. The brilliant crowning
of the day may be but an ornament, but it sits well and fitly upon the
knightly deed that rolled back the tide of battle in the hour of need.

Those Spanish ships of the weather division which were first
encountered by Nelson, after he wore out of the line, bore the brunt
of the fighting. As the whole division continued to stand on close to
the wind, these ships, becoming crippled, dropped astern of their
consorts, and so first received the broadsides of the British van as
that arrived. Being also the leaders in the movement frustrated by
Nelson, they became the most leewardly; and, as the British van on
coming up passed to leeward, this contributed farther to concentrate
fire upon the same vessels. Among them was the "Santisima Trinidad,"
of four decks and one hundred and thirty guns, then the largest ship
of war in the world. When Collingwood passed ahead of Nelson, he
engaged her, but not as near as he wished, and could have done, had
not the "Excellent's" rigging been so cut as to prevent her hauling
close to the wind. She was also brought to action by Sir James
Saumarez, in the "Orion," and towards the close of her contest with
the latter ship showed a British Union Jack,--a token of submission
possibly unauthorized, as it was almost immediately hauled in again.
Besides those boarded by Nelson, two other enemy's ships had already
struck.

It was now after four o'clock, and the other Spanish division, of
eight ships, was heading for the scene and near at hand. Although
effectually blocked in their first attempt to pierce the British line,
these had not received such injury as to detract seriously from their
efficiency. Continuing to stand south-southwest, after the British
began tacking, they at last gained ground sufficiently to come up to
windward, the side on which their other division was. In view of the
now inevitable junction of a great number of comparatively fresh
ships, and of the casualties in his own vessels, Jervis decided to
discontinue the action. He ordered his fleet to form on the starboard
tack, covering the four prizes and the "Captain;" and with this done
the firing soon ceased. The Spanish divisions united, and carried off
their other disabled ships.

Nelson's account of the proceedings of the "Captain" on the 14th of
February, having been published not long afterwards, apparently by his
authority, was challenged as incorrect by Vice-Admiral William Parker,
commanding the van, whose flag was on board the third British ship,
the "Prince George." Parker claimed that the latter, with the
"Blenheim" and "Orion," had been much closer to the "Captain" and
"Culloden" than was implied in Nelson's narrative by the words, "For
near an hour, I believe, (but do not pretend to be correct as to
time,) did the Culloden and Captain support this apparently, but not
really, unequal contest; when the Blenheim, passing between us and the
enemy, gave us a respite." Parker labored under the misfortune of a
singularly involved and obscure style, while in two separate papers he
contradicted himself more than once on points of detail; but the tone
of his letter to Nelson was temperate and dignified, and he asserted
that, "so different to your statement, very soon after you commenced
your fire, you had four ships pressing on [Culloden, Blenheim, Prince
George, and Orion], almost on board of each other, close in your rear;
but"--and the admission following must be noted as well as the
charge--"ships thus pressing upon each other, and the _two latter not
far enough ahead to fire with proper effect_,[49] besides having none
of the enemy's ships left in the rear for our succeeding ships, at
forty-three[50] minutes past one I made the signal to fill and stand
on." Parker had also stated, in his log of the action, that the brunt
fell upon the "Captain," the "Culloden," and the "Blenheim," but more
particularly the two former, "from their being more in the van."

It appears to the writer probable that Nelson over-estimated the
period that he and Troubridge remained unsupported; time would seem
long to the bravest man, when opposed to such heavy odds. Parker seems
to have reckoned it to be about fifteen minutes, and he admits that it
was impossible for him to open fire with proper effect for some time,
although close on the heels of the "Captain" and the "Culloden,"
because he could not get abreast of the enemy. All the ships--Spanish
and British--were moving ahead, probably at not very different rates
of speed. The "Prince George" certainly became in the end actively and
closely engaged, much of the time with the "San Josef," a ship of
force superior to her own.

Nelson's account is a simple, if somewhat exultant, narrative of the
facts as they passed under his observation; and, except in the
statement to which Parker objected, they do not even inferentially
carry an imputation upon any one else. There was a reflection, though
scarcely intended, upon the van ships, which should have been, and
Parker says were, close behind the "Culloden;" but the attack was upon
the extreme rear of the enemy, and Nelson probably forgot that readers
might not understand, as he did, that the ships behind him must need
some time to get up, and that his own position, abreast the enemy's
rear, was in itself an obstacle to their reaching a place whence their
batteries could bear, with the limited train of broadside guns in
those days.

Another and interesting illustration of the injustice a man may thus
unintentionally do, through inadvertence, is afforded by Nelson's
accounts of St. Vincent. There were two drawn up on board the
"Captain,"--one by himself in his own hand; the second simply signed
by him, Miller, and Berry. It is quite evident that the latter is
based upon the former, much of the phraseology being identical; but
the whole is toned down in many points. The instance of unintentional
injustice is this. In his autograph account, Nelson, thinking only of
himself,[51] speaks of his going with the boarders, and makes no
mention of the captain of the ship, Miller, whose proper business it
would be rather than his. In the revision, Miller would naturally feel
that his failure to board should be accounted for, and it contains
accordingly the statement, "Captain Miller was in the very act of
going also, but I directed him to remain." Berry's hand also appears;
for whereas Nelson's own account of boarding the "San Josef" simply
says, "I got into her main-chains," the published copy reads, "Captain
Berry assisting me into the main-chains."

So too with reference to Parker's controversy. In the first draft
there occurs the unqualified statement: "For an hour the Culloden and
Captain supported this apparently unequal contest." The revision
reads: "For near an hour, I believe, (_but do not pretend to be
correct as to time_,)[52] did Culloden and Captain," etc. Parker
quotes from the revision, which was therefore the one published, but
does not quote the words italicized. Probably, if the "Blenheim" and
the "St. George" had had a hand in this revision, there would have
been more modification; but Nelson did not realize where he was
hurting them, any more than he did in Miller's case.

The love of glory, the ardent desire for honorable distinction by
honorable deeds, is among the most potent and elevating of military
motives, which in no breast has burned with a purer flame than in that
of Nelson; but it is better that officers leave the public telling of
their own exploits to others, and it is evident that Nelson, when
taken to task, realized uncomfortably that he had not exercised due
thoughtfulness. Parker refrained from addressing him till he had
received the printed account. This was not till July, and his
remonstrance reached Nelson shortly after the loss of his arm at
Teneriffe, when on his way home for what proved to be a tedious and
painful recovery. He was then suffering, not only from pain and
weakness, but also from discouragement about his professional future,
which he thought threatened by disability, and for these conditions
allowance must be made; but for all this his reply did not compare
favorably with Parker's letter, which had been explicit in its
complaint as well as moderate in expression. He wrote curtly: "I must
acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th of July; and, after
declaring that I know nothing of the Prince George till she was hailed
from the forecastle of the San Nicolas,[53] it is impossible I can
enter into the subject of your letter."

This course was the more ungenerous, because no explanation, or even
admission of involuntary wrong done, could have detracted in the
least from the abounding credit due and accorded to Nelson for his
conduct at St. Vincent, which indeed did not depend upon the length of
time he remained unsupported, but upon the rapidity and fearlessness
with which he had acted aright at a very critical juncture. This had
been done so openly, under the eyes of all men, that it could by no
means be hid. Collingwood had borne witness to it, in words which have
been quoted. Drinkwater and Elliot had watched the whole from the deck
of their frigate. The latter had written to him: "To have had any
share in yesterday's glory is honour enough for one man's life, but to
have been foremost on such a day could fall to your share alone." The
commander-in-chief had come out to greet him upon the quarter-deck of
the flagship,--a compliment naval officers can appreciate,--had there
embraced him, saying he could not sufficiently thank him, and "used
every kind expression which could not fail to make me happy." Jervis
had also insisted upon his keeping the sword of the Spanish
rear-admiral who fell on board the "San Josef."

Before dropping this subject, which has the unpleasantness that
attends all contentions between individuals about their personal
deserts, it is right to say that Nelson had held from the first that
Collingwood, Troubridge, and himself were the only ones "who made
great exertions on that glorious day: the others did their duty, and
some not exactly to my satisfaction." "Sir John Jervis," he continued,
"is not quite contented, but says nothing publicly." He then quotes an
anecdote which, if he had it from Jervis, confirms his own opinion
about the support given. "Calder [the Chief of Staff] said, 'Sir, the
Captain and Culloden are separated from the fleet, and unsupported:
shall we recall them?' 'I will not have them recalled. I put my faith
in those ships: it is a disgrace that they are not supported and [are]
separated.'"

In his public letter Jervis refrained alike from praise and from
blame. He mentions but one name, that of Calder, as bearer of
despatches, and only incidentally says that he has been useful to him
at all times. In a private letter to the First Lord he was more
explicit, yet scarcely adequately so. Whatever momentary expression of
impatience escaped him, when anxious about the "Culloden" and
"Captain," he knew that his own flagship could not get to them in time
for efficient support, and he gives as the reason for reticence in his
public letter that all had behaved well, and that he was "confident
that had those who were least in action been in the situation of the
fortunate few, their conduct would not have been less meritorious." He
then mentions by name Troubridge,--who led the fleet,--Nelson, and
Collingwood, and five ships (without the names of the captains),
"Blenheim," "Prince George," "Orion," "Irresistible," and "Colossus,"
which "gallantly supported" Troubridge, though just where or when is
not specified. "The ships' returns of killed and wounded," he says
explicitly, "although not always the criterion of their being more or
less in action, is, in this instance, correctly so." This would
include the "Blenheim," whose casualties were in excess of any except
the "Captain," and Parker's ship, the "Prince George," which lost not
many less than Collingwood. The "Captain's" loss in killed,
twenty-four, was double that of any other ship, and in killed and
wounded nearly one-third that of the whole fleet.

An interesting anecdote of Jervis shows the importance conceded by him
to Nelson's action. It rests on good authority, and is eminently
characteristic of one who valued beyond most traits in an officer the
power to assume responsibility. "The test of a man's courage," he used
to say, "is responsibility." In the evening, while talking over the
events of the day, Calder spoke of Nelson's wearing out of the line as
an unauthorized departure from the method of attack prescribed by the
admiral. "It certainly was so," replied Jervis, "and if ever you
commit such a breach of your orders, I will forgive you also."
Success covers many faults, yet it is difficult to believe that had
Nelson been overwhelmed, the soundness of his judgment and his
resolution would not equally have had the applause of a man, who had
just fought twenty-seven ships with fifteen, because "a victory was
essential to England at that moment." The justification of departure
from orders lies not in success, but in the conditions of the case;
and Jervis was not one to overlook these, nor hereafter to forget that
only one man in his fleet had both seen the thing to do and dared the
responsibility of doing it.

A victory so signal entailed, as a matter of course, a number of those
rewards and titles with which Great Britain judiciously fostered the
spirit of emulation in her Navy. These were to a considerable extent
affairs of routine and precedent, and Nelson, knowing that junior
flag-officers had on several previous occasions been made baronets,
wished to avoid this hereditary dignity because inconsistent with his
means. His love of distinction also prompted him to desire one of
those Orders which carry with them the outward token of merit. Meeting
Drinkwater the day after the battle, he expressed his reluctance to
the baronetage, and upon the other's asking him whether he would
prefer to be a Knight of the Bath, he replied, "Yes; if my services
have been of any value, let them be noticed in a way that the public
may know them." To Elliot, who was about to return at once to England,
he wrote, asking him to make known his wishes to the Admiralty. "If
you can be instrumental in keeping back what I expect will happen, it
will be an additional obligation. I conceive to take hereditary
honours without a fortune to support the dignity, is to lower that
honour it would be my pride to support in proper splendour. There are
other honours which die with the possessor, and I should be proud to
accept, if my efforts are thought worthy of the favour of my King."

Elliot started for England a few days afterwards, and reached London
at a time when the whole country was ringing with the news of the
victory. Arriving at such a propitious moment, there could have been
for Nelson no better advocate than this man, placed high in political
councils, and having to give to the Ministry a long account of his
career in the Mediterranean, throughout the whole of which the two had
been in intimate contact and constant correspondence. Himself an
eye-witness, and filled with enthusiasm for Nelson's latest exploit,
Elliot knew better than any one that it was no sporadic outburst, but
only a signal manifestation of the intuitive sagacity, the flashing
promptness, and the sustained energy, whose steady fires he had known
to burn, without slackening of force or change of motive, through two
years of close personal association in public action to a common end.
The government thus learned more of him than can easily transpire
under ordinary service conditions, or be shown even by an incident
like that at St. Vincent; and Elliot's admiration, free from all bias
of professional partiality or professional jealousy, doubtless was
more useful to Nelson than any narrative of his own could have been.
Even the royal favor was conciliated, despite the obstinate temper
which yielded prejudices with difficulty. "I must rejoice," wrote
Nelson to the Duke of Clarence, who had mentioned to him the King's
approval, "in having gained the good opinion of my Sovereign, which I
once was given to understand I had no likelihood of enjoying."[54] It
was to the honor of the monarch that he was thus as pliant to admit
merit in an officer as yet only rising to distinction, as he was firm
at a later day to stamp with the marks of his displeasure the flagrant
moral aberration of the then world-renowned admiral.

The coveted Knighthood of the Bath was accorded on the 17th of March,
"in order," wrote the First Lord, "to mark the Royal approbation of
your successful and gallant exertions on several occasions during the
course of the present war in the Mediterranean, and more particularly
of your very distinguished conduct in the glorious and brilliant
victory obtained over the fleet of Spain by His Majesty's fleet, on
the 14th of February last." Nelson's delight was great and
characteristic. Material rewards were not in his eyes the most real or
the richest. "Chains and Medals," he wrote to his brother, "are what
no fortune or connexion in England can obtain; and I shall feel
prouder of those than all the titles in the King's power to bestow."
To his wife he said: "Though we can afford no more than a
cottage--yet, with a contented mind, my chains, medals, and ribbons
are all sufficient." To receive honor was second to no possession,
except that of knowing he had deserved it.

On the evening of the Battle of St. Vincent, soon after the firing
ceased, Nelson shifted his commodore's pendant to the "Irresistible,"
of seventy-four guns, the "Captain" being unmanageable from the damage
done to her spars and rigging. Her hull also had been so battered,
that he wrote a few days later she would never be able to receive him
again, which proved to be true; for although, after she had been
patched up, he returned to her temporarily, a newly fitted ship, the
"Theseus," seventy-four, was assigned to his flag, as soon as a
reinforcement arrived from England.

After a vain effort to reach the Tagus against contrary winds, with
disabled ships, Jervis decided to take his fleet into Lagos Bay, an
open roadstead on the southern coast of Portugal, and there to refit
sufficiently to make the passage to Lisbon. While lying at Lagos
Nelson became a Rear-Admiral of the Blue, by a flag-promotion dated on
the 20th of February, although his flag was not hoisted until the
first of April, when the official notification of his advancement was
received by him. He was then thirty-eight and a half years of age. In
this rank he remained until after the Battle of the Nile was fought,
but it mattered comparatively little where he stood on the list of
flag-officers, while Jervis commanded; that he was an admiral at all
made it possible to commit to him undertakings for which he was
pre-eminently qualified, but which could scarcely have been intrusted
to a simple captain by any stretching of service methods, always--and
not improperly--conservative.

On the 23d of February the fleet sailed again, and on the 28th
anchored in the Tagus. The same day Nelson wrote to his wife that he
was to go to sea on the 2d of March, with three ships-of-the-line, to
look out for the Viceroy of Mexico, who was reported to be on his way
to Cadiz, also with three ships-of-the-line, laden with treasure. "Two
are first-rates," said he, "but the larger the ships the better the
mark, and who will not fight for dollars?" Foul winds prevented his
getting away until the 5th. From that date until the 12th of April he
remained cruising between Cape St. Vincent and the coast of Africa,
covering the approaches to Cadiz; frigates and smaller vessels being
spread out to the westward, to gain timely notice of the approach of
the specie ships, upon whose safe arrival Spain depended both for her
commercial affairs and her naval preparations.

But while thus actively employed, and not insensible to the charm of
dollars, the immediate business on board was not in itself so
engrossing, nor to him so attractive, as to obtain that exclusiveness
of attention which he prided himself upon giving to matters more
military in character, and more critical in importance. "The Spaniards
threaten us they will come out, and take their revenge," he writes to
an occasional correspondent. "The sooner the better; but I will not
believe it till I see it; and if they do, what will the mines of
Mexico and Peru signify, compared with the honour I doubt not we shall
gain by fighting an angry Don? They will have thirty sail of the
line, we twenty or twenty-two; but fear we shall have a peace before
they are ready to come out. What a sad thing that will be!" His mind
reverts to the troops in Elba, which had been left in a most exposed
position, and were now about to withdraw under the protection of some
frigates, passing through a thousand miles of hostile sea open to the
line-of-battle ships at Toulon. He is more concerned about them than
about his possible prize-money in the rich ships from Vera Cruz and
Havana, whose danger from his own squadron was agitating all Spain.
"Respecting myself," he writes to Jervis, "I wish to stay at sea, and
I beg, if line-of-battle ships are left out,[55] either on this side
the Gut, or to the eastward of Gibraltar, that I may be the man. This
brings forward a subject which I own is uppermost in my mind,--that of
the safety of our troops, should they embark from Elba. The French
have a number of ships at Toulon. They may get two, three, or four
ready, with a number of frigates, and make a push for our convoy. I am
ready, you know, to go eastward to cover them, even to Porto Ferrajo,
or off Toulon, or Minorca, as you may judge proper."

This exposed detachment continued to occupy his thoughts. A month
later, on the 11th of April, he again writes: "I own, Sir, my feelings
are alive for the safety of our army from Elba. If the French get out
two sail of the line, which I am confident they may do, our troops are
lost, and what a triumph that would be to them! I know you have many
difficulties to contend with, but I am anxious that nothing should
miscarry under your orders. If you think a detachment can be spared, I
am ready to go and do my best for their protection." In both letters
he apologizes for this freedom of urgency with his superior: "I have
said much, but you have spoiled me by allowing me to speak and write
freely. I trust you will not imagine that my taking the great liberty
of thus mentioning my thoughts, arises from any other motive than
affection towards you."

Jervis had already joined him on the 1st of April, before the second
letter was written. His hesitation about sending the detachment
suggested by Nelson had arisen, not from doubt as to the danger of the
troops, but from the imminent expectation of the Spanish fleet coming
out. The British force was already too inferior, numerically, to risk
any diminution, in view of such a contingency. Confronted with
divergent objects, Jervis would not be drawn into the snare of
dividing his force; but after reconnoitring the port, he was satisfied
that the Spaniards could not sail before Nelson had time to fulfil the
proposed mission, and on the 12th of April he gave him the necessary
orders. The latter transferred his own squadron to the command of Sir
James Saumarez, and started at once. He had now returned to the
"Captain," which had doubtless come down with Jervis. "She is little
better than a wreck," he wrote to a friend; but the cripples had to be
kept to the front, pending the arrival of fresh ships. Besides her, he
had the "Colossus," seventy-four, and "Leander," fifty, with a
suitable number of smaller cruisers. Passing within gunshot of Port
Mahon in Minorca, he heard from several passing vessels that a French
squadron of four ships-of-the-line was at sea, as he had anticipated;
and these, he afterwards learned, were seen off Minorca only
twenty-two hours before he passed. Fortunately a fresh northwest gale
had carried them to the southward, and on the 21st of April, sixty
miles west of Corsica, he joined the convoy, which carried over three
thousand soldiers. He reached Gibraltar with it in safety in the early
days of May, without adventures of any kind. "I observed a man-of-war
brig evidently looking at us; but my charge was too important to
separate one ship in chase of her, especially as three frigates had
parted company; for until this garrison is safe down, I do not think
our business is well finished." Its arrival completed the evacuation
of the Mediterranean.

At Gibraltar several days were spent, evidently crowded with
administrative details concerning the coming and going of convoys, for
there is here an almost total cessation of Nelson's usually copious
letter-writing. An interesting and instructive incident is, however,
made known to us by one of the three letters dated during these ten
days. The Consul of the United States of America had to apply to him
for the protection of twelve American merchant ships, then at Malaga,
against the probable depredations of French privateers lying in that
port, which, under the edicts of the government of the French
Republic, with whom the United States was at peace, were expected to
overhaul and capture them when they sailed. Nelson at once complied,
ordering a British frigate to go to Malaga and escort the vessels to
the Barbary coast, and even out of the Straits, if necessary. In doing
this, he wrote courteously to the Consul: "I am sure of fulfilling the
wishes of my Sovereign, and I hope of strengthening the harmony which
at present so happily subsists between the two nations."

On the 24th of May Nelson rejoined the admiral off Cadiz, and on the
27th shifted his own flag into the "Theseus." The day before he left
the fleet, April 11th, Jervis had decided to institute a strict
commercial blockade of Cadiz, with the object of distressing Spanish
trade, preventing the entrance of supplies, upon which depended the
operations of Spain against Portugal, as well as her naval
preparations, and so forcing the Spanish fleet out to fight, in order
to rid itself of such embarrassment. Nelson, as commander of the
inshore squadron, had then issued the necessary notices to neutrals in
the port, and to this charge he now returned. Under Jervis's
intelligent partiality, he, the junior flag-officer, was thus
intrusted with a command, which in the conduct of details, great and
small, and in emergencies, was practically independent. Jervis,
knowing his man, was content to have it so, reserving of course to
himself the decision of the broad outlines of military exertion. The
inshore squadron was gradually increased till it numbered ten
sail-of-the-line. The boats of the fleet, which had been rowing guard
off the harbor's mouth under the general supervision of the two senior
flag-officers, were ordered, shortly after Nelson's arrival, to report
to him; and upon him, indeed, devolved pretty nearly all the active
enterprises of the fleet. It was his practice to visit the line of
boats every night in his barge, to see by personal inspection of these
outposts that his instructions were fully observed. "Our inferiority,"
he wrote about this time, "is greater than before. I am barely out of
shot of a Spanish rear-admiral. The Dons hope for peace, but must soon
fight us, if the war goes on."

Another motive, perhaps even more imperative than the wish to force
the Dons out, now compelled Jervis to seek by all means to increase
the activity of his fleet, and to intrust the management of such
activities to his most zealous and capable subordinate. These were the
months of the great mutinies of the British Navy, in which the seamen
of the Channel fleet, and of the North Sea fleet, at the Nore, had
taken the ships out of the hands of their officers. The details of
Jervis's management, which was distinguished as much by keen judgment
and foresight as by iron-handed severity, that knew neither fear nor
ruth when it struck, belong to his biography, not to Nelson's; but it
is necessary to note the attitude of the latter, a man more
sympathetic, and in common life gentler, than his stern superior.
Always solicitous for everything that increased the well-being and
happiness of his crew,--as indeed was eminently the case with Jervis
also,--he did not withhold his candid sympathy from the grievances
alleged by the Channel fleet; grievances which, when temperately
presented to the authorities, had been ignored. "I am entirely with
the seamen in their first complaint. We are a neglected set, and, when
peace comes, are shamefully treated; but for the Nore scoundrels,"
passing on to those who had rebelled after substantial redress had
been given, and had made unreasonable demands when the nation was in
deadly peril, "I should be happy to command a ship against them."
Jervis's measures received full support from him, clear-headed as ever
to see the essentials of a situation. The senior vice-admiral, for
instance, went so far as to criticise the commander-in-chief for
hanging a convicted mutineer on Sunday. "Had it been Christmas Day
instead of Sunday," wrote Nelson, "I would have executed them. We know
not what might have been hatched by a Sunday's grog: _now_ your
discipline is safe." His glorious reputation and his known kindly
character, supported by that of his captain, made mutiny impossible
under his flag. It had not been up a month on board the "Theseus,"
which was lately from the Channel and infected with the prevalent
insubordination, when a paper was dropped on the quarter-deck,
expressing the devotion of the ship's company to their commander, and
pledging that the name of the "Theseus" should yet be as renowned as
that of the "Captain."

The stringent blockade, and the fears for the specie ships, weighed
heavily on the Spaniards, who were not as a nation hearty in support
of a war into which they had been coerced by France. Their authorities
were petitioned to compel the fleet to go out. Whatever the event, the
British would at least have to retire for repairs; while if the Lima
and Havana ships--to look for which the Cadiz people every morning
flocked to the walls, fearing they might be already in the enemy's
hands--should be captured, the merchants of Spain would be ruined.
Better lose ten ships-of-the-line, if need be, than this convoy. With
rumors of this sort daily reaching him, Nelson's faculties were in a
constant state of pleasing tension. He was in his very element of
joyous excitement and expectation. "We are in the advance day and
night, prepared for battle; bulkheads down, ready to weigh, cut, or
slip,[56] as the occasion may require. I have given out a line of
battle--myself to lead; and you may rest assured that I will make a
vigorous attack upon them, the moment their noses are outside the
Diamond. Pray do not send me another ship," he implores; "if you send
any more, they may believe we are prepared, and know of their
intention." "If they come out," he writes later to a naval friend,
when he had ten sail under him, "there will be no fighting beyond my
squadron."

To increase yet further the pressure upon the Spanish fleet to come
out, a bombardment was planned against the town and the shipping, the
superintendence of which also was intrusted to the commander of the
inshore squadron. Only one bomb-vessel was provided, so that very
extensive results could scarcely have been anticipated; but Nelson
saw, with evident glee, that the enemy's gunboats had taken advanced
positions, and intended to have a hand in the night's work. "So much
the better," wrote he to Jervis; "I wish to make it a warm night in
Cadiz. If they venture from their walls, I shall give Johnny[57] his
full scope for fighting. It will serve to talk of better than
mischief." "It is good," he writes to another, "at these times to keep
the devil out of their heads. I had rather see fifty shot by the
enemy, than one hanged by us."

The bombardment, which was continued upon two successive nights, did
little direct harm; but it led to a sharp hand-to-hand contest between
the British and Spanish boats, in which Nelson personally bore a part,
and upon which he seems afterwards to have dwelt with even greater
pride and self-satisfaction than upon the magnificent victories with
which his name is associated. "It was during this period that perhaps
my personal courage was more conspicuous than at any other part of my
life." On the first night the Spaniards sent out a great number of
mortar gunboats and armed launches. Upon these he directed a vigorous
attack to be made, which resulted in their being driven back under the
walls of Cadiz; the British, who pursued them, capturing two boats and
a launch. In the affray, he says, "I was boarded in my barge with its
common crew of ten men, coxswain, Captain Freemantle, and myself, by
the commander of the gunboats; the Spanish barge rowed twenty-six
oars, besides officers,--thirty men in the whole. This was a service
hand-to-hand with swords, in which my coxswain, John Sykes, now no
more, twice saved my life. Eighteen of the Spaniards being killed and
several wounded, we succeeded in taking their commander." In his
report he complimented this Spanish officer, Don Miguel Tyrason, upon
his gallantry. Near a hundred Spaniards were made prisoners in this
sharp skirmish.

Not even the insult of bombardment was sufficient to attain the
designed end of forcing the enemy's fleet out to fight. The Spaniards
confined themselves to a passive defence by their shore batteries,
which proved indeed sufficient to protect the town and shipping, for
on the second night they got the range of the bomb-vessel so
accurately that the British were forced to withdraw her; but this did
not relieve the vital pressure of the blockade, which could only be
removed by the mobile naval force coming out and fighting. So far from
doing this, the Spanish ships of war shifted their berth inside to get
out of the range of bombs. Nelson cast longing eyes upon the smaller
vessels which lay near the harbor's mouth, forming a barricade against
boat attack, and threatening the offensive measures to which they
rarely resorted. "At present the brigs lie too close to each other to
hope for a dash at them, but soon I expect to find one off her guard,
and then--" For the rest, his sanguine resolve to persist in annoyance
until it becomes unbearable, and insures the desired object, finds
vent in the words: "if Mazaredo will not come out, down comes Cadiz;
and not only Cadiz, but their fleet."

This close succession of varied and exciting active service, unbroken
between the day of his leaving Lisbon, March 5th, and the date of the
last bombardment, July 5th, had its usual effect upon his spirits. His
correspondence is all animation, full of vitality and energy,
betraying throughout the happiness of an existence absorbed in
congenial work, at peace with itself, conscious of power adequate to
the highest demands upon it, and rejoicing in the strong admiration
and confidence felt and expressed towards him on all sides, especially
by those whose esteem he most valued. He complains of his health,
indeed, from time to time; he cannot last another winter; he is
suffering for the want of a few months' rest, which he must ask for in
the coming October, and trusts that, "after four years and nine
months' service, without one moment's repose for body or mind, credit
will be given me that I do not sham."

Bodily suffering was his constant attendant, to which he always
remained subject, but at this time it was powerless to depress the
moral energies which, under less stimulating conditions, at times lost
something of their elastic force. They never, indeed, failed to rise
equal to imminent emergency, however obscured in hours of gloom, or
perplexity, or mental conflict; but now, supported by the concurrence
of every favoring influence, they carried him along in the full flow
of prosperity and exhilaration. Thanking Earl Spencer, the First Lord
of the Admiralty, for a complimentary letter, he says: "The unbounded
praises Sir John Jervis has ever heaped, and continues to heap on me,
are a noble reward for any services which an officer under his command
could perform. Nor is your Lordship less profuse in them." To his
wife he writes: "I assure you I never was better, and rich in the
praises of every man, from the highest to the lowest in the fleet."
"The imperious call of honour to serve my country, is the only thing
that keeps me a moment from you, and a hope, that by staying a little
longer, it may enable you to enjoy those little luxuries which you so
highly merit." "My late affair here[58] will not, I believe, lower me
in the opinion of the world. I have had flattery enough to make me
vain, and success enough to make me confident."

FOOTNOTES:

[41] It is evident that this must have involved a compliment personal to
Nelson.

[42] See Plate, Figure 1.

[43] See Plate, Figure 2.

[44] Captured.

[45] That is, the weather division,--the eighteen ships.

[46] That is, was left in.

[47] Shrouds are large ropes which support the masts.

[48] See Plate, Figure 3.

[49] The italics are the author's.

[50] In his letter to Nelson this is thirteen, but evidently a slip. His
log of the action says forty-three.

[51] Both papers are headed: "A few remarks relative to myself in the
Captain," etc. It is unfortunate that Nicolas, in giving these two papers,
puts first the one which, from internal indications, is (in the author's
judgment) the later in date.

[52] Author's italics.

[53] Hailed to stop firing because the "San Nicolas" had surrendered.

[54] See _ante_, page 89.

[55] That is, at sea, the main fleet being still in the Tagus.

[56] Cut, or let go, the cables,--leaving the anchor in haste, instead of
raising it from the bottom.

[57] The British seamen.

[58] The night conflict with the Spanish launches.




CHAPTER IX.

THE UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT AGAINST TENERIFFE.--NELSON LOSES HIS RIGHT
ARM.--RETURN TO ENGLAND.--REJOINS ST. VINCENT'S FLEET, AND SENT INTO
THE MEDITERRANEAN TO WATCH THE TOULON ARMAMENT.

JULY, 1797-APRIL, 1798. AGE, 39.


Too much success is not wholly desirable; an occasional beating is
good for men--and nations. When Nelson wrote the words with which the
preceding chapter ends, he was on the eve of a sharp reverse, met in
attempting an enterprise that had occupied his thoughts for more than
three months. While cruising for the Viceroy of Mexico, before Jervis
left Lisbon with the fleet, he had considered the possibility of the
enemy's treasure-ships, warned of their danger, taking refuge in the
Canary Islands, which belong to Spain. Meditating upon the
contingency, he had formed a project of seizing them there, and
probably had already suggested the matter to Jervis, taking advantage
of the freedom permitted him by the latter in advancing opinions.
However that be, immediately before he started to meet the Elba
convoy, the commander-in-chief asked for his plan, which he submitted
in writing, after talking it over with Troubridge, his intimate
friend, upon whose judgment Jervis also greatly relied. Regarded as a
purely naval expedition, Nelson pointed out that it was subject to
great uncertainties, because, the land being very high, the wind could
not be depended on. It might blow in from the sea, but if so it would
be by daylight, which would deprive the attack of the benefits of a
surprise; while at night the land wind was too fitful and unreliable
to assure the ships reaching their anchorage before the enemy could
discover them, and have time for adequate preparation against assault.

For these reasons, certainty of success would depend upon co-operation
by the army, and for that Nelson suggested that the Elba troops, over
three thousand strong, already in transports and on their way, would
provide a force at once available and sufficient. Save a naval dash by
Blake, more than a century before, Teneriffe had never been seriously
attacked. Probably, therefore, the heights commanding the town of
Santa Cruz had not been fortified, and could be easily seized by the
detachment designated; besides which, the water supply was exposed to
interruption by an outside enemy. If only General De Burgh could be
persuaded, Nelson was sure of success, and offered himself to command
the naval contingent. Failing the consent of De Burgh, whom he and
Jervis both thought deficient in moral courage to undertake
responsibility, could not the admiral get assistance from O'Hara, the
governor of Gibraltar, who would have at his disposal one thousand to
fifteen hundred men? More would be better, but still with that number
success would be probable. "Soldiers," regretted Nelson
characteristically, "have not the same boldness in undertaking a
political measure that we have; we look to the benefit of our Country
and risk our own fame [not life merely] every day to serve her: a
soldier obeys his orders and no more." But he thought O'Hara an
exception, and then--could not the substantial advantages move him?
The public treasure of Spain that might be seized would be six or
seven millions sterling. Think what that sum would be, "thrown into
circulation in England!" where specie payments had just been
suspended. It was nearly a year's value of the subsidies which Great
Britain was lavishing on the general war. Whatever the merits of
Nelson's judgment upon the soldiers of his day, this avowal of
readiness, for the nation's sake, to risk fame--reputation--which was
in his eyes the dearest of possessions, should not be overlooked. It
was the best he had to give; to hazard life was but a vulgar thing
compared to it. His career, both before and after, fully bore out the
boast.

While on the return with the Elba troops, in a despatch sent ahead of
the convoy, he jogs Jervis's memory about O'Hara, having doubtless
ascertained that De Burgh, as they expected, would not deviate from
his orders to proceed to Lisbon. "I hope you will press General O'Hara
about Teneriffe. What a strike it would be!" In a copy of this letter
forwarded to the Admiralty, presumably by Jervis for its general
information, these words were omitted. Possibly he had already sounded
O'Hara, and found him unwilling, for he was not optimistic; possibly
Jervis himself thought that the fitting conditions had not yet
obtained, and did not care to let the idea get abroad before the hour
for execution arrived. For the time, the commander-in-chief preferred
to keep his fleet concentrated before Cadiz, and to try to worry the
enemy out to battle; for which object, indisputably the most
advantageous to be pursued, he also naturally wished to use his most
active and efficient subordinate. Both blockade and bombardment having
failed to provoke the enemy to action, and intelligence having been
received that a treasure-ship from Manila had put into Teneriffe, it
was decided in July to make the attempt, which had only been
postponed--never abandoned. In words written by Nelson on the 18th of
June, the conditions determining Jervis's course are clearly
indicated. "I wish these fellows would come out, and then, with the
good ships we have left [after a general engagement], we might be a
little at liberty to make dashes. I hope your design about Teneriffe
will not get wind, by making inquiries at the present moment. Whenever
I see it," he added characteristically, "ten hours shall decide its
fate." Although unable to obtain the troops upon which he considered
certainty to depend, he felt little fear for the result. Two hundred
additional marines must be given, and certain specified artillery and
ammunition in excess of what he had. With these, "I have no doubt of
doing the job as it ought to be, the moment the ships come in sight."
"Under General Troubridge ashore, and myself afloat, I am confident of
success."

[Illustration: SKETCH OF SANTA CRUZ AND SURROUNDINGS. (_From Nelson's
Journal._)]

On the 14th of July he received his orders, which were to seize Santa
Cruz, the chief town, and hold the island to ransom, unless all public
treasure were surrendered to his squadron, in which case the
contribution on the inhabitants should not be levied. "God bless and
prosper you," wrote Jervis, who, although he considered the enterprise
promising, was less sanguine than his junior. "I am sure you will
deserve success. To mortals is not given the power of commanding it."
On the 15th Nelson sailed, having under his command three
seventy-fours, a fifty-gun ship, three frigates, and a cutter. Towards
sundown of the 20th the Peak of Teneriffe was sighted, distant fifty
or sixty miles. The following morning the landing-party, a thousand
strong, under the command of Captain Troubridge, was transferred to
the frigates. The intention was to keep the line-of-battle-ships out
of sight, while the frigates, whose apparent force would carry no
impression of menace, approached near enough to make a dash during the
night. It was hoped that thus the assault might be so far a surprise
as to enable the British to storm from the rear a fort on the heights,
to the northeast of the town, and commanding it. Santa Cruz was then
to be summoned. In the meantime the ships-of-the-line would be coming
in from the sea, and upon arrival would support the shore movement by
bringing their broadsides to bear upon the walls.

By midnight the frigates were within three miles of the landing-place;
but there strong wind and contrary current delayed them, and before
they could get within a mile the day dawned. Thus discovered, the hope
of surprise was lost. At 6 A.M., when the squadron approached,
Troubridge went on board the "Theseus" and told Nelson that he
thought, if the heights over the fort, in its rear, could be seized,
he could yet compel it to surrender. The landing-party was therefore
put on shore at nine, but could not dispossess the enemy, who had
recognized the importance of the position indicated by Troubridge, and
had occupied it in force. The ships-of-the-line endeavored to get
within range of the fort, to batter it, but could not come nearer than
three miles. They were unable even to reach anchoring-ground, and, as
it was blowing very fresh, they struck their topgallantmasts and stood
off and on. At night Troubridge re-embarked his men on board the
frigates, which had remained where they were. The following morning,
July 23d, Nelson abandoned the attempt upon the fort, recalling the
frigates; and, as the wind did not yet serve to approach the shore, he
continued under sail during that day and the next. The members of the
landing-party rejoined their proper ships.

Troubridge's failure to act at once upon his own judgment, and seize
the heights above the fort, instead of waiting until he could
communicate with the admiral, whereby were lost more than three
invaluable hours, excites surprise, in view of the extremely high
value set upon him as an officer by St. Vincent and Nelson; and is the
more singular because the latter, in certain "Recommendations," dated
July 17, had indicated the heights, as well as the fort, among the
objects to be secured. It is, of course, possible that these
Recommendations were not given out; but even so, the formal orders
issued gave ample discretion. This hesitation was wholly contrary to
Nelson's own readiness to assume responsibility, and probably accounts
for his subsequent remark, in a private letter, that had he himself
been present this first attempt would not have failed. Occurring in an
officer of Troubridge's high standing, and contrasted with Nelson's
action at St. Vincent, as well as on many other occasions, the
incident serves to bring out forcibly the characteristic eminence of
the latter,--the distinction between a really great captain and the
best type of a simply accomplished and gallant officer. It may safely
be said that had Nelson been in the frigates that morning, and thought
as Troubridge thought, he would either have had the heights without
waiting for orders, or, to use his own words on a former occasion,
would have "been in a confounded scrape."

His first plan having miscarried, Nelson was nevertheless unwilling to
forsake the enterprise wholly, without attempting a direct assault
upon the town itself. Meantime the enemy was not idle, but employed
the delay caused by the wind to collect a greater force, and to
develop further the preparations to repel attack. At half-past five in
the evening of July 24 the squadron reached an anchorage two or three
miles north of Santa Cruz, and all boats were ordered prepared for a
night expedition. Captain Freemantle, of the frigate "Seahorse," had
with him his wife, whom he had lately married; and with them Nelson,
who intended to lead the attack in person, supped that evening. He was
conscious of the imminent danger to which he was about to expose
himself and his followers; it is indeed scarcely possible that he
could, in undertaking the adventure, have expected to succeed, except
through some happy accident skilfully improved,--the deserved good
fortune which had so often attended him. It was not so much the hope
of victory that moved him, as the feeling that to retreat baffled,
without a further effort, would be worse than defeat. This in fact was
the reason which he afterwards gave. "Although I felt the second
attack a forlorn hope, yet the honour of our Country called for the
attack, and that I should command it. I never expected to return."
"Your partiality will give me credit," he wrote to Jervis, "that all
has hitherto been done which was possible, but without effect: this
night I, humble as I am, command the whole, destined to land under the
batteries of the town, and to-morrow my head will probably be crowned
with either laurel or cypress. I have only to recommend Josiah Nisbet
[his stepson] to you and my Country." He urged Nisbet not to go in the
boats, on the ground that his mother should not run the risk of losing
both husband and son in one night, and that in the absence of Captain
Miller, who was going in charge of a division of men, Nisbet's duties
with the ship demanded his remaining. Nisbet steadily refused, and his
presence was the immediate means of saving the admiral's life.

At eleven P.M. the boats shoved off, carrying a thousand men. The
orders were for all to land at the mole, the intention being to storm
it, and the batteries covering it, in a body, and to fight their way,
thus massed, to the great square, which was designated as the place
for rallying. A considerable sea was running and the night dark, so
that the Spaniards did not discover the assailants till they were
within half gunshot. The bells of the place then began to ring, and a
heavy fire opened, amid which the British pushed vigorously forward.
Many, however, missed the mole. Nelson's own boat reached it with four
or five besides, and the parties from these succeeded in carrying the
mole itself, advancing to its head and spiking the guns; but there
they were met with such a sustained fire of musketry and grape from
the citadel and the neighboring houses, that they could get no
farther. Many were killed and wounded, and the rest after a struggle
had to retreat.

Troubridge, with a number of others who missed the mole, landed amid a
heavy surf, which stove the boats on a rocky beach and tumbled the men
into the water, whereby most of the ammunition was spoiled. In the
midst of the turmoil the cutter "Fox" was struck by a shot under
water, and went down, taking with her her commander and ninety-seven
men. Although the scaling-ladders had all been lost in the general
upset, those who here got on shore succeeded in climbing over the
walls, and forced their way to the place of rendezvous in the great
square. There Troubridge, having assembled between three and four
hundred men, held his ground, awaiting Nelson and the party that might
have entered by way of the mole.

It was in vain. Nelson had been struck by a grapeshot in the right
elbow, as, with sword drawn, he was stepping from the boat to the
landing. Bleeding profusely and faint, but clinging with his left hand
to the sword, which had belonged to his uncle Maurice Suckling, he
fell back into the arms of Josiah Nisbet, who managed with
considerable presence of mind to bind up the shattered limb and stop
the flowing of the blood. A few men being got together, the boat
pushed off to take the admiral back to the ship. At this moment
occurred the sinking of the "Fox;" upon which much delay ensued,
because Nelson refused to abandon the men struggling in the water, and
insisted upon looking personally to their being saved. At last the
"Seahorse" was reached; but here again he would not go on board,
saying that he would not have Mrs. Freemantle alarmed by seeing him in
such a condition and without any news of her husband, who had
accompanied the landing. When he got to the "Theseus," he declined
assistance to climb to the deck. "At two in the morning," wrote Hoste,
one of her midshipmen, who had been with him continuously since the
"Agamemnon" left England, "Admiral Nelson returned on board, being
dreadfully wounded in the right arm. I leave you to judge of my
situation, when I beheld our boat approach with him, who I may say has
been a second father to me, his right arm dangling by his side, while
with the other he helped himself to jump up the ship's side, and with
a spirit that astonished every one, told the surgeon to get his
instruments ready, for he knew he must lose his arm, and that the
sooner it was off the better."

At daylight Troubridge, who had collected some ammunition from Spanish
prisoners, started from the square to try what could be done without
ladders against the citadel; but, finding every approach blocked by
overwhelming force, he had to retreat. Having neither powder nor
provisions, and no boats with which to return to the ship, he sent a
flag of truce to the governor to say that he was prepared to burn the
place down with means at his disposal, but, being most reluctant to do
so, was willing to treat, upon condition of the whole party being
permitted to return to the ships, free and with their arms. One
scarcely knows which most to admire, Troubridge's cool audacity in
making such a demand, or the chivalrous readiness with which these
honorable terms were at once granted to a man whose gallant bearing
compelled the esteem of his enemies. Don Juan Gutierrez had repulsed
the various attempts with such steadiness and watchfulness, had
managed his business so well, that he could afford to be liberal. He
agreed that Troubridge's men should withdraw, carrying off with them
all British equipments, even to such boats as had been taken by the
Spaniards, but could still swim. On the other hand, it was stipulated
that no further attempt upon the town should be made by Nelson's
squadron. Prisoners on both sides were to be given up. This
arrangement having been concluded, the governor directed that the
British wounded should be at once received into the hospitals, while
the rest of the party, with their colors flying, marched to the mole,
and there embarked.

Troubridge dwelt with evident pride upon his part in this night's
work,--a pride that was shared then by his superiors, and will be
justified in the eyes of military men now. "The Spanish officers
assure me they expected us, and were perfectly prepared with all the
batteries, and the number of men I have before mentioned [8,000],
under arms: with the great disadvantage of a rocky coast, high surf,
and in the face of forty pieces of cannon, though we were not
successful, will show what an Englishman is equal to." His conduct
affords for all time an example of superb courage in the face of
extraordinary and unexpected difficulty and danger, and especially of
single-minded energy in carrying through one's own share of an
enterprise, without misplaced concern about consequences, or worry as
to whether the other parties were prospering or not. Had Nelson
reached the square he would have found Troubridge there, and that was
the one thing about which the latter needed to care. Nelson's own
words recur to mind: "I have not a thought on any subject separated
from the immediate object of my command,"--a maxim eminently suited to
the field and to the subordinate, though not necessarily so to the
council chamber or to the general officer. Troubridge that night
proved himself invaluable as a subordinate, though the conduct of the
previous attempt seems to show a lack of that capacity to seize a
favorable moment, although in the presence of a superior, of which
Nelson himself had given so brilliant an example at Cape St. Vincent.

The squadron remained off Teneriffe for three days after the assault,
intercourse with the shore for the purpose of obtaining fresh
provisions being permitted by the governor, between whom and the
admiral were exchanged complimentary letters and presents of courtesy.
On the 27th Nelson sailed for Cadiz, and on the 16th of August
rejoined the commander-in-chief, now become Earl St. Vincent. The
latter received him with generous sympathy and appreciation, which
leave little doubt as to what his verdict would have been, had the
gallant initiative taken by his junior at St. Vincent ended in
disaster, instead of in brilliant success. Nelson's letters, sent
ahead of the squadron by a frigate, had shown the despondency produced
by suffering and failure, which had reversed so sharply the good
fortune upon which he had begun to pride himself. "I am become a
burthen to my friends and useless to my Country. When I leave your
command, I become dead to the world; I go hence and am no more seen."
"Mortals cannot command success," replied St. Vincent. "You and your
companions have certainly deserved it, by the greatest degree of
heroism and perseverance that ever was exhibited." Nelson had asked
for his stepson's promotion, implying that he himself would not
hereafter be in a position of influence to help the boy--for he was
little more. "He is under obligations to me, but he repaid me by
bringing me from the mole of Santa Cruz." "He saved my life," he said
more than once afterwards. St. Vincent immediately made him a
commander into the vacancy caused by the death of Captain Bowen, who
had fallen in the assault. "Pretty quick promotion," wrote his
messmate Hoste, who probably knew, from close association, that Nisbet
had not the promising qualities with which he was then credited by
his stepfather, from whom in later years he became wholly estranged.

On the 20th Nelson received formal leave to return to England in the
"Seahorse," and on the 3d of September his flag was hauled down at
Spithead. On the way home he suffered much. After amputation the
ligature had been awkwardly applied to the humeral artery. As he would
not allow the surgeon to examine the stump during the passage, this
was not then discovered, but the intense spasms of pain kept him
irritable and depressed. It is likely, too, that his discouragement
was increased by brooding over the failure of his enterprise;
believing, as he did, that had he been with the landing-party, the
first attempt would have succeeded. He could scarcely fail now to see
that, although it was strictly in accordance with service methods for
the senior to remain with the ships, the decisive point in the plan,
as first formed, was the seizure of the heights, and that there,
consequently, was the true place for the one in chief command. Any
captain, Troubridge especially, could have placed the ships as well as
Nelson. It is self-accusation, and not fault-finding merely, that
breathes in the words: "Had I been with the first party, I have reason
to believe complete success would have crowned our efforts. _My pride
suffered_."

Whatever his mental distress, however, he always, from the time of
receiving the wound, wrote to his wife with careful cheerfulness. "As
to my health, it never was better; and now I hope soon to return to
you; and my Country, I trust, will not allow me any longer to linger
in want of that pecuniary assistance which I have been fighting the
whole war to preserve to her. But I shall not be surprised to be
neglected and forgot, as probably I shall no longer be considered as
useful. However, I shall feel rich if I continue to enjoy your
affection. I am fortunate in having a good surgeon on board; in short,
I am much more recovered than I could have expected. I beg neither
you or my father will think much of this mishap: my mind has long been
made up to such an event."

Immediately after quitting the "Seahorse" he joined his wife and
father at Bath. For a time the wound seemed to be progressing
favorably, but the unlucky complication of the ligature threw him
back. "Much pain and some fever," he wrote to a friend soon after his
arrival; and while he kept up fairly before his wife, who spoke of his
spirits as very good, he confessed to St. Vincent, on the 18th of
September, that he was then not the least better than when he left the
fleet. "I have suffered great misery." This letter was dated in
London, whither he had gone a few days before to be invested with the
Order of the Bath, which was formally done by George III. in person on
the 27th of September. He was graciously received by the King, who
conversed with him after the ceremony, and by his manner throughout
made a lasting impression upon the mind of Nelson, whose loyalty was
intense. The Order of the Bath remained the most highly prized among
his many decorations. At the same time was awarded him a pension of
£1,000 a year.

He remained in London till near Christmas. Sir Gilbert Elliot, the
late Viceroy of Corsica, who about this time became Lord Minto, saw
him not long after his arrival there, as did also Colonel Drinkwater.
Elliot found him looking better and fresher than he ever remembered
him, although the continued pain prevented sleep, except by use of
opium. He was already impatient to go to sea again, and chafed under
the delay of healing, concerning the duration of which the surgeons
could give him no assurance. The ligature must be left to slough away,
for it was two inches up the wound, and if, in attempting to cut it,
the artery should be cut, another amputation would be necessary higher
up, which would not be easy, for the stump was already very short.
There was consequently nothing for it but endurance. To his suffering
at this time an accomplished surgeon, who sailed with him shortly
before Trafalgar, attributed a neuralgic predisposition under which he
then labored, and which produced serious effects upon his general
health.

A singular exhibition of his characteristic animation and temperament
was elicited by Drinkwater's visit. The colonel saw him shortly before
the naval battle of Camperdown, fought on the 11th of October. "One of
the first questions which Nelson put to me was whether I had been at
the Admiralty. I told him there was a rumour that the British fleet
had been seen engaged with that of Holland. He started up in his
peculiar energetic manner, notwithstanding Lady Nelson's attempts to
quiet him, and stretching out his unwounded arm,--'Drinkwater, said
he, 'I would give this other arm to be with Duncan[59] at this
moment;' so unconquerable was the spirit of the man, and so intense
his eagerness to give every instant of his life to the service."

Until the 4th of December his agony continued. On that day the
ligature came away, giving instant and entire relief. In a letter to a
friend, apologizing for delay in replying, he said: "Truly, till last
Monday, I have suffered so much, I hope for your forgiveness. I am now
perfectly recovered, and on the eve of being employed." On Friday, the
8th, he wrote to Captain Berry, who had led the boarders to the "San
Nicolas" at Cape St. Vincent, and was designated to command the ship
in which the admiral's flag should next be hoisted, saying that he was
well; and the same day, with that profound recognition of a personal
Providence which was with him as instinctive as his courage, he sent
to a London clergyman the following request: "An officer desires to
return thanks to Almighty God for his perfect recovery from a severe
wound, and also for the many mercies bestowed upon him. (For next
Sunday.)"

As the close attention of the skilled surgeons in whose hands he had
been was now no longer needed, he returned to Bath to await the time
when his flagship should be completely equipped. St. Vincent had asked
that the "Foudroyant," of eighty guns, should be prepared for him;
but, after his sudden recovery, as she was not yet ready, there was
substituted for her the "Vanguard," seventy-four, which was
commissioned by Berry at Chatham on the 19th of December. In March she
had reached Portsmouth, and Nelson then went up to London, where he
attended a levee on the 14th of the month and took leave of the King.
On the 29th his flag was hoisted, and on the 10th of April, after a
week's detention at St. Helen's by head winds, he sailed for Lisbon.
There he remained for four days, and on the 30th of the month, off
Cadiz, rejoined St. Vincent, by whom he was received with open arms.
The veteran seaman, stern and resolved as was his bearing in the face
of danger, was unhopeful about the results of the war, which from the
first he had not favored, and for whose ending he was eager. Now, at
sixty-four, his health was failing, and the difficulties and dangers
of the British cause in the Mediterranean weighed upon him, with a
discouragement very alien from the sanguine joy with which his ardent
junior looked forward to coming battles. His request to be relieved
from command, on the score of ill health, was already on file at the
Admiralty. "I do assure your Lordship," he wrote to Earl Spencer,
"that the arrival of Admiral Nelson has given me new life; you could
not have gratified me more than in sending him; his presence in the
Mediterranean is so very essential, that I mean to put the "Orion" and
"Alexander" under his command, with the addition of three or four
frigates, and send him away, to endeavour to ascertain the real
object of the preparations making by the French." These preparations
for a maritime expedition were being made at Toulon and the
neighboring ports, on a scale which justly aroused the anxiety of the
British Cabinet, as no certain information about their object had been
obtained.

Nelson's departure from England on this occasion closes the first of
the two periods into which his career naturally divides. From his
youth until now, wherever situated, the development has been
consecutive and homogeneous, external influences and internal
characteristics have worked harmoniously together, nature and ambition
have responded gladly to opportunity, and the course upon which they
have combined to urge him has conformed to his inherited and acquired
standards of right and wrong. Doubt, uncertainty, inward friction,
double motives, have been unknown to him; he has moved freely in
accordance with the laws of his being, and, despite the anxieties of
his profession and the frailty of his health, there is no mistaking
the tone of happiness and contentment which sounds without a jarring
note throughout his correspondence. A change was now at hand. As the
sails of the "Vanguard" dip below the horizon of England, a brief
interlude begins, and when the curtain rises again, the scene is
shifted,--surroundings have changed. We see again the same man, but
standing at the opening of a new career, whose greatness exceeds by
far even the high anticipations that had been formed for him. Before
leaving England he is a man of distinction only; prominent, possibly,
among the many distinguished men of his own profession, but the steady
upward course has as yet been gradual, the shining of the light, if it
has latterly shot forth flashes suggestive of hidden fires, is still
characterized by sustained growth in intensity rather than by rapid
increase. No present sign so far foretells the sudden ascent to fame,
the burst of meridian splendor with which the sun of his renown was
soon to rise upon men's eyes, and in which it ran its course to the
cloudless finish of his day.

Not that there is in that course--in its achievements--any
disproportion with the previous promise. The magnitude of the
development we are about to witness is due, not to a change in him,
but to the increased greatness of the opportunities. A man of like
record in the past, but less gifted, might, it is true, have failed to
fill the new sphere which the future was to present. Nelson proved
fully equal to it, because he possessed genius for war, intellectual
faculties, which, though not unsuspected, had not hitherto been
allowed scope for their full exercise. Before him was now about to
open a field of possibilities hitherto unexampled in naval warfare;
and for the appreciation of them was needed just those perceptions,
intuitive in origin, yet resting firmly on well-ordered rational
processes, which, on the intellectual side, distinguished him above
all other British seamen. He had already, in casual comment upon the
military conditions surrounding the former Mediterranean campaigns,
given indications of these perceptions, which it has been the aim of
previous chapters to elicit from his correspondence, and to marshal in
such order as may illustrate his mental characteristics. But, for
success in war, the indispensable complement of intellectual grasp and
insight is a moral power, which enables a man to trust the inner
light,--to have faith,--a power which dominates hesitation, and
sustains action, in the most tremendous emergencies, and which, from
the formidable character of the difficulties it is called to confront,
is in no men so conspicuously prominent as in those who are entitled
to rank among great captains. The two elements--mental and moral
power--are often found separately, rarely in due combination. In
Nelson they met, and their coincidence with the exceptional
opportunities afforded him constituted his good fortune and his
greatness.

The intellectual endowment of genius was Nelson's from the first; but
from the circumstances of his life it was denied the privilege of
early manifestation, such as was permitted to Napoleon. It is,
consequently, not so much this as the constant exhibition of moral
power, force of character, which gives continuity to his professional
career, and brings the successive stages of his advance, in
achievement and reputation, from first to last, into the close
relation of steady development, subject to no variation save that of
healthy and vigorous growth, till he stood unique--above all
competition. This it was--not, doubtless, to the exclusion of that
reputation for having a head, upon which he justly prided
himself--which had already fixed the eyes of his superiors upon him as
the one officer, not yet indeed fully tested, most likely to cope with
the difficulties of any emergency. In the display of this, in its many
self-revelations,--in concentration of purpose, untiring energy,
fearlessness of responsibility, judgment sound and instant, boundless
audacity, promptness, intrepidity, and endurance beyond all
proof,--the restricted field of Corsica and the Riviera, the
subordinate position at Cape St. Vincent, the failure of Teneriffe,
had in their measure been as fruitful as the Nile was soon to be, and
fell naught behind the bloody harvests of Copenhagen and Trafalgar.
Men have been disposed, therefore, to reckon this moral energy--call
it courage, dash, resolution, what you will--as Nelson's one and only
great quality. It was the greatest, as it is in all successful men of
action; but to ignore that this mighty motive force was guided by
singularly clear and accurate perceptions, upon which also it
consciously rested with a firmness of faith that constituted much of
its power, is to rob him of a great part of his due renown.

But it was not only in the greatness of the opportunities offered to
Nelson that external conditions now changed. The glory of the hero
brought a temptation which wrecked the happiness of the man. The loss
of serenity, the dark evidences of inward conflict, of yielding
against conviction, of consequent dissatisfaction with self and
gradual deterioration, make between his past and future a break as
clear, and far sharper than, the startling increase of radiancy that
attends the Battle of the Nile, and thenceforth shines with
undiminished intensity to the end. The lustre of his well-deserved and
world-wide renown, the consistency and ever-rising merit of his
professional conduct, contrast painfully with the shadows of
reprobation, the swerving, and the declension, which begin to attend a
life heretofore conformed, in the general, to healthy normal standards
of right and wrong, but now allowed to violate, not merely ideal
Christian rectitude, but the simple, natural dictates of upright
dealing between man and man. It had been the proud boast of early
years: "There is no action in my whole life but what is honourable."
The attainment of glory exceeding even his own great aspirations
coincides with dereliction from the plain rules of honor between
friends, and with public humiliation to his wife, which he allowed
himself to inflict, notwithstanding that he admitted her claims to his
deferential consideration to be unbroken. In this contrast, of the
exaltation of the hero and the patriot with the degradation of the
man, lie the tragedy and the misery of Nelson's story. And this, too,
was incurred on behalf of a woman whose reputation and conduct were
such that no shred of dignity could attach to an infatuation as doting
as it was blamable. The pitiful inadequacy of the temptation to the
ruin it caused invests with a kind of prophecy the words he had
written to his betrothed in the heyday of courtship: "These I trust
will ever be my sentiments; if they are not, I do verily believe it
will be my _folly_ that occasions it."

The inward struggle, though severe, was short and decisive. Once
determined on his course, he choked down scruples and hesitations,
and cast them from him with the same single-minded resolution that
distinguished his public acts. "Fixed as fate," were the remorseless
words with which he characterized his firm purpose to trample
conscience under foot, and to reject his wife in favor of his
mistress. But although ease may be obtained by silencing
self-reproach, safety scarcely can. One cannot get the salt out of his
life, and not be the worse for it. Much that made Nelson so lovable
remained to the end; but into his heart, as betrayed by his
correspondence, and into his life, from the occasional glimpses
afforded by letters or journals of associates, there thenceforth
entered much that is unlovely, and which to no appreciable extent was
seen before. The simple _bonhomie_, the absence of conventional
reticence, the superficial lack of polish, noted by his early
biographers, and which he had had no opportunity to acquire, the
childlike vanity that transpires so innocently in his confidential
home letters, and was only the weak side of his noble longing for
heroic action, degenerated rapidly into loss of dignity of life, into
an unseemly susceptibility to extravagant adulation, as he succumbed
to surroundings, the corruptness of which none at first realized more
clearly, and where one woman was the sole detaining fascination. And
withal, as the poison worked, discontent with self bred discontent
with others, and with his own conditions. Petulance and querulousness
too often supplanted the mental elasticity, which had counted for
naught the roughnesses on the road to fame. The mind not worthily
occupied, and therefore ill at ease, became embittered, prone to
censure and to resent, suspicious at times and harsh in judgment,
gradually tending towards alienation, not from his wife only, but from
his best and earliest friends.

During the short stay of seven months in England, which ended with the
sailing of the "Vanguard," the record of his correspondence is
necessarily very imperfect, both from the loss of his arm, and from
the fact of his being with his family. Such indications as there are
point to unbroken relations of tenderness with his wife. "I found my
domestic happiness perfect," he wrote to Lord St. Vincent, shortly
after his arrival home; and some months later, in a letter from Bath
to a friend, he says jestingly: "Tell--that I possess his place in Mr.
Palmer's box; but he did not tell me all its charms, that generally
some of the handsomest ladies in Bath are partakers in the box, and
was I a bachelor I would not answer for being tempted; but as I am
possessed of everything which is valuable in a wife, I have no
occasion to think beyond a pretty face." Lady Nelson attended
personally to the dressing of his arm; she accompanied him in his
journeys between Bath and London, and they separated only when he left
town to hoist his flag at Portsmouth. The letters of Lady Saumarez,
the wife of one of his brother captains then serving with Lord St.
Vincent, mention frequent meetings with the two together in the
streets of Bath; and upon the 1st of May, the day before leaving the
fleet off Cadiz for the Mediterranean, on the expedition which was to
result in the Nile, and all the consequences so fatal to the happiness
of both, he concludes his letter, "with every kind wish that a fond
heart can frame, believe me, as ever, your most affectionate husband."

On the 2d of May the "Vanguard" quitted the fleet for Gibraltar, where
she arrived on the 4th. On the 7th Nelson issued orders to Sir James
Saumarez, commanding the "Orion," and to Captain Alexander Ball,
commanding the "Alexander," both seventy-fours, to place themselves
under his command; and the following day the "Vanguard" sailed, in
company with these ships and five smaller vessels, to begin the
memorable campaign, of which the Battle of the Nile was the most
conspicuous incident.

FOOTNOTES:

[59] The British admiral in command of the fleet which fought at
Camperdown.




CHAPTER X.

THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF THE NILE.

MAY-SEPTEMBER, 1798. AGE, 39.


Between the time that Nelson was wounded at Teneriffe, July 24, 1797,
and his return to active service in April, 1798, important and ominous
changes had been occurring in the political conditions of Europe.
These must be taken briefly into account, because the greatness of the
issues thence arising, as understood by the British Government,
measures the importance in its eyes of the enterprise which it was
about to intrust, by deliberate selection, to one of the youngest
flag-officers upon the list. The fact of the choice shows the
estimation to which Nelson had already attained in the eyes of the
Admiralty.

In July, 1797, Great Britain alone was at war with France, and so
continued for over a year longer. Portugal, though nominally an ally,
contributed to the common cause nothing but the use of the Tagus by
the British Navy. Austria, it is true, had not yet finally made peace
with France, but preliminaries had been signed in April, and the
definitive treaty of Campo Formio was concluded in October. By it
Belgium became incorporated in the territory of France, to which was
conceded also the frontier of the Rhine. The base of her power was
thus advanced to the river, over which the possession of the fortified
city of Mayence gave her an easy passage, constituting a permanent
threat of invasion to Germany. Venice, as a separate power,
disappeared. Part of her former domains upon the mainland, with the
city itself, went to Austria, but part was taken to constitute the
Cisalpine Republic,--a new state in Northern Italy, nominally
independent, but really under the control of France, to whom it owed
its existence. Corfu, and the neighboring islands at the mouth of the
Adriatic, till then belonging to Venice, were transferred to France.
The choice of these distant and isolated maritime positions, coupled
with the retention of a large army in the valley of the Po, showed, if
any evidence were needed, a determination to assure control over the
Italian peninsula and the Mediterranean Sea.

The formal acquisitions by treaty, even, did not measure the full
menace of the conditions. The Revolutionary ferment, which had
partially subsided, received fresh impetus from the victories of
Bonaparte and the cessation of Continental war; and the diplomacy of
France continued as active and as aggressive as the movement of her
armies had previously been. By constant interference, overt and
secret, not always stopping short of violence, French influence and
French ideas were propagated among the weaker adjoining states.
Holland, Switzerland, and the Italian Republics became outposts of
France, occupied by French troops, and upon them were forced
governments conformed to the existing French pattern. In short, the
aggrandizement of France, not merely in moral influence but in
physical control, was being pushed forward as decisively in peace as
in war, and by means which threatened the political equilibrium of
Europe. But, while all states were threatened, Great Britain remained
the one chief enemy against which ultimately the efforts of France
must be, and were, concentrated. "Either our government must destroy
the English monarchy," wrote Bonaparte at this time, "or must expect
itself to be destroyed by the corruption and intrigue of those active
islanders." The British ministry on its part also realized that the
sea-power of their country was the one force from which, because so
manifold in its activities, and so readily exerted in many quarters
by reason of its mobility, France had most reason to fear the arrest
of its revolutionary advance and the renewal of the Continental war.
It was, therefore, the one opponent against which the efforts of the
French must necessarily be directed. For the same reason it was the
one centre around whose action, wisely guided, the elements of
discontent, already stirring, might gather, upon the occurrence of a
favorable moment, and constitute a body of resistance capable of
stopping aggressions which threatened the general well-being.

When the British Government found that the overtures for peace which
it had made in the summer of 1797 could have no result, except on
terms too humiliating to be considered, it at once turned its
attention to the question of waging a distinctively offensive war, for
effect in which co-operation was needed. The North of Europe was
hopeless. Prussia persisted in the policy of isolation, adopted in
1795 by herself and a number of the northern German states. Russia was
quietly hostile to France, but the interference contemplated by the
Empress Catherine had been averted by her death in 1796, and her
successor, Paul, had shown no intention of undertaking it. There
remained, therefore, the Mediterranean. In Italy, France stood face to
face with Austria and Naples, and both these were dissatisfied with
the action taken by her in the Peninsula itself and in Switzerland,
besides sharing the apprehension of most other governments from the
disquiet attending her political course. An advance into the
Mediterranean was therefore resolved by the British Cabinet.

This purpose disconcerted St. Vincent, who, besides his aversion from
the war in general, was distinguished rather by tenacity and
resolution in meeting difficulties and dangers, when forced upon him,
than by the sanguine and enterprising initiative in offensive measures
which characterized Nelson. Writing to the latter on the 8th of
January, 1798, he says: "I am much at a loss to reconcile the plans
in contemplation to augment this fleet and extend its operations, with
the peace which Portugal seems determined to make with France, upon
any terms the latter may please to impose; because Gibraltar is an
unsafe depot for either stores or provisions, which the Spaniards have
always in their power to destroy, and the French keep such an army in
Italy, that Tuscany and Naples would fall a sacrifice to any the
smallest assistance rendered to our fleet." In other words, the old
question of supplies still dominated the situation, in the
apprehension of this experienced officer. Yet, in view of the serious
condition of things, and the probable defection of Portugal under the
threats of France and Spain, to which he alludes, it seems probable
that the ministry were better advised, in their determination to
abandon a passive defence against an enemy unrelentingly bent upon
their destruction. As Nelson said of a contingency not more serious:
"Desperate affairs require desperate remedies."

However determined the British Government might be to act in the
Mediterranean, some temporary perplexity must at first have been felt
as to where to strike, until a movement of the enemy solved the doubt.
In the early months of 1798 the Directory decided upon the Egyptian
expedition under General Bonaparte, and, although its destination was
guarded with admirable secrecy until long after the armament sailed,
the fact necessarily transpired that preparations were being made on a
most extensive scale for a maritime enterprise. The news soon reached
England, as it did also Jervis at his station off Cadiz. Troops and
transports were assembling in large numbers at the southern ports of
France, in Genoa, Civita Vecchia, and Corsica, while a fleet of at
least a dozen ships-of-the-line was fitting out at Toulon. Various
surmises were afloat as to the object, but all at this time were wide
of the mark.

On the 29th of April, less than three weeks after Nelson left
England, but before he joined the fleet, the Cabinet issued orders to
St. Vincent to take such measures as he deemed necessary to thwart the
projects of the Toulon squadron. It was left to his judgment whether
to go in person with his whole fleet, or to send a detachment of not
less than nine or ten ships-of-the-line under a competent
flag-officer. If possible, the government wished him to maintain the
blockade of Cadiz as it had been established since the Battle of St.
Vincent; but everything was to yield to the necessity of checking the
sailing of the Toulon expedition, or of defeating it, if it had
already started. A speedy reinforcement was promised, to supply the
places of the ships that might be detached.

Accompanying the public letter was a private one from the First Lord
of the Admiralty, reflecting the views and anxieties of the
Government. "The circumstances in which we now find ourselves oblige
us to take a measure of a more decided and hazardous complexion than
we should otherwise have thought ourselves justified in taking; but
when you are apprized that the appearance of a British squadron in the
Mediterranean is a condition on which the fate of Europe may at this
moment be stated to depend, you will not be surprised that we are
disposed to strain every nerve, and incur considerable hazard in
effecting it." This impressive, almost solemn, statement, of the
weighty and anxious character of the intended step, emphasizes the
significance of the choice, which the First Lord indicates as that of
the Government, of the officer upon whom such a charge is to devolve.
"If you determine to send a detachment into the Mediterranean [instead
of going in person with the fleet], I think it almost unnecessary to
suggest to you the propriety of putting it under the command of Sir H.
Nelson, whose acquaintance with that part of the world, as well as his
activity and disposition, seem to qualify him in a peculiar manner for
that service."

In concluding his letter, Earl Spencer summed up the reasons of the
Government, and his own sense of the great risk attending the
undertaking, for the conduct of which he designated Nelson. "I am as
strongly impressed, as I have no doubt your Lordship will be, with the
hazardous nature of the measure which we now have in contemplation;
but I cannot at the same time help feeling how much depends upon its
success, and how absolutely necessary it is at this time to run some
risk, in order, if possible, to bring about a new system of affairs in
Europe, which shall save us all from being overrun by the exorbitant
power of France. In this view of the subject, it is impossible not to
perceive how much depends on the exertions of the great Continental
powers; and, without entering further into what relates more
particularly to them, I can venture to assure you that no good will be
obtained from them if some such measure as that now in contemplation
is not immediately adopted. On the other hand, if, by our appearance
in the Mediterranean, we can encourage Austria to come forward again,
it is in the highest degree probable that the other powers will seize
the opportunity of acting at the same time, and such a general concert
be established as shall soon bring this great contest to a
termination, on grounds less unfavorable by many degrees to the
parties concerned than appeared likely a short time since." It may be
added here, by way of comment, that the ups and downs of Nelson's
pursuit, the brilliant victory at the Nile, and the important
consequences flowing from it, not only fully justified this forecast,
but illustrated aptly that in war, when a line of action has been
rightly chosen, the following it up despite great risks, and with
resolute perseverance through many disappointments, will more often
than not give great success,--a result which may probably be
attributed to the moral force which necessarily underlies determined
daring and sustained energy.

As has appeared, the Government's recommendation had been ratified
beforehand by St. Vincent, in sending Nelson with three ships to watch
Toulon. Upon receiving the despatches, on the 10th of May, the
admiral's first step was to order Nelson to return at once to the
fleet, to take charge of the detachment from the beginning. "You, and
you only, can command the important service in contemplation;
therefore, make the best of your way down to me." More urgent letters
arriving from England, with news that a heavy reinforcement had left
there, he, on the 19th, hurried off a brig, "La Mutine," commanded by
Hardy, Nelson's former lieutenant, to notify the rear-admiral that a
squadron of ten ships would be sent to him shortly from before Cadiz;
and on the 21st this detachment sailed, under the command of Captain
Troubridge.

The "Mutine" joined Nelson on the 5th of June. His little division had
so far had more bad fortune than good. Leaving Gibraltar on the 8th of
May, late in the evening, so that the easterly course taken should not
be visible to either friend or enemy, he had gone to the Gulf of
Lyons. There a small French corvette, just out of Toulon, was captured
on the 17th, but, except in unimportant details, yielded no
information additional to that already possessed. On the 19th
Bonaparte sailed with all the vessels gathered in Toulon, directing
his course to the eastward, to pass near Genoa, and afterwards between
Corsica and the mainland of Italy. On the night of the 20th, in a
violent gale of wind, the "Vanguard" rolled overboard her main and
mizzen topmasts, and later on the foremast went, close to the deck.
The succession of these mishaps points rather to spars badly secured
and cared for than to unavoidable accident. Fortunately, the "Orion"
and "Alexander" escaped injury, and the latter, on the following
morning, took the "Vanguard" in tow, to go to Oristan Bay, in
Sardinia. The situation became extremely dangerous on the evening of
the 22d, for, the wind falling light, the sail-power of the
"Alexander" was scarcely sufficient to drag both ships against a
heavy westerly swell which was setting them bodily upon the Sardinian
coast, then not far distant. Thinking the case hopeless, Nelson
ordered the "Alexander" to let go the hawser; but Captain Ball begged
permission to hold on, and finally succeeded in saving the flagship,
which, on the 23d, anchored with her consorts under the Islands of San
Pietro, at the southern extremity of Sardinia. The governor of the
place sent word that they must not remain, Sardinia being allied to
France, but added that, as he had no power to force them out, they
would doubtless do as they pleased; and he supplied them with fresh
provisions,--a line of conduct which illustrates at once the
restrictions imposed upon British operations in the Mediterranean by
French insistence, and at the same time the readiness of the weaker
states to connive at the evasion of them, other instances of which
occurred during this period. By the united efforts of the division,
four days sufficed to refit the "Vanguard" with jury-masts, and the
three ships again sailed, on the 27th, for an appointed rendezvous, to
seek the frigates, which had separated during and after the gale.

This severe check, occurring at so critical a moment,--more critical
even than Nelson knew, for he remained ignorant of the French sailing
for some days longer,--was in itself disheartening, and fell upon one
whose native eagerness chafed painfully against enforced inaction and
delay. His manner of bearing it illustrated both the religious
characteristics, which the experience of grave emergencies tends to
develop and strengthen in men of action, and the firmness of a really
great man, never more signally displayed than under the pressure of
calamity and suspense, such as he continually had to undergo. The
exceptional brilliancy and decisiveness of his greater battles--the
Nile, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar--obscure the fact that each of them
was preceded by a weary period of strenuous uphill work, a steady
hewing of his way through a tanglewood of obstacles, a patient
endurance of disappointments, a display of sustained, undaunted
resolution under discouragements, nobler far than even the moments of
triumphant action, into which at last he joyfully emerges and freely
exerts his extraordinary powers. "I trust," he wrote to St. Vincent,
"my friends will think I bore my chastisement like a man. I hope it
has made me a better officer, as I believe it has made me a better
man. On the Sunday evening I thought myself in every respect one of
the most fortunate men, to command such a squadron in such a place,
and my pride was too great for man." To his wife he wrote in the same
strain: "I ought not to call what has happened to the Vanguard by the
cold name of accident; I believe firmly that it was the Almighty's
goodness, to check my consummate vanity."

Vanity was rather a hard name to call the natural elation of a young
admiral, intrusted with an unusually important service, and proud of
his command; but the providential interposition worked directly to his
advantage. The delays caused by the repairs to the "Vanguard," and by
the subsequent necessity of seeking the separated frigates at the
rendezvous appointed for such a case, made possible the junction of
Troubridge, of whose approach Nelson was totally ignorant. On the 2d
of June Sir James Saumarez mentions speaking a ship, which a few days
before had seen eleven sail-of-the-line, supposed to be English. "We
are at a loss what conjectures to put on this intelligence." Five days
before this, May 28, a vessel out of Marseilles had informed them of
Bonaparte's sailing with all his transports. Nelson would doubtless
have pursued them at once, in conformity with his instructions to
ascertain the enemy's objects; but for such operations, essentially
those of a scouting expedition, the frigates were too necessary to be
left behind. On the 4th of June he reached the rendezvous, and, not
finding the frigates, waited. The next morning, by the arrival of the
"Mutine," he learned that he was to expect the reinforcement, which
converted his division into a fleet, and enlarged his mission from one
of mere reconnoissance to the duty of overtaking and destroying a
great maritime expedition.

Besides this good news, the "Mutine" brought word of another
misfortune, more irretrievable than the loss of spars. She had fallen
in with the frigates three days before, and the senior captain had
told Hardy that he was going with them to Gibraltar, persuaded that
the condition of the flagship, which he had seen, would necessitate
her return to an arsenal for repairs. "I thought Hope would have known
me better," commented Nelson, when he became aware of a step which
materially affected, in fact probably entirely changed, the course of
events, and most seriously embarrassed all his subsequent movements.
This untimely and precipitate action, and his remark, illustrate
conspicuously the differences between men, and exemplify the peculiar
energy and unrelaxing forward impulse which eminently fitted Nelson
for his present high charge.

The inconvenience and danger arising from the frigates' departure was
instantly felt. "Nothing," wrote Saumarez, "can equal our anxiety to
fall in with the reinforcement. Our squadron has been, these two days,
detached in all directions, without falling in with them; and there is
strong reason to fear they think us returned to Gibraltar"--from
Hope's reports. Such were the risks springing from misplaced caution,
more ruinous than the most daring venture, and which from beginning to
end well-nigh wrecked the great attempt upon which the Admiralty, St.
Vincent, and Nelson had staked so much. In further consequence, the
line-of-battle ships became separated by stretching too far apart in
their anxious care to find Troubridge, and when he joined the
"Vanguard," on the 7th, the "Orion" and "Alexander" were not in sight.
The French having so long a start, and there being now with him
eleven seventy-fours, Nelson with characteristic promptness would not
delay an instant. The fifty-gun ship "Leander," which had come with
Troubridge, was directed to wait forty-eight hours for the two
absentees, with a memorandum of the course about to be followed.
Confident that single ships would be able to overtake a squadron whose
route they knew, the admiral at once pushed on for Cape Corso, the
north point of Corsica, intending to pass between the island and
Italy, seeking information as he went. The "Mutine" was all he had to
replace the missing frigates.

June 7th thus marks the beginning of a chase, which ended only upon
the 1st of August in the Battle of the Nile. During this miserable
period of suspense and embarrassment, occasioned and prolonged beyond
all reason or necessity by the want of lookout ships, the connecting
and illuminating thread is the purpose of Nelson, at once clear and
firm, to find the French fleet and to fight it the instant found. No
other consideration draws his mind aside, except so far as it may
facilitate the attainment and fulfilment of this one object. In this
one light he sees all things. At the start he writes to St. Vincent:
"You may be assured I will fight them the moment I can reach, be they
at anchor or under sail." Three days later, he tells Sir William
Hamilton: "If their fleet is not moored in as strong a port as Toulon,
nothing shall hinder me from attacking them." "Be they bound to the
Antipodes," he says to Earl Spencer, "your Lordship may rely that I
will not lose a moment in bringing them to action, and endeavour to
destroy their transports." Such expressions are repeated with a
frequency which proves the absolute hold the resolution had upon his
mind. When obstacles occur to him, or are mentioned, they do not make
room for the thought of not fighting to be entertained; only Toulon
suggests the idea of impossibility. He raises difficulties diligently
enough, but it is only that they may be the better overcome, not that
they may deter. All possible conditions are considered and discussed,
but simply in order that the best fighting solution may be reached.
The constant mental attitude is such that the man is unprepared to
recede before any opposition; he fortifies his mind beforehand with
the best means of meeting and vanquishing it, but the attempt at least
shall be made. "Thank God," he wrote at this moment, "I do not feel
difficulties;" yet the avowal itself accompanies so plain a statement
of his embarrassments as to show that his meaning is that they do not
discourage. This characteristic appeared most strongly at Copenhagen,
partly because the difficulties there were greatest, partly from the
close contrast with a man of very different temper.

Being entirely without intelligence as to the real object of the
French, there was nothing to do but to follow upon their track, with
eyes open for indications. They were known to have gone southerly,
towards Naples and Sicily; and these two points, parts of the Kingdom
of the Two Sicilies, had been mentioned by Jervis as probable
destinations. The "Orion" and "Alexander" rejoined in two or three
days, and on the 14th of June information, second-hand but probable,
was obtained that on the 4th the French armament had been seen off the
west end of Sicily, steering to the eastward. "If they pass Sicily,"
said Nelson in his letter to Spencer written the next day, "I shall
believe they are going on their scheme of possessing Alexandria, and
getting troops to India--a plan concerted with Tippoo Saib, by no
means so difficult as might at first view be imagined." Troubridge was
now sent ahead in the "Mutine" to communicate with Sir William
Hamilton, the British minister at Naples, and with Acton, the prime
minister of that Kingdom. He took with him letters from the admiral,
who wished to know what co-operation he might hope from the Court of
Naples, in the matters of supplies, of frigates to act as lookouts,
and of pilots for Sicilian waters.

On the 17th the squadron hove-to ten miles off Naples, and Troubridge
rejoined. The Neapolitan Government sent assurances of good wishes,
and of hatred to the French; supplies would be given under the rose,
and Acton sent a written order to that effect, addressed to the
governors of ports in the name of the King. Naples being at peace with
France, assistance with ships could not be given, nor, to use the
words of Nelson, "the smallest information of what was, or was likely
to be, the future destination of the French armament. With this
comfortable account I pushed for the Faro of Messina." Troubridge
brought word, however, that the French fleet was off Malta, about to
attack it, which served to give direction for the squadron's next
move.

After leaving Naples Nelson wrote strong and clear letters to Sir
William Hamilton upon the existing conditions. Why should Naples stand
in shivering hesitation about taking a decided step in support of
Great Britain? She had looked and prayed for the arrival of the fleet,
as the one force competent to check the designs of the French. Sicily
could be approached only by water, and the distance of Naples from
Northern Italy rendered the control of the sea most advantageous, if
not absolutely essential, to a French army attempting to hold the boot
of the peninsula. Now the British fleet had come, in force adequate to
neutralize the French Navy, and, in Nelson's belief, to defeat and
destroy it, if properly supported. Did Naples expect to escape by a
timid adherence to half measures, when by her notorious preference for
the British she had already gained the ill-will of the French? "The
French know as well as you and I do, that their Sicilian Majesties
called for our help to save them--even this is crime enough with the
French." Safety--true safety--could be had only by strenuous and
decisive action in support of Nelson's squadron. Did not the attack on
Malta indicate a design upon Sicily? "Were I commanding a fleet
attending an army which is to invade Sicily, I should say to the
general, 'If you can take Malta, it secures the safety of your fleet,
transports, stores, &c., and insures your safe retreat [from Sicily]
should that be necessary; for if even a superior fleet of the enemy
should arrive, before one week passes, they will be blown to leeward,
and you may pass with safety.' This would be my opinion.... I repeat
it, _Malta is the direct road to Sicily_." If the French are
overtaken, he continues, and found in some anchorage, it can scarcely
be so strong but that I can get at them, but there will be needed
things which I have not, fire-ships, bomb-vessels, and gunboats, when
one hour would either destroy or drive them out. Without such aid, the
British may be crippled in their attempt, and forced to leave the
Mediterranean. In case of blockade--or necessity to remain for any
reason--the fleet must have supplies; which only Naples can furnish.
Failing these it must retire, and then Sicily and Naples are lost.
Since, then, so much assistance must be given in time, why postpone
now, when one strong blow would give instant safety? Why should not
his own motto, "I will not lose a moment in attacking them," apply as
well to the policy of an endangered kingdom as of a British admiral?

If this reasoning and advice took more account of the exigencies of
the British arms than of the difficulties of a weak state of the
second order, dependent for action upon the support of other nations,
they were at least perfectly consonant to the principles and practice
of the writer, wherever he himself had to act. But Nelson could not
expect his own spirit in the King of the Two Sicilies. Even if the
course suggested were the best for Naples under the conditions, it is
the property of ordinary men, in times of danger, to see difficulties
more clearly than advantages, and to shrink from steps which involve
risk, however promising of success. The Neapolitan Government, though
cheered by the appearance of the British fleet, had to consider danger
also on the land side, where it relied upon the protection of Austria,
instead of trusting manfully to its own arms and the advantages of its
position, remote from the centre of French power. Austria had pledged
herself to support Naples, if invaded without just cause; but it was
not certain that she would interfere if the cause of attack was the
premature admission of British ships into the ports of the kingdom,
beyond the number specified in the still recent treaties with France.
The Emperor was meditating war, in which he expected to assist Naples
and to be assisted by her; but he did not choose to be hurried, and
might refuse aid if an outbreak were precipitated.

Actually, what Naples did mattered little. Under some contingencies,
such as Nelson was contemplating when he wrote his letter, it might
have mattered much whether he received the abundant support of small
armed vessels which he indicated; but in the end supplies only were
required, and those he had orders from Jervis to exact at the mouth of
his cannon from all powers,--friends or neutrals,--Sardinia only
excepted. The fleet passed the Straits of Messina on the 20th of June,
and continued south, keeping close to the Sicilian shore in hope of
information, until the 22d, when it was off Cape Passaro, the
southeastern extremity of the island. There a Genoese brig was spoken,
which had left Malta the previous day. From her Nelson learned that
Malta had surrendered to the French on the 15th, a week before, which
was correct; but the information further stated, that, after landing a
garrison, the expedition had sailed again on the 16th--it was thought
for Sicily. This last news was untrue, whether by intention or not,
for Bonaparte remained in Malta till the 19th; but upon it Nelson had
to act. Had he seen the captain of the stranger himself, he might have
found out more, for he was a shrewd questioner, and his intellect was
sharpened by anxiety, and by constant dwelling upon the elements of
the intricate problem before him; but the vessel had been boarded by
the "Mutine," three hours before, and was now beyond recall.

At this season the winds in the Mediterranean prevail from the
westward; therefore, with the six days' start the enemy was believed
now to have, no time could be lost. Six days sufficed to carry the
British squadron from its present position to Alexandria, which Nelson
was already inclined to think the destination of the French. Yet,
being dependent upon a wind then practically constant in direction, it
would not do to yield a mile of ground, except upon a mature, if
rapid, deliberation. Nelson's own mind was, by constant preoccupation,
familiar beforehand with the bearings of the different conditions of
any situation likely to occur, and with the probable inferences to be
drawn; his opinions were, so to say, in a constant state of formation
and development, ready for instantaneous application to any emergency
as it arose. But he had, besides, exercised the same habit in the
captains of the ships, by the practice of summoning them on board the
flagship, singly or in groups; the slow movement of sailing vessels,
particularly in the light summer weather of the Mediterranean,
permitting such intercourse without materially affecting the progress
of the fleet. Invitations or commands so to visit the flagship were
common. "I have passed the day on board the Vanguard," notes Saumarez
on one occasion, "having breakfasted and stayed to dinner with the
admiral." "It was his practice during the whole of his cruize," wrote
Berry, the flag-captain, "whenever the weather and circumstances would
permit, to have his captains on board the Vanguard, where he would
fully develop to them his own ideas of the different and best modes
of attack, in all possible positions." That such conversations were
not confined to tactical questions, but extended to what would now be
called the strategy of the situation, is evident from allusions by
Saumarez to the various surmises concerning the probable movements of
the enemy. Nelson never yielded a particle of his responsibility, nor
of his credit, but it is clear that such discussion would not only
broaden his own outlook, but prepare his subordinates to give readier
and sounder views upon any new conjuncture that might arise.

He now summoned on board four captains "in whom I place great
confidence," Saumarez, Troubridge,--the two seniors,--Ball, and Darby,
stated the case, and received their opinions. These seem to have been
given in writing,[60] and from his letter to St. Vincent the results
of the conference, as shown by his decision, may be summarized as
follows. With the existing winds, it would be impossible for such a
fleet as the enemy's to get to the westward. Had they aimed at Sicily,
an object concerning which explicit disclaimers had been given by the
French to the Neapolitan Government, some indication of their approach
must have been known at Syracuse, the day before, when the British
were off that city. Consequently, the expedition must have gone to the
eastward. The size and nature of the armament must also be
considered,--forty thousand troops, a dozen ships-of-the-line, besides
a staff of scientific men,--all pointed to a great, distant, and
permanent occupation. The object might be Corfu, or to overthrow the
existing government of Turkey, or to settle a colony in Egypt. As
between these, all equally possible, the last was the most direct and
greatest menace to present British interests, and should determine his
course. "If they have concerted a plan with Tippoo Saib, to have
vessels at Suez, three weeks, at this season, is a common passage to
the Malabar coast, where our India possessions would be in great
danger."

Such was the conclusion--how momentous at the moment can only be
realized by those who will be at the pains to consider a man still
young, with reputation brilliant indeed, but not established;
intrusted with a great chance, it is true, but also with a great
responsibility, upon which rested all his future. On slight, though
decisive, preponderance of evidence, he was about to risk throwing
away an advantage a seaman must appreciate, that of being to windward
of his enemy,--able to get at him,--the strategist's position of
command. The tongues of envy and censure might well be--we now know
that they were--busy in inquiring why so young an admiral had so high
charge, and in sneering at his failure to find the enemy. "Knowing my
attachment to you," wrote his old friend, Admiral Goodall, alongside
whom he had fought under Hotham, "how often have I been questioned:
'What is your favourite hero about? The French fleet has passed under
his nose,' &c., &c." Nelson was saved from fatal hesitation,
primarily, by his singleness of purpose, which looked first to his
country's service, to the thorough doing of the work given him to do,
and only afterwards to the consequences of failure to his own fame and
fortunes. At that moment the choice before him was either to follow
out an indication, slight, but as far as it went clear, which, though
confessedly precarious, promised to lead to a great and decisive
result, such as he had lately urged upon the King of Naples; or to
remain where he was, in an inglorious security, perfectly content, to
use words of his own, that "each day passed without loss to our side."
To the latter conclusion might very well have contributed the
knowledge, that the interests which the Cabinet thought threatened
were certainly for the present safe. Broadly as his instructions were
drawn, no word of Egypt or the East was specifically in them. Naples,
Sicily, Portugal, or Ireland, such were the dangers intimated by
Spencer and St. Vincent in their letters, and he was distinctly
cautioned against letting the enemy get to the westward of him. He
might have consoled himself for indecisive action, which
procrastinated disaster and covered failure with the veil of nullity,
as did a former commander of his in a gazetted letter, by the
reflection that, so far as the anticipations of the ministry went, the
designs of the enemy were for the time frustrated, by the presence of
his squadron between them and the points indicated to him.

But the single eye of principle gained keener insight in this case by
the practised habit of reflection, which came prepared, to the full
extent of an acute intellect, to detect every glimmer of light, and to
follow them to the point where they converged upon the true solution;
and both principle and reflection were powerfully supported in their
final action by a native temperament, impatient of hesitations, of
half measures, certain that the annihilation of the French fleet, and
nothing short of its annihilation, fulfilled that security of his
country's interests in which consisted the spirit of his instructions.
His own words in self-defence, when for a moment it seemed as if,
after all, he had blundered in the great risk he took, though rough in
form, rise to the eloquence that speaks out of the abundance of the
heart. "The only objection I can fancy to be started is,'you should
not have gone such a long voyage without more certain information of
the enemy's destination:' my answer is ready--who was I to get it
from? The governments of Naples and Sicily either knew not, or chose
to keep me in ignorance. Was I to wait patiently till I heard certain
accounts? If Egypt was their object, before I could hear of them they
would have been in India. To do nothing, I felt, was disgraceful;
therefore I made use of my understanding, and by it I ought to stand
or fall."

The destination of the enemy had been rightly divined, following out a
course of reasoning outlined by Nelson a week before in his letter to
Spencer; but successful pursuit was baffled for the moment by the
wiliness of Bonaparte, who directed his vast armament to be steered
for the south shore of Candia, instead of straight for Alexandria.
Even this would scarcely have saved him, had Nelson's frigates been
with the fleet. Immediately after the council, the admiral with his
customary promptitude kept away for Egypt under all sail. "I am just
returned from on board the Admiral," writes Saumarez, "and we are
crowding sail for Alexandria; but the contrast to what we experienced
yesterday is great indeed, having made sure of attacking them this
morning. At present it is very doubtful whether we shall fall in with
them at all, as we are proceeding upon the merest conjecture only, and
not on any positive information. Some days must now elapse before we
can be relieved from our cruel suspense; and if, at the end of our
journey, we find we are upon a wrong scent, our embarrassment will be
great indeed. Fortunately, I only act here _en second_; but did the
chief responsibility rest with me, I fear it would be more than my too
irritable nerves would bear." Such was the contemporary estimate of an
eye-witness, an officer of tried and singular gallantry and ability,
who shared the admiral's perplexities and ambitions, though not his
responsibility. His words portray justly the immensity of the burden
Nelson bore. That, indeed, is the inevitable penalty of command; but
it must be conceded that, when adequately borne, it should convey also
an equal measure of renown.

In the morning, before the consultation with the captains, three
French frigates had been seen; but Nelson, warned by the parting of
the "Orion" and "Alexander" a fortnight before, would not run the risk
of scattering the squadron by chasing them. No time could now be lost,
waiting for a separated ship to catch up. The circumstance of the
fleet being seen by these frigates was quoted in a letter from Louis
Bonaparte, who was with the expedition, to his brother Joseph, and was
made the ground for comment upon the stupidity of the British admiral,
who with this opportunity failed to find the armament. The criticism
is unjust; had the frigates taken to flight, as of course they would,
the British fleet, if not divided, would certainly not be led towards
the main body of the enemy. Concentration of purpose, singleness of
aim, was more than ever necessary, now that time pressed and a
decision had been reached; but the sneer of the French officer
reproduces the idle chatter of the day in London streets and
drawing-rooms. These, in turn, but echoed and swelled the murmurs of
insubordination and envy in the navy itself, at the departure from the
routine methods of officialism, by passing over the claims of
undistinguished seniors, in favor of one who as yet had nothing but
brilliant achievement, and yet more brilliant promise, to justify
committing to him the most momentous charge that in this war had
devolved on a British admiral. A letter from one of the puisne lords
of the Admiralty was read publicly on board the "Prince George,"
flagship of Sir William Parker,--the same who had the controversy with
Nelson about the Battle of St. Vincent,--denouncing Lord St. Vincent
in no very gentle terms for having sent so young a flag-officer.[61]
"Sir William Parker and Sir John Orde have written strong
remonstrances against your commanding the detached squadron instead of
them," wrote St. Vincent to Nelson. "I did all I could to prevent it,
consistently with my situation, but there is a faction, fraught with
all manner of ill-will to you, that, unfortunately for the two
Baronets, domined over any argument or influence I could use: they
will both be ordered home the moment their letters arrive." It will be
seen how much was at stake for Nelson personally in the issue of these
weeks. Happy the man who, like him, has in such a case the clear light
of duty to keep his steps from wavering!

The night after Nelson made sail for Alexandria the two hostile bodies
crossed the same tract of sea, on divergent courses; but a haze
covered the face of the deep, and hid them from each other. When the
day dawned, they were no longer within range of sight; but had the
horizon of the British fleet been enlarged by flanking frigates,
chasing on either side, the immunity of the French from detection
could scarcely have continued. For some days not a hundred miles
intervened between these two foes, proceeding for the same port. On
the 26th, being two hundred and fifty miles from Alexandria, Nelson
sent the "Mutine" ahead to communicate with the place and get
information; a single vessel being able to outstrip the progress of a
body of ships, which is bound to the speed of its slowest member. On
the 28th the squadron itself was off the town, when the admiral to his
dismay found that not only the French had not appeared, but that no
certain news of their destination was to be had.

Preoccupied as his mind had been with the fear that the enemy had so
far the start that their army would be out of the transports before he
overtook them, the idea that he might outstrip them does not seem to
have entered his head. Only three vessels had been spoken since Sicily
was left behind,--two from Alexandria and one from the Archipelago;
but these knew nothing of the French, being doubtless, when met, ahead
of the latter's advance. That Nelson again consulted with his captains
seems probable--indeed almost certain, from casual mention; but if
so, their opinion as to the future course does not appear. The
unremitting eagerness of his temperament, the singleness of his
purpose, which saw the whole situation concentrated in the French
fleet, had worked together up to the present to bring him to the true
strategic point just ahead of time; although, by no fault of his own,
he had started near three weeks late.[62] These two high qualities now
conspired to mislead him by their own excess. "His active and anxious
mind," wrote Captain Berry, "would not permit him to rest a moment in
the same place; he therefore shaped his course to the northward, for
the coast of Caramania [in Asia Minor], to reach as quickly as
possible some quarter where information could probably be obtained."

To say that this was a mistake is perhaps to be wise only after the
event. Had Nelson known that the French, when leaving Malta, had but
three days' start of him, instead of six, as the Genoese had reported,
he might have suspected the truth; it is not wonderful that he failed
to believe that he could have gained six days. The actual gain _was_
but three; for, departing practically at the same time from points
equidistant from Alexandria, Bonaparte's armament appeared before that
place on the third day after Nelson arrived. The troops were landed
immediately, and the transports entered the port, thus making secure
their escape from the British pursuit. The ships of war remained
outside.

Meanwhile Nelson, "distressed for the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies,"
was beating back to the westward against the wind which had carried
him rapidly to the coast of Egypt. Rightly or wrongly, he had not
chosen to wait at the point which mature reflection had indicated to
him as the enemy's goal, and the best course that now occurred to him
was to do with his fleet the exploring duty that frigates should have
done. "_No frigates_," he wrote to Sir William Hamilton; "to which has
been, and may again, be attributed the loss of the French fleet." On
his return he kept along the northern shore of the Mediterranean,
passing near Candia; but, though several vessels were spoken, he only
gathered from them that the French were not west of Sicily, nor at
Corfu. On the 19th of July, he anchored the fleet at Syracuse, having,
to use his own words, "gone a round of six hundred leagues with an
expedition incredible," and yet "as ignorant of the situation of the
enemy as I was twenty-seven days ago."

At Syracuse fresh disappointments awaited him, which only the
indomitable single-mindedness and perseverance of the man prevented
from becoming discouragements. The minister at Naples had sent
despatches to await him at Cape Passaro; when he sent for these,
thirsty for news about the French, they had been returned to Naples.
The governor of the port, despite Acton's assurances to Troubridge,
made difficulties about the admission of so many ships, and about
supplying water, which they absolutely required. This Nelson resented,
with angry contempt for the halting policy of the weak kingdom. "I
have had so much said about the King of Naples' orders only to admit
three or four of the ships of our fleet into his ports, that I am
astonished. I understood that private orders, at least, would have
been given for our free admission. If we are to be refused supplies,
pray send me by many vessels an account, that I may in good time take
the King's fleet to Gibraltar. Our treatment is scandalous for a great
nation to put up with, and the King's flag is insulted at every
friendly port we look at." "I wish to know your and Sir William's
plans for going down the Mediterranean," he wrote to Lady Hamilton,
"for, if we are to be kicked in every port of the Sicilian dominions,
the sooner we are gone the better. Good God! how sensibly I feel our
treatment. I have only to pray I may find the French and throw all my
vengeance on them."

These words show the nervous exasperation superinduced by the
tremendous strain of official anxiety and mortified ambition; for the
governor's objections were purely formal and perfunctory, as was the
Court's submission to the French. "Our present wants," he admitted at
the same writing, "have been most amply supplied, and every attention
has been paid us." Years afterwards Nelson spoke feelingly of the
bitter mental anguish of that protracted and oft-thwarted pursuit. "Do
not fret at anything," he told his friend Troubridge; "I wish I never
had, but my return to Syracuse in 1798, broke my heart, which on any
extraordinary anxiety now shows itself, be that feeling pain or
pleasure." "On the 18th I had near died, with the swelling of some of
the vessels of the heart. More people, perhaps, die of broken hearts
than we are aware of." But the firmness of his purpose, the clearness
of his convictions, remained unslackened and unclouded. "What a
situation am I placed in!" he writes, when he finds Hamilton's
despatches returned. "As yet I can learn nothing of the enemy. You
will, I am sure, and so will our country, easily conceive what has
passed in my anxious mind; but I have this comfort, that I have no
fault to accuse myself of. This bears me up, and this only." "Every
moment I have to regret the frigates having left me," he tells St.
Vincent. "Your lordship deprived yourself of frigates to make mine
certainly the first squadron in the world, and I feel that I have zeal
and activity to do credit to your appointment, and yet to be
unsuccessful hurts me most sensibly. But if they are above water, I
will find them out, and if possible bring them to battle. You have
done your part in giving me so fine a fleet, and I hope to do mine in
making use of them."

In five days the squadron had filled with water and again sailed.
Satisfied that the enemy were somewhere in the Levant, Nelson now
intended a deliberate search for them--or rather for their fleet, the
destruction of which was the crucial object of all his movements. "It
has been said," he wrote to Hamilton, "that to leeward of the two
frigates I saw off Cape Passaro was a line-of-battle ship, with the
riches of Malta on board, but it was the destruction of the enemy, not
riches for myself, that I was seeking. These would have fallen to me
if I had had frigates, but except the ship-of-the-line, I regard not
all the riches in this world." A plaintive remonstrance against his
second departure was penned by the Neapolitan prime minister, which
depicts so plainly the commonplace view of a military situation,--the
apprehensions of one to whom immediate security is the great object in
war,--that it justifies quotation, and comparison with the clear
intuitions, and firmly grasped principle, which placed Nelson always,
in desire, alongside the enemy's fleet, and twice carried him, at
every risk, to the end of the Mediterranean to seek it. "We are now in
danger of a war, directly on Admiral Nelson's account; you see fairly
our position; will Admiral Nelson run to the Levant again _without
knowing for certain_ the position of the French, and leave the Two
Sicilies exposed in these moments? Buonaparte has absconded himself,
but in any port he has taken securitys not to be forced. God knows
where he is, and whether we shall not see him again in a few days, if
we do not hear of what a course he has taken. I present all this to
your consideration." To this letter, which oddly enough was written on
the very day the Battle of the Nile was fought, Nelson might well have
replied then, as he did in terms a year afterwards, "The best defence
for His Sicilian Majesty's dominions is to place myself alongside the
French fleet."

The fleet left Syracuse on the 25th of July, just one week before the
discovery of the enemy in Aboukir Bay put an end to Nelson's long
suspense. The course was first shaped for the southern capes of the
Morea, and on the 28th Troubridge was sent into the Gulf of Koron for
information. He returned within three hours, with the news that the
French had been seen four weeks before from the coast of Candia, and
were then steering southeast. This intelligence was corroborated by a
vessel spoken the same day. Southeast, being nearly dead before the
prevailing wind, was an almost certain clew to the destination of an
unwieldy body which could never regain ground lost to leeward; so,
although Nelson now learned that some of his missing frigates had also
been seen recently off Candia, he would waste no time looking for
them. It may be mentioned that these frigates had appeared off the
anchorage of the French fleet, and had been recognized by it as
enemies; but, so far from taking warning from the incident, the French
admiral was only confirmed by it in a blind belief that the British
feared to attack. Immediately after Troubridge's return, the fleet
bore up under all sail, and at 2.45 in the afternoon of the 1st of
August, 1798, the masthead lookout of the "Zealous" discovered the
long-sought-for enemy, lying in Aboukir Bay, on the coast of Egypt,
fifteen miles east of Alexandria.

Suspense was ended, but Nelson's weightiest responsibility had yet to
be met. The enemy was still so far distant that he could not be
reached till near nightfall, and it was possible that not only would
the battle be fought in the dark, but that some at least of the ships
would not have daylight to take their positions. The consequent
difficulty and risk was in any event great; but in this case the more
so, because the ground was unknown to every officer in the fleet. The
only chart of it in possession of the British was a rude sketch lately
taken out of a prize. There was no time now for calling captains
together, nor for forming plans of action. Then appeared conspicuously
the value of that preparedness of mind, as well as of purpose, which
at bottom was the greatest of Nelson's claims to credit. Much had been
received by him from Nature,--gifts which, if she bestows them not,
man struggles in vain to acquire by his own efforts; but the care
which he took in fitting himself to use those gifts to their utmost
capacity is his own glory. The author of the first full narrative of
these eventful weeks, Captain Berry, than whom no man had larger
occasion to observe Nelson's moods, used his capitals well when he
wrote, "The admiral viewed the obstacles with the eye of a seaman
DETERMINED ON ATTACK." It was not for him, face to face with
opportunity, to hesitate and debate whether he would be justified in
using it at once. But this preparation of purpose might have led only
to a great disaster, had it not received guidance from a richly stored
intellect, which had pondered probable conditions so exhaustively that
proper direction could be at once imparted and at once understood. The
French admiral, indeed, by his mistaken dispositions had delivered
himself into the hands of his enemy; but that might not have availed
had that enemy hesitated and given time, or had he not instantly
comprehended the possibilities of the situation with a trained glance
which had contemplated them long before. "By attacking the enemy's van
and centre, the wind blowing directly along their line, I was enabled
to throw what force I pleased on a few ships. This plan my friends
readily conceived by the signals."[63]

It was, therefore, no fortuitous coincidence that the battle was
fought on a plan preconcerted in general outline, though necessarily
subject to particular variations in detail. Not only had many
situations been discussed, as Berry tells us, but new signals had been
inserted in the signal-book to enable the admiral's intentions to be
quickly understood. To provide for the case of the enemy being met at
sea, the force had been organized into three squadrons,--a subdivision
of command which, while surrendering nothing of the admiral's
initiative, much facilitated the application of his plans, by
committing the execution of major details to the two senior captains,
Saumarez and Troubridge, each wielding a group of four ships. Among
the provisions for specific contingencies was one that evidently
sprang from the report that the enemy's fleet numbered sixteen or
seventeen of the line,--an impression which arose from there being in
it four Venetian ships so rated, which were not, however, fit for a
place in the line. In that case Nelson proposed to attack, ship for
ship, the rear thirteen of the enemy. That he preferred, when
possible, to throw two ships on one is evident enough--the approaching
battle proves it; but when confronted with a force stronger,
numerically, than his own, and under way, he provides what was
certainly the better alternative. He engages at once the attention of
as many ships as possible, confident that he brings against each a
force superior to it, owing to the general greater efficiency of
British ships over French of that date, and especially of those in his
own squadron, called by St. Vincent the _élite_ of the Navy.

The position of the French fleet, and the arrangements made by its
commander, Admiral Brueys, must now be given, for they constitute the
particular situation against which Nelson's general plan of attack was
to be directed. Considering it impracticable for the ships-of-the-line
to enter the port of Alexandria, Brueys had taken the fleet on the 8th
of July to their present anchorage. Aboukir Bay begins at a promontory
of the same name, and, after curving boldly south, extends eastward
eighteen miles, terminating at the Rosetta mouth of the Nile. From the
shore the depth increases very gradually, so that water enough for
ships-of-the-line was not found till three miles from the coast. Two
miles northeast of the promontory of Aboukir is Aboukir Island, since
called Nelson's, linked with the point by a chain of rocks. Outside
the island, similar rocks, with shoals, prolong this foul ground under
water to seaward, constituting a reef dangerous to a stranger
approaching the bay. This barrier, however, broke the waves from the
northwest, and so made the western part of the bay a fairly convenient
summer roadstead. The French fleet was anchored there, under the
shelter of the island and rocks, in an order such that "the wind blew
nearly along the line." Its situation offered no local protection
against an enemy's approach, except that due to ignorance of the
ground.

It was therefore Brueys's business to meet this defect of protection
by adequate dispositions; and this he failed to do. Numerically his
force was the same as Nelson's; but, while the latter had only
seventy-fours, there were in the French fleet one ship of one hundred
and twenty guns, and three eighties. In a military sense, every line
divides naturally into three parts,--the centre, and the two ends, or
flanks; and it is essential that these should so far support one
another that an enemy cannot attack any two in superior force, while
the third is unable to assist. Shallow water, such as was found in
Aboukir Bay, if properly utilized, will prevent a flank being turned,
so that an enemy can get on both sides of the ships there, or
otherwise concentrate upon them, as by enfilading; and if, in
addition, the ships are anchored close to each other, it becomes
impossible for two of the attacking force to direct their fire upon
one of the defence, without being exposed to reprisals from those next
astern and ahead. These evident precautions received no illustration
in the arrangements of Admiral Brueys. The general direction of his
line was that of the wind, from northwest to southeast, with a very
slight bend, as shown in the diagram. The leading--northwestern--ship
was brought close to the shoal in thirty feet of water, but not so
close as to prevent the British passing round her, turning that flank;
and there were between the successive ships intervals of five hundred
feet, through any one of which an enemy could readily pass. Brueys had
very properly accumulated his most powerful vessels at the centre. The
flagship "Orient," of one hundred and twenty guns, was seventh in the
order; next ahead and astern of her were, respectively, the "Franklin"
and the "Tonnant," each of eighty. By a singular misconception,
however, he had thought that any attack would fall upon the rear--the
lee flank; and to this utter misapprehension of the exposed points it
was owing that he there placed his next heaviest ships. Nelson's
fore-determined onslaught upon the van accordingly fell on the weakest
of the French vessels.

Such was the French order of battle. The proceedings of the British
fleet, under its leader, show an instructive combination of rapidity
and caution, of quick comprehension of the situation, with an absence
of all precipitation; no haste incompatible with perfect carefulness,
no time lost, either by hesitation or by preparations postponed. When
the enemy were first discovered, two ships, the "Alexander" and
"Swiftsure," were a dozen miles to leeward, having been sent ahead on
frigates' duty to reconnoitre Alexandria. This circumstance prevented
their joining till after the battle began and night had fallen. At the
same moment the "Culloden" was seven miles to windward. She was
signalled to drop the prize she was towing, and to join the fleet. To
this separation was due that she went aground. The remaining ten
ships, which had been steering about east, hauled sharp on the wind to
enable them to weather with ample allowance the shoal off Aboukir
Island. It was blowing a whole-sail breeze, too fresh for the lighter
canvas; the royals were furled as soon as close-hauled. As the French
situation and dispositions developed to the view, signals were made to
prepare for battle, to get ready to anchor by the stern, and that it
was the admiral's intention to attack the van and centre of the
enemy. The captains had long been forewarned of each of these
possibilities, and nothing more was needed to convey to them his
general plan, which was intrusted to them individually to carry out as
they successively came into action.

At about half-past five signal was given to form line of battle. This,
for the ships of the day, was a single column, in which they were
ranged ahead and astern of each other, leaving the broadside clear. As
they came abreast the shoal, Nelson hailed Captain Hood, of the
"Zealous," and asked if he thought they were yet far enough to the
eastward to clear it, if they then headed for the enemy. Hood replied
that he did not know the ground, but was in eleven fathoms, and would,
if the admiral allowed, bear up and sound with the lead, and would not
bring the fleet into danger. This was done, Hood leading all the fleet
except the "Goliath," Captain Foley, which kept ahead, but outside, of
the "Zealous." No close shaving was done, however, at this critical
turn; and it is that steady deliberation, combined with such parsimony
of time in other moments, which is most impressive in Nelson. So few
realize that five minutes are at once the most important and the least
important of considerations. Thus the British passed so much beyond
the island and the shoal, before keeping away, that, as the long
column swept round to head for the French van, the ships turned their
port broadsides to the enemy, and were steering southwesterly when
they finally ran down. "The English admiral," wrote the French second
in command, "without doubt had experienced pilots on board; he hauled
well round all dangers."

The "Goliath" still leading the fleet, followed closely by the
"Zealous," the flagship was dropped to sixth in the order,--Nelson
thus placing himself so that he could see what the first five ships
accomplished, while retaining in his own hands the power to impart a
new direction to the remaining five of those then with him, should he
think it necessary. Captain Foley had formed the idea that the French
would be less ready to fight on the inshore side, and had expressed
his intention to get inside them, if practicable. Sounding as he went,
he passed round the bows of the leading vessel, the "Guerrier," on the
inner bow of which he intended to place himself; but the anchor hung,
and the "Goliath" brought up on the inner quarter of the "Conquérant,"
the second ship. The "Zealous," following, anchored where Foley had
purposed, on the bow of the "Guerrier;" and the next three ships, the
"Orion," "Theseus," and "Audacious," also placed themselves on the
inner side of the French line.

The two leading French vessels were at once crushed. All the masts of
the "Guerrier," although no sail was on them, went overboard within
ten minutes after she was first attacked, while the "Conquérant" was
receiving the united broadsides of the "Goliath" and the
"Audacious,"--the latter raking. Nelson therefore placed the
"Vanguard" on the outer side, and within pistol-shot, of the third
French ship, the "Spartiate," which was already engaged on the other
side by the "Theseus," but at much longer range. His example was of
course followed by those succeeding him--the seventh and eighth of the
British engaging the fourth and fifth of the French, which were
already receiving part of the fire of the "Orion" and "Theseus" on the
inner side--the latter having ceased to play upon the "Spartiate" for
fear of hitting the "Vanguard." Thus five French ships were within
half an hour in desperate conflict with eight British, while their
consorts to leeward looked helplessly on.

The ninth and tenth of Nelson's fleet were less fortunate, owing to
the envelope of smoke and the growing darkness, which now obscured the
scene. The "Bellerophon," missing the sixth French vessel, the
"Franklin," brought up abreast the "Orient," whose force was double
her own, and which had no other antagonist. The "Majestic," groping
her way, ran into the ninth French, the "Heureux," where for some
moments she hung in a position of disadvantage and had her captain
killed. Then swinging clear, she anchored on the bow of the next
astern, the "Mercure," and there continued a deadly and solitary
action. Owing to the circumstances mentioned, the loss of each of
these ships was greater, by fifty per cent, than that of any other of
the British fleet. The movements so far described, and the resultant
fighting, may be styled the first stage of the battle. Concerning it
may be remarked the unswerving steadiness, rapidity, and yet sound
judgment, with which all the movements were executed; and further,
that not only was the first direction of the attack that prescribed by
Nelson's signal, but that the second, initiated by his own ship, was
also imparted by him. The incident of passing round the "Guerrier,"
and inside of the line, is a detail only, although one which cannot be
too highly praised. "The van ship of the enemy being in five fathom,"
wrote Captain Hood, "I expected the Goliath and Zealous to stick fast
on the shoal every moment, and did not imagine we should attempt to
pass within her." It is difficult to exaggerate the coolness,
intrepidity, and seamanlike care of Captain Foley, to whom is to be
attributed, perhaps, the whole conception, and certainly the entire
merit of the execution; but they no more detract from Nelson's honors
than does the distinguished conduct of the other captains.

The battle had begun a little after half-past six, the "Guerrier's"
masts falling at sundown, which was quarter before seven. It continued
under the conditions already given until past eight o'clock--none of
the ships engaged shifting her position for some time after that hour.
It was, apparently, just before the second act of the drama opened
with the arrival of the remaining ships--the "Alexander," "Swiftsure,"
and "Leander"--that Nelson was severely wounded; but the precise
moment has not been recorded. He was struck upon the upper part of the
forehead by a flying piece of iron, the skin, which was cut at right
angles, hanging down over his face, covering the one good eye, and,
with the profuse flow of blood, blinding him completely. He exclaimed,
"I am killed! Remember me to my wife!" and was falling, but Captain
Berry, who stood near, caught him in his arms. When carried below to
the cockpit, the surgeon went immediately to him, but he refused to be
attended before his turn arrived, in due succession to the injured
lying around him.

The pain was intense, and Nelson felt convinced that his hurt was
mortal; nor could he for some time accept the surgeon's assurances to
the contrary. Thus looking for his end, he renewed his farewell
messages to Lady Nelson, and directed also that Captain Louis of the
"Minotaur," which lay immediately ahead of the "Vanguard," should be
hailed to come on board, that before dying he might express to him his
sense of the admirable support given by her to the flagship. "Your
support," said he, "has prevented me from being obliged to haul out of
the line."[64] From the remark it may be inferred that the French
"Aquilon," their fourth ship, which became the "Minotaur's"
antagonist, had for a measurable time been able to combine her
batteries with those of the "Spartiate" upon the "Vanguard," and to
this was probably due that the loss of the latter was next in severity
to that of the "Majestic" and of the "Bellerophon." The inference is
further supported by the fact that the worst slaughter in the
"Vanguard" was at the forward guns, those nearest the "Aquilon."

After his wound was bound up, Nelson was requested by the surgeon to
lie quiet; but his preoccupation with the events of the evening was
too great, and his responsibility too immediate, to find relief in
inactivity,--the physician's panacea. He remained below for a while,
probably too much jarred for physical exertion; but his restlessness
sought vent by beginning a despatch to the Admiralty. The secretary
being too agitated to write, Nelson tried to do so himself, and it was
characteristic that the few lines he was then able to trace, blinded,
suffering, and confused, expressed that dependence upon the Almighty,
habitual with him, which illustrated a temperament of so much native
energy and self-reliance, and is more common, probably, among great
warriors than in any other class of men of action. This first outburst
of emotion, excited in him by the tremendous event wrought by his
hands, was identical in spirit, and not improbably was clothed in the
same words, as those with which began the despatch actually sent:
"Almighty God has blessed His Majesty's arms."

While Nelson lay thus momentarily disabled, important events were
transpiring, over which, however, he could have exerted no control. It
has been mentioned that the "Culloden" was seven miles to the
northward and westward of the fleet, when the French were first
discovered. Doing her best, it was impossible to reach the main body
before it stood down into action, and the day had closed when the ship
neared the shoal. Keeping the lead going, and proceeding with caution,
though not with the extreme care which led Hood and Nelson to make so
wide a sweep, Troubridge had the mishap to strike on the tail of the
shoal, and there the ship stuck fast, pounding heavily until the next
morning. The fifty-gun ship "Leander" went to her assistance, as did
the brig "Mutine," but all efforts to float her proved vain. Meanwhile
the "Alexander" and "Swiftsure" were coming up from the southwest, the
wind being so scant that they could barely pass to windward of the
reef, along whose northwestern edge they were standing. The
"Alexander," in fact, was warned by the lead that she was running into
danger, and had to tack. As they approached, Troubridge, by lantern
and signal, warned them off the spot of his disaster, thus
contributing to save these ships, and, by removing doubt, accelerating
their entrance into action. As they rounded the stranded "Culloden,"
the "Leander" was also dismissed from a hopeless task, and followed
them to the scene of battle.

The delay of the two seventy-fours, though purely fortuitous, worked
in furtherance of Nelson's plan, and resulted, practically, in
constituting them a reserve, which was brought into play at a most
auspicious moment. The "Bellerophon," crushed by the preponderating
weight of the "Orient's" battery, had just cut her cable and worn out
of action, with the loss of forty-nine killed and one hundred and
forty-eight wounded, out of a total of five hundred and ninety men.
Her foremast alone was then standing, and it fell immediately after.
The firing, which had been animated from the French left towards the
centre, now slackened around the latter, at the point where the
"Orient" and her next ahead, the "Franklin," were lying. For this
spot, therefore, the captains of the two fresh British ships steered.
The "Swiftsure," Captain Hallowell, anchored outside the enemy's line,
abreast the interval separating the "Orient" and the "Franklin,"
between which he divided his fire. The "Alexander," Captain Ball,
passed through the line, astern of the "Orient," and anchored close on
her inner quarter. Just at this time a shot cut the cable of the
"Peuple Souverain," next ahead of the "Franklin," and she drifted out
of her place to abreast the latter ship, ahead of which a wide gap of
a thousand feet was thus left. Into this the "Leander" glided, fixing
herself with great skill to rake at once the "Franklin" and the
"Orient."

These two French ships had already been much battered, and the
"Franklin" was still receiving part of the fire of the "Orion," Sir
James Saumarez, on her inner bow, as well as that of the "Defence,"
hitherto engaged by the "Peuple Souverain." This accumulation upon
them of three fresh ships would doubtless have proved irresistible,
even if a yet more dire calamity had not supervened. The new-comers
took their positions soon after eight, and a little before nine a fire
was observed on the poop of the "Orient." The British captains, seeing
the flames fighting on their behalf, redoubled their efforts,
directing their aim especially upon the scene of the conflagration,
and thereby thwarting all attempt to extinguish it. The blaze spread
rapidly, upward through the tarred rigging and the masts, downward to
the lower decks, where her heroic crew, still ignorant of the
approaching doom, labored incessantly at their guns. As the sublime
sight forced itself upon the eyes of all about, friends and enemies
alike busied themselves with precautions for their own safety in the
coming catastrophe. The ships to windward held on; those to leeward
for the most part veered or slipped their cables, the "Alexander"
fiercely refusing to do so till assured that the "Orient's"
destruction was inevitable. Captain Berry went below to report to the
admiral this appalling climax to the night's work, and to his own
long-sustained efforts in chase and battle. Nelson demanded to be led
on deck, where he gave orders that the only boat still in condition
for use should be sent with the "Vanguard's" first lieutenant, to help
save the unhappy crew. He then remained watching the progress of the
fire. At quarter before ten the "Orient" blew up. At this time the
moon rose, and from her tranquil path looked down, through the clear
Egyptian air, upon the scene of devastation.

Nelson was now persuaded to go to bed, but he neither got nor sought
repose of mind. Throughout the night, and in the early morning,
messages went from him to various ships to take this or that step, to
garner in the fruits of the victory yet unculled. The fleet responded
somewhat spasmodically, if not inadequately, to these calls. Men in
truth were worn out with labor and excitement. "My people were so
extremely jaded," wrote Captain Miller of the "Theseus," who obeyed a
summons to move, "that as soon as they had hove our sheet anchor up
they dropped under the capstan bars, and were asleep in a moment in
every sort of posture, having been then working at their fullest
exertion, or fighting, for near twelve hours." Nelson, in common with
other great leaders, could not be satisfied with any but the utmost
results. To quote again his words of years gone by: "Had ten ships
been taken and the eleventh escaped, we being able to get at her, I
should never consider it well done." His idea, Captain Berry tells us,
was first to secure the victory, and then to make the most of it, as
circumstances might permit. The expression is so luminous that it can
scarcely be doubted that the words are substantially those of the
admiral himself.[65] First, the great combination, which necessarily
for the moment neglects a part of the enemy in order to disconcert and
overwhelm the rest; afterwards, the unremitting pursuit, which
completes the triumph.

It was therefore perfectly characteristic of Nelson's habit of
thought, and not merely an egotistic expression of baseless discontent
with others, that he avowed his dissatisfaction with the results of
the night's work, stupendous and wholly unparalleled as they were. But
his own condition, prostrated and with disabled head, was doubly
typical of the state of his fleet after the "Orient" blew up. Not only
were men overcome with fatigue,--from weariness as great men have been
aroused by the inspiring call of a trusted chief,--but the guiding
head of the body was dazed and incapacitated; that was gone which
alone could sustain energy and give unity to movement. Although Nelson
indulged in no metaphorical allusions, he had this figure of the head
clearly enough in his mind, when he wrote four weeks later to Lord
Minto: "I regret that one escaped, and I think, if it had pleased God
that I had not been wounded, not a boat would have escaped to have
told the tale; but do not believe that any individual in the fleet is
to blame. In my conscience, I believe greater exertions could not have
been, and I only mean to say, that if my experience could in person
have _directed_[66] those exertions of individuals, there was every
appearance that Almighty God would have continued to bless my
endeavours." This opinion he reiterated to Lord Howe, even more
positively, after four months' longer reflection, in a letter dated
January 8, 1799; and, whether the result would or would not have
equalled his belief, the traces are clear that what was wanted, during
the remainder of that eventful night, was just that concord of action
which the head imparts to the members. Messages went from ship to
ship, captains consulted together and proposed to move together, and
did move separately; there was no lack of good-will, nor, as Nelson
says, of exertion; but men were not quite sure of what the other man
would do, and felt no authority to command him; and there was
hesitation over risks, and cautious delays about soundings and shaky
spars, which, the author is persuaded, would not have deterred Nelson
in such conditions, where victory was decisive, though not yet
complete. Illustrations would perhaps be invidious, as seeming to
imply a blame upon individuals which Nelson expressly disavowed; blame
that officers of exceptional professional capacity, concerning whom
the measured professional opinion of Lord Howe affirmed that the
Battle of the Nile "was unparalleled in this respect, that _every
captain_ distinguished himself," fell short of the peculiar excellence
attained by Nelson only among the men of his day. Moreover, this work
does not aim at a discussion of battles, except so far as they touch
Nelson personally. It may, however, be permissible to remark, that the
incident here under discussion suggests a doubt about the opinion, too
easily current, that an admiral's powers of control cease when the
battle joins. Under the circumstances, it is probable that Nelson,
being so far incapacitated as he thought himself, should have
transferred the direction of affairs, formally, to the next senior
officer, with general orders to secure the best results attainable.

The following morning it was found that the leading six ships of the
French had already struck their colors. The "Orient" having blown up,
there were six survivors. Of these, one, the "Tonnant," next astern of
the "Orient," though dismasted, was still afloat, a mile behind her
former position, having dropped there to avoid the explosion. The
"Heureux" and "Mercure," which had slipped their cables for the same
reason, were ashore and helpless. The spars of the three rear ships,
the "Guillaume Tell," "Généreux," and "Timoléon," were still standing,
and they had received little injury. At about noon these vessels,
commanded by Rear Admiral Villeneuve, got under way to go to sea; but
the "Timoléon" cast with her head inshore, and, after an ineffectual
attempt to wear, ran aground, bows on, her foremast going over the
side as she struck. The crew escaped to the beach, and she was then
set on fire by her captain, her colors flying as she burned. The two
other ships escaped, with two frigates which accompanied them. Only
one British ship, the "Zealous," was in condition to follow, and she
did so; but Nelson, seeing that she could not be supported, recalled
her from the unequal contest.

It is upon the chance that these sole survivors of the great
catastrophe might have been secured, by action during the night, that
the validity of Nelson's regrets turns. Concerning this, it is
impossible to affirm positively one way or the other; therefore his
regrets were well grounded. It is not certainties, but chances, that
determine the propriety of military action. Had Villeneuve, conscious
that he had done nothing as yet, and not fully aware how the fight had
gone, hesitated about running away, and had several British ships
dropped to leeward together, which was all they had to do, and what
the dismasted French had done, it was quite within the bound of
possibilities that the "Généreux" and the "Guillaume Tell" would have
been crippled at their anchors. "If" and "but," it may be objected.
Quite so; it is on if and but, not on yea and nay, that military
criticism justly dwells. A flash of lightning and a crash of thunder
may be seen and heard; it is the still small voice that leads the hero
to success. As regards Villeneuve, indecision was his distinguishing
trait; and Bonaparte wrote that if any error could be imputed to him,
it was that he had not got under way as soon as the "Orient" blew up,
for by that time the battle was lost beyond redemption.

The extent of the victory was decided by this retreat, and Nelson,
before devoting himself to the new duties entailed by his successes,
paused an instant that he might first acknowledge his debt of
gratitude to God and man. A memorandum was issued at once to the
captains of the Squadron:

    Vanguard off the mouth of the Nile, 2d August, 1798.

    Almighty God having blessed His Majesty's arms with victory, the
    Admiral intends returning Public Thanksgiving for the same at
    two o'clock this day; and he recommends every ship doing the
    same as soon as convenient.

    HORATIO NELSON.

To those under his command he at the same time issued a general
order, congratulating, by explicit mention of each class, the
captains, officers, seamen, and marines, upon the event of the
conflict. "The Admiral desires they will accept his most sincere and
cordial thanks for their very gallant behaviour in this glorious
battle." It was this habit of associating to himself, in full
recognition and grateful remembrance, those who followed and fought
with him, that enthroned Nelson in the affections of his men; nor will
it escape observation that the warmth, though so genuine, breathes
through words whose quietness might be thought studied, were they not
so transparently spontaneous. There is in them no appeal to egotism,
to the gratified passion for glory, although to that he was far from
insensible; it is the simple speech of man to man, between those who
have stood by one another in the hour of danger, and done their
duty--the acknowledgment after the event, which is the complement of
the famous signal before Trafalgar.

The order closed with further words of commendation, which will not
have the immortal response of the human heart to the other phrases;
but which, uttered at such a moment, conveyed a salutary warning,
justified as much by recent unhappy events in the British navy, as by
the well-known disorganization and anarchy that had disgraced that of
France. "It must strike forcibly every British seaman, how superior
their conduct is, _when in discipline and good order_, to the riotous
behaviour of lawless Frenchmen."[67] Captain Berry states that the
assembling of the "Vanguard's" ship's company for the thanksgiving
service strongly impressed the prisoners on board,--not from the
religious point of view, which was alien from the then prevalent
French temper,--but as evidence of an order and discipline which could
render such a proceeding acceptable, after a victory so great, and at
a moment of such seeming confusion. No small amount of
self-possession, indeed, was needed thus to direct the attention of
six hundred men, in the confined space of a ship, whose shattered
sides and blood-stained decks bore witness to the hundred dead and
wounded snatched from their number within the few hours before; yet,
on the other hand, nothing could have been better calculated to
compose the thoughts, or to facilitate the transition from the
excitement of battle to the resumption of daily life.

If, by the escape of two ships-of-the-line, the British triumph lacked
something in technical completeness, the disaster to the French was no
less absolute. Victory, said Nelson truly, is not the name for such a
scene as I have witnessed. There remained now to gather up the spoils
of the field, and to realize the consequences of the battle, great and
small, near and remote. The first was speedily done; battered as they
were, "only two masts standing out of nine sail-of-the-line," within a
fortnight six of the nine prizes were ready to start for Gibraltar.
Little by little, yet with the rapidity of his now highly trained
intuitions, Nelson saw the greatness of what he had effected, and with
his full native energy struggled on, amid mental confusion and bodily
suffering, and in the heat of an Egyptian August, to secure all the
fruits of success. With splitting head and constantly sick, a
significant indication of the rattling shock his brain had received,
he was wonderfully helped, so far as the direction of his efforts was
concerned, by the previous familiarity of his mind with the various
elements of the problem. First of all, the home government must be
informed of an event that would so profoundly affect the future.
Berry's orders, as bearer of despatches to St. Vincent off Cadiz, were
issued on the 2d of August; but there were no frigates, and the
"Leander," appointed to carry him, could not sail till the 6th. For
the same reason it was not until the 14th that the "Mutine" could be
sent off with duplicates, to go direct to the Admiralty by way of
Naples,--a wise precaution in all events, but doubly justified in this
case; for the brig reached port, whereas the fifty-gun ship was
captured by the "Généreux." The "Mutine's" account, though hastened
forward without delay, reached London only on the 2d of October, two
months after the action.

The news was received at the first with an applause and a popular
commotion commensurate to its greatness, and promised for the moment
to overflow even the barriers of routine in one of the most
conservative of nations. "Mr. Pitt told me the day after Captain Capel
arrived," wrote his old admiral, Hood, to Nelson, "that you would
certainly be a Viscount, which I made known to Lady Nelson. But it was
objected to in a certain quarter, because your Lordship was not a
commander-in-chief. In my humble opinion a more flimsy reason never
was given." Official circles regained, or rather perhaps again lost,
their senses, and the victory, unquestionably the most nearly complete
and the most decisive ever gained by a British fleet, was rewarded, in
the person of the commanding officer, with honors less than those
bestowed for St. Vincent and Camperdown. Nelson was advanced to the
lowest rank of the peerage, as Baron Nelson of the Nile. "In
congratulating your Lordship on this high distinction," wrote the
First Lord, "I have particular pleasure in remarking, that it is the
highest honour that has ever been conferred on an officer of your
standing,[68] in the Service, and who was not a commander-in-chief;
and the addition [of the Nile] to the Title is meant more especially
to mark the occasion on which it was granted, which, however, without
any such precaution, is certainly of a nature never to be forgotten."
His Lordship's sense of humor must a little have failed him, when he
penned the platitude of the last few words.

To the sharp criticism passed in the House of Commons on the
smallness of the recognition, the Prime Minister replied that Nelson's
glory did not depend upon the rank to which he might be raised in the
peerage; a truism too palpable and inapplicable for serious utterance,
the question before the House being, not the measure of Nelson's
glory, but that of the national acknowledgment. As Hood justly said,
"All remunerations should be proportionate to the service done to the
public;" and if that cannot always be attained absolutely, without
exhausting the powers of the State,[69] there should at least be some
proportion between the rewards themselves, extended to individuals,
and the particular services. But even were the defence of the
Ministers technically perfect, it would have been pleasanter to see
them a little blinded by such an achievement. Once in a way, under
some provocations, it is refreshing to see men able even to make fools
of themselves.

Nelson made to the First Lord's letter a reply that was dignified and
yet measured, to a degree unusual to him, contrasting singularly with
his vehement reclamations for others after Copenhagen. Without
semblance of complaint, he allowed plainly to appear between the lines
his own sense that the reward was not proportionate to the service
done. "I have received your Lordship's letter communicating to me the
Title his Majesty has been graciously pleased to confer upon me--an
Honour, your Lordship is pleased to say, the highest that has ever
been conferred on an officer of my standing who was not a
Commander-in-Chief. I receive as I ought what the goodness of our
Sovereign, and not my deserts, is pleased to bestow; but great and
unexampled as this honour may be to one of my standing, yet I own I
feel a higher one in the unbounded confidence of the King, your
Lordship, and the whole World, in my exertions. Even at the bitter
moment of my return to Syracuse, your Lordship is not insensible of
the great difficulties I had to encounter in not being a
Commander-in-Chief. The only happy moment I felt was in the view of
the French; then I knew that all my sufferings would soon be at an
end." To Berry he wrote: "As to both our Honours, it is a proof how
much a battle fought near England is prized to one fought at a great
distance."

Whatever was defective in the formal recognition of his own government
was abundantly supplied by the tributes which flowed from other
quarters, so various, that his own phrase, "the whole world," is
scarcely an exaggeration to apply to them. The Czar, the Sultan, the
Kings of Sardinia and of the Two Sicilies, sent messages of
congratulation and rich presents; the Czar accompanying his with an
autograph letter. The Houses of Parliament voted their thanks and a
pension of £2,000 a year. The East India Company acknowledged the
security gained for their Indian possessions by a gift of £10,000,
£2,000 of which he, with his wonted generosity, divided at once among
his father and family, most of whom were not in prosperous
circumstances. Other corporations took appropriate notice of the great
event; instances so far apart as the cities of London and Palermo, and
the Island of Zante, showing how wide-spread was the sense of relief.
Not least gratifying to him, with his sensitive appreciation of
friendship and susceptibility to flattery, must have been the numerous
letters of congratulation he received from friends in and out of the
service. The three great admirals,--Lords Howe, Hood, and St.
Vincent,--the leaders of the Navy in rank and distinguished service,
wrote to him in the strongest terms of admiration. The two last styled
the battle the greatest achievement that History could produce; while
Howe's language, if more measured, was so only because, like himself,
it was more precise in characterizing the special merits of the
action, and was therefore acknowledged by Nelson with particular
expressions of pleasure.

Besides the honors bestowed upon the commander of the squadron, and
the comprehensive vote of thanks usual on such occasions, a gold medal
commemorative of the battle was given to the admiral and to each of
the captains present. The First Lord also wrote that the
first-lieutenants of the ships engaged would be promoted at once. The
word "engaged" caught Nelson's attention, as apparently intended to
exclude the lieutenant of the "Culloden," Troubridge's unlucky ship.
"For Heaven's sake, for my sake," he wrote to St. Vincent, "if this is
so, get it altered. Our dear friend Troubridge has suffered enough.
His sufferings were in every respect more than any of us. He deserves
every reward which a grateful Country can bestow on the most
meritorious sea-officer of his standing in the service. I have felt
his worth every hour of my command." "I well know, he is my superior,"
he said on another occasion; "and I so often want his advice and
assistance. I have experienced the ability and activity of his mind
and body: it was Troubridge that equipped the squadron so soon at
Syracuse--it was he that exerted himself for me after the action--it
was Troubridge who saved the "Culloden," when none that I know in the
service would have attempted it--it was Troubridge whom I left as
myself at Naples to watch movements--he is, as a friend and an
officer, a _nonpareil_!" His entreaties prevailed so far that the
officer in question received his promotion, not with the others, but
immediately after them; a distinction which Troubridge bewailed
bitterly, as a reflection upon himself and his ship.

On the 9th of August, Nelson sent a lieutenant to Alexandretta, on the
northern coast of Syria, to make his way overland, by way of Aleppo,
to India, with despatches to the Governor of Bombay. Resuming briefly
the events of the past months, and the numbers and character of the
French army in Egypt, he expresses the hope that special care will be
exercised against the departure of ships from India, to convey this
huge force thither by the Red Sea. On the side of the Mediterranean,
their fate is settled by the recent victory. They can receive nothing
from France; they cannot advance freely into Syria, as water transport
is essential for much of their equipment; even in Egypt itself they
are hampered by the difficulties of communication--on land by the
guerilla hostility of the natives, and now on the water through his
own presence and control. The Nile, through its Rosetta mouth, had
been heretofore the easiest communication between Cairo and
Alexandria. The garrison of the latter depended largely for daily
bread upon this route, now closed by the fleet in Aboukir Bay. By
land, nothing short of a regiment could pass over ground where, even
before the battle, the French watering-parties from the ships had to
be protected by heavy armed bodies. He intended, therefore, to remain
where he was as long as possible. "If my letter is not so correct as
might be expected," he concludes, "I trust for your excuse, when I
tell you that my brain is so shook with the wounds in my head, that I
am sensible I am not always so clear as could be wished; but whilst a
ray of reason remains, my heart and my head shall ever be exerted for
the benefit of our King and Country."

It may be added here, that the scar left by this wound seems to have
been the cause of Nelson's hair being trained down upon his forehead,
during the later years of his life. Prior to that it was brushed well
off and up, as may be seen in the portrait by Abbott, painted during
his stay in England, while recovering from the loss of his arm. After
his death, a young officer of the "Victory," who had cut off some
locks for those who wished such a remembrance of their friend, speaks
of "the hair that used to hang over his forehead, near the wound that
he received at the Battle of the Nile."

The perception of his control over the communications from Rosetta to
Alexandria dawned rather late upon Nelson, for on the 5th of August he
had announced his purpose of starting down the Mediterranean on the
19th. This he postponed afterwards to the first part of September, and
again for as long as possible. While in this intention, most secret
and urgent orders came on the 15th from St. Vincent, to return to the
westward with his command, and to co-operate with an expedition
planned against Minorca. Six prizes, with seven of the British
ships-of-the-line, had started on the 14th for Gibraltar, under the
command of Sir James Saumarez. The three remaining prizes were burned,
and hasty temporary repairs, adequate only for a summer voyage, were
put upon the "Vanguard," "Culloden," and "Alexander," the three most
defective ships of his fleet. On the 19th he sailed with these three
for Naples, which he had from the first intended to visit, in order to
give them the complete overhauling they imperatively needed. On and
after the 13th of August several frigates had joined him. Three of
these, with three ships-of-the-line, were left with Captain Hood, to
conduct the blockade of Alexandria, and to suppress the enemy's
communications by water along the coasts of Egypt and Syria.

FOOTNOTES:

[60] The author is indebted to the present Lord De Saumarez for a copy of
the opinion of Sir James Saumarez, written on board the "Vanguard" at this
meeting:--

"The French fleet having left Malta six days ago, had their destination
been the Island of Sicily there is reason to presume we should have
obtained information of it yesterday off Syracuse, or the day before in
coming through the Pharo of Messina--under all circumstances I think it
most conducive to the good of His Majesty's service to make the best of our
way for Alexandria, as the only means of saving our possessions in India,
should the French armament be destined for that country.

"Vanguard, at sea, 22d June 1798. JAMES SAUMAREZ."

[61] Clarke and M'Arthur's Life of Nelson, vol. ii. p. 100.

[62] That is, counting from May 19, when Bonaparte left Toulon, to June 7,
when Troubridge's squadron joined, and pursuit began.

[63] Nelson to Lord Howe.

[64] G. Lathom Browne's Life of Nelson, p. 198.

[65] An interesting example of the illuminating effect of a sound maxim
upon different phases of a man's life and actions, and one illustrative of
the many-sidedness of this motto of Nelson's, occurs later in his career,
and not long before his death. When the frigates "Phoebe" and "Amazon" were
ordered to cruise before Toulon in October, 1804, "Lord Nelson gave
Captains Capel and Parker several injunctions, in case they should get an
opportunity of attacking two of the French frigates, which now got under
way more frequently. The principal one was, that they should not each
single out and attack an opponent, but 'that both should endeavour together
to take one frigate; if successful, chase the other; but if you do not take
the second, still you have won a victory, and your country will gain a
frigate.'" (Phillimore's Last of Nelson's Captains, p. 122.) When
summarized, this again is--Victory first; afterwards the results, as
circumstances may permit.

[66] Author's italics.

[67] Author's italics.

[68] "Rank" doubtless is meant by this singularly ill-chosen word.

[69] As General Sherman justly asked, "What reward adequate to the service,
could the United States have given Grant for the Vicksburg campaign?"




CHAPTER XI.

NELSON'S RETURN FROM EGYPT TO NAPLES.--MEETING WITH LADY
HAMILTON.--ASSOCIATION WITH THE COURT OF NAPLES.--WAR BETWEEN NAPLES
AND FRANCE.--DEFEAT OF THE NEAPOLITANS.--FLIGHT OF THE COURT TO
PALERMO.

SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER, 1798. AGE, 40.


The voyage of Nelson's small division from Aboukir Bay to Naples
occupied between four and five weeks, owing partly to light and
contrary winds, and partly to the dull sailing of the "Culloden,"
which had a sail secured under her bottom to lessen the dangerous leak
caused by her grounding on the night of the battle. This otherwise
unwelcome delay procured for Nelson a period of salutary, though
enforced, repose, which the nature of his injuries made especially
desirable. His mind, indeed, did not cease to work, but it was free
from harassment; and the obvious impossibility of doing anything, save
accept the present easy-going situation, contributed strongly to the
quietness upon which restoration depended. Nor were there wanting
matters of daily interest to prevent an excess of monotony. Now that
frigates were no longer so vitally necessary, they and other light
cruisers turned up with amusing frequency, bringing information, and
being again despatched hither and yonder with letters from the
admiral, which reflected instinctively his personal moods, and his
active concern in the future military operations.

The distress from his head continued for some time with little
abatement, and naturally much affected his tone of mind. At the first
he spoke of his speedy return to England as inevitable, nor did the
prospect occasion the discouragement which he had experienced after
the loss of his arm; a symptom which had shown the moral effect of
failure upon a sensitive and ambitious temperament. "My head is ready
to split," he had written to St. Vincent before starting, "and I am
always so sick; in short, if there be no fracture, my head is severely
shaken." A fortnight after leaving the bay, he writes him again: "I
know I ought to give up for a little while; my head is splitting at
this moment;" and Nicolas remarks that the letter bears evident marks
of suffering, three attempts being made to spell the word "splitting."
Yet by this time the pain had become at least intermittent, for
Saumarez, whose squadron fell in with the admiral's division several
times, notes that on the 26th of August he spent half an hour on board
the flagship, and found him in perfect health; and on the 7th of
September Nelson himself writes to the British minister at Florence
that he felt so much recovered, it was probable he would not go home
for the present. A few days later he wrote to Hood, off Alexandria,
that he relied upon the thoroughness of the blockade to complete the
destruction of the French army. "I shall not go home," he added,
"until this is effected, and the islands of Malta, Corfu, &c.,
retaken."

It is to the furtherance of these objects, all closely allied, and in
his apprehension mutually dependent, that his occasional letters are
directed. His sphere of operations he plainly conceives to be from
Malta, eastward, to Syria inclusive. "I detest this voyage to Naples,"
he wrote to St. Vincent, two days before reaching the port. "Nothing
but absolute necessity could force me to the measure. Syracuse in
future, whilst my operations lie on the eastern side of Sicily, is my
port, where every refreshment may be had for a fleet." The present
necessity was that of refit and repair, to which Syracuse was
inadequate. "For myself," he sent word to Sir William Hamilton, "I
hope not to be more than four or five days at Naples, for these times
are not for idleness." Not long after his arrival this conviction as
to the movements requiring his personal presence underwent an entire
change; and thenceforth, till he left for England two years later, it
was only the presence of clear emergency, appealing to his martial
instincts and calling forth the sense of duty which lay at the root of
his character, that could persuade him his proper place was elsewhere
than at the Court of Naples. It is only fair to add that, upon the
receipt of the news of his great victory, the Admiralty designated to
St. Vincent, as first in order among the cares of the squadron within
the Mediterranean, "the protection of the coasts of Sicily, Naples,
and the Adriatic, and, in the event of war being renewed in Italy, an
active co-operation with the Austrian and Neapolitan armies." Long
before these instructions were received, the very day indeed that they
were written, Nelson had become urgently instrumental in precipitating
Naples into war. Next in order of interest, by the Admiralty's
letters, were, successively, the isolation of Egypt and of Malta, and
co-operation with the Russian and Turkish squadrons which, it was
expected, would be sent into the Archipelago, and which actually did
attack and capture Corfu. The letter thus summarized may be taken to
indicate the general extent of Nelson's charge during the two
following years.

It may be said, then, without error, that Nelson's opinion as to the
direction of his personal supervision underwent a decisive change
after his arrival in Naples. Before it, he is urgent with that Court
to support with active naval assistance the operations against Malta,
and to send bomb-vessels, the absence of which he continually
deplores, to shell the transports in the harbor of Alexandria. He
hopes, indeed, to find on his arrival that the Emperor and many other
powers are at war with the French, but his attention is concentrated
upon Bonaparte's army. To the British minister in Turkey he is yet
more insistent as to what the Sultan should undertake. If he will but
send a few ships-of-the-line, and some bombs, he will destroy all
their transports in Alexandria; and an army of ten thousand men may
retake Alexandria immediately, as the French have only four thousand
men in it. Subsequent events showed this forecast of Nelson's to be as
erroneous as those of Napoleon were at times in regard to naval
prospects. "General Bonaparte," he continues, "only wants a
communication opened by sea, to march into Syria, that the transports
with stores, &c., for the army, may go alongshore with him." This he
had learned from French officers who were prisoners on board, and we
know it corresponded with the facts. "If the Sultan will not send
anything, he will lose Syria." "Naples," he tells St Vincent, "is
saved in spite of herself. They have evidently broken their treaty
with France, and yet are afraid to assist in finishing the vast
armament of the French. Four hours with bomb vessels, would set all in
a blaze, and we know what an army is without stores." This
anticipation also proved deceptive; but the expressions quoted are
fair examples of the general tenor of his letters between Aboukir and
Naples, and show his feeling that the important points of his command
lay to the east of Sicily.

The same tendency was shown upon the appearance of a Portuguese
squadron of four ships-of-the-line, which entered the Mediterranean in
July with orders to place themselves under his command. He first
learned the fact upon this passage, and at once sent a frigate to
Alexandria to beg the Portuguese admiral, the Marquis de Niza, to
assume the blockade, as the most important service to be rendered the
common cause. When the frigate reached its destination, Niza had come
and gone, and Nelson then headed him off at the Strait of Messina, on
his way to Naples, and sent him to blockade Malta. It may be added
that this squadron remained under his command until December, 1799,
and was of substantial utility in the various operations. Nelson
professed no great confidence in its efficiency, which was not
subjected to the severest tests; but he made a handsome acknowledgment
to its commander when it was recalled to Lisbon.

On the 22d of September the flagship anchored at Naples. On the 15th
her foremast had been carried away in a squall, and the "poor wretched
Vanguard," as Nelson called her, having to be towed by a frigate, her
two crippled consorts preceded her arrival by six days. The news of
the victory had been brought three weeks before by the "Mutine," on
the 1st of September. The Court party had gone wild with joy, in which
the populace, naturally hostile to the French, had joined with
southern vivacity of expression. Captain Capel, who commanded the
brig, with Lieutenant Hoste, who was to succeed him when he departed
with the despatches for England, had been at once taken to Court and
presented. When they left the palace they were met by Lady Hamilton,
who made them get into her carriage, and with characteristic bad taste
and love of notoriety paraded them until dark through the streets of
this neutral capital, she wearing a bandeau round her forehead with
the words, "Nelson and Victory." "The populace saw and understood what
it meant," wrote Hoste, "and 'Viva Nelson!' resounded through the
streets. You can have no idea of the rejoicings that were made
throughout Naples. Bonfires and illuminations all over the town;
indeed, it would require an abler pen than I am master of to give you
any account but what will fall infinitely short of what was the case."

By Nelson's orders the "Mutine" sailed in a few days to meet him with
despatches, and on the 14th of September joined the division off
Stromboli. With more important information, and letters from persons
of greater consequence, she had brought also one from Lady Hamilton,
giving a vivid picture of the general joy, and in particular an
account of the Queen's state of mind, so highly colored and detailed
that Nelson could only hope he might not be witness to a renewal of
it, but which so impressed him that he quoted it at length to Lady
Nelson. When the "Vanguard" approached the town, crowds of boats went
out to meet her, and His Sicilian Majesty himself came on board when
she was still a league from the anchorage. He had been preceded by the
British ambassador with Lady Hamilton. The latter, having had only
three weeks to recover from the first shock of the news, was greatly
overcome, and dropped her lovely face and by no means slender figure
into the arms of the admiral, who, on his part, could scarcely fail to
be struck with the pose of one whose attitudes compelled the
admiration of the most exacting critics. "The scene in the boat was
terribly affecting," he wrote to his wife. "Up flew her ladyship, and
exclaiming, 'O God, is it possible?' she fell into my arm more dead
than alive. Tears, however, soon set matters to rights."

This was the beginning of an intimacy destined, in the end, to affect
profoundly and unhappily the future of Nelson. Although Sir William
Hamilton, in his own congratulatory letter by the "Mutine," called him
"our bosom friend," they do not seem to have met since the summer of
1793, when the young captain carried Hood's despatches from Toulon to
Naples; and Nelson, while acknowledging on the present occasion the
kindness of an invitation to take up his quarters at the embassy, had
expressed a preference for rooms at a hotel, on account of the
business to be transacted. This reluctance, however, was easily and
properly overruled, and immediately after anchoring he went to live at
the ambassador's house, which, under the management of the celebrated
woman who presided there, became the social centre of the welcomes
lavished not only upon himself, but upon all the officers of the
ships.

Emma, Lady Hamilton, the second wife of Sir William, was at this time
thirty-three years old, her husband being sixty-eight. Her name, when
first entering the world, was Amy Lyon. Born in Cheshire of extremely
poor parents, in the humblest walk of life, she had found her way up
to London, while yet little more than a child, and there, having a
beautiful face, much natural charm of manner and disposition, utterly
inexperienced, and with scarcely any moral standards,--of which her
life throughout shows but little trace,--she was speedily ruined, fell
so far, in fact, that even with all her attractions it seemed doubtful
whether any man would own himself responsible for her condition, or
befriend her. In these circumstances, when not yet seventeen, she was
taken up by a nephew of Sir William Hamilton, Mr. Charles Greville,
who recognized not merely her superficial loveliness, but something of
the mental and moral traits underlying it, which promised a capacity
for development into an interesting and affectionate household
companion. Upon her promises of amendment, in the matter of future
relations with men, and of submission to his guidance and wishes in
the general conduct of her life, he took her in charge, and the two
lived together for nearly four years.

Greville bestowed a good deal of pains upon her training, and was
rewarded, not only by gratitude and careful compliance with his
directions, but by her sincere and devoted affection. The girl became
heartily and fondly in love with him, finding both contentment and
happiness in the simply ordered home provided for her. Her education,
which hitherto was of the smallest, received attention,--her letters
showing a very great improvement both in spelling and mode of
expression by the end of their association. On the moral side, of
course, there was not much development to be expected from one whose
standards, with less excuse, were in no way better than her own. On
this side Greville's teaching was purely utilitarian. Her position
was considered as a calling,--success in which demanded certain
proprieties and accomplishments, only to be attained by the practice
of habitual self-control, alike in doing and in not doing.

The future Lady Hamilton was affectionate and impulsive, good-humored,
with generous instincts and a quick temper; but she was also ambitious
and exceptionally clever. She loved Greville warmly; but she took to
heart the hard truths of his teachings, and they sank deep in a
congenial soil. Under the influence of the two motives, she applied
herself to gain, and did gain, a certain degree of external niceness
and self-control. Her affection for Greville made her willing, for his
sake, because he was not rich, to live quietly, to accept modest
surroundings, and to discard whatever was coarse in associates, or
unbecoming in her own person or conduct. He, while relaxing none of
his requirements, repaid her with courtesy and increasing admiration,
than which nothing was dearer to her; for, if not appreciative of the
satisfaction of self-respect, she was keenly alive to the delights of
homage from others, though extorted by purely adventitious qualities.
Glory was to her more than honor. This love of admiration, fostered,
yet pruned, by Greville's shrewd precepts, was her dominant trait. To
its gratification her singular personal advantages contributed, and
they were powerfully supported by an unusual faculty for assuming a
part, for entering into a character and representing its external
traits. Thus gifted by nature, and swayed by vanity, her development
was for the time regulated and chastened by the disinterestedness of
her passion for her lover. Her worse qualities were momentarily kept
in abeyance. Naturally lovable, not only in exterior but in
temperament, she became more and more attractive. "Consider," wrote
Greville, referring to her surroundings before she passed into his
hands, "what a charming creature she would have been, if she had been
blessed with the advantages of an early education, and had not been
spoilt by the indulgence of every caprice."

Unfortunately the restraining influence, probably ephemeral in any
event, was about to be rudely removed, permitting to flourish in
unrestrained vigor the natural tendency to compel admiration and
secure advantage by the spell of physical beauty, and by the exertion
of natural aptitudes for pleasing in the only path to success open to
her. In 1782 Hamilton's first wife died, and in 1784 he came to
England on leave. There he met Amy Lyon, now known as Emma Hart, in
the house provided for her by Greville. His admiration of her was
extreme, and its tendency was not misunderstood by her. He returned to
his post at Naples at the end of the year. In the course of 1785
Greville, who was now in his thirty-sixth year, decided that the
condition of his fortune made it imperative for him to marry, and that
as a first step thereto he must break with Emma Hart. Hamilton's
inclination for her provided a ready means for so doing, so far as the
two men were concerned; but her concurrence was not sure. After some
correspondence, it was arranged that she should go to Naples in the
spring of 1786, to live there under Hamilton's care, with the
expectation on her part that Greville would join her a few months
later. Placed as she then would be, it was probable that she would
eventually accept the offers made her; though it would be less than
just to either Greville or Hamilton, to allow the impression that they
did not intend to provide sufficiently for her needs, whatever her
decision.

In this way she left England in the spring of 1786, reaching Naples on
the 26th of April. When the poor girl, after many of her letters to
her lover remained unanswered, fully realized, that the separation was
final, her grief was extreme, and found utterance in words of
tenderness and desolation, which, however undisciplined in expression,
are marked by genuine pathos. But anger struggled with sorrow for the
mastery in her soul. She was too keen-witted not to have had an
inkling of the possible outcome of her departure from England, and of
the doubtful position she was occupying at Naples; but her wishes had
made her willingly deaf to any false ring in the assurances given her
by Greville, and she resented not only the abandonment, but the deceit
which she, justly or unjustly, conceived to have been practised, while
her womanliness revolted from the cold-blooded advice given by him to
accept the situation. The conflict was so sharp that for a time both
he and Hamilton expected she would return to England; but Greville had
not labored in vain at what he was pleased to consider her education.
By the end of the year she was addressing Hamilton in words of very
fairly assumed affection, but not until she had written to Greville,
with a certain haughty desperation, "If you affront me, I will make
him marry me." The threat was two-edged, for Hamilton intended
Greville to be his heir; but the latter probably gave little heed to a
contingency he must have thought very unlikely for a man of fifty-six,
who had passed his life in the world, and held Hamilton's public
position.

To effect this, however, Emma Hart now bent her personal charms,
strong purpose, and the worldly wisdom with which Greville had taught
her to assure her hold upon a man. Love, in its unselfishness, passed
out of her life with Greville. Other men might find her pliant,
pleasing, seductive; he alone knew her as disinterested. She followed
out her design with a patience, astuteness, and consistency which
attest the strength of her resolution, and her acute intellectual
perception of the advantages at her disposal. Ambition, a natural
trait with her, had been trained to self-control, in order to compass
a lowly, colorless success. Unlooked-for opportunity now held before
her eyes, distant and difficult of attainment, but not impossible, a
position of assured safety, luxury, and prominence, which appealed
powerfully to the love of pleasure, still dormant, and to the love of
conspicuousness, which became the two most noticeable features of her
character.

With all her natural advantages, however, the way was hard and long.
She had to become indispensable to Hamilton, and at the same time, and
by the same methods, an object the more desirable to him because of
her evident attractiveness to others. Above all, she had to contend
with her own temper, naturally lively and prone to bursts of anger,
which the prolonged suspense of the struggle, acting upon a woman's
nerves, tended peculiarly to exasperate. Hamilton was of an age when
he might be enslaved by fondness, but not constrained by strength of
passion to endure indefinitely household tempests, much less to
perpetuate them upon himself by lasting bonds. In all this Emma Hart
showed herself fully equal to the task. Tenderly affectionate to him,
except when carried away by the fits of irritability which both he and
Greville had occasion to observe, she complied readily with all his
wishes, and followed out with extraordinary assiduity his plans for
her improvement in education and in accomplishments. The society which
gathered round them was, of course, almost wholly of men, who one and
all prostrated themselves before her beauty and cleverness, with the
same unanimity of submission as did the officers of Nelson's division
after the Battle of the Nile. But, while giving free rein to coquetry,
and revelling in admiration, she afforded no ground for scandal to the
world, or dissatisfaction to Hamilton. In the attitude of outsiders
towards her, he had reason to see only the general testimony to her
charms and to his own good fortune. At the end of 1787 he wrote to
Greville: "I can assure you her behaviour is such as has acquired her
many sensible admirers, and we have a good man society, and all the
female nobility, with the queen at their head, show her every distant
civility."

Thus she persisted, keeping her beauty, and growing in mental
acquirements and accomplishments, but making little apparent headway
towards the great object of her ambition. "I fear," wrote Hamilton
towards the middle of 1789, when she had been three years with him,
"her views are beyond what I can bring myself to execute; and that
when her hopes on that point are over, she will make herself and me
unhappy. Hitherto her behaviour is irreproachable, but her temper, as
you must know, unequal." He underrated her perseverance, and
exaggerated his own strength of reluctance, innate and acquired.
Impossible as it would seem, with his antecedents and with hers, his
friends and acquaintances became alarmed for the result, and not
without cause. "Her influence over him exceeds all belief," wrote a
mutual friend to Greville in March, 1791. "His attachment exceeds
admiration, it is perfect dotage." Shortly after this letter was
written the two went to England, and there they were married on the
6th of September, 1791. By the end of the year they were back in
Naples, and did not again leave Italy up to the time of Nelson's
arrival in 1798.

Lady Hamilton did not abuse the security of the place she had won with
so much pains, nor on the other hand did her ambition and love of
prominence permit her to settle down to inert enjoyment of it. The
careful self-restraint with which she had observed the proprieties of
her former false position facilitated the disappearance of prejudices
naturally arising from it. Many English ladies of rank, passing
through Naples, visited her, and those who refused to ignore the past
of the woman, in the position of the British minister's wife, were by
some sharply criticised. "She has had a difficult part to act," wrote
Hamilton, six months after their return, "and has succeeded
wonderfully, having gained, by having no pretensions, the thorough
approbation of all the English ladies. The Queen of Naples was very
kind to her on our return, and treats her like any other travelling
lady of distinction; in short, we are very comfortably situated
here." "We dined yesterday with Sir William and Lady Hamilton," wrote
Lady Malmesbury, whose husband was among the most distinguished
diplomatists of the day. "She really behaves as well as possible, and
quite wonderfully, considering her origin and education."

This last phrase, used at the culmination of Lady Hamilton's good
fortune and personal advance, was wholly good-natured; but it sums up
the best of the not very good that can be said of her during the
height of her prosperity, and in later years. Although, as has been
remarked, she did not at this time abuse the security which as a wife
she had attained,--for policy too clearly dictated the continuance of
her previous circumspection,--the necessity for strenuous
watchfulness, exertion, and self-restraint, in order to reach a
distant goal, no longer existed; and, although a woman of many amiable
and generous impulses, she had not a shred of principle to take the
place of the motive of self-interest, which hitherto had been so
peremptory in its exactions. What she was in delicacy in 1791, that
she remained in 1796,--five years after the disappearance of her
social disabilities; a pretty fair proof that what she possessed of it
was but skin deep, the result of a diligent observance of Greville's
proprieties, for her personal advantage, not the token of a noble
inner spirit struggling from excusable defilement to the light. "She
does the honours of the house with great attention and desire to
please," wrote Greville's correspondent of 1791, before quoted, "but
wants a little refinement of manners, in which, in the course of six
years, I wonder she has not made greater progress." "She is all Nature
and yet all Art," said Sir Gilbert Elliot, in 1796; "that is to say,
her manners are perfectly unpolished, of course very easy, though not
with the ease of good breeding, but of a barmaid; excessively good
humoured, and wishing to please and be admired by all ages and sorts
of persons that come in her way; but besides considerable natural
understanding, she has acquired, since her marriage, some knowledge of
history and of the arts, and one wonders at the application and pains
she has taken to make herself what she is. With men her language and
conversation are exaggerations of anything I ever heard anywhere; and
I was wonderfully struck with these inveterate remains of her origin,
though the impression was very much weakened by seeing the other
ladies of Naples." "I thought her a very handsome, vulgar woman,"
curtly commented the lieutenant of a frigate which visited Naples in
the summer of 1798, while hunting for Nelson in the game of
cross-purposes that preceded the Nile.[70] Allowing for difference of
observers, it is plain that the Lady Hamilton whom Nelson now met, had
not improved in essentials over the Emma Hart of a half-dozen years
before.

Two years afterwards, the verdict of these men was confirmed by Mrs.
St. George,[71] a lady in London society, who viewed her possibly with
something of the repugnant prejudice of a refined and cultivated
woman, yet evidently measured her words calmly, even in her private
journal. "I think her bold, daring, vain even to folly, and stamped
with the manners of her first situation much more strongly than one
would suppose, after having represented Majesty, and lived in good
company fifteen years. Her dress is frightful. Her waist is absolutely
between her shoulders." Nelson measured her by a different standard.
"In every point of view," he tells herself, "from Ambassatrice to the
duties of domestic life, I never saw your equal. That elegance of
manners, accomplishments, and, above all, your goodness of heart, is
unparalleled." The same lady describes her personal appearance, at the
time when his devotion had reached the height from which it never
declined. "Her figure is colossal, but, excepting her feet, which are
hideous, well shaped. Her bones are large, and she is exceedingly
_embonpoint_. The shape of all her features is fine, as is the form of
her head, and particularly her ears; her teeth are a little irregular,
but tolerably white; her eyes light blue, with a brown spot in one,
which, though a defect, takes nothing away from her beauty or
expression. Her eyebrows and hair (which, by the bye, is never clean)
are dark, and her complexion coarse. Her expression is strongly
marked, variable, and interesting; her movements in common life
ungraceful; her voice loud, yet not disagreeable." Elliot's briefer
mention of her appearance is at once confirmatory and complementary of
that of Mrs. St. George: "Her person is nothing short of monstrous for
its enormity, and is growing every day. Her face is beautiful."

To these opinions it may be not uninteresting to add the critical
estimate of William Beckford, uttered many years later. Beckford was
not an admirable character, far from it; but he had known good
society, and he had cultivated tastes. Nelson accepted his
hospitality, and, with the Hamiltons, spent several days under his
roof, about Christmas time, 1800. In reply to the question, "Was the
second Lady Hamilton a fascinating woman?" he said, "I never thought
her so. She was somewhat masculine, but symmetrical in figure, so that
Sir William called her his Grecian. She was full in person, not fat,
but _embonpoint_. Her carriage often majestic, rather than feminine.
Not at all delicate, ill-bred, often very affected, a devil in temper
when set on edge. She had beautiful hair and displayed it. Her
countenance was agreeable,--fine, hardly beautiful, but the outline
excellent. She affected sensibility, but felt none--was artful; and no
wonder, she had been trained in the Court of Naples--a fine school for
an English woman of any stamp. Nelson was infatuated. She could make
him believe anything, that the profligate queen was a Madonna. He was
her dupe. She never had a child in her life."[72] As to this last
assertion, Beckford was not in a position to have personal knowledge.

But along with this native coarseness, which, if not ineradicable, was
never eradicated, she possessed an intuitive and perfect sense,
amounting to genius, for what propriety and good taste demanded in the
presentation of an ideal part,--the gift of the born actress. Of her
powers in this way the celebrated "Attitudes" were the chief example,
and there is no disagreement among the witnesses, either as to their
charm or as to the entire disappearance of the every-day woman in the
assumed character. "We had the attitudes a night or two ago by candle
light," wrote Sir Gilbert Elliot in 1796. "They come up to my
expectations fully, which is saying everything. They set Lady Hamilton
in a very different light from any I had seen her in before; nothing
about her, neither her conversation, her manners, nor figure, announce
the very refined taste which she discovers in this performance,
besides the extraordinary talent which is needed for the execution."
"You never saw anything so charming as Lady Hamilton's attitudes,"
wrote Lady Malmesbury in 1791. "The most graceful statues or pictures
do not give you an idea of them." "It is a beautiful performance,"
wrote Mrs. St. George, who saw her in 1800, when the Hamiltons and
Nelson were travelling on the Continent, "amusing to the most
ignorant, and highly interesting to the lovers of art. It is
remarkable that although coarse and ungraceful in common life, she
becomes highly graceful, and even beautiful, during this performance.
It is also singular that, in spite of the accuracy of her imitation of
the finest ancient draperies, her usual dress is tasteless, vulgar,
loaded and unbecoming."

The stormy period of the French Revolution, which was about to burst
into universal war at the time she was married, gave Lady Hamilton
another opportunity to come yet more conspicuously before men's eyes
than she had hitherto done. It is not easy to say what degree of
influence she really attained, or what particular results she may have
effected; but she certainly managed to give herself so much the air of
a person of importance, in the political intrigues of the day in
Naples, as at the least to impose successfully upon a great many, and
to be accepted very much at her own valuation. The French ambassador,
writing to Bonaparte in 1798, says: "If the preponderance which the
French Republic ought to take here, removed hence Acton and the wife
of Hamilton, this country, without other changes, would be extremely
useful for the execution of all your projects in the Mediterranean;"
and Sir William himself, who should have known, speaks of her activity
and utility,--"for several years the real and only confidential friend
of the Queen of Naples." Nelson, writing to the Queen of Naples in
1804, after Hamilton's death, said: "Your Majesty well knows that it
was her capacity and conduct which sustained his diplomatic character
during the last years in which he was at Naples."[73] Certainly,
Nelson believed, with all the blindness of love, whatever his mistress
chose to tell him, but he was not without close personal knowledge of
the inside history of at least two of those last years; for, in 1801,
addressing Mr. Addington, then Prime Minister, he used these words:
"Having for a length of time seen the correspondence both public and
private, from all the Neapolitan ministers to their Government and to
the Queen of Naples, I am perfectly acquainted with the views of the
several Powers." For her success Lady Hamilton was indebted, partly to
her personal advantages, and partly to her position as wife of the
British minister and chosen friend to the Queen. Great Britain played
a leading part everywhere in the gigantic struggle throughout the
Continent, but to a remote peninsular kingdom like Naples, protected
by its distance from the centres of strife, yet not wholly
inaccessible by land, the chief maritime state was the one and only
sufficient ally. A rude reminder of his exposure to naval attack had
been given to the King of the Two Sicilies, in 1792, by the appearance
of a French fleet, which extorted satisfaction for an alleged insult,
by threatening instant bombardment of his capital.

Sir William Hamilton, who had been minister since 1765, thus found
himself suddenly converted from a dilettante and sportsman, lounging
through life, into a busy diplomat, at the centre of affairs of
critical moment. At sixty-two the change could scarcely have been
welcome to him, but to his beautiful and ambitious wife the access of
importance was sweet, for it led to a close friendship with the Queen,
already disposed to affect her, even in the notorious position she had
held before her marriage; and the Queen, a daughter of Maria Theresa
and sister to Marie Antoinette, was much more of a man than the King.
The intimacy became the talk of Naples, and the report spread, easily
believed, because in the nature of things very likely, that the
personal relations between the two women cloaked a great deal of
underhand work, such as often accompanies diplomatic difficulties. Nor
did Lady Hamilton lack natural qualifications for the position into
which she undoubtedly wished to thrust herself. She was a brave,
capable, full-blooded, efficient woman, not to be daunted by fears or
scruples; a woman who, if only nerve and intelligence were required,
and if distinction for herself was at stake, could be fairly depended
upon. There was in her make-up a good deal of pagan virtue. She could
appreciate and admire heroism, and, under the stimulus of excitement,
of self-conscious magnanimity, for the glitter of effective
performance and the applause of onlookers, she was quite capable of
heroic action. It was this daring spirit, coarsely akin to much that
was best in himself, and of which she made proof under his own eyes,
that Nelson recognized; and this, in the thought of the writer, was
the body of truth, from which his enthusiasm, enkindled by her charms
and by her tenderness towards himself, projected such a singular
phantasm of romantic perfections.

Such was the woman, and such the position in the public eye that she
had gained for herself, when to Naples, first in the European
continent, came the news which made Nelson for the moment the most
conspicuous man of the day. He had achieved a triumph the most
startlingly dazzling that had yet been gained, and over one who up to
that time had excelled all other warriors in the brilliancy and extent
of his victories. Bonaparte was not yet the Napoleon whom history
knows, but thus far he had been the most distinguished child of the
Revolution. That Lady Hamilton then and there formed the purpose of
attaching Nelson to her, by the bonds which have sullied his memory,
is most improbable; but it is in entire keeping with the career and
the self-revelations of the woman that she should, instinctively, if
not with deliberation, have resolved to parade herself in the glare of
his renown, and appear in the foreground upon the stage of his
triumph, the chief dispenser of his praises, the patroness and
proprietor of the hero. The great occasion should shed a glamour round
her, together with him. "Emma's passion is admiration," Greville had
written soon after they parted, "and it is capable of aspiring to any
line which would be celebrated, and it would be indifferent, when on
that key, whether she was Lucretia or Sappho, or Scævola or Regulus;
anything grand, masculine or feminine, she could take up."

Unhappily, Nelson was not able to stand the heady dose of flattery
administered by a woman of such conspicuous beauty and consummate art;
nor was his taste discriminating enough to experience any wholesome
revolt against the rankness of the draught she offered him. The quick
appreciation of the born actress, which enabled her when on the stage
to clothe herself with a grace and refinement that dropped away when
she left it, conspired with his simplicity of confidence in others,
and his strong tendency to idealize, to invest her with a character
very different from the true. Not that the Lady Hamilton of reality
was utterly different from the Lady Hamilton of his imagination. That
she ever loved him is doubtful; but there were in her spirit impulses
capable of sympathetic response to his own in his bravest acts, though
not in his noblest motives. It is inconceivable that duty ever
appealed, to her as it did to him, nor could a woman of innate
nobility of character have dragged a man of Nelson's masculine renown
about England and the Continent, till he was the mock of all
beholders; but on the other hand it never could have occurred to the
energetic, courageous, brilliant Lady Hamilton, after the lofty deeds
and stirring dramatic scenes of St. Vincent, to beg him, as Lady
Nelson did, "to leave boarding to captains." Sympathy, not good taste,
would have withheld her. In Lady Nelson's letters there is evidence
enough of a somewhat colorless womanly affection, but not a thrill of
response to the greatness of her husband's daring, even when
surrounded herself by the acclamations it called forth.

What Nelson had never yet found in woman Lady Hamilton gave
him,--admiration and appreciation, undisguised and unmeasured, yet
bestowed by one who had the power, by the admission of even unfriendly
critics, of giving a reality and grace to the part she was performing.
He was soon at her feet. The playful gallantry with which Ball,
Elliot, and even old St. Vincent[74] himself, paid court to a handsome
woman, greedy of homage, became in Nelson a serious matter. Romantic
in temperament, he was all day in flattering contact with her. Worn
out and ill from that "fever of anxiety," to use his own words, which
he had endured since the middle of June, she attended and nursed him.
"Lady Hamilton," he exclaimed to Lady Nelson, with enthusiasm
undiscriminating in more ways than one, "is one of the very best women
in this world; she is an honour to her sex." A week later he tells
her, with an odd collocation of persons: "My pride is being your
husband, the son of my dear father, and in having Sir William and Lady
Hamilton for my friends. While these approve my conduct, I shall not
feel or regard the envy of thousands." The matter was passing rapidly
into the platonic stage, in which Sir William was also erelong
assigned an appropriate, if not wholly flattering, position. "What can
I say of hers and Sir William's attention to me? They are in fact,
with the exception of you and my good father, the dearest friends I
have in this world. I live as Sir William's son in the house, and my
glory is as dear to them as their own; in short, I am under such
obligations as I can never repay but with my eternal gratitude."
"Naples is a dangerous place," he sagely tells Lord St. Vincent, "and
we must keep clear of it. I am writing opposite Lady Hamilton,
therefore you will not be surprised at the glorious jumble of this
letter. Were your Lordship in my place, I much doubt if you could
write so well; our hearts and our hands must be all in a flutter."
Matters progressed; within ten days the veteran seaman learned, among
other concerns of more or less official importance, that "Lady
Hamilton is an Angel. She has honoured me by being my ambassadress to
the queen: therefore she has my implicit confidence and is worthy of
it."

That such intimacy and such relations resulted in no influence upon
the admiral's public action is not to be believed. That he consciously
perverted his views is improbable, but that he saw duty under other
than normal lights is not only probable, but evident. His whole
emotional nature was stirred as it never had been. Incipient love and
universal admiration had created in him a tone of mind, and brought to
birth feelings, which he had, seemingly, scarcely known. "I cannot
write a stiff formal public letter," he tells St. Vincent effusively.
"You must make one or both so. I feel you are my friend, and my heart
yearns to you." Such extravagance of expression and relaxation of
official tone has no pertinent cause, and is at least noteworthy. The
Court, or rather the Queen through Lady Hamilton, took possession of
him. He became immediately one of the little coterie centring round
Her Majesty, and he reflected its tone and partisanship, which,
fostered probably in the intimate conversations of the two women, were
readily transmitted to the minister by the wife whom he adored. The
Queen, impetuous, enterprising, and headstrong, like her mother and
sister, moved more by feminine feelings of hatred and revenge against
the French than by well-balanced considerations of policy, not only
favored war, but wished to precipitate the action of the Emperor by
immediately attacking the French in the Roman territory. The decision
and daring of such a course was so consonant to Nelson's own
temperament that he readily sympathized; but it is impossible to admit
its wisdom, from either a political or military standpoint. It was an
excessively bad combination, substituting isolated attacks for
co-operation, and risking results upon the chance of prompt support,
by a state which would be offended and embarrassed by the step taken.

Under ordinary conditions Nelson might have seen this, but he was well
handled. Within three days he had been persuaded that upon his
personal presence depended the salvation of Italy. "My head is quite
healed, and, if it were necessary, I could not at present leave Italy,
who looks up to me as, under God, its Protector." He continually, by
devout recollection of his indebtedness to God, seeks to keep himself
in hand. "I am placed by Providence in that situation, that all my
caution will be necessary to prevent vanity from showing itself
superior to my gratitude and thankfulness,"--but the current was too
strong for him, and was swollen to a torrent by the streams of
adulation, which from all quarters flowed in upon a temperament only
too disposed to accept them. "Could I, my dearest Fanny," he writes to
Lady Nelson, "tell you half the honours which are shown me here, not a
ream of paper would hold it." A grand ball was given on his birthday,
September 29; and a rostral column was "erected under a magnificent
canopy, never, Lady Hamilton says, to come down while they remain at
Naples." Within a week the conviction of his own importance led him to
write to Lady Hamilton, evidently for transmission to the Queen, an
opinion, or rather an urgent expression of advice, that Naples should
at once begin war. It is only conjectural to say that this opinion,
which rested on no adequate knowledge of the strength of the
Neapolitan Kingdom, was elicited by the Queen through Lady Hamilton;
but the inference derives support from the words, "I have read with
admiration the queen's dignified and incomparable letter of September,
1796,"--two years before. That his views were not the simple outcome
of his own unbiassed study of the situation is evident enough. "This
country, by its system of procrastination, will ruin itself," he
writes to St. Vincent, the very day after drawing up the letter in
question; "the queen sees it and thinks"--not as I do, but--"as _we_
do." That Lady Hamilton was one of the "we" is plain, for in the
postscript to the letter he says: "Your Ladyship will, I beg, receive
this letter as a _preparative for Sir William Hamilton,_ to whom I am
writing, with all respect, the firm and unalterable opinion of a
British admiral," etc. Certainly these words--taken with those already
quoted, and written just a week afterwards, "Lady Hamilton has been my
ambassadress to the queen"--indicate that she was the intermediary
between Nelson and the Court, as well as between him and her husband.

There is no record of any official request for this unofficial and
irregular communication of the opinion of a British admiral; and, of
course, when a man has allowed himself, unasked, though not
unprompted, to press such a line of action, he has bound himself
personally, and embarrassed himself officially, in case it turns out
badly. Nelson very soon, within a fortnight, had to realize this, in
the urgent entreaties of the Court not to forsake them; and to see
reason for thinking "that a strong wish for our squadron's being on
the Coast of Naples is, that in case of any mishap, that their
Majesties think their persons much safer under the protection of the
British flag than under any other;" that is--than under their own.
They could not trust their own people; they could not, as the event
proved, trust their army in the field; and the veteran Neapolitan
naval officer, Caracciolo, whether he deserved confidence or not, was
stung to the quick when, in the event, they sought refuge with a
foreign admiral instead of with himself. That Nelson should not have
known all this, ten days after reaching Naples, was pardonable enough,
and, if formally asked for advice without such facts being placed
before him, he could not be responsible for an error thus arising; but
the case is very different when advice is volunteered. He is more
peremptory than the minister himself. "You will not believe I have
said or done anything, without the approbation of Sir William
Hamilton. His Excellency is too good to them, and the strong language
of an English Admiral telling them plain truths of their miserable
system may do good."

The particular position of Naples relatively to France was this.
French troops had for a year past occupied the Roman Republic, which
had been established by them upon the overthrow of the Papal
Government. Their presence there was regarded by Nelson as a constant
threat to the Two Sicilies, and this to an extent was true; but rather
because of the contagion of revolutionary ideas than from the military
point of view. From the latter, it should have been obvious to a man
like Nelson that the French must be deterred, under existing
conditions, from entering Naples unprovoked; because the farther they
advanced the more exposed was their army, in case war, which was
darkly threatening, should be renewed in Upper Italy. They dared not,
unless by folly, or because first attacked, prolong their already too
extended ex-centric movement into Lower Italy. This was true, taking
account of Austria only; but now that the British fleet was released
by the entire destruction of the French at the Nile, and could operate
anywhere on the coast, it would be doubly imprudent; and when the news
that it had been done reached Egypt, Bonaparte, who had himself felt
the weight of Naples as a possible enemy, remote and feeble as she
was, exclaimed, "Italy is lost!" That Naples should co-operate in the
general movement against France was right, although, as Nelson well
knew, she had never dared do so under much more favorable
conditions,--a fact which by itself should have suggested to him
caution; but that she should act alone, with the idea of precipitating
war, refusing to await the moment fixed by the principal states, was
folly. This, however, was the course determined, under the combined
impulse of the Queen, Lady Hamilton, and Nelson; and it was arranged
that, after visiting the blockade off Malta, he should return to
Naples to co-operate in the intended movement.

On the 15th of October Nelson sailed from Naples for Malta in the
"Vanguard," with three ships-of-the-line which had lately joined him.
He still felt, with accurate instinct, that Egypt and the Ionian
Islands, with Malta, constituted the more purely maritime interests,
in dealing with which the fleet would most further the general cause,
and he alludes frequently to his wish to attend to them; but he
promised the King that he would be back in Naples in the first week of
November, to support the projected movement against the French. He
remained off Malta, therefore, only one week, during which adequate
arrangements were made for the blockade of the island, which had been
formally proclaimed on the 12th of October, and was conducted for most
of the following year by the Portuguese squadron; the senior British
officer, Captain Ball, acting ashore with the insurgent Maltese. These
had risen against the French during the summer, and now held them shut
up in La Valetta. The adjacent island of Gozo surrendered to the
British on the 28th. Hood continued in charge off Alexandria with
three ships-of-the-line; while the Ionian Islands were left to
themselves, until a combined Russian and Turkish squadron entered the
Mediterranean a few weeks later.

On the 5th of November Nelson returned to Naples. "I am, I fear, drawn
into a promise that Naples Bay shall never be left without an English
man-of-war. I never intended leaving the coast of Naples without one;
but if I had, who could resist the request of such a queen?" He could
ground much upon the Admiralty's orders, given when he was first sent
into the Mediterranean, to protect the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies,
and he had understood that the Emperor also would give his aid, if
Naples attacked. This impression received strength from an Austrian
general, Mack,--then of high reputation, but afterwards better known
by his surrender to Napoleon at Ulm, in 1805,--being sent to command
the Neapolitan army. Sir William Hamilton, however, writing on the
26th of October, was more accurate in saying that the Emperor only
advised the King "to act openly against the French _at Malta_, as he
would certainly support him;" for, Naples having a feudal claim upon
the island, action there could be represented as merely resistance to
aggression. In consequence of this misunderstanding, great confusion
ensued in the royal councils when a courier from Vienna brought word,
on the 13th of November, that that Court wished it left to the French
to begin hostilities; otherwise, it would give no assurance of help.
Nelson was now formally one of the Council which deliberated upon
military operations. In virtue of this position he spoke out, roughly
enough. "I ventured to tell their Majesties that one of the following
things must happen to the King, and he had his choice,--'Either to
advance, trusting to God for his blessing on a just cause, to die with
_l'épée à la main_, or remain quiet and be kicked out of your
Kingdoms.'" Thus rudely adjured, the King decided to be a hero after
the pattern of Nelson.

On the 22d of November a summons was sent to the French to evacuate
the Papal States and Malta, and a Neapolitan army marched upon Rome,
commanded by Mack in person. At the same time Nelson took on board his
squadron a corps of five thousand, to seize Leghorn, the possession of
which, with control of the sea, was not unjustly considered
threatening to the communications between the centre of French power,
in Northern Italy, and the exposed corps at the foot of the peninsula.
After landing this body, Nelson again went to Naples, leaving
Troubridge in charge at Leghorn, with several ships; directing him
also to keep vessels cruising along the Riviera, and before Genoa, to
break up the coastwise traffic, which had resumed great proportions
since the absence of the British from the Mediterranean, and upon
which the French army in Piedmont and Lombardy now greatly depended.

On the 5th of December the "Vanguard" once more anchored at Naples.
Nelson's estimate of affairs as he now found them, is best told in his
own words. "The state of this Country is briefly this: The army is at
Rome, Civita Vecchia taken, but in the Castle of St. Angelo are five
hundred French troops. The French have thirteen thousand troops at a
strong post in the Roman State, called Castellana. General Mack is
gone against them with twenty thousand: the event in my opinion is
doubtful, and on it hangs the immediate fate of Naples. If Mack is
defeated, this country, in fourteen days, is lost; for the Emperor
has not yet moved his army, and if the Emperor will not march, this
country has not the power of resisting the French. But it was not a
case of choice, but necessity, which forced the King of Naples to
march out of his country, and not to wait till the French had
collected a force sufficient to drive him, in a week, out of his
kingdom." It is by no means so sure that no other course of action had
been open, though Nelson naturally clung to his first opinion. By
advancing, the King gave the French occasion, if they were seeking
one; and the Neapolitan army, which might well have deterred them, as
it had embarrassed even Bonaparte in his time, had its rottenness
revealed as only trial can reveal. When reviewed, it had appeared to
Mack and Nelson a well-equipped force of thirty thousand of the
"finest troops in Europe." Brought face to face with fifteen thousand
French, in a month it ceased to exist.

Upon Mack's advance, the French general Championnet had evacuated
Rome, into which the King made a vainglorious triumphal entry. The
French retired to Castellana, followed by the Neapolitans; but in the
campaign that ensued the latter behaved with disgraceful cowardice.
Flying in every direction, with scarcely any loss in killed, and
preceded in their flight by the King, the whole force retreated in
confusion upon the capital. There revolutionary ideas had spread
widely among the upper classes; and, although the populace both in
city and country remained fanatically loyal, and hostile to the
French, the King and Queen feared to trust their persons to the issue
of events. Powerless through suspicions of those around them,
apparently well founded, and through lack of any instrument with which
to act, now that their army was destroyed, their one wish was to
escape to Palermo.

To do this involved some difficulty, as the mob, like that of Paris,
was bitterly opposed to their sovereign leaving the capital; but by
the management and determination of Nelson, who was greatly helped by
the courage and presence of mind of Lady Hamilton, the royal family
was embarked on board the "Vanguard" on the evening of December 21st.
During several previous days treasure to the amount of two and a half
millions sterling was being conveyed secretly to the ship. "The whole
correspondence relative to this important business," wrote Nelson to
St. Vincent, "was carried on with the greatest address by Lady
Hamilton and the Queen, who being constantly in the habits of
correspondence, no one could suspect." On the evening of the 23d the
"Vanguard" sailed, and after a most tempestuous passage reached
Palermo on the 26th. The youngest of the princes, six years old, taken
suddenly with convulsions, died on the way in the arms of Lady
Hamilton, whose womanly helpfulness, as well as her courage, came out
strongly in this trying time. Nelson wrote to St. Vincent: "It is my
duty to tell your Lordship the obligations which the whole royal
family as well as myself are under on this trying occasion to her
Ladyship." These scenes inevitably deepened the impression she had
already made upon him, which was not to be lessened by her lapse into
feminine weakness when the strain was over. To use her own words, in a
letter to her old lover, Greville, "My dear, adorable queen and I
_weep together_, and now that is our onely comfort." "Our dear Lady
Hamilton," Nelson wrote again a few days later, "whom to see is to
admire, but, to know, are to be added honour and respect; her head and
heart surpass her beauty, which cannot be equalled by anything I have
seen." Upon himself the brief emergency and its sharp call to action
had had the usual reviving effect. "Thank God," he wrote to Spencer,
"my health is better, my mind never firmer, and my heart in the right
trim to comfort, relieve, and protect those who it is my duty to
afford assistance to."

In Palermo Nelson again lived in the minister's house, bearing a
large, if not a disproportionate, share of the expenses. When they
returned to England in 1800, Hamilton was £2,000 in his debt. The
intimacy and the manner of life, in the midst of the Neapolitan court,
whose corruptness of manners both Nelson and Troubridge openly
condemned, was already causing scandal, rumors of which were not long
in reaching home. "I am quite concerned," wrote Captain Ball to
Saumarez, when Nelson was about to quit the station, "at the many
severe paragraphs which have been put in the newspapers respecting him
and Lady Hamilton. I am convinced that there has not been anything
improper between them--his Lordship could not fail being delighted
with her accomplishments and manners, which are very fascinating."
Lady Nelson, uneasy as a wife could not fail to be at reports
affecting her husband's honor, and threatening her own happiness,
quickly formed, and for a time entertained, the thought of joining him
on the station; but, if she broached the idea to Nelson, he certainly
discouraged it. Writing to her on the 10th of April, 1799, he said:
"You would by February have seen how unpleasant it would have been had
you followed _any_ advice, which carried you from England to a
wandering sailor. I could, if you had come, _only_ have struck my
flag, and carried you back again, for it would have been impossible to
have set up an establishment at either Naples or Palermo."[75]

The scandal increased apace after his headquarters were fixed at
Palermo. Lady Minto, writing from Vienna to her sister, in July, 1800,
says: "Mr. Rushout and Colonel Rooke,[76] whom I knew in Italy, are
here. Mr. Rushout is at last going home. He escaped from Naples at the
same time as the King did in Nelson's ship, and remained six months at
Palermo; so I had a great deal of intelligence concerning the Hero
and his Lady ... Nelson and the Hamiltons all lived together in a
house of which he bore the expense, which was enormous, and every sort
of gaming went on half the night. Nelson used to sit with large
parcels of gold before him, and generally go to sleep, Lady Hamilton
taking from the heap without counting, and playing with his money to
the amount of £500 a night. Her rage is play, and Sir William says
when he is dead she will be a beggar. However, she has about £30,000
worth of diamonds from the royal family in presents. She sits at the
Councils, and rules everything and everybody." Some of these
statements are probably beyond the personal knowledge of the narrator,
and can only be accepted as current talk; but others are within the
observation of an eye-witness, evidently thought credible by Lady
Minto, who was a friend to Nelson. Mr. Paget, who succeeded Hamilton
as British minister, mentions the same reports, in his private letter
to Lord Grenville, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Hamilton had asked to see his instructions. "I decided at once not to
do so, for he would certainly have been obliged to show them to Lady
Hamilton, who would have conveyed them next moment to the queen ...
Lord Nelson's health is, I fear, sadly impaired, and I am assured that
his fortune is fallen into the same state, in consequence of great
losses which both his Lordship and Lady Hamilton have sustained at
Faro and other games of hazard."[77]

The impressions made upon Lord Elgin, who touched at Palermo on his
way to the embassy at Constantinople, are worth quoting; for there has
been much assertion and denial as to what did go on in that
out-of-the-way corner of the world, Lady Hamilton ascribing the
falsehoods, as she claimed they were, to the Jacobinical tendencies of
those who spread them. "During a week's stay at Palermo, on my
passage here," wrote Elgin, "the necessity of a change in our
representative, and in our conduct there, appeared to me most urgent.
You may perhaps know from Lord Grenville how strong my impression on
that subject was."[78] Troubridge, a pattern of that most faithful
friendship which dares to risk alienation, if it may but save, wrote
urgently to his chief: "Pardon me, my Lord, it is my sincere esteem
for you that makes me mention it. I know you can have no pleasure
sitting up all night at cards; why, then, sacrifice your health,
comfort, purse, ease, everything, to the customs of a country, where
your stay cannot be long? I would not, my Lord, reside in this country
for all Sicily. I trust the war will soon be over, and deliver us from
a nest of everything that is infamous, and that we may enjoy the
smiles of our countrywomen. Your Lordship is a stranger to half that
happens, or the talk it occasions; if you knew what your friends feel
for you, I am sure you would cut all the nocturnal parties. The
gambling of the people at Palermo is publicly talked of everywhere. I
beseech your Lordship leave off. I wish my pen could tell you my
feelings, I am sure you would oblige me. I trust your Lordship will
pardon me; it is the sincere esteem I have for you that makes me risk
your displeasure."[79] To this manly appeal Nelson seems to have made
no reply; none at least is quoted.

FOOTNOTES:

[70] Colburn's United Service Magazine, 1847, part ii. p. 52.

[71] Afterwards Mrs. Trench, the mother of Archbishop Trench.

[72] Beckford's Memoirs, London, 1859, vol. ii. p. 326.

[73] Compare an equally strong assertion, Nicolas's Despatches, vol. vi. p.
99.

[74] St. Vincent at this time had not met her, at least as Lady Hamilton,
but they exchanged occasional letters.

[75] Pettigrew, vol. i. p. 220.

[76] Lord Minto was at this time ambassador to Vienna. Rushout and Rooke
were men well known on the Continent. Both are mentioned with some
particularity in the Memoirs of Pryse Lockhart Gordon, another continental
rambler.

[77] The Paget Papers, London, 1896, p. 185.

[78] The Paget Papers, London, 1896, p. 219.

[79] Clarke and M'Arthur, vol. ii. p. 355.




CHAPTER XII.

NELSON'S CAREER, AND GENERAL EVENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY,
FROM THE OVERTHROW OF THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN NAPLES TO THE INCURSION
OF THE FRENCH FLEET UNDER ADMIRAL BRUIX.

JANUARY-MAY, 1799. AGE, 40.


The four and a half months of unbroken residence in Palermo, which
followed the flight of the Court from Naples, were full of annoyance
and distress to Nelson, independent of, and additional to, the
disquieting struggle between his passion and his conscience, which had
not yet been silenced. The disasters in Naples continued. The
Neapolitan Navy had been left in charge of one of the Portuguese
officers, who soon found himself compelled to burn the
ships-of-the-line, to prevent their falling into the hands of the
revolutionists,--a step for which he was severely, but apparently
unjustly, censured by Nelson. The peasantry and the lower orders of
the city took up arms, under the guidance of their priests, and for
some time sought, with rude but undisciplined fury, to oppose the
advance of the enemy; but such untrained resistance was futile before
the veterans of France, and on the 23d of January, 1799, Championnet's
troops entered the city. This was followed by the establishment of the
Parthenopeian Republic, a name which reflected the prevailing French
affectation of antiquity. For all this Nelson blamed the Emperor, and
formed gloomy forebodings. "Had the war commenced in September or
October," he had written amid the December disasters, "all Italy would
at this moment have been liberated. Six months hence, when the
Neapolitan Republic will be organized, armed, and with its numerous
resources called forth, I will suffer to have my head cut off, if the
Emperor is not only defeated in Italy, but that he totters on his
throne in Vienna." To this text he stuck. Three months later, when the
preparations of Austria and Russia were complete, he wrote: "The
French have made war upon the Emperor, and have surprised some of his
troops. Serve him right! why did he not go to war before?" But the
rapid, continuous, and overwhelming successes of the Coalition,
between April and August, showed how untimely had been the step he had
urged upon the King of the Sicilies, disregardful of the needed
preparations and of the most favorable season--February to August--for
operations in Italy. Naples never recovered such political equilibrium
as she had possessed before that ill-advised advance. In Nelson's
career it, and its reverses, were to the Battle of the Nile what
Teneriffe was to St. Vincent; and it illustrates the inadequacy to
success of merely "going ahead," unless both time and method are
dictated by that martial intelligence which Nelson so abundantly
possessed, but in this case failed to use.

Not in Naples only did fortune now administer to him rebuffs, which
seemed singularly to rebuke the change of direction and of base which
he had been persuaded to give to his personal efforts. Immediately
upon his arrival in Palermo, he heard from St. Vincent that a
comparatively junior captain, Sir Sidney Smith, had been sent out by
the Cabinet, bearing, besides his naval commission from the Admiralty,
one from the Foreign Office as envoy to Turkey, conjointly with his
brother, Spencer Smith. This unusual and somewhat cumbrous arrangement
was adopted with the design that Smith should be senior naval officer
in the Levant, where it was thought his hands would be strengthened by
the diplomatic functions; but the Government's explanation of its
intentions was so obscure, that St. Vincent understood the new-comer
was to be independent of both himself and Nelson. This impression was
confirmed by a letter from Smith to Hamilton, in which occurred the
words, "Hood naturally falls under my orders when we meet, as being my
junior," while the general tone was that of one who had a right, by
virtue of his commission alone, to take charge of such vessels, and to
direct such operations, as he found in the Levant. This impression was
fairly deducible from a letter of the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, that Smith forwarded to Nelson; after which, without seeking
an interview, he at once went on for Constantinople.

Nelson immediately asked to be relieved. "_I do feel, for I am a
man_," he wrote to St. Vincent, "that it is impossible for me to serve
in these seas, with the squadron under a junior officer. Never, never
was I so astonished." With this private letter he sent an official
application for leave. "The great anxiety I have undergone during the
whole time I have been honoured with this important command, has much
impaired a weak constitution. And now, finding that much abler
officers are arrived within the district which I had thought under my
command, ... and, I flatter myself, having made the British nation and
our gracious Sovereign more beloved and respected than heretofore;
under these circumstances I entreat, that if my health and uneasiness
of mind should not be mended, that I may have your Lordship's
permission to leave this command to my gallant and most excellent
second in command, Captain Troubridge." In similar terms, though more
guarded, he wrote to Earl Spencer. At the same time he took proper
steps to prevent the official impropriety, not to say rudeness, which
Smith was about to commit by taking from Hood his charge, without
either the latter or Nelson receiving personal instructions to
surrender it. He sent Troubridge hastily to Alexandria to take
command there, with orders that, upon Smith's arrival, he should
deliver up the blockade to him, and return to the westward. "I should
hope," he wrote to Spencer, "that Sir Sidney Smith will not take any
ship from under my command, without my orders;" but he evidently
expected that he would, and was determined to forestall the
possibility of such an affront.

Nelson's services had been so eminent, and were at this time so
indispensable, and his exceptions to the manner in which Smith had
been intruded into his command were so well founded, that the matter
was rectified as rapidly as the slow round of communications in that
day would permit. The Admiralty disclaimed any intention of
circumscribing his control in the Mediterranean, and Smith received
peremptory orders from St. Vincent to report himself to Nelson by
letter for orders. The latter of course carried out the Admiralty's
wishes, by intrusting to Smith the immediate direction of operations
in the Levant, while retaining in his own hands the general outlines
of naval policy. He kept a very tight rein on Smith, however, and
introduced into the situation some dry humor, unusual with him. The
two brothers, envoys, he addressed jointly, in his official letters,
by the collective term "Your Excellency." "I beg of your Excellency,"
he says in such a letter, "to forward my letter to Sir Sidney Smith,
Captain of the Tigre. I have this day received letters from Sir Sidney
Smith, in his Ministerial capacity, I believe. I _wish_ that all
Ministerial letters should be written in your joint names; for it may
be difficult for me to distinguish the Captain of the man-of-war from
the Joint Minister, and the propriety of language in one might be very
proper to what it is in the other." To the naval captain he writes: "I
must _direct_ you, whenever you have Ministerial affairs to
communicate, that it is done jointly with your respectable brother,
and not mix naval business with the other. I have sent you my orders,
which your abilities as a sea-officer will lead you to punctually
execute."

Nelson resented to the end this giving to a junior naval officer, by a
side-wind, an authoritative position in diplomatic affairs, which, on
the naval side, properly belonged to him. "Sir Sidney should
recollect," he told Earl Spencer, meaning doubtless that the latter
also should recollect, "how I must feel in seeing him placed in the
situation which I thought naturally would fall to me." It was a
singular step on the part of the Government, justified neither by
general practice, nor by particular ability on the part of the person
chosen; and all Nelson's care and decision were insufficient to
prevent the consequent evil, although he was perfectly clear in his
intimation to "Your Excellency," the joint ministers, that they should
"upon all occasions, arrange plans of operations with me," and not
with Captain Sir Sidney Smith. Smith was active and fought well; but,
as far as he dared, he did as he pleased in virtue of his diplomatic
commission, looked only to the interests of his own small part of the
field, and, as will appear later, flatly disobeyed both the spirit and
the letter of Nelson's orders, as well as the Government's purpose,
concerning the French army in Egypt. The general sound judgment and
diplomatic ability of Nelson, who was thus superseded, had on the
other hand been fully recognized--formally by the Government,
explicitly by St. Vincent and Minto, both of whom had personal
experience of his conduct in such matters. "What relates to
co-operation with the armies of the allied powers cannot be in better
hands than yours," wrote the former. "You are as great in the cabinet
as on the ocean, and your whole conduct fills me with admiration and
confidence." "There is one other point of excellence," said Minto in
the House of Peers, "to which I must say a single word, because I am,
perhaps, the man in the world who has had the best opportunity of
being acquainted with it. The world knows that Lord Nelson can fight
the battles of his country: but a constant and confidential
correspondence with this great man, for a considerable portion of
time, has taught me, that he is not less capable of providing for its
political interests and honour, on occasions of great delicacy and
embarrassment. In that new capacity I have witnessed a degree of
ability, judgment, temper, and conciliation, not always allied to the
sort of spirit which without an instant's hesitation can attack the
whole Spanish line with his single ship." Of Nelson's superior fitness
in this respect, the unfortunate choice of Sidney Smith for his
anomalous position was to furnish the Government an additional proof.

It was not in this matter only that maritime affairs in the East took
a turn contrary to Nelson's wishes. Since he had persuaded himself
that to bolster up the corrupt and tottering throne of Naples was the
most important of his functions, he had become desirous that the
isolation and blockade of the French army in Egypt,--a factor so
decisive by its numbers, its brilliant efficiency, and the singular
genius and renown of its general and his lieutenants,--should be
assumed by some of the allies of Great Britain, although he was never
slow to express his want of confidence in their navies. He was urgent,
both with the joint ministers and with the representatives of Russia
and Turkey, that the fleets of these two powers should relieve Hood
off Alexandria, in order to strengthen his own hands on the coast of
Italy and off Malta. Neither Russia nor Turkey was easily to be
convinced. Egypt was no affair of the former's, except as it concerned
the general cause; and from that point of view it was as much the
business of Great Britain, already on the spot, as it was hers. With
twenty thousand troops about to enter into a campaign in Northern
Italy, as allies of Austria, Russia had undeniable interests there, as
well as in the Ionian Islands, which commanded the entrance to the
Adriatic, a sea important to communications between Austria and
Lombardy. The islands also were, in the hands of France, a threat to
the Turkish mainland. It was against these, therefore, that the
Russo-Turkish forces directed their efforts, greatly to Nelson's
disgust, and there they remained, chained by the obstinate resistance
of Corfu, until the 1st of March, 1799, when it surrendered. The
fifty-gun ship "Leander," which had been taken by the French
seventy-four "Généreux," when carrying Nelson's despatches after the
Nile, was here recaptured and restored to Great Britain.

Nelson viewed the progress and policy of Russia with a mind fully
imbued with the distrust, which, for the last quarter of a century,
had been supplanting gradually the previous friendly feeling of Great
Britain toward that country. As soon as he heard of the intention to
attack the islands, in November, 1798, he hurried off Troubridge to
anticipate a seizure which he expected to be more easy than it proved.
"You will proceed to sea without a moment's loss of time," his
instructions ran, "and make the best of your way to the Island of
Zante; and if the Russians have not taken possession of that island
and Cephalonia, you will send on shore by the Priest I shall desire to
accompany you, my Declaration. If you can get possession of the
islands before named, you will send my Declaration into the Island of
Corfu, and use your utmost endeavours to get possession of it....
Should the Russians have taken possession of these Islands and be
cruizing near with the Turkish fleet, you will pay a visit to the
Turkish admiral, and by saluting him (if he consents to return gun for
gun) and every other mark of respect and attention, gain his
confidence. You will judge whether he is of a sufficient rank to hold
a confidential conversation with." It is evident that Nelson's action
was precipitated by the news of the Russian movement, and its tenor
dictated by a wish to sow distrust between Turkey and Russia. The
omission of any mention of a Russian admiral is most significant.
"Captain Troubridge was absolutely under sail," he wrote to Spencer
Smith, "when I heard with sorrow that the Russians were there." His
eagerness in the matter is the more evident, in that he thus detached
Troubridge at the moment when he was about to start for Leghorn, where
his trusted subordinate and his ship would be greatly needed.

"I was in hopes that a part of the united Turkish and Russian squadron
would have gone to Egypt--the first object of the Ottoman arms," he
tells the Turkish admiral. "Corfu is a secondary consideration." To
Spencer Smith he writes: "I have had a long and friendly conference
with Kelim Effendi on the conduct likely to be pursued by the Russian
Court towards the unsuspicious (I fear) and upright Turk. The Porte
ought to be aware of the very great danger at a future day of allowing
the Russians to get footing at Corfu, and I hope they will keep them
in the East. Our ideas have exactly been the same about Russia....
Surely I had a right to expect that the united fleets would have taken
care of the things east of Candia. I never wished to have them west of
it." "The Russians seem to me to be more intent on taking ports in the
Mediterranean than destroying Bonaparte in Egypt."

It was well known at this time that the Czar was looking towards Malta
and the restoration of the Order of the Knights, of which he had been
elected Grand Master the previous October, immediately after
Bonaparte's seizure of the island became known. Nelson held that the
King of Naples was the legitimate sovereign, and he directed Captain
Ball, his own representative there, to have all the Maltese posts and
forces fly the Neapolitan flag; but he, with Hamilton, got a note from
the King, promising that Malta should never be transferred to any
other Power without the consent of England. "Should any Russian ships,
or admiral, arrive off Malta," he instructed Ball, "you will convince
him of the very unhandsome manner of treating the legitimate sovereign
of Malta, by wishing to see the Russian flag fly in Malta, and also of
me, who command the forces of a Power in such close alliance with the
Russian Emperor, which have been blockading and attacking Malta for
near six months. The Russians shall never take the lead."

Three weeks later he authorized Ball, with the consent of the King, to
preside over the meetings of the Maltese chiefs, and, by the desire of
his Sicilian Majesty, the British flag was to be hoisted alongside the
Sicilian in every place where the latter was flown, "side by side,
that of England being on the right hand," to show that the island was
under the special protection of Great Britain during the war. On the
23d of March he cordially congratulates the Russian admiral upon the
fall of Corfu, news of which he has just received, and he mentions,
meaningly, "The flag of his Sicilian Majesty, with that of Great
Britain, is flying on all parts of Malta, except the town of Valetta,
the inhabitants of which have, with his Sicilian Majesty's consent,
put themselves under the protection of Great Britain." "I attach no
value to it for us," he said explicitly to the First Lord, meaning, no
doubt, for the purposes of the existing war. This opinion was
perfectly consonant to the secondary importance he had latterly
attributed to the presence of the British in the Levant, as compared
to their duties towards Naples, but though he reiterated it in the
later war, it was with the express qualification that, for the
security of communication with India, not then in question, the value
of the island was indisputable.

But if, positively, Malta was of little use to England,--"a useless
and enormous expense," to use his own words,--yet, negatively, the
consequences of its passing into the hands of a powerful rival were
too serious to be permitted. "Any expense should be incurred rather
than let it remain in the hands of the French." The same distrust of
the Russians was suggested by his keen political insight. "You will
observe what is said in the despatches of the Consul at Corfu," he
writes to St. Vincent, "respecting the Russians being ordered to
Malta. I know this is a favourite object of the Emperor's, and is a
prelude to a future war with the good Turk, when Constantinople will
change masters. This is so clear, that a man must be blind not to see
it." "I have just received the Emperor of Russia's picture in a box
magnificently set with diamonds; it has done him honour and me a
pleasure to have my conduct approved;" "but," he tells Ball,
significantly, "this shall not prevent my keeping a sharp lookout on
his movements against the good Turk." As regards Paul I., ferocious
and half crazy as he was, this imputation of merely interested
foresight scarcely did justice to the quixotic passions which often
impelled him to the most unselfish acts, but the general tendency was
undeniable; and Nelson's watchful attitude exemplifies the numerous
diplomatic, as well as military, responsibilities that weighed upon
him. He was, practically, commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean,
even if Government refused to recognize the fact by reward, or by
proper staff appointments; for St. Vincent, autocratic as he was
towards others, could roll off upon Nelson all his responsibilities
there,--"the uncontrolled direction of the naval part," were his own
words,--and sleep quietly. Despite his objections to the island
itself, and his enthusiastic fidelity to the Neapolitan royal house,
Nelson had evidently the presentiment that Malta must come to Great
Britain, a solution which Ball and the Maltese themselves were urging
upon him. "A Neapolitan garrison would betray it to the first man who
would bribe him," he wrote; which, if true, left to Great Britain no
other alternative than to take it herself. Neither he, Troubridge, nor
the sovereigns, had confidence in the fidelity of Neapolitan officers.

The blockade of Malta was maintained with great tenacity, and,
coupled with the maritime prostration of France in the Mediterranean,
resulted in a complete isolation of the French garrison in La Valetta
by sea, the Maltese people hemming it in by land. By the 1st of May
Ball had erected a battery at the head of the harbor, sweeping it to
the entrance, so that the French ships, one of which was the
"Guillaume Tell," eighty, that had escaped from Aboukir, had to be
kept in the coves. These affairs of Malta brought Nelson into
difficult diplomatic relations with the Barbary States, Tunis and
Tripoli. The island not affording sufficient food, strenuous efforts
had to be made by him and Ball to get grain from Sicily and elsewhere,
a matter very difficult of accomplishment even were the transit
unmolested; but these petty Mussulman states, for the purposes of
piracy, kept themselves in formal war with Naples and Portugal, and
frequently captured vessels under the Sicilian flag carrying corn to
Malta. The British had too much on hand now to spare readily the force
necessary to put down these depredators, at whose misdeeds they had
winked in quieter days; and it required all Nelson's tact, combining
threats with compliments, and with appeals to the prejudices of
believers in God against those who denied Him, to keep the marauding
within bounds. The irrepressible activity of Bonaparte's emissaries
also stirred the Beys up to measures friendly to France. "The infamous
conduct of the French during the whole war, has at last called down
the vengeance of all true Mussulmen," he writes to the Bey of Tunis;
"and your Highness, I am sure, will agree with me that Divine
Providence will never permit these infidels to God to go unpunished.
The conduct of your Highness reflects upon you the very highest
honour. Although I have a squadron of Portuguese ships under my
orders, I have prevented their cruizing against the vessels of war of
your Highness. For at this moment all wars should cease, and all the
world should join in endeavouring to extirpate from off the face of
the earth this race of murderers, oppressors, and unbelievers."

After these preliminary compliments, Nelson presents his grievances.
He has given the passports of a British admiral to Sicilian vessels
_bonâ fide_ employed in carrying grain to the besiegers of the French,
and to such only; and he must insist upon those passports being
respected, as the vessels bearing them are serving the great common
cause. He demands, also, that aid be not given to the common enemy. "I
was rejoiced," he writes the Bashaw of Tripoli, "to find that you had
renounced the treaty you had so imprudently entered into with some
emissaries of General Bonaparte--that man of blood, that despoiler of
the weak, that enemy of all true Musselmen; for, like Satan, he only
flatters that he may the more easily destroy; and it is true, that
since the year 1789, all Frenchmen are exactly of the same
disposition." His Highness, however, has relapsed into his former
errors. "It is now my duty to speak out, and not to be misunderstood.
That Nelson who has hitherto kept your powerful enemies from
destroying you, can, and will, let them loose upon you, unless the
following terms are, in two hours, complied with.... If these proper
terms are not complied with, I can no longer prevent the Portuguese
ships from acting with vigour against your Highness. Your Highness
will, without difficulty, write me a letter, the substance of which
will be dictated by the British consul."

The vehemence with which the French are here denounced, though pitched
in a key deemed harmonious to the ears for which it was immediately
intended, was entirely consonant to the feelings which had lately
taken possession of Nelson. They were the result, probably, in part,
of the anxious rancor bred by the uncertainties and worry of the
pursuit of Bonaparte; in part, also, of more direct contact than
before with the unbridled license which the French Government and its
generals, impelled by dire necessity and by an unquestionable lack of
principle, had given to the system of making war support war. The
feebleness and corruption of the Directory had relaxed the reins of
discipline from top to bottom, and a practice which finds its
justification only when executed with the strictest method and
accountability, had degenerated into little better than disorganized
pillage. "'Down, down with the French!' is my constant prayer."
"'_Down, down_ with the French!' ought to be placed in the
council-room of every country in the world." "To serve my King, and to
destroy the French, I consider as the great order of all, from which
little ones spring; and if one of these little ones militate against
it, I go back to obey the great order and object, to _down, down_ with
the damned French villains. Excuse my warmth; but my blood boils at
the name of a Frenchman. I hate them all--Royalists and Republicans."
Infidels, robbers, and murderers are the characteristic terms. This
detestation of the legitimate enemy spread, intensified, to those who
supported them in Naples,--the Jacobins, as they were called. "Send me
word some proper heads are taken off," he wrote to Troubridge, "this
alone will comfort me." "Our friend Troubridge had a present made him
the other day, of the head of a Jacobin," he tells St. Vincent, "and
makes an apology to me, the weather being very hot, for not sending it
here!" Upon the copy of the letter accompanying this ghastly gift to
him, Troubridge had written, "A jolly fellow. T. Troubridge." The
exasperation to which political animosities had given rise may be
gauged by the brutal levity shown in this incident, by men of the
masculine and generous characters of Troubridge and Nelson, and should
not be forgotten in estimating the actions that in due consequence
followed.

The duties as well as the anxieties of his situation bore heavily upon
Nelson, and may help to account, in combination with the tide of
adverse fortune now running strongly, for the depression that weighed
upon him. "My public correspondence, besides the business of sixteen
sail-of-the-line, and all our commerce, is with Petersburg,
Constantinople, the Consul at Smyrna, Egypt, the Turkish and Russian
admirals, Trieste, Vienna, Tuscany, Minorca, Earl St. Vincent, and
Lord Spencer. This over, what time can I have for any private
correspondence?" Yet, admitting freely that there is a limit beyond
which activity may cease to please, what has become of the joyous
spirit, which wrote, not four years before: "This I like, active
service or none!" Occupying one of the most distinguished posts open
to the Navy; practically, and almost formally, independent; at the
very head and centre of the greatest interests,--his zeal, while
preserving all its intensity, has lost all its buoyancy. "My dear
Lord," he tells St. Vincent, alluding at the moment to his stepson
Nisbet, "there is no true happiness in this life, and in my present
state I could quit it with a smile." "My spirits have received such a
shock," he writes some days after, to the wife of his early patron,
Sir Peter Parker, "that I think they cannot recover it. You who
remember me always laughing and gay, would hardly believe the change;
but who can see what I have and be well in health? Kingdoms lost and a
royal family in distress." "Believe me," he confides to his intimate
friend Davison a month later, "my only wish is to sink with honour
into the grave, and when that shall please God, I shall meet death
with a smile. Not that I am insensible to the honours and riches my
King and Country have heaped upon me, so much more than any officer
could deserve; yet I am ready to quit this world of trouble, and envy
none but those of the estate six feet by two." "I am at times ill at
ease, but it is my duty to submit, and you may be sure I will not quit
my post without absolute necessity." "What a state I am in!" he writes
of one of those perplexities inevitable to an officer in his
position. "If I go, I risk Sicily; as I stay, my heart is breaking."
This is not the natural temper of a man to whom difficulties and
perplexities had been, and were yet again to be, a trumpet call that
stirred to animation, a stimulant that steadied the nerves, and sent
the blood coursing with new life through heart and brain. Mingled as
these expressions were with despondent broodings over his health, even
if the latter were well founded, they are the voice of a mind which
has lost the spring of self-content. The sense of duty abides, but
dogged, cheerless; respondent rather to the force of habit than to the
generous ardor of former days.

For over two months after the flight to Palermo, the condition of
affairs for the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was seemingly critical to
the verge of desperation; for neither the preparations of the
Coalition, nor the hollowness of the French successes, were
understood, and news was slow to reach the remote city where the Court
now dwelt. The republican movement extended, though superficially, to
the toe of Italy, many of the towns in Calabria planting the tree of
liberty, and the new flag flying on the islands along the coast.
Sicily, though hostile to the French, was discontented with the
existing government, and disaffection there was feared. In that,
Nelson truly observed, lay the danger. "Respecting an invasion of the
French, I have no alarms; if this island is true to itself no harm can
happen." Nevertheless, "it is proper to be prepared for defence, and,"
if Calabria is occupied by the French, "the first object is the
preservation of Messina."

For this purpose he ordered the Portuguese squadron there, immediately
after he reached Palermo; and, when the outlook grew more threatening,
appealed to the Turkish and Russian admirals to send a detachment to
the Straits. General Stuart, commanding the troops in Minorca, which
had passed into the hands of Great Britain the previous November, was
entreated to detail a garrison for the citadel of Messina, as no
dependence was placed upon the Neapolitan troops. Stuart complied, and
the citadel was occupied by two English regiments about the 10th of
March. The danger, however, was considered sufficiently imminent to
withdraw to Palermo the transports lying at Syracuse; a step which
could not have been necessary had Nelson made Syracuse, as he at first
intended, the base of operations for the British fleet, and suggests
the idea, which he himself avows, that his own presence with the Court
was rather political than military[80] in its utility, dependent upon
the fears of their own subjects felt by the sovereigns. While these
measures were being taken he endeavored, though fruitlessly, to bring
matters to a conclusion at Alexandria and Malta, in order to release
the ships there employed and fetch them to the coast of Naples. "The
moment the Emperor moves," he wrote to St. Vincent, "I shall go with
all the ships I can collect into the Bay of Naples, to create a
diversion." Nothing certain can be said as yet, "whether all is lost
or may yet be saved; that must depend upon the movements of the
Emperor." Yet it was the hand of the emperor which he had advised the
King of Naples to force, by his ill-timed advance.

Troubridge rejoined the Flag at Palermo on the 17th of March, having
turned over the command in the Levant to Sir Sidney Smith, after an
ineffectual attempt to destroy the French shipping in Alexandria. By
this time matters had begun to mend. Calabria had returned to its
loyalty, and the insurrection of the peasantry against the French was
general throughout the country, and in the Roman State. The Directory,
taking umbrage at the advance of Russian troops to the frontiers of
Austria, demanded explanations from the latter, and when these proved
unsatisfactory directed its armies to take the offensive. The French
advanced into Germany on the first of March, and in Italy towards the
end of the month. But the action of the French Government, though
audacious and imposing, rested upon no solid foundation of efficiency
in the armies, or skill in the plan of campaign. Serious reverses soon
followed, and the fatally ex-centric position of the corps in Naples
was then immediately apparent.

Before this news could reach Palermo, however, Nelson had sent
Troubridge with four ships-of-the-line and some smaller vessels to the
Bay of Naples, to blockade it, and to enter into communication, if
possible, with the loyalists in the city. As the extreme reluctance of
the King and Queen prevented his going in person,--a reason the
sufficiency of which it is difficult to admit,--Nelson hoisted his
flag on board a transport in the bay, and sent the flagship, in order
not to diminish the force detailed for such important duties. Within a
week the islands in the immediate neighborhood of Naples--Procida,
Ischia, Capri, and the Ponzas--had again hoisted the royal ensign. On
the 22d of April the French evacuated the city, with the exception of
the Castle of St. Elmo, in which they left a garrison of five hundred
men. In Upper Italy their armies were in full retreat, having been
forced back from the Adige to the Adda, whence an urgent message was
sent to Macdonald, Championnet's successor at Naples, to fall back to
the northward and effect a junction with the main body, soon to be
sorely pressed by an overwhelming force of the Austro-Russians, at
whose head was the famous Suwarrow. On the 29th the Allies entered
Milan, and on the 7th of May the northern French, now under the
command of Moreau, had retired as far as Alessandria, in Piedmont. On
this same day, Macdonald, having thrown garrisons into Capua and
Gaeta, evacuated the kingdom of Naples, and hastened northward to join
Moreau. With the exception of these fortified posts and the city of
Naples, the country was now overrun by the Christian army, the name
applied to the numerous but utterly undisciplined bands of rude
peasantry, attached to the royal cause, and led by Cardinal Ruffo. The
Jacobins in the city still held out, and had in the bay a small naval
force under the command of Commodore Caracciolo.

Troubridge's successes continued. A week later Salerno had been taken,
and the royal colors were flying at Castellamare, on the opposite side
of the Bay from Naples, and distant from it only twelve miles by land.
Nelson questioned Troubridge about the return of the King, whose most
evident political conviction was that the success of the royal cause
was vitally connected with the safety of the royal person. "What are
your ideas of the King's going into the Bay of Naples, without foreign
troops? If it should cause insurrection [of the royalists] in Naples
which did not succeed, would it not be worse? The King, if a rising of
loyal people took place, ought to be amongst them; and that he will
never consent to." "The King, God bless him! is a philosopher," he had
said, repeating an expression of Lady Hamilton's, referring to the
disasters which caused the headlong flight from Rome, through Naples,
to Palermo; "but the great Queen feels sensibly all that has
happened." The Queen also was extremely fearful, and Nelson intimated
to St. Vincent that a request would be made for British troops to
protect the sovereigns. "Their Majesties are ready to cross the water
whenever Naples is entirely cleansed. When that happy event arrives,
and not till then, a desire will be expressed for the British troops
to be removed from Messina into Naples to guard the persons of their
Majesties." That Nelson should have considered it essential to
maintain in power, by any means, sovereigns devoted to Great Britain,
is perfectly comprehensible. What is difficult to understand is the
esteem he continued to profess, for those whose unheroic bearing so
belied the words he had written six months before: "His Majesty is
determined to conquer or die at the head of his army." Under other
conditions and influences, none would have been more forward to
express dissatisfaction and contempt.

Withal, despite the favorable outlook of affairs and the most joyous
season of the year, his depression of spirits continued. "I am far
from well," he writes on the 3d of May, "and the good news of the
success of the Austrian arms in Italy does not even cheer me." But in
the midst of the full current of success, and of his own gloom, an
incident suddenly occurred which threw everything again into confusion
and doubt, and roused him for the time from his apathy. On the 12th of
May a brig arrived at Palermo, with news that a French fleet of
nineteen ships-of-the-line had escaped from Brest, and had been seen
less than a fortnight before off Oporto, steering for the
Mediterranean.

FOOTNOTES:

[80] Palermo possessed a strategic advantage over Syracuse, in that, with
westerly winds, it was to windward, especially as regards Naples; and it
was also nearer the narrowest part of the passage between Sicily and
Africa, the highway to the Levant and Egypt. With easterly winds, the enemy
of course could not proceed thither; and at this time there was no enemy's
force in the Mediterranean, so that westward movements had not to be
apprehended. All dangers must come from the westward. These considerations
were doubtless present to Nelson; but the author has not found any mention
of them by him at this period.




CHAPTER XIII.

FROM THE INCURSION OF THE FRENCH FLEET UNDER BRUIX TO THE RESTORATION
OF THE ROYAL AUTHORITY AT NAPLES.--THE CARACCIOLO EXECUTION.--NELSON'S
DISOBEDIENCE TO ADMIRAL LORD KEITH.

MAY-JULY, 1799. AGE, 40.


The intention of the French to send a fleet into the Mediterranean had
transpired some time before, and the motive--to retrieve the
destruction of their naval power in that sea by the Battle of the
Nile--was so obvious that the attempt was regarded as probable. As far
back as the 7th of January, Nelson had written to Commodore Duckworth,
commanding the detachment of four ships-of-the-line at Minorca, that
he had received notification of the force expected from Brest. If they
got into the Mediterranean, he was confident they would go first to
Toulon, and he wished to concert beforehand with Duckworth, who was
not under his orders, the steps necessary to be taken at once, if the
case arose. He did not think, so he wrote to Ball, that they would
venture a squadron to Malta or Alexandria, in view of the certain
destruction which in the end must befall it, even if successful in
reaching the port.

Both remarks show that he did not look for the number of ships that
were sent--nineteen, as the first news said, twenty-five, as was
actually the case. An emergency so great and so imminent drew out all
his latent strength, acute judgment, and promptitude. The brig that
brought the news was sent off the same night to Naples, with orders to
proceed from there to Minorca and Gibraltar, and to notify Duckworth
and St. Vincent what Nelson intended to do. A cutter sailed at the
same time for Malta. Troubridge and Ball were both directed to send or
bring all their ships-of-the-line, save one each, to Minorca, there to
unite with Duckworth. Troubridge's ships were to call off Palermo for
further instructions, but not to lose time by coming to anchor there.
Expresses were sent to the different ports of Sicily, in case any
Russian or Turkish ships had arrived, to put them on their guard, and
to request co-operation by joining the force assembling off Minorca,
where Nelson reasoned Lord St. Vincent also would repair. To the
latter he wrote: "Eight, nine, or ten sail of the line shall, in a few
days, be off Mahon, ready to obey your orders (not in the port);" for
his intention was that they should remain outside under sail. "You may
depend upon my exertion, and I am only sorry that I cannot move[81] to
your help, but this island appears to hang on my stay. Nothing could
console the Queen this night, but my promise not to leave them unless
the battle was to be fought off Sardinia."

The next day he wrote again in similar terms, seeking to reconcile his
promise to the Queen with his impulses, and, it may be said safely,
with his duty. "Should you come upwards without a battle, I hope in
that case you will afford me an opportunity of joining you; for my
heart would break to be near my commander-in-chief, and not assisting
him at such a time. What a state I am in! If I go, I risk, and more
than risk, Sicily, and what is now safe on the Continent; for we know,
from experience, that more depends on _opinion_ than on acts
themselves. As I stay, my heart is breaking; and, to mend the matter,
I am seriously unwell."

That evening, the 13th, at nine o'clock, a lieutenant arrived, who had
been landed to the westward of Palermo by a sloop-of-war, the
"Peterel," she not being able to beat up to the city against the east
wind prevailing. From him Nelson learned that the French fleet had
passed the Straits, and had been seen off Minorca. The next day, the
"Peterel" having come off the port, he went alongside, and sent her on
at once to Malta, with orders to Ball to abandon the blockade,
bringing with him all his ships, and to proceed off Maritimo, a small
island twenty miles west of Sicily, where he now proposed to
concentrate his squadron and to go himself. Troubridge, having already
orders to come to Palermo, needed no further instructions, except to
bring all his ships, instead of leaving one at Naples. Every
ship-of-the-line in the squadron, including the Portuguese, was thus
summoned to join the Flag, in a position to cover Palermo and the
approaches to the eastern Mediterranean. To these necessary
dispositions was owing that the senior officer left at Naples was
Captain Foote, who afterwards signed the articles of capitulation with
the insurgents, which gave such offence to Nelson, and have occasioned
much controversy in connection with his subsequent action.

Troubridge, having sailed at once on receipt of his first orders,
arrived on the 17th with three British ships and one Portuguese. A
heavy gale prevented Nelson getting to sea till the 20th, when he
sailed, and was joined the next morning by the fourth ship from
Naples. The same day came a Portuguese corvette from Gibraltar and
Mahon, with letters from St. Vincent and Duckworth. The former
announced that the French had passed the Straits, and that he was
about to start in pursuit. Duckworth, who also was asked to join off
Maritimo, declined to do so, saying that he must await the
commander-in-chief. Nelson had of course immediately communicated to
the latter his change of plan. He hoped to collect ten
sail-of-the-line, which, "if Duckworth reinforce me, will enable me to
look the enemy in the face"--fourteen ships to nineteen; "but should
any of the Russians or Turks be off Malta, I hope to get a force of
different nations equal to the enemy, when not a moment shall be lost
in bringing them to battle."

On the 23d of May he was off Maritimo with seven ships, Ball not
having joined yet. His spirits were fast rising, as in thought he drew
near the enemy. "Duckworth means to leave me to my fate," he wrote to
Lady Hamilton. "Never mind; if I can get eleven sail together, they
shall not hurt me." "I am under no apprehension for the safety of his
Majesty's squadron," he said in a circular letter to his scattered
vessels, designed to heighten their ardor; "on the contrary, from the
very high state of discipline of the ships, I am confident, should the
enemy force us to battle, that we shall cut a very respectable figure;
and if Admiral Duckworth joins, not one moment shall be lost in my
attacking the enemy." It must be mentioned that St. Vincent had
expressed his opinion that the French were bound for Malta and
Alexandria, and Nelson, when he wrote these words, was hourly
expecting to see their sails appear on the horizon. He did not know
yet, however, that they were twenty-five, instead of nineteen, of the
line. To St. Vincent he expressed himself with the sober, dauntless
resolution of a consummate warrior, who recognized that opportunities
must be seized, and detachments, if need be, sacrificed, for the
furtherance of a great common object. "Your Lordship may depend that
the squadron under my command shall never fall into the hands of the
enemy; and before we are destroyed, I have little doubt but the enemy
will have their wings so completely clipped that they may be easily
overtaken"--by you. In this temper he waited. It is this clear
perception of the utility of his contemplated grapple with superior
numbers, and not the headlong valor and instinct for fighting that
unquestionably distinguished him, which constitutes the excellence of
Nelson's genius. This it was which guided him in the great Trafalgar
campaign, and the lack of which betrayed Villeneuve at the same
period to his wretched shortcomings. Yet, as has before been remarked,
mere insight, however accurate and penetrating, ends only in itself,
or at best falls far short of the mark, unless accompanied by Nelson's
great power of disregarding contingencies--an inspired blindness,
which at the moment of decisive action sees, not the risks, but the
one only road to possible victory.

Whilst thus expecting an engagement which, from the disparity of
numbers, could be nothing short of desperate, he drew up a codicil to
his will, making to Lady Hamilton a bequest, in terms that show how
complete were the infatuation and idealization now in possession of
his mind: "I give and bequeath to my dear friend, Emma Hamilton, wife
of the Right Hon. Sir William Hamilton, a nearly round box set with
diamonds, said to have been sent me by the mother of the Grand Signor,
which I request she will accept (and never part from) as token of
regard and respect for her very eminent virtues (for she, the said
Emma Hamilton, possesses them all to such a degree that it would be
doing her injustice was any particular one to be mentioned) from her
faithful and affectionate friend." During this short cruise he wrote
her almost daily, and at some length, in addition to the more official
communications addressed to Hamilton. At this same period he was
excusing himself to his wife for the shortness and infrequency of his
letters: "Pray attribute it to the true cause--viz., that in truth my
poor hand cannot execute what my head tells me I ought to do."

On the 28th of May Nelson received letters from St. Vincent, dated the
21st, off Minorca, which put him in possession of the movements of the
enemy up to that date. The French fleet, under the command of Admiral
Bruix, had appeared on the 4th of the month off Cadiz. It was then
blowing a half-gale of wind, and the French admiral did not care,
under that condition, to engage the fifteen British ships-of-the-line
which were cruising off the harbor, under Lord Keith, who had come out
from England the previous autumn to be St. Vincent's second in
command. The intended junction with the Spanish squadron in Cadiz
being thus thwarted, Bruix passed the Straits on the 5th, and Lord St.
Vincent, having recalled Keith, followed on the 12th with sixteen
ships. On the 20th he joined Duckworth, and learned that the enemy,
when last seen, were heading for Toulon. Keith's removal had uncovered
Cadiz, and St. Vincent fully expected that the Spanish fleet would
leave there for the Mediterranean, which it did, and on the 20th
entered Cartagena, to the number of seventeen of the line, but much
crippled from a stormy passage. This Nelson did not yet know, nor that
Bruix had reached Toulon on the 14th of May, and sailed again on the
26th for the eastward.

Satisfied that the enemy would not at once come his way, and knowing
that a vessel had passed up the Mediterranean from St. Vincent to put
Sidney Smith on his guard, Nelson ordered Ball to resume the blockade
of Malta with two ships-of-the-line. The rest of his squadron he kept
massed, and took to Palermo, where he arrived May 29th. Lookout ships
were stationed off the north end of Corsica and west of Sardinia. "My
reason for remaining in Sicily," he wrote St. Vincent, "is the
covering the blockade of Naples, and the certainty of preserving
Sicily in case of an attack, for if we were to withdraw our ships, it
would throw such a damp on the people that I am sure there would be no
resistance."

On the 6th of June Duckworth arrived at Palermo from the main fleet,
with four ships-of-the-line, among them the "Foudroyant," eighty. This
ship had been designated originally for Nelson's flag, and he shifted
to her from the "Vanguard" on the 8th. Duckworth brought a report that
St. Vincent was about to give up the command and go home, on account
of ill-health. This at once aroused Nelson's anxiety, for he had long
felt that few superiors would have the greatness of mind to trust him
as implicitly, and humor him as tenderly, as the great admiral had
done. It is not every one that can handle an instrument of such
trenchant power, yet delicate temper, as Nelson's sensitive genius.
The combination in St. Vincent of perfect professional capacity with
masterful strength of character, had made the tactful respect he
showed to Nelson's ability peculiarly grateful to the latter; and had
won from him a subordination of the will, and an affection, which no
subsequent commander-in-chief could elicit. He wrote to him:--

    MY DEAR LORD,--We have a report that you are going home. This
    distresses us most exceedingly, and myself in particular; so
    much so, that I have serious thoughts of returning, if that
    event should take place. But for the sake of our Country, do not
    quit us at this serious moment. I wish not to detract from the
    merit of whoever may be your successor; but it must take a
    length of time, which I hope the war will not give, to be in any
    manner a St. Vincent. We look up to you, as we have always found
    you, as to our Father, under whose fostering care we have been
    led to fame.... Give not up a particle of your authority to any
    one; be again our St. Vincent, and we shall be happy.

    Your affectionate NELSON.

This letter did not reach St. Vincent before he carried his purpose
into effect; but Nelson never quite forgave the abandonment of the
command at such a moment. In after years he spoke bitterly of it, as a
thing he himself could not have done; failing, perhaps, to realize the
difference in staying power between forty-five and sixty-five.

On the 2d of June, being then seventy miles southwest of Toulon, St.
Vincent turned over to Keith the command of the twenty
ships-of-the-line then with him, and went to Port Mahon. For the
moment he retained in his own hands the charge of the
station,--continued Commander-in-chief,--with headquarters at Minorca,
and two divisions cruising: one of twenty ships, with Keith, between
Toulon and Minorca, and one of sixteen, including three Portuguese,
under Nelson in the waters of Sicily. Friction between these two began
at once. Lord Keith was an accomplished and gallant officer,
methodical, attentive, and correct; but otherwise he rose little above
the commonplace, and, while he could not ignore Nelson's great
achievements, he does not seem to have had the insight which could
appreciate the rare merit underlying them, nor the sympathetic
temperament which could allow for his foibles. Nelson, exasperated at
the mere fact of the other's succession to the command, speedily
conceived for him an antipathy which Keith would have been more than
mortal not to return; but it is to the honor of the latter's
self-command that, while insisting upon obedience from his brilliant
junior, he bore his refractoriness with dignified patience.

After St. Vincent left him, Keith continued to stand to the northward
and eastward. On the 5th of June he received certain information that
the French fleet, now twenty-two ships-of-the-line, was in Vado Bay.
This word he at once sent on to Nelson. Next day his division was so
close in with the Riviera, off Antibes, that it was fired upon by the
shore batteries; but the wind coming to the eastward, when off Monaco,
did not permit it to pass east of Corsica, and, fearing that the
French would take that route and fall upon Nelson, Keith detached to
him two seventy-fours, which joined him on the 13th of June.

At the moment of their arrival Nelson had just quitted Palermo for
Naples, taking with him the whole squadron. The King of Naples had
formally requested him to afford to the royal cause at the capital the
assistance of the fleet, because the successes of the royalists
elsewhere in the kingdom rendered imminent an insurrection in the
city against the republican party and the French, which held the
castles; and such insurrection, unless adequately supported, might
either fail or lead to deplorable excesses. Lady Hamilton, whose
irregular interference in State concerns receives here singular
illustration, strongly urged this measure in a letter, written to the
admiral after an interview with the Queen. Nelson consented, took on
board seventeen hundred troops, with the Hereditary Prince, who was to
represent the King,--the latter not wishing to go,--and was already
clear of Palermo Bay when the two ships from Keith appeared. Gathering
from their information that the French were bound for Naples or
Sicily, in which his own judgment coincided, he returned at once into
port, landed the Prince and the troops, and then took the squadron
again off Maritimo, where he expected Ball and the two ships off Malta
to join him without delay. "The French force being twenty-two sail of
the line," he wrote in suppressed reproach to Keith, "four of which
are first rates, the force with me being only sixteen of the line, not
one of which was of three decks, three being Portuguese, and one of
the English being a sixty-four, very short of men, I had no choice
left but to return to Palermo."

With this incident of the insufficient reinforcement sent, began the
friction with Keith which appears more openly in his correspondence
with others. To St. Vincent, still commander-in-chief, he wrote: "I
send a copy of my letter to Lord Keith, and I have only stated my
regret that his Lordship could not have sent me a force fit to face
the enemy: but, as we are, I shall not get out of their way; although,
as I am, I cannot think myself justified in exposing the world (I may
almost say) to be plundered by these miscreants. I trust your Lordship
will not think me wrong in the painful determination I conceived
myself forced to make," that is, to go back to Palermo, "for agonized
indeed was the mind of your Lordship's faithful and affectionate
servant."

Nelson appears to have felt that the return to Palermo, though
imperative, in view of the relative forces of himself and the French,
would not only postpone and imperil the restoration of the royal
family, but would bring discredit upon himself for not seeking and
fighting the enemy's fleet. "I shall wait off Maritimo," he wrote
Keith, "anxiously expecting such a reinforcement as may enable me to
go in search of the enemy's fleet, when not one moment shall be lost
in bringing them to battle; for," he continues, with one of those
flashes of genius which from time to time, unconsciously to himself,
illuminate his writings, "I consider the best defence for his Sicilian
Majesty's dominions is to place myself alongside the French." "My
situation is a cruel one," he wrote to Hamilton, "and I am sure Lord
Keith has lowered me in the eyes of Europe, for they will only know of
18 sail, [Ball having joined], and not of the description of them; it
has truly made me ill." But, although not justified in seeking them,
he had off Maritimo taken a strategic position which would enable him
to intercept their approach to either Naples or Sicily, "and I was
firmly resolved," he wrote with another of his clear intuitions, "they
should not pass me without a battle, which would so cripple them that
they might be unable to proceed on any distant service." "On this you
may depend," he had written to Lady Hamilton, on the first cruise off
Maritimo, three weeks before, "that if my little squadron obeys my
signal, not a ship shall fall into the hands of the enemy; and I will
so cut them up, that they will not be fit even for a summer's cruise."

On the 20th of June, off Maritimo, he received a despatch from St.
Vincent that a reinforcement of twelve ships-of-the-line from the
Channel was then approaching Port Mahon, and that Keith, having
returned thither, had left again in search of Bruix, whose
whereabouts remained unknown. He was also notified that St. Vincent
had resigned all his command, leaving Keith commander-in-chief. Nelson
was convinced--"I knew," was his expression--that the French intended
going to Naples. He determined now to resume his enterprise against
the republicans in the city; a decision which caused him great and
unexplained mental conflict. "I am agitated," he wrote Hamilton the
same day, in a note headed "Most Secret," "but my resolution is fixed.
For Heaven's sake suffer not any one to oppose it. I shall not be gone
eight days. No harm can come to Sicily. I send my Lady and you Lord
St. Vincent's letter. I am full of grief and anxiety. I must go. It
will finish the war. It will give a sprig of laurel to your
affectionate friend, Nelson." The cause of this distress can only be
surmised, but is probably to be found in the fears of the Queen, and
in the differences existing at the time between herself and the King.
Possibly, too, Lady Hamilton's sympathy with the Queen, in a present
fear for Sicily, may have led her, contrary to the request so lately
made for the admiral to go to Naples, to second an entreaty that the
island should not now be exposed; and to refuse her may have caused
him pain. On the 21st he was at Palermo, and after two hours'
consultation with their Majesties and Acton, the Prime Minister, he
sailed again, accompanied in the "Foudroyant" on this occasion by Sir
William and Lady Hamilton, but not by the Hereditary Prince, nor the
Sicilian troops. On the 24th, at 9 P.M., he anchored in the Bay of
Naples. Flags of truce were at that moment flying on the castles of
Uovo and Nuovo, which were in the hands of the Neapolitan republicans,
and upon the frigate "Seahorse," whose commander had been the senior
British officer present, before Nelson's own appearance.

On the passage from Palermo, Nelson had received information that the
royalists,--with whom were co-operating some detachments of Russians
and Turks, as well as the British naval forces, under Captain Foote,
of the "Seahorse,"--had concluded an armistice with the French and
their Neapolitan allies, who were in possession of the castles. The
terms of the armistice, thus rumored, were that the castles, if not
relieved within twenty-one days, should then be surrendered; the
garrisons to march out with the honors of war, and to be transported
to Toulon in vessels to be furnished by the King of Naples. This
report was erroneous in important particulars, especially as to the
period of twenty-one days. What really had happened was, that a
capitulation had been concluded, which provided that the Neapolitan
insurgents should evacuate the two castles held by them--Uovo and
Nuovo--as soon as the transports were ready to take them to Toulon,
but not before. The French, in the castle of St. Elmo, were not
included in the arrangement, their only part being that it required
the ratification of their commander before becoming operative. This
ratification was given, and, when Nelson's squadron came in sight,[82]
the treaty had received the signature of all the parties interested;
the flags of truce indicating a cessation of hostilities until the
terms of the capitulation were carried into effect.

Nelson had been given full power by the King of the Two Sicilies to
act as his representative. He was also, as commander of the fleet, the
representative of the King of Great Britain among the allied forces,
which were acting in support of the royalist cause. The double
function introduces great confusion into the subsequent transactions,
especially as there are on record no formal credentials investing him
with the authority he claimed to have from the King of Naples. The
omission probably arose from the extreme shortness of his stay in
Palermo on the 21st--only two hours and a half elapsing, by the
"Foudroyant's" log, between the entering of the ship and her sailing
again; a time sufficient for an interview and a clear understanding,
but scarcely for drawing up a regular commission. The fact rests upon
his own statement, adequately supported, however, by inferences
reasonably to be drawn from expressions in letters to him, both from
the King and from Acton, the Prime Minister. That his power went so
far as to authorize him to remove Cardinal Ruffo, up to that time the
King's representative, would alone confirm the assertion of a man
habitually truthful. Sir William Hamilton also, writing to Greville,
and alluding to his official despatch by the same mail, says, "We had
full powers." It may be accepted that Nelson himself was entirely
satisfied that he was authorized at the time to act for the King, when
emergency required; and it is certain that letters were speedily sent,
empowering him to appoint a new government, as well as to arrest Ruffo
and to send him to Palermo in a British ship.

Seeing the flags of truce flying, from the two castles and the
"Seahorse," and being under the impression that has been stated as to
the terms of an armistice, which he called "infamous," Nelson
immediately made a signal annulling the truce, "being determined," he
wrote to Keith, "never to give my approbation to any terms with
Rebels, but that of unconditional submission." As the execution of the
capitulation depended upon the embarkation of the garrisons in the
transports which were to be provided, Nelson was entirely master of
the situation, so far as force went. Next morning, June 25th, he moved
his fleet of eighteen sail nearer in, mooring it in a close line of
battle before the city, and at the same time sent for twenty-two gun
and mortar vessels, then lying at the islands, with which he flanked
the ships-of-the-line. In this imposing array, significant at once of
inexorable purpose and irresistible power, he sent to Ruffo his
"opinion of the infamous terms entered into with the rebels," and also
two papers, to be by him forwarded to the insurgents and to the
French. From the latter, who had not treated, was required simply an
unconditional surrender; but the message to the insurgents, sent,
singularly enough, not from the representative of the King of Naples
but from the British admiral, ran as follows:--

    His Britannic Majesty's Ship Foudroyant, Naples Bay, 25th June,
    1799.

    Rear Admiral Lord Nelson, K.B., Commander of His Britannic
    Majesty's Fleet in the Bay of Naples, acquaints the Rebellious
    Subjects of His Sicilian Majesty in the Castles of Uovo and
    Nuovo, that he will not permit them to embark or quit those
    places. They must surrender themselves to His Majesty's royal
    mercy.

    NELSON.

Ruffo refused to send the papers in, and said decisively that, if
Nelson saw fit to break the armistice then existing, between the
signature of the capitulation and its execution, he would aid neither
with men nor guns. Finally, he went on board the "Foudroyant;" but
after an animated discussion, which rose nearly to an altercation,
neither party yielded his ground. "I used every argument in my power,"
wrote Nelson, "to convince him that _the Treaty and Armistice was at
an end by the arrival of the fleet"_, and this therefore may be taken
to summarize his own position. He then gave the Cardinal a written
opinion that the treaty was one that "ought not to be carried out
without the approbation of His Sicilian Majesty." Neither his powers
nor Ruffo's, he argued, extended to granting such a capitulation.
Ruffo, indeed, had been expressly forbidden to do so; a fact which
rendered the paper void from the first. "Under this opinion," reported
Nelson to Keith, "the Rebels came out of the Castles;" "_as they
ought_," he wrote to his friend Davison, "and as I hope all those who
are false to their King and Country will, _to be hanged_, or otherwise
disposed of, as their sovereign thought proper." They were then placed
in transports, which were anchored under the guns of the fleet; and in
the end many of them were put to death.

For his action in this case Nelson has been severely blamed. The point
at issue is perfectly simple, however it may be decided. Disregarding
subordinate considerations, of which there are many, such as the
motives which induced Ruffo and Foote to grant terms, and the question
whether they would have been justified, which Nelson denied, in
conceding them under any conditions, the matter reduces itself to
this: When an agreement has been made, one of the parties to which is
acting only as a representative, not as a principal, nor accredited
for the specific purpose, has the principal, in person or by proxy, a
right to annul the agreement, provided, as in this case, it has not
passed into execution, either total or partial? Nelson admitted that
the persons of the insurgents would have been entitled to the immunity
stipulated, if they had already delivered up the castles. They had not
done so; the flags of truce marked only a cessation of hostilities,
not the completion of the transaction. By the terms, the evacuation
and embarkation were to be simultaneous: "The evacuation shall not
take place until the moment of embarkation." The status of the
opponents was in no wise altered by a paper which had not begun to
receive execution. The one important circumstance which had happened
was the arrival of the British squadron, instead of Bruix's fleet
which all were expecting. It was perfectly within Nelson's competence
to stop the proceedings at the point they had then reached.

[After writing the above, the author, by the courtesy of the Foreign
Office, received a copy of Sir William Hamilton's despatch of July 14,
1799, giving his account of the events happening after June 20th, the
date when Nelson left Palermo for Naples. In this occurs a statement
which would seriously modify, if not altogether destroy, the
justification of Nelson's conduct in annulling the capitulation, which
rests upon the condition that it had not received any substantial
execution. Hamilton says: "_When we anchored in this Bay the 24th of
June the capitulation of the castles had in some measure taken
place_.[83] Fourteen large Polacks or transport vessels _had taken on
board_ out of the castles the most conspicuous and criminal of the
Neapolitan Rebels, that had chosen to go to Toulon, the others had
_already_ been permitted with their property to return to their own
homes in this kingdom, and hostages selected from the first royalist
nobility of Naples had been sent into the castle of St. Elmo that
commands the city of Naples, and where a French garrison and the flag
of the French Republic was to remain until the news of the arrival of
the Neapolitan Rebels at Toulon.... There was no time to be lost, _for
the transport vessels were on the point of sailing for Toulon_, when
Lord Nelson ordered all the boats of his squadron to be manned and
armed, and to bring those vessels, with all the Rebels on board,
directly under the sterns of his ships, and there they remain, having
taken out and secured on board His Majesty's ships the most guilty
chiefs of the rebellion."

Occurring in an official despatch, from a minister of Nelson's
sovereign, his own warm personal friend and admirer, closely
associated with him throughout the proceedings, and his colleague and
adviser in much that was done, the words quoted, if they could stand
accepted as an accurate statement of occurrences, would establish that
Nelson had secured the persons of men who had surrendered on the faith
of a treaty, and had held them, subject to the tender mercies of the
King of the Two Sicilies. They were in his power (accepting Hamilton's
statement), only because the King's Vicar-General, his representative
so far as they knew, had guaranteed their safety if they came out of
the castles. The least they were entitled to, in such case, was to be
restored to the castles--not yet evacuated--to be placed as they were
before surrendering. It is true that, as the terms of the treaty made
embarkation and evacuation coincident, and as the latter had certainly
not taken place, it may be argued that they had no claim to immunity
when they had precipitated their action, and left the castle of their
own motion before the formal evacuation and embarkation; but one would
prefer not to rest on such a technical plea the justification of a
character generally so upright in his public acts as Lord Nelson.

Fortunately for his fame, there is adequate reason to believe--to be
assured--that Hamilton's despatch is very inaccurate in details, and
specifically in this one, so damaging as it stands. The incident of
arming the boats and bringing out the vessels took place, according to
the log of the "Foudroyant," not when the fleet moored, on the morning
of June 25th, or even shortly afterwards, but on the morning of the
28th; two days after the castles, as shown by the logs of both the
"Foudroyant" and "Seahorse," surrendered and were taken possession of.
Miss Helen Maria Williams, whose account of the affair was strongly
tinged with sympathy for the revolutionists, says: "While the two
garrisons, to the number of fifteen hundred, _were waiting for the
preparing and, provisioning of the vessels_ which were to convey them
to France, Lord Nelson arrived with his whole fleet in the Bay of
Naples [June 24-25]. On the evening of the twenty-sixth of June, the
patriots evacuated their forts, and embarked on board the transports
prepared for their conveyance to France. _The next day_ [June 27], the
transports were moored alongside the English fleet, each under the
cannon of an English vessel."[84] These several witnesses may be
confidently accepted, and prove that the embarkation and removal of
the garrisons took place after Nelson's declaration to them, dated
June 25th, in which he said "he would not permit them to embark or
quit those places. They must surrender themselves to His Majesty's
Royal mercy." Captain Foote, who had signed the capitulation that
Nelson condemned, affords evidence which, though not conclusive, is
corroborative of the above. Writing to Nelson at 7 A.M. of the 24th of
June, fourteen hours before the fleet anchored, but only eight before
he knew of its approach, he says: "the Republicans are about to
embark," and again, "when the Capitulation is put into effect;" both
which expressions show that up to that moment the agreement had not
begun to receive execution. On the 22d of June Ruffo wrote to Foote
that there were no vessels in Naples on which to embark the
revolutionists, and requested him to furnish them; a request that
Foote referred to Count Thurn, the senior Neapolitan naval officer,
for compliance. It is therefore antecedently probable that the vessels
could not have been collected from other ports, and prepared for an
unexpected voyage of at least a week's duration, before Nelson
arrived, forty-eight hours later.

Hamilton's despatch contains another mistake, affecting the order of
events, so circumstantial that, taken with the one just discussed, it
shows his accuracy on such points was more than doubtful. "Admiral
Caracciolo," he says, was hanged, "the day after the King's squadron
came to Naples;" the fact being that the squadron arrived on the night
of June 24-25, and that Caracciolo was executed on the evening of the
29th. This error was not a slip of the pen, for he characterizes the
alleged fact as "so speedy an act of justice" as to elicit loud
applause from the concourse of spectators surrounding the ship in
boats.

Hamilton was not only nearly seventy, but he was worn out in health
and constitution. Writing a fortnight after the events, and having
passed that time in the turmoil and confusion attending the
re-establishment of order in Naples, it is not wonderful that he ran
together incidents that happened in rapid succession, and failed to
realize the importance which might afterwards attach to the date of
their occurrence. "I am so worn out," he tells Greville, "by the long
despatch I have been obliged to write to-day to Lord Grenville that I
can scarcely hold my pen;" and again, "My head is _so confused_ with
long writing on this subject that I must refer you to my letter to
Lord Grenville.... You will find me much worn and am little more than
skin and bone, as I have very little stomach."

Although they were on board ship together, Nelson cannot have seen
Hamilton's despatch, or he must have corrected a misstatement which
directly contradicted his own account of June 27 to Lord Keith, as
well as that he was sending by the same messenger, in a private letter
to Earl Spencer. The latter ran thus: "Your Lordship will observe my
Note (No. 1), and opinion to the Cardinal (No. 2). _The Rebels came
out of the Castles with this knowledge_, without any honours, and the
principal Rebels were seized and conducted on board the ships of the
squadron. The others, embarked in fourteen polacres, were anchored
under the care of our ships."

Hamilton's statement remaining uncorrected, and being so
circumstantial, though erroneous, has made necessary a fuller
discussion of the evidence on this point than otherwise might have
been required.

Although, in the author's judgment, Nelson acted within his right in
disallowing the capitulation, it is essential to note that a fortnight
later, when fully cognizant of all the circumstances, he characterized
it in a letter to Lord Spencer as "infamous." "On my fortunate arrival
here I found a most infamous treaty entered into with the Rebels, in
direct disobedience of His Sicilian Majesty's orders."[85] Such an
adjective, deliberately applied after the heat of the first moment had
passed, is, in its injustice, a clear indication of the frame of mind
under the domination of which he was. Captain Foote with his feeble
squadron, and the commanders of the undisciplined mob ashore known as
the Christian army, expected, as did Nelson himself, the appearance of
the French fleet at Naples. In view of that possibility, it was at the
least a pardonable error of judgment to concede terms which promised
to transfer the castles speedily into their own hands. The most
censurable part of the agreement was in the failure to exact the
surrender of St. Elmo, which dominates the others. It is to be
regretted that Captain Foote, who naturally and bitterly resented the
word "infamous," did not, in his "Vindication," confine himself to
this military argument, instead of mixing it up with talk about mercy
to culprits and Nelson's infatuation for Lady Hamilton.]

On the 27th of June, the day following the surrender of Uovo and
Nuovo, Troubridge landed with thirteen hundred men to besiege the
French in St. Elmo, an undertaking in which he was joined by five
hundred Russians and some royalists. Forty-eight hours later Nelson
felt called upon, as representative of the King of the Two Sicilies,
to take action more peremptory and extreme than anything he had
hitherto done.

On the 29th of June, Commodore Francesco Caracciolo, lately head of
the Republican Navy, was brought on board the "Foudroyant," having
been captured in the country, in disguise. This man had accompanied
the royal family in their flight to Palermo; but after arrival there
had obtained leave to return to Naples, in order to avert the
confiscation of his property by the Republican government. He
subsequently joined the Republicans, or Jacobins, as they were called
by Nelson and the Court. His reasons for so doing are immaterial;
they were doubtless perfectly sound from the point of view of apparent
self-interest; the substantial fact remains that he commanded the
insurgent vessels in action with the British and Royal Neapolitan
navies, firing impartially upon both. In one of these engagements the
Neapolitan frigate "Minerva" was struck several times, losing two men
killed and four wounded. Caracciolo, therefore, had fully committed
himself to armed insurrection, in company with foreign invaders,
against what had hitherto been, and still claimed to be, the lawful
government of the country. He had afterwards, as the republican cause
declined, taken refuge with the other insurgents in the castles. When
he left them is uncertain, but on the 23d of June he is known to have
been outside of Naples, and so remained till captured.

It is not easy to understand in what respect his case differed from
that of other rebels who surrendered unconditionally, and whom Nelson
did not try himself, but simply placed in safe keeping until the
King's instructions should be received, except that, as a naval
officer, he was liable to trial by court-martial, even though martial
law had not been proclaimed. It was to such a tribunal that Nelson
decided instantly to bring him. A court-martial of Neapolitan officers
was immediately ordered to convene on board the "Foudroyant," the
precept for the Court being sent to Count Thurn, captain of the
"Minerva," who, because senior officer in the bay, was indicated by
custom as the proper president. The charges, as worded by Nelson, were
two in number, tersely and clearly stated. "Francisco Caracciolo, a
commodore in the service of His Sicilian Majesty, stands accused of
rebellion against his lawful sovereign, and for firing at his colours
hoisted on board his Frigate, the Minerva." The court assembled at
once, sitting from 10 A.M. to noon. The charges being found proved,
sentence of death was pronounced; and Caracciolo, who had been brought
on board at 9 A.M., was at 5 P.M., by Nelson's orders, hanged at the
foreyard-arm of the "Minerva." He was forty-seven years old at the
time of his death.

The proceedings of the court-martial were open, but the record, if any
was drawn up, has not been preserved. It is impossible, therefore, now
to say whether the evidence sustained the charges; but the acts
alleged were so simple and so notorious, that there can be little
doubt Caracciolo had fairly incurred his fate. Even in our milder age,
no officer of an army or navy would expect to escape the like
punishment for the same offence; if he did, it would be because mercy
prevailed over justice. As regards the technicalities of the
procedure, it would seem probable that Nelson's full powers,
especially when committed to a military man, included by fair
inference, if not expressly, the right of ordering courts-martial;
whereas he had not at hand the machinery of judges and civil courts,
for proceeding against the civilians who had joined in the
insurrection. Despite his fearlessness of responsibility, he was
always careful not to overpass the legal limits of his authority,
except when able to justify his action by what at least appeared to
himself adequate reasons. The Portuguese squadron, for instance, was
absolutely under his orders, so far as its movements went; but, when a
case of flagrant misconduct occurred, he confined himself to
regretting that he had not power to order a court. Anomalous as his
position was in the Bay of Naples, before the arrival of the King, and
regrettably uncertain as is the commission under which he acted, there
is no ground for disputing that he had authority to order a
court-martial, and to carry its sentence into execution, nor that
Caracciolo came within the jurisdiction of a court-martial properly
constituted. Having regard, therefore, to the unsettled conditions of
things prevailing, no fatal irregularity can be shown either in the
trial or execution of this prisoner.

But, while all this is true, the instinctive aversion with which this
act of Nelson's has been regarded generally is well founded. It was
not decent, for it was not necessary, that capture should be followed
so rapidly by trial, and condemnation by execution. Neither time nor
circumstances pressed. The insurrection was over. Except the siege of
St. Elmo, hostilities near Naples were at an end. That Caracciolo's
judges were naval officers who had recently been in action with him
would be, with average military men, rather in the prisoner's favor
than otherwise; but it was very far from being in his favor that they
were men in whom the angry passions engendered by civil warfare, and
licentious spoliation, had not yet had time to cool. Neither the
judges nor the revising power allowed themselves space for reflection.
Nelson himself failed to sustain the dispassionate and magnanimous
attitude that befitted the admiral of a great squadron, so placed as
to have the happy chance to moderate the excesses which commonly
follow the triumph of parties in intestine strife. But, however he
then or afterwards may have justified his course to his own
conscience, his great offence was against his own people. To his
secondary and factitious position of delegate from the King of Naples,
he virtually sacrificed the consideration due to his inalienable
character of representative of the King and State of Great Britain. He
should have remembered that the act would appear to the world, not as
that of the Neapolitan plenipotentiary, but of the British officer,
and that his nation, while liable like others to bursts of unreasoning
savagery, in its normal moods delights to see justice clothed in
orderly forms, unstained by precipitation or suspicion of perversion,
advancing to its ends with the majesty of law, without unseemly haste,
providing things honest in the sight of all men. That he did not do
so, when he could have done so, has been intuitively felt; and to the
instinctive resentment thus aroused among his countrymen has been due
the facility with which the worst has been too easily believed.

Commander Jeaffreson Miles of the British Navy, writing in 1843, was
one of the first, if not the very first, to clear effectually Nelson's
reputation from the stigma of treachery, and of submission to unworthy
influences, at this time. He has sought also to vindicate his hasty
action in Caracciolo's case, by citing the swift execution of two
seamen by Lord St. Vincent, at a time when mutiny was threatening. It
cannot be denied that, for deterrent effect, punishment at times must
be sudden as well as sharp; but the justification in each case rests
upon attendant circumstances. In the instances here compared, we have
in the one a fleet in which many ships were seething with mutiny, and
the preservation of order rested solely upon the firmness of one
man,--the commander-in-chief,--and upon the awe inspired by him. In
the other, we see rebellion subdued, the chief rebels in confinement,
the foreign enemy, except three small isolated garrisons, expelled
beyond the borders of the kingdom six weeks before, and a great
British fleet in possession of the anchorage. Punishment in such case,
however just, is not deterrent, but avenging. True, Nelson was
expecting the appearance of Bruix's fleet; but he himself
characterized as "infamous" the capitulation granted by Ruffo and
Foote, to which they were largely moved by the same expectation, when
wielding a much smaller force than he did. The possible approach of
the French fleet did not necessitate the hasty execution of a
prisoner.

That Nelson yielded his convictions of right and wrong, and
consciously abused his power, at the solicitation of Lady Hamilton, as
has been so freely alleged, is not probably true,--there is no proof
of it; on the contrary, as though to guard against such suspicion, he
was careful to see none but his own officers during Caracciolo's
confinement. But it is true that he was saturated with the prevalent
Court feeling against the insurgents and the French, which found
frequent expression in his letters. After living in the Hamiltons'
house for four months, during which, to use his own expression, "I
have never but three times put my foot to the ground, since December,
1798," in daily close contact with the woman who had won his
passionate love, who was the ardent personal friend of the Queen,
sharing her antipathies, and expressing her hatred of enemies in terms
which showed the coarseness of her fibre,[86] Nelson was steeped in
the atmosphere of the Court of Naples, and separated from that of the
British fleet, none of whose strongest captains were long with him
during that period. The attitude more natural to men of his blood is
shown in a letter signed by the officers of the "Leviathan,"
Duckworth's flagship. Coming from Minorca, they were out of touch with
Neapolitan fury, and they addressed Lady Hamilton, interceding for a
family engaged in the rebellion; a fact which shows the prevailing
impression--whether well founded or not--of the influence in her power
to exert. "We all feel ourselves deeply impressed with the horrid
crime of disaffection to one's lawful sovereign, ... but when we
consider the frailty of human nature," &c. "Advise those Neapolitans
not to be too sanguinary," wrote Keith to Nelson, apparently
immediately after receiving the news of Caracciolo's hanging.

The abrupt execution of Caracciolo was an explosion of fierce
animosity long cherished, pardonable perhaps in a Neapolitan royalist,
but not in a foreign officer only indirectly interested in the issues
at stake; and hence it is that the fate of that one sufferer has
aroused more attention and more sympathy than that of the numerous
other victims, put to death by the King's command after ordinary
processes of law. It stands conspicuous as the act of an English
officer imbued with the spirit of a Neapolitan Bourbon official.
"Could it ever happen," he wrote to Acton, some months after this,
"that any English minister wanted to make me an instrument of hurting
the feelings of His Sicilian Majesty, I would give up my commission
sooner than do it.... I am placed in such a situation--a subject of
one King by birth, and, as far as is consistent with my allegiance to
that King, a voluntary subject of His Sicilian Majesty--that if any
man attempted to separate my two Kings, by all that is sacred, I
should consider even putting that man to death as a meritorious
act."[87] On the other hand, it must be considered that Nelson, though
humane, tended even in his calmest moments to severity towards
military offenders. Writing with reference to a captain convicted of
misbehavior before the enemy, he said, "If a man does not do his
utmost in time of action, I think but one punishment ought to be
inflicted;" and it may be inferred that he would have approved Byng's
execution, where cowardice was not proved, but grave military
dereliction was.

On the 10th of July the King of the Two Sicilies arrived from Palermo
in the Bay of Naples, and went on board the "Foudroyant," which, for
the whole time he remained,--about four weeks,--became practically his
seat of government. There the royal standard was hoisted, there the
King held his levees, and there business of State was transacted. In
and through all moved the figures of Sir William and Lady Hamilton,
the latter considering herself, and not without cause, the
representative of the Queen. The latter had remained in Palermo, being
out of favor with the Neapolitans, and with her husband, who
attributed to her precipitancy the disasters of the previous December.
The two women corresponded daily; and, if the minister's wife deceived
herself as to the amount and importance of what she effected, there is
no doubt that she was very busy, that she was commonly believed to
exert much influence, and that great admiration for one another was
expressed by herself, Hamilton, and Nelson, the _"Tria juncta in uno"_
as the latter was pleased to style them. "I never saw such zeal and
activity in any one as in this wonderful man [Nelson]," wrote she to
Greville. "My dearest Sir William, thank God! is well, and of the
greatest use now to the King." "Emma has been of infinite use in our
late very critical business," said Hamilton to the same correspondent.
"Ld. Nelson and I cou'd not have done without her. It will be a
heart-breaking to the Queen of N. when we go"--back to England, as was
then expected. "Sir William and Lady Hamilton are, to my great
comfort, with me," wrote Nelson to Spencer; "for without them it would
have been impossible I could have rendered half the service to his
Majesty which I have now done: their heads and their hearts are
equally great and good."

The execution of Caracciolo was shortly followed by another very
singular incident, which showed how biassed Nelson had become towards
the interests of the Neapolitan Court, and how exclusively he
identified them--confused them, would scarcely be too strong a
word--with the essential interests of the Allied cause and the duties
of the British Navy. On the 13th of July the castle of St. Elmo was
surrendered by the French, the whole city of Naples thus returning
under the royal authority. On the same day, or the next, Troubridge,
with a thousand of the best men that could be sent from the squadron,
marched against Capua, accompanied by four thousand troops. A letter
had already been received from the Commander-in-chief, Keith, to
Nelson, intimating that it might be necessary to draw down his vessels
from Naples to the defence of Minorca. "Should such an order come at
this moment," wrote Nelson to the First Lord, forecasting his probable
disobedience, "it would be a cause for some consideration whether
Minorca is to be risked, or the two Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily? I
rather think my decision would be to risk the former;" and he started
Troubridge off with a detachment that seriously crippled the squadron.
Capua is fifteen to twenty miles inland from Naples.

On the 13th--it is to be presumed after closing his letter to Spencer
just quoted--an order reached him from Keith, in these words: "Events
which have recently occurred render it necessary that as great a force
as can be collected should be assembled near the island of Minorca;
therefore, if your Lordship has no detachment of the French squadron
in the neighbourhood of Sicily, nor information of their having sent
any force towards Egypt or Syria, you are hereby required and directed
to send such ships as you can possibly spare off the island of Minorca
to wait my orders." The wording was so elastic, as regards the numbers
to be sent, as to leave much to Nelson's judgment, and he replied
guardedly the same day: "As soon as the safety of His Sicilian
Majesty's Kingdoms is secured, I shall not lose one moment in making
the detachment you are pleased to order. At present, under God's
Providence, the safety of His Sicilian Majesty, and his speedy
restoration to his kingdom, depends on this fleet, and the confidence
inspired even by the appearance of our ships before the city is beyond
all belief; and I have no scruple in declaring my opinion that should
any event draw us from the kingdom, that if the French remain in any
part of it, disturbances will again arise, for all order having been
completely overturned, it must take a thorough cleansing, and some
little time, to restore tranquillity."

When Keith wrote this first order, June 27, he was at sea somewhere
between Minorca and Toulon, trying to find Bruix's fleet, of which he
had lost touch three weeks before, at the time he sent to Nelson the
two seventy-fours, whose arrival caused the latter's second cruise of
Maritimo. He had lost touch through a false step, the discussion of
which has no place in a life of Nelson, beyond the remark that it was
Keith's own error, not that of Lord St. Vincent, as Nelson afterwards
mistakenly alleged; querulously justifying his own disobedience on the
ground that Keith, by obeying against his judgment, had lost the
French fleet. What is to be specially noted in the order is that Keith
gave no account of his reasons, nor of the events which dictated them,
nor of his own intended action. No room is afforded by his words for
any discretion, except as to the number of ships to be sent by Nelson,
and, though the language of the latter was evasive, the failure to
move even a single vessel was an act of unjustifiable disobedience. To
Keith he wrote privately, and in a conciliatory spirit, but nothing
that made his act less flagrant. "To all your wishes, depend on it, I
shall pay the very strictest attention."

Conscious of the dangerous step he was taking, Nelson wrote on the
same day, by private letter,[88] to the First Lord of the Admiralty.
"You will easily conceive my feelings," he said, "but my mind, your
Lordship will know, was perfectly prepared for this order; and more
than ever is my mind made up, that, at this moment, I will not part
with a single ship, as I cannot do that without drawing a hundred and
twenty men from each ship now at the siege of Capua, where an army is
gone this day. I am fully aware of the act I have committed; but,
sensible of my loyal intentions, I am prepared for any fate which may
await my disobedience. Do not think that my opinion is formed from the
arrangements of any one," an expression which shows that he was aware
how talk was running. "_No;_ be it good, or be it bad, it is all my
own. It is natural I should wish the decision of the Admiralty and my
Commander-in-chief as speedily as possible. To obtain the former, I
beg your Lordship's interest with the Board. You know me enough, my
dear Lord, to be convinced I want no screen to my conduct."

On the 9th of July, Keith wrote again, from Port Mahon, a letter which
Nelson received on the 19th. He said that he was satisfied that the
enemy's intentions were directed neither against the Two Sicilies, nor
to the reinforcement of their army in Egypt; that, on the contrary,
there was reason to believe they were bound out of the Straits. "I
judge it necessary that all, or the greatest part of the force under
your Lordship's orders, should quit the Island of Sicily, and repair
to Minorca, for the purpose of protecting that Island during the
necessary absence of His Majesty's squadron under my command, or for
the purpose of co-operating with me against the combined force of the
enemy, wherever it may be necessary." The commander-in-chief, in
short, wished to mass his forces, for the necessities of the general
campaign, as he considered them. Nelson now flatly refused obedience,
on the ground of the local requirements in his part of the field.
"Your Lordship, at the time of sending me the order, was not informed
of the change of affairs in the Kingdom of Naples, and that all our
marines and a body of seamen are landed, in order to drive the French
scoundrels out of the Kingdom, which, with God's blessing will very
soon be effected, when a part of this squadron shall be immediately
sent to Minorca; but unless the French are at least drove from Capua,
I think it right not to obey your Lordship's order for sending down
any part of the squadron under my orders. I am perfectly aware of the
consequences of disobeying the orders of my commander-in-chief." It
cannot be said that the offensiveness of the act of disobedience is
tempered by any very conciliatory tone in the words used. The reason
for disobedience makes matters rather worse. "As I believe the safety
of the Kingdom of Naples depends at the present moment on my detaining
the squadron, I have no scruple in deciding that it is better to save
the Kingdom of Naples and risk Minorca, than to risk the Kingdom of
Naples to save Minorca." When he thus wrote, Nelson knew that Bruix
had joined the Spanish fleet in Cartagena, making a combined force of
forty ships, to which Keith, after stripping Minorca, could oppose
thirty-one.

None of Nelson's letters reached Keith until long after he had left
the Mediterranean, which probably prevented the matter being brought
to a direct issue between the two, such as would have compelled the
Admiralty to take some decisive action. On the 10th of July the
commander-in-chief sailed from Port Mahon for Cartagena, following on
the tracks of the allied fleets, which he pursued into the Atlantic
and to Brest, where they succeeded in entering on the 13th of August,
just twenty-four hours before the British came up. The narrow margin
of this escape inevitably suggests the thought, of how much
consequence might have been the co-operation of the dozen ships
Nelson could have brought. It is true, certainly, as matters turned
out, that even had he obeyed, they could not have accompanied Keith,
nor in the event did any harm come to Minorca; but there was no
knowledge in Nelson's possession that made an encounter between the
two great fleets impossible, nor was it till three days after his
former refusal to obey, that he knew certainly that Keith had given up
all expectation of a junction with himself. Then, on the 22d of July,
he received two letters dated the 14th, and couched in tones so
peremptory as to suggest a suspicion that no milder words would
enforce obedience--that his Commander-in-chief feared that nothing
short of cast-iron orders would drag him away from the Neapolitan
Court. "Your Lordship is hereby required and directed to repair to
Minorca, with the whole, or the greater part, of the force under your
Lordship's command, for the protection of that island, as I shall, in
all probability, have left the Mediterranean before your Lordship will
receive this. Keith." The second letter of the same date ended with
the words: "I therefore trust the defence of Minorca to your Lordship,
and repeat my directions that the ships be sent for its protection."
On the receipt of these, though Capua had not yet surrendered, Nelson
at once sent Duckworth with four ships-of-the-line to Minorca,
detaining only their marines for the land operations.

It seems scarcely necessary to say that, while an officer in
subordinate command should have the moral courage to transcend or
override his orders in particular instances--each of which rests upon
its own merits, and not upon any general rule that can be
formulated--it would be impossible for military operations to be
carried on at all, if the commander-in-chief were liable to be
deliberately defied and thwarted in his combinations, as Keith was in
this case. It does not appear that Nelson _knew_ the circumstances
which Keith was considering; he only _knew_ what the conditions were
about Naples, and he thought that the settlement of the kingdom might
be prevented by the departure of several of his ships. In this
opinion, in the author's judgment, his views were exaggerated, and
colored by the absorbing interest he had come to take in the royal
family and their fortunes, linked as these were with the affections of
a particular woman; but, even granting that his apprehensions were
well founded, he was taking upon himself to determine, not merely what
was best for the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, but what was best for
the whole Mediterranean command. It was not within his province to
decide whether Minorca or Naples was the more important. That was the
function of the commander-in-chief. Had the latter, while leaving
Nelson's force unchanged, directed him to follow a particular line of
operations in the district committed to him, it is conceivable that
circumstances, unknown to his superior, might have justified him in
choosing another; but there was nothing in the conditions that
authorized his assumption that he could decide for the whole command.
And this is not the less true, because Nelson was in the general a man
of far sounder judgment and keener insight than Keith, or because his
intuitions in the particular instance were more accurate, as they
possibly were. He defended his course on the ground, so frequently and
so erroneously taken, that his intentions were right. "I am so
confident," he wrote to the Admiralty, "of the uprightness of my
intentions for his Majesty's service, and for that of his Sicilian
Majesty, which I consider as the same, that, with all respect, I
submit myself to the judgment of my superiors." Four years later, in
1803, he used the following singular expressions concerning his
conduct at this period: "I paid more attention to another sovereign
than my own; therefore the King of Naples' gift of Bronté to me, if it
is not now settled to my advantage, and to be permanent, has cost me a
fortune, and a great deal of favour which I might have enjoyed, and
jealousy which I should have avoided. I repine not on those accounts.
I did my duty, to the Sicilifying my own conscience, and I am
easy."[89] "As I have often before risked my life for the good cause,"
he told his old friend the Duke of Clarence, "so I with cheerfulness
did my commission: for although a military tribunal may think me
criminal, the world will approve my conduct." With such convictions,
he might, if condemned, as he almost inevitably must have been, have
met his fate with the cheerfulness of a clear conscience; but no
military tribunal can possibly accept a man's conscience as the test
of obedience.

The Admiralty, who had sent Keith out knowing that St. Vincent, after
three arduous years, meant soon to retire, could not of course
acquiesce in Nelson's thus overriding the man they had chosen to be
his commander-in-chief. "Their Lordships do not, from any information
now before them, see sufficient reason to justify your having
disobeyed the orders you had received from your Commanding Officer, or
having left Minorca exposed to the risk of being attacked, without
having any naval force to protect it." To this measured rebuke was
added some common-sense counsel upon the pernicious practice of
jeopardizing the _personnel_ of a fleet, the peculiar trained force so
vitally necessary, and so hard to replace, in petty operations on
shore. "Although in operations on the sea-coast, it may frequently be
highly expedient to land a part of the seamen of the squadron, to
co-operate with and to assist the army, when the situation will admit
of their being immediately re-embarked, if the squadron should be
called away to act elsewhere [as Keith had called it], or if
information of the approach of an enemy's fleet should be
received,--yet their Lordships by no means approve of the seamen being
landed to form a part of an army to be employed in operations at a
distance from the coast, where, if they should have the misfortune to
be defeated, they might be prevented from returning to the ships, and
the squadron be thereby rendered so defective, as to be no longer
capable of performing the services required of it; and I have their
Lordships' commands to signify their directions to your Lordship not
to employ the seamen in like manner in future."

It was evident that the Admiralty did not fully share Nelson's
attachment to the royal house of Naples, nor consider the service of
the King of the Two Sicilies the same as that of the King of Great
Britain. Earl Spencer's private letter, while careful of Nelson's
feelings, left no room to doubt that he was entirely at one with his
colleagues in their official opinion. Nelson winced and chafed under
the double rebuke, but he was not in a condition to see clearly any
beams in his own eye. "I observe with great pain that their Lordships
see no cause which could justify my disobeying the orders of my
commanding officer, Lord Keith;" but the motives he again alleges are
but the repetition of those already quoted. He fails wholly to realize
that convictions which would justify a man in going to a martyr's fate
may be wholly inadequate to sap the fundamental military obligation of
obedience. "My conduct is measured by the Admiralty, by the narrow
rule of law, when I think it should have been done by that of common
sense. I restored a faithful ally by breach of orders; Lord Keith lost
a fleet by obedience against his own sense. Yet as one is censured the
other must be approved. Such things are." As a matter of fact, as
before said, it was by departing from St. Vincent's orders that Keith
lost the French fleet. Nor did Nelson's mind work clearly on the
subject. Thwarted and fretted as he continually was by the too common,
almost universal, weakness, which deters men from a bold initiative,
from assuming responsibility, from embracing opportunity, he could not
draw the line between that and an independence of action which would
convert unity of command into anarchy. "Much as I approve of strict
obedience to orders, yet to say that an officer is never, for any
object, to alter his orders, is what I cannot comprehend." But what
rational man ever said such a thing? "I find few think as I do,--but
to obey orders is all perfection! What would my superiors direct, did
they know what is passing under my nose? To serve my King and to
destroy the French I consider as the great order of all, from which
little ones spring, and if one of these little ones militate against
it, I go back to obey the great order." There is so much that is sound
in these words, and yet so much confusion might arise in applying
them, that scarcely any stronger evidence could be given that each
case must rest on its own merits; and that no general rule can
supplant the one general principle of obedience, by which alone unity
and concentration of effort, the great goal of all military movement,
can be obtained.

During this period of agitation and excitement, Nelson's health did
not show the favorable symptoms that usually attended a call to
exertion. Much may be attributed to a Mediterranean summer, especially
after the many seasons he had passed in that sea; but it can readily
be believed that such exceptional responsibilities as he had just
assumed could not but tell, even upon his resolute and fearless
temper. "I am really sorry," wrote Troubridge to him, from the siege
of St. Elmo, "to see your Lordship so low-spirited, all will go well;"
and a few days later, "Your Lordship must endeavour to fret as little
as possible--we shall succeed. His Majesty's arrival will relieve your
Lordship; and if he punishes the guilty, the people will be happy."
The day after he had refused to obey Keith's order, he wrote to him,
"I am truly so very unwell that I have not the power of writing so
much as I could wish;" and the next day, to the Admiralty, he makes
the same excuse, adding, "I am writing in a fever, and barely possible
to keep out of bed." "My dear friend," he tells Locker, "I am so ill
that I can scarcely sit up; yet I will not let the courier go off
without assuring you that all your kindnesses to me are fresh in my
memory.... May God Almighty grant you, my revered friend, that health
and happiness which has never yet been attained by your affectionate,
grateful friend, Nelson." It cannot but be surmised that he did not
feel that profound conviction of right, which had sustained him on
previous occasions. The disquiet indicated resembles rather that
attending the uncertainties of the Nile campaign. As Colonel Stewart
noticed, two years later, "With him mind and health invariably
sympathized."

FOOTNOTES:

[81] That is, in person.

[82] The commandant of St. Elmo signed on the 3d Messidor, June 21. Ruffo,
with the Russian and Turkish representatives, had already signed. The paper
was then sent to Foote, who signed and returned to Ruffo on the 23d of
June. The "Foudroyant" came in sight on the afternoon of the 24th.

[83] All italics in the quotations from this despatch are the author's.

[84] Nicolas, vol. iii. p. 511. Author's italics.

[85] Nicolas, vol. iii p. 406.

[86] Mr. Pryse Lockhart Gordon, who was in Palermo in January, 1799, tells
the following anecdote of Lady Hamilton. He had been dining at the
ambassador's, and after dinner a Turkish officer was introduced. In the
course of the evening he boasted that he had put to death with his own
sword a number of French prisoners. "'Look, there is their blood remaining
on it!' The speech being translated, her Ladyship's eye beamed with
delight, and she said, 'Oh, let me see the sword that did the glorious
deed!' It was presented to her; she took it into her fair hands, covered
with rings, and, looking at the encrusted Jacobin blood, kissed it, and
handed it to the hero of the Nile. Had I not been an eye-witness to this
disgraceful act, I would not have ventured to relate it." (Gordon's
Memoirs, vol. i. p, 210.) The author, also, would not have ventured to
adduce it, without first satisfying himself, by inquiry, as to the probable
credibility of Mr. Gordon, and likewise testing his narrative. It bears
marks of the inaccuracy in details to which memory is subject, but the
indications of general correctness are satisfactory.

[87] Nelson to Acton, November 18, 1799. (Nicolas.)

[88] Much confusion has been introduced into the times, when Keith's
several orders were received by Nelson, by the fact that the original of
this private letter to Earl Spencer is dated the 19th (Nicolas, vol. vii.
p. clxxxv); while the secretary, copying it into the letter-book, wrote
July 13th. (Nicolas, vol. iii. p. 408.) Nicolas considered the former
correct, probably because it came last into his hands. The author considers
the 13th correct, because the official letter to Keith bears that date, and
reads, "I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of June
27." (Nicolas, vol. iii. p. 408.)

The date of Troubridge's marching against Capua is similarly brought into
doubt by these letters. The author believes it to have been July 13 or 14,
from another official letter to Keith of the 13th. (Nicolas, vol. iii. p.
404.) "Captains Troubridge and Hallowell ... march against Capua to-morrow
morning." The odd Sea-Time of that day, by which July 13 began at noon,
July 12, of Civil Time, also causes confusion; writers using them
indiscriminatingly. The capitulation of St. Elmo was certainly signed on
July 12. (Clarke and M'Arthur, vol. ii. p. 294.)

[89] Nicolas, vol. v. p. 160.



END OF VOL. I.