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Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)

Translated by R. H. M. Elwes





PART IV:  Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions




PREFACE

Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I name bondage:
for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not his own master, but
lies at the mercy of fortune: so much so, that he is often compelled,
while seeing that which is better for him, to follow that which is worse.
Why this is so, and what is good or evil in the emotions, I propose to
show in this part of my treatise. But, before I begin, it would be well
to make a few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection,
good and evil.

When a man has purposed to make a given thing, and has brought it
to perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect, not only by
himself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or thinks that he knows,
the intention and aim of its author. For instance, suppose anyone sees a
work (which I assume to be not yet completed), and knows that the aim
of the author of that work is to build a house, he will call the work
imperfect; he will, on the other hand, call it perfect, as soon as he
sees that it is carried through to the end, which its author had purposed
for it. But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seen
before, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, he plainly
cannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect. Such seems to
be the primary meaning of these terms.

But, after men began to form general ideas, to think out types of
houses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain types to others,
it came about, that each man called perfect that which he saw agree
with the general idea he had formed of the thing in question, and called
imperfect that which he saw agree less with his own preconceived type,
even though it had evidently been completed in accordance with the idea
of its artificer.  This seems to be the only reason for calling natural
phenomena, which, indeed, are not made with human hands, perfect or
imperfect: for men are wont to form general ideas of things natural, no
less than of things artificial, and such ideas they hold as types,
believing that Nature (who they think does nothing without an object)
has them in view, and has set them as types before herself. Therefore,
when they behold something in Nature, which does not wholly conform to
the preconceived type which they have formed of the thing in question,
they say that Nature has fallen short or has blundered, and has left
her work incomplete. Thus we see that men are wont to style natural
phenomena perfect or imperfect rather from their own prejudices, than
from true knowledge of what they pronounce upon.

Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I., that Nature does not work
with an end in view. For the eternal and infinite Being, which we call
God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as that whereby it exists. For
we have shown, that by the same necessity of its nature, whereby it
exists, it likewise works (I:xvi.). The reason or cause why God or Nature
exists, and the reason why he acts, are one and the same.  Therefore,
as he does not exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act for
the sake of an end; of his existence and of his action there is neither
origin nor end. Wherefore, a cause which is called final is nothing else
but human desire, in so far as it is considered as the origin or cause
of anything. For example, when we say that to be inhabited is the final
cause of this or that house, we mean nothing more than that a man,
conceiving the conveniences of household life, had a desire to build a
house. Wherefore, the being inhabited, in so far as it is regarded as
a final cause, is nothing else but this particular desire, which is
really the efficient cause; it is regarded as the primary cause,
because men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires.
They are, as I have often said already, conscious of their own actions
and appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby they are determined
to any particular desire. Therefore, the common saying that Nature
sometimes falls short, or blunders, and produces things which are
imperfect, I set down among the glosses treated of in the Appendix to
Part 1.  Perfection and imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes
of thinking, or notions which we form from a comparison among one
another of individuals of the same species; hence I said above
(II:Def.vi.), that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing.
For we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one
genus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the category of
Being, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong. Thus, in
so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this category, and
comparing them one with another, find that some possess more of being or
reality than others, we, to this extent, say that some are more perfect
than others. Again, in so far as we attribute to them anything implying
negation - as term, end, infirmity, etc., we, to this extent, call them
imperfect, because they do not affect our mind so much as the things
which we call perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency,
or because Nature has blundered. For nothing lies within the scope of a
thing's nature, save that which follows from the necessity of the nature
of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from the necessity of the
nature of its efficient cause necessarily comes to pass.

As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive quality in
things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of thinking, or
notions which we form from the comparison of things one with another.
Thus one and the same thing can be at the same time good, bad, and
indifferent. For instance, music is good for him that is melancholy,
bad for him that mourns; for him that is deaf, it is neither good nor
bad.

Nevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be retained.
For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a type of human
nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful for us to retain
the terms in question, in the sense I have indicated.

In what follows, then, I shall mean by, "good" that, which we
certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the type
of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by "bad," that
which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in approaching the
said type.  Again, we shall that men are more perfect, or more imperfect,
in proportion as they approach more or less nearly to the said type.
For it must be specially remarked that, when I say that a man passes
from a lesser to a greater perfection, or vice versa, I do not mean
that he is changed from one essence or reality to another; for instance,
a horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a man,
as by being changed into an insect. What I mean is, that we conceive the
thing's power of action, in so far as this is understood by its nature,
to be increased or diminished. Lastly, by perfection in general I shall,
as I have said, mean reality in other words, each thing's essence, in so
far as it exists, and operates in a particular manner, and without paying
any regard to its duration. For no given thing can be said to be more
perfect, because it has passed a longer time in existence. The duration
of things cannot be determined by their essence, for the essence of
things involves no fixed and definite period of existence; but everything,
whether it be more perfect or less perfect, will always be able to persist
in existence with the same force wherewith it began to exist; wherefore, in
this respect, all things are equal.



DEFINITIONS.

I. By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to us.

II. By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a hindrance
to us in the attainment of any good. (Concerning these terms see the
foregoing preface towards the end.)

III. Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while regarding
their essence only, we find nothing therein, which necessarily asserts
their existence or excludes it.

IV. Particular things I call possible in so far as, while regarding the
causes whereby they must be produced, we know not, whether such causes
be determined for producing them.

(In I:xxxiii.note.i., I drew no distinction between possible and
contingent, because there was in that place no need to distinguish
them accurately.)

V. By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in different
directions, though they are of the same kind, such as luxury and
avarice, which are both species of love, and are contraries, not
by nature, but by accident.

VI. What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future, present, and
past, I explained in III:xviii.,notes.i.,&ii., which see.

(But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly conceive
distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit; that is, all
objects distant from us more than two hundred feet, or whose distance
from the place where we are exceeds that which we can distinctly conceive,
seem to be an equal distance from us, and all in the same plane; so also
objects, whose time of existing is conceived as removed from the present
by a longer interval than we can distinctly conceive, seem to be all
equally distant from the present, and are set down, as it were, to the
same moment of time.)

VII. By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean a desire.

VIII. By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing; that is
(III:vii.), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a man's
nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of effecting what
can only be understood by the laws of that nature.



AXIOM.

There is no individual thing in nature, than which there is not
another more powerful and strong. Whatsoever thing be given, there is
something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.



PROPOSITIONS.
Prop. I. No positive quality possessed by a
false idea is removed by the presence of
what is true, in virtue of its being true.

Proof.- Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge which
inadequate ideas involve (II:xxxv.), nor have they any positive
quality on account of which they are called false (II:xxxiii.);   contrariwise, in so far as they
are referred to God, they are true
(II:xxxii.).  Wherefore, if the positive quality possessed by a false
idea were removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its
being true, a true idea would then be removed by itself, which
(IV:iii.) is absurd. Therefore, no positive quality possessed by a
false idea, &c. Q.E.D.

Note.- This proposition is more clearly understood from II:xvi.Coroll.ii.
For imagination is an idea, which indicates rather the present disposition
of the human body than the nature of the external body; not indeed
distinctly, but confusedly; whence it comes to pass, that the mind is
said to err. For instance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it
is distant from us about two hundred feet; in this judgment we err, so
long as we are in ignorance of its true distance; when its true distance
is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination; or, in other
words, the idea of the sun, which only explains tho nature of that
luminary, in so far as the body is affected thereby: wherefore, though
we know the real distance, we shall still nevertheless imagine the sun
to be near us. For, as we said in III:xxxv.note, we do not imagine the sun
to be so near us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because
the mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the body is
affected thereby.  Thus, when the rays of the sun falling on the surface of
water are reflected into our eyes, we imagine the sun as if it were in the
water, though we are aware of its real position; and similarly other
imaginations, wherein the mind is deceived whether they indicate the
natural disposition of the body, or that its power of activity is
increased or diminished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish
at its presence. It happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an evil,
the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings; but the contrary also
happens, namely, that we fear an evil which will certainly come, and our
fear vanishes when we hear false tidings; thus imaginations do not vanish
at the presence of the truth, in virtue of its being true, but because
other imaginations, stronger than the first, supervene and exclude the
present existence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in II:.xvii.



Prop. II. We are only passive, in so far as
we are apart of Nature, which cannot be
conceived by itself without other parts.

Proof.- We are said to be passive, when something arises in us, whereof
we are only a partial cause (III:Def.ii.), that is (III:Def.i.), something
which cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our nature. We are passive
therefore in so far as we are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived
by itself without other parts. Q.E.D.



Prop. III. The force whereby a man persists
in existing is limited, and is infinitely
surpassed by the power of external causes.

Proof.-This is evident from the axiom of this part. For, when man is
given, there is something else - say A - more powerful; when A is given,
there is something else - say B - more powerful than A, and so on to
infinity; thus the power of man is limited by the power of some other
thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. Q.E.D.



Prop. IV. It is impossible, that man should
not be a part of Nature, or that he should
be capable of undergoing no changes, save
such as can be understood through his nature
only as their adequate cause.

Proof.- The power, whereby each particular thing, and consequently man,
preserves his being, is the power of God or of Nature (I:xxiv.Coroll.);
not in so far as it is infinite, but in so far as it can be explained by
the actual human essence (III:vii.). Thus the power of man, in so far
as it is explained through his own actual essence, is a part of the
infinite power of God or Nature, in other words, of the essence thereof
(I:xxxiv.). This was our first point. Again, if it were possible, that man
should undergo no changes save such as can be understood solely through
the nature of man, it would follow that he would not be able to die, but
would always necessarily exist; this would be the necessary consequence
of a cause whose power was either finite or infinite; namely, either of
man's power only, inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself
all changes which could spring from external causes; or of the infinite
power of Nature, whereby all individual things would be so ordered, that
man should be incapable of undergoing any changes save such as tended
towards his own preservation. But the first alternative is absurd (by the
last Prop., the proof of which is universal, and can be applied to all
individual things). Therefore, if it be possible, that man should not be
capable of undergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solely
through his own nature, and consequently that he must always (as we have
shown) necessarily exist; such a result must follow from the infinite
power of God, and consequently (I:xvi.) from the necessity of the divine
nature, in so far as it is regarded as affected by the idea of any given
man, the whole order of nature as conceived under the attributes of
extension and thought must be deducible. It would therefore follow (I:xxi.)
that man is infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd.
It is, therefore, impossible, that man should not undergo any changes save
those whereof he is the adequate cause. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always a prey to
his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order of nature, and
that he accommodates himself thereto, as much as the nature of things
demands.



Prop. V. The power and increase of every
passion, and its persistence in existing
are not defined by the power, whereby we
ourselves endeavour to persist in existing,
but by the power of an external cause
compared with our own.

Proof.- The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our
essence alone (III:Def.i.&.ii.), that is (III:vii.), the power of
a passion cannot be defined by the power, whereby we ourselves
endeavour to persist in existing, but (as is shown in II:xvi.) must
necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared
with our own. Q.E.D.



Prop. VI. The force of any passion or emotion
can overcome the rest of a man's activities or
power, so that the emotion becomes obstinately
fixed to him.

Proof.- The force and increase of any passion and its persistence in
existing are defined by the power of an external cause compared with
our own (by the foregoing Prop.); therefore (IV:iii.) it can overcome a
man's power, &e. Q.E.D.



Prop. VII. An emotion can only be controlled
or destroyed by another emotion contrary
thereto, and with more power for controlling
emotion.

Proof.- Emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is an idea,
whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less force of existence
than before (cf. the general Definition of the Emotions at the end of
Part III.) When, therefore, the mind is assailed by any emotion, the
body is at the same time affected with a modification whereby its power
of activity is increased or diminished. Now this modification of the body
(IV:v.) receives from its cause the force for persistence in its being;
which force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause (II:vi.),
in virtue of the body being affected with a modification contrary to
(III:v.) and stronger than itself (IV.Ax.); wherefore (II:xii.) the mind
is affected by the idea of a modification contrary to, and stronger than
the former modification, in other words, (by the general definition
of the emotions) the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and
stronger than the former emotion, which will exclude or destroy the
existence of the former emotion; thus an emotion cannot be destroyed nor
controlled except by a contrary and stronger emotion. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- An emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, can
only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a modification of
the body contrary to, and stronger than, that which we are undergoing.
For the emotion which we undergo can only be checked or destroyed by an
emotion contrary to, and stronger than, itself, in other words, (by the
general Definition of the Emotions) only by an idea of a modification
of the body contrary to, and stronger than, the modification which we
undergo.



Prop. VIII. The knowledge of good and evil
is nothing else but the emotions of pleasure
or pain, in so far as we are conscious
thereof.

Proof.- We call a thing good or evil, when it is of service or the
reverse in preserving our being (IV:Def.i.&.ii.), that is (III:vii.),
when it increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our power of activity.
Thus, in so far as we perceive that a thing affects us with pleasure or
pain, we call it good or evil; wherefore the knowledge of good and evil
is nothing else but the idea of the pleasure or pain, which necessarily
follows from that pleasurable or painful emotion (II:xxii.). But this idea
is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united to body
(II:xxi.); that is, there is no real distinction between this idea and
the emotion or idea of the modification of the body, save in conception
only. Therefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the
emotion, in so far as we are conscious thereof. Q.E.D.



Prop. IX. An emotion, whereof we conceive
the cause to be with us at the present time,
is stronger than if we did not conceive the
cause to be with us.

Proof.- Imagination or conception is the idea, by which the mind regards
a thing as present (II:xvii.note), but which indicates the disposition of
the mind rather than the nature of the external thing (II:xvi.Coroll.ii).
An emotion is therefore a conception, in so far as it indicates the
disposition of the body. But a conception (by II:xvii.) is stronger,
so long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence
of the external object; wherefore an emotion is also stronger or more
intense, when we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time,
than when we do not conceive the cause to be with us. Q.E.D.

Note.- When I said above in III:xviii. that we are affected by the image
of what is past or future with the same emotion as if the thing conceived
were present, I expressly stated, that this is only true in so far as we
look solely to the image of the thing in question itself ; for the thing's
nature is unchanged, whether we have conceived it or not; I did not deny
that the image becomes weaker, when we regard as present to us other
things which exclude the present existence of the future object: I did
not expressly call attention to the fact, because I purposed to treat
of the strength of the emotions in this part of my work.

Corollary.- The image of something past or future, that is, of a thing
which we regard as in relation to time past or time future, to the
exclusion of time present, is, when other conditions are equal, weaker
than the image of something present; consequently an emotion felt towards
what is past or future is less intense, other conditions being equal,
than an emotion felt towards something present.



Prop. X. Towards something future, which we
conceive as close at hand, we are affected
more intensely, than if we conceive that
its time for existence is separated from
the present by a longer interval; so too
by the remembrance of what we conceive to
have not long passed away we are affected
more intensely, than if we conceive that
it has long passed away.

Proof.- In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand, or not long
passed away, we conceive that which excludes the presence of the object
less, than if its period of future existence were more distant from the
present, or if it had long passed away (this is obvious) therefore (by the
foregoing Prop.) we are, so far, more intensely affected towards it. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- From the remarks made in IV:Def.vi. of this part it follows
that, if objects are separated from the present by a longer period than
we can define in conception, though their dates of occurrence be widely
separated one from the other, they all affect us equally faintly.



Prop. XI. An emotion towards that which
we conceive as necessary is, when other
conditions are equal, more intense than
an emotion towards that which impossible,
or contingent, or non-necessary.

Proof.- In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we, to that
extent, affirm its existence; on the other hand we deny a thing's
existence, in so far as we conceive it not to be necessary :xxxiii.note.i.);
wherefore (IV.ix.) an emotion towards that which is necessary is, other
conditions being equal, more intense than an emotion that which is
non-necessary. Q.E.D.



Prop. XII. An emotion towards a thing,
which we know not to exist at the present
time, and which we conceive as possible,
is more intense, other conditions being
equal, than an emotion towards a thing
contingent.

Proof.- In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are affected
by the conception of some further thing, which would assert the existence
of the former (IV:Def.iii.); but, on the other hand, we (by hypothesis)
conceive certain things, which exclude its present existence. But, in
so far as we conceive a thing to be possible in the future, we there by
conceive things which assert its existence (IV:iv.), that is (III:xviii.),
things which promote hope or fear: wherefore an emotion towards something
possible is more vehement. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to exist in the
present, and which we conceive as contingent, is far fainter, than if we
conceive the thing to be present with us.

Proof.- Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist, is more
intense than it would be, if we conceived the thing as future V:ix.Coroll.),
and is much more vehement, than if the future time be conceived as far
distant from the present (IV:x.). Therefore an emotion towards a thing,
whose period of existence we conceive to be far distant from the present,
is far fainter, than if we conceive the thing as present; it is,
nevertheless, more intense, than if we conceived the thing as contingent,
wherefore an emotion towards a thing, which we regard as contingent,
will be far fainter, than if we conceived the thing to be present with us.
Q.E.D.



Prop. XIII. Emotion towards a thing contingent,
which we know not to exist in the present, is,
other conditions being equal, fainter than an
emotion towards a thing past.

Proof.- In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are not
affected by the image of any other thing, which asserts the existence
of the said thing (IV:Def.iii.), but, on the other hand (by hypothesis),
we conceive certain things excluding its present existence. But, in so
far as we conceive it in relation to time past, we are assumed to
conceive something, which recalls the thing to memory, or excites the
image thereof (II:xviii.&Note), which is so far the same as regarding
it as present (II:xvii.Coroll.). Therefore (IV:ix.) an emotion towards a
thing contingent, which we know does not exist in the present, is fainter,
other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a thing past. Q.E.D.



Prop. XIV. A true knowledge of good and evil
cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true,
but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion.

Proof.- An emotion is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a
greater or less force of existing than before (by the general Definition
of the Emotions); therefore it has no positive quality, which can be
destroyed by the presence of what is true; consequently the knowledge
of good and evil cannot, by virtue oi being true, restrain any emotion.
But, in so far as such knowledge is an emotion (IV:viii.) if it have
more strength for restraining emotion, it will to that extent be able
to restrain the given emotion. Q.E.D.



Prop. XV. Desire arising from the
knowledge of good and bad can be
quenched or checked by many of the
other desires arising from the
emotions whereby we are assailed.

Proof.- From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it is an
emotion, necessarily arises desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the strength
of which is proportioned to the strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises
(III:xxxvii.). But, inasmuch as this desire arises (by hypothesis) from the
fact of our truly understanding anything, it follows that it is also
present with us, in so far as we are active (III:i.), and must therefore
be understood through our essence only (III:Def.ii.); consequently
(III:vii.) its force and increase can be defined solely by human power.
Again, the desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed are
stronger, in proportion as the said emotions are more vehement; wherefore
their force and increase must be defined solely by the power of external
causes, which, when compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass it
(IV:iii.); hence the desires arising from like emotions may be more
vehement, than the desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and
evil, and may, consequently, control or quench it. Q.E.D.



Prop. XVI. Desire arising from the knowledge
of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge
regards what is future, may be more easily
controlled or quenched, than the desire for
what is agreeable at the present moment.

Proof.- Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future, is fainter
than emotion towards a thing that is present (IV:ix.Coroll.). But desire,
which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil, though it be
concerned with things which are good at the moment, can be quenched
or controlled by any headstrong desire (by the last Prop., the proof
whereof is of universal application). Wherefore desire arising from
such knowledge, when concerned with the future, can be more easily
controlled or quenched, &c. Q.E.D.



Prop. XVII. Desire arising from the true
knowledge of good and evil, in so far as
such knowledge is concerned with what is
contingent, can be controlled far more
easily still, than desire for things
that are present.

Proof.- This Prop. is proved in the same way as the last Prop. from
IV:xii.Coroll.

Note.- I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved by opinion
more readily than by true reason, why it is that the true knowledge of good
and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul, and often yields to every kind of
passion. This state of things gave rise to the exclamation of the poet:
(Ov. Met. vii.20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.")

    The better path I gaze at and approve,

   The worse - I follow."
Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind, when he says,
"He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." I have not written the
above with the object of drawing the conclusion, that ignorance is more
excellent than knowledge, or that a wise man is on a par with a fool in
controlling his emotions, but because it is necessary to know the power
and the infirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason can
do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power. I have said,
that in the present part I shall merely treat of human infirmity. The
power of reason over the emotions I have settled to treat separately.



Prop. XVIII. Desire arising from pleasure is,
other conditions being equal, stronger than
desire arising from pain.

Proof.- Desire is the essence of a man (Def. of the Emotions, i.),
that is, the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist in his own
being. Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by the fact of
pleasure being felt, increased or helped; on the contrary, desire
arising from pain is, by the fact of pain being felt, diminished or
hindered; hence the force of desire arising from pleasure must be
defined by human power together with the power of an external cause,
whereas desire arising from pain must be defined by human power only.
Thus the former is the stronger of the two. Q.E.D.

Note.- In these few remarks I have explained the causes of human infirmity
and inconstancy, and shown why men do not abide by the precepts of reason.
It now remains for me to show what course is marked out for us by reason,
which of the emotions are in harmony with the rules of human reason, and
which of them are contrary thereto.

But, before I begin to prove my Propositions in detailed geometrical
fashion, it is advisable to sketch them briefly in advance, so that
everyone may more readily grasp my meaning.

As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands, that every
man should love himself, should seek that which is useful to him - I mean,
that which is really useful to him, should desire everything which really
brings man to greater perfection, and should, each for himself, endeavour
as far as he can to preserve his own being. This is as necessarily true,
as that a whole is greater than its part. (Cf. III:iv.)

Again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance with the
laws of one's own nature (IV:Def.viii.), and as no one endeavours to
preserve his own being, except in accordance with the laws of his own
nature, it follows, first, that the foundation of virtue is the endeavour
to preserve one's own being, and that happiness consists in man's power
of preserving, his own being; secondly, that virtue is to be desired for
its own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful to
us, for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly and lastly that
suicides are weak-minded, and are overcome by external causes repugnant to
their nature. Further, it follows from Postulate iv. Part.II., that we can
never arrive at doing without all external things for the preservation of
our being or living, so as to have no relations with things
which are outside ourselves. Again, if we consider our mind, we see that
our intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could
understand nothing besides itself. There are, then, many things outside
ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to be desired.
Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than those which are in
entire agreement with our nature. For if, for example, two individuals
of entirely the same nature are united, they form a combination twice
as powerful as either of them singly.

Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than man - nothing,
I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being can be wished for
by men, than that all should so in all points agree, that the minds and
bodies of all should form, as it were, one single mind and one single
body, and that all should, with one consent, as far as they are able,
endeavour to preserve their being, and all with one consent seek what is
useful to them all. Hence, men who are governed by reason - that is, who
seek what is useful to them in accordance with reason, desire for
themselves nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind,
and, consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in their conduct.

Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus briefly to
indicate, before beginning to prove them in greater detail. I have taken
this course, in order, if possible, to gain the attention of those who
believe, that the principle that every man is bound to seek what is useful
for himself is the foundation of impiety, rather than of piety and virtue.

Therefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is the case, I go
on to prove it by, the same method, as that whereby I have hitherto
proceeded.



Prop. XIX. Every man, by the laws of his
nature, necessarily desires or shrinks
from that which he deems to be good or bad.

Proof.- The knowledge of good and evil is (IV:viii.) the emotion of
pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof; therefore,
every man necessarily desires what he thinks good, and shrinks from
what he thinks bad. Now this appetite is nothing else but man's nature
or essence (Cf. the Definition of Appetite, III.ix.note, and Def. of
the Emotions, i.). Therefore, every man, solely by the laws of his
nature, desires the one, and shrinks from the other, &c. Q.E.D.



Prop. XX. The more every man endeavours,
and is able to seek what is useful to him -
in other words, to preserve his own being -
the more is he endowed with virtue; on the
contrary, in proportion as a man neglects
to seek what is useful to him, that is, to
preserve his own being, he is wanting in power.

Proof.- Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by man's essence
(IV:Def.viii.), that is, which is defined solely by the endeavour made by
man to persist in his own being. Wherefore, the more a man endeavours,
and is able to preserve his own being, the more is he endowed with virtue,
and, consequently (III:iv.&,vi.), in so far as a man neglects to
preserve his own being, he is wanting in power. Q.E.D.

Note.- No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or preserving his
own being, unless he be overcome by causes external and foreign to his
nature. No one, I say, from the necessity of his own nature, or otherwise
than under compulsion from external causes, shrinks from food, or kills
himself: which latter may be done in a variety of ways. A man, for
instance, kills himself under the compulsion of another man, who twists
round his right hand, wherewith he happened to have taken up a sword, and
forces him to turn the blade against his own heart; or, again, he may be
compelled, like Seneca, by a tyrant's command, to open his own veins -
that is, to escape a greater evil by incurring, a lesser; or, lastly,
latent external causes may so disorder his imagination, and so affect his
body, that it may assume a nature contrary to its former one, and whereof
the idea cannot exist in the mind (III:x.) But that a man, from the
necessity of his own nature, should endeavour to become non-existent, is
as impossible as that something should be made out of nothing, as everyone
will see for himself, after a little reflection.



Prop. XXI. No one can desire to be blessed,
to act rightly, and to live rightly, without
at the same time wishing to be, act, and to
live - in other words, to actually exist.

Proof.- The proof of this proposition, or rather the proposition itself,
is self-evident, and is also plain from the definition of desire. For the
desire of living, acting, &C., blessedly or rightly, is (Def. of the
Emotions, i.) the essence of man - that is (III:vii.), the endeavour
made by everyone to preserve his own being. Therefore, no one can
desire, &c. Q.E.D.



Prop. XXII. No virtue can be conceived
as prior to this endeavour to preserve
one's own being.

Proof.- The effort for self-preservation is the essence of a thing
(III:vii.); therefore, if any virtue could be conceived as prior
thereto, the essence of a thing would have to be conceived as
prior to itself, which is obviously absurd. Therefore no virtue, &c.
Q.E.D.

Corollary.- The effort for self-preservation is the first and only
foundation of virtue. For prior to this principle nothing can be
conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived.



Prop. XXIII. Man, in so far as he is
determined to a particular action
because he has inadequate ideas,
cannot be absolutely said to act in
obedience to virtue; he can only be
so described, in so far as he is
determined for the action because
he understands.

Proof.- In so far as a man is determined to an action through having
inadequate ideas, he is passive (III:i.), that is (III:Def.i., &iii.),
he does something, which cannot be perceived solely through his essence,
that is (by IV:Def.viii.), which does not follow from his virtue. But,
in so far as he is determined for an action because he understands, he
is active; that is, he does something, which is perceived through his
essence alone, or which adequately follows from his virtue. Q.E.D.



Prop. XXIV. To act absolutely in obedience
to virtue is in us the same thing as to act,
to live, or to preserve one's being (these
three terms are identical in meaning) in
accordance with the dictates of reason on the
basis of seeking what is useful to one's self.

Proof.- To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing else but
to act according to the laws of one's own nature. But we only act, in
so far as we understand (III:iii.) : therefore to act in obedience to
virtue is in us nothing else but to act, to live, or to preserve one's
being in obedience to reason, and that on the basis of seeking what is
useful for us (IV:xxii.Coroll.). Q.E.D.



Prop. XXV. No one wishes to preserve his
being for the sake of anything else.

Proof.- The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its
being, is defined solely by the essence of the thing itself (III:vii.);
from this alone, and not from the essence of anything else, it necessarily
follows (III:vi.) that everyone endeavours to preserve his being.
Moreover, this proposition is plain from IV:xxii.Coroll., for if a man
should endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else, the
last-named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue, which, by the
foregoing corollary, is absurd. Therefore no one, &c. Q.E.D.



Prop. XXVI. Whatsoever we endeavour in
obedience to reason is nothing further
than to understand; neither does the mind,
in so far as it makes use of reason, judge
anything to be useful to it, save such
things as are conducive to understanding.

Proof.- The effort for self-preservation is nothing else but the essence
of the thing in question (III:vii.), which, in so far as it exists such
as it is, is conceived to have force for continuing in existence (III:vi.)
and doing such things as necessarily follow from its given nature (see the
Def. of Appetite, II:ix.Note). But the essence of reason is nought else but
our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly understands (see the
definition in II:xl.Note:ii.) ; therefore (III:xl.) whatsoever we endeavour
in obedience to reason is nothing else but to understand. Again, since this
effort of the mind wherewith the mind endeavours, in so far as it reasons,
to preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding; this effort
at understanding is (IV:xxii.Coroll.) the first and single basis of virtue,
nor shall we endeavour to understand things for the sake of any ulterior
object (IV:xxv.); on the other hand, the mind, in so far as it reasons,
will not be able to conceive any good for itself, save such things as are
conducive to understanding.



Prop. XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly
good or evil, save such things as really
conduce to understanding, or such as are
able to hinder us from understanding.

Proof.- The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing beyond
understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself, save such
things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing Prop.). But the
mind (II:xli.&Note) cannot possess certainty concerning anything,
except in so far as it has adequate ideas, or (what by II:xl.Note,
is the same thing) in so far as it reasons. Therefore we know nothing
to be good or evil save such things as really conduce, &c. Q.E.D.



Prop. XXVIII. The mind's highest good is
the knowledge of God, and the mind's
highest virtue is to know God.

Proof.- The mind is not capable of understanding anything higher than God,
that is (I:Def.vi.), than a Being absolutely infinite, and without which
(I:xv.) nothing can either be or be conceived; therefore (IV:xxvi.,
&xxvii.), the mind's highest utility or (IV:Def.i.) good is the knowledge
of God. Again, the mind is active, only in so far as it understands, and
only to the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously. The
mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand. Now, as we have already
shown, the highest that the mind can understand is God; therefore the
highest virtue of the mind is to understand or to know God. Q.E.D.



Prop. XXIX. No individual thing, which is
entirely different from our own nature,
can help or check our power of activity, and
absolutely nothing can do us good or harm,
unless it has something in common with our nature.

Proof.- The power of every individual thing, and consequently the power of
man, whereby he exists and operates, can only be determined by an
individual thing (I:xxviii.), whose nature (II:vi.) must be understood
through the same nature as that, through which human nature is conceived.
Therefore our power of activity, however it be conceived, can be determined
and consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other individual
thing, which has something in common with us, but not by the power of
anything, of which the nature is entirely different from our own; and
since we call good or evil that which is the cause of pleasure or pain
(IV:viii.), that is (III:xi.Note), which increases or diminishes, helps
or hinders, our power of activity; therefore, that which is entirely,
different from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad. Q.E.D.



Prop. XXX. A thing cannot be bad for us
through the quality which it has in common
with our nature, but it is bad for us in so
far as it is contrary to our nature.

Proof.- We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV:viii.), that
is (by the Def., which see in III:xi.Note), when it diminishes or checks
our power of action. Therefore, if anything were bad for us through that
quality which it has in common with our nature, it would be able
itself to diminish or check that which it has in common with our nature,
which (III:iv.) is absurd. Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through
that quality which it has in common with us, but, on the other hand, in
so far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just shown), in so far as
it can diminish or check our power of action, it is contrary to our nature.
Q.E.D.



Prop. XXXI. In so far as a thing is in harmony
with our nature, it is necessarily good.

Proof.- In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it cannot be
bad for it. It will therefore necessarily be either good or indifferent.
If it be assumed that it be neither good nor bad, nothing will follow from
its nature (IV:Def.i.), which tends to the preservation of our nature,
that is (by the hypothesis), which tends to the preservation of the thing
itself; but this (III:vi.) is absurd; therefore, in so far as a thing is
in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- Hence it follows, that, in proportion as a thing is in harmony
with our nature, so is it more useful or better for us, and vice versa, in
proportion as a thing is more useful for us, so is it more in harmony with
our nature. For, in so far as it is not in harmony with our nature, it
will necessarily be different therefrom or contrary thereto. If different,
it can neither be good nor bad (IV:xxix.); if contrary, it will be contrary
to that which is in harmony with our nature, that is, contrary to what is
good - in short, bad. Nothing, therefore, can be good, except in so far as
it is in harmony with our nature; and hence a thing is useful, in proportion
as it is in harmony with our nature, and vice versa. Q.E.D.



Prop. XXXII. In so far as men are a prey
to passion, they cannot, in that respect,
be said to be naturally in harmony.

Proof. Things, which are said to be in harmony naturally, are understood to
agree in power (III:vii.), not in want of power or negation, and
consequently not in passion (III:iii.Note); wherefore men, in so far as
they are a prey to their passions, cannot be said to be naturally in
harmony. Q.E.D.

Note.- This is also self-evident; for, if we say that white and black only
agree in the fact that neither is red, we absolutely affirm that the do not
agree in any respect. So, if we say that a man and a stone only agree in the
fact that both are finite - wanting in power, not existing by the necessity
of their own nature, or, lastly, indefinitely surpassed by the power of
external causes - we should certainly affirm that a man and a stone are in
no respect alike; therefore, things which agree only in negation, or in
qualities which neither possess, really agree in no respect.



Prop. XXXIII. Men can differ in nature,
in so far as they are assailed by those
emotions, which are passions, or passive
states; and to this extent one and the
same man is variable and inconstant.

Proof.- The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained solely
through our essence or nature (III:Def.i.&ii.), but it must be defined by
the power, that is (III:vii.), by the nature of external causes in
comparison with our own; hence it follows, that there are as many kinds of
each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are affected
(III:lvi.), and that men may be differently affected by one and the same
object (III:li), and to this extent differ in nature; lastly, that one and
the same man may be differently affected towards the same object, and may
therefore be variable and inconstant. Q.E.D.



Prop. XXXIV. In so far as men are assailed
by emotions which are passions, they can be
contrary one to another.

Proof.- A man, for instance Peter, can be the cause of Paul's feeling pain,
because he (Peter) possesses something similar to that which Paul hates
(III:xvi.), or because Peter has sole possession of a thing which Paul also
loves (III:xxxii.&Note), or for other causes (of which the chief are
enumerated in III:lv.Note) ; it may therefore happen that Paul should hate
Peter (Def. of Emotions: vii.), consequently it may easily happen also, that
Peter should hate Paul in return, and that each should endeavour to do the
other an injury, (III:xxxix.), that is (IV:xxx.), that they should be
contrary one to another. But the emotion of pain is always a passion
or passive state (III:lix.); hence men, in so far as they are assailed by
emotions which are passions, can be contrary one to another. Q.E.D.

Note.- I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives that Peter
possesses something which he (Paul) also loves; from this it seems, at first
sight, to follow, that these two men, through both loving the same thing,
and, consequently, through agreement of their respective natures, stand in
one another's way; if this were so, II:xxx. and II:xxxi. would be untrue.
But if we give the matter our unbiased attention, we shall see that the
discrepancy vanishes. For the two men are not in one another's way in
virtue of the agreement of their natures, that is, through both loving the
same thing, but in virtue of one differing from the other. For, in so far
as each loves the same thing, the love of each is fostered thereby
(III:xxxi.), that is (Def. of the Emotions: vi.) the pleasure of each is
fostered thereby. Wherefore it is far from being the case, that they are
at variance through both loving the same thing, and through the agreement
in their natures. The cause for their opposition lies, as I have said,
solely in the fact that they are assumed to differ. For we assume that
Peter has the idea of the loved object as already in his possession, while
Paul has the idea of the loved object as lost. Hence the one man will be
affected with pleasure, the other will be affected with pain, and thus they
will be at variance one with another. We can easily show in like manner,
that all other causes of hatred depend solely on differences, and not on
the agreement between men's natures.



Prop. XXXV. In so far only as men live
in obedience to reason, do they always
necessarily agree in nature.

Proof.- In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are passions, they
can be different in nature (IV:xxxiii.), and at variance one with another.
But men are only said to be active, in so far as they act in obedience to
reason (III:iii.); therefore, what so ever follows from human nature in so
far as it is defined by reason must (III:Def.ii.) be understood solely
through human nature as its proximate cause. But, since every man by the
laws of his nature desires that which he deems good, and endeavours to
remove that which he deems bad (IV:xix.); and further, since that which we,
in accordance with reason, deem good or bad, necessarily is good
or bad (II:xli.); it follows that men, in so far as they live in obedience
to reason, necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for
human nature, and consequently for each individual man (IV:xxxi.Coroll.);
in other words, such things as are in harmony with each man's nature.
Therefore, men in so far as they live in obedience to reason, necessarily
live always in harmony one with another. Q.E.D.

Corollary I - There is no individual thing in nature, which is
more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason. For that
thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony with his nature
(IV:xxxi.Coroll.); that is, obviously, man. But man acts absolutely
according to the laws of his nature, when he lives in obedience to reason
(III:Def.ii.), and to this extent only is always necessarily in harmony
with the nature of another man (by the last Prop.); wherefore among
individual things nothing is more useful to man, than a man who lives in
obedience to reason. Q.E.D.

Corollary II.- As every man seeks most that which is useful to him, so are
men most useful one to another. For the more a man seeks what is useful to
him and endeavours to preserve himself, the more is he endowed with virtue
(IV:xx.), or, what is the same thing (IV:Def.viii.), the more is he endowed
with power to act according to the laws of his own nature, that is to live
in obedience to reason. But men are most in natural harmony, when they live
in obedience to reason (by the last Prop.); therefore (by the foregoing
Coroll.) men will be most useful one to another, when each seeks most that
which is useful to him. Q.E.D.

Note.- What we have just shown is attested by experience so conspicuously,
that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone: "Man is to man a God." Yet it
rarely happens that men live in obedience to reason, for things are so
ordered among them, that they are generally envious and troublesome one to
another. Nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life,
so that the definition of man as a social animal has met with general
assent; in fact, men do derive from social life much more convenience than
injury. Let satirists then laugh their fill at human affairs, let
theologians rail, and let misanthropes praise to their utmost the life of
untutored rusticity, let them heap contempt on men and praises on beasts;
when all is said, they will find that men can provide for their wants much
more easily by mutual help, and that only by uniting their forces can they
escape from the dangers that on every side beset them: not to say how much
more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is, to study the actions of
men than the actions of beasts. But I will treat of this more at
length elsewhere.



Prop. XXXVI. The highest good of those
who follow virtue is common to all,
and therefore all can equally rejoice
therein.

Proof.- To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason (IV:xxiv.),
and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to reason is to understand
(IV:xxvi.); therefore (IV:xxviii.) the highest good for those who follow
after virtue is to know God; that is (II:xlvii.&Note) a good which is
common to all and can be possessed. by all men equally, in so far as they
are of the same nature. Q.E.D.

Note.- Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good of those who
follow after virtue were not common to all? Would it not then follow, as
above (IV:xxxiv.), that men living in obedience to reason, that is
(IV:xxxv.), men in so far as they agree in nature, would be at variance
one with another? To such an inquiry, I make answer, that it follows not
accidentally but from the very nature of reason, that main's highest good
is common to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of man,
in so far as defined by reason; and that a man could neither be, nor be
conceived without the power of taking pleasure in this highest good. For
it belongs to the essence of the human mind (II:xlvii.), to have an
adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.



Prop. XXXVII. The good which every man,
who follows after virtue, desires for
himself he will also desire for other
men, and so much the more, in proportion
as he has a greater knowledge of God.

Proof.- Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason, are most
useful to their fellow men (IV:xxxv;Coroll.i.); therefore (IV:xix.),
we shall in obedience to reason necessarily endeavour to bring about that
men should live in obedience to reason. But the good which every man, in
so far as he is guided by reason, or, in other words, follows after virtue,
desires for himself, is to understand (IV:xxvi.); wherefore the good, which
each follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also for others.
Again, desire, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is the very
essence of the mind (Def. of the Emotions, i.); now the essence of the
mind consists in knowledge (III:xi.), which involves the knowledge of God
(II:xlvii.), and without it (I:xv.), can neither be, nor be conceived;
therefore, in proportion as the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge
of God, so also will be greater the desire of the follower of virtue, that
other men should possess that which he seeks as good for himself. Q.E.D.

Another Proof.- The good, which a man desires for himself and loves, he
will love more constantly, if he sees that others love it also (III:xxxi.);
he will therefore endeavour that others should love it also; and as the
good in question is common to all, and therefore all can rejoice therein,
he will endeavour, for the same reason, to bring about that all should
rejoice therein, and this he will do the more (III:xxxvii.), in proportion
as his own enjoyment of the good is greater.

Note 1- He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to cause others to love
what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the world live according to
his own fancy, acts solely by impulse, and is, therefore, hateful,
especially, to those who take delight in something different, and
accordingly study and, by similar impulse, endeavour, to make men live in
accordance with what pleases themselves. Again, as the highest good sought
by men under the guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only be
possessed by a single individual, it follows that those who love it are not
consistent in their intentions, but, while they delight to sing its praises,
fear to be believed. But he, who endeavours to lead men by reason, does not
act by impulse but courteously and kindly, and his intention is always
consistent. Again, whatsoever we desire and do, whereof we are the cause
in so far as we possess the idea of God, or know God, I set down to
Religion. The desire of well-doing, which is engendered by a life
according to reason, I call piety. Further, the desire, whereby a
man living according to reason is bound to associate others with
himself in friendship, I call honour (Honestas); by honourable I mean
that which is praised by men living according to reason, and by base
I mean that which is repugnant to the gaining of friendship. I have also
shown in addition what are the foundations of a state; and the difference
between true ,virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I
have said; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but living in
accordance with reason; while infirmity is nothing else but man's
allowing himself to be led by things which are external to himself,
and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded by the general
disposition of things rather than by his own nature considered solely
in itself.

Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in IV:xviii., whereby it
is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather
on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational
quest of what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of
associating ourselves with our fellow men, but - not with beasts, or things,
whose nature is different from our own; we have the same rights in respect
to them as they have in respect to us. Nay, as everyone's right is defined
by his virtue, or power, men have far greater rights over beasts than
beasts have over men. Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is,
that we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please,
treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature is not like
ours, and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions
(III:Ivii.Note). It remains for me to explain what I mean by, just and
unjust, sin and merit. On these points see the following note.

Note II.- In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain praise and
blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice.

Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III:xxix.Note: the time
has now come to treat of the remaining terms. But I must first say a few
words concerning man in the state of nature and in society.

Every man exists by sovereign natural right, and, consequently, by
sovereign natural right performs those actions which follow from the
necessity of his own nature; therefore by sovereign natural right every man
judges what is good and what is bad, takes care of his own advantage
according to his own disposition (IV:xix. and IV:xx.), avenges the wrongs
done to him (III:xl.Coroll. ii.), and endeavours to preserve that which he
loves and to destroy - that which he hates (III:xxviii.). Now, if men lived
under the guidance of reason, everyone would remain in possession of this
his right, without any injury being done to his neighbour V:xxxv.Coroll.i.).
But seeing that they are a prey to their emotions, which far surpass human
power or virtue (IV:vi.), they are often drawn in different directions, and
being at variance one with another (IV:xxxiii., xxxiv.), stand in need of
mutual help (IV:xxxv.Note). Wherefore, in order that men may live together
in harmony, and may aid one another, it is necessary that they should
forego their natural right, and, for the sake of security, refrain from
all actions which can injure their fellow-men. The way in which this end
can be obtained, so that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions
(IV:iv.Coroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each
other mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV:vii. and
III:xxxix. It is there shown, that an emotion can only be restrained by an
emotion stronger than, and contrary to itself, and that men avoid inflicting
injury through fear of incurring a greater injury themselves.

On this law society can be established, so long as it keeps in its own
hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging injury, and pronouncing
on good and evil; and provided it also possesses the power to lay down a
general rule of conduct, and to pass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which
is powerless in restraining emotion, but by threats (IV:xvii.Note). Such a
society established with laws and the power of preserving itself is called
a State, while those who live under its protection are called citizens. We
may readily understand that there is in the state of nature nothing, which
by universal consent is pronounced good or bad; for in the state of nature
everyone thinks solely of his own advantage, and according to his
disposition, with reference only to his individual advantage, decides
what is good or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself.

In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it can only
exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on by common consent,
and where everyone is bound to obey the State authority. Sin, then,
is nothing else but disobedience, which is therefore punished by the right
of the State only. Obedience, on the other hand, is set down as merit,
inasmuch as a man is thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the
advantages which a State provides.

Again, in the state of nature, no one is by common consent master of
anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be said to belong to
one man rather than another: all things are common to all. Hence, in the
state of nature, we can conceive no wish to render to every man his own,
or to deprive a man of that which belongs to him; in other words, there is
nothing in the state of nature answering to justice and injustice. Such
ideas are only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common
consent what belongs to one man and what to another.

From all these considerations it is evident, that justice and
injustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes which
display the nature of the mind. But I have said enough.



Prop. XXXVIII. Whatsoever disposes the human
body, so as to render it capable of being
affected in an increased number of ways, or
of affecting external bodies in an increased
number of ways, is useful to man ; and is so,
in proportion as the body is thereby rendered
more capable of being affected or affecting
other bodies in an increased number of ways;
contrariwise, whatsoever renders the body less
capable in this respect is hurtful to man.

Proof.- Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body increases
also the mind's capability of perception (II:xiv.); therefore, whatsoever
thus disposes the body and thus renders it capable, is necessarily good or
useful (IV:xxvi., IV:xxvii.); and is so in proportion to the extent to
which it can render the body capable; contrariwise (II:xiv., IV:xxvi.,
IV:xxvii.), it is hurtful, if it renders the body in this respect less
capable. Q.E.D.



Prop. XXXIX. Whatsoever brings about
the preservation of the proportion of
motion and rest, which the parts of
the human body mutually possess, is
good; contrariwise, whatsoever causes
a change in such proportion is bad.

Proof.- The human body needs many other bodies for its preservation
(II:Post.iv.). But that which constitutes the specific reality (forma)
of a human body is, that its parts communicate their several motions
one to another in a certain fixed proportion (Def. before Lemma iv. after
II:xiii.). Therefore, whatsoever brings about the preservation of the
proportion between motion and rest, which the parts of the human body
mutually possess, preserves the specific reality of the human body, and
consequently renders the human body capable of being affected in many ways
and of affecting external bodies in many ways; consequently it is good
(by the last Prop.). Again, whatsoever brings about a change in the
aforesaid proportion causes the human body to assume another specific
character, in other words (see Preface to this Part towards the end,
though the point is indeed self-evident), to be destroyed, and
consequently totally incapable of being affected in an increased
numbers of ways; therefore it is bad. Q.E.D.

Note.- The extent to which such causes can injure or be of service to the
mind will be explained in the Fifth Part. But I would here remark that I
consider that a body undergoes death, when the proportion of motion and
rest which obtained mutually among its several parts is changed. For I do
not venture to deny that a human body, while keeping the circulation of
the blood and other properties, wherein the life of a body is thought to
consist, may none the less be changed into another nature totally different
from its own. There is no reason, which compels me to maintain that a body
does not die, unless it becomes a corpse; nay, experience would seem to
point to the opposite conclusion. It sometimes happens, that a man
undergoes such changes, that I should hardly call him the same. As I have
heard tell of a certain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness,
and though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his past
life, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he had
written to be his own: indeed, he might have been taken for a grown-up
child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue. If this instance seems
incredible, what shall we say of infants? A man of ripe age deems their
nature so unlike his own, that he can only be persuaded that he too has
been an infant by the analogy of other men. However, I prefer to leave such
questions undiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious for
raising new issues.



Prop. XL. Whatsoever conduces to man's
social life, or causes men to live
together in harmony, is useful, whereas
whatsoever brings discord into a State is bad.

Proof.- For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony also causes
them to live according to reason (IV:xxxv.), and is therefore (IV:xxvi.
and IV:xxvii.) good, and (for the same reason) whatsoever brings about
discord is bad. Q.E.D.



Prop. XLI. Pleasure in itself is not
bad but good: contrariwise, pain in
itself is bad.

Proof.- Pleasure (III:xi.&Note) is emotion, whereby the body's power of
activity is increased or helped; pain is emotion, whereby the body's power
of activity is diminished or checked; therefore (IV:xxxviii.) pleasure in
itself is good, &c. Q.E.D.



Prop. XLII. Mirth cannot be excessive,
but is always good; contrariwise,
Melancholy is always bad.

Proof.- Mirth (see its Def. in III:xi.Note) is pleasure. which, in so
far as it is referred to the body, consists in all parts of the body being
affected equally: that is (III:xi.), the body's power of activity is
increased or aided in such a manner, that the several parts maintain their
former proportion of motion and rest; therefore Mirth is always good
(IV. xxxix.), and cannot be excessive. But Melancholy (see its Def. in
the same note to III:xi.Note) is pain, which, in so far as it is referred
to the body, consists in the absolute decrease or hindrance of the body's
power of activity; therefore (IV:xxxviii.) it is always bad. Q.E.D.



Prop. XLIII. Stimulation may be excessive
and bad; on the other hand, grief may be
good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure
is bad.

Proof.- Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) is pleasure, which,
in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in one or some of its
parts being affected more than the rest (see its Definition, III:xi.Note);
the power of this emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of
the body (IV:vi.), and may remain obstinately fixed therein, thus rendering
it incapable of being affected in a variety of other ways: therefore
(IV:xxxviii.) it may be bad. Again, grief, which is pain, cannot as such
be good (IV:xli.). But, as its force and increase is defined by the power
of an external cause compared with our own (IV:v.), we can conceive
infinite degrees and modes of strength in this emotion (IV:iii.);
we can, therefore, conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation,
and preventing its becoming excessive, and hindering the body's
capabilities; thus, to this extent, it will be good. Q.E.D.



Prop. XLIV. Love and desire may be excessive.

Proof.- Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause
(Def_of_Emotions:vi.); therefore stimulation, accompanied by the idea of
an external cause is love (III:xi.Note); hence love maybe excessive.
Again, the strength of desire varies in proportion to the emotion from
which it arises (III:xxxvii.). Now emotion may overcome all the rest of
men's actions (IV:vi.); so, therefore, can desire, which arises from the
same emotion, overcome all other desires, and become excessive, as we
showed in the last proposition concerning stimulation.

Note.- Mirth, which I have stated to be good, can be conceived more easily
than it can be observed. For the emotions, whereby we are daily assailed,
are generally referred to some part of the body which is affected more than
the rest; hence the emotions are generally excessive, and so fix the mind
in the contemplation of one object, that it is unable to think of others;
and although men, as a rule, are a prey to many emotions - and very few
are found who are always assailed by one and the same - yet there are
cases, where one and the same emotion remains obstinately fixed. We
sometimes see men so absorbed in one object, that, although it be not
present, they think they have it before them; when this is the case with a
man who is not asleep, we say he is delirious or mad; nor are those persons
who are inflamed with love, and who dream all night and all day about
nothing but their mistress, or some woman, considered as less mad, for
they are made objects of ridicule. But when a miser thinks of nothing but
gain or money, or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing but glory, they
are not reckoned to be mad, because they are generally harmful, and are
thought worthy of being hated. But, in reality, Avarice, Ambition, Lust,
&c., are species of madness, though they may not be reckoned among diseases.



Prop. XLV. Hatred can never be good.

Proof.- When we hate a man, we endeavour to destroy him (III.xxxix.),
that is (IV:xxxvii.), we endeavour to do something that is bad.
Therefore, &c. Q.E.D.

N.B. Here, and in what follows, I mean by hatred only hatred towards men.

Corollary I.- Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, and other emotions
attributable to hatred, or arising therefrom, are bad; this is evident from
III:xxxix. and IV:xxxvii.

Corollary II.- Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is base, and in
a State unjust. This also is evident from III:xxxix., and from the
definitions of baseness and injustice in IV:xxxvii.Note.

Note.- Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to be bad) and
laughter I recognize a great difference. For laughter, as also jocularity,
is merely pleasure; therefore, so long as it be not excessive, it is in
itself good (IV:xli.). Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself,
save grim and gloomy superstition. For why is it more lawful to satiate
one's hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy? I reason, and
have convinced myself as follows: No deity, nor anyone else, save the
envious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort, nor sets down to my
virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like, which axe signs of infirmity of
spirit; on the contrary, the greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected,
the greater the perfection whereto we pass; in other words, the more must
we necessarily partake of the divine nature. Therefore, to make use of what
comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible (not to the point of
satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is the part of a wise man. I say
it is the part of a wise man to refresh and recreate himself with moderate
and pleasant food and drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty
of growing plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres,
and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to his
neighbour. For the human body is composed of very numerous parts, of
diverse nature, which continually stand in need of fresh and varied
nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of performing
all the actions, which follow from the necessity of its own nature; and,
consequently, so that the mind may also be equally capable of -
understanding many things simultaneously. This way of life, then, agrees
best with our principles, and also with general practice; therefore, if
there be any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is the
best, and in every way to be commended. There is no need for me to set
forth the matter more clearly or in more detail.



Prop. XLVI. He, who lives under the
guidance of reason, endeavours, as
far as possible, to render back love,
or kindness, for other men's hatred,
anger, contempt, &c., towards him.

Proof.- All emotions of hatred are bad (IV:xlv.Coroll.i.); therefore he who
lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour, as far as possible, to
avoid being assailed by, such emotions (IV:xix.); consequently, he will
also endeavour to prevent others being so aspect (IV:xxxvii.). But hatred
is increased by being reciprocated, and can be quenched by love III:xliii.),
so that hatred may pass into love (III:xliv.); therefore he who lives under
the guidance of reason will endeavour to repay hatred with love, that is,
with kindness. Q.E.D.

Note.- He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is assuredly, wretched.
But he, who strives to conquer hatred with love, fights his battle in joy
and confidence; he withstands many as easily as one, and has very little
need of fortune's aid. Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through
failure, but through increase in their powers; all these consequences
follow so plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding,
that I have no need to prove them in detail.



Prop. XLVII. Emotions of hope and fear
cannot be in themselves good.

Proof.- Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain. For fear is
pain (Def. of the  Emotions:xiii.), and hope (Def. of the Emotions,
Explanation xii. and xiii.) cannot exist without fear; therefore (IV. xli.)
these emotions cannot be good in themselves, but only in so far as they
can restrain excessive pleasure (IV:xliii.). Q.E.D.

Note.- We may add, that these emotions show defective knowledge and an
absence of power in the mind; for the same reason confidence, despair, joy,
and disappointment are signs of a want of mental power. For although
confidence and joy are pleasurable emotions, they, nevertheless imply a
preceding, pain, namely, hope and fear. Wherefore the more we endeavour to
be guided by reason, the less do we depend on hope; we endeavour to free
ourselves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate fortune, directing
our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom.



Prop. XLVIII. The emotions of over-esteem
and disparagement are always bad.

Proof.- These emotions (see Def. of the Emotions, xxi., xxii.) are
repugnant to reason; and are therefore (IV. xxvi., IV:xxvii.) bad. Q.E.D.



Prop. XLIX. Over-esteem is apt to
render its object proud.

Proof.- If we see that any one rates us too highly, for love's sake,
we are apt to become elated (III:xli.), or to be pleasurably affected
Def. of the Emotions:xxx.); the good which we hear of ourselves we readily
believe (III:xxv.); and therefore, for love's sake, rate ourselves too
highly; in other words, we are apt to become proud. Q.E.D.



Prop. L. Pity, in a man who lives
under the guidance of reason, is in
itself bad and useless.

Proof.- Pity (Def. of the Emotions:xviii.) is a pain, and therefore
(IV:xli.) is in itself bad. The good effect which follows, namely, our
endeavour to free the object of our pity from misery, is an action which
we desire to do solely at the dictation of reason (IV:xxxvii.); only at
the dictation of reason are we able to perform any action, which we know
for certain to be good (IV:xxvii.); thus, in a man who lives under the
guidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and bad. Q.E.D.

Note.- He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from the necessity
of the divine nature, and come to pass in accordance with the eternal laws
and rules of nature, will not find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or
contempt, nor will he bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of
human virtue he will endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and to rejoice.
We may add, that he, who is easily touched with compassion, and is moved by
another's sorrow or tears, often does something which he afterwards regrets;
partly because we can never be sure that an action caused by emotion is
good, partly because we are easily deceived by false tears. I am in this
place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of reason. He
who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by compassion, is
rightly styled inhuman, for (III: xxvii.) he seems unlike a man.



Prop. LI. Approval is not repugnant
to reason, but can agree therewith
and arise therefrom.

Proof.- Approval is love towards one who has done good to another (Def. of
the Emotions:xix.); therefore it may be referred to the mind, in so far as
the latter is active (III:lix.), that is (III:iii.), in so far as it -
understands; therefore, it is in agreement with reason, &c. Q.E.D.

Another Proof.- He, who lives under the guidance of reason, desires for
others the good which he seeks for himself (IV:xxxvii.); wherefore from
seeing someone doing good to his fellow his own endeavour to do good is
aided; in other words, he will feel pleasure (III:xi.Note) accompanied by
the idea of the benefactor. Therefore he approves of him. Q.E.D.

Note.- Indignation as we defined it (Def. of the Emotions:xx.) is
necessarily evil (IV:xlv.); we may, however, remark that, when the
sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace punishes a citizen
who has injured another, it should not be said to be indignant with the
criminal, for it is not incited by hatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense
of duty to punish him.



Prop. LII. Self-approval may arise
from reason, and that which arises
from reason is the highest possible.

Proof.- Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of
himself and his own power of action (Def. of the Emotions:xxv.). But a
man's true power of action - or virtue is reason herself (III:iii.), as
the said man clearly and distinctly contemplates her (II:xl., II:xliii.);
therefore self-approval arises from reason. Again, when a man is
contemplating himself, he only perceived clearly and distinctly or
adequately, such things as follow from his power of action (III:Def.ii.),
that is (III:iii.), from his power of understanding; therefore in such
contemplation alone does the highest possible self-approval arise. Q.E.D.

Note.- Self-approval is in reality the highest object for which we can hope.
For (as we showed in IV:xxv.) no one endeavours to preserve his being for
the sake of any ulterior object, and, as this approval is more and more
fostered and strengthened by praise (III:liii.Coroll.), and on the
contrary (III:lv.Coroll.) is more and more disturbed by blame, fame
becomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and life under
disgrace is almost unendurable.



Prop. LIII. Humility is not a virtue,
or does not arise from reason.

Proof.- Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own
infirmities (Def. of the Emotions:xxvi.). But, in so far as a man knows
himself by true reason, he is assumed to understand his essence, that is,
his power (III:vii.). Wherefore, if a man in self-contemplation perceives
any infirmity in himself, it is not by virtue of his understanding himself,
but (III:lv.) by virtue of his power of activity being checked. But, if we
assume that a man perceives his own infirmity by virtue of understanding
something stronger than himself, by the knowledge of which he determines
his own power of activity, this is the same as saying that we conceive
that a man understands himself distinctly (IV:xxvi.), because (Land reads:
"Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"- which I have translated above. He -
suggests as alternative readings to `quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque'
(= and that).) his power of activity is aided. Wherefore humility, or the
pain which arises from a man's contemplation of his own infirmity, does
not arise from the contemplation or reason, and is not a virtue but a
passion. Q.E.D.



Prop. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue,
or does not arise from reason ; but he
who repents of an action is doubly
wretched or infirm.

Proof.- The first part of this proposition is proved like the foregoing
one. The second part is proved from the mere definition of the emotion in
question (Def. of the Emotions:xxvii.). For the man allows himself to be
overcome, first, by evil desires; secondly, by pain.

Note.- As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these two emotions,
namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and Fear, bring more good
than harm; hence, as we must sin, we had better sin in that direction.
For, if all men who are a prey to emotion were all equally proud, they
would shrink from nothing, and would fear nothing; how then could they be
joined and linked together in bonds of union?  The crowd plays the tyrant,
when it is not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who
consulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously commended
Humility, Repentance, and Reverence. Indeed those who are a prey to these
emotions may be led much more easily than others to live under the
guidance of reason, that is, to become free and to enjoy the life of the
blessed.



Prop. LV. Extreme pride or dejection
indicates extreme ignorance of self.

Proof.- This is evident from Def. of the Emotions:xxviii. and xxix.



Prop. LVI. Extreme pride or dejection
indicates extreme infirmity of spirit.

Proof.- The first foundation of virtue is self-preservation
(IV:xxii.Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV:xxiv.). He, therefore,
who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the foundation of all virtues,
and consequently of all virtues. Again, to act virtuously is merely to
act under the guidance of reason (IV:xxiv.): now he, that acts under the
guidance of reason, must necessarily know that he so acts (III:xliii.).
Therefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, and consequently of
all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue; in other words
(IV:Def.viii.), is most infirm of spirit. Thus extreme pride or dejection
indicates extreme infirmity of spirit. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and the
dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions.

Note.- Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride; for the
latter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former a painful emotion, the
pleasurable is stronger than the painful (IV:xviii.).



Prop. LVII. The proud man delights in the
company of flatterers and parasites,
but hates the company of the high-minded.

Proof.- Pride is pleasure arising from a man's over estimation of himself
(Def. of the Emotions:xxviii. and vi.); this estimation the proud man will
endeavour to foster by all the means in his power (III:xiii.Note); he will
therefore delight in the company of flatterers and parasites (whose
character is too well known to need definition here), and will avoid the
company of high-minded men, who value him according to his deserts. Q.E.D.

Note.- It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the evil results
of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a, prey to all the emotions, though to
none of them less than to love and pity. I cannot, however, pass over in
silence the fact, that a man may be called proud from his underestimation
of other people; and, therefore, pride in this sense may be defined as
pleasure arising from the false opinion, whereby a man may consider
himself superior to his fellows. The dejection, which is the opposite
quality to this sort of pride, may be defined as pain arising from the
false opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior to his fellows.
Such being the ease, we can easily see that a proud man is necessarily
envious (III:xli.Note), and only takes pleasure in the company, who fool
his weak mind to the top of his bent, and make him insane instead of
merely foolish.

Though dejection is the emotion contrary to pride, yet is the dejected
man very near akin to the proud man. For, inasmuch as his pain arises
from a comparison between his own infirmity and other men's power or
virtue, it will be removed, or, in other words, he will feel pleasure, if
his imagination be occupied in contemplating other men's faults; whence
arises the proverb, "The unhappy are comforted by finding fellow-sufferers."
Contrariwise, he will be the more pained in proportion as he thinks
himself inferior to others; hence none are so prone to envy as the
dejected, they are specially keen in observing men's actions, with a
view to fault-finding rather than correction, in order to reserve their
praises for dejection, and to glory therein, though all the time with a
dejected air. These effects follow as necessarily from the said emotion,
as it follows from the nature of a triangle, that the three angles are
equal to two right angles. I have already said that I call these and
similar emotions bad, solely in respect to what is useful to man. The
laws of nature have regard to nature's general order, whereof man is but
a part. I mention this, in passing, lest any should think that I have
wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds of men rather than
the nature and properties of things. For, as I said in the preface to the
third Part, I regard human emotions and their properties as on the same
footing with other natural phenomena. Assuredly human emotions indicate
the power and ingenuity, of nature, if not of human nature, quite as fully,
as other things which we admire, and which we delight to contemplate.
But I pass on to note those qualities in the emotions, which bring
advantage to man, or inflict injury upon him.



Prop. LVIII. Honour (gloria) is not repugnant
to reason, but may arise therefrom.

Proof.-This is evident from Def. of the Emotions:xxx., and also from the
definition of an honourable man (IV:xxxvii.Note.i.).

Note.- Empty honour, as it is styled, is self- approval, fostered only by
the good opinion of the populace; when this good opinion ceases there
ceases also the self-approval, in other words, the highest object of each
man's love (IV:lii.Note); consequently, he whose honour is rooted in
popular approval must, day by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in
order to retain his reputation. For the populace is variable and
inconstant, so that, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers
away. Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and readily
represses the fame of others. The object of the strife being estimated as
the greatest of all goods, each combatant is seized with a fierce desire
to put down his rivals in every possible way, till he who at last comes
out victorious is more proud of having done harm to others than of having
done good to himself. This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being
nothing.

The points to note concerning shame (pudor) may easily be inferred
from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance. I will only
add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue, is yet good, in so
far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is really imbued with the
desire to live honourably; in the same way as suffering is good, as
showing that the injured part is not mortified. Therefore, though a man
who feels shame is sorrowful, he is yet more perfect than he, who is
shameless, and has no desire to live honourably.

Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon concerning the
emotions of pleasure and pain; as for the desires, they are good or bad
according as they spring from good or evil emotions. But all, in so far
as they are engendered in us by, emotions wherein the mind is passive,
are blind (as is evident from what was said in IV:xliv.Note), and would
be useless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidance of
reason only, as I will now briefly, show.



Prop. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we
are determined by emotion wherein the mind
is passive; we can be determined without
emotion by reason.

Proof.- To act rationally, is nothing else (III:iii. and III:Def.ii.)
but to perform those actions, which follow from the necessity, of our
nature {to persist} considered in itself alone. But pain is bad, in so
far as it diminishes or checks the power of action (IV:xli.); wherefore
we cannot by pain be determined to any action, which we should be unable
to perform under the guidance of reason. Again, pleasure is bad only
in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action (IV:xli., IV:xliii.);
therefore to this extent we could not be determined by, it to any action,
which we could not perform under the guidance of reason. Lastly, pleasure,
in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for it consists in the
fact that a man's capability for action is increased or aided); nor is the
mind passive therein, except in so far as a man's power of action is not
increased to the extent of affording him an adequate conception of
himself and his actions (III:iii., &Note).

Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to such a
state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception of himself and
his own actions, he will be equally, nay more, capable of those actions,
to which he is determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive. But all
emotions are attributable to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the
Emotions:iv. explanation); and desire (Def. of the Emotions:i.) is nothing
else but the attempt to act; therefore, to all actions, &c. Q.E.D.

Another Proof.- A given action is called bad, in so far as it arises
from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion. But no action,
considered in itself alone, is either good or bad (as we pointed out in
the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same action being sometimes good,
sometimes bad; wherefore to the action which is sometimes bad, or arises
from some evil emotion, we may be led by reason (IV:xix.). Q.E.D.

Note.- An example will put this point in a clearer light. The action of
striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and in so far as we
merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist, and
moves his whole arm violently downwards, is a virtue or excellence which
is conceived as proper to the structure of the human body. If, then, a man,
moved by anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm,
this result takes place (as we showed in Pt.II.), because one and the
same action can be associated with various mental images of things;
therefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same
action by confused ideas, or by clear and distinct ideas. Hence it is
evident that every desire which springs from emotion, wherein the mind is
passive, would become useless, if men could be guided by reason. Let us
now see why desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive,
is called by us blind.



Prop. LX. Desire arising from a pleasure
or pain, that is not attributable, to
the whole body, but only to one or certain
parts thereof, is without utility in
respect to a man as a whole.

Proof.- Let it be assumed, for instance, that A, a part of a body, is so
strengthened by some external cause, that it prevails over the remaining
parts (IV:vi.). This part will not endeavour to do away with its own
powers, in order that the other parts of the body may perform its office;
for this it would be necessary for it to have a force or power of doing
away with its own powers, which (III:vi.) is absurd. The said part, and,
consequently, the mind also, will endeavour to preserve its condition.
Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind aforesaid has no
utility in reference to a man as a whole. If it be assumed, on the other
hand, that the part, A, be checked so that the remaining parts prevail,
it may be proved in the same manner that desire arising from pain has no
utility in respect to a man as a whole. Q.E.D.

Note.- As pleasure is generally (IV:xliv.Note) attributed to one part
of the body, we generally desire to preserve our being with out taking
into consideration our health as a whole: to which it may be added, that
the desires which have most hold over us (IV:ix.) take account of the
present and not of the future.



Prop. LXI. Desire which springs from
reason cannot be excessive.

Proof.- Desire (Def. of the Emotions:i.) considered absolutely is the
actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as in any way
determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself.
Hence desire, which arises from reason, that is (III:iii.), which is
engendered in us in so far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of
man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are
adequately conceived through man's essence only (III:Def.ii.). Now, if
such desire could be excessive, human nature considered in itself alone
would be able to exceed itself, or would be able to do more than it can,
a manifest contradiction. Therefore, such desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D.



Prop. LXII. In so far as the mind conceives
a thing under the dictates of reason, it is
affected equally, whether the idea be of a
thing future, past, or present.

Proof.- Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason, it
conceives under the form of eternity or necessity (II:xliv.Coroll.ii.),
and is therefore affected with the same certitude (II:xliii.&Note).
Wherefore, whether the thing be present, past, or future, the mind
conceives it under the same necessity and is affected with the same
certitude; and whether the idea be of something present, past, or future,
it will in all cases be equally true (II:xli.); that is, it will always
possess the same properties of an adequate idea (II:Def.iv.); therefore, in
so far as the mind conceives things under the dictates of reason, it is
affected in the same manner, whether the idea be of a thing future, past,
or present. Q.E.D.

Note.- If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration of things,
and could determine by reason their periods of existence, we should
contemplate things future with the same emotion as things present; and
the mind would desire as though it were present the good which it
conceived as future; consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser
good in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and
would in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source of
evil in the future, as we shall presently show. However, we can have but
a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (II:xxxi.) and the
periods of their existence (II:xliv.Note) we can only determine by
imagination, which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by the
present. Hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is
merely abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order
of things and the connection of causes, with a view to determining what
is good or bad for us in the, present, is rather imaginary than real.
Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the desire arising from such
knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it looks on into the future, be
more readily checked than the desire of things which are agreeable at the
present time. (Cf. IV:xvi.)



Prop. LXIII. He who is led by fear,
and does good in order to escape evil,
is not led by reason.

Proof.- All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as active,
or in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure and desire (III:lix.);
therefore, he who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil,
is not led by reason.

Note.- Superstitions persons, who know better how to rail at vice than
how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by reason, but so
to restrain them that they would rather escape evil than love virtue,
have no other aim but to make others as wretched as themselves; wherefore
it is nothing wonderful, if they be generally troublesome and odious to
their fellow-men.

Corollary.- Under desire which springs from reason, we seek good directly,
and shun evil indirectly.

Proof.- Desire which springs from reason can only spring from a pleasurable
emotion, wherein the mind is not passive (III:lix.), in other words, from
a pleasure which cannot be excessive (IV:lxi.), and not from pain;
wherefore this desire springs from the knowledge of good, not of evil
(IV:viii.); hence under the guidance of reason we seek good directly and
only by implication shun evil. Q.E.D.

Note.- This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a sick and a
healthy man. The sick man through fear of death eats what he naturally
shrinks from, but the healthy man takes pleasure in his food, and thus
gets a better enjoyment out of life, than if he were in fear of death,
and desired directly to avoid it. So a judge, who condemns a criminal
to death, not from hatred or anger but from love of the public
well-being, is guided solely by reason.



Prop. LXIV. The knowledge of evil is
an inadequate knowledge.

Proof.- The knowledge of evil (IV:viii.) is pain, in so far as we are
conscious thereof. Now pain is the transition to a lesser perfection
(Def. of the Emotions:iii.) and therefore cannot be understood through
man's nature (III:vi.,& II:vii.); therefore it is a passive state
(III.Def.ii.) which (III:iii.) depends on inadequate ideas; consequently
the knowledge thereof (II:xxix.), namely, the knowledge of evil, is
inadequate. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- Hence it follows that, if the human mind possessed only
adequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil.



Prop. LXV. Under the guidance of reason we
should pursue the greater of two goods and
the lesser of two evils.

Proof.- A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good is in
reality an evil; for we apply the terms good and bad to things, in so
far as we compare them one with another (see preface to this Part);
therefore, evil is in reality a lesser good; hence under the guidance of
reason we seek or pursue only the greater good and the lesser evil. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the lesser evil
as though it were the greater good, and we may shun the lesser good,
which would be the cause of the greater evil. For the evil, which is
here called the lesser, is really good, and the lesser good is really
evil, wherefore we may seek the former and shun the latter. Q.E.D.



Prop. LXVI. We may, under the guidance of
reason, seek a greater good in the future
in preference to a lesser good in the
present, and we may seek a lesser evil in
the present in preference to a greater evil
in the future.
"Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).  Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod
causa est faturi alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious misprint, and is
corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)

Proof.- If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things future,
it would be affected towards what is future in the same way as towards
what is present (IV:lxii.); wherefore, looking merely to reason, as in
this proposition we are assumed to do, there is no difference, whether
the greater good or evil be assumed as present, or assumed as future;
hence (IV:lxv.) we may seek a greater good in the future in preference
to a lesser good in the present, &c. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a lesser evil in
the present, because it is the cause of a greater good in the future,
and we may shun a lesser good in the present, because it is the cause
of a greater evil in the future. This Corollary is related to the
foregoing Proposition as the Corollary to IV:lxv. is related to the
said IV:lxv.

Note.- If these statements be compared with what we have pointed out
concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part up to Prop. xviii.,
we shall readily see the difference between a man, who is led solely by
emotion or opinion, and a man, who is led by reason. The former, whether
will or no, performs actions whereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is
his own master and only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary
importance in life, and therefore chiefly, desires; wherefore I call the
former a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose disposition
and manner of life it will be well to make a few observations.



Prop. LXVII. A free man thinks of death
least of all things; and his wisdom is
a meditation not of death but of life.

Proof.- A free man is one who lives under the guidance of reason, who is
not led by fear (IV:lxiii.), but who directly desires that which is good
(IV:lxiii.Coroll.), in other words (IV:xxiv.), who strives to act, to live,
and to preserve his being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage;
wherefore such an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom
is a meditation of life. Q.E.D



Prop. LXVIII. If men were born free,
they would, so long as they remained free,
form no conception of good and evil.

Proof.- I call free him who is led solely by reason; he, therefore, who
is born free, and who remains free, has only adequate ideas; therefore
(IV:lxiv.Coroll.) he has no conception of evil, or consequently (good
and evil being correlative) of good. Q.E.D.

Note.- It is evident, from IV:iv., that the hypothesis of this Proposition
is false and inconceivable, except in so far as we look solely to the
nature of man, or rather to God; not in so far as the latter is infinite,
but only in so far as he is the cause of man's existence.

This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to have
been signifieded by Moses in the history of the first man. For in that
narrative no other power of God is conceived, save that whereby he
created man, that is the power wherewith he provided solely for man's
advantage; it is stated that God forbade man, being free, to eat of the
tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that, as soon as man should
have eaten of it, he would straightway fear death rather than desire to
live. Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in
entire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be nothing in
nature which could be more useful to him; but that after he believed the
beasts to be like himself, he straightway began to imitate their emotions
(III:xxvii.), and to lose his freedom; this freedom was afterwards
recovered by the patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the
idea of God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire for
others the good which he desires for himself, as we have shown above
(IV:xxxii.).



Prop. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen
to be as great, when it declines dangers,
as when it overcomes them.

Proof.- Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion contrary to
itself, and possessing more power in restraining emotion (IV:vii.). But
blind daring and fear are emotions, which can be conceived as equally
great (IV:v. and IV:iii.): hence, no less virtue or firmness is required
in checking daring than in checking fear (III:lix.Note); in other words
(Def. of the Emotions:xl. and xli.), the free man shows as much virtue,
when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as in combat;
or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of mind, whether he elect
to give battle or to retreat.

 Note.- What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby, I explained
in III:lix.Note. By danger I mean everything, which can give rise to any
evil, such as pain, hatred, discord, &c.



Prop. LXX. The free man, who lives among the
ignorant, strives, as far as he can, to avoid
receiving favours from them.

Proof.- Everyone judges what is good according to his disposition
(III:xxxix.Note); wherefore an ignorant man, who has conferred a benefit
on another, puts his own estimate upon it, and, if it appears to be
estimated less highly by the receiver, will feel pain (III:xlii.). But
the free man only desires to join other men to him in friendship
(IV:xxxvii.), not repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like
value, but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason,
and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary importance.
Therefore the free man, lest be should become hateful to the ignorant, or
follow their desires rather than reason, will endeavour, as far as he can,
to avoid receiving their favours.

Note.- I say, as far as he can. For though men be ignorant, yet are they
men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human aid, the most
excellent of all things: therefore it is often necessary to accept favours
from them, and consequently to repay such favours in kind; we must,
therefore, exercise caution in declining favours, lest we should have the
appearance of despising those who bestow them, or of being, from
avaricious motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for
offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it. Thus, in declining
favours, we must look to the requirements of utility and courtesy.




Prop. LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly
grateful one to another.

Proof.- Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another, and
associated among themselves by the closest necessity of friendship
(IV:xxxv.,&Coroll.i.), only such men endeavour, with mutual zeal of
love, to confer benefits on each other (IV:xxxvii.), and, therefore,
only they are thoroughly grateful one to another. Q.E.D.

Note.- The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire have for one
another, is generally a bargaining or enticement, rather than pure goodwill.
Moreover, ingratitude is not an emotion. Yet it is base, inasmuch as
it generally shows, that a man is affected by excessive hatred, anger,
pride, avarice, &c. He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to
return benefits, is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over
by the gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal
his thefts, or by any similar persons. Contrariwise, such an one shows
a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by an gifts be corrupted, to his
own or the general hurt.



Prop. LXXII. The free man never acts fraudulently,
but always in good faith.

Proof.- If it be asked: What should a man's conduct be in a case where
he could by breaking faith free himself from the danger of present death?
Would not his plan of self-preservation completely persuade him to deceive?
This may be answered by pointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act
thus, it would persuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case
reason would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their forces,
or to have laws in common, that is, not to. have any general laws, which is
absurd.



Prop. LXXIII. The man, who is guided by reason,
is more free in a State, where he lives under
a general system of law, than in
solitude, where he is independent.

Proof.- The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey through fear
(IV:Ixiii.): but, in so far as he endeavours to preserve his being
according to the dictates of reason, that is (IV:lxvi.Note), in so far
as he endeavours to live in freedom, he desires to order his life
according to the general good (IV:xxxvii.), and, consequently (as we
showed in IV:xxxvii.Note.ii.), to live according to the laws of his
country. Therefore the free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom,
desires to possess the general rights of citizenship. Q.E.D.

Note.- These and similar observations, which we have made on man's true
freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to courage and nobility
of character (III:lix.Note). I do not think it worth while to prove
separately all the properties of strength; much less need I show, that he
that is strong hates no man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is
indignant with no man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud.
These propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and
religion, are easily proved from IV:xxxvii. and IV:xlvi.; namely, that
hatred should be overcome with love, and that every man should desire for
others the good which he seeks for himself. We may also repeat what
we drew attention to in the note to IV:I., and in other places; namely,
that the strong man has ever first in his thoughts, that all things
follow from the necessity of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he
deems to be hurtful and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him
impious, horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his
own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe. Wherefore
he strives before all things to conceive things as they really are, and
to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such as are hatred, anger,
envy, derision, pride, and similar emotions, which I have mentioned above.
Thus he endeavours, as we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good,
and to go on his way rejoicing. How far human virtue is capable of
attaining to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove
in the following Part.



APPENDIX.
What have said in this Part concerning the right way of life has not been
arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view, but has been set forth
piece-meal, according as I thought each Proposition could most readily be
deduced from what preceded it. I propose, therefore, to rearrange my
remarks and to bring them under leading heads.

I. All our endeavours or desires so follow from the necessity of our
nature, that they can be understood either through it alone, as their
proximate cause, or by virtue of our being a part of nature, which cannot
be adequately conceived through itself without other individuals.

II. Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner, that they can
be understood through it alone, are those which are referred to the mind,
in so far as the latter is conceived to consist of adequate ideas: the
remaining desires are only referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives
things inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined
not by the power of man, but by the power of things external to us:
wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter passions, for
the former always indicate our power, the latter, on the other hand, show
our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.

III. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined by man's power
or reason, are always good. The rest maybe either good or bad.

IV. Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect the
understanding or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone man's
highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed blessedness is nothing
else but the contentment of spirit, which arises from the intuitive
knowledge of God: now, to perfect the understanding is nothing else
but to understand God, God's attributes, and the actions which follow
from the necessity of his nature. Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason,
the ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all his
fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate conception of
himself and of all things within the scope of his intelligence.

V. Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational life: and things
are only good, in so far as they aid man in his enjoyment of the
intellectual life, which is defined by intelligence. Contrariwise,
whatsoever things hinder man's perfecting of his reason, and capability
to enjoy the rational life, are alone called evil.

VI. As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are necessarily good,
no evil can befall man except through external causes; namely, by virtue
of man being a part of universal nature, whose laws human nature is
compelled to, obey, and to conform to in almost infinite ways.

VII. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of nature, or that
he should not follow her general order; but if he be thrown among
individuals whose nature is in harmony with his own, his power of action
will thereby be aided and fostered, whereas, if he be thrown among such as
are but very little in harmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to
accommodate himself to them without undergoing a great change himself.

VIII. Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be capable of
injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the rational life, we may
endeavour to remove in whatever way seems safest to us; on the other hand,
whatsoever we deem to be good or useful for preserving our being, and
enabling us to enjoy the rational life, we may appropriate to our use and
employ as we think best. Everyone without exception may, by sovereign
right of nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest.

IX. Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any given thing
than other individuals of the same species; therefore (cf. vii.) for man
in the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of the rational life
there is nothing more useful than his fellow-man who is led by reason.
Further, as we know not anything among individual things which is more
excellent than a man led by reason, no man can better display the power of
his skill and disposition, than in so training men, that they come at last
to live under the dominion of their own reason.

X. In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of hatred, one
towards another, they are at variance, and are therefore to be feared in
proportion, as they are more powerful than their fellows.

XI. Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and high-mindedness.

XII. It is before all things useful to men to associate their ways of life,
to bind themselves together with such bonds as they think most fitted to
gather them all into unity, and generally to do whatsoever serves to
strengthen friendship.

XIII. But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness. For men are
diverse (seeing that those who live under the guidance of reason are few),
yet are they generally envious and more prone to revenge than to sympathy.
No small force of character is therefore required to take everyone as he
is, and to restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others. But
those who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing at vice than
in instilling virtue, and who break rather than strengthen men's
dispositions, are hurtful both to themselves and others. Thus many from
too great impatience of spirit, or from misguided religious zeal, have
preferred to live among brutes rather than among men; as boys or youths,
who cannot peaceably endure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as
soldiers and choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in
preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their father:
suffering any burden to be put upon them, so long as they may spite
their parents.

XIV. Therefore, although men are generally governed in everything by their
own lusts, yet their association in common brings many more advantages
than drawbacks. Wherefore it is better to bear patiently the wrongs they
may do us, and to strive to promote whatsoever serves to bring about
harmony and friendship.

XV. Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are attributable to
justice, equity, and honourable living. For men brook ill not only what is
unjust or iniquitous, but also what is reckoned disgraceful, or that a man
should slight the received customs of their society. For winning love those
qualities are especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety
(cf. IV:xxxvii.Notes.i., &.ii.; IV:xlvi.Note; and IV:lxxiii.Note).

XVI. Further, harmony is often the result of fear: but such harmony is
insecure. Further, fear arises from infirmity of spirit and moreover
belongs not to the exercise of reason: the same is true of compassion,
though this latter seems to bear a certain resemblance to piety.

XVII. Men are also gained over by liberality, especially such as have
not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain life. However, to give
aid to every poor man is far beyond the power and the advantage of any
private person. For the riches of any private person are wholly inadequate
to meet such a call. Again, an individual man's resources of character
are too limited for him to be able to make all men his friends. Hence
providing for the poor is a duty, which falls on the State as a whole,
and has regard only to the general advantage.

XVIII. In accepting favours, and in returning gratitude our duty must be
wholly different (cf. IV:lxx.Note; IV:lxxi. Note).

XIX. Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust of generation arising
from bodily beauty, and generally every sort of love, which owns anything
save freedom of soul as its cause, readily passes into hate; unless indeed,
what is worse, it is a species of madness; and then it promotes discord
rather than harmony (cf. III:xxxi.Coroll.).

XX. As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in harmony with
reason, if the desire for physical union be not engendered solely by
bodily beauty, but also by the desire to beget children and to train them
up wisely; and moreover, if the love of both, to wit, of the man and of
the woman, is not caused by bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul.

XXI. Furthermore, flattery begets harmony; but only by means of the vile
offence of slavishness or treachery. None are more readily taken with
flattery than the proud, who wish to be first, but are not.

XXII. There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety and
religion. Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet is he that
abases himself most akin to the proud (IV:lvii.Note).

XXIII. Shame also brings about harmony, but only in such matters as cannot
be hid. Further, as shame is a species of pain, it does not concern the
exercise of reason.

XXIV. The remaining emotions of pain towards men are directly opposed
to justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion; and, although
indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance to equity, yet is life
but lawless, where every man may pass judgment on another's deeds, and
vindicate his own or other men's rights.

XXV. Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire of pleasing
men which is determined by reason, is attributable to piety (as we said
in IV:xxxvii.Note.i.). But, if it spring from emotion, it is ambition,
or the desire whereby, men, under the false cloak of piety, generally
stir up discords and seditions. For he who desires to aid his fellows.
either in word or in deed, so that they may together enjoy the highest
good, he, I say, will before all things strive to, win them over with
love: not to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be called
after his name, nor to give any cause for envy. Further, in his
conversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults, and will be
careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity: but he will dwell at
length on human virtue or power, and the way whereby it may be perfected.
Thus will men be stirred not by fear, nor by aversion, but only by the
emotion of joy, to endeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in
obedience to reason.

XXVI. Besides men, we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind
we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or
any sort of fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides
man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to
preserve or destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt
to our use as best we may.

XXVII. The advantage which we derive from things external to us, besides
the experience and knowledge which we acquire from observing them, and
from recombining their elements in different forms, is principally the
preservation of the body; from this point of view, those things are most
useful which can so feed and nourish the body, that all its parts may
rightly fulfil their functions. For, in proportion as the body is capable
of being affected in a greater variety of ways, and of affecting external
bodies in a great number of ways, so much the more is the mind capable of
thinking (IV:xxxviii., IV:xxxix.). But there seem to be very few things
of this kind in nature; wherefore for the due nourishment of the body we
must use many foods of diverse nature. For the human body is composed of
very many parts of different nature, which stand in continual need of
varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of
doing everything that can follow from its own nature, and consequently
that the mind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions.

XXVIII. Now for providing these nourishments the strength of each
individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one another mutual
aid. But money has furnished us with a token for everything: hence it is
with the notion of money, that the mind of the multitude is chiefly
engrossed: nay, it can hardly conceive any kind of pleasure, which is not
accompanied with the idea of money as cause.

XXIX. This result is the fault only of those, who seek money, not from
poverty or to supply their necessary, wants, but because they, have
learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring themselves to great
splendour. Certainly they nourish their bodies, according to custom, but
scantily, believing that they lose as much of their wealth as they spend on
the preservation of their body. But they who know the true use of money,
and who fix the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs,
live content with little.

XXX. As, therefore, those things are good which assist the various parts
of the body, and enable them to perform their functions; and as pleasure
consists in an increase of, or aid to, man's power, in so far as he is
composed of mind and body; it follows that all those things which bring
pleasure are good. But seeing that things do not work with the object of
giving us pleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suit
our advantage, and, lastly, that pleasure is generally referred to one
part of the body more than to the other parts; therefore most emotions of
pleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be at hand), and consequently the
desires arising therefrom, may become excessive. Moreover we may add that
emotion leads us to pay most regard to what is agreeable in the present,
nor can we estimate what is future with emotions equally vivid.
(IV:xliv.Note, and IV:lx.Note.)

XXXI. Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as good all that
brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure. However, as we said
above (IV:xlv.Note), none but the envious take delight in my infirmity
and trouble. For the greater the pleasure whereby we are affected, the
greater is the perfection whereto we pass, and consequently the more do
we partake of the divine nature: no pleasure can ever be evil, which is
regulated by a true regard for our advantage. But contrariwise he, who is
led by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by reason.

Ap.XXXII. (1) But human power is extremely limited, and is infinitely
surpassed by the power of external causes; we have not, therefore, an
absolute power of shaping to our use those things which are without us.
Nevertheless, we shall bear with an equal mind all that happens to us
in contravention to the claims of our own advantage, so long as we are
conscious, that we have done our duty, and that the power which we possess
is not sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely;
remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we
follow her order. If we have a clear and distinct understanding of
this, that part of our nature which is defined by intelligence, in other
words the better part of ourselves, will assuredly acquiesce in what
befalls us, and in such acquiescence will endeavour to persist. For,
in so far as we are intelligent beings, we cannot desire anything save
that which is necessary, nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything,
save to that which is true: wherefore, in so far as we have a right
understanding of these things, the endeavour of the better part of
ourselves is in harmony with the order of nature as a whole.





End of Part IV










End of Project Gutenberg's The Ethics [Part IV], by Benedict de Spinoza