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Title: The beginnings of the Egyptian question and the rise of Mehemet Ali a study in the diplomacy of the Napoleonic era based on researches in the British and French archives Author: Muḥammad Shafīq Ghurbāl Author of introduction, etc.: Arnold Toynbee Release date: October 9, 2026 [eBook #79750] Language: English Original publication: London: George Routledge & sons, 1928 Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/79750 Credits: Galo Flordelis (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive) *** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BEGINNINGS OF THE EGYPTIAN QUESTION AND THE RISE OF MEHEMET ALI *** THE BEGINNINGS OF THE EGYPTIAN QUESTION AND THE RISE OF MEHEMET ALI THE BEGINNINGS OF THE EGYPTIAN QUESTION AND THE RISE OF MEHEMET ALI A STUDY IN THE DIPLOMACY OF THE NAPOLEONIC ERA BASED ON RESEARCHES IN THE BRITISH AND FRENCH ARCHIVES BY SHAFIK GHORBAL, M.A. (Lond.) _Lecturer in History, Higher Training College, Cairo_ WITH A PREFACE BY ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE LONDON GEORGE ROUTLEDGE & SONS, LTD. BROADWAY HOUSE: 68-74, CARTER LANE, E.C. 1928 _Thesis approved for the Degree of Master of Arts in the University of London_ PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY THE BOWERING PRESS, PLYMOUTH _To_ PROFESSOR ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE _A Great Teacher and Inspiring Master This Essay is Dedicated by one who is thankful to have been his pupil_ TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAP. PAGE PREFACE BY ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE ix PREFATORY NOTE xiii CHIEF ABBREVIATIONS xv LIST OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF BRITAIN, FRANCE, RUSSIA AND AUSTRIA IN CONSTANTINOPLE AND THEIR CONSULS IN EGYPT FROM 1798 TO 1812 xvii INTRODUCTION 1 I. THE GENESIS OF THE EXPEDITION 7 II. THE CONQUEST OF EGYPT 33 III. THE ANGLO-TURKISH ALLIANCE 53 IV. THE NEW DEPENDENCY 70 V. THE SYRIAN CAMPAIGN 79 VI. THE DIRECTORY AND THE EXPEDITION 91 VII. NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO THE CONVENTION OF EL-ARISH 99 VIII. THE EXPULSION OF THE FRENCH FROM EGYPT, 1800-1801 119 IX. THE FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE, 1801-1802 139 X. THE FIRST BRITISH OCCUPATION OF EGYPT, 1801-1803 155 XI. THE NEAR EASTERN FACTOR IN THE RENEWAL OF THE SECOND COALITION, 1802-1805 184 XII. THE RISE OF MEHEMET ALI, 1803-1806 207 XIII. THE WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY AND THE SECOND BRITISH INVASION OF EGYPT, 1806-1807 233 XIV. FROM TILSIT TO BUCHAREST, THE STALEMATE IN THE EAST, 1807-1812 262 XV. MEHEMET ALI. THE YEARS OF PREPARATION, 1807-1812 279 XVI. AUTHORITIES 285 APPENDICES: A. REVISIONS AND NOTES: 1. J. P. MORIER AND THE “RUSE DE GUERRE” 295 2. ARBUTHNOT AND THE VENTURE ON THE DARDANELLES 296 3. GEN. SHERBROOKE IN EGYPT IN 1807 297 4. GREAT BRITAIN AND THE CONVENTION OF BARTENSTEIN 297 5. SIR W. SIDNEY SMITH AND THE CONVENTION OF EL-ARISH 298 6. TRANSACTIONS OF LORD ELGIN 299 7. THE EGYPTIAN ARCHIVES 301 B. THE REPORT OF SEBASTIANI 301 INDEX 309 PREFACE Historical researches which throw fresh light on the consequences of the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt are a matter of general interest, since the forces set in motion in 1798 are still at work in the life of East and West alike. There are two nations, however, which are concerned in a particularly intimate way: the Egyptians, whose country—with its wonderful productivity and its unrivalled strategic position—has been one of the two focuses of the so-called Eastern Question (the other focus being the Black Sea Straits), and the British, who eventually succeeded to the heritage which Napoleon staked out as a prize to be contended for, through War and Diplomacy, by the Western Powers. The historical work introduced by this foreword has been written, in English, by an Egyptian historian who has made postgraduate studies in two British Universities and is now engaged in public work in his own country. It is to be hoped that an Arabic translation of the book will be published in due course in Egypt, in order that it may be accessible to students of history in both countries. In the opinion of the writer of this prefatory note (who had the pleasure of “supervising” part of Mr. Ghorbal’s researches—a “supervision” in which he learnt more than he taught), Mr. Ghorbal possesses just that combination of qualifications which these researches require. He is in personal touch with both East and West—with the East because it is his home, and with the West because he has lived and studied here—and at the same time he is so thoroughly detached from the passions and prejudices that enter into his field of study that—were not his name printed on the title page—it would be difficult to guess from internal evidence whether the author were an Englishman, a Frenchman, an Egyptian, or none of these. This is a remarkable achievement because these passions and prejudices of more than a century ago are not without a bearing on contemporary controversies between Englishmen and Egyptians. Yet no reflection of contemporary politics can be discerned in Mr. Ghorbal’s work. When it is added that Mr. Ghorbal understands not only the science of extracting information from archives, but the art of presenting the information which he obtains, enough will have been said to show that this book is very well worth reading, if only for the author’s merits. Nor is this one of those good books on bad subjects. The subject which Mr. Ghorbal has chosen to study is as good as can be desired. Let anyone who is not alive to its fascination turn to the passage in the contemporary Egyptian historian, Djabarti (he has been published in a French translation as well as in his own original Arabic), in which he describes the descent of the French upon Egypt in 1798. The piquancy of the situation lay in the fact that the French had descended on Egypt before—in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries—at a time when they had been the inferiors of the Orientals in general civilisation, not excluding the art of war. The mediæval French Knight had been a clumsier and less expert version of the Mameluke; and accordingly, when he tried conclusions with the Mameluke, he had been badly beaten and had abandoned the attempt to conquer Egypt as a total failure. For five and a half centuries the Frenchman left Egypt alone, while he metamorphosed himself from the Frank of 1250 into the Westerner of 1798. For five and a half centuries the Mamelukes remained as they were (except that they abandoned their Central Asian bows for English carbines) and they naturally assumed that the French had changed as little as they had changed themselves. Consequently, when they heard that Napoleon had had the temerity to land at Alexandria, they proposed to deal with him as they had dealt with St. Louis. Light-heartedly they rode out to trample his little army under their horses’ hoofs, and then suddenly they encountered not men (as human capacity was conceived of by Orientals in 1798), but creatures armed with all the incomprehensible and irresistible powers of Mr. Wells’s “Martians.” At the first onset, these Occidental “Martians” carried all before them, and Oriental mankind was stunned. Egypt became a battleground on which superhuman Frenchmen and superhuman Englishmen fought one another. Then there appeared in Egypt the Oriental man of genius who disputes with Napoleon the title to be the leading personality in this drama: Mehemet Ali. Like the troglodyte artilleryman in Mr. Wells’s story, Mehemet Ali had the imagination and the audacity to conceive the idea of stealing the supermen’s thunder. He saw that the French and English were not gods, after all, but men of like passions with the Turks and Egyptians. Their superiority lay in technique and organisation, and the secret of these could be learnt. The first Oriental man of action to learn this secret might become the master of Egypt, and Mehemet Ali determined to be that man. Though Mr. Ghorbal does not carry the story of Mehemet Ali down beyond 1812, he shows him already reaping in Egypt the harvest which Napoleon had sown. These two principal characters occupy the front of the stage and rivet the attention, but there are a number of minor characters who contribute to the interest and the entertainment of the play. We see Sultan Mahmud II of Turkey just coming into action. In his obstinate refusal to surrender the Danubian Principalities he is already displaying that staying-power which was to make him the embodiment of the Turkish national character and the preserver of the Ottoman Empire. We see Abdallah Jacques Menou, the ex-aristocrat-turned-Muslim commander of the French Army in Egypt after the departure of Napoleon and the assassination of Kléber, speculating on the application of the “single tax” to Egyptian fiscal conditions while the British expeditionary forces close in on him from the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. We see Sir Sidney Smith conducting his psychological offensive against the home-sickness of the French Army of Egypt and its supposed anti- Republican proclivities. We see Lord Elgin dividing the time which he was presumed to be devoting to diplomatic activities on behalf of his country to the collection of Turkish “purses” and Greek “marbles.” We see the Mameluke Bey Elfi carrying away “a taste for milk punch” as the fruit of his visit to England. And we see Dundas passing sleepless nights over the French menace to India, but failing to make the flesh of his colleagues in the Cabinet creep in sympathy with his own. These are a few features taken at random from Mr. Ghorbal’s very thorough and comprehensive, and also very readable, study. He has gone back to the original authorities at every point (a good illustration of this is his re-examination of the celebrated report of Sebastiani) and he has treated his subject on the right scale. He has realised that Egypt was a pawn in a diplomatic game played at Constantinople, and that this game itself was a “side-show” in the bigger game of Western politics. That, however, which was a “sideshow” from the standpoint of the West was the first act in an economic, political and cultural revolution from the standpoint of the Oriental World. ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. PREFATORY NOTE “L’Organisation de l’Orient,” wrote M. Lavisse,[1] “est, en somme, le fait capital de la période moderne.” The process—whether it is called the “organisation” or “Westernisation” or “dissolution of the Turkish Empire”—is certainly a capital fact in the history of the nineteenth century, and the French invasion of Egypt in 1798 is a notable landmark in it. The object of this essay is to trace the diplomatic history of that wonderful episode and of the events which led to the rise of Mehemet Ali, the founder of modern Egypt. The first seven chapters of this work formed the substance of a dissertation approved in 1919 for the Degree of B.A. with Honours in Modern History in the University of Liverpool. The rest of the study was approved in 1924 for the Degree of M.A. in the University of London and was awarded a mark of distinction. Since that date, however, some eminent workers have appeared on the same field. Largely through the munificence of H.M. the King of Egypt and the help of the Royal Geographical Society of Egypt, M. G. Douin,[2] M. François Charles-Roux[3] and M. Edouard Driault[4] have published first-class works on one or other aspect of the period dealt with in this work. This essay is, nevertheless, published in its original form, for it systematically co-ordinates the results of researches in the British and French Archives and is held together by the view that the diplomatic origins of the Egyptian Question are best studied in close connection with the general situation in the West. That situation has been, accordingly, linked up to European action in Egypt by chapters dealing with the policy of the Powers as it affected the Turkish Empire. The writer, while conscious of the blemishes of the work of a beginner writing in a foreign language, submits this essay to the British public. It has been his privilege to do his work in the Institute of Historical Research and owes more than he can express to the unwearied assistance given by his teachers and fellow-students. He owes special thanks, however, to his teachers, Professor Arnold Toynbee and Dr. Harold Temperley and to his fellow-student and friend, Miss G. Humberstone, M.A. [Footnote 1: _Vue générale sur l’Histoire Politique de l’Europe_, p. 181.] [Footnote 2: _L’Egypte Indépendante: Projet de 1801_. Cairo, 1924. _L’Egypte de 1802 à 1804_ (French Consular Correspondence). Cairo, 1925.] [Footnote 3: _L’Angleterre et l’Expédition d’Egypte_, 2 vols. Cairo, 1925.] [Footnote 4: _Mohammed Ali et Napoléon_ (1807-1814. French Consular Correspondence.) Cairo, 1925.] CHIEF ABBREVIATIONS Ad. Admiralty Records in the Public Records’ Office, London. F.O. Foreign Office Records in the Public Records’ Office, London. W.O. War Office Records in the Public Records’ Office, London. Arch. Nat. Archives Nationales, Paris. Arch. Aff. Et. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris. B.M. Add. MSS. British Museum Additional Manuscripts. Barrow. _The Life and Correspondence of Sir W. Sidney Smith_, 2 vols. _Correspondance._ _Correspondance de Napoléon I_, in 32 vols. Djabarti. Abdurrahman al Djabarti, _Merveilles Biographiques et Historiques_, Fr. trans. in 9 vols. Fournier. _Napoleon I_, Eng. trans., 2 vols. Int. Cor. _Original Letters from the Army of Gen. Buonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the British Fleet_, in 3 parts. Jonquière. _L’Expédition d’Egypte_, in 5 vols. Martens, A. _Recueil des Traités_, etc., first ed., in 7 vols. Martens Supplements. 4 vols. supplementary to the first ed. „ B. Second ed., in 8 vols. „ N.R. _Nouveau Recueil_, in 19 vols. „ N. Suppl. _Nouveaux Suppléments_, in 3 vols. Pallain. _Le Ministère de Talleyrand sous le Directoire._ Pajol. _Kléber, sa Vie et sa Correspondance._ BRITISH, FRENCH, AUSTRIAN AND RUSSIAN CONSULS IN EGYPT, 1798-1812 GREAT BRITAIN _Missett._ 1803-1804. British Agent without official character. _Missett._ 1804-1807. Consul General (Mr. Ch. Lock had been appointed, but died before reaching his post. Missett was appointed in succession). _Missett._ 1811-1815. N.B.—George Baldwin was the last British Consul before the French Expedition. He had to leave the country in 1796. FRANCE No Consul at the time of the Expedition. _De Lesseps._ 1803-1804. _Drovetti._ 1804-1812. RUSSIA AND AUSTRIA were both represented throughout by the Italian, _Carlo Rosetti_, former Venetian Consul. DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES IN CONSTANTINOPLE GREAT BRITAIN _J. Spencer Smith._ _Chargé d’affaires_, then “Minister Plenipotentiary.” 1798-1799. _Lord Elgin._ Ambassador. Nov., 1799 to Jan., 1803 (from March to September, 1802, Straton acted as _Chargé d’affaires_ during the Ambassador’s absence from the capital). _A. Straton._ _Chargé d’affaires._ January to May, 1803. _W. Drummond._ Ambassador. May to November, 1803. _A. Straton._ Minister Plenipotentiary, November, 1803, to June, 1805. _Ch. Arbuthnot._ Ambassador. June, 1805, to January, 1807. _Sir A Paget._ Plenipotentiary to negotiate peace and appointed to reside as Ambassador in the event of success. May to September, 1807. _Sir Robert Adair._ In residence in Constantinople since January, 1809, but appointed Ambassador only on April 26th, 1809. Remained till July, 1810. _S. Canning._ Minister Plenipotentiary. July, 1810, to June, 1812. _R. Liston._ Ambassador. Arrived Constantinople June, 1812. FRANCE _Ruffin._ _Chargé d’affaires_. 1798 and 1801-1803. The interval between his first and second term he spent in the Castle of Seven Towers. _Marshal Brune._ Ambassador. January, 1803, to December, 1804. _Parandier._ _Chargé d’affaires._ 1804-1806. _General Sebastiani._ Ambassador. August, 1806-April, 1808. _F. Latour-Maubourg._ _Chargé d’affaires_. 1808-1812. AUSTRIA _Baron d’Herbert._ “Internuncio.” 1798-1802. _Stürmer._ “Internuncio.” 1802-1812. RUSSIA _De Tamara._ “Envoy.” 1798-1802. _D’Italinsky._ “Envoy.” December, 1802, to December, 1806. _D’Italinsky._ “Envoy.” After the Peace of Bucharest. May, 1812. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE EGYPTIAN QUESTION AND THE RISE OF MEHEMET ALI INTRODUCTION A single fact sums up the history of Egypt before the landing of the French; the domination of the Mamelukes. Recruited from the slave- markets of Georgia to serve as the Ayyubid Dynasty’s bodyguard, they soon acquired such authority as to be able to destroy, in the year 1250, that dynasty and to elect as Sultan of Egypt one of their chiefs. The country became at once the theatre of civil wars and brigandage. The new sultans were not more firmly established than their predecessors. Forty- seven of them followed one another in quick succession in the short period of two hundred and fifty years, and when, in 1517, Selim the Grim turned his eyes from Europe to Oriental conquest, he was able to make short work of the sultans and to turn Egypt into a Turkish province. Faithful, however, to the traditions of Ottoman rule, he preserved the Mamelukes as a check on the pasha who governed the province in his name. And so long as the tribute was regularly paid, the Sultan at Constantinople had no cause for interference. Twenty-four Beys or Chiefs, accordingly, governed as many administrative divisions. In course of time, however, they gradually encroached upon the authority of the Turkish Pasha, till, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, only the shadow of his power was kept. In form, everything was done in the Sultan’s name; his orders were received, as the Arabic expression ran, “on the head and on the eye.” In reality, the pasha was a veritable prisoner. If he attempted to take himself seriously, it was not long before he received a herald clad in black, upon whose pronouncing the formula “Enzel!” (“Descend!”) the pasha would take the route to Constantinople. The tribute was not regularly paid and efforts were made to declare Egypt independent, notably that of Aly Bey, the ally of Catherine II and the precursor of Mehemet Ali. The Porte, conformably to its habitual policy, shut its eyes to this usurpation. It felt that to suppress the beys would entail a costly war, in which defeat would spell disaster. Its hands were, moreover, fully occupied with the defence of the heart of the Empire against Austria and Russia. In the meantime, it sowed the seeds of rivalry among the Mamelukes and kept them divided, freely using gold for that end and resorting, now and again, to bowstring and poison. The grinding tyranny went on unchecked. The young Circassian slave, once he set foot on the soil of Egypt, saw a career opening before his eyes and felt destined to become a lord. He calculated the need his master had of him and demanded his price. In a society whose _primum mobile_ was gold, the Bey’s first care was to satisfy the rapacity of his slaves. Hence the prodigality which blighted the fair land, hence the intrigues which ruined the beys in turn. Strangers amongst themselves, they were not bound by the natural ties of family. Without relations, without children, the past was a blank. Ignorant and superstitious by training, the frequent murders rendered them ferocious, the tumults seditious, the cabals perfidious, the dissimulation cowardly and the unnatural vices corrupt. A happy stroke of the sabre won the Mameluke pre-eminence. But the upstart did not change character; in a lordly station he had the soul of a slave. Power had no other end than procuring women, horses, jewels and retainers. Gold was to be had, whenever found. The poor peasant was as much pillaged as the “Frank” or Levantine merchant. Such a state of affairs could not but attract the eyes of the outside world to the unhappy land. Commerce languished. In 1770 there were fifteen French establishments in Cairo, in 1785 there were only three. The French Consul, Magallon, had to leave the Capital and take up his residence in Alexandria. The British Consul, Baldwin, had to leave the country. “I do not conceive,” he wrote, “that Egypt can be much longer tenable by the Franks owing to the excessive tyranny of Murad Bey, who latterly has given them to understand in practice and by his satellite Koraim in Alexandria in public declaration that the Consuls are nothing to him, and that he shall exact and extort as in fact he has done without respect to any one. The same spirit invades the whole body of Mamelukes.”[5] In July, 1795, the French Ambassador at Constantinople sent an envoy to the beys to ask for reparation. He could only obtain indefinite promises and reported on the anarchy from which the country was suffering.[6] Apart from these commercial grievances, did Egypt enter into British schemes of expansion or empire? British history does not offer many such schemes, for British policy has been markedly opportunist—a feature which probably explains its general success. “It was the active, far- seeing and ambitious statecraft of France which opened up new arenas of strife and ambition, while Britons followed, doubtfully at first, but in the long run doggedly. Dupleix, Montcalm and Napoleon—to mention the greatest names—precipitated a conflict which was ultimately to turn to the profit of the Sea Power and to plant the Union Jack on many lands.” As far as Egypt was concerned, whatever schemes there were came to nothing more than proposals for opening a trade between India and Egypt by way of the Red Sea.[7] In 1775, Warren Hastings, who was among the earliest of British statesmen to recognise the importance of that country’s geographical position, concluded a treaty of commerce with Mohammad Bey. This treaty, as well as all commercial projects, remained a dead letter owing to the frequent political revolutions. Egypt, however, entered into the calculations of diplomacy in connection with the innumerable projects for the partition of the Ottoman Empire. The story of these projects forms an unedifying chapter in the history of foreign policy, for we see European states concluding treaties with Turkey and at the same time contemplating dismembering it. The authors of the designs are as varied as they can be: popes, kings, emperors, diplomats, publicists, astrologers, divines, dreamers and travellers. Most of the projects, diligently collected by M. Djuvara, assign Egypt to France. Without going back to the heroic days of the Crusades, we find that Leibnitz had suggested it to Louis XIV in order to divert his attention from the Rhine.[8] After the Seven Years’ War, Choiseul proposed to Louis XV to seek in the possession of the Valley of the Nile compensation for his losses in America and the Indies.[9] The conquest of Corsica was a step in that direction. In the plans of Catherine II and Joseph II for partitioning Turkey, Egypt was to be the share of France. Many memoranda on the subject were addressed to Louis XVI. Officers, Mathieu Dumas among others, were sent to explore the ground.[10] In 1780, the explorer Sonnini met a French officer in Cairo who had been out to study the possibility of a conquest of Egypt and an advance upon India.[11] Seven years later, there appeared in France the _Voyages_ of Volney—the author of the fashionable _Ruines_ and the friend of young Bonaparte—who had spent three years in Egypt and Syria. This precise and level-headed traveller did not suggest the conquest of Egypt; but he helped to demolish the legends current on the military power of the Mamelukes. “Leur réunion,” he wrote, “est un attroupement, leur combat est un duel, leur guerre est un brigandage.”[12] Of Alexandria he wrote: “Considérée comme ville de guerre, elle n’est rien. On y voit aucun ouvrage de fortification; la phare même avec ses hautes tours, n’en est pas un. Il n’a pas quatre canons en état, et pas un canonier qui sache pointer. Les 500 Janissaires qui doivent former la garrison, réduits à moitié, sont des ouvriers qui ne savent que fumer la pipe.”[13] A year later, in 1788, he published a pamphlet—_Considérations sur la guerre des Turcs_—in which he advised France to give up her traditional alliance with the Porte.[14] Although he emphasised the importance of Egypt, he did not—as is often supposed—advise his Government to take possession of it. On the contrary he argued against it. He pointed out that the enterprise would entail three wars: with the Porte, with England, and with the inhabitants, that the French as colonists had been a failure, that France had no need for colonies, and that it would be ignominious to attack an ancient ally. Thus on the eve of the Revolution, French diplomacy seemed disposed to abandon the Turkish alliance inaugurated by the Treaty of 1536. Under the menace of invasion, however, Eastern affairs were relegated to the background. There was even a disposition to restore the efficiency of the Turkish Army and open the eyes of the Porte to its peril. This attitude did not last long. On February 9th, 1798, Magallon, ex-Consul in Egypt, addressed a memorandum on the possession of that country.[15] He declared that this was the best means for destroying British power in the East. Calling attention to the inveterate hostility of Tippoo Sahib, he stated that 15,000 Frenchmen joined to the forces of that potentate would be an overmatch to the British Army, which amounted to 15-20,000 men, mostly sepoys, upon whom there was no dependence. The Directory was impressed. Charles Delacroix, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, asked Magallon to confer with him, and declared that the design on Egypt was not renounced but merely deferred.[16] With the appointment of Talleyrand to succeed Delacroix, the project acquired an official character. [Footnote 5: To Spencer Smith, 19 April, 1798, F.O. Turkey, 21.] [Footnote 6: Jonquière, I, p. 148.] [Footnote 7: B.M. Add. MSS., 29201, f. 11, 17, 19; 29210, f. 341, 412, 422, 426, 30, 32.] [Footnote 8: Sorel, I, p. 328.] [Footnote 9: Jonquière, I, p. 146.] [Footnote 10: Jonquière, I, p. 148.] [Footnote 11: _Annual Register_, 1789, p. 239 (Domestic Literature).] [Footnote 12: _Œuvres de Volney_, p. 151.] [Footnote 13: _Ibid._, p. 117.] [Footnote 14: _Ibid._, pp. 753-774.] [Footnote 15: _Revue d’Egypte_, Sept., 1896.] [Footnote 16: Jonquière, p. 150 note.] I THE GENESIS OF THE EXPEDITION The Treaty of Campo Formio was signed on October 17th, 1797. The First Coalition was dissolved. Of the powers which formed it there now remained only Great Britain to oppose the domination of France over the Continent. Saved by her geographical position from the horrors of war, that power was successful in advancing her interests. It is true that she had to bear the burden of subsidies advanced to her allies and of a heavy war expenditure; but her gain was the conquest of naval supremacy, the monopoly of new markets and the wresting of fine colonies from Spain and Holland, the allies of the Republic.[17] The negotiations with Malmesbury at Lille (July, 1797) showed the difficulty of forming the basis of an equitable peace between two powers who, the one as supreme on sea as the other was on land, clung to all their conquests. There was, in addition, a great obstacle in the way of an accommodation; namely, the fear which the propaganda inspired in the enemies, as well as in the allies of France—fear which the old Governments took care to exaggerate.[18] This being the case, the question was, how and where was the blow to be struck which would force the British Government to acquiesce in a French peace? A naval war, properly so-called, was out of the question. For the events of the Revolution had rapidly disorganised the French Navy and imposed upon the various governments of France a timid and defensive naval policy.[19] By the beginning of the year 1798 the supremacy of Great Britain on the sea had become crushing.[20] The support of Spain and of Holland secured by the Convention of Madrid (August 18th, 1796) and by the Treaty of the Hague (May 16th, 1795) respectively was feeble and incapable of redressing the balance. The opportune victories of Jervis and Duncan had, moreover, greatly weakened the navies of these two powers and cowed their spirit.[21] To beat the English within their own boundaries seemed, consequently, the only means of enabling the French to enjoy unchallenged the fruits of long years of victories and sacrifices. Britain, it was argued, could not raise armies capable of withstanding the onslaughts of the veterans of Italy and the Rhineland. Moreover, was she not the victim of serious domestic dissensions? Had she not, for instance, in Ireland her Vendée? The naval inferiority of France was no insurmountable barrier. All that was needed for such an enterprise, it was supposed, was an opportunity to cross unmolested the narrow seas. France, possessing the initiative, would never lack such an opportunity. The project was not a new one. The French archives possess many schemes of invasion, belonging, for the most part, to the latter half of the eighteenth century.[22] The Committee of Public Safety and the Directory successively examined several of them and attempts were made, on various occasions, to carry them out, notably that of Hoche (December, 1796-January, 1797), which, in spite of its disastrous failure, showed that the crossing, at any rate, could be achieved. Public opinion was very clamorous for a descent upon England. The Anglomania so fashionable in the early stages of the Revolution had given place to a fierce hatred of the English, so that when the Directory, on November 21st, 1797, proclaimed its intention “to dictate the terms of peace in London” and “avenge the wrongs of the world,” there was, throughout the whole country, a violent outbreak of Anglophobia. Petitions couched in the fiercest of expressions poured upon the legislative councils,[23] veritable hymns of hate obtained wide circulation[24] and dramas taking the invasion for their theme proved the successes of the season.[25] A saying, ascribed to the Marechal de Saxe, “On ne vaincra jamais les Anglais que dans Londres,” was on all lips, and books relating the various invasions of which Great Britain was the victim were in great demand. The French were not, however, solely actuated by hatred. Judging from the toasts drunk in patriotic _fêtes_[26] many of them were deluded as to the true character of the reform movement in England and of the parliamentary opposition. The Jacobins thirsted to pack off the House of Lords and the royal family to the Guianas and to cut off the heads of the king and his ministers. Others desired to pillage the Bank of England and confiscate for the benefit of the Republic or for their own the warehouses, the mines and other sources of English prosperity.[27] Danton had, for a short time, been the victim of the delusion which led Frenchmen to distinguish between the English nation and its Government, to believe in the possibility of separating them. A greater man than Danton, Bonaparte, was another victim. He admired the English and praised their energy and adventurous spirit; but he imagined that with Pitt fallen and the Whigs in power he would gain their acquiescence in the supremacy of France,[28] in return for his helping them to ruin the aristocracy. This was one of the motives for his desire to end the war with Austria. But the destruction of English power, or, at least, the relegation of England into the second or third order, would win for the Republic the Empire of the East and realise the dreams which since the Crusades, as we have seen, had haunted French imagination. Already his mind was full of the East—the source of all glory—of Egypt, of the Indies and of the Suez route. Already during his time in garrison at Valence and Auxonne, he had, through a very remarkable concentration of thought and effort, amassed a most unusual amount of information on history and some of the sciences. From Marigny and Amelot he learnt about the Arabs and the Republic of Venice, from Rollin about the nations of antiquity; from Baron de Tott about Egypt and Ptolemy’s canal through the Isthmus of Suez, “which could be made navigable with very little trouble.”[29] Raynal, however, seems to have influenced him most.[30] His _Histoire philosophique et politique des Etablissements et du Commerce des Européens dans les Deux Indes_ was one of the most widely read books of the day. The passage on Egypt is striking, “On beholding this country, lying between the two seas, one of which is the gate to the East, the other the gate to the West, Alexander conceived the plan of transferring the capital of his kingdom to Egypt and of making that country the centre of the world’s commerce. That prince, the most enlightened of all conquerors, recognised that if there were any means of binding in a permanent union the conquests he had already made and those he intended to make, it was through this country, which seemed to have been predestined by nature to link Africa and Asia with Europe.”[31] He must have read the works of his friend Volney and must have been impressed by that traveller’s account of the military weakness of Egypt.[32] Already, at the age of twenty-six, the disillusioned enthusiast, seeing his hopes shattered by the fall of Robespierre, entertained for a moment the idea of going to Constantinople to reorganise the Grand Signior’s artillery.[33] In addition to the predilection of his youth, however, Bonaparte was impelled by the exigencies of the Italian campaigns and the negotiations with Austria to envisage schemes of colonial and imperial expansion. By that time the Order of St. John at Malta was in full decadence.[34] As with all institutions whose existence was prolonged beyond the term of their utility, the knights were maintained by the force of a glorious tradition. They were a set of idlers and debauchees recruited from the younger sons of noble families and “animated by none of the motives which led men to the braving of great dangers.”[35] Their minister at the Court of St. Petersburg had just signed (January 15th, 1797) an agreement with that Court whereby the possessions which the Order had in Poland and which, on the Third Partition of that Kingdom, fell to Russia, were restored to it.[36] The courier on his way to Malta with the treaty was intercepted at Ancona.[37] Bonaparte attached great importance to the agreement. It was, however, possessed of no other significance than being an indication of the chivalrous nature of Paul, of the financial embarrassments of the Order and of Russia’s conception of her traditional _rôle_ in the Christian Near East. Of these embarrassments Bonaparte acquired first-hand knowledge through one Vincent Barbara, who belonged to the Republican party in the island and who was banished.[38] Making his way to Milan, he reported on the unsettled state of Malta, the disaffection of many of the knights to the existing Government and the desire of many of the inhabitants to welcome French intervention. But what was really effective in stimulating the young general’s interest in the definite settlement of the Maltese question in a way favourable to France was the conclusion of the Preliminaries of Leoben (April 18th, 1797). The Venetian Republic was thereby sacrificed to compensate Austria for her losses in the Netherlands and the Basin of the Po. Objections were raised in France against this arrangement, which, in addition to its palpable violation of the professed principles of the Republic, would result in making Austria a strong naval power. The navy of that country, it was argued, joined to that of Naples, would wrest from the Republic the supremacy in the Mediterranean which fell to her on the evacuation of that sea by the English fleet. Bonaparte recognised the reality of the menace and sought to obviate it by the acquisition of the Venetian fleet and the Ionian Islands.[39] Under these circumstances, Malta acquired additional importance. The island, if in the possession of France, would strengthen that country’s position in the Eastern Mediterranean; but if, on the other hand, it belonged to a hostile power it would render that position precarious by serving as a wedge, as it were, between the French naval forces in the Adriatic and their bases in Provence. His correspondence at that epoch amply illustrates these points. “The decadence of the Venetians,” he argues, “dates from the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope and the rise of Ancona and Trieste.[40] Their fate, being a cowardly people and unworthy of liberty, has long been sealed. The Empire will take a long time to become a strong naval power, and, whatever sacrifices she will make, she will not be able to rise above the third order. Now is the time to take possession of Malta. The Grand Master is dying, and it will be worth while to persuade the Prince of Peace to try and have a Spaniard elected on his death.[41] The native Maltese favour the French; the Knights do not exceed five hundred and have at their disposal no more than six hundred men. A French or a Spanish squadron can easily take possession of Valetta. There is no time to lose, for Naples (to whose dissimulated hostility he calls now and again the attention of the Directory)[42] is entertaining designs on the island.” The occupation of the Ionian Islands had, in the meantime, winged his fancies eastwards. The spectacle of old nations struggling to shatter their fetters and to free themselves from the yoke of the unspeakable Turk fascinated him. “If the inhabitants are enamoured of independence,” he instructs General Gentili,[43] “you will encourage that sentiment, and, in the proclamations you will make, you will not fail to speak of Greece, of Athens and of Sparta. . . . Arnault, a distinguished man of letters, will help you in the composition of manifestoes.” The Turkish Empire was, moreover, falling to pieces and France’s privileged position in the Adriatic would enable her to benefit adequately from that event. It was probably due to this that he made the strange declaration that Corfu, Zante and Cephalonia were worth more to France than all Italy.[44] There can be no mistake, however, as to this: he prefers the isles and Italy—together. The partition of Turkey suggests many combinations. France may, for instance, acquire Egypt so that she may compass the ruin of her inveterate enemy, England. The irremediable decadence of the Turks, the passionate longing of the Greeks for independence, the importance of the ex-Venetian establishments, the vital interest of the “Great Nation” in these matters, all these themes form the subject matter of a letter to Talleyrand dated August 16th. The latter, who was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 16th, 1797, probably discerned the coming ruler under his thinly disguised superiority. He communicated to Bonaparte the Directory’s approval of his projects and declared that France was interested in all the countries washed by the Mediterranean and notably in Egypt.[45] Although Austria’s reluctance to abide by the Preliminaries of Leoben had led Bonaparte to make some military dispositions,[46] his views as regards the essential elements in the situation remained unchanged. Austria was clearly counting on the domestic troubles of France. But the _coup d’état_ of the 18th Fructidor, the triumph of the Jacobins, the recalling of Moreau and the arrest of Pichegru left her no other course but to sign the treaty and postpone all the great combinations till France came to be torn once more by civil strife, and till England and Russia were in a more accommodating mood.[47] As a result of the new turn taken by affairs Bonaparte was now able to count, for the realisation of some of his schemes, on the squadron commanded by Admiral Brueys which had already co-operated in the annexation of the Ionian Islands; Brueys, for instance, could easily, bearing in mind the small number of the Knights and of the troops at their disposal and the Gallophil sentiments of the Maltese, acquire Malta.[48] The possession of that island, together with that of the Isle of St. Pietro ceded to France by Sardinia, and of Corfu, would inevitably render the Mediterranean a French lake.[49] But he looked beyond the acquisition of naval dominance into the possibility of establishing a French Colony in the Valley of the Nile. We gather from notes left by General Desaix, who was Bonaparte’s guest during his sojourn at Passeriano, that the annexation of Egypt was then occupying his thoughts.[50] Already in the habit of confiding his ideas to Talleyrand, he now communicated to him his new scheme. “If it happen,” he wrote to him on September 13th, 1797,[51] “that at the conclusion of peace with England we find ourselves obliged to acquiesce in the loss of the Cape of Good Hope, then it will be necessary for us to acquire Egypt. This country has never belonged to a European nation. The Venetians only possessed some precarious preponderance in it. With 25,000 men from here and with some eight or ten ships-of-the-line or frigates of Venetian construction we can take possession of it. Egypt does not belong to the Grand Signior. I wish, citizen minister, you would find out for me in Paris what sort of effect our Egyptian expedition would have on the Porte. With armies like ours, for whom all religions are the same, Mahometans, Cophts [_sic_], Arabs, idolators, etc., all is to us indifferent, we will respect them each and all.” We must, however, regard this as nothing more than a flight of imagination towards some future indefinite enterprise, probably the partition of Turkey. The relations he established with the Greeks and with the Albanians may be taken as further evidence of his contemplating such a design.[52] The realisation of this grandiose scheme, however, was, for the present, out of the question. It was, moreover, scarcely consistent with his ambitious plans that he should embark with 25,000 troops on an adventure in a distant country, risk his great and rapidly won fame in engagements which might prove of very uncertain value, renounce his powerful influence in France, and rid the Directory—so unprofitably for himself—of the anxieties his ambition caused them. He did eventually lead the expedition, but only when he was compelled to do so by circumstances upon which he had not reckoned in the autumn of 1797. This conjecture is further strengthened if we take account of the way he set about to realise his project on Malta. For that realisation, the co-operation of the Navy was essential. Indeed he had already emphasised the close connection between naval and military operations,[53] and a proclamation issued to the seamen of Brueys’ squadron well expressed his thoughts.[54] “Without you,” so it ran, “we cannot carry the glory of the French name further than the limits of the continent; but with you, we can traverse the seas and the glory of France can reach the farthest regions of the earth.” He thereupon proposed to the Directory to allow him to keep Brueys’ squadron near at hand and ready, when the opportunity occurred, to disembark 2000 soldiers in Malta. “That island,” he declared, “will fall sooner or later into the hands of the English if we are foolish enough not to anticipate them.” He therefore asked the Directory to authorise him to extend the secret relations he had already opened in Malta and to take possession of it at any moment he judged opportune.[55] Meanwhile, De Hompesch, a German, was elected to succeed the deceased Grand Master. Though the new Grand Master wrote a propitiatory letter to the Directory,[56] his election was considered by the latter as a triumph of Austrian diplomacy, and an additional indication of the scheming of the Court of Vienna to appropriate Malta for the realisation of an elaborate project on the Turkish Empire to which Russia was understood to be a party. Talleyrand was consequently charged to communicate to Bonaparte the Directory’s approval of his ideas with regard to Malta and her desire that he should take the necessary measures to frustrate the designs of Austria.[57] As regards Egypt, the Directory satisfied itself by declaring Bonaparte’s views to be excellent. Talleyrand, however, promised to write in greater detail and, for the present, suggested that French intervention in Egypt should have as a professed aim the thwarting of the intrigues of Russia and England with the rebellious Mamelukes. The conclusion of the letter is striking: “L’Egypte comme colonie remplacerait bientôt les produits des Antilles, et, comme chemin, nous donnerait le commerce de l’Inde; car, tout, en matière de commerce, réside dans le temps, et le temps nous donnerait 5 voyages contre 3 par la route ordinaire.” Four days later, September 27th, the Directory repeated its wishes as regards Malta in a more positive manner.[58] Within that short interval, it seems, fresh intelligence had come to it of the intrigues not only of Austria but also of England and Russia, whose possession of Malta was declared to be more dangerous to the Republic than Austria’s. Bonaparte was, consequently, authorised to employ the squadron of Brueys in the manner he had indicated. And, as it was necessary to “prepare” opinion in Malta for the coming event, certain letters “of great importance” were sent to him for that end. A little later, three letters of the same nature were also sent and the director, Barras, suggested that his cousin—a disaffected knight—should carry them to Malta.[59] In addition to the employment of a naval force, Bonaparte seemed to have thought of another means, namely, the purchase of the island. We infer from a letter of the Directory to him that he confided this proposal to one Bottot. It was, in its turn, approved and Bonaparte was reminded not to let the island escape.[60] Thus affairs stood at the time of the signature of the treaty of Campo- Formio. Anticipating objections to it as too advantageous to Austria, Bonaparte thus justified himself in a letter to Talleyrand.[61] “Lorsque la Cisalpine a les frontières les plus militaires peut-être de l’Europe, que la France a Mayence et le Rhin, qu’elle a dans le Levant Corfu, place extrêmement bien fortifiée, et les autres îles, que veut-on davantage? Diverger nos forces pour que l’Angleterre continue à nous enlever, à nous, à l’Espagne, à la Hollande, nos colonies, et éloigne encore pour longtemps le rétablissement de notre commerce et de notre marine? Les Autrichiens sont lourds et avares; aucun people moins intrigant et moins dangereux pour nos affaires intérieures que le peuple Autrichien. L’Anglais, au contraire, est généreux, intrigant et actif. Il faut que notre gouvernement détruise la monarchie anglicane, ou il doit s’attendre lui—même à être détruit par la corruption et les intrigues de ces actifs insulaires. Le moment actuel nous offre un beau jeu. Concentrons toute notre activité du côté de la marine et détruisons l’Angleterre. Cela fait, l’Europe est à nos pieds.” The Directors sought to enmesh him in the net he had set. They took him at his word. After a sitting of four hours, during which they deliberated on the treaty and in which Rewbell and Merlin clamoured for rejecting it, the majority, composed of Larevellière-Lépeaux, François de Neufchâteau and Barras, decided to ratify it.[62] In the same sitting, the Directory decreed, on the proposition of Barras, the immediate concentration on the oceanic coast of an army to be described as the “Army of England” and the appointment of Bonaparte to command it,[63] wrote to him of the great work entrusted to him and instructed him to proceed to Rastadt as soon as possible for the exchange of ratifications and for negotiating peace with the Empire,[64] and issued a proclamation to the nation on the coming punishment of England.[65] The organisation of the Army of England was seriously taken in hand. Two days after the above-mentioned decree, that is October 28th, the Minister of Marine submitted to the Directory a report on the naval operations of the coming campaign. His conclusion was that success was possible if the necessary funds were advanced to the Navy.[66] The Minister of War, in his turn, exposed the necessity of drawing upon the army of Italy for the new expedition.[67] Bonaparte, who was not deceived as to the intentions of the Directory in giving him the new command,[68] expressed his willingness—though in great need of rest—“to pay his tribute to the fatherland,” and stated his views on the invasion.[69] For its success it was necessary to have skilful naval officers, an intelligent and firm Admiral, numerous well- commanded troops to menace the enemy on more than one point and, finally, thirty million francs. He, moreover, asked the Directory to send him the “very good maps of England which were once in the possession of General Hoche,” and, about this time, began to choose the officers and the troops which were to take part in the invasion,[70] to regulate the financial measures necessary for the movement of troops westwards,[71] to order improvements in the roads for the same end,[72] and wrote to the Directory that, once the ratifications had been exchanged at Rastadt, the columns would be put in motion towards the western coast.[73] A strong indication of the reality of the scheme was his order to General Andreossy to make cannon of the same calibre as the English, so that once the landing had been effected English projectiles could be readily used.[74] In his thoughts, however, the project of invasion did not supersede the design on Malta. The diplomatic preparation was entrusted to Poussielgue, Secretary of the French Legation at Genoa, whose work on _The History of the Revolution of Genoa_ was greatly admired by Bonaparte.[75] Poussielgue’s ostensible mission was to examine—as “inspector-general of the Levant Ports”[76]—the actual conditions of French commerce and to suggest improvements.[77] His real work, however, was “mettre la dernière main au projet que nous avons sur cette île.”[78] While Poussielgue would be occupied in intriguing, Brueys was to organise the Ionian Islands and to equip the ex-Venetian warships.[79] Bonaparte, on November 14th, wrote to him on the importance of his taking part in the invasion of England (“La grande expédition”), informed him of the mission of Poussielgue and of the possibility of his taking possession of the island of Malta with 3000 men (“La petite expédition”). Brueys, however, was to await further orders.[80] Bonaparte finally left Milan on November 17th, and arrived at Rastadt on the 25th. The next day, the Directory invited him to Paris in order to confer with him “sur les intérêts majeurs et multiples de la patrie” and to express to him the gratitude of the nation.[81] On December 5th, he arrived in Paris. As regards the composition of the naval forces to take part in the projected invasion, the Minister of Marine submitted on December 12th a rather optimistic report in which he stated that the concentration at Brest of the French ships only would give the Republic forty-seven sail- of-the-line, that a superiority over the English could be attained through Spanish co-operation, that the French ports had all the requisite light craft and that all that was necessary was the providing of funds.[82] The Directory, thereupon, decreed, on December 13th, the concentration of the French Navy at Brest.[83] A detailed plan was then drawn up by Bonaparte and the Minister of Marine. It consisted of eight operations, whereby French naval forces in the Mediterranean and Spanish squadrons carrying 15,000 troops were to assemble in Brest, the Batavian Republic was to provide the necessary shipping for the embarkation of 15,000 soldiers and its ships were to be ready to set sail by April 15th and the thirty-six sail gathered in Brest were to be ready for sea by the end of March.[84] There is no mention, it may be noticed, in these operations of the attack on Malta—“la petite expédition” (p. 18). De la Jonquière attributes this to the desire of the Directory not to add to the complications already coming to a head in Switzerland, Germany and Italy.[85] Whatever the cause was, we find Bonaparte, shortly after his arrival in Paris, writing to his brother Joseph—then French Ambassador at Rome—to stop the departure of Poussielgue.[86] The countermanding letter, however, did not arrive in time. Poussielgue arrived at Valetta on December 24th, was well received by the Government there, and began “preparing the ground.” The design on Malta thus postponed, the Directory concentrated all its attention on the invasion of Britain. The preparations, however, were seriously handicapped by financial difficulties. During the war, the Republican armies were maintained by the occupied territories and the finances of France were, to a certain extent, relieved by exactions from the conquered. The conclusion of peace cut off that source of supply and means had to be devised for maintaining the armies and defraying the expense of the projected expedition. Public credit practically did not exist and the revenue hardly sufficed to meet ordinary expenditure. Some Frenchmen gave vent to their Anglophobia in patriotic donations, but, it need hardly be remarked, the value of such gifts was purely sentimental.[87] A loan of eighty millions at five per cent interest was then floated, but, in spite of ardent proclamations, hardly a quarter of it was taken.[88] Decrees against English commerce[89] remained, as was the case in the past and as in the days of the Empire, a dead letter through the all-round fraud and complacency of which the authorities were not less guilty than the merchants.[90] In connection with these financial difficulties it is logical to consider the French intervention in Rome and Switzerland; for although the causes of that aggression were complex, the financial motive predominated. Admitting this, however[91] the assertion of Madame de Stael that the intervention in Switzerland (ordered on Bonaparte’s counsel) was due to the desire of procuring funds specifically for the Egyptian Expedition cannot be accepted.[92] For, as De la Jonquière observes, the intervention in Switzerland—conceived of at least as early as December 28th—took place several weeks before the Egyptian Expedition was decreed; and the fact that the “Bernese Treasure” was allocated actually to that Expedition is no proof of the assertion of Madame de Stael.[93] An event of the same nature as the two above-mentioned was the _coup d’état_ of January 21st, 1798, in Holland, whereby a change in the constitution of the Batavian Republic was effected. This _coup d’état_, prepared by Charles Delacroix, French Minister at the Hague, and by General Joubert, had for its aim the strengthening of the ties binding the two republics and the securing of Dutch co-operation in the invasion of England. With the preparations for that invasion, Bonaparte was, in the meantime, busily occupied. Forfait, an engineer, was directed to collect the necessary transports, and the Minister of Marine was ordered to pay him half a million out of the four millions assigned by the Directory for the Navy.[94] To examine the real state of affairs on the coast, however, he decided, early in February, to make a tour of inspection and ordered Generals Kléber and Desaix to inspect certain sections of it.[95] The former of these generals was, likewise, charged to take possession of the Isles of Saint Marcouf.[96] He, accordingly, left Paris on February 9th, and returned on the 21st after a rapid tour during which he visited, among other places, Etaples, Ambleteuse, Boulogne, Calais, Dunkirk and Ostend. “Il prit,” writes his secretary, Bourrienne, “dans les différents ports tous les renseignements dont il avait besoin, avec cette patience, cette présence d’esprit, ce savoir, ce tact, cette perspicacité qu’il possédait à un si haut degré.”[97] The same writer asserts that Bonaparte, in a conversation he had with him on January 29th, said that little Europe offered too small a field, that one should go to the East to gain power and greatness, that, nevertheless, he was willing to make a tour of inspection on the northern coast in order to convince himself of what might be ventured and that if, as he feared, the success of a landing in England should appear doubtful, he would make his “Army of England” the “Army of the East” and go to Egypt.[98] Now a conversation of that description is very probable, but it needs a far more reliable authority than that of Bourrienne to establish that it took place before the departure on the tour of inspection.[99] It should be observed, however, that there is a general tendency to look upon that tour as a mere “ruse” to put the English on a false track and to give a formal excuse for a foregone conclusion.[100] Probably this attitude is based less on precise and trustworthy evidence than on the suspicion—only too justified—of what Bonaparte says or does. The safest course, however, is to base our judgment on inference from contemporary documents. What is the evidence of these? We see him at Dunkirk conferring with General Caffarelli, whom he had ordered to proceed thither,[101] with the engineer Forfait and with General Andreossy, issuing orders for putting into immediate use whatever resources the ports he had just inspected possessed, sending privateers to “reconnoitre the English coast from Rye to Folkestone” and to find out the positions of the coast-batteries “so that these might be easily captured and the landing effected,”[102] instructing Forfait and Andreossy to arrange with the Dutch authorities the means of transport,[103] pointing out to the latter the vital interest they had in the success of the project.[104] We see him at La Fère, on the return journey, giving orders for the manufacture of searchlight engines to facilitate the disembarkation of troops.[105] The activity with which Caffarelli worked and the tone of his letters to Bonaparte, as De la Jonquière, who has published copious extracts of them truly observes,[106] do not leave any doubts as to the fact that he was engaged in a real task, in a work of truly “national importance.” And when we remember the high esteem in which Bonaparte held Caffarelli, who was acting—in the absence of Berthier in Italy—as his chief of staff, we cannot admit that he was keeping him in the dark as to his veritable intentions. To think, moreover, that Bonaparte would allow the one- legged general to toil at an unreal task, exploit so callously the energy and the devotion of a friend, knowing all the time that it was a mere farce to deceive the English, is to make him a much worse man than he really was. Is it possible, lastly, to suppose that Caffarelli was in the alleged secret and that by his display of activity he only aimed at confirming the illusion of the enemy? If that was so, why did he not in his confidential letters and reports drop a hint or make as much as a faint allusion to the veritable project? No! The tour of inspection was genuine, and we have to search for the reasons why the invasion was abandoned and the Oriental scheme revived. One determining factor was the arrival in Paris, two or three days after the return of Bonaparte, of Poussielgue’s report on his mission (p. 18).[107] Describing the conditions at Malta, the agent states that though the French knights, who actually formed half the whole number, were well-affected towards the Republic, they could not take sides against the Order, which was their sole means of subsistence; and that the well-to-do Maltese and seamen were disaffected to the Government of the knights, the former for being excluded from public affairs, the latter on account of that eternal feud with the Barbary Corsairs which was the very _raison d’être_ of the Order. After ten or twelve conferences with “the most active as well as the most enlightened patriots,” Poussielgue came to the conclusion that there was not one moment to lose in attempting the annexation of the island, and that, in this attempt, the Directory should count on no more than the “benevolent neutrality” of the native Maltese. What Poussielgue, accordingly, suggested was a combination of diplomacy and force. The Directory might, for instance, increase the embarrassments of the Grand Master by persuading the Court of Madrid to confiscate the possessions of the Order in Spain, or get the Pope to abolish the Order altogether, a measure which would be welcomed by all the powers alike, or negotiate with De Hompesch for the cession of Malta in return for a sum of money or for the life-sovereignty of a small Mediterranean island. Poussielgue deserved well of his employers. In his short sojourn, he had worked for the reconciliation of the French knights with the new regime in the country of their birth, and, “with due caution” had not failed “to make promises and raise hopes.”[108] In a covering letter addressed to Bonaparte, he called his attention to the distressing condition of the squadron under Brueys and adduced that condition as an argument for the employment of the diplomatic weapon.[109] This leads us to consider the second cause for abandoning the invasion. Brueys found his ships in such disorder that he declared his inability to carry out “the small expedition” or to proceed to Brest to take part in the invasion.[110] On January 10th, seeing the situation daily becoming worse, he announced to the Minister of Marine his resolve to return to Toulon if his affairs were not ameliorated.[111] On receiving this information the Minister reported to the Directory, on February 10th, his fears that Brueys’ squadron could not, before many months had elapsed, join the rest of the Navy at Brest and proposed recalling it to Toulon to refit.[112] This was approved,[113] but Brueys had not waited, and had left Corfu on February 24th. The invasion, under these circumstances, was impracticable. But Bonaparte could not afford inaction. For his attitude in the winter of 1797-1798 there is still unfortunately a dearth of material. Of one thing we must, however, be certain; he had long ceased to play the part of “obedient servant” to the Directory. A conversation he had with Miot, during his “proconsulate” in Italy, as Sorel well terms it, is illuminating. “What I have done up to now,” he said, “is nothing. I am only at the beginning of the course I must run. Do you imagine that I triumph in Italy in order to aggrandize the pack of lawyers who form the Directory, and men like Carnot and Barras? What an idea! A Republic of 30 million men! and with our manners, our vices! how is it possible? . . . Let the Directory try to take the command from me and they will see who is master.”[114] On his way to Rastadt he said to the same man, “As for myself, my dear Miot, I may inform you, I can no longer obey; I have tasted command, and I cannot give it up. I have made up my mind. If I cannot be master I shall leave France.”[115] He tried to be master. He assumed, as Barras complains in his _Memoirs_, the functions of a generalissimo.[116] His influence may be traced in important political events; for instance, in the intervention in Switzerland and Rome and in the _coup d’état_ in Holland.[117] He even had a share in personal matters. Bernadotte, for example, received the post of Ambassador at Vienna instead of the command in Italy, because Bonaparte preferred to see this ambitious soldier transferred from a military career to a diplomatic one, and also because Bonaparte wished to keep in his own hand Italian affairs.[118] In short, “without him, the Directory can no longer do anything,” so Barras ironically comments in his “notes.”[119] But he did not possess a recognised official position commensurate with the influence he exercised. He sought to be admitted into the Directory, but, being under the prescribed age, he was refused.[120] He allied himself with Talleyrand and Tallien and other “Thermidoriens.”[121] The concluding sentence of his speech at the _fête_ given in his honour by the Directory—“When once the welfare of the French nation has been established upon the best organic laws, all Europe will then be free”—revealed his disapproval of the much-vaunted Constitution of the year III.[122] He seems to have contemplated overthrowing that inconvenient constitution which required that Directors must not be under forty years of age. He recognised, however, that the “pear was not ripe.” One evening he told Barras that, had he so desired, the Italians would have made him king. The director warned him not to entertain such an idea, for, he continued, “if the Directory send you to-morrow to the Temple not four persons would oppose that measure.”[123] He saw “that the Directors were not liked, but also that for the time being it was counter to the general republican sentiment to put a general in the place of the civil councils.”[124] “He knew,” however, “that without an army he was nothing,” as Carnot observed in his exile.[125] The Jacobins began to attack openly the conqueror of Italy.[126] On December 22nd, Mallet du Pan wrote to the Court of Vienna, “Ce scarmouche à tête sulfureuse n’a eu qu’un succès de curiosité. C’est un homme fini . . . décidément fini. . . .”[127] On February 18th, the well-informed Prussian envoy, Sandoz, wrote to his Court, “Il n’est plus question de lui . . . le peuple de Paris, toujours léger et frivole, dit déjà de lui:—Que fait-il ici? Pourquoi n’est-il pas embarqué pour attaquer l’Angleterre?”[128] Bonaparte, in spite of all the incense offered, was alive to the insecurity of his position. To his secretary, Bourrienne, he remarked, “In Paris things are quickly forgotten. If I were to remain long inactive, I should be lost. In this Babel one reputation crowds out another. If I had been seen even three times at the theatre they would have thought no more about me; therefore I go very seldom.”[129] Bourrienne observed that he must feel flattered at the way in which the crowds flocked to see him.[130] “Bah,” he replied, “the crowd would flock to see me just as eagerly if I were going to the scaffold!” Thibaudeau even speaks of a plot against his life.[131] In short, he felt, in the words of the same writer, “que le pavé de Paris serait brûlant pour lui.”[132] He felt the necessity of “keeping his glory warm”; therefore a new sphere of activity was needed. By that time the Egyptian project—an old tradition of French diplomacy the history of which has been already sketched—had assumed, thanks to Talleyrand, an official character. Appointed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 16th, 1797, through the influence of Madame de Stael,[133] who desired, with all “honest folk,” the establishment of peace with Europe and the reconciliation of all parties in France, Talleyrand’s programme has been already formulated in his “mémoire sur les rapports actuels de la France avec les autres états de l’Europe.”[134] Like Mirabeau, he fully grasped the profound transformation which was the result of the abolition of the privileges of individuals and of corporations and the advent of national sovereignty. He foresaw the coming revolution in the industrial life of the nation and accepted in full Mirabeau’s famous dictum, “La paix extérieure, il le faut aux auteurs de la Révolution, car rien ne s’achève pendant la guerre.”[135] Returning from America in September, 1796, the ex-bishop of Autun, seeking to propitiate public opinion, addressed the members of the National Institute on the “avantages à retirer de colonies nouvelles après les révolutions” and, in that discourse, called attention to Egypt and claimed for Choiseul the merit of being the first to advocate this idea.[136] One means of securing the peace so much desired, he thought, would be the partition of the Turkish Empire. He had early contemplated such an event. On January 19th, he wrote to Bernadotte, then Ambassador at Vienna, “Il est certain que Catherine et Joseph ont songé à partager la Turquie. Il y a lieu de supposer que leurs successeurs n’ont pas abandonné ce plan. La France jadis s’est plusieurs fois efforcée de quelque peu fortifier cet état; mais toutes ces tentatives sont restées infructueuses, et n’ont fait que hâter la ruine des Osmanlis. Aujourd’hui, la République est fortement résolue à ne pas laisser s’accomplir la ruine de la Porte sans s’assurer à elle—même une part assez considérable pour que le commerce de la mer Méditerranée ne puisse pas lui être enlevé.” Egypt should be France’s share in the spoils.[137] Once that country was conquered, France would be free to propose to the two imperial courts to combine with her in the dismemberment of Turkey, or, should they prove refractory, Egypt might be used as a trump-card to force the Porte into an alliance with the Republic against them. But how could the Porte ally itself with France after such an act of unprovoked aggression? Talleyrand’s answer to this obvious objection was that the Sultan only possessed the shadow of authority in Egypt.[138] Finding his pacific inclinations overborne by the jingoism of the Director Rewbell, he sought to attenuate the consequences of the rupture of the Lille negotiations by diverting the attention of the Directory from the invasion of England to the conquest of Egypt and skilfully gave the latter course the guise of an indirect but deadly blow to English commerce.[139] He, accordingly, took the earliest opportunity to push his Egyptian project upon the Directory. The news of the death of the French Ambassador at Constantinople enabled him to call the attention of the Directory to the inevitable disruption of the Turkish Empire and to the value to the Republic of Egypt, Crete and Lemnos, and to point out that the sending of a new ambassador to Constantinople would be superfluous if the Directory decided to introduce a radical change in the traditional relations of France with the Porte.[140] On February 13th, he submitted a detailed memorandum on the subject of Egypt which was based on Magallon and Volney.[141] As Egypt, so the memorandum began, formed a province of the Roman Republic, it should be one of the French Republic, to whom had fallen the opportunity of realising a project long contemplated by the old Government of France. The authority of the Porte in that country was purely nominal, and, moreover, the ill-treatment of French merchants by the Mamelukes, due to English intrigues, called for exemplary vengeance. The Republic, in addition to the amelioration of the lot of the oppressed peasantry, would draw great advantages from the new colony. The conquest was likely to be very easy, for England would be fully occupied with her own defence, the Porte, by the efforts of skilled diplomats, could be kept quiet, and Austria and Russia could not, after their partition of Poland, set their face against it. The Beys, moreover, would not be able to dispose of more than 8000 cavalrymen who were brave but utterly unacquainted with scientific warfare, and the inhabitants, if given arms, would side with the French against their oppressors. He accordingly stated that, though 12,000 to 15,000 troops were enough for the mere conquest of Egypt, 20,000 to 25,000 men, five sail-of-the-line and six frigates would be required. If the Directory, however, would desire to drive the English out of India, the expeditionary force should be composed of 35,000 troops. The ships necessary for carrying them to India could be sent from Mauritius (l’île de France) up the Red Sea to Suez. As regards the chief command, Talleyrand made an original proposal. Arguing that the ignorance of the enemy made military talents unnecessary and that all that was needed was tact, he concluded that the command should be vested in a commission of two or three wise and firm men versed, if possible, in Egyptian affairs. This memorandum is usually considered as the result of an entente between Bonaparte and Talleyrand.[142] It is true that such an entente existed, but there is evidence that the former did not see that document till after his return from Egypt in 1799. His marginal comments on it which De la Jonquière has published definitely prove this. Some of Talleyrand’s assertions he candidly branded as false and some of his proposals he judged to be “dignes des petites maisons.” Further, would Talleyrand—had he been in secret understanding with Bonaparte—have resorted to the cumbersome commission invested with the chief command? On February 21st, we find him pressing Bonaparte to go to Rastadt. A few days later—February 27th—he expressed to Treilhard, the French envoy at the Congress, his desire to see Bonaparte negotiating with the imperial diplomats.[143] His memorandum links two traditions of French diplomacy; occupation of Egypt and intervention in India, and shows that the former is a sure means of obtaining the latter.[144] On February 23rd, Bonaparte addressed a long despatch to the Directory. The opening sentence is far from encouraging, “Quelques efforts que nous fassions, nous n’acquerrons pas d’ici à plusieurs années la supériorité des mers.” He calls attention to the fact that the naval preparations are as little advanced to-day as they were when the concentration was decreed. If his suggestions, however, are accepted—if a commission of three persons whom he names is formed, if it is given 800,000 (francs) per decade, if by March all the gunboats are assembled at Dunkirk and Ostend, if in a month’s time twenty-five out of the thirty ships-of-the- line now at Brest, together with an appropriate number of frigates, are ready to set sail, and if 300,000 (francs) per decade are allocated for the extraordinary expenses of the Army, the invasion is still possible. If, however, the measures suggested cannot be taken, it is necessary to consider other undertakings against England, such as the conquest of Hanover and of Hamburg, or the Egyptian expedition. If nothing comes of these various schemes, the Directory can fall back on peace with England.[145] In the face of this long array of requirements and the short time within which they had to be carried out, it is difficult to accept De la Jonquière’s description of the above-mentioned despatch as a _mise en demeure_ calculated to stimulate activity[146] and not as a renunciation of the project of invasion altogether, as Bonaparte told Marmont.[147] The Directory, in any case, took him at his word and in its Sessions of February 24th and 25th decreed all the suggested measures.[148] A week later, the Directory ordered such modifications in the preparations as indicate that it began to think of renouncing, in its turn, the project of invasion.[149] De la Jonquière explains this by the arrival of reports from General Desaix which were less hopeful than those of General Kléber upon which were based the decrees of February 24th and 25th.[150] It seems that we must give up all hope of knowing precisely the discussions immediately preceding the decreeing of the Egyptian Expedition. A year later, when its success was despaired of and the frontiers of France were menaced by the allied armies, everyone—and Talleyrand foremost—disclaimed any share in it. The truest account, probably, is a statement by the ex-Director Merlin: “Si l’on ne peut pas dire que c’est lui (Bonaparte) qui a conçu le premier l’idée de cette expédition, du moins on peut assurer que sans lui elle aurait restée en projet.”[151] The interests of the various parties in the Expedition are, however, evident. Bonaparte knew that when a man was not born in the purple he had to captivate men’s imagination in order to be able to govern them.[152] The war carried into Africa, into an almost fabulous country, would heighten his prestige, would appeal to the “friends of liberty” who longed to shatter the fetters of the nations of the East, to bring back within the fold of civilisation the country where science and art first saw light, to change the face of the earth.[153] He was conscious that as things then stood, such was the programme of his unpatriotic ambition, it was only too probable that within a few months a fresh war would break out on the continent of Europe which would necessarily bring his name again into public notice. When Bourrienne asked him how long he meant to remain in Egypt, he answered, “A few months or six years, it all depends upon circumstances.”[154] To his brother Joseph he said that “l’opinion publique n’était pas encore suffisamment formé sur ce que l’on devait mettre à la place (of the republic) et qu’il partait pour l’Egypte afin de lui laisser le temps de s’éclairer; que, si elle lui était favorable, et si la guerre se rallumait et tournait mal pour la France, il reviendrait alors, avec la certitude d’être l’élu du peuple dont il se montrerait le sauveur mais que, s’il surgissait pendant la guerre un nouveau général victorieux, l’Orient lui fournira peut-être le moyen de rendre des services encore plus grands que les siens et d’acquérir une plus grands gloire.”[155] Afterwards, at St. Helena, he was even more explicit: “Pour que je devinsse le maître en France, il fallait qu’en mon absence le Directoire éprouvât des revers, et que mon retour ramenât la victoire sous mes drapeaux.”[156] As for the Directory, the design commended itself to that restless spirit animating France from the day when she began her self-appointed task of sowing the seeds of disorder in the dominions of her enemies as well as those of her allies. No objection, neither the dangers of the sea and of the distant unknown land, nor the staking of the best fleet the Republic had and of 40,000 men of choice troops to a gambler’s chance, could weigh with the likelihood—small as that was—of conquering a country to which the Roman eagle had flown, of astonishing the world and of confounding the English or—above all—with the certainty of getting rid of Bonaparte, of his ambition and his masterful personality, and of his retinue of menacing and faithful warriors, of the military dominance of bold and enterprising men who had flocked to France from every front when the war came to an end. [Footnote 17: “Are not Martinique, Cape Nichola Mole and the Cape of Good Hope most important conquests?”—Pitt, speech of 9 Dec., 1795.] [Footnote 18: Cf. Talleyrand’s report to the Directory, 26 June, 1799, Pallain, pp. 425-6.] [Footnote 19: “L’émigration des officiers nobles et de ceux qui ne voulaient pas admettre les idées du jour, mit la Convention dans l’obligation d’improviser des officiers.” O. Troude, _Batailles Navales_, II, p. 252. _See also_ p. 264.] [Footnote 20: In the period January, 1793-December, 1797, France lost 35 line-of-battle ships, 61 frigates, 108 smaller ships, in all 204. While England lost 14 line-of-battle ships, 20 frigates, 43 smaller ships, in all 77.—_Ibid._] [Footnote 21: On the opportuneness of these victories. _See_ Rose, _Pitt and the Great War_, p. 547.] [Footnote 22: Jonquière, I, p. 18 note.] [Footnote 23: Extract from a petition from the “Agents du Bureau Central”: “Au nom de l’Angleterre, le sang brouillonne dans les veines, et le cœur frémit d’indignation. La haine contre le gouvernement anglais s’est accrue en proportion de ses crimes.”—Rédacteur of 4 Jan., 1798, Aulard, _Paris pendant la réaction thermidorienne_, etc., IV, p. 519.] [Footnote 24: e.g. “Le chant des Vengeances,” by Rouget de Lille, in the _Ami des Lois_ of 4 Dec., 1797.—op. cit., IV, p. 504.] [Footnote 25: e.g. the _Rapport du Bureau Central_ of 24 Dec., 1797, gives an account of the success of the “Descente en Angleterre.”—op. cit., IV, p. 505.] [Footnote 26: In a _fête_ of the employees of the Ministry of Police: “Aux victimes du despotisme du gouvernement anglais: puisse le sang qu’elles ont versé féconder promptement dans leur pays les germes de la liberté et de l’égalité,” etc.—op. cit., IV, p. 504.] [Footnote 27: Mallet du Pan to the Court of Vienna, 13 Jan., 1798.] [Footnote 28: Conversation with Sandoz, the Prussian envoy, in Dec., 1797, Bailleu, I, p. 165.] [Footnote 29: Napoleon manuscripts dealing with these respective books are numbered XXVII and XXIX, XV and XVI, XXIII, in Masson, _Napoleon Inconnu_, I.] [Footnote 30: For Raynal the MS. is numbered XVII—op. cit. _See_ the influence of Raynal in Fournier, I, p. 20.] [Footnote 31: Cited by Fournier, I, p. 147.] [Footnote 32: Volney was in Corsica in 1792. Bonaparte to Sucy, 17 Feb., 1792, Masson, _Napoléon dans sa Jeunesse_, p. 271, Paris, 1907.] [Footnote 33: Fournier, I, p. 67.] [Footnote 34: Cantu, _Histoire des Cent Ans_, Fr. Trans., II, p. 105. Hardman, _History of Malta_, chap. i.] [Footnote 35: _Correspondance_, XXIX, 369.] [Footnote 36: Hardman, op. cit., 361.] [Footnote 37: _Ibid._, 362.] [Footnote 38: _Ibid._, 7.] [Footnote 39: Venetian fleet composed of 6 sail, 4 frigates and 4 brigs. Jurien de la Gravière, _Guerres Maritimes_, I, p. 323.] [Footnote 40: 27 May, _Correspondance_, III, 1836.] [Footnote 41: Godoy, favourite of Queen of Spain.] [Footnote 42: 1 June, _Correspondance_, III, 1852, 1835.] [Footnote 43: 26 May, _Correspondance_, III, 1829.] [Footnote 44: 16 August, _Ibid._, III, 2103.] [Footnote 45: 23 August, Pallain, 124.] [Footnote 46: To the Directory, 16 Aug., 1797, _Correspondance_, III, 2103. One of his measures was to reinforce the garrison of Corfu with two battalions.] [Footnote 47: Sorel, _Bonaparte et Hoche_, p. 183.] [Footnote 48: Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 13 Sept., 1797, _Correspondance_, III, 2195.] [Footnote 49: _Ibid._] [Footnote 50: Extract from Desaix’ notes:— “Idées sur l’Egypte. S’en emparer. Avantages. Détail. Avec 5 divisions. Paix avec l’Autriche et l’Angleterre. Départ de Venise de 10,000 hommes et 8000 Polonais. Assemblages de tous les moyens d’être bien instruit. Voyages. Savari [_sic_]. Volney, etc.” Jonquière, I, p. 32 note. About the same time, Monge, the mathematician, who was then in Italy collecting the fine art objects to be sent to France received from Paris a collection of documents and memoirs on Egypt and its commercial relations with India. Jonquière, I, p. 37. Bourrienne, _Memoirs_, Eng. Trans., I, p. 201.] [Footnote 51: _Correspondance_, III, 2195.] [Footnote 52: Pasha of Scutari, 16 Aug., 1797, _Correspondance_, III, 2104.] [Footnote 53: 17 Oct., 1796, _ibid._, II, p. 60.] [Footnote 54: 16 Sept., 1797, _ibid._, III, 2212.] [Footnote 55: 23 Sept., 1797, _Correspondance_, III, 2247. Minister of Marine reported against this, 5 Oct., Jonquière, I, p. 35 note.] [Footnote 56: 17 July, Hardman, op. cit., p. 8.] [Footnote 57: 23 Sept., Pallain, p. 153.] [Footnote 58: Talleyrand to Bonaparte, 27 Sept., 1797, Pallain, p. 156.] [Footnote 59: _Ibid._ to _ibid._, 8 Oct. The letter is not given by Pallain. Jonquière, I, p. 38 note.] [Footnote 60: The Directory to Bonaparte, 21 Oct. Jonquière, I, p. 39. Barras, _Memoirs_, III, p. 65. La Revellière-Lépeaux (_Memoirs_, II, p. 367) falsely asserts that the Directory had no knowledge of the project of purchasing Malta.] [Footnote 61: Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 18 Oct., _Correspondance_, III, 2307.] [Footnote 62: Sandoz to his Court, 28 Oct., in Bailleu, _Mémoires of La Revellière-Lépeaux_, II, pp. 271-80.] [Footnote 63: Jonquière, I, p. 41.] [Footnote 64: The Directory to Bonaparte, 27 Oct., Jonquière, I, p. 42.] [Footnote 65: _Ibid._, I, p. 41, note 1.] [Footnote 66: _Ibid._, I, p. 43.] [Footnote 67: _Ibid._, I, p. 44, 30 Oct.] [Footnote 68: He said to Miot: “They [the Directors] are poor creatures. . . . They are jealous of me, I know, and notwithstanding all their flattery, I am not their dupe. . . . They were in a great hurry to make me general of the army of England, so that they might get me out of Italy, where I am the master, and am more of a sovereign than of an army commander. . . .” _Memoirs of Miot de Melito_, Eng. Trans., I, p. 226.] [Footnote 69: Bonaparte to the Directory, 5 Nov., 1797, _Correspondance_, III, 2321.] [Footnote 70: _Correspondance_, III, 2332, 2334, 2335, 2336.] [Footnote 71: To Citizen Haller, 9 Nov., _Correspondance_, III, 2337.] [Footnote 72: To Vignolle, 11 Nov., _Correspondance_, III, 2345, 2346. To Scherer, 14 Nov., Jonquière, I, p. 49 note.] [Footnote 73: To the Directory, 12 Nov., _Correspondance_, III, 2354.] [Footnote 74: _Ibid._] [Footnote 75: _Correspondance_, III, 2168, 2169. Bonaparte ordered 500 copies of the book.] [Footnote 76: “Echelles du Levant.”] [Footnote 77: Instructions, dated 12 Nov., _Correspondance_, III, 2355.] [Footnote 78: To the Directory, 12 Nov., _Correspondance_, III, 2354.] [Footnote 79: These instructions not in the _Correspondance_, Jonquière, I, p. 60. They were sent with Eugène Beauharnais.] [Footnote 80: _Correspondance_, III, 2364.] [Footnote 81: 26 Nov., Jonquière, I, p. 59 note.] [Footnote 82: _Ibid._, I, p. 67.] [Footnote 83: _Ibid._, I, p. 68.] [Footnote 84: _Correspondance_, 14 Dec., III, 2388. Jonquière (I, pp. 71-2) adds a lacking portion.] [Footnote 85: Jonquière, I, p. 73.] [Footnote 86: Joseph to Poussielgue, Jonquière, I, p. 73.] [Footnote 87: The employees of the Bureau Central placed, 4 Jan., 1798, on the “Autel de la patrie,” the sum of 4739 francs for the expenses of the invasion. Aulard, op. cit., IV, p. 519. The employees of the Police collected 2000 francs for the same end. Aulard, op. cit., IV, p. 504.] [Footnote 88: Jonquière, I, 83-4.] [Footnote 89: Decrees dated 7 Dec., 1797, 4 Jan., 1798, 18 Jan. Jonquière, I, pp. 85-6.] [Footnote 90: A report of the Minister of Police of 22 Jan. states that the loan had given small result. Jonquière, I, p. 86. Mallet du Pan (to the Court of Vienna, 28 Jan.) states that the object of the decrees was to pillage the merchants.] [Footnote 91: Cf. des Odoards, _Histoire philosophique de la Révolution française_, VIII, p. 285. Guyot, _Le Directoire et la paix d’Europe_ (chap. xiv) has shown that the desire of Bonaparte to control the Simplon Road largely accounts for the invasion of Switzerland.] [Footnote 92: _Considérations sur la Révolution française, Œuvres_, II, p. 400.] [Footnote 93: Jonquière, I, p. 87 note. “Bernese Treasure” amounted to 25 million francs, Fournier, I, p. 142.] [Footnote 94: 8 Jan., _Correspondance_, III, 2401. Forfait’s report, Jonquière, I, p. 93.] [Footnote 95: 7 Feb., _Correspondance_, III, 2414.] [Footnote 96: _Ibid._] [Footnote 97: _Memoirs_, I, p. 200.] [Footnote 98: _Memoirs_, I, p. 198.] [Footnote 99: Bourrienne’s many errors in matter of dating. The _Memoirs_ were really composed by Villemarest from Bourrienne’s notes.] [Footnote 100: Cf. _Correspondance_, XXIX, p. 362.] [Footnote 101: To Caffarelli, 7 Feb.] [Footnote 102: 12 Feb., _Correspondance_, III, 2415.] [Footnote 103: _Ibid._, 2416, 2417.] [Footnote 104: _Ibid._, 2416, 2417.] [Footnote 105: _Ibid._, 2416, 2417.] [Footnote 106: Jonquière, I, pp. 122-3.] [Footnote 107: Report dated 8 Feb., 1798, in extenso, Jonquière., I, p. 126 f.] [Footnote 108: Cf. Charles de Thuisy to Grenville. “Poussielgue apportoit des lettres de recommendation pour ceux qui pouvaient le servir en ses projets, donna des banquets scandaleux aux principaux amis de la Révolution, se lia étroitement à tous ses co-opérateurs, enfin arrêta tous ses plans.” _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 340.] [Footnote 109: Jonquière, I, p. 125 note.] [Footnote 110: 16 Dec., Jurien de la Gravière, _Guerres Maritimes_, I, p. 324.] [Footnote 111: Jonquière, I, p. 138.] [Footnote 112: Jurien de la Gravière, op. cit., I, p. 325, where the date is wrongly given as 11 Jan.] [Footnote 113: Minister of Marine to Brueys, 12 Feb., _ibid._, I, p. 327.] [Footnote 114: _Memoirs of Miot de Melito_, Eng. Trans., I, pp. 188-9. Contrast what he says of the Republic with what he wrote in his Jacobinical days, Rose, _The Personality of Napoleon_, p. 47.] [Footnote 115: _Memoirs_, I, p. 226.] [Footnote 116: _Memoirs_, III, p. 124. The grounds of this assumption were alleged to be the necessity of his controlling the movements of troops during the negotiations with the imperial plenipotentiaries at Rastadt. Talleyrand to Barras, 30 (?) Nov., 1797, Jonquière I, p. 60 note.] [Footnote 117: Fournier, I, pp. 140-2.] [Footnote 118: Fournier, I, p. 140.] [Footnote 119: _Ibid._] [Footnote 120: _Memoirs of Bourrienne_, I, p. 197.] [Footnote 121: Cf. Thibaudeau, II, p. 336.] [Footnote 122: _Bourrienne_, I, p. 198.] [Footnote 123: _Considérations_, Œuvres de Mme. de Stael, II, p. 400.] [Footnote 124: _Ibid._] [Footnote 125: _Dropmore Papers_, IV, 149.] [Footnote 126: Thibaudeau, II, p. 336.] [Footnote 127: Michel’s _Correspondance du Mallet du Pan_.] [Footnote 128: Bailleu.] [Footnote 129: _Memoirs_, I, p. 196.] [Footnote 130: _Ibid._, pp. 196, 197.] [Footnote 131: Thibaudeau, II, p. 336.] [Footnote 132: _Ibid._, II, p. 342.] [Footnote 133: Pallain, XXV.] [Footnote 134: _Ibid._, XLII-LVI.] [Footnote 135: Pallain, XXXIX.] [Footnote 136: Printed as an appendix to the first volume of Bulwer’s _Historical Characters_, 2 vols., London, 1868. The advantages may be summed up in one sentence: by establishing new colonies France will get rid of the restless and reckless. _See_ pp. 456-7 especially.] [Footnote 137: Sybel, V, pp. 169, 170, 243.] [Footnote 138: _Ibid._] [Footnote 139: Sandoz Rollin wrote to his Court on 18 March, 1798: “‘Savez-vous, m’a dit Talleyrand, que tandis que le Directoire crie guerre contre l’Angleterre moi, je crie au contraire paix, comme le dernier terme de ses ressources? . . . L’on se fâche quand je parle, de la sorte, et l’on ne veut pas être éclairé . . .’ Il dissimulait ainsi une scène très vive qui s’est passée il y a peu de jours entre le directeur Rewbell et lui, ‘Que parlez-vous de faire la paix avec l’Angleterre! disait l’autre, vous êtes le seul qui puissiez avancer une telle absurdité; je ne sais plus qu’un seul moyen de lui procurer la paix, c’est de l’humilier et de la subjuguer.’” Bailleu.] [Footnote 140: 27 Jan., 1798, Jonquière, I, pp. 588-90.] [Footnote 141: _Ibid._, I, p. 154 f.] [Footnote 142: e.g. Rose in _Cambridge Modern History_, VIII, p. 596.] [Footnote 143: Pallain, pp. 210-11. _See also_ Talleyrand to Bonaparte, 21 Feb., pressing him to go to Rastadt, Pallain, p. 206.] [Footnote 144: As early as January, 1793, an official report issued at Paris advocated an alliance with Tippoo Sahib and recommended that the French force should threaten or secure the Dutch possessions at the Cape of Good Hope and in Java and Ceylon. Rose, _Pitt and the Great War_, p. 250. In the session of the Directory of 28 Feb., 1796, a memorandum was submitted from one Gonly on restoring French establishments in the Indies. This done, he declared, England would ask for peace on her knees. Debidour, _Actes du Directoire Executif_, I, p. 704. The 20 Nov., 1797, General Jourdan wrote to Barras on the subject and offered himself for the command, _Memoirs of Barras_, III, p. 114. The 23 July, 1797, Talleyrand himself submitted three _Mémoires_ on the subject, Jonquière, I, p. 169.] [Footnote 145: _Correspondance_, III, 2419.] [Footnote 146: Jonquière, I, p. 176.] [Footnote 147: Marmont (_Mémoires_, I, p. 347): “Huit jours suffirent pour lui démontrer la disproportion entre le but et les moyens.” On his return he said to Marmont: “Il faut en revenir à nos projets sur l’Orient.”] [Footnote 148: These measures are summed up in a letter from Bonaparte to Caffarelli of 25 Feb., _Correspondance_, III, 2421.] [Footnote 149: Jonquière, I, pp. 184-5, mentions these modifications.] [Footnote 150: _Ibid._, I, p. 186.] [Footnote 151: Quoted from a _Mémoire Justificatif_, by Jonquière, I, p. 190. _Mémoires du Roi Joseph_, I, pp. 69-70, that the initiative was not taken by Bonaparte. _Memoirs of Barras_, II, p. 340 f. That he was opposed to it, that La Revellière Lépeaux was persuaded to consent by Bonaparte’s promise to spread his “theo-philanthropie” among the Egyptians, that Merlin and François wished to get rid of the military faction. _Mémoires of La Revellière-Lépeaux_, II, p. 340 f. That the suggestion came from Bonaparte, but that he was opposed to it. _Talleyrand’s share_. On 22 Feb., 1798, Sandoz wrote to his Court of a conversation with Talleyrand: “J’ai proposé en effet une entreprise qui pourra étendre la sphère de nos colonies et éclairer l’histoire du monde,” viz. to conquer Egypt with 40,000 troops. On 19 April, Sandoz wrote that Talleyrand admitted that it was he and Magallen who were the authors of the enterprise. Botta, _Histoire d’Italia_, Fr. Trans., III, pp. 160-6, makes an original statement, namely, that Pitt was the real author of the Expedition! “C’est là une des opérations les plus admirables de Guillaume Pitt.”] [Footnote 152: Mme. de Stael, _Considérations_, Œuvres, II, p. 400.] [Footnote 153: Thibaudeau, _Mémoires_, II, pp. 345, 346.] [Footnote 154: Bourrienne, _Memoirs_, I, p. 207.] [Footnote 155: Sybel, V, pp. 244-50.] [Footnote 156: _Ibid._] II THE CONQUEST OF EGYPT The measures necessary for executing the design on Egypt were detailed by Bonaparte in a despatch dated March 5th. For taking possession of Egypt and Malta he demanded twenty to twenty-five thousand men, who were to be stationed at Toulon, Marseilles, Genoa, Cività Vecchia, and Corsica and to be ready for embarkation by the end of April.[157] The Directory, on the same day, acceded to his various demands. A commission of four was appointed to direct and supervise the complex preparations, which included the refitting of ships of war, the collecting of transports and the moving of troops.[158] The proposed expedition, however, was not to be purely military. Bonaparte contemplated nothing less than bringing back to the light of day a civilisation long buried under the sands of the desert, and ending the long Egyptian night. An Arabic and a Greek printing press were to be set up for the war of propaganda.[159] Orders were given for placing at his disposal a staff of over a hundred savants, mechanics, engineers, architects, authors, and interpreters.[160] He made his preparations with a zeal such as those about him had never before seen him show, and on such a scale as would ensure success and preserve his glory from all risk. He recruited in every quarter—thus anticipating the brilliant period of the Consulate—officers and soldiers, men of letters and artists. Republicans or Royalists, nobles or Jacobins, all were the same to him, provided they served his end. Kléber, who heartily disliked him, enlisted in order to see, as he energetically expressed himself, “Ce que ce petit b . . . là avait dans le ventre.”[161] Such was then his fame that he was able to enrol under his standard his enemies as well as his friends. Admiral Brueys, who arrived at Toulon on April 2nd, was instructed to have his squadron ready to set sail by the 20th.[162] On March 31st, in order to put the English on a false track, the Directory ordered Bonaparte to proceed to Brest, and take under his command the forces preparing for the invasion of England.[163] By the middle of April, however, the preparations were well advanced and the moment arrived when the expedition could be formally decreed. Bonaparte was appointed to the command of the land as well as the sea forces and was ordered to include the Ionian Islands within the area under him.[164] He was, moreover, charged to take possession of Egypt, to expel the English from such of their Eastern establishments as he could reach, and, especially, from their Red Sea _comptoirs_, to take all measures for securing to the Republic the exclusive navigation of that sea, to cut a canal through the Isthmus of Suez, and to ameliorate by all possible means the lot of the Egyptians. This wanton aggression on the territory of a friendly power was justified by the fact that the beys were in league with the English and were perpetrating the most shocking cruelties on the French, “who were being daily tortured, plundered and murdered,” by the necessity of securing this route to India in order to destroy England’s satellites there and cut off the source of the wealth employed by that power in corrupting the world.[165] He was, likewise, to take possession of Malta if he could do so, without compromising the success of the more important operations entrusted to him. The Order of St. John—so ran the decree—had declared its hostility to France as early as October, 1794, and since then had not ceased to manifest it in various ways.[166] Finally, the French frigates and the transports stationed in the Mauritius were to proceed to Suez and be at Bonaparte’s disposal.[167] In connection with this last decree, it may be added, letters of credence addressed to various Oriental potentates, but in which the name of the envoy was left blank, were prepared.[168] Nelson’s victory made them of no use. The _Révélateur_ of September 16th and 17th, protesting against this policy of usurpation, ironically remarked that the Porte had not appointed the French his police-officers.[169] That was precisely the _rôle_ which the Directory professed and diplomatic action was determined upon to bring the Porte to view the presence of the French in Egypt in that light. The diplomatic preparations of the Directory consisted entirely in the appointment of an ambassador who was to obtain the consent of the Porte to the French occupation of Egypt or, at any rate, its acquiescence. Talleyrand drew up the necessary instructions and submitted them to the Directory on March 16th.[170] After a lengthy historical exposition of Franco-Turkish relations, he emphasised the interests of the Republic in preserving the integrity of Turkey and avoiding a rupture with that power and pointed out that the ambassador should leave France for his post towards the beginning of May. On hearing of the landing of the French in Egypt—which, probably, would be in August—he was to take measures for the protection of French residents and protract the negotiations so as to give Bonaparte time to establish himself. For the guidance of the plenipotentiary, Talleyrand drew up two plans. According to the first of these, the Porte was to be represented at Cairo by a Pasha, who should be the nominal head of the administration and whose expenses should be defrayed from an annual tribute to the Sultan amounting to 1500 “purses” (2¼ million francs). The French, moreover, were to pledge themselves to respect the property and religion of the inhabitants. In return for these “concessions,” Djezzar, the Pasha of Acre, should be deposed. According to the second plan the Porte was to surrender Egypt to the French and to have, in compensation, the Ionian Islands. The Ambassador was also to declare that France was willing to help Turkey to recover some of its lost provinces, for example, the Crimea. According to Miot de Melito, Talleyrand did not sincerely believe in the efficacy of the negotiations which he proposed.[171] Although the ex- bishop was accomplished in the art of false-witness, it is difficult to accept Miot’s statements in face of the persistence with which the Minister expressed his hope of avoiding a rupture with Turkey. Bonaparte, however, proposed that the Ambassador charged with this delicate mission should be no other than Talleyrand himself. According to Miot, he acted in this matter in accordance with his usual practice, which was “to implicate those men whose advice he had followed in any risk that might arise from acting on it, thus obtaining a guarantee against treachery or desertion.”[172] Talleyrand, in order to escape from the persistent hostility of Rewbell, accepted the post.[173] As will be explained later on, he did not leave Paris; and it was not till May 11th that he wrote to Ruffin—French chargé at Constantinople—of the Egyptian Expedition, of the intention to send an ambassador, and of his hope that an “accommodation” would be reached, and instructed him to take measures, in the meantime, for the protection of French residents.[174] While Bonaparte was still lingering in Paris, the first symptoms of the complications upon which he was counting appeared. At Rastadt the Austrian plenipotentiary had opposed France’s demand for the entire left bank of the Rhine; and in Vienna the French Ambassador, Bernadotte, had given umbrage to an etiquette-ridden Court, and, on April 13th, incited the populace to an anti-French riot, in consequence of which he was obliged to leave the country. The situation was critical and war seemed imminent. Rewbell considered the affair as a “guet-apens abominable” on the part of England and Russia, while Talleyrand and Bonaparte, on the other hand, laid the blame on Bernadotte.[175] The Prussian envoy, Sandoz, also employed his influence on behalf of peace; conciliatory communications promising satisfaction, moreover, arrived from Vienna.[176] The Directory, thereupon, decreed, on April 24th, that Bonaparte should proceed to Rastadt and settle all outstanding difficulties with Austria.[177] He seemed to be disposed[178] to undertake the new task and announced to Cobenzl his intended departure.[179] Hearing, however, that the latter had left for Vienna, he postponed his own departure for Rastadt.[180] His letters to some of his lieutenants spoke of the Bernadotte affair as only delaying for a few days the great expedition on which he was engaged.[181] Miot relates in his _Memoirs_ that the incident gave him the position he coveted by placing “once more the fate of France and of her government in his hands,”[182] while Mathieu Dumas asserts that his thoughts turned anew to a _coup d’état_ and a dictatorship.[183] He himself, at St. Helena, attributed his hesitation to patriotic anxiety as to the safety of France.[184] The Directory, however, did not take this view and insisted on his departure to Toulon, where he arrived on May 9th. Immediately on his arrival, he reviewed some of the troops and, in a proclamation, promised each of them six acres of land.[185] While waiting for a favourable wind, the question of the presence of the English Fleet in the Mediterranean came to the forefront. The French Ambassador at Madrid had been already instructed to persuade the Spanish Government to order its ships blockaded at Cadiz to manœuvre in such a way as to prevent the English fleet under St. Vincent from leaving the station.[186] Nothing, however, came of this. But the news at Toulon was that, though the English were present in the Mediterranean, they were not in such numbers as to constitute a serious menace.[187] The gigantic armada composed of about 38,000 troops, of thirteen sail-of-the-line and six frigates left Toulon, accordingly, on May 19th.[188] We have now to trace the history of the most decisive move in the history of the Expedition, namely, the decision of the English Government to send a fleet to the Mediterranean. The secret of the expedition had been so well kept that the English Cabinet was not able to worm it out.[189] Certainly Pitt’s spy system was far less efficient than had been imagined. There was even the suspicion that two French servants of Lord Grenville’s household communicated to their Government the names of all his visitors and, in this way, it was alleged that all the English spies in France were perfectly known to the Directory.[190] With ordinary activity, however, the Oriental scheme could have been found out from one of Barras’ mistresses or from some official at Toulon. The engaging of Arabic interpreters and the setting-up of Arabic printing presses might have enlightened an agent of average intelligence. The Cabinet, however, was utterly in the dark as to the destination of the armada, and its members indulged in many wild conjectures based on all sorts of fantastic clues.[191] Dundas seems to have been the only important member of the Cabinet who guessed right.[192] Some other conjectures were correct—notably that of the British Consul at Leghorn,[193] and some of the intelligence received was such as to shed light on the destination of the Expedition.[194] This information, however, reached the Cabinet too late to influence its decision to send a fleet to the Mediterranean. The grounds upon which it was based have to be sought elsewhere. This measure, tantamount to a revolution in English military policy, reflected the revival of the national spirit and the desire, in the words of a Foreign Office despatch, “to reduce France within her ancient limits” and thus secure “the future tranquillity and independence of Europe.”[195] The fitful Paul was certain to weary of his peaceful mood. His chivalrous nature revolted at the depredations of France in Switzerland and Rome. The growth of indignation at St. Petersburg begat new hopes in Vienna. The Queen of Naples—the sister of Marie- Antoinette—was fuming against the hated Jacobins and pestered her nephew, the Emperor, and the English minister, Sir William Hamilton, with appeals for protection and for help. The latter communicated these appeals to his Government in March and to St. Vincent directly in April.[196] These Neapolitan clamours must have weighed with the Austrian Court, for on March 18th, Thugut, the Chancellor, instructed the Ambassador at London, in a despatch of fifty-five pages, to find out whether England would, among other things, send a fleet to the Mediterranean.[197] Grenville stated in an interview with Starhemberg, the ambassador, that the measure was greatly desired by the Cabinet, but that they could not take it unless Naples would express her readiness to provide the English ships with the necessary supplies.[198] Pitt embraced the suggestion eagerly. With a friendly port in the Mediterranean, and occasionally even without one, he could not see much difficulty in stretching a helping hand to Naples.[199] The First Lord of the Admiralty, Earl Spencer, however, thought differently. He estimated the forces equipping at Toulon at no more than ten sail and could not see his way—with a deficiency of 8000 men—to detach a respectable force for service in the Mediterranean. He suggested, however, that St. Vincent, with the fleet under his command, should take a sweep round that sea and do all the mischief he could to the French Navy.[200] Grenville, on hearing this, became despondent;[201] but Pitt, on the contrary, was not convinced. He saw many symptoms of the spirit of the country awakening and was determined to brave the risks of invasion in preference to a lingering war.[202] His view, as in other cases, prevailed. This wise and courageous decision to resume the offensive deserves nothing but the highest praise and marks the turn of the tide in favour of England in Europe.[203] On April 29th, accordingly, the Cabinet issued orders to St. Vincent to take such measures as he deemed necessary to thwart the projects of the Toulon armament. It was left to his judgment whether to go in person with his whole fleet, or to send a detachment of not less than nine or ten ships-of-the-line under a competent flag officer. If possible, the Government wished him to maintain the blockade of Cadiz as it had been established since the Battle of St. Vincent; but everything was to yield to the necessity of checking the sailing of the Toulon expedition or of defeating it if it had already started. A speedy reinforcement to supply the ships that might be detached was promised.[204] A private letter from Earl Spencer reflected the views and anxieties of the Government:[205] “The circumstances in which we now find ourselves oblige us to take a measure of a more decided and hazardous complexion than we should otherwise have thought ourselves justified in taking; but when you are apprized that the appearance of a British squadron in the Mediterranean is a condition on which the fate of Europe may at this moment be stated to depend, you will not be surprised that we are disposed to strain every nerve and incur considerable hazard in effecting it.” The rest of the letter is a commentary on this almost solemn pronouncement and emphasises the significance of the choice of the officer who was to command. Spencer strongly recommended Nelson for that post if St. Vincent would not command in person. Before receiving these important orders, St. Vincent had, on May 2nd, sent instructions to Nelson which, after reciting that he had received intelligence that a considerable armada was preparing at Toulon and a number of transports collecting at Marseilles and Genoa for the embarkation of troops, directed him to proceed, with as much of his squadron as might be at Gibraltar, up the Mediterranean and endeavour to ascertain the destination of the Expedition which, according to some reports, was bound for Sicily and Corfu and, according to others, Portugal and Ireland. If Nelson found the enemy intending to go down the Mediterranean he was not to suffer him to pass the Straits of Gibraltar before him.[206] Upon receiving on May 10th the above despatches, however, the Admiral’s first step was to order Nelson to return at once to the fleet to take charge of the detachment from the beginning.[207] More urgent instructions from the Admiralty, dated May 2nd, reached St. Vincent on the 19th, with news that a reinforcement of eight ships-of- the-line was on its way from England. St. Vincent, recognising the importance of this, at once hurried off a brig (“La Mutine”) to notify Nelson that a reinforcement of ten ships would shortly reach him. On the 21st this detachment sailed under Captain Troubridge.[208] St. Vincent, in his new instructions, charged Nelson to use “his utmost endeavours to take, sink, burn or destroy” the French armada and authorised him to exact supplies, whenever needed, from the territories of the various Mediterranean powers.[209] The “Mutine” joined Nelson. His little squadron had had so far a checkered career. Sailing from Gibraltar on May 8th with, in addition to the “Vanguard,” the “Orion” and the “Alexander” and five smaller vessels, he made his dispositions for getting information.[210] On May 17th the capture of a French corvette gave him nothing but conflicting reports as to what was going on at Toulon.[211] On the night of the 20th, a violent gale roughly handled the “Vanguard.” Fortunately for Nelson, the other two ships escaped without much injury and the “Vanguard” was taken in tow and was anchored under the Isle of St. Pietro, at the southern extremity of Sardinia.[212] These delays made possible the junction of Troubridge, of whose approach—thanks to the dispersion of the frigates during the storm—Nelson was entirely ignorant.[213] On the very day that Nelson took shelter at St. Pietro, the French armada was under sail along the coast of Corsica. The convoy of Genoa joined it on May 21st and that of Corsica on the 27th.[214] On June 1st and 3rd, it was learnt that Nelson was in command of three ships, that he had suffered heavily in a storm and that he had left St. Pietro on May 28th.[215] Bonaparte decided, under these circumstances, not to wait for the convoy of Cività-Vecchia, but to attack Malta as soon as possible. On June 9th he arrived before the island and found that Desaix with the convoy from Cività-Vecchia had been waiting there for a few days. On the arrival of Desaix, a Maltese messenger went on board his ship to convey the Grand Master’s welcome and to announce that no more than four ships at a time could enter the port. This was, as General Belliard frankly states in his diary, the very declaration desired by the French; for it would serve as an excellent pretext for the use of force.[216] Bonaparte, on his arrival, sent Marmont on shore to fetch the French Consul, who confirmed the declaration already made to Desaix.[217] Orders were at once given for operations at four points.[218] These decided upon, other methods were also to be employed to gather the fruits of the work of Poussielgue in the island. Treacherous letters, couched in terms to allay the anxiety of the knights, were sent from, amongst others, Dolomieu, the mineralogist and ex-knight, who was one of the “savants” attached to the expedition.[219] The French Consul wrote to the Grand Master that Bonaparte had decided to obtain by force what should have been voluntarily offered.[220] In spite of the fact that the Order had ample warning of what was to befall it, all was confusion and treachery.[221] Malta, nevertheless, had her fortifications deeply embedded in the live rock. The defenders would have only to retire behind the ramparts and weary down the attacking force, which would be sufficiently occupied with the difficult task of demolishing the rocky bastions and with the problem of finding fresh water in an arid coast. A delay of a few days might have seriously compromised the success of the expedition. There now came to the help of the French that sapping of all discipline and of all sentiments of loyalty which their propaganda had helped to create, and one day of skirmishes and another of negotiations sufficed to bring about the fall of Malta.[222] On June 11th, the Grand Master proposed a suspension of hostilities, to which Bonaparte readily acceded.[223] Poussielgue and Dolomieu were then sent to “sound the intentions of De Hompesch and report on the spirit of the inhabitants.” The verbal instructions of these agents clearly prove that the fall of Malta was not as inevitable as has been generally supposed. Bonaparte was ready, if necessary, to concede to the extent of preserving the sovereignty of the Order in return for the right of the French to control the port and garrison the town of Valetta.[224] At midnight, however, the envoys of the Grand Master arrived on board the “Orient.” In half an hour was concluded the “convention” for the capitulation of the Order and the end of its sovereignty over Malta.[225] The next day the French entered the town, took possession of the fortresses and anchored their fleet in the harbour. The news of this first success reached Paris on July 1st, and was the more welcome as great anxiety had been felt for the safety of the army under Bonaparte when the presence of an English fleet in the Mediterranean became known.[226] Bonaparte remained for six days in Malta, during which he demonstrated the full capacity of his organising genius. Entrusting the administration of the island to a commission of nine and to a commissioner appointed by the French Government,[227] he ordered an inventory of all the property of the Order,[228] dispersed the knights,[229] proclaimed the right of the Maltese to equality, abolished feudal titles and slavery, prohibited the wearing of liveries, liberated the Mohammedan galley-slaves, put an end to the representation of foreign powers in the island,[230] expelled the monks and nuns, and gave the vacated livings to native Maltese and set limits to religious endowments.[231] The fall of the Order, moreover, was bound to impress the Muslem powers of the Mediterranean. Capital was also to be made of the liberation of the Muslem galley-slaves, who were, for the most part, former subjects of the Barbary regencies of North Africa.[232] General Chabot, commanding at Corfu, was directed to announce the news to Ruffin at Constantinople and to Aly of Janina.[233] Other French agents were ordered to spread the news far and wide and especially among the Greeks of the Morea.[234] Bonaparte, moreover, thought it useful at this stage to gain over Aly and thus, in addition to abetting the rebel Paswan Oglou of Widdin and to lulling the anxiety of the Porte by declaring the aim of the expedition to be the punishment of the unruly beys, he would be able to keep Turkey quiet. He, accordingly, sent his aide-de-camp, Lavallette, to that Pasha and instructed him to impress Aly with the strength of the forces under his command and with his power of increasing his glory should he be willing to take the part of the French.[235] Leaving General Vaubois in command, Bonaparte sailed from Malta on June 19th. As for Nelson, he proceeded on the 27th to search for the frigates which had separated during the storm. Their absence hampered his operations from the outset. On May 28th, for example, he learnt from a vessel out of Marseilles of the sailing of the French armada and would have pursued it had he possessed the frigates—indispensable for such a service.[236] On June 5th, by the arrival of the “Mutine,” he learnt that he was to expect the reinforcement “which converted his division into a fleet and enlarged his mission from one of mere reconnaissance to the duty of overtaking and destroying a great expedition.”[237] He also learnt that the “Mutine” had fallen in with the frigates three days before on their way to Gibraltar, persuaded that Nelson could not take the sea with his impaired ships.[238] On June 7th, Troubridge, with the reinforcements, effected his junction.[239] The French having had a long start, Nelson would not delay an instant. “You may be assured,” he wrote to St. Vincent, “I will fight them the moment I can reach their fleet, be they at anchor, or under sail.”[240] With this resolution, he began the wearisome chase of the French which ended only in the victory of the Nile. He sailed towards Naples and Sicily, points mentioned in St. Vincent’s instructions as probable, and on June 14th learnt from a Tunisian cruiser, that ten days before the French had been seen off the end of Sicily steering to the eastward. “If they pass Sicily,” he wrote the next day, “I shall believe they are going on their scheme of possessing Alexandria and getting troops to India—a plan concerted with Tippoo Sahib, by no means so difficult as might at first view be imagined.”[241] Sending Troubridge ahead to Naples to communicate with Sir William Hamilton and with General Acton, the Neapolitan Prime Minister, to gather information and to see what help Naples would give, the squadron hove to in the Bay of Naples on June 17th and Troubridge rejoined.[242] Naples sent assurances of good will and promises of surreptitious help. The information gathered was that the enemy had gone towards Malta and this gave direction to the next move.[243] On the 22nd, however, Nelson learnt near the south-west of Sicily, that the French had taken Malta on the 15th, and that their fleet had sailed on the 16th for an unknown destination.[244] This was not true, for, as we have seen, it was not till the 19th that the French sailed from Malta. Guessing that Egypt was their destination, Nelson set sail at once towards Alexandria. His reasons are clearly set forth in a despatch to St. Vincent.[245] With information from Naples, so it ran, that that kingdom was reassured by the French as to the aim of their expedition,[246] with knowledge of the extent of the preparations, of the presence of naturalists, astronomers and other “savants” and of the easterly direction of the prevailing winds, he conjectured that their aim was to establish a colony in Egypt and to use it as a basis for operations against India. The opinion of these captains “in whom he placed great confidence” confirmed him in his determination to sail to Alexandria and to lose no time in frustrating the designs of the French. On the 26th, the “Mutine” was sent ahead to deliver despatches to the British Consul in Alexandria and to gather information.[247] Two days later the squadron appeared off that town. Captain Hardy, of the “Mutine,” reported that he was not able to obtain any news as to the French.[248] Nelson was now to suffer from an excess of eagerness and singleness of purpose. “His active and anxious mind,” wrote Captain Berry, “would not permit him to rest a moment in the same place; he therefore shaped his course to the northward for the coast of Caramania, to reach as quickly as possible some quarter where information could probably be obtained.”[249] Only two days later the French armament appeared off the low-lying coast of Egypt. Leaving Malta on June 19th, it did not take the direct route, but skirted the south coast of Crete. It was off that island that its Commander-in-chief learnt of the presence of seventeen English ships. His anxiety as to the safety of the convoy was greatly increased. Twenty days of navigation had demonstrated it as incapable of manœuvring for an engagement as of effecting its escape.[250] On June 27th, the “Junon” was sent ahead to fetch the French Consul at Alexandria. Rejoining the fleet on the 29th, the “Junon” reported the appearance of an English squadron of fourteen sail under Nelson.[251] This news changed Bonaparte’s plans. His original intention was to enter the Delta by the two mouths of the Nile. An examination of the strategic geography of Egypt proves the soundness of this. As the possession of Cairo was the immediate objective of the campaign, the obstacles were the desert and the Nile. The Mamelukes could add to these natural obstacles a formidable cavalry and a fairly strong river-flotilla. The French had, consequently, to avoid the desert and the crossing of the river. Damietta and Rosetta were, therefore, the proper points for the disembarkation of the troops and the starting of the march on Cairo. Alexandria, on the contrary, did not possess this advantage. It was then almost completely cut off from the rest of Egypt by the encroaching of the desert on the cultivated land.[252] The presence of the English fleet, however, did not leave the French any other choice than land where they were. Thus, if Nelson had failed to encounter the French fleet, he was able—by the mere fact of his presence—to effect a not unimportant result. The disembarkation was effected under difficult circumstances a few miles to the westward of Alexandria, and an immediate march on that town was ordered.[253] The notables, alarmed by the appearance of the English fleet, had, in the meantime, appealed to the Mameluke governor of the neighbouring province for help.[254] A Turkish ship-of-the-line and a few frigates anchored in the harbour had, at the appearance of the English, begun to send their guns ashore.[255] The Beys at Cairo treated the matter lightly. They declared their perfect readiness to trample with their horses over all the “Franks” of the Earth.[256] The mob of Mamelukes, ferocious Beduins and simple peasants armed with long flails gathered for the defence of Egypt’s first port was quickly dispersed by French advanced detachments, and before the evening of July 2nd, the French were masters of the place. There does not seem to be any foundation for the reports of a massacre of the inhabitants.[257] Bonaparte now put into execution the long-matured policy of propitiating the Egyptians; the French were to appear to them rather as liberators than as conquerors, and as if they had come to put an end to the tyranny of a caste recruited from the slaves of Caucasia, and to ensure to the oppressed cultivator of the soil the fruit of his toil. They were also to demonstrate that their presence in Egypt would not at all affect the friendly relations between Turkey and France, for the Porte had been as much as the French the victim of its nominal vassals. While still at sea, the soldiers were admonished to respect the religion of the Egyptians and the “muftis.” “The peoples,” so the soldiers were told, “whom we are about to encounter treat women differently from us, but in every country the man who wrongs a woman is a scoundrel. Plunder enriches only a few and dishonours all; it destroys our resources and makes us hated by those whom it is to our interest to have as friends. The first town on our route was built by Alexander. Every step we take will awaken memories of great deeds worthy of exciting the emulation of Frenchmen.”[258] But his profound study of the Koran, which, together with the Bible, the Vedas, and Montesquieu’s works, he grouped in his library catalogue under the heading of “Politics,” had borne fruit in the remarkable proclamation in Arabic addressed to the Egyptians.[259] It must be stated, however, that the French original composed by Bonaparte is truer to the style and spirit of the Koran than the Levantine interpreters’ Arabic version.[260] The intermediaries between the people and the French were to be the “Ulema,” who were the nearest approach to a clergy and who were favoured by Bonaparte on account of their pacific dispositions and their relative enlightenment.[261] As regards the Sublime Porte, he was careful to preserve the symbols of its suzerainty. Villages, for instance, were to fly the Turkish as well as the French flag.[262] The Pasha of Egypt—as a fellow sufferer from Mameluke violence—was requested to join Bonaparte and “curse with him the impious race of the Beys.”[263] The commander of the Turkish ship- of-war was not allowed to sail, but was reassured as to the friendly intentions of the French.[264] The French envoy at Constantinople was directed to convey similar assurances to the Porte and was informed of the speedy arrival of an ambassador.[265] Without absolutely convincing the Egyptians, the proclamation, at any rate, seemed to appease them, especially that portion of it professing friendliness to the Commander of the Faithful. Under the influence of their religious leaders, who were sincerely opposed to any violence, and submitting to the “right” of the strongest, they easily transferred from Mamelukes to French the signs of an allegiance, which, at heart, they felt for neither. The French now began to suffer all the miseries of disenchantment. The “town built by Alexander” of which their general spoke so eloquently was only a twelfth part of what it had been in the days when his Macedonian model had given it his name; the rest of the city was simply refuse and ruins surrounded by arid stretches. The six acres promised at Toulon well seemed to the soldier an undesirable domain. The ferocious Beduin, ever on the alert to cut off stragglers, cured the disciples of Jean Jacques of their admiration for the “natural man.”[266] The disillusionment was further embittered by the sufferings of the troops on their march towards Cairo. Breaking camp on July 7th, Bonaparte sent the main body of his army along the desert road instead of the more comfortable but longer one by Rosetta and the banks of the Nile.[267] Only one division, that under Dugua, was sent by the longer route, while a flotilla, under Perrée, was to ascend the river from Rosetta.[268] The troops suffered all the horrors of a desert march—hunger, thirst, and heat.[269] In the miserable villages there were none of the appliances of civilisation; grain there was in abundance, but neither mills nor ovens, and nothing to drink but the slimy water of the cisterns. After tasting the delights of Capua, they had now to content themselves with water-melons, of which they partook so ravenously as to justify the contemporary English cartoonist who represented the ghost of Bonaparte attributing the destruction of his legions to the water-melon and the Arab.[270] The officers encouraged their soldiers in expressing their discontent.[271] These murmured, threatened to mutiny, and scoffed at the “savants” whom they believed to have deceived their general. Stories of the indignities to which the Beduins subjected their prisoners kept the highly strung soldiers on the alert all the time. The strain drove many to commit suicide, even in the presence of the general.[272] The latter, by word and deed, did all he could to restore the _morale_ of the troops. Passing near a group of disaffected men, he was accosted: “Well, General, are you going to take us to India?” “No,” was his cutting reply, “it is not with your likes that I should undertake the journey.”[273] On hearing of the landing of the French, the Beys and notables had decided to write at once to Constantinople for help, and gave the command to Murad. The latter marched with his cavalry towards the enemy after giving orders for the construction of a thick chain across the river.[274] The first “affair” between the Mamelukes and the French took place on July 10th, and was described by General Belliard as a “joke.”[275] It restored, however, the confidence of the French soldier and showed him that his magnificently accoutred enemies who tempted his cupidity, could effect nothing against the “square” formation adopted by his general. Three days later there was a second engagement of a more serious character.[276] The Mamelukes, dazzling in gold and silver, armed with pistols and carabines of the best English make and with the finest sabres of the East and mounted on horses of the purest breed, dashed upon the squares, caracoled round the flanks seeking a feeble point, but were stopped everywhere by a wall of raised bayonets, and some of the bravest expired within the French lines. The Mamelukes at last retired. In the meantime a lively engagement took place between the flotillas in which the Mamelukes acquitted themselves with honour and would have been victorious had it not been for the advance of the French troops towards the bank of the river and the sail of one of their ships catching fire accidentally.[277] The news of these defeats reached Cairo on July 15th.[278] The panic of the populace knew no bounds. The gossipmongers abandoned the bazaars and burglars plied their nefarious trade. The proclamation of Bonaparte spread by the liberated galley-slaves, whom the populace believed to be as much infidel as the French, did not produce the desired effect.[279] The Beys did not take the trouble to employ a spy or a scout to discover the route taken by the French and showed themselves not less panic stricken than the people. Ibrahim Bey, Murad’s rival, utterly in the dark as to the movements of the French, decided to remain on the Cairo side of the river. The Government of the Mamelukes had tumbled down. The Beduins emerged from their desert retreats and began pillaging the settled population, and villages renewed their traditional feuds. The “Franks” and the other Christians were subjected to insults and threats. Murad had, on the 16th, encamped at the village of Embabeh, on the left bank of the Nile, opposite Cairo. He thus committed the fatal mistake of not placing the river between himself and his enemies and thus imposing upon them the necessity of finding means for crossing it. His superior flotilla could have seriously hampered that operation and his cavalry could have fallen upon the French detachments as they effected their landing on the other side.[280] It was not to be, and in the engagement which took place on July 18th and which marked the last effort of mediæval warfare, the famous cavalry was shattered by the world’s greatest soldier, and the most indispensable condition for the rise of a New Egypt was realised.[281] The “Battle of the Pyramids” delivered Cairo into the hands of the French. Ibrahim, unable to go to the rescue of his brethren on the other bank, had departed with his cavalry, his women and his riches towards Syria. Others, who could, had followed his example. The “Ulema” of the Azhar University communicated on July 21st with Bonaparte, who repeated his former assurances and entered Cairo on July 24th.[282] The Mamelukes, having dispersed in all directions, he hastened to extend the dominion of the French over the chief provincial towns and to re- establish his communications with the coast which, during the march on Cairo, had been cut off by the Beduins and the peasants.[283] He attempted, moreover, to open negotiations with Murad, who after his defeat had blown up his flotilla and retreated towards Upper Egypt. These negotiations would give Bonaparte time to destroy the other Mameluke chief, Ibrahim, who was then lingering on the eastern frontier of Egypt to lay hands on the richly laden caravan from Mecca.[284] Accordingly Rosetti, the ex-Imperial consul and the confidant of the Beys, was instructed to offer Murad the province of Girgeh up to the cataract in return for his acknowledging the suzerainty of the French, paying them the “miri,” or tax on land, and keeping no more than 500 cavalrymen.[285] But inklings of the great victory of Nelson seemed to have reached Murad, who rejected Bonaparte’s terms and offered, in his turn, to make the French a money payment if they consented to leave Egypt.[286] Before he knew of this answer, Bonaparte had sent his troops in movement against Ibrahim. On August 11th the French cavalry had a lively engagement with the Mamelukes, and Ibrahim was able, thanks to the delay of the French infantry in coming up to battle, to effect his escape with all his immense baggage into Syria.[287] It was on his way back to Cairo, after making a futile overture to Ibrahim Bey, that Bonaparte learnt of the destruction of the French fleet in the Bay of Abukir.[288] [Footnote 157: _Correspondance_, IV, 2426.] [Footnote 158: _Ibid._, IV, 2427-2436.] [Footnote 159: The Directory to the Minister of Justice, 26 March, Jonquière, I, p. 229. To deceive the enemy the minister was ordered to set them up in the Ionian Islands.] [Footnote 160: To the Minister of Interior, 26 March, Jonquière, I, p. 230. _Correspondance_, IV, 2454. A full list of the “Savants” has been published as an appendix to the _Journal et Souvenirs_ of Villiers du Tirage.] [Footnote 161: Thibaudeau, _Mémoires_, II, pp. 346-8.] [Footnote 162: _Correspondance_, IV, 2439.] [Footnote 163: Jonquière, I, p. 252. Sandoz (despatch 19 April) that Talleyrand disapproved of this.] [Footnote 164: 12 April, _Correspondance_, IV, 2491.] [Footnote 165: _Ibid._, 2495.] [Footnote 166: _Ibid._, 2496, 2497.] [Footnote 167: 12 April, _Correspondance_, IV, 2498.] [Footnote 168: Jonquière, I, p. 368.] [Footnote 169: Aulard, op. cit., V, pp. 86, 87. The paper was immediately suppressed.] [Footnote 170: Pallain, p. 336 f.] [Footnote 171: _Memoirs_, I, p. 2498.] [Footnote 172: Miot de Melito, _Memoirs_, I, p. 271.] [Footnote 173: Talleyrand said to Sandoz: “I shall probably be removed from a post in which I had nothing but annoyance. Perhaps I shall be appointed Ambassador at Constantinople, which I would like to accept.” Fournier, I, p. 159 note. _Memoirs of Talleyrand_, I, p. 203.] [Footnote 174: Jonquière, I, pp. 593, 594.] [Footnote 175: Sandoz’s despatch of 25 April, 1798. “De vous à moi, Bernadotte a mis dans sa conduite un peu de précipitation.” Talleyrand to Treilhard, 26 April. Pallain, p. 231.] [Footnote 176: _Ibid._ to _ibid._ Pallain, p. 231.] [Footnote 177: Jonquière, I, p. 386.] [Footnote 178: Pallain, p. 232.] [Footnote 179: 25 April. _Correspondance_, IV, 2547.] [Footnote 180: 26 April, to Talleyrand. _Correspondance_, IV, 2548.] [Footnote 181: To Kléber, IV, 2549; to Caffarelli, 2550; to Brueys, 2551. Dated 28 April.] [Footnote 182: _Memoirs_, I, p. 268.] [Footnote 183: Quoted by Sybel, V, p. 249.] [Footnote 184: In a conversation with Montholon, _Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire de France sous Napoleon_, 1824, IV, pp. 297, 298.] [Footnote 185: Published in the _Moniteur_ of 21 May, 1798. Next day’s issue stated that Bonaparte never made such a promise and published as the true harangue No. 2570 of the _Correspondance_. A letter from Sulkowski refutes this. Jonquière, I, p. 464.] [Footnote 186: Jurien de la Gravière, _Guerres Maritimes_, I, p. 333.] [Footnote 187: To the Directory, 19 May, _Correspondance_, IV, 2604.] [Footnote 188: Jonquière, I, pp. 512, 518, 519.] [Footnote 189: “They order their matters so well in France that all is secret.” Nelson to St. Vincent, 18 May, _Despatches_, III, p. 16.] [Footnote 190: Crawfurd to Grenville, 26 June, 1798, _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 239.] [Footnote 191: The First Lord of the Admiralty concluded from the fact that “casks” were being shipped that the destination was the Black Sea. Spencer to Grenville, 4 May, 1798, _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 185.] [Footnote 192: Grenville to Buckingham, 3 June, _Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of George III_, II, p. 401.] [Footnote 193: Udney to Nelson, 20 April, B.M. Add. MSS. 34906. Udney to Grenville, 16 April, _Wellesley Despatches_, I, p. 678.] [Footnote 194: From Sir Francis d’Ivernois, 20 April, B.M. Add. MSS. 34454. Arrived London in July.] [Footnote 195: Rose, _Pitt and the Great War_, p. 364.] [Footnote 196: B.M. Add. MSS. 34906, f. 384. General Acton appealed for help in a letter to Hamilton of 3 April. B.M. Add. MSS. 34906, f. 386.] [Footnote 197: The “fifty-five” pages are summed up in a note of 18 April, _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 170.] [Footnote 198: Grenville to Pitt, 1 April, _ibid._, IV, p. 150.] [Footnote 199: Pitt to Grenville, 1 April, _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 152.] [Footnote 200: Spencer to Grenville, 6 April, Rose, _Pitt and the Great War_, p. 366.] [Footnote 201: Grenville to Spencer, 7 April, _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 166.] [Footnote 202: Pitt to Grenville, 7 April, _ibid._, p. 166.] [Footnote 203: Cf. Fortescue, _History of the British Army_, IV, part I, p. 586. And Wellesley’s judgment, _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 385.] [Footnote 204: Mahan, _Nelson_, I, p. 321.] [Footnote 205: _Ibid._] [Footnote 206: Nelson, _Despatches_, III, p. 12.] [Footnote 207: _Ibid._, p. 15.] [Footnote 208: St. Vincent to Troubridge, B.M. Add. MSS. 24906, f. 421, enjoining upon him the supreme importance of effecting his junction with Nelson.] [Footnote 209: St. Vincent’s instructions and additional instructions, Nelson, _Despatches_, III, p. 26.] [Footnote 210: _Despatches_, III, p. 14.] [Footnote 211: To St. Vincent, 17 May, _ibid._, p. 15.] [Footnote 212: The gale is fully described in a letter from Captain Berry, _ibid._, p. 17.] [Footnote 213: Mahan, _Nelson_, I, p. 325.] [Footnote 214: 23 May, 27 May, to the Directory, _Correspondance_ IV, 2606, 2615.] [Footnote 215: _Ibid._, IV, 2617.] [Footnote 216: Jonquière, I, p. 577.] [Footnote 217: The account of the fall of Malta is mainly based on a despatch of 13 June to the Directory (_Correspondance_, IV, 2641), and on the report of Charles de Thuisy to Grenville (_Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 339 f.)] [Footnote 218: _Correspondance_, IV, 2622, 2627, 2625, 2620.] [Footnote 219: _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 340.] [Footnote 220: _Correspondance_, IV, 2629.] [Footnote 221: A letter from the “bailli” Schœnau minister of the Order at Rastadt warning the Grand Master (Jonquière, I, p. 586 note) is described by Hardman as a forgery to discredit de Hompesch (_History of Malta_, p. 44). There can be no doubt, however, that this personage was aware of the designs of France. Hardman, op. cit., p. 9.] [Footnote 222: Notes of Sulkowski. Jonquière, I, p. 594.] [Footnote 223: Laugier, in his _Journal_, remarked that the truce would be to the advantage of the French, who could push forward their works without being molested. Jonquière, I, p. 611.] [Footnote 224: Dolomieu has published an account of this affair in the _Spectateur Militaire_ of 1826, II, p. 52.] [Footnote 225: _Correspondance_, IV, 2636.] [Footnote 226: _Moniteur_, 2 July.] [Footnote 227: _Correspondance_, IV, 2643.] [Footnote 228: Berthollet and others were charged to collect all precious articles (_Correspondance_, IV, 2650). Bonaparte estimated the value at less than a million (_ibid._, 2667).] [Footnote 229: _Correspondance_, IV, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2664.] [Footnote 230: _Ibid._, 2668.] [Footnote 231: _Ibid._, 2647.] [Footnote 232: To Consuls at Tunis, Tripoli and Algiers, 15 June. _Correspondance_, IV, 2665.] [Footnote 233: _Ibid._, 2663.] [Footnote 234: _Ibid._, 2662.] [Footnote 235: _Instructions_, IV, 2683. Bonaparte to Aly, _ibid._, 2684.] [Footnote 236: Mahan, _Nelson_, I, p. 325.] [Footnote 237: _Despatches_, III, p. 27.] [Footnote 238: _Despatches_, III, p. 27.] [Footnote 239: To St. Vincent, 11 June, _ibid._, III, p. 27.] [Footnote 240: _Ibid._, III, p. 31.] [Footnote 241: _Despatches_, III, p. 31.] [Footnote 242: _Despatches_, III, pp. 32, 33.] [Footnote 243: To Grand Master of Malta. _Ibid._, III, p. 34.] [Footnote 244: _Despatches_, III, pp. 32, 33.] [Footnote 245: 29 June, _Despatches_, III, pp. 38-41.] [Footnote 246: Sir William Hamilton to Grenville, 29 May, that Garat, the French Minister at Naples, had assured General Acton that the destination of the armament was Egypt. F.O. Sicily, 11.] [Footnote 247: Dated 24 and 26 June, _Despatches_, III, pp. 36, 37. The Consul had left—as we have seen—more than a year before.] [Footnote 248: Letter Book. _Despatches_, III, p. 38.] [Footnote 249: Mahan, _Nelson_, I, p. 339.] [Footnote 250: Notes of Sulkowski. Jonquière, II, pp. 9, 10.] [Footnote 251: Denon, who was on board the “Junon,” described what took place. _Voyage_, p. 13 _seq._] [Footnote 252: Notes of Sulkowski, who was in a position to know Bonaparte’s views. Jonquière, II, pp. 34, 35.] [Footnote 253: Bonaparte to the Directory, 6 July. _Correspondance_, IV, 2765.] [Footnote 254: Djabarti. I have used the Arabic original.] [Footnote 255: Nelson to St. Vincent, 12 July. _Despatches_, III, p. 41.] [Footnote 256: Djabarti.] [Footnote 257: Boyer’s Letter, _Int. Corr._, I, pp. 136, 137.] [Footnote 258: _Correspondance_, IV, 2710.] [Footnote 259: _Ibid._, 2723. Library Catalogue, Bourrienne, I, p. 208.] [Footnote 260: Djabarti criticises the Arabic version.] [Footnote 261: _Correspondance_, IV, 2733. They were allowed to retain their arms and were to be saluted by the soldiers.] [Footnote 262: _Ibid._, IV., 2723.] [Footnote 263: _Ibid._, IV, 2719, 30 June.] [Footnote 264: _Ibid._, IV., 2721, 1 July. A note dated 29 March, 1798, indicates that it was an item in the original diplomatic preparations to allow Turkish war vessels to sail. But Bonaparte did not release the one in Alexandria, so as to keep Nelson in the dark. Jonquière, II, p. 62 note.] [Footnote 265: _Ibid._, IV, 2777, 6 July.] [Footnote 266: The “Intercepted Correspondence” is full of these bitter complaints. See especially a letter from Louis Bonaparte to Joseph, part I, p. 3.] [Footnote 267: Berthier, _Relation_, p. 17, exaggerates the length of the second route.] [Footnote 268: _Correspondance_, IV, 2724, 2745, 2756, 2758.] [Footnote 269: See among others letters of Dumas, Colbert, Boyer in the _Int. Corr._, part I, pp. 73, 51, 135.] [Footnote 270: A. M. Broadley, _Napoleon in Caricature_, I, p. 125.] [Footnote 271: _Mémoires du duc de Rovigo_, I, p. 57., _Journal of Belliard_, Jonquière, II, p. 167.] [Footnote 272: _Int. Corr._, part I, p. 145. When the generals passed the soldiers exclaimed: “Les voilà, les bourreaux des Français.” The suicide of soldiers in presence of the generals mentioned, II, pp. 46, 215, is grossly exaggerated.] [Footnote 273: _Journal of Belliard_, Jonquière, II, p. 167.] [Footnote 274: Djabarti. Nakoula gives curious details on the effect of the news. Describing Murad he says: “His eyes became red and the fire devoured his entrails.” He suspected the Turkish government of being an accomplice.] [Footnote 275: _Journal_, Jonquière, II, p. 142 note.] [Footnote 276: Bonaparte to the Directory, 24 July. _Correspondance_, IV, 2834.] [Footnote 277: Djabarti. Perrée, who commanded, makes this curious statement: “Assurément si 3 de mes meilleurs bâtiments n’eussent pas été forcés de céder, il n’aurait plus été question de la flotille ennemie,” _Int. Corr._, I, p. 46.] [Footnote 278: Djabarti.] [Footnote 279: Djabarti, describing the galley-slaves, says: “They are infidels who can speak more than one tongue.”] [Footnote 280: Damas to Kléber, 27 July. _Int. Corr._, I, p. 74.] [Footnote 281: To Directory, 24 July. _Correspondance_, IV, 2834.] [Footnote 282: _Ibid._, 2817.] [Footnote 283: _Ibid._, 2842, 2843.] [Footnote 284: On the importance of preventing Ibrahim from capturing the caravan. _See_ letter of Morand. Jonquière, II, p. 344.] [Footnote 285: Rossetti’s Instructions, 1 Aug., IV, 2921. A private letter, 2922.] [Footnote 286: Nakoula, pp. 45, 6.] [Footnote 287: To the Directory, 19 Aug. _Correspondance_, IV, 3045. Djabarti and Nakoula claim the engagement as a victory to the Mamelukes.] [Footnote 288: Proposed the Pasha of Egypt as a mediator, 12 Aug. _Correspondance_, IV, 3005.] III THE ANGLO-TURKISH ALLIANCE After Brueys’ squadron had successfully escorted the convoy, the important question as to its ulterior _rôle_ had to be settled. As long as the conquest of Egypt was not achieved there was a good reason for keeping the fleet near at hand. To station it, moreover, on the Egyptian coast would facilitate the arrival of the expected second convoy. But such a position, on the other hand, exposed the fleet to serious risks.[289] How did Bonaparte conciliate two such conflicting interests? The question has given rise to a wearisome controversy, but the evidence of contemporary documents is unequivocal. Immediately on the fall of Alexandria, Brueys was directed to anchor his ships in the old harbour. But should careful sounding prove that there was not enough depth and should he be unable to take a military position in the Bay of Abukir, he was to set sail for Corfu.[290] Brueys, on the same day, wrote that the line-of-battle ships could not enter the harbour, and that the Bay of Abukir would provide a good shelter, especially in summer.[291] There is evidence that the immediate departure of the fleet to Corfu, which was certainly the original arrangement,[292] would have materially deranged Bonaparte’s plans, for he was counting on a speedy return to Europe. It was arranged before his departure that on the termination of the Egyptian Expedition he should resume the command of the combined forces for the invasion of England.[293] There is a despatch dated April 13th and addressed to the Directory in which he calculates that after “the termination of the Mediterranean Expedition” the fourteen sail-of-the-line under Brueys thus available would join the Brest squadron and so bring up the number by October or November (when he expected the Egyptian campaign to be over) to fifty war vessels. It would then be possible to take 40,000 troops to some point on the English coast, while other 40,000 were preparing to embark, and the Dutch fleet with 10,000 troops could threaten Scotland. In this way the landing in England was almost certain to be in November or December, as the English would be obliged, by the expedition in the East, to detach part of their Channel fleet for India and the Red Sea.[294] Who but himself could carry out such an invasion? At Toulon he addressed the troops, “You are a wing of the Army of England!” and in his orders he occasionally signed himself “Commander- in-Chief of the Army of England.” His secretary, Bourrienne, affirms this. In letters to his brother Joseph he spoke of his intention to return in the Autumn of 1798 and asked him to purchase for him an estate in Burgundy.[295] Jaubert, a naval employee, explicitly states in a confidential letter to the Minister of Marine which was afterwards intercepted and published by the English Government, that it was by Bonaparte’s order that the fleet did not sail to Corfu, and adds, “Nous sommes ici sous le vent du fatalisme, et son souffle ébranle un peu mes principes.”[296] Brueys, accordingly, anchored his squadron in the open roadstead of Abukir. Artillery officers were sent to strengthen his position by the establishing of land-batteries,[297] but they were of opinion that the fleet could not count on much support from the shore.[298] The sounding operations were, meanwhile, in full activity. On July 13th it was reported that the fleet could enter the old harbour.[299] Brueys, however, was not convinced.[300] His correspondence reveals the dearth of provisions in the fleet, which prevented him from as much as sending a frigate to gather information on the movements of the English forces, of whose presence he had received various reports,[301] the unworthiness of the soldiers serving as ships’ garrisons,[302] the bad health from which he was suffering[303] and which was, in all probability, the cause of his not taking measures to render his position more secure, and his belief that he could not sail from Egypt without an express order from Bonaparte.[304] Such an order was never sent. After the battle, Bonaparte, in a long despatch to the Directory, ignores that it was he who suggested the alternative of anchoring in the roadstead of Abukir, and declares his surprise when he heard, on July 27th, that the fleet was still there.[305] On July 30th, the despatch continued, Jullien, an aide-de-camp, was sent with instructions for Brueys to sail immediately. Jullien was, however, murdered _en route_. But on that very July 30th Bonaparte was still hoping that the sounding operations would prove a success, and expressed his belief that the English, who had only an inferior force, would be contented with the blockade of Malta.[306] Moreover, if his intention on that day was that the fleet should sail for Corfu, nothing would have been more natural than that he should have informed General Chabot, the Governor of the place, of it. Writing to him on August 3rd, he speaks of establishing trade relations, but not a word of Brueys’ fleet.[307] The only possible conclusion, therefore, is that if he ever entertained the idea of sending the fleet away from Egypt he preserved till the very end the hope of finding another course of action more subservient to his designs. After beating back from Egypt and “spreading the fleet over to the coast of Asia,” Nelson anchored at Syracuse on July 19th. “Having gone,” he wrote to Sir William Hamilton, “a round of 600 leagues at this season of the year with an expedition incredible, here I am as ignorant of the situation of the enemy as I was twenty-seven days ago.”[308] Persuaded, however, that the French were somewhere in the Levant,[309] that they were neither (so he learnt from spoken vessels) to the westward of Sicily nor at Corfu,[310] he sailed from Syracuse on July 25th and sent Troubridge on the 28th to look into the Gulf of Koron. The latter rejoined with the information that the French were seen four weeks before steering in a south-easterly direction off the coast of Crete.[311] The fleet immediately bore up under all sail and in the afternoon of August 1st the long-sought enemy was discovered anchored in Abukir Bay. Nelson, with the eye of genius, at once observed, “that where there was room for our enemy’s ships to swing, there was room for one of ours to anchor.”[312] His ships manœuvred with such consummate skill that some of them were able to pass between their opponents and the shore. Caught thus between two fires, the French were destroyed one after the other. Two ships-of-the-line and two frigates were all that Villeneuve could save by flight. In considering the causes of the disaster, it is necessary to go beyond the immediate circumstances into the more far-reaching factors, to go, for instance, beyond the explosion of the flagship “L’Orient” and the heroic death of Brueys, the non-participation of the rear under Villeneuve in the action and the resolution not to fight under sail—important as all these were—into the many deficiencies of a disorganised service which led Brueys to exclaim: “Je trouve qu’il faut bien du courage pour se charger de conduire des flottes aussi mal- outillées.”[313] As for Nelson, there now remained to gather up the spoils of the field, and to realise the consequences of the battle, great and small, near and remote. Little by little, he grasped the greatness of what he had accomplished. After the victory, he announced his intention of sailing down the Mediterranean on the 19th,[314] but batches of letters from the French began to fall into his hands. The “Intercepted Correspondence” thus early started playing its important—and hitherto unnoticed—_rôle_; namely, that of influencing the opinions of British statesmen and men of action and of shaping their decisions. These letters—written under the stress of privation and home-sickness—showed how bitter was the disillusionment, how widespread was the disaffection and how dispirited were the troops. The eager enemy did not allow for the obvious exaggeration of disenchanted warriors, but took the wailing at its full face-value. Under these circumstances, Nelson realised how much his victory would mean to the French. Had he possessed a few bomb-ships, he would have destroyed the transports in the harbour of Alexandria.[315] As it was, he hastened to inform British India. Writing to the Governor of Bombay, he summed up briefly the events of the past few months and the number and character of the French army in Egypt, and expressed the hope that special care would be exercised against the departure of ships from India, to convey this huge force thither by the Red Sea. On the side of the Mediterranean, their fate was settled by the recent victory. They could receive nothing from France, they could not advance freely into Syria, as water transport was essential for much of their equipment; even in Egypt itself they were hampered by the difficulties of communication—on land by the guerilla hostility of the Egyptians, and now on the water through his own presence and control. The Nile, through its Rosetta mouth, had been heretofore the easiest communication between Cairo and Alexandria. The garrison of the latter depended largely for daily bread upon this route, now closed by the fleet in Abukir Bay. By land nothing short of a regiment could pass over ground where, even before the battle, the French watering parties from the ships had to be protected by heavy armed bodies. He intended, therefore, to remain where he was as long as possible.[316] On the 15th, however, most secret and urgent orders came to him from St. Vincent, to return to the Westward and co-operate in the reduction of Minorca.[317] By that time, several of the lost frigates had joined him. Three of these with three ships-of- the-line were left with Captain Hood to carry on the blockade of Alexandria and to suppress the enemy’s communications by water along the coasts of Egypt and Syria.[318] That, to all intents and purposes, was to be England’s contribution. Turkey was to do the rest, and this was not great. The Porte, according to Nelson, would have only to send a few ships of war and the transports in the harbour of Alexandria would be all destroyed, and 10,000 troops and the town itself would be captured.[319] He declared himself ready, if Naples would give him the bomb-ships, to return and do the work. The three countries, England, Turkey and Naples, had only to exert[320] themselves for three months and the French might be destroyed. On the 19th, he sailed for Naples. On August 22nd the news of his great victory reached Constantinople, where it helped to end the wavering of the Porte and to confirm it in the decisions it had already taken. The Porte’s suspicions of the intentions of the French had been aroused by Bonaparte’s intrigues with the disaffected Greeks, the Pasha of Janina and other Albanian chiefs, and the assurances of the French Ambassador that Bonaparte’s ardent proclamations were only polite answers to letters he had received, could not deceive even the Turks.[321] The extensive preparations for the Egyptian Expedition therefore could not but greatly alarm them. The Porte, however, did not feel itself strong enough to demand an explanation.[322] The most disquieting rumours were spread and were readily believed by the populace, which was greatly excited by the symptoms of concern and anxiety observed on the faces of the members of the Divan.[323] Turkey had to choose between three courses of action, firstly, to oppose openly and by force of arms the French Expedition; secondly, to enter into an alliance with the Republic; and thirdly, to profess acquiescence in the retention of Egypt by the French, but to throw, secretly, every impediment in their way. As for the first course the Porte had more than one reason not to take it. For if it did it had to contract alliances with its hereditary enemies and expose the security of the heart of the Empire to the menace of Russian and Austrian troops marching there ostensibly for its succour. Moreover, the French troops stationed in the Ionian Islands could easily march on Constantinople and punish the Porte before the arrival of its allies. The discontent of the Greeks and the rebellion of Paswan Oglou fomented by the French were additional obstacles. The Porte, however, could not with any pretence to dignity take the second course. The third was more conformable to the spirit of the Turkish Government. Its characteristic in political affairs was indecision and a method of uniformly acting in such a way as might subsequently be explained in accordance with its interests. The nature of the Government was such that, in all parts of the Empire, and more particularly in Egypt, the Porte could send orders which it never meant should be carried out, nay, it could send orders which were meant to be resisted. The Porte could, consequently, set against the French in Egypt armies from Arabia and Syria as effectively as if it had declared war and answer the protests of the French Government by declaring its inability to control the unruly pashas and showering imprecations on their heads. This policy would, moreover, result in weakening the vassals to such an extent as would enable the central Government to reassert its authority.[324] We find, accordingly, that while the Grand Signior was solemnly declaring that he would not give “a handful of sand of the Egyptian territory,” calling upon the Beys not to place any belief in the stratagems of these infidels, and promising to give them every succour,[325] proclamations were sent to the provinces to the effect that the French were still the friends of Turkey and should be well treated, in spite of the fact that “a certain wretch called Bonaparte” had invaded Egypt, for that general, being a rebel to his own Government, had abused its confidence and attacked Egypt with troops intended for another enterprise![326] In this way the French had some chance of preventing a formal rupture. Received by the Reis Effendi on June 19th, their envoy—only a _chargé d’affaires_ whose financial embarrassments had diminished his influence—was placed in a difficult position by his lack of official information and instructions from his Government.[327] In this and other audiences, however, Ruffin adopted the policy of letting the Turks infer that an Ambassador would soon arrive at Constantinople. The Porte was obviously pleased at this[328]; but its hesitation did not come to an end. “There was,” wrote Spencer Smith, the English Minister, “nothing but council upon council and conference upon conference without any visible result.”[329] Spencer Smith was not idle in “abridging” these deliberations, or, in his own words, he “was not backward in taking a due share in meeting every demonstration that a palpable community of interests can have inspired, nor in taking upon himself a due share of responsibility in the language of his assurances and offers in reply.”[330] Other circumstances came to his help. The populace at Constantinople, alarmed for the safety of Islam and discontented with the manipulation of the prices of articles imported from Egypt by monopolists and “profiteers,”[331] began to murmur at the suspected connivance of the Porte in the schemes of the infidels.[332] Rumours of the presence of a formidable English squadron and even of its having obtained a great victory over the French, of the determination of the Beys to defend Egypt at all costs, of their having assembled as many as 50,000 men and of having embodied an Arab militia 100,000 strong, were widely circulated, and the people were overjoyed.[333] The Russian mission, “which naturally fixed the attention and confidence of the preponderant connection of this Empire,” and which had hitherto “manifested the least share in the hustle of the season,”[334] began to show signs of activity. In spite of the fact that Paul had started his reign with a violent fit of “burning all that his Mother, Catherine, had adored,” Russian policy in Europe and Asia derived its springs of action from the very nature of things and was marked by a singular continuity under the most varying _régimes_ of insane emperors, of foreign-born ministers, and of eccentric empresses. While declaiming against the Revolution, “subversive of all law, of rights, of religion and of morality,”[335] Paul remained at peace with France. The occupation of the Ionian Islands and the formation of a Polish legion in Italy, however, disquietened him. He feared the extension of French influence in the Near East to the detriment of the Russian monopoly and the contamination of Holy Russia by contact with revolutionary doctrines, and began to declare the necessity of “taming the French in the interests of general tranquillity and of thwarting their ambitious designs.”[336] The conquest of Malta by the Republic decided him, and generous offers of help were sent to Turkey. On July 24th, “the Russian envoy had his expected conference of several hours with the Reis Effendi.”[337] Four days later it was the English minister’s turn.[338] In an interview “lasting from nine till five in the afternoon and marked by extreme cordiality on both sides,” the Turkish Minister, after giving assurances of doing all that was possible for the English fleet in the Mediterranean, expressed his regret that the real intentions of the Porte were misunderstood and that its conduct was only the result of existing circumstances and its desire to enter into an “intimate and confidential connection with Great Britain.” The Turk expatiated—obvious tactics—on the dangers to British India from the presence of the French in Egypt, while Smith, on the other hand, took for his text that it was the duty of him upon whom the storm first burst to be duly prepared. After this dialectic, the Reis Effendi came to the point and inquired if Smith “had any powers to meet him in such a negotiation which he was sufficiently authorised to be able to conclude this very morning.” Smith obviously had no such powers. He pointed out, however, that his Government—at such a distance—“must naturally have a large measure of confidence in his discretion,” and offered, on condition of its being kept confidential and of its not being considered as binding on his Court, to draw up a project of a treaty of alliance, which, after the necessary modifications by the Divan, would be returned to him as an overture from the Porte to His Britannic Majesty. The project stipulated that Turkey would engage to oppose to the French an army of 100,000 men and its whole Navy, and that Great Britain, on the other hand, would undertake to maintain in the Levant a “respectable” fleet and not to lay down arms till the integrity of the Ottoman Empire had been secured.[339] Good progress was, in this way, accomplished. But still “there was a spoke in the wheel.” As late as August 3rd, a council of state was still “considering the Russian business” and the “fetva” or dispensation necessary to enable the Grand Signior to declare War.[340] The Porte still wavered between French “friendship” and Russian alliance, and was loth to start a veritable diplomatic revolution. “It was evident that some high-placed Turks considered that the French solely required a passage through Egypt and that this really interested England more than the Porte.”[341] It was amidst this hesitation that the news of Nelson’s victory arrived and the first batches of the gloomy correspondence of the French Army. The Porte took courage. “Bonaparte,” wrote Prince Ypsilanti, its dragoman, “did not believe that fortune would abandon him. From the intercepted letters you will gather the deplorable condition of the French Navy and the fact that their Army, too weak to advance, has been brought to a standstill between Rosetta and Alexandria.”[342] The people began to murmur loudly.[343] An old woman, whose belongings were destroyed in a great fire, boldly interpellated the Commander of the Faithful himself, and attributed the misfortune to his hesitation to declare war on the infidels, who have violated Egypt, the “Key to the two Holy Cities.” The effect was immediate. The Grand Vizier and the Grand Mufti, both in the “French interest,” were deposed and sent into exile. Another fire demolished the house of Prince Ypsilanti himself. The Porte could hesitate no longer. “The next twenty- four hours brought forth the solemn ‘fetva’ of the pontiff and the indignant declaration of the Sovereign against the invaders of the Empire.” “We go on since ‘au pas de géant’,” wrote the English Minister.[344] At the end of September, the French envoy with his countrymen were sent to the Castle of Seven Towers, which meant, in the usages of Turkish “international law,” that the Porte had declared war.[345] Early in December it issued its anti-French manifesto. As for England, while the Cabinet was divided, as was seen, in its conjectures as to the destination of the expedition, two reports, without absolutely convincing it, gave weight to Dundas’ anxiety for British India.[346] One was from the British Consul at Leghorn and the other from an agent in Frankfurt. Dundas’ mind had already been made up. Ever since his connection with the administration of India, he wrote, he had “been at great pains to collect information by every means and had long made up his mind to a conviction that the possession of Egypt by any great European power would be a fatal circumstance to the interests of this country.”[347] Here we have one of the earliest, if not the earliest, formulations of what has come to be one of the commonplaces of diplomacy. He had even composed several memoranda on the subject, but they have become dispersed. He, therefore, though expecting great results from sending Nelson to the Mediterranean, thought that other measures were necessary for the security of British India, for Bonaparte might (as he actually did) give Nelson the slip and save his army. The danger to India, moreover, would not be removed, if the French were, for the moment, satisfied with Egypt only. “The accomplished feat would still be a masterly stroke, nay, the most masterly stroke they have ever yet done for their future aggrandizement.”[348] After examining the available routes for an invasion of India, Dundas discussed the measures. If the Turks had really consented to the invasion of their territory, England was to set the Russians upon them. In any case, the Government of India should be quickly apprised and a naval force should be despatched to cruise at the “mouth of the Red Sea” or of the Persian Gulf. The border tribesmen, moreover, could be persuaded to destroy the French _en route_. The best measure, however, would be to reinforce the European troops in India. Three days after he was able to announce to Mornington—better known as Wellesley—a speedy reinforcement of 4500 troops.[349] In face of this praiseworthy vigour, even Grenville’s scepticism had to give way. But the landing of the French in Egypt was daily receiving fresh confirmation. On August 20th, a despatch from Smith based on the testimony of the Turkish harbour-master of Alexandria, left no room for doubt. The feelings on this occasion were mixed. There was the satisfaction at the escape of the British Isles, and especially Ireland, from invasion;[350] there were, on the other hand, the anxiety at the absence of news from Nelson and the fear that Turkey, even if she was to declare war on France, would be nothing more than a burden.[351] The Cabinet was not, under these circumstances, without the benefit of “expert” advice. Colonel Fullarton, who had seen service in India during the administration of Lord Cornwallis, submitted a memorandum on the subject.[352] Discussing the various possibilities of success and the measures that could be taken by the presidencies, for instance, the barring of the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits by a naval force, he considered the steps to be taken nearer home. These almost entirely consisted in rendering the Turkish Army more efficient by incorporating in it regiments of Albanians under experienced British officers. Fullarton was also one of the first to state the interest of Great Britain in controlling Egypt. “It is taken for granted,” he wrote, “that the possession of a permanent establishment in Egypt is essential to the preservation of the English Empire in the East, and, when coupled with the naval superiority of England, affords the only effectual means of preventing the French from disturbing that Empire. . . . In a transaction so novel and alarming as the present, if the daring and powerfully combined projects of the French are opposed by old and ordinary routine, as they have been by the continental powers, the result must be such as already has disgraced every nation in Europe except Great Britain.” A second memorandum on the same subject was written by no other than Warren Hastings, and was submitted directly to the King.[353] The opening words are remarkable: “My official situation in India led me, many years ago, to contemplate Egypt as affording, by the position of the isthmus of Suez between the two seas, which form the communication with the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, greater commercial advantages than any other land upon the globe.” He stated that from the very first he guessed that Egypt was the destination of the Expedition and believed that France would offer Turkey in compensation for “so capital though unprofitable a portion of the Mahomedan system, the conquest and restitution of the Crimea and an offensive and defensive alliance against the Emperors of Russia and Germany or either.” The measure he suggested for defeating the French design was the occupation and fortification of the little island of Perim and, in this way, the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb would be effectively guarded. Under the influence of communications such as these and of the knowledge of the Porte’s inclination to enter into more intimate relations with Great Britain, Grenville drew up his programme for thwarting French designs in the East. Of this programme it may be generally observed that it was a middle course between Dundas’ desire for intervening in Egypt with a British force and Spencer’s limitation of England’s _rôle_ to a naval blockade. Early in September, Grenville suggested to the First Lord of the Admiralty sending a special Naval Contingent under Sir Sidney Smith—the _protégé_ of the Grenvilles and the “expert” in Turkish affairs—to co- operate with the Turks. Lord Spencer could not see his way to accept.[354] He declared that the English forces in the Mediterranean exceeded by a third his most sanguine expectations. But he passed over in silence what was probably his real reason for rejecting the suggestion, namely, his knowledge of the strong dislike felt by St. Vincent and Nelson for Sidney Smith. A few days later, the news of definite overtures from the Porte and of the attitude adopted by Russia towards its old enemy led Grenville to reopen the subject of co- operation with the Turks.[355] But all that Spencer offered to do was to write to St. Vincent “an outline of the Cabinet’s ideas as to the employment of the fleet in the Mediterranean.” He was, however, willing to send officers to guide Turkish naval operations and thought that there were many reasons for preferring Sir Sidney and that the difficulties in the way were not insurmountable.[356] Grenville’s view prevailed. Sidney Smith was to proceed to Constantinople with the eighty-gun ship, “Le Tigre,” and was empowered by his instructions to “take the command of such of His Majesty’s ships as he may find in those seas, unless by any unforeseen accident it should happen that there should be among them any of His Majesty’s officers of a superior rank,” and was directed to act with such force in conjunction with the Russian and Ottoman squadrons for the defence of the Ottoman Empire and for the annoyance of the enemy in that quarter.”[357] As a mark of special favour to Sir Sidney and to give him a commanding position in the councils of the Associated Powers, he was accredited in a diplomatic capacity[358] and was joined with his brother, Spencer Smith, in the “full powers” instrument.[359] After these resolutions had been taken, the news of the victory of the Nile arrived at London (October 2nd). Lord Spencer thought that “there is not now the occasion there appeared before for sending another ship to the Mediterranean,” that “Nelson has taken the only measure which in his state he could take and which appears the only one required for the present of blocking up Alexandria and the mouth of the Nile by a good squadron; and by that means entirely cutting off the French Army from its supplies, of which all the intercepted letters represent them as being in the most pressing want,” that “the Turk has decidedly taken his part in a most magnificent declaration of war,” that the Russians have sent supernumerary officers to guide Turkish operations, and, finally, that “everything seems to be in so perfectly good a train in the Levant.”[360] In accordance with this news St. Vincent was instructed that the Mediterranean Fleet should perform four services: the protection of the kingdom of Naples and, in the event of a war in Italy, co-operation with the armies of Austria and Naples, the cutting off of all communications between France and Egypt, the siege of Malta, and lastly, co-operation with Turkish and Russian squadrons in the Archipelago. Of these four duties, the first was declared the most important.[361] Grenville wavered, but it was only for a moment.[362] Thus was executed one item in his programme. The next one was calculated to satisfy to some extent the requirements of Dundas, namely, to send Colonel Koehler, who had distinguished himself during the siege of Gibraltar by the Spaniards and who had been “formerly employed by Grenville on a confidential mission” in Turkey,[363] with a staff of officers and a present of artillery, to render the Turkish Army more efficient. Pitt liked the idea and would have preferred Lord Mulgrave to undertake the mission.[364] Submitting his views to Grenville, Koehler declared that this was not the time for revolutionising the military system of Turkey and that his work would consist in the formation of a corps of Janissaries with a European field artillery and officered by Europeans “which would serve as a steady and permanent defence to check the ardour of pursuit and as a foundation and as a support to rally upon,” and in helping the Turks “to consider every means practicable to harass, alarm, wear out and dispirit as well as diminish by fatigues and perpetual attacks an army devoid of every possible resource of receiving reinforcements from their country until they are found to be reduced to such a situation as to be fallen upon in all directions by one and general impetuous attack and with a moral certainty of total destruction which must sooner or later happen and most probably in a very short time.”[365] Grenville expressed himself in full accord with these views.[366] But the Duke of York—the Commander-in-Chief—“entirely disapproved of the whole business.”[367] He thought that there was great risk in giving a man like Koehler such ample discretion, that he would disappoint the hopes he had raised, and that the officers selected were young and raw and one of them was a lad of seventeen.[368] Shortly after, however, the Duke withdrew his objections and here again Grenville’s view prevailed.[369] Koehler, who was now given the rank of Brigadier-General, was instructed to offer every aid he could for “the defeat and destruction of the French Army in Egypt and also of their transports and other vessels in the port of Alexandria,” and to be “particularly solicitous to direct the efforts of the Porte in such a manner as may destroy even the probability of General Bonaparte’s using any part of his force to the annoyance of the British dominions in India.”[370] His departure for Constantinople, however, was delayed by sanguine anticipations nourished by rumours of the assassination of Bonaparte in a tumult in Cairo. Dundas wrote to Grenville remonstrating against the folly of accepting mere conjecture for ascertained fact,[371] and Koehler left England in the early days of December. As regards the project of alliance sent by Spencer Smith, Grenville thought “that it will be better on account both of the friendship subsisting between the Emperor of Russia and His Majesty and of the public and ostensible union which should subsist between powers acting in concert against the common enemy to give the treaty rather the form of an accession on the part of England to the alliance between Turkey and Russia than that of distinct and separate negotiations.”[372] Hence the differences between the _projet_ and the _contre-projet_ drawn by Grenville. While Turkey engaged to raise at least an army of 100,000 troops and to equip naval forces for co-operation with those of the allies, England undertook to maintain such naval forces in the Mediterranean as would suffice, with those of the allies, “to annoy the common enemy and frustrate his designs and, above all, to prevent any attack on the dominions of the Ottoman Porte.”[373] The “mutual guarantee” article was so interpreted as to cover either “the possessions of each party as they stood at the commencement of the war or as they may stand at the conclusion of a peace made by common consent.”[374] Fearing that Turkish activity would slacken or cease with the defeat of Bonaparte in Egypt or with his departure for India, Grenville instructed Spencer Smith to take all measures to procure the expulsion of French subjects from the territories of the Sultan and thus secure the alliance against their intrigues.[375] On November 11th, the _contra-projet_ was communicated to the Reis Effendi, and Smith asked to know the stage reached by the Russo-Turkish negotiations. After a long discussion, he found out that they had come to a standstill over the amount of the subsidy to be paid to Russia. The dispute was referred to Paul,[376] whose answer, entirely satisfactory to the Porte, arrived on December 29th.[377] By that time Sir Sidney Smith had arrived at Constantinople and the treaty had been fully discussed.[378] On January 5th, 1799, it was signed with befitting solemnity.[379] British interests at Constantinople had hitherto been so insignificant as only to require a diplomatic mission of the lowest rank. But the new alliance opened such a prospect of political influence and expanded trade with the Levant[380] that in November, Grenville accepted the offer of Lord Elgin, former Minister at Berlin, to proceed to Constantinople as Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.[381] Elgin’s departure was delayed from various causes, and in the end he was to carry the ratifications of the concluded treaty. Grenville’s programme thus launched, the Cabinet became engrossed in the hopes, anxieties and disappointments of the Second Coalition, till the failure of most of its schemes and the Convention of El-Arish forced the question of Egypt upon its attention. [Footnote 289: Loir, _Revue Maritime_, April, 1900.] [Footnote 290: 3 July. _Correspondance_, IV, 2728.] [Footnote 291: Jurien de la Gravière, _Guerres Maritimes_, I, p. 382.] [Footnote 292: “Que faisait la flotte à Alexandrie? Pourquoi, au lieu de se rendre à Corfou, où il était convenu qu’elle viendrait attendre les ordres du gouvernement . . . a-t-elle oisivement attendu l’ennemi.” Talleyrand to Sieyès. Pallain, p. 383.] [Footnote 293: Boulay de la Meurthe, _Le Directoire et L’Expédition d’Egypte_, p. 24.] [Footnote 294: _Correspondance_, IV, 2502.] [Footnote 295: Letter to Joseph, _Int. Corr._, II, p. 101.] [Footnote 296: _Ibid._, I, p. 25.] [Footnote 297: _Correspondance_, IV, 2771.] [Footnote 298: Jonquière, III, p. 96.] [Footnote 299: Jonquière, II, pp. 244-5.] [Footnote 300: Jurien de la Gravière, op. cit., I. 367.] [Footnote 301: _Ibid._, I, 365, 368.] [Footnote 302: _Ibid._, 367.] [Footnote 303: _Ibid._, 368.] [Footnote 304: Jurien de la Gravière, 370.] [Footnote 305: _Correspondance_, IV, 3045.] [Footnote 306: _Ibid._, IV, 2878.] [Footnote 307: _Ibid._, IV, 2962.] [Footnote 308: 20 July, _Despatches_, III, p. 42.] [Footnote 309: _Ibid._] [Footnote 310: To St. Vincent, _ibid._, III, p. 45.] [Footnote 311: _Ibid._, III, p. 48.] [Footnote 312: Captain Berry’s narrative, Nelson’s _Despatches_ III, p. 50.] [Footnote 313: To Bruix, 2 July, _Int. Corr._, I, p. 40.] [Footnote 314: _Despatches_, III, p. 92.] [Footnote 315: _Ibid._, III, p. 98.] [Footnote 316: _Despatches_, III, p. 95.] [Footnote 317: Mahan, _Nelson_, I, p. 366.] [Footnote 318: _Despatches_, III, pp. 104-5.] [Footnote 319: To British Minister at Constantinople, 27 Aug., _Despatches_, III, p. 109.] [Footnote 320: To Minto, 29 Aug., _ibid._, III, pp. 111-13.] [Footnote 321: Aubert Dubayet to Talleyrand, 24 Oct., 1797, Jonquière, I, p. 587.] [Footnote 322: Ruffin to Talleyrand, 1 June, _ibid._, I, p. 594.] [Footnote 323: _Ibid._] [Footnote 324: Compare an interesting despatch from Harford Jones, the East India Company agent, to Dundas, 25 Aug. F.O. Turkey, 19.] [Footnote 325: Smith to Grenville, 4 Aug. F.O. Turkey, 19.] [Footnote 326: A letter from Smyrna to Harford Jones, 17 Aug. F.O. Turkey, 20.] [Footnote 327: Ruffin to Talleyrand, 20 June. Jonquière, I, p. 596.] [Footnote 328: _Ibid._ to _ibid._, 17 July. Jonquière, I, pp. 597, 598.] [Footnote 329: Spencer Smith to Grenville, 23 July. F.O. Turkey, 19.] [Footnote 330: Spencer Smith to Grenville, 23 July. F.O. Turkey, 19.] [Footnote 331: As to this, see report by an agent of the English Minister, 23 July. F.O. Turkey, 19.] [Footnote 332: Despatch of Harford Jones, above, p. 59, note 1.] [Footnote 333: Prince Ypsilanti to the Dragoman of the English mission, report signed “T.” _Ibid._] [Footnote 334: Spencer Smith’s despatch of 23 July.] [Footnote 335: Sorel, V, p. 354.] [Footnote 336: Sorel, V, p. 354.] [Footnote 337: Smith to Grenville, 25 July. F.O. Turkey, 19.] [Footnote 338: _Ibid._ to _ibid._, 1 Aug.] [Footnote 339: F.O. Turkey, 19.] [Footnote 340: Smith’s despatch of 3 Aug. _Ibid._] [Footnote 341: Harford Jones’ despatch, p. 59, note 1., above.] [Footnote 342: Ypsilanti to Smith, 19 and 21 Aug. F.O. Turkey, 19.] [Footnote 343: Ruffin’s account. Jonquière, II, p. 229 f.] [Footnote 344: Smith to Grenville, 3 Sept., 1798. F.O. Turkey, 20.] [Footnote 345: Note 2.] [Footnote 346: P. 38, note 4.] [Footnote 347: To Grenville. _Wellesley Despatches_, I, pp. 678-81.] [Footnote 348: To Grenville, _Wellesley Despatches_, I, 678-681.] [Footnote 349: Dundas to Mornington, 16 June. _Ibid._, I, pp. 349-50. “The best work recorded of Dundas.” Fortescue, IV, part II, p. 720.] [Footnote 350: Grenville to Rufus King, 27 Aug. _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 288.] [Footnote 351: Buckingham to Grenville, 26 Aug. _Ibid._, IV, p. 388.] [Footnote 352: 25 Aug. F.O. Turkey, 19.] [Footnote 353: B.M. Add. MSS., 29234, f. 32. Covering letter dated 30 Sept.] [Footnote 354: Spencer to Grenville, 10 Sept. _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 303.] [Footnote 355: Smith’s despatches of 1 Aug. (p. 60 above) arrived on 15 Sept. Vorontsoff to Grenville, 15 Sept. _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 316.] [Footnote 356: Spencer to Grenville. _Ibid._, IV, p. 320.] [Footnote 357: Grenville to Spencer Smith, 1 Oct., 1798. F.O. Turkey, 20.] [Footnote 358: _Ibid._] [Footnote 359: 30 Sept. F.O. Turkey, 20.] [Footnote 360: Spencer to Grenville, 3 Oct. _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 332.] [Footnote 361: 3 Oct. _Despatches_, III, p. 143.] [Footnote 362: To Spencer Smith, 5 Oct. F.O. Turkey, 20. On the 10th, however, he announced the definite resolution to send Sidney Smith with the “Tigre”. _Ibid._] [Footnote 363: Grenville to the Duke of York, 12 Oct. F.O. Turkey, 25.] [Footnote 364: Pitt to Grenville, 14 Sept. _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 314.] [Footnote 365: A memorandum by Koehler. F.O. Turkey, 25.] [Footnote 366: To the Duke of York, 16 Oct. _Ibid._] [Footnote 367: To the Duke of York, 16 Oct. _Ibid._ 3 Canning to Grenville, 1 Nov. _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 356. Duke of York to Grenville, 2 Nov. F.O. Turkey, 25.] [Footnote 368: _Ibid._] [Footnote 369: Canning to Grenville, 4 Nov. _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 359.] [Footnote 370: Instructions, 7 Nov. F.O. Turkey, 25.] [Footnote 371: Dundas to Grenville, 13 Dec. _Dropmore Papers_, IV, pp. 413-14.] [Footnote 372: To Sidney and Spencer Smith, 3 Oct. F.O. Turkey, 20.] [Footnote 373: To Sidney and Spencer Smith, 3 Oct. F.O. Turkey, 20.] [Footnote 374: To Spencer Smith, 1 Oct. F.O. Turkey, 20.] [Footnote 375: _Ibid._] [Footnote 376: Minutes of a Conference. _Ibid._] [Footnote 377: Sidney Smith to Grenville, 5 Jan., 1799. F.O. Turkey, 21.] [Footnote 378: _Ibid._] [Footnote 379: Sidney and Spencer Smith to Grenville, 6 Jan. _Ibid._] [Footnote 380: Loughborough to Pitt, 30 Oct, “[The father of the present sheriff] conceives that the opening of the trade to the Levant and to the Turkish dominions will give a great spring to the commerce, and that the war itself is really become popular with the merchants and manufacturers.” _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 336.] [Footnote 381: Elgin to Grenville, 4 Nov. F.O. Turkey, 20. Grenville to Elgin, 17 Nov. _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 380.] IV THE NEW DEPENDENCY War with the French thus decided upon, the Turks set about for a plan of operations. Returning to the palmy days of Selim the Grim, the campaign which added Egypt to the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century was to serve as a model for his successors in the last days of the eighteenth. The Pasha of Damascus, the Governor and the Beys of Egypt, so the Turks calculated in their vague way, at the head of 60,000 soldiers “on the upper side of the Egyptian line,” and Djezzar, the powerful Pasha of Acre, at the head of no less than 50,000 men, were to co-operate in the reduction of Cairo. This, with the help of Allah, would inevitably lead to the fall of Alexandria. Russian and Turkish ships would probably co- operate and a corps of select Janissaries would act along the coast.[382] “Firmans” inciting the Moslems to a holy war against the French were spread far and wide.[383] The war, in this way, would not be very costly. The various insubordinate pashas and beys, whether victorious or not, were sure to be ruined in the struggle with the French; and, at the right moment, the Porte would step in to reassert its authority. The English minister, however, could hardly be put off with such calculations. He had, moreover, before him Nelson’s recommendations as to what the Turks should do.[384] The Divan readily approved Nelson’s views, for they had already had enough of the neighbourhood of the French to the disaffected Greeks. The present opportunity of expelling the restless Republicans from the Ionian Islands was not to be lost. In this they were confirmed by the determination of Paul, who was, as Nelson complained, “more intent on taking ports in the Mediterranean than destroying Buonaparte [_sic_] in Egypt,”[385] to employ the Russian naval contingent against the French in the Adriatic and in the Archipelago. The Porte—with memories of the intrigues of Catherine—could hardly prefer the Russians to the French and had to employ the major part of its Navy to co-operate with the Russian squadron and thus avoid giving them a free hand in those quarters. The minor part, after lengthy arguing by Smith, were sent to co-operate with Captain Hood, commanding the blockade of the Egyptian coast.[386] Sixteen Turkish and two Russian sail, accordingly, arrived before Alexandria on October 19th and 21st. Together with the English ships they made an attempt to capture the castle and camp of Abukir, “but having no troops to land it was impossible to do anything when the guns were silenced and the camp put to rout,” and the allies had to content themselves with a mere blockade.[387] The arrival of the Turkish ship coincided with a serious rising in Cairo against the French “liberators.” This rising cannot be understood without careful examination of Bonaparte’s organisation of Egypt. Already, as a young lieutenant, he had deeply interested himself in the recorded legislative experiments of the chief nations of ancient and modern times. Indeed, he considered history chiefly as a school for political training. Here is one of his comments while studying ancient history in Rollin: “I find that the writers of history give no detailed information as to the nature of the taxes raised by the sovereign, and as to the manner of gathering them and assessing them throughout the country. They give no details as to how the ruler makes his will known to his subjects.”[388] His political apprenticeship began in North Italy in the year 1796, when the organisation of the conquest opened for him the government of men. In Egypt, however, his energies found a new sphere. The young general contemplated the ancient land in the manner, not of the poet, but of the severe observer who neglected nothing.[389] Geography, customs, religion, problems, resources, he analysed all, he measured all. He calculated as an engineer and pondered as a statesman. There were, for instance, the various strata composing the inhabitants of Egypt; how were they to be held in check? What relations would each of them bear to the French? There was the annual inundation; how was the water to be equitably distributed? Unlike superficial observers from the West, Bonaparte saw that beneath the ungainly form, beneath the misery and degradation, was real worth. The first principle of his government was to allow the inhabitants great latitude in the management of their affairs and, especially in the administration of justice, which was entirely founded on their holy books.[390] He thought, however, that the Egyptians required regular institutions to ensure for themselves the “great benefits of an organised community, namely, security of person and of property.”[391] Such institutions would enable the people to give expression to their innermost thoughts and thus enlighten the French as to what was required for Egypt’s welfare. The class which he chose to staff these institutions or _divans_ and to act as the intermediaries between French and Egyptians were the “Ulema” and the notables. These were the natural leaders of the people, they were the interpreters of the Koran (“And the greatest obstacles proceed from religious ideas”), they could not mount a horse and were—witness their flowing robes—unwarlike in their habits and, as leaders of a revolt, would cut a poor figure. They were rich, loved justice and were actuated by good principles of morality. Moreover they hated both Turk and Mameluke and had a vision of a new Egypt. “C’était un fibre de laquelle on pouvait un jour tout espérer.”[392] As for the other sections; the Copts or Egyptian Christians had, by their mastery of the intricacies of Egyptian finance, made themselves indispensable to the new administration; the Beduins and Mamelukes were veritable pests and were to be extirpated; the foreign residents composed of the dregs of the Levant were to be kept under so as not to give the Egyptians any umbrage. On September 4th, consequently, he summoned an assembly of notables, who were to be selected by the French generals commanding in the fourteen provinces.[393] The mathematician Monge and the chemist Berthollet were appointed commissioners to the Assembly and were instructed to ask it to deliberate on the following matters: firstly, the best organisation for provincial assemblies; secondly, the formulation of a criminal and a civil code; thirdly, the systematising of the laws regulating succession; and, fourthly, the improving of the laws relating to property and taxation.[394] Chosen under conditions which should ensure their docility, the deliberations of the notables were slow “partly on account of the calmness and reticence of the Oriental character and the novelty of the affair and partly owing to the difference of usage from one province to another.”[395] Their answers were, on the whole, marked by an intelligent conservatism, and Bonaparte intimated his intention to carry out as many of their suggestions as possible.[396] But the Egyptians did not take the thing seriously. They even disliked it, and the cause is not far to seek. The institutions under which they had hitherto lived were mainly of the tax-collecting type. Their rulers exercised force over them of the most violent kind for certain purposes at certain times, but they did not impose laws as distinct from occasional commands. The subjects had to submit when the agents of the ruler descended on them for taxes, recruits, or forced labour, but in the general tenor of their lives their actions and forbearances were regulated by authorities with which the rulers never interfered.[397] An orderly system of government and, especially, of taxation, so far from securing to them their property, seemed to the Egyptians, on the contrary, to close every loophole for escaping the payment of the tax, as they might occasionally have done under the old _régime_. The Egyptians, moreover, seemed to have considered that the destruction of the Mamelukes meant their emancipation from any form of imposition.[398] Bonaparte’s forced contributions soon undeceived them. He was obliged to have recourse to these through the difficulties of collecting the taxes. The peasants did not pay the impost till the last extremity. The tax- collectors had to be accompanied by strong military escorts, often to find the villages deserted.[399] Bonaparte’s nature, moreover, was too fiery, his self-confidence too deep-rooted, his energies too many-sided, to keep him within the bounds of prudence. Fussy interferences such as the order that every Egyptian should wear a tricolour cockade or that every householder should have a lantern outside his door irritated the Moslems.[400] The advancement of Levantines, although Bonaparte disapproved of the principle, alarmed them as to the safety of their religion. His remarkable proclamations, far from reassuring, probably overshot their mark,[401] nor was the pomp with which he celebrated, for instance, the birthday of the Prophet, more successful.[402] The drunkenness and the frivolity of the French and the liberties they took with women, scandalised a society punctilious on these points.[403] The Egyptians suffered all the miseries of a military occupation. When the French took their quarters in a village, the poor peasant would find his utensils, ploughs, doors, roofs, “everything, in short, of a combustible nature” burnt for cooking, his earthen pots broken, his corn consumed, his fowl and pigeons roasted and devoured and, worst of all, his daughters ravished.[404] Furthermore, since the change of policy at the Porte, Turkish agents had been reaching Egypt through Syria and were inciting the people to revolt.[405] Inflammatory firmans from the Commander of the Faithful were read aloud in the mosques, ascribing to the French the intention of destroying Islam, and the faithful were called upon to resist. Rumours were current that Djezzar of Acre was advancing on Cairo and that Bonaparte would burn the town before evacuating it.[406] The full extent of Nelson’s great victory was perfectly known and Captain Hood entered into relations with the disaffected elements in the population, especially in Alexandria. He reconciled Murad with the Porte and with Djezzar.[407] Passions were roused to white heat. The cessation of the exemption of religious endowments from taxation, and the imposition of a tax on houses gave the signal for revolt.[408] It broke out on October 21st, and, by its suddenness, placed the dispersed French garrison in a critical situation. But the first shock of surprise over, a judicious disposition of artillery enabled the men of the 13 vendémiaire to suppress the rising. Drastic measures were taken to prevent its recurrence.[409] Undaunted, nay, rather nerved to greater efforts by the disaster to the French fleet, he had ordered[410] Desaix to open the brilliant campaign in Upper Egypt which was to take the French to its southern confines, to disperse the Mamelukes, to force the indefatigable Murad to take shelter in the oases, and to destroy the Meccans impelled into the Valley of the Nile by religious fervour and material needs,[411] and which was not to end till the French flag flew over the solitary port of Kosseir, on the Red Sea. Fully occupied as he was with restoring the spirit of the army—punishing, appeasing, promising, attending to countless details of military and civil administration—he had planned the Institute of Egypt destined to be his lasting monument in the Valley of the Nile and to give to modern Egypt its marked “Gallophil” tendencies. He organised it in four sections—Mathematics, Physics, Political Economy, and the Arts.[412] At the first session, which was held on August 23rd and in which Monge was elected president and Bonaparte vice-president, the latter suggested these questions for consideration. Could the baking- ovens of the army be improved? Was there any substitute for hops in the brewing of beer? How could the waters of the Nile be purified for drinking purposes? Was a windmill or a watermill the more serviceable? Could gunpowder be produced in Egypt? What was the state of law and of education in Egypt? and how could they be improved conformably to the notions of the inhabitants?[413] “It is doubtful whether a learned society has ever received a more imperious impulse towards the practical.” His main occupation, however, was to thwart the forces generated by Nelson’s victory. In spite of the grand self-confidence which led him to write to Kléber, “If the English relieve this squadron by another, and continue to overrun the Mediterranean, they will perhaps compel us to do greater things than we intended,”[414] or to say to Marmont: “This country was once before a mighty kingdom; in any case it is a good starting-point for conquests when the Turkish Empire breaks up, and a base for offensive operations against the English,”[415] and in spite of evidence that he did not fully realise the constricting effect of sea- power,[416] the blow had cut deeper than he cared to show. For one thing it shattered his schemes of a speedy return to France, for another it jeopardised the position of France in Egypt. “It is in such moments,” he said, “that men of superior character prove their mettle.” He rose to the occasion. Measures were taken to protect the land communications between Alexandria and Rosetta. Naval combinations whereby all the French, Venetian and Maltese vessels in the Mediterranean were to be rallied and to contain at least the Turkish fleet and escort the expected reinforcements from France were devised.[417] Overtures for trade relations were made to Tripoli.[418] Receiving reports of hostile preparations in Syria,[419] he attempted to win over Djezzar. Beauvoisins, a cavalry officer, was sent to that pasha with assurances and promises.[420] The mission, however, was a complete failure.[421] Similar overtures were made to the Shereef of Mecca.[422] The Grand Vizier was informed of the appointment of Talleyrand as ambassador and of his being furnished with full powers to settle all difficulties. Suspecting, however, that Talleyrand might not have left France, he invited the Grand Vizier to send a trusted representative to Cairo.[423] Staff-Captain Mailly de Chateaurenaud was sent with another letter of the same nature.[424] Nothing came of these efforts. He announced to the Directory that his return would not take place in October as he had promised, suggested more naval projects and measures whereby the Grand Turk would be frightened into acquiescence in the accomplished fact, but hinted, however, that if the negotiations at Rastadt proved fruitless, Egypt would be a sure means of concluding a glorious peace with England. Other courses of action were, moreover, still open to the Directory. It might, for instance, transfer the theatre of the naval war to the Mediterranean and leave Ireland alone. It was not yet too late to employ diplomatic methods. It was essential that Talleyrand should keep his word and proceed to Constantinople.[425] All doubts as to the attitude of Turkey should have been removed by the arrival of the Turkish sail and their participation in the blockade. Flags of truce were sent to find out the real state of affairs.[426] The information gathered by the French messengers about the formation of a new coalition against the Republic was true to the hilt,[427] but it was of so sombre a character that the Governor of Alexandria considered it a mere English “ruse.”[428] Without abandoning the naval combinations he had sketched, Bonaparte seemed to have entertained the idea of opening negotiations with his enemies. This was widely believed in the army.[429] He, accordingly, decided to release the Turkish battleship detained in the port of Alexandria and to send on board Beauchamp, ex- consul at Muscat, with definite overtures to the Porte. “If ever the question is made to you,” so ran his instructions,[430] “‘Will the French consent to evacuate Egypt?’ Why not,? provided that the two emperors should put an end to the revolt of Paswan Oglou and give up the project of dismembering European-Turkey; as for us, we will do everything that may prove of utility to the Ottoman Empire and secure it against its enemies, but the indispensable preliminary to all negotiation as well as to all accommodation is a ‘firman’ liberating Frenchmen wherever they have been imprisoned, especially in Syria.” If this was refused, Beauchamp was to threaten the Porte with an invasion of that province. The negotiator did not leave Alexandria before February 13th. Near Rhodes, he was captured by an English squadron under Troubridge and his important despatches intercepted.[431] The design to invade Syria took some time to mature. On December 17th he announced to the Directory that hostile preparations were going on in Syria and declared that had it not been for the seven days’ desert journey he would have demanded an explanation.[432] But reports that the Mamelukes of Ibrahim and the troops of Djezzar were actually moving determined him to make the “seven days’ journey.”[433] [Footnote 382: Minutes of a Conference, 3 Sept. F.O. Turkey, 20.] [Footnote 383: F.O. Turkey, 20. The French were accused of denying the immortality of the soul and of believing in metempsychosis.] [Footnote 384: Minutes of a Conference, 3 Sept. F.O. Turkey, 20.] [Footnote 385: To St. Vincent, 6 Dec., 1798. _Despatches_, III, p. 184.] [Footnote 386: Minutes of a Conference, 10 Sept. F.O. Turkey, 20.] [Footnote 387: Hood to Spencer Smith, 26 Oct. _Ibid._] [Footnote 388: Fournier, I, p. 20.] [Footnote 389: Cf. Chateaubriand on the Inundation of the Nile. Sainte- Beuve, _Causeries de Lundi_, I, p. 187.] [Footnote 390: To Kléber. _Correspondance_, IV, 2778.] [Footnote 391: _Ibid._, XXXIX, 494 f.] [Footnote 392: _Correspondance_, XXXIX, p. 495.] [Footnote 393: _Ibid._, IV, 3238.] [Footnote 394: _Correspondance_, V, 3423.] [Footnote 395: _Ibid._, XXXIX, 493.] [Footnote 396: See Djabarti for the answers and Jonquière, III, p. 273 note. _Correspondance_, V, 3492.] [Footnote 397: Cf. what the Russian Ambassador wrote to Grenville. _Dropmore Papers_, IV, pp. 414-15.] [Footnote 398: Miot, _Mémoires pour servir_, etc., p. 85.] [Footnote 399: Rousseau, _Kléber et Menou_, XVIII-XIX.] [Footnote 400: Djabarti. The historian does not think the wearing of the cockade against religion, but most of his countrymen thought so.] [Footnote 401: At St. Helena, when reading over his Egyptian Proclamations, he exclaimed, “C’est un peu Charlatan.” Gourgaud, _Journal_, I, p. 168. Mme. de Stael—_Considérations_, Œuvres, II, p. 404—has shrewdly remarked that in the composition of these proclamations he has an eye on the French people. Because they combine two characteristics dear to the French: “Un certain genre de grandeur et de la moquerie tout ensemble.”] [Footnote 402: The failure of these is attested—in spite of bulletins—by Desgenettes, _Souvenirs_, III, p. 165. Nakoula, speaking of an obelisk raised in one of the ceremonies, said that the Egyptians regarded it not as a “tree of liberty,” but as the symbol of their slavery. There was great joy when it was removed.] [Footnote 403: Nakoula says: “Cairo has become a second Paris; women go about shamelessly with the French; intoxicating drinks are publicly sold and things are committed of which the Lord of heaven would not approve.” Djabarti says the same thing and remarks that the “French are greatly fond of women, show them all sorts of consideration, listen to their advice,” etc. G(alland), _Tableau de l’Egypte_, I, pp. 86, 7.] [Footnote 404: Denon, _Voyage_, Eng. Trans., II, p. 244. On the methods resorted to by the peasants to save their women. Same writer, II, p. 159, and Miot, _Mémoires pour servir_, etc., pp. 35, 36.] [Footnote 405: Martin, _Histoire de l’Expédition_, p. 243.] [Footnote 406: Djabarti.] [Footnote 407: _Ibid._ He gives an amusing description of the flagship, “l’Orient.” Of these communications there can be no doubt. Kléber to Bonaparte, 19 Aug., 1789. Jonquière, II, p. 456 note. Hood to Spencer Smith, 11 Nov. F.O. Turkey, 20.] [Footnote 408: Djabarti.] [Footnote 409: _Ibid._] [Footnote 410: To Berthier, 16 Aug. _Correspondance_, IV, 3027.] [Footnote 411: Denon, _Voyage_, II, pp. 57, 58, 227, 228.] [Footnote 412: Arrêté, of 22 Aug. _Correspondance_, IV, 3083.] [Footnote 413: _Correspondance_, 3091.] [Footnote 414: To Kléber, 15, 21 Aug. _Ibid._, IV, 3018, 3059.] [Footnote 415: _Mémoires du duc Raguse_, p. 390.] [Footnote 416: Rose, _The Personality of Napoleon_, p. 225. Mahan, _Influence of Sea Power_, etc., I, p. 324.] [Footnote 417: _Correspondance_, IV, 3016; V, 3624; IV, 3045, 3056, 3063.] [Footnote 418: _Ibid._, IV, 3059.] [Footnote 419: Reynier to Bonaparte, 20 Aug. Jonquière, II, p. 527.] [Footnote 420: Instructions, 22 Aug. _Correspondance_, IV, 3097. Letter to Djezzar, 3078.] [Footnote 421: Beauvoisin’s report. Jonquière, II, p. 536 f.] [Footnote 422: _Correspondance_, IV, 3110.] [Footnote 423: _Correspondance_, IV, 3076.] [Footnote 424: _Ibid._, IV, 3280, 3281, 3282. To the Pasha of Egypt, 3206; of Damascus, 3205.] [Footnote 425: 7 Oct. _Correspondance_, V, 3439.] [Footnote 426: _Ibid._, V, 3561, 3562.] [Footnote 427: Jonquière, III, p. 334 f.] [Footnote 428: _Ibid._, III, p. 337.] [Footnote 429: Journal of Detroye. _Ibid._, III, pp. 393-4.] [Footnote 430: Instructions, 11 Dec. _Correspondance_, V, 3746. To Grand Vizier, 3747. To Talleyrand (thinking him at Constantinople), 3748.] [Footnote 431: Troubridge wished to consider him as a spy. Letter to Spencer Smith, 15 Feb., 1799. F.O. Turkey, 21. Nelson—_Despatches_, III, p. 303—in high glee at the straits to which his victory had brought the French.] [Footnote 432: _Correspondance_, V, 3767.] [Footnote 433: Reynier to Bonaparte, 30 Dec. Jonquière, III, p. 496.] V THE SYRIAN CAMPAIGN Arriving at Constantinople on December 26th, Sidney Smith’s first endeavour, after signing the treaty of alliance, was to impress upon the Porte his own plan of operations. Considering that Alexandria was the first objective, and that, according to the best reports, its garrison did not exceed 2000 troops, there was not one moment to lose in taking possession of it. To obtain this result the best thing was to make simultaneous attacks on many points by light-draught vessels. No more than 4000 men were necessary for disembarking, while 2000 more—forming a reserve—were to be posted at Rosetta and the gun-boats were to push up the river to the town of Rahmanieh and intercept the communications between the headquarters at Cairo and the coast. Sir Sidney could not be put off by the arguments of the Turks, and finally it was agreed to lay the new burden on Djezzar’s broad back and fall upon him for the 6000 soldiers needed.[434] But Sidney Smith could not be expected to be satisfied with the prosaic dictates of common sense. He was determined that the struggle for the evacuation of Egypt should have no smaller result than converting the veterans composing the army of the East into deadly enemies of the Republic. He seemed to have shared in this respect the views of more illustrious men, Burke and Windham. “Believe me, my dear lord,” he wrote to Admiral Lord Keith, “there is no way of finishing this long contest, in which we are engaged, but by putting our opponents one against the other; what force have we got to set limits to their influence otherwise? I speak from the experience I gained at Paris, when I say France can only be set to rights by Frenchmen and till she is set to rights in the internal springs of her government, we never can have peace; for the necessitous, the turbulent and the proscribed part of their 28 millions of men look to war as the element in which they can best live.”[435] He fully believed in the current notion that the French in Egypt were of “the dissatisfied part of the army which the republican tyrants wished to get rid of.”[436] He was, moreover, of opinion that no dependence could be placed upon the Turks for driving the French from Egypt; in this he was correct. Djezzar, upon whom the whole Turkish plan of campaign turned, was handicapped by his fear lest the Porte was merely playing him a trick. The pasha, moreover, “had very little idea of the abilities of the man he had to oppose,” and Captain Hope, after a visit to Acre, was obliged to declare that “if we do not completely cut off all supplies from France and if the plague and famine do not drive their army out of Cairo in my opinion the Turk never will.”[437] Turkey, moreover, was suffering from acute financial embarrassments. “The boasted treasures of the seraglio,” wrote Spencer Smith, “are to be taken in a very different estimate from the traditional fables of servile historians or superficial travellers.”[438] To its repeated request for a loan—not a subsidy—the English Cabinet literally did not deign to reply. What more, declared Smith, could a Turkish Army do than fight one pitched battle and then become a “collection of banditti”?[439] What more could the Porte do than “fulminate the thunders of Islamism against Bonaparte; a weapon which he himself has found means to employ.” The “intercepted correspondence,” moreover, had strengthened him in his illusion that the army of the East would play the Coalition’s game in France. Did not a general of that army call Egypt “a perfect Vendée”? The inhabitants of that country—witness their serious rising in which Bonaparte or, at least, Berthier, was supposed to have succumbed—were against the foreigners to a man. To prevent that general from “realising a part of his revolutionary projects” or recovering “some ground in public opinion,” Smith thought that there was no time to lose in carrying out his plans. Their military aspect has already been described. For the realisation of his original—and hitherto unnoticed—design of corrupting the French Army,[440] he had brought with him into Turkey a band of _émigrés_, foremost among whom was Phélippeaux, Bonaparte’s schoolfellow and deadly enemy, who had helped Sidney Smith to effect his escape from the Temple. The _rôle_ of Phélippeaux and his fellow _émigrés_ would be to attract by his influence most of the discontented officers of Bonaparte’s army, many of whom, to his knowledge, belonged to the same party as himself and whose defection, consequently, would be easy to obtain. The Porte’s duty under these circumstances would be to encourage deserters by giving them posts in its armies or enabling them to return home and rise against the Directory. The Turkish ministers were staggered by the novelty of the suggestion, but, anxious to expel the French out of Egypt with the least expenditure in men and money, they readily consented. Before Sidney Smith however had time to put his schemes in operation, Bonaparte’s invasion of Syria had deranged them and forced upon the “Commodore” a defensive _rôle_. As is the case with the origin of the Egyptian Expedition, the motives and aims of the campaign in Syria have long been shrouded in mystery. Was it intended as the mere anticipation of a threatened Turkish attack or as the preliminary of grandiose projects destined to “change the face of the East”? In contemporary documents the aim is clearly stated. On February 10th, when the van was actually in touch with the enemy, he wrote to the Directory: “In this operation I have three aims: firstly, to assure the conquest of Egypt by constructing a stronghold beyond the desert, and thenceforth to remove the armies of any nation whatsoever from Egypt to such a distance that they can in no way combine with a European army which should come to land on its coasts; secondly, to oblige the Porte to explain itself and thereby support the negotiations that you have doubtless set on foot, and the mission of the Consul Beauchamp, whom I am sending to Constantinople on the great Turkish ‘caravel’; thirdly, to deprive the English fleet of the supplies that it draws from Syria, by employing the two remaining months of winter so as to make all that coast friendly to me through war and negotiations.”[441] He concluded by stating that he would return to France “if war was to break out between France and the monarchies.” The same statements were made in other letters of the same date.[442] Berthier, his chief of staff, speaks of the motives of the campaign in analogous terms.[443] The value of the evidence submitted is beyond assail. It is true that Bonaparte was not in the habit of confiding his schemes to the Directory. In this case, however, this does not arise. For, had he really entertained designs of Oriental conquest, the co-operation of the French Government was indispensable. Moreover, when Berthier wrote, the Directory did not exist and there could have been no reason for reticence. In later years, however, he stated that he had contemplated vast schemes of empire and that his vision extended to Hindustan. At St. Helena he discussed the project at great length and declared that even as late as 1801, after the Treaty of Lunéville, it could have been realised had Kléber escaped the assassin’s dagger.[444] To Madame de Rémusat, in the course of the conversations of the Boulogne camp, he made similar assertions.[445] In comparing contemporary statements with later ones it is impossible to accept the latter. For though it is certain that the Egyptian Expedition was envisaged in some vague way to result in the ruin of British power in the East, there is not the slightest indication that the Directory did as much as enter into the schemes formulated by the exile of St. Helena in his forced leisure. There can be no doubt, moreover, that the letter addressed on January 25th, 1799, to Tippoo Sahib, in which that potentate was informed of the arrival on the shore of the Red Sea of his “innumerable and invincible army, filled with the desire of delivering you from the iron yoke of England,” was no more than a device to keep the British in India busy. He was, as has been shown, counting on a speedy return to France, and was merely waiting to hear that “the pear had ripened.” In the meantime, a campaign in Syria would give an opportunity for fresh victories which would efface the impression produced by the destruction of the fleet, and cover him with the glory of having outshone the crusaders. He could at times indulge in grandiose schemes and found empires as vast as that of Alexander, but he immediately subjected them to the calm scrutiny of reason. “He was well aware,” writes Bourrienne, “that these plans were out of keeping with our small forces, the feebleness of the government, and the soldiers’ loathing of the desert.”[446] Was he thinking more seriously of proceeding through Asia Minor to Constantinople? Talleyrand relates “that he spoke several times of returning to Europe via Constantinople, which was not precisely the route to India. Yet it did not require great penetration to divine that, after making a triumphal entry into Stamboul, he neither intended to restore the throne of the Sultan Selim nor yet to replace the Ottoman Empire by a “united and indivisible republic.”[447] But believing in the possibility of peace with Turkey, he could not have aimed at conquering Constantinople. It is true that the Directory, as shall be seen,[448] suggested to Bonaparte such a measure; but its despatch did not reach him before he was occupied in the siege of Acre. In point of fact this latter design seems to be a gloss on the original plan, which was nothing more than striking at Djezzar and Ibrahim before their forces marched into Egypt. This contention is, finally, borne out by the number of troops he led into Syria, namely, 12,900 men.[449] The first success of the invading army was obtained at El-Arish on February 13th, where a skilful night attack on the force sent by Djezzar to relieve the fort of that place threw the garrison on its own resources. On February 20th that garrison, composed of 1500 men, was released with its arms on condition that it would not take part in the war in Syria or Egypt for a year.[450] Bonaparte recognised the danger of allowing liberty to a body of armed men with whom the promise not to bear arms against him would weigh very little, and sought, consequently, to enrol them in his army and, in other ways, not to execute the conditions granted.[451] The next important place, Gaza, did not resist, and its capture placed in the hands of the French immense stores.[452] On March 7th, Jaffa was summoned to surrender, but its commander refused and the messenger’s head was cut off and placed on a pike over the chief tower.[453] Before nightfall the town was taken by storm and underwent all the horrors of pillage. Two of Bonaparte’s aides-de-camp, however, ventured—unauthorised—to spare the lives of a large number of the garrison who had taken refuge in a caravanserai.[454] No written engagement was concluded, but merely a pledge calculated to prevent further effusion of blood on both sides. This placed the General in a difficult situation. Food was very scarce; to send them to Egypt would have needed a strong escort and would thus weaken the army, and to release them on parole would have been a sure means of strengthening Djezzar. Moreover, some of the garrison of El-Arish, released in that manner, were found among the prisoners of Jaffa. After deliberating with some of his generals, Bonaparte took the cruel as well as impolitic resolution of massacring the 2240 men in cold blood.[455] The booty taken was immense. But it was during the halt at Jaffa that the symptoms of the plague first appeared and its ravages began to be felt. The firm conduct of Bonaparte—commemorated in the famous canvas of Gros, and the wise policy of Desgenettes, the chief physician, who refused even to use the word “plague”—kept up the spirit of the soldiers.[456] It was also at Jaffa that Bonaparte issued manifestoes similar in tone and spirit to the Egyptian ones, with the difference that it was Djezzar instead of the Beys who was the enemy he wanted to destroy.[457] Even after this, he sought to win over the old pasha.[458] It was on the road to Acre that Bonaparte first discerned the “Theseus” and the “Tigre,” under the command of Sidney Smith, called to Syrian waters by the appeals of Djezzar for help.[459] Phélippeaux gave up the _rôle_ of seeking converts to the Royalist cause among the French soldiers for the far more fruitful one of repairing the ruined fortifications. But Sir Sidney did more than place the talents of the French officer at the disposal of the pasha. After the fall of Jaffa, Bonaparte ordered the French flotilla at Damietta to set sail for that town and await instructions, which directed it to Acre.[460] But hearing of the presence of the English he sent word, on March 18th, to Jaffa to detain the ships there.[461] It was now too late. For Sidney Smith knew of their approach and took his measures to fall in with them. Of the flotilla composed of a corvette and nine sail of gun vessels only the corvette and two small vessels escaped. The event was decisive; for, in addition to the fact that the prizes mounted 34 guns, they carried the siege artillery on which the French reckoned for the reduction of Acre.[462] They had thenceforth to bear the fire of their own heavy ordnance. Though the walls of Acre were very weak, its position on a low-lying promontory of rectangular shape gave the utmost possible advantage to the power holding the sea, to the flanking fire of whose ships the columns of assault were exposed.[463] The first impression the French had of the town, however, was that it was miserably fortified. The ease with which Jaffa fell, moreover, confirmed them in the belief that they would make short work of the defence.[464] While engaged in the preparations for a regular siege, Bonaparte sought to win over the enemies of Djezzar, foremost among whom were the Druses, some Beduin tribes and the townsfolk of the different pashaliks. The result was,[465] generally speaking, that the people approached adopted an attitude of benevolent neutrality and waited to see on which side victory would declare itself. These circumstances gave the “Commodore” the opportunity of playing a congenial part. He addressed a circular letter to the Druses “recalling them to the sense of their duty and enjoining them to cut off their supplies from the French camp” and “sent them at the same time a copy of Bonaparte’s impious proclamation, in which he boasted of having overthrown all Christian establishments and accompanied it by a suitable exhortation, calling upon them to choose between the friendship of a Christian knight and that of an unprincipled renegade.”[466] According to him, this had the desired effect.[467] But unfortunately the “Christian knight” in this case was the ally of the barbarous Djezzar, and the Druses could not have been deeply moved by the destruction of the Papacy or of the Order of St. John. They would have all welcomed the defeat or destruction of the Bosnian tyrant. Sidney Smith knew that their attitude only depended on the fall or escape of Acre. “It is on the issue of this conflict,” he wrote, “that depends the opinion of the multitude of spectators on the surrounding hills, who wait only to see how it ends to join the victor; and with such a reinforcement for the execution of his known projects, Constantinople and even Vienna must feel the shock.”[468] The failure of an attempt of his on Haifa, on which affair he did not, in his despatches, waste a word, had brought him into relations with Bonaparte, who ratified, on March 23rd, an agreement for exchange of prisoners and thanked Sir Sidney for liberating a French courier from the unspeakable prison of Constantinople known as the “bagno.”[469] Neither Bonaparte at this stage, nor historians after him, suspected that the “humanity” of Smith was the outcome of a nature in which chivalrous impulsiveness was combined with calculating craftiness. From the outset he had recommended to the Porte a “humanity offensive” as a sure means of encouraging the French to desert their colours.[470] The French broke ground for their trenches on March 19th, and these, as a result of the prevailing optimism, were indifferently done.[471] The bombardment began on March 23rd, and on the next day a great part of the tower fell with a crash. But the far-sighted Phélippeaux had made a counterscarp which stopped all the efforts of the French sappers. The assault of March 28th was a disastrous failure, for which the French paid heavily. This first great check restored the spirit of the besieged and made them more amenable to carry out the suggestions of their Christian allies.[472] Smith advised vigorous sallies executed at short intervals to destroy the French works. In the absence of subordinate officers, however, “exertions that depend upon order cannot be executed,” and the various sorties did not have the expected effect and did not stop the progress of the French in their trenches.[473] During the early period of the siege, the French had to meet other enemies. A force intended for the relief of the garrison of Acre had been gathered on the banks of the Jordan.[474] Detachments of French under Junot and under Murat, and, later on, the division of Kléber, were sent against it. Fearing the risks incurred by Kléber, Bonaparte personally marched to his help, and near the foot of Mount Tabor, on April 16th, he succeeded not only in extricating his lieutenant but in destroying hundreds of the Turks, Mamelukes, Nablousians and Syrians forming the relieving force under the Pasha of Damascus. On the day of his return to the camp before Acre, April 19th, three French frigates from Alexandria succeeded in eluding Sir Sidney’s vigilance and landing six heavy pieces of artillery.[475] Their battering power thus increased, the assailants showed great vigour. On April 25th, the French fired a mine with good effect; but the storming column was baffled by inner entrenchments. Bonaparte did not lose hope, but he seemed to have made up his mind to return to Egypt once the town was taken.[476] The assault of May 1st was beaten back by the enfilading fire from two ravelins, which were built at the suggestion of Sir Sidney and the musketry poured in from the inner walls.[477] On that day Phélippeaux succumbed to sunstroke and exhaustion.[478] On May 7th the Turkish fleet, bringing reinforcements, at last hove to in view on the horizon. Its delay was due to the fact that it was originally ordered to proceed to Alexandria, and Sidney Smith found himself “obliged to be peremptory in the repetition of his orders to it to join him at Acre.”[479] The sight determined Bonaparte to carry the place at once. The assault, executed with great vigour, was beaten back, but the French kept their lodgment in the great tower, and Smith expressed on May 9th his fear that the defence would be overpowered.[480] He clung on, however, and the event justified his stubbornness. For after the failure of the great assault of May 8th, Bonaparte had come to the decision of raising the siege. Writing to the Directory on May 10th, he asserted that he had gained his object, that nothing remained but to march in the streets of Acre, to do which, however, he would have to open a trench before every house, and that as the season was advanced he would return to Egypt to meet the Turkish or European Army expected to land there in July or August.[481] In this analysis he passed over one important factor, namely, the plague. Its ravages were not relatively very great; but the medical service was seriously handicapped in various ways.[482] Another factor was the news of the seething discontent in Egypt and the rise of a fanatic who proclaimed himself the “Mahdy” or the “deliverer” who was to regenerate the world. He also had received news in March that the war had now actually broken out in Europe, and there was no time to lose. One of the difficult problems of the retreat was the transport of the wounded and invalids. There was a suggestion that an appeal should be made to Sir Sidney to facilitate sending them by sea. This appeal, however, was impossible; for Bonaparte had already circulated, on April 18th, an order to Berthier in which he held the English officer responsible for the atrocities committed during the siege by Djezzar, accused him of embarking French prisoners on plague-infected vessels, described his conduct as that of a fool, and strictly charged the French officers not to hold any communications with the English.[483] The cause of this diatribe has been something of a puzzle. Impartial French writers, recognising that the accusations were false, could not find an explanation. British writers were not more enlightened. It has been suggested that Bonaparte’s hostility to Sir Sidney dated from the latter’s share in burning the French fleet when Toulon was recaptured by the Republicans. This conjecture is strengthened by Bonaparte’s habitual reference to Smith as the “capitaine des brûlots.” There can be no doubt, however, that the true cause was the English commander’s attempt to sow the seeds of mutiny in the French ranks. One of the means he used for that end was to take advantage of the various sallies, notably that of May 16th, to disperse in the French trenches a proclamation from the Porte and endorsed by him promising repatriation to deserters. He even sent a copy to the French general, with a covering letter advising him to evacuate the territories of the Sultan.[484] He alleged that “the soldiers held their eager hands above the parapet of their works to receive the copies of it when thrown from the trench.”[485] Probably here the wish was father to the thought, for we find French writers of all shades of opinion unanimous in denying that the proclamation had had any effect. Sir Sidney, at any rate, was not mistaken as to the cause of the hostility. “The intention of it (the accusation),” he wrote, “was evidently to do away the effect which the proclamation of the Porte began to make on the soldiers.”[486] He, in his turn, brought forward the accusation that assassins had been set upon him.[487] This was probably the mere outcome of an exaggerated sense of his importance. On May 20th, the retreat began in perfect order and without any interference from the garrison. It was when the Army was leaving Jaffa that there occurred what has been since known as the “poisoning of the plague-stricken.” The proposal to administer a strong dose of opium to the patients whose grave condition would not allow them to accompany the Army was contemplated four days before the siege of Acre was raised, but had to be abandoned owing to the categorical refusal of the chief physician, Desgenettes.[488] Later on, however, Bonaparte found men willing to carry it out. The number of those to whom the opium was administered could not have been large and the dose, moreover, did not have in most of the cases the desired effect, for Sidney Smith immediately on his arrival at Jaffa on the heels of the French, found “seven poor wretches left alive in the hospital” and declared that “they are protected and shall be taken care of.”[489] In the middle of June the Syrian Army, now sadly diminished,[490] entered Cairo in triumph, after a retreat the terrible hardships of which foreshadowed those of the more famous one from Moscow. The Syrian campaign was, up to a certain extent, a success, for in the course of it the Mamelukes of Ibrahim, the troops of Djezzar, the irregular bands, and the regular Turkish soldiers sent from Constantinople and Damascus were beaten with loss, their preparations were disorganised and their bases destroyed. The harm that the failure at Acre did was rather moral than material. Whatever technical criticisms can be advanced against Bonaparte’s conduct of the campaign or of the siege, the cause of failure is clear. It was sea power. Sidney Smith’s real contribution to the success was not his dabbling in the sordid politics of Syria or his attempt to corrupt the French soldiers; it was the capture of their heavy artillery. The lovers of the picturesque dwell on what would have happened had Acre fallen, and Napoleon persisted down to his closing days in saying that its mud walls had come between him and his destiny.[491] Probably he continued to harp on Acre because he fastened his gaze too closely on what was after all, only one of the manifestations of sea power, its defence, or because he wanted to demonstrate that the Empire of the East could be realised, that the failure to win it in 1799 was only due to a mere accident and that one day, under happier auspices, success could be achieved. [Footnote 434: Minutes of a Conference of 17 Jan., 1799. F.O. Turkey, 21.] [Footnote 435: 13 March, 1800. Barrows, I, p. 387.] [Footnote 436: Barrows, I, p. 385.] [Footnote 437: To Spencer Smith, 11 Sept., 1798. F.O. Turkey, 20.] [Footnote 438: To Grenville, 3 Nov., 1798. _Ibid._] [Footnote 439: To Grenville, 7 March, 1799. _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 491.] [Footnote 440: Minutes of a Conference of 17 Jan., 1799. F.O. Turkey, 21.] [Footnote 441: _Correspondance_, V, 3952.] [Footnote 442: _Correspondance_, V, 3934, 3953, 3994, 4035, 4080, 4101.] [Footnote 443: _Relation_, p. 38.] [Footnote 444: _Correspondance_, XXX, 13, 14.] [Footnote 445: _Memoirs_, I, p. 274.] [Footnote 446: _Mémoires_, II, p. 187.] [Footnote 447: _Memoirs_, I, p. 198.] [Footnote 448: P. 93.] [Footnote 449: Jonquière, IV, p. 149.] [Footnote 450: 20 Feb., 1799. _Correspondance_, V, 3982.] [Footnote 451: Malus, _Agenda_, p. 122.] [Footnote 452: _Correspondance_, 13 March, V, 4035.] [Footnote 453: _Ibid._, V, 4011.] [Footnote 454: Bourrienne, _Memoirs_, II, p. 221.] [Footnote 455: Assertion that these men came under the Capitulation of El-Arish [_Correspondance_, V, 4035; XXX, p. 49; _Relation of Berthier_, p. 62; O’Meara, _Napoleon dans l’Exil_, I, p. 354] refuted by Jonquière, IV, p. 269 note—that such men could not have exceeded 400.] [Footnote 456: _Histoire Médicale_, p. 51.] [Footnote 457: _Correspondance_, V, 4022.] [Footnote 458: _Ibid._, V, 4026.] [Footnote 459: _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 492.] [Footnote 460: _Correspondance_, V, 4018.] [Footnote 461: _Ibid._, V, 4038.] [Footnote 462: 23 March. To St. Vincent, Barrows, I, p. 266.] [Footnote 463: To Blankett, 16 May. _Ibid._, I, p. 315.] [Footnote 464: Jonquière, IV, p. 307.] [Footnote 465: _Correspondance_, V, 4044, 4047, 4046.] [Footnote 466: To Nelson, 30 May, 1799. Barrows, I, p. 315, and to Spencer Smith, 14 May. I, p. 390.] [Footnote 467: _Ibid._] [Footnote 468: To St. Vincent, 3 May. Barrows, I, p. 281.] [Footnote 469: _Correspondance_, V, 4055.] [Footnote 470: Minutes of the Conference of 17 Jan., 1799. F.O. Turkey, 21.] [Footnote 471: Kléber, who was a tall man, observed that the trenches would be useful only for men of the height of the Commander-in-Chief. Bourrienne, II, p. 232.] [Footnote 472: At the beginning Smith had threatened to bombard the town if the Turks allowed the French to take possession of it. Barrows, I, p. 256.] [Footnote 473: _Ibid._, I, p. 273.] [Footnote 474: Berthier’s _Relation_, p. 71.] [Footnote 475: Jonquière, IV, p. 429.] [Footnote 476: Orders to send a battalion to Egypt, 25 April. _Correspondance_, V, 4109.] [Footnote 477: To St. Vincent, 2 May. Barrows, I, p. 281.] [Footnote 478: _Ibid._] [Footnote 479: To St. Vincent 9 May. Barrows, I, p. 281 f.] [Footnote 480: _Ibid._] [Footnote 481: _Correspondance_, V, 4124.] [Footnote 482: _Histoire Médicale_, p. 86.] [Footnote 483: _Correspondance_, V, 4098.] [Footnote 484: Jonquière, IV, pp. 526-7.] [Footnote 485: To Nelson, 30 May. Barrows, I, p. 307.] [Footnote 486: To Nelson, Barrows, I, p. 307.] [Footnote 487: To Spencer Smith, 14 May. _Ibid._, I, p. 296.] [Footnote 488: Desgenettes, _Souvenirs_, III, p. 256.] [Footnote 489: To Nelson, 30 May. Barrows, I, p. 307.] [Footnote 490: Jonquière, IV, p. 632, calculates the losses in killed and wounded at about 5000.] [Footnote 491: _See_ the chapter on “The Supreme Regrets” in Rosebery, _Napoleon: The Last Phase_.] VI THE DIRECTORY AND THE EXPEDITION Tracing the attitude of the French Government towards the Army of the East, we find that its first measure was to stop the departure of the second expedition upon whose arrival in Egypt Bonaparte was counting.[492] The cause was the news of the presence of a strong English fleet in the Mediterranean. Nor were the diplomatic measures, as arranged with the same general, carried out. Talleyrand, who had played such an important part during the early history of the Expedition, was among the foremost to abandon it. He did not proceed to Constantinople as had been agreed. His attitude in this matter is not clear.[493] It seems that his acceptance of the post of Ambassador was decided upon only “in principle,” and that the “affair” was really one between Bonaparte and Talleyrand. The former, for instance, spoke, in letters of May 23rd and June 18th, of the departure of the latter to Constantinople; but, in despatches of the same date addressed to the Directory, he did not refer to it at all.[494] This noteworthy fact points to another conclusion; namely, Bonaparte’s desire to exercise direct control from his headquarters at Cairo over the negotiations. This is further strengthened by the fact that after sailing from Toulon he instructed Talleyrand to hold himself in readiness but not to leave before another order and chose for him the long sea route instead of the shorter one via Ancona and Corfu. The frigate he sent him for that purpose was captured by the English on June 27th.[495] Talleyrand, by that time, had changed his mind. Fear of the “Castle of Seven Towers” has been alleged as the cause; but this explanation is hardly satisfactory, for at that time the prospects at Constantinople were not so gloomy for France. De la Jonquière’s conjecture, on the other hand, that the Directory kept him to make use of his abilities in the rising complications is not more satisfactory; for it did not set great value on these abilities. The truth is that to Talleyrand as well as to Bonaparte “the East seemed to offer compensation . . . and yet neither of them dreamt of leaving the West except with great reluctance.”[496] Finding his position more secure, the ex-bishop gave up all thought of going to the Bosphorus, and proposed another man, Descorches, for the post.[497] The latter was appointed Ambassador on September 2nd, and in spite of the despondent despatches of Ruffin and of the news of the destruction of the French fleet which had immediately followed the joyful tidings of the successful landing in Egypt, the hope that the Porte would not declare war was not lost. On September 19th, for instance, the Minister of Foreign Affairs submitted a note on the subject of the presents which Descorches was to make to the dignitaries of the Divan.[498] The instructions of the new Ambassador, moreover, did not differ materially from the _projet_ which the Minister had drawn up at the outset.[499] This hope, however, was soon destroyed by the news of Ruffin’s imprisonment. The departure of the Ambassador was suspended[500] and Bonaparte was plainly informed in a despatch of November 4th that he was to rely on his own judgment and that the Directory, not being in a position to support him, refrained from sending orders or instructions.[501] This important despatch further stated that the Neapolitan troops were about to take the field and that an Austrian division had violated the neutrality of Switzerland, and, in view of these complications, a levy of 200,000 Frenchmen had been ordered. As for Turkey, its partition was imminent and, to secure a handsome portion for the Republic, a march on Constantinople would be the surest means. In the East a treaty with Tippoo had been proposed, and one, Louis Monneron, who might be of use to Bonaparte, would be sent to that part of the world.[502] The despatch concluded: “As it would be very difficult for you at the present juncture to accomplish the return voyage to France, there seem to be only three courses open to you, to remain in Egypt, so arranging that you will be safe against all attacks from the Turks—in which case you will not forget that there are seasons of the year very unwholesome for Europeans; or to press on to India, where, once you have arrived, you will be sure to find numbers of people ready to join you in destroying the power of the English; or, lastly, to march on Constantinople against the enemy threatening you.” From the tenor of this despatch, which, incidentally, did not reach Bonaparte till March 25th, 1799, the Directory evinced small desire to have him back in Europe. Shortly afterwards, however, it was engaged in a plan of operations, the success of which would have greatly affected the course of events in Egypt. The Minister of Marine, on November 19th, reported against the naval combinations which Bonaparte had suggested, and proposed that the vessels of war in the Western ports should be formed into efficient fleets.[503] Barras endorsed this policy and recommended the Minister himself as the only Admiral capable of executing it.[504] The organisation of the fleet was, accordingly, decreed on December 19th, and was energetically taken in hand.[505] In spite of great difficulties, Bruix displayed such activity that a line-of-battle ship of 74 guns, for instance, was fully equipped in three days.[506] In three months an imposing force of twenty-four sail-of-the-line and eight frigates was ready to set sail. The Directory had, meanwhile, returned to a favourite project of the various revolutionary governments, namely, the junction of the Spanish and French fleets to secure superiority over those of Great Britain.[507] The necessary negotiations with the Court of Madrid were seriously compromised by the incapacity of Guillemardet, the French Ambassador to that Court.[508] They suffered still more, however, from the fact that their real purpose was never disclosed to the Spanish Government. Knowing the repugnance of that Government to co-operate with the Republic in the Mediterranean, the French negotiators made out that Ireland was the goal of the operations of the combined fleets. Spain was, accordingly, invited to hold the ships blockaded at Cadiz in readiness and to send the squadron stationed at Ferrol to a French oceanic naval base, and that at Carthagena to Toulon. It would be, in this way, too much involved in the enterprise to be able to abandon it. It is easy to see what effect such trickery was likely to have on the efficiency of the Spanish Navy. In one direction, however, the prospects of retrieving the situation in the Mediterranean were for a moment brightened by the brilliant campaign of Championnet which resulted in the expulsion of the Neapolitan Bourbons and the establishment of the short-lived Parthenopean Republic.[509] But the care with which Nelson destroyed what he could not save of the Neapolitan Navy and the refractoriness of the Republican authorities rendered illusory the plans of the Directory to relieve the garrison of Malta from the ports of Naples.[510] France received an additional check in the western basin of the Mediterranean. In an illuminating memorandum dated July 10th, Talleyrand had called attention to the friendliness of the Barbary Regencies and recommended the Directory to wink at the depredations of the Corsairs on the commerce of the vassal republics of Italy.[511] The disembarkation of a French army in Egypt, however, radically changed the situation.[512] The French Consul at Tunis, officially notified of the event, did his utmost to allay the fears of the Bey. What rendered the situation critical, however, was not so much religious excitement as the agitation of the merchants trading with Egypt. In spite of reiterated orders from Constantinople, the Bey was eager not to break with France. He had, however, to submit to his spiritual suzerain, so on January 3rd he gave orders to intern French subjects and authorised his corsairs to attack French shipping. The Dey of Algeria showed himself not more eager. He turned a deaf ear to two missives from the Grand Signior. A third messenger, said to be authorised to resort to such violent means as the bowstring or the poisoned cup, could not be deceived by elusive replies and the Dey had to declare against France.[513] The Regencies, however, did not take an active part in the struggle; and the lot of the interned French could not have been very hard since their Consul could, while imprisoned, take measures for revictualling the garrison of Malta and could communicate with his Government on the affairs of Egypt. Their hostility, however, formed a permanent menace to French operations in the western basin of the Mediterranean and rendered futile the attempts for the relief of Malta and for establishing communications with Bonaparte by land. The Directory satisfied itself with decreeing reprisals against the Barbary Corsairs[514] and concentrated its attention on the Naval preparations already described. Their aim was “to penetrate into the Mediterranean and destroy the enemy fleet or expel them from that sea.”[515] Bruix was accordingly instructed to avoid an engagement. If he was able to enter the Mediterranean without being molested, he must proceed first to Italy and disembark three or four thousand troops there and then for Corfu, Malta and Alexandria, distributing among these three places the allocated reinforcements. Arriving at Brest, the Admiral strove to restore the impaired discipline and instruct the different ranks in their duties.[516] Before he set sail the Directory had received Bonaparte’s despatch of February 10th, in which he had detailed the motives of the Syrian Campaign. The French Government was thus in possession of definite information which disposed of the disquieting rumours current on the Army of the East. The situation was further changed by the defeat of Jourdan at Stockach, which led to the evacuation of the right bank of the Rhine, by the retirement of Scherer on the Adda after his defeat at Magnano, and by the capitulation of Corfu to a combined force of Russians and Turks. Under these circumstances it was suggested that Bonaparte should be recalled to retrieve the fortunes of the Republic. De la Jonquière attributes this to the intrigues of the Bonapartes and their political friends.[517] Sandoz, the well-informed Prussian envoy, states that it was Barras who made the proposal to his colleagues and was met by an angry refusal.[518] Barras himself, in his _Memoirs_, says that the idea was mooted by the celebrated constitution-monger, Sieyès,[519] who was looking about for an ally to destroy the Directory. Nothing, in any case, came of these intrigues. The instructions of Bruix were not changed and he himself set sail on April 25th. A few days after a Spanish squadron from Ferrol, composed of five sail- of-the-line and one frigate, and with 3000 troops on board, anchored in the roadstead of the Isle of Aix. It is not clear what was the _rôle_ assigned to that squadron. A letter from Talleyrand to the Spanish Ambassador seems to indicate that the Ferrol ships should have joined the forces of Bruix.[520] But other documents assign to them the function of menacing Ireland so as to prevent the English Government from reinforcing its Mediterranean fleet.[521] In the meantime Bruix was able to enter the Mediterranean without engaging the enemy and arrived at Toulon on May 14th. The situation of the French in Italy had gone from bad to worse and it was finally decided to evacuate Ancona, Naples, Cività Vecchia and Leghorn. Bruix was instructed to co-operate in these operations, at the end of which he was to do his utmost to effect his junction with the Spaniards and wrest the supremacy of the sea from the English. A new task was soon added to these.[522] The successes of the Allies were so rapid that the French frontiers were now menaced and it was decided to employ the fleets in the Mediterranean in bringing back either all or most of the Army of the East. Bonaparte was apprised of this decision in a despatch of May 26th. “You will judge,” so it concludes, “if you can safely leave part of your forces behind, in which case the Directory gives you full power to hand over the command of the troops to whomsoever you think fit. The Directory would be gratified to see you at the head of the Republican armies which you have commanded hitherto with such brilliant success.”[523] Before receiving the new orders, Bruix had set sail from Toulon and arrived at Savona on June 4th. “The appearance of an imposing fleet,” wrote an eye-witness, “raised the spirits of the harassed French troops.”[524] But the Admiral, seeing that his captains were not capable of seconding him in an engagement and knowing the nearness of enemy forces, decided to retrace his course and joined the Spanish fleet at Carthagena on June 22nd.[525] At that port, he was secretly informed not to count on Spanish support, for Spain was opposed to any campaign in the Mediterranean which did not have for its first object the reconquest of Minorca.[526] Finding himself, moreover, indifferently supported by the French Ambassador and hearing of the _coup d’état_ of thirty prairial, which caused him to be uncertain as to the views of the Government, he took the part of withdrawing from the Mediterranean with the Spaniards, and arrived at Brest on August 8th with an imposing force of forty-one line-of-battle ships. Chevalier, the brilliant historian of the French Navy, thus judges this remarkable episode: “The course of Admiral Bruix was well-conceived, but failed through the weakness of our Allies and the inexperience of our own Officers and crews. . . . The Spanish fleet brought to Brest, the “gage” of an Alliance then tottering, was the only result of this campaign. It is impossible to have any illusion as to the extent of the services rendered by the fleet on the coast of Italy; a division of frigates would have done as much.”[527] Such a disappointing end could not but render the situation more critical. In spite of the false reports published by the Directory, much anxiety about the Army of the East was felt. Everyone who had anything to do with the Expedition was anxious to disclaim any share of the responsibility. “This enterprise,” observed Thibaudeau, “which found so many enthusiasts at the beginning, came to be considered as nothing but foolish and even wicked.”[528] The recriminations which followed resulted in banishing all hope in the success of the venture. The Government gave up the idea of wresting the supremacy of the seas and had to content itself with securing the coast against an English invasion.[529] In the diplomatic sphere, Talleyrand had already turned his attention to persuade Turkey to release the imprisoned French subjects. Negotiations for a cartel of exchange of prisoners were to be conducted by the Prussian envoy at Constantinople.[530] This attempt failed. A second one made by the Spanish envoy was not more successful.[531] Talleyrand, however, did not despair. He thought that the presence of the French fleet in the Mediterranean and the success of the French invasion of Syria would finally open the eyes of the Sultan.[532] The failure of the Syrian campaign, however, put an end to all such hopes. On September 3rd, the Minister submitted to the Directory a proposal for entering into negotiations with the Porte for nothing less than the evacuation of Egypt[533]. He painted the condition of the French Army in the most sombre colours and stated that France could do no more than try to extricate them from their perilous situation. Talleyrand recognised the obstacles, for though Turkey would be delighted to see Egypt restored, its allies would not consent to see the Republican armies reinforced by veteran troops under so famous a commander as Bonaparte. The solution he suggested was that that general and his troops should pledge themselves not to serve in the present war. Anticipating the weighty objection that the situation of the French was not as desperate as he represented, he proposed that the convention for the evacuation should reserve to Bonaparte the faculty of rejecting it. Talleyrand resigned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 20th. His successor, Reinhard, however, took up the project. While he was occupied with the preliminary steps of obtaining the consent of Spain to act as mediator between the Porte and the Republic, there arrived at Paris the news of the complete victory gained by Bonaparte at Abukir over a Turkish army.[534] With knowledge of the extent of the Turkish defeat and of the Porte’s desire for a separate peace, Spanish mediation was deemed unnecessary and it was decided to place the negotiations in the hands of Bonaparte.[535] He was to be apprised of this by a despatch dated October 10th. The day before he had landed at Frejus! [Footnote 492: Jonquière, II, p. 276.] [Footnote 493: The correspondence relating to it has been destroyed by Napoleon’s order.] [Footnote 494: _Correspondance_, IV, 2606, 2608, 2690, 2703.] [Footnote 495: Jonquière, I, p. 649.] [Footnote 496: Barras’ _Memoirs_, III, pp. 239-240.] [Footnote 497: _Ibid._, p. 258.] [Footnote 498: Jonquière, II, p. 256 note.] [Footnote 499: _Ibid._, p. 257 f.] [Footnote 500: Decree of 15 Oct. _Ibid._, p. 260.] [Footnote 501: Jonquière, II, p. 261 f.] [Footnote 502: This man was implicated in a bankruptcy and could not leave France. Boulay de la Meurthe, _Le Directoire et L’Expédition_, p. 61.] [Footnote 503: 19 Nov. Jonquière, V, p. 119 note.] [Footnote 504: _Memoirs_, III, p. 361.] [Footnote 505: Jonquière, V, p. 121.] [Footnote 506: Captain Moras’ account. Jurien de la Gravière, _Guerres Maritimes_, I, p. 371.] [Footnote 507: Talleyrand described Spanish naval help as “La pierre de la touche de l’alliance.” Pallain, p. 314.] [Footnote 508: _Aussi mauvais diplomate qu’ignorant médecin_. Barras, III, p. 319.] [Footnote 509: Report, 7 Feb., 1799. Jonquière, V, p. 126.] [Footnote 510: _Ibid._] [Footnote 511: Pallain, p. 339 f.] [Footnote 512: Introduction to Eugène Plantet, _Correspondance des Beys de Tunis et des Consuls de France avec la Cour_. 3 vols., Paris, 1893-9, XXXVIII-XXXIX.] [Footnote 513: Eugène Plantet, _Correspondance des Deys d’Alger avec la cour de France_, 2 vols, Paris, 1889. Introduction.] [Footnote 514: Decree of 13 Feb. Jonquière, V, 127 note.] [Footnote 515: Instructions, 15 March. _Ibid._, V, p. 136.] [Footnote 516: Moras’ account. Jurien de la Gravière, op. cit., I, p. 372.] [Footnote 517: Jonquière, V, pp. 147, 148.] [Footnote 518: Despatch of 14 April, 1799, in Bailleu.] [Footnote 519: _Mémoires_, III, p. 416.] [Footnote 520: 16 May, 1799. Jonquière, V, p. 151.] [Footnote 521: Jonquière, V, p. 151.] [Footnote 522: 17 May. _Ibid._, V, p. 160.] [Footnote 523: _Ibid._, V, p. 166; _Spectateur Militaire_, 15 May, 1840, p. 120. La Revellière-Lépeaux (_Mémoires_, II, p. 349) declares it a forgery, so also Miot de Melito (_Memoirs_, I, pp. 276, 277). Jonquière refutes this by examining the original document, V, p. 167 note.] [Footnote 524: Jurien de la Gravière, op. cit., I, p. 376.] [Footnote 525: Moras’ account in Jurien de la Gravière, op. cit., I, pp. 376, 377.] [Footnote 526: _Ibid._, I, p. 377.] [Footnote 527: _Marine française sous la République_, p. 415.] [Footnote 528: _Histoire de la Campagne d’Egypte_, III, p. 437.] [Footnote 529: Report of 21 July, 1799. Jonquière, V, p. 184 note.] [Footnote 530: To Sieyès, 28 January, 1799. Pallain, p. 420.] [Footnote 531: Memorandum dated June. _Ibid._, pp. 427, 428.] [Footnote 532: _Ibid._, pp. 428, 429.] [Footnote 533: 3 Sept., 1799. Jonquière, V, p. 184.] [Footnote 534: The “Osiris” with news arrived at Marseilles on 25 Sept., 1799. Jonquière, V, p. 439.] [Footnote 535: _Ibid._, V, p. 624.] VII NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO THE CONVENTION OF EL-ARISH The progress of Bonaparte in Syria had alarmed the Turkish Government, without causing it to change its original plan of operations.[536] On March 28th, General Koehler and the members of the “military mission” arrived at Constantinople. The despatches of that officer to Grenville afford full information on Turkish affairs in their military aspect. The methods of the Porte and the obstacles which deranged its plans are clearly set forth. One day, for instance—and that when the French were reported to be making rapid advance—the Standard of the Prophet was unfurled; the next it was sent back to the Seraglio that it might not be sullied by the presence of infidels and regicides. The Janissaries at once refused to march without the Standard of their Prophet.[537] Koehler had in the meanwhile elaborated a plan for the invasion of Egypt by the Grand Vizier himself.[538] It consisted of three operations: firstly, naval, for cutting off communications between Egypt and France and making a diversion on the coast; secondly, military, the main principle of which was to avoid a general engagement and to harass the enemy by detachments of light cavalry; and, lastly, political, for raising insurrections in Egypt. The Grand Vizier readily approved; and that was all. For as the help of the Janissaries was necessary,[539] the Porte had to dismiss all reformers and entrust the administration to men of the “old school.” The result was that “there was nothing like a regular plan of campaign . . . nothing like a national consultation of the best system of movements or operations.” “Half the audiences” at which Koehler was present “were taken up by the Grand Vizier relating the ingenious fable of a lion and a fox, a great part of the remaining half with coffee, sherbet, rosewater, and frankincense.” The same dignitary was, moreover, “more occupied upon the character and dispositions of the persons whom he was going to leave behind than with those who were to go with him.” At last, after securing himself against his enemies, he left Constantinople on May 20th at the head of a “heterogeneous army.”[540] Contrary to what would be expected, Koehler did not accompany him. By various excuses, the departure of the “mission” to the seat of war was put off from day to day and, finally, they were sent to repair the fortifications of the Dardanelles. If we may believe the brigadier, this was due to the enmity or jealousy of the brothers Smith. Sir Sidney, on the other hand, angrily repudiated this and attributed it to Koehler’s “driving a bargain with the Porte for services we had officially notified as a free offer of the King.”[541] The explanation of Lord Elgin, the new ambassador, is probably the true one. While recognising that the vanity of Koehler was such that he claimed for himself “the respect paid to a Bonaparte or a Suvarow” and “disgusted all his officers,”[542] Elgin thought that they would not have remained idle had there been at Constantinople “a person vested with sufficient authority” to co-ordinate the conflicting claims of the various “missions.”[543] The recriminations of these did not fail to give rise to ludicrous scenes. “Seeing Englishmen in authority in Turkey,” wrote the Ambassador, “takes away all delight in reading _Don Quixote_.”[544] Returning to more stirring events we find Sidney Smith elated at his success and believing that he had “successfully sown discontent and insubordination in the French camp by the distribution of the proclamation of the Porte among them from high to low, so that a more disorderly army never was seen under arms.” Nothing remained, accordingly, but to press persuasion by making some show of force. The main feature of the plan was to support the force penetrating from the coast of the Delta by a “respectable” flotilla on the Nile. “Such a combination,” he was confident, “is an overmatch for Bonaparte.”[545] While Sir Sidney was collecting the necessary forces, the latter was taking measures to meet a Turkish landing, though he did not think that it was very probable.[546] But the fact that the indefatigable Murad had emerged from his retreat and was pushing towards the coast and the appearance of ships of war off the coast of the Eastern Delta indicated the probability of a disembarkation. Warning Marmont at Alexandria and reinforcing Kléber at Damietta, he set off in person against Murad.[547] It was at the camp near the Great Pyramid that he received the news that a hundred Turkish ships had sailed into Abukir Bay on July 11th and had disembarked nearly 18,000 soldiers. Contrary to the advice of Smith, Mustapha Pasha, the commander of that army, instead of landing near the mouth of the Nile, “chose to knock his head against the Castle of Abukir where there is only one well of brackish water,” and entrenched his army in the peninsula.[548] Bonaparte, in the meantime, was concentrating his forces, and even ordered Desaix to be ready to evacuate Upper Egypt if necessary.[549] Promising forgiveness to the unruly inhabitants of the Beheira province and making overtures to Murad, he arrived near the scene of action on July 19th.[550] With 10,000 troops and 1,000 cavalry, he attacked the Turks in their positions on July 25th and gained a complete victory. He wrote to Cairo—this time much nearer the truth than usual: “You will have learnt from the staff the result of the Battle of Abukir, one of the most brilliant victories I have ever seen. Of the Turkish Army recently disembarked not one man has escaped.”[551] The victory resulted in dislodging Ibrahim from the eastern frontier and in offers from Murad for an accommodation.[552] But it had more important consequences. Hitherto Bonaparte was waiting to know if the second assumption on which he had acted in going to Egypt had been realised, namely, whether the war which he knew to have broken out was proving disastrous to France and discreditable to its government. Mustapha Pasha, who had been taken prisoner, was but little versed in European politics, and could not satisfy him on this point.[553] He took advantage, consequently, of the negotiations with Smith about the release of prisoners to obtain news. The English commander was, in his turn, eager to gain first-hand knowledge of the conditions in Alexandria. He sent his secretary on shore with newspapers dated as late as June 10th. That at once determined Bonaparte, or, in his words, “Tout lui annonçait que le moment désigné par le destin était arrivé.”[554] The words in which he communicates his decision to Marmont reveal his thoughts. “Our armies have been unsuccessful and it is hard to say how far the enemy may have advanced. Italy is lost, and with it the price of so many strenuous efforts and the sacrifice of so many lives. But what can one expect from the incapable men who are at the head of affairs? Theirs is a rule of ignorance, folly and corruption. I alone have borne the burden and by constant successes have strengthened the government which, without me, would neither have been able to obtain power nor keep it. When I leave, everything falls to pieces. Let us not wait till the ruin is complete. The news of my return will reach France simultaneously with that of the destruction of the Turkish army at Abukir. My presence will raise the people’s spirits, restore to the troops their lost confidence, and to good citizens their hopes of happier days to come.”[555] It must be observed, however, that he had already thought of returning. In several despatches to the Directory he referred to it. During the siege of Acre he mentioned it to General Dommartin and promised to take him back with him.[556] A week after his arrival at Cairo from Syria he instructed Admiral Ganteaume to have the two frigates, “Muiron” and “Carrère”—the vessels upon which he actually set sail for France—ready.[557] Before leaving Egypt, however, he decided to open negotiations with the Porte. Whatever amount of truth his despatches and bulletins possessed, he himself was not blind to what the ultimate fate of the expeditionary force would be.[558] He had already explained to the Directory his need for reinforcements and declared that in a year the army would be so weakened as to be unable to meet simultaneous attacks from the coast and the desert, and that if the Government found itself unable to help the Army of the East it should make peace.[559] He could now count, however, on the effect of the crushing defeat at Abukir upon the Porte. Accordingly, he sent the treasurer of Mustapha Pasha with a letter to the Grand Vizier, in which he very skilfully played upon the Porte’s fears of Russia and declared that if the Vizier would only send a plenipotentiary to Egypt all difficulties could be settled in a “conference of two hours.”[560] The chief command was entrusted to Kléber, whom Bonaparte considered the ablest general in the army after Desaix. In his instructions he assured him that he would do everything in his power to send him news and reinforcements.[561] If by next May, however, no help from France had reached him and if by that time the plague had carried off 1500 soldiers, Kléber was authorised to conclude peace even at the cost of evacuating Egypt. But he was to postpone the execution of this condition till the general peace and also to regulate his conduct by the successes or reverses of France in Europe. He was, moreover, to demand that the Porte should withdraw from the Coalition, accord France the privilege of trading in the Black Sea and set free all imprisoned Frenchmen. Having now completed his preparations and receiving word that Sir Sidney Smith had left his station off Alexandria,[562] Bonaparte, under pretence of making a tour of inspection in the Delta, invited Kléber to meet him at Rosetta on August 24th, and left Cairo on the 18th. Without waiting for his Lieutenant he set sail with a band of devoted followers on August 23rd. The new Commander-in-Chief bitterly resented the sudden departure of his predecessor, which left him to face the problems of bankruptcy long since imminent. Though avoiding making reflections in public, he gave vent, among his confidants, to loud complaints against him.[563] Uncompromisingly honest, Kléber suffered from the weakness of readily disclosing his thoughts in letters and conversation. He had not the prudence necessary to a man in his position, and enjoyed relieving his feelings in jocular sallies and cartoons at the expense of Bonaparte, which he indiscreetly allowed to circulate.[564] He was, however, fully possessed of the confidence of the army and the people.[565] Turning to Sidney Smith, we see that he had to set sail from Egypt probably in quest of supplies. If we believe his story, he disappeared in order to “give an opening” to Bonaparte and catch him at sea. He attributed his failure to the fact that the “Theseus” failed to reach the station designed for her to the westward through lack of supplies.[566] The story is probably untrue. His next move, however, was “concerted in a council of war held on the ‘Tigre’ off Limassol on October 8th.”[567] Deeming Alexandria to be too well-fortified to be taken by an army of irregulars, he landed his troops near the Damietta branch of the Nile. His intention was to obtain a footing there and then persuade the Grand Vizier to transport his army by sea, thus saving them a desert march and affording them the protection of his river-flotilla. He also believed that the landing on the coast would lead the French “to establish a truce and treat to greater advantage”; he meant, in short, to exploit the “‘mal du pays’ strong upon them.”[568] The operations began on October 29th and were a repetition of Abukir. He did not, however, despair. He believed that though the French would emerge every time masters of the field, such actions would, in the long run, end in their annihilation.[569] The French general had the same belief and felt it was his duty to make it known. Fifty years of age, he felt too old to shoulder the burden of the chief command; “brave de cœur, mais poltron d’esprit”[570] he underestimated his resources and exaggerated those of his enemies. Intriguing men like Tallien excited him against his predecessor and hinted that the return of the army to France would be the best means of ruining his fortunes.[571] He felt that the Army would be unwilling to make new sacrifices, that the “desertion” of Bonaparte had had the worst effect on its spirit. He was thoroughly convinced that the fate of that army had been sealed since the destruction of the fleet, and that it was badly needed by France. On October 7th he addressed to the Directory a despatch, in which he stated that the army, now reduced to half its numbers, was short of ammunition and clothing; that the population of Egypt, whom the Sultan had stirred up to animosity against the Christians, was ready to revolt at any moment; that fresh Turkish troops were advancing; that Alexandria was almost defenceless, since the heavy artillery had been lost in the Syrian campaign and the rest taken to equip Bonaparte’s two frigates; finally, that the difficulties of the situation were aggravated by the want of money, the arrears of pay due to the troops amounting to 4,000,000 francs, and there were 6,000,000 francs more of debt—and Bonaparte had not left a “sou” in the treasury. Under these circumstances, Kléber thought that he should proceed with the negotiations begun by his predecessor at once, without waiting to have 1500 soldiers carried off by the plague, and with the aim of gaining time at least.[572] In the meantime—contrary to the strategy of the Syrian campaign—he would leave the Turks to cross the desert.[573] On September 17th he wrote to the Grand Vizier in similar terms as his predecessor had done; namely, vague protestations of friendship with no specific offers.[574] To these two overtures, the Ottoman dignitary answered in two typically Turkish letters, declaring that as the Law of Mohammad enjoined forgiving the repentant the Porte would allow the French to return to their country and consider, after that step, the re-establishing of its friendship with France.[575] In spite of this haughty tone, the Turks must have been delighted at the overtures. Their prospects of a victory in the field could not have been, even to themselves, roseate. Djezzar was in revolt. “He has just shut himself up in Acre,” wrote Sidney Smith, “and laughs at the Grand Vizier, having discharged all his Turkish troops and kept nothing but his Albanian regiments. . . . He has cut off all communications with Constantinople and he will not take a bill of exchange on it as heretofore (being a monopolist merchant).”[576] He was even believed to be contemplating an attack on his suzerain’s armies.[577] It was widely believed at Constantinople that the march of the Grand Vizier had more to do with the punishment of rebel pashas than with expelling the French from Egypt.[578] Refinement of intrigue was carried to such a point as to give rise to the rumour that the Porte was not really at war with the Republic.[579] The predominant factor in the situation was fear of Russia, especially when her fleets were freely cruising under the windows of the Seraglio. The Capitan Pasha told Koehler “that the Sultan esteems this service (i.e. repairing the fortifications of the Dardanelles) as the most important of all others, that his own expressions were that Egypt or any other province of the Empire were the members, but that this was his throat which lay open to the first attack of his enemies.”[580] Under these circumstances the overtures of the French would be welcome. Knowing, however, that a separate peace would expose them to the tender mercies of their allies, the Turks aimed at obtaining, at any rate, the evacuation of Egypt. On October 30th,[581] accordingly, the Reis Effendi informed Spencer Smith of what had taken place between the French generals and the Grand Vizier and stated that it was the wish of the Porte to extend the measure of evacuation, by the consent of the Ministers of the Allied Courts, to the grant of a passage home to the French troops; that the Russian envoy had already consented and promised to send twenty-four passports, and that these were being printed. The Turks skilfully represented this arrangement as an application of the policy, which Sir Sidney had recommended, of encouraging the French to leave Egypt. The English Minister endeavoured “to gain time for reflection and further information.” He pointed out that the departure of the French _en masse_ would be a serious danger to the Allies. The Turks had their solution for this difficulty. The danger to the Allies would not arise if by “a ‘ruse’ means are found of taking them to some place where half of them are massacred and the rest are despoiled of everything and are even left with nothing but their shirts.” Smith was further to be tempted by the Reis Effendi’s declaration that Egypt under the new _régime_—i.e. when the Beys would be replaced by administrators from Constantinople—would be “infinitely more interesting to the Allies than in the past.” The English Minister, however, was not tempted and the conference broke up. The odium of the treacherous “ruse” referred to by the Reis Effendi had naturally fallen on the Turks. But its author, it must be observed, was none other than Tamara, the Russian envoy, who, during an interview with the Turkish Minister, suggested “that while the Grand Vizier should encourage the capitulation, he ought to prepare for them (the French) a punishment equal to the perfidy they had employed to occupy Egypt.”[582] Smith had, in the meantime, and at the repeated requests of the Divan, consented to grant the passports,[583] pending the decision of the new Ambassador. Lord Elgin arrived at Constantinople on November 3rd, and, being without information on the situation in Egypt and finding the “affair” in an advanced state, was greatly embarrassed.[584] He set his face, however—at that stage, at any rate—against the suggested “ruse.”[585] But he was soon won over to the Turkish view. While admitting that the destruction of Tippoo had removed the great cause of anxiety at the presence of the French in Egypt, he recognised that no Turkish Army could succeed in dislodging them, and that Egypt could be employed as a basis for revolutionising the Ottoman Empire and bringing about its downfall. With Malta unsubdued, with Switzerland under the heel of the Gallic invaders, Great Britain had ample cause to feel disquietened at Egypt being a French colony. The Turks, moreover, had certainly the right to conclude a convention for the evacuation of that country, and the Russians (though it was not in their interest to swell the Republican armies in Europe) had already consented. Thus Elgin convinced himself and believed that the only thing to be modified was “the degree of security to be granted to the French by the British flag.”[586] He notified the dragoman of the Porte that the matter had better be left to the Grand Vizier and Sidney Smith, for the “protection which the latter, as commanding officer of His Majesty’s ships in these seas was authorised to give to the French, by virtue of a capitulation was equivalent to any passports in our name.”[587] Sir Sidney had not waited for the matter to be referred to him: the affair had already become his own. He was fully informed of the overtures of the French in spite of the Grand Vizier’s efforts to keep them a secret; and decided to interfere in the negotiations.[588] I. _His motives._[589] He knew that Mustapha Pasha, who was taken prisoner at the land battle of Abukir, and whom he described as “ignorant, obstinate and ambitious,” had been won over by the promise of the nominal pashalik of Egypt “while a French colony succeeds the Beys in the administration of the province,” that it was a person of his household who carried the letters of Kléber and of Bonaparte. “An evil known is half-removed,” he wrote. He was aware that the French were playing on the antipathy of the Turks to the Russians, and his interference would prevent the Porte from throwing itself into the arms of the Republic. Convinced that the French, who had bought Malta, would be lavish in their “presents,” he considered his presence necessary “lest oriental customs might so far prevail as for great interests to be sacrificed for trifling conditions.”[590] He believed that the changes which the Turks contemplated introducing in Egypt would cause those “who were to gain from the proposed new régime to come to a hasty decision to grant the Frenchmen everything they ask in order to get rid of them and the question at once and take possession of the means of gratifying their rapacity.”[591] Sidney Smith, moreover, had from the outset entertained no illusions as to the capacity of the Turks to drive out the French by force of arms. II. _His “powers.”_ It was obvious, in addition to these statesmanlike considerations, that England must be a party to any negotiations. But did he, Sidney Smith, possess the powers to represent his country? Undoubtedly he did not, for he was accredited in a diplomatic capacity for the sole purpose of giving him a commanding position among the Allied Commanders, and his functions as “Minister plenipotentiary” should have ceased with the arrival of Lord Elgin. In a letter to the latter, he defined his position as “a link of the chain between our Government, your Lordship, and the extremity of our Empire in India” and declared himself “desirous faithfully to transmit the impressions and the impulse you may give me from time to time; meanwhile I go on to the best of my judgment.”[592] What that “judgment” was, was perfectly known to the Cabinet, and it did not feel itself bound to correct it.[593] Elgin, instead of sending him “impressions,” decided to leave everything to the man on the spot. His only resource, accordingly, was “to go on to the best of his judgment.” III. _The Interests of the Allies._ He saw the danger of allowing a large body of troops to reinforce the hard-pressed armies of France. “I shall not lose sight of the impolicy of allowing this exiled, nay imprisoned, army,” he wrote, “to reappear in the theatre of war in Europe as an armed body otherwise than under such restrictions as shall render them unable to throw themselves into the balance against us by opposing the progress of the Allied arms, which bids so fair to emancipate Europe from the tyranny of the French Directory.”[594] Of these “restrictions” we shall hear no more. Nay, in the same letter from which the above passage was taken, he expatiated on the “indignation of the French against the Jacobin faction for having brought it and them into such a desperate state,” deluded himself with the significance of the fact that none of them wore the tricolour cockade and with the belief that Kléber and his officers were animated by one sentiment of indignation against their “ci-devant” commander. He thus lost sight of the “impolicy” of their return home. He even thought that they would play the Royalists’ game,[595] or, at worst, that “they are so worn out with their campaign in Africa that they would cease to be an army on their landing in France,” that though formidable in the East they “will be lost in the vast map of the population in France, like a drop of water in the sea.”[596] IV. _The interest of Great Britain._ The aim of his operations, he declared, was the restoration of Egypt to Great Britain’s ally and the security of the British possessions in the East.[597] And if negotiations could realise that aim—even if they allowed the French to carry the Pyramids with them[598]—why should Englishmen be sacrificed “under the same disadvantages of climate and hardship that the French have surmounted with incredible difficulty and loss?”[599] He, accordingly, wrote to Kléber on October 26th, quoting the important articles of the Treaty of Alliance between the Porte and England and pointing out that the evacuation could not be carried out without the permission of the latter power.[600] Kléber had sincerely desired the intervention of the English in the negotiations and probably, in his eagerness, omitted to consider whether Smith possessed the necessary powers or not.[601] Without immediately answering this overture, the French General asked Smith to provide a conveyance for a messenger charged with acquainting the Grand Vizier with the results of a conference between Mustapha Pasha and Kléber. What had passed in that conference amply justified the English officer in interfering to thwart the intrigue.[602] Starting with the premise that Russia was the enemy to be guarded against, the two Generals decided that the negotiations should be partly secret and partly patent. The Grand Vizier would ostensibly and haughtily reject any other terms than the evacuation pure and simple and proclaim his intention to push the war to the bitter end. The secret negotiations, in which the English were to be admitted, would have for aim the restoration of Egypt. But, for various reasons, this was not to be carried out at once. The Russians, for instance, would, on hearing of it, pounce upon the defenceless dominions of the Sultan. Again, the French could not return home unless their Government was at peace with England. In the meantime, however, the Government of Egypt would be carried on in the name of a Turkish Pasha, who would enjoy more power and freedom than any of his predecessors during the usurpation of the Beys. Sidney Smith set sail to Jaffa with the bearer of the above-analysed minutes. Immediately on his arrival he was joined by General Morand with a letter from Kléber.[603] The French General declared that he offered to evacuate Egypt merely in order to put an end to the war, for his position in that country was as strong as ever and could not be affected by the reverses of the Republic in another continent.[604] The “Commodore” was now able “to bring the whole question under one point of view”[605] and placed the whole matter on utterly new bases. In the first place, the Vizier’s haughty refusal to listen to anything prior to the evacuation gave place to the principle of holding conferences between duly accredited plenipotentiaries.[606] In the second place, the solidarity of the three Allied Courts was emphasised.[607] In the third place, the conferences were to be held on board the “Tigre” off Alexandria.[608] [609]Thus did the “captain of so small a naval force” succeed in “drawing to himself a negotiation hitherto carried on by the commanders of the French and Turkish armies.” This was probably due to the fact that “though the Grand Vizier was a man of superior good sense and judgment and in high estimation, he has already been twice on the point of being deposed and punished and has thence acquired a great degree of prudence, perhaps of timidity, while acting without the immediate direction of his sovereign,” and to Sir Sidney’s assumption of the rank of Minister plenipotentiary. The indignation of the Turks, however, can be easily realised. Already the defeats of Abukir and Damietta were attributed to him, and his meddling in the affairs of the Druses and the Christians of Syria had given great offence. But now to transfer the centre of activity from the Vizier’s Camp to his ship and to have the conferences ungraced by the presence of a Turkish dignitary was worse. By the time the complaints reached Constantinople and Elgin took measures to meet them, Sir Sidney had finished his work. The new bases became known to Kléber about the end of November. He considered the situation on the whole as satisfactory.[610] The “conferences” would give him time to hear from his Government, and the “solidarity” of the Allies would enable him to look beyond Egypt and to raise his terms. His plenipotentiaries, Desaix and Poussielgue, were accordingly instructed to demand as preliminary conditions to the evacuation: The dissolution of the Triple Alliance, a new guarantee by England of the integrity of Turkey, the restoration of the Ionian Islands to France and the right of garrisoning them and Malta from the “Army of the East,” the release of all imprisoned Frenchmen, and the preservation of the privileges the French had enjoyed in Egypt prior to the occupation. If the Vizier insisted on the evacuation pure and simple, so the instructions proceeded, the French General was to be given four months to consult his Government.[611] The French envoys arrived at Damietta to find that the “Tigre” had set sail. On December 21st, however, it reappeared and Sidney Smith proposed “on account of the season to hold the conferences in the camp.”[612] During the voyage thither the negotiations began. The English commander proposed a truce, one of whose conditions was the surrender of the fort of El-Arish to the Turks.[613] He knew the value attached by the Grand Vizier to that fort. If the French accepted his proposal, well and good; if not, the Turks would have time, during the protracted conferences, to take it by force. The latter alternative took place, through the treachery of a portion of the garrison. The discussions on board the “Tigre” were begun by a note from the French plenipotentiaries setting forth the indispensable preliminaries to the evacuation.[614] Sir Sidney’s answer was so conceived that while it did not “shut the door at once against all negotiations by the absolute and total rejection of these unreasonable propositions” and while it “drew the commissioners to the extent of their pretensions,” it avoided “encouraging their hopes of these being admitted.”[615] He, accordingly, declared that such matters as the dissolution of the alliance or the restoration of the Ionian Islands were objects of a definite peace which neither he nor the French had powers to conclude. He promised nevertheless to lay these demands before the Grand Vizier and frankly stated that he would advise him to reject them.[616] This was done and was intimated to Desaix and his colleague on January 9th.[617] Kléber was likewise requested to authorise his envoys to treat on a new basis.[618] He had already done so. Early in January he received copies of the _Journal of Frankfurt_ up to October 10th. He thus learnt that Italy was lost, that Bruix’s fleet had withdrawn from the Mediterranean and was blockaded at Brest, that the Dutch fleet was in the possession of the enemy, that the Russians and the English had invaded Holland, that Müller had been beaten on the Rhine, that the Vendée was in open revolt and that the Egyptian Expedition was severely criticised in the press and the legislature. Bonaparte had instructed him to regulate his conduct by the position of affairs in Europe. He lost all hope of being reinforced and considered that it was his duty to hasten with his veteran troops to the help of the Fatherland. He authorised his envoys accordingly to consent to the evacuation pure and simple, if the Porte was to become neutral, and if the French were allowed to withdraw with arms, baggage and munitions, and with the faculty of serving anywhere and against anyone.[619] The news of the fall of El-Arish and the massacre of its garrison did not affect this resolution. Nay, the treason committed by a portion of the defenders and reports of mutiny in Alexandria and elsewhere led him to forego the demand for the neutrality of Turkey.[620] By that time Desaix and Poussielgue had, after some hesitation, consented to proceed to the Turkish Camp and the negotiations began on the new basis. Desaix was opposed to the evacuation of Egypt.[621] He warned the Commander-in-Chief that the “Turkish army was nothing but a collection of banditti” and that there were rumours of a new revolution in France which placed Bonaparte at the head of the Republic.[622] Kléber was not convinced. He had not heard of the _coup d’état_ but he was sure that Bonaparte had taken care to fly the country before being forced to capitulate and that he would employ any reinforcements which might be preparing for his own aggrandizement. If Desaix could prove that he would do better, he was willing to hand the chief command to him.[623] To place his position beyond assail, however, he convoked a council of nine generals, which fully concurred in his views.[624] At last, “after many long conferences and warm discussions,” the convention of El-Arish was signed on January 24th, 1800.[625] Sidney Smith did not sign it. His reason was, he informed Nelson, that “the execution of the articles depended solely on the Ottoman Government and on the discipline which may be preserved in the Turkish army.”[626] He reserved for himself, nevertheless, the right of arbitration and endeavoured “to prevent any untoward circumstance from again causing the sword to be drawn after it has been happily sheathed.”[627] While the negotiations were proceeding, inklings of the overtures of the French began to reach England. After the victory of Nelson and the launching of the programme of Grenville, Egyptian and other Oriental affairs were relegated to the background. Now and again an event like the capture of Seringapatam and the destruction of Tippoo or the failure of the French before Acre would carry the statesmen’s thoughts “from the opposite coast to contemplate triumphs on distant fields.”[628] The intercepted correspondence from Egypt demonstrated that there was no need for further exertion to restore that country to the Turks. Grenville’s despatches dealt with such matters as the raising of Albanian regiments to serve in Europe, the acquiring of trade privileges in the Black Sea and the ordinary affairs of the Turkey Company. A new ambassador was sent and his instructions dealt with the right of cutting timber and kindred matters. Sidney Smith sent letters teeming with ideas—wise and foolish—none of them met with commendation or reproof. Now and again we hear of Dundas lamenting this negligence of Egypt.[629] But the Cabinet’s attitude in this matter was influenced by other men’s views. This attitude can thus be described: So long as the French were in Egypt, it was absolutely necessary to watch the exits on both seas. The mere fact of their presence in Egypt was nothing compared with the danger of their carrying operations elsewhere. And as they had not the means of doing this, there was no cause for alarm.[630] On December 8th there arrived at London a despatch from Spencer Smith which dealt with the demand for passports to enable the French army to return home. The next day communications were received from Elgin on the same matter.[631] Grenville recommended to Elgin the “utmost caution in entering into any positive engagement of whatever nature till such time as he can be fully informed of the sentiments of His Majesty’s servants upon this most critical and important subject.”[632] Two days later, a council was held to formulate a more definite answer.[633] It was decided to “prevent, if possible, Lord Elgin’s consent to permit Bonaparte, i.e. the army, to evacuate, or if he should have done so to counteract the effects, by sending orders to Lord Keith to force them back again.” Windham, though admitting the difficulties of the question, was “hardly inclined to the opinion adopted.” Such a termination for the Egyptian Expedition was far from the wishes of men who believed that the French army was within an ace of destruction. The Cabinet thought that the object of the overtures was merely to gain time and “take the chance of assistance from home.”[634] The return of the French, moreover, might jeopardise the operations of the Allied armies. But that the Turks should not feel that they had been sacrificed for the other allies, promises of aid were to be made to them. These themes are dealt with in an important despatch to Lord Elgin, dated December 15th.[635] The Ambassador was informed that the power to conclude capitulations and grant passports belonged to the proper officers of His Majesty’s fleets and armies and was directed to communicate to the Porte that the commanding officer in the Mediterranean had been ordered “not to consent to the safe return of the French army or to admit of their capitulating otherwise than jointly to the allied powers whose forces are employed against them or on any terms short of their surrender as prisoners of war and of the actual detention of the officers and men in the territory of the allied powers till exchanged, the experience of the war having proved the futility of all capitulations upon parole of not serving and the bad faith with which such engagements are observed by the enemy.” Grenville pointed out that the result of the war would not depend on the “transitory occupation of a particular portion of territory placed in the hands of the enemy by the events of war” but on the “comparative strength or weakness of the French Republic as opposed to its enemies upon the frontier and in the interior.” While Elgin should impress the Porte with arguments of this nature, he was to hold out the promise that the British naval forces in that part of the Mediterranean would be speedily augmented and “that it is in contemplation to prepare such other means of annoying and distressing the enemy either from Europe or India or perhaps by an operation concerted from both sides, co-operating with those efforts which the Turkish Government will no doubt feel itself obliged to make for this object, as may induce them (the French) to such terms of capitulation as are suited to their present situation and consistent with the dignity of the Turkish Government.” Keith, in accordance with these orders, communicated to Kléber, on January 8th, the decision of the Government.[636] Nelson, acting under Keith, gave the necessary orders to Troubridge and Sidney Smith.[637] Before the Porte was acquainted with these decisions, its diplomacy employed various means to get rid of the French. Seeing that the affair of the Passports had come to no definite end and ignorant as yet of the results of Sidney Smith’s offensive intrusion, the Reis Effendi sought to benefit by Paul’s ill-humour against Austria in order to negotiate peace with France. Assuming, accordingly, that the Court of Vienna was contemplating a separate peace with the Republic,[638] he proposed that England, Russia and Turkey should ask the mediation of Prussia, conclude peace with France and thus frustrate Austria’s design. Nothing came of this quaint affair. Elgin, however, was now converted to the “stratagem of war” which the Turks had in view for rescuing Egypt, sent his Secretary Morier to report on conditions in the Vizier’s camp and to carry out the “stratagem,”[639] and began to be impressed by the necessity of curbing Sidney Smith in order to keep the Turks faithful to their engagements. At the eleventh hour, he hinted to him that he was going beyond his powers.[640] Sir Sidney went on his course unchecked. The Porte ratified the convention and began gathering the necessary transports to carry the French home,[641] when instructions reached Tamara and Elgin to stop its execution. Kléber had by this time heard of the opposition of Great Britain to the evacuation. His correspondence clearly indicates that he was not perfectly satisfied with the _œuvre de raison_ he had just accomplished. The laborious attempts that he made to convince his colleagues that he had adopted the only reasonable policy showed that he had not completely convinced himself. Hence the bitterness with which he inveighed against his predecessor for placing him in so difficult a situation. The news of the 18 brumaire and the elevation of Bonaparte “from the position of a party to that of a judge”[642] and of the refusal of England to allow the army to withdraw came to the rescue and enabled him to rise to the full height of his talents. On hearing of the decision of his Government, Sidney Smith wrote to Kléber that it was “evidently dictated by the idea that the French General was treating separately with the Turks and to prevent the execution of any measures contrary to the Anglo-Turkish alliance.” He was confident that once the Cabinet knew what had really happened it would ratify the Convention. He, consequently, asked both the Grand Vizier and Kléber to wait.[643] He proved right. Lord Keith wrote to the Secretary of the Admiralty detailing what had taken place and stating that Sir Sidney “has been an officer on the spot and may be considered as capable of granting terms to an enemy, that Lord Elgin has not only conceived but strongly recommended the measure, that the Russian Ambassador has by a formal deed consented to the terms.”[644] The arrival of this in London put the affair on a new basis. Grenville described the Convention as “a most mortifying event” and felt very “grieved at the discredit which it will throw on Sir Sidney Smith after having deserved so well of his country.”[645] Though he thought that the Government had strictly the right to reject it and that the allies expected her to do so, he feared that “the bringing of the public faith into any sort of question is a thing not to be done.”[646] Probably personal regard for Sir Sidney influenced the decision to allow the Convention to be executed. On March 29th, accordingly, orders were sent to Keith to permit the French to return and—if he suspected treachery on the part of the Russians and the Turks—to use “his utmost endeavours to persuade them to all such measures as may be most consistent with the faithful observance of the engagements contracted with the enemy.”[647] Before the news of this decision reached Egypt, Kléber had resumed hostilities and destroyed the Turkish army at the battle of Heliopolis (March 20th). The relief in England at this rupture was great. The Russian Ambassador had bitterly complained against the “Convention,” and Grenville had to throw all the blame on Sidney Smith and the Grand Vizier and to announce that the former had been recalled.[648] “Kléber and his army,” wrote Grenville on learning of that general’s resumption of hostilities, “can annoy us much less where they are than in almost any other possible situation.” There was no need, accordingly, to take new decisions.[649] The need was further diminished by the assassination of Kléber by a Syrian fanatic and the succession to the chief command of General Menou, who belonged to the so-called “colonialist” party and set his face against the evacuation of Egypt. [Footnote 536: Spencer Smith to his brother, 26 March, 1799. F.O. Turkey, 21.] [Footnote 537: Koehler’s despatch, 10 April, 1799. F.O. Turkey, 26.] [Footnote 538: 14 April. _Ibid._] [Footnote 539: Despatch of 15 April. _Ibid._] [Footnote 540: Despatch of 25 May. F.O. Turkey, 26.] [Footnote 541: 18 Oct. _Dropmore Papers_, V, p. 476.] [Footnote 542: Elgin to Grenville, 29 Dec. _Dropmore Papers_, VI, p. 91.] [Footnote 543: Despatch of same date. F.O. Turkey, 24.] [Footnote 544: Elgin to Grenville, 29 Dec. _Dropmore Papers_, VI, p. 91.] [Footnote 545: Sidney Smith to Koehler, 4 June. _Dropmore Papers_, V, p. 80.] [Footnote 546: _Correspondance_, V, 4174.] [Footnote 547: _Ibid._, V, 4277, 4278.] [Footnote 548: To Grenville, 18 Oct. _Dropmore Papers_, V, p. 478.] [Footnote 549: _Correspondance_, V, 4281.] [Footnote 550: _Ibid._, 4287. Jonquière, V, p. 394.] [Footnote 551: _Correspondance_, V, 4331.] [Footnote 552: Jonquière, V, pp. 487, 497.] [Footnote 553: Martin, _Histoire de l’Expédition_, I, p. 395.] [Footnote 554: _Correspondance_, XXX, 146.] [Footnote 555: _Mémoires du duc de Raguse_, II, p. 32.] [Footnote 556: Richardot, _Nouveaux Mémoires_, p. 188.] [Footnote 557: 21 June, 1799. _Correspondance_, V, 4197.] [Footnote 558: Afterwards he let it escape that after the loss of the fleet he was convinced that the expedition would end in disaster. Fournier, I, p. 177.] [Footnote 559: _Correspondance_, V, 4225.] [Footnote 560: 17 Aug. _Correspondance_, V, 4364.] [Footnote 561: Instructions dated 22 Aug. _Ibid._, V, 4374.] [Footnote 562: Jonquière, V, p. 573.] [Footnote 563: Desgenettes, _Souvenirs_, III, p. 273.] [Footnote 564: Cf. Rousseau, _Kléber et Menou_, XLII. One of his cartoons represented his predecessor “chassant,” the Directory.] [Footnote 565: _Memoirs of Desvernois_, p. 202; cf. Rovigo, I, p. 291; cf. Villiers du Terrage, p. 223, etc.] [Footnote 566: To Spencer Smith, 20 Oct. F.O. Turkey, 22; also _Dropmore Papers_, V, pp. 484.] [Footnote 567: Minutes. F.O. Turkey, 24.] [Footnote 568: _Dropmore Papers_, V, pp. 478, 479.] [Footnote 569: To Nelson, 8 Nov. F.O. Turkey, 23.] [Footnote 570: A. Colbert, _Traditions et Souvenirs_, II, p. 301 note.] [Footnote 571: Rousseau, _Kléber et Menou_, XXVIII.] [Footnote 572: _Int. Corr._, III, p. 28 f.] [Footnote 573: To Menou, 8 Oct. Pajol, p. 368.] [Footnote 574: _Ibid._, p. 352. _Int. Corr._, III, p. 179.] [Footnote 575: Undated letters. Pajol, p. 390 f., p. 382 f.] [Footnote 576: To Grenville, 18 Oct. _Dropmore Papers_, V, p. 480.] [Footnote 577: Koehler’s despatch, 23 Sept. F.O. Turkey, 26.] [Footnote 578: Despatch of 9 Sept. F.O. Turkey, 26.] [Footnote 579: _Ibid._] [Footnote 580: Despatch of 5 Nov. F.O. Turkey, 26.] [Footnote 581: Minutes of a Conference; Spencer Smith to Grenville, 12 Nov. F.O. Turkey, 23.] [Footnote 582: Undated letter of Tamara to Spencer Smith. F.O. Turkey, 23.] [Footnote 583: Smith to Tamara, 3 Nov. _Ibid._] [Footnote 584: Despatch to Grenville, undated. F.O. Turkey, 24.] [Footnote 585: _Ibid._] [Footnote 586: Undated despatch. F.O. Turkey, 24.] [Footnote 587: Despatch of 17 Nov. _Ibid._] [Footnote 588: To Spencer Smith, 9 Nov. F.O. Turkey, 23.] [Footnote 589: _Ibid._] [Footnote 590: To Lord Elgin, 17 December. F.O. Turkey, 23.] [Footnote 591: _Ibid._] [Footnote 592: To Elgin, 14 Jan., 1800. _Ibid._] [Footnote 593: 7 May, 1799, Spencer wrote to Grenville showing his knowledge of Smith’s peculiar policy as to the evacuation of Egypt. _Dropmore Papers_, V, p. 42. Nelson, however, on 18 March, warned Smith against it (_Despatches_, III, p. 296.) Smith maintained (Barrows, II, p. 24) that he had not received it. But the Christian Knight was not above telling a lie.] [Footnote 594: 9 Nov. F.O. Turkey, 23.] [Footnote 595: To Keith. Barrows, I, p. 385.] [Footnote 596: To Spencer. Barrows, II, p. 33.] [Footnote 597: To Nelson, 31 Jan., 1800. F.O. Turkey, 23.] [Footnote 598: To Elgin, 20 Feb., 1800. Barrows, II, p. 21.] [Footnote 599: To Spencer, undated. Barrow II, pp. 40, 50.] [Footnote 600: F.O. Turkey, 23.] [Footnote 601: To Menou, 11 Oct. Pajol, p. 370.] [Footnote 602: Minutes. Pajol, p. 374 note.] [Footnote 603: Morand’s interesting impressions of Sidney Smith may be read in Rousseau’s _Kléber et Menou_, XXIV, XXV.] [Footnote 604: Kléber to Sidney Smith, 30 Oct. Pajol, p. 378 f.] [Footnote 605: To Spencer Smith, 9 Nov. F.O. Turkey, 23.] [Footnote 606: Sidney Smith to Kléber, 8 Nov. _Ibid._] [Footnote 607: Kléber was informed that Mustapha Pasha expressed his own views. 8 Nov. _Ibid._] [Footnote 608: Sidney Smith to Kléber, 8 Nov. _Ibid._] [Footnote 609: Elgin’s despatch, 28 Dec. F.O. Turkey, 24.] [Footnote 610: To the Directory, 3 Dec. Pajol, p. 396.] [Footnote 611: Instructions dated 7 Dec. Pajol, p. 401 f.] [Footnote 612: Sidney Smith to the Grand Vizier, 15 Dec. F.O. Turkey, 23.] [Footnote 613: To Desaix and Poussielgue, 21 Dec. _Ibid._] [Footnote 614: Dated 29 Dec. _Ibid._] [Footnote 615: Marginal note in Sir Sidney’s hand. F.O. Turkey, 23.] [Footnote 616: 29 Dec., 5 Jan. _Ibid._] [Footnote 617: _Ibid._] [Footnote 618: To Kléber, 9 Jan. _Ibid._] [Footnote 619: To Desaix and Poussielgue, 3 Jan. Pajol, p. 416.] [Footnote 620: To Poussielgue and Desaix, 15 Jan. Pajol, p. 429.] [Footnote 621: To Kléber, 9 Nov. Rousseau, _Kléber et Menou_, XXV. “I am apprehensive General Desaix will require to withdraw.” Sidney Smith to Elgin, 14 Jan. F.O. Turkey, 23.] [Footnote 622: Pajol, p. 432.] [Footnote 623: To Desaix, 16 Jan. Pajol, p. 432.] [Footnote 624: _Ibid._, p. 437.] [Footnote 625: Sidney Smith to Nelson, 31 Jan., 1800. F.O. Turkey, 23.] [Footnote 626: To Nelson, 31 Jan. F.O. Turkey, 23.] [Footnote 627: To Nelson, 31 Jan. F.O. Turkey, 23.] [Footnote 628: Pitt to Grenville, 13 Sept. _Dropmore Papers_, V, p. 397.] [Footnote 629: Notably, Dundas to Pitt, 24 Nov., 1799. _Ibid._, VI, p. 39.] [Footnote 630: Cf. Spencer to Sidney Smith, undated. Barrows, II, p. 59.] [Footnote 631: _See_ above, pp. 106, 107.] [Footnote 632: 10 Dec. F.O. Turkey, 24.] [Footnote 633: Windham’s _Diary_, p. 419.] [Footnote 634: Spencer to Sidney Smith, 30 March, 1800. Barrows, II, p. 36.] [Footnote 635: F.O. Turkey, 24. Also, Grenville’s private letter, 16 Dec. _Dropmore Papers_, VI, p. 79.] [Footnote 636: Pajol, p. 466.] [Footnote 637: _Despatches_, IV, pp. 178, 179.] [Footnote 638: Elgin’s despatch, 11 Dec. F.O. Turkey, 24.] [Footnote 639: Instructions to Morier, 22 Dec. _Ibid._ These naturally do not refer to the “stratagem,” but that Morier was to execute it is beyond doubt. His papers intercepted and published in the _Courier d’Egypte_, No. 70, prove it.] [Footnote 640: 22 Dec. F.O. Turkey, 24.] [Footnote 641: Spencer Smith to Grenville, 15 Feb., 1800. _Dropmore Papers_, VI, p. 130.] [Footnote 642: The news reached Egypt on 2 March, 1800. Rousseau, _Kléber et Menou_, XXXII.] [Footnote 643: Allardyce. _Keith_, pp. 230, 231, 232.] [Footnote 644: To Evan Nepean, 1 March, 1800. Allardyce, _Keith_, pp. 230, 231.] [Footnote 645: To Minto, 28 March. _Dropmore Papers_, VI, p. 286.] [Footnote 646: _Ibid._] [Footnote 647: Nelson, _Despatches_, IV, p. 216.] [Footnote 648: Woronzow to Panin, 11 May. _Dropmore Papers_, VI, pp. 216-17.] [Footnote 649: Grenville to Pitt, 2 June. Rose, _Pitt and Napoleon, Letters and Papers_, pp. 271, 272. Also to Minto. _Dropmore Papers_, VI, p. 243.] VIII THE EXPULSION OF THE FRENCH FROM EGYPT 1800-1801 When Kléber was assassinated in June, 1800, the command _par interim_ devolved upon General Menou. The new Commander-in-Chief had not taken any part in the military operations of the French army since the capture of Alexandria in 1798. He was only known as the Governor of Rosetta, as an “apostate”[650] and the husband of a young Egyptian wife. The marriage crowned a long career of “gallantry,” but it could hardly have escaped the biting comments of Frenchmen and only helped to increase the ridicule with which Abdalla Jacques Menou was regarded. He was fat and bald, had the face of a _bon viveur_, and was uneasy on horseback. He offered the greatest contrast to the soldiers of the Revolution. He was an ex-baron, had the manners of an old courtier, was something of a philosopher and even of an _idéologue_, had taken an active part rather in the assemblies and the clubs than in the defence of the frontiers or the expansion of the Republic. He seems to have been conscious of the limits of his capacity, for he once petitioned the French Government to accord him an administrative post in the colonies or an inspectorship of troops or a diplomatic mission.[651] During the two peaceful years he spent at Rosetta, he had ample time to turn his craving for “systems” to good account.[652] He pressed Kléber to give up the idea of restoring Egypt to the Porte and to direct his attention to problems of domestic organisation and intensive development. General Reynier, who later became the avowed enemy of Menou, states that his Chief’s policy proceeded from “fear of meeting his creditors.”[653] It is true that he was deeply in debt and that—whatever he might say to the contrary—his debts were not all incurred in the service of his country, but the statement is not convincing. The attempt to explain grave decisions by motives of this nature has never proved satisfactory. It is clear, however, that Menou did not realise the great obstacles to the preservation of Egypt. He diminished the necessity of free communication between France and her colony and chimerically indulged in the hope that Britain might acquiesce in the annexation of Egypt. On taking over the command, he made it clear to his soldiers,[654] to the Grand Vizier[655] and to Sir Sidney Smith[656] that diplomatic negotiations were not in his power, and that the question of the evacuation of the country could only be settled by the Government. These declarations had, at all events, the merit of clearing the atmosphere, of destroying false hopes, and of enabling the soldiers and the enemy to see exactly where they stood. But Menou was not obsessed by any idea as to the modesty of his _rôle_. He could not but see that the country was in a most unsatisfactory condition. Since the conquest by Bonaparte everything was in chaos. Turkish institutions, or rather, practices, subsisted side by side with the European administration, the arbitrary procedure of the Mameluke _régime_ was aggravated by the abuses of the purely military new organisation. “On dirigeait,” writes M. Rigault, “à l’aveugle un pays dont on connaissait mal les usages et la langue.”[657] The Egyptians could no longer cherish any illusion as to the intentions of their new masters. They saw that nothing was sacred in their eyes. The chief mosque in Cairo was used to stable the horses of the army; the daughters of the most eminent families were seduced; the lower orders were encouraged to indulge in alcoholic beverages and drugs; the hated Levantines, Christian Syrians and Copts were allowed to take their revenge on their former oppressors;[658] the Commander of the Faithful was attacked in his Syrian territories; the old impositions were exacted with Mameluke rigour and with more than Mameluke thoroughness. In one province, the Copts, on a tax-collecting tour went out on foot to return superbly mounted on horseback and dispose of their horses in the public market.[659] These Copts used formerly to fear the Beys, but now “ils se croient sûrs de l’impunité et peut-être étorquent-ils de l’argent au nom des Français qui les accompagnent.”[660] At Rosetta, the Copt held the headmen of the villages under the bastinado for eight days and forced at least one village to pay fifteen times the legal tax on the pretence that the land had improved.[661] One French officer wrote that the Copt who travelled with him had eighty servants and twelve tents and forced the peasants to provide for his retainers.[662] It is difficult to explain how men like Bonaparte and Kléber could condone such abuses and continue to employ such vile agents. Kléber, apparently, tolerated them with the view of forcing them now and again to disgorge, to use them in the way kings of mediæval Christendom treated the Jews, namely, as a sponge. One could not help suspecting that the French had a share in the nefarious traffic. Kléber, indeed, once reminded one of his generals that “the provinces were not pashaliks.”[663] Menou endeavoured to eradicate the abuses. He ordered the heads of the various departments to submit exact accounts,[664] forbade the generals to levy unauthorised taxes.[665] He urged his soldiers to conduct themselves more decently.[666] He forbade the “Deyyeh” or pecuniary composition for murders, the smoking of “hashish,” the appearance in public of indecently dressed—or rather undressed—“fakirs.” He projected the publication of a newspaper in Arabic.[667] But his ideas went beyond the removal of abuses. He conceived that the evil had its origin in the lack of stable institutions and proceeded to endow the country with them. He entrusted the local government of the villages to heads or “sheikhs” of fellah or peasant origin. They were to be appointed by him for one year, to pay a fixed duty and to be supervised by a body of Egyptian inspectors under two directors, one Egyptian and one Frenchman.[668] How far was the new organisation a success? It did not last sufficiently long. The most evident result was that the “heads” of villages immediately shifted the new impost on the broad back of the fellah.[669] Menou restored the “divans” or assemblies of notables, which had been abolished by Kléber for “having proved futile.”[670] He elaborated codes of customs and regulations for the encouragement of agriculture, commerce and industry.[671] But the “grand design” of Menou was to establish a new system of taxation to take the place of the prevailing conditions. Those Frenchmen who have studied them have systematised them into a coherent theory of feudalism.[672] But the actual facts do not warrant this. They started with the doctrine that the land belonged to the Turkish Sultan, that he conceded it to tenants or “multezims” on the payment of a land tax, the “miry.” The multezims divided their holdings into two parts, one part they sublet, as it were, to the peasants and received rent for it, the other part they exploited directly. On the death of the multezim the land he held passed to his heirs on the payment of a fixed sum. The fellah’s “right” amounted to no more than the “right to cultivate” a certain strip of land. He could transmit it to his children, could alienate it to any solvent person. Frenchmen have thought it was the feudalism of Europe without the “hommage” or the “oath of fealty.” But this view is hardly tenable. So far, indeed, as there was any doctrine, it was the Moslem one of absolute property. The multezims’ holdings were, for all practical purposes, absolutely their own. House- property in towns was perfectly absolute. An important fraction of the land, moreover, was under the Moslem régime of the “mainmorte” and was exempt from the “miry.” What then has led the French observers to that view? In the first place, the origin of the multezims. The government in the early days of the Arab Conquest used for purposes of revenue collecting to divide the country into “fermes fiscales” and concede them in a public auction to the highest bidders.[673] Those who could promise to hold themselves responsible for the land-tax were allowed to take possession of the land without any formalising as to the rights of the actual holders. It was pure arbitrariness, neither more nor less. In the second place, the Mamelukes provide a superficial comparison with the feudal knights. But nothing, in reality, could be more dissimilar. The basis of the Mameluke regime was slavery,[674] not land-tenure. They held land in the same way as other multezims. Whatever governmental functions they exercised did not have the slightest connection with the land in their possession and were pure usurpation. Under these anarchic circumstances, it was the weakest who was bound to suffer.[675] The burden lay on the fellah. In the accounts dictated at St. Helena, Napoleon states that he consulted the learned men of Cairo about the introduction of Western usage with regard to property and taxation, and that they agreed that the practice of the West was in complete accord with the teaching of Islam. The solution he proposed was simply to have no intermediaries between the peasants and the government in respect to the lands held by them and to make the multezims responsible solely for that portion of their holdings which they were exploiting on their account. It is evident from this that the question was not a theoretical one of “rights” or “property” but simply one of urgent fiscal reform. Napoleon, however, recognised that the times were not propitious for the introduction of radical changes.[676] His successor in the command, Kléber, directed all his efforts to quit the country and naturally ignored the question, but Menou, actuated by a different motive, found in it congenial work. His first step was to collect information, for which purpose, it is said, he had to force the Copts through an imprisonment of three months to reveal their “secrets.”[677] On the 1st nivôse an IX he announced in a proclamation his intention to introduce changes in the methods of tax-collection. “Who has given the great and the powerful,” he added, “the right to make the people unhappy? Is it the Koran? No, for it teaches help to the unfortunate, compassion towards the poor, and the giving of charity. If you have forgotten your religion, I, in the name of the Republic and of the celebrated Bonaparte, shall remind you of it. I am here to free the people from oppression.”[678] The intended changes so pompously heralded are to be found in a manuscript of nine sheets, without signature and under the date of 20 nivôse an IX.[679] It seems that it was never published. Djabarti never mentions it. It treats of four different objects, the unification of all imposts on land (the physiocratic “impôt unique”) the abolition of all pretensions on the part of the multezims to administrative or judicial functions, the equality of all Egyptians in the matter of taxation, the cessation of the employment of the Copts. The peasants, accordingly, were to pay only one tax, the amount of which was to be fixed according to the quality of their lands. The multezims were to become simple landowners and receive an annual pension from the government for the loss of the rents which they used to receive from the peasants. “Les fellahs,” it is stated in the project, “ne devaient donc plus les (multezims) reconnaître comme ceux dont ils pouvaient être ignominieusement battus et condamnés à mort; le droit de vie et de mort n’appartenait qu’au gouvernement, qui, lui-même, ne pouvait en faire usage qu’en remplissant les formes juridiques ordonnés par les lois. Le général en chef déclarait que ce serait par les lois seules que les habitants de l’Egypte seraient désormais jugés.” To carry out the project, orders were issued for a cadastral survey.[680] This was on the eve of the battle of Canopus, 21st March, 1801. The British invasion killed the project. Mehemet Ali was able to play fast and loose with every kind of property because he found everything in chaos. But it was reserved for the British to make “amende honorable,” it was they who made effective Menou’s promise, “que ce serait par les lois seules que les habitants de l’Egypte seraient désormais jugés.” Menou has been unfairly dealt with by the historians.[681] The mingling of dreams and realities, the premature or fussy interference, the “extravagance” of wording and the eccentricity of conduct should not blind us to the grandeur of his conception and the wisdom of his solution. Even his enemy, Reynier, admitted that the evils could not be suffered to exist longer.[682] The greatest cause of failure lay in the invasion of 1801. But before that event took place Menou was subjected to every obstruction that active hostility or passive apathy could throw in his way. The active hostility proceeded from a group of superior officers gathered round Damas and Reynier, the apathy paralysed practically all Frenchmen and left the Commander-in-Chief all alone with his dreams. The generals had, as Napoleon said of one of them, “peu d’étendue dans l’esprit et peu d’élévation dans l’âme.”[683] In the year II they fought to repel the invader, in the year VIII it was for wealth, glory and power. In Egypt they suffered, as Sorel neatly puts it, from an “excès du sang.”[684] Lack of work had made them quarrelsome, headstrong and exacting. Sidney Smith did not go wrong when he played upon their home- sickness. They hated Menou as the man who had set his face against the evacuation of Egypt. They also despised him, and were ashamed to be subordinate to one whom they described as “général du faubourg,” or “général à faire rire,” or “un intrigant de la Révolution,” or “général d’antichambre.” “Il faut dire,” writes a historian hostile to Menou, “que prévenus contre lui, ils étaient plutôt disposés à exagérer des symptômes défavorables qu’à les atténuer. Menou, accepté par eux avec répugnance et avec colère, n’avait pas pu leur vouer en retour de l’affection et de la confiance. D’un côté le mépris de l’autre la rancune; ici des subalternes qui se sentaient plus forts que leur chef; là un chef obligé de dévorer les injures de ses subalternes; ceux-ci ne donnant que des avis incomplets, sûrs d’ailleurs que celui-là, par esprit d’antagonisme suivrait la pensée contraire, voilà où en était le gouvernement de l’Egypte.”[685] They picked quarrels with their general on every possible occasion. They questioned his right to impose death- duties on the estates of Frenchmen who died in Egypt, on the grounds that Egypt was not a colony. The notorious Tallien was their “jurist” and Menou had to “deport” him. “Je viens de revomir,” Menou wrote to Thibaudeau, “le fameux Tallien, qui avait été vomi à l’Afrique. Il s’était occupé ici en s’amusant à vouloir insurger l’armée. Quelques individus qui, par leur grade et leur place, devaient donner l’exemple, avaient écouté et goûté sa théorie d’insurrection.”[686] They went so far as to accuse him of complicity in the murder of his predecessor.[687] Did he not give his son the name of Kléber’s assassin, Soliman?[688] They even thought of relieving him of his command on the ridiculous plea of dotage and of placing Reynier in his place.[689] But Reynier shrank from this. They, however, determined upon a hostile “démarche” before he was confirmed by the home government. The “démarche” took place on the 6th Brumaire (28th October). Menou promised to give up “innovations,” and an apparent reconciliation took place.[690] But it was a serious blow to the discipline of the army—and discipline was not exactly the strong point of the Army of the East. Tallien quitted Egypt with a bulky “dossier” against Menou, but was destined to be arrested on arrival in France.[691] Menou, on his part, despatched Vial and Lazowsky with abundant “pièces justificatives.”[692] It was for the First Consul to judge. The apathy extended from the soldiers to the civilians. The “savants,” now that they had collected their material, were anxious to go home, dreaming of the learned tomes to be published and the academic distinctions to be won. There was no more talk of carrying the learning of the West to the East. “Les savants ressemblent beaucoup aux femmes, n’est-ce pas?” said General Bonaparte to Chief Physician Desgenettes. The doctor observed, “On s’amuserait un peu mieux avec les femmes.” Bonaparte explained, “C’est pour le chuchotage que j’en parle et pour les rivalités et les prétentions.”[693] A committee that Menou set up for introducing French industries refused to do so. They feared possible Egyptian competitors with French manufacturers and entered on a lengthy disputation with the general on economic doctrines.[694] The British blockade stopped all sea-borne trade and rendered nugatory all projects for the encouragement of commerce. The African traders stopped sending their caravans till they could ascertain the character of the new masters of Egypt. All circumstances, in short, were adverse to Menou. Time would have consolidated the durable foundations and destroyed all that was fragile, and time was denied him. To save Egypt for France was, for the First Consul, not only a point of policy, but also one of personal honour. The condition of the soldiers whom he had left behind contrasted with his own advent to supreme power. “Soutenir l’Egypte,” he wrote, “est la grande affaire à laquelle se subordonnaient tous les plans de guerre, toutes les propositions de paix.”[695] “L’Egypte,” he also wrote, “est un moyen de paix glorieux avec l’Angleterre, ou une atteinte à la puissance britannique.”[696] He made, accordingly, numerous efforts to pass reinforcements, munitions of war, news and encouraging messages to his soldiers in the East.[697] In January, 1800, he formed the project of a combined venture by the French and Spanish squadrons under Bruix, to reach Egypt.[698] In February, 1801, Admiral Gantheaume was nearly able to reach Alexandria, but became suddenly frightened and put back to Toulon. The First Consul pressed him to try again and authorised him to land his troops at Derne on the coast of Tripoli.[699] But Gantheaume could not do it, and deserved well the epitaph: “Ici gît l’amiral Gantheaume Qui, dès que soufflait le vent de l’Est De Brest voguait droit à Bertheaume Et, dès que soufflait le vent d’Ouest Revoguait de Bertheaume à Brest.”[700] But the First Consul was resolved not to give in. It is true that he decided, on the advice, probably, of Talleyrand,[701] to ratify the Convention of El-Arish.[702] But this was because Marengo had not been fought and won. The decision was against the grain, and the First Consul took care to refute the allegations in the despatches of Kléber, which had been intercepted and published by Great Britain.[703] He was, therefore, pleased at the non-execution of the Convention and the Battle of Heliopolis. He confirmed Menou—as the avowed enemy of the policy of evacuation—in the chief command.[704] The First Consul did not neglect to use diplomatic means. He endeavoured to force Britain by means of his superiority on the Continent to consent to a naval armistice, which was to allow him to send reinforcements to Malta and Egypt. But nothing came out of this negotiation.[705] He also tried to press the Porte to enter into negotiations with France. The Prussian, Spanish and Danish envoys in Constantinople brought the two governments into touch.[706] Talleyrand urged Ali Effendi, the Turkish ambassador, to enter into negotiations for peace. But the Turks made it clear that negotiations were impossible till after Egypt had been evacuated. This was the policy to which they steadfastly held.[707] Talleyrand, with his accustomed sophistry, pointed out to Ali that it was “contrary to the accepted diplomatic practice,” which was “que les demandes effectives de l’une soient contre-balancées par de pareilles demandes effectives de la part de l’autre.”[708] It was decided, moreover, to send Descorches—ex-French ambassador in Constantinople—to Egypt on a diplomatic mission.[709] His conduct was to be determined by the condition of affairs in that country. He should, in the first place, endeavour to persuade the Grand Vizier to consent to the possession of Egypt by France in return for an annual tribute and the recognition of the Sultan’s suzerainty. “Combien ne lui (Sultan) conviendrait-il pas de substituer à la domination de ces Beys insolents et souvent rebelles celle d’une nation grande, loyale, éclairée, industrieuse, qui respecterait les traités, qui tiendrait religieusement ce qu’elle aurait promis, qui bientôt ferait réfleurir ce pays depuis si longtemps dévasté et qui par sentiment comme par intérêt serait toujours disposée à prêter des secours utiles au Grand Seigneur.” But the Porte might, unfortunately, refuse to consider the question in this way and insist on evacuation pure and simple. Descorches was authorised to agree to this should he find that the plague had carried off 1500 soldiers and that no reinforcements had arrived before “floréal” (20 April-19 May, 1800): but he should postpone its execution till after the general peace and obtain, in return, the withdrawal of the Porte from the Coalition and the renewal of the old treaties between France and Turkey. Descorches remained in Marseilles three months, waiting for a ship. When he finally embarked, contrary winds threw him back into Toulon. There he found a letter from Talleyrand countermanding the mission, the government having heard of the Convention of El-Arish.[710] It might be generally said of this and other efforts for a rapprochement with the Porte that the First Consul set himself an insoluble problem; to conciliate the Turks without restoring Egypt, safeguard the existence of the Ottoman Empire while setting an example for making conquests at her expense. Neither the First Consul nor the Tsar Paul was inclined to bring forward a discussion on the partition of Turkey. Much has been written on the last few months of the reign of Paul. M. Tatistchef attributes the failure of the attempt to create a Franco-Russian alliance to the “gallophobe” or anti-revolutionary sentiment of most Russian diplomatists.[711] The views and intentions of the Tsar had been something of a mystery even to his son, Nicholas. When Brunov submitted to Nicholas a historical sketch[712] of his father’s policy, in which he states that Paul acted in the affairs of the Order of St. John from motives of “honour,” the Tsar wrote in the margin, “I now understand my father’s policy.”[713] It seems that what led to the wild misstatements on the concert between Paul and Bonaparte was a memorandum of Rostopchine on the partition of Turkey[714] and the “expedition” of Orloff’s Cossacks to India. M. Waliszewski, however, has made it clear that no concert could have taken place on that expedition.[715] In spite of Rostopchine’s memorandum, moreover, Russia insisted on the evacuation of Egypt and offered her services for the conclusion of peace between France and Turkey.[716] All talk, therefore, on the partition of the Sultan’s dominions was simply “de la politique de Magnificence,” as M. Driault describes it.[717] “Paul” wrote Sorel, “voyait l’intérêt de sa couronne à faire flotter de haut le pavillon russe dans la Méditerranée, et à se créer sur les rivages de cette mer et dans ses îles, des clients parmi les rois des anciennes dynasties.”[718] Nothing came therefore of all the attempts—diplomatic and naval—to save Egypt. The fate of the French colony was to be settled in the valley of the Nile itself. The feverish activity of Bonaparte, however, demonstrated to the British Government the great value he set on the possession of Egypt, and determined it to take active measures to baulk him in his ambition. To Henry Dundas was due the credit of this determination. We have seen elsewhere how that minister envisaged the question of Egypt in a way different from that of his colleagues. To him it was of first rate importance. The presence of the French there was in itself a great evil, an evil which gave him many a sleepless night.[719] He thought, indeed, with his colleagues that the French would finally succumb to disease and the attacks of the Turks and Mamelukes and hoped, with them, that the presence of General Koehler and his officers would prove sufficient to enable the Turks to make short work of the army of the Republic; but he differed from them in thinking of the possibility of giving a helping hand to the “agencies” of destruction. “If Buonaparte,” he wrote to Wellesley in October, 1799, “shall not soon die out of himself and by the forces of the country itself, it may be right to give him some help by sending a force from the Mediterranean for the purpose.”[720] The decision to refuse permission for the return of Kléber to his country was taken while Dundas was in Holland,[721] and it was partly to tranquillise him[722] and partly to keep the “divan” steady that the Government promised that the British naval force in the Levant should be reinforced and “that it is in contemplation to prepare such other means of annoying and distressing the enemy either from Europe or India or perhaps by an operation concerted from both sides” to co-operate with the Turkish army.[723] This was in December, 1799. The events of the year 1800 strengthened Dundas’ position. It became more and more clear that the Turks could do nothing. Koehler described their army as a collection of banditti. The Grand Vizier, its commander, was “so weak, so frivolous and childish that an infant three years old would have more foresight.”[724] “He is always very polite and, provided you will talk about his fine horses, the great superiority of the Turks on horseback, about his little fountain of water with a child’s boat in it, nothing can be more satisfactory than our conferences, but directly I touch upon anything which relates to military operations . . . he waives the conversation.”[725] He wasted Koehler’s time on an unworkable “invention” of his for the transport of cannon on horseback. J. P. Morier was amazed on entering the Grand Vizier’s tent for a Conference to find the dignitary amusing himself with buffoons.[726] He might get up one morning to find himself without a follower. He was shot at on more than one occasion.[727] The violent hostility displayed by the Tsar towards Britain was another important consideration. There was no fathoming the depths to which it might drag the Turks. The Porte, which attributed to the British Government the failure of the negotiations with Kléber,[728] might, in its ill-humour, listen to Russian overtures and declare against Britain. It might, in order to prevent an understanding between Paul and Bonaparte at its expense, throw in its lot with France and acquiesce in the loss of Egypt. The situation was so insecure that highly respectable British residents in Turkey imitated the Levantine practice of seeking foreign protectors, to the great indignation of the British Ambassador.[729] It was also evident that Egypt would be a stumbling-block in the way of any negotiation with France.[730] “We might,” wrote Dundas, “go to the utmost possible extent of our offers of compensation from the conquests we have made; France would say in reply, ‘if you think this is an equivalent for Egypt, we do not,’ . . . what answer can we make? It is in order to take away from the enemy all the advantages they expect from it, or, if they cannot be taken away entirely, to divide or (if I may use the expression) to neutralise them”[731] . . . that a British army had to endeavour to expel them from Egypt. The question was considered towards the end of September, 1801. On September 19th he wrote to Pitt: “The importance of expelling the French from Egypt is obvious; for it is clear that Bonaparte will subordinate every object to the retention of that colony. The danger to India may not be immediate, but it must be faced. Besides, our sacrifice of Turkish interests to those of Austria (by refusing to ratify the Convention of El-Arish) may induce the Sultan to bargain with France in terms most unfavourable to us. Or, again, France and Russia may plan a partition of the Ottoman Empire. The objections that we are pledged to do what we can for Austria and Portugal are not vital. For Portugal is safe while the Viennese Court opposes France; and by our subsidies and naval help we have borne our fair share in the coalition. Further efforts in that direction will be fruitless. We must now see to our own interests. By occupying all the ports of Egypt, we can coop up the French and force them to capitulate. Action must not be postponed for any consideration whatever.”[732] On the 24th there arrived a despatch from Elgin stating that the Reis Effendi “confidentially demanded from me to solicit as strong a corps as can be spared from the detachment which has come this spring to Minorca.”[733] This is important, for the Turks had rejected all “hints” to make such an application.[734] Much time was taken by the Cabinet in the discussion.[735] The arguments of Dundas convinced, as to the principle, even Windham, who stated that he was willing to depart “in this single case” from his “system” of confining British efforts to landings in France in co-operation with the Royalists.[736] But he rested his opposition to the scheme on the grounds of insufficiency of information and the unfavourableness of the season.[737] “I am quite sure,” he wrote, “that those who are full of confidence upon this point know very little of what they are talking about and calculate much more upon the sanguineness of their own wishes than upon any knowledge or information which they have upon the subject.”[738] Dundas, however, had his way. It was further decided that a contingent of Indian troops should attack the French from the Red Sea.[739] This idea seemed to have occurred to many, to Dundas,[740] Sidney Smith,[741] Elgin,[742] and others. Wellesley, replying to Elgin, humorously spoke of the Ambassador’s “wild project of sinking my host in the Red Sea without knowing whether it is to meet Pharaoh or the Israelites there.”[743] He approved of the principle, but could do nothing without co-operation from the Mediterranean.[744] In the meantime, there was no harm in harassing the French by “desultory operations.”[745] Unacquainted with the intentions of the home Government and desirous not to disperse his forces, he adopted the plan of concentrating the squadron of Rainier and the European troops at a point “from which they may be ready to issue with promptitude and facility either to the west coast of India or to the Red Sea or to any other quarter that the enemy may menace during the north- eastern monsoon.”[746] His choice fell upon Trincomali. He thought, moreover, that if the concentrated forces would not be needed for the defence of India or for Egypt, a “blow could be struck” at the Mauritius.[747] Early in February, 1801, however, he received Dundas’ instructions to send 1000 European troops and 2000 Sepoys.[748] Dundas embarked on the new venture with reprehensible levity. The force under Sir Ralph Abercromby, which was destined for Egypt, numbered about 15,000, while the French were estimated at 13,000—a gross miscalculation. The fortifications of Alexandria were described by Dundas as incomplete. The Minister also believed that the French were so anxious to return home that they might accept Abercromby’s offer of repatriation. Advance into the interior, after the capture of Alexandria, was not forbidden but deprecated.[749] Sir Ralph Abercromby did not sail directly to Egypt.[750] He landed on the coast of Asia Minor on 29th December, 1800. His object was to enable the troops to recuperate and to concert operations with the Turks: they to act from the eastern frontier of Egypt and he down the Eastern branch of the Nile.[751] But General Moore, after a visit to the Turkish headquarters, reported that “nothing could be done with the Turks.”[752] Abercromby reverted to his instructions.[753] The difficulties of the British commander were immense. He lacked most essentials and was in great doubt as to the reliability of the “Intercepted Correspondence.” The Porte issued firman after firman and no more. The Sultan urged his ministers to be more active and “emphatically accompanied his declaration by placing his hand on his yatagan,”[754] but even this did not improve matters. The force arrived at Abukir Bay on the 1st of March, but was not able to land till the 8th[755]. Menou had ample time to despatch reinforcements and oppose the landing. But he did nothing of the sort. He was deceived by the reports of the local commander[756] into blind security.[757] On the 13th March, the British moved towards Alexandria, but failed to carry the French strong positions to the eastward of the city,[758] and entrenched themselves opposite the French works. In the meantime Menou arrived at Alexandria with 10,000 men.[759] On the 21st of March was fought the greatest battle of the campaign.[760] Victory rested with the British, and Menou shut himself within the fortifications of Alexandria. The battle did not by itself decide the fate of the Colony. Moore was despondent and was in great doubt as to the issue.[761] But the French Commander-in-Chief played the Austrian and divided his forces. He issued absurd proclamations,[762] but gave Belliard, the commander in Cairo, no directions whatever.[763] General Hutchinson, the successor of Abercromby, who had died of wounds received in action, decided to leave a force to besiege Alexandria and to move with the main body of the Army towards the capital and reduce it with the help of the Grand Vizier. On the 27th June, Belliard capitulated.[764] He had under him about 12,000 men and hardly offered any serious resistance. “His surrendering,” wrote Moore, after inspecting the fortifications of Cairo, “seems to me one of the basest acts I have heard of.”[765] The truth of the matter was that the French were anxious to a man to go back to their country. They thought there was no dishonour in capitulating on the generous terms offered by the British—terms which reproduced those of the Convention of El-Arish. “Quand les armées croient possible de sortir d’une position critique avec une convention sans se déshonorer, tout est perdu,” wrote Napoleon.[766] The fall of Cairo brought about that of Alexandria. On the 2nd of September, Menou capitulated on the same terms as Belliard.[767] The Indian Contingent, disembarked at Cosseir, hurried northward, but arrived too late to take part in the campaign. Thus was ended the French occupation of Egypt. The success of the British troops was in great measure due to the faults of Menou and the lack of enthusiasm on the part of his followers.[768] “The whole story,” says Mr. Fortescue, “is a bitter commentary upon Bonaparte’s original expedition . . . a sufficient indication of the gambling spirit which was to be his ruin.”[769] An admirer of Napoleon concurs in this judgment. “It was the rashest attempt that history records: rasher even than Moscow,” M. Thiers told Nassau Senior. “It contained the germ of Napoleon’s subsequent life. It showed his marvellous powers of combination and execution and the wildness with which his imagination led him to despise moral and physical obstacles.”[770] But the short sojourn of the French in the Valley of the Nile had permanently affected its later history. The Mamelukes never recovered from the blows dealt them by the French. The Turks proved too weak to complete their destruction. An adventurer of genius turned the stalemate to his personal profit. The French Expedition introduced the West to the scientific study of the ancient monuments and language of Egypt and attracted upon it the gaze of an “interested” Europe. The Question of Egypt had begun. “L’Egypte,” wrote Joseph de Maistre in 1807, “est un théâtre sur lequel il faut ouvrir les yeux. Deux grandes puissances en ont tâté et l’une ou l’autre l’aura.”[771] [Footnote 650: It is not warrantable to state that Menou was insincere in his change of religion. “Quant à moi,” he once wrote, “je ne prétends nullement à l’honneur de la croix, je me contenterai tout simplement de ma petite religion mentale.” (To Lascaris, 21 messidor, VIII, 10 July, 1800. Rousseau, _Kléber et Menou_, p. 333.)] [Footnote 651: In the year VI. Rigault, _Menou_, p. 38.] [Footnote 652: Memorandum to Kléber, 6 Jan., 1800. Rigault, _Menou_, pp. 25-30.] [Footnote 653: Reynier, MSS. notes. Rigault, _Menou_, p. 266.] [Footnote 654: Proclamation, 5 messidor, VIII (24 June, 1800). Rigault, pp. 97-8.] [Footnote 655: Menou to Grand Vizier, 10 messidor (29 June, 1800). Rigault, p. 108. Menou to Berthier, 2 vendémiaire, IX (24 Sept., 1800). Rousseau, _Kléber et Menou_, p. 360.] [Footnote 656: Menou to Sir Sidney Smith, 1 messidor, VIII (20 June, 1800). Rigault, p. 106.] [Footnote 657: Rigault, _Menou_, p. 116.] [Footnote 658: “. . . J’ai reconnu que les Chrétiens étaient les plus vils et les plus méprisables habitants de ce pays-ci . . . Les Syriens . . . avares, fourbes, lâches, vindicatifs et vils au dernier degré . . . Nous sommes arrivés ici, ils ont cru ne voir en nous que des Mamelukes français et Chrétiens qui se substituaient à des Mamelukes Géorgiens et Musulmans.” Menou to Rampon, 5 nivôse, IX (26 Dec., 1800). Rousseau, _Kléber et Menou_, p. 381.] [Footnote 659: Zayaczeh to Poussielgue, 21 germinal, VII (10 April, 1799). Sulkowski, _Les Polonais en Egypte_, p. 204.] [Footnote 660: _Ibid._] [Footnote 661: Destaing, _Tableau de la Province de Rosetta_, 4 complémentaire, VIII (21 Sept., 1800). Rigault, p. 114.] [Footnote 662: Boyer to Menou, 29 messidor, VIII (18 July, 1800). Rigault, p. 114.] [Footnote 663: Rigault, _Menou_, p. 116.] [Footnote 664: _Ibid._, p. 117.] [Footnote 665: _Ibid._, p. 118.] [Footnote 666: Proclamation, 6 brumaire, VIII (5 Sept., 1800). Rousseau, _Kléber et Menou_, p. 344. “Soldats, sachez donc être généreux envers les Egyptiens, mais que dis-je? Les Egyptiens aujourd’hui sont Français, ils sont vos frères.” Rigault, p. 154.] [Footnote 667: “Ordre du jour,” 5 frimaire, IX (26 Nov., 1800). Rousseau, _Kléber et Menou_, p. 375.] [Footnote 668: Rigault, pp. 147-150.] [Footnote 669: Djabarti, VI, p. 259.] [Footnote 670: Reynier to Menou, 22 messidor, VIII (11 July, 1800). Rigault, p. 152.] [Footnote 671: Rigault, pp. 131, 165-180.] [Footnote 672: The authorities on this question are:— A mémoire by Tallien in the _Décade Egyptienne_, III, pp. 205-30. Articles by Lancret and Esteve in the _Déscription d’Egypte_, Etat moderne, I, three memoirs by Silvestre de Sacy in _Mémoires de l’Institut de France_, V and VII (especially valuable for exhaustive examination of Arab histories). Boutros Bey Gali, _Rapport sur les Documents relatifs à l’impôt foncier_; and Artin Pasha, _La propriété foncière en Egypte_.] [Footnote 673: The Arab “topographer,” Makrizi, quoted by Silvestre de Sacy, _Mémoires de l’Institut_, V, pp. 67-73.] [Footnote 674: “Dans un Gouvernement tout militaire, les chefs ont-ils pensé que des esclaves qui doivent tout à eux, qui n’ont aucune famille, et qui les regardent comme leur père, doivent être plus attachés à leurs personnes et moins dangereux dans les emplois de confiance, que ceux qui, ayant la faculté d’appuyer leur autorité de celle de leur famille, pourraient former des partis et se rendre indépendants.” Reynier, _L’Egypte après Heliopolis_, p. 64. Cf. Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire to his father, 5 mess., VII (23 June, 1799). _Lettres de E. G. Saint-Hilaire_, p. 122.] [Footnote 675: Djabarti, IX, pp. 87-90, gives a graphic picture of the conditions of the peasantry.] [Footnote 676: Napoleon’s _Campagnes d’Egypte_, I, p. 239 _sq._, and II, p. 149.] [Footnote 677: Reybaud, _Histoire Scientifique_, etc., VIII, p. 71.] [Footnote 678: Proclamation of 1 Nivôse, VIII (22 Dec., 1800). Rigault, _Menou_ p. 253.] [Footnote 679: Rigault, pp. 254-9.] [Footnote 680: Rigault, pp. 258-9.] [Footnote 681: Cf. Rousseau, _Kléber et Menou_, Introduction, p. lviii.] [Footnote 682: Reynier, _L’Egypte après Heliopolis_, p. 80.] [Footnote 683: _Campagnes d’Egypte_, II, chap. XV.] [Footnote 684: Sorel, _L’Europe et la Révolution française_, V, pp. 456-7.] [Footnote 685: Reybaud, _Histoire Scientifique_, etc., VIII, p. 93.] [Footnote 686: Menou to Thibaudeau, 7 frimaire, IX (28 Nov., 1800). Rousseau, _Kléber et Menou_, pp. 377-8. Tallien’s _Mémoire_ to Menou, 30 fructidor, VIII (17 Sept., 1800). Rigault, _Menou_, p. 139.] [Footnote 687: Reynier, MSS. notes. Rigault, p. 266.] [Footnote 688: The boy was born on 27 Nov., 1800. It was unfortunate that Menou should choose the name Soliman. It is, however, most flimsy evidence. Zayaczeh, the Governor of Rosetta where Menou’s wife lived, wrote the happy father “que Soliman est très joli, sa physionomie m’a paru absolument la vôtre.” Sulkowski, _Les Polonais en Egypte_, p. 424.] [Footnote 689: Rigault, _Menou_, p. 200.] [Footnote 690: Rigault, pp. 202-4.] [Footnote 691: _Correspondance de Napoléon_, VI, pp. 52, 53, 14 nivôse, IX (3 Jan., 1801).] [Footnote 692: Rigault, p. 205.] [Footnote 693: Gazel, _Le Baron Desgenettes_, p. 78.] [Footnote 694: Rigault, _Menou_, pp. 170-2.] [Footnote 695: To Lucien Bonaparte, 25 nivôse, IX (14 Jan., 1800). Lecestre, _Lettres Inédites_, I, No. 32.] [Footnote 696: _Correspondance_, VI, 3439.] [Footnote 697: _Correspondance_, VI, 4393, 4411, 4932, 5234, 5237, 5260; VII, 5403; and Lecestre, I, 29 and 32.] [Footnote 698: _Correspondance_, VI, 4494, 4612, 4691, 4701. Lecestre, I, No. 3.] [Footnote 699: _Correspondance_, VII, 5415, 5421, 5430, 5446. Guerin, _Histoire de la marine française_, III, pp. 633-8.] [Footnote 700: Arnault, _Souvenirs d’un Sexagénaire_, VI, p. 155.] [Footnote 701: Report undated and unsigned, Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1687.] [Footnote 702: To Talleyrand, 29 germinal, VIII (19 April, 1800). _Correspondance_, VI, 4721.] [Footnote 703: To Talleyrand. _Correspondance_, VI, 4800. To Desaix, 24 floréal, VIII (14 May, 1800). VI, 4799. To the Consuls, 25 floréal, VIII (15 May, 1800). VI, 4786.] [Footnote 704: _Campagnes d’Egypte_, II, p. 357.] [Footnote 705: Driault, _La Politique Extérieure du Premier Consul_, pp. 72-5. Bowman, _Preliminary Stages of the Peace of Amiens_, p. 49 _et seq._ L. M. Roberts, article in _Transactions of the Royal Historical Society_. New series, XV.] [Footnote 706: _Campagnes d’Egypte_, II, p. 371. Ranchon to Talleyrand, 27 brumaire, VIII (12 Nov., 1800). _Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie_, Supplements, 23. Grenville, 23 Feb., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 31.] [Footnote 707: “La France a toujours offert de traiter avec la Porte et la Porte a toujours refusé de se séparer de ses nouveaux alliés.” Rapport au Premier Consul, 21 thermidor, IX (8 Aug., 1801) Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1688.] [Footnote 708: Protocol of a conference between Talleyrand and Ali Effendi. 8 Oct., 1800. Enclosed in Elgin’s despatch, 11 Jan., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 31.] [Footnote 709: Instructions, 13 frimaire, VIII (4 Dec., 1799). Driault, op. cit., p. 47. Talleyrand to Kléber, 15 frimaire, VIII (6 Dec., 1799). The Consuls to Sultan, 7 frimaire, VIII (28 Nov., 1799). Talleyrand to Reis Effendi and to Grand Vizier, 16 frimaire, VIII (7 Dec., 1799). _Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie_, Supplements, 23.] [Footnote 710: Driault, op. cit., p. 48.] [Footnote 711: Tatistchef, _Paul et Bonaparte_, _La Nouvelle Revue_, 1887.] [Footnote 712: Brunov, _Aperçu des transactions politiques du Cabinet de Russie_, written in 1838 for Nicholas. _Sbornik_, XXXI, 1881.] [Footnote 713: Waliszewski, _Le fils de la Grande Catherine_, p. 334.] [Footnote 714: _Archives Russes_, 1878, I. _Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique_, 1889, pp. 3-12, without giving the name of the author.] [Footnote 715: Waliszewski, op. cit., pp. 512-15.] [Footnote 716: Instructions to Kolytchev, 19 Dec., 1800, n.s. Waliszewski, op. cit., p. 503. Report of Talleyrand, 27 ventôse, IX (17 March, 1801). _Sbornik_, LXX, pp. 60-1. Kolytchev to Talleyrand, 7-19 March, 1801. _Ibid._, p. 68.] [Footnote 717: Driault, op. cit., p. 150.] [Footnote 718: Sorel, _L’Europe et la Révolution française_, VI, pp. 109-11.] [Footnote 719: Dundas to Addington, 2 April, 1801. Pellew, _Life of Sidmouth_, I, p. 391.] [Footnote 720: Dundas to Wellesley, 16 October, 1799. B.M. Add. MSS. 37274, f. 267.] [Footnote 721: Dundas to Wellesley, 4 Sept., 1800. B.M. Add. MSS. 37274, f. 186.] [Footnote 722: Pitt to Dundas, 12 Dec., 1799. Stanhope, _Life of Pitt_, III, p. 204.] [Footnote 723: Grenville to Elgin, 15 Dec., 1799. F.O. Turkey, 24. Grenville to Elgin (private), 16 Dec., 1799. _Dropmore Papers_, VI, p. 79.] [Footnote 724: Koehler to Grenville, 11 July, 1800 (rec. 24 Sept.). F.O. Turkey, 27, Military.] [Footnote 725: _Ibid._] [Footnote 726: Intercepted Journal of Morier. _Courrier d’Egypte_, Nos. 70 and 73.] [Footnote 727: Intercepted Journal of Morier. _Courrier d’Egypte_, Nos. 70 and 73.] [Footnote 728: Elgin to Grenville, 22 July, 1800 (rec. 26 Aug.). F.O. Turkey, 30.] [Footnote 729: Elgin to Grenville, 25 March, 1801. F.O. Turkey, 31.] [Footnote 730: Pitt to Addington, 19 Aug, 1800. Pellew, op. cit., I, p. 262. Portland to Addington, 16 May, 1801. _Ibid._, I, p. 404. “Until the fate of Egypt is decided we can have no peace.” Dundas to Wellesley, 4 Sept., 1800. B.M. Add. MSS., 37274, f. 186. “If we get into negotiations with France, the evacuation of Egypt will be a great stumbling-block.” Instructions to Sir R. Abercromby, 6 Oct., 1800, W.O. VI, 21.] [Footnote 731: Dundas to Sir R. Abercromby, Dunfermline. _Sir R. Abercromby_, pp. 245-7. No date is given, but from internal evidence it was written after the decision to send an expedition. Mr. Fortescue, in his account of the British Expedition, omits all mention of this important factor.] [Footnote 732: Rose, _Pitt and the Great War_, p. 387.] [Footnote 733: Elgin to Grenville, 24 Aug., 1800 (rec. 24 Sept.). F.O. Turkey, 30. In September the Grand Vizier made a similar application to Koehler, but stipulated that the British should not interfere in domestic affairs. Koehler to Grenville, 19 Sept., 1800 (rec. 20 Nov., 1800). W.O., I, 344 and enclosures.] [Footnote 734: When Koehler spoke about troops from India, the Vizier “changed the subject,” when he spoke of troops from Minorca, the Vizier satisfied himself by asking “what” is Minorca, and observed, on being informed, that the troops had better remain there. Koehler to Grenville, 11 July, 1800 (rec. 24 Sept.). F.O. Turkey, 27, Military.] [Footnote 735: Dundas to Windham, 29 Oct., 1800. B.M. Add. MSS., 37879, f. 297. “Six weeks have been wasted.”] [Footnote 736: Windham to Blankett, 4 Nov., 1800. B.M. Add. MSS. 37880, f. 1.] [Footnote 737: Windham to Dundas, 22 Oct., 1800. B.M. Add. MSS., 37879, f. 17.] [Footnote 738: Windham to Blankett, 4 Nov., 1800. B.M. Add. MSS., 37880, f. 1.] [Footnote 739: Wellesley, _Despatches_, II, p. 416.] [Footnote 740: Dundas to Grenville, 13 Dec., 1798. _Dropmore Papers_, IV, p. 413.] [Footnote 741: Sidney Smith to Wellesley, 9 Nov., 1799. Wellesley, _Despatches_, II, p. 141.] [Footnote 742: Elgin to Mornington, 18 Nov., 1799. Wellesley, _Despatches_, II, p. 145. _Ibid._, 17 Nov. W.O., I, 344.] [Footnote 743: Wellesley to Elgin, 27 Oct., 1800. B.M. Add. MSS., 37282, f. 214.] [Footnote 744: Wellesley to Dundas, 18 May, 1800. _Despatches_, I, p. 587. _Ibid._, 5 March, 1800. II, p. 527. Wellesley to Sidney Smith, 26 April, 1800. W.O., I, 344.] [Footnote 745: _Ibid._] [Footnote 746: 9 July. _Despatches_, II, p. 311.] [Footnote 747: 5 Nov. _Ibid._, II, p. 413.] [Footnote 748: Dated 6 Oct., 1800. _Ibid._, II, p. 436.] [Footnote 749: Dundas to Abercromby, 6 Oct., 1800. W.O., VI, 21.] [Footnote 750: Ralph Abercromby to Dundas, 2 Nov., 1800. W.O., I, 344.] [Footnote 751: R. Abercromby to Elgin, 2 Jan., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 31.] [Footnote 752: Moore, _Diary_, I, pp. 392-4.] [Footnote 753: R. Abercromby to Dundas, 21 Jan., 1801. W.O., I, 345.] [Footnote 754: Elgin to Abercromby, 4 Dec., 1800. F.O. Turkey, 30.] [Footnote 755: R. Abercromby to Dundas, 16 March, 1801. W.O., I, 345.] [Footnote 756: Friant, the commander of Alexandria, reported that the invasion was a trivial affair and demanded a regiment of cavalry only. Rigault, pp. 240, 242.] [Footnote 757: Menou to Friant, 20 ventôse, IX (11 March, 1801). “. . . Si les Anglais veulent en faire autant tous les jours, ils mettront nos troupes en curée.” Rousseau, _Kléber et Menou_, p. 399. Menou to Reynier, 16 ventôse, IX (7 March, 1801). “Abercromby est peu entreprenant et Sidney Smith . . . un cerveau brûlé . . .” Rousseau, p. 398.] [Footnote 758: The British losses about 1300 and the French about 500. “Return of Casualties” in W.O., I, 345. Notwithstanding, Richardot, who wrote his _Memoirs_ in 1848 pretends that there was no battle at all (p. 388). This is a sample of the reliability of memoirs. Richardot was then too old.] [Footnote 759: Cartoons were distributed depicting him “hurrying” to Alexandria on the back of a tortoise and followed by a caravan of camels. On one was his wife; another was loaded with “ordres du jour”; a third with “nouvelles presque officielles”; a fourth with the “vérité toute entière.” The last three were sinking beneath the burden. Reybaud, _Histoire Scientifique_, VIII, p. 152.] [Footnote 760: Hutchinson to Dundas, 1 April, 1801. W.O., I, 345.] [Footnote 761: Moore to his father, 25 March, 1801. Lady Brownrigg, _Letters of Sir John Moore_, p. 111. Moore to his father, 1 April, 1801. _Ibid._, pp. 122-4.] [Footnote 762: There is a witty letter from René to Belliard, 25 germinal, IX (14 April, 1801). Rigault, p. 319, on the “musulman philosophy and language of their chief.”] [Footnote 763: Menou to Belliard, 30 germinal, IX (19 April, 1801). Rousseau, _Kléber et Menou_, p. 401.] [Footnote 764: Marten, A., Suppl., II, 502. B. VII, 22. Testa, II, 31.] [Footnote 765: Moore, _Diary_, II, p. 35.] [Footnote 766: _Campagnes d’Egypte_, II, p. 438.] [Footnote 767: Martens, A. Suppl., II, 509. B., VII, 29. Testa, II, 37.] [Footnote 768: Napoleon wrote to Fouché on 15 April, 1807, that it was on the strength of the misinformation in the Intercepted Correspondence that Britain invaded Egypt in 1801. He adds: “Aucune opération n’était plus hasardée que celle-là.” The attempt succeeded “parce qu’il était dans l’ordre du destin qu’elle devait réussir.” _Correspondance_, XV, 12361. Napoleon’s conversation with Reubell in 1802. _Nouvelle Revue retrospective_, 10 June, 1904, p. 374. The British expedition “was dictated by peculiarly the same ignorance, folly and presumption as had inspired all his (Dundas’) previous enterprises . . .” Fortescue, _History of the British Army_, IV, part II, p. 865. Cf. also pp. 845, 846.] [Footnote 769: Fortescue, op. cit., IV, part II, p. 864.] [Footnote 770: Senior, _Conversations with Thiers_, etc., I, pp. 198-9.] [Footnote 771: Joseph de Maistre to Rossi, 9-21 March, 1807. _Œuvres Complètes_, IX, p. 337.] IX THE FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE 1801-1802. The foundations of the peace of Europe were laid down in a spirit of rivalry that boded ill for the durability of the structure. The history of the treaties in the making is not less significant than that of the actual struggle which they were to terminate. The “Preliminaries of London” were the first of the instruments by which the general pacification of Europe was completed. They were the consummation of the various negotiations between Britain and France which took place in the years 1800 and 1801. Egypt, as has been shown, proved a stumbling block in the way of peace, and it was to remove the obstacle that Dundas urged the necessity of expelling the French from that country by force of arms. The new ministry under Addington resumed the negotiations just at the time when Sir Ralph Abercromby began to act. It was on the 21st March, 1801, that the new foreign secretary, Lord Hawkesbury, made official overtures to Otto, the French “Commissioner for prisoners” in London.[772] Hawkesbury hinted, according to French sources,[773] that France might keep Egypt while Britain should retain the conquests she had made at the expense of the Republic and her allies, Spain and Holland.[774] M. Otto, naturally, conceived the hope that Egypt could, after all, be “saved.” A friend of Mr. Addington even informed him that Britain had greater reason for fearing “disorders and revolutions” than for opposing the possession of Egypt, Belgium or Louisiana by France. The Republic, therefore, could “settle” that “affair” by an “amicable” arrangement with the sultan. This done, Britain could not with any “decency” raise the question.[775] It was rather bold of the friend of the Prime Minister to assert the disinterestedness of his country when some 15,000 British soldiers were fighting in the Nile Valley. An interview with Hawkesbury soon convinced Otto that Britain was not as powerless as his informant gave him to think. The British Minister made it clear that even if France consented to restore Egypt to her lawful sovereign, Britain would still retain “some” of her conquests.[776] In vain did the Frenchman protest against what he considered to be an unfair bargain and develop a plausible system of “barrière des intérêts” between the two countries. If only they could agree on allocating India to Britain and the Mediterranean to France, quarrels over the “ice-fields” of Newfoundland and the “fosse” of Chandernagor would no longer arise. Hawkesbury agreed that the principle was excellent, but, he added, the application was difficult.[777] The position of the British negotiator was daily growing stronger. On the 2nd of April, Nelson destroyed the Danish fleet in Copenhagen. Then came the news of the murder of the Tsar Paul. The event was a _coup de foudre_ for the “First Consul”: “Il comptait avoir trouvé dans Paul ce que Frédéric le Grand trouva dans Pierre III.”[778] Lord Hawkesbury no longer spoke of the possibility of the retention of Egypt by France, and, in communicating his terms to Otto even reserved the right of “reducing the concessions” should “good” news come from Egypt before the “signature.”[779] It was clear to him that “en stipulant ces clauses léonines, l’Angleterre nous signifiait nettement qu’elle se refusait à partager l’empire colonial et maritime.”[780] A painful suspense then ensued. All eyes were turned towards the operations in Egypt.[781] By the end of May, it was known in London that Abercromby had won the victory of Canopus. The news produced an outburst of joy which Otto, in his bitterness, described as “jactance impertinente” of a nation unaccustomed to triumphs.[782] The British Minister pressed him to conclude. France, he pointed out, was unmistakably losing Egypt. Further haggling, he added, would only mean a continuation of the carnage and a “stiffening” in the British attitude; and, he threatened, Abercromby’s victory in Egypt might herald the Third Coalition, as Nelson’s Battle of the Nile did the second.[783] Under the stress of the evil news from the East, the resistance of France subsided.[784] In a draft of a note of 23rd July to be presented by Otto, the First Consul resigned himself to the loss of Egypt.[785] On the 1st of October the preliminaries were signed.[786] “Egypt,” it was stipulated, “shall be restored to the Sublime Porte, whose territories and possessions shall be preserved entire, such as they existed previously to the present war.”[787] To Dundas this seemed a “childish” guarantee. He was not able to see what business it was of France to insert Egypt in the preliminaries, for the question was one for settlement between Britain, Russia and Turkey.[788] The late consul in Cairo, Mr. Baldwin, had written to Dundas that the reason that led to the sending of an army to Egypt should cause it to remain there. Baldwin refused to see in this any treachery against an ally, the Porte: Great Britain did not make great sacrifices for the _beaux yeux_ of the Grand Signor, but in defence of her interests, and was prepared to send him the annual tribute which the Mamelukes were supposed to pay but never did.[789] The First Lord of the Admiralty, the Earl of St. Vincent, held a different opinion. “I am bold to assert,” he wrote, “that the peace is the very best this country has ever made, and I consider it as the happiest event in my life to have contributed to so great a blessing.”[790] This, in truth, is bold, but in the sense not intended by the veteran admiral. It must have been obvious to the ministers that the terms did not offer desirable security in the East. One great means of obtaining it was by acquiring the “exclusive merit of the peace,”[791] which was to secure the integrity of the Turkish Empire. If it were not possible—and it could hardly have been—to treat the question of Egypt as one for settlement between Britain and Turkey, there was still time to prevent separate negotiations between the Sultan and the First Consul. The point was discussed by Otto and Hawkesbury. The Frenchman pretended that the “Preliminaries amply provided for the interests of the allies of King George,” that the First Consul was treating separately with them, that the presence of their plenipotentiaries in the Congress to be held at Amiens was sure to prove a cause of delay.”[792] Hawkesbury, however, refused to concede, and it was finally agreed that the allies of both countries should be admitted as “contracting parties.”[793] Two days after the conclusion, the Foreign Secretary informed Elgin that he had been able to secure the two objects nearest the Porte’s heart,[794] namely, the preservation of the integrity of its dominions and the formal recognition of the Septinsular Republic by France. In order to avoid delay, “His Majesty was induced to hope that the Porte would find no difficulty in entrusting the management of its affairs in the Congress of Amiens to the British Plenipotentiary, either by giving him full powers to that effect or by a declaration that it should accede to any stipulations into which he might enter at the Congress on its behalf.”[795] Hawkesbury, however, was calculating without the First Consul. There had been living in Paris since 1797 a Turkish Ambassador, Ali Effendi.[796] Ever since the outbreak of war between the Republic and the Sultan, he had been instructed on more than one occasion that no grounds for hostility would remain once Egypt was restored to her sovereign, the Septinsular Republic recognised, the claims of war-sufferers liquidated and the old treaties renewed.[797] These were in reality “general instructions,” but Ali, apparently, did not “formalise” and behaved as if they were “full powers” to make peace. “Ali can be considered in no other light than that of an instrument of France whose subserviency was limited only by the smallness of his mental capacity.”[798] “Il était tout à fait livré à la France.”[799] But these estimates are rather unfair. The truth of the matter was, as a French diplomat expressed it: “En outre que ses (Ali’s) lumières sont peu capables de porter le jour nulle part, il était timide comme tous les agents ottomans dans leurs rapports dont ils ne se dissimulent jamais les dangers pour leurs têtes, surtout lorsque se trouvant hors de portée de la scène très mobile de leur ministère ils ne peuvent juger l’accueil qu’ils recevront.”[800] Ali succumbed to ignorance and timidity. On the 9th October he signed with Talleyrand preliminaries of peace, by one of whose stipulations France undertook to evacuate and restore Egypt.[801] It was now some months since Belliard had capitulated in Cairo and Menou in Alexandria. The preliminaries extended to France the privileges of the most favoured nation treatment, but did not provide for the manner of concluding a definite treaty of peace. This was not, however, the end of the First Consul’s trickery. On 10th October, Talleyrand and the Russian Plenipotentiary, Morkoff, signed a secret convention, the third article of which stipulated that peace between France and Turkey was to be negotiated at Constantinople under Russian mediation.[802] Did this amount to a recognition of Russian preponderance in the Levant?[803] It was rather a platonic homage to a young and inexperienced autocrat. The idea of mediating between France and Turkey had been handed down from the previous reign. It was adopted partly from the desire to “have an ostensible share in the completion of an arrangement which interested Russia so nearly,”[804] partly in order to use Turkish affairs as a lever for the “restitution of Piedmont.”[805] But this was not all. There was a sincere desire on the part of Alexander to see general peace reign everywhere. “The set of young men” by whom he was surrounded and whom he was pleased to describe as the “committee of public safety”—their name was the “comité secret”—“had been almost equally zealous in promoting the intended peace with France, it being their professed system to endeavour to disengage the Emperor from all foreign concerns as well as connections and induce him to direct his principal attention to the affairs of the interior.”[806] This is why the “Comité secret” turned down a scheme of that inveterate self-seeker, Valerian Zouboff, for military intervention in Georgia.[807] Kotschubey, one of the Comité, expressed his relief that the Tsar decided not to “meddle” in “toutes ces sottises de Malte.” He was for “une ligne de conduite entièrement passive, au moins pour quelque temps.”[808] But what of Russia’s interests in the period of quiescence? The Minister trusted to Britain and France “neutralising” each other. “Les Anglais seuls balancent par leur prépondérance sur cet élément (mer) la suprématie des Français sur terre. Que cette balance disparaisse et rien ne s’opposera plus à ce géant.”[809] Let Britain do as she liked with Malta, let her even occupy the Ionian Islands or annex them,[810] let her destroy French influence in the Divan by the sending of “proper” ambassadors, appointed by Government and not by a company of merchants, and by the lavish use of presents;[811] but, lest Britain grew too powerful, the same speeches were made to France. The Tsar told Duroc—sent to congratulate him on his accession—that France should not give up Egypt (this was in June) and that the two powers should co-operate in curbing British ambition in the Near East.[812] The Tsar promised to use his influence to obtain for the Republic the privilege of navigation in the Black Sea, only asking that this might be kept secret.[813] There were now three courses before the Turks; to invest the British Plenipotentiary at Amiens with authority to act in their name; to ratify the preliminaries signed by Ali and enter upon separate negotiations with France, or to accept the Russian mediation and transfer the negotiations to Constantinople. To take one course to the exclusion of the others was fraught with danger. The Porte could not afford to alienate Britain, who held Egypt and had in the Mamelukes security for the Porte’s good conduct. Nor could it entertain the thought of incurring the wrath of the First Consul, whose friendship would prove a welcome check on British power and whose enmity should be dreaded. The Tsar, moreover, might soon weary of his quiet mood and was not likely to bear meekly the rejection of his proffered mediation. The only hope of safety lay in exploiting the rivalries of the three powers. The Porte ratified the Preliminaries of London[814] and endeavoured to persuade Elgin to consent to its ratifying Ali’s act “with some modifications.”[815] The British Ambassador refused. He pointed out that it had an excellent opportunity of displaying its real sentiments towards Britain, its dispositions towards the French, its sense of dignity and adherence to engagements—and all this could be done by granting Lord Cornwallis, the Plenipotentiary at Amiens, authority to act in its name.[816] He gave it the benefit of a commentary on the terms agreed to by Ali. There was no difficulty in showing that the Turk had no powers, that the instrument was otherwise unacceptable on account of faulty drafting and differences from the act concluded in London. To bestow on France, he concluded, privileges granted to the Allies was a “procedure” humiliating to the Porte, unjust to the Allies and unmerited by the French.[817] The Turkish ministers were loud in expressions of gratitude.[818] They informed the French Government of the intention to ratify the Preliminaries of Paris only in so far as they did not vary from those of London, and to invest Ali with full powers to attend the Congress of Amiens.[819] Their courage, however, was soon put to a severe test, for there arrived on the scene on the 26th of November, Colonel Sebastiani with[820] a copy of the Preliminaries and an autograph letter to the Sultan[821] which was to be delivered in person. The mission had other aims. The desire of the Consul—so ran the instructions to Sebastiani[822]—was to strengthen the Turkish Empire, to use her against Britain and Russia and to realise, in a different way, the designs, which were hoped for by the invasion of Egypt in 1798. “Il désire avant tout étendre l’influence française dans ces régions grâce à une augmentation du commerce et essayer de reconquérir l’Egypte et la route des Indes par les moyens pacifiques puisqu’il n’a pu les conserver par les armes.” Sebastiani was, therefore, to observe “dans quelles conditions s’effectuera l’évacuation de l’Egypte et comment se fait la remise de ce pays aux autorités ottomanes, quels sont leurs intentions, leurs projets pour l’avenir de ce pays.” He was also to make a special study of Russo- British relations and to disavow rumours of French complicity with various rebellious Pashas. The first “call”[823] of Sebastiani was on Tamara, the Russian envoy, who happened to be celebrating the coronation of the Tsar. The Russian showed a great deal of curiosity. Towards the end of the dinner he lost all self-control, condemned the convention by Morkoff, expressed his conviction that Codrika—the dragoman of Ali—was in French pay and “promised” that he would have him beheaded. On the next day, however, his language—now that he had apparently recovered from the effects of the banquet—was entirely changed. He pressed the Turks to be less obdurate on the point of etiquette and allow Sebastiani to deliver personally the letter to the Sultan. In return, he asked the Colonel to persuade the Porte to accept the Russian mediation. Sebastiani, naturally, refused to do this, for he was himself endeavouring—now by persuasion and now by threats—to press the Porte to negotiate separately with his country. It was finally agreed that the Sultan should meet Sebastiani “accidentally.” The Colonel presented himself in his uniform (not in the customary pelisse) delivered his letter and a “suitable” speech.[824] The Sultan enquired after the health of Bonaparte, and expressed his pleasure at Sebastiani’s speech. All this, no doubt, was bound to make a stir in Pera; but the fact remained that Ali’s “Preliminaries” were still unratified. The Russian envoy now tried what he could do. M. Tamara was a naturalised Russian of Greek origin. “Il a,” wrote Sebastiani, “toute la finesse et, j’ose dire, toute la fausseté de ses anciens compatriotes.”[825] He seems to have been particularly amenable to bribery.[826] It was on the 1st of December that he officially notified the Porte of the Russian mediation.[827] His position must have been embarrassing, for he had been pressing the Porte—in ignorance of Morkoff’s Convention—to disavow Ali on the grounds that what he had done was contrary to the Preliminaries of London. The Russian mediation was not less contrary. No wonder that Tamara could offer only “lame explanations” and unconvincing arguments.[828] The Turks, seeing that France was pressing one thing and the Russians another, turned towards Britain. Elgin advised them to thank Russia for her mediation, to observe that it would have been more “efficacious and beneficial” had it been accepted by France when she was in possession of Egypt, and to state that the negotiations—except for “trifling arrangements of trade”—would be completed in Amiens.[829] This communication infuriated Tamara. He complained that Russia had been treated like “an old shoe”; addressed “harsh” notes to the Reis Effendi, and warned him that any concessions granted to Britain in Egypt were sure to provoke French jealousy and a new attack on that province.[830] The language of his dragoman was not less violent. He used to declare “that Russia could have conquered Egypt as well as England, that she offered forces repeatedly, that any concession to England in Egypt must be common to all nations in amity with Turkey, that the restitution of Egypt by England was no favour, for Europe would not have permitted her to remain there.”[831] Elgin became so alarmed that he believed possible a concert between France and Russia for the partition of the Turkish Empire. He entreated Lord Hawkesbury to probe the matter before evacuating Egypt and Malta. In the meantime he advised the Porte to ask for delay.[832] These alarming reports arrived in London in the early days of the new year. They strengthened the suspicions entertained by the British Government with regard to the real intentions of Alexander. His language had not been clear and his somewhat ostentatious attitude of abstention lent itself to misrepresentation. They had hoped a great deal from the successor of Paul. They had believed that “no connection was more natural and more reciprocally advantageous—especially under present circumstances—than that between Russia and Britain.”[833] But Alexander did not respond to British advances. He refused to take part in the arrangement concerning Malta. In May, 1801, the British Ambassador was instructed to ascertain “whether the Russian Government was disposed to guarantee, jointly with His Majesty, the province of Egypt to the Turkish Government in the event of the Expulsion of the French . . . the guarantee might include mutual stipulations to settle the proportion of force which each party should be obliged to furnish hereafter, should Egypt be again attacked.”[834] The overture was, at any rate, premature: the French were still strong in Egypt. The Ambassador not only did not receive a reply but also suspected the causes of the delay.[835] In point of fact, the delay was due to Panin, who was trying to persuade the Tsar to consent to the joint guarantee.[836] “Malheureusement,” wrote Panin, “l’Empereur ne pense pas de même et j’ai vu le moment où il aurait consenti de plein gré à ce que les Français conservaient cette colonie”[837] The Minister was “anxious that His Imperial Majesty should take the leading part in the affairs of Egypt.”[838] The advocates of non-intervention defeated him and succeeded in having him dismissed. The overture of a joint guarantee was rejected on the grounds that the Triple Alliance between Great Britain, Russia and the Porte was still in existence and was sufficient.[839] The rejection of the overture, the Russian mediation and the violence of Tamara caused a very bad impression in London. The Cabinet was “disinclined” to believe in the “opinion” prevalent in Naples, Vienna and Constantinople to the effect that there was “a plan agreed upon between France and Russia for the dismemberment of the Turkish government.”[840] George III unburdened his soul to the sympathising Simon Vorontsoff.[841] The Ambassador found Hawkesbury “accablé de douleur.”[842] The Minister relieved his pent-up feelings in a strong official note.[843] The Russian mediation he described as “a most unfriendly act.” He trusted “that the Russian ministers would not permit the agents of His Imperial Majesty in foreign countries to become agents under the influence of other powers for the purpose of counteracting the just pretensions and rights of His Majesty.” Vorontsoff—a warm friend of Britain—was opposed to the policy of his country. But, being a true Muscovite, he attacked the policy of the Tsar in the person of Panin, to whom he attributed all that had taken place.[844] The ill-humour of the British Government was well-founded. The mere fact that Russia was pressing upon the Turks a third line of action meant a division of front that was sure to be to the profit of France. Efforts were now directed to obtain the admission of a Turkish Plenipotentiary into the Congress, either as an acceding or a contracting party.[845] If these succeeded, a separate peace between France and Turkey would be prevented, and the French Government would have failed “to obtain greater advantages with respect to the Porte than were held out to her by the Preliminaries.”[846] The efforts of French diplomacy, naturally, tended to prevent the admission of the Turks.[847] Lord Cornwallis raised the question in the sessions of 11th and 18th February, but on both occasions the French Plenipotentiary, Joseph Bonaparte, reserved his answer.[848] It was in the session of 21st February that he delivered what Talleyrand had instructed him to say.[849] Joseph declared that the Porte had ratified the Preliminaries of Paris in so far as they conformed to those of London, and so, as they entirely conformed, they stood ratified. The Porte was, moreover, anxious to conclude separately with the Republic and had invested Ali with full powers to that effect. He informed the British of this only “par honnêteté et déférence.” Only “direct negotiations” could lead to treaties of peace between such “great” powers as the Republic and Turkey, otherwise a state of war would only be replaced by a truce. To act differently was to place both powers in the second order. Both of them were, on the contrary, first-class states. The French delegate, however, expressed his readiness to give a pledge that nothing would be inserted in the treaty to be concluded with the Porte contrary to the Preliminaries of London. The statement of Talleyrand was a mass of sophistry and falsehood. Ali had been pressing to be allowed to proceed to Amiens since January, 1802. In the early days of January, M. d’Hauterive, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told him (Talleyrand being then in Lyons) that even if he went he could not be sure that Cornwallis or Joseph would consent to negotiate with him. He advised Ali to wait and spend the time “more agreeably in Paris.” The Turk expostulated on his difficult position. He even spoke in French, “with a facility and warmth that surprised M. d’Hauterive.”[850] His efforts proved of no avail.[851] M. Morkoff spoke to Talleyrand on the subject, but the French Minister pretended that “it would be too great a humiliation to the Turks not to allow them to negotiate separately.” The Russian could not help a smile.[852] The Greek dragoman, Codrika, mysteriously disappeared, and, without him, Ali—in spite of his warm effusions in French—could transact no business.[853] Lord Cornwallis pointed out the falsity of the French statements with regard to Ali,[854] so much so that Joseph had to request that Ali should write to the British delegate, “dans le sens des dispositions que j’ai communiqués dans ma dernière note à ce sujet.”[855] Talleyrand, however, could not be so easily put out. He now declared that Ali was instructed to act with Morkoff as well as Cornwallis, that all that was meant by this was “concert” and not “action simultanée,” otherwise the Russian envoy would also be admitted to the Congress.[856] On the 12th March, Joseph Bonaparte, acting on the discretion allowed to him,[857] “consented” to the admission of the Porte “as an acceding party.” There followed some debates on the insertion of the words “ally of Great Britain” with respect to the Porte.[858] The Treaty was finally signed on the 25th March. It was a great mistake on the part of the British Government not to insist on the admission of a Turkish delegate. By presenting an alternative demand, namely, the accession of the Porte, Britain facilitated the task of French diplomacy. Separate negotiations were made thereby inevitable. The ground had been prepared for them by a letter from Talleyrand to the Reis Effendi, dated the 18th January, 1802. The threat in it was unmistakable. “La Sublime Porte,” so it ran, “n’aurait à s’en prendre qu’à elle-même et à son refus de rétablir les anciens rapports qui subsistaient entre les deux états, si la France, justement blessée du peu d’égards que l’on aurait eus pour ses efforts et pour son amitié, faisait servir son influence et son immense force à faire tourner contre la puissance qui l’aurait dédaignée tous les événements politiques qui peuvent avoir lieu.”[859] “The principles of the Porte were staggered,” wrote Lord Elgin;[860] he had to use threats. He pointed out that—in the event of acquiescence in the demands of France—he would have to acquaint the naval and military commanders in the Mediterranean and gave the warning “that the fate of Egypt would be considered from a different point of view.”[861] But what could the Turks do? Great Britain had failed to obtain the admission of their delegate to the Congress. It was Lord Elgin, himself, who advised them to send to Paris or Amiens “some person well versed in the situation who, after examining everything would take a decision on the spot conformable to the state of affairs as he might find them.”[862] The advice was highly acceptable, the more so as Tamara had now come forward with a new Russian proposal. The protests of Great Britain and Simon Vorontsoff had had their effect in St. Petersburg. All that happened was laid to the account of the unfortunate Tamara. He was to be recalled, and, in the meantime, “severely reprimanded.”[863] “There never was a period,” wrote Lord St. Helens, “even while France and Russia were actually in a state of professional warfare, when the Government of this country was less disposed to place confidence in that of France, or even to keep up with that power the ordinary relations of amity and good correspondence.”[864] But still Russia could not forego all share in the Turkish peace. She now proposed that the Franco-Turkish negotiations should be transacted in Paris under the mediation and direction of the British and Russian ministers in that capital.[865] Elgin refused to support Tamara[866] and the Porte satisfied itself by promising to instruct its plenipotentiary in the sense of the Russian demand.[867] The British Cabinet was still in its ill-humour. It refused to accept the Russian proposal—on the grounds that even if it were reasonable in itself it came too late.[868] This was another blunder. For it enabled the First Consul to disregard the Russian demand and have a free hand with the Turk. Galeb, the Turkish Plenipotentiary, “was a man of much experience and apt in business, of clear judgment and an accurate knowledge of the views and interests of the Porte.”[869] But he received no support from the Allies of the Porte and had to consent to the according of the navigation of the Black Sea to France.[870] The Franco-Turkish Treaty was signed on the 25th June, 1802, and ratified in August of the same year.[871] This act concluded the pacification of Europe. Commenting on what had passed, Dr. Rose states that “Bonaparte saw that a separate treaty with the Sublime Porte would enable him not only to extract valuable trading concessions in the Black Sea trade, but also to cement a good understanding with Russia on the Eastern question, which was now being adroitly reopened by French diplomacy. Against the exclusion of Turkey from the negotiations at Amiens, Great Britain firmly but vainly protested. In fact, Talleyrand had bound the Porte to a separate agreement which promised everything for France and nothing for Turkey, and seemed to doom the Porte to certain humiliation and probable partition.”[872] This view is hardly tenable. As has been pointed out, the action of the First Consul was not exactly directed to “cement a good understanding with Russia” with a view to a probable partition of the Turkish Empire. He used Russia, on the contrary, to defeat British diplomacy and succeeded in depriving Britain of all the advantages which her occupation of Egypt ought to have conferred upon her. The victory of Bonaparte did not lie in the terms of the Treaty concluded with Galeb—for it does not contain anything contrary to the Treaty of Amiens—but in his contriving to deprive both Russia and Britain of the strong position in Constantinople which the Expedition to Egypt had enabled them to occupy, and to regain for France the place which her attempt to seize Egypt had caused her to lose. “I am anxious to declare positively,” wrote Lord Elgin, “as a conviction stamped upon my mind by the whole of this transaction, that Great Britain, in pursuing her general principles of politics, can never attempt to maintain a preponderating influence here or rely on any favour or return from hence for supporting this country after France shall resume her position and connection in Europe.”[873] [Footnote 772: Rigault, _Menou_, p. 237.] [Footnote 773: It is unfortunate that the British Archives possess very few documents relating to this negotiation.] [Footnote 774: Driault, _La Politique Extérieure du Premier Consul_, p. 165.] [Footnote 775: Otto to Talleyrand, 30 March, 1801. Rigault, _Menou_, p. 237.] [Footnote 776: Otto to Talleyrand, 3 April, 1801. Rigault, _Menou_, pp. 237-8.] [Footnote 777: Driault, _La Politique Extérieure du Premier Consul_, pp. 167-8.] [Footnote 778: Lucchesini to the King of Prussia, Paris, 17 April, 1801. Bailleu, _Preussen und Frankreich_, II, p. 38.] [Footnote 779: Hawkesbury to Otto, 12 April, 1801. F.O. France, 66.] [Footnote 780: Otto to Talleyrand, 14 April, 1801. Rigault, _Menou_, p. 238.] [Footnote 781: Otto to Talleyrand, 24 April, 1801. Rigault, op. cit., p. 239. Lady Malmesbury to Minto, 7 May, 1801. _Life and Letters of the Earl of Minto_, III, p. 217.] [Footnote 782: Driault, op. cit., p. 185.] [Footnote 783: Driault., op. cit., pp. 185-6.] [Footnote 784: On the 9th messidor (9 June, 1801) Reynier, just arrived in France from Egypt, whence he had been expelled by Menou, sent in an account of the desperate situation of the French. Rigault, _Menou_, p. 378.] [Footnote 785: _Correspondance de Napoleon_, VII, 5649. Also Napoleon to Talleyrand, 16 Sept., 1801. _Correspondance_, VII, 5749.] [Footnote 786: A copy printed by A. Strahan, London, 1801, is found in F.O. France, 59. Martens, A. Suppl., II, 543; B., VII, 377. D. Clercq, I. p. 464.] [Footnote 787: Article 5.] [Footnote 788: Dundas to Grenville, 10 Oct., 1801. _Dropmore Papers_, VII, p. 57.] [Footnote 789: Baldwin to Dundas, 27 Sept., 1801. _Political Recollections_, pp. 172, 173, 174. The success in Egypt did not whet the appetite as much as would be expected. It is rare to find expressions of opinion on the desirability of annexation. One of these was that of Colonel Anstruther. See his letter to Brownrigg, 20 April, 1801. _Dropmore Papers_, VII, p. 10.] [Footnote 790: St. Vincent to Earl of Uxbridge, 12 Oct., 1801. _Letters of St. Vincent_, I, p. 285. Navy Records Society Publications, 55.] [Footnote 791: “. . . It appears both just and reasonable that as His Majesty had the exclusive merit of rescuing Egypt from the hands of the French and thereby preserving the integrity of the Turkish dominions that he should likewise have the exclusive merit of the peace by which the integrity of these dominions were to be stipulated . . .” Hawkesbury to St. Helens, 30 March, 1802. F.O. Russia, 50.] [Footnote 792: Otto to Hawkesbury, 8 vendémiaire, X (30 Sept., 1801). F.O. France, 66.] [Footnote 793: Hawkesbury to Otto, 30 Sept., 1801. F.O. France, 66. Article 15 of the Preliminaries.] [Footnote 794: The Porte had requested Elgin to inform his government that the objects of the Porte were, (1) the restoration of Egypt; (2) the recognition of the Septinsular Republic. Elgin to Hawkesbury, 1 June, 1801 (recd. 17 July). F.O. Turkey, 32. To these the Turks added a third, namely, France to indemnify the Turks for public and private property lost in Egypt. Elgin to Hawkesbury, 1 Sept., 1801, (recd. 2 Oct.). F.O. Turkey, 32.] [Footnote 795: Hawkesbury to Elgin, 3 Oct., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 796: M. Herbette has written a charming book on the anecdotal history of Ali Effendi’s embassy. At the end he expressed curiosity to know the ultimate fate of Ali. Ali was beheaded in 1809 (Labour-Maubourg to Champagny, 13 July, 1809. _Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie_, 219).] [Footnote 797: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 22 Nov., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 798: Jackson to Hawkesbury, Paris, 20 Feb., 1802. F.O. France, 61.] [Footnote 799: Morkoff to Kotschubey, 20 March-1 April, 1802. Sbornik, 70, p. 387.] [Footnote 800: Descorches to Bonaparte, 29 messidor, VIII (17 July, 1800). Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1688.] [Footnote 801: A copy is found in F.O. Turkey, 33. Martens, A, Supplement, II, p. 556. De Clercq, I, 473. De Testa, I, p. 495.] [Footnote 802: Martens, _Traités de la Russie_, 13, pp. 266-7. De Clercq, I, p. 474.] [Footnote 803: Driault, _La Politique Extérieure du Premier Consul_, p. 211.] [Footnote 804: St. Helens to Hawkesbury, 5 Feb., 1802. F.O. Russia, 50.] [Footnote 805: Morkoff to S. Vorontsoff, 29 Dec., 1801-10 Jan., 1802. _Archives Vorontsoff_, 20, p. 96.] [Footnote 806: St. Helens to Hawkesbury, 10 Sept., 1801. F.O. Russia, 49.] [Footnote 807: “Conference” of 13 Aug., 1801. Nicholas Mikailovitch, _Le Comte Paul Stroganoff_, II, pp. 49-50.] [Footnote 808: Kotschubey to S. Vorontsoff, 9 Nov., 1801. _Archives Vorontsoff_, 18, pp. 248-9.] [Footnote 809: Kotschubey to S. Vorontsoff, 10 Dec., 1801. _Archives Vorontsoff_, 18, pp. 258-9.] [Footnote 810: St. Helens to Hawkesbury, 17 Feb., 1802. F.O. Russia, 50.] [Footnote 811: Kotschubey to S. Vorontsoff, 10 Dec., 1801. _Archives Vorontsoff_, 18, pp. 258-9.] [Footnote 812: Duroc to Bonaparte, St. Petersburg, 16 prairial, IX (4 June, 1801). Sbornik, 70, p. 177.] [Footnote 813: Caulaincourt to Talleyrand, 6 germinal, X (26 March, 1802). Sbornik, 70, p. 372.] [Footnote 814: Act of Ratification, 7 radjab, 1216 (12 Nov., 1801). F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 815: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 22 Nov., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 816: Memorandum to the Porte, 9 Nov., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 817: On the margin of the Preliminaries of Paris. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 818: “Memorandum of thanks,” 12 Nov., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 819: The Reis Effendi to Talleyrand, the Kaimakam to Bonaparte, 12 Nov., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 820: In many books this mission is either omitted or confused with the other and more famous mission of Sebastiani. Thiers omits all mention of it. Campi, _Vie de Sebastiani_, gives a confused account. There is an excellent account by Coquelle in the _Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique_ for 1903, No. 3, pp. 439-53.] [Footnote 821: Bonaparte to Selim, 19 vendémiaire, X (11 Dec., 1801). _Correspondance_, VII, 5797.] [Footnote 822: Coquelle, _Rev. d’His. Diplomatique_, 1903, No. 3, pp. 441-2.] [Footnote 823: This account is based on the report of Sebastiani found in _Arch. Nat._ AF., IV, 1688.] [Footnote 824: Coquelle, op. cit., p. 449.] [Footnote 825: _Corps diplomatique en Constantinople_ (by Sebastiani (?), date (?) 1801.) Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1688.] [Footnote 826: The same document states that Tamara sold his consent to a new tariff for a sum of money, that he hushed an attack made upon him and friends by a Turkish crowd for money.] [Footnote 827: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 2 Dec., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 828: _Ibid._] [Footnote 829: _Ibid._] [Footnote 830: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 2 Dec.. 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 831: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 12 Dec., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 832: Elgin to Hawkesbury 10 Dec., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 833: Hawkesbury to S. Vorontsoff, 8. Jan., 1802. F.O. Russia, 50.] [Footnote 834: Hawkesbury to St. Helens, 19 May, 1801. F.O. Russia, 48.] [Footnote 835: St. Helens to Hawkesbury, 10 July, 1801. F.O. Russia, 48. _Ibid._, 29 July, 1801. F.O. Russia, 48.] [Footnote 836: Panin to Vorontsoff, 7 July, 1801. _Archives Vorontsoff_, XI, p. 145.] [Footnote 837: Panin to Vorontsoff, July, 1801. _Archives Vorontsoff_, XI, p. 145.] [Footnote 838: St. Helens to Hawkesbury, 10 Sept., 1801. F.O. Russia, 49. Panin to Vorontsoff, 9-20 April, 1800. _Archives Vorontsoff_, XI, p. 113.] [Footnote 839: Kourakim and Panin to St. Helens, 30 July, 1801. F.O. Russia, 49.] [Footnote 840: Hawkesbury to St. Helens, 29 Jan., 1802. F.O. Russia, 50.] [Footnote 841: “Précis d’entretien à Weymouth,” 27 July-8 Aug., 1801. _Archives Vorontsoff_, XI, pp. 216-23.] [Footnote 842: S. Vorontsoff to Tsar, 27 Dec., 1801-8 Jan., 1802. _Archives Vorontsoff_, X, p. 409.] [Footnote 843: Hawkesbury to Vorontsoff, 8 Jan., 1802. F.O. Russia, 50.] [Footnote 844: S. Vorontsoff to A. Vorontsoff, 9 Oct., (n.s.) 1801. _Archives Vorontsoff_, X, p. 136. 2-14 Aug., 1801, pp. 113-19. 5-17 Nov., 1801. In this he calls Panin “Traître,” p. 149. S. Vorontsoff to Kotschubey, 5-17 Nov., 1801. _Archives Vorontsoff_, XI, p. 351. 17-29 Jan., 1802, p. 357.] [Footnote 845: Hawkesbury to Cornwallis, 1 Jan., 1802. F.O. France, 59.] [Footnote 846: Cornwallis to Hawkesbury, 28 Feb., 1802. F.O. France, 60, and _Correspondence of Lord Cornwallis_, III, p. 462.] [Footnote 847: Cf. Talleyrand to Joseph, 22 Jan., 1802. Du Casse, op. cit, 3, pp. 178-9.] [Footnote 848: Joseph Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 12 Feb., 1802. Du Casse, _Négociations Relatives aux Traités d’Amiens_, etc., III, pp. 226-7. Protocol, 18 Feb., 1802. F.O. France, 60. Du Casse, op. cit., III, pp. 250-1.] [Footnote 849: Talleyrand to Joseph, 18 Feb., 1802. Du Casse, op. cit., pp. 259-60. Protocol, 21 Feb., 1802. F.O. France, 60, and Du Casse, op. cit., III, p. 274.] [Footnote 850: D’Hauterive à Talleyrand, 19 nivôse, X (8 Jan., 1802). _Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie_, Supplements, 23.] [Footnote 851: Ali to Cornwallis, 27 Feb., 1802. F.O. France, 60. Jackson to Hawkesbury, 10 March, 1802. F.O. France, 61.] [Footnote 852: Morkoff to S. Vorontsoff, 8-20 March, 1802. _Archives Vorontsoff_, XX, pp. 122-3.] [Footnote 853: Jackson to Hawkesbury, 2 Feb., 1802. F.O. France, 61, and Hauterive to Talleyrand, 25 nivôse, X (14 Jan., 1802). _Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie_, Supplements, 23. Codrika was held to be responsible for the Preliminaries of Paris and was sure to have his head cut off. (This certainly in the event of his going to Constantinople, but it is no reason for his disappearance in Paris.)] [Footnote 854: Protocol, 9 March, 1802. Du Casse, op. cit., III, pp. 311-14.] [Footnote 855: Joseph to Talleyrand, 6 March, 1802. Du Casse, op. cit., III, p. 288.] [Footnote 856: Talleyrand to Joseph, 8 March, 1802. Du Casse, III, p. 309.] [Footnote 857: Talleyrand to Joseph, 10, 12 March, 1802. Du Casse, op. cit., III, pp. 314, 318.] [Footnote 858: Talleyrand to Joseph, 16 March, 1802. Du Casse, op. cit., III, p. 323. Joseph to Talleyrand, 24, 25 and 26 March, 1802. Du Casse, op. cit., III, pp. 336-9. Cornwallis to Hawkesbury, 17, 20 March, 1802. F.O. France, 60.] [Footnote 859: Talleyrand to Reis Effendi, 18 Jan., 1802. Driault, _La Politique Extérieure du Premier Consul_, p. 207. Elgin to Hawkesbury, 25 Feb., 1802. F.O. Turkey, 35.] [Footnote 860: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 5 March, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 35.] [Footnote 861: _Ibid._] [Footnote 862: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 5 March, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 35.] [Footnote 863: St. Helens to Hawkesbury, 23 Feb., 1802. F.O. Russia, 50.] [Footnote 864: St. Helens to Hawkesbury, 17 Feb., 1802. F.O. Russia, 50.] [Footnote 865: St. Helens to Hawkesbury, 5 Feb., 1802. F.O. Russia, 50. Tamara to Porte (no date) enclosed in Elgin’s despatch, 31 March, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 35.] [Footnote 866: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 31 March, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 35.] [Footnote 867: Tamara to Elgin, 6-18 March, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 35.] [Footnote 868: Hawkesbury to St. Helens, 30 March, 1802. F.O. Russia, 50.] [Footnote 869: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 11 March, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 35.] [Footnote 870: Morkoff to Tsar, 18-30 April, 1802. Sbornik, 70, pp. 395-6, about his promise to Talleyrand to support claim to navigation of Black Sea. Merry to Hawkesbury, 30 June, 1802. F.O. France, 62.] [Footnote 871: Martens, A. Suppl., III, p. 210; B., VII, p. 416. Clercq, I, p. 588. Testa, II, p. 146.] [Footnote 872: J. H. Rose, _Napoleon_, New Edition, I, p. 343.] [Footnote 873: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 5 March, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 35.] X THE FIRST BRITISH OCCUPATION OF EGYPT 1801-1803 The general success of British policy has misled continental writers as to its essentially conservative trend. One searches in vain for schemes of expansion or empire; for “it was the active far-seeing and ambitious statecraft of France which opened up new arenas of strife and ambition, while Britons followed doubtfully at first, but in the long run doggedly. Dupleix, Montcalm, and Napoleon—to mention the greatest names—precipitated a conflict which was ultimately to turn to the profit of the Sea Power and to plant the Union Jack on many lands.” “C’est ainsi que presque toujours nous avons ouvert les voies à des nations, non plus ingénieuses mais plus persévérantes et plus sages que nous.”[874] writes M. Pelissier, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and he asks dolefully, “Serons-nous donc toujours destinés à montrer comme Moïse le chemin de Terre Promise sans qu’il nous soit jamais donné de nous y établir solidement?”[875] There can be no better illustration of that characteristic of British foreign policy than the scrupulous abstention from exploiting the Turko- British Alliance for commercial privileges in the Levant.[876] Lord Elgin, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, who drew part of his appointments from the Levant Company, refrained from seeking openings for British trade either in the Red or the Black Seas. In point of fact, Britain did not press the demand for permission to navigate in the latter sea till after France had obtained it by her treaty with Turkey of 1802.[877] The far-reaching policy of Wellesley—probably the first of British statesmen to think, as it were, in terms of imperial geography—in establishing relations with the Shah of Persia, the Imam of Muscat and other Arab chiefs was flatly opposed by the Directors of the Company.[878] Enterprises were dreaded as likely to produce revolutions, and revolutions were regarded as having no other but injurious effects. “Egypt,” wrote Captain Blankett to Windham from the Coast of East Africa, “must not remain in an active state or in active hands.”[879] This well expresses the thought of the British Cabinet. There is evidence that the ultimate fate of Egypt was discussed long before it was decided to send an army to dislodge the French. The decision of Pitt, Grenville and Dundas, as Lord Elgin then understood it to be, was that it would be the wish of His Majesty’s Government to restore Egypt to the Turks.[880] There was no departure from this principle after the arrival of the news of the first successes of Sir Ralph Abercromby. The Russian Ambassador, Simon Vorontsoff, represented to Thomas Grenville, brother of Lord Grenville, the necessity of “not entirely abandoning” the coast of Egypt.[881] Lord Grenville, now out of office, recommended Addington, the new Prime Minister, to adopt the policy of the provisional occupation of Alexandria and other posts.[882] The new Cabinet “entirely concurred,”[883] and Hutchinson and Elgin were both instructed to that effect.[884] But, it should be remembered, the provisional occupation had been intended from the beginning.[885] No decision, however, was taken as to the settlement of the affairs of the country after the expulsion of the French. The only guide the British Commander had was a private letter from Huskisson.[886] The Under-Secretary conveyed to Abercromby “various suggestions” which had occurred to him in consequence of conversations he had had with a “well- informed gentleman.” Huskisson recognised that a coalition between the Beys and the French or even their neutrality would add to the difficulties of the campaign, but feared that “any intercourse” with them might arouse the “jealousy” of the Turks, the allies of Britain. He, therefore, recommended “caution and management.” It was reasonable also to assume that the Beys would not voluntarily declare against the French, for the Turks had “very foolishly” made clear their intention of destroying the power of the Mamelukes. It was probable, in consequence, that the “Cophts,” the Greeks and the mass of the people would side with the Beys against the Porte. It was also almost certain that none would respond to any promises, which the Grand Vizier might with “Turkish treachery” make, till assurances had been given by the British to see justice done. Were they to give these assurances or not? Huskisson observed that it was a “most delicate affair,” that Abercromby should obtain “much information” from Sir Sidney Smith, that if he could secure the Vizier’s concurrence in detaching the Mamelukes from France it would be well; but should the Turk, however, “prove headstrong and blind,” the success of the expedition should by no means be jeopardised through the “vanity, ignorance and arrogance” of the Turkish Councils and Turkey should be saved in spite of herself. This letter makes it clear that the British Government was not ignorant of the problem. The resolution of the Porte to have done with Mameluke usurpation had been reported by Elgin and by Tamara, the Russian envoy at Constantinople.[887] The strained relations between the Turks and the Beys in the Grand Vizier’s camp had been described by General Koehler, then attached to Turkish headquarters.[888] Ignorance, therefore, was no plea for refusing to face a difficulty. It was no solution to recommend officers not to meddle in Turkish domestic affairs, for an army operating in a country could not very well avoid interfering in matters affecting the success of its operations and even its very security. Events proved this to be so. Abercromby, before setting foot in Egypt, wrote Mourad—the Bey who had made his peace with the French—a “general letter of friendship” without making any specific promises.[889] Sidney Smith had been occupied all through 1800 in establishing connections with the Beys in Egypt and Syria.[890] His chief agents in this were the Austrian, Hammer,[891] and his own secretary, Keith. These activities gave umbrage to the Porte. Hammer was “banished” by the British commander and Sidney Smith was sent back to his ship.[892] But Elgin persuaded the Porte to issue a proclamation promising forgetfulness of the past and rewards for good conduct.[893] This, however, could have hardly tranquillised Mourad. His position was difficult. He aspired undoubtedly to regain his old power, but he was weary of war and by no means certain of the ultimate triumph of the enemies of France. He feared that the Turks might bestow their favours on his rival, Ibrahim, who had been with them since 1798. He feared still more that they would play false with Mouradites and Ibrahimites alike and take vengeance for past insults and disobedience. “The arrow,” as he put it, “that struck the eagle was an arrow made of an eagle’s feather.”[894] The assurances of the British, however, determined him to cast in his lot against the French. His scheme,[895] according to Elfi, was to propose the re-establishment, as far as possible, of things as they were in 1798; the Beys were to pay the Porte an annual tribute of 1200 purses, besides 30,000 purses for the expenses of the war (in six annual instalments), the British were to guarantee this settlement in return for the possession of Alexandria, Rosetta and Damietta. Mourad was actually moving towards the scene of operations when he died of the plague. His successor, Tambourdji, was a fine warrior but devoid of the judgment which misfortune had ripened in his predecessor. He sent a confidential agent to Sir John Hutchinson and deemed the assurances received sufficient. He joined the British Army on the 15th May, 1801.[896] It is important to enter closely into the motives of Hutchinson and to determine, as far as is practicable, the nature of the engagements he undertook. He himself endeavoured later to justify his conduct on grounds of military expediency.[897] But his earlier despatches clearly show that he looked beyond the needs of the hour and tried to settle the affairs of Egypt for the future. Thus before he left his camp near Alexandria on the march towards Cairo he wrote[898] Dundas that he was in doubt as to the real attitude of Mourad, that the Bey seemed to be the doubtful ally of the French, and certainly not the friend of the Turks, though he had lately sent a confidential messenger to the Capitan Pasha soliciting oblivion and pardon, which were granted—probably with as much sincerity as they were asked. Hutchinson went on to make the significant observations that the Turks were in a “deplorable state,” that their Empire was falling to pieces, that he “thought no event so unlikely as that Egypt would long continue to belong to Turkey, that it would probably fall to the lot of some European Power.” He expressed identical views in other reports.[899] In a letter[900] to Lord Elgin, he made a fuller statement. His position was most difficult. “The Turks without money, without provisions, without resources of any kind, pillage or plunder everything that fall into their hands.” Any interference on his part would arouse their enmity and any acquiescence would alienate the “natives” from the British. The Sultan’s dominion had ever been nominal “almost since the time of Selim.” Great Britain, therefore, would probably give him “a hold of Egypt” which he never before possessed. But that “temporary hold” would rather weaken than strengthen the Turkish Empire. The point was that some European power, probably France, would step in as easily as it did in 1798. How was the danger to be averted? By the indefinite occupation of Alexandria? Hutchinson foresaw great objections in this solution. In the first place, it would entail no less than 7,000 or 8,000 men. In the second place, the British force must have an unimpeded communication with the interior and with the mouths of the Nile. The inference to be drawn from this, but which he avoided drawing, was that Rosetta and Damietta and posts in the interior would have to be garrisoned as well as Alexandria. He feared that the “pride, ignorance and jealousy of the Turks would prevent them ever agreeing to these concessions, that the problem of Egypt would be an insoluble one and that the Porte would soon revert to its “old and natural connection with France.” The proper interpretation of this statement is that the British commander was convinced that the Turks would prove incapable of defending the country against France. At the same time he was averse from laying the burden on his own country. There was nothing for it but to entrust the Beys with that duty. Hence his engagements to them. To believe Hutchinson, “he never entered into any stipulations with the Mamelukes which were not reasonable in the extreme. They had desired nothing but protection for their lives and security for their properties under the guarantee of the British government.”[901] But it is certain, however, that the letter which he wrote them on the 5th May, 1801,[902] while it is vaguely worded, “opened a large field to their expectation.”[903] A passage like this, . . . “We have solely come to drive out the French usurpers who have overset and ruined the country and to establish all in those possessions and rights, which belonged to them,” can lend itself to any interpretation. The Beys understood British promises to mean “an ample indemnification for their losses and the full restitution of their property, power and influence in the country”[904] and emphatically called the letter of the 5th May “their charter.” Elfi was right to criticise the affair as “done without union, order, or any definite objects.”[905] The promises were not immediately carried out. The exigencies of the command allowed Hutchinson time for no more than a “talk” with the Capitan Pasha. The Turk merely gave “solemn assurances.” After the surrender of Cairo, the Mamelukes pressed for the performance of the engagements and pointed out that the Turks were manifesting the “most hostile intentions” against them. The British general accordingly saw the Capitan Pasha, but only obtained “fine exclamations.”[906] On the evening of the 9th July, 1801, he brought the subject before the Grand Vizier. “His Excellency” expressed his satisfaction, accepted his intercession and promised to restore the Beys to their villages and properties. The Capitan Pasha concurred in the views of his colleague and added a “panegyric” on Hutchinson’s character and the “honesty of the British Government.” These excellent professions were, unfortunately, belied by unmistakable symptoms of hostility towards the Beys. The latter, on the 14th July, made bitter representations and announced the intention of withdrawing to Upper Egypt, if justice were not meted out to them. It was most important to avert this step for, it is to be remembered, Menou was still holding out in Alexandria and French reinforcements were in daily expectation. The British Commander, accordingly, “determined to go through with the business and convince the Turks that he was no longer to be trifled with.”[907] What passed between him and the Turks is not exactly known. Colonel Anstruther, who was employed in the business, outlined in a later statement[908] Hutchinson’s plan as follows:— 1. That the Turks were to possess exclusively Alexandria, Rosetta and Damietta and keep a garrison in the Citadel of Cairo. This condition, however, is not stated so definitely in the general’s reports. “He did not touch upon Alexandria and Rosetta for obvious reasons.”[909] The “obvious reasons” are the instructions from the Government to occupy them himself.[910] 2. That the Pasha should be appointed as formerly by the Porte, that he was to decide all disputes betwixt the Beys, appoint their chiefs in the event of a vacancy, and have the general government of the country. 3. That the “miri” or land-tax should be augmented and paid without any deductions whatever to a Turkish receiver-general. 4. That the Beys should be reinstated in all their properties, have the entire management of them, subject, however, to certain limitations with regard to the rents to be levied on the peasants and under the obligation of keeping up a certain number of men in proportion to their respective properties. The Beys, after some bickering, accepted these terms. The Turks, according to British reports, assented to them, after some hesitation, without reserve.[911] But in his reports to Constantinople, the Grand Vizier made out that he did nothing of the sort. “En considération des services qu’il (Hutchinson) avait rendus, le Grand Vizier n’a pas répondu à sa note par un refus direct pour ne pas lui faire de la peine, mais il lui adressa un billet en réponse où, sans entrer en détail, il lui marqua en termes généraux qu’il aurait employé ses soins au sujet des Beys . . . réponse qui ne porte point le caractère de promesse ou d’engagement et qui l’on peut moins encore appeler du nom de condition ou de stipulation quelconque.”[912] The Capitan Pasha disavowed any share in the transaction.[913] It was clear that the Turks were determined to carry out none of the terms they seemed to accept.[914] The Beys had identical intentions. It is curious that Hutchinson did not realise this. It is possible to admire his sympathy with the under-dog, but it is difficult to understand the illusion not only of Hutchinson, but also of his colleagues as to the real character of the Mamelukes. “Que de supériorité,” wrote a French _émigré_ in British service, “les Mamelukes n’avaient-ils sur les Turcs! francs, loyaux, généreux et braves, tous étaient en leur faveur. Nous les regardons pour ainsi dire comme des nôtres.”[915] “There never was a stranger mistake than that of these gentlemen (British officers in Egypt) who thought of reposing confidence in the honour of the Beys, who believed them to be a highly-minded, generous race of men, and who seemed almost to fancy in the exaltation of their romantic enthusiasm that they had found in the Mamelukes the courage, the sentiments and virtues of heroes.”[916] The “atmosphere” had thus become most unsuitable for the carrying out of a scheme long maturing in London. The Cabinet had at its disposal the clear representations of Hutchinson, but it was not in a hurry to make a pronouncement. It was not that “His Majesty’s confidential servants were insensible to the magnitude of the problem, but because circumstances had unavoidably narrowed it to their views.”[917] “Expert evidence” was not wanting. J. P. Morier, of the embassy in Constantinople, had been sent by the Ambassador expressly for the purpose of giving first-hand information and advice. He examined the problem very fully in an interesting memorandum of 7th July, 1801.[918] The question was: should Egypt be delivered to the Turks, whose right was nominal, or to the Mamelukes whose right was that of conquest? There was no comfort in either solution, for neither of the two parties could well defend the country. The failure of the French was, indeed, only due “to the want of proportion between the means employed and the magnitude of the enterprise.” In the opinion of Morier, the solution lay along one or other of three lines. The first was British occupation, open and unabashed; it was somewhat “naïve” on the part of Mr. Morier to suggest that the Turks should give, “in return,” “certain commercial advantages.” An _entente_ between Great Britain and Turkey might conceivably be created. The Beys, in that event, would naturally pay the piper. A second alternative was that “Egypt might be kept upon the principle which the French had adopted,” namely, to take possession of the country while acknowledging the suzerainty of the Porte and even offering to pay a tribute. Should this be adopted, “it would be prudent and politic to reinstate some of the most popular Beys in the governments of districts contiguous to our own.” (Morier already uses the possessive pronoun.) To “shuffle” them from one district to another and to leave with everyone a British “commissary.” The idea was to avoid the “odium attached to invaders and the difficulties arising from the prejudices and fanaticism of the ‘natives’ before they had tasted the sweets of a mild and regular government.” It was to be feared that Russia and France might unite with Turkey to prevent this from taking place. A third alternative was to destroy Egypt by inundation. It is only fair to add that he went on to state that should this be done, his country “would transmit to posterity a name as black as that of the incendiary of Ephesus.” Morier was evidently bewildered by the insolubility of the problem. The Cabinet adopted none of his alternatives. It reaffirmed its self- denying ordinance[919] and informed Elgin that under the circumstances the “obvious policy” would be for Britain to act as far as possible “in the character of mediator between the different parties.” To help her agents to arrive at that desirable result, “a paper with the ideas of the ministers” was sent them. The Ambassador was not to allow it to fall into anyone’s hand and was to communicate to the Porte only extracts of it as he thought fit.[920] The ministers were satisfied that the Porte “appeared to have a just sense of the necessity of their acting upon a systematic plan for the future government of Egypt,” and were hopeful “that measures might be suggested which would cause the British name to be hereafter as much reverenced by all descriptions of the people of Egypt for procuring to them the blessings of security under a regular government as they have been taught by the gallant army . . . to respect it for distinguished valour.”[921] What were these “ideas of the ministers”?[922] In form they offered the greatest possible contrast to the creations of Menou’s fertile mind. The British scheme, as was proper, bore the cachet of the practical; it burnt no incense to liberty or to equality and omitted to theorise on “feudal principle” or _impôt unique_. Had it been carried into effect, however, it would have proved just as revolutionary as any of Menou’s projects. It was the first authoritative pronouncement on the problem of Egypt. The second was the famous Dufferin report of 1883.[923] A slight comparison between the two documents reveals how fast events had moved between 1801 and 1883. During the interval, the viceroys had built up their power, expelled the Turks, welded the heterogeneous elements into a compact nation, accumulated a burdensome debt and attracted into the country a powerful _clientèle_ from all lands. The plan of 1801 was intended to make the presence of the British unnecessary; in 1883 the British occupation was commencing its indefinite course.[924] The British ministers summed up the “condition of Egypt” prior to 1798 in three “facts”: the sovereignty of the Porte was nominal, the Mamelukes were masters of the situation, the people were most wretched. Had the French been suffered to remain, there could be no doubt that they would have effected a revolution in the social system of the country. The same result would have taken place, had Great Britain been in the place of France. The withdrawal of the British Army would be followed very probably by a relapse into the anarchy and the oppression that facilitated the French invasion in 1798. To prevent the recurrence of the evil the Porte should carry out the following measures; Great Britain being inclined to take part in the “arrangement.” 1. The rights, privileges and territorial jurisdiction of the Mamelukes should be ascertained, the nature and extent of their military services should be defined and the performance of that service should be made the condition of their tenure.[925] 2. The revenues of the State, from all sources, should be placed under fixed regulations, the “rates and proportions” to be paid to the State under each head should be established and the collectors should be severely punished if they exacted more than was due. 3. A fixed portion of the revenue should be appropriated for the pay and disbursements of the regular military force to be formed under the direction of British officers. 4. The “nizamia”[926] troops now serving in Egypt should remain there and form the nucleus of the new establishment. 5. The remainder of the establishment should be recruited in Egypt, Albania and other European dominions of the Grand Signior. 6. The chief command should be vested, if possible, in a British officer, and no payments from the appropriated funds should be made without his orders. 7. The commander should have the power to make “respectful remonstrances” to the representative of the Porte in Egypt whenever the privileges of the Mamelukes, the recognised rights of the people, the collection or the application of the military funds were infringed. 8. The right of promotion and military administration should be entirely his. 9. During the continuation of the war, Alexandria should be garrisoned by troops in the British service to be paid from the appropriated funds. There could have been no fairer and more beneficial a settlement than this. But it had from the outset no chance. The “many clashing interests” were too difficult “to reconcile.”[927] “The Porte refused to acknowledge what its representatives had agreed to; the interposition of England was delayed from day to day, in expectation of positive orders from home, and it appeared that, from the want of a communication sufficiently full and explicit at first and from the different lights in which the whole business had been reviewed and represented at Alexandria and Constantinople, the opinions which were held and acted upon at the one place were decidedly opposite to those which were held and acted upon at the other.”[928] A large share of the responsibility for this unhappy state of affairs rests with the Ambassador at Constantinople. The “Elgin marbles” have shed lustre on a diplomat of mediocre ability and doubtful integrity.[929] Pitt used to describe him as “the most discreet of His Majesty’s ministers, for he never reveals what he knows even to the Secretary of State.”[930] With all his “cant jargon,” he was not a match for the Divan.[931] He was in the habit of delivering “as his own private opinion” what he had been instructed to communicate to the Porte. His object was to “commit His Majesty’s ministers as little as possible.”[932] The mischief of this lay in the fact that what was communicated as “private opinion” could not, naturally, have with the Divan the weight of an authoritative statement of the views of the Government. His desire to commit the Government as little as possible proceeded from some vague, inarticulate ambition on his part. As early as February, 1801, he conceived the inactivity of the Turks in the operations in Egypt to be “a good thing,” as it would entitle Britain “to some compensation.”[933] Three months later, alluding to the conversations he had with Pitt, Dundas and Grenville, on the intention to restore Egypt to the Porte, he observed that “the events . . . which have taken place in Europe since that period . . . may lead to combinations that were then unforeseen.”[934] The pity of it is that he did nothing to prosecute an ambitious scheme. In the early days of June, 1801, long before the relations of Hutchinson and the Mamelukes were exactly known, a conference took place between the Reis Effendi and Elgin on the affairs of Egypt.[935] The Turkish Minister demanded a provisional British occupation and advice on the internal settlement.[936] Elgin, who had kept from[937] the Porte—as was his wont—his instructions to ask authorisation for the garrisoning of Alexandria by British troops till the general peace, was naturally delighted that the demand came from the Turks. He affected to see some obstacles against this, but finally “gave way” and promised to request Hutchinson to do what he could for the Porte. On the second point, he “advised,” on the 20th June, the adoption of the following measures: the separation of the administration of justice and the collection of revenue from the military establishment, the division of the country into a number of small pashaliks, the strengthening of the army, the fixing of the amount of pay and salaries, the bestowal upon the Mamelukes of the government of the territory above Girgeh in Upper Egypt, and the conciliation of the Bedouins.[938] He followed this by sending his secretary, William Hamilton, to Egypt for first-hand information. But[939] he did nothing to shape the arrangement entered into by Hutchinson into definite and workable terms. In the month of September he was still carrying on “inconclusive discussions” on the extent of British pledges.[940] The Turkish ministers argued that the British General certainly went beyond the intentions of his Government if he meant to replace the Beys in their old position and requested the Ambassador to introduce such modifications in Hutchinson’s pledges “as might still leave the Mamelukes an adequate compensation for their services without endangering the government of the Porte,”[941] and to “propose that each Bey and Kashef should individually collect and ensure their respective properties, that they should quit Cairo and assume distinguished situations in other parts of the Turkish Empire and that the Mamelukes should be received, as a military corps with proper emoluments, into the service of the Porte.”[942] Elgin admitted that “the discussion enabled him to see how far he could start negotiating on the plan of Hawkesbury.”[943] But he never started. His idea was to visit Egypt himself and settle the matter on the spot,[944] though one could not help suspecting that the motive was the collection of antiquities. The Turks affected[945] eagerness that this should take place soon, and M. Tamara, the Russian envoy, considered that the trip was “beneficial.”[946] The Ambassador “hoped that if any accident happened to him, his family might be allowed to consider it as happening in the execution of duty.”[947] His Excellency, however, was to be denied the renown of martyrdom. The voyage was postponed from day to day, till the affair of the separate peace with France made his presence at Constantinople indispensable.[948] What passed in the capital thus added to the complications in Egypt.[949] There was, on the one hand, the deadly rivalry between the Capitan Pasha and the Grand Vizier and the consequent desire of each of them to show greater zeal—or, rather, ruthlessness—in the service of the Sultan.[950] There was, on the other, great dissension and blindness among the Beys. Some “were little better than beggars at the gates of the Vizier,” “supplicating indeed through form” but very distrustful: some “pretended to act with deeper policy” and made friends with Turks and British, while several were still attached to France.[951] Elfi was the only one who saw clear and acted well. He advised his brethren to withdraw from Cairo and frankly put themselves under British protection, but they very foolishly refused to seek the mediation of “infidels.”[952] Elfi coolly told them that the Sultan himself had sought and benefited from the alliance with these very “infidels” and began to act on his own account. He persuaded the Grand Vizier to let him proceed to Upper Egypt to collect the estates of several people who had died in the previous year’s plague without leaving issue. There he fed the “imperial” cupidity for some time and waited in safety for events.[953] “It was plain” that an “explosion” was imminent, but “none ventured to predict from what quarter it would come.”[954] Hutchinson warned the Beys not to “enter a Turkish vessel or boat.” But they were too jealous of each other to show suspicion. At the invitation of the Capitan Pasha, the leading Mouradites proceeded to Alexandria. General Baird, commander of the Indian troops in the neighbourhood, took some measures for their protection.[955] On the 22nd October, 1801, they were embarked in two barges, but after some time the Capitan Pasha left them on the pretext of the arrival of important despatches. As soon as he withdrew, the barges changed course and made towards a large gunboat. “Upon getting alongside, before they had the opportunity of resistance or even drawing their swords, they were fired upon from the lower part of the boat and five of them instantly fell.” The rest were arrested and taken on board.[956] Hutchinson believed that the murder was premeditated. He adduced as evidence the fact that the Pasha ordered the execution of the Greek sailors, who had completely failed to accomplish the design.[957] The Greeks fled and took refuge with the British, affirming “on the Gospel” “that they were told that the Beys were brave and resolute and not likely to surrender without resistance, that, therefore, they were determined they should make none and fired upon them before they could put themselves in a posture of defence.”[958] The Capitan Pasha, on the other hand, “confessed that he disapproved the mode of attaining the object (i.e. the arrest of the Beys), that he had at first remonstrated and had not executed the orders till they were insisted upon by the Grand Vizier” . . . that the intention was to send them to Constantinople, that had their destruction been meant, they would have been slaughtered on board.[959] The “murder” does not seem to have been a part of the programme, for, almost at the same time, the Grand Vizier in Cairo was able to apprehend the Ibrahamites without bloodshed.[960] The Turks thus attempted their own “solution” of the problem. Hutchinson was infuriated and individual soldiers and officers were even anxious for a “scuffle.”[961] The British Commander delivered an “ultimatum” for the delivery of the prisoners and began to march troops to enforce his demand,[962] though he was most anxious that matters might not be pushed to extremes.[963] The Turks very wisely liberated the Beys, but feeling ran so high that the opportunity for a compromise was irreparably lost.[964] The Turks could never forget that the prize was in their grasp and had now escaped them. Elgin awoke at last to the urgency of the problem.[965] He decided to send Mr. Straton, the Secretary of the Embassy, to settle the quarrel. He was now convinced “that His Majesty’s intention of not interfering in the internal affairs of Egypt was ever distinct and positive, that no engagement of Sir John Hutchinson’s could be right if of a nature to endanger the authority of the Porte.”[966] Straton was, accordingly, instructed to persuade the Beys to leave the country, and was even authorised “to engage in his name that they should be received in England or British-India and should enjoy pensions equal to those offered by the Porte in return for military service.”[967] Arrived in Egypt, Straton communicated his instructions to Lord Cavan, the successor of Hutchinson. The new commander, however, made it clear that “he neither could nor would use any violent means to send the Beys out of Egypt or even to detain them at Gizeh[968] longer than they should think proper.”[969] But he sounded the Beys secretly. They flatly refused to consent to exile and announced their intention to withdraw to Upper Egypt. The Turks tried to prevent this. But Cavan would neither consent to detain them nor to issue, at the request of the Grand Vizier, a statement denying the assertion that the Beys were under British protection. He based his refusal on the curious plea—after all that had passed—that such an act would constitute an interference in Turkish domestic affairs.[970] Cavan thus was certainly not the partisan of the Turks that he was taken to be, nor did his command mark, as some French historians allege, a change on the part of Great Britain from patronising the Mamelukes to throwing them overboard.[971] It was true that neither he nor Straton were very capable:[972] but under the circumstances the failure simply could not be averted. The Beys left for Upper Egypt on 25th January, 1802, and a dismal chapter in the history of the country began.[973] When the unfortunate event of October was known in London, the good opinion entertained of the Turk received a serious setback. A British Government could hardly refuse to approve an act of humanity on the part of its generals.[974] The Ambassador was instructed to express disapproval of the conduct of the Turkish officials “in a calm and temperate manner.”[975] But the Addington Administration was weak. It was only too conscious of the importance of settling the affairs of Egypt, but it was lost between the clashing opinions submitted to it. Lord Elgin, on the one hand, was sending veiled attacks on the conduct of the generals and expatiating—rather boldly—on the “humaneness” of the Turk.[976] Lord Hutchinson, on the other, was ruthlessly tearing into shreds the plan, which the ministers had brought forth with exaggerated hopefulness. Hutchinson, it is important to remember, did not receive that plan till after the “massacre” had taken place and he himself had left the country.[977] This naturally colours his criticism; but, still, his comments possess more than passing interest. The question was not the future of this or that Ottoman province: it was the prospects of Turkish Reform. [978]Hutchinson thought that though the Mameluke system “was certainly not to be applauded,” it was “toleration and mildness” when compared to that of the Turks. It had the advantage, moreover, of being the one to which the inhabitants had become used. As to the suggested employment of Albanians, it was, in his opinion, fraught with danger: they were too “ferocious” to be useful, they would not serve under Christian officers, but would only follow “some favourable officer, who had probably been a robber,” like Tahir Pasha, their “present” commander. The Turks, also, would only employ “renegadoes.” They were, besides, “not susceptible of improvement”; and “he never could betray his own opinion so far as to assert that the presence of the British officers had instilled one single principle of military order or discipline amongst them.” The “proposed financial arrangement” was certainly most desirable, but it would “take years of peace, order and good government to effectuate” and, in the end, the difficulties might prove insurmountable. The French example was instructive. They attempted “some changes,” but ended by giving them up and resorting to the traditional bastinado. The British, after all was said and done, would have to take the whole arrangement into their own hands or else the funds would be misapplied and the troops would mutiny. He could only, therefore, give a “decided opinion” against “entering into any permanent arrangement with the Turks for Egypt,” “for the country that adopted them would soon repent of its error and find that it was hanging a living body to a putrid carcass.” “As for establishing a regular system of government in Egypt with the Turks in the country, no man could conceive it probable. Before it could take place, a revolution in their habits, their morals and their government must occur. They must be taught to think as they never yet thought and to act as they never yet had acted. It was not in the power or competency of any foreign nation to effect such a reformation. Inveterate habit had so confirmed their abominable system that he was thoroughly convinced it would never change but with the downfall of their Empire.” There was great truth in all this, but only a Pitt would have had the strength to “take it or leave it.” As it happened, Stuart gave the Government different and more congenial advice and thus occasioned another compromise.[979] In his view, the best policy would be “to endeavour to restore in its true spirit the Mameluke Government, increasing perhaps the tribute of the Beys under British guarantee.” This guarantee would necessitate the presence of a British officer as agent, who might remonstrate against infractions and even receive the dues of the Porte. The advantage of this arrangement would be to secure the good-will and gratitude of the Mamelukes. These were certain—when left to themselves—to drive out the Turks, so Great Britain might as well help them and attach them to herself. He believed that they would prove “the most efficient barrier and now the only one within reach against the immediate enterprises of the French,” and that they were inclined to submit to “partial sacrifices,” and he recommended that whatever plan might be adopted the Turks should not be left “in dominion.” The Government decided to send Stuart on a mission of reconciliation. He was given the chief command in Egypt[980] and was instructed[981] to go first to Constantinople and, then, in concert with the Ambassador, to persuade the Porte “to restore the _status quo_ with an augmentation of the tribute. Should this prove unacceptable, Stuart was to advise the Divan to grant the Beys the Upper Egyptian provinces above Gizeh.” The ministers expressed their anxiety that a settlement should be arrived at before the evacuation took place, as the occupation would not be prolonged—except from an “indispensable necessity”—beyond the month of July (1802). They, however, passed over in silence some significant queries raised by the General.[982] He had asked what he should do if the Turks and the Mamelukes were in “active hostility” and one party had acquired such advantages as should indispose it against reconciliation, or if the Turks still adhered to their original scheme of exile and showed an “intention” of calling in French help, or if they accepted British mediation, but requested a guarantee for the execution of an agreed arrangement. What should he do if the Porte “requested” him to postpone the evacuation? Again, supposing that by the time he arrived in Egypt, the British force had been withdrawn “by any construction of orders,” what should be his conduct? Stuart had an “object” in all this. He hinted at establishing a connection with the Mamelukes at the expense of the Porte and postponing the withdrawal _sine die_. But the Government, and this should be noted in view of French misstatements,[983] did not gratify him. Stuart arrived at Constantinople on the 19th July, 1802. On the 22nd, he and Straton (Lord Elgin was then voyaging for the benefit of his health and his collections) conferred with the Reis Effendi. The Porte refused either to restore the Beys to their old position or to grant them Upper Egypt, and held to the project of expulsion, but with double the pensions originally promised. Its argument was unanswerable. The question was not “whether the Beys should or should not be rich or powerful subjects of the Sultan, but whether the Sultan or they should be the sovereign of Egypt.[984] There was nothing to do; and Stuart had to proceed to Egypt empty-handed save for “warm praise” and the “Order of the Crescent.”[985] The Turks were, in truth, in no mood for concessions. “The issue of the affair had caused the deepest and most universal mortification among them. They well knew that the claims of the Beys were claims for the sovereignty of the country, and that under all former circumstances the contest had ended fatally for the Porte. Even in the conferences with Straton,[986] the Beys in demanding Upper Egypt refused at the same time to give up their houses at Cairo, insinuating that they would soon have occasion for them.”[987] There is a “traveller’s tale” that the Capitan Pasha received Stuart in a room which he had taken care to “infect” with the breath of two persons dying from the plague; he, as a good Turk, never worrying about himself, though his dragoman, Prince Callimachi, being in the secret, was “shivering with terror.”[988] The disappointment at the failure of their first attempt confirmed them in their obstinacy, and “pride as well as policy contributed an impulse to their resolution.”[989] “They were only waiting for the evacuation of Egypt ‘to act systematically against the Beys, being resolved on their destruction.’”[990] “This was not only a resolution of the Divan but a plan congenial to their ideas and suited to their mode of warfare.”[991] They, moreover, “conceived that the evacuation was no longer at the discretion of Britain,” and Stuart lamented that “he had no power to refer to it as conditional upon settling the affairs of the Beys.”[992] “It would have been a very effective argument.”[993] Elgin once, rather naïvely, expressed his disappointment that the Reis Effendi “did not even insinuate a wish for the continuance” of the British occupation.[994] In the heat of discussion, the Turkish Minister once “slipped” something about calling in the “aid” of Russia in the affairs of Egypt, and quickly solicited Elgin to take no notice of it.[995] One of the motives for this ardent desire to have the country evacuated was to allow the First Consul—now that he had made his peace with the Sultan—no pretext for bickering and interference. A man like Napoleon could not fail to take umbrage at the continued infraction of the terms of the Treaty of Amiens. Stuart, apparently, had no mind to evacuate. He turned out the Turks from some forts, which Cavan had allowed them to garrison, and put down “disorderliness” on their part with a ruthless hand.[996] He professed to believe that the withdrawal of his army “had become an event of great seeming uncertainty.”[997] The First Consul was fully informed of this state of affairs. There was not yet a French official representative in Cairo; but there was no lack of correspondents. There was Royer, the chief “pharmacist” of the Army of the East. He had been suspected of having poisoned some of the wounded soldiers during the Syrian campaign and of trafficking in liquor. He, apparently, thought it advisable to remain in Egypt after the expulsion of the French.[998] Another correspondent was Mengin, the future historian of Mehemet Ali.[999] Of the others mention might be made of the monk Raphaïl and the “scribe” Mikhaïl Sabbagh,[1000] both of them Syrians. The Beys, Ibrahim and Bardissy, had also been sending petitions to the First Consul, abusing their British “protectors” and clamouring for help.[1001] So much for the “loyalty and sincerity” of the “heroes” of Hutchinson and Stuart! There were also some letters from Sheikh El Messiry, the leading “savant” of Alexandria: they were simply complimentary epistles.[1002] These communications seemed to have led Napoleon to seek more information on the real position of affairs. Hence the new mission of Colonel Sebastiani to the Levant. The colonel was a Corsican “not deficient in talents but a great coxcomb.”[1003] He possessed in an ample degree the “swagger” deemed essential for service in the East, for missions of _éclat_ and for heightening prestige. Sebastiani was instructed[1004] to proceed first to Tripoli to obtain the Pasha’s recognition of the flag of the new Italian Republic, and then to Egypt. He must take note of everything of interest: the “situation” in the harbour of Alexandria, the British and Turkish forces there, the condition of the fortifications, the history of what had taken place after the expulsion of the French, the condition of the people, the views of leading men. In Cairo, Sebastiani was to do the same thing. He must repeat to all and sundry “agreeable things on the part of Napoleon,” for example, he could tell them “that he loved the Egyptians, and desired their happiness, that he often talked about them.” He was to inform Khosrev, the new Viceroy, of his intention to send an official agent for commercial relations and to find out if the First Consul could offer his good offices for settling the “differences” with the Beys. Sebastiani also carried a letter from Talleyrand to Khosrev, in which the object of the mission was declared to be the finding out whether the country had been evacuated or not. This was held to precede the arrival of an official agent.[1005] Having accomplished successfully his mission in Tripoli[1006] Sebastiani arrived in Alexandria on 10th September, 1802.[1007] On the same day he called on Stuart and demanded the prompt execution of the Treaty. The British general at first gave a “vague answer,” but, when pressed, declared that he thought that neither Malta nor Egypt was to be evacuated before a treaty of commerce between France and Britain had been concluded. Sebastiani thought that Stuart was “excessively vain, though of mediocre ability,” that he wanted to remain in Alexandria “to have himself talked about,” that he, therefore, sent his Government “alarming” reports to retard the evacuation. The Turks, on the other hand, expressed anxiety at the apparently “interminable” occupation; while the inhabitants, who were under the illusion that Sebastiani came to take possession of their city, were “overjoyed” so long as the illusion lasted. All the way to Cairo, he was met—if he can be believed—by demonstrations of joy and attachment to France and the “person” of Napoleon. But in the capital the Viceroy—though courteous and lavish in flattering expressions—maintained towards him the attitude he had invariably held towards Stuart, and rejected the proffered good offices, remarking that Constantinople was the proper place for them.[1008] Sebastiani, consequently, solaced himself with interviews with various Sheikhs and leading Christians, and expatiated in his report on their enthusiasm at seeing portraits of the First Consul. He himself, however, admitted that “three or four” of the most eminent savants abstained from meeting him in order not to “compromise” themselves. One of his companions—and Sebastiani himself narrated it, though in a diluted form—described how the party were obliged to hide themselves, fearing a hostile demonstration on the part of the inhabitants.[1009] Djabarti—usually very well-informed—merely notes the arrival of a “French ambassador.”[1010] His relations with the Beys—it should be remembered that he was not meant to establish any “connection” with them—did not amount to more than assurances of the disposition of Napoleon to mediate between them and the Porte to the advantage of both parties. This did not amount to much. But the mission[1011] and the publication in the _Moniteur_—the official organ—of extracts from the Report were destined to have important effects. The Porte was greatly alarmed, although Napoleon tried to prevent this by omitting from the published version most of the strongest assertions of Sebastiani. The new French Ambassador, General Brune, in Constantinople, presented the Divan with a mild translation of the document,[1012] but the enemies of France took good care not to let the opportunity slip. Fonton, the French dragoman of the Russian Legation—“cet homme qui a perdu sans ressource (_sic_: retour?) tout sentiment français, dont le cœur ne s’ouvre plus qu’à la haine et qui déteste d’autant plus son pays qu’il le trahit tous les jours”[1013]—made an accurate translation of the report and had it transmitted to the Sultan himself.[1014] The alarm led to a rapprochement between the Turks and the British. “The Turkish Minister spoke with great emotion, expressing the sincerity of the friendship of the Porte towards Great Britain and its determination to meet every event with firmness.”[1015] The mission also revived the hopes of the Beys of French help. Bardissy and Ibrahim made new appeals to the First Consul;[1016] but they did not, however, abate anything of their professions to the British. They even moved from Upper Egypt to the neighbourhood of Alexandria, with the object of being close to Stuart. It seemed that they succeeded in deceiving him, for he warmly denied that they had any relations with France, calling this one of Sebastiani’s “inventions.”[1017] Piqued by the conduct of the Frenchman and the continued silence of the Government[1018] and hoping against hope that something might “turn up” to prevent the evacuation, he took upon himself to postpone the carrying out of the orders[1019] for withdrawal and resolved to do something.[1020] “It was painful for him as a soldier and as a man to be a tame spectator of carnage almost at his very gates.”[1021] The result was the mission of Lord Blantyre[1022]—one of his aides-de- camp—to Constantinople. That officer found Elgin on the eve of returning to England and, therefore, most anxious to settle the long-protracted quarrel. Reading in Stuart’s instructions “that the Beys would acquiesce in any terms short of exile”—words which Stuart did not mean to be taken too literally[1023]—he entered on the negotiations with a light heart. The outcome of them was neither a treaty nor a convention, but instructions to the Viceroy to grant the Beys the imperial pardon and the rocky province of Aswan in the extreme south of the country.[1024] The Reis Effendi affirmed to Brune that Elgin tried hard, but in vain, to add a guarantee on the part of Britain.[1025] The Turks secured, thus, the advantage of making the _rôle_ of the British the rather modest one of “carrying the agreement to Alexandria.”[1026] They had the impudence to ask Blantyre to sign a document in the name of Stuart to the effect that the affair had been finally settled to his satisfaction, and that there was nothing further to be expected or asked from the Porte,[1027] and to vaunt the concession as an act of friendship to Great Britain.[1028] It was no great consolation to Stuart that the Porte had climbed down from its old scheme of the wholesale expulsion of the Mamelukes. He bitterly observed that “deception had been the instrument as well as the object of the Turks in the whole of this unpleasant question and that it was not difficult to discover that even the present concession . . . was far less a testimony of their respect, however professed, to the wishes of our government than of their alarm from the threatened interposition of France.”[1029] He had, however, to evacuate the country in March, 1803. Before he did so, he took some important steps. He took advantage of Khosrev’s demand for a “liaison” officer—intended naturally to reside in Cairo during the British occupation—and for the “loan” of an officer of the engineers, to fix Major Missett as agent for the British Government and Major Hayes to help in the repair of the fortifications.[1030] Their presence was considered to prove advantageous “when neither Turks nor Mamelukes should any longer be overawed by the presence of the British Army and when they should lose their recollection of the wholesome counsel of the British commander, given as it had been to them from the most upright and disinterested views and supported by a calm, conciliatory and dignified conduct.”[1031] Missett was instructed to send in accounts of the councils of the Viceroy, to forward the views of the British Government, to counteract the intrigues of the French and to avoid interfering between the Turks and the Mamelukes and in internal concerns except on orders from the Government.[1032] At the same time he gave the Beys secret supplies of arms and ammunition,[1033] describing it as a price for their retirement into Upper Egypt.[1034] In truth no price was necessary, for with the withdrawal of the British there was no point in the Mamelukes remaining in the barren territory near Alexandria. He, further still, revealed his policy by taking with him Elfi Bey. That Bey had been thinking for some time of “emigrating,[1035] and his brethren were anxious to rid themselves of a masterful colleague by sending him to London as their official representative.”[1036] Stuart, however, refused to accept him in that character. The point is of no great practical importance, since he admitted that the voyage of Elfi “suggested an opening to a chain of influences which he thought might be cultivated” and that “as the Bey’s consideration was high with both Mamelukes and Arabs, he might be a forcible instrument in the hands of government in the event of those occurrences against which (the government) had expressed such desire to be prepared, and at the same time counteract any project of the French to build a rival interest with those parties in their disappointment at our departure.”[1037] Thus ended the first British occupation of Egypt, and with it the possibility of effective interference in her domestic concerns. [Footnote 874: Pelissier, _Histoire de la Diplomatie française dans le Levant_. Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie. _Mémoires et Documents_, 63, p. 125.] [Footnote 875: _Ibid._] [Footnote 876: “. . . I expected to be instructed to get some benefit for the East India Company from the conquest of Egypt, but received none . . .” Lord Elgin to the Directors. Castlereagh, _Memoirs and Correspondence_, V, pp. 167, 168.] [Footnote 877: With regard to the Red Sea, that has been invariably the position in the latter half of the eighteenth century, e.g.: (_a_) Lord North considered the opening of the Red Sea route as highly prejudicial to the East India Company. Bruce, _Travels_, IV, p. 633. (_b_) The same motive led to the rejection of Warren Hastings’ treaty with the Beys. Taylor, _Considerations_, pp. 12-13. Cf. on the whole question the excellent book by M. Charles-Roux, _Autour d’une route_. As for the Black Sea: Spencer Smith had obtained the right in 1799, but it seemed to have been allowed to lapse on account of the prohibition of imports from Russia. Elgin despatch, 11 July, 1800: Elgin, in his despatch of 11 July, 1800 (F.O. Turkey, 29), alludes to conversations he had with Pitt and Grenville on the “inexpediency of opening that trade.” He repeats this in despatch of 31 May, 1801 (F.O. Turkey, 32). Before this last despatch reached London, Hawkesbury had, on the representations of the Levant Company (Levant Company to Hawkesbury, no date, F.O. Turkey, 31), instructed Elgin to obtain the privilege (Hawkesbury to Elgin, 28 July, 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32). But soon, however, he changed his orders. On the 10 May, 1802, he wrote that after weighing the advantages and disadvantages it was thought better to leave things as they were. But if France obtained this, Great Britain should have it (F.O. Turkey, 36). The Porte itself extended the privilege to Great Britain after giving it to France. (Note from the Porte to Straton, 29 July, 1802, enclosed in Straton’s despatch of 3 Aug. F.O. Turkey, 37).] [Footnote 878: B.M. Add. MSS. 37275, f. 98. Dundas to Wellesley, 11 July, 1800.] [Footnote 879: 16 Jan., 1799. B.M. Add. MSS. 37878, f. 78.] [Footnote 880: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 31 May, 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32.] [Footnote 881: Thomas Grenville to Grenville, 7 May, 1801. _Dropmore Papers_, VII, p. 15.] [Footnote 882: Grenville to Addington, 8 May, 1801. _Dropmore Papers_, VII, p. 16.] [Footnote 883: Addington to Grenville, 12 May, 1801. _Ibid._, VII, p. 18.] [Footnote 884: Instructions to Hutchinson, 19 May, 1801. W.O. 6, 21, and W.O. 1, 345. Instructions to Elgin, 19 May, 1801. F.O. Turkey, 31.] [Footnote 885: Instructions to Sir R. Abercromby, 6 Oct., 1800. W.O. 6, 21.] [Footnote 886: Huskisson to Sir R. Abercromby, 23 Dec., 1800, enclosed in Hutchinson to Hobart, 21 Sept., 1801. W.O. I, 345.] [Footnote 887: Tamara’s despatch, 16 (28) Feb., 1800. F.O. Russia, 46. Morier to Elgin, March [_sic_], 1800, enclosed in Elgin’s despatch, 22 April, 1800. F.O. Turkey, 29. Elgin-Grenville, 22 Dec., 1800 (received 8 Feb., 1801). F.O. Turkey, 30.] [Footnote 888: Koehler to Grenville, 15 July, 1800. F.O. Turkey, 27.] [Footnote 889: Colonel Anstruther: a statement of what passed between the British and the Mamelukes, 8 May, 1802. W.O. 6, 21, and W.O. 1, 346. Also a letter from Holloway, attached to Turkish headquarters, to Elfi, assuring him of protection, 25 Jan., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 34 (military).] [Footnote 890: A letter supposed to be from Keith to General Smith (uncle of Sir Sidney), 30 Jan., 1801. Barrow, _Life of Sir Sidney Smith_, I, p. 340. Sidney Smith to Hutchinson, 6 July, 1801. _Ibid._, I, p. 432. Sidney Smith to Mamelukes (no date), enclosed in a despatch from Koehler to Elgin, 8 Dec., 1800. F.O. Turkey, 27 (military).] [Footnote 891: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 26 Aug., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32. Elgin thinks Hammer to be an Austrian spy.] [Footnote 892: Pisani to Elgin, 8 Aug., 1801, enclosed in Elgin’s despatch of 26 Aug. F.O. Turkey, 32. Sidney Smith to Christopher Hutchinson (brother of the general), 23 June, 1801. Barrow, op. cit., I, p. 428. Hutchinson to Sidney Smith (no date, probably in Aug., 1801). Barrow, op. cit., I, p. 433. Sidney Smith to Hutchinson, 28 Aug., 1801. Barrow, op cit., I, p. 434. He attributes his “recall” to Turkish annoyance at his preventing a massacre at Rosetta and to “army and navy stuff” (i.e. jealousy). This is confirmed by Wilson, _History of the Expedition_, p. 65, and by the anonymous author of a _Journal_, p. 80 note, and by E. D. Clarke, _Travels_, Part II, p. 272.] [Footnote 893: Enclosed in Elgin’s despatch, 24 Feb., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 31.] [Footnote 894: Mourad to Sidney Smith, 2 April, 1801. Randolph, _Life of Wilson_, I, p. 165.] [Footnote 895: Hamilton, _Ægyptiaca_, p. 72.] [Footnote 896: Hutchinson to Hobart, 1 June, 1801. W.O. 1, 345. He describes them as numbering 1500 cavalry—inferior certainly to none in the world.] [Footnote 897: Hutchinson-Hobart, 21 September, 1801. W.O. 1, 345. The overtures of the Mamelukes were received by him “at the most critical period of the campaign.”] [Footnote 898: Hutchinson to Dundas, 3 April, 1801. W.O. 1, 345.] [Footnote 899: Hutchinson to Dundas, 20 April, 1801 (private). W.O. I, 345. He states that the Turks are “more mischievous to their friends than to their enemies. . . .” Hutchinson to Hobart, 2 June, 1801. W.O. 1, 345. “. . . If the Turks were as strong as they are barbarous, they might exterminate one half of the population and then endeavour to govern in their manner those that remained, but I think at this moment if the British and the French were out of the country, the Mamelukes, Arabs and Greeks would be an entire overmatch for the Turks. . . .” Hutchinson to Hobart, 29 June, 1801; 16 Aug., 1801; 19 Aug., 1801. W.O. 1, 345.] [Footnote 900: Hutchinson to Elgin, 25 April, 1801, enclosed in Elgin’s despatch, 31 May, 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32.] [Footnote 901: Hutchinson to Hobart, 21 Sept., 1801. W.O. 1, 345.] [Footnote 902: Hutchinson to Osman Bey, 5 May, 1801, enclosed in Straton’s despatch, 31 March, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 37.] [Footnote 903: Stuart to Sullivan, 1 Dec., 1803. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 904: Hamilton, _Ægyptiaca_, p. 4.] [Footnote 905: _Ibid._, p. 72.] [Footnote 906: Hutchinson to Elgin, 25 July, 1801, enclosed in Elgin’s despatch, 26 Aug., 1801, F.O. Turkey, 32.] [Footnote 907: Hutchinson to Elgin, 25 July, 1801, enclosed in Elgin’s despatch, 26 Aug., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32.] [Footnote 908: Anstruther’s statement, 8 May, 1802. W.O. 6, 21, and W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 909: Hutchinson’s letter above cited, note 1.] [Footnote 910: Page 157 above.] [Footnote 911: Anstruther’s statement, W.O. 6, 21 and W.O. 1, 346. Hamilton gives a similar assertion, but adds that the agreement was not concluded with the usual solemnity and forms. _Ægyptiaca_, p. 4. Wilson, _History of the Expedition_, pp. 173-4. Hutchinson to Sidney Smith (no date, probably Aug., 1801). Barrow, op. cit., I, p. 433.] [Footnote 912: Porte to Elgin, 15 rajab, 1216 (20 Nov., 1801), enclosed in Elgin’s despatch 5 Jan., 1802. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 913: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 19 Oct., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 914: “. . . I am sorry I cannot change the disposition of the Turks nor trust to any promises they make. . . .” Hutchinson to Hobart, 21 Sept., 1801. W.O. 1, 345.] [Footnote 915: De Noe, _Mémoires_, p. 244.] [Footnote 916: Drummond to Hawkesbury, 25 Oct., 1803. F.O. Turkey, 40.] [Footnote 917: Hobart to Hutchinson, 10 July, 1801. W.O. 6, 21, and W.O. 1, 345.] [Footnote 918: Elgin-Hawkesbury, 31 May, 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32, informing the minister of the sending of Morier. Memorandum of Morier with a covering letter to Hammond, 7 July, 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32.] [Footnote 919: “. . . the sole object is the expulsion of the French, and if any garrisons in Egypt remain during the war it is to prevent a French invasion.” Hobart to Hutchinson, 10 July, 1801. W.O. 6, 21, and W.O. 1, 345.] [Footnote 920: Hawkesbury to Elgin, 28 July, 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32. But the “plan” is not enclosed; it may be noted that the volume contains only “drafts” from the minister, the “originals” being in Cambridge.] [Footnote 921: Hobart to Hutchinson, 22 July, 1801. W.O. 6, 21, and W.O. 1, 345.] [Footnote 922: The plan was enclosed in Hobart to Hutchinson, 12 Oct., 1801. W.O. 6, 21, and W.O. 1, 345; in Hobart to Fox (the Commander-in- Chief in the Mediterranean), 12 Oct., 1801. W.O. 6, 55.] [Footnote 923: There is a good account of the mission and report of Lord Dufferin in D. Mackenzie Wallace, _Egypt and the Egyptian Question_, Chap. XII.] [Footnote 924: Features of the scheme resemble the provisions in the Treaties which were entered into by the East India Company and native provinces and which ended virtually in British rule. Lord Hobart, the Secretary of State for War and Colonies in the Addington Administration had been governor of Madras for some years previously. It is possible that he was the author of the scheme for Egypt. The evidence points to a _bona fide_ attempt to render the presence of British troops unnecessary.] [Footnote 925: This reveals the common mistake that Egyptian society was feudal. Cf. Chap. VIII.] [Footnote 926: “Nizamia” was the name given to the new corps created by Selim and drilled _à l’Européenne_.] [Footnote 927: Hamilton, _Ægyptiaca_, p. 6.] [Footnote 928: _Ibid._, p. 8. Cf. also pp. 336-7.] [Footnote 929: The “financial transactions” of Lord Elgin are treated in the Appendix.] [Footnote 930: Lady Malmesbury to Minto, 7 May, 1801. _Letters of Lord Minto_, III, p. 217.] [Footnote 931: Hutchinson to Fox, 7 Jan., 1802. B.M. Add. MSS. 37053, f. 9.] [Footnote 932: Straton to Hawkesbury, 15 April, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 37.] [Footnote 933: Elgin to Grenville, 9 Feb., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 31.] [Footnote 934: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 31 May, 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32.] [Footnote 935: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 10 June-12 June, 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32.] [Footnote 936: _Ibid._] [Footnote 937: Elgin to Grenville, 21 Nov., 1800. F.O. Turkey, 30. Elgin to Hawkesbury, 27 June, 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32.] [Footnote 938: Memorandum to the Reis Effendi, 20 June, 1801, enclosed in Elgin’s despatch of 26 Aug., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32.] [Footnote 939: Hamilton, _Ægyptiaca_, p. 11.] [Footnote 940: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 19 Oct., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 941: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 19 Oct., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 942: _Ibid._] [Footnote 943: _Ibid._] [Footnote 944: The project of the trip was first announced in Elgin’s despatch of 7 July, 1801. F.O. Turkey, 32, and again in that of 4 Sept., 1801, in the same volume. On the 23 Nov., 1801, he reported that he had discussed it with the Divan. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 945: Brune to Premier Consul, 5 pluviôse, XI (25 Jan., 1803). Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1688.] [Footnote 946: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 24 Nov., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 947: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 19 Oct., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 948: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 10 Dec., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 949: Mouriez states that the Porte had concerted with Elgin the design of the expulsion of the Beys. _Histoire de Mehemet Ali_, I, p. 71. We have seen that nothing of the sort took place. This is only one of the false statements of which the work of Mouriez is full.] [Footnote 950: Hamilton, _Ægyptiaca_, p. 339.] [Footnote 951: Hamilton, _ibid._, pp. 334-5.] [Footnote 952: Djabarti, VIII, pp. 63-7.] [Footnote 953: _Ibid._] [Footnote 954: Hamilton, op. cit., p. 6.] [Footnote 955: Baird to Hutchinson, 6 Oct., 1801. Hook, _Life of Baird_, I, p. 411. Hutchinson to Baird, 7 Oct., 1801. Hook, I, pp. 411-12. Baird to Hutchinson, 8, 10, 15 Oct., 1801. Hook, I, pp. 413-22.] [Footnote 956: “The depositions of Dimitri Attisi,” 22 Oct., 1801 (in Italian). W.O. 1, 345. Hutchinson to Hobart, 24 Dec., 1801. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 957: “The deposition of Dimitri Attisi,” 22 Oct., 1801 (in Italian). W.O. 1, 345. Hutchinson to Hobart, 24 Dec., 1801. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 958: _Ibid._] [Footnote 959: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 5 Jan., 1802. F.O. Turkey, 35. Wilson, _History of the Expedition_, pp. 244-5.] [Footnote 960: On the arrest of the Beys in Cairo and their release there is a full account in: De Noe, _Memoirs_, pp. 221-40; Hook, _Life of Baird_, I, pp. 440-7 and II, pp. 5-15.] [Footnote 961: Hamilton, _Ægyptiaca_, p. 7 note, p. 8. De Noe, _Mémoires_, p. 244.] [Footnote 962: Hutchinson to Grand Vizier, 27 Oct., 1801. Wilkin, _Life of Baird_, p. 151.] [Footnote 963: Hook, _Life of Baird_, II, p. 4.] [Footnote 964: Hamilton, _Ægyptiaca_, p. 8. _The Times_, 20 Sept., 1802. A letter from an officer in Alexandria, dated 9 July, 1802; 25 Sept., 1802; 27 Dec., 1802.] [Footnote 965: “. . . I cannot but conceive that the settling the affairs of Egypt will tend to ensure the duration of that peace which its conquest has hastened. . . .” Elgin to Hawkesbury, 2 Dec., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 966: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 2 Dec., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 967: Elgin to Straton, instructions and “secret” instructions both dated 12 Dec., 1801, enclosed in Elgin’s despatch 12 Dec., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 968: There was a British camp in Gizeh. The Beys were living there since their liberation.] [Footnote 969: Straton to Elgin, Cairo, 29 Jan., and 1 Feb., 1802, enclosed in Elgin’s despatch of 31st March, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 36. “Notes prises par Cavan” relative to conferences with the Beys, enclosed in Straton to Hawkesbury, 31 March, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 37. Reis Effendi to Cavan, 22 ramadan, 1216, H (26 Jan., 1802), and Cavan to Reis Effendi, 28 Jan., 1802, enclosed in Straton’s despatch of 31 March, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 37.] [Footnote 970: _Ibid._] [Footnote 971: De Noe, _Mémoires_, pp. 241-2. He laments that a kick from a horse had prevented Stuart, a friend of the Beys, from attending the conferences. Cavan’s opinion of the Turks is thus expressed: “. . . The Turk is a being replete with tyranny and treachery and void of every principle of honour and faith.” This is hardly the opinion of a pro-Turk! Cavan to Hobart, 5 May, 1802. W.O. 1, 346. Reybaud (and others), _Histoire . . . de l’Expédition_, IX, pp. 46-7. Mouriez, op. cit., I, p. 83.] [Footnote 972: Hutchinson said of Cavan: “. . . I never had a high opinion of his capacity, but I never thought him so silly and so mean a fellow as he has proved himself to be . . .” (The rest is in the same tone.) Hutchinson to Fox, 1 Jan., 1802. B.M. Add. MSS. 37053, f. 9. “Straton’s diffidence staggers him much.” Elgin to Hawkesbury, 2 Dec., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 973: Correspondence between Ibrahim and Bardissy and Stuart, end of Jan., 1802. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 974: Hobart to Cavan, March [_sic_], 1802. W.O. 6, 21. Hobart to Cavan, Feb. [_sic_,] 1802. W.O., 1, 346.] [Footnote 975: Hawkesbury to Elgin, 27 Jan., 1802. F.O. Turkey, 35.] [Footnote 976: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 28 Jan., 1802. F.O. Turkey, 35. Enclosing Elgin to Fox, 15 Jan. Elgin to Hawkesbury, 2 Dec., 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 977: The “plan” was enclosed in Hobart to Hutchinson, 12 Oct., 1801. W.O. 6, 21, and W.O. 1, 345.] [Footnote 978: Hutchinson to Hobart, Malta, 3 Jan., 1802, W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 979: Stuart to Hobart, 29 April, 1802. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 980: Hobart to Cavan, 10 May, 1802. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 981: Hobart to Stuart, 12 May, 1802. W.O. 1, 346, and Hawkesbury to Elgin, 10 May, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 36.] [Footnote 982: Stuart to Sullivan, 3 May, 1802. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 983: Reybaud (and others), _Histoire . . . de l’Expédition_, IX, pp. 62-9. That in consequence of the Franco-Turkish treaty of alliance [_sic_] of 1802, Britain veered back to the Beys.] [Footnote 984: Stuart to Sullivan, 26 July, 1802. W.O. 1, 346. Stuart to Hobart, 31 July, 1802. _Ibid._ Stuart to Hobart, 7 Aug., 1802. _Ibid._ Straton to Hawkesbury, 25 July, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 37. Straton to Hawkesbury, 3 Aug., 1802. _Ibid._ Straton to Hawkesbury, 25 Aug., 1802. _Ibid._ Ruffin to Talleyrand, 5 fructidor an X (22 Aug., 1802). Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie. Supplements, 23.] [Footnote 985: Grand Vizier to Hawkesbury, 13 Aug., 1802, enclosed in Straton’s despatch, 25 Aug. F.O. Turkey, 37, and Grand Vizier to Hawkesbury, 17 Aug., 1802. In W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 986: The conference took place in Cairo earlier in the year.] [Footnote 987: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 31 March, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 36.] [Footnote 988: Thornton, _The Present State of Turkey_, II, pp. 210-11.] [Footnote 989: Stuart to (Sullivan?), 7 Aug., 1802. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 990: That was what Tamara told Elgin. Elgin to Hawkesbury, 15 Jan., 1803. F.O. Turkey, 38.] [Footnote 991: _Ibid._] [Footnote 992: Stuart to Hobart, 17 Aug., 1802. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 993: Stuart to Hobart, 17 Aug., 1802. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 994: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 16 Nov., 1802. F.O. Turkey, 36.] [Footnote 995: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 19 October, 1801. F.O. Turkey, 33.] [Footnote 996: Stuart to Elgin, 15 Oct., 1802, enclosed in Elgin’s despatch, 14 Nov., 1802. F.O. Turkey, 36.] [Footnote 997: _Ibid._] [Footnote 998: Royer to Premier Consul, 5 Nov., 1802. Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1687. On the character of Royer, _see_ P. Triaire, _Dominique Larrey_, p. 233 note p. 260.] [Footnote 999: Mengin, _L’Egypte sous Mehemet Ali_. “Avertissement de l’éditeur.”] [Footnote 1000: There is a letter from Sabbagh in Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corr. Pol., 208, detailing his services and demanding employment now that “Bonaparte” was “sultan of the world.” There is an “eulogy” in Arabic of Napoleon by Raphail in Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1687. He carried some of the petitions of the Beys to France.] [Footnote 1001: Bardissy and Ibrahim to Bonaparte (in Arabic), 26 zulqueda, 1217, H, and Sitti Nefisa (the widow of Mourad) to Bonaparte, 26 zulqueda, 1217, H. Bardissy to Esteve, to Reynier, to Damas, 19 ramadan, 1216, H (23 Jan., 1802). Bardissy and Ibrahim in Turkish to Bonaparte same date. Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1687.] [Footnote 1002: El Messiry to Bonaparte (in Arabic) and undated, and “version d’une lettre du Sheikh El Messiry au Premier Consul,” 20 gomada el thania, 1217, H (19 Oct., 1802). Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1687.] [Footnote 1003: Ball to G(eorge) P(enn), 12 Nov., 1802, reporting that the mission was at first offered to Vial, the French Commissioner at Malta. B.M. Add. MSS. 27268, f. 10.] [Footnote 1004: Napoleon, _Correspondance_, VIII, 6368. To Sebastiani, 13 fructidor, X (5 Sept., 1802). No. 6277. To Decrès to prepare a frigate. Draft of instructions, 17 fruct. an X (3 Sept., 1802). Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 204.] [Footnote 1005: Napoleon to Talleyrand, 11 fructidor an X (29 Aug., 1802). _Correspondance_, VIII, 6276.] [Footnote 1006: There is an excellent account of Sebastiani’s activities in Tripoli based on the original report in _Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes_, II, Nov., Dec., 1919, pp. 225-236, by André Auzoux.] [Footnote 1007: This account of the mission is based on:— (_a_) The original report, not the garbled version of the Moniteur, in Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1687, and (_b_) Sebastiani to Talleyrand, dated from Alexandria, 2 vendémiaire an XI (23 Sept., 1802). Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corres. Pol., 205. The text of the report is dealt with in the Appendix.] [Footnote 1008: Khosrev to Talleyrand, 6 Nov., 1802. Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 205. “Protocol of a conference between Sebastiani and Khosrev.” (Undated, enclosed in Elgin’s despatch, 15 Jan., 1803.) F.O. Turkey, 38. Rosetti to Stuart, 6 Nov., 1802 (in Italian), and Khosrev to Stuart, 3 Nov. and 9 Nov., 1802. W.O. 1, 346. As to Khosrev’s attitude to overtures from the British generals, _see_ Cavan to Hobart, 16 Aug., 1802. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1009: Morkoff to Vorontsoff, Paris, 23 Jan.-4 Feb., 1803. Sbornik, 77, p. 30.] [Footnote 1010: Djabarti, VII, p. 133.] [Footnote 1011: For the position before the publication of the report, Ruffin to Talleyrand, 5 frimaire an XI (26 Aug., 1802). Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 205. Elgin to Hawkesbury, 13 Nov., 1802. F.O. Turkey, 36.] [Footnote 1012: Brune to Talleyrand, 2 prairial an XI (21 May, 1803). Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corr. Pol., 206.] [Footnote 1013: Brune to Premier Consul, 3 prairial an XI (22 May, 1803). Arch. Nat. AF. IV, 1688.] [Footnote 1014: Brune to Talleyrand, 2 prairial an XI (21 May, 1803). Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corr. Pol., 206.] [Footnote 1015: Elgin to Hawkesbury, 14 Nov., 1802 (duplicate). F.O. Turkey, 36.] [Footnote 1016: Bardissy to Sebastiani, 30 Oct., 1802. Bardissy and Ibrahim to Sebastiani, 18 safar, 1218, H. Bardissy and Ibrahim to “Bonaparte” (no date). Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1688.] [Footnote 1017: Stuart to Hobart, 9 March, 1803. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1018: Stuart to Hobart, 24 Nov., 1802. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1019: “. . . I held these orders (dated 17 Oct.) as merely preparatory arrangements for an event which after the mission with which I was honoured for Constantinople I must presume to think in some measure connected with the political considerations of this country.” Stuart to Hobart, 7 Dec., 1802. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1020: “. . . It is our duty to interfere and put a stop to ravage and bloodshed, we have an example in the late interference of France with respect to the indemnities in the Empire. . . .” Stuart to Elgin, 13 Nov., 1802, enclosed in Stuart’s despatch, 21 Nov., 1802. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1021: Stuart to Hobart, 24 Nov., 1802. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1022: On that mission Stuart to Elgin, 29 Sept., 1802. Enclosed in Elgin’s despatch, 14 Nov. F.O. Turkey, 36. Elgin to Hawkesbury, 13 and 15 Jan., 1803. F.O. Turkey, 38.] [Footnote 1023: Stuart to Hobart, 9 March, 1803. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1024: Brune au Premier Consul, 5 pluviôse an XI (25 Jan., 1803) Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1688.] [Footnote 1025: Brune au Premier Consul, 16 pluviôse an XI (4 Feb., 1803). Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1688.] [Footnote 1026: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1027: Blantyre to Stuart, 3 March, 1803. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1028: Grand Vizier to Hawkesbury, Jan. [_sic_], 1803, enclosed in Elgin’s despatch, 15 Jan. F.O. Turkey, 38.] [Footnote 1029: Stuart to Hobart, 9 March, 1803. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1030: Khosrev to Stuart, 5 and 20 Jan, 1803. W.O. 1, 346. Stuart to Hobart, 9 March, 1803. _Ibid._] [Footnote 1031: Hamilton, _Ægyptiaca_, p. vii.] [Footnote 1032: Stuart to Missett, 18 March, 1803. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1033: Hamilton, _Ægyptiaca_, p. 8. Colonel Barlow in a report to Hobart of conversations he had with Stuart refers to “the necessity Stuart found himself in of contributing some pecuniary help of about 8,000 dollars, some sabres, muskets and ammunition, etc.” [_sic_] 29 May, 1803. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1034: Desade to Stuart, 27 Feb., 1803. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1035: As early as Dec., 1801. He asked Hamilton what percentage interest he could obtain from investments in England, and was disappointed when told 6 per cent, for the Egyptian peasantry would give him 30 per cent on loans and consider it a good bargain. Hamilton, _Ægyptiaca_, pp. 22, 253.] [Footnote 1036: Ibrahim and Bardissy to Stuart, 25 rajab, 1217, H (21 Nov., 1802). W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1037: Stuart to Hobart, 28 Feb., 1803. W.O. 1, 346.] XI THE NEAR-EASTERN FACTOR IN THE RENEWAL OF THE SECOND COALITION, 1802-1805 “On me croit fou, inconséquent, mais je sais ce qu’il y a à faire mieux que ceux qui me jugent,” once observed the First Consul to Morkoff, the Russian envoy,[1038] and no account of his career can be true which does not credit him with some intelligible motive for his actions. Talleyrand at one time attributed the “incoherences” of his master to a mind inclined to complete derangement.”[1039] But “it is impossible to believe that the ‘most splendid genius’ that has appeared on earth, as Acton declares him to have been, was the sport alternately of tumultuous passions, of wild and unreasoning ambition, and of a ‘vice of nature,’ which drove him against his better judgment into disastrous courses.”[1040] If this be so, where is the elusive “secret de l’Empereur” to be sought? Is it to be sought in “universal dominion,” in the consummation of the diplomacy of Richelieu and Louis XIV, or in the Empire of the East? Napoleon has never revealed his secret. One thing is certain: he never intended the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. It is true that on innumerable occasions he dangled the alluring prize before covetous eyes; but it was always done with an immediate—and different—object in view, as a tactical move in the diplomatic game. “Cette idée de partager la Turquie qui flotte en l’air, il s’en saisit et la formule, non pour la réaliser . . . mais pour en faire, selon les cas, un appât ou un épouvantail.”[1041] It was to prevent the coalition from coming into being while he was consolidating his power in Switzerland, Holland and Italy that he sent “feelers” in the direction of Vienna and St. Petersburg in the years 1801 and 1802. The diplomatic reports are full of his “designs” and his “concerts”—sometimes with Austria, sometimes with Russia, and sometimes with both.[1042] They were never definite.[1043] When the Austrians talked of the “paucity” of the “compensations” they had received in Germany, Talleyrand was often in the habit of “consoling” them “en faisant entrevoir la perspective d’acquisitions à faire sur la Turquie au moment de sa prochaine destruction.”[1044] Both the First Consul and his Minister broached the subject with the Russian Morkoff on many occasions.[1045] But no definite proposals were ever made: the First Consul only expatiated on the impending ruin of the Turkish Empire, while Talleyrand simply expressed an ardent desire to “share with Russia all dangers, glories and advantages.”[1046] Neither the Court of Vienna nor that of St. Petersburg allowed itself to be drawn into a discussion. Austrian diplomacy adopted a policy to which it kept throughout the Napoleonic epoch. It refused to turn from the West—Italy and Germany—to the East. The policy of Austria is well illustrated in the instructions from Francis to Phillippe de Cobenzl, his ambassador in Paris, dated the 31st March, 1801. The Emperor believed that the First Consul only aimed at frightening the Turks into a separate peace and at “embroiling” the powers so as to leave the coast clear for himself. On the supposition of Russia, France and Austria agreeing upon some scheme of partition, Prussia was sure to demand and receive some compensation, probably the bishoprics of Münster and Hildesheim. These alone “would be more useful to her than three great Turkish provinces to Austria.” The probable share of the Hapsburgs in the Ottoman spoils, moreover, would be in mountainous territories inhabited by a warlike and fanatical population. The Emperor feared that the story would prove to be a repetition of that of the partition of Poland, into which Austria “had been forced and duped.” But, like Maria Theresa, who “wept, but took all the same,” Francis ordered his ambassador to try—in the impossibility of “averting the storm”—to have a “peaceful execution of the design” and prevent Prussia from “making mischief” while the powers were occupied.[1047] Russia also refused to respond.[1048] Was this a French defeat? It was not, for all that Napoleon wanted was to sow distrust; and in this he amply succeeded.[1049] His real Eastern policy is to be found in his instructions to the new Ambassador in Constantinople. General Brune was chosen for his “caractère entreprenant et militaire,”[1050] qualities which, in British eyes, “rendered him an extremely dangerous person in the situation to which he had been appointed.”[1051] “The intention of the government,” so he was instructed, “was that he should regain, by every possible means, the dominance which France had been enjoying in Constantinople for two hundred years.” He was to “fix on himself” all regards, show great respect to Turkish usages, illuminate his palace on the anniversary of the Prophet, acquire exclusive protection over all the Christians of Syria, Armenia and the Holy Places, send accurate information on the provinces, and procure every possible advantage for French commerce. These were declared to be the present objects of French diplomacy, as Turkey was not in a position to act against Austria as heretofore.[1052] Great Britain was deeply perturbed at the preponderant position acquired by France. The Prime Minister, Addington, was, apparently, inclined to favour the establishment of Napoleon’s rule on a hereditary basis, but declared his opposition to the expansion of France.[1053] It would be wrong, however, to ascribe this opposition to any particular action on the part of France, or to mark its beginning at any particular date. Every act of the First Consul was scrutinised with great suspicion, and every one of his innumerable “gestures” was met by a chorus of mingled abuse and lamentation. Never was there a more melancholy illustration of the fragility of the most solemn covenants when the “will to peace” was absent, and of the evils of “seeing red.” This unfortunate state of affairs arose mainly out of anxiety for the safety of the Turkish provinces and of the avowed determination of Napoleon to allow Great Britain no voice in the affairs of the Continent. By the side of these two great issues, the unworthy press campaign; the squabble over the indemnities due to war-sufferers and the commercial arrangements fade into insignificance.[1054] The reports of Merry and Whitworth were never lacking in the ascribing of some design or other on Egypt and the Morea.[1055] Sebastiani was stated to have “regular powers” to treat with Ibrahim Bey for a rising in Egypt that would place the country in the power of France. To gain this object, he was accompanied by the interpreter Jaubert and “armed” with offers of men and money.[1056] The British Cabinet would have preferred a “union of the continental powers for the defence of the East”[1057] to a violation of the Treaty of Amiens by keeping Malta. On the 27th October, 1802, Hawkesbury wrote to Admiral Warren, the Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to propose to the Russian Government an “alliance” between the two countries, to which Austria should accede, “to counterbalance the upsetting of the European system by France.”[1058] The Russians at first asked for time to reflect and then declared the overture to be “premature.”[1059] Hawkesbury, however, returned to the charge. He asked this time if “it was possible to enter into a Treaty or convention of a more limited nature by a formal engagement, either public or secret, to provide for the security and integrity of Turkey.”[1060] “One advantage of this would be that the representatives of both countries would act at once when they scented danger without reference to London or St. Petersburg.” The[1061] Russians were also informed that the best security for them was in the weakness, indolence and inactivity of the Turks.”[1062] The Government of the Tsar again “turned down” this proposal. “Je ne vous cacherai pas,” declared the Vice-Chancellor, A. Vorontsoff, in a “note verbale” to Warren, “que nous ne croyons pas encore le danger si prochain et par conséquent qu’il soit utile dans ce moment pour le bien général des affaires d’en faire un objet de négociations particulières ou de convenir des mesures qu’il y aurait à prendre.”[1063] Under these circumstances, the “doctor”—as Addington was called—gathered all his courage and decided not to evacuate Malta, in violation of the letter of the treaty. His courage, however, did not rise to countermanding the orders of November, 1802,[1064] for the withdrawal from Egypt. The occasion on which this determination with regard to Malta was made known was no other than the publication in the _Moniteur_ of the anti- British portions of Sebastiani’s Report. The publication was the occasion and not the cause of that determination. It was “seized upon” in order to clear a situation which the hesitation of a weak administration had allowed to arise. The Cabinet, therefore, “determined to notice it and to draw from it an occasion to get at—if possible—Bonaparte’s views and explain its own concerning Malta.”[1065] “Le cour de Londres,” Whitworth informed Morkoff, “étant trop convaincu des vastes projets que l’ambition insatiable de Bonaparte lui suggérait, était déterminé à saisir le moment actuel pour y mettre des bornes plutôt que de le différer plus longtemps.”[1066] The Government was now satisfied that “innumerable examples had proved the insufficiency and fragility” of “international guarantees.”[1067] When Talleyrand—sincerely pacific[1068]—tried to explain away the significance of the Report, Whitworth “was glad of this opportunity to prepare the French Government for the difficulties in the accomplishment of its wishes which he hoped and trusted it would experience.”[1069] Napoleon proved obdurate. He refused every concession and declared he would rather see the British encamped on the heights of Montmartre than acquiesce in their retaining Malta. Two days after Talleyrand had tried to “calm” the British Ambassador, the First Consul “avowed” to the latter his designs on Egypt.[1070] His minister in London held to the formula: “Tout le Traité d’Amiens et rien que le Traité,” to which Hawkesbury retorted: “L’Etat du continent tel qu’il était alors et rien que cet état!”[1071] The Prussian Minister in Paris, Lucchesini, wrote on 13th May, 1803, “Le général Bonaparte a provoqué la guerre le jour où il a prétendu exclure l’Angleterre des affaires du Continent.”[1072] It would be impossible, indeed, to expect a British Government to renounce the right to interfere in the affairs of the Continent whenever its interests dictated such interference. “This right His Majesty possesses in common with every other independent power; it rests upon general principles and does not require the confirmation of any particular treaty.”[1073] Under these circumstances, nothing but war could be the outcome. The outbreak of war between Britain and France coincided with a “revival” in Russian policy. There is some exaggeration, however, in the statement of the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikailovitch that “jusqu’à Tilsit, tout se fait à l’aveuglette, au hasard des impressions de l’heure et sans aucun système.”[1074] The aloofness of Russia was partly due to a sincere desire to concentrate attention on domestic reform, to hesitation among conflicting systems, and to consciousness of the weakness of the Addington ministry[1075] and the incapacity of the British Ambassador. Joseph de Maistre once observed that Warren “était fait pour cette mission précisément comme moi pour conduire son vaisseau. . . .”[1076] Gambling ruined the worthy admiral. “That was his affair,” “mais . . . entièrement occupé de ses intérêts et très peu de ceux de l’Angleterre, il jouit depuis le matin jusqu’au soir, et du soir jusqu’au matin et laissait cheminer les affaires comme il plaisait à Dieu.”[1077] The advent of Prince Adam Czartoryski to power, however, marked the commencement of a more active policy. The object of this Polish statesman was to “reconcile the national interests of Russia and the craving of the Tsar for glory with the interests of mankind.”[1078] The “interests of mankind,” in this connection, mean the restoration of the Polish nation, and the liberation of the Slavs. His “system” made “opposition” to Napoleon inevitable. “It was useless to attempt friendship with that potentate: his ally had either to carry out his plans or become his enemy.”[1079] It also made inevitable the destruction of the Turkish Empire. Czartoryski, apparently, did not think his projects to be capable of immediate realisation, they had to be carried out “slowly and consistently.”[1080] It was early in 1803 that the Tsar sorrowfully recognised “qu’il ne dépend pas de nous seuls de rester pacifiques.”[1081] This being so, it was as well to see identity of views between Russia and Britain. But he was anxious to find out if the latter country “did not consider the ruin of Turkey to be impending,” and what line of action she was going to take “in the different suppositions which could be formed on that subject.”[1082] Towards the end of the year, the question of Turkey occupied the attention of the Government more and more.[1083] Warren had the time to notice that “an improvement” had taken place in the language of Czartoryski,[1084] and that the information as to the “designs” of France became more and more convincing.[1085] In November, 1803, the Russian Government presented officially one item, at any rate, of its programme; it was, this time, the concerting of measures for the defence of Turkey.[1086] Czartoryski hoped that the British agents at Corfu would be supplied with money to “support” the Greeks and that a frigate would be stationed in the Adriatic. The Russians themselves were beginning to act on these principles: the Russian garrison at Corfu was to be reinforced and “connections” with the Christian subjects of the Sultan[1087] were to be commenced. That this was not the whole design is clear from an interesting memorandum of Prince Adam to the Tsar. The Minister observed “que vu l’esprit du gouvernement anglais et sa politique fondée sur ses intérêts . . . il pense que l’on pourra . . . sur cet objet (chute de la Turquie) facilement s’entendre soit à present, soit plus tard . . . avec le cour de Londres qui probablement s’y prêtera plus aisément qu’aucun autre gouvernement quelconque et acquiescera sans peine à un arrangement éventuel avec nous, par lequel les deux gouvernements se garantiront, en cas de l’anéantissement de l’empire ottoman, l’exclusion de toute autre puissance de ses domaines.”[1088] It was, no doubt, to prepare the ground for this “eventual arrangement” that Garlike, the Secretary of the British Legation, was approached through Mr. Eton—the author of a hostile survey of Turkey—by a person whose name has not been disclosed. This “person” began to talk of the imminent fall of the Ottoman Empire, when Garlike cut short the interview by declaring that his king was the ally of the Sultan.[1089] Czartoryski, however, saw Warren and informed him of his master’s intention to support the Turks, but, he added, “they acted towards Russia with much distrust and would not explain themselves clearly, and that they were in such a state of debt, insolence and confusion that it was difficult to know how to act with them.” Of one thing, however, the Prince was certain; he would not like to see French influence among the Greeks, nor would he desire to provoke a French attack from Italy. He then asked if Great Britain had any “agents” in the Morea, and concluded by declaring that it would be better to await the moves of Napoleon.[1090] Warren was profoundly perturbed at what he considered to be evidence of French intrigue. His anxiety was not allayed by a communication—again through Eton—from the same anonymous person, above referred to. The message ran to the effect that the Tsar was desirous of concerting measures with Britain for the emancipation of the Greeks, that he entertained doubts of British willingness to see a Russian prince on the throne of Constantinople, that if these doubts were removed he would go any lengths to support her in the present war . . . that he had “that object no less at heart than any of his predecessors.” Warren was informed that Russia would make an explicit overture if he “let it be discovered” that he had written to the Government about it. The Ambassador refused to do this and assured Hawkesbury that none of the ministers had ever expressed such sentiments as were attributed to the Tsar.[1091] One decisive evidence of an ardent desire of Russia to discuss the partition of Turkey was her refusal to consent to the renewal of her Treaty of Alliance with the Porte.[1092] That renewal had been clamoured for by the Turks and suggested by the British.[1093] There can be no other explanation of this than her repugnance to “tie” her hands when the interesting event should come to pass. In the meantime, Addington had given place to Pitt. The new administration was bent, before everything else, on a more vigorous war policy. The views of its predecessors in office were well summed up in Hawkesbury’s instructions to Mr. Drummond, the successor of Elgin. “We have no other desire than that the Porte should preserve the strictest neutrality and that it should not depart from that system except in the case of an aggression on the part of France or of the determination of the Emperor of Russia to make common cause with His Majesty.”[1094] It is clear, then, that something was left over till the attitude of Russia became fully known. As soon, therefore, as the Government learnt the first items of the Tsar’s programme—namely, the defence of Turkey, the “melioration” of the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte, and the establishing of “connections” with them, it decided to “counteract” French intrigues by the sending of J. P. Morier[1095] as Consul-General to the Morea, and of Lock to Egypt;[1096] but neither received instructions to “create” what might be called a British party in either place, Morier was particularly directed to pay attention to Ali Pasha of Janina, to persuade him never to listen to French incitement, to travel about in the wake of French agents, denouncing their intrigues and strengthening the hands of the various Pashas with counsel and money. Captain J. Martin Leake, who had been on the staff of General Koehler during the latter’s mission to Turkey, was later sent to assist Morier in his task.[1097] But in truth, Great Britain trusted more—and with reason—to the vigilance of her squadrons in the Mediterranean then under Nelson. There were thus some points on which the two courts were in agreement. They were primarily agreed as to the necessity of excluding French influence from the Divan. Great Britain, moreover, skilfully professed belief in the sincerity of Russian declarations, but refused to work out the agreed measures in their real spirit. But the British agents, abroad, took it upon themselves so to do. Missett, in Cairo, was actively engaged in successive and ludicrously futile intrigues.[1098] Straton, the minister at Constantinople, concluded from communications from Missett (!) that the Government wanted to take possession of Egypt and that it was only waiting for a pretext. He thought the best way was to obtain an invitation from the Porte for a British garrison and, accordingly, spoke to the Reis Effendi. The Turk “approved” the arguments but added that he had not the courage to lay the proposal before the Divan.[1099] This was in February, 1804. In July of the same year, Lock, the new Consul for Cairo, arrived in Constantinople—not exactly in the direct route to Alexandria. In a conversation with the dragoman of the Porte, he endeavoured to persuade him to get the Sultan to apply to the King for a British garrison in Alexandria. Straton, after his discomfiture early in the year, could not join in the persuasion, so he directed his dragoman, Pisani, “to support Lock by all means short of declaring that he was authorised by the Government to propose such a measure.”[1100] But the Reis Effendi again proved as obdurate as ever. He declared that he was “glad” that Lock did not expatiate on a subject “upon which he could not even enter,” “that nothing could be more calculated to affect the happy confidence and cordial harmony prevailing between the two governments if a proposal of this nature was to be insisted upon on the part of the Minister.” The worthy Pisani “made a number of equally just and friendly observations to him which made no more impression than if they had been offered to a statue.”[1101] Lock, consequently, was of opinion that the best policy would be to present the Turks with the _fait accompli_.[1102] The Russians were equally active. There was one Panghalo—a “jail-bird.” He was sent to Greece via London with one hundred and fifty florins from the Russian Government and three hundred pounds from the British in his pocket.[1103] “Major” Lambro Cazoni—“notorious” during the last Russo- Turkish war—was endeavouring to raise a Greek corps in the Danubian Principalities.[1104] The arrival of Sergio, _alias_ Laskaroff, and Fazarde in Bucharest showed that “something” was going to happen. Fazarde—who “could speak twelve languages”—was frequently closeted with the Hospodar Ipselanti.[1105] Mocenigo, in Corfu, directed all his energies to the destruction of Ali Pasha. But the greatest success achieved by the Russians was in Montenegro. In August, 1804, the prince- archbishop had a conference with Musourouski, the Russian Consul at Cattaro, which was followed by a formal declaration that the people had put themselves under Russian protection. General Ivelitch, who had been residing in the neighbourhood, however, refused to be satisfied with this, and was only “conciliated” by the decapitation of the Abbé Dolci, the Gallophil confidant of the archbishop.[1106] These activities were destined to produce important results. In the first place, the agents of the various powers were at loggerheads. A bitter feud ensued, notably, between Mocenigo, Morier and Foresti. These jealousies, naturally, extended to the governments. The Austrians were irritated at what took place in Montenegro, and threatened to declare Cattaro a “military port” and, thus, expel all consuls from it.[1107] The Russians expressed a great deal of ill-humour at the activities of Missett, Morier and Straton.[1108] It was, now, the task of British diplomacy to clear the situation, and to “contain” Russian action—not by overt opposition, as in the crisis of 1790—but by “co-operation.” Pitt was too much of a realist not to accommodate himself to the circumstances of 1804: he was not in a position to refuse Russia a free hand. But this is not enough to “show how completely his former fear of Russia’s policy in the Eastern Question had been overborne by the new and far greater danger from Napoleon’s aggression.”[1109] For, as will be demonstrated, he won on the main question: namely, the entry of Russia into the Coalition without a concert for the partition of Turkey. The first pronouncement of the Cabinet on the Eastern Question took place in June, 1804.[1110] Every confidence was expressed in the “liberal” views of the Tsar, but it was feared that connection with the Greeks might lead to more embarrassments than they were worth. As for the British Government, its earnest wish and endeavour was to save the Turkish provinces for their lawful sovereign, or at any rate “to prevent their falling into the hands of France.” “Occasions, thus, might arise in which the substance must be preferred to the form, and Turkey, according to the forcible expression of the Tsar’s sentiments, should be saved in spite of herself.” This was something different from the “eventual agreement” hinted at by Czartoryski. The Russian Government tried again, however, to bring about a discussion on that subject. Czartoryski informed S. Vorontsoff that the Tsar would not do anything without an agreement with Britain. But he added, “il faut considérer que si Bonaparte a pris pour règle de tirer le plus grand parti possible des pays sur lesquels son influence s’étend, on sera réduit peut-être pour lui résister, d’en faire autant, bien entendu avec des modifications convenables. Au reste, ce n’est pas d’opinions déjà arrêtés dont il est question. Mais la matière est trop importante pour qu’il ne faille chercher de la mettre au clair et de rendre sa decision aussi sage et adaptée aux circonstances que possible. Il nous a paru à cet effet que nous ne pouvons mieux faire que de causer, pour ainsi dire amicalement à ce sujet avec le ministère anglais; nos deux gouvernements peuvent se donner mutuellement de bons conseils, car leurs intérêts sont analogues et ne se contrarient pas.”[1111] The Russian Ambassador, however, did not fully possess the confidence of his Court. Long residence in Great Britain had filled S. Vorontsoff with admiration for British policy and British ways. He sincerely believed that the interests of both countries were identical; and it would be unfair to dismiss him as a mere blind partisan. His Government well knew that he was avowedly opposed to the emancipation of the Greeks as likely to prove prejudicial to Russian interests,[1112] that he disapproved of expansion at the expense of the Turk. “Nous sommes déjà très horriblement étendus pour que le pays puisse être bien gouverné. . . . Conservons pour voisins ces pauvres Turcs qui sont meilleurs voisins que les Suédois, les Prussiens et les Autrichiens.”[1113] It was this avowed hostility on the part of the Russian Ambassador to the destruction of the Turkish Empire that led to the mission of Novosiltsoff to London in the autumn of 1804. The desired “conversation” on the Eastern Question was only a part of a large programme—the object of which, in the words of Czartoryski, was to find for the Coalition a basis broader than the “negative” one of fighting Napoleon, and a bond, not inspired only by a common feeling of revenge but by the most elevated principles of justice and philanthropy.”[1114] One of the proposals carried by M. Novosiltsoff was the dismemberment of Turkey into a number of “confederated” small states under Russian influence, the Tsar having to be declared “Protector” and “Emperor” of the Slavs. Great Britain and France were to receive some islands and establishments in Africa or Asia, Austria (if it could not be helped) Croatia, Ragusa and a portion of Bosnia, and Russia, Moldavia, Cattaro, Corfu, the Dardanelles and Constantinople.[1115] M. Driault sees in all this an astounding measure of “naïvety,” and others a satisfactory evidence of “idealism.”[1116] The point was: how did Pitt manage to “turn” a dangerous corner; when Vorontsoff read Czartoryski’s despatch[1117] to him and his colleague Harrowby, both statesmen were surprised. They then, after some hesitation, asked if he did not believe that his Government harboured the design of seeking “compensations” in Turkey. The Ambassador was embarrassed, for he himself believed in the existence of such a design. He declared, however, that the words of the despatch did not bear such a construction. This did not convince Pitt and Harrowby, for they observed that the subject was not sufficiently developed to make an answer possible. As far as British policy was concerned, they stated that “ils ne porteront des troupes dans le territoire ottoman que quand il faut en chasser les Français ou les prévenir, s’il y a des indices certains que les Français y veulent débarquer; mais que c’est toujours dans l’intention de restituer à la Porte les pays qu’on aurait occupés uniquement pour les défendre pour elle.” They added that this did not presently arise for the simple reason that there were no available troops in the Mediterranean.[1118] Novosiltsoff could not change this attitude. When on one occasion he tried to convince Pitt that the aggrandisement of Russia would not be prejudicial to British interests, the British Premier concurred, but added that it would be “très impolitique, très nuisible à l’objet principal qu’on a en vue, de songer à la réalisation d’un pareil dessein, qu’une pareille lésion du droit des gens sera atroce.”[1119] The British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Lord Gower, was also instructed to present fully the point of view of his Government.[1120] The Minister in Constantinople was also apprized of the manner in which the question was envisaged. Mr. Straton was sharply reproached for touching upon the occupation of Egypt without “positive orders,” for “such proposals without obvious pressing necessity would only rouse the suspicions of the Porte and strengthen the French misrepresentation that we desire to hold that country for ourselves.” “But should Straton receive notice from any of the British commanders in the Mediterranean that in consequence of imminent danger of an attack upon Egypt—‘a body of troops had landed or was about to land’—he should do his utmost to place such a measure in ‘the fairest light,’ to represent it as a necessity which admitted of no delay, that its sole object was protection from France and that the province was to be restored as soon as could be done in a ‘state of security.’”[1121] The British Government, however, could not afford complete hostility to Russian actions. It instructed its agents to make their peace with their Russian colleagues,[1122] recommended Lord Gower to make no remonstrance on the conduct of men like Mocenigo and Ivelitch, but only mild “reflections,” and to inform the Court of St. Petersburgh that Britain “would try to adapt herself to the attitude of Russia as far as possible,” and that the desire of His Majesty’s Government was that the policy of both powers “should be guided by uniform and consistent principles.”[1123] The Government was also “disposed, in order to please the Tsar, to ‘drag’ on the affair of the renewal of the alliance as long as Russia wished,”[1124] and represented, to the Porte, that the delay was due only to the necessity of “concert” with St. Petersburg.[1125] But the victory gained was great. In the “Déclaration d’Alliance Intime,” concluded between Austria and Russia in October, 1804, the integrity of the Turkish Empire was solemnly stipulated.[1126] The language of Czartoryski also bore testimony to the success of Pitt. He wrote to S. Vorontsoff lamenting that his despatch had produced an effect contrary to what he intended. He emphasised that he had no “arrière pensée,” that the Tsar was disinterested—even too disinterested—and that he was convinced that the interests of both powers in the East could never clash. “Nous voulons,” he added, “soutenir l’Empire Turc, mais si le corps débile et gangrené dans ses principes vitaux croule enfin, nous ne souffrirons pas que son sort soit réglé d’une manière qui soit contraire aux intérêts majeurs de la Russie.” It was “painful” to him to note that “à la seule hypothèse d’un avantage quelconque pour la Russie, c’est nos amis qui commenceront par témoigner leur jalousie.” The last words of the letter are significant. “Laissez moi vous dire dans le plus intime de la confiance que M. Pitt ne s’est pas montré favorable à la Russie en 88 [_sic_] et que je crains que quelque parcelle de ce système n’aille se mêler dans des rapports où la loyauté et la plus entière franchise doivent présider.”[1127] In the next month, December, it was decided to renew the treaty of alliance with Turkey, in order to “appease the alarms of Mr. Pitt, whose system, so long ago as 1790, was based on the greatest jealousy of any new acquisitions on the part of Russia.”[1128] Could it be said then that Russia gained nothing from her connection with Great Britain? Such a view is not tenable, for it was precisely that connection which prevented Turkey from seeking doubtful salvation in an alliance with France and enabled Russian influence to predominate in the Divan. While the fate of the Turkish Empire was discussed in St. Petersburg, Vienna and London, Constantinople was the scene of a remarkable contest between Napoleon and his enemies. Turkey presented in that year a dismal picture.[1129] The provincial pashas showed only an outward semblance of obedience, the Janissaries were in a mutinous state of mind and in league with overt or secret robbers;[1130] bands of brigands carried their depredations up to the gates of the capital; Egypt was tossed between the Mamelukes and the Albanians, and the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina were in the hands of the Wahabis. Well might the friends and the enemies of the Turks think that their downfall was near at hand. Some contemporary observers thought that the deathblow would come from Wahabism. “These sectarians,” wrote Straton, “strike at the root of the constitution, the only thing which keeps the Empire from tumbling to pieces; namely, the chief Priesthood of the Sultan in the quality of the First Imam.”[1131] It was agreed, however, that there was no hope but in the establishment of a “new system,” “both civil and military, which had to be steadily pursued by those who formed the administration of the Empire and directed the councils of the sovereign.”[1132] Selim and some of his advisers were only too well aware of this necessity. The remarkable Capitan Pasha, Hussein, “possessed a liberality of spirit rarely to be met with in Turkey. Far from entertaining the absurd notions of his countrymen respecting Christians, he, on the contrary, fairly acknowledged their superiority and endeavoured by imitation to appropriate to himself those improvements which the advanced state of civilisation had given birth to in Christendom.”[1133] The reforming policy of the Sultan was mainly, but not entirely, directed to the fighting forces. Great success was achieved in the Navy,[1134] but the forces of reaction prevented the establishment of the first model army.[1135] “Old Turkey” was too strong for the reformers. Nothing could have been done with a people whose chief method of protest was to burn whole quarters in Constantinople.[1136] But the Turkish Empire did not fall asunder. “Like Mehemet’s ‘coffin’ it was suspended between powers of equal attraction.”[1137] “On a superficial view of the different springs of the Turkish Government, it appears all discord and confusion; but on a better acquaintance of the subject, it will be found to contain ‘concordia discors,’ a harmony arising out of discordant materials.”[1138] Such was the foreign policy of the Porte. It was influenced by neither bribery nor sentiment. Bribery, as Sir Robert Adair found out, might gain small points but could not effect a change in principle.[1139] Sentiment was equally ineffective: French, Austrians, Russians, British were taken in the mass. The foreign policy of Turkey was also, so to speak, more “impersonal” than that of any of the powers. Its springs of action lay, as it were, in the “nature of things,” and not in the character of any Reis Effendi or even Sultan. Between the combatants for influence, the Porte definitely threw itself on the side of Great Britain and Russia. “Le nom de votre Majesté,” wrote a French agent, “est plus grand que toute la puissance russe, mais cette puissance est voisine, le danger est présent et la terreur est à son comble.”[1140] Russia, moreover, presented herself as the ally of Great Britain. “She was viewed with less jealousy on account of her connection with us,” wrote the British Ambassador,[1141] partly because Britain was believed—and rightly—to be disinterested, and partly because—from her command of the sea—this power could render great service or give mortal blows. These considerations, and not the “venality” of the “administration” or the fact that this or that Minister was “sold” to this or that power,[1142] or the keeping of the real state of affairs from the knowledge of the Sultan,[1143] explains matters. The most signal result of this orientation of Turkish policy was the daring refusal—at the behest of Russia—to recognise Napoleon as Emperor of the French.[1144] Talleyrand had carefully prepared the ground by a “present” of a gold box and the sum of 40,000 francs to Halet Effendi, the Ambassador in Paris.[1145] But Halet’s “good counsel” found no echo in Constantinople, and Brune exhausted the resources of diplomacy without gaining his end. The Turks behaved in the usual way. They tried pretext after pretext, without either “accepting” or “refusing.” At one time it was that the word “Emperor” had no equivalent in Turkish, at another—on the “Internuncio’s” advice—it was that affairs of this “magnitude” usually needed twenty or thirty years to settle. When Prussia and Austria finally recognised Napoleon, the Porte seemed for a while at the end of its resources. But not so! Brune was informed that Austria did so in return for something, namely, the erection of the Grand Duchy of Austria into an Empire, and, therefore, the Porte had to study its own interests and not offend Russia. The withdrawal of Brune[1146] and the consequent rupture of diplomatic relations aroused great anxiety but did not change the determination of the Divan. For Italinski, the Russian envoy, had threatened war if the demand of Napoleon was complied with, and Mr. Straton had energetically supported the Russian’s “representations.”[1147] French influence had sunk so low that it was considered a “victory” when M. Jaubert left Constantinople with an answer to Napoleon written by the Sultan and not the Grand Vizier.[1148] French merchants and French _protégés_ began to seek—the surest sign of “decline” in the Levant—some more effective protection.[1149] The Porte also acquiesced in the passage of Russian warships and transports through the straits.[1150] It was a most serious setback to a man like Napoleon, for it touched his “amour-propre.” Was Russia satisfied with so signal a victory? She was not. Baulked in the ardent desire to arrange the partition of Turkey, she now aimed at dragging her—“débile et gangrène,” as she was—into the war with France. This was the object of the new Treaty of Alliance.[1151] The secret articles tacked on to the original Treaty of 1798 amply bears out this. The two most important of these were the ones relating to the eventual occupation of Alexandria by a British force and of the ex-Venetian possessions on the mainland and the Danubian Principalities by a Russian army and to Russian intervention in favour of the Christian subjects of the Sultan. The communication of these terms to the British Government was accompanied by a curious piece of advice. “Je crois,” wrote Czartoryski, “que notre cabinet entend infiniment mieux la politique orientale (parce que cela le touche de plus près) que celui de St. James. Nous demandons donc qu’on écoute nos conseils, qu’on suive nos directions, qu’on ne gâte pas nos opérations et qu’on ne fasse rien sans s’être au préalable bien entendu. . . .”[1152] This earnest objurgation fell on willing ears. The British Government, moreover, was informed that M. d’Italinski was allowed full discretion on the most objectionable of the secret articles.[1153] It is impossible to tell whether this was true or not, for Mr. Arbuthnot, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, who had seen Italinski’s instructions, described them as “absolutely positive.”[1154] The British Government, however, though it recognised that the terms “pressed rather strongly on the Ottoman government” saw “at the same time that it was not expedient to differ with Russia upon the degrees of measures when such great and important events depend upon union.”[1155] There was another reason besides this; namely, the fact that it was envisaging the possibility of the occupation of Egypt. Instructions were sent on 29th March, 1805, to General Craig, the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, to bear in mind that “a situation may arise in which there may be reason to suppose that the projects of France are directed . . . against Egypt. The occupation of Alexandria by a British force may in that case become necessary.”[1156] The jealousy manifested by the Porte, however, “upon a proposal of a similar nature made by Straton,” prevented the Government from inserting a stipulation to that effect in the _projet_ of the British act of accession to the Russo-Turkish Treaty.[1157] But now that the Russians were pressing the matter of “preventive occupation,” the question of the garrisoning of Alexandria might be brought forward. “His Majesty’s government certainly is not at this moment (September, 1805) prepared to send troops into Egypt, but the previous consent of the Turkish government to that measure would be of great importance if, in the course of the war, it should become necessary to adopt it, or if such consent could be procured without creating a discontent and jealousy, which may be of serious importance. At all events, I think, it will be necessary to procure a provision for the occupation of Alexandria, if the Russians should insist upon the stipulations they have proposed for stationing their troops at Parga and in other parts of the Ottoman dominions.”[1158] The negotiations started in Constantinople in March, 1805.[1159] The “patent” articles were soon agreed upon and the real battle began.[1160] The struggle centred on the articles relating to the “preventive” occupation and the intervention in favour of the Rayas. The Turkish ministers declared “that the nation itself would raise its voice against them even supposing that the sovereign’s consent had been obtained . . . if we oppose them it is because . . . it must be the object of all governments and more particularly of one constituted like ours not to hurt the feelings of the people by unnecessarily entrusting their defence to other powers and by thus debasing them in their own opinion.”[1161] The Turks argued that from the manner and language of Italinsky “in general” it “seemed” as if their allies intended to prescribe terms to them,[1162] and went so far as to declare that “war would be preferable to an alliance founded on such principles.”[1163] They did not conceal that “as the introduction of foreign troops into Moldavia would be a general signal for rebellion to all the Pashas, they would rather preserve the fidelity of their own subjects than deliver up their independence to a foreign power, whose friendship was offered to them under circumstances so suspicious and degrading.”[1164] The negotiations were broken off by the Turks in September. It was the turn of Arbuthnot to intervene. He was doubtful if it was ever “good policy” to propose such terms. But this was not the question to him. For if Italinsky failed through lack of British support, war would ensue, whereas if Arbuthnot helped him to succeed, British “influence would be paramount.”[1165] He was as fully conscious as his Government that “an unapparent want of confidence in the intentions of Russia might be of serious detriment to His Majesty’s interests.”[1166] He had been, thus, all through the negotiation, endeavouring “to sweeten the pill” and his chief argument had been that resistance could be of no avail, for the allies “might still be forced to such measures separately and for self- defence.”[1167] Thanks to his “good offices” the negotiations were resumed, and on the 23rd September, the Treaty was “delivered with signatures affixed.”[1168] But the Porte gained an important victory in persuading Italinsky to omit the two objectionable articles and have them referred to the “magnanimity” of the Tsar.[1169] The eventual instructions of the British Cabinet as to Egypt did not, therefore, apply. Turkey was in the grasp of Russia. The provinces were agitated by Russian agents, Russian squadrons were passing to and fro under the windows of the Seraglio, the Divan was daily humiliated by arrogant demands, and the ministers were not allowed the liberty of taking the most ordinary measures.[1170] But the hour of delivery was at hand. Austerlitz dissolved the coalition and emancipated the Turks. [Footnote 1038: Morkoff to Tsar, 2-14 June, 1803. Sbornik, 77, p. 212.] [Footnote 1039: Morkoff to A. Vorontsoff, 23 Jan.-4 Feb., 1803. Sbornik, 77, p. 31.] [Footnote 1040: O. Browning, _Despatches of Whitworth_, Preface, p. vi.] [Footnote 1041: Vandal, _Napoléon et Alexandre_, I, p. 4.] [Footnote 1042: Merry to Hawkesbury, 6, 6, 12 May, 2 June, 1802. Merry to Hammond, 9 June, 1802. F.O. France, 62. Merry to Hawkesbury, 26 Aug., 1802. F.O. France, 63.] [Footnote 1043: The Tsar to S. Vorontsoff, 20 Jan., 1803. _Archives Vorontsoff_, X, pp. 304-6.] [Footnote 1044: Morkoff to A. Vorontsoff, 5-17 March, 1803. Sbornik, 77, p. 69.] [Footnote 1045: e.g. Morkoff to Tsar, 27 July-8 Aug., 1802. Sbornik, 70, p. 434, and _ibid._ to _ibid._, 1-13 Dec., 1802. _Ibid._, pp. 385-6.] [Footnote 1046: Morkoff to A. Vorontsoff, 22 Dec., 1802-3 Jan., 1803. Sbornik, 70, p. 607.] [Footnote 1047: Beer, _Die Orientalische Politik Œsterreichs_. Appendix, pp. 771-5. The bald statement of M. Bourgeois. _Manuel de la Politique Etrangère_, II, p. 217—that Austria assigned to herself Bosnia, etc., is misleading.] [Footnote 1048: Warren to Hawkesbury, 31 Dec., 1802. F.O. Russia, 51. A. Vorontsoff to Morkoff, 20 Jan.-1 Feb., 1803. Sbornik, 77, pp. 22-4. _Ibid._ to _ibid._, 24 Dec., 1802-5 Jan., 1803. Sbornik, 70, pp. 619-21. Tsar to S. Vorontsoff, 20 Jan., 1803. _Archives Vorontsoff_, X, pp. 304-6.] [Footnote 1049: Garlike to Hawkesbury, 27 Sept., 1802. F.O. Russia, 51. He considers as “bad signs” (1) the fact that Morkoff had consented to transmit overtures from Napoleon. (2) Some members of the administration favour schemes against Turkey. Garlike to Hawkesbury, 10 Sept., 1802. F.O. Russia, 51. The Austrian, De Saurace mistrusts Russia.] [Footnote 1050: Vernegues, Memorandum, 8-20 March, 1804. Sbornik, 82, p. 11.] [Footnote 1051: Merry to Hawkesbury, 8 Sept., 1802. F.O. France, 64.] [Footnote 1052: Napoleon, _Correspondance_, 26 vendémiaire, XI (18 Oct., 1802), VIII, 6378.] [Footnote 1053: Talleyrand to Premier Consul, 12 brumaire XI (3 Nov., 1802). Bertrand, _Correspondance de Talleyrand_, pp. 23-4.] [Footnote 1054: Cf. W. Ekedahl in _Transactions of the Royal Historical Society_, New Series, VIII, pp. 196-7, and Martin Phillipson in _Revue Historique_, 76, p. 48.] [Footnote 1055: Note 1, p. 185 above.] [Footnote 1056: Merry to Hawkesbury, 25 Sept., 1802. F.O. France, 64.] [Footnote 1057: Morkoff to Tsar, 4-16 March, 1803. Sbornik, 77, p. 67.] [Footnote 1058: F.O. Russia, 51.] [Footnote 1059: Warren to Hawkesbury, 18, 27 Nov., 1802. F.O. Russia, 51.] [Footnote 1060: Hawkesbury to Warren, 1 Feb., 1803. F.O. Russia, 52.] [Footnote 1061: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1062: Hawkesbury to Warren, 1 Feb., 1803. F.O. Russia, 52.] [Footnote 1063: “Note verbale,” dated 12 March, 1803. F.O. Russia, 52.] [Footnote 1064: Hobart to Stuart, 26 Nov., 1802. W.O. 6, 21, and W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1065: Pelham in a conversation with Malmesbury on 13 Feb., 1803. Malmesbury, _Diaries_, IV, p. 174. This was also the view of Pitt. Pitt to Chatham, 28 Feb., 1803. Stanhope, _Life of Pitt_, IV, p. 7, and G. Rose, _Diaries_, II, pp. 18-19.] [Footnote 1066: Morkoff to A. Vorontsoff, 23 March-4 April, 1803. Sbornik, 77, pp. 81-82.] [Footnote 1067: Morkoff to Tsar, 4-16 March, 1803. Sbornik, 77, p. 67.] [Footnote 1068: Whitworth to Hawkesbury 3 and 7 Feb., 1803. Browning, _Despatches of Whitworth_, pp. 59, 61.] [Footnote 1069: Whitworth to Hawkesbury, 7 Feb., 1803. _Ibid._, p. 61.] [Footnote 1070: Morkoff to A. Vorontsoff, 16-28 Feb., 1803. Sbornik, 77, pp. 46-8. It is curious to note that at the same time Napoleon disclaimed to Morkoff designs on Egypt and declared that his first expedition was only due to personal considerations and “depuis je n’ai plus songé à une miserable contrée où j’ai éprouvé toutes sortes de désagréments.” Morkoff to Tsar, 4-16 March, 1803. Sbornik, 77, p. 61.] [Footnote 1071: Talleyrand to Premier Consul, 12 brumaire, XI (3 Nov., 1802). P. Bertrand, _Correspondance de Talleyrand_, pp. 23-4.] [Footnote 1072: Bailleu, _Preussen und Frankreich_, II, p. 138.] [Footnote 1073: Hawkesbury to Whitworth, 14 Nov., 1802. Browning, _Despatches of Whitworth_, p. 6.] [Footnote 1074: Grand Duke Nicholas Mikailovitch, _Alexandre Ier Essai d’une Etude Historique_, p. 23.] [Footnote 1075: “England seems to be awakening from its lethargy.” A. Vorontsoff to Morkoff, 24 Dec., 1802-5 Jan., 1803. Sbornik, 70, p. 621.] [Footnote 1076: Joseph de Maistre to Rossi, 21 Aug., 1804. _Œuvres_, IX, p. 204.] [Footnote 1077: Lady Bessborough (reporting a conversation with S. Vorontsoff) to Lord Granville Leveson Gower, 1 Aug., 1804. _Private Correspondence of the First Earl Granville_, I, p. 460.] [Footnote 1078: Czartoryski, _Mémoires_, II, pp. 9-13.] [Footnote 1079: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1080: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1081: Tsar to S. Vorontsoff, 20 Jan., 1803. _Archives Vorontsoff_, X, pp. 304-6.] [Footnote 1082: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1083: Warren to Hawkesbury, 28 Oct., 11 Nov., 1803. F.O. Russia, 53.] [Footnote 1084: Warren to Hawkesbury, 2 Dec., 1803. F.O. Russia, 53.] [Footnote 1085: Warren to Hawkesbury, 9 Dec., 1803. F.O. Russia, 53.] [Footnote 1086: A. Vorontsoff to S. Vorontsoff, 20 Nov., 1803. F.O. Russia, 54. Dr. Rose (_Select Despatches Relating to the Formation of the Second Coalition_, p. 1) calls this the first overture for the formation of the Alliance. But as has been made clear above, the first overture came from Britain as early as Oct., 1802.] [Footnote 1087: Warren to Hawkesbury, 30 Dec., 1803. F.O. Russia, 53.] [Footnote 1088: Czartoryski to Tsar, 17-29 Feb., 1804. Sbornik, 77, p. 286 _et seq._ The statement quoted is in pages 297-307.] [Footnote 1089: Garlike to Warren, 3 Jan., 1804. F.O. Russia, 54.] [Footnote 1090: Warren to Hawkesbury, 3 Feb., 1804. F.O. Russia, 54.] [Footnote 1091: Warren to Hawkesbury, 3 Feb., 1804. F.O. Russia, 54.] [Footnote 1092: This is how Czartoryski justified this. “La dépêche que je vous écris sur l’alliance avec la Turquie se ressent un peu de la réponse que la Cour de Londres nous a donné à ce sujet. _La prudence l’exigeait ainsi_.” Czartoryski to Vorontsoff, 4 Feb., 1804. _Archives Vorontsoff_, 15, p. 167.] [Footnote 1093: The Treaty of Alliance between Russia and Turkey concluded in 1798 was to run for eight years, i.e. to 1806. But as early as Jan., 1803, the Porte requested its renewal with the accession of Great Britain. Elgin to Hawkesbury, 10 Jan., 1803. F.O. Turkey, 38. Straton to Hawkesbury, 8 April, 1803. F.O. Turkey, 39. Drummond to Hawkesbury, 3 Nov., 1803. F.O. Turkey, 40.] [Footnote 1094: Hawkesbury to Drummond, 31 May, 1803. F.O. Turkey, 40.] [Footnote 1095: Instructions to J. P. Morier, 13 Jan., 1804. F.O. Turkey, 44. Morier was stated by Vorontsoff to know no Turkish, no Greek, and only a little Italian, to be presumptuous and vain, and to owe his place to the protection of Lord St. Vincent. S. Vorontsoff to Czartoryski, 17-29 June, 1804. _Archives Vorontsoff_, 15, p. 233.] [Footnote 1096: Instructions to Lock, 30 Jan., 1804. F.O. Egypt, 2.] [Footnote 1097: Instructions to Straton, 19 Oct., 1804. F.O. Turkey, 43.] [Footnote 1098: See the next chapter.] [Footnote 1099: Straton to Hawkesbury, 10 Feb., 1804. F.O. Turkey, vol. 42.] [Footnote 1100: Straton to Harrowby, 24 July, 1804. F.O. Turkey, 43. Lock to Harrowby, Pera, 19 July, 1804. F.O. Egypt, 2. Lock died at Malta before reaching his post.] [Footnote 1101: Pisani to Straton, 17 July, 1804. Enclosed in Straton’s despatch of 24 July. F.O. Turkey, 43.] [Footnote 1102: Lock to Harrowby, 19 July, 1804. F.O. Egypt, 2.] [Footnote 1103: Martens, _Recueil des Traités de la Russie_, XI, p. 79. Morier passes the following judgments on Russian propaganda among the Greeks:— (_a_) “. . . It is impossible to back the Turks and Greeks at the same time. . . .” To Harrowby, Corfu, 5 Jan., 1805. F.O. Turkey, 47. (_b_) “. . . The Russians insist on the necessity of holding out to the Greeks the certainty of emancipation from the Turkish yoke, so that the Greeks diffident from sad experience of the promises of the Russians, become still more so, when they see them the steady supporters of the Turks, while the same inconsistent conduct excites unnecessary suspicion amongst the latter. . . .” To Harrowby, 28 Jan., 1805. F.O. Turkey, 47.] [Footnote 1104: Summerer to Arbuthnot, Bucharest, 1 Aug., 1804. F.O. Turkey, 43.] [Footnote 1105: Summerer’s “bulletin,” Bucharest, 1 Aug., 1804. F.O. Turkey, 43.] [Footnote 1106: James Wood to Harrowby, Ragusa, 1 Sept., 1804. F.O. Turkey, 43.] [Footnote 1107: Wassilitshikow, _Les Razoumouski_, I, Part II, pp. 260-4, 263.] [Footnote 1108: Czartoryski to S. Vorontsoff, 26 Feb., 1804. Warren to Hawkesbury, 27 April, 1804. F.O. Russia, 54. Czartoryski to S. Vorontsoff, 30 April, 1804. _Archives Vorontsoff_, 15, pp. 185-6. Czartoryski to _ibid._, 18 Aug., 1804. _Ibid._, 15, pp. 242-3.] [Footnote 1109: Rose, _Select Despatches_, p. 214 note.] [Footnote 1110: Harrowby to S. Vorontsoff, 26 June, 1804. F.O. Russia, 55.] [Footnote 1111: Czartoryski to S. Vorontsoff, 18 Aug., 1804. _Archives Vorontsoff_, 15, pp. 243-4.] [Footnote 1112: Martens, _Recueil des Traités de la Russie_, XI, p. 80.] [Footnote 1113: S. Vorontsoff to Czartoryski, 10 Oct., 1804. _Archives Vorontsoff_, XI, pp. 372-3.] [Footnote 1114: _Mémoires de Czartoryski_, II, p. 35.] [Footnote 1115: Instructions to Novosiltsoff, 11 Sept., 1804. _Mémoires de Czartoryski_, II, p. 49.] [Footnote 1116: Driault, _Napoleon et l’Europe: Austerlitz_, p. 118. The second view was expressed by, among others, Professor Seton-Watson in a lecture.] [Footnote 1117: It is difficult to understand why should Vorontsoff have read the despatch to the British Ministers. Would it be too much to think that he purposely aimed at wrecking the negotiations? One thing is certain, his heart was not in it.] [Footnote 1118: Vorontsoff to Czartoryski, 10 Oct., 1804. _Archives Vorontsoff_, XI, pp. 372-3.] [Footnote 1119: Martens, _Recueil des Traités de la Russie_, XI, pp. 98-9.] [Footnote 1120: Harrowby to Gower, 10 Oct., 1804. Printed by Rose, _Select Despatches_, pp. 46-8.] [Footnote 1121: Harrowby to Straton, 19 Oct., 1804. F.O. Turkey, 43.] [Footnote 1122: Harrowby to Morier, 19 Oct., 1804. F.O. Turkey, 44. Ali Pasha was to be informed that he would not get a “satisfactory answer” from the British Government till he had reconciled himself with Mocenigo and the Sultan.] [Footnote 1123: Instructions to Gower, 10 Oct., 1804. F.O. Russia, 56. _Ibid._, 26 Oct., 1804. _Ibid._] [Footnote 1124: S. Vorontsoff to Czartoryski, 28 Sept.-10 Oct., 1804. _Archives Vorontsoff_, 15, pp. 271, 272.] [Footnote 1125: Instructions to Straton, 19 Oct., 1804. F.O. Turkey, 43.] [Footnote 1126: Martens, _Recueil des Traités de la Russie_, II, p. 409.] [Footnote 1127: Czartoryski to Vorontsoff, 25 Oct., 1804. _Archives Vorontsoff_, 15, pp. 277-9.] [Footnote 1128: Czartoryski to A. Vorontsoff, 2 Dec., 1804. _Mémoires_, II, p. 58.] [Footnote 1129: The following despatches of Mr. Drummond give a graphic picture of the Empire. Drummond, during his brief embassy, was not occupied in any important negotiations; he had ample leisure. 25 May, 7 June, 19 Aug., 6 Nov., 1803. F.O. Turkey, 40.] [Footnote 1130: Straton to Harrowby, 11 March, 1805. F.O. Turkey, 48. Morier to Mulgrave, Salonika, 17 Oct., 1805. F.O. Turkey, 47.] [Footnote 1131: Straton to Harrowby, 25 Aug., 1804. F.O. Turkey, 43. “. . . _Elle (Wahabisme) travaille déjà à saper les fondements de l’Empire Ottoman_.” Lamare to Champagny, 11 Jan., 1808. Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 216.] [Footnote 1132: Straton to Harrowby, 25 Sept., 1804. F.O. Turkey, 43.] [Footnote 1133: Straton to Hawkesbury, 10 Dec., 1803. F.O. Turkey, 41. Hussein died on 8 Dec., 1803. Poison was suspected. His reforms brought upon him the enmity of a powerful group under the Grand Vizier.] [Footnote 1134: Drummond called it “one of the finest fleets” he ever saw, 11 June, 1803. F.O. Turkey, 40. This opinion was also that of British naval officers during the campaign in Egypt.] [Footnote 1135: Straton to Harrowby, 10 April, 25 June, 1805. F.O. Turkey, 48.] [Footnote 1136: Drummond to Hawkesbury, 19 Aug., 26 Aug., 16 Sept., 1803. F.O. Turkey, 40.] [Footnote 1137: Consul Barker in a letter of September, 1805. _Syria and Egypt_, p. 149.] [Footnote 1138: _Ibid._, p. 68.] [Footnote 1139: Adair to Bathurst, 10 Feb., 1810. F.O. Turkey, 68.] [Footnote 1140: Jaubert to Napoleon, 17 floréal, XIII (6 May, 1805). Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1688.] [Footnote 1141: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 18 July, 1805. F.O. Turkey, 45.] [Footnote 1142: Straton to Harrowby, 10 Sept., 1804. F.O. Turkey, 43.] [Footnote 1143: Jaubert to Napoleon, 6 prairial, XIII (25 May, 1805). Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1688. Brune to Napoleon, 25 fructidor, XII (14 Sept., 1804). Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1688.] [Footnote 1144: On the negotiations relating to this affair there is an excellent account in M. Driault, _Napoléon et l’Europe: Austerlitz_, pp. 80-90.] [Footnote 1145: Napoleon to Talleyrand, 11 therm, XII (30 July, 1804). _Correspondance_, IX, 7884. A few months later Halet was again asking for a “loan.” Jaubert to Emperor, 6 pluviôse, XIII (25 Jan., 1805). Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1688.] [Footnote 1146: “. . . The presence of a French Ambassador is so pleasing a sight to the Turks that, in my opinion, they would purchase it at any risk save that of a quarrel with Russia. . . .” Straton to Harrowby, 9 Dec., 1804. F.O. Turkey, 43.] [Footnote 1147: Notes from Italinski, 15 Dec., and Straton, 17 Dec., 1804. To the Porte. Enclosed in Straton to Harrowby, 17 Dec., 1804. F.O. Turkey, 43.] [Footnote 1148: Driault, _Napoléon et l’Europe: Austerlitz_, p. 155.] [Footnote 1149: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 25 Aug., 1805. F.O. Turkey, 45.] [Footnote 1150: The reinforcements to Corfu passed in batches of about 2,000 at a time. “The Turks showed less surprise than was expected.” Straton to Hawkesbury, 28 May, 1804. F.O. Turkey, 42. Brune inquired from the Reis Effendi about this and was informed that there was an “arrangement” with Russia for the passage of 600 soldiers only! Brune to Napoleon, 9 messidor, XII (27 June, 1804). Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1688.] [Footnote 1151: “Le point principal de l’alliance est d’entraîner la Porte dans la Coalition d’une manière avantageuse.” Czartoryski to Vorontsoff, 4 April, 1805. F.O. Russia, 57. _Archives Vorontsoff_, XV, pp. 293-4.] [Footnote 1152: Czartoryski to S. Vorontsoff, 3-15 May, 1805. _Archives Vorontsoff_, 15, p. 301.] [Footnote 1153: Gower to Mulgrave, 26 May, 1805. F.O. Russia, 57.] [Footnote 1154: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 18 Sept., 1805. F.O. Turkey, 46.] [Footnote 1155: Mulgrave to Arbuthnot, 11 Sept., 1805. F.O. Turkey, 46.] [Footnote 1156: Camden to Craig, 29 March, 1805. W.O. 6, 56.] [Footnote 1157: “Draft,” dated 1804 [_sic_], F.O. Turkey, 45.] [Footnote 1158: Mulgrave to Arbuthnot, 16 Sept., 1805. F.O. Turkey, 46.] [Footnote 1159: Straton to Harrowby, 2 March, 1805. F.O. Turkey, 48.] [Footnote 1160: Straton to Harrowby, 17 April, 1805. F.O. Turkey, 48.] [Footnote 1161: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 4 Aug., 1805. F.O. Turkey, 45.] [Footnote 1162: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1163: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 10 Sept., 1805. F.O. Turkey, 46.] [Footnote 1164: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1165: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 4 Aug., 1805. F.O. Turkey, 45.] [Footnote 1166: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 18 July, 1805. F.O. Turkey, 45.] [Footnote 1167: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 4 Aug., 1805. F.O. Turkey, 45.] [Footnote 1168: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 24 Sept., 1805. F.O. Turkey, 46.] [Footnote 1169: The letter of Selim to the Tsar in this connection is interesting. It is enclosed in Arbuthnot’s despatch of 24 Sept., 1805. The two articles are declared to be “repugnant to our laws and to the nature of our government.” The introduction of foreign troops should “depend on actual circumstances of place and time. To do it before the evil has occurred not only would be premature, but would create rumours among our troops in different parts of the Empire, by administering to a variety of animadversions and remarks. . . . As to our non-Ottoman subjects, we consider them as constituting part of our public wealth. Their defence and protection being an obligation prescribed by our statutes and laws, we have thus far not failed in directing our attention to them. _But to propose equal favours and distinctions for them is inverting our standing regulations and repugnant to our law_.”] [Footnote 1170: Cf. a French “Manifesto,” 20 thermidor, XIII (8 July, 1805). Sbornik, 82, pp. 102-4. It called the attention of the European Powers to the “Russian Peril.”] XII THE RISE OF MEHEMET ALI 1803-1806 The events which took place in the years 1803 to 1806 and which culminated in the final confirmation of Mehemet Ali in 1806, were not directly or purposely affected by foreign influence. France had lost all weight with the Divan; Great Britain and Austria had succeeded in preventing an eventual agreement on the partition of Turkey, but had to allow Russia to secure the Ottoman Empire by a new treaty of alliance. Napoleon, now and again, took a furtive glance at the domestic struggles in Egypt. Great Britain took no step to interfere in these struggles and her views did not extend beyond envisaging the possibility of a precautional occupation of Alexandria.[1171] It is true that both powers were duly represented in Cairo. But neither representative had the means of influencing events: no money: no troops. Never was there a more ludicrous spectacle of ineffective busybodies than that presented by Major Missett and M. de Lesseps. The first Viceroy after the expulsion of the French was Khosrev, formerly a Georgian slave and the creature of the Capitan Pasha. “Il a beaucoup du caractère de son maître, il aime la gloire sans la connaître, aussi toutes ses vues se portent sur des objets futiles, tels que des habillements des troupes, etc. Il n’a aucune connaissance sur la guerre, la politique et l’administration; il ne sait que couper des têtes.”[1172] The force with which he had to vanquish the Mamelukes was comprised partly of Turks and partly of Albanians; and the Egyptians never saw a more filthy, immoral and drunken rabble.[1173] The Turks were only slightly better than the Albanians. “On ne leur connaissait aucune croyance religieuse, et ils ne se livraient à aucune pratique de piété: tout était permis à leurs yeux; la chose la plus facile pour eux était d’assassiner, de s’emparer du bien d’autrui, et de ne pas se soumettre à leurs chefs, qui étaient encore plus pervers qu’eux. Que Dieu les fasse périr tous!”[1174] The Mamelukes and their fellow-plunderers—the Bedouins—perpetrated, on their part, similar horrors.[1175] They moved in Upper Egypt under four chiefs: Ibrahim, the “doyen” of the Corps, but now so enfeebled in body and mind that the “most inferior” Mameluke could disobey him with impunity,[1176] Bardissy, the “fonds” of whose character was formed by vanity and arrogant ignorance,[1177] Elfi, the “bête noire” of his colleagues—an energetic barbarian, not entirely unattractive—and Osman Hassan, the keeper of the best of the traditions of the race. It was Bardissy and Elfi who counted for all practical purposes. The Egyptians were the helpless and abject victims of these tyrants. “Although they possess qualities which might, if improved, render them capable of being a free nation, they will long be destitute of that virtue and energy necessary to achieve their own independence.”[1178] It is ever the trait of the Oriental to fall, under the stress of evil times, into a state of dull apathy. The symbols of decay will be the only things that then impress him.[1179] The tales of impossible phenomena and the narratives of past or distant wonders will be the only things that then rouse him.[1180] It does not seem that the French occupation produced a general change of outlook.[1181] The rule of France was too short, the conditions under which it was exercised were too adverse, for it to produce profound changes. “Oriental nations in general are so averse to the adoption of any change in their local customs that it would require a much longer and better established revolution than the residence of the French in Egypt to have produced any material change in the manners or pursuits of the inhabitants. The natives of Egypt, moreover, have been long accustomed to look with indifference on a change of masters, and as their miserable state authorises them to be confident that they cannot change for the worse, there is no country where a revolution is so easy or of so little immediate consequence to the inhabitants. But the French have here, as in the rest of their conquests, fully succeeded in leaving behind them an universal detestation of their name. Their system of government began in plunder, was continued in oppression and ended with robbery.”[1182] A longer duration of French rule would no doubt have induced the excitable, sociable and imitative Egyptian to doubt the all-sufficiency of his religion,[1183] and to feel the desire for change and action grow—as it were—upon him.[1184] As things in 1803 were, his sole recourse was to prayers from the heights of the minarets and lamentations over the golden age of French rule.[1185] His proper leaders, the “ulemas” or “savants,” knew of no other means. They were a narrow, covetous and subtle class. Their learning amounted to no more than commenting upon earlier comments,[1186] and most of their efforts were directed to the accumulation of wealth and the cultivation of the powers that be. Conditions were then unfavourable to the evolution of national unity. There had to exist, before this could take place, a highly centralised authority, which should provide security and eliminate pretensions to exclusive privileges. It was indispensable also to create a healthier moral tone by the suppression of concubinage and unnatural vice, to propagate a connection—real or fictitious did not matter—between the Egypt of the Pharoahs and the Egypt of to-day,[1187] so as to enable the country to cut itself loose from Pan-Islamic trammels, and to facilitate the residence of Levantine Christians. Their _rôle_, as the first to dream of a non-religious national organisation had not been recognised, their morality had often been impugned. It was they and the “native” Christians who first thought of a lay state, of tolerance and of equality. As early as 1801, the Copts and other Christians, who did not think themselves safe after the withdrawal of the French Army, formed themselves into a Legation to plead the cause of Egyptian Independence in Europe. The documents containing their views owed probably more to the fevered brain and facile pen of Lascaris de Vintmille than to the delegates themselves.[1188] Their leader, Yacoub, known as “le général Jacob,” died at sea, and his colleagues were so depressed by poverty and exile that no more was heard of them.[1189] To foreign observers the situation in Egypt presented a stalemate. In 1803, Colonel Wilson expressed his surprise “that no adventurer endowed with fortitude, talents and ambition had proposed to command a body of auxiliaries to act against the Mamelukes.”[1190] An “American gentleman”[1191] wrote from Cairo in 1804 that “Egypt has no master . . . she must have a new master, and the first comer will be welcome.”[1192] There could, indeed, have been no other outcome than foreign occupation, or the coming to power of an adventurer. The Mamelukes, with their reduced numbers, could never have regained their old position or expelled the Turks. They could not any longer recruit in the slave-markets of the East, for in 1802 the Porte prohibited the exportation of young boys to Egypt.[1193] The Turks, on the other hand, were unable to reduce the Beys. The adventurer was already on the scene. Mehemet Ali came to Egypt with the force under the Capitan Pasha’s orders. His part consisted rather in availing himself of opportunities than in making them. Physically, he was rather below the average height, was dark complexioned, with a reddish beard.[1194] His air was defiant and his eyes were restless.[1195] He had none of the sedateness and composure of a Turkish grandee, but all the agility of his race; was sober in habit and simple in attire.[1196] Power was never to him, as it was to many a Turkish adventurer, the means of satisfying lust: he was rather impelled by the love of it, by the desire to do great things and leave a great name. When he first consciously began to work for himself it is impossible to find.[1197] He was not slow, however, to take advantage of the prevailing anarchy. The first of the series of events which culminated in his advent to power was the mutiny of the Albanian troops under Tahir Pasha. It is unwarrantable to seek the hand of Mehemet Ali in it; a rising of undisciplined and irregularly paid soldiers was a very common occurrence in Turkey. Khosrev, the Viceroy, had very foolishly made it clear that he intended to repatriate them and, at the same time, refused to pay their arrears though he had the necessary funds. In four days he was put to flight and succeeded by Tahir.[1198] The new Pasha had started life as a brigand, delighted in the company of dervishes and half-witted religious enthusiasts,[1199] but had enough sense, however, to see that the Albanians by themselves could not hold the country. He, accordingly, invited the Beys to Cairo and thus began the Coalition of the Mamelukes and the Albanians which ultimately turned to the profit of Mehemet Ali. Before his new allies arrived, however, Tahir was murdered by two Janissaries on the 25th May, 1803.[1200] The Mamelukes stepped in before the deposed Khosrev could regain the Capital. Mehemet Ali definitely accepted the alliance with the Beys.[1201] It was a serious step, for they were rebels in the eyes of the Porte and the legitimate Pasha was still in the country. He was, therefore, most careful to shun undue prominence and take too great a share in the acts of the new régime. This accounts for the fact that his name hardly appears in the despatches of the foreign agents before the year 1804. He, moreover, gave out that he was most anxious to return to his own country and approached Major Missett, the British representative, as to the provision of British shipping, the Albanians doubting their safety in Turkish transports.[1202] Missett concluded that he had the Albanians in the palm of his hand. He believed that Mehemet Ali and his followers were no more than the mercenaries of the Beys, whose progress seemed to him astonishing. [1203]He overlooked the fact that his remaining in Cairo after the deposition of Khosrev was improper.[1204] At the same time as Missett was with the Beys in Cairo, a British officer, Major Hayes, was organising the defence of Damietta for Khosrev, and against the Mamelukes![1205] Bardissy was flushed with arrogance. The absence of Elfi in London had made him the chief of the Beys. He was short-sighted enough not to see that the safest course would have been to make such arrangements as would extricate him from the Albanian Alliance. He should have restored the representative of the Sultan. He, on the contrary, took Damietta on the 1st July, 1803, and led back Khosrev as prisoner. He was soon to have another opportunity in the arrival in Alexandria of Ali Pasha, who was sent by the Porte to succeed Khosrev and who was instructed—overtly, at any rate—to grant the Beys pardon and their old privileges.[1206] Ali was a profligate Turk from Algeria. His residence in Alexandria was marked by daily outrages on the Consuls; he frankly declared that such things as capitulations could not apply where he ruled.[1207] He intrigued with the Albanians,[1208] but Mehemet Ali did not respond and succeeded in persuading the foolish Bardissy to destroy Ali. The Pasha was, accordingly, decoyed into a trap and assassinated, and his small army dispersed in all directions.[1209] Mehemet Ali had kept studiously in the background and the odium fell on Bardissy. The Bey had thus burnt his boats and put himself more and more at the mercy of his “ally.” In the meantime there had arrived in Egypt M. de Lesseps—the father of the famous Ferdinand de Lesseps—as commissary for commercial relations, the word “consul” being then applied to the head of the state. The French biographer of the Lesseps family states that . . . “il fut le premier instrument de l’élévation de Méhemet Ali. Il avait eu pour mission de chercher en Egypte un homme de caractère capable de rétablir l’ordre en s’élevant au-dessus des Mamelukes contraires à la politique française. Il avait distingué et signalé à son gouvernement Méhemet Ali qui était Colonel.”[1210] This and similar statements have passed into every book dealing with that period and there is ground for believing that they were made for the express purpose of exploiting the “gratitude” of the Viceroys. What took place was something very different. Lesseps was informed by Talleyrand (21st March, 1803) that “la situation précaire dans laquelle se trouve en ce moment l’Egypte tant par la prolongation du séjour des Anglais que par l’état de guerre qui existe entre les troupes ottomanes et les Mamelukes exige que le citoyen Lesseps apporte dans sa conduite et ses démarches auprès du chef délégué par la Porte toute la sagesse, la prudence et la circonspection dont il est capable. Il s’applique à se concilier son estime et sa confiance en évitant toutefois de s’immiscer dans les querelles des deux partis. . . .”[1211] There is no mention of choosing a candidate for the favour of the “grande nation.” On his arrival in Alexandria, Lesseps was most pleasantly surprised to find the Mamelukes warmly pro-French. Bardissy, who was then in the Delta, aimed at drawing the French Commissary to Cairo and thus investing his usurpation with a certain amount of legality. Lesseps was puzzled; for there was then in Alexandria Ali Pasha, the legitimate Viceroy. He seems to have resolved, at the beginning, to reside with Ali, and even showed him the letters of Bardissy.[1212] This did not last long, and he soon set out on his voyage to Cairo. En route he had a secret conference with the Senior Bey, Ibrahim. It took place “at dawn” on the 6th August, 1803. The Bey bitterly repented the blindness of the Mamelukes in resisting the French Army. Their dealings with the British and the Turks had now opened their eyes. The Beys were now ready to do whatever Bonaparte should desire. He had only to say the word and they would either conquer Syria and give him Egypt; remain in Cairo and behave as good subjects of the Sultan, or give up even this and eat the bread of exile in Upper Egypt.[1213] Lesseps was gratified, but refused to commit himself. His reception in Cairo was a veritable triumph.[1214] The consular procession was intentionally made to pass under the windows of Missett.[1215] “Beaucoup de Chrétiens Syriens et Cophtes vinrent le voir, ils tinrent des réunions et donnèrent des banquets à son honneur et ils se pressaient devant sa porte.”[1216] The Beys had, however, gained their point, which was to rouse Missett. The British agent scented a plot to hand over Egypt to France. All the evidence pointed to that. “The public and private testimonials of regard, the extraordinary honours paid to Mr. Lesseps,” the fact that he came to Egypt in great haste and left his family behind, his giving his servants “Mameluke” dress.[1217] He spoke, thereupon, to Bardissy on his impolitic conduct and endeavoured to wean the most notorious partisans of France.[1218] But this was not enough; he had to give Bardissy something more substantial than good advice. The origin of this move lay in a scheme formed by Sir Alexander Ball, the Commissioner for Malta. Interest in Egypt was then revived by the publication for the first time of the famous _mémoire_ of Leibnitz on the conquest of the valley of the Nile by France.[1219] Ball’s scheme amounted to a disguised British control of Egypt. The Government was to appoint a “gentleman of abilities and possessed of conciliatory manners, great liberality and firmness of character” to reside in some ostensible capacity at Alexandria. He should be authorised to supply the Governor of that town with the funds necessary for the pay of 4,000 soldiers, who were to be commanded by the foreign officers then in British service and whom the Resident could inspect. The Resident also was to advise the Governor on all civil concerns and establish such laws and regulations as would secure the liberty of the subject. The grateful inhabitants would then probably form a militia and co-operate in repelling a French attack.[1220] Ball sent one, Vincenzo Taberna—a native of Piedmont, at one time a Mameluke and later a British captain—to “sound” the Beys[1221]. But the arrival of Taberna coincided with the dominance of French influence. Missett, accordingly, gave out that the Italian adventurer was empowered by the British Government to treat on that head[1222] and gave the Mamelukes reason to expect certain assistance from Malta.[1223] Bardissy at once entered into the scheme. He sent an agent to Malta to concert with Ball. Sir Alexander was embarrassed, and his efforts tended to hush the affair as soon as possible.[1224] The Beys lived in hope for some time, and, naturally, turned their back—in Mameluke style—on Lesseps. The Frenchman was at a loss to explain such a _volte-face_. He could no longer see in Bardissy anything but “un capricieux vexateur et injuste Mamelouke.”[1225] The Bey openly declared to the dragoman of the French Consulate that he only recognised treaties made with himself, and added: “Vous nous avez dépouillés et chassés, voilà nos obligations envers vous.”[1226] Lesseps found himself in an “affreux situation” and asked: “Quel parti peut prendre un agent du gouvernement au milieu de tels excès?”[1227] A month after his triumph he was vehemently requesting to be recalled.[1228] The triumph of the British agent was only superficial. Bardissy confessed he was duping him.[1229] All the Europeans were subjected to the time- honoured “avanies.” The French agent candidly admitted that the question for them all was security of person and goods, not political influence. Missett studiously kept the humiliating subject out of his despatches, though he once reported that he had to threaten armed resistance to any forcible entry into his own house and added that only a sense of duty had induced him to stand such treatment long.[1230] The problem of Egypt was being considered in other quarters. The occasion on which it was brought forward was the visit of Elfi Bey to London. Elfi, as has been shown in the preceding pages, left Egypt in company with General Stuart, but without the knowledge or sanction of His Majesty’s Government.[1231] He was detained in Malta for some months by orders of that general, till the intentions of the Government with regard to him were known. There he gave Ball a great deal of trouble[1232] and kept sending inflammatory letters to his brethren on the pretended slights shown him.[1233] He was finally allowed to proceed to London, where he arrived in October, 1803.[1234] His presence embarrassed the Government, for the Porte had been reported to have evinced a great uneasiness as to the objects of the voyage.[1235] There was even reluctance to give him a hearing,[1236] and before this was done the Foreign Secretary hastened to instruct the Ambassador in Constantinople to assure the Divan that the fixed determination of His Majesty’s Government was not to listen to any proposal from him which might affect the interest or the rights of the Ottoman Porte in Egypt.[1237] Nor did Elfi ever make such a proposal. The Bey expressly stated to Lieutenant-Colonel J. Moore, who had been deputed to see him, “that his object in coming to this country was not to urge on the British Government points which might tend to involve it in fresh contests or disputes with foreign powers, but to clear his own and his friends’ characters from imputations of rebellion as well as to prove the justice of the foundation upon which they built their pretensions to the protection and countenance of this country.”[1238] He then proceeded to retrace the course of events from 1798. The Government turned to its advisors. General Stuart was of opinion that nothing could be done without a military force being present in the country, that is to say, a British military force; that no officer could take anything on himself in Egypt with less than 4,000 effectives, that the Porte might be brought round to acquiesce in a British occupation, and that, if they needed any justification before the world for precautionary measures, it was the conduct of France with regard to Naples.[1239] The Ambassador in Constantinople, Drummond, expressed totally different views. In a despatch of 25th October, 1803, which was received at the Foreign Office on 8th December, he strongly disapproved of the conduct of the British generals in Egypt with regard to the Beys. He proceeded to state “it never can be consistent with our policy to leave the Beys in the independent possession of Egypt . . . any connection which we desire to keep with that country may be more effectually and easily maintained through the medium of the Porte than through that of the treacherous chiefs of lawless banditti. If things were placed upon their ancient footing, we could always be enabled by our maritime superiority to hold the balance between the Turks and the Mamelukes. . . . While the Turkish Empire continues to exist, the Beys can never reckon with certainty upon the independent possession of Egypt; and it may not be lightly surmised that upon any emergency they should invite the French to come to their assistance. . . . Great Britain is the ally of the Porte. It never can be to her interest to consent to the partition of the Turkish Empire, and, therefore, she can never desire that one of the finest and most productive provinces of the Turkish Empire shall be lost to it. While Egypt continues to be an integral part of the dominions of the Ottoman Empire, its invasion by a foreign power is less likely to happen than if it were subject to the Mamelukes. This is evident, because the Porte would naturally defend a country which belonged to it; and the greater the state is, which is attacked, the greater is the shock given to the general system of politics. . . . From all these considerations I am induced to lament that measures were not taken effectually to secure the sovereignty of Egypt to the Turks since it was deemed expedient to recall the British troops from this country. . . .”[1240] The Government, however, could not entirely renounce all interest in the domestic politics of Egypt. “Our exertions and the restitution of the province to the Porte give us a claim to interfere in the interest of our security.” The Government was, moreover, thoroughly convinced “that in every circumstance which regards the safety of Egypt, His Majesty’s interests are entirely conformable to those of the Sublime Porte.” The past exertions of the Beys entitled them to a situation not less advantageous than that which they enjoyed in 1798. “The object of His Majesty’s policy is to secure the country against any project on the part of France and to preserve it under the sovereignty of the Porte.” The following were proposed as bases of compromise: firstly, the Beys should acknowledge the sovereignty of the Porte, and, secondly, they should agree to pay an annual tribute equal to or exceeding the one they were formerly supposed to pay, and should be pledged to the British Government for this.[1241] The Government was thus loth, after the experience of 1801, to evolve a detailed scheme. It now saw that such schemes could not be realised without the presence of British troops; and it had none to spare.[1242] The Consul destined for Egypt, Mr. Charles Lock, was instructed to be strictly neutral and to avail himself of any influence which he might acquire for no other purpose than that of endeavouring to remove the grounds of mutual dissatisfaction between them (the Turks and the Beys) and of inspiring them with a just sense of the benefits which each of them would derive from a permanent reconciliation.[1243] Major Missett was informed of the departure of Elfi and instructed to endeavour to promote a reconciliation.[1244] The Bey was treated—as was proper—as “a distinguished stranger to whom the common laws of hospitality extended.”[1245] It has been deemed necessary to treat this point in detail, for upon it have been made the wildest misstatements. Mengin, the historian who has inspired all the later histories of Mehemet Ali, states that Elfi, “séduit par les promesses des Anglais, était allé en Angleterre. Il était depuis longtemps livré à eux sans réserve, suivit leurs impulsions et n’écoutait que leurs conseils.”[1246] He gives an apocryphal account of his relations with the British Government. The Bey was at first well- received, then entirely neglected, but when the news of the entry of the Mamelukes into Cairo reached London, Elfi suddenly returned to favour, credits were opened to him, etc.[1247] As a matter of dates, the return of the Beys to power took place in May and was known in London long before Elfi reached it. As for the result of his visit, Mouriez, another “authority,” speaks of a “traité secret qui lui (Britain) concédait l’occupation des ports de la Méditerranée et de la mer Rouge au cas où le Bey deviendrait chef suprême. Le ministère anglais poussait avec vigueur la cause de son protégé auprès du Cabinet ottoman.”[1248] Whatever might have been the excuse for these historians, none can be pleaded for the “statement” of M. Charles Roux that “l’Angleterre entretint les liaisons établies par ses généraux avec les Beys, parmi lesquels elle chercha à constituer, autour d’Elfi, un parti anglais.”[1249] The only thing that can be said is that M. Charles Roux seems to have confined his researches in the British archives to the years anterior to the visit of Elfi. The conduct of the Bey on his return voyage was far from that of the partisan which French writers make him out to have been. Sir Alexander Ball, who saw him in Malta, reported him to be a “sad villain,” who would prove an enemy of Britain. The Maltese interpreter of the Bey told Ball that after King George had asked his various questions on Egypt, the Bey observed to his followers that the “infidels” kept their eyes always on his country and hoped that God would blind them. Elfi also told them—among other absurdities—that the king offered to give him one of his daughters in marriage, together with a substantial pension.[1250] His idea was, probably, to impress them. To Hallowell, Captain of the “Argo,” the ship that conveyed Elfi home, the Bey expressed his determination to “fight any enemy that might attempt to possess themselves of his country” and enforced his expressions by taking hold of his hand between his teeth, saying thus “he would devour them.” He did not believe that the French would make a second bid for the possession of Egypt, and stated that he would be glad to encourage the importation of English manufactures but never wished to see an English soldier in the country.[1251] British reports do not show that Elfi had greatly benefited from his visit to London. The only net gain seemed to be his developing a pronounced taste for milk-punch. He would order things, and then refuse either to pay for or to receive them. He was unconsciously oblivious of the fact that there were laws and that they had to be obeyed. “His whims,” complained the harrassed Hallowell, “were as fickle as the wind and he was only constant to his pipe.”[1252] Djabarti, on the other hand, pictures an Elfi sobered by experience and struck by all that he had seen in London—order, stability, prosperity, absence of begging, and all this in spite of “infidelity.”[1253] The chronicler was rather partial to Elfi, partly through detestation of Bardissy, and the Albanians, and partly through common interest in astrology. Elfi, at any rate, had not the chance of carrying out whatever he might have intended. For, during his absence, his destruction had been planned by Mehemet Ali and Bardissy. The latter could have given no greater proof of utter blindness. He sent an agent to Ball to ask for help and to prevent Elfi from returning to Egypt on the plea that he was secretly corresponding with the French. Elfi met the agent in Malta and informed him that he had a “promise” of 1500 British troops in the event of Bardissy quarrelling with him, a statement which Hallowell denied in the presence of both Bey and agent.[1254] It does not indicate great enterprise that neither Missett nor Lesseps was acquainted with a plot which was far from being a mystery. Ball and Hallowell could not—obviously—fall in with Bardissy’s request. Hallowell continued the voyage to Egypt, his intention being “to conciliate the powers that be in Alexandria (whether Turk or Mameluke) so as to put it in a posture of defence.”[1255] Arrived near Alexandria, he advised the Bey not to land till he had heard from his people,[1256] but Elfi refused to listen and disembarked on the 14th February, near Abukir. Orders for putting him to death had already been despatched in all directions. Elfi, however, managed to escape.[1257] Hearing of what had happened to his late guest, Hallowell expressed his satisfaction[1258]—not exactly the sentiment that should have been entertained towards a tool in the hands of Britain.[1259] Bardissy had thus dealt his own cause a fatal blow. He dispersed his Mamelukes all over the country in hot pursuit of the Elfites and on money collecting expeditions, while the Albanians were concentrated in Cairo and even mounted guard on Bardissy’s house. Anarchy and exactions were the order of the day. But the whole odium fell on Bardissy, for he was the ostensible ruler and Mehemet Ali affected the _rôle_ of moderator of Mameluke rigour. The inhabitants believed that the Bey was solely responsible for their ills and made several hostile demonstrations against him.[1260] In short, the Mamelukes committed every conceivable error. Missett said that their rapacity had alienated all hearts from them: they had, against his repeated advice, destroyed or expelled the Janissaries of the town, whose friendship they should have secured against the inconstancy of the Albanians, “but they considered themselves as conducted by the hand of God to the repossession of Egypt, and their good fortune had rendered them deaf to the counsels of prudence and sound policy.”[1261] In March, 1804, when the agitation had reached a climax, Mehemet Ali showed his hand. In a few hours he was able to drive out the Mamelukes from Cairo, a city which they were never to enter again as rulers.[1262] Had M. Lesseps any share in this revolution?[1263] Had he discovered the man of destiny in the person of Mehemet Ali, and, in the words of M. Charles-Roux, “lia parti de bonne heure avec Mehemet Ali?”[1264] Here is how the French Consul “signalled” the Albanian chief. In a despatch of 3 Ventôse XII (22nd February, 1804) he wrote, “Mehemet Ali, chef des Arnautes, désire la protection de la France, et sa médiation auprès du grand seigneur. Je puis vous assurer d’avance que son projet n’est plus équivoque et qu’il veut s’emparer de l’autorité suprême; mais quoique ce chef ne soit pas aussi féroce que ses semblables, qu’il nous paraisse attaché, je ne crois qu’il ait le génie de concevoir un plan vaste et les moyens pour l’exécuter.”[1265] The second point is, was Lesseps in a position to engineer a revolution? He was not. The aim of his liaisons with the Albanians was no other than to save himself and the Europeans. “Mille faits particuliers,” he wrote on the 24th February, “me prouvent que ma lutte contre l’oppression ne sert qu’à aiguiser les poignards dirigés contre moi. Les sacrifices que j’ai faits pour me concilier les chefs des Albanais m’ont sauvé jusqu’ici.”[1266] What were those sacrifices? “Malheureusement je ne puis rien donner et l’Angleterre prodigue l’or et les présents. Je fais en sorte de suppléer par mon activité.”[1267] If Republican poverty prevented him from scattering gold, Republican virtue did not scruple at the use of liquor. Speaking of his presents, Lesseps wrote, “Je les fais consister en bagatelles, en liqueurs principalement qui ne cessent de m’être demandés, surtout par les chefs des troupes Albanaises.”[1268] He adds the significant phrase, “Je dois me trouver heureux de les contenter à ce prix, quand à chaque moment la ville est menacée de pillage et qu’on ne peut sortir sans risques d’être atteint d’une balle ou d’un coup de yatagan.”[1269] Here is Missett’s version of a highly original means of influence: “Lesseps, to conciliate the friendship of the Albanians, did not blush to keep a tavern in his own house, and, taking advantage of the fact that his goods were exempt from customs, he undersold the other tavern keepers and so got customers.”[1270] The distribution of liquor, at all events, did not make Cairo safer for Europeans. Missett had already left it in February, under the pretext of arranging with Hallowell means for the defence of Alexandria.[1271] Before the Mamelukes were expelled, Lesseps and the principal merchants had to retire to Alexandria on account of the violent disturbances in Cairo.[1272] Would he have done so when he had reason to remain with his “creature,” Mehemet Ali? As a matter of fact, when the Albanian chief informed Lesseps that “son union avec les Mameloukes ne pourrait être sincère et durable et qu’il faudrait nécessairement en venir à un éclat,” the French Consul tried “de l’engager à la patience.”[1273] And it is quite consonant with this that it was probably Mehemet Ali who advised Lesseps “à se retirer à Alexandrie pour se mettre à l’abri des suites qu’elle (une révolution) pouvait avoir.”[1274] The revolution took place, but Mehemet Ali did not immediately seize power. He was careful, before doing that, to enter on the path of legality by working again for the Porte and its representatives. He was, moreover, affecting the part of a man trying to do his best for the inhabitants and the troops, and had thus to avoid all appearance of self-seeking. There were two eligible persons at his disposal. There was still lingering in the country the deposed Khosrev, who was very anxious to regain his place. He tried hard to win the favour of Mehemet Ali; and Missett spoke of an unnatural alliance[1275] between them. Khosrev went so far as to tell Missett that if the British obtained the viceroyalty for him, he would be ready to demand the services of a British force.[1276] But the pashalik was not in the disposition of Missett or Lesseps. The real disposer of it seemed to favour for the moment the candidature of Khosrev, but threw him overboard when he found the other Albanian chiefs dead against Khosrev, whom they held to be responsible for the murder of their old leader, Tahir.[1277] Mehemet Ali had perforce to call in the other candidate, Khourshid, the Governor of Alexandria, and install him as Pasha of Egypt.[1278] Major Missett was not displeased; the pecuniary obligations conferred upon the new viceroy by Mr. Briggs (merchant and vice-consul in Alexandria) and Missett’s own exertions in the days when the Beys ruled in Cairo to procure for him from them the situation of Pasha would, he trusted, prove of some advantage to the interests of Great Britain in Egypt.”[1279] But the Major forgot that these exertions were by now old history. He was soon mortified to find the new viceroy “a pageant in Mehemet Ali’s hands.”[1280] Khourshid’s programme was to dismiss the Albanians.[1281] But even Missett could see that “since the expulsion of the Mamelukes the Albanians were without control and would spread devastation far and wide; that they had amassed great wealth and might prefer the mild climate of Egypt to the rude mountains of Albania.”[1282] The mercenaries and their leader had now become the chief factor in the situation. Missett resolved from the outset to have nothing to do with them, but to pin all his faith on that shattered reed, the Mamelukes in general and Elfi in particular. It is difficult to explain such obstinacy in backing the wrong horse. Was it because Mehemet Ali was “a man devoid of every principle of honour,” “that whatever government paid him best (as he himself told Missett) should command his services”?[1283] But surely Missett knew very well that the Beys were neither more honourable nor more prepared to sell their services in the cheapest market.[1284] Or was it because Mehemet Ali had sold himself to France?[1285] But Missett was fully aware of the intrigues of French agents with the Beys and of the desire of Bardissy to gain the chief authority through French help.[1284] It does not seem, it is true, that he was a capable person. His French colleague wrote of him, “l’histoire de toutes ses intrigues passées me prouve que c’est un homme qui, avec d’excellentes qualités de société, n’est qu’un médiocre politique. Il ne sait ni combiner un plan avec justesse ni conduire celui qui lui serait suggéré à son exécution.”[1286] But this is not the whole truth. Missett’s object was to see the British occupy Egypt, and his belief was—whether rightly or not—that this was not possible except with the Beys in power.[1287] He endeavoured therefore to do the greatest harm he could to Mehemet Ali. But his capacity for mischief was not great. It did not extend beyond transmitting to Constantinople petitions from Elfi for pardon and favour,[1288] persuading Khourshid—who hardly needed it—to prevail on the Divan to appoint Mehemet Ali to the pashalik of Salonika;[1289] attempting to reconcile the Viceroy with the Beys, etc. It is thus true, that, in the words of M. Charles-Roux, “la politique britannique (or, rather, ‘la politique Missett’) fut mal inspirée et malheureuse.”[1290] But was it true, as the same writer alleges, that “la France . . . voyait avec faveur monter l’étoile de Méhemet Ali et cultivait les grâces du maître de demain.”[1291] In the first place, we have not been able to discover that M. Brune or Sebastiani ever made—during their embassies—any move in favour of the Albanian. In the second place, M. Lesseps left Egypt in November, 1804, some months before Mehemet Ali became _de facto_ Viceroy. Before he returned to France, the Albanian rather fell than rose in his estimation. His exactions from two French protégés led Lesseps to reflect “que sa conduite me fait voir que l’intérêt est le principal mobile de ses actions.”[1292] What was more important was that the first and last pronouncement made by Napoleon was in favour of the Mamelukes and not in that of the “maître de demain.” In June, 1804, there arrived in Egypt one Framery, with instructions to Lesseps to sound the Beys on the nature of the help of which they were in need.[1293] Lesseps did so through Joseph Duclos, one of these Frenchmen who remained in Egypt after the evacuation. Bardissy said he wanted 3,000 men, 5,000 rifles, 10 field-pieces, 5 mortars, 1,000 sabres and a loan of two millions; Damietta was chosen for the disembarkation.[1294] No more was heard of this affair. Mehemet Ali saw clearly that neither Missett nor Lesseps could do anything for or against him. He had recourse to new allies, the sheikhs and inhabitants of Cairo. It was a stroke of genius to discover a source of strength in the “Contemptibles,” whom the Turks and the Beys agreed in kicking and fleecing. “Il se rapprochait secrètement de Seyid Omar—one of the most prominent of the Sheikhs of Cairo—le flattait et allait souvent chez lui, quelquefois même au milieu de la nuit, il lui promettait et jurait faussement que s’il était nommé à la tête du gouvernement de l’Egypte il se conduirait avec justice, ferait respecter les lois, exécuter les jugements, qu’il ne ferait rien sans prendre son avis et celui des ulemas. Il ajoutait qu’il consentait à être destitué et renvoyé du pays s’il venait à manquer à ses engagements, il insinuait à Omar qu’il était ainsi que les autres ulemas assez puissants pour le renverser puisqu’ils agissaient de la sorte avec le gouvernement actuel.”[1295] This was one of his methods. The other was corruption. He wrote his banker in Constantinople to spare no expense to get the pashalik for himself.[1296] It was only despair that forced the sheikhs and the inhabitants to take up arms.[1297] “La faim fait sortir le loup du bois,” wrote a Frenchman present on the scene.[1298] The insurrection broke out on the arrival of a new body of troops from Syria, known as the “Delis,” or “madmen,” and notorious even in Turkey for their misdeeds. Khourshid had called them to his aid to crush the Albanians, but they were soon won over to the cause of Mehemet Ali and their presence only served to exasperate the Egyptians. The Cairenes rose under Omar and demanded the deposition of Kourshid. The Turk contemptuously refused to abdicate, declaring that he was Pasha by order of the Grand Signior and would not relinquish his position at the demand of the “fellaheen.” The Pasha was promptly declared deposed, was besieged in his palace, and Mehemet Ali allowed himself to be elected governor pending the pleasure of the Sultan.[1299] The scene in Cairo reminded Frenchmen of the enthusiasm which reigned in France in the early moments of the Revolution.[1300] They saw the Sheikhs going about in arms, “chose extraordinaire pour des ministres de l’islamisme.”[1301] To the Spanish traveller, Ali Bey, who was in Cairo in 1806, Egypt presented the spectacle of “Une république aristocratique courbée sous le fer du despotisme militaire.”[1302] Seyid Omar even expressed a theory of insurrection. An officer of the besieged Khourshid asked him, “Comment avez-vous pu révoquer celui que le Sultan avait nommé? Dieu n’a-t-il pas dit, ‘Obéissez à Dieu, au Prophète et à ceux qui vous gouvernent?’” To which Omar replied, “Par ceux qui gouvernent il faut entendre les ulemas et le sultan quand il est juste. Or, le Pasha est injuste et depuis des temps fort anciens on a vu le peuple déposer ses gouvernants. Il en serait également du même du Khalife et du sultan, s’ils ne suivent pas le bon chemin.”[1303] But we should not make too much of this. The Sheikhs would have preferred a British or a French army to do the work for them,[1304] and as soon as Mehemet Ali was confirmed by the Sultan (July, 1805) they declared their intervention in politics to be at an end and resumed their teaching in the University.[1305] Had the foreign agents any hand in the insurrection? As for Missett, his enmity to the new Viceroy was unquestionable. With regard to France, M. Drovetti, the vice-consul and head of the establishment after the departure of Lesseps, was in Alexandria all the time. He could not but be struck with the personality of Mehemet Ali. “Toutes ses manèges,” he wrote his agent in Cairo, Mengin, the future historian, “ressentent l’homme machiavélique et commencent à me faire croire qu’il a réellement plus du bon sens que les Turcs en général.”[1306] He instructed him to probe the Pasha’s intentions and to prevent an understanding between him and Elfi, whom he considered to be an English tool,[1307] and cautioned him to be careful in his language till the judgment of the Porte on the events was known.[1308] This was all the “favour” to Mehemet Ali’s ambition! The measure of France’s influence is found in an injunction to Mengin to place the French protégés under the protection of the sheikhs of Cairo. “C’est avec eux,” Drovetti wrote, “mon cher, que dans les circonstances actuelles il faut que vous cémentiez les liaisons les plus intimes qu’il sera possible.” If Mengin should find them desirous of restoring the Mamelukes he should recommend them to appoint Solyman Bey and do all he could against Bardissy or Elfi.[1309] Drovetti’s application for instructions received the reply, drafted by Napoleon himself, that commercial agents had nothing to do with politics, that their conduct should be governed by two rules, “ne reconnaître d’autorité que lorsque la victoire a décidé du sort de pays, quelles que soient les révolutions ne jamais quitter son poste.”[1310] Drovetti obeyed and his quietness was in singular contrast to the febrile activity of Missett. He persuaded the Turkish governor and the notables of Alexandria to refuse the admission of an Albanian garrison into that town. He wrote Mr. Arbuthnot in Constantinople that every impartial man agreed with Elfi’s assertion that there could be no tranquillity without the restoration of the Mamelukes. There were two obstacles, the irreconcilable enmity of Bardissy to Elfi and the presence of the Albanians. “If the Turkish government, guided by liberality and political wisdom, would apply to His Majesty’s Government for a few regiments to be stationed at Alexandria, and if the request was granted, Egypt would soon rejoice in her deliverance from her oppressors.”[1311] If the Porte did not consent, it should proclaim the Mamelukes the lawful governors of Egypt and incite the Ulemas and people against the Albanians.[1312] The occasion for this communication was the mission of two agents of Elfi to Constantinople with the object of restoring the Mamelukes through British mediation.[1313] The scheme originated in the Porte and had no other object than setting the Mamelukes against the new Pasha and obtaining funds from both parties.[1314] Arbuthnot consented to mediate only if the Porte applied to him. The Porte refused and the Ambassador washed his hands of the whole affair.[1315] The Turkish ministers, however, agreed with Elfi’s agents on the sum of 1,500 purses to be equally divided between Elfi, Bardissy and Ibrahim. Mehemet Ali was to be replaced by Moussa Pasha.[1316] The Capitan Pasha sailed to Alexandria with one sail of the line and six frigates and corvettes to enforce the new arrangement. This is the authentic version of the episode. Mengin writes, “On s’occupait à Londres de rendre sa (Elfi’s) maison la souveraine de l’Egypte, on agissait pour lui à Constantinople, l’ambassadeur britannique employait tout son crédit pour y parvenir, il avait remis au Reis Effendi plusieurs notes.”[1317] The eminent historian of Napoleon’s diplomacy, M. Driault, states, “le gouvernement anglais soutenait avec d’importants subsides l’un d’entre’eux (Beys), Elfi, il pensât en faire le maître de l’Egypte, pour y régner sous son nom, il combattait de tout son pouvoir l’autorité croissante de Méhemet Ali, il cherchait à exciter les défiances de la Porte à son égard, il s’offrait au sultan pour rétablir l’ordre en Egypte gracieusement. Il traçait en somme les premiers traits d’une politique qui lui devait réussir quatre vingt ans plus tard.”[1318] Elsewhere he speaks of the rivalry between Mehemet Ali and Elfi as “une des formes de la lutte des influences françaises et anglaises.”[1319] Even Missett did not desire any special privileges for Elfi apart from the other Beys.[1320] The Capitan Pasha arrived in August, 1806. His conduct immediately proved that he was going to hold an auction for the disposal of the pashalik. Elfi sent in his presents[1321] but could not persuade his rival Beys to send in their quota of the price.[1322] He failed even to impress the Turks with his military power, for he could not even carry a miserably fortified village.[1323] Mehemet Ali displayed in the crisis all the resources of his genius. He got up[1324] petitions from the notables and sheikhs against his transference elsewhere. He began to repair the fortifications and received an oath of allegiance from the Albanians.[1325] But he knew the Turk. He outbid Elfi. The Capitan Pasha sailed home and Mehemet Ali was reconfirmed in September, 1806. In the same month Bardissy died and Elfi’s hopes in undisputed sway revived. He made a new request for British mediation. Arbuthnot refused to listen and directed Missett to take as little share as possible in the civil dissensions in Egypt.[1326] The Ambassador laid it down as certain “that no faith should ever be placed in Elfi or in the other Beys . . . that the Porte would under no circumstances consent to our mediation . . . that it could not have been the desire of the Porte to see the French remain in Egypt, but it was a choice of evils to see them driven out by the English.”[1327] Elfi turned to Missett for mediation with the Viceroy, but his terms were deemed unreasonable even by Missett.[1328] The British Agent, however, thought it clever to protract the negotiations in order to keep Elfi’s forces in Lower Egypt as long as possible, judging that they might prove useful in the event of a British invasion.[1329] Elfi, however, was not destined to witness it. He died in January, 1807. “Tout est fini, l’Egypte reste à Mehemet Ali, car personne n’osera plus la lui contester. Il commandera les Mameloukes et le drapeau de ceux-ci ne se verra plus” were his last words.[1330] [Footnote 1171: See Chap. XI.] [Footnote 1172: Rapport de Sebastiani (original version). Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1687.] [Footnote 1173: As to the misdeeds of the soldiers: Djabarti, VII, pp. 43, 45, 46, 59, 63, 64, 126, 127, 155; and Hamilton, _Ægyptiaca_, pp. 14-15, 337, 338, 371-2; and _A non-military Journal_ (Anonymous), p. 37.] [Footnote 1174: Djabarti, VII, p. 241.] [Footnote 1175: Hamilton, _Ægyptiaca_, p. 252 note. Djabarti, VII, p. 241.] [Footnote 1176: Missett to Hobart, 25th Aug., 1803. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1177: Lesseps to Jaubert, 1 brumaire, XII (23 Oct., 1803). Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1687.] [Footnote 1178: Wilson, _History of the British Expedition_, p. 246.] [Footnote 1179: (Il ne faut pas) “que les gens sages prennent tant de peines à construire ce qui est destiné à être détruit.” Djabarti, VIII, p. 61.] [Footnote 1180: Cf. Hamilton, _Ægyptiaca_, p. 31. There is a story of a “Sheikh” being taken round the laboratories of the French Institute. He was not evidently impressed and when he was told, in answer to his question, that “science” could not enable him to be in two places at the same time, remarked that it was then of no use.] [Footnote 1181: De Noe, _Mémoires_, p. 200, and “Ali Bey,” _Travels_, II, p. 65, among others confirm the contrary view.] [Footnote 1182: Hamilton to Elgin, 2nd July, 1802. F.O. Turkey, 36. Extracts of this highly interesting memorandum have been published by Dr. Rose in his _Napoleonic Studies_.] [Footnote 1183: Djabarti thought that expulsion of the French by the British was a proof of the “mérite de la religion musulmane,” VII, p. 109.] [Footnote 1184: Cf. _Non-military Journal_ (Anonymous), pp. 96-7.] [Footnote 1185: Speaking of the year 1217 H. (May, 1802, to May, 1803), Djabarti adds, “On regrettait alors la domination des Français,” VII, p. 155. Lesseps to Jaubert, 27 fructidor XII (13th Sept., 1804) . . . “jusqu’à présent le ciel a été inexorable. . . .” Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1687.] [Footnote 1186: The “library” of a “savant” consisted of the following (all MSS.): 12 exemplaires du Koran — Chroniques d’Iben Isaac — Traité de l’amour par Ali fils d’Ali Fakhreddine — Poèmes et Chansons — “curiosités historiques” — Formules des contrats du marriage et des divorces — “Artifices nombreuses dont usent les femmes en matière d’amour” — faits historiques et poetiques — Style épistolaire avec des modèles. _Courier_ [_sic_] _d’Egypte_, No. 116, 20 prairial IX.] [Footnote 1187: Cf. the views of Elfi as to old monuments in Hamilton, _Ægyptiaca_, p. 29.] [Footnote 1188: Lascaris de Vintmilli was an ex-knight of Malta who called himself secretary to the Egyptian Delegation. Their memoranda to the British Government are found in F.O. Turkey, 33, and to Bonaparte in Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, 203.] [Footnote 1189: Petition of the Egyptian Refugees. Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Supplements, 31.] [Footnote 1190: Wilson, _History of the British Expedition_, p. 243.] [Footnote 1191: As to the purpose of the visit of this American, whose name is not disclosed, see Mengin, _L’Egypte sous Mehemet Ali_, I, pp. 140-1. It was to demand the liberation of the brother of the Bey of Algiers, Parandier to Talleyrand, 18 pluviôse XIII (6th Feb., 1805). Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 209.] [Footnote 1192: An American Gentleman to Sir Alex. Ball, 13 Dec., 1804. B.M. Add. MSS. 37268, f. 86.] [Footnote 1193: “Note Officielle,” 20 Jan., 1802, enclosed in Elgin’s despatch, 28 Jan., F.O. Turkey, 35.] [Footnote 1194: Viscount Valentia (Earl Mountmorris), _Travels_, III, pp. 368, 369. “Ali Bey,” _Travels_, II, p. 236. Both of them saw Mehemet Ali in 1806.] [Footnote 1195: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1196: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1197: Djabarti, very hostile to Mehemet Ali, attributes the mutiny in 1803 to his intrigues.] [Footnote 1198: Djabarti, VII, p. 173, and Missett to Hobart, 8 May, 1803. W.O. 1, 346. The affair began on 29 April and ended on 2 May, 1803.] [Footnote 1199: Djabarti, VII, pp. 180-1.] [Footnote 1200: Djabarti, VII, p. 180. and Missett to Hobart 2 June, 1803. W.O. 1, Vol. 346.] [Footnote 1201: There was in Cairo one Ahmed Pasha, who was on his way to take the government of Medina in the Hedjaz. He attempted to succeed Tahir and wait the confirmation of the Porte, but was set aside by Mehemet Ali. Djabarti, VII, pp. 182-5.] [Footnote 1202: Missett to Hobart, 18 Nov., 1803. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1203: Missett to Hobart, 8 July, 1803. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1204: He himself states, “My position was critical; I do not know how to treat Tahir—as a rebel or as a faithful subject.” Missett to Hobart, 8 May, 1803. W.O. 1, 346. Ball to [_sic_], Malta, 27 Dec., 1805, referring to the action of Missett, “Our conduct in Egypt most inconsistent.” B.M. Add. MSS. 37268, f. 90.] [Footnote 1205: Hayes to Hobart, 20 May, 1803. W.O. 1, 346. stating that he thus acted on the authority of Missett.] [Footnote 1206: The “firman” arrived on 17th Nov., 1803. Missett to Hobart, 18 Nov., 1803. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1207: Briggs to Hawkesbury, 10th Dec., 1803. F.O. Egypt, 2.] [Footnote 1208: Missett to Hobart, 15 Dec., 1803. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1209: Missett to Hobart, 4 Feb., 1804. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1210: Bridier, _Une Famille Française_, p. 156.] [Footnote 1211: Instructions to Lesseps, 1 germinal X. Arch. Aff. Et., Corresp. Consulaire, 26, Le Caire. It may be noted that the name of Lesseps is invariably used without the “de.”] [Footnote 1212: Lesseps to Brune, 23 prairial XI (11 June, 1803). Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 206. This act drew on Lesseps a sharp reproof from Talleyrand. The Minister thought it quite unnecessary to show the Pasha the letters of Bardissy and repeated his injunctions as to “circumspection.” Talleyrand to Lesseps, 3 vendémiaire XII (25 Sept., 1803). Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Supplements 23.] [Footnote 1213: Lesseps to Jaubert (“bulletin”), fructidor XI (18 Aug.,-17 Sept.), 18 thermidor XI (6 Aug., 1803). Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1687.] [Footnote 1214: Djabarti, VII, p. 213.] [Footnote 1215: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1216: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1217: Missett to Hobart, 25 Aug., 1803. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1218: _Ibid._ to _ibid._, 28 Oct., 1803. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1219: The memorandum was “discovered” by Mortier in Hanover, and sent to Napoleon. The general had thus no knowledge of it in 1798. It was published by his orders in 1803. _The Gentleman’s Magazine_ for October, 1803, gives long excerpts and concludes with a justification for the retention of Malta, pp. 943-8. Sir A. Ball, in a letter to George Penn, thanks him for the copy he had sent him and informs him that it would be translated into Italian and circulated. 1 Nov., 1803. B.M. Add. MSS. 37268, f. 56.] [Footnote 1220: Memorandum dated 27 Oct., 1803. B.M Add. MSS. 37268, f. 51.] [Footnote 1221: Lock to Hawkesbury, 31 May, 1804. F.O. Egypt, 2.] [Footnote 1222: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1223: Ball to Missett, 15 Dec., 1803. B.M. Add. MSS. 37268, f. 65; and Taberna to Stuart, 6 Nov., 1804. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1224: Ball to Missett, 15 Dec., 1803. B.M. Add. MSS. 37268, f. 65.] [Footnote 1225: Lesseps to Talleyrand, 1 brumaire XII (23 Oct., 1803). Arch. Aff. Et., Corresp. Consulaire, Le Caire.] [Footnote 1226: Lesseps to Talleyrand, 3 jour complémentaire XI (19 Sept. 1803). Arch. Aff. Et., Corresp. Consulaire, Le Caire.] [Footnote 1227: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1228: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1229: Lesseps to Talleyrand, 10 frimaire, XII (1 Dec., 1803). Arch. Aff. Et., Corresp. Consulaire, Le Caire.] [Footnote 1230: Missett to Hobart, 11 Feb., 1804. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1231: Hawkesbury to Drummond, 18 Oct., 1803. F.O. Turkey, 40.] [Footnote 1232: Ball to Penn, 25 July, 1803. B.M. Add. MSS. 37268, f. 47.] [Footnote 1233: Taberna to Ball (in Italian), 28 Feb., 1804. B.M. Add. MSS. 37268, f. 84. Missett to Hobart, 18 Oct., 1803. W.O. 1, 34.] [Footnote 1234: _Gentleman’s Magazine_, Oct., 1803, p. 972. It gives this description. Elfi had a suite of 17, drank two bottles of champagne or Burgundy after dinner, fascinated with everything, especially with the ladies.] [Footnote 1235: Drummond to Hawkesbury, 11 July, 1803. F.O. Turkey, 40.] [Footnote 1236: Sir G. C. Braithwaite Boughton to Sullivan, 17 Oct., 1803. W.O. 1, 347, describing Elfi’s anxiety to meet someone in authority.] [Footnote 1237: Hawkesbury to Drummond, 18 Oct., 1803. F.O. Turkey, 40.] [Footnote 1238: B.M. Add. MSS. 34921, f. 371. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1239: Stuart to Sullivan, 26 Oct., 1803. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1240: Drummond to Hawkesbury, 25 Oct., 1803. F.O. Turkey, 40.] [Footnote 1241: Hawkesbury to Drummond, 20 Dec., 1803. F.O. Turkey, 40.] [Footnote 1242: General Villetes, the Commander in Malta, so told Mr. Lock. Lock to Hawkesbury, 31 May, 1804. F.O. Egypt, 2.] [Footnote 1243: Instructions to Lock, 30 Jan., 1804. F.O. Egypt, 2. Mr. Lock went to Constantinople to get an invitation for a British force (Chap. XI). He died before reaching Egypt.] [Footnote 1244: 20 Dec., 1803. W.O. 1, 346.] [Footnote 1245: Drummond to Hawkesbury, 11 July, 1803. F.O. Turkey, 40. Cf. in _The Times_ of 9 Dec., 1803, a description of Elfi’s visit to India House.] [Footnote 1246: Mengin, _L’Egypte sous Mehemet Ali_, I, p. 25.] [Footnote 1247: _Ibid._, I, p. 80.] [Footnote 1248: Mouriez, _Histoire du Méhemet Ali_, I, p. 242.] [Footnote 1249: _Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes_, Sept.-Oct., 1923, p. 97.] [Footnote 1250: Ball to Penn, 23 Feb., 1804. B.M. Add. MSS. 37268, f. 78.] [Footnote 1251: Hallowell to Marsden, 7 May, 1804. Enclosing copies of letters to Nelson, 16 March, 1804. Ad. I, 1929. The originals in B.M. Add. MSS. 34922, ff. 200, 310, 311.] [Footnote 1252: See “copies” of letters from Hallowell transmitted to the War Office, 20 Dec., 31 Dec., 1803, 3 Feb., 1804. W.O. 1, 347. Hallowell to Marsden, 21 Dec., 1803. Ad. I, 1927, 25 Jan., 1804. Ad. I, 1929.] [Footnote 1253: Djabarti, VIII, pp. 86-8.] [Footnote 1254: Hallowell to St. Vincent, 3 Feb., 1804. Transmitted to War Office. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1255: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1256: Hallowell to Nelson, 16 March, 1804, sent to Marsden, 7 May, 1804. Ad. I, 1929.] [Footnote 1257: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1258: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1259: Even Missett was not perturbed for long at the fate of Elfi. He at first protested to Bardissy (Missett to Hobart, 22 Feb., 1804. W.O. 1, 347), but soon reported his intention to proceed to Cairo to exploit the “friendly dispositions” of Bardissy. (Missett to Hobart, 6 March, 1804. W.O. 1, 347.)] [Footnote 1260: Djabarti, VII, pp. 278 and 275.] [Footnote 1261: Missett to Hobart, 18 March, 1804. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1262: _Ibid._, 16 March, 1804. W.O., 347.] [Footnote 1263: Missett to Hobart, 29 March, 1804. W.O. 1, 347. “It is now known that Lesseps promised Mehemet Ali and Ahmed (another Albanian chief) £30,000 to expel the Mamelukes.” Missett to Hobart, 13 May, 1804. W.O. 1, 347. “I conveyed to Bardissy that Lesseps had instigated the Albanians against them.” Missett to Hobart, 21 May, 1804. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1264: _Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes_, Sept.-Oct., 1925, p. 97.] [Footnote 1265: Lesseps to Talleyrand, 3 ventôse, XII (22 Feb., 1804). Arch. Aff. Et., Corresp. Consulaire, Le Caire. Lesseps to Jaubert, same date. Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1687.] [Footnote 1266: Lesseps to Talleyrand, 5 ventôse, XII (24 Feb., 1804). Arch. Aff. Et., Corresp. Consulaire, Le Caire.] [Footnote 1267: Lesseps to Talleyrand, 17 pluviôse, XII (1 Feb., 1804). Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 207.] [Footnote 1268: Lesseps to Talleyrand, 1 nivôse, XII (22 Dec., 1803). Arch. Aff. Et., Corresp. Consulaire, Le Caire.] [Footnote 1269: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1270: Missett to Hobart, 3 Sept., 1804. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1271: Missett to Hobart, 27 Feb., 1804. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1272: Missett to Hobart, 6 March, 1804. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1273: Lesseps to Jaubert, 16 pluviôse, XII (5 Feb., 1804). Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1687.] [Footnote 1274: Pelissier, “Négociations de la France dans le Levant.” Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Mémoires et Documents. Vol. 64.] [Footnote 1275: Missett to Hobart, 29 March, 1804. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1276: _Ibid._, 28 May, 1804. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1277: Djabarti, VII, p. 284.] [Footnote 1278: Missett to Hobart, 16, 18 March, 1804. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1279: Missett to Hobart, 16 March, 1804. W.O. 1, 347. “Khourshid entreated me to get him Pashalik. I was engaged in this when the Elfi affair interrupted the negotiations.” Missett to Hobart, 22 Feb., 1804. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1280: Missett to Hobart, 19 April, 1804. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1281: Missett to Hobart, 18 March, 1804. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1282: Missett to Hobart, 18 March, 1804. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1283: Missett to Hobart, 10 Aug., 1804. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1284: “. . . The Beys . . . ever act on the impulse of the moment, descending to the lowest flattery when in distress and assuming the most insulting arrogance when their affairs assume a more favourable aspect.” Missett to Hobart, 11 Feb., 1804. W.O. 1, 347. “Bardissy and all the others are treacherous, the same is true of Elfi.” Missett to Camden, 10 Oct., 1804. W.O. 1, 347. “. . . . Whatever Power affords them (the Beys) the means of establishing their own authority will receive from them every outward mark of acknowledgment.” Missett to Hobart, 25 Jan., 1804. W.O. 1, 347. Also Missett to Camden, 20 Dec., 1804, 10 March, 1805. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1285: Missett to Hobart, 12 March, 1804. W.O. 1, 347. Mehemet Ali having rebelled against Sultan is likely to accept advantages held to him by the French agent. Missett to Hobart, 28 May, 1804. W.O. 1, 347. Mehemet Ali “being guided by the French agent” must oppose the restoration of order, etc.] [Footnote 1286: Lesseps to Jaubert, 24 brum., XIII (14 Nov., 1804). Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1687.] [Footnote 1287: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1288: Elfi’s petition to “Grand Vizier” of Britain (Arabic), 9 gomada elthania 1219, H. Enclosed in Missett’s despatch, 16 Aug., 1804. W.O. 1, 347. Elfi asks for mediation for “pardon” of Sultan and 4000 British soldiers to destroy the Albanians.] [Footnote 1289: Missett to Hobart, 16 Aug., 1804. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1290: _Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes_, Sept.—Oct., 1923, p. 97.] [Footnote 1291: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1292: “Intercepted” despatch from Lesseps to Jaubert, 11 germinal, XII (31 March, 1804). “Intercepted” despatch from Lesseps to Jaubert, 14 germinal, XII (3 April, 1804). Lesseps states that he would not return to Cairo till after the insult done by Mehemet Ali to the Consular house after the expulsion of the Mamelukes had been expiated.] [Footnote 1293: Napoleon to Talleyrand, 2 frimaire, XII (24 Nov., 1803). _Correspondance_, IX, 7312, 7313.] [Footnote 1294: Lesseps to Talleyrand, 10 messidor, XII (28 June, 1804). Arch. Aff. Et., Corresp. Consulaire, Le Caire.] [Footnote 1295: Djabarti, VIII, p. 70.] [Footnote 1296: Missett to Hobart, 16 June, 1804. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1297: Taberna to (Missett?), 19 July, 1805. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1298: Royer to Jaubert, 25 March, 1805. Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1687.] [Footnote 1299: On the whole episode. Djabarti, VII, pp. 309, 318, 312, 368-9, 375-92.] [Footnote 1300: Drovetti, _Journal_, 1-17 prairial (20 May-5 June, 1805). Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 209.] [Footnote 1301: Drovetti, _Journal_, 1-17 prairial (20 May-5th June, 1805). Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 209.] [Footnote 1302: _Voyages d’Ali Bey_, II, p. 246.] [Footnote 1303: Djabarti, VII, p. 375.] [Footnote 1304: Taberna to Missett, 26 Aug., 1804. W.O. 1, 347. Describes the visit of the sheikhs to him, with the request for a British force. Lesseps to Napoleon, Leghorne, 19 frimaire, XIII (9 Dec., 1804). Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1687. Sheikh Fayyoumi went to Alexandria to see Lesseps on this subject.] [Footnote 1305: Djabarti, VII, p. 385.] [Footnote 1306: Drovetti to Mengin, 26 floréal, XIII (15 May, 1805). Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 209.] [Footnote 1307: Drovetti to Mengin, 30 floréal, XIII (19 May, 1805). Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 209.] [Footnote 1308: Drovetti to Mengin, 2 prairial, XIII (21 May, 1805). Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 209.] [Footnote 1309: Drovetti to Mengin, 12 prairial, XIII (31 May, 1805). Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 209.] [Footnote 1310: Napoleon to Hauterive, 24 messidor, XIII (13 July, 1805). _Correspondance_, XI, 8976. M. Brotonne has reprinted, by mistake, this letter in his _Dernières Lettres Inédites de Napoléon_, I, p. 145, and gives it the date of 16 July.] [Footnote 1311: Missett to Arbuthnot, 22 March, 1806. F.O. Turkey, 50.] [Footnote 1312: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1313: Arbuthnot to Fox, 5 May, 1806. F.O. Turkey, 50.] [Footnote 1314: Djabarti, VII, p. 74, and Arbuthnot’s despatch. Note 1. Mehemet Ali had to levy a contribution of 2500 purses to satisfy the Capitan Pasha. The Turk in addition endeavoured to impose 150 purses in Alexandria, although that city had been exempt since the expulsion of the French. Missett adds that the “Pasha does not blush.” Missett to Arbuthnot, 1 Oct., 1806. F.O. Egypt, 2.] [Footnote 1315: Arbuthnot to Missett, 5 June, 1806. F.O. Turkey, 50.] [Footnote 1316: Djabarti, VIII, p. 75. Leake, _Travels in Northern Greece_, II, p. 616, gives an amusing description of Moussa Pasha, whom he saw at Epalto in Feb., 1805. Moussa was then so poor as to eat his pilaff cooked in oil instead of butter. His servants used to steal the firewood of Mr. S.[trane], the British Consul in Patras. Moussa was then economising to purchase the pashalik of the Morea. “He was humble and civil as is usual with Turks in adversity.” In Nov., 1806, Leake again saw him in Salonika after the failure in Egypt. Moussa attributed his discomfiture to the bribes of Mehemet Ali to the Capitan Pasha (III, p. 237). Moussa later became Kaimakam and engineered the deposition of the Sultan. Hobhouse, _Travels_, II, p. 392.] [Footnote 1317: Mengin, _L’Egypte sous Mehemet Ali_, I, pp. 207-8.] [Footnote 1318: Driault, _Napoléon et l’Europe, Austerlitz_, p. 229.] [Footnote 1319: Driault, _La Politique Orientale de Napoléon_, p. 112.] [Footnote 1320: Missett to Windham, 18 June, 1806. W.O. 1, 347. When the Capitan Pasha arrived, Missett sent congratulations to Bardissy, Ibrahim and Osman Hassan. Missett to Windham, 14 Aug., 1806. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1321: Thirty horses (10 of them saddled), 4000 sheep, cows, buffaloes, 100 camels laden with provisions and clothes and money. Djabarti, VIII, p. 25.] [Footnote 1322: Djabarti, VIII, p. 75.] [Footnote 1323: Missett to Windham, 14 Aug., 1806. W.O. 1, 347.] [Footnote 1324: Djabarti, VIII, p. 36. Very few of the signatories read it. “Forged” seals were also used.] [Footnote 1325: Djabarti, VIII, p. 25. “Cela n’a rien d’étonnant car tous étaient ses creatures. Chacun d’eux possédait nombre de maisons, de femmes et de villages, en un mot, avait une situation qui dépassait ses espérances et ses rêves. Ils entendaient bien défendre leurs richesses au risque de leur vie.”] [Footnote 1326: Arbuthnot to Howick, 15 Jan., 1807. F.O. Turkey, 55.] [Footnote 1327: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1328: Missett to Arbuthnot, 17 Nov., 1806. F.O. Egypt, 2.] [Footnote 1329: Missett to Arbuthnot, 29 Sept., 1806. F.O. Egypt, 2.] [Footnote 1330: Djabarti, VIII, p. 80.] XIII THE WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY AND THE SECOND BRITISH INVASION OF EGYPT 1806-1807 “Toi,” wrote Napoleon in 1805 to the Sultan, “descendant des grands Ottomans . . . as-tu cessé de régner? . . . Réveille-toi, Selim!”[1331] It needed the cannon of Austerlitz to awaken the somnolent Grand Signior. To him and his Turks, the great victory meant release from the tight grasp of the Muscovite. They “consider Bonaparte as an instrument in the hands of providence to punish the iniquities of an offending world. His late almost miraculous successes have nearly induced them to believe that by opposition to his will the vengeance of heaven might be incurred.”[1332] Mr. Arbuthnot did not mean to be ironical; he was quoting the actual words of the Reis Effendi. The Porte hastened to recognise the instrument of Providence as Emperor of the French and despatched Mouhib Effendi to Paris as Ambassador Extraordinary.[1333] It refused to ratify the new treaty with Russia.[1334] It began to be troublesome over the passage of Russian warships and transports through the Straits.[1335] It aimed at cutting at the root of foreign—especially Russian—influence by abolishing the privilege allowed to ambassadors of granting diplomas of protection, or “Barats,” to Ottoman born subjects.[1336] The blow threatened prestige as well as ambassadorial pockets, and the opposition was strenuous. It was to the credit of the British Legation that it took no great interest in the matter. It was as a sign of refractoriness that it troubled the British Ambassador. He was further worried by the evident disinclination of the Porte to renew its Treaty of Alliance with Britain.[1337] Ramazan came in handy as an excuse for delay. But, the fasting over, the Turks alleged that they were too much occupied in devising means of defence against a probable French attack to enter upon diplomatic negotiations: they were fulfilling, at all events, the purpose of a formal treaty. A threat on the part of the Ambassador to report this behaviour to his Government and to the commanders in the Mediterranean elicited the unambiguous answer that “the Grand Signor had taken the resolution not to renew the treaty until the restoration of a general peace could enable him to enter without danger into new engagements with His Majesty.”[1338] The Reis Effendi accompanied his declaration with “a solemn oath that two separate parts of flesh in one body should not be more united than the two empires.”[1339] It was evident that the “salutary” dread of Russia had ceased. The robed dignitaries of the Divan even failed to notice the presence of the Russian dragoman within the precincts.[1340] The new situation of affairs revived the hope of Napoleon in creating a new source of trouble for his enemies. His Minister for Foreign Affairs was for strengthening Austria—naturally at the expense of Turkey—in order to stem the flow of Russian “barbarism.”[1341] His henchman Hauterive refused to believe that the Emperor could have any other policy.[1342] But it does not seem that Talleyrand had taken the matter seriously; he told Lucchesini, the Prussian Minister, that “il aimait quelquefois à faire des romans politiques,” and that the scheme was one of them.[1343] Napoleon, at all events, concluded his peace with Austria on totally different lines. He obtained Dalmatia “pour donner à Sa Hautesse (the Sultan) des preuves habituelles de son amitié et pour multiplier les relations entre les deux puissances et ne voir aucun obstacle qui séparât leurs territoires, leurs forces et leurs intérêts.”[1344] This marks the beginning of two years of Napoleonic activity in the East. “Ce n’est plus comme un territoire qui attend une invasion étrangère qu’elle doit compter en Europe; mais c’est comme un état destiné à servir de barrière à la Russie et à conserver le rivage de la mer Noire et le passage du Bosphore.”[1345] “Au moment où un Empire’s affaiblit et penche vers sa chute, une main puissante peut encore le relever et le raffermir.”[1346] General Sebastiani was to be the imperial agent in the reconstruction of the barrier. The new Ambassador should inspire the Turks with confidence, work for a triple alliance of Persia, France and Turkey, regain influence not by arrogance but by skill and “insinuation,” declare that the Emperor had abandoned all rebels, even his “old friends” in Egypt, make the connection with the Porte “visible” to all the world, throw “disfavour” on Russia, and bear in mind that France did not desire the partition of the Turkish Empire, even if she were offered three quarters of it. The “immediate object” of Sebastiani, however, should be to close the Straits against Russian ships of war, prevent the Greeks from sailing under the Russian flag, fortify all military posts against Russia and re-establish the absolute sway of the Sultan over the Danubian Principalities.[1347] As for Russia, it was clear that the failure of her overture to draw Britain into an eventual agreement on the partition of Turkey had only led her to put aside formal projects of this nature. She found out that such acts were repugnant to the British practice. She now put forward “practical” measures. Should the Porte show signs of adhesion to France, she hoped that the British fleet would approach the Straits in support of Russian “demonstrations” by land and sea.[1348] The imminent dissolution of the coalition provided another argument. “There are no other means of obtaining tolerable terms of peace but by occupying with English and Russian troops certain portions of Turkey and Egypt. As long as the war lasts, the security of these countries from the hands of Bonaparte renders such occupation necessary and in the case of a negotiation for peace the abandonment of them may be expected to obtain from France the evacuation of Italy and other countries now occupied by French troops.”[1349] But this was not the whole programme of Czartoryski. He developed for the Tsar fully fledged schemes for the erection of new Slav states. He insisted on the moral obligation of supporting his Christian brethren in the Balkans, but did not forget to set aside the Danubian Principalities for annexation.[1350] It was decided, however, to lay aside this extensive scheme. An extraordinary council was assembled in the early days of 1806. It was agreed that France had acquired by the possession of Dalmatia, the means of changing the nature of the relations between Turkey and Russia and carrying out her designs in the East, that Russia should, therefore, maintain her connection with Britain; secure, on the one hand, the confidence of the Porte, and cultivate, on the other, the attachment of the Christian subjects of the Sultan; that Russia should have her forces ready to forestall any move on the part of France or Austria for the occupation of Turkish territory, especially the Danubian Principalities, and, lastly, that the Tsar should find out the real intentions of Napoleon under some pretext or other.[1351] These resolutions contain the germ of Russian policy in the year 1806. Russia clearly wanted to have the principalities. She desired to “retrieve the glory of her arms, tarnished by the disasters of the late campaign, and to gratify the army by some important conquest.”[1352] But the general situation imposed a line of conduct that was not straight. She spoke to Napoleon—with whom M. D’Oubril was now “negotiating”—in one language; to Britain in another. M. Strogonoff was sent to London with the object of arriving at some understanding. He had been instructed to start with the time-honoured premise that the first duty was to defend the Turkish Empire, but to add that this was no remedy. The remedy was to “establish a new order of things.” Strogonoff was warned, however, to be careful not to arouse the old British “errements.” Knowing that Fox, the new Foreign Secretary, was anxious to conclude peace with France, Czartoryski endeavoured to present acquisitions in Turkey under the guise of “compensations” necessary for restoring the balance of power and facilitating the advent of peace. He did not omit to emphasise the necessity of preventing Egypt from falling into the hands of France.[1353] A conference with Fox, however, deeply chagrined the Russian. When he began to describe “the principle of compensation,” the British statesman could not help exclaiming an “Oh!” of surprise, and added that the application was feasible on condition that all efforts to save Turkey had really proved to be of no avail. As to Egypt, he stated that he did not hold the common opinion that its possession by France endangered, in any way, British India.[1354] The British Minister did not fail to make his policy clear. On the 29th April he wrote the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, “If any alliance should take place between France and the Porte or any cession of territory be made to the former or any permission given to her to occupy with her troops any part of the Turkish Empire, it would certainly become the interest of the two allies to act vigorously against the Porte as well as against France, and the further Russia can push her conquests the more this country will be satisfied.” The point was: could Russia at the same time carry on two wars or not.[1355] As for the principle of compensations being applied to bring about or to follow a peace with France it was unworkable. “If it is to take place after a peace . . . the object of balance could not be attained and the powers would be relatively the same as before,” if during negotiations for peace, what would Bonaparte demand! “But this is not the worst, a ground of suspicion will be given and we may, by those who are ill-inclined to us, be but too plausibly represented as acquiescing in some of the past encroachments of France—not for the purpose of giving peace to Europe and gaining some chance of future repose and independence for her princes and states, but for that of taking our share in the general system of spoliation and plunder.” Conquests were “eligible” only in the event of a war in which the Porte had been the aggressor.[1356] Czartoryski chafed at “the prudence of abstaining from all but measures purely defensive . . . until the Porte had committed some open act of aggression” and declared that the “only” points at which Russia could come into grips with France were the Principalities and Serbia and that a defensive war was more prejudicial to Russia than the most unfavourable terms of peace.[1357] No agreement was reached. Russia worked on her own account and waited for events. She obtained from Prussia a declaration that the Prussian guarantee of the integrity of the Turkish Empire would not be violated if the Tsar declared war on the Sultan in order to stave off a connection between France and Turkey.[1358] But, outwardly, the attitude of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg was marked by hesitation. “By one messenger Italinsky was ordered to hold the language of the days of Catherine, by another to be conciliatory.”[1359] The Minister, “most self-controlled of men,” was so disheartened that he thought of resigning his post.[1360] Czartoryski complained that nothing was done one way or another.[1361] His own position had been badly shaken by the military defeats. “Tout le monde est persuadé qu’il est l’ennemi de la Russie et le prophète de la liberté dont on fait peur à la noblesse.”[1362] The Turks, very foolishly, extricated Russia out of the “impasse.” “Le cheval amaigri,” once Napoleon said, “bondira dans la pâture et bientôt deviendra indomptable.”[1363] They showed more inclination to France than they really intended. Extraordinary honours were paid to the French Ambassador.[1364] This was impolitic because it alienated Arbuthnot,[1365] because the Turks never entertained the thought of incurring British hostility[1366] and because they did not intend to conclude any formal engagements with France.[1367] The conduct of Sebastiani was, moreover, not such as to allay British anxiety. There was no end of “Te Deums,” of “harangues” and “fanfaronnades.”[1368] He was doing all he could to make the new relations with the Porte visible to all who had eyes to see. The Russians professed to be alarmed. Some military preparations intended against the Servians they took to be meant for themselves.[1369] Italinsky made out that he would be shortly invited to sign an instrument declaratory of his Court’s consent to evacuate Mingrelia and that on his refusal he would be promptly immured in the Castle of Seven Towers.[1370] The well-intentioned British Ambassador could not but take the “suspicious” signs at their face value. He advised his Government from the beginning that energetic measures must be taken to save Turkey against her will.[1371] Supposing that the Sultan were well-inclined towards Britain, the presence of a Squadron in the Straits would give him strength to resist “venal and ignorant ministers.”[1372] He applied on more than one occasion to Sir Sidney Smith, then commanding a squadron in Neapolitan waters, for two ships to cruise in the Archipelago.[1373] Lord Collingwood sent him, on his demand, four ships of war under Sir Thomas Louis, to give him the necessary backing.[1374] It seems that Arbuthnot sincerely believed in the disinterestedness of Russian policy and was of opinion that Russia would not take active measures till after having concluded an arrangement with his own Government.[1375] He seems to have been of opinion that once Turkey had fallen under French dominance the “barrier” to British India was definitely destroyed. He therefore pinned his faith on the presence of a British squadron. He represented to the Government that the Turkish fleet could never be withdrawn into a place of safety, that the capital would surrender should its communications with Asia be intercepted and that the Straits could easily be forced.[1376] It was under these circumstances that the Porte played into the hands of Russia by deposing on the 24th August the notoriously pro-Russian hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, Mourousi and Ipsilanti.[1377] This was in violation of the “Règlement” of 1802, which necessitated consultation with Russia.[1378] It was a foolish “coup de tête,” taken under the stupid impression that the treaty, which D’Oubril had concluded with France, guaranteed the complete independence of the Turkish Empire.[1379] The Porte could not have known that D’Oubril was disavowed by his own Government; but even so, it was a gross miscalculation on its part to believe that any guarantee could so easily release it from its engagements. It soon discovered that it had made a false step, for it consented to restore the deposed hospodars with all the _éclat_ that the Russian Minister insisted on, and drank the “cup of humiliation” to the dregs.[1380] The Turkish ministers and Arbuthnot believed that this was the end of the matter.[1381] But they were reckoning without Russia. The opportunity was too good to let slip. Italinsky was sharply rebuked for having thought that the Tsar could unduly trouble himself over the fate of two Greek princes. He should have borne in mind that this was not the point at issue, that the objects of the Tsar were to secure the free navigation of the Straits, the renewal of the Anglo-Turkish alliance and the renunciation of all connection with France.[1382] Before these new demands were satisfied, General Michelson marched into Moldavia.[1383] But Russia won something more. She managed to drag Britain into hostile measures against the Porte. Herein lay the mistake of Arbuthnot. He identified himself as closely as ever with Russian action. His belief in Russian disinterestedness went to the extreme extent of thinking that he could persuade Michelson to withdraw from Moldavia![1384] He rejected overtures from the Turks for a convention retarding the expiry of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of Alliance.[1385] It is true that he had been deprived, for months, of instructions from his Government, but he should have seen that the closer he allied himself with Italinsky, the more complete the dependence of Turkey on France would become. Arbuthnot’s mistakes thus brought about the result which it was Britain’s sole desire to prevent, namely, French predominance in Turkey. And it was this that took place. In spite of Arbuthnot’s threats and the presence of Louis’ ships, the Porte declared war on Russia on 27th of December, 1806.[1386] The British Government decided, in November, 1806, before it knew that the Porte had reinstated the hospodars, to act in the way which the Ambassador had for long been pointing out. In his valuable study of Napoleon’s Eastern policy, M. Driault gives an utterly false account of the British intervention. “L’occasion,” he states, “est singulièrement tentante, Napoléon ne peut rien contre eux (the British) dans ces pays (Levant). Les Russes ne peuvent agir vigoureusement. Constantinople est sans défense. Quelle garantie, si elle tombe entre leurs mains! Qu’est- ce que Austerlitz, que Jena, auprès d’un pareil fait: Les Anglais à Constantinople? Le gouvernement de Londres eut une conscience vague de la politique qu’il devait suivre, il tente un coup de main sur Constantinople. Ce pouvait être un moment décisif dans l’histoire de l’Europe.”[1387] Great Britain was delighted to see Russia and France “neutralise” each other and leave the Mediterranean free for her enterprises. “All the Talents” were pursuing purely British objects at the “negligible” cost of evident selfishness.[1388] The truth of the matter was, as Canning later put it to D’Alopeus, the Russian Ambassador in London. “Whatever efforts Great Britain may have been induced to make towards the side of Turkey have been made solely in compliance with the express wishes of Russia, in support of Russian hostilities and for the attainment of Russian objects.”[1389] In his first instructions to Arbuthnot, Lord Howick (the future Earl Grey of the Reform Bill) lamented what had happened, and urged the Ambassador to do all he could to “recall the Porte to a better policy.” The conduct of Sebastiani, he thought, “justified” the allies in requiring his removal. He announced that a squadron would be sent to give due weight, and, if necessary, enforce Arbuthnot’s representations.[1390] On the arrival of the ships, the Porte should be informed that it had “come either to attack or defend as the conduct of the Porte should determine,” that Turkey had before it two alternatives: “either the influence of France must cease or the friendship so long established between the two powers, a friendship beneficial to both, but eminently advantageous to the Porte, can no longer continue,” that Britain only wanted the strict observance of engagements, particularly as regards the deposition of the hospodars and the free passage of the Straits. When these demands were satisfied, the Ambassador was to declare that the “fleet shall remain only so long as its presence may be necessary for the security and protection of the Porte itself.” But should he fail to obtain satisfaction, he was to terminate his mission and hostile action would then begin. The dismissal of Sebastiani and the renewal of the alliance were stated to be desirable in themselves, but their rejection should not open hostilities if the other demands were complied with. In the event of the outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey, Arbuthnot should offer his mediation on the basis of immediate compliance with the two principal objects. If the mediation were refused, he was to terminate his mission.[1391] With the termination of the diplomatic mission, the admiral commanding the squadron should demand the surrender of the Turkish fleet, together with a supply of naval stores from the arsenal sufficient for its complete equipment, and accompany his demand with a menace of immediate bombardment.[1392] But this was not the whole. “In the event of strong measures becoming necessary immediately on the commencement of hostilities,” the commander of the squadron, who was to be Admiral Duckworth, should inform General Fox, the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. Fox was then to send a force of 5,000 men to occupy Alexandria.[1393] “The object of His Majesty’s Government is not the conquest of Egypt but merely the capture of Alexandria for the purpose of preventing the French from regaining a footing in that country and of enabling His Majesty’s forces there to afford countenance and protection to such of the parties in that country as may be best disposed to maintain at all times a friendly intercourse with Great Britain.” The Commander of the Expedition should possess, therefore, not only military talents, “but also those qualities which may best suit him for a civil or political trust of very considerable interest.” He might find it inevitable to interfere in the “contests for power” that were agitating Egypt. The Government, however, could not prescribe the limits of interference and recommended that the commander should give as much attention to Major Missett’s views as they “should appear to merit.”[1394] The squadron under Duckworth sailed from Cadiz on the 15th of January, 1806, Lord Collingwood regaling himself with the charming picture of “sweet little sultanas” taking refuge on board British ships.[1395] In the meantime events were moving fast in Constantinople. The outbreak of war with Russia had deprived Arbuthnot of his guiding principle, namely, energetic support of Italinsky’s action.[1396] He was not sure whether his own Government would approve of what he had been doing or not. The Porte was also anxiously waiting for an authoritative pronouncement and fondly believed that the British Cabinet did not share the pro-Russian proclivities of the Ambassador.[1397] Howick’s instructions of 14th November arrived on 23rd January, 1807. Arbuthnot was in transports of joy. In a conference of four hours on the 25th January, he had full vengeance. “The Turkish ministers were now so amazed and dejected that they did not utter a single word which was worth repeating.”[1398] They endeavoured to discover whether the restoration of the hospodars was known or not in London at the date of the “instructions.” He, naturally, refused to gratify this inconvenient curiosity.[1399] He assumed a harsher tone. He admitted to the Reis Effendi that the Hospodars were reinstated, but it was done with such “bad grace” as to justify him in demanding “security” and the removal of Sebastiani.[1400] The Porte resorted to crude methods. Seeing that the Ambassador had no time to refer to his Government for new instructions, consequent upon the satisfaction of Russia’s ostensible demands, that it was he who was to determine what conduct Admiral Duckworth should adopt, it resolved to “isolate” Arbuthnot and prevent those communications with the fleet which placed it in a most unenviable situation between the exigencies of Sebastiani and his. The Porte was very anxious to avoid war with Britain, the French Ambassador wrote on the 27th January.[1401] But Arbuthnot took it into his head that the hindering of his free communications was the prelude to arrest and the unpleasant sojourn in the Castle of Seven Towers. He resolved, accordingly, to escape. On the evening of the 29th January, he invited the British residents to a dinner on board the “Endymion.” At nine o’clock the ship—no doubt to the great amazement of the guests, who were not in the secret—set sail towards Tenedos, where it arrived on the 31st January.[1402] The “hedjira” of Mr. Arbuthnot was a foolish mistake. No one gained from it but Sebastiani, so much so that it was alleged that it was one of the French Ambassador’s agents who played so adroitly on Arbuthnot’s fears as to induce him to fly the capital.[1403] The flight, as Lord Holland wrote, made the expedition “assume the appearance of a mere military enterprise, not of a force destined to enforce the negotiations of the ambassador by placing before the eyes of the sultan an English fleet ready and able to bombard his capital.”[1404] No argument could be adduced in its defence. If it was the safety of the British merchants, what of their wives and children who were left behind? If it was to enable him to communicate freely with Duckworth, surely the squadron that was deemed sufficient to capture the capital of the Turkish Empire should have achieved the less difficult object of extricating Mr. Arbuthnot from a Turkish prison. On the 10th February, Duckworth arrived at Tenedos. He had already, on hearing of the flight of the Ambassador, sent word to General Fox to despatch the force destined for the occupation of Alexandria.[1405] This disposes of the allegation of M. Driault that the occupation of Alexandria was decided upon to avenge the check before Constantinople. “Ils se décidèrent à agir pour écraser Mehemet Ali, venger l’échec qu’ils venaient de subir à Constantinople avant qu’il se fût connu dans la vallée du Nil, fonder au Caire, à défaut du Bosphore, leur empire sur la Méditerranée.”[1406] To found an empire on the Bosphorus with some ten ships of the line and not a single soldier on board! The Admiral and the Ambassador decided not to commence hostilities till after they had known the result of the overtures made to the Capitan Pasha. The Turkish admiral asked the Ambassador to return to Constantinople and negotiate with the proper ministers; the squadron, in the meantime, to remain at anchor outside the Dardanelles. Arbuthnot refused to comply except on condition that the ships should anchor within the Straits and a British officer should watch in every castle to make sure that no repairs or new works would be carried out. The Turks refused these conditions.[1407] It seems that the presence of the warships had made the timid landsman momentarily most bellicose. “Our sovereign and his ally had been greatly injured. A powerful fleet had been sent to secure those interests which had been endangered, and though the passage of the Dardanelles in its present fortified state cannot be undertaken without great risks, any probable loss would in my opinion be preferable to that dishonour which would be attached to His Majesty’s arms if a menace had been made, which, in the day of peril, we had not dared to act upon.”[1408] He raised his demands. “If I did not do so I should have lost the only opportunity which may perhaps ever occur of employing with effect the wonderfully fine naval force which has been sent to give weight to my representations.”[1409] The squadron passed through the Dardanelles on the 19th February without any loss and anchored near the Princes’ Islands. A curious combination of circumstances then arose and ended in the discomfiture of the “wonderfully fine” naval force. Mr. Arbuthnot began to weary of the jingoistic mood. It just dawned upon him “that Russia was unwise in the extreme” and that he was demanding what he had already obtained.[1410] He began to be less sure of success, “for the war with Russia had opened the eyes of the Turks,” the fortifications were repaired and the “venture” became hazardous.[1411] He “had a secret wish to render unnecessary the heavy blow which they would now probably be forced to strike.”[1412] He “was in an agony of fear for his four infant children” in Constantinople.[1413] The reaction that followed the excitement of triumph prostrated him and he fell ill at the most critical moment.[1414] The outcome was hesitation. Duckworth was not the man to remedy the evil. “He was,” in the words of one of his captains, “excellent only if acting as a second in command to a Nelson.”[1415] The hesitation saved the Turks. They had been in such panic, Sebastiani wrote to Talleyrand, that had the British demanded his imprisonment, let alone his dismissal, the Porte would have acquiesced.[1416] The Turks skilfully played for time and, when their fortifications were complete, peremptorily demanded the withdrawal of the ships. The wind seemed to have favoured the Turks and prevented the British from leaving their anchorage, all the time they were before the capital, save for a few hours.[1417] The Admiral and the Ambassador—contrary to the advice of Sir Sidney Smith[1418]—judged it imprudent to tarry any longer. On the return journey, the ships were somewhat roughly handled, the casualties amounting to forty-two killed and two hundred and thirty-five wounded.[1419] Thus ended the first half of the scheme of the British intervention. The conception was peculiarly British: a combination of hostility and conciliation that had served the purpose on many an occasion but that was not always bound to succeed. As a contemporary writer said, the venture reminded one of what a Turk had said of a tournament in the Court of Charles VIII. He thought that if it was done in earnest it was not enough and if in jest it was too much.[1420] The share of Sebastiani in the discomfiture was great. It was his ardour and skill that kept up the spirit of the Turks and raised the means of resistance.[1421] It should also be noted that the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean studiously kept aloof.[1422] The failure of the enterprise led to the consummation it was intended to prevent, namely, the predominance of France.[1423] The force destined for Alexandria, under General Fraser, left Sicily on the 6th March, 1807. It was mainly composed of non-British units, and none of the general officers, including the Commander, except for General Meade, had served in the expedition of 1801.[1424] It seems that both the Porte and Mehemet Ali were expecting a British attack, for the Viceroy tried to introduce an Albanian garrison into Alexandria; but Major Missett, hoping for the arrival of a British force, succeeded in thwarting the Pasha.[1425] Mehemet Ali solemnly attested that he did all he could and proceeded to Upper Egypt to subjugate the Beys,[1426] while Missett endeavoured to enlist the support of several Arab tribes, and wrote Shahine, the successor of Elfi, “to look forward with confidence to happier days.”[1427] On the 14th March, the force arrived off Alexandria. On the 20th the town capitulated. “If the governor of Alexandria,” wrote Missett, “held out for forty-eight hours after the disembarkation, he did so with a view to screen himself from the resentment of his government, and if the inhabitants did not immediately open the gates it must be ascribed to their want of energy, their spirit having been broken by long oppression.”[1428] This first success revived his hopes. He wrote to the Beys on the 22nd March, pointing out that the present was their only chance and demanding a “confidential” person to state their wants and wishes.[1429] This was his interpretation of the instructions about “assisting such parties as should be disposed to maintain a permanent intercourse” with Great Britain. “The fact was that he was indulging in a grand scheme and trying to draw his countrymen on to the conquest of Egypt.”[1430] The first step was to be the occupation of Rosetta. He made, accordingly, strong representations to Fraser that Alexandria had only one day’s ration of wheat and that Rosetta had to be occupied if the troops and the inhabitants were not to starve.[1431] Had the general been in Egypt in 1801, he would have remembered that Menou stood a siege for several months, that he was besieged by some 7,000 British soldiers and not an Albanian rabble, that the harbour of Alexandria was blockaded and he could not, unlike the British, obtain anything by sea. The mistake of Fraser was in allowing himself to be deceived by Missett. His second mistake was not to have marched with the bulk of his troops towards Rosetta, seeing that it was so necessary.[1432] He sent General Wauchope with some 1,400 soldiers to capture Rosetta. Under the misrepresentations of Missett,[1433] they thought that they had nothing to fear and marched unguardedly into the narrow streets. They were suddenly fired upon from all directions and had to retire in great panic, leaving 120 killed (including Wauchope) and 250 wounded. “It was a very heavy and unexpected stroke,” Fraser sadly commented.[1434] But Missett was nothing daunted. He “got up” a deputation of the notables of Alexandria to represent to the General “that a famine would be certain and immediate” if Rosetta were not taken.[1435] A second attempt was accordingly resolved upon. General Stewart, with 2,500 men, was to accomplish this object. In the meantime, however, the Albanians had become full of confidence in themselves and the fortifications of the town were repaired. Stewart could do nothing against it. He had, moreover, to detach nearly half his force to guard his communications to the southward. The detachment was enmeshed by Albanians arriving from Cairo and surrendered before Stewart could come to its help.[1436] He had, therefore, to return to Alexandria. These two severe checks determined Fraser to confine himself to Alexandria. He found out, at great cost, what the real game of Missett had been.[1437] But the mischief had been done. For on the first news of the disembarkation of the British, the Albanians were seized with great panic. They began to make hasty preparations for a flight into Syria with as much of the plunder of Egypt as they could carry. The sheikhs and the inhabitants—anxious for a European occupation and bitterly disappointed in the Viceroy whom they had elected[1438]—began to accommodate themselves to a new order of things. The Mamelukes were marching northward towards the scene of action. The Pasha made to them the most liberal offers. M. Drovetti, the French Consul, sent to them M. Mengin—the future historian—to persuade them against joining the “perfidious” British.[1439] A deputation of eloquent sheikhs held forth to them on the damage they would do the cause of religion should they ally themselves with the British. “Les Français,” the deputation argued, “ne sont soumis à aucune religion et agissent au nom de la liberté et de l’égalité tandis que les Anglais sont des Chrétiens attachés à leur religion et vous n’ignorez pas la haine de chaque religion pour les autres. . . . Dieu vous ayant donné la grâce et fait connaître la lumière pendant votre enfance . . . qu’ayant été élevés par des savants et des juris-consultes . . . qu’ayant passé ce qui s’est écoulé de votre vie dans le sein de la religion musulmane . . . vous ne devez pas finir par perdre le fruit de toutes vos bonnes actions en se liant d’amitié avec ceux qui ne suivent pas la voie tracée par Dieu et son prophète.”[1440] It is probable that this discourse was not lost on individual Beys.[1441] But, taken as a whole, their conduct was determined by other considerations. They were full of hatred for Mehemet Ali, but did not hate each other less. M. Mengin found them without discipline and enthusiasm. “They were followed by troops of prostitutes and passed their time in debauchery.” The deciding factors, however, were the reverses at Rosetta. “Les Beys,” writes Mengin, “n’avaient pas une haute idée de la force de l’armée britannique. . . . Les revers de Rosetta laissaient voir assez la faiblesse de ces troupes. . . . Manfoukh Bey ne pouvait pas comprendre comment des Européens avaient pu se laisser battre par des Turcs.”[1442] They maintained, however, their correspondence with Missett and Fraser and endeavoured, by flimsy excuses, to justify their dilatoriness.[1443] It was clear to Fraser that “it appears much more their view for us to assist them in getting possession of Cairo, than to co-operate with us in keeping possession of Alexandria.”[1444] He left them alone. Missett chafed at this policy and persuaded Fraser to reject an overture from Mehemet Ali for alliance with the British on the grounds that no “permanent benefit could be expected from an alliance with so mercenary and faithless a set of men as the Albanians, and that such an alliance would alienate the Mamelukes and the inhabitants.”[1445] General Fraser, accordingly, told the agent of the Pasha that if the Viceroy would liberate the British prisoners and promise not to intercept the supplies of Alexandria he would not interfere with him and would “grant him every favour in his power.”[1446] He meant by “favour” a sum of money! Things, however, remained in that condition till the withdrawal of the British. Fraser was not attacked and the Pasha did all he could, especially by excellent treatment of his prisoners,[1447] to be on the best of terms with him. The situation in the Near East, however, affected the general relations of the Powers. Prussia had taken the place of Austria in the Coalition. The Ministry of All the Talents had been succeeded by an administration in which George Canning held the Foreign Office. Napoleon redoubled his activity in the East. He concluded a Treaty of Alliance with Persia and dispatched General Gardane with a numerous suite of officers to that country. European nations were no longer indifferent to the affairs of Asia. Since the expansion of Russia and British India, “L’Europe et l’Asie sont entrées en contact par un plus grand nombre de points. La même guerre s’étend de l’Orient à l’Occident et tous les peuples qui ont un ennemi commun se trouvent liés par les mêmes intérêts et par le besoin de la commune défense.”[1448] This point is emphasised in all Napoleon’s instructions.[1449] The supreme object was to give his enemies as much trouble as he could. Turkey was envisaged in this light. He endeavoured by all means at his command to revive the spirit of the Turks. He gave orders that the bulletins of the “Grande Armée” should be translated into Turkish.[1450] He instructed Cambacérès to compose an appeal “par un vieil ottoman” against Russia and have thousands of copies of it printed in Turkish and Arabic.[1451] The curious document is in the French Archives.[1452] As early as December, 1806, he had proposed an offensive and defensive alliance. He made full use of the rivalries of the powers in the East in his diplomatic transactions. For ever since the occupation of the Danubian Principalities, Austria had kept aloof from her late allies. The Russians did all they could to placate her by assurances of “disinterestedness” and repeated invitations to help herself.[1453] But she rejected all advances. Pozzo di Borgo was sent to Vienna to do all he could, but had no success. He reported that Austria would never join the allies till after Russia had withdrawn her troops from Moldavia and Wallachia.[1454] Napoleon refused to make peace with Prussia except on condition of her subscribing a guarantee of the integrity of the Turkish Empire and an engagement to join her efforts to his to force Russia out of the Principalities and ordered Talleyrand to declare that “Sa Majesté ne pourra . . . rendre aucun des pays que le sort des armes a mis en sa puissance avant que la Porte Ottomane ne soit rentrée dans la plénitude de tous ses droits sur la Moldavie et la Valachie et que son indépendance absolue n’ait été reconue et garantie.”[1455] The offer of mediation on the part of Austria on the basis of the assembling of a general congress broke down on the insistence of Napoleon that the Porte should be admitted to it.[1456] It was evident, therefore, to Canning[1457] and to the Russian Ministry that neither could the war with France be vigorously prosecuted nor could the approaches to peace be cleared till after they had taken measures to deprive Napoleon of his advantage by making peace with Turkey. Hence the missions of Pozzo di Borgo and Sir Arthur Paget to the Porte. By the first article of the Russian project of a treaty of peace with Turkey, all previous “conventions and treaties” were to be renewed. The second article states that as the French possession of Dalmatia was a source of danger to Turkey, the two states should use all possible means to drive out the French from that territory and settle among themselves its future status. The third article stipulates for the renewal of the Anglo-Turkish alliance and a joint guarantee on the part of Russia and Britain of the integrity of the Turkish Empire. The fourth article authorises Russia to possess the fortresses of Choczim and Binder as “sureties” till it concluded peace with France. By the fifth, Serbia was to be erected into a “tributary principality” under a prince to be elected by the people for life and to be confirmed by the Sultan. The sixth article restores Wallachia and Moldavia into their former status, but stipulates that Ipsilanti could maintain a force of 4,000 or 5,000 men “to protect his province against incursions from the right bank of the Danube.”[1458] The instructions to Pozzo di Borgo throw considerable light on these terms. With regard to the second article, the envoy was authorised to be satisfied “que la Porte emploie ses bons offices à contribuer à l’évacuation de ce pays (Dalmatia) par les Français sans que pour cela elle se constitue en état de guerre avec eux.” But in return for this concession, Russia should be allowed free access for her troops and the right of annexing the province or disposing of it as she might think fit. He need not insist on the third article. As for the fourth, Pozzo was to understand that the Tsar had no particular interest in Choczim and Binder, that all that he desired was “pouvoir compter avec quelque certitude sur la constance de la Porte dans la système qu’il lui convient qu’elle suive.” He would accordingly accept any other “gages” of equal value, for example, the expulsion of Sebastiani. The Serbians were to be thrown overboard if the Porte offered strenuous opposition. Pozzo, however, should find some means of doing something for them, “de manière toutefois que nous puissions conserver avec ce peuple intéressant un lien quelconque au moyen duquel nous puissions du nouveau compter sur lui si jamais les circonstances le rendraient nécessaire.” As for the number of the force to be maintained by Ipsilanti, he was authorised to reduce it to 1,500.[1459] There was nothing in these terms to win over Turkey from her connection with France. Ipsilanti was to have an army intended against the “right bank” and he was as much Russian as Michelson. Nor could the Porte have preferred the neighbourhood of Russia in Dalmatia to that of France. Such points as these must have been present in Canning’s mind, but he was not disposed to complicate matters. He professed himself satisfied[1460] and hastened to join his efforts to those of Russia[1461] by sending Sir Arthur Paget to Constantinople.[1462] The object of the mission was to “endeavour to accommodate the differences which have broken out between the Porte and Russia and to bring back the Porte to a just sense of the expediency of renewing and maintaining its former engagements as well with Russia as with this country and of throwing off the predominant influence which is now exercised over the councils of the Divan by France.” Much was left to Paget’s discretion, but he was informed that however probable the fall of the Turkish Empire might be, it was neither the wish nor the interest of Great Britain to be “instrumental in precipitating” this event. At a moment when all efforts should be directed to avert the “one great danger with which Europe and the world were threatened from the overbearing greatness and insatiable ambition of France,” the British Government saw with regret Russia divert a considerable portion of her forces to “objects of aggrandizement” on the side of Turkey. Such “objects” would probably add but little of “solid” power to the Russian Empire and such a policy might in the end drive her to seek security in a separate peace with France or change the “wavering neutrality” of Austria into a close alliance with Napoleon. It was, however, expedient that Paget should work as far as possible with his Russian colleague and endeavour to impress moderation upon him by pointing out that “His Majesty would not even consider the retention of recent conquests in Egypt as to be put in competition with the advantages of a pacific arrangement.”[1463] As for specific points, Paget was instructed to consider “the termination of the war as upon the whole a more desirable object than the satisfaction of particular demands. He should not demand the surrender of the Turkish fleet and should drop that relating to the dismissal of Sebastiani” if he could not press it with advantage. Paget should guide himself by circumstances, “supporting Russia on the whole, but endeavouring rather to reconcile the Russian plenipotentiary to terms somewhat short of those which were originally required than countenance and encourage him in the pursuit of unattainable stipulations.”[1464] He must not enter into touch with the Porte at once if he found the blockade operating effectively, but was to endeavour to make the Turks receive favourably his pacific mission.[1465] Egypt, accordingly, was to be held as a “lever” in the negotiations.[1466] But the possibility of a speedy evacuation was not ignored. The Government had no knowledge then of the reverses before Rosetta, but feared from the first reports of Fraser and Missett “that the occupation of Alexandria, originally intended to guard more effectually against the French acquiring a footing in that country, might become a much heavier drain upon our military resources than was originally anticipated.” The general commanding should not, therefore, “frame his conduct in the expectation of reinforcements.” He should also keep in view that “His Majesty is not prepared to look to the permanent possession of Egypt on a peace.” “The prosecution of other military objects of greater moment in other quarters or the result of the discussion now pending with the Porte may possibly even during the war determine His Majesty to withdraw his forces from Egypt, so that it will be requisite as far as possible to avoid any measures which might render such a step inconsistent with the honour or good faith of the King or of those employed in His Majesty’s Service.” Fraser, therefore, was never to give pledges to help the Beys to recover Cairo or commit the Government “with respect to any eventual system of government to be hereafter established in Egypt,” and was to confine himself to assurances of “good offices.”[1467] On the news of the reverses of Wauchope and Stewart, the Government, acting under the misrepresentation of Missett that Alexandria could not be held without Rosetta and believing that to enable Fraser to do so would mean the evacuation of Sicily, ordered the evacuation of Alexandria if it had not already taken place.[1468] The choice, it appeared to the Government, was between Sicily and Alexandria; “it is not an alternative upon which the smallest hesitation could exist here.”[1469] In the meantime the Porte was doing all it could to prevent the French from obtaining complete control over its policy. It rejected offers of a corps of French troops. It answered the proposal for an offensive and defensive alliance by the query whether Poland was to be first restored or not and by expatiating on the necessity of sending a special ambassador to French headquarters.[1470] The envoy, Emin Vehid Effendi, was sent, but was instructed to do nothing. He seems to have been an excellent choice. Talleyrand found him “fort désagréable dans ses communications.”[1471] When the French Minister asked him if he had powers to take part in a general congress, Vehid did not understand what a “congress” meant.[1472] When the sending of French officers to Constantinople was proposed, he said that this could be done only after the conclusion of the treaty.[1473] But he did all he could to prevent this. Caulaincourt and Roux were appointed to negotiate with him. Vehid informed them at great length that his object was “constante amitié” and that “offensive alliances” offended against Islam, and, having delivered himself of this declaration, he fell asleep.[1474] It was evident that Vehid was impossible to work with. M. Driault thinks that this behaviour was due to the fact that the Turk was expecting the fall of the Sultan and was, accordingly, acting from personal considerations.[1475] But this is rather wide of the mark. Neither Vehid nor any Turk could have taken upon himself to act contrary to his instructions. The truth was that the Porte was expecting any moment a radical change in the relations of the powers. The Reis Effendi informed Arbuthnot, as early as December, 1806, that an alliance between Russia and France at the Sultan’s expense was a most probable event. Mr. Arbuthnot, in his wisdom, was not surprised; he expected any “absurdity” from a Turk.[1476] The somnolent Vehid organised in Warsaw behind the back of Talleyrand a bureau of secret information.[1477] Under the circumstances the best course for the Turks was to remain as they were, decline formal engagements with Napoleon—however dazzling his offers[1478] might be—but keep on his side and reject the advances of Britain and Russia. This explains the fate of the missions of Pozzo di Borgo and Paget. Sir Arthur arrived at Sicily on the 10th July, 1807. After he had conferred with General Moore, they took upon themselves to suspend the execution of the orders for the evacuation of Egypt. They did so because they thought that the orders had been sent under the false impression that Alexandria was not tenable and with the object of not denuding Sicily of British troops. Paget, moreover, felt the need of having a “lever” in his negotiations. There was no other one available, for the blockade of the coasts of Turkey was not even begun.[1479] On the 28th July he arrived off Tenedos.[1480] Pozzo di Borgo had been there since the 24th May, but had met with no response.[1481] The prospects of the British did not look brighter.[1482] He found great difficulty even in entering into touch with the Porte. The revolution that hurled down the Sultan and the reformers, accompanied as it was by the massacre of many of the leading officials, doubtless affected the prosecution of any important transaction. But it had nothing to do with foreign politics, as shall be later explained. After many delays and attempts to separate the British and the Russian plenipotentiaries came the news of Tilsit and the consequent arrangements for a Russo-Turkish peace under French mediation. Pozzo’s mission was, therefore, at an end. Paget now worked on his own account. But Tilsit could hardly have improved his position. The Turks were very anxious to be friends with the British but feared to give the new allies any pretext for attack. They informed Paget that there had been no declaration of war on either side (which was true) and that, therefore, there could exist no necessity for a formal treaty, that once Alexandria was evacuated and the blockade raised the “former footing” would be “automatically” renewed.[1483] Paget combated this view and pointed out that a formal “instrument” was indispensable.[1484] The Turks, in pursuance of the same policy, insisted on “secrecy” and pointed out that even if peace be concluded, a British ambassador could not be immediately “received” in Constantinople, but had to reside for some months in some island in the Archipelago.[1485] On the 30th of September, the British plenipotentiary received instructions from Canning dated the 14th and 15th August.[1486] The Minister enclosed a copy of the patent articles of the treaty of Tilsit and informed Paget that His Majesty was willing to recognise the Government of the Porte “in whatever part of its dominions its residence may be established” and maintain with it “the closest friendship and connection.”[1487] The Minister also discussed the means of averting the ruin of Turkey. He favoured the establishment of relations with such of the Pashas as were disposed to defend themselves—notably those of Janina and Smyrna.[1488] Egypt would only be evacuated, if it had not already been, if the Porte consented to strengthen its forces there and allow the “co-operation” of a British naval force in its defence.[1489] But these new instructions did not affect matters. The situation, as envisaged in them, was already fully known to Paget and the Turkish ministers. On the 18th October the Capitan Pasha declared that in view of the critical situation with regard to Russia and France the Porte had to break the negotiations, that Turkey was not at war with Britain and that in four months the Sultan would propose a new negotiation.[1490] The mission of Paget came to an end. Before this took place, Alexandria had been evacuated. Fraser, notwithstanding the orders suspending the withdrawal, had been preparing for it.[1491] General Sherbrooke and Captain Fellowes arranged the necessary convention with Mehemet Ali in person. Fraser described the conduct of the Viceroy as “most fair and liberal,” as “truly noble and deserving of his warmest gratitude.” The evacuation took place on the 23rd September.[1492] The chagrin of Missett can be imagined. He had been urging his Government to occupy Alexandria till the general peace, to drive out the Albanians, restore the Mamelukes and enter with them into engagements for the defence of the country in the event of an attack. The Porte would be thankful, for it had not received a piastre since Mehemet Ali came to power—as if the Mamelukes did not offend in this respect. It was hopeless to make such an arrangement with Mehemet Ali, for he had obtained the Pashalik through French intrigue and was aiming at independence.[1493] It seems that Missett made this allegation because he knew that the object of his Government was the preservation of the integrity of the Sultan’s dominions. He informed Paget that “he could with difficulty believe that His Majesty’s ministers would in time of war have ordered the evacuation of a place so intimately connected with our Indian possessions if the state of this country had not been misrepresented to them,” that he was convinced that as long as Egypt was under Mehemet Ali it would ever be “a field for French intrigue,” and that a new effort to “retrieve British prestige” was necessary.[1494] To correct the “misrepresentations” he sent home a mass of reports signed by his agents, Maltese, Greeks, Syrians, etc.[1495] To do “something” he sent the Mameluke Bey, Emin, to Paget “to solicit his good offices” with the Porte.[1496] Emin arrived at Tenedos on the 1st of October. Paget was well disposed, for, under the misrepresentation of Missett, he believed that Mehemet Ali “was very much in the French interest” and was determined that “if he got to Constantinople his first object would be to get him removed.”[1497] But the British plenipotentiary was not in a position to do anything even for himself. Emin was in an awkward position. He could neither remain at Tenedos nor proceed to Constantinople nor return to Egypt now that it had been evacuated. Malta was his only place of retreat.[1498] This was Missett’s last effort. He had to leave the country and retire to Italy. The Mamelukes as a political body, he had discovered, were now extinct.[1499] When he came back to Egypt in 1811 on a second spell of office, it was his fate to see them literally extinct and himself a helpless cripple.[1500] Thus ended the second British invasion of Egypt, an event that could not be truly represented except in connection with the situation as a whole. Apart from the mistakes of Fraser and the responsibility of Missett, the conception was at fault. Moore’s criticism is unanswerable: if the expedition was decided upon to influence the Turks, Egypt was too far away to affect the course of events in Constantinople, and if that country was to be occupied as the British share in a “scramble” for the Turkish spoils, it could have been taken at any convenient time and the troops should have remained in Sicily, where they were greatly needed, or should have been sent to the Dardanelles with the naval force.[1501] [Footnote 1331: _Correspondance_, X, 8298, 10 pluviôse, XIII (30 Jan., 1805).] [Footnote 1332: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 6 Feb., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 49.] [Footnote 1333: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1334: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 15 Feb., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 49. The Russian ratification arrived in Constantinople in Dec., 1805.] [Footnote 1335: Arbuthnot to Fox, 25 April, 1806. F.O. Turkey, 50. _Ibid._ to _ibid._, 5 May, 1806, 29 July, 1806. F.O. Turkey, 50.] [Footnote 1336: Arbuthnot to Fox, 9 April, 1806. Secret report of Pisani. Enclosed in Arbuthnot’s despatch, 5 May, 1806. F.O. Turkey, 50.] [Footnote 1337: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 20 Jan., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 49. Enclosing report of Pisani. Reis Effendi to Arbuthnot. Enclosed in the despatch of 28 Jan. F.O. Turkey, 49.] [Footnote 1338: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 16 March, 1806. F.O. Turkey, 49.] [Footnote 1339: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1340: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 6 Feb., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 49.] [Footnote 1341: A memorandum of Talleyrand, dated 17 Oct., 1805. Bertrand, _Lettres de Talleyrand_, pp. 158-163. Talleyrand to Napoleon, 5 Dec., 1805. Bertrand, op. cit., pp. 209-11.] [Footnote 1342: Hauterive to Talleyrand, 31 Oct., 1805. Bailleu, _Preussen und Frankreich_, II, p. 603.] [Footnote 1343: Lucchesini to King of Prussia, 12 Aug., 1805. Bailleu, op. cit., II, p. 360.] [Footnote 1344: Talleyrand to Reis Effendi, 16 nivôse, XIV (3 Jan., 1806). F.O Turkey, 49. “Exposé de la situation de l’Empire,” 5 March, 1806. _Correspondance_, XII, 9929.] [Footnote 1345: Instructions to Sebastiani, quoted by Driault, _Napoléon et l’Europe: Austerlitz_, pp. 405-6.] [Footnote 1346: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1347: Instructions to Talleyrand, 9 June, 1806. _Correspondance_, XII, 10339.] [Footnote 1348: Czartoryski to S. Vorontsoff, 9 Sept., 1805. F.O. Russia, 59.] [Footnote 1349: Gower to Mulgrave, Troppau, 15 Dec., 1805. F.O. Russia, 59.] [Footnote 1350: Czartoryski to Tsar, 11-23 Jan., 1806. Sbornik, 82, pp. 252-64. _Ibid._ to _ibid._, 11-23 Jan., 1806. _Ibid._, pp.265-75. _Ibid._ to _ibid._, 23 Feb.-7 March, 1806. _Ibid._, pp. 315-16. _Ibid._ to _ibid._, 24 Feb.-8 Mar., 1806. _Ibid._, pp. 322-4.] [Footnote 1351: Sbornik, 82, pp. 240-1.] [Footnote 1352: Gower to Mulgrave, 2 March, 1806, F.O. Russia, 62.] [Footnote 1353: Czartoryski to Strogonoff, 6 Feb., 1806. Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovitch, _Strogonoff_, III, pp. 1-3.] [Footnote 1354: Vorontsoff to Czartoryski, 19-31 March, 1806. _Archives Vorontsoff_, XV, pp. 392-3.] [Footnote 1355: Fox to Gower, 29 April, 1806. F.O. Russia, 62. _Ibid._, 19 June, 1806. F.O. Russia, 62.] [Footnote 1356: Fox to Vorontsoff, 29 March, 1806. F.O. Russia, 66.] [Footnote 1357: Gower to Fox, 17 May, 1806. F.O. Russia, 62.] [Footnote 1358: Gower to Mulgrave, 2 March, 1806. F.O. Russia, 62. Duke of Brunswick to King of Prussia, 7 March, 1806. _Mémoires of Hardenberg_, II, pp. 555 _et seq._ Czartoryski to D’Alopeus, 12-24 May, 1806. _Ibid._, III, pp. 13-14. Goltz to Hardenberg, 2-14 May, 1806. _Ibid._, III, pp. 23-5. Draft of Declaration, June [_sic_], 1806. _Ibid._, III, p. 38.] [Footnote 1359: Arbuthnot to Fox, 27 June, 1806. F.O. Turkey, 50.] [Footnote 1360: Arbuthnot to Fox, 27 June, 1806. F.O. Turkey, 50.] [Footnote 1361: Czartoryski to Strogonoff, 13 May, 1806. Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovitch, _Strogonoff_, II, p. 242.] [Footnote 1362: Rostopchine to Tsitsianoff, 5 April, 1805. _Matériaux pour une Biographie de Rostopchine_, p. 510. Cf. Michel Vorontsoff to S. Vorontsoff, 15 Oct., 1806. _Archives Vorontsoff_, XXII, p. 362.] [Footnote 1363: Mathieu Dumas, _Souvenirs_.] [Footnote 1364: Arbuthnot to Fox, 28 Aug., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 51.] [Footnote 1365: Arbuthnot to Reis Effendi, 28 Aug., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 51.] [Footnote 1366: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 21 Dec., 1805. F.O. Turkey, 49. “As for our influence, I think the Porte does not want it destroyed, we being a disinterested friend.”] [Footnote 1367: Arbuthnot to Fox, 4 April, 1806. F.O. Turkey, 49. “Mouhib Eff. is instructed to profess friendship, but to listen to no overtures for a treaty.”] [Footnote 1368: For his conduct in Bucharest, _see_ Boppe, “La Mission de Meriage,” _Annals de l’Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques_, for 1886, p. 259; and Summerers to Arbuthnot, 1 Aug., 1806. F.O. Turkey, p. 259. Arbuthnot to Fox, 14 Aug., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 50.] [Footnote 1369: Arbuthnot to Fox, 29 July, 1806. F.O. Turkey, 50.] [Footnote 1370: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1371: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 20 Jan., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 49.] [Footnote 1372: Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 21 March, 1806. F.O. Turkey, 49.] [Footnote 1373: Arbuthnot to Fox, 28 Aug., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 51. Arbuthnot to Sir Sidney Smith, 27 Sept., 1806. Ad. I, 412.] [Footnote 1374: Collingwood to Marsden, 2 Nov., 1806. Collingwood to Louis, 2 Nov., 1806. Ad. I, 412.] [Footnote 1375: Arbuthnot to Howick, 21 Jan., 1807. F.O. Turkey, 55.] [Footnote 1376: Arbuthnot to Fox, 29 Sept., 1806 (rec. 9 Nov.). F.O. Turkey, 51.] [Footnote 1377: Arbuthnot to Fox, 25 Aug., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 51.] [Footnote 1378: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1379: Stuart to Fox, 7 Sept., 1806. F.O. Russia, 63. Arbuthnot to Fox, 25 Aug., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 51.] [Footnote 1380: Arbuthnot to Fox, 14 Oct., 1806 (rec. 2 Jan., 1807). F.O. Turkey, 51. Arbuthnot to Fox, 17 Oct., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 51. Arbuthnot to Spencer, 30 Oct., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 51.] [Footnote 1381: Arbuthnot to Howick, 15 Jan., 1807. F.O. Turkey, 55. I saw Italinsky’s instructions. “The deposition of the Hospodars was the chief ground of complaint, that the revocation of the act was the only point which was immediately to be insisted upon and that this being obtained all the other objects of discussion were to be referred to subsequent negotiation. . . .” Arbuthnot to Howick, 25 March, 1807. Italinsky who is here “fairly confesses that Russia wanted the Principalities all along. . . .”] [Footnote 1382: Memorandum from Budberg “vers la fin de 1806” [_sic_]. Sbornik, 82, pp. 488-91. Budberg to Italinsky, Nov., 1806 (_sic_). _Mémoires of Hardenberg_, V, pp. 412-17. Stuart to Howick, 11 Nov., 1806. F.O. Russia, 65.] [Footnote 1383: Arbuthnot to Howick, 10 Dec., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 52.] [Footnote 1384: Arbuthnot to Michelson, 21, 26 Dec., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 52. Arbuthnot to Howick, 22 Dec., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 52.] [Footnote 1385: Arbuthnot to Fox, 14 Oct., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 51. The treaty signed in January, 1799, was to run for eight years.] [Footnote 1386: Arbuthnot to Howick, 28 Dec., 1806, and the Sultan to King George, 7 Dec., 1806 (o.s.). F.O. Turkey, 52.] [Footnote 1387: Driault, _La Politique Orientale de Napoléon_, p. 78.] [Footnote 1388: _Ibid._, p. 112.] [Footnote 1389: F.O. Russia, 73.] [Footnote 1390: Howick to Arbuthnot, 14 Nov., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 52.] [Footnote 1391: Howick to Arbuthnot, 20 Nov., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 52.] [Footnote 1392: Collingwood to Duckworth. Enclosed in despatch to Marsden, 15 Jan., 1807. Ad. I, 413.] [Footnote 1393: Howick to Lords of Admiralty, 21 Nov., 1806. Ad. I, 412.] [Footnote 1394: Windham to Fox, 21 Nov., 1806. W.O. 6, 56. Lady Holland, in her _Journal_, (II, p. 209), states that Thomas Grenville and Windham between them arranged the expeditions to Egypt and the Dardanelles without their colleagues’ knowledge. But the orders are perfectly “en règle” and belie this statement. If she means that these two ministers were the moving spirits in the affair, it is another matter. It seems that Thomas Grenville’s appetite for conquests in the Mediterranean was rather whetted. Cf. his letter to his brother, Buckingham, (25 Nov., 1806). _Memoirs of Court and Cabinets of George III_, IV, p. 101.] [Footnote 1395: Lord Collingwood to Lady Collingwood, 29 March, 1807. G. L. N. Collingwood, _Selections of Correspondence_, p. 243.] [Footnote 1396: Arbuthnot to Howick, 15 Jan., 1807. F.O. Turkey, 55.] [Footnote 1397: Arbuthnot to Howick, 27 Jan., 1807. F.O. Turkey, 55.] [Footnote 1398: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1399: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1400: Arbuthnot to Reis Effendi, 26 Jan., 1807. F.O. Turkey, 55.] [Footnote 1401: Sebastiani to Talleyrand, on 27 Jan., 1807, reported in Talleyrand to Emperor, 4 March, 1807. Bertrand, _Lettres de Talleyrand_, p. 323. Cf. also letter of 7 March, _ibid._, p. 329.; and Sebastiani to Talleyrand, 18 Feb., 1807, quoted by Driault, _La Politique Orientale de Napoléon_, p. 76.] [Footnote 1402: Arbuthnot to Howick, 3 Feb., 1807. F.O. Turkey, 55.] [Footnote 1403: Stratford Canning to Canning, 26 March, 1809. F.O. 352, I.] [Footnote 1404: _Memoirs of the Whig Party_, II, p. 106.] [Footnote 1405: Duckworth to Fox, 9 Feb., 1807. B.M. Add. MSS. 37050, f. 69 and W.O. 1, 303.] [Footnote 1406: Driault, _La Politique Orientale de Napoléon_, p. 137. When the venture failed, we find Arbuthnot—the man, if any, who should be expected to be bitter against the Turks—declaring that the failure was rather fortunate as it left the door open for reconciliation. Arbuthnot to Howick, Malta, 25 March, 1807. F.O. Turkey, 55.] [Footnote 1407: Arbuthnot to Howick, 14 Feb., 1807. F.O. Turkey, 55.] [Footnote 1408: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1409: Arbuthnot to Howick, 10 Feb., 1807. F.O. Turkey, 55.] [Footnote 1410: Arbuthnot to Howick, 16 Feb., 1807. F.O. Turkey, 55.] [Footnote 1411: Arbuthnot to Howick, 17 Feb., 1807. F.O. Turkey, 55.] [Footnote 1412: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1413: Arbuthnot to Howick, 14 Feb., 1807. F.O. Turkey, 55.] [Footnote 1414: Arbuthnot to Howick, 6 March, 1807. F.O. Turkey, 55.] [Footnote 1415: Blackwood to Castlereagh, 6 March, 1807. _Correspondence of Castlereagh_, VI, pp. 165-6. Cf. also letter, 2 Feb., 1807, p. 155.] [Footnote 1416: Sebastiani to Talleyrand, 18 Feb., 1807, cited by Driault, _La Politique Orientale de Napoléon_, p. 96.] [Footnote 1417: Arbuthnot to Howick, 6 March, 1807. F.O. Turkey, 55. This despatch gives a full account of the enterprise.] [Footnote 1418: Anonymous, _Memoirs of Sir Sidney Smith_, II, pp. 34, 37-43, 66-7.] [Footnote 1419: Lord Burghersh to his father, 6 Feb., 1807 ([_sic_] it should be March). R. Weigall, _Correspondence of Lord Burghersh_, pp. 7-10.] [Footnote 1420: _Annual Register_ for 1807, p. 200.] [Footnote 1421: In five days he erected 520 cannon and 110 mortars. Driault, _La Politique Orientale de Napoléon_, p. 103.] [Footnote 1422: Collingwood to Marsden, 20 March, 1807. Ad. I, 413.] [Footnote 1423: The Debates in the House of Commons on the enterprise did not take place till February, 1808, under somewhat unreal conditions. By that time the situation had been radically changed by the Treaty of Tilsit. The Opposition naturally tried to make the most out of the Bombardment of Copenhagen. Canning pointed out that there was no similarity between the two events. _Annual Register_, February and May, 1808, pp. 67-73.] [Footnote 1424: Randolph, _Life of Sir Robert Wilson_, quoting from Wilson’s Diary, II, p. 287.] [Footnote 1425: Missett to Windham, 14 Feb., 1807. W.O. 1, 348.] [Footnote 1426: Djabarti, VIII, p. 93.] [Footnote 1427: Missett to Windham, 26 Jan., 1807. W.O. 1, 348. Missett to Windham, 21 Feb., 1807. W.O. 1, 348.] [Footnote 1428: Missett to Windham, 23 March, 1807. W.O. 1, 348. It is curious that a British general should describe the action of the Governor of Alexandria as being “not a dereliction of duty,” but the satisfaction of popular desire. Stuart to Adair, 20 Aug., 1808. _Papers of Stratford Canning_. F.O. 1, 352.] [Footnote 1429: Missett to Ibrahim, to Othman Hassan, to Shahine, 22 March, 1807. W.O. 1, 348.] [Footnote 1430: Bunbury, _The Great War with France_, p. 291 note.] [Footnote 1431: Missett to Fraser, 23 March, 1807. Fraser to Windham, 27 March, 1807. W.O. 1, 348.] [Footnote 1432: This was Moore’s criticism. _Diary_, II, p. 174. Moore to Brownrigg, 15 April, 1807. _Diary_, II, p. 167.] [Footnote 1433: The British agent at Rosetta, the Maltese Petrucci, expecting a simple “walk-in” had actually prepared a banquet for the officers. Deposition of Carusi, 15 June, 1807. W.O. 1, 348.] [Footnote 1434: Fraser to Windham, 6 April, 1807. W.O. 1, 348.] [Footnote 1435: Fraser to Windham, 6 April, 1807. W.O. 1, 348.] [Footnote 1436: The casualties: 11 killed, 110 wounded, 800 prisoners. Stewart to Fraser, 18, 25 April, 1807. W.O. 1, 348. Missett to Windham, 26 April, 1807. W.O. 1, 348. He attributes the failure of the first attempt to rashness, and of the second to excessive caution.] [Footnote 1437: Fraser to Missett, 21 April, 1807, and Missett to Fraser, 22 April, 1807. W.O. 1, 348.] [Footnote 1438: Lord Valentia, _Travels_, III, pp. 348, 442, 475. Mengin, op. cit., I, p. 286. Deposition of Joseph Aziz, 20 Oct., 1807. W.O. 1, 348. Djabarti, VIII, p. 111. “Ces troupes (Albanians) commirent de tels excès que la population les détesta et souhaita l’occupation du pays par les Européens, quelle que fût leur nationalité.”] [Footnote 1439: There is unfortunately a gap in the _Correspondance Consulaire_ of Cairo preserved in the Archives of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, between June, 1804, and April, 1808. I was refused access to the “Cartons” of the Consulate of Alexandria, on the plea that “cartons” were only accessible to the year 1793. M. Driault had, however, been allowed to make use of them. He states (_Politique Orientale de Napoléon_, p. 116) that there is in them a gap from 14 April to 12 Oct., 1807. The explanation is that Drovetti corresponded in 1807 exclusively with Sebastiani. The Ambassador, however, neither communicated nor referred to the reports of the Consul. As a matter of fact, it is only in the despatch of 28 April, 1807, that he refers to the capture of Alexandria by the British. (Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 213.)] [Footnote 1440: Djabarti, VIII, p. 104.] [Footnote 1441: For example, Osman Hassan declared that he would not end his days fighting for the Christians. Djabarti, VIII, p. 98.] [Footnote 1442: Mengin, op. cit., I, pp. 291-2.] [Footnote 1443: Ibrahim to Fraser (April, 1807). Shahine to Missett, 1 April, 1807. Ibrahim to Fraser, 21 April, 1807. Shahine to Missett, 22 April, 22 May, 1807. W.O. 1, 348.] [Footnote 1444: Fraser to Windham, 1 May, 1807. W.O. 1, 348.] [Footnote 1445: Missett to Windham, 18 May, 1807. W.O. 1, 348.] [Footnote 1446: Fraser to Windham, 19 May, 1807. W.O. 1, 348. Fraser to Fox, 19 May, 1807. B.M. Add. MSS. 37050, f. 158.] [Footnote 1447: Vogelsang to Fraser, 1 May, 1808. W.O. 1, 348. “Nous ne pourrons assez nous louer de la manière que les Turcs nous ont traité étant prisonniers.” Sergeant Waters to Coopé, 9 May, 1807. B.M. Add. MSS. 37050, f. 150. “. . . Many of us refused to give up arms having little faith they will be given quarter. In this they were deceived for after having been roughly handled and plundered, we were treated differently, our captors feeling secure. They behaved uncommonly lenient and generous, and thanks to God, Who is able to soften the hardest heart, they have continued to use us ever since agreeable to the actual customs of prisoners of war, and perhaps in some instances better.” In a letter of May he mentions that the wounded are carefully tended and is grateful for the efforts of Drovetti. He states that the Sergeant was given 10 paras per day, the corporal 8, and the private 5. The officer, he believes, received 15.] [Footnote 1448: Draft of Instructions to Gardane, March, 1807 [_sic_]. Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1686.] [Footnote 1449: Napoleon to Talleyrand, 12 April, 1807. _Correspondance_, XV, 12354. Napoleon to Gardane, 10 May, 1807. _Correspondance_, XV, 12563; and Alfred de Gardane, _Mission de Gardane_, en Perse, pp. 82-94.] [Footnote 1450: To Cambacérès, 11 Dec., 1806. _Correspondance_, XIV, 11434.] [Footnote 1451: To Cambacérès, 11 Dec., 1806. _Correspondance_, XIV, 11434.] [Footnote 1452: Cambacérès wrote to Hauterive, 30 Dec., 1806, that Kieffer and Belleteste should translate it into Turkish and Marcel into Arabic. Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, 212. Talleyrand was sceptical. Talleyrand to Hauterive, 25 Jan., 1807. Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie. Supplement 24.] [Footnote 1453: Stuart to Fox, 31 Sept., 1806. F.O. Russia, 63. Stuart to Howick, 11 Nov., 1806. F.O. Russia, 64. Stuart to Howick, 14 Jan., 1807. F.O. Russia, 67.] [Footnote 1454: Despatch of 14-26 Feb., 1807. Cited by Martens, _Recueil des Traités de la Russie_, II, p. 506.] [Footnote 1455: Cited by Driault, _Napoléon et l’Europe, Tilsit_, p. 44.] [Footnote 1456: Coquelle, _Napoléon et l’Angleterre_, pp. 153-64.] [Footnote 1457: It is curious that M. Driault (_Tilsit_, p. 161) attributes the expedition to Egypt to the new administration. The probable explanation is that it took place in March, 1807, the new administration came to power in the same month. In his earlier work, _La Politique Orientale de Napoléon_, he attributes it correctly, however, to the Fox-Grenville Cabinet (although he misrepresents the motives).] [Footnote 1458: F.O. Russia, 69.] [Footnote 1459: 12 March, 1807. F.O. Russia, 72.] [Footnote 1460: Canning to Gower, 16 May, 1807. F.O. Russia, 69.] [Footnote 1461: The preceding administration had also thought of sending Sir Harford Jones to mediate between Persia and Russia (F.O. Russia, 68). Canning took up the project (Instructions to Jones, June, 1807. F.O. Russia, 69), but Tilsit delayed the departure and changed the object of the mission.] [Footnote 1462: A contemporary scandalmonger states that Canning was sure that the mission would fail and that he was only providing Paget with a “job.” Lady Erroll, to Frere (undated). G. Testing, _J. H. Frere and his Friends_, p. 147.] [Footnote 1463: Instructions, no date (draft). F.O. Turkey, 56.] [Footnote 1464: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1465: Instructions, May, 1807 [_sic_]. _Ibid._] [Footnote 1466: Instructions to Paget, 18 May, 1807. F.O. Turkey, 56.] [Footnote 1467: Castlereagh to Fox, 17 May, 1807. W.O. 6, 56.] [Footnote 1468: Castlereagh to Fox, 14 June, 1807. B.M. ADD. MSS. 37050, f. 178.] [Footnote 1469: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1470: Napoleon to Talleyrand, 11 March, 1807. _Correspondance_, XIV, 11986. Napoleon to Sebastiani, 1 Dec., 1806. _Correspondance_, XIV, 11337. Driault, _La Politique Orientale de Napoléon_, p. 68.] [Footnote 1471: Talleyrand to Emperor, 15 March, 1807. Bertrand, _Lettres de Talleyrand_, p. 357.] [Footnote 1472: Talleyrand to Emperor, 8 March, 1807. Bertrand, op. cit., pp. 332-3.] [Footnote 1473: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1474: Driault, _Tilsit_, pp. 141-3.] [Footnote 1475: Driault, _Politique Orientale_, p. 190.] [Footnote 1476: Arbuthnot to Howick, 22 Dec., 1806. F.O. Turkey, 52.] [Footnote 1477: Stratford Canning to Canning, 1 Dec., 1808. “The Papers of S. Canning.” F.O. 1, 352.] [Footnote 1478: The conquest of the Crimea was dangled before their eyes.] [Footnote 1479: Paget to Canning, 12 July, 1807. F.O. Turkey, 56. Moore, _Diary_, II, p. 194, pp. 181-2.] [Footnote 1480: Paget to Canning, 30 July, 1807. F.O. Turkey, 56.] [Footnote 1481: Pozzo di Borgo, to Paget, 17-29 July, 1807. F.O. Turkey, 56.] [Footnote 1482: Paget to Canning (20 July, 1807?), private. “The Paget Papers,” II, p. 309.] [Footnote 1483: Reis Effendi to Paget, 15 Gomada el Akher, 1222 H. F.O. Turkey, 56.] [Footnote 1484: Paget to Reis Effendi, 27 Aug., 1807. _Ibid._ Paget to Canning, 3 Sept., 1807. _Ibid._] [Footnote 1485: Paget to Canning, 24 Sept., 1807. _Ibid._] [Footnote 1486: Paget to Canning, 1 Oct., 1807. _Ibid._] [Footnote 1487: Canning to Paget, 14 Aug., 1807. _Ibid._] [Footnote 1488: Canning to Paget, 15 Aug., 1807. F.O. Turkey, 56.] [Footnote 1489: Canning to Paget, 14 Aug., 1807. _Ibid._] [Footnote 1490: Paget to Canning, 22 Oct., 1807. F.O. Turkey, 56.] [Footnote 1491: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1492: Fraser to Castlereagh, 26 Sept., 1807. W.O. 1, 348. On the withdrawal Captain Hallowell blocked the harbour of Alexandria by sinking two old ships at the entrance. He did this on instructions with the object of preventing large warships from finding enough depth of water. Whether this was really effective or not the point did not arise. Collingwood to Pole, 16 Oct., 1807. Ad. 1, 413. Hallowell to Pole, 11 Sept., 1807. Ad. 1, 1933.] [Footnote 1493: Missett to Canning, 13 June, 1807. F.O. Egypt, 3.] [Footnote 1494: Missett to Paget, 22 Aug., 1807. F.O. Turkey, 56.] [Footnote 1495: They are to be found in W.O. 1, 348.] [Footnote 1496: Missett to Castlereagh, Messina, 16 Jan., 1808. W.O. 1, 348. Emin to Missett, 2 Dec., 1807. _Ibid._ Missett to Emin, 8 Jan., 1808. _Ibid._] [Footnote 1497: Paget to Canning, 4 Oct., 1807. F.O. Turkey, 56.] [Footnote 1498: Missett to Castlereagh, Messina, 16 Jan., 1808. W.O. 1, 348. Emin to Missett, 2 Dec., 1807. _Ibid._ Missett to Emin, 8 Jan., 1808. _Ibid._ Paget to Canning, 4 Oct., 1807. F.O. Turkey, 56. Paget to Canning, 8 Oct., 1807. _Ibid._] [Footnote 1499: Missett to Castlereagh, 21 Oct., 1807. W.O. 1, 348.] [Footnote 1500: As to this physical disability and its effects, _see_ Bunbury, _Great War with France_, pp. 285-6. Missett’s second period of residence lasted all 1815. He then retired into Italy, where he died in 1820 (_Gentleman’s Magazine_). There is no notice of him in the _Dictionary of National Biography_.] [Footnote 1501: Moore, _Diary_, II, p. 151.] XIV TILSIT TO BUCHAREST: THE STALEMATE IN THE EAST 1807-1812 There is a legend of Tilsit. The meeting of Alexander and Napoleon on a raft in mid-stream, the scenes of fraternisation designed by two masters of stage effects, the rumour that a British Agent lay hidden behind a curtain and overheard the conversations between the two autocrats[1502] are bound to stir the dullest imagination. The belief that the partition of the Turkish Empire had been resolved upon[1503] has taken root, and the question as to which of the two emperors duped the other has never yet been solved.[1504] Tilsit, on the contrary, created a situation in which the powers balanced each other so equally as to enable the Turks to emerge from the conflict without serious loss of territory. “Les Projets de guerre dans l’Inde, les projets de partage de l’Empire ottoman semblent des fantômes produits sur la scène pour occuper l’attention de la Russie,” wrote Talleyrand in his memoirs.[1505] “Au fond,” said Metternich, “Napoléon ne songeait ni à la Porte ni à l’Asie.”[1506] Tilsit for him and for Alexander was an expedient. There were some important considerations which weighed with the Tsar. Austria had left the Coalition at the beginning of 1806, Prussia had been overrun, British help had never come.[1507] He desired to save as much of Prussia as he could. He found an opening for the annexation of the Principalities in an understanding with France. Friedland had convinced him that he could gain nothing by war. His “experts” argued that the Ionian Islands and Cattaro did not lie in the line of “natural” advance.[1508] There is a significant letter from him to his favourite sister, the Grand Duchess Catherine, written on 17th June, 1807, “Dieu nous a sauvé; au lieu de sacrifices, nous sortirons de la lutte avec une sorte de lustre,” he wrote.[1509] To come to Tilsit in a gloomy mood of despair and to return the ally of Napoleon, to make sure that France would no longer raise trouble in Persia and the Balkans, and to keep in his memory a mass of Napoleonic “promises” to be used or neglected as should be necessary were no despicable gains. For France, Tilsit meant the completion of the Continental system, the annexation of the Ionian Islands and Cattaro, the recognition by Russia of the vast changes Napoleon had introduced in the map of Europe and the new thrones he had raised. The “promises” might keep Russia dependent upon him. The dependence of Russia might enable him to browbeat Prussia and keep Austria in hand. The West would lie at his feet. It was on a report of the May Revolution in Constantinople and the deposition of Sultan Selim, that Napoleon expressed himself to have been released by the event from all obligations to Turkey. It was a “decree of Providence,” he said.[1510] The decree was rather one of Napoleonic expediency. The French Chancery had already examined the possibility of considering the Turkish Empire as “le théâtre et le moyen d’une négociation qui mettrait fin aux démêlés subsistants entre l’Empereur et le Tsar et qui ouvrirait la carrière aux combinaisons les plus vastes et les plus importantes.”[1511] The Prussian, Hardenberg, elaborated a scheme of partition, the adoption of which would not only restore his country but would also round off her frontiers.[1512] In the midst of defeat the Prussians never lost sight of the Hohenzollern “rage d’expansion.”[1513] All these plans provided material for talk. The treaties were of a totally different nature. They stipulated the conclusion of an armistice between Russia and Turkey, the evacuation of Wallachia and Moldavia, the non-entry of the Turks into them till after the ratification of a Russo- Turkish definitive treaty of peace, the acceptance of French mediation between the two belligerents. The eighth article of the Treaty of Alliance laid down, however, that in the event of the Sultan refusing the offer of mediation or of the negotiations for peace leading to no “satisfactory result” after three months, France would make common cause with Russia and the two “s’entendront pour soustraire tous les provinces de l’Empire Ottoman en Europe, la ville de Constantinople et la Province de Roumelie exceptées, au joug et aux vexations des Turcs.”[1514] The Russians evacuated the Ionian Islands and Cattaro. A French officer, Guilleminot, helped to bring about the conclusion of an armistice between the Russians and the Turks. This was the armistice of Slobodzie, which was signed on the 24th August, 1807.[1515] But the Tsar refused to ratify it, basing his refusal on the “fact” that the Russian general had no powers, that the terms were humiliating and that as soon as the Russians began to withdraw the Turks followed on their heels and started plundering and murdering the inhabitants.[1516] Russia, thus, was violating the treaty. To justify his action, the Tsar had recourse to “l’air de Tilsit.” Referring to his conversations with Napoleon, Alexander stated that the French Emperor “m’a souvent dit qu’il ne tenait point à cette évacuation, qu’on la traînerait en longueur pour se dispenser et qu’il n’était pas possible de souffrir plus longtemps les Turcs en Europe, il me laissait même entrevoir le projet de les jeter en Asie. Ce n’est qu’ensuite qu’il est revenu à leur laisser Constantinople, et quelques provinces environnantes.”[1517] Russia was by no means trying to raise the question of partition. The object in view was to keep Moldavia and Wallachia; if a secret treaty excepted only Constantinople from the process of “liberation,” why could not a treaty of peace extend the frontier of Russia to the Danube?[1518] If the Ottoman Empire was to be soon “dead” and its heirs were to be soon assembled, why should not one of them keep what he had in hand?[1519] The instructions and the behaviour of Count Tolstoï, the new Ambassador in Paris, further elucidate the point. He was to insist on the indefinite occupation of the two provinces, to present the proposals for partition as proceeding from his “personal initiative” and to refrain altogether from making them if he found the French Government disinclined to listen.[1520] Tolstoï was not the man to err in this respect. “Il est brave militaire,” so Napoleon describes him, “mais il est rempli de préjugés et de méfiance contre la France et est bien loin de la hauteur des évènements de Tilsit et de la nouvelle position où l’étroite amitié qui règne entre votre Majesté et moi ont placé l’univers.”[1521] Napoleon, however, was not the man to let go his advantage for nothing. If the Tsar refused to withdraw his troops from Turkish territory, he would not evacuate Prussian Silesia.[1522] His Minister for Foreign Affairs, Champagny, wrote to Caulaincourt, the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, “L’Empereur voit toujours avec peine qu’on s’attache plus à des prétendus [_sic_] propos qu’à la lettre du traité, qu’il appelait en donnant suite à la métaphore de M. de Roumiantsoff l’air noté et, par conséquent, l’air véritable de Tilsit.”[1523] But he was careful not to go far in this direction. He kept up all the language of yore.[1524] He did not insist on mediating between Russia and Turkey, though Mouhib Effendi, the Turkish Ambassador in Paris, had been pressing to enter into negotiations with Tolstoï.[1525] The complications in Spain, moreover, led him to instruct Caulaincourt to discuss the partition of Turkey. The Tsar responded with equal “sincerity.”[1526] Lack of response would have shown Napoleon that Alexander was looking for some other system. It was too early yet not to keep up appearances. The result was a series of conferences between Caulaincourt and Roumiantsoff, known as the “entretiens of St. Petersburg,” in which Turkey was partitioned on paper.[1527] Napoleon did not disapprove, he merely stated that the affair was too important to be settled by any but the two emperors.[1528] An interview was necessary. In the meantime Russia could swallow Finland. Turkey, the unfortunate object of ambition and abuse of power, was then in an indescribable state of confusion. A revolution in May, 1807, cost Selim his throne, a second in November his life and hurled down Mustafa from power. Most of the prominent officials of the Porte had been massacred. But the outbreaks had nothing to do with foreign policy.[1529] They marked the beginning of the struggle between the Old and the Young Turks. The former sought salvation in a return to the past, the latter in innovations. “Le gouvernement,” wrote Sebastiani after the first revolution, “sera une oligarchie ecclésiastique en défiance de toutes les nations chrétiennes, de l’Angleterre et de la Russie, comme de la France, à moins que les évènements n’entraînent cette nation vieille et débile.”[1530] Their foreign Policy was not changed. Their sound instinct convinced them that Napoleon and Alexander could never agree on a scheme of partition. They accordingly determined to keep to France. They threw themselves on the “benevolence” of Napoleon and notified the intention to accede to any arrangement as to peace.[1531] They broke off the negotiations with Paget. It was an experiment on their part, for, it may be recalled, the Porte informed him that it would apply within four months for a resumption of the negotiations. But as time went on it became clear that a change was necessary. Sebastiani could not take upon himself to assure them of the real sentiments of Napoleon. He himself was as much in the dark and believed that his remaining at Constantinople after Tilsit savoured of treachery. The signs were that they could obtain peace only at the price of a cession of territory. Mouhib Effendi received no support from Champagny in Paris. The French Minister instructed Sebastiani to inform the Porte that the misfortunes of Turkey were due to internal evils.[1532] This was true, but it could have brought no comfort. Then came the query if they were prepared to cede their two provinces, and, if not, what means had they to carry on the war.[1533] There were, moreover, threats of punishing the Pasha of Janina; and a disquieting association of ideas reminded the Porte that Bonaparte invaded Egypt in 1798 with the object of punishing the Mamelukes.[1534] The experiment of working with France had led to no result. The Porte, accordingly, took two bold steps. It consented to negotiate with Russia directly and without French intervention,[1535] and it made overtures to Great Britain.[1536] The occasion, for Canning, was not merely one for making peace with the Turks. His object was to forge a weapon against France. He had already, on the first news of Tilsit, endeavoured to dissociate Alexander from Napoleon by the two missions of Sir Robert Wilson to St. Petersburg and by the attack on Copenhagen.[1537] Sir Robert, “a rather sanguine, credulous man,”[1538] brought back from his first trip a favourable report, and Canning, “making due allowance”[1539] for the character of the agent, sent him back again.[1540] “Nothing important, however, was to be left to his sole discretion. If Russia were sincere, it would be worth while to keep her up to it by showing a disposition to cultivate and strengthen the former good understanding; if she were not sincere . . . there would be no harm done.”[1541] On his arrival in the Russian capital, Wilson told Roumiantsoff that Britain was desirous of seeing the power of Russia augmented, whereas France was as anxious to see it reduced. He proceeded to state that his country would never propose the partition of the Turkish Empire, but would consent to the annexation of the Danubian principalities as a result of negotiations between Russia and Turkey—negotiations which might lead to the former “Union” between them and would “protect the interests” of the Tsar “on the side of Greece,” which he had to abandon by his present system.[1542] But the Russian Government could hardly break with France on “mere verbal affirmations” which were not officially confirmed.[1543] Wilson, moreover, seemed to have behaved with much “swagger” and kept company with all those who were disaffected against the French alliance.[1544] He was told to quit, and war was soon declared on Britain. But Canning did not lose hope. In his instructions to Sir Robert Adair, who was to negotiate with the Porte, he states that if Russia, “resenting the delusion” which, probably, had been practised upon her or “taking a more enlarged view” of the dangers of French predominance, should desire peace with Turkey, Britain would be willing to help and would accede to a Russo-Turkish treaty stipulating the determination of both parties to resist French designs. The continuance of the war between Russia and Britain would make no difference with regard to this.[1545] There was also another project, namely, an alliance between Austria, Britain and Turkey.[1546] The choice of Sir Robert Adair, a _persona grata_ in Vienna and in confidential communication with Austrian circles,[1547] pointed to this. The appointment does credit to Canning, for Adair belonged to the Opposition and had been the subject of one of the Minister’s witticisms.[1548] The Minister made it clear that, whatever was to be done, there was to be neither a guarantee of integrity nor a subsidy. “Money,” he wrote, “we have not and a guarantee, though cheap enough, is hardly honest.”[1549] If there was to be no guarantee was there to be no help? If it came to the worst, Britain would help the “removal” of the seat of government and would recognise the Porte wherever it might be found. She was disposed, in the meantime, to “utilize those local Turkish advantages” of which the Porte was unable to make use. “In this description,” wrote Canning, “I do not mean to point at Egypt, the occupation of which would probably be a ground of incurable jealousy and alarm to the Turkish government and the continued possession of which is known by experience to require a larger army than His Majesty could appropriate for that object.” The difficulty applied to any other “station”—the term is significant—that would require a large garrison. An island would serve the purpose better, Crete, for example. But it was to be made clear that the offer of help was to be contingent upon the demand of the Turks and upon their co-operation.[1550] Egypt, thus, did not find place among the “local advantages.” The position of Ali Pasha of Janina was totally different from that of Mehemet Ali. The geographical position of his territory, the fact that co-operation with him need be no more than naval, his avowed enmity to the masters of the Ionian Islands—be they French or Russian—endowed Ali with a degree of prominence which the extent of his power and resources would not otherwise have justified. Ali had sent an envoy to London and had made his desire to annex the ex-Venetian possessions on the mainland abundantly clear.[1551] J. P. Morier advised the granting of Egypt to Ali on the grounds that there were already Albanian soldiers in that province.[1552] Leake, who had been for years with Ali, recommended that his ambition should be gratified.[1553] The Government, however, took a different line. The Pasha was by no means to be encouraged to expect any aid in the realization of his schemes of independence—supposing that he had any. Should the Porte succumb to France or abandon resistance to that power, Ali would then receive naval “co-operation” in his defence against France and the establishing of his independence. If the immediate attainment of any of the “objects” desired by him would enable him to resist France, the British fleet would help him to attain that object.[1554] A “quantity” of artillery and munitions of war were also to be given to him.[1555] This is not exactly the “convention” of which M. Driault speaks as having been concluded between Ali and the British Government.[1556] Sir Robert Adair arrived off Tenedos in September, 1808. After three months of arduous negotiations with Vehid Effendi—the same Turk who proved so “disagreeable” to Talleyrand at Warsaw—the Peace of the Dardanelles was concluded.[1557] The Peace is in many ways a remarkable one. It was the first breach in the wall against Britain.[1558] It was the first great act of a reign destined to occupy a prominent place in Turkish annals. Six months before, Sebastiani described Mahmoud as “un prince faible, doux et valétudinaire, atteint d’une épilepsie incurable.”[1559] The peace was a great act of wisdom and courage. The French “chargé d’affaires” had used violent threats. Peace with Britain, he said, meant, _ipso facto_, war with France.[1560] To withstand the threats of France and to take three months to make peace with her mortal enemy would hardly justify Dr. Rose in attributing the delay to “Oriental Pride and Lethargy.”[1561] The Treaty is also notable for the article stipulating reciprocity for the privileges enjoyed by British subjects in Turkish dominions.[1562] Thenceforward the Porte determined to steer clear of all foreign connections and to await the outcome of events.[1563] It is doubtful if any but Turks could carry out successfully a policy of that nature. It was the wisest under the circumstances and it served the purpose well. The price they paid was by no means excessive: violent accusations by disappointed diplomatists and abusive epithets by unsympathetic historians. Napoleon had, in the meantime, become hopelessly entangled in Spanish complications; and Austria had been showing unmistakable signs of restiveness. He tried hard to avert the war by dangling before the eyes of Metternich a share in the spoils of Turkey or threatening to make her the helpless spectator of the partition.[1564] It happened that the Turkish Ambassador was present during the conversation and the scandalised Metternich commented, “Cette conversation est sans doute sans exemple dans les fastes de la diplomatie.”[1565] There was nothing for it but to proceed to Erfurt and pay the Tsar’s price. Talleyrand was sent beforehand “to speak to the Tsar the language that suited him.” To tell him of “l’intérêt bien entendu du continent, sept millions de Grecs rendus à la liberté, etc.” “Voilà,” continued Napoleon, “un beau champ pour faire de la philanthropie, je vous donne sur cela carte blanche, je veux seulement que ce soit de la philanthropie lointaine.”[1566] But Talleyrand had formed his own programme and went to Erfurt to execute it. It was not certain that to thwart the Emperor’s ambition meant treachery to France. “Talleyrand,” as M. Sorel neatly put it, “ferait la France européenne et lui ministre européen de la France en Europe, de l’Europe en France.”[1567] Even if he was to use the language of seduction, Alexander would not have listened. At Tilsit, it was to his interest to listen and to seem duped. Rightly or wrongly he did not judge the moment opportune to break with Napoleon.[1568] But he, all the same, exacted the price for joining forces against Austria. Napoleon recognised the annexation of Moldavia and Wallachia up to the Danube with the sole proviso that this recognition should be kept secret.[1569] The situation was, apparently, changed beyond recognition. The Tsar now expatiated on the necessity of the continued existence of the Turkish Empire for the preservation of the peace of Europe.[1570] The war between Austria and France was to prove the extent of his sincerity. His contribution to the common effort was beautiful phrases and no more, “des guirlandes de lauriers et de Cyprès mêlés, mais de Cosaques point,” says M. Sorel.[1571] There could be no mistake about it: Alexander had become an ally only in name. Napoleon saw it but found it necessary to simulate. “Il lui importe,” wrote Champagny to Caulaincourt, “que cette erreur dont il est désabusé soit partagée par toute l’Europe.”[1572] He kept up the appearances of alliance. He refused to answer a letter from Mahmoud announcing his accession to the throne.[1573] He openly avowed in a speech to the “Corps Législatif” his satisfaction at the expansion of Russia to the Danube.[1574] But he worked beneath the surface in the other direction. He seemed even to have welcomed the Peace of the Dardanelles as strengthening the Turks, for he disapproved of the threats used by his chargé d’affaires in Constantinople, instructed him to remain at his post till the British should succeed in having him dismissed and to bear always in mind that France did not desire a war with Turkey.[1575] Latour-Maubourg was informed that the continuance of the war in the Balkans was to the advantage of France, that she would resist the expansion of Russia beyond the Danube by all her forces and would be disposed to guarantee the integrity of Turkey apart from Moldavia and Wallachia.[1576] Napoleon, moreover, scrupulously avoided all language that might savour of hidden designs on the territories of the Sultan or of the expectation of the fall of his empire through decadence.[1577] His most effective weapon, however, was his exploitation of Austrian jealousy of Russian aggrandisement in the Balkan peninsula. To discover her views, he invited her to join in a scheme of partition, and when she turned a deaf ear he instigated her to do all she could against his ally.[1578] The Tsar also, after all that had happened, was maintaining a simulation of alliance. He demanded from the Porte the expulsion of Sir Robert Adair, the newly-installed British Ambassador, and, on this being rejected, he broke off the negotiations that were being carried on at Jassy.[1579] But he secretly tried to obtain Austrian pressure on the Porte by inviting Vienna to have an “equivalent” in Serbia and Bosnia.[1580] Austria felt the strength of her position between Alexander and Napoleon and rejected the overture. It was clear, therefore, that a stalemate had arisen and that it would only cease with the outbreak of war between Russia and France. Till that event had taken place, diplomacy—however active or ingenious were the diplomatists—was impotent. The activity of Sir Robert Adair and his successor, Stratford Canning, should not, thus, deceive us as to their influence on the course of events. The biographer of the _Great Elchi_ quotes with approval a statement that Stratford took upon himself the task of “bearding Napoleon in his dream of universal empire . . . without a single person’s advice and on his own responsibility.” It must have been “downright madness,” “yet it was precisely what Canning did.”[1581] Language like this seems rather excessive when we remember that for some two years the Foreign Office did not send instructions worthy of the name to Constantinople. Dr. Rose and Mr. A. Cecil seem to be at a loss to explain this serious omission.[1582] Lord Wellesley was Foreign Secretary and was not the man to neglect his duties. Canning was inclined to put it down to his youth and insignificance.[1583] But this is hardly more tenable, since the Government could have appointed some one else in his place. The truth was that the British Government postponed all diplomatic interference till it could be sure of the real attitude of the Tsar. In the spring of 1811, the signs were favourable. Mr. Robert Liston was appointed to the Constantinople Embassy and was instructed to hold himself in readiness to depart.[1584] His departure—the Tsar had now veered back temporarily to the alliance—was put off till September. In that month he actually embarked his luggage, but the orders were countermanded and the frigate was diverted to another service.[1585] “The apprehension of embroiling Britain with Russia or Turkey,” this was written in November, 1811, “still prevents Wellesley from sending out Liston, to whom appeals would doubtless be made by both, very difficult to be avoided or decided upon.”[1586] In February, 1812, Liston gave up all hope of the embassy.[1587] It was only in April, 1812, that he sailed. He arrived in Constantinople to find that peace had been concluded between Russia and Turkey.[1588] There is thus no mystery about the causes of the apparent negligence of the embassy in Constantinople. It is difficult, in face of this, to imagine that young Canning’s influence would carry things very far. All that he did was to carry forward Adair’s correspondence with various persons in Vienna and St. Petersburg.[1589] It does not seem that his correspondents were in the secrets of their governments. When war broke out between France and Austria, Adair was not enlightened as to the way Russia was helping her ally and tried to “injure” the cause of Russia by “preventing” peace between her and Turkey and even thought of a combined Turco-British attack on “Sebastopolis.”[1590] When Napoleon married Marie Louise, Adair turned against Austria. His informants gave him the impression that there was a scheme on foot by which Austria would receive the Principalities, the Porte the Crimea, and Poland would be restored.[1591] The diplomat, accordingly, endeavoured to “promote” peace between the Tsar and the Sultan. He sent to his Russian friends copies of the Franco-Persian Treaty of 1807 and a letter from Napoleon to the Shah,[1592] to convince them of the treachery of France! This was rather dead history. The problem for Adair’s and Canning’s diplomacy was how to bring about peace between Russia and Turkey when neither of them was willing to give up her pretensions. What effective arguments could they use to persuade the Turks to cede their provinces when they were convinced that sooner or later a war with France would force the Russians to evacuate?[1593] What compensation could they give the Russians for renouncing their pretensions? They had no authority to offer a British alliance. The Tsar was sure to have it when it suited him to break with France. At one time, Sir Robert Adair sought a solution by offering Russia a colony in the West Indies![1594] Diplomacy was impotent, whatever biographers might say. Latour-Maubourg had no greater influence on the march of events. His hands were tied by his instructions to make the most cordial professions to the Porte but to remember always that the Tsar was still the ally of the Emperor.[1595] He was instructed to press the Porte to send an ambassador to Paris furnished with full powers to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance, but to make clear that the necessity for such an alliance might never arise.[1596] The language of the French “chargé” was accordingly vague. The Turks perfectly understood him, but saw his embarrassment and mercilessly demanded an explicit statement in writing.[1597] Why should they help him out of his difficulties? But they were not foolish enough to cut a line of possible retreat. They assured Latour-Maubourg that they were ready to do anything, only there was the difficulty arising out of the fact that Mahmoud’s notification had been left without answer.[1598] When the “difficulty” was removed by the falsehood that the answer had been sent and lost,[1599] the French position was not improved by the nature of the overture they made. It was to be nothing less than a mass rising of the whole Moslem world under its personal leader—the Sultan—and against the Muscovites.[1600] Talk like this could lead to nothing. Latour-Maubourg was blamed for what was not his fault.[1601] “Ma diplomatie,” wrote Napoleon, “eût dû faire pour moi la moitié de la campagne et à peine y-a-t-elle songé.”[1602] The truth was that he gathered the fruits of a system in which he tried to combine the opposites, “managing” Russia till the right moment and searching for allies against her. All through the year 1811 the Tsar had been pressed to make peace with the Sultan.[1603] But he could not bring himself to give up all hope of the Principalities. He tried to the last moment to wear down Turkish resistance. But neither military disasters nor the machinations of a strong peace-party supported by the Janissaries could weaken the grim resolution of Mahmoud. At last, when the evil hour came, the Tsar had to renounce the fruits of six years of efforts and sacrifice. But he cherished the illusion of obtaining the alliance of the Porte against France and a combined effort against Dalmatia! The project had to be dropped.[1604] The Treaty of Bucharest marks the end of a phase in the diplomatic history of the Near East. The French invasion of Egypt in 1798 had thrown the Turks into the turmoils of the wars of the Empire. The Greek War of Independence opened another phase: the struggle of the Near Eastern nationalities for emancipation. Never was Turkey so weak, nor its fall so imminent as in the years 1798 to 1812. Well might the Porte have adopted as its motto the saying of l’abbé Sieyès when asked what he had done during the French Revolution: “I have survived.” [Footnote 1502: A. G. Stapleton, _Canning and his Times_, pp. 124-5. Mr. Temperley is inclined to the view that it was Talleyrand who sent Canning the information (_Canning_, pp. 91-3). But it is not certain that Talleyrand had started at the time of Tilsit to work against Napoleon. It does not seem, moreover, that the hypothesis of a “secret intelligence from Tilsit” is necessary to explain the policy of Canning. Sound political calculation was sufficient to convince him that the Alliance of Napoleon and Alexander would be mainly directed against Britain, and would use every means against her. We have seen in his instructions to Paget, of May, 1807, that he envisaged the possibility of that alliance (above, p. 255).] [Footnote 1503: Cf. Vandal, _Napoléon et Alexandre_, I, Chap. I. Bourgeois, _Manuel Historique de la Politique Etrangère_, II, pp. 292-309.] [Footnote 1504: Driault, _La Politique Orientale de Napoléon_, p. 206. “C’est le Tsar qui fut séduit, conquis à l’alliance française.” Sorel, _L’Europe et la Révolution française_, I, p. 73, believes that Napoleon had been deceived by the “caresses” and compliments of Alexander. Pozzo di Borgo later told Lady Holland that the Tsar was acting a part throughout. Lady Holland, _Foreign Reminiscences_, p. 169 note.] [Footnote 1505: Talleyrand, _Mémoires_, I, pp. 399-400.] [Footnote 1506: Metternich, _Mémoires_, I, p. 59.] [Footnote 1507: Budberg to Gower, 18 June, 1807 (?). Sbornik, 89, p. 45. Randolph, _Life of Wilson_, II, pp. 162, 163, 170-1, 194, 196, 213-14, 225, 227. Quotations from the Journal of Wilson, who was with the Russian Army.] [Footnote 1508: Memorandum from Pisani, 21 June-3 July, 1807. Sbornik, 88, p. 60.] [Footnote 1509: Nicholas Mikhailovitch. _Correspondance d’Alexandre avec sa sœur_, p. 18. It is clear from a document on the possibilities of negotiations with France that all that Alexander could hope for was to keep Wallachia and Moldavia. Sbornik, 89, pp. 33-6.] [Footnote 1510: According to the Tsar this was what Napoleon said. Savary to Napoleon, 4 Nov., 1807. Sbornik, 83, pp. 184 and 180.] [Footnote 1511: The memorandum is without date or signature. Arch. Nat. AF., 1688. But from some of the ideas it seems that it was by Talleyrand, e.g., “S’il ne conviendrait point aux intérêts de l’Empereur de rendre au territoire occupé par les Turcs la valeur politique qui lui appartient dans la balance européenne. . . .” “Every Nation has duties towards Europe as a whole. Turkey has failed in hers.” These and others are the ideas of the “good European” Talleyrand.] [Footnote 1512: _Mémoires of Hardenberg_, III, pp. 460-2.] [Footnote 1513: Cf. Tatistcheff, _Alexandre et Napoleon_, p. 132.] [Footnote 1514: Martens, _Recueil des Traités de la Russie_, XIII, pp. 317, 319-20, 325.] [Footnote 1515: Martens, A. Suppl., IV, 456. B. VIII, 689.] [Footnote 1516: Savary’s despatches, 23 Sept., 1807. Sbornik, 83, pp. 79, 85. 15 Nov., 1807. _Ibid._, pp. 220-34. Guilleminot to Savary, 28 Sept., 1807. _Ibid._, 192-4. Alexander to Napoleon, 15 Nov., 1807. _Ibid._, 294-5.] [Footnote 1517: Savary to Napoleon, 18 Nov., 1807. Sbornik, 83, p. 227. Cf. Savary to Napoleon, 6 Aug., 1807. Sbornik, _ibid._, pp. 6-7, and _Mémoires du duc de Rovigo_ (Savary), III, p. 150.] [Footnote 1518: Roumiantsoff to Tolstoi, 6 Nov., 1807. Sbornik, 89, pp. 218-22.] [Footnote 1519: Savary to Napoleon, 4 Nov., 1807. Sbornik, 83, p. 180.] [Footnote 1520: Instructions to Tolstoï, 14 Sept., 1807. Sbornik, 89, pp. 97-127. Martens, _Traités de la Russie_, XIV, p. 14.] [Footnote 1521: Napoleon to Alexander, 2 Feb., 1808. _Correspondance_, XVI, 13524. Champagny to Savary, 8 Nov., 1807. Sbornik, 83, p. 211. Metternich to Stadion, 12 Nov., 1807. _Mémoires_, II, pp. 138-9.] [Footnote 1522: To Savary, 6 Oct., 1807. _Correspondance_, XVI, 13225. To Savary, 14 Oct., 1807, No. 13253. To Savary, 1 Nov., 1807, No. 13318. To Savary, 7 Nov., 1807, No. 13339. Champagny to Savary, 9 Oct., 1807. Sbornik, 83, pp. 121-3. Champagny to Savary, 8 Nov., 1807. _Ibid._, pp. 211-6. Tolstoï to Roumiantsoff, 26 Oct.-7 Nov., 1807. Sbornik, 89, pp. 177-9. _Ibid._, 27 Oct.-8 Nov., 1807. _Ibid._, pp. 185-6.] [Footnote 1523: Champagny to Caulaincourt, 21 March (2 April), 1808. Sbornik, 88, p. 594.] [Footnote 1524: Especially the letter to Alexander of 2 Feb., 1808. _Correspondance_ XVI, 13524.] [Footnote 1525: Champagny assured Tolstoi that he should only exchange full powers with Mouhib to rid the minister from the insistence of the Turk. Tolstoï to Roumiantsoff, 13-25 Jan., 1808. Sbornik, 89, p. 382.] [Footnote 1526: Caulaincourt to Napoleon, 15 February, 1809. N. Mikhailovitch, _Les Relations de la Russie et la France_, III, p. 83.] [Footnote 1527: Vandal, I, Chap. VIII, gives an excellent account of them. The notes relating to them were withdrawn by Alexander from Paris in 1816. Ernouf, _Maret, Duc de Bassano_, p. 323 note.] [Footnote 1528: Napoleon to Alexander, 29 April, 1808. _Correspondance_, XVI, 13791.] [Footnote 1529: Memorandum by Stratford Canning, 15 March, 1809. F.O. Turkey, 63. Sebastiani to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1 June, 1807. Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1688.] [Footnote 1530: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1531: Reis Effendi to Talleyrand, 5 Aug., 1807. Driault, _La Politique Orientale de Napoléon_, p. 224.] [Footnote 1532: Champagny to Sebastiani, 14 Jan., 1808. Driault, op. cit., p. 264.] [Footnote 1533: Napoleon to Champagny, 12 Jan., 1808. _Correspondance_, XVI, 13446.] [Footnote 1534: Napoleon to Ali Pasha, 9 July, 1807. _Correspondance_, XV, 12887.] [Footnote 1535: Adair to Canning, 19 March, 1809. Adair, _Peace of the Dardanelles_, I, p. 145. And Latour-Maubourg to Champagny, 9 Feb., 1810. Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corres. Politique, 220.] [Footnote 1536: Reis Effendi to Captain Stewart (of the “Sea Horse”), 13 Feb., 1808. Adair, _Peace of the Dardanelles_, I, p. 2.] [Footnote 1537: Canning to Paget, 25 Sept., 1807. _Paget Papers_, II, p. 363.] [Footnote 1538: Malmesbury, _Diaries and Correspondence_, IV, pp. 393, 399. Ross to Malmesbury, 21 Sept., 1807. _Letters of the Earl of Malmesbury_, II, pp. 48-9, and same to same 23 Sept., p. 50. Jackson thought Wilson one of “the most harum-scarum fellows that perhaps ever existed, yet there is an immense deal of good in him and much sound judgment at bottom.” _Diaries and Letters of Sir G. Jackson_, II, pp. 108-9. On another occasion he attributed Wilson’s misstatements to lively imagination. _Further Letters of Sir G. Jackson_, I, p. 447.] [Footnote 1539: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1540: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1541: Ross to Malmesbury, 29 Sept., 1807. _Letters of Malmesbury_, II, pp. 51-2.] [Footnote 1542: Sir Robert Wilson to Canning, 29 Oct., 1807. Randolph, _Life of Sir R. Wilson_, II, p. 436. His statement is substantially the same as that reported by Roumiantsoff to Savary. Savary to Napoleon, 4 Nov., 1807. Sbornik, 83, p. 185. Roumiantsoff to Tolstoï, 6 Nov., Sbornik, 89, p. 223 (here he states that Wilson declared that Britain would conquer the Ionian Islands and offer them to Russia).] [Footnote 1543: Roumiantsoff to D’Alopeus, 26 Oct.-7 Nov., 1807. Martens, _Traités de la Russie_, VI, p. 139.] [Footnote 1544: Barthelemy de Lesseps to Talleyrand, 22 Oct., 1807. Jean de la Tour, _Les Prémices de l’Alliance franco-russe_, pp. 265-6, and 3 Nov., 1807, pp. 274-5.] [Footnote 1545: Canning to Adair, 26 June, 1808. F.O. Turkey, 60. Cf. Adair to Bathurst, 10 Feb., 1810. “One great benefit of restoring peace with Turkey was the chance which it afforded of profiting by events that might arise to detach Russia from France.” F.O. Turkey, 68.] [Footnote 1546: Canning to Adair, 3 Dec., 1808. _The Papers of Stratford Canning_. F.O. III, 352. Canning to Adair, 9 May, 1809. F.O. Turkey, 63.] [Footnote 1547: Cf. Adair, _Peace of the Dardanelles_, I, p. xxi.] [Footnote 1548: Canning dubbed him “Bauba—dara—adul—Phoolah,” and made him the hero of the ballad, “Sweet Matilda Pollengen,” which was supposed to describe the course of Adair’s love when a student at Gottingen. _Creevey Papers_, I, p. 22 note.] [Footnote 1549: Canning to Adair, 3 Dec., 1808. _Papers of Stratford Canning_, F.O. 352, III.] [Footnote 1550: Canning to Adair, 26 June, 1808. F.O. Turkey, 60.] [Footnote 1551: The envoy was Seyed Ahmet, a native of Barbary. He had a letter from Ali to King George III (undated, recd. 23 July, 1808). F.O. Turkey, 61.] [Footnote 1552: J. P. Morier to Hammond, 8 Dec., 1807. F.O. Turkey, 59.] [Footnote 1553: Leake to Canning, 26 Dec., 1808. F.O. Turkey, 61.] [Footnote 1554: Canning to Adair, 26 June, 1808. F.O. Turkey, 60.] [Footnote 1555: Canning to Adair, 20 Aug., 21 Oct., 1808. F.O. Turkey, 60.] [Footnote 1556: Driault, _La Politique Orientale de Napoléon_, p. 278.] [Footnote 1557: 5 January, 1809. Martens, N.R., I, p. 160. Hertslet, II, p. 370. Elliot, II, p. 207.] [Footnote 1558: Metternich, _Mémoires_, II, p. 275.] [Footnote 1559: Sebastiani’s memorandum, 12 July, 1808. Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1688.] [Footnote 1560: Latour-Maubourg to Porte, 17 Jan., 1809. Adair, _Peace of the Dardanelles_, I, pp. 133-8.] [Footnote 1561: _Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy_, I, p. 371.] [Footnote 1562: Articles V and VIII. On the 11 Jan., 1810, Sedki Effendi, the Turkish Minister, sent a note demanding the release of Natali, the Turkish Consul in London, from the King’s Bench Prison, in virtue of Article VIII of the Treaty of the Dardanelles. F.O. Turkey, 72.] [Footnote 1563: Adair to Canning, 3 June, 1809. _Peace of the Dardanelles_, I, p. 209. S. Canning to Wellesley, 21 Feb., 1812. F.O. Turkey, 77. S. Canning to Wellesley, 12 April, 1812. _Ibid._ Latour-Maubourg to Champagny, 8 July, 1809. Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corr. Pol., 219.] [Footnote 1564: Metternich to Stadion, 17 Aug., 1808. _Mémoires_, II, pp. 197, 199.] [Footnote 1565: _Ibid._] [Footnote 1566: Talleyrand, _Mémoires_, I, pp. 412-13.] [Footnote 1567: Sorel, _L’Europe et la Révolution française_, VII, p. 302.] [Footnote 1568: Alexander to the Dowager Empress, 25 Aug., 1808. N. Mikhailovitch, _L’Empereur Alexandre_, I, p. 83. Martens, _Traités de la Russie_, XIV, pp. 62-3.] [Footnote 1569: Convention of Erfurt, 12 Oct., 1808. _Correspondance_, XVII, 14372. Martens, _Traités de la Russie_, XIV, p. 71.] [Footnote 1570: Caulaincourt to Napoleon, 15 Feb., 1809. N. Mikhailovitch, _Les Relations de la Russie_, etc., III, p. 83. Cf. Martens, _Traités de la Russie_, XIV, p. 57.] [Footnote 1571: Sorel, op. cit., VII, p. 358.] [Footnote 1572: 2 June, 1809. Cited by Driault, _Tilsit_, pp. 430-1.] [Footnote 1573: There is a draft of an answer dated 16 Oct., 1809 (the date is important), but it was not sent. Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corres. Pol., 219.] [Footnote 1574: 3 Dec., 1809. _Correspondance_, XX, 16031.] [Footnote 1575: Napoleon to Champagny, 7 Sept., 1809. _Correspondance_, XIX, 15765.] [Footnote 1576: Champagny to Latour-Maubourg, 10 Aug., 1810. Draft of a note from Latour-Maubourg, 2 Aug., 1810. Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 220.] [Footnote 1577: When Fourier wrote a preface to the _Déscription d’Egypte_, Napoleon himself changed it in this sense. Champollion- Figeac, _Fourier et Napoleon_, pp. 83, 105, 122.] [Footnote 1578: Metternich to Emperor, 9 July, 1810. _Mémoires_, II, pp. 360-9; 28 July, pp. 369-80, and I, pp. 107-113.] [Footnote 1579: Adair to Canning, 25 March, 1809. _Peace of the Dardanelles_, I, p. 162.] [Footnote 1580: Metternich to Emperor, 31 Oct., 1810, II, pp. 396-8. Martens, _Traités de la Russie_, III, pp. 73-84, 36-37, 56-61.] [Footnote 1581: S. L. Poole, _Stratford de Redclyffe_, I, p. 128. Same view asserted in _Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy_, II, p. 365.] [Footnote 1582: _Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy_, I, p. 388 and III, p. 553.] [Footnote 1583: S. L. Poole, op. cit., I, p. 91.] [Footnote 1584: To Liston, 12 March, 1811. F.O. Turkey, 75. Ch. Culling Smith to S. Canning, 21 March, 1811. F.O. Turkey, 73. Vandal, _Napoléon et Alexandre_, III, p. 239, asserts that Alexander requested the good offices of Britain.] [Footnote 1585: Lady Jackson, _Further Selections from the Diaries and Letters of Sir George Jackson_, I, p. 287.] [Footnote 1586: (?) to Buckingham, 30 Nov., 1811. _Mémoires of the Regency_, I, p. 150.] [Footnote 1587: Miles, _Correspondence on the French Revolution_, p. 370.] [Footnote 1588: Liston to Castlereagh, 11 July, 1812. F.O. Turkey, 79.] [Footnote 1589: His correspondence with St. Petersburg was—through Ludolf, the unrecognised envoy of the Neapolitan Bourbons in Constantinople—with Sierra Capriola, their unrecognised envoy in St. Petersburg. Liston was instructed to give Ludolf £500 for his services and to promise him more. Castlereagh to Liston, March [_sic_,] 1812. F.O. Turkey, 79.] [Footnote 1590: For the origin of the conception. Adair to Stuart, 7 Aug., 1808; 25 Aug. _Stratford Canning Papers_. F.O. 352, I. Adair to Canning, 13 July, 1808. F.O. Turkey, 60. Adair to Canning, 19 March, 1809. _Peace of the Dardanelles_, I, p. 150. The Porte intimated that it wanted no fleets. Adair to Bathurst, 26 Dec., 1809. _Peace of the Dardanelles_, I, p. 313. Latour-Maubourg to Champagny, 22 Jan., 1810. Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 220. Bathurst instructed Adair to give up the project, on the grounds that the Turks were too influenced by events in the Danube to be depended upon. To Adair, 19 Oct., 1809. F.O. Turkey, 64.] [Footnote 1591: Adair to Wellesley, 24 April, 1810. F.O. Turkey, 68.] [Footnote 1592: Adair to Bathurst, 26 Dec., 1809. _Peace of the Dardanelles_, I, p. 324.] [Footnote 1593: “The great obstacle to peace is the expectation of a war in the North.” S. Canning to Wellesley, 6 Dec., 1811. F.O. Turkey, 74.] [Footnote 1594: Adair to Wellesley, 31 March, 1810. F.O. Turkey, 68. It was rejected by the Russians. Adair to Wellesley, 5 July, 1810. F.O. Turkey, 68. Castlereagh to Liston, 27 March, 1812. F.O. Turkey, 79. Called the project “impossible.”] [Footnote 1595: Instructions to Latour-Maubourg, 19 Feb., 1811. Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 220.] [Footnote 1596: Instructions to Latour-Maubourg, 27 April, 1811. Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 221.] [Footnote 1597: Latour-Maubourg to Maret, 4 April, 1812. _Ibid._, 224.] [Footnote 1598: This was a pretext. If the Turks wanted an alliance they would not have been punctilious on a point of etiquette. Pellisier, _Diplomatie française dans le Levant_. Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie. Mémoires et Documents, 63.] [Footnote 1599: Maret to Latour-Maubourg, 31 Jan., 1812. Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 224.] [Footnote 1600: Draft of a Treaty of Alliance, 9 Feb., 1812. _Ibid._ Turquie, 224. The Turks made peace with the Russians, and turned the whole down with the reflection, “L’homme qui a soif ne refuse pas l’eau qu’on lui présente.” Latour-Maubourg to Maret, 17 May, 1812. _Ibid._, 224.] [Footnote 1601: In November, 1811, Napoleon thought of appointing Seguier the Consul at Triesta, in his place. _Ibid._, 222.] [Footnote 1602: “Documents inédits,” cited by Vandal, op. cit., III, p. 336.] [Footnote 1603: Talleyrand and Bernadotte pressed him to do so. Czerniczeff to Tsar, 9-21 April, 1811. Sbornik, 21, pp. 59-63. Kourakine to Tsar, 6-18 Feb., 1811. _Ibid._, 334-5. Nesselrode, _Lettres et Papiers_, III, pp. 232-3, 254-5. Austria did the same. M. Mikhailovitch, _Alexandre_, I, pp. 336-437.] [Footnote 1604: S. Canning to Castlereagh, 17 June, 1812. F.O. Turkey, 77. Liston to Castlereagh, 18-27 July, 7 Aug., 14 Sept., 1812. _Ibid._, 79. Greig to Vorontsoff, 30 Aug., 1812. _Archives Vorontsoff_, XIX, p. 452. Langeron, _Mémoires_, p. 3.] XV MEHEMET ALI: THE YEARS OF PREPARATION 1807-1812 In the years between Tilsit and the invasion of Russia no change took place in the situation in the East. Napoleon was without a navy worthy of the name and Great Britain was not disposed to renew the venture of 1807. Egypt was too far afield: Spain provided an excellent field where the Mistress of the Seas could come into grips with the Master of the Continent. It was not till the latter half of 1811 that Major Missett came back to Cairo as British Consul, probably as a result of the representations of Stratford Canning, who was the first to direct the attention of the British Government to the great qualities of Mehemet Ali and to draw a parallel between him and his fellow Albanian, Ali of Janina.[1605] Mehemet Ali was engaged in those years in crushing possible domestic rivals. The “ulemas” of Cairo had endeavoured to use against him the weapons employed by them against his predecessor—Khourshid. But the results were different. He succeeded in dividing them into warring cliques, deprived the refractory of lucrative posts and “exiled” the maker of his own fortunes—Omar Makram—out of the Capital. “Les cheikhs et ulemas,” wrote a French resident, “firent entendre leurs plaintes auxquelles le Pasha ne prêta qu’une oreille indifférente. La plupart lui sont vendue et il a éloigné ceux qui ne favorisent pas ses objets.”[1606] The Mamelukes presented a more serious problem. All efforts at a pacific accommodation between them and himself proved of no avail. “Les stipulations,” wrote the French consul in 1808, “exigent une confiance difficile à établir et les Mamelukes ne peuvent se résoudre à payer le tribut qu’on leur demande. Malgré leur faiblesse et leur état de décadence, pour ainsi dire, journalière, ils ne peuvent se faire l’idée de renoncer à la possession de l’Egypte en favour des Osmanlis.”[1607] They could not dispossess the Pasha and he could obtain no decisive victory over them. The result was treachery and the massacre of the major part of them in March, 1811.[1608] The immediate object of his other activities in these early years was the hoarding of treasure. It had played an important part in the history of Near Eastern adventures—be they Jewish or Turkish. The hoard was a motley collection of precious stones, ornamental daggers and swords, costly stuffs, snuff-boxes, pipes and specie. Over it lurked a Jew or an Armenian, crafty, cruel, treacherous and devoured by the mania of hoarding. It was he who suggested the distant expeditions and pointed out the unhappy individuals to be fleeced and the means of filling the coffers. Astrologers, divines and prophets seconded his operations. For the Pasha of Egypt it was an imperious necessity. He had to feed the cupidity of the Porte. He had to bribe the Mamelukes into submission in the years preceding their destruction. But it was his Albanians who devoured his treasure. He was at their mercy but was unable to do without them. In 1809 they numbered 10,000, but received the pay of 30,000.[1609] Three years later, they increased to 15,000 and the troubles of the Pasha rose in proportion.[1610] In 1810, the French consul described his position as the most critical since his coming to power.[1611] The soldiers were the only persons in the country who had money, all the rest had been fleeced.[1612] It was, accordingly, with undisguised relief that the Viceroy heard of the defeat of his own soldiers in Arabia.[1613] Money was to be obtained by all means. When Pahlin, the Swedish Chargé at Constantinople, cited to Mehemet Ali a passage from Diodorus on the supposed existence of some buried treasure, the Pasha started digging with zest.[1614] The taxes were collected with exactness, the slipshod methods of the Beys were a story of the past. To give one example, the customs at Bulak—the river port of Cairo—which brought in under the Beys no more than thirty purses, amounted in 1812 to 1500, and this without hardship or injustice to anyone.[1615] But the processes of legality did not answer the necessities of the times. It was in 1808 that Ali began to lay violent hands on property. All titles were to be produced, most of them were quashed and the rest had to be registered at a fee. Time- honoured exemptions from taxation were stopped.[1616] The result was the destruction of the class of multezims and the passing of the land into the hands of the Viceroy, who distributed it among members of his family, officers, favourites and the peasants.[1617] “Allez trouver un autre que moi,” the peasant would say to the multezim when requested for his labour, “je suis occupé à mes affaires. Vous n’avez plus rien à faire dans ce pays, car vos jours sont passés et nous sommes devenus les paysans du Pasha.”[1618] These years present Mehemet Ali at his worst, destructive, avaricious and rigorous.[1619] But they were not unredeemed by prognostics of the coming statesmanship.[1620] One of his great sources of revenue then was the sale of wheat to the British. There was a great dearth in the years 1809, 1810 and 1811 in all Mediterranean countries except Egypt. The Porte laid an embargo on the export, but the Pasha did not heed it. “He refuses,” wrote Missett in 1811, “to obey any orders from his highness that may stand in opposition to his interests.”[1621] The sale brought in what must have been an amazing quantity of bullion, specie, and manufactured articles. It was an operation that must have relieved the difficult situation of British industries. The Pasha used to buy from the peasants at a low price, employ false measures and force them to carry the wheat to his depots. He used to sell it to the British agents at a price ranging from ninety to a hundred piastres per ardeb, whereas it was selling in the markets at twenty.[1622] It was not merely the excessive profits which caused the transaction. There were political considerations. “Le Bacha,” wrote Drovetti, “a cru qu’en accordant aux Anglais ce qu’ils demandent ils cessent d’entretenir des relations avec les Beys et qu’il n’aura plus rien à craindre d’eux.”[1623] When Drovetti protested, he frankly answered that if the British could not obtain wheat by sale, they might take it by force.[1624] The events of 1807 seemed to have impressed his mind deeply. He could not but have been struck by the extreme decadence of Turkish power and was resolved to secure Egypt for himself. When, in 1809, the Porte made its peace with Great Britain, Mehemet Ali assured Drovetti that even if the Sultan should declare war on France, he would remain neutral.[1625] The most important article of the “treaty” which he signed in 1810 with an agent of the East India Company stipulates that in the event of a war between Britain and Turkey, the Pasha would not molest British subjects or touch their property, but would, on the contrary, afford them every protection and assistance.[1626] But he thought of something more than extricating himself from possible embarrassments resulting from the Porte’s situation with regard to Europe. He sought some security against the Porte itself. The precariousness of the position of all “rebellious” pashas has never been sufficiently allowed for.[1627] The Porte could shut its eyes but it never forgot nor forgave. The revolt of Latif Pasha in 1813, after Mehemet Ali had restored the Holy Cities to the Sultan, was instigated from Constantinople.[1628] The Porte any day might set a neighbouring Pasha against him, it might have him poisoned or strangled. It was permanent, he was transient. It was an institution, he was an individual. His Albanians were more of an obstruction than a help. He had not yet thought of the latent soldierly qualities of the Egyptian peasant. There was no security for him but in a connection with some foreign power. His sentiments did not come into the matter. “Il n’aime,” wrote a French agent in 1811, “ni les Français ni les Anglais.”[1629] In March, 1810, he asked Drovetti if Napoleon would assist him in establishing his position on the same footing as that of the Barbary Regencies. Drovetti could not listen to proposals of this nature.[1630] It was with some repugnance that he had to turn to Missett, for “some circumstances” had made him suspect “that the British Government did not want him to rule in Egypt.”[1631] But he made his overtures all the same. The answer of the Government was clear. “As there is no prospect of a war with the Porte,” wrote Bathurst to Missett, “it would not be consistent with sound policy and good faith to enter into a negotiation with the Viceroy of Egypt on the subject of his meditated attempt to establish his independence.” Missett, however, was to give him amicable assurances of the disposition of the Prince Regent to maintain friendly intercourse with him, even if hostilities should ever break out between Britain and Turkey.[1632] Foiled in his attempts, Mehemet Ali continued the precarious practice of buying “friends” in the Divan, and obeying the Sultan’s behests. Hence the campaign against the Wahabis.[1633] Thus conclude the years of a process of transition which began with the French Invasion in 1798. Mehemet Ali had established his power in Egypt and was henceforth free to turn the country into a vast personal estate. But in the exploitation—ill or well—of the estate, the inhabitants were transformed. They became homogeneous in serving one master, they were drilled into soldiers and sailors and marched to victory against the Sultan, they were forced into schools and the production of wealth, they were governed and taught to expect and find security.[1634] Mehemet Ali made modern Egypt. The years, moreover, marked the end of the isolation of the Egypt of the Mamelukes. The country was opened to European influences and enterprise. Its ultimate fate and its relations to the suzerain-state became diplomatic problems of the first magnitude, problems that divided or united the Powers and even once brought them to the verge of war. [Footnote 1605: S. Canning to Wellesley, 15 March, 1811. F.O. Turkey, 73.] [Footnote 1606: Mengin to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 20 Jan., 1812. Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 224. Mengin came to Egypt with the French Expedition and remained there till Oct., 1811.] [Footnote 1607: Drovetti to Talleyrand, 12 July, 1808. Arch. Aff. Et., Corresp. Cons., Le Caire.] [Footnote 1608: The occasion for the massacre is said to be the discovery of correspondence between the Beys and the Pasha of Acre. Missett to Liverpool, 14 July, 1811. W.O. 1, 349. Drovetti to Champagny, 4 March, 1811. _Correspondance Consulaire_, Le Caire. The Reis Effendi confessed to Canning that it was done on the Sultan’s orders. S. Canning to Wellesley, 1 May, 1811. F.O. Turkey, 73. (Marginal note dated 10 May.)] [Footnote 1609: Drovetti to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 9 April, 1809. Arch. Aff. Et., Corresp. Consulaire, Le Caire.] [Footnote 1610: Drovetti to Ministre, 5 June, 1811. Arch. Aff. Et., Corresp. Cons., Le Caire.] [Footnote 1611: Drovetti to Ministre, 13 June, 1810. _Ibid._] [Footnote 1612: The soldiers advanced money at an interest of 50 piastres a month on loans of 500 piastres. Djabarti, VIII, p. 182.] [Footnote 1613: Drovetti, _Bulletin de Mars_, 1812. _Ibid._] [Footnote 1614: Latour-Maubourg to Minister of Foreign Affaires, 2 March, 1811. Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corresp. Pol., 221.] [Footnote 1615: Djabarti, VIII, p. 352.] [Footnote 1616: Djabarti, VIII, pp. 149-150, 206. Jomard, “Coup d’Œil . . . sur l’Egypte,” p. 11.] [Footnote 1617: Djabarti, VIII, pp. 343, 345, 177.] [Footnote 1618: Djabarti, IX, p. 87.] [Footnote 1619: In his despatch of 8 April, 1808, Drovetti states that two-thirds of the land cultivated at the time of the French Expedition passed out of cultivation. Arch. Aff. Et., Corresp. Consulaire, Le Caire. Mengin, in the memorandum above cited, states that the population had diminished by a third, that the feddam which paid 12 piastres in taxes under French rule now (1812) paid 50.] [Footnote 1620: The Pasha wrote on 16 May, 1812, to Lord Liverpool asking for “pumps” to raise the water of the Nile to highly situated fields. In his letter he excellently states the problem of irrigation. W.O. 1, 349. Drovetti, in his bulletin of March, 1812, notices an improvement in the situation of the peasantry and states that the Pasha is proceeding to plant 30,000 olive trees in one of the provinces. Arch. Aff. Et., Corresp. Consulaire, Le Caire.] [Footnote 1621: Missett to C. C. Smith, 4 July, 1811. F.O. Egypt, 4.] [Footnote 1622: Djabarti, VIII, p. 279. Captain Waldegrave to Cotton, 24 Jan., 1811. F.O. Egypt, 4.] [Footnote 1623: Drovetti to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 28 April, 1810. Arch. Aff. Et., Corresp. Consulaire, Le Caire.] [Footnote 1624: Drovetti to Minister, 11 Nov., 1810. Arch. Aff. Et., Corresp. Con., Le Caire.] [Footnote 1625: Drovetti to Minister, 9 April, 1809. _Ibid._] [Footnote 1626: The “Treaty” is enclosed in Samuel Brigg’s letter to Wellesley, 30 May, 1810. F.O. Egypt, 3. I have not been able to trace its fortunes.] [Footnote 1627: Cf. Barker, _Egypt and Syria_, I, p. 67.] [Footnote 1628: Missett to Cook, 13 Dec., 1813. F.O. Egypt, 4.] [Footnote 1629: A French agent’s (anonymous) report. Cairo, 7 June, 1811. Arch. Nat. AF., IV, 1687.] [Footnote 1630: Drovetti to Minister, 28 Nov., 1810. Corresp. Consulaire, Le Caire. The idea is alleged by Drovetti to have been suggested to the Viceroy by British agents. Despatch of 12 March, 1810. Latour-Maubourg, when he heard of the overture, thought of communicating it to the Porte to win its favour to himself. Despatch of 7 Dec., 1811. Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, 222. This is another refutation of the “help” received by Mehemet Ali from France. As for French influence in these years it was nil. Napoleon sent an agent, Nerciat, to Egypt. He never, at all events during the period under review, reached Egypt. His letters from Syria are in Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, “Supplements,” 223.] [Footnote 1631: Missett to Cook, Alex., 20 June, 1812. F.O. Egypt, 4.] [Footnote 1632: Bathurst to Missett, 3 Sept., 1812. _Ibid._] [Footnote 1633: A proof of his repugnance to undertake the expedition is his request to Missett to write to Minto, Governor-General of India, to announce the intention to destroy Egyptian or Turkish armaments in the Red Sea. The Pasha thought that this announcement would serve him as a pretext for abandoning the expedition. Missett to Minto, 9 June, 1812. F.O. Egypt, 4.] [Footnote 1634: Missett noted it as early as 1813. Missett to Cook, 9 Nov., 1813. F.O. Egypt, 4.] AUTHORITIES I _Bibliographies_ “Cambridge Modern. History,” Vols. VIII, IX. Fournier, August. “Napoléon I,” Eng. trad., 2 vols. London, 1914. Hilmy, Ibrahim (Prince). “The Literature of Egypt and the Sudan,” 2 vols. London, 1886. Maunier, R. “Bibliographie Economique, Historique . . . de l’Egypte.” Cairo, 1918. II _Collections of Treaties_ Martens, G. F. de. “Recueil des Traités,” 1st Ed., 7 vols. (1791-1801); “Supplément,” 4 vols. (1802-1808), 2nd Edition, 8 vols. (1761-1808); “Nouveau Recueil,” depuis 1808 jusqu’au present, 16 vols.; “Nouveaux Supplements,” 3 vols. Martens, F. de. “Recueil des Traités Conclues par la Russie avec les Puissances Etrangères,” 14 vols., 1872-1905. Testa, A. de (Baron). “Recueil des Traités de la Porte Ottomane,” 11 vols. 1864. III _Sources in Manuscript_ Archives Nationales (Paris). AF. IV. 1688. Porte Ottomane pièces diplomatiques (an VIII—1808); AF. IV. 1687. Pologne. Egypte. États Barbaresques (an VIII—1813); AF. IV. 1686. Perse. Indes (1767-1809). Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères: “Turquie,” Correspondance Politique, vols. 201 to 225. “Turquie,” “Supplements,” vols. 23, 24, 30. “Turquie,” “Mémoires et documents,” vols. 63, 64. “Histoire de la Diplomatie française dans le Levant” par Pelissier. “Le Caire,” Correspondance Consulaire, vol. 26. (1803-1828.) British Museum Manuscripts. Additional 19628. An account in Arabic of the French Expedition by Nakoula al Turk. The Papers of Sir Alexander Ball, General Fox, Marquis Wellesley, W. Windham, Nelson and Viscount Valentia and Sir Robert Wilson. (The references are specified in the footnotes.) Admiralty Records. Ad. 2, vol 923. Secretary’s letters to commanders (1800-1807); vol. 146, orders and instructions; vol. 375, Lords’ Letters to Secretaries of State. Ad. I, vol. 412, despatches of Lord Collingwood for 1806, vol. 413, for 1807. (The letters from captains are specified in the footnotes.) Foreign Office Records: F.O. 24 (Egypt), vols. 2, 3, 4. F.O. 27 (France), vols. 59 to 68. F.O. 65 (Russia), vols. 40 to 73. F.O. 78 (Turkey), vols. 19 to 79. F.O. 352 (The Papers of Stratford Canning), vols. 1, 2, 3. War Office Records. W.O. 1, vols. 344 to 349, despatches from Egypt. (1795 to 1816.) W.O. 1, vol. 303, despatches from Messina and Palermo. (1800-1811.) W.O. 6, vol. 163 (letters to Secretaries of State, 1764-1806); vol. 56 (instructions to Commander-in-Chief in Minorca); vols. 20, 21, 22 (instructions relating to expeditions). IV _Documents in print_ Archives Vorontsoff. 40 vols. 1872-1895. Adair, Sir R. “Historical Memoirs of a Mission to the Court of Vienna.” London, 1844. —— “The Negotiations of the Peace of the Dardanelles,” 2 vols. London, 1845. Auckland (Lord). Journals and Correspondence, 4 vols. London, 1861. Bailleu, P. “Preussen und Frankreich,” 1795-1807, 2 vols. Leipzig, 1881-1887. Brotonne, L. “Lettres Inédites de Napoléon,” Paris, 1898. —— “Dernières Lettres inédites de Napoléon,” 2 vols. Paris, 1903. Boppe, A. “Documents inédits sur les relations de Napoléon avec la Serbie.” Belgrade, 1888. Boulay de la Meurthe. “Correspondance de Talleyrand avec Bonaparte pendant la campagne de Marengo.” Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique, 1892. Bertrand, P. “Lettres Inédites de Talleyrand à Napoléon.” Paris, 1889. Browning, O. The Despatches of Whitworth. London, 1887. Brownrigg, B. “The Letters of Sir John Moore.” Oxford, 1923. Collingwood, G. L. “A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Lord Collingwood.” London, 1828. Corbett, J. S. “The Private Papers of Earl Spencer,” 2 vols. London, 1893-1894. Chuquet, A. “Quatre généraux de la Révolution: Kléber, Hoche, Desaix, Marceaux,” 4 series. Paris, 1911. “Dropmore Papers.” (The Historical Manuscripts Commission Reports), vols. IV to IX. Daudet, C. “Correspondance Inédite de Joseph de Maistre.” Paris, 1908. Du Casse (Baron). “Négociations relatives aux Traités de Lunéville, d’Amiens et de Mortfontaine,” vol. III. Paris, 1855. De la Cour de la Gardiolle, L. M. “Quatre Lettres sur l’Egypte et le combat d’Aboukir.” Nîmes, 1880. De Gardane, A. “La Mission du général Gardane en Perse.” Paris, 1865. Fisher, H. A. L. “Letters of Napoléon I.” English Historical Review, 1903. Granville (Lady). “Correspondence of the 1st Earl Granville,” 2 vols. London, 1916 Jackson (Lady). “Diaries and Letters of Sir G. Jackson,” 2 vols. London, 1872. —— “Further Selection . . . etc.” 2 vols. 1873. Lecestre, L. “Lettres Inédites de Napoléon,” 2 vols. Paris, 1897. Malmesbury (3rd Earl). “A Series of Letters of the 1st Earl of Malmesbury,” 2 vols. London, 1870. Minto (Lady). “Letters of Earl of Minto,” 3 vols. London, 1874. Miles, W. H. “Correspondence on the French Revolution,” 2 vols. London, 1890. Martin. “The Despatches of Wellesley,” 5 vols. Michel. “Correspondance de Mallet du Pan avec l’Empereur d’Autriche,” 2 vols. Paris, 1884. Maxwell, Sir H. “The Creevey Papers,” 2 vols. London, 1903. Napoleon I. “Correspondance,” 32 vols. _Circ._ 1855. Nicolas, Sir N. H. “The Despatches of Nelson,” 7 vols. London, 1844-1846. Nesselrode. “Lettres et Papiers,” 3 vols. 1904. Nicholas Mikailovitch (Grand Duke). “Correspondance d’Alexandre avec sa sœur.” St. Petersbourg, 1910. —— “Les Relations diplomatiques de la Russie et de la France d’après les rapports des ambassadeurs,” 7 vols. —— “Le Comte Paul Strogonoff,” 3 vols. Paris, 1905. [Semi-official.] “Original letters from the army of Bonaparte intercepted by the British fleet,” 3 parts. London, 1798-1799. [Official.] “Pièces diverses . . . relatives à l’Armée d’Orient.” Paris, an IX. Pallain, G. “Le Ministère de Talleyrand sous le Directoire.” Paris, 1891. Paget, Sir A. “The Paget Papers,” 2 vols. London, 1896. Pearce, R. R. “Correspondence of Wellesley,” 3 vols. London, 1846. Poussielgue. “Lettre avec Pièces justificatives à M. Thiers.” Paris, 1845. Rousseau. “Kléber et Menou en Egypte.” Paris, 1900. Rose, J. H. “Despatches Relating to the third Coalition.” London, 1904. [Kléber.] “Rapport fait au gouvernement français des événements depuis El Arish . . .” Cairo, 1800. Ross, C. “Correspondence of Cornwallis,” 3 vols. London, 1895. Rostopchine, T. “Matériaux.” Bruxelles, 1864. Stapleton, E. J. “Some Official Correspondence of G. Canning,” 2 vols. London, 1887. St. Hilaire, E. G. “Lettres Écrites d’Egypte.” Paris, 1901. Smith, D. B. “Letters of St. Vincent,” vol. I. London, 1922. “Sbornik.” Vols. 77, 88, 82, 70. Diplomatic correspondence relating to Franco-Russian relations, 1800 to 1808. —— Vol. 21. “The Despatches of Czerniczeff and Kourakine.” —— Vol. 83. “The Despatches of Savary.” —— Vol. 89. “The Despatches of Tolstoï.” Vane, C. “The Correspondence of Castlereagh,” 12 vols. “The Wellesley Papers,” 2 vols. London, 1914. Wickham, W. “Correspondence,” 2 vols. London, 1870. V _General Works and Studies on Special Points_ Auzoux, A. “La Mission de Sebastiani à Tripoli.” “Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes,” 1919. Berthier, A. (Prince de Wagram). “La Relation des Campagnes du général Bonaparte en Syrie et en Egypte.” Paris, an VIII. Boulay de la Meurthe. “Le Directoire et l’Expédition d’Egypte.” Paris, 1885. Brehier, L. “L’Egypte de 1798 à 1900.” Paris, 1900. Bourgeois, E. “Manuel Historique de la Politique Etrangère,” 3 vols. n.e. Paris, 1919-1923. Bunbury, Sir H. “Narrative of some passages in the Great War with France.” London, 1854. Boppe, A. “La Mission de Meriage à Widin.” “Annales de l’Ecole libre de sciences politiques.” 1886. Breton. “L’Egypte et la Syrie,” 6 vols. Paris, 1814. Bertrand, P. “Talleyrand, l’Autriche et la Question d’Orient en 1805.” Revue Historique, 1889. Boppe, A. “L’Albanie et Napoléon.” Paris, 1914. Beer, A. “Die Orientalische Politik Œsterreichs.” Prague, 1883. Bowman, H. H. “Preliminary Stages of the Peace of Amiens.” Toronto, 1899. Browne, A. “Bonaparte in Egypt and the Egyptians of to-day.” London, 1907. Brunov. “Aperçu des Transactions politiques du Cabinet de Russie.” Written in 1838 for the Tsar Nicholas. Sbornik, vol. XXXI. Barker, J. “Syria and Egypt,” 2 vols. London, 1876. Charles-Roux, F. “Une négociation pour l’évacuation de l’Egypte.” “Revue d’Histoire diplomatique.” 1923. —— “La Turquie, les Mameloukes et la première occupation Anglaise en Egypte.” “Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes.” 1923. Coquelle, P. “Napoléon et l’Angleterre.” Paris, 1904. —— “La Mission de Sebastiani à Constantinople en 1801.” “Revue d’His. Diplomatique.” 1903. —— “L’Ambassade de Brune.” Id. 1904. —— “L’Ambassade de Sebastiani.” Id. 1904. “Déscription de l’Egypte.” “Etat moderne.” T. 1. Driault, E. “La Question d’Orient.” 7th ed. Paris, 1914. —— “La Politique Extérieure du Premier Consul.” 1914. —— “La Politique Orientale de Napoléon.” Paris, 1904. —— “Napoléon et l’Europe: Austerlitz.” Paris, 1912. —— “Napoléon et l’Europe: Tilsit.” Paris, 1917. De la Greverie, P. “Le Régiment des Dromadaires.” Paris, 1910. De la Jonquière. “L’Expédition d’Egypte,” 5 vols. Paris, 1900, etc. Des Genettes. “Histoire Médicale de l’Armée d’Orient.” 2nd ed. 1830. Douin, G. “La Flotte de Bonaparte sur les côtes d’Egypte.” Cairo, 1922. —— “La Campagne de Bruix en Méditerranée.” Cairo, 1923. Djuvara. “Cent Projets du Partage de l’Empire Ottoman.” Paris, 1914. Ekedahl, E. “The Principal Causes of the Renewal of the War between England and France in 1803.” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 1894. Eton, W. “Survey of the Ottoman Empire,” 2nd ed. London, 1799. Fortescue, J. “History of the British Army,” vol. IV, parts I and II. Gell, Conrad. “The Relations between England and France in 1802.” “English Historical Review,” 1909. Ghika, J. D. “La France et les Principautés Danubiennes.” “Annales de l’Ecole libre des Sciences Politiques.” 1896. Guyot. “Le Directoire et la Paix de l’Europe.” Hardman, W. “History of Malta.” London, 1909. “Jehan d’Ivray” (pseud.). “Première [_sic_] Occupation Anglaise en Egypte, 1807.” “Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes.” 1922. —— “Bonaparte en Egypte.” Paris, 1914. Juchereau de Saint Denis. “Histoire de l’Empire Ottoman,” 4 vols. Paris, 1844. Jurien de la Gravière. “Guerres Maritimes,” 2 vols. 1906. Jomard. “Coup d’œil impartial sur l’Etat présent de l’Egypte comparé à sa situation antérieure.” Paris, 1836. Martin. “Histoire de l’Expédition d’Egypte.” Paris, 1815. Mahan. “The Influence of Sea Power during the wars of the French Revolution,” 2 vols. Mengin. “L’Egypte sous Mehemet Ali,” 2 vols. Paris, 1823. Morier, J. P. “Memoir of a campaign with the Ottoman Army in Egypt.” London, 1801. Mouriez, P. “Histoire de Mehemet Ali,” 3 vols. Paris, 1858. Napoleon I. “Campagnes d’Egypte,” dictated in St. Helena and forming volumes XXIX and XXX of the “Correspondance.” Peyre, R. “L’Expédition d’Egypte.” Paris, 1890. Pisani, P. “La Dalmatie sous Napoléon.” Paris, 1893. —— “L’Expédition Russo-Turque aux îles Ioniennes en 1798.” “Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique,” 1888. Pierre, V. “Deux Officiers Anglais à la Tour du Temple.” “Correspondant,” 1894. Paton, “History of the Egyptian Revolution,” 2 vols. London, 1863. Phillipson, M. “La Paix d’Amiens et la Politique générale de Napoléon.” “Revue Historique,” 1901. Potrel, J. “La Russie et la Rupture d’Amiens.” Annales de l’Ecole libre des sciences politiques, 1897. Rodocanachi, E. “Bonaparte et les Iles Ioniennes.” Paris, 1899. Rose, J. H. “Pitt and the Great War.” London, 1911. Reynier, J. L. E. “L’Egypte après Heliopolis.” 1802 and 1827. English translation with “refutation.” London, 1802. Reybaud and others. “L’Histoire Scientifique et militaire de l’Expédition d’Egypte,” 12 vols. Paris, 1830-1836. Roberts, L. M. “Negotiations preceding the peace of Lunéville.” Transactions Royal Historical Society, new series, vol. XV. Reyme and others. “L’Egypte.” Paris, 1848. Rigault. “Menou.” Sorel, A. “Bonaparte et Hoche en 1797.” Paris, 1896. —— “La question d’Orient au XVIII siècle.” Paris, 1902. —— “L’Europe et la Révolution française,” 8 vols. Sybel, H. von. “Geschichte der Revolution zeit.” French trans., 6 vols. Paris, 1886. Skalkouski, A. “Les Polonais en Egypte.” Cracovi, 1910. Tatistcheff, S. “Paul et Bonaparte.” “La Nouvelle Revue,” 1887. —— “Alexandre et Napoléon.” Vandal, A. “Napoléon et Alexandre,” 3 vols. Volney. “Œuvres.” 1838. Wilson, Sir R. “History of the British Expedition to Egypt.” London, 1803. Ward, Sir A. W. “The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy,” vol. I. 1922. VI _Memoirs, Diaries, Pamphlets, Books of Travel_ Abdurahman Al Djabarti. “Merveilles Biographiques et Historiques ou Chroniques.” French trad., 9 vols. Cairo, 1896, etc. Aulard, A. “Paris pendant la réaction thermidorienne et sous le Directoire,” 5 vols. Paris, 1898-1902. Arnault, A. V. “Souvenirs d’un Sexagénaire,” 4 vols. Paris, 1833. “Ali Bey El Abbassi” (pseud.). “Voyages,” 4 vols. Paris, 1814. Antes, J. “Anecdotes.” No date. Antes, J. “Observations on Egypt,” etc. London, 1800. Barras, P. F. J. N. de. “Mémoires.” English trad. 4 vols. London, 1895-1896. Bourrienne, L. A. F. de. “Mémoires.” English trad. 4 vols. London, 1830. Bricard, A. et J. “Journal du Canonier Bricard.” Buckingham and Chandos. “Memoirs of the Court of England during the Regency,” 2 vols. London, 1856. —— “Memoirs of the Courts and Cabinets of George III,” 4 vols. Bransen, J. “Travels,” 2 vols. London, 1826. Baldwin, G. “Political Recollections Relative to Egypt.” London, 1802. Browne, W. S. “Travels.” London, 1799. Chateaubriand. “Itinéraire à Jerusalem,” 3 vols. Paris, 1811. Chanut. “Campagnes de Bonaparte en Egypte.” Paris, 1834. Clarke, E. D. “Travels,” 6 vols. London, 1810-1813. Crollean, C. “Journal du Capitaine François dit le Dromadaire.” Collins, F. “Voyages.” London, 1807. 2 vols. Paris, 1903. Choiseul-Gouffier (Comtesse de). “Reminiscenses sur Alexandre et Napoléon.” Paris, 1862. —— “Mémoires sur l’Empereur Alexandre.” 1829. (Challbrand). “Les Française en Egypte.” Tours, 1856. Champollion-Figeac. “Fournier et Napoléon” Souvenirs. Paris, 1844. Czartoryski, A. (Prince). “Memoirs,” 2 vols. Paris, 1887. Colchester (Lord). “The Diary of Lord Colchester,” 3 vols. London, 1861. Denon, D. V., “Voyages,” 2 vols. Paris, 1802. Desvernois. “Mémoires.” Paris, 1898. Doguereau. “Journal.” Paris, 1904. Durrien. “Lettres sur la Campagne d’Egypte.” Carnets Historiques, 1899. De Dedem de Gelder (Baron). “Un général Hollandais sous le Premier Empire.” Paris, 1900. De Noé (Comte). “Mémoires Relatifs à l’Expédition Anglaise partie de l’Inde en 1800 pour aller combattre les Français en Egypte.” Paris, 1826. Du Casse (Baron). “Mémoires du Roi Joseph,” vol. I. Paris, 1855. Di Peitro, D. “Voyage.” Paris, 1818. Dumas, Mathieu. “Souvenirs,” 3 vols. Paris, 1839. Delprech, Comieras. “Considérations sur la Possibilité, l’intérêt et les moyens qu’aurait la France de rouvrir l’ancienne route du commerce de l’Inde.” Paris, an VI. Eton, W. “Concise account of the commerce of the Black Sea.” London, 1805. —— “A letter to Lord D. on the political relations of Russia,” etc. London, 1807. F. L. G. “Mémoires de Langeron.” Paris, 1902. Frank, L. “Mémoire sur le commerce des Nègres au Caire.” Paris, 1802. Fullarton, W. “A view of the English Interests in India.” London, 1788. (2nd ed.) Froment, D. “Du Commerce des Européens avec les Indes par la mer Rouge.” Paris, an VII. Galli, H. “Journal d’un officier de l’Armée d’Orient.” (Vertray.) Paris, 1883. Galt, J. “Voyages.” London, 1812. Gardane. “Journal du Voyage.” Paris, 1809. Hobhouse, J. C. (Lord Broughton). “Travels,” 2 vols. London, 1855. Holland (Lady). “Foreign Reminiscences.” London, 1850. —— “Diary,” 2 vols. London, 1908. Holland (Lord). “Memoirs of the Whig Party,” 2 vols. —— “Further Memoirs.” Hardenberg. “Memoirs,” 5 vol. Hamilton, W. “Ægyptiaca.” London, 1809. Horniman, F. “The Journal of Travels of F. Horniman.” London, 1802. Holland, M. “Travels,” 2 vols. London, 1819. Hughes, T. S. “Travels,” 2 vols. London, 1830. Irwin, E. “An Inquiry into the feasibility of the supposed Expedition of Buonaparte to the East.” 1798. —— “Buonaparte in Egypt.” 1798. (An officer.) “Reply to Irwin.” 1798. Irwin, E. “The failure of the French Crusade.” 1799. Jollois, P. “Journal.” Paris, 1904. La Revellière-Lépeaux, L. M. D. “Memoirs,” 3 vols. Paris, 1895. Leake, W. M. “Journal of a Tour in Asia-Minor.” London, 1824. —— “Travels in the Morea,” 3 vols. London, 1830. —— “Travels in Northern Greece,” 4 vols. London, 1835. Marmont (duc de Raguse). “Memoirs,” 9 vols. Paris, 1857. Miot de Melito. “Mémoires.” Miot, J. “Mémoires pour servir à l’Histoire de l’Expédition d’Egypte.” 1804 and 1814. Metternich (Prince). “Memoirs,” 8 vols. Paris, 1880. M. (Le Comte). “Journal d’un Dragon d’Egypte.” Paris, 1899. Maurice, Sir F. “The Diary of Sir John Moore,” 2 vols. London, 1904. Maule, F. “Memoirs of the Campaign in Egypt.” London, 1816. [Anonymous]. “Mémoire sur l’Egypte considérée comme possession agricole, commerçante, militaire et politique.” Paris, an VI. Meneval (Baron). “Sur le Retour de Bonaparte de l’Egypte.” “Spectateur Militaire.” 1840. Millet, P. “Souvenirs.” Paris, 1903. Malmesbury (1st Earl). “Diaries,” 4 vols. London, 1844. [Anonymous]. “Memoirs of Sir Sidney Smith,” 2 vols. London, 1839. Neale, A. “Travels.” London, 1818. Norry, Ch. “Relation de l’Expédition d’Egypte.” Paris, an VII. (Officer on the Staff.) “A non-military journal of the Campaign in Egypt.” London, 1803. Pelleport (Vicomte de). “Souvenirs,” 2 vols. Bordeaux, 1857. (A Private.) “A faithful journal of the late campaign in Egypt.” No date. Pouqueville, F. C. H. L. “Voyage en Morée,” 3 vols. Paris, 1815. Parsons, W. “Travels.” London, 1808. Richardot. “Nouveaux Mémoires sur l’armée française en Egypte.” Paris, 1848. —— “Réfutation des mémoires d’Outre Tombe.” Paris, 1849. Russell (Lord John). “Memorials of C. J. Fox,” 4 vols. 1853. Reubell. “A conversation with Bonaparte in 1802.” “Nouvelle Revue Retrospective.” 1904. Rose, Sir G. “Diaries,” 2 vols. London, 1860. Redouté. “Journal.” “Revue Politique et Littéraire.” 1894-5. Renshaw, R. “Voyage.” No date. Richardson, R. “Travels,” 2 vols. London, 1822. Savary (duc de Rovigo). “Mémoires,” 8 vols. Paris, 1828. Stael-Holstein (Mme de). “Considérations sur la Révolution française.” 1836. Stewart, C. “The Travels of Mirza Abu Taleb Khan,” 3 vols. London, 1814. Semple, R. “Observations on a journey . . .” 2 vols. London, 1807. Senior, N. “Conversations and Journals in Egypt,” 2 vols. London, 1882. Sonini, C. S. “Travels.” Eng. trad. 3 vols. London, 1807. Sestini, P. “Voyages.” Londres, 1789. Talleyrand. “Memoirs.” Eng. trad. 5 vols. London, 1891. Thibaudeau, A. C. “Mémoires sur . . . le Directoire.” Paris, 1827. Thoumas. “L’Agenda de Malus.” 1892. Taylor, J. “Lettres . . . sur l’Inde . . .” Translated from English. Paris, 1801. —— “Considerations on the Practicability . . . of a new speedy communication between Great Britain and India.” London, 1795. Thornton, T. “The Present State of Turkey,” 2 vols. London, 1809. Turner, W. “Journal of a Tour in Turkey,” 3 vols. London, 1820. Usko, J. F. “Narrative of Travels.” London, 1808. Vigo-Roussillon. “Fragments.” “Revue des Deux Mondes.” 1890. Villiers du Tirage. “Journal et Souvenirs.” Valentia (Viscount). “Voyages,” 4 vols. London, 1809. Witman, W. “Travels.” London, 1803. Walsh, T. “Journal of the late campaign in Egypt.” London, 1803. Windham, W. “Diary.” Walpole, R. “Memoirs in European and Asiatic Turkey,” 2 vols. London, 1817. VII _Biographies_ Allardyce, A. “A memoir of Lord Keith.” London, 1882. Alison, Sir A. “Life of Castlereagh,” 3 vols. London, 1861. Barrow, J. “Life of Sir Sidney Smith,” 2 vols. London, 1848. Bagot, J. “Canning and his Friends,” 2 vols. London, 1909. Bridier, L. “Une famille française, les de Lesseps.” Paris, 1900. Besancenet, A. de. “Le général Dommartin.” Paris, 1880. Dunfermline (Lord). “A memoir of Sir R. Abercrombie.” Edinburgh, 1861. D’Aubigné. “Vie de Kléber.” Paris, 1880. D’Eckmuhl. “Davout,” 4 vols. Paris, 1879. Ernouf. “Maret, duc de Bassano.” Paris, 1878. —— “Kléber.” Paris, 1857. Fournier, A. “Napoleon I.” Eng. trad. 2 vols. London, 1914. Gazel, L. “Le Baron des Genettes.” Paris, 1912. Hook. “Sir David Baird,” 2 vols. London, 1832. Hammond, J. L. Le B. “Charles James Fox.” London, 1903. Lanfrey, P. “History of Napoleon,” Eng. trad. 4 vols. London, 1888. Lockroy, R. “Ahmed le Boucher.” Paris, 1888. Lane-Poole, S. “Stratford Canning, Viscount de Redclyffe,” 2 vols. London, 1888. Mahan, A. T. “Nelson,” 2 vols. London, 1899. Martha-Beker, F. “Desaix.” Paris, 1852. Masson, Frédéric. “Napoléon Inconnu” (for Napoleon’s early writings). Nicholas Mikhailovitch. “Alexandre I,” 2 vols. St. Petersburg, 1912. Pajol (Comte). “Kléber.” Paris, 1877. Pellew, G. “Sidmouth,” 3 vols. London, 1847. Phipps, P. W. “Life of Colonel P. Phipps.” London, 1847. Rose, J. H. “Life of Napoleon.” New edition, 1922. —— “The Personality of Napoleon.” London, 1912. Randolph, H. “Life of Sir Robert Wilson,” 2 vols. London, 1862. Stanhope. “Life of Pitt,” 4 vols. London, 1861. Temperley, H. “Canning.” London, 1905. Triaire, P. “Dominique Lussey.” Tours, 1902. Wilkin, W. H. “Sir Davis Baird.” London, 1912. Wassilitschikov, A. “Les Razoumouski,” 6 parts. 1893. Waliszeuski, K. “L’Empereur Paul I.” Paris, 1912. —— “Alexandre I.” Paris, 1923. VIII _Newspapers_ “Le Courier [_sic_] d’Egypte.” 1798-1801. “La Décade Egyptienne.” 1798-1801. “The Annual Register,” “The Gentleman’s Magazine,” “The Times,” “The Moniteur.” APPENDIX I REVISIONS AND NOTES 1. _J. P. Morier and the “Ruse de Guerre.”_ (“Dictionary of National Biography.” Article, J. P. Morier.) In his note on J. P. Morier, Mr. S. Lane-Poole writes: “According to the ‘Nouvelle Biographie,’ Morier was taken prisoner by the French, but in spite of his character as the representative of a hostile power, entrusted, moreover, with a secret mission to co- operate diplomatically with the Turks with a view to the expulsion of the French from Egypt, he was set at liberty with a warning that should he again be found in Egypt he would meet with the fate of a spy. _No authority, however, is adduced for this story, which is unsupported by any public or private evidence._” This assertion is totally false. The “story” is supported by public and private evidence. M. Charles-Roux in his recent study of the “Convention of El Arish” (“Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes for 1923,” pp. 319-20, 340) notes a “ruse de guerre,” by which the French evacuating Egypt on the faith of a solemn convention would be “destroyed” at sea. But he does not critically examine this curious episode, probably on the assumption that any “horror” might be conceived by a Turk. It was on the 30th October, 1799, that the Reis Effendi, in a conference with Mr. Spencer Smith, alluded to the overtures made by Kléber for the evacuation of Egypt, and, anticipating the objection that the return of so large an army as that under Kléber to Europe might turn the balance against the allies, stated that “means would be found of taking them to some place where half of them are to be massacred and the rest despoiled of everything and are even to be left with nothing but their shirts.” (S. Smith to Grenville, 12 Nov., 1799, F.O., Turkey, 23.) The “ruse” was enthusiastically taken up by Tamara, the Russian envoy. (Tamara to S. Smith, undated, F.O., Turkey, 23.) When Lord Elgin arrived in November, 1799, he at first objected. (Elgin to Grenville, undated, F.O., Turkey, 24), but he was soon “converted” to it and sent his secretary, J. P. Morier, to Turkish headquarters to arrange the execution. The written instructions to Morier, dated 22nd December, 1799, naturally do not refer to the “ruse” (F.O., Turkey, 24). But the object of his mission is clearly attested in a letter from Elgin to Lord Keith: “The Turks had conceived the utility to the common cause of destroying the French army and the benefit to ourselves of taking every degree of vengeance for so unprovoked an aggression and of making an example of such unprecedented atrocity of conduct: and if little less precipitancy had been used in concluding the capitulation (i.e. Sidney Smith’s successful conclusion of the Convention in January) _these ideas, which were sufficiently important for me to induce me to send my private secretary with them to Sir Sidney Smith_, would have been carried out” (enclosed in Elgin’s despatch of 10th March, 1800, F.O., Turkey, 28). Morier could not convince Sidney Smith to adopt the measure. He entered Egypt with the Turks after the successful conclusion of the Convention. But when the rupture occurred and the Grand Vizier was defeated near Cairo, Morier had to make the best of his way out of the country. He arrived at Damietta on the 23rd March, 1800 and sailed in a small boat to join Sir Sidney Smith, but a storm forced him to take refuge in the Lake of Bourollos. He was surrounded by the French and could not save his incriminating papers, as there were only three feet of water, so he buried them in the ballast sand. They were, however, taken by the French. He, himself, was taken to Rosetta and, because he had a “safe pass” from a French officer, he was allowed to join Sir Sidney Smith in the “Tigre.” (This account is from Morier to Elgin, 5th April, 1800, F.O., Turkey, 28.) The papers of Morier were published in the “Courier d’Egypte” (Nos. 70 and 73, 21 prairial an VIII and 18 messidor VIII). There is no doubt as to their authenticity. Neither Morier nor Elgin said a word. Elgin satisfied himself by stating that there was no “harm” in the loss of the papers, “although the opinions expressed in them differ from those of Sidney Smith and the persons he employs” (Elgin to Grenville, 9th July, 1800, F.O., Turkey, 28). The point remains: were the Turks serious in this “ruse de guerre”? They were not. Their only interest was in the evacuation of Egypt and whether the French were destroyed or not “en route” was of no importance to them. As a matter of fact, Elgin states that after it had been suggested the Porte dropped all mention of it in its communications with the British embassy. The Grand Vizier who was to arrange the execution “notified the Porte of his determination not to engage in so scandalous a transaction.” (Elgin to Grenville, 9th May, 1800, F.O., Turkey, 28.) But the Russians, on the contrary, were keen. Orders were sent from St. Petersburg to the fleet under Admiral Ushakoff to carry out the “ruse” “if appearances could be saved.” Italinsky, then Russian Minister in Palermo, informed Nelson of Ushakoff’s readiness, and Tamara repeatedly urged it upon the Porte. (Elgin to Grenville, 28th January, 1800, 9th May, 1800, F.O., Turkey, 28; Italinsky to Nelson, 7th March, 1800, B.M. Add. MSS. 34916, f. 311.) 2. _C. Arbuthnot and the venture on the Dardanelles._ (“Dictionary of National Biography.” Art., C. Arbuthnot.) W. P. Courtney states Arbuthnot was instructed to “demand from the Porte the dismissal (among other things) of the French ambassador,” the rejection of which led to the forcing of the Dardanelles—“it was mainly owing to his firmness that whatever success attended the operations was achieved.” It has been made clear in Chapter XIII of this essay that the demand for the dismissal of Sebastiani was not intended to be insisted on, that whatever qualities were displayed by Arbuthnot, firmness was not among them, and that, considering the object of the fleet to be the elimination of French influence, no success attended its operations. 3. _General Sherbrooke in Egypt in 1807._ (“Dictionary of National Biography.” Art., Sherbrooke.) The note states that General Sherbrooke was sent to Egypt to enter into arrangements with the Mamelukes. In point of fact, Sherbrooke was on the staff of General Fraser, and it was he who signed with the Pasha of Egypt the convention for the evacuation of Alexandria by the British. (Fraser to Castlereagh, 26th September, 1807, W.O. 1, vol. 348.) 4. _Great Britain and the Convention of Bartenstein._ In the year 1807, three diplomatic instruments were signed. They have caused unnecessary confusion. On the 28th January, 1807, General Hutchinson signed a Treaty of Peace with Prussia; on the 26th April, 1807, Alexander and Frederick William signed the Convention of Bartenstein, to which Great Britain and Austria were invited to accede—an invitation which both declined; on the 27th June, 1807, Canning and Jacobi-Kloest signed a treaty of subsidy, before the exchange of ratifications of which, Tilsit changed the whole situation, and so it was not ratified. Apart from rectifying misstatements which have found their way into authoritative works, the question is not without importance. Canning would not subscribe to the vague commitments of Bartenstein, which foreshadowed the settlement of 1814, but would conclude, on the other hand, treaties of subsidy for the prosecution of the war. Now Colonel Lloyd (“Cambridge Modern History,” vol. IX, p. 289) states that on 27th June, Great Britain acceded to the Convention of Bartenstein, undertaking to pay a subsidy of £100,000 to Prussia in the course of the year. He thus confuses accession to the Convention with the treaty of subsidy. Dr. Rose (“Cambridge Modern History,” vol. IX, p. 296) states that Britain “became a party” to the Convention. In the “Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy” (vol. I, p. 356) he writes that “she soon acceded to it.” Garden (“Histoire des Traités de paix,” vol. X, p. 200) writes that she “s’empressa d’accéder à la Convention.” On 29th June, 1807, Jacobi-Kloest, the Prussian Minister in London, officially communicated the Convention to Canning and announced that he had full powers to sign an act of accession with a British plenipotentiary (F.O., Prussia, 77). On the same day, D’Alopeus did the same thing and declared that “Son Excellence M. Canning, ayant déjà _fait connaître au soussigné les dispositions de son auguste souverain de concourir à l’accomplissement de l’important objet que les hautes parties contractantes ont en vue_.” (F.O., Russia, 73.) Matters did not go beyond that stage. The Treaty of Tilsit was announced officially on the 1st August (D’Alopeus to Canning, 20th July-1st August, 1807, F.O., Russia, 73). In his answer to this communication, Canning expatiated on the dispositions of George III and adduced as a proof “_the willingness expressed by His Majesty to accede to the Convention of Bartenstein_.” (Canning to D’Alopeus, 5th August, 1807, F.O., Russia, 73.) It was now too late. 5. _Sir W. Sidney Smith and the Convention of El Arish._ In the excellent articles referred to above, M. Charles-Roux considers that Sidney Smith, in working for the evacuation of Egypt, was actuated by the desire to see them quit that country and by the conviction that the Turks could never succeed in driving them out. These, doubtless, were important motives. But there was another one not less important, and not, by any means, disguised, namely, turning the Army of the East into an anti-revolutionary force. His view of the Revolution was moderate and his methods of fighting were at one with those of Windham, namely, co-operation with those opposed to extremism. “My experience,” he wrote to Windham on the 13th August, 1794, “has proved to me that this (a rising against the ‘Convention’) never can be expected if the ‘white flag’ is shewn to them as an earnest of the return of the antient [_sic_] system in its full extent. . . . There can be no doubt that there exists a party in France and even in Paris itself of the moderate kind impotent under the present tyranny, which put their persons and property in such an irksome state of insecurity. This party might be induced to shew itself if support were near and such support cannot be so quickly conveyed as by the shortest route and that on which there are the fewest barriers.” (Namely, that of Dieppe) (B.M. Add. MSS. 37852, f. 32.) In the years that followed he was in close touch with “émigrés” of all kinds. His escape from the Temple was effected by them. He maintained his relations with them with the approval of Lord Grenville. (Lord Grenville to Windham, 12th May, 1798, B.M. Add. MSS. 37846.) When he went to the Levant at the end of the year, he took with him, among others, Phélippeaux, the codisciple of Bonaparte, de Fromelin, alias Bromley, and the young Frotté, for no other object than to attract by their influence most of the discontented officers of Bonaparte’s army, many of whom, to his knowledge, belonged to the same school of thought as Phélippeaux. He advised the Porte to encourage would-be deserters by promising them posts in its armies or a safe return home to rise against the Directory. (Minutes of a Conference on 17th January, 1799, F.O., Turkey, 21.) He was convinced that the Army of the East “belonged to the dissatisfied part of the army which the Republican tyrants wished to get rid of,” “that France can only be set to rights by Frenchmen,” and that, till then, there could be no peace. (To Keith, 13th March, 1800. Barrow, I, 385, 387.) During the siege of Acre he did not neglect to use these means of seduction. (De La Jonquière, IV, pp. 526-7; to Nelson, 30th May, 1799, Barrow, I, 307; to Spencer Smith, 14th May, 1799, Barrow, I, 296.) The result was a violent proclamation from Bonaparte against Sir Sidney, whom he dubbed for his achievements in Toulon, “Le Capitaine des brûlots,” and strict injunctions to his men not to enter into communications with him. (“Correspondance,” t. V, 4098.) With the accession of Kléber to the command, the prospects brightened. He believed that Kléber and his officers were animated by one sentiment of indignation against their “ci-devant” commander, deluded himself with the fact that none of them wore the tricolour cockade and the “indignation of the French against the Jacobin faction for having brought it and them into such a desperate state.” (9th November, 1800, F.O., Turkey, 23.) Sidney Smith had no success. But was his failure complete? By no means. His insinuations had created a strong party in the army, opposed to the occupation of Egypt. As for the wider aspect of his programme, it was impossible of realisation. In the way, however, that Bonaparte treated Poussielgue, Reynier and Damas—exactly the men who were in close touch with Sidney Smith—there is evidence of his suspicion that Sir Sidney had created enemies of his person and grandeur. 6. _Transactions of Lord Elgin._ The ambassadors in Constantinople drew handsome profit from the sale of diplomas of protection or “barâts.” Liston, in 1795, denied himself the privilege of drawing upon so “turbid a source.” The protected person exploited “all the weight of the British embassy,” even in law- suits. (Drummond to Hawkesbury, 22nd June, 1803, F.O., Turkey, 40.) The lengths that Lord Elgin went in the art of making money was astounding. (Drummond to Hawkesbury, 13th July, 1803, F.O., Turkey, 40.) In August, 1801, “an attention” was paid him on the surrender of Cairo in the shape of 25,000 piastres in gold. In September he received 32,000 and his “Lady” 15,000. This was on the news of the surrender of Alexandria. On the 14th January, 1803, the sum of 25,000 was sent to them upon their departure. During his embassy, there “occurred” only five barâts, upon one of which Elgin received nothing, being a transfer from one person to another. The “highest consideration” to the “ambassadoress” upon another was 5,000. The rest brought in less. As for procuring “firmans” for individuals, Elgin received 1000 for his interposition at the Porte. “They fell in more frequently than Barâts.” He also received 10,000 as “equipage money” when he proposed to go to Egypt to settle the affairs of the Beys. The visit was cancelled, but the money was not returned. There was also the sum of 30,000 piastres for furnishing the French Palace when it was occupied by Elgin during the war between Turkey and France. The money, apparently, was not all spent on furniture, for the French Chargé, when he took over the palace, refused to accept the furniture on account of its badness. Elgin also received—but this in common with all his predecessors—a lump sum of 27,000 for himself and 10,000 for his wife in lieu of the “Taayn,” which was an allowance of 500 piastres per day granted to the embassies by the Porte. As for “jewels” and “presents,” excluding the legitimate ones on the occasion of presenting credentials, a ring of the value of 10,000 piastres presented by Selim to Lady Elgin in an audience in October, 1801, a diamond snuff-box in June, 1800, worth 10,000 piastres, an elegant diamond “aigrette” from the dowager Sultana, worth 10,000, an “aigrette” on the recovery of Egypt valued at 12,000, a snuff-box worth 5000 and a dagger worth 4000 from the Capitan Pasha, to Lady Elgin a parcel of shawls and a diamond flower from the sister of the same dignitary, another and a diamond watch and chain from the dowager Sultana—the whole fetched 20,000. (Reports of Pisani to Drummond II, 25th July, 1803, F.O., Turkey, 40.) Pisani observes “that the above pecuniary compliments (as well as the other presents in jewels, etc.) were not made without some previous suggestion and solicitation on the part of the person acting in the ambassador’s interests at the Porte.” It might be asked, however, could Pisani’s deposition be accepted? It could, because, in stating every item, he gave his, his wife’s and his daughter’s share. The Capitan Pasha told the French Ambassador, Brune, that “Elgin a demandé et obtenu cinq audiences de congé parceque des présents sont attachés à cette sorte de cérémonie, pour des présents sa femme était allé visiter jusqu’aux dernières concubines du sérail; enfin le capitan Pasha se dit avoir été presque butiné ou dépouillé par l’indiscrétion de toutes les personnes qui composaient la légation anglaise.” (Brune to Bonaparte, 16 pluviôse an XI, 4th February, 1803, Arch. Nat. AF. IV, 1688.) Elgin waxed indignant over the fact that Christopher Hutchinson went straight to the Porte with the news of the surrender of Alexandria and thus first received the full benefit of Turkish joy. (Elgin to Hawkesbury, 19th October, 1801, F.O., Turkey, 33.) But, we have seen, he was not forgotten. No excuse could be pleaded for him. The dragomen, however, were in a peculiar situation. They were not paid any salary at all. In point of fact, Pisani, in making his above-mentioned declaration, requested Drummond to receive it—not as a matter for censure—but as proof of the necessity of establishing a new system which would free the dragomen from worry and ensure their independence of the influence of the Porte. With Elgin it was a different matter. His appointments came to £4500 a year. (Elgin to Hawkesbury, 13th January, 1803, F.O. Turkey, 38.) The Levant Company paid for all the customary presents to the Porte. Straton, who succeeded Elgin as mere “Chargé d’Affaires,” voluntarily divested himself from profits resulting from the sale of barâts and other sources, but could not deprive the dragomen of what was, for them, a means of livelihood. When Lord Hawkesbury received the accounts of the “very improper practices with respect to pecuniary transactions which have prevailed at Constantinople at different periods under the sanction or with the connivance of former ambassadors,” he announced the intention to reform the practice. (Hawkesbury to Drummond, 9th September, 1803, F.O., Turkey, 40.) As a matter of fact, efforts were made in the succeeding years to do this. Scales of pay were proposed for the dragomen; but the practice was not changed during the years under review. 7. _The “Egyptian Archives.”_ M. Maunier states that his valuable “bibliography” “exclura les documents publiques ou privées dont le recensement voudrait un travail special” (p. XII). There is an official “Records Office”—but not a Public Records Office—in the Citadel of Cairo. As far as I have been able to find out—the contents are not catalogued—it mainly contains title-deeds, and old administrative and judicial documents. The King of Egypt is said to possess a large collection of political documents, mostly written in Turkish and relating especially to the wars of Ibrahim Pasha. I have been informed that these documents are in the course of being translated into Arabic. APPENDIX II THE REPORT OF SEBASTIANI Historical criticism of this document has moved, as it were, in the air. Historians have relied mainly on “mémoires”-writers and confined their labours to ingenious guesswork. According to Lucien Bonaparte (“Mémoires,” II, ch. IX), Napoleon “dictated” the Report with the express purpose of rousing “John Bull.” Meneval (“Mémoires,” I, ch. III) says that Jaubert saw a proof of the Report as it was to be printed in the “Moniteur” and advised the omission of the most irritating passages. But Maret refused to take upon himself to do this. We have also to take into account the fact that a few days after the publication, Sebastiani himself met the British Ambassador at Talleyrand’s and “recanted everything he had said in his report disrespectful to General Stuart and mentioned him in terms of great esteem.” (Whitworth’s despatch, 3rd February, 1803, Browning, p. 59.) Fournier (“Life of Napoleon,” I, p. 316, note) dismisses the hypothesis that Sebastiani told Napoleon something other than he told the British Ambassador and believes that Napoleon “altered” the despatch of the Colonel. The inference is that Napoleon fabricated a report and attributed it to his agent. But all this is wrong. We will print below a letter sent from Sebastiani from Alexandria which is couched in the same style and expresses the same views as the Report itself. We will also print those passages from the manuscript report which have been either omitted from or changed in the “Moniteur” version. The conclusions are:— 1. The Report was entirely Sebastiani’s. 2. Napoleon certainly “altered” the Report, but not in the sense implied in Fournier, i.e. he omitted or changed all passages that might give umbrage to the Porte or incriminate individuals and left intact all passages against British policy and agents. The alterations on the original manuscript are in pencil and are more or less becoming effaced. 3. The “recantation” of Sebastiani is of no importance. He probably recanted at the orders of his master in pursuance of a momentary need. SEBASTIANI TO TALLEYRAND. Devant Alexandrie à bord de la “Cornelie.” 2 vendémiaire XI (23 Sept., 1802). . . . On arrival I went to Stuart, spoke to him about the evacuation. His answer, as I had expected, was that he had received no orders and that he believed he would have to pass the winter in Egypt. “Le peuple d’Alexandrie a montré le plus grand joie en nous voyant. Déjà on disait que je venais prendre possession de la ville au nom du Grand Consul et le contentement des habitants se manifestait de manière à attirer même l’attention des Anglais.” The English occupy Alexandria with 4500 soldiers only. The Turks occupy the rest of the country with 20,000. They had been driven out of the forts of Alexandria by Stuart. Great “mésintelligence” between the two armies. The Mamelukes are in the Fayyoum or at 10 or 12 leagues from Cairo. They number 3 to 4000, defeated the Turks and popular with the inhabitants. The English openly favour them. The Arabs are with them. Djezzar, it is said, will join them. Great disorder in Syria. “L’Armée d’Orient et surtout le Premier Consul ont laissé ici de grands souvenirs. Son nom est en vénération et on peut compter entièrement sur tous les habitants de quelque nation et de quelque religion qu’ils soient. Ce que j’ai l’honneur de vous dire est la plus exacte vérité.” If the Pasha accepts my mediation I shall be in position to know the exact situation of the Beys. (Arch. Aff. Et. Turquie, Corr. Pol., vol. 205.) THE REPORT (Arch. Nat. AF. IV, 1687—“Moniteur.” 10 pluviôse XI—30 Jan., 1803.) N.B.—The passages that occur in the two versions are briefly stated in English. We will insert only those that have not been published and those that have been altered. _“Moniteur” Version._ _Manuscript Version._ “La mission dont j’ai été chargé avait pour objet de connaître l’état actuel de l’Egypte et de la Syrie sous les rapports politiques, administratifs, et militaires. J’ai pensé que pour répondre aux instructions que j’avais reçues je devais voir par moi même les hommes et les choses et surtout les voir sans prévention. Cette opération n’était pas sans difficulté cependant je crois être parvenu à me procurer des renseignements positifs. Je vais les réunir et afin que l’on connaisse mieux ce que j’ai fait, ce rapport sera le journal de mon voyage.”—Mission in Tripoli—Arrival and interview with Stuart—“Il ajouta qu’il pensait que les Anglais ne quitteront l’Egypte et Malte que lorsqu’un traité de commerce aurait été conclu entre la France et l’Angleterre.” Stuart is a mediocre spirit, “et d’une vanité excessive. Il croyait fixer l’attention de l’Europe sur lui, en conservant le commandement de l’armée anglaise en Egypte. Je sais d’une manière positive qu’il cherche à alarmer le cabinet de St. James sur la situation de ce pays, afin d’en empêcher ou d’en retarder l’évacuation.” He has for A.D.C. a French émigré, Chevalier de Sades, and is under his influence. I saw Khourchid Pasha and announced the speedy arrival of French commercial agents, which gave him great pleasure. He did not hide that he saw with pain the British occupation I told him that it could not be prolonged. On 25th I saw Sheikh Messire. “C’est de lui que j’appris qu’au moment de mon arrivée on avait cru que je venais prendre possession de la ville et que les habitants en avaient été dans l’enchantement.” I was a witness of their joy. On the same day saw Sheikh Ibrahim Mufti. “C’est un homme entièrement dévoué à la France dont il a une pension, mais très décrié pour ses mœurs et ayant fort peu de l’influence.” Visited forts, details, Voyage to Cairo, saw various people. “Tout le monde m’assûra que les Français y sont vivement regrettés et que le nom du Premier Consul y est en vénération.” Details on Foué, Rahmanieh, Menouf. Here Sheikh Abdine, “m’assûra que l’Egypte faisait constamment des vœux pour rentrer sous la domination du Premier Consul.” I told him and others, “Ce que j’ai toujours dit en Egypte,” that 1st Consul loves their country, will not forget it and is interested in its welfare [a] et vous recommandera à la that[a] “Il commande aux deux plus Porte. puissantes et plus riches nations de l’univers, la France et [b] “fait.” l’Italie.” He had dictated[b] peace to Europe and Egypt will [c] “Conserve aux pauvres Cheikhs feel the interest he _takes in d’Egypte.” her_.[c] In Cairo, meeting with Khosrev. “Le Pacha sentait si bien qu’il n’était pas en état de résister longtemps aux Beys qu’il me chargea de prier le Premier Consul d’ouvrir cette négociation (with the Beys) à Constantinople et de la terminer promptement.” Visits to Forts. Meetings with Sheikhs. “J’ai été étonné du courage avec lequel ils avouent leur désir de redevenir les sujets du Premier Consul. Pour être sûr de la sincérité de leurs vœux et de leurs sentiments” one should have seen as I did their enthusiasm on receiving the portraits of Bonaparte. Sayed Omar ill and I saw his son, Bekri “qui est fort mal avec le Pasha, me pria de ne point le voir, craignant de se compromettre. El Arichy, El Mohdy et El Arice me firent dire la même chose.” On 7th called on the widow of Mourad Bey. “Elle me parla avec force des vexations des Turcs et me pria de contribuer au rétablissement des Beys qui conserveraient à la France et au Premier Consul une reconnaissance éternelle.” I told her of my overture for mediation and its rejection and added “qu’elle pouvait cependant assurer les Beys (dont elle est l’agent au Caire) que le Premier Consul avait reçu leur lettre, qu’il avait pour eux de la bienveillance et qu’il s’intéresserait pour terminer leurs différends d’une manière avantageuse aux deux partis.” Visits to Citadel, Roda, Gizé, Bulak. Murmurs of Turkish soldiers, but I did not heed. A Turk pointed his yatagan at me, but as he was drunk and the people indignant at his behaviour, I took no notice. Moustapha Oukil promised to bastinado my servant. I was near having his head cut off, but I forgave him. Albanians were instigated against me. English spread rumours of a French invasion. Pasha not duped by this. Stuart instigated murderers against me. Two most influential persons with Pasha are Rosetti and Mahrouki. There is also a “defterdar,” Sherif Effendi, “Homme qui entend les affaires et qui jouit d’une bonne réputation. Il gémit de l’influence de Rosetti et de Mahrouki, et j’ai été très satisfait de lui. Au divan de Constantinople dont il est membre, il a toujours été pour le parti français.” Was Effendi, and refused Pashalik of Jedda. “Un jeune homme qui m’a été vraiment utile, et qui est aussi dévoué à la France qu’il est enthousiaste du Premier Consul, c’est M. Stefanachi, drogman du Pasha. C’est un Grec de la Morée; il jouit d’une fortune considérable, il a de l’imagination et croit à une prompte dissolution de l’empire Ottoman. Il ne doute point que dans le bouleversement de le vaste empire sa patrie ne devienne le partage de la France, et il a déjà pour elle tous les sentiments d’affection d’un citoyen français. Il a de l’indiscrétion de son âge, mais, bien manié, on peut en tirer un grand partie.” Khosrev Pasha is a Georgian slave, brought up in household of Capitan Pasha. He has much of character of his master. “Il aime la gloire sans la connaître, aussi toutes ses vues se portent sur des objets futiles, tels que des habillements des troupes, etc. Il n’a aucune connaissance sur la guerre, la politique et l’administration; il ne sait que couper des têtes: il est vrai que sa cour lui donne des ordres bien barbares. Son drogman m’en a communiqué un entre-autres, par lequel le divan lui enjoint de faire périr tous les Mamelukes qui sont répandus dans l’Egypte, qu’ils conservent ou non des liaisons avec les Beys. J’en ai vu un autre par lequel on le charge de humilier tous les principaux Cheikhs, de les dépouiller, autant que possible, de leurs richesses et de frapper notamment sur les Cheikhs el Bekery et el Sadat.” Sadat bitterly complained to me and protested attachment to Consul. “Et ne désire que l’occasion de lui prouver son dévouement.” He said that the time that Great man spent in Egypt had [d] “ne doit s’en ressouvenir been marked by benefits to himself qu’en le bénissant, il était and “ma patrie[d] _ne peut être juste et bon.” heureuse que sous lui_.” “L’intendant Cophte m’a proposé d’entretenir une correspondance par laquelle il informerait de tout ce qui pourrait survenir d’intéressant en Egypte et en Syrie. Il m’a offert ses services et ceux de sa nation, dans le cas où l’on aurait des vues sur l’Orient. J’ai tout lieu de croire à sa sincérité, mais je lui ai répondu que je n’avais aucune instruction là-dessus.” Saw Beduin Chieftains, received a deputation from Monks of Convent of Sinai. Wrote to Pasha in their favour. Accorded them your protection. Monks of “Progagande” celebrated a Te Deum for prosperity of First Consul. On eve of departure again saw Pasha and recommended to him all Christians as well as Moslems who had had connection with our army. Left for Damiette. “Au Caire, comme dans toute l’Egypte, j’ai dit beaucoup de bien de la Porte et le Pasha en a été extrêmement satisfait.” En route for Damiette, son of Hassan Toubar visited me. “Il se plaignait amèrement des vexations qu’il éprouvait de la part des Turcs, pour l’attachement qu’il avait montré à l’armée française. Il me déclara qu’il n’attendait que l’occasion de donner de nouveaux témoignages de ses sentiments.” His influence very great. Saw various people en route and in Damiette. “Le 20e j’ai reçu une lettre d’Osman Bey, El Bardissy, qui m’a été adressée au Caire. . . . Dans ma réponse à Osman je lui fis part que le Premier Consul m’a chargé de terminer les différends des Beys avec les Osmanlis, mais que cette affaire ne pouvait se traiter qu’à Constantinople, que le Premier Consul avait pour eux de la bienveillance et qu’il chercherait à leur être utile.” “La situation actuelle de l’Egypte ne saurait être plus malheureuse. Le système de contributions adopté par le Pasha est un mélange informe de celui qui avait été établi dans les derniers tems [_sic_] de l’armée française et de celui qui existait du tems [_sic_] des Mamelukes. Le peuple paye le double et sa misère est à son comble. Cette province est traitée en pays conquis, et le chef et les subalternes craignant également de la voir passer en d’autres mains se hâtent de faire fortune. Les avanies sont fréquentes, le prétexte en est l’intelligence des victimes avec les Beys, les véritables motifs ce sont les richesses de ceux qu’on veut perdre. Le délateur le plus furieux et le plus à craindre, c’est Mahrouki: C’est lui qui a fait périr dernièrement le commandant de Menouf. Les Osmanlis sont en horreur et je ne doute point que le Caire et toute l’Egypte ne s’insurgent en faveur des Mamelukes, quoi qu’ils ne soient pas aimés, mais le souvenir de leurs vexations est effacé par le sentiment de souffrances actuelles des habitants. Il est certain cependant que les Mameloukes ne peuvent plus régner en Egypte. Leurs propres forces ne se montent pas au delà de 3000 hommes et l’achat des esclaves Géorgiens leur étant défendu à Constantinople il leur est impossible de réparer leurs pertes et d’organiser un corps d’armée, qui leur assure la possession de ce royaume. Les Arabes qui combattent aujourd’hui dans leurs rangs ne tarderont pas à les quitter, d’ailleurs ils n’ont plus pour eux l’opinion. On les croyait invincibles avant l’arrivée de l’armée française, aujourd’hui leur prestige est détruit.” In Egypt, Chieftains, merchants, [e] aiment à s’entretenir du ulemas, “[e]_tout attend sa Premier Consul, font des vœux délivrance du Premier Consul, tout pour son bonheur. Toutes les fait des vœux pour rentrer sous sa nouvelles qui le concernent domination et il est certain qu’à se répandent d’Alexandrie ou l’apparition d’une armée française de Damietta aux Pyramides et le pays se déclarera pour elle_.” grandes cataractes avec une rapidité étonnante. Visit to Acre. Interview with Djezzar (with no changes or omissions from the original). Details on the British, Turkish and Mameluke forces in Egypt, and forts. 6000 Frenchmen should suffice for the reconquest of the country. Details on the Mamelukes. Power is divided between Ibrahim, Elfi and Bardissy. “Ce dernier passe pour être fort attaché aux Français et cette opinion lui donne beaucoup d’influence.” Details on Syria. INDEX _Abercromby_ (Sir Ralph, British general, 1734-1801); to command British troops in Egypt, 135; number of his forces, 135; landing of in Abukir, 135; first operations, 135, 136; victory near Alexandria, 136; letter to Murad Bey, 158; death from wounds, 136 _Abukir_, British victory in Bay of, (see under Nelson); Turkish Army lands and is defeated in Peninsula of, 101; British land in, 135 _Acre_, Siege of, by Napoléon, 85-88 _Adair_ (Sir Robert, British Ambassador in Constantinople, 1809-1810); negotiates Peace of Dardanelles, 271; attempts to end Russo-Turkish War, 274, 275 _Addington_ (Henry, 1st Viscount Sidmouth); forms ministry, 139 _Albanians_ in Egypt; Djabarti’s description of, 207-208; mutiny of, 211; coalition with Mamelukes, 211; expel Mamelukes from Cairo, 222 _Alexander I_ (Emperor of Russia, 1801-1825); policy on accession, 144-145, 148, 149; and the Treaty of Tilsit, 263; and Erfurt, 272; and the Franco-Austrian War, 273-4 _Alexandria_, taken by British in 1801, 137; and in 1807, 248 _Algiers_, rupture of Dey of, with France, 94 _Aly_ (Mameluke chief, 18th century); attempt at independence, 1 _Aly_ (Turkish ambassador in Paris); character of, 143; signs a treaty of peace with France, 143; beheaded, 142, note 6 _Aly_ (Viceroy of Egypt), murdered by Mamelukes, 213 _Amiens_ (Treaty of), 151; (Congress of) and Turkish participation in, 152 _Anstruther_ (British officer in Egypt), statement of as to British engagements to Mamelukes, 162 _Arbuthnot_ (Charles, ambassador in Constantinople, 1805-1807), and Elfi, 230; position of and application for warships, 239; criticism of policy of, 241; escapes on warship, 245; Appendix, 296 _Austerlitz_, Battle of, effect of on Turks, 233 _Austria_, policy of as to partition of Turkey, 185; dislike of Russian occupation of Danubian Principalities, 253 _Baldwin_ (George, British Consul in Egypt), on Mameluke extortions, 2; withdraws from Egypt, 2; and British possession of Egypt, 141 _Ball_ (Sir Alexander, British naval officer and Commissioner in Malta), and settlement of Egyptian affairs, 215; and Elfi, 220, 221 _Bardissy_ (Osman el, Mameluke Chief). Professions of attachment to France, 178, 181; and to Great Britain, 181; character of, 208; supremacy of, 212; mistakes of, 212-213; and Elfi, 221; driven out of Cairo by Albanians, 221; demands French help, 227; death of, 232 _Barras_ (Paul François Nicolas, Comte de, Member of Directory) and Napoleon, 25 _Bartenstein_, Convention of, 297-298 _Batavian Republic_ (Holland), changes in Constitution of, 21; alliance of, with France, 8 _Bathurst_ (Henry, 3rd Earl Bathurst, 1762-1834), and Mehemet Ali’s overture for recognition of his independence, 283 _Beauchamp_ (French Consul at Muscat), mission of, to Turkey, 77-8 _Beauvoisins_ (Calmet-Beauvoisins, Joseph, French officer), mission of, to Djezzar, 76 _Belliard_ (Augustin-Daniel, French general, 1769-1832), surrenders Cairo, 136, 137 _Bernadotte_ (Jean Baptiste, later King Charles XIV of Sweden), French Ambassador in Vienna, 25; incident to, 36 _Berthollet_ (Claude Louis, French chemist), Commissioner to Divan of Cairo, 72 _Blantyre_ (Lord, A.D.C. to General Stuart), mission of, in Constantinople, 181-182 _Bonaparte_. See under _Napoleon_ _Britain_, French project of invasion of, 22-23; naval supremacy of, 7, 8; ignorance of Government of aims of French preparations, 38; policy after Nelson’s victory, 66; mission of Koehler, 66-67; negligence of Egyptian affairs, 69; and evacuation of Egypt by French, 115; and Convention of El Arish, 117; and French proposal for a naval armistice, 128; and the decision to send an army to Egypt, 131-134; overture to Russia for a guarantee of Turkish Empire, 148; and Russian mediation between France and Turkey, 149; failure to obtain admission of Turkey to Congress of Amiens, 152; right of navigation in Red and Black Seas, 155, note 4; decision to return Egypt to Turkey, 156; scheme for the government of Egypt, 165-167; comparison of that scheme with Lord Dufferin’s, 165-167; Hutchinson’s criticisms of it, 173-174; relations with France after Amiens, 187; overture for alliance with Russia and Austria, 187; decision not to evacuate Malta, 188; war with France, 189; and alliance with Turkey, 203-206; real relations with Elfi, 217-219; and Turkey in 1806, 241-243; and Mehemet Ali’s overture for recognition of independence, 283 _Brueys_ (François-Paul, French admiral, 1753-1798), command in Mediterranean, 13; to take part in invasion of England, 18; and capture of Malta, 18; condition of squadron under, 24; escorts army to Egypt and after, 53-54; defeat by Nelson, 56; death in action, 56. _Bruix_ (Etienne-Eustache, French admiral, 1759-1805), naval operations of in Mediterranean, 93, 95-97. _Brune_ (Guillaume, Marshal of France), Ambassador in Constantinople, his instructions, 186; withdraws from Constantinople, 202 _Bucharest_ (Treaty of), 278 _Cafarelli_ (Cafarelli du Falga, Maximilien, French general, 1756-1799). Takes part in preparations for invasion of England, 22; and Napoleon, 22 _Cairo_. Taken by the French, 51; rising of, 71, 73-74, 75; surrender of by Belliard, 136 _Canning_ (George). At the Foreign Office, 252; and mission of Paget to Turkey, 255-256, 259; and Egypt, 256; and mission of Sir Robert Wilson to St. Petersburg, 268; and mission of Adair to Turkey, 269-271 _Canning_ (Stratford, Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, British diplomat, 1786-1880). Efforts to end Russo-Turkish War, 274, 275; early judgment of on Mehemet Ali, 279 _Capitan-Pasha_ (see under Husein) _Catherine II_ (Empress of Russia). Alliance of with Aly of Egypt, 1; plan of partition of Turkey, 3 _Caulaincourt_ (Duc de Vicence, French diplomat, 1772-1827); interviews with Rumiantsoff on Turkey, 266 _Cavan_ (Earl of) succeeds Hutchinson to chief command in Egypt, 172; and the Mamelukes, 172 _Cazoni_ (Lambro), Russian agent in the Balkans, 194 _Charles-Roux_ (François, French historian), on Mehemet Ali and France and Great Britain, 226 _Choiseul_ (Etienne François, Duc de, 1719-1785), proposes conquest of Egypt, 3 _Collingwood_ (Cuthbert, Baron Collingwood, British Admiral, 1750-1810), sends warships to support Arbuthnot in Constantinople, 239 _Copts_, unpopularity of during French occupation, 121; corruption of Coptic tax-collectors, 121 _Czartoryski_ (Adam George, Prince, 1770-1861), his views, 190, 191; position of in 1806, 238 _Dardanelles_ (Peace of), 271 _Delacroix_ (Charles, minister of Foreign Affairs under Directory), and Egyptian expedition, 5; and _coup d’état_ at the Hague, 21 _Desaix_ (Desaix de Veygoux, 1768-1800, French general), and invasion of England, 21, 30; campaign of in Upper Egypt, 75; negotiates Convention of El Arish, 111 _Descorches_, projected missions to Constantinople, 92, 129-130 _Directory_, approves Napoleon’s designs on Malta, 15, 16; decrees invasion of England, 17; decrees invasion of Egypt, 30; motives, 32; plans to relieve army in Egypt, 93, 95-97; recalls Napoleon, 96 _Divan of Cairo_, attitude of Egyptians to, 73; composition of, 72; deliberations of, 73 _Djezzar_ (Ahmet, Pasha of Acre), rejects French overtures, 76; appointed to act against French in Egypt, 70; and siege of Acre, 85-88; relations with Porte after siege, 105 _Djuvara_, book of on schemes of partition of Turkey, 3 _Donoughmore_ (see under Hutchinson) _Driault_ (Edouard, French historian), on Mehemet Ali and England and Turkey, 230, 231; on causes of second British expedition to Egypt, 241-242, 245 _Drovetti_ (French Consul in Egypt), and the rise of Mehemet Ali, 228-229; persuades Mamelukes not to join British, 250-251 _Drummond_ (William) Ambassador in Constantinople, 192 _Duckworth_ (Sir John Thomas, British admiral, 1748-1817), demonstration before Constantinople, 246; failure of, 247 _Duclos_ (Joseph, French resident in Cairo), intermediary between French Consul and Bardissy, 226 _Dufferin_ (First Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, 1826-1902), report on Egypt, 165 _Dundas_ (Henry, Viscount Melville, 1742-1811), and the aim of French preparations, 38; and the importance of Egypt, 62-3; reinforces British troops in India, 63; and British expedition to Egypt, 131-134; underestimates French power, 135; and invasion of Egypt by troops from India, 134; and the Preliminaries of London, 141 _Egyptians_, grievances of, under French rule, 120 _El Arish_ (Convention of), 111-113, 114, 116, 128; (village of), captured by Napoleon, 83; by Turks, 113 _Elfi_ (Mameluke chief), escapes to Upper Egypt, 170; visit to England, 183; character of, 208; activities of in Malta and England, 216, 217-219, 220; Djabarti’s partiality to, 220; attacked by Bardissy, 221; relations with Turks, 230, 231; death of, 232 _Elgin_ (Thomas Bruce, 7th Earl of Elgin, 1766-1841), agrees to issue passports to Frenchmen, 107; and the “ruse de guerre,” 107, 116; Appendix, 295-296; sends Morier to Egypt, 116; his opinion of Koehler, 100; and the invasion of Egypt by troops from India, 134; Pitt on his ability and methods, 167; sends Straton to Egypt, 171-172; financial transactions of, 299-300 _El Messiry_ (savant of Alexandria), epistle to Napoleon, 178 _Fazarde_, Russian agent in Balkans, 195 _Fellowes_ (British naval officer), and convention with Mehemet Ali, 260 _Foresti_ (Spiridon, British agent in Corfu), quarrels with Mocenigo, 195 _Fortescue_ (Sir John), opinion of French expedition, 137 _Fox_ (Charles James), policy of with regard to Turkey, 237-238 _Framery_ (French agent in Egypt), and the Mamelukes, 226 _Fraser_, commands British troops sent to Alexandria, 248; his instructions, 243; fails to capture Rosetta, 249; relations with Mehemet Ali, 251-252; evacuates Alexandria, 260 _French Expedition to Egypt_, results of, 137-138 _Fullarton_ (William, 1754-1808, British officer); memorandum of, to British Government on Egypt, 63-64 _Galeb_ (Turkish Ambassador in Paris), character of, 153; signs treaty of peace with France, 153 _Gantheaume_ (Honoré, 1755-1818, French admiral), attempts to relieve army in Egypt, 128; satirical epitaph on, 128 _Gardane_ (Claude, French general, 1766-1817); mission in Persia, 252 _Gaza_, captured by Napoleon, 83 _Grand Vizier_ (see under Yusuf Zia) _Grenville_ (William Wyndham, Baron Grenville, 1759-1834), policy of, with regard to French in Egypt, 64-65, 66-67, 67-68, 69; and the retirement of the French Army from Egypt, 115-116, 117-118; and the provisional occupation of Alexandria, 157 _Grey_ (see under Howick) _Halet_ (Turkish Ambassador in Paris), presents by French Government to, 202 _Hallowell_ (British naval officer), escorts Elfi to Egypt, 221; opinion of Elfi, 221 _Hamilton_ (Sir William, British Minister in Naples, 1730-1803), and Neapolitan appeal for a British squadron in Mediterranean, 39 _Hamilton_ (William, British antiquarian on Elgin’s staff); his views as to French rule in Egypt, 208-209 _Hardenberg_ (Prussian Minister), proposes partition of Turkey, 264 _Hastings_ (Warren, 1732-1818, Governor-General of British India). Treaty of Commerce with Muhammad Bey of Egypt, 3; recognition of Egypt’s importance, 3; memorandum of on French occupation of Egypt, 64 _Hauterive_ (Maurice, Comte d’, French diplomat, 1754-1830), proposes alliance with Austria at expense of Turkey, 234 _Hawkesbury_ (Robert Banks Jenkinson, 2nd Earl Liverpool, 1770-1828), and the Preliminaries of London, 139-141; and the Porte’s participation in Congress of Amiens, 142 _Hayes_ (British officer of artillery), engaged in repairing fortifications of Cairo, 182 _Heliopolis_, Turks defeated near by Kléber, 118 _Hompesch_ (Ferdinand de, 1744-1805, Master of Order of St. John), election of, 15 _Hood_ (Sir Samuel, British naval officer, 1762-1814), commands blockade of Egypt after Battle of Nile, 57; failure to capture fort of Abukir, 71 _Howick_ (Charles Grey, 2nd Earl Grey), instructions of, to destroy French influence in Turkey by military intervention, 242-243 _Husein_ (Capitan Pasha, i.e. Turkish high admiral), reforms of, 200; rivalry of with Grand Vizier, 170; plot of to arrest Mamelukes, 170-171; alleged agreement with Hutchinson as to terms for Mamelukes, 163 _Huskisson_ (William, 1770-1830), sends to Abercromby a plan for settling affairs of Egypt, 157 _Hutchinson_ (John Hely, 2nd Earl Donoughmore), succeeds Abercromby to Chief Command in Egypt, 136; besieges Alexandria, 136; views of as to settlement of Egyptian affairs, 159-161; extent of his engagements to Mamelukes, 161; agreement of with Turks on Mameluke’s position, 162; and the Turkish plot to arrest the Mamelukes, 170-171; his criticism of the British Government plan as to settlement of Egypt, 173-174 _Ibrahim_ (Mameluke chief); flight to Syria, 51; relations with French and British agents, 181; loss of influence, 208 _Institut d’Egypte_, foundation of, 75 _“Intercepted Correspondence”_ (French correspondence intercepted by the British fleet), effects of, 56 _Ionian Islands_, occupied by France, 11 _Ivelich_ (Russian general), intrigues of, in Montenegro, 195 _Jacob_ (Yakoub, Coptic “general” in French service), leaves Egypt with the French army, 210; aspirations and views attributed to him, 210 _Jaffa_, capture of by French, 83; massacre of garrison of, 83-84 _Jaubert_ (French naval architect), on the mooring of the fleet in Abukir Bay, 54 _Jonquière_ (C. de la, French military historian), on French intervention in Switzerland, 20; on invasion of England, 22; on Napoleon’s relations with Talleyrand, 29 _Joseph II_ (Austrian Emperor), and partition of Turkey, 3 _Joubert_ (Barthelemy, 1769-1799, French general), and _coup d’état_ at the Hague, 21 _Keith_ (George Keith Elphinstone, Viscount, 1746-1823, British admiral), and withdrawal of French from Egypt, 116, 117, 118 _Khosrev_ (Turkish viceroy of Egypt), 207; character of, 207; deposition and flight of, 211 _Khourshid_ (Turkish viceroy of Egypt), raised by Mehemet Ali to Viceroyalty, 224; intrigues against Albanians, 224, 227; revolt of Cairo against, 227-228 _Kléber_ (Jean Baptiste, 1753-1800, French general), and invasion of England, 30; goes with Napoleon to Egypt, 33; entrusted by Napoleon with the Chief Command, 103; Napoleon’s instructions to, 103; character of, 103; repels Turkish attack on Damietta, 104; gloomy picture of affairs in Egypt, 105; enters into negotiations with Turks, 104-105; and negotiations relating to the Convention of El Arish, 110-113; change of attitude towards evacuation, 117; resumes hostilities and defeats Turks near Heliopolis, 118; assassination of, 118 _Koehler_ (George Frederick, British officer), mission of, to improve Turkish Army, 66, 67, 100; on Turkish plan of operations, 99; Elgin’s opinion of, 100; account of the Grand Vizier’s army, 132; and the dissensions between the Turks and Mamelukes, 158 _Kotschubey_ (Russian politician), advises a policy of non- intervention, 144 _Lascaris de Vintmille_ (Knight of Malta, entered French service, influence of, on the views attributed to the “Egyptian Delegation,” 210 _Latour-Maubourg_, French _chargé d’affaires_ in Constantinople, 276-277 _Lavalette_ (Antoine-Marie, Comte de, 1769-1830, French general), mission of, to Aly Pasha of Janina, 44 _Leake_ (William Martin, 1777-1860, British officer and antiquarian), mission of in Balkans, 193 _Leibnitz_ (Gottfried Wilhelm, 1646-1716, German philosopher), proposes to Louis XIV the conquest of Egypt, 3 _Lesseps_ (Mathieu de, French Consul in Egypt and father of Ferdinand de Lesseps of Suez Canal fame), Consul in Egypt, 213; his instructions, 213; alleged rôle of in rise of Mehemet Ali, 213; good reception of, 214; changed position of, 215, 216; and the expulsion of the Mamelukes, 222; his opinion of Mehemet Ali, 222; insecurity of and devices to save himself, 222, 223; leaves Cairo, and then Egypt, 223, 226 _Levantines_, contribution of, to development of national sentiment, 210 _Liston_ (Sir Robert, British diplomat), Ambassador in Constantinople. Delayed departure of till 1812, 274 _Liverpool_ (Earl of), see under Hawkesbury. _Lock_ (Charles), Consul in Egypt, 193; hints to Turks to ask for a British garrison in Egypt, 194 _Louis_ (Sir Thomas, British admiral), sails to Constantinople to support diplomacy of Arbuthnot, 239 _Magallon_ (French Consul in Egypt), retires to Alexandria, 2; proposes invasion of Egypt, 4 _Mahmoud II_ (Sultan of Turkey, 1808-1839), succeeds to throne, 277; resolution of, 277 _Mailly-de-Chateaurenaud_, mission of to Djezzar, 77 _Maistre_ (Joseph de, French philosopher, 1753-1821), on Admiral Warren, 189 _Mallet du Pan_ (Jacques, publicist and agent of Emigrés, 1749-1800), and decline of Napoleon’s popularity, 26 _Malta_, decadence of Order of St. John, 10; designs of France on, 20, 23; surrender to Napoleon, 42-43; retained by British, 188 _Mamelukes_, origins and rule of, 1, 2, 3; first encounter with Napoleon, 50; defeat near Embabeh, 51-52; abandon Cairo, 51; British sympathy with, 163; plot of Turks against, 170-171; retirement to Upper Egypt, 173; weakness of, 210; coalition of with Albanians, 211; expulsion from Cairo, 222; and second British expedition, 250-251; massacre of, 280 _Marie-Caroline_ (Queen of Naples, 1752-1814), and French Republic, 38 _Mehemet Ali_, early career of, 211; description of, 211; attitude of during coalition of Mamelukes with Albanians, 212; his rise not due to foreign help, 207, 228-229; sets Bardissy against Elfi, 221; expels Mamelukes from Cairo, 222; raises Khourshid to Pashalik, 224; wins over populace, 227; defeats Mameluke intrigue, 231; and the second British expedition, 248, 250, 251-252; convention of with the British, 260; policy of, after 1807, 279, 280-281; massacre of the Mamelukes, 279; relations with Great Britain, 282-283; and with France, 283; campaign against Wahabis, 284; summary of results of his rule, 284 _Melville_ (see under Dundas) _Mengin_ (French resident in Cairo and historian of Mehemet Ali), correspondent of French Government, 178; statement on the rise of Mehemet Ali, 228-229; persuades Mamelukes not to join British, 250-251 _Menou_ (Jacques-François de, called Abdalla, French general, 1750-1810), succeeds Kléber, 118; career of, 119; character of, 119; policy, 119-120; projects of reform, 121 _et seq._; relations with generals, 125-127; confirmed by Napoleon, 128; and invasion by Turks and British, 135; defeated near Alexandria, 136; surrender of Alexandria, 137 _Merlin de Douai_ (Philippe-Auguste, French politician, 1754-1838), and the responsibility for the French expedition, 30 _Mickaïl Sabbagh_ (Syrian resident in Cairo), 178 _Miot de Melito_ (Comte André François, 1762-1841), and Talleyrand’s disbelief in efficacy of negotiations with the Turks, 35; and Napoleon’s motives for proposing Talleyrand to be Ambassador, 36 _Missett_ (British officer); agent in Egypt, 182; and coalition of Albanians with Mamelukes, 212; and Bardissy and Lesseps, 215; humiliating position of, 216; leaves Cairo, 223; enmity to Mehemet Ali, 225; his opinion of Lesseps, 225; and the rise of Mehemet Ali, 230; and second British expedition to Egypt, 248; leaves Egypt with the army, 260-261; return of, 261 _Monge_ (Gaspard, French mathematician, 1746-1818), commissioner to Divan, 72; president of institute, 75 _Montenegro_, under Russian protection, 195 _Moore_ (Sir John, British general, 1761-1809), and Belliard’s surrender of Cairo, 137; criticism of British policy in 1807, 261 _Morier_ (J. P.), mission of, to Egypt, 116, 295-296; memorandum on Egyptian affairs, 164; Consul in Morea, 193, 195 _Morkoff_, Russian Minister in Paris, 143 _Murad_ (Mameluke chief), commands Mameluke army, 50; defeated in Embabeh, 51-52; retires to Upper Egypt, 51, 52, 75; and Turkish designs, 159; joins British, 159; death of, 159 _Musourouski_, Russian Consul in Cattaro. Intrigues in Montenegro, 195 _Mustafa IV_ (Sultan of Turkey, 1807-1808), succeeds Selim III, 226 _Napoleon_, and the East, 9; reading in youth, 10; and Malta, 11, 12, 15; and Greeks, 12; and Talleyrand, 13; designs on Turkey, 12, 13; justifies Campo-Formio, 16; and invasion of England, 17, 21, 29; mission of Poussielgue to Malta, 18; conversations with Bourrienne, 21; and Directory, 24, 25, 26; and Republic, 25; to invade Egypt, 30, 31, 33; proposes Talleyrand to Constantinople embassy, 36; captures Malta, 43, 44; in Mediterranean, 46-47; captures Alexandria, 47; proclamation to Egyptians, 48; march on Cairo, 49-50; encounters with Mamelukes, 50, 51, 52; enters Cairo, 51; and the fleet, 53-54, 55; and principles of administration, 71-72, 123-124; Divan, 72; forced contributions, 73; conquest of Upper Egypt, 75; founds institute, 75; and Nelson’s victory, 77; overtures to Djezzar and Porte, 76, 77-78; Invasion of Syria, 81-83; massacre of prisoners in Jaffa, 84; siege of Acre, 85-88; relations with the Druses, 85; defeats Turks at Mont Tabor, 86-87; and Sidney Smith, 86, 88-89; return to Egypt, 89; defeats Turks in Abukir, 101; return to France, 102, 103; instructions to Kléber, 103; efforts to keep Egypt, 127, 128; and convention of El Arish, 128; and Kléber’s allegations, 128; confirms Menou, 128; and a naval armistice with Britain, 128; mission of Descorches, 129-130; relations with Paul, 130; Thiers and Fortescue on Egyptian Expedition, 137; first mission of Sebastiani, 146; peace with Turkey, 154; second mission of Sebastiani, 178-179; Sebastiani’s report, 180, 301-308; and partition of Turkey, 184; sends Brune as Ambassador to Turkey, 186; Turkey refuses to recognise his change of title, 202; on duties of commercial agents, 229; recognition by Turkey, 233; peace with Austria, 234, 235; Sebastiani Ambassador in Constantinople, 235; mission of Gardane in Persia, 252; and Tilsit, 263; and Erfurt, 272; and Mehemet Ali, 226 _Nelson_ (Horatio, Viscount Nelson, 1758-1805); to command in Mediterranean, 40; appears before Malta, 41, 42; operations in Mediterranean, 44-45, 46; appears before Alexandria, 45; Battle of the Nile, 55, 56; plans after victory, 56-57 _Novosiltsoff_ (Russian diplomat), mission to London, 197, 198 _Omar Makram_ (a savant of Cairo), and rise of Mehemet Ali, 227, 228 _Order of St. John_, expulsion of from Malta, 43 _Osman Hasan_ (Mameluke chieftain), character of, 208 _Otto_ (Louis-Guillaume, French diplomat, 1754-1817), negotiates Preliminaries of London, 139-141 _Paget_ (Sir Arthur), mission of, to Constantinople, 253, 255-256, 258-260; and Mehemet Ali, 261 _Panghalo_, Russian agent in Balkans, 194 _Paul_ (Russian Emperor, 1796-1801), and French Revolution, 38, 60; and Turkey, 68, 71; relations with Napoleon, 130 _Phélippeaux_ (Antoine de, Royalist officer, 1768-1799), and Sidney Smith, 80; and siege of Acre, 84, 86, 87 _Pitt_ (William), and a British squadron in Mediterranean, 39; his opinion of Elgin, 167; second administration, 192; and Russian designs on Turkey, 195-199 _Porte_ (Sublime Ottoman Porte). (See under Turkey.) _Poussielgue_ (Jean-Baptiste, French official and agent), negotiates convention of El Arish, 111; sent as agent in Malta, 18, 19, 23 _Pozzo di Borgo_ (Charles André, diplomat in Russian service, 1764-1842), mission of, in Turkey, 253, 254, 258-259 _Prussia_, and Russia and Turkey, 238 _Raphaïl_, a monk resident in Cairo, 178 _Reubell_ (Jean-François, French politician, 1747-1807), and Talleyrand, 27, note 5 _Reinhardt_, succeeds Talleyrand as Minister of Foreign Affairs, 98 _Rome_, French intervention in, 20 _Rose_ (J. H., British historian), and conclusion of peace between France and Turkey, 153; and Pitt’s attitude to Russia in East, 195; and restoration of peace between Britain and Turkey, 271 _Rosetti_ (Carlo, Venetian, and later Austrian Consul in Egypt), mission to Murad, 52 _Roumiantsoff_ (Russian Chancellor), interviews with Caulaincourt, 266 _Royer_ (Pharmacist of French army and resident in Cairo), and administration of poison to invalid soldiers, 177; corresponded with French Government, 177 _Ruffin_ (French _Chargé d’Affaires_ in Constantinople), and the French expedition, 36, 59, 62 _Russia_, and Turkey, 186, 188, 192, 197, 203-206, 236, 236-237; occupation of Danubian principalities, 241; evacuation of Ionian Islands and Cattaro, 264; and armistice of Slobodzie, 264; and treaty of Bucharest, 278 _St. Vincent_ (John Jervis, Earl of, 1735-1823, British admiral), and French preparations, 39-40; opinion of Preliminaries of London, 141 _Sandoz-Rollin_ (Prussian Minister in Paris, and decline of popularity of Napoleon, 26; and Bernadotte incident in Vienna, 36 _Sebastiani_ (Horace, Comte de, Marshal of France, 1772-1851), first mission in Near East, 146; character of, 178; second mission, 178-180, 301-308; effect of report, 188; Ambassador in Constantinople, 235; helps in defence of Constantinople, 247 _Selim I_ (Sultan of Turkey, 1512-1520), conquers Egypt, 1, 2 _Selim III_ (Sultan of Turkey, 1789-1807), opposition to his reforms and deposition, 258; murder of, 266 _Sergio_, Russian agent in Balkans, 195 _Sherbrooke_ (British general, signs convention with Mehemet Ali, 264, 297 _Slobodzie_, armistice of, 264 _Smith_ (John Spencer, British Minister in Constantinople), and landing of French in Egypt, 39; and Anglo-Turkish alliance, 60-61, 68; agrees to issue of passports to French soldiers, 107 _Smith_ (Sir William Sidney, 1764-1840, British admiral); sent to the Levant, 64-65; and St. Vincent and Nelson, 65; accredited in a diplomatic capacity, 65; signs Treaty of alliance with Turkey, 68; plans, 79-81; and siege of Acre, 84-88; and Napoleon, 86-89, 104; and Turkish attack on Damietta, 104; and negotiations of Convention of El Arish, 108-114, 298-299; recall of, 118; relations with Mamelukes, 158; and invasion of Egypt by troops from India, 134 _Spain_, and French alliance, 8; and French naval operations, 93-94, 96, 97 _Spencer_ (George John, 2nd Earl Spencer, 1758-1834), and a British squadron in the Mediterranean, 39, 40; and the sending of Sidney Smith to Levant, 65 _Staël_ (Mme. de), and French intervention in Switzerland, 20; and Talleyrand’s ministry, 26 _Starhemberg_ (Austrian Ambassador in London), and a British fleet in the Mediterranean, 39 _Stewart_ (British officer), failure in capture of Rosetta, 249 _Straton_, mission of, in Egypt, 172; hint to Porte to apply for a British force to Egypt, 193 _Stratford de Redcliffe_. (See under Canning, Stratford) _Strogonoff_, mission of, in London, 236-237 _Stuart_ (Sir John, Count of Maida, British general, 1759-1815); his mission to Turkey, 175, 176-177; and mission of Blantyre, 181; evacuates Egypt, 182; and Elfi, 183; and missions of Missett and Hayes, 182; and Mamelukes, 183 _Switzerland_, French intervention in, 20 _Syria_, French invasion of, 81-83 _Tahir_ (Chief of Albanian soldiery in Egypt), seizes power, 211; invites Mamelukes to Cairo, 211; murder of, 211 _Talleyrand-Perigord_ (Charles Maurice, Prince de Bénévent, 1754-1838), Minister of Foreign Affairs, 13, 26; and Napoleon, 13; and Egypt as a colony, 15, 27; Views on foreign policy, 26 _et seq._; relations with Rewbell, 27, note 5; diplomatic preparations of French expedition, 35; to be Ambassador in Turkey, 36, 91-92; suggests evacuation of Egypt, 98; resigns, 98; his treaties with Ali and Morkoff, 143; presents to Halet, 202; and an alliance with Austria, 234; at Erfurt, 272 _Tallien_ (Jean-Lambert, French politician, 1767-1820); intrigues against Menou, 126 _Tamara_ (Russian envoy in Constantinople), and the “ruse de guerre,” 295-296; and Sebastiani, 146-147 _Tambourdji_ (Mameluke chief), succeeds Murad, 159; joins British, 159 _Thiers_ (Adolphe, French statesman and historian, 1797-1873), and French expedition, 137 _Thugut_ (Austrian Chancellor), and a British fleet in the Mediterranean, 39 _Tilsit_, Treaty of, 262, 264 _Troubridge_ (Sir Thomas, British admiral, 1758-1807), 41 _Turkey_, and French preparations, 58; and invasion of Egypt, 58-60; and alliance with Britain and Russia, 60-61; war plans, 70; war measures, 70, 71, 74; defeat in Abukir and Damietta, 101, 104; to issue passports to Frenchmen, 106, 295-296; ratifies Convention of El Arish, 116; and Treaty of Amiens, 145, 146, 152; intentions regarding Mamelukes, 158; and Sebastiani’s report, 180; projects of dismemberment of, 184, 185, 186; and alliance with Russia and England, 192; condition and prospects of reform, 200-201; relations with Russia, England and France, 201, 202, 203-206, 238-239, 241, 244, 247; and Elfi, 230; and Battle of Austerlitz, 233, 233-234; mission of Pozzo di Borgo, 253, 254, 258-259; mission of Paget, 253, 255-256, 258-260; and alliance with France, 257-258; and Tilsit, 262, 267-268; peace of the Dardanelles, 271; and massacre of Mamelukes, 280 _Ulemas_ (Egyptian learned-men), character of, 209 _Vaubois_ (Claude Henri, Comte de, French general), commander in Malta, 44 _Vehid_, Turkish envoy to Napoleon’s Court in Warsaw, 257 _Vizier_. (See under Yusuf Zia) _Venice_, and Treaty of Campo-Formio, 11 _Volney_ (Constantin, Comte de, French traveller and publicist, 1757-1820); his voyage to Egypt, 4 _Vorontsoff_ (S., Russian Ambassador in London), and Russia and Turkey, 196 _Warren_ (Sir John Borlase, admiral and Ambassador in Russia, 1753-1822), abilities of, 189-190 _Wauchope_ (British officer), failure to capture Rosetta, 249 _Wellesley_ (Richard, Marquess, 1760-1842), on sending a force from India against the French in Egypt, 134; relations with neighbouring states, 155-156; Foreign Secretary, 274 _Windham_ (William, 1750-1810), and British expedition to Egypt, 134 _Wilson_ (Sir Robert Thomas, 1777-1849, British general), and affairs in Egypt, 210; mission of, to Russia, 268-269 _Yaakub_. (See under Jacob) _York_ (Duke of, Frederick August, 1763-1827), and mission of Koehler, 67 _Yusuf Zia_ (Grand Vizier of Turkey), character of, 99-100; to act against French in Egypt, 100; and French overtures, 105; defeat of near Heliopolis, 118; agreement with Hutchinson, 163; and Capitan Pasha, 170 _Zouboff_ (Valerien), and intervention in Georgia, 144 Transcriber's note Obvious typographical errors have been fixed. French spelling has been corrected where necessary. Closing or opening quotation marks have been inserted where necessary; a few quotes have been left unclosed. In page 7, footnote 19, changed: "O. Troude, _Batailles Navales_, III" to: "II" *** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BEGINNINGS OF THE EGYPTIAN QUESTION AND THE RISE OF MEHEMET ALI *** Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will be renamed. 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