THE

                         SECOND ADMINISTRATION

                                  OF

                             JAMES MADISON

                               1813–1817




                     HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES.

                                  BY

                             HENRY ADAMS.


   VOLS. I. AND II.--THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF JEFFERSON.
       1801–1805.

   VOLS. III. AND IV.--THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF JEFFERSON.
       1805–1809.

   VOLS V. AND VI.--THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF MADISON.
       1809–1813.

   VOLS. VII., VIII., AND IX.--THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF
       MADISON. 1813–1817. WITH AN INDEX TO THE ENTIRE WORK.




                                HISTORY

                                OF THE

                       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                  DURING THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF

                             JAMES MADISON

                            BY HENRY ADAMS

                               VOL. II.

                               NEW YORK
                        CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS
                                 1891




                           _Copyright, 1890_
                      BY CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS.

                           University Press:
                    JOHN WILSON AND SON, CAMBRIDGE.




                         CONTENTS OF VOL. II.


    CHAPTER                                                 PAGE

       I. MASSACHUSETTS DECIDES                                1

      II. CHIPPAWA AND LUNDY’S LANE                           24

     III. FORT ERIE                                           62

      IV. PLATTSBURG                                          91

       V. BLADENSBURG                                        120

      VI. BALTIMORE                                          149

     VII. SLOOPS-OF-WAR AND PRIVATEERS                       174

    VIII. EXHAUSTION                                         212

      IX. CONGRESS AND CURRENCY                              239

       X. CONGRESS AND ARMY                                  263

      XI. THE HARTFORD CONVENTION                            287

     XII. NEW ORLEANS IN DANGER                              311

    XIII. THE ARTILLERY BATTLE                               340

     XIV. THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS                          367




                     HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES.




                              CHAPTER I.


AT the beginning of the year 1814, the attitude of New England
pleased no one, and perhaps annoyed most the New England people
themselves, who were conscious of showing neither dignity, power,
courage, nor intelligence. Nearly one half the people of the five New
England States supported the war, but were paralyzed by the other half,
which opposed it. Of the peace party, one half wished to stop the war,
but was paralyzed by the other half, which threatened to desert their
leaders at the first overt act of treason. In this dead-lock every one
was dissatisfied, but no one seemed disposed to yield.

Such a situation could not last. In times of revolution treason might
be necessary, but inert perversity could at no time serve a useful
purpose. Yet the Massachusetts Federalists professed only a wish to
remain inert. Josiah Quincy, who fretted at restraints, and whose
instincts obliged him to act as energetically as he talked, committed
his party to the broad assertion that “a moral and religious people”
could not express admiration for heroism displayed in a cause they
disapproved. They would defend Massachusetts only by waiting to be
invaded; and if their safety depended on their possessing the outlet
of Lake Champlain, they would refuse to seize it if in doing so
they should be obliged to cross the Canadian line. With one accord
Massachusetts Federalists reiterated that until their territory should
be actually invaded, they would not take arms. After January 1, 1814,
when news of the battle of Leipzig arrived, the dreaded invasion of New
England became imminent; but the Federalists, officially and privately,
insisted on their doctrine of self-defence.

   “In the tumult of arms,” said Governor Strong in his speech to
   the legislature, January 12, 1814, “the passions of men are
   easily inflamed by artful misrepresentations; they are apt to
   lose sight of the origin of a contest, and to forget, either
   in the triumph of victory or the mortification of defeat, that
   the whole weight of guilt and wretchedness occasioned by war is
   chargeable upon that government which unreasonably begins the
   conflict, and upon those of its subjects who, voluntarily and
   without legal obligation, encourage and support it.”

The Massachusetts Senate echoed the sentiment in language more
emphatic:--

   “Beyond that submission which laws enacted agreeably to the
   Constitution make necessary, and that self-defence which the
   obligation to repel hostile invasions justifies, a people can
   give no encouragement to a war of such a character without
   becoming partakers in its guilt, and rendering themselves
   obnoxious to those just retributions of Divine vengeance by
   which, sooner or later, the authors and abettors of such a war
   will be assuredly overtaken.”

The House of Representatives could see but one contingency that
warranted Massachusetts in making voluntary exertion:--

   “It is only after the failure of an attempt to negotiate,
   prosecuted with evidence of these dispositions on the part of
   our Administration, that any voluntary support of this unhappy
   war can be expected from our constituents.”

In thus tempting blows from both sides, Massachusetts could hardly fail
to suffer more than by choosing either alternative. Had she declared
independence, England might have protected and rewarded her. Had she
imitated New York in declaring for the Union, probably the Union would
not have allowed her to suffer in the end. The attempt to resist both
belligerents forfeited the forbearance of both. The displeasure of
Great Britain was shown by a new proclamation, dated April 25, 1814,
including the ports of New England in the blockade; so that the whole
coast of the Union, from New Brunswick to Texas, was declared to be
closed to commerce by “a naval force adequate to maintain the said
blockade in the most rigorous and effective manner.”[1]

However annoying the blockade might be, it was a trifling evil compared
with other impending dangers from Great Britain. Invasion might be
expected, and its object was notorious. England was known to regret the
great concessions she had made in the definitive treaty of 1783. She
wished especially to exclude the Americans from the fisheries, and to
rectify the Canadian boundary by recovering a portion of Maine, then a
part of Massachusetts. If Massachusetts by her neutral attitude should
compel President Madison to make peace on British terms, Massachusetts
must lose the fisheries and part of the District of Maine; nor was it
likely that any American outside of New England would greatly regret
her punishment.

The extreme Federalists felt that their position could not be
maintained, and they made little concealment of their wish to commit
the State in open resistance to the Union. They represented as yet only
a minority of their party; but in conspiracies, men who knew what they
wanted commonly ended by controlling the men who did not. Pickering
was not popular; but he had the advantage of following a definite
plan, familiar for ten years to the party leaders, and founded on the
historical idea of a New England Confederation.[2] For Pickering,
disunion offered no terrors. “On the contrary,” he wrote, July 4, 1813,
“I believe an immediate separation would be a real blessing to the
‘good old thirteen States,’ as John Randolph once called them.”[3] His
views on this subject were expressed with more or less fidelity and
with much elaboration in a pamphlet published in 1813 by his literary
representative, John Lowell.[4] His policy was as little disguised as
his theoretical opinions; and in the early part of the year 1814, under
the pressure of the embargo, he thought that the time had come for
pressing his plan for a fourth time on the consideration of his party.
Without consulting his old associates of the Essex Junto, he stimulated
action among the people and in the State legislature.

The first step was, as usual, to hold town-meetings and adopt addresses
to the General Court. Some forty towns followed this course, and voted
addresses against the embargo and the war. Their spirit was fairly
represented by one of the most outspoken, adopted by a town-meeting at
Amherst, over which Noah Webster presided Jan. 3, 1814.[5] The people
voted--

   “That the representatives of this town in the General Court are
   desired to use their influence to induce that honorable body to
   take the most vigorous and decisive measures compatible with the
   Constitution to put an end to this hopeless war, and to restore
   to us the blessings of peace. What measures it will be proper
   to take, we pretend not to prescribe; but whatever measures
   they shall think it expedient to adopt, either separately or in
   conjunction with the neighboring States, they may rely upon our
   faithful support.”

The town of Newbury in Essex County made itself conspicuous by
adopting, January 31, a memorial inviting bloodshed:--

   “We remember the resistance of our fathers to oppressions which
   dwindle into insignificance when compared with those which we
   are called on to endure. The rights ‘which we have received
   from God we will never yield to man.’ We call on our State
   legislature to protect us in the enjoyment of those privileges
   to assert which our fathers died, and to defend which we profess
   ourselves ready to resist unto blood. We pray your honorable
   body to adopt measures immediately to secure to us especially
   our undoubted right of trade within our State. We are ourselves
   ready to aid you in securing it to us to the utmost of our
   power, ‘peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must;’ and we pledge
   to you the sacrifice of our lives and property in support of
   whatever measures the dignity and liberties of this free,
   sovereign, and independent State may seem to your wisdom to
   demand.”

The voters of Newbury were constituents of Pickering. Their address
could not have reached him at Washington when a few days afterward he
wrote to Samuel Putnam, an active member of the General Court, then in
session, urging that the time for remonstrances had passed, and the
time for action had come:[6]--

   “Declarations of this sort by Massachusetts, especially if
   concurred in by the other New England States, would settle the
   business at once. But though made now by Massachusetts alone,
   you surely may rely on the co-operation of New Hampshire, Rhode
   Island, and Connecticut, and I doubt not of Vermont and New
   York. With the executives and legislatures of most, and the
   representatives of all of them, you can freely communicate.
   Ought there not to be a proposal of a convention of delegates
   from those six States?”

The project of a New England convention was well understood to violate
the Constitution, and for that reason alone the cautious Federalists
disliked and opposed it. Doubtless a mere violence done to the law
did not necessarily imply a wish for disunion. The Constitution was
violated more frequently by its friends than by its enemies, and often
the extent of such violations measured the increasing strength of the
Union. In such matters intent was everything; and the intent of the
proposed New England convention was made evident by the reluctance with
which the leaders slowly yielded to the popular demand.

The addresses of the towns to the General Court were regularly referred
to a committee, which reported February 18,[7] in a spirit not
altogether satisfactory to the advocates of action:--

   “Whenever the national compact is violated and the citizens
   of this State are oppressed by cruel and unauthorized laws,
   the legislature is bound to interpose its power and wrest from
   the oppressor his victim. This is the spirit of our Union, and
   thus it has been explained by the very man who now sets at
   defiance all the principles of his early political life.... On
   the subject of a convention, the committee observe that they
   entertain no doubt of the right of the legislature to invite
   other States to a convention and to join it themselves for
   the great purposes of consulting for the general good, and of
   procuring Amendments to the Constitution whenever they find that
   the practical construction given to it by the rulers for the
   time being is contrary to its true spirit and injurious to their
   immediate constituents.... This was the mode proposed by Mr.
   Madison[8] in answer to objections made as to the tendency of
   the general government to usurp upon that of the States.”

The _argumentum ad personam_ commonly proved only weakness.
Madison’s authority on these points had always been rejected by the
Federalists when in power; and even he had never asserted the right
of States to combine in convention for resistance to measures of
the national government, as the General Court was asked to do. So
revolutionary was the step that the committee of both Houses shrank
from it: “They have considered that there are reasons which render
it inexpedient at the present moment to exercise this power.” They
advised that the subject should not be immediately decided, but
should be referred to the representatives soon to be returned for the
next General Court, who would “come from the people still more fully
possessed of their views and wishes as to the all-important subject of
obtaining by future compact, engrafted into the present Constitution,
a permanent security against future abuses of power, and of seeking
effectual redress for the grievances and oppressions now endured.”

To the people, therefore, the subject of a New England convention was
expressly referred. The issue was well understood, and excluded all
others in the coming April election. So serious was the emergency,
and so vital to the Administration and the war was the defeat of a
New England convention, that the Republicans put forward no party
candidate, but declared their intention to vote for Samuel Dexter, a
Federalist,--although Dexter, in a letter dated February 14, reiterated
his old opinions hostile to the embargo, and professed to be no further
a Republican than that he offered no indiscriminate opposition to the
war. His Federalism was that of Rufus King and Bayard.

   “What good is to be expected,” he asked,[9] “from creating
   division when engaged in war with a powerful nation that has
   not yet explicitly shown that she is willing to agree to
   reasonable terms of peace? Why make publications and speeches
   to prove that we are absolved from allegiance to the national
   government, and hint that an attempt to divide the empire might
   be justified?... The ferocious contest that would be the effect
   of attempting to skulk from a participation of the burdens of
   war would not be the greatest calamity.”

Under such circumstances the load of the embargo became too heavy for
the Massachusetts Republicans to carry. They tried in every manner to
throw it off, as persistently as President Madison tried to hold it
on. Their candidate, Dexter, argued strongly against the restrictive
system in his letter consenting to stand. They drew a distinction
between the restrictive system and the war; but even in regard to the
war they required not active support, but only abstinence from active
resistance. The Federalists used the embargo to stimulate resistance
to the war, and advocated a New England convention under cover of the
unpopularity of commercial restrictions.

With the pertinacity which was his most remarkable trait, Madison clung
to the embargo all winter in face of overwhelming motives to withdraw
it. A large majority in Congress disliked it. England having recovered
her other markets could afford to conquer the American as she had
conquered the European, and to wait a few months for her opportunity.
The embargo bankrupted the Treasury, threatened to stop the operations
of war, and was as certain as any ordinary antecedent of a consequent
result to produce a New England convention. Yet the President
maintained it until the news from Europe caused a panic in Congress.

The Massachusetts election took place in the first days of April,
while Congress was engaged in repealing the embargo and the system
of commercial restrictions. The result showed that Dexter might have
carried the State and defeated the project of a New England convention,
had the embargo been repealed a few weeks earlier. A very large
vote, about one hundred and two thousand in aggregate, was cast. The
Federalists, whose official vote in 1813 was 56,754, threw 56,374
votes; while the Republicans, who cast 42,789 votes in 1813, numbered
45,359 in 1814.

The reduction of the Federalist majority from fourteen thousand to
eleven thousand was not the only reason for believing that Dexter
might have carried Massachusetts but for the embargo. At the same time
William Plumer, supported like Dexter by the Republicans, very nearly
carried New Hampshire, and by gaining a majority of the executive
council, precluded the possibility that New Hampshire as a State
could take part in a New England convention. The President’s Message
recommending a repeal of the embargo was sent to Congress March 31, and
the Act of Repeal was signed April 14. Two weeks later, April 28, the
New York election took place. To this election both parties anxiously
looked. The Administration press admitted that all was lost if New York
joined Massachusetts,[10] and the New England Federalists knew that a
decisive defeat in New York would leave them to act alone. The returns
were watched with such anxiety as had seldom attended a New York
election, although no general State officer was to be chosen.

In May, 1813, Governor Tompkins carried the State by a majority of only
3,506, and the Federalists in the House of Assembly numbered sixty,
while the Republicans numbered fifty-two. The city of New York and
the counties of Queens, Westchester, Dutchess, Columbia, Rensselaer,
and Washington--the entire range of counties on the east shore of the
Hudson--were then Federalist. The counties of Albany, Montgomery,
Oneida, Otsego, Madison, and Ontario in the centre of the State
were also Federalist. At the congressional election of 1812, twenty
Federalists and six Republicans had been chosen. The May election
of 1814 was for the State Assembly and for Congress. No opportunity
was given for testing the general opinion of the State on a single
issue, but no one could mistake what the general opinion was. City and
State reversed their political character. The Republicans recovered
possession of the Assembly with a large majority of seventy-four to
thirty-eight, and the Congressional delegation numbered twenty-one
Republicans and only six Federalists.

The result was supposed to be largely due to a dislike of the New
England scheme and to a wish among New York Federalists that it should
be stopped. The energy of the demonstration in New York marked the
beginning of an epoch in national character; yet the change came too
late to save Massachusetts from falling for the first time into the
hands of the extreme Federalists. The towns of Massachusetts chose as
their representatives to the General Court a majority bent on taking
decisive action against the war. Connecticut and Rhode Island were
controlled by the same impulse, and the discouraged Republicans could
interpose no further resistance. A New England convention could be
prevented only by a treaty of peace.

The effect of the attitude of New England was felt throughout the
Union, and, combined with the news from Europe, brought a general
conviction that peace must be made. No man in the Union was more
loyal to the war than Governor Shelby of Kentucky, but Shelby already
admitted that peace had become necessary.

   “I may in confidence confess to you,” wrote Shelby, April 8,[11]
   “that I lament over my country that she has in her very bosom a
   faction as relentless as the fire that is unquenchable, capable
   of thwarting her best interests, and whose poisonous breath is
   extending to every corner of the Union. There is but one way
   to cure the evil, and that is an awful and desperate one; and
   in the choice of evils we had better take the least. Were we
   unanimous I should feel it less humiliating to be conquered, as
   I verily believe that the Administration will be driven to peace
   _on any terms_ by the opposition to the war.”

If Governor Shelby had reached this conclusion before he knew the
result of the Massachusetts election, the great mass of citizens who
had been from the first indifferent to the war felt that peace on any
terms could no longer be postponed. Mere disunion was not the result
chiefly to be feared. That disunion might follow a collapse of the
national government was possible; but for the time, Massachusetts
seemed rather disposed to sacrifice the rest of the Union for her own
power than to insist on a separation. Had the Eastern States suffered
from the hardships of war they might have demanded disunion in despair;
but in truth New England was pleased at the contrast between her own
prosperity and the sufferings of her neighbors. The blockade and the
embargo brought wealth to her alone. The farming and manufacturing
industries of New England never grew more rapidly than in the midst of
war and commercial restrictions.[12] “Machinery for manufactures, etc.,
and the fruits of household industry increase beyond calculation,”
said a writer in the “Connecticut Herald” in July, 1813. “Wheels roll,
spindles whirl, shuttles fly. We shall export to other States many
more productions of industry than ever were exported in any one former
season.” Manufactures were supposed to amount in value to fifteen or
twenty million dollars a year. The Federalists estimated the balance
due by the Southern States to New England at six million dollars a
year.[13] The New England banks were believed to draw not less than
half a million dollars every month from the South.

   “We are far from rejoicing at this state of things,” wrote a
   Connecticut Federalist;[14] “and yet we cannot but acknowledge
   the hand of retributive justice in inflicting the calamities
   of war with so much more severity on that section of the Union
   which has so rashly and so unmercifully persisted in their
   determination to commence hostilities. The pressure of this
   balance is sensibly felt, and will continue to increase as long
   as the war continues.”

John Lowell declared[15] that “the banks are at their wits’ end to lend
their capital, and money is such a drug ... that men against their
consciences, their honor, their duty, their professions and promises,
are willing to lend it secretly to support the very measures which
are intended and calculated for their ruin.” To avoid the temptation
of lending money to support Madison’s measures, many investors bought
British government bills of exchange at twenty to twenty-two per cent
discount. These bills were offered for sale in quantities at Boston;
and perhaps the most legitimate reason for their presence there was
that they were taken by New England contractors in payment for beef and
flour furnished to the British commissariat in Canada.

While New England thus made profits from both sides, and knew not what
to do with the specie that flowed into her banks, the rest of the
country was already insolvent, and seemed bent on bankruptcy. In March,
1814, the legislature of Pennsylvania passed a bill for the creation of
forty-one new banks. March 19 Governor Snyder vetoed it.[16]

   “It is a fact well ascertained,” said Governor Snyder, “that
   immense sums of specie have been withdrawn from the banks in
   Pennsylvania and certain other States to pay balances for
   British goods which Eastern mercantile cupidity has smuggled
   into the United States. The demand for specie has in consequence
   been and is still so great that the banks in Philadelphia and in
   some other parts have stopped discounting any new paper. I ask a
   patriotic legislature, Is this an auspicious era to try so vast
   an experiment? Shall we indirectly aid our internal and external
   enemies to destroy our funds and embarrass the government by
   the creating of forty-one new banks which must have recourse
   for specie to that already much exhausted source? Is there at
   this time an intelligent man in Pennsylvania who believes that a
   bank-note of any description is the representative of specie?”

The Pennsylvania legislature instantly overrode Governor Snyder’s veto
and chartered the new banks, which were, according to the governor,
insolvent before they had legal existence. In ordinary times such
follies punished and corrected themselves in regular course; but in
1814 the follies and illusions of many years concentrated their
mischiefs on the national government, which was already unequal to
the burden of its own. The war was practically at an end as far as
the government conducted it. The army could not show a regiment with
ranks more than half full.[17] The first three months of the year
produced less than six thousand recruits.[18] The government could
defend the frontier only at three or four fortified points. On the
ocean, government vessels were scarcely to be seen. The Treasury was
as insolvent as the banks, and must soon cease even the pretence of
meeting its obligations.

The Secretary of the Treasury, authorized by law to borrow twenty-five
millions and needing forty, offered a loan for only ten millions
shortly before Congress adjourned. In Boston the government brokers
advertised that the names of subscribers should be kept secret,[19]
while the Boston “Gazette” of April 14 declared that “any man who lends
his money to the government at the present time will forfeit all claim
to common honesty and common courtesy among all true friends to the
country.” The offers, received May 2, amounted to thirteen millions,
at rates varying from seventy-five to eighty-eight. Jacob Barker, a
private banker of New York, offered five million dollars on his single
account. The secretary knew that Barker’s bid was not substantial, but
he told the President that if it had been refused “we could not have
obtained the ten millions without allowing terms much less favorable to
the government.”[20] The terms were bad at best. The secretary obtained
bids more or less substantial for about nine millions at eighty-eight,
with the condition that if he should accept lower terms for any part
of the sixteen millions still to be offered, the same terms should be
conceded to Barker and his associates. The operation was equivalent to
borrowing nine millions on an understanding that the terms should be
fixed at the close of the campaign. Of this loan Boston offered two
millions, and was allotted about, one million dollars.

The event proved that Campbell would have done better to accept all
solid bids without regard to rate, for the government could have
afforded to pay two dollars for one within a twelve-month, rather
than stop payments; but Campbell was earnest to effect his loan at
eighty-eight, and accordingly accepted only four million dollars
besides Barker’s offer. With these four millions, with whatever part
of five millions could be obtained from Barker, with interest-bearing
Treasury notes limited to ten million dollars,[21] and with the
receipts from taxes, the Treasury was to meet demands aggregating about
forty millions for the year; for the chance was small that another
loan could succeed, no matter what rate should be offered.

For this desperate situation of the government New England was chiefly
responsible. In pursuing their avowed object of putting an end to
the war the Federalists obtained a degree of success surprising even
to themselves, and explained only by general indifference toward the
war and the government. No one could suppose that the New England
Federalists, after seeing their object within their grasp, would desist
from effecting it. They had good reason to think that between Madison’s
obstinacy and their own, the national government must cease its
functions,--that the States must resume their sovereign powers, provide
for their own welfare, and enter into some other political compact; but
they could not suppose that England would forego her advantages, or
consent to any peace which should not involve the overthrow of Madison
and his party.

In such conditions of society morbid excitement was natural. Many
examples in all periods of history could be found to illustrate every
stage of a mania so common. The excitement of the time was not confined
to New England. A typical American man-of-the-world was Gouverneur
Morris. Cool, easy-tempered, incredulous, with convictions chiefly
practical, and illusions largely rhetorical, Morris delivered an
oration on the overthrow of Napoleon to a New York audience, June 29,
1814.

   “And thou too, Democracy! savage and wild!” began Morris’s
   peroration,--“thou who wouldst bring down the virtuous and wise
   to the level of folly and guilt! thou child of squinting envy
   and self-tormenting spleen! thou persecutor of the great and
   good!--see! though it blast thine eyeballs,--see the objects
   of thy deadly hate! See lawful princes surrounded by loyal
   subjects!... Let those who would know the idol of thy devotion
   seek him in the island of Elba!”

The idea that American democracy was savage and wild stood in flagrant
contrast to the tameness of its behavior; but the belief was a part
of conservative faith, and Gouverneur Morris was not ridiculed, even
for bad taste, by the society to which he belonged, because he called
by inappropriate epithets the form of society which most of his
fellow-citizens preferred. In New England, where democracy was equally
reviled, kings and emperors were not equally admired. The austere
virtue of the Congregational Church viewed the subject in a severer
light, and however extreme might be the difference of conviction
between clergymen and democrats, it was not a subject for ridicule.

To men who believed that every calamity was a Divine judgment, politics
and religion could not be made to accord. Practical politics, being
commonly an affair of compromise and relative truth,--a human attempt
to modify the severity of Nature’s processes,--could not expect
sympathy from the absolute and abstract behests of religion. Least
of all could war, even in its most necessary form, be applauded or
encouraged by any clergyman who followed the precepts of Christ. The
War of 1812 was not even a necessary war. Only in a metaphysical or
dishonest sense could any clergyman affirm that war was more necessary
in 1812 than in any former year since the peace of 1783. Diplomacy had
so confused its causes that no one could say for what object Americans
had intended to fight,--still less, after the peace in Europe, for
what object they continued their war. Assuming the conquest of Canada
and of Indian Territory to be the motive most natural to the depraved
instincts of human nature, the clergy saw every reason for expecting a
judgment.

In general, the New England clergy did not publicly or violently press
these ideas. The spirit of their class was grave and restrained rather
than noisy. Yet a few eccentric or exceptional clergymen preached
and published Fast-day sermons that threw discredit upon the whole
Congregational Church. The chief offenders were two,--David Osgood,
of the church at Medford, and Elijah Parish, a graduate of Dartmouth
College, settled over the parish of Byfield in the town of Newbury,
where political feeling was strong. Parish’s Fast-day sermon of April
7, 1814, immediately after the election which decided a New England
convention, was probably the most extreme made from the pulpit:--

   “Israel’s woes in Egypt terminated in giving them the fruits
   of their own labors. This was a powerful motive for them to
   dissolve their connection with the Ancient Dominion. Though
   their fathers had found their union with Egypt pleasant and
   profitable, though they had been the most opulent section in
   Egypt, yet since the change of the administration their schemes
   had been reversed, their employments changed, their prosperity
   destroyed, their vexations increased beyond all sufferance.
   They were tortured to madness at seeing the fruit of their
   labors torn from them to support a profligate administration....
   They became discouraged; they were perplexed. Moses and others
   exhorted them not to despair, and assured them that _one_ mode
   of relief would prove effectual. Timid, trembling, alarmed, they
   hardly dared to make the experiment. Finally they dissolved the
   Union: they marched; the sea opened; Jordan stopped his current;
   Canaan received their triumphant banners; the trees of the field
   clapped their hands; the hills broke forth into songs of joy;
   they feasted on the fruits of their own labors. Such success
   awaits a resolute and pious people.”

Although Parish’s rhetoric was hardly in worse taste than that of
Gouverneur Morris, such exhortations were not held in high esteem by
the great body of the Congregational clergy, whose teachings were
studiously free from irreverence or extravagance in the treatment of
political subjects.[22] A poor and straitened but educated class, of
whom not one in four obtained his living wholly from his salary, the
New England ministers had long ceased to speak with the authority
of their predecessors, and were sustained even in their moderate
protest against moral wrong rather by pride of class and sincerity
of conviction than by sense of power. Some supported the war; many
deprecated disunion; nearly all confined their opposition within the
limits of non-resistance. They held that as the war was unnecessary and
unjust, no one could give it voluntary aid without incurring the guilt
of blood.

The attitude was clerical, and from that point of view commanded a
degree of respect such as was yielded to the similar conscientiousness
of the Friends; but it was fatal to government and ruinous to New
England. Nothing but confusion could result from it if the war should
continue, while the New England church was certain to be the first
victim if peace should invigorate the Union.




                              CHAPTER II.


AFTER the close of the campaign on the St. Lawrence, in
November, 1813, General Wilkinson’s army, numbering about eight
thousand men, sick and well, went into winter-quarters at French Mills,
on the Canada line, about eight miles south of the St. Lawrence.
Wilkinson was unfit for service, and asked leave to remove to Albany,
leaving Izard in command; but Armstrong was not yet ready to make the
new arrangements, and Wilkinson remained with the army during the
winter. His force seemed to stand in a good position for annoying the
enemy and interrupting communications between Upper and Lower Canada;
but it lay idle between November 13 and February 1, when, under orders
from Armstrong, it was broken up.[23] Brigadier-General Brown, with two
thousand men, was sent to Sackett’s Harbor. The rest of the army was
ordered to fall back to Plattsburg,--a point believed most likely to
attract the enemy’s notice in the spring.[24]

Wilkinson obeyed, and found himself, in March, at Plattsburg with
about four thousand effectives. He was at enmity with superiors and
subordinates alike; but the chief object of his antipathy was the
Secretary of War. From Plattsburg, March 27, he wrote a private letter
to Major-General Dearborn,[25] whose hostility to the secretary was
also pronounced: “I know of his [Armstrong’s] secret underworkings, and
have therefore, to take the bull by the horns, demanded an arrest and
a court-martial.... Good God! I am astonished at the man’s audacity,
when he must be sensible of the power I have over him.” Pending the
reply to his request for a court-martial, Wilkinson determined to make
a military effort. “My advanced post is at Champlain on this side. I
move to-day; and the day after to-morrow, if the ice, snow, and frost
should not disappear, we shall visit the Lacolle, and take possession
of that place. This is imperiously enjoined to check the reinforcements
he [Prevost] continues to send to the Upper Province.”[26]

The Lacolle was a small river, or creek, emptying into the Sorel
four or five miles beyond the boundary. According to the monthly
return of the troops commanded by Major-General de Rottenburg, the
British forces stationed about Montreal numbered, Jan. 22, 1814, eight
thousand rank-and-file present for duty. Of these, eight hundred and
eighty-five were at St. John’s; six hundred and ninety were at Isle
aux Noix, with outposts at Lacadie and Lacolle of three hundred and
thirty-two men.[27]

Wilkinson knew that the British outpost at the crossing of Lacolle
Creek, numbering two hundred men all told,[28] was without support
nearer than Isle aux Noix ten miles away; but it was stationed
in a stone mill, with thick walls and a solid front. He took two
twelve-pound field-guns to batter the mill, and crossing the boundary,
March 30, with his four thousand men, advanced four or five miles to
Lacolle Creek. The roads were obstructed and impassable, but his troops
made their way in deep snow through the woods until they came within
sight of the mill. The guns were then placed in position and opened
fire; but Wilkinson was disconcerted to find that after two hours the
mill was unharmed. He ventured neither to storm it nor flank it; and
after losing more than two hundred men by the fire of the garrison, he
ordered a retreat, and marched his army back to Champlain.

With this last example of his military capacity Wilkinson disappeared
from the scene of active life, where he had performed so long and
extraordinary a part. Orders arrived, dated March 24, relieving him
from duty under the form of granting his request for a court of
inquiry. Once more he passed the ordeal of a severe investigation, and
received the verdict of acquittal; but he never was again permitted to
resume his command in the army.

The force Wilkinson had brought from Lake Ontario, though united
with that which Wade Hampton had organized, was reduced by sickness,
expiration of enlistments, and other modes of depletion to a mere
handful when Major-General Izard arrived at Plattsburg on the first
day of May. Izard’s experience formed a separate narrative, and made
a part of the autumn campaign. During the early summer the war took
a different and unexpected direction, following the steps of the new
Major-General Brown; for wherever Brown went, fighting followed.

General Brown marched from French Mills, February 13, with two thousand
men. February 28, Secretary Armstrong wrote him a letter suggesting an
attack on Kingston, to be covered by a feint on Niagara.[29] Brown, on
arriving at Sackett’s Harbor, consulted Chauncey, and allowed himself
to be dissuaded from attacking Kingston. “By some extraordinary mental
process,” Armstrong thought,[30] Brown and Chauncey “arrived at the
same conclusion,--that the main action, an attack on Kingston, being
impracticable, the _ruse_, intended merely to mask it, might do as
well.” Brown immediately marched with two thousand men for Niagara.

When the secretary learned of this movement, although it was contrary
to his ideas of strategy, he wrote an encouraging letter to Brown,
March 20:[31]

   “You have mistaken my meaning.... If you hazard anything by this
   mistake, correct it promptly by returning to your post. If on
   the other hand you left the Harbor with a competent force for
   its defence, go on and prosper. Good consequences are sometimes
   the result of mistakes.”

The correspondence showed chiefly that neither the secretary nor the
general had a distinct idea, and that Brown’s campaign, like Dearborn’s
the year before, received its direction from Chauncey, whose repugnance
to attacking Kingston was invincible.

Brown was shown his mistake by Gaines, before reaching Buffalo March
24, and leaving his troops, he hurried back to Sackett’s Harbor,
“the most unhappy man alive.”[32] He resumed charge of such troops
as remained at the Harbor, while Winfield Scott formed a camp of
instruction at Buffalo, and, waiting for recruits who never came,
personally drilled the officers of all grades. Scott’s energy threw
into the little army a spirit and an organization strange to the
service. Three months of instruction converted the raw troops into
soldiers.

Meanwhile Brown could do nothing at Sackett’s Harbor. The British
held control of the Lake, while Commodore Chauncey and the contractor
Eckford were engaged in building a new ship which was to be ready
in July. The British nearly succeeded in preventing Chauncey from
appearing on the Lake during the entire season, for no sooner did Sir
James Yeo sail from Kingston in the spring than he attempted to destroy
the American magazines. Owing to the remote situation of Sackett’s
Harbor in the extreme northern corner of the State, all supplies and
war material were brought first from the Hudson River to Oswego by way
of the Mohawk River and Oneida Lake. About twelve miles above Oswego
the American magazines were established, and there the stores were kept
until they could be shipped on schooners, and forwarded fifty miles
along the Lake-shore to Sackett’s Harbor,--always a hazardous operation
in the face of an enemy’s fleet. The destruction of the magazines would
have been fatal to Chauncey, and even the capture or destruction of the
schooners with stores was no trifling addition to his difficulties.

Sir James Yeo left Kingston May 4, and appeared off Oswego the next
day, bringing a large body of troops, numbering more than a thousand
rank-and-file.[33] They found only about three hundred men to oppose
them, and having landed May 6, they gained possession of the fort
which protected the harbor of Oswego. The Americans made a resistance
which caused a loss of seventy-two men killed and wounded to the
British, among the rest Captain Mulcaster of the Royal Navy, an active
officer, who was dangerously wounded. The result was hardly worth the
loss. Four schooners were captured or destroyed, and some twenty-four
hundred barrels of flour, pork, and salt, but nothing of serious
importance.[34] Yeo made no attempt to ascend the river, and retired to
Kingston after destroying whatever property he could not take away.

Although the chief American depot escaped destruction, the disgrace and
discouragement remained, that after two years of war the Americans,
though enjoying every advantage, were weaker than ever on Lake Ontario,
and could not defend even so important a point as Oswego from the
attack of barely a thousand men. Their coastwise supply of stores to
Sackett’s Harbor became a difficult and dangerous undertaking, to be
performed mostly by night.[35] Chauncey remained practically blockaded
in Sackett’s Harbor; and without his fleet in control of the Lake the
army could do nothing effectual against Kingston.

In this helplessness, Armstrong was obliged to seek some other line on
which the army could be employed against Upper Canada; and the idea
occurred to him that although he had no fleet on Lake Ontario he had
one on Lake Erie, which by a little ingenuity might enable the army to
approach the heart of Upper Canada at the extreme western end of Lake
Ontario. “Eight or even six thousand men,” Armstrong wrote[36] to the
President, April 30, “landed in the bay between Point Abino and Fort
Erie, and operating either on the line of the Niagara, or more directly
if a more direct route is found, against the British post at the head
of Burlington Bay, cannot be resisted with effect without compelling
the enemy so to weaken his more eastern posts as to bring them within
reach of our means at Sackett’s Harbor and Plattsburg.”

Armstrong’s suggestion was made to the President April 30. Already
time was short. The allies had entered Paris March 31; the citadel of
Bayonne capitulated to Wellington April 28. In a confidential despatch
dated June 3, Lord Bathurst notified the governor-general of Canada
that ten thousand men had been ordered to be shipped immediately
for Quebec.[37] July 5, Major-General Torrens at the Horse-guards
informed Prevost that four brigades,--Brisbane’s, Kempt’s, Power’s, and
Robinson’s; fourteen regiments of Wellington’s best troops,--had sailed
from Bordeaux for Canada.[38] Prevost could afford in July to send
westward every regular soldier in Lower Canada, sure of replacing them
at Montreal by the month of August.

“A discrepancy in the opinions of the Cabinet,” according to
Armstrong,[39] delayed adoption of a plan till June, when a compromise
scheme was accepted,[40] but not carried out.

   “Two causes prevented its being acted upon _in extenso_,”
   Armstrong afterward explained,[41]--“the one, a total failure
   in getting together by militia calls and volunteer overtures
   a force deemed competent to a campaign of demonstration and
   manœuvre on the peninsula; the other, an apprehension that the
   fleet, which had been long inactive, would not yet be found
   in condition to sustain projects requiring from it a vigorous
   co-operation with the army.”

Brown might have been greatly strengthened at Niagara by drawing
from Detroit the men that could be spared there; but the Cabinet
obliged Armstrong to send the Detroit force--about nine hundred in
number--against Mackinaw. Early in July the Mackinaw expedition,
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Croghan, started from Detroit, and
August 4 it was defeated and returned. Croghan’s expedition did not
even arrive in time to prevent a British expedition from Mackinaw
crossing Wisconsin and capturing, July 19, the distant American post at
Prairie du Chien.[42]

Armstrong did not favor Croghan’s expedition, wishing to bring him and
his two batteries to reinforce Brown, but yielded to the Secretary of
the Navy, who wished to capture Mackinaw,[43] and to the promises
of Commodore Chauncey that on or before July 1 he would sail from
Sackett’s Harbor, and command the Lake. In reliance on Chauncey, the
Cabinet, except Monroe, decided that Major-General Brown should cross
to the Canadian side, above the Falls of Niagara, and march, with
Chauncey’s support, to Burlington Heights and to York.[44]

This decision was made June 7, and Armstrong wrote to Brown, June 10,
describing the movement intended.[45] The Secretary of the Navy, he
said, thought Chauncey could not be ready before July 15:

   “To give, however, immediate occupation to your troops, and to
   prevent their blood from stagnating, why not take Fort Erie and
   its garrison, stated at three or four hundred men? Land between
   Point Abino and Erie in the night; assail the Fort by land and
   water; push forward a corps to seize the bridge at Chippawa;
   and be governed by circumstances in either stopping there or
   going farther. Boats may follow and feed you. If the enemy
   concentrates his whole force on this line, as I think he will,
   it will not exceed two thousand men.”

Brown had left Sackett’s Harbor, and was at Buffalo when these orders
reached him. He took immediate measures to carry them out. Besides his
regular force, he called for volunteers to be commanded by Peter B.
Porter; and he wrote to Chauncey, June 21,[46] an irritating letter,
complaining of having received not a line from him, and giving a sort
of challenge to the navy to meet the army before Fort George, by July
10. The letter showed that opinion in the army ran against the navy,
and particularly against Chauncey, whom Brown evidently regarded
as a sort of naval Wilkinson. In truth, Brown could depend neither
upon Chauncey nor upon volunteers. The whole force he could collect
was hardly enough to cross the river, and little exceeded the three
thousand men on whose presence at once in the boats Alexander Smyth had
insisted eighteen months before, in order to capture Fort Erie.

So famous did Brown’s little army become, that the details of its force
and organization retained an interest equalled only by that which
attached to the frigates and sloops-of-war. Although the existence
of the regiments ceased with the peace, and their achievements were
limited to a single campaign of three or four months, their fame
would have insured them in any other service extraordinary honors and
sedulous preservation of their identity. Two small brigades of regular
troops, and one still smaller brigade of Pennsylvania volunteers, with
a corps of artillery, composed the entire force. The first brigade was
commanded by Brigadier-General Winfield Scott, and its monthly return
of June 30,1814, reported its organization and force as follows:[47]--


             _Strength of the First, or Scott’s, Brigade._

                                PRESENT FOR DUTY.            AGGREGATE.
                          /--------------^-------------\
                          Non-com. Officers,   Officers.    Present and
                            rank-and-file.                    absent.

   Ninth Regiment                332              16            642
   Eleventh Regiment             416              17            577
   Twenty-second Regiment        217              12            287
   Twenty-fifth Regiment         354              16            619
   General Staff                                   4              4
                                ----              --           ----
       Total                    1319              65           2129

The Ninth regiment came from Massachusetts, and in this campaign was
usually commanded by its lieutenant-colonel, Thomas Aspinwall, or
by Major Henry Leavenworth. The Eleventh was raised in Vermont, and
was led by Major John McNeil. The Twenty-second was a Pennsylvania
regiment, commanded by its colonel, Hugh Brady. The Twenty-fifth was
enlisted in Connecticut, and identified by the name of T. S. Jesup,
one of its majors. The whole brigade, officers and privates, numbered
thirteen hundred and eighty-four men present for duty on the first day
of July, 1814.

The Second, or Ripley’s, brigade was still smaller, and became even
more famous. Eleazar Wheelock Ripley was born in New Hampshire, in the
year 1782. He became a resident of Portland in Maine, and was sent as a
representative to the State legislature at Boston, where he was chosen
speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, Jan. 17, 1812,
on the retirement of Joseph Story to become a Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States. A few weeks afterward, March 12, 1812,
Ripley took the commission of lieutenant-colonel of the Twenty-first
regiment, to be enlisted in Massachusetts. A year afterward he
became colonel of the same regiment, and took part in the battle of
Chrystler’s Field. Secretary Armstrong made him a brigadier-general
April 15, 1814, his commission bearing date about a month after that
of Winfield Scott. Both the new brigadiers were sent to Niagara, where
Scott formed a brigade from regiments trained by himself; and Ripley
was given a brigade composed of his old regiment, the Twenty-first,
with detachments from the Seventeenth and Nineteenth and Twenty-third.
The strength of the brigade, July 1, 1814, was reported in the monthly
return as follows:--


            _Strength of the Second, or Ripley’s, Brigade._

                                PRESENT FOR DUTY.            AGGREGATE.
                       +---------------^-----------------+
                       | Non-com. Officers,    Officers. |  Present and
                           rank-and-file.                     absent.

  Twenty-first Regiment         651               25            917
  Twenty-third Regiment         341                8            496
  General staff                                    2              2
                                ---               --           ----
      Total                     992               35           1415

Ripley’s old regiment, the Twenty-first, was given to Colonel
James Miller, who had served in the Tippecanoe campaign as major
in the Fourth Infantry, and had shared the misfortune of that
regiment at Detroit. The other regiment composing the brigade--the
Twenty-third--was raised in New York, and was usually commanded by
one or another of its majors, McFarland or Brooke. Ripley’s brigade
numbered one thousand and twenty-seven men present for duty, on the
first day of July.

The artillery, under the command of Major Hindman, was composed of four
companies.


            _Strength of Hindman’s Battalion of Artillery._

                       PRESENT FOR DUTY.    AGGREGATE.
    Towson’s Company          89               101
    Biddle’s Company          80               104
    Ritchie’s Company         96               133
    Williams’s Company        62                73
                             ---               ---
        Total                327               413

The militia brigade was commanded by Peter B. Porter, and consisted of
six hundred Pennsylvania volunteer militia, with about the same number
of Indians, comprising nearly the whole military strength of the Six
Nations.[48]


   _Strength of Major-General Brown’s Army, Buffalo, July 1, 1814._

                            PRESENT FOR DUTY.           AGGREGATE.
                    /--------------/\-------------\
                    Non-com. Officers,    Officers.    Present and
                      rank-and-file.                     absent.
    Artillery              330               15             413
    Scott’s Brigade       1312               65            2122
    Ripley’s Brigade       992               36            1415
    Porter’s Brigade       710               43             830
                          ----              ---            ----
        Total             3344              159            4780

Thus the whole of Brown’s army consisted of half-a-dozen skeleton
regiments, and including every officer, as well as all Porter’s
volunteers, numbered barely thirty-five hundred men present for duty.
The aggregate, including sick and absent, did not reach five thousand.

The number of effectives varied slightly from week to week, as men
joined or left their regiments; but the entire force never exceeded
thirty-five hundred men, exclusive of Indians.

According to the weekly return of June 22, 1814, Major-General
Riall, who commanded the right division of the British army, had a
force of four thousand rank-and-file present for duty; but of this
number the larger part were in garrison at York, Burlington Heights,
and Fort Niagara. His headquarters were at Fort George, where he
had nine hundred and twenty-seven rank-and-file present for duty.
Opposite Fort George, in Fort Niagara on the American side, five
hundred and seventy-eight rank-and-file were present for duty. At
Queenston were two hundred and fifty-eight; at Chippawa, four hundred
and twenty-eight; at Fort Erie, one hundred and forty-six. In all,
on the Niagara River Riall commanded two thousand three hundred and
thirty-seven rank-and-file present for duty. The officers, musicians,
etc., numbered three hundred and thirty-two. At that time only about
one hundred and seventy men were on the sick list. All told, sick
and well, the regular force numbered two thousand eight hundred and
forty men.[49] They belonged chiefly to the First, or Royal Scots; the
Eighth, or King’s; the Hundredth, the Hundred-and-third regiments, and
the Artillery, with a few dragoons.

As soon as Porter’s volunteers were ready, the whole American army
was thrown across the river. The operation was effected early in
the morning of July 3; and although the transport was altogether
insufficient, the movement was accomplished without accident or delay.
Scott’s brigade with the artillery landed below Fort Erie; Ripley
landed above; the Indians gained the rear; and the Fort, which was an
open work, capitulated at five o’clock in the afternoon. One hundred
and seventy prisoners, including officers of all ranks,[50] being
two companies of the Eighth and Hundredth British regiments were
surrendered by the major in command.

The next British position was at Chippawa, about sixteen miles below.
To Chippawa Major-General Riall hastened from Fort George, on hearing
that the American army had crossed the river above; and there, within a
few hours, he collected about fifteen hundred regulars and six hundred
militia and Indians, behind the Chippawa River, in a position not to
be assailed in front. The American army also hastened toward Chippawa.
On the morning of July 4 Scott’s brigade led the way, and after an
exhausting march of twelve hours, the enemy tearing up the bridges in
retiring, Scott reached Chippawa plain toward sunset, and found Riall’s
force in position beyond the Chippawa River. Scott could only retire a
mile or two, behind the nearest water,--a creek, or broad ditch, called
Street’s Creek,--where he went into camp. Brown and Ripley, with the
second brigade and artillery, came up two or three hours later, at
eleven o’clock in the night.[51] Porter followed the next morning.

Brown, knowing his numbers to be about twice those of Riall, was
anxious to attack before Riall could be reinforced; and on the morning
of July 5, leaving Ripley and Porter’s brigades encamped in the rear,
he reconnoitred the line of the Chippawa River, and gave orders for
constructing a bridge above Riall’s position. The bridge was likely
to be an affair of several days, and Riall showed a disposition to
interfere with it. His scouts and Indians crossed and occupied the
woods on the American left, driving in the pickets and annoying the
reconnoitring party, and even the camp. To dislodge them, Porter’s
volunteers and Indians were ordered forward to clear the woods; and at
about half-past four o’clock in the afternoon, Porter’s advance began
to drive the enemy’s Indians back, pressing forward nearly to the
Chippawa River. There the advancing volunteers and Indians suddenly
became aware that the whole British army was in the act of crossing
the Chippawa Bridge on their flank. The surprise was complete, and
Porter’s brigade naturally broke and fell back in confusion.[52]

  [Illustration:

    PLAN
    OF THE
    BATTLE OF CHIPPAWA

    STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N. Y.]

No one could have been more surprised than Brown, or more incredulous
than Scott, at Riall’s extraordinary movement. The idea that a British
force of two thousand men at most should venture to attack more than
three thousand, with artillery, covered by a deep, miry creek, had not
entered their minds. Riall drew up his little army in three columns on
the Chippawa plain,--the King’s regiment four hundred and eighty strong
in advance, supported by the Royal Scots five hundred strong, and the
Hundredth four hundred and fifty strong, with a troop of dragoons and
artillerists; in all about fifteen hundred regular troops, with two
twenty-four-pound field-pieces and a five-and-a-half inch howitzer. Six
hundred militia and Indians occupied the woods.[53] The whole force
advanced in order of battle toward Street’s Creek.

Brown was at the front when this movement was made. Porter was routed.
Ripley with the second brigade was in the rear. Scott, having rested
his brigade in the morning and given them a dinner to celebrate the
Fourth of July, had ordered a grand parade “to keep his men in breath,”
as he said; and while Riall’s regular force, fifteen hundred strong,
formed on the Chippawa plain a mile away, Scott’s brigade--which
a week before had been reported as containing thirteen hundred men
present for duty, and if all its details had been called in could
hardly have exceeded thirteen hundred men in the ranks on the afternoon
of July 5--was forming, before crossing the little bridge over Street’s
Creek to parade on the plain already occupied by the British. Owing to
the brushwood that lined the creek Scott could not see the plain, and
received no notice of danger until he approached the bridge at the head
of his brigade. At that moment General Brown in full gallop from the
front rode by, calling out in passing, “You will have a battle!”[54]
Scott remarked that he did not believe he should find three hundred
British to fight, and crossed the bridge.

If Riall was unwise to attack, Scott tempted destruction by leaving
his secure position behind the creek; but at that moment he was in his
happiest temper. He meant to show what he and his brigade could do. As
his thin column crossed the bridge, the British twenty-four-pound guns
opened upon it; but the American line moved on, steady as veterans,
and formed in order of battle beyond. Towson’s three twelve-pounders
were placed in position near the river on the extreme right, and opened
fire on the heavier British battery opposite. The infantry deployed in
three battalions,--the right, under Major Leavenworth of the Ninth;
the centre, under Major McNeil of the Eleventh; the left, under Major
Jesup of the Twenty-fifth. Throwing the flanks obliquely forward,
and extending Jesup’s battalion into the woods on the left to prevent
outflanking, Scott ordered an advance; and at the same time Riall
directed the Royal Scots and the Hundredth to charge.[55] The two
lines advanced, stopping alternately to fire and move forward, while
Towson’s guns, having blown up a British caisson, were turned on the
British column. The converging American fire made havoc in the British
ranks, and when the two lines came within some sixty or seventy paces
of each other in the centre, the flanks were actually in contact. Then
the whole British line broke and crumbled away.[56] Ripley’s brigade,
arriving soon afterward, found no enemy on the plain. The battle had
lasted less than an hour.

Riall’s report made no concealment of his defeat.[57]

   “I placed two light twenty-four-pounders and a five-and-a-half
   inch howitzer,” he said, “against the right of the enemy’s
   position, and formed the Royal Scots and Hundredth regiment with
   the intention of making a movement upon his left, which deployed
   with the greatest regularity and opened a very heavy fire. I
   immediately moved up the King’s regiment to the right, while
   the Royal Scots and Hundredth regiments were directed to charge
   the enemy in front, for which they advanced with the greatest
   gallantry under a most destructive fire. I am sorry to say,
   however, in this attempt they suffered so severely that I was
   obliged to withdraw them, finding their further efforts against
   the superior numbers of the enemy would be unavailing.”

For completeness, Scott’s victory at Chippawa could be compared with
that of Isaac Hull over the “Guerriere;” but in one respect Scott
surpassed Hull. The “Constitution” was a much heavier ship than its
enemy; but Scott’s brigade was weaker, both in men and guns, than
Riall’s force. Even in regulars, man against man, Scott was certainly
outnumbered. His brigade could not have contained, with artillerists,
more than thirteen hundred men present on the field,[58] while Riall
officially reported his regulars at fifteen hundred, and his irregular
corps at six hundred. Scott’s flank was exposed and turned by the
rout of Porter. He fought with a creek in his rear, where retreat was
destruction. He had three twelve-pound field-pieces, one of which was
soon dismounted, against two twenty-four-pounders and a five-and-a-half
inch howitzer. He crossed the bridge and deployed under the enemy’s
fire. Yet the relative losses showed that he was the superior of his
enemy in every respect, and in none more than in the efficiency of his
guns.

Riall reported a total loss in killed, wounded, and missing of five
hundred and fifteen men,[59] not including Indians. Scott and Porter
reported a total loss of two hundred and ninety-seven, not including
Indians. Riall’s regular regiments and artillery lost one hundred
and thirty-seven killed, and three hundred and five wounded. Scott’s
brigade reported forty-eight killed and two hundred and twenty-seven
wounded. The number of Riall’s killed was nearly three times the number
of Scott’s killed, and proved that the battle was decided by the
superior accuracy or rapidity of the musketry and artillery fire, other
military qualities being assumed to be equal.

The battle of Chippawa was the only occasion during the war when equal
bodies of regular troops met face to face, in extended lines on an open
plain in broad daylight, without advantage of position; and never again
after that combat was an army of American regulars beaten by British
troops. Small as the affair was, and unimportant in military results,
it gave to the United States army a character and pride it had never
before possessed.

Riall regained the protection of his lines without further loss; but
two days afterward Brown turned his position, and Riall abandoned it
with the whole peninsula except Fort George.[60] Leaving garrisons in
Fort George and Fort Niagara, he fell back toward Burlington Bay to
await reinforcements. Brown followed as far as Queenston, where he
camped July 10, doubtful what next to do. Fretting under the enforced
delay, he wrote to Commodore Chauncey, July 13, a letter that led to
much comment:[61]--

   “I have looked for your fleet with the greatest anxiety since
   the 10th. I do not doubt my ability to meet the enemy in the
   field, and to march in any direction over his country, your
   fleet carrying for me the necessary supplies.... There is not a
   doubt resting in my mind but that we have between us the command
   of sufficient means to conquer Upper Canada within two months,
   if there is a prompt and zealous co-operation and a vigorous
   application of these means.”

Brown, like Andrew Jackson, with the virtues of a militia general,
possessed some of the faults. His letter to Chauncey expressed his
honest belief; but he was mistaken, and the letter tended to create
a popular impression that Chauncey was wholly to blame. Brown could
not, even with Chauncey’s help, conquer Upper Canada. He was in danger
of being himself destroyed; and even at Queenston he was not safe.
Riall had already received, July 9, a reinforcement of seven hundred
regulars;[62] at his camp, only thirteen miles from Brown, he had
twenty-two hundred men; in garrison at Fort George and Niagara he
left more than a thousand men; Lieutenant-General Drummond was on his
way from Kingston with the Eighty-ninth regiment four hundred strong,
under Colonel Morrison, who had won the battle of Chrystler’s Field,
while still another regiment, DeWatteville’s, was on the march. Four
thousand men were concentrating on Fort George, and Chauncey, although
he might have delayed, could not have prevented their attacking Brown,
or stopping his advance.

Brown was so well aware of his own weakness that he neither tried to
assault Fort George nor to drive Riall farther away, although Ripley
and the two engineer officers McRee and Wood advised the attempt.[63]
After a fortnight passed below Queenston, he suddenly withdrew to
Chippawa July 24, and camped on the battle-field. Riall instantly
left his camp at eleven o’clock in the night of July 24, and followed
Brown’s retreat with about a thousand men, as far as Lundy’s Lane, only
a mile below the Falls of Niagara. There he camped at seven o’clock on
the morning of July 25, waiting for the remainder of his force, about
thirteen hundred men, who marched at noon, and were to arrive at sunset.

The battle of Chippawa and three weeks of active campaigning had told
on the Americans. According to the army returns of the last week in
July, Brown’s army at Chippawa, July 25, numbered twenty-six hundred
effectives.[64]


  _Strength of Major-General Brown’s Army, Chippawa, July 25, 1814._

                       PRESENT FOR DUTY.       AGGREGATE
                       Non-com. Officers      Present and
                         and Privates.          absent.
    Scott’s Brigade          1072                1422
    Ripley’s Brigade          895                1198
    Porter’s Brigade          441                 538
    Artillery                 236                 260
                            -----               -----
        Total                2644                3418

Thus Brown at Chippawa bridge, on the morning of July 25, with
twenty-six hundred men present for duty, had Riall within easy reach
three miles away at Lundy’s Lane, with only a thousand men; but Brown
expected no such sudden movement from the enemy, and took no measures
to obtain certain information. He was with reason anxious for his
rear. His position was insecure and unsatisfactory except for attack.
From the moment it became defensive, it was unsafe and needed to be
abandoned.

The British generals were able to move on either bank of the river.
While Riall at seven o’clock in the morning went into camp within a
mile of Niagara Falls, Lieutenant-General Gordon Drummond with the
Eighty-ninth regiment disembarked at Fort George, intending to carry
out a long-prepared movement on the American side.[65]

Gordon Drummond, who succeeded Major-General de Rottenburg in
the command of Upper Canada in December, 1813, and immediately
distinguished himself by the brilliant capture of Fort Niagara and
the destruction of Buffalo, was regarded as the ablest military
officer in Canada. Isaac Brock’s immediate successors in the civil and
military government of Upper Canada were Major-Generals Sheaffe and De
Rottenburg. Neither had won distinction; but Gordon Drummond was an
officer of a different character. Born in 1772, he entered the army in
1789 as an ensign in the First regiment, or Royal Scots, and rose in
1794 to be lieutenant-colonel of the Eighth, or King’s regiment. He
served in the Netherlands, the West Indies, and in Egypt, before being
ordered to Canada in 1808. In 1811 he became lieutenant-general. He was
at Kingston when his subordinate officer, Major-General Riall, lost the
battle of Chippawa and retired toward Burlington Heights. Having sent
forward all the reinforcements he could spare, Drummond followed as
rapidly as possible to take command in person.

No sooner did Drummond reach Fort George than, in pursuance of orders
previously given, he sent a detachment of about six hundred men across
the river to Lewiston. Its appearance there was at once made known
to Brown at Chippawa, only six or seven miles above, and greatly
alarmed him for the safety of his base at Fort Schlosser, Black Rock,
and Buffalo. Had Drummond advanced up the American side with fifteen
hundred men, as he might have done, he would have obliged Brown to
re-cross the river, and might perhaps have destroyed or paralyzed him;
but Drummond decided to join Riall, and accordingly, recalling the
detachment from Lewiston at four o’clock in the afternoon, he began his
march up the Canadian side with eight hundred and fifteen rank-and-file
to Lundy’s Lane.[66]

At five o’clock, July 25, the British army was nearly concentrated.
The advance under Riall at Lundy’s Lane numbered nine hundred and
fifty rank-and-file, with the three field-pieces which had been in the
battle of Chippawa, and either two or three six-pounders.[67] Drummond
was three miles below with eight hundred and fifteen rank-and-file,
marching up the river; and Colonel Scott of the One Hundred-and-third
regiment, with twelve hundred and thirty rank-and-file and two more
six-pound field-pieces, was a few miles behind Drummond.[68] By nine
o’clock in the evening the three corps, numbering three thousand
rank-and-file, with eight field-pieces, were to unite at Lundy’s Lane.

At a loss to decide on which bank the British generals meant to
move, Brown waited until afternoon, and then, in great anxiety for
the American side of the river, ordered Winfield Scott to march his
brigade down the road toward Queenston on the Canadian side, in the
hope of recalling the enemy from the American side by alarming him for
the safety of his rear. Scott, always glad to be in motion, crossed
Chippawa bridge, with his brigade and Towson’s battery, soon after
five o’clock, and to his great surprise, in passing a house near the
Falls, learned that a large body of British troops was in sight below.
With his usual audacity he marched directly upon them, and reaching
Lundy’s Lane, deployed to the left in line of battle. Jesup, Brady,
Leavenworth, and McNeil placed their little battalions, numbering at
the utmost a thousand rank-and-file, in position, and Towson opened
with his three guns. The field suited their ambition. The sun was
setting at the end of a long, hot, midsummer day. About a mile to their
right the Niagara River flowed through its chasm, and the spray of the
cataract rose in the distance behind them.

  [Illustration:

    PLAN OF THE
    BATTLE
    OF
    LUNDY’S LANE
    AT SUNSET

    STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N. Y.]

At the first report that the American army was approaching, Riall
ordered a retreat, and his advance was already in march from the field
when Drummond arrived with the Eighty-ninth regiment, and countermanded
the order.[69] Drummond then formed his line, numbering according to
his report sixteen hundred men, but in reality seventeen hundred and
seventy rank-and-file,[70]--the left resting on the high road, his
two twenty-four-pound brass field-pieces, two six-pounders, and a
five-and-a-half-inch howitzer a little advanced in front of his centre
on the summit of the low hill, and his right stretching forward so as
to overlap Scott’s position in attacking. Lundy’s Lane, at right angles
with the river, ran close behind the British position. Hardly had he
completed his formation, when, in his own words, “the whole front was
warmly and closely engaged.”

With all the energy Scott could throw into his blow, he attacked the
British left and centre. Drummond’s left stopped slightly beyond the
road, and was assailed by Jesup’s battalion, the Twenty-fifth regiment,
while Scott’s other battalions attacked in front. So vigorous was
Jesup’s assault that he forced back the Royal Scots and Eighty-ninth,
and got into the British rear, where he captured Major-General Riall
himself, as he left the field seriously wounded. “After repeated
attacks,” said Drummond’s report, “the troops on the left were
partially forced back, and the enemy gained a momentary possession
of the road.” In the centre also Scott attacked with obstinacy; but
the British artillery was altogether too strong and posted too high
for Towson’s three guns, which at last ceased firing.[71] There
the Americans made no impression, while they were overlapped and
outnumbered by the British right.

From seven till nine o’clock Scott’s brigade hung on the British left
and centre, charging repeatedly close on the enemy’s guns; and when at
last with the darkness their firing ceased from sheer exhaustion, they
were not yet beaten. Brady’s battalion, the Ninth and Twenty-second,
and McNeil’s, the Eleventh, were broken up; their ammunition was
exhausted, and most of their officers were killed or wounded. The
Eleventh and Twenty-second regiments lost two hundred and thirty men
killed, wounded, and missing, or more than half their number; many of
the men left the field, and only with difficulty could a battalion
be organized from the debris.[72] McNeil and Brady were wounded,
and Major Leavenworth took command of the remnant. With a small and
exhausted force which could not have numbered more than six hundred
men, and which Drummond by a vigorous movement might have wholly
destroyed, Scott clung to the enemy’s flank until in the darkness
Ripley’s brigade came down on the run. The American line was also
reinforced by Porter’s brigade; by the First regiment, one hundred and
fifty strong, which crossed from the American side of the river; and by
Ritchie’s and Biddle’s batteries.

At about the same time the rest of Riall’s force, twelve hundred and
thirty rank-and-file, with two more six-pound guns, appeared on the
field, and were placed in a second line or used to prolong the British
right. If Scott had lost four hundred men from the ranks Drummond
had certainly lost no more, for his men were less exposed. Brown was
obliged to leave details of men for camp duty; Drummond brought three
thousand rank-and-file on the field. At nine o’clock Drummond could
scarcely have had fewer than twenty-six hundred men in Lundy’s Lane,
with seven field-pieces, two of which were twenty-four-pounders. Brown
could scarcely have had nineteen hundred, even allowing Porter to
have brought five hundred of his volunteers into battle.[73] He had
also Towson’s, Ritchie’s, and Biddle’s batteries,--seven twelve-pound
field-pieces in all.

As long as the British battery maintained its fire in the centre,
victory was impossible and escape difficult.[74] Ripley’s brigade alone
could undertake the task of capturing the British guns, and to it the
order was given. Colonel Miller was to advance with the Twenty-first
regiment against the British battery in front.[75] Ripley himself took
command of the Twenty-third regiment on the right, to lead it by the
road to attack the enemy’s left flank in Lundy’s Lane. According to
the story that for the next fifty years was told to every American
school-boy as a model of modest courage, General Brown gave to Miller
the order to carry the enemy’s artillery, and Miller answered, “I’ll
try!”[76]

The two regiments thus thrown on the enemy’s centre and left numbered
probably about seven hundred men in the ranks, according to Ripley’s
belief. The Twenty-first regiment was the stronger, and may have
contained four hundred and fifty men, including officers; the
Twenty-third could scarcely have brought three hundred into the field.
In a few minutes both battalions were in motion. The Twenty-third,
advancing along the road on the right, instantly attracted the enemy’s
fire at about one hundred and fifty yards from the hill, and was thrown
back. Ripley reformed the column, and in five minutes it advanced
again.[77] While the Twenty-third was thus engaged on the right, the
Twenty-first silently advanced in front, covered by shrubbery and the
darkness, within a few rods of the British battery undiscovered, and
with a sudden rush carried the guns, bayoneting the artillery-men where
they stood.

So superb a feat of arms might well startle the British general, who
could not see that less than five hundred men were engaged in it;
but according to the British account[78] the guns stood immediately
in front of a British line numbering at least twenty-six hundred men
in ranks along Lundy’s Lane. Drummond himself must have been near
the spot, for the whole line of battle was but five minutes’ walk;
apparently he had but to order an advance, to drive Miller’s regiment
back without trouble. Yet Miller maintained his ground until Ripley
came up on his right. According to the evidence of Captain McDonald
of Ripley’s staff, the battle was violent during fifteen or twenty
minutes:--

   “Having passed the position where the artillery had been
   planted, Colonel Miller again formed his line facing the enemy,
   and engaged them within twenty paces distance. There appeared
   a perfect sheet of fire between the two lines. While the
   Twenty-first was in this situation, the Twenty-third attacked
   the enemy’s flank, and advanced within twenty paces of it before
   the first volley was discharged,--a measure adopted by command
   of General Ripley, that the fire might be effectual and more
   completely destructive. The movement compelled the enemy’s flank
   to fall back immediately by descending the hill out of sight,
   upon which the firing ceased.”[79]

Perhaps this feat was more remarkable than the surprise of the
battery. Ripley’s Twenty-third regiment, about three hundred men,
broke the British line, not in the centre but on its left, where
the Eighty-ninth, the Royal Scots, King’s, and the Forty-first
were stationed,[80] and caused them to retire half a mile from the
battle-field before they halted to reform.

When the firing ceased, Ripley’s brigade held the hill-top, with the
British guns, and the whole length of Lundy’s Lane to the high-road.
Porter then brought up his brigade on the left; Hindman brought up his
guns, and placed Towson’s battery on Ripley’s right, Ritchie’s on his
left, while Biddle’s two guns were put in position on the road near the
corner of Lundy’s Lane. Jesup with the Twenty-fifth regiment was put in
line on the right of Towson’s battery; Leavenworth with the remnants of
the Ninth, Eleventh, and Twenty-second formed a second line in the rear
of the captured artillery; and thus reversing the former British order
of battle, the little army stood ranked along the edge of Lundy’s Lane,
with the British guns in their rear.

  [Illustration:

    PLAN OF THE
    BATTLE
    OF
    LUNDY’S LANE
    10 O’CLOCK

    STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N.Y.]

The British force was then in much confusion, a part of it marching
into the American line by mistake, and suffering a destructive fire;
a part of it firing into the regiment on its own right, and keeping up
the fire persistently.[81] In order to recover their artillery they
must assault, without guns, a steep hill held by an enemy with several
field-pieces. Had Brown been able to put a reserve of only a few
hundred men into the field, his victory was assured; but the battle and
exhaustion were rapidly reducing his force. He had at ten o’clock not
more than fifteen hundred men in the ranks, and almost every officer
was wounded.

After a long interval the British line was reformed, and brought to
the attack. General Drummond’s report said nothing of this movement,
but according to the American account the two lines were closely
engaged their whole length at a distance of ten or twelve yards. In
the darkness the troops could aim only at the flash of the muskets.
“We having much the advantage of the ground, the enemy generally
fired over our heads,” said Captain McDonald of Ripley’s staff; “but
the continual blaze of light was such as to enable us distinctly to
see their buttons.” After a sharp combat of some twenty minutes the
enemy retreated. Three times, at intervals of half an hour or more,
the British line moved up the hill, and after the exchange of a hot
fire retired; between the attacks, for half an hour at a time, all was
darkness and silence, hardly interrupted by a breath of air. Brown
and Scott were with Porter on the extreme left. In the centre, by
the captured cannon, Ripley sat on his horse, ten or twelve paces
in rear of his line. Two bullets passed through his hat, but he was
unhurt. Captain Ritchie was killed at his battery on the left; Jesup
was wounded on the right. Each attack sorely diminished the number
of men in the ranks, until at the close of the third about seven
hundred rank-and-file, with few officers, were believed to remain in
position.[82]

Scott, with Leavenworth’s consolidated battalion, after ranging
somewhat wildly the entire length of the line in the attempt to turn
the enemy’s flank, and receiving the fire of both armies, joined
Jesup’s Twenty-fifth regiment on the right, and was at last severely
wounded.[83] At about the same time Brown was wounded on the extreme
left,[84] where Porter’s volunteers held the line. Major Leavenworth,
with the remnants of the first brigade, moving from the left to
reinforce Jesup on the right after the third repulse of the enemy,
met Scott retiring from the field, and soon afterward was hailed by
General Brown, who was also returning to camp severely wounded. The
time was then about eleven o’clock, and every one felt that the army
must soon retreat.[85] Farther in the rear General Brown met Major
Hindman of the artillery, who was bringing up his spare ammunition
wagons. Brown ordered Hindman to collect his artillery as well as he
could, and retire immediately; “we shall all march to camp.” He said
that they had done as much as they could do; that nearly all their
officers were killed or wounded; that he was himself wounded, and he
thought it best to retire to camp. Hindman on arriving at the hill,
firing having wholly ceased, immediately began to withdraw the guns.
Ripley first learned the order to withdraw by discovering the artillery
to be already gone.[86] Next came a peremptory order to collect the
wounded and retire.[87] The order was literally obeyed. The enemy in
no way molested the movement; and at about midnight the wearied troops
marched for camp, in as good order and with as much regularity as they
had marched to the battle-field.[88]

Hindman withdrew his own guns, and having with some difficulty procured
horses to haul off the British pieces, on returning to the hill after
Ripley’s withdrawal found the enemy again in possession, and some men
and wagons captured.[89] He left the field at once, with the British in
possession of their guns, and followed the retreating column.

Lieutenant-General Drummond’s report of the battle, though silent as to
the repeated British repulses, declared that the Americans fought with
uncommon gallantry:--

   “In so determined a manner were the attacks directed against
   our guns that our artillery-men were bayoneted by the enemy in
   the act of loading, and the muzzles of the enemy’s guns were
   advanced within a few yards of ours. The darkness of the night
   during this extraordinary conflict occasioned several uncommon
   incidents; our troops having for a moment been pushed back, some
   of our guns remained for a few minutes in the enemy’s hands.”

Drummond’s “few minutes” were three hours. According to the British
account, the One-Hundred-and-third regiment, with its two field-pieces,
arrived on the field just at nine, and “passed by mistake into the
centre of the American army now posted upon the hill.”[90] The regiment
“fell back in confusion” and lost its two field-pieces, which were
captured by Miller, with Riall’s five pieces. By British report, Miller
was at nine o’clock “in possession of the crest of the hill and of
seven pieces of captured artillery.”[91] Drummond admitted that in
retiring “about midnight” the Americans carried away one of his light
pieces, having limbered it up by mistake and leaving one of their own.
During the entire action after nine o’clock Drummond did not fire a
cannon, although, according to Canadian authority, the fighting was
desperate:--

   “The officers of the army from Spain who have been engaged
   in Upper Canada have acknowledged that they never saw such
   determined charges as were made by the Americans in the late
   actions.... In the action on the 25th July the Americans charged
   to the very muzzles of our cannon, and actually bayoneted the
   artillery-men who were at their guns. Their charges were not
   once or twice only, but repeated and long, and the steadiness of
   British soldiers alone could have withstood them.”[92]




                             CHAPTER III.


THE battle of Lundy’s Lane lasted five hours, and Drummond
believed the American force to be five thousand men. In truth, at no
moment were two thousand American rank-and-file on the field.[93]
“The loss sustained by the enemy in this severe action,” reported
Drummond,[94] “cannot be estimated at less than fifteen hundred men,
including several hundred prisoners left in our hands.” Drummond’s
estimate of American losses, as of American numbers, was double the
reality. Brown reported a total loss, certainly severe enough, of eight
hundred and fifty-three men,--one hundred and seventy-one killed,
five hundred and seventy-two wounded, one hundred and ten missing.
Drummond reported a total loss of eight hundred and seventy-eight
men,--eighty-four killed, five hundred and fifty-nine wounded, one
hundred and ninety-three missing, and forty-two prisoners. On both
sides the battle was murderous. Brown and Scott were both badly
wounded, the latter so severely that he could not resume his command
during the war. Drummond and Riall were also wounded. On both sides,
but especially on the American, the loss in officers was very great.

The effect of the British artillery on Scott’s brigade, while daylight
lasted, had been excessive, while at that period of the battle the
British could have suffered comparatively little. Among Scott’s
battalions the severest loss was that of Brady’s Twenty-second
regiment, from Pennsylvania,--at the opening of the campaign two
hundred and twenty-eight strong, officers and men. After Lundy’s Lane
the Twenty-second reported thirty-six killed, ninety wounded, and
seventeen missing. The Ninth, Leavenworth’s Massachusetts regiment,
which was returned as numbering three hundred and forty-eight officers
and men June 31, reported sixteen killed, ninety wounded, and fifteen
missing at Lundy’s Lane. The Eleventh, McNeil’s Vermont battalion,
which numbered three hundred and four officers and men June 30,
returned twenty-eight killed, one hundred and two wounded, and three
missing. The Twenty-fifth, Jesup’s Connecticut corps, numbering
three hundred and seventy officers and men at the outset, reported
twenty-eight killed, sixty-six wounded, and fifteen missing. These four
regiments, composing Scott’s brigade, numbered thirteen hundred and
eighty-eight officers and men June 30, and lost in killed, wounded,
and missing at Lundy’s Lane five hundred and six men, after losing two
hundred and fifty-seven at Chippawa.

Ripley’s brigade suffered less; but although, after the British guns
were captured, the Americans were exposed only to musketry fire, the
brigades of Ripley and Porter reported a loss of two hundred and
fifty-eight men, killed, wounded, and missing. The three artillery
companies suffered a loss of forty-five men, including Captain Ritchie.
The total loss of eight hundred and fifty-three men was as nearly as
possible one third of the entire army, including the unengaged pickets
and other details.

When Ripley, following the artillery, arrived in camp toward one
o’clock in the morning,[95] Brown sent for him, and gave him an
order to return at day-break to the battle-field with all the force
he could collect, “and there to meet and beat the enemy if he again
appeared.”[96] The order was impossible to execute. The whole force
capable of fighting another battle did not exceed fifteen or sixteen
hundred effectives, almost without officers, and exhausted by the
night battle.[97] The order was given at one o’clock in the morning;
the army must employ the remainder of the night to reorganize its
battalions and replace its officers, and was expected to march at four
o’clock to regain a battle-field which Brown had felt himself unable
to maintain at midnight, although he then occupied it, and held all
the enemy’s artillery. The order was futile. Major Leavenworth of
the Ninth regiment, who though wounded commanded the first brigade
after the disability of Scott, Brady, Jesup, and McNeil, thought it
“the most consummate folly to attempt to regain possession of the
field of battle,” and declared that every officer he met thought like
himself.[98]

Yet Ripley at dawn began to collect the troops, and after the
inevitable delay caused by the disorganization, marched at nine
o’clock, with about fifteen hundred men, to reconnoitre the enemy. At
about the same time Drummond advanced a mile, and took position in
order of battle near the Falls, his artillery in the road, supported by
a column of infantry. A month earlier Drummond, like Riall, would have
attacked, and with a force greater by one half could hardly have failed
to destroy Ripley’s shattered regiments; but Chippawa and Lundy’s Lane
had already produced an effect on the British army. Drummond believed
that the Americans numbered five thousand, and his own force in the
ranks was about twenty-two hundred men. He allowed Ripley to retire
unmolested, and remained at the Falls the whole day.

Ripley returned to camp at noon and made his report to Brown. The
question requiring immediate decision was whether to maintain or
abandon the line of the Chippawa River. Much could be said on both
sides, and only officers on the spot could decide with certainty how
the enemy could be placed under most disadvantage, and how the army
could be saved from needless dangers. Ripley, cautious by nature,
recommended a retreat to Fort Erie. With the assent, as he supposed, of
Brown and Porter,[99] Ripley immediately broke up the camp at Chippawa,
and began the march to Fort Erie, sixteen miles in the rear. Although
complaint was made of the retreat as confused, hasty, and unnecessary,
it was conducted with no more loss or confusion than usual in such
movements,[100] and its military propriety was to be judged by its
effects on the campaign.

The same evening, July 26, the army arrived at Fort Erie and camped.
Brown was taken from Chippawa across the river to recover from his
wound. Scott was also removed to safe quarters. Ripley was left with
the remains of the army camped on a plain, outside the unfinished
bastions of Fort Erie, where the destruction of his entire force
was inevitable in case of a reverse. Ripley favored a withdrawal
of the army to the American side; but Brown, from his sick bed at
Buffalo, rejected the idea of a retreat, and fortunately Drummond’s
reinforcements arrived slowly. The worst result of the difference
in opinion was to make Brown harsh toward Ripley, who--although
his record was singular in showing only patient, excellent, and
uniformly successful service--leaned toward caution, while Brown and
Scott thought chiefly of fighting. The combination produced admirable
results; but either officer alone might have failed.

  [Illustration:

    PLAN

    of the Attack and Defence
    of Fort Erie,

    By JN. LE BRETON, LT. DY. AG. Q. M.
    GEN’L.

    _Ms. British Archives._

    STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N.Y.]

Distrusting Ripley, and angry at losing the British cannon at Lundy’s
Lane as well as at the retreat from Chippawa, Brown wrote, August 7,
to the Secretary of War a report containing an improper implication,
which he afterward withdrew, that Ripley was wanting either in courage
or capacity.[101] He also summoned Brigadier-General Gaines from
Sackett’s Harbor to command the army.[102] Gaines arrived, and as
senior brigadier assumed command at Fort Erie, August 4, while Ripley
resumed command of his brigade. During the week that elapsed before
Gaines’s arrival, the army, under Ripley’s orders, worked energetically
to intrench itself in lines behind Fort Erie; and after Gaines took
command the same work was continued without interruption or change of
plan, under the direction of Major McRee, Major Wood, and Lieutenant
Douglass of the Engineers.

The result was chiefly decided by Drummond’s errors. Had he followed
Ripley closely, and had he attacked instantly on overtaking the
retreating army at Fort Erie or elsewhere, he would have had the
chances in his favor. Had he crossed the river and moved against
Buffalo, he would have obliged Brown to order the instant evacuation of
Fort Erie, and would have recovered all the British positions without
the loss of a man. Drummond took neither course. He waited two days at
Chippawa before he moved up the river within two miles of Fort Erie.
About August 1 his reinforcements arrived,--DeWatteville’s regiment
from Kingston, and the Forty-first from Fort George,--replacing
his losses, and giving him three thousand one hundred and fifty
rank-and-file;[103] but he seemed still undecided what course to
adopt. The battles of Chippawa and Lundy’s Lane had given the British
army respect for American troops, and Drummond hesitated to assault
the unfinished works at Fort Erie, although he was fully one half
stronger in men than Gaines and Ripley, who had barely two thousand
rank-and-file after obtaining such reinforcements as were at hand.


       _Strength of Scott’s Brigade, Fort Erie, July 31, 1814._

                                PRESENT FOR DUTY.           AGGREGATE.
                          /-------------/\-------------\
                          Non-com. Officers,   Officers.    Present and
                             rank-and-file.                    absent.
   Ninth Regiment              139                8             569
   Eleventh Regiment           293               11             624
   Twenty-second Regiment      218               10             408
   Twenty-fifth Regiment       255                7             676
   General Staff                                  4               4
                               ---               --           -----
       Total                   905               40            2281


                    _Strength of Ripley’s Brigade._

    First Regiment                  141       6      220
    Twenty-first Regiment           441      20      849
    Twenty-third Regiment           292      12      713
    General Staff                             4        4
                                    ---      --     ----
        Total                       874      42     1786


    _Monthly return of troops under Major-General Brown, Fort Erie,
                            July 31, 1814._

    Bombardiers, etc.                58       2       69
    Light Dragoons                   47       1       64
    Artillery Corps                 241      12      364
    First Brigade                   905      40     2281
    Second Brigade                  874      42     1786
                                   ----      --     ----
        Total of Brown’s army      2125      97     4564

Drummond began operations by ordering a detachment of six hundred
men to cross the river and destroy the magazines at Black Rock and
Buffalo.[104] During the night of August 3 Colonel Tucker of the
Forty-first, with four hundred and sixty rank-and-file of his own and
other regiments,[105] landed two or three miles below Black Rock, and
advanced against it. They were met at the crossing of a creek by two
hundred and forty men of Morgan’s Rifles, then garrisoning Black Rock,
with some volunteers. The effect of the rifles was so deadly that
the British troops refused to face them, and Tucker returned after
losing twenty-five men. This repulse, as creditable in its way to the
American army as the battles at Chippawa and Lundy’s Lane, caused much
annoyance to Drummond, who issued an order, August 5, expressing “the
indignation excited by discovering that the failure of an expedition,
the success of which... would have compelled the enemy’s forces to
surrender or... encounter certain defeat, was attributable to the
misbehavior of the troops employed.”[106] The only success achieved by
British detachments was the cutting out of two American schooners which
covered the approach to Fort Erie, near the shore.

Drummond having decided not to assault the lines of Fort Erie until
he had made an impression on the works, next sent for guns of heavy
calibre.[107] Ten days were passed in opening trenches and constructing
batteries. Gaines and Ripley employed the time in completing their
defences. Of these, the so-called Fort Erie was the smallest part,
and made only the salient angle toward Drummond’s approaches. As the
British had constructed the fort, it was a small, unfinished work,
about one hundred and fifty yards from the Lake-shore, open in the
rear, and mounting three guns. The American engineers completed its
rear bastions, and constructed an earthwork seven feet high, with a
ditch, to the shore, where a small stone-work completed the defence on
that side, and brought the lines to the water’s edge. The stone-work
was called the Douglass battery, after the lieutenant of engineers who
built it. Fort Erie, Battery Douglass, and their connecting breastwork
secured the camp on the right. A similar breastwork, nearly at right
angles with the first, was extended three hundred and fifty yards
westward parallel with the Lake-shore, then turning slightly ran three
hundred and fifty yards farther till it neared the Lake-shore, where
it was finished on Snake Hill by a projecting battery called Towson’s.
Traverses were constructed, and a strongly intrenched camp, about seven
hundred yards by two hundred and fifty, was thus formed, open on its
rear to the Lake.

Hindman had general charge of the artillery. Battery Douglass mounted
one gun; another was mounted on the neighboring line; Fort Erie
contained six,[108] under Captain Williams; Biddle’s and Fanning’s
(Ritchie’s) four guns were placed on the long line in the front; and
Towson had six field-pieces at the extreme left.[109] Scott’s brigade,
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Aspinwall, was posted on the right;
Porter’s volunteers and the First Rifles occupied the centre; and
Ripley with the Twenty-first and Twenty-third regiments defended the
left.

Drummond opened with six guns, August 13, and prepared for assault the
following day. His arrangements were somewhat complicated. He divided
the attacking force into three columns, retaining another division in
reserve. The strongest column, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Fischer
of DeWatteville’s regiment, was composed of portions of four regular
regiments, and numbered about thirteen hundred men; these were to
assault Towson and Ripley on Snake Hill. The centre column, commanded
by Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond of the One-Hundred-and-fourth, numbered
only one hundred and ninety rank-and-file, including a party of seamen
and marines;[110] these were to attack Fort Erie. The third column,
under Colonel Scott of the One-Hundred-and-third regiment, numbered six
hundred and fifty rank-and-file; these were to assault the breastworks
between Fort Erie and Battery Douglass.[111] According to these
numbers, Drummond meant to assault with twenty-one hundred and forty
rank-and-file, or about twenty-four hundred men all told. His reserve
numbered one thousand men.[112] Some further number must have been
detailed in camp duty.

Drummond’s instructions, dated August 14, to Colonel Fischer were
minute.[113] Fischer’s column was to march immediately, in order to
pass through the woods before dark, and halt for the night opposite
the point of attack, with every precaution against discovery:--

   “You are to advance to the attack precisely at two o’clock. You
   are to enter the enemy’s position betwixt Snake Hill and the
   Lake, which is represented to be sufficiently open; but this
   is not to prevent your making your arrangements for assaulting
   any other part of the position by means of the short ladders
   and hay-bags with which you will be furnished. In order to
   _insure success_, the Lieutenant-General most strongly
   recommends that the flints be taken out of the firelocks, with
   the exception of a reserve of select and steady men who may be
   permitted to retain their flints, if you think it necessary or
   advisable, not exceeding one third of your force. This reserve,
   with the detachment of artillery, should take post on Snake
   Hill.”

A demonstration was to be made a few minutes before two o’clock against
the American pickets opposite the centre of the line.

Drummond’s general orders concluded by encouraging his men to consider
their task easy:[114]--

   “The Lieutenant-General most strongly recommends a free use of
   the bayonet. The enemy’s force does not exceed fifteen hundred
   fit for duty, and those are represented as much dispirited.”

The British general under-estimated Gaines’s force, which probably
contained at least two thousand rank-and-file fit for duty August 14,
who though possibly overworked and inclined to grumble, were ready to
fight. Neither Gaines nor Ripley, nor any of the excellent officers
of engineers and artillery who defended the lines of Fort Erie, were
likely to allow themselves to be surprised or even approached by a
force no greater than their own without ample resistance. They kept
strong pickets far in advance of their lines, and were alive to every
sign of attack. Soon after midnight of August 14 the fire of the
British siege-guns slackened and ceased. At the same moment Gaines
left his quarters and Ripley ordered his brigade to turn out. Both
officers looked for an assault, and were not mistaken. At two o’clock
the pickets fired and fell back, and at half-past two o’clock Colonel
Fischer’s advancing column moved against Snake Hill.

There at the breastworks were Towson’s guns and the Twenty-first
regiment commanded by Major Wood of the Engineers, only two hundred
and fifty strong, but as steady as at Lundy’s Lane.[115] A part of
Fischer’s brigade marched gallantly up to the abattis, bayonets
charged and guns without flints, and approached within ten feet of the
breastwork, but failed to reach it. The other column, DeWatteville’s
regiment at its head, “marching too near the Lake,” according to
Colonel Fischer’s report,[116] “found themselves entangled between
the rocks and the water, and by the retreat of the flank companies
were thrown in such confusion as to render it impossible to give them
any kind of formation during the darkness of the night, at which time
they were exposed to a most galling fire of the enemy’s battery.” A
part of De Watteville’s regiment waded through the water round the
American line, and came into the camp on the flank, but found there two
companies posted to meet such an attempt, and were all captured, so
that Colonel Fischer, writing his report the next day, seemed ignorant
what had become of them.

The attack and repulse of Colonel Fischer on the extreme American
left were soon over, and the story was easy to understand; but the
attack on Fort Erie and the extreme right was neither quickly ended
nor easily understood. There a column of more than seven hundred men,
all told, under Colonel Scott of the One-Hundred-and-third, was to
attack the Douglass battery. Another column, numbering somewhat more
than two hundred men, all told, under Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond of
the One-Hundred-and-fourth, was to assault Fort Erie. The American
line between Battery Douglass and Fort Erie was held by the Ninth
regiment and the volunteers, and was covered by the battery. Fort Erie
was defended by about one hundred and eighteen men of the Nineteenth
regiment under Major Trimble, and about sixty artillerists[117] under
Captain Williams.

The most intelligible account of the battle at the eastern end of the
lines was given neither in Gaines’s nor Drummond’s reports, but in some
charges afterward brought against Gaines by Major Trimble, who was
angry at the language of Gaines’s report. Trimble’s charges were judged
to be frivolous, but his story of the battle was more precise than any
other.

According to Major Trimble, Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond’s column was
directed against the north curtain of the fort, and was repulsed, but
continued the assault. Colonel Scott’s column at the same time advanced
within about sixty yards of the Douglass battery, but deterred by
the fire of the guns served under the direction of Major McRee and
Lieutenant Douglass of the Engineers, and by the loss of its commanding
officer Colonel Scott, who fell before the American line, the column
moved quickly to the right, gained the ditch of the northeast bastion
of Fort Erie, and under cover of the smoke and darkness entered the
bastion. There they were joined by Drummond’s men. They surprised
the artillerists, and in the scuffle Captain Williams and his
lieutenants--McDonough, Fontaine, and Watmough--were killed or disabled.

Without support the British columns could do no more, and
Lieutenant-General Drummond did not come to their support. None of the
reports mentioned the time at which the bastion was captured; but the
small British force, which could not have exceeded six or seven hundred
men, remained for more than two hours in or about the bastion, exposed
to the American fire, to which they could not reply with effect,
and waiting for Drummond and the reserve, which the Americans also
expected and trained their guns to enfilade. The British in the bastion
repeatedly attempted to advance from the bastion to gain possession of
the Fort, and twice tried to force the door of the stone mess-house
from which the men of the Nineteenth regiment kept up a destructive
fire. They repulsed the attacks made by reinforcements ordered by
Gaines into the Fort to recover the bastion; yet their destruction was
inevitable as soon as the dawn should arrive, for they could neither
advance nor escape, nor remain where they were, under the guns of the
garrison.

After maintaining themselves till five o’clock in this difficult
position, the British soldiers and sailors in the bastion were
panic-struck by the explosion of an ammunition-chest under the
platform. According to General Drummond’s official report, “Some
ammunition, which had been placed under the platform, caught fire
from the firing of guns in the rear, and a most tremendous explosion
followed, by which almost all the troops which had entered the place
were dreadfully mangled. Panic was instantly communicated to the
troops, who could not be persuaded that the explosion was accidental;
and the enemy at the same time pressing forward and commencing a heavy
fire of musketry, the Fort was abandoned, and our troops retreated
toward the battery.”

The explosion merely hastened the rout. Probably the attacking
columns would have fared still worse, had they remained. Even their
panic-stricken flight saved only a remnant. Of Drummond’s column,
said to number one hundred and ninety rank-and-file, one hundred and
eighty-eight officers and men were reported as missing, wounded,
or killed. Of Scott’s column, said to number six hundred and fifty
rank-and-file,--the Royal Scots and the One-Hundred-and-third
regiments,--four hundred and ninety-six officers and men were returned
as killed, wounded, or missing. Of the whole rank-and-file engaged
under Fischer, Scott, and Drummond, numbering two thousand one hundred
and fifty men, if the British report was correct, seven hundred and
eighty were officially reported among the casualties. The loss in
officers was equally severe. Colonel Scott was killed before the lines.
Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond was killed in the bastion. One major, ten
captains, and fifteen lieutenants were killed, wounded, or missing. The
total British loss was nine hundred and five among some twenty-four
hundred engaged. The total American loss was eighty-four men.[118]

General Drummond was excessively mortified by his failure, in truth the
severest blow that British arms could suffer at that moment. For the
fourth time in six weeks a large body of British troops met a bloody
and unparalleled check, if not rout, from an inferior force. In a
private letter to Prevost, dated August 16, Drummond attributed the
disaster to the misconduct of DeWatteville’s regiment, a foreign corps,
which was struck by panic:[119]--

   “It appears that part of the forlorn hope and about half of
   Watteville’s Light Company, by wading through the water,
   though the footing was excessively rough and rocky along the
   Lake-shore, turned the left flank of an abattis which extended
   from the enemy’s battery on Snake Hill, the left of their
   position, to the Lake, and part penetrated through the abattis
   itself, and thereby gained the rear of the enemy’s works. The
   fire of the enemy at this time being extremely heavy both from
   artillery and musketry, it would seem as if a simultaneous shock
   of panic pervaded the greater part of those not in immediate
   advance; and the forlorn hope, not finding itself sufficiently
   supported, was reluctantly under the necessity of relinquishing
   the advantages they had gained, and of retiring again through
   the water under a most galling fire. They lost many men, and
   DeWatteville’s Light Company nearly half their number. The
   Light Company of the Eighty-ninth, notwithstanding they were
   almost overwhelmed by the grenadiers of DeWatteville in the
   precipitancy of their retreat, was the only body that preserved
   its order and remained firm upon its ground. By this act of
   steadiness they fortunately lost scarcely a man. The main body
   of DeWatteville’s regiment retreated in such confusion that they
   carried the King’s regiment before them like a torrent. Thus by
   the misconduct of this foreign corps has the opportunity been
   totally lost.”

The mortification of Drummond was acute in having to charge both his
attacking columns with being panic-stricken: “The agony of mind I
suffer from the present disgraceful and unfortunate conduct of the
troops committed to my superintendence, wounds me to the soul!” Yet
he offered no evidence to show that his troops fled before they were
beaten, nor did he explain why he had thought it useless to order
the reserve to their support after they had captured the bastion. In
reality the battle of Fort Erie was more creditable to the British than
the battles of Chippawa or Lundy’s Lane, and the Americans could not
admit that in either of the three the conduct of Drummond’s troops was
“disgraceful.”

The defeat so much weakened Drummond that he could no longer keep
the field without support, and immediately sent for two more
regiments,--the Sixth and the Eighty-second from Burlington and
York,--numbering about one thousand and forty rank-and-file, and making
good his losses.[120]

At that time Chauncey was in control of Lake Ontario. The anxieties and
delays in fitting out his new ship had ended in a fever, under which
he was still suffering when he received General Brown’s challenge of
July 13 to meet him opposite Fort George. Chauncey did not immediately
reply except by message through General Gaines. July 31, everything
being at last ready, he was carried on board his ship, and the next
day he sailed, arriving August 5 off Fort George. Brown’s army was then
besieged in Fort Erie, and could not approach the fleet. This situation
gave to Chauncey the opportunity of writing a letter to Brown, repaying
the harshness that Brown had shown to him.

   “Was it friendly or just or honorable,” asked Chauncey,[121]
   “not only to furnish an opening for the public, but thus to
   assist them to infer that I had pledged myself to meet you on
   a particular day at the head of the Lake, for the purpose of
   co-operation, and in case of disaster to your army, thus to turn
   their resentment from you, who are alone responsible, upon me,
   who could not by any possibility have prevented, or retarded
   even, your discomfiture? You well know, sir, that the fleet
   could not have rendered you the least service during your late
   incursion upon Upper Canada. You have not been able to approach
   Lake Ontario on any point nearer than Queenston.”

Brown’s quarrel with Chauncey made much noise in its day, and, like
the less defensible quarrel with Ripley, proved that Brown was
unnecessarily aggressive; but in the situation of the United States,
aggressiveness was the most valuable quality in the service. That Brown
might have become a great general was possible, had his experience been
larger; but whatever was his merit as a general, his qualities as a
fighter were more remarkable than those of any other general officer in
the war. Except immediately after receiving his wound at Lundy’s Lane,
when his army was exhausted by four hours of extreme effort, he never
seemed satiated with fighting. Among all the American major-generals,
he alone made raw troops as steady as grenadiers, and caused militia to
storm entrenched lines held by British regulars.

Brown might have been well satisfied to let Drummond exhaust his
strength in attacking Fort Erie. From a military point of view, Fort
Erie was worthless for any other purpose than to draw the enemy to the
extreme end of their line, where they could with difficulty obtain
supplies, and could take no part in the serious campaigning intended on
Lake Champlain. For that object, no more pitched battles were needed.
Drummond’s force was wasting away by sickness and exposure.[122]

After the battle of August 15, the British continued to bombard Fort
Erie. No great damage was done; but a shell exploded in Gaines’s
quarters August 29, injuring him severely and obliging him to
relinquish command. Brown was still unfit for service, but was bent
upon more fighting, and knew that Ripley preferred to abandon Fort Erie
altogether. Accordingly he resumed command at Buffalo, September 2, and
set himself to study the situation.

The situation was uncomfortable, but in no way perilous. The lines
of Fort Erie were stronger than ever, and beyond danger of capture
from any British force that could be brought to assault them, until
Drummond should discover some new means of supplying troops with
subsistence. The army return of August 31 gave the precise strength of
the garrison.


          _Strength of the Army at Fort Erie, Aug. 31, 1814._

                                  PRESENT FOR DUTY.         AGGREGATE.
                          /---------------/\-------------\
                           Non com. Officers,  Officers.    Present and
                             rank-and-file.                     absent.
  Dragoons                        27               1             48
  Bombardiers, etc.               34                             51
  Artillery Corps                206              10            369
  First Brigade                  725              39           2311
  Second Brigade                 698              42           1646
  Porter’s Brigade               220              16            599
  First and Fourth Rifles        217              11            504
                                ----             ---           ----
      Total                     2127             119           5528

The regular force in Fort Erie numbered two thousand and thirty-three
effectives[123] September 4, and though annoyed by the enemy’s fire and
worn by hard work, they were in both these respects better situated
than the besiegers. Sooner or later the British would be obliged to
retreat; and Brown was informed by deserters that Drummond was then
contemplating withdrawal.[124] Brown estimated the British force very
loosely at three or four thousand;[125] and it was in fact about the
smaller number.

Drummond’s situation was told in his reports to Sir George Prevost.
September 8 be wrote[126] that he should not fail to seize any
favorable opportunity to attack; “but should no such opportunity
present itself, I feel it incumbent on me to prepare your Excellency
for the possibility of my being compelled by sickness or suffering
of the troops, exposed as they will be to the effects of the wet and
unhealthy season which is fast approaching, to withdraw them from their
present position to one which may afford them the means of cover.
Sickness has, I am sorry to say, already made its appearance in several
of the corps.” Three days afterward, September 11,[127] Drummond was
warned by several signs that his lines were to be attacked by Brown,
although “whether the account which is _invariably_ given by
deserters of his intention to act offensively ... be correct, I have
not yet been able accurately to ascertain.” Drummond’s batteries
had been almost silent for several days for want of ammunition,
and he could do nothing till the arrival of reinforcements,--the
Ninety-seventh regiment,--unaccountably delayed. Rain had begun, and he
dreaded its effect on the troops. In his next despatch, dated September
14,[128] he said that the rain had been incessant, and “as the whole of
the troops are without tents, and the huts in which they are placed
are wholly incapable of affording shelter against such severe weather,
their situation is most distressing.” The roads were impassable; the
nearest depot of supplies was Fort George, and Drummond had not cattle
enough to move a third of his heavy ordnance if a sudden movement
should be necessary. The enemy seemed about to cross the river in his
rear, and the Ninety-seventh regiment had not yet arrived:--

   “In the mean time I have strong grounds for thinking that the
   enemy will risk an attack,--an event which though from the
   necessity of defending my batteries in the first instance with
   the pickets alone I shall have to meet under every possible
   disadvantage, yet I am very much disposed to hope may be the
   most fortunate circumstance which can happen, as it will bring
   us in contact with the enemy at a far cheaper rate than if we
   were to be the assailants.”

While Drummond struggled between the necessity of retreat and the
difficulty of retreating, Brown was bent on attacking his lines. The
plan was open to grave objections, and a council of war, September 9,
discouraged the idea. Brown was much disappointed and irritated at the
result of the council, especially with Ripley; but while giving the
impression that he acquiesced, he brought over all the volunteers he
could obtain.[129] The number was never precisely given, but according
to the official reports of General Peter B. Porter who commanded them,
and of General Brown himself, they did not exceed one thousand.[130]
With these, and an equal number of regular troops, Brown undertook to
assault Drummond’s entrenchments.

The nearest British line was about six hundred yards from old Fort
Erie. From the first British battery on the Lake-shore, to Battery
No. 3 in the woods, the line extended nearly half a mile, covered by
abattis, but defended only by the brigade of troops on actual duty. If
carried, the first line could not be held without capturing the second
line, about fifty yards distant, and a third line, farther in the
rear; while the main British force was encamped, for reasons of health
and comfort, a mile behind, and was supposed to number at least three
thousand six hundred men, or quite sufficient to recover their works.
Brown professed no intention of fighting the British army. He proposed
only “to storm the batteries, destroy the cannon, and roughly handle
the brigade upon duty, before those in reserve could be brought into
action.”[131]

Although Drummond expected and wished to be attacked, he kept no
proper pickets or scouts in the woods, and all day of September 16
American fatigue parties were at work opening a path through the forest
the distance of a mile, from Snake Hill on the extreme left to the
extremity of the British line in the woods. So little precaution had
Drummond’s engineers taken that they left the dense forest standing
within pistol-shot of the flank and rear of their Battery No. 3 on
their extreme right, and the American parties opened a path within one
hundred and fifty yards of the flank of the British line without being
discovered.

At noon, September 17, General Porter led a column of sixteen hundred
men--of whom one thousand were militia volunteers, and a part were
the Twenty-third regiment--along the path through the woods, in three
divisions, commanded by Colonel Gibson of the Fourth Rifles, Colonel E.
D. Wood of the Engineers, and Brigadier-General Davis of the New York
militia. At three o’clock, under cover of heavy rain, the whole force
fell suddenly on the blockhouse which covered the flank and rear of
the British battery No. 3, and succeeded in capturing the blockhouse
and mastering the battery held by DeWatteville’s regiment. While
detachments spiked the guns and blew up the magazine, the main column
advanced on Battery No. 2, while at the same time General Miller,
promoted to the command of Scott’s old brigade, moved with “the remains
of the Ninth and Eleventh Infantry and a detachment of the Nineteenth”
from a ravine in front of Battery No. 3 to pierce the centre of the
British line between Battery No. 3 and Battery No. 2.[132]

Within half an hour after the first gun was fired, Porter and Miller
had effected their junction within the British lines, had captured
Battery No. 2, and moved on Battery No. 1, by the Lake-shore. There the
success ended. Battery No. 1 could not be carried. By that time the
Royal Scots, the Eighty-ninth, the Sixth, and the Eighty-second British
regiments had arrived,--probably about one thousand men.[133] A sharp
engagement followed before Brown, after ordering his reserve under
Ripley to the assistance of Porter and Miller, could disengage his
troops. The three commanders of Porter’s divisions--Gibson, Wood, and
Davis--were killed or mortally wounded,--Gibson at the second battery,
Davis and Wood in assaulting the shore battery. Ripley was desperately
wounded at the same time. General Porter, Lieutenant-Colonel Aspinwall
of the Ninth, and Major Trimble of the Nineteenth, as well as a number
of other officers, were severely wounded. That the last action was
sharp was proved by the losses suffered by the British reinforcements.
According to the British official return, the four regiments which
came last into the field--the Royal Scots, Sixth, Eighty-second, and
Eighty-ninth--lost thirty-six killed, one hundred and nine wounded, and
fifty-four missing,--a total of two hundred men, in a short action of
half an hour at the utmost, without artillery.

The American forces were recalled by Brown and Miller as soon as their
progress was stopped, and they retired without serious pursuit beyond
the British lines. Their losses were very severe, numbering five
hundred and eleven killed, wounded, and missing, or about one fourth
of their number. Among them were several of the best officers in the
United States service, including Ripley, Wood, and Gibson. Drummond’s
loss was still more severe, numbering six hundred and nine,[134]
probably almost one man in three of the number engaged. The British
killed numbered one hundred and fifteen. The Americans reported
seventy-nine killed,--sixty regulars, and nineteen militia.

The next day Drummond issued a general order claiming a victory over an
American force of “not less than five thousand men, including militia;”
but his situation, untenable before the sortie, became impossible after
it. Three out of six battering cannon were disabled;[135] he had lost
six hundred men in battle, and his losses by sickness were becoming
enormous. “My effective numbers are reduced to considerably less than
two thousand firelocks,” he reported, September 21. Immediately after
the sortie, although reinforced by the Ninety-seventh regiment, he made
his arrangements to retreat.

   “Within the last few days,” he wrote to Prevost, September
   21,[136] “the sickness of the troops has increased to such an
   alarming degree, and their situation has really become one of
   such extreme wretchedness from the torrents of rain which
   have continued to fall for the last thirteen days, and from
   the circumstance of the Division being entirely destitute of
   camp-equipage, that I feel it my duty no longer to persevere in
   a vain attempt to maintain the blockade of so vastly superior
   and increasing a force of the enemy under such circumstances. I
   have therefore given orders for the troops to fall back toward
   the Chippawa, and shall commence my movement at eight o’clock
   this evening.”




                              CHAPTER IV.


WEAK as was the army at Niagara, it was relatively stronger
than the defence at any other threatened point. Sackett’s Harbor
contained only seven hundred effectives.[137] On Lake Champlain,
Major-General Izard tried to cover Plattsburg and Burlington with about
five thousand regular troops.[138] Already Armstrong knew that large
British reinforcements from Wellington’s army were on their way to
Canada;[139] and within a few weeks after the battle of Lundy’s Lane
eleven thousand of the best troops England ever put in the field were
camped on or near the Sorel River, about to march against Izard’s five
thousand raw recruits.

They could march nowhere else. Not only was the line of Lake
Champlain the natural and necessary path of an invading army, but the
impossibility of supplying any large number of troops in Upper Canada
made Lake Champlain the only region in which a large British force
could exist. Sir George Prevost had reached the limit of his powers
in defending Upper Canada. His commissary-general, W. H. Robinson,
wrote to him, August 27, expressing “the greatest alarm” on account of
deficient supplies at Burlington Heights and Niagara, where instead of
nine thousand rations daily as he expected, he was required to furnish
fourteen thousand, half of them to Indians.[140] Much as Prevost
wanted to attack Sackett’s Harbor, and weak as he knew that post to
be, he could not attempt it, although he had thirteen or fourteen
thousand rank-and-file idle at Montreal. In October he went to Kingston
expressly to arrange such an attack, and found it impossible.

   “An investigation of the state of the stores at this post,”
   he wrote to Lord Bathurst October 18,[141] “proved that the
   articles for the armament and equipment for a ship of the class
   of the ‘St. Lawrence,’ carrying upward of one hundred guns,
   had absorbed almost the whole of the summer transport-service
   from Montreal, leaving the materials for an undertaking of the
   magnitude of the destruction of Sackett’s Harbor still at the
   extremity of the line of communication; and now, by giving
   precedence to that supply of provisions and stores without
   which an army is no longer to be maintained in Upper Canada,
   its removal is inevitably postponed until the winter roads are
   established.”

Not only were military operations on a large scale impossible in Upper
Canada, but for the opposite reason occupation of Lake Champlain by a
British force was necessary. Northern New York and Vermont furnished
two thirds of the fresh beef consumed by the British armies. General
Izard reported to Armstrong, July 31,[142]--

   “From the St. Lawrence to the ocean, an open disregard prevails
   for the laws prohibiting intercourse with the enemy. The road to
   St. Regis is covered with droves of cattle, and the river with
   rafts, destined for the enemy. The revenue officers see these
   things, but acknowledge their inability to put a stop to such
   outrageous proceedings. On the eastern side of Lake Champlain
   the high roads are found insufficient for the supplies of
   cattle which are pouring into Canada. Like herds of buffaloes
   they press through the forest, making paths for themselves....
   Nothing but a cordon of troops from the French Mills to Lake
   Memphramagog could effectually check the evil. Were it not
   for these supplies, the British forces in Canada would soon
   be suffering from famine, or their government be subjected to
   enormous expense for their maintenance.”

After Chauncey, August 1, regained possession of Lake Ontario, any
British campaign against Sackett’s Harbor or Detroit became doubly
impossible, and the occupation of Lake Champlain became doubly
necessary. Prevost wrote to Bathurst, August 27,[143]--

   “In fact, my Lord, two thirds of the army in Canada are at this
   moment eating beef provided by American contractors, drawn
   principally from the States of Vermont and New York. This
   circumstance, as well as that of the introduction of large sums
   in specie into this province, being notorious in the United
   States, it is to be expected that Congress will take steps to
   deprive us of those resources; and under that apprehension large
   droves are daily crossing the lines coming into Lower Canada.”

The fear that Izard might at any moment take efficient measures to
cut off the British supplies gave double force to the reasons for
occupying Lake Champlain, and forcing the military frontier back beyond
Plattsburg and Burlington.

The political reasons were not less strong or less notorious than
the military. England made no secret of her intention to rectify
the Canadian frontier by lopping away such territory as she could
conquer. July 5, the day of the battle of Chippawa, Lieutenant-Colonel
Pilkington sailed from Halifax, and under the naval protection
of Sir Thomas Hardy in the “Ramillies,” landed at Eastport, July
11, with the One-Hundred-and-second regiment, some engineers and
artillery,--a detachment of six hundred men,--and took possession of
Moose Island.[144] Fort Sullivan, with six officers and eighty men,
capitulated, and Great Britain took permanent possession of the place.

Moose Island was disputed territory, and its occupation was not
necessarily conquest; but the next step showed wider views. August 26,
Lieutenant-General Sir J. C. Sherbrooke, the British governor of Nova
Scotia, set sail from Halifax with a powerful fleet, carrying near two
thousand troops, and arrived September 1 at the Penobscot.[145] At
his approach, the American garrison of the small battery at Castine
blew up their fort and dispersed. In all Massachusetts, only about six
hundred regular troops were to be found, and beyond the Penobscot, in
September, 1814, hardly a full company could have been collected. The
able-bodied, voting, male population of the counties of Kennebeck and
Hancock, on either side of the Penobscot River, capable of bearing
arms, was at that time about twelve thousand, on an estimate of one in
five of the total population; but they offered no resistance to the
British troops.

One misfortune led to another. A few days before Sherbrooke’s arrival
at Castine the United States ship “Adams,” a heavy corvette carrying
twenty-eight guns, having escaped from Chesapeake Bay and cruised
some months at sea struck on a reef on the Isle of Haut, and was
brought into the Penobscot in a sinking condition. Captain Morris, who
commanded her, took the ship up the river about twenty-five miles, as
far as Hampden near Bangor, and removed her guns in order to repair
her. Sherbrooke, on occupying Castine, sent a detachment of some
six hundred men in boats up the river to destroy the ship, while he
occupied Belfast with another regiment.[146] Captain Morris hastily put
his guns in battery, and prepared to defend the ship with his crew,
numbering probably more than two hundred men, relying on the militia
to cover his flanks. On the morning of September 3, in a thick fog,
the enemy’s boats approached and landed their infantry, which attacked
and routed the militia, and obliged Captain Morris to set fire to the
“Adams,” abandon his guns, and disperse his men.[147] The British force
then marched to Bangor, which they occupied without opposition. Their
entire loss was one man killed and eight wounded.[148] At Bangor they
remained nearly a week, destroying vessels and cargoes; but Sir John
Sherbrooke had no orders to occupy the country west of the Penobscot,
and his troops returned September 9 to Castine.

At Castine the British remained, while another detachment occupied
Machias. All the province of Maine east of the Penobscot was then in
Sherbrooke’s hands. The people formally submitted. One hundred miles
of Massachusetts sea-coast passed quietly under the dominion of the
King of England. The male citizens were required to take, and took, the
oath of allegiance to King George,[149] and showed no unwillingness
to remain permanently British subjects. After September 1 the United
States government had every reason to expect that Great Britain would
require, as one condition of peace, a cession of the eastern and
northern portions of Maine.

For this purpose the British needed also to occupy Lake Champlain, in
order to make their conquests respectable. The British general might
move on Plattsburg or on Burlington; but in order to maintain his
position he must gain naval possession of the Lake. In such a case the
difficulties of the American government would be vastly increased,
and the British position would be impregnable. Armstrong knew these
circumstances almost as well as they were known to Sir George Prevost.

In May the British flotilla entered Lake Champlain from the Sorel
River, and cruised, May 9, as far southward as Otter Creek, terrifying
Vermont for the safety of the American flotilla under Lieutenant Thomas
Macdonough at Vergennes. Irritated and alarmed by this demonstration,
Armstrong ordered Izard to seize and fortify Rouse’s Point, or the
mouth of Lacolle River, or Ash Island, and so close the entrance
to the Lake.[150] Apparently Armstrong gave the order in ignorance
that Lacolle River and Ash Island were strongly fortified British
positions,[151] and that a battery established at Rouse’s Point, in
the relative situation of forces, must have fallen into British hands.
On this point the opinion of Izard was more valuable than that of
Armstrong; and Izard, after much study and inquiry, decided to erect
his fortifications at Plattsburg. He preferred the task of taking a
position which he could certainly hold, although it would not prevent
the enemy from passing if they chose to leave it behind them. At
Plattsburg, therefore, he collected his troops, amounting to five or
six thousand men, and constructed strong forts, while Macdonough’s
fleet took position in the bay.

While thus occupied, Izard cast anxious glances westward, doubting
whether, in case of a reverse at Niagara or Sackett’s Harbor, he ought
not to move on the St. Lawrence and threaten the British communications
between Montreal and Kingston.[152] The same idea occurred to
Armstrong, who in a letter dated July 27 recommended Izard to carry
it out.[153] The letter reached Izard August 10, when he had advanced
with his army to Chazy, and had learned enough of the concentration of
British troops in his front to be assured that they meant to direct
their serious attack against Lake Champlain. He wrote Armstrong a
letter, August 11, which failed only in saying too little, rather than
too much, of the dangers risked in obeying Armstrong’s order:[154]--

   “I will make the movement you direct, if possible; but I shall
   do it with the apprehension of risking the force under my
   command, and with the certainty that everything in this vicinity
   but the lately erected works at Plattsburg and Cumberland
   Head will in less than three days after my departure be in
   the possession of the enemy. He is in force superior to mine
   in my front; he daily threatens an attack on my position at
   Champlain; we are in hourly expectation of a serious conflict.
   That he has not attacked us before this time is attributable to
   caution on his part, from exaggerated reports of our numbers,
   and from his expectation of reinforcements.... It has always
   been my conviction that the numerical force of the enemy has
   been under-rated. I believe this to be the strong point of our
   frontier for either attack or defence, and I know that a British
   force has been kept in check in Lower Canada for many weeks
   past, greatly superior to that which I could oppose to it.”

Izard was right. Every week new British forces poured into Quebec and
were forwarded to Montreal. The arrival of the first division at Quebec
was announced in the American newspapers early in August. Within a few
weeks three brigades arrived and were sent to the front. When Izard
wrote, he was probably faced by ten thousand veteran British troops
within twenty or thirty miles of his position, and more were known to
be on their way. At such a moment the danger of attempting a diversion
was great; but Armstrong refused to believe it. Irritated by Izard’s
remonstrance, the secretary not only persisted in his own opinion, but,
abandoning the idea of a movement against the British communications
along the St. Lawrence, ordered Izard to march his army to Sackett’s
Harbor, and from there to operate either directly in force against
Kingston,[155] or to go on to Niagara and assist Brown, then hard
pressed at Fort Erie. “It is very distinctly my opinion,” wrote the
secretary August 12,[156] “that it has become good policy on our part
to carry the war as far to the westward as possible, particularly while
we have an ascendency on the Lakes.”

Izard obeyed. His troops, numbering four thousand men, began their
march August 29 for Sackett’s Harbor, and for several weeks at the
crisis of the campaign ceased to exist for military purposes. Within
the fortifications at Plattsburg Izard left a miscellaneous body of
three thousand, three hundred men,[157] without an organized battalion
except four companies of the Sixth regiment. Brigadier-General
Alexander Macomb, who as senior officer was left in command, reported
his force as not exceeding fifteen hundred effectives.[158]

Armstrong’s policy of meeting the enemy’s main attack by
annihilating the main defence never received explanation or excuse.
At times Armstrong seemed to suggest that he meant to rely on the
navy,[159]--and indeed nothing else, except Izard’s forts, was left to
rely upon; but in truth he rather invited the invasion of a British
army into New York to “renew the scene of Saratoga.”[160] As Izard
predicted, the enemy crossed the frontier at once after his departure,
occupying Chazy September 3, and approaching, September 5, within eight
miles of Plattsburg.

Great Britain had never sent to America so formidable an armament.
Neither Wolfe nor Amherst, neither Burgoyne nor Cornwallis, had led
so large or so fine an army as was under the command of Sir George
Prevost. According to his proposed arrangement, the light brigade,
under Major-General Robinson, contained four battalions of the
Twenty-seventh, Thirty-ninth, Seventy-sixth, and Eighty-eighth foot,
with artillery, and numbered two thousand eight hundred and eighty-four
rank-and-file. The second brigade, under Major-General Brisbane,
contained battalions of the Eighth, Thirteenth, and Forty-ninth, De
Meuron’s regiment and Canadian voltigeurs and chasseurs, numbering
four thousand and forty-eight rank-and-file. The third brigade, under
Major-General Power, contained battalions of the Third, Fifth,
Twenty-seventh, and Fifty-eighth, and numbered three thousand eight
hundred and one rank-and-file. The reserve, under Major-General Kempt,
contained battalions of the Ninth, Thirty-seventh, Fifty-seventh, and
Eighty-first, numbering three thousand five hundred and forty-nine
rank-and-file. Finally, fourteen hundred and eighty-eight men of the
Sixteenth and Seventieth regiments, under the command of Major-General
DeWatteville, were stationed between Coteau du Lac and Gananoque on the
St. Lawrence.[161]

Thus the left division of the British army in Canada numbered fifteen
thousand seven hundred and seventy effectives, or, including officers,
probably eighteen thousand men, without reckoning the Canadian militia,
either incorporated or sedentary. Two lieutenant-generals and five
major-generals were in command. Amply provided with artillery and
horses, every brigade well equipped, they came fresh from a long
service in which the troops had learned to regard themselves as
invincible. As they were at last organized, four brigades crossed
the border, numbering not less than “eleven thousand men with a
proportionate and most excellent train of artillery, commanded in
chief by Sir George Prevost, and under him by officers of the first
distinction in the service.”[162] A reserve of about five thousand men
remained behind.

The fleet was almost as formidable as the army. As the force of the
flotilla was reported to Prevost, it consisted of a thirty-six-gun
ship, the “Confiance;” an eighteen-gun brig, the “Linnet;” two ten-gun
sloops and twelve gunboats, carrying sixteen guns,[163]--all commanded
by Captain Downie, of the Royal Navy, detached by Sir James Yeo for the
purpose.

Such an expedition was regarded with unhesitating confidence, as able
to go where it pleased within the region of Lake Champlain. About every
other undertaking in America the British entertained doubts, but in
regard to this affair they entertained none.[164] Every movement of
the British generals showed conviction of their irresistible strength.
Had Prevost doubted the result of attacking Plattsburg, he could have
advanced by St. Albans on Burlington,[165] which would have obliged
Macomb and Macdonough to leave their positions. So little did his
army apprehend difficulty, that in advancing to Plattsburg in face of
Macomb’s skirmishers they did not once form in line, or pay attention
to the troops and militia who obstructed the road. “The British troops
did not deign to fire on them except by their flankers and advanced
patrols,” reported Macomb.[166] “So undaunted was the enemy that he
never deployed in his whole march, always pressing on in column.”

The fleet felt the same certainty. According to the best Canadian
authority,[167] “the strongest confidence prevailed in the superiority
of the British vessels, their weight of metal, and in the capacity and
experience of their officers and crews.” Captain Downie informed Sir
George Prevost’s staff-officer that he considered himself with the
“Confiance” alone a match for the whole American squadron.[168] Taking
the British account of the “Confiance” as correct, she was one hundred
and forty-six feet long on the gun-deck, and thirty-six feet broad; she
carried a crew of three hundred officers and men;[169] her armament
was thirty-seven guns,--twenty-seven long twenty-four-pounders,
six thirty-two-pound carronades, and four twenty-four-pound
carronades,--throwing in all nine hundred and thirty-six pounds.[170]
The American account, which was more trustworthy because the
“Confiance” became better known in the American than in the British
service, gave her thirty-one long twenty-four-pounders and six
carronades.[171]

Macdonough’s best ship was the “Saratoga.” Her dimensions were
not recorded. Her regular complement of men was two hundred and
ten, but she fought with two hundred and forty; she carried eight
twenty-four-pounders, twelve thirty-two and six forty-two-pound
carronades,--or twenty-six guns, throwing eight hundred and
twenty-eight pounds. Her inferiority to the “Confiance” at long range
was immense, and within carronade range it was at least sufficient to
satisfy Captain Downie. He believed that a few broadsides would dispose
of the “Saratoga,” and that the other American vessels must then
surrender.

Assuming Sir George Prevost’s report to have been correct, the two
fleets compared as follows:[172]--


                       _Force of British Fleet._

                                              Long  Short   Weight of
       Vessels.       Guns.  Long.  Short.   metal. metal.    metal.
                            /-----/\-----\  /-----/\-----\
    Confiance          37     31      6       744    192      936
    Linnet             16     16              192             192
    Chubb              11      1     10         6    180      186
    Finch              10      4      6        24    108      132
    Twelve Gunboats    16      8      8       162    256      418
                       --     --     --      ----    ---     ----
        Total          90     60     30      1128    736     1864


                      _Force of American Fleet._

                                               Long  Short   Weight of
       Vessels.       Guns.   Long.  Short.   metal. metal.   metal.
                             /-----/\-----\  /-----/\-----\
    Saratoga           26       8     18       192    636      828
    Eagle              20       8     12       144    384      528
    Ticonderoga        17      12      5       168    146      314
    Preble              7       7               63              63
    Ten Gunboats       16      10      6       192    108      300
                       --      --     --       ---   ----     ----
        Total          86      45     41       759   1274     2033

In this calculation the possible error consists only in one disputed
eighteen-pound columbiad on the “Finch,” and three disputed guns--one
long and two short--on the British gunboats. In one case the British
would have thrown about nineteen hundred pounds of metal,--in the
other, about eighteen hundred. A glance at the two tables shows that in
one respect Downie held a decisive superiority in his guns. He had no
less than sixty long-range pieces, while Macdonough had but forty-five.
Downie’s long-range guns threw at least eleven hundred pounds of metal;
Macdonough’s threw but seven hundred and sixty. If Downie chose his
own distance beyond range of the thirty-two-pound carronades, and
fought only his long guns, nothing could save Macdonough except extreme
good fortune, for he had but fourteen twenty-four-pound guns against
Downie’s thirty-four. Firing by broadsides, Downie could throw from his
single ship, the “Confiance,” sixteen twenty-four-pound shot, to which
Macdonough could reply only with eight, even if he used all his long
guns on the same side.

The Americans had a decided advantage only in their commander. Thomas
Macdonough, born in Delaware in 1783, was thirty years old when this
responsibility fell upon him. He had been educated, like most of the
naval heroes, in the hard service of the Tripolitan war, and had been
sent to construct and command the naval force on Lake Champlain in
the spring of 1813. Macdonough’s superiority over ordinary commanders
consisted in the intelligent forethought with which he provided for
the chances of battle. His arrangement showed that he foresaw, and
as far as possible overcame in advance, every conceivable attack. He
compelled the enemy to fight only as pleased himself.

  [Illustration:

    PLAN
    OF THE
    BATTLE
    OF
    PLATTSBURG

    Position of vessels
    20 M. after anchoring]

Macdonough anchored his four large vessels across Plattsburg Bay,
where it was a mile and a half wide, and placed his gunboats in their
rear to fill the gaps. Cumberland Head on his left and front, and Crab
Island on his right obliged the enemy to enter in a line so narrow
that Downie would find no room to anchor on his broadside out of
carronade range, but must sail into the harbor under the raking fire
of the American long guns, and take a position within range of the
American carronades.[173] As the battle was to be fought at anchor,
both squadrons would as a matter of course be anchored with springs on
their cables; but Macdonough took the additional precaution of laying
a kedge off each bow of the “Saratoga,” bringing their hawsers in on
the two quarters, and letting them hang in bights under water.[174]
This arrangement enabled him to wind his ship at any time without fear
of having his cables cut by the enemy’s shot, and to use his larboard
broadside if his starboard guns should be disabled. In effect, it
doubled his fighting capacity.

Sir George Prevost and the army were ready to move before Downie’s
fleet could be prepared. Marching directly forward with the utmost
confidence, Sir George turned the advanced American position at Dead
Creek Bridge and drove away the gunboats that covered it. He reached
the Saranac River September 6, and saw beyond it a ridge “crowned with
three strong redoubts and other field-works, and blockhouses armed with
heavy ordnance, with their flotilla at anchor out of gunshot from the
shore.”[175] The description was not exaggerated. Izard was himself a
trained engineer, and the works built by him, under the direction of
Major Totten of the Engineer Corps, were believed capable of resisting
for three weeks a combined attack by land and water, even if the
British fleet were victorious.[176] Three good companies of artillery
manned the guns. Excellent officers of every arm were in command.

Prevost properly halted, and declined to assault without the
co-operation of the fleet. He waited five days impatiently for Downie
to appear. Not till seven o’clock on the morning of September 11 did
the British flotilla sail round Cumberland Head. At the same time
Prevost ordered his troops to cross the Saranac and storm the American
works.

Downie intended, without regarding his superiority in long-range guns,
to sail in and to lay the “Confiance” alongside of the “Saratoga;” but
the wind was light and baffling, and his approach was so slow that he
could not long bear the raking fire of the American guns. As he came
within carronade range the wind baffling, he was obliged to anchor
at two cables’ lengths,[177] or three hundred yards,[178] and begin
action. With the same discipline that marked the movements of the
troops on shore, Downie came to, anchored, made everything secure, and
then poured a full broadside into Macdonough’s ship. The “Saratoga”
shivered under the shock of sixteen twenty-four-pound shot and canister
charges striking her hull; almost one-fifth of her crew were disabled;
but she stood stoutly to her work, and the whole line was soon hotly
engaged.

Americans usually had a decided advantage in their better gunnery, but
three hundred yards was a long range for thirty-two-pound carronades,
which at point-blank carried less than two hundred and fifty yards,
and lost accuracy in proportion to elevation.[179] Macdonough was
slow to prove superiority. Early in the battle the British suffered
a severe, and perhaps in the experience of this war a decisive, loss
in their commander, Captain Downie, instantly killed by one of his
own guns thrown off its carriage against him by a solid shot. Yet at
the end of two hours’ combat the British squadron was on the whole
victorious, and the American on the point of capture. Of the three
smaller American vessels, the “Preble” on the extreme right was driven
out of the engagement, and the British gunboats, turning the American
flank, attacked the “Ticonderoga,” which maintained a doubtful battle.
The American left was also turned, the “Eagle” having been driven to
take refuge between the “Saratoga” and “Ticonderoga,” in the centre.
Macdonough’s ship was then exposed to the concentrated fire of the
“Confiance” and “Linnet,” and his battery was soon silenced. The
“Saratoga” could no longer use a gun on the engaged side, and the
battle was nearly lost.

Then Macdonough’s forethought changed the impending defeat into
victory. His fire had nearly silenced the “Confiance,” and disregarding
the “Linnet,” he ceased attention to the battle in order to direct the
operation of winding ship. Little by little hauling the ship about,
he opened on the “Confiance” with one gun after another of the fresh
broadside, as they bore; and the “Confiance,” after trying in vain to
effect the same operation, struck her colors. Then the British fleet
was in the situation which Downie had anticipated for the Americans in
the event of silencing the “Saratoga.” The three smaller vessels were
obliged to surrender, and the gunboats alone escaped. The battle had
lasted from quarter past eight till quarter before eleven.

  [Illustration:

    POSITIONS
    OF THE
    BRITISH AND AMERICAN FORCES
    AT
    PLATTSBURG

    AFTER A SKETCH BY
    BRIG. GEN. MACOMB]

By land, the British attack was much less effective than by water. The
troops were slow in reaching their positions, and had time to make no
decisive movement. A column under Major-General Robinson was ordered
to move round by the right flank to a ford previously reconnoitred,
some distance up the Saranac, in order to gain a position whence
they could reverse the American works and carry them by assault;
but Robinson’s column missed its way, and before reaching the ford
heard the cheers of the American troops, and halted to ascertain its
cause.[180] The remainder of the army waited for Robinson’s column to
assault. The casualties showed that nothing like a serious engagement
took place. The entire loss of the British army from September 6 to
September 14 was officially reported as only thirty-seven killed and
one hundred and fifty wounded, and of this loss a large part occurred
previous to the battle of September 11. The entire American loss was
thirty-seven killed and sixty-two wounded.

In the naval battle, Macdonough reported fifty-two killed and
fifty-eight wounded, among about eight hundred and eighty men. The
British reported fifty-seven killed and seventy-two wounded, in
crews whose number was never precisely known, but was probably fully
eight hundred. In neither case was the loss, though severe, as great
relatively to the numbers as the severity of the action seemed to
imply. The “Saratoga” lost twenty-eight killed in a crew of two
hundred and forty. In Perry’s battle on Lake Erie, the “Lawrence” lost
twenty-two men killed in a crew of one hundred and thirty-one. About
one man in eight was killed on Macdonough’s ship; about one man in six
on Perry’s.

With needless precipitation, Prevost instantly retreated the next day
to Champlain, sacrificing stores to a very great amount, and losing
many men by desertion. The army was cruelly mortified, and Prevost lost
whatever military reputation he still preserved in Canada. In England
the impression of disgrace was equally strong. “It is scarcely possible
to conceive the degree of mortification and disappointment,” said the
“Annual Register,”[181] “which the intelligence of this defeat created
in Great Britain.” Yeo brought official charges of misconduct against
Prevost, and Prevost defended himself by unusual arguments.

   “With whatever sorrow I may think of the unfortunate occurrences
   to which I allude,” he wrote to Bathurst, three weeks
   later,[182] “I consider them as light and trivial when compared
   to the disastrous results which, I am solemnly persuaded, would
   have ensued had any considerations of personal glory, or any
   unreflecting disregard of the safety of the province, or of the
   honor of the army committed to my charge, induced me to pursue
   those offensive operations by land, independent of the fleet,
   which it would appear by your Lordship’s despatch were expected
   of me. Such operations, my Lord, have been attempted before, and
   on the same ground. The history of our country records their
   failure; and had they been undertaken again with double the
   force placed under my command, they would have issued in the
   discomfiture of his Majesty’s arms, and in a defeat not more
   disastrous than inevitable.”

The Duke of Wellington was not so severe as other critics, and
hesitated to say that Prevost was wrong; “though of this I am certain,
he must equally have returned ... after the fleet was beaten; and I am
inclined to think he was right. I have told the ministers repeatedly
that a naval superiority on the Lakes is a _sine qua non_ of
success in war on the frontier of Canada, even if our object should
be wholly defensive.”[183] Yet the Duke in conversation seemed to
think that his army in Canada was also at fault. “He had sent them
some of his best troops from Bordeaux,” he said five-and-twenty years
afterward,[184] “but they did not turn out quite right; they wanted
this iron fist to command them.”

Meanwhile Major-General Izard, by Armstrong’s order, marched his four
thousand men as far as possible from the points of attack. Starting
from Champlain, August 29, the army reached Sackett’s Harbor September
17, having marched about two hundred and eighty miles in twenty days.
At Sackett’s Harbor Izard found no orders from the government, for
the government at that time had ceased to perform its functions; but
he received an earnest appeal from General Brown to succor Fort Erie.
“I will not conceal from you,” wrote Brown, September 10,[185] “that
I consider the fate of this army very doubtful unless speedy relief
is afforded.” Izard, who had no means of testing the correctness of
this opinion, decided to follow Brown’s wishes, and made, September
17, the necessary preparations. Violent storms prevented Chauncey from
embarking the troops until September 21; but September 27 the troops
reached Batavia, and Izard met Brown by appointment. The army had then
been a month in movement. The distance was more than four hundred
miles, and no energy could have shortened the time so much as to have
affected the result of the campaign. At one end of the line Sir George
Prevost retreated from Plattsburg September 12; at the other end,
Lieutenant-General Drummond retreated from Fort Erie September 21; and
Izard’s force, constituting the largest body of regular troops in the
field, had been placed where it could possibly affect neither result.

Izard was a friend of Monroe, and was therefore an object of
Armstrong’s merciless criticism.[186] Brown was a favorite of
Armstrong, and shared his prejudices. The position of Izard at
Buffalo was calculated to excite jealousy. He had implicitly obeyed
the wishes of Armstrong and Brown; in doing so, he had sacrificed
himself,--yielding to Macomb the credit of repulsing Prevost, and
to Brown, who did not wait for his arrival, the credit of repulsing
Drummond. As far as could be seen, Izard had acted with loyalty toward
both Armstrong and Brown; yet both distrusted him. Brown commonly
inclined toward severity, and was the more sensitive because Izard, as
the senior officer, necessarily took command.

Until that moment Izard had enjoyed no chance of showing his abilities
in the field, but at Niagara he saw before him a great opportunity.
Drummond lay at Chippawa, with an army reduced by battle and sickness
to about twenty-five hundred men. Izard commanded fifty-five hundred
regular troops and eight hundred militia.[187] He had time to capture
or destroy Drummond’s entire force before the winter should set
in, and to gather the results of Brown’s desperate fighting. Brown
was eager for the attack, and Izard assented. October 13 the army
moved on Chippawa, and stopped. October 16, Izard wrote to the War
Department,[188]--

   “I have just learned by express from Sackett’s Harbor that
   Commodore Chauncey with the whole of his fleet has retired
   into port, and is throwing up batteries for its protection.
   This defeats all the objects of the operations by land in this
   quarter. I may turn Chippawa, and should General Drummond not
   retire, may succeed in giving him a good deal of trouble; but
   if he falls back on Fort George or Burlington Heights, every
   step I take in pursuit exposes me to be cut off by the large
   reinforcements it is in the power of the enemy to throw in
   twenty-four hours upon my flank or rear.”

In this state of mind, notwithstanding a successful skirmish, October
19, between Bissell’s brigade and a strong detachment of the enemy,
Izard made a decision which ruined his military reputation and
destroyed his usefulness to the service. He reported to the Department,
October 23,[189]--

   “On the 21st, finding that he [Drummond] still continued
   within his works, which he had been assiduously engaged in
   strengthening from the moment of our first appearance, the
   weather beginning to be severe, and a great quantity of our
   officers and men suffering from their continued fatigues and
   exposure, at twelve at noon I broke up my encampment, and
   marched to this ground [opposite Black Rock] in order to prepare
   winter quarters for the troops.”

Nothing remained but to break up the army. Brown was sent at his own
request to Sackett’s Harbor, where the next fighting was expected. A
division of the army went with him. The remainder were placed in winter
quarters near Buffalo. Fort Erie was abandoned and blown up, November
5, and the frontier at Niagara relapsed into repose.

Izard felt the mortification of his failure. His feelings were those
of a generous character, and his tone toward Brown contrasted to his
advantage both in candor and in temper with Brown’s language toward
him; but great energy generally implied great faults, and Brown’s
faults were better suited than Izard’s virtues for the work of an
American general at Niagara. Greatly to Izard’s credit, he not only saw
his own inferiority, but advised the government of it. He wrote to the
Secretary of War, November 20,[190]--

   “The success of the next campaign on this frontier will in a
   great measure depend on concert and good understanding among
   the superior officers.... General Brown is certainly a brave,
   intelligent, and active officer. Where a portion of the forces
   is composed of irregular troops, I have no hesitation in
   acknowledging my conviction of his being better qualified than I
   to make them useful in the public service.”

So sensitive was Izard to the public feeling and his loss of standing
that he sent his resignation to the secretary, December 18,[191] in
terms which betrayed and even asserted his consciousness of shrinking
under the weight of responsibility:--

   “I am fully aware that attempts have been made to lessen the
   confidence of government as well as of the public in my ability
   to execute the important duties intrusted to me,--duties which
   were imposed unexpectedly and much against my inclination. It
   is therefore not improbable that my voluntary retirement will
   relieve the Department of War from some embarrassment, and
   that my individual satisfaction will accord with the public
   advantage,--especially as my view of the connection between
   military command and responsibility differs materially from that
   entertained by persons in high authority.”

A man who showed so little confidence in himself could not claim the
confidence of others, and in contact with stronger characters like
Armstrong, Brown, Scott, or Andrew Jackson could play no part but
that of a victim. His resignation was not accepted, but his career
was at an end. When he relieved the pressure kept by Brown constantly
applied to the extremity of the British line, the movement of war
necessarily turned back to its true object, which was Sackett’s
Harbor. Drummond no sooner saw Fort Erie evacuated and his lines
re-established, November 5, than he hurried on board ship with a part
of his troops, and reached Kingston, November 10,[192] where Sir
George Prevost had already prepared for an attack on Sackett’s Harbor
as soon as supplies could be brought from Quebec to Kingston over
the winter roads. Soon afterward Sir George Prevost was recalled to
England, and a new commander-in-chief, Sir George Murray, supposed to
be a man of higher capacity, was sent to take direction of the next
campaign. Reinforcements continued to arrive.[193] About twenty-seven
thousand regular troops, including officers, were in Canada;[194] a
seventy-four-gun ship and a new frigate were launched at Kingston;
and no one doubted that, with the spring, Sackett’s Harbor would be
formally besieged. Izard remained at Buffalo, doing nothing, and his
only influence on the coming as on the past campaign was to leave the
initiative to the enemy.




                              CHAPTER V.


ARMSTRONG’S management of the Northern campaign caused severe
criticism; but his neglect of the city of Washington exhausted the
public patience. For two years Washington stood unprotected; not a
battery or a breastwork was to be found on the river bank except the
old and untenable Fort Washington, or Warburton.[195] A thousand
determined men might reach the town in thirty-six hours, and destroy
it before any general alarm could be given.[196] Yet no city was more
easily protected than Washington, at that day, from attack on its
eastern side; any good engineer could have thrown up works in a week
that would have made approach by a small force impossible. Armstrong
neglected to fortify. After experience had proved his error, he still
argued in writing to a committee of Congress[197] that fortifications
would have exhausted the Treasury; “that bayonets are known to
form the most efficient barriers; and that there was no reason in this
case to doubt beforehand the willingness of the country to defend
itself,”--as though he believed that militia were most efficient when
most exposed! He did not even provide the bayonets.

  [Illustration:

    POSITIONS
    OF THE
    BRITISH AND AMERICAN
    FORCES NEAR
    WASHINGTON AND BALTIMORE,
    FROM AUGUST 20 TO SEPTEMBER 12 1814]

In truth, Armstrong looking at the matter as a military critic decided
that the British having no strategic object in capturing Washington,
would not make the attempt. Being an indolent man, negligent of
detail, he never took unnecessary trouble; and having no proper staff
at Washington, he was without military advisers whose opinion he
respected. The President and Monroe fretted at his indifference, the
people of the District were impatient under it, and every one except
Armstrong was in constant terror of attack; but according to their
account the secretary only replied: “No, no! Baltimore is the place,
sir; that is of so much more consequence.”[198] Probably he was right,
and the British would have gone first to Baltimore had his negligence
not invited them to Washington.

In May the President began to press Armstrong for precautionary
measures.[199] In June letters arrived from Gallatin and Bayard in
London which caused the President to call a Cabinet meeting. June 23
and 24 the Cabinet met and considered the diplomatic situation.[200]
The President proposed then for the first time to abandon impressment
as a _sine qua non_ of negotiation, and to approve a treaty that
should be silent on the subject. Armstrong and Jones alone supported
the idea at that time, but three days afterward, June 27, Monroe
and Campbell acceded to it. The Cabinet then took the defences of
Washington in hand, and July 1 decided to organize a corps of defence
from the militia of the District and the neighboring States. July 2,
the first step toward efficient defence was taken by creating a new
military district on the Potomac, with a military head of its own.
Armstrong wished to transfer Brigadier-General Moses Porter from
Norfolk, to command the new Potomac District;[201] but the President
selected Brigadier-General Winder, because his relationship to the
Federalist governor of Maryland was likely to make co-operation more
effective.

Political appointments were not necessarily bad; but in appointing
Winder to please the governor of Maryland Madison assumed the
responsibility, in Armstrong’s eyes, for the defence of Washington.
The Secretary of War seemed to think that Madison and Monroe were
acting together to take the defence of Washington out of his hands,
and to put it in hands in which they felt confidence. Armstrong
placed Winder instantly in command, and promptly issued the orders
arranged in Cabinet; but he left further measures to Winder, Monroe,
and Madison. His conduct irritated the President; but no one charged
that the secretary refused to carry out the orders, or to satisfy the
requisitions of the President or of General Winder. He was merely
passive.[202]

Winder received his appointment July 5, and went to Washington for
instructions. He passed the next month riding between Washington,
Baltimore, and points on the lower Potomac and Patuxent,[203] obtaining
with great fatigue a personal knowledge of the country. August 1 he
established his permanent headquarters at Washington, and the entire
result of his labors till that time was the presence of one company
of Maryland militia at Bladensburg. No line of defence was selected,
no obstructions to the roads were prepared, and not so much as a
ditch or a breastwork was marked out or suggested between Annapolis
and Washington. Another fortnight passed, and still Winder was not
further advanced. He had no more men, arms, fortifications, and no
more ideas, on the 18th of August than on the 5th of July. “The
call for three thousand militia under the requisition of July 4 had
produced only two hundred and fifty men at the moment the enemy landed
at Benedict.”[204] Winder had then been six weeks in command of the
Washington defences.

Meanwhile a British expedition under command of Major-General Robert
Ross, a distinguished officer of the Peninsula army, sailed from
the Gironde, June 27, to Bermuda. Ross was instructed “to effect a
diversion on the coasts of the United States of America in favor of
the army employed in the defence of Upper and Lower Canada.” The point
of attack was to be decided by Vice-Admiral Cochrane, subject to the
general’s approval; but the force was not intended for “any extended
operation at a distance from the coast,” nor was Ross to hold permanent
possession of any captured district.[205]

   “When the object of the descent which you may make on the coast
   is to take possession of any naval or military stores, you will
   not delay the destruction of them in preference to the taking
   them away, if there is reasonable ground of apprehension that
   the enemy is advancing with superior force to effect their
   recovery. If in any descent you shall be enabled to take such
   a position as to threaten the inhabitants with the destruction
   of their property, you are hereby authorized to levy upon them
   contributions in return for your forbearance; but you will
   not by this understand that the magazines belonging to the
   government, or their harbors, or their shipping, are to be
   included in such an arrangement. These, together with their
   contents, are in all cases to be taken away or destroyed.”

Negroes were not to be encouraged to rise upon their masters, and
no slaves were to be taken away as slaves; but any negro who should
expose himself to vengeance by joining the expedition or lending it
assistance, might be enlisted in the black corps, or carried away by
the fleet.

Nothing in these orders warranted the destruction of private or public
property, except such as might be capable of military uses. Ross was
not authorized, and did not intend, to enter on a mere marauding
expedition; but Cochrane was independent of Ross, and at about the
time when Ross reached Bermuda Cochrane received a letter from Sir
George Prevost which gave an unexpected character to the Chesapeake
expedition. A small body of American troops had crossed Lake Erie
to Long Point, May 15, and destroyed the flour-mills, distilleries,
and some private houses there. The raid was not authorized by the
United States government, and the officer commanding it was afterward
court-martialed and censured; but Sir George Prevost, without waiting
for explanations, wrote to Vice-Admiral Cochrane, June 2, suggesting
that he should “assist in inflicting that measure of retaliation which
shall deter the enemy from a repetition of similar outrages.”[206]

When Cochrane received this letter, he issued at Bermuda, July 18,
orders to the ships under his command, from the St. Croix River to
the St. Mary’s, directing general retaliation.[207] The orders were
interesting as an illustration of the temper the war had taken.

   “You are hereby required and directed,” wrote the Vice-Admiral
   to the British blockading squadrons, “to destroy and lay
   waste such towns and districts upon the coast as you may find
   assailable. You will hold strictly in view the conduct of
   the American army toward his Majesty’s unoffending Canadian
   subjects, and you will spare merely the lives of the unarmed
   inhabitants of the United States. For only by carrying this
   retributory justice into the country of our enemy can we hope
   to make him sensible of the impropriety as well as of the
   inhumanity of the system he has adopted. You will take every
   opportunity of explaining to the people how much I lament the
   necessity of following the rigorous example of the commander
   of the American forces. And as these commanders must obviously
   have acted under instructions from the Executive government
   of the United States, whose intimate and unnatural connection
   with the late government of France has led them to adopt the
   same system of plunder and devastation, it is therefore to
   their own government the unfortunate sufferers must look for
   indemnification for their loss of property.”

This ill-advised order was to remain in force until Sir George Prevost
should send information “that the United States government have come
under an obligation to make full remuneration to the injured and
unoffending inhabitants of the Canadas for all the outrages their
troops have committed.” Cochrane further wrote to Prevost that “as
soon as these orders have been acted upon,” a copy would be sent to
Washington for the information of the Executive government.

Cochrane’s retaliatory order was dated July 18, and Ross’s transports
arrived at Bermuda July 24. As soon as the troops were collected and
stores put on board, Cochrane and Ross sailed, August 3, for Chesapeake
Bay. They arrived a few days in advance of the transports, and passing
up the bay to the mouth of the Potomac, landed, August 15, with Rear
Admiral Cockburn, to decide on a plan for using to best effect the
forces under their command.

Three objects were within reach. The first and immediate aim was a
flotilla of gunboats, commanded by Captain Joshua Barney, which had
taken refuge in the Patuxent River, and was there blockaded. The next
natural object of desire was Baltimore, on account of its shipping and
prize-money. The third was Washington and Alexandria, on account of the
navy-yard and the vessels in the Potomac. Baltimore was the natural
point of attack after destroying Barney’s flotilla; but Cockburn,
with a sailor’s recklessness, urged a dash at Washington.[208] Ross
hesitated, and postponed a decision till Barney’s flotilla should be
disposed of.

Two days afterward, August 17, the troops arrived, and the squadron,
commanded by Vice-Admiral Cochrane, moved twenty miles up the bay to
the mouth of the Patuxent,--a point about fifty miles distant from
Annapolis on the north, and from Washington on the northwest. Having
arrived there August 18, Cochrane wrote, or afterward ante-dated, an
official letter to Secretary Monroe:[209]--

   “Having been called on by the Governor-General of the Canadas
   to aid him in carrying into effect measures of retaliation
   against the inhabitants of the United States for the wanton
   destruction committed by their army in Upper Canada, it has
   become imperiously my duty, conformably with the nature of the
   Governor-General’s application, to issue to the naval force
   under my command an order to destroy and lay waste such towns
   and districts upon the coast as may be found assailable.”

The notice was the more remarkable because Cochrane’s order was issued
only to the naval force. The army paid no attention to it. Ross’s
troops were landed at Benedict the next day, August 19; but neither
there nor elsewhere did they destroy or lay waste towns or districts.
They rather showed unusual respect for private property.

At Benedict, August 19, the British forces were organized in three
brigades, numbering, according to different British accounts, four
thousand five hundred, or four thousand rank-and-file.[210] Cockburn
with the boats of the fleet the next day, August 20, started up the
river in search of Barney’s flotilla; while the land force began its
march at four o’clock in the afternoon abreast of the boats, and camped
four miles above Benedict without seeing an enemy, or suffering from a
worse annoyance than one of the evening thunder-storms common in hot
weather.

The next day at dawn the British army started again, and marched that
day, Sunday, August 21, twelve miles to the village of Nottingham,
where it camped.[211] The weather was hot, and the march resembled a
midsummer picnic. Through a thickly wooded region, where a hundred
militia-men with axes and spades could have delayed their progress for
days, the British army moved in a solitude apparently untenanted by
human beings, till they reached Nottingham on the Patuxent,--a deserted
town, rich in growing crops and full barns.

At Nottingham the army passed a quiet night, and the next morning,
Monday, August 22, lingered till eight o’clock, when it again advanced.
Among the officers in the Eighty-fifth regiment was a lieutenant
named Gleig, who wrote afterward a charming narrative of the campaign
under the title, “A Subaltern in America.” He described the road as
remarkably good, running for the most part through the heart of thick
forests, which sheltered it from the rays of the sun. During the march
the army was startled by the distant sound of several heavy explosions.
Barney had blown up his gunboats to prevent their capture. The British
naval force had thus performed its part in the enterprise, and the
army was next to take the lead. Ross halted at Marlboro after a march
of only seven miles, and there too he camped, undisturbed by sight
or sound of an armed enemy, although the city of Washington was but
sixteen miles on his left, and Baltimore thirty miles in his front.
Ross had then marched twenty or twenty-one miles into Maryland without
seeing an enemy, although an American army had been close on his left
flank, watching him all day.

At Marlboro Ross was obliged to decide what he should next do. He
was slow in forming a conclusion. Instead of marching at day-break
of August 23, and moving rapidly on Baltimore or Washington, the
army passed nearly the whole day at Marlboro in idleness, as though
it were willing to let the Americans do their utmost for defence.
“Having advanced within sixteen miles of Washington,” Ross officially
reported,[212] “and ascertained the force of the enemy to be such as
might authorize an attempt to carry his capital, I determined to make
it, and accordingly put the troops in movement on the evening of the
23d.” More exactly, the troops moved at two o’clock in the afternoon,
and marched about six miles on the road to Washington, when they struck
American outposts at about five o’clock, and saw a force posted on
high ground about a mile in their front. As the British formed to
attack, the American force disappeared, and the British army camped
about nine miles from Washington by way of the navy-yard bridge over
the Eastern Branch.

Thus for five days, from August 18 to August 23, a British army, which
though small was larger than any single body of American regulars then
in the field, marched in a leisurely manner through a long-settled
country, and met no show of resistance before coming within sight of
the Capitol. Such an adventure resembled the stories of Cortez and
De Soto; and the conduct of the United States government offered no
contradiction to the resemblance.

News of the great fleet that appeared in the Patuxent August 17 reached
Washington on the morning of Thursday, August 18, and set the town
in commotion. In haste the President sent fresh militia requisitions
to the neighboring States, and ordered out the militia and all the
regular troops in Washington and its neighborhood. Monroe started
again as a scout, arriving in the neighborhood of Benedict at ten
o’clock on the morning of August 20, and remaining there all day and
night without learning more than he knew before starting.[213] Winder
was excessively busy, but did, according to his own account, nothing.
“The innumerably multiplied orders, letters, consultations, and
demands which crowded upon me at the moment of such an alarm can more
easily be conceived than described, and occupied me nearly day and
night, from Thursday the 18th of August till Sunday the 21st, and had
nearly broken down myself and assistants in preparing, dispensing, and
attending to them.” Armstrong, at last alive to the situation, made
excellent suggestions,[214] but could furnish neither troops, means,
nor military intelligence to carry them out; and the President could
only call for help. The single step taken for defence was taken by the
citizens, who held a meeting Saturday evening, and offered at their own
expense to erect works at Bladensburg. Winder accepted their offer.
Armstrong detailed Colonel Wadsworth, the only engineer officer near
the Department, to lay out the lines, and the citizens did such work as
was possible in the time that remained.

After three days of confusion, a force was at last evolved. Probably
by Winder’s order, although no such order was preserved, a corps
of observation was marched across the navy-yard bridge toward the
Patuxent, or drawn from Bladensburg, to a place called the Woodyard,
twelve miles beyond the Eastern Branch. The force was not to be
despised. Three hundred infantry regulars of different regiments,
with one hundred and twenty light dragoons, formed the nucleus; two
hundred and fifty Maryland militia, and about twelve hundred District
volunteers or militia, with twelve six-pound field-pieces, composed a
body of near two thousand men,[215] from whom General Brown or Andrew
Jackson would have got good service. Winder came out and took command
Sunday evening, and Monroe, much exhausted, joined them that night.

There the men stood Monday, August 22, while the British army marched
by them, within sight of their outposts, from Nottingham to Marlboro.
Winder rode forward with his cavalry and watched all day the enemy’s
leisurely movements close in his front,[216] but the idea of attack did
not appear to enter his mind. “A doubt at that time,” he said,[217]
“was not entertained by anybody of the intention of the enemy to
proceed direct to Washington.” At nine o’clock that evening Monroe sent
a note to the President, saying that the enemy was in full march for
Washington; that Winder proposed to retire till he could collect his
troops; that preparations should be made to destroy the bridges, and
that the papers in the government offices should be removed.[218] At
the same time Monroe notified Serurier, the only foreign minister then
in Washington, that the single hope of saving the capital depended on
the very doubtful result of an engagement, which would probably take
place the next day or the day after, at Bladensburg.[219]

At Bladensburg, of necessity, the engagement must take place, unless
Winder made an attack or waited for attack on the road. One of two
courses was to be taken,--Washington must be either defended or
evacuated. Perhaps Winder would have done better to evacuate it, and
let the British take the undefended village; but no suggestion of the
sort was made, nor did Winder retreat to Bladensburg as was necessary
if he meant to unite his troops and make preparations for a battle.
Instead of retreating to Bladensburg as soon as he was satisfied--at
noon of Monday, August 22--that the British were going there, he
ordered his troops to fall back, and took position at the Old Fields,
about five miles in the rear of the Woodyard, and about seven miles
by road from the navy-yard. Another road led from the Old Fields to
Bladensburg about eight miles away. The American force might have been
united at Bladensburg Monday evening, but Winder camped at the Old
Fields and passed the night.

That evening the President and the members of the Cabinet rode out to
the camp, and the next morning the President reviewed the army, which
had been reinforced by Commodore Barney with four hundred sailors,
the crews of the burned gunboats. Winder then had twenty-five hundred
men, of whom near a thousand were regulars, or sailors even better
fighting troops than ordinary regulars. Such a force vigorously led
was sufficient to give Ross’s army a sharp check, and at that moment
Ross was still hesitating whether to attack Washington. The loss of
a few hundred men might have turned the scale at any moment during
Tuesday, August 23; but Winder neither fought nor retreated, but once
more passed the day on scout. At noon he rode with a troop of cavalry
toward Marlboro. Satisfied that the enemy was not in motion and would
not move that day, he started at one o’clock for Bladensburg, leaving
his army to itself. He wished to bring up a brigade of militia from
Bladensburg.[220]

Winder had ridden about five miles, when the British at two o’clock
suddenly broke up their camp and marched directly on the Old Fields.
The American army hastily formed in line, and sent off its baggage to
Washington. Winder was summoned back in haste, and arrived on the field
at five o’clock as the British appeared. He ordered a retreat. Every
military reason required a retreat to Bladensburg. Winder directed a
retreat on Washington by the navy-yard bridge.

The reasons which actuated him to prefer the navy-yard to Bladensburg,
as explained by him, consisted in anxiety for the safety of that
“direct and important pass,” which could not without hazard be left
unguarded.[221] In order to guard a bridge a quarter of a mile long
over an impassable river covered by the guns of war-vessels and the
navy-yard, he left unguarded the open high-road which led through
Bladensburg directly to the Capitol and the White House. After a very
rapid retreat that “literally became a run of eight miles,”[222]
Winder encamped in Washington near the bridge-head at the navy-yard
at eight o’clock that night, and then rode three miles to the White
House to report to the President. On returning to camp, he passed
the night until three or four o’clock in the morning making in
person arrangements to destroy the bridge “when necessary,” assuring
his officers that he expected the enemy to attempt a passage there
that night.[223] Toward dawn he lay down, exhausted by performing a
subaltern’s duty all day, and snatched an hour or two of sleep.

The British in their camp that evening were about eight miles from
Bladensburg battle-field. Winder was about five miles distant from
the same point. By a quick march at dawn he might still have arrived
there, with six hours to spare for arranging his defence. He preferred
to wait till he should know with certainty that the British were on
their way there. On the morning of Wednesday, August 24, he wrote to
Armstrong:[224]--

   “I have found it necessary to establish my headquarters here,
   the most advanced position convenient to the troops, and nearest
   information. I shall remain stationary as much as possible, that
   I may be the more readily found, to issue orders, and collect
   together the various detachments of militia, and give them as
   rapid a consolidation and organization as possible.... The
   news up the river is very threatening. Barney’s or some other
   force should occupy the batteries at Greenleaf’s Point and the
   navy-yard. I should be glad of the assistance of counsel from
   yourself and the Government. If more convenient, I should make
   an exertion to go to you the first opportunity.”

This singular note was carried first to the President, who, having
opened and read it, immediately rode to headquarters. Monroe, Jones,
and Rush followed. Armstrong and Campbell arrived last. Before
Armstrong appeared, a scout arrived at ten o’clock with information
that the British army had broken up its camp at daylight, and was
probably more than half way to Bladensburg.[225]

Winder’s persistence in remaining at the navy-yard was explained as
due to the idea that the enemy might move toward the Potomac, seize
Fort Washington or Warburton, secure the passage of his ships, and
approach the city by the river.[226] The general never explained how
his presence at the navy-yard was to prevent such a movement if it was
made.

The whole eastern side of Washington was covered by a broad estuary
called the Eastern Branch of the Potomac, bridged only at two points,
and impassable, even by pontoons, without ample warning. From the
Potomac River to Bladensburg, a distance of about seven miles, the
city was effectually protected. Bladensburg made the point of a right
angle. There the Baltimore road entered the city as by a pass; for
beyond, to the west, no general would venture to enter, leaving an
enemy at Bladensburg in his rear. Roads were wanting, and the country
was difficult. Through Bladensburg the attacking army must come; to
Bladensburg Winder must go, unless he meant to retreat to Georgetown,
or to re-cross the Eastern Branch in the enemy’s rear. Monroe notified
Serurier Monday evening that the battle would be fought at Bladensburg.
Secretary Jones wrote to Commodore Rodgers, Tuesday morning, that the
British would probably “advance to-day toward Bladensburg.”[227] Every
one looked instinctively to that spot[228], yet Winder to the last
instant persisted in watching the navy-yard bridge, using the hours of
Wednesday morning to post Barney’s sailors with twenty-four-pound guns
to cover an approach[229] where no enemy could cross.

  [Illustration:

    MAP OF THE
    BATTLE
    OF
    BLADENSBURG

    STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N. Y.]

No sooner did Winder receive intelligence at ten o’clock Wednesday
morning that the British were in march to Bladensburg, than in the
utmost haste he started for the same point, preceded by Monroe and
followed by the President and the rest of the Cabinet and the troops.
Barney’s sailors and their guns would have been left behind to guard
the navy-yard bridge had Secretary Jones not yielded to Barney’s
vigorous though disrespectful remonstrances, and allowed him to
follow.[230]

In a long line the various corps, with their military and civil
commanders, streamed toward Bladensburg, racing with the British, ten
miles away, to arrive first on the field of battle. Monroe was earliest
on the ground. Between eleven and twelve o’clock he reached the spot
where hills slope gently toward the Eastern Branch a mile or more in
broad incline, the little straggling town of Bladensburg opposite,
beyond a shallow stream, and hills and woods in the distance. Several
militia corps were already camped on the ground, which had been from
the first designated as the point of concentration. A Baltimore
brigade, more than two thousand strong, had arrived there thirty-six
hours before. Some Maryland regiments arrived at the same time with
Monroe. About three thousand men were then on the field, and their
officers were endeavoring to form them in line of battle. General
Stansbury of the Baltimore brigade made such an arrangement as he
thought best. Monroe, who had no military rank, altered it without
Stansbury’s knowledge.[231] General Winder arrived at noon, and rode
about the field. At the same time the British light brigade made its
appearance, and wound down the opposite road, a mile away, a long
column of redcoats, six abreast, moving with the quick regularity, of
old soldiers,[232] and striking directly at the American centre. They
reached the village on one side of the stream as Winder’s troops poured
down the hill on the other; and the President with two or three of his
Cabinet officers, considerably in advance of all their own troops,
nearly rode across the bridge into the British line, when a volunteer
scout warned them of their danger.[233]

Much the larger portion of the American force arrived on the ground
when the enemy was in sight, and were hastily drawn up in line wherever
they could be placed.[234] They had no cover. Colonel Wadsworth’s
intrenchments were not used,[235] except in the case of one field-work
which enfiladed the bridge at close range, where field-pieces were
placed. Although some seven thousand men were present, nothing
deserving the name of an army existed. “A few companies only,”
said the Subaltern, “perhaps two or at the most three battalions,
wearing the blue jacket which the Americans have borrowed from the
French, presented some appearance of regular troops. The rest seemed
country-people, who would have been much more appropriately employed
in attending to their agricultural occupations than in standing
with muskets in their hands on the brow of a bare, green hill.”
Heterogeneous as the force was, it would have been sufficient had it
enjoyed the advantage of a commander.

The British light brigade, some twelve or fifteen hundred men, under
Colonel Thornton of the Eighty-fifth regiment, without waiting for the
rear division, dashed across the bridge, and were met by a discharge of
artillery and musketry directly in their face. Checked for an instant,
they pressed on, crossed the bridge or waded the stream, and spread to
the right and left, while their rockets flew into the American lines.
Almost instantly a portion of the American line gave way; but the rest
stood firm, and drove the British skirmishers back under a heavy fire
to the cover of the bank with its trees and shrubs. Not until a fresh
British regiment, moving well to the right, forded the stream and
threatened to turn the American left, did the rout begin. Even then
several strong corps stood steady, and in good order retired by the
road that led to the Capitol; but the mass, struck by panic, streamed
westward toward Georgetown and Rockville.

Meanwhile Barney’s sailors, though on the run, could not reach the
field in time for the attack, and halted on the hillside, about a
mile from Bladensburg, at a spot just outside the District line. The
rout had then begun, but Barney put his five pieces in position and
waited for the enemy. The American infantry and cavalry that had not
fled westward moved confusedly past the field where the sailors stood
at their guns. Winder sent Barney no orders, and Barney, who was not
acting under Winder, but was commander-in-chief of his own forces under
authority of the Navy Department, had no idea of running away. Four
hundred men against four thousand were odds too great even for sailors,
but a battle was not wholly disgraceful that produced such a commander
and such men. Barney’s account of the combat was as excellent as his
courage:[236]--

   “At length the enemy made his appearance on the main road in
   force and in front of my battery, and on seeing us made a halt.
   I reserved our fire. In a few minutes the enemy again advanced,
   when I ordered an eighteen-pounder to be fired, which completely
   cleared the road; shortly after, a second and a third attempt
   was made by the enemy to come forward, but all were destroyed.
   They then crossed over into an open field, and attempted to
   flank our right. He was met there by three twelve-pounders, the
   marines under Captain Miller, and my men acting as infantry,
   and again was totally cut up. By this time not a vestige of the
   American army remained, except a body of five or six hundred
   posted on a height on my right, from which I expected much
   support from their fine situation.”

Such a battle could not long continue. The British turned Barney’s
right; the corps on the height broke and fled,[237] and the British,
getting into the rear, fired down upon the sailors. The British
themselves were most outspoken in praise of Barney’s men. “Not only did
they serve their guns with a quickness and precision that astonished
their assailants,” said the Subaltern, “but they stood till some of
them were actually bayoneted with fuses in their hands; nor was it till
their leader was wounded and taken, and they saw themselves deserted
on all sides by the soldiers, that they left the field.” Barney held
his position nearly half an hour, and then, being severely wounded,
ordered his officers to leave him where he lay. There he was taken by
the British advance, and carried to their hospital at Bladensburg.
The British officers, admiring his gallantry, treated him, he said,
“with the most marked attention, respect, and politeness as if I was
a brother,”--as though to show their opinion that Barney instead of
Winder should have led the American army.

After the sailors retired, at about four o’clock, the British stopped
two hours to rest. Their victory, easy as it seemed, was not cheaply
bought. General Ross officially reported sixty-four killed and one
hundred and eighty-five wounded.[238] A loss of two hundred and fifty
men among fifteen hundred said to be engaged[239] was not small; but
Gleig, an officer of the light brigade, himself wounded, made twice,
at long intervals, an assertion which he must have intended as a
contradiction of the official report. “The loss on the part of the
English was severe,” he said,[240] “since out of two thirds of the
army which were engaged upward of five hundred men were killed and
wounded.” According to this assertion, Ross lost five hundred men among
three thousand engaged, or one in six. Had Winder inflicted that loss
while the British were still on the Patuxent, Ross would have thought
long before risking more, especially as Colonel Thornton was among the
severely injured. The Americans reported only twenty-six killed and
fifty-one wounded.

At six o’clock, after a rest of two hours, the British troops resumed
their march; but night fell before they reached the first houses of
the town. As Ross and Cockburn, with a few officers, advanced before
the troops, some men, supposed to have been Barney’s sailors, fired
on the party from the house formerly occupied by Gallatin, at the
northeast corner of Capitol Square. Ross’s horse was killed, and the
general ordered the house to be burned, which was done. The army did
not enter the town, but camped at eight o’clock a quarter of a mile
east of the Capitol. Troops were then detailed to burn the Capitol,
and as the great building burst into flames, Ross and Cockburn, with
about two hundred men, marched silently in the darkness to the White
House, and set fire to it. At the same time Commodore Tingey, by
order of Secretary Jones, set fire to the navy-yard and the vessels
in the Eastern Branch. Before midnight the flames of three great
conflagrations made the whole country light, and from the distant
hills of Maryland and Virginia the flying President and Cabinet caught
glimpses of the ruin their incompetence had caused.

Serurier lived then in the house built by John Tayloe in 1800, called
the Octagon, a few hundred yards from the War and Navy Departments and
the White House.[241] He was almost the only civil official left in
Washington, and hastened to report the event to Talleyrand:[242]--

   “I never saw a scene at once more terrible and more magnificent.
   Your Highness, knowing the picturesque nature and the grandeur
   of the surroundings, can form an idea of it. A profound darkness
   reigned in the part of the city that I occupy, and we were
   left to conjectures and to the lying reports of negroes as to
   what was passing in the quarter illuminated by these frightful
   flames. At eleven o’clock a colonel, preceded by torches, was
   seen to take the direction of the White House, which is situated
   quite near mine; the negroes reported that it was to be burned,
   as well as all those pertaining to government offices. I thought
   best, on the moment, to send one of my people to the general
   with a letter, in which I begged him to send a guard to the
   house of the Ambassador of France to protect it.... My messenger
   found General Ross in the White House, where he was collecting
   in the drawing-room all the furniture to be found, and was
   preparing to set fire to it. The general made answer that the
   King’s Hotel should be respected as much as though his Majesty
   were there in person; that he would give orders to that effect;
   and that if he was still in Washington the next day, he would
   have the pleasure to call on me.”

Ross and Cockburn alone among military officers, during more than
twenty years of war, considered their duty to involve personal
incendiarism. At the time and subsequently various motives were
attributed to them,--such as the duty of retaliation,--none of which
was alleged by either of them as their warranty.[243] They burned the
Capitol, the White House, and the Department buildings because they
thought it proper, as they would have burned a negro kraal or a den
of pirates. Apparently they assumed as a matter of course that the
American government stood beyond the pale of civilization; and in truth
a government which showed so little capacity to defend its capital,
could hardly wonder at whatever treatment it received.

A violent thunder-storm checked the flames; but the next morning,
Thursday, August 25, fresh detachments of troops were sent to complete
the destruction of public property. Without orders from his Government,
Ross converted his campaign, which till then had been creditable to
himself and flattering to British pride, into a marauding raid of which
no sensible Englishman spoke without mortification. Cockburn amused
himself by revenging his personal grievances on the press which had
abused him. Mounted on a brood mare, white, uncurried, with a black
foal trotting by her side, the Admiral attacked the office of the
“National Intelligencer,” and superintended the destruction of the
types. “Be sure that all the C’s are destroyed,” he ordered, “so that
the rascals cannot any longer abuse my name.”[244] Ross was anxious
to complete the destruction of the public buildings with the least
possible delay, that the army might retire without loss of time;[245]
and the work was pressed with extreme haste. A few private buildings
were burned, but as a rule private property was respected, and no
troops except small detachments were allowed to leave the camp.

Soon after noon, while the work was still incomplete, a tornado burst
on the city and put an end to the effort. An accidental explosion at
the navy-yard helped to check destruction. Ross could do no more, and
was in haste to get away. No sooner had the hurricane, which lasted
nearly two hours and seemed especially violent at the camp, passed
over, than Ross began preparations to retire. With precautions wholly
unnecessary, leaving its camp-fires burning, the British column in
extreme silence, after nine o’clock at night, began its march. Passing
Bladensburg, where the dead were still unburied, Ross left his wounded
in the hospital to American care, and marched all night till seven
o’clock Friday morning, when the troops, exhausted with fatigue, were
allowed a rest. At noon they were again in motion, and at night-fall,
after marching twenty-five miles within twenty-four hours, they arrived
at Marlboro. Had the advance from Benedict been equally rapid, Ross
would have entered Washington without a skirmish.




                              CHAPTER VI.


WHILE Ross and Cockburn were hastily burning the White House
and the Department buildings, anxious only to escape, and never sending
more than two hundred soldiers beyond Capitol Square, the President,
his Cabinet, his generals, and his army were performing movements at
which even the American people, though outraged and exasperated beyond
endurance, could not but laugh.

The President, after riding over the battle-field until the action
began, remarked to Monroe and Armstrong that “it would be now proper
for us to retire in the rear, leaving the military movement to
military men,” which they did.[246] A moment afterward the left of the
line gave way, and the panic-stricken militia poured along the road
leading westward toward the point which in later times became known
as the Soldier’s Home. The President retired with them, “continuing
to move slowly toward the city,” according to Monroe, in company with
Attorney-General Rush. The slowness of movement, on which Monroe seemed
to lay stress, was compensated by steadiness. The President left
Bladensburg battle-field toward two o’clock. He had already ridden in
the early morning from the White House to the navy-yard, and thence to
Bladensburg,--a distance of eight miles at the least. He had six miles
to ride, on a very hot August day, over a road encumbered by fugitives.
He was sixty-three years old, and had that day already been in the
saddle since eight o’clock in the morning, probably without food. Soon
after three o’clock he reached the White House, where all was confusion
and flight.[247] He had agreed with his Cabinet, in case of disaster,
to meet them at Frederick in Maryland, fifty miles away, but he did
not go toward Frederick. Before six o’clock he crossed the Potomac in
a boat from the White House grounds, and started by carriage westward,
apparently intending to join his wife and accompany her to his
residence at Montpelier in Loudoun County, adjoining Frederick County,
on the south side of the Potomac. Secretary Jones, Attorney-General
Rush, and one or two other gentlemen accompanied him. In the midst of a
troop of fugitives they travelled till dark, and went about ten miles,
passing the night at a house “a few miles above the lower falls.”[248]

The next morning, August 25, the President travelled about six miles
and joined his wife at an inn on the same road, where he remained
during the tornado, subjected to no little discomfort and some insult
from fugitives who thought themselves betrayed. Although far beyond
reach of the British troops and some twenty miles from their camp, the
panic was still so great as to cause an alarm on the following night,
which drove Madison from his bed for refuge in the Virginia woods,[249]
at the time when Ross’s army, more than twenty miles distant, was
marching at the utmost speed in the opposite direction.

Of all the rulers, monarchical or republican, whose capitals were
occupied by hostile armies in the Napoleonic wars, Madison was
personally the most roughly treated. Monroe’s adventures were not
less mortifying. As a scout the Secretary of State’s services were
hardly so valuable as those of a common trooper, for he was obliged
to be more cautious; as a general, his interference with the order of
battle at Bladensburg led to sharp criticisms from General Stansbury,
whose arrangements he altered,[250] and to the epithet of “busy and
blundering tactician” from Armstrong.[251] After the battle he was
not less busy, and opinions greatly differed whether he was less
blundering. He did not return to the White House with Madison, but
joined Winder and rode with him to the Capitol, where he assented to
an evacuation, and retired after the flying troops through Georgetown,
passing the night on the Maryland side of the Potomac. The next
morning, August 25, he crossed the river and overtook the President.
After an interview with him, Monroe recrossed the river to Winder’s
headquarters at Montgomery Court House, where he resumed military
functions.

The Secretary of the Treasury, G. W. Campbell, on the morning of the
battle went to the Cabinet meeting at the navy-yard, but his health,
which had become much affected, obliged him to return to his lodgings
instead of riding to Bladensburg. In parting from Madison, Campbell
lent him a pair of pistols, which the President put in his holsters.
Federalists were curious to know whether the pistols were the same
with which he shot Barent Gardenier, but learned only that they were
fine duelling pistols, and that they were stolen from the President’s
holsters during his short stay at the White House after the battle. The
secretary’s duelling pistols became the best known of all the weapons
unused that day; but the secretary himself made no further appearance
on the scene. He went to Frederick. The Secretary of the Navy and the
Attorney-General accompanied the President, and shared his fortunes.

Although ridicule without end was showered on the President and the
other civilians, their conduct was on the whole creditable to their
courage and character; but of the commanding general no kind word
could be said. Neither William Hull, Alexander Smyth, Dearborn,
Wilkinson, nor Winchester showed such incapacity as Winder either
to organize, fortify, fight, or escape. When he might have prepared
defences, he acted as scout; when he might have fought, he still
scouted; when he retreated, he retreated in the wrong direction;
when he fought, he thought only of retreat; and whether scouting,
retreating, or fighting, he never betrayed an idea. In the brief
moment of his preparations on the field at Bladensburg he found time
to give the characteristic order to his artillery: “When you retreat,
take notice that you must retreat by the Georgetown road.”[252] When
he left the field of Bladensburg he rode past Barney’s sailors, at
their guns, and sent his aid to Colonel Beall, on the hill covering
Barney’s right, with an order to retreat.[253] “After accompanying the
retreating army within two miles of the Capitol, I rode forward for the
purpose of selecting a position.”[254] He reached the Capitol first,
and was presently joined there by Monroe and Armstrong. Having decided
not to fight at the Capitol, or at any point between the Capitol and
Georgetown, he rode to Georgetown.[255] Behind Rock Creek his army
would have been safe, and he could certainly have rallied more than
a thousand men to stop the panic; but he thought a farther retreat
necessary, and went on to the heights. On the heights nothing could
reach him without hours of warning, but he rode three miles farther to
Tenallytown. At Tenallytown his exhausted men stopped a moment from
inability to run farther, yet he seemed angry at their fatigue. Struck
by a fresh panic at the glare of the burning city, he pressed his men
on at midnight. “After waiting in this position [Tenallytown] until I
supposed I collected all the force that could be gathered, I proceeded
about five miles farther on the river road, which leads a little wide
to the left of Montgomery Court House, and in the morning gave orders
for the whole to assemble at Montgomery Court House.” The river road
was the road that led farthest from the enemy westward, when every
motive required retreat toward Baltimore if anywhere. The next morning
Winder returned to the Rockville road, till he reached Rockville, or
Montgomery Court House, sixteen miles from Washington, where at last he
paused.

From the beginning to the end of the campaign Winder showed no military
quality. In other respects his conduct tallied with his behavior in
the field. He lost no opportunity of throwing responsibility on the
President and on his troops, and he so far succeeded as to save himself
from public anger by encouraging the idea that the President and the
Cabinet had directed the campaign. Universal as that belief was,
and continued to be, it was without foundation. While Winder courted
advice from every quarter, and threw on the President at every instant
the responsibility for every movement, neither the President nor the
Cabinet showed a disposition to interfere with his authority in any way
except to give the support he asked. Under the strongest temptation
they abstained even from criticism.

More than all the rest, Armstrong refrained from interference with
the movements of Winder. Of all the unfortunate or incapable generals
of the war, Winder was the one whom Armstrong treated with least
bitterness,[256] although he was not Armstrong’s choice, and was
the direct cause of the secretary’s ruin. So careful was Armstrong
not to interfere, that his non-interference became the chief charge
against him. At one moment the President told the secretary that he
interfered too much, at another moment that he should interfere more;
but in truth Armstrong was the only man connected with the defence of
Washington whom no one charged with being ridiculous. After August 20
his conduct was not open to reproach. He was cool when others were
excited; he tried to check the panic; his suggestions were sensible; he
gave all possible aid both to Winder and to the citizens; he attended
the President in his expeditions, used wisely such power as he had,
and indulged in few words.[257] At the President’s request he went
to Bladensburg to support and assist Winder; at the President’s order
he retired after the battle began. He returned, after Winder, to the
Capitol, hoping to convert that strong building into a fortress,--a
measure not unreasonable, if the regulars and sailors were rallied to
make a stand there. When Winder decided to retire to Georgetown, the
secretary acquiesced without a word. Then, in pursuance of a Cabinet
decision made a few hours before, he set out in company with Secretary
Campbell for Frederick, and arrived there in the course of the next day.

Armstrong and Campbell were at Frederick when the British army began
its retreat Thursday night; the President was in Virginia, sixteen
miles up the river; Winder and Monroe, with the remaining troops,
were at Montgomery Court House sixteen miles from Washington.
There they learned, Friday morning, that the British had marched
toward Bladensburg, probably going to Baltimore; and at about ten
o’clock in the morning Winder marched from Montgomery Court House
toward Brookville and Baltimore with all his force. Passing through
Brookville, they camped, Friday night, “about half way between
Montgomery Court House and Ellicott’s upper mills,”[258] and Winder
there left them, starting late that evening alone for Baltimore, and
leaving Monroe and Stansbury in command, with directions to follow.

Meanwhile the President had crossed the Potomac that morning, expecting
to find Winder and Monroe at Montgomery Court House; but on arriving
there at six o’clock in the evening, and learning that the army had
marched toward Baltimore, he followed as far as Brookville, about ten
miles, where he passed the night.[259] Attorney-General Rush was with
him. Saturday morning, August 27, the President sent notes to all his
Cabinet requesting them to unite in Washington.[260] The same afternoon
he returned with Monroe and Rush to the city, which they reached at
about six o’clock, after three days’ absence.

Armstrong and Campbell, ignorant of the change in plan, waited at
Frederick for the President’s arrival, while the President and
Monroe, Sunday, August 28, began the task of restoring the functions
of government. The task was difficult, not so much on account of the
British ravages, which had been confined to public property, as on
account of the general irritation and the continued panic. Hardly had
Ross’s army disappeared when a squadron of British war-vessels, under
Captain Gordon of the frigate “Seahorse,” worked its way up the river,
approaching Fort Washington or Warburton August 27. The commander of
that post, misunderstanding his orders, abandoned it and crossed the
river with his men. Gordon’s squadron reached Alexandria the next day,
and the town capitulated, since it could not resist. Until August 31
the frigates remained at Alexandria, loading such vessels as were there
with the tobacco and other produce which the warehouses contained.[261]

The citizens of Washington and Georgetown, expecting to be visited
in their turn, and conscious of their inability to resist, talked
of a capitulation. Public feeling ran strong against the President.
Armstrong was absent. Winder was at Baltimore. Monroe alone was in a
position to act, and upon Monroe the President was obliged to depend.

   “Under these circumstances,” said Monroe in the only authentic
   account of the event which remains,[262] “the President
   requested Mr. Monroe to take charge of the Department of War
   and command of the District _ad interim_, with which he
   immediately complied. On the 28th, in the morning, the President
   with Mr. Monroe and the Attorney-General visited the navy-yard,
   the arsenal at Greenleaf’s Point, and passing along the shore of
   the Potomac up toward Georgetown. Mr. Monroe, as Secretary of
   War and military commander, adopted measures under sanction of
   the President for the defence of the city and of Georgetown.”

Colonel W[adsworth?] who was placing some guns on the opposite shore
refused to obey an order of Monroe to change their position. Monroe
rode across the bridge and gave the order in person. The colonel
replied that he did not know Mr. Monroe as Secretary of War or
commanding general. Monroe ordered him to obey or leave the field, and
the colonel left the field.

Monroe’s act, whether such was his intention or not, was a _coup
d’état_. The citizens, unable to punish the President, were
rabid against Armstrong. No one could deny that they had reason for
their anger, although the blame for their misfortunes was so evenly
distributed between every officer and every branch of government that
a single victim could not justly be selected for punishment. Monroe,
instead of giving to Armstrong in his absence such support as might
have sustained him, took a position and exercised an authority that
led necessarily to his overthrow. The influence of such acts on the
citizens was obvious. That evening the first brigade of militia held a
meeting, and passed a formal and unanimous resolution that they would
no longer serve under the orders or military administration of General
Armstrong, whom they denounced as the willing cause of the fate of
Washington.[263] This mutinous resolution, adopted in the immediate
presence of the enemy, was taken to the President by two officers of
the brigade, one of whom at least was a strong friend of Monroe.[264]

The resolution of the first brigade was communicated to the President
the next morning, Monday, August 29. All the President’s recorded acts
and conversation for months after the capture of Washington implied
that he was greatly shaken by that disaster. He showed his prostration
by helplessness. He allowed Monroe for the first time to control him;
but he did not dismiss Armstrong. At one o’clock on the afternoon
of the same day the Secretary of War arrived in Washington.[265]
The President that evening rode to his lodgings. Madison preserved
a memorandum of their conversation, and Armstrong also immediately
afterward recorded what passed.[266] The President described to the
secretary the violent prejudices which existed in the city against
the Administration, and especially against himself and the Secretary
of War. “Before his arrival there was less difficulty, as Mr. Monroe,
who was very acceptable to them, had, as on preceding occasions of
his absence, though very reluctantly on this, been the medium for the
functions of Secretary of War;” but since Armstrong had returned,
something must be done.

Armstrong replied that he was aware of the excitement, and knew its
sources; that evidently he could not remain if his functions were
exercised by any one else; that he would resign, or retire from
Washington at once, as the President preferred.

Madison deprecated resignation, and recommended “a temporary
retirement, as he suggested;” and after some further conversation, in
which the President complained of the secretary’s mistakes, they parted
with the understanding that Armstrong should leave Washington the next
morning. Armstrong behaved with dignity and with his usual pride; but
he understood, if Madison did not, the necessary consequences of his
retirement, and on reaching Baltimore sent his resignation to the
President. At the same time he announced it to the public in a letter,
dated September 3, containing comments on the weakness of Madison’s
conduct calculated to close their relations.

Between conscious intrigue and unconscious instinct no clear line of
division was ever drawn. Monroe, by the one method or the other, gained
his point and drove Armstrong from the Cabinet; but the suspicion
that he had intrigued for that object troubled his mind to the day
of his death.[267] Even after Armstrong’s departure, the dangers and
disadvantages of appointing Monroe his successor were so great that for
three weeks the post remained unfilled, until, after many doubts and
hesitations, Monroe wrote to Madison a letter claiming the appointment
of Secretary of War.

   “I have thought much of the state of the Departments at this
   time,” he informed the President, September 25,[268] “and of
   the persons whom it may be proper to place in them, and have
   concluded that whatever may be the arrangement with respect to
   other Departments, the Department of War ought to be immediately
   filled. I think also that I ought to take charge of it.... By
   taking charge of the Department twice, and withdrawing from
   it a second time, it may be inferred that I shrink from the
   responsibility from a fear of injuring my reputation; and this
   may countenance the idea that the removal of the others was an
   affair of intrigue in which I partook, especially in the latter
   instance, from selfish and improper motives, and did not proceed
   from his incompetency or misconduct. It seems due, therefore,
   to my own reputation to go through with the undertaking by
   accepting permanently a trust which I have not sought, never
   wished, and is attended with great responsibility and hazard. By
   taking the place, all clamor will be silenced. It is known, here
   at least, that I was put into it when the other could no longer
   hold it. Those who wished it in the first instance will be
   satisfied, and I shall go on with your support and a favorable
   expectation of the public that I shall discharge to advantage
   its duties.”

While Monroe in private communications with Madison thus treated
Armstrong’s retirement as a “removal,” due to his “incompetency or
misconduct,” and Madison apparently acquiesced in that view, in public
Madison seemed inclined to convey the idea that Armstrong was not
removed or meant to be removed from office, but rather deserted it.
Whichever view was correct, Madison certainly dreaded the political
effect of appearing to remove Armstrong; and while he gave to Monroe
the appointment of Secretary of War, he wrote, September 29, to
Governor Tompkins of New York, offering him the State Department.

Governor Tompkins declined the offer. Apart from the great need of
his services as governor, the experience of Northern men in Virginia
Cabinets was not calculated to encourage any aspirant to the Presidency
in seeking the position. Monroe remained Secretary of State as well as
Secretary of War. As Secretary of State he had little or nothing to do,
which was partly the cause of his activity in military matters; but as
Secretary of War he was obliged to undertake a task beyond the powers
of any man.

During an entire month after the appearance of the British in the
Patuxent, the United States government performed few or none of its
functions. The war on the frontiers was conducted without orders from
Washington. Every energy of the government was concentrated on its own
immediate dangers, as though Washington were a beleaguered fortress.
Slowly the tide of war ebbed from the Potomac and Chesapeake, and not
until it had wholly subsided could men cease to dread its possible
return.

Captain Gordon’s squadron began its descent of the river September 1,
greatly annoyed[269] by batteries erected on the banks by Commodore
Rodgers, Perry, and Porter, who were sent from Baltimore, by order of
Secretary Jones, for the purpose. Not until September 6 did Captain
Gordon escape from his perilous position and rejoin the fleet.
Meanwhile the shores of Chesapeake Bay continued to be ravaged with
all the severity threatened by Cochrane. Frederick Chamier, afterward
the author of several popular sea-stories, was then a lieutenant on
the “Menelaus” in Cochrane’s squadron, and his recollections in “The
Life of a Sailor” gave a lively picture of the marauding in which
he took part.[270] Like Napier, Chamier was too tender-hearted for
his work. “I am willing to make oath,” he wrote, in reply to Captain
Scott’s contradictions, “that on the day that the ‘Menelaus’ entered
the Potomac, three houses were burning at the same time on the
left-hand bank of the river. We burnt more than five ourselves.” War
was commonly accompanied by destruction, but the war in the Chesapeake
was remarkable for the personal share taken by the highest officers,
especially by Cockburn and Ross, in directing the actual operation of
setting fire to private and public property.[271]

At last the practice caused a disaster that cost the British navy a
life more valuable than all the property it could destroy or carry
away. The “Menelaus,” commanded by Sir Peter Parker, was sent up
Chesapeake Bay to divert attention from the general movement of troops
and ships on the Potomac.[272] The “Menelaus” took position off the
Sassafras River, which Cockburn had cleared of vessels the year before.
Nothing in the river could injure the navy, but the “Menelaus” was
ordered to make a diversion; and Sir Peter Parker learned from negroes
that two hundred militia, encamped behind a wood half a mile from the
beach, intended to cross the bay for the protection of Baltimore.[273]
One hundred and twenty-four men were landed at eleven o’clock on the
night of August 30, and went in search of the militia. Instead of half
a mile, they were led by their guides three or four miles, and at last
found the militia drawn up, ready to receive them. Sir Peter Parker
ordered an attack, and while cheering it on in the moonlight was struck
by a buckshot, which severed the femoral artery. The sailors carried
him back to the ship, but he died long before reaching it.[274] His
party escaped with a loss of thirteen killed and twenty-seven wounded
besides their captain.

The Americans regretted only that the punishment had fallen on the
wrong person, for Cochrane and Cockburn rather than Parker were the
true marauders; but the lesson was effectual, and the British became
more cautious after Parker’s death. Indeed, their activity in the
Chesapeake centred thenceforward in an effort to capture Baltimore,
which required all their strength.

Baltimore should have been first attacked, but Cockburn’s influence by
diverting Ross to Washington gave the larger city time to prepare its
defence. The citizens themselves, headed by the mayor, took charge of
the preparations; and their first act, contrary to the course pursued
by Armstrong and Winder at Washington, was to construct intrenchments
round the city, and to erect semi-circular batteries at a number of
points, mounted with cannon and connected by a line of works. After the
capture of Washington the citizens toiled still more earnestly at their
task, until a formidable line of redoubts protected the town, and,
though not wholly finished, gave cover to the militia. The batteries
were manned by sailors, commanded by officers of the navy. The harbor
was protected by Fort McHenry, small but capable of defence, and
occupied by a strong force of regular troops, sailors, and volunteer
artillerists numbering about one thousand, under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Armistead of the Artillery.[275]

These precautions made the capture of Baltimore impossible by such
a force as had taken Washington, even though aided by the fleet.
The precise number of troops present in the city, according to the
official return for September 10, was twelve thousand nine hundred and
ninety-one men present for duty, with eight hundred and ninety-seven
officers. The aggregate of present and absent was sixteen thousand
eight hundred and five men.[276] The force was ample to man the works,
but the fortifications chiefly decided the result. No army on either
side during the war succeeded in storming works in face, except by
surprise; and to turn the works of Baltimore a larger army was required
than Ross had at his command.

The militia major-general commanding at Baltimore was no other than
Samuel Smith, senator of the United States. He had lately passed his
sixty-second year. The brigadier-general in the United States service
who commanded the military district was W. H. Winder, whose defence of
Washington ended abruptly August 24, and who left that neighborhood on
the evening of August 26 to take command of the defences of Baltimore.
Winder was a Baltimore lawyer, only three years Smith’s junior, when
Eustis and Madison gave him a regiment in March, 1812. Smith was not
disposed to accept the idea of subordination to a man of inferior
rank, military and civil, who knew no more of war than Smith knew,
and whose career had been twice marked by unusual ridicule. Winder on
arriving in Baltimore notified Smith that he should take command, and
was astonished when the senator declined to surrender his authority.
Winder appealed to the President and to the governor of Maryland, his
cousin Levin Winder; but nothing could be done to assist him, and in
the end he submitted. Samuel Smith remained in command.

The British leaders having succeeded in turning their demonstration
up the Patuxent into an attack on Washington, next decided to make “a
demonstration upon the city of Baltimore, which might be converted
into a real attack should circumstances appear to justify it,”[277]
and sailed from the Potomac September 6 for the Patapsco River. They
anchored September 11 off its mouth. From that point Ross’s army when
landed had only fourteen miles to march, and no water in their way,
while Cochrane’s fleet had but twelve miles to sail. Compared with the
approaches to Washington, the approach to Baltimore was easy.

  [Illustration:

    MILITARY TOPOGRAPHY
    OF
    BALTIMORE
    AND ITS VICINITY
    AND OF
    PATAPSCO NECK
    TO
    NORTH POINT
    BY ORDER OF
    BRIG. GEN. W. H. WINDER

    1814.]

Ross’s troops were all landed at daylight on the northern point,
and were in motion by eight o’clock September 12, without
firing a shot. Their numbers were differently given by British
authorities,--one reporting them at three thousand two hundred and
seventy rank-and-file;[278] the other reckoning them at upward of five
thousand.[279] Ross made on the Patapsco no such leisurely movements
as on the Patuxent, but began his march at once, and proceeded about
five miles without meeting resistance. The light brigade with the
Eighty-fifth regiment was in advance; the second brigade, under Colonel
Brooke of the Forty-fourth, followed; and the third brigade, under
Colonel Patterson of the Twenty-first, formed the rear. At the same
time the fleet moved up the channel toward Fort Henry.

The city was naturally excited at the news that the British had
arrived. General Smith, on receiving the intelligence September 11,
detached a brigade of Baltimore militia, under General Stricker, to
check the enemy if possible, and Stricker advanced that evening about
seven miles toward North Point. His force numbered about three thousand
two hundred men;[280] and with that body of raw militia, a part of
whom had been routed at Bladensburg only a fortnight before, General
Stricker attempted to fight a battle with five thousand old soldiers.
On the morning of September 12 he formed his troops in three lines
three hundred yards apart, apparently in close order, without cover
or protection of any kind, standing in fields more or less open, and
with an exposed flank.[281] Of all his arrangements, the only one
which showed ordinary caution was to send a detachment of cavalry
and riflemen a mile or two in his front. As the British advance
approached, the American outposts fell back, and General Stricker sent
forward some four hundred men, partly rifles, as skirmishers. The
British advanced guard coming up, the skirmishing party fired, but was
soon driven back. Ross and Cockburn were walking together with the
advance, and after the firing ceased, Ross turned back alone to order
up the light companies in anticipation of more serious resistance. On
his way he was shot through the breast from the wood, and fell in the
road, where he lay till he was found by the light companies hurrying
forward to the scene of the firing. He barely spoke afterward.[282]

The loss of their commanding general was the second heavy penalty
paid by the British for their contempt of militia. Colonel Brooke
immediately took command, and the advance was not checked; but the loss
was not the less serious. When Brooke saw Stricker’s line stretching
across the field, he did not dash at them at once with the light
brigade as Thornton had attacked the larger force and stronger position
at Bladensburg, but deployed the whole army and formed a regular order
of battle. Although his force easily overlapped and outflanked the
American, the engagement that followed was sharp, and the Americans
were not routed without considerable loss to the British, who reported
forty-six killed and two hundred and seventy-three wounded,--or more
than they reported at Bladensburg. The Americans, though routed,
suffered less, losing only twenty-four killed, one hundred and
thirty-nine wounded, and fifty prisoners, with two field-pieces.

This spirited little battle detained the British so long that they
bivouacked on the field, and passed the night in a drenching rain,
resuming their march the next morning, September 13, when they found
the roads obstructed, and were obliged to move so slowly that evening
arrived before they came in sight of Baltimore.[283] When at last
they saw on the distant heights the long line of intrenchments that
surrounded Baltimore on the side of their approach, they stopped short.
Colonel Brooke had gone forward with the advance, and was engaged all
day, at about a mile and a half distance, in studying the American
lines. He made arrangements for a night attack, hoping to avoid the
effects of the American artillery,[284] and then waited for the fleet
to support him.

The fleet all day bombarded the forts and batteries that covered
the entrance to the harbor, and continued the bombardment till past
midnight. Unlike most naval engagements during the war, this battle was
harmless to either party. The heavier British ships feared to approach
within range, owing to a barrier of sunken vessels, covered by the guns
on shore and by gunboats. Without the heavy ships, the lighter vessels
could not maintain a position. The fort sustained no great injury, and
only four men were killed and twenty-four wounded.[285] The fleet as
far as was reported sustained no injury whatever. The firing ceased
toward midnight, and Admiral Cochrane sent word to Colonel Brooke that
he could do no more.[286]

   “Under these circumstances,” reported Colonel Brooke, “and
   keeping in view your Lordship’s instructions, it was agreed
   between the Vice-admiral and myself that the capture of the town
   would not have been a sufficient equivalent to the loss which
   might probably be sustained in storming the heights.”

Sir George Prevost at Plattsburg only two days before, with three times
the number of troops and a much smaller number of opponents, came to
the same conclusion. That both officers were probably wise was shown
by the experience of Lieutenant-General Drummond, a month earlier,
in attempting to storm the lines of Fort Erie. Brooke and Prevost
followed the same course in another respect, for Brooke withdrew his
army so rapidly that at noon of September 14 it had already passed the
battle-field of two days before, and in another day the whole force was
re-embarked.[287]

As soon as the wind allowed, the fleet returned to the lower
Chesapeake; and September 19 Admiral Cochrane sailed for Halifax to
prepare for a new expedition. The troops remained till October 14 in
their transports in the bay, and then set sail for Jamaica, leaving
Virginia and Maryland to a long repose, which the vexed shores sorely
needed.




                             CHAPTER VII.


AFTER balancing gains and losses, the result of the campaign
favored Great Britain by the amount of plunder which the navy obtained
in Alexandria, and by the posts which Governor Sherbrooke occupied
between the Penobscot and the Passamaquoddy in Maine. Considering
the effort made and the waste of money, the result was a total
disappointment to the British people; but even these advantages on land
could not be regarded as secure until the British navy and mercantile
marine had summed up their profits and losses on the ocean.

At the beginning of the year 1814 the American navy had almost
disappeared. Porter in the “Essex” still annoyed British interests in
the Pacific; but of the five large frigates only the “President” was at
sea. January 1 the “Constitution,” Captain Charles Stewart, left Boston
and cruised southward, making a few prizes and destroying a British
fourteen-gun schooner, but fighting no battle and effecting no object
equivalent to her cost. In returning to Boston, April 3, she narrowly
escaped capture by the two British frigates blockading the port, and
with difficulty got into Marblehead harbor. The “Constitution” did not
again go to sea until December 17. During her cruise of three months,
from January 1 to April 3, she made four prizes.

The “President” regained New York February 18, and was blockaded during
the rest of the year. The “United States” and “Macedonian” remained
blockaded at New London. The “Constellation” remained blockaded at
Norfolk. The corvette “Adams,” twenty-eight guns, ran the blockade of
Chesapeake Bay January 18, and cruised until August 17, making nine
prizes and several narrow escapes before striking on the Isle of Haut
and taking refuge in the Penobscot as the British forces occupied
Castine. The story of her destruction has been told. Her fate was
the same she would have met had she remained in Washington, where a
week earlier the new forty-four-gun frigate “Columbia” and the new
twenty-two-gun sloop-of-war “Argus” were burned to prevent them from
falling prize to the British army.

This short abstract accounted for all the frigates except the “Essex,”
whose fortune was no happier than that of the larger ships. October 27,
1812, the “Essex,” Captain David Porter, left the Delaware, intending
to meet Bainbridge and form part of a squadron under his command.
Failing to meet Bainbridge, though constantly near him, Porter at last
decided to sail southward; and when Bainbridge in the “Constitution”
reached Boston February 27, 1813, the “Essex” had already passed
Cape Horn, and was running up the western coast of South America to
Valparaiso.

At Valparaiso Porter arrived March 14, 1813, to the consternation of
commerce. Chili had recently asserted independence of Spain, and as
yet no English war-vessels were stationed in the Pacific. The chief
British interest was the whale fishery which centred in the Galapagos
Islands,--a group lying under the equator, about a thousand miles from
Panama. Although the influence of England was supreme, on account of
her naval power, her commerce, and her political alliance with the
Spanish people, and although Porter had neither a harbor of his own,
nor the support of a diplomatic officer on the Pacific, he had nothing
to fear. He was well received at Valparaiso, where since 1811 J. R.
Poinsett had held the post of United States Consul-General for Buenos
Ayres, Chili, and Peru; but the “Essex” tarried only for supplies, and
soon sailed for the Galapagos Islands. There she arrived in April,
1813, and in the course of the summer captured all the British whalers
known to be in those seas. These were twelve in number, and after
sending some of them away, Porter still had a fleet of five armed ships
besides his own, and nothing more to do.

The “Essex” had then been a year at sea, and needed repairs. Porter
determined to take his entire fleet of six vessels about three thousand
miles to the Marquesas Islands,--as though to make a voyage of
discovery, or to emulate the mutineers of the “Bounty.” The squadron
sailed three weeks over the southern seas, until, October 23, the
Marquesas Islands were sighted. There Porter remained seven weeks,
amusing himself and his crew by intervention in native Marquesan
politics, ending in his conquest of the principal tribes, and taking
possession of the chief island in the name of his Government. That he
should have brought away his whole crew after such relaxation, without
desertion, was surprising. The men were for a time in a state of mutiny
on being ordered to sea; but they did not desert, and the squadron
sailed, Dec. 12, 1813, for Valparaiso.

Porter would have done better to sail for the China seas or the Indian
Ocean. He knew that British war-vessels were searching for him, and
that Valparaiso was the spot where he would be directly in their way.
He arrived February 3, and five days afterward two British vessels
of war sailed into the harbor, making directly for the “Essex” with
the appearance of intending to attack and board her. The crew of the
“Essex” stood at quarters ready to fire as the larger ship ran close
alongside, until her yards crossed those of the “Essex,” and Porter
probably regretted to the end of his life that he did not seize the
opportunity his enemy gave him; but the British captain, from his
quarter-deck only a few feet away, protested that the closeness of his
approach was an accident, and that he intended no attack. The moment
quickly passed, and then Porter found himself overmatched.

The British frigate “Phœbe,” thirty-six guns, had sailed from England
in March, 1813, under secret orders to break up the United States
fur-establishment on the Columbia River.[288] At Rio Janeiro the
“Phœbe” was joined by the “Cherub,” a sloop-of-war rated at eighteen
guns, and both sailed in search of the “Essex.” The “Phœbe” was
one hundred and forty-three and three quarters feet in length, by
thirty-eight and a quarter in breadth; the “Essex” was one hundred and
thirty-eight and a half feet in length, and thirty-seven and a quarter
in breadth. The “Phœbe” carried a crew of three hundred men and boys;
the “Essex” carried two hundred and fifty-five. The “Essex” was the
better sailer, and the result of an action depended on her ability to
use this advantage. The broadside of the “Essex” consisted of seventeen
thirty-two-pound carronades and six long twelve-pounders; the “Phœbe”
showed only eight carronades, but had thirteen long eighteen-pounders,
one long twelve-pounder, and one long nine-pounder. At close range,
Porter’s battery would overpower the “Phœbe’s” long guns, but the
“Phœbe’s” thirteen long-range eighteen-pounders could destroy her enemy
without receiving a shot in return. Porter knew all this, and knew also
that he could not depend on Chilian protection. No British captain
in such a situation could afford to be delicate in regard to the
neutrality of Chili, which was not even a recognized nation. At most
Porter could hope for immunity only in the port of Valparaiso.

Captain Hillyar of the “Phœbe” made no mistakes. During an entire month
he blockaded the “Essex” with his two vessels, acting with extreme
caution. At last Porter determined to run out, trusting to a chase to
separate the blockading cruisers; and March 28, 1814, with a strong
southerly wind, he got under way. As he rounded the outermost point a
violent squall carried away his maintopmast. The loss threw on Porter
a sudden emergency and a difficult, instantaneous decision. He decided
to return to harbor. A young midshipman, David Farragut, who made his
first cruise in the “Essex,” gave his high authority in after years to
the opinion that Porter’s decision was wrong. “Being greatly superior
in sailing powers,” said Farragut, “we should have borne up, and run
before the wind.” The chance of outsailing the “Phœbe,” or separating
her from her consort, was better than that of regaining the anchorage.

The wind did not allow of a return to port, and the “Essex” was run
into a small bay three miles from Valparaiso, and anchored within
pistol-shot of the shore. There Hillyar had her wholly at his mercy. At
first he attacked somewhat timidly. Although Porter could bring only
three long twelve-pounders to bear, he damaged the “Phœbe’s” rigging
until Hillyar, in half an hour, hauled off to repair the injury,--or,
according to Hillyar’s account, the “Phœbe” was prevented by the
freshness of the wind from holding a position.[289] Finally the “Phœbe”
anchored, and began firing her broadsides of long eighteen-pounders
into the “Essex’s” quarter. The “Cherub” kept under way, using only
her bow guns. Reply was impossible. The crew of the “Essex” fired what
guns would bear, and got the ship under way; but the “Phœbe” kept her
distance, throwing thirteen eighteen-pound shot into the “Essex” every
five or ten minutes, until the “Essex” was cut to pieces and her decks
were shambles.

The last attack continued, according to Captain Hillyar, from 5.35 till
6.20 P. M., when the “Essex” struck. The entire battle lasted
from four o’clock until the surrender. The carnage was frightful and
useless. Porter declared that fifty-eight of his crew were killed.
Hillyar claimed one hundred and nineteen unwounded prisoners, while
Porter declared the number of unwounded prisoners to be seventy-five.
The British ships, with five hundred men, lost only fifteen killed and
wounded.

The loss of the “Essex,” like the loss of the “Chesapeake” and “Argus,”
was unnecessary. Porter need not have gone to Valparaiso, or might have
tried to run out at night, or might have fought, even after the loss
of his maintopmast, under less disadvantage. The disaster completed
the unfortunate record of the frigates for the year. They made some
sixteen prizes and busied many British cruisers, but won no victories
and suffered one bloody defeat.

The sloops told a different story. Early in 1814 three of the new
sloops-of-war were ready for sea,--the “Frolic,” the “Peacock,”
and the “Wasp.” They were heavy vessels of their class, about one
hundred and twenty feet long on the main-deck, and thirty-two feet
in extreme breadth; carrying crews of about one hundred and sixty
men, with an armament of twenty thirty-two-pound carronades and two
long eighteen-pounders. Although only one third the tonnage of the
forty-four-gun frigates, and carrying only one third the crew, the
new sloops-of-war threw nearly half the weight of metal,--for the
broadside of the “Constitution” commonly exceeded but little the
weight of seven hundred pounds, while the sloops threw three hundred
and thirty-eight. The difference was due not to the weight, but to
the range. The frigates carried thirty long twenty-four-pounders; the
sloops carried only two long eighteen-pounders. The sloops were rigged
as ships, and built with the usual solidity of war-vessels, costing
about seventy-five thousand dollars each.

The first to sail was the “Frolic,” from Boston, in February. She
captured only two prizes before she was herself taken, April 20,
off Matanzas, after a chase by the thirty-six-gun British frigate
“Orpheus,” assisted by a twelve-gun schooner.

The second sloop-of-war, the “Peacock,” commanded by Lewis Warrington,
sailed from New York in March. Warrington was a Virginian, thirty-two
years old and fourteen years in the service, with the rank of
master-commandant in 1813. Cruising down the coast, the “Peacock” first
ran in to St. Mary’s on the Florida frontier; and then continuing
southward, on the morning of April 29, off the Indian River Inlet, she
discovered a small convoy on its way from Havana to Bermuda, under
charge of the British eighteen-gun brig “Epervier.” The British brig
was no match for the American ship. She was smaller, and carried only
sixteen thirty-two and two eighteen-pound carronades, with a crew of
one hundred and three men and fifteen boys.[290] The inferiority was
something like four to three; but Captain Wales of the “Epervier”
gallantly brought his vessel into action at the usual close-range of
these murderous combats.

Captain Wales told the result in an official report, dated May 8, to
Vice-Admiral Cochrane.[291] The report was not published, the British
Admiralty having become sensitive to the popular outcry against their
naval management.

   “At eight A. M.,” reported Captain Wales, “the wind
   being about east-south-east, I saw a strange sail in the
   southwest apparently in chase of us; at nine, perceiving her
   to near very fast and to be a square-rigged vessel-of-war, I
   shortened sail and hauled to the wind on the larboard tack
   to be between her and the convoy, being rather ahead of them.
   The wind at this time veering round to the southward enabled
   the stranger to lay up for us.... At 9.50 A. M. we
   weathered her and exchanged broadsides; having passed her beam,
   we tacked, shortened sail, and continued in close action until
   eleven A. M., when--five of our larboard guns being
   disabled by the breeching-bolts giving way, and three others by
   shot, and unable to manœuvre so as to get the starboard guns to
   bear in consequence of the rigging and sails being cut to pieces
   in the early part of the action by star-shot, the main boom shot
   away, the foremast wounded in several places, and several shot
   between wind and water, with four-and-a-half feet of water in
   the hold, and the enemy seemingly in a state to continue the
   action--I deemed it prudent to surrender.”

The giving way of the breeching-bolts did not wholly disable the guns,
for Captain Wales specially commended “Mr. Lawrence Kennedy the Purser,
who rendered much service in his exertions at the after-guns by getting
them in a fighting state again when unshipped by the fighting-bolts
coming out of their places.”

At the close of the battle the “Peacock’s” hull had not been touched;
aloft, her foreyard was disabled and a few upper stays were cut away;
of her crew, two men were slightly wounded,--but this was all the
injury sustained in running for three quarters of an hour under the
close fire of nine heavy guns.[292] The “Epervier” was reported by
Captain Warrington as showing forty-five shot-holes in her hull;
masts and rigging much cut up, and twenty-three men killed or wounded
in a crew of one hundred and twenty-eight. The difference between the
force of the two vessels amply accounted for the capture; but the
Admiralty might well show unwillingness to admit the bad condition of
the vessels-of-war to which it intrusted the duty of convoying British
mercantile shipping.[293] So complete was the “Epervier’s” disaster
that no excuse was offered for it, except the plea that she was in
almost every respect inferior to the standard that British vessels of
her class were supposed to maintain.

Captain Warrington saved the “Epervier” and brought her into Savannah
in spite of two British frigates encountered on the way. He sailed
again early in June, and passed the months of July and August in
British waters or in the track of British commerce from the Faroe
Islands to the Canaries. He burned or sunk twelve prizes, besides
making cartels of two more, and brought his ship through the blockade
into New York harbor, October 30, without injury, with only one man
lost and the crew in fine health.[294]

The third new sloop was named the “Wasp” after the famous victor over
the “Hornet.” The new “Wasp” sailed from Portsmouth, New Hampshire,
May 1, under command of Johnston Blakeley. Born in Ireland in 1781,
Blakeley was from infancy a North Carolinian. He became in 1800 an
officer in the navy. Blakeley and the “Wasp” of 1814, like Jones
and the “Wasp” of 1813, ran a career in which tragedy gave a deeper
tinge than usual to the bloody colors they won; but their success was
on the whole greater than that of any other national cruiser from
the beginning to the end of the war. Merely as a story of adventure
Blakeley’s career was exciting, but romance was its smallest interest.
For several reasons the sloop battles and cruises afforded one of the
best relative tests of American character and skill among all that were
furnished in the early period of the national history; and among the
sloops, Blakeley’s “Wasp” was the most distinguished.

Blakeley ran directly across the ocean into soundings at the mouth
of the British Channel. There he remained during the month of June,
searching every vessel that passed. The number of neutrals constantly
diverting his attention kept him actively employed, and led him farther
into the Channel than was intended; but although three British frigates
and fourteen sloops were at sea for the protection of British waters,
the “Wasp” continued to burn and sink such British merchantmen as
she met,--the first, June 2, and subsequently June 13, 18, 23, and
26,--until on the morning of June 28 a man-of-war brig appeared to
windward, and bore down on the American ship.

The day was warm and overcast. During the whole morning the two vessels
approached each other so slowly that each had more than time to study
his opponent. Once more the foresight of the American ship-builders
secured a decisive advantage. The British brig, the “Reindeer,” was
altogether unequal to the contest. In tonnage she resembled the
“Epervier,” and her armament was even lighter. Captain Manners, her
commander, had substituted twenty-four-pound carronades for the usual
thirty-two-pounders, and his broadside of ten guns threw only two
hundred and ten pounds of metal,[295] while the “Wasp’s” eleven guns
threw three hundred and thirty-eight pounds. The American crew numbered
one hundred and seventy-three men; the British numbered one hundred
and eighteen. Contest under such conditions was a forlorn hope, but
the “Reindeer’s” crew were the pride of Portsmouth, and Manners was
the idol of his men. They might cripple the “Wasp” if they could not
capture her; and probably the fate of the “Argus,” a year before,
encouraged the hope that the “Reindeer” could do at least as well as
the “Pelican.”

Each captain manœuvred for the weather-gauge, but the Englishman gained
it, and coming up on the “Wasp’s” weather-quarter, repeatedly fired
his light twelve-pound bow-carronade, filled with round and grape
shot, into the American ship. Blakeley, “finding the enemy did not get
sufficiently on the beam to enable us to bring our guns to bear, put
the helm a-lee,” and fired as his guns bore. The firing began at 3.26
P. M. and lasted until 3.40, fourteen minutes, at close range.
In that space of time each gun in the broadside could be fired at the
utmost three times. Apparently Manners felt that he had no chance with
his guns, for he brought his vessel’s bow against the “Wasp’s” quarter
and repeatedly attempted boarding. Early in the action the calves of
his legs were shot away; then a shot passed through both his thighs;
yet he still climbed into the rigging to lead his boarders, when two
balls at the same moment struck him in the head. His fall ended the
battle; and such had been the losses of his company that the highest
officer remaining unhurt on the British brig to surrender the vessel
was said to be the captain’s clerk. At 3.45 the “Reindeer’s” flag was
struck,--the whole action, from the “Wasp’s” first gun, having lasted
nineteen minutes.

Had every British vessel fought like the “Reindeer,” Englishmen would
have been less sensitive to defeat. In this desperate action the “Wasp”
suffered severely. Her foremast was shot through; her rigging and spars
were much injured; her hull was struck by six round shot and much
grape; eleven men were killed and fifteen wounded, or nearly one man in
six, “chiefly in repelling boarders,” reported Blakeley. The “Reindeer”
was a wreck, and was blown up as soon as the wounded could be removed.
Of her crew, numbering one hundred and eighteen, thirty-three lost
their lives; thirty-four were wounded,--in all, sixty-seven, or more
than half the brig’s complement.

Ten days afterward Blakeley ran into Lorient, where his ship was well
received by the French, whose British antipathies were increased rather
than lessened by their enforced submission. After refitting, the “Wasp”
sailed again August 27, and four days later cut out a valuable ship
from a convoy under the eyes of a seventy-four. The same evening,
September 1, at half-past six, Blakeley sighted four vessels, two on
either bow, and hauled up for the one most to windward. At 9.26 at
night the chase, a brig, was directly under the “Wasp’s” lee-bow, and
Blakeley began firing a twelve-pound bow-carronade, which he must have
taken from the “Reindeer,” for no such gun made part of his regular
armament.

The battle in the dark which followed has been always deeply
interesting to students of naval history, the more because the
British Admiralty suppressed the official reports, and left an air of
mystery over the defeat which rather magnified than diminished its
proportions. The British brig was the sloop-of-war “Avon,” commanded
by Captain James Arbuthnot, and carrying the usual armament of sixteen
thirty-two-pound carronades with two long six-pounders. Her crew was
reported as numbering one hundred and four men and thirteen boys.
Captain Arbuthnot’s official report[296] said that the “Avon” had
been cruising in company with the sloop-of-war “Castilian,” when at
daylight, September 1, he “discovered an enemy’s schooner in the
rear of the Kangaroo convoy,” and gave chase. The “Castilian” also
gave chase, and at seven o’clock the twenty-gun ship “Tartarus” was
signalled, also in chase.[297] All day the three British sloops-of-war
chased the privateer schooner, until at half-past six o’clock in the
evening the “Castilian’s” superiority in sailing free left the “Avon”
out of sight, nine miles astern. The position of the “Tartarus” was
not mentioned in the reports, but she could hardly have been ahead of
the “Castilian.” The three British sloops were then within ten miles
of each other, under full sail, with a ten-knot wind. The weather was
hazy, and neither the “Castilian” nor the “Tartarus” could see that the
“Avon” was signalling the “Castilian” a recall. The “Avon” saw at four
o’clock a large sail on her weather-beam standing directly for her, and
knowing that the “Wasp” was cruising in these waters, Captain Arbuthnot
felt natural anxiety to rejoin his consort.

Captain Arbuthnot’s report continued:--

   “The stranger closing with us fast, I kept away and set the
   weather studding-sails in hopes of nearing the ‘Castilian’
   or ‘Tartarus,’ the latter of which I had only lost sight of
   at 3 P. M. At 7.30 P. M. the stranger had
   approached within hail, and being unable to get a satisfactory
   answer I had not a doubt of her being an enemy’s corvette.
   At 8.30 he fired a shot over us which was instantly returned
   with a broadside. He then bore up and endeavored to rake us,
   but was prevented. The action then became general within half
   pistol-shot, and continued without intermission until 10.30
   P. M., when--having seven feet of water in the hold,
   the magazine drowned; tiller, foreyard, main-boom, and every
   shroud shot away, and the other standing and the running rigging
   cut to pieces; the brig quite unmanageable, and the leak gaining
   fast on the pumps; with forty killed and wounded, and five of
   the starboard guns dismounted; and conceiving further resistance
   only would cause a useless sacrifice of lives--I was under the
   painful necessity of ordering the colors to be struck to the
   American corvette ‘Wasp,’ the mainmast, almost immediately
   after, going over the side.”

Lieutenant George Lloyd, commanding the “Castilian,” reported September
2 the circumstances attending the loss of the “Avon,” as far as they
concerned his share in the matter.[298] At nine o’clock the “Castilian”
heard a very heavy firing in the north-northeast, and immediately
wore and made all possible sail in that direction, burning blue
lights. At quarter past ten the firing ceased, “and on coming up I
had the mortification to observe the ‘Avon’ a totally dismantled and
ungovernable wreck, with her mainmast gone,--the enemy, apparently a
large ship corvette, lying to, to leeward of her, who on my closing
made all sail, and evinced every wish to avoid a contest with us.”

   “I immediately used means to enable me to bring her to close
   action; and from our superior sailing I had in a few minutes
   the gratification to be within half a cable’s length on her
   weather quarter. But I lament to state at this anxious crisis
   the ‘Avon’s’ situation became most alarming; she had commenced
   firing minute guns, and making every other signal of distress
   and of being in want of immediate assistance. I must here
   (as my pen can but inadequately describe) leave you, sir, to
   judge the feelings of myself, officers, and crew, as, from the
   confusion which evidently prevailed on board the enemy, the
   damage she had sustained, and her bad steerage, together with
   the cool and steady conduct of the officers and men I have the
   honor to command, I had no doubt of her falling an easy prey
   could we have persisted in attacking her, but which was not to
   be done without sacrificing the lives of the surviving gallant
   crew of our consort. Thus situated ... I was obliged ... to
   leave the flying enemy to escape; but I feel somewhat gratified
   the situation of the ‘Castilian’ enabled me to give him a
   raking, and I doubt not from the closeness of the vessels a
   most destructive broadside, which he did not return even with a
   single gun,--a circumstance that, I trust, cannot fail to prove
   how destructive the ‘Avon’s’ fire must have been.”

Lieutenant Lloyd did not explain how his enemy was to bring guns to
bear under the circumstances, the “Castilian” tacking under the
“Wasp’s” stern at half a cable’s length distance, and immediately
standing in the opposite direction, nor did he say what had become of
the “Tartarus.” Doubtless the “Wasp” steered badly, her rigging being
much damaged; and Blakeley was chiefly intent on keeping off till he
could reeve new braces. The “Castilian’s” broadside cut the “Wasp’s”
rigging and sails, and shot away a lower main cross-tree, but did no
other serious damage.

The “Avon” lost ten men killed and thirty-two wounded, besides being
reduced to a sinking condition in an hour of night action in a ten-knot
wind, with two more ships-of-war in sight and hearing. The “Wasp” lost
two men killed and one wounded, four round shot in the hull, and the
“rigging and sails suffered a great deal.”[299]

Blakeley had done enough, and could hardly do more. Besides two
eighteen-gun brigs, he made in his cruise fourteen prizes, which he
destroyed, several of great value. In that year all the frigates in
the United States service had not done as much. With a single-decked
ship of five hundred tons, armed with carronades, Blakeley blockaded
the British Channel for two months, capturing vessels in sight
of ships-of-the-line, and destroying two sloops-of-war in rapid
succession, without serious injury to himself, and to the consternation
of the British marine.

After sinking the “Avon,” September 1, Blakeley held on his course
toward Madeira, and there, September 21, captured the brig “Atlanta,”
which he sent to Savannah. Still later, October 9, near the Cape de
Verde Islands, he spoke a Swedish brig, which reported him. After that
day no word of tidings was ever received from the “Wasp.” Somewhere
under the waters of the Atlantic, ship and crew found an unknown grave.

Besides the large sloops-of-war, three smaller vessels--the
“Syren,” “Enterprise,” and “Rattlesnake”--went to sea in 1814.
The “Syren” was captured after a chase of eleven hours, nearly
on a wind, by the “Medway,” seventy-four; her sixteen guns, and
everything else that could be spared, were thrown overboard during
the chase. The “Rattlesnake” and “Enterprise” cruised in company
toward the West Indies, and made some prizes. The “Rattlesnake”
was fast, the “Enterprise” a very dull sailer; but after repeated
hairbreadth escapes, the “Rattlesnake” was caught, July 11, by the
frigate “Leander,” with Cape Sable to windward, and was obliged to
surrender.[300] The “Enterprise,” with her usual good fortune, was
never taken, but became a guardship.

After November 1 the United States government had not a ship at sea.
In port, three seventy-fours were building, and five forty-fours were
building or blockaded. Three thirty-six-gun frigates were laid up or
blockaded. Four sloops-of-war were also in port, the “Peacock” having
just returned from her long cruise. Such a result could not be called
satisfactory. The few war-vessels that existed proved rather what the
government might have done than what the British had to fear from any
actual or probable American navy. The result of private enterprise
showed also how much more might easily have been done by government.

The year 1814 was marked by only one great and perhaps decisive success
on either side, except Macdonough’s victory. This single success was
privateering. Owners, captains, and crews had then learned to build
and sail their vessels, and to hunt their prey with extraordinary
skill. A few rich prizes stimulated the building of new vessels as
the old were captured, and the ship-yards turned them out as rapidly
as they were wanted. In the neighborhood of Boston, in the summer of
1814, three companion ships were built,--the “Reindeer,” “Avon,” and
“Blakeley;” and of these the “Reindeer” was said to have been finished
in thirty-five working days, and all three vessels were at sea in the
following winter. No blockade short of actual siege could prevent such
craft from running out and in. Scores of them were constantly on the
ocean.

On the Atlantic privateers swarmed. British merchantmen were captured,
recaptured, and captured again, until they despaired of ever reaching
port. One British master who was three times taken and as often
retaken, reported that he had seen ten American privateers crossing
his course. A letter from Halifax printed in the London “Times” of
December 19 said: “There are privateers off this harbor which plunder
every vessel coming in or going out, notwithstanding we have three
line-of-battle ships, six frigates, and four sloops here.” The West
Indies and the Canaries were haunted by privateers. The “Rambler,”
“Hyder Ali,” and “Jacob Jones” of Boston penetrated even the Chinese
seas, and carried prize-goods into Macao and Canton. Had these pests
confined their ravages to the colonies or the ocean, the London clubs
and the lobbies of Parliament would have thought little about them;
but the privateer had discovered the weakness of Great Britain, and
frequented by preference the narrow seas which England regarded as her
own. The quasi-blockade of the British coasts which American cruisers
maintained in 1813 became a real and serious blockade in 1814. Few days
passed without bringing news of some inroad into British waters, until
the Thames itself seemed hardly safe.

The list of privateers that hung about Great Britain and Ireland
might be made long if the number were necessary to the story, but the
character of the blockade was proved by other evidence than that of
numbers. A few details were enough to satisfy even the English. The
“Siren,” a schooner of less than two hundred tons, with seven guns and
seventy-five men,[301] had an engagement with her Majesty’s cutter
“Landrail” of four guns, as the cutter was crossing the British Channel
with despatches. The “Landrail” was captured after a somewhat sharp
action, and sent to America, but was recaptured on the way. The victory
was not remarkable, but the place of capture was very significant;
and it happened July 12, only a fortnight after Blakeley captured the
“Reindeer” farther westward. The “Siren” was but one of many privateers
in those waters. The “Governor Tompkins” burned fourteen vessels
successively in the British Channel. The “Young Wasp” of Philadelphia
cruised nearly six months about the coasts of England and Spain and in
the course of West India commerce. The “Harpy” of Baltimore, another
large vessel of some three hundred and fifty tons and fourteen guns,
cruised nearly three months off the coast of Ireland, in the British
Channel and in the Bay of Biscay, and returned safely to Boston filled
with plunder, including, as was said, upward of £100,000 in British
Treasury notes and bills of exchange. The “Leo,” a Boston schooner of
about two hundred tons, was famous for its exploits in these waters,
but was captured at last by the frigate “Tiber” after a chase of eleven
hours. The “Mammoth,” a Baltimore schooner of nearly four hundred tons,
was seventeen days off Cape Clear, the southernmost point of Ireland.
The most mischievous of all was the “Prince of Neufchatel” of New York,
which chose the Irish Channel as its favorite haunt, where during the
summer it made ordinary coasting traffic impossible. The most impudent
was probably the “Chasseur,” commanded by Captain Boyle, who cruised
three months, and amused himself, when off the British coast, by
sending to be posted at Lloyd’s a “Proclamation of Blockade” of “all
the ports, harbors, bays, creeks, rivers, inlets, outlets, islands,
and sea-coast of the United Kingdom.” The jest at that moment was too
sardonic to amuse the British public.

As the announcement of these annoyances, recurring day after day,
became a practice of the press, the public began to grumble in louder
and louder tones. “That the whole coast of Ireland, from Wexford round
by Cape Clear to Carrickfergus,” said the “Morning Chronicle” of
August 31, “should have been for above a month under the unresisted
dominion of a few petty ‘fly-by-nights’ from the blockaded ports of the
United States, is a grievance equally intolerable and disgraceful.”
The Administration mouthpiece, the “Courier,” admitted, August 22,
that five brigs had been taken in two days between the Smalls and
the Tuskar, and that insurance on vessels trading between Ireland
and England had practically ceased. The “Annual Register” for 1814
recorded as “a most mortifying reflection,” that with a navy of nearly
a thousand ships of various sizes, and while at peace with all Europe,
“it was not safe for a vessel to sail without convoy from one part of
the English or Irish Channel to another.” Such insecurity had not been
known in the recent wars.

As early as August 12, the London Assurance Corporations urged the
government to provide a naval force competent to cope with the
privateers. In September the merchants of Glasgow, Liverpool, and
Bristol held meetings, and addressed warm remonstrances to government
on the want of protection given to British commerce. The situation was
serious, and the British merchants did not yet know all. Till that time
the East India and China trade had suffered little, but at last the
American privateers had penetrated even the Chinese seas; and while
they were driving the British flag into port there, they attacked the
East India Company’s ships, which were really men-of-war, on their
regular voyages. In August the “Countess of Harcourt” of more than five
hundred tons, carrying six heavy guns and ninety men, was captured in
the British Channel by the privateer “Sabine” of Baltimore, and sent
safely to America. The number and value of the prizes stimulated new
energy in seeking them, and British commerce must soon yield to that of
neutral nations if the war continued.

The merchants showed that a great change had come over their minds
since they incited or permitted the Tories to issue the Impressment
Proclamation and the Orders in Council seven years before. More than
any other class of persons, the ship-owners and West India merchants
were responsible for the temper which caused the war, and they were
first to admit their punishment. At the Liverpool meeting, where Mr.
Gladstone, who took the chair, began by declaring that some ports,
particularly Milford, were under actual blockade,[302] a strong
address was voted; and at a very numerous meeting of merchants,
manufacturers, ship-owners, and underwriters at Glasgow, September 7,
the Lord Provost presiding, resolutions were unanimously passed--

   “That the number of American privateers with which our channels
   have been infested, the audacity with which they have approached
   our coasts, and the success with which their enterprise has been
   attended, have proved injurious to our commerce, humbling to our
   pride, and discreditable to the directors of the naval power of
   the British nation, whose flag till of late waved over every sea
   and triumphed over every rival.

   “That there is reason to believe, in the short space of
   twenty-four months, above eight hundred vessels have been
   captured by the Power whose maritime strength we have hitherto
   impolitically held in contempt.”

The war was nearly at an end, and had effected every possible purpose
for the United States, when such language was adopted by the chief
commercial interests of Great Britain. Yet the Glasgow meeting
expressed only a part of the common feeling. The rates of insurance
told the whole story. The press averred that in August and September
underwriters at Lloyd’s could scarcely be induced to insure at any rate
of premium, and that for the first time in history a rate of thirteen
per cent had been paid on risks to cross the Irish Channel. Lloyd’s
list then showed eight hundred and twenty-five prizes lost to the
Americans, and their value seemed to increase rather than diminish.

Weary as the merchants and ship-owners were of the war, their disgust
was not so intense as that of the navy. John Wilson Croker, Secretary
of the Admiralty Board, whose feelings toward America were at best
unkind, showed a temper that passed the limits of his duties. When
the London underwriters made their remonstrance of August 12, Croker
assured them, in a letter dated August 19,[303] that at the time
referred to “there was a force adequate to the purpose of protecting
the trade both in St. George’s Channel and the Northern Sea.” The
news that arrived during the next two weeks threw ridicule on this
assertion; and Croker was obliged to reply to a memorial from Bristol,
September 16, in a different tone.[304] He admitted that the navy had
not protected trade, and could not protect it; but he charged that the
merchants were to blame for losing their own ships. His letter was a
valuable evidence of the change in British sentiment:--

   “Their Lordships take this opportunity of stating to you, for
   the information of the memorialists, that from the accounts
   which their Lordships have received of the description of
   vessels which had formed the largest proportion of the captures
   in the Irish and Bristol channels, it appears that if their
   masters had availed themselves of the convoys appointed for
   their protection from foreign ports, or had not in other
   instances deserted from the convoys under whose protection they
   had sailed, before the final conclusion of the voyage, many of
   the captures would not have been made. It is their Lordships’
   determination, as far as they may be enabled, to bring the
   parties to punishment who may have been guilty of such illegal
   acts, and which are attended with such injurious consequences to
   the trade of the country.”

Little by little the Americans had repaid every item of the debt of
insult they owed, and after Croker’s letter the account could be
considered settled. Even the “Times” was not likely to repeat its
sneer of 1807, that the Americans could hardly cross to Staten Island
without British permission. Croker’s official avowal that no vessel
could safely enter or leave one port in the British Islands for another
except under guard of a man-of-war, was published on the same page with
the memorialists’ assertion that the rate of insurance had gradually
risen till it exceeded twofold the usual rates prevailing during the
wars on the Continent.

The spirit of exasperation shown by Croker extended through the navy.
The conduct of Cochrane and Cockburn has been already told. That of
Captain Hillyar at Valparaiso was equally significant. Under the
annoyance of their mortifications the British commanders broke through
ordinary rules. Captain Lloyd of the “Plantagenet,” seventy-four, on
arriving in the harbor of Fayal, September 26, saw a large brig in
the roads, which he must have known to be an American privateer. He
was so informed by his pilot. It was the “General Armstrong,” Captain
Samuel C. Reid, a brig which for two years had fretted and escaped the
British navy. The “Plantagenet,” with two other ships-of-war, appeared
at sunset. Reid dared not run out to sea, and the want of wind would in
any case have prevented success. A little after dusk, Reid, seeing the
suspicious movements of the enemy, began to warp his vessel close under
the guns of the castle. While doing so, at about eight o’clock four
boats filled with men left the ships and approached him. As they came
near he repeatedly hailed and warned them off, and at last fired. His
fire was returned, but the boats withdrew with the loss of a number of
men.[305]

Captain Lloyd, in a somewhat elaborate report to explain the propriety
of his conduct, enclosed affidavits to prove that the Americans had
violated the neutrality of the port. The affidavits proved that,
knowing the character of the vessel, he sent two boats from his own
ship to assist the boats of the “Carnation” to “watch” the privateer.
His report told the story as he wished it to be understood:[306]

   “On the evening of the 26th instant I put into this port for
   refreshments, previous to my return to Jamaica. In shore was
   discovered a suspicious vessel at anchor. I ordered Captain
   Bentham of the ‘Carnation’ to watch her movements, and sent the
   pinnace and cutter of this ship to assist him on that service;
   but on his perceiving her under way, he sent Lieut. Robert
   Faussett in the pinnace, about eight o’clock, to observe her
   proceedings. On his approaching the schooner, he was ordered to
   keep off or they would fire into him, upon which the boat was
   immediately backed off; but to his astonishment he received a
   broadside of round, grape, and musketry, which did considerable
   damage. He then repeatedly requested them to leave off firing,
   as he was not come to molest them; but the enemy still continued
   his destructive fire until they had killed two men and wounded
   seven, without a musket being returned by the boat.”

Lieutenant Faussett’s affidavit threw more light on this curious story
of British naval management. He deposed--

   “That on Monday, the 26th instant, about eight o’clock in the
   evening, he was ordered to go in the pinnace as guard-boat
   unarmed on board her Majesty’s brig ‘Carnation,’ to know what
   armed vessel was at anchor in the bay, when Captain Bentham of
   said brig ordered him to go and inquire of said vessel (which
   by information was said to be a privateer). When said boat
   came near the privateer, they hailed (to say, the Americans),
   and desired the English boat to keep off or they would fire
   into her; upon which said Mr. Faussett ordered his men to
   back astern, and with a boat-hook was in the act of so doing,
   when the Americans in the most wanton manner fired into said
   English boat, killed two men and wounded seven, some of them
   mortally,--and this notwithstanding said Faussett frequently
   called out not to murder them, that they struck and called for
   quarter. Said Faussett solemnly declares that no resistance of
   any kind was made, nor could they do it, not having any arms,
   nor of course sent to attack said vessel.”

Lieutenant Faussett’s affidavit proved that the “General Armstrong”
had good reason for firing into the British boats. The “Carnation”
had anchored within pistol-shot of the privateer; four boats of the
“Plantagenet” and “Carnation,” filled with men, were on the water
watching her in the moonlight; every act of the British squadron
pointed to an attack, when Captain Bentham ordered the pinnace “to go
and inquire” of the vessel, known to be an American privateer, what
armed vessel it was. If Captain Bentham did not intend to provoke
a shot from the privateer, his order was wanting in intelligence.
Lieutenant Faussett accordingly approached in the pinnace, the other
boats being not far behind. That his men were unarmed was highly
improbable to the privateer, which affirmed that their fire killed
one of the American crew and wounded the first lieutenant;[307] but
their armament had little to do with the matter. They approached as
enemies, in the night, with a large armed force immediately behind
them. The privateer repeatedly warned them off. Instead of obeying the
order, Lieutenant Faussett came alongside. When he was fired on, he
was so near that by his own account he shoved off with the boat-hook.
Considering who and where he was, he had reason to be thankful that any
of his boat’s-crew escaped.

Captain Lloyd’s report continued:--

   “This conduct, in violating the neutrality of this port, I
   conceive left me no alternative but that of destroying her. I
   therefore repeatedly ordered Captain Bentham to tow in the brig
   and take that step immediately. All the boats of this ship and
   the ‘Rota’ were sent under his orders to tow him alongside or
   assist him in the attack, as circumstances might require; but
   from continued light baffling winds and a lee tide he was not
   able, as he informed me, with his utmost exertions to put my
   orders in execution.”

Meanwhile Captain Reid of the “General Armstrong” warped his vessel
close to the beach, under the fort, and made all his preparations for
the attack which he knew must come. The people of the town, with the
governor among them, lined the shore, and witnessed the affair. Captain
Lloyd’s report told the result:--

   “Finding the privateer was warping under the fort very fast,
   Captain Bentham judged it prudent to lose no time, and about
   twelve o’clock ordered the boats to make the attack. A more
   gallant, determined one never was made, led on by Lieutenants
   Matterface of the ‘Rota’ and Bowerbank of this ship; and every
   officer and man displayed the greatest courage in the face of a
   heavy discharge of great guns and musketry. But from her side
   being on the rocks (which was not known at the time), and every
   American in Fayal, exclusive of part of the crew, being armed
   and concealed in these rocks, which were immediately over the
   privateer, it unfortunately happened when these brave men gained
   the deck they were under the painful necessity of returning to
   their boats, from the very destructive fire kept up by those
   above them from the shore, who were in complete security,--and I
   am grieved to add, not before many lives were lost exclusive of
   the wounded.”

As far as the accounts[308] agree, the boats were twelve in number,
with about two hundred men. The privateersmen numbered ninety. As the
boats approached, the guns opened on them; and when they came alongside
the privateer they found the boarding-nettings up, with a desperate
crew behind. So vigorously did the British seamen attack, that they
gained the forecastle for a time. All three American lieutenants were
killed or disabled, and Captain Reid fought his brig alone; but the
deck was at last cleared, and the surviving assailants dropped into
their boats or into the water.

Proverbially, an unsuccessful boat-attack was the most fatal of all
services. The British loss was excessive. According to their report at
the time, “Lieutenants Bowerbank, Coswell, and Rogers of the ‘Rota’
were killed, as well as thirty-eight seamen, and eighty-three wounded;
the first, fourth, and fifth lieutenants of the ‘Plantagenet’ were
wounded, and twenty-two seamen killed, and twenty-four wounded.[309]”
According to the official report, thirty-four were killed and
eighty-six were wounded. The “Guerriere” in her battle with the
“Constitution” lost only seventy-eight men altogether. The “Macedonian”
lost only one hundred and four. The attack on the “General Armstrong”
was one of the bloodiest defeats suffered by the British navy in the
war. Not only was the privateer untaken, but she lost few of her
crew,--nine in all, killed and wounded.

Captain Lloyd then declared that he would destroy the privateer if he
had to destroy Fayal in doing it, and ordered Captain Bentham of the
“Carnation” to attack her with his guns. Reid abandoned and scuttled
the “General Armstrong,” taking his men on shore. The “Carnation’s”
shot inflicted some injury on the town, before the privateer was set on
fire by the “Carnation’s” boats.[310]

If the British navy cared to pay such a price for the shell of an old
privateer brig, which had already cost British commerce, as Captain
Lloyd believed, a million dollars,[311] the privateers were willing to
gratify the wish, as was shown a few days afterward when the “Endymion”
tried to carry the “Prince of Neufchatel” by boarding. This privateer
had made itself peculiarly obnoxious to the British navy by the
boldness of its ravages in British waters. It was coming to America
filled with plunder, and with a prize in company, when off Gay Head the
“Endymion” was sighted, October 11, and gave chase.

Captain Hope of the “Endymion” made an official report, explaining with
much detail that he chased the privateer till evening, when the wind
failed, and he then sent out his boats:[312]--

   “I sent all the boats under command of Lieutenants Hawkins,
   Ormond, and Fanshaw. In approaching the ship an alarm was
   fired. The boats had been previously rowing up under a shoal,
   and had not felt the effects of a rapid tide which they almost
   instantaneously became exposed to. The second barge in taking
   the station assigned by Lieutenant Hawkins on the schooner’s
   starboard bow, having her larboard oars shot away, unfortunately
   was swept by the stream athwart the first barge; thereby all
   the boats became entangled; and it is with extreme concern I
   acquaint you that the attack was in consequence at this moment
   only partially made. Notwithstanding this disadvantage at the
   first onset, every exertion that human skill could devise was
   resorted to to renew the contest; and they succeeded in again
   getting alongside, but not in the position intended. Their
   failure, therefore, is to be ascribed in the first instance
   to the velocity of the tide, the height of the vessel’s side,
   not having channel plates to assist the men in getting on her
   deck, and her very superior force (a schooner of the largest
   dimensions, the ‘Prince of Neufchatel,’ three hundred and
   twenty tons, eighteen guns, long-nine and twelve-pounders, with
   a complement of one hundred and forty men of all nations,
   commanded by Mons. Jean Ordronaux). The boats’ painters being
   now shot away, they again fell astern without ever being able to
   repeat the attack, and with great difficulty regained the ship,
   with the exception of the second barge.”

Captain Ordronaux of the privateer had a crew of less than forty men
then at quarters, and they suffered severely, only nine men escaping
injury. The boarders gained the deck, but were killed as fast as they
mounted; and at last more than half the British party were killed or
captured. According to the British account, twenty-eight men, including
the first lieutenant of the “Endymion,” were killed; and thirty-seven
men, including the second lieutenant, were wounded.[313] This report
did not quite agree with that of the privateer, which claimed also
twenty-eight prisoners, including the second lieutenant, who was
unhurt. In any case, more than seventy men of the “Endymion’s” crew,
besides her first and second lieutenant, were killed, wounded, or
captured; and the “Prince of Neufchatel” arrived in safety in Boston.

In the want of adjacent rocks lined with armed Americans, such as
Captain Lloyd alleged at Fayal, Captain Hope was reduced to plead the
tides as the cause of his defeat. These reports, better than any other
evidence, showed the feelings of the British naval service in admitting
discomfiture in the last resort of its pride. Successively obliged
to plead inferiority at the guns, inferiority in sailing qualities,
inferiority in equipment, the British service saw itself compelled
by these repeated and bloody repulses to admit that its supposed
pre-eminence in hand-to-hand fighting was a delusion. Within a single
fortnight two petty privateers, with crews whose united force did not
amount to one hundred and fifty men, succeeded in repulsing attacks
made by twice their number of the best British seamen, inflicting a
loss, in killed and wounded, officially reported at one hundred and
eighty-five.

Such mortifying and bloody experiences made even the British navy weary
of the war. Valuable prizes were few, and the service, especially in
winter, was severe. Undoubtedly the British cruisers caught privateers
by dozens, and were as successful in the performance of their duties
as ever they had been in any war in Europe. Their blockade of American
ports was real and ruinous, and nothing pretended to resist them. Yet
after catching scores of swift cruisers, they saw scores of faster
and better vessels issue from the blockaded ports and harry British
commerce in every sea. Scolded by the press, worried by the Admiralty,
and mortified by their own want of success, the British navy was
obliged to hear language altogether strange to its experience.

   “The American cruisers daily enter in among our convoys,” said
   the “Times” of February 11, 1815, “seize prizes in sight of
   those that should afford protection, and if pursued ‘put on
   their sea-wings’ and laugh at the clumsy English pursuers. To
   what is this owing? Cannot we build ships?... It must indeed he
   encouraging to Mr. Madison to read the logs of his cruisers. If
   they fight, they are sure to conquer; if they fly, they are sure
   to escape.”




                             CHAPTER VIII.


IN the tempest of war that raged over land and ocean during
the months of August and September, 1814, bystanders could not trust
their own judgment of the future; yet shrewd observers, little affected
either by emotion or by interest, inclined to the belief that the
United States government was near exhaustion. The immediate military
danger on Lake Champlain was escaped, and Baltimore was saved; but
the symptoms of approaching failure in government were not to be
mistaken, and the capture of Washington, which was intended to hurry
the collapse, produced its intended effect.

From the first day of the war the two instruments necessary for
military success were wanting to Madison,--money and men. After three
campaigns, the time came when both these wants must be supplied,
or the national government must devolve its duties on the States.
When the President, preparing his Annual Message, asked his Cabinet
officers what were the prospects of supplying money and men for another
campaign, he received answers discouraging in the extreme.

First, in regard to money. In July, Secretary Campbell advertised a
second loan, of only six million dollars. He obtained but two and a
half millions at eighty. His acceptance of this trifling sum obliged
him to give the same terms to the contractors who had taken the nine
millions subscribed in the spring at eighty-eight. Barker found
difficulty in making his payments, and from both loans the Treasury
could expect to obtain only $10,400,000, owing to the contractors’
failures.[314] The authorized loan was twenty-five millions. The
secretary could suggest no expedient, except Treasury notes, for
filling the deficit.

Bad as this failure was,--though it showed Secretary Campbell’s
incapacity so clearly as to compel his retirement, and obliged the
President to call a special session of Congress,--the Treasury might
regard it as the least of its embarrassments. Commonly governments
had begun their most desperate efforts only after ordinary resources
failed; but the United States government in 1814 had so inextricably
involved its finances that without dictatorial powers of seizing
property its functions could not much longer be continued. The general
bankruptcy, long foreseen, at length occurred.

The panic caused by the capture of Washington, August 24, obliged
the tottering banks of Philadelphia and Baltimore to suspend specie
payments. The banks of Philadelphia formally announced their
suspension, August 31, by a circular explaining the causes and
necessity of their decision.[315] The banks of New York immediately
followed, September 1; and thenceforward no bank between New Orleans
and Albany paid its obligations except in notes. Only the banks of
New England maintained specie payments, with the exception of those
in least credit, which took the opportunity to pay or not pay as
they pleased. The suspension was admitted to be permanent. Until the
blockade should be raised and domestic produce could find a foreign
market, the course of exchange was fixed, and specie payments could
not be resumed. The British navy and the Boston Federalists held the
country firmly bound, and peace alone could bring relief.

Suspension mattered little, and had the National Bank been in existence
the failure might have been an advantage to the government; but without
a central authority the currency instantly fell into confusion. No
medium of exchange existed outside of New England. Boston gave the
specie standard, and soon the exchanges showed wide differences.
New York money stood at twenty per cent discount, Philadelphia at
twenty-four per cent, Baltimore at thirty per cent. Treasury notes
were sold in Boston at twenty-five per cent discount, and United
States six-per-cents stood at sixty in coin.[316] The Treasury had no
means of transferring its bank deposits from one part of the country
to another. Unless it paid its debts in Treasury notes, it was unable
to pay them at all. No other money than the notes of suspended banks
came into the Treasury. Even in New England, taxes, customs-duties,
and loans were paid in Treasury notes, and rarely in local currency.
Thus, while the government collected in the Middle and Southern States
millions in bank-notes, it was obliged to leave them in deposit at the
local banks where the collection was made, while its debts in Boston
and New York remained unpaid. The source of revenue was destroyed. The
whole South and West, and the Middle States as far north as New York,
could contribute in no considerable degree to the support of government.

The situation was unusual. The government might possess immense
resources in one State and be totally bankrupt in another; it might
levy taxes to the amount of the whole circulating medium, and yet
have only its own notes available for payment of debt; it might
borrow hundreds of millions and be none the better for the loan. All
the private bank-notes of Pennsylvania and the Southern country were
useless in New York and New England where they must chiefly be used. An
attempt to transfer such deposits in any quantity would have made them
quite worthless. The Treasury already admitted bankruptcy. The interest
on the national obligations could not be paid.

The President’s second inquiry regarded men. The new Secretary of War,
Monroe, gave him such information as the Department possessed on the
numbers of the army. A comparative account showed that in June, 1813,
the regular troops numbered 27,609; in December, 34,325. In January,
1814, the number was nominally 33,822;[317] in July the aggregate was
31,503, the effectives being 27,010.[318] Since July the recruits had
declined in numbers. The three months of March, April, and May produced
6,996 recruits; the three months of July, August, and September were
reported as furnishing 4,477.[319] The general return of September 30
reported the strength of the army at 34,029 men.[320] The government
was not able to provide the money necessary to pay bounties due for
the last three months’ recruiting.[321] The Secretary of War admitted
the failure of the recruiting service, and attributed it to the high
bounties given for substitutes in the militia detached for United
States service.[322]

The smallness of the armies in the field showed worse results than
were indicated by the returns. Macomb at Plattsburg claimed to have
only fifteen hundred effectives. Izard carried with him to Buffalo
only four thousand men. Brown’s effectives at Fort Erie numbered two
thousand. Apparently these three corps included the entire force in the
field on the Canada frontier, and their combined effective strength did
not exceed eight thousand men. The year before, Wilkinson and Hampton
commanded fully eleven thousand effectives in their movements against
Montreal. Nothing showed that the victories at Niagara and Plattsburg
had stimulated enlistments, or that the army could be raised above
thirty thousand effectives even if the finances were in a condition to
meet the expense.

Much was said of the zeal shown by the State militia in hastening to
the defence of their soil, and the New England Federalists were as
loud as the Kentucky and Tennessee Democrats in praise of the energy
with which the militia rose to resist invasion; but in reality this
symptom was the most alarming of the time. Both in the military and in
the political point of view, the persistence in depending on militia
threatened to ruin the national government.

The military experience of 1814 satisfied the stanchest war Democrats
that the militia must not be their dependence. In Maine the militia
allowed themselves with hardly a show of resistance to be made
subjects of Great Britain. At Plattsburg volunteers collected in
considerable numbers, but the victory was won by the sailors and the
engineers. At Niagara, Brown never could induce more than a thousand
volunteers to support him in his utmost straits. Porter’s efforts
failed to create a brigade respectable in numbers, and at Chippawa
his Indians outnumbered his whites. Four days after the repulse
of Drummond’s assault on Fort Erie, at the most anxious moment
of the Niagara campaign, Major-General Brown wrote to Secretary
Armstrong,[323]--

   “I very much doubt if a parallel can be found for the state
   of things existing on this frontier. A gallant little army
   struggling with the enemies of their country, and devoting their
   lives for its honor and its safety, left by that country to
   struggle alone, and that within sight and within hearing.”

A month afterward Brown succeeded in obtaining a thousand volunteers,
and by some quality of his own made them assault and carry works that
old soldiers feared to touch. The feat was the most extraordinary that
was performed on either side in the remarkably varied experience of the
war; but it proved Brown’s personal energy rather than the merits of a
militia system. At Washington the militia were thoroughly tested; their
rout proved chiefly the incompetence of their general, but the system
was shown, before the battle, to be more defective than the army it
produced. At Baltimore the militia were again routed, and the town was
saved chiefly by the engineers and sailors. In Virginia, where more
than forty thousand militia were in the field, they protected nothing,
and their service was more fatal to themselves than though they had
fought severe battles. Nearly all the Virginia militia summoned for
the defence of Norfolk suffered from sickness, and the mortality
when compared with that of the regular service was enormous; five
militia-men sickened and died where one regular soldier suffered.[324]
In Tennessee and Georgia the experience was equally unfortunate; the
Georgia militia could do nothing with the Creeks, and Andrew Jackson
himself was helpless until he obtained one small regiment of regulars.

Besides its military disadvantages the militia service was tainted with
fraud. Habitually and notoriously in New England and New York, the
militia-men when called out attended muster, served a few days in order
to get their names on the pay-roll, and then went home. The United
States government wasted millions of dollars in pay and pensions for
such men. Another source of waste was in the time required to place
them in the field. The government struggled to avoid a call of militia,
even though risking great disasters by the neglect.

The worst of all evils lay still further in the background. The militia
began by rendering a proper army impossible, and ended by making
government a form. The object of Massachusetts in praising the conduct
of militia, and in maintaining its own at a high state of efficiency,
was notorious. The Federalists knew that the national government must
sooner or later abandon the attempt to support an army. When that
time should come, the only resource of the government would lie in
State armies, and Massachusetts was the best equipped State for that
object. Her militia, seventy thousand strong, well-armed, well-drilled,
and as yet untouched by war, could dictate to the Union. Whenever
Massachusetts should say the word, the war must stop; and Massachusetts
meant to say the word when the government fairly ceased to possess
either money or arms.

That moment, in the belief of the Massachusetts Federalists, had come.
Their course in the summer and autumn of 1814 left no doubt of their
intentions. No act of open rebellion could be more significant than
their conduct when Sherbrooke’s expedition occupied Castine. Then
at last Governor Strong consented to call out the militia, which he
refused to do two years before, because, he asserted, Castine and the
other coast towns were sufficiently defended;[325] but the governor was
careful to avoid the suspicion that these troops were in the national
service. He acted independently of the national government in the
terms of his general order of September, 1814,[326] placing his militia
under the command of a major-general of their own, and making only
a bare inquiry of the Secretary of War whether their expenses would
be reimbursed,[327]--an inquiry which Monroe at once answered in the
negative.[328] The force was a State army, and could not fail to cause
the President more anxiety than it was likely ever to cause the Prince
Regent.

At the same time the governor of Connecticut withdrew from the command
of Brigadier-General Cushing the brigade of State militia then in the
national service, and placed it under a major-general of State militia,
with injunctions to obey no orders except such as were issued by State
authority.[329] The evil of these measures was greatly aggravated
by coinciding with the crisis which stopped the course of national
government. Connecticut withdrew her militia, August 24; Washington was
captured the same day; the Philadelphia banks suspended payment August
29; Castine was taken August 31; and Governor Strong called out the
Massachusetts militia September 6. The government was prostrate, and
New England was practically independent when Sir George Prevost crossed
the frontier, September 3. So complete was the paralysis that Governor
Chittenden of Vermont, on receiving official notice[330] that the
British army and navy were advancing on Lake Champlain, refused to call
out the militia, because neither the Constitution nor the laws gave him
authority to order the militia out of the State.[331] He could only
recommend that individuals should volunteer to assist in the defence of
Plattsburg. Chittenden’s conduct was the more suggestive because of his
undoubted honesty and the absence of factious motive for his refusal.

The full meaning of Governor Strong’s course was avowed a few days
afterward. Having called a special meeting of the State legislature
for October 5, he addressed to it a message narrating the steps he had
taken, and the refusal of the President to assume the expenses of the
militia called into service for the defence of the State.

   “The situation of this State is peculiarly dangerous and
   perplexing,” said Governor Strong;[332] “we have been led by the
   terms of the Constitution to rely on the government of the Union
   to provide for our defence. We have resigned to that government
   the revenues of the State with the expectation that this object
   would not be neglected.... Let us then, relying on the support
   and direction of Providence, unite in such measures for our
   safety as the times demand and the principles of justice and the
   law of self-preservation will justify.”

The sense which this invitation was intended to bear could be best
understood by appreciating the temper of the body thus addressed and
the time when the appeal was made. The national government had for
practical purposes ceased. The Boston “Centinel,” a newspaper of large
circulation, said to reach six thousand copies, announced September 10,
1814, that the Union was already practically dissolved, and that the
people must rise in their majesty, protect themselves, and compel their
unworthy servants to obey their will. Governor Strong knew that the
legislature was controlled by extreme partisans of the Pickering type,
who wished, to use his phrase, to “let the ship run aground.” Even
Josiah Quincy, one of the most vehement Federalists, was aware that the
members of the General Court stood in danger of doing too much rather
than too little.[333]

Strong’s message of October 5 was echoed by Pickering from Washington,
October 12, in a letter which closed with the exhortation to seize the
national revenues:--

   “As, abandoned by the general government except for taxing us,
   we must defend ourselves, so we ought to secure and hold fast
   the revenues indispensable to maintain the force necessary for
   our protection against the foreign enemy and the still greater
   evil in prospect,--domestic tyranny.”[334]

The Massachusetts legislature could not fail to understand Governor
Strong’s message as an invitation to resume the powers with which the
State had parted in adopting the Constitution.

The legislature referred the message to a committee, which reported
only three days afterward through its chairman, Harrison Gray
Otis:[335]--

   “The state of the national Treasury as exhibited by the proper
   officer requires an augmentation of existing taxes; and if in
   addition to these the people of Massachusetts, deprived of their
   commerce and harassed by a formidable enemy, are compelled to
   provide for the indispensable duty of self-defence, it must soon
   become impossible for them to sustain this burden. There remains
   to them therefore no alternative but submission to the enemy, or
   the control of their own resources to repel his aggressions. It
   is impossible to hesitate in making the election. This people
   are not ready for conquest or submission; but being ready and
   determined to defend themselves, they have the greatest need of
   those resources derivable from themselves which the national
   government has hitherto thought proper to employ elsewhere.”

The report further showed that the United States Constitution had
failed to secure to New England the rights and benefits expected from
it, and required immediate change. The prescribed mode of amendment was
insufficient:--

   “When this deficiency becomes apparent, no reason can preclude
   the right of the whole people who were parties to it to adopt
   another.... But as a proposition for such a convention from a
   single State would probably be unsuccessful, and our danger
   admits not of delay, it is recommended by the committee that in
   the first instance a conference should be invited between those
   States the affinity of whose interests is closest.”

Thus, after ten years’ delay, the project of a New England Convention
was brought forward by State authority, through the process of war with
England, which George Cabot from the first declared to be the only
means of producing it.[336] As Otis’s committee presented the subject,
the conference was in the first place to devise some mode of common
defence; and, in the second, “to lay the foundation for a radical
reform in the national compact by inviting to a future convention a
deputation from all the States in the Union.” The report closed by
offering seven Resolutions, recommending the enlistment of a State
army of ten thousand men, a loan of a million dollars at six per cent,
and the appointment of delegates “to meet and confer with delegates
from the States of New England or any of them” on the defence of those
States and the redress of their grievances.

The Senate committee also made a strenuous argument against the
President’s decision that State militia were in State service
unless called for by a United States officer and placed under his
direction,[337] and recommended that the subject should be referred
to the next session. To the proposition for a conference of the
New England States, and to Otis’s other Resolutions, the Senate
and House assented, October 13, by large majorities, varying in
numbers, but amounting to two hundred and sixty against ninety in
the case of the proposed convention. The minority in both Houses
presented protests, charging the majority with intending more than
was avowed. “The reasoning of the report,” said the Protest signed by
seventy-six members of the House,[338] “is supported by the alarming
assumption that the Constitution has failed in its objects, and the
people of Massachusetts are absolved from their allegiance, and at
liberty to adopt another. In debate it has been reiterated that the
Constitution is no longer to be respected, and that revolution is
not to be deprecated.” The House refused to receive the Protest, as
disrespectful. The minority withdrew from further share in these
proceedings; and the majority then, October 19, chose twelve delegates
“to meet and confer on the 15th December next with such as may be
chosen by any or all of the other New England States upon our public
grievances and concerns.” The choice was marked by a conservative
spirit not altogether pleasing to Timothy Pickering. George Cabot and
Harrison Gray Otis stood at the head of the delegation.

The remonstrances and threats of the minority made the majority
cautious, but did not check them. The legislature of Connecticut
immediately appointed seven delegates to meet those of Massachusetts at
Hartford, December 15, for the purpose of recommending “such measures
for the safety and welfare of these States as may consist with our
obligations as members of the national Union.”[339] In this clause the
legislature intended to draw a distinction between obligations to the
Union and obligations to the Constitution. To the former the people
avowed no hostility; to the latter they thought the war had put an end.
On that point the committee’s report was clear.[340]

Besides Massachusetts and Connecticut the legislature of Rhode Island,
by a vote of thirty-nine to twenty-three, appointed, November 5, four
delegates to confer at Hartford upon the measures which might be in
their power to adopt to restore their rights under the Constitution,
“consistently with their obligations.”[341] These three States alone
chose delegates. The governor and legislature of New Hampshire would
probably have joined them had not the Republican council stood in the
way. The legislature of Vermont, including its Federalist minority,
unanimously declined the invitation.

Immediately after these steps were taken, the autumn elections
occurred. Members of Congress were to be chosen, and the people were
obliged to vote for or against the Hartford Convention as the issue
expressly avowed. President Madison might safely assume that no man
voted for Federalist Congressmen in November, 1814, unless he favored
the project of a New England Convention. The result was emphatic.
Massachusetts chose eighteen Federalists and two Republicans; Vermont,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut chose only Federalists.
In all, New England chose thirty-nine Federalist Congressmen and
two Republicans[342] for the Fourteenth Congress. In the Thirteenth
Congress, chosen in 1812, when the feeling against the war was supposed
to be strongest, the Federalist members from New England numbered
thirty, the Republicans eleven.[343]

Beyond New England the autumn elections were less significant, but
were still unsatisfactory to the Administration. New Jersey returned
to her true sympathies, and as far as her Congressmen expressed her
opinions gave unanimous support to the war; but Pennsylvania, owing to
local quarrels, elected five Federalist members; and Maryland elected
five Federalists and four Republicans. In spite of the great loss in
Federalist members which had occurred in the spring elections in New
York, the Federalists numbered sixty-five in the Fourteenth Congress;
in the Thirteenth they numbered sixty-eight. The Administration had
hoped, and freely asserted, that a strong reaction in favor of the war
had followed the burning of Washington and the avowal of England’s
designs against Maine and the Northwestern territory. The elections
showed no such reaction. The war was no more popular than before.

The public apathy was the more alarming because, whatever was the
true object of the Hartford Convention, all Republicans believed it
to be intended as a step to dissolve the Union, and they supported
the Administration chiefly because Madison represented the Union.
Federalists might deceive themselves. Probably the men who voted for
the Hartford Convention saw its necessary consequences less clearly
than they were seen by the men who voted against it. The Republican
vote represented the strength of Union sentiment more closely than
the disunion sentiment was represented by the Federalist vote. Yet
the States from Maryland to Maine chose a majority of Congressmen who
were not Republicans. The New England States, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland returned much more than half
the members of Congress,--one hundred and eight in one hundred and
eighty-two; and of these fifty-seven were Federalists, while only
fifty-one were Republicans. The unpopularity of the Administration was
not easily overestimated when Madison could win no more support than
this, at a time when the public believed a vote for Federalism to be a
vote for disunion.

   “I give you the most serious assurance,” wrote Randolph in an
   open letter to James Lloyd, of Massachusetts,[344] remonstrating
   against the Convention, “that nothing less than the shameful
   conduct of the enemy and the complection of certain occurrences
   to the eastward could have sustained Mr. Madison after the
   disgraceful affair at Washington. The public indignation would
   have overwhelmed in one common ruin himself and his hireling
   newspapers.”

Randolph’s political judgments were commonly mistaken, but in this
instance he proved himself to be at least partially right; for at the
next election, six months later, when the current had turned decidedly
in Madison’s favor, Randolph after a sharp contest defeated Eppes and
recovered control of his district. Virginia could hardly have chosen a
representative less calculated to please Madison.

The President himself betrayed unusual signs of distress. Nothing in
Madison’s character was more remarkable than the placidity with which
he commonly met anxieties that would have crushed a sensitive man; but
the shock of defeat at Bladensburg, the flight from Washington, and the
anxieties that followed broke him down. William Wirt visited Washington
October 14, before the action of the Massachusetts legislature was yet
completed. After viewing the ruins of the White House, a “mournful
monument of American imbecility and improvidence,” he called upon
the President at Colonel Tayloe’s Octagon House, which Serurier had
occupied, but which Madison took for his residence after his return.

   “P---- and I called on the President,” wrote Wirt in a private
   letter.[345] “He looks miserably shattered and woe-begone. In
   short, he looked heart-broken. His mind is full of the New
   England sedition. He introduced the subject and continued to
   press it, painful as it obviously was to him. I denied the
   probability, even the possibility, that the yeomanry of the
   North could be induced to place themselves under the power and
   protection of England, and diverted the conversation to another
   topic; but he took the first opportunity to return to it, and
   convinced me that his heart and mind were painfully full of the
   subject.”

No misconduct of New England alone would have so unmanned a Virginia
President. Madison’s worst troubles lay nearer home; Massachusetts
made only the last straw in his burden. Jefferson, with his usual
kindliness, tried to console and encourage him; but Jefferson’s
consolations proved only the difficulty of finding words or arguments
to warrant satisfaction with the past or hope for the future.

   “In the late events at Washington,” wrote Jefferson, September
   24,[346] “I have felt so much for you that I cannot withhold
   the expression of my sympathies. For although every reasonable
   man must ne sensible that all you can do is to order,--that
   execution must depend on others, and failures be imputed to them
   alone,--yet I know that when such failures happen they affect
   even those who have done everything they could to prevent them.
   Had General Washington himself been now at the head of our
   affairs, the same event would probably have happened.”

Jefferson’s estimate of Washington’s abilities was lower than that
commonly accepted; and his rule that a President’s responsibility
ceased after giving an order, besides ignoring the President’s
responsibility for the selection of agents, seemed to destroy the
foundation of the public service. “I never doubted that the plans
of the President were wise and sufficient,” wrote Jefferson to
Monroe.[347] “Their failure we all impute, (1) to the insubordinate
temper of Armstrong, and (2) to the indecision of Winder.” The rule
that an administrator might select any agent, however incompetent,
without incurring responsibility for the agent’s acts, was one which in
private affairs Jefferson would hardly have accepted.

Yet Jefferson’s opinions probably expressed Republican sentiment in
Virginia, and showed better than any other evidence the course of
thought among Madison’s friends. In that respect his expressions
retained permanent value. The Virginians were willing to throw off
responsibility for public disaster; and they naturally threw it
on New England, since New England challenged it. Writing to his
friend William Short, Jefferson spoke of the threatening attitude of
Massachusetts:[348]--

   “Some apprehend danger from the defection of Massachusetts. It
   is a disagreeable circumstance, but not a dangerous one. If they
   become neutral, we are sufficient for one enemy without them,
   and in fact we get no aid from them now.”

Probably most Virginians shared this belief, at least so far as
concerned the aid rendered by Massachusetts to the war. In truth,
Massachusetts gave little aid, and made a profession of her wish to
give none at all; but the difficulty did not end there. Massachusetts
and Virginia were States of the first class. The census of 1810
allotted to Massachusetts, including Maine, a population of about seven
hundred thousand; to Virginia, a white population of five hundred
and fifty-one thousand, and a colored population of four hundred and
twenty-three thousand,--nine hundred and seventy-four thousand in
all. In the ratio of representation Massachusetts counted for twenty,
Virginia for twenty-three. The quota of Massachusetts in the direct tax
was $316,000; that of Virginia was $369,000. On the scale furnished
by these data, Virginia should have contributed in support of the war
about one eighth or one seventh more men and money than were required
from Massachusetts. The actual result was different.

The amount of money contributed by Massachusetts could not be compared
with that contributed by Virginia, partly because of the severe
blockade which closed the Virginian ports. The net revenue from customs
derived from Virginia in 1814 was $4,000; that from Massachusetts was
$1,600,000.[349] Unlike the customs revenue, the receipts from internal
revenue were supposed to be reasonably equalized, so that each State
should contribute in due proportion. According to the official return,
dated Nov. 24, 1815, the total internal duties which had then been paid
to the collectors for the year 1814 in Massachusetts was $198,400; in
Virginia it was $193,500. The total amount then paid to the Treasury
was $178,400 in Massachusetts, and $157,300 in Virginia.[350] The
direct tax was fixed by Congress and was assumed by the State in
Virginia, but regularly assessed in Massachusetts. One paid $316,000;
the other, $369,000. The total revenue derived from Massachusetts was
therefore $2,114,400 in the year 1814; that from Virginia, $566,500. Of
the loans effected in the same year, Massachusetts took a small part
considering her means,--hardly a million dollars. Virginia took still
less,--only two hundred thousand.[351]

In money, Massachusetts contributed four times as much as Virginia to
support the war, and her contributions were paid in Treasury notes or
paper equivalent to coin,--not in the notes of banks worthless beyond
the State. In men, the estimate was affected by the inquiry whether the
militia were to be considered as protecting the national government
or the State. Owing to the presence of the British in the Chesapeake,
Virginia kept a large force of militia on foot, some of which were
in garrison at Norfolk, and a few were on the field of Bladensburg.
Massachusetts also was obliged to call out a considerable force of
militia to protect or garrison national posts.

The relative numbers of regular troops were also somewhat doubtful;
but the paymaster of the army reported Oct. 26, 1814, that he had
distributed in bounties during the year $237,400 for Massachusetts, and
$160,962 for Virginia.[352] During the year, six regular regiments--the
Ninth, Twenty-first, Thirty-third, Thirty-fourth, Fortieth, and
Forty-fifth--recruited in Massachusetts. Three--the Twelfth, Twentieth,
and Thirty-fifth--recruited in Virginia. Perhaps the military aid
furnished by the different sections of the seaboard could be better
understood by following the familiar divisions. New England furnished
thirteen regiments. New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania furnished
fifteen. The Southern States, from Delaware to South Carolina
inclusive, furnished ten. Of all the States in the Union New York alone
supplied more regular soldiers than Massachusetts, and Massachusetts
supplied as many as were furnished by Virginia and the two Carolinas
together.

Judged by these standards, either Massachusetts had done more than
her share, or Virginia had done less than hers. The tests were
material, and took no moral element in account; but in moral support
the relative failure of Massachusetts was not beyond dispute. Public
opinion in New England was almost equally divided, and the pronounced
opposition to the war was much greater in the Eastern States than in
the Southern; but in the serious work of fighting, New England claimed
a share of credit. In the little army at Niagara New York supplied
the Major-General, Virginia and Massachusetts the two brigadiers;
but Winfield Scott’s brigade was chiefly composed of New England
men; and when, nearly half a century afterward, Scott in his old
age was obliged to choose between his allegiance to his State and
allegiance to the Union, the memory of the New England troops who had
won for him his first renown had its influence in raising his mind
above the local sympathies which controlled other Virginia officers.
Without reflecting on Virginia courage or patriotism, the New England
Republicans were warranted in claiming that not the Virginia regiments,
but the Massachusetts Ninth, the Vermont Eleventh, the Massachusetts
Twenty-first, and the Connecticut Twenty-fifth routed the Royal Scots
at Chippawa, and bayoneted the British artillery-men at Lundy’s Lane,
and stormed Drummond’s intrenchments at Fort Erie. They could add that
without their sailors the war might have been less successful than it
was; and they would have been justified had they asked Jefferson to
glance at his latest newspaper as he wrote that Massachusetts gave no
aid to the war, and read the despatch of Johnston Blakeley reporting
that the New England crew of the “Wasp” had sunk the “Avon” in the
middle of a British fleet.[353] Virginians did not take kindly to the
ocean; and on land, owing to the accidents of war, no Virginia regiment
was offered a chance to win distinction.

These comparisons were of little weight to prove that New England was
either better or worse than other parts of the Union, but they showed
that the difficulties that depressed Madison’s mind were not merely
local. He might have disregarded the conduct of the State governments
of Massachusetts and Connecticut had he enjoyed the full support of
his own great Republican States, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North
Carolina. Except New York, Kentucky, Tennessee, and perhaps Ohio, no
State gave to the war the full and earnest co-operation it needed.
Again and again, from the beginning of the troubles with England,
Madison had acted on the conviction that at last the people were
aroused; but in every instance he had been disappointed. After the
burning of Washington, he was more than ever convinced that the moment
had come when the entire people would rally in their self-respect;
but he was met by the Hartford Convention and the November elections.
If the people would not come to the aid of their government at such a
moment, Madison felt that nothing could move them. Peace was his last
hope.




                              CHAPTER IX.


CONGRESS was summoned to meet in extra session September 19,
by a proclamation issued August 8, before the capture of Washington.
On the appointed day the members appeared, but found their building
in ashes, and met like vagrants, without a shelter they could call
their own. The President caused the only public office that had been
spared, to be fitted for their use. Partly owing to the exertions of
Dr. Thornton, the head of the Bureau of Patents, partly owing to the
tornado of August 25, the building used as Post and Patent Office was
not burned. There Congress was obliged to hold its sessions, in such
discomfort as it had never before known.

The President sent his Annual Message September 20, which informed
Congress that it had been specially summoned to supply “any inadequacy
in the existing provision for the wants of the Treasury,” as well as
to be ready for whatever result might be reached by the negotiation
at Ghent. Two thirds of the Message related to the operations of war,
and the President seemed rather disposed to suppress than to avow his
difficulties, but the little he said of them was heavy with anxiety.
He announced that July 1 five million dollars remained in the Treasury,
and that “large sums” must be provided; but he did not add that the
loan had failed, or that the banks and Treasury had suspended specie
payments. He did not say that the regular army and the militia system
were inadequate to national defence; but he declared “the necessity of
immediate measures for filling the ranks of the regular army,” and of
giving “the requisite energy and efficiency” to the militia:--

   “From this view of the national affairs Congress will be urged
   to take up, without delay, as well the subject of pecuniary
   supplies as that of military force, and on a scale commensurate
   with the extent and the character which the war has assumed. It
   is not to be disguised that the situation of our country calls
   for its greatest efforts.... From such an adversary, hostility
   in its greatest force and in its worst forms may be looked for.”

The President threw on the Secretaries of the Treasury and of War the
ungrateful task of announcing the details of their need. Secretary
Campbell was first to address Congress, and the tone of his report on
the state of the finances received emphasis from the resignation which
he sent at the same time to the President. Campbell’s annual report of
September 23 was an admission of incompetence. He had paid, he said,
nearly twenty millions from the Treasury between January and July;
twenty-seven millions more were payable between July and the following
January. For the year 1815 the Treasury would require at least as
much as for 1814. Congress must therefore speedily provide at least
seventy-four millions for the service between July 1, 1814, and Dec.
31, 1815. He ventured to suggest no means of obtaining this sum, or any
amount approaching it.

July 1 the Treasury contained $4,722,000. From its various sources of
revenue it could expect $4,840,000 during the remainder of the year;
from loans already contracted, $4,320,000. In all, $13,822,000 might be
considered as in hand, which was one half the sum immediately required.
For the year 1815 the revenue in all its branches might produce
$8,200,000, leaving $39,000,000 to be provided. Twenty-two millions
were the extent of Campbell’s resources, but fifty-two million dollars
more must be raised merely to carry on the government as it had been
administered in the past year.

The plan of finance adopted by Gallatin at the outset of the war
assumed that all deficits could be covered by loans.

   “The experience of the present year,” said Campbell, “furnishes
   ground to doubt whether this be practicable, at least in the
   shape in which loans have hitherto been attempted. Nor is it
   even certain that the establishing and pledging of revenues
   adequate to the punctual payment of the interest and eventual
   reimbursement of the principal of the sums which will be
   required for the year 1815, would enable the Treasury to obtain
   them through the medium of loans effected in the ordinary way.”

Loans being impracticable, Campbell discussed the possibility of using
Treasury notes. Eight millions were already in issue, and of these
more than four millions would fall due before December 31. Campbell
considered that six millions in Treasury notes was about as large
a sum as could easily be circulated, but by issuing notes of small
denominations he hoped to raise the amount to ten millions.

From all sources Campbell hoped to obtain about twenty-four million
dollars of the seventy-four millions required. For the remaining
fifty millions he had no suggestion to offer. The means for new and
extraordinary exertions, he said, “ought to be provided.” He declared
that the resources of the nation were ample,--which was true, but was
also the most discouraging symptom of the time; for if the people,
with ample resources, as he asserted, refused to come to the support
of their own government on any terms, their decision must be accepted
as final. Besides throwing upon Congress all these difficulties,
without a suggestion of his own, Campbell added that Congress would be
required to exert its powers to remedy the evils of the currency and
the suspension of specie payments.

Congress on hearing this financial statement regarded the situation
as desperate. “Tell Dr. Madison,” Senator Lacock was reported[354]
to have said to the President’s private secretary, “that we are now
willing to submit to his Philadelphia lawyer for head of the Treasury.
The public patient is so very sick that we must swallow anything,
however nauseous.” Dallas was nominated October 5, and confirmed the
next day without opposition, as Secretary of the Treasury. No stronger
proof could have been given of the helplessness of Congress, for Dallas
was a man who under no other circumstances could have obtained a ray of
popular favor.

Dallas’s character was high, his abilities undoubted, his experience
large; but for ten years he had been one of the least popular men
in Pennsylvania, the target of newspaper abuse and the champion of
political independence. The people reasonably required that their
leaders should more or less resemble some popular type, and if the
result was monotonous the fault was in the society, not in its politics
or its politicians; but Dallas was like no ordinary type in any people.
His tone of intellectual and social superiority, his powdered hair,
old-fashioned dress and refined manners, his free habits of expense,
and the insubordination even more than the vivacity of his temper
irritated the prejudices of his party.[355] He had little respect
for Presidents, and none for Congress. For Jefferson and Virginia
doctrines he felt distrust, which was returned. Earnest in temper and
emphatic in tone, even to the point of tears and tropical excitability,
Dallas came to Washington as though to lead a forlorn hope,--caring
little for parties and less for ambition, but bent upon restoring to
the government the powers that his friend Gallatin, too easily as he
thought, had allowed to slip from its grasp.

The difficulties of the Treasury when Dallas took charge of it were
not easily exaggerated. His own description,[356] given some six weeks
afterward, made no disguise of them. “The Treasury,” he said, “was
suffering under every kind of embarrassment. The demands upon it were
great in amount, while the means to satisfy them were comparatively
small, precarious in collection, and difficult in their application....
The means consisted, first, of the fragment of an authority to borrow
money when nobody was disposed to lend, and to issue Treasury notes
which none but necessitous creditors or contractors in distress ...
seemed willing to accept;” second, of bank-credits, chiefly in the
South and West, rendered largely useless by the suspension of specie
payments; third, of the current receipts of taxes, also useless because
paid chiefly in Treasury notes. The Treasury was bankrupt. The formal
stoppage of payments in interest on the debt was announced, November
9, by an official letter from the secretary, notifying holders of
government securities in Boston that the Treasury could not meet its
obligations, and that “the government was unable to avert or to control
this course of events.”[357] After that date the Treasury made no
further pretence of solvency.

From this situation the government could be rescued only by a great
effort; and obviously the currency must be first restored, for
until some system of exchange could be established, every increase
of taxation would merely increase unavailable bank deposits. Fifty
millions of Southern bank-notes, locked in the vaults of Southern
banks, would not pay the over-due interest on government bonds at
Boston.

To this subject every one turned, but the schemes that seemed to have
a chance of adoption were only two. The first came from President
Jefferson, and was strongly pressed by the South. As Jefferson
explained it, the plan seemed as simple as his plans were apt to
be; he proposed to issue twenty millions in promissory notes every
year as long as might be necessary. “Our experience,” he told the
President,[358] “has proved it [a paper currency] may be run up to two
or three hundred millions without more than doubling what would be the
prices of things under a sufficient medium, or say a metallic one.” His
plan included an increase of taxation by two million dollars every year
to redeem the same amount of Treasury issues.

Obviously the insuperable obstacle to this plan was the paper money
of the State banks, which already stood at discounts varying from ten
to fifty per cent in specie, and in any large quantity could not be
discounted at all. Until private paper should be abolished, public or
government paper could not be brought into common use. Jefferson’s
views on this, as on the whole subject, were interesting.

   “The banks have discontinued themselves,” he explained.[359]
   “We are now without any medium; and necessity, as well as
   patriotism and confidence, will make us all eager to receive
   Treasury notes if founded on specific taxes. Congress may now
   borrow of the public, and without interest, all the money they
   may want, to the amount of a competent circulation, by merely
   issuing their own promissory notes of proper denominations for
   the larger purposes of circulation, but not for the small. Leave
   that door open for the entrance of metallic money.... The State
   legislatures should be immediately urged to relinquish the right
   of establishing banks of discount. Most of them will comply on
   patriotic principles, under the convictions of the moment; and
   the non-complying may be crowded into concurrence by legitimate
   devices.”

Instead of “banks of discount,” Jefferson probably meant to say banks
of issue, although the Virginia school was hostile to all banks, and
possibly he wished to destroy the whole system. If the scheme were
adopted, twenty million dollars in paper money would not supply the
wants of the Treasury, which required at least fifty millions within a
year. The resource was limited, even if the States could be compelled
to stop the issue of private notes,--which was extremely doubtful in
the temper of Massachusetts and with the leanings of Chief-Justice
Marshall. Jefferson did not touch upon legal tender; but the assumption
of power implied in the issue of paper money seemed to require that
the government should exercise the right of obliging its creditors to
accept it. The actual interest-bearing Treasury notes stood then at
a discount of about twenty per cent. The proposed paper money could
hardly circulate at a better rate, and coin was not to be obtained.
Under such conditions the notes must be a forced currency if they were
to circulate at all.

The scheme was reported to the House by the Committee of Ways and Means
through its chairman, John W. Eppes, Jefferson’s son-in-law.[360] For
the report Eppes was alone responsible, and the plan in his hands
varied in some points from that of Jefferson. Starting from the
admitted premise that loans were not to be obtained, and that money
could not be transferred from one point to another in any existing
medium at the disposition of government, Eppes proposed to issue
Treasury notes “in sums sufficiently small for the ordinary purposes
of society,” which were not to be made payable on demand in coin, but
might at any time be exchanged for eight per cent bonds, and were to
be received “in all payments for public lands and taxes.” Nothing was
said of legal tender, or of driving bank-notes from circulation; but
Eppes proposed to double the taxes at one stroke.

Eppes’s scheme lost the advantages of Jefferson’s without gaining any
of its own. It abandoned the hope of abolishing bank paper; and in want
of such a restraint on private issues, the proposed government paper
would merely add one more element of confusion to the chaos already
existing. Eppes further altered Jefferson’s plan by adding some ten
millions instead of two millions to the burden of taxation; but even
Jefferson protested that this part of the scheme was impracticable.

   “This is a dashing proposition,” he wrote to Monroe;[361] “but
   if Congress pass it, I shall consider it sufficient evidence
   that their constituents generally can pay the tax. No man has
   greater confidence than I have in the spirit of the people to
   a rational extent. Whatever they can, they will. But without
   either market or medium, I know not how it is to be done. All
   markets abroad and all at home are shut to us, so that we have
   been feeding our horses on wheat. Before the day of collection,
   bank-notes will be but as oak-leaves; and of specie there is not
   within all the United States one half of the proposed amount of
   the taxes.”

This was the situation of the Virginia scheme when Dallas took the
matter in hand. Immediately after entering into office, Dallas wrote to
Eppes an official letter, dated October 17, expressing views wholly at
variance with the Virginia plan.

   “Under favorable circumstances and to a limited extent,” he
   said,[362] “an emission of Treasury notes would probably afford
   relief; but Treasury notes are an expensive and precarious
   substitute either for coin or for bank-notes, charged as they
   are with a growing interest, productive of no countervailing
   profit or emolument, and exposed to every breath of popular
   prejudice or alarm. The establishment of a national institution
   operating upon credit combined with capital, and regulated by
   prudence and good faith, is after all the only efficient remedy
   for the disordered condition of our circulating medium. While
   accomplishing that object, too, there will be found under the
   auspices of such an institution a safe depository for the public
   treasure and a constant auxiliary to the public credit. But
   whether the issues of a paper currency proceed from the national
   Treasury or from a national Bank, the acceptance of the paper in
   a course of payments and receipts must be forever optional with
   the citizens. The extremity of that day cannot be anticipated
   when any honest and enlightened statesman will again venture
   upon the desperate expedient of a tender-law.”

Without a tender-law the Virginia scheme would hardly answer the
purposes required, since the government must restrain the issue of
paper within a limit too narrow for usefulness. Dallas did not press
this point, but developed his own scheme, which required, like that of
Eppes, a duplication of taxes to produce twenty-one million dollars,
and the creation of a national Bank with a capital of fifty million
dollars.

Either Eppes’s or Dallas’s plan might answer the immediate object
of providing a currency, and both required the exercise of implied
powers by Congress. Apparently Congress had only to choose, but in
truth choice was most difficult. The House readily adopted Dallas’s
recommendation in principle, and voted, October 24, by sixty-six to
forty, that it was expedient to establish a national Bank; but the
problem of establishing a specie-paying bank without specie passed
its powers. Dallas abandoned the attempt at the outset. He proposed a
bank of fifty millions capital, of which forty-four millions might be
subscribed in government bonds and Treasury notes, and six millions in
coin. The bank was at once to lend to government thirty millions,--of
course in bank-notes,--and no one denied that an immediate suspension
of specie payments must follow such an issue. To any bank, strong or
weak, the old Virginia influence represented by Eppes was hostile; and
to a bank insolvent from the start the Federalists also were opposed.

When the bill, reported November 7, was printed, it was found to
contain a provision authorizing the suspension of specie payments at
the President’s discretion. The discussion began November 14, and
every successive day revealed objections and increased the opposition.
Calhoun complicated the subject still further by bringing forward,
November 16, a plan of his own, requiring the capital to consist “one
tenth in specie, and the remainder in specie or in Treasury notes to
be hereafter issued,” and taking away all government control. Ingham
of Pennsylvania, representing Dallas, combated Calhoun with force, but
could not make his own measure agreeable to the House. His phrase in
regard to the suspension of specie payments was significant. Congress,
he said, would be to blame for “frantic enthusiasm” if it did not
provide for the case. “It may happen, and probably will happen, that
their specie payments cannot be continued, and what will then be
the situation of the bank? Failing to fulfil the purposes designed,
its credit is blighted, its operations are stopped, and its charter
violated; and if this should take place before your Treasury notes are
sold, the government will scarce obtain a moment’s relief.” That the
new bank could not pay specie was obvious. The Bank of England itself
could not pay specie, and had not attempted to do so for nearly twenty
years.

The House in committee adopted Calhoun’s amendment by a majority of
about sixty, in spite of Ingham’s opposition; and thus substituted for
Dallas’s scheme a large private bank, over which the government was
to exercise no control, with a capital of fifty millions, nine tenths
of which were to be Treasury notes. The House then discovered so many
unforeseen difficulties, that November 25 it recommitted the bill to a
select committee, of which Lowndes, Calhoun, Ingham, Forsyth, and two
Federalists were members.

Dallas was obliged openly to enter the lists against Calhoun, and
wrote to the committee a letter, dated November 27,[363] sounding like
a defiance: “The dividend on the funded debt has not been punctually
paid; a large amount of Treasury notes has already been dishonored;
and the hope of preventing further injury and reproach in transacting
business with the Treasury is too visionary to afford a moment’s
consolation.” Calhoun’s scheme, he plainly intimated, was impracticable
and mischievous.

The next day, November 28, Lowndes brought back Calhoun’s bill to
the House, together with Dallas’s letter, and told the House that
the committee could come to no agreement. Upon this admission of
helplessness, Hanson addressed the House in a speech which seemed to
carry Federalist exultation to the extremest point. Protesting his
anxiety to defend the country, Hanson uttered a cry of triumph over the
destruction of the government:--

   “Not only had government bills been dishonored and the interest
   of the public debt remained unpaid, but ... so completely
   empty was the Treasury and destitute of credit, that funds
   could not be obtained to defray the current ordinary expenses
   of the different Departments. Disgraceful, humiliating as the
   fact was, it ought not to be concealed from the nation, and he
   felt it his duty to state to the House that the Department
   of State was so bare of money as to be unable to pay even
   its stationery bill. The government was subsisting upon the
   drainings of unchartered banks in the District, which felt
   themselves compelled to contribute their means lest the rod
   _in terrorem_ which was held over them should be applied,
   and an Act of incorporation refused.”

No one contradicted or answered Hanson. The House wavered in incapacity
that suggested dissolution. At last Richard M. Johnson, in order to
force a decision right or wrong, moved the previous question and
brought the House to a vote. Then the majority turned against Calhoun,
as they had before turned against Dallas, and rejected the bill by a
vote of one hundred and four to forty-nine.

The Southern preference for government paper currency lay at the bottom
of Calhoun’s scheme as of Jefferson’s, and seemed to Dallas to combine
ignorance with dishonesty. Treasury notes bearing interest could not
be made to serve as a currency, and were useless as a foundation for
government paper. “What use is there,” asked Ingersoll,[364] “in such
a mass of banking machinery to give circulation to some millions of
Treasury notes? Why not issue them at once without this unwieldy, this
unnecessary medium?” Yet when Bolling Hall of Georgia, in pursuance of
Macon’s aphorism that “paper money never was beat,” moved, November 12,
Resolutions authorizing the issue of Treasury notes as legal tender,
the House refused to consider it by a vote of ninety-five to forty-two.
Eppes did not vote; Calhoun voted against it, and of the twenty-five
Southern members who supported it Macon and Stanford were the most
prominent.

Nothing could be plainer than that the House must ultimately come to
inconvertible government paper, whether issued by the Treasury or by
a Bank. Dallas, Eppes, and Calhoun were all agreed on that point, if
on no other; but after Congress had sat two months and a half, the
House was no nearer a decision than when it met. The Federalists,
voting at one time with Calhoun, at another with Dallas, were able to
paralyze action. Eppes wrote to Dallas, December 2, inviting further
information; and Dallas wrote back the same day, recounting the needs
of the Treasury for the current month, merely on account of the
national debt. Dallas reported that $5,726,000 in Treasury notes and
dividends were due, or would fall due by January 1; and that including
unavailable bank-credits, and subject to possible contingencies,
the Treasury might contain resources to meet these demands to the
amount of $3,972,000.[365] Eppes could do no more for immediate
relief than report a bill for the issue of some ten millions more of
interest-bearing Treasury notes, which was passed without debate and
became law, December 26, without improving the situation.

The House also passed the heavy tax-bills without much opposition
except from Federalists who wished to stop military operations on the
part of the government. Between thirty and forty members, or about one
half of the Federalists, carried their opposition to that point. The
bill raising the direct tax to six million dollars passed the House,
December 22, by a vote of one hundred and six to fifty-three, and
passed the Senate, January 5, 1815, by twenty-three to seven. Dallas
and Eppes hoped to raise about twenty million dollars through the new
taxation, or twice what had been previously attempted. Jefferson held
that these taxes could not be paid, and expressed his opinion without
reserve.

   “If anything could revolt our citizens against the war,” wrote
   Jefferson, November 28,[366] “it would be the extravagance with
   which they are about to be taxed.... The taxes proposed cannot
   be paid. How can a people who cannot get fifty cents a bushel
   for their wheat, while they pay twelve dollars a bushel for
   their salt, pay five times the amount of taxes they ever paid
   before? Yet this will be the case in all the States south of the
   Potomac.”

If any conclusion was intended to be drawn from the official
return[367] sent to Congress, October 13, of internal taxes received
to that date in each State, the evil predicted by Jefferson seemed
already to exist. In Massachusetts, of taxes to the amount of
$200,000, accrued for the first two quarters of the year, $170,000 had
been received before October 10. In New York $393,000 had accrued, and
$303,000 had been received; thus New York was nearly one fourth in
arrears. Pennsylvania was worse; of $470,000 accrued the government
had received $280,000,--leaving two fifths in arrears. Virginia was
in somewhat worse condition than Pennsylvania; of $247,000 accrued
$136,000 had been paid,--leaving four ninths in arrears.

Yet Pennsylvania and Virginia paid taxes in their own depreciated bank
paper, while New York and New England paid chiefly in Treasury notes.
The new taxes were still to be paid in the same medium, although the
laws gave no express authority for it. In the next Congress, when the
subject was discussed, Wright of Maryland said:[368] “When Congress
passed the revenue laws and imposed the six million and three million
land tax, did they contemplate the payment of specie? No! they knew
the people had it not, and of course could not pay it.... Does any man
doubt that Congress intended these taxes being paid in bank paper? Nay,
has not the Secretary of the Treasury ... sealed this construction
of the law by taking the bank paper in discharge for these taxes?”
That the bank paper was worth less than Treasury notes was shown
by the Southern States paying their taxes in such paper, when they
might equally well have paid them in Treasury notes except for the
difference in value.

The medium of depreciated and depreciating bank paper in which the
taxes were to be paid, secured the States outside of New England from
intolerable pressure by giving the means of indefinite depreciation;
but to the government such a resource meant merely a larger variety
of bank-credits, which were of no certain value even in the towns
where the banks existed, and were of no value at all elsewhere. The
burden of taxation would be thrown chiefly on New England; and if the
Hartford Convention did nothing else, it was sure to take measures
for sequestering the proceeds of taxation in New England for military
purposes. The hope of restoring the finances by taxation was faint.
Until the currency could be established and exchanges made secure, the
government was helpless.

The House having broken down November 28, the Senate next took the
matter in hand. Rufus King reported, December 2, a bill to incorporate
a bank, which was in effect the bill recommended by Dallas. After a
week’s consideration the Senate passed the bill, December 9, by the
vote of seventeen to fourteen,--King and the Federalists, with four
Republican senators, voting against it. The House referred it to the
Committee of Ways and Means, which reported it, December 14, with
amendments. The debate began December 23, and was cut short December 27
by C. J. Ingersoll, who by the close vote of seventy-two to seventy
obliged the House to call for the previous question, and order the bill
to its third reading. This energy was followed by a reaction; the bill
was recommitted for amendment, again reported, and vehemently attacked.

Never had the House shown itself more feeble. The Federalists took the
lead in debate; and January 2 Daniel Webster, in a speech that placed
him at the head of the orators of the time, dictated the action of
Congress:--

   “What sort of an institution, sir, is this? It looks less like a
   bank than like a department of government. It will be properly
   the paper-money department. Its capital is government debts;
   the amount of issues will depend on government necessities;
   government in effect absolves itself from its own debts to the
   bank, and by way of compensation absolves the bank from its own
   contracts with others. This is indeed a wonderful scheme of
   finance. The government is to grow rich because it is to borrow
   without the obligation of repaying, and is to borrow of a bank
   which issues paper without the liability to redeem it.... They
   provide for an unlimited issue of paper in an entire exemption
   from payment. They found their bank in the first place on the
   discredit of government, and then hope to enrich government out
   of the insolvency of the bank.”

Webster was a master of antithesis, and the proposed bank was in effect
what he described; but had he been a member of the British Parliament
he might have made the same objections, with little alteration, to
the Bank of England. The Hartford Convention was in session while he
spoke. Every word of his speech was a shock to the government and the
Union, for his only suggestion was equivalent to doing nothing. He
moved to instruct the committee to report a bill creating a bank with
thirty millions of capital, composed one fourth of specie and three
fourths of government securities; without power to suspend specie
payments, and without obligation to lend three fifths of its capital
to the government. To such a bank he would give his support, “not as a
measure of temporary policy, or an expedient to find means of relief
from the present poverty of the Treasury,” but as an institution most
useful in times of peace.

The House came to a vote the same day, and divided eighty-one to
eighty. Then the Speaker, Langdon Cheves, rose, and after denouncing
the proposed bank as “a dangerous, unexampled, and he might almost say
a desperate resort,” gave his casting vote against the bill.

No sooner had the House struck this blow at Dallas than it shrank
back. The next day, amid complaints and objections, it reconsidered
its matured decision by the sudden majority of one hundred and seven
to fifty-four. Once more the bill was recommitted, and once more
reported, January 6, in the form that Webster proposed. Weary of their
own instability, the majority hastened to vote. Most of the Federalists
supported the bill; but Grosvenor of New York, one of the ablest,
frankly said what every one felt, that the proposed institution could
not be a specie bank, or get a million of its notes into circulation.
“The government relying on it would be disappointed, and ruin soon
stare them in the face.” With this understanding the House passed the
bill, January 7, by a vote of one hundred and twenty to thirty-eight;
and the Senate, after a struggle with the House, accepted it, January
20, by a vote of twenty to fourteen.

Dallas was not a man to be easily daunted even in so desperate a
situation. After ten days deliberation, the President sent to Congress
a veto message.

   “The most the bank could effect,” said Madison, “and the most it
   could be expected to aim at, would be to keep the institution
   alive by limited and local transactions ... until a change from
   war to peace should enable it, by a flow of specie into its
   vaults and a removal of the external demand for it, to derive
   its contemplated emoluments from a safe and full extension of
   its operations.”

“I hope this will satisfy our friends,” wrote Webster to his
brother,[369] “that it was not a bank likely to favor the
Administration.” Either with or without such a bank, the Administration
was equally helpless. The veto left the Treasury, February 1, without
a resource in prospect. The unsatisfied demands reached nearly twenty
millions. The cash balance, chiefly in bank-credits, was little more
than six millions. A further deficit of forty millions remained
to be provided above the estimated revenue of 1815. United States
six-per-cents commanded only a nominal price, between fifty and sixty
cents on the dollar,[370] and were quoted in Boston at a discount of
forty cents.[371] Treasury notes being in demand for taxes, were worth
about seventy-five cents in the dollar. Dallas had no serious hope of
carrying on the government. In a letter to the Committee of Ways and
Means, dated January 17, he could only propose to add six millions more
to the taxes, issue fifteen millions in Treasury notes, and borrow
twenty-five millions on any terms that could be obtained. In making
these recommendations he avowed in grave words his want of confidence
in their result:[372]--

   “In making the present communication I feel, sir, that I have
   performed my duty to the Legislature and to the country; but
   when I perceive that more than forty millions of dollars must be
   raised for the service of the year 1815, by an appeal to public
   credit through the medium of the Treasury notes and loans, I am
   not without sensations of extreme solicitude.”

Young George Ticknor of Boston happened to be in the gallery of the
House of Representatives when Eppes read this letter, January 21, and
the next day he wrote,[373]--

   “The last remarkable event in the history of this remarkable
   Congress is Dallas’s report. You can imagine nothing like the
   dismay with which it has filled the Democratic party. All his
   former communications were but emollients and palliations
   compared with this final disclosure of the bankruptcy of the
   nation. Mr. Eppes as Chancellor of the Exchequer, or Chairman
   of the Committee of Ways and Means, read it in his place
   yesterday, and when he had finished, threw it upon the table
   with expressive violence, and turning round to Mr. Gaston, asked
   him with a bitter levity between jest and earnest,--

   “‘Well, sir! will your party take the government if we will give
   it up to them?’

   “‘No, sir!’ said Gaston; ... ‘No, sir! Not unless you will give
   it to us as we gave it to you!’”




                              CHAPTER X.


WHILE Dallas struggled with Congress to obtain the means of
establishing a currency in order to pay the army, Monroe carried on a
similar struggle in order to obtain an army to pay. On this point, as
on the financial issue, Virginian ideas did not accord with the wishes
of Government. The prejudice against a regular army was stimulated
by the evident impossibility of raising or supporting it. Once more
Jefferson expressed the common feeling of his Virginia neighbors.[374]

   “We must prepare for interminable war,” he wrote to Monroe,
   October 16. “To this end we should put our house in order by
   providing men and money to an indefinite extent. The former may
   be done by classing our militia, and assigning each class to the
   description of duties for which it is fit. It is nonsense to
   talk of regulars. They are not to be had among a people so easy
   and happy at home as ours. We might as well rely on calling down
   an army of angels from heaven.”

As Jefferson lost the habits of power and became once more a Virginia
planter, he reverted to the opinions and prejudices of his earlier life
and of the society in which he lived. As Monroe grew accustomed to the
exercise and the necessities of power, he threw aside Virginian ideas
and accepted the responsibilities of government. On the same day when
Jefferson wrote to Monroe that it was nonsense to talk of regulars,
Monroe wrote to Congress that it was nonsense to talk of militia. The
divergence between Monroe and Jefferson was even greater than between
Dallas and Eppes.

   “It may be stated with confidence,” wrote Monroe to
   Congress,[375] “that at least three times the force in militia
   has been employed at our principal cities, along the coast and
   on the frontier, in marching to and returning thence, that would
   have been necessary in regular troops; and that the expense
   attending it has been more than proportionately augmented from
   the difficulty if not the impossibility of preserving the same
   degree of system in the militia as in the regular service.”

In Monroe’s opinion a regular force was an object “of the highest
importance.” He told the Senate committee that the army, which was only
thirty-four thousand strong on the first of October, should be raised
to its legal limit of sixty-two thousand, and that another permanent
army of forty thousand men should be raised for strictly defensive
service. In the face of Jefferson’s warning that he might as well call
down an army of angels from heaven, Monroe called for one hundred
thousand regular troops, when no exertions had hitherto availed to
keep thirty thousand effectives on the rolls.

The mere expression of such a demand carried with it the train of
consequences which the people chiefly dreaded. One hundred thousand
troops could be raised only by draft. Monroe affirmed the power as well
as the need of drafting. “Congress have a right by the Constitution,”
he said, “to raise regular armies, and no restraint is imposed on the
exercise of it.... It would be absurd to suppose that Congress could
not carry this power into effect otherwise than by accepting the
voluntary service of individuals.” Absurd as it was, such had been
the general impression, and Monroe was believed to have been one of
the most emphatic in maintaining it. “Ask him,” suggested Randolph,
“what he would have done, while governor of Virginia and preparing to
resist Federal usurpation, had such an attempt been made by Mr. Adams
and his ministers, especially in 1800. He _can_ give the answer.”
Doubtless the silence of the Constitution in respect to conscription
was conclusive to some minds in favor of the power; but the people
preferred the contrary view, the more because militia service seemed to
give more pay for less risk.

The chance of carrying such a measure through Congress was not
great, yet Monroe recommended it as his first plan for raising men.
He proposed to enroll the free male population between eighteen and
forty-five years of age into classes of one hundred, each to furnish
four men and to keep their places supplied.[376] The second plan
varied from the first only in the classification, not in the absence
of compulsion. The militia were to be divided into three sections
according to age, with the obligation to serve, when required, for a
term of two years. A third plan suggested the exemption from militia
service of every five militia-men who could provide one man for
the war. If none of these schemes should be approved by Congress,
additional bounties must be given under the actual system. Of the four
plans, the secretary preferred the first.

The Senate committee immediately summoned Monroe to an interview. They
wished an explanation of the failure in the recruiting service, and
were told by Monroe that the failure was chiefly due to the competition
of the detached militia for substitutes.[377] The military committee
of the House then joined with the military committee of the Senate in
sounding the members of both bodies in order to ascertain the most
rigorous measure that could be passed. According to the report of Troup
of Georgia, chairman of the House committee,[378] they “found that no
efficacious measure, calculated certainly and promptly to fill the
regular army, could be effectually resorted to. Measures were matured
and proposed by the [House] committee, but were not pressed on the
House, from the solemn conviction that there was no disposition in the
Legislature to act finally on the subject.”

Yet the issue was made at a moment of extreme anxiety and almost
despair. In October, 1814, the result of the war was believed to
depend on the establishment of an efficient draft. The price of United
States six-per-cents showed better than any other evidence the opinion
of the public; but the military situation, known to all the world,
warranted deep depression. Sir George Prevost, about to be succeeded
by an efficient commander,--Sir George Murray,--was then at Kingston
organizing a campaign against Sackett’s Harbor, with an army of twenty
thousand regular troops and a fleet that controlled the Lake. Another
great force, military and naval, was known to be on its way to New
Orleans; and the defences of New Orleans were no stronger than those of
Washington. One half the province of Maine, from Eastport to Castine,
was already in British possession.

To leave no doubt of England’s intentions, despatches from Ghent,
communicating the conditions on which the British government offered
peace, arrived from the American commissioners and were sent, October
10, to Congress. These conditions assumed rights of conquest.
The British negotiators demanded four territorial or proprietary
concessions, and all were vital to the integrity of the Union. First,
the whole Indian Territory of the Northwest, including about one third
of the State of Ohio, two thirds of Indiana, and nearly the entire
region from which the States of Illinois, Wisconsin, and Michigan were
afterward created, was to be set aside forever as Indian country under
British guaranty. Second, the United States were to be excluded from
military or naval contact with the Lakes. Third, they had forfeited
their rights in the fisheries. Fourth, they were to cede a portion of
Maine to strengthen Canada.

These demands, following the unparalleled insult of burning Washington,
foreshadowed a war carried to extremities, and military preparations
such as the Union had no means ready to repel. Monroe’s recommendations
rested on the conviction that the nation must resort to extreme
measures. Dallas’s financial plan could not have been suggested except
as a desperate resource. Congress understood as well as the Executive
the impending peril, and stood in even more fear of it.

Under these circumstances, when Troup’s committee refused to act, Giles
reported, on behalf of the Senate committee, two military measures.
The first, for filling the regular army, proposed to extend the
age of enlistment from twenty-one to eighteen years; to double the
land-bounty; and to exempt from militia duty every militia-man who
should furnish a recruit for the regular service.

The second measure, reported the same day, November 5, purported to
authorize the raising an army of eighty thousand militia-men by draft,
to serve for two years within the limits of their own or an adjoining
State.[379] The provisions of this measure were ill-conceived,
ill-digested, and unlikely to answer their purpose. The moment the
debate began, the bill was attacked so vigorously as to destroy
whatever credit it might have otherwise possessed.

Of all the supporters of the war, Senator Varnum of Massachusetts was
one of the steadiest. He was also the highest authority in the Senate
on matters pertaining to the militia. When Giles’s bill came under
discussion November 16, Varnum began the debate by a speech vehemently
hostile to the proposed legislation. He first objected that although
the bill purported to call for an army of eighty thousand men, “yet in
some of the subsequent sections of it we find that instead of realizing
the pleasing prospect of seeing an ample force in the field, the force
is to be reduced to an indefinite amount,--which contradiction in
terms, inconsistency in principle, and uncertainty in effect, cannot
fail to produce mortification and chagrin in every breast.” Varnum
objected to drafting men from the militia for two years’ service
because the principle of nine months’ service was already established
by the common law. If the nation wanted a regular force, why not make
it a part of the regular army without a system of drafting militia
“unnecessary, unequal, and unjust?” The machinery of classification
and draft was “wholly impracticable.” The limit of service to adjoining
States abandoned the objects for which the Union existed. The proffered
bounties would ruin the recruiting service for the regular army; the
proffered exemptions and reductions in term of duty left no permanency
to the service. The bill inflicted no penalties and charged no officers
with the duty of making the draft. “I consider the whole system as
resolving into a recommendation upon the patriotism of the States and
Territories and upon the patriotism of the classes.”

The justice of Varnum’s criticism could not fairly be questioned. The
bill authorized the President “to issue his orders to such officers of
the militia as he may think proper,” and left the classification and
draft in the hands of these militia officers. Every drafted man who had
performed any tour of duty in the militia since the beginning of the
war was entitled to deduct a corresponding term from his two years of
service; and obviously the demand created for substitutes would stop
recruiting for the regular army.

Hardly had Varnum sat down when Senator Daggett of Connecticut spoke.

   “The bill,” said the Connecticut senator, “is incapable of being
   executed, as well as unconstitutional and unjust. It proceeds
   entirely upon the idea that the State governments will lend
   their aid to carry it into effect. If they refuse, it becomes
   inoperative. Now, sir, will the Executives, who believe it a
   violation of the Constitution, assist in its execution? I tell
   you they will not.”

Every member of the Senate who heard these words knew that they
were meant to express the will of the convention which was to meet
at Hartford within a month. The sentiment thus avowed was supported
by another New England senator, whose State was not a party to the
Convention. Jeremiah Mason of New Hampshire was second to no one in
legal ability or in personal authority, and when he followed Daggett
in the debate, he spoke with full knowledge of the effect his words
would have on the action of the Hartford Convention and of the State
executives.

   “In my opinion,” he said, “this system of military conscription
   thus recommended by the Secretary of War is not only
   inconsistent with the provisions and spirit of the Constitution,
   but also with all the principles of civil liberty. In atrocity
   it exceeds that adopted by the late Emperor of France for the
   subjugation of Europe.... Such a measure cannot, it ought not to
   be submitted to. If it could in no other way be averted, I not
   only believe, but I hope, it would be resisted.”

Mason pointed to the alternative,--which Massachusetts was then
adopting, as the necessary consequence of refusing power to the
government,--that the States must resume the powers of sovereignty:

   “Should the national defence be abandoned by the general
   government, I trust the people, if still retaining a good
   portion of their resources, may rally under their State
   governments against foreign invasion, and rely with confidence
   on their own courage and virtue.”

At that time the State of Massachusetts was occupied for one hundred
miles of its sea-coast by a British force, avowedly for purposes of
permanent conquest; and the State legislature, October 18, refused to
make an inquiry, or to consider any measure for regaining possession
of its territory, or to co-operate with the national government for
the purpose,[380] but voted to raise an army of ten thousand men.
The object of this State army was suggested by Christopher Gore, the
Federalist senator from Massachusetts who followed Mason in the debate.
In personal and political influence Gore stood hardly second to Mason,
and his opinions were likely to carry the utmost weight with the
convention at Hartford. With this idea necessarily in his mind, Gore
told the Senate,--

   “This [bill] is the first step on the odious ground of
   conscription,--a plan, sir, which never will and never ought to
   be submitted to by this country while it retains one idea of
   civil freedom; a plan, sir, which if attempted will be resisted
   by many States, and at every hazard. In my judgment, sir, it
   should be resisted by all who have any regard to public liberty
   or the rights of the several States.”

These denunciations were not confined to New England. Senator
Goldsborough of Maryland, also a Federalist, affirmed that the
sentiment of abhorrence for military duty was almost universal:--

   “Sir, you dare not--at least I hope you dare not--attempt a
   conscription to fill the ranks of your regular army. When
   the plan of the Secretary of War made its appearance, it was
   gratifying to find that it met with the abhorrence of almost
   every man in the nation; and the merit of the bill before you,
   if such a measure can be supposed to have merit at all, is
   that it is little else, as regards the militia, than a servile
   imitation of the secretary’s plan.”

Nevertheless, when Goldsborough took his seat the Senate passed the
Militia Bill by a vote of nineteen to twelve,--Anderson of Tennessee
and Varnum of Massachusetts joining the Federalists in opposition. The
Regular Army Bill, which was in effect a bill to sacrifice the regular
army, passed November 11, without a division. Both measures then went
to the House and were committed, November 12, to the Committee of the
Whole.

Ordinarily such a measure would have been referred to the Military
Committee, but in this instance the Military Committee would have
nothing to do with the Senate bill. Troup, the chairman, began the
debate by denouncing it.[381] The measure, he said, was inadequate to
its object. “It proposed to give you a militia force when you wanted,
not a militia, but a regular force.... You have a deficiency of
twentyodd thousand to supply. How will you supply it? Assuredly the
[Regular Army] bill from the Senate will not supply it. No, sir, the
recruiting system has failed.” On the nature of the force necessary
for the next campaign Troup expressed his own opinion and that of his
committee, as well as that of the Executive, in language as strong as
he could use at such a time and place. “If, after what has happened,
I could for a moment believe there could be any doubt or hesitation
on this point, I would consider everything as lost; then indeed there
would be an end of hope and of confidence.” Yet on precisely this point
Congress showed most doubt. Nothing could induce it to accept Troup’s
view of the necessity for providing a regular army. “The bill from the
Senate,” remonstrated Troup, “instead of proposing this, proposes to
authorize the President to call upon the States for eighty thousand raw
militia; and this is to be our reliance for the successful prosecution
of the war! Take my word for it, sir, that if you do rely upon it (the
military power of the enemy remaining undivided) defeat, disaster, and
disgrace, must follow.”

The House refused to support Troup or the President. Calhoun was first
to yield to the general unwillingness, and declared himself disposed
to accept the Senate bill as a matter of policy. Richard M. Johnson,
though sympathizing with Troup, still preferred to accept the bill as
the only alternative to nothing: “If it was rejected, they would have
no dependence for defence but on six months’ militia.”[382] On the
other hand, Thomas K. Harris of Tennessee protested that if the British
government had it in their power to control the deliberations of
Congress, they could not devise the adoption of a measure of a military
character better calculated to serve their purposes. The people, he
said, were in his part of the country prepared to make every sacrifice,
and expected Congress, after the news from Ghent, to do its share; but
Congress was about to adopt a measure of all others the best calculated
to prolong the war.[383]

While the friends of the government spoke in terms of open
discouragement and almost despair of the strongest military measure
which Congress would consent to consider, the Federalists made no
concealment of their wishes and intentions. Daniel Webster used
similar arguments to those of his friend Jeremiah Mason in the Senate,
affirming that the same principle which authorized the enlistment of
apprentices would equally authorize the freeing of slaves,[384] and
echoing pathetic threats of disunion.[385] Other Federalists made no
professions of sadness over the approaching dissolution of government.
Artemas Ward of Massachusetts spoke December 14, the day before the
Hartford Convention was to meet, and announced the course which events
were to take:[386]--

   “That the Treasury is empty I admit; that the ranks of the
   regular army are thin I believe to be true; and that our country
   must be defended in all events, I not only admit but affirm.
   But, sir, if all the parts of the United States are defended, of
   course the whole will be defended. If every State in the Union,
   with such aid as she can obtain from her neighbors, defends
   herself, our whole country will be defended. In my mind the
   resources of the States will be applied with more economy and
   with greater effect in defence of the country under the State
   governments than under the government of the United States.”

Such avowals of the intent to throw aside Constitutional duties were
not limited to members from New England. Morris S. Miller of New York
made a vehement speech on the failure of national defence, and declared
the inevitable result to be “that the States must and will take care
of themselves; and they will preserve the resources of the States for
the defence of the States.”[387] He also declared that conscription
would be resisted, and echoed the well-remembered declamation of Edward
Livingston against the Alien Bill in 1798, when the Republican orator
prayed to God that the States would never acquiesce in obedience to the
law.

“This House,” replied Duvall of Kentucky, “has heard discord and
rebellion encouraged and avowed from more than one quarter.” Indeed,
from fully one fourth of its members the House heard little else. Under
the shadow of the Hartford Convention the Federalist members talked
with entire frankness. “This great fabric seems nodding and tottering
to its fall,” said Z. R. Shipherd of New York, December 9;[388] “and
Heaven only knows how long before the mighty ruin will take place.”
J. O. Moseley of Connecticut “meant no improper menace” by predicting
to the House, “if they were determined to prosecute the war by a
recourse to such measures as are provided in the present bill, that
they would have no occasion for future committees of investigation into
the causes of the failure of their arms.”[389] The latest committee
of investigation had recently made a long report on the capture of
Washington, carefully abstaining from expressing opinions of its own,
or imputing blame to any one, and Moseley’s remark involved a double
sneer. None of these utterances were resented. Richard Stockton of
New Jersey was allowed unanswered to denounce in measured terms the
mild Militia Bill then under debate, from which the committee had
already struck the term of two years’ service by substituting one year;
and Stockton concluded his fine-drawn arguments by equally studied
menace:[390]--

   “This bill also attacks the right and sovereignty of the
   State governments. Congress is about to usurp their undoubted
   rights,--to take from them their militia. By this bill we
   proclaim that we will have their men, as many as we please, when
   and where and for as long a time as we see fit, and for any
   service we see proper. Do gentlemen of the majority seriously
   believe that the people and the State governments will submit
   to this claim? Do they believe that all the States of this
   Union will submit to this usurpation? Have you attended to the
   solemn and almost unanimous declaration of the legislature of
   Connecticut? Have you examined the cloud arising in the East? Do
   you perceive that it is black, alarming, portentous?”

The Resolution of the Connecticut legislature to which Stockton
referred was adopted in October, and authorized the governor in case
of the passage of the Militia Bill to convoke the General Assembly
forthwith, to consider measures “to secure and preserve the rights and
liberties of the people of this State, and the freedom, sovereignty,
and independence of the same.”[391] Stockton’s speech was made December
10, and “the cloud arising in the East,” as he figured the Hartford
Convention, was to take form December 15. The Republican speakers
almost as earnestly used the full influence of these national fears
to rouse the energies of the House. They neither denied nor disguised
the helplessness of government. All admitted dread of approaching
disaster. Perhaps C. J. Ingersoll was the only member who declared that
the war had been successful, and that Americans need no longer blush
to be Americans; but Ingersoll disliked the Militia Bill as cordially
as it was disliked by Troup or Varnum, and voted for it only because
“something must be done.”[392]

   “When our army,” said Samuel Hopkins of Kentucky, in closing the
   debate, “is composed of a mere handful of men, and our treasury
   empty so that it cannot provide for this gallant handful;
   when an enemy, powerful and active, is beating against our
   shores like the strong wave of the ocean; when everything is
   at stake,--... surely such is not the moment for parsimonious
   feelings in raising taxes, or for forced constructions to defeat
   the means for raising men.”

Notwithstanding every effort of the war-leaders, the opposition
steadily won control over the House. Daniel Webster during his entire
lifetime remembered with satisfaction that he shared with Eppes the
credit of overthrowing what he called Monroe’s conscription.[393]
December 10, at Eppes’s motion, the House voted by a majority of
sixty-two to fifty-seven to reduce the term of service from two years
to one.[394] A motion made by Daniel Webster to reduce the term to six
months was lost by only one voice, the vote standing seventy-eight to
seventy-nine.[395] The bill passed at last, December 14, by a vote of
eighty-four to seventy-two, in a House where the true war majority was
forty-six. When the Senate insisted on its provision of two years’
service, Troup, in conference committee, compromised on eighteen
months. Then the House, December 27, by a vote of seventy-three to
sixty-four, rejected the report of its conference committee. The next
day, December 28, in the Senate, Rufus King made an unpremeditated
motion for indefinite postponement. Some members were absent; no debate
occurred. The question was immediately put, and carried by a vote of
fourteen to thirteen.[396] The effect of this action was to destroy the
bill.

With this failure the attempt to supply an army was abandoned, and
Congress left the government to conduct the war in 1815, as in 1814,
with thirty thousand regular troops and six months’ militia. Monroe’s
effort to fill the ranks of the army ended in doubling the land-bounty;
in authorizing the enlistment of minors, who had till then been
enlisted without authorization; and in exempting from militia duty such
persons as should furnish a recruit for the regular army.[397] The
prospect was remote that such inducements could do more than repair
the waste of the actual force; but the government was unable to pay a
larger number even if the force could be raised, and Monroe was obliged
to prepare for the next campaign with such slight means of defence as
remained to him. The last effort to induce the House to consider a
serious method of raising troops was made February 6, and was referred
to the Committee of the Whole, with a tacit understanding that the
ordinary process of recruiting was not to be disturbed.[398] According
to the returns in the adjutant-general’s office, the whole number of
men--non-commissioned officers, privates, musicians, and artificers,
present or absent, sick or well--in the regular army Feb. 16, 1815,
was thirty-two thousand one hundred and sixty. During the previous
two months it had remained stationary, the returns of December, 1814,
reporting thirty-two thousand three hundred and sixty men. Nothing
showed a possibility of greatly increasing the force by the means
prescribed by Congress.

The navy requiring little new legislation, readily obtained the
little it asked. Almost the first Act of the session, approved Nov.
15, 1814, authorized the purchasing or building of twenty sixteen-gun
sloops-of-war. Another Act of Feb. 7, 1815, created a Board of
Commissioners for the navy to discharge all the ministerial duties of
the secretary, under his superintendence.

This legislation, with the various tax-bills, comprised all that was
accomplished by Congress between the months of September and February
toward a vigorous prosecution of the war. For the navy the prospect
of success in the coming year was sufficiently fair, and privateering
promised to be more active than ever; but the army was threatened with
many perils. The most serious of all dangers to the military service
of the Union was supposed by Federalists to be the establishment of
armies by the separate States. The attempt to establish such an army
by Massachusetts in time of peace had been one of the causes which
led to the Constitution of 1789;[399] and at the close of 1814,
when Massachusetts voted to raise an army of ten thousand men, the
significance of the step was more clearly evident than in the time of
the Confederation.

The State of Massachusetts might be supposed to act in a spirit of
hostility to the Constitution; but no such motive actuated States
outside of New England. If they followed the same course, they did
so because the national government was believed to be incompetent to
the general defence. Of all the States Massachusetts alone possessed
considerable resources, and could command both credit and specie; yet
the creation of a State army of ten thousand men overburdened her
finances, and obliged her to claim her share of the national revenues.
No other State could expect to support an army without immediate
financial trouble. Yet Governor Tompkins of New York recommended to the
legislature in September the establishment of a State army of twenty
thousand men,[400] and the legislature passed Acts for the purpose. The
legislature of Pennsylvania took a similar measure into consideration.
The legislature of Maryland passed an Act for raising five thousand
State troops. Virginia decided also to create a State army, with two
major-generals. South Carolina passed a law for raising a brigade of
State troops, and appointed the officers. Kentucky took measures for
raising a State army of ten thousand men.

The national government, unable to create an efficient army of its
own, yielded to necessity, and looked already to the State armies as
levies to be taken into the national service in case of need. The
States, on their side, unable to bear the expense of separate armies,
expected to be relieved of the burden by the national government. Yet
for the moment the States, however deficient their means might be,
seemed better able than the general government not only to raise men
but to support them. In January, 1815, the financial resources of the
government were exhausted, so that the Treasury could not meet the
drafts drawn by Major-General Jackson and the pressing demands of
the paymaster at New Orleans. The Secretary of War was obliged to go
from bank to bank of Washington and Georgetown asking, as a personal
favor, loans of their bank-notes already depreciated about fifty per
cent. So desperate, according to Monroe’s account, was the situation
that his success depended on adding his own guaranty to that of the
government.[401] At no time of his life were Monroe’s means sufficient
to supply his private needs, and nothing could express so strongly his
sense of national bankruptcy as the assertion that his credit was
required to support that of the United States.[402]

The State armies were the natural result of such a situation. Congress
could not resist the movement, and passed an Act, approved Jan. 27,
1815, authorizing the President to receive into the national service a
certain proportion of the State troops, not exceeding forty thousand
men in the aggregate. Little was said in debate on the bearings of
the Act, which seemed to concede the demand of Massachusetts that
the States should be allowed to raise troops at the expense of the
United States. The Hartford Convention had then met, deliberated, and
adjourned. Its report had been published, and among its demands was one
that “these States might be allowed to assume their own defence.” The
Federalists considered the Act of Jan. 27, 1815, as a “full and ample”
concession of the demand.[403] Senator Gore wrote to Governor Strong,
January 22, while the measure was before the President, commenting on
the financial and military expedients of Dallas and Monroe:[404]

   “These appear to me the spasms of a dying government.... The
   bill authorizing the raising of State troops by the States,
   and at the expense of the United States, according to the
   plan sent you some time since, has passed both Houses. Thus
   one part of the recommendation of the Hartford Convention
   seems to be adopted. The other,--that to authorize the States
   to receive the taxes,--will probably be more difficult to be
   attained. The accession to this seems not to accord with Mr.
   Monroe’s intimation in your letter, or rather in his letter
   to you. Indeed, if they have fears of the State governments,
   one can hardly account for this government’s authorizing the
   States to raise and keep in pay, at the expense of the United
   States, troops which may be used for purposes hostile to, or not
   conformable with, the views of the paymaster.”

The accession to the principle of State armies which surprised
Gore could be explained only by the government’s consciousness of
helplessness. Gore was somewhat careful to express no opinion of the
probable consequences, but other Federalists spoke with entire candor.
Timothy Pickering expected a division of the Union.[405] Less extreme
partisans looked only to a dissolution of government. A year afterward,
in the calmer light of peace and union, Joseph Hopkinson, a very
distinguished Federalist of Philadelphia, not deluded like the New
Englanders by local pride or prejudice, declared publicly in Congress
the common conviction of his party on the probable consequences of
another year of war:[406]

   “The federal government was at the last gasp of existence.
   But six months longer and it was no more. ... The general
   government would have dissolved into its original elements; its
   powers would have returned to the States from which they were
   derived; and they doubtless would have been fully competent to
   their defence against any enemy. Does not everybody remember
   that all the great States, and I believe the small ones too,
   were preparing for this state of things, and organizing their
   own means for their own defence?”

Calhoun contradicted Hopkinson and denied his assertions; but on that
subject Hopkinson was at least an equal authority. Calhoun knew well
his own State, but he knew little of New England; and he had yet to
learn, perhaps to his own surprise, how easily a section of the Union
could be wrought to treason.




                              CHAPTER XI.


THE Massachusetts legislature issued, October 17, its invitation to
the New England States for a conference,[407] and on the same day
the newspapers published the despatches from Ghent, to August 20,
containing British conditions of peace,--which required, among greater
sacrifices, a cession of Massachusetts territory, and an abandonment
of fisheries and fishing rights conceded with American independence.
Two counties of the State beyond the Penobscot were then in British
military possession, and a third, Nantucket, was a British naval
station. Yet even under these circumstances the British demands did not
shock the Federalist leaders. Governor Strong, after reading the Ghent
documents October 17, wrote to Pickering at Washington,[408]--

   “If Great Britain had discovered a haughty or grasping spirit,
   it might naturally have excited irritation; but I am persuaded
   that in the present case there is not a member of Congress who,
   if he was a member of Parliament, would have thought that more
   moderate terms ought in the first instance to have been offered.”

The argument seemed to prove only that members of Congress could also
be haughty and grasping; but Governor Strong thought the British
demands reasonable, and began at once to sound his friends in regard
to the proposed concessions. The following day he wrote[409] that the
Essex people expected to lose the fisheries, but were ready to give up
a portion of Maine to retain them.

Pickering wrote in reply, acquiescing in the proposed barter of
territory for fisheries, and also in the more extravagant British
demands for the Indians and the Lakes. “I was gratified,” said
Pickering,[410] “to find my own sentiments corresponding with yours.”
The leading Federalists united with Pickering and Strong in blaming
the American negotiators and the government for rejecting the British
offers. The same view was taken by the chief Federalist newspaper of
the State, the Boston “Centinel.”[411]

Thus in the November election, a few weeks later, two issues were
impressed on the people of New England. In regard to neither issue did
the Federalist leaders attempt concealment. The people were invited, as
far as the press of both parties could decide the points of dispute,
to express their opinion,--first, whether the British conditions of
peace should have been taken into consideration; second, whether the
States should be represented at the Hartford Convention. The popular
response was emphatic. Everywhere in New England the Republican
candidates were defeated; and the Federalists, encouraged by the
result,--believing the Hartford Convention to be the most popular
action taken by Massachusetts since the State adopted the Federal
Constitution,[412]--prepared to support measures, looking to the
restoration of peace and to the establishment of a new Federal compact
comprising either the whole or a portion of the actual Union.

However varied the wishes of the majority might be, they agreed in
requiring a radical change in the organic law. This intention was
their chief claim to popularity. The Boston “Centinel,” announcing
November 9 the adhesion of Connecticut and Rhode Island to the Hartford
Convention, placed over the announcement the head-line, “Second and
third Pillars of a new Federal Edifice reared.” During November and
December, almost every day, the newspapers discussed the question what
the convention should do; and the chief divergence of opinion seemed to
regard rather the immediate than the ultimate resort to forcible means
of stopping the war. The extremists, represented in the press by John
Lowell, asked for immediate action.

   “Throwing off all connection with this wasteful war,”--wrote “A
   New England Man” in the “Centinel” of December 17,--“making
   peace with our enemy and opening once more our commerce with the
   world, would be a wise and manly course. The occasion demands it
   of us, and the people at large are ready to meet it.”

Apparently Lowell was right. The people showed no sign of unwillingness
to meet any decision that might be recommended by the convention. As
the moment approached, the country waited with increasing anxiety for
the result. The Republican press--the “National Intelligencer” as
well as the Boston “Patriot”--at first ridiculed the convention, then
grew irritable, and at last betrayed signs of despair. On both sides
threats were openly made and openly defied; but in Massachusetts the
United States government had not five hundred effective troops, and if
the convention chose to recommend that the State should declare itself
neutral and open its ports, no one pretended that any national power
existed in Massachusetts capable of preventing the legislature from
carrying the recommendation into effect if it pleased.

From immediate extravagance Massachusetts was saved by the leaders
who, knowing the popular excitement, feared lest the convention should
be carried too fast into disorder, and for that reason selected
representatives who could be trusted to resist emotion. When George
Cabot was chosen as the head of the State delegation, the character
of the body was fixed. The selection of Cabot did not please the
advocates of action. Pickering wrote to Lowell suggesting doubts
whether Cabot was the fittest choice.[413] Lowell replied that he
shared these doubts, and that in consequence he had been led to oppose
the convention altogether, because it would not withdraw the State
resources from the general government.[414] Cabot, he said, was “most
reluctantly dragged in like a conscript to the duty of a delegate;” he
had always been despondent as to the course of public affairs, and felt
no confidence in the possibility of awakening the people to their true
disease,--which was not the war or the Union, but democracy. Lowell
did not know “a single bold and ardent man” among the Massachusetts or
Connecticut delegates. In the “Centinel” of December 7 he described
Cabot’s tendencies in language evidently intended as a warning to Cabot
himself:--

   “There are men who know that our troubles are not the offspring
   of this war alone, and will not die with it. But they despair
   of relief, and think resistance unavailing. They consider the
   people in their very nature democratic, and that nothing but the
   severity of their sufferings has driven them from those men and
   that system out of which have grown all our evils; that should
   they be restored to that state of prosperity which they once
   enjoyed, the same passions and opinions would diffuse themselves
   through the country, and the same course of conduct be again
   followed out.”

Cabot shocked Pickering by expressing all his favorite political views
in one brief question: “Why can’t you and I let the world ruin itself
its own way?”[415] Such a turn of mind was commonly the mark of a
sceptical spirit, which doubted whether the world at best was worth the
trouble of saving; and against this inert and indifferent view of human
affairs New England offered a constant protest. Yet the Massachusetts
delegation to Hartford was in sympathy with Cabot, while the
Massachusetts legislature seemed to sympathize with Pickering. William
Prescott, another member of the delegation, was chiefly remarkable for
prudence and caution; Nathan Dane bore the same stamp; Harrison Gray
Otis took character and color from his surroundings. The Connecticut
delegation--James Hillhouse, Chauncey Goodrich, Roger M. Sherman, and
others--were little likely to recommend “effectual measures.” The
convention consisted of men supposed to be inclined to resist popular
pressure, and Cabot was probably serious in replying to a young friend
who asked him what he was to do at Hartford: “We are going to keep you
young hot-heads from getting into mischief.”[416]

In the Council Chamber of the State House at Hartford the delegates
assembled, December 15, and gave instant evidence of their intention
to discourage appeals to popular emotion. Their earliest steps decided
their whole course. They chose George Cabot as their President, and
they made their sessions secret. Under no circumstances could the
convention have regarded itself as a popular body, for the delegates
numbered only twenty-three persons, mostly cautious and elderly men,
who detested democracy, but disliked enthusiasm almost as much. Two
new members, appointed by popular meetings in New Hampshire, were
next admitted; and toward the close of the sessions another member,
representing the county of Windham in Vermont, was given a seat. Thus
enlarged, the convention over which George Cabot presided numbered
twenty-six members besides the secretary, Theodore Dwight.

Excess of caution helped to give the convention an air of conspiracy,
which warned future conspirators to prefer acting, or appearing to act,
in public. The secrecy of the Hartford conference was chiefly intended
to secure freedom for the exchange of opinion, and also in some degree
to prevent premature excitement and intrusion of popular feeling; but
the secrecy created a belief that the debates would not bear publicity.
Possibly much was said which verged on treasonable conspiracy; but
the members were not men of a class likely to act beyond their
instructions, and they adhered strictly to the practical task imposed
on them. Some years afterward, Harrison Gray Otis, laboring to clear
his political reputation from the stigma of membership, caused the
official journal of the convention to be published; and the record,
though revealing nothing of what was said, proved that nothing was
formally done or proposed which contradicted the grave and restrained
attitude maintained in its public expressions.

On the first day of its meeting the convention appointed a committee to
consider and report upon the business to be done. Chauncey Goodrich,
Otis, and three other members formed this committee, which reported
the next day the points in dispute between the States and the national
government,--the militia power, conscription power, duty and means of
defence, and matters of a like nature. After two days of discussion,
the convention appointed another committee to frame a general project
of measures, and again placed a Connecticut man--Nathaniel Smith--at
its head, with Otis second. Still another committee was appointed,
December 21, to prepare a report showing the reasons which guided the
convention to its results; and of that committee Otis was chairman.

Clearly, Otis took the chief burden of business; and the result could
scarcely fail to reflect in some degree the character of the man as
well as of the body for which he was acting. Though ambitious of
leading, Otis never led. John Lowell described his character, as it
was understood in Boston, perhaps somewhat harshly, for Otis was no
favorite with any class of men who held fixed opinions:[417]--

   “Mr. Otis is naturally timid and frequently wavering,--to-day
   bold, and to-morrow like a hare trembling at every breeze. It
   would seem by his language that he is prepared for the very
   boldest measures, but he receives anonymous letters every day
   or two threatening him with bodily harm. It seems the other
   party suspect his firmness. He is sincere in wishing thorough
   measures, but a thousand fears restrain him.”

Otis was the probable author of the report, adopted December 24,
recommending a course to the convention; and he was chairman of the
larger committee to which that report was referred, and within which
the final report--after a discussion lasting from December 24 to
December 30--was framed. The discussions, both in committee and in
convention, took much time and caused some difficulties; but nothing
was ever known of the speeches made, or of the motions proposed, or
of the amendments offered. All the reports were finally adopted by
the convention; and all proposed business then having been finished,
January 5 the convention adjourned without day, authorizing Cabot to
call another meeting at Boston if he should at any time see occasion
for it.

The report, therefore, contained all the information which the
convention intended to make public, and only from that document could
the ultimate object of the members be inferred. It was immediately
published in Connecticut, and at the meeting of the legislatures of
Massachusetts and Connecticut in January it was laid before them for
approval.

Considering the conservative temper of the delegates and their dislike
for extreme measures, the report bore striking evidence of the popular
passion which urged them forward. A few paragraphs in its first pages
showed the spirit of its recommendations, and a few more showed the
effect expected from them:--

   “It is a truth not to be concealed that a sentiment prevails
   to no inconsiderable extent ... that the time for a change is
   at hand.... This opinion may ultimately prove to be correct;
   but as the evidence on which it rests is not yet conclusive,
   ... some general considerations are submitted in the hope of
   reconciling all to a course of moderation and firmness which may
   ... probably avert the evil, or at least insure consolation and
   success in the last resort.... A severance of the Union by one
   or more States against the will of the rest, and especially in
   time of war, can be justified only by absolute necessity.”

Having thus discouraged precipitation, and argued in favor of firm
and moderate measures as a probable means of preserving the Union,
the report sketched the limits of the Union that was to be preserved.
In a paragraph closely following the precedent of the Virginia
Resolutions of 1798, the report asserted the right and duty of a State
to “interpose its authority” for the protection of its citizens from
infractions of the Constitution by the general government. In the
immediate crisis, this interposition should take the form of State laws
to protect the militia or citizens from conscriptions and drafts; of
an arrangement with the general government authorizing the States to
assume their own defence, and to retain “a reasonable portion of the
taxes collected within the said States” for the purpose; and of State
armies to be held in readiness to serve for the defence of the New
England States upon the request of the governor of the State invaded.

Such measures involved the establishment of a New England
Confederation. The proposed union of the New England States for their
own defence ignored any share to be taken by the general government in
the defence of the national territory, and reduced that government to
helplessness. What could be done by New England might be done by all;
and the Federalists assumed that all would be obliged to do it.

If the general government should reject the request for the proposed
arrangement, the ultimate emergency must arise; but with the measures
to be then taken the convention would not interfere.

   “It would be inexpedient for this convention to diminish
   the hope of a successful issue to such an application by
   recommending, upon supposition of a contrary event, ulterior
   proceedings. Nor is it indeed within their province. In a
   state of things so solemn and trying as may then arise, the
   legislatures of the States, or conventions of the whole people,
   or delegates appointed by them for the express purpose in
   another convention, must act as such urgent circumstances may
   then require.”

Besides the measures of urgency which must be immediately accepted by
the national government, the convention recommended seven amendments
to the Constitution; but on these no immediate action was required.
The single issue forced on the government by the convention was that
of surrendering to Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island “a
reasonable portion of the taxes collected within said States,” and
consenting to some arrangement “whereby the said States may, separately
or in concert, be empowered to assume upon themselves the defence of
their territory against the enemy.” If the United States government
should decline such an arrangement, the State legislatures were to send
delegates to another convention to meet at Boston, June 15, “with such
powers and instructions as the exigency of a crisis so momentous may
require.”

While the convention was preparing its report, from December 15 to
January 5, the public waited with the utmost curiosity for the result.
Major Jesup, famous at Chippawa and Lundy’s Lane, was then recruiting
for the Twenty-fifth United States Infantry at Hartford, and reported
constantly to the President and War Department; but he could tell
nothing of the convention that was not notorious. His letters were
mere surmises or unmilitary comments on the treasonable intentions of
the meeting.[418] The Federalists knew no more than was known to the
Republicans; but while they waited, they expressed fear only lest the
convention should fall short of their wishes.

   “I care nothing more for your actings and doings,” wrote
   Gouverneur Morris to Pickering in Congress.[419] “Your decree
   of conscriptions and your levy of contributions are alike
   indifferent to one whose eyes are fixed on a star in the East,
   which he believes to be the day-spring of freedom and glory. The
   traitors and madmen assembled at Hartford will, I believe, if
   not too tame and timid, be hailed hereafter as the patriots and
   sages of their day and generation.”

As far as newspapers reflected public opinion, the people of New
England held the same views as those expressed by Gouverneur Morris.
The Boston “Centinel” contained, December 28, an address to the
Hartford Convention announcing that the once venerable Constitution
had expired: “At your hands, therefore, we demand deliverance. New
England is unanimous. And we announce our irrevocable decree that the
tyrannical oppression of those who at present usurp the powers of the
Constitution is beyond endurance. And we will resist it.” A meeting at
Reading in Massachusetts, January 5, pledged itself to make no more
returns for taxation and to pay no more national taxes until the State
should have made its decision known.

A newspaper paragraph copied by the Federalist press[420] advised
the President to provide himself with a swifter horse than he had at
Bladensburg if he meant to attempt to subjugate the Eastern States.
“He must be able to escape at a greater rate than forty miles a day, or
the swift vengeance of New England will overtake the wretched miscreant
in his flight.” Such expressions of the press on either side were of
little authority, and deserved no great attention; but the language
of responsible and representative bodies could not be denied weight.
Opposition to the convention seemed cowed. Apparently the State was
ready for immediate action; and the convention, in recommending a delay
of six months, risked general disapproval.

While the public was in this temper, the convention adjourned, and its
report was given to the press. No one doubted that moderate men would
approve it. The only persons whose approval was in question were “bold
and ardent” partisans, like Gouverneur Morris, Pickering, and John
Lowell, who wanted instant action. Chiefly for the sake of unanimity,
these men gave in their adhesion. John Lowell hastened to publish his
acquiescence in the convention’s report.[421] Pickering also approved
it, although Pickering’s approval was partly founded on the belief
that the Union was already dissolved, and no further effort in that
direction need be made.

   “If the British succeed in their expedition against New
   Orleans,” Pickering wrote to Lowell,[422]--“and if they have
   tolerable leaders I see no reason to doubt of their success,--I
   shall consider the Union as severed.

   This consequence I deem inevitable. I do not expect to see a
   single representative in the next Congress from the Western
   States.”

Governor Strong and Senator Gore also approved the convention’s report.
On receiving it at Washington, January 14, Gore wrote to Strong: “The
result of the Hartford Convention is here, and affords satisfaction
to most if not to all,--to some because they see not the point nor
consequence of the recommendation as relates to taxes.” The point and
consequence of that recommendation were clear to Gore, and he approved
of both.

If any leading Federalist disapproved the convention’s report, he left
no record of the disapproval. In such a case, at such a moment, silence
was acquiescence. As far as could be inferred from any speeches made
or letters written at the time, the Federalist party was unanimous in
acquiescing in the recommendations of the Hartford Convention.

In Massachusetts and Connecticut the acquiescence was express. The
legislature, convened at Boston, January 18, hastened to refer the
convention’s report to a joint committee, which reported, January 24,
Resolutions that the legislature “do highly approve” the proceedings of
the convention, and that State commissioners should immediately proceed
to Washington to effect the arrangement proposed.[423] By a very large
majority of three to one, the legislature adopted the Resolutions,
making the acts of the convention their own. Three commissioners were
quickly appointed,--Harrison Gray Otis at their head,--and in the early
days of February started for Washington.

Massachusetts was then more than ever convinced that it must
peremptorily insist on taking its share of the national revenue into
its own hands. Already the first step toward providing a State army had
plunged the State treasury into financial difficulties, and measures
for defence were stopped until new resources could be obtained. To
the surprise of Governor Strong, the Massachusetts banks, restrained
by their charters, applied to the State government the same rigorous
refusal of credit which they had applied to the national government,
and Strong found himself unable to obtain even the loan of one million
dollars authorized by the legislature at its autumn session. The
miscarriage cast a shade of ridicule on the character of the State
which criticised so severely the failure of the national government
to defend it, and found itself unable to take the first step toward
defence without the aid of the national government, bankrupt and
impotent though it was. Governor Strong sent to the legislature on
the first day of its winter session a message[424] that might have
been sent by Madison to Congress. He reminded the legislature that it
had, by a Resolution of Oct. 11, 1814, authorized a loan of a million
dollars from the banks.

   “At that time,” continued Strong’s message, “it was supposed
   that there would be no difficulty in procuring the requisite
   sums from that source, and the treasurer soon obtained loans to
   a considerable amount; but the directors of some of the banks
   declared themselves unable to lend, and others have expressed
   such reluctance as forbids an expectation that the whole amount
   can be obtained in that way during the continuance of the
   present cautious operations of the banks.”

The treasurer had obtained $631,000, and with the expenditure of that
sum the work of defence and the organization of the State army ceased.
“The efforts of defensive preparation which were made in this State
the last year,” Governor Strong declared, “will, if continued at the
expense of the Commonwealth, be fatal to our finances.” The necessary
consequence followed, that the State must take the national revenues.
Accordingly the committee of both Houses, to which the subject was
referred, reported[425] an approval of suspending the organization
of State troops “until in virtue of some arrangement to be made with
the national government sufficient funds can be provided for their
pay and support, without recourse to additional taxes.” Under such
circumstances the national government was little likely to surrender
its resources, and every symptom showed that the State then meant to
seize them.

The same committee formally approved the governor’s course in
declining to co-operate with the national government in expelling the
enemy from Maine. The public excuse for the refusal was founded on the
condition of the Treasury. In Federalist society the weightier motive
was supposed to be the wish to leave on the national government the
odium of failure to defend the State.[426]

While Massachusetts sustained the Hartford Convention, and pressed to
an issue the quarrel with the national government, Connecticut acted
with equal zeal in the same sense. The governor, John Cotton Smith, was
an old man, and neither his opinions nor his passions were extreme; but
as far as concerned the Hartford Convention, his views differed little
from those of Pickering and Lowell. He called a special session of the
legislature for January 25, to act on the delegates’ report; and his
speech at the opening of the session would have been taken for irony,
had his moderation of character not been known.[427] “The temperate and
magnanimous course proposed for our adoption cannot fail to allay the
apprehensions which many have professed to entertain, and to enliven
the hopes of all who cherish our national Union, and are disposed to
place it on a solid and durable basis.” The legislature without delay
approved the measures recommended by the convention, and appointed
delegates to accompany those sent from Massachusetts to effect the
proposed arrangement with the government at Washington.

In later times the Hartford Convention was often and vigorously
defended by writers whose works were friendly to the national
government, and whose influence was popular.[428] The wisdom, loyalty,
and patriotism of George Cabot and his associates became the theme
of authors whose authority was above dispute. Nearly always the
defence rested on the argument that popular opinion went beyond the
convention’s report, and that the convention risked its credit by
refusing to advise instant withdrawal from the Union.[429] This view
was apparently correct. The efforts of the moderate Federalists to
praise the moderation of the report, and the labored protests of the
extremists against the possible suspicion that they objected to its
moderation,[430] showed that the convention was then believed to have
offered resistance to what Governor Smith stigmatized as “rash councils
or precipitate measures.” The tone of the press and the elections bore
out the belief that a popular majority would have supported an abrupt
and violent course.

The tone of the minority at the time showed a similar belief that
Massachusetts favored disunion. During all the proceedings of the State
legislatures and the convention, the loyal press and citizens never
ceased to point out the dangerous, treasonable, and absurd results to
be expected from the course pursued. In the Massachusetts Senate John
Holmes of Maine attacked the convention and its doings in a speech
that gave him wide reputation.[431] Threats of civil war were freely
uttered and defied. Among the least violent of Federalists was James
Lloyd, recently United States senator from Massachusetts; and to him
as a man of known patriotism John Randolph addressed a letter, Dec.
15, 1814, remonstrating against the Hartford Convention that day to
meet. Lloyd replied in a letter also published, advising Randolph and
the Virginians to coerce Madison into retirement, and to place Rufus
King in the Presidency as the alternative to a fatal issue.[432] The
assertion of such an alternative showed how desperate the situation was
believed by the moderate Federalists to be.

A long letter of a similar kind was written, Nov. 26, 1814, by Jonathan
Mason to Wilson Cary Nicholas.[433] The opinion of the men among whom
Mason lived was expressly declared by Mason to the effect that “Great
Britain will not treat with Mr. Madison. He must retire, or the country
and the Union are at an end.... This is plain language, but in my soul
I believe it true. We shall not be destroyed to-day or to-morrow, but
it will come; and the end of these measures [of the Administration]
will be disunion and disgrace.”

In the Republican party the belief was universal that the Hartford
Convention could lead only to a New England Confederation; and the
belief was not confined to partisans. An anecdote that George Ticknor
delighted in telling, illustrated the emotion that then agitated men
far beyond the passing and fitful excitements of party politics.
Ticknor, a young Federalist twenty-three years old, wished for letters
of introduction to Virginia, and asked them from John Adams, then a man
of eighty, whose support of the war made him an object of antipathy to
the party he had led.

   “When I visited him in Quincy to receive these letters,” related
   Ticknor,[434] “I had a remarkable interview with him, which at
   the time disturbed me not a little.... Soon after I was seated
   in Mr. Adams’s parlor,--where was no one but himself and Mrs.
   Adams, who was knitting,--he began to talk of the condition of
   the country with great earnestness. I said not a word; Mrs.
   Adams was equally silent; but Mr. Adams, who was a man of strong
   and prompt passions, went on more and more vehemently. He was
   dressed in a single-breasted dark-green coat, buttoned tightly
   by very large white metal buttons over his somewhat rotund
   person. As he grew more and more excited in his discourse,
   he impatiently endeavored to thrust his hand into the breast
   of his coat. The buttons did not yield readily; at last he
   _forced_ his hand in, saying, as he did so, in a very loud
   voice and most excited manner: ‘Thank God! thank God! George
   Cabot’s close-buttoned ambition has broke out at last: he wants
   to be President of New England, sir!’”

Whether George Cabot wanted it or not, he was in danger of becoming
what John Adams predicted. He was far from being the first man who had
unwillingly allowed himself to be drawn into a position from which
escape was impossible. After going so far, neither leaders nor people
could retreat. The next and easy step of sequestrating the direct and
indirect taxes was one to which the State stood pledged in the event of
a refusal by President Madison and Congress to surrender them. After
such an act, the establishment of a New England Confederation could
hardly be matter of choice.

If so considerable a mass of concurrent testimony did not prove the
gravity of the occasion, as it was understood by the most intelligent
and best-informed men of the time, ample evidence could be drawn from
other sources. William Wirt described the painful anxiety of Madison
as early as the month of October. Throughout Virginia the depression
was akin to despair. John Randolph and Wilson Cary Nicholas gave
expression to it in letters to prominent New Englanders; but Jefferson
in private was still more pronounced in his fears. “The war, had it
proceeded, would have upset our government,” he wrote to Gallatin a
year later,[435] “and a new one, whenever tried, will do it.” George
Ticknor, after obtaining at Quincy his letter of introduction from
John Adams to Jefferson, delivered it at Monticello at a time when the
anxiety for the safety of New Orleans was acute. He found Jefferson
convinced that the city must fall, and Jefferson expressed the
expectation that the British would hold it indefinitely.[436] Pickering
felt the same conviction, and regarded the event as a dissolution of
the Union.

The “Federal Republican” of Baltimore published, January 5, the day
when the Hartford Convention adjourned, a letter from Washington
announcing “an explosion at hand; that the President would be called on
to resign; and there must be peace by that or a future Administration.”
The fall of New Orleans was to be the signal for a general demand that
Madison should resign, and the Federalist press already prepared the
ground by insisting that “Mr. Madison has scarcely raised his little
finger to preserve New Orleans,” and would finally determine to abandon
the State of Louisiana.[437] That Madison’s authority could survive
two such blows as the capture of Washington and the loss of Louisiana
seemed improbable; but that he should resign was impossible, though the
alternative was a collapse of government.

When the month of February arrived, government and people were waiting
with keen apprehension for some new disaster, and the least probable
solution was that England knowing the situation would consent to any
tolerable peace. The “Federal Republican” of January 28, commenting on
the expected bank veto, summed up the consequences, not unfairly from
its point of view, in few words:--

   “It is impossible, as Mr. Giles said in his luminous and
   eloquent argument upon the measure [of a national bank], that
   the government can stand these reiterated shocks.... The
   interest upon the public debt remains unpaid, and there exists
   not the means, without making the most ruinous sacrifices, to
   pay it. The government is in arrears to the army upward of
   nine million dollars; to the navy, about four millions.... The
   condition of our finances is known to the enemy; and is it
   possible he will be such a fool as to give us peace, after the
   mortal blow we aimed at him, when he knows we cannot pay the
   interest on the public debt, that we cannot pay our army or our
   navy, and when he finds us unable to defend any part of the
   country at which he strikes?”

  [Illustration:

    A GENERAL MAP OF THE
    SEAT OF WAR IN LOUISIANA
    AND WEST FLORIDA,

    _Shewing all the fortified points and encampments
    of both the American and
    British Armies; also the march of Gen.
    Jackson’s Army on his expedition
    against Pensacola._

    BY MAJOR A. LACARRIERE LATOUR.

    STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N. Y.]




                             CHAPTER XII.


A DESPATCH from Lord Bathurst, marked “most secret,” and dated
July 30, 1814, informed Major-General Ross that, after finishing his
operations in Chesapeake Bay, he was to sail with his whole force to
Jamaica, where he would join an expedition then preparing in England
to rendezvous at Cape Negril on the west coast of Jamaica about
November 20. Lieutenant-General Lord Hill was to command the combined
land-forces.[438] These orders were given before the arrival of a long
report from Vice-Admiral Cochrane concerning the military condition
of the American territories on the Gulf of Mexico, which Cochrane
considered such “that he had no doubt in his mind that three thousand
British troops landed at Mobile, where they would be joined by all the
Indians, with the disaffected French and Spaniards, would drive the
Americans entirely out of Louisiana and the Floridas.”[439]

Circumstances induced the British government to defer sending Lord
Hill, with a large force, to the Gulf; and Cochrane was informed by
a despatch, dated August 10, that Major-General Ross was directed to
carry out the Vice-Admiral’s plans, which required fewer men.[440]
Orders were sent to Ross, of the same date, informing him that
reinforcements amounting to more than twenty-one hundred rank-and-file
were preparing to sail from England, which with the Fifth West India
regiment and two hundred black pioneers from Jamaica would enable Ross
to carry more than five thousand effective rank-and-file to the theatre
of his operations.[441]

Ross’s detailed instructions were dated September 6.[442] They began
by recounting the force which was intended to act against New Orleans.
The brigade from the Gironde which Ross took to the Chesapeake was
estimated at about twenty-three hundred effectives, and a battalion
which he had taken from Bermuda was supposed to have raised his
rank-and-file to thirty-four hundred men. In addition to this force,
a brigade under Major-General Keane, numbering twenty-one hundred and
fifty men, was under orders for Jamaica, which with the black troops
would enable Ross to proceed to his destination “with near six thousand
men, exclusive of the marines and seamen.... About the same time you
will be joined by the First West India regiment from Guadeloupe.”

The objects which rendered the success of the expedition “extremely
important” were two: first, the command of the mouth of the
Mississippi, so as to deprive the back settlements of America of their
communication with the sea; second, “to occupy some important and
valuable possession by the restoration of which we may improve the
conditions of peace, or which may entitle us to exact its cession as
the price of peace.”

The point of attack was left to the discretion of Cochrane and Ross.
They might proceed directly against New Orleans, or move in the
first instance into the back parts of Georgia and the country of the
friendly Indians. In either case, the second object in view could not
be attained against the will of the inhabitants. “With their favor and
co-operation, on the other hand, we may expect to rescue the whole
province of Louisiana from the United States.”

   “If therefore you shall find in the inhabitants a general and
   decided disposition to withdraw from their recent connection
   with the United States, either with the view of establishing
   themselves as an independent people or of returning under the
   dominion of the Spanish Crown, you will give them every support
   in your power; you will furnish them with arms and clothing, and
   assist in forming and disciplining the several levies, provided
   you are fully satisfied of the loyalty of their intentions,
   which will be best evinced by their committing themselves in
   some act of decided hostility against the United States....
   You will discountenance any proposition of the inhabitants to
   place themselves under the dominion of Great Britain; and
   you will direct their disposition toward returning under the
   protection of the Spanish Crown rather than to the attempting
   to maintain what it will be much more difficult to secure
   substantially,--their independence as a separate State; and you
   must give them clearly to understand that Great Britain cannot
   pledge herself to make the independence of Louisiana, or its
   restoration to the Spanish Crown, a _sine qua non_ of peace
   with the United States.”

After occupying New Orleans, Ross and Cochrane were to decide whether
any further military operations could be carried on; and if nothing
of material importance could be attempted, they were to send the
disposable part of their force to Bermuda.

Ross’s report of the capture of Washington reached Lord Bathurst
September 27, and caused so much satisfaction that the British
government decided to show its approval by placing another
major-general, Lambert, with a brigade numbering twenty-two hundred
rank-and-file, under Ross’s command, to be used without restriction,
either in the Middle or the Southern States.[443] The Prince Regent
highly applauded the ability with which Ross had conducted the capture
of Washington, “an enterprise so creditable to his Majesty’s arms,
and so well calculated to humble the presumption of the American
government, which contrary to the real interests, and as it is believed
contrary to the prevailing wish, of the nation has involved that
country in an unnecessary and unjust war against his Majesty.”[444]
Only in one respect did Bathurst hint a criticism on the course pursued
by Ross. While informing him, September 29, that reinforcements were
on their way which would place upward of ten thousand men under his
command, to be used very much at his discretion, Bathurst added,[445]--

   “You and your troops have gained great credit in the discipline
   you observed at Washington. It is no disparagement of your
   merit to say that it was prudent as well as merciful to show
   such forbearance. If, however, you should attack Baltimore, and
   could, consistent with that discipline _which it is essential
   for you not to relax_, make its inhabitants _feel_
   a little more the effects of your visit than what has been
   experienced at Washington, you would make that portion of the
   American people experience the consequences of the war who have
   most contributed to its existence.”

When this despatch was written, Ross had made his attack on Baltimore,
and had failed. The report of his failure and death was received by the
War Department in London October 17, and Bathurst as soon as possible
selected a new commander for the expedition to New Orleans. Orders,
dated October 24, were sent to Major-Generals Sir Edward Pakenham and
Gibbs to join Vice-Admiral Cochrane forthwith, detailing the force at
their command. Pakenham was to follow the instructions already given
to Ross, and was especially enjoined to conciliate the people of
Louisiana:--

   “You will for that purpose cause the force under your command
   to observe the strictest discipline; to respect the lives and
   the property of all those who are inclined to a peaceable
   deportment, and by no means to excite the black population to
   rise against their masters.”

The “Statira” received orders, October 28, to convey Major-Generals
Pakenham and Gibbs to the rendezvous at Negril Bay in Jamaica, whither
the large force intended for New Orleans was already moving from
several distant quarters. The day for beginning the movement on New
Orleans was already fixed for November 20, and Pakenham could at that
season hardly expect to reach Jamaica in time to sail with his troops.
Meanwhile the English press talked openly of the expedition and its
object.

Military District No. 7, in which New Orleans and Mobile were
situated, had not been neglected by the United States government.
The regular force assigned by Secretary Armstrong for its defence
consisted of five regiments of United States Infantry,--the Second,
Third, Seventh, Thirty-ninth, and Forty-fourth, with three hundred
and fifty artillerists,--an aggregate of two thousand three hundred
and seventy-eight men. The provision was relatively liberal. District
No. 5, on Chesapeake Bay, contained an aggregate of two thousand two
hundred and eight regular troops; District No. 6, including North and
South Carolina and Georgia, was allotted two thousand two hundred and
forty-four men. One half the regular army was employed in such garrison
duty, and a greater number could not have been allotted consistently
with retaining an army in the field. Indeed, the only means by which
Armstrong could provide so strong a defence, aggregating nearly eight
thousand men, for the Southern States was by stripping Massachusetts.
District No. 1, including Massachusetts and Maine, contained only
six hundred and fifty-five regular troops; and District No. 2,
including Rhode Island and Connecticut, contained only seven hundred
and fourteen. Besides the regular troops, New Orleans enjoyed the
protection of gunboats and one or two larger armed vessels. The city
needed only an efficient commander to defy any ordinary attack.

Armstrong supplied a commander who might, as he believed, be safely
considered efficient. In the month of May Andrew Jackson was appointed
to the command of Military District No. 7, with headquarters at
Mobile. At that moment Jackson, having finished the Creek war, was
about to make the necessary arrangements for the future control of the
Creek nation, and he did not take immediate command of his district.
No occasion for haste existed. During the summer of 1814 no British
force of consequence approached the Gulf of Mexico, or was likely to
approach it until the frosts began. Jackson was detained in the centre
of Alabama, undisturbed by fears for New Orleans, until the so-called
Treaty or Capitulation of August 9 with the Creeks released him from
further duties in that region. He left the Creek country August 11,
with his regular troops, going by water down the Alabama River, and
arriving at Mobile about August 15.

At the same moment government was brought to a stand-still at
Washington by the appearance of General Ross’s army in the Patuxent,
and the raids on Washington and Baltimore. Between August 20 and
September 25 the War Department could do little more than attend to
its own pressing dangers. Jackson was left independent, substantially
dictator over the Southwest. If New England carried out its intentions,
and the government sank, as seemed probable, into helplessness, his
dictatorship was likely to be permanent.

When Jackson arrived at Mobile, August 15, the defence of New Orleans
was not in his mind. The people of Tennessee and Georgia had long
been bent on the seizure of the Floridas, and Jackson had been one of
the most ardent in favoring the step. The Creek war and the escape of
the hostile Creeks to East Florida strengthened his conviction that
the Spaniards must be expelled. He had begun the war with the idea
of pushing his army directly through the Creek country to Pensacola,
which he meant to hold.[446] The instant he succeeded in destroying
the military power of the Creeks, he began preparations for invading
Florida. As early as July he wrote to the War Department suggesting an
attack on Pensacola:--

   “Will you only say to me, Raise a few hundred militia (which
   can be quickly done), and with such a regular force as can be
   conveniently collected, make a descent upon Pensacola and reduce
   it?”[447]

At the same time Jackson entered, July 12, into an angry correspondence
with the Spanish governor of Pensacola, and requested him to deliver
up the Creek warriors who had taken refuge in East Florida,--a demand
with which he knew that the Spaniard had no means of complying. August
10 he wrote to Armstrong announcing that he had given orders for the
reoccupation of Mobile Point. “The United States in possession of
Pensacola and Mobile, well defended, our whole coast and country in
this quarter would be secure.”[448] A direct attack by the British on
New Orleans had not occurred to his mind.

Although Jackson received no answer from Washington to his suggestion,
he came to Mobile, August 15, determined to pursue his object;
and his decision was confirmed by the eccentric conduct of Major
Nicholls, an Irish officer, who was sent to Pensacola, July 23, with
the sloops-of-war “Hermes” and “Carron,” with four officers, eleven
non-commissioned officers, and ninety-seven privates of the Royal
Marines, taking two howitzers, a field-piece, a thousand stand of
arms, and three hundred suits of clothing for the Creek warriors.[449]
Nicholls landed his marines, seized Fort Barrancas, disembarked arms,
and began to collect the fugitive Creeks, commonly known as Red Sticks,
with a view to invading Louisiana, while he spread extravagant stories
of his plans.

Had the British government sent Nicholls to Pensacola expressly to
divert Jackson’s attention from New Orleans, he could not have used
his means more successfully for his purpose. Jackson at Mobile, some
sixty miles away, learned within forty-eight hours what Nicholls was
doing at Pensacola, and wrote instantly, August 27, to Governor Blount
of Tennessee,[450] calling out the whole quota of Tennessee militia,
twenty-five hundred men, who were to march instantly to Mobile. “It is
currently reported in Pensacola,” he added, “that the Emperor of Russia
has offered his Britannic Majesty fifty thousand of his best troops for
the conquest of Louisiana, and that this territory will fall a prey to
the enemy before the expiration of one month.”

During the next three months Nicholls with a mere handful of men
distracted Jackson’s whole attention. From Pensacola, August 29,
Nicholls issued a proclamation calling on the natives of Louisiana
to assist him “in liberating from a faithless, imbecile government”
their paternal soil.[451] A few days afterward, September 3, a British
sloop-of-war, the “Sophie,” appeared at Barataria, forty miles
south of New Orleans. There for several years smugglers and pirates
had established a station, to the scandal of society and with its
connivance.[452] Three Frenchmen, the brothers Laffite,--Jean, Pierre,
and Dominique,--ruled over this community, and plundered impartially
the commerce of England and Spain, while defying the laws of the United
States and the power of the national government.[453] The British
sloop-of-war brought to Jean Laffite a letter from Major Nicholls
asking him and his men, with their vessels, to enter into British
service, under penalty of destruction to their establishment.[454]
Laffite, preferring to make terms with the United States, and knowing
that the authorities at New Orleans were about to break up his
establishment in any case, sent to Governor Claiborne the letters he
received from Captain Lockyer of the “Sophie,” and offered his services
to defend Barataria.

Nothing in these demonstrations suggested a direct attack on New
Orleans. Nicholls constantly gave out that he meant to attack Mobile,
and from there “push for New Orleans;”[455] but his force was wholly
inadequate, and his rank was much too low, to warrant the belief that
he intended a serious campaign. Yet such noisy and insulting conduct
was adapted to irritate a man of Jackson’s temper, and to keep his
attention fixed on Mobile and Pensacola. Nicholls even undertook to
annoy Jackson in his headquarters.

On a bare sand-point at the entrance of Mobile Bay, General Wilkinson,
on taking possession of Mobile in April, 1818, established a battery
which he armed with Spanish cannon. The redoubt, which was called
Fort Bowyer, could not hold against a land attack properly supported,
and offered a temptation to the enemy; but in the absence of a land
force competent to besiege it, the fortification was useful to close
the entrance of Mobile Bay against marauders. In Fort Bowyer Jackson
placed one hundred and sixty men of the Second United States Infantry,
commanded by Major William Lawrence. Twenty guns were mounted on the
platforms, but according to the American account only two twenty-four
pounders and six twelve-pounders were likely to prove serviceable.[456]

  [Illustration:

    PLAN

    Shewing the Attack made by a
    BRITISH SQUADRON
    ON
    Fort Bowyer at Mobile Pt.
    ON THE 15 SEPTR., 1815.

    By MAJOR A. LACARRIERE LATOUR,
    Principal Engineer 7th Military Dist., U.S. Army, 1815.]

The British force at Pensacola consisted chiefly of four sloops,
commanded by Captain W. H. Percy,--the “Hermes,” twenty-two guns, the
“Carron,” twenty, and the “Sophie” and “Childers” of eighteen guns
each. The usual armament of such vessels consisted of thirty-two-pound
carronades, with two long-nines or sixes. Apparently the British
squadron threw thirty-four thirty-two-pound shot, and four nine
or six pound balls at a broadside. Whether the armament was greater
or smaller mattered little, for Captain Percy was unable to use with
effect the batteries of either the “Carron” or the “Childers.” With
much difficulty, owing to the shoals, he brought his squadron within
range of Fort Bowyer, and with more gallantry than discretion prepared
for the attack.

According to the British account, the land force at Percy’s command
consisted of sixty marines and one hundred and twenty Indians, with
one five-and-a-half-inch howitzer. According to the American account,
a twelve-pound field-piece was placed ashore in battery with the
howitzer. Such a force was insufficient to do more than intercept the
garrison if it should be driven out of the fort. The brunt of the
action fell on the ships, and experience did not warrant Percy in
believing that his sloops, with their carronades, could silence a work
like Fort Bowyer.

Nevertheless Percy gallantly made the attempt. At half-past four of
the afternoon of September 15, he brought the “Hermes” close in, and
opened fire within musket-shot of the fort. The “Sophie” came to anchor
some distance astern, but within range. The “Carron” and the “Childers”
anchored so far out that their carronades were useless, and apparently
even the American twenty-four-pounders did not touch them. The “Hermes”
and the “Sophie” alone sustained injury,[457] but their experience was
decisive. After an hour’s action, the cable of the “Hermes” being
cut, she became unmanageable, and at last grounded and was abandoned.
Captain Percy set her on fire, and carried his crew, including the
wounded, with much difficulty to his other vessels. The “Sophie”
withdrew from fire, and the squadron returned at once to Pensacola.

Assuming that Captain Percy could use with effect only the twenty guns
of the broadsides of the “Hermes” and “Sophie” against the twenty
guns of the fort, the American gunnery was evidently superior to the
British. The “Hermes” lost twenty-five men killed and twenty-four
wounded,--a very severe loss in a crew which could not much have
exceeded one hundred and fifty men. A better test of marksmanship was
offered by the “Sophie,” which received comparatively little attention
from the fort, but lost six killed and sixteen wounded. The whole
American loss was reported as four killed and five wounded,[458] under
the combined fire of both ships at close range, the fort having no
casemates, and parapets only on the front and flanks.[459] Three guns
were dismounted.

Greatly pleased by this success, Jackson issued a
counter-proclamation[460] to the people of Louisiana, somewhat in the
style of that which Nicholls had issued three weeks before.

   “The base, the perfidious Britons,” it began, “have attempted
   to invade your country. They had the temerity to attack Fort
   Bowyer with their incongruous horde of Indians and negro
   assassins.... The proud, vain-glorious boaster Colonel Nicholls,
   when he addressed you, Louisianians and Kentuckians, had
   forgotten that you were the votaries of freedom.... I ask you,
   Louisianians, can we place any confidence in the honor of men
   who have courted an alliance with pirates and robbers? Have not
   these noble Britons, these honorable men, Colonel Nicholls and
   the honorable Captain W. H. Percy, the true representatives of
   their royal master, done this? Have they not made offers to the
   pirates of Barataria to join them and their holy cause? And have
   they not dared to insult you by calling on you to associate as
   brethren with them and this hellish banditti?”

With the exception of this proclamation and another[461] of the same
date to the free negroes of Louisiana, Jackson paid no attention to the
defence of New Orleans, but left it entirely to Governor Claiborne.
He disregarded a memorial from the citizens, dated September 18,
urging his personal attention and presence. “My whole force would not
satisfy the demands they make,” he wrote to the War Department, October
10.[462] “As soon as security is given to this section of my district,
which is first indispensably necessary, I shall hasten to New Orleans,”
he wrote from Mobile, October 14.[463] He entertained no doubt that
at Mobile he stood between the British and their object. “Unless
Pensacola were reduced,” said his confidential biographer[464] ten
years afterward, “it was vain to think of defending the country.... The
attack on Mobile Point was a confirmation of his previous conjectures
as to the views of the enemy.”

The Government at Washington became alarmed. While Jackson waited at
Mobile for the arrival of General Coffee with his Tennesseeans to
attack Pensacola, Monroe at Washington received warnings from Europe,
Halifax, and Bermuda that the British force which had just laid
Washington in ashes was but a division of a larger army on its way to
attack New Orleans. He wrote to Jackson, September 25,[465]--

   “There is great cause to believe that the enemy have set on
   foot an expedition against Louisiana, through the Mobile, in
   the expectation that while so strong a pressure was made from
   Canada and in this quarter, whereby the force of the country and
   attention of the government would be much engaged, a favorable
   opportunity would be afforded them to take possession of the
   lower part of that State, and of all the country along the
   Mobile.”

The President, he continued, had ordered five thousand additional
troops from Tennessee to march to Jackson’s aid, and had directed
the governor of Georgia to hold twenty-five hundred more subject to
Jackson’s orders. He had also sent one hundred thousand dollars in
Treasury notes to Governor Blount of Tennessee, to be applied to the
necessary expenses of the campaign, and Jackson could draw on him for
the necessary funds. The orders to the governor of Tennessee were sent
the same day, September 25. A week later, October 3, Monroe wrote to
Governor Shelby of Kentucky, requesting him to send twenty-five hundred
men to Jackson. Again, October 10, Monroe wrote to Jackson, informing
him that not less than twelve thousand five hundred men were already
subject to his orders, from Kentucky, Tennessee, and Georgia:

   “There is strong reason to presume, from intelligence just
   received from our ministers at Ghent, that a British force
   consisting of twelve or fifteen thousand men sailed from
   Ireland early in September for New Orleans and the Mobile, with
   intention to take possession of that city and of the country
   through which the great rivers on which the whole of the United
   States westward of the Alleghany Mountains so essentially
   depends.”

When Monroe received a letter from Jackson, dated September 9,
indicating his intention of attacking Pensacola, the secretary replied
October 21,[466] forbidding the step. “I hasten to communicate to
you the directions of the President that you should at present take
no measures which would involve this government in a contest with
Spain.” He reiterated the warning that British forces would probably
be directed against Louisiana; but he did not order Jackson to New
Orleans, nor did he notify him that arms would be sent there. Not until
November 2 were orders given that four thousand stand of arms should be
sent from Pittsburg, and only November 11 and 15 were the arms shipped,
not by steamer but by the ordinary flatboat.[467] Even then the arms
were in advance of the men. The governor of Tennessee could not appoint
an earlier day than November 13 for mustering the new levies, and on
that day three thousand men assembled at Nashville, while two thousand
collected at Knoxville. Not till November 20 did the Nashville division
start down the river, to arrive a month later at New Orleans.

Jackson quietly waited at Mobile for the twenty-five hundred men he
had summoned from Tennessee by his letter of August 27. Two months
were consumed in this manner. The Tennessee brigade, under command
of General Coffee, marched promptly, and passing through the Indian
country arrived October 25 at Mobile. Coffee brought with him somewhat
more than the number of men required by the call. His force was about
twenty-eight hundred.[468] Jackson held at Mobile the Second, Third,
Thirty-ninth, and Forty-fourth United States Infantry, besides some
Mississippi troops and Choctaw Indians.[469] With the Tennesseeans he
could dispose of more than four thousand troops.

Notwithstanding Monroe’s warning letter of September 25, Jackson still
paid no immediate attention to New Orleans. October 28 he wrote to
Monroe, acknowledging a letter from him of September 27, and announcing
that he was then organizing an attack on Pensacola. Having no authority
for the act, and aware that the Government was anxious about New
Orleans, he added: “I hope in a few weeks to place this quarter in
perfect security, and to be able to move to New Orleans with General
Coffee’s mounted men.”[470] October 31 Jackson wrote, apparently for
the first time, that he needed arms, and that half the arms of the
militia were not fit for use.[471]

Taking four thousand one hundred men,[472] without trains, Jackson
marched November 3 against Pensacola, which he occupied, November 7,
with little resistance, although “Spanish treachery,” he said,[473]
“kept us out of possession of the fort until nearly twelve o’clock at
night.” The next morning the British blew up Fort Barrancas, six miles
below, where they had established themselves, and Colonel Nicholls
sailed away no farther than the Appalachicola River, leaving Jackson
to do what he pleased with Pensacola, a position of no value to either
party.

Even Armstrong, who favored Jackson against what he thought the
ill-will of Madison and Monroe, afterward condemned the movement
against Pensacola. “The general’s attack and capture of the town on the
7th of November, 1814, was to say the least of it decidedly ill-judged,
involving at once an offence to a neutral power, and a probable
misapplication of both time and force as regarded the defence of New
Orleans.”[474] Jackson remained only two days at the place, and then
returned to Mobile, where he arrived November 11 and remained until
November 22, as though still in doubt. He detached Major Blue of the
Thirty-ninth United States Infantry, with a thousand mounted men, to
the Appalachicola to break up the depot established there for supplying
assistance to the Red Stick Indians.[475] Nothing indicated that he
felt anxiety for the safety of New Orleans, although the British
expedition, comprising some fifty vessels, was then at Jamaica, and
November 26 actually sailed for the Mississippi.[476]

Jackson’s conduct greatly alarmed the President and the Secretary of
War. When the despatches arrived at Washington announcing what was
taking place at Mobile and Pensacola, Monroe hastened to order General
Gaines to Mobile. He wrote to Jackson, December 7,[477]--

   “General Gaines is ordered to join you and act under you in
   the defence of New Orleans and of the district under your
   command. Full confidence is entertained that this appointment
   of an officer of his merit will afford to you a very acceptable
   aid in the discharge of your highly important duties.... Much
   anxiety is felt lest you should remain too long on the Mobile.
   The city [New Orleans], it is presumed, is the principal
   object of the enemy, and it cannot be defended on either of
   the passes by which it may be approached,--one by the river
   Mississippi itself, another by the Fourche, the third by Lake
   Pontchartrain,--without occupying the ground bearing on these
   passes.”

Three days afterward, December 10, Monroe wrote again in stronger
terms:[478]--

“It is hoped that you will have long since taken a suitable position
on the river to afford complete protection to that city. Mobile is
a comparatively trifling object with the British government. Your
presence at such a point on the river with the main body of your troops
will be of vital importance.”

Jackson left Mobile November 22, four days before the British
expedition under Sir Edward Pakenham sailed from Jamaica. Both Jackson
and Pakenham were moving to New Orleans at the same time. Pakenham
brought with him an immense fleet and a large army. Jackson, instead
of taking, as Monroe hoped, “the main body” of his troops, left at
Mobile the main body, consisting of the Second, Third, and Thirty-ninth
regiments, about a thousand or twelve hundred men.

According to his friend’s biography, probably founded on his own
information, Jackson’s “principal fears at present were that
Mobile might fall, the left bank of the Mississippi be gained, all
communication with the Western States cut off, and New Orleans be thus
unavoidably reduced.”[479] That the British should advance against the
Mississippi by way of Mobile was improbable, as Monroe pointed out; but
they could have taken no course which better suited the resources of
Jackson. A march of near two hundred miles, through a barren and wooded
country, with Jackson’s whole force concentrated in their front, was an
undertaking that promised little success.

Leaving at Mobile three regular regiments, Jackson ordered the
Forty-fourth regiment to New Orleans, and directed Coffee with two
thousand of his mounted brigade to march to Baton Rouge. He was himself
ill and suffering, and made no excessive haste. “I leave this for New
Orleans on the 22d instant,” he wrote to Monroe, November 20,[480] “and
if my health permits, shall reach there in twelve days. I travel by
land, to have a view of the points at which the enemy might effect a
landing.” Starting from Mobile November 22, he arrived at New Orleans,
about one hundred and twenty-five miles, on December 2.[481] His troops
were then much scattered. The main body was at Mobile. The Forty-fourth
regiment was in march from Mobile to New Orleans, where the Seventh
regiment was already stationed. A thousand volunteer horsemen, part
of Coffee’s brigade, under Major Blue of the Thirty-ninth Infantry,
were scouring the Escambia, Yellow Water, and other remote Florida
recesses. The remainder of Coffee’s brigade was at Baton Rouge December
4, greatly reduced by various causes, and numbering only twelve hundred
men.[482] A few Mississippi dragoons were near them. A division of
Tennessee militia, twenty-five hundred strong, under General Carroll,
had started from Nashville November 20, and might be expected at
New Orleans about December 20. A division of Kentucky militia, also
twenty-five hundred strong, was on its way, and might arrive about
the new year. Meanwhile the British expedition was sailing, with much
deliberation, past the shores of Cuba, toward Florida.[483]

At New Orleans nothing had yet been done for defence; but inaction
was not the worst. Jackson found the people despondent and
distrustful.[484] The legislature showed incompetence and, as
Jackson believed, indifference. The whole population of Louisiana
was but small, containing certainly not more than fifty thousand
white inhabitants; while the city of New Orleans probably numbered
hardly more than twenty thousand persons including slaves. The State
government supplied one thousand militia under the general requisition
of the President.[485] The city raised a battalion of volunteers nearly
three hundred strong, a rifle company numbering sixty-two men when in
the field, and a battalion of free mulattoes, chiefly refugees from St.
Domingo, which produced two hundred and ten men,--in all, between five
and six hundred troops. Jackson immediately reviewed the companies,
December 2, and could expect no further aid from these sources. No arms
were in store, even if men could be found, and none of the necessary
supplies of an army had been provided.

Jackson’s first act after arriving at New Orleans showed no
consciousness of danger. Armstrong, criticising his measures, afterward
said:[486] “Had the general been better acquainted with military
history, he would not have suffered a single day of the twenty he had
for preparation to have passed without forming one or more intrenched
camps for the protection of the city.” Instead of doing this, Jackson
did what had been done by Armstrong and Winder at Washington in
August. Having arrived in the city December 2, he started two days
afterward to inspect Fort St. Philip on the river sixty miles below. He
returned to New Orleans December 11,[487] believing that the British
would approach by the river, and prepared works to arrest their
advance.[488] He then rode out to Chef Menteur and Lake Pontchartrain
on the north, which he thought the next probable point of attack. He
was still absent, December 15, examining the situation of different
works northward of the city, when the British expedition struck its
first blow.[489]

Six American gunboats, the whole force on the lakes, watched the
entrance of Lake Borgne through which the British must pass if they
attacked New Orleans by way of the lakes. They were stationed for
observation rather than for resistance,--although for observation a few
fishermen’s boats would have been more useful. The British expedition,
upward of fifty sail, made land December 10,[490] and was seen by the
gunboats, which retired within the lake. The British land-forces were
transferred from the heavy ships into the lighter vessels, and under
convoy of sloops-of-war entered Lake Borgne December 13. The boats of
the squadron, carrying about a thousand seamen and marines,[491] left
the ships during the night of December 12 in search of the American
gunboats, which tried to escape, but were becalmed and obliged by the
tide to anchor. After a tedious row of thirty-six hours the British
boats overtook the gunboat flotilla December 14, and after a sharp
struggle succeeded in capturing the whole, with a loss of seventeen men
killed and seventy-seven wounded.[492] The American crews numbered one
hundred and eighty-two men, and lost six killed and thirty-five wounded.

News of the capture of the gunboats, which occurred at noon December
14 about forty miles to the eastward of New Orleans, arrived on the
evening of December 15, and produced the utmost consternation.[493]
Jackson hurried back to the city, where his presence was no longer a
matter of choice but necessity. Instantly on hearing the news he sent
expresses to Coffee at Baton Rouge, and to Carroll and Thomas, wherever
they might be found on the river, urging them to hasten with all
possible speed to New Orleans. He issued a proclamation to the people
of the city, in which he threatened them with punishment if they were
not unanimous,[494] and at the same time he recommended the legislature
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Finding the legislature hesitate,
Jackson declared martial law by proclamation[495] the same day,
December 16, and assumed dictatorial powers.

  [Illustration:

    MAP
    SHEWING THE LANDING OF THE
    BRITISH ARMY

    _its several Encampments and fortifications
    on the Mississippi and the works
    they erected on their Retreat; also the
    different posts Encampments and fortifications
    made by the several Corps of the
    American Army during the whole campaign._

    By Major A. LACARRIERE LATOUR,

    Late principal Engineer 7th Military District, U. S.
    Army, 1815.

    STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N.Y.]

Feverish activity followed. General Coffee above Baton Rouge received
Jackson’s summons on the evening of December 17, and marched the next
morning with twelve hundred and fifty men. In two days he made one
hundred and twenty miles, camping on the night of December 19 within
fifteen miles of New Orleans, with eight hundred men.[496] Carroll,
with the Tennessee brigade which left Nashville November 27, arrived
at New Orleans December 21, and a squadron of mounted Mississippi
volunteers hurried down. The British also lost no time. Their advance
disembarked on the Isle aux Poix in Lake Borgne on the night of
December 14, and during the following week all the boats and seamen
of the fleet were occupied in transporting seven thousand men, with
their equipment, thirty miles from the fleet to the island. During the
night of December 18 two British officers reconnoitred the head of Lake
Borgne.[497] At the mouth of Bayou Bienvenu, not fifteen miles from
New Orleans, was a fishermen’s village. The fishermen were Spaniards,
with no love for the United States, and ready to accept British pay.
They received the two British officers, and conveyed them in a canoe
up the bayou to the Villeré plantation on the bank of the Mississippi
only six miles from New Orleans.[498] There, at their leisure,
Lieutenant Peddie of the quartermaster’s department and Captain Spencer
of the “Carron” selected the line of advance for the British army, and
returned, unmolested and unseen, through the bayou to the lake and the
Isle aux Poix.

Only December 21, two days after the British reconnaissance, was an
American picket of eight men and a sergeant placed at the fishermen’s
village,[499] where they remained thirty-six hours without learning
that British officers had been on the spot, or that the fishermen
were all away, acting as pilots for the approaching British boats.
Meanwhile the troops at Isle aux Poix were ready to move almost as soon
as Lieutenant Peddie could return to show them the way. At ten o’clock
on the morning of December 22 the light brigade--sixteen hundred and
eighty-eight rank-and-file,[500] under Colonel Thornton, who had led
the advance at Bladensburg--embarked in boats, and after a day on
the lake arrived the next morning, December 23, at daylight, without
giving alarm, at the fishermen’s village, where they surprised and
captured the picket, and then passing up the bayou five miles, landed
at a point about three miles from the Mississippi River. No attempt
at concealment was made.[501] The troops were formed in column, and
found no obstacles to their march except the soft ground and the
ditches. Through reeds and cypress swamp they made their way about
three miles, when their advance suddenly entered open fields skirted
by an orange-grove, with the broad Mississippi beyond. They were on
the Villeré plantation; and they surprised and captured Major Villeré
and his militia company, in his own house at noon-day, after a march
of three miles with sixteen hundred men, from a point which had been
recognized by Jackson as one of two or three necessary avenues of
approach.

The record of American generalship offered many examples of misfortune,
but none so complete as this. Neither Hull nor Harrison, neither Winder
nor Samuel Smith, had allowed a large British army, heralded long in
advance, to arrive within seven miles unseen and unsuspected, and
without so much as an earthwork, a man, or a gun between them and their
object. The disaster was unprecedented, and could be repaired only by
desperate measures.




                             CHAPTER XIII.


THE defence of New Orleans resembled the defence of Washington
until the moment when in each case the British expedition came within
sight. Jackson was even slower than Winder to see the point of danger
or to concentrate his forces. At Washington, Winder took command July
1, and the British expedition arrived August 16; at Mobile, Jackson
took command August 16, and the British expedition arrived December
14. In neither case was the interval seriously employed for defence.
So much was Jackson misled that he collected no troops, and made no
inquiry as to the military means at his disposal at New Orleans. Had
he gone there September 1, he would have felt the want of arms and
equipment, and would have been able to supply them. During the summer,
while yet among the Creeks, he was said to have made requisition for
a quantity of war material to be sent to New Orleans;[502] but he
certainly showed no interest in its shipment or the causes for its
delay in arrival. The arms should have reached New Orleans in October,
when he would have had ample time to correct any failure or want
of supply. He could have used, in case of necessity, the steamboat
“Enterprise,” which was then regularly plying on the Mississippi, and
was not the only steamboat on those waters.[503] If New Orleans was
deficient in many articles of military necessity, the fault was not
wholly in the War Department.

A similar criticism applied to the political situation at New Orleans.
Governor Claiborne wanted authority to control the factions in his
legislature, and the legislature wanted an impulse sufficiently
energetic to overcome its inertia. Probably Jackson’s presence would
at any time have given authority to Claiborne and energy to the entire
State government. From the moment of his actual arrival, difficulties
of this kind seemed to cease. “It is hardly possible,” said the
military historian of the campaign,[504] “to form an idea of the change
which his arrival produced on the minds of the people.”

When the British expedition was once known to have appeared at the
entrance of Lake Borgne, Jackson’s task was perhaps simpler than
Winder’s, for Winder might doubt whether the British meant to attack
Washington, and in fact General Ross took the decision only at the
last moment; but no one could doubt that New Orleans was the object
of Pakenham’s expedition. Jackson had only to choose his positions
and collect his resources. These were small; but on the other hand
the British were opposed by natural difficulties much greater at
New Orleans than at Washington. Even their greater numbers were
a disadvantage when they were obliged to move in widely separated
detachments, in open boats, from a point far distant from their
column’s head, and toward a point easily fortified.

If until the moment of the enemy’s appearance Jackson showed no more
military capacity than was shown by Winder, his conduct thenceforward
offered a contrast the more striking because it proved how Washington
might have been saved. Winder lost his head when he saw an enemy.
Jackson needed to see his enemy in order to act; he thought rightly
only at the moment when he struck. At noon, December 23, New Orleans
was in greater danger than Washington on the afternoon of August 23,
when the British advanced from the Patuxent. Had Colonel Thornton
followed his impulses and marched directly on the city, he must have
reached it before a gun could have been fired by the Americans; his own
muskets would have given the first news of his arrival. Major-General
Keane, his commanding officer, preferred caution,[505] and his delay
gave a few hours time for Jackson to show his qualities.

News that a British column had reached the Villeré plantation was
brought to Jackson at headquarters in New Orleans, at about half-past
one o’clock, much as the news was brought to Winder, August 24, that
the British were marching on Bladensburg. The distances were about
the same. Winder and Jackson both allowed the enemy to approach within
seven miles before anything had been done for defence. In one respect
Jackson was more unfortunate than Winder, for his troops were not
ready to march; they were not even collected. Jackson sent orders to
the different corps, but several hours passed before the men could be
brought down and posted between the city and the British.

Fortunately Major Latour, chief-engineer in Military District No.
7, had been sent that morning to examine the approaches from Lake
Borgne, and as he rode down the road at noon he met persons flying
toward town with news that the British had penetrated through the
canal to Villeré’s house. Latour was a trained French engineer, whose
services were extremely valuable, not only during the campaign but
afterward; for he subsequently wrote a “History of the War in West
Florida and Louisiana,” which was far the best military work published
in the United States till long after that time, and furnished the
only accurate maps and documents of the campaign at New Orleans.[506]
On the morning of December 23 Latour approached within rifle-shot of
the British force, and judged their number accurately as sixteen or
eighteen hundred men.[507] Such exact information, which could not have
been gained from any ordinary scout, was invaluable. Latour hastened
to headquarters, and reported at two o’clock to Jackson the position
and numbers of the enemy. The general, on that information, decided to
attack.

For such a purpose Jackson’s resources were ample. Four miles above the
city his Tennessee militia were camped,--Carroll’s brigade numbering
probably about two thousand effectives, and the remnants of Coffee’s
mounted brigade numbering some seven hundred men in the field. The
Mississippi and New Orleans volunteers could be reckoned at about
seven hundred men,[508] besides three regiments of city militia. The
Seventh United States Infantry produced four hundred and sixty-five men
in the ranks; the Forty-fourth counted three hundred and thirty-one;
while a detachment of artillerists, twenty-two in number, with two
six-pound field-pieces, added greatly to the numerical strength of the
Infantry.[509] Against Thornton’s force, numbering one thousand six
hundred and eighty-eight rank-and-file, or about nineteen hundred men
all told, Jackson could oppose about five thousand Infantry with two
field-pieces.

Besides these land forces Jackson was provided with another resource.
In the river at New Orleans lay a war-schooner, the “Carolina,”
rated at fourteen guns, armed with one long twelve-pounder and
six twelve-pound carronades on a broadside.[510] A sixteen-gun
sloop-of-war, the “Louisiana,” was also at New Orleans, but not
ready for immediate use. The “Carolina” could be brought instantly
into action, and her broadside of seven twelve-pounders, added to the
field-battery of two six-pounders, gave Jackson immense advantage
over the British, who had no artillery except two three-pounders and
rockets, and whose lines must be enfiladed by the “Carolina’s” fire.

Jackson, aware of his superiority, expected with reason to destroy the
British detachment. He did not even think more than half his force
necessary for the purpose, but detached the whole of Carroll’s brigade
and the three regiments of city militia,--fully twenty-five hundred
men,--to guard the town against an apprehended attack from the north.
Without giving the reasons which led him to believe that the British
could approach on that side without ample warning, his report said,--

   “Apprehending a double attack by the way of Chef Menteur, I left
   General Carroll’s force and the militia of the city posted on
   the Gentilly road, and at five o’clock P.M. marched
   to meet the enemy, whom I was resolved to attack in his first
   position, with Major Hind’s dragoons, General Coffee’s brigade,
   parts of the Seventh and Forty-fourth regiments, the uniformed
   companies of militia under the command of Major Plauché, two
   hundred men of color chiefly from St. Domingo, raised by
   Colonel Savary and acting under the command of Major Daquin,
   and a detachment of artillery under the direction of Colonel
   McRea, with two six-pounders under the command of Lieutenant
   Spots,--not exceeding in all fifteen hundred.”

More exact returns showed that Jackson carried with him eight hundred
and eighty-four regular troops and two field-pieces, five hundred and
sixty-three mounted riflemen of Coffee’s brigade, five hundred and
fifty-nine Louisiana militia, one hundred and seven Mississippians, and
eighteen Choctaw Indians,--in all, twenty-one hundred and thirty-one
men and two guns, besides the “Carolina,” which dropped down the river
at four o’clock.[511]

Jackson did not, like Winder, pass the hours in looking at his enemy,
nor did he, like General Smith at Baltimore, send out militia under
militia officers, to stand in close order on an open field and wait
attack. His chief difficulty was due to the ground, which obliged him
to make his main assault in a narrow column along the road. To gain the
advantage of his numbers, he detached Coffee with seven hundred and
thirty-two men, mostly armed with rifles, to make a detour toward the
left and fall on the British flank and rear, while Jackson himself,
with fourteen hundred men and two guns, should strike the British
advance where it was posted on the levee.

  [Illustration:

    PLAN OF THE
    Attack made by MAJ.-GEN. JACKSON
    On a division of the British Army commanded
    by
    MAJOR-GEN. J. KEANE,
    On the 23rd December, 1814, at 7 o’clock at night.

    by MAJOR A. LACARRIERE LATOUR, principal Engineer in the
    7th Military District U. S. Army.

    STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N. Y.]

The signal for battle was to be given by the “Carolina’s” guns.
Commodore Patterson in the “Carolina” received his orders at half-past
six, and getting out sweeps, brought his vessel in a few minutes
abreast of the British camp, where he anchored close in shore and
began a heavy fire,[512] soon after seven o’clock. Ten minutes later,
Jackson, waiting about two miles above, ordered his men to advance,
and moving down the road with his regulars and New Orleans companies
struck the British outposts about a mile below his point of departure,
at a few minutes before eight o’clock. At the same time Coffee, as he
marched along the edge of the swamp, hearing the signal, wheeled to the
right, and moved toward the British flank.

Night had then fallen. The weary British troops had lain down, when
their sentries on the levee gave the alarm, and immediately afterward
the roar of seven cannon close beside them threw their camp into
confusion. About half an hour afterward, while the “Carolina” still
swept the camp with its shot, the British sentries on the levee a
mile above gave another alarm, and in a few moments the outposts were
sharply attacked.

The accounts of the battle fought along the levee, under the command
of Jackson in person, were both confused and contradictory. Thornton’s
brigade was composed of the Eighty-fifth and Ninety-fifth regiments, a
company of rocketeers, one hundred sappers and miners, and the Fourth
regiment as a support,--in all, sixteen hundred and eighty-eight
rank-and-file.[513] At the point where the fighting began the
British had merely an outpost, which was forced back by Jackson’s
attack, with some difficulty, about one hundred and fifty yards.[514]
Colonel Thornton ordered two of his regiments--the Eighty-fifth and
Ninety-fifth, eight hundred rank-and-file[515]--to support the outpost,
and their arrival checked Jackson’s advance. Indeed, the American line
was driven back and lost ground, until the two field-pieces were in
danger, and were hastily withdrawn.[516] Each party claimed that the
other first withdrew from fire; but the American report admitted that
the battle which began on the levee at eight ceased before nine, while
Jackson seemed not to regard his attack as successful. His first brief
report, written December 26,[517] said,--

   “The heavy smoke occasioned by an excessive fire rendered it
   necessary that I should draw off my troops, after a severe
   conflict of upward of an hour.”

Jackson’s official report of December 27 said,[518]--

   “There can be but little doubt that we should have succeeded on
   that occasion with our inferior force in destroying or capturing
   the enemy, had not a thick fog which arose about eight o’clock
   occasioned some confusion among the different corps. Fearing
   the consequences, under this circumstance, of the further
   prosecution of a night attack with troops then acting together
   for the first time, I contented myself with lying on the field
   that night.”

Although the battle was severest where Jackson commanded, it was most
successful where Coffee attacked. On hearing the “Carolina” open fire,
Coffee turning to the right advanced on the British flank, striking
it nearly opposite to the “Carolina’s” position. The British, thus
surrounded, were placed in a situation which none but the steadiest
troops could have maintained. So great was the confusion that no
organized corps opposed Coffee’s men. Squads of twenty or thirty
soldiers, collecting about any officer in their neighborhood, made head
as they best could against Coffee’s riflemen, and the whole British
position seemed encircled by the American fire. Forced back toward
the river, the British rallied behind an old levee which happened at
that point to run parallel with the new levee, at a distance of about
three hundred yards.[519] Knots of men, mixed in great disorder, here
advancing, there retreating, carried on a desultory battle over the
field, often fighting with clubbed weapons, knives, and fists. At last
the British centre, finding a strong protection in the old levee which
answered for an earthwork, held firm against Coffee’s further advance,
and were also sheltered by the new levee in their rear from the fire of
the “Carolina’s” guns. At about the same time several companies of the
Twenty-first and Ninety-third regiments arrived from Lake Borgne, and
raised the British force to two thousand and fifty rank-and-file.[520]
Coffee then despaired of further success, and withdrew his men from the
field.

   “My brigade,” wrote Coffee immediately afterward,[521] “met the
   enemy’s line near four hundred yards from the river. The fire on
   both sides was kept up remarkably brisk until we drove them to
   the river-bank, where they gave a long, heavy fire, and finally
   the enemy fell behind the levee or river-bank that is thrown
   up. The battle had now lasted near two and a half hours. The
   regulars had ceased firing near one hour before I drew my men
   back.”

The “Carolina” began firing soon after seven o’clock, and ceased at
nine.[522] Jackson’s attack with the regulars began at eight o’clock,
and his force ceased firing before nine. Coffee withdrew his men
at about half-past nine. The hope of destroying the British force
was disappointed; and brilliant as the affair was, its moral effect
was greater than the material injury it inflicted. Major-General
Keane officially reported his loss as forty-six killed, one hundred
and sixty-seven wounded, and sixty-four missing,--two hundred and
sixty-seven in all.[523] Jackson reported twenty-four killed, one
hundred and fifteen wounded, and seventy-four missing,--two hundred
and thirteen in all. The two regular regiments suffered most, losing
fifteen killed and fifty-four wounded. Coffee’s Tennesseeans lost nine
killed and forty-three wounded. The New Orleans volunteer corps and the
colored volunteers lost seventeen wounded.

Compared with the night battle at Lundy’s Lane, the night battle of
December 23 was not severe. Brown’s army, probably not more numerous
than Jackson’s, lost one hundred and seventy-one men killed, while
Jackson lost twenty-four. Brown lost five hundred and seventy-one
wounded, while Jackson lost one hundred and fifteen. Drummond at
Lundy’s Lane reported a British loss of eighty-four killed, while Keane
reported forty-six. Drummond reported five hundred and fifty-nine
wounded, while Keane reported one hundred and sixty-seven. The total
British loss at Lundy’s Lane was eight hundred and seventy-eight men;
that of December 23 was two hundred and sixty-seven. Jackson’s battle
was comparatively short, lasting an hour and a half, while the fighting
at Lundy’s Lane continued some five hours. Lundy’s Lane checked the
enemy only for a day or two, and the battle of December 23 could hardly
be expected to do more.

Conscious that the British army would advance as soon as its main body
arrived, Jackson, like Brown, hastened to place his men under cover of
works. Falling back the next morning about two miles, he took position
behind an old canal or ditch which crossed the strip of cultivated
ground where it was narrowest. The canal offered no serious obstacle to
an enemy, for although ten feet wide it was shallow and dry, and fully
three quarters of a mile long. Had the British been able to advance in
force at any time the next day, December 24, directing their attack
toward the skirts of the swamp to avoid the “Carolina’s” fire, they
might have forced Jackson back upon New Orleans; but they were in no
disposition to do on the 24th what they had not ventured to do on the
23d, when they possessed every advantage. Keane believed that Jackson’s
force in the night battle amounted to five thousand men.[524] Keane’s
troops, weary, cold, without food, and exposed to the “Carolina’s”
fire, which imprisoned them all day between the two levees,[525] were
glad to escape further attack, and entertained no idea of advance. The
day and night of December 24 were occupied by the British in hurrying
the main body of their troops from the Isle aux Poix across Lake Borgne
to the Bayou Bienvenu.

By very great efforts the boats of the fleet transported the whole
remaining force across the lake, until, on the morning of December 25,
all were concentrated at the Villeré plantation. With them arrived
Major-General Sir Edward Pakenham, and took command. Hitherto the
frequent British disasters at Plattsburg, Sackett’s Harbor, Fort Erie,
and the Moravian towns had been attributed to their generals. Sir
George Prevost, Major-Generals Drummond and Riall, and Major-General
Proctor were not officers of Wellington’s army. The British government,
in appointing Sir Edward Pakenham to command at New Orleans, meant
to send the ablest officer at their disposal. Pakenham was not only
one of Wellington’s best generals, but stood in the close relation
of his brother-in-law, Pakenham’s sister being Wellington’s wife. In
every military respect Sir Edward Pakenham might consider himself the
superior of Andrew Jackson. He was in the prime of life and strength,
thirty-eight years of age, while Jackson, nearly ten years older, was
broken in health and weak in strength. Pakenham had learned the art of
war from Wellington, in the best school in Europe. He was supported by
an efficient staff and a military system as perfect as experience and
expenditure could make it, and he commanded as fine an army as England
could produce, consisting largely of Peninsula veterans.

Their precise number, according to British authority, was five
thousand and forty rank-and-file, on Christmas Day, when Pakenham
took command.[526] Afterward many more arrived, until January 6, when
ten regiments were in camp at Villeré’s plantation,--Royal Artillery;
Fourteenth Light Dragoons; Fourth, Seventh, Twenty-first, Forty-third,
Forty-fourth, Eighty-fifth, Ninety-third, and Ninety-fifth
Infantry,--numbering, with sappers and miners and staff-corps, five
thousand nine hundred and thirteen rank-and-file; or with a moderate
allowance of officers, an aggregate of at least sixty-five hundred
Europeans. Two West India regiments of black troops accompanied the
expedition, numbering ten hundred and forty-three rank-and-file.
The navy provided about twelve hundred marines and seamen, perhaps
the most efficient corps in the whole body. Deducting eight hundred
men for camp-duty, Pakenham, according to British official reports,
could put in the field a force of eight thousand disciplined troops,
well-officered, well-equipped, and confident both in themselves and in
their commander. More were on their way.

The Duke of Wellington believed such a force fully competent to
capture New Orleans, or to rout any American army he ever heard of;
and his confidence would have been, if possible, still stronger, had
he known his opponent’s resources, which were no greater and not very
much better than those so easily overcome by Ross at Bladensburg. The
principal difference was that Jackson commanded.

Jackson’s difficulties were very great, and were overcome only by the
desperate energy which he infused even into the volatile creoles and
sluggish negroes. When he retired from the field of the night battle,
he withdrew, as has been told, only two miles. About five miles below
New Orleans he halted his troops. Between the river and the swamp,
the strip of open and cultivated land was there somewhat narrower than
elsewhere. A space of a thousand yards, or about three fifths of a
mile, alone required strong defence. A shallow, dry canal, or ditch,
ten feet wide, crossed the plain and opened into the river on one
side and the swamp on the other. All day the troops, with the negroes
of the neighborhood, worked, deepening the canal, and throwing up a
parapet behind it. The two six-pound field-pieces commanded the road
on the river-bank, and the “Louisiana” descended the river to a point
about two miles below Jackson’s line. A mile below the “Louisiana” the
“Carolina” remained in her old position, opposite the British camp.
By night-fall the new lines were already formidable, and afforded
complete protection from musketry. For further security the parapet
was continued five hundred yards, and turned well on the flank in the
swamp; but this task was not undertaken until December 28.[527]

The first act of Sir Edward Pakenham gave the Americans at least three
days for preparation. Even veteran soldiers, who were accustomed to
storming mountain fortresses held by French armies, were annoyed at
exposing their flank to the fire of fifteen or twenty heavy guns,
which hampered not only every military movement but also every motion
beyond cover of the bank. Pakenham sent instantly to the fleet for
cannon to drive the ships away. In reality he could not so relieve
himself, for the American commodore soon placed one twenty-four-pound
gun and two twelve-pounders in battery on the opposite bank of the
river, where they answered every purpose of annoyance, while the ships
after December 28 took little part in action.[528] Pakenham gained
nothing by waiting; but he would not advance without artillery, and
the sailors, with much labor, brought up a number of light guns,--nine
field-pieces, it was said,[529] two howitzers, and a mortar. Pakenham
passed two days, December 25 and 26, organizing his force and preparing
the battery. At daylight, December 27, the guns were ready. Five pieces
suddenly opened with hot shot and shell on the “Carolina,” and in half
an hour obliged the crew to abandon her.[530] The “Louisiana,” by
extreme exertion, was hauled beyond range while the British battery was
occupied in destroying the “Carolina.”

Nothing then prevented Pakenham’s advance, and the next morning,
December 28, the whole army moved forward.

   “On we went,” said the Subaltern, “for about three miles,
   without any halt or hindrance, either from man or inanimate
   nature coming in our way. But all at once a spectacle was
   presented to us, such indeed as we ought to have looked for, but
   such as manifestly took our leaders by surprise. The enemy’s
   army became visible. It was posted about forty yards in rear of
   a canal, and covered, though most imperfectly, by an unfinished
   breastwork.”

The British left, coming under the fire of the “Louisiana,” was
immediately halted and placed as far as possible under cover. The
skirmishers in the swamp were recalled. In the evening the whole army
was ordered to retire beyond cannon-shot and hut themselves.[531] They
obeyed; but “there was not a man among us who failed to experience both
shame and indignation.”[532]

Beyond doubt, such caution was not expected from Sir Edward Pakenham.
Sir George Prevost at Sackett’s Harbor and Plattsburg, and Colonel
Brooke at Baltimore had retired before American works; but those works
had been finished forts, strongly held and situated on elevated points.
Even with such excuses, and after suffering severe losses, Prevost was
discredited for his retreats. Pakenham did not live to make a report,
and his reasons remained unavowed; but Admiral Cochrane reported
that it was “thought necessary to bring heavy artillery against this
work, and also against the ship which had cannonaded the army when
advancing.”[533] The decision implied that Pakenham considered the
chances unfavorable for storming the American line.

In effect, Pakenham’s withdrawal December 28 was equivalent to
admitting weakness in his infantry, and to calling on the artillery as
his strongest arm. The experiment showed little self-confidence. Not
only must he sacrifice two or three days in establishing batteries, but
he must challenge a contest with cannon,--weapons which the Americans
were famous for using, both afloat and ashore, with especial skill.
Jackson could also mount heavy guns and allow Pakenham to batter
indefinite lines. Sooner or later Pakenham must storm, unless he could
turn the American position.

  [Illustration: Sketch of the Position of the British and American
  Forces

  NEAR NEW ORLEANS, FROM THE 23rd OF DECEMBER TO THE 8th OF
  JANUARY, 1815.

  _From original by John Peddie, D. A. Q. M. Genl., endorsed
  “Enclosure in M. Genl. Lambert’s of 29 Jany., 1815.”--British
  Archives._

  REFERENCES.

    A. Enemy’s position on the night of the 23rd of December when he
         attacked.
    B. Bivouac of the troops for the 23rd of December.
    C. Position on the night of the 23rd of December.
    D. Position on the night of the 24th of December.
    E. Position after the advance on the 28th of December.
    F. Col. Thornton’s attack on the morning of the 8th of January.
    G. Col. Thornton’s furthest advance.
    1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. Redoubt and batteries constructed after
         the advance of the 28th.
    H. The enemy retiring.]

The seamen were once more set to work, and “with incredible labor”
rowed their boats, laden with heavy guns, from the fleet to the
bayou, and dragged the guns through three miles of bog to the
British headquarters. The Americans also prepared batteries. From
the lines one thirty-two-pounder, three twenty-four-pounders, and
one eighteen-pounder commanded the plain in their front. Besides
these heavy guns, three twelve-pounders, three six-pounders, a
six-inch howitzer or mortar, and a brass carronade, useless from its
bad condition,[534]--in all, twelve or thirteen guns, capable of
replying to the British batteries, were mounted along the American
lines. On the west bank of the river, three quarters of a mile away,
Commodore Patterson established, December 30 and 31, a battery of
one twenty-four-pounder and two long twelve-pounders, which took the
British batteries in flank.[535] Thus the Americans possessed
fifteen effective guns, six of which were heavy pieces of long
range. They were worked partly by regular artillerists, partly by
sailors, partly by New Orleans militia, and partly by the “hellish
banditti” of Barataria, who to the number of twenty or thirty were
received by General Jackson into the service and given the care of two
twenty-four-pounders.

The number and position of the British guns were given in Lieutenant
Peddie’s sketch of the field. Before the reconnaissance of December
28, field-pieces had been placed in battery on the river-side to
destroy the “Carolina” and “Louisiana.” Canon Gleig said that “nine
field-pieces, two howitzers, and one mortar” were placed in battery
on the river-side during the night of December 25.[536] Captain
Henley of the “Carolina” reported that five guns opened upon him on
the morning of December 26.[537] Captain Peddie’s sketch marked seven
pieces mounted in battery on the river-side, bearing on Commodore
Patterson’s battery opposite, besides four pieces in two batteries
below. Their range was sufficient to destroy the “Carolina” and pierce
the breastwork across the river,[538] and therefore they were probably
twelve and nine pounders.

Besides these lighter long-range guns, the British constructed three
batteries in the night of December 31.

   “Four eighteen-pounders,” reported Major Forrest,[539] British
   assistant-quartermaster-general, “were placed in a battery
   formed of hogsheads of sugar, on the main road, to fire upon
   the ship if she dropped down. Preparations were also made to
   establish batteries,--one of six eighteen-pounders, and one
   of four twenty-four-pound carronades; also batteries for the
   field-pieces and howitzers, the latter to keep the fire of
   the enemy under, while the troops were to be moved forward in
   readiness to storm the works as soon as a practicable breach was
   effected.”

According to Peddie’s sketch the Battery No. 6, on the road or new
levee, contained not four but two guns. Battery No. 5, some fifty yards
from No. 6, contained six guns, as Major Forrest reported. Battery No.
4, to the left of the old levee, contained four guns, probably the
carronades. Battery No. 3, to the right of the old levee, contained
five guns, probably the field-pieces and howitzers. In all, seventeen
guns bore on the American lines,--besides seven, in Batteries No. 7 and
No. 8, bearing on Commodore Patterson’s three-gun battery across the
river. According to Gleig,[540] the British had thirty guns; but in
any case they used not less than twenty-four guns, throwing a heavier
weight of metal than was thrown by the fifteen pieces used by the
Americans. The British artillery was served by regular artillerists.

These details were particularly interesting, because the artillery
battle of Jan. 1, 1815, offered the best test furnished during the
war of relative skill in the use of that arm. The attack had every
advantage over the defence. The British could concentrate their fire
to effect a breach for their troops to enter; the Americans were
obliged to disperse their fire on eight points. The American platforms
being elevated, offered a better target than was afforded by the low
British batteries, and certainly were no better protected. Three of
the American guns were in battery across the river, three quarters of
a mile from the main British battery of six eighteen-pounders, while
the “Louisiana’s” carronades were beyond range, and the “Louisiana”
herself was not brought into action.[541] On the American side the
battle was fought entirely by the guns in Jackson’s lines and in
Patterson’s battery across the river,--one thirty-two-pounder, four
twenty-four-pounders, one eighteen-pounder, five twelve-pounders,
three six-pounders, and a howitzer,--fifteen American guns in all,
matched against ten British eighteen-pounders, four twenty-four-pound
carronades, and ten field-pieces and howitzers,--twenty-four guns in
all. If the British field-pieces were twelves and nines, the weight
of metal was at least three hundred and fifty pounds on the British
side against two hundred and twenty-four pounds on the American side,
besides two howitzers against one.

The main British batteries were about seven hundred yards distant from
Jackson’s line. Opposite to the battery of six eighteen-pounders were
the American thirty-two and three twenty-four-pounders. Behind the
British batteries the British army waited for the order to assault.
Toward eight o’clock on the morning of Jan. 1, 1815, the British opened
a hot fire accompanied by a shower of rockets. The American guns
answered, and the firing continued without intermission until toward
noon, when the British fire slackened, and at one o’clock the British
artillerists abandoned their batteries, leaving the guns deserted.

During the entire war, no other battle was fought in which the defeated
party had not some excuse to offer for inferiority. Usually the excuse
ascribed greater force to the victor than to the vanquished, or dwelt
upon some accident or oversight which affected the result. For the
defeat of the British artillery, Jan. 1, 1815, no excuse was ever
suggested.[542] The British army and navy frankly admitted that the
misfortune was due to American superiority in the use of artillery.
British evidence on that point was ample, for their surprise and
mortification were extreme; while the Americans seemed never fully to
appreciate the extraordinary character of the feat they performed. The
most detailed British account was also the most outspoken.

   “Never was any failure more remarkable or unlooked-for than
   this,” said Gleig....[543] “The sun, as if ashamed to shine upon
   our disgrace, was slow of making its appearance; a heavy mist
   obscured him, and the morning was far advanced before it cleared
   away. At last, however, the American lines were visible, and
   then began a fire from our batteries, so brisk and so steadily
   kept up that we who were behind made not the smallest doubt
   of its effect. It was answered for a while faintly, and with
   seeming difficulty. By and by, however, the enemy’s salutation
   became more spirited, till it gradually surpassed our own, both
   in rapidity and precision. We were a good deal alarmed at this,
   and the more that a rumor got abroad that our batteries were not
   proof against the amazing force of the American shot. We had,
   it may be stated, imprudently rolled into the parapets barrels
   filled with sugar, under the impression that sugar would prove
   as effectual as sand in checking the progress of cannon-balls.
   But the event showed that we had been completely mistaken. The
   enemy’s shot penetrated these sugar-hogsheads as if they had
   been so many empty casks, dismounting our guns and killing our
   artillery-men in the very centre of their works. There could be
   small doubt, as soon as these facts were established, how the
   cannonading would end. Our fire slackened every moment; that
   of the Americans became every moment more terrible, till at
   length, after not more than two hours and a half of firing, our
   batteries were all silenced. The American works, on the other
   hand, remained as little injured as ever, and we were completely
   foiled.”

Admiral Codrington, writing from the British headquarters three days
after the battle, expressed equal astonishment and annoyance:[544]--

   “On the 1st we had our batteries, by severe labor, ready in
   situations from which the artillery people were, as a matter
   of course, to destroy and silence the opposing batteries, and
   give opportunity for a well-arranged storm. But instead of so
   doing, not a gun of the enemy appeared to suffer, and our firing
   too high was not made out until we had expended too much of our
   hardly-collected ammunition to push the matter further. Such a
   failure in this boasted arm was not to be expected, and I think
   it a blot in the artillery escutcheon.”

Codrington somewhat under-estimated the effect of the British fire.
Three of the American guns, including the thirty-two-pounder, were more
or less damaged, and the cotton-bales which formed the cheeks of the
embrasures proved to be as little serviceable as the hogsheads of sugar
in the British river battery.[545] Two artillery caissons were exploded
by the British rockets. Thirty-four men were killed or wounded; while
the British reported a loss of seventy-six killed and wounded between
Jan. 1 and 5, 1815, most of whom fell in the artillery battle.[546]

The British official reports said less, but their silence was equally
significant.

   “Our batteries made little impression upon the enemy’s parapet,”
   wrote Major Forrest.[547] “The order for the assault was
   therefore not carried into effect. The troops remained in this
   advanced position, and orders were given to retire the guns in
   the night. The evening changed to wet, and the ground became in
   consequence so deep that it required the exertions of the whole
   army as a working-party, aided by the seamen, to retire the guns
   a short distance before daylight. The army then fell back to the
   position it occupied on the 31st.”

Admiral Cochrane’s official report was still more brief, and best
understood by the comments already quoted from his friend Admiral
Codrington:--

   “On the 1st instant batteries were opened; but our fire not
   having the desired effect, the attack was deferred until the
   arrival of the troops under Major-General Lambert, which was
   daily expected.”

If the Subaltern was right, the British defeat resulted in the loss of
several guns.

   “The enemy having made no attempt to carry off our heavy
   guns, which we abandoned to their fate,” continued Gleig, “it
   was judged advisable to bring them into the camp as soon as
   circumstances would allow; and for this purpose working parties
   were again sent out as soon as the darkness screened them. It
   was my fortune to accompany them. The labor of dragging a number
   of huge ship’s guns out of the soft soil into which they had
   sunk, crippled too as most of them were in their carriages, was
   more extreme by far than any one expected to find it. Indeed,
   it was not till four o’clock in the morning that our task came
   to a conclusion, and even then it had been very imperfectly
   performed. Five guns were eventually left behind. These were
   rendered useless, it is true, by breaking their trunnions; but
   it cannot be said that in the course of the late operations the
   British army came off without the loss of some of its artillery.”

  [Illustration:

    PLAN
    OF THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF THE
    AMERICAN LINES

    Below New Orleans, on the 8th January, 1815.

    By MAJOR A. LACARRIERE LATOUR, principal Engineer 7th
    Military District, U. S. Army, 1815.

    STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N. Y.]




                             CHAPTER XIV.


EFFECTUALLY stopped by these repeated miscarriages, General
Pakenham, with fully five thousand good soldiers at his command,
decided to wait an entire week for Major-General Lambert, who was then
on his way with two fresh regiments. In the meanwhile Pakenham adopted
a suggestion made first by Vice-Admiral Cochrane,[548] to prepare for
throwing a force across the river to turn Jackson’s line from the
opposite bank. The plan required that the Villeré canal should be
extended through the levee to the river without the knowledge of the
Americans. Perhaps Pakenham would have done better by dragging his
boats across the intervening space; but he preferred to dig a canal,
and the work, begun January 4, was done so successfully that until
January 6, when it was completed, Jackson did not suspect the movement.
On the same day Lambert’s division arrived.

From this week of inaction the Americans gained little advantage. The
lines were strengthened; but although the Kentucky reinforcements, more
than two thousand in number, under General Thomas and John Adair,
arrived January 4, they were ill provided with arms, and Jackson
could furnish them neither with arms, clothing, nor equipment. The
Louisiana militia were in the same condition. Jackson did his utmost
to supply these wants; the people of New Orleans did more, and lent at
last the few hundred muskets reserved against the danger of a slave
insurrection,[549] until in the end, if Adair was correct, a thousand
of the Kentuckians were placed in the line of battle. Yet after all the
reinforcements had been mustered, Jackson’s main dependence was still
on his artillery and his intrenchments. In the open field he could not
meet the British force.

In his immediate front, Jackson had little to fear. Three thousand
marksmen, behind intrenchments everywhere at least five feet high,
defended by heavy guns and supported by the “Louisiana” on the river
and a strong battery on the opposite shore, could defy twice or three
times their number advancing across an open plain under fire of eight
or ten heavy guns. The result of the artillery battle of January 1,
as well as the reconnaissance of December 28, showed what the British
general and his staff thought of their chances in a front attack. Twice
they had refused to attempt it when Jackson’s lines were unfinished;
they were not likely to succeed when the lines were strengthened by
another week of labor.

In his direct front, therefore, Jackson had reason to think that the
British did not intend serious attack. Their next attempt could hardly
fail to be a flanking movement. Jackson had been surprised, December
23, by such a movement, and feared nothing so much as to be surprised
again. For this reason he still kept a large body of troops, three
regiments of Louisiana militia, on the north of the city.[550] “His
greatest fear, and hence his strongest defence next to the one occupied
by himself, was on the Chef Menteur road, where Governor Claiborne, at
the head of the Louisiana militia, was posted.” He kept close watch
on the bayous which extended on his immediate flank, and constructed
other lines in his rear to which he could retreat in case his left
flank should be turned through the swamp. Apparently the idea did not
occur to him that the British might more easily turn his right flank by
throwing a force across the river; and when he learned, January 7, that
the British were engaged in making this movement, the time had already
passed when he could prevent it.

No means had been provided for transporting troops directly from one
bank of the river to the other. If obliged to protect the batteries
established by Commodore Patterson on the west bank, Jackson must march
troops from his lines back five miles to New Orleans, cross them by the
ferry, and march them down the other shore. Such a movement required
a whole day, and divided the army in a manner hazarding the safety of
both wings.

Practically the west bank was undefended when Jackson, January 7, first
heard that the British were about to occupy it. Commodore Patterson had
mounted there, as has been told, a number of heavy guns in battery, but
these guns were not in position to cover their own bank against attack
from below. Major Latour was engaged with negroes in laying out lines
of defence, but nothing was completed. In an advanced position, about
a mile below the line of Jackson’s works, a bastion had been raised
close to the river, and near it a small redan, or salient, had been
constructed. This work, which was untenable in case of attack in flank
or rear, was occupied by four hundred and fifty Louisiana militia,
commanded by General David Morgan. During the afternoon of January 7,
after the British plan of attack was suspected, General Morgan caused
three guns--one twelve-pounder and two six-pounders--to be mounted on
his line. Late the same evening General Jackson ordered four hundred
men of the Kentucky division to New Orleans, where they were to obtain
muskets, then to cross the river, and march down the opposite shore
to reinforce Morgan. The Kentuckians obeyed their orders, but they
found only about seventy muskets at New Orleans; and not more than two
hundred and fifty armed men, weary with marching and faint from want
of food, reached Morgan’s quarters at four o’clock on the morning of
January 8.[551] Adair, who should have known the number best, declared
that only one hundred and seventy men were then in the ranks.[552] They
were sent a mile farther and stationed as an advanced line, with one
hundred Louisiana militia.

Thus seven or eight hundred tired, ill-armed, and unprotected militia,
divided in two bodies a mile apart, waited on the west bank to be
attacked by a British column which was then in the act of crossing
the river. Their defeat was almost certain. A thousand British troops
could easily drive them away, capture all the batteries on the west
bank, destroy the “Louisiana” as they had destroyed the “Carolina,”
thus turning all Jackson’s lines, and probably rendering necessary
the evacuation of New Orleans. For this work Pakenham detached the
Eighty-fifth regiment, about three hundred strong, the Fifth West
India, two hundred seamen and two hundred marines,--about twelve
hundred men in all,[553]--under command of Colonel Thornton, who had
led the light brigade at Bladensburg and across Lake Borgne to the
Mississippi. The movement was ordered for the night of January 7, and
was to be made in boats already collected in the Villeré canal.

With some hesitation[554] Pakenham decided to make a simultaneous
attack on Jackson. The arrangements for this assault were simple.
The usual store of fascines and ladders was provided. Six of the
eighteen-pound guns were once more mounted in battery about eight
hundred yards from the American line, to cover the attack. The
army, after detaching Thornton’s corps, was organized in three
divisions,--one, under Major-General Gibbs, to attack Jackson’s left;
another, under Major-General Keane, to attack along the river-side; a
third, the reserve, to be commanded by Major-General Lambert.

“The principal attack was to be made by Major-General Gibbs,” said the
British official report.[555] The force assigned to Gibbs consisted
of the Fourth, Twenty-first, and Forty-fourth regiments, with three
companies of the Ninety-fifth,--about two thousand two hundred
rank-and-file.[556] The force assigned to Keane consisted of “the
Ninety-third, two companies of the Ninety-fifth, and two companies of
the Fusileers and Forty-third,”[557]--apparently about twelve hundred
rank-and-file. “The first brigade, consisting of the Fusileers and
Forty-third, formed the reserve” under Major-General Keane, apparently
also twelve hundred strong. Adding two hundred artillerists and five
hundred black troops of the First West India regiment, employed as
skirmishers along the edge of the swamp, the whole body of troops
engaged on the east bank in the assault, according to the official
report and returns of wounded,[558] numbered about five thousand three
hundred rank-and-file, consisting of the Fourth, Seventh (Fusileers),
Twenty-first, Forty-third, Forty-fourth, Ninety-third, and Ninety-fifth
regiments, of whom twenty-two hundred were to attack on the right,
twelve hundred on the left, and twelve hundred were to remain in
reserve.

Thus of the whole British force, some eight thousand rank-and-file,
fifty-three hundred were to assault Jackson’s line; twelve hundred were
to cross the river and assault Morgan; eight hundred and fifty men were
detailed for various duties; and the seamen, except two hundred with
Colonel Thornton, must have been in the boats.

To meet this assault, Jackson held an overwhelming force, in which his
mere numbers were the smallest element. According to a detailed account
given by Jackson two years afterward, his left wing, near the swamp,
was held by Coffee’s brigade of eight hundred and four men; his centre,
by Carroll’s brigade of fourteen hundred and fourteen men; his right,
near the river, by thirteen hundred and twenty-seven men, including all
the regulars; while Adair’s Kentucky brigade, numbering five hundred
and twenty-five men, were in reserve.[559] Adair claimed that the
Kentuckians numbered fully one thousand. The dispute mattered little,
for barely one third of the entire force, whatever it was, discharged a
gun.

Besides three thousand or thirty-five hundred men on the parapets
and a thousand in reserve, Jackson had twelve pieces of artillery
distributed along the line, covering every portion of the plain. The
earth-wall behind which his men rested was in every part sufficiently
high to require scaling, and the mud was so slippery as to afford
little footing.[560] Patterson’s battery on the opposite shore
increased in force till it contained three twenty-four-pounders and
six twelve-pounders,[561] covered the levee by which the British left
must advance. The “Louisiana” took no part in the action, her men being
engaged in working the guns on shore; but without the “Louisiana’s”
broadside, Jackson had more than twenty cannon in position. Such a
force was sufficient to repel ten thousand men if the attack were made
in open day.

Pakenham, aware of the probable consequences of attacking by daylight,
arranged for moving before dawn; but his plan required a simultaneous
advance on both banks of the river, and such a combination was liable
to many accidents. According to the journal of Major Forrest, the
British Assistant-Quartermaster-General,[562] forty-seven boats were
brought up the bayou on the evening of January 7:

   “As soon as it was dark, the boats commenced to be crossed
   over into the river. A dam erected below the sternmost boat
   had raised the water about two feet. Still there was a very
   considerable fall from the river; and through which, for an
   extent of two hundred and fifty yards, the boats were dragged
   with incredible labor by the seamen. It required the whole
   night to effect this, and the day had dawned before the first
   detachment of Colonel Thornton’s corps (about six hundred men)
   had embarked; and they just reached the opposite bank when the
   main attack commenced on the enemy’s line.”

At six o’clock in broad dawn the columns of Gibbs and Keane moved
forward toward Jackson’s works, which were lined with American troops
waiting for the expected attack. Gibbs’s column came first under
fire, advancing near the swamp in close ranks of about sixty men in
front.[563] Three of the American batteries opened upon them. Coming
within one hundred and fifty yards of the American line, the British
column obliqued to the left to avoid the fire of the battery directly
in face. As they came within musketry range the men faltered and
halted, beginning a confused musketry fire. A few platoons advanced to
the edge of the ditch, and then broke. Their officers tried in vain
to rally them for another advance. Major-General Gibbs was mortally
wounded, according to the official report, “within twenty yards of the
glacis.”[564] Pakenham himself rode forward to rally Gibbs’s column,
and was instantly struck by a grape-shot and killed, nearly three
hundred yards from the American line.[565] “As I advanced with the
reserve,” said Lambert’s report, “at about two hundred and fifty yards
from the line, I had the mortification to observe the whole falling
back upon me in the greatest confusion.”

Keane’s column on the left moved along the road and between the river
and the levee. Pressing rapidly forward, greatly annoyed by Patterson’s
battery on the west bank, the head of this column reached the American
line, and stormed an unfinished redoubt outside the main work at the
edge of the river. The concentrated fire of the whole American right
almost immediately drove the column back in disorder; the men who
reached the redoubt were killed; Major-General Keane was severely
wounded and carried off the field, while the casualties among officers
of a lower grade were excessive. The Ninety-third regiment in Keane’s
brigade lost its lieutenant-colonel and two captains killed, and
four more captains severely wounded; three hundred and forty-eight
rank-and-file were wounded, ninety-nine were reported missing, and
fifty-eight killed. These losses amounted to five hundred and five in
seven hundred and seventy-five rank-and-file.[566]

Lambert’s report continued:[567]--

   “In this situation, finding that no impression had been made;
   that though many men had reached the ditch, they were either
   drowned or obliged to surrender, and that it was impossible to
   restore order in the regiments where they were,--I placed the
   reserve in position until I could obtain such information as to
   determine me how to act to the best of my judgment, and whether
   or not I should resume the attack; and if so, I felt it could be
   done only by the reserve.”

Just as the main attack ended, Colonel Thornton with his six hundred
rank-and-file, having landed on the west bank, advanced against
Morgan’s line, routed it, turned the redoubt, and advanced on
Patterson’s heavy battery beyond. Patterson unable to use his guns had
no choice but to spike his pieces and retreat. Thornton passed up the
river a mile beyond Jackson’s line,[568] and needed only a field-piece
and some hot shot to burn the “Louisiana” and march opposite New
Orleans.

From the eastern shore Jackson watched the progress of Thornton with
alarm. His official report of January 9 gave an idea of his emotions.

   “Simultaneously with his advance on my lines,” Jackson said,
   “the enemy had thrown over in his boats a considerable force
   to the other side of the river. These having landed were hardy
   enough to advance against the works of General Morgan; and
   what is strange and difficult to account for, at the very
   moment when their entire discomfiture was looked for with a
   confidence approaching to certainty, the Kentucky reinforcements
   ingloriously fled, drawing after them by their example the
   remainder of the forces, and thus yielding to the enemy that
   most formidable position. The batteries which had rendered
   me for many days the most important service, though bravely
   defended, were of course now abandoned, not however until the
   guns had been spiked. This unfortunate rout had totally changed
   the aspect of affairs. The enemy now occupied a position from
   which they might annoy us without hazard, and by means of which
   they might have been enabled to defeat in a great measure the
   effect of our success on this side the river.”

John Adair, who was then in command of the Kentucky brigade, General
Thomas being unwell, took great offence at Jackson’s account of the
battle on the west bank. “The detachment on the other side of the
river,” he reported to Governor Shelby,[569] “were obliged to retire
before a superior force. They have been calumniated by those who
ought to have fought with them, but did not.” The tone of Jackson’s
report, and his language afterward, showed a willingness to load the
Kentucky troops on the west bank with the responsibility for a military
oversight with which they had nothing to do; but the oversight was not
the less serious, whoever was responsible for it. The Kentucky and
Louisiana troops did not easily yield. The British returns of killed
and wounded showed that Thornton’s column suffered a considerable
loss. Thornton himself was wounded; his regiment, the Eighty-fifth,
numbering two hundred and ninetyeight rank-and file, reported a loss
of forty-three men killed, wounded, and missing, besides their colonel.
Of one hundred sailors employed in the attack[570] twenty were killed
or wounded, besides Captain Money of the royal navy, “who, I am sorry
to say, was severely wounded,” said Thornton. The Americans made as
good a resistance as could have been expected, and had they resisted
longer they would merely have been captured when the next detachment
of Thornton’s column came up. The chief blame for the disaster did not
rest on them.

Jackson was helpless to interpose. As he and his men, lining the river
bank, watched the progress of Thornton’s column on the opposite shore,
Jackson could do nothing; but he ordered his men “that they should take
off their hats, and give our troops on the right bank three cheers.”
Adair, who inclined to a severe judgment of Jackson’s generalship, told
the story more picturesquely:[571]--

   “I was standing by him when he gave his order, and with a smile,
   not of approbation, observed I was afraid they could not hear
   us. The distance from us to them, on a straight line, was upward
   of one mile and a half; there was a thick fog, and I confess I
   could not see the troops of either army. All I could discover
   was the blaze from the guns; and seeing that continue to
   progress up the river was the only knowledge we had that our men
   were retreating.”

Jackson then ordered General Humbert, a French officer acting as
a volunteer, to take four hundred men and cross the river at New
Orleans to repulse the enemy, cost what it might;[572] but had the
enemy pressed his advantage, no force at Jackson’s command could have
stopped their advance, without causing the sacrifice of Jackson’s
lines. Fortunately the only remaining British general, Lambert, was not
disposed to make another effort. The eight regiments of regular troops
which made the bulk of Pakenham’s army had suffered severely in the
assault. One of these regiments, the Eighty-fifth, was with Thornton
on the west shore. Two, the Seventh and Forty-third, had been in the
reserve, and except two companies had never approached the works within
musket-shot, yet had lost fifty-two killed, and about one hundred
wounded and missing, in an aggregate of less than eighteen hundred.
The five remaining regiments--the Fourth, Twenty-first, Forty-fourth,
Ninety-third, and Ninety-fifth--were nearly destroyed. They went into
battle probably about three thousand strong:[573] they lost seventeen
hundred and fifty men killed, wounded, and missing. The total British
loss was two thousand and thirty-six.[574] The American loss was
seventy-one. Even on the west bank the American loss was much less than
that of the British.

The loss of three major-generals was almost as serious as the loss of
one third of the regular Infantry. Lambert, the fourth major-general,
weighed down by responsibility and defeat, had no wish but to escape.
He recalled Thornton’s corps the same evening from its position on the
opposite bank, and the next day, January 9, began preparations for his
difficult and hazardous retreat.[575]

Pakenham’s assault on Jackson’s lines at New Orleans, January 8,
repeated the assault made by Drummond, August 15, at Fort Erie.
According to the British account of that battle, Drummond’s engaged
force numbered twenty-one hundred and forty men; the reserve, about one
thousand.[576] Drummond’s direct attack, being made by night, was more
successful than Pakenham’s; his troops approached nearer and penetrated
farther than those of Gibbs and Keane; but the consequences were the
same. Of three thousand men, Drummond lost nine hundred and five. Of
six thousand, engaged in the double action of Jan. 8, 1815, Pakenham
lost two thousand and thirty-six. In each case the officers commanding
the assaulting columns were killed or wounded, and the repulse was
complete.

After the battle General Lambert’s position was critical. His
withdrawal of Thornton’s corps from the west bank betrayed his
intention of retiring, and his line of retreat was exposed to attack
from the bayou which headed near Jackson’s camp. Fortunately for him,
Jackson was contented with checking his advance.

   “Whether, after the severe loss he has sustained,” wrote
   Jackson, five days after the battle,[577] “he is preparing to
   return to his shipping, or to make still mightier efforts to
   attain his first object, I do not pretend to determine. It
   becomes me to act as though the latter were his intention.”

If Jackson’s inaction allowed Lambert to escape, it was likely to
hazard a renewal of the attack from some other quarter; but the
armies remained for ten days in their old positions without further
hostilities, except from artillery fire, until on the night of January
18, after making careful preparations, the whole British force silently
withdrew to fortified positions at the mouth of the bayou, disappearing
as suddenly and mysteriously as it came, and leaving behind it
only eight or, according to the American report, fourteen[578] of
the guns which had covered the river and held the “Louisiana” at a
distance.[579] At the mouth of the bayou the army remained until
January 27, when it was re-embarked in the ships off Chandeleur’s
Island.

  [Illustration:

    MOBILE POINT

    FROM ORIGINAL BY

    TH. CAMPBELL, LIEUT. ROYAL STAFF CORPS.

    _British Archives._]

On the day of the battle of January 8, a British squadron appeared
in the river below Fort St. Philip. Two bomb-vessels, under the
protection of a sloop, a brig, and a schooner, bombarded the fort
without effect until January 18, when they withdrew at the same time
with the army above.

Notwithstanding the disastrous failure of the campaign before New
Orleans, the British expedition, as it lay off Chandeleur Island
February 1, still possessed nearly as much strength as when it appeared
there December 11. Reinforced by a thousand fresh soldiers, Lambert
determined to attack Mobile. “It was decided,” reported Lambert,[580]
“that a force should be sent against Fort Bowyer, situated on the
eastern point of the entrance of the bay, and from every information
that could be obtained it was considered that a brigade would be
sufficient for this object, with a respectable force of artillery.”
At daylight on the morning of February 8 a whole brigade and a heavy
battering-train were disembarked in the rear of Fort Bowyer.

Jackson’s determination to defend Mobile had already deprived him of
the use of more than half the regular troops assigned to his military
district, who remained inactive at Mobile during the months of December
and January. They were commanded by General Winchester, whose record
as a military officer was not reassuring. Although Fort Bowyer was
known to be untenable against attack by land, Jackson not only retained
Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence there, but increased his force until he
had three hundred and sixty men in his command,--equal to the average
strength of an entire regiment, or half the force of regulars which
Jackson commanded at New Orleans. This garrison was only large enough
to attract, not to repel, an enemy. The obvious criticism on such a
course was afterward made by Armstrong:[581]--

   “After the arrival of the British armament the garrison of Fort
   Bowyer was not only continued but increased, though from its
   locality wholly unable to aid in any important purpose of the
   campaign. Nor was this the whole extent of the evil, for by the
   disposition made of this gallant corps it was not only subjected
   to present inaction, but ultimately ... to the perils of a siege
   and the humiliation of a surrender.”

Colonel Lawrence had no choice but to capitulate, which he did February
11. He had not even the opportunity to resist, for the British made
regular approaches, and could not be prevented from capturing the place
without the necessity of assault. Jackson reported to the Secretary of
War[582] that this event was one which he “little expected to happen
but after the most gallant resistance; that it should have taken place
without even a fire from the enemy’s batteries is as astonishing as it
is mortifying.” In truth, the military arrangements, not Lawrence’s
defence, were responsible for the result; and Jackson had reason to
fear that a greater disaster was at hand, for unless General Winchester
should promptly evacuate Mobile, the disaster of the River Raisin was
likely to be repeated on a larger scale.


                            END OF VOL. II.


FOOTNOTES:

[1] Proclamation of Admiral Cochrane, April 25, 1814; Niles, vi. 182.

[2] Pickering to John Lowell, Nov. 7, 1814; New England Federalism, p.
404.

[3] Pickering to George Logan, July 4, 1813; New England Federalism, p.
391.

[4] Thoughts in Answer to a Question respecting the Division of the
States; by a Massachusetts Farmer.

[5] The Palladium, Feb. 1, 1814.

[6] Pickering to Putnam, Feb. 4, 1814; New England Federalism, p. 391.

[7] Report of Committee; Niles, vi. 4–8.

[8] Federalist, no. 46.

[9] Dexter to the Electors of Massachusetts, Feb. 14, 1814; Niles, vi.
9.

[10] National Intelligencer, May 5, 1814.

[11] Shelby to J. J. Crittenden, April 8, 1814; Life of Crittenden, p.
31.

[12] Letter of Jan. 15, 1814; “National Intelligencer,” Jan. 27, 1814.

[13] The Palladium, July 15, 1814.

[14] The Palladium, July 15, 1814.

[15] Road to Ruin, No. 5; The Examiner, Jan. 8, 1814.

[16] Niles, vi. 94.

[17] Scott’s Autobiography, pp. 114, 118, 121.

[18] Return, etc.; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 521.

[19] Advertisement of Gilbert & Deane, Boston “Chronicle,” April 14,
1814.

[20] Secretary Campbell to Madison, May 4, 1814; Madison MSS., State
Department Archives.

[21] Act of March 4, 1814; Annals, 1813–1814, p. 2795.

[22] Defence of the Clergy; Concord, July, 1814.

[23] Armstrong to Wilkinson, Jan. 20, 1814; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, i 625.

[24] Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 64.

[25] Wilkinson to Dearborn, March 27, 1814; Dearborn MSS.

[26] Wilkinson to Dearborn, March 27, 1814; Dearborn MSS.

[27] State of the Left Division, Jan. 22, 1814; MSS. Canadian Archives.
Freer Papers, 1814, p. 17.

[28] James, ii. 82, 83.

[29] Armstrong to Brown, Feb. 28, 1814; Notices, ii. 213.

[30] Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 66.

[31] Lossing, p. 793.

[32] Brown to Armstrong, March 24, 1814; Lossing, p. 793.

[33] James, ii. 100.

[34] Report of Sir James Yeo; James, ii. 428–430.

[35] M. T. Woolsey to Chauncey, June 1, 1814; Niles, vi. 266.

[36] Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 216.

[37] Prevost to Bathurst, Aug. 27, 1814; MSS. British Archives.

[38] Torrens to Prevost, July 5, 1805; MSS. Canadian Archives.

[39] Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 74, 82.

[40] Armstrong to Izard, June 11, 1814; Izard’s Correspondence, p. 33.

[41] Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 82.

[42] Colonel McKay to Colonel McDouall, July 27, 1814; Report on
Canadian Archives by Douglas Brymner, 1887, p. cv.

[43] Madison to the Secretary of Navy, May 4, 1814; Madison’s Works,
iii. 396.

[44] Madison’s Cabinet Memorandum, June 7, 1814; Madison’s Works, iii.
403.

[45] Armstrong to Brown, June 10, 1814; MSS. War Department Records.

[46] Brown to Chauncey, June 21, 1814; enclosed in Brown to Armstrong,
June 22, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives.

[47] Monthly Returns, etc., MSS. War Department Archives.

[48] Stone’s Life of Red Jacket, p. 328.

[49] Weekly Distribution Return, June 22, 1814; MSS. Canadian Archives,
Freer Papers, 1814, p. 53.

[50] James, ii. 117.

[51] Brown’s Report of July 7, 1814; Official Letters, p. 368.

[52] Stone’s Life of Red Jacket, p. 352.

[53] Riall’s Report of July 6, 1814; James, ii. 431.

[54] Scott’s Autobiography, p. 128.

[55] Riall’s Report, July 6, 1814; James, ii. 432.

[56] Scott’s Autobiography, p. 130. Jesup’s Narrative; Ingersoll, ii.
90, 91. Mansfield’s Scott, pp. 105–110.

[57] James, ii. 432.

[58] Mansfield’s Scott, p. 112.

[59] James ii. 434.

[60] Riall to Drummond, July 8, 1814; MSS. Canadian Archives.

[61] Brown to Chauncey, July 13, 1814; Niles, vii. 38.

[62] James, ii. 132.

[63] Ripley’s “Facts relative to the Campaign on the Niagara,” p. 8.
Jesup’s Narrative; Ingersoll, ii. 106.

[64] Ripley’s “Facts,” 1815.

[65] Harvey to Lieut.-Colonel Tucker, July 23, 1814; MSS. Canadian
Archives.

[66] James, ii. 142.

[67] James, ii. 139.

[68] James, ii. 144.

[69] Drummond’s Report of July 27, 1814; James, ii. 436.

[70] James, ii. 143.

[71] Letter of Major Leavenworth, Jan. 15, 1815; Ripley’s “Facts,” p.
21.

[72] Letter of Major Leavenworth, Jan. 15, 1815; Ripley’s “Facts,” pp.
18–27.

[73] Strength of the Army, July 25, 1814; Ripley’s “Facts,” Appendix.

[74] Mansfield’s Scott, p. 129; _note 2_.

[75] Miller’s Letter in the Boston “Patriot,” Sept. 4, 1814; Ripley’s
“Facts,” p. 27.

[76] Lossing, p. 820, _note_.

[77] Evidence of Captain McDonald; Ripley’s “Facts,” p. 12.

[78] Drummond’s Report, July 27, 1814; James, ii. 437.

[79] Evidence of Captain McDonald; Ripley’s “Facts,” p. 13.

[80] Drummond’s Report; James, ii. 143.

[81] James, ii. 145.

[82] Evidence of Captain McDonald; Ripley’s “Facts,” p. 16.

[83] Cf. Wilkinson’s Memoirs, i. 712.

[84] Letter of Major Leavenworth, Jan. 15, 1815; Ripley’s “Facts,” p.
23. Jesup’s Narrative; Ingersoll, ii. 107.

[85] Letter of Major Leavenworth, Jan. 15, 1815; Ripley’s “Facts,” p.
23. Jesup’s Narrative; Ingersoll, ii. 107.

[86] Ripley’s “Facts,” Appendix.

[87] Letter of Captain Clarke, March 15, 1815; Ripley’s “Facts,” p. 30.
Letter of Adjutant Livingston, March 6, 1815; Ripley’s “Facts,” p. 31.

[88] Letter of Major Leavenworth, Jan. 15, 1815; Ripley’s “Facts,” p.
25.

[89] Colonel Hindman’s statement; Ripley’s “Facts,” p. 43.

[90] James, ii. 144–145.

[91] James, ii. 146.

[92] Letter in Halifax newspaper; Niles, vii. 410.

[93] Strength of the American army; Ripley’s “Facts,” Appendix.

[94] Drummond’s Report of July 27, 1814; James, ii. 438.

[95] Letter of Capt. McDonald, March 20, 1815; Ripley’s “Facts,” p. 29.

[96] Brown’s Report of the battle of July 25; Niles, vi. 433.

[97] Letter of Major Leavenworth, Jan. 15, 1815; Ripley’s “Facts,” p.
27.

[98] Letter of Major Leavenworth, Jan. 15, 1815; Ripley’s “Facts,” p.
27.

[99] Ripley’s “Facts.” Cf. Brown’s Narrative; Ingersoll, ii. 105.

[100] Letter of Major Leavenworth, Jan. 15, 1815, Ripley’s “Facts,” p.
383.

[101] Report of Aug. 7, 1814; Niles, vi. 434. Brown to Dallas, May,
1815; Ripley’s “Facts,” p. 46.

[102] Brown’s Diary; Ingersoll’s History, ii. 105.

[103] James, ii. 161, 162.

[104] Drummond to Prevost, Aug. 4, 1814; MSS. Canadian Archives.

[105] James, ii. 162, 163.

[106] Ingersoll’s History, ii. 145. Cf. Report of Major Morgan, Aug. 5,
1814; Niles, vi. 437.

[107] Drummond to Prevost, Aug. 4, 1814; MSS. Canadian Archives.

[108] Charges of Lieutenant-Colonel Trimble against General Gaines;
Niles, xi. 219.

[109] Report of General Gaines, August, 1814; Niles, vii. 19.

[110] James, ii. 170, 171.

[111] Drummond’s orders of Aug. 14, 1814; Niles, vii. 21. James, ii.
169–171.

[112] James, ii. 178.

[113] Instructions to Lieutenant-Colonel Fischer, Aug. 14, 1814; MSS.
Canadian Archives.

[114] Lieutenant-General Drummond’s Order for attack [Secret]; Niles,
vii. 21.

[115] Gaines’s Report of Aug. 23, 1814; Niles, vii. 19. Ripley’s Report
of Aug. 17, 1814; Niles, vii. Supplement, p. 139.

[116] Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Fischer, Aug. 15, 1814; James, ii.
453.

[117] Charges of Major Trimble; Niles, xi. 219.

[118] British Return; James, ii. 454. American Return; Niles, vii. 21.

[119] Drummond to Prevost, Aug. 16, 1814; MSS. Canadian Archives.

[120] James, ii. 814. Drummond to Prevost, Aug. 16, 1814; MSS. Canadian
Archives.

[121] Chauncey to Brown, Aug. 10, 1814; Niles, vii. 38.

[122] James, ii. 230.

[123] Ripley to Armstrong, Sept. 4, 1814; MSS. War Department.

[124] Lossing, p. 837.

[125] Brown to Izard, Sept. 10, 1814; Izard’s Correspondence, p. 86.

[126] Drummond to Prevost, Sept. 8, 1814; MSS. Canadian Archives.

[127] Drummond to Prevost, Sept. 11, 1814; MSS. Canadian Archives.

[128] Drummond to Prevost, Sept. 14, 1814; MSS. Canadian Archives.

[129] Jesup’s Narrative; Lossing, p. 837, _note_; Ingersoll, ii.
151.

[130] Porter’s Report of Sept. 22, 1814, and Brown’s Report of Sept.
29, 1814; Niles, vii. 100, 101.

[131] Brown’s Report of Sept. 29, 1814; Niles, vii. 100.

[132] Brown’s Report of Oct. 1, 1814; Official Letters, p. 445.

[133] James, ii. 232, 233. Report of Major-General DeWatteville, Sept.
19, 1814; James, ii. 469.

[134] James, ii. 234.

[135] James, ii. 236.

[136] Drummond to Prevost, Sept. 21, 1814; MSS. Canadian Archives.

[137] Chauncey to Jones, Aug. 10, 1814; Niles, vii. 37.

[138] Izard to Armstrong, July 19, 1814; Izard’s Correspondence, p. 54.

[139] Armstrong to Izard, July 2, 1814; Izard’s Correspondence, p. 51.

[140] W. H. Robinson to Sir G. Prevost, Aug. 27, 1814; MSS. British
Archives.

[141] Prevost to Bathurst, Oct. 18, 1814; MSS. British Archives.

[142] Izard’s Correspondence, p. 57.

[143] Prevost to Bathurst, Aug. 27, 1814; MSS. British Archives.

[144] Lieut.-Colonel Pilkington to Lieut.-General Sherbrooke, July 12,
1814; James, ii. 472.

[145] Sherbrooke to Bathurst, Sept. 18, 1814; James, ii. 475.

[146] Sherbrooke to Bathurst, Sept. 18, 1814; James, ii. 475.

[147] Morris to Jones, Sept. 20, 1814; Niles, vii. 63.

[148] James, ii. 482.

[149] Lossing, p. 903, _note_.

[150] Armstrong to Izard, May 25 and June 30, 1814; Izard’s
Correspondence, pp. 23, 48.

[151] Izard to Armstrong, July 12, 1814; Izard’s Correspondence, p. 52.

[152] Izard to Armstrong, July 19, 1814; Izard’s Correspondence, p. 54.

[153] Armstrong to Izard, July 27, 1814; Izard’s Correspondence, p. 64.

[154] Izard to Armstrong, Aug. 11, 1814; Izard’s Correspondence.

[155] Armstrong to Izard, July 27, 1814; Izard’s Correspondence, p. 64.

[156] Armstrong to Izard, Aug. 12, 1814; Izard’s Correspondence, p. 69.

[157] Izard’s Correspondence, p. 144.

[158] Macomb to Armstrong, Sept. 15, 1814; Niles, vii. 60.

[159] Armstrong to Izard, Aug. 2, 1814; Izard’s Correspondence, p. 61.

[160] See ante, vol. vii. p. 173.

[161] Proposed Distribution of the Forces in the Left Division; MSS.
Canadian Archives, Freer Papers, 1812–1813, p. 107.

[162] James, ii. 206.

[163] Comparative Force of the Flotillas; MSS. Canadian Archives.
Prevost’s Report; James, ii. 462; Christie, ii. 211, _note_.

[164] Christie, ii. 221, 222.

[165] Montreal Herald, Sept. 24, 1814.

[166] Report of Sept. 15, 1814; Niles, vii. 50.

[167] Christie, ii. 212.

[168] Christie, ii. 212.

[169] London Naval Chronicle, xxxii. 292. Niles, viii.; Supplement, p.
173.

[170] James, p. 413.

[171] Cooper’s Naval History, ii. 429.

[172] Macdonough’s Report of Sept. 12, 1814; Niles, vii. 42. Cooper’s
Naval History, chap. xxviii. James’s Naval Occurrences, pp. 414, 415.
Roosevelt’s Naval War of 1812, pp. 378–384.

[173] Cooper’s Naval History, ii. 427, 431.

[174] Cooper’s Naval History, ii. 432.

[175] Prevost’s Report of Sept. 11, 1814; James, ii. 461.

[176] Izard to Monroe, Oct. 7, 1814; Izard’s Correspondence, p. 97.

[177] Report of Captain Pring, Sept. 12, 1814; James, Appendix no. 90.

[178] Report of Commodore Macdonough, Sept. 13, 1814; Niles, vii. 41.

[179] Howard Douglas’s Naval Gunnery, p. 115. (Fourth edition).

[180] Christie, ii. 215, 216.

[181] Annual Register for 1814, p. 332.

[182] Prevost to Bathurst, Oct. 6, 1814; Christie, ii. 395.

[183] Wellington to Sir George Murray, Dec. 22, 1814; Despatches, xii.
224.

[184] Stanhope’s Conversations, p. 252.

[185] Brown to Izard, Sept. 10, 1814; Izard’s Correspondence, p. 86.

[186] Notices, ii. 102–107.

[187] Izard to Monroe, Oct. 16, 1814; Izard’s Correspondence, p. 100.

[188] Izard to Monroe, Oct. 16, 1814; Izard’s Correspondence, p. 103.

[189] Izard to Monroe, Oct. 23, 1814; Izard’s Correspondence, p. 105.
Cf. Brown to Armstrong, Nov. 28, 1814; Kosciusko Armstrong’s “Notice of
J. Q. Adams’s Eulogy on James Monroe,” p. 29.

[190] Izard to Monroe, Nov. 20, 1814; Izard’s Correspondence, p. 119.

[191] Izard to Monroe, Dec. 18, 1814; Izard’s Correspondence, p. 130.

[192] James, ii. 241.

[193] James, ii. 393.

[194] MSS. Canadian Archives. Freer Papers, 1814, p. 31.

[195] Lieutenant Edwards’s Report of July 25, 1814; State Papers,
Military Affairs, i. 545.

[196] Winder to Armstrong, July 9, 1814; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i. 543.

[197] Letter of Secretary Armstrong, Oct. 17, 1814; State Papers,
Military Affairs, i. 538.

[198] Letter of J. P. Van Ness, Nov. 23, 1814; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i. 581.

[199] Madison to Armstrong, May 20, 1814; Madison’s Works, iii. 399.

[200] Madison’s Works, iii. 408, 409.

[201] Notices, ii. 140.

[202] Madison’s Works, iii. 422, 426.

[203] Winder to Armstrong, July 27, 1814; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i. 546.

[204] Winder’s letter of Sept. 26, 1814; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i. 552.

[205] Bathurst to Ross, 1814; War Office Despatches, MSS. British
Archives.

[206] Cochrane to Prevost, July 22, 1814; MSS. Canadian Archives. C.
684, p. 221.

[207] Orders of Vice-Admiral Cochrane, July 18, 1814; MSS. Canadian
Archives, C. 684, p. 204.

[208] James, ii. 275, 276; Cockburn to Cochrane, Aug. 27, 1814; Ross to
Bathurst, Aug. 30, 1814; James, ii. 492–499.

[209] Cochrane to Monroe, Aug. 18, 1814; State Papers, Foreign Affairs,
iii. 693.

[210] Gleig’s Washington and New Orleans, p. 51. James, ii. 283.

[211] Map of General Ross’s Route; Wilkinson’s Memoirs.

[212] Ross’s Report of Aug. 30, 1814; Niles, vii. 277.

[213] Monroe to Madison, Aug. 20 and 21, 1814; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i. 537. Winder’s Narrative, Ibid. 554.

[214] State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 547, 549.

[215] Winder’s Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 554.
General W. Smith’s Statement; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 563.

[216] Winder’s Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 554.
General W. Smith’s Statement, i. 563.

[217] Winder’s Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 555.

[218] State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 538.

[219] Serurier to Talleyrand, Aug. 22, 1814; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.

[220] Winder’s Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, pp. 555, 556.

[221] Winder’s Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, pp. 556, 557.

[222] Statement of John Law; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 585.

[223] Winder’s Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 557.

[224] State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 548.

[225] Captain Burch’s Statement, Oct. 12, 1814; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i. 574.

[226] Rush’s Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 542.
Winder’s Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 557.

[227] Review of J. Q. Adams by Kosciusko Armstrong, p. 7.

[228] William Pinkney’s Statement; State Papers, Military Affairs, i.
572.

[229] Secretary Jones’s Report, Oct. 3, 1814; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i. 576.

[230] Armstrong’s Letter; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 540.
Ingersoll’s History, ii. 173.

[231] Stansbury’s Report; Monroe’s Letter; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i. 561, 536.

[232] Gleig’s Subaltern, p. 68.

[233] Letter of William Simmons; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 596.

[234] Winder’s Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 557.
Stansbury’s Report; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 562.

[235] Van Ness’s Letter; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 580.

[236] Barney’s Report of Aug. 29, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs,
i. 579.

[237] Colonel Beall’s Statement; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 571.

[238] James, ii. 499.

[239] Cockburn to Cochrane, Aug. 27, 1814; James, ii. 493.

[240] Campaigns, p. 67; Cf. Barney to the National Intelligencer.
Niles, vii. Supplement, p. 159.

[241] Benjamin Ogle Tayloe. In Memoriam, p. 154.

[242] Serurier to Talleyrand, Aug. 22 and 27, 1814. Archives des Aff.
Étr. MSS.

[243] Reports of Ross and Cockburn; James, ii. 499.

[244] Ingersoll’s History, ii. 189.

[245] Ross’s Report of Aug. 30, 1814; James, ii. 496.

[246] Monroe’s Letter, Nov. 13, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs,
i. 537.

[247] Mrs. Madison to her sister, Aug. 24, 1814; Memoirs and Letters of
Dolly Madison, p. 108.

[248] Memorandum of Colonel Monroe; MSS. State Department Archives.

[249] Ingersoll’s History, ii. 208; Memoirs and Letters of Dolly
Madison, p. 116.

[250] Report of General Stansbury, Nov. 15, 1814; State Papers,
Military Affairs, i. 560.

[251] Notices, ii. 148.

[252] Statement of John Law, Nov. 10, 1814; State Papers, Military
Affairs, p. 585.

[253] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, i. 786.

[254] Winder’s Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, p. 558.

[255] Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 231; Appendix no. 28. Winder’s
Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, p. 559.

[256] Notices, vol. ii. chap. v.

[257] Madison’s Memorandum, Aug. 24, 1814; Works, iii. 422.

[258] Stansbury’s Report; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 562.

[259] Madison to Monroe, Aug. 26, ten o’clock P.M.; Ingraham’s
“Sketch of the Events,” p. 61.

[260] Note of Aug. 27, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives.

[261] Report of Captain Gordon, Sept. 9, 1814; James, Appendix no. 84.

[262] Monroe’s Memorandum; Gilman’s Monroe, p. 119.

[263] Williams; Capture of Washington, p. 105.

[264] McKenney’s Memoirs, p. 47.

[265] Madison’s Memorandum; Works, iii. 424. Letter of Jacob Barker,
Feb. 8, 1843; Life of Barker, pp. 114, 115.

[266] Armstrong’s Letter of Sept. 13, 1814; Niles, vii. 6.

[267] McKenney’s Memoirs, p. 44.

[268] Monroe to Madison, Sept. 25, 1814; Madison MSS. State Department
Archives.

[269] Report of Captain Gordon, Sept. 9, 1814; James, ii. Appendix no.
84.

[270] Chamier’s “Life of a Sailor.” Preface to Second Edition, chap.
xviii.

[271] Life of a Sailor, Bentley, 1850, p. 180.

[272] James, ii. 276.

[273] Report of Acting-Commodore Crease, Sept. 1, 1814; Niles, vii.,
Supplement, p. 150.

[274] Chamier’s “Life of a Sailor,” pp. 183–191.

[275] Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Armistead, Sept. 24, 1814; Niles,
vii. 40.

[276] Army Returns; MSS. Adjutant-General’s office, War Department.

[277] Cochrane’s Report of Sept. 17, 1814; James, ii. Appendix no. 73.

[278] James, ii. 313, 314.

[279] Gleig’s Campaigns, p. 116.

[280] Report of General Stricker, Sept. 15, 1814; Niles, vii. 26.

[281] Drawing of line of battle; Lossing, p. 953. Report of Colonel
Brooke, Sept. 17, 1814; James, ii. Appendix no. 71.

[282] James, ii. 315.

[283] Gleig’s Campaigns, p. 102.

[284] Brooke’s Report of Sept. 17, 1814; James, ii. Appendix no. 71, p.
508.

[285] Armistead’s Report, Sept. 24, 1814; Niles, vii. 40.

[286] Cochrane’s Report of Sept. 17, 1814; James, ii. 514.

[287] Subaltern, chap. xiii.

[288] James, p. 305.

[289] Report of Captain Hillyar; James, ii. Appendix no. 71. Naval
History, vi. 153.

[290] Commander R. W. Wales to Sir Alexander Cochrane, May 8, 1814;
MSS. British Archives.

[291] Commander R. W. Wales to Sir Alexander Cochrane, May 8, 1814;
MSS. British Archives.

[292] James’s Naval History, vi. 160.

[293] James, pp. 342–347.

[294] Report of Captain Warrington, Oct. 30, 1814; Niles, vii. 155.

[295] Blakeley’s Report of July 8, 1814; Niles, vii. 114.

[296] Report of Captain James Arbuthnot, Sept. 1, 1814; MSS. British
Archives.

[297] Report of Lieutenant George Lloyd of the “Castilian,” Sept. 2,
1814; MSS. British Archives.

[298] Lieutenant Lloyd to Vice-Admiral Sawyer, Sept 2, 1814; MSS.
British Archives.

[299] Blakeley’s Report, Sept. 11, 1814; Niles, vii. 191.

[300] Letter from the Purser, July 29, 1814; Niles, vi. 391.

[301] James, p. 361.

[302] Morning Chronicle, Sept. 6, 1814.

[303] Niles, vii. 174.

[304] Croker to the Mayor of Bristol, Sept. 16, 1814; Niles, viii.
Supplement, p. 186.

[305] Letter of Consul Dabney, Oct. 5, 1814; Niles, vii. 253.

[306] Robert Lloyd to Rear-Admiral Brown, Sept. 28, 1814; MSS. British
Archives.

[307] Letter of Captain Reid, Oct. 4, 1814; Niles, vii. Supplement, p.
167.

[308] Niles, vii. 255. James’s Naval History, vi. 509. Cf. Letter from
Fayal, Oct. 15, 1814. Cobbett’s “Weekly Register,” reprinted in Niles,
vii. Supplement, p. 171.

[309] Niles, vii. 255.

[310] Dabney’s Letter; Niles, vii. 254. Reid’s Letter of Oct. 4, 1814;
State Papers, Naval Affairs, p. 495.

[311] Report of Captain Lloyd, Oct. 4, 1814; MSS. British Archives.

[312] Captain Hope to Rear Admiral Hotham, Oct. 11, 1814; MSS. British
Archives.

[313] James’s Naval History, vi. 527.

[314] Report of Secretary Campbell, Sept. 26, 1814; State Papers,
Finance, ii. 840.

[315] Niles, vii.; Supplement, p. 176.

[316] Niles, vii.; Supplement, p. 176.

[317] Armstrong to Eppes, Feb. 10, 1814; Niles, vi. 94. See
_ante_, vol. vii. p. 381.

[318] Report; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 535.

[319] Return of Enlistments, Nov. 2, 1814; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i. 521. Letter of Assistant Inspector-General, Oct. 22, 1814;
State Papers, Military Affairs, p. 518.

[320] The Inspector-General’s Letter of Nov. 2, 1814; State Papers,
Military Affairs, p. 520.

[321] Report of the Paymaster, Oct. 26, 1814; State Papers, Military
Affairs, p. 519.

[322] Monroe to Giles, Oct. 26, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs,
p. 518.

[323] Brown to Armstrong, July [August] 19, 1814; MSS. War Department
Archives.

[324] Niles, vii.; Supplement, p. 188.

[325] Strong to Eustis, Aug. 5, 1812; State Papers, Military Affairs,
i. 610.

[326] General Orders, Sept. 6, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, p.
613.

[327] Strong to the Secretary of War, Sept. 7, 1814; State Papers,
Military Affairs, p. 613.

[328] Monroe to Strong, Sept. 17, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs,
p. 614.

[329] Cushing to the Secretary of War, Sept. 12, 1814; State Papers,
Military Affairs, p. 620.

[330] Macomb to Chittenden, Sept. 4, 1814; Niles, vii. 102.

[331] Chittenden to General Newell, Sept. 5, 1814; Niles, vii. 103.

[332] Message of Oct. 5, 1814; Niles, vii. 113.

[333] Quincy’s Life of Quincy, p. 357.

[334] Pickering to Strong, Oct. 12, 1814; New England Federalism, p.
394.

[335] Report of Oct. 8, 1814; Niles, vii. 149.

[336] Cabot to Pickering, Feb. 14, 1804; Lodge’s Cabot, p. 341. See
_ante_, vol. ii. p. 166.

[337] Senate Report of Oct. 18, 1814; Niles, vii. 151.

[338] Niles, vii. 154.

[339] Niles, vii. 165.

[340] Report; Niles, vii. 164.

[341] Niles, vii. 181.

[342] Niles, ix. 281.

[343] Niles, iv. 268.

[344] Randolph’s Letter to Lloyd, Dec. 15, 1814; Niles, vii. 258.

[345] Kennedy’s Life of Wirt, i. 339.

[346] Jefferson to Madison, Sept. 24, 1814; Works, vi. 385.

[347] Jefferson to Monroe, Jan. 1, 1815; Works, vi. 407.

[348] Jefferson to Short, Nov. 28, 1814; Works, vi. 398.

[349] Seybert, p. 436; Pitkin, p. 415.

[350] Statement, etc.; State Papers, Finance, iii. 44–48.

[351] State Papers; Finance, ii. 846, 847.

[352] Letter of Paymaster Brent, Oct. 26, 1814; State papers, Military
Affairs, i. 519.

[353] Niles’s Register, Nov. 26, 1814.

[354] Ingersoll’s History, ii. 253.

[355] Ingersoll’s History, ii. 254, 257.

[356] Dallas to William Lowndes, Nov. 27, 1814; State Papers, Finance,
ii. 872.

[357] Dallas to the Commissioner of Loans at Boston, Nov. 9, 1814;
Niles, vii. 270.

[358] Jefferson to Madison, Oct. 15, 1814; Works, vi. 391.

[359] Jefferson to Thomas Cooper, Sept. 10, 1814; Works, vi. 375.

[360] Report of Oct. 10, 1814; State Papers, Finance, ii. 854.

[361] Jefferson to Monroe, Oct. 16, 1814; Works, vi. 394.

[362] Dallas to Eppes, Oct. 17, 1814; State Papers, Finance, ii. 866.

[363] Dallas to Lowndes, Nov. 27, 1814; State Papers, ii. 872.

[364] Annals of Congress, 1814–1815, p. 606.

[365] Dallas to Eppes, Dec. 2, 1814; State Papers, Finance, ii. 877.

[366] Jefferson to Short, Nov. 28. 1814; Works, vi. 398.

[367] Statement, etc.; State Papers, Finance, ii. 861.

[368] Annals of Congress, 1815–1816, p. 1435.

[369] Letter to E. Webster, Jan. 30, 1814; Webster’s Correspondence, i.
250, 251.

[370] Review of Dallas’s Report; Boston “Advertiser,” Dec. 1815.

[371] Niles, vii.; Supplement, p. 176.

[372] Dallas to Eppes, Jan. 17, 1817; State Papers, Finance, ii. 885.

[373] Life of George Ticknor, i. 31.

[374] Jefferson to Monroe, Oct. 16, 1814; Works, vi. 394.

[375] Monroe to Giles, Oct. 17, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs,
i. 514.

[376] Explanatory Observations, State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 515.

[377] Monroe to Giles, Oct. 26, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs,
i. 518.

[378] Annals of Congress, Feb. 6, 1815, p. 1130.

[379] A Bill, etc.; Niles, vii. 181.

[380] Message of Governor Strong, with documents, Jan. 18, 1815.

[381] Debate of Dec. 2, 1814; Annals of Congress, 1814–1815, iii. 705.

[382] Annals of Congress, 1814–1815, iii. 974.

[383] Annals of Congress, 1814–1815, iii. 891, 895.

[384] Annals of Congress, 1814–1815, iii. 734.

[385] Speech of C. J. Ingersoll, Dec. 9, 1814; Annals, 1814–1815, iii.
809.

[386] Annals of Congress, 1814–1815, iii. 907.

[387] Annals of Congress, 1814–1815, iii. 790, 791.

[388] Annals of Congress, 1814–1815, iii. 829.

[389] Annals of Congress, 1814–1815, iii. 833.

[390] Annals of Congress, 1814–1815, iii. 848.

[391] Resolution; Niles, vii.; Supplement, p. 107.

[392] Annals of Congress, 1814–1815, iii. 808.

[393] Curtis’s Life of Webster, i. 139.

[394] Annals of Congress, 1814–1815, iii. 869.

[395] Annals of Congress. 1814–1815, iii. 882.

[396] Curtis’s Life of Webster, i. 139 _note_.

[397] Act of Dec. 10, 1814; Annals of Congress, 1814–1815, p. 1837.

[398] Annals of Congress, 1814–1815, pp. 1125–1130.

[399] Madison’s Debates, ii. 712.

[400] Message of Sept. 30, 1814; Niles, vii. 97.

[401] Monroe’s Memoir; Deposition of Tench Ringgold, Feb. 14, 1826, pp.
13, 58.

[402] Eulogy of James Monroe by J. Q. Adams, p. 75.

[403] H. G. Otis’s Letters in Defence of the Hartford Convention, 1824,
pp. 38, 39.

[404] Lodge’s Cabot, p. 561.

[405] Pickering to John Lowell, Jan. 24, 1815; New England Federalism,
p. 425.

[406] Debate of Jan. 29, 1816; Annals of Congress, 1815–1816, p. 795.

[407] Letter of Invitation, Oct. 17, 1814; Niles, vii. 179

[408] Lodge’s Memoir of Strong; Proceedings of Massachusetts Historical
Society, 1879.

[409] Lodge’s Memoir of Strong; Proceedings of Massachusetts Historical
Society, 1879.

[410] Pickering to Strong, Oct. 29, 1814; Lodge’s Cabot, p. 535.

[411] Boston Centinel, Oct. 19, 1814.

[412] Otis’s Letters in Defence of the Hartford Convention, p. 10.

[413] Pickering to Lowell, Nov. 7, 1814; Lodge’s Cabot, p. 541.

[414] Lowell to Pickering, Dec. 3, 1814; Lodge’s Cabot, p. 545.

[415] Lodge’s Cabot, p. 541.

[416] Lodge’s Cabot, p. 519.

[417] Lodge’s Cabot, p. 548.

[418] Ingersoll’s History, ii. 232–238; MSS. War Department Archives.

[419] Morris to Pickering, Dec. 22, 1814; Morris’s Works, iii. 324.

[420] Boston Gazette, Jan. 5, 1815.

[421] Boston Centinel, Jan. 14, 1815.

[422] Pickering to Lowell, Jan. 23, 1815; Lodge’s Cabot, p. 561.

[423] Report of Committee, Jan. 24, 1815; Niles, vii. 372.

[424] Niles, vii.; Supplement, p. 97.

[425] Boston Centinel, Feb. 4, 1815.

[426] Sumner’s East Boston, p. 739.

[427] Speech to the Connecticut Legislature; Niles, vii.; Supplement,
p. 95.

[428] Lodge’s Cabot, pp. 504–526; Lossing, p. 1015; Goodrich’s
Recollections, ii. pp. 9–61.

[429] Lodge’s Cabot, p. 518.

[430] Pickering to Lowell, Jan. 23, 1815; Lodge’s Cabot, p. 561.

[431] Niles, vii.; Supplement, pp. 49–53.

[432] Palladium, Jan. 24, 1815. Cf. Pickering to Lowell, Jan. 24, 1815;
New England Federalism, p. 426.

[433] Mason to Nicholas, Nov. 26, 1814; Nicholas MSS.

[434] Life of Ticknor, i. 12.

[435] Jefferson to Gallatin; Works, vi. 498.

[436] Life of Ticknor, i. 37.

[437] The Federal Republican, Jan. 14 and 16, 1815.

[438] Bathurst to Ross, July 30, 1814; MSS. British Archives.

[439] Cochrane to Croker, June 20, 1814; MSS. British Archives.

[440] Croker to Cochrane, Aug. 10, 1814; MSS. British Archives.

[441] Bathurst to Ross, Aug. 10, 1814; MSS. British Archives.

[442] Bathurst to Ross, Sept. 6, 1814; MSS. British Archives.

[443] Bathurst to Ross, Sept. 28, 1814; MSS. British Archives.

[444] Bathurst to Ross, Sept. 29, 1814; MSS. British Archives.

[445] Bathurst to Ross, Sept. 29, 1814; MSS. British Archives.

[446] Eaton’s Jackson, p. 210.

[447] Eaton’s Jackson, p. 212.

[448] Jackson to Armstrong, Aug. 10, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives.

[449] Sir Alexander Cochrane to Croker, July 23, 1814; MSS. British
Archives.

[450] Jackson to Governor Blount, Aug. 27, 1814; Niles, vii. 47.

[451] Military and Naval Letters, p. 407.

[452] Latour, p. 14.

[453] National Intelligencer, Oct. 22, 1814.

[454] Latour, Appendix, p. ix.

[455] Anonymous Letter of Aug. 8, 1814; Latour, Appendix, p. v.

[456] Latour, p. 34.

[457] James, ii. 344.

[458] General Orders of Sept. 17, 1814; Niles, vii. 95.

[459] Latour, p. 33.

[460] Latour, Appendix, p. xxix.

[461] Latour, Appendix, p. xxxi.

[462] Jackson to Monroe, Oct. 10, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives.

[463] Jackson to Monroe, Oct. 14, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives.

[464] Eaton, pp. 239, 240.

[465] Monroe to Jackson, Sept. 25, 1814; MSS. War Department Records.
Monroe MSS.

[466] Monroe to Jackson, Oct. 21, 1814; MSS. War Department Records.

[467] Monroe to Hugh L. White, Feb. 9, 1827; Monroe MSS., State
Department Archives.

[468] Eaton, p. 243.

[469] Jackson to Governor Blount, Nov. 14, 1814; Official Letters, p.
451.

[470] Jackson to Monroe, Oct. 28, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives.

[471] Jackson to Monroe, Oct. 31, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives.

[472] Jackson to Monroe, Nov. 14, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives.

[473] Jackson to Monroe, Nov. 14, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives.

[474] Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 176.

[475] Eaton, p. 257.

[476] Subaltern, p. 101.

[477] Monroe to Jackson, Dec. 7, 1814; MSS. War Department Records.

[478] Monroe to Jackson, Dec. 10, 1814; MSS. War Department Records.

[479] Eaton, pp. 261, 282.

[480] Jackson to Monroe, Nov. 20, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives.

[481] Jackson to Monroe, Dec. 2, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives.

[482] Eaton, p. 290.

[483] Subaltern, p. 193.

[484] Eaton, p. 286; Latour, p. 53.

[485] General Orders of Aug. 6, 1814; Latour, Appendix, p. xvii.

[486] Notices, ii 177.

[487] Jackson to Monroe, Dec. 12, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives.

[488] Eaton, p. 272.

[489] Eaton, p. 282.

[490] Sir Alexander Cochrane to J. W. Croker, Dec. 16, 1814; Latour,
Appendix, p. cxxxviii.

[491] James, ii. 349.

[492] Report of Captain Lockyer, Dec. 18, 1814; James, ii. 523.

[493] Letter of Dec. 16, 1814; Niles, vii. 316.

[494] General Orders, Dec. 16, 1814; Niles, vii. 316.

[495] General Orders, Dec. 16, 1814; Niles, vii. 317.

[496] Eaton, p. 290.

[497] Report of Major-General Keane, Dec. 26, 1814; James, ii. 529.

[498] Admiral Cochrane to Mr. Croker, Jan. 18, 1815; James, ii. 550.

[499] Latour, p. 77; Jackson’s Report of Dec. 27, 1814; Latour,
Appendix, p. xlv.

[500] James, ii. 355.

[501] Subaltern, p. 212.

[502] Latour, p. 66.

[503] Eaton, p. 293, _note_.

[504] Latour, p. 53.

[505] Subaltern, p. 215 (American edition, 1833).

[506] See Memoir of Latour in Cullum’s Campaigns of the War of
1812–1815, p. 309.

[507] Latour, p. 88.

[508] Latour, p. 105.

[509] Latour, p. 105.

[510] Captain Henley’s Letter of Dec. 28, 1814; Niles, vii. 387.

[511] Latour, p. 104. Parton, i. 617. Commodore Patterson’s Report of
Dec. 28, 1814; Latour, Appendix, p. xliii.

[512] Patterson’s Report of Dec. 28, 1814; Latour, Appendix, p. xliii.

[513] James, ii. 355.

[514] Latour’s Plan.

[515] James, ii. 355. Keane’s Report of Dec. 26, 1814; James, ii. 529.

[516] Latour, pp. 96, 97. Parton, ii. 90.

[517] Report of Dec. 26, 1815; Latour, Appendix, p. xliv.

[518] Report of Dec. 27, 1814; Niles, vii. 357.

[519] Latour’s Plan of the Battle of December 23; Peddie’s Sketch.

[520] James, ii. 362. Keane’s Report; James, ii. 530.

[521] Parton, ii. 100.

[522] Patterson to Secretary of Navy, Dec. 28, 1814; Latour, Appendix,
p. xliii.

[523] Report of Major-General Keane, Dec. 26, 1814; James, ii. 529.

[524] Keane’s Report of December 26, 1814; James, ii. 531.

[525] Subaltern, pp. 228, 229.

[526] James, ii. 363.

[527] Latour, p. 121.

[528] Patterson’s Report of Jan. 2, 1815; Latour, Appendix, p. 1, no.
xxviii.

[529] Gleig’s Campaigns, p. 165.

[530] Report of J. D. Henley, Dec. 28, 1814; Niles, vii. 387.

[531] Journal of Major Forrest; Latour, Appendix, p. cxlvii.

[532] Subaltern, p. 235.

[533] Cochrane’s Report of Jan. 18, 1815; James, ii. 552.

[534] Latour, pp. 147, 148.

[535] Patterson’s Report of Jan. 2, 1815; Latour, Appendix, p. 1, no.
xxviii.

[536] Campaigns, p. 166.

[537] Henley’s Report of December 28; Niles, vii. 387.

[538] Latour, p. 136. Patterson’s Report of Jan. 2, 1815; Latour,
Appendix, p. 1, no. xxviii.

[539] Journal of Major Forrest, Assistant-Quartermaster-General; MSS.
British Archives. Latour, Appendix, p. cxlvii.

[540] Subaltern, p. 249. Gleig’s Campaigns, p. 173.

[541] Patterson’s Report of Jan. 2, 1815; Latour, Appendix, p. 1, no.
xxviii.

[542] James, ii. 369.

[543] Subaltern, p. 249 (American edition, 1833).

[544] Life of Codrington, i. 334.

[545] Latour, pp. 133, 134.

[546] Return of Casualties; James, ii. 543.

[547] Journal; Latour, Appendix, p. cxlvii.

[548] Life of Codrington, i. 336. Lambert’s Report of Jan. 28, 1815;
Latour, Appendix, p. clxvi.

[549] Adair’s letters of Oct. 21, 1817; Letters of Adair and Jackson,
Lexington, 1817.

[550] Eaton, p. 359.

[551] Latour, p. 170.

[552] Adair to Jackson, March 20, 1815; Letters of Adair and Jackson,
1817; Latour, Appendix, p. cxxxii.

[553] Journal of Major Forrest, Assistant-Quartermaster-General; MSS.
British Archives. Lambert’s Report, Jan. 10, 1815; James, ii. 543.

[554] Life of Codrington, i. 336.

[555] Lambert’s Report of Jan. 10, 1815; Niles, viii. 177.

[556] James, ii. 373.

[557] Lambert’s Report; Niles, viii. 177.

[558] Niles, viii. 180.

[559] Jackson to Adair, July 23, 1817.

[560] Latour, pp. 147–152.

[561] Patterson’s Report of Jan. 13, 1815; Latour, Appendix, p. ix.

[562] Journal of Major Forrest, Assistant-Quartermaster-General; MSS.
British Archives.

[563] Latour, p. 154.

[564] Lambert’s Report of Jan. 10, 1815; Latour, Appendix, p. cxlix.

[565] Latour’s Plan.

[566] Return of Casualties; James, ii. 554.

[567] James, ii. 373.

[568] Latour’s Plan.

[569] Letter of Jan. 13, 1815; Niles, vii. 389.

[570] Thornton’s Report of Jan. 8, 1815; James, ii. 547.

[571] Letters of General Adair and General Jackson, 1817.

[572] Latour, p. 175.

[573] James, ii. 373.

[574] James, ii. 382.

[575] Report of General Lambert, Jan. 28, 1815; James, ii. 565.

[576] James, ii. 179.

[577] Jackson to the Secretary of War, Jan. 13, 1815; Niles, vii. 374.

[578] Latour, p. 185.

[579] Lambert’s Report of Jan. 28, 1815; Latour, Appendix, p. clxvi.

[580] Report of Feb. 14, 1815; Latour, Appendix, p. clxxii.

[581] Notices, ii. 176.

[582] Jackson’s Report of Feb. 24, 1815; Latour, Appendix, p. xcvii.


Transcriber’s Notes:

1. Obvious printers’, punctuation and spelling errors have been
corrected silently.

2. Where hyphenation is in doubt, it has been retained as in the
original

3. Some hyphenated and non-hyphenated versions of the same words have
been retained as in the original.

4. Italics are shown as _xxx_.