IAMBLICHUS
                                   ON
                            =The Mysteries=
                                 OF THE
                  EGYPTIANS, CHALDEANS, AND ASSYRIANS.


                       TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK

                                   BY

                             THOMAS TAYLOR.


Ο δε Αριστοτελης προς Αντιπατρον περι Αλεξανδρου γραφων, εφη μη μονον
εκεινῳ προσηκειν οτι πολλων κρατει μεγαφρονειν, αλλ’ ουδεν ηττον ει τις
ορθως γινωσκει περι θεων.

                                                               PLUTARCH.


                           =Second Edition.=


                                LONDON:
                            BERTRAM DOBELL,
                      77 CHARING CROSS ROAD, W.C.
                                  AND
                           REEVES AND TURNER,
                      5 WELLINGTON STREET, STRAND.
                               MDCCCXCV.




                             ADVERTISEMENT.


The various translations and original works of Thomas Taylor, though
still in request by the more zealous students of ancient philosophy and
occult science, have now become so scarce and expensive that it is only
within the power of comparatively wealthy collectors to obtain them.
This is a matter for regret, inasmuch as it cannot be affirmed that his
writings have been, or are likely to be superseded, or that they are
without value. They can hardly be neglected without loss by those who
desire to understand the systems of philosophy which satisfied the
spiritual needs of the antique world. It is not possible, even for the
most fervent believer in modern “progress,” to dismiss the speculations
of the ancient philosophers as antiquated notions which have had their
day and no longer possess interest or value. The names of Socrates,
Plato, and Aristotle can never grow dim with age, nor is it possible to
conceive a time when men shall cease to study and reverence them. As the
disciple, the translator, and the expounder of these and of other sages
of antiquity, Thomas Taylor deserves to be held in honour and
remembrance, and it would be a misfortune if his labours remained
unknown because of the scarcity of his books. It is for this reason that
the present reprint has been undertaken; and it is hoped that it will
meet with such a measure of success as may encourage the republication
of various other works by the same author. It has been printed in
handsome style and published at a moderate price in order that it may be
regarded as a desirable addition to the scholar’s library, while yet it
will not tax severely the means of the not too wealthy student. For the
rest it is only necessary to say that this reprint is, in size, number
of pages, type, and general get-up, an almost exact facsimile of the
original edition, which was first printed in 1821. No alterations or
additions have been made in or to the original text, as it is thought
that those who care for Taylor’s writings will prefer to have them in
their integrity. Should it be found possible, however, to continue the
series it is intended to prefix to a future volume an essay on Taylor,
which will contain a biography of him, and a critical estimate of his
writings.


  _May, 1895._




                             INTRODUCTION.


It appears to me that there are two descriptions of persons by whom the
present work must be considered to be of inestimable worth, the lovers
of antiquity and the lovers of ancient philosophy and religion. To the
former of these it must be invaluable, because it is replete with
information derived from the wise men of the Chaldeans, the prophets of
the Egyptians, the dogmas of the Assyrians, and the ancient pillars of
Hermes; and to the latter, because of the doctrines contained in it,
some of which originated from the Hermaic pillars, were known by
Pythagoras and Plato, and were the sources of their philosophy; and
others are profoundly theological, and unfold the mysteries of ancient
religion with an admirable conciseness of diction, and an inimitable
vigour and elegance of conception. To which also may be added, as the
colophon of excellence, that it is the most copious, the clearest, and
the most satisfactory defence extant of genuine ancient theology.

This theology, the sacred operations pertaining to which called
_theurgy_ are here developed, has for the most part, since the
destruction of it, been surveyed only in its corruptions among barbarous
nations, or during the decline and fall of the Roman empire, with which,
overwhelmed with pollution, it gradually fell, and at length totally
vanished from what is called the polished part of the globe. This will
be evident to the intelligent reader from the following remarks, which
are an epitome of what has been elsewhere more largely discussed by me
on this subject, and which also demonstrate the religion of the
Chaldeans, Egyptians, and Greeks to be no less scientific than sublime.

In the first place, this theology celebrates the immense principle of
things as something superior even to being itself; as exempt from the
whole of things, of which it is nevertheless ineffably the source; and
does not, therefore, think fit to enumerate it with any triad[1] or
order of beings. Indeed it even apologizes for giving the appellation of
the most simple of our conceptions to that which is beyond all knowledge
and all conception. It denominates this principle however, _the one_ and
_the good_; by the former of these names indicating its transcendent
simplicity, and by the latter its subsistence as the object of desire to
all beings. For all things desire good. At the same time, however, it
asserts that these appellations are in reality nothing more than the
parturitions of the soul, which, standing as it were in the vestibules
of the adytum of deity, announce nothing pertaining to the ineffable,
but only indicate her spontaneous tendencies towards it, and belong
rather to the immediate offspring of the first God than to the first
itself. Hence, as the result of this most venerable conception of the
supreme, when it ventures not only to denominate it, though ineffable,
but also to assert something of its relation to other things, it
considers this as preeminently its peculiarity, that it is _the
principle of principles_; it being necessary that the characteristic
property of principle, after the same manner as other things, should not
begin from multitude, but should be collected into one monad as a
summit, and which is the principle of all principles.

The scientific reasoning from which this dogma is deduced is the
following. As the principle of all things is _the one_, it is necessary
that the progression of beings should be continued, and that no vacuum
should intervene either in incorporeal or corporeal natures. It is also
necessary that every thing which has a natural progression should
proceed through similitude. In consequence of this, it is likewise
necessary that every producing principle should generate a number of the
same order with itself, viz. _nature_, a natural number; _soul_, one
that is psychical (_i. e._ belonging to soul); and _intellect_ an
intellectual number. For if whatever possesses a power of generating,
generates similars prior to dissimilars, every cause must deliver its
own form and characteristic peculiarity to its progeny; and before it
generates that which gives subsistence to progressions, far distant and
separate from its nature, it must constitute things proximate to itself
according to essence, and conjoined with it through similitude. It is,
therefore, necessary from these premises, since there is one unity, the
principle of the universe, that this unity should produce from itself,
prior to every thing else, a multitude of natures characterized by
unity, and a number the most of all things allied to its cause; and
these natures are no other than the Gods.

According to this theology, therefore, from the immense principle of
principles, in which all things causally subsist, absorbed in
superessential light, and involved in unfathomable depths, a beauteous
progeny of principles proceed, all largely partaking of the ineffable,
all stamped with the occult characters of deity, all possessing an
overflowing fulness of good. From these dazzling summits, these
ineffable blossoms, these divine propagations, _being, life, intellect,
soul, nature, and body_ depend; _monads_ suspended from _unities_,
deified natures proceeding from deities. Each of these monads, too, is
the leader of a series which extends from itself to the last of things,
and which, while it proceeds from, at the same time abides in, and
returns to, its leader. And all these principles, and all their progeny,
are finally centred and rooted by their summits in the first great
all-comprehending one. Thus all beings proceed from, and are
comprehended in, the first being: all intellects emanate from one first
intellect; all souls from one first soul; all natures blossom from one
first nature; and all bodies proceed from the vital and luminous body of
the world. And, lastly, all these great monads are comprehended in the
first one, from which both they and all their depending series are
unfolded into light. Hence this first one is truly the unity of unities,
the monad of monads, the principle of principles, the God of Gods, one
and all things, and yet one prior to all.

No objections of any weight, no arguments but such as are sophistical,
can be urged against this most sublime theory, which is so congenial to
the unperverted conceptions of the human mind, that it can only be
treated with ridicule and contempt in degraded, barren, and barbarous
ages. Ignorance and impious fraud, however, have hitherto conspired to
defame those inestimable works[2] in which this and many other grand and
important dogmas can alone be found; and the theology of the ancients
has been attacked with all the insane fury of ecclesiastical zeal, and
all the imbecile flashes of mistaken wit, by men whose conceptions on
the subject, like those of a man between sleeping and waking, have been
_turbid_ and _wild_, _phantastic_ and _confused_, _preposterous_ and
_vain_.

Indeed, that after the great incomprehensible cause of all, a divine
multitude subsists, cooperating with this cause in the production and
government of the universe, has always been, and is still, admitted by
all nations and all religions, however much they may differ in their
opinions respecting the nature of the subordinate deities, and the
veneration which is to be paid to them by man; and however barbarous the
conceptions of some nations on this subject may be, when compared with
those of others. Hence, says the elegant Maximus Tyrius, “You will see
one according law and assertion in all the earth, that there is one God,
the king and father of all things, and many Gods, sons of God, ruling
together with him. This the Greek says, and the Barbarian says, the
inhabitant of the continent, and he who dwells near the sea, the wise
and the unwise. And if you proceed as far as to the utmost shores of the
ocean, there also there are Gods, rising very near to some, and setting
very near to others.”[3]

The deification, however, of dead men, and the worshiping men as Gods,
formed no part of this theology, when it is considered according to its
genuine purity. Numerous instances of the truth of this might be
adduced, but I shall mention for this purpose, as unexceptionable
witnesses, the writings of Plato, the Golden Pythagoric Verses,[4] and
the Treatise of Plutarch on Isis and Osiris. All the works of Plato,
indeed, evince the truth of this position, but this is particularly
manifest from his Laws. The Golden verses order that the immortal Gods
be honoured first, as they are disposed by law; afterwards the
illustrious Heroes, under which appellation the author of the verses
comprehends also angels and dæmons, properly so called; and in the last
place, the terrestrial dæmons, _i. e._ such good men as transcend in
virtue the rest of mankind. But to honour the Gods as they are disposed
by law, is, as Hierocles observes, to reverence them as they are
arranged by their demiurgus and father; and this is to honour them as
beings not only superior to man, but also to dæmons and angels. Hence,
to honour men, however excellent they may be, as Gods, is not to honour
the Gods according to the rank in which they are placed by their
Creator; for it is confounding the divine with the human nature, and is
thus acting directly contrary to the Pythagoric precept. Plutarch too,
in his above mentioned treatise, most forcibly and clearly shows the
impiety of worshiping men as Gods.[5]

“So great an apprehension indeed,” says Dr. Stillingfleet,[6] “had the
Heathens of the necessity of _appropriate acts of divine worship_, that
some of them have chosen to die, rather than to give them to what they
did not believe to be God. We have a remarkable story to this purpose in
Arrian and Curtius[7] concerning Callisthenes. Alexander arriving at
that degree of vanity as to desire to have divine worship given him, and
the matter being started out of design among the courtiers, either by
Anaxarchus, as Arrian, or Cleo the Sicilian, as Curtius says; and the
way of doing it proposed, _viz._ by incense and prostration;
Callisthenes vehemently opposed it, _as that which would confound the
difference of human and divine worship, which had been preserved
inviolable among them_. The worship of the Gods had been kept up in
temples, with altars, and images, and sacrifices, and hymns, and
prostrations, and such like; _but it is by no means fitting_, says he,
_for us to confound these things, either by lifting up men to the
honours of the Gods, or depressing the Gods to the honours of men_. For
if Alexander would not suffer any man to usurp his royal dignity by the
votes of men; how much more justly may the Gods disdain for any man to
take their honours to himself. And it appears by Plutarch,[8] that the
Greeks thought it a mean and base thing for any of them, when sent on
any embassy to the kings of Persia, to prostrate themselves before them,
because this was only allowed among them in divine adoration. Therefore,
says he, when Pelopidas and Ismenias were sent to Artaxerxes, Pelopidas
did nothing unworthy, but Ismenias let fall his ring to the ground, and
stooping for that, was thought to make his adoration; which was
altogether as good a shift as the Jesuits advising the crucifix to be
held in the mandarin’s hands while they made their adorations in the
Heathen temples in China.

Conon[9] also _refused to make his adoration, as a disgrace to his
city_; and Isocrates[10] accuses the Persians for doing it, _because
herein they showed that they despised the Gods rather than men, by
prostituting their honours to their princes_. Herodotus mentions
Sperchies and Bulis, who could not with the greatest violence be brought
to give adoration to Xerxes, _became it was against the law of their
country to give divine honour to men_.[11] And Valerius Maximus[12]
says, “_the Athenians put Timagoras to death for doing it_; so strong an
apprehension had possessed them, that the manner of worship which they
used to their Gods, should be preserved sacred and inviolable.” The
philosopher Sallust also, in his Treatise on the Gods and the World,
says, “It is not unreasonable to suppose that impiety is a species of
punishment, and that those who have had a knowledge of the Gods, and yet
despised them, will in another life be deprived of this knowledge. And
it is requisite to make the punishment of those who have honoured their
kings as Gods to consist in being expelled from the Gods.”[13]

When the ineffable transcendency of the first God, which was considered
as the grand principle in the Heathen religion by the best theologists
of all nations, and particularly by its most illustrious promulgators,
Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato, was forgotten, this oblivion was
doubtless the principal cause of dead men being deified by the Pagans.
Had they properly directed their attention to this transcendency they
would have perceived it to be so immense as to surpass eternity,
infinity, self-subsistence, and even essence itself, and that these in
reality belong to those venerable natures which are, as it were, first
unfolded into light from the unfathomable depths of that truly mystic
unknown, about which all knowledge is refunded into ignorance. For, as
Simplicius justly observes, “It is requisite that he who ascends to the
principle of things should investigate whether it is possible there can
be any thing better than the supposed principle; and if something more
excellent is found, the same inquiry should again be made respecting
that, till we arrive at the highest conceptions, than which we have no
longer any more venerable. Nor should we stop in our ascent till we find
this to be the case. For there is no occasion to fear that our
progression will be through an unsubstantial void, by conceiving
something about the first principles which is greater and more
transcendent than their nature. For it is not possible for our
conceptions to take such a mighty leap as to equal, and much less to
pass beyond, the dignity of the first principles of things.” He adds,
“This, therefore, is one and the best extension [of the soul] to [the
highest] God, and is, as much as possible, irreprehensible; _viz._ to
know firmly, that by ascribing to him the most venerable excellences we
can conceive, and the most holy and primary names and things, we ascribe
nothing to him which is suitable to his dignity. It is sufficient,
however, to procure our pardon [for the attempt], that we can attribute
to him nothing superior.”[14] If it is not possible, therefore, to form
any ideas equal to the dignity of the immediate progeny of the
ineffable, _i. e._ of the first principles of things, how much less can
our conceptions reach that thrice unknown darkness, in the reverential
language of the Egyptians,[15] which is even beyond these? Had the
Heathens, therefore, considered as they ought this transcendency of the
supreme God, they would never have presumed to equalize the human with
the divine nature, and consequently would never have worshiped men as
Gods. Their theology, however, is not to be accused as the cause of this
impiety, but their forgetfulness of the sublimest of its dogmas, and the
confusion with which this oblivion was necessarily attended.

But to return to the present work. To some who are conversant with the
writings of Porphyry, who know how high he ranks among the best of the
Platonists, and that he was denominated by them, on account of his
excellence, _the philosopher_, it may seem strange that he should have
been so unskilled in theological mysteries, and so ignorant of the
characteristics of the beings superior to man, as by his epistle to
Anebo he may appear to have been. That he was not, however, in reality
thus unskilful and ignorant, is evident from his admirable Treatise on
Abstinence from Animal Food, and his Αφορμαι προς τα νοητα, or
Auxiliaries to Intelligibles. His apparent ignorance, therefore, must
have been assumed for the purpose of obtaining a more perfect and
copious solution of the doubts proposed in his Epistle, than he would
otherwise have received. But at the same time that this is admitted, it
must also be observed, that he was inferior to Iamblichus in theological
science, who so greatly excelled in knowledge of this kind, that he was
not surpassed by any one, and was equaled by few. Hence he was
denominated by all succeeding Platonists _the divine_, in the same
manner as Plato, “to whom,” as the acute Emperor Julian remarks, “he was
posterior in time only, but not in genius.”[16]

The difficulties attending the translation of this work into English are
necessarily great, not only from its sublimity and novelty, but also
from the defects of the original. I have, however, endeavoured to make
the translation as faithful and complete as possible; and have
_occasionally_ availed myself of the annotations of Gale, not being able
to do so _continually_, because for the most part, where philosophy is
concerned, he shows himself to be an inaccurate, impertinent, and
garrulous smatterer.




                                  THE
                          EPISTLE OF PORPHYRY
                                 TO THE
                            EGYPTIAN ANEBO.


  _Porphyry to the Prophet Anebo greeting._


I commence my friendship towards you from the Gods and good dæmons, and
from those philosophic disquisitions, which have an affinity to these
powers. And concerning these particulars indeed, much has been said by
the Grecian philosophers; but, for the most part, the principles of
their belief are derived from conjecture.

In the first place, therefore, it is granted that there are Gods. But I
inquire what the peculiarities are of each of the more excellent genera,
by which they are separated from each other; and whether we must say
that the cause of the distinction between them is from their energies,
or their passive motions, or from things that are consequent, or from
their different arrangement with respect to bodies; as, for instance,
from the arrangement of the Gods with reference to etherial, but of
dæmons to aerial, and of souls to terrestrial, bodies?

I also ask, why, since [all] the Gods dwell in the heavens, theurgists
only invoke the terrestrial and subterranean Gods? Likewise, how some of
the Gods are said to be aquatic and aerial? And how different Gods are
allotted different places, and the parts of bodies according to
circumscription, though they have an infinite, impartible, and
incomprehensible power? How there will be a union of them with each
other, if they are separated by the divisible circumscriptions of parts,
and by the difference of places and subject bodies?

How do theologists, or those who are wise in divine concerns, represent
the Gods as passive, to whom on this account, it is said, erect phalli
are exhibited, and obscene language is used? But if they are impassive,
the invocations of the Gods will be in vain, which announce that they
can appease the anger of the divinities, and procure a reconciliation
with them; and still more, what are called the necessities of the Gods,
will be vain. For that which is impassive cannot be allured, nor
compelled, nor necessitated. How, therefore, are many things, in sacred
operations, performed to them as passive? Invocations,—likewise, are
made to the Gods as passive; so that not dæmons only are passive, but
the Gods also, conformably to what Homer says,

            “And flexible are e’en the Gods themselves.”[17]

But if we assert with certain persons, that the Gods are pure
intellects, but that dæmons, being psychical, participate of intellect;
in a still greater degree will pure intellects be incapable of being
allured, and will be unmingled with sensible natures. Supplications,
however, are foreign to the purity of intellect, and therefore are not
to be made to it. But the things which are offered [in sacred rites] are
offered as to sensitive and psychical essences.

Are, therefore, the Gods separated from dæmons, through the former being
incorporeal, but the latter corporeal? If, however, the Gods are
incorporeal alone, how will the sun and moon, and the visible
celestials, be Gods?

How, likewise, are some of the Gods beneficent, but others malefic?

What is it that connects the Gods in the heavens that have bodies, with
the incorporeal Gods?

What is it that distinguishes dæmons from the visible and invisible
Gods, since the visible are connected with the invisible Gods?

In what do a dæmon, hero, and soul, differ from each other? Is it in
essence, or in power, or in energy?

What is the indication of a God, or angel, or archangel, or dæmon, or a
certain archon, or soul being present? For to speak boastingly, and to
exhibit a phantasm of a certain quality, is common to Gods and dæmons,
and to all the more excellent genera. So that the genus of Gods will in
no respect be better than that of dæmons.

Since the ignorance of, and deception about, divine natures is impiety
and impurity, but a scientific knowledge of the Gods is holy and
beneficial, the ignorance of things honourable and beautiful will be
darkness, but the knowledge of them will be light. And the former,
indeed, will fill men with all evils, through the want of erudition, and
through audacity; but the latter will be the cause to them of every
good. [I wish you, therefore, to unfold to me the truth respecting these
particulars.[18]]

[And, in the first place, I wish you to explain to me distinctly[19]]
what that is which is effected in divination? For we frequently obtain a
knowledge of future events through dreams, when we are asleep; not
being, at that time, in a tumultuous ecstasy, for the body is then
quiescent; but we do not apprehend what then takes place, in the same
manner as when we are awake.

But many, through enthusiasm and divine inspiration, predict future
events, and are then in so wakeful a state, as even to energize
according to sense, and yet they are not conscious of the state they are
in, or at least, not so much as they were before.

Some also of those who suffer a mental alienation, energize
enthusiastically on hearing cymbals or drums, or a certain modulated
sound, such as those who are Corybantically inspired, those who are
possessed by Sabazius, and those who are inspired by the mother of the
Gods. But some energize enthusiastically by drinking water, as the
priest of Clarius, in Colophon; others, by being seated at the mouth of
a cavern, as those who prophesy at Delphi; and others by imbibing the
vapour from water, as the prophetesses in Branchidæ. Some also become
enthusiastic by standing on characters, as those that are filled from
the intromission of spirits. Others, who are conscious what they are
doing in other respects, are divinely inspired according to the
phantastic part; some, indeed, receiving darkness for a cooperator,
others certain potions, but others incantations and compositions: and
some energize, according to the imagination, through water; others in a
wall, others in the open air, and others in the sun, or in some other of
the celestial bodies. Some also establish the art of the investigation
of futurity through the viscera, through birds, and through the stars.

I likewise ask concerning the mode of divination, what it is, and what
the quality by which it is distinguished? All diviners, indeed, assert,
that they obtain a foreknowledge of future events through Gods or
dæmons, and that it is not possible for any others to know that which is
future, than those who are the lords of futurity. I doubt, therefore,
whether divinity is so far subservient to men, as not to be averse to
some becoming diviners from meal.

But, concerning the causes of divination, it is dubious whether a God,
an angel, or a dæmon, or some other power, is present in manifestations,
or divinations, or certain other sacred energies, as is the case with
those powers that are drawn down through you [priests] by the
necessities with which invocation is attended.

Or does the soul assert and imagine these things, and are they, as some
think, the passions of the soul, excited from small incentives?

Or is a certain mixed form of subsistence produced from our soul, and
divine inspiration externally derived?

Hence it must be said, that the soul generates the power which has an
imaginative perception of futurity, through motions of this kind, or
that the things which are adduced from matter constitute dæmons, through
the powers that are inherent in them, and especially things adduced from
the matter which is taken from animals.

For in sleep, when we are not employed about any thing, we sometimes
obtain a knowledge of the future.

But that a passion of the soul is the cause of divination, is indicated
by this, that the senses are occupied, that fumigations are introduced,
and that invocations are employed; and likewise, that not all men, but
those that are more simple and young, are more adapted to prediction.

The ecstasy, also, of the reasoning power is the cause of divination, as
is likewise the mania which happens in diseases, or mental aberration,
or a sober and vigilant condition, or suffusions of the body, or the
imaginations excited by diseases, or an ambiguous state of mind, such as
that which takes place between a sober condition and ecstasy, or the
imaginations artificially procured by enchantment.

Nature, likewise, art, and the sympathy of things in the universe, as if
they were the parts of one animal, contain premanifestations of certain
things with reference to each other. And bodies are so prepared, that
there is a presignification of some by others, which is clearly
indicated by the works performed in predicting what is future. For those
who invoke the divinities for this purpose, have about them stones and
herbs, bind certain sacred bonds, which they also dissolve, open places
that are shut, and change the deliberate intentions of the recipients,
so as from being depraved to render them worthy, though they were before
depraved. Nor are the artificers of efficacious images to be despised.
For they observe the motion of the celestial bodies, and can tell from
the concurrence of what star with a certain star or stars, predictions
will be true or false; and also whether the things that are performed
will be inanities, or significant and efficacious, though no divinity or
dæmon is drawn down by these images.

But there are some who suppose that there is a certain obedient genus of
dæmons, which is naturally fraudulent, omniform, and various, and which
assumes the appearance of Gods and dæmons, and the souls of the
deceased; and that through these every thing which appears to be either
good or evil is effected; for they are not able to contribute any thing
to true goods, such as those of the soul, nor to have any knowledge of
them, but they abuse, deride, and frequently impede those who are
striving to be virtuous. They are likewise full of pride, and rejoice in
vapours and sacrifices.

Jugglers likewise fraudulently attack us in many ways, through the
ardour of the expectations which they raise.

It very much indeed perplexes me to understand how superior beings, when
invoked, are commanded by those that invoke them, as if they were their
inferiors; and they think it requisite that he who worships them should
be just, but when they are called upon to act unjustly, they do not
refuse so to act. Though the Gods, likewise, do not hear him who invokes
them, if he is impure from venereal connexions, yet, at the same time,
they do not refuse to lead any one to illegal venery.

[I am likewise dubious with respect to sacrifices, what utility or power
they possess in the universe, and with the Gods, and on what account
they are performed, appropriately indeed, to the powers who are honoured
by them, but usefully to those by whom the gifts are offered.[20]]

Why also do the interpreters of prophecies and oracles think it
requisite that they should abstain from animals, lest the Gods should be
polluted by the vapours arising from them; and yet the Gods are
especially allured by the vapours of animals?

Why is it requisite that the inspector [who presides over sacred rites]
ought not to touch a dead body, though most sacred operations are
performed through dead bodies? And why, which is much more absurd than
this, are threats employed and false terrors, by any casual person, not
to a dæmon, or some departed soul, but to the sovereign Sun himself, or
to the Moon, or some one of the celestial Gods, in order to compel these
divinities to speak the truth? For does not he who says that he will
burst the heavens, or unfold the secrets of Isis, or point out the
arcanum in the adytum, or stop Baris, or scatter the members of Osiris
to Typhon, [or that he will do something else of the like kind[21]],
does not he who says this, by thus threatening what he neither knows nor
is able to effect, prove himself to be stupid in the extreme? And what
abjectness does it not produce in those who, like very silly children,
are possessed with such vain fear, and are terrified at such fictions?
And yet Chæremon, who was a sacred scribe, writes these things, as
disseminated by the Egyptians. It is also said, that these, and things
of the like kind, are of a most compulsive nature.

What also is the meaning of those mystic narrations which say that a
certain divinity is unfolded into light from mire, that he is seated
above the lotus, that he sails in a ship, and that he changes his forms
every hour, according to the signs of the zodiac? For thus, they say, he
presents himself to the view, and thus ignorantly adapt the peculiar
passion of their own imagination to the God himself. But if these things
are asserted symbolically, being symbols of the powers of this divinity,
I request an interpretation of these symbols. For it is evident, that if
these are similar to passions of the Sun, when he is eclipsed, they
would be seen by all men who intently survey the God.

What also is the design of names that are without signification? and
why, of such, are those that are barbaric preferred to our own? For if
he who hears them looks to their signification, it is sufficient that
the conception remains the same, whatever the words may be that are
used. For he who is invoked is not of the Egyptian race; nor, if he was
an Egyptian, does he use the Egyptian, or, in short, any human language.
For either all these are the artificial contrivances of enchanters, and
veils originating from our passions, which rumour ascribes to a divine
nature; or we ignorantly frame conceptions of divinity, contrary to its
real mode of subsistence.

I likewise wish you to unfold to me, what the Egyptians conceive the
first cause to be; whether intellect, or above intellect? whether alone,
or subsisting with some other or others? whether incorporeal, or
corporeal; and whether it is the same with the Demiurgus, or prior to
the Demiurgus? Likewise, whether all things are from one principle, or
from many principles? whether the Egyptians have a knowledge of matter,
or of primary corporeal qualities; and whether they admit matter to be
unbegotten, or to be generated? For Chæremon, indeed, and others, do not
think there is any thing else prior to the visible worlds; but in the
beginning of their writings on this subject, admit the existence of the
Gods of the Egyptians, but of no others, except what are called the
planets, the Gods that give completion to the zodiac, and such as rise
together with these; and likewise, the sections into decans, and the
horoscopes. They also admit the existence of what are called the
powerful leaders, whose names are to be found in the calendars, together
with their ministrant offices, their risings and settings, and their
significations of future events. For Chæremon saw that what those who
say that the sun is the Demiurgus, and likewise what is asserted
concerning Osiris and Isis, and all the sacred fables, may be resolved
into the stars and the phases, occultations and risings of these, or
into the increments or decrements of the moon, or into the course of the
sun, or the nocturnal and diurnal hemisphere, or into the river [Nile].
And, in short, the Egyptians resolve all things into physical, and
nothing into incorporeal and living essences. Most of them likewise
suspend that which is in our power from the motion of the stars; and
bind all things, though I know not how, with the indissoluble bonds of
necessity, which they call fate. They also connect fate with the Gods;
whom, nevertheless, they worship in temples and statues, and other
things, as the only dissolvers of fate.

Concerning the peculiar dæmon, it must be inquired how he is imparted by
the lord of the geniture, and according to what kind of efflux, or life,
or power, he descends from him to us? And also, whether he exists, or
does not exist? And whether the invention of the lord of the geniture is
impossible, or possible? For if it is possible he is happy, who having
learned the scheme of his nativity, and knowing his proper dæmon,
becomes liberated from fate.

The canons, also, of genethlialogy [or prediction from the natal day]
are innumerable and incomprehensible. And the knowledge of this
mathematical science cannot be obtained; for there is much dissonance
concerning it, and Chæremon and many others have written against it. But
the discovery of the lord, or lords, of the geniture, if there are more
than one in a nativity, is nearly granted by astrologers themselves to
be unattainable, and yet they say that on this the knowledge of the
proper dæmon depends.

Farther still, I wish to know whether the peculiar dæmon rules over some
one of the parts in us? For it appears to certain persons, that dæmons
preside over the parts of our body, so that one is the guardian of
health, another of the form of the body, and another of the corporeal
habits, and that there is one dæmon who presides in common over all
these. And again, that one dæmon presides over the body, another over
the soul, and another over the intellect; and that some of them are
good, but others bad.

I am also dubious whether this dæmon is not a certain part of the soul,
[such, for instance, as the intellectual part;] and if so, he will be
happy who has a wise intellect.

I see likewise, that there is a twofold worship of the peculiar dæmon;
the one being the worship as of two, but the other as of three. By all
men, however, the dæmon is called upon by a common invocation.

I farther ask, whether there is a certain other latent way to felicity,
separate from the Gods? And I am dubious whether it is requisite to look
to human opinions in divine divination and theurgy? And whether the soul
does not devise great things from casual circumstances? Moreover, there
are certain other methods, which are conversant with the prediction of
future events. And, perhaps, those who possess divine divination,
foresee indeed what will happen, yet are not on this account happy; for
they foresee future events, but do not know how to use this knowledge
properly. I wish, therefore, that you would point out to me the path to
felicity, and show me in what the essence of it consists. For with us
[Greeks] there is much verbal contention about it, because we form a
conjecture of good from human reasonings. But by those who have devised
the means of associating with beings more excellent than man, if the
investigation of this subject is omitted, wisdom will be professed by
them in vain; as they will only disturb a divine intellect about the
discovery of a fugitive slave, or the purchase of land, or, if it should
so happen, about marriage, or merchandize. And if they do not omit this
subject, but assert what is most true about other things, yet say
nothing that is stable and worthy of belief about felicity, in
consequence of employing themselves about things that are difficult, but
useless to mankind; in this case, they will not be conversant either
with Gods or good dæmons, but with that dæmon who is called fraudulent;
or, if this is not admitted, the whole will be the invention of men, and
the fiction of a mortal nature.




                 =Iamblichus[22] on the Mysteries, &c.=


                                  THE

                    ANSWER OF THE PRECEPTOR ABAMMON

                                 TO THE

                     EPISTLE OF PORPHYRY TO ANEBO,

                                 AND A

                SOLUTION OF THE DOUBTS CONTAINED IN IT.




                               SECTION I.




                                CHAP. I.


Hermes, the God who presides over language, was formerly very properly
considered as common to all priests; and the power who presides over the
true science concerning the Gods is one and the same in the whole of
things. Hence our ancestors dedicated the inventions of their wisdom to
this deity, inscribing all their own writings with the name of Hermes.
If, therefore, we participate of a portion of this God, adapted and
commensurate to our powers, you do well to propose your theological
doubts to the priests, as friends, and to make these doubts known to
them. I also very properly conceiving that the epistle sent to my
disciple Anebo was written to me, shall give you a true answer to your
inquiries. For it would not be becoming, that Pythagoras and Plato,
Democritus and Eudoxus, and many other of the ancient Greeks, should
have obtained appropriate instruction from the sacred scribes of their
time, but that you who are our contemporary, and think conformably to
those ancients, should be frustrated of your wish by those who are now
living, and who are called common preceptors. I, therefore, thus betake
myself to the present discussion; and do you, if you please, conceive
that the same person to whom you sent the letter returns you an answer.
Or, if it should seem fit to you, admit it to be me who discourses with
you in writing, or some other prophet of the Egyptians, for this is of
no consequence. Or, which I think is still better, dismiss the
consideration whether the speaker is an inferior or a superior
character, but direct your attention to what is said, so as readily to
excite your mind to survey whether what is asserted is true or false.

In the first place, therefore, we shall divide the genera of the
proposed problems, in order that we may know the quantity and quality of
them. And, in the next place, we shall show from what theologies the
doubts are assumed, and according to what sciences they are
investigated. For some things that are badly confused, require a certain
distinction; others are conversant with the cause through which they
subsist, and are apprehended; others, which we propose according to a
certain contrariety, draw our decision on both sides; and some things
require from us the whole development of mystic doctrines. Such,
therefore, being the nature of the subjects of discussion, they are
assumed from many places, and from different sciences. For some things
introduce animadversions from what the wise men of the Chaldeans have
delivered; others produce objections from what the prophets of the
Egyptians teach; and there are some that, adhering to the theory of
philosophers, make inquiries conformably to them. There are now likewise
some, that from other opinions, which do not deserve to be mentioned,
elicite a certain dubitation; and others originate from the common
conceptions of mankind. These things, therefore, are of themselves
variously disposed, and are multiformly connected with each other.
Hence, through all these causes, a certain discussion is requisite for
the management of them in a becoming manner.




                               CHAP. II.


We shall, therefore, deliver to you the peculiar dogmas of the
Assyrians; and also clearly develop to you our own opinions; collecting
some things from the infinite writings of the ancients, but others from
those particulars which were comprehended by the ancients in one
treatise, and pertain to the whole knowledge of divine natures. If also
you should propose any philosophic inquiry, we shall discuss it for you,
according to the ancient pillars of Hermes, which Plato and Pythagoras
knew before, and from thence constituted their philosophy. But such
things as exhibit foreign inquiries, or which are contradictory and
contentious, we shall assist mildly and aptly, or we shall demonstrate
their absurdity. Such, likewise, as proceed conformably[23] to common
conceptions, we shall endeavour to discuss in a way perfectly known and
clear. And things, indeed, which require the experience of divine
operations to an accurate knowledge of them, we shall explain, as far as
this is possible to be effected by words alone; but such as are full of
intellectual theory, we shall develop with a view to the purification of
the soul. But indications of this theory worthy of notice may be
mentioned, by which it is possible for you, and those who resemble you,
to be conducted by intellect to the essence of [real] beings. And with
respect to such things as become known by a reasoning process, we shall
leave no one of these without a perfect demonstration. But in all things
we shall give to each that which is appropriate. And such questions,
indeed, as are theological, we shall answer theologically; such as are
theurgic, theurgically; but such as are philosophical, we shall, in
conjunction with you, philosophically explore. Of these, also, such as
extend to first causes, we shall unfold into light, by following them
conformably to first principles. But such as pertain to morals, or to
ends, we shall fitly discuss, according to the ethical mode. And, in a
similar manner, we shall examine other things methodically and
appropriately. Let us, therefore, now betake ourselves to your
inquiries.




                               CHAP. III.


In the first place, therefore, you say, “_it must be granted that there
are Gods_.” Thus to speak, however, is not right on this subject. For an
innate knowledge of the Gods is coexistent with our very essence; and
this knowledge is superior to all judgment and deliberate choice, and
subsists prior to reason and demonstration. It is also counited from the
beginning with its proper cause, and is consubsistent with the essential
tendency of the soul to _the good_. If, indeed, it be requisite to speak
the truth, the contact with divinity is not knowledge. For knowledge is
in a certain respect separated [from its object] by _otherness_.[24] But
prior to the knowledge, which as one thing knows another, is the uniform
connexion with divinity, and which is suspended from the Gods, is
spontaneous and inseparable from them. Hence, it is not proper to grant
this, as if it might not be granted, nor to admit it as ambiguous (for
it is always unically established in energy); nor are we worthy thus to
explore it, as if we had sufficient authority to approve or reject it.
For we are comprehended in it, or rather we are filled by it, and we
possess that very thing which we are, [or by which our essence is
characterized] in knowing the Gods.

I shall likewise say the same thing to you, concerning the more
excellent genera that follow the Gods, I mean dæmons, heroes, and
undefiled souls.[25] For it is necessary to understand respecting these,
that there is always in them one definite reason of essence, and to
remove from them the indefiniteness and instability of the human
condition. It is likewise requisite to separate from them that
inclination to one side of an argument rather than another, arising from
the equilibrium of a reasoning process. For a thing of this kind is
foreign from the principles of reason and life, and rather tends to
secondary natures, and to such things as pertain to the power and
contrariety of generation. But it is necessary that the more excellent
genera should be apprehended uniformly.

The connascent perception, therefore, of the perpetual attendance of the
Gods, will be assimilated to them. Hence, as they have an existence
which is always invariably the same, thus also the human soul is
conjoined to them by knowledge, according to a sameness of subsistence;
by no means pursuing through conjecture, or opinion, or a syllogistic
process, all which originate in time, an essence which is above all
these, but through the pure and blameless intellections which the soul
received from eternity from the Gods, becoming united to them. You,
however, seem to think, that there is the same knowledge of divine
natures as of any thing else, and that one thing, rather than another,
may be granted from opposites, in the same manner as it is usual to do
in dialectic discussions. There is, however, no similitude whatever
between the two kinds of knowledge. For the knowledge of divine natures
is different from that of other things, and is separated from all
opposition. It likewise neither subsists in being now granted, or in
becoming to be, but was from eternity, uniformly consubsistent with the
soul. And thus much I say to you concerning the first principle in us,
from which it is necessary those should begin who speak or hear any
thing about the natures that are superior to us.




                               CHAP. IV.


With respect to your inquiry, “_what the peculiarities are in each of
the more excellent genera, by which they are separated from each
other?_” if you understand by peculiarities the specific differences
under the same genus, which are distinguished by opposite qualities, as
the rational and irrational under animal; we by no means admit
peculiarities of this kind, in things which neither have one common
essence, nor an equal contradistinction, nor receive a composition from
something common, which is indefinite, and defines the peculiarity. But
if you apprehend the peculiarity to be, as in prior and secondary
natures, differing in their whole essence and whole genus, a certain
simple condition of being, definite in itself; in this case, your
conception of peculiarities will be reasonable. For these peculiarities
of things, which have an eternal subsistence, are simple, and entirely
exempt. The inquiry, however, proceeds imperfectly. For it was
necessary, in the first place, to inquire what the peculiarities are of
the more excellent genera, according to essence; in the next place, what
they are according to power; and thus afterwards, what they are
according to energy. But, as your question now stands, with respect to
the peculiarities by which these genera are separated, you alone speak
of the peculiarities of energies. Hence you inquire concerning the
difference in the last things pertaining to them; but you leave
uninvestigated such things as are first, and most honourable in them,
and which are the elements of their difference. In the same place, also,
something is added concerning “_efficacious and passive motions_,” which
is a division by no means adapted to the difference of the more
excellent genera. For the contrariety of action and passion is not
inherent in any one of them; but their energies are unrestrained,
immutable, and without habitude to their opposites. Hence, neither must
we admit in them motions of such a kind as arise from action and
passion. For neither do we admit in the soul a self-motion, which
consists of the mover and that which is moved; but we conceive that it
is a certain simple essential motion, subsisting from itself,[26] and
not possessing a habitude to another thing, and exempt from acting on,
and suffering from, itself. Who, therefore, can endure that the
peculiarities of the genera superior to the soul, should be
distinguished according to active or passive motions?

That also which is added by you, “_or of accidents_,” is foreign from
these genera. For in composites, and things which exist together with,
or in others, or are comprehended by others, some things are conceived
to be precedaneous, but others consequent; and some as essences, but
others, as afterwards acceding to essences. For there is a certain
coarrangement of them, and incongruity and interval intervenes. But, in
the more excellent genera, all things must be conceived in τῳ ειναι,
i. e. _in merely existing_; and wholes have a precedaneous subsistence,
are separate by themselves, and have not their hypostasis from, or in
others; so that there is not any thing in them which is accidental.
Hence the peculiarity of them is not characterized from accidents.

At the end, likewise, of your inquiry, you introduce a distinction
according to nature. For your question asks, “_How essences are known by
energies, by physical motions, and by accidents?_” The very contrary,
however, to all this takes place. For if energies and motions were
constitutive of essences, they would be the lords of the difference
which is between them. But if essences generate energies, the former
being separate prior to the latter, will impart to motions, energies,
and accidents, that by which they differ from each other. This,
therefore, subsists contrarily to what you suppose, for the purpose of
discovering the peculiarity which you now investigate.

In short, whether you think that there is one genus of the Gods, one of
dæmons, and in a similar manner of heroes, and souls essentially
incorporeal; or whether you admit that these are severally many, you
inquire what the difference of them is according to peculiarities. For
if you apprehend that each of these is one [and the same genus] the
whole arrangement of scientific theology is confounded. But if, as truth
requires, you admit that they are genetically distinguished, and that
there is not in them one common essential definition, but that those of
them which are prior, are exempt from those that are inferior, it is not
possible to discover their common boundaries. And even if this were
possible, this very thing would destroy their peculiarities. In this
way, therefore, the object of investigation cannot be found. He,
however, he who directs his attention to the analogous sameness which
exists in superior natures, as, for instance, in the many genera of the
Gods, and again in dæmons and heroes, and, in the last place, in souls,
will be able to define their peculiarities. Hence through this, it is
demonstrated by us what the rectitude is of the present inquiry, and
what its [accurate] distinction, and also in what manner it is
impossible, and in what manner it is possible, for it to subsist.




                                CHAP. V.


In the next place, let us direct our attention to the solution of your
inquiries. There is, therefore, _the good itself_ which is beyond
essence, and there is that good which subsists according to essence; I
mean the essence which is most ancient and most honourable, and by
itself incorporeal. And this is the illustrious peculiarity of the Gods,
which exists in all the genera that subsist about them, preserving their
appropriate distribution and order, and not being divulsed from it, and
at the same time being inherent with invariable sameness in all the
Gods, and their perpetual attendants.

In souls, however, which rule over bodies, and precedaneously pay
attention to them, and which, prior to generation, have by themselves a
perpetual arrangement, essential good is not present, nor the cause of
good, which is prior to essence; but to these a certain
participation[27] and habit, proceeding from essential good, accedes;
just as we see that the participation of beauty and virtue is very
different [in these souls] from that which we behold in men. For the
latter is ambiguous, and accedes to composite natures as something
adventitious. But the former has an immutable and never failing
establishment in souls, and neither itself ever departs from itself, nor
can be taken away by any thing else. Such, therefore, being the
beginning and end in the divine genera, conceive two media between these
extreme boundaries, _viz._ the order of heroes, which has an arrangement
more elevated than that of souls, in power and virtue, in beauty and
magnitude, and in all the goods which subsist about souls, and which,
though it entirely transcends the psychical order, yet, at the same
time, is proximately conjoined to it, through the alliance of a similar
formed life. But the other medium, which is suspended from the Gods,
though it is far inferior to them, is that of dæmons, which is hot of a
primarily operative nature, but is subservient to, and follows the
beneficent will of the Gods. It likewise unfolds into energy the
invisible good of the Gods, being itself assimilated to it, and gives
completion to its fabrications conformably to it. For it renders that
which is ineffable in the good of the Gods effable, illuminates that
which is formless in forms, and produces into visible reasons [or
productive forms] that which in divine good is above all reason.
Receiving also a connascent participation of things beautiful, it
imparts and transfers it, in unenvying abundance, to the genera
posterior to itself. These middle genera, therefore, give completion to
the common bond of the Gods and souls, and cause the connexion of them
to be indissoluble. They also bind together the one continuity of things
from on high as far as to the end; make the communion of wholes to be
inseparable; cause all things to have the best, and a commensurate
mixture; in a certain respect, equally transmit the progression from
more excellent to inferior natures, and the elevation from things
posterior to such as are prior; insert in more imperfect beings order
and measures of the communication which descends from more excellent
natures, and of that by which it is received; and make all things to be
familiar and coadapted to all, supernally receiving the causes of all
these from the Gods.

You must not, therefore, think that this division is the peculiarity of
powers or energies, or of essence; nor assuming it separately, must you
survey it in one of these. But by extending it in common through all the
genera, you will give perfection to the answer concerning the
peculiarities of Gods, dæmons, and heroes, and also of those in souls
which are now the subjects of your inquiry.

Again, however, according to another mode of considering the subject, it
is necessary to ascribe to the Gods the whole of that which is united,
of whatever kind it may be; that which is firmly established in itself,
and which is the cause of impartible essences; the immoveable, which
also is to be considered as the cause of all motion, and which
transcends the whole of things, and has nothing in common with them; and
the unmingled and the separate, understood in common in essence, power
and energy, and every thing else of this kind. But that which is now
separated into multitude, and is able to impart itself to other things,
and which receives from others bound in itself, and is sufficient in the
distributions of partible natures, so as to give completion to them;
which also participates of the primarily operative and vivific, having
communion with all real and generated beings; receives a commixture from
all things, imparts a contemperation to all things from itself, and
extends these peculiarities through all the powers, essences, and
energies, in itself; all this we shall truly ascribe to souls, by
asserting that it is naturally implanted in them.




                               CHAP. VI.


What, therefore, shall we say concerning the media? I think, indeed,
that from what has been before said, they will be manifest to every one;
for these give completion to the indivisible connexion of the extremes.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to be more explicit. I consider,
therefore, the dæmoniacal tribe to be multiplied, but, unitedly, to be
comingled, but in an unmingled manner, and to comprehend all other
things of a subordinate nature, according to the idea of that which is
more excellent. But again, the tribe of heroes supernally presides over
a more obvious division and multitude, and likewise over motion,
commixture, and things allied to these. It also receives gifts of a more
excellent nature, concealed as it were inwardly; I mean union, purity, a
firm establishment, impartible sameness, and a transcendency above other
things. For one of these middle genera is proximate to the first, but
the other to the last, of the extremes. But it reasonably follows,
according to continuity of alliance, that the medium which begins from
the most excellent natures, should proceed to such as are less
excellent; but that the medium which primarily produces a contact with
the last of things, should also in a certain respect communicate with
the natures that transcend it. From these media, also, the completion
may be seen of the first and last genera, and this entirely connascent,
in a similar manner, in existence, in power, and in energy. As we have,
therefore, in these two ways, perfectly completed the division of the
four genera, we shall deem it sufficient in the others, to exhibit the
extreme peculiarities alone, for the sake of conciseness, and because
what remains, _i. e._ the comprehension of the media, is in a certain
respect evident. But the media themselves, as being known from the
extremes, we shall omit; making a definition of the extremes in the
shortest way, as follows.




                               CHAP. VII.


Of the extremes, therefore, one is supreme, transcendent, and perfect;
but the other is last in dignity, deficient, and more imperfect. And the
former, indeed, is capable of accomplishing all things at once,
uniformly in an instant; but the latter is neither able to effect all
things, nor at once, nor suddenly, nor impartibly. The former also
generates and governs all things, without being inclined towards them;
but the latter is naturally disposed to verge, and be converted to the
things which it generates and governs. And the former, indeed, as
primordial and cause, precedes all things in power; but the latter,
being suspended from the will of the Gods, as from a cause, is from
eternity consubsistent with it. The former, likewise, according to one
vigorous acme, comprehends the ends of all energies and essences; but
the latter passes from some things to others, and proceeds from the
imperfect to the perfect. Farther still, to the former that which is
highest and that which is incomprehensible pertain, and also that which
is better than all measure, and is in such a manner formless, as not to
be circumscribed by any form; but the latter is vanquished by
inclination, habitude, and propensity; and is detained by appetites
directed to that which is less excellent, and by familiarity with
secondary natures. Hence, in the last place, it is formalized by
all-various measures derived from them. Intellect, therefore, which is
the leader and king of all beings, and which is the demiurgic art of the
universe, is always present with the Gods with invariable sameness,
perfectly, and without indigence, being purely established in itself,
according to one energy. But soul participates of a partible and
multiform intellect, having its attention directed to the government of
the whole. It also providentially attends to inanimate natures, becoming
at different times ingenerated in different forms.

From the same causes, therefore, order and beauty itself are
consubsistent with the more excellent genera; or, if some one had rather
admit it, the cause of these is consubsistent with them. But with soul,
the participation of intellectual order and divine beauty is always
present. And with the former, indeed, the measure of wholes, or the
cause of this, perpetually concurs. But soul is terminated by the divine
boundary, and participates of this in a partible manner. To the former,
also, empire over all beings, through the power and domination of cause,
may be reasonably ascribed. But soul has certain distinct boundaries, as
far as to which it is able to have dominion. Such, therefore, being the
different peculiarities in the extremes, it will not be difficult to
understand what we have now said, and to perceive the middle
peculiarities of dæmons and heroes, which are allied to each of the
extremes, possessing a similitude, to each, departing from both to the
medium, and embracing a concordant communion comingled from them, and
connected with it in appropriate measures. Such, therefore, must be
conceived to be the peculiarities of the first divine genera.




                              CHAP. VIII.


But neither must we admit that cause of the distinction of these genera
which you subjoin, viz. “_that it is an arrangement with reference to
different bodies; as, for instance, of Gods to etherial bodies, but of
dæmons to aerial bodies, and of souls to such as are terrene_.” For such
an arrangement as this, which resembles that of Socrates to a tribe,
when he is a senator, is unworthy of the divine genera, because all of
them are essentially unrestrained and free. To which may be added, that
it is dreadfully absurd to ascribe to bodies a principal power of giving
a specific distinction to the first causes of themselves. For bodies are
in servile subjection to these causes, and are ministrant to generation.
And farther still, the genera of the more excellent natures are not in
bodies, but the former externally rule over the latter. Hence they are
not changed in conjunction with bodies. Again, they impart from
themselves to bodies every such good as they are able to receive, but
they themselves receive nothing from bodies; so that neither will they
derive from them certain peculiarities. For if they were as the habits
of bodies, or as material forms, or were in some other way
corporeal-formed, it would, perhaps, be possible for them to be changed
together with the differences of bodies. But if they are separate from
bodies, and essentially preexist unmingled with them, what reasonable
distinction, produced from bodies, can be transferred to them? To which
also may be added, that this assertion of yours makes bodies to be more
excellent than the divine genera, since the former afford a seat to
superior causes, and insert in them peculiarities essentially. He,
therefore, who coarranges allotments, distributions, and consociations
of governors with the governed, will evidently assign a principal
authority to more excellent natures. For, because the presiding powers
are such [as we have shown them to be], on this account they have such
an allotment, and give to it an essential specific distinction, but they
are not assimilated to the nature of their receptacles.

It is necessary, therefore, to admit a thing of this kind in partial
souls. For such as is the life which the soul received, prior to its
insertion in a human body, and such as the form which it readily
exerted; such also is the organical body which it has suspended from
itself, and such the consequent corresponding nature, which receives the
more perfect life of the soul. But with respect to more excellent
natures, and which, as wholes, comprehend the principle [of parts] in
these, inferior are produced in superior natures; bodies, in incorporeal
essences; things fabricated, in the fabricators; and, being circularly
comprehended in, are directed and governed by, them. Hence, the
circulations of the celestial bodies, being primarily inserted in the
celestial circulations of the etherial soul, are perpetually inherent in
them; and the souls of the worlds [_i. e._ of the spheres], being
extended to their intellect, are perfectly comprehended by it, and are
primarily generated in it. Intellect, also, both that which is partial
and that which is universal, is in a similar manner comprehended in the
genera that are more excellent than intellect. Since, therefore, second
are always converted to first natures, and superior are the leaders of
inferior essences, as being the paradigms of them, hence essence and
form accede to subordinate from superior natures, and things posterior
are primarily produced in such as are more excellent; so that order and
measure are derived from primary to secondary beings, and the latter
possess that which they are from the former. But the contrary must not
be admitted, _viz._ that peculiarities emanate from things less
excellent to the natures which precede them.

Hence, through these things such a corporeal-formed division as you
introduce, is demonstrated to be false. It is, indeed, especially
necessary not to propose any thing of this kind; but if this should
appear to you to be requisite, yet you must not think, that what is
false deserves to be discussed. For such a discussion does not exhibit a
copiousness of arguments; but he wearies himself in vain, who, proposing
things that are false, endeavours afterwards to subvert them, as things
that are not true. For how is it possible that an essence, which is of
itself incorporeal, and which has nothing in common with the bodies that
participate of it, should be distinguished from other things by
corporeal qualities? How can that which is not locally present with
bodies, be separated by corporeal places? And how can that which is not
inclosed by the partible circumscriptions of subjects, be partibly
detained by the parts of the world? What, also, is that which can
prevent the Gods from being every where? And what can restrain their
power from extending as far as to the celestial arch? For to effect
this, must be the work of a more powerful cause, which is able to
inclose and circumscribe them in certain parts. But truly existing
being, and which is essentially incorporeal, is every where, wherever it
may wish to be. And that which is divine, and which transcends all
things, would [if what you say were admitted] be transcended by the
perfection of the whole world, and, as a certain part, would be
comprehended by it. Hence, it would be inferior to corporeal magnitude.
I do not, however, see after what manner these sensible natures could be
produced and specifically distinguished, if there was no divine
fabrication, and if no participation of divine forms, extended through
the whole world.

In short, this opinion wholly subverts sacred institutions, and the
theurgic communion of the Gods with men; since it exterminates from the
earth the presence of the more excellent genera. For it says nothing
else than that divine dwell remote from earthly natures, and that this
our place of abode is deserted by them. According to this assertion,
therefore, neither can we, that are priests, learn any thing from the
Gods, nor do you rightly inquire of us, as knowing more than others,
since we shall differ in no respect from other men.

No one, however, of these assertions is sane. For neither are the Gods
detained in certain parts of the world, nor are terrene natures
destitute of their providential attention. But the divinities are
characterized by this, that they are not comprehended by any thing, and
that they comprehend all things in themselves. But terrestrial natures
possess their existence in the _pleromas_[28] of the Gods; and when they
become adapted to divine participation, then prior to their own proper
essence, they immediately possess the Gods, which [latently] preexisted
in it.

Through these things, therefore, we have shown that the whole of this
division is false; that the method [employed by you] of investigating
peculiarities is irrational; and that to suppose the government of the
Gods is fixed in a certain place, is by no means to apprehend the whole
essence and power which is in them. It would have been proper,
therefore, to have omitted the opposite inquiry made by you, about this
distribution of more excellent natures, as not contradicting in any
respect true conceptions. Because, however, it is necessary rather to
direct the attention to true science, but not to dispute with men, on
this account, we also shall adapt the present inquiry to a certain
rational and theological apprehension.




                               CHAP. IX.


I consider you, therefore, as asking, for it is your inquiry, “_Why,
since the Gods dwell in the heavens alone, there are invocations by
theurgists of terrestrial and subterranean Gods?_” For what you assert
in the beginning is not true, that the Gods circumvolve in the heavens
alone: since all things are full of them. You also inquire, “_How some
of the Gods are said to be aerial, and different Gods are allotted
different places, and circumscribed portions of bodies, though they
possess infinite, impartible, and incomprehensible power? And how,
likewise, there will be a union of them with each other, as they are
separated by divisible circumscriptions of parts, and by difference of
places and subject bodies?_” Of all these, therefore, and an infinite
number of other similar questions, one and the best solution will be
obtained by surveying the mode of divine allotment.

A divine nature, therefore, whether it is allotted certain parts of the
universe, such as heaven or earth, or sacred cities and regions, or
certain groves, or sacred statues, externally[29] illuminates all these,
in the same manner as the sun externally irradiates all things with his
rays. Hence, as light comprehends the things which are illuminated by
it, thus also the power of the Gods externally comprehends its
participants. As, likewise, the solar light is present with the air in
an unmingled manner; but this is manifest from no light being left in
the air, when once that which illuminated it has departed, though heat
is still present with it, when that which heated it is entirely
withdrawn; thus also the light of the Gods illuminates separately, and
being firmly established in itself, wholly proceeds through all beings.
Moreover, the light which is the object of sensible perception, is one,
continuous, and every where the same, whole; so that it is not possible
for any part of it to be separate and cut off from the whole, nor to be
inclosed in a circle, nor at any time to depart from its illuminating
source. After the same manner, therefore, the whole world being
partible, is divided about the one and impartible light of the Gods. But
this light is every where one and the same whole, and is impartibly
present with all things that are able to participate of it; through an
all perfect power fills all things, and by a certain causal
comprehension, incloses and terminates the whole of things in itself,
and is every where united to itself, and conjoins ends to beginnings.
This too, all heaven and the world imitating, revolve with a circular
motion, are united to themselves, and lead the elements which are
carried round in a circle. Hence the world causes all things to be in
each other, and to tend to each other, makes the end of one thing to
coalesce with the beginning of another, as, for instance, earth with
heaven, and produces one connexion and concord of wholes with wholes.

Will not, therefore, he who surveys this conspicuous statue of the Gods,
thus united to itself, be ashamed to have a different opinion of the
Gods, who are the causes of it, so as to introduce among them sections,
and separations, and corporeal-formed circumscriptions? I, indeed,
should think, that every one would be thus disposed. For if there is no
ratio, no habitude of symmetry, no communion of essence, nor a connexion
either in capacity or in energy, between that which is adorned and the
adorning cause; if this be the case, there will neither be found in the
world a certain extension according to interval, nor local
comprehension, nor partible interception, nor any other such like
connascent equalization in the presence of the Gods [with mundane
natures]. For in things which are of a kindred nature, according to
essence and power, or which are, in a certain respect, of the same
species, or homogeneous, a certain comprehension, or conservation, may
be discovered. But in such things as are entirely exempt from all
mundane wholes, what opposing circumstance, or transition through all
things, or partible circumscription, or local comprehension, or any
thing else of this kind can justly be perceived? I think, therefore,
that the several participants of the divinities are of such a nature,
that some partake of them etherially, others aerially, and others
aquatically; which also, the art of divine works perceiving, employs
adaptations and invocations, conformable to such a division. And thus
much concerning the distribution of the more excellent genera into the
world.




                                CHAP. X.


After these things, you again subjoin another division for yourself,
“_in which you separate the essences of the more excellent genera by the
difference of passive and impassive_.” But neither do I admit this
division. For no one of the more excellent genera is passive, nor yet
impassive in such a way as to be contradistinguished from that which is
passive; nor is naturally adapted to receive passions, but liberated
from them through virtue, or some other worthy condition of being. But
because they are entirely exempt from the contrariety of action and
passion; and because they are not at all adapted to suffer, and have
essentially an immutable firmness, on this account I place the impassive
and the immutable in all the divine genera.

For consider, if you are willing, the last of divine natures, _viz._ a
soul purely liberated from bodies. What does such a soul want with the
generation which is in pleasure, or the restitution which is in it to a
natural condition, since such a soul is above nature, and lives an
unbegotten life? Why, also, should it participate of the pain which
leads to corruption and dissolves the harmony of the body, since it is
beyond all body, and the nature which is divided about body, and is
entirely separate from the harmony which descends from the soul into the
body? But neither is it in want of the passions which precede sensation:
for neither is it detained in body, nor inclosed by it, so as to require
corporeal organs, in order to apprehend certain other bodies which are
external to these organs. And, in short, being impartible, and abiding
in one and the same form, and also being essentially incorporeal, and
having no communication with a generated and passive body, it cannot
suffer any thing either according to division, or according to a change
in quality, nor can have any thing which is allied to any kind of
mutation or passion.

But neither does the [rational] soul, when it accedes to body, either
itself suffer, or the reasons which it imparts to the body. For these
_reasons_ are _forms_, and being simple and uniform, they receive no
perturbation in themselves, and no departure from their proper mode of
subsistence. That which remains, therefore [or the participant of the
rational soul], becomes the cause of suffering to the composite. Cause,
however, is not the same with its effect. Hence, as soul is the first
origin of generable and corruptible composite animals, but is itself by
itself ingenerable and incorruptible; thus, also, though the
participants of the soul suffer, and do not wholly [_i. e._ truly]
possess life and existence, but are complicated with the indefiniteness
and diversity of matter, yet the soul is itself by itself immutable, as
being essentially more excellent than that which suffers, and not as
possessing impassivity, in a certain deliberate choice, which verges
both to the impassive and the passive, nor as receiving an adscitious
immutability in the participation of habit or power.

Since, therefore, we have demonstrated that it is impossible for even
the last genus of the more excellent order of beings, _viz._ the soul,
to participate of suffering, how can it be proper to adapt this
participation to dæmons and heroes, who are perpetual, and the
attendants of the Gods, and who always invariably preserve the same
divine order, and never desert it? For we know this indeed, that passion
is something disorderly, confused, and unstable, never having any proper
authority of its own, but being devoted to that by which it is detained,
and to which it is subservient for the purposes of generation. This,
therefore, rather pertains to some other genus, than to that which
always exists, and is suspended from the Gods, and which, in conjunction
with them, observes the same order, and accomplishes the same period.
Hence dæmons are impassive, and all the more excellent genera, which
follow them [and the Gods].




                               CHAP. XI.


“_How therefore_,” you ask, “_are many things performed to them in
sacred operations, as if they were passive?_” I reply, that this is
asserted through an ignorance of sacerdotal mysticism. For of the things
which are perpetually effected in sacred rites, some have a certain
arcane cause, and which is more excellent than reason; others are
consecrated from eternity to the superior genera, as symbols; others
preserve a certain other image, just as nature, which is effective of
invisible reasons, expresses certain visible formations; others are
adduced for the sake of honour, or have for their end some kind of
similitude, or familiarity and alliance; and some procure what is useful
to us, or in a certain respect purify and liberate our human passions,
or avert some other of those dire circumstances which happen to us. It
must not, however, be on this account granted, that a certain portion of
sacred institutions is employed in the service of Gods or dæmons, as if
they were passive. For an essence which is by itself perpetual and
incorporeal, is not naturally adapted to receive a certain mutation from
bodies.

Nor, even though we should admit that this essence is especially in want
of such things, will it require the aid of men to a sacred worship of
this kind; since it is itself filled from itself, and from the nature of
the world, and the perfection which is in generation; and, if it be
lawful so to speak, prior to being in want it receives the
self-sufficient, through the never failing wholeness of the world and
its own proper plenitude, and because all the more excellent genera are
full of appropriate good. Let this, therefore, be a lenitive for us in
common, concerning the worship of the undefiled genera, as being
appropriately coadapted to the beings that are more excellent than we,
and because pure things are introduced to pure, and impassive things to
impassive, natures.

But directing our attention to particulars, we say that the erection of
the _phalli_ is a certain sign of prolific power, which, through this,
is called forth to the generative energy of the world. On which account,
also, many phalli are consecrated in the spring, because then the whole
world receives from the Gods the power which is productive of all
generation. But I am of opinion, that the obscene language which then
takes place, affords an indication of the privation of good about
matter, and of the deformity which is in material subjects, prior to
their being adorned. For these being indigent of ornament, by so much
the more aspire after it, as they in a greater degree despise their own
deformity. Again therefore, they pursue the causes of forms, and of what
is beautiful and good, recognizing baseness from base language. And
thus, indeed, the thing itself, _viz._ turpitude, is averted, but the
knowledge of it is rendered manifest through words, and those that
employ them transfer their desire to that which is contrary to baseness.

Another reason, also, of these things may be assigned. The powers of the
human passions that are in us, when they are entirely restrained, become
more vehement; but when they are called forth into energy, gradually and
commensurately, they rejoice in being moderately[30] gratified, are
satisfied; and from hence, becoming purified, they are rendered
tractable, and are vanquished without violence. On this account, in
comedy and tragedy, by surveying the passions of others, we stop our own
passions, cause them to be more moderate, and are purified from them. In
sacred ceremonies, likewise, by certain spectacles and auditions of
things base, we become liberated from the injury which happens from the
works effected by them.[31] Things of this kind, therefore, are
introduced for the sake of our soul, and of the diminution of the evils
which adhere to it through generation, and of a solution and liberation
from its bonds. On this account, also, they are very properly called by
Heraclitus _remedies_, as healing things of a dreadful nature, and
saving souls from the calamities with which the realms of generation are
replete.




                               CHAP. XII.


You also say, “_that invocations are directed to the Gods as to beings
that are passive, so that not only dæmons are passive, but likewise the
Gods_.” This, however, is not the case. For the illumination which takes
place through invocations, is spontaneously visible and self-perfect; is
very remote from all downward attraction; proceeds into visibility
through divine energy and perfection, and as much surpasses our
voluntary motion as the divine will of _the good_ transcends a
deliberately chosen life. Through this will, therefore, the Gods, being
benevolent and propitious, impart their light to theurgists in unenvying
abundance, calling upwards their souls to themselves, procuring them a
union with themselves, and accustoming them, while they are yet in body,
to be separated from bodies, and to be led round to their eternal and
intelligible principle.

But it is evident, from the effects themselves, that what we now say is
the salvation of the soul. For the soul in contemplating blessed
spectacles, acquires another life, energizes according to another
energy, and is then rightly considered as no longer ranking in the order
of man. Frequently, likewise, abandoning her own life, she exchanges it
for the most blessed energy of the Gods. If, therefore, the ascent
through invocations imparts to the priests purification from passions, a
liberation from generation, and a union with a divine principle, how is
it possible to connect with it any thing of passion? For an invocation
of this kind does not draw down the impassive and pure Gods, to that
which is passive and impure; but, on the contrary, it renders us, who
have become passive through generation, pure and immutable.

Neither do the invocations which implore the Gods to _incline_ to us,
conjoin the priests to them through passion; but procure for them the
communion of an indissoluble connexion, through the friendship which
binds all things together. Hence, it does not, as the name seems to
imply, incline the intellect of the Gods to men; but, according to the
decision of truth, renders the will of man adapted to the participation
of the Gods, elevates it to them, and coharmonizes the former with the
latter, through the most appropriate persuasion. On this account also,
such names of the Gods as are adapted to sacred concerns, and other
divine symbols, are able, as they are of an anagogic or elevating
nature, to connect invocations with the Gods themselves.




                              CHAP. XIII.


Moreover, “_the pacifications of anger_” will become manifest, if we
understand what the anger of the Gods is.[32] This, therefore, is not,
as it appears to be to some, a certain ancient and inveterate rage, but
an abandonment of the beneficent care of the Gods, from which we turn
ourselves away, withdrawing, as it were, from meridian light, hiding
ourselves in darkness, and depriving ourselves of the beneficent gift of
the Gods. Hence _pacification_ is able to convert us to the
participation of divinity and the providential care of the Gods, from
which we were divulsed, and to bind together, commensurately,
participants and the participated natures. So far, therefore, is
pacification from accomplishing its work through passion, that it
separates us from the passive and tumultuous abandonment of the Gods.

But “_the oblation of victims_,” when some evil is present in places
about the earth, procures a remedy for the evil, and secures us from the
incursion of any mutation or passion. Hence, whether a thing of this
kind is effected through Gods or dæmons, it invokes these as the
expellers of evil, and [our true] saviours, and through them
exterminates all the injury which may accede from the calamities. Those
powers, also, who avert genesiurgic[33] and physical punishments, do not
expel them through passions. And if some one should think that the
suppression of the guardian care of the Gods, introduces a certain
spontaneous injury, in this case the persuasion arising from
pacification recalls the benevolence of the more excellent genera, to a
providential attention to our affairs, and takes away our privation of
good, being itself perfectly pure and immutable.




                               CHAP. XIV.


Farther still, with respect to “_what are called the necessities of the
Gods_,” the whole truth of this is, that necessities are peculiar to,
and subsist in such a way as accords with the nature of, the Gods.[34]
Hence they do not subsist as if they were externally derived, or were
the effect of violence, but after such a manner as _the good_ ought to
be from necessity, so the Gods entirely exist, and are by no means
otherwise disposed. This necessity, therefore, is mingled with
beneficent will, and is the friend of love; through an order adapted to
the Gods, possesses identity and immutability; and because it is
contained in one boundary, abides in this, and never departs from it.
Hence, through all these particulars, the contrary to what you infer
takes place. For it happens that a divine nature is incapable of being
allured, is impassive and uncompelled, if there are in reality such
powers in theurgy, as we have demonstrated there are.




                               CHAP. XV.


After this, you pass on to another division into contraries, _viz._ the
division of Gods with reference to dæmons. For you say, “_that the Gods
are pure intellects_;” but you propose this opinion as an hypothesis, or
you narrate it as a dogma adopted by certain persons. And you infer,
“_that dæmons are psychical essences participating of intellect_.”
Neither, therefore, am I ignorant that this is the opinion of many
philosophers; but to you, I do not think it is proper to conceal what
appears to me to be the truth. For all such opinions are full of
confusion; since they wander from dæmons to souls, which also
participate of intellect; and from the Gods to an immaterial intellect
in energy, which the Gods entirely excel by a priority of nature. Why,
therefore, is it requisite to attribute to them these peculiarities,
which are by no means appropriate? And thus much concerning this
division, for it would be superfluous to make any further mention of it.
But it is requisite that your doubts respecting this distinction should
be properly considered, as the discussion of them pertains to the
sacerdotal province.

Farther still, having said “_that pure intellects are inflexible_,
[i. e. _not to be changed or altered_] _and unmingled with sensibles_,”
you doubt, “_whether it is requisite to pray to them_.” But I think it
is necessary to pray to no others than these. For that in us which is
divine, intellectual,[35] and one, or intelligible, if you are willing
so to call it, is most clearly excited in prayer; and, when excited,
vehemently seeks that which is similar to itself, and becomes copulated
to perfection itself. But if it should appear to you to be incredible,
that an incorporeal nature can be capable of hearing sounds, and it
should be urged by you, that for this purpose the sense of hearing is
requisite, that it may apprehend what is said by us in prayer; you
willingly forget the excellency of primary causes, which consists in
both knowing and comprehending in themselves at once the whole of
things. The Gods, therefore, do not receive prayers in themselves,
through any corporeal powers or organs, but rather contain in themselves
the energies of pious invocations; and especially of such as, through
sacred ceremonies, are established in, and united to, the Gods. For
then, in reality, a divine nature is present with itself, and does not
communicate with the intellectual conceptions in prayer, as different
from its own.

“_Supplications, however_,” you say, “_are too foreign to the purity of
intellect to be offered to the Gods_.” But this is by no means the case.
For on this very account, because we fall short of the Gods in power,
purity, and every thing else, we shall act in the most opportune manner,
by invoking them with the most vehement supplications. For the
consciousness of our own nothingness, when we compare ourselves, with
the Gods, causes us to betake ourselves spontaneously to suppliant
prayer. But from supplication, we are in a short time led to the object
of supplication, acquire its similitude from intimate converse, and
gradually obtain divine perfection, instead of our own imbecility and
imperfection.

If, indeed, it is considered that sacred prayers are sent to men from
the Gods themselves, that they are certain symbols of the divinities,
and that they are only known to the Gods, with whom, in a certain
respect, they possess the same power,—how can it any longer be justly
apprehended, that a supplication of this kind is sensible, and not
divine and intellectual? Or what passion can accede to a thing of this
kind, the purity of which the most worthy human manners cannot easily
equal?

You say, however, “_that the things which are offered in supplications
are offered as to sensitive and psychical natures_.” And, indeed, if the
offerings consisted of corporeal and composite powers alone, or of such
things as are merely subservient to corporeal organs, your assertion
would be true. But as the offerings participate of incorporeal forms, of
certain reasons, and more simple measures, the aptitude of them is to be
surveyed according to this alone. And if a certain alliance, or
similitude, is present, which is either proximate or remote, it is
sufficient to effect the contact of which we are now speaking. _For
there is not any thing which in the smallest degree is adapted to the
Gods, to which the Gods are not immediately present, and with which they
are not conjoined._ The connexion, therefore, of supplications with the
Gods, is not as with sensitive or psychical natures, but as with divine
forms, and with the Gods themselves [as Gods, _i. e._ as superessential
hyparxes]. So that we have sufficiently spoken in opposition to this
division.




                               CHAP. XVI.


The difference which separates “_Gods from dæmons by the corporeal and
incorporeal_,” is the next thing that follows in what you have written;
this being much more common than the former difference, and yet it is so
far from expressing the peculiarities of their essence, that it does not
afford a conjectural knowledge of them, nor of any accidents which
pertain to them. For neither is it possible from these things to
apprehend whether they are animals or not, and whether they are deprived
of life, or are not at all in want of it. Farther still, neither is it
easy to conjecture how these names are predicated, whether in common, or
of many different things. For if in common, it is absurd that a line and
time, God and dæmons, fire and water, should be under the same
incorporeal genus. But if of many things, what reason is there when you
speak of the incorporeal, that you should rather manifest by it Gods
than points; or when you speak of the corporeal, that you should not be
thought to speak of the earth rather than of dæmons? For neither is this
very thing defined, whether Gods and dæmons have bodies, or are carried
in bodies, as in a vehicle, or use them, or comprehend them, or are
alone the same[36] with body. But, perhaps, it is not proper to examine
this distinction very minutely. For you do not propose it as your own
decision, but you exhibit it as the opinion of others.




                              CHAP. XVII.


We will exchange, therefore, this division for the doubt which may be
adduced by you against the present opinion. “_For_,” it may be said by
you, “_how, conformably to what we assert, can the sun and moon, and the
visible natures in the heavens, be Gods, if the Gods are alone
incorporeal?_” To this we reply, that the celestial divinities are not
comprehended by bodies, but contain bodies in their divine lives and
energies; that they are not themselves converted to body, but they have
a body which is converted to its divine cause; and that body does not
impede their intellectual and incorporeal perfection, nor occasion them
any molestation by its intervention. Hence it does not require an
abundant attention, but follows the divinities spontaneously, and after
a certain manner, self-motively, not being in want of manual direction;
but, through an anagogic tendency, being itself uniformly coelevated by
itself, to _the one_ of the Gods.

It may also, if requisite, be said that a celestial body is most allied
to the incorporeal essence of the Gods. For as the latter is one, so the
former is simple; as the latter is impartible, so the former is
indivisible;[37] and as that is immutable, so this is unchanged in
quality. If, likewise, it is admitted that the energies of the Gods are
uniform, a celestial body also, has one circulation. To which may be
added, that it imitates the sameness of the Gods, by a perpetual motion,
which is invariably the same, and which subsists according to one reason
and one order. It also imitates a divine life, by the life which is
connascent with etherial bodies. Hence, this celestial body does not
consist of things contrary and different, as is the case with our body;
nor does the soul of the celestial Gods coalesce with the body into one
animal from two things; but the celestial animals of the Gods are
entirely similar and counited, and are throughout wholes, uniform, and
incomposite. For things of a more excellent nature are always
transcendent in them, after the same manner; and things of an inferior
nature are suspended from the dominion of such as are prior, yet so as
never to draw down this dominion to themselves. But all these are
congregated into one coarrangement and perfection; and, after a certain
manner, all things in the celestial Gods are incorporeal, and wholly
Gods; because the divine form which is in them predominates, and inserts
every where throughout one total essence. Thus, therefore, the visible
celestials are all of them Gods, and after a certain manner incorporeal.




                              CHAP. XVIII.


Your next inquiry doubts, “_how some of the Gods are beneficent, but
others malefic_.” This opinion, therefore, is assumed from the
predictors of nativities. It is, however, entirely remote from the
truth. For all the Gods are good, and invariably the causes of good; and
all of them are uniformly convolved to one good, according to the
beautiful and good alone. The bodies, likewise, which are subject to
them possess immense powers; some of which are firmly established in the
divine bodies themselves, but others proceed from them into the nature
of the world, and into the world itself, descending in an orderly manner
through the whole of generation, and extending without impediment as far
as to things which have a partial subsistence.

With respect to the powers, therefore, which remain in the heavens in
the divine bodies themselves, there can be no doubt that all of them are
similar. Hence, it remains that we should discuss those powers which are
thence transmitted to us, and are mingled with generation. These,
therefore, descend with invariable sameness for the salvation of the
universe, and connectedly contain the whole of generation after the same
manner. They are likewise impassive and immutable, though they proceed
into that which is mutable and passive. For generation being multiform,
and consisting of different things, receives _the one_ of the Gods, and
that in them which is without difference, with hostility and
partibility, conformably to its own contrariety and division. It also
receives that which is impassive, passively; and, in short, participates
of them according to its own proper nature, and not according to their
power. As, therefore, that which is generated [or has a subsistence in
becoming to be,] participates of being generatively, and body
participates of the incorporeal, corporeally; thus, also, the physical
and material substances which are in generation, participate of the
immaterial and etherial bodies, which are above nature and generation,
in a confused and disorderly manner. Hence they are absurd who attribute
colour, figure, and contact to intelligible forms, because the
participants of them are things of this kind; as likewise are those who
ascribe depravity to the celestial bodies, because their participants
sometimes produce evils. For the participation from the first could not
be a thing of this kind, unless the recipient had some mutation. But if
that which is participated is received as in another and different
thing, this other thing in terrene natures is evil and disorderly. The
participation, therefore, becomes the cause of the abundant difference
in secondary natures, and also the commixture of material substances
with immaterial effluxions; and besides these, another cause is this,
that what is imparted in one way, is received in another by terrestrial
substances. Thus, for instance, the efflux of Saturn is constipative,
but that of Mars is motive; but the passive genesiurgic receptacle in
material substances receives the former according to congelation and
refrigeration, but the latter according to an inflammation which
transcends mediocrity. Do not, therefore, the corruption and privation
of symmetry arise from an aberration which is effective of difference,
and which is material and passive? Hence the imbecility of material and
terrene places, not being able to receive the genuine power and most
pure life of the etherial natures, transfers its own passion to first
causes. Just as if some one having a diseased body, and not being able
to bear the vivific heat of the sun, should falsely dare to say, in
consequence of looking to his own maladies, that the sun is not useful
to health or life.

A certain thing of this kind also may take place in the harmony and
crasis of the universe: for the same things may be the salvation of the
whole, through the perfection of the things inherent and the recipients;
but may be noxious to the parts, through their partible privation of
symmetry. In the motion, therefore, of the universe, all the
circulations preserve the whole world invariably the same; but some one
of the parts is frequently injured by another part, which we see is
sometimes the case in a dance.

Again, therefore, corruptibility and mutability are passions connascent
with partial natures. But it is not proper to ascribe these to wholes
and first causes, either as if they existed in them, or as if they
proceeded to terrestrial substances from them. Hence, through these
things it is demonstrated, that neither the celestial Gods, nor their
gifts, are effective of evil.




                               CHAP. XIX.


In the next place, therefore, we shall answer your question, “_What it
is which conjoins the Gods that have a body in the heavens with the
incorporeal Gods._” What this is, therefore, is evident from what has
been before said. For if these Gods, as incorporeal, intelligible, and
united, ride in the celestial spheres, they have their principles in the
intelligible world, and intellectually perceiving the divine forms of
themselves, they govern all heaven according to one infinite energy. And
if they are present with the heavens in a separate manner, and lead the
perpetual circulations of them by their will alone, they are themselves
unmingled with a sensible nature, and exist together with the
intelligible Gods.

It will be better, however, to answer you more particularly, as follows:
I say, therefore, that the visible statues of the Gods originate from
divine intelligible paradigms, and are generated about them. But being
thus generated, they are entirely established in them, and being also
extended to,[38] they possess an image which derives its completion from
them. These images likewise fabricate another order; sublunary natures
are in continuity with them, according to one union; and the divine
intellectual forms, which are present with the visible bodies of the
Gods, exist prior to them in a separate manner. But the unmingled and
supercelestial intelligible paradigms of them, abide by themselves in
unity, and are at once all things, according to the eternal
transcendency of themselves.

There is, therefore, one common indivisible bond of them according to
intellectual energies; and there is also this bond according to the
common participations of forms, since there is nothing which intercepts
these, nor any thing which comes between them. For indeed, an immaterial
and incorporeal essence itself, being neither separated by places, nor
by subjects, nor defined by the divisible circumscriptions of parts,
immediately concurs, and is connascent with sameness. The progression
also, from, and the regression of all things to, _the one_, and the
entire domination of _the one_, congregates the communion of the mundane
Gods with the Gods that preexist in the intelligible world.

Farther still, the intellectual conversion of secondary to primary
natures, and the gift of the same essence and power imparted by the
primary to the secondary Gods, connects the synod of them in
indissoluble union. For in things of different essences, such as soul
and body, and also in those of a dissimilar species, such as material
forms, and those which are in any other way separated from each other,
the connascent adventitious union is derived from supernal causes, and
is lost in certain definite periods of time. But by how much the higher
we ascend, and elevate ourselves to the sameness both in form and
essence, of first natures, and proceed from parts to wholes, by so much
the more shall we discover the union which has an eternal existence, and
survey the essence, which has a precedaneous and more principal
subsistence, and possesses about, and in itself, difference and
multitude.[39]

Since, however, the order of all the Gods is profoundly united, and the
first and second genera of them, and all the multitude which is
spontaneously produced about them, are consubsistent in unity, and also
every thing which is in them is one,—hence the beginning, middles, and
ends in them are consubsistent according to _the one itself_; so that in
these, it is not proper to inquire, whence _the one_ accedes to all of
them. For the very existence in them, whatever it may be, is _this
one_[40] of their nature. And secondary genera, indeed, remain with
invariable sameness in _the one_ of such as are primary; but the primary
impart from themselves union to the secondary genera, and all of them
possess in each other the communion of an indissoluble connexion.

From this cause, therefore, the perfectly incorporeal Gods are united to
the sensible Gods that have bodies. For the visible Gods also are
external to bodies, and on this account are in the intelligible world;
and the intelligible Gods, through their infinite union, comprehend in
themselves the visible Gods; and both are established according to a
common union and one energy. In a similar manner, also, this is the
illustrious prerogative of the cause and orderly distribution of the
Gods, on which account the same union of all the divinities extends from
on high, as far as to the end of the divine order. But if this deserves
to be doubted, the contrary would be wonderful, _viz._ that there should
not be this union of the visible and intelligible Gods. And thus much
concerning the contact with, and establishment of, the sensible in the
intelligible Gods.




                               CHAP. XX.


After this, you again resume the same inquiries, of which what has been
already said may be considered as a sufficient solution. Since, however,
it is necessary, according to the proverb, frequently to speak of and
consider things that are beautiful, neither shall we pass over these
particulars, as if they had been now sufficiently answered, but by
repeatedly discussing them we may, perhaps, obtain from all of them a
certain perfect and great scientific good. For you doubt “_what it is
which distinguishes dæmons from the visible and invisible Gods, since
the visible are conjoined with the invisible divinities_.” But I,
beginning from this as the first thing, shall demonstrate what it is in
which they differ. For, because the visible are united to the
intelligible Gods, and have the same idea with them, but dæmons are far
distant from them, according to essence, and scarcely adumbrate them
through similitude, on this account they are separated from the visible
Gods; and they differ from the invisible Gods, according to the
difference itself of the invisible.[41] For dæmons, indeed, are
invisible, and by no means to be apprehended by sense; but the Gods
transcend rational knowledge and material intelligence. And, because
they are unknown and unapparent to these, they are thus denominated; but
are said to be invisible in a way very different from that in which this
is asserted of dæmons. What, therefore, have the invisible Gods, so far
as they are invisible, more excellent than the visible Gods? Nothing.
For that which is divine, wherever it may be, and whatever allotment it
may possess, has the same power and dominion over all the natures that
are arranged under it. Moreover, though the invisible Gods should become
visible, yet they rule over invisible dæmons. For neither the place,
which is the recipient of divinity, nor a certain part of the world,
produces any mutation in the dominion of the Gods. But the whole essence
of the Gods remains everywhere the same, indivisible and immutable,
which all subordinate beings similarly venerate, in the order assigned
them by nature.

By the assistance also of this reasoning, we may discover another
difference between Gods and dæmons. For both the visible and invisible
Gods, indeed, comprehend in themselves the whole government of whatever
is contained in all heaven and the world, and in the total invisible
powers in the universe. But those powers that are allotted a dæmoniacal
prefecture, distributing certain divisible portions of the world, govern
these, and have themselves a partible form of essence and power. They
are, likewise, in a certain respect, connascent with, and inseparable
from, the subjects of their government. But the Gods, though they may
ride in bodies, are entirely separated from them. The providential
attention, therefore, to bodies, produces no diminution in those to whom
body is subservient: for it is connectedly contained by a more excellent
nature, is converted to it, and is not the cause of any impediment to
it. But the adhering to a genesiurgic nature, and the being divided
about it, necessarily give to dæmons a more subordinate condition. In
short, that which is divine is of a ruling nature, and presides over the
different orders of beings; but that which is dæmoniacal is of a
ministrant nature, and receives whatever the Gods may announce, promptly
employing manual operation, as it were, in things which the Gods
intellectually perceive, wish, and command. The Gods, therefore, are
liberated from the powers which verge to generation; but dæmons are not
entirely purified from these. And thus much concerning this distinction;
and we trust, that from the former and the present exposition, the
difference between Gods and dæmons will become more known.




                               CHAP. XXI.


The division, however, of _the passive from the impassive_, which you
adopt, may perhaps be rejected by some one, as not adapted to either of
the more excellent genera, through the causes which we have before
enumerated; and it also deserves to be subverted, because it is inferred
that these genera are passive, from what is performed in religious
ceremonies. For what sacred institution, what religious cultivation,
which is conformable to sacerdotal laws, is effected through passion, or
produces a certain completion of passions? Is not each of these
legislatively ordained from the first, conformably to the sacred laws of
the Gods, and intellectually? Each also imitates both the intelligible
and celestial order of the Gods; and contains the eternal measures of
beings, and those admirable signatures which are sent hither from the
Demiurgus and father of wholes, by which things of an ineffable nature
are unfolded into light through arcane symbols, things formless are
vanquished by forms, things more excellent than every image are
expressed through images, and all things are accomplished through a
divine cause alone, which is in so great a degree separated from
passions, that reason is not able to come into contact with it.

This, therefore, is nearly the cause of our aberration to a multitude of
conceptions. For men being in reality unable to apprehend the reasons of
sacred institutions, but conceiving that they are able, are wholly
hurried away by their own human passions, and form a conjecture of
divine concerns from things pertaining to themselves. In so doing,
however, they err in a twofold respect; because they fall from divine
natures; and because, being frustrated of these, they draw them down to
human passions. But it is requisite not to apprehend after the same
manner, things which are performed both to Gods and men, such as
genuflexions, adorations, gifts, and first fruits, but to establish the
one apart from the other, conformably to the difference between things
more and things less honourable; and to reverence the former, indeed, as
divine, but to despise the latter as human, and as performed to men. It
is proper, likewise, to consider, that the latter produce passions, both
in the performer and those to whom they are performed; for they are
human and corporeal-formed; but to honour the energy of the former in a
very high degree, as being performed through immutable admiration, and a
venerable condition of mind, because they are referred to the Gods.




                              SECTION II.




                                CHAP. I.


It is also necessary to demonstrate to you, in what dæmons, heroes, and
souls differ from each other, and whether this difference is according
to essence, or according to power, or according to energy. I say,
therefore, that dæmons are produced according to the generative and
demiurgic powers of the Gods, in the most remote termination of
progression, and ultimate distribution into parts. But heroes are
produced according to the reasons [or effective principles], of life in
divine natures; and from these, the first and perfect measures of souls
receive their termination and distribution into parts.

Since, however, the nature of dæmons and heroes is thus generated from
different causes, it is also necessary that the essence of the one
should be different from that of the other. Hence, the essence of dæmons
is effective, and perfective of mundane natures, and gives completion to
the superintendence of generated individuals. But the essence of heroes
is vital and rational, and is the leader of souls. And, with respect to
the powers of each, those of dæmons must be defined to be prolific,
inspective of nature, and of the bond by which souls are united to
bodies. But it is requisite to attribute to heroes vivific powers, which
are the leaders of men, and are liberated from generation.




                               CHAP. II.


It follows, therefore, that in the next place we should define the
energies of them. And those of dæmons, indeed, must be surveyed as
occupied about the world, and more widely extended in their effects; but
those of heroes as less extended, and as converted to the order of
souls. Hence, these being thus distinguished, soul succeeds, which
proceeds as far as to the end of the divine orders; and, being allotted
from these two genera certain portions of powers, is redundant with
partible additions, and other prerogatives derived from itself. It also
produces at different times different forms and reasons and manners,
which originate from different sources; and, according to each part of
the world, employs various lives and ideas; becoming, connascent with,
and likewise receding from, whatever natures it pleases; being,
assimilated to all things, and at the same time, through difference,
being separated from them; drawing forth reasons allied to real beings
and generated natures; and connecting itself with the Gods, according to
other harmonies of essences and powers, than those by which, dæmons and
heroes are united to the divinities. It likewise possesses the eternity
of a similar life and energy in a less degree than dæmons and heroes;
yet, through the beneficent will of the Gods, and the illumination
imparted by them, it frequently proceeds higher, and is elevated to a
greater, _i. e._ to the angelic, order; when it no longer remains in the
boundaries of soul, but the whole of it is perfected into an angelic
soul and an undefiled life. Hence, also, soul appears to comprehend in
itself all-various essences and reasons, and forms or species of every
kind. If, however, it be requisite to speak the truth, soul is always
defined according to one certain thing, but adapting itself to
precedaneous causes, it is at different times conjoined to different
causes.

So great, therefore, being the difference between the energies of
dæmons, heroes, and souls throughout, it is no longer proper to doubt,
what it is which separates them from each other; but they are to be
distinguished by the peculiar nature of each. And so far as they are
able to form one conjunction, so far the communion of them must be
surveyed. For thus it will be possible truly to comprehend and define
separately the conception which ought to be formed of them.




                               CHAP. III.


Let us, however, now proceed to the appearances of the Gods and their
perpetual attendants, and show what the difference is in their
appearance. For you inquire, “_by what indication the presence of a God,
or an angel, or an archangel, or a dæmon, or a certain archon_ [i. e.
_ruler_], _or a soul, may be known_.” In one word, therefore, I conclude
that their appearances accord with their essences, powers, and energies.
For such as they are, such also do they appear to those that invoke
them, and they exhibit energies and ideas consentaneous to themselves,
and proper indications of themselves. But that we may descend to
particulars, the phasmata, or luminous appearances, of the Gods are
uniform; those of dæmons are various; those of angels are more simple
than those of dæmons, but are subordinate to those of the Gods; those of
archangels approximate in a greater degree to divine causes; but those
of archons, if these powers appear to you to be the cosmocrators,[42]
who govern the sublunary element, will be more various, but adorned in
order; but if they are the powers that preside over matter, they will
indeed be more various, and more imperfect, than those of the archons
[properly so called]; and those of souls will appear to be all-various.
And the phasmata, indeed, of the Gods will be seen shining with salutary
light; those of archangels will be terrible, and at the same time mild;
those of angels will be more mild; those of dæmons will be dreadful;
those of heroes (which you have omitted in your inquiry, but to which we
shall give an answer for the sake of truth) are milder than those of
dæmons; but those of archons, if their dominion pertains to the world,
produce astonishment, but if they are material, they are noxious and
painful to the spectators; and those of souls are similar to the heroic
phasmata, except that they are inferior to them.

Again, therefore, the phasmata of the Gods are entirely immutable,
according to magnitude, morphe,[A] and figure, and according to all
things pertaining to them; those of archangels approximate to those of
the Gods, but fall short of the sameness of them; those of angels are
subordinate to these, but are immutable; and those of dæmons are at
different times seen in a different form, and appear at one time great,
but at another small, yet are still recognized to be the phasmata of
dæmons. Moreover, those of such archons as are leaders are immutable;
but those of such as are material are multiformly changed; those of
heroes are similar to those of dæmons; and those of souls imitate in no
small degree the dæmoniacal mutation. Farther still, order and quiet
pertain to the Gods; but with archangels, there is an efficacy of order
and quiet. With angels, the adorned and the tranquil are present, but
not unattended with motion. Perturbation and disorder follow the
dæmoniacal phasmata; but spectacles attend the archons, conformable to
each of the particulars which we have already mentioned; the material
archons, indeed, being borne along tumultuously; but those of a leading
characteristic, presenting themselves to the view, firmly established in
themselves. The phasmata of heroes are subject to motion and mutation;
but those of souls resemble, indeed,

[Sidenote A: Morphe pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of
superficies.] the heroic, but at the same time are less than these. In
addition also to these peculiarities, divine beauty, indeed, shines with
an immense splendour as it were, fixes the spectators in astonishment,
imparts a divine joy, presents itself to the view with ineffable
symmetry, and is exempt from all other species of pulchritude. But the
blessed spectacles of archangels have indeed themselves the greatest
beauty, yet are not so ineffable and admirable as those of the Gods.
Those of angels divide, in a partible manner, the beauty which they
receive from archangels. But the dæmoniacal and heroical self-visive
spirits, have both of them beauty in definite forms, yet the former is
adorned in reasons which define the essence, and the latter exhibits
fortitude. The phasmata of archons may be divided in a twofold respect.
For some of them exhibit a beauty which is spontaneous, and of a ruling
characteristic; but others, an elegance of form which is fictitious and
renovated. And the phasmata of souls are, indeed, adorned in definite
reasons, but these reasons are more divided than those in heroes, are
partibly circumscribed, and are vanquished by one form. If, however, it
be requisite to define all of them in common, I say that each
participates of beauty according to its arrangement, the peculiar nature
which it possesses, and its allotment.




                               CHAP. IV.


Proceeding, therefore, to other peculiarities of them, we say, that with
the Gods, indeed, there is acuteness and rapidity in the energies, which
shine forth with greater celerity than those of intellect itself, though
in themselves they are immoveable and stable. With archangels, the
celerities are, in a certain respect, mingled with efficacious energies.
Those of angels partake of a certain motion, and do not, similarly with
archangels, possess a power which is effective by speaking. The
operations of dæmons appear to be more rapid than they are in reality.
In the motions of the heroic phasmata, a certain magnificence presents
itself to the view; but in accomplishing what they wish to effect, their
energies are not so rapid as those of dæmons. In the phasmata of
archons, the first energies appear to be most excellent and
authoritative; but the second have a more abundant representation, yet
in actions fall short of the end. And the phasmata of souls are seen to
be more moveable, yet are more imbecile, than those of heroes.

In addition to these things also, the magnitude of the epiphanies [or
manifestations] in the Gods, indeed, is so great as sometimes to conceal
all heaven, the sun and the moon; and the earth itself, as the Gods
descend, is no longer able to stand still. When archangels appear,
certain parts of the world are moved, and a divided forerunning light
precedes them. But they exhibit a magnitude of light commensurate to the
magnitude of their domination. The angelic light is less than the
archangelic, and more divided, but in dæmons it is still more divided,
and the magnitude of the manifestation is not always equal in them. The
manifestation of heroes is still less than that of dæmons, but exhibits
more of an elevated condition. Again, the manifestation of such archons
as preside over mundane forms, presents itself to the view as above
measure great; but such of them as are distributed about matter, exhibit
in their manifestations an abundance of pride and arrogance. Those of
souls are not all of them seen to be equal, but appear to be less than
those of heroes. And, in short, the magnitude of the manifestation is
appropriately present in each of these, according to the magnitude of
their powers, and the amplitude of the empire through which they extend
themselves, and in which they exercise their authority.

After these things, therefore, we shall define the reasons of the
self-apparent statues [or images]. Hence, in the forms of the Gods which
are seen by the eyes, the most clear spectacles of truth itself are
perceived, which are also accurately splendid, and shine forth with an
evolved light. The images of archangels present themselves to the view
true and perfect; but those of angels preserve, indeed, the same form,
but fail in plenitude of indication. The images of dæmons are obscure;
and those of heroes are seen to be still inferior to these. With
respect, also, to archons, the images of such as are mundane, are clear;
but of such as are material, obscure. Both, however, are seen to be of
an authoritative nature. And the images of souls appear to be of a
shadowy form.

In a similar manner, likewise, we must determine concerning the light of
these powers. For the images of the Gods, indeed, are replete with a
fulgid light. Those of archangels are full of supernatural light. Those
of angels are luminous; but dæmons present themselves to the view with a
turbid fire. The light of heroes is mingled with many things. And, with
respect to archons, the light of those that have the government of the
world is more pure; but of those that preside over matter, exhibits
itself mingled from things of a dissimilar and contrary nature. And the
light of souls manifests itself to be partibly filled with many of the
mixtures which exist in generation.

Conformably, also, to what has been said, the fire of the Gods, indeed,
shines forth with an indivisible and ineffable light, and fills all the
profundities of the world, in an empyrean,[43] but not in a mundane,
manner. But the fire of archangels is impartible indeed, but is seen to
possess about itself an abundant multitude, either preceding or
following after itself. The fire of angels is divided, except that it
exhibits itself in the most perfect ideas. That of dæmons is still more
shortly circumscribed by a distribution into parts, is effable, and does
not astonish the sight of those that have seen more excellent natures.
The fire of heroes has, after a certain manner, the same things as that
of dæmons, but at the same time falls short of the most accurate
similitude to it. Moreover, with respect to archons, the fire of those
that are of a more elevated order, is more pellucid; but of those that
are material, is more dark. And the fire of souls is seen to be much
divided and multiform, and is comingled from many of the natures that
are in the world. Again, the fire of the Gods appears to be entirely
stable. That of archangels is tranquil; but that of angels is stably
moved. The fire of dæmons is unstable; but that of heroes is, for the
most part, rapidly moved. The fire of those archons that are of the
first rank is tranquil; but of those that are of the last order is
tumultuous. And the fire of souls is transmuted in a multitude of
motions.




                                CHAP. V.


Moreover, that which purifies souls is perfect in the Gods; but in
archangels it is anagogic. Angels alone dissolve the bond of generation.
Dæmons draw souls down into nature; but heroes lead them to a
providential attention to sensible works. Archons either deliver to them
the government of mundane concerns, or the inspection of material
natures. And souls, when they become apparent, tend in a certain respect
to generation.

Farther still, consider this, also, that you should attribute everything
which is pure and stable in the visible image to the more excellent
genera. Hence, you should ascribe to the Gods that which in the image is
transcendently splendid, and which is firmly established in itself. That
which is splendid, but is established as in another thing, you should
give to archangels; but that which remains in another to angels. To all
these, therefore, you should oppose, that which is rashly borne along,
is unestablished, and filled with foreign natures, the whole of which is
adapted to inferior orders.

These, also, may now be divided according to the difference of
commixture. For mundane vapours are mingled with dæmons, and are
unstably borne along, contrary to the motion of the world. Genesiurgic
compositions of pneumatic substances are mingled with heroes, about
which substances, also, they are moved. The archons of the world remain
invariably the same, exhibiting the mundane nature which they possess.
But the archons of matter are full of material substances. And souls are
filled with an abundance of stains and foreign spirits, together with
which, when they become visible, each of these genera presents itself to
the view.

The following, also, will be no small indications to you [of the
difference of these powers]. With the Gods matter is immediately
consumed. With archangels it is consumed in a short time. With angels
there is a solution of, and elevation from, matter. By dæmons matter is
elegantly adorned. With heroes there is a coadaptation to it, in
appropriate measures, and a skilful providential attention to it. And
with respect to archons, those that are the governors of the world are
present with matter in a transcendent manner, and in this way unfold
themselves into light. But those that are material, exhibit themselves
as entirely replete with matter. With respect to souls, also, those that
are pure, present themselves to the view out of matter, but those of a
contrary description are seen surrounded with it.




                               CHAP. VI.


Moreover, the gifts arising from the manifestations are not all of them
equal, nor have the same fruits. But the presence[44] of the Gods,
indeed, imparts to us health of body, virtue of soul, purity of
intellect, and in one word elevates every thing in us to its proper
principle. And that, indeed, in us which is cold and destructive it
annihilates; that which is hot it increases, and renders more powerful
and predominant; and causes all things to accord with soul and
intellect. It also emits a light, accompanied with intelligible harmony,
and exhibits that which is not body as body to the eyes of the soul,
through those of the body. The presence of archangels imparts likewise
the same things, except that it does not impart them always, nor in all
things, nor does it bestow goods which are sufficient, perfect, and
incapable of being taken away; nor is their appearance accompanied with
a light equal to that of the Gods. The presence of angels imparts
divisibly still more partible goods, and the energy through which it
becomes visible falls very short of comprehending in itself a perfect
light. That of dæmons renders the body, indeed, heavy, afflicts with
diseases, draws down the soul to nature, does not depart from bodies,
and the sense allied to bodies, and detains about this terrestrial place
those who are hastening to divine fire, and does not liberate from the
bonds of Fate. The presence of heroes is in other respects similar to
that of dæmons, but is attended with this peculiarity, that it excites
to certain generous and great undertakings. The appearance which is
visible by itself, of the mundane archons, imparts mundane goods, and
every thing pertaining to human life; but that of the material archons
extends material benefits, and such works as are terrestrial. Moreover,
the vision of souls that are undefiled, and established in the order of
angels, is anagogic, and the saviour of the soul, is accompanied with
sacred hope, and imparts those goods which sacred hope vindicates to
itself. But the vision of other souls draws down to generation, corrupts
the fruits of [sacred] hope, and fills the spectators with passions
which fix them to body.




                               CHAP. VII.


Moreover, in the manifestations there is an indication of the order
which the powers that are seen possess. For the Gods are surrounded by
either Gods or angels; but archangels have angels either preceding or
coarranged with them, or following them behind, or are accompanied by a
certain other multitude of angels, who attend on them as guards. Angels
exhibit, together with themselves, the peculiar works of the order to
which they belong. Good dæmons permit us to survey, in conjunction with
themselves, their own works, and the benefits which they impart; but
avenging dæmons exhibit the species of punishments [which they inflict];
and such other dæmons as are depraved are surrounded by certain noxious,
blood-devouring, and fierce wild beasts.[45] Archons [of the first rank]
exhibit, together with themselves, certain portions of the world; but
other archons attract to themselves the inordination and confusion of
matter. With respect to soul, if it ranks as a whole, and does not
belong to any particular species, it presents to the view a formless
fire, extended through the whole world, which is indicative of the
total, one, indivisible, and formless soul of the universe; but a
purified soul exhibits a fiery form, and a pure and unmingled fire.
Then, also, the most inward light of it is seen, and an undefiled and
stable form, and it most willingly and joyfully follows its elevating
leader, and unfolds, by its works, its own appropriate order. But the
soul which verges downward draws along with it the signs of bonds and
punishments, is heavy with material spirits, is detained by the
anomalous tumults of matter, and exhibits before itself, genesiurgic
presiding dæmons. And, in short, all these genera exhibit their proper
orders; _viz._ the aerial genera exhibit aerial fire; the terrestrial a
terrestrial and blacker fire; and the celestial a more splendid fire.
But in these three boundaries all the genera are distributed according
to a triple order of beginning, middle, and end. And the Gods, indeed,
exhibit the supreme and most pure causes of this triple order. But the
genera of angels depend on those of archangels. The genera of dæmons
appear to be subservient to those of angels; and in a similar manner to
these, the genera of heroes are ministrant. They are not, however,
subservient to angels in the same way as dæmons. Again, the genera of
archons, whether they preside over the world or over matter, exhibit the
order which is adapted to them. But all the genera of souls present
themselves to the view as the last of more excellent natures. Hence,
also, they exhibit places in conjunction with themselves; souls of the
first rank primary, but those of the second rank secondary, places, and
the rest conformably to their arrangement, in each of these three
genera.




                              CHAP. VIII.


Moreover, with respect to the tenuity and subtilty of light, the Gods
extend a light so subtle that corporeal eyes cannot sustain it, but are
affected in the same manner as fishes, when they are drawn upward from
turbid and thick water into attenuated and diaphanous air. For men who
survey divine fire are not able to breathe, through the subtilty of it,
but become languid as soon as they perceive it, and are deprived of the
use of their connascent spirit. Archangels, also, emit a light which is
intolerable to respiration, yet their splendour is not equally pure with
that of the Gods, nor similarly overpowering. The presence of angels
renders the temperature of the air tolerable, so that theurgists are
capable of being united to it. But when dæmons are present, the whole
air is not at all affected; nor does the air, which surrounds them,
become more attenuated; nor does a light precede them, in which, being
previously received and preoccupied by the air, they unfold the form of
themselves; nor are they surrounded by a certain splendour, which
diffuses its light everywhere. When heroes appear, certain parts of the
earth are moved, and sounds are heard around them; but, in short, the
air does not become more attenuated, nor incommensurate to theurgists,
so as to render them unable to receive it. But when archons are present,
an assemblage of many luminous appearances runs round them, difficult to
be borne, whether these appearances are mundane or terrestrial. They
have not, however, a supermundane tenuity, nor even that of the supreme
elements. And to the psychical appearances the air is more allied, and,
being suspended from them, receives in itself their circumscription.




                               CHAP. IX.


In the last place, the dispositions of the soul of those that invoke the
Gods to appear receive, when they become visible, a liberation from the
passions, a transcendent perfection, and an energy entirely more
excellent, and participate of divine love and an immense joy. But when
archangels appear, these dispositions receive a pure condition of being,
intellectual contemplation, and an immutable power. When angels appear,
they participate of intellectual wisdom and truth, pure virtue, stable
knowledge, and a commensurate order. But when dæmons are seen, they
receive the appetite of generation and a desire of nature, together with
a wish to accomplish the works of Fate, and a power effective of things
of this kind. If heroes are seen, they derive from the vision other such
like manners and many impulses, which contribute to the communion of
souls. But when these dispositions come into contact with archons,
mundane or material, motions are excited in conjunction with the soul.
And, together with the vision of souls, the spectators derive
genesiurgic tendencies and connascent providential inspections, for the
sake of paying attention to bodies, and such other peculiarities as are
allied to these.

In addition to these things, also, the manifestation of the Gods imparts
truth and power, rectitude of works, and gifts of the greatest goods;
but the manifestation of other powers is appropriately accompanied by
such things as are commensurate to their several orders. Thus the
manifestation of archangels imparts truth, not simply about all things,
but definitely of certain things; and this not always, but sometimes;
nor indefinitely to all, or every where, but with limitation, in a
certain place, or to a certain individual. In like manner it does not
impart a power effective of all things, nor always without distinction,
nor every where; but a power which is effective sometimes, and in a
certain place. But the manifestation of angels, in a still greater
degree than that of archangels, divides, in imparting good, the
circumscriptions which are always defined by them in more contracted
boundaries. Again, the manifestation of dæmons does not impart the goods
of the soul, but either those of the body, or goods pertaining to the
body. And they impart these when the order of the world permits them.
After the same manner, likewise, the manifestation of heroes imparts
second and third goods, and regards as its scope the whole terrestrial
and mundane polity of souls. With respect to archons, the manifestation
of some of these imparts mundane benefits, and all the goods of life;
but that of others of an inferior rank imparts not a few of the
prerogatives of material natures. And souls, when they appear, procure
for those that behold them things which contribute to the benefit of
human life. Thus, therefore, we have appropriately defined the gifts of
these powers, conformably to the proper order of each; and the
particulars in the manifestations about which you inquired, have
received a fit reply. And thus much for these questions.




                                CHAP. X.


What you introduce, however, for the purpose of obtaining a knowledge of
these things, whether it be your own opinion, or whether you have heard
it from others, is neither true nor rightly asserted. For you say,
“_that to speak boastingly, and to exhibit an adumbrative phantasm, are
common to Gods and dæmons, and to all the more excellent genera of
beings_.” But the thing is not as you apprehend it to be. For a God, an
angel, and a good dæmon, instruct men in what their proper essence
consists; and never use an addition in their language which transcends
their power, or their appropriate good. For truth is coexistent with the
Gods, in the same manner as light with the sun. And, at the same time,
we say, that divinity is not in want of any beauty or virtue which it is
possible to add to him through language. Moreover, angels and dæmons
always receive truth from the Gods, so that they never assert any thing
contrary to this, each of them being essentially perfect, nor can they
add any thing to it for the sake of commendation.

When, therefore, does the deception mentioned by you “_of speakingly
boastingly_” take place. For when a certain error happens in the
theurgic art, and not such _autoptic_, or self-visible, images are seen
as ought to occur, but others, instead of these, then inferior powers
assume the form of the more venerable orders, and pretend to be those
whose forms they assume; and hence arrogant words are uttered by them,
and such as exceed the authority which they possess. For, as it appears
to me, if any fraud germinates from the first principle, much falsehood
is derived from the perversion, which it is necessary the priest should
learn from the whole order in the phasmata, and by the proper
observation of which they are able to confute and reject the
fictitious[46] pretext of these inferior powers, as by no means
pertaining to true and good spirits. Nor is it proper to introduce
errors in the true judgment of things; for neither in other sciences or
arts do we judge of their works from the aberrations which may happen to
take place in them. You should not, therefore, here characterize things
which are scarcely performed with rectitude through ten thousand
labours, from the errors which may, through ignorance, befall them; but
rather assert something else of them. For if the works which take place
from the appearance of these powers are such as you say, viz. if they
are arrogant and false, yet the operations about fire of true spirits
are genuine and true. For, as in all other things, such as are principal
primarily begin from themselves, and impart to themselves that which
they give to others; as, for instance, in essence, in life, and in
motion; thus also the natures which supply all beings with truth,
primarily proclaim the truth of themselves, and precedaneously unfold
the essence of themselves to the spectators. Hence, likewise, they
exhibit to theurgists a fire which is of itself visible. For it is not
the province of heat to refrigerate, nor of light to darken or conceal
any thing; nor with any other nature which essentially performs a
certain thing, is a power present of at the same time effecting the
contrary. But things which do not possess a [true] nature, and which are
contrary to things that exist essentially; these are able to receive
contraries, and are adapted to fall into evil.

We must say the same thing, therefore, concerning phantasms. For if
these are not true, but other things are so which have a real existence,
thus also in the appearances of spirits, they seem to be such as things
which are true beings; at the same time they participate of falsehood
and deception, in the same manner as the forms which present themselves
to the view in mirrors; and thus vainly attract the mind about things
which never take place in any of the more excellent genera. These
phantasms, likewise, will consist in deceptive perversions. For that
which is an imitation of [real] being, and is an obscure assimilation,
and becomes the cause of deception, pertains to no one of the true and
clearly existing genera. But the Gods, indeed, and those powers that
follow the Gods, reveal true images of themselves, but by no means
extend phantasms of themselves, such as exist in water, or in mirrors.
For on what account should they exhibit these? Shall we say, as bringing
with them an indication of their own essence and power? This, however,
is by no means the case. For these phantasms become the cause of
deception to those that believe in them, and withdraw the spectators
from the true knowledge of the Gods. Shall we say, then, that it is
because they afford a certain utility to those that behold them? But
what advantage can be derived from falsehood? If, therefore, this is not
the case, may it not be natural to divinity to extend a phantasm from
itself? But how can that which is firmly established in itself, and
which is the cause of essence and truth, produce in a foreign seat a
certain deceitful imitation of itself? By no means, therefore, does
divinity either transform himself into phantasms, nor extend these from
himself to other things, but emits, by illumination, true
representations of himself, in the true manners of souls. Conformably to
this, also, the attendants of the Gods are emulous of the self-visible
truth of the Gods. But that which you now say, “_that it is common to
Gods and dæmons, and the rest of the more excellent genera, to produce
fictitious images, and to speak boastingly of themselves_,” confounds
all the genera of superior beings in each other, and leaves no
difference whatever between them. For thus all things will be common to
them, and nothing singularly excellent will be given to transcendent
natures. It will, therefore, be more just to ask, in opposition to you,
in what will the genus of the Gods be superior to that of dæmons? These
genera, however, have nothing in common, nor is the communion between
them phantastic, nor is it fit from such natures as are last, and from
the errors which take place in them, to estimate first essences, and the
true impressions of forms which are in them. For by thus thinking
concerning these essences, we shall think justly, and in a way pleasing
to the Gods.




                               CHAP. XI.


In what follows, in which you think that ignorance and deception about
these things are impiety and impurity, and in which you exhort us to the
true developement of these particulars, is not, indeed, attended with
any ambiguity, but is acknowledged by all men. For who will not grant
that the science which apprehends real being, is most adapted to a
divine cause, but that ignorance which is hurried along to nonbeing,
since it is most remote from a divine cause, falls off from truly
existing forms? Since, however, what is said by you is not sufficient, I
will add what is wanting; and because what you assert is rather
philosophical and logical, than conformable to the efficacious art of
priests, on this account I think it is necessary to say something more
theurgical about these particulars.

For, let “_ignorance and deception be error and impiety_,” yet it does
not follow that, on this account, things which are offered to the Gods,
and divine works, are false. For a conception of the mind does not
conjoin theurgists with the Gods; since, if this were the case, what
would hinder those who philosophize theoretically, from having a
theurgic union with the Gods? Now, however, in reality, this is not the
case. For the perfect efficacy of ineffable works, which are divinely
performed in a way surpassing all intelligence, and the power of
inexplicable symbols, which are known only to the Gods, impart theurgic
union. Hence, we do not perform these things through intellectual
perception; since, if this were the case, the intellectual energy of
them would be imparted by us; neither of which is true. For when we do
not energize intellectually, the _synthemata_[47] themselves perform by
themselves their proper work, and the ineffable power of the Gods itself
knows, by itself, its own images. It does not, however, know them, as if
excited by our intelligence; for neither is it natural that things which
comprehend should be excited by those that are comprehended, nor perfect
by imperfect natures, nor wholes by parts. Hence, neither are divine
causes precedaneously called into energy by our intellections; but it is
requisite to consider these, and all the best dispositions of the soul,
and also the purity pertaining to us, as certain concauses; the things
which properly excite the divine will being divine synthemata
themselves. And thus, things pertaining to the Gods, are moved by
themselves, and do not receive from any inferior nature a certain
principle in themselves of their own proper energy.

I have, however, been thus prolix, in order that you may not think all
the authority of the energy in theurgic operations is in our power, and
that you may not suppose the true work of them consists in our
conceptions, or the falsehood of them in our deception. For though we
may know the peculiarities which are consequent to each genus, yet we
may not obtain the truth which is in their works. Nevertheless,
efficacious union [with divine natures] is not effected without
knowledge; yet knowledge does not possess a sameness with this union. So
that neither is divine purity obtained through right knowledge, as
neither is purity of body procured through health; but divine purity is
more undefiled than knowledge, and is more transcendently united. Hence
neither this, nor any thing of the like kind which is in us, and is
human, cooperates any thing to the end of divine actions.

Accept, therefore, this, which is said indeed incidentally, but is a
sufficient reply to the whole of your conception concerning the theurgic
art. Those assertions, also, of yours pertain to the same thing, in
which you say, “_that the science of the Gods is sacred and useful, and
call the ignorance of things honourable and beautiful darkness, but the
knowledge of them light; and also add, that the ignorance of these
things fills men with all evils, through inerudition and audacity, but
the knowledge of them is the cause of all good_.” For all these
assertions tend to the same thing with the preceding, and obtain
together with them an appropriate discussion. It is necessary, therefore
to omit them, and to pass on to the inquiries concerning divination, and
concisely dissolve them.




                              SECTION III.




                                CHAP. I.


In the first place, therefore, you ask me to explain to you distinctly,
“_what that is which is effected in the foreknowledge of future
events?_” Immediately, however, that which you endeavour to learn is
impossible. For, according to the meaning of your question, you think
that foreknowledge is something which is generated, or subsists in
becoming to be, and pertains to things which have a natural subsistence.
It is not, however, one of the things which have their existence in
becoming to be, nor is it effected after the manner of physical
mutation, nor is it invented and devised as something useful for the
purposes of life, nor in short, is it a human work, but is divine and
supernatural, and is supernally sent to us from the heavens. It is also
unbegotten and eternal, and spontaneously has a precedaneous
subsistence.

The greatest remedy, therefore, for all such doubts is this, to know the
principle of divination, that it neither originates from bodies, nor
from the passions about bodies, nor from a certain nature, and the
powers about nature, nor from any human apparatus, or the habits
pertaining to it. But neither does it originate from a certain art,
externally acquired, about a certain part of such things as are
subservient to life. For the whole authority of it pertains to the Gods,
and is imparted by them; it is also effected by divine works, or signs;
and it possesses divine spectacles, and scientific theorems. All other
things, however, are subjected as instruments to the gift of
foreknowledge transmitted from the Gods; _viz._ such things as pertain
to our soul and body, and such as are in the nature of the universe, or
are inexistent in particular natures. But some things are previously
subjacent, as in the order of matter, such as places, or certain other
things of the like kind.

If some one, however, dismissing primordial causes, should refer
divination to secondary offices, such as the motions of bodies, or the
mutations of passions, or certain other motions, or the energies of
human life, or animal or physical reasons, and should think that in so
doing he asserts something manifest; or if, considering the symmetries
of these with reference to each other, as causes, he should apprehend
that he can assign something accurate concerning divination, he wholly
deviates from the truth. But the one right boundary, and the one
principle of all these particulars, is by no means to produce without a
cause the foreknowledge of futurity, from things which have no
prescience in themselves, but to survey from the Gods who contain in
themselves the terminations of all the knowledge of beings, divination
distributed about the whole world, and about all the natures that are
separately contained in it. For such a cause as this is primordial, and
is especially most common, containing in itself primarily those things
which it gives to its participants, and particularly imparting truth, of
which divination is in want; and antecedently comprehending the essence
and cause of future events, from which foreknowledge necessarily and
incessantly proceeds. Let such a principle as this, therefore, be the
origin in common of all divination, from which it is possible to
discover scientifically all the species of it; which we shall now
unfold, conformably to the questions proposed by you.




                               CHAP. II.


Concerning the divination, therefore, which takes place in sleep, you
say as follows: “_We frequently obtain through dreams, when we are
asleep, a knowledge of future events, not being in an ecstasy, through
which we are much agitated, for the body is quiet, but we do not
apprehend what we see in the same clear manner as when we are awake_.”
It is usual, however, for what you here say, to happen in human dreams,
and in dreams which are excited by the soul, or by some of our
conceptions, or by reason, or by imaginations, or certain diurnal cares.
And these, indeed, are sometimes true and sometimes false; and in some
things they apprehend reality, but in many deviate from it. But the
dreams which are denominated _theopemptoi_, or _sent from God_, do not
subsist after the manner which you mention; but they take place either
when sleep is leaving us, and we are beginning to awake, and then we
hear a certain voice, which concisely tells us what is to be done; or
voices are heard by us, between sleeping and waking, or when we are
perfectly awake. And sometimes, indeed, an invisible and incorporeal
spirit surrounds the recumbents, so as not to be perceived by the sight,
but by a certain other cosensation and intelligence. The entrance of
this spirit, also, is accompanied with a noise, and he diffuses himself
on all sides without any contact, and effects admirable works conducive
to the liberation of the passions of the soul and body. But sometimes a
bright and tranquil light shines forth, by which the sight of the eyes
is detained, and which occasions them to become closed, though they were
before open. The other senses, however, are in a vigilant state, and in
a certain respect have a cosensation of the light unfolded by the Gods;
and the recumbents hear what the Gods say, and know, by a consecutive
perception, what is then done by them. This, however, is beheld in a
still more perfect manner, when the sight perceives, when intellect,
being corroborated, follows what is performed, and this is accompanied
with the motion of the spectators. Such, therefore, and so many being
the differences of these dreams, no one of them is similar to human
dreams. But wakefulness,[48] a detention of the eyes, a similar
oppression of the head, a condition between sleeping and waking, an
instantaneous excitation, or perfect vigilance, are all of them divine
indications, and are adapted to the reception of the Gods. They are also
sent by the Gods, and a part of divine appearances antecedes according
to things of this kind.

Take away, therefore, from divine dreams, among which also divination is
contained, “_the being asleep_,” and also the assertion, “_that we do
not apprehend what we see in sleep, in the same clear manner as when we
are awake_.” For the Gods are no less clearly present with us in these
dreams than when we are awake. And, if it be requisite to speak the
truth, the presence of the Gods, in the former case, is necessarily
clearer and more accurate, and produces a more perfect perception than
in the latter. Some, therefore, not knowing these indications of
prophetic dreams, and conceiving that they have something in common with
human dreams, rarely and casually obtain a foreknowledge of futurity,
and in consequence of this, reasonably doubt how dreams contain any
truth. And this, also, appears to me to disturb you, in consequence of
your not knowing the true indications of dreams. It is necessary,
however, that, admitting these to be the elements of the true knowledge
of dreams, you should attend to the whole of the discussion concerning
divination in sleep.




                               CHAP. III.


The wise,[49] therefore, speak as follows: The soul having a twofold
life, one being in conjunction with body, but the other being separate
from all body; when we are awake we employ, for the most part, the life
which is common with the body, except when we separate ourselves
entirely from it by pure intellectual and dianoetic energies. But when
we are asleep, we are perfectly liberated, as it were, from certain
surrounding bonds, and use a life separated from generation. Hence, this
form of life, whether it be intellectual or divine, and whether these
two are the same thing, or whether each is peculiarly of itself one
thing, is then excited in us, and energizes in a way conformable to its
nature. Since, therefore, intellect surveys real beings, but the soul
contains in itself the reasons of all generated natures, it very
properly follows that, according to a cause which comprehends future
events, it should have a foreknowledge of them, as arranged in their
precedaneous reasons. And it possesses a divination still more perfect
than this, when it conjoins the portions of life and intellectual energy
to the wholes from which it was separated. For then it is filled from
wholes with all scientific knowledge, so as for the most part to attain
by its conceptions to the apprehension of every thing which is effected
in the world. Indeed, when it is united to the Gods, by a liberated
energy of this kind, it then receives the most true plenitudes of
intellections, from which it emits the true divination of divine dreams,
and derives the most genuine principles of knowledge. But if the soul
connects its intellectual and divine part with more excellent natures,
then its phantasms will be more pure, whether they are phantasms of the
Gods, or of beings essentially incorporeal, or, in short, of things
contributing to the truth of intelligibles. If, also, it elevates the
reasons of generated natures, contained in it to the Gods, the causes of
them, it receives power from them, and a knowledge which apprehends what
has been, and what will be; it likewise surveys the whole of time, and
the deeds which are accomplished in time, and is allotted the order of
providentially attending to and correcting them in an appropriate
manner. And bodies, indeed, that are diseased it heals; but properly
disposes such things as subsist among men erroneously and disorderly. It
likewise frequently delivers the discoveries of arts, the distributions
of justice, and the establishment of legal institutions. Thus in the
temple of Esculapius, diseases are healed through divine dreams; and,
through the order of nocturnal appearances, the medical art is obtained
from sacred dreams. Thus, too, the whole army of Alexander was
preserved, which would otherwise have been entirely destroyed in the
night, in consequence of Bacchus appearing in sleep, and pointing out a
solution of the most grievous calamities. The city Aphutis, likewise,
when besieged by King Lysander, was saved through a dream sent to him by
Jupiter Ammon. For afterwards, he most rapidly withdrew his army from
thence, and immediately raised the siege.

What occasion, however, is there to be prolix in mentioning every
particular of things which happen daily, and which exhibit an energy
superior to all language? What, therefore, has been said concerning
divine divination in sleep is sufficient to show what it is, how it is
effected, and what advantage it affords to mankind.




                               CHAP. IV.


Afterwards, also, you say, “_that many, through enthusiasm and divine
inspiration, predict future events, and that they are then in so wakeful
a state, as even to energize according to sense, and yet they are not
conscious of the state they are in, or at least, not so much as they
were before_.” I wish, therefore, here to point out to you the signs by
which those who are rightly possessed by the Gods may be known. For they
either subject the whole of their life, as a vehicle or instrument to
the inspiring Gods; or they exchange the human for the divine life; or
they energize with their own proper life about divinity. But they
neither energize according to sense, nor are in such a vigilant state as
those who have their senses excited from sleep (for neither do they
apprehend future events); nor are they moved as those are who energize
according to impulse. Nor, again, are they conscious of the state they
are in, neither as they were before, nor in any other way; nor, in
short, do they convert to themselves their own intelligence, or exert
any knowledge which is peculiarly their own.

The greatest indication, however, of the truth of this is the following.
Many, through divine inspiration, are not burned when fire is introduced
to them, the inspiring influence preventing the fire from touching them.
Many, also, though burned, do not apprehend that they are so, because
they do not then live an animal life. And some, indeed, though
transfixed with spits, do not perceive it; but others that are struck on
the shoulders with axes, and others that have their arms cut with
knives, are by no means conscious of what is done to them. Their
energies, likewise, are not at all human. For inaccessible places become
accessible to those that are divinely inspired; they are thrown into
fire, and pass through fire, and over rivers, like the priest in
Castabalis, without being injured. But from these things it is
demonstrated, that those who energize enthusiastically are not conscious
of the state they are in, and that they neither live a human nor an
animal life, according to sense or impulse, but that they exchange this
for a certain more divine life, by which they are inspired and perfectly
possessed.




                                CHAP. V.


There are, therefore, many species of divine possession, and divine
inspiration is multifariously excited; whence, also, the signs of it are
many and different. For either the Gods are different, by whom we are
inspired, and thus produce a different inspiration; or the mode of
enthusiasms being various, produces a different afflatus. For either
divinity possesses us, or we give up ourselves wholly to divinity, or we
have a common energy with him. And sometimes, indeed, we participate of
the last power of divinity, sometimes of his middle, and sometimes of
his first power. Sometimes, also, there is a participation only, at
other times communion likewise, and sometimes a union of these divine
inspirations. Again, either the soul alone enjoys the inspiration, or
the soul receives it in conjunction with the body, or it is also
participated by the common animal.

From these things, therefore, the signs of those that are inspired are
multiform. For the inspiration is indicated by the motions of the
[whole] body, and of certain parts of it, by the perfect rest of the
body, by harmonious orders and dances, and by elegant sounds, or the
contraries of these. Either the body, likewise, is seen to be elevated,
or increased in bulk, or to be borne along sublimely in the air, or the
contraries of these, are seen to take place about it. An equability,
also, of voice, according to magnitude, or a great variety of voice
after[50] intervals of silence, may be observed. And again, sometimes
the sounds have a musical intension and remission, and sometimes they
are strained and relaxed after a different manner.




                               CHAP. VI.


That, however, which is the greatest thing is this, that he who [appears
to] draw down a certain divinity, sees a spirit descending and entering
into some one, recognizes its magnitude and quality, and is also
mystically persuaded and governed by it. But a species of fire is seen
by the recipient, prior to the spirit being received, which sometimes
becomes manifest to all the spectators, either when the divinity is
descending, or when he is departing. And from this spectacle the
greatest truth and power of the God, and especially the order he
possesses, as likewise about what particulars he is adapted to speak the
truth, what the power is which he imparts, and what he is able to
effect, become known to the scientific. Those, however, who, without
these blessed spectacles, draw down spirits invisibly, are without
vision, as if they were in the dark, and know nothing of what they do,
except some small signs which become visible through the body of him who
is divinely inspired, and certain other things which are manifestly
seen, but they are ignorant of all the most important particulars of
divine inspiration, which are concealed from them in the invisible. But
to return from this digression: if the presence of the fire of the Gods,
and a certain ineffable species of light, externally accede to him who
is possessed, and if they wholly fill him, have dominion over and
circularly comprehend him on all sides, so that he is not able to exert
any one proper energy, what sense, or animadversion, or appropriate
projection of intellect, can there be in him who receives a divine fire?
What human motion, likewise, can then intervene, or what human reception
of passion or ecstasy, or of aberration of the phantasy, or of any thing
else of the like kind, such as is apprehended by the multitude, can take
place? Let such, therefore, be the divine indications of true
inspiration from the Gods, which he who attends to will not wander from
a right knowledge concerning it.




                               CHAP. VII.


It is not, however, sufficient to learn these things alone, nor will he
who only knows these become perfect in divine science. But it is
requisite also to know what enthusiasm is, and how it is produced. It is
falsely, therefore, supposed to be a motion of dianoia, in conjunction
with dæmoniacal inspiration. For human dianoia is not moved, if it is
thus enthusiastically affected; nor is the inspiration produced by
dæmons, but by the Gods. Neither is enthusiasm simply an ecstasy; for it
is a reelevation and transition to a more excellent condition of being.
But delirium and ecstasy evince a perversion to that which is worse.
Hence, he who is an advocate for the latter, speaks, indeed, of things
which happen to those that energize enthusiastically, yet does not teach
that which is precedaneous. But this consists in being wholly possessed
by divinity, which is afterwards followed by mental alienation. No one,
therefore, can justly apprehend that enthusiasm is something pertaining
to the soul, or to some one of its powers, or to intellect or energies,
or to corporeal imbecility, or that it cannot subsist without the
debility of the body. For neither is the work of divine inspiration
human, nor does the whole of it depend on human powers and energies; but
these, indeed, have the relation of a subject, and divinity uses them as
instruments. He accomplishes, however, the whole work of divination
through himself, and being separated in an unmingled manner from other
things, neither the soul nor the body being at all moved, he energizes
by himself. Hence, when divinations are rightly effected in the way
which I have mentioned, then they subsist without falsehood. But when
the soul has been previously disturbed, or is moved in the interim, or
the body intervenes, and confounds the divine harmony, then divinations
become turbulent and false, and the enthusiasm is no longer true nor
genuine.




                              CHAP. VIII.


If, therefore, true divination was a solution of the divine part of the
soul from the other parts of it, or if it was a separation of intellect,
or a certain extension of it; or if it was a vehemence and extension of
energy or passion, or an acuteness and motion of dianoia, or a fervour
of intellect; then, since all such like particulars are excited by our
soul, enthusiasm might be reasonably supposed to be the offspring of the
soul. If, however, the body, on account of certain temperaments, whether
they are such as are melancholic, or any other, or, to speak more
particularly, on account of heat, or cold, or moisture, or a certain
specific quality of these, or the mixture or temperature of these in a
certain proportion, or the pneumatic part of the soul, or the more and
the less of these; if any one of these is established as the cause of
enthusiastic alienation, in this case, the alienation will be a
corporeal passion, and will be excited by physical motions. But if its
excitation originates from both the soul and the body, so far as these
coalesce with each other, a motion of this kind will be common to the
animal [produced by the union of the two]. The enthusiastic energy,
however, is not the work either of the body or the soul, or of both
conjoined. For these do not contain in themselves a certain cause of
divine alienation, nor are things of a more excellent nature adapted to
be generated by such as are less excellent.

But it is necessary to investigate the causes of divine mania. And these
are the illuminations proceeding from the Gods, the spirits imparted by
them, and the all perfect domination of divinity, which comprehends
indeed every thing in us, but exterminates entirely our own proper
consciousness and motion. This divine possession, also, emits words
which are not understood by those that utter them; for they pronounce
them, as it is said, with an insane mouth, and are wholly subservient,
and entirely yield themselves to the energy of the predominating God.
The whole of enthusiasm is a thing of this kind, and is effected by
these causes, though this must not be considered as asserted with
consummate accuracy.




                               CHAP. IX.


What you afterwards say is as follows: “_That some of those who suffer a
mental alienation, energize enthusiastically on hearing cymbals or
drums, or a certain modulated sound, such as those who are
Corybantically inspired, those who are possessed by Sabazius, and those
who are inspired by the mother of the Gods_.” It is necessary,
therefore, to discuss the causes of these things, and to show how they
are definitely produced.

That music, therefore, is of a motive nature, and is adapted to excite
the affections, and that the melody of pipes produces or heals the
disordered passions of the soul, changes the temperaments or
dispositions of the body, and by some melodies causes a Bacchic fury,
but by others occasions this fury to cease;[51] and, likewise, how the
differences of these accord with the several dispositions of the soul,
and that an unstable and variable melody is adapted to ecstasies, such
as are the melodies of Olympus,[52] and others of the like kind; all
these appear to me to be adduced in a way foreign to enthusiasm. For
they are physical and human, and the work of our art; but nothing
whatever of a divine nature in them presents itself to the view.

We must rather, therefore, say, that sounds and melodies are
appropriately consecrated to the Gods. There is, also, an alliance in
these sounds and melodies to the proper orders and powers of the several
Gods, to the motions in the universe itself, and to the harmonious
sounds which proceed from the motions. Conformably, therefore, to such
like adaptations of melodies to the Gods, the Gods themselves become
present. For there is not any thing which intercepts; _so that whatever
has but a casual similitude to, directly participates of, them_. A
perfect possession, likewise, immediately takes place, and a plenitude
of a more excellent essence and power. Not that the body and the soul
are in each other, and sympathize, and are copassive with the melodies;
but because the inspiration of the Gods is not separated from divine
harmony, but is originally adapted and allied to it, on this account it
is participated by it in appropriate measures. Hence also, it is excited
and restrained according to the several orders of the Gods. But this
inspiration must by no means be called an ablation, purgation, or
medicine. For it is not primarily implanted in us from a certain
disease, or excess, or redundance; but the whole principle and
participation of it are supernally derived from the Gods.

Neither is it proper to say that the soul primarily consists of harmony
and rythm. For thus enthusiasm would be adapted to the soul alone. It is
better, therefore, to deny this, and to assert that the soul, before she
gave herself to body, was an auditor of divine harmony; and that hence,
when she proceeded into body, and heard melodies of such a kind as
especially preserve the divine vestigie of harmony, she embraced these,
from them recollected divine harmony, and tends and is allied to it, and
as much as possible participates of it. Hence the cause of divine
divination may, after this manner, be assigned in common.




                                CHAP. X.


Let us, however, discuss what pertains to divination more particularly;
not asserting this, that nature leads each thing to its like; for the
enthusiastic energy is not the work of nature; nor again asserting that
the temperature of the air, and of that which surrounds us, produces
also a different temperature in the body of those that energize
enthusiastically; since inspiration, which is the work of the Gods, is
not changed by corporeal powers or temperaments. Nor must we say, that
the much celebrated inspiration of divinity is adapted to passions and
generated natures. For the gift of the proper energy of the Gods to men
is impassive and superior to all generation. But since the power of the
Corybantes is, in a certain respect, of a guardian and efficacious
nature,[53] and that of Sabazius appropriately pertains to Bacchic
inspiration, the purifications of souls,[56] and the solutions of
ancient divine anger,[57] on this account the inspirations of them
entirely differ from each other.

With respect, however, to the mother of the Gods, you, indeed, seem to
think that those who are possessed by the Goddess are males; for,
conformably to this, you denominate them Metrizantes. But the thing is
not truly so. For those who are precedaneously inspired by the mother of
the Gods are women; but the males that are thus inspired are very few in
number, and such as are more effeminate. This enthusiasm, however, has a
vivific and replenishing power,[58] on which account, also, it in a
remarkable degree differs from all other mania.

Proceeding, therefore, in this way, in what remains of the present
discussion, and fitly distinguishing the inspirations of the Nymphs, or
of Pan, and the other differences of them, according to the powers of
the Gods, we shall separate them conformably to their appropriate
peculiarities; and we shall also be able to explain through what cause
they leap and dwell in mountains, why some of them appear to be bound,
and why they are worshiped through sacrifices. All these, likewise, we
shall ascribe to divine causes, as containing in themselves all the
authority of these particulars; but we shall not say that either a
certain collected redundancy of body or soul requires to be purified, or
that the periods of the seasons are the causes of such like passions, or
that the reception of the similar, and the ablation of the dissimilar,
bring with them a certain remedy for an excess of this kind. For all
such like particulars are corporeal-formed, and are entirely separated
from a divine and intellectual life. But each thing energizes
conformably to its nature; so that the spirits which are excited by the
Gods, and which produce in men Bacchic inspiration, expel every other
human and physical motion; and it is not proper to assimilate their
energies to those which are usually exerted after our manner; but it is
fit to refer them to perfectly different and primordial divine causes.
One species, therefore, of divine inspiration is of this kind, and is
after this manner produced.




                               CHAP. XI.


Another species of divine divination which is much celebrated, most
manifest and manifold, is that of oracles, about which you say as
follows: “_There are some who drink water, as the priest of Clarius, in
Colophon;[59] but others are seated at the mouth [of a cavern], as those
who prophesy at Delphi; and others imbibe the vapour from water, as the
prophetesses in Brandchidæ_.”[60] You have, therefore, made mention of
these three oracles by name, not that there are only these, for there
are many more which you have omitted, but as these are more celebrated
than the rest, and, at the same time, because through these you may be
sufficiently instructed in the mode of divination sent to men from the
Gods, hence, as it appears to me, you were satisfied with these. We,
therefore, likewise shall discuss these three, omitting to speak about
the many other oracles that exist.

It is acknowledged then by all men, that the oracle in Colophon gives
its answers through the medium of water. For there is a fountain in a
subterranean dwelling from which the prophetess drinks; and on certain
established nights, after many sacred rites have been previously
performed, and she has drank of the fountain, she delivers oracles, but
is not visible to those that are present. That this water, therefore, is
prophetic, is from hence manifest. But how it becomes so, this,
according to the proverb, is not for every man to know. For it appears
as if a certain prophetic spirit pervaded through the water. This is
not, however, in reality the case. For a divine nature does not pervade
through its participants in this manner, according to interval and
division, but comprehends as it were externally, and illuminates the
fountain,[61] and fills it from itself with a prophetic power. For the
inspiration which the water affords is not the whole of that which
proceeds from a divine power, but the water itself only prepares us, and
purifies our luciform spirit,[62] so that we may be able to receive the
divinity; while, in the mean time, there is a presence of divinity prior
to this, and illuminating from on high. And this, indeed, is not absent
from any one, who through aptitude is capable of being united to it. But
this divine illumination is immediately present, and uses the prophetess
as an instrument; she neither being any longer mistress of herself, nor
capable of attending to what she says, nor perceiving where she is.
Hence, after prediction, she is scarcely able to recover herself. And
before she drinks the water, she abstains from food for a whole day and
night; and retiring to certain sacred places, inaccessible to the
multitude, begins to receive in them the enthusiastic energy. Through
her departure, therefore, and separation from human concerns, she
renders herself pure, and by this means adapted to the reception of
divinity: and from hence she possesses the inspiration of the God,
shining into the pure seat of her soul, becomes full of an unrestrained
afflatus, and receives the divine presence in a perfect manner, and
without any impediment.

But the prophetess in Delphi, whether she gives oracles to mankind
through an attenuated and fiery spirit, bursting from the mouth of the
cavern, or whether being seated in the adytum on a brazen tripod, or on
a stool with four feet, she becomes sacred to the God; whichsoever of
these is the case, she entirely gives herself up to a divine spirit, and
is illuminated with a ray of divine fire. And when, indeed, fire
ascending from the mouth of the cavern circularly invests her in
collected abundance, she becomes filled from it with a divine splendour.
But when she places herself on the seat of the God, she becomes
coadapted to his stable prophetic power: and from both these preparatory
operations she becomes wholly possessed by the God. And then, indeed, he
is present with and illuminates her in a separate manner, and is
different from the fire, the spirit, the proper seat, and, in short,
from all the visible apparatus of the place, whether physical or sacred.

The prophetic woman too in Brandchidæ, whether she holds in her hand a
wand,[63] which was at first received from some God, and becomes filled
with a divine splendour, or whether seated on an axis, she predicts
future events, or dips her feet or the border of her garment in the
water, or receives the God by imbibing the vapour of the water; by all
these she becomes adapted to partake externally[64] of the God.

But the multitude of sacrifices, the sacred law of the whole sanctimony,
and such other things as are performed in a divine manner, prior to the
prophetic inspiration, _viz._ the baths of the prophetess, her fasting
for three whole days, her retiring into the adyta, and there receiving a
divine light, and rejoicing for a considerable time—all these evince
that the God is entreated by prayer to approach, that he becomes
externally present, and that the prophetess, before she comes to her
accustomed place, is inspired in a wonderful manner; and that, in the
spirit which rises from the fountain, another more ancient God, who is
separate from the place, shines forth to the view, and who is also the
cause of the place, of the country, and of the whole divination.




                               CHAP. XII.


It appears, therefore, that the divination of oracles accords with all
the hypotheses which we have before adduced concerning prediction. For
if a power of this kind was inseparable from the nature of places, and
of the bodies which are the subjects of it, or proceeded[65] according
to a motion defined by number, it would not be able to foreknow, with
invariable sameness, things which exist every where and always. But
being separate and liberated from places and things which are measured
by the numbers of time, and also from those which are detained in place,
it is equally present with all things wherever they may be, and subsists
simultaneously with all the natures that are produced according to time.
It likewise comprehends in one the truth of all things, through its
separate and transcendent essence.

Hence, if this is rightly asserted by us, the prophetic power of the
Gods is not partibly comprehended by any place, or partible human body,
nor by the soul, which is detained in one certain species of divisible
natures; but being separate and indivisible, it is wholly every where
present with the natures which are capable of receiving it. It likewise
externally illuminates and fills all things, pervades through all the
elements, comprehends earth and air, fire and water, and leaves nothing
destitute of itself, neither animals nor any of the productions of
nature, but imparts from itself a certain portion of foreknowledge, to
some things in a greater, and to others in a less, degree. Moreover,
existing itself prior to all things, by its own separate nature, it
becomes sufficient to fill all things, so far as each is able to partake
of it.




                              CHAP. XIII.


Let us, therefore, now direct our attention to another species of
divination, which is not public, but of a private nature, concerning
which you say, “_that some become enthusiastic by standing on
characters, as those that are filled from the intromission of spirits_.”
This species, therefore, through those who badly use it, cannot easily
be comprehended in one definition. But it is obvious and superficial,
and known to many, and employs a falsehood and deception which are not
to be endured; nor is it at all attended with the presence of a certain
divinity, but it produces a certain motion of the soul, which is adverse
to the Gods, and attracts from them an obscure and adumbrative
representation, which, through the evanescent nature of its power, is
usually disturbed by dæmoniacal depraved spirits. That, however, which
is truly a representation of the Gods, is in other respects genuine and
pure, immutable and true, and is inaccessible to, and unimpeded by,
spirits of a contrary nature. For, as darkness is not adapted to sustain
the splendour of the glittering light of the sun, but suddenly becomes
totally invisible, entirely recedes, and immediately vanishes; thus,
also, when the power of the Gods, which fills all things with good,
abundantly shines forth, no place is left for the tumult of evil
spirits, nor can it present itself to the view; but, as if it was
nothing, it departs into nonentity, not being able to be at all moved,
when more excellent natures are present, or to disturb[66] such natures
in their illuminations.

Since, therefore, these differ so greatly, I shall not use any other
indications, in order to distinguish them, than those which are adduced
by you. For when you say, “_some standing on characters_,” you seem to
signify nothing else than the cause of all the evils pertaining to these
things. For there are some who, neglecting the whole business of the
telesiurgic theory, both concerning the invoking [priest] and the
inspector (εποπτης), and also despising the order of religion, and the
most holy endurance of labours for a long time, and rejecting the sacred
laws and ordinances, and other religious ceremonies, think that the
standing on characters is alone sufficient, and that by doing this for
one hour, they can cause a certain spirit to enter; though how is it
possible that any thing beautiful or perfect can be effected by these?
Or how, by ephemeral works, can a contact he produced with the eternal
and true essence of the Gods in sacred deeds? Through these things,
therefore, it appears that such like rash men entirely err, and that
they do not deserve to be ranked among diviners.




                               CHAP. XIV.


Concerning another kind of divination, also, you say as follows:
“_Others who are conscious what they are doing in other respects, are
divinely inspired according to the phantastic part, some indeed
receiving darkness for a cooperator, others certain potions, but others
in cantations and compositions. And some energize according to the
imagination through water,[67] others in a wall, others in the open air,
and others in the light of the sun, or some other celestial body._” The
whole, however, of this kind of divination of which you now speak, since
it is multiform, may be comprehended in one power, which may be called
the eduction of light.[68] But this illuminates with divine light the
etherial and luciform vehicle[69] with which the soul is surrounded,
from which divine visions occupy our phantastic power, these visions
being excited by the will of the Gods. For the whole life of the soul
and all the powers that are in it, being in subjection to the Gods, are
moved in such a way as the Gods, the leaders of the soul, please.

And this takes place in a twofold manner, either from the Gods being
present with the soul, or imparting to the soul from themselves a
certain forerunning light; but, according to each of these modes, the
divine presence and the illumination have a separate subsistence. The
attentive power, therefore, and dianoia[70] of the soul, are conscious
of what is effected, since the divine light does not come into contact
with these; but the phantastic part is divinely inspired, because it is
not excited to the modes of imaginations by itself, but by the Gods, the
phantasy being then entirely changed from human custom.

Since, however, a contrary is receptive of a contrary, according to a
mutation and departure from itself, and that which is allied to another
thing, and familiar[71] with it through similitude, is capable of
receiving it, hence the illuminators receive darkness as a cooperator,
and employ in illuminating the light of the sun, or of the moon, or, in
short, of the air.

Sometimes, likewise, they use collocations of such things as are adapted
to the Gods that are about to descend, or they employ incantations or
compositions, and these appropriately prepared for the reception,
presence, and manifestation of the Gods. And again, sometimes they
introduce light through water, because this being diaphanous, is aptly
disposed to the reception of light. But at other times, they cause light
to shine forth on a wall, having previously prepared the wall for the
reception of light in the best manner by the sacred descriptions of
characters; and, at the same time, they fix the light in a certain solid
place, so that it may not be widely diffused.

Many other modes, also, of introducing light might be mentioned; but all
of them may be referred to one mode, that of irradiation, wherever it
may be effected, and through whatever instruments the Gods may
illuminate. Since, therefore, this illumination accedes externally, and
has every thing which it possesses subservient to the will and
intelligence alone of the Gods, and as the greatest thing pertaining to
it, possesses a sacred irradiating light, either supernally derived from
ether, or from the air, or the moon, or the sun, or from some other
celestial sphere,—this being the case, it is evident from all these
particulars, that such a mode of divination as this is unrestrained,
primordial, and worthy of the Gods.




                               CHAP. XV.


Let us, therefore, pass on to the mode of divination which is effected
through human art, and which possesses much of conjecture and opinion.
But concerning this you say as follows: “_Some also establish the art of
the investigation of futurity through the viscera, through birds, and
through the stars_.” And there are, indeed, many other arts of this
kind, but the above are sufficient to exhibit the whole artificial
species of divination. Universally, therefore, this art employs certain
divine signs, which derive their completion from the Gods, according to
various modes. But from divine portents, according to an alliance of
things to the signs which are exhibited, art in a certain respect
decides, and from certain probabilities conjecturally predicts. The
Gods, therefore, produce the signs, either through nature, which is
subservient both generally and particularly to the generation of
effects; or through genesiurgic dæmons, who presiding over the elements
of the universe, partial bodies, and every thing contained in the world,
conduct with facility the phænomena, conformably to the will of the
Gods. But these signs symbolically premanifest the decrees of divinity
and of futurity, as Heraclitus says, “neither speaking nor concealing,
but signifying;”[72] because they express the mode of fabrication
through premanifestation. As, therefore, the Gods generate all things
through forms[73], in a similar manner they signify all things through
signs, impressed as it were by a seal (δια συνθηματων). Perhaps,
likewise, they render by this mean our intelligence more acute. And thus
much has been said by us in common concerning the whole of this kind of
human art.




                               CHAP. XVI.


Descending, however, to particulars, the soul of animals, the dæmon who
presides over them, the air, the motion of the air, and the circulation
of the heavens, variously change the viscera,[74] conformably to the
will of the Gods. But an indication that they are so changed is this,
that they are frequently found without a heart,[75] or deprived of the
most principal parts, without which it is not at all possible for
animals to be supplied with life. With respect to birds, likewise, the
impulse of their proper soul moves them, and also the dæmon who presides
over animals; and, together with these, the revolution of the air, and
the power of the heavens which descends into the air, accord with the
will of the Gods, and consentaneously lead the birds to what the Gods
ordained from the first. Of this the greatest indication is, that birds
frequently precipitate themselves to the earth, and destroy themselves,
which it is not natural for any thing to do; but this is something
supernatural, so that it is some other thing which produces these
effects through birds.

Moreover, the lations of the stars approximate to the eternal
circulations of the heavens, not only locally, but also in powers, and
the irradiations of light. But these are moved conformably to the
mandates of the celestial Gods. For the most pure, agile, and supreme
part of the air, is adapted to be enkindled [_i. e._ is most
inflammable], so that when the Gods assent, it is immediately set on
fire. And if some one thinks that certain effluxions of the celestial
bodies are imparted to the air, his opinion will not be discordant with
what is frequently effected by the divine art. The union, also, and
sympathy of the universe, and the simultaneous motion of the most remote
parts, as if they were near, and belonged to one animal, cause these
signs to be sent from the Gods to men in the most luminous manner,
primarily, indeed, through the heavens, but afterwards through the air.

From all that has been said, therefore, this becomes manifest, that the
Gods, employing many instruments as media, send indications to men; and
that they also use the ministrant aid of dæmons and souls, and the whole
of nature, and of every thing in the world which is willingly obedient
to them, they being the primordial leaders of all these, and
transmitting the motion which descends from them wherever they please.
Hence, they being separate from all things, and liberated from all
habitude and coarrangement with things in generation, lead all that
generation and nature contains, according to their own proper will. This
explanation, therefore, of divination accords with the doctrine of the
fabricative energy and providence of the Gods. For it does not draw down
the intellect of more excellent natures to sublunary concerns and to us,
but this intellect being established in itself, converts to itself signs
and the whole of divination, and discovers that these proceed from it.




                              CHAP. XVII.


In the next place you inquire “_concerning the mode of divination, what
it is, and what the quality is by which it is distinguished_,” which we
have already explained, both generally and particularly. But you, in the
first place, represent diviners as asserting, “_that all of them obtain
a foreknowledge of future events through Gods or dæmons, and that it is
not possible for any others to know that which is future, than those who
are the lords of futurity_.” Afterwards you doubt, “_whether divinity is
so far subservient to men, as not to be averse to some becoming diviners
from meal_.” You do not, however, properly apprehend the abundance of
the power of the Gods, their transcendent goodness, and the cause which
comprehends all things, when you denominate their providential care and
defence of us subserviency. And, besides this, you are ignorant of the
mode of divine energy, that it is not drawn down and converted to us,
but that it has a separate precedency, and gives itself, indeed, to its
participants, yet neither departs from itself, nor becomes diminished,
nor is ministrant to those that receive it; but, on the contrary, uses
all things as subservient to itself. The present doubt also appears to
me to be erroneous in another respect, for supposing the works of the
Gods to be like those of men, it inquires how they are effected. For
because we are converted to our works, and sometimes adhere to the
passions of the things which we providentially attend to, on this
account you badly conjecture that the power of the Gods is subservient
to the natures which are governed by them. But this power is never drawn
down to its participants either in the production of the worlds, or in
the providential inspection of the realms of generation, or in
predicting concerning it. For it imparts to all things good, and renders
all things similar to itself. It likewise benefits the subjects of its
government most abundantly, and without envy, and by how much the more
it abides in itself, by so much the more it is filled with its own
proper perfection. And it does not itself, indeed, become any thing
belonging to its participants, but it causes the things which receive it
to partake of its peculiarities, and preserves them in an all perfect
manner. It also abides at the same time perfectly in itself, and
comprehends them at once in itself, but is neither vanquished nor
comprehended by any one of them. In vain, therefore, are men disturbed
by a suspicion of this kind. For divinity is not divided together with
the above mentioned modes of divination, but produces all of them
impartibly. Nor does he effect different things at a different time, in
a distributed manner, but produces all of them according to one energy,
collectively and at once. Nor is he detained about signs, being
comprehended in, or divided about, them; but contains them in himself,
and in one order, and comprehends them in unity, and produces them from
himself, according to one invariable will.

If, also, the power of the Gods proceeds in premanifestation as far as
to things inanimate, such as pebble stones, rods,[76] pieces of wood,
stones, corn, or wheat, this very thing is most admirable in the
presignification of divine prophesy; because it imparts soul to things
inanimate, motion to things immoveable, and makes all things to be clear
and known, to partake of reason, and to be defined by the measures of
intellection, though possessing no portion of reason from themselves.
Another divine miracle also divinity appears to me to exhibit through
signs in these things. For, as he sometimes makes some stupid man to
speak wisely, through which it becomes manifest to every one, that this
is not a certain human but a divine work; thus, also, he reveals through
things which are deprived of knowledge, conceptions which precede all
knowledge. And, at the same time, he declares to men that the signs
which are exhibited are worthy of belief, and that they are superior to
nature, from which he is exempt. Thus he makes things to be known which
are naturally unknown, and things which are without knowledge gnostic.
Through them, also, he inserts in us wisdom, and through every thing
which is in the world excites our intellect to the truth of real beings,
of things which are in generation, and of future events. From these
things, therefore, I think it is manifest, that the mode of divination
is perfectly contrary to what you suspected it to be. For it is of a
ruling and primordial nature, of an unrestrained power, and transcendent
nature, comprehending in itself all things, but not being comprehended
by any thing, nor enclosed by its participants. For it ascends into, and
rules over, all things simultaneously, and without circumscription, and
collectively signifies future events. Hence, from what has been said,
you may easily dissolve these vulgar doubts, which disturb most men, and
may in a becoming manner elevate yourself to the intellectual, divine,
and irreprehensible presignification of the Gods from all things.
Through this, therefore, we have evinced, that divinity is not drawn
down to the signs employed by divination.




                              CHAP. XVIII.


Another contest, however, awaits us, not less than that in which we have
been before engaged, and which you immediately announce, concerning the
causes of divination, “_whether a God, an angel, or a dæmon, or some
other power, is present in manifestations, or divinations, or certain
other sacred energies_.” But our reply to your question is simply this,
that it is not possible for any thing to be performed in a manner
adapted to sacred concerns in divine works, without the presence of some
one of the more excellent natures, as inspecting and giving completion
to the sacred energy. And where the felicitous operations are perfect,
sufficient to themselves, and unindigent, of these the Gods are the
leaders. But where they are media, and in a small degree fall short of
the extremes, they have angels as the powers that perfect and unfold
them into light. And it is the province of dæmons to effect those
operations which rank as the last. But the right performance of actions
which are effected in a divine manner, is entirely to be ascribed to
some one of the more excellent natures. For since it is not possible to
speak rightly about the Gods without the Gods, much less can any one
perform works which are of an equal dignity with divinity, and obtain
the foreknowledge of every thing without [the inspiring influence of]
the Gods. For the human race is imbecile, and of small estimation, sees
but a little, and possesses a connascent nothingness; and the only
remedy of its inherent error, perturbation, and unstable mutation, is
its participation, as much as possible, of a certain portion of divine
light. But he who excludes this, does the same thing as those who
attempt to produce soul from things inanimate, or to generate intellect
from things unintelligent. For without the cooperation of a cause, he
constitutes divine works from things which are not divine.

Let it be granted, therefore, that a God, a dæmon, or an angel, gives
completion to more excellent works, yet we must not on this account
admit what you adduce as a thing acknowledged, “_that they affect these
things, in consequence of being drawn through us by the necessities with
which invocation is attended_.” For divinity is superior to necessity,
and this is likewise the case with all the choir of more excellent
natures that is suspended from him. Nor is he alone exempt from the
necessity which is introduced by men, but also from that which
comprehends in itself the world; because it is not the province of an
immaterial nature, and which does not receive any adventitious order, to
be subservient to any necessity introduced from any thing else. And in
the next place, invocation, and the things performed by a scientific
operator, accede and are conjoined to more excellent natures through
similitude and alliance, and do not accomplish their energies through
violence. Hence, the effects which are seen to take place in diviners,
do not happen as you think, from the scientific theurgist being
passively affected; nor is divination thus effected through necessity,
passion preoccupying the predictor; for these things are foreign from,
and incongruous to, the essence of more excellent natures.




                               CHAP. XIX.


But neither does the cause [of the energies] of more excellent natures
subsist as a certain middle instrument,[77] nor does he who invokes
operate through him who prophesies; for to assert these things is
impious. And it is much more true to say, that God is all things, is
able to effect all things, and that he fills all things with himself,
and is alone worthy of sedulous attention,[78] esteem, the energy of
reason, and felicitous honour; that which is human being vile, of no
account, and ludicrous, when compared with that which is divine. Hence I
laugh, when I hear it said, that divinity is spontaneously present with
certain persons or things, either through the period of generation, or
through other causes. For thus that which is unbegotten will no longer
be more excellent, if it is led by the period of generation; nor will it
be primarily the cause of all things, if it is coarranged with certain
things, according to other causes. These assertions, therefore, are
unworthy of the conceptions which we should frame of the Gods, and
foreign from the works which are effected in theurgy.[79] But an
investigation of this kind suffers the same thing as the multitude
suffer, about the fabrication of the universe and providence. For not
being able to learn what the mode is in which these are effected, and
refusing to ascribe human cares and reasonings to the Gods, they wholly
abolish the providential and fabricative energy of divinity. As,
therefore, we are accustomed to answer these, that the divine mode of
production and providential inspection is very different from that which
is human, and which it is not proper wholly to reject through ignorance,
as if it had not from the first any subsistence; thus, also, it may be
justly contended against you, that all prediction, and the performance
of divine works, are the works of the Gods, as they are not effected
through other and these human causes, but through such as are alone
known to the Gods.




                               CHAP. XX.


Omitting, therefore, these things, we may reasonably adduce a second
cause, assigned by you, of the above mentioned particulars: viz. “_that
the soul says and imagines these things, and that they are the passions
of it, excited from small incentives_.” Neither, however, does nature
possess these passions, nor does reason admit them. For every thing
which is generated is generated from a certain cause, and that which is
of a kindred nature derives its completion from a kindred nature. But a
divine work is neither casual, for a thing of this kind is without a
cause, and is not entirely arranged, nor is it produced by a human
cause. For this is a thing foreign and subordinate; but that which is
more perfect cannot be produced from the imperfect. All works,
therefore, which have a similitude to divinity germinate from a divine
cause. For the human soul is contained by one form, and is on all sides
darkened by body, which he who denominates the river of Negligence, or
the water of Oblivion, or ignorance and delirium,[80] or a bond through
passions,[81] or the privation of life, or some other evil, will not by
such appellations sufficiently express its turpitude. How, therefore, is
it possible that the soul, which is detained by so many evils, can ever
become sufficient to an energy of this kind? It is, indeed, by no means
reasonable to suppose that she can. For if at any time we appear to be
capable of effecting this, it is alone through participating of, and
being illuminated by, the Gods, that we enjoy the divine energy. Hence
the soul does not participate of divine works, so far as she possesses
her own proper virtue and wisdom; though if works of this kind pertained
to the soul, every soul would perform them, or that soul alone which
possessed its proper perfection. Now, however, neither of these is
sufficiently prepared for this purpose; but even the perfect soul is
imperfect as with reference to divine energy. The theurgic energy,
therefore, is a different thing, and the felicitous accomplishment of
divine works is imparted by the Gods alone. For if this were not the
case, the worship of the Gods would not, in short, be requisite, but
divine goods might be present with us from ourselves, without the
exercise of religion. If, therefore, these opinions are insane and
stupid, it is proper to abandon an hypothesis of this kind, as not
affording a cause which deserves to be mentioned of the accomplishment
of divine works.




                               CHAP. XXI.


Is, therefore, what you add in the third place more true; viz. “_that
there is a certain mixed form of hypostasis, consisting of our soul and
divine inspiration externally derived_?” Consider this then more
accurately, lest we should be deceived by it, being impeded by its
plausibility. For wherever one thing is effected from two, this one
thing is wholly of a similar species, nature, and essence. Thus the
elements which concur in the same thing, produce one certain thing from
many, and many souls coalesce in one total soul. That, however, which is
perfectly exempt, can never become one with that which departs from
itself;[82] so that neither will there be one certain form of hypostasis
with the soul and divine inspiration. For if divinity is unmingled, the
soul will not be mingled with it; and if he is immutable, he will not be
changed through a concretion into that which is common, from the
simplicity of his subsistence. Some, therefore, prior to us, were of
opinion that certain small sparks excite in us divine forms. It is
impossible, however, that these sparks, whether they are physical, or in
some other way corporeal-formed, should be transferred from things of a
casual nature to things which are divine. But in what is now asserted by
you, the soul is said to be a concause of the divine commixture; and it
is evident, this being admitted, that the soul becomes of an equal
dignity with the Gods, that it gives a certain part to them and receives
a part from them, and that it also affords a measure to natures more
excellent than itself, and is itself bounded by them. That likewise
follows which is asserted by some, and is most dire, that the Gods
precedaneously subsisting in the order of elements, are inherent in
their effects, and there will be a certain thing produced in time, and
from a mixture according to time, which will contain the Gods in itself.
What, likewise, is this comingled form of subsistence? For if it is both
[soul and divine inspiration externally derived], it will not be one
thing consisting of two, but a certain composite, and a coacervation
from two things. But if it is as something different from both, eternal
natures will be mutable, and divine natures will in no respect differ
from physical substances in generation.[83] And as it is absurd to admit
that an eternal nature is produced through generation, it is still more
absurd to suppose that any thing which consists of eternal natures can
be dissolved. Neither, therefore, is this opinion concerning divination
by any means reasonable; and besides this, it is also paradoxical,
whether it is considered as one supposition or as two.




                              CHAP. XXII.


You say, therefore, “_that the soul generates the power which has an
imaginative perception of futurity, through motions of this kind, or
that the things which are adduced from matter constitute dæmons through
the powers that are inherent in them, and especially things adduced from
the matter which is taken from animals_.” It appears to me, however,
that what is now asserted by you exhibits a dire illegality with
reference to the whole of theology and the theurgic energy. For one
absurdity in it, and which is the first that presents itself to the
view, is this, that it makes dæmons to be generable and corruptible. And
another, which is more dire than this, is that things which are prior
will be produced from things which are posterior to themselves. For
dæmons exist prior to soul, and to the powers which are distributed
about bodies. In addition to these things, also, how can the energies of
a partible soul which is detained in body, become essence, and be by
themselves separate out of soul? Or how can the powers which are divided
about, be separated from bodies, though they have their very being in
bodies? And who is it that liberating them from a corporeal condition of
subsistence, again collects the corporeal dissolution, and causes it to
coalesce in one thing? For thus a thing of this kind will be a dæmon,
who will have an existence prior to his being constituted. This
assertion, likewise, is attended with certain common doubts. For how can
divination be produced from things which have no divining power? And how
can soul be generated from things which are without soul? And, in short,
how can things which are more perfect be the progeny of such as are more
imperfect? The mode, likewise, of production appears to me to be
impossible. For it is impossible that essence should be produced through
the motions of the soul, and through the powers which are in bodies. For
from things which are without essence, it is impossible that essence
should be generated.

Whence, also, does the imagination, receiving from a certain thing a
divining power, become prophetic of futurity? For we do not see that any
one of the things which are sown through generation possess any thing
more than what is imparted to it by its first generating cause. But, in
the present instance, the imagination will receive a certain more
excellent addition from that which has no existence. Unless some one
should say, that dæmons preside over the matter which is derived from
animals, and that when this matter is adduced, the presiding dæmon is
sympathetically moved towards it. According to this opinion, therefore,
dæmons are not generated from the powers in bodies; but preceding and
having an existence prior to bodies, they are moved in conformity to
them. Let it, however, be admitted, that dæmons are thus sympathetic,
yet I do not see after what manner there will be something true
respecting futurity. For the foreknowledge and premanifestation of
futurity is not the province of a copassive and material power, which is
detained in a certain place and body; but, on the contrary, this
pertains to a power which is liberated from all these. Such, therefore,
are the corrections of this opinion.




                              CHAP. XXIII.


The animadversions which are after this adduced, at first, indeed, doubt
about the mode of divination, but as they proceed, endeavour entirely to
subvert it. We shall, therefore, discuss both these. And, in the first
place, we shall begin to dissolve the former of these doubts. “_For in
sleep, when we are not employed about any thing, we sometimes obtain a
knowledge of the future._” Not that the cause of divination is derived
both from us and externally: for in things the principle of which
definitely subsists in us, and that which is consequent is externally
derived, if these two have a coarrangement and connexion with each
other, in this case the works of the two are definitely effected, and
the things which are suspended from them follow their precedaneous
causes. But when the cause is independent of us, and preexists by
itself, the end is not defined on account of us, but the whole depends
on things external to us. Now, therefore, since the truth which is in
dreams does not entirely concur with our works, but frequently shines
forth from itself, it shows that divination is externally derived from
the Gods, that it possesses an independent power, and that it
benevolently unfolds futurity when it pleases, and in such a way as it
pleases. These things, therefore, should have an answer of this kind.




                              CHAP. XXIV.


In what follows, while you endeavour to unfold divination, you entirely
subvert it. For if a passion of the soul is admitted to be the cause of
it, what wise man will attribute to an unstable and stupid thing orderly
and stable foreknowledge? Or how is it possible that the soul, which is
in a sane and stable condition according to its better powers, _viz._
those that are intellectual and dianoetic, should be ignorant of
futurity; but that the soul which suffers according to disorderly and
tumultuous motions, should have a knowledge of what is future? For what
has passion in itself adapted to the theory of beings? And is it not
rather an impediment to the more true intellection of things? Farther
still, therefore, if the things contained in the world were constituted
through passions, in this case passions, through their similitude, would
have a certain alliance to them. But if they are produced through
reasons and through forms, there will be another foreknowledge of them,
which is liberated from all passion. Again, passion alone perceives that
which is present, and which now has a subsistence; but foreknowledge
apprehends things which do not yet exist. Hence, to foreknow is
different from being passively affected.

Let us, however, consider your arguments in support of this opinion.
That “_the senses are occupied_,” therefore tends to the contrary to
what you say; for it is an indication that no human phantasm is then
excited. But “_the fumigations which are introduced_,” have an alliance
to divinity, but not to the soul of the spectator. And “_the
invocations_” do not excite the inspiration of the reasoning power, or
corporeal passions in the recipient; for they are perfectly unknown and
arcane, and are alone known to the God whom they invoke. But that “_not
all men, but those that are more simple and young are more adapted to
divination_,” manifests that such as these are more prepared for the
reception of the externally acceding and inspiring spirit. From these
indications, however, you do not truly conjecture that enthusiasm is a
passion. For it follows from these signs, that the influx of it, in the
same manner as the inspiration, is externally derived. In this way,
therefore, these things subsist.




                               CHAP. XXV.


That which follows in the next place, descends from a divine alienation
of mind to an ecstasy of the reasoning power which leads it to a worse
condition, and absurdly says, “_that the cause of divination is the
mania which happens in diseases_.” For, as we may conjecture, it
assimilates enthusiasm to the redundancy of the black bile, to the
aberrations of intoxication, and to the fury which happens from mad
dogs. It is necessary, therefore, from the beginning, to divide ecstasy
into two species, one of which leads to a worse condition of being, and
fills us with stupidity and folly; but the other imparts goods which are
more honourable than human temperance. One species also deviates to a
disorderly, confused, and material motion; but the other gives itself to
the cause which rules over the orderly distribution of things in the
world. And the one, indeed, as being deprived of knowledge, wanders from
wisdom; but the other conjoins with natures that transcend all our
wisdom. The one, likewise, is unstable, but the other is immutable. The
one is preternatural, but the other is above nature. The one draws down
the soul, but the other elevates it. And the one entirely separates us
from a divine allotment, but the other connects us with it.

Why, therefore, does your assertion so much wander from the proposed
hypothesis, as to decline from things primary and good to the last evils
of insanity? For in what is enthusiasm similar to melancholy, or
intoxication, or any other delirium excited by the body? Or what
prediction can ever be produced from diseases of the body? Is not a
derivation of this kind a perfect corruption, but divine inspiration the
perfection and salvation of the soul? And does not depraved enthusiasm
take place through imbecility, but the enthusiasm which is more
excellent through a plenitude of power? In short, the latter being
quiescent, according to its own proper life and intelligence, gives
itself to be used by another [power which is superior to itself]; but
the former, energizing according to its proper energies, renders these
most depraved and turbulent. This, therefore, is a difference the most
manifest of all others, because all the works of divine natures differ
[in a transcendent degree] from the works of other beings. For as the
more excellent genera are exempt from all others, thus also their
energies do not resemble those of any other nature. Hence, when you
speak of divine mania, immediately remove from it all human perversions.
And if you ascribe a sacred “_sobriety and vigilance_” to divine
natures, you must not consider human sobriety and vigilance as similar
to it. But by no means compare the diseases of the body, such as
suffusions, and the imaginations excited by diseases, with divine
imaginations. For what have the two in common with each other? Nor
again, must you compare “_an ambiguous state_,” such as that which takes
place between a sober condition of mind and ecstasy, with sacred visions
of the Gods, which are defined by one energy. But neither must you
compare the most manifest surveys of the Gods with the imaginations
artificially procured by enchantment. For the latter have neither the
energy, nor the essence, nor the truth of the things that are seen, but
extend mere phantasms, as far as to appearances only.

All such doubts as these, however, which are adduced foreign to the
purpose, and tend from contraries to contraries, we do not consider as
pertinent to the present hypothesis. Hence, as we have shown the
unappropriateness of them, we do not think it requisite to discuss them
any further, because they are contentiously introduced, and not with
philosophical investigation.




                              CHAP. XXVI.


There are many other contentious innovations also, which may be the
subject of wonder. But some one may justly be astonished at the
contrariety of opinions produced by admitting either that the truth of
divination is with enchanters, the whole of which subsists in mere
appearances alone, but has no real existence; or that it is with those
who are incited by passion or disease, since every thing which they have
the boldness to utter is fraudulently asserted. For what principle of
truth, or what auxiliary of intelligence, either smaller or greater, can
there be in those who are thus insane? It is necessary, however, not to
receive truth of such a kind as that which may be fortuitous; for this,
it is said, may happen to those that are rashly borne along. Nor must
such truth be admitted as that which subsists between agents and
patients, when they are concordantly homologous with each other; for
truth of this kind is present with the senses and imaginations of
animals. Hence this truth has nothing peculiar, or divine, or superior
to common nature. But the truth of divination is established in energy
with invariable sameness, has the whole knowledge of beings present with
it, and is connascent with the essence of things. It likewise employs
stable reasons, and perfectly, aptly, and definitely knows all things.
This truth, therefore, is adapted to divination. Hence, it is very far
from being a certain natural prescience, such as the preperception which
is inherent in some animals of earthquakes and rain. For this arises
from sympathy, when certain animals are moved in conjunction with
certain parts and powers of the universe; or when, through the acuteness
of a certain sense, they antecedently perceive things which happen in
the air, before they accede to places about the earth.

If, therefore, these assertions are true, though we derive from nature
impressions by which we obtain a knowledge of things, or come into
contact with futurity, it is not proper to consider an impression of
this kind as prophetic foreknowledge; but it is, indeed, similar to this
knowledge, yet falls short of it in stability and truth, is conversant
with that which frequently, but not always, happens, and apprehends the
truth in certain, but not in all things. Hence, if there is a discipline
which foresees the future in the arts, as, for instance, in the piloting
or medical art, this does not all pertain to divine foreknowledge. For
it conjectures the future by certain signs, and these such as are not
always credible, nor such as have that of which they are the signs,
connected with them with invariable sameness. But with divine
providence, a stable knowledge of the future precedes; [and this is
attended with] an immutable faith suspended from causes; an indissoluble
comprehension of all things in all; and a perpetually abiding and
invariable knowledge of all things as present and definite.




                              CHAP. XXVII.


Moreover, neither is it sufficient to assert, “_that nature, art, and
the sympathy of things in the universe, as if they were the parts of one
animal, contain premanifestations of certain things with reference to
each other; nor that bodies are so prepared, that there is a
presignification of some by others_.” For these things, which are very
clearly seen, exhibit a certain divulsed vestige of divine prediction,
in a greater or less degree; since it is not possible for any thing to
be perfectly destitute of divine divination. But as in all things the
image of good exhibits a similitude of divinity; thus, likewise, in all
things a certain obscure or more manifest image of divine prediction
shines forth to the view. Nevertheless, no one of these is such as the
divine species of divination; nor must the one, divine, and unmingled
form of it be characterized from the many phantasms which proceed from
it into generation. Nor, if there are certain other false and deceitful
resemblances, which are still more remote from reality, is it fit to
adduce these in forming a judgment of it. But the divine form or species
of divination is to be apprehended according to one intelligible and
immutable truth; and the mutation which subsists differently at
different times is to be rejected as unstable and unadapted to the Gods.
If, therefore, that which is truly divination is a thing of this kind,
_i. e._ is a divine work, who would not blush to ascribe it to nature,
which produces its effects without reason and intellect, as if nature
elaborated in us a certain prophetic apparatus, and inserted this
aptitude in some things in a greater but in others in a less degree? For
in those things in which men receive auxiliaries from nature in the
attainment of their proper perfection, in these, also, certain aptitudes
of nature precede; but in things in which no human work is proposed [to
be effected], in these neither does the end pertain to us. And when a
certain good, which is more ancient than our nature, has a prior
arrangement, it is not possible in this case that a certain natural
excellence should become the prepared subject of it. For in those things
of which there are perfections, in these imperfect preparations are
ingenerated; but both these are the habits of men [and not of Gods].
Hence, of those things which are not present with us, so far as we are
men, there will not be a preparative from nature. There is not,
therefore, a natural seed in us of divine prediction. If some one,
however, should in a more general way assert, that there is a certain
human divination, of this there will be a certain physical preparation.
But with respect to that which may be truly denominated divination, and
which pertains to the Gods, it is not proper to think that this is
ingrafted by nature. For both other things, and also the indefinite,
according to the more and the less, are the attendants on this. Hence it
is separated from divine divination, which abides in stable boundaries.
On this account, also, it is requisite strenuously to contend against
him who asserts that divination originates from us. You likewise adduce
clear indications of this from the works performed in predicting what is
future. For you say, “_that those who invoke [the divinities for the
purposes of divination] have about them stones and herbs, bind certain
sacred bonds, which they also dissolve, open places that are shut, and
change the deliberate intentions of the recipients, so as to render them
worthy, though they were before depraved_.” All these particulars,
therefore, signify that the inspiration accedes externally. It is
requisite, however, not only to preassume this, but also to define what
the inspiration of divine origin is, which produces divine divination.
For if this is not done, we shall not previously know what its
peculiarity is, in consequence of not attributing to it its proper
character, and adapting this to it as a certain seal. And this, indeed,
has been accurately done by us a little before.




                             CHAP. XXVIII.


You adduce, however, as a thing by no means to be despised, “_the
artificers of efficacious images_.” But I should wonder if these were
admitted by any one of the theurgists who survey the true forms of the
Gods. For why should any one exchange truly existing beings for images,
and descend from the first to the last of things? Or do we not know that
all things effected by an adumbration of this kind, have an obscure
subsistence, are the phantasms only of that which is true, and appear to
be good, but in no respect are so? Other things, also, of this kind that
accede, are borne along in a flowing condition of being; but obtain
nothing genuine, or perfect, or manifest. But this is evident from the
mode of their production: for not divinity, but man is the maker of
them. Nor are they produced from uniform and intelligible essences, but
from matter, which is assumed for this purpose. What good, therefore,
can germinate from matter, and from the material and corporeal-formed
powers which are in bodies? Or is not that which derives its subsistence
from human art, more imbecile than men themselves, who impart existence
to it? By what kind of art, likewise, is this image fashioned? For it is
said, indeed, to be fashioned by demiurgic art; but this is effective of
true essences, and not of certain images. Hence the image-producing art
is distant by a great interval from the seminal production of realities.
Besides, neither does it preserve a certain analogy with divine
fabrication. For divinity does not fabricate all things, either through
the celestial physical motions, or through a partial matter, or through
powers thus divided; but he produces the worlds by conceptions, will,
and immaterial forms, and through an eternal and supermundane soul. The
maker of images, however, is said to elaborate them through the
revolving stars. But the thing does not in reality subsist so as it
appears to do. For since there are certain infinite powers in the
celestial Gods, the last genus of all the powers in them is physical.
But again, of this power one portion being inherent in spermatic reasons
[or productive powers], and prior to these reasons being established in
immoveable natures, essentially precedes generation. But another portion
being inherent in sensible and visible motions and powers, and in
celestial effluxions and qualities, has dominion over the whole visible
order of things. This last power, therefore, in all these rules over the
circumterrestrial manifest generation in places about the earth. Many
other arts, however, as for instance, the medical[84] and gymnastic, use
this power, which has dominion over visible generation, and the
qualities of the effluxions sent from the heavens employ it, and
likewise all such arts as in their operations communicate with nature.
And moreover, the image-making art attracts a certain very obscure
genesiurgic portion from the celestial effluxions.

Such, therefore, as the truth is, such also it is requisite to unfold it
to others. It must be said, then, that the maker of images neither uses
the celestial circulations, nor the powers which are inherent in them,
nor those powers which are naturally established about them; nor, in
short, is it possible to come into contact with them. But he
artificially, and not theurgically, applies himself to the last
effluxions which openly proceed from the nature of them, about the last
part of the universe. For these effluxions, I think, being mingled with
a partial matter, are capable of being changed and transformed
differently at different times. They likewise receive the transposition,
from some things to others, of the powers which are in partial natures.
The variety, however, of such like energies, and the composition of a
multitude of material powers, are not only entirely separated from
divine fabrication, but also from natural production. For nature
produces her proper works collectively, and at once, and accomplishes
all things by simple and incomposite energies. Hence it remains that a
commixture of this kind, about the last and manifest celestial
effluxion, and about the things which are moved by a celestial nature,
is artificial.




                              CHAP. XXIX.


Why, therefore, does the maker of images, who effects these things,
desert himself, though he is better than these images, and consists of
things of a more excellent nature, and confide in inanimate idols, which
are inspired with the representation alone of life, contain a renovated
harmony, and which is externally multiform, and are in reality diurnal?
Shall we say that something genuine and true is inherent in them?
Nothing, however, which is fashioned by human art is genuine and pure.
But you will say, that simplicity and uniformity of energy predominate
in the whole of their composition. This is very far from being the case.
For the idol, according to its visible composition, is mingled from
all-various and contrary qualities. Shall we say then, that a certain
pure and perfect power is manifest in them? By no means. For a thing of
this kind possesses an adventitious multitude of effluxions, collected
from many places, and which shows itself to be imbecile and evanescent.
But if these particulars, which we have enumerated, are not found to
take place in images, is stability present with them, as it is said to
be [by the patrons of these images]? By no means, likewise, is this the
case. For these idols are extinguished with much greater rapidity than
the images which are seen in mirrors. For they are immediately formed by
the accession of fumigations from exhaling vapours; but when the
fumigation is mingled with, and diffused through, the whole air, then
the idol is likewise immediately dissolved, and is not naturally adapted
to remain for the smallest portion of time. Why, therefore, should the
man who is a lover of truth, pay attention to these useless delusions?
I, indeed, do not think them to be of any value. For if the makers of
these images know that the fictions about which they are busily
employed, are nothing more than the formations of passive matter, the
evil arising from an attention to them will be simple. But in addition
to this, these idol-makers are similar to the images in which they
confide. And if they pay attention to these idols as if they were Gods,
the absurdity will be so great, as neither to be effable by words, nor
to be endured in deeds. For a certain divine splendour never illuminates
a soul of this kind, because it is not adapted to be imparted to things
which are entirely repugnant to it; neither have those things which are
detained by dark phantasms a place for its reception. This delusive
formation, therefore, of phantasms, will be conversant with shadows,
which are very remote from the truth.




                               CHAP. XXX.


You say, however, “_that the makers of images observe the motion of the
celestial bodies, and can tell from the concurrence of what star, with a
certain star or stars, predictions will be true or false; and also
whether the things that are performed will be inanities, or significant
and efficacious_.” But neither will these phantasms, on this account,
possess any thing divine. For the last of the things which are in
generation are moved in conjunction with the celestial courses, and are
copassive with the effluxions which descend from the heavenly bodies.
Moreover, if any one considers these things accurately, he will find
that they demonstrate the contrary to what is here asserted. For how is
it possible that things which are in every respect mutable, and this
with facility, and which are all-variously turned by external motions,
so as to become inefficacious, or prophetic, or significant, or
effective, or at different times different, should contain in
themselves, by participation, any portion, however small, of divine
power? What then, are the powers which are inherent in matter the
elements of dæmons? By no means: for no partial sensible bodies generate
dæmons; but much more are these generated and guarded by dæmons. Neither
is any man able to fashion, as by a machine, certain forms of dæmons;
but, on the contrary, he is rather fashioned and fabricated by them, so
far as he participates of a sensible body. But neither is a certain
dæmoniacal multitude generated from the elements of sensibles; since, on
the contrary, this multitude is simple, and energizes uniformly about
composite natures. Hence, neither will it have sensibles more ancient,
or more stable than itself; but being itself more excellent than
sensibles, both in dignity and power, it imparts to them the permanency
which they are able to receive. Unless indeed, you denominate idols
dæmons, not rightly employing an appellation of this kind. For the
nature of dæmons is one thing, and that of idols another. The order of
each, likewise, is very different. Moreover, the leader of idols is
different from the great leader of dæmons. And this, also, you admit.
For you say, “_that no God or dæmon is drawn down by idols_.” What,
therefore, will be the worth of a sacred deed, or of the foreknowledge
of what is future, if it is entirely destitute of divinity and a dæmon?
So that it is requisite to know what the nature is of this
wonder-working art, but by no means to use or confide in it.




                              CHAP. XXXI.


Again, therefore, still worse than this is the explanation of sacred
operations, which assigns as the cause of divination, “_a certain genus
of dæmons, which is naturally fraudulent, omniform, and various, and
which assumes the appearance of Gods and dæmons, and the souls of the
deceased_.” I shall, therefore, relate to you, in answer to this, what I
once heard from the prophets of the Chaldeans.

Such Gods as are truly divinities, are alone the givers of good; alone
associate with good men, and with those that are purified by the
sacerdotal art, and from these amputate all vice, and every passion.
When these, also, impart their light, that which is evil, and at the
same time dæmoniacal, vanishes from before more excellent natures, in
the same manner as darkness when light is present; nor is it able to
disturb theurgists in the smallest degree, who receive from this light
every virtue, obtain worthy manners, become orderly and elegant in their
actions, are liberated from passions, and purified from every disorderly
motion, and from atheistical and unholy conduct. But those who are
themselves flagitious, and who leap, as it were, to things of a divine
nature in an illegal and disorderly manner, these, through the
imbecility of their proper energy, or through indigence of inherent
power, are not able to associate with the Gods. Because, likewise, they
are excluded, through certain defilements, from an association with pure
spirits, they become connected with evil spirits, are filled from them
with the worst kind of inspiration, are rendered depraved and unholy,
become replete with intemperate pleasures, and every kind of vice, are
emulous of manners foreign to the Gods, and, in short, become similar to
the depraved dæmons, with whom they are connascent. These, therefore,
being full of passions and vice, attract to themselves, through
alliance, depraved spirits, and are excited by them to every kind of
iniquity. They are also increased in wickedness by each other, like a
circle conjoining the beginning to the end, and similarly making an
equal compensation. Hence deeds which are the nefarious offences of
impiety, which are introduced into sacred works in a disorderly manner,
and which are also confusedly performed by those who betake themselves
to such works, and at one time, as it seems, cause one divinity to be
present instead of another, and again, introduce depraved dæmons instead
of Gods, whom they call equal to the Gods (αντιθεους)—such deeds as
these you should never adduce in a discourse concerning sacerdotal
divination. For good is more contrary to evil than to that which is not
good. As, therefore, the sacrilegious are in the most eminent degree
hostile to the religious cultivation of the Gods; thus, also, those who
are conversant with dæmons who are fraudulent, and the causes of
intemperance, are undoubtedly hostile to theurgists. For from these
every depraved spirit departs, and when they are present, is entirely
subverted. Every vice, too, and every passion, are by these perfectly
amputated: for a pure participation of good is present with the pure,
and they are supernally filled with truth from a divine fire. These,
therefore, suffer no impediment from evil spirits, nor are these spirits
any obstacles to the goods of their souls. Nor are theurgists disturbed
by pride, or flattery, or the enjoyment of exhalations, or any violence;
but all these, as if struck by lightning, yield and recede, without
touching the theurgist, or being able to approach to them. Hence this
genus of divination is undefiled and sacerdotal, and is truly divine.
This, also, does not, as you say it does, require me, or any other as an
arbiter, in order that I may prefer it to a multitude of other things;
but it is itself exempt from all things, is supernatural, and has an
eternal preexistence, neither receiving a certain opposition, nor a
certain transcendency, which has a prearrangement in many things,
because it is of itself liberated, and uniformly precedes all things.
And to this it is requisite that you, and every one who is a genuine
lover of the Gods, should give himself wholly; since by this mean
irreprehensible truth will be obtained in divinations, and perfect
virtue in souls; and through both these, an ascent will be afforded to
theurgists to intelligible fire, which ought to be preestablished as the
end of all foreknowledge, and of every theurgic operation. Hence you in
vain adduce the opinion of those who think that divination is effected
by an evil dæmon, since these do not deserve to be mentioned in
speculations concerning the Gods. At the same time, likewise, they are
ignorant of the means of distinguishing truth from falsehood, because
they are from the beginning nourished in darkness, and are wholly
incapable of knowing the principles from which these are produced. Here,
therefore, we shall terminate our discussion concerning the mode of
divination.




                              SECTION IV.




                                CHAP. I.


Let us then, in the next place, consider the opposing arguments, what
they are, and what reason they possess. And if we should discuss some
things a little more abundantly, in consequence of speaking freely and
at leisure, it is requisite that you should promptly attend to, and
endure what, we say. For it is necessary that great labour should be
bestowed on the greatest disciplines, and that they should be accurately
explored for a long time, if you intend to know them perfectly. Do you,
therefore, conformably to the present hypothesis, propose the arguments
which occasion the doubt, and I will answer you. Say then, “_it very
much perplexes me to understand how superior beings, when invoked, are
commanded by those that invoke them, as if they were their inferiors_.”
But I will unfold to you the whole division, which is worthy of regard,
concerning the powers that are invoked; from which you will be able
clearly to define what is possible and what is impossible, in the
subjects of your investigation. For the Gods, indeed, and the natures
that are more excellent than we, through the wish of what is beautiful,
and from an unenvying and exuberant fulness of good, benevolently impart
to those that are worthy, such things as are fit for them, commiserating
the labours of sacerdotal men, but being delighted with those that they
have begotten, nourished, and instructed. But the middle genera are the
inspective guardians of judgment. These inform us what ought to be done,
and from what it is fit to abstain. They also give assistance to just
works, but impede such as are unjust; and as many endeavour to take away
unjustly the property of others, or basely to injure or destroy some
one, they cause these to suffer the same things as they have done to
others. But there is, likewise, another most irrational genus of
dæmons,[85] which is without judgment, and is allotted only one power,
through an arrangement by which each of these dæmons presides over one
work alone. As therefore, it is the province of a sword to cut, and to
do nothing else than this, thus also of the spirits which are
distributed in the universe, according to the partible necessity of
nature, one kind divides, but another collects, things which are
generated. This, however, is known from the phænomena. For the
Charonean[86] spiracles, as they are called, emit from themselves a
certain spirit, which is able to corrupt promiscuously every thing that
falls into them. Thus, therefore, of certain invisible spirits, each is
allotted a different power, and is alone adapted to do that which it is
ordained to perform. He, therefore, who turns from their natural course
things which contribute to the universe in an orderly manner, and
illegitimately performs a certain thing, in this case receives the
injury arising from that which he uses badly. This, however, pertains to
another mode of discussion.




                               CHAP. II.


But we sometimes see that take place which is now proposed to be
considered. For it happens that spirits are commanded [to do this or
that] who do not use a reason of their own, and have not the principle
of judgment. Nor does this occur irrationally. For our dianoia naturally
possessing the power of reasoning about and judging of things as they
are, and comprehending in itself many powers of life, is accustomed to
command the most irrational spirits, and such as derive their perfection
from one energy alone. Hence, it invokes these as more excellent
natures, because it endeavours to attract to particulars from the whole
world, in which we are contained, things which contribute to wholes.[87]
And it commands them as inferior natures, because frequently certain
parts of things in the world [such as our reasoning power] are more pure
and perfect than things which extend themselves to the whole world.
Thus, for instance, if one thing is intellectual [as is the case with
our dianoia], but another is wholly inanimate or physical, then that
which proceeds to a less extent has a more principal power than that
which is more extended, though the former falls far short of the latter
in magnitude and multitude of domination. For these things, also,
another reason may be assigned, and which is as follows: in all
theurgical operations the priest sustains a twofold character; one,
indeed, as man, and which preserves the order possessed by our nature in
the universe; but the other, which is corroborated by divine signs, and
through these is conjoined to more excellent natures, and is elevated to
their order by an elegant circumduction, this is deservedly capable of
being surrounded with the external form of the Gods. Conformably,
therefore, to a difference of this kind, the priest very properly
invokes, as more excellent natures, the powers derived from the
universe, so far as he who invokes is a man; and again, he commands
these powers, because through arcane symbols, he, in a certain respect,
is invested with the sacred form of the Gods.




                               CHAP. III.


Dissolving, however, the doubts in a way still more true, we think it
requisite, in invoking superior natures, to take away the evocations
which appear to be directed to them as to men, and also the mandates in
the performance of works, which are given with great earnestness. For if
the communion of concordant friendship, and a certain indissoluble
connexion of union, are the bonds of sacerdotal operations, in order
that these operations may be truly divine, and may transcend every
common action known to men, no human work will be adapted to them; nor
will the invocations of the priest resemble the manner in which we draw
to ourselves things that are distant; nor are his mandates directed as
to things separated from him, in the way in which we transfer one thing
from others. But the energy of divine fire shines forth voluntarily, and
in common, and being self-invoked and self-energetic, energizes through
all things with invariable sameness, both through the natures which
impart, and those that are able to receive, its light. This mode of
solution, therefore, is far superior, which does not suppose that divine
works are effected through contrariety, or discrepance, in the way in
which generated natures are usually produced; but asserts that every
such work is rightly accomplished through sameness, union, and consent.
Hence, if we separate from each other that which invokes and that which
is invoked, that which commands and that which is commanded, that which
is more and that which is less excellent, we shall, in a certain
respect, transfer the contrariety of generations to the unbegotten goods
of the Gods. But if we despise all such things, as it is just we should,
as of an earth-born nature, and ascribe that which is common and simple,
as being more honourable, to the powers who transcend the variety which
is in the realms of generation, the first hypothesis of these questions
will be immediately subverted, so that no reasonable doubt concerning
them will be left.




                               CHAP. IV.


What then shall we say concerning the next inquiry to this, viz. “_why
the powers who are invoked think it requisite that he who worships them
should be just, but they when called upon to act unjustly do not refuse
so to act_?” To this I reply, that I am dubious with respect to what you
call acting justly, and am of opinion that what appears to us to be an
accurate definition of justice does not also appear to be so to the
Gods. For we, looking to that which is most brief, direct our attention
to things present, and to this momentary life, and the manner in which
it subsists. But the powers that are superior to us know the whole life
of the soul, and all its former lives; and, in consequence of this, if
they inflict a certain punishment from the prayer of those that invoke
them, they do not inflict it without justice, but looking to the
offences committed by souls in former lives;[88] which men not
perceiving think that they unjustly fall into the calamities which they
suffer.




                                CHAP. V.


The multitude, also, are accustomed to doubt in common the very same
thing concerning providence, _viz._ why certain persons are afflicted
undeservedly, as they have not done any thing unjustly prior to their
being thus afflicted. For neither here is it possible to understand
[perfectly] what the soul is, and its whole life, how many offences it
has committed in former lives, and whether it now suffers from its
former guilt. In this life, also, many unjust actions are concealed from
human knowledge, but are known to the Gods, since neither is the same
scope of justice proposed to them as to men. For men, indeed, define
justice to be the soul’s performance of its own proper business,[89] and
the distribution of desert, conformably to the established laws, and the
prevailing polity. But the Gods, looking to the whole orderly
arrangement of the world, and to the subserviency of souls to the Gods,
form a judgment of what is just. Hence the judgment of just actions with
the Gods is different from what it is with us. Nor is it wonderful, if
we are unable, in most things, to arrive at the supreme and most perfect
judgment of more excellent natures. What also hinders, but that to each
thing by itself, and in conjunction with the whole alliance of souls,
justice may in a very transcendent manner be decreed by the Gods? For if
a communion of the same nature in souls, both when they are in and when
they are out of bodies, produces a certain identical connexion and
common order with the life of the world, it is likewise necessary that,
a fulfilment of justice should be required by wholes, and especially
when the magnitude of the unjust deeds antecedently committed by one
soul transcends the infliction of one punishment due to the offences.
But if any one should add other definitions, through which he can show
that what is just subsists with the Gods in a way different from that in
which it is known by us, from these also our design will be facilitated.
For me, however, the beforementioned canons are alone sufficient for the
purpose of manifesting the universal genus, and which comprehends every
thing pertaining to the medicinal punishments inflicted by divine
justice.




                               CHAP. VI.


In order, therefore, that from an abundance of arguments we may contend
against the objection which is now adduced, we will grant, if you
please, the contrary to what we have asserted, _viz._ that certain
unjust things are performed in this business of invocations. That the
Gods, however, are not to be accused as the causes of these is
immediately manifest. For those that are good are the causes of good;
and the Gods possess good essentially. They do nothing, therefore, that
is unjust. Hence other causes of guilty deeds must be investigated. And
if we are not able to discover these causes, it is not proper to throw
away the true conception respecting the Gods, nor on account of the
doubts whether these unjust deeds are performed, and how they are
effected, to depart from notions concerning the Gods which are truly
clear. For it is much better to acknowledge the insufficiency of our
power to explain how unjust actions are perpetrated, than to admit any
thing impossible and false respecting the Gods; since all the Greeks and
Barbarians truly opine the contrary to be the case with divine natures.
After this manner, therefore, the truth respecting these particulars
subsists.




                               CHAP. VII.


Moreover, it is necessary to add the causes whence evils[90] sometimes
arise, and to show how many and of what kind they are. For the form of
them is not simple; but, being various, is the leader of the generation
of various evils. For if what we a little before said, concerning images
and evil dæmons, who assume the appearance of Gods and good dæmons, is
true, an abundant evil-producing tribe, about which a contrariety of
this kind usually happens, will from hence appear to flow. _For an evil
dæmon requires that his worshipper should be just, because he assumes
the appearance of one belonging to the divine genus; but he is
subservient to what is unjust, because he is depraved._ The same thing,
likewise, that is said of good and evil may be asserted of the true and
the false. As, therefore, in divinations we attribute true predictions
to the Gods alone, but when we detect any falsehood in predictions we
refer this to another genus of cause, _viz._ that of dæmons; thus, also,
in things just and unjust, the beautiful and the just are to be alone
ascribed to Gods and good dæmons; but such dæmons as are naturally
depraved, perpetrate what is unjust and base. And that, indeed, which
consents and accords with itself, and always subsists with invariable
sameness, pertains to more excellent natures; but that which is hostile
to itself, which is discordant, and never the same, is the peculiarity
in the most eminent degree of dæmoniacal dissension, about which it is
not at all wonderful that things of an opposing nature should subsist;
but perhaps the very contrary, that this should not be the case, would
be more wonderful.




                              CHAP. VIII.


We may, however, beginning from another hypothesis, demonstrate the same
thing. We must admit that the corporeal parts of the universe are
neither sluggish nor destitute of power, but as much as they excel our
concerns in perfection, beauty, and magnitude, by so much also is the
power which is present with them greater. Each, likewise, by itself is
capable of effecting different things, and produces certain different
energies. They are also capable of effecting things much more numerous
on each other. And besides this, a certain multiform production extends
to parts from wholes; partly from sympathy, through similitude of
powers, and partly from the aptitude of the agent to the patient. If,
therefore, certain evils and destructions happen to parts, they are
salutary and good as with reference to wholes and the harmony of the
universe, but to parts they introduce a necessary corruption, either
from not being able to bear the energies of wholes, or from a certain
other commixture and temperament of their own imbecility, or, in the
third place, from the privation of symmetry in the parts to each other.




                               CHAP. IX.


After the body of the universe, also, many things are generated by the
nature of it. For the concord of similars, and the contrariety of
dissimilars, effect not a few things. Farther still, the assemblage of
many things into the one animal of the universe, and the powers in the
world, whatever the number and quality of them may be, effect, in short,
one thing in wholes and another in parts, on account of the divided
imbecility of parts. Thus, for instance, the friendship, love, and
contention which subsist in energy in the universe, become passions in
the partial natures by which they are participated. Those things,
likewise, that are preestablished in forms and pure reasons in the
nature of wholes, participate of a certain material indigence, and
privation of _morphe_, in things which subsist according to a part. And
things which are conjoined to each other in wholes are separated in
parts. Hence partible natures, which participate of wholes in
conjunction with matter, degenerate from them in all things, and also
from what is beautiful and perfect. But some parts are corrupted, in
order that wholes may be preserved in a condition conformable to nature.
Sometimes, likewise, parts are compressed and weighed down, though at
the same time wholes remain impassive to a molestation of this kind.




                                CHAP. X.


We shall collect, therefore, what happens from these conclusions. For if
certain invocators employ the physical or corporeal powers[91] of the
universe, an involuntary gift of energy [from these powers], and which
is without vice, takes place. He, likewise, who uses this gift
[sometimes] perverts it to things of a contrary nature, and to base
purposes. And the gift, indeed, is moved contrarily together with the
passions, and sympathetically through similitude; but he who uses the
thing which is imparted, deliberately draws it, contrary to justice, to
what is evil and base. And the gift, indeed, causes things which are
most remote to cooperate through the one harmony of the world. But if
some one understanding this to be the case should iniquitously endeavour
to draw certain portions of the universe to other parts, these parts are
not the cause of the evil that ensues; but the audacity of men, and the
transgression of the order in the world, pervert things that are
beautiful and legal. Hence neither do the Gods effect what appears to be
base, but this is accomplished by the natures and bodies that proceed
from them; nor do these very natures and bodies impart improbity from
themselves, as it is thought they do; but they send their proper
effluxions to places about the earth, for the salvation of wholes, and
those who receive them transmute them by their commixture and
perversion, and transfer what is given to a purpose different from that
for which it was imparted. From all these particulars, therefore, it is
demonstrated that a divine nature is not the cause of evils and unjust
deeds.




                               CHAP. XI.


Moreover, you inquire, and at the same time doubt, “_how it comes to
pass that the Gods do not hear him who invokes them, if he is impure
from venereal connexions; but, at the same time, they do not refuse to
lead any one to illegal venery_.” You have, indeed, a clear solution of
these things from what has been before said; if they are done contrary
to [human] laws, but are effected according to another order and cause
more excellent than laws. Or if it happens that things of this kind are
conformable to the mundane harmony and friendship, yet produce a
conflict in parts through a certain sympathy. Or if the communication of
good, which is beautifully imparted, is perverted by those that receive
it to the contrary.




                               CHAP. XII.


It is, necessary, however, to discuss these things particularly, and to
show how they subsist, and what reason they possess. It is requisite,
therefore, to understand that the universe is one animal; and that the
parts in it are, indeed, separated by places, but through the possession
of one nature hasten to each other.[92] The whole collective power,
however, and the cause of mixture, spontaneously draws the parts to a
mingling with each other. But it is also possible for this spontaneous
attraction to be excited and extended by art more than is fit. The cause
itself, therefore, of this mixture extending from itself to the whole
world, is good, and the source of plenitude; has the power of
harmonically procuring communion, consent, and symmetry; and inserts, by
union, the indissoluble principle of love, which principle retains and
preserves both things that are in existence, and such as are becoming to
be. But in the parts, through their separation from each other and from
wholes, and because, from their own proper nature, they are imperfect,
indigent, and imbecile, their mutual connection is accompanied with
passion; by which, in most of them, desire and a connascent appetite are
inherent. Art[93] therefore, perceiving this innate desire thus
implanted by nature, and distributed about it (art itself also being
multiformly distributed about nature), variously attracts and derives it
as through a channel. Hence it transfers that which in itself is orderly
and arranged into the privation of order, and fills that which is
beautiful and commensurate with deformity. But the venerable end in each
particular thing, which is connascent with union, it transfers to
another indecorous plenitude, which is an assemblage of different things
according to a common passion. It likewise imparts a matter from itself,
which is unadapted to the whole generation of what is beautiful, either
because it does not entirely receive it, or because it transfers it to
other things. It also mingles many different physical powers, which it
manages as it pleases for the purposes of generation. Hence we have
universally shown, that the apparatus of a venereal connexion of this
kind proceeds from a certain human art, and not from a certain
dæmoniacal or divine necessity.




                              CHAP. XIII.


Consider, therefore, also another genus of causes; how a stone or a herb
frequently possess from themselves a nature corruptive, or again
collective of generated natures. For this is not only the case with
these, but this physical power is also in greater natures and greater
things, which those who are not able to infer by a reasoning process,
will perhaps transfer the works and energies of nature to more excellent
beings [_i. e._ to Gods, angels, and dæmons]. Now, therefore, it is
acknowledged that the tribe of evil dæmons has a very extended power in
generation, in human affairs, and in such things as subsist about the
earth. Hence, why is it wonderful that a tribe of this kind should
effect such works as these? For every man is not able to distinguish a
good from an evil dæmon, or by what peculiarities the one is separated
from the other. Hence those, who are not able to perceive the difference
between the two, absurdly reason concerning the cause of them, and refer
this cause to genera superior to nature and the dæmoniacal order. If,
also, certain powers of a partial soul are assumed in order to effect
these things, whether such a soul is detained in body, or has left the
testaceous and terrestrial body, but wanders about the places of
generation in a turbid and humid spirit; this, indeed, will be a true
opinion, but separates the cause of these things at the greatest
distance from more excellent natures. By no means, therefore, is that
which is divine, or any good dæmon, subservient to the illegal desires
of men in venereal concerns. For of these things there are many other
causes.




                               SECTION V.




                                CHAP. I.


The doubt mentioned by you in the next place, is, as I may say, an
inquiry which is made in common both by the learned and the unlearned, I
mean concerning sacrifices, “_what utility or power they possess in the
universe, and with the Gods, and on what account they are performed,
appropriately indeed to the powers who are honoured by them, but
usefully to those by whom the gifts are offered_.” In the same place,
also, another objection occurs, viz. “_that the interpreters of
prophecies and oracles ought to abstain from animals, lest the Gods
should be polluted by the vapours arising from them. For this is
contrary to the assertion, that the Gods are especially allured by the
vapours of animals._”




                               CHAP. II.


The hostile opposition, therefore, in the things that are now proposed,
may be easily dissolved by demonstrating the dignity of wholes with
respect to parts, and by recalling to your recollection the exempt
transcendency of the Gods above men. But what I mean is this, that the
soul, which ranks as a whole, presides over all the mundane body,[94]
and that the celestial Gods ascend, as into a vehicle, into a celestial
body, neither receiving any injury from thence, nor any impediment in
their intellections. But to a partial soul, the communion with body is
noxious in both these respects. If, therefore, some one perceiving this,
should nevertheless introduce such a doubt as the following, that if the
body is a bond to our soul, it will also be a bond to the soul of the
universe, and that if a partial soul is converted to the body on account
of generation, in a similar manner the power of the Gods is converted to
generation; in answer to this every one may reply, that he who thus
doubts does not know how much superior beings transcend men, and wholes
parts. Since, therefore, the objections pertain to things different from
each other, they do not produce any ambiguity.




                               CHAP. III.


Here, therefore, the same reasoning is likewise sufficient. For with us
the enjoyment of bodies which once were united to soul, impresses in us
heaviness and defilement, ingenerates in us voluptuousness, and produces
many other diseases in the soul. But with the Gods, and with mundane and
total causes, this is by no means the case. For the exhalation which
ascends after a divine manner from animals that are sacrificed, as it is
comprehended by, and does not comprehend, the Gods, and as it is also
connected with the universe, but does not conjoin wholes and the Gods to
itself, is in consequence of this coadapted to superior beings and to
total causes, but does not restrain them and coadapt them to itself.




                               CHAP. IV.


Nor is that which so greatly disturbs you, and for which you so
strenuously contend, attended with any difficulty, I mean abstinence
from animals,[95] if it is rightly understood. For those who worship the
Gods do not abstain from animals, lest the Gods should be defiled by the
vapours arising from them. For what exhalation from bodies can approach
those who, before any thing material can come into contact with their
power, intangibly amputate matter? Nor is it the power of the Gods only
that abolishes all bodies, and causes them to vanish, without any
approximation to them; but a celestial body, also, is unmingled with all
the material elements;[96] nor does it receive into itself any thing
extraneous, nor impart any portion of itself to things of a foreign
nature. How, therefore, can any terrestrial vapour, which is not
elevated five stadia from the earth before it again flows down to the
earth, either nourish a circulating and immaterial body, or, in short,
produce in it a certain defilement, or any other passion? For it is
acknowledged that an etherial body is void of all contrariety, is
liberated from all mutation, is entirely pure from the possibility of
being transmuted into any thing else, and is perfectly free from a
tendency to, and from the middle, because it is either without any
tendency, or is convolved in a circle. Hence, it is not possible that
bodies, which consist of different powers and motions, which are
all-variously changed, and are moved either upwards or downwards, should
have any communion of nature or power with celestial bodies, or that any
exhalation of the former should be mingled with the latter. As the
former, therefore, are entirely separated from the latter, they will not
effect any thing in them. For celestial bodies being unbegotten, are not
capable of receiving any mutation from generated natures. How,
therefore, can the Gods be defiled by such like vapours, who suddenly,
as I may say, at one stroke, amputate the vapours ascending from all
matter and material bodies?

This, therefore, it is not fit to suspect of the Gods [_viz._ that they
can be defiled by vapours]; but it is much more requisite to think that
things of this kind are foreign to us and to our nature. For things
which are divided, and also material and kindred natures, are able to
have a certain communion with each other in acting and suffering; but
things which are essentially different, and such as are entirely
transcendent, and which employ other natures and powers, these cannot
act on or receive any thing from each other. The defilement, therefore,
produced by material natures, falls on things which are detained by a
material body; and from these it is necessary those should be purified
who are capable of being defiled by matter. But how can those beings be
defiled by material essences who neither have a divisible nature nor
possess the power of receiving in themselves the passions of matter?
How, likewise, can divinity, who has nothing in common with us, in
consequence of antecedently existing superior to human imbecility, be
polluted by my passions, or by those of any other man?

Neither of these, therefore, at all pertains to the Gods; neither our
being filled with material bodies; (for there is nothing, in short, of
this kind with them, nor are they defiled by our stains, since they are
entirely pure and incorruptible), nor if there are certain material
vapours of bodies which are emitted about the earth; for these vapours
are most remote from the essence and power of the Gods. Hence the whole
hypothesis of contrariety is subverted if no part of it pertains to the
Gods. For how, in short, can that which is not possess in itself a
certain contest [with any thing]? You in vain, therefore, suspect things
of this kind to be absurd, and you adduce doubts unworthy of the Gods,
since they cannot be reasonably applied even to good men. For no man who
possesses intellect, and is free from passion, would ever permit himself
to be allured by the exhalation of vapours, and much less would any one
of the beings more excellent than man suffer himself to be thus allured.
These things, however, will be discussed shortly after. But now, since
this contrariety is, through many solutions, subverted, we shall here
finish what we have to say about the first doubt.




                                CHAP. V.


Your next inquiry is of greater consequence, and is concerning things of
a greater nature. How, therefore, shall I be able, briefly and
sufficiently, to give you an answer to a question which is extremely
difficult, and requires a long explanation? Nevertheless I will answer
it, and without failing in alacrity. I will also endeavour to follow
what you have concisely indicated and tacitly signified. But I will
unfold to you my dogma concerning sacrifices [which is as follows]. It
is by no means requisite that sacrifices should be offered for the sake
of honour alone, in the same manner as we honour benefactors; nor for
the sake of returning thanks for the goods imparted to us by the Gods;
nor yet for the sake of first fruits, or as a remuneration by certain
gifts of more venerable goods bestowed on us by the Gods. For these
things are also common to men, and are assumed from the common polity of
mankind, but by no means preserve the transcendency of the Gods and the
order of them as exempt causes.




                               CHAP. VI.


But the greatest thing in sacrifices, _viz._ their efficacious power,
and why especially they are so very beneficial that without them we are
neither liberated from pestilence, nor famine, nor sterility of fruits,
nor obtain seasonable showers of rain, nor things of much greater
consequence than these, I mean such as contribute to the purification of
the soul, or an emancipation from generation; these are not at all
indicated by such modes of sacrifices as you adduce. Hence no one can
justly approve of them, because they assign a cause of the works
performed in sacrifices unadapted to their dignity. And if some one
should approve of them it will be only in a secondary way, and as
suspended from primary, more ancient, and venerable causes.




                               CHAP. VII.


The discussion therefore requires that we should show what it is through
which sacrifices are effective of things, and are suspended from the
Gods, the precedaneous causes of effects. If then we say that the
communion of similar powers, or the dissension of contraries, or a
certain aptitude of the agent to the patient in the universe, as in one
animal, every where possessing one and the same life, coexcites adapted
similars, pervading with invariable sameness according to one sympathy,
and existing most near in things most remote: if we should say this, we
should thus assert something of what is true, and which necessarily
accompanies sacrifices, yet we should not demonstrate the true mode of
their subsistence. For the essence of the Gods is not placed in nature
and in physical necessities, so as to be coexcited by physical passions,
or by the powers which extend through all nature; but independently of
these, it is defined by itself, having nothing in common with them,
neither according to essence, nor according to power, nor any thing
else.




                              CHAP. VIII.


The same absurdities likewise happen from assigning, as the causes of
what is effected by sacrifices, either certain numbers that are with us,
such, for instance, as assuming the number sixty in the crocodile,[97]
as adapted to the sun; or physical reasons, as the powers and energies
of animals, for instance, of the dog[98], the cynocephalus,[99] and the
weasel[100], these being common to the moon; or material forms, such as
are seen in sacred animals[101] according to the colours, and all the
forms of the body; or any thing else pertaining to the bodies of
animals, or of other things which are offered; or a certain member, as
the heart of a cock;[106] or other things of the like kind which are
surveyed about nature, if they are considered as the causes of the
efficacy in sacrifices. For from these things the Gods are not
demonstrated to be supernatural causes; nor, as such, to be excited by
sacrifices. But they are considered as physical causes detained by
matter, and as physically involved in bodies, and coexcited and becoming
quiescent together with them, these things also existing about nature.
If, therefore, any thing of this kind takes place in sacrifices, it
follows as a concause, and as having the relation of that without which
a thing is not effected; and thus it is suspended from precedaneous
causes.




                               CHAP. IX.


It is better, therefore, to assign as the cause of the efficacy of
sacrifices friendship and familiarity, and a habitude which binds
fabricators to the things fabricated, and generators to the things
generated. Hence when, this common principle preceding, we take a
certain animal, or any thing which germinates in the earth, and which
genuinely and purely preserves the will of its maker; then, through a
thing of this kind, we appropriately move the demiurgic cause, which
presides over it in an undefiled manner. But these causes being many,
and some, as the dæmoniacal causes, having a proximate arrangement; but
others, as divine causes, being arranged above these; and farther still,
one most ancient and venerable cause being the leader of these; all the
causes are moved in conjunction by a perfect sacrifice. Each thing,
likewise, is in a kindred manner adapted to the sacrifice, according to
the order which it is allotted. But if any sacrifice is imperfect, it
proceeds to a certain extent, but is not capable of proceeding any
further. Hence many are of opinion that sacrifices are to be offered to
good dæmons, many to the last powers of the Gods, and many to the
mundane or terrestrial powers of dæmons or Gods. These things,
therefore, as being a part of sacrifices, are not falsely asserted; but
they do not comprehend the whole of the power of sacrifice, and all the
goods it contains, which extend to every thing divine.




                                CHAP. X.


We, however, admit all these assertions; physical essences, indeed,
being coexcited as in one animal, according to aptitude or sympathy, as
in another respect being subjects, and following and being subservient
to the cause of the efficacy of sacrifices; but dæmons, and terrene or
mundane divine powers, being primarily familiarized to our order;
nevertheless, we must say, that the most perfect and leading cause of
the efficacy of sacrifices is to be conjoined to demiurgic and the most
perfect powers. But since these comprehend in themselves all the causes
of sacrifice, we say that all the effective causes of it are at once
coexcited together with these. And from all these a common utility is
imparted to the whole of generation; sometimes through cities and
people, or all various nations, or circumscriptions more or less
extended than these; but at other times through houses, or an
individual, these causes impart good with an unenvying and exuberant
will, unaccompanied with passion; conferring their benefits with an
impassive intellect, according to adaptation and alliance; one
friendship at the same time which connectedly contains all things,
producing this bond through a certain ineffable communion.

For these assertions are much more true, and more characteristic of the
essence and power of the Gods, than what you suspect to be the case,
viz. “_that the Gods are especially allured by the vapours produced in
the sacrifices of animals_.” For if dæmons are invested with a certain
body, which some think is nourished by sacrifices, yet this body is
immutable and impassive, luciform and unindigent; so that neither does
any thing flow from it, nor is it in want of any influx externally
introduced. And if some one should admit that there is this influx, yet
since the world and the air contained in it have a never failing
abundance of exhalations from terrene places, an efflux of this kind
being equally diffused on all sides, what use can there be of sacrifices
to dæmons? But neither do the influxions equally and commensurately fill
the place of the effluxions, so as that neither excess should at any
time predominate, nor deficiency be produced, but that there should be a
perfect equality and similitude of the bodies of dæmons, and this
invariably the same. For the Demiurgus of the universe has not provided
abundant nutriment, and which may be easily obtained, for all the
animals in the earth and the sea, but has made the beings superior to us
to be in want of it; nor has he imparted to other animals a native
abundance of what is daily requisite, but given to dæmons nutriment
which is adscititious and procured by us men; so that if we through
indolence, or some other pretext, should neglect an offering of this
kind, the bodies of dæmons would be in want of food, and would
participate of incommensuration and disorder. Why, therefore, do not the
authors of these assertions subvert the whole order of things, so as to
make us to be in a better and more powerful class of beings? For if we
supply dæmons with nutriment, we shall much more be the causes of their
existence. For every thing receives nutriment and perfection from that
by which it was generated. And this, indeed, may be seen in the visible
generations of things; but it may also be surveyed in the heavens and
the earth. For terrestrial are nourished by celestial natures. But this
becomes most eminently manifest in invisible causes. For soul indeed, is
perfected by intellect; but nature by soul. And other things are in a
similar manner nourished by their causes. If, therefore, it is
impossible that we should be the primordial causes of dæmons, it is, for
the same reason, impossible that we should be the causes of their
nutriment.




                               CHAP. XI.


It appears to me, also, that the present question errs in another
respect. For it is ignorant that the offering of sacrifices through fire
has the power of consuming and destroying the matter of them in a
greater degree; that it assimilates this matter to itself, but is not
itself assimilated to the matter; and that it elevates to divine,
celestial, and immaterial fire, but does not tend downwards to matter
and generation. For if the enjoyment of the vapours from matter allured
dæmons, it would be requisite that the matter should be pure and entire;
since thus there would be a more abundant efflux from it to its
participants. But now all the matter is enkindled and consumed, and is
changed into the purity and tenuity of fire; which is itself a clear
indication of the contrary to what you assert. For superior beings
[_i. e._ dæmons] are impassive, and they are delighted to amputate
matter through fire, and render us impassive. They likewise assimilate
whatever is in us to the Gods, in the same manner as fire[107]
assimilates all solid and resisting substances to luminous and
attenuated bodies. And they elevate us through sacrifices and the
sacrifice fire to the fire of the Gods, in the same manner as fire
elevates to fire, and draws upward gravitating and resisting substances
to divine and celestial natures.




                               CHAP. XII.


For, in short, the vehicle[108] which is subservient to dæmons neither
consists of matter, nor of the elements, nor of any other of the bodies
known to us. What perfect supply of food, therefore, can there be from
one essence to another [specifically different]? Or what enjoyment can
accede from foreign to foreign natures? There cannot be any. But much
more, as the Gods by the fire of lightning divide matter, and separate
from it things which are essentially immaterial, but which are
vanquished and bound by it, and render them impassive from being
passive; thus also the fire that is with us, imitating the energy of
divine fire, destroys every thing which is material in sacrifices,
purifies the things which are offered, liberates them from the bonds of
matter, and renders them, through purity of nature, adapted to the
communion of the Gods. It likewise liberates[109] us after the same
manner from the bonds of generation, assimilates us to the Gods, causes
us to be adapted to their friendship, and conducts our material nature
to an immaterial essence.




                              CHAP. XIII.


Subverting, therefore, in this manner the common absurd opinions
concerning sacrifices, we shall introduce in their place true
conceptions about them; omitting the particular discussion of each
species of sacrifice, which the peculiar and distinct consideration of
sacrifices requires, because this pertains to another inquiry, and
because, at the same time, every one who is intelligent may be able to
accomplish this from what has been already said, and from one thing may
extend his reasoning power to many, and may easily know what is omitted
from what has been discussed. And I, indeed, think that these things
have been sufficiently explained, both in other respects and because the
explanation pays attention in a becoming manner to the purity of the
Gods. Because, however, it may perhaps appear to others to be
incredible, and not sufficiently manifest, and the veracity of it may be
suspected, as not exciting the discursive energy of reason, I wish to
consider these things a little more fully; and, if possible, to add
arguments more evident than those which have been adduced.




                               CHAP. XIV.


We shall begin, however, the elucidation of this subject in the best
possible manner, if we demonstrate that the sacred law of sacrifices is
connected with the order of the Gods. In the first place, therefore, we
say, that of the Gods some are material, but others immaterial. And the
material, indeed, are those that comprehend matter in themselves, and
adorn it; but the immaterial are those that are perfectly exempt from,
and transcend, matter. But, according to the sacrific art, it is
requisite to begin sacred operations from the material Gods for the
ascent to the immaterial Gods will not otherwise be effected. The
material Gods, therefore, have a certain communion with matter, so far
as they preside over it. Hence they have dominion over things which
happen about matter, such as the division, percussion, repercussion,
mutation, generation, and corruption of all material bodies. He,
therefore, who wishes to worship these theurgically, in a manner adapted
to them, and to the dominion which they are allotted, should, as they
are material, employ a material mode of worship. For thus we shall be
wholly led to a familiarity with them, and worship them in an allied and
appropriate manner. Dead bodies, therefore, and things deprived of life,
the slaying of animals, and the consumption of victims, and, in short,
the mutation of the matter which is offered, pertain to these Gods, not
by themselves, but on account of the matter over which they preside. For
though they are in the most eminent degree separate from it, yet at the
same time they are present with it. And though they comprehend matter in
an immaterial power, yet they are coexistent with it. Things that are
governed, also, are not foreign from their governors; and things which
are subservient as instruments, are not unadapted to those that use
them. Hence, it is foreign to the immaterial Gods, to offer matter to
them through sacrifices, but this is most adapted to all the material
Gods.




                               CHAP. XV.


Let us then, in the next place, direct our attention to that which
accords with what has been before said, and with our twofold condition
of being. For there is a time when we become wholly soul, are out of the
body, and sublimely revolve on high, in conjunction with all the
immaterial Gods. And there is also a time when we are bound in the
testaceous body, are detained by matter, and are of a corporeal-formed
nature. Again, therefore, there will be a twofold mode of worship. For
one mode, indeed, will be simple, incorporeal, and pure from all
generation, and this mode pertains to undefiled souls. But the other is
filled with bodies, and every thing of a material nature, and is adapted
to souls which are neither pure nor liberated from all generation. We
must admit, therefore, that there are twofold species of sacrifices; one
kind, indeed, pertaining to men who are entirely purified, which, as
Heraclitus says, rarely happens to one man, or to a certain easily to be
numbered few of mankind; but the other kind, being material and
corporeal-formed, and consisting in mutation, is adapted to souls that
are still detained by the body. Hence, to cities and people not yet
liberated from genesiurgic fate and the impeding communion of bodies, if
such a mode of sacrifice as this latter is not permitted, they will
wander both from immaterial and material good. For they will not be able
to receive the former, and to the latter they will not offer what is
appropriate. At the same time, likewise, every one in sacrificing
performs the sacrifice with reference to what he is, and not with
reference to what he is not. It is not proper, therefore, that the
sacrifice should transcend the proper measure of him by whom it is
offered. The same thing will also be said by me concerning the connexion
which appropriately coadapts the men who worship and the powers that are
worshiped. For this connexion requires that a mode of worship should be
chosen adapted to itself; _viz._ an immaterial connexion, a mode of
worship immaterially mingled, and purely conjoining by pure incorporeal
powers, incorporeal natures to themselves; but a corporeal-formed
connexion, a corporeal-formed mode which depends on bodies, and is
mingled with the essences that preside over bodies.




                               CHAP. XVI.


Farther still, therefore, we must not disdain to add what follows; that
we frequently perform something to the Gods who are the inspective
guardians of body, and to good dæmons, for the sake of the necessary use
of the body; as, for instance, when [by sacrifices] we purify it from
ancient stains, or liberate it from diseases, and fill it with health,
or remove from it heaviness and torpor, or procure for it any other
good. In this case, therefore, we evidently must not busy ourselves with
the body in an intellectual and incorporeal manner. For the body is not
adapted to participate of modes of this kind; but, obtaining things
which are allied to itself, it is meliorated and purified by bodies. The
rites of sacrifices, therefore, will necessarily, for a purpose of this
kind, be corporeal-formed; partly cutting off what is superfluous in us;
partly supplying us with that of which we are in want; and partly
leading into symmetry and order such things in us as are immoderately
disturbed. We also frequently engage in sacred operations, entreating
superior beings to grant us such things as are adapted to the wants of
human life. And these are such as preserve the body in health, or
pertain to those things which we procure for the sake of the body.




                              CHAP. XVII.


What, therefore, shall we derive from the Gods who are entirely exempt
from all human generation, with respect to sterility, or abundance or
any thing else pertaining to [the mortal] life? Nothing whatever. For it
is not the province of those who are liberated from all things to meddle
with gifts of this kind. But if some one should say that the perfectly
immaterial comprehend in themselves the material Gods, and that through
this they also contain in themselves their gifts according to one first
cause; such a one will also say, that in consequence of this an
abundance of divine gifts descend from the immaterial Gods. It must not,
however, be granted to any one to say that the immaterial Gods bestow
these gifts by proximately interfering with the actions of human life.
For such an administration of our affairs is partible, is accomplished
with a certain conversion [to the subjects of its care], is not entirely
separate from bodies, and is incapable of receiving a pure and undefiled
domination. Will not, therefore, that mode of sacrifice in works of this
kind be most appropriate which is mingled with bodies, and adheres to
generation; and not that which is entirely immaterial and incorporeal?
For the _pure_ mode of sacrifice is perfectly transcendent and
incommensurate [with our concerns]. But the mode which employs bodies,
and the powers that subsist through bodies, is in the most eminent
degree allied to human affairs. It is also capable of producing a
certain prosperous condition of things, and of imparting symmetry and
temperament to the mortal race.




                              CHAP. XVIII.


According to another division, therefore, the numerous herd [or the
great mass] of men is arranged under nature, is governed by physical
powers, looks downward to the works of nature, gives completion to the
administration of Fate, and to things pertaining to Fate, because it
belongs to the order of it, and always employs practical reasoning about
such particulars alone as subsist according to nature. But there are a
certain few who, by employing a certain supernatural power of intellect,
are removed indeed from nature, but are conducted to a separate and
unmingled intellect; and these, at the same time, become superior to
physical powers. Others again, who are the media between these, tend to
things which subsist between nature and a pure intellect. And of these,
some indeed equally follow both nature and an immaculate intellect;
others embrace a life which is mingled from both; and others are
liberated from things subordinate, and betake themselves to such as are
more excellent.

This division, therefore, being made, that which follows will most
manifestly take place. For those who are governed by the nature of the
universe, who lived conformably to this, and employ the powers of
nature, these should embrace a mode of worship adapted to nature, and to
the bodies that are moved by nature, and should choose for this purpose
appropriate places, air, matter, the powers of matter, bodies, and the
habits of bodies, qualities, and proper motions, the mutations of things
in generation, and other things connected with these, both in other
parts of piety and in that part of it which pertains to sacrifice. But
those who live conformably to intellect alone, and to the life of
intellect, and are liberated from the bonds of nature, these should
exercise in all the parts of theurgy the intellectual and incorporeal
mode of worship. And those who are the media between these, should
labour differently in the paths of piety, conformably to the differences
of this middle condition of life, either by embracing both modes of
piety, or separating themselves from one of the modes [and adhering to
the other], or receiving both these modes as the foundation of things of
a more honourable nature. For without these they never can arrive at
things supereminent. Or, in some other way, they should thus, in a
becoming manner, labour in the paths of sanctity.




                               CHAP. XIX.


On this subject, however, there is also the following division. Of
divine essences and powers some have [a genesiurgic] soul and nature
subject and ministrant to their fabrications, whenever they wish to use
them. But others are entirely separate from soul and nature, I mean from
a divine, and not only from a mundane and genesiurgic soul and
nature.[110] And others are the media[111] between these, and afford to
the extremes a communion with each other, either according to an
exuberant participation of greater good, or according to an unimpeded
reception of less good, or according to a concord which binds together
both the extremes. When, therefore, we worship the Gods who reign over
soul and nature, it is not foreign to these to offer to them physical
powers, and bodies which are governed by nature. For all the works of
nature are subservient to them, and contribute to their government. But
when we undertake to honour those Gods who are essentially uniform, then
it is requisite to venerate them with liberated honours. Hence,
intellectual gifts are adapted to these, and things which pertain to an
incorporeal life, together with the fruits of virtue and wisdom, and
whatever perfect and total goods of the soul there may be. Moreover, to
the Gods who subsist as media, and who are the leaders of goods of a
middle nature, sometimes twofold gifts will be adapted, and sometimes
such as have a communication with both these; or such as are separated
from inferiors, and pertain to more elevated natures; or, in short, such
as in one of the modes give completion to the medium.




                               CHAP. XX.


Being impelled, therefore, from another principle, _viz._ from the world
and the mundane Gods, from the arrangement of the four elements in the
world, and the association of the elements according to [appropriate]
measures, and also from the orderly circulation of bodies about centres,
we shall have an easy ascent to the truth of the piety respecting
sacrifices. For if we are in the world, are contained as parts in the
universe, are primarily produced by it, and perfected by the total
powers that are in it, and if we consist of its elements, and receive
from it a certain portion of life and nature; if this be the case, it is
not proper to pass beyond the world and the mundane orders. We must
admit, therefore, that in each part of the world there is this visible
body, and that there are also incorporeal powers, which are divided
about bodies. Hence the law of religion distributes similars to
similars, and thus extends from on high, through wholes, as far as to
the last of things; assigning, indeed, incorporeals to incorporeals, but
bodies to bodies, and this commensurately to the nature of each. If,
however, some theurgist should participate of the supermundane Gods,
which is the rarest of all things, he, indeed, in the worship of the
Gods will transcend both bodies and matter; being united to the Gods by
a supermundane power. But that which happens to one person with
difficulty and late, and at the end of the sacerdotal office, ought not
to be promulgated as common to all men; nor ought it to be made a thing
common to those who are commencing theurgic operations, nor to those who
have made a middle proficiency in it. For these, after a manner, pay a
corporeal-formed attention to sanctity.




                               CHAP. XXI.


I think, therefore, that all who are lovers of the contemplation of
theurgic truth will acknowledge this, that the piety which pertains to
divine natures ought not to be exercised towards them partially or
imperfectly. Hence, since prior to the appearance of the Gods, all
such powers as are presubjacent to them are moved, and when the Gods
are about to descend to the earth, precede them as in a solemn
procession;[112] he who does not distribute to all these powers that
which is adapted to them, and does not honour each in an appropriate
manner, will depart imperfect, and destitute of the participation of
the Gods. But he who propitiates all of them, and offers to each
acceptable gifts, and such as are to the utmost of his power adapted
to them, will always remain secure and irreprehensible, giving
completion in a proper manner to the perfect and entire receptacle of
the divine choir. Since this, therefore, is the case, whether is it
necessary that the mode of sanctity should be simple, and consist of a
certain few things, or that it should be multiform and all-harmonic,
and mingled, as I may say, from every thing contained in the world?
If, indeed, the power which is invoked, and is excited in the
performance of sacred rites, was simple, the mode of sacrifice should
necessarily be simple. But if the multitude of powers which are
excited when the Gods descend and are moved, is not to be comprehended
by any one, except theurgists alone, who accurately know this through
experience in sacred operations; if this be the case, they alone are
capable of knowing what the perfection is of the sacrific art; and
they also know that the omission, though of a few things, subverts the
whole work of religion; just as in harmony, from the bursting of one
chord, the whole becomes dissonant and incommensurate.[113] As,
therefore, in the visible descents of the Gods, a manifest injury is
sustained by those who leave some one of the more excellent genera
unhonoured,[114] thus also in the invisible appearances of the Gods in
sacrifices, it is not proper to honour one of them, and not honour
another, but it is entirely requisite to honour each of them according
to the order which he is allotted. But he who leaves some one of them
unhonoured, confounds the whole work of piety, and divulses the one
and whole orderly distribution of it; not, in so doing, as some one
may think, imperfectly receiving the Gods, but entirely subverting all
the ceremonies of religion.




                              CHAP. XXII.


What then [it may be said], does not the summit of the sacrific art
recur to the most principal one of the whole multitude of Gods, and at
one and the same time worship the many essences and principles that are
[rooted and concentred] in it? Entirely so, but this happens at the
latest period, and to a very few, and we must be satisfied if it takes
place when the sun of life is setting. Our present discussion, however,
does not ordain laws for a man of this kind; for he is superior to all
law;[115] but it promulgates a law such as that of which we are now
speaking, to those who are in want of a certain divine legislation.[116]
It says, therefore, that as the world has one coarrangement from many
orders, thus also it is necessary that the consummation of sacrifices,
being never failing and entire, should be conjoined to the whole order
of more excellent natures. If, however, the world is multiform, and all
perfect, and is united from many orders, it is also necessary that
sacred operations should imitate its omniform variety through the whole
of the powers which they employ. Hence, in a similar manner, since the
things which surround us are all-various, it is not fit that we should
be connected with the divine causes that preside over them, from a
certain part which they contain. Nor is it proper that we should ascend
imperfectly to the primordial causes of them.




                              CHAP. XXIII.


The various mode, therefore, of sanctity in sacred operations partly
purifies and partly perfects some one of the things that are in us or
about us. And some things, indeed, it restores to symmetry and order;
but others it liberates from mortal-formed error. But it renders all
things familiar and friendly to all the natures that are superior to us.
Moreover, when divine causes, and human preparations which are
assimilated to them conspire in one and the same, then the perfection of
sacred operations imparts all the perfect and great benefits of
sacrifice. It will not be amiss, also, to add such particulars as the
following, in order to the accurate comprehension of these things. An
exuberance of power is always present with the highest causes, and at
the same time that this power transcends all things, it is equally
present with all with unimpeded energy. Hence, conformably to this, the
first illuminate the last of things, and immaterial are present with
material natures immaterially. Nor should it be considered by any one as
wonderful, if we say that there is a certain pure and divine
matter.[117] For matter being generated by the father and demiurgus of
wholes, receives a perfection adapted to itself, in order to its
becoming the receptacle of the Gods. At the same time nothing prevents
more excellent beings from being able to impart their light to
subordinate natures. Neither, therefore, is matter separated from the
participation of better causes; so that such matter as is perfect, pure,
and boniform, is not unadapted to the reception of the Gods. For, since
it is requisite that terrestrial natures should by no means be destitute
of divine communion, the earth also receives a certain divine portion
from it, sufficient for the participation of the Gods. The theurgic art,
therefore, perceiving this to be the case, and thus having discovered in
common, appropriate receptacles, conformably to the peculiarity of each
of the Gods, it frequently connects together stones, herbs, animals,
aromatics, and other sacred, perfect, and deiform substances of the like
kind; and afterwards, from all these, it produces an entire and pure
receptacle. For it is not proper to despise all matter, but that alone
which is foreign from the Gods. But that matter is to be chosen which is
adapted to them, as being able to accord with the edifices of the Gods,
the dedication of statues, and the sacred operations of sacrifices. For
no otherwise can a participation of superior beings be obtained by
places in the earth, or by men that dwell in it, unless a foundation of
this kind is first established. _It is also requisite to be persuaded by
arcane assertions, that a certain matter is imparted by the Gods,
through blessed visions._ This matter, therefore, is doubtless
connascent with those by whom it is imparted. Hence, does it not follow
that the sacrifice of a matter of this kind excites the Gods to present
themselves to the view, immediately calls forth the participation of
them, receives them when they accede, and perfectly unfolds them into
light?




                              CHAP. XXIV.


The same things also may be learned from the distribution of the Gods
according to places; and from this, and the partible dominion over each
particular thing, it may be seen how many allotments, greater or less,
superior beings are assigned according to their different orders. For it
is evident, that to the Gods who preside over certain places, the things
produced by them are most appropriately offered in sacrifice; and that
what pertains to the governed is most adapted to be sacrificed to the
governors. For always to makers their own works are particularly
grateful; and to those who primarily produce certain things, such things
are primarily acceptable. Whether, therefore, certain animals, or
plants, or any other productions of the earth, are governed by superior
beings, at one and the same time, they participate of their inspective
care, and impart to us an indivisible communion with the Gods. Some
things, therefore, of this kind, if they are carefully preserved,
increase the familiarity of those that retain them with the Gods; and
these are such as by remaining entire, preserve the communion between
Gods and men. Of this kind are some of the animals in Egypt, and man,
who is everywhere sacred. But some things, when consecrated, produce a
more manifest familiarity; and these are such as by an analysis into the
principle of the first elements, effect an alliance more sacredly
adapted to superior causes. For the more perfect this alliance is, the
more perfect always is the good which is imparted by it.




                               CHAP. XXV.


If, therefore, these things were human customs alone, and derived their
authority through our legal institutions, it might be said that the
worship of the Gods was the invention of our conceptions. Now, however,
divinity is the leader of it, who is thus invoked by sacrifices, and who
is surrounded by a numerous multitude of Gods and angels. Under him,
likewise, a certain common presiding power, is allotted dominion
according to each nation of the earth. And a peculiar presiding power is
allotted to each temple. Of the sacrifices, also, which are performed to
the Gods, the inspective guardian is a God; but an angel, of those which
are performed to angels; and a dæmon, of such as are performed to
dæmons. After the same manner, also, in other sacred operations, the
presiding power is allotted dominion over each, in a way allied to his
proper genus. When, therefore, we offer sacrifices to the Gods,
accompanied by the presiding Gods, who give completion to sacred
operations, then at the same time, it is necessary in sacrifices to
venerate the sacred law of divine sanctity; and at the same time, also,
we ought to be confident, as sacrificing under the Gods who are the
rulers of such works. We ought, likewise, to be very cautious, lest we
should offer any gift unworthy of, or foreign from, the Gods. And, as
the last admonition, we should in a manner entirely perfect, pay
attention to all that surrounds us, and to the Gods, angels, and dæmons
that are distributed according to genera in the universe. And to all
these, in a similar manner, an acceptable sacrifice should be offered;
for thus alone sanctity can be preserved in a way worthy of the Gods who
preside over it.




                              CHAP. XXVI.


Since, however, prayers are not the smallest [but on the contrary a very
great] part of sacrifices, especially give completion to them, and
through these the whole operation of them is corroborated and effected;
and since, besides this, they afford a common utility to religion, and
produce an indissoluble and sacred communion with the Gods, it will not
be improper to discuss a few particulars concerning prayer. For this is
of itself a thing worthy to be known, and renders more perfect the
science concerning the Gods. I say, therefore, that the _first_ species
of prayer is _collective_; and that it is also the leader of contact
with, and a knowledge of, divinity. The _second_ species _is the bond of
concordant communion_, calling forth, prior to the energy of speech, the
gifts imparted by the Gods, and perfecting the whole of our operations
prior to our intellectual conceptions. And the third and most perfect
species of prayer is _the seal of ineffable union with the divinities_,
in whom it establishes all the power and authority of prayer; and thus
causes the soul to repose in the Gods, as in a never failing port. But
from these three terms, in which all the divine measures are contained,
suppliant adoration not only conciliates to us the friendship of the
Gods, but supernally extends to us three fruits, being as it were three
Hesperian apples of gold.[118] The _first_ of these pertains to
_illumination_; the _second_, to _a communion of operation_; but through
the energy of the _third_, we receive _a perfect plenitude of divine
fire_. And sometimes, indeed, supplication _precedes_; like a precursor
preparing the way before the sacrifice appears. But some times it
_intercedes as a mediator_; and sometimes _accomplishes the end of
sacrificing_. No operation, however, in sacred concerns, can succeed
without the intervention of prayer. Lastly, the continual exercise of
prayer nourishes the vigour of our intellect, and renders the
receptacles of the soul far more capacious for the communications of the
Gods. It likewise is the _divine key_, which opens to men the penetralia
of the Gods; accustoms us to the splendid rivers of supernal light; in a
short time perfects our inmost recesses, and disposes them for the
ineffable embrace and contact of the Gods; and does not desist till it
raises us to the summit of all. It also gradually and silently draws
upward the manners of our soul, by divesting them of every thing foreign
to a divine nature, and clothes us with the perfections of the Gods.
Besides this, it produces an indissoluble communion and friendship with
divinity, nourishes a divine love, and inflames the divine part of the
soul. Whatever is of an opposing and contrary nature in the soul, it
expiates and purifies; expels whatever is prone to generation, and
retains any thing of the dregs of mortality in its etherial and splendid
spirit; perfects a good hope and faith concerning the reception of
divine light; and, in one word, renders those by whom it is employed the
familiars and domestics of the Gods. If such, then, are the advantages
of prayer, and such its connexion with sacrifice, does it not appear
from hence that the end of sacrifice is a conjunction with the Demiurgus
of the world? And the benefit of prayer is of the same extent with the
good which is conferred by the demiurgic causes on the race of mortals.
Again, from hence the _anagogic_, _perfective_, and _replenishing_ power
of prayer appears; likewise how it becomes efficacious and unific; and
how it possesses a common bond imparted by the Gods. And, in the third
and last place, it may easily be conceived from hence how prayer and
sacrifice mutually corroborate and confer on each other a sacred and
perfect power in divine concerns.

Hence, since it appears that there is a perfect conspiration and
cooperation of the sacerdotal discipline with itself, and that the parts
of it are more connascent than those of any animal, being entirely
conjoined through one connexion; this being the case, it is not by any
means proper to neglect this concord, nor to admit some of its parts and
reject others; but it is fit that all of them should be exercised in a
similar manner, and that those should be perfected through all of them
who wish to be genuinely conjoined to the Gods. These things therefore,
cannot subsist otherwise.




                              SECTION VI.




                                CHAP. I.


It is now, however, time for me to pass on to the next doubt which you
propose, viz. “_Why it is requisite that the inspector [who presides
over sacred rites] ought not to touch a dead body, though most sacred
operations are performed through dead bodies?_” Again, therefore, that
we may dissolve this doubt, we shall direct our attention to this
apparent opposition; for there is not in reality any, but these things
_alone seem_ to subsist contrarily. For if the laws of sacred rites
ordered that the same dead bodies should not be touched and should be
touched, this would be a thing contrary to itself. But if they order
that some dead bodies should be abstained from as impure, but that
others which are consecrated should be touched, this is not attended
with any contrariety. Farther still, it is not lawful to touch human
bodies when the soul has left them, since a certain vestige, image, or
representation of divine life is extinguished in the body by death. But
it is no longer unholy to touch other dead bodies, because they did not
[when living] participate of a more divine life. To other Gods,
therefore, who are pure from matter, our not touching dead bodies is
adapted; but to those Gods who preside over animals, and are proximately
connected with them, invocation through animals is properly made.
According to this, therefore, no contrariety takes place.




                               CHAP. II.


After another manner, also, this doubt may be dissolved. For in men,
indeed, who are detained in matter, bodies deprived of life produce a
certain stain; because that which is not alive inserts a certain
defilement in that which is living, in the same manner as the impure in
that which is pure, and that which is in privation in that which is in
habit; and also because that which is dead produces a certain pollution,
through a physical aptitude to a worse condition, in consequence of
having possessed the power of dying. But a dead body cannot produce any
defilement in a dæmon who is perfectly incorporeal, and does not receive
any corruption. For it is necessary that he should transcend a
corruptible body, and not participate of any representation of
corruption from it. And thus much in answer to the contrariety of the
doubt.




                               CHAP. III.


In the next place we shall explain how divination is effected through
sacred animals, such, for instance, as hawks. We must never say,
therefore, that the Gods accede through bodies that are thus procured,
being employed. For they do not preside over animals, either partibly,
or proximately, or materially, or with a certain habitude towards them.
But to dæmons and these such as are very much divided, to different
orders of whom different animals are allotted, and who proximately
exercise a government of this kind, and do not obtain their proper
dominion in a way perfectly independent and immaterial, such a contact
with the organs of divination must be ascribed. Or, if some one is
willing so to admit, a seat must be attributed to them, through which we
may be able to associate with and employ them. It is necessary,
therefore, to think that this seat should be pure from bodies. For there
can be no communion whatever between the pure and its contrary; but it
is reasonable to admit that this seat is conjoined with men, through the
soul of animals. For this soul has a certain alliance to men, through
homogeneity of life; but it is allied to dæmons, because, being
liberated from body, it has in a certain respect a separate subsistence.
Hence, being a medium between both, it is subservient to its presiding
dæmon, but announces to those who are yet detained in body that which
its prefect commands. And it imparts to both these a common bond with
each other.




                               CHAP. IV.


It is necessary, however, to think that the soul which uses divination
of this kind, not only becomes an auditor of the prediction, but also
contributes in no small degree from itself to the consummation of it,
and of what pertains to its operations. For this soul is coexcited and
cooperates, and at the same time foreknows, through a certain necessary
sympathy. Such a mode, therefore, of divination as this is entirely
different from the divine and true mode, being alone able to predict
respecting small and diurnal concerns, _viz._ respecting such as being
placed in a divided nature, are borne along about generation, and which
impart motions from themselves to those things that are able to receive
them, and produce multiform passions in things which are naturally
adapted to be copassive. Perfect foreknowledge, however, can never be
effected through passion. For that which is itself especially immutable,
immaterial, and entirely pure, is accustomed to apprehend the future;
but that which is mingled with the most irrational and dark nature of a
corporeal-formed and material essence is filled with abundant ignorance.
An artificial apparatus, therefore, of this kind does not deserve to be
called divination; nor is it proper to bestow much attention upon it,
nor to believe in any other person who uses it, as if it possessed in
itself a certain clear and known indication of truth. And thus much
concerning divination of this kind.




                                CHAP. V.


Let us, therefore, now discuss another species of doubts, the cause of
which is occult, and which, as you say, is accompanied with “_violent
threats_.” But it is variously divided about the multitude of threats.
“_For it threatens either to burst the heavens, or to unfold the secrets
of Isis, or to point out the arcanum in the adytum,[119] or to stop
Baris, or to scatter the members of Osiris to Typhon, or to do something
else of the like kind._” Men do not, however, as you think, threaten by
such words as these the sun or the moon, or any of the celestial Gods;
for if they did, more dire absurdities would ensue than those which you
lament. But, as we before observed, there is a certain genus of powers
in the world which is partible, inconsiderate, and most irrational, and
which receives reason from another, and is obedient to it; neither
itself employing a proper intelligence, nor distinguishing what is true
and false, or what is possible or impossible. A genus, therefore, of
this kind, when threatenings are extended, is immediately coexcited and
astonished, because, as it appears to me, it is naturally adapted to be
led by representations, and to allure other things, through an astounded
and unstable phantasy.




                               CHAP. VI.


These things also admit of another explanation of the following kind.
The theurgist, through the power of arcane signatures, commands mundane
natures, no longer as man, nor as employing a human soul; but as
existing superior to them in the order of the Gods, he makes use of
greater mandates than pertain to himself, so far as he is human. This,
however, does not take place as if he effected every thing which he
vehemently threatens to accomplish; but he teaches us by such a use of
words the magnitude and quality of the power which he possesses through
a union with the Gods, and which he obtains from the knowledge of arcane
symbols. This, likewise, may be said, that the dæmons who are
distributed according to parts, and who guard the parts of the universe,
pay so much attention to the parts over which they preside, that they
cannot endure a word contrary [to the safety of these], but they
preserve the permanency of mundane natures immutable. They preserve this
permanency, therefore, in an unchanged condition, because the order of
the Gods remains invariably the same. Hence they cannot endure even to
hear that threatened in which the aerial and terrestrial dæmons have
their existence.




                               CHAP. VII.


Or this thing may likewise be explained as follows: Dæmons preside with
a guardian power over arcane mysteries, and this in so remarkable a
degree, because the orderly distribution of things in the universe is
primarily contained in dæmons. For the parts of the universe remain in
order, because the beneficent power of Osiris continues sacred and
undefiled, and is not mingled with any opposing error and perturbation.
The life of all things likewise remains pure and incorruptible, because
the occult vivific beauties of the productive principles in Isis do not
descend into body which is born along,[120] and is the object of sight.
But all things continue immoveable and perpetual, because the course of
the sun is never stopped. And all things remain perfect and entire,
because the arcana in the adytum[121] are never disclosed. Hence, in
those particulars in which the whole of things possesses its safety, I
mean in arcana being always preserved occult, and in the ineffable
essence of the Gods, never receiving a contrary condition; in these,
terrestrial dæmons cannot endure, even in words, to hear that they
subsist otherwise than they do, or that they become profaned; and on
this account threatening language has a certain power when employed
against them. No one, however, threatens the Gods, nor is such a mode of
invocation addressed to them. Hence with the Chaldeans, by whom words
used to the Gods alone are preserved distinct and pure, no threats are
employed. But the Egyptians, mingling dæmoniacal words with divine
signatures, sometimes employ threats. You have, therefore, an answer to
these doubts, concise indeed, but I think sufficiently free from error.




                              SECTION VII.




                                CHAP. I.


The doubts also that follow in the next place require for their solution
the assistance of the same divinely-wise Muse. But I am desirous,
previous to this, to unfold to you the peculiarity of the theology of
the Egyptians. For they, imitating the nature of the universe, and the
fabricative energy of the Gods, exhibit certain images through symbols
of mystic, occult, and invisible intellections; just as nature, after a
certain manner, expresses invisible reasons [or productive powers]
through visible forms. But the fabricative energy of the Gods delineates
the truth of forms, through visible images. Hence the Egyptians,
perceiving that all superior natures rejoice in the similitude to them
of inferior beings, and thus wishing to fill the latter with good,
through the greatest possible imitation of the former, very properly
exhibit a mode of theologizing adapted to the mystic doctrine concealed
in the symbols.




                               CHAP. II.


Hear, therefore, the intellectual interpretation of symbols, according
to the conceptions of the Egyptians; at the same time removing from your
imagination and your ears the image of things symbolical, but elevating
yourself to intellectual truth. By “_mire_,” therefore, understand every
thing corporeal-formed and material; or that which is nutritive and
prolific; or such as the material species of nature is, which is borne
along in conjunction with the unstable flux of matter; or a thing of
such a kind as that which the river of generation receives, and which
subsides together with it; or the primordial cause of the elements, and
of all the powers distributed about the elements, and which must be
antecedently conceived to exist analogous to a foundation. Being,
therefore, a thing of this kind, the God who is the cause of generation,
of all nature, and of all the powers in the elements, as transcending
these, and as being immaterial, incorporeal, and supernatural,
unbegotten and impartible, wholly derived from himself, and concealed in
himself,—this God precedes all things, and comprehends all things in
himself. And because, indeed, he comprehends all things, and imparts
himself to all mundane natures, he is from these unfolded into light.
Because, however, he transcends all things, and is by himself expanded
above them, on this account he presents himself to the view as separate,
exempt, elevated, and expanded by himself above the powers and elements
in the world. The following symbol, likewise, testifies the truth of
this. For by the God “_sitting above the lotus_,” a transcendency and
strength which by no means come into contact with the mire, are
obscurely signified, and also indicate his intellectual and empyrean
empire. For every thing belonging to the lotus is seen to be circular,
_viz._ both the form of the leaves and the fruit; and circulation is
alone allied to the motion of intellect, which energizes with invariable
sameness, in one order, and according to one reason. But the God is
established by himself, and above a dominion and energy of this kind,
venerable and holy, superexpanded, and abiding in himself, which his
being seated is intended to signify. When the God, also, is represented
as “_sailing in a ship_,”[122] it exhibits to us the power which governs
the world. As, therefore, the pilot being separate from the ship
presides over the rudder of it, thus the sun having a separate
subsistence, governs the helm of the whole world. And as the pilot
directs all things from the stem, giving from himself a small principle
of motion to the vessel; thus, also, by a much greater priority, the God
indivisibly imparts supernally from the first principles of nature, the
primordial causes of motions. These particulars, therefore, and still
more than these, are indicated by the God sailing in a ship.




                               CHAP. III.


Since, however, every part of the heavens, every sign of the
zodiac,[123] all the motion of the heavens, every period of time
according to which the world is moved, and all things contained in the
wholes of the universe, receive the powers which descend from the sun,
some of which are complicated with these wholes, but others transcend a
commixture with them, the symbolical mode of signification represents
these also, indicating “_that the sun is diversified according to the
signs of the zodiac, and that every hour he changes his form_.” At the
same time, also, it indicates his immutable, stable, never failing, and
at once collected communication of good to the whole world. But since
the recipients of the impartible gift of the God are variously affected
towards it, and receive multiform powers, from the sun, according to
their peculiar motions, hence the symbolical doctrine evinces through
the multitude of the gifts, that the God is one, and exhibits his one
power through multiform powers. Hence, likewise, it says that he is one
and the same, but that the vicissitudes of his form, and his
configurations, must be admitted to exist in the recipients. On this
account it asserts “that he is changed every hour, according to the
signs of the zodiac,” in consequence of these being variously changed
about the God, according to the many modes by which they receive him.
The Egyptians use prayers to the sun, conformable to these assertions,
not only in visions which are seen by the bodily eyes, but also in their
more common supplications, all which have such a meaning as this, and
are offered to the God conformably to a symbolic and mystic doctrine of
this kind. Hence it would not be reasonable in any one to undertake a
defence of them.




                               CHAP. IV.


But the inquiries which follow in the next place, require a more
abundant doctrine, in order to their elucidation. At the same time,
however, it is necessary to discuss the truth concerning them with
brevity. For you inquire “_what efficacy there is in names that are not
significant_.”[124] They are not, however, as you think, without
signification; but let them be indeed unknown to us (though some of them
are known to us, the explications of which we receive from the Gods),
yet to the Gods all of them are significant, though not according to an
effable mode; nor in such a way as that which is significant and
indicative with men through imaginations; but either intellectually,
conformably to the divine intellect which is in us; or ineffably, and in
a way more excellent and simple, and conformably to the intellect which
is united to the Gods. It is requisite, therefore, to take away all
conceptions derived by an abstraction from sensibles, and all logical
evolutions from divine names;[125] and likewise the connascent physical
similitudes of language to things which exist in nature. But the
intellectual and divine symbolical character of divine similitude must
be admitted to have a subsistence in names. And, moreover, though it
should be unknown to us, yet this very circumstance is that which is
most venerable in it, for it is too excellent to be divided into
knowledge. But in those names which we can, scientifically analyze,[126]
we possess a knowledge of the whole divine essence, power, and order,
comprehended in the name. And farther still, we preserve in the soul
collectively the mystic and arcane image of the Gods, and through this
we elevate the soul to the Gods, and when elevated conjoin it as much as
possible with them. But you ask, “_Why, of significant names, we prefer
such as are Barbaric to our own?_” Of this, also, there is a mystic
reason. For because the Gods have shown that the whole dialect of sacred
nations such as those of the Egyptians and Assyrians, is adapted to
sacred concerns; on this account we ought to think it necessary that our
conference with the Gods should be in a language allied to them.
Because, likewise, such a mode of speech is the first and most ancient.
And especially because those who first learned the names of the Gods,
having mingled them with their own proper tongue, delivered them to us,
that we might always preserve immoveable the sacred law of tradition, in
a language peculiar and adapted to them. For if any other thing pertains
to the Gods, it is evident that the eternal and immutable must be allied
to them.




                                CHAP. V.


You object, however, “_that he who hears words looks to their
signification, so that it is sufficient the conception remains the same,
whatever the words may be that are used_.” But the thing is not such as
you suspect it to be. For if names subsisted through compact[127] it
would be of no consequence whether some were used instead of others. But
if they are suspended from the nature of things, those names which are
more adapted to it will also be more dear to the Gods. From this,
therefore, it is evident that the language of sacred nations is very
reasonably preferred to that of other men. To which may be added, that
names do not entirely preserve the same meaning when translated into
another language; but there are certain idioms in each nation which
cannot be signified by language to another nation. And, in the next
place, though it should be possible to translate them, yet they no
longer preserve the same power when translated. Barbarous names,
likewise, have much emphasis, great conciseness, and participate of less
ambiguity, variety, and multitude. Hence, on all these accounts, they
are adapted to more excellent natures. Take away, therefore, entirely
those suspicions of yours which fall off from the truth, viz. “_if he
who is invoked is either an Egyptian or uses the Egyptian language_.”
But rather think that as the Egyptians were the first of men[128] who
were allotted the participation of the Gods, the Gods when invoked
rejoice in the Egyptian rites. Again, however, if all these were the
fraudulent devices of enchanters, how is it possible that things which
are in the most eminent degree united to the Gods, which also conjoin us
with them, and have powers all but equal to those of superior beings,
should be phantastic devices, though without them no sacred operation
can be effected? But neither “_do these veils [by which arcana are
concealed] originate from our passions, which rumour ascribes to a
divine nature_.” For beginning, not from our passions, but, on the
contrary, from things allied to the Gods, we make use of words adapted
to them. “_Nor do we frame conceptions of a divine nature, contrary to
its real mode of subsistence._” But conformably to the nature which it
possesses, and to the truth concerning it, which those obtained who
first established the laws of sacred religion, we persevere in our
conceptions of divinity. _For if any thing else in religious legal
institutions is adapted to the Gods, this must certainly be
immutability. And it is necessary that ancient prayers,[129] like sacred
asyla, should be preserved invariably the same, neither taking any thing
from them, nor adding any thing to them which is elsewhere derived._ For
this is nearly the cause at present that both names and prayers have
lost their efficacy, because they are continually changed through the
innovation and illegality of the Greeks. For the Greeks are naturally
studious of novelty, and are carried about every where by their
volatility; neither possessing any stability themselves, nor preserving
what they have received from others; but rapidly relinquishing this,
they transform every thing through an unstable desire of discovering
something new. But the Barbarians are stable in their manners, and
firmly continue to employ the same words. Hence they are dear to the
Gods, and proffer words which are grateful to them; but which it is not
lawful for any man by any means to change. And thus much we have said in
answer to you concerning names, which though they are inexplicable, and
are called Barbaric, yet are adapted to sacred concerns.




                             SECTION VIII.




                                CHAP. I.


Leaving, therefore, these particulars, you wish in the next place that I
would unfold to you “_What the Egyptians conceive the first cause to be;
whether intellect, or above intellect; whether alone, or subsisting with
some other or others; whether incorporeal, of corporeal; and whether it
is the same with the Demiurgus, or is prior to the Demiurgus? Likewise,
whether all things are from one principle, or from many principles;
whether they have a knowledge of matter, or of primary corporeal
qualities; and whether they admit matter to be unbegotten, or to be
generated?_” I, therefore, will in the first place relate to you the
cause why in the books of the ancient writers of sacred concerns many
and various opinions concerning these things are circulated, and also
why among those that are still living, and are renowned for their
wisdom, the opinion on this subject is not simple and one. I say then,
that as there are many essences, and these differing from each other,
the all-various multitude of the principles of these, and which have
different orders, were delivered by different ancient priests. As
Seleucus[130] narrates, therefore, Hermes described the principles that
rank as wholes in two myriads[131] of books; or, as we are informed by
Manetho[132], he perfectly unfolded these principles in three myriads
six thousand five hundred and twenty five volumes. But different ancient
writers differently explained the partial principles of essences. It is
necessary, however, by investigation to discover the truth about all
these principles, and concisely to unfold it to you as much as possible.
And, in the first place, hear concerning that which is the first subject
of your inquiry.




                               CHAP. II.


Prior to truly existing beings and total principles [or principles that
rank as wholes], there is one God, prior to [that deity who is generally
believed to be] the first God and king,[133] immoveable, and abiding in
the solitude of his own unity. For neither is the intelligible connected
with him, nor any thing else; but he is established as the paradigm of
the God who is the father of himself, is self begotten, is father alone,
and is truly good. For he is something even greater and prior to this,
is the fountain of all things, and the root of the first intelligible
forms. But from this one deity, the God who is sufficient to himself
unfolds himself, into light. For this divinity, also, is the principle
and God of Gods, a monad from _the one_, prior to essence, and the
principle of essence. For from him entity and essence are derived; and
hence, also, he is denominated the principle of intelligibles. These,
therefore, are the most ancient principles of all things, which Hermes
arranges prior to the etherial, empyrean, and celestial Gods. He
likewise delivered to us the history of the empyrean Gods in one hundred
books; of the etherial in an equal number; and of the celestial in a
thousand books.




                               CHAP. III.


According to another order, however, he arranges the God _Emeph_[134]
prior to, and as the leader of, the celestial Gods. And he says that
this God is an intellect, itself intellectually perceiving itself, and
converting intellections to itself. But prior to this, he arranges the
impartible one, which he says is the first paradigm, and which he
denominates _Eicton_. In this, also, is contained that which is first
intellective, and the first intelligible, and which is to be worshiped
through silence alone. Besides these, also, other leaders preside over
the fabrication of visible natures. For the demiurgic intellect, who is
the curator of truth and wisdom, descending into generation, and leading
the power; of occult reasons into light, is called in the Egyptian
tongue Amon; but in consequence of perfecting all things with veracity
and artificially, he is called Ptha. The Greeks, however, assume Ptha
for Vulcan, solely directing their attention to the artificial
peculiarity of the God. So far, also, as he is effective of good he is
called Osiris; and he has other appellations through other powers and
energies. With the Egyptians, therefore, there is another domination of
the whole elements in generation, and of the powers contained in them;
four of these powers being male and four female, which they attribute to
the sun. And there is, likewise, another government of the whole of
nature about generation, which they assign to the moon.[135] But
dividing the heavens into two, or four, or twelve, or six-and-thirty
parts, or the doubles of these, they give to the parts a greater or less
number of rulers. And over all these they place one ruler, who
transcends all the rest. Thus, therefore, the doctrine of the Egyptians
concerning principles, proceeding from on high as far as to the last of
things, begins from one principle, and descends to a multitude which is
governed by this one; and every where an indefinite nature is under the
dominion of a certain definite measure, and of the supreme unical cause
of all things. But God produced matter by dividing materiality from
essentiality;[136] and this being vital, the Demiurgus receiving,
fabricated from it the simple and impassive spheres. But he distributed
in an orderly manner the last of it into generable and corruptible
bodies.




                               CHAP. IV.


These things, therefore, having been accurately discussed, the solution
of the doubts which you have met with in certain books will be manifest.
_For the books which are circulated under the name of Hermes contain
Hermaic opinions, though they frequently employ the language of the
philosophers: for they were translated from the Egyptian tongue by men
who were not unskilled in philosophy._ But Chæremon,[137] and any others
who have at all discussed the first causes of mundane natures, have
unfolded the last rulers of these. And such as have written concerning
the planets, the zodiac, the decans, horoscopes, and what are called
powerful and leading planets, these have unfolded the partible
distributions of the rulers. The particulars, also, contained in the
Calendars comprehend a certain very small part of the Hermaic
arrangements. And the causes of such things as pertain to the phases or
occultations of the stars, or to the increments and decrements of the
moon, are assigned by the Egyptians the last of all. The Egyptians,
likewise, do not say that all things are physical. For they separate the
life of the soul and the intellectual life from nature, not only in the
universe, but also in us. And admitting intellect and reason to subsist
by themselves, they say that generated essences were thus fabricated.
They likewise arrange the Demiurgus as the primary father of things in
generation; and they acknowledge the existence of a vital power, prior
to the heavens, and subsisting in the heavens. They also establish a
pure intellect above the world, and one impartible intellect in the
whole world, and another which is distributed into all the spheres. And
these things they do not survey by mere reason alone, but through the
sacerdotal theurgy, they announce that they are able to ascend to more
elevated and universal essences, and to those that are established above
Fate, _viz._ to God and the Demiurgus; neither employing matter, nor
assuming any other thing besides, except the observation of a suitable
time.




                                CHAP. V.


This deific and anagogic path Hermes, indeed, narrated, but Bitys, the
prophet of King Ammon,[138] explained it, having found it in the adyta
of Saïs[139] in Egypt, written in hieroglyphics; and the same prophet
also delivered the name of God, which pervades through the whole
world.[140] But there are, likewise, many other coarrangements of the
same things; so that you do not appear to me to act rightly in referring
all things with the Egyptians to physical causes. For there are,
according to them, many principles and many essences; and also
supermundane powers, which they worship through sacerdotal sanctimony.
To me, therefore these things appear to afford common auxiliaries to the
solution of all the remaining inquiries. But since it is necessary not
to leave any one of them uninvestigated, we shall add them to these
problems, and examine them on all sides, in order that we may see where
there is any thing futile in your opinions.




                               CHAP. VI.


You say, therefore, “_that according to many of the Egyptians, that
which is in our power depends on the motion of the stars_.” What the
truth, however, is respecting this, it is necessary to unfold to you
from the Hermaic conceptions. For man, as these writings say, has two
souls. And one, indeed, is derived from the first intelligible, and
participates of the power of the Demiurgus; but the other is imparted
from the circulation of the celestial bodies, to which the soul that
sees God returns. These things, therefore, thus subsisting, the soul
that descends to us from the worlds follows the periods of the worlds;
but that which is intelligibly present from the intelligible, transcends
the genesiurgic motion, and through this a liberation from fate, and the
ascent to the intelligible Gods, are affected. Such theurgy, likewise,
as leads to an unbegotten nature is perfected conformably to a life of
this kind.




                               CHAP. VII.


Hence that of which you are dubious is not true, “_that all things are
bound with the indissoluble bonds of Necessity_,” which we call Fate.
For the soul has a proper principle of circumduction to the
intelligible, and of a separation from generated natures; and also of a
contact with real being, and that which is divine. “_Nor must we ascribe
fate to the Gods, whom we worship in temples and statues, as the
dissolvers of fate._” For the Gods, indeed, dissolve fate; but the last
natures which proceed from them, and are complicated with the generation
of the world and with body, give completion to fate. Hence we very
properly worship the Gods with all possible sanctity, and the observance
of all religious rites, in order that they may liberate us from the
evils impending from fate, as they alone rule over necessity through
intellectual persuasion. But neither are all things comprehended[141] in
the nature of fate, but there is another principle of the soul, which is
superior to all nature and generation, and through which we are capable
of being united to the Gods, of transcending the mundane order, and of
participating eternal life, and the energy of the supercelestial Gods.
Through this principle, therefore, we are able to liberate ourselves
from fate. For when the more excellent parts of us energize, and the
soul is elevated to natures better than itself,[142] then it is entirely
separated from things which detain it in generation, departs from
subordinate natures, exchanges the present for another life, and gives
itself to another order of things, entirely abandoning the former order
with which it was connected.




                              CHAP. VIII.


What then, is it not possible for a man to liberate himself [from fate]
through the Gods that revolve in the heavens, and to consider the same
as the leaders of fate, and yet as those that bind our lives with
indissoluble bonds? Perhaps nothing prevents this from being the case.
For if the Gods comprehend in themselves many essences and powers, there
are also in them other immense differences and contrarieties. Moreover,
this also may be said, that in each of the Gods, though such as are
visible, there are certain intelligible principles through which a
liberation to souls from mundane generation is effected. But if some one
leaves only two genera of Gods, _viz._ the mundane and supermundane, the
liberation to souls will be effected through the supermundane Gods.
These things, therefore, are more accurately discussed in our treatise
_Concerning the Gods_, in which it is shown who are the anagogic Gods,
and according to what kind of powers they are so; how they liberate from
fate, and through what sacred regressions; and what the order is of
mundane nature, and how the most perfect intellectual energy rules over
this. So that what you add from Homer, “that the Gods are flexible,” it
is not holy to assert. For the works of the sacred ceremonies of
religion have long since been defined by pure and intellectual laws.
Subordinate natures, also, are liberated through a greater order and
power; and when we abandon inferior natures, we are transferred into a
more excellent allotment. This, however, is not effected contrary to any
original sacred law, so as to cause the Gods to be changed, through a
sacred operation being afterwards performed; but from the first divinity
sent souls hither, in order that they might again return to him.
Neither, therefore, is any mutation produced through a reascent of this
kind, nor do the descents and ascents of souls oppose each other. For as
generation and this universe are suspended from an intellectual essence;
thus, also, in the orderly distribution of souls, the liberation from
generation accords with the care employed by them about generation.




                              SECTION IX.




                                CHAP. I.


Let us now, therefore, to the utmost of our power, endeavour to discuss
the manifold doubt concerning the peculiar dæmon, and which also is
subject to various objections. Since, however, to speak summarily, the
consideration of the peculiar dæmon is twofold, the one being theurgic,
but the other artificial; and the one drawing this dæmon down from
supernal causes, but the other from the visible periods in generation;
and the one making no use whatever of the calculation of nativities, but
the other meddling with methods of this kind; and the one worshiping
this dæmon in a way more universal and supernatural, but the other
partibly conformable to nature; this being the case, you appear to me to
have absurdly transferred a more perfect sacred operation to one that is
human, and in this to have exercised your inquiries.




                               CHAP. II.


In the next place, here also you appear to me to have cut off only a
certain small part of the discussion concerning the peculiar dæmon. For
since it is usual with those who artificially operate about nature to
invoke this dæmon in an orderly manner from the decans, from the
dispensators of influxes, from the signs of the zodiac, the stars, the
sun and moon, from the greater and lesser bear, from the whole elements,
and from the world, this being the case, you do not act rightly in
assuming one, and that the smallest part of all these, _viz._ the lord
of the geniture, and making your inquiries about this alone. Here,
likewise, again from one of the things proposed to be considered, you
inquire “_how the lord of the geniture gives the peculiar dæmon, and
according to what kind of efflux, or life, or power, it descends to us
from him_.” You also speak concerning the calculation of nativities, and
ask “_whether there is any reality in it or not_;” and likewise
concerning the invention of the lord of the geniture, “_whether it is
impossible to be found, or possible_.” In what respect, however, do
these things pertain to the domination of the dæmon? For it is evident
that our knowledge of the manner in which he subsists, contributes
nothing to his essence and the cause of his existence. For in things
which belong to the empire of nature, such as are generated in the
universe have a proper stability of their own essence, though we should
be ignorant how they are produced. In this way, therefore, we reply in
_common_ to your doubts. But directing our attention _particularly_ to
the subjects of your inquiry, we shall endeavour to give you solutions
of them.




                               CHAP. III.


You say, then, “_that he is happy who having learned the scheme of his
nativity, and knowing his proper dæmon, is thus liberated from fate_.”
To me, however, you appear to assert these things in a way neither
consonant to themselves nor to truth. For if our proper dæmon is
distributed to us from the scheme of our nativity, and from thence we
are able to discover him, how can we _be liberated from fate_, through a
knowledge of the dæmon imparted to us by fate? But if, as you say, we
are truly liberated from necessity through this dæmon, how is he
allotted to us by fate? Thus, therefore, what is now said by you opposes
what you before asserted; and is also discordant with truth. For the
proper dæmon of every one does not entirely accede from the scheme of
the peculiar nativity; but his origin is more ancient than this, which
we shall hereafter discuss. To which may be added, that if the
descending dæmon was to be alone surveyed from hence, he will not be
happy who obtains the knowledge of his genesiurgic dæmon. And who would
[willingly] receive this dæmon as his leader to a liberation from fate,
if he was given to him for this purpose, that he might accomplish the
distributions of fate? Farther still, this appears to me to be only a
certain and the last part of the theory pertaining to this dæmon; and
that the whole theory of his essence is omitted by a method of this
kind. But these things, indeed, though they are falsely asserted, yet at
the same time are not utterly foreign from the purpose. The doubts,
however, adduced by you in the next place, concerning “_the enumeration
of the canons and the genethlialogical science_,” as they are
inscrutable, are not attended with any ambiguity in the present
discussion. For whether these arts are known or are incomprehensible,
yet, at the same time, the efflux from the stars distributes to us the
dæmon, whether we know it or not. But divine divination is able to teach
us concerning the stars, in a way which is most true, and [when we are
in possession of this] we are not entirely in want of the enumeration of
canons, or of the divining art.




                               CHAP. IV.


If, however, it be necessary, dismissing these particulars, to speak
what appears to me to be the truth, you do not rightly infer “_that a
knowledge of this mathematical science[143] cannot be obtained, because
there is much dissonance concerning it, or because Chæremon, or some
other, has written against it_.” For if this reason were admitted, all
things will be incomprehensible. For all sciences have ten thousand
controvertists, and the doubts with which they are attended are
innumerable. As, therefore, we are accustomed to say in opposition to
the contentious, that contraries in things that are true are naturally
discordant, and that it is not falsities alone that are hostile to each
other; thus, also, we say respecting this mathematical science, that it
is indeed true; but that those who wander from the scope of it, being
ignorant of the truth, contradict it. This, however happens not in this
science alone, but likewise in all the sciences, which are imparted by
the Gods to men. For time always proceeding the divine mode of knowledge
becomes evanescent, through being frequently mingled and contaminated
with much of what is mortal. This divine mode is indeed [in astrology
also], and a certain clear indication of truth, though it is but small,
is at the same time preserved in it. For it places before our eyes
manifest signs of the mensuration of the divine periods, when it
predicts the eclipses of the sun and moon, and the concursions[144] of
the moon with the fixed stars, and when the experience of the sight is
seen to accord with the prediction. _Moreover, the observations of the
celestial bodies through the whole of time,[145] both by the Chaldeans
and by us, testify that this science is true._ Indications, also, more
known than these might be adduced, if the present discussion was
precedaneously about these particulars. But as they are superfluous, and
do not pertain to the knowledge of the peculiar dæmon, I shall, as it is
fit so to do, omit them, and pass on to things more appropriate than
these.




                                CHAP. V.


You say then, in your epistle, “_that the discovery of the lord or lords
of the geniture, if there are more than one in a nativity, can scarcely
be obtained, and by astrologers themselves is confessed to be
unattainable; and yet they say that the peculiar dæmon is from thence to
be known_.” But how can astrologers confess that the knowledge of the
lord of the geniture is not to be obtained by them, when they deliver
clear methods for the discovery of it, and teach us rules by which we
may discover the doubts; some, indeed, giving us five,[146] others more
and others less than five rules? Omitting this, however, let us direct
our attention to a thing of greater consequence, _viz._ the accidents
pertaining to both these. For if it is possible to discover the lord of
the geniture, the dæmon imparted by him will be known; but if this
knowledge is unattainable, we shall be ignorant of the lord of the
geniture according to this hypothesis, and yet, nevertheless, he will
have an existence, and also the dæmon imparted by him. What therefore
hinders, but that the discovery of him may be difficult through
prediction from the nativity, and yet through sacred divination, or
theurgy, there may be a great abundance of scientific knowledge on this
subject? In short, the dæmon is not alone imparted by the lord of the
geniture, but there are many other principles of it more universal[147]
than this. And farther still, a method of this kind introduces a certain
artificial and human disquisition concerning the peculiar dæmon. Hence,
in these doubts of yours there is nothing sane.




                               CHAP. VI.


If, however, it be requisite to unfold to you the truth concerning the
peculiar dæmon, we must say that he is not distributed to us from one
part of the heavens, or from some one of the visible elements; but that
from the whole world, the all-various life contained in it, and the
all-various body through which the soul descends into generation, a
certain peculiar portion is distributed to each of the parts in us,
according to a peculiar prefecture. This dæmon, therefore, is
established in the paradigm before the soul descends into generation;
and when the soul has received him as its leader, the dæmon immediately
presides over the soul, gives completion to its lives, and binds it to
body when it descends. He likewise governs the common animal of the
soul, directs its peculiar life, and imparts to us the principles of all
our thoughts and reasonings. We also perform such things as he suggests
to our intellect, and he continues to govern us till, through sacerdotal
theurgy, we obtain a God for the inspective guardian and leader of the
soul. For then the dæmon either yields or delivers his government to a
more excellent nature, or is subjected to him, as contributing to his
guardianship, or in some other way is ministrant to him as to his lord.




                               CHAP. VII.


From these things, therefore, it is easy to answer your next question.
For the peculiar dæmon does not rule over one of the parts in us, but,
in short, over all the parts at once, and extends to every principle
within us, in the same manner as he was distributed to us from the total
orders in the universe. For that which it appears to you proper to add
as an indication “_that dæmons preside over the parts of our body, so
that one is the guardian of health, another of the form of the body, and
another of the corporeal habits, and that there is one dæmon who
presides in common over all these_;” this you should consider as an
argument that there is one dæmon who is the guardian and governor of
every thing that is in us. You must not, therefore, distribute one dæmon
to the body, but another to the soul, and another to intellect: for it
is absurd that the animal should be one, but the dæmon that presides
over it multiform. For every where the natures that govern are more
simple than the natures that are governed. And it will be still more
absurd if the many dæmons that rule over the parts are not connascent,
but separated from each other. But you also make contrariety among them.
For you speak as if “_some of them were good, but others bad_.” Evil
dæmons, however, have no where a ruling allotment, nor are they
oppositely divided to such as are good with equal authority and power.




                              CHAP. VIII.


Afterwards, abandoning these particulars, you pass on to the opinion of
philosophy. But you subvert the whole hypothesis concerning the peculiar
dæmon. For if [as you say] “_this dæmon is a part of the soul_,” such,
for instance, as the intellectual part, “_and he is happy who is in
possession of a wise intellect_,” there will no longer be any other more
excellent or dæmoniacal order, presiding over, as transcending the human
soul. But certain parts of the soul, or a certain divided power, will
have dominion over many of the forms of life that are in us; and will
rule over these, not connascently, but as naturally exempt, and as
transcending the whole of our composition.




                               CHAP. IX.


After this, therefore, you also mention another disquisition concerning
the peculiar dæmon, which represents “_some as worshiping two, but
others three, dæmons of this kind_.” The whole of this, however, is
erroneous. For it is a false mode of proceeding to divide the causes
that preside over us, and not refer them to one; since this wanders from
the union which has dominion over all things. The opinion, likewise,
which distributes this dæmon into body, and the government of body,
draws down his domination to a certain most minute part. So that what
necessity is there for those who embrace this opinion to direct their
attention to sacred operations, the first principle of them being
futile? There is, therefore, of each of us one peculiar presiding dæmon;
but it is not proper to think that this dæmon is common to all men; nor
again, that he is common, but is peculiarly present with each
individual. For division, according to species and difference of matter,
do not receive the communion and sameness of things essentially
incorporeal. “_Why then_ [you say] _is the peculiar dæmon invoked by a
common mode by all men?_” Because the invocation of him is effected
through one God, who is the lord of dæmons; who from the first defined
to every one his peculiar dæmon; and who, in sacred operations, unfolds
to every one his proper dæmon, according to his own proper will. For
always in the theurgic order secondary are invoked through primary
natures. Among dæmons, therefore, one common leader of the cosmocrators
about generation sends to each of us his peculiar dæmon. Hence, when the
peculiar dæmon is present with each of us, he then unfolds the worship
which is proper to be paid to him and his name, and likewise delivers
the proper mode of invoking him.




                                CHAP. X.


And this order is adapted to dæmons; one part of it being allied to
those that are invoked; another being derived from more ancient causes;
and the third part effecting a common completion from both the others.
Do not, therefore, assimilate divine invocations to such as are human,
nor those that are ineffable to those that are effable; nor compare
those that are prior to every boundary, and every indefinite mode, to
those that are defined by men, or to indefinite actions. For our
concerns have nothing in common with theirs, whose whole genus and whole
order transcend and govern the whole of our essence and nature. But
here, especially, the greatest errors happen to men, when from human
imbecility they infer any thing concerning the domination of dæmons, and
from things which are small, of no worth, and distributed into parts,
form a conjecture of great, excellent, and perfect natures. And thus
much in answer to you concerning the peculiar dæmon, in addition to what
has been before said.




                               SECTION X.




                                CHAP. I.


It now remains, in the last place, that we should speak concerning
felicity, about which you make various inquiries, first of all proposing
objections, afterwards doubting, and then interrogating. Adducing,
therefore, all that is said by you, we shall answer it appropriately.
You inquire, then, “_whether there is not some other latent way to
felicity_.” But how, in that path which recedes from the Gods, is it
probable there can be an ascent to felicity? For if the essence and
perfection of all good are comprehended in the Gods, and the first and
ancient power of them is with us priests, and if by those who similarly
adhere to more excellent natures, and genuinely obtain a union with
them, the beginning and end of all good is earnestly pursued; if this be
the case, here the contemplation of truth, and the possession of
intellectual science are to be found.[148] And a knowledge of the Gods
is accompanied with a conversion to, and the knowledge of, ourselves.




                               CHAP. II.


Hence you in vain doubt, “_that it is not proper to look to human
opinions_.” For what leisure can he have whose intellect is directed to
the Gods to look downward to the praises of men? Nor do you rightly
doubt in what follows, viz. “_that the soul devises great things from
casual circumstances_.” For what principle of fictions can there be in
truly existing beings? Is it not the phantastic power in us which is the
maker of images? _But the phantasy is never excited when the
intellectual life energizes perfectly._ And is not truth essentially
coexistent with the Gods? Is it not, likewise, concordantly established
in intelligibles? It is in vain, therefore, that things of this kind are
disseminated by you and others. But neither do those things for which
certain futile and arrogant men calumniate the worshipers of the Gods,
the like to which have been asserted by you, at all pertain to true
theology and theurgy. And if certain things of this kind germinate in
the sciences of divine concerns, as in other arts evil arts blossom
forth; these are doubtless more contrary to such sciences than to any
thing else. For evil is more hostile to good than to that which is not
good.




                               CHAP. III.


I wish, in the next place, to reply to such assertions as calumniate
divine prediction. For you compare with it “_certain other methods which
are conversant with the prediction of future events_.” To me, however,
it does not appear to be any thing honourable if a certain natural
aptitude is ingenerated in us to the indication of the future, just as
in animals there is a foreknowledge of earthquakes, or winds, or
tempests. For an innate presage of this kind is the consequence of
acuteness of sensation, or sympathy, or some other conjoint motion of
the physical powers, and is not attended with any thing venerable and
supernatural. Nor if some one, by human reasoning, or artificial
observation, conjectures from signs those things of which the signs are
indicative (as physicians foreknow that a fever will take place from the
systole and torpor of the pulse), neither does he appear to me to
possess any thing honourable and good. For he conjectures after a human
manner, and concludes from our reasoning power about things which are
acknowledged to be effected naturally, and forms a judgment not very
remote from the corporeal-formed order. Hence, if there is in us a
certain natural presentiment of the future, in the same manner as in all
other animals, this power is clearly seen to energize; this presentiment
does not in reality possess any thing which is most blessed. For what is
there among the things which are implanted in us by nature in the realms
of generation that is a genuine, perfect, and eternal good?




                               CHAP. IV.


Divine divination, therefore, which is conjoined with the Gods, alone
truly imparts to us a divine life; since it participates of [divine]
foreknowledge, and divine intellections, and renders us in reality
divine. It likewise causes us to be genuine participants of _the good_,
because the most blessed intellectual perception of the Gods is filled
with all good. Hence those who possess this divination “_do not_,” as
you conjecture, “_foresee future events, and are nevertheless unhappy_.”
For all divine foreknowledge is boniform. Nor “_do they foresee, indeed,
what is future, but do not know how to use this knowledge properly_.”
For, together with the foreknowledge, they receive the beautiful itself,
and true and appropriate order: and utility is also present with it. For
the Gods, in conjunction with it, deliver a transcendent power of
defence against the inconveniences which accede from nature. And when it
is necessary to exercise virtue, and the ignorance of future events
contributes to this, then the Gods conceal what will be for the sake of
rendering the soul better. But when the ignorance of what is future does
not at all contribute to this, and foreknowledge is advantageous to
souls, for the sake of their salvation and reascent [to divinity], then
the Gods insert the foreknowledge which pertains to divination in the
penetralia of the essences of souls.




                                CHAP. V.


But why am I prolix about these particulars? For I have abundantly
shown, in what has been before said, the transcendency of divine above
human divination. It is better, therefore, in compliance with your
request, “_to point out to you the way to felicity, and show you in what
the essence of it is placed_.” For from this the truth will be
discovered, and at the same time all the doubts may be easily dissolved.
I say, therefore, that the more divine[149] intelligible man, who was
formerly united to the Gods by the vision of them, afterwards entered
into another soul, which is coadapted to the human form, and through
this became fettered with the bonds of necessity and fate. Hence it is
requisite to consider how he may be liberated from these bonds. _There
is, therefore, no other dissolution of them than the knowledge of the
Gods._ For to know scientifically _the good_ is the idea of felicity;
just as the oblivion of good, and deception about evil, happen to be the
idea of evil. The former, therefore, is present with divinity; but the
latter, which is an inferior destiny, is inseparable from the mortal
nature. And the former, indeed, measures the essences of
intelligibles[150] by sacred ways; but the latter, abandoning
principles, gives itself up to the measurement of the idea of body. The
former is a knowledge of the father; but the latter is a departure from
him, and an oblivion of the God who is a superessential father, and
sufficient to himself. The former, likewise, preserves the true life of
the soul, and leads it back to its father; but the latter draws down the
generation-ruling[151] man, as far as to that which is never permanent,
but is always flowing. You must understand, therefore, that this is the
first path to felicity, affording to souls an intellectual plenitude of
divine union. But the sacerdotal and theurgic gift of felicity is
called, indeed, the gate to the Demiurgus of wholes, or the seat, or
palace, of _the good_. In the first place, likewise, it possesses a
power of purifying the soul, much more perfect than the power which
purifies the body; afterwards it causes a coaptation of the reasoning
power to the participation and vision of _the good_, and a liberation
from every thing of a contrary nature; and, in the last place, produces
a union with the Gods, who are the givers of every good.




                               CHAP. VI.


Moreover, after it has conjoined the soul to the several parts of the
universe, and to the total divine powers which pass through it; then it
leads the soul to, and deposits it in, the whole Demiurgus, and causes
it to be independent of all matter, and to be counited with the eternal
reason alone. But my meaning is, that it peculiarly connects the soul
with the self begotten and self-moved God, and with the all-sustaining,
intellectual, and all-adorning powers of the God, and likewise with that
power of him which elevates to truth, and with his self-perfect,
effective, and other demiurgic powers; so that the theurgic soul becomes
perfectly established in the energies and demiurgic intellections of
these powers. Then, also, it inserts the soul in the whole demiurgic
God. And this is the end with the Egyptians of the sacerdotal elevation
of the soul to divinity.




                               CHAP. VII.


With respect to _the good_, likewise, they conceive that one kind is
divine, and this is the God who is prior to the intelligible; but that
the other is human, and is a union with the former. And these two kinds
of good Bitys has unfolded from the Hermaic books. This part, therefore,
is not, as you suspect, omitted by the Egyptians, but is divinely
delivered by them. Nor do “_theurgists disturb the divine intellect
about trifling concerns_;” but they consult it about things which
pertain to the purification, liberation, and salvation of the soul.
Neither do they studiously employ themselves in things which are indeed
difficult, yet useless to mankind; but, on the contrary, they direct
their attention to things which are of all others most beneficial to the
soul. Nor, in the last place, are “_they deceived by a certain
fraudulent dæmon_,” who, having vanquished a fallacious and dæmoniacal
nature, ascend to an intelligible and divine essence.




                              CHAP. VIII.


And thus we have answered, to the utmost of our ability, your inquiries
concerning divination and theurgy. It remains, therefore, at the end of
this discussion, that I should beseech the Gods to afford me an
immutable guard of true conceptions, to insert in me truth eternally,
and to supply me abundantly with the participation of more perfect
conceptions of the Gods, in which the most blessed end of our good is
posited, and the confirmation of our concordant friendship with each
other.




                           ADDITIONAL NOTES.


Page 9. _Anebo._ Porphyry in his Life of Plotinus, and also in the
second book of his Treatise on Abstinence from Animals, informs us that
he was familiar with a certain Egyptian priest, who, as Gale
conjectures, is probably the priest to whom Porphyry now writes. The
diction, indeed, as Gale observes, denotes that the person to whom this
Epistle is addressed was a very _great prophet_, who, nevertheless, is
afterwards said to be a _priest_. This, however, is not any thing novel
or incongruous. For by Apuleius in Metamorph. lib. xi. the Egyptian
Zaclas is said to be _propheta primarius et sacerdos, a chief prophet
and priest_.


Page 9. _Hermes the God who presides over language._ The Egyptians
celebrated two Hermes, the former of which is here signified by
Iamblichus. This deity is the source of _invention_, and hence he is
said to be the son of _Maia_; because _search_, which is implied by
_Maia_, leads _invention_ into light. He bestows too _mathesis_ on
souls, by unfolding the will of his father Jupiter; and this he
accomplishes as the angel or messenger of Jupiter. Proclus in MS.
Comment. in Alcibiad. observes, “that this deity is the inspective
guardian of _gymnastic exercises_; and hence _hermæ_, or carved statues
of Mercury, were placed in the Palæstræ; of _music_, and hence he is
honoured as _the lyrist_ λυραιος among the celestial constellations; and
of _disciplines_, because the invention of geometry, reasoning, and
discourse is referred to this God. He presides, therefore, over every
species of erudition, leading us to an intelligible essence from this
mortal abode, governing the different herds of souls, and dispersing the
sleep and oblivion with which they are oppressed. He is likewise the
supplier of recollection, the end of which is a genuine intellectual
apprehension of divine natures.”


P. 10. _The ancient pillars of Hermes._ These pillars, according to Amm.
Marcellinus, lib. xxii. were concealed prior to the deluge in certain
caverns, which were called συριγγες, _syringes_, not far from the
Egyptian Thebes. The second Hermes interpreted these pillars, and his
interpretation formed many volumes, as Iamblichus informs us in Section
viii. of this work. These pillars are mentioned by Laertius in his Life
of Democritus; by Dio Chrysostom in Orat. 49; by Achilles Tatius on
Aratus; and by others of the ancients.


P. 15. _There is, therefore, the good itself which is beyond essence,
and there is that good which subsists according to essence._ There are
three orders of good; _viz._ that which is imparticipable and
superessential; that which is imparticipable and essential; and that
which is essential and participable. Of these, the last is such as our
nature contains; _the good_ which ranks among forms is essential; and
that which is beyond essence is superessential. Or we say that _the
good_ which subsists in us may be considered as a habit, in consequence
of subsisting in a subject; the next to this ranks as essence, and a
part of essence, I mean _the good_ which ranks among forms; and _the
good_ which is beyond essence, is neither a habit, nor a part. With
respect to _the good_, also, which subsists according to essence, it
must be observed, that since forms are twofold, some alone
distinguishing the _essences_ of the things fashioned by form, but
others their _perfections_, the genus of essence, same and different,
and the form of animal, horse, and man, and every thing of this kind,
give distinction to essence and subjects; but the form of _the good_,
the beautiful, and the just, and in like manner the form of virtue, of
health, strength, and every thing of a similar nature, are perfective of
the beings to which they belong: and of some, essence is the leader, but
of others _the good_. For, as Plato says, every thing except _the one_,
must necessarily participate of essence; and whatever preserves, gives
perfection to, or defends any being, must be good. Hence, since these
two are leaders, the one of forms which give subsistence to things, and
the other of such as are the sources of their perfection; it is
necessary that one of these should be subordinate to the other; I mean
that _the good_ which is allotted a coordination among forms that are
the sources of perfection, should be subordinate to _essence_, which
ranks among causes, whence subsistence originates, if _the good_ is
being, and a certain being. For it is either the same with, or different
from, essence, which the Elean guest or stranger in the Sophista of
Plato shows to be the genus of being. And if _the good_ is the same with
essence, an absurdity must ensue: for being and well-being are not the
same. But if _the good_ is something different from essence, it must
necessarily participate of essence, in consequence of essence being the
genus of all forms. But if genera are more ancient than forms, _the
good_ which ranks among forms, and is posterior to their genus, will not
be the superessential good which reigns over intelligibles; but this
must be asserted of that good, under which this and every form is
arranged, which possesses being, and which is the leader of the other
genera of being.


P. 15. _But the other medium, which is suspended from the Gods, though
it is far inferior to them, is that of dæmons._ In addition to what is
said in this work by Iamblichus concerning dæmons, the following
information about them from Olympiodorus, in his MS. Scholia on the
Phædo of Plato, is well worthy the attention of the philosophical
reader:

“Since there are in the universe things which subsist differently at
different times, and since there are also natures which are conjoined
with the superessential unities, it is necessary that there should be a
certain middle genus, which is neither immediately suspended from deity,
nor subsists differently at different times, according to better and
worse, but which is always perfect, and does not depart from its proper
virtue; and is immutable indeed, but is not conjoined with the
superessential [which is the characteristic of deity]. The whole of this
genus is dæmoniacal. There are, also, different genera of dæmons: for
they are placed under the mundane Gods. The highest of these subsists
according to _the one_ of the Gods, and is called an unific and divine
genus of dæmons. The next subsists according to the intellect which is
suspended from deity, and is called intellectual. The third subsists
according to soul, and is called rational. The fourth, according to
nature, and is denominated physical. The fifth according to body, which
is called corporeal-formed. And the sixth according to matter, and this
is denominated material.” Olympiodorus adds, “or after another manner it
may be said, that some of these are celestial, others etherial, others
aerial, others aquatic, others terrestrial, and others subterranean.
With respect to this division also, it is evident that it is derived
from the parts of the universe. But irrational dæmons originate from the
aerial governors, whence, also, the Chaldean Oracle says,

               Ηεριων ελατηρα κυνων χθονιων τε και υγρων.

_i. e._ being the charioteer of the aerial, terrestrial, and aquatic
dogs.” Our guardian dæmons, however, belong to that order of dæmons
which is arranged under the Gods that preside over the ascent and
descent of souls. For a more copious account of dæmons see the notes on
the First Alcibiades in vol. i. of my translation of Plato.


P. 22. _One and the best solution will be obtained by surveying the mode
of divine allotment._

The manner in which divine allotments subsist is admirably unfolded by
Proclus in Tim. p. 43, as follows: “Since, according to a division of
the universe into two parts, we have distributed allotments into the
celestial and sublunary, there can be no doubt what the former are, and
whether they possess an invariable sameness of subsistence. But the
sublunary allotments are deservedly a subject of admiration, whether
they are said to be perpetual or not. For since all things in generation
are continually changing and flowing, how can the allotments of the
providential rulers of them be said to be perpetual? For things in
generation are not perpetual. But if their allotments are not perpetual,
how is it possible to suppose that divine government can subsist
differently at different times? For an allotment is neither a certain
separate energy of the Gods, so that sublunary natures changing, we
might say that it is exempt, and remains immutable, nor is it that which
is governed alone, so that no absurdity would follow from admitting that
an allotment is in a flowing condition, and is conversant with
all-various mutations; but it is a providential inspection, and
unrestrained government of divinity over sublunary concerns. Such being
the doubts with which this subject is attended, the following appears to
be a solution of the difficulty.

“We must say, then, that it is not proper to consider all the natures
that are in generation, and generation itself, as alone consisting of
things mutable and flowing, but that there is also something immutable
in these, and which is naturally adapted to remain perpetually the same.
For the interval which receives and comprehends in itself all the parts
of the world, and which has an arrangement through all bodies, is
immoveable, lest, being moved, it should require another place, and thus
should proceed from one receptacle to another, _ad infinitum_. The
etherial vehicles, also, of divine souls, with which they are circularly
invested, and which imitate the lives in the heavens, have a perpetual
essence, and are eternally suspended from these divine souls themselves,
being full of prolific powers, and performing a circular motion,
according to a certain secondary revolution of the celestial orbs. And,
in the third place, the wholeness (ολοτης) of the elements has a
permanent subsistence, though the parts are all-variously corrupted. For
it is necessary that every form in the universe should be never failing,
in order that the universe may be perfect, and that, being generated
from an immoveable cause, it may be immoveable in its essence. _But
every wholeness is a form, or rather it is that which it is said to be
through the participation of one all perfect form._

“And here we may see the orderly progression of the nature of bodies.
For the interval of the universe is immoveable according to every kind
of motion. But the vehicles of divine souls alone receive a mutation
according to place; for such a motion as this is most remote from
essential mutation. And the wholeness of the elements admits in its
parts the other motions of bodies, but the whole remains perfectly
immutable. The celestial allotments also, which proximately divide the
interval of the universe, codistribute likewise the heavens themselves.
But those in the sublunary region are primarily, indeed, allotted the
parts which are in the interval of the universe, but afterwards they
make a distribution according to the definite vehicles of souls. And, in
the third place, they remain perpetually the same, according to the
total parts of generation. The allotments of the Gods, therefore, do not
change, nor do they subsist differently at different times; for they
have not their subsistence proximately in that which may be changed.

“How, therefore, do the illuminations of the Gods accede to these? How
are the dissolutions of sacred rites effected? And how is the same place
at different times under the influence of different spirits? May it not
be said, that since the Gods have perpetual allotments, and divide the
earth according to divine numbers, similarly to the sections of the
heavens, the parts of the earth also are illuminated, so far as they
participate of aptitude. But the circulation of the heavenly bodies,
through the figures which they possess, produce this aptitude; divine
illumination at the same time imparting a power more excellent than the
nature which is present with these parts of the earth. This aptitude is
also effected by nature herself as a whole, inserting divine impressions
in each of the illuminated parts, through which they spontaneously
participate of the Gods. For as these parts depend on the Gods, nature
inserts in such of them as are different, different images of the
divinities. Times too cooperate in producing this aptitude, according to
which other things, also, are governed; the proper temperature of the
air likewise; and, in short, every thing by which we are surrounded
contributes to the increase and diminution of this aptitude. When,
therefore, conformably to a concurrence of these many causes, an
aptitude to the participation of the Gods is ingenerated in some one of
the natures which are disposed to be changed, then a certain divinity is
unfolded into light, which, prior to this, was concealed through the
inaptitude of the recipients; possessing, indeed, his appropriate
allotment eternally, and always extending the participation of himself,
similarly to illuminations from the sun, but not being always
participated by sublunary natures, in consequence of their inaptitude to
such participation. For as with respect to partial souls such as ours,
which at different times embrace different lives, some of them, indeed,
choose lives accommodated to their appropriate Gods, but others foreign
lives, through oblivion of the divinities to whom they belong; thus,
also, with respect to sacred places, some are adapted to the power which
there receives its allotment, but others are suspended from a different
order. And on this account, as the Athenian guest in Plato says, some
places are more fortunate, but others more unfortunate.

“The divine Iamblichus, however, doubts how the Gods are said to be
allotted certain places according to definite times, as, by Plato in the
Timæus, Minerva is said to have been first allotted the guardianship of
Athens, and afterwards of Saïs. For if their allotment commenced from a
certain time, it will also at a certain time cease. For every thing
which is measured by time is of this kind. And farther still, was the
place which at a certain time they are allotted, without a presiding
deity prior to this allotment, or was it under the government of other
Gods? For if it was without a presiding deity, how is it to be admitted
that a certain part of the universe was once entirely destitute of
divinity? How can any place remain without the guardianship of superior
beings? And if any place is sufficient to the preservation of itself,
how does it afterwards become the allotment of some one of the Gods? But
if it should be said, that it is afterwards under the government of
another God, of whom it becomes the allotment, this also is absurd. For
the second God does not divulse the government and allotment of the
former, nor do the Gods alternately occupy the places of each other, nor
dæmons change their allotments. Such being the doubts on this subject,
he solves them by saying, that the allotments of the Gods remain
perpetually unchanged, but that the participants of them at one time,
indeed, enjoy the beneficent influence of the presiding powers, but at
another are deprived of it. He adds, that _these are the mutations
measured by time, which sacred institutes frequently call the birthday
of the Gods_.


P. 23. _Which also the art of divine works perceiving, &c._ This art of
divine works is called _theurgy_, in which Pythagoras was initiated
among the Syrians, as we are informed by Iamblichus in his Life of that
philosopher. (See p. 9 of my translation of that work.) Proclus also was
skilled in this art, as may be seen in the Life of him by Marinus.
Psellus, in his MS. treatise on Dæmons, says, as we have before
observed, “that magic formed the last part of the sacerdotal science”;
in which place by magic he doubtless means that kind of it which is
denominated theurgy. And that theurgy was employed by the ancients in
their mysteries, I have fully proved in my treatise on the Eleusinian
and Bacchic Mysteries.[152] This theurgy, too, is doubtless the same as
the magic of Zoroaster, which Plato in the First Alcibiades says,
consisted in the worship of the Gods; on which passage the following
account of theurgy by Proclus was, I have no doubt, originally part of a
commentary. For the MS. Commentary of Proclus, which is extant on this
dialogue, does not extend to more than a third part of it; and this
Dissertation on Theurgy, which is only extant in Latin, was published by
Ficinus the translator, immediately after his Excerpta, from this
Commentary. So that it seems highly probable that the manuscript from
which Ficinus translated his Excerpta, was much more perfect than that
which has been preserved to us, in consequence of containing this
account of the theurgy of the ancients.

“In the same manner as lovers gradually advance from that beauty which
is apparent in sensible forms, to that which is divine; so the ancient
priests, when they considered that there is a certain alliance and
sympathy in natural things to each other, and of things manifest to
occult powers; and discovered that all things subsist in all, they
fabricated a sacred science from this mutual sympathy and similarity.
Thus they recognised things supreme in such as are subordinate, and the
subordinate in the supreme: in the celestial regions, terrene properties
subsisting in a causal and celestial manner; and in earth celestial
properties, but according to a terrene condition. For how shall we
account for those plants called heliotropes, that is, attendants on the
sun, moving in correspondence with the revolution of its orb, but
selenitropes, or attendants on the moon, turning in exact conformity to
her motion? It is because all things pray, and hymn the leaders of their
respective orders; but some intellectually, and others rationally; some
in a natural, and others after a sensible, manner. Hence the sunflower,
as far as it is able, moves in a circular dance towards the sun; so that
if any one could hear the pulsation made by its circuit in the air, he
would perceive something composed by a sound of this kind, in honour of
its king, such as a plant is capable of framing. Hence, too, we may
behold the sun and moon in the earth, but according to a terrene
quality; but in the celestial regions, all plants, and stones, and
animals, possessing an intellectual life according to a celestial
nature. Now the ancients, having contemplated this mutual sympathy of
things, applied for occult purposes, both celestial and terrene natures,
by means of which, through a certain similitude, they deduced divine
virtues into this inferior abode. For, indeed, similitude itself is a
sufficient cause of binding things together in union and consent. Thus,
if a piece of paper is heated, and afterwards placed near a lamp, though
it does not touch the fire, the paper will be suddenly inflamed, and the
flame will descend from the superior to the inferior parts. This heated
paper we may compare to a certain relation of inferiors to superiors;
and its approximation to the lamp, to the opportune use of things
according to time, place, and matter. But the procession of fire into
the paper, aptly represents the presence of divine light to that nature
which is capable of its reception. Lastly, the inflammation of the paper
may be compared to the deification of mortals, and to the illumination
of material natures, which are afterwards carried upwards, like the
enkindled paper, from a certain participation of divine seed.

“Again, the lotus, before the rising of the sun, folds its leaves into
itself, but gradually expands them on its rising: unfolding them in
proportion to the sun’s ascent to the zenith; but as gradually
contracting them as that luminary descends to the west. Hence this
plant, by the expansion and contraction of its leaves, appears no less
to honour the sun, than men by the gesture of their eyelids, and the
motion of their lips. But this imitation and certain participation of
supernal light is not only visible in plants, which possess nothing more
than a vestige of life, but likewise in particular stones. Thus the
sun-stone, by its golden rays, imitates those of the sun; but the stone
called the eye of heaven, or of the sun, has a figure similar to the
pupil of an eye, and a ray shines from the middle of the pupil. Thus,
too, the lunar stone, which has a figure similar to the moon when
horned, by a certain change of itself, follows the lunar motion. Lastly,
the stone called helioselenus, _i. e._ of the sun and moon, imitates,
after a manner, the congress of those luminaries, which it images by its
colour. So that all things are full of divine natures; terrestrial
natures receiving the plenitude of such as are celestial, but celestial
of supercelestial essences;[153] while every order of things proceeds
gradually, in a beautiful descent, from the highest to the lowest. For
whatever particulars are collected into one above the order of things,
are afterwards dilated in descending, various souls being distributed
under their various ruling divinities.

“In the next place, there are many solar animals, such as lions and
cocks, which participate, according to their nature, of a certain solar
divinity; whence it is wonderful how much inferiors yield to superiors
in the same order, though they do not yield in magnitude and power.
Hence it is said, that a cock is very much feared, and, as it were,
reverenced, by a lion; the reason of which we cannot assign from matter
or sense, but from the contemplation alone of a supernal order. For thus
we shall find that the presence of the solar virtue accords more with a
cock than with a lion. This will be evident from considering that the
cock, as it were, with certain hymns, applauds and calls to the rising
sun, when he bends his course to us from the antipodes; and that solar
angels sometimes appear in forms of this kind, who, though they are
without shape, yet present themselves to us, who are connected with
shape, in some sensible form. Sometimes, too, there are dæmons with a
leonine front, who when a cock is placed before them, unless they are of
a solar order, suddenly disappear; and this because those natures which
have an inferior rank in the same order always reverence their
superiors; just as many, on beholding the images of divine men, are
accustomed, from the very view, to be fearful of perpetrating any thing
base.

“In fine, some things turn round correspondent to the revolutions of the
sun, as the plants which we have mentioned, and others after a manner
imitate the solar rays, as the palm and the date; some the fiery nature
of the sun, as the laurel; and others a different property. For, indeed,
we may perceive that the properties which are collected in the sun, are
every where distributed to subsequent natures constituted in a solar
order, that is, to angels, dæmons, souls, animals, plants, and stones.
Hence the authors of the ancient priesthood discovered from things
apparent the worship of superior powers, while they mingled some things
and purified others. They mingled many things indeed together, because
they saw that some simple substances possessed a divine property (though
not taken singly) sufficient to call down that particular power, of
which they were participants. Hence, by the mingling of many things
together, they attracted upon us a supernal influx; and by the
composition of one thing from many, they produced an assimilation to
that one which is above many; and composed statues from the mixture of
various substances conspiring in sympathy and consent. Besides this,
they collected composite odours, by a divine art, into one,
comprehending a multitude of powers, and symbolizing with the unity of a
divine essence; considering that division debilitates each of these, but
that mingling them together restores them to the idea of their exemplar.

“But sometimes one herb, or one stone, is sufficient to a divine
operation. Thus a thistle is sufficient to procure the sudden appearance
of some superior power; but a laurel, raccinum (or a thorny kind of
sprig), the land and sea onion, the coral, the diamond, and the jasper,
operate as a safeguard. The heart of a mole is subservient to
divination, but sulphur and marine water to purification. Hence the
ancient priests, by the mutual relation and sympathy of things to each
other, collected their virtues into one, but expelled them by repugnancy
and antipathy; purifying when it was requisite with sulphur and bitumen,
and sprinkling with marine water. For sulphur purifies, from the
sharpness of its odour; but marine water on account of its fiery
portion. Besides this, in the worship of the Gods, they offered animals,
and other substances congruous to their nature; and received, in the
first place, the powers of dæmons, as proximate to natural substances
and operations; and by these natural substances they convoked into their
presence those powers to which they approached. Afterwards they
proceeded from dæmons to the powers and energies of the Gods; partly,
indeed, from dæmoniacal instruction, but partly by their own industry,
interpreting appropriate symbols, and ascending to a proper intelligence
of the Gods. And lastly, laying aside natural substances and their
operations, they received themselves into the communion and fellowship
of the Gods.”

The Emperor Julian alludes to this theurgical art, in the following
extract from his Arguments against the Christians, preserved by Cyril.
Το γαρ εκ θεων εις ανθρωπους αφικνουμενον πνευμα, σπανιακις μεν και εν
ολιγοις γινεται, και ουτε παντα ανδρα τουτου μετασχειν ρᾳδιον, ουτε εν
παντι καιρῳ. ταυτῃ το και το παρ’ Εβραιοις επελιπεν, ουκουν ουδε παρ’
Αιγυπτιοις εις τουτο σωζεται. Φαινεται δε και τα αυτοφυη χρηστηρια ταις
των χρονων εικοντα περιοδοις. ὃ δε φιλανθρωπος ημων δεσποτης και πατηρ
Ζευς εννοησας, ως αν μη πανταπασι της προς τους θεους αποστερηθωμεν
κοινωνιας δεδωκεν ημιν δια των ιερων τεχνων επισκεψιν, υφ’ ης προς τας
χρειας εξομεν την αποχρωσαν βοηθειαν. _i. e._ “For the inspiration which
arrives to men from the Gods is rare, and exists but in a few. Nor is it
easy for every man to partake of this, nor at every time. This has
ceased among the Hebrews, nor is it preserved to the present time among
the Egyptians. Spontaneous oracles, also, are seen to yield to temporal
periods. This, however, our philanthropic lord and father Jupiter
understanding, that we might not be entirely deprived of communion with
the Gods, has given us observation through _sacred arts_, by which we
have at hand sufficient assistance.” For the cause why, at stated times,
sacred arts, oracles, and inspiration fail, see the additional notes to
my translation of Iamblichus’s Life of Pythagoras.


P. 24. _The participant of the rational soul becomes the cause of
suffering to the composite._ See my translation of Plotinus on the
Impassivity of Incorporeal Natures, in which this is beautifully and
profoundly demonstrated. Proclus, also, in Tim. lib. v. p. 340,
admirably observes, that the motion of the nutritive power, and the
percussions of sense, are the causes of the perturbation of the soul;
but that we must not fancy that the soul suffers any thing through
these. “For as if,” says he, “some one standing on the margin of a river
should behold the image and form of himself in the floating stream, he
indeed will preserve his face unchanged; but the stream, being
all-variously moved, will change the image, so that at different times
it will appear to him different, oblique and erect, and perhaps divulsed
and continuous. Let us suppose too, that such a one, through being
unaccustomed to the spectacle, should think that it was himself that
suffered this distortion, in consequence of surveying his shadow in the
water, and thus thinking, should be afflicted and disturbed, astonished
and impeded. After the same manner, the soul beholding the image of
herself in body, borne along in the river of generation, and variously
disposed at different times, through inward passions and external
impulses, is indeed herself impassive, but thinks that she suffers; and
being ignorant of, and mistaking her image for, herself, is disturbed,
astonished, and perplexed.”


P. 35. _Since, however, the order of all the Gods is profoundly
united.——For the very existence in them, whatever it may be, is the one
of their nature._

The Gods are self-perfect superessential unities, so far as they are
Gods. For the principal subsistence of every thing is according to the
summit of its essence, and this in the Gods is _the one_, through which
they are profoundly united to each other and to _the one itself_, or the
ineffable principle of things, from which they are ineffably unfolded
into light. Concerning this union of them with each other, Proclus
admirably observes as follows, in his MS. Commentary on the Parmenides
of Plato. “All these unities are in, and are profoundly united to, each
other, and their union is far greater than the communion and sameness
which subsist in beings. For in the latter there is indeed mutual
mixture of forms, similitude, and friendship, and a participation of
each other; but the union of the Gods, as being a union of unities, is
much more uniform, ineffable, and transcendent: for here _all are in
all_, which does not take place in forms or ideas;[154] and their
unmingled purity, and the characteristic of each, in a manner far
surpassing the diversity in ideas, preserves their natures unconfused,
and distinguishes their peculiar powers. Hence, some of them are more
universal, and others more particular; some of them are characterised by
permanency, others by progression, and others by conversion, or
regression. Some, again, are generative, others anagogic, or of an
elevating nature, and others demiurgic; and universally, there are
different characteristics of different Gods, _viz._ the connective,
perfective, demiurgic, assimilative, and such others as are celebrated
posterior to these; so that all are in all, and yet each is at the same
time separate and distinct.

“Indeed we obtain this knowledge of their union and characteristics from
the natures by which they are participated. For, with respect to the
visible Gods, we say that there is one soul of the sun, and another of
the earth, directing our attention to the visible bodies of these
divinities, which possess much variety in their essence, powers, and
dignity among wholes. As, therefore, we apprehend the difference of
incorporeal essences from sensible inspection, in like manner from the
variety of incorporeal essences, we are enabled to know something of the
unmingled distinction of the first and superessential unities, and of
the characteristics of each. For each unity has a multitude suspended
from its nature, which is either intelligible alone; or intelligible,
and at the same time intellectual; or intellectual alone; and this last
is either participated, or not participated; and this again, is either
supermundane, or mundane. And thus far does the progression of the
unities extend.” Shortly after he adds, “As trees by their extremities
are rooted in the earth, and through this are earthly in every part, in
the same manner divine natures are rooted by their summits in _the one_,
and each is a _unity_ and _one_, through its unconfused union with _the
one itself_.” See more on this most important of all subjects in the
notes to my translation of the Parmenides.


P. 50. _For as in all other things, such as are principal, primarily
begin from themselves, &c._

Hence every God begins his own energy from himself, which Proclus thus
demonstrates in Prop. 131 of his Elements of Theology. “For every God
first exhibits the peculiarity of his presence with secondary natures in
himself; because he imparts himself to other things also according to
his own exuberant plenitude. For neither is deficiency adapted to the
Gods, nor fulness alone. For every thing deficient is imperfect, and not
being itself perfect, it is impossible it should make another thing to
be perfect. But that which is full is alone sufficient to itself, and is
not yet prepared to communicate. It is necessary, therefore, that the
nature which fills other things, and which extends to other things the
communications of itself, should be superplenary, or exuberantly full.
Hence, if a divine nature fills all things from itself with the good
which it contains in itself, it is exuberantly full. And if this be the
case, establishing first in itself the peculiarity which it imparts to
others, it will extend to them the communications of superplenary
goodness.


P. 59. _It is requisite also to know what enthusiasm is, and how it is
produced._

The following account of enthusiasm, and of the different kinds of mania
mentioned by Plato in the Phædrus, from the Scholia of Hermeas on that
dialogue, is extracted from the additional notes to my translation of
Proclus on the Timæus, and is given in this place for the sake of the
Platonic English reader, who may not have that translation in his
possession, as a valuable addition to what is here said by Iamblichus on
this subject.

“Since Plato here delivers four kinds of mania, by which I mean
enthusiasm, and possession or inspiration from the Gods, _viz._ the
musical, the telestic, the prophetic, and the amatory, previous to the
discussion of each, we must first speak about enthusiasm, and show to
what part of the soul the enthusiastic energy pertains; whether each
part of it possesses this energy; if all enthusiasm is from the Gods;
and in what part of the soul it is ingenerated; or whether it subsists
in something else more excellent than soul. Where, then, does that which
is properly and primarily called enthusiasm subsist, and what is it? Of
the rational soul there are two parts, one of which is _dianoia_, but
the other _opinion_. Again, however, of dianoia, one part is said to be
the lowest, and is properly dianoia, but another part of it is the
highest, which is said to be the intellect of it, according to which the
soul especially becomes intellectual, and which some call intellect in
capacity. There is also another thing above this, which is the summit of
the whole soul, and most allied to _the one_, which likewise wishes well
to all things, and always gives itself up to the Gods, and is readily
disposed to do whatever they please. This, too, is said to be _the one_
of the soul, bears the image of the superessential one, and unites the
whole soul. But that these things necessarily thus subsist, we may learn
as follows: The rational soul derives its existence from all the causes
prior to itself, _i. e._ from intellect and the Gods. But it subsists
also from itself: for it perfects itself. So far, therefore, as it
subsists from the Gods, it possesses _the one_, which unites all its
powers, and all the multitude of itself, and conjoins them to _the one
itself_, and is the first recipient of the goods imparted by the Gods.
It likewise makes all the essence of the soul to be boniform, according
to which it is connected with the Gods, and united to them. But so far
as it subsists from intellect it possesses an intellectual nature,
according to which it apprehends forms, by simple projections, or
intuitions, and not discursively; and is conjoined to the intellect
which is above itself. And so far as it constitutes itself, it possesses
the dianoetic power, according to which it generates sciences and
certain theorems, energizes discursively, and collects conclusions from
propositions. For that it constitutes or gives subsistence to itself, is
evident from its imparting perfection to itself; since that which leads
itself to perfection, and imparts to itself well-being, will much more
impart to itself existence. For well-being is a greater thing than
being. If, therefore, the soul imparts that which is greater to itself,
it will much more impart that which is less. Hence that which is
primarily, properly, and truly enthusiasm from the Gods, is effected
according to this one of the soul, which is above dianoia, and above the
intellect of the soul; which one is at another time in a relaxed and
dormant state. This one, likewise, becoming illuminated [by the Gods],
all the life of the soul is illuminated, and also intellect, dianoia,
and the irrational part, and the resemblance of enthusiasm is
transmitted as far as to the body itself.

“Other enthusiasms, therefore, are produced about other parts of the
soul,[155] certain dæmons exciting them,[156] or the Gods also, though
not without the intervention of dæmons. For dianoia is said to energize
enthusiastically, when it discovers sciences and theorems in a very
short space of time, and in a greater degree than other men. Opinion,
likewise, and the phantasy, are said thus to energize when they discover
arts, and accomplish admirable works, such, for instance, as Phidias
effected in the formation of statues, and another in another art, as
also Homer says[157] of him who made the belt of Hercules, ‘that he
neither did nor would artificially produce such another.’ Anger,
likewise, is said to energize enthusiastically, when in battle it
energizes supernaturally.

         Like Mars, when brandishing his spear, he raged.[158]

But if some one, yielding to desire, should eat of that which reason
forbids, and through this should unexpectedly become well, you may say
that desire also, in this instance, energized enthusiastically, though
obscurely; so that enthusiasm is likewise produced about the other parts
of the soul. Enthusiasm, however, properly so called, is when this one
of the soul, which is above intellect, is excited to the Gods, and is
from thence inspired. But at different times it is possessed about the
aptitudes of itself, by different Gods; and is more or less possessed
when intellect or dianoia is that which is moved. As, therefore, when we
inquire what philosophy is, we do not always accurately define it, but
frequently, from an improper use of the word, call mathematics or
physics philosophy and science; we do the like also with respect to
enthusiasm. For though it should be the phantasy which is excited, we
are accustomed to call the excitation enthusiasm. Moreover, those who
ascribe enthusiasm to the temperatures of bodies, or the excellent
temperament of the air, or the ascendency of exhalations, or the
aptitudes of times and places, or the agency of the bodies that revolve
in the heavens, speak rather of the cooperating and material causes of
the thing than of the causes of it properly so called. You have,
therefore, for the producing cause of enthusiasm, the Gods; for the
material cause, the enthusiastically energizing soul itself, or the
external symbols; for the formal cause, the inspiration of the Gods
about _the one_ of the soul; and for the final cause, good.

“If, however, the Gods always wish the soul what is good, why does not
the soul always energize enthusiastically? May we not say, that the Gods
indeed always wish the soul what is good, but they are also willing that
the order of the universe should prevail, and that the soul, through
many causes, is not always adapted to enthusiasm, on which account it
does not always enthusiastically energize? But some say that the
telestic art extends as far as to the sublunary region. If, therefore,
they mean that no one of the superlunary and celestial natures energizes
in the sublunary region, they evidently assert what is absurd. But if
they mean that the Telestæ, or mystic operators, are not able to
energize above the lunar sphere, we say, that if all the allotments of
souls are sublunary, their assertion will be true; but if there are also
allotments of souls above the moon, as there are (for some are the
attendants of the sun, others of the moon, and others of Saturn, since
the Demiurgus disseminated some of them into the earth, others into the
moon, and others elsewhere), this being the case, it will be possible
for the soul to energize above the moon. For what the whole order of
things impacts to the soul for a very extended period of time, this the
soul is also able to impart to itself for a short space of time, when
assisted by the Gods through the telestic art. For the soul can never
energize above its own allotment, but can energize to the extent of it.
Thus, for instance, if the allotment of the soul was as far as to
philosophy, the soul would be able, though it should not choose a
philosophic but some other life, to energize in that life somewhat
philosophically. There are also said to be certain supermundane souls.
And thus we have shown how the soul energizes enthusiastically.

But how are statues said to have an enthusiastic energy? May we not say,
that a statue being inanimate, does not itself energize about divinity,
but the telestic art, purifying the matter of which the statue consists,
and placing round it certain characters and symbols, in the first place
renders it, through these means, animated, and causes it to receive a
certain life from the world; and, in the next place, after this, it
prepares the statue to be illuminated by a divine nature, through which
it always delivers oracles, as long as it is properly adapted. For the
statue, when it has been rendered perfect by the telestic art, remains
afterwards [endued with a prophetic power] till it becomes entirely
unadapted to divine illumination; but he who receives the inspiring
influence of the Gods receives it only at certain times, and not always.
But the cause of this is, that the soul, when filled with deity,
energizes about it. Hence, in consequence of energizing above its own
power, it becomes weary. For it would be a God, and similar to the souls
of the stars, if it did not become weary. But the statue, conformably to
its participations, remains illuminated. Hence the inaptitude of it
entirely proceeds into privation, unless it is again, _de novo_,
perfected and animated by the mystic operator. We have sufficiently
shown, therefore, that enthusiasm, properly so called, is effected about
_the one_ of the soul, and that it is an illumination of divinity.

“In the next place, let us discuss the order and the use of the four
manias, and show why the philosopher makes mention of these alone. Is it
because there are no other than these, or because these were sufficient
for his purpose? That there are, therefore, many other divine
inspirations and manias Plato himself indicates as he proceeds, and
prior to this, he makes mention of the inspiration from the Nymphs. But
there are also inspirations from Pan, from the mother of the Gods, and
from the Corybantes, which are elsewhere mentioned by Plato. Here,
however, he alone delivers these four manias; in the first place,
because these alone are sufficient to the soul, in the attainment of its
proper apocatastasis, as we shall afterwards show; and in the next
place, because he delivers the proximate steps of ascent to the soul.
For the gifts of the Gods to all beings are many and incomprehensible.
But now he delivers to us the energies of the Gods which are extended to
souls. He delivers, however, these four manias, not as if one of them
was not sufficient, and especially the amatory, to lead back the soul to
its pristine felicity; but at present the series and regular gradation
of them, and the orderly perfection of the soul, are unfolded. As,
therefore, it is possible for the tyrannic life, when suddenly changed,
to become aristocratic, through employing strenuous promptitude and a
divine allotment, but the gradual ascent is from a tyrannic to a
democratic, and from this to an oligarchic life, afterwards to a
timocratic, and at last to an aristocratic life, but the descent and
lapse are vice versa; thus also here, the soul being about to ascend,
and be restored to its former felicity, is in the first place possessed
with the musical mania, afterwards with the telestic, then with the
prophetic, and, in the last place, with the amatory mania. These
inspirations, however; conspire with, and are in want of, each other; so
abundant is their communion. For the telestic requires the
prophetic[159] mania; since the latter[160] interprets many things
pertaining to the former. And again, the prophetic requires the telestic
mania. For the telestic mania perfects and establishes oracular
predictions. Farther still, the prophetic uses the poetic and musical
mania. For prophets, as I may say, always speak in verse. And again, the
musical uses the prophetic mania spontaneously, as Plato says. But what
occasion is there to speak about the amatory and musical manias? For
nearly the same persons exercise both these, as, for instance, Sappho,
Anacreon, and the like, in consequence of these not being able to
subsist without each other. But it is very evident that the amatory
mania contributes to all these, since it is subservient to enthusiasm of
every kind: for no enthusiasm can be effected without amatory
inspiration. And you may see how Orpheus appears to have applied himself
to all these, as being in want of, and adhering to, each other. For we
learn that he was most telestic, and most prophetic, and was excited by
Apollo; and besides this, that he was most poetic, on which account he
is said to have been the son of Calliope. He was likewise most amatory,
as he himself acknowledges to Musæus, extending to him divine goods, and
rendering him perfect. Hence he appears to have been possessed with all
the manias, and this by a necessary consequence. For there is an
abundant union, conspiration, and alliance with each other, of the Gods
who preside over these manias, viz. of the Muses, Bacchus, Apollo, and
Love.

“It remains, therefore, that we should unfold the nature of each of the
manias, previously observing that those which are internal, and
originate from the soul itself, and give perfection to it, are of one
kind; but the external energies of them, and which preserve the outward
man, and our nature, are of another. The four external, however, are
analogous to the four internal manias. Let us consider, therefore, in
the first place, the internal, and which alone originate from the soul
itself, and let us see what they effect in the soul. In order, likewise,
that this may become manifest, and also their arrangement, let us survey
from on high, the descent, as Plato says, and defluxion of the wings of
the soul. From the beginning, therefore, and at first, the soul was
united to the Gods, and its unity to their one. But afterwards the soul
departing from this divine union descended into intellect, and no longer
possessed real beings unitedly, and in one, but apprehended and surveyed
them by simple projections, and, as it were, contacts of its intellect.
In the next place, departing from intellect, and descending into
reasoning and dianoia, it no longer apprehended real beings by simple
intuitions, but syllogistically and transitively, proceeding from one
thing to another, from propositions to conclusions. Afterwards,
abandoning true reasoning, and the dissolving peculiarity, it descended
into generation, and became filled with much irrationality and
perturbation. It is necessary, therefore, that it should recur to its
proper principles and again return to the place from whence it came. To
this ascent and apocatastasis, however, these four manias contribute.
And the musical mania, indeed, leads to symphony and harmony, the
agitated and disturbed nature of the parts of the soul, which were
hurried away to indefiniteness and inaptitude, and were filled with
abundant tumult. But the telestic mania causes the soul to be perfect
and entire, and prepares it to energize intellectually. For the musical
mania alone harmonizes and represses the parts of the soul; but the
telestic causes the whole of it to energize, and prepares it to become
entire, so that the intellectual part of it may energize. For the soul,
by descending into the realms of generation, resembles a thing broken
and relaxed. And the circle of _the same_, or the intellectual part of
it, is fettered; but the circle of _the different_, or the doxastic
part, sustains many fractures and turnings. Hence, the soul energizes
partially, and not according to the whole of itself. The Dionysiacal
inspiration, therefore, after the parts of the soul are coharmonized,
renders it perfect, and causes it to energize according to the whole of
itself, and to live intellectually. But the Apolloniacal mania converts
and coexcites all the multiplied powers, and the whole of the soul, to
_the one_ of it. Hence Apollo is denominated as elevating the soul from
multitude to _the one_. And the remaining mania, the amatory, receiving
the soul united, conjoins this one of the soul to the Gods, and to
intelligible beauty. As the givers, therefore, of these manias are
transcendently united, and are in each other, the gifts also on this
account participate of, and communicate with, each other, and the
recipient, which is the soul, possesses an adaptation to all the gifts.
This, therefore, is the order, and these are the energies and powers
within the soul itself, of these four manias.

“But let us also consider their external energies on man, and what they
outwardly effect about us. The musical mania, therefore, causes us to
speak in verse, and to act and be moved rythmically, and to sing in
metre, the splendid deeds of divine men, and their virtues and pursuits;
and, through these, to discipline our life, in the same manner as the
inward manias coharmonize our soul. But the telestic mania, expelling
every thing foreign, contaminating, and noxious, preserves our life
perfect and innoxious, and banishing an insane and diabolical phantasy,
causes us to be sane, entire, and perfect, just as the internal telestic
mania makes the soul to be perfect and entire. Again, the prophetic
mania contracts into one the extension and infinity of time, and sees,
as in one present now, all things, the past, the future, and the
existing time. Hence it predicts what will be, which it sees as present
to itself. It causes us, therefore, to pass through life in an
irreprehensible manner; just as the internal prophetic mania contracts
and elevates all the multiplied and many powers and lives of the soul to
_the one_, in order that it may in a greater degree be preserved and
connected. But the amatory mania converts young persons to us, and
causes them to become our friends, being instructive of youth, and
leading them from sensible beauty to our psychical beauty, and from this
sending them to intelligible beauty; in the same manner as the internal
amatory mania conjoins _the one_ of the soul to the Gods.

“All the above mentioned manias, therefore, are superior to the prudent
and temperate energies of the soul. Nevertheless, there is a mania which
is coordinate with temperance, and which we say has in a certain respect
a prerogative above[161] it. For certain inspirations are produced,
according to the middle and also according to the doxastic reasons of
the soul, conformably to which artists effect certain things, and
discover theorems beyond expectation, as Asclepius, for instance, in
medicine, and Hercules in the practic[162] life.”

Afterwards, in commenting on what Plato says of the mania from the
Muses, viz. “that it adorns the infinite deeds of the ancients,” Hermeas
observes, “that the inward energy in the soul of the poetic mania, by
applying itself to superior and intelligible natures, imparts to
subordinate natures harmony and order; but that the external
divinely-inspired poetry celebrates the deeds of the ancients, and
instructs both its contemporaries and posterity, extending its energies
every where.” But Plato says, “that he who without the divinely-inspired
mania of the Muses expects to become a divine poet, will, by thus
fancying, become himself imperfect, and his poetry will be vanquished
and concealed by the poetry which is the progeny of mania.” Hermeas
adds, “For what similitude is there between the poetry of Chærilus and
Callimachus, and that of Homer and Pindar? For the divinely-inspired
poets, as being filled from the Muses, always invoke them, and extend to
them all that they say.” For a fuller and most admirable account of the
poetic mania, and of the different species of poetry by Proclus, see the
notes on the tenth book of the Republic, in my translation of Plato, and
also the Introduction to my translation of the Rhetoric, Poetic, and
Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle.

From what is here said by Hermeas about enthusiasm, the intelligent
reader will easily see that none of the Roman poets, whose works have
been transmitted to us, possessed that which is primarily, properly, and
truly enthusiasm, or that highest species of it in which _the one_ of
the soul is illuminated by a divine nature, and through transcendent
similitude is united to it. As to Virgil, indeed, the prince of these
poets, though he invokes the Muse in the beginning of the Æneid, yet his
invocation of her is but a partial and secondary thing. For he only
calls on her to unfold to him the causes that involved a man of such
remarkable piety as Æneas in so many misfortunes:

                      Musa, mihi causa memora, &c.

And, confiding in his own genius, he begins his poem without soliciting
supernal inspiration,

                        Arma, virumque cano, &c.

To which may be added, that this placing himself before the Muse,
resembles the _ego et meus rex_ of Wolsey. On the contrary,
divinely-inspired poets, as Hermeas well observes, knock, as it were, at
the gates of the Muses, and thus being filled from thence exclaim,

                         Εσπετε νυν μοι Μουσαι

And,

                            Μηνιν αειδε θεα—

And,

                        Ανδρα μοι εννεπε Μουσα.

For being always extended to them, they dispose the whole of what they
afterwards say as derived from their inspiring influence. With an
arrogance too, peculiar to the Romans, who, as a certain Greek poet[163]
says, were a people

                         Beyond measure proud.

He associates himself, in his fourth Eclogue, with the Muses, as their
equal:

                 Sicelides Musæ, paulo majora canamus.

Which reminds me of what Suetonius relates of Caligula, that he would
place himself between the statues of Castor and Pollux, and confer
privately with Jupiter Capitolinus, fancying that he was intimate with,
and of equal dignity with, these divinities. And as to the poets that
have lived since the fall of the Roman empire, it would be ridiculous to
suppose that they possessed this highest enthusiasm, as they did not
believe in the existence of the sources from whence it is alone
genuinely derived.


P. 67. _The attentive power of the soul._ This is that part or power of
the rational soul which primarily apprehends the operations of the
senses. For the rational soul not only has intellect in capacity, the
dianoetic power, will, and choice, but another power, which is called by
the best of the Greek interpreters of Aristotle, as well as by
Iamblichus, το προσεκτικον, _the attentive_. This power investigates and
perceives whatever is transacted in man; and says, I understand, I
think, I opine, I am angry, I desire. And, in short, this attentive part
of the rational soul passes through all the rational, irrational,
vegetable, or physical powers. If, therefore, it is requisite it should
pass through all these powers, it will also proceed through the senses,
and say, I see, I hear; for it is the peculiarity of that which
apprehends energies thus to speak. Hence if it is the attentive power
which says these things, it is this power which apprehends the energy of
sensibles; for it is necessary that the nature which apprehends all
things should be one, since man also is one. For if one part of it
should apprehend _these_, and another _those_ things, it is just, as
Aristotle says, as if you should perceive _this_ thing, and _I_ that. It
is necessary, therefore, that the attentive power should be one
indivisible thing.

P. 74. _For the human soul is on all sides darkened by body, which he
who denominates the river of Negligence, or the water of Oblivion_,
&c.——_will not by such appellations sufficiently express its turpitude_.
“The whole of generation, as well as the human body,” says Proclus in
Tim. lib. v. p. 339, “may be called a river, through its rapid,
impetuous, and unstable flux. Thus also in the Republic, Plato calls the
whole genesiurgic nature the river of Lethe; in which are contained, as
Empedocles says, Oblivion, and the meadow of Ate; the voracity of
matter, and the light-hating world, as the Gods say; and the winding
streams under which many are drawn down, as the Chaldean oracles
assert.”


P. 105. _But there are a certain few who by employing a certain
supernatural power of intellect, are removed from nature_, &c. The class
to which these few belong is beautifully unfolded, as follows, by
Plotinus, in the beginning of his Treatise on Intellect, Ideas, and real
Being. “Since all men from their birth employ sense prior to intellect,
and are necessarily first conversant with sensibles, some proceeding no
farther, pass through life, considering these as the first and last of
things, and apprehending that whatever is painful among these is evil,
and whatever is pleasant is good; thus thinking it sufficient to pursue
the one and avoid the other. Those, too, among them who pretend to a
greater share of reason than others, esteem this to be wisdom, being
affected in a manner similar to more heavy birds, who collecting many
things from the earth, and being oppressed with the weight, are unable
to fly on high, though they have received wings for this purpose from
nature. But others are in a small degree elevated from things
subordinate, the more excellent part of the soul recalling them from
pleasure to a more worthy pursuit. As they are, however, unable to look
on high, and as not possessing any thing else which can afford them
rest, they betake themselves, together with the name of virtue, to
actions and the election of things inferior, from which they at first
endeavoured to raise themselves, though in vain. _In the third class is
the race of divine men_, who, through a more excellent power, and with
piercing eyes, acutely perceive supernal light, to the vision of which
they raise themselves above the clouds and darkness, as it were, of this
lower world, and there abiding despise every thing in these regions of
sense; being no otherwise delighted with the place which is truly and
properly their own, than he who after many wanderings is at length
restored to his lawful country.” See my translation of the whole of this
treatise.


P. 117. _By mire, therefore, understand every thing corporeal-formed and
material._ “Matter,” says Simplicius in his Commentary on the first book
of Aristotle’s Physics, “is nothing else than the mutation of sensibles,
with respect to intelligibles, deviating from thence, and carried
downwards to nonbeing. Those things, indeed, which are the properties of
sensibles are irrational, corporeal, distributed into parts, and passing
into bulk and divulsion, through an ultimate progression into
generation, _viz._ into matter; for matter is always truly the last
sediment. Hence, also, the Egyptians call the dregs of the first life,
which they symbolically denominate water, matter, being as it were a
certain mire. And matter is, as it were, the receptacle of generated and
sensible natures, not subsisting as any definite form, but as the state
or condition of subsistence; just as the impartible, the immaterial,
true being, and things of this kind, are the constitution of an
intelligible nature; all forms, indeed, subsisting both in sensibles and
intelligibles, but in the former materially, and in the latter
immaterially; viz. in the one impartibly and truly, but in the other
partibly and shadowy. Hence every form is in sensibles distributed
according to material interval.”


P. 120. _Through the innovation and illegality of the Greeks._
Iamblichus says, that through this innovation and illegality, both names
and prayers have at present lost their efficacy. For during his time,
and forborne centuries prior to it, the genuine religion of the Greeks
was rapidly declining, through their novelty and volatility, of which he
here complains. Hence the Emperor Julian, in the fragments of his
treatise against the Christians, preserved by Ciryl, says, speaking of
the Christians, “If any one wishes to consider the truth respecting you,
he will find that your impiety consists of the Judaic audacity, and the
_indolence_ and _confusion of the heathens_. For deriving from both, not
that which is most beautiful, but the worst, you have fabricated a web
of evils.——Hence, from the innovation of the Hebrews, you have seized
blasphemy towards the venerable Gods; but from our religion you have
cast aside reverence to every nature more excellent than man, and the
love of paternal institutes.” Το γαρ αληθες ει τις υπερ υμων εθελοι
σκοπειν, ευρησει την υμετεραν ασεβειαν, εκ τε της Ιουδαϊκης τολμης και
της παρα τοις εθνεσιν αδιαφοριας και χυδαιοτητος συγκειμενην. εξ αμφοιν
γαρ ουτι το καλλιστον αλλα το χειρον ελκυσαντες, παρυφην κακων
ειργασασθε.——Απο μεν ουν της Εβραιων καινοτομιας το βλασφημειν
τιμωμενους θεους ηρπασατε· απο δε της παρ’ ημιν θρησκειας το μεν ευλαβες
τε ομου προς απασαν την κρειττονα φυσιν, και των πατριων αγαπητικον,
απολελοιπατε.


P. 122. _Prior to truly existing beings, and total principles_, &c. Of
the two most ancient principles of all things mentioned in this chapter,
as celebrated by Hermes, the first corresponds to _the one itself_ of
Plato, and the second to _being itself_, or superessential being, the
summit of the intelligible triad; which two principles are beautifully
unfolded by Proclus in the second and third books of his treatise on the
Theology of Plato.

P. 122. _He arranges the God Eneph prior to, and as the leader of, the
celestial Gods.—But prior to this he arranges the impartible one, which
he says is the first paradigm, and which he denominates Eicton._ It
appears to me that the former of these two divinities is the same with
Saturn, who is the summit of the intellectual order of Gods; and that
the latter is _the animal itself_ of Plato, or the Phanes of Orpheus,
who subsists at the extremity of the intelligible triad. For the God
Eneph is said by Iamblichus to be an intellect intellectually perceiving
itself, and converting intellections to itself; and these are the
characteristics of Saturn. And the God Eicton is said to be the first
paradigm, and this is also asserted of Phanes.


P. 123. _For the books which are circulated under the name of Hermes,
contain Hermaic opinions, though they frequently employ the language of
the philosophers: for they were translated from the Egyptian tongue by
men who were not unskilled in philosophy._ A few only of these books are
now extant, but what is here said by Iamblichus sufficiently proves
their authenticity, and that they contain the genuine doctrines of
Hermes. They have doubtless, however, been occasionally interpolated by
some of the early Christians, though not to that extent which modern
critics, and that mitred sophist Warburton, suppose.


P. 123. _And such as have written concerning the decans._ The twelve
parts, mentioned in the preceding chapter, into which the Egyptians
divide the heavens, are the twelve signs of the zodiac. But the
thirty-six parts are the twelve houses of the planets, divided into
three other portions, which they call decans. Ptolemy, however, in his
Quadripartite, subverts this doctrine of the Egyptians. Concerning these
decans, see Scaliger ad Manilium, Kircher II. parte Oedipi, and
Salmasius de Annis climactericis. Gale also gives the following extract
from Hermes relative to the decans, which had not been before published,
and which he derived from a MS. copy of Stobæus in the possession of
Vossius. Φαμεν ω τεκνον, περιεκτικον των απαντων ειναι το σωμα. εννοησον
ουν αυτο ωσπερ κυκλοειδες σχημα——υπο δε τον κυκλον του σωματος τουτου
τεταχθαι τους λϛ δεκανους, μεσους του παντος κυκλου του
ζωδιακου.——νοησωμεν ωσπερει φυλακας αυτους προϊστασθαι των εν κοσμῳ
απαντων παντα συνεχοντας——και τηρουντας την των παντων ευταξιαν.——ετι δε
νοησον ω Τατ, οτι απαθεις εισιν ων οι αλλοι αστερες πασχουσιν. ουτε γαρ
επεχομενοι τον δρομον στηριζουσιν, ουτε κωλυομενοι αναποδιζουσιν, αλλ’
ουδε μην απο του φωτος του ηλιου σκεπονται, απερ πασχουσιν οι αλλοι
αστερες. ελευθεροι δε οντες υπερανω παντων, ωσπερ φυλακες και επισκοποι
ακριβεις του παντος, περιεχονται τῳ νυχθημερῳ το παν.——εχουσι προς ημας
την μεγιστην δυναμιν. _i. e._ “We say, O son, that the body [of the
universe] is comprehensive of all things. Conceive, therefore, this to
be as it were of a circular form.——But under the circle of this body the
thirty-six decans are arranged, as the media of the whole circle of the
zodiac.——These, likewise, must be understood to preside as guardians
over every thing in the world, connecting and containing all things——and
preserving the established order of all things.——Farther still,
understand, O Tat, that these decans are impassive to the things which
the other stars suffer. For neither being detained, do they stop their
course, nor being impeded do they recede, nor are they, like the other
stars, concealed as with a veil by the light of the sun. But being
liberated above all things, they comprehend the universe as the
guardians and accurate inspectors of it, in the Nycthemeron [or the
space of night and day].——They also possess, with respect to us, the
greatest power.”


P. 125. _So that what you add from Homer, “that the Gods are flexible,”
it is not holy to assert._ The words of Homer are στρεπτοι δε τε και
θεοι αυτοι, and are to be found in Iliad ix. v. 493. But when Iamblichus
says, it is not holy to assert the Gods are flexible, he means that it
is not holy according to the literal signification of the words; divine
flexibility indicating nothing more than this, that those who through
depravity were before unadapted to receive the illuminations of the
Gods, and in consequence of this were subject to the power of avenging
dæmons; when afterwards they obtain pardon of their guilt through
prayers and sacrifices, and through methods of this kind apply a remedy
to their vices, again become partakers of the goodness of the Gods. So
that divine flexibility is a resumption of the participation of divine
light and goodness by those who through inaptitude were before deprived
of it.


P. 130. _Dæmons preside over the parts of our body._ Proclus in the
fragments of his Ten Doubts concerning Providence, preserved by
Fabricius in the eighth vol. of his Bibliotheca Græca, observes, “That
the Gods, with an exempt transcendency, extend their providence to all
things, but that dæmons, dividing their superessential subsistence,
receive the guardianship of different herds of animals, distributing the
providence of the Gods, as Plato says, as far as to the most ultimate
division. Hence some of them preside over men, others over lions or
other animals, and others over plants; and still more partially, some
are the inspective guardians of the eye, others of the heart, and others
of the liver.” He adds, “all things, however, are full of Gods, some of
whom exert their providential energies immediately, but others through
dæmons as media: not that the Gods are incapable of being present to all
things, but that ultimate are themselves unable to participate primary
natures.” Hence it must be said that there is one principal dæmon, who
is the guardian and governor of every thing that is in us, and many
dæmons subordinate to him, who preside over our parts.


P. 134. _Hence it is requisite to consider how he may be liberated from
these bonds._ “The one salvation of the soul herself,” says Proclus in
Tim. lib. v. p. 330, “which is extended by the Demiurgus, and which
liberates her from the circle of generation, from abundant wanderings,
and an inefficacious life, is her return to the intellectual form, and a
flight from every thing which naturally adheres to us from generation.
For it is necessary that the soul, which is hurled like seed into the
realms of generation, should lay aside the stubble and bark, as it were,
which she obtained from being disseminated into these fluctuating
realms; and that purifying herself from every thing circumjacent, she
should become an intellectual flower and fruit, delighting in an
intellectual life, instead of doxastic nutriment, and pursuing the
uniform and simple energy of the period of sameness, instead of the
abundantly wandering motion of the period which is characterized by
difference. For she contains each of these circles, and twofold powers.
And of her horses one is good, but the other the contrary [as is said in
the Phædrus]. And one of these leads her to generation, but the other
from generation to true being. The one also leads her round the
genesiurgic, but the other round the intellectual circle. For the period
of the same and the similar elevates to intellect, and an intelligible
nature, and to the first and most excellent habit. But this habit is
that according to which the soul being winged governs the whole world,
becoming assimilated to the Gods themselves. And this is the universal
form of life in the soul, just as that is the partial form, when she
falls into the last body, and becomes something belonging to an
individual, instead of belonging to the universe. The middle of these,
also, is the partial universal, when she lives in conjunction with her
middle vehicle, as a citizen of generation. Dismissing, therefore, her
first habit, which subsists according to an alliance to the whole of
generation, and laying aside the irrational nature which connects her
with generation, likewise governing her irrational part by reason, and
extending opinion to intellect, she will be circularly led to a happy
life from the wanderings about the regions of sense; which life those
that are initiated by Orpheus in the mysteries of Bacchus and
Proserpine, pray that they may obtain, together with the allotments of
the [celestial] sphere, and a cessation of evil. But if our soul
necessarily lives well, when living according to the circle of sameness,
much more must this be the case with divine souls. It is, however,
possible for our soul to live according to the circle of sameness, when
purified, as Plato says. Cathartic virtue, therefore, alone must be
called the salvation of souls; since this cuts off, and vehemently
obliterates, material natures, and the passions which adhere to us from
generation; separates the soul and leads it to intellect; and causes it
to leave on earth the vehicles with which it is invested. For souls in
descending receive from the elements different vehicles, aerial,
aquatic, and terrestrial; and thus at last enter into this gross bulk.
For how, without a medium, could they proceed into this body from
immaterial spirits?”


                                THE END.




                 _Printed by_ BALLANTYNE, HANSON & CO.
                         _Edinburgh and London_

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Footnote 1:

  According to this theology, as I have elsewhere shown, in every order
  of things, a triad is the immediate progeny of a monad. Hence the
  intelligible triad proceeds immediately from the ineffable principle
  of things. Phanes, or intelligible intellect, who is the last of the
  intelligible order, is the monad, leader, and producing cause of a
  triad, which is denominated νοητος και νοερος, i. e. _intelligible,
  and at the same time intellectual_. In like manner the extremity of
  this order produces immediately from itself the intellectual triad,
  Saturn, Rhea, and Jupiter. Again, Jupiter, who is also the Demiurgus,
  is the monad of the supermundane triad. Apollo, who subsists at the
  extremity of the supermundane order, produces a triad of liberated
  Gods. (Θεοι απολυτοι.) And the extremity of the liberated order
  becomes the monad of a triad of mundane Gods. This theory, too, which
  is the progeny of the most consummate science, is in perfect
  conformity with the Chaldean theology. And hence it is said in one of
  the Chaldean oracles, “_In every world a triad shines forth, of which
  a monad is the ruling principle_.” (Παντι γαρ εν κοσμῳ λαμπει τριας ης
  μονας αρχει). I refer the reader, who is desirous of being fully
  convinced of all this, to my translation of Proclus on the Theology of
  Plato.

Footnote 2:

  _Viz._ The Philosophical Works of Proclus, together with those of
  Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Syrianus, Ammonius, Damascius,
  Olympiodorus, and Simplicius.

Footnote 3:

  Ενα ιδοις αν εν πασα γῃ ομοφωνον νομον και λογον, οτι θεος εις παντων
  βασιλευς και πατηρ, και θεοι πολλοι, θεου παιδες, συναρχοντες θεῳ.
  ταυτα και ο ελλην λεγει, και ο βαρβαρος λεγει, και ο ηπειρωτης και ο
  θαλαττιος, και ο σοφος και ο ασοφος. κᾳν επι του ωκεανου ελθῃς τας
  ηϊονας, κᾳκει θεοι, τοις μεν ανισχοντες αγχου μαλα, τοις δε
  καταδυομενοι. Dissert. i. Edit. Princ.

Footnote 4:

  “Diogenes Laertius says of Pythagoras, that he _charged his disciples
  not to give equal degrees of honour to the Gods and heroes_. Herodotus
  (in Euterpe) says of the Greeks, _That they worshiped Hercules two
  ways, one as an immortal deity, and so they sacrificed to him; and
  another as a Hero, and so they celebrated his memory_. Isocrates
  (Encom. Helen.) distinguishes between the honours of heroes and Gods,
  when he speaks of Menelaus and Helena. But the distinction is no where
  more fully expressed than in the Greek inscription upon the statue of
  Regilla, wife to Herodes Atticus, as Salmasius thinks, which was set
  up in his temple at Triopium, and taken from the statue itself by
  Sirmondus; where it is said, _That she had neither the honour of a
  mortal nor yet that which was proper to the Gods_. Ουδε ιερα θνητοις,
  αταρ ουδε θεοισιν ομοια. It seems by the inscription of Herodes, and
  by the testament of Epicteta, extant in Greek in the _Collection of
  Inscriptions_, that it was in the power of particular families to keep
  festival days in honour of some of their own family, and to give
  _heroical honours_ to them. In that noble inscription at Venice, we
  find three days appointed every year to be kept, and a _confraternity_
  established for that purpose with the laws of it. The first day to be
  observed in honour of the Muses, and sacrifices to be offered to them
  as _deities_. The second and third days in honour of the _heroes_ of
  the family; between which honour and that of deities, they showed the
  difference by the distance of time between them, and the preference
  given to the other. But whereinsoever the _difference_ lay, that there
  was a _distinction_ acknowledged among them appears by this passage of
  Valerius, in his excellent oration, extant in Dionysius Halicarnass.
  Antiq. Rom. lib. ii. p. 696. _I call_, says he, _the Gods to witness,
  whose temples and altars our family has worshiped with common
  sacrifices; and next after them, I call the Genii of our ancestors, to
  whom we give δευτερας τιμας, the second honours next to the Gods_, (as
  Celsus calls those, τας προσηκουσας τιμας, _the due honours that
  belong to the lower dæmons_.) From which we take notice, that the
  Heathens did not confound all _degrees of divine worship_, giving to
  the lowest object the same which they supposed to be due to the
  _celestial deities_, or the _supreme_ God. So that if the distinction
  of divine worship will excuse from idolatry, the Heathens were not to
  blame for it.” See Stillingfleet’s Answer to a book entitled Catholics
  no Idolaters, p. 510, 513, &c.

Footnote 5:

  See the extracts from Plutarch, in which this is shown, in the
  Introduction to my translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

Footnote 6:

  Answer to Catholics no Idolaters. Lond. 1676. p. 211.

Footnote 7:

  Arrian. de Exped. Alex. l. iv. et Curt. lib. viii.

Footnote 8:

  Vit. Artaxerx. Ælian. Var. Hist. lib. i. c. 21.

Footnote 9:

  Justin. lib. vi.

Footnote 10:

  Panegyr.

Footnote 11:

  Lib. vii.

Footnote 12:

  Lib. vi. cap. iii.

Footnote 13:

  Και κολασεως δε ειδος ειναι αθειαν ουκ απεικος. τους γαρ γνοντας
  θεους, και καταφρονησαντας, ευλογον εν ετερῳ βιῳ και της γνωσεως
  στερεσθαι, και τους εαυτων βασιλεας ως θεους τιμησαντας, εδει την
  δικην αυτων ποιησαι των θεων εκπεσειν. Cap. xviii.

Footnote 14:

  και χρη τον επι τας αρχας αναβαινοντα ζητειν, ει δυνατον ειναι τι
  κρειττον της υποτεθεισης αρχης κᾳν ευρεθῃ, παλιν επ’ εκεινου ζητειν,
  εως αν εις τας ακροτατας εννοιας ελθωμεν, ων ουκετι σεμνοτερας εχομεν·
  και μη στησαι την αναβασιν. ουδε γαρ ευλαβητεον μη κενεμβατωμεν,
  μειζονα τινα και υπερβαινοντα τας πρωτας αρχας περι αυτων εννοουντες.
  ου γαρ δυνατον τηλικουτον πηδημα πηδησαι τας ημετερας εννοιας, ως
  παρισωθηναι τῃ αξιᾳ των πρωτων αρχων, ου λεγω και υπερπτηναι. μια γαρ
  αυτη προς θεον ανατασις αριστη, και ως δυνατον απταιστος. και ων
  εννοουμεν αγαθων τα σεμνοτατα, και αγιωτατα, και πρωτουργα, και
  ονοματα και πραγματα αυτῳ ανατιθεντας ειδεναι βεβαιως, οτι μηδεν
  ανατεθεικαμεν αξιον. αρκει δε ημιν εις συγγνωμην, το μηδεν εχειν
  εκεινων υπερτερον. Simplic. in Epict. Enchir. p. 207. Lond. 1670. 8vo.

Footnote 15:

  Of the first principles, says Damascius in MS. περι αρχων, the
  Egyptians said nothing, but celebrated it as a darkness beyond all
  intellectual conception, a thrice unknown darkness. Πρωτην αρχην
  ανυμνηκασιν, σκοτος υπερ πασαν νοησιν, σκοτος αγνωστον τρις τουτο
  επιφημιζοντες.

Footnote 16:

  For farther particulars respecting this most extraordinary man, see
  the introduction to my translation of his Life of Pythagoras, and my
  History of the Restoration of the Platonic Theology.

Footnote 17:

  Iliad, lib. x. v. 493.

Footnote 18:

  Gale has omitted to give the original of the sentence contained in the
  brackets; the translation of which I have added from the answer of
  Iamblichus to this epistle.

Footnote 19:

  Here also the original is omitted by Gale, and the translation of it
  is given by me from the text of Iamblichus.

Footnote 20:

  The paragraph within the brackets is omitted in the original; but I
  have supplied it from the following answer of Iamblichus to this
  Epistle. This omission is not noticed by Gale.

Footnote 21:

  Here likewise the words within the brackets, which are omitted in the
  original, are added from Iamblichus; but the omission is not noticed
  by Gale.

Footnote 22:

  The following testimony of an anonymous Greek writer, prefixed to the
  manuscript of this treatise, which Gale published, proves that this
  work was written by Iamblichus: Ιστεον οτι ο φιλοσοφος Προκλος
  υπομνηματιζων τας του μεγαλου Πλωτινου εννεαδας, λεγει οτι ο
  αντιγραφων εις την προκειμενην του Πορφυριου επιστολην, ο θεσπεσιος
  εστιν Ιαμβλιχος· και δια το της υποθεσεως οικειον και ακολουθον,
  υποκρινεται προσωπον Αιγυπτιου τινος Αβαμωνος· αλλα και το της λεξεως
  κομματικον και αφοριστικον, και το των εννοιων πραγματικον,  και
  γλαφυρον, και ενθουν, μαρτυρει τον Προκλον καλως και κριναντα, και
  ιστορησαντα. _i. e._ “It is requisite to know that the philosopher
  Proclus, in his Commentary on the Enneads of the great Plotinus, says
  that it is the divine Iamblichus who answers the prefixed Epistle of
  Porphyry, and who assumes the person of a certain Egyptian of the name
  of Abammon, through the affinity and congruity of the hypothesis. And,
  indeed, the conciseness and definiteness of the diction, and the
  efficacious, elegant, and divine nature of the conceptions, testify
  that the decision of Proclus is just.” That this, indeed, was the
  opinion of Proclus, is evident from a passage in his Commentaries on
  the Timæus of Plato, which has escaped the notice of Gale, and which
  the reader will find in a note on the fourth chapter of the eighth
  section of the following translation.

Footnote 23:

  In the original κατα τας κοινας εννοιας, which Gale erroneously
  translates _contra communes opiniones_.

Footnote 24:

  Damascius περι αρχων says, “that _difference_ not existing, there will
  not be knowledge.” And, “that the contact as of one with one is above
  knowledge.” Likewise, “that the intellectual perception of the first
  intelligible is without any difference or distinction. ετεροτητος μη
  ουσης, μηδε γνωσις εσται. Et συναφη ως ενος προς εν, υπερ γνωσιν.
  Alibi, διακριτος η του πρωτου νοητου νοησις.

Footnote 25:

  Between souls that always abide on high with purity, such as the souls
  of _essential_ heroes, and those that descend into the regions of
  mortality, and are defiled with vice, such as the souls of the greater
  part of mankind, the class of _undefiled_ souls subsists. These
  descend into the realms of generation, partly from that necessity by
  which all human souls are, at times, drawn down to the earth, and
  partly for the benevolent purpose of benefiting those of an inferior
  class. But they descend without being defiled with vice. They are also
  called heroes, κατα σχεσιν, _i. e._ according to _habitude_, in order
  to distinguish them from _essential_ heroes. And, in the Pythagoric
  Golden Verses, they are denominated the _terrestrial_ heroes.

Footnote 26:

  For αυτην εαυτοις ουσαν in this place, it is necessary to read αυτην
  εαυτης ουσαν.

Footnote 27:

  For εποχη here, I read μετοχη.

Footnote 28:

  _Viz._ In the plenitudes, or _total_ perfections, of the Gods.

Footnote 29:

  _i. e._ Without habitude, proximity, or alliance to the things which
  it illuminates.

Footnote 30:

  What is here asserted by Iamblichus is perfectly true, and confirmed
  by experience, _viz._ that the passions, when _moderately_ gratified,
  are vanquished without violence. But Gale, not understanding this,
  says, “Hoc adeo verum est, ac si dixisset, ignem extingues, oleum
  addendo camino.” For a moderate gratification of the passions does not
  resemble the pouring of oil on fire; since this similitude is only
  applicable to them when they are _immoderately_ indulged.

Footnote 31:

  See my Dissertation on the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries.

Footnote 32:

  In the original, Και δη, και “αι της μηνιδος εξιλασεις” εσονται
  σαφεις, εαν την μηνιν των δεων καταμαθωμεν, which Gale most
  erroneously translates as follows: “Sed et ratio possit reddi
  _supplicationum, quibus divinam iram procuramus_, si recte
  intelligamus, qualis sit deorum ira.”

Footnote 33:

  _Viz._ Punishments produced by the realms of generation, or the
  sublunary region.

Footnote 34:

  It is well observed by Proclus, “that divine necessity concurs with
  the divine will.” Θεια αναγκη συντρεχει τῃ θειᾳ βουλησει. Procl. in
  Tim. lib. i.

Footnote 35:

  For νοητον here, it is obviously necessary to read νοερον.

Footnote 36:

  For τουτο here, it is necessary to read ταυτο.

Footnote 37:

  For as a celestial body consists of light so pure and simple, that,
  compared with a terrestrial body, it may be said to be immaterial;
  hence, like the light of the sun, it cannot be divided, or in other
  words, one part of it cannot be separated from another.

Footnote 38:

  For προς αυτην in this place, I read προς αυτα.

Footnote 39:

  The nature of _the one_, as it is _all-receptive_, and
  _all-productive_ (πανδεχης και παντοφυης) exhibits in itself a certain
  representation and indication of multitude; for it is all things prior
  to all.

Footnote 40:

  For the Gods are essentialized in _the one_; or, as Damascius
  observes, speaking Chaldaically, in the paternal peculiarity. For in
  every God there is father, power, and intellect; _father_ being the
  same as hyparxis and _the one_.

Footnote 41:

  _Viz._ According to the difference which there is between the
  invisibility of Gods and the invisibility of dæmons.

Footnote 42:

  The _cosmocrators_, or governors of the world, are the _planets_. See
  the fourth book of my translation of Proclus on the Timæus of Plato.

Footnote 43:

  For πυριως in this place, I read εμπυριως. For the empyrean world,
  according to the Chaldeans, is above the material worlds, and emits a
  supermundane fire or light.

Footnote 44:

  For περιουσια here, it is necessary to read παρουσια.

Footnote 45:

  These are terrestrial dæmons, to whom the Chaldean oracle alludes,
  which says, “The wild beasts of the earth shall inhabit thy vessel,”
  _i. e._ as Psellus explains it, the composite temperature of the soul.

Footnote 46:

  For πεπλανημενην here, it seems requisite to read πεπλασμενην. Gale
  also, in his version, in this place has fictum.

Footnote 47:

  _i. e._ The inexplicable theurgic signs or symbols.

Footnote 48:

  For υπνος here, it is necessary to read αυπνος. For Iamblichus has
  before shown that divine dreams are not produced in sleep, but either
  when sleep leaves us, or between sleeping and waking, or when we are
  perfectly awake. The necessity of this emendation is also evident from
  what Iamblichus shortly after adds, viz. _that we must take away from
  divine dreams the being asleep_; i. e. the being in a profound sleep.

Footnote 49:

  In the original there is nothing more than λεγουσι δε ταδε in this
  place; but the sense requires that we should read λεγουσι δε οι σοφοι
  ταδε. And this emendation is confirmed by the versions of Scutellius
  and Gale.

Footnote 50:

  For κατα τα μεταξυ διαλαμβανομενα κ. λ, I read μετα κ. λ.

Footnote 51:

  “Among the deeds of Pythagoras,” says Iamblichus, in his Life of that
  father of philosophy, (chap. xxv.) “it is said, that once through the
  spondaic [_i. e._ Doric] song of a piper he extinguished the rage of a
  Tauromenian lad, who had been feasting by night, and intended to burn
  the vestibule of his mistress, in consequence of seeing her coming
  from the house of his rival. For the lad was inflamed and excited [to
  this rash attempt] by a Phrygian song; which, however, Pythagoras most
  rapidly suppressed. But Pythagoras, as he was astronomizing, happened
  to meet with the Phrygian piper at an unseasonable time of night, and
  persuaded him to change his Phrygian for a spondaic song; through
  which the fury of the lad being immediately repressed, he returned
  home in an orderly manner, though a little before this he could not be
  in the least restrained, nor would, in short, bear any admonition; and
  even stupidly insulted Pythagoras when he met him. When a certain
  youth, also, rushed with a drawn sword on Anchilus, the host of
  Empedocles, because, being a judge, he had publicly condemned his
  father to death, and would have slain him as a homicide, Empedocles
  changed the intention of the youth, by singing to his lyre that verse
  of Homer,

              Nepenthe, without gall, o’er every ill
              Oblivion spreads.
                                              ODYSS. lib. 4.

  And thus snatched his host Anchilus from death, and the youth from the
  crime of homicide. It is also related, that the youth from that time
  became the most celebrated of the disciples of Pythagoras. Farther
  still, the whole Pythagoric school produced, by certain appropriate
  songs, what they called _exartysis_, or adaptation; _synarmoga_, or
  elegance of manners; and _epaphe_, or contact, usefully conducting the
  dispositions of the soul to passions contrary to those which it before
  possessed. For when they went to bed, they purified the reasoning
  power from the perturbations and noises to which it had been exposed
  during the day, by certain odes and peculiar songs, and by this means
  procured for themselves tranquil sleep, and few and good dreams. But
  when they rose from bed, they again liberated themselves from the
  torpor and heaviness of sleep, by songs of another kind. Sometimes,
  also, by musical sounds alone, unaccompanied with words, they healed
  the passions of the soul and certain diseases, enchanting, as they
  say, in reality. And it is probable that from hence this name _epode_,
  _i. e._ enchantment, came to be generally used. After this manner,
  therefore, Pythagoras, through music, produced the most beneficial
  correction of human manners and lives.”

  Proclus also, in his MS. Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato,
  observes, “that of musical instruments some are repressive, and others
  motive; some are adapted to rest, and others to motion. The
  repressive, therefore, are most useful for education, leading our
  manners into order, repressing the turbulency of youth, and bringing
  its agitated nature to quietness and temperance. But the motive
  instruments are adapted to enthusiastic energy; and hence, in the
  mysteries and mystic sacrifices, the pipe is useful; for the motive
  power of it is employed for the purpose of exciting the reasoning
  power to a divine nature. For here it is requisite that the irrational
  part should be laid asleep, and the rational excited. Hence those that
  instruct youth use repressive instruments, but initiators such as are
  motive. For that which is disciplined is the irrational part; but it
  is reason which is initiated, and which energizes enthusiastically.”

  See, likewise, on this subject, Ptolem. Harmonic, lib. iii. cap. 7 and
  8, who observes among other things, “that our souls directly
  sympathize with the energies of melody, recognizing, as it were, their
  alliance to them—and that at one time the soul is changed to a quiet
  and repressed condition, but at another to fury and enthusiasm. Ταις
  ενεργειαις της μελῳδιας συμπασχειν ημων αντικρυς τας ψυχας, την
  συγγενειαν ωσπερ επιγινωσκουσας——et, ποτε μεν εις ησυχιαν και
  κατασολην τρεπεσθαι, ποτε δε εις οἱσρον και ενθυσιασμον. And, in the
  last place, see Plato in his Io, and Aristotle in his Politics.

Footnote 52:

  Proclus in Polit. p. 865, says, “that the melodies of Olympus were the
  causes of ecstasy.” Τα του Ολυμπου μελη εκσατικα.

Footnote 53:

  The nature of the Corybantes, and the order to which they belong, is
  unfolded as follows by Proclus, in Plat. Theol. lib. vi. cap. 13. “To
  what has been said we shall add the theory pertaining to the
  unpolluted[54] Gods among the ruling divinities [_i. e._ among the
  divinities that subsist immediately after the intellectual Gods]. For
  Plato also gives us an opportunity of mentioning these, since it is
  necessary that the rulers and leaders of wholes should subsist
  analogous to the intellectual kings, though they make their
  progression in conjunction with division, and a separation into parts.
  For as they imitate the paternal generative and convertive powers of
  the intellectual kings, thus also it is necessary that they should
  receive the immutable monads in themselves, according to the ruling
  peculiarity, and establish over their own progressions secondary
  causes of a guardian characteristic. And the mystic tradition, indeed,
  of Orpheus makes mention of these more clearly. But Plato being
  persuaded by the mysteries, and by what is performed in them,
  indicates concerning these unpolluted Gods. And in the Laws, indeed,
  he reminds us of the inflation of the pipe by the Corybantes, which
  represses every inordinate and tumultuous motion. But in the
  Euthydemus, he makes mention of the collocation on a throne, which is
  performed in the Corybantic mysteries; just as in other dialogues he
  mentions the Curetic order, speaking of the armed sports of the
  Curetes. For the Curetes are said to surround and to dance round the
  Demiurgus of wholes, when he was unfolded into light from Rhea. In the
  intellectual Gods, therefore, the first Curetic order is allotted its
  hypostasis. But the order of the Corybantes, which precedes Core
  [_i. e._ Proserpine], and guards her on all sides, as the theology
  says, is analogous to the Curetes in the intellectual order. If,
  however, you are willing to speak conformably to Platonic custom,
  because these divinities preside over purity, and preserve the Curetic
  order undefiled, and also preserve immutability in their generations,
  and stability in their progressions[55] into the worlds, on this
  account they were called Corybantes. For το κορον, _to koron_, is
  every where significant of purity, as Socrates says in the Cratylus;
  since, also, you may say that our mistress Core was no otherwise
  denominated than from purity and an unpolluted life. But, in
  consequence of her alliance to this order, she produces twofold
  guardian triads, one in conjunction with her father, but the other
  herself by and from herself, imitating in this respect the whole
  vivific Goddess [Rhea] who constitutes the first Curetes.”

Footnote 54:

  These Gods are called _unpolluted_, because they are the causes of
  _purity_. For every God begins his own energy from himself, and is
  that primarily which his effects are secondarily.

Footnote 55:

  For περιοδοις here, it is necessary to read προοδοις.

Footnote 56:

  Servius, in commenting on the “Mystica vannus Iacchi” of Virgil,
  observes, that the sacred rites of Bacchus pertained to the
  purification of souls, “Liberi patris sacra ad purgationem animarum
  pertinebant.” And elsewhere he says, “Animæ aere ventilantur, quod
  erat in sacris Liberi purgationis genus.” Euripides also, in Bacchis,
  exclaims,

                   Ω μακαρ οστις ευδαιμων τελετας Θεων
                   Ειδως, βιοταν αγιστευει,
                   Και θιασευεται ψυχαν,
                   Εν ορεσι βακχευων
                   Οσιοισι καθαρμοις.

  _i. e._ “O blessed and happy he, who knowing the mysteries of the
  Gods, sanctifies his life, and purifies his soul, celebrating orgies
  in the mountains, with holy purifications.”

Footnote 57:

  “In the greatest diseases and labours (says Plato in the Phædrus) to
  which certain persons are sometimes subject _through the ancient
  indignation of the Gods, in consequence of former guilt_, mania when
  it takes place, predicting what they stand in need of, discovers a
  liberation from such evils by flying to prayer and the worship of the
  Gods. Hence, obtaining by this means purifications and the advantages
  of initiation, it renders him who possesses it free from disasters
  both for the present and future time, by discovering to him who is
  properly insane, and possessed by divinity, a solution of the present
  evils.” And the Platonic Hermias beautifully unfolds the meaning of
  this ancient indignation of the Gods, through former guilt, as
  follows: “Offences which have been committed for a great length of a
  time, are more difficult to be washed away, and a liberation from them
  can alone be effected by the telestic art; but those that have been
  committed for a shorter time are more easily cured. Thus, also, we see
  in the medical art, that maladies which have existed but for a little
  time, if they are paid attention to at their commencement, are easily
  remedied, but that when they are of long standing, they are more
  difficultly healed. For the evil in this case becomes as it were
  natural and confirmed by habit, and resembles an indurated ulcer. A
  similar thing to this, therefore, takes place in guilty conduct.
  Hence, if he who has committed an injury, immediately repents, and
  acknowledges his guilt to him whom he has injured, he dissolves the
  injury, and renders himself no longer obnoxious to justice. But when
  some one dissolves an injury committed by his father, by restoring,
  for instance, land which he had unjustly taken, he then makes himself
  to be unobnoxious to justice, and lightens and benefits the soul of
  his father. These things, however, the telestic art more swiftly
  remedies. Moreover, if it should happen that the whole race of some
  one successively use land which had originally been plundered, in this
  case, the injury in the first place becomes immanifest, and on this
  account is more difficult to be cured; and, in the next place, time
  causes the evil to become as it were natural. Hence the Gods
  frequently predict to men that they should go to such or such places,
  and that an apology should be made to this man, who was never known to
  them, and that he should be appeased, in order that thus they may
  obtain a remedy and be liberated from their difficulties, and that the
  punishments inflicted on them by the Furies may cease. The Gods,
  however, predict, not for the purpose of taking away punishment, but
  in order that justice may be done, and that we may be amended. The
  telestic art, therefore, renders him better who possesses the mania
  which it imparts, and through him saves also many others. Thus, for
  instance, it is related of one who was cutting down an oak, and though
  he was called on by a Nymph not to cut it down, yet persisted in
  felling it, that he was punished for so doing by the avenging Furies,
  that he was in want of necessary food, and that if at any time he met
  with it, it was immediately taken from him, till one who possessed the
  telestic art told him to raise an altar and sacrifice to this Nymph,
  for thus he would be liberated from his calamities. Another person,
  likewise, who had slain his mother, was freed from the punishment
  inflicted on him by the Furies by migrating to another country,
  conformably to the mandate of divinity, and there fixing his abode.”

Footnote 58:

  This is because Rhea, the mother of the Gods, is a vivific Goddess,
  being filled indeed (says Proclus, in Plat. Theol. lib. v. c. xi.)
  from the father prior to her [_i. e._ from Saturn] with intelligible
  and prolific power, but filling the Demiurgus [Jupiter], who derives
  his existence from her, with vivific abundance.

Footnote 59:

  See, concerning this oracle, Scholiastes Apollonii ad i. librum, et
  Tacitus ii. Annal.

Footnote 60:

  This oracle is mentioned by Herodotus, l. i., by Strabo, l. xiv. and
  by Ammian. Marcell. lib. xxix.

Footnote 61:

  See Plutarch in his treatise De Defectu Oraculorum.

Footnote 62:

  See Plutarch in the above mentioned treatise. Concerning this luciform
  spirit, or vehicle, which is immortal, and which is called by
  Olympiodorus αυγοειδες χιτων, a _luciform vestment_, see my
  Translation of the fifth book of Proclus on the Timæus.

Footnote 63:

  It was usual for those who prophesied to carry a wand. Tiresias had a
  sceptre, and Abaris an arrow. The Scholiast on Nicander says, that the
  Egyptian and Scythian magi, and also many of those in Europe,
  prophesied with wands. And Eustathius on the Odyssey, p. 1657,
  observes, “that there is a certain magic in divine wands,” esse in
  ραβδοις θειοις τινα μαγειαν.

Footnote 64:

  That is, to partake of an illumination, which has no σχεσις, or
  _habitude_, to any thing material.

Footnote 65:

  For ἡ προιουσα here, it seems necessary to read ἢ προιουσα.

Footnote 66:

  Proclus, in his MS. Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato,
  observes, “that in the mysteries some one of the more imperfect dæmons
  assumes the appearance of one that is more perfect, and draws down to
  himself souls that are not yet purified, and separates them from the
  Gods. Hence, in the most holy of the mysteries [_i. e._ in the
  Eleusinian mysteries], prior to the manifest presence of the God [who
  is invoked], certain terrene dæmons present themselves to the view,
  disturbing those that are initiated, divulsing them from undefiled
  good, and exciting them to matter. On this account the Gods [in the
  Chaldean oracles] order us not to behold them, till we are guarded by
  the powers imparted by the mysteries. For they say,

            Ου γαρ χρη κεινους σε βλεπειν πριν σωμα τελεσθεις.

  _i. e._ It is not proper you should behold them till your body is
  purified by initiation. And they add the reason,

              Οτι τας ψυχας θελγοντες αει τελετων απαγουσι,

  _i. e._ For these dæmons alluring souls, always draw them away from
  the mysteries.

  Conformably to this, also, Proclus in Plat. Theol. p. 7, says, ωσπερ
  εν ταις των τελετων αγιωταταις φασι τους μυστας, την μεν πρωτην
  πολυειδεσι, και πολυμορφοις των θεων προβεβλημενοις γενεσιν απανταν,
  εισιοντας δε, ακλινεις, και ταις τελεταις πεφραγμενους, αυτην την
  θειαν ελλαμψιν ακραιφνως εγκολπιζεσθαι, και γυμνιτας (ως αν εκεινοι
  φαιεν) του θειου μεταλαμβανειν, τον αυτον οιμαι τροπον και εν τη
  θεωριᾳ των ολων. _i. e._ “As in the most holy of the mysteries, they
  say, that the mystics at first meet with the multiform and many shaped
  genera [_i. e._ with evil dæmons], which are hurled forth before the
  Gods, but on entering the interior parts of the temple, unmoved, and
  guarded by the mystic rites, they genuinely receive in their bosom
  divine illumination, and divested of their garments, as they would
  say, participate of a divine nature; the same mode, as it appears to
  me, takes place in the speculation of wholes.”

  That mitred sophist, Warburton, as I have elsewhere called him, from
  not understanding the former part of this latter extract from Proclus,
  ridiculously translates the words πολυειδεσι και πολυμορφοις των θεων
  προβεβλημενοις γενεσιν, “multiform shapes and species, that prefigure
  the first generation of the Gods.” See his Divine Legation of Moses,
  book ii. p. 152, 8vo. a work replete with distorted conceptions and
  inaccurate translations. And yet, as great a sophist as Warburton was,
  and notwithstanding the work I have just mentioned abounds with false
  opinions, and such as are of the most pernicious kind, yet he is
  compelled by truth to acknowledge, in book ii. p. 172, “that the
  wisest and best men in the Pagan world are unanimous in this, that the
  mysteries were instituted pure, and proposed the noblest end by the
  worthiest means.” But this by the way.

Footnote 67:

  This divination according to the imagination through water, may be
  illustrated by the following extract from Damascius (apud Photium):
  Γυνη ιερα θεομοιρον εχουσα φυσιν παρᾳλογοτατην. υδωρ γαρ εγχεασα
  ακραιφνες ποτηριῳ τινι των υαλινων, εωρα κατα του υδατος εισω του
  ποτηριου τα φασματα των εσομενων πραγματων, και προυλεγεν απο της
  οψεως αυτα απερ εμελλεν εσεσθαι παντως. η δε πειρα του πραγματος ουκ
  ελαθεν ημας. _i. e._ “There was a sacred woman who possessed in a
  wonderful manner a divinely gifted nature. For pouring pure water into
  a certain glass cup, she saw in the water that was within the cup the
  luminous appearances of future events, and from the view of these she
  entirely predicted what would happen. But of this experiment we also
  are not ignorant.”

Footnote 68:

  “The Platonists,” says Psellus (ad Nazianzenum) “assert that light is
  spread under divine substances, and is rapidly seized, without any
  difficulty, by some who possess such an excellent nature as that which
  fell to the lot of Socrates and Plotinus. But others, at certain
  periods, experience a mental alienation about the light of the moon.”

Footnote 69:

  Concerning this vehicle, in which the phantastic power resides, see
  vol. ii. of my translation of Proclus on the Timæus of Plato, p. 407;
  the Introduction to my translation of Aristotle on the Soul; and the
  long extract from Synesius on Dreams, in vol. ii. of my Proclus on
  Euclid.

Footnote 70:

  _i. e._ The discursive energy of reason.

Footnote 71:

  Proclus in Plat. Polit. having observed that Socrates in the Phædrus,
  when he speaks in a divinely inspired manner, and poetically adopts
  such names as are employed by the poets, and says that it is not
  possible for one who speaks with an insane [_i. e._ with an inspired]
  mouth to abstain from them, adds “that an alliance to the dæmoniacal
  genus, preparing the soul for the reception of divine light, excites
  the phantasy to symbolic narration.” Η προς δαιμονιον γενος οικειοτης,
  η προευτρεπιζουσα την του θειου φωτος παρουσιαν, ανακινει την
  φαντασιαν εις την συμβολικην απαγγελιαν. p. 396.

Footnote 72:

  These words of Heraclitus are also quoted by Plutarch in his treatise
  De Defectu Oraculorum.

Footnote 73:

  For εικονων here, I read ειδων.

Footnote 74:

  Herodian, lib. viii. observes, that the Italians very much believed in
  the indications of future events through the viscera: and Strabo, lib.
  xvii. asserts the same thing.

Footnote 75:

  The auspices were said to be pestiferous when there was no heart in
  the entrails, or when the head was wanting in the liver. This was the
  case with the animals that were sacrificed by Cæsar on the day in
  which he was slain. The same thing also happened to Caius Marius, when
  he was sacrificing at Utica. But when Pertinax was sacrificing, both
  the heart and the liver of the victim were wanting, whence his death
  was predicted, which happened shortly after. In the sacrifices,
  likewise, which Marcellus performed prior to the unfortunate battle
  with the Carthaginians, the liver was found to be without a head, as
  Plutarch and Livy, Pliny and Valerius Maximus relate.

Footnote 76:

  Gale observes that this appears to have been a very ancient mode of
  divination, and does not differ from that which is comprehended under
  the term _wood_. Hence the Scholiast, in Nicandri Theriaca, says,
  “that the Magi and Scythians predicted from the wood of the tamarisk.”
  For in many places they predict from rods. And that Dinon, in the
  first book of his third Syntaxis, observes, “that the Median diviners
  predict from rods.” The Scholiast likewise adds the testimony of
  Metrodorus, who says, “that the tamarisk is a most ancient plant, and
  that the Egyptians, in the solemnity of Jupiter, were crowned with the
  tamarisk, and also the Magi among the Medes.” He adds, “that Apollo
  also ordained that prophets should predict from this plant, and that
  in Lesbos he wears a tamarisk crown, has often been seen thus adorned,
  and that in consequence of this he was called by the Lesbians
  μυρικαιον, _Muricaion_, [from μυρικη, the tamarisk].” What the
  Scholiast here says, is confirmed by Herodotus, in lib. iv. and
  elsewhere. To this, also, what every where occurs about prediction
  from the laurel pertains. For if the leaves of the laurel when
  committed to the fire made a noise, it was considered as a good omen,
  but if they made none, a bad one.

Footnote 77:

  Gale, in his translation, has totally mistaken the meaning of the
  original in this place, and it is not unusual with him to do so. For
  the original is αλλ’ ουδε ως οργανον τι μεσον εξι το των κρειττονων
  αιτιον, και δρα δια του θεσπιζοντος ο καλων. This he thus translates:
  “Sed neque dicendum est fatidicum animum esse instrumentum intermedium
  divinorum, sacerdotem vero invocantem esse tanquam efficientem
  causam.” In consequence, also, of this mistake, he erroneously
  conceives that Iamblichus dissents from himself.

Footnote 78:

  God is all things causally, and is able to effect all things. He
  likewise does produce all things, yet not by himself alone, but in
  conjunction with those divine powers which continually germinate, as
  it were, from him, as from a perennial root. Not that he is in want of
  these powers to the efficacy of his productive energy, but the
  universe requires their cooperation, in order to the distinct
  subsistence of its various parts and different forms. For as the
  essence of the first cause, if it be lawful so to speak, is full of
  deity, his immediate energy must be deific, and his first progeny must
  be Gods. But as he is ineffable and superessential, all things proceed
  from him ineffably and superessentially. For progressions are
  conformable to the characteristics of the natures from which they
  proceed. Hence the cooperating energy of his first progeny is
  necessary to the evolution of things into effable, essential, and
  distinct subsistence. _The supreme God, therefore, is_, as Iamblichus
  justly observes, _alone worthy of sedulous attention, esteem, the
  energy of reason, and felicitous honour_; but this is not to the
  exclusion of paying _appropriate_ attention and honour to other powers
  that are subordinate to him, who largely participate of his divinity,
  and are more or less allied to him. For in reverencing and paying
  attention to these _appropriately_, we also attend to and reverence
  him. For that which we sedulously attend to, honour, and esteem in
  them, is that alone which is of a _deified_ nature, and is therefore a
  portion, as it were, of the ineffable principle of all things.

  Gale, from not understanding this, exclaims, “if these things are
  true, (_viz._ that God is alone worthy of sedulous attention, &c.) as
  they are, indeed, most true, to what purpose, O Iamblichus, is that
  mighty study and labour about dæmons and other spirits?” But the
  answer to this, by regarding what has been above said, is easy. For
  mighty study and labour about these intermediate powers is necessary,
  in order to our union with their ineffable cause. For as we are but
  the dregs of the rational nature, and the first principle of things is
  something so transcendent as to be even beyond essence, it is
  impossible that we should be united to him without media; _viz._
  without the Gods, and their perpetual attendants, who are on this
  account _the true saviours of souls_. For in a union with the supreme
  deity our true salvation consists.

Footnote 79:

  For these conceptions and these works teach us, that in reality we,
  through sacred operations, approach to divinity, but that divinity
  does not draw near to us. Hence Proclus in Alcibiad. εν ταις κλησεσι,
  και εν ταις αυτοψιαις προσιεναι πως ημιν φαινεται το θειον, ημων
  επανατεινομενων επ’ αυτο. _i. e._ “In invocations of the Gods, and
  when they are clearly seen, divinity, in a certain respect, appears to
  approach to us, though it is we that are extended to him.”

Footnote 80:

  Gale, in his note on these words, after having observed that Porphyry
  says, that ignorance, darkness, and folly attend the soul in its lapse
  into body; and that, according to Servius, the soul, when it begins to
  descend into body, drinks of folly and oblivion, quotes also Irenæus
  (lib. ii. c. 59), who makes the following stupid remark: “Souls
  entering into this life [it is said] drink of oblivion, before they
  enter into bodies, from the dæmon who is above this ingress. But
  whence do you know this, O Plato, since your soul also is now in body?
  For if you remember the dæmon, the cup, and the entrance, it is
  likewise requisite that you should know the rest.” To this it is easy
  to reply, that a soul purified and enlightened by philosophy, like
  that of Plato, is able to recognise many things pertaining to its
  preexistent state, even while in the present body, in consequence of
  partially emerging from corporeal darkness and oblivion; but that it
  is not capable of knowing every thing _distinctly_, till it is
  perfectly liberated from the delirium of the body. And Gale, no less
  sillily, adds, “respondebunt Platonici hæc omnia cognovisse Platonem
  ex narratione, quæ circumferebatur de Ere Armenio, qui Lethes aquam
  non biberat.” _i. e._ “The Platonists will answer that Plato knew all
  these things from the narration of the Armenian Erus [in the Republic]
  who did not drink of the water of Lethe.” For Plato did not obtain
  this knowledge from any historical narration, but from possessing in a
  transcendent degree the cathartic and theoretic virtues, and from
  energizing enthusiastically (or according to a divinely inspired
  energy) through the latter of these virtues.

Footnote 81:

  Agreeably to this, Porphyry says in his Αφορμαι προς τα νοητα, or
  _Auxiliaries to Intelligibles_, ψυχη καταδειται προς το σωμα, τῃ
  επιστροφη τῃ προς τα παθη τα απ’ αυτου.——And ψυχη εδησεν εαυτην εν τῳ
  σωματι. _i. e._ “The soul is bound to the body, by a conversion to the
  passions arising from her union with it.” And, “the soul binds herself
  in the body.” Philolaus also says, that the ancient theologists and
  prophets asserted, ως δια τινας τιμωριας α ψυχα τῳ σωματι συνεζευκται,
  και καθαπερ εν σαματι τουτῳ τεθαπται, “that the soul is conjoined to
  the body on account of certain punishments, and that it is buried in
  it as in a sepulchre.”

Footnote 82:

  This assertion, that the nature which is perfectly exempt can never
  become one with that which departs from itself, is opposed by Gale,
  who says that man is composed of soul and body, and yet the latter is
  far inferior to, and less excellent than, the former. But in adducing
  this instance, he clearly shows that he does not understand what
  Iamblichus says. For the human soul being a medium between a certain
  impartible and partible essence, so far as it partakes of the partible
  essence, has a certain alliance with body, and is not perfectly exempt
  from it. But this is not the case with divine inspiration and our
  soul: for the former in a perfectly exempt manner transcends the
  latter. Let it, therefore, be granted him that, as Psellus says,
  “hypostatic union conducts different essences or natures to one
  hypostasis,” yet such a union can never take place between two things,
  one of which has no habitude, proximity, or alliance to the other.
  Gale was led into this mistake by not properly attending to the words
  _perfectly exempt_, το παντελως εξῃρημενον, which are here employed by
  Iamblichus. But such mistakes are usual with Gale, from his inaccurate
  and rambling manner of thinking. He likewise forgot, at the time he
  was writing notes on Iamblichus, that he was the master of a grammar
  school, and not a philosopher.

  From what has been said, the absurdity, also, of their opinion is
  immediately obvious, who fancy that the divine essence can be mingled
  and united with the mortal nature. For if such a union were possible,
  it would benefit and exalt the latter, but injure and degrade the
  former. Just as in the union of the rational soul with the body (as
  Proclus beautifully observes in Tim. p. 339), “the former, by verging
  to a material life, kindles indeed a light in the body, but becomes
  herself situated in darkness; and by giving life to the body, destroys
  both herself and her own intellect [in as great a degree as these are
  capable of receiving destruction]. For thus the mortal nature
  participates of intellect, but the intellectual part of death, and the
  whole, as Plato observes in the Laws, becomes a prodigy composed of
  the mortal and the immortal, of the intellectual and that which is
  deprived of intellect. For this physical law which binds the soul to
  the body is the death of the immortal life, but vivifies the mortal
  body.”

Footnote 83:

  Here again Gale, from not understanding, opposes Iamblichus. For he
  says, “sed nec hoc sequitur. S. Maximus, ubi hypostaticam unionem
  declarat; hæc inquit, cernuntur in corpore et anima. Una ex utroque
  confit hypostasis composita. Servat autem in se naturam perfectam
  utriusque sc. corporis et animæ, και την τουτων διαφοραν ασυμφυρτον
  και τα ιδιωματα ασυμφυρτα και ασυγχυτα.” _i. e._ “But neither does
  this follow. S. Maximus, where he unfolds hypostatic union, says these
  things are perceived in the soul and body. One composite hypostasis is
  produced from both. But this hypostasis preserves in itself the
  perfect nature of each, and likewise the difference of these
  unmingled, end the peculiarities unmingled and unconfused.” This
  hypostatic union, however; as we have before observed, cannot take
  place between divine inspiration and the soul, because the former is
  _perfectly exempt_ from the latter.

  Gale adds, “Quæro autem quid velit Iamblichus per αμφοιν? Opinor,
  ψυχην et την εξωθεν θειαν επιπνοιαν. Non facile evincet επιπνοιαν esse
  αιδιον τι, utpote quæ sit transiens dei actio.” _i. e._ “I ask what
  Iamblichus means by _both_. I think _the soul and divine inspiration
  externally_ derived. But he will not easily prove that inspiration is
  something eternal, because it is a transient energy of God.” Gale is
  right in his conjecture, that Iamblichus by the word _both_ in this
  place, means the soul and divine inspiration externally derived; for
  it can admit of no other meaning; but when he adds, that inspiration
  cannot be something eternal, because it is a transient energy of
  divinity, he shows himself to be as bad a theologist as he is a
  philosopher. For God being an eternal, or rather a supereternal
  nature, his energies have nothing to do with time and its transitive
  progressions, but are stably simultaneous; so that transition does not
  exist in his inspiring influence, but in the recipients of it, these
  being of a temporal and mutable nature. Hence it is just as absurd to
  call any energy of divinity transient, as it would be to say that the
  light of the sun is transient, because it shines through diaphanous,
  but not through opaque, substances.

Footnote 84:

  Hippocrates was of opinion that physicians ought to be skilled in
  astronomy. And Galen derides those physicians who deny that astronomy
  is necessary to their art. See his treatise entitled Si quis sit
  Medicus eundem esse philosophum. And in lib. viii. cap. 20, of his
  treatise De Ingenio Sanitatis, he calls physicians that are ignorant
  of astronomy homicides. But by astronomy here, both Hippocrates and
  Galen intended to signify what is now called astrology. Roger Bacon
  also, in his Epistle to Pope Clement, says, “Opera quæ fiunt hic
  inferius, variantur secundum diversitatem cœlestium constellationum,
  ut opera medicinæ et alkimiæ.” _i. e._ “The works which are performed
  in these inferior realms are varied according to the diversity of the
  celestial constellations, as, for instance, the works of medicine and
  alchemy.” If, however, as Galen says, and doubtless with great truth,
  physicians that are ignorant of this are homicides, how numerous must
  the medical homicides be of the present age!

Footnote 85:

  According to Proclus, in Alcibiad. Prior, there are three orders of
  dæmons, the first of which are more _intellectual_, the second are of
  a more _rational nature_, and the third, of which Iamblichus is now
  speaking, are _various, more irrational, and more material_.

Footnote 86:

  Charonea is a country of Asia Minor, bordering on the river Meander;
  and in it there are spiracles which exhale a foul odour. According to
  Pliny, there are places of this kind in Italy, in the country of
  Puteoli, now Puzzulo. In Amsanctus, also, a place in the middle of
  Italy, in the country of the Samnites, there were sulphureous waters,
  the steams of which were so pestilential, that they killed all who
  came near them. Hence Cicero, in lib. i. De Divin. “Quid enim? Non
  videmus, quam sint varia terrarum genera? Ex quibus et mortifera
  quædam pars est, ut et Amsancti in Hirpinis, et in Asia Plutonia.”

Footnote 87:

  And these irrational spirits, so far as they contribute to wholes, are
  more excellent than we are, though through being irrational they are
  inferior to us.

Footnote 88:

  See the justice of providence in this respect most admirably defended
  by Plotinus, in the first of his treatises on Providence, which
  treatise forms one of the five books of Plotinus translated by me, in
  8vo. 1794.

Footnote 89:

  In the original, την ιδιαν της ψυχης αυτοπραγιαν, which Gale very
  inadequately translates _proprium animæ officium_.

Footnote 90:

  See my translation of Proclus on the Subsistence of Evil, at the end
  of my translation of his six books on the Theology of Plato.

Footnote 91:

  See cap. 40, 41, 42, of Eunead iv. lib. iv. of Plotinus, from which
  the doctrine of this chapter is derived.

Footnote 92:

  Agreeably to this, Plotinus, also, in Eunead iv. lib. iv. cap. 32,
  says, παν τουτο το εν, και ως ζωον εν ζωον τε οντος, και εις εν
  τελουντος, ουδεν ουτω πορρω τοπου ως μη εγγυς ειναι τη του ενος ζωου
  προς το συμπαθειν ψυσει, _i. e._ “This universe is one, and is as one
  animal. But being an animal and completely effecting one thing,
  nothing in it is so distant in place as not to be near to the nature
  of the one animal, on account of its sympathy with the whole of
  itself.”

Footnote 93:

  This art is no other than magic, of which the following account, from
  a very rare Greek manuscript of Psellus, _On Dæmons according to the
  Dogmas of the Greeks_, will, I doubt not, be acceptable to the reader,
  as it illustrates what is here said by Iamblichus, and shows that
  magic is not an empty name, but possesses a real power, though at
  present this art seems to be totally lost. Ficinus published some
  extracts from this manuscript in Latin; but Gale does not appear to
  have had it in his possession. Η γοητεια δε εστι τεχνη τις περι τους
  ενυλους και χθονιους δαιμονας φαντασιοσκοπουσα τοις εποπταις τα τουτων
  ειδωλα. και τους μεν ωσπερ εξ αδου αναγουσα, τους δε υψοθεν καταγουσα,
  και τουτους κακωτικους. και ειδωλα αττα υφιστησι φαντασματα τοις
  θεωροις των τουτων. και τοις μεν ρευματα τινα εκειθεν κυμαινοντα
  επαφιησι· τοις δε δεσμων ανεσεις και τρυφας, και χαριτας επαγγελλεται.
  επαγεται δε τας τοιαυτας δυναμεις, και ασμασι και επασμασιν. η δε
  μαγεια πολυδυναμον τι χρημα τοις Ελλησιν εδοξε. μεριδα γουν ειναι
  ταυτην φασιν εσχατην της ιερατικης επιστημης. ανιχνευουσα γαρ των υπο
  την σεληνην παντων την τε ουσαν και φυσιν, και δυναμιν και ποιοτητα.
  λεγω δε στοιχειων και των τουτων μεριδων, ζωων, παντοδαπων φυτων, και
  των εντευθεν καρπων, λιθων, βοτανων, και απλως ειπειν, παντος
  πραγματος, υποστασιν τε και δυναμιν. εντευθεν αρα τα εαυτης εργαζεται.
  αγαλματα τε υφιστησιν υγειας περιποιητικα, και σχηματα ποιειται
  παντοδαμα· και νοσοποια δεμιουργηματα ετερα. και αετοι μεν, και
  δρακοντες, βιωσιμοι αυτοις προς υγειαν υποθεσις´ αιλουροι δε και
  κυνες, και κορακες αγρυπνητικα συμβολα. κηρος δε και πηλος εις τας των
  μοριων συμπλασεις παραλαμβανονται. φανταζει δε πολλακις, και πυρος
  ουρανιου εδοσεις, και διαμειδιωσι επι τουτων αγαλματα· πυρί δε
  αυτοματῳ λαμπαδες αναπτονται. _i. e._ “_Goeteia_, or _witchcraft_, is
  a certain art respecting material and terrestrial dæmons, whose images
  it causes to become visible to the spectators of this art. And some of
  these dæmons it leads up, as it were from Hades, but others it draws
  down from on high; and these, too, such as are of an evil species.
  _This art, therefore, causes certain phantastic images to appear
  before the spectators._ And before the eyes of some, indeed, it pours
  exuberant streams; but to others it promises freedom from bonds,
  delicacies, and favours. They draw down, too, powers of this kind by
  songs and incantations. But _magic_, according to the Greeks, is a
  thing of a very powerful nature. _For they say that this forms the
  last part of the sacerdotal science._ Magic, indeed, investigates the
  nature, power, and quality of every thing sublunary; _viz._ of the
  elements, and their parts, of animals, all-various plants and their
  fruits, of stones, and herbs: and in short, it explores the essence
  and power of every thing. From hence, therefore, it produces its
  effects. And it forms statues which procure health, makes all-various
  figures, and things which become the instruments of disease. It
  asserts, too, that eagles and dragons contribute to health; but that
  cats, dogs, and crows are symbols of vigilance, to which, therefore,
  they contribute. But for the fashioning of certain parts wax and clay
  are used. Often, too, celestial fire is made to appear through magic;
  and then statues laugh, and lamps are spontaneously enkindled.”

  This curious passage throws light on the following extract from the
  first book of the Metaphorsis of Apuleius: “Magico susurranime, amnes
  agiles reverti, mare pigrum colligari, ventos inanimes expirare, solem
  inhiberi, lunam despumari, stellas evelli, diem tolli, noctem teneri.”
  _i. e._ “By magical incantation rapid rivers may be made to run back
  to their fountains, the sea be congealed, winds become destitute of
  spirit, the sun be held back in his course, the moon be forced to
  scatter her foam, the stars be torn from their orbits, the day be
  taken away, and the night be detained.” For it may be inferred from
  Psellus, that witches formerly were able to cause the _appearance_ of
  all this to take place. It must also be observed, that this MS. of
  Psellus _On Dæmons_ forms no part of his treatise _On the Energy of
  Dæmons_, published by Gaulminus; for it never was published.

Footnote 94:

  Hence Iamblichus (apud Stob. Eclog. Phys. p. 114), says, Ουχ η αυτη
  εστι πασων ψυχων κοινωνια προς τα σωματα. αλλ’ η μεν ολη ωσπερ Πλωτινῳ
  δοκει, προσιον εαυτῃ το σωμα εχει εν εαυτῃ, αλλ’ ουκ αυτη προσεισι τῳ
  σωματι, ουδε περιεχεται υπ’ αυτου. αι δε μερισται προσερχονται τοις
  σωμασι, και των σωματων γιγνονται. _i. e._ “There is not the same
  communion of all souls with bodies; but the soul which ranks as a
  whole (as it also appeared to Plotinus), approaching to itself,
  contains body in itself, but does not itself approach to body, nor is
  comprehended by it. Partible souls, however, accede to bodies, and
  give themselves up to them.”

  Conformably to this Porphyry also, in his Αφορμαι προς τα νοητα, No.
  30, says, “No _whole_ and perfect essence is converted to its own
  progeny; but all perfect natures are led back to the causes by which
  they were generated, even as far as to the mundane body. For this
  body, being perfect, is elevated to the mundane soul which is
  intellectual, and through this is circularly moved. But the soul of
  this body is elevated to intellect, and intellect to that which is
  first. All things, therefore, extend themselves to this, beginning
  from that which is last, according to the peculiar ability of each.
  But the reduction to that which is first is either proximate or
  remote. Hence these are not only said to aspire after divinity, but
  also to enjoy him as far as they are able. But in partial natures, and
  which are able to verge to many things, a conversion to their progeny
  belongs. Hence in these guilt, in these disgraceful perfidy, is found.
  Matter, therefore, defiles these, because they decline to it, at the
  same time that they possess the power of converting themselves to a
  divine nature.”

Footnote 95:

  Iamblichus here alludes to the excellent treatise of Porphyry, περι
  της των εμψυχων αποχης, _On Abstinence from Animal Food_, from which
  work the English reader will find several admirable extracts in one of
  the Introductory Dissertations prefixed to my translation of Proclus
  on Euclid.

Footnote 96:

  A celestial body, as is beautifully shown by Proclus in Tim. lib. iii.
  contains the summits of all the elements, but is characterized by
  vivific unburning fire; so that, in short, it is vitalized extension.

Footnote 97:

  The number sixty is no less manifest in the crocodile than in the sun.
  For according to Aristotle (in Hist. Anim. lib. v.) the crocodile
  brings forth sixty eggs of a white colour and sits on them for sixty
  days.

Footnote 98:

  “Isis,” says Gale, “is the moon. And a dog attended Isis when she was
  diligently seeking her husband Osiris. But the moon perpetually seeks
  the sun, and therefore that sagacious animal, the dog, accords with
  Isis. In the solemnities, also, of Isis, dogs preceded the
  procession.” After this manner others besides Gale; who have not
  penetrated the depths of the philosophy and theology of Plato, would
  doubtless explain what is fabulously said of Isis. In reality,
  however, Isis is not the moon, but one of the divinities that revolve
  in the lunar sphere as an attendant on the moon, and who, in modern
  language, is one of the satellites of that planet. For, as I have
  shown from Proclus, in the Introduction to my translation of the
  Timæus of Plato, every planetary sphere is an ολοτης, _or a part of
  the universe having a total subsistence_, i. e. _ranking as a whole_,
  and is surrounded with a number of satellites analogous to the choir
  of the fixed stars. Of these satellites, likewise, the leaders of
  which are the planets, the first in order are Gods; after these,
  dæmons revolve in lucid orbicular bodies; and these are followed by
  partial souls, such as ours. See Proclus in Tim. p. 275 and p. 279·
  This theory, as I have elsewhere observed, is the grand key to the
  theology and mythology of the ancients, as it shows at one view why
  the same God is so often celebrated with the names of other Gods;
  which induced Macrobius to think that all the Gods were nothing more
  than different powers of the sun. The English reader will find an
  abundant confirmation of what is here said in the fourth book of my
  translation of the above mentioned admirable work of Proclus.

Footnote 99:

  “The Egyptians,” says Horapollo, lib. i. “wishing to signify the moon,
  paint a cynocephalus, because this animal is variously affected by the
  course of the moon.”

Footnote 100:

  In the original μυγαλη. “This word,” says Gale, “is written variously,
  _viz._ as μυγάλη, μυγαλὴ, and μυγαλῆ. It is also variously translated,
  for it is either _rattus_, or _mus araneus_.” Plutarch, in the fourth
  book of his Symposiacs, Quest. 5, says, “that the Egyptians were of
  opinion that darkness was prior to light, and that the latter was
  produced from mice in the fifth generation, at the time of the new
  moon. And further still, they assert that the liver of the weasel
  diminishes in the wane of the moon.”

Footnote 101:

  With the Egyptians many animals were sacred; for the worship of which
  the following admirable apology is made by Plutarch in his treatise of
  Isis and Osiris:

  “It now remains that we should speak of the utility of these animals
  to man, and of their symbolical meaning; some of them partaking of one
  of these only, but many of them of both. It is evident, therefore,
  that the Egyptians worshiped the ox, the sheep, and the ichneumon, on
  account of their use and benefit, as the Lemnians did larks, for
  discovering the eggs of caterpillars and breaking them; and the
  Thessalians storks, because, as their land produced abundance of
  serpents, the storks destroyed all of them as soon as they appeared.
  Hence, also, they enacted a law, that whoever killed a stork should be
  banished. But the Egyptians honoured the asp, the weasel, and the
  beetle, in consequence of observing in them certain dark resemblances
  of the power of the Gods, like that of the sun in drops of water. For
  at present, many believe and assert that the weasel engenders by the
  ear, and brings forth by the mouth, being thus an image of the
  generation of reason [or the productive principle of things]. But the
  genus of beetles has no female; and all the males emit their sperm
  into a sphericle piece of earth, which they roll about, thrusting it
  backwards with their hind feet, while they themselves move forward;
  just as the sun appears to revolve in a direction contrary to that of
  the heavens, in consequence of moving from west to east. They also
  assimilated the asp to a star, as being exempt from old age, and
  performing its motions, unassisted by organs, with agility and ease.
  Nor was the crocodile honoured by them without a probable cause; but
  is said to have been considered by them as a resemblance of divinity,
  as being the only animal that is without a tongue. For the divine
  reason is unindigent of voice, and proceeding through a silent path,
  and accompanied with[102] justice, conducts mortal affairs according
  to it. They also say it is the only animal living in water that has
  the sight of its eyes covered with a thin and transparent film, which
  descends from his forehead, so that he sees without being seen, which
  is likewise the case with the first God. But in whatever place the
  female crocodile may lay her eggs, this may with certainty be
  concluded to be the boundary of the increase of the Nile. For not
  being able to lay their eggs in the water, and fearing to lay them far
  from it, they have such an accurate presensation of futurity, that
  though they enjoy the benefit of the river in its access, during the
  time of their laying and hatching, yet they preserve their eggs dry
  and untouched by the water. They also lay sixty eggs, are the same
  number of days in hatching them, and those that are the longest lived
  among them live just so many years, which number is the first of the
  measures employed by those who are conversant with the heavenly
  bodies.

  “Moreover, of those animals that were honoured for both reasons, we
  have before spoken of the dog. But the ibis, killing indeed all deadly
  reptiles, was the first that taught men the use of medical evacuation,
  in consequence of observing that she is after this manner washed and
  purified by herself. Those priests, also, that are most attentive to
  the laws of sacred rites, when they consecrate water for lustration,
  fetch it from that place where the ibis had been drinking; for she
  will neither drink nor come near unwholesome or infected water; but
  with the distance of her feet from each other and her bill she makes
  an equilateral triangle. Farther still, the variety and mixture of her
  black wings about the white represents the moon when she is gibbous.

  “We ought not, however, to wonder if the Egyptians love such slender
  similitudes, since the Greeks also, both in their pictures and
  statues, employ many such like resemblances of the Gods. Thus in Crete
  there was a statue of Jupiter without ears. For it is fit that he who
  is the ruler and lord of all things should hear no one.[103] Phidias
  also placed a dragon by the statue of Minerva, and a snail by that of
  Venus at Elis, to show that virgins require a guard, and that keeping
  at home and silence become married women. But the trident of Neptune
  is a symbol of the third region of the world, which the sea possesses,
  having an arrangement after the heavens and the air. Hence, also, they
  thus denominated Amphitrite and the Tritons. The Pythagoreans,
  likewise, adorned numbers and figures with the appellations of the
  Gods. For they called the equilateral triangle, Minerva Coryphagenes,
  or begotten from the summit, and Tritogeneia because it is divided by
  three perpendiculars drawn from the three angles. But they called _the
  one_ Apollo, being persuaded to this by the obvious meaning of the
  word Apollo [which signifies a privation of multitude] and by the
  simplicity of the monad[104]. The duad they denominated strife and
  audacity, and the triad justice. For since injuring and being injured
  are two extremes subsisting according to excess and defect, justice,
  through equality, has a situation in the middle. But what is called
  the tetractys, being the number 36, was, as is reported, their
  greatest oath, and was denominated the world. For this number is
  formed from the composition of the four first even and the four first
  odd numbers, collected into one sum.[105] If, therefore, the most
  approved of the philosophers did not think it proper to neglect or
  despise any occult signification of a divine nature when they
  perceived it even in things which are inanimate and incorporeal, it
  appears to me that they, in a still greater degree, venerated those
  peculiarities depending on manners which they saw in such natures as
  had sense, and were endued with soul, with passion, and ethical
  habits. We must embrace, therefore, not those who honour these things,
  but those who reverence divinity through these, as through most clear
  mirrors, and which are produced by nature, in a becoming manner,
  conceiving them to be the instruments or the art of the God by whom
  all things are perpetually adorned. But we ought to think that no
  inanimate being can be more excellent than one that is animated, nor
  an insensible than a sensitive being, not even though some one should
  collect together all the gold and emeralds in the universe. For the
  divinity is not ingenerated either in colours, or figures, or
  smoothness; but such things as neither ever did, nor are naturally
  adapted to participate of life, have an allotment more ignoble than
  that of dead bodies. But the nature which lives and sees, and has the
  principle of motion from itself, and a knowledge of things appropriate
  and foreign to its being, has certainly derived an efflux and portion
  of that wisdom which, as Heraclitus says, considers how both itself
  and the universe is governed. Hence the divinity is not worse
  represented in these animals than in the workmanships of copper and
  stone, which in a similar manner suffer corruption and decay, but are
  naturally deprived of all sense and consciousness. This then I
  consider as the best defence that can be given of the adoration of
  animals by the Egyptians.”

Footnote 102:

  Instead of και δικης, I read και μετα δικης.

Footnote 103:

  _i. e._ Should be perfectly impartial.

Footnote 104:

  Instead of διπλοτατοις μοναδος as in the original, which is nonsense,
  it is necessary to read, as in the above translation, απλοτητι της
  μοναδος.

Footnote 105:

  For 2 + 4 + 6 + 8 = 20; and 1 + 3 + 6 + 7 = 16; and 20 + 16 = 36.

Footnote 106:

  The cock was sacred to Apollo, and therefore its heart was believed to
  be the instrument of divination in sacrifices. The chemic Olympiodorus
  says, “that the cock obscurely signifies the essence of the sun and
  moon.” See, in the additional notes, what is said by Proclus
  concerning the cock, in his treatise On Magic.

Footnote 107:

  It is well observed by Ficinus, in lib. i. Eunead. ii. Plotin. “that
  the fire which is enkindled by us is more similar to the heavens than
  other terrestrial substances. Hence it participates of light, which is
  something incorporeal, is the most powerful of all things, is as it
  were vital, is perpetually moved, divides all things, without being
  itself divided, absorbs all things in itself, and avoids any foreign
  mixture: and lastly, when the fuel of it is consumed, it suddenly
  flies back again to the celestial fire, which is every where latent.”

Footnote 108:

  For this vehicle is luciform, and consists of pure, immaterial,
  unburning, and vivific fire. See the fifth book of my translation of
  Proclus on the Timæus.

Footnote 109:

  Proclus in Tim. lib. v. observes concerning the telestic art, or the
  art which operates through mystic ceremonies, “that, as the oracles
  teach, it obliterates through divine fire all the stains produced by
  generation.” Η τελεστικη δια του θειου πυρος αφανιζει τας εκ της
  γενεσεως απασας κηλιδας, ως τα λογια διδασκει. Hence another Chaldean
  oracle says, τῳ πυρι γαρ βροτος εμπελασας θεοθεν φαος εξει. _i. e._
  “The mortal who approaches to fire will have a light from divinity.”
  Hercules, as we also learn from Proclus, was an example of this
  telestic purification. For he says, Ηρακλης δια τελεστικης
  καθῃραμενος, και των αχραντων καρπων μετασχων, τελειας ετυχε εις τους
  θεους αποκαταστασεως, in Plat. Polit. p. 382. _i. e._ “Hercules being
  purified through the telestic art, and participating of undefiled
  fruits, obtained a perfect restoration to the Gods.”

Footnote 110:

  In the original, λεγω δε της θειας ψυχης τε και φυσεως, αλλ’ ουχι της
  περικοσμιου τε και γενεσιουργου. But it appears to me that we should
  here read, conformably to the above translation, λεγω δε της θειας,
  ψυχης τε και ψυσεως, αλλ’ ουχι μονου της περικοσμιου τε και
  γενεσιουργου.

Footnote 111:

  These media consist of the order of Gods denominated αρχαι, or
  _rulers_, and of those called απολυτοι, or _liberated_; the former of
  which also are denominated _supermundane_, and the latter
  _supercelestial_, in consequence of existing immediately above the
  celestial Gods. See, concerning these media, the sixth book of my
  translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

Footnote 112:

  Proclus on the First Alcibiades observes, “that about every God there
  is an innumerable multitude of dæmons, who have the same appellations
  with their leaders. And that these are delighted when they are called
  by the names of Apollo or Jupiter, because they express in themselves
  the characteristic peculiarity of their leading Gods.” In the same
  admirable commentary, also, he says, “that in the most holy of the
  mysteries [_i. e._ in the Eleusinian mysteries], prior to the
  appearance of divinity, the incursions of certain terrestrial dæmons
  present themselves to the view, alluring the souls of the spectators
  from undefiled good to matter.”

Footnote 113:

  It is beautifully observed by Simplicius on Epictetus, “that as if you
  take away letters from a sentence, or change them, the form of the
  sentence no longer remains, thus also in divine works or words, if any
  thing is deficient, or is changed, or is confused, divine illumination
  does not take place, but the indolence of him who does this dissolves
  the power of what is effected.” Ωσπερ γαρ εαν στοιχεια του λογου
  αφελῃς, ἢ υπαλλαξης, ουκ επιγινεται το του λογου ειδος, ουτω και των
  θειων εργων ἢ λογων ει ελλειπει τι, ἢ υπηλλακται, ἢ συγκεχυται, ουκ
  επιγινεται η του θειου ελλαμψις, αλλα και εξυδαροι την των γινομενων
  δυναμιν η του ποιουντος ραθυμια.

Footnote 114:

  Conformably to this, Servius, in his Annotations on the words

                          Diique, deæque omnes—

  in the sixth book of the Æneid observes, “more pontificum, per quos
  ritu veteri in omnibus sacris post speciales Deos, quos ad ipsum
  sacrum, quod fiebat necesse erat invocari, generaliter omnia numina
  invocabantur.” _i. e._ “This is spoken after the manner of the
  pontiffs, by whom, according to ancient rites, in all sacrifices,
  after the appropriate Gods whom it was necessary to invoke to the
  sacrifice, all the divinities were invoked in general.” And in his
  Annotations on the seventh of the Æneid he informs us, “that king
  Œneus offered a sacrifice of first fruits to all the divinities but
  Diana, who being enraged sent a boar [as a punishment for the
  neglect].” With respect to this anger, however, of Diana, it is
  necessary to observe with Proclus, “that the anger of the Gods does
  not refer any passion to them, but indicates our inaptitude to
  participate of them.” Ο γαρ των θεων χολος, ουκ εις εκεινας αναπεμπει
  τι παθος, αλλα την ημων δεικνυσι ανεπιτηδειοτητα της εκεινων μεθεξεως.

Footnote 115:

  Plotinus was a man of this description, to whom, most probably,
  Iamblichus alludes in what he now says.

Footnote 116:

  In the original θυμον τινος: but it is doubtless requisite to read
  with Gale, θεσμον τινος. This I have translated _a certain divine
  legislation_, because we are informed by Proclus, in Platon. Theol.
  lib. iv. p. 206, “that θεσμος is connected with deity, and pertains
  more to intelligibles; but that νομος, which unfolds intellectual
  distribution, is adapted to the intellectual fathers.” Ο γαρ θεσμος
  συμπλεκεται τῳ θεῳ, και προσηκει μαλλον τοις νοητοις ο δε νομος την
  νοεραν εμφαινων διανομην, οικειος εσι τοις νοεροις πατρασι.

Footnote 117:

  “Perhaps,” says Proclus, in MS. Comment, in Parmenid. “it is necessary
  that, as in souls, natures, and bodies, fabrication does not begin
  from the imperfect; so likewise in matter, prior to that which is
  formless, and which has an evanescent being, there is that which is in
  a certain respect form, and which is beheld in one boundary and
  permanency.” This, therefore, will be the pure and divine matter of
  which Iamblichus is now speaking. Damascius also says, that matter is
  from the same order whence form is derived.

Footnote 118:

  This particular respecting the apples of gold is added from the
  version of Scutellius, who appears to have translated this work from a
  more perfect manuscript than that which was used by Gale.

Footnote 119:

  The conjecture of Gale, that for ἢ το εν Αβυδῳ in this place, we
  should read ἢ το εν αδυτῳ, is, I have no doubt, right. For the highest
  order of intelligibles is denominated by Orpheus _the adytum_, as we
  are informed by Proclus in Tim. By the arcanum in the adytum,
  therefore, is meant the deity who subsists at the extremity of the
  intelligible order (_i. e._ Phanes); and of whom it is said in the
  Chaldean Oracles, “that he remains in the paternal profundity, and in
  the adytum, near to the god-nourished silence.”

Footnote 120:

  For εις το φαινομενον και ορφμενον σωμα, I read εις το φερομενον κ. τ.
  λ.

Footnote 121:

  Here too for Αβυδῳ I read αδυτῳ.

Footnote 122:

  Conformably to this, Martianus Capella also, in lib. ii. De Nuptiis
  Philol. &c. speaking of the sun, says, “Ibi quandam navim, totius
  naturæ cursus diversa cupiditate moderantem, cunctaque flammarum
  congestione plenissimam, et beatis circumactam mercibus conspicatur.
  Cui nautæ septem, germani tamen, suique similes præsidebant in prora.
  Præsidebat in prora felis forma depicta, leonis in arbore, crocodili
  in extimo.” For these animals, the cat, the lion, and the crocodile
  were peculiarly sacred to the sun. Martianus adds, “In eadem vero
  rate, fons quidem lucis æthereæ, arcanisque fluoribus manans, in
  totius mundi lumina fundebatur.” _i. e._ “In the same ship there was a
  fountain of etherial light flowing with arcane streams, which were
  poured into all the luminaries of the world.” Porphyry, likewise, in
  his treatise De Antro Nymph. says, “that the Egyptians placed the sun
  and all dæmons not connected with any thing solid or stable, but
  raised on a sailing vessel.”

Footnote 123:

  In the original παν ζωδιον, which Gale erroneously translates
  _animalia omnia_.

Footnote 124:

  Of this kind are the following names in Alexand. Trallian. lib. ii.
  Μευ, Θρευ, Μορ, Φορ, Τευξ, Ζα, Ζων, Θε, Λου, Χρι, Γε, Ζε, Ων, i.e.
  _Meu_, _Threu_, _Mor_, _Phor_, _Teux_, _Za_, _Zōn_, _The_, _Lou_,
  _Chri_, _Ge_, _Ze_, _Ōn_. By these names Alexander Trallianus says,
  the sun becomes fixed in the heavens. He adds, “Again behold the great
  name Ιαξ, (lege Ιαω), Αζυφ, Ζυων, Θρευξ, Βαϊν, Χωωκ, i. e. _Iaō_,
  _Azuph_, _Zuōn_, _Threux_, _Baïn_, _Chōōk_.” Among the Latins, also,
  Cato, Varro, and Marcellus de Medicamentis Empiricis, there are
  examples of these names; the power and efficacy of which, as Gale
  observes, are testified by history, though it is not easy to explain
  the reason of their operation.

Footnote 125:

  Proclus, in commenting on the following words of Plato in the Timæus,
  (see vol. i. p. 228, of my translation of his Commentary), _viz._
  “Let, therefore, this universe be denominated by us _all heaven_, or
  _the world_, or whatever other appellation it may be especially
  adapted to receive,” beautifully thus observes concerning the _divine_
  name of the world. “As of statues established by the telestic art,
  some things pertaining to them are manifest, but others are inwardly
  concealed, being symbolical of the presence of the Gods, and which are
  only known to the mystic artists themselves; after the same manner,
  the world being a statue of the intelligible, and perfected by the
  father, has indeed some things which are visible indications of its
  divinity; but others, which are the invisible impressions of the
  participation of being received by it from the father, who gave it
  perfection, in order that through these it may be eternally rooted in
  real being. _Heaven_, indeed, and _the world_ are names significant of
  the powers in the universe; the latter, so far as it proceeds from the
  intelligible; but the former, so far as it is converted to it. It is,
  however, necessary to know that _the divine name_ of its abiding
  power, and which is a symbol of the impression of the Demiurgus,
  according to which it does not proceed out of being, is ineffable and
  arcane, and known only to the Gods themselves. For there are names
  adapted to every order of things; those, indeed, that are adapted to
  divine natures being divine, to the objects of dianoia being
  dianoetic, and to the objects of opinion doxastic. This also Plato
  says in the Cratylus, where he embraces what is asserted by Homer on
  this subject, who admits that names of the same things are with the
  Gods different from those that subsist in the opinions of men,

             Xanthus by God, by men Scamander call’d
                                             ILIAD xx. v. 74.

  And,

            Which the Gods Chalcis, men Cymindis call.
                                            ILIAD xiv. v. 291.

  And in a similar manner in many other names. For as the knowledge of
  the Gods is different from that of partial souls, thus also the names
  of the one are different from those of the other; since divine names
  unfold the whole essence of the things named, but those of men only
  partially come into contact with them. Plato, therefore, knowing that
  this preexisted in the world, omits the divine and ineffable name
  itself, which is different from the apparent name, and with the
  greatest caution introduces it as a symbol of the divine impression
  which the world contains. For the words, “_or whatever other
  appellation_” and “_it may receive_” are a latent hymn of the mundane
  name, as ineffable, and as allotted a divine essence, in order that it
  may be coordinate to what is signified by it. Hence, also, divine
  mundane names are delivered by Theurgists; some of which are called by
  them ineffable, but others effable; and some being significant of the
  invisible powers in the world, but others of the visible elements from
  which it derives its completion. Through these causes, therefore, as
  hypotheses, the mundane form, the demiurgic cause and paradigm, and
  the apparent and unapparent name of the world are delivered. And the
  former name, indeed, is dyadic, but the latter monadic. For the words
  “_whatever other_” are significant of oneness. You may also consider
  _the ineffable_ name of the universe as significant of its abiding in
  the father; but the name _world_, as indicative of its progression;
  and _heaven_ of its conversion. But through the three, you have the
  final cause, on account of which it is full of good; abiding
  ineffably, proceeding perfectly, and converting itself to _the good_
  as the antecedent object of desire.”

Footnote 126:

  See the additional notes at the end of vol. v. of my translation of
  Plato, where many of these names are beautifully unfolded from the MS.
  Scholia of Proclus on the Cratylus.

Footnote 127:

  See the additional notes at the end of vol. v. of my translation of
  Plato, and also the notes to my translation of Aristotle de
  Interpretatione, in which the reader will find a treasury of recondite
  information concerning names, from Proclus and Ammonius.

Footnote 128:

  Most historians give the palm of antiquity to the Egyptians. And
  Lucian, in lib. De Syria Dea, says, “that the Egyptians are said to be
  the first among men that had a conception of the Gods, and a knowledge
  of sacred concerns.——They were also the first that had a knowledge of
  sacred names.” Αιγυπτιοι πρωτοι ανθρωπων λεγονται θεων τε εννοιην
  λαβειν και ιρα εισασθαι——πρωτοι δε και ονοματα ιρα εγνωσαν.
  Conformably to this, also, an oracle of Apollo, quoted by Eusebius,
  says that the Egyptians were the first that disclosed by infinite
  actions the path that leads to the Gods. This oracle is as follows:

       Αιπεινη γαρ οδος, μακαρων, τρηχειατε πολλον,
       Χαλκοδετοις τα πρωτα διοιγομενη πυλεωσιν.
       Ατραπιτοι δε εασσιν αθεσφατοι εγγεγαυιαι
       Ας πρωτοι μεροπων επ’ απειρονα πρηξιν εφηναν,
       Οι το καλον πινοντες υδωρ Νειλωτιδος αιης·
       Πολλας και Φοινικες οδους μακαρων εδαησαν,
       Ασσυριοι, Λυδοιτε, και Εβραιων (lege Χαλδαιων) γενος ανδρων.

           _i.e._ “The path by which to deity we climb,
           Is arduous, rough, ineffable, sublime;
           And the strong massy gates, through which we pass
           In our first course, are bound with chains of brass.
           Those men the first who of Egyptian birth
           Drank the fair water of Nilotic earth,
           Disclosed by actions infinite this road,
           And many paths to God Phœnicians show’d.
           This road th’ Assyrians pointed out to view,
           And this the Lydians and Chaldeans knew.”

  For Εβραιων in this oracle I read Χαλδαιων, because I have no doubt
  that either Aristobulus the Jew, well known for interpolating the
  writings of the Heathens, or _the wicked Eusebius_ as he is called by
  the Emperor Julian, have fraudulently substituted the former word for
  the latter.

Footnote 129:

  Prayers of this kind are such as those of which Proclus speaks in Tim.
  p. 65, when he says, “The _cathartic_ prayer is that which is offered
  for the purpose of averting diseases originating from pestilence, and
  other contagious distempers, _such as we have written in our
  temples_.” Καθαρτικαι δε (ευχαἰ, επι αποτροπαις λοιμικων νοσημοτων, ἢ
  παντοιων μολυσμων’ οιας δε και εν τοις ιεροις εχομεν αναγεγραμμενας.

Footnote 130:

  Porphyry, in lib. ii. De Abstinentia, mentions Seleucus the
  theologist, and Suidas says that Seleucus the Alexandrian wrote 100
  books _concerning the Gods_.

Footnote 131:

  These books (βιβλοι) were most probably nothing more than short
  discourses, such as the treatises now are which are circulated as
  written by Hermes, and which, as Iamblichus informs us, contain
  Hermaic doctrines.

Footnote 132:

  A great priest, a scribe of the Adyta in Egypt, by birth a Sebanite,
  and an inhabitant of Heliopolis, as he relates of himself.

Footnote 133:

  In the original, πρωτος και του πρωτου θεου και βασιλεως, which Gale
  translates, prior etiam primo Deo, et rege [sole]. But the addition of
  _sole_ in his translation is obviously most unappropriate and false:
  for Iamblichus is evidently speaking of a deity much superior to the
  sun.

Footnote 134:

  For Ημηφ here, Gale conjectures that we should read Κνηφ _Kneph_: for
  Plutarch says that the unbegotten _Kneph_ was celebrated with an
  extraordinary degree of veneration by the Egyptian Thebans.

Footnote 135:

  Hence the moon is said by Proclus to be αυτοπτον της φυσεως αγαλμα,
  the self-visible statue or image of nature.

Footnote 136:

  Proclus in Tim. p. 117, cites what is here said as the doctrine of the
  Egyptians, and also cites for it the authority of Iamblichus. But his
  words are, και μην και η των Αιγυπτιων παραδοσις τα αυτα περι αυτης
  (της υλης) φησιν. ο γε τοι θειος Ιαμβλιχος ιστορησεν οτι και Ερμης εκ
  της ουσιοτητος την υλοτητα παραγεσθαι βουλεται., _i. e._ “Moreover the
  doctrine of the Egyptians asserts the same things concerning matter.
  For the divine Iamblichus relates that Hermes also produces matter
  from essentiality.”

Footnote 137:

  This is most probably the Chæremon who is said by Porphyry, in lib.
  iv. De Abstinentia, “to be a lover of truth, an accurate writer, and
  very conversant with the Stoic philosophy.” Τοιαυτα μεν τα κατ’
  Αιγυπτιους υπ’ ανδρος φιλαληθους τε και ακριβους, εντε τοις Στωϊκοις
  πραγματικωτατα φιλοσοφησαντος μεμαρτυρημενα.

Footnote 138:

  This was the ninth king in the twenty-sixth dynasty of the Saitan
  kings.

Footnote 139:

  This city is mentioned by Plato in the Timæus, who represents Critias
  as saying “that there is a certain region of Egypt, called Delta,
  about the summit of which the streams of the Nile are divided, and in
  which there is a province called Saitical.” He adds, “of this province
  the greatest city is Saïs, from which also King Amasis derived his
  origin. The city has a presiding divinity, whose name is, in the
  Egyptian tongue, Neith, but in the Greek Athena, or Minerva.” It is
  singular that Gale, who is not deficient in philology, though but a
  smatterer in philosophy, should have omitted to remark in his notes
  this passage of Plato.

Footnote 140:

  Proclus, in MS. Comment, in Alcibiad. cites one of the Chaldean
  oracles, which says,

                   ——πορθμιον ουνομα το δ’ εν απειροις
                   Κοσμοις ενθρωσκον.

  _i. e._ “There is a transmitting name which leaps into the infinite
  worlds.” And in his MS. Scholia in Cratyl. he quotes another of these
  oracles, _viz._

              Αλλα εστιν ουνομα σεμνον ακοιμητῳ στροφαλιγγι,
              Κοσμοις ενθρωσκον, κραιπνην δια πατρος ενιπην.

  _i. e._ “There is a venerable name with a sleepless revolution,
  leaping into the worlds through the rapid reproofs of the father.”

Footnote 141:

  For εχεται in this place, I read περιεχεται.

Footnote 142:

  Gale, in his translation of this part, has entirely mistaken the
  meaning of Iamblichus, which he frequently does in other places. For
  the words of Iamblichus are, οταν γαρ δη τα βελτιονα των εν ημιν
  ενεργῃ, και προς τα κρειττονα αναγεται αυτης η ψυχη; and the version
  of Gale is “quando enim pars nostri melior operari incipiat, et ad sui
  portionem meliorem recolligatur anima.” For τα κρειττονα is not the
  better part of the soul; but when the better parts of the soul
  energize, the soul is then intimately converted to itself, and through
  this conversion is elevated to superior natures.

Footnote 143:

  _Viz._ The science of calculating nativities.

Footnote 144:

  _i. e._ The joint risings and settings.

Footnote 145:

  _i. e._ Through a period of 300,000 years; and Procl. in Tim. lib. iv.
  p. 277, informs us that the Chaldeans had observations of the stars
  which embraced whole mundane periods. What Proclus likewise asserts of
  the Chaldeans is confirmed by Cicero in his first book on Divination,
  who says that they had records of the stars for the space of 370,000
  years; and by Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. lib. xi. p. 118, who says that
  their observations comprehended the space of 473,000 years.

Footnote 146:

  “We say,” says Hephestion, “that a star is the lord of the geniture,
  which has five conditions of the lord of the nativity in the
  horoscope; _viz._ if that star receives the luminaries in their proper
  boundaries, in their proper house, in their proper altitude, and in
  the proper triangle.” He also adds, “and if besides it has contact,
  effluxion, and configuration.” See likewise Porphyry in Ptolemæum, p.
  191.

Footnote 147:

  According to the Egyptians every one received his proper dæmon at the
  hour of his birth; nor did they ascend any higher, in order to obtain
  a knowledge of it. For they alone considered the horoscope. See
  Porphyry apud Stobæum, p. 201, and Hermes in Revolut. cap. iv.

Footnote 148:

  In the original ενταυθα δε ουν και η της αληθειας παρεστι θεα, και η
  της νοερας επιστημης. But instead of η της νοερας απιστημης, which
  appears to me to be defective, I read η κτησις της νοερας επιστημης.

Footnote 149:

  For θεωτος here, I read θεωτερος.

Footnote 150:

  In the original, by a strange mistake, των θνητων is inserted here
  instead of των νοητων, which is obviously the true reading. The
  version of Gale also has _intelligibilium_.

Footnote 151:

  _i. e._ Man, considered as a rational soul, connected with the
  irrational life; for this man has dominion in the realms of
  generation.

Footnote 152:

  See the second edition of this work in Nos. XV. and XVI. of the
  Pamphleteer.

Footnote 153:

  _i. e._ Of natures which are not connected with body.

Footnote 154:

  For in these, all are in each, but not all in all.

Footnote 155:

  By an unaccountable mistake here του σωματος is inserted instead of
  της ψυχης; but the mistake is not noticed by the German editor of
  these Scholia.

Footnote 156:

  And in consequence of this mistake, for αυτο in this place, we must
  read αυτα.

Footnote 157:

  Odyss. xi. 612.

Footnote 158:

  Iliad xv. 605.

Footnote 159:

  For μουσικης here, it is necessary to read μαντικης.

Footnote 160:

  And for μαντικην read μαντικη.

Footnote 161:

  For υπο here, it is necessary to read υπερ.

Footnote 162:

  The German editor of these Scholia, instead of πρακτικῃ which is the
  true reading in this place, and which he found in the manuscript,
  absurdly substitutes for it πυκτικῃ, as if Hercules was a pugilist.
  See my translation of the Dissertation at Maximus Tyrius, on the
  Practic and Theoretic Life.

Footnote 163:

  Vid. Olympiodor. in Aristot. Meteor.

------------------------------------------------------------------------


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                          TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES


 1. Silently corrected obvious typographical errors and variations in
      spelling.
 2. Retained archaic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings as printed.
 3. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.
 4. Enclosed bold or blackletter font in =equals=.